Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration (Palgrave studies in European Union Politics)

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration Lauren M. McLaren

Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics Edited by: Michelle Egan, American University USA, Neill Nugent, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK, William Paterson, University of Birmingham, UK Editorial Board: Christopher Hill, Cambridge, UK, Simon Hix, London School of Economics, UK, Mark Pollack, Temple University, USA, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Oxford UK, Morton Egeberg, Oslo University, Norway, Amy Verdun, University of Victoria, Canada Palgrave Macmillan is delighted to announce the launch of a new book series on the European Union. Following on the sustained success of the acclaimed European Union Series, which essentially publishes research-based textbooks, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics will publish research-driven monographs. The remit of the series is broadly defined, both in terms of subject and academic discipline. All topics of significance concerning the nature and operation of the European Union potentially fall within the scope of the series. The series is multidisciplinary to reflect the growing importance of the EU as a political and social phenomenon. We will welcome submissions from the areas of political studies, international relations, political economy, public and social policy and sociology Titles include: Heather Grabbe THE EU’S TRANSFORMATIVE POWER Lauren M. McLaren IDENTITY, INTERESTS AND ATTITUDES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION Justus Schönlau DRAFTING THE EU CHARTER Rights, Legitimacy and Process Forthcoming titles in the series include: Ian Bache and Andrew Jordan (editors) THE EUROPEANIZATION OF BRITISH POLITICS Karen Smith and Katie Verlin Laatikainen (editors) THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED NATIONS Morten Egeberg (editor) MULTILEVEL COMMUNITY ADMINISTRATION

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration Lauren M. McLaren Lecturer in Comparative Politics University of Nottingham

© Lauren M. McLaren 2006 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2006 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–9281–9 hardback ISBN-10: 1–4039–9281–9 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Identity, interests, and attitudes to European integration / Lauren M. McLaren. p. cm. — (Palgrave studies in European Union politics) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–9281–9 (cloth) 1. European Union—Public opinion. 2. Europe—Economic integration—Public opinion. 3. Public opinion—European Union countries. I. McLaren, Lauren M., 1968– II. Series. JN40.I34 2005 341.242′2—dc22 2005053499 10 15

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Contents

List of Tables

ix

List of Figures

xii

List of Acronyms

xiii

1 Introduction Development of the modern European state, nation and nationalism European integration Why study the public’s opinions toward integration? Approaches to the study of public opinion toward European integration The approach of this book: resources, group conflict and symbols Plan of the book

17 20

2 Opposition to European Integration: the Data Conceptualisation and measurement Measuring opposition to (and support for) integration Summary

21 21 27 30

3 ‘Rational’ Explanations of Support for European Integration Egocentric utilitarianism Perceptions and utilitarianism Sociotropic utilitarianism The general utilitarian model Summary and conclusions

31 31 38 44 46 48

4 Group Conflict Theory and European Integration Two related literatures: self-interest and group conflict Group conflict and opposition to European integration Measuring group conflict Group conflict and opposition to European integration: empirical analysis Conclusion vii

1 3 6 8 12

49 49 53 53 61 68

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Contents

5 Symbolic Politics and European Integration: the Role of National Symbols and Identity The concept of symbolic politics Symbolic politics and opposition to European integration National identity in Europe Symbols and opposition to European integration: empirical analysis Conclusion 6 Precursors to Group Conflict and Symbolic Threat: Rationality? Explaining support for integration: a review Comparing models Utilitarianism: a re-examination Summary and conclusions 7 Attitudes to Policy-making in the EU Overview of policy-making in the EU and trends in policy-making preferences Summary of policy-making in the EU Explaining the public’s policy-making preferences in the EU Summary and conclusions 8 New Member States, Utilitarianism, Perceived Threat and Opposition to European Integration Image of EU and support for EU membership Explaining Euro-enthusiasm and Euro-scepticism Utilitarianism, perceived threat and attitudes to European integration: empirical analysis Conclusion

69 69 72 74 83 91 93 93 96 101 109 110 110 132 133 146 156 157 161 183 187

9 Conclusion

189

Notes

194

References

201

Index

209

List of Tables 2.1 Attitudes toward the EU and toward European integration (correlation) 2.2 Preferred importance of EU in future (%) 2.3 Correlation between support for EU items (gamma) 2.4 Summary statistics for dependent variable (support for European integration) 3.1 Occupation and support for European integration, EB 53 and EB 54.1 3.2 Education and support for European integration, EB 53 and EB 54.1 3.3 Income and support for European integration, EB 53 and EB 54.1 3.4 Personal benefits from EU 3.5 Winners and losers by occupation 3.6 Winners and losers by income 3.7 Perceived winners and losers 3.8 (Economic) utilitarian model of support for European integration 4.1 Intercorrelations of group threat items, Spring 2000 4.2 Correlations (Pearson’s r), group threat index and support for integration, Spring 2000 4.3 Correlations (gammas) between group threat and support for integration, Autumn 2000 4.4 Correlations (gammas), group threat items, Autumn 2000 4.5 Correlations (Pearson’s r), group threat index and support for integration, Autumn 2000 4.6 Budget balance in the European Union (ecus) 5.1 National pride 5.2 Attachment and threat posed by EU to national identity 5.3 Correlations (gammas), cultural threat and support for integration, Spring 2000 5.4 Correlations (Pearson’s r), cultural threat and support for integration, Spring 2000 5.5 Correlations (gammas), cultural threat and support for integration, Autumn 2000 ix

22 28 29 30 33 36 37 39 40 42 43 47 61 62 64 65 66 66 75 81 86 87 90

x

List of Tables

5.6

Correlations (Pearson’s r), cultural threat and support for integration, Autumn 2000 6.1 Predictors of support for European integration, Spring 2000 6.2 Predictors of support for European integration, Autumn 2000 6.3 Predictors of perceived group conflict over resources from immigrants, Spring 2000 6.4 Predictors of perceived group conflict over resources from European integration process, Autumn 2000 6.5 Predictors of perceived symbolic threat from immigrants, Spring 2000 6.6 Predictors of perceived symbolic threat from European integration process, Autumn 2000 7.1 Policy-making preferences logistic regression predicted probabilities of supporting national-level policy-making 7.2 Aggregate policy-related variables Appendix: Logistic regression of EU-level policy-making preferences 8.1 Personal benefits from EU membership (receive more advantages) 8.2 Perceived advantages or disadvantages, CCEB Autumn 2003 8.3 Occupation and support for European integration, CCEB2001.1 and CCEB2003.4 8.4 Education and support for European integration, CCEB2001.1 and CCEB2003.4 8.5 Income and support for European integration, CCEB2001.1 and CCEB2003.4 8.6 Perceived personal advantages by occupation, 2001.1 and 2003.4 8.7 Perceived personal advantages by income, 2001.1 and 2003.4 8.8 Utilitarian predictors of attitudes to European Union 2001.1 and 2003.4 8.9 Intercorrelation of realistic threat items 8.10 Impact of realistic threat items on attitudes to European integration 8.11 Intercorrelation of symbolic threat items

91 98 99 103 104 106 107

140 142 148 161 162 164 166 167 169 170 171 176 177 181

List of Tables

8.12 Impact of symbolic threat items on attitudes to European integration 8.13 Utilitarian, symbolic and group-based threats and opposition to European integration in the candidate countries 8.14 Precursors to realistic group-based threats, CCEB 2003.4 8.15 Predictors of symbolic threat, CCEB 2003.4

xi

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184 185 186

List of Figures 2.1 Country’s EU membership is a good thing 2.2 For European unification 3.1 Sociotropic utilitarianism and support for integration (EB 53, Spring 2000) 4.1 Perceived threat from minorities, Spring 2000 4.2 Unemployment and blame minorities for unemployment 4.3 Perceived threat from EU, Autumn 2000 5.1 Attachment to country 5.2 Attachment to Europe 5.3 Feel nationality only 5.4 Symbolic threat from minorities, Spring 2000 5.5 Symbolic threat from EU, Autumn 2000 6.1 Support for integration: effects of variables 7.1 Environmental policy handled by national government 7.2 Welfare policy handled at national level 7.3 Unemployment policy handled at national level 7.4 Immigration policy handled at national level 7.5 Asylum policy handled at national level 7.6 Prefer foreign policy handled by national government 7.7 Defence policy handled by national government 7.8 Currency policy handled at national level 8.1 Positive image of EU 8.2 Neutral image of EU 8.3 Membership of EU a good thing 8.4 Fear joining EU will cost too much money 8.5 Difficulties for farmers 8.6 Fear of loss of social benefits 8.7 Fear of loss of national identity 8.8 Fear that language will be used less and less

xii

23 26 45 57 59 60 76 77 78 85 89 100 113 117 120 123 124 127 129 131 158 159 160 173 174 175 179 180

List of Acronyms CAP CCEB CEE CFSP EB EC ECSC EDC EEC EMS EMU EP ERM EU EU-15 IGC JHA NATO OECD QMV TEU

Common Agricultural Policy Candidate Country Eurobarometer Central and Eastern Europe Common Foreign and Security Policy Eurobarometer European Community European Coal and Steel Community European Defence Community European Economic Community European Monetary System Economic and Monetary Union European Parliament Exchange Rate Mechanism European Union European Union 15 member states (prior to 1 May 2004 enlargement) Intergovernmental Conference Justice and Home Affairs North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Qualified Majority Voting Treaty on European Union

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1 Introduction

Without doubt, the European Union is a construct like no other in the international system. In fact, scholars have long debated the question of how to describe it: is it an international organisation, a quasi-state, something moving toward a confederation, toward a federation, or what? It is unlikely that anyone would contend that the EU in its present form is ‘just’ an international organisation, or even an international trade organisation, because its structure and powers go far beyond those of other international trade organisations currently in existence (such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, the European Free Trade Area, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations).1 Indeed, the EU has become so powerful that it is able to restrict the ability of individual member states to conduct trade agreements on their own, and has indirectly restricted fiscal policies of these member states (through the budgetary requirements of the euro zone, applied through the Stability and Growth Pact).2 Further, government leaders in member states often refer to directives that have been ‘handed down’ from Brussels and the limitations on their economic capabilities due to EU requirements, indicating to their publics that the EU serves as a real restriction on national sovereignty within the realm of policy-making. In addition, it is well-documented that EU legislation accounts for an everincreasing portion of all legislation before each national parliament (Norton 1996). That is, a large proportion of national-level legislation debated in European parliaments actually consists of EU directives that are being transposed into national law. Thus even in the national legislative arenas of member states, legislation related to European integration rivals domestic legislation for the time and attention of national parliamentarians. 1

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

While there are still policy areas in which EU member states maintain considerable unilateral decision-making ability, there can be little doubt that these countries have turned some portion of their sovereignty over to this supranational organisation; some would argue that member states were willing to take this one step further with the proposed European Constitution (discussed further below).3 Whether this is due to the path-dependent nature of the integration process – as has been argued by neofunctionalists and historical institutionalists – or to states meeting their own selfish needs by coming together in a fairly restrictive international regime, offering one another bargains and trade-offs – as argued by intergovernmentalists – is not important for the question that will be addressed in this book. What is important is that the EU has tremendous power over member state political systems and thus the citizens residing within those states. Considering that the member states of the EU are themselves democratic and that the question of how ordinary citizens view these member state governments is a valid one to pose, I argue that the same is true for the European Union. The purpose of this book, therefore, is to provide an analysis of EU citizen attitudes toward the European Union, drawing upon standard approaches that have been offered in previous research on this topic as well as introducing a new approach to the study of attitudes to integration taken from the social psychology and political psychology literatures on identity and in-group favouritism. This chapter will first briefly review the development of the modern European state, nation and nationalism, as this is at the heart of the approach that is being introduced here. The European integration process – the primary original goal of which was to reduce some of the negative effects of nationalism in Europe – will then be briefly reviewed. I contend that while the European project itself has been elite-driven, elites cannot completely ignore citizen opinions in this realm, and I explain the reasons for this in the pages to follow. Next, previous approaches to the study of citizen opinions regarding integration will be briefly reviewed, and I will ultimately argue that many of these approaches have focused on economic utilitarianism, to the neglect of other potential (non-economic) explanations for differences in attitudes toward the EU. Finally, I introduce my own approach, which draws upon the concepts of nationalism, group identity and xenophobia, concepts that until very recently have been almost completely ignored within the literature on opposition to European integration.

Introduction

3

Development of the modern European state, nation and nationalism As Walker Connor (1990) illustrates, social scientists are still grappling with the origins of modern-day nations and nationalism. Indeed, we are struggling to define the concepts of nation and nationalism. However, historical analyses appear to be in agreement that the phenomenon that most scholars (and lay people) would recognise as nationalism began on the European continent with the development of the modern state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In contrast to ‘nation’, ‘state’ is quite tangible and easy to define: it is a territory with a government and people over whom the government rules. Thus, states have been in existence for an unknown amount of time, and perhaps can be traced back to ancient Greek city-states, or even before. However, it is believed that there is something different about the nature of states in the present day in comparison to Ancient Greece, and that difference stems from the loyalty of the mass citizenry to the modern state. Namely, in states like those spanning the Ottoman or Habsburg Empires, it is unlikely that many of the individuals living within those territories had feelings of loyalty to the state. Presumably, those who had been co-opted into the bureaucratic elite and had learned the language necessary for becoming one of these elites4 felt considerable loyalty to the state for which they worked, but for those not participating in the administration of the state, it is argued that the perception must have been that their governors were quite separate from them, speaking a different language, and in some cases being of a different religious background (e.g. Muslim, in the case of the Ottoman Empire), and perhaps not necessarily ruling for the benefit of the ordinary citizenry. One major difference, then, between the types of states run by the Ottomans or Hapsburgs and the modern state has to do with this notion of mass loyalty to the state, and the start-date of this process is usually pegged to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, in which most of Europe was fairly permanently divided into states, each having a single sovereign in the form of a monarch. Naturally, these divisions could not automatically guarantee individual-level loyalty to the new states, and the building of such loyalty occurred gradually after the division of the European continent. The key dates in the onset of national identity are often thought to be the 1775 First Partition of Poland, the 1776 American Declaration of Independence, the commencement and second phase of the French Revolution in 1789 and 1792, respectively, and Fichte’s

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

Addresses to the German Nation of 1807 (Hutchinson and Smith 1994), the latter combining elements of rational Enlightenment thinking with the concepts of fatherland and patriotism. Along with these events, there were certain developments that made mass-level national identity possible where it had not been so before. Namely, in contexts in which people spoke different languages or dialects, spreading unifying, loyalty-building propaganda would have been quite difficult (in logistic terms), and the high degree of linguistic diversity was also not likely to allow for the creation of feelings of community and belongingness even if logistically possible. As argued by Anderson in Imagined Communities (1991), two important events occurred – perhaps coincidentally – around the same time. One was that elites began to switch from using an elite language, such as Latin, to using vernaculars. The question of exactly how some vernaculars were chosen over others is still mostly unanswered, but what is clear is that gradually elites in the newly formed European states no longer spoke a language that was likely to alienate those that they were ruling. The other important catalyst for the creation of the modern state and nationalism was print capitalism. Namely, at the time when elites were still speaking Latin, this was clearly the largest possible market on which texts could be sold. If publishers had even considered trying to market in local vernaculars, they likely concluded that the number of different translations that would be necessary would simply make such a venture unprofitable. However, the market for Latin texts was becoming saturated, and so once elites began to pick and choose from local vernaculars, printers saw the possibility of larger markets for locallanguage texts. Indeed, Anderson argues that the important event in this regard was Martin Luther’s nailing a German translation of his thesis onto the chapel door in Wittenberg. Rather than only creating a Latin version, Luther had translated the thesis into a text readable by the local community. The fact that the text was so widely read among these locals indicated to publishers that there was indeed a market for local-language texts, stimulating the printing of texts in those vernaculars. Finally, it must be realised that initially this market could not have been very large, as the majority of Europeans were likely to have been illiterate. Thus, the final stage in the beginning of the development of nationalism comes from the decision of elites to provide mass education for those living in their states. In fact, some might argue that this was the main reason that a single language had to be chosen in the first place. Indeed, if we relate nationalism back to the French Revolution,

Introduction

5

then the order of events would be closer to the following: governments needed to create armies and citizens who would be willing to defend the state to the death, and the only way to create such loyalty was to propagate quasi-myths about kinship. In turn, such myth creation and propaganda would need to be conducted in a common language in order to be believable. As Hobsbawm argues, one key element that was necessary in ‘inventing traditions’ was ‘the development of a secular equivalent of the church – primary education . . . conducted by the secular equivalent of the priesthood’ (Hobsbawm 1983: 271). In short, the confluence of the clear division of European territory into states with single monarchs as their heads, the switch from Latin and other elite languages to local vernaculars, and widespread mass education produced the conditions under which nationalism could thrive. The above discussion describes the current dominant approach to the study of nationalism, which essentially contends that its development was fundamentally driven by historical decisions made by elites, often with the intention of imbuing their citizenry with an identity that was strong enough to make them willing to die in defence of their states. However, this approach almost completely ignores another, which stresses the basic human need for identity and belongingness. The latter would not deny that historical circumstances have been crucial to the creation of national identity, but contends that the identity portion of this concept is far more fundamental, in that it is based on the human psyche. Specifically, humans have always had belonging needs, but in previous time periods these were fulfilled by more immediate communities, often in the form of kinship circles. According to Clifford Geertz, every human carries attachments derived from things like place of birth, kinship, religion, language, and social practices that are natural to her and are rooted in the non-rational foundations of personality (Geertz 1967). As a result of modernisation, these communal types of attachments began to wither away, but since people still had a need for identity, some other type of attachment was necessary, and that became nationalism. This was likely to be a relatively easy transition because, as Pierre van den Berghe (1978) argues, ethnic groups can be thought of as ‘in-breeding superfamilies’, and they often command unreasoned loyalty because they function like superfamilies. This distinction between the perceptions of the basis of nationalism and national identity is quite important for the approach taken in this book to the study of attitudes toward European integration. If the historical analysis is ‘correct’, and identity is so easy to manipulate, then presumably national identity could be manipulated away by elites,

6

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

if they so desire. It should be added, however, that even if identities are easy to manipulate, the previous elites who created national identity were extremely successful and so changing these identities might be extraordinarily difficult. In other words, they cannot simply be erased now that they have been created. If the second approach to the study of nationalism is ‘correct’, the implications are that identities are perhaps not so easy to manipulate, and that fairly major external developments are likely to be necessary to produce any noticeable change in current identities. Perhaps one of those external developments could be the seemingly permanent peace among countries that once battled fiercely with one another. In other words, the reason leaders like Napoleon had for creating national identity in the first place – to build a loyal army to defend France and conquer other territories in the name of France – does not seem to exist in the part of the world that is the focus of this book, Europe. However, perhaps because of the continuing existence of the territorial units on which such identity is based (i.e. states), national identity appears to be alive and well on the European continent. In fact, it was only relatively recently that the above-mentioned peace came into existence, and thus only recently that it became possible for European national identities to wither away. We explore levels of national attachment further in Chapter 5, but now we turn to a discussion of one of the potential sources of this withering away of national identity, the European integration process.

