IMAGINATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE ARTS
IMAGINATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE ARTS Edited by
Matthew Kieran and Dominic McI...
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IMAGINATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE ARTS
IMAGINATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE ARTS Edited by
Matthew Kieran and Dominic McIver Lopes
LONDON AND NEW YORK
First published 2003 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2003 Selection and editorial matter: Matthew Kieran and Dominic McIver Lopes; individual chapters: the contributors. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-49864-X Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-34238-0 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-30516-0 (Print Edition)
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
vi
List of contributors
vii
Introduction PART I Imagination, narrative, and emotion
1 13
1
Reasons, emotions, and fictions BERYS GAUT
14
2
How I really feel about JFK STACIE FRIEND
35
3
Narrative, emotion, and perspective PETER GOLDIE
55
4
In search of a narrative MATTHEW KIERAN
70
PART II Truth in imagination
89 90
5
Fictional assent and the (so-called) “puzzle of imaginative resistance” DEREK MATRAVERS
6
The tower of Goldbach and other impossible tales KATHLEEN STOCK
106
7
On the relation between pretense and belief TAMAR SZABÓ GENDLER
124
8
Literary fiction and the philosophical value of detail EILEEN JOHN
142
9
Fiction and value ROMAN BONZON
160
Imagining the truth: an account of tragic pleasure JAMES SHELLEY
177
10
v
PART III Sensory imagination
186
11
Seeing twice over CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS
187
12
Out of sight, out of mind DOMINIC McIVER LOPES
207
13
The imaged, the imagined, and the imaginary DAVID DAVIES
225
14
Film and the transcendental imagination: Kant and Hitchcock’s The Lady Vanishes MELISSA ZINKIN
246
15
The funerary sadness of Mahler’s music SAAM TRIVEDI
260
16
Sculpture and space ROBERT HOPKINS
274
PART IV Afterthoughts 17
293
The capacities that enable us to produce and consume art GREGORY CURRIE
294
Bibliography
306
Name index
318
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A volume such as this is impossible without the skill and generosity of many people. First in line for thanks are the authors, who not only contributed their work but also endured the editorial process with patience and good humor. Some of the chapters in this collection were first presented at a conference on Imagination and the Arts held in July 2001 at the University of Leeds. We are grateful to all those who attended the conference for sharing their time and their ideas. We are also grateful for conference funding provided by the Analysis Trust, the British Academy, the British Society of Aesthetics, the Department of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia, and the School of Philosophy at the University of Leeds. R.B.Kitaj kindly granted permission for the use of his work on the dust jacket and Marlborough Gallery in London provided a transparency. We thank Brad Murray, who proved meticulous in preparing the manuscript, compiling the bibliography, and guarding against poor style and poor philosophy. Our final debt is to Tony Bruce and his staff at Routledge for having so ably ushered this book into this print. Matthew Kieran Dominic McIver Lopes
CONTRIBUTORS
Roman Bonzon is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Augustana College, in Rock Island, Illinois. He has written in aesthetics and the philosophy of language. Gregory Currie is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nottingham. He recently completed a book on imagination, Recreative Minds, and is now working on the psychology and philosophy of imagination. David Davies teaches philosophy at McGill University. He works on art, mind, language, and science, and has just completed a book on the ontology of art. Stacie Friend is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Washington and Jefferson College. Her research focuses on fiction, reference, and the imagination. Berys Gaut teaches in the Department of Moral Philosophy, University of St Andrews. He publishes in aesthetics, philosophy of film, and ethics, and is the author of Art, Emotion and Ethics, to be published by Oxford University Press. Tamar Szabó Gendler is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Syracuse University. She is author of Thought Experiments and co-editor of Conceivability and Possibility. Peter Goldie is Lecturer in Philosophy at King’s College London. Recent books are The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration, and, as editor, Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Robert Hopkins is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield. His publications, which are mostly in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind, include Picture, Image, and Experience. Eileen John teaches at the University of Louisville and writes on topics in aesthetics and the philosophy of literature. Matthew Kieran is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Leeds. He is the author of Revealing Art (London: Routledge, forthcoming) and articles in ethics and the Philosophy of Art.
viii
Dominic McIver Lopes teaches philosophy at the University of British Columbia. He is the author of Understanding Pictures and co-editor of the Routledge Companion to Aesthetics. Derek Matravers lectures in philosophy at the Open University. He is the author of Art and Emotion. James Shelley, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Auburn University, is the author of papers in aesthetics and epistemology. He is currently writing a book on Hume’s theory of taste. Kathleen Stock is a lecturer in philosophy at the University of East Anglia. Her current research focus is the nature of imagination and related questions. Saam Trivedi is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Simmons College. He has published on interpretation, expressiveness, the ontology of artworks, and the emotions, and is working on aesthetics and ethics. Christopher Williams is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nevada, Reno. Melissa Zinkin is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and co-director of the philosophy, literature, and criticism program at Binghamton University. She is writing a book on Kant’s concept of force.
INTRODUCTION
Much progress in aesthetics during the second half of the twentieth century may be ascribed to the assumption that an understanding of representation in art provides the key to many problems in aesthetics. A good part of the success of aesthetics during the past twenty years may be credited to attempts to work out how mental representation figures in the appreciation of art—where “mental representation”, when it comes to appreciating art, has often meant “imagination”. (True, the imagination has always formed part of the subjectmatter of aesthetics, but its recent revival can be traced to recent advances in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind.) The seventeen chapters that make up this volume attest to the richness of what might be called imagination theory. But if a rich body of philosophical work is often the child of skeptical impulses, this volume is no exception, for each chapter seeks to extend imagination theory in a new direction. The best introduction to proposals for a change of course makes clear where we are and why we must move forward. Imagination in make-believe Kendall Walton’s Mimesis as Make-Believe revolutionized philosophical thinking about representational art, fiction, imagination, and appreciation. Despite the intense analytic scrutiny these concepts had already endured, the so-called paradoxes of fiction remained seemingly intractable, the concept of imagination had been banished from philosophy of art and philosophy of mind, and scant progress had been made toward understanding appreciation. In place of clarifications or refinements of the existing concepts Walton proposed an entirely new way to carve up the categories. Revolution can be disorienting. Thus, Walton holds that all art is representational, that all representational works are fictions, and that appreciation always involves a kind of fiction-making. Nevertheless, a theorist is right to reconceptualize what he wishes to explain provided that the explanation is illuminating. What precipitates Walton’s recarving is the insight that the categories of representational art, fiction, imagination, and appreciation all connect to makebelieve. This notion appears first as part of the theory of representation that is the
2 INTRODUCTION
principal offering of Mimesis as Make-Believe. Representational works, according to Walton, function as props in games of make-believe. Good models of such games are to be found in children’s play. Suppose that Turner and Desmond are playing Star Wars. In their game, paper tubes are light sabers, trees are droids, skateboards are spacecraft, the garden shed is the Death Star, and the boys are Jedi. Using these props, they make-believe that they destroy the droids with their light sabers and fly their spacecraft to the Death Star: waving a paper tube across a tree is destroying a droid, and riding a skateboard to the garden shed is flying to the Death Star. The role of the props is to determine what is true in the game. When Turner falls off his skateboard, it is true within the game of Star Wars that he has been hit by the enemy. Walton defines a fictional truth as what is true in a game of make-believe. In consequence, fictional truth is not any special kind of truth—there is no special sense in which it is true that Dracula is immortal. A fictional truth is quite simply a fact about what is fictional. Moreover, since props in games of make-believe have the role of generating fictional truths, representations function as props that generate fictional truths. Dracula functions as a prop in a game properly played with works of literature to generate fictional truths. When I read Dracula it is fictional, for example, that I am reading a report of the career of a vampire. Representations function to generate fictional truths and users of representations are meant to imagine these truths. It is fictional that p if and only if there is, in a game of make-believe, a mandate to imagine p. To say that it is a fictional truth that Turner has destroyed the Death Star is to say that the game of Star Wars prescribes that we are to imagine that Turner has destroyed the Death Star. It is fictional that Dracula avoids mirrors because this is what we are asked to imagine when we read Dracula. (Note that we need not actually imagine what a game mandates that we imagine so a fictional truth need not be an imagined truth.) In sum, representations function as props in games of make-believe. Props in such games have the role of generating fictional truths. Fictional truths are what players of games of make-believe are prescribed to imagine. Thus representations function to prescribe imaginings. This network of conceptions has some surprising features. First, since representations are analyzed as props that function to generate fictional truths, all representations are works of fiction. Some of the incredulity this claim may engender is alleviated by a second feature of Walton’s account. Fictional truth is compatible with truth and imagining with believing. It is fictional in the game of Star Wars that Desmond is human but it is also true that he is human; the game prescribes that its players imagine that Desmond is human even as they believe that he is human. Likewise, Dracula’s readers imagine that Transylvania is mountainous even as some of them believe truly that Transylvania is mountainous. In effect, a fictional truth is not, on Walton’s account, anything like what it is in the ordinary sense. It is not, for example, a non-deceptive falsehood. A truth is fictional if and only if there is a prescription in a game of make-believe to imagine it.
INTRODUCTION 3
One might seek empirical evidence in support of this theory of representation or the conceptions of fiction and imagination that comprise it. It might be possible, for example, to locate practices that constitute games of make-believe in people’s interactions with artworks. In the case of literary works these would include “principles of generation” that determine what is fictional given the sentences of the text. However, this strategy is unlikely to succeed unless art-using practices are fairly stable across texts and Walton doubts that this condition obtains. He doubts, for instance, that David Lewis’s reality and mutual belief principles are employed in any systematic fashion to determine what a literary text makes fictional (Lewis 1983). In lieu of a direct argument Walton submits that his proposals best explain certain longstanding puzzles regarding our appreciation of artworks. In particular, the notion of make-believe makes available a novel notion of what Walton calls participation. The key to participation is that the player is a prop in most games of makebelieve, including the games governing our interactions with artworks. Peter Lamarque sets the idea out succinctly (Lamarque 1991:163). John is watching a movie in which a monster attacks New York. There are three ways to characterize his appreciation of the fiction: (1) it is fictional that John believes that the monster is attacking New York; (2) John believes that it is fictional that the monster is attacking New York; (3) John believes that the fictional monster is attacking New York. Walton rejects (3) since it construes John’s belief about the monster as de re, but it is the distinction between (1) and (2) that concerns us here. In (1) John’s belief falls within the scope of the fiction operator whereas in (2) the content of John’s belief (that the monster is attacking New York) falls within the scope of fiction operator but his believing it does not. Walton prefers, wherever possible, giving the fiction operator the wide scope it has in (1). When the fiction operator has wide scope some of what is fictionally true concerns John and some concerns the work. Walton distinguishes two fictional worlds, each accessed by a distinct set of fictional truths. The “work world” is accessed by what is fictional in the work (e.g. that the monster is attacking New York) and these fictions are generated by the representation alone. The “game world” is accessed by fictional truths about the spectator (e.g. that he believes that the monster is attacking New York) and these fictions are generated partly by the spectator himself in so far as he, alongside the work, is a prop in the proceedings. What is true in the game depends on what is true in the work world but the converse does not hold. Participation in many games of make-believe is not, therefore, limited to imagining what is true in the work world; it also includes imagining truths about oneself as a constituent of the game world.
4 INTRODUCTION
Walton submits that this conception of participation delivers solutions to three puzzles: the paradox of emotional responses to fiction, the puzzle of how we can derive pleasure from tragedy, and the puzzle of how well-known stories can sustain suspense. The adequacy of Walton’s solutions to these puzzles has received more attention than any other aspect of his account. But before proceeding to this it is helpful to consider in more detail the theories of imagination inspired by Walton. Imagination as an attitude Walton acknowledges that there are many forms of imagination. However, given the work that it is made to do in his theory, the operative notion of imagination is a prepositional attitude. Two questions to ask are what kind of attitude the imagination is and what principles generate imaginings. The answer to the first question depends on the answer to the second. It is natural to define imagination as that attitude taking fictional propositions as its contents (where a fictional proposition is one that is not true). But on recent theories of imagination, such as Walton’s, imagination is prior to fiction: fictional truths are those that are to be imagined. Thus it is fictional that George W.Bush is the President of the United States wherever it is prescribed that one imagine that Bush is the President of the United States. The contents of imaginings are fictional propositions in the trivial sense that they are to be imagined, not in the ordinary sense that they are a species of falsehood. Since we cannot characterize the attitude of imagination nontrivially by its contents, we must characterize it functionally, by the way imaginings are generated or by the inferential relations obtaining among them. Walton offers one characterization; a second derives from the view that imagination is mental simulation. Simulation theory originated as an explanation of the attribution of attitudes to others. In the version of the theory developed by Gregory Currie, simulation is a mental operation that consists in allowing the belief-desire system to run “offline”, disconnected from its normal sensory inputs and behavioral outputs and from the simulator’s own beliefs and desires, yet taking into account the situation of another person (Currie 1995a). While run off-line, the simulator’s belief-desire system nevertheless continues to operate in an otherwise normal way, generating inferences and causing emotional responses, thereby telling her what mental state she would be in were she in the other’s situation. Suppose that upon seeing a distant hiker suddenly double back in the presence of a bear, I attribute to him the state of fear. According to simulation theory, I do this by substituting for my beliefs (e.g. that my surroundings are safe) beliefs representing the hiker’s environment (that it is bear-infested) and allowing my belief-desire system to process the substituted input. I discover in this way that I would feel fear, so I attribute fear to the hiker—but since my belief-desire system has been run offline, I do not experience fear myself. Currie proposes that imagination is mental
INTRODUCTION 5
simulation. Imaginings are belief-like and desire-like states that are generated by running the belief-desire system off-line. Works of art generate imaginings by providing inputs to the belief-desire system, run off-line. The attitude of imagination is defined by the conjunction of two features of mental simulation. First, imaginings are inferentially insulated from other prepositional attitudes. What is imagined is independent of what is believed or desired. One’s imagining that Holmes inhabits 221B Baker Street is not impugned by any belief one has that is inconsistent with it. Second, imaginings retain belieflike inferential relations to other imaginings (Currie 1995a:149–50). This is the point of describing imagination as the operation of the belief-desire system run offline, for the belief-desire system is what sustains inferential and causal connections among mental contents. But states of imagination rely on the same inference generator and have similar effects on the affective system as do beliefs and desires. Were this not so, simulation would be unreliable as a mechanism for attributing mental states to others. In sum, imaginings are not beliefs because they do not have the right inferential connections to other beliefs and desires, but they may be described as quasi-beliefs (and quasi-desires) because they preserve belief-like (or desire-like) functional and causal connections to other imaginings and to emotions. If I believe that p and I believe that q then I believe that p and q. Hence if I imagine that p and I imagine that q then I imagine that p and q. Likewise, if I believe that p and p is dangerous then I will probably experience fear. I will be put into a state of fear, or something relevantly similar to it, if I imagine that p. According to the make-believe theory, imaginings are prescribed in games of make-believe comprising conditional rules mandating that when a given state of affairs obtains, some proposition is to be imagined. Vermeer’s Woman Holding a Balance is designed to function as a prop in a game of make-believe, which prescribes, in view of the way the picture’s surface is marked, that one imagine that a woman is holding a balance. Imaginings generated in games of make-believe are inferentially insulated from other propositional attitudes. Imagining that Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street does not imply that one does not believe that 221B Baker Street is uninhabited, and believing that 221B Baker Street is a vacant lot and imagining that Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street does not imply either that one imagines or believes that Holmes inhabits a vacant lot. Fictional truths are inferentially elaborated within games of make-believe: some fictional truths entail others. However, what inferential relations obtain between fictional truths is up for grabs, depending only upon the rules of the relevant game of make-believe. Imagining that p and imagining that q may not, in some games of make-believe, entail imagining p and q. According to simulation theory, imaginings are the product of the normal belief-forming mechanism and its inference generator; according to make-believe theory, imaginings are generated in accordance with inference rules that need not match those that generate beliefs.
6 INTRODUCTION
Response and resistance Parts I and II of this volume are taken up with the nature and shaping of our imaginative responses to works and our resistance to them. Tolstoy’s creation of Anna Karenina is not to be understood as asserting that any such person exists, Bram Stoker’s Dracula is not a historical tale or future prediction, and Borges’s Labyrinths is unconcerned with what is strictly possible or not. We are to imagine the characters and states of affairs as represented without any concern for what is or even could be the case. Yet, in doing so we affectively respond to them and their plight in ways that are common to our emotional responses to actual people. We fear Dracula, pity Anna Karenina, and are intrigued by the infinite library. In real life we fear those with great power and evil intent, pity those trapped in lovelorn marriages, and are curious about intellectual puzzles. The only difference is that in the case of fictions our emotional responses are directed toward objects we understand to be nonexistent. Pre-reflectively this all seems straightforward enough. But as Colin Radford originally pointed out, why think that our responses to nonexistent objects ought to be consistent with our responses to actual objects (Radford 1975)? Indeed, what grounds do we have for thinking such responses are rational at all? If we know that Mephistopheles does not exist, it is clearly irrational to be afraid of him. If we believe Christ never existed, it is irrational to pity him. So if it is not part of the content of what we imagine that we believe Dracula, Karenina, or the infinite library to exist, then it is irrational for us to feel for or respond to them. It is important to clarify what emotions are being taken to be on this line of thought. Emotions are held to be constituted by a phenomenological feeling conjoined with a cognitive element such as judgment or belief. I can feel the same way in two cases but my emotions may differ depending on what I believe. For example, in two different cases my palms get sweaty, my heart races, and I feel jittery. Yet, in one case I may be fearful and in the other I may be embarrassed. What explains the difference? In the former case I believe that something is threatening me whereas in the other I believe that I have done something shameful. It is this “cognitive” view of emotion that leads to a paradox. To have the genuine emotion of fear requires the judgment or belief that I am being threatened, but when watching a horror movie I seem to feel fear while believing that I am in no danger at all, for I am well aware that the monster represented on the screen is not going to jump out at me. It is this paradox which pushes Radford to conclude that our emotional responses to fiction are irrational. Walton argues that the paradox can be resolved if we construe our responses to fictions not as genuine emotions but rather as quasi-emotions felt in the context of games of make-believe. Playing such games, we imagine that we are afraid and our imagining this is partly constituted by our imagining that we believe we are in danger. Such responses are not genuine emotions: they have the same feel or affective aspect as genuine emotions but we do not believe Dracula threatens us. Nevertheless our imaginings help explain how and why we make the inferences
INTRODUCTION 7
we do and why we come to care for fictional characters and respond to fictional situations. On Walton’s account, our affective responses to fictions are rational since they do not depend upon judgment or belief. It does seem counterintuitive to claim that our affective responses to fiction are make-believe rather than genuine emotions and Walton’s theory has been criticized on this basis. The very intensity of our “sadness” for the fate of a tragic character suggests that we are genuinely moved (Carroll 1990:73–4). Moreover, we often cannot just switch our affective responses on and off at will, at least if the artwork is any good, which is surely what would be suggested if our responses were make-believe ones. It seems that we genuinely respond to thoughts we entertain and do not merely pretend to do so. The thought theory holds that in entertaining thoughts about what is fictionally true we come to be genuinely sad (Lamarque 1981; Carroll 1990:84–6). But objections to Walton’s account based on appeals to phenomenology are inadequate because it is part of the account that quasi-fear feels the same as genuine fear. What makes our response to Dracula a quasi-emotion rather than a proper one is the difference in their cognitive components (an imagining in one case and a belief in the other). It follows that intensity of feeling cannot be a good criterion for whether an emotion is genuine or not. Consider someone who attends a really good horror movie and is subject to intense and visceral fear, horror, and disgust (which is what makes it a good horror movie). On the way out she is set upon and verbally abused by a stranger. The feelings she is subject to during this incident might be much more attenuated than the feelings she was subject to in the cinema yet in both cases she genuinely feels them. Which emotions are genuine depends upon what she believes rather than the degree of feeling involved. Furthermore, it does not follow from Walton’s account that quasi-emotions can be switched on and off at will within games of make-believe. Walton could argue that as long as one’s involvement in the game is whole-hearted and the prescriptions concerning what we should imagine are of the right sort, we will be prompted to have certain affective responses whether we will it so or not. Walton is committed only to the commonplace recognition that we can stop playing the game and thereby avoid being subject to feelings it prompts. Indeed, he has suggested that the thought theory of emotional responses seems to entail that I genuinely fear a collection of properties or thought contents (Walton 1997:47). This would either be a bizarre result or involve the need to talk of a special kind of fear. So, Walton argues, the thought theory is less faithful than Walton to the phenomenology of emotional responses to art. One might remain skeptical of Walton’s account for a different reason. Affective responses to fiction are being characterized as atypical or peculiar because we are responding to states of affairs, fictional ones, we believe we can do nothing about. But there is a wide range of similar non-fictional cases (Moran 1994). Just think of our emotional responses to the past or to modal facts—how things might or could have been. If Walton were to claim such responses were
8 INTRODUCTION
irrational, which is a hard claim to make out, then there is nothing particular to the paradox in the case of fiction. Alternatively this may provide good grounds for thinking our affective responses to fictions are genuine. What prompts them is perhaps more a function of the expressive aspect of a work than the bare prescription to imagine a certain proposition. There are different ways to present fictional truths and how they are presented to us shapes the nature of our affective responses. Different takes on the same scene may prescribe the same imaginings but solicit highly divergent responses. Consider a movie scene of someone eating dinner. The shots might concentrate on the formality of the diner, the precision with which each mouthful is savored, and the complementary contrast of the different colors and textures of each dish. Or the same scene could be shot in a way that emphasizes the outsized nature of the food consumed, the sheen of juices, the flecked spittle of the diner, the gape of the mouth as the meaty flesh is brought up to be engorged. In the former case the scene is shot in a way that prescribes admiration for the diner’s taste and discrimination; in the latter it solicits repulsion. Thus, the expressive qualities of a work play a large part in shaping our complex cognitive-affective attitudes toward what is represented, in ways that are not strictly relevant to the generation of fictional truths. We should therefore distinguish between prepositional imaginings, where we imagine that something is the case, from the expressively imaginative aspect of a work, which concerns the connections, associations, emotional mood, or tone suggested by the way the propositional imaginings are prescribed. It is the way the scene is presented that prompts the mind to respond in certain ways. The second scene of the diner focuses on the glistening spittle and sheen of the meat juices, prompts us to experience it as seeing something flecked and oozing, not merely to imagine that it is flecked and oozing. Whether they are genuine or quasi-emotions, many of our responses to expressive aspects of a work are prior to rather than part of the content of the imagining. In exploring this possibility, we need a better understanding of non-propositional imagining generally and this is something the chapters in Part III of the volume help provide (more on this below). There are also limits to participation, as the phenomenon of imaginative resistance shows. An example commonly used to illustrate the phenomenon is Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will. Riefenstahl’s film is an immensely powerful and beautiful quasi-documentary of the 1934 Nuremburg rallies. The technique, composition, and editing are not only highly innovative but are designed to solicit responses of admiration and awe for Nazism. From the opening shots of the plane descending from the heavens to the sweeping shots of the crowds and the heroic isolation of Hitler, we are presented with an aesthetically appealing intimation of fascism as bold, noble, pure, and righteous. Yet, assuming we hold Nazism to be morally repugnant, it seems we either cannot or will not imagine what the film mandates even while we appreciate its artistry. Our entering into and responding fully to the film is somehow precluded since it
INTRODUCTION 9
would involve entertaining or assenting to values and ideals we take to be deeply wrong. Walton has noted a curious asymmetry (Walton 1994a). We are willing to imagine deviations in fictional worlds from laws of nature but we are much more reluctant to, or cannot, entertain deviations from moral truths. In science fiction, for example, we are prepared to imagine possibilities regarding time travel, multiple identity, or causality which we take to be actually impossible, just because imagining them is mandated. But a story decreeing that genocide is right is insufficient to make us accept that in the fictional world this is so. Walton’s explanation of the asymmetry is based on a supervenience principle. Since we generally assume that moral properties supervene on natural properties, where there is a divergence of moral properties in the fictional world from the actual world we conclude that there is a divergence in the natural properties. Where the fictional world, as it is represented, fails to respect this principle then we are entitled to hold that things could not be as they are represented, no matter what imaginings the work mandates. However, this diagnosis of imaginative resistance looks far too broad if it is supposed to be distinctive to the moral case and it looks as if we can imagine worlds which are at odds with the supervenience principle. After all, even if we assume that the mental supervenes on the physical we do not resist imagining a Cartesian fiction. According to Moran, imaginative resistance is psychological and an upshot of our character; we are reluctant to imagine morally inverted worlds because to do so would be to endorse certain sentiments that should be condemned (Moran 1994). But this explanation looks problematic in a different way. Just to imagine a morally inverted world does not entail the actual endorsement of the relevant sentiments. I might fully imagine certain racist attitudes and values, and allow my responses to proceed on that basis, but it does not follow that I actually endorse them. I may just take up an attitude of fictional assent; if these were the appropriate attitudes and values then I would respond as I do in reading the racist novel. I can, conceptually and psychologically, do this while nonetheless holding that such attitudes and values are actually deeply pernicious and wrong. Heightened resistance to moral falsehoods might reflect a psychological tendency to fear the corruption of our own characters, whereby we tend to react strongly against attempts to get us to imagine some moral falsehoods for fear of coming to internalize them ourselves. But truly great artistry can overcome this reluctance if we are prepared to allow it to do so. This would explain why there remains something important to Plato’s thought that truly great art can be dangerous indeed (Kieran 2003). Making sense of imagination It is an axiom of contemporary theories of imagining that states of imagination are mental states with prepositional contents. Attitude theorists need not deny that there are sensory imaginings, but they do hold that sensory imaginings are
10 INTRODUCTION
propositional imaginings, albeit of a special sort. We have seen that a notion of non-propositional imagining might help account for the rationality of emotional responses to fictions and for the phenomenon of imaginative resistance. Part III of this volume contains several non-propositional accounts of sensory imagination. A simulation theorist may opt to restrict his account to cases of non-sensory imagining and either deny that sensory imagining exists or grant that it exists as a phenomenon independent of prepositional imagining. But Currie takes sensory imagination to be a kind of prepositional imagination and proposes that simulation theory accommodates it, specifically as it is brought to bear in the interpretation of pictures. In his view, grasping what a picture depicts requires that one visually imagine the scene it depicts. It is fictional, for instance, in A Fist Full of Dollars that the Man With No Name keeps on walking despite having been hit by several gunshots. But my imagining this state of affairs while watching the movie differs in obvious and important ways from the imagining that is required to comprehending a description of the event (a literary fiction may evoke a sensory imagining but none is required to grasp the fiction). Currie accepts that the former but not the latter necessarily shares many features in common with seeing a man rise and continue to approach an enemy who is shooting him. It involves “perceptual imaginings”. Perceptual imaginings are a species of propositional imagining unlike that required to comprehend a literary fiction. Since imagination is quasi-belief, we should hew to the principle that “distinctions between kinds of imaginings ought to have their basis in distinctions between types of belief” (Currie 1995a:182). This, after all, is the point of taking states of imagination to be the product of the belief-desire system run off-line. Thus, perceptual imaginings parallel perceptual beliefs. A perceptual belief is a belief with a particular kind of content. First, it is one in which there is a counterfactual dependence between the belief’s content and the perceptible properties of the object of belief (if the object were redder or if it were square instead of round, the believer would have believed that it is redder or that it is square). Second, perceptual beliefs represent objects as having properties that are highly specific and that are “bundled” together in a way that reflects their origin in a sense modality. This distinguishes visual beliefs from auditory beliefs or from beliefs in other sense modalities—visual beliefs, for instance, bundle the specific shape, size, and color of objects; auditory beliefs bundle other types of properties. Two objections may be raised against the hypothesis that sensory imagining is perceptual imagining so defined. First, it does not capture the distinction between perceptual and literary imaginings. A reliable witness in a who-done-it novel may describe the perpetrator of a crime in a way that is counterfactually dependent upon the perpetrator’s features, that bundles them by sense modality, and that is highly specific. The reader’s imagining will be highly specific, bundled by sense modality, and counterfactually dependent on the perpetrator’s features. Yet, this imagining is quite unlike that we have when we see the perpetrator on screen or
INTRODUCTION 11
in the “mind’s eye”. The point may be put another way. We may respond to the who-done-it novel with two kinds of imagining, one required and one optional. The optional imagining is like seeing the perpetrator; the required imagining is like believing a journalistic report. How do these imaginings differ if perceptual imagining is quasi-believing? One might reply by crafting a more nuanced account of the specificity or bundling of properties in perceptual belief and imagining. However, if the second objection is effective, the first goes through, no matter how specificity and bundling are defined. The second objection is that sensory imagining—including the kind of imagining that might be thought to be in play when we watch movies or look at pictures—cannot be characterized as akin to belief, since it shares properties of experience incompatible with belief. Belief is one kind of mental state; experience is another. The differences are myriad, of course, but we should emphasize the following. First, experiences, but not beliefs, are necessarily occurrent. They always have a precise duration and occupy a precise location in the stream of conscious mental events. This is not the case with either beliefs or prepositional imaginings, which are quite often dispositional. (This explains the fact that experiences but not beliefs are the stuff of episodic memory: I can remember that I experienced such and such without recalling the experience itself but I cannot remember having a belief without recalling the belief itself.) Second, experiences necessarily have a phenomenal character (beliefs need not) and a full description of an experience must include what it is like to have the experience. Thus, unlike belief, experience can be more or less vivid. Third, the contents of experience are frequently, if not invariably, belief-independent. This is strikingly brought out in illusions, such as the Müller-Lyer illusion: my seeing the lines as different in length is not corrected by my belief that they are equal in length. Finally, the content of experience is non-conceptual: the properties it represents need not be ones of which the perceiver possesses concepts. A perceiver may have experiences as of shapes, colors, chords, and timbres for which she possesses no concepts. That this is so is consistent with the doctrine that all experience is concept-laden: perhaps some concepts must be applied to experience but representing some properties in experience need not require the possession of concepts of those properties. By contrast, the contents of belief are conceptual: each property represented in belief is necessarily one of which the believer possesses a concept. My seeing the monster in Alien or my running “If She Marries a Taxi Driver” through my head necessarily has a precise duration and is accessible to episodic memory. Sensory imagining also has, by necessity, a phenomenal character— Frank Jackson’s Mary can learn what it is like to experience red by sensorily imagining red or by seeing the blood of the movie monster’s victims (she cannot learn what it is like to experience red by propositionally imagining that she sees a red object.) Its content is non-conceptual—the precise color and consistency of the slime dripping from the alien’s teeth may be properties of which I possess no concepts (DeBellis 1995; Lopes 2000). This content is also belief-independent. I may believe that the monster is a harmless latex dummy and may do my best to
12 INTRODUCTION
resist imagining otherwise, but for all that it looks as if there is an alien monster on the rampage. Interestingly, the contents of pure sensory images are also beliefindependent—the lines in a mental image of the Müller-Lyer illusion appear different in length, even if one believes they are equal (Pressy and Wilson 1974; Berbaum and Chung 1981; Wallace 1984). The hypothesis that sensory imaginings are akin to perceptual beliefs is false if they have certain experience-like features. It should be—and it has been—acknowledged from the start that imagination is not a unitary phenomenon. There are many forms of imagination and each needs its own explanation. But this is no setback. The best first step toward understanding imagination in all its guises is to provide an account of one central form of imagination. Its limitations inform us about other varieties of imagination and guide us in devising accounts of them.
