In the Company of Generals: The World War I Diary of Pierpont L. Stackpole

Copyright ©2009 by The Curators of the University of Missouri University of Missouri Press, Columbia, Missouri 65201 Printed and bound in the United States of America All rights reserved 5 4 3 2 1 13 12 11 10 09

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Stackpole, Pierpont L. (Pierpont Langley), 1875-1936. In the company of generals : the World War I diary of Pierpont L. Stackpole / edited with an introduction by Robert H. Ferrell. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. Summary: “Stackpole’s diary provides an insider’s view into the command decisions of Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett, who took charge of the U.S. First Army in mid-October 1918 and reorganized it in preparation for its breakthrough of the German lines at the Meuse-Argonne in November”— Provided by publisher. ISBN 978-0-8262-1870-4 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Liggett, Hunter, 1857-1935—Military leadership. 2. Stackpole, Pierpont L. (Pierpont Langley), 1875-1936—Diaries. 3. United States. Army—Officers— Diaries. 4. Generals—United States—History—20th century. 5. Command of troops—History—20th century. 6. United States. Army—Organization— History—20th century. 7. United States. Army—History—World War, 19141918. 8. United States. Army. Army, 1st—History—20th century. 9. United States. Army. American Expeditionary Forces—History. 10. Argonne, Battle of the, France, 1918. I. Ferrell, Robert H. II. Title. E745.L54S73 2009 940.4’36—dc22 2009028219

This paper meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, Z39.48, 1984. Design and composition: Jennifer Cropp Printer and binder: Thomson-Shore, Inc. Typefaces: Garamond, Minion, and Worcester Frontispiece: Pierpont L. Stackpole

For Beverly Jarrett, who gave twenty years of her life to the State of Missouri and to the state of scholarship

/

Contents

Maps and Photographs

vii

Acknowledgments

ix

Introduction

1

1. Beginnings

7

2. Preparation

26

3. Crisis—for the Anglo-French

39

4. Giving Advice

53

5. To Soissons

84

6. Aisne-Marne I

103

7. Aisne-Marne II

113

8. St. Mihiel

129

9. Attack in the Meuse-Argonne

140

10. Second Attack

155

11. Third Attack

166

12. Fourth—and Victory

180

Epilogue

193

Bibliography

195

Index

203

Maps and Photographs

All the maps are from American Armies and Battlefields in Europe (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938), the army’s official guide published under the supervision of General Pershing; it was reprinted by the army’s Center of Military History in 1995. Several maps contain signs for stops and arrows for routes, referring readers to portions of the guide’s text. Diagrammatic Sketch of Western Front Showing Topographical Features of Military Importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Strategical Features Influencing Selection of the Lorraine Front for the American Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Ground Gained by German Offensives of March and April, 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Ground Gained by German Offensives of May, June, and July, 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 French-American Counteroffensive, July 18, 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Described Route and Additional Places of Interest in Aisne-Marne Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 Plan of Attack of First Army, September 12, 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 Ground Gained by First Army, September 26– October 3, 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Plan of Attack of First Army, October 4, 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Plan of Attack of First Army, October 14, 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167

ix

˘

Maps and Photographs

Ground Gained by First Army, November 1–11, 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 All the photos in the photo section on pages 66–83 are from the 111-Signal Corps. The photograph of Pierpont L. Stackpole that appears in the frontispiece is from the George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, Virginia.

Acknowledgments

Edward M. Coffman understands the U.S. Army better than anyone else, and I owe much to his kind instruction. My thanks to J. Garry Clifford, who is an ingenious discoverer of information. Jeffrey C. Graf and Louise Malcomb, research archivists at Indiana University, again were helpful in so many ways. Thanks also to the readers of this manuscript, James J. Cooke and John Milton Cooper. I benefited from the wise assistance of scholars who supervise archives: Richard J. Sommers at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, part of the Army War College in Carâ•‚ lisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and Mitchell A. Yockelson and Timothy D. Nenninger of the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. Also my thanks to John Slonaker, now retired from the Military History Institute, who understands all the collections there. Some years ago the late Larry I. Bland of the George C. Marshall Foundation at Virginia Military Institute and I were going to edit the Stackpole diary together, but our joint project never moved forward because of Larry’s inveterate desire to work too hard. At the University of Missouri Press, I am indebted to the now director emerita, Beverly Jarrett, who understands better than anyone else I know the close connection between scholarship and publishing—she has been responsible for literally hundreds of books. And to the present staff: Sara Davis, John Brenner, and Dwight Browne, for (respectively) editorial, again editorial, and production. Julianna M. Schroeder usually edits books on botany these days but took a flyer on this military manuscript. For her painstaking and thoughtful work I do thank her. Betty J. Bradbury did the word processing. Carolyn, Lorin, Amanda, and Samantha contributed in more ways than they know.

xi

Introduction

The author of the diary that follows, a Boston lawyer by name of Pierpont L. Stackpole, who was commissioned a major and promoted to lieutenant colonel during American participation in World War I, 1917–1918, was, properly speaking, an aide to the generals of the American Expeditionary Forces, the AEF, during that great conflict. He accomplished this task by officially serving as the aide to Major General (later lieutenant general) Hunter Liggett, who became the first AEF corps commander in January 1918. Liggett told the generals how to fight. Stackpole was privy to his conversations; he was present, or he heard about them from Liggett afterward. Often he himself passed the information to the generals. Building an army is a difficult proposition, and in World War I this was especially so. The officers of the Regular Army, Liggett included, had never commanded so many troops before; their seniors of the Civil War, none of whom was in the army when the nation went to war in 1917, had seen large forces, but all of the leading American officers in World War I had commanded, at most, two or three thousand men. The senior officers of the Regular Army, who became colonels and generals in 1917–1918, had to start at the beginning. It was the same case, for the most elementary responsibilities, for the junior officers—company grade officers, captains, and lieutenants—who had training of no more than three months, after which they became, according to the men, “ninety-day wonders.” Training was the need of the volunteers and drafted troops in 1917– 1918, and, considering the small, thin base on which the wartime army was organized, it understandably was not well done. Within the United States the officers and men gathered in cantonments in the autumn of 1917. Meanwhile a small force went to France, which by the beginning of 



In the Company of Generals

1918 comprised four divisions. Early in 1918 the cantonment divisions began to come over, brought across with assistance of British shipping. But training remained inadequate, for two reasons. In the cantonment camps the men had no heavy weapons, for American industry proved unable to produce them. Then training was in the main wrongheaded because in November 1917 the skilled German army, its leaders impatient with the stalemated trench front in France, decided to institute a series of spring and summer offensives, a much more mobile war of movement in which troops moved forward through enemy lines into back areas and created havoc, all the while protected by artillery. Defensive tactics according to the new German procedures would be through machine guns and artillery, the former protected by trenches and cement pillboxes. Allied intelligence was poor and did not learn of the new tactics scheduled for 1918, nor did leaders of the American army have the slightest idea they would have to confront them, that trench warfare as it had been known would become obsolete. Over the winter of 1917–1918, the commander in chief of the AEF, General John J. Pershing, organized his troops, and cantonment divisions came over throughout the spring and summer, after which they had to be gotten up and placed in the American portion of the line, in Lorraine. On the line from the Channel to Switzerland, at the top was the small Belgian army, then the British Expeditionary Force, then the French, and last the Americans. In a general way, as one looked at the growth of the American army in the months beginning in January 1918, everything seemed orderly, but under the surface it was far from that. The great need was to turn the troops into a fighting force. Here the trainer was Liggett. Liggett’s many tasks were subtle in the extreme, for at first, and this situation lasted into the summer, his control over troops was no more than suggestive—when troops went into the line, they were under French command, until the institution of the principal unit of command, the First Army, in August, and the opening of the first major American battle, St. Mihiel, the next month, September 12–16. After that came the sudden and huge responsibility of command in the principal American battle of World War I, the Meuse-Argonne, that opened September 26, 1918, and continued for forty-seven days until the armistice of November 11. That battle was the deadliest in all of American history, down to the present writing, with losses of twenty-six thousand men killed

Introduction



and nearly a hundred thousand wounded. The next deadliest battle for American forces was Okinawa in 1945, where the dead numbered fourteen thousand, almost half of them caused by kamikaze attacks on ships supporting the troops. In World War I, General Liggett commanded the First Army beginning in mid-October 1918. When he took command, the First Army was in trouble, for under Pershing, who was managing both AEF general headquarters and the field army, the army had made three attacks, September 26, October 4, October 14, and failed in all of them. Liggett stopped the hammering and in the following two weeks brought up supplies and made careful placement of divisions in the line. With the troops at last organized, he sent them forward in machinelike order on November 1–2 and, accompanied on the remainder of the western front by the British and French, the three major forces broke the German line. From the American side the above great scene was the turning point in the history of the twentieth century, for such was victory against the German army in 1918 (influencing that century’s tragic sequels, of German rearmament, World War II, the cold war, and years later the appearance of terrorism). Hunter Liggett had served many years in the Regular Army. Born in Reading, Pennsylvania, in 1857, he entered West Point in 1875, graduating in 1879. Receiving the usual second lieutenancy, he went to the American West, Fort Keogh, Montana, and spent the next eighteen years mostly in western posts, with the usual encounters, lessening by this time, with the Indians. He reached the grade of captain in 1897, and thereafter his career took the usual turn for Regulars, in that he served in Cuba in 1898 and then in the Philippine insurrection. In 1909 he became a lieutenant colonel, and three years later colonel. He became president of the War College in Washington, a largely honorific post because the college, imposed upon the army by the lawyer Elihu Root as part of his reforms after the administrative confusions of the SpanishAmerican War, never became a teaching institution, simply a domicile for officers working in the War Department. After this passage of years, Liggett reached the rank of brigadier general and then, March 16, 1917, the eve of American entrance into the European war, major general. Liggett by this time was an unlikely candidate for command in France. He had become fat to the point of obesity, and despite commanding one of the newly formed divisions in the



In the Company of Generals

United States, he seemed slated for remaining in the United States and eventual retirement. But General Pershing knew Liggett’s enormous common sense and quick mentality and in January 1918 gave him command of the initial American army corps. From then on Liggett waited with careful patience, through months of uncertain or no authority, until in mid-October the command prize of the AEF, the First Army, the bulk of the American army in France, came to him. The generals to whom Liggett spoke, and sometimes Stackpole, were a varied group, although they tended to appear alike, what with their Sam Browne belts (required in the AEF by General Pershing). Some had more authority than others. They are best described by Stackpole the diarist as Liggett or Stackpole encountered them. Suffice it to say that Liggett met them as the numbers of corps expanded, notably the corps commanders in the First Army, numbered (in addition to I Corps) V and III Corps. The division commanders were next in importance, and this meant the four original divisions and then those that commenced coming over when transport became available. The GHQ generals appeared, Stackpole believed, to partake of General Liggett’s special mess where, because of Liggett’s rank, the food was well above average. Pershing himself often—too often, Stackpole sensed—was present. Visiting generals from the United States cluttered the I Corps commander’s table, more so when he became commander of the First Army. The diary constitutes a sort of stereopticon (to cite a favorite photographic device of the time) view of the AEF. The life of Pierpont Langley Stackpole, prior to his assignment as aide to General Liggett, was an orderly existence in and around Boston. Born in Brookline in 1875, he graduated from Harvard in 1897 and from Harvard Law School in 1900. He was in practice of law in the city when war began in 1917. He applied for admission to the citizens’ training camp near Plattsburgh, New York, and upon graduation on August 15 was commissioned in the field artillery, with orders to proceed forthwith to France. After some weeks at the artillery school in Saumur and a month or so as an artillery information officer at the headquarters of the Air Service in the AEF’s general headquarters in Chaumont, he was detailed as aide to General Liggett. A few words about the editing of the diary. Sections of the original diary are clearly not worth publication, for they deal with strictly transient arrangements of divisions. Sometimes the lists of divisions are

Introduction



travelogues, about where divisions went and how they went. Other lists pertain to people who passed through I Corps or, eventually, First Army headquarters. All this was worth recording at the time in what sometimes was describable as a headquarters diary—many large units kept them. To print this kind of thing would be of no value to a presentday reader. The editor has omitted considerable sections of the diary of this sort, without use of ellipses. In one respect the present editor was much surprised at the diary’s aridity, for some years ago when he first read the Stackpole diary he looked forward very much to reading the post-armistice section. Here, he thought, the diarist would feel ready to make commentaries that during wartime he, Stackpole, and Liggett himself, would have hesitated to record. Too, it seemed likely that Liggett, of the principal figures of the AEF, would see wartime matters in retrospect. After the armistice, time would be available to look back and come to conclusions. Instead, it is curious to say, the diary portion that begins with November 12, 1918, and runs steadily into the new year, down to the summer of 1919 when the AEF’s Third Army, as the Army of Occupation of Germany was described, reduced itself to a few thousand men, contains utterly nothing of interest. The opposite of frankness, or of interest in summing up or concluding, the diary’s value simply disappeared. It is possible to see what happened to commands as divisions gradually went home, their unit commanders with them. The armies—the First and Second as well as the Third—disappeared, and the corps commands could not continue without the units and themselves shrank into insignificance. Pershing himself, and Liggett too, went back to the home country, duly feted, the commander in chief of the AEF far more than the tactical commander who gave the AEF its glorious victory. The better course with the post-armistice portion of the diary was to omit all of it, although with a sense of regret that the galaxy of generals that once surrounded the First Army commander, Pershing and, in its time of success, Liggett—all these important people—went home without comment, and the war began to disappear into history.

1 Beginnings

In the dark winter of 1917–1918, the AEF did not amount to much. During previous months, from the time early in May when Pershing and a small contingent of officers came from the United States, only three divisions—the First, Twenty-sixth, and Forty-second—followed. A fourth, the Second, was put together from miscellaneous units that had come over. All these divisions were organized in accord with a table of organization that Pershing hoped would make them self-sufficient when brought into the line—they would possess their own replacements, being so large that even with losses, dead and wounded, they could keep going. Audaciously he arranged battalions of one thousand men, three battalions in a regiment of four thousand, two regiments in an infantry brigade of eight thousand men, two infantry brigades in a division of twenty-eight thousand including a smaller brigade of artillery troops, an engineer regiment, three machine-gun battalions, trains (ammunition wagons or trucks), and medical troops. With other supply troops a division required forty thousand men. The rub of the matter, however, was that by early 1918 there were only four divisions. It was possible to multiply by two to obtain the number of equivalent British and French and German divisions. Also, the size was impressive; the training was not—they were green divisions, barely accustomed to their weapons and how to use them, and without an understanding of how to take machine guns and protect themselves against enemy artillery. Worst of all, they had no training in open warfare, which the German army was about to initiate. The German army had a clear superiority of divisions on the western front and did not take full advantage of the Russian defeat on the eastern front in 1917 and signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in February 1918. It could have transferred dozens of divisions east to west, but the German commander Ludendorff did not believe his army needed them. Some were of little value, such as cavalry divisions; others were second-rate troops for 





10

In the Company of Generals

other reasons. But the Allies themselves had so weakened their own forces in 1917, in two failed offensives, that the German army had a clear superiority without the troops in Russia. The French army had bled itself white in the so-called Nivelle offensive of March 1917, in which the general in command, Robert Nivelle, foolishly opened the offensive without preparing his troops. Losses in the French army were a hundred thousand, and many divisions mutinied, putting the French army on the defensive until late that year when the new French commander, General Henri Pétain, ventured two small offensive attacks. In support of the weakened French, the commander of the British troops in France, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, undertook a series of senseless attacks against German troops that took the name of a Belgian village, Passchendaele, and these ran on from June until November 1917, at a cost of four hundred thousand casualties. Pershing and his generals, not to mention the administration of President Woodrow Wilson in faraway Washington, knew only that trouble was looming. The immediate issue was whether the Americans could get troops—two dozen and more divisions had formed and loosely trained in the cantonments in the United States, huge tent camps in the South, barrack camps in the North—overseas in time to make a difference. A reader of the initial pages of the diary of the then-major Pierpont L. Stackpole, who began assisting Major General Liggett on January 25, 1918, might think that at this crucial time on the western front, just before the first massive German attack on March 21, 1918, the general was engaged in a series of small observations interspersed with luncheons and dinners. The latter were omnipresent, perhaps too much so. But behind them was the shrewd mind of Liggett as he looked over the green troops and their equally green commanders, from division generals on down, and sought how to shape them up in whatever weeks or months—he trusted the latter was the case—remained before they could enter the front line against Europe’s besttrained divisions, which were the German army. Without further ado the diary follows.

Friday, January 25, 1918 Reported to General Liggett at Neufchâteau, headquarters of the I Army Corps, at 5:30 p.m. Until 7:00 p.m. in conference with General Liggett, Colonel Craig, General Cole, an aide, and General Bundy.

Beginnings

11

Dinner: General Liggett, Craig, Heintzelman. 8:30 to 12:00 in the evening in meeting with General Liggett, Craig, General Edwards, and aide. General Edwards talks about French training, also machine guns and ammunition. In this initial entry the individuals were to take on importance as the AEF turned into a real fighting force in the months that followed. Malin Craig, soon a brigadier, would be chief of staff to Liggett, who himself would command the I Corps in the battles of St. Mihiel and the Meuse- Argonne. Charles H. Cole, brigade commander of the Twenty-sixth Division, would fail as a commander, and in October after much hesitation Pershing would relieve him in the style to which the commander in chief was accustomed, which was to say he sent Cole back to the United States to train troops. Major General Omar N. Bundy was a superannuated fuddyâ•‚ duddy who for a while nominally commanded the Second Division and then was dispatched to a corps command that contained no troops and was supposed to threaten the Germans in the French departments near the Swiss border—after which Bundy, too, could be sent back to the home country. Stuart Heintzelman, grandson and son of generals, would be chief of staff of the Second Army when it formed in mid-October 1918. Major General Clarence R. Edwards, who spoke about training, was perhaps the most difficult person to get out of France that the AEF high command would encounter. A paunchy, furrow-browed ignoramus who supervised his division with a laxity that turned all high staff officers at Pershing’s general headquarters at Chaumont against him, but a sly fellow who had a large following in the Twenty-sixth (New England) Division, a group of National Guardsmen, and who had been chief of the bureau of insular affairs in Washington before the war, he proved exceedingly difficult to remove. Eventually, with Cole, he went back to train troops but fortunately did not train any after arrival, for the armistice by that time intervened.

Saturday, January 26 Procured divisional maps from the Twenty-sixth Division headquarters. Delivered message to Heintzelman from General Liggett about seeing Major Blue (French Zone major) concerning commissary exclusion order applying to French, also removal of troops from neighboring villages.

12

In the Company of Generals

Lieutenant Colonel P. Brown called in the morning. At 12:00 noon met General Cole and staff and attended sham trench engagement on Pompiera Road; Generals Kennedy, Kuhn, Hale, and Edwards were present. Witnessed exhibition of bayonet drill and a demonstration of the O’Brien formation for firing lines in infantry attacks. Nothing was very impressively done. Arranged for chauffeur for expedition to the front tomorrow. Dined with Captain Maraden (of Forestry Service), General Liggett, Craig, Heintzelman, and Captain Malleck (French). In the shaking out of high command that followed, down to and including the battles of St. Mihiel (September 12–16, 1918) and the Meuse- Argonne (September 26–November 11), Lieutenant Colonel Brown, engaging and quick-witted, would rise to major general and command the Fourth Division. Major General Joseph E. Kuhn did poorly with the Seventy-ninth Division, holding up the entire nine-division attack in the Meuse-Argonne’s first day, but on the second day his troops managed to take the eminence in their sector known as Montfaucon. He had been president of the War College in Washington and before that an observer with the German army during the period of American neutrality, 1914–1917. His brushes, presumably, with experience and with theory did not seem to mesh with the requirements of command and keeping a big twenty-eight-thousand-man division in motion. Kuhn kept his command until the end of the war, but the Seventy-ninth saw little action after its first unpromising days in the Meuse-Argonne. A point of interest in the above diary entry by Major Stackpole is mention of bayonet practice. It was a sign of the greenness of American divisions, not to mention their theoretical training. For months after the cantonment divisions went into camp in the United States in September 1917, and the four divisions in France trained over the winter of 1917– 1918, the men simulated bayonet attacks, learning the parries and how to push their long rifle-attached weapons into dummies suspended on poles. But the fighting in 1918 almost never involved bayonets. Many officers who had been immersed in the fighting at the front vowed that they never saw, and of course never inflicted, a bayonet wound. It was the stuff of Allied, and especially American, propaganda pictures, which always showed a doughboy bayoneting a protesting albeit helpless German.

Beginnings

13

Sunday, January 27 Simpkins, aide to General Edwards, arranged by telephone that a car should call for General Liggett at eleven, and take us to the machine-gun range, where General Edwards was to join us by one o’clock at the latest, and send General Liggett back in his car. Simpkins said General Edwards would like to have General Liggett first attend a conference of the Twentysixth Division officers at ten o’clock, but General Liggett declined. The plan proposed by General Edwards at his Friday night visit had been to call for us at 9:00 a.m. and take us direct to the machine-gun show. We were sent with the chauffeur, who had no exact knowledge of the location, which we found about three kilometers east of Prez-sousLafauche, and arrived shortly before 11:15, when about fifteen hundred men were standing about, waiting for orders and lunch. One hundred and sixty-eight machine guns were on the line, pointing (two at each) at eighty-four targets about five hundred meters distant, the guns being about three yards apart. The major of ordnance was the only officer who appeared to have much authority and was in a position to welcome the general. The men had lunch while we strolled about and at 1:00 p.m. took their places for firing. Two periods of firing took place, of about fifteen minutes each, the firing during the first period being much too fast, though apparently no attempt was made by officers to correct this until at the close of the period, after the major pointed out the expenditure of ammunition in amount almost double to that allowed. However, the percentage of hits for the two periods was about 60. General Edwards drove up with Simpkins, A.D.C., at 2:30, one and one-half hours late. He offered the visits of General Kuhn and others and pressing telegrams as his excuse. General Liggett quietly said those things would happen and that he would like to go home at once, which we did. Simpkins appeared anxious to apologize and said everything had gone wrong, and “C’est la guerre.” In the afternoon I called on Mrs. Martin and presented the general’s compliments and regrets at not being able to come himself. Colonel Brown, from the United States, was with the general and Colonel Craig privately. In the evening General Liggett, Captain Ord, Colonels Craig and Heintzelman, and I dined at the Lafayette Club. I detailed to Colonel

14

In the Company of Generals

Craig the experiences of the day, including General Liggett’s remarks about General Edwards being always late, his fondness for wine— pudding, good dinners, etc., and the bad management in wasting the time of fifteen hundred men at a futile show.

Nothing if not shrewd, Stackpole—and through Liggett’s disgust quietly communicated—showed what a time-waster the Twenty-sixth’s commanding general was. By talking far more than he needed, Edwards wasted the time of headquarters officers. Failing to plan demonstrations, he wasted the time of the men involved. Not doing what General Liggett, his superior, asked, on innumerable occasions, he wasted the time of his entire division.

Monday, January 28 I start the mess. At a little after nine I called upon Simpkins to ascertain arrangements for going to a demonstration of the O’Brien method of deployment, which General Edwards had asked General Liggett to witness at ten this day. Simpkins knew nothing about it, but General Edwards, overhearing, said, “Good God, I forgot all about that.” He found by telephoning that no arrangements had been made, and suggested 3:00 p.m. to which I assented, but as no one knew where it would take place I agreed to go to Major Bright, adjutant, at Remberville, at 3:00 and go where he said. At 2:30 Simpkins told our chauffeur that we had better meet them at the trenches, without definitely saying what trenches. At 3:30 we arrived at New Haven trenches and found Simpkins in charge and the show ready, and had a good demonstration under charge of O’Brien, first lieutenant. In fifteen minutes we came away, the general having said to Simpkins that he would call on General Edwards at 5:00, and changing to 5:30 when Simpkins said that General Ragenau was to be there at 5:00. Upon returning I reported all this to Colonel Craig. At 5:00 I delivered a note to Simpkins for General Edwards, asking him to call on General Liggett at 6:30, having already told Ragenau’s A.D.C. that General Liggett would see him between 5:30 and 6:30, which were the hours he named. Simpkins said General Edwards had a dinner at 7:30

Beginnings

15

and Ragenau at 5:00, and asked if he should bring his chief of staff; I told him that General Edwards might do as he liked about this. Ragenau, Lemaitre, and another arrived at 6:25. At 6:30 Colonel Craig called up Simpkins to find out where General Edwards was and said to Simpkins that excuses would not be accepted. General Edwards and chief of staff appeared in five minutes, General Edwards saying his time was just 6:30. Ragenau left at about 7:05; Edwards at about 7:30. We went to Bourmont, Second Division headquarters, in the morning at 11:00; General Bundy was away; saw Colonel Tebbetts, who explained provost marshal business to Captain Ord. Stayed fifteen minutes. Colonel Reno gave me a physical examination for promotion and certificate of eligibility. Captain McDonald’s men take hold of the mess, which starts with General Liggett, Colonels Craig, Heintzelman, Winship, Cheatham, and myself; arranged with Levering Hill to send me gas masks, intelligence reports, and daily papers by courier.

While the German high command was furiously busy preparing for the new offensives the Americans—principally the errant Edwards—were concerning themselves with social amenities.

Tuesday, January 29 At 10:00 a.m. we left for Gondrecourt with General Liggett. At Gondrecourt, which is headquarters of the First Division, was General Bullard, commander of the First Division, and Colonel Upton, of the Gondrecourt schools (I Corps). General Bullard described the trenches taken over by the AEF from the French as not too bad, and explained their inferiority in condition to the British trenches by thinness of the French lines, in contrast with the British; he explained that the Germans (Seventy-eighth Bavarians opposite the Americans) were on a ridge about one hundred feet above the positions occupied by the French and Americans and if they chose could knock up the Allied positions, although they could not successfully break them up by attack. The front trenches were difficult to hold against an attack, but no change has yet been made in General Monroe’s

16

In the Company of Generals

orders that they should be held at all costs. The logical defensive position for the Allies is in the rear trenches, now under construction, but fifteen hundred men working for two to three months are necessary to finish the work. The Americans have about 30 percent more men to a trench unit in their positions than the French. General Liggett advised General Bullard that while it was none of his business he thought Bullard should recommend that two battalions be drawn back to the rear position; Bullard acquiesced in this view and questioned the wisdom of the order of General Monroe and his superiors. General Bullard expressed no dissatisfaction with the French, but recommended strongly that before any division goes in preparations should be thoroughly completed; that the French will perform, but must have some reasonable time to carry out their plans; that officers of divisions moving in must go over everything completely in advance. General Bullard said he was satisfied the Germans would make no strong attack on the western front and when General Liggett asked him why they were bringing the Russians [German divisions] over he said he supposed they had to do something with them, as they were no longer needed on the eastern front. Bullard said there were ten thousand men who needed gas masks; that while he understood they were on the way he did not get them. The 26th and 28th infantry regiments were the organizations in need. Bullard said he needed another supply company for the supply trains. He complained that the hospital had been bad, but was now getting into shape. He also said that Chaumont orders provided for the 1st Brigade of the First Division to come back when the 2nd Brigade goes up. [Chaumont orders would be those from GHQ, AEF, at Chaumont.] Colonel Upton complained that the schools had to contend with frightful conditions; his principal troubles were: (1) Need of transportation. (2) Need of men for fatigue duty. He complained that GHQ was taking his men away from him all the time; that equipment was short and was still arriving; that he procured what he had only by going to England himself; that when he had asked for a lot of men from the 164th he had received only officers. He said the school has about thirty-seven hundred plus three hundred just arrived as artillerymen, who are Montana infantrymen and will, in possibly one month’s time, be adequately trained for service by Colonel

Beginnings

17

Murray. He ascribed much of the success of the schools to General Bullard, who was quite willing to take the credit of starting them. Upton said he had organized a band out of the 164th. Upton asked General Liggett to attend a show at the school on Friday, but General Liggett said his trip to Langres would prevent, but that he would come next week for two days and accept the hospitality of billets from him. Reached the chateau at 1:45. Brought back a map of the area for billets in the First Division, but had some difficulty in procuring it and no success in getting a complete list of billeting facilities from the First Division office, who had no such information, and referred to mayors of the separate towns as the only accurate source. Captain Humbert, A.D.C. to General Bullard, said many towns with billets formerly available to the First Division were withdrawn now by the French. At 4:15 called with General Liggett upon mayor of Clermont and left card, with expressions, etc., through an interpreter. At 4:30 at the office and went over the day with Craig and the First Division gas mask business with DeWitt. At 5:30 call from Scott (major, infantry), who had been sent by General Edwards to get General Liggett’s help in getting necessary equipment for machine guns, which Scott had been called down from Langres to inspect. He said that the Twenty-sixth Division machinegun batteries knew nothing about indirect fire and the officers were not up in firing data, etc.; that he was going to take hold and teach them; he needed protractors, compasses and lights, especially. Craig took him in charge. At 9:00 p.m. General Edwards, Pendleton and chief of staff called and reported the return of an advance party from Soissons, where they were bombed last night. Pendleton reported the selection of Soissons as railhead and said the advance party had not been expected by the French. General Edwards complained because of the above failure of General du Maud’huy to be informed by the French mission and also because General Lassiter had no instructions from GHQ, but he said Lassiter had gone to the front on his directions and preceded the division.

As General Liggett and his aide Stackpole passed from the corps’s divisions, Twenty-sixth and First, it seemed that everywhere were complaints. It was the

18

In the Company of Generals

dead of winter, and the months in France after May 1917 may well have been getting on nerves, and there certainly were shortages, such as the gas masks missing in the First Division—a dangerous shortage in combat. Liggett and aide heard, however, more complaining than they wished. Major General Robert L. Bullard, commander of the First, was an attractive officer and would become one of the war’s two lieutenant generals when in mid-October Liggett and he took command of First and Second armies respectively. General Monroe, despite his English-sounding name, was a French general. Colonel Leroy S. Upton would receive an infantry brigade in the Twenty-ninth Division, not yet arrived in France, and escape the school work for which he did not seem well suited, since he knew little save to complain of shortages. Schools were a subject that plagued the AEF as Pershing inaugurated a school system—schools everywhere, not merely in divisions but under the tutelage of GHQ—that consumed troops and may not have done much to make them ready for combat; schools nonetheless continued until the armistice, including schools for arms of combat and specialties within them. The reader will notice a sort of cameo appearance of Captain DeWitt, General John DeWitt of World War II.

Wednesday, January 30 Left with General Liggett at 9:00 a.m. for Langres. On the lookout for General Bell all the way to Bourmont, but do not meet him. Arrived at Rolompont (via Langres), General Menoher’s headquarters, Forty-second Division, at 11:30. General Menoher, Colonel MacArthur, chief of staff, Colonel Hughes, G-3, Lieutenant Wolf, assistant to Colonel MacArthur, Captain Handy, A.D.C. to General Menoher, all there. In conference between General Menoher and General Liggett it developed that at present General Menoher has about seventeen thousand in the division area and about six thousand artillery at Coëtquidan, and is short about thirty-nine hundred. Supplies are adequate, though surplus supplies brought over in the division had been taken away. The division is short of transportation and has only fifty trucks against the three hundred which it should have. General Menoher has converted about fifty medical department Ford trucks into supply trucks by cutting

Beginnings

19

off the back part of the bodies, which leaves them with a carrying capacity of eight hundred pounds without straining the springs, and is adequate for supplying the companies, which are scattered all over the area. General Menoher finds the area inconvenient, as Langres, the heart of it, is cut out. All the billets available are full. The training has progressed uniformly throughout the division, but they are behind. Battalion training is just beginning and will be completed February 15, when General Menoher understands he is to go into the line, though he has no knowledge of the locality assigned. A machine-gun school was established three days ago and training is given to one company at a time, under French instruction. Instruction in bomb throwing is commencing and the training ground, with ranges, etc., is practically finished. Target practice for rifles has been carried out on various ranges. General Menoher had no special complaints, and furnished at request a list of replacements, record of strength, map of billeting area showing location of troops in billets. The office records were running smoothly and everything asked for was easily and promptly supplied. The general’s staff includes in addition to the above, Major Ogden, judge advocate, who has the general’s confidence. The list presented shows shortage. In the afternoon visited machine-gun practice under direction of a French captain, expert. Firing was carried out under close supervision at five hundred meters at four targets, each with four figures standing. The shooting was good and carefully corrected. Ammunition is giving some trouble and the jump of the gun causes great variance in the shots. In one instance a gunner had three successive shots at the target and the fourth one hundred meters short. They have no appliance for correcting this variation and the French officer said that in his own company he welded the parts so as to insure steadiness. General Liggett said he would send down a sample of the block used in the Twenty-eighth. A schoolroom barracks, with charts, etc., in charge of a French sergeant, is provided. By process of rotation the complement of machine gunners from each company is to have this training. Proceeded to witness exhibition of battalion problem by First Battalion, 166th (Ohio infantry). Problem involved advance under barrage simulated by red flags carried about one hundred fifty meters ahead, with supporting lines moving up from rear trenches. Problem carefully worked out and execution smooth and quiet, and in strict accordance with time, from zero

20

In the Company of Generals

hour. Advance slow and regular. At gas signals masks were promptly adjusted. This was followed by spirited and admirably conducted bayonet drill by a bayonet squad under Lieutenant Watson. Then proceeded to headquarters, 83rd Brigade, through many villages, where troops were invariably lined up in good order. Stopped at brigade headquarters at Longeau, but General Lenihan was not there when we called. Thence back to Rolompont, where we were billeted with General Menoher and Captain Handy. Excellent mess and the general’s after dinner talk and attitudes were much appreciated; it was very bright and cordial and thoroughly sound.

The third of Liggett’s divisions in I Corps, the Forty-second, was obviously to his liking. This, like the Twenty-sixth, was a National Guard division, but what a difference! The Forty-second had been put together from twenty-six miscellaneous Guard units in so many states, including the District of Columbia, and was known therefore as the Rainbow Division, a sobriquet bestowed upon it by the then-major in the War Department, now Major General Frank T. Menoher’s chief of staff and a full colonel, Douglas MacArthur, who that summer would be assigned the 84th Brigade and receive a star—his first in a long career that rose to five. The reader will notice reference to G-3, the G system initiated by Pershing’s headquarters, GHQ, and copied by all units down to regiments and even battalions. G-1 was administration, G-2 intelligence, G-3 operations, G-4 supply, G-5 training. Coëtquidan was a Napoleonic-era artillery training camp, at which field artillery brigades of the AEF’s divisions received their artillery pieces. The U.S. Army possessed a three-inch piece that would have done quite well in the line in France, had there been enough of them. There were not, and AEF divisions all received French artillery pieces, the three-inch so-called French 75 and the heavy six-inch 155s. “Bomb throwing” obviously was grenade throwing. The jumping machine gun was obviously the French Chauchat, the poorest gun on the western front. Toward the end of the war, the Americans substituted the excellent American-made Brownings, light and heavy, the latter replacing the French Hotchkiss. The Brownings were standard guns throughout World War II and the Korean War.

Beginnings

21

Captain Handy was General Thomas T. Handy of World War II, acting army chief of staff at the end of that conflict.

Thursday, January 31 Proceeded from Rolompont to Ferrolles, headquarters of General Brown of the 84th Brigade, and picked him up and went to the training fields of the 167th (3rd Iowa) and witnessed battalion problem of defense. Rather noisily and crudely carried out; discipline was rather loose, and a gas drill was slow. Gas drill is just beginning for these men. Thence we proceeded in the drill ground of the 168th Infantry (Alabama), where practice in gas discipline was conducted by lining up onehalf a company thirty-five yards away from the other half and at a signal one side would run to the other, mimicking rolling gas and estimated to reach the waiting side in six seconds. The journey took about eight seconds, and those whose masks were not adjusted in this time were “gassed.” The Alabamians were a rather seedy looking crowd, though alert in the drill. Thence back to Rolompont and on through Nogent to a point about two kilometers beyond, where two battalions of the 167th (3rd Iowa) under Lieutenant Colonel Tinley marched past en route from St. Blin to the 7th area. The men had been detained in the St. Blin area when the others moved on because of a scarlet fever quarantine. The men marched well and looked healthy, though they were not well shod. Some had on the old issue light shoe, and the new issue shoes seemed run down at the heels or over on the side or to be too light in the sole. A few men were still suffering from trench feet. General Menoher, Colonel MacArthur, Lieutenant Wolf, and Captain Handy accompanied us on the entire trip, but left after the inspection of the Iowa battalion. General Brown and two of his officers were with us during the inspection of Brown’s brigade. Returned through Rembercourt, arriving at 2:30. General J. F. Bell and aide, and Captain Croucher, stopped for the night, en route from Toul, but left at four, on receipt of telephone message from Colonel McCoy that they must make Chaumont tonight and join the French in the morning on a trip to the French and British fronts.

22

In the Company of Generals

Stackpole mixed the numbers of units: the Alabama regiment was the 167th, the Iowa 168th.

Friday, February 1 Colonel Webb Hayes arrives just at the end of breakfast and had breakfast at mess. General Liggett invites him to go to Gondrecourt, and I so inform Craig, who says that Hayes ought not to go and later I so inform the general, who tells Hayes that the party is for headquarters only and Hayes would not be welcome, though General Liggett would take him to Gondrecourt so that he could take a train for Paris. The general asks me to report about trains to Paris, and I report unfavorably about connections and suggest that Hayes return to Paris by Chaumont, where we would get him down if he could get no train. He was persuaded to go, and presumably did go, with Colonel Hines, who turned up. General Liggett (while I was out of the room telephoning) wrote an announcement on a life history which Hayes carries, which the general read over when I came into the room. It was directed to General Bliss and referred to Hayes’ experience and said that “in his judgment” Hayes’ experience and business ability would make him a useful officer on the line of communication. This is all Hayes got from the general as far as I know, and he indicated to me by putting his fingers to his mouth that he wanted me to keep quiet about him. Hayes told me boastfully the story of his exploits and indicated that General Liggett had urged him to go to Gondrecourt, but he did not want to butt in, and later attempted rather slyly to give up going to Paris and go to Gondrecourt with us, but I killed that. He said he thought there was some anxiety at headquarters about General Liggett’s health and I told him he might say that the general was all right and over his cold and much better than he had been. Hayes was traveling with a sort of blanket permission from the United States state department and had been all over Italy and France, except at the French, British and American fronts. General Liggett told me subsequently that Hayes had asked him to get him a commission and put him on his staff, or at least make him a civilian member, but the general had told him it was impossible. I agreed with the general’s statement to me that Hayes was a very friendly, interesting and energetic man, but said I thought even on casual inspection he was a man of no judgment, and General

Beginnings

23

Liggett said that was exactly the trouble with him. I also told the general that considering the friendliness and devotion of Hayes to General Liggett he was very insincere and unfair in saying to the people at Rolompont (as they told us he did) that the general wanted him to come to Neufchâteau and in saying to me that General Liggett wanted him to go to Gondrecourt. The general said that of course he had not wanted Hayes around at all, and supposed he said such things in his eagerness to get himself recognized, as he was crazy to be in uniform. Went on to Gondrecourt at twelve o’clock; after stopping for half an hour at General Bullard’s headquarters went on past the schools to the maneuver field. Colonel Lister, the executive for Colonel Upton, escorted us to the observation point, and Colonel Teypes explained problems. General Liggett spent some time with General Bailey, from the United States at GHQ, and with General Bonham Carter, head of British training, and General Wagstaff of the British mission at Chaumont. General Liggett’s criticism of the maneuver follows: (1) Advancing columns should have been in squads rather than sections, and General Bonham Carter agreed with him. (2) Deployment was too slow. (3) Question as to deployment with nothing by way of protection in front. (4) Machine guns should have advanced with the riflemen. (5) The concentration in the German trenches was too dense, inasmuch as the trenches conquered and undergoing consolidation were theoretically under searching enemy artillery fire, as the enemy had the exact range on its own trenches, which had been taken. Returned at 3:30. Colonel Sweeney of the intelligence section, GHQ, Colonel Whitehead of the Air Service, and others, called on their way back from Gondrecourt. They and General Harbord and others had missed the show except from a distance, as the guard kept them back. Colonel Craig said this was up to the corps commander, but General Liggett said that Malone was still in charge of the schools and the real fault was their own, as they were late and the machine-gun fire across the road involved in the problem made it unsafe to proceed on the road after the problem started, at 2:30. Colonel Booth, chief of staff for General Bell, turned up for dinner and overnight and Major Williams of the intelligence section reports for staff duty.