European integration The notion of an integrated European political system is said to have been floating around among elites and intellectuals as early as the nineteenth century. Such movements became even more prominent during and between the two World Wars, but did not really take off until the end of World War Two. It was clear after that war that some mechanism was necessary to keep the entire continent from being destroyed in devastating wars every thirty years or so, and that the old mechanism, the balance of power, was no longer feasible: it was not adequately preventing war in the first place, and it was unlikely that any of the war-torn countries of Europe were going to be very powerful balancers against the new superpowers (the Soviet Union and United States) in any case. After World War Two, Jean Monnet’s ideas for functional integration began to circulate and were discussed among six European heads of state including – most importantly – Germany and France. The

Introduction

7

idea behind Monnet’s plan was that it would be possible to integrate the economies of European countries to such a degree that war among them would no longer be possible without the risk of severe selfinflicted damage. This plan seemed reasonable to the parties involved, and so they began the process of European integration, first via attempts at integrating their coal and steel industries, then through the creation of a customs union and eventually a common market, and finally a monetary union. That there has been considerable peace in Europe (outside of the wars in the Balkans) for more than five decades since the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) is thought by some to be a testament to the success of the project. At the very least, EU member states have become extraordinarily important trading partners for one another, providing markets for one another’s goods, and this alone should make it far less likely that one member state – especially a country like Germany, which is a major beneficiary of this vast market – would attack another. Moreover, the member states are constantly engaged in dialogue and planning for future integration projects in a system that promotes co-operation, compromise and peaceful dialogue. In short, war among the current member states seems unthinkable, at least in the near future. Although there is not agreement among all of the member states regarding the role of the state in this new system, the European integration process is likely to be perceived as threatening state sovereignty and national identity among at least part of the European citizenry. While – as indicated above – it may be possible to create and change identities, such a process is not likely to be easy, especially given that not all elites are in agreement about the need to change the nature of identity in Europe to a more cosmopolitan, less ‘parochial’ form of identity anyway (i.e. to promote European identity over national identity). There are likely to be two different realms in which citizens differ in their feelings about national versus European identity. One lies in their strength of national identity in the first place. The other lies in whether they believe the EU to be posing a threat to such identity. We can imagine a spectrum of individuals, ranging from those who care little about national identity and thus have no reason to feel threatened by the EU to those who treasure their national identities dearly and see the EU as a threat to such identity. And of course, there may be many who treasure their national identity but do not feel that this identity is threatened by the process of European integration. Chapter 5 explores these various possibilities empirically.

8

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

Why study the public’s opinions toward integration? The European project proceeded from the start as an overwhelmingly elite-driven one. It was perceived by many (e.g. Stanley Hoffman 1966) as being an international trade organisation and as such was completely within the purview of elite decision-making, just as organisations like the North American Free Trade Agreement or World Trade Organisation are today. As with other international agreements, the EU’s roots lie in secret deal-making between the member states, and it has been in the interests of each of those member states to not make the circumstances of various negotiations public, as would be the case in most international negotiations. In addition, the European Coal and Steel Community was not thought to be very far-reaching and was not likely to have a major impact on the sovereignty of the member states.5 In short, studying opinion toward it in the early days might have been seen as the equivalent of studying opinion regarding the OECD or the Council of Europe. In fact, by the 1970s scholars were writing of a ‘permissive consensus’ that existed among the citizens of the member states (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970), indicating that opinions related to the EU were not strongly held – people were not strongly in favour or strongly opposed, and this allowed their leaders to make decisions without consulting them directly. It is not clear exactly when the Community began to affect those living within it in much more obvious ways. This process could have started with the creation of the customs union, in that member states were no longer allowed to negotiate trade deals with other countries on their own, although it seems unlikely that this had much effect on individuals living within the EEC, except to provide an EEC-wide protective trade barrier. In other words, the specific benefits were likely to be mostly unseen, if not positive. On the other hand, the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy in 1962 is likely to be a point at which the Community’s policies more clearly impinged on ordinary citizens (other than farmers) in the form of subsequent higher prices for agricultural products. Other obvious effects also came gradually. Perhaps the first of these was one of the goals outlined in the Single European Act of 1986/87: to rectify national protectionism within the Community. By the mid1980s, certain industries, especially those that had been national monopolies, were still not open to competition from companies from other Community member states. In other words, nationally based companies were still being favoured for businesses that constituted

Introduction

9

national monopolies and for public works projects that were contracted out by national governments. This included transportation, telecommunications and energy industries, to name a few. The Single European Act called for a removal of this type of protectionism, thereby providing a far clearer threat to national industry in the form of potential competition from companies based in other member states. The removal of many other barriers to free trade through the principle of mutual recognition could have been another element of the Single European Act that had visible effects on citizens living within the EEC member states.6 The far more obvious infringements, however, have come more recently, in the form of restrictive monetary and fiscal policy, and, of course, the loss of national currencies. Namely, participants in the euro zone have tied their own hands on the issue of monetary policy – they are not allowed to make such policy themselves anymore, as this is done through the independent European Central Bank. Member states still have some leeway in the area of fiscal policy, but only as long as they are willing to increase income taxes. This is because until very recently7 they could not run large deficits and because there are limitations on the maximum and minimum VAT and excise taxes that could be charged (and because of the ideological reasons for keeping these regressive taxes to a minimum). Thus, the only way that governments can influence fiscal policy is to increase or reduce the government budget. However, increasing the government budget would necessarily require an increase in some form of tax, and for governments that have already reached the maximum on VAT and excise taxes, or worry that this is a fairly regressive form of taxation, the only realistic option is to increase income taxes. This is not a very popular form of fiscal policy manipulation, though, and governments have been reluctant to do it.8 In sum, it may be becoming clearer to ordinary citizens that their governments have their hands tied because of euro financial requirements. Moreover, as indicated above, European-level regulations and directives make up far more of the national-level law than ever before, and governments are often open about the need to change their implementation techniques to comply with a new regulation or the need to change national legislation as a consequence of an EU directive. Franklin and Wlezien (1997) find empirical evidence in support of the notion that Europeans’ opinions regarding European integration change in tandem with the amount of legislation coming from the EU – in other words, that the public is indeed paying attention to what is happening

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

at the EU level and becomes less and less supportive as a result of increasing amounts of EU legislation. In sum, the EU may have begun as a trade organisation with little impact on those living within its boundaries, but it is unlikely that anyone familiar with the organisation would argue that the same is true now (see Thomassen and Schmitt 1999). In fact, some have gone so far as to refer to the EU as a system of multilevel governance (see Hooghe and Marks 2001). If the EU does indeed have governing abilities that affect citizens living within the democratic member states, those citizens’ opinions are quite important to study, in exactly the same way that we consider the study of the approval of the prime minister or party in power to be worthy of investigation. In addition, there is clear evidence that the opinions of the EU’s citizens can have a direct effect on what happens at the EU level. This comes most obviously in the form of EU-related referenda, which periodically give the EU a splash of democracy and which have clear effects on what governments can and cannot do. Perhaps the most notable of these were the constitutional referenda held in France and the Netherlands (29 May 2005 and 1 June 2005, respectively). With these referenda, the French and Dutch publics derailed a project that had the support of all member state governments, halting both the institutional reform and the symbolic creation of an EU ‘constitution’ that had been agreed by the representatives of these governments. It is likely that academics will spend the next decade trying to determine the precise reasons for these votes, but some of these are expected to be connected to the key factors discussed in this book – a lack of utilitarian-based support, along with fears about the effects of further integration on group-level resources and symbols (see below).9 These two referenda are not the only ones in which European publics have played a major role in their governments’ EU-level policies. The Norwegian government has been restricted since 1972 from even joining the EU because its citizens have twice voted against membership.10 In addition, the Danish government has been restricted from participating in the euro because its citizens refused to join the euro zone, as did the Swedes. Furthermore, the very creation of the common currency in the first place was nearly rejected by the French and Danish publics in 1992 in the referenda held on the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty). Other compelling evidence of the effect of the European public on EU policy-making is that Irish citizens surprisingly put their foot down on the first Nice Treaty referendum held there, which, among other things, threatened to thwart the Union’s eastern

Introduction

11

enlargement plans, as the Nice Treaty outlined the institutional changes necessary for enlargement. Irish citizens were given a second chance to say ‘yes’ to this treaty, and the referendum did eventually pass in October 2002, but the Irish alone managed to keep the rest of the EU on tenterhooks regarding enlargement plans.11 Thus, referenda on EU-related matters are obvious points at which mass publics can have major effects on EU-level policy-making. There are other situations in which European citizens are likely to be playing a considerable role in their governments’ EU policies even without referenda being held, however. For instance, while the British government that negotiated the Maastricht Treaty (which paved the way for the creation of the euro) had no desire to bring Britain into the euro, Tony Blair came to power with British adoption of the euro as one of his key European-level policy goals.12 However, he has been unable to move forward with this plan because it is politically unpopular and because he has promised British citizens that they will have their own splash of democracy in the form of a referendum on the issue. In other words, it appears that the British public is indirectly restricting the Labour government from taking Britain into the euro. We can also point to the French government’s outright refusal to renegotiate the Common Agricultural Policy as an example of a major policy that is very likely influenced by French public opinion; that is, French governments would have considerable difficulty agreeing to reform the current system – despite widespread belief that it is inefficient, unfair and unworkable in the newly enlarged EU – because of fear of punishment at the polls. Although very few systematic analyses exist to show the impact of the European public on day-to-day EU policy-making, there are good reasons to expect that the opinions of the public do constrain EU policy-makers. First, such a constraint is likely to operate indirectly via national parliaments. The degree of supervision on the part of national parliaments clearly varies across the EU (Norton 1996), but it is unlikely that many of these parliaments would accept EU legislation quietly while knowing that their constituents are opposed to aspects of the legislation (see Katz and Wessels 1999). Second, empirical analysis suggests that national-level political parties in Europe respond to attitudes to European integration by adjusting their positions on the issue (Carrubba 2001). This would lead us to expect that these parties would also adjust their positions on EU policy-making accordingly, thus implying that public opinion is constraining governing party behaviour with regard to European integration. Third, the analysis that has been conducted on this particular question indicates that public opinion does

12

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

appear to have a constraining effect on EU-level policy-making, at least in the area of immigration policy (Lahav 2004). Ultimately then, as argued by Richard Sinnott (1998: 28), policy concerns among the mass public are likely to at least have an indirect input into EU-level policymaking regimes. Thus, as many scholars have contended, decision-makers at the EU level can only ignore public opinion at the risk of losing electoral support and – perhaps even worse – at the risk of producing repercussions that could affect the survival of the Union itself (Franklin and Wlezien 1997; see also Franklin, van der Eijk and Marsh 1996; van der Eijk and Franklin, forthcoming). For this reason (and others outlined above), it is imperative that scholars continue to monitor this opinion and to sort out the various causes of variation in support for the project. In the next section, I provide an overview of the theories and hypotheses that have been introduced by those who have studied attitudes to integration.

Approaches to the study of public opinion toward European integration Around the time of the publication of the permissive consensus idea, interest in the European public’s opinions related to the EU began to increase. In 1970, the European Commission funded the first study to be used to gauge attitudes to the EEC, and in 1974 the Commission began to conduct semi-annual polls on this same issue (as well as a whole host of other issues). The standard semi-annual polls – Eurobarometer surveys – continue through today, and are often supplemented by ‘flash’ Eurobarometers and other special surveys. Thus, the theoretical approaches to the study of European integration can be traced from the early surveys of the 1970s. I will summarise these approaches (roughly) chronologically. Post-materialism Early strands of research conceptualised the European integration process as something akin to ‘thinking outside of the box’, or more specifically, thinking about a new world order in which a cosmopolitan European society existed. Moreover, it was argued that some people were able to conceive of such a cosmopolitan society that transcended nation-state boundaries, whereas others were not. Early theories about citizen perceptions of the European integration process were, in fact, developed in tandem with another theory that became one of the most prominent (and most criticised) within the field of comparative public

Introduction

13

opinion, that of post-materialist value change. This theory has a rather long history of being altered somewhat and has had multiple criticisms levelled against it, mostly against the measures chosen by the scholar who developed the theory. A review of this entire literature is outside of the purview of this chapter, but I will briefly discuss the theory as it relates to support for European integration.13 The theory is based on ideas developed by Abraham Maslow on needs hierarchies, ideas that have also received their fair share of criticism in the psychology literature. The notion of needs hierarchy postulates that people have various types of needs that can be thought of as pyramid-shaped, with the basic ones of food, water, shelter, etc. belonging at the base of the pyramid, and things like the need for love and self-actualisation coming toward the middle of the pyramid. Other values like aestheticism are at the very top of the pyramid. The argument is that if people can have the needs met that are at the bottom of the hierarchy, they will then move up the hierarchy and thus will have other, different needs which they will work to fulfil (see Maslow 1962). Ronald Inglehart (1977) adapted this theory in his post-materialist value change approach, but with a slight twist. Inglehart argued that the needs that one had when one was socialised continue to exert influence over one’s values later in life. Thus, people who grow up in times of scarcity and physical danger will always, to some degree, value economic and physical security, and will certainly value them more than individuals who do not grow up in times of scarcity and physical danger. The ultimate point was that younger generations growing up in Western democracies were likely to have very different values than older generations who grew up during the Great Depression and World War Two. Specifically, the former would emphasise the things that were higher up in the needs hierarchy, like self-actualisation and beautification of the environment, while the latter would emphasise things lower in the hierarchy, like economic and physical security. What relationship did this idea have to the study of opinions regarding European integration? As mentioned above, Inglehart conceived of the European integration project as being something of a higher-order type of cosmopolitan system and thus thought that those who were trying to fulfil higher-order goals would gravitate to it. Perhaps more specifically, they would be more capable of thinking outside of the bounds of the traditional nation-state than those who were still worrying about basic needs. And, in fact, the relationship between post-materialist values and support for European integration was quite strong, although some have contended that this is due to

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

cognitive mobilisation rather than post-materialist values (Janssen 1991). Thus, it is to cognitive mobilisation that we now turn. Cognitive mobilisation Part of what was thought to be changing about post-World War Two generations was their increasing levels of education and increasing time to devote to reading about and discussing politics – the latter stemming from less time being devoted to basic subsistence needs than had been the case for those growing up during harder times, and the former from government efforts to ensure (and require) mass education. Thus, perhaps part of the explanation for differences in levels of support for European integration can be found in differences in cognitive mobilisation. This idea was also introduced by Inglehart (1970) as a separate potential explanation for support for European integration. The reasoning behind this hypothesis was that those who were more cognitively mobilised – i.e. those who were capable of digesting complex political events and who actually took the time to do so – were likely to be less fearful of the EU simply as a result of more exposure to it. Those who were not cognitively mobilised were not likely to have managed to receive much information about the EU, and were therefore fearful of the unknown nature of it. Janssen (1991) later tested this idea in competition with the postmaterialism theory, contending that the only reason that post-materialism was likely to be having any effect on levels of support for European integration was due to its cognitive mobilisation component: those who were more post-materialist were likely to also be the ones who were more cognitively mobilised. His empirical analysis shows rather convincingly that once we control for cognitive mobilisation, the relationship between post-materialism and support for European integration disappears. And in this case, it is fairly clear that this is indicative of a spurious relationship rather than an indirect one. Namely, it is theoretically unlikely that post-materialist values precede cognitive mobilisation, and this would be required in order to make a case for an indirect relationship such as the following: Post-materialism → Cognitive mobilisation → Support for integration In short, post-materialism may really only be spuriously related to support for European integration. In contrast, scholars have continued to find that cognitive mobilisation positively affects attitudes to integration (Gabel 1998a, 1998b).

