In Search of Solutions: The Problem of Religion and Conflict (Religion and Violence)

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In Search of Solutions

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Religion and Violence Series Editors Lisa Isherwood, University of Winchester, and Rosemary Radford Ruether, Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, California This interdisciplinary and multicultural series brings to light the ever increasing problem of religion and violence. The series will highlight how religions have a significant part to play in the creation of cultures that allow and even encourage the creation of violent conflict, domestic abuse and policies and state control that perpetuate violence to citizens. The series will highlight the problems that are experienced by women during violent conflict and under restrictive civil policies. But not wishing to simply dwell on the problems the authors in this series will also re-examine the traditions and look for alternative and more empowering readings of doctrine and tradition. One aim of the series is to be a powerful voice against creeping fundamentalisms and their corrosive influence on the lives of women and children. Published: Reweaving the Relational Mat A Christian Response to Violence against Women from Oceania Joan Alleluia Filemoni-Tofaeono and Lydia Johnson Weep Not for Your Children: Essays on Religion and Violence Lisa Isherwood and Rosemary Radford Ruether America, Amerikkka: Elect Nation and Imperial Violence Rosemary Radford Ruether Forthcoming: Meditations on Religion and Violence in the United States T. Walter Herbert Shalom/Salaam/Peace: A Liberation Theology of Hope Constance A. Hammond

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In Search of Solutions The Problem of Religion and Conflict

Clinton Bennett

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Published by Equinox Publishing Ltd. UK: Unit 6, The Village, 101 Amies St., London SW11 2JW USA: DBBC, 28 Main Street, Oakville, CT 06779 www.equinoxpub.com First published 2008 © Clinton Bennett 2008 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN-13 978 184553 239 0 978 184553 240 6

(hardback) (paperback)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bennett, Clinton. In search of solutions : the problem of religion and conflict/Clinton Bennett. p. cm. — (Religion and violence) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-1-84553-239-0 (hb) ISBN-13: 978-1-84553-240-6 (pb) 1. War—Religious aspects. 2. Northern Ireland. 3. Bosnia and Hercegovina. 4. ArabIsraeli conflict. I. Title. BL65.W2B46 2008 201'.7273—dc22 2007020463 Typeset by S.J.I. Services, New Delhi Printed and bound in Great Britain by Lightning Source, Milton Keynes, UK

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C ONTENTS

List of Maps

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Introduction: The Problem of Religion and Conflict

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PART ONE: CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND RESOURCES AND SOURCES

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Chapter One: Northern Ireland: ‘The Troubles’

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Chapter Two: Northern Ireland: Religion and ‘The Troubles’

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PART TWO: THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT RESOURCES AND SOURCES

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Chapter Three: The History of the Bosnian Conflict

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Chapter Four: The Role of Religions

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PART THREE: THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT RESOURCES AND SOURCES 137 Chapter Five: History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

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Chapter Six: The Role of Religion in the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict

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PART FOUR: TOWARDS A SOLUTION

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Chapter Seven: The Problem of Violent Scriptures—A Higher Hermeneutic

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Chapter Eight: The End of History and God’s Purposes for Creation

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Conclusion: A Religion-less Future?

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Bibliography

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Index of References

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General Index

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LIST OF MAPS

Map 1: Northern Ireland

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Map 2: Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Map 3: Israel-Palestine

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Janet Joyce of Equinox for commissioning this book. This is the fifth title on which we have worked together. I am also grateful to Lisa Isherwood and Rosemary Radford Ruether for including my book in their series on religion and violence. Many colleagues have helped to facilitate the writing and research process. I wish to acknowledge Dr Andrew Wilson for suggesting that I design and teach a course on the United Nations and Global Peace. Material prepared for that course has contributed significantly to the content of this book. Some of the research used to inform what follows derives from work I did while on the faculty of Westminster College, Oxford, where I taught a course on Islam and the West and included a case study of Bosnian Islam as an example of Islam in the West, or of Western Islam. Most of the research for this book was carried out in the Library of UTS – Interfaith Seminary, Barrytown, NY. The Library Director, Dr Keisuke Noda, more than deserves a mention in these acknowledgments for maintaining such a valuable and learning conducive resource center. In addition to Internet sources, several texts consulted were accessed in the University of Birmingham Library, Birmingham, UK, where I was privileged to be a Visiting Research Fellow. Dr Tyler Hendricks, UTS President, also merits a mention here for enabling me to adjust my teaching schedule so that I could spend a day a week attending NGO briefings and workshops at the United Nations. As an ambassador for peace of the Interreligious and International Federation for World Peace, an NGO in special consultative status with ECOSOC, I have had the opportunity to attend and to speak at several international conferences at which issues relevant to the theme of this book were discussed. I am more than grateful to IIFWP for including me in these colloquia and for inviting me to take part in their peace-making programs. IIFWP have accredited me as a representative at the UN, enabling me to

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attend NGO briefings and other meetings open to NGO observers. In addition, Eric Olsen, Managing Editor of World and I: Innovative Approaches to Peace, a magazine of the IIFWP, deserves thanks for commissioning me to write an article on a theology of peace which served to stimulate thinking reflected in the concluding chapters of this book. Henry Christopher, a graphic artist, produced the three maps for this book and I am very grateful to him for his excellent work. These acknowledgments must pay tribute to the people of Northern Ireland, Palestine and Israel for their hospitality during visits to their territories. At several IIFWP consultations I have had the privilege of meeting some senior politicians from the Balkans and conversations with them make a material contribution to part two of this text. Bible quotations in this text, except when cited from another source, are derived from the Hebrew and Greek texts guided by the Revised Standard Version in English. Qur’anic verses cited are my own interpretation of the original Arabic guided by Yusuf Ali’s English rendering. Diacriticals have been used in this book although I cannot claim to have always succeeded in following all the conventions. My excuse is that most of us are not trained in their use and that the aim of this book is to encourage a deeper commitment to peace not linguistic expertise. The work of many scholars has contributed to the contents of this book. I would especially like to acknowledge insight gained from Charles Kimball and from Charles Selengut; I once sat with the former drafting Issues in Christian-Muslim Relations for the World Council of Churches at several meetings in Switzerland, while I marched through the streets of Jerusalem with the latter chanting, ‘peace, shalom, a-salam-ualaikum’. I am, as always, grateful to Rekha Sarker Bennett, my wife, for her encouragement and support. As I finished working on this book, my mother, Joan Bennett, nee Cooper, passed away. She had been ill for some time with leukemia. A career nurse, my mother cared for injured soldiers during World War II. For much of the rest of her professional life, she was a District Nurse, Midwife and Ward Sister. In this role, she helped to bring many children into this world and also assisted in training student nurses. In retirement, she served as Mission Secretary of an Anglican Parish Church and as treasurer of her local CPSA branch (Combined Pensioners and Superanuates Association of New South Wales). My mother was a generous and caring person,

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whose heart reached out towards those who were less fortunate than she was. The type of world envisaged towards the end of this book is just like the world she would have wanted all people to occupy. I dedicate what follows to her memory. Clinton Bennett Sojourner Truth Library, SUNY New Paltz, New Paltz, NY.

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Introduction

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INTRODUCTION : THE P ROBLEM OF RELIGION AND CONFLICT Since 11 September 2001 the issue of the relationship between religion and violence has attracted wide interest. As a result of religion’s perceived role in such conflicts as the three on which this book focuses—Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Israel-Palestine—religion had its critics even before 9/11. In the Lebanon, in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) and in Iraq itself, enmity between different branches of the same religion provokes criticism that religion causes social instability. It has almost become a cliche‚ to ask whether religion, because it is part of the problem, can also be part of the cure. Following 9/11, and the launch of what was at first called a ‘Crusade Against Terrorism’, many people assume that Huntington’s ‘threat thesis’ has been proved right (see Huntington 1993; 1996). This posits that with the end of the Cold War, the next confrontation is likely to be a civilizational one between Muslims and Non-Muslims, with the former aided by certain neo-Confucian states. Silvio Berlusconi’s comments that Islam and European values are incompatible (27 September 2001), and debate surrounding Turkey’s application to join the European Union, has convinced some that, even if religion per se is not bad, Islam is. Many of my own students, explaining their reasons for studying world religions say that they want to understand why religion causes so much strife in the world. This somewhat negative reason to choose a topic of study shows how widespread the idea has become that religion is bad for people. There is now a considerable body of literature discussing this question and no shortage of University and College courses. Some argue that, since religion is at the very root of the problem, it cannot form part of any cure. Therefore, humanity should grow out of religious belief, which belongs to our childhood not to our maturity. Others recognize that religion is part of the problem but believe that religion is not only redeemable but can ultimately help humanity to build a

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peaceful, just world. Some downplay religion’s role, arguing that other factors, such as tribal rivalries, economic inequality, poverty, injustice, are much more significant. This introduction examines some of the arguments for and against religion having a role in peace-building, or indeed any role at all in humanity’s future, surveys some of the relevant literature, identifies distinctive features of this book’s argument and outlines its content. The Religion is a Menace View The view that religion is a menace and the cause of conflict and even of irrational human behaviour in the world has been advocated in recent years by Richard Dawkins (see 2006a and 2006b) in the UK and by Sam Harris in the USA (2005). As a scientist, Dawkins believes that science can answer all humanity’s questions about the origin and meaning of life, not religion. He regards religion as a virus, which, like any parasite, survives by sucking sustenance from healthy life-forms. He usefully compares what he called ‘memes’ with ‘genes’; genes pass on biological, or genetic material to our offspring while ‘memes’ are cultural ideas and achievements that get passed on by non-biological mechanisms, such as education (see Dawkins 2006a: 189-201). Just as only whatever aids the survival of the species will be biologically perpetuated, so only healthy memes ultimately thrive. Unhealthy memes, like a virus, will die (Dawkins 2006b: 186). Religion is a virus, indeed a ‘type of mental illness’ (2006a: 330) because it is irrational. It can not explain the origin or the meaning of life, but it can incite people to violence or to commit atrocities in its name. It is capable of justifying anything, such as that ‘a person should die—on a cross, at the stake, skewered on a crusader’s sword, shot in a Beirut street, or blown up in a bar in Belfast’ (Dawkins 2006a: 198). ‘Religious faith’, says Dawkins, ‘deserves a chapter to itself in the annals of war technology’ (2006a: 331). In calling religion a psychological malady, Dawkins stands on the distinguished shoulders of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), for whom religion was a type of neurosis. Like all neurosis, religion originates in sexual frustration and rivalry, and keeps adherents in a permanent state of childishness (see Freud 1990). We do not need religion, Dawkins says, in order to be good since our genes contain altruistic tendencies (2006b: 216). There is no true morality in ‘sucking up to God’ (2006b: 226).

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For Harris (2005) religious faith ‘represents so uncompromising a misuse of the power of our minds that it forms a kind of perverse, cultural singularity—a vanishing point beyond which rational discourse proves impossible’ (2005: 25). Religion, says Harris, ‘perpetuates man’s inhumanity to man’ and so has no future (2005: 15). The substance of his argument is that religions’ claim to truth, to having the only right answer to the ills of the world, make them inevitably and intrinsically intolerant of others. Thus: The contest between our religions is zero-sum. Religious violence is still with us because our religions are intrinsically hostile to one another ... It is time we acknowledged that no real foundations exists within the canons of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, or any of our other faiths for religious tolerance and religious diversity (2005: 225).

Remarking in the ‘Afterword’ of the second edition of his best selling book how controversy swirled around his thesis, Harris adds: Since the End of Faith was first published, current events have remained a running confirmation of its central thesis. There are days when almost every headline in the morning paper attests to the social costs of religious faith ... One spectacle of religious hysteria follows fast upon the next ... (2005: 236).

Dawkins and Harris, whom the former cites in his God Delusion (2006b) are not the first to accuse religions of being responsible for conflict, or to regard religion as a form of mental illness. Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) the distinguished philosopher and pacifist, took the view that religion is immoral because it encourages people to act in order to attract an award, not because it is moral or selfless. This may be contrary to what many Christians believe about salvation as God’s free gift but some moral philosophers do use this argument against religion. Russell claimed that in order to argue that God’s commands are ‘good’, it is necessary to regard ‘good’ as possessing meaning ‘independent of God’s fiat’, and, logically, this meaning must be ‘anterior to God’, which means that belief in God can not be linked to morals, since this proves that there would still be moral rights and wrongs even without God (2006b: 12). Russell attributed religion to ‘fear’: Religion is based ... primarily and mainly upon fear. It is partly the terror of the unknown and partly ... the wish to feel you have a kind of elder brother who will stand by you in all your troubles and disputes.

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In Search of Solutions Fear is the basis of the whole thing—fear of the mysterious, fear of defeat, fear of death. Fear is the partner of cruelty, and therefore it is no wonder if cruelty and religion have gone hand in hand ... (Russell 1957: 22).

Like Dawkins, Russell preferred to place his trust in ‘science’; ‘science can teach us, and I think our own hearts can teach us, no longer to look for imaginary supports, no longer to invent allies in the sky but rather to look to our own efforts here below to make this world a fit place to live in’ (Russell 1957: 22). Religion is actually the ‘chief obstacle’ to the realization of ‘universal happiness’, and stands between children and ‘rational education ... religion prevents our children from having a rational education; religion prevents from removing the fundamental causes of war; religion prevents us from teaching the ethic of scientific cooperation’. It is possible, said Russell, that ‘mankind is on the threshold of a golden age’ but it is first necessary ‘to slay the dragon that guards the door’, which is religion’ (Russell 1957:47). Russell believed that ‘intelligence’, which is the highest virtue, is ‘impeded by any creed, no matter what’ (1957: 205). He actually singled out Christianity’s negative attitude towards human sexuality as one of its biggest flaws; as its ‘worse feature...so morbid and unnatural’ (1957: 26). Russell did not think that Christianity could offer anything useful, or that history provided the ‘faintest reason to suppose that Christianity’ had any solution to the problems of the world (1957: 203). On the contrary, it had caused wars and conflict; ‘The First World War was wholly Christian in origin’, he wrote, ‘the three emperors were devout, and so were the more warlike of the British cabinet’, while ‘opposition to the war came’ mainly from ‘the Socialists’ (1957: 203). He was a conscientious objector while many zealous Christians fought in the trenches. Some would disagree that World War I was a religiously motivated war, arguing that it was about power, supremacy in Europe, and breathing space for Germany. However, both sides did employ a great deal of religious rhetoric and religion was certainly recruited to legitimize and drum up support for the war. Phillips (2006) describes how many Christian ministers more or less assumed the role of recruiters. H.G. Well’s phase, ‘the war to end all war’ became popular because it ‘appeared to fulfill St John’s prophecy of the war between the legions of God and Satan, conveniently defined as England and Germany, respectively’ (2006:

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257). In analyzing religious support for violence, war and conflict in the three contexts scrutinized in this book, the actual place that religion plays in the mix of cause, effect and of agent provocateur, will be carefully analyzed. Discussion • Do you think that non-religious people are any more tolerant of others than religious people? • Admitting that religions do have violent histories, have religious people been more prone to violence than non-religious people? • If the answer to these questions is that non-religious people are often also intolerant and violent, does it strengthen or weaken Harris’ thesis? If the answer is that religious people are generally less tolerant and more violent than non-religious people, what consequences does this have for Harris’ thesis? • Can you identify examples of intolerance and violence that appear to have no real religious motivation? Psychological Aspects Rene Girard, whom Charles Selengut (2003: 51) describes as ‘perhaps the most innovative thinker interpreting the relationship between religion and violence’, argues that religion has a tendency, especially when it regards itself as possessing the ‘truth’, to focus on the Other as a justifiable outlet for violence and aggression. Girard linked primitive religion with human sacrifices. These, he argues, helped to maintain social cohesion and to control violence by offering a surrogate victim that restrains ‘the violent impulses of society’ (Girard 1979: 17). ‘Religion’ thus ‘tames, trains, arms and directs violent impulses as a defensive force against those forms of violence that society regards as inadmissible’ (1979: 20). He developed a type of projectionist theory in which ‘the subject desires the object because the rival desires it’ (1979: 145 italics original). He called this ‘mimetic desire’. This results in competition over the same object of desire. We may sometimes only desire the object because Others desire it, which makes it seem valuable. We may even be satisfied if we prevent the Other from obtaining the desired object, even if we do not succeed in possessing it either. Our animosity towards the Other is aided and abetted by the tendency to dehumanize them, which

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makes it easier for us to slay them. However, once the Other has been eliminated, hostility recedes, since slaying the victim satisfies our thirst for violence. ‘As violence subsides’, wrote Girard, ‘it is thought to have departed with the victim, to have somehow been dissipated outside the community’ (1979: 266). Discussing Christianity, Girard explains Jesus’ death in terms of this myth: a jealous crowd lynches the victim-God, except that the Gospels emphasize Jesus as an innocent victim. By ritualizing the slaying of the victim, Christianity ideally removes the need for violence. People, however, are slow to learn and Christian history has been just as violent as pre-Christian history. We still kill those who threaten us, often minorities or those who appear to be different from ourselves. Girard argues, on the one hand, that knowledge that Jesus was innocent opens up the possibility of empathy with those who suffer innocently, while on the other this empathy only operates when human consciousness has matured. As ignorance recedes, so will the need to ‘sacrifice’ victims. The psychological process by which we set up ‘us’ and ‘Other’ categories often ascribes all the best virtues to ourselves, all the worst to the ‘Other’. Gergen has argued that such negative stereotyping of the Other as the antithesis of ourselves often occurs when contact is minimal, and that when there are few, if any, attempts to listen to the Other’s self-description, ‘there is a tendency for accounts...to become simplified’ so that ‘evil’ becomes located in the Other, who ‘slowly takes on the shape of the stupid or villainous’ (1999: 140-41). Yet, not all psychology diagnoses religion as a malady. Freud’s one-time colleague, Carl Jung (1875-1966), saw religion as a supplement to science, and encouraged people to integrate spirituality and awareness of the unconscious realm of ideals and archetypes with reason and logic (1938, [1991]). Fowler’s Stages of Faith (1981) builds on a positive psychological view of religion to describe self-actualized individuals as those whose orientation is universal, who are able to learn from different faiths, who transcend the particular in the cause of global peace, justice or humanitarianism. Such self-actualized people include, for Fowler, Martin Luther King and Mahatma Gandhi. Fowler, a developmental psychologist, draws on Jean Piaget’s theory of cognitive development (see Piaget 1962). Fowler’s six stages are: intuitiveprojective (imagination is uninhibited by logic); Mythic-literal (the imagination is controlled but only literal meanings are embraced);

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Synthetic-Conventional (conformity to group values); Individuation-reflective (angst about identity and belief); Conjunctive (accepts paradox and transcendence); Universal, or selfactualized (all limitations of one’s culture and tradition are transcended—such individuals strive to overcome all divisions, to assert the unity of all people, even self-preservation is sacrificed in the cause of the ‘unitive vision’). A Simplistic Analysis In analyzing the problem, it is too easy on the one hand to reduce the causes of conflict to economic, identity, tribal or ethnic aspects that conveniently side-lines religion, apparently getting it off the hook as a major or significant cause of conflict. Writers have depicted the Israel-Palestine, Bosnia, and Northern Ireland conflicts as mainly non-religious. Even if it can be proven that religion is not a main cause but has been recruited along the way, this does not really exonerate religion, since by lending support to the conflict or by allowing itself to be manipulated, it can be said to have demonstrated a fundamental flaw. On the other hand, it is easy to overstress religion’s role, making it the main cause at the expense of other causes. It is much more difficult to identify exactly what role religion does play. Nonetheless, religious people—and I am a committed Christian—need to honestly admit that religion is a factor in many conflicts, that violence is often justified religiously and that religion’s most cherished texts can themselves be used to justify and to sanction violence. Thompson (1988) and SchmidtLeukal (2004) suggest that no religion is blameless of justifying violence. Some have better records than others but even Buddhists have resorted to violence to defend ‘Buddhism, or particular forms of it against other religions and other Buddhist denominations’ (Schmidt-Leukal 2004: 52). Use of religion to justify violence can be dismissed as misuse or misinterpretation but all of the above named texts show that scriptures can be read as justifying or even as encouraging violence. Nelson-Pallmeyer says that ‘streams within the Bible and Qur’an’ are ‘flooded by an enormous reservoir of God’s abusive violence’ (2003: xiii). He takes these streams to be the dominant ones, and says that the problem is not therefore one of ‘misinterpretation’ but that ‘actual violence’ is ‘at the heart of these texts’, thus they can be ‘reasonably cited by people to justify

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their own recourse to violence’ (Nelson-Pallmeyer 2003: xiv-xv). Those involved cite numerous texts to support their actions. The perpetrators of 9/11 saw themselves as martyrs for Islam. This book will explore three conflict contexts in which religion is generally acknowledged to be at least a factor, although some minimize its role while others emphasize its role. It will seek to evaluate what role religion does play (or has played) in the Northern Ireland, Bosnian and Israel- Palestinian conflicts. It will take seriously the psychological tendency to demonize those who do not share our views and will argue that religion, although one factor among others, all too easily lends itself in support of conflict. An alternative, peace affirming understanding of religion is needed if religion is to survive. According to Harris, Dawkins and others, religion’s complicity in causing conflict disqualifies it from being part of the cure, while Schmidt-Leukal (2004) and Smock (2002) offer the opposite judgment, that religions ‘have the resources to be and can indeed be part of the solution’. Dawkins is right to argue that religion will only survive if it performs a valid function. This is similar to the change of mindset for which McTernan calls, arguing that if religious leaders are to ‘be a part of the solution to the contemporary global problem of indiscriminate violence for which religion is at least partly responsible’, they will have to ‘embark upon an “adaptive leap” that will require’ a re-examination of ‘some of their fundamental beliefs and loyalties’ (McTernan 2003: 161). This will involve the realization that ‘no single tradition is capable of comprehending the truth alone—in all its fullness’ (McTernan 2003: 161). Similarly, Kimball, who is confident that religions contain all the resources needed to affirm peacemaking as the priority, says: Throughout history religion has often been connected with what is noblest and best in human beings. Now, perhaps more than ever, religious people must transcend narrowly defined self-interest and seek new ways to live out what is noblest and best in their faith tradition (Kimball 2002: 187-88).

This book will contend that it is wrong to argue that religions are biased towards hatred of the other but that there are strong tendencies within them towards just the type of tolerance and affirmation of diversity that Harris claims are conspicuous by their absence in the scriptural records.

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Responses to Religious Pluralism Since competition between religions has been a cause of violence, used to impose my truth onto others, how religious people choose to understand the fact that many religions exist is a significant factor in determining attitudes towards the religious Other. This book takes the view that there are three possible responses to the fact of religious pluralism: 1. One religion is correct and from God, others are of human, or of a more sinister origin. That is, either they are futile human efforts to reach God, or they are deliberate obstacles to the true religion raised up by Satan. This approach, usually called exclusive, says that the gap between humanity and God caused by sin can only be bridged from the divine side, and that God has uniquely bridged the gap through one religion, be that Christianity, Islam or any other. You will regard your own religion as a force for good, others as malign. Many Christians and Muslims hold this view. Pat Robertson, a Republican Party US Presidential candidate in 1988, founder of the Christian Coalition, said on 13 March 2006 that Bin Laden and his followers were ‘crazed fanatics’ motivated ‘by demonic power’. ‘Islam’, he said, ‘is Satanic’ and its goal, whether ‘you like it or not, is world domination’ (700 Club, TV Show). 2. God has revealed God’s-self through the many religions of the world, reminding humanity that the totality of God, or of the Ultimate, can not be reduced to any single formulation, and that paradox lies at the heart of God, since apparently different and even contradictory understandings of God’s nature can all be true. Instead of competing with each other for converts, or for supremacy, religious people should co-operate to improve human life for all. Recognizing that some people may choose to change their religious affiliation, however, they ought to allow this in a spirit of openness towards what people find works best for them. 3. All religions are human efforts to make sense of life, which may be understood as negative, as the childish invention of an imaginary divine benefactor, onto whom we project responsibility for decisions that we ought to make ourselves. Or, religion can be understood as serving a positive function in helping to identify moral norms and standards of behaviour.

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In Search of Solutions However, since no religion has been ‘revealed’, and there is actually no God or supra-human reality to ‘reveal’ them, none may claim to be any truer, or better, than any other. This position can be associated with belief in the existence of God or in an Ultimate Reality that does not ‘reveal’ itself. Usually called ‘pluralism’, this is the position of John Hick’s God and the Universe of Faiths (1998). The Three Paradigms

Race (1982) popularized what are known as the three paradigms as an analytical framework for categorizing different theologies of religion. Kimball usefully summarizes these (2002: 202-10). These three paradigms are the exclusive (which roughly corresponds to the first position described above), inclusivist and pluralist (which roughly corresponds to the third position described above). My own preference, which is for my second position, is closer to pluralism than to inclusivism but differs from pluralism by positing a revelatory, or divine source, for all religions. The inclusivist position as such does not feature in my three possible explanations; inclusivism says that all those whom God chooses to redeem, whatever religious label they actually wear, which could be Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, Jewish or Christian, are saved as a result of what God has accomplished through a single religion. Thus, one religion is actually the exclusive channel to God but people who adhere to different traditions faithfully are ‘included’, that is, have honorary, anonymous and unconscious membership, of this religion. Actually, religion is the wrong word, because what is really meant here is ‘faith’, which is ‘mediated’ by an exclusive mechanism but which God freely gifts to people irrespective of their religion. For Christianity, the saving mechanism is the Cross. Some Muslims are also inclusivist. Most Muslims do not believe that Jesus died on the Cross; for them, those who are saved are saved because they live as ‘muslims’, although not necessarily as ‘Muslims’. Vivekananda (1863-1902), the Hindu reformer, was an inclusivist, believing that when people achieve the highest level of spiritual awareness, they will realize that the best and truest description of the Ultimate is the one found in the Upanishads and is a principle, not a person.

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Discussion • Do you think my three options exhaust possible responses to religious pluralism? • How does my scheme compare in usefulness with the more popular ‘three paradigms’? • Can you devise a more comprehensive schema? • Is it possible to write sympathetically about religion if you are convinced that religion is a form of delusion? So What is Religion’s Role? Contrary to Dawkins’ and Harris’ view that what is needed is the demise of religion, this book argues that if religion was extracted from the mix of causes of conflict, where it is a factor, it is highly unlikely that conflict would cease. Nor do all conflicts have a religious aspect; violence in the name of Basque or Maharasthan independence has no obvious religious aspect. Nor did the 100 days of Rwandan genocide from 6 April 1994, when Hutus killed Tutsis, or the conflict in Somalia which also involved inter-clan rivalry. If, as I shall argue, it is not religion per se but a manipulation of religion that supports violence, its demise will not solve conflicts as long as other issues remain unresolved, such as power and wealth distribution but its manipulation towards peace may help to resolve conflict. Religion, I argue, is a factor in Northern Ireland’s ‘troubles’ but were all religious elements to be removed by, for example, everyone renouncing their faiths, some people would still want union with the Republic of Ireland while others would still want to remain British. In the Balkans, if religion were extracted from the mix, nationalistic ideology that claimed Bosnia’s territory to an extent that denied Bosnia’s right to exist as a separate state could still flourish. Religion may have strengthened this ideology but it is not an indispensable component. I tend to endorse a functionalist understanding of religion. Pioneered by Emile Durkheim (18581917) functionalism stresses religion’s role in maintaining harmony and in setting moral boundaries, within society. Durkheim described religion as ‘a unified set of beliefs and practices related to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden — beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community ... all those who adhere to them’ (Durkheim 1915: 47). However, I do not want

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to reduce religion to a human construct invented to serve a social purpose. I do not go as far as Smock in seeing religion as better at fostering friendship, since I think it has an almost universal tendency to generate negative views of others but I do believe that it can play an important peace building role. Too easily, how we see ourselves polarizes us and others yet negative views of others are not the only views that can be derived from religion. On the one hand, exclusivist tendencies (we’re right, you’re wrong) are present in all religions, even within those that boast tolerance (they protest too loudly) but I disagree with Harris that pluralistic tendencies are weak and ineffective (see Harris 2005: 21). These tendencies can be strengthened. Perhaps what gets so easily manipulated is bad religion. Good religion might be less liable to manipulation. Good religion might have peace-making, justice and combating prejudice and discrimination, as its goal. In order to foster peace instead of fuelling war, the more inclusive and pluralist strands must be emphasized. Kimball thinks that powerful resources for inclusive attitudes can be found within religious traditions, and that these can be nurtured (Kimball 2002: 187). Like Kimball, I am convinced that ‘it is possible to be a person of faith with integrity—a Christian, a Hindu, a Jew, a Muslim, a Buddhist— and at the same time recognize that one’s own experience of God does not exhaust the possibilities’ (Kimball 2002: 8-9). Harris is probably right to say that the exclusivist tendency is more popular but if those who regard their scriptures as peace-affirming speak louder and in greater number, and if they address the inequalities that encourage conflict, those who use scripture to justify violence may attract less and less support. They gain support where discontent already exists, where some have all the opportunities and others none, or where some are seen as a threat to others’ values or identity. When more people endorse peace-affirming interpretations of religion, the few will find it difficult to recruit followers to the cause of violence. The Power to Imagine If religious leaders can help to solve problems of racial bigotry, identity politics, economic poverty, inequality, injustice, which are all part of the mix of the causes of violence, then they will contribute

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to conflict resolution. Peace affirming interpretations of scripture are available. Vis-à-vis the Qur’an, interpretations offered by, for example, Farid Esack and M.M. Taha are convincing and persuasive and there is no reason why non-peaceful interpretations should dominate. One criticism of Selengut (2003) is that he fails to show why religion inevitably results in intolerance or to ask whether ‘Muslims really have no choice but to ‘perpetually wage war against all non-believers’ (Selengut 2003: 20; van Gorder 2004: 86). Similarly, a review of McTernan says that his ‘constructive points’ including religion’s more pluralist affirming voice does not ‘receive the same kind of detailed treatment that’ he ‘gives to his critical analysis’ (Marshall 2004: 90). Selengut refers to only one Qur’anic verse, 9: 5 which, known as a sword verse, is widely cited to justify violence (Selengut 2003: 46). Historically, as he points out, Muslims divided the world into the World of War, or Dar-al-Harb (the non-Muslim world) and the world of Islam, or Dar-al-Islam. Based on an interpretation of Qur’an 9: 5, they believed that transforming, ‘by force and violence if necessary ... non-Muslim areas into Muslim controlled states’ was a divine duty (Selengut 2003: 29). However, even though this was a dominant view and one that was based on an understanding of God’s intent, it was not necessarily correct. Tibi (2002) and others point out that the division of the world into two opposing realms was politically motivated (2002: 95). Nor is the division found explicitly in the Qur’an. This book will take the view that it is naive to suggest that religion is not prone to abuse. It argues that religious leaders, honestly acknowledging this, should vigorously champion peaceaffirming religious principles. This is similar to Kimball’s approach, which argues that religion both is and is not the problem depending on how we understand ‘religion’ itself (Kimball 2002: 32). Kimball then speaks about what he calls ‘authentic’ and ‘corrupt religious truth claims’ (Kimball 2002: 41). The former are ‘never as inflexible and exclusive as zealous adherents insist’, while the latter represent a propensity for religions to become evil (Kimball 2002: 36). However, warning signs can be detected, which indicate when religion is becoming evil, that is, when religiously motivated behaviour becomes ‘harmful or malevolent’ (Kimball 2002: 38). Kimball’s signs, each of which represents a chapter of his book, are: 1. Absolute truth claims. 2. Blind obedience to leaders.

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3. The idea that an ideal time or society can be established now. 4. That the end justifies the means used to achieve this. 5. That war can be regarded as sacred. ‘Early detection’, he says, ‘is the critical first step in forestalling disaster’ (Kimball 2002: 38). Michael Sells’ study of the Bosnian conflict shows how religious leaders in the former Yugoslavia all too readily supported genocide. Sells calls on religious leaders to ‘better understand and more clearly explain the full humanity of those who embrace other religions’ (Sells 1998: 145). He argues that a frontier zone such as Bosnia, between the majority Muslim and majority non-Muslim world, can either be negatively imagined and constructed as a barrier or positively as a bridge. Mario Apostolov (2004) points out that, where borders exist, and communities mix and mingle and ‘shade off’ into each other, just as Christians and Muslims have historically done in various border-zones, these spaces have the potential to be either ‘barriers’ or ‘bridges’ (2004: 185). How we view others is largely determined by the tradition that our elders choose to transmit. However, nothing is automatic about what gets transmitted. The choice and transmission of pluralistic views of us and others can replace the choice and transmission of exclusive views. Fatima Mernissi, the leading Muslim feminist, argues that imagination can be a powerful ally in the struggle for peace, human rights and democracy (Mernissi: 1992). This, she says, is why dictatorial regimes often fear free-thought. In a passage behind which the post-modern thought of Michel Foucault (1926-84) can be detected, she writes of Khomeini’s condemnation of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses (1988): The imam, who watches over the cosmic equilibrium to see that the vessel of Islam continues to sail on a hostile planet, condemned the outpourings of the imagination as a deadly attack. Salman Rushdie is a writer of fiction. He creates from the imagination, the most indomitable refuge of individuality, a person’s little secret garden that escapes all censorship, all compromise. An individual can be forced to submit, but his imagination can never be controlled (Mernissi 1992: 90).

Although I suggest below that post-modern analysis has its limits, I have found Foucault’s writing provocative and insightful. In the citation above, Mernissi drew on Foucault’s panoptic metaphor in his The Birth of the Clinic (1973)—the scientists gazed down from the ‘tower’ in order to control his subjects according to his own,

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self-serving notions of normal and deviant behaviour. I have been especially influenced by Foucault’s The Archeology of Knowledge (1972) in which he shows how what passes as authoritative or as truth in any discipline is actually a construct, the result of a process by which some data was selected over other data and some methods were used instead of others to interpret and analyze the data, thus ‘we must question those ready-made synthesis, those groupings that we normally accept before any examination, those links whose validity is recognized from the outset; we must oust these forms and obscure forces by which we usually link the discourse of one man with that of another; they must be driven out from the darkness in which they reign’ (Foucault 1972: 22). Discussion • Do you think that any text on religion and violence can properly claim to be neutral, or objective? • Do we always take meaning to texts? Can we ever find meaning within a text? The Case Studies Case studies are central to this book. They provide instances of religions’ involvement in conflict that can be discussed and analyzed. Since Christian-Muslim relations have been this author’s primary field of study, Muslims feature in two of the studies. The current debate about the incompatibility of Islam with so-called Western values and the inevitability of some sort of clash of civilizations rarely considers, in its neat juxtaposition of a stable, democratic West and a chaotic, totalitarian Islamic world that for several centuries, Western powers controlled most of the Muslim world but did virtually nothing to democratize Muslim states. Nor does it take account of the artificial creation of many Muslim states, whose borders were drawn up by the departing colonial powers. The fact that there is real suspicion in the Muslim world about the West’s agenda and motive should not be ignored. Many Muslims regard the West as hypocritical, acting on United Nations’ Resolutions when it suits them, such as invading Iraq which has oil, while withdrawing from Somalia as soon as soldiers died. Bosnia is a case where the West was reluctant and slow to intervene; in Kuwait they were

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eager and quick. The much flaunted superiority of Western democracy over Muslim systems of governance is also suspect; Muslims believe that God, not people, should rule and are far from convinced that the people, not narrow vested interests, rule the USA and other Western states, where controversy about election results and low voter turn-out poses questions about legitimacy. The globalization project, to many, seems to elevate capitalism, profit and materialism over concern for the just distribution of resources, compassion and spirituality. Not all people in the non-Western world want fast food and pornography, which is often how globalization is perceived (see Akbar Ahmed 2003: 53-6). As long as the idea that all Westerners are sexually permissive, materialistic and libertarian gets perpetuated in the Muslim media, and the idea that all Muslim societies are totalitarian, oppressive and intent on world domination, gets perpetuated in the Western media, conflict remains a real possibility. Northern Ireland (chapters one and two) was chosen because as a conflict it involves intra- Christian rivalry, not Islam on which much discussion focuses. It has also been, for much of my life, the conflict on my own doorstep yet one in which less interest has often been expressed than in more distant ones, reminding me of Jesus’ advice that we should take the plank out of our own eye before we remove the splinter from our neighbour’s (Mt. 7:3). Also, identity politics and historical animosities fuel the conflict, as does economic and discrimination-related issues. These are involved in almost all conflicts, so parallels can be drawn to other situations where Islam is involved (as in Muslim-Hindu conflict) but also to situations where Islam is not a factor (such as the Maharasthan independence movement). An important feature of the peace-process in Northern Ireland was the contribution of women, two of whom, Betty Williams and Máiread Corrigan, won the 1976 Nobel Peace Prize. The two women led a non-sectarian movement, now called The Peace People but were inspired by their own deep faith in God’s love for all people. Initially, they were told to sit down and to shut up by the men who were traditionally leaders of the Irish communities. One criticism of religion is that it has usually been dominated by men, often at the expense of women, whose role has been minimal or non-existent. If more women, or women in partnership with men, had a greater say in interpreting religious

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traditions, would they have been as prone to violence? The role of women will also be referred to in the other two case studies. I also chose Israel-Palestine (chapters five and six) and Northern Ireland because of a longstanding personal interest in these conflicts. Both are examples of contexts where the concept of a ‘covenant people’ played a significant role in defining relations between the main opponents or actors (see Akenson 1992). This concept operates at various levels and in a number of specific ways but one central claim is that a special, exclusive relationship exists between a piece of land, and a given people; such ‘societies...will be profoundly attached to specific pieces of land...This will not be mere land hunger, but land will be seen as sacralized, as holy, and as a “Promised Land”’ (Akenson 1992: 42). Bosnia (chapters three and four) is an example of a context involving Muslims but in the main as victims, not as victimizers, thus challenging the stereotype that Muslims are prone to violence. Again, Bosnia can be represented as in the main a nationalistic conflict, thus the religious aspects can be stressed, or minimized. Sells (1998) argues that religion was fundamentally and profoundly part of the mix, that animosity towards Muslims was driven by an ancient conviction that the Slavs were a Christian race, ‘and that any conversion away from Christianity is a betrayal of the Slavic race’ (Sells 1996: 36). The search to understand the dynamics of the Bosnian conflict was for me a very time consuming but important task, because Bosnian Muslims are Europeans and as Muslims elsewhere in Europe develop their communities and their inter-community relations they may very well be influenced by the Bosnian experience. At the time, the media’s off-hand references to Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims and to the various new republics that had emerged after the break-up of Yugoslavia, was confusing and rarely explained. Israel-Palestine is for many the most challenging and complex conflict, resolution of which would give impetus to conflict resolution initiatives elsewhere. The Alexandria Initiative involving religious leaders provides an example of religions trying to become part of the solution. The colonial and neo-colonial aspects of the Palestinian conflict also have important parallels elsewhere, including Iraq and India-Pakistan. Each case study will describe the history of the conflict, identify causes, analyze the role played by religion, discuss peace initiatives and where appropriate religious involvement in these, such as the Alexandria process. Each introduces sources and

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resources used to tell the story of the conflict and to analyze causes. Each gives a time-line and descriptions of key actors, organizations and political parties. One handicap of teaching about religion and conflict when trying to affirm a positive role for religion is the difficulty of identifying success stories, which is also true for interreligious dialogue. Much is said about the idea of collaboration, but actual examples are difficult to find. Each case study draws on material I have used in teaching. They also represent something of my personal search to understand the dynamics and complexities of these conflicts, so my own voice is included. All three case studies suggest that what is often called consociational democracy may be a crucial component in situations where a ‘winner takes all’ system leaves minorities feeling vulnerable, discriminated against or marginalized. Power-sharing has been built into the peace agreements in Northern Ireland and in Bosnia and has recently been attempted in the Palestinian National Authority in the context of the Palestinian National Authority. Each study presents the history of the conflict in one chapter and analyses the role of religion in another. Discussion • Some analysts think that case studies can be less than useful, because each context needs to be understood within their own detailed and complex particularity, which makes arguing from specific studies to general truths impossible. Do you agree? • How useful do you think case studies are? • Would an argument for or against religion drawing on philosophy, psychology or even theology without case studies be a better approach? A Theological Contribution This book differs from most of the literature that has discussed this issue in that it is designed for use as a College text, although it is also hoped that general readers will find it useful. I hope that the discussion questions, while designed for classroom use, will stimulate other readers in their thinking about the issues raised. Unlike Selengut (2003) this book does not claim neutrality. Selengut tries to avoid a position that is ‘avowedly partisan’ in favour of ‘a

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more neutral academic view, sometimes referred to as “value neutrality”’ (2003:14). He does so as a sociologist. Harris (2005) falls into the partisan category, and is an anti-religious text. As such, it should be read in order to understand one end of the spectrum. An example of a book that takes a more positive view of religion’s role is Coward and Smith (2004) which examines how religions also defend human rights and contain resources for fostering peace. Smock (2002), Gopin (2000) and Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen’s Identity and Violence (2006) take a similar stance. One of these books should be read as representative of the other end of the spectrum. Selengut’s neutral book falls in the centre, and should also be read. I am writing this book as a theologian and professional student of religion, who, as an ordained minister, has participated in inter-religious dialogue for two and a half decades. Much of this engagement in inter-religious dialogue has involved theoretical discussion about the nature of God, or of the ‘Ultimate’ and of God’s/the Ultimate’s relationship with humanity; but it has also involved attempts to build bridges between people and to resolve conflict. This started at a relatively local level, working in the City of Birmingham, England, to improve community relations following race riots in 1985, when I helped many Mosques and neighbourhood self-help initiatives obtain charitable status and funding. Later, through involvement in an International Kashmir Conflict Resolution Group and the work of the Inter-religious and International Federation for World Peace, I had the opportunity to attend gatherings of politicians and religious leaders where strategies for conflict resolution were discussed, and religion was regarded as having a positive role to play in building bridges and breaking down barriers. A Personal Search I have always tried to combine teaching, writing and research with praxis. I have chaired a school board, I have served on a city-wide Community Relations Council, I have helped to organize an HIV/ AIDS awareness program using literature in the principal Asian languages of the city. I have worked with a School District in Upstate New York to assist teachers to respond to the particular needs of children from the Indian Sub-Continent. Recently, I have had the opportunity of regularly attending NGO briefings, the 45th

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Commission for Social Development and the Spiritual Caucus at the United Nations’ headquarters in New York city through the Interreligious and International Federation for World Peace, which enjoys consultative status with ECOSOC. The possible future role of a reformed United Nations will be considered later in this book. I have tried to build bridges of understanding following local or international incidents through visits to different places of worship, and speaking engagements. Incidents that have occupied my time include the Rushdie affair following Khomeini’s fatwa (1989), the 1992 destruction by Hindu fundamentalists of the Ayodhia Babri Mosque (1992), 9/11, the French law against wearing conspicuous religious symbols (passed March, 2004), the murder of the Dutch film director, Theo Van Gogh (November 2004), 7/7, controversy surrounding cartoons of Muhammad in a Danish paper, (October 2005), as well as both Gulf Wars and the Bosnian and other conflicts. At times, with my training in theology and religion, I have felt inept. This was especially true during my years as a Baptist missionary in Bangladesh (1979-82), when I thought that agricultural, medical or engineering skills may have made a more valuable contribution. More recent opportunities to join various peace conversations, alongside some who do possess real power, have been very welcome, enabling me to use my analysis of conflict to at least shed some light on the contexts involved. I wrote In Search of the Sacred (1996) on how we should study religion, drawing on personal encounter as well as on texts. In Search of Muhammad (1998) was an attempt to practice what I had preached. In Search of Jesus (2001) took me inside my own faith as well as outside it to explore and discover why so many people, Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, humanist, Marxist and others find Jesus fascinating, and motivational. This research certainly confirmed my own conviction that Jesus has caused a great deal of good in the world, despite Russell’s opinion, which I cited (Bennett 2001: 21112), and of others, that religion is dangerous. My own conclusion was that Jesus compels us towards freedom and reconciliation (Bennett 2001: 362), so that barriers between people are broken down, and liberty and justice are known by all. Increasingly, the issue of religion and conflict has preoccupied me. I have striven, and searched, to find a useful role. This fourth ‘in search of’ book is the result. More so than my previous books, it aims to be praxis driven. McTernan (2003) describes his book as trying to ‘bridge the

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gap between the worlds of the theorists and the practitioners’, which is also my aim. The case studies aim to provide readers with insight into the role religion does play in these contexts so that they will take religion seriously as ‘an actor in its own right’, rather than as ‘a proxy for some other cause’, to again cite McTernan (2003: xv). In the process of writing this book, somewhat to my dismay, I realized that my most useful contribution could well be textual, developing an approach to the biblical and Qur’anic material that avoids on the one hand the ‘humanizing’ and on the other the ‘a text can mean whatever readers read into it’ hermeneutic. My material on problematic scriptural passages may be the locus of this book’s main contribution. The Limit of Post-Modern Analysis On several occasions, I have shared a platform with Charles Selengut, speaking about the role that religion can play. At a seminar held 20 December 2005 in the United Nations, NY, on the theme, ‘Universal Human Rights: Judaism, Christianity and Islam—Alliances Furthering Peace’ the topic of how scriptures themselves are used to sanction violence was a major subject. Selengut took the view that, according to post-modern thought, a text means what a reader says it means. Therefore, to argue that Osama bin Laden, who uses Q9:5 to justify violence is misinterpreting the text, and that a different meaning is the correct interpretation, is to fly in the face of critical theory. Rather, we must accept that scriptures are themselves part of the problem. There is no credible basis on which, for example, Akbar Ahmed can assert his alternative interpretation as the ‘right’ one over-andagainst Bin Laden’s as the ‘wrong’ one (see Ahmed, 2003: 9). Speaking on the same platform, I had difficulty with this postmodern analysis. On the one hand, I believe that texts do answer the questions we pose of them, and that many texts can be manipulated to support quite different positions. Yet I am far from convinced that texts never have a single meaning, a meaning that the writer intended to convey, and which can be read from the text. I think, for example, that Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount is a pacifist text that does not support or sanction violence. When Jesus said, ‘blessed are the peacemakers’ he did not say, ‘blessed are those who wage war’ (Mt. 5:9). I had thought that I would pursue

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analogy, which Nelson-Pallmeyer calls ‘sidestepping or denying the full weight’ of scriptural violence, ‘which Gandhi did ... in’ interpreting the Bhagavad Gita as a pacifist text’ (Nelson-Pallmeyer 2003: 134). However, the more I looked at problem passages, the more I realized that God telling Saul to annihilate the Amalekites is not analogy and that a different hermeneutic is needed (1 Sam. 15:3). There is no doubt that the Qur’an has been, is and can be interpreted in a way that justifies 9/11, and in a way that totally condemns 9/11. Thus, we may want to say that the text is itself ambiguous, or that one of these meanings is correct, one incorrect. Or, we could say that both are, in the light of post-modern theory, equally plausible. Consequently, Osama bin Laden and his followers can not be regarded as bad Muslims; it has to be accepted that they do what they do as good Muslims, inspired by an authentic reading of their scripture. If this is indeed so, the case for religions as desirable and positive systems of belief and practice fails, and Harris is right. Religions should be abandoned. If religion is simply whatever people want it to be, and unprovoked, indiscriminate killing of non-combatants is acceptable, most people who have a sense of what is right and wrong, that is, a moral conscience, will say that it is not merely wrong but a menace to humanity, and should ‘end’. The problem, as Harris puts it, would ‘be with Islam itself...men like bin Laden actually believe what they say’, and that they will ‘go straight to paradise’ for ‘killing thousands of our neighbours’ (Harris 2005: 29). Harris devotes a whole chapter to ‘The Problem with Islam’, and concludes that unless Muslims can ‘reshape their religion into an ideology that is basically benign’, and not as he sees it, malign, ‘or outgrow it altogether—it is difficult to see how Islam and the West can avoid falling into a continual state of war, and on innumerable fronts’ (Harris 2005: 152). Both with reference to the Bible and to the Qur’an, the claim that neither can be used to justify violence flies in the face of fact— they have been, and they are, so used. One solution to this hermenuetical problem is to regard them as human texts. NelsonPallmeyer suggests this, arguing that treating ‘texts rooted in the violence-of-God traditions in the Bible and Qur’an as sacred’ is hugely problematical (2003: xvi), and can only be solved by understanding that these ‘texts’ are actually human constructs; ‘What if’, he asks, ‘Jews, Christians and Muslims were to view the Bible

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and Qur’an as products of human beings who offered their views on how history intersects with the divine?’ (Nelson-Pallmeyer 2003: 134). I have two problems with this apparently attractive solution. First, the vast majority of Jews, Christians and Muslims will have enormous difficulty with demoting their sacred texts to the level of the human. Even liberal Jews and Christians, who do regard the Bible as humanly mediated, with mistakes and textual flaws, believe that the biblical authors had some sort of experience of inspiration, that something of what they wrote represents truth from and about God and God’s will. Second, if we assert that scriptures are wholly human, then what rationale is there for preferring some passages, such as those that extol peace and justice, over others, such as those that sanction violence in God’s name? This removes the ground on which religions rest, which is ‘divine’ ground. I argue that, for religious people, the reduction of scripture to a totally human construct is so hugely problematical that an approach that upholds the revealed status of scriptures is more fruitful. As a religious person, I prefer to identify a hermeneutic that enables me to fly in the face of post-modern analysis and say that there is a correct and an incorrect way to read scriptures, and that a peace affirming reading is right and a violence-sanctioning one is wrong. To do this, I rest on theological ground. This book argues that post-modern analysis has its limits. On the one hand, I have learnt a lot, as stated above, from Foucault’s post-modern theory about the assumptions and attitudes that have been built into texts, which represents disciplinary bias, and about how knowledge is constructed by those who exercise ‘authority’, which can properly inform our analysis of texts. I think that postmodernism is right to tell us that many voices, such as those of women or of dissidents, have been silenced. It reminds us that the claim to impartiality is somewhat suspect, since we all bring attitudes and assumptions to our writing. It liberates us to declare a personal voice, or stake, in our writing, to tell our readers who we are and what we believe so that they do not have to engage in textual archeology to uncover this. Having declared our personal voice, though, post-modern theory also encourages us to avoid the mistakes of the past by giving serious consideration to alternative perspectives and to other people’s voices as well. Kimball’s book, in my view, is strengthened by the passion of his personal voice; he writes, ‘Far from being impartial or dispassionate, I am deeply and

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personally connected with the subject matter presented in the pages that follow...’ (Kimball 2002: 9). Yet this book’s central thesis will rest on the contention that post-modern analysis has its limits. Moghissi (1999) and Tibi (2002), both Muslim, although the former may distance herself more from her religious background, have also critiqued the limits of post-modern analysis. Moghissi argues that the politically correct view that we should be more ‘accepting of practices which are unacceptable here but admissible there’ (Moghissi 1999: 5) condemns women in Islamic societies to fundamentalism as the only option. Tibi regards post-modernity’s cultural relativity (I do not have the right to impose my ‘way’ onto ‘you’) as dangerously nihilistic; ‘For those who are concerned with human rights as universal rights, the idea of cultural pluralism (honouring legitimate difference) must not become tantamount to a self-defeating cultural-relativism, which permits itself to excuse even abhorrent differences...the acceptance or even sanctioning of practices constituting violations of human rights...as being simply expressions of a different culture cannot be tolerated by an enlightened world’ (Tibi 2002: 213). Discussion • Do you agree that postmodern analysis has its limits? • Do you think that humanity is capable of an ethical consensus? • Do you think that values constantly change, that there are no universal truths? • If there are universal truths, what makes them universal? • Should we judge others by our standards, or by theirs? • What if my standards are wrong, while theirs are right, or vice versa and who adjudicates whose are universal and not particular? Towards A Higher Hermeneutic The values of the Enlightenment are, says Tibi, endangered by the excesses of post-modernity, and he believes that an international moral consensus can be identified, provided that it is truly crosscultural and not exclusive to a particular, hegemonic civilization (Tibi 2002: 45). Some such consensus is a prerequisite for international order; ‘if each civilization were uncompromisingly to claim the

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exclusivity and universality of its own norms and values…there could be no consensus on international morality’, and ‘the result would be, inescapably, international disorder’ (Tibi 2002: 88). For Tibi, such a moral consensus can not rest only on religious ground, since this would alienate non-religious people but must be broadly based on secular grounds; ‘divergent civilizations need to agree on common terms for living in peace with one another’, and ‘the consensus that emerges cannot be in line with either a pax americana or a pax islamica’ (Tibi 2002: 45). While Tibi dismisses Hans Kung’s call for a ‘Global Ethic’ that ‘combines all religions of the world on ethical grounds’ as the ‘daydreaming of a theologian’, this theologian nonetheless asserts that something like a Global Ethic, consistent with religious secular values, and ‘freely accepted’ by the nations and religions of the world, can be used to apply a ‘higher hermeneutic’ to scripture. This book, in chapter seven, will argue that scriptures, correctly understood, endorse peace not violence, and that when they are interpreted with the ‘higher principle’ as the hermeneutical key, they point to a peaceful and just world as the only future that is wholly consistent with God’s plan. This higher principle could be described as the ‘Golden Rule’, to ‘love your neighbour as yourself’, which many commentators believe is a crucial teaching of all religions (see Kimball 2003: 39, 193). Kimball describes how ‘faith, hope and love’ are the ‘guiding principles’ that the ‘spiritual compasses’ of all the ‘enduring religions’ provide us with (Kimball 2003: 191). This book, in examining ‘Violent’ passages in the Qur’an, argues that Judge Hamoud al-Hitar of the Yemen has right on his side in trying to convince Muslim terrorists that their ideas are not justified by the Qur’an, especially when read in the light of the higher principle. The higher principle will be understood both in terms of the type of international moral consensus for which Tibi calls, as well as the idea of the human conscience which, says Paul, ‘accuses or excuses’ our actions (Rom. 3:15). In offering an unashamedly theological perspective, this book argues, in dealing in some detail with problematic Scriptural material, that awkward passages, which Nelson-Pallmeyer describes as ‘portrayals of God as punishing and violent and of God’s power as coercive and abusive’ (Nelson-Pallmeyer: xiv) must be understood with reference to the concept that God has a plan for the world. Some readers of this book may find this theological argument acceptable, yet for anyone of religious faith the concept of

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providence, of God having a plan for creation, is a fundamental idea and non-religious readers may wish to understand why this plays a central role in religious thought. Belief in God cannot be proved, as Russell rightly argues but nor does it have to be, since if God does exist, this existence is independent of anyone’s belief, or lack of belief, in God. Belief in God could be judged immoral if it does indeed result, as Russell, Dawkins, Harris and others argue, in misery, conflict and malignity but if it enhances life, then even though it lacks proof, it can be considered beneficial. Kimball argues, as I shall, that religions have enabled individuals to ‘transcend narrow self-interest in pursuit of higher values and truths’ and that, throughout history, they have often ‘been connected with what is noblest and best in human beings’ (Kimball 2003: 187) even though religion has also encouraged divisive tribalism and the dehumanizing of the religious Other. I do not subscribe to the view that religion abrogates human responsibility. There is a tendency in religion to see humanity as so debased and flawed that only God can redeem the world but there is also a strand that calls on humanity to assume responsibility for re- shaping the world, based on Genesis 1:28 and Q2:30 and summed up in the Jewish expression, tikkun olam (repairing the world). Essential to this approach is the claim that passages of scripture describing an historical event, however abhorrent, do not represent a mandate to repeat that event, or to act in a similar way, today. End of History Chapter eight discusses the bold idea that religious history needs to be read in the light of an understanding of God’s plan. Kimball comments that religions provide their followers with ‘symbolic maps’ to guide them on their pilgrimage, or journey, though life. Such maps help to identify our goals, as well as obstacles that get in our way (Kimball 2002: 189). Thus, the biblical tradition ‘from Genesis to Revelation’ indicates for Christians ‘where we come from and where we are going’. This is what I mean by God’s plan, which, subtracted from religion, would effectively tear the map in half, making it a map to nowhere. My own view is that in the endtime society, lives will center directly on God, thus minimizing the importance of religion as a mediator between humanity and God, although religious practices may continue as channels through which

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people express their devotion, faith, piety and prayer. Only then will jealousy and rivalry cease. This, of course, is utopian but my point is that if we do not imagine how we want the world to be, and make it so, it will remain the world we do not want it to be. Bluntly, it is a matter of, yes, we can make the world a fairer place, or no that is an impossible task. If the latter is accepted, religions can probably only be Marx’s ‘opium of the people’, helping us to put up with exploitation and injustice now because utopia waits for us in heaven. If that is so, then since Marxism itself does not appear to have delivered the utopian, class-less and need-less society of which Marx himself dreamt, either humanity will never achieve such an ideal or some other ideology will be needed to help us arrive at the end of our human journey, if indeed there is one. Dawkins seems to be an ally here, because he suggests that human ability to ‘turn against’ our ‘creators’, that is, the meme and gene machines that make us what we are, and to thus change our future, is a unique quality of our species. This power to rebel, he says, is related to our ability to imagine, ‘our power to stimulate the future in imagination’ (Dawkins 2006a: 200). Personally, belief in God has little to do with whether my vision is realized. What it depends on is the power of the human imagination to make dreams come true, and the dream of a better, fairer world can be imagined and acted on by people who are not religious as well as by those who are. Utopian dreams are dangerous when, in order to achieve them, force and coercion are used, which is Kimball’s third sign of corrupt religion. My vision of a world in which all have food to eat, houses to live in, access to education and to health care would be achieved by co-operation, by the best use of human ingenuity and creativity to properly steward, protect and preserve global resources. I draw here on Fukuyama (1992) and on Barber (1995) as well as on William Ernest Hocking’s concept of a ‘coming world civilization’ and on an emerging consensus, in which the United Nations has taken a lead, on what a peaceful world would look like. The chapter offers a vision of the future that actually draws on secular thinkers more than on religious scholarship. Its proposals are offered as real world possibilities. I am not interested in make-believe. The conclusion suggests that the End of History might also involve the demise of institutional religion or perhaps a diminishing of its role. It will argue that religion’s ultimate goal is to do itself out of a job. With Hocking I anticipate a future world civilization in which division

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and conflict, poverty and injustice, will be history and the best of all religions will converge into a new reality. Hocking retells a Hindu proverb: The place of junctions of rivers has a peculiar sanctity, because each of the streams realizes its full being. But if Jumna and Ganges run together, shall the united lower river be called Ganges or Jumna? Is it neither? Is it both? Or is it that one whose symbol men freely find compacted with the sense of both, holding in historic life and deed, for which there can be no repetition and no substitute, a prophetic answer to man’s eternal need? (Hocking 1956: 170).

While the conclusion references the theological contributions of Henri Bergson and Teilhard de Chardin, it continues to develop a realpolitik approach by building further on such theorists as Fukuyama and Barber. The concept of peace that informs this book is one that begins with a personal commitment to peace, then moves into the social and political spheres, then to the global level to protect and preserve the integrity of all life on the planet as well as the existence of the planet itself. This concept of peace embraces the spiritual, the physical, the non-human and the human spheres. Removal of the causes of conflict, such as poverty, injustice, discrimination is assumed to be a central task, as well as ridding the world of war and of weapons of war. A cultural transformation, such as that proposed by the UN Declaration on a Culture of Peace, United Nations General Assembly (1999) “Declaration on a Culture of Peace”, Resolution 53/243A September 13 http://www.undocuments.net/a53r243a.htm) is a prerequisite, a ‘culture’ based on ‘respect for life, ending of violence, and promotion and practice of non-violence through education, dialogue and co-operation’.

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Part One CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND Resources and Sources Donald Harman Akenson, God’s Peoples: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel and Ulster (1992). Mainly historical analyses showing the theological and biblical foundations of the Ulster Protestant’s attachment to the land, and understanding of the Catholic Other. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images (1995). Detailed analyses with chapters five, six and seven devoted to the role of religion. Patrick Grant, ‘Northern Ireland: Religion and the Peace Process’ (2004) an essay in a collection on religion and peacemaking. This chapter is realistic about the negative role of religion in Northern Ireland but also highlights the contribution of the Churches towards peace and reconciliation. Clair Mitchell, ‘Behind the Ethnic Marker: Religion and Social Identification in Northern Ireland’ (2005). Religion may be a ‘badge of ethnic difference’ (citing McGarry and O’Leary) but it is also ‘the main signifier’ of difference, which invites the question, ‘what meaning does this have’? Mitchell, a sociologist of religion, presents data from in-depth interviews with 35 individuals. Her aim was to allow each interviewee to tell their stories against the backdrop of recent anti-Good Friday Agreement demonstrations, then to tease out ‘their subjective definitions of faith, what role it played in their life and political ideas.’ She also used participant observation, attending religious events, community and social activities in 2000 and 2001. Eamon Collins (and Mick McGovern) Killing Rage (1997): a harrowing and deeply honest account of an IRA insider’s role in the conflict. It includes his motive for supporting and his reasons for eventually repudiating violence. Collins writes that he had openly criticized Gerry Adams of Sinn Féin for ‘selling out’ what he called ‘physical-force republicans’, until he realized

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many years later that ‘the armed struggle was taking nationalists nowhere’ and that Adams ‘deserves respect for ... slowly taking the republican movement with him towards a future without violence’ (p.8). The author was himself murdered as a traitor to the cause outside his own home on 27 January 1999. Sarah Buscher and Bettina Ling Máiread Corrigan and Betty Williams: Making Peace in Northern Ireland (1999). Part of the series, ‘Women Who Changed the World’ published by the Feminist Press of New York’s City University, this is a popular account of the achievements of the joint winners of the 1976 Nobel Peace Prize towards moving the peace initiative forwards. The Peace People’s website, www.peacepeople.com (The Peace People was founded by Corrigan and Williams). The Corrymeela Community’s website, www.corrymeela.com: founded in 1965, before the troubles started, Corrymeela brings Catholic and Protestant youth together in a neutral, spiritual retreat. A PBS site on Ireland, ‘Fortress Ireland’ http://www.pbs.org/wnet/ ancientireland/fortress2.html Accompanies a PBS documentary, ‘In Search of Ancient Ireland’ (2002). The site has brief but useful information on ancient Ireland, the development of Celtic Christianity, Rome’s attempts to incorporate the Irish Church within its structures, and the invasion by Henry II of England at the Pope’s bidding. The Close Up Foundation’s Northern Ireland civics site http:// www.closeup.org/nireland.htm (Contains historical information as well as up-to-date political data). CAIN (Conflict Archive on the Internet) at cain.ulst.ac.uk (University of Ulster) has many relevant resources and essays. Film: Bloody Sunday (2002) directed by Paul Greengrass, won the Golden Bear Award at the Berlin Film Festival. A realistic, documentary-style reenactment of the events of 30 January 1972. In the opening scene, MP Ivan Cooper played by James Nesbitt, states that the Catholics are marching because ever since partition they have faced discrimination by the Protestant controlled state. Very realistic scenes of troops patrolling the streets fully armed with blackened faces convey the feeling of a land under siege. In the background, the graffiti says ‘Brits out’. Preparing for the march, the British troops are ordered to round up between 200 and 300 hooligans. Photographs of suspects are distributed. Told to be aggressive and to teach the Catholics a lesson, the

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troops target a group who break away from the main route. When the youths see the troops, they throw stones. Once or twice, we glimpse a gun in the hands of a youth. However, the film supports the claim that the troops shot without justification, that is, they were not fired at first. They killed 13 civilians. Towards the end, after the shooting, we see the IRA distributing weapons to new recruits. Cooper, when he addresses the rally, says that their goal of ending Unionist rule was not an option but how this was to be achieved, violently or non-violently, was a choice they had to make. Referring to Gandhi and to Martin Luther King, he said the task was to show that non-violence could work.