24

In the Company of Generals

Colonel Hines called in the morning and had much to say about rank and the control exercised by men of lower rank as staff officers over those of higher rank in actual command. His idea seemed to be to preserve throughout the control of superior over inferior, but in the separate grades to choose men of the best qualifications in the given grade for the most difficult jobs. He also criticized the practice which permits subordinates to send out communications which reflect their own decisions in the name of their chief. General Andeleur, in command of the Eighteenth French Division in this district, called in the morning. General Reno, calling on General Liggett, digressed to describe what he regarded as the cumbersome method of the French in handling wounded, as respects paperwork, but admitted that they get away with it.

Stackpole found himself with a bird’s-eye (one might say) view of the AEF at a formative time, and in the company of Liggett he was able to see the ups and downs and sideways of what was happening. Webb Hayes, obviously an incompetent and a bore, was son of President Rutherford B. Hayes, and he had to have attention even as he was shoved into the wings of anything that might happen at center stage. Harbord, then a brigadier general, had risen from major, and Pershing would regard him as his most valuable officer. The erstwhile major was keeping a diary, which upon publication after the war he may have bowdlerized, edited, but he was privy to all of GHQ’s hopes and fears. John L. Hines was rising to corps command, lieutenant colonel to major general and, after the war, army chief of staff in succession to Pershing. Hines’s comments about the importance of rank for command, especially of how in the U.S. Army there was an opposite tendency, perhaps from the example of the German army, where lower-level staff officers could control the movements of armies, is much worth remembering. In 1914 a certain Colonel Hentsch of the German army had intervened at army level during the initial German lunge into northern France that was headed straight for Paris. Hentsch was a member of the general staff and turned back German forces when success beckoned. It was a famous moment, and a fatal one, in the military history of the war, and Hines may have been thinking of it. He did not then know that as commanding general of the Fourth Division on the opening day of the Meuse-Argonne he would receive a message

Beginnings

25

from a brigadier general, Alfred M. Bjornstad, chief of staff of III Corps, then under the command of Bullard. Without Bullard’s consent, Bjornstad forbade the Fourth—one of its infantry brigades was on the scene and could have done it—to stay out of V Corps territory. This meant that the brigade could not take the eminence of Montfaucon from above and snuff out the weak German defenses, thereby releasing the entire forces, all nine divisions, of the First Army to continue north, fast as they could, before the Germans organized their defenses. At that time the Germans had a scant two and onehalf weak divisions in the whole area. A little later Hines took over III Corps and when Bjornstad, then his chief of staff, sent out the first message to a division without telling Hines, had Bjornstad relieved.

Saturday, February 2 General Liggett indoors practically all day, while I doctored his eye for conjunctivitis. Called on General Andeleur, commanding the French division now stationed in this area. General Andeleur expressed the opinion that the German offensive was not likely, but would be most welcome.

More foolish words were never spoken. The great series of German offensives that opened with a huge attack on March 21, 1918, nearly broke British and French lines and nearly accomplished what the Allies were beginning to fear, a fatal collapse of the western front before the American Army, the AEF, could come to their rescue.

2 Preparation

Time was running short by early February 1918, for on the singular day, November 11, 1917, the Germans had decided on Operation Michael, the attack scheduled for March 21. The Americans needed to establish more corps headquarters, in preparation to receive the cantonment divisions—for at the beginning of the year the British government had offered shipping to bring them over. The prospect was large numbers of American troops, and the prospect also was where to put them, for French army troops were in most of the better places. The American troops would need billeting fairly close together, by divisions, with the men in barns and farmhouses, officers in houses in villages. There was the need to billet close, if possible, to rail lines so that supplies might come in easily and if necessary divisions could entrain for wherever they were needed. At the outset in the summer of 1917, General Pershing had opted for an area in France fairly close to the German fortress of Metz, which his AEF planners considered an ideal place for attack. The Lorraine sector was to be supplied by French ports to the southwest of Paris, with the S.O.S., Services of Supply, at Tours. American engineers began enlarging the ports and strengthening the rail lines. The idea was to place American troops to the right of the French army, the bulk of which stood in the way of any German attack toward Paris. The British army from the outset of action in 1914 had stood between the French and the Channel, to allow for supplies across the Channel, also (so the French warily believed) to permit a hasty withdrawal to the home country in event of another sweeping attack such as the initial German lunge through Belgium toward Paris. A small Belgian army assisted the British forces and held a sliver of Belgium, the remainder of which was under German occupation.

26

Preparation

27

Sunday, February 3 Indoors, doctoring the general’s eye, which shows much improvement. General Edwards calls in the evening with Colonel Dowell, Major Harwood (just returned from machine-gun school), and his supply officer. He enters complaint about machine-gun supplies, including literature, which, however, they had in French sometime back. Harwood criticizes the policy of sending Plattsburgers to machine-gun schools or any others who are to become simply machine gunners rather than instructors qualified for instructing. He thinks majors and captains should be sent and qualified for instructing and believes this to be in accordance with British expectations. Harwood, with the permission of General Edwards and General Liggett, is to return at once and go to the British front. General Edwards read the report and recommendations of Colonel Parker, who had been training the Twenty-sixth Division machine gunners for the past week. Parker emphasized ability of machine-gun officers to compute firing data for indirect barrage fire and reported his journeys back and forth before the guns under a barrage, in order to give confidence to the men in the integrity of the ammunition. The report was to go to GHQ. Edwards referred to the keenness of the men in bayonet drill and spoke of a sergeant who was killed by a thrust through the thigh. The sergeant was instructing a private and showing his own skill at avoiding a jab and taking away the gun. He taunted the private to make him vicious in his attack and failed to meet it. It was purely accidental. The mass for the departing Twenty-sixth was held in Jean d’Arc Square.

Monday, February 4 General Liggett, Colonel Cheatham, and I made a trip looking for new headquarters to the east, in case we moved from Neufchâteau and established the I Corps divisions on the eastern front. Motored through Colombey-les-Belles to Pont-St.-Vincent, thence to Vézelise, then back through Crépey to Pont-St.-Vincent and on to Nancy, where we lunched at Walther’s restaurant in the Plaza Stanislaus; then on to Toul, and back through Mellein and Colombey-les-Belles.

28

In the Company of Generals

All the towns in the area were filled with French troops and much artillery of all calibers. Pont-St.-Vincent was full of Colonials and Moroccans. It is a place of twenty-three hundred [people], on the railway line, with large iron works and many shops and tenements, and one manor house, suitable for the general’s headquarters. If cleared of French it would answer for corps headquarters. Vézelise has thirteen hundred, is on a railway, with freight yards; has shops and buildings suitable for officers, and one group of buildings on a hillside, up from the town, which appeared to be comfortable and commodious. Highways run through in every direction. It is about twenty-five kilometers southeast of Haney by direct route. Vézelise appeared to all of us as most desirable as respects location, etc., assuming French troops are sufficiently eliminated. British Royal Flying Corps has a depot there and the American Air Service proposes to have one. Colonel Craig returns from Langres in the afternoon and reports no special success in securing desirable officers from the staff school.

Plattsburgers were graduates of the civilian training camps established before the war at Plattsburgh, New York, and elsewhere by Major General Leonard Wood, former army chief of staff who was in command of the eastern army command headquartered in New York City. Wood anticipated American involvement in the war and made arrangements for brief weeks of civilian training followed by reserve commissions. To be sure, if it became necessary for the Regular Army to expand, there would be an immense need for officers. In the event, expansion of the army in 1917–1918 to four million men, there was need for two hundred thousand officers, when the Regular Army in 1917 possessed a mere seven thousand.

Tuesday, February 5 Information received that the AEF may go in west of present sector, around St. Mihiel, and we made a trip to select headquarters. General Liggett, Colonel Cheatham, and I proceeded through Domrémy and Vaucaleurs to Void, which (aside from Toul) appears to be the best location for headquarters in this region. It has thirteen hundred inhabitants,

Preparation

29

many shops and offices, and apparently can supply one or two appropriate houses for residence. It has railway facilities and is on main highways. French troops now infest the place. Thence we went north through Pagny-sous-Marne to Ménil-la-Tour, General Bullard’s headquarters. Attended meeting of General Bullard with many of his officers at 3:00 p.m. following Bullard’s taking over command under General Monroe of the French Sixth Army at 12:00 noon. General Bullard has no tactical command as yet. General Duncan, General Summerall, Colonel King, chief of staff, Colonel Hines, Colonel Parker, etc., were present, and some made reports. Gas masks are still short. Colonel Frazier of supplies wants 200,000 feet of lumber. Colonel Snow of the medical department has his supplies going smoothly. The signal officer has strung three hundred to four hundred miles of wire and is now short. General Duncan reports some experiments with triangles to give gas shell alarm. Colonel King recommends that infantry commanders shall notify artillery of proposed raids. General Duncan says that notice is now sent to artillery battalion commanders. General Bullard urged cooperation between artillery and infantry; pointed out a new system of support trenches, which will require an immense amount of digging, and alluded to changed dispositions on the left, which provide for one battalion in the front trenches to two in the rear. An artillery shoot was going on while we were there and some airplane activity. Yesterday the American artillery, one regiment and one battalion of 75s and two battalions of 155s, dropped forty-five hundred shells in the German trenches and the supposition was that the trenches had been knocked in, but no photographs or other proofs were at hand. Raids had been made by the Germans two nights and four nights back. General Bullard now agrees with General Monroe’s and General Debeney’s original advice and appeal that no newspaperman should come into the area. The Chicago Tribune reports his [General Monroe’s] officers and his intelligence men held the opinion that an expert with the Boche could plot out the exact route from the reporter’s story. Came home through Toul and Colombey-lesBelles, without waiting for General Monroe, who was to call on General Bullard at 3:00. Three truckloads of men had arrived at Ménil from Gondrecourt at noon, but without equipment, and they were therefore sent back. General Edwards and Captain Hyatt, his aide, called in the afternoon. Edwards was disturbed because his recommendations for promotions

30

In the Company of Generals

had not gone through, but Craig and General Liggett said that was none of their concern and was up to GHQ; he also said that National Army appointees were out of luck anyway in the matter of promotion. General Edwards said he was departing February 7 for Soissons, due largely to a hint from Heintzelman. Craig said he thought General Edwards had misconstrued what Heintzelman said. Colonel Dowell was to stay behind and superintend the movement of troops. Craig in conference with General Liggett, Heintzelman and me afterwards said he thought he ought to leave for Soissons February 7 and be there until General Liggett comes on Saturday. Heintzelman was doubtful about it, and General Liggett was opposed, as Gleaves is now there, and he wanted to save Craig the hardship of the trip and have him go Saturday with him.

General Edwards clearly was becoming a pest—there was always something wrong, he felt, that needed immediate attention. He seemed to have no idea that General Liggett had all sorts of things to attend to and that he, Edwards, should attempt to resolve his own problems. Reference to the National Army may appear confusing, and it is. When the Regular Army underwent its wartime expansion, an entity was created, the National Army, within which officers could be promoted to ranks that would disappear after the war when the National Army was eliminated.

Wednesday, February 6 Made a trip to Gondrecourt, and thence through Houdelaincourt, etc., to Naix, and General Buck’s headquarters (2nd Brigade, First Division). Lunched there. General Buck, Captain Woodworth, A.D.C., Lieutenant McCleave, Lieutenant Don Weston, and Lieutenant Paris, A.D.C. General Buck claims his troops are in good shape and ready to put on any show for General Liggett, who declined the offer and said he preferred to see them some other time in the usual course of their duties. Buck said machine gunners were very keen—“bears”—on indirect laying and barrage. He has just received fifteen hundred replacements and needs two hundred fifty more for the 26th and five hundred for the 28th. He complained about supplies, etc. He knew nothing about the three truckloads moving up to Ménil without equipment and could

Preparation

31

get nothing definite from his adjutant, Savage, at Gondrecourt. Home through Ligny and Void. General Liggett said he wanted to end the prejudice of his staff against General Edwards, and had told Craig not to go to Soissons today. He said he wanted to save Craig the hardship; that there was nothing he could do anyway, and that Gleaves was on the job. He said he knew Craig was anxious not to have him miss a trick; that he thought Edwards could come through all right, and if he did not then would be the time to interfere. To do anything now to upset the Twenty-sixth Division organization and their confidence in their commander would be fatal. He said he knew Edwards’ popularity was brought about by his political methods, etc., and admitted that an organization held together by this sort of control was not as strong as one supported by excellence of training and discipline, and he admitted that Edwards was not sound from a military point of view in this crisis. The Twenty-sixth Division troop trains which passed us had a good many men hanging out the doors and riding on bumpers and jumping off while the trains moved slowly. General Alexander, assigned to the Forty-first and on his way to General Bullard’s front, turned up.

The grand question about division commanders was whether they could control—and train—so many troops (what with twenty-eight thousand men in a division, not to mention support troops), and Edwards, whose popularity with his New England Guard troops was undeniable, was already a question mark. He would become more of a question mark, for the Twenty-sixth Division turned out poorly in the field. Brigadier General Beaumont Buck, then of the First Division, was part of the problem, and when he received the Third Division turned out to be a talker rather than doer and like Edwards had to be relieved in the middle of the great battle of the Meuse-Argonne.

Friday, February 8 Went on through Frécourt to Doublain, headquarters of General Doyen of the Marine Brigade. General Doyen, General Bundy, Major Jenkins, a French major of the Foreign Legion (Waddell), Lieutenant

32

In the Company of Generals

Harrison, A.D.C. to Bundy, Lieutenant Goodwin, A.D.C. to General Doyen, were present. Attended drill by A Company of the 5th Marines. Excellent bayonet drill by command; a sham bayonet charge over trenches against dummies and through wire; a trench staking out, laying wire; a simulated raid, including wire cutting and cleaning up dummies with knives; games in coordination and reaction, and athletics interspersed according to the custom of those regiments to give the men amusement, physical development, and quickness of action. Troops appeared fresh and well disciplined. The French major in conversation with me objected to wire cutting in trench raiding as making a noise that would soon draw fire, even though snippers were covered with burlap. The Germans (and French sometimes) synchronize shell explosions with wire cutting to prevent detection, but the explosions must not be too frequent and create too much interest and the process is a tedious one; but when wire is cut the raiders advance from the trench in a rush. In the Marine drill the raiders lay in platoon files back of the wire cutters. The French major said heavy barrages breaking wire just before the raid give notice to the enemy, who vacates the front trenches in order to prevent taking prisoners. If a shoot is conducted during the day the enemy may be able to repair the wires before the raid. Came back through Blevencourt, headquarters of Colonel Catlin, 6th Marines, who was out; left the general’s card. Then back through the area occupied by the 9th Infantry. Soulencourt, etc., and Pompières, now deserted by the Twenty-sixth Division. The whole of the second area seemed to be in good shape so far as billets are concerned and the area is a convenient one, easily covered in a day. Major McCabe, from Valdahon, joins the staff. General Liggett signs a disapproval of T. Roosevelt Jr.’s promotion to lieutenant colonel on the principle that he had shown nothing so exceptional as to prefer him to Regulars of more experience.

It is of interest to observe comments on bayonet practice from such a sophisticate as Stackpole, showing how a quick-witted Boston lawyer nonetheless was taken in by it. The French major’s commentaries about trench raids, how wire-cutting was downright difficult, obviously made their point. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. was awkward to promote, although many Regulars surely were less able than the bright eldest son of the former president.

Preparation

33

Sunday, February 17 General Liggett adverts again to Webb Hayes and admits his action in sending his endorsement to General Pershing, which was meant only for General Bliss, to have been unfair, though he insists he could use Hayes to advantage by giving him a specific job, like unloading a vessel on the line of communication. In reference to Colonel William Mitchell, he says he is unusually successful with a signal company in the field and has great energy; that he should not be treated too roughly, but should be made to see that he gains nothing by continuing his attacks on GHQ for changes in organization; he should have a squadron to work with and devote himself to active work in preparation for its service. He again voices some doubt about General Edwards’ soundness.

Webb Hayes had minor usefulness, and General Liggett, a kindly man, sometimes too much so to Stackpole’s taste, was hoping to fit him in somewhere. Colonel William (“Billy”) Mitchell was a loose cannon. He had been in the Signal Corps and was hoping for command of the nascent Air Service, and hence his contentions over organization with the then–Air Service commander in France, Brigadier General Benjamin Foulois, with whom he could not get along.

Tuesday, March 5 General Liggett and I went to First Division headquarters. Colonel Marshall outlined new plan of defense formulated by French for the American sector, involving predisposition of machine-gun units and construction of emplacements. Digging on new line of support trenches continues. New arrangement of American troops ordered by French being carried out, providing more depth. General Bullard said failure of American raid night of March 3 was evidently due to lack of experience, as insufficient time was allowed the engineers to prepare for blowing up wire. Barrage went down promptly and effectively, he thought, and he was satisfied much damage was done anyway, and raid would have been a great success if it

34

In the Company of Generals

could have started. Apparently some camouflage in this talk and inference is that French were content that the true explanation should not be disclosed in detail and Bullard was following this cue, being, of course, accountable to French command under present arrangement. He said he had no knowledge of German dirigibles dropping about twenty-nine hundred shells on Juvy long after our barrage had ceased, but assumed that they might have expected a raid from this direction. Four men still missing, either prisoners or buried in destroyed dugouts in German raid March 1. General Bullard was about to have conference with officers of the 2nd Brigade just coming into the sector. Went to Beyoille hospital. General Pershing called at office during our absence.

Captain George C. Marshall had gone over to France with General Pershing on the British liner Baltic, hence was one of the first American officers in France. Promoted rapidly to full colonel, he was consecutively operations officer for the First Division, assistant operations officer (G-3) for AEF headquarters in Chaumont, then operations officer for the First Army once constituted in August 1918, and during the battle of the Meuse-Argonne.

Thursday, March 7 General Liggett, Colonel Craig, and I go to Chaumont. General Liggett sees General Pershing and relates much of interview; he is informed as to the front to be occupied eventually by I Corps; he reported that he told General Pershing that General Edwards had not obeyed any of his orders relative to instruction at Soissons; that up to time of his leaving Soissons he had not visited his front; that except for his insistence, the orders relative to arrangement of staff officers for instruction would not have been carried out; that he was satisfied General Edwards was in poor health; that in spite of it all the spirit and discipline in the Twenty-sixth was excellent and he supposed General Edwards should have credit for this just as he would be blamed for any lack of spirit, etc. General Pershing said he knew all this; he did not agree about Edwards’ responsibility

Preparation

35

for discipline, etc., as he thought others had brought that about (Cole and Traub); he thought that perhaps the ground of ill health was the best one on which to base retirement. Colonels Hartshorn and McCloskey at dinner, visiting staff officers from United States. Hilaire Belloc and Major McCabe received and dined by the general.

The above would not be the last entry in Stackpole’s diary about the independent-minded Edwards. The latter seemed to believe that he ranked as a general officer, which became possible for him when he took over the bureau of insular affairs in the prewar War Department, which gave him seniority over most of the general officers in the AEF save General Pershing himself. This offered a basis for criticism of more than his own division —he was entitled to criticize broadly the work of the AEF at Chaumont under Pershing. The problem was that Edwards’s Twenty-sixth Division had not yet seen action, as was true of almost all units in the AEF (the First Division had recently suffered a small trench raid). Moreover, Edwards had great support from the men in his division, for as mentioned, his slack methods within the division, under such poor generals as Cole and Traub, kept everyone in a state of happiness.

Friday, March 8 Colonel Baker returned at 12:15 with Colonel ? from battalion P.C. [post of command] two miles further out and reported on loss of men in dugout the night before. A Minenwerfer [mortar] shell dropped on the dugout and buried one officer and sixteen men. The Americans tried unsuccessfully to dig their comrades out and then called on the French for aid in the morning when they had found six dead, including the officer, and heard two talking down below; another Minenwerfer came along and smashed everything in again, so all were lost. The dugout was an old one, of which no doubt the Germans already had coordinates. The Americans had made it conspicuous to avions by throwing straw on top when the relief came in the night before and changed the old bedding; there was only one entrance; too many men were in the dugout.

36

In the Company of Generals

Saturday, March 9 General Liggett said that General Pershing told him he was all right if he could succeed in making anything out of Edwards and Bundy.

Bundy was given a shadow corps in Alsace, the purpose being to fool the Germans into believing that the AEF would have a buildup there. He then was sent home under General Pershing’s favorite device for returning inconvenient generals, which was to assign them to the home country to “train troops,” perhaps the least duty of which they were capable.

Monday, March 11 General Brewster, inspector general, called on General Liggett and he and Major Olmstead and Lieutenant Scott given special lunch at 4:00 p.m. General Brewster conferred with General Liggett about General Edwards. General Menoher called 5:00 p.m. General Wagstaff, British liaison officer at GHQ, to dinner. Captain Bill Cresson and Norman Whitehouse called on us in p.m. The general agrees with Menoher and Drum that the Forty-second should not be compelled to march back from Lunéville. He also indicated his position respecting Edwards. He does not trust him, never has, and does not think he can handle his division as a combat division. On the other hand he believes that Edwards has not only the personal regard but the confidence of his officers and men and the esprit produced by these should not be shattered by change; that even though this regard and confidence is resting on an unsubstantial basis, such as political favor, etc., it should outweigh in Edwards’s favor any unfavorable judgment of General Liggett, in the absence of some definite and conclusive evidence of incompetency as developed in current operations. I expressed the view that Edwards’s deficiency resulted from an inherent lack of character and military force and ability; that having determined in his own mind that he was incompetent to command a division in combat, the corps commander must act on his own judgment and relieve him without waiting for glaring exhibitions of failure.

Preparation

37

It is interesting to observe the corps commander making a political judgment, and the Boston-lawyer-turned-major making a military judgment.

Tuesday, March 19 Neufchâteau, awaiting arrival of secretary of war. Colonel Mitchell, aviation, called and presented new draft of figures on I Corps, Air Service, which General Liggett said he would keep and look over. Mitchell again repeated that General Harbord had told him he was waiting for an endorsement from General Liggett to act on. Miss Scott, daughter of General Scott, and another old maid, representing Red Cross canteen at Neufchâteau, called in the rain and got a ride home in the general’s bus.

Secretary of War Newton D. Baker came to France doubtless upon recommendation of the new U.S. Army chief of staff in Washington, General Peyton C. March, who systematically saw to it that Baker had little to do with serious matters—organization, supply, rank of officers—in the AEF. The secretary’s arrival of course called for ceremony and shows and tells. Colonel Mitchell was jockeying to obtain the command held by his Air Service rival, General Foulois.

Wednesday, March 20 Review for secretary of war on plateau above Trovray, off road to Hevilliers. Left Neufchâteau at 12:30 with Colonel Craig and the general; at Trovray at 3:00 p.m. Review commenced a little past 3:00 p.m. March past by 1st Brigade, First Division, 16th and 18th infantry, five to six thousand. General Pershing, Secretary Baker, and General Liggett, and Colonel Hines on reviewing line, with General Black, General Harbord, Colonel Collins, Colonel Boyd, Colonel Craig, and myself behind. Review well carried out, particularly by 18th Infantry (Colonel Parker); transportation in notably good condition, four mules to each

38

In the Company of Generals

traveling oven. Colonel Hines’s transportation, with ten mules to kitchen, unable to pull through the heavy going. General Pershing addressed officers of brigade and introduced Baker, who made conventional speech, referring to the brigade as first U.S. veterans, and emphasizing fact that we are fighting side by side with French for great principle for which the two civilizations stand, intimating that we must see the thing through, as this is the last time in world affairs it will have to be done.

Stackpole, after this acidulous appraisal of the Baker speech, did not know, and could not yet place it in his diary, that the German army would attack between the British and French armies, the weakest place in the Allied line, the following morning, March 21, 1918. The attack was another great German lunge, supervised by the German field commander in the West, General Ludendorff. There was a world of difference between the ceremonies with a brigade of an American division, six thousand men on the field, and what the German army with all its enormous skill began the next day.

3 Crisis—for the Anglo-French

When the dozens of German divisions attacked, they by chance struck in a weak place. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig had been listening to French complaints for months that the French army held more front line than did the British, and so had arranged for his Fifth Army—the British had four army organizations in France—to take over thirty miles of line. The French trenches were in poor condition, and the British general in charge faced the issue of what to do with them. He did not have sufficient laborers and chose to have them build roads rather than put the trenches in order (which needed second- and third-line and connecting trenches). The German commander, Ludendorff, by chance chose that unprepared place to send in his divisions. These are not the pages to relate how the Germans—in addition to choosing this vulnerable place for their attack—chose, in a decision of even more importance, a more fateful venture: to go over to a new method of warfare that for lack of a better name could be described as open warfare. The idea of the new tactic was to get away from trench war, which if properly done on, say, the Allied side, made trenches virtually invulnerable. After a tremendous artillery preparatory fire and a rolling barrage, the German troops came over in attack groups, carrying their machine guns, seeking to infiltrate the Anglo-French lines—the attack concentrated on the British Fifth Army but involved French troops to the right. The storm troops attempted to get into rear areas and cut communications with front-line troops and to generally create a scene of such confusion that the Anglo-French troops would give up. In large part, that is what happened. Operation Michael, as it was called, came close to accomplishing what its commanders hoped to do, although sufficient troops, mostly British, contained the enormous breach in the lines, which was fifty-five

39

40

41

42

In the Company of Generals

miles in length, nearly fifty in depth, and penetrated to the Marne River and, in a few places, beyond. Paris itself seemed in danger. Trucks stood outside the American embassy, waiting to evacuate the embassy staff and what records could be gathered and taken out. In all of this it was nearly impossible for the American divisions to do much. There were at this time only the four divisions that General Liggett had been seeing—the First, Second, Twenty-sixth, and Forty-second. There was some substitution of Americans for Frenchmen in the line, but not a great deal, and the only U.S. division that was in any serious way ready, the First, was sent to the assistance of the British but did not enter the line. Meanwhile, General Liggett and his staff did their best to ready the three remaining divisions and to prepare for the arrival, which was imminent and would last into the summer and down almost to the end of the war on November 11, 1918, of the cantonment divisions.

Thursday, March 21 Call by H. P. Davison, Major J. Perkins, Eliot Wadsworth, Hugh Scott of Red Cross. Call by W. R. Bennett, chief of staff of General Foulois, of Air Service. He says General Liggett’s memo on Mitchell’s letter exactly coincides with that of Foulois, etc. General Liggett had already been over papers with me and determined to hold it back until there is some real call for a memo, by Harbord, etc.

It was not exactly fitting that on the day of the German attack General Liggett was still hearing from the contending parties over the Air Service, the squadrons of which for the most part had not yet been formed. Airplane production in the United States, so much discussed at the outset of American entrance into the conflict (fifty thousand planes had been talked about), had become a fiasco, with only a few planes getting to France before the armistice. It was necessary to obtain trainers and attack planes and bombers (Colonel Mitchell was an avid enthusiast for aerial bombing), and insufficient planes were available. Moreover, American pilots were

Crisis—for the Anglo-French

43

barely trained by the time of the armistice, most of them outmatched by the skilled German pilots.

Saturday, March 23 Meeting at general’s room after dinner to celebrate General Liggett’s birthday, sixty-first, on twenty-first of March. Craig, Heintzelman, DeWitt, Gouret, General Liggett, and I polished off the general’s health with a little fizz. Colonel W. Mitchell dropped in.

Sunday, March 24 Went to Chaumont with General Liggett thence to Colombey-lesdeux-Eglises, on road to Bar-sur-Aube; thence to Vigny, past supply trains and machine-gun battalions of Twenty-sixth marching to area; thence south to Boulogne, and across to Anndolert and north to Neufchâteau. Bullard also would like to see French officers put into our units as commanders, so that we might have men of experience in war in command. He cites Rasmussen (major) and other Americans who have fought through with the English as particularly effective by reason of their experience.

Monday, March 25 General Bullard with French officer called and had luncheon. He emphasized what he said yesterday about labor and French officers. The fact of his visit to Pershing yesterday and his evident intent in ascertaining whether II Corps troops were in the line with British indicated something of an ambition in that direction. Revised letter of Craig submitted to General Liggett relative to General Edwards. Colonel F. Conner and Colonel Grant of G-3 at dinner. They came from Chaumont to outline present plans so far as matured for our going into lines to help French and British in present emergency.

44

In the Company of Generals

Tuesday, March 26 Neufchâteau. At General Liggett’s request drove Mrs. Martin and son all over the place—Vittel, Châtenois, etc. Seven or eight complete motorized batteries of 75s on move westward through Châtenois. Had notice that Forty-second goes back under French command and Twenty-sixth goes in next to First on left.

Wednesday, March 27 Left at 7:30 for Second Division at Souilly, etc. Picked up Major Budd (intelligence) at Dieue, and went to General Bundy’s headquarters at Sommedieue. Bundy was out with the 23rd Regiment, and though General Liggett told Tebbetts, chief of staff, not to attempt to reach him, Tebbetts, who should have done so, said on our return in about one hour that he had not found him, but would do so at once, and I told him it was too late. Saw Tebbetts, Major Hitz, and Colonel Eltinge at headquarters. General Liggett said he wanted Tebbetts to tell Bundy to look up a major who could be promoted to lieutenant colonel for Upton’s regiment (9th). Tebbetts and Eltinge said it was a difficult proposition, as majors of excellence were scarce and they had already borrowed one from the Marines. Eltinge pointed out intention of French to draw in their lines around Les Espagne and to draw the 9th back somewhat so that Upton’s headquarters would be at Bourmont, with reserves at Woimbey. He said he had assented to putting two extra battalions in line with four more in at a certain sector, in response to request of French, and General Liggett approved. He said French proposed that American colonels should take over command of sectors where preponderance of Allied forces were Americans, and General Liggett authorized him to acquiesce. Called on General Doyen, of Marines, at P.C. Toulon. 5th and 6th OK. Called on General Murray, of 3rd Brigade, at Troyon. General Liggett spoke to him about a lieutenant colonel for Upton. Murray recounted troubles with two of their majors who were inefficient.

Crisis—for the Anglo-French

45

Called on General Boyer, of French Thirty-fourth, at Troyon, and visited P.C.’s at Fort Troyon. Did not call on General Vandenberg, of II Corps (French), though I urged it, and General Liggett left message. General Liggett encouraged Budd in his intelligence work and told Tebbetts and Murray to help him. Home at 7:00 p.m.

Even before getting into battle, the AEF’s senior officers were seeing that battalion majors were crucial people. The size of AEF battalions made such units difficult to command in battle.

Thursday, March 28 Called on General Bullard, who was eager for American divisions to take over sectors independent of French command. General Buck joined and had some comments to make about existing order calling for invariable counterattacks following attacks. His difficulty seemed cleared up by General Bullard’s assurance that attack, as a general term, included artillery retaliation, etc., and was not limited to infantry counteroffensive. General Edwards and Colonel Dowell at dinner. General Edwards in talk with General Liggett afterwards said he had been summoned to GHQ to answer to some atrocious lies, and he had smoothed it over all right with Harbord. He complained of interference by Heintzelman and in a rather irritating way, but General Liggett made no protest.

Friday, March 29 Neufchâteau. General Haan, General Boardman, and General Covel to luncheon. General Haan is anxious to get his Thirty-second Division together and has succeeded in getting the detachment left in England ordered over here. Orders changed relative to the Twenty-sixth and First; former to take over in Apremont-Toul sector; latter to come out for training.

46

In the Company of Generals

The Thirty-second Division, a Guard division of Michigan and Wisconsin troops commanded by Major General William G. Haan, was to prove one of the best of AEF divisions.

Sunday, March 31 Started early for Vigent, proceeding by way of Greux, Amanty, Bedinvilliers, Rosières de Blois, Void and Commercy to avoid roads crowded with Twenty-sixth movement. Ran into 102nd Field Artillery moving through Greux. Blocked in Greux, where there were three lines of traffic. French camions and guns on our left of road parked, detachments of 102nd in bridle path on right, and two American trucks standing at entrance in clear middle space at farther end. After I attracted the attention of the trucks and a noncom by signals, etc., the truck moved through, but during the interval the block was complete, and no attempt had been made to post controls at either end of the line of camions, where they were obviously required. At Vigent, General Liggett talked on telephone to General Cole, at Jour-sous-les-Côtes, and did little more than ask him if everything was all right, and get a reassuring response, with some qualifications as to supplies and ammunition. He also talked to Colonel Shelton, who apparently was reasonably comfortable in his mind, though he had not gotten his men into billets until 3:00 a.m., and had supposed he was going to Pont-à-Mousson under the old order until he got to Toul and found the French camion captain was under orders to take him to Boucq. He was delayed at Boucq in persuading the camion captain to take the 104th on to billets rather than setting them down at Boucq. Lieutenant Colonel Foote of the 104th Infantry at Vigent was in distress about food and ammunition for the battalion, which he was taking in that afternoon, and he could not find the place where he was to hold his outfit pending the relief at night. I motored him up to the Gironville Fort hill and showed him the ground and indicated hutments in the woods, where he could billet the outfit out of airplane observation. Thence to Ménil-la-Tour. General Bullard said General Edwards had spent the previous morning with him, but intimated that he devoted most of his time to complaints at the changed orders, and said that

Crisis—for the Anglo-French

47

Edwards must accustom himself to changes in orders if he was coming into that sector. Thence to Saiserais, Marbache, Levedun, Gondreville and Toul, looking for area for division maneuvers for First Division under GHQ training program. At Toul, Heintzelman gave us new order just issued by Eighth Army, providing for movement of First Division to Gisers on western front, under French command. At Colombey-les-Belles ran into a block of three lines of traffic—mule transportation, 101st Field Artillery, motors—apparently halted for rest, or at least for no other evident purpose, unless to allow Massachusetts men to gather around C. C. Baxter, Dr. Morton Prince, Dr. Coughlin, the Massachusetts legislative war committee, who were all making speeches, and entirely neglectful of the block occasioned. Baxter and Prince came over and introduced themselves while we were waiting in the block. No officers or others in command were in sight and there was no attempt to regulate movement. In course of journey I had opportunity to emphasize the feeling of Craig, Heintzelman, and DeWitt relative to the inefficiency of the Twentysixth Division staff and command, this complaint being directed at the friction between corps staff and division staff and Edwards, which made it impossible to do anything with them, and at the entire lack of driving force in staff and commander. General Liggett said he thought that Craig and Heintzelman were prejudiced and he had already allowed them to say more than he should unless he had been thoroughly convinced of their genuineness and loyalty. He later agreed with me that Colonel Heintzelman was judicial in his habit of mind and in this instance. He admitted that the staff was bad, but excused Edwards on ground that his two good men (Shelton and ?) had been taken away from him by GHQ, but he agreed that it was Edwards’s business to keep his staff up, and as a matter of fact he had only inexperienced men. He said it was all right for his staff officers to call things to his attention, but the responsibility of decision was his. I told him that Colonel Craig was particularly concerned because he felt that acquiescence in the situation was not only a reflection on the corps commander and his staff, but it endangered the lives of twentyseven thousand men and it was too great a hazard to take the chance of some calamity in order to give Edwards a further chance.

48

In the Company of Generals

Camions were French trucks. Stackpole obviously was prejudiced against speeches. Behind the general confusion in the Twenty-sixth Division was the awkwardness of dealing with Edwards. One might have thought it was National Guard versus Regulars, with the corps officers representing the latter, but Stackpole was no Regular nor was he prejudiced because of being a Massachusetts man. It was a case of inefficiency, and Edwards permitted it, talking all morning with Bullard, complaining to him, as if Bullard could do anything, when his men supposedly were on the road. Liggett may have been partly at fault for babying Edwards, hesitating to admonish him.

Monday, April 1 General Liggett opened up on the anomalous character of the position which he is occupying, commanding a corps and still with no corps to command. He considers that with the Forty-second, First, Second, and Twenty-sixth placed under French command he has no command at all, except over the Thirty-second, which is to be formed into a combat division. He admits, however, that he has a certain duty of supervision, and has exercised this function more from a sense of duty than because of any requirement in the existing state of things. He says that he has called on brigade and regimental commanders because he knew them personally, though he would under other circumstances restrict his activities to division commanders. He said that as respects the Twenty-sixth, the division had been under his command only a short time, while in training; that he had gone up to Soissons only because the GHQ ordered it, and he did not propose to pull GHQ’s chestnuts out of the fire for them. They had retained General Edwards and General Bundy in command of these divisions and if they did not like them they could pull them out. I suggested that his remark to General Passaga that he had come up there to see that the Twenty-sixth was turned over to him in the best possible shape carried an implication of responsibility for personnel. He said he supposed he did have such responsibility as to compel him to relieve a man who was drunk or guilty of some flagrant insubordination, etc., but he felt no duty to relieve any of the present division commanders on basis of performances. Altogether he was disturbed and disappointed over the extraordinarily indefinite character

Crisis—for the Anglo-French

49

of his authority and the limitations of his command, which appears to extend to nothing but corps troops, practically nonexistent. Spent night at Toul in new quarters.

This was a considerable confession, and behind it lay the organizational problem of the AEF that entered into all calculations, namely, the commanding personality of Pershing. The commander in chief, like all his generals, had never, prior to 1917, commanded more than a few thousand men at best. The Old Army, which until the Spanish War comprised a total of twenty- five thousand, simply did not have that many men around. Creation of a massive army in France, which ran far beyond the sizes seen even in the Civil War (with which the 1917–1918 generals were far too young to have any memory), thus created command problems. Pershing was such a micromanager that he probably had not even thought of giving Liggett the opportunity, and one might say the authority, to dismiss Edwards and Bundy. He was to do that himself during the Meuse-Argonne—he had to do it, as he could not waste the men under their commands. But he had an opportunity, far earlier, to delegate that issue, and surely should have taken it.