Introduction

15

Support for the governing party For some time, scholars tended to work within the realm of postmaterialist theory and heavily incorporated ideas about cognitive mobilisation when investigating attitudes to the EC. In contrast, Franklin, Marsh and McLaren (1994) contended that opinions regarding the EU were likely to reflect support for the party in government. People who would prefer that a right-wing party be in power at times when a leftwing party is, in fact, in power, are likely to express their unhappiness regarding the national governing situation indirectly via their opinions related to the EU. This idea was formulated specifically within the context of referenda – the Maastricht referenda held in Ireland, Denmark and France in 1992 – and it was shown that in these particular referenda, voters could be seen to be using the referendum as a confidence vote on the government and tended to divide on their votes for Maastricht along party lines. Anderson (1998) in his proxy model of support for European integration introduces an even more robust measure that perhaps captures a similar idea: satisfaction with democracy. In terms of face validity, this item might be thought to literally capture levels of satisfaction with democracy; however, in the European context, it is not likely that people are expressing dissatisfaction with democracy as a method of governing but dissatisfaction with the way democracy is working at the time of the survey. The survey item is not clear about the time frame (‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)?’), but it seems fair to speculate that it is a sort of running average of the respondent’s memory of recent times. 14 Of course, dissatisfaction with the way democracy is working may directly stem from having parties one opposes running the government – certainly Labourites are none too happy about the way democracy is working when Conservatives are in power and vice versa (see Anderson and Guillory 1997) – but level of satisfaction with democracy may even more robustly capture the referendum aspect of opposition to European integration: those who are not happy with the current government are likely to project this on to the EU, whereas those who are happy are likely to project their euphoria on to the EU as well. Why might such a thing happen? The main reason provided by the above authors is that people simply do not know much about the EU, and must use information about something they know in order to determine how they feel about something they do not know. People tend to know far more about what their government is doing domestically

16

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

than what is happening in Brussels and will project their feelings about national government performance onto the EU level. Anderson (1998) conceptualises this as a ‘proxy’ approach: since people do not know enough about the EU to judge it on its merits, they rely on proxies to answer questions related to how they feel about the EU. One of his most significant proxies was indeed satisfaction with democracy, and it was far more consistently related to level of support for the EU than was support for the governing party. Rationalism The most recent turn in the literature on support for integration has been toward utilitarianism, especially economic utilitarianism.15 This approach is actually the focus of Chapter 3 of this book, and so I will not spend too much time here on it, except to summarise it and then introduce my own alternative approach. Unlike the theories outlined above, utilitarian theories focus on respondents’ gains and losses and the likely effect of these on attitudes toward integration. This approach began with an emphasis first on perceptions of increased economic growth, increased trade, and the modernisation of industry, and it was contended early on that perceptions of the EU are ‘inextricably linked’ with these economic perceptions (Shepherd 1975: 124). Later analyses by Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) also supported this notion, and found that aggregate levels of support for the EU could be explained by inflation and intra-EU export balances, but not so much by GDP, unemployment or EU budget returns. The authors conclude that ‘Europeans are more likely to see a relationship between inflation rates and the EC’s image, presumably because the Community’s major policy instruments, such as VAT financing revenues, regulation of agricultural prices through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and especially European Monetary System (EMS), have a well-known and much-discussed impact on prices’ (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993: 521–2). Moreover, ‘when the relationship is extrapolated over time, it suggests that the growth of intra-EC trade has been a major stimulus to “Europeanist” sentiment’ (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993: 523). Other researchers further expanded on this notion of economic utilitarianism. For instance, one study finds that the level of cross-border trade in particular regions of the EU has an effect on attitudes toward the EU (Anderson and Reichert 1996). It was contended in that study that the benefits people living in regions bordering another EU member state would receive from between-country free trade would make them more supportive of European integration than those not living in

Introduction

17

border regions. Gabel (1998a, 1998b) moves this utilitarian approach to perhaps an even more appropriate level of analysis, contending that certain individuals are likely to benefit more than others in the integration process. He outlines what he specifically terms a ‘utilitarian model’ of public support for European integration and explains why people with better job skills, incomes and educations should be particularly supportive of European integration and those with poor skills, incomes and educations should be particularly hostile. Again, I will further outline these arguments in Chapter 3. My overall contention in this book is that utilitarian models require a great deal of information on the part of the ordinary European. Europeans would be required to either have some idea about the trade benefits accruing to the country (and thus indirectly to themselves) or to their region of the country; it is also required that people of different education and income levels calculate the costs and benefits of integration to their own lives. While this may be occurring to some degree within the EU, I argue that the utilitarian models, as well as the older preutilitarian models, fail to address the more fundamental reasons for variation in support for integration, reasons that have very little to do with personal self-interest, being aware of the EU, etc. These reasons revolve around the discussion that began at the start of this chapter related to national identity. Thus, we return to a discussion of this topic within the context of attitudes toward the EU.

The approach of this book: resources, group conflict and symbols As indicated above, widespread nationalism developed quite recently, but it is thought to be fairly entrenched in many European democracies. The statistics presented regarding attachment to one’s country are indicative of this (e.g. from the International Social Survey 1995 study of national identity). If we follow the logic of most of the strands of thinking regarding national identity, they lead us to the conclusion that it is unlikely to wither away in the near future. Those who argue that it was a result of historical developments and was somewhat artificially constructed by leaders would not be able to find any symbols, myths, etc. that yet compete with national symbols and myths for the loyalty of most Europeans. The major exception to this is regional loyalties like those in the Basque region in Spain or Scottish nationalism: the level of attachment to country may be questionable in those regions. However, again, based on the figures presented in Chapter 5, on average,

18

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

it appears that attachment to country even in Britain and Spain is high despite regional loyalties. Moreover, attachment to the EU is rather low, comparatively. The point is that the EU does not appear to be competing very heavily with the member states for the loyalty of citizens. Indeed, evidence presented in Chapter 5 indicates that for many citizens, they are not in competition at all. In addition, those who argued that national identity developed, at least in part, as a result of modernisation and dislocation which destroyed traditional sources of identity like communities would be hard-pressed to find any other form of identity that can replace the national one in the present day. Modern European society is likely to be just as mobile as it was when modernisation began (if not more so), and so people are likely to still need some form of identity other than local community. National identity apparently meets those identity needs. Finally, the contention that national identity has its roots in primordialism provides the strongest argument for the notion that it will not be disappearing anytime soon. In support of this contention, laboratory experiments have clearly shown that people formulate an identity even in situations in which there is no clear basis for that identity (such as race, ethnicity, place of birth, etc.) (Tajfel 1970, 1972). Such experimental findings led social psychologists to argue that identity provides something that humans need, most likely positive self-esteem (discussed further in Chapter 5). Thus, as long as national identity could be providing people with a basis for self-esteem and self-value, it is likely that these people will be opposed to threats to that national identity. This is where the EU (potentially) comes in. As we will see, some find the EU to be more threatening to their national identity and culture than others. It is unclear why this is the case, but this is an issue that will be explored in Chapter 6. More immediately, in Chapters 4 and 5, our purpose is to determine to what degree opposition to European integration does, in fact, stem from such nationalistic concerns. Readers might be surprised to find that while this is indeed an empirically supported explanation for variance in support for integration, it is not as strong as might be expected, nor is it a consistently strong relationship across all countries. Moreover, this book does not address identity exclusively in the manner just indicated. We will also turn to research on reasons for hostility toward other groups and non-in-group members to find out specifically why some people in the EU may oppose European integration. Two related strands of academic literature are especially

Introduction

19

important. One is the group conflict approach, which contends that members of one group (usually framed within the context of a dominant group) are hostile toward members of another group because the members of the first group feel that the members of the second are taking resources that ‘belong to’ the first group. This explanation is partly based on notions of economic self-interest, or utilitarianism, in that the concern for group resources may stem from concern about one’s own resources. However, there is another aspect of this approach that has little to do with self-interest, and from that aspect, issues of group conflict stem from identity and in-group protectiveness. In other words, members of the in-group want to protect one another, as would be the case in a family, or superfamily, to use van de Berghe’s terminology. This argument will be further outlined in Chapter 4, but the overall point is that this in-group protectiveness of resources may be one of the reasons that some individuals in the EU are opposed to European integration – they worry that the in-group’s economic resources will have to be shared with non-members. The other relevant strand of theory from the in-group/out-group literature points to more symbolic concerns. This approach was originally offered as a counter to the group-conflict approach and contends that the most important reason for out-group hostility is not likely to be worry over resources, but instead is more symbolic in nature. Specifically, members of the out-group threaten certain symbols and values that the in-group holds to be dear. National identity and culture are taken by the author to be among these symbols, but I also explore worries about the loss of language due to European integration, in addition to focusing on less direct indicators of symbolism (again, see Chapter 5). The overall findings suggest that these two theoretical approaches generally provide fairly powerful explanations of variation in attitudes toward European integration and rival the utilitarian approaches in size. However, it is important to note that both models perform well in a multivariate context, and that some people may be viewing the EU more ‘rationally’ than others, or perhaps there is some element of the ‘rational’ and some element of the ‘irrational’ for most Europeans when thinking about European integration. The book will be able to address the question of who the utilitarians are likely to be, and will also examine the concept of rationality and utility much more closely to determine whether my approach really does belong outside of the bounds of utilitarianism, or whether it is primarily utilitarian (that is, based on rational calculations).

20

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

Plan of the book In the next chapter, the conceptualisation and measurement of support for European integration are discussed, and evidence of variation in levels of such support in the EU-15 is provided. In Chapter 3, I provide a thorough account of the utilitarian approach to the study of attitudes toward European integration, illustrating the effect of various selfinterest variables on level of support for the EU (again, in the EU-15). I also introduce new evidence that provides a clearer indication than in previous research as to who is perceived to benefit and who is perceived to lose in the process of European integration. In Chapter 4, the general focus of this book is reviewed and the first portion of the identity approach is introduced – that of perceived group conflict over resources. Chapter 5 includes the other portion of the identity approach, which is that of symbolic politics. Because of the likely connections between rationalism and group identity, Chapter 6 investigates the question of whether group identity factors are actually driven by self-interest. Chapter 7 then turns to the question of whether group identity is related to perceptions of the appropriate locus of policymaking control in the EU. That is, where do EU citizens believe policy responsibility ought to lie and are these beliefs affected by perceptions of loss of national symbols and culture? Chapters 2–7 are focused mostly upon older member states (i.e. the EU-15 countries) because these are the countries for which most theories on attitudes to integration have been developed. Chapter 8 investigates the theoretical constructs of utilitarianism and perceived group threat specifically within the context of the ten new member states to determine whether these theoretical constructs can be applied to these countries. Finally, in Chapter 9, conclusions are drawn regarding the nature of opposition to European integration and its potential long-term effects on the integration project.

2 Opposition to European Integration: the Data

This chapter discusses the specific meaning of ‘attitudes toward European integration’, which is the concept under investigation in this book, provides data which display cross-time changes in these attitudes in the EU-15, and then finally discusses the measures of attitudes toward integration that will be used for most of the analyses in Chapters 3–6.

Conceptualisation and measurement Opposition to (or, alternatively, support for) integration implies many things. One is hostility toward the specific project of the European Union. Another is some degree of acceptance for the European Union as it exists now, but general opposition to integration that would proceed any further than economic integration. Feelings about the two are likely to be intimately related, but not necessarily identical. There are a whole range of reasons for opposing the specific entity of the European Union, including opposition to the notion of European integration or opposition to the EU as it is currently constructed. Empirical evidence indicates that opposition to the specific entity of the EU can be traced in part to dissatisfaction with the poor quality of democracy and representation at the EU level (Rohrschneider 2002). However, in general, it can be argued that the EU embodies the current integration efforts and feelings about it should partly reflect feelings about integration. Table 2.1 provides the Pearson’s correlation 21

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

Table 2.1: Attitudes toward the EU and toward European integration (correlation)

Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland N. Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

For unification – EU membership a good thing (r)

For unification – EU membership a good thing (gamma)

N

0.52 0.59 0.56 0.63 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.37 0.45 0.38 0.39 0.46 0.48 0.55 0.70 0.62 0.66 0.53

0.73 0.70 0.74 0.75 0.70 0.64 0.71 0.52 0.56 0.60 0.63 0.64 0.58 0.76 0.85 0.74 0.79 0.68

73,232 68,559 75,241 54,195 76,203 44,123 75,333 68,447 20,344 28,765 73,079 43,941 72,448 33,299 21,630 17,690 18,705 865,234

Note: Figures are based on the pooled Mannheim Trends File available from the UK Data Archive (www.data-archive.ac.uk).

coefficient (r) between items thought to measure each of these two concepts (see Gabel 1998a, 1998b). The items are: • Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY’S) membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad? • In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? Are you for – very much, for – to some extent, against – to some extent, against – very much The correlations are calculated using the Eurobarometer Mannheim Trends File, and thus, the correlations for each country are based upon the pooled samples from that country.1 Generally, the correlation coefficient values presented here indicate a high degree of correspondence between feelings about one’s country’s participation in the EU and about the unification project in general. Note that measures that might be more appropriate for these types of data (such as gamma values) indicate a very strong

Opposition to Integration: the Data 23

association.2 The only countries for which the association is somewhat weak (Pearson’s r ≤ 0.40) are the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Ireland. Although it is not possible to conduct a time series analysis of the major questions addressed in this book due to lack of cross-time measures of the key predictor variables under investigation in Chapters 4 and 5, I will present some of the cross-time measures of attitudes toward the EU and toward the integration process. In the figures below, the countries have been grouped by entry to the EU (Original Six, First and Southern Enlargements, and Eftan Enlargement)3 in order to make the graphs readable. The first item to be considered is the question of whether the country’s EU membership has been good or bad. Figure 2.1 provides the ‘good’ responses for all member states, with the EU average overlaid on the graphs. Note that the original data collection on this item began in 1973, soon after the admission of the UK, Denmark and

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

Ireland, and so these three countries are included in all of the cross-time EU-average calculations. However, the composition of the EU changes in 1981 (when Greece joins), 1986 (when Spain and Portugal join), and 1995 (see note 3 on p. 195), and each of these additions is likely to have had a significant impact on the averaged calculations (across the EU, that is). However, as can be seen in Figure 2.1, after the fairly sceptical Eftan countries joined the EU – potentially decreasing average support for the community (see the discussion below) across the whole entity – support in many of the Original Six dropped as well (in Italy, West Germany and France, for instance). In general, what Figure 2.1 indicates is considerable fluctuation in feeling that one’s country’s membership of the EU has been a good thing. Overall, until the post-1993 period, the majority in each of the Original Six member states clearly felt positively about the EU. After 1993, we begin to see some decline in support for the EU in West Germany, Belgium and France, although it should be noted that by 2000, the majority of Belgians were once again claiming that their country’s EU membership was a good thing. The other countries’ citizens generally can be said to be highly favourable toward their countries’ membership of the EU, but with some fluctuation in the degree of support. One other point to note about Figure 2.1 is that – as documented elsewhere (Bosch and Newton 1995) – the Original Six countries are fairly consistently higher than the EU average in their degree of support for their countries’ EU membership. The upper right-hand portion of Figure 2.1 includes a group of countries that are often below the EU average in levels of support for their countries’ memberships of the EU. The most obvious of these are Great Britain and Denmark. In the former, in the years after Margaret Thatcher’s ascendancy to the prime ministership, percentages thinking the country’s EU membership was good dropped to the mid-20 per cent range. However, there was a clear, steady upward trend from that point to greater than 50 per cent support for the country’s EU membership in 1990; however, this was also followed by a steady decline to early 1980s levels by the late 1990s and 2000. The cases of Ireland and Greece (see the lower left-hand portion of the figure for the Greek trend line) are also interesting to note. Although it is generally assumed that these countries are overwhelmingly enthusiastic about their EU memberships, what the cross-time percentages show is that in Ireland, while support for the country’s EU membership is somewhat high in the 1970s, there is a marked decline in the early 1980s, and then a sharp increase that eventually approaches 80 per cent, and this figure has remained at fairly