Part I IMAGINATION, NARRATIVE, AND EMOTION
1 REASONS, EMOTIONS, AND FICTIONS Berys Gaut
It is obvious that one can imagine having an emotion. Less obvious is whether one can have an actual emotion directed toward a merely imagined state of affairs. The latter is a quite general issue about the relation of imagination to emotion. A particular application of this issue has received extensive discussion in philosophical aesthetics in the last twenty years, in respect of emotions directed toward fictional objects. Generally the question has been put like this: is it possible to feel real emotions toward events and situations known to be fictional, and if so, how? The so-called “paradox of fiction” is then construed as the problem of how there can be real emotions directed towards known fictions. On the face of it, such emotions are puzzling: when we are afraid of something, for instance, it seems that we must believe that the feared object exists and is dangerous, and also be disposed to remove ourselves from its dangers. Yet, watching a horror film, we do not believe that the depicted monsters actually exist or are really dangerous, and far from rushing in terror from the cinema, we stay and watch with enjoyment. Some aestheticians, including Kendall Walton, Gregory Currie, and Jerrold Levinson, have tried to dissolve the paradox by arguing that (with various nuances and qualifications) it is not, in fact, possible to feel real emotions toward known fictional events: very broadly, what is happening is that the spectator is imagining feeling these emotions (Currie 1990; Walton 1990; Levinson 1997; Walton 1997). These theorists do not deny that spectators may feel real emotions toward real-world analogues of fictional events, nor do they deny that there is something emotion-like going on in spectators when they are moved by fictions: it is simply not real fear, pity, disgust, and so forth, that they are feeling toward the fictional events. Let us dub this view emotional irrealism. Returning a different answer to the question are philosophers such as Peter Lamarque, Noël Carroll, John Morreall, Richard Moran, Derek Matravers, and Richard Joyce, who argue that the phenomenology of spectatorship supports the claim that spectators can feel real emotions toward fictions, and that there are no good philosophical reasons for holding that the phenomenology is non-veridical in such cases (Lamarque 1981; Carroll 1990; Morreall 1993; Moran 1994; Matravers 1998; Joyce 2000). Let us term this view emotional realism.
REASONS, EMOTIONS, AND FICTIONS 15
I argue here for the truth of emotional realism. I also show that there is a distinct puzzle concerning not the possibility but the rationality of fiction-directed emotions. The latter puzzle has often not been as sharply separated from the former issue as it ought to be; for instance, Colin Radford in one of the earliest papers in the debate addressed the question of the rationality of fiction-directed emotions, but his position encouraged a conflation of this with the distinct question of their possibility (Radford 1975). Though distinct, there is nevertheless an important connection between the two issues: it will turn out that the strongest arguments for emotional irrealism stem from arguments based on rationality considerations, so that the puzzle about the rationality of fictiondirected emotions needs to be solved or dissolved in order to resolve the issue of realism. I first examine the possibility puzzle, and show how realism can dissolve it, since it is based on a misconception of what is required for something to be an emotion. I then turn to the rationality puzzle, examine various realist attempts to solve it, and offer my own solution, based on three rationality criteria grounded on the main characteristics of emotional states. Finally, I compare the solution offered here to three recent attempts to solve the puzzles, and argue for its superiority to them. The possibility of fiction-directed emotions Before turning to the paradox of fiction, we need to consider what an emotion is. In one broad, but legitimate, sense of the term, an emotion is a state that is characteristically felt, a state that characteristically has a phenomenology (unlike, say, a belief, which has none). In this sense, we may say that someone is very emotional, and simply mean that he is prone to swings of mood, or tends to feel things deeply. In a narrower sense of the term, an emotion is just one of the various kinds of state that are characteristically felt. It is hard precisely to delineate emotions in this narrower sense from other affective states—indeed, it has plausibly been suggested that emotions do not form a natural class at all (Rorty 1980:1). But it is useful at least to distinguish emotions from moods. A mood, such as happiness or sadness, need not have an intentional object: someone can simply be happy or sad, without being happy or sad about anything. An emotion in contrast has an intentional object: I am afraid of something, I pity someone. According to the dominant (and I would argue correct) cognitive-evaluative theory of the emotions, an emotion not only has an intentional object, but also essentially incorporates an evaluation of that object. So to be afraid of something essentially involves evaluating that thing as dangerous; to pity someone essentially involves construing her as suffering; to be angry with someone essentially involves thinking of that person as having wronged someone about whom one cares. (Cognitive-evaluative theories in various forms are defended by Lyons 1980; de Sousa 1987; Greenspan 1988; Roberts 1988. The particular evaluations mentioned as being essentially connected with each emotion are used for
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illustrative purposes only; in fact, they may be more complex than is commonly suggested, but that does not matter for our present purposes.) Finally, an emotion is a state that characteristically can motivate actions: I run away because I am afraid, I help someone because I pity her, I strike someone because I am angry with him. There are, then, three main characteristic aspects to an emotion: the affective, the cognitive-evaluative, and the motivational. In most fully fledged occurrent emotions all three are present, but it is not necessary that all three be present for an emotion to exist. Not all of the characteristic features of an emotion are essential to it. In particular, many emotional episodes are non-occurrent: one can be angry with someone for a long time, even when he is absent and one is not thinking about him. One need not have any feeling of anger during these long periods. Nevertheless, if one’s anger does become occurrent, perhaps because the person is present, characteristically one will experience a feeling of anger. According to the cognitive-evaluative theory, an emotion is not however individuated by its particular feeling. The feelings that we experience when we are ashamed and when we feel guilty, for instance, might well be identical, and what individuates them is the content of the respective evaluative thoughts—of having done something shameful, as opposed to having done something morally wrong. Lyons, for instance, holds that an occurrent emotion involves bodily sensations of felt disturbance caused by certain evaluations; but he does not maintain that each emotion has a unique feeling associated with it by which we individuate the emotion (Lyons 1980). A feeling must be present in occurrent emotion, but what feeling it is might vary from occasion to occasion, or from person to person. Turning back to our problem, the paradox of fiction has been discussed chiefly in terms of the emotions of pity and fear, the emotions aroused by tragic representations. But if we cast our net wider, the irrealist case becomes less compelling. Disgust, for instance, is (certainly in the broad sense) an emotion; but it is odd to say that one has to know whether something really occurred if one is to be disgusted at the thought of it. If I describe in vivid and detailed fashion the jam-and-live-mouse sandwich that I breakfasted on the other day, you might well be disgusted, without supposing that I am telling the truth. And if I tell you a joke, you don’t have to wait to find out whether the events I describe really happened before you can find the joke funny. I can also be awed by or feel wonder at a depicted landscape, even though I know that the artist invented it. Nor does there seem to be anything problematic (contra Walton 1990:203) about the possibility of admiring a fictional character, such as Superman. Stronger, though, are the intuitions supporting the irrealist case in respect of fear and pity. How can one really fear something, or fear for someone, if one does not believe that the thing is dangerous or the person endangered? And how can one not be motivated to flee if danger really threatens one? Indeed, how could one enjoy these states if one really were afraid? Similar considerations apply to pitying someone.
REASONS, EMOTIONS, AND FICTIONS 17
If the irrealist is right about these matters, he or she owes an account of what is going on in such cases. Perhaps the most developed version of such an account is due to Kendall Walton. Walton holds that it is only fictional that Charles, the spectator of a horror movie, is afraid of the green slime that features in it, and what makes this the case is that Charles “experiences quasi fear [the sensations and physiological reactions normally associated with fear] as a result of realizing that fictionally the slime threatens him. This makes it fictional that his quasi fear is caused by a belief that the slime poses a danger, and hence that he fears the slime” (Walton 1990:245). According to this analysis, spectators actually experience the sensations and physiological reactions normally associated with fear; these reactions do not, however, constitute fear when directed toward fictions. The account thus readily provides an error theory for why spectators might falsely conclude that they really are afraid, even though they are only make-believedly afraid. One evident disadvantage that such an account has over realism is its far greater complexity: whereas the realist holds simply that Charles is afraid of the Green Slime, the irrealist holds that he is in the complex state described above, which would involve his possession of concepts such as quasi-fear. We can indeed ascribe such concepts to spectators if they are necessary to explain the phenomena, even if spectators are not explicitly aware of possessing the concepts (think of how Chomskyans ascribe knowledge of deep grammatical structures to competent speakers, though such speakers have no explicit knowledge of them). But if there is a simpler account available, which adequately explains the phenomena, we ought on general heuristic grounds to adopt that. And this means that, unless the irrealist has good grounds for showing that realism is inadequate, then realism ought to be the preferred account. We have already adverted to the kinds of considerations to which irrealists can appeal; they can be organized around the three aspects of an emotion: the affective, the cognitive-evaluative, and the motivational. First, if a fiction-directed emotion is genuine, how could one enjoy feeling it? After all, real fear is intrinsically unpleasant, and people go out of their way to avoid it. But spectators enjoy horror films, and also a wide variety of other fictions in which they fear for characters. That strongly suggests that such spectators are only make-believedly afraid, not really so. However, this argument fails. For one of the many merits of Walton’s account is that it allows for make-believe fear to have exactly the same phenomenology as real fear—that is what quasi-fear is. And any adequate account of make-believe fear must keep its phenomenology the same as that of fear, because it is a truth of introspection that one can be in a state that feels like fear when watching a horror film. But if one insists that one cannot enjoy fear, because the feel of fear is unpleasant, then one must equally insist that one cannot enjoy make-believe fear, since, sharing the same phenomenology, that too must be unpleasant. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere (Gaut 1993), it is a mistake to hold that fear is intrinsically unpleasant. According to the cognitive-evaluative theory it is not the feeling that individuates the emotion, but the cognitive content; and this allows for at least some cases where fear can be felt
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as pleasant (perhaps because of its associated “arousal jag”). Bunjee-jumpers, mountaineers, and many others who are confronted with real danger, can seek out and enjoy fear; the cognitive theory shows how this is possible. The second, cognitive-evaluative aspect of an emotion seems to provide a stronger ground for the irrealist case. Real emotions require their subjects to have appropriate beliefs: real fear requires one to believe that someone about whom one cares is threatened. If a man in a pub tells you a harrowing story about his sister, then you will cease to be harrowed if the man then admits that he made the story up, and does not have a sister (Radford 1975). However, the example does not prove that an emotion requires a belief: if one’s emotion does evaporate on being told that the sister is an invention, that merely shows that if an emotion is grounded on a belief, removal of that belief tends to remove the emotion grounded on it. It does not support the more general claim that having an appropriate belief is a necessary condition for the existence of an emotion. The claim that to have an emotion, a person must have the appropriate evaluative belief, might seem to follow from the cognitive-evaluative theory of the emotions. But in fact cognition is a broader category than belief, including imaginings in a broad sense—unasserted thoughts, construals, seeings-as, and so on. The more restricted version of cognitivism, which holds that emotions require beliefs about their objects has been dubbed judgmentalism, and there are good reasons to reject it. Consider Fido, an old and harmless dog. Due to a traumatic childhood incident, Fred has a neurotic fear of dogs, and Fred fears Fido. Fred does not believe that Fido is dangerous: Fred has, for instance, no tendency to warn others about him. Fred simply cannot help seeing Fido as dangerous, and he responds to Fido with fear. So it is possible to feel fear while not possessing a belief that the object of one’s fear is dangerous (Greenspan 1988: chapter 2). Or consider cases where I vividly imagine my hand being mangled by a machine, and I feel fear, though I firmly believe that my hand is not caught in the machine (Carroll 1990: 78–9); or when I vividly imagine plunging to my death on the rocks below, though I believe that I am safely behind the parapet on the cliff-top. It is also possible to fear merely counterfactual cases (Moran 1994). For instance, it makes sense to be afraid of what would have happened if Hitler had won the Second World War. And a visitor to the CN Tower in Toronto can have the experience of walking on a glass floor several hundred feet up on the observation deck of the tower, seeing the ground far below one’s feet. As one edges gingerly across the floor, one certainly believes that it is safe to do so (otherwise it would be madness to walk across), but the experience of fear is perfectly genuine: the appearance of extreme danger is a very vivid one, and grounds one’s fear of falling. The irrealist will deny the possibility of these cases. First, it will be objected that all of these examples are ones in which one does have a belief, albeit an irrational and probably subconscious one. Several phobic fears may be like this: someone who fears flying may well have an irrational belief that flying is dangerous. However, while this may be true of some phobias, it fails as a plausible
REASONS, EMOTIONS, AND FICTIONS 19
explanation for the full range of cases considered above: I do not, for instance, have a subconscious and irrational belief that Hitler really did win the Second World War, or that I will fall to my death when I walk across the glass floor—if I did have the latter belief, I would not walk across. The better explanation is that the vivid imagining or appearance of danger is sufficient to ground real fear. Second, it has been objected that anti-judgmentalist accounts mistake the intentional object of emotions. Carroll dubs his version of the anti-judgmentalist view the Thought Theory, and holds that Charles fears the thought of the Green Slime, and this thought need not be asserted (Carroll 1990). A related position is defended by Lamarque (Lamarque 1981). Walton has objected to the latter that one does not fear the thought, but the object of the thought—the Green Slime (Walton 1990:203). The anti-judgmentalist should simply agree: the theory should hold that one fears not the act of thinking of the Green Slime, but the thought-content: that is, the Green Slime. Judgmentalism holds that asserted thoughts, that is, beliefs, are necessary for emotions; and that the intentional object of the fear is the belief-content, that is, what the belief is about; antijudgmentalism holds that unasserted thoughts are all that may be required for an emotion, and should relatedly hold that the object of fear is the thought-content, that is, what the thought is about. Finally, an irrealist can object that the Fido case and its ilk show only that it is not necessary to believe that an object is dangerous to fear it; but it is compatible with this that one must believe that the object exists in order to fear it. So fear does not require characterizing beliefs that something is dangerous, but it does require existential beliefs, and hence the paradox of fiction is not solved by the anti-judgmentalist stratagem. Something like this suggestion is made by Levinson (Levinson 1997). However, such a half-way position lacks motivation: fear has as its formal object the dangerous, so the fact that one believes that the object of fear exists, even though it lacks the property of being dangerous, would be no less puzzling than the case where one does not believe that object of fear exists at all. And far from it being the case that fear must be directed to what one believes exists, fear is often felt toward what may happen in the future, not what one believes is presently so. The third, motivational, aspect of emotions grounds what some irrealists have seen as their most powerful argument. Walton remains neutral on Greenspan’s anti-judgmentalism, but holds that there are nevertheless good reasons for thinking that Charles, unlike Fred who fears Fido, is not really afraid, for Charles is not motivated to flee, and “fear emasculated by subtracting its distinctive motivational force is not fear at all” (Walton 1990:102). Similarly, the irrealist can hold that I am not motivated to help Anna Karenina, and that this undermines the claim that I pity her. In reply, the realist needs to get clearer about what the motivational aspect of an emotion involves. Consider a parallel argument to the above in respect of historical victims: it might be claimed that I do not really pity Anne Boleyn, since I am not motivated to help her in any way. But I really can pity Anne Boleyn;
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and this is so by virtue of the fact that I have a genuine desire or wish that she had not suffered as she did. It is the presence of such a desire or wish that constitutes the motivational aspect of the emotion of pity. If, for instance, I said that I pitied Anne, but had no desire at all that she not suffer as she did, there would be defeasible grounds for questioning whether I really did pity her. But I do not try to help Anne, since I lack the belief that there is something I can do to help her. It is absence of this belief, not of the desire (or therefore of the emotion), that explains why I do not act. So the absence of motivated action does not prove that I do not pity Anne; rather, I lack the appropriate beliefs about being able to help her. In the same way, I may genuinely pity Anna Karenina, since I wish that she had not suffered as she did, but I lack the belief about being able to help her in any way; so I do not try to do so. The point applies not just to historical cases, but also to anyone whom I believe I cannot help. If I watch a live television broadcast of a hurricane sweeping through a small Florida town, I can genuinely pity the inhabitants, though I do not try to get them out of the way of the hurricane, since I know that there is nothing I can do to prevent it from engulfing them. (For a similar set of considerations see Matravers 1991 and 1998: chapter 4.) A parallel argument applies to the case of fear. It is not the case that the desire criterial for fear is a desire to flee, since in the case of certain fears, fleeing is not appropriate—as in the case of my fear that I will lose my job. Rather, the desire is not to be threatened or endangered. And here again, spectators do not flee, since they lack the appropriate beliefs to motivate flight. Charles does not believe that he is endangered, but only imagines it; and given this, his desire not to be threatened does not motivate flight. However, this desire, imagined to be frustrated, may express itself in his reactions: covering his eyes, flinching, moaning, and so forth. Charles may in addition desire to flee the Green Slime, but even then he is not motivated to flee it, since he knows that no action available to him could count as fleeing it, since he cannot physically remove himself from the Slime: it occupies a fictional space, distinct from the physical space he occupies, and no point of this physical space is closer or more distant from the Slime than any other. (He may of course flee the cinema, but this action counts as fleeing the image of the Slime, not the Slime itself.) So again, the motivational aspect of fear is constituted by the presence of a desire or wish; lack of the motivated action of flight may be explained by the absence of appropriate beliefs, not by the absence of the emotion. (Note that I have not maintained that motivated action invariably requires an appropriate belief as well as a desire—for Fred only imagines Fido to be dangerous, and this imagining, combined with his desire not to be endangered, is sufficient to motivate him to flee Fido. An imagining here takes the role of a belief in motivation; but—to anticipate the later discussion—this looks like it is an aspect of Fred’s irrationality, and that in rational persons, an appropriate belief is required together with a desire to motivate action. Since the present section discusses the possibility of fiction-directed emotions, I am assuming here that spectators of fictions are rational, so that if they lack the appropriate belief, they will
REASONS, EMOTIONS, AND FICTIONS 21
not be motivated to act. The rationality claim will be defended in the next section.) The irrealist may object that we do not genuinely pity fictional characters, for we have desires that require them to suffer. I do not genuinely pity Anna, since I want to read Anna Karenina because it is a great tragic novel, and Anna’s suffering is necessary to its being a tragedy. If someone produced a Bowdlerized version of the novel, in which Anna goes off to live happily ever after with Vronsky, I would not want to read it. So my feeling of pity is illusory: I really do want Anna to suffer. One can in general desire that some state of affairs occur, insofar as it has some property, and also desire that the same state of affairs not occur, insofar as it has a different property. I want to eat this chocolate cake insofar as it will taste delectable; I also want not to eat the chocolate cake insofar as it will make me fat. Having such conflicting desires is possible, indeed common, and not in the least irrational. Moreover, if I decide overall that the latter desire is the stronger, and I do not eat the cake, that does not show that the desire to eat the cake is not real or strong—it is, as witnessed by my pangs of regret as I reluctantly refuse a slice. In the same way, I may genuinely desire that Anna not suffer, insofar as she is loveable and the suffering is overall undeserved, while also desiring that Anna suffer, insofar as her suffering is a necessary constituent of a great novel. The greater strength of the latter desire does not prove that the former does not exist. So my desire that she not suffer, and my pity for her, are genuine (Neill 1993 gives a somewhat similar response). We have seen that irrealist arguments drawing on all three aspects of an emotion fail to show that we cannot have fiction-directed emotions. The realist replies in each case drew not just on discussion of fictional cases, but also crucially on non-fictional cases, such as emotions felt toward counterfactual cases, or to real life cases, and on emotions felt toward historical personages or toward contemporaries whom one cannot help. It emerged that it is not a requirement that one has an appropriate belief for one to have a genuine emotion, a mere imagining may suffice; and we also saw that the motivational aspect of an emotion can involve merely the presence of a wish or desire. And as we noted, the greater complexity of Walton’s make-believe account gives reason to prefer the realist account, if realism is at least as adequate an account of the phenomena. Realism is, in fact, a better account of the phenomena, being grounded on an antijudgmentalist theory of the cognitive aspect of emotions, and a better understanding of the motivational aspect of emotions. There are other irrealist accounts besides Walton’s. Most prominently, Currie has offered an account of make-believe emotions directed toward fictions, which holds that such states are simulated emotions; these are emotions which are running “off-line”, that is, without their normal connections to the input system of beliefs and the output system of actions (Currie 1990: chapter 5). Currie’s account has the advantage that it lacks some of the complexity of Walton’s, eschewing talk of quasi-emotions, for instance. But, in light of the account of
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emotions offered above, there is reason to deny that if an emotion is detached from its normal inputs and outputs, it is only a simulated emotion. Emotions can be detached from beliefs (Fido-type cases) or not motivate actions (Anne Boleyntype cases) while being perfectly genuine. More recently, Currie has suggested that the issue between realism and irrealism rests on little more than a verbal point about how one decides to employ emotion-terms (Currie 1997). Putting his point in the terminology adopted here, whether one uses emotion-terms so that an emotion requires a belief and a motivated action to exist, or a mere imagining and a desire, is a matter of an essentially verbal choice. However, even this reconciliationist approach is ruled out by the account defended above: for Currie’s proposal would make it merely an essentially verbal choice whether I say that I really pity Anne Boleyn, or Fred really fears Fido, yet as we have seen, there are good reasons to hold that both are genuine emotions. The rationality of fiction-directed emotions There is a related problem for realism, which is at least as pressing as that considered above. Suppose that the anti-judgmentalist is right about the nature of emotions, and that beliefs are not required for emotions to exist. Nevertheless, it looks plausible to hold that appropriate beliefs are required for emotions to be rational. Even if I can fear Fido without believing that he really is dangerous, it seems that for my fear of him to be rational, I must believe that he is dangerous. (I may have an irrational belief that he is dangerous, but if so, this is a case of theoretical irrationality, and the emotion itself is derivatively irrational by virtue of this theoretical irrationality.) If I say “I’m afraid of Fido, though he’s perfectly harmless” this may describe a possible state, but it also seems to be a selfconviction of irrationality. Yet, in the case of fiction-directed emotions, we do not believe that fictional entities exist, or are suffering, or are dangerous; and that seems to render these emotions irrational. For anyone who believes that our emotional engagement with fictions is valuable, this is not a welcome result. Moreover, though we argued against irrealist accounts, if it transpired that the cost of rejecting them were that spectators were systematically irrational, then a principle of charity in interpretation would come to bear. If we had to conclude that emotional responses to fictions were irrational, there would be a strong reason, given the pervasive nature and importance of such responses, to reinterpret them so that they were only imagined emotions, and hence to preserve the rationality of spectators’ responses to fictions. This would put pressure on the arguments of the last section, and it might be better to conclude that fictiondirected emotions are make-believe. We need first to say a little about what rationality is. In its most general characterization, rationality is a matter of sensitivity to reasons; specifically, it is a matter of being able to recognize reasons and respond appropriately to them. It covers reasons to believe (theoretical rationality), reasons for action (practical rationality), and reasons to feel (affective rationality), the latter being our
REASONS, EMOTIONS, AND FICTIONS 23
particular concern. There is a distinction between two standards of demandingness of rationality. Sometimes when we wonder what rational persons would believe, do, or feel, we wonder what they have most reason to believe, do, or feel. This requires the deliberator to bring to bear all relevant reasons in the appropriate domain, and this can be a very demanding task, far beyond the capacity of an ordinary person. If one wonders what one has most reason to believe about the truth of a particular mathematical proposition, one may have to engage in mathematical reasoning of a complexity that few can follow. Call this notion maximal rationality. When we call someone irrational, on the other hand, the accusation cannot be of failing to be maximally rational, for this would be an extremely demanding standard, given all of the reasons that are potentially relevant in any particular domain, and most people on most occasions might well be judged to be irrational by this standard. Rather, we must be adopting a lower standard in making this accusation: the irrational person is a person who fails to achieve some minimal standard of rationality. The reasons that he or she fails to recognize or to respond to appropriately would be those, which are readily graspable, being clear and evident. How to specify this notion more exactly is a moot issue, but for our present purposes, we need not attempt to do so. The main point is to distinguish these two standards of irrationality, and relatedly to note that not all failures to grasp reasons are instances of irrationality. Irrationalism How is the realist to respond to the claim that fiction-directed emotions are irrational? The most straightforward realist position is simply to embrace the objection, and to be an irrationalist about fiction-directed emotions. Emotional responses towards fictions are irrational, and charity should not lead us to deny that they occur. There are, after all, natural responses that are irrational: people tend to be systematically more optimistic about how well their lives will go than is epistemically warranted. And love, as Proust and Stendhal have made us well aware, can have many irrational aspects to it, involving projections of one’s hopes and fantasies onto the loved one, which may have little foundation in reality. But that is simply how love is, and it would be wrong to try to interpret away these features of our lives in the interest of ascribing greater rationality to ourselves. Similarly, perhaps we have a natural tendency to respond to fictions with real emotions, but this is nevertheless irrational. Something like this seems to have been Plato’s view in the Ion. Socrates says of the recitor of verses: There he is, at a sacrifice or festival, got up in holiday attire, adorned with golden chaplets, and he weeps, though he has lost nothing of his finery. Or he recoils with fear, standing in the presence of more than twenty thousand friendly people, though nobody is stripping him or doing him damage. Shall we say that the man is in his senses? Ion: Never, Socrates, upon my
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word. That is strictly true. Socrates: Now, then, are you aware that you produce the same effects in most of the spectators too? Ion: Yes, indeed, I know it very well. As I look down at them from the stage above, I see them, every time, weeping, casting terrible glances, stricken with amazement at the deeds recounted. (Plato 1961:535 d-e) Socrates, then, does not doubt the reality of fear and sorrow in these cases: he simply thinks that they are irrational. Radford’s preferred response to the problem also seems to be a version of irrationalism (Radford 1975). The emotional realist can hold that fiction-directed emotions are real, but irrational, and fall into a class of other real but frequently irrational emotions or attitudes. However, this response is not very plausible. First, the claim is extremely counterintuitive, since all instances of emotions directed toward fiction would have to be held to be irrational, since we always lack the requisite evaluative and existential beliefs about fictions. It is not that the responses sometimes err in being irrational (as is the case with optimism and love); they always so err. And these responses are a core part of our general response to fictions, so that it is likely that almost every response to fiction would be tainted by irrationality. This is hard to accept. Second, the objection from the principle of charity cannot be easily evaded. For emotional irrealism, as we have seen, has a story to tell about how imagined emotions have affective features that explain why we confuse them with real emotions; the account provides an error theory of why a spectator might falsely conclude that he really is afraid. And since that error theory is not wildly implausible, a principle of charity points toward the conclusion that emotional irrealism is correct. In contrast, it is much more implausible to interpret away the irrational aspects of optimism and love—wild optimists are not experiencing quasi-optimism, and people irrationally in love are not experiencing merely quasilove. The pressure exerted by charity in favor of reinterpretation is much greater in the fiction case, so irrationalism should not seek shelter in the occurrence of irrational responses in real life. A final problem with the irrationalist line is that claiming that fiction-directed emotions are irrational leaves us with the difficulty of making some of the discriminations required in assessing viewers’s responses to works. Suppose you fear some dreadful monster in a horror film, but Bertie fears an innocent victim in that film; Bertie’s fear is irrational, in a way that your fear is not. But if all emotions directed toward fictions were irrational, we could not make this sort of discrimination. Yet, we clearly can, do and ought to make such discriminations, so we are not and ought not to be irrationalists.