Tuesday, April 2 Drove from Toul to Boucq, new headquarters of General Edwards, of Twenty-sixth, taking over adjoining sector. Edwards at once said he knew the movement had been a rotten one, but was disposed to lay much of it on the changes in orders in the French staff, nine in one day, he said. General Liggett said he thought on the whole the movement was “all right”; mistakes were bound to happen; but he did not understand why Colonel Shelton should have been allowed to proceed in ignorance of his destination or why the 101st Trench Mortar Battery should have been in such a state of confusion as respects billets and supplies. The explanation was very confused. General Edwards complained that he should have an extra company of one- and one-half-ton trucks to complete his transportation, his argument being that he had only fifty-six trucks to the First Division’s one hundred eighty. He also spoke of his intention to send in a long list of promotions and General Liggett said to send them along.

50

In the Company of Generals

Friday, April 12 General Liggett in course of the day spoke of the attitude of Craig and Heintzelman on Edwards’s question and their inability to see any side of the question except the single necessity of removal, without reference to his power or duty to do so. He said he thought Craig saw it now, but Heintzelman was stupid and never would see it. He said that he never would have tolerated their insistence except that he recognized they were actuated by their desire for his own good. He had felt much embarrassment by Craig’s “schoolboy” memorandum, which had been placed before General Harbord, which he himself had withdrawn. He repeated that he was not going to be put in the position of pulling Pershing’s and GHQ’s chestnuts out of the fire. I said that the interesting thing to me was the fact that both Craig and Heintzelman and the others and himself were all in agreement as to Edwards’s inefficiency, the differences apparently came in the matter of method of removal, and in this respect the others did not seem to get his point of view. He assented cordially and repeated that there was no difference of opinion as to Edwards’s qualifications.

Friday, April 19 Went to Toul, to corps headquarters. There inspected headquarters of Air Service of corps (Colonel W. Mitchell); thence to an inspection of the 94th Pursuit Squadron at Toul airdrome, equipped with new type baby Nieuports. Three of the squadron on duty gave a fancy flying and combat exhibition. The general shook hands with Winslow, one of the two who recently shot down an Albatross, also with the three performers, and with Lufbery, now a major and member of the squadron. The squadron commander is Major Hoeffner.

Sunday, April 21 Colonel Fiske, of training section, with him white slave, Major Williams, called, apparently to try on his pedantic idea that the divisions now in the trenches should be put through a schedule of training in open warfare while still holding their respective sectors.

Crisis—for the Anglo-French

51

Interesting entry, as Fiske had been a captain at the outset of the war and would become brigadier general in charge of G-5, training, at GHQ. His single achievement was to send out inspectors whose reports, now in AEF files, were frequently observant. Fiske was full of ideological points about training—most of them gleaned from prewar books on tactics.

Tuesday, April 23 Went to Boucq, via Vaucaleurs, and called on General Edwards. Hugh Scott, and Osborn, of Red Cross, Hyatt and Colonel Major were there on our arrival. Edwards, Hyatt, and I (presently joined by Simpkins) were left alone. Edwards gave rather an incoherent account of the Seicheprey affair, dwelling on details of minor consequence, and saying “This is how we won the fight” etc. He explained that Passaga had himself given the order for a counterattack with six companies; that Traub had demurred, and he had taken the matter up with Passaga and told him he would make the attack and lick the Boche with three companies and Passaga had insisted the attack must be made and limited participation to four companies; that Gallant (major) failed to carry out the orders; that as it turned out the splendid rolling barrage drove the Germans back out of Sibile Trench and the attack was unnecessary and might have been disastrous. This he designated as “lucky bull” and “his lucky bull,” for they found the lines deserted by the Boche when they went up to them later, but full of grenades and rapid-fire pistols and helmets in regular rows along trenches and parapets, indicating that the Boche was thoroughly prepared to resist an attack if it had been made and that the artillery fire had killed all those whose helmets were lying around, the bodies themselves having been taken away by the Boche. (Bunk!) Edwards was very bitter against Gallant and insisted he was not fit for command and meant to have him tried. He also expressed some dissatisfaction with Traub. He was quite complacent with his liaison, which he said had been good throughout. He was much disturbed over spies, who he thought were operating in large numbers through all the villages. He suspected the French, but said Passaga would not permit him to have any definite measures undertaken against them. He made no intimation that the spies might be in our own troops. He had ordered sentries to shoot at any light appearing at night, etc.

52

In the Company of Generals

Hyatt and Simpkins had more things to tell me than they could utter. But it was clear that runners were the only effective means of liaison; that some outfits had been without ammunition for two hours; that twenty-five machine guns were unaccounted for; that some units had been all cut up; that none knew even then the extent of American losses, and there was nothing but conjecture as to Boche casualties. (They were all over the place.)

It suffices to end this chapter of Stackpole’s diary with the Seicheprey raid of April 20. Liggett’s nominal corps, under French control, had seen two previous German raids on the First Division, November 3, 1917, and March 1, 1918. In the initial raid the enemy attacked an American platoon in the line and killed three Americans (one was shot, one had his head bashed in, and the third had his throat cut). Five men were wounded and twelve taken prisoner. But the officers of the First learned their lesson and before the second raid pulled back troops from front-line advanced positions, leaving automatic gunners in the rifle pits. The Germans sent 220 men, who killed twenty Americans, wounded others, and took twelve prisoners. Enemy losses totaled eighty-three, including seventeen men killed and bodies left behind, four prisoners, and the others caught by American artillery fire while moving back to their lines. The Twenty-sixth might have learned from this, and when German artillery was advancing on the troops of General “Pete” Traub, the brigade commander should have pulled back his men as did the First earlier. This time 2,800 men came over, killed 81 Americans, wounded 187, gassed 214, and took 187 prisoners. To the embarrassment, although hardly enough, of Edwards they held the American line for twenty-four hours. About all this Liggett could do nothing, for the Twenty-sixth was under French command, and anyway his control over the incompetents, Edwards and Traub, was completely lacking. Responsibility really was that of Pershing, who was so busy organizing the AEF and at the same time conducting what amounted to diplomatic negotiations with the British and French commanders on the western front and their respective governments that he could not handle all his military duties.

4 Giving Advice

As the AEF began to take on proportions, what with appearance of such divisions as the Thirty-second, its complexity really required more advice, and the individual divisions needed help too, for, as General Haan said of his own Thirty-second, the men were all right but the officers hardly knew what to do. In some sense the officers, wearing proudly their new overseas belts that crossed their right shoulder and pointed out their possession of rank, needed reinforcement, pressure, forcing them to prove that they deserved rank. Some of what the officers needed was in the army’s technical manuals, most of them copied from French originals. They also needed plain common sense—the ability to determine when their ordering of the days of the men under their command made sense and when their daily orders merely wasted time, in which the Old Army, the prewar Regular Army, was expert. The time was short in which the AEF could learn the basic tactics of a complicated war—increasingly complicated because the Germans in their great spring and summer offensives introduced the tactics of the flexible battlefield, of open—rather than trench—warfare. This indeed was not in the tactical manuals but needed instruction from the perhaps few American officers who had heard from British and French instructors and others what had gone on in the western front since March 21, 1918. In all of this the intelligent General Liggett, who seemed headed toward high command as the AEF divisions came over, was almost helpless, beyond advice, and he had to be careful in dispensing that, for he could make himself ineffective if he came up against laggards such as General Edwards. The latter was not merely a laggard but possessed all of the Old Army skill at balancing advice against his own instincts and then, the result, doing little or nothing.

53

54

In the Company of Generals

The mission of General Liggett was further limited by the fact that as the veteran divisions—the First, Second, Twenty-sixth, and Forty-second— took over parts of the line, they were not under his control as a corps commander. His authority was titular rather than real. He had to wait out the assignment of authority, which, he sensed, coming from Pershing, who enjoyed holding all the authority he could get his hands on, was likely to be little more than titular. And so Liggett and his smart, observant staff members, Craig, Heintzelman, and Stackpole, were reduced to watching what was happening, giving advice if they could, and otherwise storing in their minds the abilities and inabilities of the divisions that came to their attention. In the end, too, they found themselves almost wasting time listening to the complaints and watching Colonel Mitchell of the Air Service as he maneuvered against Brigadier General Foulois, who possessed the power that Mitchell himself was determined to obtain.

Thursday, May 2 Inspected 1st Observation Squadron with Colonel Mitchell at Ouches, squadron in operation with A.R.S. Spads and photographic and information departments in operation. Lieutenant Myer in charge of maps, photographs, etc. Major Roger, squadron commander. The field, etc., was getting into shape and everything seemed to be running well, with commendable esprit. Returned via Vaucaleurs, Houdelaincourt, Dainville, Febrecourt.

A problem developed with Mitchell when promoted to brigadier general and placed in charge of the Air Service squadrons during the Meuse-Argonne. Brigadier General Dennis E. Nolan, G-2 (intelligence) in GHQ, desired observation and photographs during the Meuse-Argonne and was certain that Mitchell was denying them. The Air Service commander claimed, and there was something to this, that the weather in the Meuse-Argonne was poor, cloudy and rainy, and observation and photography difficult. Nolan felt he was denying them, for his interest was in bombing and in aerial combat. Whether showing off the photography squadron was a part of Mitchell’s game to impress Liggett is difficult to say.

Giving Advice

55

Friday, May 3 All day at terrain exercises for Thirty-second Division conducted by Heintzelman. The performance was an improvement on the last. General Liggett and I were with division headquarters. Notable failure to keep in touch with airplanes while division headquarters were moving.

Saturday, May 11 Went to Robert-Espagna via Bar-le-Duc to see General Bundy and Colonel Malone of 23rd; General Lewis of 3rd Brigade at Fain; General Harbord of 4th Brigade (Marines) at P.C. Moscow, but about to move to Vanault-les-Daman. (Map of dispositions, etc., given to Craig.) General Bundy disturbed by lack of mules, which prevented traveling ovens from keeping up with troops; also harassed by French mission. He did not know how long he was to stay at the area or when he is going into the line. He had before him a schedule of open warfare training which Colonel Malone and Colonel Brown had made out and General Liggett looked it over and approved of it. Colonel Malone seemed reluctant to give his men any rest or opportunity to clean up, though General Bundy and General Liggett advised it. Bundy seemed more confident of himself and quite ready to take over a sector himself, if he had to. Malone was vigorous and eager to a fault. The move out into the area seemed to be progressing well enough, except in instances of food shortage caused by delay of moving kitchens. Men had only one meal in twenty-four hours, and he personally told them to draw on emergency rations when he discovered it. What most of the divisions needed was instruction in open warfare, that is, getting the exercises out of the trenches, teaching units, up to division in size, and how to handle themselves in the open, for this was the principal tactic of the German army in the recent offensive. The Thirty-second Division was to see much action and the instruction must have helped.

56

In the Company of Generals

Monday, May 13 General Haan said that he really had no brigadiers, and Boardman had admitted that he was not up to the job. General Liggett said he had no colonels either and Haan agreed, though he said he thought Lee, of the 127th, while uneducated, might still show something. Haan said eight captains had been taken away from him to go to school and never sent back, having been assigned to the First Division. One of his companies was left at one time with nothing but noncoms. Lee favors reserve officers, but Haan and Covel find difficulty in bringing them into National Guard outfits and providing proper rank.

Thursday, May 16 General Harbord, of Marine Brigade, at headquarters, also General Bundy there for lunch. Harbord after recent talk with J.J.P. [Pershing] said he thought corps could be brought together before long, probably two divisions at a time, so as to form First Army, with three more corps of two divisions each.

James G. Harbord was close to Pershing and had been his chief of staff at GHQ. The commander in chief sent him out to command the Marine Brigade in the Second Division, where he would be in charge during Belleau Wood, a battle soon to come. Pershing was anxious to gather his divisions and bring them back from British and French control, and the Allies of course did not wish him to do so. They deplored the AEF commander’s desire to form an army, claiming—and there was some truth in this—that the quick expansion of the U.S. Army after America entered the war placed an enormous difficulty in the way of expanding the officer corps, especially in finding competent field grade officers, majors and above. The First Army actually came into existence in August.

Tuesday, May 21 General Patrick, new chief of Air Service, AEF, called on General Liggett for advice as to what he should do with Mitchell and Foulois. He

Giving Advice

57

said there is even yet no organization of the Air Service over here and Pershing has called on him to construct one, all under one chief, with three departments—training, supplies, and fighting. He thinks well of Brett and Dodd, but he admits Foulois has fallen down and surrounded himself with too much family, etc. Foulois wants the First Army and Mitchell won’t and can’t serve under him as corps chief. He wants to do justice to Mitchell, and still realizes that he is an exceptionally difficult man to handle and is a troublemaker. Both Mitchell and Foulois are absurdly ambitious and selfish. General Liggett said if he was to command the First Army he would want Mitchell, who had demonstrated that he can deliver the goods on the line and has behind him loyal and well disciplined squadrons. He had had his troubles with Mitchell over friction between him and Van Horn and S.O.S., but those were over, though he knew Mitchell’s tendency to want to be the whole thing. If he were to have the First Army and Mitchell, he would tell Mitchell at the outset that as soon as he found him gossiping and meddling and interfering with Air Service matters outside his own sphere he would recommend Pershing to send him home. He thought Foulois might be sent home, or put in charge of something in the rear, just as Kenly had been. He suggested that it was a matter both Patrick and he could think over, and he thought it might be left undecided until the army commander is named. He said he thought the army commander’s decision as to who he wanted would be properly accepted and controlling and relieve Patrick of the responsibility. Patrick did not agree to this. Patrick’s difficulty seemed to be that he did not know how to deal with the Foulois bunch, and while he seemed to think Mitchell the better man for army chief, he was not prepared to deal with the disturbing offset of this decision on the Foulois crowd and those in the SOS. General Liggett said he did not know much about Foulois, and avoided expressing any opinion on the solution of this phase, except as respects Foulois personally, who he thought might be sent home or given something else to do here. Patrick was asking for help and he got it to this extent. General Liggett repeated that if he was army commander he should prefer Mitchell to Foulois on the basis of performance and for the good of the service, but he should at the outset warn Mitchell that he was not indispensable and would be promptly relieved if he failed to stick to his own business. Mitchell and Patrick were both at dinner.

58

In the Company of Generals

The inability of Foulois, who was a much better flyer (he had been one of the earliest in the army), and Mitchell, who was a master of the “controlled crash” landing and had taken up flying only in 1916, to get together was the reason for appointing Major General Mason Patrick of the engineers. An interesting sidelight of the above entry is that Liggett was speculating about becoming army commander. Pershing instead kept his duties as commander in chief with headquarters of GHQ at Chaumont, and took on command of the First Army—in August—at Soulis. It was too much, and in mid-October he passed the army command to Liggett. SOS stood for Services of Supply.

Sunday, May 26 General Liggett, Craig, and I went to Langres and the general and I go to Châteauvillain and called on General Dickman of the Third Division. General Dickman was planning to visit the Boucq sector on Tuesday and Wednesday next with his chief of staff and aide, in advance reconnaissance party. General Liggett advised him to look the place over carefully as he might have to go in there.

Major General Joseph T. Dickman would command his division during the forthcoming attack by the Germans that penetrated to the Marne and a few places below. His machine-gun companies (he was an expert on machine guns) stopped German troops at the river. Appointed to corps command at St. Mihiel, he would shift to the Meuse-Argonne as I Corps commander in the last stages of that battle.

Friday, May 31 Attended terrain exercise at Washington center, above Houdelaincourt, for graduation of I Corps school candidates, 9:30 to 5:30. Exercise late in starting, rather crudely contrived and carried out with no skill or enthusiasm. Artillery slow and not very good when registered. Desultory and meaningless machine-gun and 37-mm. firing. Wires not properly protected for communications. Colonel Eaton, commandant, evidently dissatisfied. Colonel Avery in charge, rather too complacent;

Giving Advice

59

Major Banever, of artillery, obviously tardy in registration and with unsatisfactory wire communication.

Saturday, June 1 In the morning Colonel Mitchell was here and was advised by General Liggett to move out of Toul and turn over his pursuit squadrons gracefully and do everything possible to assist General Foulois. He invited him to come down here and join our mess. He told Mitchell that he had nothing to do with army aviation. Later Mitchell talked to me at Lafayette Club and emphasized his indispensable assistance to the French, for whom he claimed to be running Eighth Army aviation, and the dependence of the 94th and 95th squadrons on him. I told him to forget it; that his job had passed to another and that settled him in pursuit aviation; that he obviously must leave Toul and let Foulois alone, and go to Ouches and run the corps observation.

Sunday, June 2 General Foulois, Colonel Burnett, and Colonel Mitchell at lunch. Foulois and Burnett called on General Liggett and Mitchell called alone when I was out. The general’s attitude toward Foulois was thoroughly cordial, but dignified and impersonal. General Liggett told me he emphasized to Mitchell the necessity of his getting out of Toul and keeping his hands off. At lunch it developed that about seventeen thousand Air Service men are in England, but only three hundred of them pilots in training, the rest being mechanics; also that aviators and all in the Air Service know that the one hundred fifty Gnome motors in the #20 Nieuport are not satisfactory, but French and Americans must use them until better ones are supplied—and these are promised. Here, Burnett said about three hundred trained pilots are in France ready for the front; sixteen hundred to seventeen hundred in training in United States, though these seemed to include mechanics. Our men

60

In the Company of Generals

get one hundred hours or nine months’ training against much less in French and British service. Much training is in gunnery. Twenty observation planes are here from America (Haviland type). General Wagstaff of British mission called in the afternoon. He knew little about developments of the day in the northeast. He said our Second Division is in near Château-Thierry with one brigade (Marines) on left and other brigade on right of road from Paris. Headquarters— Montreuil-aux-Lions. The Third Division is guarding bridge of Marne, east of Château-Thierry. Headquarters—Montigny les Conde.

The organization problem with the Air Service, at least in terms of the feuding between Mitchell and Foulois, continued, and the two vied for the attention of General Liggett, perhaps thinking that in any reorganization of the AEF he, Liggett, would command the First Army. Meanwhile the Second and Third divisions had gone into action.

Monday, June 10 Neufchâteau. Colonel Mitchell called to ask advice about Foulois’s proposal to have him as assistant chief Air Service First Army in charge of operations tactical while Foulois himself retained strategical branch. General Liggett asked him if he wanted to do it. Mitchell said he thought he did and General Liggett then said he had no objection, but advised Mitchell to think it over before he tied up with an untrustworthy commander who had tried to send him home. Mitchell gave a very confused and evasive account of his interview with Patrick, who he said simply told him that General Pershing wanted to see him, and with Pershing, who he said told him he and Foulois must manage to work together, and with Foulois who he said proposed that they should clean the slate and that he should become operations man. He said Foulois had remarked that they could wreck the Air Service if they wanted to pull apart and could make it if they wanted to work together. He said he wanted some promotions made immediately when the change went into effect, mentioning Royce, Noyes, and Brereton. He rushed to the telephone and told “Flossie,” as he called him, that the proposition looked pretty good to him and he

Giving Advice

61

would be back from Belfort day after tomorrow and fix things up with him. General Liggett told him that he thought he ought to protect himself by GHQ order, which would relieve him from the corps and assign him definitely to army. Mitchell said that after assignment to various divisions of observation squadrons, there will still be three at Ouches permanently. I advised Heintzelman of General Liggett’s attitude and expressed my personal view that Mitchell and Foulois had probably agreed to agree before Mitchell went to Patrick, and very likely on Mitchell’s initiative, and he had given the general nothing like the correct version. I also suggested that as an aid to Mitchell and to the service Heintzelman should confer with Mitchell and write him a memo, terse and accurate, as to exactly what he understood his function was to be and what he was to have, so that the minds of Mitchell and Foulois might meet on something definite at the outset and save the inevitable discussion resulting from a loose oral understanding.

“Billy” Mitchell, as he became known to tens of thousands of air force members for many years after 1917–1918, was part genius, part maneuverer. He could analyze, if he wished and if his personal crotchets and ambitions did not get in the way. In 1918 it was plain to such discerning individuals as Liggett and his staff—Stackpole, Craig, Heintzelman—that Mitchell was doing more harm than good. He possessed a byzantine streak of opportunism—of personal advancement—that came out in the above-mentioned maneuvers with Foulois against Patrick and indeed the entire AEF. The organization of the Air Service, which Pershing in 1917 had wrested from its prewar position, the Signal Corps, and gotten into the AEF, was only partial. Planes were short, including those with decent motors. No one seemed to know how many pilots were training or had finished training. When serious action came at St. Mihiel, the field was conquered in a day or two—German forces were retreating when Pershing’s men attacked on September 12, and by September 16 he had rolled up the German salient. For years afterward it was said that Mitchell, in command of the Air Service, controlled the air, but this probably was because the German air force did not commit its planes to a salient the ground forces were giving up. At the Meuse-Argonne there was another confusion, in that Mitchell, again operationally in control, and now a brigadier general so that,

62

In the Company of Generals

perhaps, he could confront Foulois more easily, was too interested in bombing. Whatever planes he brought together for bombing in those primitive times accomplished little in bombing, as a total of 139 tons were dropped from the air. Where Mitchell’s planes were needed was to drive German planes away from a prime mission, which was artillery spotting, which the German planes accomplished with impunity. To a lesser extent, because it was so unnerving to soldiers on the ground, they needed to drive German airmen away from machine-gunning of American troops, which they also did with impunity; machine-gunning from the air was mostly ineffective, but it annoyed troops, was altogether unnerving, and the troops deserved some peace of mind as they went about their basic business.

Thursday, June 13 Went to Chaumont with General Liggett and Colonel Craig, in answer to summons of General Pershing. General Liggett and Craig saw General Pershing and General McAndrew and dined at General Pershing’s. Mitchell here in morning, still in doubt about how he and Foulois would manage to agree and searching for advice from General Liggett, who simply told him to go to it, if he wanted to, but protect himself by a GHQ order. Mitchell explained dispositions of squadrons with divisions and said he would see that the I Corps got satisfactory service. I advised Mitchell to have his and Foulois’s understanding reduced to writing as to essentials at the outset as a means of clearing their minds, to eliminate any unessentials, and determine the important points on which their minds really met. This would prevent disagreement and discussion at the outset of operations, and the minor matters could be easily adjusted when they came up. Later I told Colonel Winship this and he said he had given similar advice. Colonel Winship reported on return from Thirty-second Division. He said Covel told him he was surprised at the way Haan had taken hold of his division and the decisive manner of command he had developed. Winship said the colonels were N.G. [no good], one a barber and one a butcher; that Boardman said he never would have come over if he had

Giving Advice

63

known what it was like, and he was too old to learn. That he disliked and distrusted Covel, who was shallow and much of an opportunist; that many of the subordinate National Guard officers were unclear and did not give proper instructions to their men; that the men were fine. He reported that the Negro contingent on the Swiss border feels rather isolated and shoved into the discard both as respects training, equipment, and opportunity. They are to use French equipment, etc., and be in with French. The Negro colonel was rather disheartened.

Two American generals were killed during 1917–1918, one of them while unadvisedly taking an automobile through a subsector of the line under German artillery fire, the other being Boardman. He gave up his general’s rank—voluntarily—went down to colonel, and died in action. His brigade opposite, Covel, was dismissed by Haan, who received two excellent infantry brigadiers, Generals Malone and McCoy (both promoted from colonel).

Friday, June 14 Neufchâteau. Colonel Mitchell called at about 5:30 and when the general said, “Well, Mitchell, have you got everything fixed up,” he replied, “I don’t know, general, it looks almost too good.” He said Foulois was helpless and it was funny that the day he came back they brought down three planes. He explained to the general the plan for dividing into tactical and strategical Air Service, with himself at head of former brigade and Van Horn at head of latter. He said of course Van Horn didn’t know anything about it, but he guessed he’d get along all right. Royce was to be promoted to corps air commander and Lahm was to have balloon job, though he wanted Brereton. He produced a blueprint which he described as covering the scheme of organization they had agreed on and said to me that it was the same thing I had seen in the Air Service with slight modifications. I recognized it by the constant allusions throughout the tables to an information officer (now obsolete), and it proved to be Mitchell’s old blueprint of October, 1917. He told the general that

64

In the Company of Generals

Foulois had a letter which he was going to bring to him so that they both might go over the whole plan with him before dinner in order to enable Foulois to take it to Patrick in Chaumont that evening. He called up Toul to find if Foulois had left, but gave us no indication of the reply. Whitehall said the plan affected the corps and they wanted the general’s approval for that reason. The general said all he wanted to do was to further any plan that would be in the interest of effective Air Service. We went to dinner and found Foulois there with Craig. When Mitchell left just at the end of dinner he told the general that Foulois had the letter he had talked over with him and “You know all about it,” and Foulois would show it to him for approval and go to Chaumont. I warned Craig to get the general’s ear, as Mitchell had overstated things and had undoubtedly given Foulois the impression that he knew much more about their plans than he actually did, and that the blueprint if attached to the letter approved would simply open up an old fight in which Mitchell had been whipped. Craig spoke to the general outside and he and Foulois and General Liggett retired to the sitting room with the papers. The general signed the endorsement “Recommended” and Foulois took it to Chaumont to see General Patrick. Craig and I both were satisfied that the general had made a mistake. Later in the evening I told the general that the blueprint which Mitchell had presented was an old one on which he had been licked after a long wrangle with intelligence and that I thought the print would be offered as an exhibit with the letter; also that the whole thing looked to me like a trick by Mitchell and Foulois to get his endorsement to a plan for their own benefit; that Foulois had been selected to work Craig, and Mitchell was “to work the old man”; that neither had been frank and behaved like skunks; that Mitchell’s behavior was abominable because he was taking advantage of the general’s friendship. General Liggett said he had simply intended to recommend the plan in so far as it affected the corps and he had nothing to do with anything else, and the recommendation should not be given any further significance. He said that if Craig was coming over he would have him call up Patrick and have the endorsement changed. When Craig came over General Liggett said about the same thing and blamed his “own stupidity” for signing the endorsement in that form.

Giving Advice

65

Saturday, June 15 I called Preston, secretary to Collins at GHQ, and told him to be prepared to tell Heintzelman when he appeared where he could find General Patrick of the Air Service, as he wanted to see him. Preston said Burnett, of Air Service, was at his side and said Patrick was in London. Heintzelman later recovered the paper from Foulois and Burnett and brought it back. In the evening the general assured Craig that any such paper as the Air Service document would thenceforth be submitted through channels and taken by chief of staff for his consideration. He said he had no faith in Foulois and had lost faith in Mitchell and would have nothing more to do with him. He agreed that his leg had been pulled a little.

It seems almost incredible that Mitchell could stir such activity, but he clearly did, which Liggett’s bright aides stopped. This occurred at a time when action for American troops was increasing, what with the Second and Third divisions at Belleau Wood, Vaux (a village that the Second’s army brigade took in an almost model action, with slight losses), and along the Marne at Château-Thierry.

Hunter Liggett.

66

Major General Beaumont B. Buck. In October 1918 Pershing sent Buck home to train troops.

67

Major General Robert L. Bullard, First Division, later commanding general, promoted to lieutenant general, of the Second Army. To Bullard’s right is a member of staff, George C. Marshall.

68

Major General Omar Bundy (left) and Colonel A. W. Catlin (right), respectively commanding general of the Second Division and commander of the Sixth Marines, Second Division.

69

Brigadier General Malin Craig, chief of staff to General Liggett. In the late 1930s, Craig became army chief of staff and reduced the size of American divisions to the Continental size.

70

Major General Joseph T. Dickman, the new commanding officer of I Corps, Broda Farm, Le Neufour, Meuse, France.

71

Brigadier General Hugh A. Drum.

72

Major General George B. Duncan of the Eighty-second Division, part of one of whose infantry regiments sought to relieve the Lost Battalion of the Seventy-seventh Division.

73

Major General Clarence R. Edwards of the Twenty-sixth Division reviews one of his regiments. Edwards was without question the bête noire of Major Stackpole.

Major General William G. Haan, commander of the Michigan-Wisconsin Thirty-second Division, interrogating captured German officers.

74

Major General James G. Harbord.

75

Major General John L. Hines, commander of the Fourth Division, then III Corps, in the Meuse-Argonne. His predecessor in III Corps, Robert L. Bullard, was willing to allow the corps chief of staff, Brigadier General Alfred M. Bjornstad, to send orders in the corps commander’s name. The first time Bjornstad did that under Hines, the latter forced a choice between Bjornstad and himself—the chief of staff went to the Seventh Division and lost his prominence.

76

Major General Joseph E. Kuhn, Seventy-ninth Division, whose division delayed for a day before the height of Montfaucon and according to General Pershing delayed the entire First Army during the initial attack in the Meuse-Argonne.

77

Brigadier General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the 84th Infantry Brigade, Forty-second Division.

78

Major General John E. McMahon, Fifth Division. His tactical errors were largely responsible for the failure of the AEF’s second attack in the MeuseArgonne. McMahon’s chief of staff said that his division commander slept through the battle of St. Mihiel, and required forty-two seconds to sign his name. McMahon was a member of Pershing’s West Point class of 1886.

79

Major General Charles T. Menoher, commander of the Forty-second Division. Unlike General Edwards of the Twenty-sixth, Menoher sought to cooperate with General Liggett.

(Top right, p.81) Brigadier General William Mitchell. (Bottom right, p.81) Menoher opens the door for General John J. Pershing. The two men were both members of the West Point class of 1886.

80

81

Major General Charles P. Summerall, commander successively of the First Division and V Corps. Chaplain Francis P. Duffy of the division’s 165th Infantry Regiment, who heartily disliked him, described him as von Summerall. The general told General Liggett that the chaplain was a dispiriting factor in the First Division.

82

Major General Peter E. Traub conversing with his division engineer, Colonel Thomas C. Clarke.

83

5 To Soissons

The crisis for the British and French armies on the western front began March 21 with the opening offensive of the enormous German attack, and the latter ran on through four more attacks—lunges—until the fifth that began July 15 and ended in failure the next day. The fourth offensive toward Soissons had taken this sizable French city and had much confused the French railway system for east-west traffic that centered on the city. The purpose of the fifth offensive was to enlarge and perhaps find an opening in the salient of which Soissons was a part, and if the opening had appeared (it did not) to attack from the salient and move in the direction of Paris. All the while the AEF was still very much in organization, which for General Pershing meant more training. He would retrain the troops, emphasizing his favorite tactical weapon, the rifle. With a rifle, according to the general, a soldier could do almost anything. Yes, the soldier needed reinforcement with artillery against enemy machine guns. Pershing regarded artillery strictly as a supplement to the rifle of an individual soldier. He regarded machine guns as a nuisance. The use of gas, which the German army employed in enormous quantities in 1918, as much in that single year as in the years since first use at Ypres in 1915, did not nearly so concern him as the proper use of the rifle, in the hands of good American soldiers—which to his mind all of them were. So he proposed to prepare the troops, through such individuals as Brigadier General Fiske, his G-5. The divisions came over, however, the cantonment divisions, and moved constantly from place to place, which was like moving a circus, each division constituting a dozen circuses. They did not get much if any training. The only troops trained to Pershing’s satisfaction were those present in early 1918, having spent the winter with the exception of the Twenty-sixth (which General Edwards did not train). 84

To Soissons

85

Liggett did his best with the training program imposed by GHQ, but the general and his Boston-lawyer-turned-major and Colonels Craig and Heintzelman could do little with Pershing’s impossible training program, and anyway such generals as Edwards were not inclined to take advice with no authority behind it.

Sunday, June 16 Neufchâteau. Brigadier General Lejeune, of Marines, called with Major Ellis and Lieutenant Nelson. Lejeune said that the Marine Division was progressing and in certain respects was an accomplished fact. McAndrew (chief of staff) agreed to have him meet Pershing on the subject in two or three days.

Major General James McAndrew was Pershing’s chief of staff at GHQ. Brigadier General John A. Lejeune would become commander of the Second Division during the Meuse-Argonne—the Marine brigade in that division made him eligible for that command. True to the Marines, Lejeune was seeking enlargement of the Marine contingent in the AEF into a division. It was an interesting idea, although at that moment the Marines were engaged in expelling the Germans from Belleau Wood, which they accomplished after a month of huge casualties, virtually half of their two regiments in the Marine Brigade. Interestingly, too, the brigade at Belleau was under Brigadier General Harbord, who was no tactician, whatever Pershing’s opinion of his high worth to the AEF. Whether Lejeune would have subscribed to different tactics than frontal attacks—Harbord hardly used the division’s artillery brigade against Belleau Wood, which was infested with enemy machine-gun nests—is difficult to say.

Tuesday, June 18 Went to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre with the general, via Chaumont, For�╂ ges, Nogent, Provens, Coulommiers, and settled in new quarters under instructions from GHQ.

86

In the Company of Generals

Called on General Pershing and General McAndrew at Chaumont, both in conference with General Kernan, and we did not see them, but General Liggett left card with word that he was going through to new station.

Wednesday, June 19 Singleton very anxious to have General Liggett see Bundy and Brown and arrange for relief of Second Division, as Brown tells him the outfit is all in. I referred to the relief of Marine regiment by the 7th Regiment Infantry, of Third Division, and also to the fact that the general knows all about the need of rest for the Second and has spoken of it, but that is all he can do. Singleton wanted the general to emphasize this with General Degoutte. I told him the division was under General Degoutte’s tactical command and when he thought the time had come for their relief it was his business to relieve it. The general later endorsed all this. I advised McDonald to make no permanent arrangements for French officers in staff messes pending arrival of Colonel Craig, who I thought ought to consider whether all the French officers (six in number) should not be housed and messed together like a French mission. I also advised McDonald to be on the lookout for another chateau for the general in case we have to leave this one, and to consider something farther to the east. Colonel Craig, Colonel Barber, Colonel DeWitt reported. Craig had no further instructions, though he had called at Chaumont, and simply reported that Fox Conner had advised him that the corps might be called on to function very soon and to govern himself accordingly and let him know when he was ready. He reported that Colonel Drum told him that General Pershing said he appreciated the anomalous position in which General Liggett had been kept, but it was unavoidable and General Liggett seemed to be the only one of his generals who understood the situation. The Second Division was in trouble, with the Marines still fighting under the inspirational guidance of Harbord, whose leadership was betokened by

To Soissons

87

wearing a French helmet rather than an American one. The French higher command, over the Second, did not seem to have any tactical advice and was perhaps accustomed to wasting French lives and hence willing to waste American. It was a devil of a command situation in which Liggett as nominal corps commander could do nothing. In all this, the commander in chief, having placed his favorite GHQ general with the Second Division in command of the Marine Brigade, did nothing. Liggett carefully held back.

Friday, June 21 General Bundy called at the office (Château Condé). He appeared vigorous and self-possessed and had no special complaint to make. Drove over with Colonel Craig, General Liggett, and Major Kahn and called on new corps commander, General LeBrun, who takes over in place of the XXI Corps at Cantigny. The general expressed pleasure at working with General Liggett and spoke of us all as one family. A very agreeable and alert man. He moves his quarters to La Ferte-sousJouarre presently. General Lassiter, of corps artillery, reported with Colonel Cubisson (chief of staff). He was instructed by General Liggett to establish himself and look over the ground and call on French artillery commanders. He dined with us.

Saturday, June 22 At office in morning. General Liggett saw Colonel McCloskey from the Second Division artillery, 6th Regiment. In afternoon went to Château-Thierry road, west of Montmirail, thence north to crossroad west of town of Viffort, to Essie and La Chapelle, looking for battery positions for corps artillery, and then to Vieilles-Maisons, and back to Nogent and Charly, Crouttes, Saacy.

Corps artillery might have intervened in the near debacle of tactics at Belleau Wood, but apparently there was no thought of it. Perhaps it was impossible because the Second Division was under French command.

88

In the Company of Generals

Monday, June 24 Colonel Mitchell called; said he will move up aviation by end of month, four pursuit, two observation. He is brigade commander, Royal Corps commander. He has made all arrangements with French for cooperating in aviation on this front. Went with General Liggett to meet General Pétain with General Degoutte and LeBrun. Pétain said General Liggett was soon to have this sector with a corps consisting of one French and one American division.

A corps of two divisions, one of them French, meant command of one and one-half divisions by American divisional measurements, making General Liggett not much more than a divisional commander. Liggett may have thought that this at least would give him some battlefield control.

Wednesday, June 26 General Lassiter here on artillery program. Two regiments corps artillery to go in with French, one with artillery group on right, south of Marne and one on left, west of Ourcq. Called on Degoutte and Lassiter turned up also; artillery programs approved. Called on General Bundy, Second Division (Genevrois Farm). Bundy talked privately to General Liggett, he told me about it afterward. The principal topic was the relief of the Second Division, which Bundy had already been told to ask for through French III Corps, and General Liggett said he could not discover why Bundy hung back. Brown also had whispered conversation with the general on Bundy and the division generally. According to the AEF artillery table of organization, an artillery brigade equaled half of an infantry brigade. Instead of the latter’s two regiments it contained three, each twelve hundred men instead of four thousand. Artillery regiments in a brigade contained one with heavy guns, 155 mm., the other two with 75s. Hence the distribution of corps artillery to the line

To Soissons

89

under French command did not amount to much in terms of guns and men (eighteen 155s in a heavy regiment, thirty-six 75s in a light). Bundy was an ineffective commander and did not seem to know much about the Second Division.

Thursday, June 27 Clemenceau met the staff at the office and made a few agreeable remarks responded to by General Liggett. Again Barbour fussed things up by bringing in his assistants. Clemenceau told General Liggett that he was then going to the Second Division to congratulate them on the performance of the twenty-fifth.

Premier Georges Clemenceau spoke fluent English, having been a war correspondent during the American Civil War. He planned to congratulate the Second Division on the capture of Belleau Wood (perhaps with no remarks about the high cost).

Friday, June 28 Went to First Division and called on General Bullard, headquarters Tertigny, east of Breteuil. Explored country back of lines from there down. All day and hard trip through Meaux, Senlis, Clermont, Creil, etc. Bullard and King somewhat worn. In some companies lieutenants are commanding with unsatisfactory captains as platoon leaders. General Liggett said in response to Bullard’s complaint about Roosevelt’s lack of promotion to lieutenant colonel that he thought the first application was distinctly inappropriate, as there were many older men in the service in the division just as good; that he had some doubt about the second, which Bullard said had come back from GHQ disapproved; that perhaps the next time the thing might go through. General Brewster to dinner and overnight.

90

In the Company of Generals

As a veteran of World War II, the present editor remembers the World War I place-names. In 1944–1945 he spent the winter in a tent in the park of Creil, looking across a moat to the city’s castle, and often drove through the medieval town of Senlis.

Saturday, June 29 Called on General Harbord, 4th Brigade (Marines), Second Division, at La Loge Farm. Harbord much agitated because Bundy had not had him and Marine colonels to meet Clemenceau when he did have Lewis and Upton of the 3rd Brigade. (Bundy’s excuse had been that the 3rd Brigade officers simply happened to be there, and it was his own stupidity that was at fault for not having Harbord and Neville immediately summoned.) General Liggett said at once in presence of Ley (adjutant) that he had nothing to do with it and knew nothing about it except that Clemenceau told him he was going out to congratulate the Second Division. Harbord and General Liggett had a private conference, but I infer from General Liggett’s report that there was not much in it except further discussion of the above and of defense plans, etc. General Brewster had private conference with General Liggett about Second Division—to dinner again. General Liggett and chiefs of section had their pictures taken with General LeBrun and corresponding staff. General Degoutte called on General Liggett and outlined plan for Twenty-eighth to relieve the Second.