Opposition to Integration: the Data 25

consistently high levels through the 1990s. Finally, although a majority of Spanish and Portuguese citizens have thought their countries’ membership of the EU was good from the time of their entry to the EU, and although such positive feelings have been prevalent in close to 80 per cent of the population, far fewer numbers in the 1990s view EU membership as clearly positive. Figure 2.1 (lower right-hand portion of the graphs) also provides similar percentages for the Eftan Enlargement countries, plus East Germany, which became part of the EU when it was unified with West Germany in 1990. The cross-time percentages for East Germany clearly reveal early levels of soaring enthusiasm for participation in the EU marked by a rapid decline into ambivalence toward the EU. By 2000, easterners had become as Euro-sceptic as their West German neighbours. In addition, like those countries in the first enlargement (Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland), the three Eftan countries consist of citizens who are not all that enthusiastic about EU membership. The measure discussed above is a way of gauging opinions regarding the EU itself. We can also examine cross-time attitudes toward the more general idea of European unification using the item ‘Are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?’ Unfortunately, this item has not been included in a Eurobarometer since 1995, and so it will not be possible to investigate general feelings about unification in the late 1990s in any sort of comparative manner. Ultimately, I will thus need to depend upon a different measure of attitudes toward the integration process in the later analyses in this book. (Note, however, that particular item is a recent addition to EB surveys, and so comparing it to the question of whether the respondent is for or against unification is not possible either.) In any case, we turn to a discussion of cross-time favourability toward European unification before introducing the measures of support for integration used in the rest of this book. Figure 2.2 provides the percentages of those who say they are for efforts to unify Europe (either ‘very much for’ or simply ‘for’). As the figure indicates, citizens living in the Original Six group of countries tend to be overwhelmingly and consistently in favour of European integration. Although the French and Belgians were not quite as enthusiastic as the rest of the countries in the 1970 survey, levels of enthusiasm quickly reached those comparable to the other original member states. Also, while there has been some degree of cross-time fluctuation in support for unification, support has been strong across much of the 1970–95 time period. Additionally, it is important to note that for much of this time span, the original member states have favoured the idea of unification

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

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Figure 2.2: For European unification

at levels that were higher than the overall EU average. Thus, the Original Six have sustained considerable enthusiasm for the idea of unifying Europe since the early 1970s (and presumably prior to the 1970s as well) – again, consistent with findings noted by other observers. This is in contrast to some of the later participants in the project, as can also be seen in Figure 2.2. Support for European unification in Denmark through the mid to late 1980s was particularly low, with the lowest point coming in 1985, which was the beginning of the launch of the idea of completing the single European market. Shortly thereafter, however, enthusiasm for unification appears to have taken hold, and by 1991, almost 65 per cent of Danes supported the general idea of European unification. This support dropped slightly, presumably in the wake of the debates surrounding the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union) in the early 1990s, but it did not

Opposition to Integration: the Data 27

decline to 1970s and 1980s levels. These trends are similar to the ones in Figure 2.1. The other usual group of Euro-sceptics – the British – have also been surprisingly supportive of the European unification project. They do not exceed the EU average at any point, but until the early 1990s, neither were they very far below it. Indeed, even in the highest period of Euro-scepticism (according to this measure, that is), more than 50 per cent of the British claimed to be in favour of efforts to unify Europe. On the other hand, fairly unsurprisingly, in the 1990s, the countries which have been on the receiving end of EU development funds (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland – this topic will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter) have displayed levels of support for unification that are close to or exceed the EU average. As with perceptions regarding whether EU membership has been good for the country, Irish and Greek citizens were not quite as enthusiastic in the early years as in later times, but would still be counted as enthusiastic, given that the vast majority were clearly in favour of European unification. As mentioned above, this survey item was unfortunately discontinued by Eurobarometer after 1995, which was the time when some of the most Euro-sceptic member states joined the EU. However, these countries were indeed surveyed in 1994 and 1995, and in all three, the majority of citizens were in favour of efforts to unify Europe.4

Measuring opposition to (and support for) integration As discussed above, much of the analysis in the rest of this book will not be able to incorporate the valuable time series component because items used to investigate the group conflict and symbolic threat approaches (which are the focus of the book) are only available in a handful of Eurobarometer surveys. Furthermore, I will not be able to use the second survey item discussed above as a measure of general support for integration because the item also does not appear in the same surveys as my group and symbolic threat items. Thus, it is necessary to find an alternative measure of support for integration. As mentioned above, I will be investigating predictors of attitudes to the general idea of European integration. To repeat, this includes perceptions of the specific entity of the EU as well as attitudes toward further integration. Both of the items selected for my analyses do, in fact, relate to the EU, but one of them also refers to the issue of future integration. The first item chosen as a measure of support for European integration is the question which asks whether the country’s membership of the EU

28

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

has been good or bad, and is a standard measure of EU support (see Gabel 1998a, 1998b; Carey 2002). The second item is as follows: In five years’ time, would you like the European Union to play a more important, a less important or the same role in your daily life? This question was chosen initially for its face value – that is, those who would like the EU to come to play an even more important role in their daily lives would, it seems, like to see the integration process deepen even further, to the point that they can see its effects on a daily basis. On the other hand, those who want the EU to play a less important role in their daily lives would seem to prefer to have the integration process reversed to some degree. Finally, those who prefer the EU to continue to play the same role in their lives as it currently does would appear to be happy with the current level of integration.5 Percentages preferring the EU to play a more important role in their daily lives are displayed in Table 2.2. These percentages were obtained from Eurobarometers 53 and 54.1 (from the Spring and Autumn of 2000, respectively). Note that these two surveys have been

Table 2.2: Preferred importance of EU in future (%)

Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland N. Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

More

Less

Same

DK

N

42.2 43.8 39.6 56.7 66.5 54.0 50.5 44.5 38.8 44.1 45.1 63.3 33.3 38.3 31.0 42.6 35.0 41.9

10.6 20.4 15.2 12.1 4.5 4.5 7.6 10.2 9.2 8.2 9.0 5.8 15.4 19.1 16.6 20.8 15.6 16.2

37.1 32.4 31.2 19.2 19.5 30.1 33.3 31.6 32.3 36.3 36.2 18.4 29.9 31.9 45.7 31.7 34.4 30.0

10.2 3.5 14.1 12.1 9.7 11.5 8.7 13.8 19.8 11.4 9.8 12.6 21.5 10.8 6.8 5.0 15.0 12.0

2111 2000 2023 2006 1987 2000 2005 2001 613 1209 1979 2000 2128 2048 2025 2000 2005 32140

Note: From Eurobarometers 53 (Spring 2000) and 54.1 (Autumn 2000). Percentages are average responses across the two surveys.

Opposition to Integration: the Data 29

chosen for the analysis in this book because they include the key measures needed for the group threat concepts discussed later in the book. As the figures in Table 2.2 indicate, Italians, the Portuguese, Greeks and Spaniards would be particularly happy for the EU to play a bigger role in their daily lives. In most other countries, people would either prefer that the EU continue playing the same role in their daily lives or are not really sure how they feel about this issue. The largest percentages saying they want the EU to play less of a role in their lives are in Denmark and Sweden, but in fact only about 20 per cent of Danes and Swedes claim that they would like to see the EU playing a less important role in their daily lives in the future. The correlations (gamma values) between the two items measuring attitudes to European integration are displayed in Table 2.3, and indicate that there is a relatively strong relationship between the two. Thus, the two items have been combined to create an additive index of support for European integration. Summary statistics for the indices are presented in Table 2.4 and conform to the general trends discussed earlier in this chapter, with the Belgians, Greeks, Italians, Spanish, Irish, Luxembourgers, Dutch and Portuguese displaying higher levels of support for integration and the British and Swedes displaying lower levels.

Table 2.3:

Correlation between support for EU items (gamma)

Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland N. Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

EB 53 Spring 2000

EB 54.1 Autumn 2000

0.56 0.76 0.63 0.53 0.49 0.48 0.62 0.30 0.68 0.38 0.57 0.35 0.72 0.51 0.57 0.69 0.57 0.59

0.56 0.76 0.64 0.36 0.55 0.56 0.61 0.48 0.59 0.40 0.51 0.45 0.65 0.59 0.55 0.63 0.59 0.57

30

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

Table 2.4: Summary statistics for dependent variable (support for European integration) Spring

Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland N. Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

Autumn

Mean

SD

N

Mean

SD

N

2.91 2.26 2.49 3.13 3.20 3.07 2.76 3.00 2.40 3.01 2.96 3.21 2.03 2.35 2.27 2.05 2.15 2.66

1.09 1.42 1.21 1.00 0.95 0.97 1.17 0.93 1.08 0.94 0.99 0.90 1.19 1.17 1.21 1.45 1.21 1.21

942 944 921 951 959 964 878 968 263 470 838 920 954 990 949 949 898 14758

2.82 2.24 2.54 2.97 3.16 3.08 2.73 2.91 2.58 3.08 2.85 3.17 2.04 2.41 2.18 1.98 2.28 2.64

1.07 1.42 1.23 1.06 1.01 0.99 1.17 0.97 1.08 0.88 1.04 0.93 1.20 1.21 1.21 1.40 1.24 1.21

1048 1000 1013 1002 987 1000 1003 1001 313 609 1004 1000 1058 1014 1015 1000 1000 16067

Summary This chapter has charted cross-time trends in levels of support for the EU and for European integration and has contended that these two concepts are strongly related, in that the EU embodies current ongoing attempts at European integration. The chapter also introduced a new item to be used in measuring the latter component and provided summary statistics for an index which combines (1) attitudes to the EU, and (2) attitudes to integration. The index was also shown to conform to what is generally known about which country’s citizens tend to be more (or less) supportive of integration. The next chapter introduces the first model of support for integration to be investigated in this book, the ‘rational’, utilitarian model, and uses the index discussed in this chapter to empirically analyse the model.

3 ‘Rational’ Explanations of Support for European Integration

One of the most influential approaches to the study of support for the European integration process in the past decade has been the rational, cost-benefit – also termed ‘utilitarian’ – approach. In this chapter, the general idea of utilitarianism as applied to the study of opposition to European integration is outlined, along with its specific hypotheses, and illustrations of the empirical strength of these hypotheses are provided. The standard utilitarian arguments necessarily make assumptions about which categories of individuals are likely to benefit or lose from integration, but it is also important to consider perceptions of loss or gain. Thus, in contrast to utilitarian research on attitudes to integration, I also include such an analysis of perceptions of who has benefited and who has lost in the integration process.

Egocentric utilitarianism1 Utilitarian accounts of attitudes toward European integration resemble the old adage of ‘where you stand determines where you sit’, and are almost exclusively concerned with economic utilitarianism. Specifically, those who benefit (or are likely to benefit) economically from European integration should be more supportive of the process; those who lose (or are likely to lose) should be more hostile. The theory then infers that the economic policies adopted in the EU, especially since the Single European Act (which came into effect in 1987), pose clear costs and benefits to individuals living within the territory of the European Union, and that these individuals realise they are likely to do well/poorly and determine their positions on the issue of European integration accordingly. The specific portions of the integration project that are argued to present relatively clear costs and benefits are the free movement of 31

32

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

labour and capital provisions, as well as provisions making it easier for businesses to move from one to another of the EU member states. In the absence of a Europe-wide social protection safety net (which is still very much under negotiation), the implications of both the former and latter are quite clear: companies can go freely to where they find cheaper labour or cheaper labour is likely to come to them, providing competition for people who do certain types of work. Those with lowerlevel job skills and low levels of education are thought to be most potentially hard-hit because they are more easily replaceable by companies moving elsewhere or hiring ‘foreign’ (non-national) workers. Alternatively, there are people with other types of work and educational backgrounds who are likely to see potential gains from a Europe-wide market: those with more developed job skills and higher levels of education can easily use their skills and knowledge (of running toplevel international businesses, for instance) to find better-paying jobs, to increase their salaries at their current jobs by threatening to migrate to a country where people in their position are paid higher salaries, or to actually go to another EU member state to start up a business there. They are also likely to be rather hopeful about easier cross-national mergers that would put them at the head of large-scale corporations. Free movement of capital is also likely to benefit some more than others. Those who do not have much capital will not likely care much that it can flow freely across the EU. Those who do have such capital – i.e. those with higher incomes – could benefit from the freed capital market, in terms of banking and purchasing and selling stocks. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 1, fiscal requirements for participating in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and later in the adoption of the euro were quite strict regarding the size of the national budget deficit and debt that would be allowed, forcing participating member states to try to rein in their spending,2 much of which was for social welfare benefits. Again, especially in the absence of a Europe-wide social protection system – according to the utilitarian approach – it is those with less developed job skills, less education and lower incomes who are likely to be most fearful of the consequences of these national-level spending cuts, as they are the ones who are likely to be most in need of such spending (see Gabel 1998a and 1998b for a thorough discussion of these arguments). Using the surveys that were discussed in the previous chapter (Eurobarometers from the Spring and Autumn of 2000), we investigate the empirical relevance of these components of egocentric utilitarianism: occupation, education and income. Table 3.1 provides the OLS unstandardised

‘Rational’ Explanations of Support for Integration Table 3.1:

33

Occupation and support for European integration, EB 53 and EB 54.1

Country

Professional Executive Unemployed

Retired

Small business

Spring 2000 Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland Northern Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

0.57*** 0.36 0.88*** 0.16 0.35 0.33 0.52 0.25 1.38 0.30 0.10 0.33 0.40* 0.63* −0.08 0.76** 0.98*** 0.40***

0.57* 0.50** 0.80*** 0.16 −0.04 −0.08 0.55*** 0.05 −0.01 0.24 0.26 0.38* 0.64*** 0.54*** 0.35 0.97*** 0.50*** 0.34***

−0.03 0.21 0.66** 0.04 −0.15 0.06 −0.06 −0.36* −0.73* 0.17 0.23 −0.10 0.18 −0.01 −0.29 −0.24 −0.43 −0.02

0.05 −0.10 0.48*** −0.18 −0.33* −0.34*** −0.00 −0.19 −0.38 0.29* 0.07 −0.33*** 0.11 0.08 −0.23 0.32* −0.06 −0.03

−0.06 0.50 0.86*** −0.00 −0.09 −0.05 0.04 0.13 −0.48 0.55* 0.63* 0.00 −0.02 −0.19 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.29***

Autumn 2000 Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland Northern Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

0.27 0.90** 0.58* 0.56** 0.36* 0.37 0.38 0.42* 0.45 0.07 0.59* 0.55 0.67*** 0.22 0.31 0.52* 0.01 0.41***

0.29 0.83*** 0.49*** 0.65** 0.54*** 0.37 0.24 0.25 0.06 0.18 0.58*** −0.00 0.36* 0.75*** 0.60*** 0.61*** 0.50*** 0.38***

−0.16 0.16 0.21 0.37 0.18 0.10 0.35 −0.21 0.46 0.25 −0.01 0.14 0.05 −0.20 0.07 −0.26 0.15 0.01

−0.20 0.33* 0.24* 0.27 −0.03 −0.22* −0.09 0.02 0.04 −0.06 0.31* −0.15 −0.23* 0.09 0.03 0.29* −0.07 −0.01

0.08 0.64* 0.02 0.28 0.06 0.34* 0.15 0.28 0.84 0.10 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.13 −0.09 0.37 0.39* 0.34***

Note: Figures in cells are unstandardised regression coefficients (OLS); manual workers are the omitted category. * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

34

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

Table 3.1:

(cont.) Occupation and support for European integration, EB 53

and EB 54.1 Country

Farmer

Student

Housewife

Other

Adj. R2

N

Spring 2000 Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland Northern Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

−1.12 −0.12 −0.10 0.14 −0.05 −0.20 −0.36 0.06 −0.63 −0.24 −0.77 −0.42* 0.67 −0.23 −1.28* 0.24 0.61* 0.17*

0.26 0.27 0.85*** 0.26 −0.02 −0.04 0.65 0.33** −0.05 0.35* 0.33* 0.30** 0.92*** 0.62*** 0.27 0.31 0.70*** 0.40***

0.01 0.28 0.50*** −0.06 −0.09 −0.32** −0.14 −0.11 −0.35 −0.05 0.07 −0.23* 0.19 0.27 −0.31 −0.04 0.17 0.18***

0.24 0.13 0.57*** −0.07 0.04 −0.08 0.07 0.05 −0.10 0.20 0.32* 0.22* 0.04 0.05 −0.05 0.26 0.22 0.15***

0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02

941 943 920 950 958 963 877 967 262 469 837 919 953 989 948 948 897 14,757

Autumn 2000 Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland Northern Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

0.14 1.23* −0.21 0.60** −0.68 0.76 −0.13 0.05 −0.19 −0.03 −0.80 −0.35 1.03 −0.78 −0.91*** 0.22 −0.32 0.11