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Control The realist might hold that the reason why fear of Fido is irrational has nothing to do with the absence of an evaluative belief, so the absence of this belief does not tend to show that fear of Dracula is also irrational. Rather, the crucial difference between the two cases lies in relation to the control that subjects have over the respective emotions. Fred’s neurotic fear of Fido is something he cannot control: he sees Fido and is consumed with fear. But Charles, watching the Green Slime, can control his fear: he can turn his attention away from it, thus abolishing his fear; nor does the fear overwhelm him. It is lack of emotional control that makes Fred’s fear irrational, not lack of an evaluative belief. However, it cannot be lack of control that makes an emotion irrational. For consider my terror of the pit-bull terrier that is howling ravenously and unrestrainedly in front of me. My fear is out of my control, but it is also completely rational: I may be about to be viciously attacked. Moreover, the control criterion will not invariably separate fictional from nonfictional cases, since emotions felt toward real situations can sometimes be as much under our control as are emotions felt toward fictions. Fred may well be able to remove his fear of Fido by avoiding Fido and not thinking about him. In just the same way, Charles may decide that the horror film has got too grisly, close his eyes, and think of something pleasantly soothing. Strategies for coping with fear, by diverting one’s attention to something else and engaging with pleasant thoughts, are equally available in both cases. Lack of control is in fact more likely to be explained by experiencing an extremely powerful emotion, whether produced by a fictional or nonfictional situation—the power of the response temporarily robs one of one’s ordinary coping abilities for dealing with emotions. Aspectual criteria The correct solution to the problem, I propose, begins by acknowledging the complexity of emotional states, with their three aspects of the motivational, cognitive, and affective. Given this complexity, it would be surprising if the criteria for rationality (in the minimal sense of not being irrational) were not similarly complex, and related to these three aspects of an emotion. The cognitive criterion There is a salient difference between Fred’s fear of Fido and Charles’s fear of the Green Slime—Fred believes that Fido exists (even though he does not believe that he is dangerous), but Charles does not believe in the existence of the Green Slime. This difference looks like a plausible reason for why Charles’s fear is rational, and Fred’s is not. So consider this criterion:
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(C1) the rationality of fear of objects believed to exist requires one to believe that they are dangerous; and the rationality of fear of objects merely imagined to exist requires one (correctly) to imagine that they are dangerous.1 Fred believes that Fido exists, but he does not believe that he is dangerous, hence his fear is irrational. Charles only imagines that the Green Slime exists, but he correctly imagines it as dangerous, hence his fear of it is rational in this respect. And the criterion is not ad hoc: the distinction in the rationality criterion derives from the difference in the cognitive states of imagination and belief. The criterion also gives the correct answer about Bertie, who fears not the evidently vicious monster, but the evidently harmless victim in a horror film (she bears a strong resemblance to his aged aunt, of whom he is terrified). In the case of fictions, a large part of what makes it correct to imagine that someone is the victim, and not the monster, is laid down by the internal norms of the fiction—by what the artists made fictional by their actions. Given these norms, Bertie has imagined incorrectly. The criterion is general: it draws the distinction not between fictional and reallife cases, but between cognitive states, which are imaginings, whether or not they are associated with fictions, and cognitive states, which are beliefs. Incorrectness in imagining is possible not just for fictions that are generated by an author independently of the audience, but also for self-generated imaginings, because incorrectness can be fixed by the implicit prescriptions governing such imaginings. Imagining a calm and peaceful scene on a beach, I am suddenly struck by fear of the passing shadows of children, even though these children are in no way dangerous in my fantasy. That counts as an irrational fear. And contrast the rational fear of what might have happened had Hitler won the Second World War with the fear of what would have happened had Italy won the 1974 World Cup. The latter fear isn’t rational, unless I have ancillary imaginings that would make the team dangerous—such as that they were really a terrorist organization planning to blow up the stadium after they had won. The criterion thus yields intuitively correct results; but it may seem vulnerable to objections. First, consider Frank, who has no neurotic fears of Fido, but instead decides to play a game of make-believe featuring the trusty old dog, in which he imagines Fido to have the temperament of a maddened Rottweiler on speed, and to possess not his actual toothless old gums, but glinting dental machinery with which to effect his murderous dispositions on the hapless Frank. Frank, imagining Fido thus, is terrified. On the cognitive criterion, since Frank believes that Fido exists, for his fear of Fido to be rational, he should believe that Fido is dangerous. But he doesn’t. So his fear of Fido counts as irrational. But surely his fear may be perfectly rational: perhaps Frank is a psychotherapist, and is trying to figure out what it is like to be gripped by fear. In this scenario, what is the intentional object of Frank’s fear? Not Fido as he actually is: for, knowing that he is playing a game of make-believe, Frank’s feelings about the real Fido may (and should) not have changed in the least: Frank
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may pat and stroke Fido without the slightest tremor when he steps out of his game. Rather, it is the make-believe Fido that he fears, he of the terrible temperament and the deadly fangs. Since this Fido is a merely imagined being, he can rationally fear him according to the cognitive criterion. Contrast this with Fred’s neurotic fear of Fido. What makes it possible for Fred to fear Fido is that he imagines the dog to be dangerous, even though he does not believe that he is. In seeing him as dangerous, he may imagine him as having the vicious temperament and deadly capacities that Frank imagines him to possess in the game. But the difference in the case of the phobia is that Fred fears the actual Fido: he shrinks from his touch, he goes clammy at the sight of him. The intentional object of Fred’s neurotic fear is actual-Fido, whom he believes to exist: but the intentional object of Frank’s rational fear in the game is imaginedFido. (It is possible, of course, that as a causal consequence of his imaginings, Frank might come to fear the actual Fido, for instance, fearing him outside the game; he is then irrational on the cognitive criterion; and that is correct, for in this case he has induced Fred’s irrational phobia in himself) There is a close connection to another case here. Suppose I meet Tom Cruise, who plays Dracula in a film, at a party, and on seeing his warm smile and outstretched hand, I cringe with fear and shrink from his touch. What I have reason to fear is Dracula, not Cruise—Dracula is imaginary, and given the properties ascribed to him in the film, it is correct to imagine him as dangerous. If the intentional object of my fear is however Cruise, my fear is irrational, for I believe that Cruise exists and is not dangerous. I am irrational because I have confused fictional persons with real ones, and the responses appropriate toward fiction are in this case inappropriate when directed at reality. A similar scenario can be constructed for pity: I may irrationally pity an actress who played the part of Tess of the D’Urbervilles. Second, it may be objected that this solution actually shows that we are no longer dealing with the same emotion directed toward objects imagined to exist and believed to exist, and therefore in the former case perhaps the emotion itself is only imagined. For if the rationality-conditions differ in the two cases, then the emotions must differ too: since mental states are normative, any mental state is constituted by a specification of those conditions under which it is rational. However, consider the case of belief: belief is rational (justified) with respect to mathematical statements only when these are proved a priori; but for statements about the number of chairs in a room, attempting to ground them a priori would be irrational. So the rationality-conditions for belief are distinct in the two kinds of cases. Nevertheless, “belief” means just the same when belief is about a priori propositions as when it is about a posteriori ones. So the distinction in the rationality-conditions between emotions directed toward entities only imagined to exist and towards entities believed to exist does not show that there are two different kinds of emotions involved. Moreover, the difference in the rationalityconditions need not be traced to a difference in the emotion: the
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difference can be traced to a difference in the mode of cognition of their objects, that is, to whether they are imagined or believed to exist. The motivational criterion Suppose that you imagine ghosts to exist, you imagine them as dangerous (correctly, given their well-known propensities), and you fear them. You don’t believe that the ghosts exist or are dangerous; so in respect of the cognitive criterion, your fear is rational (i.e. not irrational). But are you really rational? You might be—like Frank, you might be engaged in a project of imaginative understanding, and want to grasp what is going on in the minds of the ghostfearing tribe that you are currently living with and studying, without irrationally holding their beliefs. But suppose that you are so caught up in this imaginative project, that you start looking in the dark corners of your room for signs of ghostly inhabitancy, huddle under your bed when you hear rumbling noises from outside, and so on. At that point, you have slipped into irrationality, because you are now engaged in trying to avoid those non-existent ghosts; but you have not violated the cognitive criterion. (In respect of the two ways you were fearing ghosts, before you were like Charles, watching the horror film, and you were rational; now you are like a spectator who flees screaming from the cinema, trying to get away from the Slime.) So there must be a further criterion for rationality, concerning motivations. If you actually believed that ghosts exist and are dangerous, your glances under the bed would not count as irrational (though your beliefs probably would). So your fear counts as irrational by virtue of its motivating actions to avoid ghosts, even though you have no motivation-relevant beliefs—in this case, that ghosts exist and are dangerous. And this suggests a motivational criterion: (C2) an emotion is irrational if it motivates action, though its subject lacks motivation-relevant beliefs. Motivation-relevant beliefs are those that ascribe the relevant evaluative property to the object of the emotion (e.g. believing that something is dangerous, in the case of fear) or those that concern the possibility of the subject acting toward the evaluated object (e.g. believing that one can do something to help, in the case of pity). This criterion also picks out a further aspect of Fred’s irrationality. Fred is motivated to flee Fido, though he lacks the belief that Fido endangers him. So he is motivated to act by his desire not to be endangered and his vivid imagining that he is endangered. As I noted earlier, motivated action requires not necessarily desire and belief, but desire and some cognitive state, which may be an imagining, that ascribes the evaluative property to an object. And I also suggested that if the motivation to flee in the case of fear were present, though the belief about being endangered were not, then that would show that the motivation is irrational. So it is with Fred: his motivation is irrational, since he lacks the belief
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(about being endangered) that would rationalize it. His fear violates the motivational criterion. Frank’s emotion in contrast is not irrational, since he also lacks the belief, and is not motivated to flee Fido. Is the motivational criterion tenable? First, it may seem that it sits badly with the cognitive criterion, since it renders it otiose. What makes Fred’s response to Fido irrational is not his emotions, it might be objected, but what he is motivated to do: run away from him. If like Charles in the fiction case, Fred were not motivated to flee, then whatever his emotional state, he would be rational. Appeal to the cognitive criterion is unnecessary. But even if Fred were not motivated to flee by his fear of Fido, his fear would still be irrational, since he has no reason to fear the dog. Emotions involve evaluative thoughts, and the rationality of these thoughts can be assessed independently of the motivations, which they ground in certain circumstances. This can also be true of responses to nonfictions: if I pity the Nazis, and not their victims, while knowing that it is the victims, not the Nazis, who suffered, then my pity is irrational, even though I am not motivated to help either group, since I know they are beyond the reach of my actions. The motivational criterion cannot do all the work. Second, people watching a horror film may flinch, moan, go pale, shiver, and so on; these are actions motivated by fear. Since spectators do not believe that they are threatened, these motivated actions will count as irrational on the motivational criterion. But they are the natural accompaniments of fear, and hard to suppress. So almost all fear would count as irrational on this criterion—and the same will apply mutatis mutandis to other emotions by virtue of their natural accompaniments. We should distinguish between expressive and goal-directed actions. The activity just mentioned, insofar as it involves actions and not merely involuntary behavior, is expressive activity, the natural bodily and behavioral tendencies of the emotion. Goal-directed actions in contrast aim at some end cognized by the agent, and the actions seek to achieve that end. So contrast the case of blanching and shivering at the Green Slime, with the case where I carefully check under my cinema seat for signs of ectoplasmic goo adhering to it. The latter action is irrational, the former not. The motivational criterion should be understood to govern actions insofar as they are goal-directed, and not insofar as they are simply expressive. The affective criterion Suppose that I believe (correctly) that I am in considerable danger of losing my job; this motivates me to do what I can to avoid losing it. Cognitively and motivationally, my fear is rational. But I am tormented by the prospect of losing my job, I brood on it and suffer immensely, though none of this affects my job performance. I am suffering to no point, and the emotion is irrational, yet it passes the cognitive and motivational tests. So we need a further criterion, which governs the affective (or more broadly evaluative) dimension of an emotion:
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(C3) an occurrence of an emotion is irrational if experiencing it involves suffering to no point. This criterion is supported by a wide range of cases. It governs not just actual, but also imagined situations, or what we might call “negative fantasies”. Suppose that I am very prone to torment myself with fear and dread by imagining myself being roundly humiliated whenever I meet people for the first time. I imagine suitably luridly embarrassing and humiliating scenarios, though I am not motivated to avoid meeting people because of this. On the cognitive and motivational criteria, my fear is rational. Yet, it is in fact irrational: there is no point to this self-torment, and I ought to stop it. So the affective criterion correctly governs these kinds of cases. Note in contrast that if I am prone instead to engage in positive, pleasant fantasies, the warm feelings that I have toward them do not seem irrational at all. The affective criterion also explains an aspect of the irrationality of phobias: one reason we hold them to be irrational is because they are disabling in various ways—the person in the grip of the phobia suffers, and he or she is prevented from performing otherwise worthwhile activities (such as going outside, or meeting people, or enjoying the pleasures of canine company). Some instances of suffering are worthwhile because they have a point (one may believe them to be character-improving, for instance). But these cases are not like that: this is suffering without a point. And the affective criterion provides yet another reason why we deem Frank’s encounters with Fido to be rational and Fred’s not. Frank, if he feels intense fear, may suffer; but his suffering has a point, for it allows him to understand his patients better; Fred’s suffering in contrast has no point—indeed, it prevents him from enjoying time with that loveable old hound. One might suppose that some kind of proportionality criterion would do the job better here—a criterion that holds, for instance, that one ought to feel greater fear the more in danger one is in. But that is too crude. If I am climbing an extremely dangerous mountain, I have reason not to feel a very high degree of fear, since that might be so distracting that my climb is rendered even more dangerous. Fear presumably has as its point the preservation of the subject who fears; yet in this case, feeling it in proportion to the danger might well make my preservation less likely. This fear not only has no point, it undermines the point of having fear itself. We should understand the “has no point” criterion as also including the case where the suffering undermines the point of the emotion itself. Finally, note that the pointlessness must, according to the general constraint on minimal rationality stated earlier, be clear and evident. If it transpired, for instance, that feeling certain emotions, such as jealousy, were always prone to produce psychic damage with no compensating advantage, then it would not necessarily follow that feeling jealous is always irrational—the invariably damaging nature of jealousy might not be clear and evident, but might be discoverable only via complex empirical work in psychology. In such cases, the ability to see this would
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be more like the ability to grasp complex mathematical reasons; and failure to recognize them would not count as an instance of irrationality. I have argued that there are at least three criteria for emotional rationality, each associated with a particular aspect of what it is to be an emotion. Violation of any of them grounds a charge of irrationality, in the sense of a failure to be even minimally rational. Perhaps this is not a complete list of criteria; for even if each is associated with an aspect of an emotion, it does not follow that each aspect has only one criterion associated with it. And there may be ways to finesse and refine the particular criteria that I have offered. Recall too that these criteria are only meant to capture minimal rationality: if one asks what a maximally rational emotional response requires, then that will require a different and more demanding answer (quite plausibly appealing to something like Aristotle’s phronimos). Nevertheless, these three criteria do capture, at least in outline, a large part of our reasons for holding occurrences of emotions to be irrational. And it is clear that fictiondirected emotions can be rational according to each of these criteria. Charles can really feel fear: he correctly imagines the Slime as dangerous; he is not motivated to flee the Slime, since he does not believe that it is dangerous; and he is not suffering to no point (indeed he is likely to be enjoying the experience). Fictiondirected emotions can be rational according to a general set of criteria that govern the rationality conditions of emotions both toward situations believed to exist and toward situations that are merely imagined. That being so, we have shown that realism is correct. Comparisons I conclude by comparing the solution offered here with three other recent solutions to the paradox of fiction, due to Alex Neill, Derek Matravers, and Richard Joyce, briefly displaying the advantages of the present account over theirs. Neill adopts a judgmentalist version of the cognitive-evaluative theory of the emotions (however, he says at one point that emotions require one to adopt a perspective on something, which may be a concession to the anti-judgmentalist view—see Neill 1993:4). However, he maintains that the belief necessary for the existence of the emotion need not be belief that its object has the appropriate evaluative property, but may be instead belief that it is fictional that its object has that property. The latter condition allows it to be possible to fear for or pity a fictional character. But fear for oneself is not possible, since one neither believes, for instance, that one is threatened by Dracula, nor does one believe that it is fictional that one is so threatened, since one knows that nothing fictional can threaten a real person (there is an “ontological gap” between fiction and reality, preventing cross-world action). Moreover, the reason that one does not flee Dracula is that the desire to flee from something requires either that one believe that one is threatened by it, or that one believe that it is fictional that one is
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threatened by it; but neither of these is the case. Hence Charles can stay firmly in his seat, despite the marauding Green Slime. The main problems with this account derive from its judgmentalist account of the emotions. As Fido and the other cases demonstrate, it is not necessary for an emotion to exist that one have the relevant belief—Fred does not believe that Fido is dangerous; nor does he believe that it’s a fiction that Fido is dangerous (indeed, that thought would be a source of comfort to him). Also, Fred has a desire to flee Fido, and indeed may act on that desire, even though he lacks both of the beliefs just mentioned. It is possible for action to be motivated by a desire and an imagining, not a desire and a belief—the latter, as noted earlier, is a condition for the rationality of the motivation, not for its possibility. Moreover, there is no good reason to deny the possibility of fear for oneself. When the Slime stares out of the screen at Charles, it is fictional that the Slime threatens him (this is akin to a theatrical aside). The case is unusual, since fictional characters do not generally perform such asides, but when they do so, imagining that one is threatened is prescribed, and hence it is fictional that one is threatened. So it is correct to believe that it is fictional that one is threatened, and hence even on Neill’s account it should be appropriate for one to feel fear. But there is a subtler worry: in such cases, it seems that it cannot be myself for whom I fear, since it is not true that the Slime threatens me, but at most it threatens my fictional or possible counterpart (I, as I exist in the fictional world) (Neill 1992: 96). However, this is, in fact, sufficient for fear for oneself. For consider a case where I narrowly avoid skidding in my car, and afterwards fear what might have happened to me, had I hit that tree. Here, one might insist that strictly speaking, it is a possible counterpart of myself for whom I fear (myself when I hit the tree), rather than myself as I actually am (unharmed). But nevertheless we speak quite naturally and appropriately of such a case as one in which I fear for myself. My concern for myself includes not just myself as I am, but also myself under various possible circumstances. I do not cease to care for myself merely because certain of my properties alter, for example, I get older. Hence when we talk of selfconcern, this includes concern for possible counterparts of ourselves, and so there is no reason to deny that I am afraid for myself when I contemplate myself in various possible situations. Matravers in contrast to Neill endorses anti-judgmentalism; and he also notes that the inability to act toward historical figures shows that lack of motivated action does not undermine the existence of fiction-directed emotions (Matravers 1998: chapters 3 and 4). These are, as we have seen, central parts of the solution. But Matravers in addition embraces as a core part of his solution the report model for fiction—the claim that the appropriate game we play with a work of fiction is to imagine it as a narrated documentary representation, which is non-transparent (i.e. whose function is not solely to produce belief in its audience). But the report model is unnecessary, since, as we have seen, anti-judgmentalism and the motivational point are all that are required to defend realism. The report model is also deeply problematic, and false of many fictions, particularly cinematic ones. Its
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truth would require that every fiction film have a narrator, and be fictionally a documentary. Yet, most films do not have narrators (even implicit, visual ones); and to suppose that they are fictionally documentaries would require bizarre imaginings about why, say, the couple making love privately in the room do not notice that there is a film crew in the room with them, or how a modern camera crew can be filming in, say, an ancient Roman amphitheatre (is this a time-travel movie?). Responses open to supporters of the report model are available, but they are flawed, and the model should be rejected (Gaut forthcoming). Joyce (2000) distinguishes clearly between the problems of the possibility of fiction-directed emotions and their rationality. He solves the former by adopting an anti-judgmentalist view (though he does not confront the problems due to lack of motivated actions). The rationality puzzle he addresses by distinguishing between emotions that we do not control, which if counterproductive are phobias, and emotions, which are under our control, and these he holds are common in the case of fiction-directed emotions. Emotions under our control are subject to the norms of instrumental rationality, so they are rational if subjects are justified in believing that having them serves their interests. Since fiction provides valuable experiences in respect both of pleasure and of providing us with opportunities to learn, having fiction-directed emotions can be rational. Joyce’s criterion is related in part to the affective criterion developed earlier, since it is sensitive to the question of whether an emotion is in a certain way counterproductive. And his argument that it is not necessarily the absence of belief that makes something a phobia (since phobias can be founded on irrational beliefs as well) is well taken. But his instrumentalist solution fails. Suppose that you offer me a large sum of money, in order that (via the processes of active imagination) I induce in myself a serious fear of doorknobs. I succeed in doing this, and will not touch doorknobs, shrink away when I see one, and so on. My production of the emotion in myself was instrumentally rational (I gained something to my benefit), but the emotion itself is still irrational. It violates, for instance, the motivational criterion—I am motivated to avoid doorknobs, even though I do not believe they are dangerous (or if I do believe they are dangerous, my fear is derivatively irrational, as being founded on an irrational belief). So it can be instrumentally rational to induce in oneself an emotion that is irrational. Joyce’s account suffers from the same general defect as the other two just examined—it seeks to provide one simple criterion for a complex phenomenon, and so ends up in oversimplifying the rationality constraints to which emotions are subject. Realization of the complexity of these constraints is the key to seeing how fictiondirected emotions can be rational. Acknowledgments Ancestors of this chapter were delivered at the Universities of Aarhus, Oslo, Toronto, and Wisconsin, Madison; a more recent version was presented at the
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Imagination and the Arts conference. I am grateful to participants at all of these occasions for their questions and comments, as well as to Patricia Greenspan and Jerrold Levinson. Note 1 The proposal, of course, generalizes: for each emotion, one should substitute in the formula the evaluative property, which individuates that emotion—for pity, suffering; for anger, having been wronged, and so on. Note that in some instances of phobias the subject may have irrational beliefs about the feared object, which he believes to exist; in these cases, the phobic fear would pass the cognitive criterion, but the emotion would be derivatively irrational; that is, the fear would be irrational by virtue of being grounded on an irrational belief. A related criterion has also been suggested by Eva Dadlez (Dadlez 1996). However, she holds that it is a necessary condition for an emotion to be irrational that it be directed at a real object; but this is not correct, as the cases of Bertie and of the fear of ghosts show.