Sunday, June 30 General Degoutte, General Harbord, Ley, and aide at luncheon. I advised General Liggett against sending in memo as to disposition of armies and plan of strategy to GHQ at this time, as its purpose would probably be misconstrued. He seemed to take the same view.

To Soissons

91

Monday, July 1 M. Barthou, French statesman, called. Called on General Maistre, Army Group commander, at Sézanne. Passed Twenty-sixth Division trains—in good road order.

Tuesday, July 2 Luncheon for General LeBrun, General Lassiter, Colonel Cubisson, and LeBrun’s chief of staff, Wyuel, and aides. General Edwards of Twenty-sixth butted in and spoiled the party. LeBrun evidently bored by him and coldly inattentive. He appeared to have a previously formed opinion and to be quite willing to convey his impression by courteous frigidity of manner. Edwards bombastic and assertive. General Liggett attended corps meeting at Degoutte’s in morning. Colonel Neville of Marines here for dinner and overnight. He was still agitated with Clemenceau incident and twice told story of order emanating from Preston Brown, chief of staff, of Second, which brought colonels up to front in taking their positions at end of May behind their regiments which were temporarily lost to them. Marine (5th) losses, 1,732, with 55 officers, 38 wounded and 17 killed. Replacements not absorbed and need training in open warfare. General Bundy called.

Wednesday, July 3 Called on Edwards at Nanteuil-sur-Marne, not there. Saw Traub, Edwards, and Bundy at General Liggett’s office and Degoutte called. General Liggett acknowledged verbally the order putting the One Hundred Sixty-seventh French and Second American under his tactical command in present sector as I Corps.

92

In the Company of Generals

Edwards and Bundy both expressed congratulations. Edwards on relieving Bundy wants headquarters farther to rear, preferably Mérysur-Marne, and General Liggett seemed to approve. Bundy advised it. General Degoutte said he would consider it. The Twenty-sixth is all here and Cole’s brigade, the 52nd, starts to take over night of July 4 in Marine sector, left. Called on General LeBrun, to whom General Liggett exhibited the order and expressed pleasure that LeBrun was to remain in La Ferte as headquarters for a corps in reserve. Colonel Mitchell called on General Liggett when I was not here. General Liggett said he “did not say anything.”

Thursday, July 4 Letter of good wishes from General Maistre, commanding Group of Armies of North. Attended function for staff at General LeBrun’s, at 10:00 a.m., when General Liggett took over command of I Corps, including French One Hundred Sixty-seventh and American Second. With General LeBrun of III Corps and aide, Lieutenant de Groutte, called on General Schmidt, of One Hundred Sixty-seventh, at Dhuisy. His division has about five thousand rifles and is about six hundred short, occupies four and one-half kilometer front, with all battalions on line echeloned in depth, one and one-half kilometers to each of three and one back. Then called on Lebocq, commanding the Seventy-third Division, which comes out of the VII Corps into the III, substituting with the One hundred and fourth. In afternoon called on Degoutte at army headquarters and General Liggett formally reported that he had carried out the order as to taking over. Degoutte said that an order went to LeBrun today directing him to take charge of construction of second line (Seventy-third) and to handle traffic and police control. He said things would be complicated for a few days and a new order could come about every day until the situation clears. He said that he was considering the question of change of headquarters for Twenty-sixth. He wanted disposition of the Second so made as to protect the second lines in support, on the feasibility that an attack may be made any day.

To Soissons

93

General Edwards called and has another chateau to suggest for headquarters of Twenty-sixth. General Liggett told him that Degoutte was the one to decide this. General Lassiter called. Said he proposed to send out instructions and did the general want to see such things. The general looked at the samples exhibited and said emphatically yes. There can be no doubt but that General Lassiter understood that any communications must be forwarded to the corps before dissemination. General Liggett said that he wanted Lassiter to attend any meeting he might have with division artillery commanders and give advice. Lassiter said he did not see why division commanders should attend, as he considered the corps artillery commander’s function was to advise on such questions with corps commander and then consult with division commanders. He had positive views, which however were not developed by General Liggett, as he was evidently not sure in his own mind as to the relations that should obtain under GHQ’s sanction.

Liggett’s tenuous control as corps commander of one and one-half divisions, measuring the French division as worth one-half, was assuredly tenuous, for the French division was being replaced by another. Moreover the back areas were under French command. And Liggett would be commanding the Twenty-sixth, through Edwards, which was no command at all, given Edwards’s talents at running his division the way he wished. As for artillery, Lassiter was showing initiative as corps artillery commander, but relations between him and the division artillery brigade commander (or commanders, if one counted the French artillery officer) were tenuous, as Liggett had no idea what GHQ wished in that regard. As matters worked out, corps artillery commanders had little power.

Saturday, July 6 Visited General Edwards at Chamigny and Bundy at Genevrois. Edwards said in spite of some complications he thought the move had gone off creditably. He at once began to gossip about the Marines and said they were lazy and would not dig or get hot meals for themselves in

94

In the Company of Generals

a difficult position like Vaux, though they could fight. He said his men on reconnaissance had found a number of dead Marines and Germans in Belleau Wood and he proposed to ask Bundy to let him bury them, as his men were fresher. Later when we were with Bundy, Colonel Bonnell of Twenty-sixth Division, 101st Engineers, made the request and Bundy after hesitation granted permission. My own notion is that Edwards is establishing a dramatic climax to his gossip about the Marines’ shiftlessness and lack of discipline by saying that they were even too lazy to bury their dead and he had to do it for them. General Liggett told Edwards to establish his headquarters at Genevrois Farm, no matter where he lived, and Edwards reluctantly acquiesced. His attitude was rather arrogant. General Liggett showed Edwards a memorandum as to what he should do in placing and protecting the Twenty-sixth Division and Major, chief of staff, took this. At General Bundy’s, General Liggett showed him the memo he had given to Edwards, and Brown, chief of staff, snatched this as eagerly as Major had. Bundy seemed as usual somewhat over his head, if not off it. Brown was anxious to get his transportation south of the Marne at once, and General Liggett approved.

Sunday, July 7 Mitchell, of Air Service, here in the morning, apologizing that message summoning him here at 9:00 a.m. had not reached him. He sketched his plan for the Air Service in the corps and was told to be here at 8:00 on Monday. Lassiter called on artillery plans for 155 Filloux, which under present plans are to be on south bank of Marne, southeast of ChâteauThierry; both the 146th and 148th regiments. Lassiter was rather lame in his statement as to Air Service artillery liaison while the general was present, but later according to Craig told Mitchell the Air Service was rotten.

Monday, July 8 At 9:00 meeting with Mitchell, Lassiter, Voris, Brereton, and French special army air commander and two associates, these last being lugged along by Mitchell.

To Soissons

95

Lassiter gave a terse statement of communications and artillery and air liaison. Mitchell displayed a sketch, and Voris reported work progressing and assured General Liggett of prompt conclusion. General Liggett ignored Mitchell to a great extent and made Brereton feel that as corps Air Service commander he was responsible to the corps commander for giving service and affecting liaison immediately, and General Liggett said he wanted the confusion stopped and everyone to cooperate to this end. Impression was strong that General Liggett’s wishes were definite. In morning Generals Bundy, Edwards, and Lassiter here and General Liggett gives them definite instructions pursuant to the orders of Sixth Army as to disposition of troops in observation line proportionate to support in resistance line and gave each a colored sketch. The generals seemed to understand, though they were stupid about it. Edwards was eager to develop a plan for attack via Vaux and to recount his interview with Degoutte, and General Liggett said that such matters were entirely up to the high command and the point for them was to obey the instructions given them. General Liggett said that Bundy’s plan of defensive was good but not consistent with the Degoutte plan of defense. Later in the afternoon Bundy telephoned to General Liggett that “he had stopped the movement” and it developed that the reason for this was the order calling on artillery for 9:00 to 11:00 shoot with batteries in alternative positions and Bundy was afraid of strafing. The orders for artillery were straightened out and amended and the movement went on. At 3:00 the next morning it was completed.

Tuesday, July 9 Mitchell had reported that Royce was relieved with General Liggett’s consent and that he was here getting Air Service into shape at General Liggett’s suggestion. General Liggett said both these statements were false. He did not know why Mitchell was here or where he fitted in this scheme of brigade commanders, though he liked Mitchell and Mitchell had no better friend in the army than himself.

96

In the Company of Generals

Thursday, July 11 General Liggett had considerable personal talk with Pershing which I did not hear, but which seemed to leave General Liggett with the feeling that Pershing appreciated the difficult tasks which Liggett had been called on to fulfill and the faithful manner in which he had performed them; that he wanted to get American divisions together and make use of their aggressive spirit in attack, but he was subject to directions from the French to a great extent and had to fight for this program.

Friday, July 12 I went with General Pershing and Boyd to General Muir’s headquarters at La Hussière (Twenty-eighth Division) and thence to General Weigel’s brigade headquarters, and thence on to line of resistance which Pershing inspected from Hill 100 to be Le Grand Fruert. Pershing, Muir, Weigel, King (chief of staff), Boyd, Wyerly. Pershing occasionally interrogated officers about positions, etc., and led them a devil of a chase over the hillside. Thence went to headquarters of General Harbord at Nanteuil-sur-Marne for lunch. Thence to Genevrois Farm (Twentysixth headquarters), where General Pershing and General Edwards had a long conference; thence we all proceeded to review ground northeast of La Ferté on Château-Thierry road, where Pershing presented eighteen medals (DSC) to Twenty-sixth Division line. Pershing, Liggett, Edwards, Cole, Shelton, General Traub officiating, and Adjutant Stevens reading order. Performance in rain at 3:15. General Liggett accompanied by Major Ord from corps. General Harbord at dinner to celebrate Craig’s promotion and Colonel Malone from 23rd Infantry to dinner, but declined to stay overnight. He is nervously wrought up, saying that he scarcely had his clothes off from May 31 to date; full of scorn of Marines, pride over his own regiment’s achievements, and nervous because he has been jumped in promotions.

Here Stackpole’s diary is confusing, as one might think that it was Harbord exhibiting scorn for the Marines—but it clearly was Malone. The latter

To Soissons

97

duly would make brigadier. Harbord meanwhile had made major general. Pershing would put Harbord in command of the Second Division and the latter would jump off on a French-designed offensive on July 18, only a few days away. This itself said something, for Harbord commanded the division only a few days before it went into battle.

Saturday, July 13 General Degoutte at office 10:30. Expressed satisfaction with disposition of battalions, and was doubtful about General Bowley’s (Second Division artillery) plan to have his guns farther up so as to reach both zones, between outpost and resistance and behind resistance, and agreed with the objection already advanced by General Liggett, based on theory that the primary function of the artillery was to protect line of support in second positions and it should be located far enough back to do this at convenient range and not be in danger of capture in a suddenly successful rush on second line. General Degoutte announced that III Corps Americans would have headquarters at Meaux—First Division with headquarters at Dammartin, and Second to remain tactically under I Corps Americans, though administratively under III Corps. The Fourth French goes in support with headquarters at Rebais. Alliez’s division (One Hundred Sixty-seventh) goes where Fourth was. Two French cavalry divisions, headquarters Meaux, under General Rabienveux. Degoutte’s notice of attack for vicinity of 14th between ChâteauThierry and Rheims and east of Rheims with plan of envelopment and advance through Champagne. General Bougevis, of French army group, called and was shown G-2 establishment in which he has particular interest as respects topography. General Edwards here, but did his business principally with Craig. He told General Liggett that he was satisfied that the only way to get prisoners in the Bouresches-Vaux sector was to attempt a daylight raid, which he would like to do this afternoon with General Liggett’s permission. General Liggett said he thought Edwards better try again at night and the artillery concentration this afternoon on Hill 204 would help him. He readily acquiesced, and my notion, which General Liggett agreed with, was that Edwards was trying by his absurd scheme to hedge—if General Liggett had assented he would have taken credit of success, or

98

In the Company of Generals

hidden behind General Liggett in event of failure; if night patrols fail he will say he told corps commander they would and proposed only feasible means of success, which were rejected. Conference with Lassiter about heavy artillery and his part of defense and attack plan. Inspected observation air group at Francheville. Mitchell, Brereton, and Hall—1st, 13th, and 88th squadrons—which seem now to be well equipped, largely with new Samsons and with photographic, wireless, gun, radio and other necessary departments. Things in good shape and personnel looked good, though rather unmilitary. Mitchell’s status undefined and Brereton, as corps Air Service commander, is embarrassed by him. Hall, as observation group commander, is the man at the field, and seems to run the show, though scarcely a pilot. Organization arrangements thoroughly bad; telephone and other liaison means improving. General Bullard called and announced that as he was to have Second Division in III Corps he wanted to go to see Bundy, of the Second. I took him up there. The meeting between Bullard and Bundy, who ranks him, was up to expectations. Colonel Preston Brown, chief of staff of Second Division, to dinner.

In Bundy’s case—and this was one of his special problems—he as a division commander ranked Bullard as a corps commander. Both were major generals. This placed Bullard in an awkward position. Bundy was about to be relieved, the division going to Harbord on the eve of the counterattack by the French and Americans scheduled at the Soissons salient for July 18, two days after the German attack petered out on July 16.

Sunday, July 14 Bastille Day. Drove to Dammartin to call on Bullard (headquarters First Division). Bullard off with Bjornstad (chief of staff of III Corps). General Liggett showed King (chief of staff of First) letter defining status of Bullard as commander of III Corps and Second Division as only administratively under his command so as to avoid any confusion, as Bullard’s attitude yesterday indicated a willingness to take over imme-

To Soissons

99

diately the entire command of Second. King said that Bullard had the letter and the order of the Sixth Army and understood, though he would take the matter up with him. From Dammartin to Dhuisy via Liay and Cocherel for lunch with General Schmidt (One Hundred Sixty-seventh French in I Corps) and attended first part of show given by a battalion in support. Late in afternoon, about 6:30, French Sixth Army sent word that artillery brigade of Second Division was to move out at once for Betz; that General Bundy was to report at Taillefontaine for lunch tomorrow with General Doyen of Moroccan division and others for a conference at 7:00 p.m. General Degoutte sent word that General Liggett should report for a conference at 7:30 at Trilport and General Liggett and Craig and Kahn left and returned at 12:00. Brown telephoned me about the meeting tomorrow and the confusion in command. Bundy called and waited for some time to see General Liggett. General Bullard telephoned asking me to let Bundy know that he is to have the VI Corps Americans and Harbord is to have the Second Division, and the latter is to attend alone the conference tomorrow; he wanted to know who commanded the Regular brigade of the Second. He said the whole Second is to come out of present position and his corps will be in Tenth Army, General Mangin, headquarters Vesigny. I conveyed Bullard’s message to Bundy purely as intermediary. He said Harbord was on leave and asked me to communicate with him at address in Paris which he left. Barbour, I discovered by telephone, was on the point of mussing these things up and I told him we better both do nothing and await Craig’s return, to which he consented. Later Craig advised that Harbord had already been notified sub rosa and would be here at 8:00 a.m. and any further responsibility was assumed by him, with full approval of what I had already done and said. Shelling all night—attack about Vaux and big push east of ChâteauThierry.

Bundy was being sent to take charge of a new corps created near the Swiss border to deceive the Germans into thinking the Americans were concentrating troops there. Bundy himself believed they were, and this was part of the deception. The serious matter, to be sure, was that the Second Division was being thrown into battle virtually without a commander—in

100

In the Company of Generals

an attack scheduled for July 18—because Harbord was being brought back from leave.

Monday, July 15 General Liggett received at 9:15 M. Sejunne and cohorts of greasy French politicians and gave them permission to go out to second line positions to see Americans of Second Division. General Lassiter called in to report on the night bombardment, still continuing, insisted explosives were arrivals and there were no French or American guns firing in this vicinity. He later confirmed this in writing and reported objective was the Air Service landing field above the chateau and guns were naval 12–15-in. Colonel Hoffman summoned to give report on trench work reported One Hundred Sixty-seventh work completed and good. The Twentysixth he knew little about and was instructed to stir up Colonel Bonnell and get the work done immediately and make periodical reports. Colonel Van Deman of G-2, Washington, called, making study, etc., and was passed up to Colonel Williams. General Lewis called on way to Thirtieth Division, which he is to command. General Ely of First Division, taking his brigade in Second. General P. Traub goes to Thirty-fifth Division as C.O., and Colonel Shelton as [sentence unfinished]. General Aultman called—reported satisfactory liaison between artillery and infantry in the Twenty-sixth, considerable early morning activity by enemy airplanes, though no réglages [opposition by the Air Service]. He loses two French groups, but keeps his forty-eight 75s and thirty-four 155s. Second Division artillery ordered back again and apparently Second Division entire remains here, either in I Corps or as army reserve. Later, order for artillery rescinded.

Wednesday, July 17 General Liggett has conferences with Lassiter about artillery preparations.

To Soissons

101

In afternoon General Cameron called and said some of his men were jumping off tonight with the II and VII corps and General Liggett explained the program. General Degoutte called at 4:30 and gave H-hour for the show and gave verbal explanation of order—twenty divisions to participate to the north and the VII and I corps to guide left regulating movement in accordance with progress to north. He reports satisfactory results in Champagne. He says the Thirty-ninth Division will not be added to I Corps U.S., as it goes to the Ninth Army with the XXXVIII Corps. General DeMitry, of Ninth Army, moves in on right and takes the XXXVIII and III Corps French in the center group of armies (Maistre) and Degoutte’s army becomes a part of Fayolle’s group to the north. Degoutte said while they expected to throw six divisions into the Marne attack at noon, only three were available. General Liggett read him his letter to McAndrew, chief of staff, GHQ, asking for more American divisions, and Degoutte approved. He does not, however, expect a drive down the valley from Château-Thierry. Lassiter was here part of the time and left to complete artillery plans, complaining that the time allowed was too brief. General Liggett approved of the order at 8:00 p.m. and at 8:30 had General Edwards and Aultman of artillery brigade here to go over it. Edwards did not seem to grasp his responsibilities in the matter or to have a clear idea of his mission; he was asking for advice and suggestions from General Liggett, which were given only to this extent—a caution not to crowd men too much in front line to take shell fire and not to let the attack run away beyond the objective, where further orders from the corps will determine the next move. Whether or not he would take Torcy on the first rush was left to his direction. General Liggett made him understand that once the show started it was out of his hands and in the hands of division commanders; the responsibility of decision as to details of operations of his division within the scope of the order was his and he must be out with horses, conveyances, and everything else necessary to keep in touch with the movement and preserve liaison. Aultman seemed to comprehend. Corps orders and maps were given to them. In evening Major Carston, of French Sixth, delivered in person a letter of General Degoutte giving H-hour 4:30 a.m., etc. Mitchell and Foulois were here but the general simply shook hands with them in Craig’s room.

102

In the Company of Generals

Preparations for what proved the battle of Soissons, and what the French sometimes described as the second battle of the Marne, hence were lastminute and at the least confusing. General Liggett’s part in them was slight. The wonder was that what happened in the attack of Degoutte with two American divisions, First and Second, and a French Moroccan division, was a considerable success, although with heavy American casualties.

6 Aisne-Marne I

The follow-up of the battle of Soissons was the Aisne-Marne offensive, and the individual who had to advance the action of I Corps was Liggett; his instruments for advance were appallingly weak, namely, the Twenty-sixth Division and a French division. All this was under the command of Degoutte, a suitable enough general but no assistance in pushing Edwards, who was Liggett’s principal problem. Now and then the ambitious Colonel Mitchell would appear, hoping that he might become an air brigade commander, which would make him a brigadier general. He perhaps sensed that his own displays of resolution could handle anything, inspiring General Pershing at GHQ to keep him around. Liggett was reduced to shoving around Edwards, an enormous task because as mentioned, Edwards had learned in the Old Army how one could maneuver; he was a master at it. He believed he could outmaneuver Liggett in the latter’s position as corps commander with only one and one-half divisions, the bulk of which were Edwards’s troops.

Thursday, July 18 Up at 3:30 and at headquarters at 4:30, when attack started. General Liggett in early afternoon advised Lassiter (in accord with his own view) against moving corps artillery forward except perhaps two pieces to go in by Crupon, on assumption, of course, that divisional artillery will follow up. Called on General Edwards at headquarters, Méry, and General Liggett gave him a memo of cautionary advice about counterattacks. General Liggett disapproved of plan advanced for taking Bouresches-Void, as the direct attack would be too costly and would in any event bring the Twenty-sixth ahead of the general line; if they wanted to put a company 103

104

In the Company of Generals

in to infiltrate and keep contact, he had no objection. This plan was evidently the more comprehensive one—which they abandoned. General Liggett talked over the situation with Edwards and impressed upon him the duty of doing the assigned part and guiding on the left throughout the operation, but he told him that he might very properly help out Schmidt (One Hundred Sixty-seventh) on the left if he needed help in his task on the immediate left of the Twenty-sixth to the extent of a battalion or so and Edwards approved, intimating that he was all the more ready to do this as Schmidt’s task was clearly bound up with theirs, and I inferred that they had already talked the matter over in a general way. As to the corps reserve of one battalion, General Liggett consented to the substitution of a battalion in action today for the one held out today, the used battalion to become corps reserve; and he told Edwards in an offhand way that he might use it if he wanted it. Called on General Schmidt of One Hundred Sixty-seventh. The general told Schmidt that if he wanted help from Edwards for his operations around 193 his request to that effect would have his approval, the fair inference being that he could have help if he wanted it.

Aisne-Marne I

105

In the evening General Degoutte called and thanked General Liggett for the assistance and successful performances of the Americans engaged, the Twenty-sixth and Fourth being in his army. He reported fine advances by Third and First Americans to Mount de Paris and south of Soissons, check of French about Choug and Neuilly-St.-Front. He was obviously disappointed, but considered it on the whole a good day. He plans a continuation of the exploitation for tomorrow, and at 10:30 General Liggett received a note giving H-hour as 4:00 a.m. Lassiter here on ammunition. General Liggett signs letter he dictates.

Friday, July 19 Up at 3:15 and at office at 4:00 a.m. Exploitation resumed, but with less satisfactory results. Liaison officer, Captain Gray, here from French VII Army Corps (Massenet) to learn about present state of Schmidt’s line and his and the Americans’ intentions respecting Hill 193. He was advised that Schmidt is about to attack 193 with two regiments, the Americans on Schmidt’s right assisting with covering machine-gun and rifle fire. A report came from Grant that the 52nd Brigade (Cole) had limited amount of assistance to machine-gun and protecting rifle fire and would give no units to Schmidt for attack, as they wished to conserve them for operations tomorrow. Barbour was excited over this and thought there was some misunderstanding which General Liggett might want to clear up. General Liggett gave him a brief hearing, but later called Edwards for explanation. Edwards said he approved of Cole’s decision as the latter had only one hundred fifty effectives in each battalion and General Liggett seemed satisfied to let it go at that. Question of reserve battalion also came up, when it appeared that Edwards had not saved out any battalion and had not replaced the one originally assigned by a used battalion. Craig got after this. Called on Schmidt, who said his attack on 193 was in progress; that Gaucher on his left had been calling on him to take 193 and Petret before he would go forward himself and that explained the delay in taking Nevathiers assigned to the 164th. Schmidt said he would take 193, but Petret was in Gaucher’s zone and he was not going after it. He said artillery and machine-gun assistance from Americans was already arranged to his satisfaction and while he would like American infantrymen he did

106

In the Company of Generals

not want to endanger or lose more lives than necessary. He intimated that friction and lack of harmonious cooperation were characteristic of French division command. Called on Edwards, to whom General Liggett explained Schmidt’s situation, and the part that Cole was to play in the advance and the general eastward direction of zone of advance for Twenty-sixth Division. Called on General Cole, of 52nd Brigade, who said he understood the plan perfectly. He said he had two hundred fifty effectives in one battalion and six hundred fifty in another; that he was getting replacements. He said Schmidt had what he wanted as assistance; he thought he was good, but had not much regard for his I.D. [intelligence department]. General Treat blew in on his way to Italy, rubbernecking. General Coulter, a National Guard Forty-first Division slob from Havre, imposed himself for the purpose of asking General Liggett to make him a lieutenant general or something higher, if possible. At office in evening until 12:00. Attack progresses.

Saturday, July 20 Up at 3:00 a.m. H hour at 4:00. Edwards telephoned me to give message to General Liggett saying that he had brigade and regimental commanders in conference over a serious situation involved in the extension of the plan of attack at which he demurred. I told him Craig was on his way out and would take care of the question and so reported to General Liggett. At 10:00 Kahn brings Degoutte’s instructions for a new order providing for a general attack. 10:15 General Degoutte arrives and makes slight modification in plan and outlines situation. General Brewster calls here on the scent for Mitchell. He wanted to know what Liggett wanted done with Mitchell and he said in effect that corps Air Service had not been good until he got hold of Mitchell and told him to keep his hands off, that now it is all right; that he likes to have Mitchell around where he can ask his advice if he wants it, etc., but he did not satisfy Brewster, who evidently wanted General Liggett to ask for Mitchell’s relief—an obviously inappropriate decision to come from

Aisne-Marne I

107

the corps commander, as Mitchell is not corps Air Service commander but brigade commander of First Army. Major General John Chamberlain, chief of inspector general’s department, hung around all day, asking questions about everything going on—a visitor pure and simple. General Pershing, Boyd, and Hughes at luncheon. General Liggett went over series of orders and maps with J.J.P. covering current operation and gave him a complete set. General Wright, V Corps, on top of us also and for dinner and night. Lassiter arrived at 12:00 to perfect artillery plans. Attack starts at 3:00. 6:30 visited Schmidt at Dhuisy, about to move on to Marigny as new headquarters. Attack on 193 uncertain, but reports things going well. His men very tired and only twelve fresh battalions. 7:00 visited Edwards, who reported right (101st) held up by machine guns in wood and losses heavy. General Liggett told him to go around the woods. Edwards demurred because of the extra distance the men must go and General Liggett made light of this. Edwards and Major (chief of staff) admitted they were not able to say where their units were, and information came back very slowly. Major said they would move headquarters tomorrow. He proposed a longer jump. Office in evening—orders for tomorrow. Bed.

Sunday, July 21 Up at 8:00. Craig established advance headquarters at Montreuil-aux-Lions. He telephoned that Edwards at 8:00 a.m. had failed to open headquarters at Genevrois Farm yesterday afternoon as ordered and to open up at Lucy-le-Bocage today. We drove to Méry and they all reported that Edwards had left for Lucy two hours before—it was then after 9:00 and Edwards had been ordered to be there at 4:00. At Lucy-le-Bocage met Edwards driving up to unsettled headquarters, as he said, from a visit to Cole at La Vois de Châtel. Bowen, Simpkins and Major all had different stories about where the headquarters were established, evidently in anticipation of critical inquiry. Edwards said he had been there at 4:00.

108

In the Company of Generals

Craig had sent an officer out before 8:00 and found no one, and went himself after 8:00 and found simply telephone people. General Liggett said he did not know what to think unless he should admit that they, the Twenty-sixth staff, were all liars. When we were there Edwards did have telephone connections and at least three officers. General Degoutte called on Craig before General Liggett got to Montreuil-aux-Lions and showed much disappointment at the failure of the Twenty-sixth to get its objective. Edwards was rather flighty with General Liggett on this subject, claiming fierce fighting, two thousand losses, etc., and his men all tired out. Reports from Twenty-sixth show slower progress. General Brewster around trying again to draw out General Liggett on the subject of Edwards and Mitchell. I did not hear all the conversation, but knew from General Liggett that he did not commit himself and declined to furnish a memorandum. General John Chamberlain was also snooping around incessantly with his satellites. It appears that the inspector general’s officers were both interested in Edwards’s tardiness in establishing his headquarters and in his failure to keep up to schedule and his reluctant attitude. It appears that he had not followed General Liggett’s suggestion about going around the woods and of course was held up. General Wright overnight. He told me privately that the confusion in the 52nd Brigade was hopeless and stragglers and trophy hunters all over the place. General Liggett very insistent all day about getting a location map of 52nd and Backman and Sills expressly instructed to go out and find their units, as none in the Twenty-sixth knew anything about it, but at end of day the confusion was unexplained. Much confusion at the office. Degoutte in with new orders for attack—push, push, push. Called on Schmidt (One hundred Sixty-seventh) in morning at Marigny, where he had established his headquarters on time. Still troubled by the struggle on 193. Long telephone with GHQ on prisoners, etc.

In the Aisne-Marne offensive that followed the successful if costly battle of Soissons, the Twenty-sixth was lagging. It was becoming clear that Liggett’s advice to Edwards was going in one ear and out the other.

Aisne-Marne I

109

Monday, July 22 Started off at 6:30 for Montreuil-aux-Lions and thence to Lucy-leBocage, Torcy, Etrepilly, Givray, Grande Rue Farm, headquarters of Twenty-sixth Division. Edwards out on ground. Saw Bowen and Major and Hyatt. Lassiter there also. General Edwards discussed with Lassiter the disposition of corps artillery and functions in pursuit attack; with Bowen and Major with reference to positions of 52nd, which they admitted they did not know. The outfit seemed to be worried, timorous, and full of self pity over exaggerated losses. From there to Epaux-Bezu and called on General Schmidt at P.C. He seemed fairly well satisfied with program of One Hundred Sixty-seventh. He said he had realized that the order for his withdrawal behind the 52nd Brigade at 5:00 a.m. could not be carried out as the lines had not sufficiently pinched together to permit it and he had kept on attacking and would do so. General Liggett said the order was not annulled but suspended. He had previously made this clear at Twenty-sixth, and admonished them to push, push, push in accordance with army orders, to limit of endurance. Established advance corps P.C. at 12:00 at Buire. In evening Edwards spreads disquieting rumors and asks for reinforcements, which are secured through Second Army—brigade of Twenty-eighth Americans. Heavy shelling. Brewer reports. Cole balks at new attack orders and Edwards tells him to make an effort anyway.

Tuesday, July 23 Shelton could not give positions of 52nd or Thirty-ninth French or the other units with any confidence. He considered the 52nd hopelessly confused and needing reorganization; the 104th he could not find out much about. General Liggett told him to send at once, while he waited, for report on 101st and liaison with Thirty-ninth French. Captain Lee soon returned with the former, which showed progress, and Lieutenant Peters, liaison officer, soon returned with report of progress by Thirtyninth and liaison established. Shelton said he could not get out himself as he had to stick to the telephone. Parker was not very lucid in his report on 102nd, but said men were dead in the outfit; that the First Battalion had 175 men, Second Battalion 250, Third Battalion 500; all

110

In the Company of Generals

the rest dead. General Liggett did not believe this and said so; also that he thought a large portion of the missing were asleep in the woods or straggling—which Parker denied. Shelton, over-calm, showed no signs of life or drive. The atmosphere of his headquarters was like a morgue— everybody dead or dying or in a state of collapse of crying for relief. General Edwards came there and talked with General Liggett privately in the motor car. I heard nothing of the conversation except General Liggett’s inquiry if Edwards had found out where his units were and his advice that they must dispose of machine-gun nests by surrounding them rather than by direct attack, men against machine. Came home via Château-Thierry, Vincelles, Lucy, Clignon, etc. General Degoutte here advising push with new objectives, etc. In middle of night Edwards called up to say that Shelton strongly advised against making attack ordered and he emphasized to Craig, who was at the telephone, the fatigued condition of the troops. He wants Liggett’s permission to postpone attack for more artillery preparation. Craig said he would speak to the general about it and in my hearing General Liggett said “Tell him to obey his orders; that there was nothing that had been said by him in his morning’s talk on machine guns which would justify the slightest inference that the orders were not to be obeyed.” Craig said all this in effect, but did not respect the general’s words or give a very strong tone to his responses, which was somewhat weakened by Edwards’s insistence on discussion. A fine opportunity lost. The attack, which was to start at 4:00, was not delivered until 8:30, and Edwards pleaded in excuse the fact that Wright’s brigade did not get into position in time.

Wednesday, July 24 Called on Edwards at Grande Rue Farm. Edwards and officers horribly low and nervous and eagerly looking forward to relief. General Liggett said that Edwards had some colonels whom he must lose and Edwards said he was sending in a letter making recommendations for relief of Parker, 102nd, and Foote, 104th, by inference. General Liggett asked him about the other two, Hume and Logan, and Edwards said Logan was very popular and willing and Hume was the only Regular colonel he had. Edwards and General Liggett had private talk in which

Aisne-Marne I

111

General Liggett told me afterwards he had told Edwards that the trouble with him was that he never obeyed his orders or made his officers obey theirs, intruding his own judgment or allowing officers to exercise their ideas when only one thing was called for—exact obedience. He reminded Edwards that he had himself insisted on a court-martial for Major Gallant, who had failed to carry out an order at Seicheprey.

Thursday, July 25 General Degoutte here with change in plan, which contemplated a temporary halt on present line; the Forty-second to take over the corps front, retiring the Twenty-sixth Division and the 56th Brigade of the Twenty-eighth, which should go out as soon as practicable and the One hundred Sixty-seventh to go out of line tomorrow night. Presently the dispositions on the front will be, left to right—II Corps Sixth Army, First American Army (Four, Twenty-six, Forty-second and I Corps, Third, Twenty-eight, II Corps), French Fifth. Mitchell here to find out what Brewster is trying to do with him. General Liggett said he told Brewster his chief of Air Service, Royce, was relieved without his knowledge or approval and that is about all. Mitchell said he had not done it (and was lying). Mitchell says his present function is technical supervision as brigade commander over corps air units and pursuit (American) units in Sixth Army. He expects Foulois to become chief of Air Service, zone of advance, and himself to be chief of Air Service, First Army.

Friday, July 26 Went to Trugny via Epieds to see Menoher, who is postponing operations until the Twenty-sixth is out. He reports much confusion in the Twenty-sixth, with units of French between Americans and units with lost direction. His line at noon is established, however, and they are ready for the operations at 3:00 p.m. Lassiter here as usual. General Degoutte came with modifications of plan which he had already developed with Craig when we were away, the change being to

112

In the Company of Generals

postpone the general attack until tomorrow at 8:00 p.m. in order to avoid possibility of troops in advance being caught on plateau in daylight under shell fire. This might happen if the Americans’ advance was unexpectedly slow or if they were held back by tardiness of the Thirtyfifth on the right or the Ninth on the left. At 5:00 MacArthur gives notice that he has taken his objective. Forty-second Division artillery to go in place tonight; One hundred Sixty-seventh goes out. General Liggett expressed regret today that Craig was so prejudiced against the Twenty-sixth Division; he thought the division had done creditably under the circumstances. I told him I thought Craig’s prejudice applied to General Edwards and he did feel strongly on that point and that he felt him entirely untrustworthy. I said that I thought the Twenty-sixth was entitled to credit only under the circumstances of great handicap, which resulted from the inefficiency of officers, their disregard of orders, and their babyish way of dealing with the men; and all this emanated from the top. General Liggett agreed. He said he thought Edwards was much improved over Neufchâteau, and while I admitted this I said I thought the recent demonstration showed him to be hopeless and he could not be made over; that the stigma on the fine men of the Twenty-sixth involved in this recent mêlée and fainthearted performance was a crime attributable to the unsoundness of the Twenty-sixth command. The position of General Liggett and staff, principally Craig and Stackpole, was anomalous during this start of the Aisne-Marne offensive, for Liggett’s principal problem was to push Edwards, which was equivalent to pushing an inert mass. Edwards had an acute sense of how much he could get away with and sensed that Liggett was in a bad position, could not relieve him, was technically running a corps consisting of the Twentyâ•‚ sixth and a French division half the size of the Twenty-sixth, all under Degoutte, whose tactics, quite simply, were to push and push. If the Americans through Liggett were unable (Edwards was unable) to push, all Degoutte could do was to cover the Twenty-sixth’s inaction and put out a new order asking for push. As a sort of sideshow, Mitchell was maneuvering with his alleged command that gave some authority over I Corps’s Air Service—how much, Liggett was uncertain, although Stackpole reduced the errant colonel’s actions to lying.

7 Aisne-Marne II

When the last of the German attacks failed one day after it began, July 15–16, the Allies and Americans began to force the German army back over a series of rivers from the Marne to the Aisne, and this effort required weeks, through most of August. American casualties were heavy because officers and men were without experience, save for the counterattack toward Soissons on July 18 by the First and Second divisions that started the Germans on their way. In the rollback one could contend that American divisions gained experience, whatever their losses. But the problem of losses during the AisneMarne offensive was that the cost of the enterprise was more than the experience justified. In the Aisne-Marne, General Liggett served as the American I Corps commander, under Degoutte, whose army command comprised I Corps and the French corps under General de Moundessir. Fortunately Liggett’s corps was reinforced by the Forty-second Division, replacing the Twenty-sixth under Edwards, the latter being more trouble than it was worth.

Saturday, July 27 Lassiter called to speak of hopeless confusion in army corps and divisional artillery, owing to changes in orders. Decided that One Hundred Sixty-seventh artilllery shall remain until tomorrow morning, by which time Forty-second artillery should take over. General Schmidt, One Hundred Sixty-seventh, called on way over from sector to rest area, headquarters Dhuisy. General Degoutte here with reference to postponement of attack. 113

114

In the Company of Generals

General Haan and aide (Thirty-second) here en route to new headquarters. General Lenihan here. General Edwards and aide here, and though I was not present I know General Liggett took attitude that no discrimination should be made against Parker of 102nd, where the other colonels were as bad, and made it clear that Twenty-sixth must go ’way back to reconstitute and train. Colonel Bach of Fourth here; also Colonels Bugge and McCleave of army staff. Major Hammond here from Shannon’s personnel office; also General McKinstry, eng.

Aisne-Marne II

115

Degoutte here again with outline of plan for following up Boche retreat tomorrow and order sent out for continuing activity of patrols and advance guards and making attack at 11:00 tonight to Ourcq.

Sunday, July 28 Degoutte at Buire in morning and consented to change of headquarters to Mouchaton chateau. Move accomplished and headquarters established at 12:30 p.m. Forty-second proceeds with attack and at night reports 4,200 casualties with seven battalions across the Marne and Sergy seven times taken and lost. Bach of Fourth Division and his staff assembled at chateau to establish headquarters. Went to Artois Farm. Two battalions ordered to assemble in region of Artois Farm, available for General Menoher. Lassiter is directed by General Liggett to bring up eight more big guns. Degoutte calls to argue for continuance of attack in spite of representations by chief of staff and General Liggett as to condition of Fortysecond and the risks involved, and modified his order so as to provide for attack on left of corps sector and on right only if the XXXVIII Corps caught up and sustained the right flank of Brown’s brigade of Fortysecond now up in the air. Of course the order was obeyed and this had already been provided for before Degoutte’s visit, but General Liggett gave him a letter stating his views as a matter of record. It appears that cavalry (18,000) placed under disposition of General Menoher and instructed to advance through break when in his judgment a sufficient break had been made failed to respond to his signal. Chief of staff of XXXVIII Corps came over to conference in order to inform Degoutte and Liggett as to his line.