−0.00 0.85*** 0.47 0.25 0.31* 0.32** 0.54*** 0.36*** 0.60* 0.03 0.53*** 0.51*** 0.68*** 0.63*** 0.58*** 0.26 0.87*** 0.48***

−0.28* 0.40 0.06 0.23 −0.10 −0.03 0.22 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.24 −0.06 −0.09 −0.37 −0.03 0.21 0.03 0.20***

−0.06 0.01 0.55*** 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.44** 0.01 0.38** 0.04 0.22* 0.03 0.32** 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.06 −0.01 0.30* 0.02 0.25* 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.26 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.21*** 0.02

1047 999 1012 1001 986 999 1002 1000 312 608 1003 999 1057 1013 1014 999 999 16,066

Note: Figures in cells are unstandardised regression coefficients (OLS); manual workers are the omitted category. * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

‘Rational’ Explanations of Support for Integration

35

coefficients for each of the occupational categories available in the Eurobarometer surveys, with ‘manual labourer’ serving as the comparison category and the index of attitudes to European integration discussed in the previous chapter as the dependent variable.3 Recall that manual labourers are predicted by the utilitarian model to be particularly hostile to the integration project because of the degree of vulnerability they face within the context of a free labour and business market. Professionals and executives, on the other hand, ought to be amongst the most supportive of the integration project because of the increased cross-border trade and movement of labour that has resulted from the Single European Act. As indicated in Table 3.1, these expectations receive considerable empirical support. While the professional and executive categories do not achieve statistical significance in many of the member states, this is likely to be a function of the small numbers of observations within each category. On the other hand, in a few countries, the coefficients do indeed achieve statistical significance and imply a fairly powerful impact: for instance, in Western Germany (EB 53), Austria (EB 53) and Denmark (EB 54.1) professionals’ degree of support for European integration is one full point higher (on the 0–4 point index discussed in the previous chapter) than that of manual workers. Moreover, also in West Germany and Sweden (in EB 53) and Denmark (EB 54.1), executives are considerably more supportive of integration than manual workers. For many of the member states, the coefficients for these two types of high-level occupations produces at least a half-point change in level of support for the integration process. The overall EU averages indicate a much weaker impact, however, of less than one-half of a point. Although other job categories are not of particular interest to the utilitarian model as outlined above, one of these clearly deserves mention and ought to perhaps be added to the general utilitarian model, and that category is students. Of all the occupational groupings included in the Spring and Autumn 2000 surveys, the ‘students’ category displays the most consistent results, and indicates that, on average (that is, across the EU), students tend to support the integration project to the same degree as professionals and executives (again, with manual workers as the omitted category). One need only drop into any major university in Europe to understand why students are so supportive of EU integration – having the freedom to move to other EU member states for the purpose of study without needing a residence or work permit is a very obvious benefit of the implementation of free movement provisions within the EU. Level of education, on the other hand, while having a statistically significant effect in almost every country (see Table 3.2), does not help

36

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

Table 3.2: Education and support for European integration, EB 53 and EB 54.1 Country

Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland Northern Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

EB 53 (Spring 2000)

EB 54.1 (Autumn 2000)

b

Adj. R2

b

Adj. R2

0.05*** 0.02* 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.03** 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.01 0.06*** 0.01***

0.03 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00

0.06*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.07*** 0.03** 0.05 0.04*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.02** 0.01 0.06*** 0.01***

0.04 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00

Note: Figures in cells are unstandardised regression coefficients (OLS); * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

predict much change in level of support for the EU. The range of the education variables in the two data sets is 6–90 (EB 53) and 6–58 (EB 54.1), and so it could be argued that the maximum impact is indeed quite large.4 However, for this particular variable, it seems more reasonable to consider percentile values in interpreting the OLS coefficients. For both Eurobarometers, the lowest 10 per cent completed their schooling at age 14 while the top 90 per cent cut-off is at the age of 24. With an unstandardised regression coefficient of .01, this implies that people with top levels of education are approximately 0.10 points higher in their support for integration (on a 0–4 point index). In other words, the effect is minuscule. It must be noted, though, that the size of this effect varies considerably by country. For instance, in Belgium, Germany, France, Portugal, Britain and Austria, there is more than one-half a point difference in support for integration between these lower and higher levels of education. Again, however, compared to occupation, the effect still seems rather weak. Finally, we repeat a similar story for income, which has a fairly consistent effect on attitudes to integration (Table 3.3). Once again,

‘Rational’ Explanations of Support for Integration

37

Table 3.3: Income and support for European integration, EB 53 and EB 54.1 Country

Low-Medium Medium-High

High

Don’t know Adj. R2

N

Spring 2000 Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland N. Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

0.14 0.11 −0.14 0.08 0.32** 0.44*** 0.07 0.31* −0.00 0.15 −0.07 0.42*** −0.07 −0.08 0.01 0.24 0.30* 0.08*

0.31* 0.49*** 0.09 0.37*** 0.17 0.34** −0.06 0.31* 0.59* 0.45** 0.04 0.50*** 0.03 0.10 0.33* 0.27 0.34** 0.27***

0.12 0.47*** 0.42*** 0.48*** 0.15 0.52*** 0.29* 0.41** 0.34 0.69*** 0.18 0.71*** 0.22 0.18 0.36** 0.69*** 0.53** 0.33***

−0.02 0.36* −0.00 0.07 0.12 0.52*** 0.14 0.23* 0.18 0.39*** −0.12 0.35*** 0.05 0.06 −0.17 0.32 0.28* 0.26***

0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01

941 943 920 950 958 963 877 967 262 469 837 919 953 989 948 948 897 14,757

Autumn 2000 Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland N. Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

0.38** −0.09 −0.09 0.20 −0.06 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.10 −0.45 0.05 0.09 0.17 −0.12 −0.12 −0.08 0.08 0.00

0.41** 0.67*** −0.00 0.26* 0.25* 0.45*** 0.13 0.35** 0.32** 0.10 0.11 0.40*** −0.05 0.44*** 0.28 0.51*** 0.04 −0.45 0.26 0.48*** 0.07 0.14 0.38*** 0.30* 0.05 0.39* −0.09 0.35** 0.10 0.12 0.28* 0.56*** 0.15 0.60*** 0.11***** 0.29***

0.27* −0.13 0.24* 0.17 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.30** −0.28 0.04 −0.15 0.21* 0.07 −0.08 −0.42** −0.09 −0.06 0.17***

0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01

1047 999 1012 1001 986 999 1002 1000 312 608 1003 999 1057 1013 1014 999 999 16,066

Note: Figures in cells are unstandardised regression coefficients (OLS); lowest income is the omitted category. * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

38

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

however, the overall effect in the combined EU sample is somewhat weak – the highest income group is only about one-third of a point more supportive of the integration process than is the lowest income group. As with other utilitarian variables, the effect of this one varies by country, with the largest effects found in Luxembourg (especially in EB 53), Portugal (also in EB 53), Belgium (EB 54.1) and Sweden. In many other countries, those in the highest income group are approximately one-half of a point more supportive of the EU than are those in the lowest income category. This is true, for instance, in Denmark, Greece, Spain and Austria in EB 53 and West Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and Austria in EB 54. Thus, while egocentric utilitarianism can be seen to have some effect on attitudes to integration, these effects vary considerably and, on average, are not overwhelming.

Perceptions and utilitarianism The above analyses – which are standard in egocentric utilitarian explanations of support for EU integration – are built upon assumptions about perceptions regarding winning and losing in the integration process. But do EU citizens actually perceive themselves to have received benefits or incurred costs in the way that would be predicted by the utilitarian model? I investigate this question using new survey items that were first introduced in a Eurobarometer survey in the Spring of 2000. Eurobarometer 53 is the first survey in which EU citizens are asked directly about whether they feel that they received personal benefits or losses due to European integration, and also asks these citizens more generally who they perceive to have benefited from integration. Thus, the survey provides a rare opportunity to investigate the utilitarian model more directly than has been possible before. I begin by examining responses to the following question: ‘Do you think you, yourself, have got more advantages or more disadvantages from (OUR COUNTRY) being a member of the European Union?’ Responses to this question are shown in Table 3.4. The modal category was clearly the middle one – most people think that they have received an equal number of advantages and disadvantages from the EU. When we combine this with the percentage who spontaneously reply that they are not sure whether they have received more benefits or not, we then have a clear majority who are neutral about the personal benefits they might have received from the country’s membership of the EU. Amongst

‘Rational’ Explanations of Support for Integration

39

Table 3.4: Personal benefits from EU

Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland Northern Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

More advantages

As many disadvantages as advantages

More disadvantages

DK

N

26.4 30.4 26.1 37.4 28.5 55.5 20.5 59.0 25.5 34.3 28.9 44.6 19.7 21.1 28.9 19.4 23.4 31.4

47.2 47.9 41.1 45.0 43.6 30.1 51.0 22.4 37.3 46.8 43.7 38.3 32.2 45.9 49.4 46.8 39.8 41.6

11.3 12.5 21.3 8.2 11.1 5.9 14.2 4.3 9.9 10.0 15.2 5.2 23.1 23.7 16.1 26.0 23.3 14.5

15.1 9.2 11.4 9.4 16.9 8.5 14.2 14.3 27.4 8.9 12.3 12.0 25.1 9.4 5.6 7.8 13.6 12.5

942 944 926 951 959 964 878 968 263 470 838 920 954 992 949 949 898 14,765

Source: EB 53 (Spring 2000).

those who do not have a neutral opinion, those who think they have received more advantages clearly outweigh those who think the opposite (31.3 per cent versus 15.1 per cent).5 Are there any particular groups in society that feel they have benefited more than they have lost from the integration process? In terms of human capital, it is expected that those who are in certain occupations – particularly those with better skills – are likely to think they have received more advantages from their country’s membership of the EU than those who have less skills. As is clear from Table 3.5, the group feeling that it has received the most advantages from the integration process is, as predicted by the utilitarian approach, top level managers: 55 per cent of this group feel that they have been personally advantaged by their country’s membership of the EU. Next behind the top managers are employed professionals, followed by students and then some farmers. The groups that feel more disadvantaged than average are, once again, some of the farmers, the unemployed, the retired, supervisors and unskilled workers. However, it must be noted that for all of these latter categories, it is only a very small minority that feels

Winners and losers by occupation

Source: EB 53 (Spring 2000).

Farmer Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect) Owner of a shop, craftsman, other self-employed person Business proprietors, owner (full or partner of a company) Employed professional General management, director or top management (managing directors, director general) Middle management, other management (department head, junior manager, teacher) Employed position, working mainly at a desk Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesman, driver) Employed position, not at a desk, but in service job (hospital, police, restaurant) Supervisor Skilled manual worker Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant Responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after home Student Unemployed or temporarily not working Retired or unable to work through illness Total N

Table 3.5:

21.3 13.6

15.3 19.5 14.9 18.4 13.1 7.8 20.0 19.5

30.6 39.0 40.0 40.4 36.4 28.3 42.1 45.5 44.4 46.0 40.5 43.6 40.1 40.3 34.5 40.2 44.6

41.7 39.5 33.2 33.0 47.0 55.0 39.2 33.1 30.0 27.4 28.1 29.8 26.3 28.7 44.0 26.5 23.2

11.2 15.4

12.3

17.4 17.0 11.1 11.0

Disadvantages

As many advantages as disadvantages

Advantages

11.9 11.7 15.2 18.0 13.7 13.3 12.7

11.2

10.3 10.5

6.5

9.5 9.6 5.5 5.8

6.4 7.9

DK

185 1,450 868 1,860 1,793 937 3,286 16,077

1,095

1,307 469

1,065

609 270 217 191

235 228

N

40

‘Rational’ Explanations of Support for Integration

41

disadvantaged by EU membership. As would be expected from Table 3.4, the bulk of the occupational groupings are in the centre (neutral) category. In fact the only groups that take neutral positions at less-than-average rates are farmers, top managers and students, and all of these groups generally feel more advantaged than disadvantaged by their countries’ EU membership. Although there are clear differences in perceptions of benefits received across some of the occupational categories, it is difficult to speak in terms of winners and losers. Clearly, there are some who perceive that they are winners – big business executives, farmers and students – but there do not actually appear to be big losers, in that the bulk of EU citizens either see a balance of advantages or disadvantages or simply do not know whether they have benefited or not from EU membership. Thus, it is perhaps more appropriate to speak in terms of winners and non-winners rather than winners and losers. The utilitarian approach also predicts that people at different levels of income should perceive costs and benefits to themselves. As discussed above, the freeing of capital markets is likely to provide major benefits to those at high incomes, as they will be more able to shop around for better interest rates on bank loans and better returns on pan-European stocks, and also do not have to worry anymore about the transaction costs associated with currency exchange across most of the EU. On the other hand, those with lower incomes are expected to be more threatened by the integration process because of the same issues raised above – integration makes it more possible for businesses to relocate to hire less costly labour, leaving those at lower income scales especially vulnerable. Further, this is likely to become an even greater threat as a result of the CEE enlargement.6 As indicated in Table 3.6, the relationship between income and perception of winning and losing in the integration process is quite similar to that found for the occupation variable. Namely, it is clear that larger percentages of those at higher income levels feel that they have indeed been personally advantaged by their country’s membership of the European Union. However, those at the lowest income levels are only marginally more likely to claim that they have been disadvantaged by European integration. In addition, there are fairly small differences between the income groups among the neutral answers, and this mostly falls with the realm of responding ‘don’t know’ to the question of whether the respondent has benefited from integration. Thus, once again, we would conclude that there are a few more people who perceive themselves to be winners among the highest income group

42

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

Table 3.6: Winners and losers by income

Lowest income Low-mid income High-mid income Highest income Don’t know Total

Advantages

As many advantages as disadvantages

Disadvantages

DK

N

25.7 27.5 33.6 37.4 32.0 31.2

42.2 44.5 43.5 42.8 37.7 41.5

17.2 17.5 14.7 13.0 13.8 15.1

15.0 10.4 8.2 6.9 16.5 12.2

2,686 2,903 2,689 2,594 5,205 16,077

Source: EB 53 (Spring 2000).

than the lowest, but that it is difficult to argue that there are also clear losers among the lowest income group. Education levels across those who felt advantaged and disadvantaged by the EU were also examined and no differences were detected, confirming the results presented above. Overall, then, it appears that there is not a tremendous difference in perceived personal benefits from European integration by different economic groups in society. In other words, while there is some difference across groups, it is not overwhelming and on balance, the personal benefits and costs seem to cancel each other out. However, is it possible that Europeans perceive certain other groups as gaining more advantages or disadvantages from the integration process? According to EU citizens themselves, there are three very clear winners in the EU: politicians, large businesses and those who speak foreign languages (see Table 3.7). Young people and professionals, such as lawyers and doctors, are also perceived to be highly advantaged by the country’s EU membership. Rather surprisingly, the group that people seem to think is most disadvantaged is farmers.7 Given the high degree of protectionism provided to farmers by the Common Agricultural Policy, it is quite unexpected that ordinary citizens think farmers on balance have been subjected to more disadvantages than advantages. Other groups that are perceived to be relatively disadvantaged by integration include the elderly, rural inhabitants, the unemployed and pensioners. In sum, the findings in this section regarding perceived costs and benefits support those in the previous section – there are indeed differences across occupational and income groups in perceptions of whether they have personally received more advantages and differences in overall perceptions of who in society has benefited from integration.

‘Rational’ Explanations of Support for Integration

43

Table 3.7: Perceived winners and losers Advantages As many Disadvantages advantages as disadvantages Those who speak foreign languages Children Young people Middle-aged people Elderly people Politicians All the (NATIONALITY) Inhabitants of (CAPITAL OF OUR COUNTRY) Inhabitants of our region Inhabitants of rural areas Large businesses Small and medium sized businesses Self-employed craftsmen Factory workers Teachers Civil servants Office workers/managers in the private sector Farmers Lawyers, doctors, architects, etc. Other employed/selfemployed people The unemployed Pensioners People belonging to a minority group in terms of race, religion or culture Everybody (SPONTANEOUS) Nobody (SPONTANEOUS)

DK

63.8

20.8

2.8

12.5

51.5 52.0 24.8 14.8 71.5 29.6 34.4

34.2 28.8 44.6 38.8 14.4 45.3 36.2

6.6 7.3 16.0 30.8 3.5 12.3 6.8

17.7 12.0 14.6 15.6 10.6 12.8 22.6

24.7 23.3 68.4 33.6

42.2 32.3 16.5 35.9

16.4 29.1 4.1 17.2

16.7 15.3 11.0 13.3

22.4 19.7 29.4 39.4 35.8

37.0 41.3 42.6 36.8 39.3

24.1 21.8 8.6 6.2 6.8

16.5 17.2 19.4 17.6 18.1

27.8 44.4 21.9

23.0 33.1 46.2

37.4 4.6 11.7

11.8 17.9 20.2

20.0 13.4 32.6

33.7 40.1 32.7

28.4 28.9 13.1

18.0 17.7 21.6

7.3 2.5

13.0 9.7

8.9 8.6

70.8 79.2

Source: EB 53 (Spring 2000); the total number of observations varies somewhat from item to item, but is approximately 16,070.