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Chapter One NORTHERN I RELAND: ‘THE TROUBLES’ Introducing ‘The Troubles’ ‘The Troubles’ refer to conflict between the Loyalists, or supporters of the union of Northern Ireland with the United Kingdom, and Republicans, or Nationalists, who want Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland. Loyalists are predominantly Protestants; Republicans predominantly Catholic. From its creation in 1922, the Protestant controlled Northern Ireland government systematically discriminated against Catholics, as had British governments in Ireland since the sixteenth century. The ‘troubles’, usually dated from 1968, are generally said to have ended after the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. The violence reached its height between 1969 and 1974, when the average annual number of deaths was 990, out of a total population of roughly 1.5 million (Akenson 1992: 264). Between 1969 and 1993, 3,523 people were killed—12.4% of the population. I can not remember a time when news of conflict in Ireland was not a regular feature of radio and television broadcasts. Even as a child I was aware that the conflict involved Protestants on one side and Catholics on the other. Whether or not ‘the troubles’ were caused by religion, religious affiliation identifies and labels the opposing sides. As a Baptist, I was taught that the Catholic Church was in error—indeed, that it was a cult—so although I did not know much about the conflict, I instinctively sympathized with the Protestants until I leant more about the causes of ‘the troubles’. As violence escalated, with both sides using extraconstitutional means to pursue their agendas, with neither side accepting responsibility or genuinely exploring a peaceful resolution of the conflict, blame increasingly appeared to be shared. In the analysis that follows, there is no intent to impute attitudes described to all Protestants, or to all Catholics, only to some.

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Who Started the Violence? Blame for the violence is difficult to attribute. Grant (2004) says that ‘although there is debate about the extent of anti-Catholic discrimination, there is overwhelming consensus that it occurred, and that Northern Ireland’s Catholic minority had a just grievance’ (Grant 2004: 266). The ‘troubles’ are usually said to have started when riots broke out during Civil Rights marches in October 1968 although two years earlier the Ulster Defense Force killed four Roman Catholics in Belfast. On 5 October 1969 the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), an almost wholly Protestant force, stood by while Loyalists (Protestants) started to attack the Civil Rights marchers with clubs. Some Protestants at that time supported the Civil Rights movement, itself inspired by developments in the United States (see Collins 1997: 43). Rumour had it that the Irish Republican Army (IRA), whose origin can be dated back to the guerrilla war fought against the British during the independence struggle of 1919-22, was not only backing the Civil Rights Movement (itself non-violent) but was planning a military campaign in its support. One of the immediate provocations behind the marches was the eviction in Caledon, County Tyrone, of a Catholic tenant so that the house he occupied could be allocated to an unmarried Protestant girl (Akenson 1992: 276). On 12 August 1969 a riot broke out between Catholic residents of the Bogside in Derry and members of the Loyalist Apprentice Boys of Derry organization after the RUC had routed the parade through that overwhelmingly Catholic neighborhood. In the riot, the RUC was repulsed from what was immediately declared to be free Derry. Back-up was called for from throughout Ulster and the violence continued. Armed police faced petrol-bombs, stones and barricades. On the 14th, the police were augmented by the arrival of a company of the British Prince of Wales Own Regiment, which marked the beginning of British military presence in Northern Ireland. Armored cars were deployed for the first time. After an initial lull when the Catholics hoped that the British troops might prove to be neutral, the violence escalated. Riots spread to Belfast. Five Catholics and one Protestant died and Loyalists destroyed all Catholic houses along Bombay Street. Two children were killed in a Catholic area of Belfast. The British army then occupied the North, building walls between volatile Catholic and Protestant areas. Roads were barricaded with check points.

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Youths who looked menacing, or who did not look as if they were intent on anything other than getting to their destination, were routinely searched and harassed, something I witnessed myself. A total of 16 deaths occurred in 1969, 26 in 1970, 121 in 1971 and as many as 479 in 1972, the highest record of conflict-related deaths so far. McGarry and O’Leary comment that the number of deaths exceeds ‘the combined toll during the Irish war of independence and the formation of Northern Ireland’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 255). Westminster instructed the Government of Northern Ireland to end all discriminatory practices against Catholics, and to restore peace. As a result of continued violence, Westminster suspended the Belfast government on 24 March 1972. Akenson points out that the Civil Right’s Movement was not nationalist in the sense of wanting separation from the UK but aimed ‘to give Catholics full membership of the political, economic and social system of Northern Ireland as a constituent of the United Kingdom’ (1992: 275). However, Protestant opposition to the movement put nationalism at the top of the Catholic agenda. A brief attempt at power sharing between the two sides occurred in 1974, after the Sunningdale Conference. Break down of this diplomatic initiative, due to intense opposition by Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party, resulted in yet another increase in violence. Collins, who became a leading member of the IRA, traces his own conversion to violence from this political failure: The unionists destruction of the power-sharing experiment—with the seeming collusion of the British Army—had convinced me that they were not prepared to compromise. I began to believe that the Provos [IRA] had been right all along: only force would bring about justice in Northern Ireland for Catholics in this Protestant statelet (Collins 1997: 55).

Loyalists started a bombing campaign in 1969, attacking power supplies with the aim of blaming the IRA, which had split into the Provisional IRA (whose members identify themselves as Catholic, although the organization is secular) and the Official IRA, which was Marxist. By 1972, their combined activities had killed 100 soldiers, wounded 500 and exploded 1,300 devices. On Bloody Friday, 21 July 1972, the Provisional IRA killed 9 and seriously injured 30 people when they exploded 22 bombs in Belfast. The largest loss of life in one day took place on 17 May 1974, when

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Map of Ireland

bombs exploded in Dublin and Monaghan, killing 33 and injuring hundreds, planted by the Ulster Volunteer Force to coincide with the Protestant Ulster Workers’ Council strike. The UVF was reformed in 1966, when the fiftieth anniversary of the Easter Rebellion (see below) was perceived to produce an increase in

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nationalist, or republican, support. Members of the part-time Ulster Defense Regiment were targeted by the IRA and assassinated in planned attacks, such as the killing of Major Ivan Toombs in his Customs and Excise office at Warrenpoint on 16 January 1981. Collins was one of the perpetrators of this successful IRA assassination, although not himself the killer. When the UDR was wound up in 1992, it had a Catholic membership of ‘less than 3%’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 125). The republican bombing campaign took itself to the island of Britain, in an attempt to stir public opinion in favor of a total British withdrawal from Ireland. On 21 November 1974, 21 people died when bombs exploded in two public houses in Birmingham, West Midlands. Terrorism had reached Britain. After the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 15 November 1985, which created an all-Ireland consultative body on legal and security issues, to which the Protestants objected, the loyalist paramilitaries also started an assassination campaign. Victims included the high-profile Catholic lawyer, Pat Finucane (d. 1989) and Terence McDaid (d. 1988) whose lack of any known IRA sympathy suggests that he was mistaken for someone else. After a change in the law towards the end of 1971, many Catholics were arrested and interned without trial. Initially, IRA prisoners enjoyed a special status as ‘political prisoners’. This was stripped from them, resulting in prison riots and hunger-strikes, several to death. Judges started to sit in juryless courts, known as Diplock Courts. Famously, Bobby Sands (195481), who had been elected to the British Parliament as member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone, died after a 66-day long hungerstrike. The Irish police and the British troops are said to have adopted a ‘shoot to kill’ policy against the IRA, shooting terrorist suspects without any attempt to arrest them. About 30 such deaths have allegedly occurred. Allegations of collusion between the security forces and the Loyalist paramilitary abound. Collins says that the hunger-strikes gave the IRA a new legitimacy, ‘the IRA no longer had to hark back to 1916 or 1919 to reaffirm the legitimacy of their struggle...the hunger strikes provided them with a whole new iconography of martyrs to exploit’ (Collins 1997: 210). Visiting Ireland in 1973, I saw security forces stop and strip-search youths whom they treated as if they were animals. This attitude was evident from the expression of hate and disgust on their faces. Collins describes his own arrest, on an occasion when he was quite innocent, and how the British soldiers treated him, ‘get your fucking

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hands on your head, you Irish cunt. Get your legs out. Get your fucking legs out’, they said, as they ‘kicked [his] legs further and further apart until [he] fell to the ground’ (Collins 1997: 50). In late 1982, visiting the then occupied West Bank, I routinely saw Israeli soldiers stop, search and hit Palestinian youth who were just walking along the street. No provocation, or possible suspicion of paramilitary activity, was needed. They were simply ‘enemies’ and thus legitimate targets for harassment. Collins writes of how he actually ‘admired’ Major Toombs, whom he respected for remaining in Warrenport after an earlier, failed attempt on his life. Collins hated the Major’s politics but ‘even then...could see that all Ivan wanted to do was defend and protect what he saw as his land, his way of life, his community, against a subversive threat’ (Collins 1997: 22). However, striking Toombs was ‘to strike at an ancient colonial system of elites’, and killing him ‘would also be a symbol of our dogged resistance to inequality and injustice, a gesture of solidarity with the protesting prisoners in the H-block who had just embarked on the first hunger strike (Collins 1997: 23). Likeable or not, Toombs had to die. Collins also tells a story from his mother’s youth, years before the ‘troubles’. Her older brother decided to take the family’s ice-cream van along to an Orange Order parade, thinking that Protestant liking for ice-cream would cancel out any anti-Catholic hostility. He took his sister along to help serve. He was wrong. Suddenly, someone yelled ‘Fucking papists’ from the crowd, recognizing the van’s provenance from its own advertisement of ‘John Cumiskey and Sons, Crossmaglen’ and charged with his club. Some bystanders tried to pull him off, noticing Collins’ mother inside, who ‘was only a wee girl’ but others joined in, rocking ‘the vehicle to and fro, their enraged, flushed faces mounting anti-Catholic invective, “Fenian bitch, Romish cunt”...’ (Collins 1997: 32). Broken Images Broken Images, McGarry and O’Leary’s subtitle, is an evocative phrase with, as they say, ‘iconoclastic suggestions’ (1995: 3). Pointing to the many different ‘theories and interpretations of the causes of antagonism’ it describes the images each side has of the other; they are ‘broken images’ because neither properly reflects who the Other really are, that is, that they are human. The truth of the matter is,

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however, that when ‘the troubles’ broke out, both sides were ready to use violence. Paramilitary forces already existed on both sides, and both could draw on a history of violence that made violence in the present the continuation of a violent past. The Protestants also controlled the security forces. On the one hand, as McGarry and O’Leary point out (1995: 191; 193) neither sides’ paramilitary organizations are labeled as Catholic or Protestant. On the other hand, religion is the definitive marker of affiliation to each side. Collins consistently describes actors in his narrative as Catholic or as Protestant. For example, on one occasion he was working late at the Customs and Excise, when Toombs came into his office expecting a Protestant colleague to be working there; ‘To me it seemed that Toombs had been disappointed at missing this young man’s company for a few hours—a Scot, a Protestant, someone to talk to without fear of bringing a bullet in the back—rather than me, a Catholic, a nationalist, an unknown quantity’, says Collins (1997: 21). On another occasion, he describes a fellow prison inmate as ‘a Catholic’ who lived in ‘a respectable middle-class area in Protestant East Belfast’ who, working for years at ‘the heart of unionist supremacy, Stormont Castle’, started to help the IRA because he was ‘embittered by his personal experience of discrimination’ (Collins 1997: 300-301). The Historical Background In the 1920s, Britain wanted to grant ‘Home Rule’ to the whole of the island of Ireland. However, its Government of Ireland Act, 1920, partitioned Ireland by creating a separate state in the North, because the majority of the North’s population, who were Protestant, claimed they would suffer discrimination and economic decline in an Ireland dominated by Catholics. This fear had a lot to do with the comparative industrial backwardness of the South, and with the isolationist rhetoric of republican leaders but they also believed that a Catholic government would ‘directly reduce Protestant civil liberties’ (Akenson 1992: 184). Partition was not meant to be permanent; both Governments (North and South) would remain under ‘the supervision of London’, both would ‘belong to a Council of Ireland’ which ‘at any future date...could be replaced by a united Irish parliament through the passages of identical affirming acts by the parliaments of Northern and Southern

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Ireland’ (Akenson 1992: 189). Britain had tried to rid itself of the ‘Irish problem’ for half a century or more but had inherited or created for itself an intractable problem. With its Protestant majority, itself the result of deliberate settlement encouraged by former British rulers, Northern Ireland (six out of the nine historical counties of the province of Ulster) threatened violence if the whole of Ireland was granted ‘Home Rule’. Akenson argues that whether the Northern Irish Protestants really wanted a separate state or not, they had a deep attachment to their land, believing it to be their god-given ‘promised land’. In 1912, this understanding of their relationship with the land found expression in the Solemn League and Covenant, which spoke of how their fathers had humbly relied ‘on God’ and pledged to refuse to accept any ‘Home Rule’ which would be ‘disastrous’ to their ‘material well being... subversive of’ their religious freedom, destructive of ‘their citizenship’ and perilous to the unity of the Empire of which they were ‘loyal subjects’ (Akenson 1992: 187). They also swore to ‘use all means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland’. Akenson remarks that ‘virtually the whole male population’ signed this covenant, while women signed a separate Declaration (Akenson 1992: 186). The same year, the Presbyterian Church had published a similar statement, calling on all their ‘co-religionists ... in Great Britain’ to save them from the ‘overwhelming calamity’ that lay ahead if Home Rule was granted, and appealing to all British people to ‘remember that we Presbyterians are now in Ireland because three centuries ago our forefathers were “planted” in Ulster by the English government’ so that ‘by their loyalty and industry they might secure the peace and prosperity of our province’ (Akenson 1992: 185-86). The following year, the Protestants formed their own para-military organization, the Ulster Volunteer Force, fully armed and ready to seize control of Ulster should Home Rule be implemented. The Protestants simply wanted to remain an integral part of the United Kingdom. Akenson points out that Ulster Protestants are far from homogenous and that the largest single church in Northern Ireland, perhaps surprisingly, is the Catholic, 33.5% in 1926, followed by the Presbyterians at 31.4% and Anglicans at 27.0%. However, he argues that Presbyterians were culturally dominant and successfully integrated ‘other Northern Protestants

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into their way of thinking’ without ‘requiring conversion (Akenson 1992: 191). This unity, however, may be less solid now than in 1921, since in the years that followed Partition, the Church of Ireland (Anglican), whose structures cover the whole island, distanced itself from unionism. ‘By the 1960s its members in the south were no longer unionists’ having ‘accepted and were allegiant to the reality of the republic’ (Akenson 1992: 291). Levels of church attendance, though, were among the highest in Europe when the ‘troubles’ started and continue to be remarkably high, despite what has been called increasing secularization. In the 1991 Census, 38.4% of the population identified themselves as Catholic, 50.6% as Protestants, 3.8% said they had no religion and 7.3% declined to answer this question. Mitchell (2005) cites research dated 2002 that nearly 90% of the population claim a religious affiliation, namely 46% Protestant and 40% Catholic while 51% regularly attend Church (Mitchell 2005: 4). This compares with less than 10% in metropolitan Britain. The North automatically became a Protestant-run state, even though, oddly, it was ‘a state that no one wanted’—the British didn’t want it, the majority of people in Ireland did not want it and the Protestants, who got it, didn’t want it either (Akenson 1992: 183). The Southern Irish, refusing to accept the compromise of devolved government under Britain, renewed their independence struggle, during which the IRA emerged under Michael Collins (1890-1922), later Irish Minister for Finance, as the spear-head of armed resistance. Partition was a compromise by the British partly to avoid further bloodshed but mainly to offload the problem of Ireland onto the Irish. Unfortunately, the so-called ‘Irish Problem’ did not go away, because Protestants in the North continued to discriminate against the Catholic minority in what can be only described as a systematic and systemic way, built into the very system of governance. Very few Catholics were employed in the police or civil service. Elections were gerrymandered; electoral boundaries were rigged to ensure that pockets of Catholic majorities formed single constituencies, so that their candidates would win in those restricted areas whereas Protestant voters were ‘spread into thin (but sure) electoral majorities in other areas’ (Akenson 1992: 199). Some people simply voted twice, once as themselves, then again, wearing different clothes as a long dead Protestant. In the 1921 election, the first to the NI Parliament with partition as the

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main issue, the Unionists won 40 out of 52 seats (12 were won by nationalists). In the last election (1969) Unionists won 39 seats (UUP 36, Independent Unionists 3) nationalists won 6, independents 3. The Northern Irish Parliament was bicameral, with 52 seats in the lower house and 26 indirectly elected seats in the Senate (upper house). Originally, the Senate would have covered both jurisdictions in Ireland. The Parliament was first opened by King George V in June 1921. It is often referred to as ‘Stormont’ after Stormont Castle, built to house the government in 1932. The RUC was especially controversial, numbering 3,000 officers in 1969—12% were Catholic (Akenson 1992: 201). Also controversial was the Ulster Defense Regiment, a part-time volunteer but official militia formed in 1970 and disbanded in 1992, originally established to replace the equally controversial B-Specials, part-time police formed in 1920, whom Catholics regarded as a Protestant vigilante force. Collins recalls that as a youth all he knew about the B-Specials was that only Protestants could join, and that they were ‘bogeymen’ who carried guns (Collins 1997: 40). ‘They were armed, we were not’, he wrote (Collins 1997: 41). The ‘business vote’ also favored Protestants, who dominated economically; owners of business property could cast two votes for Local Council Elections. Public housing, which was controlled by Local Councils, went to whichever community ran the council, usually Protestant although in the eleven towns run by Catholics, they ‘discriminated just as heavily against Protestants’ (Akenson 1992: 200). Laws no longer prevented Catholics from buying or inheriting land but Protestants rarely if ever sold to Catholics; even at auction, if a Catholic bid the highest price, the ‘auctioneer would announce that the reserve price had not been met...then asked for sealed bids by post’ (Akenson 1992: 192). This was accompanied by the sort of petty discrimination that, even as a child, I can remember being directed at blacks in Britain, who need not even think about trying to get a room in a Guest House which had, ‘No Blacks’ pinned to its front door. Collins once threw a stone through a shop window because he remembered that his father had told him about a ‘sign in their windows, “RCs need not apply”’ (Collins 1997: 44). Collins describes Northern Ireland as ‘a Protestant state for a Protestant people, a bulwark against the hordes of hostile pagans across, and within, the sixcounty state’s borders’ (Collins 1997: 31). His mother, a staunch Catholic, always reminded him of the ‘terrible cruelties inflicted by

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the English and their Scots planters over many centuries’ (Collins 1997: 36). Protestants who feared their religious and economic decline in a Catholic-majority republic may point to the fate of Protestants in the South, where they were a 10% minority in 1911 but only 4.1% in 1971 (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 182). They also point to the ‘special’ status afforded the Catholic church in the Irish Republic’s Constitution, which ‘entrenches Catholic morality on divorce and abortion’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 101). The Catholic Church has consistently insisted that the Republic’s public policy ‘should enforce Catholic doctrines as far as possible’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 206), perhaps confirming Protestant suspicion about ‘the power of the Catholic Church in a united Ireland’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 181). DUP leader and Free Presbyterian minister, Ian Paisley believes that the Catholic Church is engaged in a crusade to destroy Protestantism, with the IRA as its storm-troopers. How was it that the Ulster Protestants gained a state, and why were attitudes between the two communities so bitter and hostile? Why did Protestants discriminate against Catholics? McGarry and O’Leary, rejecting the contention that the ‘troubles’, or the political dead-lock, in Northern Ireland can be explained with reference to religion, conclude that what does stand at the center of the conflict is ‘the clash of rival political nationalisms’, in other words, one community wants to remain British while the other wants to be Irish (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 264). However, since they also identify religion as ‘the key ethnic marker’ (McGarry and O’Leary: 212), the question remains, how did the situation emerge in which both political nationalisms are ‘marked’ by a religious, rather than by any other label? Some Key Actors, Parties and Events 1920: Northern Ireland created by the British. All six Prime Ministers would be members of the Ulster Unionist Party, committed to maintaining union with the United Kingdom. 1964: Ian Paisley founded the Protestant Unionist Party, which changed its name to the Democratic Unionist Party in 1971. In 1966, it won two council seats. In 1970, Paisley was elected to Westminster under the PUP banner as member for North Antrim. Paisley and

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another PUP member also gained Stormont seats. Paisley’s catchphrases of ‘No Surrender’ and ‘Ulster says No’ in opposition to most peace initiatives or civil rights legislation, have become famous. The DUP now hold the majority of NI seats at Westminster and are the largest party in the NI Assembly, replacing the UUP as protector of the Union. This split in the Unionist Movement resulted from the reformist policies of NI Prime Minister Captain Terence O’Neill (in office 1963-69) who started to tackle anti-Catholic discrimination and to normalize relations with the South. 1966-1969: Civil Rights Movement: various organizations, such as the Campaign for Social Justice (founded 1964) and Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), founded 1967. The Ulster Defense Force, re-formed at around about the same time, declared war on the then quiescent IRA, committing four sectarian murders on 26 June 1966. The first civil rights march took place on 24 August 1968. On 5 October 1968, a march in Derry resulted in violence between the demonstrators and the RUC, and what became known as ‘the troubles’ began. August 1969 riots occurred across NI. The Civil Rights Movement consciously modeled itself on the USA’s, which combined direct action, civil disobedience and non-violence. Future Nobel Peace Prize winner, John Hume was one of the leaders of the Civil Rights Movement. August 1969: British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson (1916-1995) tells NI to put its house in order, and to address Catholic grievances, declaring that the UK had ultimate responsibility for protecting every NI citizen. British Troops arrive in NI. December 1969-January 1970: The Provisional IRA (para-military) splits from the IRA as the latter agreed to recognize the legitimacy of the NI, Irish and UK governments. The Official IRA, the smaller splinter, also engaged in violence but called a cease-fire in 1972 appalled at its own killing of an 18 year-old Catholic man, a soldier on leave from a British regiment. Focusing on social issues, it subsequently transformed itself into the Workers’ Party (see Collins1997: 211). 21 August 1970: The Social and Democratic Labour Party formed under Gerry Fitt (1926-2005), a member of the British Parliament since 1966, became the main voice for republicanism supporting the reunification of Ireland by consent. Consistently opposed to violence, the SDLP has taken part in diplomatic initiatives to resolve

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the conflict and occupies its Westminster seats, as opposed to Sinn Féin, Ireland’s oldest political party (founded in 1905). Sinn Féin also split at this time: the Marxist leaning official Sinn Féin recognized the three governments; the Provisional Sinn Féin withheld recognition of Westminster and Belfast. Also during 1971, the Ulster Defense Association, a Loyalist paramilitary, was formed. 12 December 1971: The first political assassination of the ‘troubles’— the Official IRA kills UUP Senator John Barnhill. 9 August 1971: Internment without trial was introduced. Subsequently 342 people were arrested in a series of raids, followed by the worst riots since August 1969. March 1972: UK Prime Minister, Edward Heath (1916-2005) told the NI Government that they must end internment, agree on the transfer of responsibility for peace and order to Westminster, and on a referendum on the border issue (the NI-Republic border was never officially agreed). 24 March: the Stormont was prorogued due to the NI government’s inability to accept all of the above. Power was ‘temporarily’ transferred to Westminster. The Parliament never re-opened, being succeeded by the Northern Ireland Assembly. Brian Faulkner was the sixth and last Prime Minister (1971-72). In protest, the Ulster Unionist Party severed its historic links with the British Conservatives. 30 June 1972: Bloody Sunday: British troops shoot 13 Catholic demonstrators in Londonderry during a Civil Rights march led by MP Ivan Cooper (a founder member of the SDLP), a champion of non-violence, featured in the film Bloody Sunday. Soldiers claimed to have returned fire and that those targeted had petrol bombs, which remains the official story, although hotly disputed. Several of the victims were shot in the back. At the end of the film, Cooper says, ‘you know what you’ve just done...you’ve destroyed the Civil Rights Movement, and you’ve given the IRA the biggest victory it will ever have. All over this city tonight, young men...boys will be joining the IRA, and you will reap a whirlwind’. 8 March 1973: A referendum on whether NI should remain in the UK was held. 98.9% voted in favour but only 57.5 % of the electorate participated. Most republicans did not vote. January-May 1974: Following the Sunningdale Agreement, a powersharing executive was formed which restored governance to NI.

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Members included the Former PM, Brain Faulkner (1921-77), the SDLP’s Gerry Fitt and John Hume but the UUP withdrew support when its members of the newly elected Assembly voted against Sunningdale, forcing Faulkner’s resignation. The DUP opposed the Agreement, and pledged to ‘wreck it’. Sunningdale involved the Government of Ireland, and also provided for a Council of Ireland with seven members from the North, and seven from the South. The DUP rejected (and continues to reject) the idea that the Republic should have any say in NI affairs. The experiment at power-sharing ended on 14 May amidst increased violence, mainly perpetrated by Loyalists. The final blow came when the Ulster Workers Council called a strike, with the UDA pulling the strings, paralyzing Northern Ireland. A ‘virtual paramilitary infrastructure sealed most of the main roads...and anyone who went about his or her business without permission from the strike officials was liable to serious bodily harm’ (Akenson 1992: 286). Power stations were occupied, supply lines sabotaged. 1975: The UVF is declared illegal following 12 fatalities in October (with 46 people injured). It had been legalized the previous year, following the Government’s decision to recognize Sinn Féin. 24 October 1976: Betty Williams and Máiread Corrigan hold the first ‘people-movement’ peace rally, a protest by relatives of victims and those who feared becoming victims. Protestant and Catholic women hug each other. Shortly afterwards, The Peace People march through the Protestant Shankhill area, invited by local women. The same year, A.J.P. Taylor (1906-90), the eminent historian, suggested that the best solution to the Northern Irish problem would be to allow the IRA to expel all the Protestants, who might perhaps settle in Canada. 10 December 1977: Williams and Corrigan receive the Nobel Peace Prize, in recognition that their Peace People movement helped build widespread opposition to continued violence, and support for the peace process. 1977: Ian Paisley leads another Protestant Workers strike but this one did not gather the level of support that the 1974 strike had attracted. 1978: February—Twelve people dead from an IRA hotel attack in Derry.

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1979: Airey Neave (1916-1979), Shadow NI Secretary and a decorated World War II veteran who made the first ‘Home Run’ from the notorious Colditz POW camp, murdered in March by Irish National Liberation Army, a break away from the Real IRA following its cease-fire. Lord Mountbatten (1900-1979) former First Sea Lord, Supreme Allied Commander in South-East Asia during World War II, last Viceroy of India and a close relative and confidante of the British Royal Family, was killed in August by the Provisional IRA. Most people saw these killings as acts of cowardice. 1981: The hunger-strikes begin (republican prisoners claiming political status). Bobby Sands was the first of ten to die (5 May 1981). 9 April 1981: Provisional Sinn Féin contests Westminster elections for the first time; Bobby Sands, on hunger-strike, wins a seat. In 1985, Gerry Adams, leader of the party, unseated Gerry Fitt, who had opposed the hunger-strikes. Sinn Féin MPs do not take up their seats at Westminster. The party is widely believed to have strong links with the IRA. Adams is accused of having a terrorist record, which he denies. October 1984: The Brighton bombing during the Conservative Party Conference, kills 5 and injures 30 including Cabinet member, Norman Tebbit, whose wife was paralyzed as a result of the bomb attack. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher narrowly escaped injury. November 1985: This period saw the first major political initiative since Sunningdale, the result of years of behind-the-scenes meetings and negotiation especially involving John Hume, who is generally credited with the thinking behind Sunningdale, this Agreement and the subsequent Good Friday Agreement. Thatcher and Garret FitzGerald, Ireland’s Taoiseach, sign the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Paisley and UUP leader, James Molyneaux, led a protest rally, shouting ‘No Surrender’ and ‘Ulster Says No’. In protest, all Unionists M.P.s resigned and in the following by-election, the DUP and the UUP agreed not to stand against each other. 1985-1994: In negotiations, SDLP continued to represent republicanism but kept close contact with Adams, whose involvement was conditional on brokering not only a cease-fire with the IRA, but commitment to the surrender of all weapons. There were rumours of secret talks between the British, John Hume of the SDLP and Adams as early as 1988.

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15 December 1993: The Downing Street Declaration, between PM John Major and the Irish Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, affirmed that NI would only cease to be part of the UK if a majority of its population expressed a desire to leave. This led to a change of Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland to affirm that while the unity of island remained ‘the firm wish of the Irish nation’, it would only be achieved when a majority in ‘both jurisdictions in the island’ expressed this wish. Ireland thus recognized Northern Ireland’s legality as an entity within the United Kingdom. Sinn Féin could enter negotiations if it renounced violence. 1994: IRA and the loyalists declare cease-fires, and Sinn Féin officially enters talks. Since 1988, Adams’ voice had been dubbed on British radio and television as part of a government ban on giving terrorists what Thatcher called ‘the oxygen of publicity’. The ban is now lifted. His real voice was surprisingly like the actor’s had been. Adams visited the USA, having been previously refused entry. 1995: US President Bill Clinton visits NI, and shakes hands with Adams. The US, with a large Irish community, has had an historical interest in the NI peace process. Former US Senator and majorityleader, George J. Mitchell was appointed to head a commission to draw up principles of non-violence which all parties involved in the peace-process would have to accept as a condition of participating. July 1995: An Orange Order march, led by Paisley and UUP leader, David Trimble, hand in hand again leads to violence. This time, the RUC tried to cancel the march which eventually proceeded. Nationalists responded by burning cars and engaging with the police. 1996: Outraged at Sinn Féin’s acceptance of the Mitchell Principles, the IRA breaks its cease-fire and explodes a bomb at London’s Canary Wharf, injuring 100 people and causing millions of pounds of damage. A few days later, eight are killed in another London bombing. Manchester’s Arndale Centre was destroyed in June (no casualties). Adams found himself under a great deal of pressure to exert control over the paramilitaries. July 1997: IRA renews its cease-fire, calling it ‘unequivocal’. Groups such as the Continuity IRA, the Irish National Liberation Army (I.N.L.A.), the Loyalist Volunteer Force (which threatened fellow Protestants who colluded in the peace process) and the Orange Volunteers (a Protestant break-away group that threatens to kill

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IRA prisoners released under the Good Friday Agreement) and the Real IRA remain active. 10 April 1998: (Good Friday) the Belfast, or Good Friday, Agreement was released and subsequently ratified by referenda in NI and the Republic, opposed by the DUP. The Agreement established the Northern Ireland Assembly with a power-sharing executive, crossborder co-operation and several new cross-border agencies. All paramilitaries had to decommission their weapons. Paisley opposed the agreement, although he accepted two seats on the new Executive. DUP members refused to attend because of Sinn Féin’s presence. Sinn Féin had been allowed to join the process eight weeks after the IRA’s statement, following controversy about what ‘unequivocal’ meant. April 1998: The IRA said that it did not agree with the policy of decommissioning. 22 May 1998: In the referendum, 71% of voters in NI said ‘yes’ to the agreement (the turnout was 81.1%; source: ARK). In the Republic (where the question included the constitutional amendment) 94.4% voted ‘yes’ (turnout 56.3%). 25 June 1998: First elections for the new Assembly: SDLP single largest party with 24 seats, followed by UUP with 28 and DUP with 20. Sinn Féin won 18. However, the constitution enshrines the principle of power-sharing between the two communities. July 1998: A Parades Commission was established, to decide whether contentious marches should be banned, allowed or re-routed having contributed so much to the ‘troubles’ over the years. 1 July 1998: Trimble becomes First Minister of Northern Ireland. From 11 February to 30 May the office was suspended. Trimble resigned in July 2001 but was re-elected 5 September. The Assembly was suspended 14 October 2002 (see below). 15 August 1998: The Real IRA exploded a bomb in Omagh, killing 29 people including a pregnant woman. This qualifies as the single bloodiest strike during the troubles. Their aim had been to destroy the court house. A few days earlier, they had injured 33 people in Banbridge, County Down. Between September 1997 and August 1998 they committed a total of 9 acts of terror. Following the Omagh bombing, many Real IRA members left the organization.

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December 1998: Trimble and Hume receive the Nobel Peace Prize. Trimble stated, in his acceptance lecture, that while there were two religious denominations in Northern Ireland, there was only ‘one true moral denomination’, which ‘wanted peace’. December 1999: IRA meets General John de Chastelain, chairman of the International Commission on Decommissioning and agrees to co-operate. 2000: The British Government announces that the RUC is to be abolished and replaced by a Northen Ireland Police Service with officers recruited from both communities. 14 October 2002: The Assembly was suspended. Unionist members walked out following a police raid on the offices of Sinn Féin revealing extensive espionage operations. 2005 September: De Chastelain announced that NI was weapon-free. A Catholic priest and a former President of the Methodist Church were among the official witnesses. Paisley rejected the statement, claiming that the IRA had controlled the process, aided and abetted by the duplicitous and dishonest governments of the UK and Ireland. 2005: Elections saw the DUP replace the UUP as the majority Loyalist party, taking 9 Westminster seats (including Trimble’s) to the UUP’s one. Another wave of violence involving the UDF and the Loyalist Volunteer Force, which broke away from the older paramilitary organization in 1996 when its leader, Billy Wright (a lay preacher, subsequently murdered by the INLA 22 December 1997) was ‘stood down’ for breaking the 1994 cease fire. In September 2005, 63 arrests were made during an Orange Order march. 22 May 2006: Paisley turns down Adam’s offer of the First Ministership of NI. 1 November 2006: As conversations on reviving self-rule continue following the St Andrew’s talks 11-13 October between the NI political parties (including the DUP) and the British and Irish governments, IRA dissidents explode bombs in Belfast causing damage to property but not people. 8 May 2007: Paisley becomes First Minister agreeing to cooperate with Sinn Féin (certain conditions under the St Andrews’ Agreement having been met) choosing power over continued opposition. He

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surprised many by working cordially with the Deputy First Minister, Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness, who constitutionally had equal power and by forming a positive relationship with the Irish PM, Bertie Ahern. Retiring on 5 June 2008 Paisley was succeeded as DUP Leader and as First Minister by Peter Robinson. McGuinness continued as Deputy First Minister. History of the Conflict: Ireland’s Religious Heritage Christianity famously started to flourish in Ireland when St Patrick (386-493) found himself sold into slavery there, escaped, then believed it his mission to return and evangelize the ‘strange land’. Christianity had already reached Ireland but it was Patrick who really enabled Christianity to take root, preaching far and wide, building churches and baptizing local chiefs as well as their subjects. Christianity in Ireland took on a distinctive flavor, which is usually called Celtic Christianity. This had several features: a reverence or love of nature as a reminder of God’s gifts and glory; use of poetry and of song praising nature; places of natural beauty were considered sacred and many became pilgrimage sites. Monasteries rather than dioceses (the areas over which a bishop exercises authority, usually based on Roman administrative zones) formed the backbone of Celtic Christianity. Monasteries often consisted of a whole village, in which the chief, his subjects, some married with families, others celibate, lived together with the Abbot as spiritual mentor. Women were respected. Some may have exercised authority equal to that of men. People tend to read back into Celtic Christianity everything they wish to see in contemporary Christianity, so it is not always easy to establish facts. Chiefs, however, appear to have been elected, as were the Abbots. There is debate about whether some women were ordained as priests, and consecrated the Mass. Monks shaved their tonsure from ear to ear, not the crown. Easter was celebrated on the Vernal Equinox. Bishops, it is said, fulfilled mainly ceremonial or liturgical roles and had no fixed seat. Some priests may have married. It is often claimed that Celtic Christianity was less dogmatic, more concerned with experience. St Patrick forbade anyone from persecuting witches. Beautiful calligraphy was used to illustrate Bibles, and learning was encouraged. Ireland’s isolated monasteries survived Viking raids and scholars from elsewhere in Europe visited these centers of learning. Ireland

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is credited with preserving much scholarship during the Dark Ages (fifth to eleventh centuries). Irish missionaries traveled as evangelists throughout the Continent, including St Columbanus (543-615) and St Gall (550-646), after whom St Gallen in Switzerland is named. Gradually, the Irish Church was brought into conformity with the rest of Roman Christianity but some distinctive emphasis continued until the sixteenth century. After the majority in England became Protestant, perhaps in reaction to the loss of political autonomy to the English, Ireland became loyal to Rome. Bishops now spoke with authority. If the enemy were Protestant, they would be Catholic. Ironically, it was because Pope Hadrian IV, himself English, felt that Ireland remained an untamed, wild land with many ‘pagan, godless and rebellious rulers’ that he ceded the island to King Henry II, as the Lordship of Ireland (1155), on condition that Henry re-affirmed his recognition of the Pope’s supreme temporal and spiritual authority. The Pope wanted to suppress Celtic Christianity, and to incorporate the Irish Church fully into the structures of the Catholic hierarchy. It was Henry VIII who changed the title from ‘Lord of Ireland’, to King of Ireland. Whether what is said and written about Celtic Christianity is, or is not true, the fact that it was sufficiently different from mainstream Catholicism to justify launching what amounted to a campaign against Irish Christianity is relevant to this inquiry, since it led to Britain’s embroilment in Ireland. It could be argued that Ireland’s original non-conformity to mainstream Catholicism was partly in order to assert a different religious identity from that of the English. Ireland’s later conversion to orthodox Catholicism could similarly be explained as a desire to distinguish herself from England’s new, Protestant religion. Scotland, too, chose a different form of Protestantism from England. The Political Background Increasing contact between Ireland and Europe resulted in efforts to centralize political power in the hands of a high-king, or overlord of the island. This both imitated political organization elsewhere and aimed to strengthen Ireland against possible outside aggression, as European kings were in the habit of claiming neighboring territory. Brian Boru (940-1014) emerged as King of a united Ireland but no successor was able to occupy his shoes, and the subsequent

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squabble for supremacy created a vacuum of which Henry II of England was able to take advantage. He invaded Ireland and gained a foothold on the east coast. As well as having the Pope’s blessing, he responded to a call for help from one of the Irish contenders, the King of Leinster, Dermot MacMurrough (d. 1171). Skirmishes continued for centuries in the attempt, as it was put, ‘to pacify Ireland’. In 1315, the King of Scotland, Edward Bruce, invaded Ireland in the hope of thwarting English expansion. As a result, the English lost ground and some local Irish kings regained territory. The boundary between English and Irish land was known as ‘the Pale’, hence the expression, ‘beyond the pale’; the other side of the ‘pale’ was rebellious, ungodly and barbaric. English was the language to the East of the Pale, Irish was the language of the West. Free Irish were forbidden from marrying anyone of English descent, who were also forbidden from wearing Irish clothes or from learning the Irish language. With religion already in the mix, an ‘us’ and ‘them’ juxtaposition was well under construction. Those within the Pale were civilized, Christian, loyal to the Pope in Rome; those beyond the Pale were barbaric, heretic or pagan. By the fifteenth century, English involvement in other wars, elsewhere, led to a decline of their power in Ireland, exercised indirectly through the Ftzgeralds, Earls of Kildare, who were Judiciars, or Lords Deputy of Ireland. Once again, local chiefs asserted independence. Then Henry VIII (1491-1547) decided that he was going to restore English rule in Ireland, as well as finally extend it throughout the whole island. This was in part because a pretender to the English throne, Lambert Simnel (1477-1534) of the House of York had attracted Irish support, including the Earl of Kildare. Henry became King of Ireland but the process of conquest continued for another century. It was a bloody, brutal and protracted affair. The local chiefs were eventually disarmed and a central government established. Monasteries were closed down and an official Protestant Church of Ireland established. Rebellions constantly broke out, such as the Rebellion of 1641 and continued until Cromwell’s invasion. Catholics were stripped of all power, and Protestants were appointed in their place. By the start of the eighteenth century, Protestants owned 90% of all property. The Earls of Tyrone and the King of Tyrconnel were the last to surrender. Defeated in 1601, they rebelled in 1603. Pardoned, the Earl of Tyrone was allowed to retain his title and estates, while the King of Tyrconnel was given the English title of

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Earl (Akenson 1992: 103). However, in 1607, ‘humiliated by the continuing decline of their influence, and fearful of further harassment by the English government, the Earls of Tyrone and Tyrconnel and nearly one hundred petty chiefs boarded a boat in Lough Swilly and fled to the Continent’ (Akenson 1992: 105). ‘In one brief moment’, comments Akenson, ‘the native Irish leadership...disappeared, and the province was left open to English manipulation’ (Akenson 1992: 105). The Cromwellian Act of Settlement (1652) aimed to pay for the expenses of squashing the 1641 rebellion by confiscating land, and settling Protestants in Ireland. Even those of the ‘popish religion’ who had not rebelled lost one-third of their land unless they had actually aided the Protestant army! Some Parliamentarians wanted to deport all the Irish to the Western provinces of Connacht and Cork, with the East becoming pure Protestant territory. The estates of all those who fled were confiscated and given to Protestants. Migration was then encouraged from England and Scotland to consolidate Protestant power. The Corporation of the City of London agreed to colonize Londonderry. These settlers include the ancestors of the Ulster-Scots, who, mainly Presbyterians from Scotland, saw their migration to nearby Ireland in terms of the conquest of a Promised Land, whose existing population was alien, religiously and culturally, and, moreover, no longer had a legitimate claim to the land. Akenson points out that migration from Scotland was comparatively easy because of the shorter distance, and because there was already ‘constant traffic across the HibernianScottish maritime basin’ (Akenson 1992: 106). Thus, Ulster was the natural destination for Scottish settlers. Anti-Catholic legislation, known as the Penal Laws, forbade a single man from inheriting his parents’ property, which then went to Protestants. Nor could Catholics buy Protestant land, or any new land. Catholics could not serve in Parliament, or hold any public office, although the latter applied to Presbyterians as well. Only Anglicans could govern. Catholics could gain all these rights by joining the Church of Ireland. A ban on studying overseas even prevented non-Protestant Irish from attending the great centers of Catholic learning. Converting them, for Calvinists, was not on the agenda, since ‘vulgarly put, the heathen were predestined to be heathen and that was that’ (Akenson 1992: 120). The Scottish settlers regarded themselves as honest, pious, thrifty and hardworking, all Calvinist virtues, and

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looked on the Irish as lazy, stupid and violent. The origin of ‘Irish jokes’, still alarmingly popular among the English, which depict the Irish as intellectually challenged, indolent and drunk, stems from this polarity. Protestant-Catholic Hostility The Protestant settlers were part of a systematic overhauling of the land-grant system in Ireland. Large plantations were established, owned by Protestants but worked by Irish labor. The Penal Laws and the land ownership laws all benefited Protestant settlers, and those Irish who converted. Gradually, Catholics owned not only less and less land but also smaller and smaller holdings, as they split what they had among their sons. This would have disastrous consequences for the Catholic population but what most of all exacerbated the bitterness and hostility that already existed between the two communities was the Cromwellian invasion of 1649, followed by the Siege of Derry (April to July 1688), when the deposed Catholic King, James II, tried to enter the City of Derry which was defended by Protestant apprentice boys until relief arrived ‘and saved the faithful defenders’ (Akenson 1992: 139). Next, at the Battle of the Boyne (1 July 1690), William of Orange defeated James II. During the Cromwellian pacification of Ireland, the infamous Siege of Drogheda took place (11 September 1649). Cromwell ordered his soldiers to spare no one after the town finally fell. In addition to about 2,800 soldiers, 700 civilians including Catholic priests were killed, some burnt while barricaded in a Church. This became an iconic moment for Catholics. The dead are all martyrs for the Catholic faith. Collins recalled how when he was ten years-old, his mother took him on a pilgrimage to Drogheda; ‘and [he] prayed silently in the Church that held the severed head of Oliver Plunkett, the bishop murdered by Cromwellians for his Catholic faith, and declared a saint by the Pope—a real Catholic saint. I was overwhelmed with awe when I saw the lovingly preserved door to his prison cell’ (Collins 1997: 36). For Protestants, the Siege of Derry and the Battle of the Boyne both represent iconic moments, so much so that they constitute the founding myth of their identity as a people in Northern Ireland, the Ulster-Scots. They stand for the defeat of the anti-Christ’s representative by the representative of Christ. William of Orange serves as a type of Christ.

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Ireland was ‘won’ for the Protestant cause. An Orange Order website describes the Battle as ‘the sound defeat of the tyrannical intentions of an absolute ruler...a step towards the evolution of Democracy and freedom’. Protestants are there by right of conquest. ‘In the north of Ireland, it is still common in Protestant districts to see, in large murals painted on the end of row-houses, a monarch on a white horse leading a victorious army’ (Akenson 1992: 139). In 1814, the Apprentice Boys of Derry were founded to commemorate the Siege. During what is called the ‘Marching Season’, they parade through the streets of Derry. The Orange Order, founded in 1795, preserves the memory of the Battle of the Boyne, with its annual marches. It exists to promote and to defend Biblical Protestantism. Catholics can not join. Members are forbidden from attending a Catholic service or function. The Rebellion of 1641 is also part of the Protestant founding myth, since it is said that many Protestants were massacred, including women and children. All these incidents combined to create for Protestants the belief that they were God’s Chosen People, and Ireland their Promised Land. Just as the Israelites had to subdue Canaan, so they had to subdue Ireland. Just as the Israelites had been constantly attacked by godless pagans, so they ‘had suffered mightily at the hands of the evil surrounding tribes’ (Akenson 1992: 141). The hymn, ‘Guide Me O Thou Great Jehovah...Land me safe on Canaan’s Side’ perhaps epitomizes this theology (Akenson 1992: 98). As long as Irish Catholics, like the Canaanites in ancient Israel, existed they were to be kept separate, lest contamination occur. Quotes in Brewer (1998) from letters to the Belfast Telegraph ‘in recent years’ suggest that this understanding lives on for some, ‘oh people of Ulster, you are God’s Israel, chosen seed, God gave your forebears this land to be a light in darkest Ireand’, and ‘Protestants are being culturally cleansed’, which presumably is offering a comparison between the fate of Northern Irish Protestants and Muslims in the Balkans, ‘the campaign to suppress Protestantism increases’ (Brewer 1998: 117. Chapter three online at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/sectarian/ brewer.htm) Protestant myth also preserves what Akenson calls ‘vengeance tales’, stories of reprisals and revenge taken out against Catholics in retaliation for insurrection. McGarry and O’Leary discuss the view that Catholics and Protestants, or nationalists and unionists— however they are described—are ‘encased in ancestral myths’ in

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which the former are ‘an oppressed people’, the latter ‘a besieged people’ with the result that within both communities, a ‘culture of violence’ dominates (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 215). Many ballads and songs belong to the vengeance-tale genre. One such story has the Protestants throwing some 3,000 Catholic villagers over a cliff during the 1641 rebellion. Usually, the statistics of such a story would be exaggerated by the victims but in this case it is the ‘heirs of the perpetrators’ who embroider the story (Akenson 1992: 141-42). There is no evidence that such an event occurred. Akenson suggests that these stories are part of the tendency for the Ulster-Scots to compare themselves with the Children of Israel, whose task it was to remain pure, uncontaminated by the surrounding culture. One Protestant Member for Parliament, Ernest W. Hamilton, a staunch anti-Catholic, writing about the 1641 rebellion, described it as the ‘temporary ascendancy of the brute element’ (cited in Akenson 1992: 142), evocative of the juxtaposition between the civilized, hardworking Protestants and the backward, primitive as well as godless Catholics. The ‘type of revenge’ memorialized by the story involves ‘purifying the land by removing the remnant of the heathen peoples who previously held the land’ (Akenson 1992: 143; see for example, Isa. 56:5-7; Deut. 7:1-3). Segregation in Northern Ireland, which continues to this day, can be traced back to such biblical precedents. Akenson refers to the tendency of Covenant peoples to dwell on history; ‘chosen people think historically’, he says, hence constant reference to these iconic moments as defining how people regard themselves, and Others, today. The Irish covenant expressed both a bond with the land, and the Protestant identity of the Ulster-Scots. Its historical roots lie in what Akenson refers to as a ‘biblical-grid’. Here was a people steeped in the Bible, and, as Calvinists, they wanted to see the whole society conform to biblical principles, which lies behind Calvin’s Geneva. ‘There were prohibitions on dancing, games and most innocent pleasures’ (Akenson 1992: 111), which pretty much sums up my own, quasi-Calvinist Baptist upbringing in rural Australia. As well as regarding Catholics as non-Christian, we were suspicious of Anglicans and even of Methodists, accusing them of observing the mere external forms of religious life while lacking inner-conviction, as well as believers’ baptism (baptism by full immersion as a confessed believer, or born-again Christian). Calvin derived his ethics as much from the Hebrew Bible as from the

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Gospels. In Christian thought, God’s covenant with the Hebrews (Gen. 17:6-7) gets transferred to the Church. The Ulster-Scots Scottish forebears had also Covenanted, in 1643, to preserve the non-episcopal constitution of the Church of Scotland, and to rid the world of popery. The Chosen People are ‘to be holy’, ‘separate (sacred) from other people (the profane)’ (Akenson 1992: 26. See Lev. 20-26). This also contributed to a sense of being constantly at risk. Protestants, in fact, occupied the better, low-lying land, leaving Catholics with the less fertile but higher ground. Thus, the Ulster-Scots often lived in fortified ranches and were constantly vigilant against the possibility of attack (see McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 230). They were sure that the land was theirs by divine right but it was also a dangerous place to live. Every member of the community, says Akenson, ‘was assumed to have a role in protecting the polity against the Cannaanites’. Thus, the Ulster-Scots were ‘aggressive in searching out and settling their Promised Land’ and ‘were defensive and inward-looking once they had obtained a purchase’. Perhaps, he surmises, this is ‘why they, like the children of Israel, made no attempt to convert their enemies to righteousness, but instead fought them tooth and nail’ (Akenson 1992: 120). Akenson’s description of Northern Irish topography reminds me of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, where I worked on a Moshav (cooperative farm) for several months in 1982-83. The settlement was not actually fortified but the farmers rode out into their fields armed with rifles on their tractors, and there was a real sense that they were front line soldiers. ‘Every Israeli’, my farmer (a parttime Army Captain) told me, is a ‘front line soldier’. Nearby Arab villagers were far more numerous than the Jewish settlers. Akenson says that even in urban areas, internal walls separated the two communities, as people occupied what can be described as ‘ethnic enclaves’ (Akenson 1992: 145). People know their topography. They know who lives where and also which piece of land evokes memory of which past event, which ‘deliverance myth’ whether Catholic or Protestant (Akenson 1992: 138). The mentality of facing a menace, and of keeping this at bay, or ‘beyond the pale’, seems to apply to all three case studies. Some Serbs see themselves as holding off the Muslim threat, keeping Europe pure and Christian. Thus, the frontier between Christian and Muslim in the Balkans is a wall, or bulwark. Many Jews see

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themselves as occupying an enclave of civilization and of democracy in the midst of an inalienably hostile, autocratic and comparatively backward Middle East, almost as if they are the buffer-zone between this world and Europe. The Ulster-Scots saw themselves as the frontier guard between Protestant Northern Europe, and the Catholic South. McGarry and O’Leary describe the ‘Irish border as a political expression of a “cultural divide” which demarcates the northern Protestant peoples of the British isles from the southern, Catholic and Anglican peoples’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 220). Northern Irish Protestants, more so than any English men or women that I know, stress the Protestant character of the United Kingdom, referring to the terms of William and Mary of Orange’s ascension as the Protestant Constitution, a term that I do not think I have encountered except in Northern Irish Protestant rhetoric (for example, see the Paisley-backed European Institute of Protestant Studies web-site, www.ianpaisley.org). Stories of Catholics dying as martyrs for the true faith instill pride and a sense of identity within Catholic collective memory. In addition to Drogheda, years of special significance for Catholics include 1798 and 1916. The year 1798 saw a widespread anti-British rebellion, from May until August, during which French troops intervened and delivered a defeat against the British before being themselves defeated and repatriated to France. Upwards of 25,000 people died, and the event entered the Catholic imagination as one during which the dead had died as ‘martyrs for our Catholic faith, the true religion’, thus ‘religion and politics’ were ‘fused together by the blood of the martyrs’ (Collins 1997: 37). The origin of the Orange Order dates from this Rebellion, with the aim of safeguarding the Protestant heritage. 1916 was the year of the Easter Uprising, during which 64 rebels were killed as opposed to 140 British soldiers. 16 rebels were later executed, among them James Connolly (1868-1916), one of the leaders and subsequent heroes. Collins recalled how, aged eleven, he visited ‘The 1916 Room’ in the National Museum, Dublin, where he saw ‘the bullet-stained hat and woollen vest worn by James Connolly when he was executed’, and went home with ‘a new, exalted sense of [his] country’s history...The image of Connolly’s woollen vest soiled with his blood stayed with me for a long time’, he continued, ‘In my mind, Plunkett, Pearse [another 1916 rebel] and Connolly were all linked together’ as ‘martyrs for our Catholic faith’ (Collins 1997: 36-7). Collins also

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comments how unhelpful he later found, after his own renunciation of violence, the tendency both to be selective about the past and to dwell on what was said yesterday instead of what ought to be said today: Instead of looking at history in all its complicated richness, both Catholic and Protestant have tended to celebrate particular momentary episodes as signposts on the road to deliverance (to use someone else’s image). I hope that Catholics will start to question more incisively the meaning today of words uttered, for instance, in 1798 or 1916. I hope also that a similar critical debate will take place within the Protestant community, some of whose members still seem to be mentally becalmed in the seventeenth century (Collins 1997: 6).

The majority of people in Ireland had little reason to appreciate English rule, or even the Act of Union of 1800, a result of the 1798 Rebellion, which was supposed to integrate Ireland into the United Kingdom, with Members of Parliament at Westminster and Bishops in the House of Lords (from the Protestant Church of Ireland) but did nothing to alleviate poverty or to emancipate Catholics, who were still barred from holding public office. Some promoters of the Act had wanted to push through radical reforms which would have aided the Irish economy and abolished the Penal Law, with the hope that Ireland would realize that benefit of incorporation into the United Kingdom, as an equal partner with England, Scotland and Wales. The Act also abolished the Irish Parliament, which was replaced by direct rule from London. Opposition to British rule continued, and most Irish considered Britain indifferent to their welfare. Disaster hit when blight caused crop failure of what was both the sole crop and the staple food for most Irish, the potato. This became the great potato famine of 1845 to 1849. With their small-holdings getting smaller and smaller, fewer and fewer farmers could make anything other than a subsistence living from their land. Evictions followed when Catholic farmers failed to pay their rates, which threw them onto the poor house system, and onto philanthropy. For Protestants, this confirmed their image of Irish Catholics as lazy. In 1849, 90,000 people were evicted. In 1850, this rose to 109,000. Some were allowed to return to their land as caretakers. Some British philanthropists helped the victims but hardly any government relief was offered, and out of a total Irish population of 8 million, about 800,000 died. Some suggest a much higher figure.