Monday, July 29 General Cameron of Fourth here to report headquarters at Artois Farm, and his artillery moving up under General Babbitt. General Edwards here for undiscovered purpose, but apparently to insure action by Craig on his memorandum respecting officers. In talk with General

116

In the Company of Generals

Liggett, Edwards spoke with evident purpose of justifying his own and Shelton’s conduct of the habit of the French, to obey orders or not as they might choose. He was told by General Liggett that his outfit would go back into the Ferte-sous-Jouarre area to be reconstituted and trained.

Tuesday, July 30 Called on General Menoher at Brevardes (Forty-second). He and MacArthur both stated 2,400 (and few killed) to be casualties to date. They say Forty-second has another punch and is going strong, but the XXXVIII Corps must come up on their right if their right flank is not to be left up in the air. They can hold on where they are, but they can’t go forward without needless loss. General Liggett told them not to move on their right until the XXXVIII comes up and not to have too many in front line—echelon in depth. MacArthur went with us to 84th Brigade headquarters (Brown) at La Croix Blanche Farm. Brown very much changed and despondent about the condition of his brigade—lost his nerve and all in. MacArthur told me that the brigade is all right and he himself has been fighting it for the last two days, as Brown is done up.

Being chief of staff of the Forty-second Division, General MacArthur was in a position to take over the 84th Brigade permanently from General Brown, “done up.” But one wonders if he was jockeying for Brown’s post. MacArthur had become chief of staff of the Forty-second when it was formed in 1917. He had been a major in the war department working close to Secretary Baker, and the move allowed him the rank of colonel. In July 1918, he received promotion to brigadier general and was scheduled to leave for the United States where he would train an infantry brigade of the Eleventh Division in Maryland. Then, according to him, General Brown of the 84th Brigade broke down, collapsed. According to the brigade’s two infantry colonels, this was not the case; Brown was in control. It was possible that MacArthur, who was close to Menoher, had talked himself into brigade command in France, which he of course desired. Brown was relieved on August 5, sent to Blois, the AEF’s camp for incompetents, and reduced to colonel. MacArthur testified strongly against him.

Aisne-Marne II

117

Thursday, August 1 Called on Menoher (Forty-second) in Brevardes. MacArthur and Menoher both there. They said Brown had collapsed and MacArthur to be in temporary command of 84th Brigade, with Hughes chief of staff and Murphy G-3. They were concerned over the attack of the 63rd Brigade (Covel) of Thirty-second Division, in which he [Covel] had declined to follow method of infiltration and advanced his brigade in dense formation against machine guns, with large losses. General Liggett much disturbed at this, stating that one battalion instead of one brigade was sufficient for the purpose. He said if the report was true, there was ground for Covel’s relief. He wanted to convey his views to Haan, but it was a delicate matter and he did not know exactly how to do it. He repeated advice not to attempt to rush Nesle, but to go around it with small bodies. Losses were reported by General Menoher of about four thousand, with five hundred killed. In afternoon conference, General Pétain, Generals Degoutte, Liggett, du Moundessir, Bullard (the latter an interloper and a nuisance). Pétain had du Moundessir explain dispositions in his zone and Liggett the same. Both he and Degoutte expressed satisfaction at I Corps dispositions. Pétain said very little, but cautioned against too much eagerness on part of Americans and attempts to take tons of machine-gun nests by direct attack. He said the French had learned this lesson with cost and we must learn ours as quickly as possible. General Liggett said he had been continually impressing this on the division, brigade and other commanders. Degoutte laid out plan for operations at 4:15 tomorrow morning, when du Moundessir will work forward with the Thirty-second Division and the Forty-second will keep pace. General Liggett agreed to do this, though on understanding that nothing should interfere with relief of Forty-second tomorrow night.

Saturday, August 3 Visited Cameron at headquarters, Château de la Forêt. General Liggett advised him to keep in touch with his brigadiers to prevent them from putting too many men in front line and surround rather than rush

118

In the Company of Generals

machine-gun nests. Cameron thought Booth had moved forward (but he was wrong) and he did not know very accurately where the brigade line was, though he knew they were not up to the XXXVIII Corps, with which they had established liaison. He said he had some losses last night from bombs dropped in the woods on sheltered men. Cameron rather nervous and did not seem to have things especially well in hand. Through Villers-sur-Fère and Fère-en-Tardenois to Berlinges and visited General Poore of 7th Brigade, who did not know what his zone limits were and had to be shown by General Liggett, who also warned him about the use of men in front line and against machine guns. Saw Gatly, chief of staff, Forty-second Division artillery.

Losses of the Forty-second Division seemed remarkably high, and one wonders if the division commander and his chief of staff knew what was happening in the battalions on the front line.

Sunday, August 4 Franklin Roosevelt and party (assistant secretary of the navy) called at chateau and we sent them off on a joy tour under direction of Major Hunter Scott. Like everybody else they wanted to get shot at with a guarantee against a hit and smell dead men and horses.

Monday, August 5 Colonel Mitchell here. He says scarcity of aviators and observers is now a more serious obstacle than scarcity of airships. The recent plan of GHQ to cut down the squadrons is fatal to good service. He claimed we had brought down eighty-five Boches and lost about forty ships in the recent offensive. He said English were very brave, but had tremendous losses, largely day bombers brought down by antiaircraft artillery. He professes not to know what Foulois is doing, who runs the bombing program, etc., and says things are not in a satisfactory condition and Patrick is very nervous about this.

Aisne-Marne II

119

Very conflicting reports from our units, especially as to Fismes and Bazoches, neither of which are in our hands, though frequently so reported. Very unsatisfactory reports from Cameron, who can’t seem to keep track of his outfits, especially Booth’s brigade. Aultman called at Mouchaton in morning on his way out with 51st Artillery Brigade. He said he has lost about three horses and his animals were in bad shape. He hoped to go into billets somewhere south of the Marne and get grazing.

General Aultman’s losses of animals sounded as if the horses were not getting enough hay. A large problem in the AEF was that animals needed both hay and oats, and supplies of one were not necessarily in the same places as the other. Without both, the animals starved.

Tuesday, August 6 Bjornstad, chief of staff of the III Corps, AEF, was here for a sinister purpose. He said he was not going to attack today and suggested that we should not. General Liggett said we proposed to obey our orders. Bjornstad said he had a plan for cooperation of effort by the I and III corps, which he wanted us to join in. General Liggett told him that such plans were the business of the army commander. Bjornstad said that he thought the plan might appropriately be put up to Degoutte as the suggestion of the I and III corps, but General Liggett maintained that this was an attempt to run the army and he would not have anything to do with it. Bjornstad was evidently half ashamed of his performance, but was persistent, and turned back twice to say—“Is there anything more I can do in this proposition?” At lunch it developed clearly that Bjornâ•‚ stad and Bullard are both trying to run the show independently of each other, and Bjornstad is somewhat nettled and subdued by the superior authority of rank, which he cannot get around. Cameron told Craig in the evening that the major part of the 7th Brigade was over the Vesle and Bazoches surrounded, about to be entered and mopped up, and would be ours tomorrow morning; that the 8th Brigade had the Route Nationale to the east.

120

In the Company of Generals

Wednesday, August 7 Fère-en-Tardenois. Much uncertainty about Bazoches and the line of Poore’s 7th Brigade, owing to unsatisfactory liaison. It develops that he had two companies across the river, but has not got into or surrounded the place. It develops that Poore’s brigade has hung back and Bach’s regiment has no intention of going forward and Poore has no intention of making them, claiming that they are fatigued, that shell fire is a horrible thing, etc., and Poore has no liaison with Booth. Bugge, G-3, ascertained this by personal inspection. Cameron was reported by Bugge as admitting that something was wrong in Poore’s outfit, but he was not disposed to take any definite action by way of disciplining Poore or insisting on obedience to orders. Colonel DeWitt, army G-4, at lunch; says army is to go to Chezy in ten days or so; that Seventy-seventh moves up in trucks from Coulommiers to Loupeigne and Mareuil, commencing on tenth of August, and army plan is to supply eight thousand replacements to the Forty-second out of the Twenty-sixth. Colonel Drum, army chief of staff, called and saw Craig; also Winship. General Degoutte here in afternoon. General Liggett expressed regret that the 7th€[Brigade] had misrepresented things in their claims that they were over and mopping up Bazoches last night, that the fact was that only two companies were over the Vesle at Bazoches. He explained the position of Booth on the right and Girard (One Hundred Sixty-second) on the left. Degoutte asked if he had any conference with the III Corps and General Liggett said that Bjornstad had been over the day before and again at night with some plan or other, but General Liggett had nothing to do with him and said he was going to obey his orders. (This lost a good deal in Kahn’s faulty translation.) In answer to Degoutte’s rather persistent inquiry, General Liggett said he thought that the men of the Fourth were tired and that they could not be expected to do much more than rectify the line FismesBazoches. At Degoutte’s request he also expressed his idea on any continuance of the advance to the heights above the Vesle at the moment—there was nothing to be gained by it, especially if undertaken by exhausted troops and an attack then on the Aisne position would

Aisne-Marne II

121

be a mistake. The land between the Aisne and the Vesle he described as “no man’s land.” Degoutte said he would like to have the I Corps reach out a little to the right and take the triangle across the Vesle between the railroad and the highway, and then let the III Corps come in and take it over. He thought the loss incident to III Corps taking the place would be greater than for the I [Corps] already across to clean it up, though General Liggett thought the III ought to take care of it. Degoutte had evidently been having his troubles with the III Corps and could not get them to do anything. He also wants the I Corps to get Bazoches and straighten out line and then send feelers forward onto heights above the Vesle to keep contact with Germans and watch for any withdrawal. He wished to retain the bridgehead established by recent operations and in the form indicated Fismes and Bazoches, east and west. General Liggett said we could establish this line and would do our best. Cameron here in afternoon at General Liggett’s request. He wants to draw back and stay on this side of the Vesle and is reluctant to have Poore do anything more (eager to get home). His plan was to have Booth and Poore both hold on as they are for a day and see what happens. After Craig joined conference, at my suggestion, Degoutte’s order was reported, which settled any discussion about withdrawing and it was understood that Bazoches should be soaked with gas and the Fourth and the One Hundred Sixty-second should attempt to surround the place on the east and west.

Saturday, August 10 General Cameron came in to get some idea to what was going to happen, as he said. He said it was his idea that it was better to settle down where they are and dig in, but General Liggett said that was contrary to army orders. Cameron wants to get a definite habitat so he can build big dugouts. General Liggett told him to have his men dig themselves as well as they could as temporary protection, in any event. He said that a company got into Bazoches yesterday, but went out when the place was bombed, and was being reformed, preparatory to going in again, when the captain had orders from General Poore to retire. General Liggett said he guessed Poore could land in the S.O.S. Cameron said Poore had run down to him yesterday to find out what to do with two companies that

122

In the Company of Generals

got into difficulties, and he told him it was his business to command his outfit. He thought Poore was not nerveless, but overcautious. General Liggett said he was much disappointed in Poore. Cameron had a good deal to say about losses from shell fire, the wrecked condition of his men every time they came out of it, the vulnerability of the Vesle valley from the Chemin des Dames, etc., and showed himself to be in a very flabby, reluctant frame of mind, about ready to lie down. He said the 7th Brigade were all in and he wanted to stretch Booth over and put Poore in behind. General Liggett said Poore better peg away and see what he could do, and General Liggett suggested that he be advised to run a few squads of machine gunners or entrenched riflemen in to hang onto the place, as they could with the help of a barrage do all necessary. Cameron did not believe reports from the Thirty-eighth on their right and is all at odds with the Sixty-seventh on left over a trifle, and appears to be giving his mind to every collateral subject and dodging the immediate issue in hand. He undoubtedly was looking for a lead from General Liggett on Poore and thinks he ought to can him, but lacks nerve. He referred to Bowley’s misleading account of progress and his unsatisfactory showing, and said that perhaps Cameron would have to get rid of some of his colonels, too. Generals Johnson and Wittenmyer and Noble called and the officers of the Seventy-seventh were crowded around the place all day. Summoned to Château-Thierry, by General Degoutte. Bullard of III Corps there, too. Degoutte said Pershing would not take First Army.

Saturday, August 17 General Liggett again observed to me that Cameron has been a great disappointment and shown himself incapable and Poore showed he could not command his brigade. He admitted that Booth’s performance demonstrated the condition of the men was not the cause of Poore’s reluctance and failure to make his advance on Bazoches on schedule. He said he proposed to send in a report on this to GHQ. He thought Cameron had not shown himself trustworthy, that Menoher was the only one of the three who had. As to the Twenty-sixth, he said he proposed to tell Pershing that he did not want to have anything more to do with that outfit. He said Edwards

Aisne-Marne II

123

was absolutely untrustworthy and had again shown it by attempting to justify his promiscuous leaves to Paris by saying that General Liggett told him to send as many as he could. The fact was, as I knew, that General Liggett told General Edwards that he might go to Paris, but he never gave an intimation that anyone else might go.

Wednesday, August 21 Called on General Burnham, of Eighty-second Division, at Marbache. He had right portion of our sector, astride the Moselle at Pont-àMousson; also on General Summerall, of First Division, moving out from left portion of sector to be relieved by General Allen and the Ninetieth Division; also on General Girard, Eighth Army (Flavigny), and General Passaga, XXXII Corps (Toul), both being out; and on General Dickman, IV American Corps, at Toul. No definite news as to our duties, etc., except General Lassiter goes to IV Corps and all corps troops go and we get French artillery with a general and staff to command it.

Thursday, August 22 General Cameron, V Corps, here to talk about Poore and get General Liggett’s support. He said Poore had gone to GHQ while he was in hospital and asked for the Fourth Division, though he knew that both Cameron and General Liggett were displeased and dissatisfied with Poore’s performances on the Vesle; that he could not recommend him for the division, though he was prepared to give him a chance by not denouncing him and suggesting that Poore continue until he shows himself worthy and then he may get the division. He said his staff were all opposed to him and favored Booth. General Liggett said that he was never more surprised or disappointed than when Poore failed to deliver, as he considered him a man of good attainments and abundant qualifications and yet he had not shown himself fit to command a brigade and certainly could not be recommended for a division. He said if he were in Cameron’s place he would recommend giving Poore a chance to make good in temporary command and then recommend him for the division if he proved himself worthy. Cameron appeared much relieved and beat it.

124

In the Company of Generals

I warned General Liggett that he was in danger of having a frank and gratuitous expression of opinion misconstrued in quotation and I would not trust Cameron to be fair, as I thought he was characteristically lying down on General Liggett, as so many like to do, with the intention of quoting him to get the benefit of his weight of opinion and use it for their own purpose. General Liggett said he thought Mitchell and Edwards had both used him in that way. In course of conversation General Liggett said that in the abstract he quite agreed with my view that a man who, like Poore, had failed to make good should go, but there were considerations, such as past history and accomplishments and the difficulty of finding as good men to take their places. I said that I thought in considering the question of substitutes he was assuming the responsibilities of the higher command and this had nothing to do with the question of fitness.

Cameron had received command of a corps.

Saturday, August 24 Burnham wants authority to retaliate against some machine-gun fire on his kitchen, etc. He does not seem to know what to do. General Liggett refers him to Girard, who says he will give him some ammunition, but Burnham does not know what he needs and is on verge of accepting ammunition for G.P.F.’s [heavy French-made artillery] without knowing until I told him that he had none.

Tuesday, August 27 General McAlexander reports to take brigade (180th) of Ninetieth Division. He goes with me to headquarters, Ninetieth Division, where we found General Allen, Kingman (chief of staff), and Thorne, G-3. General Liggett advised Allen that he had too many men in outpost line, and graphically explained Pétain’s views, given to us on the Marne. He also advised against anything in the intermediate position

Aisne-Marne II

125

as unnecessary to support the outpost line, who must do or die, and probably in the way of a defensive barrage for the resistance line. Kingman and McAlexander grasped it all and agreed. Allen seemed to like many men up as it gave experience to the maximum number, and he liked some units in the intermediate position as they supplied moral support to outpost line. He evidently must think the plan over, and perhaps get a good dose of gas in his outpost before he comprehends.

Friday, August 30 I told Quekemeyer that I was sick of having so many people inquiring furtively for the general’s health and I wanted him to know that the general’s health was excellent, that he was much better than six months ago, keen, alert, and hardy, and in the Marne, where everyone of the staff had dysentery from the dead horses, men and flies around, the general had a much easier time than many of his staff, was never incapacitated, and simply stayed quiet while it lasted. Quekemeyer said he had wondered at the inquiries, was glad to get this firsthand information, and would use it where it would do most good. I referred to such stories as mean and pernicious, to which Quekemeyer agreed. In the afternoon Craig called up to say that he had ordered Allen of the Ninetieth to conform to army orders in view of his putting five battalions into line instead of four and wanted General Liggett’s support. The general told me he had already told Allen he had too many in the front line and he approved of Craig’s order and would support it when Allen’s expected protest comes in the morning. First Army took over at 11:00 p.m.

Colonel John C. Quekemeyer was one of Pershing’s aides. The First Army, the AEF’s only field army—the Second Army would be announced in midOctober, and the Third Army comprised divisions scheduled after the war for occupation of Germany—took over the American divisions under French command on the above date, preparatory to the battle of St. Mihiel, to open September 12.

126

In the Company of Generals

Saturday, August 31 General Allen turned up, arguing that he wanted to give maximum number of members of his outfit a chance to look over the ground and get front-line training, and he at least thought he would keep the equivalent of four battalions in front, splitting organizations. General Craig was present with General Liggett and the latter seemed rather lukewarm about the thing anyway, though insisting that he had told Allen that four should be a maximum, while the general argued that he understood he approved of his five battalions disposition. Craig later told the general [Liggett] he thought he had gone back on him and the latter wrote a positive letter of command to Allen to limit his front line to four battalions, with authority to substitute battalions so as to widen scope of training; no further discussion of the subject to be entertained. General Berry of artillery brigade, Thirty-fifth Division, called to report and would gladly have accepted three rooms and bath and meals and a bottle of wine, if anyone had been damn fool enough to offer them.

Sunday, September 1 Pershing sent word he would be here in the morning and wanted Vincent, the corps artillery commander, available. Later we were directed to meet at IV Corps headquarters, where Vincent, General Liggett and I arrived at about 12:30. Pétain, McGlachlin, De Chambrun, Lassiter, Dickman, Heintzelman. Pétain asked artillerymen as to their dispositions of guns and ammunition and asked General Liggett if in the event of a push in eleven days he would be ready and General Liggett said yes. Pétain intimated a change in pivot of line to vicinity of Regnieville and warned against an advance too close to the left bank of Moselle, north of Pont-à-Mousson, because of concentration of dominating artillery. He said tanks had been most useful, but German antitank bullets from guns and elephant rifles were now too effective and two-thirds of tanks had been stopped in recent operations. Therefore the return to artillery preparation preceding infantry advance was necessary and he seemed to have in mind eight to twelve hours of intense preparation. Heintzelman was anxious to have him denominate this as a surprise attack or otherwise and was somewhat muddled anyway. Pétain indicated that

Aisne-Marne II

127

provision must be made for protection of guns and ammunition so far up. Evidently Pétain was running the show; Pershing was not there.

Tuesday, September 3 Plan of First Army somewhat changed. I Corps gets Seventy-eighth instead of Thirty-fifth Division.

Friday, September 6 General Allen (Ninetieth), Burnham (Eighty-second), Lejeune (Second) at luncheon.

Saturday, September 7 Eighty-second men in Frouard, etc., undisciplined; Thirty-fifth good; Fifth transportation excellent; Seventy-eighth good as far as observed. Trott, of Fifth, was concerned over Traub’s daylight movement yesterday and interference with General Castner and I assured him the chief of staff had knowledge of this and was composing a letter on the subject. They knew that the Thirty-fifth was army reserve anyway and could not understand why the corps should be bothered with these matters, which, however, they were much disturbed about. Prior to St. Mihiel, division movements were to be at night.

Monday, September 9 Visited General McMahon (Fifth) at Martincourt. He wants—(1) Advice as to what artillerymen shall do if they are attacked or raided in their present advanced positions in view of the caution against losing prisoners. His C.A. [chief of artillery], Flagler, had suggested seriously that they beat it and leave their guns, and McMahon evidently had offered no better solution. General Liggett made no definite responses,

128

In the Company of Generals

but said he guessed they would not be put in that predicament. (As a matter of fact the guns, if he has any up there, are four kilometers back and Allen is charged with defense of everything in the sector and has reinforced his lines to protect artillery in place.) (2) To delay removal to Mammey P.C. until French get out and delouse. General Liggett said this was not a matter of much consequence anyway. (3) Noise protection from artillery for tanks to move into place. (4) Apportionment of dugouts at Mammey between himself and artillery. McMahon did not seem very brisk or alert and a bit bewildered as his fool questions would indicate. Bishop Brent, now chief army chaplain, made an interminably long call and seems to think he has a pretty fair line of goods on his religious counters; all varieties of shades and weight and stock coming in well for the fall season. He proposes some day to send one to the corps, after trying out his division chaplains in action, and eventually the corps will get ten at headquarters, with an average of one to every one thousand men throughout the army. Oh, God!

In the midst of the battle of Meuse-Argonne, General McMahon’s Fifth Division made dispositions, at McMahon’s insistence, that virtually destroyed General Pershing’s attack plan of October 14, and McMahon was sent back to the United States.

Wednesday, September 11 General Allen here, concerned about gas, telephone connection with adjacent division, and method of passing on request for artillery fire. General Liggett soothed him—no mustard gas west of Moselle; wire connection all completed; as to calling up for artillery assistance, “Oui,” and a bright smile, and “Allen, you have on a new pair of boots every time you come to see me.” General Traub, Thirty-fifth, General McAndrew, chief of staff, GHQ, and Colonel Marshall called.

Colonel George C. Marshall was assistant G-3 of the First Army.

8 St. Mihiel

Ever since the AEF chose the Lorraine sector for its portion of the line from the Channel to Switzerland—the Belgians at the top, British next, then French—Pershing and his staff looked forward to attacking the German fortress of Metz, and when the American commander in chief organized the First Army from the incoming cantonment divisions from the United States he followed what was known in GHQ as the Metz strategy. By the late summer of 1918, a part of it was the proposal by Marshal Foch (who became a marshal of France on August 5) that the AEF take out the German salient around the town of St. Mihiel, which had been there since 1914. As the German army began its slow movement back from the Marne to the Aisne following the short-lived offensive opening July 15, it presumably would have to adjust its lines, which would mean giving up the salient around St. Mihiel, and Foch (it was a fault of his strategy) believed the Germans had to be pushed out. But as it happened, when the Americans attacked on September 12, the enemy had begun to move artillery out of the salient. Still, they had prepared their machine-gun positions and fought from them and engaged in as much of a defense in depth as they could manage in front of what was, as they knew, irresistible force. Meanwhile, confusing everything, Foch at the end of August asked the Americans to attack to the right of the Aisne-Marne sector, between the Argonne Forest and the Meuse River. Triply confusing, he preceded this request with a request that the AEF continue the Aisne-Marne. Pershing settled for St. Mihiel and not going on to Metz, in return for the MeuseArgonne that would give the AEF the entire sector from St. Mihiel to the French Seventh Army west of the Argonne Forest. St. Mihiel was an easy victory, if only because of the Americans’ huge numerical preponderance of troops, 225,000 to the enemy’s 25,000. The AEF rolled up the salient in one day, although they could not be certain 129

130

In the Company of Generals

until September 16 that the Germans would not gather troops and counterâ•‚ attack. The basic problem in all of this was not St. Mihiel, which was easy enough, but getting American divisions the fifty kilometers or more from there necessary to attack in the Meuse-Argonne, which had to be at night in order not to have the Germans moving reinforcements. For General Liggett and staff, the problem of changing headquarters was no difficulty, and from the Stackpole diary it seemed almost easy, but for the troops involved, nine divisions backed up by reserve divisions, it was enormous. Liggett’s I Corps was assigned three divisions—the Seventy-seventh, Twenty-eighth, and Thirty-fifth—with the Eighty-second in reserve. The divisions had ten days, for D-Day was September 26.

St. Mihiel

131

Thursday, September 12 Artillery preparations began at 1:00 a.m. (726 guns in this corps) and show started for infantry at 5:00 a.m. At headquarters all day. Allen backward on connecting with Fifth Division on his left and slow and cautious in pushing out reconnaissance patrols to the line of exploitation. He announced at noon that he was on the army line, but it developed later that he had not come up on the left and joining McMahon’s Fifth. At about 2:30 he called up General Liggett to say his work for the day was completed and he wanted instructions for the morrow. General Liggett said the next day’s instructions would come in due time; now he must dig in and organize a strong defensive position at the army objective and push out strong reconnaissance patrols as far as exploitation line to see what was there and to serve as outpost line. In spite of this the day closed without any definite word from Allen as to how deep his patrols had gone. In evening he asked for a regiment to reinforce him; why no one knew, and of course he did not get it. Other units reported reaching army objectives and digging in; small losses and many captures of prisoners and material. Late in evening reported S.O.S. from Ely (3rd Brigade, Second Division) on account of heavy attack. Confusion in communication to Loge Mangin, new P.C., made it difficult to arrange for counter barrage and counter battery. All done, however, and brigade of Seventy-eighth allotted to support. It afterwards appeared that there was no attack and the message was a fake by Boche. Order from Pershing to the V and IV corps to close neck of bottle at Vigneulles, as the enemy had not cleared the salient, and to I Corps to make army objective a solid line of resistance and push out strong patrols. Hole closed at 3:30 next a.m. and outpost line established by I Corps.

Friday, September 13 Visited Allen (Ninetieth) at Mammey. The general did not know just how far his outpost line had extended or whether lack of combat liaison with the Fifth had been corrected. (The day previous McMahon, of Fifth, and Malone [brigade], had complained of gap between them and Ninetieth.)

132

In the Company of Generals

General Liggett told Allen he must push out his patrols and send officers to find exact location; that he should clean up Bois du Prate and personally satisfy himself that he was up now with the Fifth, with no gap, and combat liaison. Allen saw something was wrong and by the end of the day made satisfactory report on all points and supplied location map showing positions of all fighting units, including artillery. Secretary of War Baker was to be here for luncheon at 12:30. We arrived, after jam in Puvenelle Forest, at 12:20 and just missed Baker, who had seen Craig and had slight lunch and hurried off to meet Pershing in St. Mihiel on sudden summons. Called on Duncan, Eighty-second, at Marbache, raid on Bel-Air Farm to come off at 6:00 p.m. with approval of General Liggett, not because it had any military significance, but as unobjectionable exercise if the division commander thought it worthwhile. Burnham said that his patrols had gone to Eply, some ways out, but had come back on finding positions occupied; they had uniformly ascertained pressure and kept contact. General Liggett complimented them on hard and thankless task. General Passaga here with bottle of fizz to congratulate General Liggett.

After American participation in the World War, it often was said that action itself, experience in the field, shook down the officer corps, which prior to 1917 had tried its knowledge against fairly easy foes—Cubans, other Caribbean peoples, Filipinos, and Mexicans—definitely not up to the skills of the Imperial German army. This perhaps did take place in the Meuse- Argonne, but the experience thesis, the shakedown thesis, did not work well at St. Mihiel because the engagement, one day at best (I Corps finished its work there in half a day), was too short a time. Just before the Meuse- Argonne, General Burnham of the Twenty-eighth Division was sent as military attaché to Greece, not a prime place for stationing a division major general. Others whose divisions took part in St. Mihiel, notably Major Generals McMahon of the Fifth Division and Traub of the Thirty-fifth, were found wanting not at St. Mihiel, where their abilities were not sufficiently tested, but at the Meuse-Argonne, where the testing was much more complex.

St. Mihiel

133

Saturday, September 14 Went to General McMahon’s, Fifth Division, headquarters at St. Jacques. McMahon somewhat shaky, but seemed to have things pretty well in hand and was able to report position held as resistance and outpost lines. His principal trouble was traffic congestion, which was increased by a brigade of the Seventy-eighth coming into the area on the alert. Went on through Mammey to reach Second Division P.C., but blocked this side of Regnieville as miles of traffic held up by shelling of road. Pershing was here and saw Craig in our absence. He gave directions to push out strong patrols to feel for Hindenburg Line and this was passed on to divisions. General Burnham here twice, once to report on raid which did not amount to much (one prisoner) and developed some machine-gun resistance. Smoke screen did not work well and aided enemy registration. Second visit to get General Liggett’s approval to release of Nelson (colonel of 328th)—given—and ask aid in keeping Beebe. General Liggett said he could not help him, but suggested that he write a letter to McAndrew, chief of staff, GHQ, and see if he could retain Beebe, who is evidently to be replaced by Sheldon. Allen and McMahon both here late in afternoon. Allen much bucked up and McMahon leaving with a few encouraging words from General Liggett. His communications bother him and he has much on his mind and getting decrepit fast.

After the brief engagement at St. Mihiel it was realized that road discipline was a prime need of the AEF.

Sunday, September 15 Called on General Vincent, chief of corps artillery, and General Liggett complimented him, much pleasing the little man. Clemenceau called to hand over a few tidbits. He said some promising things about Degoutte. Quekemeyer and a French politician and

134

In the Company of Generals

Clemenceau’s military aide were along; also Damroze, Pershing’s and Foch’s liaison agent.

Monday, September 16 Went to Loge Mangin, south of Thiaucourt, and called on General Lejeune, Second (Brown and Bowley also), and General McRae (Seventyeighth), taking over at 10:00 a.m., the relief having been accomplished the night before. Bowley, Brown, and Lejeune all complained of inadequate counter battery work by corps artillery. Craig goes to army headquarters for orders and I hold down the office. Orders come for move on eighteenth to northwest for another job. In this operation tanks were of little use in I Corps; whippets helped somewhat; mediums never got about to do a thing; some of them were ready to start off on the eighteenth with infantry, which left at 8:00 a.m. tankless. Air Service in this corps was unsatisfactory, as army pursuit squadrons gave little protection to our observation squadrons and did not keep the Boche back of the line, prevent ranging and photographic missions or infantry machine-gun firing and bombing. Artillery in division was good throughout and corps artillery fair. No gas use, wire not much of an impediment and the men jumped much of it. All divisions did well, the Second particularly, advancing aggressively and organizing promptly, the Fifth slower to organize the ground, the Ninetieth slow to find itself, but coming through with everything expected. No gas used in attack. Average advance by I Corps ten kilometers on fourteen kilometer front. New line approximately Vaudiere west to eight Chemins. About five thousand prisoners, two hundred camions of caliber 77 and upwards, hundreds of machine guns, mortars, etc., and railway trains, ambulances, and immense amount of ammunition and supplies were captured. Losses about four thousand, and only slight casualties. Many liaison officers and GHQ visitors flittered round during the show and the VI Corps staff commenced to assemble, General Wells, chief of staff, being entertained at General Liggett’s mess. On this day many officers temporarily attached were ordered away, and Major Bowen, of G-3, left to become chief of staff of Third Division. Tonight the Seventy-eighth relieves the Fifth, thus taking over the line

St. Mihiel

135

formerly acquired and held by the Second and Fifth. P.C. Seventy-eighth Loge Mangin. P.C. Fifth goes back to Domèvre.

The Tank Corps at St. Mihiel had dozens of light Renault tanks, but they could be holed with ease because of their exceedingly slow speed, five or six miles per hour, and light armor. French medium tanks were mechanically unreliable. American tank production never reached the field. Lack of Air Service pursuit planes was serious, for the skilled German pilots came over at will, as appears here, and not merely spotted for enemy artillery but machine-gunned American troops. The spotting was devastating, machinegunning more annoying than serious, but lack of air support was a constant AEF complaint until the end of the war.

Tuesday, September 17 Our advance parties proceed to Rarecourt. Everyone inquisitive as old women to know where we are going and what we are going to do and the atmosphere is full of idle speculation, which is not encouraged at the headquarters, smothered with injunctions as to secrecy. Paris, other army elements, and all French camion drivers, are the best informed as to the next show—it would appear.

Wednesday, September 18 Visited General Allen (Ninetieth) at Mammey. He thinks he had his patrols well out and a strong outpost line as well as resistance position. He said Pershing had asked him for recommendations, indicating that he thought a man should either be candidate for promotion or demotion. Allen had written a letter in which he had rather skillfully represented that the two brigade commanders, O’Neill and McAlexander, had performed difficult tasks well and were worthy of such consideration as the higher command chose to give them; that the colonels of the 359th and 360th, Hartmann and Price, were in his judgment qualified for service as brigadiers, and he particularly recommended Price for promotion. He wanted General Liggett to approve, and the general

136

In the Company of Generals

wrote “Approval 11 A.M. Sept. 18” on the end of an extra carbon of the original, which had already gone forward. Allen proposed to send the copy with General Liggett’s endorsement on after the original. We turned over to IV Corps at 12:00 a.m. Dickman, commanding general of IV Corps, blew in at a bit after twelve, looking for me or someone in charge to straighten out a traffic block (which did not exist) and I told him to go and get his own P.M. [provost marshal], who was out in front—and he did. (The general was a bit illuminated in my judgment.) One of the AEF’s most difficult problems was to evaluate officers for high command, especially generals serving with divisions, major generals or brigadiers—this when American generals did not really obtain experience until the Meuse-Argonne.

Thursday, September 19 Started for Rarecourt, southeast of Verdun, our new headquarters. Called on Mrs. Martin, at Neufchâteau; Pershing, at Ligny-en-Barrois, and arrived in Rarecourt 5:00 p.m. Pershing expressed to General Liggett great satisfaction at achievements of I Corps in recent operations.

Saturday, September 21 Took over command of division in region and sector at 8:00 a.m., Twenty-eighth in, Seventy-seventh moving in, Thirty-fifth to go in tonight and next night, all with screen of French, in front for concealment in event of raid. The removal of French artillery from old positions while the American artillery goes into the new positions for the pending operations made a temporary break in the barrage, but this is agreed to on supposition that infantry aided by machine-gun barrage can stand off any raid.

I Corps’s divisions began, left to right, at the far left of the Meuse- Argonne sector, with the Seventy-seventh Division occupying the lower end of the Argonne Forest. Next, from the forest’s east edge to the Aire

St. Mihiel

137

River, was the Twenty-eighth Division. Last, on the right side of the Aire, was the Thirty-fifth. To the right of I Corps was V Corps, followed, to the Meuse, by III Corps.

Sunday, September 22 Lieutenant Colonel Voris (signals) here; says telephone communications are working out satisfactorily, though everything is above ground and in case of severe counter preparation will be shot to pieces. He thinks good use can be made of the German poles and possibly wire, if we get well into their territory. General Aultman in command of Aisne group army artillery, with P.C. at Locheve, called. He has one regiment of G.P.F.’s on right of our sector with 270 mortars (range ten kilometers and dispersion three hundred meters) and forty G.P.F.’s on left with 270—ninety-one guns in all. Three thousand rounds only for G.P.F.’s, about six thousand rounds for others. He plans extensive interdiction and harassing fire and wants to dispose of towns with gas rather than fire of destruction. Ninety-second reported N.G. In afternoon called on General Cameron, V Corps, at Ville-surCoussance. He said Pershing had jumped him somewhat on traffic control and had been astonished to find there was no screen of French in front of the Seventy-ninth. This was chargeable to General Bullard of III Corps, who had been in charge of sector when the Seventy-ninth came in, and Pershing attempted to remedy the omissions by having the Thirty-third, which had already lost prisoners, stretch over into the Seventy-ninth outpost line. The result, however, was the loss of prisoners from both the Thirty-third and Seventy-ninth in a raid which was probably encouraged by the noise incidental to the shift.

Monday, September 23 All division commanders and chiefs of staff here at 5:00 p.m. to go over plan and corps order. Colonel Drum, chief of staff, First Army, here for a moment.

138

In the Company of Generals

Tuesday, September 24 Traffic bad everywhere; double banking, blocks, careless driving, no rear lookouts, machines halted on road, and active movement. Troops resting from march in open near Les Islettes without discipline (probably supply detachments and Twenty-eighth) and bad discipline among men south of Les Islettes, Futeau. Seventy-seventh, General Alexander, claimed to have no men in that region, but I reminded him of a number of Seventy-seventh Division headquarters signs on buildings in Futeau and officers and men about.

Traffic in the area of attack in the Meuse-Argonne already was bad, doubtless in part because movement was allowed only at night. But this was a warning, or should have been, that road discipline in the forthcoming battle would be poor, as at St. Mihiel.

Wednesday, September 25 General Pétain, here in early morning, outlined combined attack from Belgian coast to St. Mihiel on a front of 450 kilometers. He said the Germans were preparing for attack on Metz, which is the only place where no attack is to be delivered. Heavy shelling by Boche 5:30 to 6:30 indicates nervousness. No raid, as at first reported; later, raid reported all along the front, and nine French captured from outpost screen. Notice of D Day and H hour and X arrived at noon. General Liggett writes personally to Traub (composed by Craig) giving friendly warning against slackness of discipline reported from many sources with reference to the Thirty-fifth. Traub sends in reply in which General Liggett says he shows he feels hurt and the general says he does not see why he should feel hurt, but he supposes he will have to write him another letter—which he does. (Apropos of the Traub letter General Liggett says that Peter said he had never used the French gas mask since the time it was discarded, this being one of the criticisms in the letter to him on the complaint of Major Goss, the ubiquitous and effervescent gas officer; that he was pained

St. Mihiel

139

to note a lack of confidence on General Liggett’s part. General Liggett replied that his note was simply a friendly warning which should prove helpful and implied no lack of confidence.) The artillery preparations of the corps on left and right began as per schedule at 11:00 p.m. H—6 1/2, and I Corps preparations at 2:30 a.m. (twenty-sixth), the firing by army artillery (Aisne group under Aultman) and railroad guns commencing at time assigned by army without reference to corps.

It was true that the Germans opposite the Americans in the Meuse- Argonne were nervous about whether they would face attack or the attack would go elsewhere; hence the need to take prisoners. Fortunately, while the French said the rear areas were full of Americans, the one or two Americans taken were close to the Meuse, where Americans already had been identified.

9 Attack in the Meuse-Argonne

The Meuse-Argonne opened on September 26, 1918, and lasted until the armistice, November 11. It was the largest battle in American history; 1.2 million men took part. It was also the deadliest; twenty-six thousand men were killed or died of wounds. Casualties altogether were about one hundred thousand. The battle was fought in phases. The first attack lasted until September 28 or 29, when the opposing German forces managed to stabilize their lines and, on the American side, the AEF’s divisions came to a halt, the men too tired to go any farther. The result of the Meuse-Argonne, first phase, was a move of the divisions up to where the German army had its first line of resistance, of which there were three, named after Wagnerian witches—Giselher, Kriemhilde, and Freya. The second line, Kriemhilde, was where enemy forces proposed to make their most serious stand. The third, Freya, was mostly a theoretical line, for the enemy had not yet prepared its defenses. Geographically the Freya line lacked natural obstacles—hills or defiles—such as made the Kriemhilde line so difficult. The three lines, together, constituted the Hindenburg Line that marked German defenses all the way from the Channel to Switzerland.