Big business and students are perceived to be advantaged and perceive themselves to be more advantaged by integration than other groups. This, in turn, is thought to make them more supportive of European integration. That is, they are favourable toward integration for very instrumental reasons, and the rest of society (perhaps correctly) also

44

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

realises that these groups are among the major beneficiaries of the European project. The only misperception detected here was in relation to farmers. Farmers themselves feel that they have received more advantages than disadvantages from European integration (at higher than average rates), whereas most members of society perceive this group as being harmed by integration. On the other hand, the response to these questions by the farmers themselves indicates that some of them may indeed have been harmed by European integration.

Sociotropic utilitarianism The economic utilitarianism argument goes beyond economic benefits that are expected by an individual based on her socio-economic position and contends that the actual benefits received by the member states have an impact on levels of support for the EU (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). In countries where the net benefits are negative, levels of support are expected to be lower than in countries where such benefits are positive. There are two primary sources of economic benefits and costs to EU member states. One is the EU budget – wealthier member states like Germany and France traditionally have paid far more into the EU budget than they have received. Once the Structural Development Funds (SDFs) were established and Southern European countries began receiving the bulk of the EU SDF budget, it likely became clearer as to which countries were benefiting and which were losing. Another of the economic benefits that EU member states can receive relates to the increase in trade levels within the EU resulting from the removal of barriers to free trade. Countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, for instance, run large positive trade balances with the EU, whereas Southern Europe, the UK and Austria have large trade deficits with the EU. According to the utilitarian model, these benefits and costs ought to translate into greater and lesser support for the integration process respectively (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). Prior empirical research has indicated that these two economic factors do indeed have an impact on support for the integration project (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998a; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). Using the Spring 2000 Eurobarometer survey, I will illustrate the aggregate effect of having a large positive budget balance and a large positive trade balance on levels of support for the EU.8 As can be seen in Figure 3.1, a country’s budget balance with the EU is clearly related to attitudes toward the EU – people living in countries that maintain a

‘Rational’ Explanations of Support for Integration

80

Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands

Want EU Play More Important Role, Spring 2000

EU Membership a Good thing, Spring 2000

80

70 Portugal Belgium

60

Italy

Spain

Greece

Denmark 50

France Finland

Germany

40

Sweden Austria United Kingdom

30

Italy Greece 60

50

–10000

80

0

40 Germany 30

United Kingdom

Belgium

Denmark France

Finland

Germany

40 Austria Sweden 30 United Kingdom

0

Trade Balance, 1999

20000

40000

Rsq = 0.1114 60000

Want EU Play More Important Role, Spring 2000

EU Membership a Good thing, Spring 2000

Greece Portugal Italy

–10000

Rsq = 0.1787 10000

0

80

Spain

20 –20000

Austria Denmark Finland

Budget Balance, 1999

Ireland

50

Luxembourg Ireland

Netherlands

Sweden

20 –20000

10000

Netherlands

60

Spain

France Belgium

Budget Balance, 1999

70

Portugal

70

Rsq = 0.2406

20 –20000

45

Italy 70

Portugal Greece

60 Spain France

50

Belgium Ireland

40

Germany

Sweden

Netherlands

Austria Denmark 30 Finland United Kingdom 20 –20000

0

20000

40000

Rsq = 0.0755 60000

Trade Balance, 1999

Figure 3.1: Sociotropic utilitarianism and support for integration (EB 53, Spring 2000) Note: Budget and trade statistics are in millions of euros.

large positive budget balance (that is, they receive far more than they pay in) tend to think their country’s membership of the EU has been ‘a good thing’ in much higher numbers, and tend to prefer that the EU play a more important role in their lives in five years’ time when compared to people living in countries that have been paying far more into the budget than they receive.9 For instance, Germany runs a budget deficit with the EU of more than 10 billion euro, and approximately 40 per cent of Germans agreed in 2000 that their country’s membership of the EU had been a good thing; approximately 35 per cent would also like to see the EU play a more important role in their lives in the future. This is in comparison to Spain, which has a positive budget balance of almost 10 billion euro, and in which 65 per cent claim that EU membership has been a good thing for their country and

46

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

approximately 55 per cent would like to see the EU playing a greater role in their daily lives in the near future. Unless these results are spurious (driven by other factors), they indicate quite clearly that feelings about the EU are indeed driven to a great degree by instrumental considerations. The trade graphs, however, tell another story.10 Apparently increased trade is not nearly as relevant to explaining support for integration, and indeed the figures indicate extremely counter-intuitive results. Namely, running a positive trade balance with the EU seems to have very little bearing on feeling that one’s country’s membership of the EU has been a good thing. There is a slightly positive effect, but this is mainly because of an outlier, the Netherlands. Also, it is clear that a high level of trade balance with other EU countries is associated with wanting the EU to play a less important role in one’s daily life. While this finding seems particularly counter-intuitive, it must be noted again that the same countries that run large positive trade balances in the EU are also net contributors to the EU budget. Thus, it is likely that in a multivariate analysis, the latter will be more important in explaining individual attitudes toward the EU than the former.11 It is to this analysis that we now turn.

The general utilitarian model The above analyses were all simple bivariate models in which each element of the economic utilitarian model was explored separately. From these analyses, it appears that occupation and budget balance both have significant effects on level of support for the EU. What happens to these variables when they are entered into a full model that controls for each of the other utilitarian variables? Moreover, can such a model provide a more complete picture of the nature of utilitarianism in the realm of attitudes toward the EU? The findings are quite similar to those discussed in previous sections of the chapter, but we are now able to estimate the effect of high levels of occupational skill, education and income simultaneously and controlling for one another (as well as aggregate-level utilitarian factors). It is important to first note that the effect of education is, once again, weak and is now statistically insignificant (Table 3.8). Given its explanatory weakness, I have decided to omit it from further discussion here. As for occupation and income, it appears that someone who is a professional or executive and has a middle-high or high level of

‘Rational’ Explanations of Support for Integration

47

Table 3.8: (Economic) utilitarian model of support for European integration EB 53 b Occupation Professional Executive Unemployed Retired Small business Farmer Student Housewife Other occupation Education Income Low-mid income Mid-high income High income Income – DK Budget balance, 1999 Intra-EU trade, 1999 Constant Adj R2 SEE N

0.36 0.33 0.05 0.01 0.20 0.06 0.37 0.12 0.11 −0.005

EB 54 SE

0.09*** 0.08*** 0.07 0.08 0.09* 0.20 0.06*** 0.10 0.05* 0.01

b

0.39 0.37 0.08 0.05 0.27 0.03 0.47 0.13 0.18 −0.01

SE

0.10** 0.06*** 0.06 0.06 0.06*** 0.23 0.08*** 0.08 0.06** 0.01

0.10 0.24 0.27 0.21

0.06 0.07** 0.09** 0.09*

0.03 0.12 0.25 0.13

0.04 0.06* 0.08** 0.07

0.00007 0.00001 2.50 0.06 1.17 14,287

0.00*** 0.00*** 0.15***

0.00006 0.000008 2.51 0.05 1.19 15,456

0.00*** 0.00** 0.14***

Note: Coefficients are OLS with White robust standard errors; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

income is likely to be more supportive of European integration by about one-half of a point on the 0–4 index. Note once again that this relative weakness of effect is a result of pooling the member states. Recall that the effects of occupation and income varied across countries, and in the process of pooling, very strong effects are, of course, combined with very weak effects. However, such pooling was necessary in order to introduce the aggregate variables of budget and trade balance. The effect of budget balance is considerably greater than the effect of high income and job skill – in Spring 2000, a country with a negative 10 billion euro budget balance with the EU (e.g. Germany) tends to be about 0.7 points below average in their support for European integration. On the other hand, carrying a positive 10 billion euro budget balance would bring about a 0.7 point increase in support for the EU. No member

48

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

state ran that high a positive budget balance with the EU in 2000, but Spain was the net beneficiary of approximately 7 billion euro, thereby boosting its level of support for integration by approximately half of a point. Thus, the overall impact of this variable is approximately 1.25 points. The size of the effect for the Autumn survey is almost exactly the same. After controlling for the budget balance, the level of intra-EU trade also has a positive effect on attitudes toward the integration process, but it is much weaker than that of budget balance. A shift from running a 10 billion euro trade deficit (e.g. Spain, UK) to running a 60 billion euro positive trade balance (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands) produces about one-half of a point increase in level of support for the EU. What is obvious from these combined results is that while individuallevel utilitarianism is somewhat important for influencing people’s opinions regarding the EU, country-level costs and benefits in the form of budget contributions and receipts tend to carry far more weight with Europeans. The former conclusion is also supported by the investigation of the questions related to perceptions of who are winners and losers in the EU. Although sociotropic and egocentric concerns were described in separate sections and as somewhat alternative ways of thinking about perceived costs and benefits, it should be recognised that there is likely to be some link between these two. The most obvious linkage can be seen in Table 3.4, which indicates that the Spanish and Irish are far less ambivalent about the personal benefits they have received due to European integration than are other nationalities. Thus, the aggregatelevel benefits that go to those two countries do seem to translate into perceptions of personal benefits received by the average Spaniard or Irish citizen.

Summary and conclusions Overall, the utilitarian model as specified in this chapter receives some empirical support. Particularly powerful are the sociotropic utilitarian explanations of support for integration. However, as indicated earlier in the chapter, the individual-level utilitarian argument requires reformulation, in that while groups that had been hypothesised to see themselves as benefiting from European integration do indeed benefit, those who were hypothesised to see themselves as losers did not do so. Finally, it is clear from the empirical results that there is still room for improvement in our understanding of opposition to integration.

4 Group Conflict Theory and European Integration

Utilitarian theory explains support for European integration in terms of how each individual benefits from integration; alternatively, it explains opposition to integration by arguing that some individuals lose in this integrative process. Or – at the very least – people perceive that they are likely to win or lose, and this perception fundamentally depends upon their socio-economic position in life. As should be apparent, this approach is extremely individualistic in nature. In addition, the evidence presented in Chapter 3 indicates that the standard utilitarian predictors are not all that powerful in explaining variation in attitudes toward the European Union, nor perceptions of specific costs and benefits to the individual provided by integration. Moreover, in most of the EU member states, the majority of the population does not seem to think they personally have benefited or lost from the integration process. In this chapter, we move away from these individualistic, utilitarian approaches and present an alternative theory that focuses on group-level interests. This alternative approach stems from a body of literature grounded in group conflict theory.

Two related literatures: self-interest and group conflict That people’s behaviour can be explained in terms of self-interest is a fundamental assumption of most economic approaches to the study of human behaviour. Indeed, as argued by Sears and Funk, ‘The notion that human behaviour is governed at least in part by selfish urges plays a role in virtually every psychology and moral philosophy in Western thought’ (1990: 147). Theoretical approaches that question this assumption point to multiple empirical examples of behaviour that is not necessarily consistent with a rational calculation of costs and benefits to the individual himself. 49

50

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

As Sen (1990) points out, prominent economists themselves will usually admit that individuals do not solely make decisions based on utilitarian calculations. However, for the sake of parsimony, and for the sake of explaining the main phenomena that are of interest to the economist, the self-interest assumption continues to dominate. However, as several of the authors in Mansbridge’s (1990) Beyond Self-Interest contend, many human behaviours simply do not have their basis in self-interest. On the positive side, giving to charities, voting, giving blood, not cheating on income taxes when it would be easy to do so are all examples of something other than self-interest motivating the individual’s behaviour. On the negative side, acts of vengeance that bring nothing positive to the actor can also be thought of as examples in which something other than economic self-interest motivates human behaviour. Jencks (1990) points to three different sources of unselfishness – empathy, community and morality. Of interest for the current research is the notion of unselfishness revolving around community, which involves ‘identification with a collectivity rather than with specific individuals’ (Jencks 1990: 54). Furthermore, people may come to put the interests of the collective ahead of their own, or even think about many issues primarily in terms of the benefits and losses to the collective. Included in the types of collectivities found in modern society is the nation-state (as well as other groupings like the family) and one of the major contentions of this book is that many individuals respond to European integration in terms of the collectivity of the nation. Group conflict theory was originally created as an explanation for the hostility that develops between different ethnic groups living in the same environment (neighbourhood, city, etc.). The central contention of the theory is that such hostility is a result of perceptions of members of groups other than one’s own (usually minority groups) receiving benefits at a cost to one’s own group (Blumer 1958). To put it more bluntly, it is perceived that members of the other group are taking resources that ‘belong to’ one’s own group. A similar theoretical approach that expands on group conflict theory is known as realistic group conflict theory. As developed by Bobo (1983, 1988; see also LeVine and Campbell 1972), one central element of the theory is that real competition for resources must exist, and that the individuals in the threatened group must perceive a collective and individual threat. However, Quillian (1995) contends that the perception of threat to the group’s resources is quite enough to produce hostile reactions to the other group, regardless of whether there is a real threat to the

Group Conflict Theory and Integration 51

group’s resources or not. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the important point is that it is the perceived threat to the group that tends to produce the most hostile reactions, not threat to the individual (Kinder and Sears 1981; for a review, see Sears and Funk 1990). Thus, it is primarily the threat to in-group interests that produces hostility toward alternative ethnic groups. An examination of literature related to other policy issues indicates that this notion of group interest helps explain a whole range of attitudes and behaviours. Specifically, individual policy preferences often do not stem from concerns for the well-being of the person herself, but instead illustrate concern for some larger group interest – often seemingly the national interest. Similar findings also appear in the voting behaviour literature, where worries about a declining national economic situation tend to be far stronger predictors of vote choice than worries about the individual’s personal economic situation (Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1990; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979). Indeed, Kinder (1981) conducts multiple tests across various time points and finds that despite economic dislocations, citizens still tend to consistently rely on their evaluations of the national economy far more than concerns about personal economic problems. Finally, the review article by Sears and Funk (1990) indicates that self-interest rarely has an effect on voting behaviour in elections and referenda, nor does it have much effect on policy preferences. Some might contend that a person’s concerns for the group, or for society, are ultimately driven by concerns that the individual has for himself and his own well-being. For instance, in the case of economic voting, perhaps the individual worries that if the national economy declines, his personal financial situation will also deteriorate. In other words, behind concern for the economy of society is a very rational, individualistic worry about whether one’s job will be lost, whether one can purchase a new automobile as planned, etc. Indeed, Bobo and Kluegel (1993: 445) claim that these two areas should not be thought of as separate: ‘The distinction between individual and group self-interest should not be overdrawn. Often there is a direct tie between individual self-interest and patterns of group identification.’ However, their analysis does not attempt to determine whether the interest investigated does indeed revolve around concerns for personal losses or concerns for the group’s losses, and converts these two distinct ideas into one by referring to them as ‘group self-interest’ (see p. 459, for instance). These two concepts cannot, in fact, be assumed to be identical. Funk and Garcia-Monet

52

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

(1997), for instance, conduct extensive analyses in order to test for the possibility that expressions of group interest are mostly a result of self-interest and find that there is indeed a significant indirect effect for individual finances on attitudes toward various policies; however, this effect is consistently weak, and the authors conclude that some other explanation of sociotropic (group-level) evaluations must be found. Part of the reason that self-interest is such a weak predictor of voting behaviour and policy preferences appears to be that people are often not aware of the implications of policy outcomes for their own lives. It has been shown that when people are either aware that they have a large stake in a policy outcome or when they have been primed in a previous question to think about their personal interest in the policy, then self-interest does indeed have a strong impact on policy evaluations (Chong, Citrin and Conley 2001; Sears and Funk 1990). Sears and Lau (1983) also show with experimental evidence that when respondents are primed or reminded of their interests before being asked about their policy preferences, self-interest has a much stronger effect on such policy evaluations than when the respondent has not been primed. Indeed, Green and Gerken (1989) find an extremely powerful effect for self-interest in an instance where the person’s stake in a policy outcome – namely smoking restrictions – was clear. Specifically, smokers were clearly more opposed to such restrictions than non-smokers. Funk (2000) draws similar conclusions and contends that among those who have no personal stake in a policy outcome, there tends to be a great deal of reliance on perceptions of societal interest. The implication is that people generally do not go through life worrying about the effect that a change in government or government policy will have on their personal lives, and so when they are asked to evaluate various policy proposals or to make a voting choice, they are using something other than personal interest to do so. The conclusion drawn by much of this research is that this other element is sociotropic evaluations, or societal interest. Research from Europe on attitudes toward the welfare state and health care policies points to similar conclusions (Gelissen 2000; Gevers et al. 2000). Perhaps even more telling is that even if a person expects no personal benefits from a policy but is likely to incur costs, that person is still likely to support the policy if she sees a societal-level benefit to be gained by the policy (Funk 2000). Thus, in general, grouplevel interests are rather powerful predictors of individual-level attitudes and behaviours that can be conceptually and empirically separated from individual-level interests.