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Many Irish migrated at this time, especially to Canada and the USA which, as J. M. Mill (1806-1973) pointed out, ‘alleviated the extreme indigence’ (Mill 1962: 505). Lack of official British response to this humanitarian crisis suggested to most Irish that Britain simply did not care about Ireland. She just wanted to dominate the island as yet another colonial possession. What became known as the Fenian, or independence movement, started in the early 1850s, named after mythical Irish warriors whose task had been to protect the island. After 1829, Irish Catholics could serve in the British Parliament. By the end of the nineteenth century, most anti-Catholic legislation had been repealed but nothing was done to address the economic and land-related effect, now centuries old, of this discrimination on the Catholic population. ‘What Is to Be Done with Ireland?’ Several attempts were made at the Westminster Parliament to offer ‘Home Rule’. From 1885 until World War I, it was the dominant issue. As Canada and Australia gained Dominion Status and as some even entertained the possibility that India might become a Dominion, Home Rule for Ireland was seen as a compromise that would allow the Irish to solve their own economic problems while remaining within the British Empire. In 1886 and 1893, Bills were killed by the House of Lords. Some peers had interests in Ireland to protect; others simply wanted to maintain the status quo. Between the 1870’s and 1914, the Irish Parliamentary Party won the majority of Westminster seats and supported Home Rule. Many, including members of the IPP wanted complete independence. In 1886, a group split from the British Liberal Party as the Liberal Unionist Party advocating continued union between Britain and Ireland. In 1912, the Liberal Unionists merged with the British Conservative Party, which became the Conservative and Unionist Party. The Ulster Unionist Party emerged as a distinct organization in 1905 but traditionally took the Conservative whip. Some Irish Protestants did support independence, such as Isaac Butt (1813-79) and Charles Stewart Parnell (1846-91). Parnell supported the Irish Republican Brotherhood, who launched an unsuccessful revolt in 1865. Philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806-73) in an essay called ‘What is to be done with Ireland’ (1848), remarked that the British had tyrannized Ireland for centuries, and now seemed bent on trampling

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‘out the last spark of freedom in the country’ and placing it in a permanent state of siege (Mill 1962: 499). Some attributed the cause of Irish disaffection to the demagogy of such men as Daniel O’Connell (1775-1847), an Irish MP (IPP) and advocate of Home Rule, or of complete independence but ‘the cause of Irish disaffection’ was ‘no creation of Mr O’Connel’, rather it is ‘because several millions of the Irish are people having nothing to support them but potatoes and for two or three months of every year not enough of those, even when the crops have not failed; all the remainder of what the land produced, be the remainder great or small, being taken under the name of rent, by about eight thousand persons’ (Mill 1962: 2515) It was no use blaming the condition of the Irish on their ‘laziness recklessness, their improvident multiplication’ (Mill 1962: 502) when the cause was a ‘bad social system’ and English ‘ignorance... prejudice...and indifference’. This social system, he said, ‘cannot be tolerated; it is an abomination in the sight of mankind’ (Mill 1962: 503). Twenty years later, little had changed and Mill again wrote that increased agitation in Ireland for freedom, or Fenianism, should not be thought to have come from out of nowhere, but was an understandable response to British indifference. Almost any other civilized nation, said Mill, would have done a better job of ruling Ireland! Mill did not think that independence or even Home Rule would benefit Ireland, arguing that as part of the United Kingdom, the Irish had a voice in Parliament and access to jobs throughout the Empire. Until the land law is reformed, and in a manner acceptable to ‘the Irish tenantry (Mill 1962: 532) England would only be able to rule by ‘brute force’, thus forfeiting ‘all the characters we possess as lovers and maintainers of free government.’ Something like Fenianism would remain ‘the torment of the English government and people’ (Mill 1962: 532). Mill correctly identified the fundamental issue—land redistribution. In 1879 a Land League was established to campaign against exploitation of tenant farmers and for the right to own the land they farmed. After the failed attempts to legislate for Home Rule, another Bill was introduced in 1912, which would devolve all Irish issues to Dublin while defense and foreign affairs would be dealt with by Westminster, where Irish MPs would remain. The Bill still faced fierce opposition in both houses of Parliament. The Bill’s promoter, Herbert Henry Asquith (1852-1928), Liberal PM

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1908-1916, hoped that both friends and enemies of the bill would nonetheless vote it through as they realized that they needed to focus their attention on the arms race with Germany. Asquith suspected that he would have to do some sort of a deal with Ulster’s Protestants, as their opposition to Home Rule was a matter of record. By the end of 1912, the Protestants had expressed their determination to resist Home Rule, and were armed and ready to do so. They had formed themselves into a covenental society, ready to defend their promised land. Ironically, while they pledged themselves to defend the Union, what they perhaps most feared was being abandoned by that Union, as McGarry and O’Leary comment, ‘On the one hand’ their fear was being over run ‘by native, Catholic or republican insurrection’ on the other it was the fear of being abandoned by a ‘metropolitan Britain, retreating from its last colonial outposts’ as had been ‘foreshadowed by the Home Rule debates between the 1880s and the 1920s (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 235). The Loyalists’ fear flows, they suggest, ‘from a political culture of despair’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 240) that they appear to be doomed to failure—as a minority in the United Kingdom, and as a minority in Ireland (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 242). Some analysts suggest that successive British rulers’ and governments’ historical tendency to regard ‘Ireland as a distraction and an irrelevance’, often failing ‘to carry through on settlements, deals and understandings’ directly contributes to the Northern Irish Protestants’ siege mentality (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 232). The British MP and former Conservative Minister, Enoch Powell (19121998), who represented a Northern Ireland constituency from 1974 to 1987, maintained that ‘the root cause of the violence’ was ‘the uncertainty of Britain’s commitment to Northern Ireland’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 103). One factor of the political scene is that Northern Irish politics remains separate from metropolitan politics, in other words, the main parties are peculiar to Northern Ireland, reflecting the interests and concerns of the two cultural communities. The Northern Irish probably value their relationship with Britain more than Britain values its relationship with Ireland. Initially, Protestants had feared economic decline had they remained within a united Ireland. McGarry and O’Leary suggest that ‘Ulster Protestants are not usually regarded as British by people living in Great Britain’, who tend to see them as ‘Irish people who by some twist of imperial

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history happen to be entitled to British passports’, rather like Ugandan Asians (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 113). They refer to ‘some evidence that the British’ regard Northern Ireland as a ‘colony’, despite the ‘occasional protestations by British Prime Ministers like Margaret Thatcher that it is ‘as British as Finchley’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 312). Collins (1997) says on the one hand that he feels more at home in Belfast or in London than in Dublin. On the other hand, he recounts that when, as a young man staying in a London Boarding House, other residents gave off the distinct impression that they were frightened of him (Collins 1997: 42). I dimly remember a similar feeling about an Irish student who lived in my Hall of Residence at Manchester University in the midto late-1970s, when the ‘troubles’ were at their height. I am sure he was perfectly innocent but we all saw him as some sort of paramilitary agent. We couldn’t understand his accent and he exuded less an air of menace than one of brooding mystery. When partition occurred, Belfast boasted the largest shipbuilding yard in the British Isles. Britain may have thought that the province would make a net contribution to the British exchequer, while the 26 southern counties may have cost the British tax-payer. In fact, industry in the North declined and Northern Ireland ‘has long ceased to be a good source of surplus value’ as the ‘gap between what is raised in taxation from Northern Ireland and what is spent by the UK state in the region, shows a picture of increasing dependency’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 74-5). This was not what Britain expected when it created the state, and it may in the end contribute to Britain’s willingness to let the majority of the Irish people determine their own future. Majoritarianism, though, has its limitations. Britain currently feels frustrated by the fact that the majority of people in Gibralter wish to remain British, while Britain would prefer to cede sovereignty to Spain and, sentimentality apart, rid itself of an embarrassing and anachronistic relic of empire. The British, some say, always wanted to exploit rather than to integrate Ireland, partly determined by geographical separateness which did not apply between England, Wales and Scotland (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 331). Other approaches to governance may be needed in societies where communities are polarized, as in the Lebanon, Iraq and the Balkans. Ways of ensuring that minorities are both respected and adequately represented, that a majority or nearmajority does not tyrannize minorities, require something other

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than a straight majority-based system. Apostolov (2004) in his book about frontier-zones, radically suggests that the nation-state might not always be the ideal political unit, especially for multi-cultural and religiously plural societies. It may ‘be necessary to go beyond the fixation on the nation-state paradigm in order to analyze the intricate relations of groups with distinct cultural identities’ in some contexts (Apostolov 2004: 15). McGarry and O’Leary lean towards going beyond the nation-state fixation when they suggest that a way forward for Northern Ireland could be in a ‘pooling of sovereignty within the context of the EU’ (1995: 306), although this would need to take account of a strong anti-Europe element in the Protestant community, especially in the DUP. In fact, most peace initiatives in Northern Ireland have attempted to implement some type of power-sharing arrangement, and all have involved the Republic as a partner. Partition Many Northern Irish Protestants found themselves defending Britain, as World War I broke out (4 August 1914). The Home Rule Bill of 1912, scheduled to become law that year, was dropped and the ‘overwhelming majority of the Ulster Volunteer Force...enlisted in the army to fight in Europe’ where Northern Irish Protestants took part in such battles as the Somme, and many sealed ‘the covenant with their blood’. Their battle cry was ‘no surrender’. Subsequently, Orange Day commemorations on the 12 July refer not only to ‘the battles of Derry, Enniskillen and the Boyne’, but ‘also to the Somme, to the Covenant, and to blood sacrifice’ (Akenson 1992: 202). Enniskillin here refers to the Battle of Newtownbuter in 1689, another Protestant victory against the Jacobites. Enniskillin is for some also synonymous with the ‘troubles’ as the site of the Remembrance Sunday Bombing of 1987, which killed eleven civilians. The real target, according to the IRA, was a color guard of British soldiers. By 1919 and the end of World War I, the 1916 Easter Uprising against British rule in Ireland had taken place. Again led by the Irish Republican Brotherhood, this rebellion was more successful than that of 1865. Over six days, key locations in Dublin were seized and a Republic proclaimed. The perpetrators, including James Connolly, were court-martialed and executed, becoming heroes of the republican cause. Unlike the more recent

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activities of the IRA, the uprising followed the rules of war, not of terrorism (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 55). Hence those involved were treated as combatants. By 1920, the Government of Ireland Act was set to grant Home Rule separately to the North and to the South, with the former as a compromise. The South never accepted Home Rule, or devolved government with the British Parliament retaining ultimate responsibility and sovereignty. The South’s leaders did not want Partition, and actually agreed to write into the constitution mechanisms to protect Protestant interests, aware that a divided Ireland would also cut the industrial North off from the agrarian South (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 65: 72). After the War of Independence (1919-21) which was mainly fought by the IRA, the South gained its own Government as the Irish Free State. This was the same as Canada’s and Australia’s dominion status, which meant that it remained within the British Empire. A Civil War followed (1922-23) between supporters of the new government, and republicans. The British remained adamant that Ireland could not have complete sovereignty, and refused to place ‘Ireland on the agenda of the Versailles peace conference’ that attempted to put Europe in order after World War I ‘even though it had self-determination and the rights of small nations as part of its remit’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 44). Some interpret the whole Irish problem as a legacy of British imperial policy and point out that Britain, a self-proclaimed democracy, did not consult the whole of the Irish people on the issue of partition. Thus, the ‘border demarcating “Northern Ireland” from “Southern Ireland”’ can be seen ‘as a denial of the Irish people’s right to national selfdetermination’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 28). For some, the Northern Ireland conflict is reducible to an anti-colonial struggle (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 328). The Free State won the Civil War. In 1937 the British Monarch was replaced by a President, and in 1949 the Republic departed from the British Commonwealth. Some Catholics involved in the ‘troubles’ regard their campaign as a continuation of the 1916 rebellion, aiming for the re-unification of Ireland as a republic. The original Constitution of the Republic of Ireland defined its territory as the whole of the island of Ireland, which includes the North (Articles 2 and 3, amended as a result of the Good Friday Agreement). The Act of the British Parliament that created the Irish Free State included Ulster but provision was made for Northern

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Ireland to opt out, which it did. As Akenson says, the Northern Irish Protestants never wanted a State but they got one, and once established it would always be for them a ‘semi-sacralized entity’ (Akenson 1992: 150). They saw it as theirs, and built privilege into its infrastructure. Catholic support for union with the Republic, for Protestants, amounted to disloyalty. Thus we have the two ‘rival political nationalisms’ of which McGarry and O’Leary have written (1995: 264). Akenson says that, given ‘the covenental culture of the dominant group in Ulster’s Protestant culture, the Presbyterians, it was inevitable that the state of Northern Ireland would institutionalize strong patterns of discrimination against Roman Catholics’ (Akenson 1992: 193). Given the history of hostility between the two groups, and their dislike of each other, discrimination probably was inevitable but the question of exactly why an economically and politically dominant group discriminates against a poorer, less powerful minority, is worth exploring. Partition was Britain’s compromise, as it would be, later, in India. Protestants claimed that they would suffer in a Catholic dominated Ireland, so were granted their own separate state in which they would be the majority. This was partitioned off from the rest of the island, where Catholics were the majority, effectively producing two rival, or at least incompatible nationalisms. Thus, Protestants who want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom oppose Catholics who want unification with the Republic of Ireland, although some would no doubt settle for justice within the existing political and economic system. Collins comments that for him the ‘idea of a United Ireland has almost become a meaningless abstraction’ and thinks it possible for Catholics and Protestants to find ways of living together in peace (Collins 1997: 5) Demographics, however, are in favor of nationalism, since at some point in the next quarter of a century, Catholics will form a majority. Ironically, Britain today—as McGarry and O’Leary point out—can be more properly characterized as pluralist than as Protestant, which is why some Catholics support unionism, defending the UK not as a Protestant but as a ‘pluralist, tolerant and diverse state’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 185).

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Discussion • The International community did not intervene in the Northern Ireland conflict? Should it have done so, and on what basis? • Before reading the analysis below, do you think that religion caused the ‘troubles’ or that its role has been secondary to rival nationalistic ideologies, and issues surrounding civil rights, injustice and discrimination? • Does the above portrait tend to downplay religion in order to shift the blame onto nationalism as the real bogey that should be jettisoned as humanity matures? Am I simply showing my bias as a theologian and pro-religion academic? • Akenson says that, given ‘the covenental culture of the dominant group in Ulster’s Protestant culture, the Presbyterians, it was inevitable that the state of Northern Ireland would institutionalize strong patterns of discrimination against Roman Catholics’ (Akenson 1992:193). Given the history of hostility between the two groups, and their dislike of each other, was discrimination inevitable? • Why would an economically and politically dominant group discriminate against a poorer, less powerful minority? If the majority treated the minority justly, how would its dominant position have been compromised? • Is the mere fact that religious people, however motivated, act violently not in and of itself enough to prove that religion is bad for humanity? • Is the cause of the Northern Irish conflict so complex that ascribing its cause to either religion or to nationalism or to injustice is impossible? Rather, are all these factors part of a mix so that all are causes of violence?

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Chapter Two N ORTHERN IRELAND: RELIGION AND THE ‘ TROUBLES’ Reasons Why Religion is Not the Cause First, I examine McGarry’s and O’Leary’s reasons for rejecting the contention that religion is at the core of the conflict, then I suggest reasons, drawing on Mitchell (2005), for suggesting that religion plays a more significant role than merely marking the boundary between the two communities. McGarry and O’Leary, of course, get religion off the hook, giving Dawson the thumbs down. They suggest that it is because religion is a key marker that people attach more significance to religion than it deserves (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 212) which in their view detracts attention away from the political actors, absolving ‘political agents of responsibility’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 213). Rather, the two communities are ‘divided by broader cultural differences, national allegiances, histories of antagonistic encounters, and marked differences of economic and political power’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 172). I shall argue that religion is not neutral in any of the above but gives content to and was often the prime mover behind these ‘broader cultural differences’. Criticizing Steve Bruce, a supporter of the view that ‘the Northern Ireland conflict is a religious conflict’, McGarry and O’Leary suggest that sociologists of religion, ‘over-ambitious to apply their insights’, should be more cautious in doing so (1995: 200-201; see Bruce: 1986). In this instance, they are critical of how Bruce interpreted electoral data to overemphasize the popularity of the more hard-line Democratic Unionist Party, whose support in the 1980’s ranged from 13 to 20%. They predicted a decline in its electoral base (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 406). In fact, in 2005 the DUP won 33.7% of the votes for Westminster representation, winning 9 out of 18 seats, and in 2004 in elections for the Northern Ireland Assembly, its share of the vote was 25.6%, winning 30 out of 108 seats, being the largest single party behind the Ulster

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Unionists with 27 members and 22.7% of the vote. Originally, the DUP began to pick up seats when the fourth Prime Minister of NI, Captain Terrence O’Neill (1914-1990) started to tackle anti-Catholic discrimination and to regularize relations with the Republic. As the UUP has moved towards rapprochement with the minority community, the DUP’s strength has grown. McGarry and O’Leary examine what they call ‘the limits to religious explanations’, whether Protestantism is at the core of the conflict, whether Catholicism is at the core, and whether religion is responsible for the Social Boundary in Northern Ireland. They also discuss the idea that the two communities are ‘encased in ancestral myths’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 215) with violence and conflict so embedded in each culture that they can be characterized as cultures of violence. One important point they make is that there is a racist element in the English tendency to explain the conflict as being ‘about religion’, which attributes to the Irish ‘peculiar, atavistic and anachronistic’ characteristics which keep them locked into outdated religious animosities, long since left behind by the English and other Europeans (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 175-76). McGarry and O’Leary’s Argument McGarry and O’Leary offer the following arguments against religion occupying the center stage of the conflict, while acknowledging that it is ‘the key ethnic marker’ (1995: 212). 1) Relations between Catholics and Protestants were improving when the troubles began, due in part to the Second Vatican Council’s teaching on ecumenical relations (190). 2) The Catholic Church declared that the IRAs violent modus operandi can not be regarded as a ‘just war’ (192). Protestants do not defend their use of violence with any theological rationale. 3) No political organization representing the Catholic community wears a religious label, while many MPs elected by the Catholic or Republican constituency have ‘enjoyed a closer relationship with Trotsky and Marx than with the Pope’ (191). Similarly, the IRA is not a religious body, nor is the UDA or UVF (Ulster Defense Association). 4) Paramilitaries on both sides have refrained from targeting ‘religious personnel and institutions’ with the exception of the Revd Robert Bradford (1941-1981), a Methodist Minister and Orange

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Order member who was also a Unionist MP ‘with outspoken views on how to deal with hunger-strikers’ and of an ‘isolated incident at Darley in 1983 when republican gunmen —probably from the INLA—killed three Protestant evangelicals during a religious service’, which is insufficient evidence of a basically religious agenda (192). 5) The claim that the conflict is a religious conflict because only this can make sense of Ian Paisley’s political career doesn’t work. In their view, the DUP may qualify as a religious party (193) but its electoral support is based on its pro-working class economic policies, not its evangelical religious stance. 6) Protestantism in Northern Ireland is increasingly fragmented, which has put the notion of being a covenant people into the cultural past (204; here they follow Akenson’s argument in his chapter, ‘A Covenant Comes Apart, 1969 to the present’ (Akenson, 1991: 263-94). 7) Northern Ireland is becoming secularized. While at the start of the conflict, levels of church attendance were among the highest in Europe, as the conflict ‘escalated, and has continued’ these levels gave declined (189). 8) No Catholic clergy have stood for political office (191). 9) The fact that ‘many Catholic priests support a united Ireland’ while ‘most Protestant clergy support the Union’ can be understood irrespective of their religious identity, since ‘they live, have families and perform pastoral functions within’ their respective communities (195). 10) The separate cultural enclaves in which the two communities exist, with separate schools, what amounts to a ban on intermarriage, Catholics playing Gaelic games, emphasizing their Gaelic heritage and Protestants playing rugby and cricket, can all be explained without reference to religion except as an ethnic marker. Separate education does not itself explain violence, (for example, Canada and the Netherlands show that it can ‘be characterized by peaceful co-existence’ (209). With reference to the contention that Irish culture is naturally violent, drawing on ancient myth and hostility, they argue that if this were so, Irish communities in Diaspora, such as in Australia, the USA or Canada would also be violent (253-4).

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Reasons Why Religion is a Central Issue McGarry and O’Leary base their analysis on a detailed and comprehensive discussion of the reasons that are commonly cited to place religion at the center of the conflict, which they reject. This response will reply to each of the above points. 1) The Presbyterian Church in Northern Ireland has distanced itself from the ecumenical movement, resigning in 1989 from the British Council of Churches when I was actually a member of its executive staff. The majority of Northern Irish Protestants remain committed to a view of the Catholic Church as heretical, while many still believe that the Vatican is involved in a conspiracy to destroy Protestantism. Vatican II rejected the old view of Protestants as heretical, recognizing that elements of the true Church are present in other ecclesiastical communities but this does not mean that all Catholics are convinced. Just as anti-Catholicism is alive and well, so is anti-Protestantism. For example, the US based web site of the Society of Pius X says that ‘despite the new ecumenism’, the plain fact remains that there is a fundamental antithesis between ‘Catholic’ and ‘Protestant’ which in fact ‘contradict and exclude each other’. This is taken from an article by Father Basil Wrighton published in the August 1992 Angelus magazine. Another article by the same cleric explains the machinations of Vatican II, and its key errors. The Pius X Society was founded by Archbishop Lefebvre (1905-91), the French cleric who was excommunicated for rejecting Vatican II. His followers claim that they are true Catholics. One former DUP deputy leader (see below) runs a web site dedicated to countering the evils of ecumenism and Romanism. I know many Protestants who regard the Catholic Church as in error. 2) Collins’ own conversion to violence can be cited to support the point that religion does not explain violence in Northern Ireland, since it was Marxism not religion that gave him permission to join the IRA. He wrote, ‘the Catholic church throughout my childhood had taught me that violence was wrong’ and my ‘upbringing had left me with an inner revulsion for killing’ (Collins 1997: 62). Collins’ book also depicts many of the perpetrators of violence as psychotic, petty-minded men who took advantage of the ‘troubles’ to promote their own agendas, thus suggesting that their motives had little to do with just-war theory, or liberation theology. McGarry and O’Leary, though, comment that the majority of IRA activists lacked

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criminal records, nor represented ‘an army of unskilled and unemployed people’ (1995: 291). On the other hand, in the past of both communities, violence was carried out with explicitly religious motives. The Battle of the Boyne was waged by Catholics against Protestants, and vice-versa and the Williamite victory did result in the Protestant Constitution of 1688. The British, in persecuting Irish Catholics, did see this as part of Protestant ascendancy. When Catholics rose up in rebellion, this was perceived not merely in nationalist but also in religious terms, since the idea of Churchstate separation was non-existent. Putting down a rebellion can be legitimated by Mt. 21:28-46 in which the landowner punishes his tenants for refusing to pay rent and for killing his son, giving the land away to ‘other tenants, who will give him his share of the crop at harvest time’. Thus, the lawful rulers of Ireland punished the rebellious Irish, and gave their land to loyal tenants instead. The issue was not whether the state would be religious but would it be Protestant or Catholic. Whether conscious reference was made to just-war theory or not (a just war has to be declared by the properly constituted authority), or whether people actually thought in terms of ‘taking up arms against a perceived aggressor or oppressor’, which, say McGarry and O’Leary, few religions reject as authentic, perpetrators of violence on both sides were religious people who believed that what they did had religious blessing. A ‘letter read in the English Parliament’ during the 1641 revolt referred to ‘poor Protestants’ who were being ‘barbarously’ tormented by the rebels. The ‘tormented’ were not identified as English or Scottish settlers or as colonialists but at ‘Protestants’. Oliver Cromwell saw the executions at Drogheda as punishment for the Catholic massacre of Protestants, and called it the ‘righteous judgement of God on these barbarous wretches’, which sounds religious. When the Covenanters of 1912 pledged that they would defend their land ‘by all means which may be found necessary’ they did so ‘humbly before God’, and with the full backing of their churches. McGarry and O’Leary are right to say that theological rationale has not been used to justify the violence. Indeed, most interventions by clergy have condemned violence and encouraged a peaceful resolution of the issues behind the conflict. Yet, while he drew on Marxism to legitimate his support of violence, Collins always identifies his fellow nationalists, past and present, as Catholics: ‘Catholics...had died in their thousands over the centuries for the

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nationalist cause; ten men had just died on hunger strike for the same cause’ (Collins 1997: 119). For Collins, Marxist or not, the nationalist cause was also a Catholic struggle. Thus, he speaks of how the legal system too often served as ‘an instrument which the Protestant ruling class could use to crush the rights of the Catholic community’ (Collins 1997: 340), again clearly identifying the two rival groups by their religious labels. It seems to me that Christians have often acted violently, and that while they sometimes justify this with reference to certain scriptural texts, they do not always do so. Given the history of Christians condoning wars, of enforced conversion and of cultural genocide in many parts of the world, the presupposition that Christians would be naturally peaceful seems difficult to sustain. Indeed, almost every war fought in Europe had some sort of Christian blessing, and the kings who led them saw themselves, more often than not, as semi-divine. The ‘divine right of kings’ was not invented by James I of England (1566-1625), but dates back at least to Philip IV of France (1268-1314), who believed that he ruled ‘by divine grace’, embodied ‘earthly law’ and was the sole ‘interpreter of heavenly law’, which meant that he ‘had no need of scruples or conscience’ (Howarth 1982: 256). In other words, kings often believed that whatever they did to expand their territories, or to persecute political or religious dissidents, was automatically God’s will. This qualifies, in my view, as bad theology, but bad theology or not, it is a theological stance that lies behind violent actions that Christians have committed in the past. Thus: Pope John VII (705-707) and Leo IV (845-855) promised eternal life to all who defended the church against Arabs and Vikings. The Holy Roman Emperor Charlemagne (724-814; Emperor 800-14) fought the pagans with papal blessings. Pope Leo IX (1049-54) gave freedom from sin to soldiers fighting the Normans in southern Italy. Gregory VII (1073-85) declared the properly ordained knight absolved of sin as St Peter’s servant...War with countries was so common that war was virtually normal and peace abnormal. War was carried outside Europe in conquests of the American Indians, African tribes, the maharajahs of India and Indonesia. Christian arms moved into the Near East and the Far East whenever and wherever opportunity offered. In addition to fighting local people, Christians fought each other...(Thompson 1988: 26; 31).

My argument is that those committing acts of violence during the troubles did not have to justify them religiously, since Christian history itself serves as sufficient justification. McGarry and O’Leary

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cite a survey on what people thought caused the conflict, and conclude that ‘non-religious’ reasons such as ‘civil rights, discrimination and socio-economic inequalities’ scored higher than ‘religion’, commenting that ‘only 13% of Protestants and 12% of Catholics thought religion was one of the main causes’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 195-96). However, I would argue that Catholics in Northern Ireland have civil rights concerns, experience discrimination and a lower standard of living because Protestants felt they had a God-given right to treat Catholics, who are in error, as second-class citizens who, like the Canaanites in Israel, should not really live there anymore. McGarry and O’Leary’s comment that the paramilitaries of both sides enjoyed ‘considerable legitimacy within their own communities’ refers to religiously defined communities (McGarry and O’Leary 1995:345). Of course, while Protestants accuse the IRA of being religiously inspired, since in their view ‘Catholics are bent on eradicating Protestantism’, they deny that Loyalist terrorists are ‘real Protestants’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 183). Collins himself believed that the armed struggle was a just cause, and that members of the UDR were ‘legitimate targets’. He began to have serious doubts about the legitimacy of the struggle when he discovered that one of his victims, Norman Hanna, ‘shot...in front of his wife and child’ (Collins 1997: 325) was no longer a UDR officer, although he had been one previously. Collins, who had asked for assurances that the target was a serving officer, then ranted at an IRA colleague that they had killed an ‘innocent civilian.’ His colleague replied that Hanna’s brother was in the UDR, as if that was justification enough, to which Collins wanted to know why the brother had not been the target (Collins 1997: 116). 3) Religious organizations do not always identify themselves with explicitly religious labels. The Orange Order does not necessarily sound religious, any more than does the Boy Scouts or the Ancient Order of Hibernians. Both are. The latter dates from Henry VIII’s reign, founded to protect Irish Catholic priests from discovery and death. Catholic Westminster MP Joseph Devlin (1872-1934) revived the order in modern times, serving as Grand Master. Under his leadership, the Order was quite militant and anti-Protestant, recruiting members of the Molly Maguires, a vigilante group that engaged in intimidation and violence against Protestant land owners to force them to lower the rents of their Catholic tenants. Britain

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does not have a history of political parties with ‘religious’ names, so Northern Irish politics has followed this example. McGarry and O’Leary claim that the Protestant Unionist Party changed its name in 1971 ‘because of the limited attractiveness of its religious label’, and says that it was ‘some time before the party attracted significant support’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 193). This can be questioned. First, two Stormont seats and a Westminster seat within a few years of starting a new party is not a bad political achievement. Second, Ian Paisley first gained his seat under the PUP, and has retained it under the DUP. The North Antrim voters know they are electing the same man, with the same policies, and the same hard-line antiCatholic beliefs. I doubt if the name change fooled anyone. Name change or not, the party’s identification with the Protestant community could hardly be clearer. The name change may simply have been recognition that, while parties on both sides are supported by religiously defined constituencies, in the UK system a religiously named party doesn’t sit comfortably with the political culture. However, 80% of the DUP’s professional politicians belong to Paisley’s Free Presbyterian Church, which can not have escaped electors’ attention. One of Mitchel’’s interviewees could be typical here. Helen used to vote for UUP but now supports the DUP. A born again Christian, she spoke of ‘Protestant loss’ and of ‘the growing strength of’ the Catholic community, which she feared (Mitchell 2005:16). McGarry and O’Leary, pointing out that religiously differentiated parties do exist ‘in other countries which are not racked by conflict, religious or otherwise’ find it unusual that they do not exist in Northern Ireland but in my view this is not surprising, given their absence from UK politics (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 193). Mitchell says that while the churches have spoken out against violence, ‘their main interest’ throughout the ‘conflict was to locate themselves in the political mainstream of their respective communities’ (Mitchell 2005: 4). McGarry and O’Leary themselves point out that support for nationalist parties and republican paramilitaries is almost exclusively Catholic, while Unionist parties and loyalist paramilitaries are overwhelmingly supported by Protestants (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 174). Also, the ‘correlation between political partisanship and religion’ in Northern Ireland is the highest in Europe. In their own detailed analysis of the Good Friday Agreement, they refer to the two communities as Catholic and Protestant (McGarry and O’Leary

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1995: 417). While both sides have had external support—Loyalists from South Africa and Republicans from Lybia, for example—neither have been dependent on such aid. Both have enjoyed ‘considerable legitimacy within their own communities’, which all agree are religiously defined, and certainly contain some people with more than a nominal or cultural attachment to their religion (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 345). In fact, Northern Irish politics has been explicitly sectarian, with Prime Minister Sir James Craig famously saying: ‘we are a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant State’ and that he was ‘An Orangemen first...and a politician afterwards’ (Brewer 1998: 98). In the election of 1938, UUP slogans (oft repeated since) included ‘No surrender’, ‘no popery’ and ‘not an inch’ when the break-away Progressive Unionists challenged the sectarian policies of the government, which was nothing short of selling out to Dublin (Brewer 1998: 94). They needed to ‘look out’ for Catholics because they ‘breed like bloody rabbits’, said the Prime Minister (Brewer 1998: 92). Paisley has also been cited as having described Catholics as breeding like rabbits and multiplying like vermin. Quite a few Loyalist MPs have been, and are, ordained Protestant clergy (far more than have entered politics in England, Scotland or Wales) while Gerry Adams and Martin McGuiness have appealed to Catholic voters, at least in part, because ‘they are devout Catholics’ (Grant 2004: 273), even if other Republican politicians have been Marxist. Grant says ‘91.4% of Catholic priests favor Irish unity’ (Grant 2004: 271) and cites evidence of ‘hidden support’ among Catholic priests for Sinn Fein (Grant 2004: 271). McGarry and O’Leary refer to suspicion that Father Ryan was an IRA activist. Others claim that Father James Chesney (d. 1980), Father Patrick Fell and Father John Burns were all involved in the IRA (McDonald 2002). Paisley has accused Catholic priests of handing out machine guns to their parishioners. Paisley also appears to have incited violence against Catholics, although he denies this. However, if any of the above is even partly true, religion moves towards the center of the stage. If priests have actively supported the conflict, one assumes that they would have some sort of theological rationale, even though we do not know the content. John Andrews (1871-1956) the second Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, served as Grand Master of the Orange Order, while his successor, Basil Brooke (1888-1973) tried to strengthen ties between government

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and the order. David Trimble was a member, the Revd Martin Smyth, MP for Belfast South 1982-2005, UUP President from 2001, served as Grand Master of the Order while all but one Senator between 1922 and 1969 were Orangemen. The year 1969 was the last election for the old Parliament before Edward Heath prorogued it in 1972. Paisley’s role will be discussed below. Just as it would be rash to leap to the conclusion that organizations that do not label themselves as religious lack any religious aspect, it would be equally rash to assume that Christian Democracy in Germany has anything very much to do with Christianity, despite the title. McGarry and O’Leary regard the view that the conflict is ‘about religion’ to be based on superficial analysis (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 175). The issue here, in my view, is not that religion motivates or even justifies the conflict, but that it is largely generated by the religious differences between the two communities that drove them apart in the first place, and which, in the main, produced the political scenario in which the conflict takes place. Moreover, the conflict continues to be fueled by these religiously defined differences, even to be exasperated by them. 4) The fact that paramilitaries have not targeted clergy does not make a convincing case against religion as a central motive. In fact, Churches were attacked in 1999 and also in the 2005 outbreak of violence, when petrol and paint bomb attacks took place on Catholic Churches in Paisley’s own North Antrim constituency, condemned by leaders of the Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian and Methodist Churches 9 July 2005. Loyalists have assassinated Catholics, and nationalists Protestants. Much killing has been indiscriminate: a bomb exploded in a Protestant or Catholic neighborhood might easily have killed a member of the clergy. Apart from the targeting of ‘traitors’, or when bombs have been set off in UK cities, both sides have exploded their bombs where the majority of people are likely to be from the opposite community. Violence, as Collins’ book suggests, tends to perpetuate itself for the sake of violence. My argument is not that the terrorists deserve any credit, or that their violence is in any sense justifiable, only to suggest that it does have an aim. Just as bin Laden’s anti-Western violence has an aim, such as the withdrawal of Western troops from Muslim countries, so Irish sectarian violence has an aim; Loyalists want to preserve the Union with Britain, Republicans want justice in Northern Ireland in the short term and unification with Ireland in the longer term. Each

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side wants to intimidate the other into making political concessions. Possibly, neither side thought that targeting of clergy would aid their cause but was more likely to make the enemy more determined not to ‘yield an inch’. The claim that the paramilitary have refrained from choosing religious targets seems less sustainable today than when McGarry and O’Leary published their book in 1995. 5) I agree that too much should not be hung on the career of one man, Ian Paisley. Nonetheless, I am not as convinced as McGarry and O’Leary that Paisley and his party attract support for reasons that have very little to do with his anti-Catholic, pro-Protestant stance. True, his economic policies, which are interventionist or protectionist of working-class interests may well appeal to a broader spectrum of voters, yet why has he and his party attracted votes away from mainstream Unionism? Paisley’s own North Antrim seat is mainly rural and religious. In the 1986 by-election he won 97.4% (uncontested by the UUP and contested only by one pro-Good Friday Agreement candidate) of the votes (turnout was 53.5%), in 2001 he won with 49.9% and in 2005 he won, with 54.8% (an increase of 4.9% with his nearest challenger, the UUP candidate, on 14.5% and Sinn Fein on 12.2%. It is the 49th safest seat in the UK. Why do people vote for him? As argued above, the DUP’s Protestant identity could hardly be clearer. MP William McRea of South Antrim, like Paisley, is a Free Presbyterian Minister and has led prayers at paramilitary funerals, including a family service for Billy Wright. He was convicted of riotous behaviour in 1971. Another Free Presbyterian minister, Ivan Foster, a former deputy leader of the DUP co-founded Ulster Resistance in 1986, and became a battalion leader. He runs a website dedicated to countering the influences of ecumenism and Catholicism. In his opinion, ‘Adams and McGuiness are not men of peace but head up ‘one of the most effective terror organizations in Europe, if not the world’ and both have the ‘blood of innocent Protestants and Roman Catholics on their hands’. Paisley’s views of the Catholic Church are widely known. He regards the Republic, Sinn Fein, the IRA and all Catholics (but especially Jesuits) as engaged in a conspiracy to destroy Protestantism. For him, the IRA lies behind the Good Friday Agreement, and acceptance of the Agreement is tantamount to taking the road to Dublin. Paisley regards the Pope as the AntiChrist, and famously denounced Queen Elizabeth II for meeting with Pope John Paul II. Since Catholics are entrapped in a false

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Church, they are not merely in error but are actually malignant. His cries of ‘No Surrender’ have political as well as theological significance. He is vehemently anti-European, suggesting that the creation of the European Union is part of the end-time scenario. He may well have borrowed this from Hal Lindsey’s and C. C. Carlson’s 1970 book, The Late Great Planet Earth. Paisley’s doctorate is from Bob Jones University, South Carolina. He rejects ecumenism. His Free Presbyterian Church, founded in 1951, only has about 10,000 members (Akenson 1992: 293). However, its beliefs and the views of its founder may have wider support, since several studies show that ‘Northern Irish people often hold more hard-line opinions than they declare openly’ (Grant 2004: 270). Whether Paisley’s career is of itself proof of the centrality of religion is dubious but the fact is that his party currently has the majority of seats at both Westminster and in the NI Assembly, and its politics and theology coalesce. Speaking at the DUP’s 21 February 2004 Conference, Paisley declared that evil forces were combining to destroy their province, betray their heritage and to destroy the union. The DUP would not have anything to do with the ‘Judas Iscariot Strategy’ that was dancing to the IRA’s tune, nor would it ‘be entering any talks, negotiations, pow-wows or socializations with IRA/Sinn Fein’ Speaking at the DUP Conference, 21st February, 2004, Paisley said that true unionism has risen again from the ashes, and would fight the good fight. ‘We are all creatures’, he said, ‘of the one and only creator, God’ and closed with the benediction. What could be more explicitly religious? 6) The claim that Protestantism in Northern Ireland is more fragmented and that the covenant-society has come apart may be partly true. There is no turning back the clock to pre-1972. Power sharing, in some form, will continue in Northern Ireland. However, Akenson’s claim that the DUP can only hope to ‘enfold more than a minority of the Ulster Protestant population’ (1992: 293) has proven to be wrong and Northern Irish Protestantism can be understood independently of church structures or boundaries. Many people who do not attend Church regard themselves as a member of the community, moreover, their social and political attitudes have been shaped by the same type of theology that informs Paisley. Mitchell (2005) interviewed Victoria, who does not attend church but for whom Protestantism is ‘a way of life’. In her opinion, it stands for freedom of thought while Catholicism does peoples’ thinking for them, and her Catholic ‘contemporaries ...are still “driven” in some

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way by the Catholic church’ (Mitchell 2005: 13). Similarly, nonchurch-goer Philip also thought that he was ‘freer’, when asked what he associated with being a Protestant (Mitchell 2005: 13). Many Protestants see Catholics as ‘unfree and politically duped’. ‘Religious discourse’; says Mitchell, ‘still resonates for the nominally affiliated (Mitchell 2005: 19). Even with de-churching, I agree with Mitchell that it is unlikely that the demarcation between the two communities will ‘disappear any time soon’ (15). 7) Secularization has increased in Northern Ireland but religious affiliation remains significantly higher than elsewhere in Europe, and non-practicing Protestants and Catholics still identify themselves as members of their respective communities, so much so that both Protestant and Catholic ‘group memberships are deeply embedded in existing social structures’ and are ‘very difficult to re-negotiate’ (Mitchell 2005: 17). Mitchell says that even in so-called ‘postChristian European societies’ old attitudes of who is who continue to inform how people see each other (2005: 19). 8) McGarry and O’Leary’s point that while priests have stood for election in Latin America, none have in Northern Ireland is not a convincing argument against the ‘troubles’ having a religious element. Official Catholic policy forbids priests from holding political office. The Irish Church is generally very compliant with Rome. On the other hand, almost all Catholic priests are sympathetic towards nationalist aspirations and several may have helped the IRA while Cardinal O’Fiach explicitly supported a united Ireland. Monsignor Denis Faul (1932-2006) was active in the Civil Rights Movement. Father Des Wilson, a liberation theologian, has been a consistent advocate of human rights and social justice. 9) Clergy support for the two political policies can, as McGarry and O’Leary argue, be explained by reasons that have little to do with religion. Indeed, Protestant clergy, who are employed more directly by their congregations than Catholic clergy, may find it prudent not to challenge their parishioners’ politics On the other hand, clergy (with some possible exceptions) have distanced themselves sufficiently from their communities to condemn violence, which has had enough support from both communities to sustain itself for over 30 years. Therefore, clergy can challenge their parishioners’ ideas when they feel justified. Some clergy have also challenged perceptions of the other as malicious. Many, however, may believe that Protestantism is threatened by Catholicism, or

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that Catholics would fair better in a Catholic state. I know English Catholics who still believe that England’s conversion to Catholicism is a real possibility. When the controversy about Anglican ordination of women broke in 1991, Cardinal Basil Hume said that this could be the opportunity for the ‘re-conversion of England for which we have been praying for years’. 10) Segregation, a result of religion, does not, in McGarry and O’Leary’s opinion, of itself explain violence. Both communities have had their reasons to encourage segregation. Catholics prefer Catholic schools. Protestants do not encourage inter-marriage, which is difficult for Catholics unless both parents agree to raise their children as Catholics. While segregated schooling does not result in violence in other parts of the world, the difference in the Northern Irish context is that segregation is almost total. Protestants and Catholics hardly mix. Historically, the two cultures were kept deliberately apart in a way that resembles apartheid in South Africa. In my view, when the Other is more imagined than seen, or met, or personally known, stereotypes dominate. It is easy to demonize someone you have hardly ever meet, but who you believe is hostile to your way of life and wants to destroy it. Thus, as Mitchell says, the social demarcation of the two communities ‘creates a space in which to imagine other groups’ difference’ (Mitchell 2005: 18). In the case of Protestants, it is estimated that one quarter of the Protestant population subscribe to the view that a united-Ireland would be priest-ridden, and anti-Protestant (Mitchell 2005:15-16). Protestantism in this view represents ‘salvation and light in opposition to the damnation and darkness of Catholicism’ (Mitchell 2005:15), so that even an un-churched Protestant thinks that ‘her Catholic friends’ are ‘indoctrinated’ and under a great deal of ‘pressure and guilt’ (Mitchell 2005:13). Both communities instill their members, however nominal, with an ‘us’ and ‘them’ view of ‘acceptance’ ‘non-acceptance’ ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’ (Mitchell 2005: 9). Thus, I agree with Mitchell that theology aside, affiliation in each community represents more than a ‘marker of identity’, but determines how people see each other in terms of in-groups and out-groups (Mitchell 2005: 19). It is seeing the Other as opposed to your freedom, or to your economic prosperity, that causes conflict, and in as much as this negative seeing of the other is religiously inspired, religion is a central factor. Injustice, the rigged electoral system, discrimination, were the immediate causes of the conflict

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but these were themselves the product of a history that gave Protestants permission to assert their superiority over Catholics. The Peace Process and the Role of Religion Protestants in Northern Ireland inherited and perpetuated a hostile view of Catholics, which, in its most extreme version, regards Catholics as malign. Historically, before Vatican II, the Catholic Church saw Protestants as heretics. Many Protestants, and the Catholic Church officially, have now embraced ecumenism. McGarry and O’Leary argue that while ecumenism should be encouraged for its own sake, it should not be regarded as a cure, since it does not ‘deal with the material concerns of both communities’ (McGarry and O’Leary: 1995: 213). They are wrong. The ecumenical movement internationally is committed to racial and social justice, to care of the environment and to creating the right conditions in which peace can flourish—the Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation programme of the World Council of Churches. As the ecumenical process does pick up speed in Northern Ireland, it is likely to contribute towards a more just society. One crucial development must be more opportunities for Protestants and Catholics to meet, so that they can learn to see each other as children of the same God. Here, the pioneer work of the Corrymeela Community is one important example of Protestants and Catholics working together to heal ‘social, religious and political divisions’. Most statements by church leaders have condemned violence, although clergy do tend to support the political aspirations of their communities. However, the political peace process has accepted that until and unless the majority of people in both the Republic and Northern Ireland choose unification, a power-sharing government will exercise authority in the North. This will address the concerns of both communities. At present, violence has not completely ceased but it no longer enjoys popular support. Post St Andrews, the largest party, the DUP has accepted power-sharing and is cooperating with people it previously denounced and even demonized. Willingness by the British and Irish governments to compromise on who decides how to resolve the North-South issue and on claiming sovereignty over the whole island did much to progress the peace process. Due to the powersharing arrangement, structures are in place which can tackle the causes of minority grievances, which at the same time guarantee

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that the majority community has a major voice in governance. Demographics may well result in re-unification, although this does not mean that Unionists will quietly accept the consequences. Proportional representation, too, has been built into the NI electoral system since 1973 (Sunningdale). The Women’s Movement It is widely accepted that what stimulated the political peace was the beginning of the repudiation of violence. This can be attributed to several factors, such as the willingness of some on both sides to trust the political, non-violent option. Many attribute the tendency to repudiate violence to diminished support for physical-force, as even paramilitaries themselves became sickened by their own actions. The Peace People movement certainly made a significant contribution. Máiread Corrigan’s sister, Anne Maguire, was critically injured and her niece and two nephews killed on 10 August 1976 when a British army patrol shot a suspected IRA sniper as he drove his car, which caused an accident. Máiread recalls how she had been beaten by police for speaking up ‘when she saw British soldiers searching young girls.’ On another occasion, a Republican funeral was interrupted when soldiers threw tear-gas through the Church window (Buscher and Ling 1999: 35). Máiread, a devout Catholic, was a volunteer with the Legion of Mary. She helped Catholics whose homes were torched by Loyalists. She was convinced that Jesus was non-violent, and that as a good Christian she should love, not hate, her enemies (Buscher and Ling 1999: 37). Friends criticized her for her pacifism, saying it was the easy way out (Buscher and Ling 1999: 37). Betty Williams had joined the IRA in 1972, convinced that it was the only ‘group that would protect the Catholic community’ (Buscher and Ling 1999: 46). She ‘shared the deep frustration and anger that Catholics were feeling (Buscher and Ling 1999: 46). She lost two cousins that same year. She became disillusioned by violence and was for a short while a member of a peace group founded by a Protestant minister, Joseph Parker. In 1976, she and her daughter witnessed the death of the Maguire children and that night ‘something snapped’. For years, she had lived with violence but now she decided to try to do something, since ‘what happened to the Maguire family’ could happen to anyone (Buscher and Ling 1999: 51). She started a door to door campaign

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collecting signatures condemning the IRA’s violence, and demanding that the IRA leave the neighborhood. She invited all women, from both communities, to unite together in the cause of peace. The campaign attracted media attention, and escalated. Soon, Máiread was Betty’s partner and the door-to-door campaign started to organize peace-demonstrations. The first demonstration, 14 August 1976 attracted 10,000 people, mostly women. Protestant participants (each group carried the name of their neighborhood on placards) encountered jostles and angry shouts from some IRA supporters in the crowd, shouting ‘Brits Out! Provos Rule’ but when the Catholic and Protestant groups met, they embraced while other protestors successfully drove off the IRA activists (Buscher and Ling 1999: 53). Catholics later escorted Protestants back to their buses, to ensure ‘there was no more trouble from the...IRA’. Other successful demonstrations followed, with Catholics and Protestants crossing boundaries into each other’s zones, something that people did not do. At one rally, the Protestant leader of Women Together, Sadie Paterson, sang a hymn, churches rang their bells and ‘people wept tears of joy’ (Buscher and Ling 1999: 57). The Peace People are a secular organization but many of its supporters were deeply religious. With more signatures, more rallies including Trafalgar Square in London, and their ‘Peace Declaration’, the movement generated a ground swell of anti-violence sentiment. Both women can be described as women of faith. In her Nobel Lecture, Williams spoke of being ‘for life and creation’. Women, she said, had for too long encouraged men to go to war, believing it to be brave and manly. Now, women of the world needed to encourage men not to ‘turn up for war, not to work for a militarized world but a world of peace, a non-violent world’. Women, she said, did have a special contribution to make, to ensure that ‘the realities of giving birth and love’ get ‘pride of place over the vainglorious adventures that lead to war’. She knew that priorities could not be changed overnight, but ‘men must begin to have the courage not even to prepare for war’, and money spent on arms should be diverted to feed the hungry and house the homeless. Award of the Nobel Peace Prize recognized the impetus given by these women towards shaming the supporters of violence to trust politics instead. It is widely accepted that their campaign helped to create the climate in which the 1994 cease-fire became possible. Also critical, though,

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was John Hume’s efforts to include Sinn Féin in the peace process by complying with the Mitchell Principles. The momentum of the Women’s Movement in Northern Ireland has not continued but the fragile peace has. Collins comments that ‘the most reasonable and compromising voices’ for peace have often been former paramilitaries (Collins 1997: 7) disgusted by their own actions. ‘The main thing we can reasonably hope for’, he says, ‘is that the various groups will agree to differ without the use of violence’ (Collins 1997: 6). Collins suggested that as Catholics learn more about Protestants, they would ‘see mirror images of themselves’. He points to certain copy-cat tendencies, such as Republicans copying the Loyalist marching bands with ‘pipes and drums’, whereas in the past they had been ‘less bombastic’, while ‘impressive murals’ marking out territory, originally a Republican phenomenon, ‘began appearing in Protestant areas’ as well. His hope was that ‘the two sides can learn more useful things from each other’ (Collins 1997: 7). The peace process would have continued without the efforts of the two women Nobel Peace Prize winners but their intervention stands as an example of how ordinary people, in this instance mainly women, often bypassed by the political process (only three women MPs had been elected in Northern Ireland) can make a difference. They drew their inspiration in part from Martin Luther King Jr and Leo Tolstoy, partly from their religious convictions but mainly from their own humanity; ‘the world’ said Williams ‘is divided ideologically, and theologically, right and left and men are prepared to fight over their ideological differences...yet the whole human family can be united by compassion’ (Nobel Lecture, 11 Dec 1976). At the root of the ‘troubles’ has been both sides’ willingness to see the other as inalienably different, and hostile. Religion has, I believe, shaped and even encouraged this hostility but it can offer a different image of the other, the image of sameness—that is, of being created in the image of the same God, with the same dignity, rights and values. What has dominated people’s imaging of the Other in the past does not have to continue to do so in the future. Grant (2004: 267-68) comments, referring to books on the ‘troubles’ by leading clerics from both sides, such as Catholic Archbishop Daly, Anglican Archbishop Eames and Presbyterian Moderator Dunlop, that ‘if it were left to the Dunlops, Eamses, and Dalys of Northern Ireland, Christians there would likely get along well enough, and certainly without violence’.

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• Do you think that women have a special, unique contribution to make towards peace-building? • If more women held positions of political responsibility, would a culture of peace begin to replace the existing culture that so often seems to glorify violence? • Does the argument of this chapter convince you? • Or, do the ancient myths that Protestants and Catholics tell about each other not so alienate and divide the two communities that religion lays at the heart of any conflict between them, more so than rival nationalisms? • I stated above that Protestants found in their religion permission to discriminate against Catholics. Do you regard this as ‘good’ or as ‘bad’ religion? • Is the type of distinction suggested by Kimball plausible, or is this another example of someone who thinks that religion can be good allowing this a priori conviction to blind him to the fundamental truth that religion per se is bad for humanity?

Part Two THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT Resources and Sources Khalid Duran’s ‘Bosnia: The Other Andalusia’ (1995) argues that the religious heritage of Bosnia was pluralist and comparable with that of Andalusia under the Moors, when Christians, Muslims and Jews co-existed in a flourishing intellectual and cultural climate for much of the time. Bosnia’s churches, mosques and synagogues existed side-by-side. Bosnian Muslims, he says, were leading in the fields of democracy and modernity. Good relations existed between traditionalist and reformist Muslims. Muslims did not subscribe to the anti-Christian views promulgated by Iran. Duran is credited with coining the term ‘Islamofascism’. Misha Glenny’s The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 deals mainly with the history of the region from independence from the Ottomans through to the end of Tito’s reign (1980). Religious aspects are not emphasized. The more recent conflict is dealt with in the ‘Epilogue’ as ‘The Balkan Vortex’ where more attention is given to the role of religion. The book as a whole is a lengthy, informative and comprehensive treatment. Douglas M. Johnston’s and Jonathon Eastvold’s ‘History Unrequited: Religion as Provocateur and Peacemaker in the Bosnian Conflict’ (2004) examines both religion’s complicity in the conflict and efforts by religious leaders to resolve the conflict. Rusmir Mahmutc’ehajic’’s ‘The Downhill Path and Defense, Not Surrender’ (1989) [an extract from his book, Living Bosnia] argues that failure by others to rise to the defense of multi-ethnic Bosnia resulted in Bosnian Muslims developing a ‘more strident Islamic identity’. This was exactly what their enemies set out to achieve—to reduce Bosnia’s Muslims to their Muslim identity, then to ‘portray’ them as ‘radicals’ who represented a ‘potential threat to global stability’. The author resigned from the Cabinet when he saw his vision of ‘unity in diversity’ compromised by those who

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appeared to want power for the sake of power. He had served as Vice-President (1991-93). His books The Denial of Bosnia (2000a) and Bosnia the Good (2000b) are also cited extensively in this analysis. Michael A. Sells’ The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (1998). Sells’ book is a detailed analysis of how religious myth, what he refers to as ‘Christo-Slavic religious nationalism’, was manipulated to justify ‘atrocities in Bosnia’. He also discusses Croat Catholic anti-Muslim propaganda always pointing out how some religious leaders ‘specifically and courageously condemned’ the atrocities. His thesis is that the religiously pluralist heritage of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which many Muslims and others wished to preserve, was systematically destroyed in an attempt to re-write history. David Steele’s ‘Contributions of Interfaith Dialogue to Peace-building in the Former Yugoslavia’ (2002) describes his own work as director of a project on religion and conflict at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Washington, DC., in bringing religious leaders together in conflict resolution seminars and workshops. This initiative is also referred to by Johnston and Eastvold (2004: 231). The Bosnian Manuscript Ingathering Project (www.kakarigi.net/manu/ ingather.htm) contains much useful information. ‘A Brief History of BosniaHerzegovina’ by Andras J. Riedlmayer was a major source of historical material contained in this chapter. Like Sells, the web site takes the view that at the root of the conflict was a struggle between two ‘visions of Bosnia, one multi-ethnic and inclusive, the other purely Serb and exclusive’. Alija Izetbegovic’’s Islamic Declaration (original 1970) is available at www.balkan-archive.org.yu/politics/index.html, a pro-Serb web site that talks of the ethnic-cleansing of Serbs perpetuated by Croats and Muslims. Sells (1998: 65) refers to the ‘claim of...genocide against Serbs by a worldwide Islamic conspiracy aided by Germany and the Vatican. Izetbegovic’ was President of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Islamic Declaration is widely cited as proof that Izetbegovic’ intended to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state. For example, J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins in their chapter, ‘Islam at War in the Balkans’, represent Izetbegovic’’s aim as the creation of an Islamic society ‘that would not tolerate equality or co-existence with non-Muslims’ (Burr and Collins 2006: 132). Film/Fiction: Behind Enemy Lines, directed by John Moore (20th Century Fox, 2001): negatively, the film makes the US look heroic and there is no

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effort to explain the historical setting. One NATO commander says that after five years he cannot tell the difference between Serb, Croat and Bosnian uniforms. The film shows a ‘safe-area’ being attacked, civilian casualties and evidence of war crimes. It is not clear whether the perpetrators were Serb military or Serb militia. The shooting of a US-NATO pilot is blamed on Muslims. The senior NATO commander speaks somewhat condescendingly about the prospects for peace, as if the Balkans is hardly worth the effort.

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Chapter Three THE HISTORY OF THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT Some Personal Comments My first academic post at Westminster College, Oxford, from September 1992 came shortly after the break-up of Yugoslavia when the conflict in Bosnia was about six months old. Teaching a course on Islam and the West, I realized that this needed to include Islam in the West and that the Muslim communities of the Balkans were centuries old, much older than the Muslim communities of more recent migrant origin in West Europe. Of course, not all Muslims in West Europe are migrants or of migrant origin. However, many are and the Muslim cultures of France, Britain and Holland, for example, are largely imported. In the case of the Balkans, Muslims are ethnically Slav as are their Christian neighbors. Most belong to families that have been Muslim for hundreds of years. As some in the West speak about the need for Muslims to develop a type of European Islam, here, perhaps, was a European Islam that already existed and had a long history. Muslims quickly emerged, so it seemed, as victims rather than victimizers in the conflict, breaking the stereotype that Muslims are, more often than not, aggressors. This added another dimension of interest to the developing story of Yugoslavia’s demise. As events proceeded, I was dismayed by the slowness of international response and by how some depicted the Muslims of Bosnia as bringing retribution upon themselves. Margaret Thatcher’s reference to an Islamic time-bomb, for example, identified Muslims as a problem. Initially, I used the result of my research to teach a segment on Islam in East Europe during my Islam and the West course. At several conferences I have met politicians and religious leaders from the Balkans, including a former President. This gave me the opportunity to discuss the Balkan conflict with some who have been directly involved. This chapter draws on these encounters.

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Although I have not experienced the same direct personal contact with the region as I have with Ireland and Israel-Palestine, I was eager to include a case study on Bosnia in this book. It is, I believe, especially important for all of us to understand how multi-religious and multi-ethnic societies can be organized. Britain, my own country of birth, prides itself on having managed racial diversity well. This, however, is a suspect claim. After 9/11, racist attacks and desecration of mosques increased. Following 7/7, a series of surveys have shown that many British Muslims see themselves as Muslim first. An NOP Research Poll taken for Channel 4 TV and broadcast on 7 August described 45% of British Muslims as believing that 9/11 was an American-Israeli conspiracy, while one in four thought 7/7 was justified. This was after the foiled plot to blow up planes mid-Atlantic. Thirty per cent said they would prefer to live in some type of Islamic state while 28% believe it possible that Britain will one day become such a state. Seventy-eight per cent supported punishment of those deemed to have insulted the Prophet, while 68% said that people who insult Islam should be arrested and prosecuted. Other polls suggest that 50% of Muslims think relations between Muslims and the majority community are getting worse. A UK Government survey says that only 56% agree with the view that while British society may not be perfect, they should not seek to bring it to an end (5 April 2004, ‘Relations with the Muslim Community’, Cabinet Office). Bosnia may have important lessons on how to create societies in which diverse people can develop common loyalties and a shared sense of co-responsibility. Sells (1998) sees a correlation between European anti-Muslim bias, the idea that Islam is ‘inimical’ to European values, as one of the reasons why it took three and a half years before intervening in the Bosnian conflict (Sells 1998: 202-03). In a world that increasingly speaks about co-responsibility, how the international community responds to conflict is an important issue. The United Nation’s own charter begins with the commitment to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’. The United Nations did not feature in the Northern Irish conflict, which has generally been regarded as a domestic issue but the United Nations has passed resolutions concerning the former Yugoslavia, beginning with Resolution 713 (25 September 1991) which enforced an arms embargo. Some UN Resolutions are listed below, in the section on key parties, actors and events. The UN will emerge as a major player in our next case study, the Israel-Palestine conflict. Following Bloody

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Sunday (1972), the Republic of Ireland’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Patrick Hillery did go to the UN demanding its involvement but Britain’s own veto in the Security Council more or less ruled this out. In the Bosnian context, the UN has been criticized for its slow response to the conflict and for its reluctance to commit sufficient troops to be effective on the ground. Critics point out that the Western powers, through the UN, are quick to act when their interests are directly involved, slow when their interests are not. The loss of US-UN soldiers at Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993, which resulted in a total withdrawal, contributed—it has been argued— to reluctance to be drawn into other conflicts, such as Bosnia and Rwanda. The approach seems to have been to let such conflicts run their course with only a token UN presence. Some suggest that lack of any strategic or economic interest also made the Western powers reluctant to intervene, or that they thought that the break-up of the Balkans would actually make it cheaper to drive oil and gas pipelines through from sources further east. Similarities With and Difference from Northern Ireland The collapse of Yugoslavia resulted in several armed conflicts. This case study focuses on the war in Bosnia (1992-96) which included the systematic attempt to eradicate Bosnian cultural artifacts and to ethnically ‘cleanse’ Bosnia of its Muslim population. Some 1000,000 were killed and about 2 million displaced. No fewer than 320 UN soldiers lost their lives. The conflict, or war, can be dated from 3 April 1992 when Serb military started to carry out what was termed ‘ethnic cleansing’, later generally described as genocide, in several areas of Bosnia and to have ended with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord on 22 November 1996. A major issue that has been discussed by the international community is why intervention was delayed, even though evidence of genocide was easily verifiable. Several similarities with the Northern Ireland conflict can be identified. One similarity is that some commentators ascribe animosity and conflict to ancient feuds, suggesting that it is almost in the make-up of Irish and Balkans to fight. McGarry and O’Leary cite the often repeated comment that ‘the Irish are at it again...as if they have some distinctive genetic propensity to war among themselves’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 215). When violence first broke out in the former Yugoslavia, the then US Secretary of State,

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Warren Christopher, giving testimony before the US Congress on 7 May 1993 explained the violence in terms of ‘ancient antagonisms’ (Sells 1998: 127). A few years later, Lawrence Eagleburger, formerly of the same office of state in the USA declared, ‘they have been killing each other with a certain amount of glee in that part of the world for some time now (Sells 1998: 124). Sells suggests that the choice of the term ‘in that part of the world’ was a deliberate hint to the domestic US audience that ‘these people are not our concern’. Both Sells and Glenny refer to the tendency of outsiders to see an ‘imagined Balkans—a world where people are motivated not by rational considerations but by a mysterious congenital bloodthirstiness’ (Glenny 1999: 661; see Sells 1998: 125-28). Religions’ role in the conflict has also been minimized by many analysts. Thus, ‘religion was deemed so inconsequential—at least by the intellectual elite—that one commentator could quip that the three sides, the Serb, Croatian and Bosnian Muslims ‘are of the same race, speak the same language, and are distinguishable only by their religion— in which none of them believe’ (Johnston and Eastvold 2004: 214 citing P. J. O’Rourke). Sells says, ‘Many deny a religious motive in the assault on Bosnia and upon Bosnian Muslims’ (1998: 27). In this view, the conflict was the result of ‘a long history of ethnic conflict’. An obvious difference with Northern Ireland is that the Bosnian conflict involved on one side people who were at least nominally identifiable as Christians, while those on the other are identified as Muslims. Northern Ireland was an intra-Christian conflict; Bosnia was an inter-faith conflict. Northern Ireland involved two main groups, Catholic and Protestant. Bosnia involved three (Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Bosnian Muslims). The perception of some in both conflicts that they were protecting a larger cultural reality is another similarity. Some Protestants in Ireland saw themselves as the frontier between Protestantism and Catholicism; similarly, some Serbs saw the Balkans as the frontier between Christian Europe and the Muslim world, classically represented by former President Miloševic’’s famous speech at Kosovo on 28 June 1989, in which he described Serbia as ‘the bastion of European culture and religion’, and said that the Battle that had been waged there 600 years ago ‘had been a battle to defend Europe from Islam’ (Sells 1998: 122). Myths and ancient events play roles in both conflicts. What, then, were the immediate causes of the war in Bosnia? In the analysis of the role of religion in the Bosnian conflict, a major issue

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will be the nature of Bosnian Islam. Was it a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism, inherently anti-Western or was it an open, liberal, pluralist affirming type of Islam that some have compared with that of Andalusia (see Duran 1995)? In what follows, there is no intent to impute attitudes described that fueled conflict to all Serbs, or to all Croats or to all Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims, the preferred term), only to some. Finally, power-sharing has been written into both the Good Friday and the Dayton Accord agreements. Introducing the Conflict: The Collapse of Yugoslavia Yugoslavia saw two phases of existence, first as a kingdom, then as a communist state. Yugoslavia’s constituent parts had been former provinces of the Ottoman Empire or, in the case of Slovenia, of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Ancient Bosnia, after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire became a pawn between the Byzantine Empire in the East and the emerging Holy Roman Empire in the West. For several centuries it was ruled by Hungary. Its neighbors, Croatia and Serbia became independent kingdoms in the ninth century. Bosnia won independence in 1200 CE. This was achieved by fighting off not only the Hungarians but also the Serbs. Serbia became an Ottoman province in 1389, following defeat in the Battle of Kosovo. Bosnia fell in 1463. Croatia entered a union with Hungary in 1102 and was later split between areas conquered by the Ottomans and those that remained within Hungary. Throughout this period, however, some Croatian institutions including its traditional Sabor (Assembly of Nobles) survived. Sabor is still the Croatian word for ‘parliament’. On 1 December 1918 the regent of Serbia, officially independent from the Ottomans since 1878, declared the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Bosnia, although not reflected in the name, was part of this new kingdom. In 1929, the kingdom took the name Yugoslavia. For Croats, say Johnston and Eastvold, ‘joining in a federation with the previously independent Serbs seemed like an ideal way to avoid being devoured by Italian expansionism along the Adriatic coast’. For Serbians, the goal was always to bring ‘all Serbs together under the political roof of a “Greater Serbia”’. ‘The desire’, they continue, ‘to incorporate all areas with large numbers of Serbs outside Serbia into a single country in which Serbs composed the majority was the principal motive for their initial support of a

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Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina

union of South Slavs and for their opposition to its breakup decades later’ (Johnston and Eastvold 2004: 217). Bosnia had been administered by the Austro-Hungarian Empire since 1878. In 1878, when European powers met in Berlin to settle what they saw as the Ottoman problem, namely, that the Empire was hugely indebted to them, one result was ceding Bosnia to

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Austria-Hungary. While an international commission was entrusted with oversight of Ottoman finances, most of its territory remained intact. The exceptions were: Cyprus, which was ceded to Britain to help her look after her interests in the Suez; Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria which were granted independence; and Bosnia which went to Austria-Hungary as a type of protectorate, since they had missed out on the European scramble for Empire (Riedlmayer: 1993). In 1909, Austria-Hungary formally annexed the province. Nationalist sentiment, however, started to develop in Bosnia stimulated partly by new ideas entering the region as a result of efforts by the AustroHungarians to modernize Bosnia. Partly, it was due to Russia’s and Serbia’s promotion of the idea of a great Slav state, or a Greater Serbia, evoking memories of the thirteenth century when Serbia had reached its largest territorial size. Russia saw herself as guardian of all Orthodox peoples and therefore encouraged Serbian nationalism. Bosnia had large numbers of Serbs (Bosnian Serbs 31%) and Croatians (Bosnian Croats 17%) as well as those who saw themselves as Bosnian, although all were actually Slavs. It also had a substantial Jewish presence. About 43% of the population was Muslim (1991 Census). World War I was sparked by the assassination, in Sarajevo, Bosnia, of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne by Gavrilo Princip, a Serb nationalist. Austria-Hungary was regarded as a major obstacle to nationalist aspirations. After World War I, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire was dissolved, the way was clear for the Balkan states to unite. Bosnia appears to have had little choice but to join this new union. This was very much led by Serbia’s royal family. Increasingly, power was centralized in Serbia and by 1931 Yugoslavia was an absolute monarchy. Internally, administrative divisions were redrawn so as to effectively obliterate the identity of the old provinces, all of which had previously existed as independent nations. Croatians especially resented this due to their developed sense of collective identity. In 1941, when Hitler invaded, the King fled and Yugoslavia was divided among Germany’s allies, with some areas going to Italy, some to Bulgaria, some to Germany itself while Croatia became a puppet-state run by the Ustashe. The Ustashe set up concentration camps for Jews and gypsies and Serbs, pursuing a policy of ethnic cleansing. Only Roman Catholics were exempt. Serbs were forced to become Croats by

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converting to Catholicism. Croatian Muslims do not appear to have been victimized and some joined a Muslim Ustashe brigade, although many Muslim condemned these racist policies. Ethnic cleansing also took place in Serbia, which was the first Nazi satellite to declare that it was ‘Jew-free’. A group of Serbs, known as the Chetniks, saw their chance to expand Serbia’s territory and after an initial period of anti-German resistance, they started to victimize Croats and Muslims. Their vision was of a state free of Jews, Muslims, Gypsies and Catholics that would emerge triumphant in the region after World War II. However, it would be the multi-ethnic Partisans of Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980) who in the end attracted the most support, pitted as they were against the Germans, the Ustashe and anyone who allied themselves with the occupiers. They attracted assistance from the allies. At the end of World War II, Tito emerged as Prime Minister of the newly constituted Democratic Federal Yugoslavia—from 1963, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, effectively a communist state. He became President in 1953. He ruled as a dictator until his death. The particular brand of communism that Tito espoused was known as ‘market socialism’, with workers rather than the state owning the means of production while the market is allowed to determine production and pricing. Yugoslavia was economically better off than most other Communist states. Tito broke with Stalin and the USSR in 1948 and subsequently benefited from the Cold War since Europe was willing to arm him, enabling him to build up the fourth largest military in Europe. Sells (1998) says that in anticipation of a Soviet invasion that never came, ‘the Yugoslav army...had stockpiled immense stores of weapons in hardened bunkers and had constructed weapons factories throughout Yugoslavia’ (Sells 1998: 116). Under Tito, Yugoslavia comprised of six constituent republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovena. Regional nationalism was discouraged, as was religion as opposed to the official, atheistic ideology of the state. Cultural expression as long as it ‘posed no political threat’ was allowed (Riedlmayer 1993). Tito taught ‘brotherhood and unity’. Major issues required ‘unanimity among the republics’ (Johnston and Eastvold 2004: 222). Tito developed a political elite, for whom Marxist and materialist values and the new myth of a ‘national liberation struggle’ replaced religious and nationalist mythologies (Johnston and Eastvold 2004: 220). In fact, the federation gave ‘weight to each

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republic’s concerns’ so that the ‘hegemony’ of ‘any particular group’ was avoided (Johnston and Eastvold 2004: 220). Ethnic difference had no place in the class struggle! When Tito died, he was succeeded by a Presidential Council consisting of the leaders of the six republics (and of two autonomous regions, Kosovo and Vojvodina), among whom the Presidency alternated. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and of communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia could not sustain itself. Disintegration started when Slovenia, the most prosperous of the republics, declared independence on 25 June 1991 and managed to defeat the Yugoslav Army in the Ten Day War that followed. Yugoslav Army soldiers were even sent back to Serbia wearing only their underwear. An immediate provocation behind Slovenia’s cession was the attempt by the Serbian President, Slobodan Miloševic’ (1941-2006), to take over the revolving Presidency by blocking the turn of the Croatian nominee, Stipe Mesic. Having abolished the two autonomous regions in 1990, Miloševic’ appointed his own supporters to continue to represent these regions in the Council. Miloševic’ is usually described as a ‘neo-Stalinist’ (Glenny 1999: 637). Slovenia became a member of the European Union on 1 May 2004. Croatia declared independence on 25 June 1991, leaving what was called ‘rump Yugoslavia with four out of six republics. Once their candidate for the Presidency had been blocked, Croatia’s independence became inevitable. On 8 September 1991, Macedonia peacefully seceded following a referendum. On 27 March 1992, the Bosnian Serbs under Radovan Karadñic declared independence as the Republika Srpska. The Republika had access to Yugoslavian army resources, and formed its own military. On 5 April 1992, under Alija Izetbegovic’ (1925-2003) Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence and by 22 May was accepted as a member of the United Nations. This state was constituted of mainly Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Bosnians were split between those who wanted a separate Bosnia, those who wanted union with Serbia and those who wanted union with Croatia. The Presidents of Serbia and of Croatia almost certainly planned to divide Bosnia between themselves as part of their plans to restore the ‘greater Serbia’ and ‘greater Croatia’ of medieval times by including all Serbs and Croats within their territories. Effectively, says Mahmutc’ehajic’ (2000a) this ‘denied’ Bosnia’s existence:

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The demand that Croatian and Serbian territory should be ‘harmonized’ developed, not surprisingly, into a campaign for the division of Bosnia as a precondition for resolving internal tensions...It was demanded that ‘Serbian autonomous regions’ should be formed in Bosnian territory, which were accordingly (albeit illegally) established, and constituted 63 per cent of the total territory of Bosnia. This was followed by the demand for ‘Croatian autonomous regions’ covering 21 per cent of Bosnia...The overlap between the Serbian and Croatian autonomous areas covered 13 percent of Bosnian state territory (Mahmutc’ehajic’ (2000a) 36).