Thursday, September 26 H hour at 5:30. A brigade of Twenty-eighth was forty minutes late in starting. General Liggett was up at 5:30 and in office of chief of staff from 8:00 to 9:45. At 10:00 General Delatour, of Fifth Division Cavalry (French), reported that he was preparing to establish temporary P.C. at Brizeaux 140

Attack in the Meuse-Argonne

141

and billet around Brizeaux and Futeau. General Liggett explained to him that he had authorized an order yesterday which would take the cavalry up into the Argonne, west of Varennes, by night, and have them there fresh for operations after the first phase line of combined army objective is reached, but the army had directed that the cavalry should be held in rear subject to movement at army orders, and the corps order had thereupon been cancelled before delivery.

Two points here about French forces to the west of I Corps’s line: First, GHQ obviously was fearful of dispatching cavalry, because of the vulnerability of horses. From the outset of the World War, cavalry had proved of little use, but all sides (save the Americans, who did not have the shipping necessary to bring over cavalry) maintained them, in the vain hope that a break in the lines would allow the cavalry divisions to deploy and bring chaos behind the lines. The other point is that from the beginning, as in Stackpole’s first diary account of the attack, there was concern for liaison with the French. The truth was that the French were not enthusiastic about attacking in concert with the Americans, with the result that the I Corps’s left flank frequently was unprotected.

142

In the Company of Generals

All morning reports by air, pigeon, wireless, telephone, radio, messengers, liaison officers, and every other means of communication were exceedingly meager and inaccurate and conflicting and this was the situation all through the day. Thirty-fifth Division was most insecure about the position of its front line, and the Twenty-eighth and Seventyseventh slightly less so. No particular opposition presented by natural obstacles, trenches, wire, mines, etc., the advance was very slow, and though all divisions reported themselves on corps objective at 9:30 a.m. and were ordered to move on to American Army objective, it developed at end of day that the utmost line reached by any division in the corps was probably the corps objective, though there was some evidence that the Seventy-seventh had a line farther out on a part (left) of its men. All very unsatisfactory. The corps to right (V and III) seem to have the same experience and to have made no better progress, though everywhere the opposition is reported as slight, and the trenches are cleaned up and material removed, showing a carefully planned withdrawal. The liaison detachment of French and Ninety-second Negroes of the First Combined Brigade, XXXVIII Corps, on our left did not move at all. Early in the afternoon went out to Traub’s (Thirty-fifth) P.C. above Neuvilly. Traub not there, supposed to be over beyond Vauquois. Hawkins, chief of staff, tried in vain to explain where his elements were, but admitted that he did not know and was then on his way to find out, with Colonel Baer, of inspector general’s department, at his side. Traffic on Clermont-Neuvilly-Varennes road impossible—complete block with roads full for hours, due in large measure to failure of the engineers to build up bridge at crater south of Boureuilles; men sitting for hours on horses, double banking, etc., and no exact compliance with any corps instructions. Gourent, G-1, out personally attacking traffic north of Neuvilly. Shelling of adjoining roads but slight impediment. Thirty-fifth artillery blocked on the road moving up toward Varennes. Called at Twenty-eighth headquarters, P.C. Georgia. Muir and Sweeney both doubtful about location of units, complained that early airplane reports had put their front lines in impossibly favorable positions and they thought the Germans had dressed themselves in khaki and put out panels as a deception. Their wire had given out so that messages could not come back from regiments, but more was being set up. Message center had been established at Varennes. Darrah, brigadier general, was the dependable commander on the front and had been given com-

Attack in the Meuse-Argonne

143

mand. Muir seemed nervous and without resource; Sweeney very active and trying to stir everyone up. Artillery commencing to move up and horses looked pretty well. Called on Alexander at P.C. in Les Petits Bâtis. Johnson, of 154th [Brigade], called him in great state of nerves while we were there. Alexander declined to accept the reports of his chief of staff and others that his people were on the army objective and said the best he could say was they probably were on corps objective. He talked to Wittenmyer (155th) while we were there and at General Liggett’s dictation told him he must reach out on right and get liaison with Twenty-eighth, find out where his people were, and organize for the night sufficiently to meet possible counterattack. Alexander said the liaison detachment on his left had not budged and he was protecting his left flank by bringing up one of his own reserve battalions. He said he had trouble with machine-gun opposition developing in his rear and General Liggett told him that was because he did not have a company come through after his advance to mop up, so that those in front could keep moving and those behind could proceed safely. General Liggett dwelt on liaison at the Twenty-eighth also and admonished Muir and Sweeney (with specific instructions) to effect liaison with the Seventy-seventh and Thirty-fifth, and to make proper provision for mopping up after the first line went through so as not to impede progress of following elements and hold up the show. In the evening the order came for the corps to attack from army objective line at 5:30 a.m. and to immediately reach that line so as to be ready for jump-off synchronized with other operations. This was immediately conveyed by Craig by telephone in my hearing, and with great care and precision, to Traub, Thirty-fifth, Sweeney, Twenty-eighth, and Hannay, Seventy-seventh. Came back by way of Brizeaux and called on General Delatour, of French Fifth Cavalry, who was out. Paced his cavalry on road, which was in good shape. Secretary of War Baker called in afternoon during our absence.

From the outset Liggett and Stackpole saw that the divisions did not know how to secure information from front-line units and communicate it to I Corps. They hardly knew how to manage as divisions. The French word

144

In the Company of Generals

liaison was not really in their lexicon. Lack of experience, perhaps, was the cause of this gross failure, but some of it was the inattentiveness of division commanders and their staffs, not to mention brigade and regimental commanders. The worst of the divisions from the outset was the Thirty-fifth, followed closely by the two others. The Thirty-fifth, although Liggett had not known this, was using French wire that had only cotton, not rubber, insulation, and circuits broke upon any dampness; the Twenty-eighth simply ran out of wire—although if it had been uninsulated it would have done no good anyway. Without information Liggett, corps commander, could do little more than inquire what was going on. He could not control his corps.

Friday, September 27 Attack scheduled everywhere for 5:30 was slow in starting by an hour or so in each division and did not go fast anywhere. The difficulties of getting reports with even substantial security continue, and the Thirtyfifth, which is becoming the popular object for condemnation, is most derelict. Bugge, of Corps G-3, is sent to Thirty-fifth, as chief of staff, and Hawkins, chief of staff, goes to a regiment. Nothing seems to materialize in the Thirty-fifth and Traub is at an advanced P.C. at Cheppy, out of reach. So late in afternoon General Liggett and I went to P.C. Côtes des Forimont, and found that an attack was scheduled for 5:30. General Liggett acquainted himself with the little that Bugge and Gallagher, G-3, could tell him; had Traub notified that he was there and proposed to wait there until he had some definite report of the operations, which came by telephone from Traub at about 9:00 p.m. to the effect that the show had gone well, the men went at the line across the Charpentry road, drove out the Germans, and was still going and out of sight. Muir’s line was telephoned to us and Sweeney was warned to come up on his right and effect liaison. Things are not going so very well there either. The left seems particularly insecure and uncertain. Drum and Conner here, the latter for dinner in our absence. Traub asked for reinforcements, which the general said he would send him to the extent of a regiment of the Ninety-second blacks, but this order was countermanded when on arrival at headquarters we found army order withdrawing all reserves subject to order of the army.

Attack in the Meuse-Argonne

145

Saturday, September 28 General Ireland (chief surgeon AEF) and a brigadier general with him called. Talked to General Traub for General Liggett and got position of his artillery from him and General Berry, and Traub was warned about being too conservative and leaving it too far behind; it would give him the best protection for his flanks, about which he was worried, as he said his advance left both flanks exposed. He had sent Bugge to arrange for liaison with Ninety-first and thought he had it with Twenty-eighth; he wanted a regiment of reinforcements, also air protection against réglage missions and counter battery against guns then shelling his infantry. He was told that Drum, chief of staff of First Army, was stirring up Ninetyfirst on right; that Craig would stir up Twenty-eighth; that air protection was something he ought normally to get through his Air Service liaison man, and counter battery through his artillery brigade commander, applying to corps or army group assigned to help. He thought things were going all right and said his men had gone forward splendidly, though he was nervous about his flank. He insisted his line ran through Exermont and sagged off southeast and southwest because of exposed position of flanks. He was told to keep in touch with Muir, and later on when he advised that he was about to dig in on line reached, was told army instruction was to keep on pushing. General Liggett spoke to Muir in morning over telephone and advised him to establish and maintain combat liaison right and left and to keep pushing. Darrah was relieved in afternoon and General Nolan and Colonel Conger, both of G-2, GHQ, were given the respective brigades. A good deal of disorganization and straggling evident in this division. Muir said his artillery was well up. Called on Alexander, Seventy-seventh, at P.C. in Les Petits Bâtis. His advance was progressing slowly owing to difficulties of terrain and machine-gun nests, etc. Abri St. Louis had been a tough nut for them, but they had smoked it out and killed occupants. Germans came out with “Kamerad” to surrender, threw bombs and caused losses and disorder, increased by a cry of “Retire.” No prisoners taken, and General Liggett said under such circumstances all should be killed as combatants and not taken, and particularly the officers responsible for such a trick;

146

In the Company of Generals

also that anyone, friend or foe, shouting “Retire” or attempting to cause stampede, should be immediately shot. Alexander had liaison on neither right nor left and was told to reach out and feel for it. His artillery was reported well up. Both Johnson and Wittenmyer were doing well, he said. General Liggett told him to keep pushing. Pershing here during our absence and had Craig call each division commander and in his name tell him that he must push on regardless of men or guns, night and day. Pershing stopped here at about 7:30 on way back from Twenty-eighth and Thirty-fifth. I was not present in room, but the general said he seemed to be in a rather excited state of mind, with much to say about the enormous importance of our operations and the possibility of ending the war right here if they were successful and the imperative need of drive and push. General Liggett gave him some notion of the terrain, the insidious character of the opposition, and the handicap all the divisions suffered from by reason of inexperience, lack of training, new officers, losses of officers, and poor ones. Pershing said he appreciated this. General Liggett said he seemed to be in good enough humor. General Nolan and Quekemeyer (knocked up by explosion of mine he had rushed over) were at dinner.

On this day, September 28, the German defenders believed they had contained the First Army, and they were correct. Pershing and probably his subordinate commanders, including Liggett, had been too confident of what had happened at St. Mihiel, an easy victory, with the AEF having overwhelming odds, ten to one, against the Germans in the St. Mihiel salient. They had not anticipated the lack of liaison in such units as the Thirty-fifth (which, after all, did not fight—was in reserve—at St. Mihiel). They did not sense the need to move very fast against the defending Germans in the Meuse-Argonne, before the enemy obtained reinforcement.

Sunday, September 29 At request of General Liggett got Seventy-seventh (Dreadnaught), who reported (Hannay, chief of staff) that left was meeting strong resistance on parallel 75, east of Binarville, machine gun and rifle; line

Attack in the Meuse-Argonne

147

sagged in center of zone and right was coming up with less resistance. No liaison right or left, except on right with battalion of Twenty-eighth, which had lost its brigade. French division commander on left had reported to them that the Ninety-second Negroes had turned back disorganized and were useless except for labor; that he proposed to put in a French regiment to effect liaison. Artillery well up. 11:00 a.m. Traub reported (by relay) positions of artillery around Varennes, Charpentry, Very, Neuvilly; also that his division was in need of reorganizing and he proposed to pull them back, leaving out part on advanced line, establish line Chaudron Farm, east and west; organize on line Charpentry, east and west, and then proceed with attack. Craig said he had suggested this to Thirty-fifth one-half hour before. Later in day General Liggett said to me he thought it was a mistake to do this by daylight and it was probably responsible for bringing on German counterattack in afternoon, when Thirty-fifth may have appeared to be withdrawing; Thirty-fifth checked counterattack by Fifty-second Division regiment and made killing, restoring their old lines by nightfall. Sweeney (chief of staff) Twenty-eighth reported move of P.C. to La Forge, need of aviation and counter battery, etc., to silence harassing shell fire. Twenty-eighth on heights west of Apremont. Attempted in afternoon to go to Thirty-fifth P.C., but blocked by traffic south of Varennes. Our P.C. (advanced) moved to dugouts, Côtes des Forimont. Ninety-second Division, one brigade under General Ballou, put at disposal of XXXVIII French Corps. General Summerall, First Division, reports with his outfit to relieve Thirty-fifth, P.C. Balecourt. One regiment, Eighty-second, moved up under Muir (Twenty-eighth) to aid Thirty-fifth from Apremont in meeting counterattacks. General Darrah, 55th Brigade, Twenty-eighth, relieved, reports for orders, and in absence of receipt stays overnight. Craig goes to new P.C. late in afternoon. In afternoon General Liggett talked direct with Muir, who locates his right but is still uncertain about his left, and General Liggett tells him to work out along 78 parallel and find Alexander (Seventy-seventh). General Liggett also talks with Alexander, who is finding much fighting and tells him to keep moving and to reach out to right and get Muir. By relay, Traub through Bugge (G-3), reports counterattack checked; Traub at scene of operations.

148

In the Company of Generals

Still much uncertainty as to state of line, both in our corps and on right. Darrah asks General Liggett to say for him that his brigade was farthest advanced of any in the corps, as he thinks himself badly used and “is no two-spot.” General Liggett did not commit himself and said he understood Muir had complained because he said his men could not carry out certain orders and he appealed to me to confirm his recollection, which I did. Darrah in effect admitted this and said his men could not go forward all day and all night, they must have sleep and food. (But this dramatic statement scarcely applied to the situation.)

By this time the three divisions in I Corps were, so to speak, dead in the water, stopped, each for a different reason, according to the commanders. In the Argonne Forest, General Alexander claimed the terrain so difficult his men had to fight on ground resembling a jungle—bushes, trees, hills, vales, everything geographically conspiring against him, not to mention that the Germans had been in the forest for four years and had secured everything with machine guns in pillboxes, artillery on heights, wire everywhere, often between trees and thus virtually hidden until Alexander’s troops came up to it and suffered thereby. The excuse of the Twenty-eighth Division, like that of the Seventy-seventh true enough so far as it went, was that they occupied a narrow valley, that of the Aire, with German artillery in the Argonne heights zeroing in on Route Nationale 46, the principal road north. The Thirty-fifth, like the other divisions, offered little information, but its trouble, according to Traub, was bad roads forward and the slowness of its artillery under General Berry.

Monday, September 30 Went to P.C. Bonehead (advanced P.C. of corps). Counterattacks against Thirty-fifth and Twenty-eighth successfully driven off morning before. Went to Traub’s P.C. at Cheppy (Thirty-fifth). Traub out with brigades and regiments, location not known, and not in touch even with an aide. Bugge (chief of staff) said that if it had not been for engineers they would have been overcome yesterday in counterattack; that their losses had been heavy, particularly among officers, one colonel,

Attack in the Meuse-Argonne

149

two lieutenant colonels, four majors. He said that the order which had been given was to stick, pending withdrawal at nightfall, but the men had commenced to withdraw at once, and probably encouraged counterattack and had become much demoralized. General Liggett said they ought to go forward and retake their positions, for if they did not they would never be any good again, and that it ought to be a matter of honor with the division to retake Montrebeau Woods and turn the line over to General Summerall as they had once had it, and not in a state of disorganization. Bugge said the engineers could not be spared, when I told him for Craig that he must draw his engineers back to where they belonged at once; he said Traub could account for only two thousand men. (It appears that Montgomery, according to Colonel Baer, inspector, had been the whole show, reorganizing everything in the field, and getting instant promotion to full colonel. It also appears that an aviator with his machine gun was really the man who stopped the counterattack; it also develops that Captain Ord, corps intelligence observer, saw the thing coming and got hold of a major and drove the men back; and it further transpires that an observer reports that the Germans never got through the outpost line anywhere, as it remained firm, and so it goes.) General Liggett told Bugge that the order for any withdrawal by day was a mistake and if he had known of it in time he should have stopped it. General Summerall and chief of staff were at Cheppy with reconnaissance completed and plan made, which was described to General Liggett in a few words and considered, as he told me, entirely satisfactory. From Cheppy through Varennes to La Forge (Twenty-eighth), Muir’s line is about the same—Apremont southwest through Hill 245—in liaison with Seventy-seventh. Two counterattacks on Nolan’s brigade in Apremont during night reported. Sweeney, chief of staff, felt confident they could have Châtel-Chéhéry southeast line as outpost line before morning. Accurate shelling and machine-gun fire holding up the Twenty-eighth. Traffic awful everywhere, got through only by using rank of commanding general. Lack of information had shielded the reasons for the end of the first attack in the Meuse-Argonne. For much the same reasons all the divisions had

150

In the Company of Generals

failed to move forward as quickly as General Pershing desired. In I Corps the commanders lacked the ability to get the men forward, for because of inadequate liaison the officers did not know where support was and took the line of least resistance, which was to move timidly. Poor roads, bad telephone wire, insufficient artillery support, inability to take out machine-gun nests short of frontal assaults—all these reasons stopped the divisions, and it all was exacerbated by General Traub’s sheer incompetence, not yet clear to Liggett and Pershing.

Tuesday, October 1 Visited Alexander, Seventy-seventh, at his P.C. in Les Petits de Bâtis. He claims that his division has never lost any ground gained, that it has been steadily plodding along through very difficult country, that the experience has been invaluable, and the men have done well, with very slight losses—three hundred or so. He said he had canned a good many at the rear echelon (Florent) among the officers showing incompetency, timidity or neurasthenia. He has changed his mind about General Johnson, whom he does not now want to relieve. He is pushing kitchens up so that his men get hot food and has only a few cases of sickness. He expects to establish himself on the road to Viergette west, south of parallel 377, by tonight. His division is the only one moving today, under the army order. General Liggett cautioned him against going into the front lines too much himself. At advanced P.C. in afternoon. Traffic congestion from Varennes to Clermont mainly on account of single track at crater holes south of Boureuilles and Varennes and bad handling by army. Corps and army artillery commanders report impossibility of moving guns and supplying ammunition, etc., on this one traffic route under army control and used by I Corps, army, and in part by V Corps. General Liggett confers with Colonel Hoffman, corps engineer, and suggests that even at this late date the craters should be bridged and Hoffman is to confer with Morrow of the army and Peek and see how they can cooperate. Called Muir, Twenty-eighth, for General Liggett and at 8:00 p.m. he reports that he holds Le Chêne Tondu and has liaison both right and left. Called on General Simon, commanding Fifth Cavalry Division, French, at Claon. He takes place of Delatour, just retired by age.

Attack in the Meuse-Argonne

151

Alexander reports in afternoon slow, but steady, progress. Army order out, prescribing next objective as original first phase objective, with slight modification. First Division accomplished relief of Thirty-fifth last night, except artillery; Thirty-fifth artillery stays in temporarily.

Wednesday, October 2 In afternoon at P.C. Bonehead, after learning personally by telephone the status in each division sector. Alexander progressing, but with fields of wire to overcome more troublesome than fire, and with La Viergette to the west road and railroad as his day’s objective. Muir holding on under shell fire and counterattack Apremont south to Le Chêne Tondu. Summerall maintaining line and reconnoitering with strong patrols, which develop machine-gun opposition. Called on General Burnham, Eighty-second, at Grange la Comte Farm. The general is impatient to get his division into action. I went to Triaucourt for General Traub, Thirty-fifth Division, and brought him back to dinner. General Burnham and Colonel R. Slodin (chief of staff) also here. Traub rather worn out, but full of talk, primarily with reference to his own experience when personally visiting brigade commanders in search of information which he says he could not otherwise procure. He lived without sleep for four days and nights, subsisted exclusively on coffee and cigarettes, was the pet target of every German battery, was frequently bracketed in the open with an expenditure of three hundred or more shells in the process, almost walked into the German lines, was gassed, in short had a hell of a time—“You bet your life.” Hundreds of his officers and thousands of his men are still missing, but straggling in. General Liggett said he thought Traub had done all that was humanly possible and the division had in view of conditions been pushed a bit too far. In afternoon another regiment of the Eighty-second was ordered up in rear of Twenty-eighth, so that an entire brigade is there, but not to be used by Twenty-eighth, and to remain army reserve. (General Liggett told Traub to take the names of all officers reporting late and Colonel Bugge [chief of staff] was given similar instructions by Craig.)

152

In the Company of Generals

In afternoon Alexander said he was on his line to Viergette road west. Sweeney (chief of staff, Twenty-eighth) said he was not and liaison between Seventy-seventh and Twenty-eighth was south of that point. Le Chêne Tondu middle of line between Americans and Germans and hotly contested all day. Patrols had been north to La Forge, but had been drawn back to Apremont. General Alexander moves Seventy-seventh P.C. to southeast of Abri du Crochet.

Having allowed his division to disintegrate—save for the twelve hundred men of his engineer regiment, who managed a line from Baulny to the northeast, behind which the remnants of his regiments could reassemble—Traub bragged about his personal courage in unbelievable detail.

Thursday, October 3 Alexander reports by telephone in morning that he is on his objective, the road, but ahead of the people on his right and left. The Twentyeighth seems to be at a standstill, but are not yet clamoring for relief; the First are impatient at remaining “set” under shell fire and want to start something; their patrols get shot up. General Aultman, summoned here, gives new position for his Aisne grouping of army, 155s (seventy-two guns) all well up and running across west from Varennes. General Barnum, of 183rd Brigade, Ninety-second Division, calls. He has only a machine-gun battalion left in his immediate command, as all the rest have been farmed out. Traffic conditions much improved on Neuvilly-Varennes road, due to diversion to Tour de Paris road and better handling. Colonel Bugge here and wants to know when he can come back. He is reminded to take names of all Thirty-fifth Division officers straggling in. Order received at 12:30 for attack tomorrow at 5:25 a.m. with no artillery preparation before H hour. I personally notified Hall, of Air Service, General Walsch, corps artillery, Colonel Williams, G-2, of day and hour, and arranged for conference with division commanders, Muir, Alexander, and Summerall, at advanced P.C. at 3:00 p.m. At conference,

Attack in the Meuse-Argonne

153

at which I was not present, instructions both general and specific were given to the commanders relative to attack, as I know from General Liggett’s reference to what took place. Craig was there. General Liggett referred to the Ninety-second and the polite comment of the French that they did not need them and expressed his conviction that they would never be any good with black officers, to which Pershing agreed. General Pershing said he proposed as soon as possible to put General Liggett in command of the First Army, as the Second Army is now forming, though he said it might not happen for some time. General Liggett said he would do his best. He also observed that he hoped to get on the Grandpré line tomorrow. General Walsch (corps artillery) called early in evening to report that the First Division artillery plans were complete and good; that the Twenty-eighth were not complete because they could not get necessary data from infantry; Seventy-seventh would not have much to do. Established in dugout P.C. at Côtes des Forimont. Everything set. Addendum—Colonel Mitchell, Air Service, called on General Liggett at Rarecourt and had much plausible comment to make about the work of his Air Service; he described the system of patrols and the impossibility of keeping every German machine back from the line; recommended better instruction to green troops in use of signals to contact planes, and to artillery in using air réglage, admitting that some fault belonged to the Air Service itself. He claimed destruction of 188 planes of enemy in this drive with loss of sixty pilots, eight hours per day for pilots in air and only three groups, as some had gone to the Champagne. The general made no comment on any of the subjects mentioned.

Between the bragging of Traub and the excuse-making of Mitchell (whose Air Service had not protected the attacking divisions from the German pilots, who observed the divisions’ positions at will) there was the interesting announcement, not to take effect for two weeks, that Pershing would relinquish command of the First Army to Liggett. The commander in chief simply had too many tasks and could not give the army the close attention it needed. General Liggett in the past had had new divisions thrust nominally under his control, but with himself unable to do much more than advise division commanders who were under combat control of the French. At St.

154

In the Company of Generals

Mihiel the battle was over for I Corps the day it opened. At the Meuse- Argonne for its first attack he received three divisions with which he had not worked before, had only a few days in which to appraise their qualities or lack thereof, and after two or three days of fighting I Corps had stopped, with Liggett not knowing even the little that the division commanders knew of location and ability of units.

10 Second Attack

John J. Pershing probably was not much of a strategist—otherwise he would not have followed the St. Mihiel attack two weeks later with the Meuse-Argonne. And as the latter battle developed, he showed he was not much of a tactician. When an attack failed, his favorite tactic was to try again. The second attack by the AEF, October 4, 1918, failed almost as soon as it opened, and that was the reason, quite apart from his remarking to General Liggett that he would give up First Army to Liggett, that Stackpole’s favorite general—as the quondam lawyer wrote in his diary, “the General” (meaning Liggett)—eventually took over, shortly after the fifteenth of the month. The trouble in the Meuse-Argonne, as it became evident even to Pershing after the opening of battle again on October 4, was that the troops lacked experience. The commander in chief brought in reserve divisions, the First in I Corps, taking the place of the Thirty-fifth, and replaced all the divisions, all three, in V Corps. The sector of III Corps narrowed because of the turn northwest of the Meuse River, and hence General Bullard sent the Thirty-third Division across into the heights of the Meuse where German guns were thundering night and day against the almost squeezedin American troops to the west. These tactical replacements and dispositions did not do much to assist the lack of experience, and soon the battle was virtually stalemated, as it had been at the end of September after the first attack. So Liggett waited in the wings, to use the theatrical metaphor, while Pershing brought himself to a decision to relinquish the First Army and allow Liggett real command, something that Stackpole’s superior had not possessed even since the beginning of the year when he received a nominal corps command.

155

156

In the Company of Generals

Friday, October 4 Attack started at 5:35 without artillery preparation in all divisions and in III and V corps to east, the objective being combined army first phase line. First goes forward well, though with much machine-gun and artillery resistance, and takes Fléville and line southeast through Hill 240, and thence generally east. Right brigade (General Nolan, temporary commanding officer) of Twenty-eighth progresses to point on east bank of Aire, southwest of Fléville and holds line back to Apremont. Left brigade of Twenty-eighth is stuck around Le Chêne Tondu and does not move. General Liggett visited Twenty-eighth headquarters in afternoon and saw Muir and Sweeney, satisfying himself that Nolan’s dispositions protect him in Apremont, and stirring things up for Conger on left, attack already planned. General Liggett told Muir he did not want to relieve the Twenty-eighth until it had completed its task and

Second Attack

157

Muir said that was the way he felt about it, and the Twenty-eighth had something still to offer and could go forward and would. An attack by left (56th) brigade in late afternoon is supposed to have cleaned up Le Chêne Tondu. Liaison between Twenty-eighth and Seventy-seventh is supposed to be established on about this line, but there is entire distrust of each by the other, and so unfortunate amount of back biting and argument. (The time of one accurate and conscientious observer spent in determining the facts would quickly resolve the uncertainty—but then there would be nothing for the staff to argue about.) Tanks seem to have helped right brigade, but to have missed their way and failed their mission with left.

Saturday, October 5 Attack at 6:30. Emissary with felicitations from General Degoutte, now chief of staff of Belgian Army. Called on Alexander, Seventy-seventh, at German dugout, P.C., Champ Mahaut, for purpose of stirring up the Seventy-seventh. Alexander says he does not believe Twenty-eighth has Chêne Tondu—and it appears incidentally that this very positive assertion is based on the report of Colonel [Gordon V.] Johnson (a traveling sightseer loosely and temporarily connected with the corps), who reported on the lines as he saw them before yesterday’s attack came off. He gives his own line as still sagging around 75.5 parallel in the middle up to 76.2 parallel on the right, with six companies (about ten men to the company) isolated upon the left on road La Palette Trench to Viergette. He said they had learned only late last night that the XXXVIII Corps French on left were not to attack today, but the commander of the division on his left had agreed to make an attack with two companies north from Binarville and help him out, on the understanding that this small force would have to withdraw if counterattacked by the Boche, who had filtered into the Palette Trench and a switch southeast, which was behind the isolated companies. The French attack was successful, but [Evan M.] Johnson, commanding left brigade, did not come up to help and the French had to leave. Johnson was ordered to make attack and save these companies which had been up there two days without food other than

158

In the Company of Generals

“iron rations.” Late in day it transpired that the attack failed, machine guns, wire, and rifle fire being too much for Johnson, and the attempt was made to deliver airplane message to the companies (Captain [Major] Whittlesey) to fight their way back. General Liggett went over artillery situation with Alexander and said his guns were too far back, but Alexander said they could not use them much farther up as the woods were so thick that the bursts would come almost at the muzzle of the gun. General Liggett asked him if he had trench and Stokes mortars and 37-mm. available and Alexander said he was afraid to use them as his troops (the six companies) were so near the Germans. General Liggett said a French attack would squeeze out the Boche, but he did not know what to suggest other than what Alexander was doing. Alexander said he was about at the end of his rope. He had tried coaxing and kicking and every expedient to make his men move. He had sustained losses, but not heavy, and he had many stragglers and men drawn from the city, who knew nothing about the woods and fighting of this character, but he thought they were not all in, and was greatly distressed that he could report no better progress. He said Wittenmyer of the right brigade was doing all he could, but held at a standstill by felled trees surrounded by wire and machine guns behind them. He said the tactical developments on the left were the worst he ever saw. He has just canned another colonel (Stacey) after two days’ trial and given the regiment to a captain; he has an average of about one officer to a company. He seems to be having an unusual amount of trouble with officers and to act very hastily in their shortcomings. I have heard him say nothing commendatory about any of them except “old Wit” and I think he probably fails to get results he wants out of them because he does not handle them as he should. One gets the impression that he stands quite alone in the whole show. General Liggett had no consolation to offer, and his assistance was limited to a searching résumé with Alexander of the implements at his disposal and the best way to use them, again suggesting that he leave troublesome places to be cleaned up by those coming from the rear rather than allow a relatively small obstacle to halt a large unit. The Argonne country they are going through is certainly the limit—ravines, sharp banks, heavy timber, dense brush, and all the obstacles the Germans have been able to invent and construct during four years of occupancy. Mr. Shipton reported as corps chaplain.

Second Attack

159

General Liggett suffering slightly from diarrhea. Corps casualties in this drive (September 26) over sixteen thousand; First Division casualties about fifteen hundred today and four thousand since came in line. Strength of brigades in Twenty-eighth about twentysix hundred, many stragglers hiding out. Seventy-seventh Division losses slight. American corps on our right, V and III, are held up by strong resistance. The divisions against First Army front are increasing and of best quality. Seventy-sixth Reserve Division, Second Division, Fifth Guard. And Fifty-second in line on our front now.

Liggett was speaking to Alexander about the Lost Battalion, companies of Brigadier General Evan M. Johnson’s brigade that had gone up a large ravine on October 2 and been surrounded by the Germans. Stackpole does not seem to realize that five hundred men were involved and that on the first full day, October 3, food ran out. The men were relieved only on the evening of October 7, when the Germans retreated because an attack that day by the elements of the Twenty-eighth Division and Eighty-second Division, the latter the reserve division of the corps, forced them out. They were hastened by General Johnson’s 307th Regiment, which got through around 7:00 p.m. The Lost Battalion’s gallant stand, in which parts of two of Johnson’s regiments lost well over one hundred men, became for Americans throughout the United States the best-known newspaper story of the war.

Sunday, October 6 First exploits only; Twenty-eighth attacks 244 Hill and Bois de Taille d’Abbé with support on left from Seventy-seventh. General Duncan and chief of staff and artillery chief, and Sweeney, here for conference at lunch, and General McAndrew (chief of staff, AEF) and Drum (chief of staff, First Army). McAndrew harps away on the strategical importance of Côte 244 as a pivot, but shows little accurate knowledge of the character of terrain or of enemy defenses. He seems to approve of General Liggett’s plan for sending Eighty-second in through the Twenty-eighth and across Argonne to mop up ahead of

160

In the Company of Generals

Seventy-seventh as something they had already thought of—pig’s rib. General Liggett observed that the Seventy-seventh, composed largely of New York City draft men, was not naturally as well equipped for fighting in the woods as a division of western men, Michigan or Wisconsin, and General McAndrew assented. He said he did not think the Eightysecond was much better than the Twenty-eighth. Went to Aultman’s for conference about artillery fire and Aultman and Walsch were here on same subject. Aultman does not think much of Price, of the Twenty-eighth artillery brigade. Order out for reduction of Argonne.

The historian of the AEF Edward M. Coffman has written that the idea of Liggett, sending up a brigade of the Eighty-second from below Varennes to a ford at La Forge, whence it could cross the Aire and plunge into the Argonne in concert, from below, with Nolan’s brigade of the Twenty-eighth, was a marked tactical move in a time, in the Meuse-Argonne, of frontal attacks.

Monday, October 7 Attack by Twenty-eighth and Eighty-second (one brigade) at 5:00 a.m., no preparations, to move west, taking German observation points and press retirement from Argonne in front of Seventy-seventh. Eightysecond got only six companies into action during day, but made some progress and Twenty-eighth got well started in cleaning up its sector. Seventy-seventh wound up on right and managed on left to move Captain [Major] Whittlesey’s outfit, which had been cut off for several days. General Liggett called on Muir, Duncan, and Alexander, telling Muir he was doing good work and intimating relief in two or three days; questioning Duncan about why Lindsey’s brigade had been so unsuccessful in getting across the Aire in season to get into position before this was rendered impossible by daylight shelling, also about ineffectiveness of artillery, and telling him to keep at it and make his objective and hold Hill 223; and admonishing Alexander to keep going on his right, and saying perhaps he needed a new brigade commander for his left. Duncan seems to be as thick as mud and not worth a damn and neither he nor Sheldon, his chief of staff, seem to have much conception of what

Second Attack

161

they are expected to do in a tactical sense. Rhodes, artillery commander, said his losses during the day were slight, and he had been unable to fire much of any because it was impossible to get in position on time. He will be all set for tomorrow. All of the Eighty-second Division officers had several days for reconnaissance and should know the ground well. The 103rd Brigade (Cronin), which General Liggett has it in mind to shoot up through Viergette preliminary to relieving the Twenty-eighth, is taken by the army for another operation tomorrow, to which the First Division is also committed under the V Corps. Muir and Sweeney said they thought the Bois de Taille d’Abbé must be cleaned up as Conger had gone around on the other side of it. Alexander expressed great regret that he had such an unfortunate experience with Whittlesey’s outfit and such unsatisfactory results on his left. He had no complaint to make of French on left, and had been obliged to write an apology for firing into them; it was also found his artillery had fired into his own lost detachment and he had ordered all firing stopped. He had directed fire on the German position south of Whittlesey and north of his own men, believing six hundred yards sufficient leeway. General Liggett questioned this—and it is evident that it was a venturesome performance when the guns (155s) must fire map range (without observation) and on a target (trench) located on map by approximation from airplane photograph. Alexander is still wrought up over his officers and it is evident that there is no harmony or mutual trust in the outfit. General Alexander personally is doing everything he can in his own imperious bull-headed way and General Liggett reassured him by telling him he thought he was doing all he could. The Eighty-second lost 223 Côte and were ordered by General Liggett to retake it immediately (at 7:00 p.m.) at point of bayonet. They had gone over it without properly defending it against counterattack and in general seemed not to have provided for any depth in their formation for attack and conquest of the ground. General Liggett observed that perhaps some brigade commander would do much better than Lindsey (who seems to have flubbed around all day). General McRae, Seventy-eighth Division, reported. Headquarters at Grand Champ Farm, south of Les Islettes. Lindsey only got across two thousand men, and Liggett felt that if the general had gotten over more they could have cut off the Germans who

162

In the Company of Generals

were leaving the Argonne. The Americans could hear German transport rumbling as the enemy troops left the forest.

Tuesday, October 8 All day at P.C. Bonehead, Côtes des Forimont, watching reports of divisions on continuance of advance. All go slowly and General Liggett is out of patience with the apparent supineness and lack of initiative of the Seventy-seventh, both right and left (Johnson and Wittenmyer) and said he thinks very likely Johnson is no good and must go, as he has handled his brigade badly from the start. He is somewhat reassured by Nolan’s and Conger’s activity in the Twenty-eighth, though they don’t make much headway. He is entirely dissatisfied with Duncan and Lindsey of Eighty-second, and the work of the colonels. Orders have not been carried out, handling and maneuvering of troops has been confused and amateurish. He thinks little of Duncan and inclines to the view that Lindsey better go. Reports are much exaggerated and are conflicting to such an extent that General Liggett gave directions that hereafter all reports should come in with visé of chief of staff. He calls for investigation of the incorrect report of yesterday about Hill 223. On the whole an unsatisfactory day, though all elements made some progress. Duncan called for reinforcements in middle of day, but did not get them.

Wednesday, October 9 Trouble in the Eighty-second—a sluggish outfit. Called on Duncan, Eighty-second, in afternoon. He gave a line entirely at variance with line submitted authoritatively earlier in day. He is having trouble with communications and would like to move his P.C. up. He and Sheldon, chief of staff, said they had taken Hill 263 but lost it. General Liggett told them if they ever get there again to dig in and stay there, as that was much more important than Cornay, which they had taken and lost. Duncan complained that Lindsey’s men were reported by a French officer to be much fatigued, and he proposed, with General Liggett’s approval, to move Cronin’s brigade up to relieve them, retaining one regiment around Chêne Tondu in divisional reserve. General Liggett did

Second Attack

163

not approve and said he thought Lindsey better keep moving. Duncan is dissatisfied with Sheldon and wants to swap him for Hannay, of the Seventy-seventh. Duncan’s outfit has not moved much if any today and Duncan does not seem to know what he is about anyway—soft, stupid, deceitful. Alexander, on whom we called, reported some movement in his sector and was told by General Liggett that he could make himself and the division famous if he would push in and be first in Grandpré. He won’t swap with Duncan, but wants to lose Hannay. A disturbing false alarm came in evening, announcing the Eightysecond was driven out of Cornay again with the loss of two companies. General McRae, Seventy-eighth, reported.

Thursday, October 10 Attack resumed at 7:00 a.m. with little opposition and Seventyseventh and Eighty-second rush the Aire and are approximately on combined army objective. The Argonne proper is cleared at last. The French XXXVIII Corps is the first to get patrols in Grandpré. The Eighty-second, through Duncan, is still more fatigued and about twelve hundred men in all that can be mustered for Lindsey’s brigade, the others and many officers being presumably hiding out in the woods or straggling down the quieter paths toward the mess and kitchen. (Duncan thinks he ought to be reinforced, relieved, concerted generally and given a D.S.C. and a city mansion for his distinguished service in bungling everything, standing still and losing his outfit.) Pershing talks over the telephone in afternoon with General Liggett, simply to learn the situation. General McRae is here again, preparing to move the Seventy-eighth up today and his own headquarters to Varennes. The Fifth French command is again ordered back to Claon in readiness. Alexander sends Hannay to a regiment and takes Colonel Sherrill, his engineer, as chief of staff. The Twenty-eighth came out in toto and the Eighty-second took over their sector and a portion of the First Division sector north of the Aire toward Sommerance, the First Division being now engaged in an operation with the V Corps.

164

In the Company of Generals

Attack to be resumed tomorrow northward with new sector limits and indefinite objective as enemy is supposed to be out, except casual machine-gun rear guard; towns north all reported burning.