2 HOW I REALLY FEEL ABOUT JFK Stacie Friend
Here are some unsurprising responses to works of fiction: pitying Anna Karenina and feeling sad at her death; hoping that Strether remains in Paris and experiencing disappointment when he leaves; admiring Mr Smith and feeling suspense while he filibusters on the Senate floor. Common as they are, however, these reactions are puzzling: how is it possible for us to be moved emotionally by characters we know do not exist and events we know never transpired? It would appear impossible, or at least highly irrational, for you to pity my sister if you believe I do not have one, or to be angry with me for selling your trousers if you do not believe that I did. So it would seem that we ordinarily take beliefs to be requisite to our experiencing certain emotions—which makes our responses to fiction that much more difficult to comprehend. The most well-known and controversial solution to this paradox of fiction is Kendall Walton’s. According to Walton, because our pity of Anna—to take one example—does not involve belief, it is not genuine pity, but rather make-believe or imagined or, in Walton’s preferred terminology, quasi-pity (Walton 1978, 1990). On the face of it, this claim is rather unintuitive: my pity does not feel any less genuine than my pity of actual people, and I am not pretending to have an emotion the way an actor might do. But in spite of what some critics assume, Walton is not making the patently implausible claim that readers of Anna Karenina are faking their pity or pretending to feel pity, or that their experience must be less intense than genuine pity, or that they have conscious control over their emotions, or that they are not experiencing anything at all. To the contrary, Walton agrees that readers experience something essentially related to pity; what he denies is that this something is full-fledged pity. Even so, Walton’s opponents argue that we can resolve the paradox of fiction while preserving the intuition that our response to Anna is ordinary, run-of-the-mill pity; and they claim that retaining this intuition explains more than Walton’s approach. In my view, the arguments of Walton’s opponents depend on idiosyncratic features of examples involving purely fictional characters like Anna Karenina. Although the debate is usually couched in terms of such characters, the same basic problem arises when the individuals represented in fiction are real. We might detest Richard III as Shakespeare portrays him, even though we do not believe that this portrayal is accurate; and we might hope for the success of the Apollo 13
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mission in Ron Howard’s film, even though we know that it failed in reality. It would be a mistake, then, to assume that the paradox of fiction arises only when the objects of our emotions do not exist: what is really at issue is the fact that we respond emotionally to fiction in ways that are not explained by our beliefs, but instead by what we imagine. That this is the crux of the paradox of fiction becomes clear only when we consider fictions about real persons and events. And I contend that once we turn our attention to these cases, Walton’s theory proves significantly more explanatory than the opposition. I defend this claim through an examination of our emotional responses to the real-life characters of Oliver Stone’s movie JFK, arguing that unless we draw a distinction between emotions along Walton’s lines, we cannot explain central features of our engagement with the fiction. In particular, I will argue that the distinction proposed by Walton accounts for important facts about cognitive organization that are easy to overlook when the debate over the paradox of fiction focuses on invented characters. In the opening section I outline the debate between Walton and his critics, whom after Noël Carroll I designate as thought theorists (Carroll 1990). Both Walton and the thought theorist accept the general thesis of cognitivism, according to which emotions essentially involve propositionally contentful states. In what follows I assume the truth of cognitivism; what is at issue in my chapter is the debate between narrow cognitivists such as Walton who maintain that the contentful state must be a belief, and broad cognitivists such as Carroll who deny this. I then take up JFK, arguing that the thought theory cannot resolve the apparent conflict between my emotions in response to the film and my emotions based on what I believe about the real people and events it depicts. I argue that Walton’s approach better explains the fact that my belief-involving emotions take priority in my cognitive life—a priority necessary to maintain rationality. I next consider and reject the reply that conflicts between my emotions can be avoided if we accept that my responses to the film are directed, not at the real people portrayed, but instead at fictional characters. Finally, I suggest that the priority of belief-involving emotions, and with it their claim to be the only genuine emotions, derives from their place at the foundations of practical reasoning. Puzzle and pretense Walton’s solution to the paradox of fiction cannot be understood in isolation from his more general theory of make-believe. Starting from examples of novels, plays, films, paintings, and sculptures, Walton aims to construct a theory of what he calls representational art or fiction. Walton defines a work of fiction as a work whose function it is to act as props in certain games of make-believe. The connection with children’s games of make-believe, where the props may be dolls and toy trucks, is intentional; for Walton there is continuity between the two types of games. The idea is that works of fiction are designed to prescribe imaginings about their content, and imagining what is prescribed is participating in the game of
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make-believe authorized by the work. What we are supposed to imagine is what is “true in the fiction”. We must agree that works of fiction are not created so that we can register that such-and-such is the case in some distant fictional world; rather, we are supposed to engage imaginatively with them, making believe that the events narrated really have taken place, that the people described really do exist, and so on. On Walton’s theory our imaginings about the content of the work are generated by the more basic games of make-believe we play with fictional representations, which involve imagining about ourselves. Specifically, we imagine that in engaging with the fiction we are learning about actual fact, and we respond to the fictional events from within this pretense. In reading Crime and Punishment, for example, we imagine ourselves to be reading a nonfiction report of actual events, thereby generating fictional truths about our own experiences. In particular, we imagine, of our reading the novel, that this very experience counts as learning about actual people and situations. Similarly, according to Walton, in looking at a bust of Napoleon, we imagine, of our seeing the bust, that this very experience counts as looking at Napoleon. Our psychological, emotional, physical, and verbal responses within the scope of these imaginings all constitute aspects of our participation in the relevant games of make-believe. Suppose I find myself pitying Hardy’s Tess because Angel rejects her. I am perfectly aware that there are no such people as Tess Durbeyfield and Angel Clare, and no such event as Angel’s rejection of Tess. Nonetheless, it is clear that Tess of the d’Urbervilles prescribes that I imagine that there are such people and that Angel rejected Tess. I imagine, of my reading the novel, that I am learning about these real people and their situations. Within the context of so imagining, I learn that Tess has been rejected; in reality, of course, this is not the case. Still, my imagining is sufficiently vivid that I have a sinking sensation, tears well up, I find it hard to turn the page. Facts about my real feelings—specifically, the psychological and physical state I am in due to my imagining that Angel rejected Tess, which Walton terms quasi-pity—make it fictionally the case that I pity Tess; from a perspective outside the game of make-believe, however, this experience is not genuine pity. Just as it is the fact that I (really) read a novel that makes it fictionally the case that I read a nonfiction report, it is the fact that I (really) experience quasi-pity that makes it fictionally the case that I experience pity. And because it is only fictionally the case that I am reading a true report or that Angel mistreats Tess—the imaginings that explain my quasi-pity—it is only fictionally the case that I pity her. As even this brief overview indicates, Walton’s introduction of quasi-emotions is a natural consequence of his theory of make-believe. While the theory is by no means uncontroversial, it is commonly accepted that the concept of make-believe is central to the institution of fiction, and that we can understand truth-in-fiction as prescriptions to make-believe or imagine the content of the work. That is, Walton’s critics agree that I imagine, rather than believe, that in reading Tess of the d’Urbervilles I am learning about actual events such as Angel’s rejection of Tess.
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At the same time, however, they think that my emotional response to reading the fiction is genuine compassion. By contrast, Walton argues that because this response is based on what I imagine rather than what I believe, it cannot be genuine compassion. Walton’s defense of this claim appeals to a particular version of cognitivism about the emotions (Walton 1990:200–4). According to cognitivism, a propositionally contentful state constitutes an essential component of an emotion and partially individuates it. This cognitive component is what distinguishes emotions from mere “feelings”, which are just affective states. In paradigmatic cases, the cognitive component of an emotion is a belief: in pity the belief that someone has suffered, in fear the belief that one is in danger, and so on. At least some of these emotional states also have a particular affective component, involving phenomenological and physiological responses, as well as associations with action: for example, fear usually involves a feeling of anxiety and an increase in heart rate and perspiration, along with a desire to flee whatever is feared. The complex of these aspects is what makes the emotion the emotion it is. Although there is general agreement that in the central cases the cognitive component of an emotion is a belief, consensus diminishes when we come to the question of whether the belief-requirement is conceptually necessary. Narrow cognitivists such as Walton argue that for a particular experience to count as, say, genuine pity, the propositional content that someone has undeservedly suffered must be believed. One reason for adopting this view is the connection between belief and the sort of motivational force that would lead to action: one will not desire to help without believing that there has been undeserved suffering. Another reason is the observation that we typically assess emotions as irrational when they are not explained by a belief: no matter how vividly I imagine that my friend Eric stole my watch, it would be irrational to yell at him. Even if one rejects the constitutive claim of cognitivism—that a propositional attitude is literally a component of an emotion—it remains the case that my imagining Eric to be a thief provides no explanation for genuine anger. By contrast, neither feature seems to apply to emotions in response to fiction: our “pity” of Tess has no motivational force, nor do we count ourselves irrational in spite of the lack of belief; in other words, the response departs substantially from what we ordinarily expect of the emotion. In spite of these considerations, there remains a conviction that our emotional responses to fiction are no different in kind from the emotions we experience in at least some other contexts. Thought theorists therefore reject narrow cognitivism, holding that if an emotion involves a cognitive component—in the case of pity a thought or proposition with a content like “that person is suffering undeservedly”—this thought could be entertained, supposed, imagined, or whatever, and the emotion would still count as genuine pity. Noël Carroll contrasts a belief, which is “a proposition held in the mind as asserted” with a (mere) thought, which is “a matter of entertaining a proposition in the mind
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unasserted,” as when we suppose or imagine that something is the case (Carroll 1997:209). Moreover, it seems to be indisputable that emotions can be engendered in the process of holding propositions before the mind unasserted. While cutting vegetables, imagine putting the very sharp knife in your hand into your eye. One suddenly feels a shudder. You need not believe that you are going to put the knife into your eye. Indeed, you know that you are not going to do this. Yet merely entertaining the thought, or the propositional content of the thought (that I am putting this knife into my eye), can be sufficient for playing the role in causing a tremor of terror. For emotions may rest on thoughts and not merely upon beliefs. (Carroll 1997:209) Thus, on the thought theory, there is nothing out of the way in our terror at the merely imagined thought of plunging a knife into our eye; and similarly, there is nothing problematic in taking our pity of Tess to be genuine even though we know there is no such person who suffered. But Walton can simply accept Carroll’s contention that in both cases, our response is caused by something we imagine; establishing a causal relationship is still insufficient to show that the resultant state is an emotion. Because Carroll agrees that “a central component of the emotions is a cognitive state” (Carroll 1997:209), if one’s “shudder” or “tremor of terror” is to count as a full-fledged emotion Carroll must demonstrate that the propositional content imagined constitutes a component of the experience. A causal connection does not fulfill this task. There are, however, clearer cases of genuine emotions where beliefs or motivational force are lacking, which can be adduced by thought theorists as evidence against Walton. Thought theorists frequently invoke phobias: while Sally’s phobic fear of Fido is irrational because she does not believe that Fido poses any danger to her, it still counts as genuine fear. In response to this kind of example, Walton stresses the motivational component of the emotion, the fact that Sally always avoids Fido (Walton 1990:201–2). Thought theorists then point to our emotional responses to nonfiction representations: in these cases there is belief, but due to spatial or temporal distance no motivation to act. If something occurred a hundred years ago or a thousand miles away, we are as little capable of doing anything about it as we are in the case of fiction (Matravers 1998:69–73; Gaut, Chapter 1, this volume). Thought theorists conclude that if these responses, where one or another central component of an emotion is missing, nonetheless count as genuine examples of particular emotions, so should our responses to fiction. At this point the debate between Walton and the thought theorist seems merely to be a matter of terminology: one side wants to classify our response to Tess’s fictional plight as one among several species of the genus genuine pity, while acknowledging that it departs from the paradigm case involving belief; the
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other side takes this departure to be sufficient to classify the response as quasi-pity. Although much of the opposition to Walton’s theory apparently results from discomfort about the terminology, what matters is not the choice of label, but whether or not classifying the emotions one way or the other explains the phenomena we want to explain. After all, both Walton and the thought theorist agree in their basic description of our emotional responses to fiction: that these responses can have the same physiological and psychological profile as emotions that involve beliefs; that they do not involve beliefs, but only imaginings; and that they lack motivational force. Furthermore, Walton and the thought theorists agree that we need to draw a distinction between those cases where lack of belief entails irrationality, as with phobias, and those cases where lack of belief does not entail irrationality, as with responses to fiction. Walton has a simple explanation of the distinction: only full-fledged emotions require beliefs to be rational, while quasi-emotions do not. The thought theorist cannot have recourse to this explanation, for she maintains that both phobias and responses to fiction are species of genuine emotions. It is for this reason that once Berys Gaut (Chapter 1, this volume) has finished arguing that the emotions are genuine, he must then address the problem of how to explain why emotional responses to what we imagine are not irrational in the way phobias are. To understand the problem this poses for the thought theorist, let’s reconsider Carroll’s example. One reason that a causal connection between imagining putting a knife in one’s eye and a tremor of terror is insufficient to show that the result is an emotion is that causation is the paradigm of a nonrational relation. My reaction to this episode of imagining looks instead to be an involuntary physiological response, a response that provides no reason to stop cutting vegetables. Indeed, if I told you I had decided not to cut the vegetables on this basis, you would think I was either irrational or that I was deceptively trying to get out of cooking. By contrast, if I believed that I might suffer an epileptic seizure and really put the knife into my eye, I would be irrational, given the risk, to cut the vegetables. Carroll, like Gaut, must provide some additional explanation of the fact that although I am genuinely terrified in both cases, I am rational to continue cutting when my terror results from what I imagine, while I would be irrational to continue cutting when my terror results from what I believe. This whole approach misses the virtue of Walton’s account. Walton’s invocation of quasi-emotions is designed, not primarily to stress the differences between these experiences and genuine emotions, but rather to stress the essential connection between them. If we take ordinary, belief-based pity and what Walton calls quasi-pity both to be full-fledged emotions in their own right, we have to start explaining why they differ in central respects, for example, why only one kind is irrational when belief is lacking. If, on the other hand, we take quasi-pity to have the relationship to real pity that Walton suggests, we can see just how they are connected. On Walton’s theory, one genuinely experiences a certain emotional state, involving an imagined content and just those physical and
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psychological features that characterize genuine pity, and one imagines of that experience that it is an experience of genuine pity. Again, this construal follows from Walton’s overall account of our experience of fictions. One genuinely reads a novel, and one imagines of one’s reading the novel that it is reading a true report. One genuinely sees a picture of an elephant, and one imagines of one’s seeing the picture that it is seeing an actual elephant. Put more concisely, one “imaginatively sees a real elephant”. In Chapter 1 Gaut suggests a reason for rejecting this approach to emotions. Addressing a puzzle about how we can learn through imagination, he proposes that having actual emotions toward imagined situations can help us learn what we ought to do. If we accept that our imaginative engagement with fiction gives rise to genuine emotions, Gaut says, we can explain our learning as a case of education through actual experience. Presumably, Walton’s insistence that we do not experience genuine emotions in response to fiction leaves him faced with the puzzle. It is not clear to me why describing my experience in reading Tess of the d’Urbervilles as “genuine pity toward an imagined person” provides a better explanation of how we learn than describing it as “imagined pity toward a real person”, given that the phenomenology of the latter is exactly the same as the former. What is clear, however, is that Gaut’s construal is unavailable when we consider our responses to works of fiction about real people. As a result, I will argue, such works pose a serious problem for the thought theory. To see why, let us turn to JFK. Keeping cognitive order JFK is Oliver Stone’s 1991 controversial movie about the assassination of John F.Kennedy. The film takes as its subject Jim Garrison, the real New Orleans District Attorney who prosecuted the only trial related to the assassination, and is based largely on Garrison’s 1988 book On the Trail of the Assassins. In the movie Garrison (Kevin Costner) is a noble person willing to make sacrifices in the pursuit of the truth: specifically, the truth that Lee Harvey Oswald (Gary Oldman) was merely a patsy in the military-industrial-governmental conspiracy to assassinate Kennedy. The investigation by Garrison and his team uncovers a plot arranged in New Orleans by the civic leader Clay Shaw (Tommy Lee Jones). In the movie as well as in reality, Garrison brought Clay Shaw to trial in 1969 for conspiring to murder President Kennedy. It is more than clear that in response to the film we are supposed to imagine that Jim Garrison is a person of inestimable integrity, whose dedication to the truth is genuinely heroic, and that Clay Shaw is a shady, arrogant individual whose acquittal depends on the continued operation of the conspiracy. It is important to recognize that imagining in these ways differs from our imagining, in response to Hardy’s novel, that Angel rejects Tess. Because Jim Garrison and Clay Shaw, along with most of the other characters in JFK, are real people, the movie prescribes imaginings about them—imaginings that refer to the
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real individual. That is, we do not merely imagine that there is someone the movie is about, who is named “Jim Garrison” and who prosecuted someone named “Clay Shaw”; rather, we imagine, of the real Garrison and the real Shaw, that the one prosecuted the other. Compare little Peggy’s game with her dolls. Let’s say that in Peggy’s game, it is fictional—that is, participants in the game are supposed to imagine—that a doll in the sink is a baby having a bath, that a doll in the sock drawer is a baby in her crib, and so on. Imagining, of the particular dolls involved in the game, that they are babies bathing, sleeping, etc., is to be contrasted with imagining that there is some baby bathing, sleeping, and so on. Walton calls the real people, places, things, and events depicted in works of fiction objects of representation; fictions generate de re fictional truths about the objects they represent. So just as the rules of Peggy’s game make it fictionally the case, of a particular doll, that it is a baby asleep in her crib, JFK makes it fictionally the case, of the real Jim Garrison, that he was a noble, self-sacrificing individual pursuing the truth. That Stone would also like us to believe that this is so is obvious; the propagandist element of the film is hard to miss. However, people with any independent information about Garrison are unlikely to change their beliefs as a result of watching the movie. Having read a number of articles undermining Garrison’s version of events, I have formed a very different opinion of the man, perhaps “the most thoroughly discredited” of any conspiracy theorist even among conspiracy theorists themselves (Wicker 1991). Garrison and his office bribed witnesses, took statements made under hypnotic suggestion as testimony, and otherwise presented no evidence for the guilt of Clay Shaw, who was acquitted in under one hour. After years of prosecution, Shaw was left bankrupt and died an early death (Epstein 1992). Let us say that I believe that Jim Garrison’s obsession with proving a government conspiracy and his cavalier attitude toward the truth ruined a perfectly respectable man’s life. Call the set of a person’s beliefs about the world her belief stock. It is part of my belief stock that Garrison was a contemptible person. Right now, as I am writing this, such beliefs about Garrison are occurrent: that is, I am consciously aware of them. Most of the time, however, the beliefs are dispositional: that is, most of the time I am not explicitly thinking anything whatever about Jim Garrison or the Kennedy assassination. Even when I am thinking about something else entirely, though, it would be an accurate description of me to say that I believe that Garrison’s theory was false. Most of the beliefs in our belief stocks are dispositional in this way. Now, these beliefs about Garrison and Shaw clearly contradict what the movie prescribes that I imagine about them. This contradiction need not pose a problem: that we are able to imagine that real things are different from the way we believe them to be is basic to the nature of imagination and to the practice of fiction. I imagine that Garrison is admirable, while I believe he was contemptible. If we were unable, in response to science fiction, to imagine the world to operate with different physical laws; or in response to horror films, to imagine that there are monsters; or in response to
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historical novels, to imagine that we are privy to the secret thoughts of historical personages, the institution of fiction would be difficult to explain. Let us agree, then, that even while watching JFK and imagining as prescribed (occurrently), my dispositional beliefs stay constant. Contrast my case with the response of Naïve Nellie. Nellie is completely persuaded by Stone’s propaganda, coming to believe that Garrison was noble while Shaw was part of a conspiracy that reached to the highest levels of government. Both of us engage in imagining that Tommy Lee Jones is Clay Shaw, that Kevin Costner is Jim Garrison, and so on. And, depending on one’s theory of film experience, both of us imagine either that we are seeing the real events unfold (Walton 1990), or that we are watching a nonfiction report of those real events (Currie 1990:92–8; Matravers 1998). (In several parts of the film, of course, we are watching documentary footage, edited by Stone.) But we go on to do different things with the contents of our imaginings. The cognitive difference between us can be described by employing the contrast between incorporating and compartmentalizing new information (Gerrig 1993:207–24). Nellie incorporates the content of the film into her stock of beliefs about the world. She includes in her belief stock such propositions as “Garrison was noble” and “Shaw was a conspirator”. Of course I form beliefs in response to the movie as well, beliefs like “in JFK, Garrison is noble” and “in JFK, Shaw is a conspirator”. But in my case the contents remain attached to the representation, and are thereby compartmentalized. This is in sharp contrast to my belief that Garrison was contemptible: once I decide that the nonfiction articles I’ve read about Garrison are accurate, I can forget these sources of my belief entirely and assimilate their contents into my belief stock. If I did the same with the content of JFK, my rationality would be impugned, because I would believe both that Garrison was contemptible and that he was noble—and it is a basic constraint on rationality that we avoid contradictory beliefs. Instead I believe that Garrison was contemptible and that the movie portrays him as noble. And though in response to the movie I imagine that Garrison is noble, I continue to believe that he was contemptible. Keeping the beliefs in our belief stocks organized in this way reflects their role in practical reasoning: our actions will not be successful if our beliefs fail to represent the world correctly. The same kinds of issues arise with emotions as with beliefs. It should come as no surprise that based on my beliefs, I feel contempt for Garrison and disgust at his cavalier attitude for the truth, while I pity Shaw, a good man wrongly accused by an obsessed prosecutor. Most of the time these emotions are not occurrent, because I am not thinking about Garrison; still, even while I am thinking about something else, it would be correct to say that I feel contempt for him. These emotions thus form part of my emotional stock, and they change in predictable ways correlated with changes in my beliefs. If I came to believe that Garrison had, in fact, been nobly pursuing the truth, I would be irrational to continue to feel contempt for him. In other words, there is a rational connection between my emotions toward, and my beliefs about, particular individuals and events.
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In response to the film, however, I experience emotional responses contrary to my ordinary attitudes. I sympathize with Garrison and his cause, and I am convinced that Shaw is an evil conspirator. I want Garrison to win and it comes as a shock when the jury acquits. All this in spite of the fact that I already knew, going into the movie, that no one has ever been convicted for conspiring to murder Kennedy. To keep cognitive order, it seems that I must keep these emotions separate from my ordinary attitudes toward Garrison, just as I keep my imaginings about Garrison separate from my beliefs about him. If I do not, I will find myself admiring Garrison for his noble pursuit of truth and condemning him for his disregard of truth, surely an irrational state of mind. Avoiding contradictions among our emotions can be just as important to rationality as avoiding contradictions among our beliefs, because they too play a role in practical reasoning: inconsistent desires will prevent us from attaining our goals. By contrast, Nellie can incorporate her emotional responses to the film into her stock of emotions without inconsistency. Based on the beliefs she forms in response to the movie, she genuinely admires Garrison. Walton has a simple explanation of the fact that I remain as rational in my emotions as Nellie, since there need be no conflict between my genuine contempt and my quasiadmiration: it is not literally true that I admire Garrison, but only fictionally true; really I detest him. The thought theorist must describe the case differently. On her view, both my admiration and my contempt are genuine emotions, one of which is explained and partly constituted by what I believe, and the other of which is explained and partly constituted by what I imagine. So I feel admiration for Garrison because I imagine that he is admirable, and I feel contempt for him because I believe that he is contemptible. But this way of putting it implies that imagining, of Garrison, that he was admirable is sufficient to explain genuine admiration of him. That just seems false. Compare the following case. Suppose you believe Nelson Mandela to be a great man and you admire him. Now, if I made up a story in which Mandela tortured kittens, and you knew this story to be pure fantasy, it would be inexplicable for you to change your feelings toward him. Similarly, my imagining that Garrison was a noble pursuer of truth would not explain a change in my feelings toward him. That is, my emotional stock should remain exactly the same, even while I am imagining that Garrison is different from how I believe him to be. Clearly the thought theorist will have to find some way of keeping apart the contempt and admiration, such that they do not conflict. On the thought theory, the fact that my admiration is explained by what I imagine makes no difference to the analysis; it is just the same sort of emotion I would experience based on a belief. The problem is just that, based on my beliefs, I experience an apparently incompatible emotion, namely contempt. The thought theorist responds that there is no difficulty in principle in admiring and condemning the same person, so long as one is responding to different features of the person (Gaut, Chapter 1, this volume). Thus I admire Bill Clinton for his record in foreign diplomacy, but I feel
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contempt for him due to his inability to keep his pants up while in office. However, the same sort of approach does not apply to my feelings about Garrison, because these respond to exactly the same feature of the man: his attitude toward the truth. The thought theorist might reply that in one case the feature is real, and in the other case imagined. But then we are back to the problem that imagined features of a person provide no rational explanation for genuine emotions. To remove the sense of conflict, the advocate of the thought theory could say that different episodes of thinking about Garrison—one imagining, one believing— result in different emotions toward him. This way of representing the situation accords with Carroll’s description of the case where I imagine putting a knife in my eye. We could assume that insofar as I experience genuine terror in response to my imagining, the terror is temporary; once I recall that I am not going to stab myself, I can continue cutting vegetables. In other words, it is only so long as I am occurrently imagining stabbing myself in the eye that I experience terror. Similarly, the thought theorist might suggest, I genuinely admire Garrison only so long as I am occurrently imagining that he is nobly pursuing the truth. The rest of the time I feel contempt for him. Because I do not experience these emotions at the same time, there is no conflict. However, if I believe that Garrison was contemptible and I feel contempt toward him, there is no reason to think that I stop believing he is contemptible and feeling contempt for him as soon as I start imagining him to be as the movie portrays him. Suppose I am watching the film at exactly the moment two of my friends discuss my feelings about the Kennedy assassination. If Lauren tells Anthony that I reject Garrison’s version of the conspiracy theory and that I detest the man, we do not want to say that she has given a false description of my attitude just because I am emotionally caught up in the film. It is better to say that all the while I continue to detest Garrison, even while I am imaginatively construing him as heroic. In other words, my belief-involving contempt has priority over my imagination-involving admiration. This is because it forms part of my stock of emotions, the ones that guide my actions in accord with my stock of beliefs. And because it forms part of my emotional stock, it remains constant so long as I continue to believe that Garrison was contemptible. As a result, it is fair to say that regardless of what thoughts about Garrison I happen to be imagining, all the while I really feel contempt for him. Walton’s theory explains this feature of my interaction with JFK. Because my admiration is experienced in the context of my game of make-believe with JFK, it is only fictionally the case, rather than actually the case, that I admire Garrison. This is perfectly consistent with its being true that I really detest Garrison. It is difficult to see how the thought theory can provide an equally satisfactory account.