On 18 November 1991 some Croats declared the ‘Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosnia’, creating a third quasi-political entity. This entity organized a militia, known as the Croatian Defense Council. The Bosnian referenda on independence 29 February and 1 March 1992, which saw a majority (99.4%) in favor, was rejected by most Bosnian Serbs, who boycotted the poll, dismissing its result as engineered by a Muslim-Croat alliance that ran counter to the constitutionally enshrined principle of consensus. Montenegro voted in 1992 to remain united with Serbia within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, although a second referendum on 21 May 2006 resulted in secession. It was admitted as the UN’s 192nd member on 28 June 2006. In Croatia, Serbs declared their own state, resulting in a civil war that continued until 1995 with United Nations peace-keeping forces being first deployed in January 1992 (United Nations Protection Force UNPROFOR). Croatian independence had immediate consequences for both Bosnia and Macedonia, whose Presidents realized that Croatians would look to Croatia, just as their Serbs would look to Serbia, and try to secede (Glenny 1999: 636). Bosnia’s own survival depended on ‘a consensus’ of all three of its communities, ‘a consensus that patently did not exist’ (Glenny 1999: 636). Croatia’s adoption ‘of the checkerboard symbol (the symbol of the hated Ustasha who massacred innumerable Serbs during World War II) as its national emblem’, say Johnston and Eastvold, ‘terrified Serbs’, who assumed that Croatia ‘was determined to blot out any Serbian influence’ (Johnston and Eastvold 2004: 221). Miloševic’, who saw the large number of ethnic Albanians (Muslims) in Kosovo as an affront to Serbian pride, began a campaign of re-housing Serbs fleeing conflict there, expelling Albanians to make room for them. Thousands of Albanians were dismissed from government jobs. Kosovo’s Albanians declared independence on 2 July 1990. Between 1996 and 1999, conflict between Serbian forces and the Kosovo

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Liberation Army saw hundreds of churches and mosques destroyed and some 5000 civilian casualties. In 1999, Kosovo became a UN protectorate, run by a UN-appointed governor. Initially, the international community was reluctant to see the breakup of Yugoslavia, suspicious that its republics were viable as separate entities. However, as break-up began, some encouragement was given; the Germans encouraged Croatia while the USA encouraged Bosnia-Herzegovina (Glenny 1999: 637-38). Discussion • If the International Community was suspicious about the viability of the republics as separate entities, should they have intervened? • Is the International Community handicapped by the doctrine that people have the right of self-determination? Or, could it have suggested to the republics strategies and possibilities to continue together in some form of federal relationship? • When is intervention in the internal affairs of a country justified? The ‘regime change’ goal of the invasion of Iraq was used to justify the pre-emptive strike of 2003. While US President George Bush and others argue that Iraq presented a military threat to the West, which a collapsing Yugoslavia did not, might this nonetheless be used as a precedent for internal intervention? • The prevention of genocide by intervention was legalized by UN Security Council Resolution 1674 passed 28 April 2006— after both the Bosnian and Rwandan tragedies. How Did the War Begin? Effectively, the declaration of an independent Bosnian Serb State sliced Bosnia into three sections: the Bosnian Republic was in the center; one section of Republika Srpska, around Banja Luka, was to the North bordering on Croatia; another, around Gorazde, was to the South East, bordering on Serbia and Montenegro. Croatia also borders on the West. When Miloševic’ realized that Yugoslavia was disintegrating, he engineered a United Nations Resolution on 25 September 1991 against any arms sales in the region. This greatly benefited Serbia, since it had inherited the former Yugoslav Army and its weaponry. Accounts vary as to exactly when the Bosnian

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war started. There were casualties in early 1992 but the generally accepted date for the start of the war is 6 April when units of the Serb controlled Yugoslav Army started to shell the Muslim-majority city of Sarajevo. Bosnian Serbs ‘inherited the bulk of Yugoslav Army supplies in Bosnia’ (Glenny 1999: 641). The aim seems to have been to destroy a Bosnian state and to preserve or extend rump Yugoslavia as a Serb-dominated entity. In May, the Bosnian government pleaded with the international community to lift the arms embargo but in vain (Sells 1998: 137). What followed began to resemble cultural genocide; 17 May saw the destruction of the Oriental Institute. Mosques, libraries, synagogues, archives and museums were put to the torch, including the National Library destroyed 25-28 September 1992. The historic bridge at Mostar, built in 1556—the Bridge Betrayed in Sell’s title—was destroyed 9 November 1993. One Croat militiaman put it like this, ‘It is not enough to cleanse Mostar of the Muslims...the relics must also be destroyed’ (Sells 1998: 93). This followed what Glenny described as an orgy of destruction (1999: 646). Sells describes the famous bridge as ‘a symbol of Bosnia’s role in bridging cultures’ (1998: 113). Glenny says that the act was videoed by ‘a group of Bosnian Croat soldiers’ as if to ‘represent the utter senselessness and misery of the entire conflict’ (Glenny 1999: 646). Soon, Serb military occupied 70% of the country. Muslims, Croats, Gypsies and Jews were rounded up and routinely attacked, killed, raped and robbed. Those who remained were transported to camps. Legislation reminiscent of Nazi statutes made marriage, or sexual relations, with a nonSerb illegal. Non-Serbs were expelled from employment in the ‘public sector’ and required to identify their residences by displaying white flags. In the spring of 1993, some Croats, intent on carving out their own Croatian space, joined in the ethnic cleansing. Various paramilitary groups were involved, such as the Serbian Voluntary Guard and the Croatian Defense Forces, which also recruited from Serbia and Croatia. Muslims were now caught in the middle of these competing nationalisms. Their aim, says Glenny, was either a ‘Zagreb-dominated union between Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovia’ or ‘to divide Bosnia with the Serbs’ (Glenny 1999: 645). Glenny notes that even Croatians who were ostensibly allied with the Muslims regularly ‘sold oil and other supplies to the Bosnian Serbs’ (Glenny 1999: 645). Sells regards the destruction of culture as essential to the plan to partition Bosnia, since, if ‘Bosnia has no

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culture’, why should it not be divided between Serbia and Croatia. Then the Muslims could be herded ‘into a central ghetto?’ (Sells 1998: 150). Called on to intervene, the international community was very reluctant. Sentiments cited above, that people in this part of the world had been killing each other with glee for centuries, called for caution. US President Bill Clinton suggested that until people in the region ‘got tired of killing themselves, bad things’ would ‘continue to happen’ (cited by Sells 1998: 127). Europeans could distance themselves sufficiently from this troubled region, although the possibility of having to give space to a flood of refugees was worrisome. One text suggested that the Balkans are ‘too close to the Orient (read Islam) to be a true part of Europe’ (Sells 1998: 124 citing Robert Kaplan 1992). This book, says Sells, ‘popularized the caricature of Balkan people as locked in unending hate and revenge’, similar to the stereotypical Irish (Sells 1998: 125). Referring to the same book, Johnston and Eastvold sum up its approach as the ‘“primordial hatreds” view’ (216). One US Congressmen stated that people in the Balkans had been fighting each other for fifteen hundred years, ‘oblivious to the fact that none of the major religious and ethnic groups in Bosnia had yet settled in the Balkans at that time’ (128). What Sells calls ‘Balkanization’ reduces the area to one of systemic violence, even genocide (125). However, while the conflict is routinely referred to as a war, most of the victims were unarmed civilians. Others simply did not see the conflict as significant in economic or oil-driven terms. Intervention may have been much swifter if concerned nations saw a risk to their supply of oil or of energy or of conflict spilling over their own borders. Perhaps it was the influx of refugees into West Europe that finally provoked action. Eventually, when intervention did follow, it ‘revolved less around perceived strategic or economic issues than around humanitarianism’, says Glenny (1999: 639). The USA with NATO eventually intervened with some ‘strategic bombing’ in September 1995, aimed at helping the Bosnians at Sarajevo. In September 1992, UNPROFOR’s mandate was extended to include Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was commissioned to secure the safety of Sarajevo airport and to create a safe-area around five Bosnian towns, including Sarajevo and Srebrenica. It was to protect Red Cross, UN High Commission for Refugees and humanitarian workers, calling on NATO to offer strategic air support when necessary. Srebenica,

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however, was handed over by UN troops on 11 July 1995 to Serb militia, who proceeded to execute 8,000 Muslim men and boys, since adjudicated an act of genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yogoslavia. The UN forces, says Glenny, became a ‘convenient scapegoat for everybody’ but they were ‘outgunned, demoralized, and subject to the most inflexible bureaucracy in military history’ (Glenny 1999: 641). The UN rules of engagement only allowed the troops to shoot if they were themselves direct targets of shooting. Working together, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance representing the United Nations and European Union representative, Lord David Owen, proposed the ‘Vance-Owen Plan’ in January 2003 which ‘divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten cantons with a dominant ethnic group in nine’. The area ‘designated for Croat control was’, says Sells, ‘very generous’ described as a reflection ‘of the reality on the ground’ (Sells 1998: 100). This sounded as if aggression and conquest was being awarded (Sells 1998: 134). Owen himself claimed that Serbs had controlled 60% of pre-war Bosnia. However, the Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan, which was quickly dropped. Finally, on 22 November 1995, the Dayton Peace Accord was signed, negotiated by the Contact Group nations of Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the USA with the European Union, and signed by Croatia, Yugoslavia and Bosnia. The parties agreed to mutually recognize each other, to resolve differences peacefully and to cease all hostilities. The Agreement left Bosnia-Herzegovia, and the Bosnian Serb Republic with borders similar to those of 1992. The two states are roughly the same size (51% and 49% of the original republic). Free and fair elections were to take place in both states. UNPROFOR was stood down and IFOR, a NATO-led multi-national force, was to ensure compliance. This had a one-year mandate. On 21 December 1995 the UN established an international police task force for Bosnia with a brief to reform and restructure the security and police services. On 31 December 2002 the UN handed over responsibility to a European Union Police Mission, which is still operative. Glenny suggests that Bosnia remains to all intent and purposes a ‘military protectorate’ and that should troops withdraw, the fragile peace would not survive (Glenny 1999: 652). Under the constitutional arrangement, representatives of the three main communities, Muslim, Serb and Croat each have a seat on the Presidential Council, thus ‘the three local elites are

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comfortable with the arrangement as it guarantees their hold on power within their own communities’ (Glenny 1999: 652). The Bosnian and Northern Irish peace processes thus both feature a power-sharing solution. Unfortunately, says Glenny, the way in which the map has been drawn ‘discourages cooperation’ across the communities and ‘undermines the economic development of all three’. The Dayton Agreement also established the post of High Representative, charged with oversight of the implementation of the civilian provisions. Critics say that the High Representative has more power than the elected government, which has stifled legitimate development. Discussion • To what extent was UN reluctance to intervene in Bosnia racist? • Was reluctance due to the non-interest of Security Council members? • General Romeo Dallair of Canada, who headed the UN force in Rwanda, who warned that the impending tragedy would happen, suggests that the UN is very reluctant to intervene in any sub-Saharan African context. Is this justified? Some Key Parties, Actors and Events 4 May 1980: Death of Marshall Tito, President of Yugoslavia. February 1988: Slobodan Miloševic’ becomes President of Serbia. 28 March 1989: Serbia reduces the autonomy of its two provinces. 28 June 1989: Miloševic’ speaks at the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, saying that Serbia had regained its ‘state and its dignity’. Lack of leadership and betrayal had led to defeat 600 years ago. Unity, cooperation and seriousness would result in success. 600 years ago, Serbia had not only defended itself but also ‘European culture, religion and society’. Serbia once again faced battles, ‘not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded’. The enemies implied in this call to battle were widely assumed to be Muslims, who had defeated the Serbs in the original battle of Kosovo. November 1990: Alija Izetbegovic’ of the Muslim Party of Democratic Action elected President of Bosnia. Imprisoned several times under

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Tito for what was described as ‘pan-Islamic activities’ Izetbegovic’’s Islamic Manifesto was published in 1971 and his Islam Between East and West in 1984. Critics accused him of wanting to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state. His openly expressed commitment to a multi-ethnic Bosnia, which he consistently promoted, was dismissed as camouflage. 25 June 1991: Croatia and Slovenia declare independence. Croatia’s first President, Franjo Tudjman (1922-99) drew support from Croatians in Diaspora to pursue his policy of Croatian nationalism based on Catholic values and Croatia’s historical traditions. His Croatian Democratic Union has been described as Christian Democrat (centre-right). His somewhat revisionist writing questioned the number of victims in Croatia during the World War II puppet regime, and that the figure of 6 million victims of the Holocaust is far too high. He actively encouraged anti-Muslim stereotypes, so that some Croatians disowned their Muslim relatives. Practicing Muslims were called ‘Turks’ (Sells 1998: 103). In attracting German support for independence, Croatia depicted itself as ‘an integral part of a civilized Catholic, central European culture while denigrating its Serbian neighbour as representative of the barbaric, despotic Orient’ (Glenny 1999: 637 citing Calic 1995: 17). Tudjman also played the ‘Green card’, initially espousing environmentally friendly policies in a ploy to attract European-wide Green Party support. 8 September 1991: Macedonia declares independence. Greece objects to the name, claiming that Macedonia ‘had a Hellenic pedigree stretching back to Alexander the Great’ (Glenny 1999: 656). Due to the name-dispute, the UN agreed to accept Macedonia in 1993 as the ‘former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ but several nations have subsequently recognized Macedonia as the Republic of Macedonia. 25 September 1991: UN Resolution 713 enforces an arms embargo in the former Yugoslavia, engineered by Serbia. 21 February 1992: UN Resolution 742 established UNPROFOR – United Nations Protection Force and stationed troops in Croatia. 3 March 1992: Referendum boycotted by Bosnian Serbs approves Bosnian independence.

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27 March 1992: Bosnian Serbs under Radovan Karad Žic’, co-founder of the Serbian Democratic Party, declare the Republik Srpska. A devout Serbian Orthodox, Karad Žic’ was described by the Church ‘one of the most prominent sons of our Lord Jesus Christ working for peace’ as the International Tribunal indicted him for crimes of genocide and of crimes against humanity (Sells 1998: 85). At time of writing he remains a fugitive. 6 April 1992: Bosnian Serbs begin the siege of Sarajevo. 1 June 1992: About 762 Muslims killed in Zvornik. June 1992: UN Forces deployed in Bosnia. Summer 1992: UN Peace-keeping Forces frequented the ‘rape-camp’ known as Sonja’s Kon-Tiki (near Sarajevo), taking advantage of the women who were ‘Muslim captives held against their will, abused and sometimes killed’ (Sells 1998: 132). August 1992: Journalists gain access to the Omarska Concentration Camp where about 6,000 Muslims and Croats were captive. Accounts described the ‘breathtaking inhumanity’ of their treatment. 9 September 1992: Massacre at Cerska: bodies later found in mass graves. September 1992: UN Forces mandate further extended to include protection of humanitarian workers in Bosnia. 2 January 1993: The Vance-Owen Plan is published. 8 January 1993: The Bosnian Prime Minister, Hakija Turajlic’, is killed by Serbs after stopping his UN escort. 16 April 1993: UN declares Srebrenica a safe area. 5 May: Republika Srpska rejects the Vance-Owen Plan. 25 May 1993: UN Resolution 827 established the International Tribunal ‘for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law’ in the former Yugoslavia. June 1993: As the ‘Convoy of Joy’ transports humanitarian aid to relieve Muslim controlled Tuzla, militiamen shoot ‘The Muslim drivers or pulled them out of the trucks and slit their throats’.

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Several days of pillaging follow, as UN peacekeepers watch (Sells 1998: 102). 28 August 1993: Bosnian Croats form the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, which Glenny describes as a ‘shot-gun’ wedding that effectively resulted in giving Croatia ‘the right to interfere directly in Bosnian affairs’. It also brought about a shift in US policy, which had previously given ‘rhetorical support ... to the Bosnian government’ but which now gave ‘practical support’ to Croatia, building up its army as the ‘only way of eroding Serbian military superiority’ (Glenny 1999: 647). Late-1993: Muslim volunteers from overseas supplement Bosnia’s ill-equipped army of 5 corps or brigades, forming the 7th Muslim Victorious Brigade. Bin Laden’s training camp in Afghanistan trained mujahideen to fight in Bosnia, where hundreds are said to have volunteered. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia promised ‘unstinting support’ while at the Organization of Islamic Conference meeting in December 1992, Iran called for Muslim states to arm Bosnia if the UN and the West ‘did not take action to end the fighting by midJanuary 1993’ (Burr and Collins 2006: 135). 5 February 1994: Sixty-eight die and 100 are injured by a single shell shot into the Sarajevo market. 23 February 1994: Cease-fire agreed. 28 Feb 1994: NATO shoots down four airplanes flying across the UN-declared no fly zone. This was NATO’s first intervention. 12 March 1994: A four hour delay in NATO’s response to a request for air-support from UN ground troops resulted in a UN enquiry. French troops were fired on by Serbs near the Muslim stronghold of Bihac. 14 March 1994: Bosnian Muslims and Croats sign an accord, reducing the warring factions to two. 12-14 July: Eight thousand men and boys executed outside the UN safe-haven of Srebrenica after UN peace-keepers handed the area over to the Serbs. UN soldiers witnessed the massacre. Their rules of engagement only authorized self-defense and they were not themselves under fire. It may be debated whether intervention

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could have prevented the killings, that is, that the UN peace-keepers were outnumbered and outgunned. 25 July 1995: USA passes a bill to authorize the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia, motivated by the events at Srebrenica. August-September 1994: Expulsions and executions of Muslims in Banja Luka and Bijeljina. 28 August 1995: Second massacre at Sarajevo results in first NATO bomb attacks. 12 days of attacks against tanks, ammunition dumps and air defense radars, claims NATO, helped to convince the Serbs that ‘the benefits of negotiating peace outweighed those of continuing to wage war’ (from NATO’s website, section ‘The Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina: How did it evolve?’ www.nato.int/issues/sfor/evolution.html). 21 November 1995: Dayton Accord signed, formalizing two states one with a Muslim, one a Serb majority. Bosniaks are roughly 80% of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Serb 4.4%, Croat 14%, others 1%). The Serb Republic (Srpska) surrounds Bosnia-Herzegovina on three sides with a third entity, the Brko District. Technically a ‘condominium’ it is effectively independent. 14 September 1996: Elections held for a three-person (Croat, Serb, Muslim) presidency. Izetbegovic’ wins but resigns in 2000 on health grounds. 1 April 2001: Miloševic’ was arrested and handed over to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at the Hague where he was charged with violating the laws of war and of crimes against humanity. He died 11 March 2006 before his trial had ended. 1 August 2001: Radislav Krstic, Bosnian Serb General, found guilty of genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the death of 8,000 at Srebrenica and sentenced to 46 years in prison. On appeal, his conviction was changed to ‘aiding and abetting genocide.’ His sentence was reduced by 11 years. 26 March 2006: The UN Tribunal adjudicates that Serbia was not directly responsible for genocide in Bosnia but had violated its

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responsibility to prevent and punish mass killings. However, the court also ruled that genocide had occurred. 17 February 2008: Muslim majority Kosovo declares unilateral independence from Serbia. Serbia denounces this as demonstrations protest against the declaration. 18 July 2008: Karad Ž ic’ was arrested and charged 19 July at The Hague with war crimes and genocide. Discussion • What lessons should the International Community learn from the Bosnian War? • How might the International Community have handled the conflict differently? • What, if anything, might have averted the war? • Would you characterize the war as a civil conflict or as an interstate conflict? • Is the above account biased, in your opinion? • Is my analysis that the conflict involved competing nationalisms fighting for the same space a convincing one, based on what you have read of the conflict? • Effectively, has the peace plan rewarded aggression? • Can the people of the world trust the UN to safeguard them from genocide?

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Chapter Four THE ROLE OF RELIGION Rival Aspirations, or Historical Antagonisms? The above summary of the history of the conflict deliberately downplayed the religious aspects. The question under review here is to what extent was religion a key factor? Was it a prime cause of violence? Was it, as has been argued for Northern Ireland, a marker of identity but not a significant cause of conflict? Was it incidental to the main issues involved? This discussion will argue that religion was used during the violence as a very important marker of identity, and that some on both sides drew inspiration from religious sources. With respect to Muslim involvement, I shall argue that reference to Islam was more reactive than primary, although there are no few commentators who always saw the issue as one of holding back an Islamist threat. Bosnian Muslims, it was said, aimed to ‘set up a fundamentalist Jamahariyya (people’s state)’ (Sells 1998: 120). Margaret Thatcher, urging President Bush to take action, spoke of the need to spare Europe from ‘an Islamic time bomb’ (cited by Duran 1995: 36). Certainly, Jihadists flocked to the aid of their fellow Muslims in Bosnia. It is also true that as a result of the conflict some Bosnian Muslims have become more sympathetic towards an Islamist agenda. Duran comments that, faced by the possibility of almost complete annihilation and by the seeming indifference of the global community, Muslims developed ‘an increasingly strident Islamic identity’ (1995: 181). In my view, religion is more central to the Bosnian conflict than to the Northern Irish ‘troubles’. I agree with Johnston and Eastvold that religion was used as a ‘provocateur’ in the Bosnian conflict. This may well represent a miss-use of religion, what I have called ‘bad religion’ but it remains alarming for me, as a religious person, that religion so easily lends itself to be manipulated in this way. More so than in Northern Ireland, religious leaders were themselves implicated in this ‘misuse’ of religion.

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Johnston and Eastvold point out that whether or not beliefs that motivated actions were ‘legitimate or even true’, they were ‘a factor’. Regardless of its truth, ‘adherents to a religious-nationalist version of history will regard it as factual and behave accordingly’ (Johnston and Eastvold 2004: 216). At the heart of the conflict, it can be argued, stands myths or stories that each side tell about the other as well as about themselves. First, I examine the case against religion as a factor. ‘Strictly speaking’, say Johnston and Eastvold, ‘the recent war in Yugoslavia was not a religious war...’ but ‘religion was clearly invoked as a rhetorical tool by all sides’ as ‘a means to a political end, not an end in itself’ (Johnston and Eastvold 2004: 223). Does this get religion off the hook? The Case Against Religion as a Central Cause The case against religion rests mainly on the view that what is at issue, as in Northern Ireland, are rival nationalisms. Serb nationalism wanted a Serb state, in which there was no room for other identities such as Croat or Muslim. Croats wanted a Croatian state. Others, who happened to be Muslims, preferred the multi-national reality that had been Yugoslavia or a similarly constituted state. Once Croatia, in pursuit of its national agenda, had left the federation, Serbs were automatically in a dominant position, given their substantial presence in Bosnia as well as in Serbia. Bosnian Muslims may simply wish to have been identified as ‘Bosnian’ but for historical reasons, this identity was denied. Under Yugoslavia, Bosnians were either Serbs or Croats. In 1968, the Constitution was altered to allow Muslims to register as ‘musliman’, or as ‘Muslim by nationality’. The then President of Bosnia, Hamdija Pozderac (1924-1988) is reported to have said that while Bosnians who did not consider themselves Croats or Serbs would prefer to be known simply as ‘Bosnians’, they would accept Muslimhood although the name was wrong. From the 1990s, the preferred term has been ‘Bosniak’ to describe people with strong ties to the Bosnian region, who follow Islam and have a common language and culture. Since Serbs are mainly Orthodox and Croatians Catholic, this does mean that the three main communities are identifiably by different religious labels, just as the two protagonists in Northern Ireland were. However, the conflict can be represented as predominantly caused by rival nationalisms, with Bosnian Muslims caught in the

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middle of Serb and Croatian ambitions to divide the region between themselves, based on the fact that substantial ‘Serb’ and ‘Croatian’ populations existed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbs happen, in this view, to be Orthodox while Croats happen to be Catholic, just as in Northern Ireland Loyalists happen to be Protestant and Republicans happen to be Catholic. The medieval entities of Serbia and Croatia had also overlapped with Bosnia, as well as with each other (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a: 8). Even without introducing a specific religiously motivated antiMuslim rhetoric, these two nationalisms inevitably denied Bosnia’s right to exist. On the one hand, this ethnic identification was also religious, since it was based less on any historical tie with Croatia or Serbia than on religious affiliation; ‘99.5 percent of Orthodox believers also considered themselves to be Serbs and 98.1 percent of Roman Catholics considered themselves to be Croats’ according to a 1953 Census (Johnston and Eastvold 2004: 225). On the other, identification as Serbian and of Croat and not as Bosnian played well with those who wanted to be part of either a Greater Serbia or a Greater Croatia and who had no desire to perpetuate the existence of Bosnia as a multi-cultural entity. Muslims, or Bosniaks, who identified with neither Serbia nor with Croatia but with Bosnia were bound to be victims in any clash or division of the region. They can be regarded as a third nationality, caught between the nationalisms of Serbia and Croatia. The term ‘Bosnian Muslim’, which I have used in this chapter, is considered by some to be outof-date and even offensive, reducing the identity of those who are now usually called Bosniaks to a religious one and therefore denying their national aspirations, which, arguably, plays into the hands of those who deny that there is any such thing as a Bosnian national identity. Johnston and Eastvold discuss four views of the conflict, under the titles ‘primordialist’, ‘clash of civilizations’, ‘constructionist’ and ‘self-critical constructive’. Each view has different policy implications for the outside world. This analysis also draws on the theory that the clash in part stems from differences between the perceptions of urban as opposed to rural dwellers. Rural dwellers tend to like things the way they are and to be suspicious of outsiders, even of people from the next village. Urban dwellers, who are often more comfortable with cosmopolitanism, are ‘tolerant’ and ‘sophisticated’ (Johnston and Eastvold 2004: 215). The ‘primordialist’ view posits

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that, especially among rural dwellers, ancient myths and hatreds exist. The outside response is to stay away and ‘let the Balkans fight it out’ among themselves (Johnston and Eastvold 2004: 210). The ‘clash of civilizations’ view clearly owes a debt to Samuel P. Huntington. Similar to the ‘primordialist’ view this assumes fundamental cultural differences between the parties but outside response may take one of two directions. It can see détente as possible, provided that differences are respected or it can choose to take one side as opposed to another. Joshua Muravchick argues that not only did the UN fail to ‘modify its own embargo’ but its commanders on the ground showed a tendency to support Serbs. He argues that the UN forces not only failed to stop the Srebrenica massacre but ‘helped to bring it about; citing British General Rose’s comment that the only option Muslims had was to ‘move out or submit to living under Serb rule’ (Muravchick 2005: 26). In other words, since their goal was to see an end to the war, they decided that the ‘shortest path...was for the weaker party’, the Bosnian Muslims, ‘to surrender’ (Muravchick 2005: 28). In both these views, history leaves little room for change and differences are so substantial that conflict is inevitable. Constructionists take what the authors describe as a more malleable view of history, arguing that the recent conflict is not rooted in ancient animosities but was ‘recently provoked by demagogues’. Urban dwellers especially have a history of ‘peaceful co-existence’ that has been ‘shattered by external forces’. Mixed marriages were much more common than among rural dwellers. Riedlmayer (1993) says that one third of all marriages in Bosnia over ‘recent decades’ involved crossing culture or religion. Urban people tend to identify with the municipality in which they lived rather than with an ethnic or national group. Rural dwellers, more so than Urban dwellers, ‘tend to view the world in terms of the ongoing struggle to defend their pristine way of life against a hostile world’. Thus, the three communities have lived at peace in Bosnia’s cities but this harmonious co-existence has been damaged by propaganda from outside, that is, from Serbia and Croatia. Outsiders would intervene to ‘stop the conflict’ and to ‘foster conditions for democratic and economic reform’. Finally, self-critical constructionists see conflict as fueled by rural actors rather than by urban actors. Both rural and urban accounts need to be considered but not uncritically. What can be described as ‘concerns’ rather than ‘ancient animosities’ have been ‘revived

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and distorted’ by those who want to promote conflict. Outsiders should take ‘ethno-religious concerns seriously’ and expose ‘distortions of these concerns’ so that a lasting peace can be achieved. A settlement of difference is more in ‘line’ with the belligerents’ heritages ‘than continued war’. All views posit that difference or ‘deeply held concerns’ lie behind the conflict but none single out religion as a major factor. Reference to ‘ethno-religious’ concerns links ‘religion’ with ‘ethnicity’, which may be a peculiarity of the Balkan situation. Religion, generally, crosses ethnicity so that it is not really possible to associate any single religion with a specific racial group. On the other hand, the Northern Irish conflict could also be said to involve two ethno-religious groups, one of Scots, one of Celtic ancestry with very few people from either community belonging to the dominant religion of the other. Interestingly, apart from reference to ‘economic reform’, none of these views single out inequality, injustice or discrimination as major issues either, which feature prominently in analyses of the Northern Irish conflict. On the other hand, economic issues were involved, as many people lost their jobs merely because they belonged to a different community, for example, the expulsion of non-Serbs from public posts in Serb-controlled territory. The Case for Religion as a Central Cause Two Scenarios Those who stress the role of religion argue one of two cases. First, that Islam was the cause of the conflict, posing a threat to other territories. In this scenario, Bosnia would emerge as an Islamist state with its own expansionist agenda. Second, that Slavic Christian nationalism was the cause, although obviously these two can be reversed. In this view, the Bosniaks are represented both as racetraitors and as traitors to Christendom. Thus, their conversion to Islam disenfranchises them from what Mahmutc´ehajic´ describes as ‘the European heritage’. The Muslims have no right to claim the legacy of the ‘medieval Bosnian kingdom’, since they forfeited this right by their conversion (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a: 29). In contrast, Serbia and Croatia represent themselves as candidates for membership of the European space (of which Yugoslavia was never fully part) on the grounds that their own ‘ethno-national policies

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are in harmony with historical trends and world order’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a 10). Representing themselves as on the path to the type of liberal democracies that characterize Western Europe, this is contrasted with the Islamist danger of a Bosnian state controlled by Muslims. The very existence of Bosnia as a state in which Muslims reside threatens their development into cohesive, ‘mono-ethnic states able to take their rightful place in the European Union’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a: 11). In this scenario, ‘the Muslim presence clashes with ...the development of liberal-democratic principles; thus, it is the alleged duty of “true” Christians to remove this anomaly’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a: 11). The first view depends on establishing that the nature of Bosnian Islam was radical, which is subject to a great deal of debate. Many argue that Islam was not the cause, since Bosnian Islam was tolerant and affirming of a pluralist state. Islam, though, may have been conscripted once conflict began to attract support for the defense of Bosnia. The view that Slavic religious nationalism was the cause is closely linked with the contention that Islam was a dangerous actor, since this represents Slavic religious nationalism as the defender and not the aggressor. Others see Slavic religious nationalism as the chief aggressor against an Islam that posed no threat, although it may be conceded that Muslims became more radical as a result of the conflict. The analysis that follows draws on Sells, Duran, Mahmutc´ehajic´ and on Izetbegovic´. Islam as Cause: The Nature of Bosnian Islam The nature of Bosnian Islam depends on who is describing or perceiving it, which directly impacts on how the history of Muslim presence in Bosnia and its recent manifestations are depicted. According to Mahmutc’ehajic’, Sells and Duran, most Bosnian Muslims at the time that Yugoslavia began to implode saw their state as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious reality in which there was ‘unity in diversity’. They opposed ‘all ideologies that are based on exclusivity and ignore the call for charity towards others’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a: 35). Duran (1995: 31) described Bosniaks as ‘leading in democracy and modernity, in pluralism and secularization’ and as favoring ‘a state for all Bosnians regardless of their religious affiliation’. Duran points out that Bosnian Islam is also itself diverse and that different schools of it maintained good

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relationships with one another. Thus, a traditionalist leader such as Hafiz Kamil Silaijich, Imam of Sarajevo’s largest mosque was in ‘close and amicable contact with reformist groups’ (Duran 1995: 33). Mixed marriages were common. Islamic law was not practiced and the prevalent expression of Islam might best be described as ‘Islamic humanism’ not ‘fundamentalism’ (Duran 1995: 32). Duran suggests that Bosnian Islam was just the type of Islam that some European Muslims describe as ‘Euro Islam’, which, as described by one of its champions, the Syrian-born German citizen, Bassam Tibi, is an interpretation of Islam that: Makes it compatible with four...constitutional standards...laicism (that is, the separation of religion and politics, secular tolerance based on individual human rights, democratic pluralism and last but not least, civil society (Tibi 2001: 226).

Sells also stresses that the majority of Bosniaks wanted a pluralist, multi-religious society. Many Bosnians, he says: Sought a nation based not on exclusive religious affiliation but on constitutional rule and respect for differing religions (Sells 1998: 8).

Bosnia: Unity in Diversity Throughout his extensive writing, Rusmir Mahmutc´ehajic´, former Bosnian Vice-President, consistently articulates this view of Bosnian Islam. This ‘nationalism’, he says, was the very opposite of Serbian and Croatian ethno-religious nationalisms, and so was a roadblock in the way of their dreams to incorporate all Serbs and Croats into homogenous states; ‘the Greater Serbian and Greater Croatian plans can be summed up by citing their two most immediate purposes: the establishment of ethno-national rule in their respective territories, once cleansed of Bosniak presence, and the destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina in terms of its significance as a common state for members of all ethno-religious groups’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a: 74). According to Serbian and Croatian logic, Bosnia is a ‘false creation’, since its territory had ‘originally belonged to the Serbs and the Croats’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a :59). This is why, says Sells, that as well as attempting to kill all Muslims, the perpetrators of the genocide also systematically set out to destroy all signs that a pluralist, tolerant society had ever existed in Bosnia so that ‘history could be rewritten according to the desires of those who wished to

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claim that this land was always and purely Christian Serb’. Thus, any ‘evidence...of five hundred years of shared living between Christian and Muslims’ was obliterated (Sells 1998: 4). Mahmutc´ehajic´’s detailed analysis of what he calls the ‘denial of Bosnia’ also locates this within the wider context of an emerging model that positions ‘civilizations’ at the centre of global geo-politics in which ‘civilizations’ define ‘themselves by their links with individual cultural entities’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a: 82). This view has been influenced by Huntington’s clash of civilizations theses. Huntington argues that multi-cultural societies are weak; he castigates the United States for abandoning its European heritage (Huntington 1996: 306). Mahmutc´ehajic´ says that the plan to partition Bosnia was agreed between Miloševic´ and Tudjman and that in order to carry this out, a deliberate effort had to be made to drive Croats and Bosniaks apart. As noted in the historical section above, some Croats were initially allied with the Muslims (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000: 46N5). Mahmutc´ehajic´ argues eloquently that Bosnia has a long history, pre-dating the Ottoman period and the presence of Islam, of embracing diversity. He rejects the contention that different religioethnic groups in Bosnia had a record of hostility and antagonism, a picture painted by, among others, the political leaders of Serbia and Croatia, for whom Muslims represent ‘the evil Other, the embodiment of primitivism and inhumanity...opposed to the civilized virtues of European culture’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a: 61). Even if Bosnian Muslims and Christians had once lived together in ^ peace, they could no longer do so; as Radovan Karadzic’ put it, ‘Serbs cannot live together with Muslims and Croats’ (cited by Mahmutc’ehajic’ 2000a: 45 (not 46)). According to Mahmutc´ehajic´, Bosnians have always resisted centralizing tendencies, valuing unity in diversity. Before the Ottoman period, attempts to impose a single version of Christianity were resisted, resulting in the emergence of a Bosnian Church that was neither Catholic nor Orthodox but possibly had more in common with Arianism and perhaps with the Cathars (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000b: 119-20). According to Mahmutc’ehajic’, Bosnian Christians did not reverence or kneel before icons or the cross (2000b: 121). Alongside these Bosnian Christians were Catholic and Orthodox Christians. All three lived side-by-side. While there was never any formal agreement between them that ‘no single creed can have priority, nor that the right road

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lay in dialogue based on acceptance of the faiths of all participants’, this consensus nonetheless emerged (2000a: 119). Mahmutc´ehajic´ argues that when, following the Ottoman conquest, Islam became another religious option in Bosnia, the stage was set both for nonicon, non-cross reverencing, Arianist-tending Bosnian Christians, or Bogomils, to convert to Islam and for all religious communities to continue to co-exist on the basis that each represented a viable ‘path’, based on ‘respect for the statement that “God gave every people their law and their way of life”’ (2000a: 119; citing Q5: 48). Conversion to Islam took place over time. There were some incentives for converting but Mahmutc´ehajic´ argues that it was due to the work of Sufi teachers, whose presence in Bosnia preceded the Ottoman invasion, that encouraged conversion. These Sufis integrated their ‘message into the language and the country’ (2000b: 124). Q5: 48 is often cited by Muslim pluralists to show that religious diversity is part of God’s plan. Jews also lived in Bosnia. After the expulsion of Jews from Spain (1492), Bosnia was one of the Ottoman provinces where many found refuge. For Mahmutc´ehajic´, what emerged as political polity in Bosnia— a view of the nation as one that was knitted together by recognition of ‘unity in diversity’—was at root profoundly theological. He describes Bosnia as ‘a mesh woven of separate strands, all leading to one and the same centre’ (2000b: 115). At the centre, for him, sits the Bosnian conviction that different religions represent distinct ways of honoring the Absolute. ‘Bosnia’, he writes, ‘is a name for a model of community life shared by the inheritors of different holy traditions’ (2000a: 119). He also locates this affirmation of pluralism as an Islamic virtue: the three religions of Bosnia - Christianity, Judaism and Islam - can be seen as different but doctrinally complete exoteric expressions of one and the same Reality. Their single forefather, Abraham, the prophet, has an endless diversity of offspring ... (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000b: 82).

He argues that this co-existence in Bosnia, what he calls the harmonia Abrahamica, provided an essential balance against any single tradition becoming perverse, idolizing itself as the only true faith. This is the type of pluralist society that once flourished in parts of Andulusia during Muslim rule, referred to in Spanish as convivencia. Thus, ‘the exoteric multitude continues to be not only possible, but necessary, since it provides the orthodox religious forms with a variety of

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perspectives which stand in the way of the perversion of each and any religion into an idol’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000b: 83). Judaism represents ‘the letter and the law’, Christianity represents ‘spirit and faith’, Islam synthesizes the two. Unlike other writers who see Islam as superseding or as replacing the earlier religions, Mahmutc´ehajic´ views them as mutually complimentary and necessary, so that ‘the denial of one is the denial of all’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000b: 83). Their mutual health is actually of global importance. Bosnia can be described as ‘the good’ because she symbolized this balance, this harmonia Abrahamica; ‘Bosnia is the name for the awareness of this balance—it is thus of paradigmatic importance for the entire world’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000b: 83). ‘Bosnia’, he says, ‘is possibly the only European state where ancient ideas about the multiplicity of holy teaching have managed to obtain a foothold before being consumed by the desire for nation-states’ (2000a: 120). Destruction of Bosnia’s cultural and religious heritage is thus ‘an ill omen for the future of the world’ (2000a: 86), at least one in which there is room for any reference to the ‘transcendent’, since in his view ‘the core element of religion’ transcends ‘divisions and conflict’ because they have the ‘transcendent’ as their reference point. Religions represent the ‘form’ that a path to God, and to human perfection, takes but the ‘essence’ is transcendent. When ‘forms’ see themselves as ‘the essence, they become an end in themselves’ (2000a: 7). When any religious community becomes ‘cut off from universality, it ceases to be aware that every human being is holy’, he says. Adherents of different faiths then emerge as Others, inconvenient obstacles to our own exclusivity (2000a: 20). Mahmutc´ehajic´ argues that ‘to suggest that separation of communities according to religion is the solution is to claim that religion promotes hatred more successfully than it promotes tolerance’, which takes us to the core question explored in this book (2000a: 21). The ‘conflict of civilizations’ thesis ‘denies or simplifies the present and future reality of cultural and political pluralism in the world’ (2000a: 84). ‘Those’, says Sells, ‘who see culture as a creative process that by its very nature involves intermingling and creative tension among different elements will treasure BosniaHerzegovina’, while those who look ‘for the essence of culture and language in ethnic, racial or religious purity will find Bosnia incomprehensible’ (Sells 1998: 148). The advocates of Serbian and of Croatian nationalism could not tolerate this version of Bosnian

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history, in which Bosnia’s heritage was one in which different faiths coexisted peacefully, since, if Serbs and Croats could live at peace and prosper in a pluralist state, they had no basis to claim that Serbs and Croats could not live with Muslims. This is why, as Sells argues, the anti-Bosnian elements tried to eliminate all traces of Bosnia’s cultural heritage, which ‘could not be defined by the linguistic and religious criteria of nineteenth century nationalism’ (Sells 1998: 151). While others want to build walls around their culturally or religiously pure enclaves—like the Ulster-Scots in Northern Ireland—Bosnians have a ‘stubborn propensity to think in terms of bridges instead of walls’ 1998: 154). Sells suggests that the strongest argument in favour of the existence of Bosnia’s pluralist culture is the fact that ‘Croat and Serb nationalists’ spent ‘almost four years’ destroying what, according to them ‘did not exist’ but which ‘does exist and continues to exist...Testimony to that existence is to be found in the people and in the cultural world that has survived, and in the empty spaces throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina where so many human lives and monuments used to be’ (1998: 150). The constitution described Bosnia as a multi-religious state and what Muslims found especially ‘galling...is the phrase, popular among diplomats and newscasters, “Muslim-dominated government...”’ when the executive branch was made up of two Catholics, two Orthodox Christians and three Muslims, that is, it had a Christian majority! (Sells 1998: 121). They also point out that the British or USA governments are not routinely described as ‘Protestant’ dominated, although they are. Bosnia: An Islamist Time Bomb If Bosnia’s history was not that described above, then it was presumably a much more fragmented history in which hostility replaces harmony between its various peoples. If Christian, Jew and Muslim did not enjoy a harmonia Abrahamica, then either they had as few dealings with each other as possible, keeping themselves to themselves, or they experienced conflict and hostility. This is the claim, already cited, that each community was consumed by ancient animosities towards the Other and that people in the Balkans had been fighting among themselves for centuries. According to the sources on which this analysis is based, denial of Bosnia’s pluralist past was accompanied by the demonizing of its Muslim population.

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This overlaps with the contention that the conflict was mainly fueled by Slavic-Christian nationalism, at the center of which is the representation of Bosniaks as dangerous enemies of Christian Europe. If you remove the pluralist legacy from Bosnia, claim that Bosnian Catholics are Croatian and Bosnian Orthodox Serbian, then what is left are the Bosniaks, which reduces Bosnia to its Muslim component; ‘Any Bosniak claim to be defending Bosnia-Herzegovina could then be dismissed as a smoke screen concealing an equally nationalist project of territorial annexation...Serbs and Croats could then claim the same rights as the Bosniaks to annex territory’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´, 2000a: 46). What Mahmutc´ehajic´ calls the ‘Muslim scheme’ was an essential part of the partition plan (2000a: 50). In other words, by reducing Bosnia to its Muslim population, that population could then be portrayed as a danger to European stability as well as a more immediate danger to Serbs and Croats. At an early point, Tudjman claimed that the Bosnians, under Izetbegovic´, planned to establish a fundamentalist state and to create a ‘Greater Bosnia’. Izetbegovic´ would manufacture a Muslim majority by ‘flooding Bosnia with 500,000 Turks’. Croats, abandoned as a minority in such a state would turn their anger against Zagreb (Mahmutc´ehajic´, 2000a: 49; Zimmerman 1996: 181-82). If a rumpBosnia consisted wholly or almost wholly of Muslims, some sort of an Islamic State would quite possible have emerged, since, once the idea of such a state entered public discourse, some would say, ‘a Muslim state, why not?’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a: 54). As Mahmutc´ehajic´ points out, the ‘Croatian-Bosniak Muslim peace agreement signed in Bonn on 9 January 1994’ referred to a ‘BosniakMuslim republic’ alongside the ‘Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosnia’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a: 54). The contention that the Bosnian Muslims, once in power, intended to establish an Islamist state cites as evidence Izetbegovic´ ’s 1970 Islamic Declaration penned during the Tito period about five years after Muslims were allowed to describe themselves as Musliman. This is said to lay the foundation of a future Islamist polity. What critics single out is the following paragraph: The first and foremost conclusion is the incompatibility of Islam and non-Islamic systems. There can be neither peace nor co-existence between the Islamic faith and non-Islamic social and political institutions...in its assertion of the right to organize its own world, Islam clearly excluded any foreign ideology on its territory... (1990: 30).

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As Mahmutc´ehajic´ comments, this does sound threatening (2000a: 44). Sells describes the document as basically an ‘anti-communist assertion of religious truth’ which made some ‘provocative statements concerning the incompatibility of Islam with other systems’ (such as the passage cited above) and sets out some of the ‘principles of an Islamic state...without specifying any particular nation’ (1998: 118). In fact, the publication was addressed to Muslims everywhere (1990: 78). However, others see the document much more ominously. Typical here is its treatment by Burr and Collins (2006). They devote a chapter to Bosnia under the title, ‘Islam at War in the Balkans’ which all but suggests that Muslims were the aggressors, not fighting for their very survival while the world community literally stood by and watched. Describing Izetbegovic´’s various jail-terms under Tito for Islamic activism, they comment that ‘despite his Islamist views’ he ‘somehow managed to survive’, while his ‘defense of Muslims in the courts, his advocacy of Islam, his writings and his imprisonment... won for him a large following among the Bosniaks’ (Burr and Collins 2006: 132). They cite two passages from the Declaration, the passage cited above and a passage stating that the ‘Islamic movement should and must start taking over power as soon as it is morally and numerically strong enough to’ do so (Izetbegovic´ 1990: 56). What they do not quote is a passage on the same page that reads, ‘Islamic rebirth is first a revolution in education, and only then in politics’ or a passage such as, ‘The Islamic order can only be established in countries where Muslims represent the majority of the population’ (Izetbegovic´ 1990: 49) since ‘history does not relate any true revolution which came from power...all began in education and meant in essence a moral summons’ (Izetbegovic´ 1990: 53). Of course, this would be achieved if 500,000 Turks did flood into Bosnia. Izetbegovic´, though, repeatedly speaks of what he sees as the democratic basis of Islamic government, which is democratic in ‘reality’, not form, a ‘consensus of opinion’ (Izetbegovic´ 1990: 44). While the Declaration does speak of taking over power, there is nothing resembling a call for extraconstitutional action. One tyranny, says Izetbegovic´, must not be replaced by another (Izetbegovic´ 1990: 53). No single Muslims can claim special authority for their views (Izetbegovic´ 1990: 40). His approach to Islamic law seems to be open, since he does not think that Muslims have to be bound by past interpretations (Izetbegovic´ 1990: 31). What he says about international relations does not sound

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threatening or expansionist. These should, he writes, be based on the Qur’anic principles of dialogue, freedom of religion and reciprocity (Izetbegovic´ 1990: 50). While he does speak of ‘taking power’ this can be understood in the context of assuming or taking power after a democratic election. He says that any authentically Islamic society would be democratic (Izetbegovic´ 1990: 44), and that the Islamic revolution must start with education, ‘the road begins by winning people, not power’ (Izetbegovic´ 1990: 43) and ‘Islamic rebirth is first a revolution in education, and only then in politics’ (Izetbegovic´ 1990: 56). His ultimate aim was pan-Islamic. He thought that Muslims should not shed any tears over the demise of nationalism, although this would be achieved in stages beginning with solidarity and mutual help within the Muslim world (Izetbegovic´ 1990: 66-7). The Islamic state must only use force justly and would be governed by the principle of forgiveness (Izetbegovic´ 1990: 49) and would be characterized by social justice, together with the ‘religious and moral education of the people’ (Izetbegovic´ 1990: 59). Burr and Collins, referring to Izetbegovic´’s ‘professed reverence for democracy’, describe Sayyid Qutb as ‘his hero’. For Qutb, democracy and Islam were completely incompatible. Behind Izetbegovic´’s ‘fatherly facade’, they write, he was ‘intelligent, calculating and strong in his convictions that Islam would prevail, establish a worldwide Islamic community that ‘would not tolerate equality or co-existence with non-Muslims’ (Burr and Collins 2006: 132). Izetbegovic´’s 1984 book, Islam: Between East and West, condemns the West for denying Islam and critically compares Islam and the West ‘using examples from art, morality, culture and law’ (Izetbegovic´ 1984: 132). Other Muslims who have declared their commitment to democracy have similarly been accused of insincerity. Izetbegovic´ repeatedly said that without a majority, Muslims cannot establish an Islamic State (Izetbegovic´ 1990: 49). Hence the charge that Izetbegovic´ intended to flood Bosnia with Turks, which would have given him the majority he said he would need. Minorities, he said, would ‘enjoy religious freedom and all protection’ provided they were ‘loyal’ (Izetbegovic´ 1990: 51). The exact rights of non-Muslims are not described in detail and there may well be legitimate concerns regarding their equality in an Islamic State. However, loyalty to the state is a universal requirement, required of citizens in all democratic states. It is also

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worth reminding ourselves that while minorities in Europe and North America may be equal in law, many do not feel equal and experience discrimination and prejudice as a daily reality. Writers such as Sayyid Qutb and Izetbegovic´ looked at the West and at Communism and did not see there the answers they believed would help to develop and advance the life of Muslim societies. Both writers see Islam as the answer to Muslim needs, indeed to those of the world. Muslim societies, they said, were either secularized as in Turkey, recovering from colonial rule or under totalitarian rule that could not be recognized as authentically Islamic. In many contexts, Islamic systems and institutions had been replaced by Western ones; for example, traditional Islamic education with a religious as well as a secular curriculum had been replaced by the purely secular curriculum of the West. Islamic law had been replaced by British, Dutch or French law. Yet Muslim societies were selfjudged as backward. Since neither Western nor Communist systems were working, why not try Islamic solutions. Yet while Izetbegovic´ did not want foreign systems, he did suggest that Muslims should study without prejudice the ‘positive and negative experiences of others, especially ‘the USA, the USSR and Japan’ (Izetbegovic´ 1990: 72). One slogan of the Islamists is for Islamic, not imported, solutions. What Izetbegovic´ was saying when he wrote of there being no peace or co-existence between Islamic and foreign institutions was that Muslims had the right to determine their own futures, to construct their own infrastructures, to apply their own laws. He was asserting the right of autonomy, of self-determination. The Western view that only its systems are valid, that the rest of the world must imitate them, is just the sort of arrogance that fuels the Muslim view that they are being ‘attacked’ and ‘besieged’ by the West. When Qutb and Izetbegovic´ wrote from their prison cells, there seemed little hope of revival within the Islamic world. They wrote to encourage Muslims to assert their Muslim identity and to live up to their ideals. These ideals, and the models of authentic Islam that they offered, were perhaps of an impossibly high standard. While Mahmutc´ehajic´ thinks that Izetbegovic´ might have chosen his language more judiciously, and holds him responsible for the drift towards Islamism, he writes that ‘persecuted in the real world, they [Qutb, Izetbegovic´] turned to abstractions: an allembracing solution, a distant salvation, a messianic dream’. Unfortunately, the text that was produced ‘was tailor-made for the

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authors of Bosnia’s destruction’, who used it as ‘key evidence for their allegations of the Muslim peril’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a: 44 n3). Playing the European card against Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia positioned themselves in the European mainstream, representing a Bosnian Muslim state as threatening, possibly as expansionist, possibly the source of jihadists attacks on the rest of Europe. The two leaders saw it as their ‘duty to destroy the Bosnian Muslims’, which they believed would ‘facilitate their acceptance by Europe’ (Sells 1998: 122). Both claimed that their own states had always been, and always would be, European. Historically, Europe has been reluctant to regard the Balkans as altogether European. Certainly, when it felt threatened by the Ottoman Empire, the Balkans served as a convenient buffer-zone. Today, since the Bosniaks were also depicted as having somehow become ‘Turks’, and Turkey has entered accession talks with the European Union, it is difficult to see how a Turkish-type Islam would threaten Europe. However, Sells, describing the views of Ivo Andric´ (1892-75), the Nobel Prize winning novelist, writes that he ‘portrays the Bosnian Slavs who converted to Islam not only as cowardly and covetous...but finally as the corrupted “Orient” that cut off the Slavic race from the “civilizing currents” of the West’ (Sells 1998: 47). This was set out in Andric´’s doctoral thesis. Others, such as the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch, Pavle, argued that the Muslims were actually Turks, and thus had no claim on the land (Sells 1998: 83). According to ‘Serb religious nationalist’, Dragoš Kalajic´, Bosniaks had ‘inherited an inferior “special gene” passed on by the Ottomans from North Africa’, and ‘did not belong in Europe’ (Sells 1998: 83). Sells says that the charge of Islamism was combined with ‘the charge that’ the Bosniaks planned to recreate the Ottoman Empire. The Muslim state would be ruled by ‘religious scholars’, or even by a Sultan, an option that a careful reading of the Declaration would seem to reject (Izetbegovic´, 1990: 118). According to one advocate of this view, as many as 110,000 Bosniaks were studying fundamentalism in Egypt (Sells 1998: 119), which, as Sells points out, would be 5% ‘of the entire Bosnian Muslim population’. ProSerbian Internet sites accuse Muslims of aggression against Serbs and Croats and of war-crimes, of ‘plotting to put Serb women into harems’ (Sells, 1998: 23). Serb forces deliberately tried to provoke Muslim revenge in support of their own claim that ‘Serbs could never live safely with Muslims’ (Sells 1998: 73). In May 1992, the

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Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church protested against ‘European indifference to genocide in Bosnia’, that is, to ‘the alleged genocide against the Serbs’ (Sells 1998: 84). Bosniaks are also represented as having started the contest for territorial space, in theory if not in practice by attributing to them expansionist plans, or the charge that they intended to forcefully convert Christians, who thus needed Serbian and Croatian protection. As almost all commentators point out, in fact, isolated and almost alone in their struggle against aggression and genocide, many Bosniaks did adopt a more radical Islam, encouraged to do so by the Mujahidin and jihadists who came to their aid, who saw it as their task both to help defend the Bosniaks and to ‘lead them back to what they believed was a more proper version of Islam’ (Sells 1998: 101). Mahmutc´ehajic´, who resigned from the government as it became more Islamist, deeply regrets this tendency and suggests that, unfortunately, what Bosnia’s enemies set out to do has worked; ‘The enemy plan as described... aims to reduce the totality of Bosnia and Herzegovin’s culture, history and statehood to that of her Muslims, and the more convincingly her Muslims can be described as “Islamic radicals”...the easier her enemy’s final goal will be to attain’ (1998: 183). In fact, he says, abandoning their historical pluralist legacy, ‘Bosnian Muslims...find themselves pushed from both sides, directly and indirectly, into nationalist exclusivity and a fascism of their own’ (181; see Johnston and Eastvold 2004: 228-9). No doubt such Qur’anic verses as 22: 39-40 and possibly 9:5 and 3: 157 (martyrs got to paradise) have been cited by jihadists in Bosnia, fighting what they see as Serbian aggression. Christianity as Cause: Slavic-Christian Nationalism In this scenario, an ancient battle and accusations of ‘not belonging’ feature as prominently as they did in the Northern Irish conflict. There, the Protestants saw the Battle of the Boyne as a crucial turning point in history, when the Protestant King William, a Christ-type figure, defeated the bad Catholic king, thus ‘winning’ Ireland for the Protestant cause. On the other hand, the Catholics see the Protestants as foreign settlers who lack their own historical claim on the island of Ireland. In the Balkans, the ancient battle in question took place at Kosovo on 15 June 1389 when the Turks killed the Serbian Prince Lazar, the Christ-like or Christ-type figure. In later

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myth, the Muslims become ‘Christ-killers’. Although Lazar had been killed by Turks, Bosnians who converted to Islam were also charged with responsibility for Lazar’s death. By converting, they betrayed both the Christian religion and the Slav race. Sinning doubly, they became race-traitors, guilty of shedding Lazar’s blood and of aiding and abetting the oppression and subjugation of the Balkans for five centuries or so. One issue is how ancient a myth this is. There is evidence that it was propagated in the nineteenth century to coincide with the reassertion of Serbian and Croatian nationalism, although the myth is especially associated with Serbia. Sells says that the ‘Kosovo myth’ was part of a collection of folklore published by the ‘key figure in the Serb romantic literary movement...Vuk Karad Žic´ (1787-1884)’ described by Mahmutc´ehajic´ as the ‘father of the Serbian language’ (2000a: 70) in the early nineteenth century (Sells 1998 : 38). The idea that Lazar had been a ‘Christ figure’ and that Muslims were responsible for his death appeared in various ‘sermons and chronicles but the full-blown Christ-killer myth ‘was still not fully realized’ (Sells 1998: 39). The myth had solidified by the mid-nineteenth century, with Serbian Orthodox Bishop Petar II Petrovic´ (1813-1851), popularly known as Njegoš, playing a key role. In his play, The Mountain Wreath (1847) Muslims become ‘Turks’ due to their conversion; subsequently, many ‘Serb nationalists and Serb clerics referred to Bosnian Slavic Muslims as Turks, even though all political ties with Turkey ended’ after World War I (Sells 1998: 41; see Goy 1995). The play’s hero, a bishop, broods ‘on the evil of Islam’ and ‘suggests celebrating...Pentecost by cleansing...the land of non-Christians’, anticipating the ethnic-cleaning of World War II and of the Bosnian War. Although a comparatively late composition, this play was pressed into service as the ‘national myth’, comparable to the Story of Roland in France. Mahmutc´ehajic´ describes it as the ‘centerpiece of the Serbian national plan’ (2000a: 69). In the play, Prince Lazar has a last supper with his knights, parallel to Jesus. ‘Our battle’, that is, against the evil Muslims, says the play, ‘shall have no end/Until we or the Turks are dead to the last man’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a: 70). As a ‘battle between good and evil’, the confrontation ‘can only end in the destruction of one of the other’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a: 70). Muslims inherit a curse through their mothers’ milk. The twin themes of ‘race-betrayal’ and of ‘turkification’ would enter popular discourse. Some argue that not only had converts to Islam betrayed their race, but that

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only the most cowardly of Christians had apostatized. Assuming that cowardliness is a genetic quality, Bosnia’s contemporary Muslims were of this distinctly inferior lineage. Mahmutc´ehajic´ argues that this myth sanctified the Slavic national goal of denying Bosnia’s existence and turned genocide into a sacred act: The destruction of everything and everyone Muslims—male and female, young and old, houses and mosques—is proclaimed to be a sacred act that deserves sacred praise, as symbolized by the blessings bestowed on the crusading killers by Bishop Danilo at the end of The Mountain Wreath...(Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a: 70).