Group Conflict Theory and Integration 53

Group conflict and opposition to European integration A major contention of this book is that in the search for rational, utilitarian answers to the question of why some people oppose European integration while others are in favour, we have missed a terribly important aspect of individuals’ thinking about politics in general. We know that individuals think about the group when forming their attitudes toward other policies, so why would this not be the case when forming attitudes regarding the integration process? Specifically, is it not likely to be the case that some individuals are more concerned about losses to the group resulting from European integration than others, and that such concerns are likely to lead them to oppose this integration process? To be even more specific, the current integration project poses an obvious threat to the main terminal societal grouping to which most people have become attached, the nation-state (see Carey 2002). If individuals are concerned about the withering away of their nation-state, then it is likely that their concern is based on considerations of loss of national resources. For instance, what is to become of national resources as state boundaries disappear? Naturally, those national resources would be given to some individuals who are not currently members (or citizens) of the nation-state. This is similar to notions of group conflict in the realm of attitudes toward immigration (see Quillian 1995). Members of the community, or the nation-state, often worry that the resources that belong to the dominant nationality will be given away to those who are not part of the community, namely immigrants. Concern about one’s own interests, on the other hand, are not very powerful predictors of anti-immigrant hostility (McLaren 1996). In other words, group interest seems to stimulate a strong desire to expel non-members of the national community, whereas self-interest does not. Why, then, should this not also be true in the case of European integration?

Measuring group conflict As indicated in Chapter 2, I will be analysing data from Eurobarometer 53 of Spring 2000 and Eurobarometer 54.1 of Autumn 2000. These two surveys were selected because they contain the best measures of the main independent variables of interest in this research, group conflict (discussed in this chapter) and symbolic threat (discussed in the next chapter). Moreover, the questions in the two surveys refer in similar ways to two different issues – one to minorities living within the

54

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

country and the other to the possible effects of integration on the nation-state. Thus, we will be able to determine whether group interest sorts of concerns expressed regarding minorities are indeed the same as interest expressed in the realm of European integration, as I suspect they are. This will be discussed further below. As just indicated, the measures of perceptions of group conflict in EB 53 refer to feelings about minority groups living in the country. Specifically, they follow a question that asks whether the respondent feels that she belongs to one of the majority groups or one of the minority groups in the country, in terms of race, religion and culture. Only 8 per cent of the entire EU sample responded in the affirmative, and all of these individuals were removed from the statistical analyses below. The subsequent questions that will be used in the analyses here are: • In schools where there are too many children from these minority groups, the quality of education suffers. • People from these minority groups abuse the system of social benefits. • The presence of people from these minority groups increases unemployment in (COUNTRY). Respondents were asked to state whether they tend to agree or disagree with these statements, which appear in a list of several others also asking about perceptions of minority groups. These measures of threat perception might be seen as problematic for two reasons. First, it may not be all that clear to whom ‘minority groups’ is referring. Of course, there is no definitive way to know exactly what the respondent is thinking in answering these questions, but, based on answers to other survey questions, we can infer that respondents are most likely imagining relatively recent (i.e. post-World War Two) migrants to their country. One point that leads to this conclusion goes to what the items mean ‘on their face’. As discussed above, the respondent has been cued in a previous question to consider minority groups in terms of different race, religion and culture. The use of the word ‘race’ is especially likely to make the respondents think about non-Europeans (and thus, non-EU citizens). Indeed, if we examine the responses to questions from a previous Eurobarometer (EB 30) about who the respondent thinks of when he hears about people of a different race, the vast majority in all EU countries point to ‘Blacks’, Arabs, Turks, the ‘Yellow Race’, Indians, Pakistanis or Sri Lankans, depending on which of these groups have migrated in large numbers to the respondent’s country. Thus, if the respondent is asked to think

Group Conflict Theory and Integration 55

about people from minority groups in terms of race, religion and culture, he is most likely imagining Muslims from Turkey, North Africa, or Pakistan, Chinese Buddhists, or Hindus from India, not Basques living in Spain or Catholics in Northern Ireland (McLaren 2002). In other words, while the questions might appear to be extremely ambiguous at first glance, I contend that the reference is likely to be rather clear, and that the items listed above are capturing an underlying sense of threat posed by out-groups. Another piece of evidence that points to a similar conclusion is that these two items are very strongly related to attitudes toward legal migration (McLaren 2003). Those who are unthreatened by members of minority groups tend to be more positive about the treatment of legal migrants, whereas those who are more threatened by ‘these’ minority groups tend to favour harsher treatment for such migrants. Thus, it appears that people are indeed mostly thinking about immigrants when they are asked about minority groups of different races, religions and cultures. A second potentially problematic aspect of these measures is that they do not specifically gauge level of perceived threat from other EU citizens. Indeed, as just argued, the questions are very likely to not be measuring perceptions of other Europeans at all. While one might expect that EU citizens think very differently about other EU citizens compared to non-EU citizens, my own research (McLaren 2001) indicates that this is not necessarily the case – survey respondents generally prefer to treat the two groups almost identically when it comes to allowing them to migrate to the respondent’s home country, for instance. Thus, the distinction that one might expect does not appear in reality. Furthermore, I am arguing that it is a general fear of the degradation of the resources of the nation that leads some to be hostile toward the European Union. Why would such fears be relevant to attitudes toward European integration, though? The answer to this question revolves around the notions of group protectiveness outlined above. Whether there is any real threat to resources of a group or not, many individuals are likely to view policy decisions in terms of how they will affect the group. Thus, things like jobs, social welfare benefits and public education fit within the realm of resources that ought to be reserved and preserved for those in the group. Like immigration, the whole process of European integration – the creation of an open market in which people can move freely in search of better lives (or better business) – means that those who are not conceptualised as part of the traditional national grouping are allowed free access to the group’s resources, and this particular problem is likely to be a major threat to those who do indeed think in these terms.

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

This issue is also investigated more directly in this chapter using the context of resource-based threat coming specifically from the EU. These survey questions (from Eurobarometer 54.1, Autumn 2000) begin as follows, ‘Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the European Union. Here is a list of things which some people say they are afraid of. For each one, please tell me if you – personally – are currently afraid of it, or not?’ The items selected to measure conflict over resources are: • The loss of social benefits. • The transfer of jobs to countries which have lower production costs. • More difficulties for (NATIONALITY) farmers. Some might contend that these particular items are far better measures of the type of threat with which this book is concerned, in that they tie the issue of European integration more specifically into the notion of groupbased threat than do the migration-related items. On the other hand, this can also be viewed as a weakness – these items are so close to the concept of support for integration that it might seem unreasonable to expect that answers to them and answers to questions about the integration process are not one and the same. It is for this reason that including measures of group resource-based threat that make no reference to the EU (as with the migration items above) is important. That is, if both approaches indicate that concern for the loss of group resources, whether from immigrants or from integration, affect attitudes toward the EU, then it is less likely that we will conclude that the relationship is either spurious or driven solely by closeness of the measurement of the items. It might also be argued that these survey items (both the immigrationrelated items and the integration-related items) are really capturing self-interest and not group-level interest. This issue will be addressed extensively in Chapter 6. The findings of that chapter indicate, however, that the above items can indeed be validly used as measures of perceived threats to group interests. Beginning with fears about the quality of education where there are many children of minority backgrounds, we see considerable variation in concern about this potential problem (see Figure 4.1a). It is apparent that respondents in countries where the post-World War Two history of influx of immigrants is more recent and where there are relatively fewer numbers of migrants (Italy, Spain, Ireland and Portugal) tend to be much less concerned about this – less than a majority of the respondents in these countries claim that education does indeed suffer when there

Group Conflict Theory and Integration 57

(a) Education suffers

(b) Minorities abuse social benefits

100

100

80

80

60

60

40

40

20

20

0

0 ia str n Au ede Swland any Fin erm itain G r E. t B ea al Gr rtug nds a Po herl ourg t Ne emb x Lu and l Ire nce Fra in a Sp y l Ita ce ny ee a Gr erm .G k W mar n Delgium Be

ia str n Au ede Swland ny a Fin erm itain G r E. t B ea l Gr rtuga nds a Po herl urg o t Ne emb x Lu and l Ire nce Fra in a Sp y l Ita ece ny a e Gr erm .G k W mar n Delgium Be

(c) Minorities increase unemployment 100 80 60 40 20 0 ia str Au den e Sw and ny l a Fin erm tain i G E. t Br ea l Gr rtuga nds Po herla urg t bo Ne em x Lu and l Ire nce Fra in a Sp y l Ita ce y ee an Gr erm G k W. mar n Delgium Be

Figure 4.1:

Perceived threat from minorities, Spring 2000

are many cultural minorities attending the local school. Note that only a minority of Finns also express such a concern; although Finland is a country of immigration, its immigrant population is, in fact, rather small. This lack of worry about minorities creating problematic educational atmospheres can be contrasted to countries like Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, where very large majorities do believe that the quality of education in the midst of many children of non-native descent is reduced. When we examine expressions of concern about social benefits being abused by minorities (Figure 4.1b), a somewhat different pattern emerges. The only two countries where small minorities (<40 per cent) of respondents think that migrants abuse social benefits are Italy and Spain – again, these are countries with a relatively shorter historical

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

experience with immigration, and so these percentages are not surprising. On the other hand, 50 per cent or more in Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Britain, Belgium and France tend to think minorities do indeed abuse the system of social benefits. In the latter two countries, the figure is greater than 60 per cent. The most surprising among this particular list is Ireland – as discussed above, Ireland has relatively little experience with post-World War Two immigration and relatively few immigrants. Thus, it is unexpected that there is so much concern for abuse of social welfare benefits in this country. However, with the Irish economic miracle of the 1990s, citizens of Ireland have come to realise that their country has become extremely attractive to foreign labourers and do appear to feel justified in thinking that such foreign workers are only there to take advantage of the recently acquired wealth of the country. In terms of worrying that minorities increase unemployment (Figure 4.1c), we again find a rather different picture. Greeks, who were not so worried about minorities causing the deterioration of educational provision or about them abusing social benefits, are apparently very worried that such groups would increase unemployment. Portugal, which is also not a heavy receiving country for migrants, similarly had a relatively large number of citizens who expressed this concern. As seen in Figure 4.2, responses to this question tend to be very strongly related to the national unemployment situation.1 Note that the level of unemployment is not very strongly related to thinking that minorities increase unemployment, but the change in unemployment is. Specifically, people in countries like Greece, Belgium and Germany, which have experienced persistently high unemployment, tend to be most worried about the effect of minorities on this unemployment problem. In countries where the unemployment problem is declining considerably (e.g. Ireland, Spain and Finland), there is far less concern that minorities contribute to the unemployment problem. Moving now to the data from Autumn 2000 – which focuses specifically on the effects of European integration on group benefits – as illustrated in Figure 4.3a, the percentages of individuals thinking that European integration means a loss of social benefits are rather similar across EU member states. Italians seem to be least worried about this aspect of European integration, and the Irish are also relatively less worried. Alternatively, East Germans, followed by the French, Greeks and Austrians, tend to be more likely to say that European integration means a loss of social benefits. Why would individuals be concerned at all about the EU bringing about benefit losses? Mostly because – as discussed in Chapter 3 – in the period leading up to the adoption of the

Group Conflict Theory and Integration 59 90%

Minorities increase unemployment (agree)

Greece 80%

70% E. Germany Belgium 60%

W.Germany

Portugal

France

Netherlands

50%

Austria

Britain Denmark

Ireland 40%

Italy

Luxembourg

Sweden

Spain Finland

Rsq = 0.3740 30% –10

–8

–6

–4

–2

0

2

Change in unemployment, 1995–2000

Figure 4.2:

Unemployment and blame minorities for unemployment

euro, participating countries (all EU member states except the UK, Denmark and Sweden) were required by EU agreements to reduce both budget deficits and debts to a certain range (a maximum of 3 per cent of GDP for deficits and 60 per cent for public debt). What is more, these countries were required to continue practising budgetary restraint after the adoption of the euro. This has meant that public sector spending has been decreased in the process of European integration. In addition, discussions of a social charter in the EU are still in the negotiation phase (and have been stalled there for some time), and so the EU has not been able to take over from national governments in providing all EU citizens with such benefits. Thus, citizens likely have valid concerns about the EU eventually leading to some loss of social welfare benefits. What about worries over the transfer of jobs to other countries? Not surprisingly, Italians and Spaniards, followed by the Portuguese, tend to be least worried about this issue (see Figure 4.3b). One of the benefits that was expected to accrue to the poorer member states was that companies located in the wealthier member states would likely relocate

60

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration (a) EU means loss of social benefits

(b) EU means transfer of jobs

100

100

80

80

60

60

40

40

20

20

0

0 ia str n Au ede Swland any Fin ermritain G E. t B ea l Gr tuga nds r a Po herl ourg t b Ne em x Lu nd la Ire nce Fra in a Sp y l Ita ece any e Gr erm .G rk W nma De ium lg Be

ia str n Au ede Swland ny a Fin erm itain G r E. at B l e Gr tuga nds r a Po herl urg o t Ne emb x Lu nd la Ire nce Fra in a Sp y l Ita ece any e Gr erm .G rk W ma n De ium lg Be

(c) EU means difficulties for farmers 100 80 60 40 20 0 ia str n Au ede Swland any Fin erm itain G r E. t B ea l Gr tuga nds r a Po herl ourg t Ne emb x Lu d lan Ire nce Fra in a Sp y l Ita ece any e Gr erm .G rk W nma De ium lg Be

Figure 4.3:

Perceived threat from EU, Autumn 2000

so as to be able to hire labourers at cheaper wages and to pay less for social benefits for those labourers. Specifically, it was expected that countries like Spain, Portugal and Italy would benefit from the process of job transfers, whereas the wealthier, Northern European countries would likely lose jobs. And, indeed, we do see a considerable amount of worry over this problem in many of the richer EU member states. On the other hand, there are a few somewhat anomalous results, like the fact that the Greeks tend to be far more concerned about this issue than other Southern European countries. As indicated above, however, unemployment in Greece has been consistently high, and it is likely that the general problem of high unemployment is leading to morethan-usual concern about the job situation in Greece. Finally, concern for the country’s farmers shows fairly different results (Figure 4.3c). This appears to be a major concern for Greek citizens, as

Group Conflict Theory and Integration 61

well as Portuguese respondents, followed by Finns. West Germans appear to be relatively less worried about this, followed by Danes, Italians, Irish and Luxembourgers.

Group conflict and opposition to European integration: empirical analysis We begin this section by analysing the bivariate correlations between the perceived group threat measures and level of support for European integration in the Spring 2000 data set (in which the measure of perceived threat is based upon attitudes to minorities already living in the country). First, it should be noted that the bivariate correlations among the items selected as measures of these concepts are fairly strong (Table 4.1).2 Although there are a few instances in which gamma values drop below 0.25, in most other cases, the values are large enough to justify including all three of these items in a single index rather than analysing them individually.

Table 4.1: Intercorrelations of group threat items, Spring 2000 Country

Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland N. Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

Education suffers – abuse social benefits

Education suffers – increase unemployment

Abuse social benefits – increase unemployment

N

0.57 0.41 0.34 0.31 0.42 0.35 0.66 0.44 0.53 0.42 0.32 0.31 0.49 0.44 0.47 0.39 0.47 0.40

0.48 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.32 0.37 0.61 0.35 0.41 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.31 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.43 0.34

0.68 0.38 0.56 0.28 0.49 0.46 0.69 0.36 0.50 0.41 0.41 0.46 0.60 0.45 0.50 0.37 0.58 0.47

942 944 907 951 959 964 878 968 263 470 838 920 954 985 949 949 898 14,739

Note: Figures are gamma values; all are significant at p ≤ .01.

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Table 4.2: Correlations (Pearson’s r), group threat index and support for integration, Spring 2000 Country

Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland N. Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

Pearson’s r −0.26 −0.06NS −0.22 −0.01NS −0.19 −0.09 −0.32 −0.11 −0.22 −0.11* −0.13 −0.10 −0.28 −0.25 −0.14 −0.10 −0.18 −0.16

b coefficient

Maximum impact (6 points)

N

−0.14 −0.04 −0.15 −0.003 −0.09 −0.04 −0.17 −0.05 −0.12 −0.05 −0.07 −0.05 −0.17 −0.16 −0.09 −0.07 −0.11 −0.10

−0.84 −0.24 −0.90 −0.02 −0.54 −0.24 −1.02 −0.30 −0.72 −0.30 −0.42 −0.30 −1.02 −0.96 −0.54 −0.42 −0.66 −0.60

942 944 907 951 959 964 878 968 263 470 838 920 954 985 949 949 898 14,739

Notes: All correlations are significant at p ≤ .01 unless otherwise indicated; NS = not statistically significant; * p ≤ .05; range of EU support index is 0–4.