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Real and unreal individuals The thought theorist does have another strategy open to her, however. She could argue that my emotional responses to JFK are not directed at the real Garrison, but rather at Garrison-as-he-is-in-JFK. If this means that I experience genuine admiration only insofar as I imagine Garrison to be as portrayed in the movie, we have not progressed beyond the last option. So it must mean that my emotions are directed at different things: my contempt is for the real Garrison, while my admiration is for the fictional Garrison—a fictional character based on the real person. Similarly, Gaut (Chapter 1, this volume) suggests that in imagining that one’s friendly dog Fido is dangerous, the resultant fear is not of the real Fido, but of “the make-believe Fido,…a merely imagined being.” Leaving aside the question of what it means to be “a merely imagined being,” let us agree that if the object of my admiration were not identical to the object of my contempt, there would be no conflict. I have argued elsewhere that it is a mistake to construe our emotional experiences in response to fictions about real individuals as directed instead toward fictional characters (Friend 2000a), so I will outline only briefly some of the problems that arise on such a construal. First, if we agree that my imaginings in response to the film are imaginings about the real Garrison, it is ad hoc to say that my emotions—which are supposed to be explained by, and partly constituted by, my imaginings—are directed at a fictional character. On this construal, I respond to the film by imagining, of the real Jim Garrison, that he is nobly pursuing the truth; and as a result of so imagining, I admire a fictional character for nobly pursuing the truth. But if it is (the real) Garrison who is the noble pursuer of truth in my imaginings, then it should be the same Garrison, imagined as noble, whom I admire. The obvious reply to this consideration is to deny that my imaginings themselves are about the real Garrison. According to this reply, we take the Garrison-of-JFK to be a fictional character modeled on, but not identical to, the real Garrison, thereby placing him in the same category as Tess, Angel, Raskolnikov, and their ilk. Yet there are good reasons to reject this approach. To begin with, it would mean committing oneself to the very strong—and to my mind indefensible— claim that works of fiction never prescribe imaginings about actual people, places, things, or events. Consider how one feels about London as it is portrayed in Bleak House, or about Napoleon as he is portrayed in War and Peace. Should we say that Dickens and Tolstoy were inventing fictional characters modeled on the real city and person, simply to account for conflicts in our emotional responses to the fictions? Clearly not. Second, this solution fails to account for the difficulty people might have in imagining something contrary to what they believe, as with historians of the English monarchy who face a psychological obstacle in imagining as prescribed by Richard the Third. It is precisely because we recognize that we are supposed to be imagining about a real person that such obstacles arise. Finally, leaving aside these more general considerations, to deny that JFK is about the real Jim Garrison—that is, to deny that JFK refers directly to the historical individual—
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is simply to misinterpret the movie. This is not only because Stone wants to persuade us that Garrison was, in reality, a noble pursuer of truth. It is also because the use of documentary footage in the film requires our making the identification: More than halfway into “J.F.K.,”…New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison and his wife, Liz, are seen watching a television documentary about Mr. Garrison’s investigation of the events of Nov. 22, 1963, in Dallas. The documentary’s anchorman is heard charging that the District Attorney used improper methods to get witnesses to support his case against the New Orleans businessman Clay Shaw for his part in a supposed conspiracy surrounding the murder of President Kennedy. Kevin Costner, portraying Mr. Garrison, suggests by facial expression and dialogue that the charge is unfair and rigged to destroy his credibility—thus attacking the credibility of the documentary. (Wicker 1991) In describing this scene, Wicker assumes that Costner portrays the real Jim Garrison, and for good reason. There can be no doubt that the documentary— a real NBC broadcast, which was aired on 19 June 1967—refers to the real Jim Garrison. But there also can be no doubt that we are supposed to imagine the subject of the documentary to be identical to the man watching it in the living room with his wife. Such aspects of the film undermine attempts to distinguish the Garrison-of-JFK from the historical person. None of what I have said provides a knockdown argument that JFK refers directly to the real Jim Garrison and prescribes imaginings about him. And there are, of course, any number of philosophers and literary theorists who deny either that works of fiction refer at all, or that they prescribe our imagining directly about real individuals. I happen to think that if we can resolve the apparent conflict between my imagination-involving admiration and my belief-involving contempt, while also maintaining that JFK prescribes imaginings about the real Jim Garrison, we ought to do so; and Walton’s claim that my contempt is a genuine emotion while my admiration is merely a quasi-emotion does just that. But because there is so much controversy over reference in fiction, I would like to indicate why taking Garrison-as-he-is-in-JFK to be a fictional character still would not suffice to resolve the conflict. Consider this question: why do the problems I have outlined for the thought theory seem to arise only when we are dealing with real individuals? That is, why does it seem more plausible to say that I genuinely pity Tess because Angel rejects her than it is to say that I genuinely admire Garrison because of his noble pursuit of truth? Because in the former case there seem to be no conflicts between what I imagine and what I believe. My imagining that Tess suffered and my consequent pity for her appear to function cognitively the same way as my believing that
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Garrison was contemptible and my consequent contempt for him. If I detached my imaginings about Tess from their source in Hardy’s novel and incorporated them into my stock of beliefs, they would not conflict with any other beliefs about Tess —and the same applies to my pity for Tess, which conflicts with no other feelings about her. If this is right, we can say that my imaginings and feelings about Tess are dispositional: even if I am thinking about something else entirely, it would be accurate to say that I pity Tess. The situation is not so simple, however. First, it is not true that I could assimilate my imaginings about Tess into my stock of beliefs without causing conflicts. After all, one of the things I imagine in response to Hardy’s novel is that Tess exists, and I certainly do not believe that. In my belief stock I might have the propositions “Tess does not exist” and “in Hardy’s novel, Tess exists”, but I could not have both “Tess does not exist” and “Tess exists” without being irrational. Recall that my belief stock is my set of beliefs about the world; taken together, these beliefs constitute my representation of how the world really is. Nowhere in this representation of the world will we find reference to such people as Oliver Twist or Raskolnikov, to such places as Eldorado or Lilliput, or to such events as Angel’s rejection of Tess. We will find reference to works of fiction that prescribe imaginings about these fictional people, places, and events; but the contents of those imaginings remain attached to their sources and thus compartmentalized. Now, some theorists argue that we should include Oliver et al. in our representations of the world, as abstract or nonexistent objects. From this perspective, works of fiction inform us about real entities about which we can form beliefs, thereby allowing for smooth assimilation into our belief stocks. There are numerous problems with these approaches (see Friend 2000b), but in the present context the difficulty is that they still fail to remove all conflicts among our emotions. When the same character is portrayed differently in different fictions, emotional responses can change: if I admire Odysseus’s devotion to Penelope in the Odyssey, I will feel quite differently about him in response to Dante’s Inferno (Canto 26) according to which he preferred further adventures to returning home to his wife. We could claim that these are two different characters, but such a move not only appears ad hoc, it runs counter to our ordinary experiences of fiction. In the present case, identification of the character across works is necessary to the correct interpretation of Dante’s epic: if we did not recognize the Ulysses identified by Dante as the very same one imported by Virgil from Homer, we would not possess the background necessary to explain (and thereby, for Dante, to justify) the punishment he receives in the Inferno. And in spite of the changes undergone by James Bond over the course of his career, the popularity of the Bond films depends on our assuming that they are about the same character. The same can be said for any other serial fiction. Indeed, the problem of conflict would not be resolved even if we insisted that for each film or each epic poem there are distinct fictional characters, because many individual works of fiction are inconsistent, whether by error—in Turgenev’s Fathers and Sons, Katya Odintsov is said to be both eighteen and
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twenty-one—or by design—in Robbe-Grillet’s Jealousy, the main character is both a customs official and not a customs official, both honest and dishonest. Just as one might respond differently to the same fictional character in different fictions, one could conceivably experience apparently contradictory emotional states depending on variations in the way a fictional character is represented from one part of a work to the next. What these considerations indicate is that so long as we wish to maintain the view that our affective responses to fiction are genuine emotions, we are faced with the problem of conflicts among these emotions—a problem that does not go away even if we construe all of these emotions as directed toward fictional characters, and even if we take fictional characters to be real. More importantly, these cases highlight the distinctive feature of cases involving beliefs about real individuals. If one is describing my feelings about Garrison, there is a clear priority to be given to my contempt over my admiration; this is why Lauren is right to say I detest Garrison even while I am watching JFK. By contrast, there is no reason to prioritize either of my feelings about Odysseus, no answer to the question, “do I really admire him or do I really detest him?” It is not that I am ambivalent, that I simply cannot decide how to feel about the character. Rather, it is because my different responses to Odysseus occur within the scope of different imaginings; neither can be detached from their sources and incorporated into my emotional stock. Just as the thought theorist must offer some additional explanation of why emotional responses to fiction are not irrational despite the lack of belief, she must offer some additional explanation of why certain emotional responses take priority over others in our cognitive organization. Once again Walton has a straightforward explanation of the data: only my belief-involving contempt for Garrison is a genuine emotion, and this explains why it is the sole feeling that takes priority. By contrast, my feelings about Odysseus and my responses to JFK count as genuine only within the confines of certain games of make-believe. Moreover, the kinds of object-directed emotional states on which I have focused so far—contempt for Garrison, pity of Tess—are not the only ones where conflict arises and prioritization is relevant. It will be recalled that in watching JFK, I hope that Garrison will win his case, and I am shocked and disappointed when the jury acquits Shaw. These responses are puzzling in their own right. First, it cannot literally be true that I hope the real Garrison will win the case, because the real case is long over. Second, it is not literally true that I hope the fictional Garrison will win; to the contrary, I think the film would be much worse, and my experience of it much less enjoyable, if it had a happy ending. On the thought theory, my desire that Garrison win because I am sympathetic to him, and my desire that he lose because that would make a better film, are in direct conflict, though one might outweigh the other (Gaut, Chapter 1, this volume). But it is quite intuitive to say that really I want the film to be structured a certain way, and that it is only within the context of my imagining that I want Garrison to win. It is a common feature of our experience of fiction that we can
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experience the same or similar emotional ups and downs each time we see a movie or read a book. On Walton’s theory, whenever I see the film I imagine that I am learning about these events for the first time (Walton 1978, 1990:258– 62). This is consistent with its being the case that all the while, I know how the movie ends and do not genuinely wish it to end any differently. Similarly, it would be incomprehensible for me literally to be shocked and disappointed when Shaw is acquitted. Because I could not literally be shocked by an event I know already to have transpired, it must be the case that I am shocked that Garrison loses only within the context of imagining that I am learning about these events for the first time. To make sense of this, we must assume that I am imagining the events to unfold before my eyes, or at least to unfold concurrently with my watching the movie. But it is not merely that I go from one episode of imagining to another—from imagining that Garrison might win the case to imagining that he has lost—responding to each separately. In addition to imagining about Garrison and Shaw, I must also imagine about myself: in particular, I must imagine that in watching the movie I am finding out about the events. Only this can explain how I am shocked “when” Shaw is acquitted. One might think, though, that my shock on the first viewing of the film still counts as genuine, because I do not know how the plot will unfold. But this only goes to show that I am shocked that in the film Garrison loses his case; in other words, that I am genuinely surprised the film turned out a certain way. Compare Neill’s proposal that Charles, who appears to be “terrified” of the Green Slime in a scary movie, is really just startled by the images and music of the film (Neill 1991). Because this analysis provides a different object for Charles’s emotional state, it lends no support to those who wish to claim that Charles is genuinely afraid of the Slime. Similarly, my genuine shock upon finding out that the film develops a certain way— which is just what I am ignorant of before seeing it—lends no support to those who would claim that I am genuinely shocked that Garrison loses his case. To the contrary, the fundamental features of my response lend support to Walton’s claim that I experience only quasi-shock, rather than the genuine article. Emotions in practical reasoning I have emphasized the priority that certain emotional states have in our cognitive organization, maintaining that because they can be detached from their sources and incorporated into our emotional stock they have a good claim to being the only genuine emotions. But why are this prioritization and incorporation so important? How do they justify denying the status of “genuine emotion” to other experiences? Above, I suggested, briefly, that the answer has to do with the contribution of certain emotions to practical reasoning. We must avoid contradictions among the beliefs in our belief stocks because a failure to represent the world correctly can prevent successful action. Similarly, we must avoid
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contradictions among our emotions because inconsistent desires can prevent us from attaining our goals. This explanation, however, seems to leave me vulnerable to one of the charges leveled by thought theorists against Walton. It will be recalled that, in reply to the thought theorist’s appeal to phobias as genuine emotions without belief, Walton stresses the significance of action: “fear is motivating in distinctive ways, whether or not its motivational force is attributed to cognitive elements in it…. Fear emasculated by subtracting its distinctive motivational force is not fear at all” (Walton 1990:201–2). If this point could be generalized to other emotions, it looks as though on Walton’s account, the importance of belief to emotion is just that it plays a role in explaining motivation. And if that is right, the fact that works of nonfiction often fail to motivate actions should imply that the emotions we experience in response to these works, though they involve beliefs, are not genuine—surely an unintuitive result. In writing Robinson Crusoe, Defoe drew heavily on the journal of the reallife castaway, Alexander Selkirk. A reader of Selkirk’s journal could surely be moved to emotion at his suffering. However, the fact that Selkirk was marooned in 1704 (and died in 1721) makes it impossible— really impossible—for the reader to help him…. Hence, if the absence of such a connection [to action] is no reason to deny that we feel emotions towards Alexander Selkirk, it is no reason to deny that we feel emotions towards Robinson Crusoe either. (Matravers 1998:69) Matravers goes on to argue that motivational force is a characteristic only of our emotional responses to events or situations with which we are confronted; when we encounter them instead through representations, whether fictional or nonfictional, there is no motivation to act (Matravers 1998:69–73). That we may be motivated by Selkirk’s journal to avoid sea voyages does not alter this fact; the same can be said of reading Defoe’s novel. The issue with which Matravers is concerned is instead whether or not we are motivated by our pity to help Selkirk, which clearly we cannot be. He concludes that unless we are willing to deny that our pity of Selkirk is genuine pity, we should not deny that our pity of Crusoe is equally genuine. I have serious doubts that Walton wants to generalize his claim about the importance of motivational force from defining fear to analyzing other emotions. Some emotions, like admiration, typically do not motivate us to act even when we are confronted with their objects, and most are not connected to action as tightly as fear. If I had met Jim Garrison before his death in 1992, an observer would not question my contempt on the grounds that I failed to spit in Garrison’s face; by contrast, if Sally claims to fear Fido but always behaves as if he were the gentlest creature on earth, we would be right to question the genuineness of her fear. There are no grounds for assuming that Walton would move from the case of fear to the
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implausible conclusion that we only ever experience genuine emotions when we are motivated to action. But does not this mean that Matravers is right when he says that connections to action have nothing to do with whether an emotion should count as genuine? No, because the connection to action need not be direct. Remember our friend Nellie, who in watching JFK comes to believe everything that I merely imagine. We can safely say that Nellie believes that Garrison was a noble pursuer of truth and that she genuinely admires him, that she genuinely despises Shaw, and that she is genuinely shocked and disappointed to learn that Shaw was acquitted But she is not motivated to act on any of these emotions: there is nothing she can do about the trial, which was over in 1969; there is nothing she can do about Shaw, who died in 1973; and even in 1991, when Garrison was still alive, she was (let us assume) separated from him geographically. Matravers is correct to say that the lack of motivation does not undermine the claim that Nellie’s admiration, despisement, disappointment, and shock are all genuine emotions. But this does not mean that these emotions have no connection to action whatsoever. To the contrary, because Nellie incorporates the beliefs she forms in response to JFK into her belief stock, and because she incorporates her emotional responses to JFK into her emotional stock, they form part of the foundation for her practical reasoning. Even if Nellie is prevented from acting directly on these emotions because the events depicted in the movie are long over, they still play a rationalizing role with respect to other actions she might take, a role that distinguishes them from the quasi-emotions I experience. For example, if Nellie were passionate enough, she might join the ranks of conspiracy theorists and try to defend Garrison’s reputation. Her decision to do this would be explained by her genuine admiration for Garrison. By contrast, the fact that I admire Garrison in the context of imaginatively responding to JFK would provide no rational explanation of my taking the same action. My contempt, on the other hand, would explain why I write letters to the editor denouncing Nellie’s campaign. It is true that in response to works of fiction we are often motivated to act in ways indirectly connected to the people or situations represented in the fiction. Thought theorists sometimes point out that fictional portrayals of poverty might be just as likely to motivate me to donate to a charity as nonfiction portrayals, and in both cases my response may be very indirect: “my pity for a particular starving person on the news may cause me to send a cheque to a famine relief agency which may not even operate in the relevant part of the world” (Matravers 1998: 70). But I could decide to send a check to a famine agency that would help the particular starving person I pity; I could even decide to fly to the region, find that person, and give her food. The point is not that I probably will not do these things; the point is that if I did, only pity founded on the belief that that person is suffering would provide an explanation of my behavior. Contrast this with my response to a television advertisement in which an actress playing a starving person appeals to the viewer for donations to a famine relief agency. Suppose that
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I am moved to tears by the portrayal. Even so, it would be irrational, if not incomprehensible, for me to fly out to Los Angeles, find this actress, and give her food, all on the basis of my feeling of pity in response to the advertisement. And a good explanation of this fact is that I do not really pity her: my experience is just quasi-pity, and counts as genuine pity only within the context of my imagining that the actress is a starving person. It makes sense to give priority to those affective states that play the role in our practical reasoning that only belief-involving emotions do—to reserve the classification genuine emotion for them. While these emotions may not motivate us to act in direct response to the situations that cause them, the fact that they form part of an emotional stock rationally correlated with our set of beliefs about the world means that they explain certain actions in a way that imagination-involving affective states cannot. Only those emotions that can be detached from their original contexts and incorporated into our emotional stocks can contribute in this way to practical reasoning. And the importance of this function is reflected in our descriptions of how people really feel. As we have seen, in any case where there is a conflict between an emotional state involving belief and an emotional state involving imagination, the former takes priority: it is how one really feels so long as one continues to have the relevant beliefs, and regardless of what one might be imagining at the moment. Thus, I genuinely feel contempt for Garrison even while watching JFK. By contrast, there is no priority to be given to either of my quasi-emotions toward Odysseus, because neither can be detached from its game of make-believe and assimilated into my emotional stock. I conclude that Walton’s distinction between genuine and quasi-emotions accounts for defining features of our interaction with works of fiction that are not explained by the thought theory. His claim that my response to JFK constitutes genuine admiration for Garrison only within my game of make-believe captures the sense in which this response shares features of real admiration, while also recognizing that it does not play the same role in my cognitive life as the genuine emotion. For each puzzle posed by the assumption that imaginings are sufficient for genuine emotion—how to distinguish the rational from the irrational emotions, how to account for the priority of certain emotions—Walton has a solution that follows naturally from his larger theory of make-believe. At the center of his account of our engagement with fiction is the claim that we do not stand outside the fictional world looking in, learning about distant fictional events and experiencing emotions as a result; rather, we engage in imaginings about ourselves, and only within the context of these imaginings do we respond emotionally. This explains why our quasi-emotions do not conflict with the genuine emotions that rationally motivate many of our actions. Acknowledgments David Hills first drew my attention to such “epistemological attitudes” as shock and surprise in our experiences of fiction. In developing the ideas in this chapter,
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I have benefited from numerous discussions with Kendall Walton, as well as informal conversations with several participants at the conference Imagination and the Arts. I have also profited from the comments of Dominic Lopes and Matthew Kieran.