Just as the Battle of Kosovo had been in defense of Europe from Islam, so was the new war against Bosnia (Sells 1998: 122). From the late 1980s, fully supporting the Greater Serbia goal, the Serbian Orthodox Church propagated the ‘motif of Muslims as Christ killers and race traitors’ (Sells 1998: 79). Medals were issued to honor soldiers and militiamen for their ethnic cleansing activities. A fundraising campaign for a new Cathedral in Belgrade made much of the fact that it was to be built on the site where ‘Ottoman Turks had burned the bones of St. Sava, the founder of the Serbian Church’ (Sells 1998 81). ‘Orthodox clergy’, says Sells, ‘sit as members of the parliament of the Republika Srpska’ (Sells 1998: 82). Radovan Karad Ž ic´, a proud descendant of Vuk Karad Žic´, honored by the Serb Orthodox Church as a Knight of the 900 year-old First Rank of Saint Dionysius of Xanthe (Sells 1998: 85) and ‘his followers integrated the Kosovo tradition...into the daily rituals of ethnoreligious purification’, says Sells (1998: 51). Karad Žic´ claimed that Sarjevo would be the capital of the Bosnian Serb republic. Muslims ‘had no rights to Sarajevo’, hence, presumably, the destruction of its Muslim and pluralist heritage. One bishop even denounced those who spoke out against ‘expulsions of Muslim civilians and the burning of mosques’ (Sells 1998: 83). Sells describes how a priest in Trebinje led the eviction of a Muslim family and the burning of a 500 year-old mosque (1998: 80). According to one nationalist, the militia leader, Arkan, Serbs were ‘fighting for their faith’ (Sells 1998: 83). Serbian ‘religious leaders lauded those...responsible for designing and implementing...ethnic cleansing’, not least of all the Bosnian Serb President (1998: 81-2). Serb mothers received medals from the Church for giving birth, since this would help to maintain the strength of the Christian

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population against the alleged Muslim ‘demographic plot’ (1998: 65). Sells describes one contemporary adaptation of an older ‘religious nationalist song’ that specified Izetbegovic´ as a target; If we go to battle/It’s you I’ll kill...’ (1998: 90). Miloševic´ himself was depicted in posters side by side with Prince Lazar and Jesus, ‘in a kind of holy trinity’, says Mahmutc´ehajic´ (2000a: 70). Mahmutc´ehajic´ argues that Croatian nationalism was an imitation of and a reaction to, Serbian nationalism. However, it evolved its own ‘Croatian variants of anti-Bosnianism, anti-Bosniakism, and anti-Islamicism’ (2000a: 71). Croatia tended to play the Islamist card, indicated by the citation from Tudjman that Muslims planned to establish a fundamentalist state. The government controlled media ‘hammered home stereotypes about Muslims’ (Sells 1998: 103). Tudjman also encouraged ‘Christoslavic hatred of Muslims’ and emphasized the Christian and Catholic nature of the state. Part of the strategy pursued by Tudjman and Miloševic was to downplay any history of hostility between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. Thus, Croats and Serbs declared that they were ‘brothers in Christ’ while ‘Muslims are nothing to us’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a: 45). Some Catholics, especially in Herzegovina, played the ‘anti-Muslim’ card just as vigorously as their Orthodox counterparts. One Franciscan ‘compared the Bosnian government with the “Turkish occupiers”’ (Sells 1998: 106). Friars in ‘the Mostar region...repeated the Tudjman propaganda that the Bosnian Muslims wanted an Islamic state’ adding that ‘free speech, democracy’ and ‘freedom of religion’ would have no place in such a state (Sells 1998: 106). Croatian as well as Serbs ‘subscribed to the view of novelist Ivo Andric´’ who popularized the notion that only the cowardly and greedy had converted to Islam (1998: 106), citing another Franciscan that the Bosniaks ‘had sprang from bad Christians who turned Muslim because only thus could they protect their own land’ (1998: 107). Sells suggests that religion was recruited by the politicians to help legitimize their nationalist policies. However, although some Church leaders did condemn the atrocities, the Serbian Orthodox Church only criticized Miloševic´ when, during the peace process, he modified his extreme nationalist position (Sells 1998: 84). Church leaders ‘refused to condemn specific crimes committed in the name of Serb Orthodoxy’, says Sells (1998: 85). According to Sells, the violence was ‘religious’, even if religion was a political tool, since the ‘victims were chosen on the basis of their religious identity’

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and ‘those carrying out the killings acted with the blessing and support of...church leaders’. Also, violence was ‘grounded in a religious mythology that characterized the targeted people as race traitors...and...its perpetrators were protected by the policy makers of a Western world that is culturally dominated by Christianity’ (1998: 144). This represents a strong case for religion as a cause of the violence, since it begs the question whether aspirations for territorial expansion alone could have generated as much support. Poverty, discrimination and justice do not appear to be at the root of conflict, either. Croats and Serbs were not fighting for economic empowerment but for the destruction of a whole state. Religion appears to have lent itself to the creation of a nationalist ideology that sanctified genocide. Ideas about Christianity as a religion of peace and of love do not seem to have featured in the rhetoric that surrounded the conflict. Rather, religion here was recruited as an integral element of national identity, and in both Serbia and Croatia church-state relations were very close, if not ‘established’. Even if the argument that religion caused the violence cannot be sustained, this does not, as with Northern Ireland, get it off the hook. Its role in fueling and in justifying, even in sanctifying the violence, makes it culpable. If religion so easily becomes the tool of political and nationalist ideology so that it condones, encourages and blesses violence, it has a serious case to answer. This is especially true if it wants to claim to be good for people, to value peace and love above hatred and war. I am not suggesting that religion was indispensable to the nationalist ideologies that claimed Bosnia’s territory as Serbian or as Croatian, thus denying Bosnia’s right to exist as a separate state. If religion, which was used to strengthen this ideology, was extracted from the mix, war in the Balkans could still have taken place. What I am claiming is that religion allowed itself, perhaps too enthusiastically, to be recruited. It therefore cannot claim innocence. The Role of Religion Within the Peace Process Some religious leaders did speak out, both before and during the war. Muslim and Catholic leaders in Kosovo warned ‘that war’ would ‘bring misery to all sides’. The Orthodox Prior of the monastery of Visoki Deèani…added his voice to theirs, offering ‘a lonely and profound contrast to the Serbian Orthodox hierarchy’

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who praised ‘Serbia’s crusade to protect Europe from Islam’ (Sells 1998: xviii). Several high-ranking Catholic clergy in Croatia, including the Cardinal and the Franciscan Superior for Bosnia, ‘specifically and courageously condemned the crimes of Croat religious nationalists’ (1998: 105). However, unlike Northern Ireland, where official, mainstream Church voices un-ambiguously condemned the violence, many Christian leaders fully identified themselves with Christo-slavism. Religious leaders from outside the Balkans, though, were involved in an early effort to broker peace. The World Conference on Religion and Peace brought many of Bosnia’s religious leaders together to try to agree on a ‘common moral agenda’ (Johnston and Eastvold 2004: 230). Assisted by a number of not-for-profit agencies, including the US Institute of Peace, a secretariat was established to start the process of ‘implementing its positions’ (2004: 231). Subsequently, this initiative has ‘received widespread acclaim’ as the ‘strongest and most autonomous interethnic’ institution in Bosnia. It is currently tackling a ‘broad range of complex issues’ including the ‘reconstruction of religious monuments’, the ‘return of clerical leaders’ to their ‘homes and places of worship’ as well as trying to provide basic social services. Especially in communities where neighbor turned on neighbor, while external conflict has ceased, internally people bear many scars and hostility lurks under the surface. Mahmutc´ehajic´ writes of the need to rebuild trust between the communities, and comments that in Bosnia today ‘there is little or no diminution of mutual distrust’ (2000a: 124). Another initiative, which was launched before the end of the war, was led by the US Center for Strategic and International Studies. This consisted of a series of conflict-resolution workshops ‘for clergy and laity from the involved faith communities in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia’ (Johnston and Eastvold 2004: 231). Initially, the hope was not that the existing animosities would disappear but that a foundation might be laid for ‘longer-term reconciliation’. A basic premise was that military or diplomatic solutions themselves, inevitably involving leaders at the very top of society, could not by themselves ‘break the cycle of revenge’. Only by introducing a ‘spiritual component... into international politics that gets to the heart of forgiveness and reconciliation’ would the cycle of violence be broken (2004: 231). The project plans to establish an NGO in each of the republics committed to religious peacemaking. David Steele, who directed

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the above project, gives a more extended account in his 2002 chapter (see Steele 2002). He argues that when ‘war confronts the person of faith with the catastrophic breakdown of neighborly love, the primary call is to reverse the process by redeveloping constructive relationships with one’s adversity’ (Steele 2002: 75). Steele points out that only working with leaders is ineffectual. It is often the middle ranking people who wield more immediate influence with the communities where they live. The initiative works with people in their private, not representative, capacities since this ‘allows them to share more openly and not be restricted by the need to speak in the name of an institution’ (Steele 2002: 76). Everyone’s ‘sense of victimization’ needs to be dealt with. Regardless of who causes or who is ‘to blame’ for war, all parties see themselves as victims (Steele 2002: 77). In the seminars which Steele himself led, people were encouraged to share their stories of suffering, to thus connect with other participants at the level of human experience. This does not mean that ‘all suffering is equal’ but that everyone’s is ‘taken seriously’ (Steele 2002: 77-8). The next stage, says Steele, is to identify basic needs, such as ‘recognition, well-being, security, identity’ that all share (Steele 2002: 79). Admitting that even the most evil acts of the enemy can be motivated by human needs and fears can lead to forgiveness (Steele 2002: 80). In other words, some Serbs and Croatians, even if misguided, genuinely felt threatened and believed that their survival was in jeopardy. Muslims, he said, emphasized justice as a necessary ‘requisite to any meaningful reconciliation’, which Catholics were able to affirm also occupies ‘a central place in Catholic theology’ (Steele 2002: 81). Muslims, he said, spoke of their failure to forgive, while Catholics admitted that non-Croats were denied justice in ‘Croatian controlled areas’ (Steele 2002: 81). Forgiveness, says Steele, does not absolve the transgressor of their sins, of the atrocities or war crimes committed but is essential for the forgiver, to enable him or her to free themselves ‘from the bondage of revenge’ (Steele 2002: 82). Without forgiveness, the cycle of violence will continue. Participants need to be encouraged to explore the ‘full picture of justice’ (83), that is, to ‘examine all the needs of people in society’ and to determine how these can be met. Bosnians have said to me that while there is peace in the sense that guns are not being fired, there is not yet peace in people’s hearts. The United Nations and politicians can sign Accords and Treaties

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that result in peace settlements and cease-fires, but it takes the sort of initiative described above to reach peoples’ hearts. Women and the Peace Process Reports suggest that although lacking the publicity of the Northern Ireland Women’s Movement, women have played a significant role in the post-war healing and reconciliation process in the Balkans. For example, in 2005 the United Nations issued a progress report on its Decade for a Culture of Peace which includes an assessment of contributions by civil society organizations (670 submitted responses) in each region. These organizations identify progress made and obstacles to progress. The report on progress in Europe stated that: women are playing a leading role, as described by “Women in Black” (Belgrade, Serbia): ‘Throughout the region women initiated peace exchanges, dialogue amongst women activists and made numerous proclamations demanding an end to war and violence (UN Civil Society Report At Midpoint of Culture of Peace Decade).

‘Women in Black’ started as a movement among Palestinian and Israeli women in 1998 and now has chapters throughout the world. It uses vigils and silence for peace, rather than slogans or shouting, often with children present. Women in Black have also used other types of non-violent, direct-action protest, such as sitting in front of military convoys, entering military bases and refusing to obey orders. Wearing black signifies mourning for the victims of war. Women in Black are also concerned about male domestic violence against women, and contend that this is linked with war. Male culture too often dignifies violence. The organization aims to build bridges across differences based on promoting a culture of peace and recognition of the dignity and worth of all people. The ‘Women in Black’ internet archive has a lot of material on their consistent stance against violence in the Balkans from 1999, when they declared, ‘Let Civility Prevail’ (see http://www.womeninblack.net/archive. html). It would be difficult to evaluate what impact such protest has had on the peace process but a willingness to put aside maximum demands contained in the ‘Let Civility Prevail’ statement could have contributed to the Dayton Accord. Although some regard the Accord as having rewarded aggression, nonetheless Serbia backed down from the full extent of

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its territorial demands, which would have left Bosnia even more emasculated than it is. Mahmutc´ehajic´ comments that the Dayton Accord may be a ‘byword in stopping’ the genocide but it also ‘legalized, at least partially, the goals and architects of the war’ (2000a: 126). What remains of an emasculated Bosnia, though, is still a multi-ethnic state with a power-sharing Presidium comprising Croat, Serb and Bosniak. He thinks it imperative that those ‘forms of Bosnian culture that have the potential to revive or develop trust between the separate elements’ be revived or its ‘unity’ will not survive (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a: 125). The great human tragedy of the Balkans could be that a state that was ready to incorporate unity in diversity into its ‘political plan’ was prevented from doing so; this ‘could serve as a foundation for building a state powerful enough to defend and develop this multiplicty’ against the homogenizing tendency that posited that ‘Serbian rule and Orthodoxy, or Croatian rule and Catholicism, should dominate, to the exclusion of all others’ (Mahmutc´ehajic´ 2000a :119). Turning to discuss the Israel-Palestinian conflict, this can be also characterized as rivalry between two competing ethno-religious nationalisms claiming a right to the same space. The same solution, partition, which was applied to Bosnia is the most commonly accepted strategy to resolve the dispute. This two state solution is more or less entrenched in the current political status quo, with the Palestinian National Authority as an embryonic second state. However, some of the contributors discussed in the next case study suggest that a Bosnia-type pluralist society in which Jews and Muslims and Christians enjoy the harmonia Abrahamica, could be the ideal solution. Discussion • If you have read Izetbegovic´’s Islamic Declaration, do you find it threatening and in favor of an Islamic State that would reduce non-Muslims to second class citizens? • Has religion, in your opinion, fueled and flamed rather than caused, or justified, aggression and hostility between Muslims and Christians in the Balkans? • If religion did not cause but did contribute towards inflaming violence, is it just as guilty of being ‘bad for us’ as it would be if it were the major cause of violence?

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• Does this analysis get religion too easily off the hook? • Do you think that religion has contributed in any substantial way to peace-building? How might such a contribution be evaluated? • If Bosnia was an outstanding example of multi-religious harmony, how could it have so easily and so quickly disintegrated into such a cauldron of violence and hatred? • Are the champions of societies as ideally homogenous right— are such societies much less likely to erupt into violence? • Do we only discriminate against those who are visibly different from ourselves?

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Part Three THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN C ONFLICT Resources and Sources Donald Harman Akenson, God’s People (1992). Akenson’s chapters on Israel are especially useful in exploring the complex relationship between Israeli nationalism, religion and any role that the Bible may have played in the establishment of Israel and in informing Israeli attitudes towards Palestinians. Parallels are drawn between Israel, Northern Ireland and apartheid South Africa. Mitchell G. Bard, Myths and Facts: A Guide to the Arab-Israeli Conflict (2006). This book does contain a great deal of data and addresses many of the myths involved. In my opinion, it is far from neutral and favors the Israelis. If ‘Arab governments’ had not ‘gone to war in 1948’, ‘a Palestinian state would be celebrating more than half a century of independence’ (2006: 243). This is also on-line at the Jewish Virtual Library, where most of the historically relevant documents are also available. J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Alms for Jihad (2006) chapter 9, ‘The Holy Land’ (2006: 211-36), detailed description of Islamic charities aiding Palestinians, arguing that much charity funds para-military activities. Dan Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine-Israeli Conflict (revised edn 2004). Although labeled a ‘beginners guide’ this book gives a Jewish and a Palestinian perspective and lives up to its claim to be the ‘only book that allows both sides to be heard’. In my view, it is essential reading. Marc Ellis, Israel and Palestine: Out of the Ashes: The Search for Jewish Identity in the Twenty-first Century (2002). Ellis, an American Jew, has written extensively and spoken around the world on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He argues that in oppressing the Palestinians, Jews betray their own heritage. If the 614th commandment is not to allow Hitler a posthumous victory, the 615th is, ‘thou shalt not lessen the humanity of Palestinians’ (2002: 37).

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Rosemary Radford Ruether and Herman J. Ruether, The Wrath of Jonah: The Crises of Religious Nationalism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (2002). This book offers a careful and scholarly discussion of biblical material and of the historical development of Jewish nationalism, or Zionism. Locating the origins of Zionism in nineteenth century Ethno-European nationalism, the authors convincingly show how the Jewish settlers were predisposed towards a negative view of Arabs. Vis-à-vis the biblical material, they argue that the God of the Bible is the god of all people; Jews and Arabs may thus be ‘called, by historical circumstances, to live side by side’ and must find a way, ‘politically and personally’, to share the land (2002: 241-42). www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org contains a vast amount of information and almost all, if not all, relevant documents and UN Resolutions. www.palestine-net.com is dedicated to the ‘just cause’ of the Palestinian people. www.palestinefacts.org is dedicated to ‘providing comprehensive and accurate information...on the ongoing struggle between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Arabs’ which sounds neutral but the contents has a pro-Israeli slant, for example, ‘What Was the Impact of Zionists on Palestine’ tells us that ‘In the early 19th century, Palestine was a backward, neglected province of the Ottoman Empire...the land was empty, neglected, desolate, abandoned, fallen into ruins’. This is the myth that Palestine was a land without a people waiting for a people without a land. Building Peace From the Ground Up: A Call to the UN for Stronger Collaboration with Civil Society (2002) is a report by seven faith based NGOs engaged in peace and reconciliation work and offers case studies of how such agencies can assist in its UN’s peace-making role. Case study 7 reports a project in Israel/Palestine. Case study 3 is relevant for Part Two of this book. Film/Fiction Leon Uris’ Exodus (novel 1958, film 1960) dramatizes the creation of the state of Israel against the background of the anti-British campaign, illegal immigration to Palestine, the end of World War II, the UN Vote, the Declaration of Independence and the subsequent war. While pro-Israeli, it captures the hopes and fears, aspirations and dreams, of the principal characters. Chaim Potok’s The Chosen (novel 1967, film 1982) although set in New York, this story usefully illustrates how Jews were divided on the issue of Israel. While some worked to support Israel, others were opposed to its creation.

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Chapter Five HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT Many commentators describe the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people and between Israel and several Muslim-majority states as the biggest threat to global peace. Many recognize that resolution must be a diplomatic priority. Yet, the conflict is now, by one reckoning at least, 86 years old. This dates the conflict from the outbreak of Arab anti-Jewish riots in 1920-21. Speaking at the United Nations on 19 September 2006, French President Jacques Chirac identified the conflict as the ‘epicenter of global instability’. The conflict, like those in Northern Ireland and the Balkans, can be characterized in terms of rival nationalisms, between Israeli nationalism and Palestinian nationalism, contesting for the same territory. Any religious aspect can be downplayed, serving perhaps as a marker of identity since most Israelis are Jewish and most Palestinians are Muslim. Reference to Israel as the land that God promised, then gave to, the Jewish people might appear to elevate a religious aspect above others. However, by no means all Jews use religion or the Bible to justify their current claim on the land, although some do. The Palestinian claim on the land may be said to be primarily that of a long historical occupation. Specifically Islamic elements, such as the conviction that the initial Muslim conquest of Palestine was a sign of divine favor and that once territory has become part of the Dar-al-Islam (House of Islam) it must be defended, which is a sacred duty, can be regarded as secondary to the claim of possession based on historical occupancy (see Selengut 2003: 345). Religion can be relegated as a less than central concern, or it can be brought forward and represented as a major component. In this respect, there is similarity between all three case studies. Just as Northern Ireland has been described as a ‘Protestant State’, Bosnia as a ‘Muslim State’ or as a state that aspires to be an Islamic State, so much rhetoric describes Israel as ‘the Jewish State’. The Palestinian struggle for justice and for territory has not always had an explicit

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Islamic face. Palestinian Christians as well as Muslims have engaged in the national struggle. One of the best- known faces of the PLO apart from Arafat’s, is that of Anglican academic and politician, Hanan Ashrawi, official spokeswoman from 1991 to 1993, one of the main participants in the Oslo process. Several organizations, not least of all HAMAS (formed in 1987), do have explicit Islamist agendas. Some argue that the struggle has gained an Islamic face as a strategy to attract Muslim support. This argument would be difficult to sustain, since the Palestinian cause has always enjoyed international Muslim, not only Arab Muslim support. Non-Arab Muslim countries also voted against UN Resolution 181 (see below). No non-Arab Muslim country recognizes Israel and their citizens cannot travel there, although Pakistan did consider recognition after Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. As with the previous case studies, no attitudes attributed here to Jews or to Arabs apply to all Jews or to all Arabs, only to some of them. Northern Ireland’s ‘troubles’ can be characterized as a type of civil war. The Balkan war is less easy to categorize—it had aspects both of civil war, since the majority of protagonists were citizens of Bosnia from its different constituent communities but it was also international, since the nations of Croatia and Serbia were involved as well. Similarly, the Israel-Palestinian conflict is partly a civil dispute; when Israel declared statehood on May 14 1948 those who did so and Arab Palestinians occupied one political entity. It is also an international conflict, since it involves, or has involved, war or hostilities with other nations, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran. Open hostility has not occurred between Israel and Iran but Iran does not recognize Israel and officially wishes to see its destruction. The current President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says that Israel ‘must be wiped off the map’. He also questions whether the Holocaust killed nearly as many people as is commonly claimed. Whatever role may be assigned religion in this conflict, as in the two earlier case studies, myth plays a crucial role. Some of these myths have religious content, some do not. While this chapter analyzes the historical background to the conflict, in exploring causes it does not place religion center stage. The question in this chapter is how did two different people end up in the same place, claiming the same land? Chapter six, which will scrutinize and critique the place occupied by religion in some detail, asks whether it was a major or a secondary cause, or whether it is largely irrelevant to

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any resolution of the conflict. As with Bosnia, which as a result of the peace-process has been partitioned or divided into two states, the most popular solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict is for ‘two states’. Some argue, however, for a single state with power-sharing built into the constitution, which resembles the Northern Ireland solution. Some would have preferred an un-partitioned Bosnia in which the different communities shared power. The United Nations has passed resolution upon resolution addressing the IsraelPalestinian conflict. It has had a peace-keeping presence in Lebanon but not on Israeli soil, or on Israeli occupied territory. Personal Preface I first visited Israel and the West Bank, that is, occupied territory, between October 1982 and January 1983. I saw Israeli air force planes flying in squadrons into Lebanese airspace; Israel had invaded Lebanon in June 1982. I saw Arab youth routinely stopped and searched on the West Bank, especially in the area of the Old City of Jerusalem outside the wall. The sight of armed soldiers walking along urban streets reminded me of Northern Ireland. I saw the obvious difference between affluent Israeli homes and settlements and the Arab shanty-towns. Twenty years later, in January 2003 I again visited Israel and the West Bank, now constituted as the Palestinian National Authority. I saw some differences, such as the absence of Israeli security forces in the West Bank. The ‘Military Command of Judea and Samaria’ no longer featured on signboards. Nor did I see youth being harassed. I saw the wall under construction, dividing Israeli territory (including West Bank settlements) from Palestinian, allegedly to prevent suicide bomb attacks which also reminded me of partitioning walls I had seen in Northern Ireland. I still saw the poverty and generally dilapidated condition of housing, shops and infrastructure. My first visit to the region was some 16 years earlier, when, as a child, I was a passenger on a ship sailing through the Suez Canal not long before it became impossible to navigate as a result of the Six Day War of June 5-10. The military build-up in the Suez area was very visible, so we were escorted through the canal in a convoy by the Egyptian Navy. When, some months later, I heard that Israel had successfully engaged a war with her Arab neighbors during which she also extended her borders, I was impressed by Israel’s military abilities. Raised within

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the Christian church, even at that age I was aware of widespread support and sympathy for Israel, while her Arab enemies were generally spoken of with distaste. I did not understand the full picture. I was not aware of the Holocaust until later, or even of Christian beliefs about the End of the World involving the return of the Jews to Israel and the rebuilding of the Temple. I only knew that most adults around me sympathized with Israel, so I did too. Later in life, after I had become a professional scholar of Islam, which, by definition involves a study of the Middle East, I realized that the situation is much more complex. I could no longer blame one side. Subsequently, I tried to gather information and to analyze the causes of the conflict. I also attempted to identify solutions. My first visit to Israel involved working on a co-operative farm, Moshav Fazael, on the West Bank, very close to the Jordanian border, or rather the barbed-wire fence on the Israeli side of the river. I had qualms about working in what was occupied territory but I was able to use the money I earned to travel widely within IsraelPalestine, to spend a longer period there and to witness how local Arabs were treated. My 2003 visit was as a conference delegate, alongside Muslims, Jews and other Christians, exploring the root causes of conflict and roads to peace. Friendships made and conversations held added much to my own research, thinking and ideas. This experience is reflected in what follows. If I were to be bluntly honest, I would say that I blame Protestants (some, not all) for the ‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland, Serbs and Croats (some, not all) for the Balkan War, but that I am neutral on the PalestinianIsraeli conflict. Rarely have I attended or participated in conferences or seminars on this conflict when a balance has been achieved. On one occasion I was chairing a seminar when I thought that World War III was about to break out. A presentation by a very distinguished Rabbi attracted fierce objections from the Grand Mufti of Syria. At another meeting, a Black Hebrew convert to Judaism living in Israel was interrupted by cries of ‘you’ve stolen my house’ from Palestinians present. These chapters will attempt a balanced analysis. On Israel-Palestine, public opinion especially in the USA and the UK, has considerable impact on these countries’ policies in terms of their support for Israel, or for the Palestinians. The US is widely perceived to be a friend of Israel and has not, for example, condemned Israel’s development of nuclear arms (on the grounds that Israel is not signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty) or called

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for sanctions to compel compliance with UN Resolutions on withdrawal from Occupied Territories. The US has tried to prevent Arab trade boycotts against Israel, although it did not use its UN veto to block an anti-Israeli resolution until 1971. It also opposed settlements although more recently it has remained silent on this issue. Its military and economic aid to Israel has risen from $2.5 billion in the early 1980s to almost $6 billion in 2001 (Ruether 2002: 257 n. 32). On the other hand, the United Nations is accused of being pro-Palestinian; it has ‘no fewer than three special bodies...devoted exclusively to propagation of Palestinian grievances’ while ‘there is not a single equivalent body for any other suffering nationality’ (Muravchik 2005: 62). In the same year that it repealed the Resolution on ‘Zionism as Racism’ (1991) the UN ‘passed no fewer than thirty-four resolutions denouncing Israel’ (Muravchik 2005: 65). Historical Background How Jewish Settlement Began How did two different peoples end up in the same place, claiming the same ground? The Palestinian Arabs had been living in the region for centuries. Some Jews dispute this, claiming that Arabs living there in the late Ottoman period were recent arrivals (see Bard 2006: 3-4). Some even claim that the majority of Palestinian refugees are actually Arabs from elsewhere, although why anyone would volunteer to live in such conditions is a mystery. Conquered by Umar, the second caliph of Islam in 638CE the area had been ruled over by various dynasties and sultanates until it became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1517. Between 1831 and 1840 it was briefly under Egyptian control. For much of this period it was part of the province (Vilayet) of Greater Syria, which included modern Syria, Lebanon and Israel Palestine. Palestine was administered by the Pasha of Damascus. However, in 1887-8 the area was sub-divided into three districts (Sanajek; singular Sanjak), those of Acre, Nablus and Jerusalem. The latter was awarded special status because of its religious significance and was governed from Istanbul (see CohnSherbok and El-Alami 2004: 106). Although not a province under the Ottomans, during the nineteenth century the area to the West of the River Jordan was referred to in official correspondence as Arz-i-Filistin, and the Arabs who lived there described themselves

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as Filistin. The term Palestine was widely used in European discourse. One view of the sequence of events that re-introduced the second community, Jews, into what had been, in ancient times, their ‘promised land’, is that this was driven by the interests of the European colonial powers, not least of all Great Britain’s. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the European powers had built up considerable commercial interest in the Middle East, including the Suez Canal, which was placed under British control by the Convention of Constantinople in 1888. Britain had bought Egypt’s share of the canal company in 1875, using Rothschild (that is, Jewish) money. Britain, France and Holland secured various ‘capitulations’ or commercial treaties from the Ottomans, allowing them to establish trading posts. These were autonomous colonies in all but name. Anticipating the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, the European powers were creating interests in the region which could, at some point, become territorial concessions. Germany gained concessions from Turkey in 1899 to build a railroad from Konya to Baghdad, which subsequently motivated British interest in Iraq. Iraq was also within the Russian sphere of influence. By the start of the twentieth century, France was the dominant power in the Lebanon and Syria. Egypt, Aden, the Persian Gulf and Cyprus (formerly under the Ottomans) were controlled by the British. Small European commercial outposts and colonies dotted the Middle East. French concessions included a chain of Post Offices. This was how British power had started in India. Benjamin Disraeli (1804-81) thought it would be advantageous for Britain to control territory on both sides of the Suez and so encouraged Jewish migration. Alongside any religious motivation, he saw the extension of British interests as a major concern. Meanwhile, European Jews were developing their own sense of nationalism at a time when nationalism was rampant in Europe. Nationalism, which had its roots in the French Revolution of 1789-99, asserted that a legitimate nation belongs to its people, who in turn derive their identity from the nation: a nation is not the possession of an imperial dynasty, or of the Church. Colonial Interests in the Region Nations were uniform culturally and linguistically. Their people told a common story about themselves (a myth of origins).

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Nationality was tied up with identity, and with feelings. In the Balkans, former Ottoman provinces were gaining independence and asserting their nationhood. The German and Italian states were uniting to form nations. Poland, with a large Jewish population, was under Russian rule but nationalist sentiment was strong. While the haskalah movement (Jewish enlightenment) stressed that Jews were loyal citizens of the countries where they lived, representing Judaism as a religion not a national identity, other Jews began to argue that Jews were a nation without a land and that securing a land was the only remedy against persecution. Napoleon Bonaparte had supported the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, proclaiming in 1799, ‘now is the moment...to claim the restoration of your rights among the population of the universe which has been shamefully withheld for thousands of years, your political existence as a nation among nations’ (Akenson 1992: 152). Napoleon’s own ambitions in the region failed, so nothing came of this. Before Napoleon, Jews from North Africa, from the Yemen and from Italy started to migrate, beginning as early 1741. However, postNapoleon, others took up the issue of re-settling Jews in Palestine, seeing this as a strategy through which Europe could exert yet more influence in the region, since European Jews would retain commercial and family links with Europe. Between 1827-39, Lord Palmerston encouraged Jews to migrate; between these dates, the number of Jews in Jerusalem increased from 550 to 5,500 (Johnson 1997: 321). Palmerston, who appointed the first ever Western consulgeneral to Jerusalem, instructed the British Ambassador in Istanbul to ‘put pressure on the Turks to allow Jews...to return to Palestine’, arguing that this would be of enormous benefit to the Ottoman Empire, since hard-working Jews would raise revenue (322). He probably thought that a client-colony in the area would be strategically well placed. The dream was to fill gaps in Britain’s possessions—between Egypt and India, thus protecting the route to the East. Others took up this call for Jews to return to Palestine to transform what was regarded as a wasted agricultural resource into profitable land. George Gawler (1795-1869), second governor of South Australia wrote in favor of replenishing the ‘deserted towns and fields of Palestine with the energetic people whose warmest affections are rooted in the soil’ (1845: 6). He actually set up a Palestinian Colonization Fund after the Crimea War and visited Palestine in 1849. His request for a posting in Syria was turned

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down. Lord Alexander Lindsay (1812-80) the 25th Earl of Crawford, after traveling in Egypt and the Holy Land, wrote: ‘The soil of Palestine...waits for the return of her banished children, and the application of industry, commensurate with her agricultural capabilities, to burst once more into universal luxuriance...’ (1847: Volume 2: 71). In 1836, Zvi Hirsch Kalischer (1795-1874), a supporter of re-settlement in Palestine, had petitioned Amschel Rothschild, founder of the banking dynasty, to buy Palestine, or at least Jerusalem, from the Turks. British influence internationally had secured the right of Christians and Jews to settle in Palestine through the Treaty of Paris (1856) following the Crimean War. Early advocates of Jewish nationalism did not use religious language, or a religious justification. For example, Moses Hess (181275) who wrote Rome and Jerusalem: The Last National Question in 1862 was inspired by socialist principles, and by the rise of German nationalism. He asserted that German nationalism would not tolerate other nationalisms, so those Jews who wanted to maintain a distinctive identity should be encouraged to see themselves as a nation. It would be wholly consistent with the emerging national movements throughout Europe were Jews to establish for themselves a socialist state in Palestine. Such a state would be a model, an example of what labor and the class-less society could achieve. Within a few years of Hess’s book, some Jews began to ‘return’ to Palestine, convinced that life there would be better than it was in Europe, where anti-Semitism was on the increase. They went because of persecution in Europe, because they could migrate and because both Britain and France supported such settlement. Purchasing land in Palestine, these Jews settled there, mainly to farm. Many were Russian; Russia encouraged Jews to emigrate. In the 1880s about 15,000 Russian Jews migrated to Palestine. This became known as the first alliyah, or return. Physical hard work was understood as redemptive; European Jews had grown lazy. These Russian Jews farmed co-operatively, establishing the first moshavot. They wrote back to European Jews that in Palestine they could revive the Jewish nation socially, economically and spiritually through labor. Shortage of funds resulted in appeals to wealthy Jews for financial backing, which such men as Edmond James de Rothschild (1845-1934), and Sir Moses Montefiore (1784-1885) provided. Schools, clinics and an administrative infrastructure were sponsored. Baron Rothschild was especially interested in developing

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vineyards and the wine trade. Montefiore visited Palestine seven times between 1827 and 1875 and built the famous windmill and almshouses outside Old Jerusalem, on behalf of the American philanthropist, Judah Touro (1775-1854) to provide healthy accommodation for Jewish residents. The windmill (which never actually worked) was meant to provide Jews with the means to earn their living. Rothschild and Montefiore were highly successful, assimilated Jews who regarded the un-assimilated and often persecuted Jews of East Europe as an embarrassment. Their philanthropy had as much to do with ridding Europe of troublesome Jews as it did with resettling Palestine. However, they also thought that a thriving Jewish community in Palestine would be advantageous to Europe, representing European commercial interests and a virtual British-French colony within the Ottoman world. Montefiore also aided Christian minorities within the Muslim world. Montefiore and Rothschild ‘had no interest in Jewish nationalism’ (Ruether and Reuther 2002: 52) but saw the colonies as ‘private enterprise’. However, among the delegation that had requested funding from Rothschild was Leo Pinsker (1821-91), whose Auto-Emancipation: A Call to His People by a Russian Jew (1881 [1947]) advocated that the Jews were a nation and that, in order to create their nation, they needed to revive Hebrew as their national language, and settle Palestine as their homeland since ‘nations’ are characterized by a common language and by possession of a national homeland (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 47). Later, the myth emerged, already implicit in some of the above citations, that Palestine was a land without a people for a people without a land. This is untrue, because there were people present and some of those people, Arab Palestinians, can trace their families’ presence there for a very, very long time. My wife has visited the Jerusalem home of the Bukhari family, whose head, Sheikh Bukhari, is a renowned Sufi teacher and leader of the Uzbeke community. The Bukharis have occupied the same house for 300 years. The Ruethers comment that Palestinians can ‘speak of their fathers and mothers, grandparents and greatgrandparents having lived in Palestinian villages and towns’ and they ‘feel deep attachment to the land’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 230). On the other hand, the pioneer Jewish settlers bought land legally, and started to farm on what was often waste or apparently infertile land, usually sold by distant proprietors in Beirut or Damascus. After 1892, it became more difficult for Jews to purchase

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land (Akenson 1992: 154). Akenson remarks that they ‘paid heavily for the land they acquired...especially considering that much of the land was swamp, barren, or otherwise marginal’ (1992: 167). Moshav Fazael, where I worked in 1982-83, was a fertile oasis surrounded by rocks and desert, which had a strange beauty all of its own. By using artesian waters, the farm had been created in what was otherwise a wilderness in which nothing grew at all. This land had not been farmed by anyone before the Moshav’s establishment. There was no evidence of earlier settlement. When the first Jewish settlers arrived, Palestine had declined as an agriculturally productive region and land was available for purchase. There are various schemas for identifying phases of the ‘return’. The first phase can be dated from 1882 until the effective end of Ottoman rule, that is, December 1917. By 1917, the Jewish population of Palestine was approximately 27% (63% Muslim, 8% Christians). The convention is to divide the return into five stages, 1882-1903, 190414, 1919-23, 1924-28 and 1929-39 (see Cohn-Sherbok and El-Alami 2004: xiii-xiv). Zionism: A Multifaceted Phenomenon Jewish migration to Palestine and the creation of the modern state of Israel is widely associated with Zionism, or with the Zionist Movement or movements, since Zionism is a multifaceted phenomenon. Yet, the World Zionist Organization was not formed until 1897, by which time the first aliyah was well under way. Its founder, Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), who is credited with coining the term, Zionism, published his The Jewish State in 1896. This was a plea for the establishment of an independent Jewish state as the only antidote to continued anti-Semitism. Herzl did not specify Palestine. Any ‘part of the globe’ would serve the purpose and although he preferred Palestine he gave serious consideration to the British offer of land in Uganda (1903-5) (Akenson 1992: 157). Argentina was also considered. Herzl was repulsed by the ‘wailing wall’ when he saw it during a 1898 visit to Jerusalem, ‘what superstition’, he declared (Akenson 1992: 159). This movement is known as political Zionism. It did not refer to any religious claim on Palestine. Herzl actually envisaged a type of client-colony, rather like the various colonial concessions in the Ottoman Empire and also in China (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 53). Increasingly, however,

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Palestine became the location of choice, mainly due to the influence of Eastern Jews, for whom it was inconceivable that a Jewish state should be anywhere other than Palestine. This choice, however, was rarely expressed with reference to any specifically religious claim, although many Jews felt a mystical bond with Israel, the land to which many had long since hoped to return. Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, would speak of Israel as being the Jews’ ‘by right’; it ‘always had been’ and ‘would remain’ their country (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 160). The World Zionist Organization included among its aims the strengthening and fostering of national sentiment and consciousness among Jews. Political Zionism was anathema to some Orthodox Jews, for whom settlement of the Holy Land was regarded as trying to ‘force restoration’, that is, to force the Messiah’s coming (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 55). Those who did settle in Palestine during the first aliyah were often secular, non-practicing Jews. Dietary laws were not observed in many pioneer settlements, including Moshavot and kibbutzim. Socialism, in fact, was the dominant ‘religion’. Many progressive Jews also opposed political Zionism because, believing that assimilation as Europeans was possible, they argued that Judaism was a religion not a ‘national identity’. For socialist Zionists, the project involved developing a classless state based on universal principles of freedom and human value which can be described as ‘romantic utopianism’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 66). Religious Zionism is usually closely associated with Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, later Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Palestine. For him, it was the Jews’ destiny to return to Palestine and to establish a homeland there. Then the Messiah would come to initiate an age of peace and justice, from which all humanity would benefit. Passages such as Isa. 1: 26-7 (taken to refer to the restoration of the Sanhedrin) and Isaiah chapter 60 (of which verse 15 appears to refer to the Jew’s suffering and loss of Jerusalem) and Deut. 30: 4-5 suggest that any return of the Jews to Israel would be bought about by a divine act, if, indeed, the Bible knows of their post-135CE expulsion from Israel. On the other hand, these texts can be used to argue that Jews are meant to return to Israel by whatever means, so that the events described can take place. Interestingly, Kook posited that the Messiah would come once world harmony had been achieved, which the new Jewish state would nurture. Many religious Zionists emphasized that it was God who gave Palestine

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to the Jews, and that this was a permanent gift. Thus, their right to the land is inalienable. Many religious Zionists believe that the very act of reclaiming land that was originally Jewish, that is, that was part of the territory gifted them by God, will hasten the Messiah’s coming. This informed Jewish settlement in the post-1967 occupied territory, which is considered part of Biblical Israel. On the other hand, many settlers are also secular Jews, including the family I worked for. Secular Jews who led the return to Israel had unwittingly brought the day of salvation (Geula) closer. There is a special ‘spark’ within all Jews that, consciously or unconsciously, binds them to Israel. Even those Jews who thought they came to create a socialist Utopia, or who fled from persecution, actually came because this inner (Nitzotz) spark was at work within them. Some ultra-Orthodox Jews still refuse to recognize the state of Israel, either on the grounds that it was created by human agency, or because it was constituted as a secular state; Jewish law is not the state law. Danny’s father, the Hasidic Rebbe, in Potok’s The Chosen (1967), represents this position. From British Mandate to the State of Israel: 1917–48 World War I changed the political reality of Palestine, which became a League of Nation’s protectorate mandated to Great Britain, which had long coveted control of Palestine. Contemplating the defeat of the Ottomans, Britain, France and Russia planned to divide the Empire up between themselves, based on their existing, or declared, regional interests. In addition to laying claim on Palestine during secret talks with the French (see below), Britain more or less played a trump card by its successful military occupation of the area. General Edmund Allenby (1861-1936) rode triumphantly into Jerusalem on 11 December 1917 not long after the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917. A devout Christian, Allenby entered the city on foot to show his respect for its status as a Holy City. In his proclamation of military law, he referred to the City as sacred to ‘the adherents of three of the great religions of mankind’. The ‘prayers and pilgrimages of multitudes of devout people’ had ‘consecrated’ its soil. Allenby may not have regarded Britain’s victory in religious terms but he did share the excitement that biblical names evoked (he later took the title Vicount Allenby of Megiddo) and he was well aware that for many Britons extending the British

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Empire into territory once ruled by Alexander the Great and by the Emperors of Rome made Britain their modern day successor. As World War I ended, British policy makers were convinced that ‘the Middle East was where Britain would find its postwar imperial expansion’ (Phillips 2006: 257). Possibly from Cromwell’s readmission of Jews to England, some Britons thought that their nation would somehow be used by God in the events of the end time (Phillips 2006: 256). Phillips comments that Prime Minister Lloyd George, raised as a Welsh evangelical, was fascinated by ‘the names and places in the Holy Land’ and ‘provided critical support for a postwar Jewish homeland under British auspices and for the late 1917 British invasion of Palestine’ (2006: 257). The Balfour Declaration committed His Majesty’s Government to using their ‘best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of ‘the reestablishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people’ (letter reproduced in Akenson 1992: 163). This later gained legal status when the League of Nations drew up the terms of the British mandate of Palestine. The territories allotted to the colonial powers were trusteeships. Considered unready for self-determination, they required protection. In its 1922 mandate, Britain was authorized to put ‘into effect the declaration originally made November 2nd, 1917 by the Government of His Brittanic Majesty, and adopted by the said powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. It was also clearly understood that ‘nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine’ (www. jewishvirtuallibrary.org/source/History/Palestine_Mandate.html). It has often been pointed out that the expression ‘in Palestine’ did not imply that the whole of Palestine would become such a homeland. The international Jewish community formally supported the British mandate, expressing the view that from Cromwellian times onwards Britain had evidenced sympathy for the welfare of the Jewish people and enjoyed a ‘peculiar relationship... to the Jewish Palestinian problem’. Indeed Britain was itself ‘associated with Zionism in the minds of the Jews’ (Statement to the Paris Peace Conference, 13 February 1919). At this stage, what Britain had in mind was almost certainly a client-state or colony, not an independent sovereign state. The powers thought they could off-load their Jewish populations, thus solving the problem of anti-Semitism. At the same time, they would

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extend their influence in the Middle East; Jews from Europe would have little in common with Arabs and, with many European interests they would tend to ally themselves with Europe. This, of course, was only true of European Jews. Oriental Jews had much culturally in common with their Arab neighbors. Jews who had already settled in Palestine, and those who supported the establishment of a homeland there, were all influenced by the nineteenth century European concept of nationalism. Critics later claimed that when the settlement of Jews began, from 1882, the non-Jewish residents of Palestine did not have nationalist ambitions. This is true, however, it is also true that the residents of modern Syria, Iraq and Jordan did not have nationalist aspirations either. As part of the Ottoman Empire, nationalism was not yet on the agenda. Many Muslims believe that there should be a single Islamic entity, that the nation state is a European invention that has no place in Islam. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, nationalism had gained some support in Egypt and in Syria, led by secularized intellectuals. In 1913, some Arab intellectuals met in Paris and called for increased autonomy within the Empire. Some supported a pan-Arabic state, which would cover all Arab-majority territory, rather than separate nation states. Others objected to panArabism, since this excluded Muslims who were not Arab while it included Arabs who were not Muslim (see Tibi 1998: 100). It was into this climate that the colonial powers, meeting through representatives in London, decided to carve up the region according to their own interests. What emerged after World War I bore no relationship to pre-existing Ottoman borders but effectively created new political entities. Their names corresponded to ancient kingdoms, as did their locations; however, their borders were new and did not necessarily constitute nation states whose populations shared an identity, told a common story about themselves or possessed a developed sense of loyalty to these entities. Some Muslims have even described the introduction of nationalism as a ‘colonial Western conspiracy’ (see citation in Tibi 1998: 100). For other Muslims, the fact that Christians had been prominent in promoting nationalistic ideas was enough to make it suspect (see Sivan 1985: 36). Just as the borders of the Muslim state of Pakistan were drawn up by Viscount Cyril Radcliffe, chosen because of his neutrality (or ignorance—his first visit to India was in order to partition it) so an

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Englishman, Sir Mark Sykes (1879-1919), a Member of Parliament and a Frenchman, Charles François George-Picot (former Consul General in Beirut), drew up the border between Syria and Iraq ‘attributing Mosul to the latter as an exchange chip in their global imperial game’ (Apostolov 2004: 64). The Agreement of 1916 was drawn up in London, where Picot was a counselor at the French Embassy. Sykes, significantly, had also promoted the Balfour Declaration, which some suggest is why an Arab Palestinian state was excluded from the Agreement. This carved Iraq and Jordan out of Palestine. With what was left of Palestine, these all became British mandates under the League of Nations. Picot is also said to have been pro-Jewish; he believed that post-World War I French Jews would wield significant influence, in concert with American Jews, so should be kept happy. Accompanying General Allenby, Picot rode into Jerusalem with him on 25 December 1917. According to T. E. Lawrence’s account, Picot, who thought that his Agreement placed Palestine under joint French, British and Russian administration, announced to Allenby that ‘tomorrow’ he would ‘take the necessary steps to set up civilian government’. Allenby replied that ‘in the military zone’, he was ‘the only authority’ (1991: 455). At the same time, Britain was promising the Sharif of Mecca, in return for assistance against the Ottomans, an ‘Arab State’ somewhere in the same region that Picot and Sykes were already dividing up. This promise was never formalized as an official treaty. Initially, the British army officer Thomas Edward Lawrence (18881935), better known as Lawrence of Arabia, had been secretly assigned to negotiate with the Arab leader. Later, the promise was affirmed in letters from Sir Henry McMahon (1862-1949), the British High Commissioner in Egypt to the Sharif. The exact borders of the Arab State were left vague. Sharif Hussain, Emir of Mecca from 1908-17, assumed that Palestine would be included. Sir Henry later stated in a letter to The Times of London (23 July 1947) that he had not intended to convey the impression that Palestine was to be part of the area designated for Arab independence (see Bard 2006: 11). The letters made clear that certain areas would be excluded in order to protect British and French interests. Lawrence himself felt betrayed when, following the War, the Arab State was absent from the partition plans. The case for an Arab State or confederation of independent emirates stretching across most of the Arab world was presented to the Paris Peace Conference, 1919. Such a state

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would have included Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Jordan, probably with Damascus as its capital. In 1918, Lawrence also advocated a separate Kurdish state in a map presented to the British cabinet. Eventually, two of Sharif Hussain ibn Ali’s sons, Feisal and Abdullah, were installed as Kings of Iraq and Jordan respectively. Feisal was also briefly King of Syria, but Syria had been promised to the French. In 1917, Hussain ibn Ali, whose Hashemite family had guarded the Holy Cities for 700 years, declared himself King of the Hejaj, and later Caliph, ruling at least nominally until he was defeated by the founder of the Saudi monarchy, Abdul Aziz Saud, in 1924. He fled to Jordan. The British Mandate of Palestine After 1922, legally and de facto after the British conquest of 1917, Palestine became a defined, distinct entity. It was not yet a ‘state’ but the terms of the League of Nations’ mandate included the establishment of ‘self-governing institutions’ (Article two) and of ‘local autonomy’ (Article 3), which would be at least a first step towards Palestine’s transformation into a nation. Before the Mandate was finalized, Arabs realized that the international community supported some type of Jewish homeland within the borders of Palestine, and some erupted into anti-Jewish riots. In early 1919, Arab Palestinians held their first conference to discuss the future of Palestine, attended by Muslims and Christians. This conference supported ‘a unified and fully independent Palestine as South Syria’ (Cohn-Sherbok and El-Alami 2004: 120). Howard Bliss, President of the American University of Beirut, wrote to the US President informing him that ‘the people of Syria were relying on his principles of self-determination...to express their political aspiration’. Woodrow Wilson commissioned a report, whose members went on a fact finding mission to Palestine. They were told by some Arabs that the Zionists planned to ‘displace the indigenous Palestinian population by land purchase and military mobilization in order to enforce mass Jewish immigration’ (2003: 121). The report concluded that the Jewish-homeland proposal would represent a ‘gross violation of the principles of selfdetermination’ and that the US, not Britain, should hold the mandate. However, Wilson had already supported the Balfour Declaration. Another Arab Conference, held at Haifa in 1920, tried

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to persuade Britain to change its policy but failed. In response, rioting again broke out with ‘more than two hundred casualties, mostly Jewish’ (2003: 122). A year later, a delegation traveled to Europe to seek support for Arab self-determination, visiting the Pope in Rome, Britain and Geneva. Unfortunately, the British ‘Parliament was in recess and there was no meaningful interaction’ (2003: 122). Zionism, they said, was aggression against the indigenous population of Palestine. This delegation re-drafted the Mandate, not yet finalized, so that it would include ‘a legislative council with powers that would enable the existing majority of Palestinians to prevent’ the creation of ‘a Jewish National Home’ (2003: 122-23). Once the British mandate became effective, most Arabs adopted a policy of non-cooperation with the British authorities, who established a ‘representative council consisting of eight Muslims, two Christians and two Jews’ (2003: 127). Subsequently, this effort to create a representative institution failed. Instead, the British High Commissioner had to rule directly, without any adequate consultation with the two main communities (2003: 26). The result was that the Arab and Jewish communities were largely left to ‘manage their own affairs’. The Mandate itself made provision for a Jewish Agency, which would ‘take part in the development of the country’, ‘secure the cooperation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish National Home’, and generally have oversight of the welfare and interests of Jews in Palestine (Article 4). This implied that the Agency would represent worldwide Jewish aspirations, and that continued migration would be encouraged. To enable Muslim governance of holy sites, religious foundations and funds, such as the orphan fund and shariah courts, the British established the Supreme Muslim Council (1922). They strongly supported the election of Amin al-Husayni (1893-1974) as its Head, who had helped the British recruit soldiers during World War I and had held various posts. He was already Mufti of Jerusalem. At the time he was under sentence for his part in the riots of April 1920, during which he had denounced the Balfour Declaration. He was pardoned. He is said to have assured Herbert Samuel, the first High Commissioner (the first practicing Jew to serve in the British cabinet) that he would maintain the peace. In fact, not only did he incite riots and the massacre of Jews in 1929 and 1936 but during World War II he aligned himself with Germany, convinced that a

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Nazi victory would result in all Jews being swept out of Palestine. Dismissed by the British in 1936, he went to Iraq from where he broadcast ‘anti-Jewish propaganda to the Arab world’ and recruited Balkan Muslims ‘for the Axis armies’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 99). Eventually he fled to Germany. By then, the ‘tide of war had turned in the Middle East’ and an Allied victory looked certain. Those Arab states that had achieved independence formed the Arab League in 1945 to ‘represent Arab interests in international negotiations’. The Mufti still enjoyed considerable support in Palestine. In 1946, he made his way to Cairo where he was recognized by the Arab League as the official spokesman for the Palestinians (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 100). The mandate was unworkable. The British could not, on the one hand, aid the creation of a Jewish homeland while also, on the other, respecting the rights of non-Jewish Palestinians, since the latter were totally opposed to a Jewish state. This does not mean that all Arabs totally opposed a state in which both Jews and Muslims as well as Christians lived together, perhaps sharing power. The British tried to rule fairly. Some administrators were pro-Arab, having served previously within the Arab world. These colonial officials spoke Arabic, not Hebrew, and may have had anti-Semitic tendencies. However, while the Jewish migrants were to benefit from international Jewish philanthropy, which financed many schools and other institutions, Arabs had to rely solely on the money spent by a not especially affluent British Administration. The riots of 1929 and 1936 protested not only against the increasing size and strength of the Jewish community, but also the economic disparity between Arabs and Jews. During the 1929 riots, extra troops were deployed from Egypt and Malta (Cohn-Sherbok and El-Alami 2003: 132). In 1936, casualties occurred on both sides and a ‘no taxation without representation’Arab protest was launched, resulting in the imprisonment and deportation of some of the protesters (CohnSherbok and El-Alami 2003: 134). Between 1936 and 1939, 320 Jews and 250 Arabs were killed. As early as the 1920-21 riots, some Jews had formed a para-military organization to protect their farms and properties. During the 1936 disturbances, this para-military (known as Haganah) aided the British but a break-away group, the Irgun (formed in 1931), was increasingly impatient and dissatisfied with British policy, which had not brought a homeland any nearer but was beginning to make migration difficult for Jews. Irgun became

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anti-British, although a truce was called during the early years of World War II. By 1944, it had renewed aggression, hoping that British casualties and damage to property would hasten Britain’s departure. Attacks included the bombing of the King David Hotel, which housed both the civil and military headquarters. Ninety-two British officials died. Various commissions between 1936-39 were suggesting partition as the best solution, to divide Palestine into Jewish and Arab states (Akenson 1992: 175). The Peele Commission (1937) suggested that the two communities should be physically separated through ‘population transfer’ (Akenson 1992: 176). In 1939, in a government White Paper, the British curtailed Jewish immigration and the sale of land to Jews, all but reneging their historical support for a Jewish homeland (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 98; Bard 2006: 29). The Mufti immediately called for the end of all migration and for the creation of a fully independent, sovereign, Arab-majority state. At this stage, no one was arguing for an Islamic state and Christians as well as Muslims remained and remain involved in the Palestinian, or Arab, nationalist movement. The proposed homeland for Jews was, however, referred to as a Jewish state but this was because it would be a refuge and safe place for Jewish people from around the world. ‘Jewish’ did describe this community. Jews were not identifiable by any other term. Jewish in this context was primarily used as a racial term, describing many Jews who did not practice Judaism. Ironically, comment the Ruethers, ‘the notion that Jews are a nation, in the sense of being a race, was drawn from European racist, anti-Semitic concepts of nationalism’ while the reality is that Jews are actually ‘a multiracial and multicultural group, who have through the centuries assimilated the many cultures and physical characteristics of the people among whom they have lived’. In fact, what tied them together was their ‘religiously based communal life, which was carried on independently of political sovereignty’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 226). From the first aliyah onwards, Jews settling in Israel stressed political and socialist aspirations. For the majority, a national identity over-rode any religious label. Migration of Jews from 1933 to 1938 (the Aliyah Bet) was often illegal, aided by Irgun. Arabs and Jews were now fighting for the same piece of land and relations between them were so strained that a multi-religious state was no longer given serious consideration. There have been, however, Jewish supporters of what has been called ‘binationalism’. This concept

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was promoted in the 1920s by the British group who proposed one state in which both Jews and Arabs could prosper (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 64-5). Judah A. Magnes, first President of the Hebrew University, also supported binationalism. With Martin Buber and others he formed Ihud, which, in sharp contrast to the majority of Jews who stressed links with Europe, saw Palestine’s future as an ‘Arab-Jewish binational state’ as ‘part of the Arab world’ rather than as an ‘outpost of European culture’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 65-6; see Ellis 2002: 138-39). By the end of World War II, the number of Jewish refugees and Holocaust survivors was such that Britain, caught in the middle, no longer felt able to fulfil its mandate. In February 1947, Britain indicated to the newly formed United Nations that it was handing the ‘problem’ to them (Akenson 1992: 178). Britain set May 1948 as the date she would withdraw from Palestine, including troops stationed there. Resolution 181 and the Creation of the State of Israel The United Nations established a commission to report on Palestine. The committee was formed on 15 May 1947 consisting of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Holland, Iran, India, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay and published its report on 31 August. Like earlier British reports, this recommended partition, the creation of separate states for Jews and Arabs with Jerusalem as a third entity under direct UN control. The UN Trusteeship Council would review Jerusalem’s status after 10 years and conduct a referendum on how the territory should be governed. Iran, India and Yugoslavia advocated a federation of two constituent states, while Australia abstained. The partition plan gave 55% of the British mandate of Palestine to the Jews, who represented roughly 60% in the areas allocated them under the plan. However, only about 8% of the land was owned by Jews, since many rented land from Arabs. Just under 50% of the land was ‘crown’ land, that is, vested in the government of Palestine. The territory designated as the Jewish state consisted of some very fertile and some desert areas. The plan also made provisions for an Economic Union which would facilitate a joint currency, access to water and power and to sacred sites in Jerusalem. The partition plan was presented to the General Assembly on 29 November 1947 in the form of Resolution 181. The two states were to ‘come into existence two months’ after the withdrawal of British

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troops. Britain was to cooperate with a UN Commission to enable the transition of power to take place. The commission would adjudicate any frontier disputes between the new states, which would each hold democratic elections within two months. Resolution 181 was passed by 33 votes to 13 with 10 abstentions. Every Arab and Muslim country then in membership of the UN voted against. The United States voted in favor; the United Kingdom abstained. With total Arab opposition, the plan was probably doomed from the start. The Jewish Agency accepted the plan; members of Irgun and of the break-away group, the Lehi or Stern group, rejected the plan, arguing that the proposed state was too small to survive. The logic of partition was the same as in the cases of Ireland and India, that is, two distinct communities refused to live at peace together in a common space, so that space would be divided into two. Partition was based on where each community was the most populous. Later, the same solution was applied in Bosnia. In most cases, partition also creates minorities on both, or at least on one side, of the border. The European nations almost certainly supported Resolution 181 because, once more, they were faced with a Jewish problem; how to deal with the huge number of refugees stranded throughout Europe, many of whom were already determined to reach Palestine. Europe’s guilt about its own anti-Semitic record and how anti-Semitism may have contributed to the holocaust also played a role. Resolution 181 itself makes no reference to the Holocaust, or to anti-Semitism, or to why a Jewish state should be established. Rather, it reports on the ‘solution to the problem’ of the ‘future governance of Palestine’. Given that the Jewish community: represented a sizeable percentage of the population; had been promised some sort of a homeland in Palestine by the previous inter-governmental body; and aspired to become a nation, their claim to statehood was taken as justified. To ignore the claims of a settled population would be difficult, since Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States were themselves settler societies that had acquired land and formed nations with little if any regard for the rights of the indigenous peoples who had lived there for centuries before the settlers arrived. The Arab demand was for an independent, undivided Palestine which would have an Arab majority; Jews already settled could remain but immigration would be discontinued. The Arab plan would ‘recognize the Hebrew

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language in the Jewish areas’ and constitutionally guarantee ‘freedom of worship’ (Cohn-Sherbok and El-Alami 2004: 1500. The UN had to consider whether, in such a state, Jews would cease to fight for their own nation and concluded that they almost certainly would. Many Jews linked the creation of Israel with the urgency of survival following the Holocaust, so that Hitler would not enjoy a posthumous victory. To make matters more difficult, Britain refused to work with the Commission, so instead a UN Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte (1885-1948), a relative of the King of Sweden who had helped to protect Jews during World War II was appointed. On 15 May 1948 Britain terminated its Mandate. Neither the departing colonial power nor any other state did anything to assist the birth of the proposed Arab and Jewish states. Resolution 181 authorized the inhabitants of Palestine to ‘take such steps as might be necessary on their part to put this plan in effect’, so the Jewish Agency and political parties proceeded to put in place a mechanism to establish the state of Israel. The Arabs did not take any parallel steps, apparently assured by the Arab world that it would not tolerate a division of Palestine and would intervene to ensure that any attempt at this failed. Rioting and civil unrest broke out immediately after the Plan was published with Arab attacks on Jewish homes followed by Jewish reprisals. By 11 December about 70 Jews and 50 Arabs were dead. Between December 1947 and February 1948, an estimated 427 Arabs, 381 Jews and 46 British were killed. The violence confirmed to the world that the two communities could not live together. The Arab nations pointed out that non-Jews were 67% of Palestine and that they should determine the future of the territory that, following British withdrawal, was entitled to immediate independence. Arab rights were being ignored. In November and December, the Arab League met, declared partition illegal and announced that it would provide arms and support to the Palestinian people. On 14 May the Jewish leaders issued the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. Proclaimed by David Ben Gurion (1886-1973), who later became the country’s first prime minister, this Declaration based its legality on Resolution 181 which, in their view, represented irrevocable recognition of their right to establish a state. The Declaration begins by recalling that Eretz-Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people where their spiritual, religious and political identity had been shaped. Although

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forcibly exiled from their land, the Jews had never ceased to keep faith with it, to pray for their return and for the restoration of their political freedom. The British Mandate of Palestine, building on the Balfour Declaration, had given international recognition to the sacred connection between the land of Israel and the Jewish people. The catastrophe that had recently befallen the Jewish people, namely the Holocaust, demonstrated the urgency of solving the problem of the homelessness of the Jews by allowing them to establish in the land of Israel a Jewish state where all Jews could live, if they wished. During World War II, Jews had contributed fully to the fight against Nazism and were thus entitled to be ‘reckoned among the people who founded the United Nations’. The above does refer to a ‘sacred connection’ between Israel and the Jews although it does not spell out in any detail historical or religious or biblical claims on the land. It states as a matter of common knowledge that Israel had been the Jews’ ancient home, that during years of exile they had continued to hope to return to this land but its main argument for establishing a Jewish state is recognition of the status quo on the ground, namely, that: in recent decades [Jews had] returned in their masses. Pioneers, ma’pilim (immigrants coming to Eretz-Israel in defiance of restrictive legislation) and defenders, they made deserts bloom, revived the Hebrew language, built villages and towns, and created a thriving community controlling its own economy and culture, loving peace but knowing how to defend itself, bringing the blessings of progress to all the country’s inhabitants, and aspiring towards independent nationhood’.