Friday, October 11 Called on McRae of Seventy-eighth, at Varennes, and saw chief of staff, who said their brigades were practically up—southwest of Cornay and west of Varennes. They had enough rolling kitchens, but lacked transportation for them. Called on Alexander, who was up in lines. Sherrill, his chief of staff, said they were all right in the outfit, though naturally worn from so much steady going. He was told by General Liggett that he wanted to relieve them tonight, but that could not be done, and he hoped to relieve them by the Seventy-eighth tomorrow night and wanted them to get their positions in good shape to turn over. Sherrill said they were preparing to throw bridges across the Aire and engineers were reconnoitering for the purpose. General Pershing asked General Liggett over telephone for advice and recommendations as to divisional commanders who had served under him here and shown themselves of corps caliber. General Liggett replied that Summerall, of the First, was in a class by himself, that Menoher might do, and so might Muir. Alexander he thought rather contentious. Haan he had not seen enough of. McGlachlin, of artillery, he liked as far as his observation went when he had corps artillery at Souge. All this in response to Pershing’s inquiries. General Liggett said Harbord was also qualified, but Pershing said he was out of the question in view of his S.O.S. job. McRae he said might be all right after more experience. In fact, General Liggett said to Pershing that he thought after trying men out that he might find men with the necessary qualities where he least expected to find them. It develops that presently General Liggett goes to the First Army, Bullard to Second Army, Dickman from IV to I corps, Hines to III Corps, Summerall to V Corps, relieving “Bocash” Cameron. Colonel Ely, of 327th, arrived at dinnertime in high state of excitement because summarily relieved by General Lindsey on the field of battle. He was all wound up and bent on justice, claiming the trouble dates back to the era under General Burnham when Lindsey tried un-

Second Attack

165

successfully and for some trifling reason to get him. We kept Ely for dinner, and much soothed he was sent in to Rarecourt for a night of sleep at the general’s house, with instructions to go to his rear echelon at Fléville in the morning and tell Duncan he was there so that the latter might arrange an interview with him. A letter was sent to Duncan, of which Ely had a copy, requesting a thorough investigation. Craig goes to 10:30 p.m. meeting of chiefs of staff at Rampont.

The tempest between Colonel Ely and Brigadier General Julian R. Lindsey showed how uncertain were commanders in their reputations with their seniors, this at a time when the Meuse-Argonne’s second attack failed. Lindsey was in trouble with Liggett.

Saturday, October 12 A day of organizing positions and reorganization of units. General Liggett is summoned to take command of First Army at once as soon as General Dickman of IV Corps reports to take the I Corps, which he did in his beefy fashion at about 3:30 p.m., with instructions from General Pershing that he wanted General Liggett to come at once to Souilly. General Liggett and I reported at Souilly late in afternoon and Generals Pershing and Liggett had a long conference at which the parts of the different elements in the coming renewal of attack were discussed with, I judge, much time wasted. We dined with Pershing on his train.

11 Third Attack

At last Liggett received the command for which he was so eminently fitted, together with the three-star rank that made him one of the two lieutenant generals in the AEF. Bullard, given command of Second Army, had the task, unlike Liggett, of putting together a staff, gathering a few divisions that already were across the Meuse, and attempting to capture the heights next to the river on which the Germans had emplaced dozens of heavy guns and were bedeviling American troops to the west in the First Army. Bullard also had the task of attacking, to the east toward Metz, the fortress that Pershing had in mind until Foch talked him out of it just before St. Mihiel. Bullard’s attack was scheduled for November 14. The new First Army commander chose not to take full command until after the third attack in the Meuse-Argonne, scheduled for October 14. It was Pershing’s attack, for the commander in chief had planned it. The attack, as mentioned, was a virtual failure, after which the hand of Liggett could put the First Army in shape, rest the men for two weeks, bring up supplies, and dispose the divisions according to an arrangement that, with the thoroughness of none of the AEF’s previous attacks, would shatter the German line and bring victory.

Sunday, October 13 Visited the III Corps at Montreville, General Hines (vice Bullard assigned to Second Army) and Bjornstad, chief of staff. Hines and Bullard seemed to have grasped plan and to understand the function of the Fifth Division, coming in from behind and driving northwest. They had a day bombing operation to advocate in connection with the show.

166

Third Attack

167

Called on V Corps, Summerall (vice Cameron returned to Fourth Division) and Burtt, chief of staff, at Verrières en Hesse. Summerall out visiting Haan, Thirty-second. Burtt showed dispositions for attacks and understood function of Forty-second in striking northeast. Called on I Corps, Dickman, and Craig (chief of staff), whose function was rather that of pivot in this operation, to swing around from the east in Grandpré with the French swinging from the west and squeezing out the forest. To each corps General Liggett made it clear that he had no order and so far as he knew had not command of the First Army and was coming around rather as Pershing’s representative and to help him in preparing for this operation. He also passed on to each at Pershing’s request the injunction that brigade and regimental commanders should go forward

168

In the Company of Generals

and see things and get where they could have some personal influence in the progress of the battle. It transpired on our return that the V Corps order was not in accord with the orders of adjoining outfits under the general army order, and this discovery by Craig and Bjornstad called for a meeting at Rampont, which Drum attended. The army order was ambiguous anyway and did not have General Liggett’s endorsement, and of course he had had nothing to do with it. The plan he did approve. Everything pointed to an ineffective G-3 chief and a lack of coordination all through the staff, and things began to change at once under General Liggett’s influence and suggestion. Barber left G-1 for G-3 of Second Army. McCleave left G-3 for chief of staff of Third Division; Kramer and Marshall taking their places respectively. Pershing’s gradual creation of a command structure during his year and a half in France had created what on paper seemed a logical order of things: GHQ sent orders to the First Army, which passed them to the corps, then the divisions. But there were too many chiefs in the layers and the possibility of garbling of directives on the way down. Pershing had further confused everything by taking on two hats, one as commander in chief, the other as commander of the First Army. Liggett—at last brought in to run operations—had to come in gingerly and, as mentioned, allow Pershing’s offensive of October 14 to take its course. Meanwhile he introduced himself to corps commanders, giving them a sense that he was at hand, not remotely, as had been the case with Pershing faraway in GHQ at Chaumont. It was true that Pershing, like Liggett earlier in I Corps, was a traveler, perhaps too much so, suddenly appearing in headquarters everywhere, but his visits had been at random and then he would go back to Chaumont. Although it was not visible in Stackpole’s diary, the commander in chief frequently was also in Paris consulting with Allied generals in the Supreme War Council, constituted during the German spring offensives. This meant Pershing was negotiating with the generals (on the American side this included General Bliss, who thankfully tended to go along with Pershing’s judgment) and often their political seniors, Prime Minister David Lloyd George of Britain, Premier Clemenceau, and (representing President Wilson) the president’s close friend and adviser Colonel Edward M. House.

Third Attack

169

Monday, October 14 The attack is resumed and develops serious resistance everywhere and it develops that the turning movement from the east cannot be accomplished as planned. General Allen, of the Ninetieth, reported; also General Claudel, of XVII Corps, came to discuss operations in programs east of Meuse. General LeComte, of XXXIII Corps (French), called. General O’Neil, of Ninetieth (179th Brigade), called also. McGlachlin, chief of army artillery, and Colonel W. Mitchell, chief of Air Service, had interviews of no special consequence. Pershing was hovering around. At my suggestion Drum ascertained from GHQ that McAndrew had directed an order to issue covering General Liggett’s command of First Army, as General Liggett was not willing to do anything definite in the way of command without such an order. When Drum showed his telegram from McAndrew confirming above he was satisfied. It appeared also that a telegram had gone out dated October 12 to corps, over General Liggett’s name, saying he assumed command of First Army at 12:12 by direction of commander in chief. But this was all, and all orders of October 12, 13, and 14 were still going out “By command of General Pershing”—this was probably inadvertence, and promptly stopped by Drum. General Liggett gave instructions that no orders or communications “by direction” should be sent out without his or Drum’s or Grant’s approval. He consented to let Grant relieve Drum of administrative detail and come direct to him with such papers. Drum attempts to visé and correct every operations order. If GHQ in the person of J.J.P. will take itself away and not attempt to operate through the First Army the show will run better and some coordination may develop. It seemed a pity for Liggett to have to watch while the AEF’s third attack petered out, but he was too newly in his post to make any dispositions to the contrary. What happened was that I Corps and III Corps moved divisions forward without much result. The principal thrust was to have been in the middle, in V Corps, but there the Forty-second Division to the left only moved forward to take a nearby position, the Côte de Châtillon, and thereafter was too exhausted to go farther. On the right the Fifth Division, under

170

In the Company of Generals

the incompetent McMahon, who was relieved for his failure, did not push at all; he simply fussed around the fringes of his front line—so that V Corps’s attack too petered out.

Tuesday, October 15 Visited I Corps, Dickman and Craig, with respect to pending operations involving pushing left ahead, using the fresh Seventy-eighth. Dickman appeared to be more of a lunkhead than usual. General McAndrew (chief of staff, AEF) here and Pershing around also. De Chambrun at lunch. Marshal Foch calls for immediate transfer of Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first to Flanders to help Belgians and will have no delay in plan to have movement commence tomorrow. This a GHQ matter so far as First Army is concerned under General Liggett’s command, but handled through First Army by Pershing and Drum. General Liggett and Pershing had a long conference in the morning, at which I was not present, but General Liggett said Pershing changed his mind many times and finally General Liggett told him to give the First Army a directive and he would do all that was humanly possible to carry it out. General Liggett said that Foch and Pétain were pressing Pershing continually to push on, though Pershing knew that he was getting all he could out of the outfits under the circumstances and many of them were well used up. General Hines, III Corps, had a long conference with General Liggett and Drum in the evening as to the behavior of the Fifth Division commanding officers and brigade commanders, who had apparently done very badly and knocked up a fresh division to no good purpose. McMahon, Castner, and Malone all came in for criticism; they had evidently lost their heads and let their people drift away from them. I was not present, but this comes from General Liggett.

Wednesday, October 16 At office all day. The operation going forward actively was confined to the I Corps, which was to push forward beyond Grandpré and Champigneulle, while the V and III corps did little else than hold. Strong re-

Third Attack

171

sistance and counterattacks everywhere. I Corps makes some progress and connects with French XXXVIII at Talma, holds one-half Grandpré and one-half Champigneulle by street fighting and has Hill 122. The Forty-second Division, V Corps, chews up a new division (One hundred ninety-ninth) in counterattack and improves its position; the Thirtyninth Division, XVII Corps, gains Grand Montagne summit, east of Meuse. Two new German divisions from Champagne (Thirteenth and One Hundred Ninety-ninth) thrown in on this front. General Pershing is still around at his office on the train and butting into details, with numerous changes of mind. Ely replaces McMahon in Fifth, and P. Brown replaces Buck in Third, the two discards going to replacement divisions. This was on Pershing’s order; General Liggett was not consulted about these substitutions so far as I know, but he had determined and advised that McMahon be relieved, and if called on for recommendations had concluded to suggest Flagler, of Fifth Division artillery brigade, in preference to Wittenmyer, of the Seventy-seventh, both of whom he considered available. He decided on Drum’s statement of Morrow’s slowness that a new army engineer must be appointed and had Drum so state to Pershing. General Martin, of Eighty-seventh Division (brigade commander), called; also Colonel Price, 359th Infantry, to pay respects. Quekemeyer gets General Liggett’s consent to removal of French Fifth Cavalry Division. An extraordinary spectacle is presented by Pershing, who has directed General Liggett to assume command of the First Army, hanging around and worrying everybody with endless talk, rather than giving his orders and leaving the First Army to carry them out. Mitchell was in to see the general and spoke with enthusiastic vagueness about the Air Service. He particularly lauds the pursuit work now. He wants to build concrete crosses for landing, etc. On the front of I Corps the Seventy-eighth Division, a fresh unit, replacing the tired Seventy-seventh under Alexander, was in trouble because of resistance in the area of Grandpré, to which the Germans gave full attention because it virtually anchored the left side of the AEF’s line in the Meuse- Argonne. The trouble for the Americans was, first, the town itself, dominated by a jutting high place on which there once had been a chateau, from which the German defenders machine-gunned all attackers; second from the

172

In the Company of Generals

Bois des Loges to the right, a small acreage shaped like a piece of corrugated iron, in which the enemy scattered machine gunners and every night gassed the attacking troops of the Seventy-eighth Division; and to make matters worse the commander of the Seventy-eighth, Major General McRae, was blocked to the west by German guns in the huge Bois de Bourgogne.

Thursday, October 17 Visited the I Corps and saw Dickman, who read over the directive given by Pershing to General Liggett at latter’s request, defining general purpose to crowd enemy east of Meuse by advance of I Corps, accompanied by XXXVIII French and assisting pressure, and advance of V Corps and pressure and holding by III, with XVII cleaning up high ground to east of Brieulles, across river. General Dickman seems gradually to absorb the notion and to grasp General Liggett’s injunction to keep on pushing and clean up Grandpré, Bois des Loges, and acquire and hold high ground around Champigneulle. At V Corps, Summerall read the directive and at once correctly outlined the task of his corps. He said he had relieved Lenihan, of 83rd Brigade, and put in Reilly. Lenihan had not had his brigade in hand and the 165th (Colonel Mitchell) had been demoralized both as regards men and officers. The men were straggling badly and flunking and he concluded on investigation that this might be due to the utterances of their chaplain, who had told them there would be an armistice in a few days and there was no use in getting killed for no purpose. He had located this gent in a hospital and proposed to discipline him with the next thing to shooting. Thirty-second wants to be relieved and says so. General Bjornstad (in absence of Hines) has much to say about deplorable conditions in Third and Fifth divisions of III Corps, where only a very small proportion of the men can be found. He claims the officers are listless, do no studying, and have no control. General Liggett says he intends to substitute the Fifth on the whole line (as practically stabilized) for both the Third and Fourth and draw them back in near vicinity. Pershing here, but departs tonight. He is still trying to run the GHQ through this army and using Drum, chief of staff of army, for GHQ purposes. He is crowded by the French to advance and is crowding our own troops, though as General Liggett said he had admitted to him they had

Third Attack

173

already been crowded to the limit. General Liggett said he told Pershing to go away and forget it. General Liggett’s plan as confirmed by army order is to hold on present line, taking advantage of every opportunity to harass the enemy and drive him out of his positions and develop his [the enemy’s] defense, establishing ourselves as near as possible in Bois des Loges, Bois de Bantheville, and Bois des Rappes, so as to have a good line to jump off from a little later, say by October 26, when divisions drawn back will be fresh for another effort. The increasing strength of the enemy opposite our front in every branch, infantry, machine gun, artillery, and air service, involves us in unavoidable daily losses in any event and any attack but a strong, concerted effort on our whole front involves more loss of life than the gain of ground justifies. A delay enables the French to work up more on the west of Bois de Bourgogne, by applying divisions to be withdrawn from Champagne in view of German withdrawal of units from that front to ours. However, the injunction is to push constantly. Losses about 7,500 in this operation so far. Daily losses in entire American forces at front about 5,000. Extent of German losses on our front not known.

Friday, October 18 System of daily meetings instituted with chief of artillery, chief of Air Service, and chief engineer. McGlachlin, Mitchell, and Morrow all here. McGlachlin is about ready to fire Montmédy with 14-inch naval guns near Verdun; he awaits aerial observation. Morrow is sent away to speed up his work. Mitchell all enthusiasm, as usual. At Hines’s headquarters, III Corps, the stragglers problem still troubles them and Bjornstad has all sorts of fantastic ideas for preventing straggling, though everyone insists that shooting is the only remedy— that can’t be done under President Wilson’s policy. Hines is disposed to wait a day or so for results from Brown (Third) and Ely (Fifth), the new commanders. Brown is throwing bombs into dugouts as a means of compulsion. Hines is enjoined to clean up the Bois des Rappes. He reports that his inspection of corps medical unit at evac hospital discloses careless administration. Called on General Claudel, of French XVII Corps, who is still working at his problem of getting the high ground east of Meuse in his

174

In the Company of Generals

sector. He is in General Liggett’s expressed judgment solving the problem correctly. He is economizing ammunition so as to have a three days’ supply to use in the artillery work on the day of his attack. He wants replacements for certain regiments in the Twenty-ninth and Thirty-third U.S., but is given no encouragement. Headquarters at Regret, just west of Verdun. Through Verdun to Belrupt, headquarters of French XXXIII, General LeComte out. Home through Dieue. Bowditch (aide of J.J.P.) was brought to mess by Drum without consulting General Liggett, who rather preferred to keep the mess as it was and to accept Bowditch’s suggestion, made through me, that he could quite as well go to McGuire’s mess, where provision had already been made for him. Bowditch left here in an office to receive reports and to ask me everything General Liggett does—which is a very simple matter to handle, but hard on old Peter, who may not know he is apparently playing the spy. General McGlachlin invited to dinner, but absent on account of illness. General Mitchell reports to me that General Patrick, of the Air Service, is coming up to present medals to aviators at 10:00 tomorrow, and Mitchell thinks General Liggett should do it, as the men are in his army. I told Mitchell that if Patrick was instructed by GHQ to make the presentations he better go ahead and obey instructions; if not and the duty devolved on General Liggett he could not do it tomorrow and would do so only at a time and under circumstances of his own arranging. This reply approved by General Liggett. Mitchell tricky, as usual. (General F. Parker gets First Division; C. King replaces Bjornstad, who goes to a brigade; Wills goes from chief of staff Sixth to Fourth, and Bundy, commanding general, VII, goes home.)

The above activities, all in a single day, well illustrated Liggett’s problems as he sought to bring his three corps and, within them, divisions under control. This meant travel, and upon return to headquarters the conversations or necessary attentions given to incessant kibitzers or opportunists. His aide Stackpole, perhaps accustomed to the calm and order of a Boston law office, found all this activity annoying and may also have been quick to judge the intentions of many of the callers, or even measure the extent of their curiosity, and a reader must take some of his observations cum grano salis.

Third Attack

175

Saturday, October 19 General Sir Arthur Paget, of British army, presents his compliments. At I Corps it appears that the Seventy-eighth is making some progress, having cleaned up Grandpré and Bois des Loges and holding line substantially on parallel 88. They have suffered a good many losses, but are going strong. The Eighty-second is doing nothing. Line runs south of Champigneulle, which has been gassed to drive out Germans remaining. The Seventy-seventh is cleaned, deloused, and refitted. Push and keep on pushing is the instruction, so as to take advantage of any withdrawal or weakening by the enemy, pending a strong attack later on. Craig says the Eighty-second complain of too much shelling at headquarters, but when I later told him Drum said he had authority to allow a change and he passed this on to the Eighty-second they said they did not want to change. The report on the Hill 263 episode, which General Liggett as corps commander had ordered Duncan to make, is not in, and Craig is to stir him up on it. Duncan has restored Ely to his regiment. The Traub, Thirty-fifth, report is in, but without recommendations as to what shall be done with the officers. Craig later reports the Germans come into Bois des Loges every night and have to be driven out in the morning. He also reports serious shell fire losses in the Seventy-eighth. At the V Corps, Summerall is working on small operation to rectify and strengthen his line for jumping off. He is satisfied that the Bois de Bantheville is cleaned up. He is endeavoring by personal instruction and influence to convince his commanders that unless they can show him losses—men in the wire or beyond it—he can’t feel that they have really tried to accomplish their tasks. Mitchell and Marshall to dinner. Mitchell hangs around and finally shows me personally an order taking him to Army Group, Lahm to Second Army chief, and Milling assigned to First Army. He said this was done while Pershing was still in command of First Army and the order was GHQ. He said he did not want to go if General Liggett wanted him to stay and was fishing for some request for his services or expression of regret from General Liggett (which he won’t get) by way of endorsement. General Liggett is through with him and his attitude is that the sooner Mitchell goes the better and Mitchell will never get to him on the subject. Drum is told this by me and seems to understand the situation. He has had his difficulties with Mitchell; he says Milling is a different sort.

176

In the Company of Generals

At midnight Craig, speaking for Dickman who was with him, and McRae, speaking for himself and General Hersey (brigade commander) who was also present at I Corps headquarters, reported that the left brigade (Hersey’s) of the Seventy-eighth was all shot to pieces, with only a little over seven hundred effectives remaining; that the Germans were still in northern part of Grandpré and made the Bois des Loges too hot for them to stay in; that they wanted reinforcements or replacements, and did not want to be relieved. Drum on General Liggett’s dictation told them to hold the woods by observation and with a few strong points and establish a line on the Grandpré–St. Juvin road, where the men would have some semblance of shell fire shelter, joining up with the Eightysecond on their right down the slope from 182, and with the French on their left west of Grandpré. This withdrawal to be accomplished at once before daybreak, and in such a manner so not to excite Boche or alarm the Eighty-second. Both McRae and Hersey had been through narrow escapes in shell fire in the afternoon and General Liggett concluded they were probably nervous about the situation partly on this account.

Matters in I Corps, that is, in the attacking Seventy-eighth, became so dicey that the division’s commanding general ventured a retreat, a tactic he had to propose with awkwardness, for in the weeks past the commander in chief had told everyone who would listen that it was necessary to hold every foot of ground, there must be no retreating anywhere. As it turned out, Generals McRae and Hersey did not withdraw troops and managed to hang on until the Germans let go of the Bois des Loges and Bourgogne in the AEF attack of November 1 and thereafter.

Sunday, October 20 Pershing turned up again, with his entourage and steam train. Drum and the general (as he told me) prevailed upon him to think that any aggressive attack except in a limited way in local operations should be deferred for a few days until it could be made on a wide front and until we have allowed say six divisions to get freshened up, available for such an operation. Constant general attacks with a pretty well used up force accomplish little now except an increase of already heavy daily losses. In

Third Attack

177

the absence of some order from Foch the plan is to be carried out, with a general attack on our front in prospect for a week hence. Called at I Corps, where the excitement of the previous evening over the predicament of the Seventy-eighth seemed to have disappeared; the withdrawal of the elements had been successfully accomplished, and both Dickman and Craig were disposed to minimize the seriousness of the affair of last night. General Liggett rather reprimanded them for not handling it themselves, as they should have. Their excuse for letting McRae refer the matter up was their anxiety over any semblance of withdrawal in visé of the understood attitude of the commander in chief on the subject. The Eighty-second is reported by Craig as pretty tired. At III Corps, the general went over the Bois des Rappes and Chêne Claire situation with Hines and approved of the local operations under way to clear up these woods. Hines is glad to rid himself of Bjornstad, who does too much by himself and tries to run the works. Hines reports that they are getting some hold on the stragglers situation and both Brown and Ely are succeeding in rounding up some of them. He read over an order prepared by his G-1, which was aimed at this evil, and General Liggett expressed approval in a general way, but they were in my judgment too damn long, amateurish and ill-considered. However, anything goes in the army as long as you do something—put it on paper and boast about it. At French VII Corps General Claudel said his preparations were complete for an operation on the high ground on the twenty-second, a heavy artillery concentration preceding a lively attack, with limited objective— old sector warfare style. General Liggett approved of the plans exhibited. He referred to incident in the Twenty-sixth Division of Boche coming over to make friends with our men, who had shot them—a different version from the one which came from General Edwards, who sent in a report of a very friendly talk between the Germans and our men on peace, etc., and prospects of saving blood by armistice. Edwards, by the way, was reproved by General Liggett in a personal letter, in which he told him to have his men shoot at once instead of parley. Pershing monopolizing the general’s office on our return late in afternoon. Drum and Liggett attended a conference on Pershing’s train in evening, at which they discussed condition of divisions, replacements, etc., all in reference to reconstituting the army as speedily as possible for the fresh offensive.

178

In the Company of Generals

General Mitchell and Colonel Milling called on General Liggett, the former to announce his departure, the latter to present himself as chief of Air Service.

Monday, October 21 General Conner, G-3, GHQ, around much of day working on plans for next move—at lunch. Major General Martin, Colonel Waldron, called and were received. Colonel Milling in with General Liggett in morning and received General Liggett’s definite though kindly admonition that he was chief of Air Service of First Army and responsible to army commander and must show results. General Morrow and Colonel W. Howell at dinner. Bois des Rappes reported “riveted down” and Ravins aux Pierres reported by I Corps as taken for good.

Tuesday, October 22 General Cameron called on General Liggett and had a rather long conference, from which I absented myself as I could not attend without a rather conspicuous intrusion. Cameron had an envelope in his hand when he came out and I daresay got General Liggett to sign some damn fool soft-hearted stuff, which may cause the ruin of both of them in these days of captious judgments. Cameron in my opinion is a treacherous eel. Later it appears that Cameron has been relieved from the Fourth Division and is going home, but without reduction in rank. He wanted to learn from General Liggett why he had been relieved and the latter told him he did not know. Cameron told him many things about his talks with Pershing, including the allusion to the tired condition of the troops, and General Liggett told Cameron he thought he could find in his own utterances the reason, as even though what he said might be true, Pershing did not want to hear them. General Liggett said Cameron had a letter announcing the fact of his relief, and apart from his inquiry as to why he had been relieved gave no evidence of disappointment or disposition to complain or protest—and so far as I know General

Third Attack

179

Liggett did not commit himself as pro or con in the business and did not sign anything. And the sooner Cameron and Edwards, who thank God is also relieved, get out of reach, the better pleased I shall be. Cole also goes back with Edwards. Bamford takes the Twenty-sixth Division. Colonel Milling, of Air Service, called to describe the effort at night pursuit of German bombers last night. General McAndrew, chief of staff, AEF, and General Conner, at General Liggett’s office and at luncheon, though General Liggett and I were not there. A directive is submitted with reference to operations on about the twenty-eighth and General Liggett’s policy of conservation and refreshment is to be followed meanwhile. Called at I Corps, where General Dickman was given opportunity to read directive. Alexander is not yet back. Duncan is dissatisfied with his artillery, but running his division according to Craig and preferring Lindsey to Cronin. General Liggett told them of Pershing’s directive that in view of the scarcity of replacements the divisions in a corps should be equalized by transfer as far as feasible, the result being, of course, a reduction of the company strength. Operations on left of line arranged for tomorrow. At V Corps, General Summerall read directive and seemed to understand his function. He was pleased at prospect of getting First or Second Division to assist—“Superb” as he said. He wants to use the twenty-four tanks and sixteen crews now at Varennes but ordered away, and General Liggett authorized Drum to hold them. Summerall believes in a heavy artillery concentration as preparation, both for effect on enemy and reassuring effect on our own troops. General DeWitt at dinner. Order out for coming operations.

Almost as if it were a footnote to the preparations for attack, soon scheduled for November 1, was the relief and sending home of General Cameron. From the outset Stackpole did not like Cameron, and Liggett thought him without talent as a division commander, whereupon GHQ elevated him to command of V Corps, on a nominal equality with Liggett then commanding I Corps. The command of three green divisions in the general attack of September 26 was doomed to failure, and Cameron then slowly passed into obscurity, that is, an assignment back in the United States, uncertainly directed by Pershing.

12 Fourth—and Victory

The surprise of World War I, except possibly to sophisticates such as Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett, was the suddenness with which it ended. Liggett, of course, was devoting his days to planning for a German defeat, and from his confidence Stackpole, his aide, could see decision replacing confusion, a good sign that something might be taking place that would produce the victory everyone on the Allied side desired. Here the necessity was preparation. Liggett’s predecessor in command of the First Army had believed that movement and American grit and determination would bring victory, and instead had tired the troops to ineffectiveness by pushing them. Liggett was willing to push, but only after the men had good food rather than iron rations—canned beef and crackers—and received blankets and could find warmth in shelters at the front. Strange machines, autoclaves, appeared near the front lines, and men took showers while the autoclaves boiled their clothes, killing the vermin and cooties that bedeviled troops; the lice came from the rats that infested positions on the front. Pershing was uneasy about the delay that providing these necessities required, but he let Liggett go ahead, as he had little choice, for he still was busy with his many other duties. Liggett meanwhile dealt with corps commanders and division commanders, placed their ideas against his own and those of his staff, and placed the divisions in the best positions for attack.

Wednesday, October 23 Colonel Milling had brief conferences with General Liggett and indicated satisfactory arrangements for heavy bombing and machinegun fire from the air on Barricourt Wood and German advance lines, in cooperation with infantry in coming show. 180

Fourth—and Victory

181

General Lejeune, Second Division, reported now moving up to St. Menehould and Les Islettes. Artillery left behind with French, to no purpose, he claims. Infantry has been marched too much by French. General Bandholtz reports to reorganize military police. At III Corps, Montreville, General Hines reads directive and expresses confidence in the plan. The Fifth is being reorganized by Ely, and Brown has the Third well in hand. Straggling situation is much improved. General Liggett explained to him [Hines] the commander in chief’s instructions about equalizing units, but I don’t think he got it quite straight and am speaking to Drum to have him make sure in his next talk with Hines. Order out for replacing Edwards by Bamford, in Twenty-sixth. Cameron is reported as having already left the Fourth. General Campbell King reports on way to V Corps as chief of staff. General Bjornstad goes to 13th Brigade, Seventh Division, somewhere in south of France. Colonel Spalding ordered to report here as chief engineer, while General Morrow goes to Third Army. Colonel Kromer to dinner (damn this entertaining of chiefs of sections). Artillery maps submitted by all outfits—that is, corps and army artillery.

Thursday, October 24 McAndrew, Conner, and Pershing here. Drum and General Liggett attend conference at Pershing’s train relative to employment of First Army and secure his acquiescence to plan for allowing enough time before another blow for reconstituting and getting force in shape to make a decisive thrust all along this front. General Liggett informed by General Pershing of his confirmation as a lieutenant general.

Friday, October 25 Visited I Corps headquarters and General Liggett was advised by Dickman and Craig as to developments in line operations by Seventyeighth Division, and General Liggett made suggestions to them about function of I Corps in coming operations.

182

In the Company of Generals

In afternoon General Liggett, Drum, Colonel Foret (French mission), lieutenant interpreter, and myself went to Fère Suippe for conference with General Gouraud, Fourth French Army, this being at suggestion of Pétain. General Liggett asked General Gouraud when he would be ready and Gouraud asked when we would and General Liggett replied the twentyeighth, whereupon Gouraud said that was too early for him and he could not commence before the second. He agreed that the operations ought to be made contemporaneous; that four days’ difference was too much—one day would not be disadvantageous. General Liggett said we would attack November 1 in view of Gouraud’s statement that he could not attack until the second. General Liggett said he would prepare to have the artillery of the Second Division join the division before the attack, and Gouraud reluctantly agreed to give it up so that it would enter First Army October 29. It was understood that a liaison detachment was to affect liaison between XXXVIII Corps and First Army. Gouraud advised that after the first day he might be compelled to hold up for two days in order to get his guns across the stream, and this was accepted by General Liggett simply as a statement of fact, with no acquiescence on his part, and he intimated it would be likely to upset coordination in progress between the two armies, as the American flank might be unprotected if they tried to advance without the French. General Gouraud asked for an American liaison officer who could speak in place of Colonel Hobson, who had been withdrawn and could not speak French, and intimated that adequate facilities had not been given by G-3 to his liaison officer, Captain Prefet. On the whole, the interview seemed to start with a spirit unnatural to the conferences in which General Liggett had participated as corps commander, but cleared up very soon when the general quietly and definitely announced what he was prepared to do, and was most gracious about nonessentials, including cigars. My idea is that the early atmosphere was reminiscent of former days, when Drum alone or Drum and Pershing had conferred with Gouraud and jockeyed around in endless quibbling discussions, which it would seem to be Pershing’s habit to protract. I doubt also if Drum is altogether persona grata, no doubt because associated with his former chief, who I think has been pretty successfully handled by the French who have spared no pains to increase his notoriety and his decorations.

Fourth—and Victory

183

Corps commander Summerall here.

The historian Coffman has long felt that whatever Stackpole’s abilities, the lawyer-officer was hard on Pershing, and there is some truth in the point. Stackpole was a partisan of the general, as he denominated Liggett, not Pershing. Still, there was truth also in what Stackpole wrote about Pershing’s willingness to contend with the French, on whatever level, military or political. It was better to act as did Liggett, inform the French of what the Americans would do, rather than what the French should.

Saturday, October 26 General Maistre, Group of Armies, here at request of Pétain and Foch to coordinate efforts of the First American Army and Fourth French, and after a couple of hours of incessant talk by the goodnatured and enthusiastic Frenchman, it was clear that the show would not commence until the first on our part, and by the Fourth on the second, and Maistre would attempt to have Foch direct both attacks on the same day, probably the second. Maistre said some modifications of the Fourth Army plan were necessary and he handed out some modifications of the American plan as suggestions, which were politely but not enthusiastically considered. Maistre’s suggestions were directed at throwing a rather bigger lead on the First Army for the relief and aid of the Fourth. Generals Summerall and Hines here to discuss the plan, Summerall being rather too intent on working out a plan of his own without adequate reference to his right and left. Drum is rather insistent on an objective which the general does not altogether approve, and a conference with all corps commanders was arranged for tomorrow.

Sunday, October 27 The corps commanders were all at a conference and then at luncheon and an agreement reached as to coordination of plans, etc.

184

In the Company of Generals

General Gordon, of Eighth Division, reported, with Colonel Benham, his chief of staff. Lieutenant Colonel Foret to dinner.

Monday, October 28 In Souilly all day. McAndrew and Conner here. General Strong of Fortieth Division (depot) reported. Army order for the operations out. Colonel Spalding, of St. Louis, presented himself, full of glory. Attack order of battle—right to left III Corps, Fifth and Ninetieth, Third and Thirty-second res.; V Corps, Eighty-ninth and Second, First and Forty-second res.; I Corps, Eightieth, Seventy-seventh, Seventy-eighth, Eighty-second res.

Tuesday, October 29 Pershing around again and worried (so General Liggett told me) by the form of an order which went out from Maistre as commander of group, giving impression that the First American Army was under him in these operations, and also because of some slight change of boundaries. General Liggett says he told him to forget it and not to allow himself to be bothered, to give us the directive and leave us alone. Maistre came in the afternoon, but we were away, and Pershing saw him. We ducked on purpose. Went up through the Argonne to Grandpré and around by Lançon, St. Menehould, etc. Attack determined for November 1, French Fourth cooperating.

Wednesday, October 30 Called at I and V corps. Côtes des Forimont and Cheppy. Plans for attack developed.

Fourth—and Victory

185

Thursday, October 31 Called at III Corps, Montreville. Prince Higashi Fushimi, of Japan, and Captain Jiro Naugo, A.D.C., Lieutenant General Shibe, Captain Marquis Mayeda, Vice Admiral Kozaburo Ogui blew in by special train and were entertained for one-half hour by General Liggett. McAndrew and Conner here.

Friday, November 1 General Liggett has official notice of lieutenant generalcy. Two hours’ artillery preparation and attack started at 5:30. The I Corps on left made little progress, Bois de Bourgogne over through Champigneulle, Seventy-eighth and Seventy-seventh divisions, but the Eightieth on the right went forward; III and V corps made their objectives. Dickman got anxious and moved headquarters to Chéhéry. Pershing, McAndrew, and Conner hanging around.

Saturday, November 2 Called at I Corps. Opposition removed and everything going forward, the Seventy-seventh and Seventy-eighth having lost contact and endeavoring to catch up in trucks. Called V Corps, Cheppy. The reader will have observed almost no mention of poison gas in Stackpole’s diary, a curious omission, especially for his entries of November 1–2. The Germans increasingly used gas after they introduced it in 1915, and by 1918 they were much more sophisticated in employing it. Favorite tactics were to lull the opposing Allied troops into carelessness in carrying their masks and then send over a massive gas “shoot”; or to disguise use of gas shells by mixing them with ordinary shells; or to send over just enough gas

186

In the Company of Generals

Fourth—and Victory

187

to keep opposing troops in masks, which were uncomfortable to wear for an extended time—small portions also tired men without their realizing they had been gassed. The last happened with the Forty-second Division when it entered the V Corps in October, so that after capture of the Côte de Châtillon the division was too tired to take advantage of its victory and pursue the German foe. Prior to the Meuse-Argonne, the U.S. Army used little gas against the opposing German troops, on the theory that if the Americans did not employ it, their opponents would not do so. Altogether gas cost American forces 18,670 casualties, 20 percent of total casualties. There was only use of gas by III Corps against German artillery emplacements in the heights above the Meuse. The general policy of abstention came to an end during the American fourth attack on November 1–2, what with massive yperite, mustard gas, use—dozens of tons—by both I and V corps. Use of ordinary high explosive shells by Liggett’s artillery was skillfully handled in this attack, but the employment of gas was almost overwhelming, particularly by I Corps. The slowness of I Corps during the attack’s first day was because 41.4 tons of yperite in the Bois des Loge and Bois de Bourgogne required a day to drive out or annihilate the German artillerymen and machine gunners.

November 2 to 6 inclusive The attack progresses favorably everywhere, against well-directed artillery and determined machine-gun opposition covering the retreat. I Corps goes to Chéhéry and Harricourt. V Corps goes to Remireville and then to Nouart. III Corps goes to Romagne and finally to Dun-sur-Meuse. Called at intervals on I Corps at Chéhéry and Harricourt (twice) and V at Nouart, and Second at Romagne. By the sixth (end) the operation was concluded in its more active stage.

The remarkable brevity of the diary entries for November 1–6 indicates the enormous success of the attack, the AEF’s fourth in the great battle of the Meuse-Argonne. And what a success it was! Liggett had designated V Corps under Summerall, in the middle of the line, as the point of the attack. The

188

In the Company of Generals

two divisions of V Corps under Major Generals Lejeune and Wright, both able commanders, and under their infantry colonels, similar leaders, moved forward with a competency that few attack divisions had possessed in the past. They were supported not by the traditional (according to AEF tables of organization) artillery brigades, one each, but by five, together with French artillery regiments gathered for the occasion. The artillery thus produced a preparation fire and then a rolling barrage that took out all opposition in front of the infantry. Moreover, the front line everywhere now was in open country—no more of the rolling terrain, few forests that presented obstacles, none of the tangle of obstacles that the Seventy-seventh Division had found in the Argonne Forest. The men were in country with occasional villages that contained churches with steeples, houses with roofs. It was a new kind of war. Liggett, during this wonderful movement, was everywhere, and Stackpole unable to write.

Thursday, November 7 In Souilly. Drum was off all day. It developed, however, that an order or memo had gone out to the I and V corps, quoting in paragraph 1 an injunction by Pershing to take Sedan and in paragraph 2 a statement that boundary limits would not be observed. Marshall intimated to me that there was such a thing, but did not want it taken up with General Liggett until Drum should show him the order, which Marshall rather assumed General Liggett must have seen. Grant also acted a little queer and was distressed over dual command. When Drum returned he made no mention of the order, but referred to the eagerness of the divisions to get to Sedan and the reluctance of the French to have them. General Liggett was disposed to entertain the view that the French ought to be allowed to go in there first, particularly as the IX Corps, which was craving the honor, had been pushed out of there in 1914, and the only military advantage was for us to gain the heights commanding the town.