3 NARRATIVE, EMOTION, AND PERSPECTIVE Peter Goldie
Sometimes, in thought and talk, we are engaged with the actual—with events that are actually going on around us. But, reflective creatures as we are, our concerns are often directed toward events that are now past, or events that might come to be in the future, or events that might have been, or events that are fictional. Much of our daily lives is taken up by imaginative engagement with non-actual events in this way: we read fiction, we see films, we daydream, we remember things happening, we hypothesize about how things might have happened, and we make plans for the future. And, in all these cases, we can respond emotionally to what we imagine. My thesis is that there is a centrally important feature that unites and explains such engagement with non-actual events: the engagement is with a narrative, and the engagement is achieved through imaginatively adopting two kinds of perspective that the narrative involves (see Goldie 2000, 2002a, b, forthcoming). Roughly (the details will become clear as I progress), a narrative is something that can be narrated; it need not be narrated though, for a narrative can be just “thought through”, as, for example, when one remembers or imagines a sequence of events. It is more than just a bare chronicle, but a representation of the events, and of the people involved, which is organized, shaped, and colored in a way that gives coherence, meaningfulness, and emotional import to the represented events (see Genette 1980; Ricoeur 1984–; Bal 1997). Narratives can involve internal and external perspectives or points of view. The internal perspective is involved where the narrative represents or otherwise indicates the perspective, including the thoughts, feelings, and emotions, of one or more of the people who are internal to the narrative. Then, external to the narrative, there is the narrator’s own external perspective. (I leave to one side here the difficult issues concerning external narrator, implied author, and actual author; see Booth 1961 and Iseminger 1992. For the purposes of this chapter, the external narrator of fictional works can be taken to be the authorial figure implied by the narrative, although I would not want to be committed to the idea that the interests of a reader of fiction should be restricted to such a notional figure.) The external perspective is distinct from the internal perspective even where, as in autobiographies, the two perspectives are those of one and the same person. And the external perspective is always there, in spite of sometimes seeming evanescent, always shaping and coloring the narrative,
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and indicating the narrator’s own evaluation and emotional response to what happened. A narrative, when it is narrated, can thus reveal internal and external perspectives, and the narrative will thereby invite the reader or audience to share in these perspectives and to respond emotionally to the events as they are represented in the narrative. (From now on I will not mention audiences unless the context requires it. Remarks about the reader should be taken to apply equally to audiences.) If all this is right, then there should be much in common amongst our emotional responses to non-actual events, whether fictional or real life, and to the extent that there are differences, these should be explainable. My main aim in this chapter is to demonstrate this by showing that the idea of imaginative engagement with a narrative, and specifically with the narrator’s perspective, external to the narrative, plays a central explanatory role. I will focus on just three aspects of our emotional responses to non-actual events, each of which needs to be explained. They are as follows. First, the relation between imagination, emotional response, belief, and action needs to be explained. Second, there is the phenomenon, familiar to readers of fiction, of being emotionally “carried along” by what we imaginatively engage with. Third, also familiar to readers of fiction, is the phenomenon of emotional resistance: sometimes we are willing to be emotionally “carried along” only so far, and we reach a point where resistance sets in. All three of these features have been discussed recently in relation to our imaginative engagement with fiction; I will show how they relate more generally to our imaginative engagement with narrative, whether fictional or otherwise, and, by doing this, show the special explanatory importance of the narrator’s external perspective. I An emotional response to actual events in real life—to the here and now— paradigmatically bears a very direct connection to belief and to action. For example, my fear of the snake that is slithering toward me involves (at least typically) recognition of the snake as frightening, and the emotion immediately motivates me to avoid it; or, if I see someone who is near or dear to me being threatened in some way, my feelings of compassion involve recognition of the threat to the other person, and will immediately motivate me to help him or her (see Goldie 2002a). Emotions are thus both world-guided and action-guiding. Things seem different when we respond emotionally to fiction. My fear of the looming monster in the horror movie does not motivate me to run out of the cinema (cf. Walton 1990); or, if I listen to the weekly radio soap opera, The Archers, and hear of Mark Hebden being killed in a car crash, I may get a lump in my throat, but my feelings of compassion do not motivate me to rush to Ambridge, or send flowers, or ring up the BBC to see if I can be of any help. The reason why there is this difference in action-motivation is, it is often said, to be explained by a difference in belief. In real life, if I see a monster approaching me and feel fear, I believe a monster to be actually in front of me, or if I see a friend
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in danger and feel compassion, I believe someone to be actually threatened in some way. Whereas, in fiction, I have no such beliefs. No wonder I do not act. This contrast, between our paradigmatic emotional responses to actual events in real life and to fictional events, has led many to argue that our emotional responses to fiction are not real emotions but quasi-emotions, involving make-beliefs or imaginings rather than beliefs, and make-beliefs do not have the same connection to action as do beliefs (cf. Currie 1990, 1997; Walton 1990, 1997). But the trouble with this stark division between two types of feeling response, emotional and quasi-emotional, is that our responses to real life non-actual events would also be consigned to quasi-emotions: we would only have quasi-emotional responses to accounts of things that have happened in the past, or to things that we imagine, remember, daydream, hypothesize, and plan. Here are some examples, in none of which are the relevant beliefs involved. (1) I imagine someone being held down by a kidnapper and having his little finger cut off, and I feel fear. (2) I imagine my future self, old, decrepit, and senile, with saliva trickling down my chin, and I feel disgust and horror at my future state. (3) I think back on the evening’s dinner party, and I feel what Nietzsche nicely calls bonheur de l’escalier—a happiness that I did not experience at the time, but now feel toward what I remember as I make my way home. (4) I read a vivid historical account of how slaves were treated on slave ships in the eighteenth century and I feel deep compassion toward their plight and anger at how they were so mistreated. (5) I remember something very silly that I did some time ago (by thinking through what happened), and I feel embarrassed. If we want to say, as I do, that in all these five cases I am responding with genuine emotions, not quasi-emotions, then we should allow that genuine emotions need not involve beliefs in the relevant sense, but can also involve imaginings, rememberings, and so on. (The line of argument I am running here is closely related to Richard Moran’s constraint that any solution to the so-called paradox of fiction should also deal with other types of emotional response to the non-actual (Moran 1994). My approach, as Greg Currie notes, may be substantially the same as the appeal to quasi-emotions (Currie 1990:211–13; 1997:70). However, words seem to me to be important here.) So we can now say that we can have genuine emotions directed toward the non-actual, whether fictional or real life. Then one might go on to try, as Greg Currie has done, to unify our emotional responses to non-actual events, both fictional and real life, by appeal to just one kind of imagining, namely simulation (Currie 1990, 1997). Simulation, according to Currie, is (and these terms are equivalent according to his terminology) empathizing with someone, or putting oneself into someone’s shoes, or taking the role of someone (where the someone can be me at some non-actual time or place). Simulation in this sense is what I will also call, following Richard Wollheim, central imagining, or imagining “from the inside” (Wollheim 1984). (I introduce this further term for the sake of a contrast with acentral imagining, as will become clear in a moment.) If I simulate, or empathize with (or centrally imagine) Albert, Currie says, “while Albert
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believes p and desires q, I, in empathizing with him, come to believeI p and desireI q, where ‘believingI’ and ‘desiringI’ denote states that bear systematic resemblances to believing and desiring…. [T]hey are like real beliefs and desires in respect of content…and they are like real beliefs and desires in terms of internal causal role, but unlike them in terms of external causal role…. I-states are blocked off from behavior. They are, as people sometimes say, ‘off-line’” (Currie 1997: 67–8). Thus, according to Currie, if Albert related to me an account of how his finger was cut off by a kidnapper, I would simulate Albert, believingI that my finger is about to be cut off and so forth, and as a result I might feel fear. Here, the emotion that I experience matches that of Albert during his experience: fear. But what if I did not feel fear, but rather compassion or pity toward Albert as he tells me his story? If I did, this would involve—and this is the disagreement with Currie—a different kind of imaginative engagement with non-actual events: not simulation or central imagining from Albert’s perspective, internal to the imagined scene, but acentral imagining—that is, perceptually imagining from no point of view within the imagined scene (see Wollheim 1984; Goldie 2000, 2002a). Thus, in this example, acentrally imagining Albert having his finger cut off, I feel compassion or pity, and not fear; I do not centrally imagine the narrative unfold from Albert’s perspective internal to the narrative, but rather I imagine it from an external perspective, responding to the narrative in the way that the narrator, Albert, encourages me to do. Thus we now seem to have two distinct kinds of imagining of the non-actual. In many other cases, as can be seen by looking back at the five examples that I have just given, we can acentrally imagine things from a perspective external to what is narrated. In (1), I could have acentrally imagined the victim, and felt compassion or pity, as I did for Albert. In (2), when I imagine being old, decrepit, and senile, I do not simulate or centrally imagine my future self, for if I did I would not feel disgust and horror (for my mental state then is beyond such self-reflection at how I have degenerated); rather, I (that is, me now) imagine my future self acentrally, from a perspective external to the imagined scene, and the disgust and horror that I now feel at imagining myself in that state bear no “systematic resemblance” to my mental state at the imagined time, as would be the case if I were simulating myself. One can put the point like this: the disgust and horror that I now feel at myself, old, decrepit, and senile, is a response to what I imagine; it is not part of the content of what I imagine. In (3), casting my mind back to the dinner party earlier that evening, I acentrally remember myself and the other guests from a point of view, say, behind the chair in which I am seated, so that I (that is, me then) am as much part of the content of what is imagined as are the other guests, and, surveying the imagined scene, I (that is, me now) experience happiness in a way that I did not at the time. Thus I have a perceptual memory of what happened, and an emotional response to it, without centrally imagining myself or anyone else in the imagined scene. Perceptually remembering past events is often like this. Similarly, in (4), the compassion and pity that I feel toward the slaves does not involve centrally imagining being one of them, for
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compassion and pity are emotions directed toward the suffering of another. The acentral imagining in this case does not exclude the possibility that I might also, as part of the same imaginative project, simulate, or centrally imagine being a slave, and this might, so to speak, enliven my thoughts about them, and thus enliven my compassion. (If we are fairly similar in personality to the protagonist, and if the situation is one that we can readily imagine being in, then we may well be more likely to centrally imagine the protagonist.) However, it is not, I think, coherent to centrally imagine and acentrally imagine at one and the same time, although we do have an ability to flit from one to the other with great facility. In (5), when I remember the silly thing I did, again I could both centrally and acentrally imagine the scene—the embarrassment could be both personal embarrassment and what is called witness embarrassment, the latter arising through my (that is, me now) acentrally imagining my earlier self. So I do not think we can unify our emotional responses to non-actual events by appeal to just one kind of imaginative engagement, namely simulation or central imagining. Rather, when we respond emotionally to a narrative, sometimes we imaginatively engage with the narrative by simulation or centrally imagining one or more of the people internal to the narrative, and sometimes by acentrally imagining, sharing the perspective of the external narrator. Consequently, imaginative engagement with the non-actual does not require make-beliefs or I-beliefs of the sort introduced by Currie: for example, my compassionate response to the slaves involves beliefs about their plight, not Ibeliefs, and these beliefs are part of what is involved in my feeling of compassion at their plight. Indeed, the whole idea of our engagement with the non-actual being in some sense “off-line” begins to seem unmotivated. For our minds are directed toward the non-actual in all sorts of different ways that are not properly unified by the notion of I-beliefs and of thinking off-line. This is demonstrated by the fact that, when we think about, imagine, remember, daydream, hypothesize, or plan, and respond emotionally to it, our emotional responses do often have a very clear connection with action (although obviously the connection is not as direct as it is in respect of real life that is actual, such as my fearfully avoiding the snake). This is in part why it is important to remember that there is a range of cases within the non-actual. In some cases, our emotions will be more directly action-guiding: for example, at a meeting I might avoid asking a question having felt embarrassed at the thought of how I might appear stupid and be laughed at. In other cases, our emotions will be more obliquely action-guiding: for example, my compassionate emotional response to the vivid account of life and death on the slave ships might motivate me to give money to Christian Aid, and perhaps to feel and behave with more tolerance toward black African Americans. Then, with this range of cases in mind, when we turn to non-actual fictional examples, we can see that in many respects there is really not so much of a contrast between what is non-actual and real life and what is non-actual and fictional. Sometimes engagement with fiction will involve centrally imagining or simulating one or more of the characters; but, as in real life non-actual, it need
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not. For example, the compassion that I feel on hearing of the fate of Mark Hebden in The Archers arises through acentrally imagining what is being narrated and responding emotionally to it in the way that the narrative encourages. And sometimes the emotional response to fiction can be connected to action in very much the same sort of way as with real life non-actual—for example, on hearing of Mark Hebden’s death, I might come to feel and behave with more tolerance toward farmers than I would otherwise have done, just as I might give money to Christian Aid on hearing of the treatment of the slaves. (This is not to succumb to what Currie 1990 calls the transfer strategy as a way of dealing with the paradox of fiction; this is the idea that we respond to the fate of fictional characters as surrogate objects standing in for real people.) One might object here that I have lost the distinction, within non-actual narratives, between what is fictional and “the rest”. But this is wrong. The essential distinction remains that what makes a narrative fictional, and thus sets it off against all other sorts of narrative, is its being narrated, and read, as part of a special sort of practice, which invites the reader to imagine or make believe that what is being narrated actually happened, even when it is known that it did not. This distinction remains entirely unaffected by what I have said (see Currie 1990; Lamarque and Olsen 1994; and Goldie forthcoming). (There are, however, particular aspects to the creation and understanding of fictional narratives that give imagination a more central role than in narratives of factual matters; it is not merely contingent that fictional narratives are mostly imaginary (Savile 1998).) So far then I have tried to show that there are two kinds of imagining involved in our engagement with narratives, and that acentrally imagining from the narrator’s external perspective has a special role in explaining the place of belief in our emotional responses to narrative, and in explaining the connection of emotion to action. II The second feature of our emotional responses to narrative that I want to discuss and explain is as follows: when we respond emotionally to the fate of characters in fictional narratives, we allow ourselves to be “carried along” emotionally by the story, and we seem to do this more than we would if the narrative were not a work of fiction. There are various manifestations of the phenomenon in our responses to fictional narratives, as some examples will show. Let me begin by returning to the person who gets extremely involved emotionally with The Archers. Let us now call him Freddie. Freddie feels deep compassion toward the friends of Mark Hebden when they hear of his death. And yet, when Freddie is told that his cousin’s friend has been killed in a car crash, he feels little emotion toward his cousin in his tragic loss, perhaps thinking that a bit too much fuss is being made about the whole thing; after all, we are all going to die sooner or later. This example illustrates a difference merely of degree of compassion. But then there is the person who feels compassion toward the fate of a fictional
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character, whereas, if he heard about a similar fate in real life, he would not just feel less compassion, but none at all—indifference—or even another sort of emotion entirely—contempt, perhaps. Matthew Kieran has an apt example of this, of “someone who once was a Roman Catholic but is now a confirmed atheist reading of what happened to Charles Ryder in Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited. Given her secular conversion she firmly believes that morality categorically cannot depend upon the commands issued by God. Nonetheless, in reading Brideshead Revisited she responds with sympathy, admiration, awe and ultimately affirmation to the culmination of the novel” (Kieran, Chapter 4, this volume), whereas in real life she would do no such thing, perhaps considering Ryder to be a fool. Greg Currie also gives an example of this phenomenon, which he calls the problem of personality: his own response as reader to the fate of Jago, a character in C.P.Snow’s The Masters. In the fiction, Jago wants the Mastership of a Cambridge college. Currie says that Jago is the sort of person that he would have little time for in real life, and someone that he would never lend his support to in trying to attain a Mastership: an intellectually mediocre character, sometimes rather pathetic. Yet, Currie says, “nonetheless, I wanted Jago to win, and it was with growing dismay that I watched the decline of his fortunes” (Currie 1997:64). My explanation of what is going on in these examples appeals to the narrator’s external perspective. This shapes and colors the narrative, indicating the narrator’s evaluation of the narrated events, and at the same time, the narrator’s emotional response to them. (The idea of a narrator “indicating” an evaluation and an emotional response is intended to be vague: it should include, e.g. the possibility of the narrator showing his evaluation and feelings, without specifically stating them; and it should include the possibility of the narrator unintentionally showing his evaluation and feelings.) The narrator’s external perspective thus encourages the reader, through acentral imagining, to share this perspective on the events that are narrated, and to have the same sort of emotional response. Now, there are two ways in which a reader’s emotional response to a narrative can be appropriate. First, it can be appropriate in the sense of being concordant with the narrator’s external response, as evidenced principally in the text of the narrative. This is the response that the narrative invites the reader to share in—the response that the work, so to speak, calls for. I will call this narrative appropriateness. And second, the reader’s response can be appropriate in the sense of being taken by the reader to be, in fact, appropriate to the events that are narrated. I will call this ethical appropriateness (at this point I do not want too much to hang on the word “ethical”). And these two ways of being appropriate can diverge in particular cases, as they did in the examples given by Kieran and Currie. In both these examples, the narrative is inviting the reader to share in the narrator’s external response to Ryder and to Jago, endorsing the values that Ryder and Jago endorse. Thus, the narratively appropriate reader response to Brideshead and to The Masters is one that is concordant with that of the narrator, sharing the narrator’s perspective. Kieran’s hypothesized reader of Brideshead, and Currie, as reader of
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The Masters, both have these narratively appropriate responses. But clearly Kieran and Currie consider their responses to be ethically inappropriate, being grounded in values that they do not share: Kieran’s reader does not now share Waugh’s Catholicism; and Currie does not share Snow’s “outlook” (see Currie 1997:72– 3). Thus, in each case, the emotional response that was narratively appropriate was also, according to the values of Kieran and Currie, ethically inappropriate. Their responses were thus discordant. Currie puts forward his own explanation of what he calls the problem of personality. It is different from mine. His is based exclusively on the notion of simulating, empathizing with, or taking on the role of someone. It goes as follows. When Currie reads The Masters, he simulates a hypothetical reader of fact whose outlook is like that of the implied author and who is reading about the fate of a Cambridge academic called Jago, and this hypothetical reader of fact is, in turn, simulating Jago; and because of what Currie claims to be the transitivity of simulation, this is equivalent to Currie simulating Jago (Currie 1997:69). The upshot is that Currie finds himself sharing the outlook of the implied author. This seems to me to have a number of difficulties. First, it is too complex an account of what is actually, and phenomenologically, much more simple and direct. Second (although this would obviously not be considered an objection by Currie), it does not give a place for the reader to take a direct external perspective through acentral imagining. And third, his account depends on simulation being transitive (and transparent), and this is doubtful as it depends in part on people being alike psychologically. The examples I have given so far are all from our responses to fictional narratives. But the phenomenon also arises, albeit to a lesser degree, in our experiences of real-life narratives. To show that it does arise, let me give an example from my own experience of reading a work of history, where I was drawn into and carried along by the narrator’s own values and emotional responses, in spite of not sharing these values. Antonia Fraser’s recent history of Marie Antoinette is unashamedly sympathetic to her and to her plight (Fraser 2001). We are, for example, encouraged to understand Marie Antoinette’s rather clumsy approach to the political situation in France, and her delights in the pleasures of the court, as being the products of her upbringing, rather than being typical of what Nancy Mitford called a woman of “monumental stupidity,” who was “frivolous without being funny” (cited in Fraser 2001:422). And I found myself to a considerable extent, just as in Kieran’s and Currie’s examples, having the narratively appropriate response to what was related, in effect taking Fraser’s (and thus Marie Antoinette’s) side much more than I would have done if I had been reading some other less favorable account of her life, such as one by Nancy Mitford. So we have a story of real life taking just the same form as those earlier fictional ones (cf. Gaut 1998; Matravers 1998). The phenomenon is also quite familiar in reading diaries and autobiographies, as well as in hearing the shorter stories that people tell about themselves in the pub or over the dinner table: one finds oneself at the time taking the narrator’s side more than one would on
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reflection, and more than one would if what happened had been related from some other less sympathetic perspective. So this discordance between the two sorts of external response of a reader (the narratively appropriate response and the ethically appropriate response) can be found in factual narratives just as it can be found in fiction. And now it is possible to see at least two reasons why we find this phenomenon to a lesser degree with factual narratives. The first reason is simply that the sustained coloring and shaping of a story takes some considerable time and skill if it is to achieve the effect that concerns us here—if we are to allow ourselves to be carried along emotionally by the narrator’s values as revealed in his external perspective in spite of our discordant ethical responses. It is precisely the expressive qualities of the successful fictional work and the artifice involved that achieve these effects; it is not as though the artifice gets in the way (cf. Moran 1994:85–6). And these expressive qualities are found more often in fictional works than in factual narratives (although I would maintain that they are far from uncommon in wellwritten histories, biographies, and autobiographies, such as, to take some recent examples, Orlando Figes’s The People s Tragedy, Antony Beevor’s Stalingrad, and Ray Monk’s two-volume biography of Bertrand Russell). The second reason why we more readily allow ourselves to be emotionally carried along by the fate of characters in fiction is that we know them not to be real. When we are engaged with a work of fiction, as Freddie was with The Archers, we know that we can “switch off” more or less at will. When we make believe that what is being narrated actually happened, and engage emotionally with the narrative, sharing in the narrator’s external perspective, we do not lose sight of the thought that this is, after all, fiction. Like Freddie, we can, at least typically, allow ourselves to a considerable extent to indulge our profound feelings for humankind, and let our sentiments run away with us without concerns about their connection to action. Again, though, the phenomenon is not restricted to our engagement with fictional narratives, and it will vary from case to case across all sorts of narrative—we might equally feel we can safely indulge our sentiments when we read an account of the plight of slaves in the eighteenth century. This may not be a particularly attractive feature of the human personality, but it is one we should face up to. I suspect that this phenomenon, of allowing ourselves to indulge our feelings in our responses to fiction, when they are typically less directly connected to action, also sometimes applies to our less savory attitudes. For example, we may feel “safe”, up to a point, in allowing ourselves to indulge our hidden sadistic side when we read de Sade’s Juliette: we allow ourselves to have the narratively appropriate response—the one that goes along with de Sade—whilst holding on to the thought that this response is itself ethically inappropriate. But, in our experience of fictional works there is sometimes a resistance to this sort of emotional engagement, and it is to this third aspect of our emotional response to narratives that I now turn. It will emerge that emotional resistance is not unique to fictional works; the phenomenon is found too in our
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responses to narrative of real life non-actual events. So hopefully this discussion will further bolster my central thesis about narrative, and about the role of the narrator’s external perspective. III Hume, with a specific sort of example in mind, describes the phenomenon of emotional resistance as follows: Where any innocent peculiarities of manners are represented…they ought certainly to be admitted; and a man, who is shocked with them, gives an evident proof of false delicacy and refinement…. But where the ideas of morality and decency alter from one age to another, and where vicious manners are described, without being marked with the proper characters of blame and disapprobation; this must be allowed to disfigure the poem, and to be a real deformity. I cannot, nor is it proper I should, enter into such sentiments; and however I may excuse the poet, on account of the manners of his age, I never can relish the composition…. We are displeased to find the limits of vice and virtue so much confounded: And whatever indulgence we may give to the writer on account of his prejudices, we cannot prevail on ourselves to enter into his sentiments, or bear an affection to characters, which we plainly discover to be blameable. The case is not the same with moral principles, as with speculative opinions of any kind…. Whatever speculative errors may be found in the polite writings of any age or country, they detract but little from the value of these compositions. There needs but a certain turn of thought or imagination to make us enter into all the opinions, which then prevailed, and relish the sentiments or conclusions derived from them. But a very violent effort is required to change our judgements of manners, and excite sentiments of approbation or blame, love or hatred, different from those to which the mind from long custom has been familiarized. And where a man is confident of the rectitude of that moral standard, by which he judges, he is justly jealous if it, and will not pervert the sentiments of his heart for a moment, in complaisance to any writer whatsoever. (Hume 1985) As Hume points out in this passage, our imagination happily goes along with “speculative errors”; moreover, we are happy to imagine magical and miraculous goings-on: for example, the time machine that works in Back to the Future, and the miraculously cured disfigurement on the face of the priest in Graham Greene’s The End of the Affair. And we may also go along up to a point with ethically inappropriate responses, so long as they do not go deep. (“Innocent peculiarities of manners” are all right.) But where the narrator’s perspective invites us to share in values and responses that we consider to be ethically inappropriate in a significant
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way, we seem to reach a point where resistance sets in. There seems to be something special about morality here (see Moran 1994; Walton 1994a). In Hume’s view, we ought to consider the fictional work to be aesthetically less praiseworthy in virtue of this ethical deficiency. So, taking the hint from Hume, I will discuss this phenomenon of emotional resistance in the context of ethicism; this is, in the words of Berys Gaut, the view that “ethical assessment of attitudes manifested by works of art is a legitimate aspect of the aesthetic evaluation of those works” (Gaut 1998:182; cf. Carroll 1998b). Consider a fictional work—a novel—about a camp guard at Auschwitz who is assiduous at his tasks, and who takes great pride in his achievements, and in the achievements of those of his fellow guards who share in his values; he considers any signs of compassion for the inmates to be weak and contemptible. Yet let us assume that it is also made clear through the narrator’s external perspective that this man’s thoughts, feelings, and emotions were terribly, horribly wrong. What should ethicism have to say about this novel? In Gaut’s words, continuing the sentence quoted earlier, “if a work manifests ethically reprehensible attitudes, it is to that extent aesthetically defective, and if a work manifests ethically commendable attitudes, it is to that extent aesthetically meritorious” (Gaut 1998: 182). If this were all there were to ethicisrn, then this work would be aesthetically defective as it manifests the camp guard’s ethically reprehensible attitudes at the internal level. However, as Gaut makes perfectly clear, what matters here are the ethical attitudes that are revealed at the external level, and not those at the internal level. He says, “it is important to distinguish between the evil or insensitive characters represented by a work and the attitude the work displays toward those characters. Only the latter is relevant to the ethicist thesis” (Gaut 1998:188). So the answer to the question, according to Gaut, is that this novel about the camp guard will be aesthetically meritorious, and this is so only because of the attitudes revealed at the external level. If we are engaged fully with a fictional narrative, “carried along” by the narrator’s perspective, we do not just make-believe that the ethical values that the work invites us to share are correct; we really enter into the narrator’s values, as we are invited to do, and become really committed to the thought that what is narrated about their characters and their actions is, say, blameworthy, or praiseworthy. Having such narratively appropriate responses is part of what is involved in being a “good” reader. But when we are antecedently committed to different and opposing ethical values, we can begin to resist having the narratively appropriate responses, as they are discordant with what we know to be ethically appropriate. As Hume says in the passage cited above, “we cannot prevail on ourselves to enter into his [the narrator’s] sentiments, or bear an affection to characters, which we plainly discover to be blameable.” It is now easy to see how emotional resistance can also arise with real-life narratives. If I told you a story of my boorish behavior last week in a way that invited you to find it amusing and harmless, you would resist entering into my sentiments, as you would if, at a party, I suggested that you should plan to
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drive home, blind drunk as you are, and that you should feel proud of taking on such a challenge whilst drunk. As in the fictional examples, the emotional response that I, the narrator, invite you to share in—the narratively appropriate response— is discordant with what you consider to be ethically appropriate, and resistance sets in: you will not be carried along by my view on these matters. There are, however, some difficulties and complications with ethicism. First, it ought to be relevant to the ethicist thesis just how well the internal perspective is presented. Consider two different stories about the camp guard, both of which display, at the external level, ethically appropriate attitudes toward the narrative. One reveals the guard’s thoughts, feelings, and emotions in such a sensitive way that the reader is able to enter into his attitudes, and imagine feeling pride in such work, and contempt for colleagues who feel compassion for the inmates. The other story is told in a way that not only leaves the reader emotionally cold, but also leaves him mystified as to how anyone could behave in such a way. Would we not want to say that the first of these stories is an aesthetically better story, and that it is aesthetically better in part because of the tension that is set up between the attitudes revealed at the internal and the external level? In reading the first story, the reader enters into the mind of the camp guard, and sees just how someone like that (someone unnervingly like him, the reader) could have such feelings, and thereby becomes acquainted with badness in a way that the first story fails to achieve. And it is a better story for that (cf. Devereaux 1998). The same sort of point can be made about real-life narratives. When we read Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, we are told what happened with great sensitivity to the motivations and emotional responses of the perpetrators of the terrible slaughter of innocent civilians in Poland, and yet it is entirely clear that the narrator’s external attitudes are appropriate. Second, we need to consider narratives that reveal ethically inappropriate attitudes at the internal level but that are dispassionate at the external level. An immediate response to this is that dispassionateness is an inappropriate attitude here. And this is right: it is a profound mistake to think that dispassionateness is a merit in all cases. If, as Aristotle says, one should have the right feelings in the right way and at the right time, then there are occasions where one should have strong feelings; it is wrong to be dispassionate. I presume that Gaut would agree with this. But here is the complication. What of those occasions where dispassionateness (or at least trying to be dispassionate) is taken to be a merit: for example, in scientific enquiry, or in journalistic reporting? Perhaps we need to ask a further question: Why is this story being told at all? Stanley Milgram’s account of his obedience experiments (Milgram 1963, 1974), much of which is narrative in form, is praiseworthy for its dispassionateness in the interests of science (although Milgram’s own perspective is never entirely obscured from view). But surely we should take a different view of a dispassionate court report of a rape trial in The Times where the rape is related in full detail, or of a detailed but dispassionate report in The National Enquirer of a judicial execution by lethal
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injection. In such cases, surely, the very publication of the narrative is ethically inappropriate: regardless of its dispassionateness, it is published with the unexpressed intention of engendering in its readers a lurid interest, and an ethically inappropriate emotional response; indeed, the narrative could surely still be ethically inappropriate even if the external response had the appearance from the text of being ethically appropriate; reports in The Sun seem to me to be often like this: “see pages 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 for more on this unspeakably [sic] outrageous assault on an innocent young girl”. Some stories are better not told; others are better not told in such detail. The third point goes deeper, and I can only touch on it here. According to ethicism, as formulated by Gaut, if a narrative reveals an ethically inappropriate attitude at the external level, then this necessarily reduces its aesthetic value. Perhaps this is too strong. Perhaps, as Matthew Kieran puts it, “there can be and indeed are works whose value as art is enhanced in virtue of rather than despite their morally defective character” (Kieran, forthcoming). No doubt sometimes the ethical values revealed in a work can be such that emotional resistance sets in, so that we resist having the narratively appropriate emotional response, and, because this resistance can adversely affect our ability to appreciate the work qua work of art, its aesthetic value is reduced. But perhaps there are other works of art—call them dangerous— that impress on us a profound aesthetic appreciation of the appeal of what is ethically bad in a way that could not be fully achieved if the narrator’s external perspective were ethically appropriate—if it were, in effect, moralizing. Such dangerous works—dangerous because of their potential effect in the wrong hands—may have an aesthetic value that is, as Kieran has argued, enhanced in virtue of its ethically inappropriate values at the external level: only because of this can we come thereby to be truly acquainted with the beauty of badness. As Tolstoy said in the “Kreutzer Sonata,” it is amazing how complete is the delusion that beauty is goodness, and, one can now add, that badness is ugly. Examples are difficult here. Let me suggest two, where the main characters are morally bad, but the narrator’s perspective does not encourage the condemnation that it ethically should. In A Bout de Souffle, Jean-Luc Godard’s film, we are persuaded to see Michel, the character played with such style by Jean-Paul Belmondo, as really very likeable and charming; but here is someone who steals from his girlfriend, who kills policemen, and is generally bad. And in Mozart’s and da Ponte’s Don Giovanni, we are persuaded to see Don Giovanni in at least an ambiguous light: again, we come to see much that is likeable—even admirable— about someone who has on his record 1,003 women in Spain alone. In both, I suggest, the work would be aesthetically of less worth if it moralized about its main characters. Leaving such possibilities to one side, I need now to address the following question: at what point, in a particular case, does one cease to be carried along by the narrative, coming to a point at which emotional resistance sets in? Obviously, such a question does not have a simple answer, and, as I have already emphasized, there is no systematic divide between fictional and nonfictional narratives. All
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sorts of factors will be relevant in a particular case—for example, how imaginative one is; how emotionally “malleable” one is; what the subject matter is; the artifice of the narrative. But I would like to focus on just two factors: first, what ethical values one has; and second—an issue I have already discussed in part— how close and direct the connection is between emotional response and action. It reveals something about my values that I have, perhaps, less resistance toward a narrative that invites me to think of boorish behavior as meriting amusement than I have toward being invited to find wanton physical cruelty amusing; and perhaps being proud of driving whilst drunk is somewhere in between these. But emotional resistance can reveal more than this about the reader, for sometimes we might reach a point at which we ought to resist, given our considered ethical values, but we do not resist: the narrative has a terrible fascination and resonance for us. As I suggested earlier, we might find out to our surprise that we are carried along a lot further with de Sade’s Juliette than we thought we would be, and further than we think we ought to be, given our considered views about sadism. We begin to wonder whether we are after all capable of doing things like that, and whether it is not just a matter of luck that we have not been put in circumstances where the opportunity arises (cf. Devereaux 1998). In some such cases, the discordance and tension between the narratively appropriate response and the ethically appropriate response can become almost unbearable: one tries to stop reading or to turn away one’s eyes—not out of disgust or horror at the content of the narrative, but rather because one knows one is being drawn in, like a moth to the flame. The second factor that can affect emotional resistance that I want to discuss is how close and direct the connection is between emotional response and action, which, I have said, will vary from case to case, but typically, across comparable cases, will be less direct where the narrative is fictional. For example, Currie, in reading C.P.Snow’s novel, was willing to be carried along by the narrator’s values, and to respond accordingly; he knew that sympathy with the fate of Jago was ethically inappropriate, as Jago was intellectually mediocre in Currie’s view, but this did not seem to constrain his actually caring about Jago, and wanting him to succeed. But, as I suggested earlier, presumably Currie would have shown more emotional resistance if he was told that a real-life Jago-character was trying to get a chair in his own university department, or in some other university in which he has valued friends. And this would be so even if he were told this by someone who was an avid and eloquent supporter of “Jago”. What is relevant is only that Currie thought him mediocre, and that real-life Jago’s appointment would impinge on Currie’s future intellectual life. Freddie’s case is rather different. Freddie, like Currie, is more willing to be carried along emotionally by what is fictional (feeling deeply for the friends of Mark Hebden in The Archers) than he is by the real-life story (feeling little or nothing for his cousin whose friend has died). And Freddie, like Currie, is responding differently in the two cases because of the different connections between emotional response and action (as well as, perhaps, the extraordinary artifice of
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the British Broadcasting Corporation). But Freddie, unlike Currie, has revealed something ethically unattractive about himself: he fails to be carried along by the real-life narrative not because he is invited to respond emotionally in a way that he considers to be ethically inappropriate—in a way that goes against his ethical values; rather, he fails to be carried along because, selfishly, he does not want to be drawn into action. One might put it like this: merely thinking that his cousin needs help puts less psychological pressure on Freddie to help than if he were genuinely emotionally engaged. The thing about Freddie is not only that he does not really care about his cousin; he does not really care about Mark Hebden’s friends either—he only pretends to care, indulging himself in an overly sentimental way, because he knows that they are not real-life characters, so there is no risk of being drawn into action. But remember the point that the connection to action is not necessarily less direct where fiction is concerned than it is in comparable real-life narratives: fictional and real-life narratives could have the same sort of content and the same sort of connection to action. For example, we might resist entering very far into the emotional responses encouraged by Leni Riefenstahl in The Triumph of the Will, her documentary of the 1934 Nuremberg rally; but I dare say we would be just about equally resistant to a fictional movie, set roughly in the present day, involving the same sort of people as Hitler and his followers, and inviting the same sort of response as Riefenstahl did to Hitler. In both these cases, there is clearly a direct connection between emotional response and action, for the characters portrayed could so easily have their counterparts in present day real life. In contrast, we might not resist being carried along by a narrative that sought to get us to see that there was something glorious about Aztec human sacrifice, in spite of our considering human sacrifice to be terrible, and this would be equally the case whether the narrative was a work of fiction set in those times or a historical account of what actually happened. In both these non-actual narratives, fictional and real life, the connection to action is, one hopes, remote: a real-life world, with me in it, containing racist National Socialists is a much closer one than a world containing organized rituals of human sacrifice. Thus, by considering three aspects of our emotional responses to narratives of non-actual events—the connection to belief and to action, our willingness to be emotionally carried along by the narrative, and our emotional resistance—I hope to have bolstered my thesis, with which I began this chapter, that the notion of narrative, and the narrator’s external perspective that is involved in narrative, have a centrally important explanatory role. Acknowledgments A number of people have helped me with earlier versions of this chapter. I would especially like to thank Matthew Kieran and David Papineau for their comments, and, as editors, Matthew (again) and Dom Lopes for all their help. My debt in this chapter to the writing of Greg Currie and Richard Moran will be evident.