In other words, the Jews were there. They had created a virtual state for themselves from which other, non-Jewish co-inhabitants of the land also benefited and deserved to become a nation based on the universally accepted principle that where a people represent a majority, they have the right of self-determination. Of course, they were only a majority in a relatively small area. The Arabs, said Ben Gurion in 1924, did not have the right to govern Palestine because Palestine was ‘still underdeveloped’, awaiting ‘its builders’ (cited in Akenson 1992: 172). The USA was the first country to recognize Israel, 11 minutes after the proclamation. The United States’ was founded on the same principle: the pioneers had built a society for themselves; continued colonial rule from Britain was

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unjust and exploitative; therefore they had the right to sever their ties with Great Britain by asserting their own separate and equal status as a state, to which they were entitled by the ‘Laws of Nature and of God’. Only thus could they enjoy Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. The US Declaration of Independence refers to God’s law, to the right to alter or abolish a form of government that had become destructive of securing Life, Liberty and Happiness but nowhere does it mention that other people also have rights to the land, that is, the American Indians. The claim to become a free and independent state was based on the fact that they control the land, and are being oppressed by the existing authority. The Jews certainly felt that the departing British authority had ceased to be sympathetic towards them and their national aspirations. The Declaration of US Independence can be said to have more explicitly religious content than does the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. Arab Reaction and the Continued Conflict On 15 May the surrounding Arab countries invaded Israel, sending a telegram to the United Nations that in the absence of any legal authority in Palestine, it was their responsibility to intervene to protect the rights of the Palestinian people and to prevent the Jews from seizing any more territory. On 14 May before the Declaration of Independence, the Haganah had taken control of Haifa, Safed, Acre and Jaffa and launched an offensive to capture Jerusalem, which the UN Plan did not allocate them (Akenson 1992: 232). Ben Gurion appears to have fully intended to reduce the Arab population in areas between those where Jews were already firmly in control, since this would make the new state more manageable. Fighting had therefore already started when the Arab armies invaded, enabling them to depict the Jews as aggressors. What followed can, on the one hand, be seen as a battle for the survival of Israel, on the other it can be seen as a battle for land, since many Jews did not believe that the 55% of Palestine allotted them by Resolution 181 would constitute a viable state. When hostilities ceased on 29 July 1949, Israel had expanded its territory to 80% of Palestine. Egypt occupied the Gaza strip, while Jordan occupied then annexed Jerusalem and the West Bank (1950) (Bard 2006: 73). Annexation of occupied territory was made illegal by the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949). Only the UK and Pakistan officially recognized

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‘the Jordanian takeover’. Thousands of Arabs had become refugees. As Akenson comments, debate continues on whether they were ‘pushed’ or ‘jumped’ (1992: 232). The standard Israeli claim is that they voluntarily left their homes, assured by the Arab nations that this would make it easier for them to quickly destroy Israel without causing civilian casualties. The standard Arab claim is that they were rounded up and compelled to leave. Certainly, the Arab population of Israel decreased from 700,000 to 156,000. Also, in less than a year after independence, Jewish migration doubled the state’s population. Palestinians refer to their flight from their homes as al-Nakba, the Catastrophe, possibly evoking a comparison with the holocaust. Debate also continues about the logistics of the war. The standard Israeli and pro-Israeli account is that their victory was more or less a miracle; Jewish partisans were pitted against the armies of Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Syria including some elite, British trained troops. Others calculate that Jewish combatants outnumbered Arabs, that Israel was a highly militarized society and that the Israelis had sufficient experience fighting against the British as well as fighting for the British during World War II in the specially formed Jewish Brigade. Folke Bedrnodotte, who was himself shot by the Stern Gang on 17 September 1948, having requested that the UN establish a Conciliation Commission the previous day, negotiated several truces during the conflict. He believed that the problems could be resolved if the two sides would talk to each other. Israel, he said, now existed and its borders had to be agreed. Jerusalem should be internationally administered. However, he allocated the Negev to the Arabs; during the war, Israel seized this territory on 6 January 1949. The future of territories allocated to the Arabs, he said, should be ‘left to the governments of the Arab states’. Peace was restored through a series of armistices, starting with Egypt on 24 February and ending with Syria on 20 July. These countries did not recognize Israel; a state of war, although not of military engagement, remained. Israel had de facto created its own borders, as had Jordan. Resolution 194, passed on 11 December 1948, had called for an end to hostilities, for the safe return of all refugees and for the demilitarization of and UN control over Jerusalem. In September 1948, the Arab League established a Palestinian Government in Gaza with the Grand Mufti, al-Husseini, as President. Until annulled by Egypt in 1959, who effectively controlled it, this

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government was recognized by several Arab governments. Passports were issued in its name. Egypt occupied Gaza between 1948 and 1967. Its population was almost entirely Palestinian. No Arab state was established on the territory allocated by Resolution 181. Israel was admitted to the United Nations on 11 May 1949 (before the formal end of the Arab-Israel War). Expressing why no permanent peace was negotiated, a future Foreign Minister of Egypt and Secretary-General of the Arab League said: ‘An armistice, that is one thing, but to make peace with [Israel] would mean that we have to accept that you are here to stay’ (Cohn-Sherbok and El-Alami 2004: 152). Talk of destroying Israel or of driving the Jews into the sea may be the rhetoric of anger that an injustice had been perpetuated, although Syria and Iran at present remain officially committed to replacing Israel with a Palestinian state. Summary of the Main Events post-1949 1950: Israel passes the Absentees’ Property Law and the Law of Return. Arguably contrary to UN Resolution 194, the Property Law declared that all property belonging to absent owners devolved to the state. Some Arab refugees did return. Most did not. The Law of Return entitles all who can prove their Jewish identity to settle in and obtain citizenship of Israel. 1956-57: Egypt annexed the Suez Canal. Israel assisted Britain and France against Egypt. Briefly, Israel occupied the Sinai and Gaza Strip then withdrew. The war ended when Britain and France disengaged in what amounted to capitulation. After this war, the UN stationed peacekeepers in the Gaza Strip. 1959: Yasser Arafat (1929-2004) established Fateh (the Palestinian National Liberation Movement), which advocated and began armed struggle against Israel. 1964: the Arab League forms the Palestinian Liberation Organization to represent refugee concerns, many of whom were still living in shanty towns and camps under Egyptian and Jordanian control. 1965: al-Fateh carried out its fist guerilla campaign across the Israeli border, operating from Jordan.

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1967: 19 May, the UN peacekeepers in Gaza are instructed to leave by the Egyptian President. 22 May, Israeli ships were banned from the Suez and blocked from the Gulf of Aqaba. On 6 June, when diplomatic demands for passage through the Suez failed, Israel attacked Egypt. Reluctantly, Jordan also entered the conflict, as did Syria and Iraq. Hostilities ceased on 11 June, with the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, the West Bank including Jerusalem and the Golan Heights under Israeli control. These subsequently became known as the ‘Occupied Territories’. The majority of Palestinians now lived under Israeli military command. UN Resolution 242 called for the protagonists to recognize each other and to work for a just and lasting peace in which all states in the region could live in security and proposed a land for peace formula whereby in return for Israel relinquishing occupied territory, her neighbors would make peace. Israel was to have free passage though all international waterways. The Resolution made no specific reference to a state for the Palestinians but it does refer to the ‘just settlement of the refugee problem’. 1968-70: many Jews regard the ‘Occupied Territories’ as legally part of the land of Israel, referring to biblical descriptions of the land. Officially, only the Golan Heights was formally annexed, which made governing the territories easier; Palestinians had no civil rights and were governed by ‘military administrations that did not have to answer to the civil code’ (Akenson 1992: 317). A process of colonization began; land was ‘seized’ by the military on the grounds that it was ‘waste’, or needed for security purposes, while land that had belonged to the Jordanian government was declared to be Israeli government property (Akenson 1992: 314-15). Jewish settlers, many of whom were religious Zionists, occupied and started to farm this land. Arabs who had lived there became refugees again, increasing the population of the remaining land available for their use. About 300,000 fled to Jordan. By 1977, about 5,000 settlers ‘were in place’ (Akenson 1992: 316). These settlers were considered to be full Israeli citizens, with all civil rights. The post-1948-49 borders were never officially recognized by the UN, so the West Bank was doubly occupied, first by Jordan, then by Israel. During the same period, the PLO declares that its goal is a democratic, secular state covering the whole of the former British mandate of Palestine. Arafat became Chairman of the PLO in 1969.

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1970: The PLO is expelled from Jordan following terrorist activities involving the highjacking of Swiss, American and British planes by Black September (see Bard 2006: 231) and the killing of Jordan’s Prime Minister. Attacks on non-Israeli targets were intended to provoke the international community to rebuke Israel for mistreatment of the refugees and to demand justice for the Palestinian people. The PLO relocated to Lebanon. The PLO declared a Palestinian Republic in the northern city of Irbid. October 1973: In the Yom Kippur War, Egypt and Syria briefly regain the Sinai and the Golan Heights respectively but Israel quickly recovered these territories. 1975-90: Civil war largely stimulated by the flood of Palestinian refugees into Lebanon sparks conflict among the various communities of this multi-cultural country. The traditional balance and power-sharing arrangement between Christians and Muslims breaks down. Attacks across the border into Israel result in Israeli intervention (June 1982). Lebanon asked Syria to assist in ending the conflict. By June 1985, most Israeli troops had been withdrawn. The war officially ended with the Taif Agreement of 1990. In 1982, some Lebanese Shia with the support of Iran form the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, better known as hizbullah (The Party of God). Hizbullah is liberally funded by Iran ($1 billion between 1993 and 2003; Burr and Collins 2006: 235). Subsequently, Islamic language of jihad and reference to Palestine as a land sacred to Muslims entered the discourse of Palestinians fighting for their own state. In 1987, Palestinians formed HAMAS (the Islamic Resistance Movement) which rejects peaceful means of achieving its goal, which is to replace Israel with an Islamic state. Some believe that HAMAS wants a state that would be Jew-free, although its charter says that under the banner of Islam ‘followers of all religions can co-exist in security and safety’ (Article 6). The preface speaks of obliterating Israel. Article 32, citing the Protocols of the Elders of Zion that alleges a Zionist conspiracy to control the world, claims that unless stopped Israel plans to continue her expansion throughout the region. See Bard for an extract from the HAMAS Covenant (Bard 2006: 342-43). Akenson refers to a biblical verse that can be read to extend Israel’s borders to ‘include most of modern Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq’ (1992: 175; Gen. 15: 18) even though Israel never occupied most of these areas.

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10 November 1975: the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 3379 condemning Zionism as Racism because Israel allows any Jew to return while denying Palestinians the same right. On 16 December 1994, Resolution 4686 rescinded the above. A year later at the World Conference Against Racism held in South Africa, Syria, Egypt and Iran proposed to insert a condemnation of Israel as a racist state into the Conference Declaration. The US and Israeli delegations walked out. The final document did not condemn Israel. It did condemn anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and anti-Arabism and stated that the ‘Holocaust must never be forgotten’. 1977: Egyptian President Anwar Sadat accepts invitation to visit Jerusalem. Negotiations begin to normalize relations between Egypt and Israel and on the issue of Palestine. 1979: President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin sign a peace treaty brokered at Camp David by US President Jimmy Carter. Israel agrees to return the Sinai to Egypt, applying UN Resolution 242’s ‘land for peace’ formula; Israel ‘received additional US aid for withdrawing’ (Bard 2006: 242; see Resolution on p. 344). The Treaty recognized Resolution 242 as the basis for resolving the conflict. The Treaty committed all parties to move towards granting Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza full autonomy within five years. An elected, self-governing authority would be established. Its powers and remit were to be agreed by all parties, including Jordan. Israel’s security would not be compromised. This political initiative represents the first real move towards peace. President Sadat was assassinated on 6 October 1982 by members of Islamic Jihad, who regarded him as an apostate Muslim. 1982: The PLO relocated from Lebanon to Tunisia. 1987-93 The First Intifada: According to the timetable agreed at Camp David, a Palestinian authority should have been established by the mid-1980s. Frustrated by lack of progress, initially a non-violent protest begins in the West Bank and Gaza. In 1988, Arafat, speaking at the UN, pledges that the PLO would renounce violence and recognize Israel if the Palestinians were allowed to establish their own State. This gives some impetus to the political process, in which Norway becomes involved as a broker in addition to the US. As the Intifada progressed, young men and boys started to throw stones at Israeli troops. Later, such weapons as Molotov cocktails and hand

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grenades were used. Israelis soldiers and civilians were killed. The first suicide attack within Israel took place in July 1989 when a bus was bombed. 1993 Oslo Accord: Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitchak Rabin sign the Oslo Accord in Washington, DC. The Accord established a National Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Gaza. Arafat and Rabin receive the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize together with Israel’s then Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres. But on 4 November 1995 a right-wing Jew assassinates Rabin for signing the Accord. In 1994, Arafat returned to the West Bank. HAMAS rejected the Accord and started a campaign of suicide bombings. 26 October 1994: Israel and Jordan normalize relations. Jordan received billions of US Aid as a result. 20 January 1996: Arafat is elected President of the National Palestinian Authority with an 88.2% majority. 2000 Second Intifada: despite the existence of the PNA conditions do not improve and a second uprising breaks out. This was also sparked by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount. Upwards of 700 Israelis and 2,000 Palestinians loose their lives. Suicide bombings increase. HAMAS gained popularity. March 2002: Israel starts to build a defensive wall around its West Bank settlements and between its borders and the PNA. 28 March 2002: The Saudi Crown Prince proposed a peace plan that involves all Arab governments recognizing Israel in return for settlement of land disputes and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The PLO rejects the plan, which the Arab league accepts. Israel describes it as an ‘interesting development’. The plan states that the Arab countries would ‘consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace-treaty with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region’. May 2003: The European Union, the Russian Federation, the UN and the USA publish their Road Map to Peace, setting out a timetable for resolution of territorial issues and for the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian State (reproduced in Bard 2006: 335-41 The PNA and Israel accept the plan, which endorses the ‘two-state solution’.

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November 2004: Arafat, virtually a prisoner in his Ramallah bunker, repeatedly bombed by the Israelis, was allowed to fly to Paris for medical treatment where he died (11 November). Many claim that he had enriched himself with money intended to aid his people (Burr and Collins 2006: 223-25). On 24 November, Syria declares willingness to negotiate with Israel based on ‘land for peace’ principle ‘without condition’. Israel said that the offer was ‘not serious’. 9 January 2005: In the Palestinian Presidential election, the moderate Mahmoud Abbas of Fateh wins with 62.52%. August-Sept 2005: The Israeli government unilaterally withdraws from and closes settlements in the Gaza Strip. Many Israelis opposed this and settlers who refused to move were forcibly evicted. Israel refuses to negotiate with the PNA as long as violence continues. 2006: In the Assembly elections of 25 January HAMAS gains 44% of the vote, a ‘small plurality’ (Carter 2006: 10) but win the majority of seats. Western states withdraw aid unless HAMAS recognizes Israel. Negotiations start to form a government of national unity that would include Fateh. 12 July 2006: Hizbullah, which has 14 out of 128 seats in the Lebanese Parliament and a wide network of social welfare activities, captured two Israeli solders. Blaming the Lebanese government, Israel commenced air-strikes, followed by an invasion involving several direct military encounters with Hizbullah forces. Civilian as well as military installations were destroyed. A UN brokered cease fire came into effect 14 August 2006. The death toll estimates vary but approximately 44 Israeli civilians and 119 soldiers, approximately 500 Hizbullah militiamen, 46 Lebanese Army combatants and upwards of 1,100 Lebanese civilians are reported dead. In addition, 7 UN personnel were killed. October 2006: Syria repeats offer of talks with Israel; Israel rejects this saying that Syria must first withdraw support for armed insurgency. Oct 12, HAMAS Prime Minister Ismail Haniyah says that HAMAS will not recognize Israel or abandon the armed struggle.

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15 February 2007: Ismail Haniyah resigns to make way for a government of national unity. 14 June 2007: Abbas declares a state of emergency following armed clashes between HAMAS and Fateh in Gaza. HAMAS, however, effectively control Gaza; Fateh the West Bank. April 2008: Turkey attempts to mediate between Syria and Israel to revive talks. 4 June 2008: HAMAS offers Israel a temporary cease-fire through Egyptian mediation, which is refused. Discussion • Do you agree with the argument that Israel is more the result of ethno-European nationalism than religious claims on the land? Bard rejects the ‘myth’ that Israel is a tool of European colonialism, deliberately planted in the Arab world as an outpost for European interests (2006: 9-10). • Do you agree that the Palestinian cause has been primarily a nationalist, not a religious, one? • Do you think that a one-state solution was ever an option? • What might convince Israel to trust Arab states when they say that they will make peace in return for land? • Is the principle of non-negotiation with those who have not repudiated violence justified? Neither Egypt not Jordan had renounced violence, and indeed were officially still at war with Israel when they began talking (no modern nation state has declared itself pacifist) yet peace treaties were still negotiated. Technically, a state of war still exists between Israel and Syria. • Is the analytical usefulness of the above historical survey compromised by down-playing the role of religion? • Does the biblical narrative that God gave Canaan to the Hebrews, and commanded them to totally wipe out the existing inhabitants, not more readily and more plausibly explain the events that followed the re-creation of Israel than any other theory? • Many blame Israel for the continued conflict—for example, by refusing to surrender occupied territory. Many blame the Arab states—for example, by their failure to recognize Israel. Does

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attributing blame serve any useful purpose, or must we move beyond the blame game? What might ‘moving beyond the blame game’ mean in this context? • Is neutrality on this issue humanly possible?

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Chapter 6 T HE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT Based on the preceding historical introduction, which admittedly did not place religion center stage, this chapter argues that while religion has been recruited by both sides, especially in more recent years, to fuel animosity and to justify claims for the control of land, its initial involvement was marginal in comparison with rival nationalisms. The reality that confronted the world in late 1947 was that two people, who were hostile to each other, wanted to control all or part of the same territory. One people, the Jews, claimed an historical, even theological, connection with the land but their immediate justification for establishing a state in which they would constitute the majority was that they currently occupied a substantial portion of that land. This had its roots in the ethnocentric European conviction that territory outside Europe was ‘open to European occupation’ (Akenson 1992: 157 citing Maxine Rodinson). The other people, the Palestinians, claimed that, as they had lived in the same land for centuries and were the overall majority, they had the right to determine how the whole territory should be governed. No doubt some Arabs intended that any Palestinian state would be ruled by some form of Islamic government, although Christians as well as Muslims pioneered Palestinian nationalism. Certainly, the Arab State that the Sharif of Mecca had hoped to rule would have been an Islamic entity. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who fully supported Hitler’s final solution, would also have envisaged an Islamic state. See Bard on the Mufti’s meeting with Hitler during 1941; ‘Arabs were Germany’s natural friends because they had the same enemies...the Jews’, said Hitler (22-23). No doubt some Muslims always regarded Palestine as properly belonging to the Muslim world. Islamic territory, once lost, should be regained. In 1922, when the British Mandate of Palestine was created the Muslim countries were not in a position to claim Palestine; they were just emerging as independent states.

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In 1947, the Arab and Muslim countries thought that they could look to the United Nations to protect the rights of the Palestinians to determine their own future, regarding Palestine as de facto an independent state once Britain had withdrawn. Instead, Resolution 181 proposed partition. As the Jews settled in Palestine contemplated the creation of their homeland, however, even though they did not cite biblical verses that gave Palestine to the ancient Israelites, they did use the Bible to define the boundaries of their future state. Thus, in defining what should be the ‘rightful boundaries of Eretz Israel’ even secular Jews turned to the Bible (Akenson 1992: 175). After the capture of the provinces of Judea and Samaria (the ‘Occupied Territories’) in 1967, biblically-minded Jews were in the forefront of settlement, arguing that ‘the entire promised land belonged to the Jewish people and’ to ‘surrender any portion of the Land conquered in the 6 Day War would be a moral transgression’ (Akenson 1992: 321). After 1967, says Akenson, it became more acceptable to cite the Bible and religious claims on the land, since now Israel’s survival seemed much more likely (1992: 323). Prior to 1967, survival alone had sufficed. By the mid-1980s, substantial elements within the Palestinian liberation struggle were employing Islamist language. They were engaged in a jihad to a recover lost portion of Dar-ul-Islam including Islam’s third most sacred city, Jerusalem. Even as early as 1982 when I first visited Jerusalem, Al-Aqsa Mosque was a symbol of Palestinian aspirations; I purchased a poster showing the Mosque surrounded by barbed wire. Since 1967, there have been several Jewish attempts to destroy Al-Aqsa, presumably so that the Temple can be rebuilt. Some Jews and fundamentalist Christians believe that this is necessary before the Messiah either comes for the first time, or returns. Christians cite such verses as 2 Thessalonians 2: 34, in addition to passages in Daniel (9: 27; 11: 31; 12: 11), which, taken to predict the Apocalypse, refer to the Temple’s existence. Since it was destroyed in 70 CE, in order to feature in End Time scenes, it must be rebuilt. Formal Jewish prayer for the Orthodox ends with the hope that ‘services in G-d’s’ Temple might be restored. One consequence of a 1969 attack on the Temple Mount was the creation of the Organization of Islamic Conference, the intergovernmental organization of majority Muslim states. The restoration of Arab Muslim sovereignty over Jerusalem was the main agenda at the OIC’s inaugural meeting. However, there are

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many Jews who do not refer to biblical texts to justify the existence of their state, just as there are many Palestinians who do not employ Islamist discourse. Q5: 82-3, which describes Jews as among the most hostile to Muslims, can be cited as evidence of Muslim-Jewish animosity but the historical record suggests that Jews did not fare badly in Muslim countries. When expelled from Spain in 1492, the Ottoman Caliph gave instructions to his governors that they should be welcomed and helped to settle in their provinces. Earlier, Jews expelled from a less tolerant Muslim regime in Spain also found refuge elsewhere in the Muslim world. Yet animosity obviously existed by the late 1920s (see Ruether and Ruether 2002: 29-35). In my opinion, this was largely a result of the way in which the Jewish migrants created completely separate and economically independent settlements in their midst and often looked down on the Arabs as if they belonged to an inferior species. The original architects of settlement believed that Arabs as well as migrants would benefit economically; some Arabs would become wealthy through the sale of land while poorer Arabs would work on the Jewish farms. In practice, the landowners often lived in Damascus or Beirut while Jews’ increasingly employed other Jews on the farms, while some of the more zealous Jews actually drove Arabs from out of the fields of other Jews who had employed them and even boycotted Arab goods. (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 51). Thus, ‘the Palestinian Arabs experienced the Zionists as planting exclusivist institutions, setting up a total way of life, culturally and economically, that eliminates interchange between Arab and Jews’ in striking similarity to how the Ulster Scots separated themselves from the Catholics. Akenson’s theory is that the Ulster Scots also saw themselves as a covenant people who had to keep themselves pure, uncontaminated by the natives. Later, the influential activist and thinker Ze’ev Jabotinsky (1880-1940) on the one hand fought the British but on the other saw Israel’s future as an extension of the European space into the Levant. He believed that some people were naturally weaker, some naturally stronger. His attitude towards Arabs can be described as ‘racist’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 61). Once in control of the West Bank and Gaza, the Israelis had an opportunity either to find some just solution to the issue of Palestinian rights and claims, or to oppress them. They chose the latter course of action and descriptions of the measures they put in place again recall those of the Ulster Scots. Settlers were privileged in many areas. Sewerage,

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power supplies and other amenities were installed, while neighboring Arab villages and towns went without. Palestinian areas ‘would be denied water’ and ‘large scale agricultural development has not been allowed’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 122). Roads were built connecting settlements but bypassing Palestinian areas (2002: 121). ‘Palestinians in Jerusalem have been continually denied permits to build houses’ (2002: 122) while Jewish homes have mushroomed (see Ellis 2002: 67). During the Intifada, the IDF (Israel Defense Force) damaged and sometimes bulldozed thousands of homes (Ruether and Ruether 2002:125; see Carter 2006: 150-51 on the growth of settlements). This has been described as ‘ethnic cleansing’, to borrow a term from the Balkan War. Any Jew has the right of ‘return’ to Israel but Palestinians have no such right. Palestinians remain on the ‘bottom rung of the Israeli economy’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 147). Although some Arabs who live in Israel as citizens have prospered, there is economic disparity between Arabs and Jews. Schools in Israel are not (as in Northern Ireland) officially segregated but in practice they are, for example, 14 out of 28 elementary schools in Tel Aviv (Akenson 1992: 257). Oriental Jews, too, have been subject to racist attitudes, being regarded by European Jews as ‘primitive’ (Akenson 1992: 257; Ruether and Ruether 2002: 151) 70% of land in the West Bank was designated for Jewish use (Akenson 1992: 331). Little money was spent on education for the Arabs. The Ruethers remark, ‘Palestinians in the Occupied Territories live under a constant regime of restrictions and harassments, culminating in torture, physical injury and death’ as anyone suspected of anti-Israeli, that is ‘terrorist’ activity, is detained and interrogated (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 157). Pass and permit laws, similar to those in South Africa, were also imposed, which effectively denied Palestinians access to the authorities that governed them except as ‘collaborators’ (Akenson 1992: 242). The aim, suggest Ruether and Ruether, is to encourage the Arabs to leave so that ‘the land can be annexed to Israel without the population’. Describing the same process, Akenson uses the word ‘redeem’. The Israelis, he says, set out to purify the land, or to redeem it, just as God had commanded them in the Bible to rid the land of all its previous inhabitants (see Deut. 7: 2). Thus, one belief that most Israelis held in common was that they ‘had been in some way chosen to “redeem the land” and to displace the modern equivalent of the Philistines and Canaanites’

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(Akenson 1992: 243). Israelis, he surmises, may have needed ‘a common enemy (the Arabs) and a common goal (redemption of the land and suppression of the Palestinians)’ to bind them together (Akenson 1992: 242). Akenson identifies the same attitude of being guardians against barbarism or heresy that featured in the two previous case studies: Ulster Scots held back the Catholic threat; Serbia held back the Muslim threat, as does Israel, which from an early date has ‘made effective propaganda by describing itself as ‘the only democracy in the Middle East’ (Akenson 1992: 241). Beleaguered by ‘an outside world full of enemies’, Israel was a modern day David in which the few defended civilization’s Middle Eastern outpost against the many (Akenson 1992: 245). The Ruethers suggest that little real progress will be made until and unless Israelis jettison ‘three cherished Zionist myths’, namely, ‘that Jews have an a priori right to the whole of Palestine’, ‘that the other people resident there... do not have a parallel claim’ and that ‘Israel must be an outpost of European people and culture’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 240). Building on their initial sense of cultural if not racial superiority which rather ironically the early settlers borrowed from Europeans, they transferred this to the Arabs. Having themselves been subject to anti-Semitism, they mirrored this in their attitude towards the Arabs. Currently, comment the Ruethers, ‘Many Jews are wont to claim that Arabs are moved by an irrational hatred and desire to destroy Israel, and so there can be no peace’ (2002: 238). The presence of Arabs in the land, according to religious militants, is polluting (2002: 229). Speaking at a seminar that I chaired, Richard Rubenstein the distinguished Holocaust theologian, stated that he did not see the possibility of permanent peace only of ‘temporary truces that could last for five, ten years...but peace’, he said, ‘is impossible’ (Rubenstein 2004: 88-89). The Jewish Religion as a Cause of Continued Conflict Drawing especially on the work of Marc Ellis, the Reuthers comment on a process by which remembrance of the Holocaust came to occupy the center stage of Jewish thought and identity. Bent on ‘destroying’ Israel, Arabs are seen as intent on perpetrating another Holocaust, the horror of which is so great that all measures to oppress Palestinians so that they do not have the means to rise up against the Jews are justified. Any comparison of the conditions and

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suffering of the Arabs with those of the Jews under Hitler is ‘an abomination and a blasphemy’. Jewish suffering is unique and incomparable with any other (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 215). Arabs become surrogates for the Nazis, against whom Jewish resistance had failed. Now, against the Arabs, whose opposition to Israel is perceived as ‘a Satanic desire to continue the Holocaust’, the Jews defense must succeed or Hitler will be awarded a posthumous victory (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 199). Arabs have thus been demonized; ‘by making the Arabs the surrogate of the Nazis... it becomes impossible to see them as fellow human beings’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 199). Ellis points out that before 1967, Jewish thinkers were almost silent on the Holocaust; after 1967, they can point to ‘the victory in the Six-day War’ as ‘a miracle, a sign that innocent people so recently victimized might be on the verge of redemption’ (Ellis 2002: 55). Indeed, post-1967 Israel has emerged as a major concern for Jews all around the world, whereas prior to 1967, although many Diaspora Jews spent time in Israel as volunteers or helped Israel from the outside, they were not convinced that it would survive. Now that Israel’s survival seems likely, it moves, with the Holocaust, to the center of the ground ‘around which the boundaries of Jewish commitment are defined’ (Ellis 2002: 54). Progressive synagogues may not pray for the restoration of the priesthood but inculcating a ‘love of Israel’ has become a central plank of their programs. This is listed as an aim of the religious school run by the Reform synagogue closest to where I currently live, where I take students on field-trips. Ellis argues that in oppressing the Palestinians, Jews are betraying the Holocaust; postHolocaust, ‘Jewish suffering is unacceptable ... but also no people should have to suffer as Jews have’ (Ellis 2002: 54). Jewish empowerment after 1967 is a positive for all Jews who are too used to being disempowered but in mistreating the Palestinians Jews have abandoned the moral high ground. Those who were persecuted have become the persecutors. Those who oppose Israel’s occupation of the West Bank are seen as ‘mirroring those who sought to destroy Jews and Jewish life when Jews were stateless’ (Ellis 2002: 69). Ellis coined the term ‘Constantinian Judaism’ to describe the ‘militarized’ Judaism of the settlements and of the state that supports them (Ellis 2002: 69-73). He includes US Jews who support Israel’s policies in this Constantinian framework, since they too exercise power. This Judaism, rooted in power, is blind to the

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hypocrisy of erecting monuments to Aushchwitz ‘in order “never again” to allow such atrocities to go on without outcry’ while at the same time stifling ‘the cries of the Palestinians as their houses are blown up, their land confiscated, and their children maimed with so-called rubber bullets’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 217). This theology informs the continued oppression of Palestinians, since should they gain a viable state, they would represent an unacceptable threat. Thus, stone-throwing and suicide bombings continue, because without a viable state economic and social conditions within the Palestinian National Authority remain poor. Even if the biblical verses that speak of a return of the Jews to Israel can be applied to the late nineteenth century re-settlement and even if the original gift of the land to Israel was a divine act, this did not represent a permanent deed of ownership. Sovereignty remained God’s (Lev. 25:23) and their possession of it was always contingent on their keeping their covenant with God (Lev. 18:26, 28). This involved ensuring that justice was upheld (Deut. 16:20) (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 10). Justice included loving your neighbor as yourself (Lev. 19:18). Lev. 19:33-34 is emphatic that since the Hebrews had themselves been oppressed and enslaved in Egypt, they must ‘not vex him’. Although exclusive texts, such as Deut. 7:3 appear to authorize the total extermination of the original inhabitants of the land, the biblical reality is that non-Hebrews continued to live in the land as part of what, in practice, was a multi-cultural, pluralist society over which David’s kingship was acknowledged, ‘a Jewish overlordship amid diverse people, most of whom retained its own cults’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 8). David’s army had Philistines, Hittites, Moabites and others among its officers (2 Sam 23: 8-39). The Jews were still referred to as ‘Israel’ even when they did not occupy the land. In fact, ‘periods of Jewish sovereignty over parts of Palestine were brief in antiquity’ and more often than not Jews lived ‘under a series of empires’ such as the Persian, Hellenistic and Roman (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 225). The Ruethers are not convinced that the claim that the Jews have a right to the land that takes precedence over other people’s rights stands up to scrutiny. In my opinion, their return to Israel might be part of a divine plan but once there the reality should have been a multi-cultural society, since other people also lived there ‘and the God of the Bible created and loves all nations (Ruether and Ruether 2002: xxi). The story of Jonah, from which the Ruether’s title,

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The Wrath of Jonah, is derived, reminds us that God ‘creates, loves, and seeks to save the other people equally with Israel’ (2002: 13). Jonah found this hard to accept; he wanted to limit God’s love to his own people. If the restoration of the land to Israel represents a move towards the redemption of the Cosmos, then what has transpired in that land falls far short of the ideal. Instead of being a ‘light to the nations’, a model of ‘social justice and equality’, Israel embodies ‘militarism and inter-communal discrimination and hatred’ (2002: 227). In a world where ‘nation-states are a mix of people living within national boundaries’, the ‘ethnically exclusive state is a nineteenth century European ideology’ that fails in ‘the face of contrary reality’ (2002: 231). The Ruethers and Ellis suggest that Israel needs to redeem itself by recognizing that Palestinians also have rights to the land and that, as fellow human beings, they deserve justice. Jews and Palestinians need to find ways of coexisting, of living ‘together in one land’. This ‘reflects a worldwide dilemma and challenge’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 242). Ellis writes, ‘Since millions of Jews and Palestinians live in the same land, the challenge is to move towards a life that emphasizes inclusion in the personal, cultural, economic and political spheres’. He believes that in years to come, ‘a new narrative of Israel’s origins and history will evolve’ and that ‘the foundation of separation will lose its ethical and normative force’ (Ellis 2002: 178-79). Phobia that Israel is surrounded by enemies committed to destroying her, say the Ruethers, fails to recognize that two Arab nations have made peace and that others have ‘indicated their willingness to settle with Israel’ if various conditions are met (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 240). Originally, the Palestinians were badly led by the Grand Mufti, who, in the years before 1947 refused to engage in constructive conversations with either the Jews or the British that could have resulted in a mutually acceptable compromise on the future governance of Palestine. He also prevented any alternative Arab leadership from engaging in conversations (Ruether and Reuther 2002: 97). Cohn-Sherbok and El-Alami 2003: point out that the ‘greater part of the Arab world does accept the existence of the State of Israel as a fact and is prepared to do business with it’. However, the dispute will remain unresolved as long as inequality and injustice remain: ‘whether as a single state or as two states, Palestinians and Israelis must have absolutely identical legal, civil and democratic rights and equality of opportunity’ (2003: 211).

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Whether or not the original conquest of Palestine in biblical times was or was not justified, settlers do ‘at some point become legitimate’, so the challenge for today is how to adjust to the contemporary reality in which more than one people live in the land ‘so that a civil atmosphere of justice and peace can prevail’ (Ellis 2002: 77). In addition to the new command that Hitler must not be given a posthumous victory, Ellis suggests ‘Thou shalt not lessen the humanity of Palestinians’ (2002: 37). He fears for the future identity of Jews if it is to be constructed on the total humiliation of another people (2002: 48). No doubt some Israelis do feel insecure and threatened by a world around them that seems unfriendly, and in their minds justify what they know to be unjust. Certainly marching for peace in the Old City of Jerusalem, I have encountered the view that the other side, the Palestinians, are to blame. The claim, though, that Israelis attack when attacked can not be sustained; ‘the myth of “purity of arms”...began to be unmasked in the war in Lebanon’ while ‘a gaping world witnessed Israeli Defense Force soldiers and also settlers using live ammunition, three-foot clubs, and cyanide gas against any Palestinian, young, old, male or female’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 220). The Case for Islam as a Major Cause of the Conflict The previous chapter suggests that Islam was hardly a factor in the original Palestinian national struggle. Initial Arab and Muslim opposition to the establishment of Israel was based on the illegality of Resolution 181, which proposed partition of Palestine instead of allowing the majority Arab population to determine their own future. Echoing this view, El-Alami says, ‘territory cannot be “carved out” of other sovereign states’ (Cohn-Sherbok and El-Alami 2003: 211) although partition has featured in all three cases studies, as it also featured in India. Much Arab and Muslim writing repudiates that just because the Jews suffered in Nazi Germany, the creation of Israel was justified. El-Alami writes: ‘I cannot accept that the dreadful events of the Second World War demonstrate the validity of the Zionist ambition’. ‘The creation’, he continues, ‘of the apartheid state that is Israel represents the ultimate victory of the extreme separatist notions propounded by Nazism’, thus, like Akenson, comparing Israel and South Africa (El-Alami, in CohnSherbok and El-Alami 2003: 208). Carter also uses apartheid in the

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title of his 2006 book. Increasingly, however, Islam has been recruited to fuel animosity against Israel and to argue that any Palestinian state that replaces Israel would be an Islamic entity. Use of Islamist language appears to have become more popular following the 1967 war, when religious vocabulary was also employed by Jews. Muslims appear to have copied European anti-Jewish rhetoric, widely citing the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. There is a strand in Islam that ascribes certain people with innate evil, which some Muslims currently project onto Jews. As a child, Farid Esack was taught to greet non-Muslims with samm alaykum (poison be on you). There obviously is an Islamic element to the conflict since I have visited Mosques in the UK whose worshipers have no ethnic link with Palestinians but whose hatred for Jews was palpable. Other Muslims point out that while Israelis can legitimately be viewed as engaged in a ‘total war’ against Palestinians, not all Jews everywhere are anti-Palestinian. Ellis, for example, has long identified himself with the Palestinian cause. So have others. In Israel, I was often told that ‘every Israeli citizen is a frontline soldier’. My farmer, a reserve army Captain, carried his gun whenever he rode his tractor into the fields. HAMAS justifies suicide bombs against civilians on the basis that all Israelis are at war with the Palestinian people. In fact, they are not. Ellis draws attention to the ‘refuseniks’, Israeli soldiers who refuse to serve in the Occupied Territories because they saw ‘in the policy of might and beatings, images of Nazi brutality once carried out against Jews’ (Ellis 2002: 140). Ismail al-Faruqi, a former governor of Galilee under the British mandate and subsequently a renowned Muslim scholar who also contributed significantly to Muslim-Christian-Jewish relations, wrote in 1983 that the sins of the Jews in evicting Palestinians from their land can only be atoned for through the dismantling of the State of Israel so that its wealth could be ‘confiscated to pay off its liabilities’ (al-Faruqi 1983: 261-62). While the dismantling of the Zionist state does not have to involve ‘the destruction of Jewish lives or property’, it is, said this moderate Muslim, ‘a first principle of Islam that aggression and injustice be met with an identical proportion of the same’. Qur’anic verses such as 2:190 and 22:39-40 permit selfdefense. Jews, he says, could continue to live in Palestine as ‘covenanters with the Islamic state for peace’ (al-Faruqi 1983: 266). Neither the PLO nor al-Fateh can be described as Islamist even

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though most of their members are Muslim. As such, in deciding to recognize Israel’s existence and right to security, which HAMAS has refused to concede, they presumably found that this did not conflict with their faith. A few Muslims point to Qur’an verse 17:100104 to argue that Muslims must recognize Israel, since this passage speaks of God assembling the Jews in Israel before the End. AlFaruqi, as a Palestinian, believed that a great injustice was inflicted on his people, that the Jews used ‘pressure, bribery, blackmail, speculation and forced evictions’ to expel Arabs from their land. This wrong had to be put right. Israel was a state that rested on illegal foundations. It has to be dismantled, and a new state put in its place. For al-Faruqi, any state in which Muslims are the majority would be an Islamic entity. However, if Islam is subtracted from the above description of his position, a very similar picture emerges. Al-Faruqi believed that the partition of Palestine into two states (one of which has not yet been established) was wrong. Rather, the majority community should have determined its future governance. Jews resident in Palestine could remain as full citizens of the new state. In this state they would be a minority and immigration on the basis of Jewishness would not continue. Immigration was raised as a major issue in the 1920s (see El-Alami: 137-38). This is actually identical to the original Palestinian nationalism that had objected to the carving up of Palestine in the early 1920s. Yet, as noted above, some Muslims are prepared to accept the two-state solution, provided that any Palestinian state is economically viable. The peace plan published by Saudi Arabia in March 2002 and endorsed by several Arab countries calls for the recognition of Israel by all parties and for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories with East Jerusalem as its capital. Israel would have sovereignty over the Western Wall. While calling for Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders this plan allows Israel to retain some areas of the West Bank in exchange for equivalent transfers to a Palestinian state. Obviously, return of the Golan Heights to Syria, and loss of East Jerusalem are hugely problematic but what is significant about this plan is that the proposer, the government of Saudi Arabia, sees itself as a global guardian of Islam. Its constitution is the Qur’an. Saudi Arabia has also indicated a willingness to drop the demand for the right of Palestinians to return to Israel. Whatever verses some Muslims might cite to incite hatred against Israel, other Muslims are prepared to recognize its existence

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as well as the right to ‘secure its borders’. Israel has offered to return some of the Golan Heights but Syria insists on a ‘complete withdrawal’ (Bard 2006: 63). A Syrian controlled and militarized Golan Heights, which overlooks Galilee, would represent at least a psychological threat to Israel. The Palestinian Campaign for Peace and Democracy, whose members include Christians and Muslims, advocates the NuseibehAyalon Agreement. Sari Nuseibeh is President of Al-Quds University, Ami Ayalon is the retired Israeli chief Admiral. Drawn up by some Israelis and Palestinians, this endorses the two state solution, while suggesting joint sovereignty of Jerusalem as capital of both states (see ‘Briefing by Sari Nusseibeh and Ami Ayalon Sponsors of “The People’s Voice” Peace Initiative’ 12 December 2003, Foundation for Middle East Peace; http://www.fmep.org/ documents/briefing_Nusseibeh-Ayalon_12-12-03.html). Hanan Ashrawi, the well-known former PLO spokeswoman, an Anglican, supports the Campaign. She is also a Member of the Palestinian Parliament. The current impasse in the peace process is the result of HAMAS gaining the majority in the Palestinian Parliament, officially the Legislative Council (in the elections of January 2006) and refusing to recognize Israel. Arguably, if almost every Muslim government has indicated willingness to recognize Israel, albeit with conditions, HAMAS, despite its electoral success, is acting contrary to majority Muslim opinion. Rubenstein’s reference to the possibility of temporary truces is based on a classical Muslim view that, since the non-Islamic world is illegitimate and must eventually be brought under Islamic rule, any treaty with non-Islamic governments can not be permanent. However, there is no reference in the Qur’an to short-term treaties, only to suing for peace if your opponent sues for peace (8:6) and as a matter of international law, Muslim states have given permanent recognition to non-Muslim governments through membership of the United Nations and as signatories of conventions and treaties (see Khadduri 1955: 203; 288). Q42:49 says that whoever forgives an enemy and seeks reconciliation will be rewarded by God. To depict Islam as immutable plays into the hands of those for whom it is a fixed system that cannot be rethought or reinterpreted based on what the Qur’an says rather than on how previous generations have understood scripture. Muslims may indeed say that Islam is immutable but they also hesitate to claim that any human understanding of Islam is perfect

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and incapable of improvement. The fact that Muslims in Palestine have engaged in terrorist tactics and suicide bombings, for some, confirms the notion that Islam sanctions indiscriminate killing. On this issue, many Muslims point out that the Qur’an sees suicide as a sin (Q4: 29-30) while Q17:33 prohibits the taking of any life unjustly. Thus, writes Muktedar Khan (2004) ‘while war in search of justice and to escape persecution is permissible in Islam’, the ‘slaughter of...civilians’ can not be defended by any reading of the Qur’an, which states that if anyone who has killed ‘one innocent soul, it is as if he has killed all humanity’ (5:32) (Khan 2004: 5). The election of HAMAS expresses frustration that despite all the diplomacy, life is no better. While it is untrue that all Israelis are opposed to a just settlement for the Palestinians, faced with the reality of life it must sometimes seem that any Israeli is indeed an enemy. The depth of frustration and hostility that enables anyone to become a suicide bomber must be unimaginably extreme. Anwar Sadat’s assassins believed that he had betrayed Islam by signing the Camp David Treaty but he can be depicted as a Muslim champion of peace; ‘in 1977 in the Egyptian Parliament, Sadat announced that he was willing to go to the end of the world, even to the Knesset, in search of peace’ (Cohn-Sherbok and El-Alami 2003: 169). Bard says that the ‘peace drive did not begin with President Anwar Sadat’s...courageous’ visit to Israel but followed half a century of Israeli overtures (Bard 2006: 241). Christianity as a Cause of Continued Conflict Jimmy Carter, who helped to broker the Camp David agreement, is a man of profound Christian faith who says that while he was US President his faith informed his politics (2006: 6). His agenda is world peace. Other Christians, though, have a different agenda; believing that war and conflict in the Middle East is necessary before Jesus’ return, they lobby against peace initiatives. They also support settlement in the Occupied Territories, since they believe that Israel must take ‘the entire Holy Land’ before Jesus’ return. Before that, infidels (Antichrists)’ will conquer the area. (Carter 2006: 114-15). This is derived largely from an interpretation of Revelations (see Lindsey 2002: 236-43). Such Christians ‘make frequent trips to Israel, to support it with funding, and lobby in Washington for the colonization of Palestinian territory’. Carter points out that such

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settlement is proceeding at a rapid pace and includes plans to ‘retain far-reaching West Bank settlements and to expand a large enclave known as Ma’aleh Adumim from deep within the West Bank all the way into East Jerusalem’ (Carter 2006: 115). The wall under construction protects these enclaves and undermines the possibility of a viable Palestinian state. Some analysts point out that the wall reinforces the Israelis ‘siege mentality’ and ‘blatantly asserts Israel’s military and logistical superiority’ (Cohn-Sherbok and El-Alami 2003: 189). Others suggest that any Palestinian state allowed by Israel would consist of cantons separated by Israeli territory, through which Palestinians would have to cross to reach other cantons, and while the whole state would remain economically dependent on Israel (Ellis 2002: 84). Carter also points out that the new doctrine of the legitimacy of ‘pre-emptive strikes’ sends out the message that ‘violence has become a much more acceptable alternative to peaceful negotiations in the resolution of differences’ (Carter 2006: 125). West Bank expansion and continued conflict in the Middle East, on the one hand, is welcomed and even encouraged by fundamentalist Christians; on the other hand this sets back hope of a peaceful and just solution. Numerous statements by the World Council of Churches (WCC) call for Israel’s withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders. The WCC has also affirmed the right of ‘a people under occupation’ to resist, preferably non-violently and has condemned the ‘cantonization’ of the land (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 172-73). The WCC supports a shared Jerusalem. The Vatican has had a problematic relationship with Israel stemming from Pope Pius XII’s refusal to condemn the Nazis during World War II but diplomatic relations were established in 1994. However, the Vatican also sponsors ‘charitable work for Palestinians’ including ‘a large number of schools and social service centers’, and all work is carried out on a non-sectarian basis (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 166). The Vatican’s stance is that the Palestinians have the same right to a ‘homeland in which they can live at liberty’ as do the Jews. Religion and the Peace Process The above analyses suggests that both Judaism and Islam have been factors during the conflict, that various people and movements justify their actions and policies with reference to religion but that the

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fundamental issue remains one of land, justice and mutual recognition of each other’s humanity, human and civil rights. At bottom, the conflict remains one of two nationalisms confronting each other in what is still, largely, a common space. The issue here is what role have religions played in encouraging peace and in condemning violence. First, as in the Northern Irish conflict, many religious leaders around the world have condemned the violence and called for peace. These include Jews, Christians and Muslims. For example, the Alexandria Declaration (January 2002), whose signatories include the Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel Bakshi-Doron, Sheikh Tal El Sider, a Minister of State for the Palestinian Authority, together with several archbishops and bishops, pledges that they will jointly pursue a ‘quest for a just peace that leads to reconciliation in Jerusalem and the Holy Land, for the common good of all our peoples’. They call for a ‘religiously sanctioned cease fire’ and for a ‘just, secure and durable solution’ to the conflict. ‘Bloodshed’, states the declaration, must ‘not be allowed to pollute’ the Holy Land, which is ‘holy to all three of our faiths’. Both Ariel Sharon, the then Prime Minister of Israel and Yasser Arafat, then President of the Palestinian National Authority, supported this initiative, which describes itself as a parallel religious track to the political road map. The co-hosts were Dr George Carey the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Sheikh Tanwaty, widely recognized as the premier scholar in the Islamic world. The InterReligious and International Federation for World Peace, through its Middle East Peace Initiative, has sponsored hundreds of interfaith pilgrimages to Israel and Palestine to express solidarity with both sides in the quest for peace. Eminent Muslims, Christians, Jews and Druze including Israelis and Palestinians have repeatedly called for a non-violent solution. A similar initiative by the Fellowship of Reconciliation has sent interfaith peace delegations from the USA to Palestine and Israel to engage in dialogue with ‘all parties to the conflict’ (Building Peace: 20). Reporting their activities to the UN, the Fellowship suggested that ‘as a small peace delegation’ its members ‘were able to access people and places that might not be reachable by parties in conflict’ while their ‘inter-faith, multi-racial composition set a good example of how Jews and Muslims can work and live together in peace’ (21). In addition, women and men on both sides have pledged themselves to achieve a just solution, such as signatories to the

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Nuseibeh-Ayalon Agreement, referred to above. There are numerous groups on both sides and some that cross the boundaries. These include Women in Black, founded in 1998 and the Jerusalem Connection, which in 1989 brought together on the Israeli side Bat Shalom and on the Palestinian side, the Jerusalem Center for Women, to campaign for an end of the settlements, a just resolution of the conflict, respect for human rights and to seek ways that both people could co-exist. The homepage of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom lists many organizations, conferences and initiatives involving men as well as women that are dedicated to an equitable, peaceful and just settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see www.peacewomen.org). The Ruethers refer to the courageous work of human rights activists, Jewish and non-Jewish, who have ‘striven to make visible the massive human rights violations...in the Occupied Territories’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 220). ‘Women’, they write, ‘have played a key role in the work of survival’, holding the ‘family together when their fathers, husbands, and sons are in prison’. ‘Networks’, they continue, ‘of women’s organizations have also founded kindergartens, orphanages, literary projects, and improvements in medical services and sanitation in villages’ (2002: 158-59). Some of these women and men are secular, many regard themselves as good Jews and as good Muslims who see beyond the stereotype to the humanity of the other. Religion is a factor in fueling the conflict but religious people are also active in opposing violence and the demonization of the other. Some religious people will continue to support settlements in the West Bank, even to encourage violence but many will challenge this from the perspective of their religions’ commitment to peace with justice. If religion was subtracted from the Israel-Palestine conflict, would it cease? This analysis suggests that while injustice and rival territorial claims remain unresolved, the absence of religion would do little to resolve the conflict. Most analysts still regard the twostate solution as the only viable option. Ellis speculates that a federal solution, one that binds Israelis and Palestinians together in a mutually beneficial relationship, might be the better option (2002: 78-79). Could both communities, he asks, see common citizenship as a route to normalizing life, to developing shared loyalties that transcend the Jew-Arab, settler-indigenous differences, to the recognition that neither community will ‘be secure without the others’s security’ (2002: 78; 92)? A very fragile peace currently exists

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in Israel-Palestine. At present, the two sides are not speaking with each other. The status of Jerusalem remains a major issue, since both sides make absolute territorial claims. Israel blames Palestinian violence and HAMAS’s non-recognition for the current impasse. The Palestinians blame the continued presence of settlements in the West Bank and what the Ruethers describe as ‘the endless efforts of Israelis to remove or subjugate Palestinians in increasingly diminished numbers on less and less land’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 243). Selengut (2003) says that ‘moderates and secularists on both sides are willing and able to compromise and work out some political solution akin to the 1947 call for partition’. However, for ‘the faithful on both sides...it is not a matter of politics...but a divine imperative’ to ‘destroy and remove the other’ and by doing so ‘to realize...God’s will’. Yet are the hardliners truly ‘faithful’ to their scriptures, to their respective covenants with God? The next chapter examines whether either scripture supports such exclusive claims. Discussion • Do you agree with Ellis that an Israel that oppresses the Palestinians violates the Jews’ covenant with God? • Do you accept the argument that because God gave the Hebrew people the land of Canaan thousands of years ago, this does not mean that they can claim an exclusive right on the land today? • How do you understand the Bible’s references to the return of the Jews to Israel? Identify existing barriers to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. How might these be resolved? • The Saudi plan has not attracted much international support. Do you think this is because it is a Saudi plan, not a European or North American plan? • Does racism play a role in the continued conflict? • The alternative Geneva Peace Plan (2003) as well as the NuseibehAyalon Agreement proposes that Jerusalem serve as capital of both states (see Carter 2006: 163-76 on the Geneva Initiative). The latter plan implies joint sovereignty, the former a division of the city. The original UN plan placed Jerusalem under international jurisdiction. How would you resolve the issue over Jerusalem’s status? • Ellis speaks of Jerusalem as the ‘broken middle’, as the ‘between’ of ‘three religions’ (2002: 81). Here, he says, the ‘ordinary

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In Search of Solutions becomes a gateway to the ultimate’. What do you think he means by this and how might recognition of the broken-ness of Jerusalem help to resolve dispute about who should own the City? Is the city too sacred to too many people to be owned singly by anyone? Is it plausible to argue, as this chapter has, that religion is not the main cause of the conflict which most people regard as the most profoundly religious of all? On the other hand, the Islamic dimension has been dismissed as irrelevant, even as more or less fabricated. Does this allow one religious claim to trump another? Who is qualified to adjudicate between them? Muslims claim that Islam replaced the Jewish covenant, just as Christians have often claimed. Any special relationship between Jews and Israel has been cancelled. In the context of international law, which Israel cites as the basis of its existence, can the claim that God gave land to a certain people play any role? What sort of a new story might Jews and Arabs one day tell about themselves so that the ‘the foundation of separation will lose its ethical and normative force’ (Ellis 2002: 178-79). How likely is it that Israelis will jettison ‘three cherished Zionist myths’, namely, ‘that Jews have an a priori right to the whole of Palestine’, ‘that the other people resident there…do not have a parallel claim’ and that ‘Israel must be an outpost of European people and culture’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 240).

The Problem of Violent Scriptures

Part Four T OWARDS A SOLUTION

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Chapter Seven THE PROBLEM OF V IOLENT S CRIPTURES: A HIGHER HERMENUETIC While the three case studies suggested that religion was not a major factor in causing those conflicts, they did show how religion was used to fuel animosity. In each situation, religion was also involved as a marker of identity. Thus, even if religion was not used to justify violence, what outsiders see is religious people acting violently. If religious traditions are so unambiguously committed to peace and reconciliation, why do religious people find it so easy to fight each other? My survey of the conflicts suggested that religious texts were not widely cited to motivate or encourage violence. Qur’anic texts were cited in Bosnia and Palestine to justify self-defense, while biblical texts played a part in the Northern Irish and Israeli contexts. The Ulster Scots and Israeli Jews found justification for their policies vis-a-vis the ‘Other’ in the biblical narrative of conquering and purifying a promised land. Settlements in the West Bank were inspired by the conviction that Jews must re-occupy the whole of their promised land, although it is difficult to identify specific verses that support this view. Fundamentalist Christians think that an escalation of conflict in the Middle East fulfils biblical predictions and so express no interest in peace-making in that region. Some Muslims who aided the Bosnian and Palestinian causes, who may also have fought in Afghanistan and Chechnya, see these conflicts as part of a wider jihad against the whole non-Muslim world. This will be explored below. Religion also has a case to answer if it can be so easily manipulated to fuel hatred, even if nationalism, poverty, injustice and discrimination are the major causes of discontent. One argument is that since the Bible and Qur’an contain a lot of divinely sanctioned violence, it should be no surprise that Christians and Muslims act violently. I suggested in the first case study that Christians do not need to cite specific verses to justify violent actions, since they know full well that Christians have, as a matter of fact,

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engaged in wars and conflicts that have often enjoyed religious sanction. Christians who point the finger of accusation at Islam for allegedly having a violent history should first take the plank out of their own eye. Some argue that as the God of the Bible and of the Qur’an are violent, any argument in favor of religions as forces for peace needs to deal with their understanding of God and with what can be described as ‘violent scriptures’ if any convincing case is to be made. It can not be denied that Christians, Muslims and Jews have found justification for violence in their scriptures. The argument that such justification always represents a misinterpretation of scripture may be difficult to sustain, although in this writer’s opinion a case can be made for this. Recognizing Violent Histories Before proceeding further, given that the three case studies appear to have almost, if not quite, vindicated religions vis-a-vis causing violence, it is only honest to point out that Islam and Christianity both have violent histories. On the other hand, both Christianity and Islam started as non-violent, pacifist religions. The change occurred once they had acquired power. Most if not all Christians were pacifist from the time of Jesus until Constantine I (d 337 CE) embraced Christianity. Muhammad and his early companions pursued a purely peaceful policy until after the migration to Madinah (622 CE). There, Muhammad emerged as political leader of the whole city as well as continuing to lead the Muslims spiritually. NonMuslims also recognized his political and juridical authority and covenanted together with the Muslims in the Constitution of Madinah. Initially, Qur’anic verses such as 22:39-40 and 2:190 permitted self-defense from external aggression. Towards the very end of Muhammad’s life, a verse such as 9:5 was taken to permit aggression to extend Islamic rule. This may or may not have been a correct interpretation but it was one that suited the expansionist ambitions of rulers who were effectively secular, not religious. Islam, in its imperial form, took its place alongside other great empires, all of which were expansionist. Nonetheless, the conviction was that once subject to Islamic rule, territory would enjoy peace and stability; administered justly, the population would realize the truth of Islam’s claims and become Muslim. It became a duty of the Caliph to prosecute war against unbelief if such aggression stood a

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reasonable chance of success. Some classical texts speak about a perpetual war between the World of Islam and the World of Rebellion, which may, for pragmatic purposes, be postponed by temporary truces. In this view, non-Muslim governments are regarded as invalid, so no permanent treaties are possible. First, however, war had to be declared. Muslims distinguish between the expansion of what can be described as the empire, and of Islam. The wars of expansion aimed to bring non-Muslim territory under Muslim rule. The population of these territories were to be invited, not forced, to convert. Such thinking still informs the activities of some contemporary Muslims, such as Osama bin Laden. After first bringing true Islamic rule to existing Muslim countries, his aim is to create a global caliphate. Despite the charge that Islam spread by the sword, the historical record tells a different story. Sir Thomas Arnold (1864-1930), who researched extensively the history of how Islam spread, wrote, ‘The spread of Islam...over so vast a portion of the globe’ was ‘due to various causes, social, political and religious; but among these, one of the most powerful factors at work in the production of this stupendous result, has been the un-remitted labors of Muslim missionaries’ (Arnold 1913: 3). Over zealous Muslims have certainly at times demanded faith by sword-point yet the evidence is that what spread initially was Islamic governance, followed over centuries by conversion. On the other hand, vast territories were also successfully evangelized which were never conquered, significantly what is now the largest Muslim country, Indonesia. In Egypt and Syria, it took a thousand years for Islam to acquire the position is has today. When the Crusaders arrived in Jerusalem in 1099, Muslims had only recently become the majority. Many had only ‘converted a few centuries earlier’ (Courbage and Fargues 1998: 20; 51). Under Islamic rule in places like Spain and India Muslims were always a minority. Muslims have believed themselves religiously mandated to expand territorially, thus Islam’s several almost successful attempts to invade European space. Judaism embraced pacifism following the Jews expulsion from Palestine in 135CE and it was not until the creation of the modern state of Israel that what Ellis calls ‘Constantinian Judaism’ emerged, which was a product of power. Kurlansky (2006), discussing the ‘Problem with States’, says ‘one of history’s greatest lessons is that once a state embraces a religion, the nature of the religion changes radically.’ ‘It loses’, he continues, ‘its nonviolent component and

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becomes a force for war rather than peace’ (2006: 25). Similarly, Ellis comments that given the fact of Jewish power both in Israel and in the United States, Jews ‘must admit that’ they ‘like others, use’ their ‘power to pursue injustice in exactly the same way that other peoples and nation-states do’ (2002: 169). Christians were an illegal and persecuted group until the reign of Constantine 1 who patronized and empowered the church. Before Constantine, as followers of a teacher who said that those who make peace are blessed (Mt. 5:9), many if not all Christians were pacifist, refusing to fight. Now, demanding one creed for one church so that it could serve as the one religion of the one empire under the rule of one emperor, those who disagreed with officially sanctioned doctrines found themselves banished, out of office or even dead. Before too long, the Church had developed the just war theory, which made war acceptable as an instrument of the state to which the church was not only allied, but subservient. Just war theory emerged in the writings of Ambrose (340-397), who had served as a Roman official and Augustine (354-430). Later, during the Crusades, the church went further and blessed war as a positive good, provided that infidels were slain and booty given to the church. Military orders were established. For the first several hundred years, Christian evangelism was purely peaceful. Throughout history, this has remained the usual practice. However, Christians have also used violence to compel belief. On numerous occasions, Jews have been confronted with the choice between death and conversion. Many chose death, often at their own hands. King Olaf of Norway (9691000) used ‘every weapon—flattery, guile, persuasion, and, when all else failed, naked coercion’ to convert his people. ‘In most cases’, says Neill, ‘when’ people ‘saw that the king was prepared to thrust his religion down their throats at the point of the sword, they saw reason’ (1964: 90). After all, Jesus did not say to Peter to throw away only to put away his sword, and had also said: ‘I have not come to bring peace but a sword’ (Lk 12:51) (Thompson 1988: 26). Peaceful Jesus also violently turned over the money changers’ tables in the Temple. Another text cited to support use of violence is the Parable of the Tenants (Mt. 21:32-46; Mk 12:1-12). A ruler who punishes those who refuse to pay taxes, or who rebel against him could cite this passage. Jesus did not censure the landowner for killing the tenants or for renting out the vineyard to other people who would give him his share of the harvest.