Stackpole refers confusedly, as well he might have, to another attempt by General Pershing to interfere with the direction of the First Army. This was

Fourth—and Victory

189

what became known as “the race to Sedan,” in which Pershing sent down an ambiguous order (“boundaries will not be binding,” Drum wrote into the order before it went out to Dickman and Summerall). Meanwhile Pershing was secure in his knowledge that Summerall probably would take advantage of what seemed an opportunity to race his favorite division, the First, under the complaisant Parker, toward Sedan. The First was in reserve in V Corps, and Summerall, without any questioning, turned it loose, allowing its regiments to pass into the territory allotted to I Corps under Dickman and, as matters turned out, cut across Dickman’s divisions en route to Sedan.

Friday, November 8 I got from Marshall a copy of the memo alluded to above, sent out over the name of General Liggett, and gave it to him. Marshall said that the direction to send out Pershing’s request came from Pershing, through Conner, who asked that it be telephoned out—as it was the evening of the sixth and the memo went out by wire the same night; Drum had added the paragraph about limits; Marshall assumed that Drum had consulted the general. The general showed the memo to Drum and told him it was a source of trouble. We went to I Corps at Harricourt and found Craig and Dickman in a state of anger and excitement because the First Division was all mixed up with the Forty-second, which it marched in front of directly across to the west. He read a telegram from Menoher that MacArthur had been arrested by First Division patrols and that the First Division already had its P.C. at Chéhéry, over to the west in the French sector. Congestion of traffic had resulted and an impossible confusion in supply and a clash had taken place between the First and Forty-second. Telephone communication with V Corps headquarters was impossible then, and the division had gone on so fast that it was practically impossible to talk to them. At Nouart, V Corps, where headquarters were just being established, General Burtt was in charge. Emerson (colonel), G-3, was the first man we saw and General Liggett asked him where the First Division was and he said at Chéhéry and Summerall had left for there early in the morning, but had not been heard from. When asked by what order the First Division went over there, he said corps order.

190

In the Company of Generals

When Burtt appeared General Liggett told him the performance of the First Division was a military atrocity and Parker must have lost his head. Burtt was told to get them back immediately where they belonged and [Burtt] said he had already been sending messages to them to this effect in response to telegrams from the army. When interrogated as to whose order permitted the division to go there and who made such a plan he said after some evasion that he supposed General Summerall, General Parker, and he were all responsible. He said the order emanated in the first instance from the army, but General Liggett said he did not know of that order before it was sent and had only just seen it; besides he explained to Burtt that it simply called on the V to support the I Corps right in taking Sedan, and that no reasonable interpretation of the paragraph about limits would permit of the atrocity of marching one division across the front of another in pursuit of the enemy, which might have resulted in a military catastrophe if the enemy had been able to take advantage of the blunder. He told Burtt to tell Summerall to send him at once a written statement as to by what authority the move was made, who gave the order, and all about it. Summerall’s statement came in at midnight, but was a lame affair, throwing the burden onto the memorandum. In the evening General Liggett told Drum that memo ought never to have been sent and dwelt upon the impossible character of the maneuver, the futility of getting excited over Sedan, of itself of no military importance, and the craziness of Parker and ambition of Summerall. Drum acquiesced, though claiming the interpretation of the memo was not warranted, and talked of relief and court-martial for Parker and perhaps for Summerall. I think, however, he got General Liggett’s point, though reluctantly, that he himself had blundered. It appears that Pershing had talked to General Liggett excitedly about taking Sedan, and General Liggett had not approved of the idea and said the French would not stand for it; also that Pershing had himself gone the rounds on the night of the sixth and told the I Corps to get Sedan, and probably had said the same thing to the V Corps. Previous conversation in which Pershing had said that Frank Parker and the First Division could go ahead and take any objective seems to favor the view that he may have indicated to Summerall and Parker that the First should join the race. All this was in direct opposition to General Liggett’s plan and action of how the operation should be conducted. Another instance of

Fourth—and Victory

191

ignorant meddling, in which Drum, who knew General Liggett’s views, was involved.

Saturday, November 9 Pershing at the office, and according to General Liggett was much amused at the rivalry between the First and Forty-second, failing entirely to appreciate the serious consequences which might have resulted. The First Division is reported as back where it belongs, but is not yet there. General Maistre reports the “Roosevelt Regiment” is approaching Oinecourt, way over in French sector, and evidently planning to march down the valley of the Bar and enter Sedan from the west. General Liggett again makes it clear to Drum that the direction by Pershing was the cause of the trouble and that the memo should never have gone. He says he wants the matter investigated by Grant, but he does not propose under the circumstances to take any action against either Parker or Summerall, and is satisfied that they will never do such a thing again, though if it had not occurred at the end of a successful operation, with no especially harmful consequence, he would have one or both court-martialed.

Pershing’s gross interference in Liggett’s command has now largely passed into history, remembered only by military historians. Liggett’s greatness as a commander appeared in the denouement, which was letting Summerall, Parker, Burtt, and Drum know what he thought of their insubordination. Afterward, he did the only wise thing open to him, which was to let the matter pass, if he could, into oblivion (although to anyone who learned what happened, it really could not).

Sunday, November 10 Decorated about twenty-five of First Army aviators with D.S.C. at Rembercourt, Colonel Milling presiding and General Liggett giving decorations and making little speech, in which he told the men the recent

192

In the Company of Generals

operations could not have been such a success without the work and cooperation of the Air Service. Visited Hines’s (III Corps) headquarters at Romagne, but he had just moved to Dun-sur-Meuse.

Monday, November 11 At 6:30 a.m. word was received by Drum from Boyd by telephone that armistice was signed at 5:00 effective at 11:00, and orders in pursuance immediately transmitted to corps.

In this prosaic manner the First Army learned of the end of the war.

Epilogue

After the war, in 1925 and 1928, Liggett was the author of two books about the war, Commanding an American Army and A.E.F.: Ten Years Ago in France. The first was written by Stackpole, the second by a Saturday Evening Post writer. After serving as commander of the IX Corps Area with headquarters at the Presidio in San Francisco, the general retired in California and died in 1935. Apart from his books, ghostwritten as they were, if obviously informed on many subjects by the putative author, Liggett left no papers. During his active military career, he endorsed orders and recommendations but was the author of few letters or detailed accounts of what he was doing or attempted; he was accustomed to writing occasionally in pencil on legal-sized, lined yellow pads, and he left few such missives. Hence the large value of the diary by his aide Stackpole. The Boston lawyer went back to his legal work at what some of the denizens of his large American city described as the hub of the universe, and he concerned himself with the work of his firm, Warner, Stackpole, and Bradlee. His interests went well beyond the law, as he was vice president and member of the board of trustees of the New England Conservatory and a trustee of the Boston Symphony. He was treasurer of the South End House Association and served with the Community Federation. He was a director of the Merchants National Bank. There is no evidence of his leaving papers or of engaging in any literary enterprises other than writing General Liggett’s first book and keeping the wartime diary. After Stackpole’s death in 1936, the law firm sent his diary to the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, where it has remained to the present day, occasionally used by scholars.

193

Bibliography

Alexander, Robert. Memories of the World War: 1917–1918. New York: Macmillan, 1931. American Armies, and Battlefields in Europe. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938. Asprey, Robert B. At Belleau Wood. New York: Putman’s, 1965. ———. The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct World War I. New York: Morrow, 1991. Bach, Christian A., and Henry N. Hall. The Fourth Division: Its Services and Achievements in the World War. Garden City, N.Y.: Fourth Division, 1920. Baker, Horace A. Argonne Days in World War I. Ed. Robert H. Ferrell. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007. Barry, John W. The Midwest Goes to War: The 32nd Division in the Great War. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow, 2007. Bartlett, Merrill L. Lejeune: A Marine’s Life, 1867–1942. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. Beaver, Daniel R. Modernizing the American War Department: Changes and Continuity in a Turbulent Era, 1885–1920. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2006. ———. Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort: 1917–1918. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966. Blackburn, Marc K. The United States Army and the Motor Truck: A Case Study in Standardization. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1996. Blake, Robert Wallace. From Belleau Wood to Bougainville: The Oral History of Major General Robert Blake USMC and the Travel Journal of Rosselet Wallace Blake. Bloomington, Ind.: Authorhouse, 2004.

195

196

Bibliography

Braim, Paul F. The Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1987. Bruce, Robert B. A Fraternity of Arms: America and France in the Great War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003. Buck, Beaumont B. Memories of Peace and War. San Antonio, Tex.: Naylor, 1935. Bullard, Robert Lee. Personalities and Reminiscences of the War. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page, 1925. Bullard, Robert Lee, and Earl Reeves. American Soldiers Also Fought. New York: Longmans, Green, 1936. Byerly, Carol R. Fever of War: The Influenza Epidemic in the U.S. Army during World War I. New York: New York University Press, 2005. Chambers, John Whiteclay. To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America. New York: Free Press, 1987. Clifford, John Garry. The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913–1920. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1972. Cochrane, Rexmond C. The 1st Division in the Meuse-Argonne: 1–12 October 1918. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, 1957. ———. The 26th Division East of the Meuse: October 1918. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, 1960. ———. The 29th Division in the Côtes de Meuse: October 1918. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, 1959. ———. The 33rd Division along the Meuse: October 1918. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, 1958. ———. The 42nd Division before Landres–et–St. Georges: October 1918. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, 1960. ———. The 78th Division at the Kriemhilde Stellung: October 1918. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, 1957. ———. The 79th Division at Montfaucon: October 1918. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, 1960. ———. The 89th Division in the Bois de Bantheville: October 1918. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, 1960. ———. The 92nd Division in the Marbache Sector. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, 1959. ———. The Use of Gas in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign: September– November 1918. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, 1958.

Bibliography

197

Coffman, Edward M. The Hilt of the Sword: The Career of Peyton C. March. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966. ———. The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. ———. The Regulars: The Army Officer, 1898–1941. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004. ———. The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Cooke, James J. The All-Americans at War: The Eighty-second Division in the Great War, 1917–1918. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002. ———. Billy Mitchell. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002. ———. Pershing and His Generals: Command and Staff in the AEF. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997. ———. The Rainbow Division in the Great War. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994. ———. The U.S. Air Service in the Great War: 1917–1918. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996. Cramer, C. H. Newton D. Baker: A Biography. Cleveland, Ohio: World, 1961. DeWeerd, Harvey A. President Wilson Fights His War: World War I and the American Intervention. New York: Macmillan, 1968. Dickman, Joseph T. The Great Crusade: A Narrative of the World War. New York: Appleton, 1927. Doughty, Robert A. Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005. Eisenhower, John S. D. Yanks: The Epic Story of the American Army in World War I. New York: Free Press, 2001. Ferrell, Robert H. America’s Deadliest Battle: Meuse-Argonne, 1918. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007. ———. Collapse at Meuse-Argonne: The Failure of the Missouri-Kansas Division. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004. ———. Five Days in October: The Lost Battalion of World War I. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2005. ———. The Question of MacArthur’s Reputation: Côte de Châtillon, October 14–16, 1918. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008. Fleming, Thomas J. The Illusion of Victory: America in World War I. New York: Basic Books, 2003.

198

Bibliography

Gaff, Alan D. Blood in the Argonne: The “Lost Battalion” of World War I. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005. Gavin, Letti. American Women in World War I: They Also Served. Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1997. Grotelueschen, Mark Ethan. Doctrine under Trial: American Artillery Employment in World War I. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2001. ———. The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Gudmundsson, Bruce I. Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1989. Haber, L. F. The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Hamburger, Kenneth E. Learning Lessons in the American Expeditionary Forces. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, n.d. Harbord, James G. The American Army in France: 1917–1919. Boston: Little, Brown, 1936. ———. Leaves from a War Diary. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1925. Harries, Meiron, and Susie Harries. The Last Days of Innocence: America at War, 1917–1918. New York: Random House, 1997. Hawley, Ellis W. The Great War and the Search for a Modern Order: A History of the American People and Their Institutions, 1917–1933. New York: St. Martin’s, 1979. Herwig, Holger H. The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914–1918. London: Arnold, 1997. Hogan, Martin J. The Shamrock Battalion of the Rainbow: A Story of the “Fighting Sixty-ninth.” Ed. James J. Cooke. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007. Holley, I. B., Jr. General John M. Palmer: Citizen Soldiers and the Army of a Democracy. Wesport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1982. ———. Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation of the Aerial Weapon by the United States during World War I: A Study in the Relationship of Technological Advance, Military Doctrine, and the Development of Weapons. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953. Hudson, James J. Hostile Skies: A Combat History of the American Air Service in World War I. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1968.

Bibliography

199

Huelfer, Evan Andrew. The “Casualty Issue” in American Military Practices: The Impact of World War I. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003. Hurley, Alfred F. Billy Mitchell: Crusader for Air Power. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975. James, D. Clayton. The Years of MacArthur: 1880–1941. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970. Johnson, Douglas V., II. “A Few `Squads Left’ and Off to France: Training the American Army in the United States in World War I.” Ph.d. diss., Temple University, 1993. Johnson, Douglas V., II, and Rolfe E. Hillman Jr. Soissons, 1918. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999. Johnson, Hubert C. Breakthrough Tactics, Technology, and the Search for Victory on the Western Front in World War I. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994. Keegan, John. The First World War. New York: Knopf, 1999. Keene, Jennifer D. Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. Kennett, Lee. The First Air War: 1914–1918. New York: Free Press, 1991. Kindsvater, Peter S. American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003. Langer, William L. Gas and Flame in World War I. New York: Knopf, 1965. Lawrence, Joseph D. Fighting Soldier: The AEF in 1918. Ed. Robert H. Ferrell. Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, 1985. Lebow, Eileen F. A Grandstand Seat: The American Balloon Service in World War I. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998. Lee, Dwight D. Sergeant York: An American Hero. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985. Lejeune, John A. The Reminiscences of a Marine. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1930. Liggett, Hunter. A.E.F.: Ten Years Ago in France. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1928. ———. Commanding an American Army: Recollections of the World War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1925. Lowry, Bullitt. Armistice 1918. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1996. Ludendorff, Erich. Ludendorff ’s Own Story: August 1914–November 1918. 2 vols. New York: Harper, 1919.

200

Bibliography

March, Peyton C. The Nation at War. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1934. Marshall, George C. Memoirs of My Service in the World War, 1917–1918. Ed. James L. Collins Jr. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976. Meigs, Mark. Optimism at Armageddon: Voices of American Participants in the First World War. New York: New York University Press, 1997. Millett, Allan R. The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army, 1881–1925. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1975. Millett, Allan R., and Williamson Murray, eds. Military Effectiveness: The First World War. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988. Neiberg, Michael S. The Second Battle of the Marne. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008. Nenninger, Timothy K. “John J. Pershing and Relief for Cause in the American Expeditionary Forces, 1917–1918.” Army History 61 (spring 2005): 21–32. ———. The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881– 1918. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1978. ———. “Tactical Dysfunction in the AEF: 1917–1918.” Military Affairs 51 (1987): 177–81. ———. “Unsystematic as a Mode of Command: Commanders and the Process of Command in the American Expeditionary Forces, 1917–1918.” Journal of Military History 64 (2000): 739–68. Pearlman, Michael D. Truman and MacArthur: Public Policy and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008. ———. Warmaking and American Democracy: The Struggle over Military Strategy, 1700 to the Present. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. Pershing, John J. My Experiences in the World War. 2 vols. New York: Stokes, 1931. Persico, Joseph E. Eleventh Month, Eleventh Day, Eleventh Hour: Armistice Day, 1918: World War I and Its Violent Climax. New York: Random House, 2004. Pitt, Barrie. 1918: The Last Act. London: Cassell, 1962. Pogue, Forrest C. George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880–1939. New York: Viking, 1963.

Bibliography

201

Rainey, James W. “Ambivalent Warfare: The Tactical Doctrine of the AEF in World War I.” Parameters 13 (1983): 34–45. ———. “The Questionable Training of the AEF in World War I.” Parameters 22 (1992–1993): 89–103. Reardon, Carol. Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Use of Military History, 1865–1920. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990. Reilly, Henry J. Americans All: The Rainbow at War. Columbus, Ohio: Heer, 1936. Rogers, Horatio. World War I through My Sights. San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1976. Shay, Michael E. The Yankee Division in the First World War. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007. Sherwood, Elmer W. A Soldier in World War I: The Diary of Elmer W. Sherwood. Ed. Robert H. Ferrell. Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society Press, 2004. Simpson, Albert F., ed. The World War I Diary of Col. Frank P. Lahm, Air Service, A.E.F. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ga.: Aerospace Studies Institute, 1970. Smith, Gene. Still Quiet on the Western Front: Fifty Years Later. New York: Morrow, 1965. Smythe, Donald. “A.E.F. Snafu at Sedan.” Prologue 5 (1973): 135–49. ———. Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing. New York: Scribner, 1973. ———. Pershing: General of the Armies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. Thompson, Hugh S. Trench Knives and Mustard Gas: With the 42nd Rainbow Division in France. Ed. Robert H. Ferrell. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004. Trask, David F. The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917–1918. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993. ———. General Tasker Howard Bliss and the “Sessions of the World,” 1919. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1966. ———. The United States in the Supreme War Council: American War Aims and Inter-Allied Strategy, 1917–18. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961. Travers, Tim. How the War Was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917–1918. London:

202

Bibliography

Routledge, 1992. ———. The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900–1918. London: Allen and Unwin, 1987. Twichell, Heath Jr. Allen: The Biography of an Army Officer, 1859–1930. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1974. United States Army in the World War. 17 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948. Van Deman, Ralph H. The Final Memoranda: Major General Ralph H. Van Deman, USA Ret., 1865–1952, Father of U.S. Military Intelligence. Ed. Ralph E. Weber. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1988. Vandiver, Frank E. Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing. 2 vols. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1977. Van Every, Dale. The A.E.F. in Battle. New York: Appleton, 1928. Venzon, Anne Cipriano, ed. The United States in the First World War: An Encyclopedia. New York: Garland, 1995. Votaw, John F. The American Expeditionary Forces in World War I. Oxford: Osprey, 2005. Waller, Douglas. A Question of Loyalty: Gen. Billy Mitchell and the Courtmartial that Gripped the Nation. New York: HarperCollins, 2004. Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. New York: Macmillan, 1973. ———. History of the United States Army. New York: Macmillan, 1967. Wheeler, James Scott. The Big Red One: The Legendary First Division, from World War I to Desert Storm. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007. Wilson, Dale E. Treat ’Em Rough! The Birth of American Armor, 1917–20. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989. Wright, William M. Meuse-Argonne Diary: A Division Commander in World War I. Ed. Robert H. Ferrell. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004. Yockelson, Mitchell A. Borrowed Soldiers: Americans under British Command, 1918. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007. Zabecki, David T. Steel Wind: Colonel Georg Bruchmueller and the Birth of Modern Artillery. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994.

Index

Air Service, 4, 28, 56, 59–60, 63–65, 94–95, 100, 106–7, 111–12, 134–35, 152–53, 169, 171, 174, 178–79, 192. See also Signal Corps Aisne-Marne, 103, 108, 113, 129 Alexander, 31, 138, 143, 145–48, 150– 52, 160–61, 163, 179 Allen, Henry T., 112–28, 131–33, 135, 160 American Red Cross. See Red Cross Andeleur, Gen., 24–25 Aultman, Dwight F., 100–101, 119, 137, 152, 165 Avery, Col., 58–59 Babbitt, Brig. Gen., 115 Bach, Col., 120 Baer, Col., 142, 149 Bailey, Gen., 23 Baker, Col., 35 Baker, Newton D., 37–38, 116, 132, 143, 147 Bamford, Maj. Gen., 181 Bandholtz, 181 Banever, Maj., 58–59 Barber, 168 Barbour, 105 Barnum, Malvern Hill, 152 Barthou, Louis, 81 Baxter, C. C., 47 Bayonet, 12 Beebe, Col., 133 Belgium, 10, 26, 157, 170 Bell, J. Franklin, 18, 21

Belleau Wood, battle, 56, 65, 85, 87, 94 Belloc, Hillaire, 35 Benham, Col., 184 Bennett, W. R., 42 Berry, Lucien G., 126, 145, 148 Bjornstad, Alfred M., 24–25, 98, 119– 20, 160–66, 168, 172–74, 177, 181 Black, Gen., 37 Bliss, Tasker H., 22, 33, 168 Boardman, Brig. Gen., 45, 56, 62–63 Bonham Carter, Gen., 23 Bonnell, Col., 94, 100 Booth, Col., 23, 119–23 Boston Symphony Orchestra, 193 Bourgevis, Gen., 97 Bowditch, Peter, 174 Bowen, Major, 109, 134 Bowley, Brig. Gen., 97, 122, 134 Boyd, Col., 37, 96, 192 Boyer, Gen., 45 Brent, Bishop, 128 Brereton, Lewis, 60, 94–95, 98 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 7 Brewster, André, 36, 89–90, 106, 108, 111 Bright, Maj., 148 Brown, Preston, 12, 21, 86, 88, 91, 98, 134, 171, 173, 177, 181. See also Fourth Division Brown, Robert A., 115–16 Buck, Beaumont, 30–31, 171 Budd, Maj., 44–45 Bugge, Jens, 114, 133, 145, 148, 151–52 Bullard, Robert L., 15–17, 23, 25, 29,

203

204 31, 33–34, 43, 48, 89, 98–99, 117, 122, 137, 155, 164, 166. See also III Corps; First Division Bundy, Omar N., 10–11, 15, 31–32, 36, 48–49, 55–56, 86–95, 98, 100, 174. See also VII Corps; Second Division Burnett, Col., 59 Burnham, Maj. Gen., 123–24, 127, 132–33, 151, 164–65 Burtt, Brig. Gen., 44, 167, 189–91 Cameron, George H., 101, 117–23, 137, 167, 178–79 Carston, Maj., 101 Castner, Joseph E., 127, 170 Catlin, Col., 32 Chamberlain, John, 107–8, 126 Cheatham, Col., 15, 27 Chicago Tribune, 29 Civil War, 1, 49, 89 Claudel, Gen., 169, 173–74, 177 Clemenceau, Georges, 89–90, 133–34, 168 Coëtquidan artillery training camp, 20 Coffman, Edward M., 160, 183 Cole, Charles H., 10–12, 34–35, 46, 92, 96, 105–7, 179 Collins, Col., 37, 65 Commanding an American Army (book), by Hunter Liggett, 193 Community Federation (Boston), 193 Conger, Col., 145, 157, 161–62 Conner, Fox, 43, 86, 144, 178, 179, 181, 184–85, 189 Coughlin, Dr., 47 Covel, Brig. Gen., 45, 56, 62–63, 117 Craig, Malin, 10–15, 17, 22–23, 28, 30–31, 34, 37, 43, 47, 50, 55, 62, 64, 85–87, 94, 96–97, 99, 101, 105–8, 110â•fiÂ�12, 115, 119–21, 125–26, 132– 34, 143, 145–47, 149, 151, 153, 165, 167–68, 170, 175–77, 179, 181 Cresson, William, 36 Cronin, Brig. Gen., 161–62, 179 Croucher, Capt., 21 Cuba, 132

Index Cubisson, Col., 87, 91 Darrah, Brig. Gen., 142–43, 145, 147 Davison, Henry P., 42 Debeney, Gen., 29 Degoutte, Jean, 86, 88, 90–93, 95, 97, 99, 101, 103, 106, 110–11, 113, 115, 117, 119–22, 133–34, 157 Delatour, Gen., 140–41, 143, 150 DeWitt, John, 18, 43, 47, 86, 120, 179 Dickman, Joseph T., 58, 123, 126, 135, 164–65, 167, 170, 172, 176–77, 179, 181, 189 Dowell, Col., 27, 30, 45 Doyen, Gen., 31–32, 44, 99 Drum, Hugh A., 36, 86, 137, 144–45, 159, 168–72, 175–77, 181–82, 184, 188–90, 192 Duncan, George B., 29, 132, 159, 160, 162, 165, 175, 179 Eaton, Col., 58–59 Edwards, Clarence R., 11–15, 17, 27, 29–31, 33–36, 45–54, 84–85, 91–95, 97–98, 101, 103–7, 109–10, 112, 114–15, 122–23, 177, 181. See also Twenty-sixth Division Eighteenth Division (French), 24 Eighth Army (French), 47, 59, 123 Eighth Division, 184 Eightieth Division, 184 Eighty-ninth Division, 184 Eighty-second Division, 123, 127, 130, 147, 151, 159–63, 175–77, 184 Eighty-seventh Division (French), 171 Eleventh Division, 116 Ellis, Maj., 85 Eltinge, LeRoy, 46, 85 Ely, Col., 165, 175, 189 Ely, Hanson E., 100, 131, 164, 171, 173, 177, 181. See also Fifth Division Fifth Army (British), 39 Fifth Cavalry Division (French), 140– 41, 143, 150, 163, 171 V Corps, 4, 25, 107, 131, 137, 142, 150,

Index 155–56, 161, 163–64, 167–70, 175, 179, 175, 179, 184–85, 188–90 Fifth Division, 127, 131, 133–36, 166, 169–73, 181, 184, 194 Fifth Guard Division (German), 159 Fifty-second Division (German), 147–59 I Corps, 111, 160, 167, 170–72, 176–78, 181, 184–85, 189–90 First Division, 7, 31, 33, 35, 37, 42, 45, 47, 49, 52, 54, 56, 89, 97, 100, 102, 113, 123, 153, 155, 159, 161, 163–64, 174, 179, 184, 189–91 Fiske, Brig. Gen., 50–51, 84 Flagler, C.A.F., 127–28, 171 Foch, Ferdinand, 129, 134, 170, 176–77, 183 Foote, Lt. Col., 46, 110–11 Foreign Legion, 31–32 Foret, Col., 182 Fort Keough (Montana), 3 Fortieth Division, 184 Forty-second Division, 7, 42, 44, 48, 54, 111–13, 115–18, 120, 132, 167, 169, 171, 184, 187, 189, 191 Foulois, Benjamin, 33, 42, 54, 56–57, 59–60, 62–64, 111, 118. See also Air Service Fourth Army (French), 97, 182–84 IV Corps, 123, 126, 131, 136, 164–65 Fourth Division, 12, 105, 111, 114–15, 121, 123, 172, 174, 178 Frazier, Col., 29 Freya line, 140 Fushimi, Higashi, 185 Gallagher, Walter, 144 Gallant, Maj., 51, 111 Gas, 84, 185, 187 Girard, Gen., 120, 123–24 Giselher line, 140 Gleaves, 30–31 Goodwin, Lt., 31–32 Gordon, Gen., 184 Gouraud, Gen., 182 Grant, Col., 43, 105, 169, 188, 191

205 Greece, 132 Groutte, de, Lt., 92 G-system, 20 Haan, William G., 5, 46, 53–54, 62, 114, 117, 164, 167. See also Thirty-second Division Haig, Douglas, 10, 39 Hale, Gen., 12 Hall, 98 Hammond, Maj., 114 Handy, Thomas T., 20–21 Hannay, J. R. R., 142, 146–47, 163 Harbord, James G., 23–24, 37, 42, 45, 50, 55–56, 85–87, 90, 96–97, 99, 164 Harrison, Lt., 31–32 Hartmann, Col., 135 Hartshorn, Col., 35 Harvard Law School, 4 Harvard University, 4 Harwood, Maj., 27 Hawkins, Hamilton S., 144 Hayes, Rutherford B., 24 Hayes, Webb, 22, 24, 33 Heintzelman, Stuart, 11–15, 30, 43, 45, 47, 50, 55, 61, 85, 126 Hentsch, Lt. Col., 24 Hersey, Mark L., 176 Hill, Levering, 15 Hindenburg Line, 133, 140 Hines, John L., 22, 24–25, 29, 37–38, 164, 166, 170, 172–73, 177, 181, 183, 192. See also Fourth Division; III Corps Hitz, Maj., 44 Hobson, Col., 182 Hoeffner, Maj., 50 Hoffman, Col. 100, 150 House, Edward M., 168 Howell, W.,178 Hughes, Col. William N., 20, 107 Humbert, Capt., 17 Hume, Col., 110–11 Hyatt, Capt., 29, 52, 109 Ireland, Merritte W., 145 Italy, 22

206 Jenkins, Maj., 31 Johnson, Evan, 122, 143, 146, 157, 159, 162 Johnson, Gordon W., 157 Kahn, Maj., 87, 99–100, 120 Kenly, Maj. Gen., 57 Kennedy, Gen., 12 Kernan, Maj. Gen., 86 King, Campbell, 29, 89, 96, 98–99, 124, 174 Kingman, 125 Korean War, 20, 168 Kriemhilde line, 140 Kromer, Col., 181 Kuhn, Maj. Joseph E., 12. See also Seventy-ninth Division Lafayette Club, 13–14, 59 Lahm, Col., 63, 175 Lassiter, Gen., 17, 87–88, 91, 93–95, 98, 100–101, 103, 105, 113, 115, 123, 126 Lebocq, Gen., 92 LeBrun, Gen., 92, 87–88, 90–91 LeComte, Gen., 169, 174 Lee, Capt., 109 Lee, Col., 56 Lejeune, John A., 85, 127, 134, 181, 188 Lenihan, Michael J., 20, 55, 172 Lewis, Maj. Gen., 100 Liggett, Hunter: takes command of I Corps, 7–25; settling in, 26–38; German offensive, 39–83; Soissons, 84–102; Aisne-Marne, 103–28; St. Mihiel, 129–39; Meuseâ•‚Argonne, initial attack, 140–54; second attack, 155–65; third, 166–79; last, 180–92; later years, 193 Lindsey, Julian R., 160–65, 179 Lister, Col., 23 Lloyd George, David, 168 Logan, Col., 110–11 Lost Battalion, 159 Ludendorff, Erich, 7, 138–39, 50 MacArthur, Douglas, 18–21, 112,

Index 116–17, 189 McAlexander, 124–25, 135 McAndrew, 62, 85–86, 101, 128, 159– 60, 169–70, 179, 181, 184–85 McCabe, Maj., 32, 35 McCleave, 114, 168 McCloskey, Brig. Gen., 35, 87 McCoy, Frank R., 21, 93 McDonald, Capt., 15 McGlachlin, Maj. Gen., 126, 164, 169–70, 174 McKinstry, Maj. Gen., 114 McMahon, John E., 127, 131, 133, 169–71 McRae, James H., 134, 161, 163–64, 172, 176–77 Maistre, Gen., 91–92, 101, 183–84, 191 Major, Col., 51, 94, 107, 109 Malone, Paul B., 23, 55, 63, 96–97, 131, 170 Mangin, Gen., 99 Maraden, Capt., 12 March, Peyton C., 37 Marshall, George C., 33, 128, 168, 175, 188–89 Martin, Maj. Gen., 171, 178 Massenet, Gen., 105 Maud’huy, du, Gen., 1 Mayeda, Capt., 185 Menoher, Frank T., 19–21, 36, 111, 115–17, 122, 164, 172, 189 Merchants National Bank (Boston), 193 Meuse-Argonne, battle of: first attack, 140–54; second, 155–64; third, 166– 79; fourth—and victory, 180–92 Mexico, 132 Milling, Col., 175, 178–80, 191–92 Mitchell, William, 33, 37, 42–43, 54, 56–57, 59–65, 88, 91, 94–95, 98, 101, 171, 173–75, 103, 106–8, 111, 118, 124, 153, 169, 171, 173–75, 178–79. See also Air Service Monroe, Gen., 15–16, 18, 29 Montgomery, Col., 149 Morrow, Gen., 171, 173, 178, 181

Index Moundessir, Gen. de, 113, 117 Muir, Maj. Gen., 96, 142–43, 145, 148–49, 152, 156–57, 160–61 Murray, Col., 16–17, 44–45 National Guard, 20, 48, 56, 63 Naugo, Jiro, 185 Nelson, Col., 133 Nelson, Lt., 85 Neville, Brig. Gen., 90–91 New England Conservatory of Music, 193 Ninetieth Division, 123, 124, 127, 131, 135, 169–70, 184 Ninety-second Division, 137, 142, 144, 147, 152–53 Ninth Army (French), 101 IX Corps (French), 188 IX Corps Area (U.S.), 193 Ninth Division (French), 112 Nivelle, Robert, 10 Noble, Robert H., 122 Nolan, Dennis E., 54, 145–46, 160, 162 Ogan, Kozaburo, 185 Ogden, Maj., 19 Olmstead, Maj., 37 One Hundred and Fourth Division (French), 132 One Hundred and Ninety-ninth Division (German), 171 One Hundred and Sixty-eighth Division (French), 97 One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Division (French), 91–92, 99–100, 104, 108–9, 111–13 O’Neil, Gen., 135 Ord, Maj., 13–14, 96 Paget, Arthur, 175 Parker, Frank, 27, 29, 37–38, 109–10, 115, 174, 189–91 Passaga, Gen., 48, 51, 123, 132 Passchendaele, battle of, 10 Patrick, Mason, 56–58, 60, 64–65, 118, 174

207 Peek, Gen., 150 Perkins, Lt., 42 Pershing, John J., 2, 4–5, 10, 18, 24, 33–36, 38, 43, 49–50, 52, 56–58, 62, 84–86, 97, 103, 107, 122–23, 126–29, 131–32, 135–37, 146, 149–50, 153, 155, 163–67, 169–71, 173–84, 188–91 Pétain, Henri, 10, 88, 117, 124–27, 138, 170, 182–83 Peters, Lt., 109 Philippines, 132 Philippine Insurrection, 3 Plattsburg training camp, 4, 27–28 Poison gas. See Gas Poore, Benjamin A., 118, 120–24 Prefet, Capt., 182 Price, Col., 135, 171 Prince, Morton, 47 Quekemeyer, John G., 125, 133–34, 196 Rabienveux, Gen., 97 Ragenau, Gen., 14–15 Rainbow Division. See Forty-second Division Red Cross, 37, 42, 51 Reilly, Henry J., 172 Reno, Gen., 15, 24 Rhodes, Charles D., 161 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 118 Roosevelt, Theodore Jr., 32, 191 Root, Elihu, 3 Royal Flying Corps, 28, 88 Royce, Col., 60, 63, 95, 111 Russia, 7, 10, 18. See also Brest-Litovsk, treaty of St. Mihiel, battle of, 2, 11–12, 28, 58, 61, 129–30, 145, 153–55, 166 Sam Browne belt, 4 Saumur artillery school, 4 Schmidt, Gen., 92, 99, 104, 106–7, 109, 113 Scott, Hugh, 42, 51 Scott, Hunter, 118 Scott, Lt., 36

208 Scott, Maj., 17 Second Army, 5, 11, 18, 109, 125, 164, 166, 168, 175 II Corps, 101, 111 II Corps (French), 111 Second Division, 7, 31, 42, 54, 56, 60, 65–86, 88–89, 91–92, 97–100, 102, 113, 127, 133–35, 159, 179, 181–82, 184, 187 Services of Supply. See S.O.S. XVII Corps (French), 168, 171–74, 177 Seventeenth Division, 185 Seventh Army (French), 129 VII Corps (French), 92, 101, 105, 174 Seventh Division, 181 Seventy-eighth Bavarian Division, 5, 127, 131, 133–35, 142, 161, 163–64, 170–72, 175–77, 181, 184 Seventy-ninth Division, 137 Seventy-seventh Division, 122, 136, 138, 142, 145–50, 152–53, 157, 159– 60, 162–63, 171, 175, 184–85 Seventy-sixth Reserve Division (German), 159 Seventy-third Division (French), 92 Shannon, Col., 114 Sheldon, Raymond, 113, 160–63 Shelton, Col., 46–47, 49, 96, 109–10, 116 Sherrill, Col., 164 Shibe, Lt. Gen., 185 Shipton, Mr., 159 Signal Corps, 33, 61 Simon, Gen., 150 Simpkins, 13–14, 52, 107 Singleton, 86 Sixth Army (French), 29, 95, 99, 101, 111, 141 VI Corps, 99, 134 Sixth Division, 174 Sixty-seventh Division (French), 122 Slodin, R., 151 Snow, Col., 29 Soissons, battle of, 84–103, 108, 113 S.O.S., 58, 121, 131, 164

Index South End House Association (Boston), 193 Spalding, Col., 184 Spanish-American War, 3, 49. See also Philippines Stacey, Cromwell, 158 Strong, Maj. Gen., 184 Summerall, Charles P., 29, 123, 149, 151–52, 164, 167, 175, 179, 183, 189–91 Supreme War Council, 168 Sweeney, Col., 23, 142–44, 147, 149, 152, 157, 159, 161 Tank Corps, 135, 157, 179 Tebbetts, 44–45 Tenth Army (French), 99 Third Army, 125 III Corps, 4, 24–25, 97, 99, 119, 121–22, 137, 142, 155–56, 159, 166, 170, 172–73, 177, 181, 184–85, 187–88 III Corps (French), 88, 92, 101 Third Division, 31, 58, 60, 65, 111, 134, 168, 171–73, 181–84 Thirtieth Division, 100 XXXVIII Corps (French), 101, 115, 118, 137, 142, 147, 163, 172, 182 Thirty-eighth Division (French), 171 Thirty-fifth Division, 100, 126, 127–28, 130, 136–39, 142, 144, 146–48, 151–52, 155, 175 Thirty-fifth Division (French), 112 Thirty-fourth Division (French), 45 Thirty-ninth Division (French), 101, 109, 171 XXXII Corps (French), 123 Thirty-second Division, 46, 48, 53, 55, 62, 114, 117, 184 Thirty-seventh Division, 170 XXXIII Corps, 116, 169, 174 Thirty-third Division, 155, 174 Tinley, Matthew B., 21 Traub, Peter E., 34–35, 51–52, 91, 96, 100, 127–28, 132, 138–39, 142–45, 147, 150–51, 153, 175

Index Twenty-eighth Division, 19, 96, 111, 130, 136–37, 140, 142–43, 145–50, 152–53, 156–57, 159, 163 XXI Corps (French), 87 Twenty-ninth Division, 18, 174 Twenty-second Division, 7 Twenty-sixth Division, 11, 20, 32, 42– 49, 54, 91–94, 96, 100, 103, 105–6, 108–9, 111, 114, 120, 122–23, 132, 177, 181 Upton, Leroy S., 15–16, 18, 23, 44–90 U.S. Military Academy, 3 Van Deman, Ralph H., 100 Vandenberg, Gen., 45 Vincent, Gen., 133 Virginia Military Institute, 193 Voris, Lt. Col., 94–95, 137 Wadsworth, Eliot, 42 Wagstaff, Gen., 23, 36, 60 Waldron, Col., 178

209 Walsch, Gen., 152–53, 160 War College, 3 Warner, Stackpole, and Bradlee (law firm), 193 Watson, Lt., 20 Wells, Bryant, 134 West Point. See U.S. Military Academy Weston, Don, 30 Whitehead, Col., 23 Whitehouse, Norman, 36 Whittlesey, Charles W., 158, 160 Williams, Col., 100, 152 Williams, Maj., 23, 50 Wilson, Woodrow, 10, 168, 173 Winship, Blanton, 15, 62–63, 120 Winslow, Alan, 50 Wittenmyer, Edmund C., 122, 146, 158, 162, 171 Wolf, Walter B., 20–21 Wood, Leonard, 28 Woodworth, Capt., 30 World War II, 3, 18, 20–21, 90 Wright, William M., 107, 188