4 IN SEARCH OF A NARRATIVE Matthew Kieran
What’s involved in the appreciation of narrative artworks? How do we come to understand characters, what they are thinking, feeling, what their underlying attitudes are, what the nature of their character is? In virtue of what do we come to care about them? In trying to address these questions I will go some way toward articulating a conception of narrative understanding. Part of the thrust of the argument is negative since it aims to show that imagination, construed in terms of simulation, cannot be as central as some recent authors have suggested. Through showing how and why this is so, we will arrive at a more complex grasp of the nature of narrative appreciation. But I will also go on to give a more positive characterization of the ways in which we arrive at a deep and full understanding of fictional characters in artistic narratives. In seeking to distinguish and clarify some of the ways we do so I will discuss notions of narrative understanding, character, empathy, sympathy, imaginativeness and expressive qualities. Expressivity In relation to narrative appreciation it has been claimed that simulation, which involves taking on pretended or simulated beliefs, is fundamental (Currie 1995a; Feagin 1996; Oatley and Gholamain 1997). The claims made for simulation theory are most clearly articulated by Gregory Currie who holds that simulation is central to both working out what is fictionally the case, primarily with respect to a character’s experience, and with regard to how and why we care about and affectively respond to fictional characters (Currie 1995a:153–4). Of course there are many cases where we do not use simulation, since we are told what state a character is in or the type of character, and we can understand our responses to those passages without taking into account simulation (Carroll 1998a). Furthermore it seems unproblematic to grant that some degree of narrative understanding is required for simulating a character or the sort of beliefs and feelings a character is represented as having. So I take the simulation thesis really to be the more nuanced claim that:
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(1) When I want to really understand the nature of a character’s experience and their attitude toward their own experience (what their character is really like), then I need to simulate. A deep understanding of fictional characters requires simulation, though a shallow understanding of them need not. (2) In order to capture the full nature of our affective responses to a narrative, we must understand the simulation process that we go through as readers— because that simulation process is central to our acquiring an understanding of characters. Now we are often told much about a character or they are represented as being certain types of people. With respect to situations, characters and allusions we have a stock of schemas, often based on certain prototypes, which enables us to recognize certain states, characteristics and make assumptions about various interrelations therein (Carroll 1998a). There is a fair amount of psychological evidence to support the claim that we standardly employ prototypes, schemas and general categorization in making sense of the states people are in and attributing certain characteristics to them (Farr and Moscovici 1984; Fiske and Taylor 1984). Thus rhetorical devices, drawing the readers attention to particular features of the character, their behavior and the use of both direct and indirect discourse enables us to identify characters as being certain types of people. The representation of actions, facial expressions, gestures, body language and tone of voice characteristic of certain states are all used in ways that, given what we discern about the context, give rise to a recognition of the state the fictional character is in. Importantly such characterization is often used to help the reader identify more fundamental features of a fictional person’s character. For example, when the reader first encounters the Steele sisters in Austen’s Sense and Sensibility they are represented as paying an overly felicitous attention to Lady Middleton’s spoilt children. Their endurance and excessive affection are clearly marks of fundamental features of their character: prudential self-interest allied with a craven willingness to be sycophantic. Furthermore, the imagery and allusions deployed by an author may intimate to the reader what type of person they should recognize the fictional character to be. In Anna Karenina Vronsky is characterized as a splendid animal, much given to affected physicality and the self-admiration of his physical features. Thus we are already given a fair idea of the kind of person Vronsky is, the kind of charm he possesses, the ways in which he loves athletic games, his regiment and St Petersburg society. For, amongst other things, he is the kind of narcissistic person who loves things, activities and people by virtue of the way they reflect his own self-adoration. Even if we assume claims (1) and (2) are perfectly true there is a question to be asked about how important they are. Most fiction bestsellers can be read without having to simulate much because the authors often do not set up situations or characters in such a way that simulation would be profitable or interesting enough. Simulation hardly seems to offer much in relation to works such as Harry Potter or the works of Jeffrey Archer. So even if the forementioned claims are right
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and simulation is required for a deep understanding of characters in say the novels of Henry James, for most narrative reading simulation is probably quite worthless. Furthermore, to see why these claims cannot be right consider the opening to Dickens’ Hard Times: “Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else. You can only form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts: nothing else will ever be of any service to them. This is the principle on which I bring up my own children, and this is the principle on which I bring up these children. Stick to Facts, Sir!” The scene was a plain, bare monotonous vault of a schoolroom, and the speaker’s square forefinger emphasized his observations by underscoring every sentence with a line on the schoolmaster’s sleeve. The emphasis was helped by the speaker’s square wall of a forehead, which had his eyebrows for its base, while his eyes found commodious cellarage in two dark caves, overshadowed by the wall. The emphasis was helped by the speaker’s mouth; which was wide, thin, and hard set. The emphasis was helped by the speaker’s voice, which was inflexible, dry and dictatorial. The emphasis was helped by the speaker’s hair, which bristled on the skirts of his bald head, a plantation of firs to keep the wind from its shining surface, all covered with knobs, like the crust of a plum pie, as if the head had scarcely warehouse-room for the hard facts stored inside. The speaker’s obstinate carriage, square coat, square legs, square shoulders—nay, his very neckcloth, trained to take him by the throat with an unaccommodating grasp, like a stubborn fact, as it was— all helped the emphasis. “In this life, we want nothing but Facts, Sir; nothing but Facts!” The speaker, and the schoolmaster, and the third grown person present, all backed a little, and swept with their eyes the inclined plane of little vessels then and there arranged in order, ready to have imperial gallons of facts poured into them until they were full to the brim. Our understanding of Gradgrind, arrived at via the prescribed imaginings, is not a function of imagining myself to be in the schoolmaster’s position, imagining myself to be him in what I imagine or indeed imagining myself to be anyone at all. So even if what is going on here is a case of imagining myself to be in the fictional world it does not seem that it is or must be a case of simulating any of the characters, whether it be the schoolmaster or one of the onlookers, since I may imagine that I am peripherally observing the scene. Furthermore, it does not seem as if any form of imagining concerning myself is prescribed or required—I may just imagine that the scene unfolds as it is characterized. In either case no fictional character is being simulated in any way. It might be objected that even where we are just imagining the scene nonetheless we are simulating—we are not imagining
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the scene from the perspective of one of the fictional characters but from that of the implied narrator. So centrally imagining a character is not notably required to grasp their experience and we need not advert to the simulation of such a narrator as opposed to recognizing the state Gradgrind is represented as being in and what his putative attitudes are. Thus central imagining, whether of a fictional character or narrator, is just not required to both grasp and affectively respond to the character of Gradgrind as portrayed. Furthermore, and just as crucially, I need not imagine “being someone” in the weak sense of just “taking on” the sorts of thoughts and responses Gradgrind is portrayed as having in order to understand him. What information is unavailable to us without simulation here? Here’s a case where we can arrive at a deep understanding of a character. When I read the opening passage of Hard Times I pick up on Gradgrind’s harsh, brutal and emphatic tone, his austere, rigidified, overly rationalistic conception of education and his underlying attitude of commercialism. In part apprehending the way Gradgrind is portrayed as being expressive of these attitudes is a function of the other possible ways in which Gradgrind could have been portrayed. His tone of voice could have been represented as being tentative, wavering and mournful. He could have been represented as saying that it was unfortunate that the school system required the drumming in of facts. He could even have been represented as being somewhat sanguine about this form of education. Whereas what Gradgrind does is identify himself wholeheartedly with the application of the conception of education represented. Furthermore had the manner of Gradgrind’s behavior been different, though the same beliefs and desires might have been expressed, we would have a different understanding of him. So what Gradgrind’s actions are expressive of is partly a function of what other actions and manner of so doing he could have been represented as enacting but did not. If he thought this form of education inhuman or harmful to the children then his tone and choice of words would not have been eulogistic but sorrowful. If he had thought that “possession of facts” were by no means what was required for life he would have been derogatory or perhaps even abusive of the school before him. By contrast if he were merely sanguine about the state of affairs he might merely have shrugged the scene off and not bothered to comment on it. Given the conventional artistic devices used, and the expressive tone and tenor of the representation, I come to see that Gradgrind is proud of the school system, its application, underlying ideals and identifies wholeheartedly with a broadly utilitarian attitude toward life and others. Already we have a deep and sophisticated grasp of Gradgrind. But in no way was simulation required to arrive at such an understanding. I’m not simulating Gradgrind or an observer or a narrator or even just simulating holding the kind of thoughts Gradgrind is represented as having. In the very first few paragraphs we feel as if we have got into Gradgrind’s mind and character very deeply indeed without any simulation. No doubt someone might be tempted to claim that we still rely on simulation here in the following way. Even in cases where the author writes “Gradgrind is proud” or the expressive tone and tenor of the characterization suggests this, if we
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had not done some appropriate and quite specific simulating in the past we would not understand the author. So though there may be no present simulating, past simulation is required. To understand “is proud” we have to simulate it. So later on when we encounter the term or its associated expressive aspects we do not have to simulate just because we already have some simulation-based understanding to hand. But not only does the simulation account now rest on speculative child psychology but, more importantly, it is uninteresting. For the interesting and robust claim was that the process of simulating the beliefs, desires and attitudes of a character or, more minimally, simulating the same sort of beliefs, desires and attitudes that such a character has, was required in engaging with the work in order to understand and appreciate the narrative. Blocking simulation and the role of memory At least in certain kinds of cases it is important not to simulate. For simulating a character’s states may not only be unnecessary but may actively distort our understanding of them. One might be tempted here, as an obvious example, to cite instances where we are prescribed to imagine that a character is subconsciously motivated or self-deceived. It is common in narratives for fictional characters to be mistaken about their own mental states, dispositions and character whereas it may be clear to the reader exactly what is motivating the character and why. But, one might think, were one simulating the character this would not be the case. Why? Because a reader’s successful simulation of a character would mimic the structure of the unconscious motivation or self-deception and the reader would thus arrive at the same mistaken self-understanding that the fictional character has. But this is standardly not the case precisely because the reader appreciates the character in ways they themselves do not—and this cannot be a function of simulating them. Now the example here will not quite do the work. For, it may be replied, this is to confuse what is being simulated with the object of the simulation. Consider, for example, Olivier’s famous portrayal of Hamlet. Hamlet, who for the sake of argument is the object of our simulation, is portrayed as being unconsciously motivated for Freudian reasons. Of course, if we were seeking to simulate that which Hamlet is conscious of, in terms of his thoughts and desires, we would not simulate the darker Freudian drives Hamlet is portrayed as having. But precisely because Hamlet is portrayed in a manner that suggests an overweening dependence on his mother, an overly felicitous attention to her every state and whim, apparently jealous overreactions to her sexual affections placed elsewhere and a sensual attention to the look and feel of her, the performance prescribes us to imagine that he is so unconsciously motivated. And, the thought goes, just as we can make sense of someone acting out the part of someone so unconsciously motivated so we too can simulate such unconscious motivation. And a veridical simulation would indeed do just that. The difference lies not in what is being simulated and the state the fictional character is portrayed as being in but, rather,
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the asymmetry between what we are aware of informationally regarding what gets factored into the simulation and what, fictionally, Hamlet is aware of as shaping his beliefs and desires. Notice, first, that the reply relies on us already having grasped much about the character, including that they are self-deceived in certain ways, so it is far from clear that simulation is required to understand the character rather than attention to the expressive aspects of the work and performance. Second, despite the simulationist reply, if I am too successful in simulating the states of characters represented then I may not be in an appropriate position to discern their important features. The parallel with acting here may be instructive. I once heard recounted the following tale: Dustin Hoffman and Laurence Olivier were acting together on Marathon Man and Olivier was beginning to grow impatient with Hoffman continually delaying shooting because he felt he could not quite get “inside” the skin of his character. After one interminable delay Olivier finally asked Hoffman what his problem was and Hoffman duly replied that he could not “feel” what the character was supposed to be feeling. To which Olivier rather acidly replied “Well, my dear boy, you could always try acting.” The sharp point of the barb is that what is crucial in acting concerns whether or not the manner of acting is appropriately expressive of certain states and cognitive—affective attitudes. And not only need this not but often had better not involve simulation. Simulating Hamlet’s states may preclude the actor from acting—Daniel Day Lewis’s famous walk out halfway through a performance of Hamlet followed by his absconding from the production as a whole might be a salutary lesson here. For Day Lewis, renowned for his emphasis on method acting, apparently could not cope with playing Hamlet precisely because it paralyzed his capacity to perform the play. Less dramatically, simulations of the states of dramatic characters would often preclude actors from performing as they are required to in order to convey or express the characters’ thoughts and feelings. Just consider, for example, how common it is for characters represented as being in a state of uncontrollable grief to articulate in complex verbal form the nature of their grief, enunciated clearly, with rhetorical repetition of key words for emphasis. Yet uncontrollable grief (and presumably any veridical simulation thereof) is usually manifested in sobbing and wailing that muffles speech and paralyzes complex verbal thought in the face of sheer horror at the loss of whatever or whomever is being mourned—it is uncontrollable. In these kinds of cases simulation is not merely unnecessary but serves to preclude the appropriate dramatic expression of the character’s states and attitudes required by the play. Now just as an actor’s simulation of the state of a dramatic character may preclude them from enacting the requisite expressive aspects of their performance, so too the simulation of a character by a reader may preclude them from being able to discern features that are crucial to their understanding of the character and their situation. If one were to simulate certain states of characters, such as blind terror, utter subsumption of self in sexual ecstasy, sheer panic, uncontrollable grief, blind anger or all consuming fury, then
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presumably it would be very difficult indeed if not nigh impossible to switch attention to other features of the narrative. For the point about such states is precisely that they are supposed to be all consuming and uncontrollable. Hence in such cases simulating the particular character’s experience is neither required, since one can grasp the characteristics of such states without simulation, nor sufficient for understanding the character since the reader would then be blocked from attending to other crucial expressive aspects of the text. Perhaps this is to overstate the case somewhat. After all the simulationist could acknowledge that if one were to spend the whole time simulating such states then one would get nowhere. But surely the point is that to really understand the rage or grief of a character some simulation has to be undergone but this is consistent with my being able to read on with a vivid, tangible sense of the relevant state. So I start to feel something akin to rage or grief building up in me, identifying the states ostensively, and am thereby reminded as to what states in that locale really are like without thereby delving too deeply into them. Now I know the types of feelings involved and what the character is feeling since I’ve just been subject to something like it myself. If I had not simulated then I would not understand the depth or true nature of the state the character is in. So simulation here may be required only to “tease” oneself with such emotions or ones in their locale and then read on with the vivid memory of them at hand. But without the vivid memory all I’d have is a very shallow understanding indeed. But if this is the response I do not see what the appeal of simulation is here. First, the claim has been weakened from simulation of the sort of states the character is subject to being required, to the simulation of states that are in the same sort of locale or region. Thus simulation of the same sort of state is not now required to ostensively identify it. Second, and more significant, simulation is not required to do this. Indeed more often surely we advert to memory. In the case of familiar emotions we just remember what they are like—I might recall the feeling of betrayal say in which case I am not simulating an emotion but recalling it. In the case of unfamiliar emotions we grasp the contours of the state from the description and the way in which it is thus relatable to those emotions we are familiar with and have been subject to. Character traits We often apprehend the character or personality traits of fictional characters in what we imagine but it would be odd to think these are simulated. The logic of character traits is not susceptible to simulation. For character traits as such are not experienced since, minimally, they are dispositions to act in certain ways. Now it could be objected that character traits can be simulated since though they are dispositions, they are dispositions to have certain emotions or respond emotionally in certain ways. But this cannot be right. At best one can simulate emotional states consistent with certain character traits, but then there are many emotions consistent with a particular trait, and any given emotional state is consistent with
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many character traits. So we need to say more about the relations between traits and emotional states. First, not all character traits are even in the first instance reducible to the disposition to feel certain emotions. A considerate person is one who is disposed to take care to register and treat as important the feelings, thoughts, needs and desires of others. Such a disposition does not connect to or have any internal connection to any particular emotional state. Someone can be considerate without feeling any particular way about the state of affairs or person their attention is directed toward. And clearly one can be considerate whether one feels sad, angry, sanguine, resentful or a whole host of other emotional states. Second, even those character traits that look as if they are amenable to being treated as temperaments cannot be so characterized. Pride, for example, looks as if it is a disposition to feel self-satisfied. But being disposed to feel self-satisfied is not the same kind of thing as pride. One can, after all, be self-satisfied without being proud in any way. Pride, rather, is constituted by a tendency to overestimate or over value the nature of one’s achievements or character. And one can be proud without feeling self-satisfied, be proud whilst yet feeling unhappy at what one has failed to achieve or proud without any concomitant affective feeling whatsoever. Character traits are, minimally, internalized dispositions to act, respond or apprehend in cognitive-affective terms in accordance with a regulative principle. From the third-person perspective the character trait of pride may be captured in terms of someone who always overrates their thoughts, actions and achievements. The content of the injunction from the character’s viewpoint, which is internalized and regulates a proud man’s thoughts, actions and attitudes, might then be captured by something like the principle “always value highly your character and achievements”. And the internalized disposition to regulate oneself thus cannot be simulated. One can only come to the appropriate judgments concerning what traits a character possesses, and their particular nature, by coming to grasp certain narrative relations that obtain as their character is shown to develop. Consider, for example, Austen’s Pride and Prejudice. Thematically the book develops from a scenario where both Elizabeth and Darcy are proud in different respects and are prejudiced against each other as a result. Their characters develop from the various injuries to their pride and the subsequent insight afforded them, ultimately leading to the restoration of a less partial pride to each other. From what we are told about Darcy, his behavior and manner of expression we learn that Darcy possesses highly idealized standards of propriety and has received unqualified approval and admiration from his parents. Hence we come to see his pride. But as the story develops we discern that his pride is both narcissistic and insecure. His defensive manner, his habit of scorning others and solicitations of praise suggest the particular nature of his pride. Hence it is intelligible just why he should both assume Elizabeth would admire him as all others apparently do and why it is a severe blow to him that he should be rebuffed. Only by coming to see his behavior as Elizabeth has viewed it does he come to the self-realization that he
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has failed to live up to his high ideals and only when he reshapes himself accordingly and wins her approval does his pride come to be better founded. Simulation is neither necessary nor sufficient for grasping the fundamental traits of Darcy’s character, since traits cannot themselves be simulated, and yet understanding his traits is crucial to our grasp of particular episodes, his character development and the thematic development of the novel. Narrative appreciation How do we arrive at narrative understanding then? In a molecular and symbiotic way that makes use of many of the features I’ve adverted to. First of all we are guided by what states the work explicitly tells us a character is in, the type he is identified as being and what we are prescribed to imagine about them. In imagining a character’s behavior, their facial expressions, gestures, intonation we come to an initial judgment. For example, that Gradgrind is feeling bullish or that Othello is horrified. Any deeper understanding requires a grasp of what the objects of their cognitive-affective thoughts, feelings and attitudes are and the ways in which they think of and respond to them. There are many ways in which a work can do this but we should at least consider a few. A work may prescribe us to imagine a character in terms of certain expressive qualities we relate to concepts we already possess. For example, we know that people are animals, and as such are partly driven by animalistic drives and appetites, but this is not always at the forefront of our apprehension of people or characters. An author may seek to make this vivid in the apprehension of a character’s behavior, as animalistic, in order to give us a deeper understanding of the base drives or vulgar aspects that dominate him. In portraying the behavior of a character as bestial, say, we may be prescribed to imagine him as being akin to a leader of a pack of dogs on the prowl, to imagine his glances as wolverine, to imagine the deference of others in terms of the recognition of a pack leader and so on. Second, a work may seek to extend or modify our initial apprehension of the states of a character. For example, as the narrative structure of Othello progresses I come to see Othello’s reactions in certain situations as being crucially interrelated. I see his slowness to anger, his romantic and trusting nature, his horror at Iago’s initial speculations, I see his increasing agitation as being related to a personal sense of insecurity that Iago cultivates and exploits and as I come to see how he descends into jealousy proper I come to understand the interrelations therein that explain the highly noble nature of both his jealousy and his actions. Hence it is a great tragedy. Our narrative understanding can also become increasingly refined by coming to apprehend expressive qualities in terms of newly acquired concepts or ever finer distinctions amongst concepts we possess. For example, we imagine Darcy’s reaction to Elizabeth’s rebuff as one of anger but are only later struck by the particular kind of anger involved and what it stems from—the way in which his
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sullen pout, glowering facial expression, arms crossed and body deliberately turned away are expressive of a petulant anger, which is the mark of injured pride. Our narrative understanding of a character can be further deepened by the sudden apprehension of new connections between and interrelations amongst expressive features. Austen, for example, often represents a character glancing elsewhere whilst conversing as being expressive of a desire to seek socially significant people out. She also tends to represent over solicitous flattery as being expressive of a yearning desire to please or be well thought of and overly felicitous shows of formality and manners as expressive of a particular kind of vulgarity of mind. But in reading Sense and Sensibility one is suddenly struck by the way in which Lucy Steele is portrayed as exhibiting all these qualities and the ways in which they are all interconnected; how her seeking out of others whilst in conversation stands in stark incongruity with the showy drawing of attention to formal courtesies, how the highlighted show of manners serves to block rather than ease social interaction and how the insensitivity to ease social interaction expresses a vulgar lack of interest in and respect for others. This is not to mention the figurative, symbolic and metaphoric allusions that are commonplace or the many uses of different perspectives on a character’s actions which serve, indirectly, to afford the reader a much deeper grasp of character. Whether episodic or over a more extended range, our grasp of a character gives rise to and symbiotically interacts with our narrative understanding. For understanding is not merely a matter of knowing what mental state a character is in at t1, followed by knowing what mental state they are in at t2 and so on. It requires, furthermore, some degree of overarching understanding as to how and why those states are connected with each other and thus make sense in relation to one another. I do not deny that simulation may play a role here—imagining that I am in a character’s place or that I am them may aid me in following the kinds of responses that help to make sense of their consequent mental states. But again this already depends upon our imaginative apprehension and understanding of the particular character and the kind of person they are or are likely to become. Someone who lacks imaginativeness in this sense lacks neither standard powers of observation nor the capacity to imagine they think or feel something—for example, in reading a novel they can adequately imagine a character seeing certain things, where they move their hands when they talk and can imagine holding the beliefs or having the feelings being reported to them. Rather what they lack, or at least possess only to a very low degree, is the capacity to appreciate the manner of the portrayal, to see them as an instantiation of finely variegated types of people, to discriminate between the appropriate associations or connotations of different uses of language, to grasp an action in terms of relevant contrasts and metaphorical associations and make the right kinds of judgments concerning the nature and interrelations of character traits to the character’s states. Any kind of understanding of particular characters primarily depends upon the expressive qualities or manner of their behavior and actions as represented. One
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then attempts to make sense of what one apprehends in their imagined action, what one recognizes it as expressive of and the various associations, analogies, connections, types and what one may metaphorically perceive the action in terms of in relation to some narrative. The narrative understanding arrived at is then assumed as a defeasible explanation that best makes sense of how and why the person’s manner is as it is and how their mental states relate both to their situation and their basic character traits. Only then are we in any position to attempt any kind of imaginative simulation or reenactment regarding their mental states with any hope or degree of verisimilitude. Thus it is crucial that we distinguish imaginative apprehension, where we recognize the expressive qualities of a character’s action, from the fictional reenactment of a character’s mental states involved in imaginative simulation. The former concerns the different ways in which the prepositional attitudes and cognitive-affective states generally may be expressed. Our imaginative apprehension of them is required in order to even be in a position to attempt an imaginative reenactment of the mental states of a particular character in the first place—for such imaginative recognition is prior to, constrains and informs imaginative simulation. Hence someone whose powers of imagination in the sense of entertaining mental states is great may, nonetheless, not be very good at all at understanding particular characters in literary narratives since their powers of imaginative apprehension may be coarse and uncultivated. In such a case the simulation will be insufficiently constrained and informed by a discriminating imaginative apprehension of the manner of the represented actions, behavior and character. Of course, we are sometimes at a loss as to what a character is thinking and feeling precisely because the characterization proffered, deliberately or otherwise, is relatively thin. In such cases we no doubt naturally do ask ourselves “what on earth would I have to think and feel in order to be doing that”. And here the role of simulation may come to the fore. But these kinds of cases do not constitute the norm. What is needed is a rich, complex theory of how the above features of narrative understanding are interlinked and this is something simulation as such cannot provide. Sympathy for fictional characters The grounds for skepticism regarding the centrality of simulation to grasping what is fictionally the case regarding characters do not, however, affect the claims that simulation is central to explaining how and why we care about fictional characters. In what follows I shall concentrate on the paradigmatic cases of sympathy and empathy. Stephen Darwall has argued that sympathy generally depends upon empathic simulation and the degree to which one cannot empathize is the degree to which one is unable to be sympathetic toward another (Darwall 1998). If true then empathic simulation must be what explains how and why we are sympathetic with respect to fictional characters. Susan Feagin, in contrast to Currie’s more generalist aspirations, claims simulation is merely one of the many processes involved in narrative appreciation (Feagin 1996). Feagin