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To avoid criticism that he wielded a sword, the Archbishop of Mainz ‘battled and killed with a mace’ (in 1182; Thompson 1988: 25). Chief of the Franks, Clovis, who was baptized with 3,000 of his followers on Christmas Day 496 CE, declared that had he been present at Jesus’ crucifixion it would never have happened. The Teutonic Knights were empowered by the Pope, in return for the land they conquered, to root out paganism in Prussia. They decreed that all subjects must be baptized within a month while anyone who relapsed into paganism was enslaved (Neill 1964: 94). Many were forcible converted. ‘How far inner conviction’, says Neill, ‘followed upon outward observance may be questioned’ (Neill 1964: 95). In South America, the Spanish and Portuguese, having each received half of the non-Christian world as a gift from the Pope on condition that they instructed the natives in the faith, were none too particular about method. Under the encomiendo system, colonists were allotted a quota of Indians as labor in return for Christian instruction. Under the harsh conditions imposed by greedy men whose only interest was gold, ‘whole populations died’; ‘I have...come to take away their gold’ said one colonists, not for any other purpose Neill 1964: 145). Most wars in Europe up to and including World War II were sanctioned by Church authorities. England’s Cromwell believed that God gave him victory: ‘The enemies of the state’ thus ‘became the enemies of God and their destruction’ was ‘God’s doing’ (Thompson 1988: 31). This sounds like the biblical, ‘God goes with you to fight against your enemies’ (Deut. 20: 4). During the Holocaust, perpetrators went to Church on Sunday and murdered hundreds on Monday. To put it bluntly, Christians, on the whole, have for two thousand years, simply ignored Jesus’ teaching about loving their enemies’ (see Mt. 5:44. Paraphrasing Walter Wink as cited by Liechty 2002: 100). If this warlike history was justified with reference to violence in scripture, is Christianity inevitably prone to violence? Discussion • Based on your reading of the Bible, do you think that Christians were right to develop ‘just war’ theory? • Would you describe ‘forced conversion’ as an example of ‘bad religion’ or is this a natural consequence of the religious

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tendency to claim exclusive possession of the ‘truth’, as Harris (2005) claims? How Can Violent Scriptures Be Interpreted? Descriptions of divinely sanctioned violence can be allegorized, which was how Gandhi viewed the Bhagavad Gita, which consists of a conversation in the middle of a battlefield. Krishna, the avatar or manifestation of Vishnu, tells Arjuna that as a ksatriya (warrior) he must fight, even though teachers and relatives face him on the other side of the battle line. Gandhi interpreted this as ‘a spiritual battle in human hearts rather than as an historical war’ (Thompson 1988: 69). Krishna also says, during the discourse, ‘knowledge means humility, sincerity, nonviolence’ (Bhagavad Gita: 13: 7). However, many Hindus believe that the great battle described did take place and Hindus do not have a non-violent history. The biblical description of the conquest of Canaan could be allegorized, as could the scene in I Sam. 15:3 when Saul is commanded by God to totally annihilate the Amalakites, women, children, animals as well as male combatants. However, it does not read as allegory. Could the story of the initial conquest of Canaan be read allegorically? Was God demanding absolute obedience from his chosen people, so that a total commitment to God was necessary and any possibility of contamination, of being tempted into immorality or idolatry, must be annihilated? Even if the conquest is an allegory, it still describes a God who not merely condoned ethnic cleansing but commanded this, which suggests that allegory does not help us much. Although the historical reality of the conquest of Canaan tells a somewhat different story, since non-Hebrews remained in the land, it is easy to see how Ulster-Scots and modern day Hebrews, believing that God has gifted them the ‘land’ and that they must separate themselves from the existing residents, could justify discriminatory policies and practices that reduce any possible threat to their possessing the land. In fact, the same biblical verses informed early settlers in the USA, where the American Indians were referred to as Amalekites and Canaanites, whose extermination could be justified (Nelson-Pallmeyer 2003: 43). Nelson-Pallmeyer takes the view that ‘violence of God traditions are at the heart of the Bible and Quran’ (2003: xiv). He suggests that even the Christian notion of Jesus’ death as an innocent sacrifice

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that paid the price of human sin ‘only makes sense if we embrace violent and punishing images of God featured prominently in the Hebrew Bible’ (2003: 60). He cites many verses from both scriptures that threaten divine retribution for sin, that divide the world into a good ‘us’ and an ‘evil’ them, that sanction violence. Of the Quran, he says that many verses ‘considered individually or collectively, could reasonably be interpreted to justify or even to require violence, terrorism, and war against enemies in service to Allah or in pursuit of “Islamic justice”’ (2003: 91). He acknowledges that the ‘vast majority of Muslims reject terrorism’ but comments that the perpetrators of 9/11 ‘cited many passages from the Quran’ to justify their actions (2003: 20). At least 200 biblical verses, including New Testament verses, can be cited as evidence that the Bible is a violent scripture. Nelson-Pallmeyer claims that Jews, Muslims and Christians ‘encourage violence because they refuse to fully challenge the authority of “sacred texts”’ (2003: 98). He considers the allegorical approach, citing Gandhi (2003: 134) but suggests that the more productive solution is to ‘view the Bible and Quran as products of human beings who offered their views on how history intersects with the divine’ (2003: 134). My difficulty with this suggestion is that religious people view scriptures as inspired or even as revealed. Muslims believe that the Qur’an is word for word divine, with no human content and react critically when Christians suggest that Muhammad wrote the Qur’an. Responding to one Christian scholar who suggested that Muslims adopt a source and redaction critical approach to the Qur’an, S. H. Nasr replied that ‘One cannot “overlook the beliefs of a billion Muslims concerning the nature of the Qur’an and its relation to the prophet’ (Siddiqui 1997: 161-62 citing S. H. Nasr). Nasr comments that there is no credible way to divide the Qur’an into two, human and divine, right or wrong (Siddiqui 1997: 161). While many biblical scholars—including progressive Jews as well as Christians—regard the Bible as a human construct, conservative Christians and Orthodox Jews reject this. New Testament scholarship is skeptical that Jesus actually said much that the gospels attribute to him. A great deal of material has been identified as back projected by the early church. On the one hand, the criteria used to adjudicate authenticity are carefully argued and the results of this scholarship can be very convincing. This is the tradition in which I was trained. On the other hand, much that gets retained is conveniently consistent

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with contemporary values or theological tendencies while much that gets jettisoned supports a more traditional theology. Scholarly criteria notwithstanding, the charge that we keep what we like and abandon what we do not like is difficult to avoid. Either we accept that scriptures do contain revelation, and were not purely human creations, or we declare then to be solely the product of what our ancestors thought God willed, or sanctioned or demanded of humanity. How then can we separate what was a genuine discernment of God’s will or a mistaken human construct, or the attribution to God of human ideas? A God made in our image is not a God at all; a God who gives us permission to destroy our enemies could be a God made in our image. By retaining the whole of scripture, we risk the charge that any interpretation is valid. We could simply extract any passage that sanctions violence, leaving as valid all passages that extol peace, forgiveness, justice and reconciliation. That exercise could leave both scriptures as pure as driven snow, with no hint of a God who approves use of force. Yet, if all ‘violent’ passages are human and all pacifist, non-violent passages are from God, how do we know that the latter are not also, in fact, of purely human origin? Perhaps our better selves projected God as a peaceful God, while our worse selves projected a violent God. If we divide scripture in this way, we are, it seems to me, left with nothing that can be regarded as genuinely linking us with God. Religion as a totally human construct runs contrary to what religious people believe about the origins of their traditions, as divinely revealed. In what follows, by positing what I refer to as a ‘higher principle’ I aim to suggest how violent passages can be accepted as a legitimate part of scripture without at the same time turning God into a violent, vindictive God whom few of us would want to worship. God, I suggest, has worked within the broken world of humanity as it exits to progress God’s own providential purposes. Can we understand violence yesterday as somehow furthering God’s ultimate purposes without turning God into a violent God or sanctioning violence for all time? My approach does not rule allegory out as having no role, since portions of scripture are self-evidently meant to be understood as allegory, or can be so understood without stretching credulity.

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• Belief in the divine authorship of scripture, arguably, rests solely on religious faith and cannot expect a sympathetic hearing among secular scholars. In attempting to honor what religious people believe about their scriptures, am I compromising academic integrity? • Do you think that I have rejected the scripture as human solution too easily? The Higher Principle My suggestion is that both the Bible and the Qur’an contain a higher principle, the principle of peace. This relates to the ultimate concern of these scriptures. No passages exist that describe the end of God’s purposes as a world of war, conflict and injustice. Both scriptures, when they point towards the future that God intends for the world, extol peace. The end-time descriptions of the Hebrew Bible contain the much cited words that swords will be beaten into ploughshares and spears into pruning hooks (Isa. 11:6-9; Mic. 4: 3) while the Qur’an describes Islam as the ‘abode of peace’ and Muslims as those who do what is right and refrain from what is wrong (10:25; 3: 110). In addition to the higher principle of peace being the unambiguous end-time goal of God’s purposes in these scriptures, it resonates with what many people believe to be the ideal condition for human life. Our consciences, which collectively inform such documents as the UN Charter, attest that peace is the higher principle. Yet, I believe that it has taken humanity many centuries to arrive at our contemporary understanding of peace. Even in ancient days, notions of peace existed—yet peace was achieved by my group dominating others. The Pax Romana and even the more recent Pax Britannica were imposed by strength. Unlike the peace envisioned by the UN Charter, their ‘peace’ did not include upholding ‘fundamental human rights’, the ‘dignity and worth of’ every person, the ‘equal rights of men and women’ or the promotion of ‘social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom’. Freedoms did not exist; many people felt that they were oppressed. Recent affirmations of what the term ‘global peace’ means, such as the Commitment to Global Peace signed by religious and spiritual leaders from around the world following the UN sponsored Millennium Summit in August

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2000 extends peace to embrace the natural environment, calling on governments and on all people of good will to collaborate in caring ‘for the earth’s ecological systems and all forms of life’. This and other declarations also affirm that the eradication of poverty from the face of the earth is a condition of true peace. This holistic understanding of peace resonates with the scriptural goal but cannot be said to have featured prominently in historical human discourse on peace, which tended to be regarded as absence of war brought about by military dominance or political power. I contend that while this view of peace is contained in scriptures it has taken centuries for humanity to catch up with the biblical and Qur’anic vision. The UN Charter and the UDHR are, in my view, among the noblest documents yet written by human hand. The idea that something that can be referred to as a collective human consciousness has evolved is, of course, derived from G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), as is Fukuyama’s concept of the ‘end of history. Fukuyama points out that, unfortunately, ‘prejudice against Hegel’ caused by the close association between Hegel and Marxism and others add ‘twentieth century totalitarianism’ blinds people to the importance of his thought (1992: 59). Hegel’s aim was to ‘explain the “good” contained in the various real states and civilizations of history, the reason why they were ultimately overthrown, and the “germ of enlightenment” that survive from each and thereby paved the way for higher levels of development.’ This analysis then informed Hegel’s understanding of ‘universal history which would provide the “exhibition of the spirit”, or of the ‘collective human consciousness’ in ‘the process of working out the knowledge of that which it is potentially’ (Fukuyama 1992: 60). Fukuyama argues that liberal democracy stands at the pinnacle of human achievement in the political sphere, and, based on equal rights, will eventually triumph. This, he believes, may not see the end of all conflict but conflict is likely to diminish and International Relations will deal with ‘the solving of technical problems, environmental concerns and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands’ (1989: 18). The higher principle that can be discerned in scripture thus coalesces with aspects of contemporary thought. Developments in the material world, in this view, are brought about by prior development ‘in the realm of consciousness or ideas’.

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Although Nelson-Pallmeyer claims that the ‘overwhelming preponderance of passages in the Quran...legitimate violence, warfare, and intolerance’ this is open to challenge. Many verses that do legitimate war in self-defense also extol peace. For example, Q2: 216 says that fighting is prescribed for Muslims even though they do not like it. However, this is not a blanket invitation for Muslims to fight whenever and against whomsoever they want to but to defend access to the Sacred Mosque against those who drive Muslims out and oppress them (2:217). Q2:190 says that Muslims have permission to fight those who fight them. The next verse, 191 also refers to resisting oppression and those who deny Muslims access to the Sacred Mosque, while verse 192 says that if the enemy cease fighting, so must Muslims, for Allah is forgiving and merciful. Q22:39-40, widely held to be the earliest verse to allow armed combat, again permits only self-defense and describes the circumstances as those when believers are driven from their homes and monasteries, synagogues and mosques are destroyed by the aggressors. This verse can not be interpreted as sanctioning indiscriminate violence. Q8:61 in the context of describing conflict between Muslims and the ‘ungodly’, says ‘if they incline towards peace’, the Muslims should ‘also’. It would be difficult to assert that this verse presumes Muslim aggression, rather than defense. 8:38 says that if the oppressors ‘cease persecution’, they will be ‘forgiven that which is past’. Of all the Qur’anic passages that sanction war, only two verses can be cited as possibly permitting aggression, namely, 9:5 and 9:28, known as ‘sword verses’ (ayaat us-saif ). These tell Muslims that ‘when the forbidden months are passed’ they can kill pagans wherever they find them, lie in wait for them in every stratagem of war and that those who disbelieve can be fought until they submit, and agree to pay tribute. No doubt the ‘every stratagem of war’ could inform suicide bombings and 9/11, except that the Qur’an prohibits taking your own life. Verses such as 2:154, 3: 157-158 and 3:169 that promise paradise to those who die in battle as martyrs for the cause of Allah may well encourage young men to volunteer in Bosnia, Chechniya, Palestine or Afghanistan. However, 3:169 addresses those who were ‘driven out of their homes’, while the other verses as traditionally understood refer to casualties during wars that have been

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authorized by the caliph according to rules of engagement stipulated by Islamic law. These verses do not actually encourage martyrdom; rather, they state that those who do die while fighting for God have no reason to fear. Admitting that Muslims have fought aggressive wars to extend God’s rule, Islamic law specifies that the enemy must first be given a chance to embrace Islam peacefully. The martyrdom referred to by the words, ‘if you die or are slain’ is taken to mean a Muslim who is killed in an authorized war, not someone who takes it into his or her own head to fly a plane into a skyscraper, killing indiscriminately. Indeed, jihad was classically understood as a collective duty (fard al-kifaya), thus participation was organized by the state. Jihad, too, unlike other fard (obligatory) duties is also temporary, since once worldwide peace has been achieved, it will cease. Islamic rules of engagement protect civilians, crops, places of worship, houses and animals. Even if the argument that a population is engaged in a total war has any credibility, the rules of engagement should still protect children, the sick and elderly. Describing the classical theory of jihad, Khan (2004) writes; ‘God forbids violence except 1) when Muslims are not allowed to practice their faith.... 2) when people are oppressed... and 3) when people’s land is forcibly taken away from them’ (4-5). In his view, ‘what happened’ on 9/11 was ‘horrible, inhuman and un-islamic’ (4). Muslims also point out that terms such as ‘Dar-al-Harb’ (House of Rebellion) and Jihad of the sword are not found in the Qur’an. The argument that the Qur’an permits aggression in order to extend Muslim rule, also, relies on the doctrine of abrogation (naksh), that is, that the later verses in Chapter 9, taken to be a very late passage, cancel the earlier verses in Chapter 2 that only permit selfdefense. First, this doctrine has never enjoyed universal Muslim support. Second, 9:5 and 9:29 are widely held to refer to an existing battle between Muslims and unbelievers during which there was a temporary truce to provide for pilgrimage or fasting for the duration of the forbidden, or sacred months. Once the truce ended, fighting continued. Every stratagem of war is thus a regular feature of any armed conflict. 9:3 - 4 specifically refer to treaty obligations, ‘the treaties are not dissolved with the pagans with whom you have entered alliance, and who have not subsequently failed you...so fulfil your obligations with them’. The higher principle, that God wants to create a society in which all people live at peace, over-

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rides the possibility that the Qur’an permits and perhaps even encourages indiscriminate violence. The good, says the Qur’an, is of ‘steep ascent, it is to free the captive, to give food to the hungry and to orphans’ (90: 9-16). Millions of Muslims around the world identify with the mystical tradition (Tasawwuf) which emphasizes love (hubb, a common Qur’anic term) and ‘sulh-i-kul’, that is, ‘peace to all’ and which also has a distinguished history of philanthropy including kindness to animals. Nowhere does the Qur’an say that aggressive violence and enforced conversions are good acts that please God. On the contrary, it says that there is ‘no compulsion in religion’ (2: 256). However, some ‘Muslim traditionalists and fuqara hold that certain types of people may be forcible converted’, while others argued that a forced conversion is ‘not valid’ unless the person remains a Muslims ‘after the coercive’ force has ceased. If they then revert to their earlier religion, they are not ‘considered an apostate and may not be killed’ (Friedman 2003: 104; 106). Apostasy may be a capital offence. Some even argued that 9:5 abrogated 2:156 (102). Possibly, aggression was necessary so that the Islamic community could not only survive but thrive, offering an alternative model to that of the Christian world. This, I believe, is what God intended. Islam aims to hold spiritual and material concerns in balance; Christianity has often spiritualized salvation and devalued life in this world. This makes redeeming the social order, establishing societies that are free, peaceful and just a much less important task than saving souls for eternal life in some spiritual existence after death. Islam, which from the outset wanted to create societies that cared for the disadvantaged, protected the weak, that were governed according to God’s values not by human whim, challenged the overly spiritual emphasis of the Christian religion. Yet, a sanctioning of aggression yesterday—if indeed the Qur’an does sanction aggression, which is highly debatable—within the geo-political realities of the 7th century, does not represent blanket permission to engage in aggression whenever some Muslims feel so inclined. What it does mean is that God allowed war at a given stage in the unfolding of the divine plan so that a necessary model, Islam, could flourish. War may not be an absolute evil. In certain circumstances, war can be pragmatically necessary, or a qualified good. Does God condone acts that are merely ‘qualified good acts’, or must a good God only ever condone unqualified good acts? My argument is that, working with human material and respecting

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human freedom, God chooses to work with humanity as humanity actually exists. God enters history through intervening in the lives of those whom God chooses to serve God’s-self. In a world of violence, God has to deal with violence. God could have declared that violence was absolutely evil but this would not have resulted in peace. Until humanity was ready to accept the truth of the higher principle, a lesser principle, that of war as a qualified good, was needed. Even if we accept that we cannot fully comprehend God’s inscrutable purposes, since God’s ways are not our ways and God’s thoughts are not our thoughts, we may be able to accept that if God has sanctioned wars, these were necessary as part of God’s plan, which we believe is ultimately good. In Christian understanding, the law was necessary and divine but yet fell short of what God ultimately intended for humanity, which was a ‘new covenant’ written not on stone but in the hearts of women and men (Jer. 31: 31). This does not mean that the law was ‘wrong’. God, it can be argued, voluntarily empties God’s-self of the totality of what it means to be God so that God can honor humanity by only demanding of humanity what humanity is mature enough to give. The higher principle, contained in scripture and more recently confirmed by our God-gifted consciences should be the interpretive lens through which the whole of the Qur’an is read. When read through this lens, peace emerges as the ultimate goal. Judaism, Christianity and Islam all affirm that, despite sin and the ‘fall’, people possess a natural knowledge of the basic distinction between right and wrong. Paul stated that God’s law is ‘written in our hearts’, enabling our thoughts or our conscience to excuse or to condemn our own acts (Rom. 2:15). A Case Study of the Higher Principle in Practice Selungut and Nelson-Pallmeyer believe that the problem with the Qur’an is that it can reasonably be interpreted as sanctioning violence. Kimball argues that ‘only a highly selective reading of the Qur’an can produce’ the ‘kind of narrow interpretations’ that justify 9/11 and acts of terrorism (2002: 56). I agree. It may remain true that Bin Laden and his supporters think they have a Qur’anic mandate for their actions but many eminent Muslim scholars argue that they do not. In this understanding, 9:5 and 9:29 refer to the renewal of military engagement after a temporary armistice. The interpretation

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that they permit indiscriminate aggression is simply wrong. Khan (2004) says of the perpetrators of 9/11 that he is ‘convinced that Islam does not shape’ their ‘values and beliefs’, since ‘Islam is a religion of peace’ (2004: 5). For example, Mohammed Sayed Tantawi, Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, the premier Islamic seat of learning, stated on 17 March 2003 that jihad is not terrorism but self-defense. He strongly condemned 9/11 and clearly restricts jihad to fighting military personnel, that is, members of the armed forces. In the Yemen, Bin Laden’s ancestral home, an experiment in convincing terrorists sympathetic to Bin Laden that they do not have Islam on their side started in August 2001 when the President asked if any Muslim scholar would debate with the many prisoners held on suspicion of terrorist activities. These included those held responsible for planning the suicide bomb attack on the USS Cole (2000) that killed 17 sailors. One senior judge and Islamic scholar, Hamoud al-Hitar, responded and was appointed as Head of the Dialogue Committee. Following what have been described as Qur’anic duels with the suspects, those who repent and admit that they have no Islamic justification for their actions, are pardoned. About 250 jailed suspects have been released, although they are kept under surveillance. About 65 hard core and indicted suspects remain imprisoned. Judge al-Hitar has several times been invited to the United Kingdom to talk with security officials there. According to the BBC, the plan is to give Muslim prisoners in Britain lessons on Islamic values before their release, that is, on moderate Islamic values. My research on exactly how these Qur’anic duels proceed unfortunately did not produce a transcript. Presumably, al-Hitar demonstrates how 9:5 and 9:29 should be interpreted and argues that the Qur’an only permits properly authorized, defensive or just war. In his broadcast on 13 October 2005, Tim Whewell interviewed both al-Hitar and released prisoners. The latter suggested that they had not been convinced by the judge but told him what they thought he wanted to hear. Nasser al-Bahri, who had accompanied Bin Laden for several years, said that inmates knew that the judge was their ticket out of prison, so ‘ingratiated themselves with him’. He denied that debates took place on the meaning of the Qur’an. However, in interview with Whewell, al-Hitar gave as an example of a duel his response to the citing of ‘fight the unbelievers wherever you find them’. The Qur’an, he said, says ‘qitab’ (fight) not ‘kill’. Al-Hitar

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says that the inmates cite verses of the Qur’an to support their views but do not display detailed knowledge. Inmates promise, before their release, to respect the rights of non-Muslims and not to target the embassies of foreign countries. On the one hand, the success of this project is widely disputed. On the other, I have met many distinguished Muslim scholars from around the world who hold al-Hitar in the highest esteem for what he is trying to achieve. No terrorist act has been committed on Yemeni soil since the dialogues started. Whether released inmates are genuine in their conversion to what is widely described as ‘mainstream Islam’ or not does not mean that they are right, and that the judge is wrong. Application of the higher principle vindicates the judge’s effort as enlightened and noble, regardless of its results. M. M. Taha (190985), the Sudanese reformer, reversed the application of naksh to such verses as 9:5 and 9:29 and also as applied, classically, to verses that discriminate against women and minorities by arguing that it is actually the earlier, pacifist, egalitarian Makkan verses that cancel the later verses. He understood the Madinan verses as God adjusting the law downwards to cope with the human circumstance that people were not yet prepared to accept the higher principle. As humanity matures, the law can ascend again and embrace the Makkan verses. Bin Laden may possibly claim that his interpretation of the Qur’an is a plausible one. Postmodern criticism suggests that texts say what we ask them to say, that is, that we take meaning to the texts rather than derive it from the texts. All readings are interpretative. Postmodernism may be right that we cannot make an absolute truth claim for any human reading of a divine text. The text may be infallible but our readings are not. However, if the higher principle is embraced as the end-result of human thought on the type of world we want to establish, then a reading that violates this could be less plausible, less convincing than a reading that validates the principle. Postmodernism raises valuable questions about the presence of bias in any text. Its warning that those who exercise discipline also define normality according to their own interests is also important. However, what has been called the limit of postmodern analysis could reduce all morality to individual opinion, precluding the possibility of moral consensus, which would effectively function as the very type of universal or meta-theory that post-modernism rejects. Postmodernism says that I have my

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values, you have yours and even if they are radically different, we are both entitled to assert them. Discussion • Is any reading of a text, in this post-modern world, a valid reading? • Is the ‘higher principle’ as I have proposed this convincing when applied to the problematic sword verses of the Qur’an? • If we claim that some interpretations are better than others, what criteria, apart from the fact that I prefer the ‘better’ interpretations, could objectively adjudicate between clashing interpretations? • In approving some aspects of post-modern thought while rejecting others, am I inconsistent? The Bible and the Higher Principle However, can the Bible be interpreted as elevating peace over conflict? In the Hebrew Bible, Israel was one nation among the many nations. Even as a nation specially chosen by God, whose purposes are ultimately peaceful, Israel had to defend herself. Israel was called into being in a violent word, where nation competed with nation. By being born in the cauldron of war, she was honed and ready to survive, well placed to become the society God wanted her to be. Even God, without denying human free will or intervening in the process of human maturation, must work with the material before God. Israel had to survive as the community fashioned around God’ law, a people obedient to God to serve as a model and example for all. War was a human reality. Israel’s enemies needed to be defeated, or Israel would not survive. God also used her enemies to punish and to discipline Israel. However, this was to teach humanity a profound lesson, the lesson that even the land that God had promised and given to Israel was not her permanent possession. Retaining the land was contingent on Israel mirroring God’s justice, and remaining faithful to God. When Israel abandoned justice and the worship of the true God for false Gods, she was punished. However, because God used violence in the Hebrew Bible to progress God’s plan does not sanctify violence for all time. A progressive view of revelation posits that God reveals as much of

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God’s-self at a particular time as humanity is capable of receiving and understanding. God’s use of violence might mean that war is not an absolute evil, that there are certain circumstances when, in the face of great evil, war as a pragmatic necessity is permitted. While the Bible contains lots of violence, it never celebrates or rejoices in violence. The higher principle, that love and peace and justice are what God demands, emerges very early. All people are promised ‘blessings’, and this presumably means lives of peace and prosperity, not war and want (Gen. 12: 3). Certainly, all passages that describe God’s ultimate purposes posit a peaceful, violence free world. If this is God’s plan and purpose, then violence must recede. As humanity matures, violence becomes less and less acceptable. When evaluated by the ethic of the higher principle, violence can only be seen as less than ideal, perhaps even as a compromise made necessary by the pragmatic realities of a fallen and broken world. Originally, it was humanity not God that introduced violence into the world. God had to deal with violent humanity. Until humanity matured enough to appreciate that non-violence is the higher way, God had to accommodate God’s-self to the level of humanity. Mighty, terrible acts were necessary to convince the Hebrews that the ‘I am Who I Am’ of Exodus 3 was worth allegiance, Deut. 4:34 and 7:23 and similar verses do sound bloodthirsty, yet they attest to God’s concern for the survival and viability of the nation he had chosen. So that he could raise up David as an ideal, if not perfect, King, the nation had to survive in a world of expanding empires and of some very fearsome peoples, of whom God’s people were afraid (7:19). God, I believe, suffered every time, pragmatically and in order to allow human free will, God reduced God’s-self to the level of God’s own creation, even though this was always within God’s higher purpose. Instead of a ‘hidden God’, what we have is a ‘self-emptying God’, a kenotic God who had to divest God’s-self of certain aspects of what makes God God (Phil. 2:8). Jesus, in Christian thought, was wholly God but not the whole of God. God could not reveal God’s-self fully to Moses because no human could survive such an encounter; ‘Thou can not see my face’, said God, rather, ‘thou shall see my back parts’ (Exod. 33:20-3). God chooses to limit God’s-self, almost to lower God’s-self to a human level yet in doing so God does not diminish God’s-self but honors God’s own creation. God’s creation is immature. God’s creatures are violent and prone to

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oppress others, so one people must be forged for whom oppressing others is equivalent to rejecting God, thus; ‘if you do not oppress the alien, the fatherless, and the widow, and shed innocent blood in this place, then I will let you dwell in my house’ (Jer. 7:6-7). The litmus test of the Israelites’ faithfulness to God, then, was their commitment to justice and fair treatment of all. For Jews living in Eretz Israel today to oppress the Palestinians who live in he same space is a breach of their covenant with God. Jews have no absolute claim on the land of Israel, so even if we accept that the creation of the modern state was willed by God, their claim to possess the land remains contingent on keeping God’s covenant. Ellis suggests that Jews today need to ask what fidelity to the covenant means in terms of their treatment of the Palestinians. What it means to be Jewish, he says, will be formed by how the Holocaust is remembered and by how Jews treat their Palestinian neighbors. What, he ask, would be the Jewish inheritance if Israeli soldiers continue to die ‘in order to make servile or eliminate a native population?’ (2002: 180). The Torah, with the exception of the first 12 chapters, is more or less exclusively the Hebrew’s book. God’s love for humanity is universal yet in order to establish a firm foundation on which God could share divine love inclusively God first had to forge a relationship with a single people. God was establishing, for the fulfillment of God’s own inscrutable purposes, an exclusive relationship with one people. However, Gen. 12:3 establishes that the purpose of entering this covenant with one people was for the good of all peoples. This purpose is also made explicit in the story of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, when God states (v 18) that even the sinful residents of these cities have a claim on Abraham’s blessing. As the biblical narrative unfolds, God’s equal concern for all nations and peoples become more and more explicit, as universalism becomes a major theme. Initially, the existence of the multiplicity of nations seems to be part of the downwards movement of humanity away from God, the result of the Tower of Babel (Genesis 2). Yet Psalm 82: 8 declares that all nations belong to God. Arguably, God redeems the concept of the nation by choosing one people (‘am) to mold to God’s will. Initially, the notion of Kingship appears to represent rebellion against God (I Sam. 8) but later God redeems kingship by anointing his chosen servant, David (1 Sam. 16), who emerged as a truer if not perfect model of kingly

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duty and responsibility. The connection, too, between David’s rule and peace is central; any future associated with the memory of David will be a peaceful future, since from his lineage will be born a child who will be the ‘prince of peace’. This prince will exercise wise governance (Isa. 9: 6). God uses other people, such as the Moabites, to discipline his chosen nation (Judg. 3: 12). In 2 Kgs 17: 23 God allowed the Assyrians to carry the disobedient Northern tribes into exile, and in 2 Kgs 24 God sends Nubuchadnezar King of Babylon many tribes to aid his victory over Judah and the southern tribes. Later, through the Prophet Jeremiah, he tells the exiles in Babylon not to hanker after Jerusalem but to put down roots, to buy houses, to marry off their sons and daughters and to work and pray for the peace and prosperity of ‘the city where I have carried you’ (Jer. 29: 5-7). Subsequently and continuing to this day, many Jews have believed that their duty is to work for peace and justice wherever they live, among the peoples and the nations where they have found refuge. This developed into the conviction that the Jews’ duty is to become the light to the gentiles, to fill the world with wisdom, to combat ignorance, to re-build the world piece by piece. God sent Jonah to preach to the hated Assyrians, whom God intended to forgive and to bless. Jonah rebels and even weeps when he realizes that his enemies are also beloved of God. God used Cyrus, King of Persia, to allow the Hebrews who so chose to return to Jerusalem and to rebuild the temple (Ezra 1: 1). Ellis speaks of how he and other Jews choose exile in order to hold a Judaic reality that now includes an ‘empire’ to account for its faithfulness or lack of fidelity to the covenant tradition (2002: 169). He tells how an Israeli co-speaker tried to disenfranchise him from expressing any opinion of Israel-Palestine by questioning his commitment to Judaism and to Jewish life (2002: 5). Why? Ellis does not even speak non-liturgical Hebrew, ‘he doesn’t even speak our language’, said the critic. In the transition from synagogue to state, Hebrew has shifted from a language of worship, says Ellis, to one of power. He is not at all convinced that he wishes to speak that language, a language ‘that is used less as a praise of God’s presence than as an instrument to project state power’. In a strongly worded response, Ellis writes, ‘“our language” spoken with such vehemence—the language of power and might...marks a return to the Jewish ghetto mentality, now armed with nuclear missiles, a

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nuclearized ghetto’ (2002: 6). Ellis here refers to the same siege mentality that can describe the Ulster-Scots and the Serbs. The former see themselves as besieged by Catholics, who are a threat to Protestants everywhere, the latter as besieged by the Muslim world that threatens to overwhelm Europe. I first heard Ellis speak on Israel-Palestine at a Jewish-Christian dialogue meeting at the National Council of Churches in New York in 1989. The Christians welcomed his speech; the Jews were very unhappy. Between 1998 and 2001 we were colleagues at Baylor University, Texas. I know from conversations that Ellis has personally suffered from no small degree of ostracization from Jewish life. The local Jewish community in Texas actually complained to the University that it had employed him! The fact that he does not live in Israel does not mean that he has not paid a personal price for his passionate concern for justice in Israel-Palestine. Rather, he is part of a ‘non-Hebrew speaking remnant...that seeks an interdependent empowerment of Jews and Palestinians’ (2002: 6). The nations are punished and chastised alongside Israel but in Isaiah’s vision of the culmination of God’s purposes, all the nations flock to Mount Zion, with their glory and wealth and treasures and are accepted ‘on God’s altar’. The language here, with reference to incense, is that of worship; all the nations will worship the true God. The sun will shine forever, war will be taught no more. Continuing into chapter 65, where the words ‘I will make a new heaven and a new earth’ suggest that these passages are indeed describing the ‘end’ of divine providence, the prophet predicts that no one will be exploited, or go hungry and that the broken relationship between the human and non-human worlds will be restored so that even snakes will no longer bite our children, as will relationships within the non-human sphere so that ‘lamb and the leopard will lie down together’ (Isa. 11: 6-8)’. An issue that this end-time description does raise is whether nations, although used by God to progress providential purposes, have any final value. The next chapter will suggest that rather than religions being the biggest obstacle to peace, nationalism is. While the democratic nation state is held by many to be the pinnacle of governance, some suggest models in which the nation-state would play a less significant role. I tend to agree with Kenneth Cracknell (1986) that biblical passages which speak of the gathering in of the nations imply the birth of a ‘new people’. Referring to Psalm 102, which says, ‘When peoples

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gather together, and kingdoms, to worship the Lord’ (v 2), Cracknell comments: ‘the vision is clear: All humanity will be gathered in the new heaven and the new earth’ and a ‘new race’, a ‘people yet unborn’, will ‘praise the Lord’ (1986: 48; see also Ps. 102: 18). Could this ‘new people’ represent an end of divisive nationalistic ideologies as people recognize that despite ethnic differences all people are children of one God? Ultimately, in Christian understanding, God’s identifying of God’s-self with human life culminated in the incarnation and crucifixion of Jesus. God took upon God’s-self the suffering of the innocent, and these innocents include, perhaps, the pre-Israelite residents of Canaan who were evicted or killed, and all those who were slain without being guilty of any major sin through history. Some point to the flood as the act of a cruel God, yet another view is to say that God gives life and has the right to take life away. Others point to an incident such as the turning of Lot’s wife into a pillar of salt as an inhumane act, yet Lot’s wife had disobeyed a direct command. Perhaps, in looking back she was mourning the loss of the cities and of the life she had enjoyed in them, perhaps while Lot was righteous his wife was not. Sometimes we may have to accept on faith that God knows what God is doing. Nowhere in the Bible is permission given to employ war at whim, rather, we are told to love our neighbors, who could easily also be our enemy, as ourselves. Use of religious rhetoric to justify or to fuel violence is contrary to the higher principle that is embedded in scripture itself, and so is bad religion. Discussion • Can God, who is perfect, utilize the less than ideal to progress his purposes? • Can God use what is only a ‘pragmatic necessity’ to further providence? Or, does this reduce God’s God-ness? • Or, is my argument that God voluntarily empties himself of aspects of God’s-Gods-ness a viable proposition? Room for Allegory All biblical passages that look to the future go beyond violence to a world of peace and justice. Humanity progresses away from violence towards non-violence, away from exclusiveness towards

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inclusiveness. God needed first to establish a nation and a people whose exclusive loyalty was to God. Sometimes, they thought that God loved them more than other people but God constantly reminded them that he loved all people equally. He had chosen them to accept a special duty, to uphold the Torah (Deut. 7: 6-9). Nelson-Pallmeyer finds the Book of Revelations especially violent. ‘God’s liberating, punishing or apocalyptic violence’, he says, ‘is the named or unnamed assumption behind nearly every passage, story, and theological claim in the New Testament’ (2003: 60). We have already seen how the book’s supposed description of End Time battles and conflict impacts on efforts to resolve disputes in the Middle East. Fundamentalist Christians, very influential in US politics, have no interest in peace talks. However, there is no unanimity among Bible scholars that Revelation should be read literally. It is subject to allegorical interpretation. While I do not think that allegory is the best solution to the problem of violent scriptures, allegory is recognized as a genre in both the Bible and Qur’an. Many Muslims regard Qur’anic descriptions of Paradise and of Hell as allegory, which Nelson-Pallmeyer says either promise reward for violence or depict the punishment of a violent God. Much of the content of Revelation may well refer to incidents that occurred in the Roman world of the century in which it was written. I accept that it is also an End Time text. Its vision of the new heaven and the new earth and of the end of all human suffering, of death, when the age of God’s dwelling with God’s people (Rev. 21) will dawn is eschatological but there is every possibility that the great battle between good and evil depicted in earlier chapters is meant to be allegorical. The book almost did not make it into the Christian canon because many bishops considered it too easily misinterpreted. By applying the higher principle to the book, which itself affirms the ultimate value of peace—for a world in which there is no death, crying nor pain corresponds to ‘global peace’—a conflict-violent view of the end of days can be overruled. Revelation 21: 24-6 tells us that the nations will bring their wealth into the eternal city (Rev. 21: 24-6). Could not this pooling of wealth suggest that what will exist the other side of the ‘end’ is a renewed humanity, a single nation centered on God? This discussion will be developed in the next chapter. Did God allow some people to suffer through battles and wars so that God’s purposes could be progressed? Does this make God

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cruel? In my view, God is good and not cruel but I do think that God’s purposes might sometimes involve innocent people suffering. All such suffering, including the victims of the Holocaust, of the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides, of all the innocents of human history, will be vindicated. Job suffered but ‘was perfect and upright’ (Job 1: 1). When Job challenged God, God said, ‘where were you when I laid the foundation of the world?’ (Job 38: 4). Faith in God, which nourishes and sustains all spiritual and religious life, is ‘the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen’ (Heb. 11: 1). Jews, Christians and Muslims hope for a peaceful, just and sustainable world. This dream has not yet materialized as reality. However, it represents our highest aspirations. Eminent leaders of the world’s religions have found it possible, in such declarations as the Commitment to Global Peace, to unambiguously condemn all religiously sanctioned violence, hatred, prejudice, injustice and discrimination because they feel empowered, not disempowered, by their scriptures and traditions to do so. Thus, they have covenanted together with the United Nations to ‘lead humanity by word and deed in a renewed commitment to ethical and spiritual values, which include a deep sense of respect for all life and for each person’s inherent dignity and right to live in a world free of violence’. Over against religious voices that support violence, here is a strong voice extolling peace as the highest, noblest virtue. Chapter nine will draw on some secular writers to support and to develop the argument of this chapter, suggesting that God’s ultimate purposes move beyond the nation-state, to a different political structure. However, its argument will be set in the context of realtime possibilities and systems that humanity might construct, since I do not personally believe that the ‘end of history’ will be brought about by some divine, cataclysmic intervention. How might human communities be governed? Might the nation-state become less significant than it currently is in the governance of the world? Or, how might the disunited nations of the world truly become ‘united’, the dream that lies behind the United Nations? Discussion • By arguing that some scripture can be read allegorically but that allegory does not solve the problem of violent scripture,

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In Search of Solutions am I creating a device to help me deal with problem passages that do not otherwise fit my theory? As an ‘end-time’ text, should not Revelation be unambiguously non-violent? Have I downplayed the challenge that Revelations presents to my thesis? Must a God who once sanctioned violence be seen as having permanently sanctioned violence, or is my argument that God’s sanctioning of violence yesterday must be understood within the context of a maturing, unfolding plan for humanity and also in the context of the process of human maturation at all convincing? Part of my argument is that it has been the nation-state rather than religion that has caused conflict. Do you agree with this thesis?

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Chapter Eight T HE END OF HISTORY AND GOD’S PURPOSES FOR C REATION How Liberal Democracy Was Born In the medieval world, nations did not exist in Europe in the modern, post-Westphalian understanding. Countries were the personal possession of kings. Given that Europe’s royal families were inter-related, dispute over territory was often about which member of the family should govern which territory. Kings had absolute authority. They could, in theory, declare war whenever they wanted to. However, they had to rely on local barons to provide most of the troops, which meant that the barons had to be kept content. While ordinary subjects hardly featured in any form of governance, some sort of baronial assembly developed at an early stage. Effectively, the barons started to share in governance. Later, some commoners were included in these assemblies as they started to evolve into modern Parliaments. However, the one person one vote system of democracy did not materialize until the early twentieth century. It was not until 1971 that Swiss women gained the franchise. Barons, however, knew that their vassals had to be kept content, else local rebellion would erupt. Kings knew that they had to keep their barons content, else national revolt could occur. Slowly, the concept that the king had obligations towards his subjects, that he could not simply do what he wanted, replaced the notion of the absolute power of kings. As Parliaments developed, powers of taxation were used to curb a king’s military plans. Most kingdoms, too, were units of larger imperial powers, such as the Holy Roman Empire or the German Federation or the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Several European nations acquired vast overseas territories, especially the Spanish, the Portugese, the French, the Dutch and the British. Even when subjects at home had transformed themselves into de facto if not de jure citizens, and had a large say in governance, those who lived in the colonies had little

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or no say unless these were settler societies, such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Following the loss of the 13 North American colonies on the issue of representation in Parliament, Britain was not going to repeat the same mistake and gave settlers elsewhere a high degree of self-governance. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) is said to have given birth to the concept of international law, as well as to the modern nation-state. The treaty recognized all nations, regardless of size, as equal. This is the doctrine that still informs international governance; all members of the United Nations, whether a small Pacific island or China, the world’s most populous state have one vote each, although this principle was compromised in the Security Council, where the five permanent members possess a veto. Wars in Europe were fought over territory as different countries claimed that certain pieces of earth were theirs by right of common ethnicity, or historical possession. Wars were also fought because some countries claimed that they had the right to expand into other people’s space based on superiority of their race, culture or religion. Alexander the Great’s empire appears to have been an effort to export Greek civilization to the rest of the world. The Romans believed their civilization superior to others, although they borrowed much from outside. The various Muslim caliphates expanded Islamic territory because many Muslims believe that Islam is the best system of faith, practice and social organization, willed by God for all people. The religious wars in Europe (1560–1715) between Catholics and Protestants were justified on the basis that only one version of the religion should dominate at a time when Church and state were united. Church and state more or less parted company as a result of these wars. Citizens, it was decided, could belong to whatever religion they chose. True, some established churches remain but almost all privileges have been abolished. The British tended to justify their overseas Empire on the basis that they were imparting a superior civilization to inferior, or backward people who, left to themselves, would kill each other anyone because of ancient animosities based on religion or tribe. Some Britons thought that imperial rule was their destiny. Napoleon I (1769-1821) appears to have set out to unite Italy and Germany under French rule, perhaps imitating the Roman model of an orderly, peaceful, well run empire. An egotist, he may simply have wanted to rule the world but he seems to have wanted to rule it efficiently. He

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thought, then, that he had a system that was better than other systems. He was also a promoter of French culture. In World War II Germans claimed to be racially superior to other races and therefore to have the right of conquest. Germany also regarded her systems as more efficient and better, as had Napoleon. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in Leviathan (1651) proposed that the natural state of nations is one of perpetual war. The US Declaration of Independence (1776) and The Napoleonic Code (1804) represent a significant shift forward in human understanding of the status of individual citizens. Both affirm that all men are equal. At the time, of course, this equality excluded women and black people. This awareness made inroads into the traditional idea that the upper-classes were natural rulers, while the lower-classes were natural subjects. Even in Victorian Britain, public service was regarded as a duty, thus it attracted very little financial gain. It was the Chartist Movement, through their petition of 1848 that campaigned for salaries for elected public servants and for an expansion of the then limited franchise. Voting was tied to property. The US Declaration of Independence echoes Utilitarian thought when it says that all people are equally entitled to the pursuit of happiness. Usually associated with Jeremy Bentham (17491832) and his godson, J. S. Mill, cited in the first case study, Utilitarianism or welfarist consequentialism says that societies work best when they aim to achieve the maximum happiness for the maximum number of people. Why be unselfish, however? Why should we be interested in the happiness of a single individual outside our inner circle of family and friends. Mill believed that humans progress morally and as we do so we realize that altruism is a higher virtue than selfishness. Other Utilitarians have suggested that the goal of personal happiness will never satisfy us; only a goal such as making other people happy will enable us to truly feel happy! Presumably, happiness involves having a home to live in, a decent job of work, enough food to eat, freedom of thought and of religion, in other words, the ‘human rights’ set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The ancient Stoics had taught that only virtue results in happiness and that only virtue is good. If we think that attaining such goals as decent housing, a good education, health care and meaningful employment will make us happy, we will want to ensure that others attain them too. It may be significant that the Chair of the UDHR drafting committee,

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Eleanor Roosevelt, was the widow of the US President who introduced the ‘New Deal’. At bottom, the New Deal recognized that all citizens were entitled to a basic standard of living. Socialism in Europe, sometimes identified with the Democrats in the USA, believes that the state has obligations towards its citizens to protect their basic welfare. In the UK, the 1942 Beveridge Report spoke of government’s responsibility to care for citizens ‘from the cradle to the grave’. In the UK, availability of health care ‘free at the point of use’ became a central doctrine of what has been called the Welfare State. The basis of the system is that, with a high standard of education that provides different options for differently gifted people, opportunities for employment, provision of low-rent social housing for those on lower incomes, everyone can contribute to a national fund that covers their health care, periods of unemployment and eventually their retirement. The Social Security system in the US shares aspects of this. Both are open to abuse by the lazy and indolent. While a liberal society is not necessarily socialist, liberalism embraces many notions that inform the Welfare State. Liberalism posits the equality of all citizens. Liberalism accepts that citizens have basic rights to employment, health care, education. It parts company from the Welfare State in that it does not think that Government must always be the primary provider of services. The socialist or welfare state tends towards large government paid for by higher taxes, so that services can be provided. The more conservative political philosophies, such as Republican in the US, tend to lower taxes and to reduce the size of government so that people have more money in their pockets to pay directly for the services they wish to purchase from the provider of their choice. Private provision results in competition, which benefits the consumer. Yet, however conservative a party in power has been, none have repudiated the basic assumptions of the welfare system. Liberalism accepts that in return for taxes, citizens have a claim on their governments to protect them. Francis Fukuyama (1992) believes that liberal democracy represents the ‘end point of man’s ideological development’ as well as the ‘final form of human government’ (1992: xi), and argues that its universal triumph will see war diminish and eventually fade away. This represents the maturation of human consciousness. While throughout history, pride and claims to be superior, or megalothymia fueled war, the emergence of liberalism sees the elevation of what

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Plato called ‘thymos’ over pride or the struggle for glory. Thymos may be described as ‘an innate human sense of justice’, as the ‘psychological seat of all the noble virtues like selflessness, idealism, morality, self-sacrifice, courage and honorability’ (1992: 171). In Plato, it was linked with ‘a good political order’ (1992: 169). Thymos enables us to first assign worth to ourselves, and to feel indignant when our worth is devalued then to assign ‘worth to other people’ and to feel ‘anger on behalf of others’ (1992: 171). Richard Dawkins thinks that ability to value others may be a peculiar characteristic of humans, a mechanism to spite our own selfish genes. Fukuyama points out that in societies where pride of race or of faith is no longer part of the educational curriculum, where megalothymia is no longer a valued virtue, we are rather taught to respect the dignity of all people. This expresses itself in concern that certain measures are taken to ensure that those in genuine need have a safety net beneath them. Few in a liberal democracy would argue for such a net’s abolition. Fukuyama does think that liberal democracies presuppose the ‘right of free economic activity and economic exchange bases on private property and markets’, usually called capitalism (1992: 44). Muslims might want to use a fixed fee instead of a fluid interest right. Some Muslims, too, regard private ownership as a limited right which can be confiscated by the state if misused, for example, an empty house in an area where people are homeless, or immoral use of a property or inequality in a society that encourages egalitarianism. Employers, in Islamic understanding, may be entitled to draw a higher salary but employees should afford to live a similar lifestyle, not one far below the employer’s. Is Liberal Democracy God’s Goal While I am not arguing that liberal democracy and God’s intent for the world are identical, there are similarities. Both posit an end of conflict. Both posit an end to poverty. Both free the world from a preoccupation with military strength so that our ingenuity can be used to solve some of the pressing problems of the environment and of planetary survival. Fukuyama does not think that violence will end easily; some residual megalothymia may cause conflict but this will be contrary to the dominant motif. History, effectively, will have ended, he says. His theory also posits that the two possible competitors to liberalism, that is, Marxism and totalitarianism, have

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failed. He developed this thesis as the Cold War reached its conclusion. However, he did not interpret this as the victory of capitalist ideology over Marxist but as the triumph of the human consciousness. He does speculate that while liberalism currently has no ideological rival, one might appear in the future. Totalitarianism and Marxism both failed because the ideas that motivated them quite simply ‘died’. Neither could be sustained, though, because the human consciousness of equality as a moral principle would not allow itself to be crushed. Marxism used the rhetoric of equality but denied people too many freedoms, including that of political expression. However, if liberal democracy is the end of history, is it also God’s goal, or plan, for humanity? It could well be a large step in the right direction. Fukuyama believes that history will culminate with the universal acceptance of the principles of liberal democracies. These may be fiscally conservative. They may uphold traditional values surrounding marriage and sexuality but they will all be egalitarian. Different portions of humanity may reach the goal at different times but like wagon trains headed for the same destination, ‘the great majority of them will be making the slow journey into town, and most will eventually arrive there’ (Fukuyama 1992: 339). However, the role of the nation-state may be problematic in such a future. Can we guarantee that a nation that looks at its neighbor and sees that she gets to eat a larger slice of the pie of the world’s wealth, will not try to seize that slice? Fukuyama probably envisions that societies that consist of people who are able to feel ‘anger on behalf of others’ will also express anger at the unfair distribution of global resources. Campaigns such as that to end world poverty, presumably, would flourish in thymos dominated societies. In my opinion, the emerging global moral consensus that wishes to see war abolished, and human rights upheld, also wants to see a more just world order. Globalization, for some, will deliver this through market forces. Wealth will trickle down. The nations of the world, when they met to agree the Millennium Development goals, appear to have expressed some very selfless and egalitarian thoughts. They committed themselves to sharing responsibility ‘for managing worldwide economic and social development’, to ‘deal comprehensively with...the debt problems of low and middle income developing countries’ and to ‘spare no effort to free’ all people ‘from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty’.

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Here, I suggest, the aspirations of all the world’s political leaders coalesces with the scriptural vision of a world in which there is no crying, no hunger, no homelessness, no exploitation. It seems that the nations of the world are working to achieve God’s goal, although God’s ultimate plan may demand a radical change in how the world is governed. I happen to believe that a humanity that is globally committed to end poverty, and war, and discrimination against people based on their skin color, or gender, sexuality or faith, can achieve this goal. However, a further evolution in world governance may be needed. Does the Nation State Survive in God’s Plan? Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, which originally consisted of 50 countries, membership has grown to 192. Many areas of the world were under colonial administration when the UN was created. The process of de-colonization, to a certain extent supervised by the UN itself, has seen the birth of more than 140 new states. Some had existed at previous points in history but many were themselves the creation of colonial powers. Among the 192 nations there are some very large states. Some are very small both in size and population. Many of the conflicts that continue to plague the globe can be described as nationalist, or ethnic. For example, the campaign for Basque independence is ethnic. The dispute over Kashmir, like the three case studies discussed earlier, has religious aspects but at root the conflict is about whether Kashmir is to be part of Pakistan, of India or an independent state. Conflict in Chechnya, too, has religious aspects but the issue is whether Chechnya will remain under Russian control, or achieve independence. Was partition necessary in Bosnia? If all citizens of Bosnia, whether Croat, Serb or Bosniak had perceived themselves to be equal, with adequate opportunities and a decent standard of living, would conflict have succeeded? Despite the descriptions of Bosnia as a happy multi-cultural society, which I do not dispute, there may nonetheless have been some discontent, some hardly recognized grievance against the Other to allow a whole history to be totally swept aside. On the other hand, perhaps destructive forces can be unleashed that are so powerful that hatred and hostility can be generated ex nihilo. Many Kashmiris pride themselves on their distinctive identity, which traditionally embraces Hindus and

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Muslims. They write eloquently of centuries of harmonious coexistence. Yet, Hindus have turned against Muslims and Muslims against Hindus even in villages where life-long friendships existed between victims and victimizers. What enables people to change so quickly? In Hitler’s Germany, Christians who had lived alongside Jews for years and who saw them as friends, handed these neighbors over to the death squads. Some, of course, protected them. Often, people simply start to believe the racist or anti-religious propaganda they are fed. When Serbia told Serbs in Bosnia that Muslims intended to make them second-class citizens in an Islamic state, either they believed the propaganda or what had seemed an insignificant complaint was suddenly huge. In Kashmir, militant Islamic groups threaten villages with reprisals if they do not cease to fraternize with Hindus. Hindus or Muslims are blamed for some recent fire, or incident. Soon, this results in attacks on Hindu homes, as local Hindus whom Muslim have known for years get labeled as agents of the Indian oppressors and occupiers. Huntington’s Clash Thesis Such apparently religiously motivated hatred appears to confirm the contention that religion is bad for us. However, in all of these cases the basic question was ‘which nation shall I belong to?’ If I am Serb and I choose a Serbian and not a ‘Bosnian’ identity, then I do not want to be part of Bosnia. If I am a Kashmiri Muslim, do I want to belong to Pakistan, or to India, or to neither? Bosniaks who wanted a multi-cultural Bosnia had to contend with Croats and Serbs in Bosnia who chose to create their own national spaces in the same space that Bosnia then occupied. Jews and Palestinians in Israel could, at some point in history, have chosen to live together as equals in a common space. Instead, Israel emerged as a nationstate in the space that was also claimed by Palestinian nationalists. Two states competed for the same space. One of the contributors to how the world might work after the Cold War is Samuel P. Huntington, whose clash of civilization thesis first appeared in an article in Foreign Affairs in 1993. Like Fukuyama, Huntington says that the clash of ideologies has ended. Future conflict, he thinks, will be inter-civilizational. He predicted that a Western versus Islamic, or a Western versus a Neo-Confucian-Islamic alliance, would be the next great conflict. Why? Partly because the Islamic world,

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he says, has ‘bloody borders’, partly because the Muslim world and the Western world are on a collision course. Both believe that their civilization is superior. Claims of civilizational superiority, the motive for much war throughout history, has not ended. Huntington ranks as a pessimist when set beside Fukuyama. Others, as the Cold War ended, also offered optimistic opinions about the world’s future. Many spoke of a New Age, including the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, winner of the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize and US President George H.W. Bush. Gorbachev, speaking at the UN on 7 December 1988 argued that the world’s history of ‘incessant wars’ was accompanied by another history, that of the ‘emergence of a mutually connected and integral world’. I am calling this our growing awareness of the higher principles. He continued, ‘Further world progress is now possible only through the search for a consensus of all mankind, in movement towards a better world’. The world could either continue as it is, or ‘learn to shape and direct the process in such a way as to preserve civilization, to make it safe for all and more pleasant for normal life’. Gorbachev, here, was taking about what under another name we would call ‘global peace’. What he described as the ‘de-ideologization of interstate relations’ has to be replaced by recognition that humanity needed to cooperate to solve ‘a single world problem’. This involves the transformation of economic relations, protecting the environment, ending hunger, disease, illiteracy ‘and other mass ills’. This ‘common human ideal’, he said, must take priority over petty rivalries and dissipated energies. Gorbachev, like Fukayama, spoke of human consciousness. Progress, he argued, would only now occur when it is ‘determined by the priorities of all mankind’ which must guide ‘world policy’. George H.W. Bush also spoke of a New Age when he addressed the US Congress on 11 September 1990 following what he described as a ‘very productive meeting’ with Gorbachev. Admitting that the Cold War had compromised the ability of the UN to keep the world’s peace, Bush warned dictators that ‘they could no longer count on East-West confrontation to stymie concerted United Nations action against aggression’. A ‘new world’, he said, was ‘struggling to be born’. In this world, the rule of law would replace that of the jungle, the strong would respect the rights of the weak and nations would recognize their mutual obligations to uphold ‘freedom and justice’. The US might even reduce her military capability. This vision of a new world order also informed

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the Millennium Goals, as the Declaration says, ‘at the start of a new millennium’, the nations of the world reaffirmed their faith in the UN and ‘its Charter as indispensable foundations of a more peaceful, prosperous and just world’. Sadly, the UN in the past has found constructive intervention difficult because member states only acted, usually, when it was in their interests, while the P5 can exercise a veto either in self-interest, or in the interests of allies. The existence of the P5, which reflects the post-World War II geo-political reality, is anachronistic and undemocratic. Personally, extending membership to countries such as Germany and Japan because they are large contributors to the UN budget and India due to its size among others will merely perpetuate privilege. It will do nothing to democratize the UN. Even a fully democratic UN would depend on nations’ willingness, sometimes, to put other’s interests first. If, in the new world order, compromise is called for I would accept Permanent Members minus a veto. However, 9/11 and subsequent events have shattered, for some, the notion that much has changed. Huntington’s prediction of a clash between Islam and the West, many say, was accurate. While the United Nations launched its Dialogue Among Civilizations program to counter the clash-thesis, suggesting that intercivilizational harmony can be achieved, many think that such a project is doomed to fail. Huntington, however, did diagnose that the main reason for Islamic hostility towards the West stems from the West’s own insistence that its ways, its systems, its products are the best, and that the rest of the world requires them. Globalization is thus regarded as the extension of the West into Islamic space, giving us what Barber (1995) calls ‘Jihad vs McWorld’. The West is regarded as hypocritical in acting so swiftly to liberate Kuwait, an oil-rich state, when Iraq invaded it in 1990, when it failed to act after India invaded Kashmir, Israel the Occupied Territories, Serbia Bosnia, or when genocide was perpetrated in Rwanda. The West stood by when a democratically elected but Islamist government was overthrown by a military coup in Algeria (1992) yet claims to be spreading democracy world-wide. Many Muslims regard it as hypocritical that the US enjoys good relations with Saudi Arabia, which is an absolute monarchy. While my higher principle and the concept of an emerging global consensus points us beyond war, if a clash of civilizations is inevitable, what hope is there for world peace? Are civilizations inevitably predisposed to

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clash? Huntington thinks that they are, since, he says, the idea of a ‘universal civilization’ that ‘fits all’ is a Western concept that Asian and other cultures reject, favoring particularism. Hence Burma and North Korea shut out corruption by the West. In response, what the New Age and End of History predicts is not a single world culture but the mutual recognition of the value, worth and dignity of all cultures. Second, the idea that particularism is a peculiarly and problematic non-Western phenomenon is racist. Europeans have also been guilty of particularism. Third, the assumption that nonWestern cultures are incapable of change, of embracing pluralism, of valuing difference, is also racist. South Korea engages constructively with the West, adapting its cultural and technological products and many Western ideas to its own needs; so too does Japan; so too does China. I have visited South Korea five times, so can speak from experience. Huntington’s thesis actually perpetuates what can be described as Ethno-nationalism, the type of nationalism championed by Serbia and Croatia over and against the pluralist nationalism of Bosnia, of Kashmir and of the Lebanon before the influx of refugees. According to the Ruethers, ethno-nationalism created Israel making conflict with the Palestinian Other inevitable. Huntington castigates the United States for compromising its cultural heritage by endorsing multi-cultural policies. It needs to decide, he says, if it is a European civilization or a ‘country of many civilizations, which is to say, a country’ that ‘lacks a cultural core’ (Huntington: 1996: 306). He argues that multi-cultural countries can not survive as ‘coherent societies’ (1996: 306-7). Bosnia’s and Kashmir’s non-survival as multicultural societies may appear to confirm this claim but these societies were victim of external aggression and forces that inhibited or prevented self-determination. Others, including Franz Boas (18581942) in his still very useful The Mind of Primitive Man (1938), banned and burnt in Hitler’s Germany, have argued that humanity has progressed most when cultures and even religions have met and mingled, as in Spain under Muslim rule. Boas argued that there is no such thing as a pure race, German or Jewish and that ‘it has never been proved that continued intermixture has brought about deterioration’ (Boas 1938: 238). The back cover of a 1963 edition stated that ‘Today’s defenders of racial segregation in the United States and of apartheid in South Africa still jibe at this measured, objective analysis’. Were ethno-nationalism, or the type of

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particularism described by Huntington, to continue to dominate the main blocks of civilizational alliances envisioned by the clashthesis, conflict could be inevitable. Such a world order would not overcome megalothymia, which Fukuyama thinks has been responsible for most wars in history. However, the world is changing. Few and fewer nation states are nearly as ethnically homogenous as they were a century ago. Migration, inter-marriage, the impact of globalization means that ‘almost everywhere today nation-states are a mix of people living within national boundaries’ (Ruether and Ruether 2002: 230). Writing this book while employed at the Unification Theological Seminary, a reference here to the founder’s vision and program of action is appropriate. Sun Myung Moon believes that the end-reality will be a single nation state. Within this state, the cultures and religions of the world will be valued. Rivalry will be replaced by recognition that despite differences, sometimes apparently irreconcilable, all religions rest on common values. All will be regarded as proclaiming truths about human life and about that which, ultimately, is Other than any of our descriptions of it, whether called Allah, God, Brahman or said to be non-existent. Moon’s movement attempts to build bridges between peoples and races and cultures through inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue but also through exchange marriage between men and women from traditionally hostile backgrounds. Moon believes that trade and commerce and better communications between people allow us to discover both our common humanity and the richness of other cultures. He contends that when countries engage in mutually beneficial trade, they do not fight. Fukuyama similarly argues that liberal democracies, built on free market capitalism, do not fight. Multi-cultural societies do need to guarantee equal treatment and equal opportunities. Merely being legally equal does not automatically translate into actual equality. Being legally able to participate in civil society does not mean that people feel welcome there. Issues related to language and how much, if any, outward conformity to a single culture, are required also need addressing. People in some states feel that their national identity is threatened by the presence of cultural Others, who even when they have acquired citizenship, insist on wearing different clothes, or on speaking a different language. Obviously, some ability to communicate is essential. Yet, a country such as India, has no official

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common language, yet it in many respects is thriving. It can be argued that the world is moving away from the type of homogenous state valued by Huntington, towards diversity. What counts in diverse, pluralist societies is not a common cultural identity but ability to contribute economically and to participate in civil society. Barber, among others, thinks that the nation state is ‘impaired’ as the vehicle to transport us into a global democratic future. In the West, the nation-state is ‘too identified with bureaucracy, inefficiency, and a professional political class, in whom peoples everywhere have lost confidence’ (Fukuyama 1992: 276). Thus, low voter turnout raises questions about the legitimacy of no few governments, for whom a majority of the population did not vote. The role of trans-national corporations, too, reduced many smaller states’ ability to control or to govern their economies. Jihad will threaten world stability as long as those who wage it remain discontent. Those who truly want to dominate the whole world will have to abandon military means in favor of peaceful persuasion around the dialogue table at which the world’s problems are discussed. If an Islamic solution is the best one, others will willingly adopt it. Barber thinks that smaller units of governance will relegate nation states’ role to a secondary role. ‘Global governance’ he says ‘remains a distant dream’. However, ‘the kinds of global citizenship necessary in its cultivation are less remote’ (Barber 1995: 277). The key, he says, lies in civil society and in peoples’ ability to participate in more local governance, in what he calls ‘community selfgovernment’. Powers now vested in national government need to be reclaimed and exercised at community level. Civil society embraces all the networks, informal and formal associations and charities through which citizens promote their interests, ideas or ideologies or organize their activities outside the public sector. Such local communities could develop true civil governance so that democracy ceases to be some universal panacea and instead becomes an ‘admonition to people to live in a certain fashion, in self-determining communities somehow still open to others, with tolerance and mutual respect yet a firm sense of their own values’ (Barber 1995: 279). In his response to Huntington, Sandel similarly values more local commitments. Skeptical that global government would work, he points out that most of us actually live our lives with a variety of loyalties. Despite Huntington’s view of homogenous states, with

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citizens exclusively loyal to the nation, many of us belong to international networks, including religions that give us membership of such global bodies as the Baptist World Congress, which I mention because it was at its 100th centenary that I heard Jimmy Carter, speak, whom I admire both for his mediating role in the Camp David Israel-Egypt Accord and for his work in promoting democracy and fair elections since he left Presidential office. He was awarded the 2002 Nobel Peace Prize for ‘decades of untiring effort to find peaceful solutions to international conflicts, to advance democracy and human rights and to advance economic and social developments’. I also refer to the 2005 Baptist World Congress because, as a Baptist, I feel that I have much in common with Baptists regardless of their national identity. Or, we belong to an international association concerned with the environment, or we speak a second language and feel an affinity to all those who speak that language, or our spouse is from another country, or our children or our grandchildren live somewhere else or have married a national of a different country. Or, our job takes us around the world and since our company works in many countries, it has a concern for the peace, stability and economic viability of all these states. Kofi Annan’s April 2000 UN report ‘We the Peoples’ stated that ‘groups and individuals more and more often interact directly across frontiers, without involving the state’. While this can be negative, involving terrorism, drugs and smuggling it can also ‘create opportunities for mutual understanding and common action’ (Executive Summary, para. 11; http://www.un.org/millennium/ sg/report/summ.htm). Given such a web of loyalties, says Sandel, we need to ‘negotiate our way among the sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting obligations that claim us, and to live with the tension to which multiple loyalties arise’ (1996: 350). Our political structures need to enable us to navigate our way through this layered existence. By devolving power to a local level, we can remain rooted in the community where we spend most of our time, where my neighbors need, regardless of their skin-color, faith or ethnic origin or place of birth, is also my need. How would this avoid a Jihad vs McWorld clash? Barber does not restrict ‘jihad’ to Muslims but includes all those who ‘detest modernity’ and oppose ‘the secular, scientific, rational, and commercial civilization created by the Enlightenment’, especially its ‘virtues of freedom, democracy, tolerance and diversity’ (1995:

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xiv). Barber argues that while jihad and McWorld pull in opposite directions, the first towards the local, the second towards the global both ‘make war on the sovereign nation-state’ (1995: 6). Devolution, Barber suggests, would allow local communities to find ways of preserving what they value in their faith and cultural traditions, ‘to sustain solidarity and traditions against the state’s legalistic and pluralistic abstractions’ while the ‘relative homogeneity of the entities whose anti-statist and anti-modern forces incline them to Jihad can potentially incline them to local participatory democracy’ as well (1995: 231). Devolution would, for example, enable local communities of Muslims and others to construct their own microsystems, to try out their ideas, to exercise self-determination, which is a basic human right. Local, self-governing communities could cooperate with others, perhaps within an historical nation state, perhaps in new forms of federal association. Barber thinks that some form of con-federalism could emerge as a framework for world governance. The European Union could serve as a model although more power would be delegated in both directions. Both foreign aid and foreign affairs would reside at international level, so that instead of a national acting in its interests the interests of all the people of the world will be considered. What we currently call ‘defense’ would also reside at the international level but in a demilitarized world this might be renamed ‘dispute resolution’, which I prefer to the more traditional ‘conflict resolution’. Instead of being a top-down system, this would be a bottom up system resting on the foundation of local civil societies. Civil societies would be participatory. Local people would decide on local issues. Paid local politicians may no longer be needed. Citizens might ‘log onto a civic bulletin board across national boundaries’ (1995: 287). Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), the US’s third President and a founding father, envisaged every American being involved in governance at some level, ‘there shall not be a man in the State who will not be a member of some of its councils, great or small, he will let the heart be torn out of him sooner than his power be wrested from him’ (cited by Barber 1995: 288). The Articles of Confederation which the 13 colonies signed on 1 March 1781 refers to the goal of promoting ‘mutual and general welfare’ as well as to ‘common defense’ and the ‘security of liberties’ (cited in Barber 1995: 289). Culturally, new stories about who we are and how we got to where we are, about our common destination, could be told. These

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would replace older, ethno-centric stories that tend to say, we arrived here this way and therefore have a privileged claim on this land, whether Israel, or this ‘sceptred isle’ (England, as described by Shakespeare in Richard II, Act 2 Scene I) that others do not and never can share. The citation from Shakespeare continues, ‘this earth of majesty, this seat of Mars, this other Eden...this blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England’. An ethno-centric view of what Englishmen means excludes many who now live there. Historically, the idea that England was Israel’s successor, somehow especially beloved, even chosen, of God, informed the idea that Britain’s ‘destiny’ was to civilize the world. In as much as English has become the most widely spoken language in the world, this did play a positive role in effecting communication. Without communication, the ignorance that informs prejudice and notions of race superiority cannot be challenged. The USA early developed the notion of its ‘manifest destiny’, that is, to spread democracy and freedom. So long as it does spread democracy and freedom, not its own power and influence, the USA can be seen as fulfilling God’s purposes. There is a tendency in certain parts of the world towards devolution, for example, the establishment of the Welsh Assembly and the Scottish Parliament, with devolved powers. National governments are likely to resist losing power, whether down to a local or up to a global level. There is a lot of prestige involved in being a Prime Minister or a Cabinet Minister. Is a world conceivable in which such posts no longer exist in their present form? Might not the head of a confederation, or nation in which most power has been devolved, be elected every five years by and from the mayors or leaders of local or regional councils? Party politics, or perhaps professional politicians, might disappear in such a system which, when all is said and done, resembles classical Athenian democracy except that participation in Athens was limited to free, adult males. However, ancient Athens may still have lessons to teach us. About 30,000 people were eligible to attend the Assembly. The quorum was 6,000. Everyone who attended and participated in public debate did so by right. Legislation went before a Council of 500 although anyone could submit ideas. Up to one quarter of all citizens would have held the Presidency, which revolved around 50 senior councilors chosen by lot, as were the 500 councilors. However, each of the 50 were only President for one day once in their lives. Citizens could serve two terms on the

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Council. The 50 served for one month, the 500 for a year. In 403BCE, it was decided that the first 6,000 citizens who assembled in the public square for debate would get paid. Agendas were posted in advance. If religion can be divisive in human affairs, so can two-or multi-party political systems. When citizens repatriate governance of the polis, politics is likely to be about dialogue not confrontation. So What About God? A world resembling the above would need a forum or fora for the resolution of problems that confront us globally. The architects of both the League of Nations and the United Nations hoped that some system of world governance would emerge. Immanuel Kant (1724-1894) proposed a world federation of free republics. The founder of the B’hai faith, Baha’ullah (1817-92), envisioned a world commonwealth of nations. Consultations at the local level were included in his system. The World Federalist Movement, founded in 1947 in Switzerland, itself a con-federalist state, advocates a world government. It currently has about 50,000 supporters although membership has reached as high as 150,000. How would a unified world of peace, which the higher principle and God’s plan for humanity, may imply, be governed? The Book of Revelations speaks of God dwelling with humanity. This can be understood physically, or spiritually. A humanity that renounces violence, that ensures a reasonably fair distribution of the world’s resources, since, as Gandhi famously said, ‘there is enough in the world for everyone’s need but not for everyone’s greed’, that protected the weak and vulnerable, that guaranteed a basic standard of living for all, could be said to have centered itself on God, at least from a religious perspective. God’s principles and human consensus on right and wrong would coalesce so that they became one and the same. People would be conscious of God, so much so that awareness of God would abide within them. In my view, whether people in such a world personally believe in God is not important. What is vital is that all people recognize the complete humanity of others, do not selfishly consume more than they need, resolve all differences peacefully, ensure that justice is upheld and that all people have basic needs met. Such a society is humanly possible. If we truly believe in such a world, we can create it. The world does not have to remain the way it is, even if powerful

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interests control it. The producers and purveyors of weapons want nations to arm themselves but a groundswell of pro-disarmament opinion can change that. I am not so idealistic that I think that violence would never threaten us. A totally disarmed world might invite a military takeover by some rogue individual or community. Perhaps, whatever global institution binds the more regional and local together would have to retain some military capability. My end of history finishes in the real world, not in a utopian fairy tale. True, much of what this chapter describes sounds Utopian but I am personally convinced that it is achievable. In fact, it resembles what would be the end result of meeting the Millennium Goals quite closely, which call for ‘the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons’. Even though the present policy is for the existing nuclear powers to keep theirs while preventing proliferation, the Declaration goes beyond this to a more ambitious goal. Yet, if the nations meeting at the UN could think this, could imagine a nuclear-weapon-free world, if they could commit themselves to this noble goal, then the goal can be achieved. Those who believe that dreadful battles must be endured before this type of world becomes reality tend to believe that the ‘new heaven and the new earth’ will be a different, spiritual and probably non-material creation. Only divine intervention can create this reality. The above description of the world as a confederacy of more local communities, in which people of different faiths and races cooperate together in self-governing units, ensuring that all basic needs are met, that real opportunities exist for people to flourish intellectually and culturally, can, I believe, be constructed by human hand. Some religious people believe that the world is too broken, too corrupt, to be redeemed and that anyway salvation is spiritual, not physical. Others believe that God intends us to restore this world, to redeem this world, to rebuild Eden. In Jewish understanding, every small act of common decency (Tikkun) aids this process. Personally, I think that the ‘fall’ in Genesis may have been ‘upwards’, not downwards. In the garden, life was perfect. Humanity had no work to do. Once expelled from the Garden, humanity must work. Now, he must raise a sweat (Gen. 3: 19). Now, humanity must help God to repair what our pride and sin has broken. Made in the image of the Creator, humanity shares with God one singular ability that no other creature has—the ability to co-create. I contend, as described in chapter seven, that the type

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of world towards which the Millennium Declaration aims to move humanity is similar to the type of world that the religious and spiritual leaders envisioned when they met, also under UN auspices, in the year 2000, while all of these resemble the end-time vision offered by Christian, Jewish and Muslim scriptures. No apocalyptical catastrophe or cataclysmic event will force all the wagons of humanity to draw into the same town, whether at the same or at different times. What will deliver this future are the efforts of a billion people who, frustrated by lack of progress towards peace by political leaders, frustrated by jingoistic saber rattling, by the reduction of Others to cartoon stereotypes which they know are false and self-serving, re-appropriate governance to themselves. Women, in this model, too, automatically included in the councils of the earth, would have a greater voice than ever before in governance. If women do have a distinctive role to play as peacemakers, this would have every opportunity to make a real difference. The United Nations charter begins ‘we the people’ and the UN itself has increasingly reached out to civil society, to Non Governmental Organizations, to religious people, convinced that it cannot achieve its goals by relying solely on states. The Millennium Declaration committed the UN to ‘develop strong partnerships with the private sector and with civil society organizations’ (Millennium Declaration, General Assembly Resolution, 18 September 2000 A/ REs/55/2. para. 20; http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ ares552e.pdf). In his 2001 Nobel Peace Prize Lecture, also entitled ‘We the Peoples’ Kofi Annan, then Secretary-General of the UN stated: In the 21st century, I believe the mission of the United Nations will be defined by a new, more profound awareness of the sanctity and dignity of every human life, regardless of race or religion. This will require us to look beyond the framework of States...What is not always recognized is that “we the peoples” are made up of individuals whose claims to the most fundamental rights have too often been sacrificed in the supposed interests of the state or the nation...The sovereignty of states must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights. Peace must be made real and tangible in the daily existence of every individual in need...

His speech referred to growing awareness that the values of tolerance and mutual understanding can be found in the world’s great faiths. He spoke of the need for us all to recognize that we

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are the ‘products of many cultures, traditions and memories’, that we can ‘gain strength by combing the foreign with the familiar’— he may have had Huntington in mind—and that ‘mutual respect allows us to study and learn from other cultures’. Obstacles to real democracy, he said, ‘have little to do with culture and religion’, much more to do with the unwillingness of the powerful to relinquish power. He ended by asserting that the United Nations offers the only viable route to ‘global peace and co-operation’. The UN may indeed have a continued role to play, perhaps as the assembly where world issues are resolved. However, it needs reform. More significantly, it needs the authority to be able to demand accountability. At present, it lacks the ability to enforce Resolutions. It also needs to develop a mechanism that enables consensus rather than majority decisions. All sides of any story must be considered. Somebody, perhaps the Secretary-General, must be empowered to challenge the members to live up to their own stated values and standards, as set out in the Charter, the UDHR and the Millennium Declaration. Ordinary people committed to change, committed to re-imaging how we want the world to be, can make a difference. Once governance is repatriated to the people, by the people and for the people, decisions that are pro-democracy, pro-tackling poverty, prodisarmament, pro-human rights, will replace those that perpetuate inequality, injustice and privilege. Some issues, such as a woman’s right to choose, same-sex marriages, meat eating or vegetarianism will continue to require discussion and resolution. Some of those involved in campaigning for, or against, these and other issues, such as animal rights, currently resort to violence. Such acts, I believe, in a world that repudiates violence, that encourages children from infancy to resolve disputes peacefully, will become rare. They will so offend the world’s conscience that they will damage, not promote, their perpetrators’ cause. I passionately believe that by making peace studies compulsory at every level of education, nonviolent resolution of difference will become as natural for us as thumping our enemy seems to be in today’s world. I also suggest that more entertainment, more video games, more films in which the non-violent win, will help to generate a new consciousness, a new mind-set, a better world. In a Northern Ireland where local communities governed themselves as units of a world committed to justice, equality and a fairer distribution of resources, would

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Catholics feel discriminated against by Protestants? Perhaps a hardline Paisleyite might still see his Catholic neighbor as somehow subhuman, yet, in this scenario a Protestant would have a Catholic neighbor, rare in segregated Northern Ireland, people would meet regularly in numerous councils and would do so as fellow citizens of a society that values human diversity, that rejoices in variety, that emphasizes equality as the fundamental building block of thymos. As a religious person, I am convinced that openness to the religious Other as also a child of God, that a commitment to recognizing that we are all travelers on a common quest, will replace exclusive truth claims, because this makes the best theological sense. I agree with Sacks (2002) that if I cherish my own faith I should readily ‘understand the value of others’ (2002: 209). ‘We will learn’, he says, ‘to live with diversity once we understand the God-given, world-enhancing dignity of difference’. Discussion • Do you think that societies work best when they are reasonable homogenous? • Do you think that the portrayal of such societies as Bosnia as a happy multi-cultural model of tolerance can be sustained given the extent of the atrocities that so-called good neighbors unleashed on each other? • Are people capable of such intense hatred that they readily dehumanize and kill their one time friends? Can psychology help to explain this? • Is the re-appropriation of power to the local a pragmatic possibility? • How large might the local be? • Would a multiplicity of small self-governing communities be economically viable? • Would duplication be wasteful? • Is small beautiful, or is larger better? • Is the United Nations likely to lead us forward into such a new world order, or will it drag us back into the past of national self-interests, competition and ‘mutually assured destruction’? • Are you convinced that there is an alignment emerging between a secular and a religious vision of how the world can be shaped, and on the moral values that would inform its governance?

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C ONCLUSION A Religion-less Future Chapter seven argued for a world of the future in which nation states as currently constituted would play a much less significant role. Nation states may survive, or different confederations and associations and alliances of smaller, more local units might emerge. Barber calls this the ‘confederal option’. What role nation-states will or will not play in the new world order will depend on whether people continue to consider them useful or not. A reformed and empowered United Nations might also continue as a type of global government. The type of mechanism described in chapter seven to ensure fairness and a retreat from self-interest would, I believe, become increasingly unnecessary, as members hold themselves morally accountable. The biblical record can be read either as nations remaining distinct, but not rivals, within the new world or as merging to form a new people, a single though diverse people centered on God. Either way, nations recede in significance. What about religion? Are religions, like the raft in the Buddha’s metaphor, a burden once we have reached the far shore? In addition to similarity between the higher principle and ideas proposed by Fukuyama and others, William Hocking envisaged a coming world civilization. Hocking argued that Christianity is not something that Christians possess and can therefore ‘transmit’ to others. Rather, it is eternally sought after. He called for the demise of Only Way Christianity in favor of a ‘radical re-conception;’ that yields up the claim to possess the ‘keys’ to God’s presence for a ‘far more convincing universality based on an application to itself of its own maxim, ‘He that loseth his life, for my sake, the same shall find it’ (Hocking 1956: 168-69). In other words, Christianity, while contributing what is most valuable at its center, will merge with other religions into a world embracing civilization; ‘retaining the

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symbols of their historic pieties, the great faiths will grow and their awareness of a unity more significant than the remaining differences’ (1956: 170). Hocking cited a Hindu proverb, quoted in this book’s introduction, that the place where rivers run into each other is especially sacred, because each realizes their full potential and the united, lower stream can not properly be referred to by either of the names of the upper rivers. If this condition does describe the end of the religious journey, might all our religious clothing be jettisoned? Ultimately, the end of history might demand the end of religions as all merge into a single belief and practice. On the other hand, a world of sameness, a monochrome world, would arguably be different from the one in which different cultures—and I believe faiths—are accepted on God’s altar. That description sounds as if the wealth, treasures and the differently flavored incense of the nations and their faiths will continue to enrich society. Diversity, I believe, is a god-gifted reality that keeps us intellectually honest, so that we do not arrogantly claim that all beauty resides in our culture, our art, or that truth exclusively resides in our religion. Barber thinks that if either Jihad or McWorld were to dominate the globe, the result would be bleak. Neither, he argues, value diversity. The ‘unity of God’, says Sacks, Chief Rabbi in Britain and the Commonwealth, ‘lies in the diversity of creation’ (2002: 53). He continues, ‘unity in heaven creates diversity on earth’ (2002: 54) and ‘God, creator of diversity, commands us to honor his creation by respecting diversity’ (2002: 200). If cultural diversity thrives in the end-time world, religious diversity may also have a role to play. Just as I did not argue for the actual demise of the nation state but rather for a diminished role, my argument here is that different religions will also have a reduced function. The role of the nations is diminished by the delegation downwards, to the local, of many powers while some powers are likely to be delegated upwards, to the global level. Religions are the vehicles within which we explore our faith, within which we find spiritual nurture, within which we express our love and praise for God. Often, our outward expressions of humanitarian service are also channeled through our religious organizations. I envisage a world in which more people will feel at home in more than one tradition. I envision a world in which social welfare will be increasingly shouldered by the communities in which we live. Perhaps existing

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structures, that is, faith-based agencies, might be used to provide services, since the ethos of the new world order will prefer voluntary mechanisms over statutory systems. This avoids bureaucracy and prevents response to genuine needs becoming mechanical, unfeeling, doled out by civil servants who do not genuinely care for the needy. Of course, there are many professional care-givers who do care. However, many do not; they ‘just work here’. I envision that, in this new world, houses of worship will be less particular about who they allow to pray there. Currently, a non-Muslim cannot pray in a Mosque following the Muslim prayer rite. I think that in the new world, anyone who expresses a sincere desire to praise God by whatever rite they choose, will be welcome in the prayer house where that rite is habitually practiced. I believe that many of us will remain for much of the time within our familiar religious homes. These enable us to express our faith, and we find nourishment and spiritual satisfaction within them. Religions, in this new world, will no longer compete for members. They will no doubt continue to produce priests and Rabbis and Imams to serve their flocks but these flocks will be fluid. Many trained clergy or religious leaders will be religiously bi-lingual, able to operate in more than one tradition while some communities will broaden their practices. In China, Korea and Japan and to some extent also in India, what is called multiple religious identity is common place. People quite simply identify with more than one tradition. Here, in the new world, the West will learn from the East. What results is not syncretism as such but resembles the way in which many of us feel at home in two different cultures, speaking more than one language. How, then, will they be funded? Here, I suggest that if religious institutions and professional religious personnel, such as myself, continue to be valued, to perform a positive function within the communities where people live, we will be funded by those communities. Should Dawkins prove right, and religions are found to be parasites, taking but not giving, they most certainly will not survive. Ultimately, humanity may find that religions as we know them, like the nations of the globe as currently constituted, are redundant. I think that some form of organized, congregational worship, will continue. Exactly how this might be organized remains open to speculation. If individuals all feel that they communicate directly with God, that God dwells with them and they dwell with God,

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might congregational, corporate worship itself become redundant? Revelation 21: 22 says there will be no Temple in the new world. Biblically speaking, however, I think that just as the angels sing God’s praise continually and collectively (Ps. 148) , so humanity will want to raise humanity’s voice, as if it were one, united voice— for that is indeed what it will be—in honor and praise of God. The ‘no temple’ does not necessarily mean ‘no houses of prayer’ at all. Rather, it could mean that no house can claim to be the one-and-only place where true prayer can be offered. What emerges in this future will probably be different from what we currently know, since while history as we know it, that is, of wars and rivalry, conflict and strife, will end, history as we have not yet known it, of harmonizing, of cultural cross-borrowing—if not cross dressing—of selfless love of others, of innovative ways to ground our fundamental affirmations and values into our DNA itself, will flourish. Artistic expression and literary creativity will blossom as never before. Our understanding of the inter-connectivity of all life, of the nature of the Ultimate Other, who is ineffable yet knowable, will mature as more and more religious resources become available. Neglected insights from dead religions, from traditional religions dismissed and stigmatized as pagan or heretical, will begin to inform our consciousness. Theology or ‘faith seeking understanding’ will no longer confine itself to one religion but will draw on the insights of all. Some speculate that a cosmic consciousness might evolve that will alter what we are, biologically, perhaps enabling a deeper level of communication with the planet itself, or with Gaia, or with the divine reality that permeates all existence. Some think that humanity will acquire new powers that equip us to truly become God’s friends, God’s partners. The Muslim poet and philosopher, Muhammad Iqbal, thus spoke of how we might shape the very destiny of the Universe itself: man has the power to shape and direct the forces around him; in his innermost being man, as conceived by the Qur’an, is a creative energy, an ascending spirit who, in his outward march, rises from one state of being to another. It is the lot of man to share in the deeper aspirations of the Universe around him, and to shape his own destiny as well as that of the Universe (Iqbal 1930: 11).

Iqbal was familiar with Alfred North Whitehead’s process thought that sees the ‘universe as a structure of events possessing the character of a continuous creative flow’ (Iqbal 1930: 47). He also admired

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Henri Bergson (1859-1941) the 1927 Nobel Laureate for Literature, who in Creative Evolution (1907) and other writings advocated that our creative impulse or living energy shapes human life, not the gradual accumulation of small evolutionary mutations. After service as a French diplomatic, Bergson devoted himself to the work of the League of Nations, chairing its international cooperation committee. He influenced Teilhard de Chardin (1881- 1955) who popularized the notion of the emerging human consciousness which, when it reaches the Omega Point, will lead us into a new state of peace and global unity. For De Chardin the perpetuation of violence represents an abandoning of maturity. His new age is linked with a deeper, profounder relationship with the Spirit of Earth itself, which can be read into or from Isa. 65: 25. The Omega Point represents the maturation of human consciousness; it can be understood as the deification of humanity. ‘Evolution’, he wrote, ‘is an ascent towards consciousnesses’. God, humanity, the cosmos will enter into a new, unified, inter-dependent relationship. De Chardin posited love as the driving force behind this tendency towards unity; thus, ‘if you claim’ that ‘universal love is impossible’, how then do you explain ‘that irresistible instinct in our hearts which leads us towards unity whenever and in whatever directions our passions are stirred’, he asked (Chardin 1959: 266). Love, he said, ‘is cosmic energy’, ‘the more or less direct trace marked on the heart of the element by the psychical convergence of the universe upon itself’ (1959: 265). Building on this thesis, some posit that humanity will develop new powers and abilities, that we will exist at a different level. We may resemble parts of a gigantic computer; virtual reality could enable us to ‘live for ever’ because our ‘quantum brain states’ would be digitally simulated. ‘Man’, the ‘knowing subject’, he said, ‘will perceive at last that man, “the object of knowledge”, is the key to the whole science of nature’ (1959: 281). ‘Enormous powers’, De Chardin predicted, would be ‘liberated in mankind’; ‘disease and hunger will be conquered by science and we will no longer need to fear them in any acute form’ (1959: 288). He used the term noosphere to describe a planetary consciousness, a type of ‘thinking mechanism’ that makes the earth more animate than inanimate, something with which we can have a relationship.‘In the perspective of noogenesis’, he wrote, ‘time and space become truly humanized—or rather superhumanised.’ ‘Far from being mutually exclusive’, he continues, ‘the Universal and Personal...grow in the same direction...It is a mistake

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to look for the extension of our being or of the noosphere in the Impersonal’, since it ‘could not be anything but the Hyper-Personal— at the Omega Point’ (1959: 260). Australian aborigines have always said that the earth owns us, we do not own it. De Chardin believed in evolution but in an evolution that is directed, not random. Only a true marriage of religion and science, he argued, could ‘embrace the past and future of evolution so as to contemplate, measure and fulfil them’ (1959: 285). The process, though, could go two ways depending on whether we allow ‘evil to go on growing alongside good’. In this scenario, we might align ourselves only partly with the noosphere. Consequently, something more like ‘traditional apocalyptic thinking’ may ensue, in which there is ‘an internal schism of consciousness’ (1959: 288-89). Perhaps the end-time battles of Revelation are one option that humanity might choose by failing to co-operate with God. It is within our grasp to choose a violent, or a peaceful, end of history. De Chardin’s ideas attracted controversy. A Jesuit priest, he was accused of teaching that Jesus had not completed his saving mission on the Cross, since humanity’s task is to advance by evolution towards the goal of planetary peace and unity. Traditional Catholic theology says that salvation was instantaneous, achieved by Jesus’ death but De Chardin appears to suggest, as I have, that human perfection, or salvation, is to be achieved step by step. Others champion De Chardin for reconciling faith and science. Interestingly, he spent many years in China and was also very widely traveled. There is little doubt that he drew on Chinese and Eastern religion, which he saw as open and cosmic in comparison to the individualcenteredness of Western Christianity, which too often focuses exclusively on saving separate souls, not the whole universe. All, says De Chardin, evolves from unity towards re-unification; ‘in a converging universe...the universal centre of unification...must be conceived as pre-existing and transcendent’, thus the end result is not one in which God becomes all’, wrote, but ends with God as the ‘all in all’, En pasi panta Theos; Ephesians 4: 6 (1959: 294; 310). De Chardin’s ‘noosphere’ has been compared with J. E. Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis, that the earth is a living being that requires ‘interrelationship’ or ‘partnership’ with man’ in order to maximize its ability to keep earth healthy for all its inhabitants (Lovelock 1987: xii; 145). Christian love, says De Chardin, itself represents a ‘new state of consciousness (1959: 295). In my opinion, Jesus, who

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said that those who come after him will do ‘greater things’ (Jn 14: 12) indeed summons us to perfect God’s world. ‘Peace I leave with you’ he said; his will is for us to live at peace in a world of justice that is also the holy, harmonious, happy world of God’s intent (Jn 14: 27). Discussion • Is religion’s job to make itself redundant? • In a future world reconciled with the divine, would external acts of religious practice have any place or would people commune directly with God at a deeper, spiritual level? • Do you think that a world of peace and justice can be achieved? Is this just a nice dream? • Do you agree that there is an alignment between religious and secular thinking on an emerging moral consensus? • Does the above description of how the type of new world order that many envision resemble a practical plan or is it too utopian, too idealistic? • Do you think there is any such thing as an emerging consciousness? • Do you find theories about human existence itself evolving into a higher form too fanciful, too science fictional, to be credible? • Or, are the efforts of such theologians as Whitehead and De Chardin legitimate attempts to re-express religious language, some would say myth (not in the sense of being false but in the sense of being metaphorical rather than literal) as scientific fact? • Am I deluding myself to suggest that the above description of what a new world order might look like represents a practical plan? Is humanity not too greedy, too selfish, too sinful, for such a self-less world to ever exist? Is repentance a necessary foundation? • Or, would such principles as Utilitarianism and thymos result in people working for the good of all because this is the best guarantee that they also will benefit. If so, are people acting morally or merely out of enlightened self-interest? • If good actions result in any type of reward, whether on earth or in heaven, are acts genuinely moral, as Russell argued? • One religious answer would deny that religious people perform ‘moral’ acts in order to get a reward, since ‘salvation’ is totally

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dependent on divine grace and on divine action and can not be earned, no matter how good a person’s life has been. • Do you think that humans are capable of complete selfless-ness? Or, might we be incapable of this now but capable in a spiritually transformed world, even one that remains a physical, material reality?

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B IBLIOGRAPHY Adams, David (ed.), UN Civil Society Report at Midpoint of Culture of Peace Decade, 2005, Brantford, CT: Decade Office for the Culture of Peace and Non-Violence http://decade-culture-of-peace.org/report/wrcpx.pdf Ahmed, Akbar, Islam Today: A Short Introduction to the Muslim World (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002). — Islam Under Siege: Living Dangerously in a Post-Honor World (Cambridge: Polity, 2003). Akenson, Donald Harman, God’s People: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel and Ulster (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992). al-Faruqi, Ismail R., ‘Islam and Zionism’ in John L. Esposito (ed.), Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 261-67. Ali, ‘Abdullah Yusuf, The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 10th edn, 1999). Annan, Kofi, Nobel Lecture (Stockholm: The Nobel Foundation, 2001). Apostolov, Maria, The Christian-Muslim Frontier: A Zone of Contact, Conflict or Cooperation (London and New York: Routledge/Curzon, 2003). Arnold, Sir Thomas, The Preaching of Islam (London: Constable & Co., 1913). Barber, Benjamin R., ‘Jihad v McWorld’, The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 269: 3 (1992 ), pp. 53-65. — Jihad v McWorld (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995). Bard, Mitchell G., Myths and Facts: A Guide to the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Chevy Chase, MD: American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, 2006). Bennett, Clinton, In Search of the Sacred (London: Cassell, 1996). —In Search of Muhammad (London: Cassell, 1998). —In Search of Jesus (London: Continuum, 2001). Bergson, Henri, Creative Evolution (New York: The Modern Library, 1907; 1944). Boas, Franz, The Mind of Primitive Man (New York: The Free Press, 1938; 1963). Brewer, John D., with Gareth Higgins, I, Anti-Catholicism in Northern Ireland, 1600-1998: The Mote and the Beam (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998). Bruce, Steve, God Save Ulster! The Religion and Politics of Paisleyism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). Burr, J. Millard and Robert O. Collins, Alms for Jihad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Buscher, Sarah and Bettina Ling, Máiread Corrigan and Betty Williams: Making Peace in Northern Ireland (New York: The Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 1999).

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INDEX OF R EFERENCES Genesis 1 3 12 15

28, 26 19, 234 3, 209, 210 18, 166

Exodus 3 33

14, 209 20-3, 209

Leviticus 18 18 19 25

26, 129 28, 179 33-34, 179 23, 179

Deuteronomy 4 7 7 7 7 16 20 30

34, 209 3, 179 6-9, 214 19, 209 23, 209 20, 179 4, 196 4-5, 149

Judges 3

12, 211

I Samuel 8, 210 15

2 Samuel 23

3, 197 16, 210

8-39, 179

Index of References 2 Kings 17

23, 211 24, 211

Ezra 1:1

211

Job 38

4, 215

Psalms 82

Isaiah 1 9 11

8, 210 102, 212-3 148, 241

26-7, 149 6, 211 6-9, 200, 212 60, 149 65, 212, 242

Jeremiah 7 29 31

6-7, 210 5-7, 211 31, 205

Daniel 9 11 12

27, 174 31, 174 11, 174

Micah 4

3, 200

Matthew 5 5 12 21

9, 31, 195 44, 106 1-2, 195 32-46, 195

Mark 12

1-12, 195

Luke 12

51, 195

253

254

In Search of Solutions

John 14 14

12, 244 27, 244

Romans 2 3

15, 205 15, 25

Philippians 2

8, 209

2 Thessalonians 2

3-4, 174

Hebrews 11

1, 215

Revelation 21, 214, 241 Qur’an Al-Baqara (the Cow) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

30, 26 90-192, 202 154, 202 156, 204 190, 193, 202 216, 202 217, 202

Al-i-Imran (Family of Imran) 3 3 3

110, 200 157, 162, 202 169, 202

An-Nisa (The Women) 4

29-30, 185

Al-Ma’ida (the Table Spread) 5 5 5

32, 185 48, 118 82-3, 175

Al-Anfal (The Spoils of War) 8 8

38, 202 61, 202

Index of References At-Tawba (The Repentance) 9 9 9

3-4, 203 5, 13, 21, 126, 193, 202-7 29, 203, 205-207

Hud 10

25, 200

Al-Isra (The Night Journey) 17

33, 185

Al-Haj (The Pilgrimage) 22

39-40, 193, 202

Al-Balad (The City) 90

9-16, 204

255

256

In Search of Solutions

GENERAL INDEX A Abbas, Mahmoud, 169-170 Abdullah of Jordan, 154 Adams, Gerry, 46, 47, 49 Afganistan, 107, 192, 202, 223 Aherni, Bertie, 50 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 140 Ahmed, Akbar, 16 Akenson, Donald H., 17, 29, 38-40, 53, 55-57, 64, 66, 67, 70, 79, 137, 145, 148, 151, 157-58, 161-63, 165-66, 173-77, 181 Alexander the Great, 105, 151, 218 Alexandria initiative/Declaration, 17, 187 Allegory, 197, 197-99, 213-15 Allenby, Edmund, 150-51, 153 Aliyah, 146-149, 158, 157 Andrews, John, 76 Andriæ, Ivo, 125 Annan, Kofi, 230, 235 Apartheid, 81, 137, 181, 227-28 Apostolov, Mario, 14, 64, 153, 204 Apprentice Boys of Derry, 33, 55 Augustine, St., 194 Arab League, 156, 160, 163-64, 168 Arafat, Yasser, 140, 164-65, 187 Arnold, Sir Thomas, 194 Ashrawi, Hanan, 140 Asquith, Henry Herbert, 61 Austria-Hungary, 95, 96 B Baptist World Congress, 230 Baha’ullah, 232 Balkans, 11, 55, 57, 87-135, 140

Balfour Declaration, 151, 154, 161 Bangladesh, 20 Barber, Benjamin R., 27-28, 226, 229-31, 239, 241 Bard, Mitchell G., 137, 143, 153, 157, 162, 166-68, 170, 173, 184-85 Begin, Menachim, 167 Ben-Gurion, David, 149, 160-62 Bennett, Clinton, 16, 19-21, 33, 34, 57, 63, 71, 90-91, 141-42, 148, 174, 181, 230 Bennett, Rekha, 147 Beirut, 2, 147, 153-4, 175 Belfast, 2, 33, 34, 38, 44, 48, 49, 63, 77 Bentham, Jeremy, 219 Bergson, Henri, 28, 242 Bernadotte, Count Folke, 160, 163 Bhagavad Gita, 22, 197 Bible, 7, 22-3, 50, 56, 139, 149, 174, 176, 179, 189, 192-3, 196-98, 213-14. Binationalism, 157-58 Bin Laden, Osama, 9, 21-22, 77, 107, 194, 204-207 Bliss, Howard, 154 Bloody Sunday, 30, 34, 44 Boas, Franz, 227 Bob Jones University, SC, 79 Boro, Brian, 52 Boyne, Battle of, 54, 55, 64, 72, 126 Bosnia, 1, 7, 8, 11, 14, 17, 18, 87-135, 140-41, 159, 192, 202, 215, 223-24, 226-27, 237 Christianity in, 117-18 Genocide, 92, 101, 108, 109, 215 Bosniaks, 94, 108, 112, 114-17, 121-22, 125

General Index Buddha/Buddhism, 7, 10, 12, 20, 238 Burlusconi, Silvio, 1 Buscher, Saran and Ling, Bettina, 30, 83, 84 Burns, John, 74 Bush, George H. W., 110, 225 Bush, George W., 100 Butt, Isaac, 60 Brewer, John D., 55, 76 Brooke, Basil, 74 British Council of Churches, 71 Bruce, Steve, 68 Burr, Millard J. and Collins, Robert O., 88, 107, 122-23, 137, 166, 169 C Calvinists/Presbytarians, 39, 53, 56, 66, 67 Camp David Peace Treaty, 167, 185, 230 Carlson, C. C., 79 Carey, George, 187 Carter, Jimmy, 167, 169, 176, 181, 185-6, 189, 230 Celtic Christianity, 50-51 Charlemagne, 73 Chechnya, 193, 202, 223 Chesney, James, 76 China, 148, 218, 227, 240, 243 Chirac, Jacques, 139 Chosen People, 55, 56, 57 Christians/Christianity 126-31, 134, 140, 142, 146-48, 150, 152, 154-57, 166, 173-74, 184-87, 190, 192-93, 195-98, 204-205, 209, 212-15, 224, 235, 238, 245 Christopher, Warren, 93 Civil Rights Movement, NI. 33, 34, 43, 44, 80 Civil Society, 116, 133, 138, 228-29, 235 Clash of Civilizations, 112-13, 117, 224, 226-28. Clinton, William J., 47, 102 Cohn-Sherbok, Dan and El-Alami, Dawoud, 137, 148, 154, 156, 160, 164, 189-81, 186 Cole, USS, 206 Cold War, 1, 97, 222, 224-5

257

Collins, Eamon, 29, 36, 37, 41, 58-9, 63, 71, 73, 77, 85 Collins, Michael, 40 Commonwealth of Nations (formerly British Commonwealth), 65 Conscience (human), 22, 25, 73, 205, 236 Confederalism, 231, 233 Connolly, James, 58, 64 Corrigan, Máiread, 16, 30, 45, 83 Cooper, Ivan, 30, 44 Courbage, Youssef and Fargues, Philippe, 194 Corrymeela Community, 30, 82 Coward, Harold and Smith, G. S., 19 Cracknell, Kenneth, 212-13 Craig, Sir James (1st Viscount Craigavon) 76 Crimea War, 145-46 Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, 99, 107, 121 Croatia, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100-103, 105, 107, 111-14, 116-17, 119, 121, 125-27, 129-31, 134, 140, 227 Cromwell, Oliver, 54, 72 Crusades, the, 2, 194-95 Cyprus, 96, 114 D Dallair, Roméo, 104 Dar-ul-Islam, 13, 139, 174 Dar-ul-Harb, 13, 203 Dawkins, Richard, 2, 3, 4, 8, 11, 26, 27, 68, 221, 240 Dayton Peace Accord, 92, 103, 104, 108 David, King, 177, 179, 209-11 De Chardin, Pierre Teilhard, 28, 242, 243-44 De Chastelaine, John, 49 Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 160 Democracy, 14, 16, 18, 55, 58, 65, 77, 87, 115, 123, 129, 177, 184, 201, 218, 220-22, 226, 229-32, 236 Democratic Ulster Unionist Party (Protestant UUP), 34, 42, 43, 45, 48, 49, 64, 68, 69, 70, 75, 78, 79 Devlin, Joseph, 74

258

In Search of Solutions

Disraeli, Benjamin, 144 Downing St Declaration, 47 Durkheim, Emile, 11 Duran, Khalid, 87, 94, 110, 115, 116 E Eagleburger, Lawrence, 93 Easter Rebellion/uprising, 34, 58, 64 Egypt, 125, 140-41, 143-46, 152-53, 156, 162-67, 170, 179, 185, 194, 230 Ellis, Marc, 137, 158, 176-78, 180-82, 186, 188-90, 194-95, 210-12 Enlightenment, the, 24, 230 Jewish Enlightenment, 145 Esack, Farid, 13, 182 European Union, 1, 64, 79, 98, 103, 125, 168, 231 F Al-Fateh, 164, 169, 170, 182 Faul, Denis, 80 Faulkner, Brian, 44, 45 Al-Faruqi, Ismail, 183 Fazael, 57, 142, 146, 148 Feisal of Iraq, 154 Fell, Patrick, 76 Fellowship of Reconciliation, 187 Finucane, Pat, 36 Fitt, Gerry, 43, 45 Fitzgerald, Garret, 46 Freud, Sigmund, 2, 6 Foster, Ivan, 78 Foucault, Michel, 14-15 Fowler, James, 6-7 France, 56, 73, 90, 103, 114, 127, 144, 150 Friedmann, Yohanan, 204 Fukuyama, Francis, 27-28, 201, 220-22, 224-25, 228-30, 238 G Gaia hypothesis, 243 Gandhi, M. K., 6, 22, 31, 197-98, 233 Gawler, George, 145 Gaza Strip, 140, 162-65, 167-70, 175 Geneva Peace Plan, 189 Great Britain/United Kingdom, 2, 4, 36, 38-41, 51, 59-60, 62-66, 74, 77, 90-92,

96, 103, 144-46, 150-55, 158-63, 174, 206, 218-19, 232, 239 Gergen, Kenneth K., 6 George-Picot, Charles Francois, 153 Germany, 4, 62, 77, 88, 96,103, 105, 144, 155-56, 173, 181, 218-19, 224, 226-27 Girard, Rene, 5-6 Glenny, Misha, 87, 93, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105 Grant, Patrick, 29, 33, 76, 85 Greengrass, Paul, 30 Global Ethic, 24 Global governance, 223, 229, 231, 233 Globalization, 16, 222, 226, 228 Golan Heights, 165-166, 183-184 Golden Rule, 24 Good Friday Agreement, 29, 32, 46, 48, 65, 75, 78 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 225 H Hadrian IV (Adrian), 51 Haganah, 156, 162 HAMAS, 140, 166, 168-170, 182-85, 189-90 Hamilton, Ernest W., 56 Haniyah, Ismail, 169-70 Harmonia Abrahamica, 118-20, 134 Harris, Sam., 2, 3, 5, 8, 11, 19, 22, 26 Heath, Edward, 44 Hegal, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 201 Henry II of England, 30, 51-52 Henry VIII of England, 51-52, 74 Hertz, Theodor, 148 Hess, Moses, 146 Higher principle/hermeneutic, 24, 200-203, 205, 207-209, 213-14, 225-26, 233 Hindu/Hinduism, 10, 12, 16, 20, 28, 197, 223-24, 239 Hitler, Adolf, 96, 137, 173, 178, 181, 224, 227 Al-Hitar, Hamoud, 24, 206-207 History, end of, 28, 201, 215, 217-37 Hizbullah, 166, 169 Hobbes, Thomas, 219 Hocking, William Ernest, 27-8, 238-39

General Index Holocaust, 105, 140, 142, 158-61, 163, 167, 177-78, 196, 210 Home Rule, 38, 38, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65 Howarth, Stephen, 73 Hume, Cardinal Basil, 81 Hume, John, 43, 46, 49 Huntington, Samuel P., 1, 113, 117, 224-29, 246 Hussain ibn Ali, Sharif of Mecca, 153-54, 173 Al-Hussayni, Amin, Mufti of Jerusalem, 155-57, 163, 173, 180 I Interreligious and International Federation for World Peace, 19, 187 Iran-Iraq War, 1, 87, 90, 107, 140, 158, 164, 166-67 Iraq, 1, 15, 17, 63, 100, 140, 144, 152-54, 156, 163, 165-66, 227 Irish Civil War, 65 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 29, 31, 33, 36, 38, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 64, 65, 69, 74, 76, 79, 84 Irish Republican Brotherhood, 60, 64 India, 17, 19, 46, 60, 66, 73, 144-45, 152, 158-59, 181, 194, 223-24, 226, 228, 240 Intifada (uprising), 167-68, 176 Irgun, 156-57, Islam, 1, 3, 8-9, 13-16, 21-22, 24-25, 87-88, 90-91, 93-4, 102, 105, 107, 112-9, 131, 134, 139-40, 142-43, 152, 157, 166-67, 173-75, 181-87, 190, 193-94, 198, 200, 203-207, 218, 229 Islamofascism, 88 Israel-Palestine. 1, 7, 8, 17, 91, 134, 137-90 Izetbegovic´, Alija, 88, 104, 105, 108, 115, 121-125, 134 Iqbal, Muhammad, 241 J Jabotinsky, Ze’ev, 175 James I of England and VI of Scotland, 73 James II of England and VII of Scotland, 54

259

Japan, 124, 226-27, 240 Jefferson, Thomas, 231 Jerusalem, 141, 143, 145-50, 153, 155, 158, 162-63, 165, 167, 173-74, 176, 181, 183-90, 194, 211 Jihad, 110, 125-26, 129, 166-67, 174, 192, 203, 206, 226, 229-31, 239 Jung, Carl, 6 Jesus, 6, 10, 16, 20, 21, 83, 106, 127, 129, 185, 193, 195-98, 209, 213, 243 Jewish people/Judaism, 22, 23, 57, 90, 96-97, 101, 137-190, 192-95, 198, 210-12, 215, 224 Johnson, Paul, 145 Johnston, Douglas M., and Eastvold, Jonathon, 87, 97, 99, 110-12, 126, 131 Jonah, 179-80 K Kashmir/Kashmir conflict, 19, 223-24, 226-27 Karadvic´, Radovan, 98, 106, 109, 117, 128 Karadvic´, Vuk, 127-28 Khadduri, Majid, 184 Khan, Muqtedar, 185, 203, 206 Khomeini, Ruhollah, 14, 20 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 6, 31, 85 Kimball, Charles, 8, 10, 12-14, 23-27, 86, 205 Kosovo, 93-94, 98-100, 109, 126-27, 130 Battle of 93-94, 104 Kook, Abraham Isaac, 149 Korea, 240, 227 Krishna, 197 Krstic, Radislav, 108 Küng, Hans, 24 Kurlansky, Mark, 194 Kuwait, 15, 166, 226 L Lawrence, Thomas Edward, 153 Lazar, Prince, 126-27, 129 League of Nations, 150-51, 153-54, 242 Lebanon, 1, 63, 140-41, 143-44, 163, 166-67, 181, 227 Lindsay, Lord Alexander, 146 Lindsey, Hal, 79, 185

260

In Search of Solutions

Lovelock, James Ephraim, 243 M Macedonia, 96-97, 99, 105 McGarry, John and O’Leary, Brendan, 29, 34, 36-38, 42, 55-58, 62-65, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72-78, 80-81, 92 McGuinness, Martin, 50 McMahon, Sir Henry, 153 MacMurrough, Dermot, 52 McTernan, Oliver, 8, 20, 21 Maharashtran independence movement, 16 Mahmutc´ehajic´, Rusmir, 87, 90, 98-99, 112, 114-19, 121, 124-26, 127-29, 131, 134 Magnes, Judah A., 158 Major, John, 47 Marx, Karl/Marxism, 27, 71-72, 201, 221-22 Mental illness, religion as 2-3, 6 Mernissi, Fatima, 14 Messiah, the, 149, 150, 174 Mill, John Stuart, 60-61, 219 Millennium Goals, 200, 222, 226, 234-36, 230 Miloševic´, Slobodan, 93, 98, 99, 104, 108, 117, 129 Mitchell, Clair, 29, 40, 68, 75, 79, 80, 81 Mitchell, George, 47 Moghissi, Haideh, 24 Molly Maguires, the, 74 Molyneaux, James, 46 Mostar, 101, 129 Montefiore, Sir Moses, 146-47 Montenegro, 96, 97, 99, 100 Moon, Sun Myung, 228 Mountbatten, Lord Louis, 46 Muhammad, 20, 193, 198, 241 Muravchik, Joshua, 113, 143 N Al-Nakba (The Catastrophe), 163 Nasr, S. H., 198 Nation-state/nation, 64, 119, 144, 180, 195, 212, 215, 216, 218, 222, 228, 229, 231, 238,

Nationalism, 34, 42, 66-67, 86, 88, 96-97, 101, 105, 109, 111-12, 114, 116, 120-21, 123, 126-27, 129, 134, 137-39, 144, 146-47, 152, 157-58, 170, 173, 183, 187, 192, 212, 227, Napoleon I, 145, 218-19 Nazis/Nazism, 97, 101, 156, 161, 181-82, 178, 186 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 88, 102, 107, 108 Neave, Airey, 46 Neill, Stephen, 195-96 Nelson-Pallmeyer, Jack, 7, 8, 22-23, 25, 197-98, 202, 205, 214 Nine/Eleven, 1, 8, 20, 22, 91, 198, 202-203, 205-206, 226 Nobel Peace Prize, 16, 30, 43, 45, 48-49, 84-85, 168, 225, 235, 230 Northern Ireland, 1, 7, 8, 11, 18, 29-87, 92, 93, 104, 110, 111, 114, 130, 141, 187, 192, Nusseibeh-Ayalon Peace Plan, 184, 188-89 O Occupied Territory, 37, 141-43, 147, 150, 162, 164-66, 170, 173-74, 176, 182-83, 185, 188, 226 O’Connell, Daniel, 61 O’Fiach, Cardinal Tomás, 8 Oil, 15, 92, 101-102, 226 O’Neill, Terence, 43, 69 Omega Point, 242-43 Orange Order, 58, 64, 69, 70, 74, 77 Ottoman Empire, 90, 94-96, 118, 125, 128, 136, 143-45, 147-48, 150, 151-53, 175 Organization of Islamic Conference, 107, 174 Oslo Accord/Process, 140, 168 Owen, Lord David, 103, 106 P Paisley, Ian, 34, 42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 70, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79 Palmerston, Viscount, 145 Paradigms, the three, 10-11

General Index Paris Peace Conference, 151, 153 Partition of Bosnia, 102, 117, 121, 134, 141, 223 Partition of Ireland, 31, 38, 40, 63, 64-66 Partition of India, 152 Partition of Palestine, 154, 157-60, 174, 181, 183, 189 Pakistan, 17, 152 Palestinian Liberation Organization, 140, 165-68 Palestinian National Authority, 18, 134, 141, 167-69, 179, 187 Papacy/Popes, 30, 51, 52, 54, 57, 73, 196, Parnell, Charles Stuart, 60 Peace People, the, 30, 83, 84 Peele Commission, the, 157 Penal laws, 53, 59 Peres, Shimon, 168 Petar II Petrovic´, 127 Phillip IV of France, 73 Phillips, Kevin, 4, 151 Piaget, Jean, 6 Pinkser, Leo, 146 Post-modernism, 14, 21, 23-24 Potock, Chaim, 138, 150 Powell, Enoch, 62 Power-sharing, 18, 34, 45, 48, 64, 79, 82, 94, 104, 134, 141, 156, 166 Protocols of the Elders of Zion, 166, 182 Psychology, 2, 5-6, 8, 18, 237 Q Qutb, Sayyid, 123-24 Qur’an, 7, 13, 21-23, 25, 123, 126, 182-85, 192-93, 198, 200-208, 214, 241 R Rabin, Yitchak, 167 Race, Alan, 10 Radcliffe, Cyril, 152 Real IRA, 46, 48 Rebellion of 1641, 52, 53, 55 Religion as immoral, 3-4 Republika Srpska, 95, 96, 100, 106, 108, 128, Reynolds, Albert, 47

261

Riedlmayer, Andras J., 88, 97, 113, Road Map to Peace, 168 Robertson, Pat, 9 Robinson, Peter, 50 Rodinson, Maxime, 173 Rothschilds, the, 146-47 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 220 Royal Ulster Constabulary, 33, 41, 43, 49 Rubenstein, Richard, 177, 184 Ruether, Rosemary Radford and Ruether, Herman J., 138, 143, 147-49, 156-58, 175-81, 186, 188-90, 227, 228 Rushdie, Salman, 14, 20 Russell, Bertrand, 3-4, 20, 26, 244 Russia (pre-Soviet), 96, 145, 146, 150, 153 Russian Federation (post-Soviet), 103, 168, 223 Rwandan genocide, 11, 100, 215, 226 S Sacks, Jonathan, 237 Sadat, Anwar, 167, 185 St Andrews Talks/Agreement, 49, 82 Sands, Bobby, 36, 46 Samuel, Herbert, 155 Sarajevo, 96, 101, 102, 106, 107, 108 Saudi Arabia, 107, 154, 166, 168, 183, 189, 226 Saudi Peace Plan, 168, 183 Sen, Amartya, 19 Science, 2, 4 Selengut, Charles, 5, 13, 18, 19, 21, 139, 189 Sells, Michael, 14, 88, 91, 101-103, 105, 110, 115, 117, 119-20, 122, 125, 128-30, Serbia, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100-102, 104-109, 111-14, 116, 117, 119, 121, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 140, 227 Serbian Orthodox Church, 106, 121, 125-30, 134 Schmidt-Leukal, Perry, 7-8 Scotland, 51-53, 57, 59, 63, 976 Scottish Parliament, 232 Shakespeare, William, 232 Sharon, Ariel, 168, 187

262

In Search of Solutions

Siddiqui, Ataullah, 198 Sinn Féin, 29, 44-50, 76, 78, 79, 85, Six-Day War, 141, 178 Smock, David, 8, 12, 19 Smythe, Martin, 77 Social Democratic and Labour Party, 43, 46 Solemn League and Covenant, 39, 64, 70 Somalia, 11, 15, 92 South Africa, 29, 76, 81, 167, 181, 227 Soviet Union, 97-98, 124, 225 Spain, 63, 118, 175, 194, 227 Srebenica, 102, 106-108 Stalin, Joseph, 97-98 Steele, David, 88, 131-32 Stormont Castle, Belfast, 38, 41, 43-44, 75 Suez Canal, 96, 141, 144, 164-65, Sufism 118, 147, 204 Suicide bombings, 141, 179, 182, 185, 202, 206 Sunningdale Agreement, 34, 44-46, 83 Switzerland, 51, 233 Sykes, Sir Mark, 153 Syria, 116, 140, 142-45, 152-54, 163-67, 169-70, 183-84, 194, 211 T Taha, M. M., 13, 207 Taif Agreement, 166 Tantawi, Sheikh Muhammad, 187, 206 Taylor, A. J. P., 45 Thatcher, Margaret, 46, 90, 110 Thompson, Henry O., 7, 73, 196 Thymos, 221-22, 228, 237, 244 Tibi, Bassam, 13, 24-25, 116, 152 tikkun olam, 26, 234 Tito, Josip Broz, 97, 104, 121 Tolstoy, Leo, 85 Toombs, Ivan, 36-38 Trimble, David, 48-49, 77, 110 Truman, Harry, 161 Troubles, the, 11, 30, 34-67, 69-86, 88, 142 Tudjman, Franjo, 105, 117, 121, 129 Turkey, 1

U Uganda, 148 Ulster Scots, 53, 56-58, 114, 120, 175, 177, 192, 197, 212 Ulster Defense Association, 44, 69 Ulster Defense Regiment, 36, 41, 74 Ulster Unionist Party, 42, 43, 44, 48, 75, 78 Ulster Volunteer Force, 34, 69 Ulster Workers’ Council Strike, 34, 45 United Nations, 14, 20, 27, 91, 92, 98-100, 102-109, 132-33, 138-41, 143, 158, 160, 163-64, 167-69, 174, 187, 200-202, 214, 226, 233, 236 UN Charter, 91, 200-201, 226, 235-36 UN Declaration of a Culture of Peace, 28, 133 UN Dialogue among civilizations program, 226 Resolution 181, 158, 159, 160, 162, 164, 174, 181 Resolution 194, 163-64 Resolution 713, 91, 105 Resolution 742, 105 Resolution 823, 106 Resolution 1674, 100 Resolution 3379, 143, 167 Resolution 4686, 167 United States of America, 2, 16, 47, 61, 93, 103, 107-108, 124, 154, 159, 161, 167-168, 187, 220, 227, 231-32 US Center for Strategic Studies, 88, 131 US Declaration of Independence, 162, 219 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 201, 219, 236 Upanishads, 10 Uris, Leon, 138 Ustashe, 96-97, 99 Utilitarian, 219, 244 V Van Gough, Theo, 20 Vance, Cyrus. 103, 106 Virus, religion as, 2

General Index Vivekananda, 10 W War on terror, 1 Welsh Assembly, 232 West Bank of the River Jordan, 37, 57, 140-42, 165, 168-67, 175-76, 178, 183, 186, 188-89, 192 Whitehead, Alfred North, 241, 244 William III of England, 54, 58, 126 Williams, Betty, 16, 30, 45, 83, 85 Wilson, Des, 80 Wilson, Harold, 43 Wilson, Woodrow, 154 Wells, H. G., 4 Women and peacemaking, 85, 86, 133, 188, 235 Women in Black, 133, 188 World Conference of Religions for Peace, 131

263

World Council of Churches, 82, 186 World Federalist Movement, 232 World War 1, 4, 64, 65, 150-51, 186 World War II, 155, 157-58, 160-61, 181, 219 World Zionist Organization, 148 Wright, Billy, 49 Y Yemen, 25, 145, 206-207 Yomm Kippur War, 166 Yugoslavia, 14, 17, 88, 90-92, 94, 96-101, 103-106, 108, 111, 114-15, 158 Z Zimmerman, Warren, 121 Zionism, 148-49, 154-56, 175, 178, 181-82 As racism, 143, 167