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seems undecided as to whether sympathetic or anti-pathetic responses involve empathic simulation but she has argued that simulation gives us an informative account of empathy. Let us consider sympathy. Initially it may seem puzzling as to why one might think that sympathy for fictional characters should be primarily explained in terms of our empathic reenactment of their states and situation. After all, sympathy seems to involve taking up a cognitive-affective attitude toward a character’s situation that involves recognizing and commiserating with their difficulties. Sympathy is thus tightly tied to a concern for the good and well-being of a character. But why think this must be tied to the simulation of what a character is thinking and feeling? For one can recognize the nature of a character’s plight as represented, care for them and thus respond sympathetically, without having simulated the same sort of suffering or feelings the character is represented as having. I sympathize with the children in Gradgrind’s school, for example, but I do not imagine myself experiencing the same sort of pain, deprivation and suffering. For what is crucial is not that I simulate their experience as represented but that I care about it. However, Darwall argues that sympathy should properly be construed as an emotion of a particular form that depends upon empathic simulation. Darwall’s characterization of sympathy is as follows: It is a feeling or emotion that (a) responds to some apparent threat or obstacle to an individual’s good or well-being, (b) has that individual himself as object, and (c) involves concern for him, and thus for his well-being, for his sake. Seeing the child on the verge of falling, one is concerned for his safety, not just for its (his safety’s) sake, but for his sake. One is concerned for him. Sympathy for the child is a way of caring for (and about) him. (Darwall 1998:261) Darwall claims, with reference to C.D.Batson’s experimental psychological work on the “Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis”, that sympathy naturally arises from the capacity to empathize (Batson 1991; Batson and Shaw 1991). In one of Batson’s experiments students are played an audio tape of “Carol” who they believe to be one of their class members. They hear that Carol has missed a month of term because she’s been in hospital as the result of an accident. The subjects of the experiment are then asked if they will help. There’s a “difficult escape” scenario where Carol will return to class next week and an “easy escape” scenario where she will be studying at home. According to Batson, where the subjects are drawn into empathizing by imagining what Carol is feeling the tendency to help shown even in the “easy escape scenario” is markedly high. The likely explanation, according to Darwall, is that the high empathy subjects feel vicarious distress as a function of their empathic reenactment of what Carol is feeling. They thereby come to be distressed not merely at Carol’s plight but on her behalf, that is, come to desire relief for her sake. Thus empathy gives rise to sympathy; the latter is a higher-order emotional response dependent on the former. An important feature
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of Darwall’s characterization of sympathy, with which I agree, is that the form of sympathy is individual-regarding. The desires and feelings bound up with sympathy do not just have prepositional objects, for example, that Carol gets better and makes up her classes. Rather the form of sympathetic concern is partly constituted by the non-propositional “indirect objects” it takes, for example, I desire for Carol’s sake that she get better and make up class. We can see how easily this kind of explanation in the ordinary case smoothly transfers across to the case of fictional characters. Where a work manages to get me to empathically reenact the plight of a fictional character I am more likely to be distressed for them as opposed to merely recognizing that a fictional character is in a dire state of affairs. Darwall is not alone in characterizing sympathy as an emotion. For example, Peter Goldie has argued that sympathy is a basic emotion, though he does not claim that sympathy depends upon empathy (Goldie 2000). However, it strikes me as odd, to say the least, to conceive of it thus. Sympathy seems more like a standing state or condition that is constituted by an attitude toward someone, albeit one where we are concerned for another person for their own sake. The assumption that sympathy is an emotion seems to rest on a conflation of sympathy with compassion or the occurrent emotional response of pity. But that it is a conflation can be shown by the following considerations. First, there is no distinctive phenomenology that constitutes the affective aspect of sympathy. My sympathy for someone can be concomitant with the affective phenomenology of fear, since I am afraid for them, sadness, since I am sorry for them, anger, since I am enraged on their behalf. It’s not even obvious that being sympathetic for someone precludes certain more positive emotional responses such as feeling delighted for someone. After all, I might be sympathetic for someone because they find it hard to choose between living in London or Rome. I would truly sympathize if a friend of mine had to make such a decision but the sympathy would be concomitant with delight for them that they are faced with such an enviable (though I believe a rather difficult) choice. Second, having sympathy for someone does not entail feeling pity, compassion or fellow feeling for them. A friend tells me of their romantic troubles and I may be moved to intercede on their behalf. I am disposed to take pity on them because I recognize their plight and they are my friend. But this does not depend upon my having any occurrent emotional response whatsoever. I may neither feel the desperation they themselves are subject to nor sorrow at their desperation and yet may still be strongly moved to act because I desire what is good for them and recognize their plight. Indeed, I may even have sympathy for their plight and not act at all if I judge that continuance of their romantic entanglements would clearly be bad for them. The crucial point here though is that having sympathy for someone is conceptually independent of occurrent emotional responses. Sympathy is thus better characterized as a standing state or condition constituted by an attitude of concern for someone for their own sake (one desires what is best for them), which disposes one to act in their
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interests. As such it is conceptually independent of rather than constituted by any occurrent emotional response. Still, it might be asked, why does it matter that sympathy proper is a standing state rather than an occurrent emotional response? The form of Darwall’s argument seems unaffected and the claim, that sympathy arises as a function of the empathic reenactment of a person’s or fictional character’s pitiful plight, still stands. But this is not the case. If sympathy were an emotion then Darwall’s claim would have more plausibility than if we construe it, as I have argued we should, as a standing state. Consider the following contrast between sympathy proper and an emotion such as fear. If I am normally afraid of being threatened with physical violence then I both should and will, ceteris parabis, feel fear where I empathically reenact the position of another who is so threatened. This is because the emotional response, in both cases, arises as a function of the intrinsic properties of this kind of situation. There is a relation of fit between situations that present themselves as being highly threatening and feeling the emotion of fear. This is not the case with sympathy. If I am normally sympathetic with respect to my friend’s romantic entanglements it neither does not nor should it necessarily follow, ceteris parabis, that I am sympathetic with respect to someone else who is similarly romantically caught up. This is so even were I to pay attention to all the intrinsic properties of the comparative situations and were to find them alike in all respects. It’s important to realize that this is not merely a matter of psychology for the difference here is blameless. Why is this? What matters in the case of sympathy, in a way that does not hold true in the case of fear, is what the external relations are that obtain between the person in the romantic entanglements and myself. In the case of my friend I have an attitude of sympathy because I care for him and I care for him because I take certain relations to hold between us—of trust, affection, self-revelation and an overarching attitude of mutual regard. In the case of just anyone such relations do not hold and thus I am neither constrained as a matter of normative or psychological necessity to be sympathetic. Of course, I can come to be sympathetic with respect to someone who is not a friend in such a situation. But what this depends upon is a matter of the relations that are made salient as holding between myself and the other person. So the standing state of sympathy with respect to someone, given they are in a pitiful plight, is a function of the relations perceived to hold between myself and themselves as opposed to being a straightforward function of empathic reenactment. It is the crucial importance of perceived external relations and overarching attitudes toward those relations that explain why empathy, in and of itself, is neither necessary nor sufficient for sympathy. I can be sympathetic for someone without having empathized with them since my overarching attitude toward them and my perception of their relations to myself may be such that where their plight is made salient to me, for example, I may observe it or it may be reported to me in more or less vivid terms, I am sympathetic toward them. Conversely I can empathize with someone, in the sense of imaginatively reenact what I take them to be thinking and feeling, and yet fail to be sympathetic because of my
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overarching attitude and how I perceive the relevant external relations to be. Empathizing with an enemy or someone I consider to be feckless may, for example, only serve to enhance my contempt for them rather than inculcating sympathy. Darwall himself does concede, with reference to Batson’s study, “it might be that the subjects had some standing desire or principle to aid others in need and that empathy simply makes Carol’s need more evident than it would otherwise have been.” It is just that he thinks the “more likely possibility is that the vicarious distress that high empathy subjects feel comes to have a new object, namely Carol and her predicament” (Darwall 1998:274). A more adequate way of characterizing the alternative possibility being dismissed is that the subjects may already have had a standing disposition to be sympathetic with respect to those they perceive to be in bad circumstances and closely related to themselves. Nonetheless, the simulationist may reply, where the subjects empathically reenacted Carol’s predicament there was a higher percentage of students who perceived their relations to Carol as being more relevantly close to themselves than in the scenario where they were merely informed of her predicament. Thus, as a psychological rather than a conceptual matter, empathic reenactment of another’s plight is more likely to render salient the perception of external relations upon which sympathy depends. There is no conceptual dependence of sympathy upon empathy, nor does sympathy arise as a straightforward function of empathy but empathy is, putatively as a matter of psychological fact, more likely to highlight the kind of external relations required to give rise to (but of themselves insufficient for) sympathy. It is important to note that the experiments themselves do not justify even this conclusion. Reports of Carol’s situation were contrasted with the audio-tape of her. But it does not follow that what does all of the work in the audio-tape case is empathy, since much of the relevant work may just be psychological presentism induced by hearing Carol’s voice, the expressiveness in her voice and the expressive characterization of her experiences. Moreover, it’s not obvious that a brief second hand report of her condition is the right kind of contrast. If subjects had been presented with, for example, a second hand characterization of her plight in the style of Dickens, say, they might well have showed the same responses or perhaps an even higher response rating of sympathy as those subjects exposed to the audiotape. For the vividness and expressiveness of the characterization of her experience and the ways in which this helped to make salient her relations to the subjects of the experience could be just as powerful without calling upon them to empathize with Carol’s experiences. Nonetheless, I think there is some reason to hold that empathy is, as a psychological matter, one way that the perception of relevant external relations required for sympathy can be made salient. To that extent there is some truth in the thought that empathy can help to explain our sympathy for others (whether actual or fictional). Nonetheless, empathizing is neither necessary nor sufficient for sympathy and is merely one way amongst
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many of making salient the relevant external relations required (but insufficient) for sympathy. Empathizing with fictional characters We have seen that empathy at least can play a role in the cultivation of sympathy (though not nearly as strong or direct a role as has been suggested), so now the question arises as to whether the simulationist analysis of empathy is the right one. Feagin’s simulationist analysis of empathy is as follows; we empathize with someone (actual or fictional) where we (a) come to “share” the feelings, typically at least, of a reflectively identifiable protagonist in terms of structurally analogous activities or processes and (b) the phenomenological quality of the experience is the same for the protagonist and the empathizer (Feagin 1996:94–109). In other words empathy is experiencing the same thoughts and feelings as someone else, where “same” means identical both in terms of kind and felt quality, as a result of the same kind of emotional interactions or thought processes that the other person went through. For example, if my friend tells me of his romantic woes I empathize with him to the extent that I empathically reenact what gave rise to his feeling so sad and the reasoning that gave rise to his despair. It is important to note, as Feagin herself emphasizes, that in the fictional case the simulation of a process can be carried out even though there is not the same “input” for the simulation as there typically is when one participates in “real” life. This is just to recognize the point that ordinarily our empathic reenactment of someone else is based on how we perceive them and their situation to be whereas in the case of literature, for example, it is a matter of what we are told by the words on the page. As articulated the position requires some slight fine tuning. It is common enough to assume that empathizing with someone requires that there be a reflectively identifiable protagonist (Wollheim 1984). Yet this is too strong. This is not merely because we can and sometimes do find ourselves spontaneously empathizing with someone without already having identified them as someone to empathize with. I may suddenly find myself empathizing with the frustrated person in the queue next to me or may unexpectedly find myself empathizing with a fictional character like Hannibal Lecter. But this is merely to point out that those we empathize with are not always identifiable prior to the act of empathizing. Rather, as Peter Goldie has argued, it is because we sometimes can and do empathize with a type of person even though we cannot refer to nor have an identifiable particular individual in mind (Goldie 1999). Goldie’s example concerns his experience of walking in the Pyrenees and suddenly imagining what it must have been like for a Roman soldier struggling up the mountains in the heat. As he says, one can think of him empathizing with “‘that soldier’ or ‘him’, whilst acknowledging that one knows nothing particular about him that enables one to individuate him from others of the type; all one needs for the imaginative project is a characterization of the type. Rejection of the reference condition also
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makes coherent the project of the detective, seeking constantly to build up a substantial characterization of ‘the murderer’, in order to better predict what ‘he’ will do, and thus to find out his identity and be able to refer to him” (Goldie 1999:418). Still, this is to quibble about the formulation of the claim rather than a challenge to the simulationist analysis of empathy. So let us take the more appropriate characterization to be cashed out in terms of, minimally, a retrospectively identifiable individual or type. Does the simulationist analysis hold up? On the simulationist account of empathy the phenomenological quality of the experience shared by the person (or type) being empathized with and the empathizer must be the same and the upshot of structurally similar reasoning and emotional processes. But this cannot be right. For example, shame and horror loom large in Anna Karenina’s emotional narrative. The two-page chapter following the scene of Anna’s seduction uses the term horror ten times or more. Yet one need not “feel” horror nor have reenacted the same emotional narrative and reasoning processes as she is represented as having gone through in order to empathize with her. We need only recognize that horror is what she is represented as feeling, grasp how and why this is so and identify with her situation. And, in light of the above considerations, it does not seem as if simulation is required to do that. A weak way of making the objection is to advert to phenomenological differences within the same emotion type. I may “feel” the same emotion type as Anna Karenina in empathizing with her and yet there may be phenomenological differences since the intensity of Anna’s felt emotion and its overall shape, the depth and permeation of the feeling in relation to her mental economy, may be markedly different from that which I empathically reenact. But such differences are ones of degree rather than kind and as long as simulation of the same emotion type is involved that is all that the simulationist needs. A more profound way of making the point is to show that empathy as such does not require the empathic reenactment of the same type of emotion, hence one can empathize with someone and yet the phenomenological differences can be ones of type rather than just matters of degree, nor need it depend upon having reenacted the same mental narrative. If true, then the simulationist’s identity claim must be false. Many cases of empathy seem to arise from the perception and characterization of someone and their situation in terms that are related to our own thoughts, emotional responses, attitudes and past experiences. Consider the following varied kinds of cases: someone describes their psychological unease at rejecting their religious beliefs; someone describes how they were humiliated by a rude customer in a shop; someone expresses how unutterably bored and frustrated they are with the pettiness and fecklessness of certain people they work with; someone describes how nice it was to be on holiday in Italy; how let down they feel after being betrayed by a friend; how annoyed they feel at being taken for granted by someone. Ordinarily it is easy to empathize with someone describing such states of affairs precisely because we can relate them to similar, though not necessarily the
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same, types of experiences we ourselves have had. But though we might empathize, in the sense of sharing fellow feelings with the person, none of these cases need depend upon or be a function of having simulated what the person “must have” thought and felt. Furthermore, the better and more informative characterization of the experience afforded the less likely it is we would need to do so given the expressiveness and salient relations highlighted. Indeed some of my reasoning may well be highly disanalogous. For example, reflections about my own experiences or those of my friends, parents and relations may be brought to bear in a way that leads me to have similar kinds of responses to the situation as represented and identify them with hers. Hence, to return to the case of Anna Karenina, I may well empathize with her because I relate her experiences to those of my own or perhaps even those of my friends and family. I have some sense of what it is like to be treated coldly, to give in to temptation and to be betrayed and may come to share the feelings she is represented as having to the extent that I relate her experiences as represented to my own or those of others I care for. Thus I may empathize without having structurally mirrored the mental narrative and processes she is represented as having undergone. Furthermore, for similar reasons, we often can and do empathize with someone though we are not simulating the same type of feelings they are experiencing. After all, we can empathize with someone in the sense of extending our fellow feelings toward them without it being the case that we are simulating the pain, horror, shame or guilt we take them to be subject to. Empathy, I would suggest, is more appropriately characterized as involving the recognition of the states and situation a character is represented as being in, a grasp of what this may be like and an identification with the desires, aspirations and attitudes of the character. All that is required here is adversion to features of our own past experience, familiarity with the experience of others and an ability to extrapolate and interrelate from such experiences as they are thought to hold with respect to the character one identifies with. I am not denying that an empathic reenactment of the mental narrative of someone is sufficient for empathy. The problem is that the simulationist analysis conflates a typical means of empathizing with an analysis of empathy itself. So simulation is a typical and important means of empathizing with people (rather than being constitutive of empathy). The further question remains. How does the simulative means of empathizing help, if at all, to explain how and why we care for fictional characters? It follows from the argument thus far that it cannot be the only mechanism that explains the phenomenon. Characters can be made vivid, we can come to identify with and care for them just in virtue of the imaginative way they are described to us, how their situation is relatable to our own past experiences and our cognitive-affective attitudes. Nor is empathy achieved via simulation a sufficient condition for caring for or indeed hating them. After all, I may simulate the mental narrative of a character and remain bored and indifferent to them precisely because I find there to be nothing of interest or value therein. Nonetheless, at least where the mental narrative of a character is of
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interest to us and where the nature and plight of a character is either beyond our own experience or difficult to see how it is easily relatable to our own experience, simulation can have a role to play in bringing home to us their plight, the nature of their experience and thus engaging our cognitive-affective responses with respect to them. We should not underestimate the extent to which we can easily be made to love, hate, admire, loathe or simply be beguiled by fictional characters based on the same kinds of concerns we are moved by in real life. We are interested, for example, in those who are exceptional, witty or who resemble ourselves in some respect. Furthermore, the kinds of situations, conflicts and choices facing the characters serve to heighten our interest and care for them. To return to Othello, we care deeply for him because he is represented as being of such an exceptionally noble and admirable character and is drawn into a situation where any ordinary person would have felt jealous long before he succumbs. On the basis of the above considerations it seems we have little reason to grant either that simulation is standardly required for the deep apprehension of character or that it is the canonical ground for grasping the experiences, states and traits of dramatic characters. This is not to deny that simulation has a role to play. Given a rich narrative understanding of a character simulation may help deepen our understanding in terms of what our expectations about that character’s dispositions are likely to be. It is just that, as I have argued, simulation cannot be the central process by which we come to understand particular characters. For deep understanding can be achieved without simulation, necessarily depends upon the possession of a rich narrative understanding and makes use of many narrative features with respect to which simulation is otiose or inapplicable. Simulation cannot be the central mechanism that affords narrative understanding. Furthermore, empathizing is neither necessary nor sufficient for sympathy and is merely one way amongst many of making salient the relevant external relations required (but insufficient) for sympathy. As a typical means of realizing empathy simulation does have a role to play in engaging our cognitiveaffective concerns for fictional characters, but it is neither the only nor the central psychological mechanism required to do so. Narrative appreciation and understanding is far more rich and complex than adversion to simulation theory seems to allow. Acknowledgments I would particularly like to thank Dominic Lopes, Bryan Frances and R.R.Rockingham Gill for their helpful comments and exchanges on drafts of this chapter.
Part II TRUTH IN IMAGINATION
5 FICTIONAL ASSENT AND THE (SOCALLED) “PUZZLE OF IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE” Derek Matravers
In his 1994 paper “Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality” Kendall Walton poses the following question: Can an author simply stipulate in the text of a story what moral principles apply in the fictional world, just as she specifies what actions characters perform? If the text includes the sentence, ‘in killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a girl’ or ‘the village elders did their duty before God by forcing the widow onto her husband’s funeral pyre,’ are readers obliged to accept it as fictional that, in doing what they did, Giselda or the elders behaved in morally proper ways? Why shouldn’t storytellers be allowed to experiment explicitly with worlds of morally different kinds, including ones even they regard as morally obnoxious? There is science fiction; why not morality fiction? (Walton 1994a:37) There does seem to be a curious asymmetry here. Before I can spell it out more precisely, I shall need to fill in some background. In doing this, I broadly follow Walton in his earlier work, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Walton 1990). For the moment, I shall take as my example written fiction (the novel), although I will make some remarks about other sorts of fiction later. In reading a fiction, a reader engages in an imaginative project. Within this imaginative project there are some propositions to which he assents (“Emma Woodhouse married Mr. Knightley”) and some propositions to which he does not assent (“Emma Woodhouse wore an eyepatch”). Let us call this pro-attitude to such propositions, a pro-attitude that is part of the imaginative project of reading a fiction, “fictional assent”. (Those troubled by the apparent split infinitive are invited to consider “fictionally assent” as a compound verb.) The asymmetry I want to discuss is as follows: (1) Within the imaginative project of engaging with fiction F, a reader can fictionally assent to p, where p is some nonmoral proposition that he does not believe holds.
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(2) Within the imaginative project of engaging with fiction F, a reader cannot fictionally assent to q, where q is some moral proposition that he does not believe holds. To take an example, let p be the proposition that people can be instantaneously transported from a spaceship to the surface of the earth and q be the proposition that there is nothing wrong with female infanticide. A reader can fictionally assent to the former, but cannot fictionally assent to the latter. That is, readers who come across “in killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a girl” cannot fictionally assent to it. Even within the fiction, female infanticide is wrong. This bald statement of the asymmetry needs to be hedged with explanations and qualifications. By a “moral proposition”, I mean a proposition asserting something to be a moral truth. Speaking in the realist idiom aids clarity, but is not an essential part of the problem. Antirealists too will need to have some way of characterizing the asymmetry (see Walton 1994a:38). By a nonmoral proposition I mean every other proposition. Nonmoral propositions include assertions about fictional characters’ moral beliefs. For example, it is unproblematic for a reader to fictionally assent to claims such as “these people believe female infanticide is wrong”. For the purposes of the contrast, I have classed all nonmoral propositions together. This is provisional: we shall see later that some sorts of nonmoral propositions (e.g. those that assert that something is or is not funny) should perhaps be placed on the other side of the divide. Second, I shall not be providing arguments that this asymmetry exists. There seems to be enough agreement that it does exist for it to be worth considering. If any readers do not recognize it at all, they should simply think themselves lucky and stop reading this chapter. I shall, however, be returning to consider the circumstances in which the asymmetry becomes less stark. Third, I have stated the asymmetry in terms of what a reader “cannot” do. In order not to beg any questions, I mean this—initially at least—to be taken as neutrally as possible. It should cover all possibilities from simply psychological difficulty (perhaps hardly “cannot” at all) to logical impossibility. The problem itself goes back to Hume’s “On the Standard of Taste.” Walton (as we have seen), Richard Moran and Tamar Gendler have recently essayed solutions (Moran 1994; Gendler 2000). I have also benefitted from hearing a paper by Greg Currie on the subject, which has not at time of writing, been published (Currie 2002). Walton’s solution, albeit only tentatively endorsed, starts with a supervenience thesis about moral facts. My account of Walton is indebted to Gendler. Moral properties depend or supervene on ‘natural’ ones and, I believe, in the relevant manner (whatever that is); being evil rests on, for instance, the actions constituting the practices of slavery and genocide. This, I suggest, is what accounts (somehow) for the resistance to allowing it to be fictional that slavery and genocide are not evil.
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(Walton 1994a:45) This is not, however, enough. Even if I believe that A depends upon B, it does not seem to follow (in general) that within the imaginative project of engaging with fiction F, a reader cannot fictionally assent to some proposition that A exists in the absence of B. I believe that mental states supervene on brain states, but can engage with the science fiction that has explicit Cartesian presuppositions. Walton (of course) realizes this, and so provides us with a second step. We still need an explanation of why we should resist allowing fictional worlds to differ from the real world with respect to the relevant kind of supervenience relations. My best suspicion, at the moment, is that it has something to do with an inability to imagine these relations being different from how we think they are, perhaps an inability to understand fully what it would be like for them to be different. (Walton 1994a:46) Gendler glosses the solution as follows: “if there are things that are unimaginable, then we certainly cannot imagine them, so we should not be surprised that our capacity to make-believe at will runs out at precisely those points” (Gendler 2000: 66). She construes Walton as claiming that the reason we cannot imagine moral supervenience relations being different to how they are is that we think it conceptually impossible that they could be. She refers to this as the impossibility hypothesis, and goes on to reject it by showing—successfully, I think—that conceptual impossibility does not preclude imaginability. I take Walton’s point to be slightly different. It is not so much that moral supervenience relations being different to how they are is conceptually impossible, but rather that we could not fully understand what it would be like for them to be different. Gendler herself stresses this point in the course of her discussion, before going on to concentrate on impossibility. (We could not fully understand what it would be for slavery to be morally sound; we would simply lose our grip on what the terms meant.) Focusing on the failure of understanding, however, fares no better than focusing on conceptual impossibility. Consider Walton’s earlier example: that female infanticide is morally sound. To believe this one would need to believe that being female is a reason to kill a child. Could we fully understand what it would be to endorse this? We need to consider two possibilities. The first is that there are certain things true in the fiction that makes this belief easy to understand. For example, the fiction might be set in a world in which female children are innately evil and inevitably cause death and