The first column of Table 4.2 provides the bivariate correlation coefficients for the relationship between the combined group conflict index and level of support for European integration, while the second provides the b-coefficient from a bivariate OLS regression conducted for each country. Finally, the third column provides an estimate of the maximum impact of perceived group threat from minorities on level of support for European integration, based upon the size of the b-coefficients in the second column. Generally, the findings indicate that the effect of perceptions of group conflict is quite variable. In some countries (France, Britain and Germany), we find a somewhat strong to moderate relationship. In two countries (Denmark and Greece), the relationship is not statistically significant, and in the rest, there is a weak relationship, as indicated by the correlation coefficient. How much of a change does group threat bring about in level of support for integration, however? The estimates provided in column three indicate that the difference between someone who feels that group resources are

Group Conflict Theory and Integration 63

completely unthreatened by immigrants and someone who feels the maximum amount of threat ranges from close to one full point on the support for integration index (which itself ranges from 0–4) in Belgium, Germany, France and Britain, to almost zero in Greece. The former figure represents a 20 per cent reduction in support for European integration. Also, for many other countries, the effect of group threat is close to or slightly above one half of a point; this includes Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and Austria. Note that these sizes are quite similar to those found for the egocentric and sociotropic utilitarian items. The countries in which these feelings of group threat and group protectiveness have little impact on level of support for the EU are Denmark, Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal. All of these countries except Denmark are countries that, as discussed above, have far less experience with migration and thus people are less likely to be primed to think in terms of group threat issues than is the case in places like Germany and France. Moreover, rather than posing a threat to group resources, the EU has provided the exact opposite – a major boost to the resources of the entire economies of these countries. It is no wonder, then, that group threat translates far more weakly into opposition to integration in these countries. As discussed above, however, these items are less direct measures of perceptions of group conflict related to European integration than some might like. Tables 4.3–4.5 use the more direct measures discussed above from the Autumn 2000 Eurobarometer. Because of the closeness of each of these items to the issue of integration, I thought it useful to begin with a discussion of each of them – worry about loss of social benefits, about difficulties for the country’s farmers, and about the transfer of jobs – as they relate to level of support for the EU. Each item does, in fact, have a varying impact on level of support for integration. For instance, Belgian opposition to integration appears to stem more from concern for loss of social benefits and less so from worry about difficulties for farmers or the transfer of jobs. In Denmark, there is a similarly large difference in the size of the gamma coefficients across different types of potential group threat. In Portugal, worry about loss of social benefits has a significant, moderate impact, whereas other types of potential group conflict are not significantly related to opposition to integration. In the rest of the countries, however, the effect of the three potential types of group conflict is roughly similar. In addition, as indicated in Table 4.4, the intercorrelation of items is also quite strong; thus I combine them into a single index representing degree of feeling resource-based group conflict specifically from European integration.

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Table 4.3: Correlations (gammas) between group threat and support for integration, Autumn 2000 Country

Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland N. Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

Loss of social benefits −0.37 −0.50 −0.16 −0.09* −0.30 −0.05NS −0.37 −0.22 −0.09NS −0.11NS −0.16 −0.21 −0.25 −0.22 −0.27 −0.34 −0.40 −0.26

Difficulties for farmers −0.19 −0.32 −0.21 .00NS −0.17 0.02NS −0.29 −0.22 −0.16* −0.03NS −0.17 −0.05NS −0.22 −0.16 −0.25 −0.34 −0.31 −0.17

Transfer of jobs −0.16 −0.36 −0.19 0.07NS −0.23 0.06NS −0.25 −0.13 0.07NS −0.00NS −0.11* −0.01NS −0.25 −0.20 −0.23 −0.35 −0.29 −0.19

N

1048 1000 1013 1002 987 1000 1003 1001 313 609 1004 1000 1058 1014 1015 1000 1000 16,067

Notes: All correlations are significant at p ≤ .01 unless otherwise indicated; NS = not statistically significant; * p ≤ .05.

The correlations between this index and the index of support for integration (see Table 4.5) tell a roughly similar story to the one that emerged above, except that these relationships are generally stronger than those found in Table 4.2, supporting the contention that they are better measures of EU-related group conflict. On the other hand, it appears that in most of the usual countries – Greece, Spain and Portugal – this relationship is quite weak. The Danish results, however, are very interesting. Recall that feelings of group conflict related to minorities had little impact on Danish attitudes to the EU; when we use EU-related items, the conclusion about group conflict and attitudes toward the EU change considerably. Similarly, we find a much stronger impact in Sweden than was the case with group conflict as measured in terms of minorities taking group benefits. However, in all countries but these two, the distribution of the size of the effect is similar across the two measures, as indicated above, with the only major difference being that the EU-specific items have an overall larger impact.3 Thus, based on two very different measures of perceptions of group conflict, the results of the analyses are quite similar.

Group Conflict Theory and Integration 65 Table 4.4: Correlations (gammas), group threat items, Autumn 2000 Country

Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland N. Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

Loss of social benefits – difficulties for farmers

Loss of social benefits – transfer of jobs

Difficulties for farmers – transfer of jobs

N

0.48 0.52 0.39 0.65 0.37 0.71 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.37 0.32 0.51 0.56 0.52 0.60 0.47 0.57 0.49

0.48 0.54 0.49 0.41 0.40 0.57 0.54 0.45 0.33 0.44 0.34 0.47 0.54 0.61 0.63 0.49 0.67 0.51

0.67 0.50 0.66 0.66 0.56 0.71 0.62 0.52 0.47 0.56 0.42 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.56 0.63 0.70 0.59

1048 1000 1013 1002 987 1000 1003 1001 313 609 1004 1000 1058 1014 1015 1000 1000 16,067

Notes: All correlations are significant at p ≤ .01 unless otherwise indicated; NS = not statistically significant; * p ≤ .05.

One of the general findings is that members of the traditionally poorer member states of the EU seem to relate the process of European integration to loss of group benefits to a much lesser degree (if at all) than the wealthier member states. The reasons for such differences are likely to stem from issues discussed above connected to actual benefits that have accrued to member states. If we examine the EU budget balance in all of the member states in recent years (see Table 4.6), it is quite clear as to who are the beneficiaries and who are the providers. It is not surprising that people living in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland would be less likely to connect European integration to the loss of group benefits, in that the citizenry of these countries overall have gained benefits during the process of European integration. Note that Luxembourg was also in the group of countries in which there was a fairly small relationship between these variables, and Luxembourg is one of the countries that does not lose much in the EU budget either.

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

Table 4.5: Correlations (Pearson’s r), group threat index and support for integration, Autumn 2000 Country Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland N. Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

r

b coefficient

Maximum impact (0–6)

N

−0.25 −0.39 −0.20 −0.06NS −0.23 −0.02NS −0.28 −0.19 −0.04NS −0.07NS −0.15 −0.10 −0.25 −0.18 −0.23 −0.35 −0.32 −0.21

−0.13 −0.26 −0.12 −0.04 −0.12 −0.01 −0.17 −0.09 −0.02 −0.03 −0.08 −0.05 −0.14 −0.11 −0.14 −0.25 −0.18 −0.12

−0.78 −1.56 −0.72 −0.24 −0.72 −0.05 −1.02 −0.54 −0.12 −0.18 −0.48 −0.30 −0.84 −0.66 −0.84 −1.50 −1.08 −0.72

1048 1000 1013 1002 987 1000 1003 1001 313 609 1004 1000 1058 1014 1015 1000 1000 16,067

Notes: All correlations are significant at p ≤ .01 unless otherwise indicated; NS = not statistically significant; * p ≤ .05; range of EU support index is 0–4.

Table 4.6: Budget balance in the European Union (ecus)

Germany UK Netherlands France Belgium Italy Sweden Austria Denmark Finland Luxembourg Ireland Portugal Greece Spain

1998

1999

2000

Average

−10,357.70 −5,654.90 −3,048.30 −1,725.10 −1,442.90 −2,186.00 −1,087.60 −807.60 −213.60 −221.80 −88.10 2,224.80 2,890.40 4,633.10 6,672.10

−11,216.30 −5,283.30 −3,350.70 −1,139.10 −1,364.70 −1,793.10 −1,202.20 −827.60 −139.40 −295.60 −100.90 1,826.70 2,700.10 3,659.90 6,701.60

−11,542.20 −6,098.80 −3,269.90 −2,323.20 −1,430.60 −229.00 −1,438.40 −709.10 −69.80 154.30 −79.90 1,525.80 1,990.60 4,237.00 4,455.30

−11,038.73 −5,679.00 −3,222.97 −1,729.13 −1,412.73 −1,402.70 −1,242.73 −781.43 −140.93 −121.03 −89.63 1,859.10 2,527.03 4,176.67 5,943.00

Source: Eurostat, Statistical Guide to Europe, 2001.

Group Conflict Theory and Integration 67

On the other side of the spectrum, citizens in the budgetary loser countries do see such a connection between integration and loss of group benefits, most likely because unlike the four mentioned above, during the process of preparation for the Common Market and the introduction of the euro, they did not receive special benefits to prepare their own economies in the same way that the poorer four did. This, along with the problem of having to reduce social benefits to prepare for the introduction of the euro and the lack of a Europewide social welfare system, has very likely produced the stronger connection between issues of group conflict and European integration in this group of member states. Overall, then, there is rather clear evidence that perceptions of losses to the group in relation to European integration mirror realworld circumstances that each member state faces. Countries of Southern Europe, as well as Ireland, have traditionally not had many immigrants threatening to take benefits nor have they faced an EU that has taken funds from them and redistributed these funds to other countries. The lack of both of these, of course, stems from a similar source: all four of these member states have been particularly poor until recently. They did not attract immigrants because they were not seen as providing tremendous wealth for their own citizens; in other words, economic opportunity there may have seemed rather low, especially in comparison to countries like Germany, the Netherlands and France. At the same, they received considerable EU funding for the same reason that immigrants stayed away – they were relatively poor. On the other hand, in the wealthier EU member states, there does indeed seem to be some concern that group resources are being taken away, and people who fear that immigrants are taking these resources tend also to be hostile toward European integration, indicating that general concern for group-level resources does indeed translate into anti-integration hostility. Even more specific evidence from data collected in Autumn of 2000 indicates that many people in wealthier member states are concerned about the loss of group benefits that the integration process poses, and those people are – not surprisingly – less likely to have a positive view of that integration process. At the same time, it should be noted that the empirical relationships found in this chapter are not hugely overwhelming. In other words, concern for group-level loss does not automatically translate into opposition to the EU, indicating that variation in levels of support for the EU stems from other sources as well.

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

Conclusion This chapter was the first of two to introduce the general approach of this book to the study of attitudes toward European integration. As indicated in the introduction to the book, one problem with much of the prior literature on support for European integration is that it ignores sources of variation in this phenomenon that revolve around group-level concerns stemming from group-level, or national, identity. This particular chapter addressed the issue of opposition to European integration which results from worry that national benefits might be taken away (and given to those not in the national grouping), and finds that especially in countries where there have been real events that are likely to make people think that benefits are being lost to non-nationals – namely where immigration has been high and where the EU budget is taking resources away from the national budget and redistributing it to non-nationals – opposition to the EU is indeed partly driven by fear for the loss of national resources. On the other hand, as indicated above, these empirical results are not overwhelming, and certainly leave room for further explanation of attitudes toward European integration. Thus, we turn next to a discussion of the more symbolic sorts of concerns that people may have while formulating their opinions toward the EU.

5 Symbolic Politics and European Integration: the Role of National Symbols and Identity

The previous chapter introduced a theory of inter-group relations that was in many ways rather similar to the utilitarian approach, in that at the heart of the theory there was some element of competition for resources. As discussed in that chapter, however, perceptions of competition for resources may not stem from individual feelings of vulnerability to such competition but concern for the resources of one’s in-group. This chapter takes a somewhat different approach to the question of attitudes to European integration, drawing on another literature known as ‘symbolic politics’. Rather than postulating that competition for economic resources is at the heart of feelings of hostility toward other groups, this approach contends that out-groups pose threats to important symbols that the in-group holds to be dear (see McLaren 2002, 2004; see also Hooghe and Marks 2004 and Carey 2002 for further explanations of the importance of national identity). This theory will be first outlined as applied in the context of attitudes toward minority groups – one of the key areas for which the theory was originally developed – and is then introduced as an explanation of variation in opinion regarding European integration.

The concept of symbolic politics The theory of symbolic politics was, in fact, originally designed as a counter-argument to the approaches discussed in the previous chapters. In light of the vast array of empirical results indicating that self-interest and ‘group self-interest’ often play very little role in the formulation of policy preferences by mass publics, some other explanation for such preferences was required. This alternative approach, like the one 69

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discussed in Chapter 4, has its roots in studies of relations between African-Americans and whites in the United States. However, I believe the approach can also be applied fruitfully to the study of public opinion toward European integration, as it (the symbolic politics approach) addresses broad issues of in-group identity and out-group rejection. In the literature on inter-group relations in the US, in addition to failing to find strong evidence for self-interest approaches, researchers also began to notice that the measures for racism that were typically introduced into mass surveys were indicating a considerable decrease in prejudice against blacks. This was rather surprising, as many of the more visible problems between whites and blacks, such as housing segregation, higher percentages of blacks in prisons, lower income and education for blacks, etc., persisted. Researchers inferred that respondents were being more careful about being openly racist, and instead of actually being less racist, they were likely to be behaving in a more politically correct manner. It was then speculated that opposition to race-targeted policies like affirmative action was a new, socially acceptable manner of expressing racism. When opposition to these policies was used as a measure of racism, however, very little evidence could be found that self-interest was driving variation in racism. This was especially perplexing, given that affirmative action clearly presented the issue of conflict over resources, particularly competition for jobs and studentships at universities. The fact that those (white) citizens who were expected to be fearful of such competition were not opposed to affirmative action at high levels led researchers to question the whole notion of in-group identification and out-group rejection as being a function of competition for economic resources. That is, out-group rejection must result from some psychological process other than real or perceived conflict over resources. Thus, it was contended that opposition to affirmative action really resulted from ‘symbolic racism’, in that blacks, as a group, were perceived as being a threat to traditional white American values, such as individualism and hard work; according to the so-called symbolic racists (i.e. those who are racist for symbolic reasons), the explanation for why blacks – as a group – are not doing well in American society is that they do not buy into these values. Thus, blacks are seen as a threat to important cultural symbols, or the ‘American way of life’. Initial empirical work (Sears, Hensler and Speer 1979) supported this contention.1 Turning to research on social identity, we find even more convincing evidence that members of groups have a tendency to strongly identify with their own group and to derogate other groups, even when there is clearly no competition for resources. Tajfel’s (1970) classic experiment in

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which he artificially assigned participants to groups in a laboratory and then observed in-group favouritism is still quite compelling in this regard. As Monroe, Hankin and van Vechten point out, ‘The thousands of experiments underlying social identity theory have consistently shown that individuals identify with the in-group, support group norms, and derogate out-group members along stereotypical lines, even when there is no individual gain at stake’ (2000: 435; italics added by the author). Some of these experiments include tasks such as awarding points to other parties in the experiment without having any interaction with the members and without any gain for the participant herself. Even in such circumstances, individuals tend to favour those they know to be in their own ‘group’, which is usually only identified by a letter (e.g. A, B, C, D, etc.). If an in-group identity that has nothing at all to do with interest in resources can be created rather quickly in laboratory experiments, certainly identities that are longer-established and ingrained through socialisation – such as national identities – are likely to provoke the same type of in-group favouritism and out-group derogation that stem from something other than competition for resources. What I am contending is that perhaps it is simply the symbol of the group itself and the need to maintain the integrity of the group that lead individuals to develop hostility toward those who are not members. If this is the case, the obvious question is why do humans need group identity in the first place? What does social identity theory say is the root of this phenomenon? The original version of the theory sought psychological explanations and contended that the main reason such identities form is that they serve a need for achieving positive self-esteem (Tajfel 1970). It is thought that feeling that one is part of a group that has superior characteristics (compared to other groups) makes individuals who are part of the former feel positive about themselves.2 The so-called minimal group experiments mentioned above, in which participants accept seemingly meaningless categories imposed by an experimenter, point to the need for identity on the part of individuals when faced with a virtually meaningless situation in order to give that situation some meaning (Tajfel 1972). It is not too difficult to imagine other contexts in which such identity does indeed make individuals in the group feel better about themselves by feeling themselves to be part of a group. Sporting events are one clear example of this phenomenon. Supporting one’s sports team against another team often serves to unite those supporters and make them feel ‘British’, ‘German’, ‘Brazilian’, etc. Even individuals who tend not to claim a strong in-group identity are likely to gain very positive feelings of pride from openly supporting

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the team in question. And perhaps this phenomenon results from the very social nature of human beings – people need to be connected to one another, and identity clearly provides this connection. This connection, in turn, is likely to make the identifiers feel more positive about themselves. Another explanation for identity formation processes which was later developed as an offshoot of social identity theory (and came to be known as self-categorisation theory) is the cognitive economy argument (Turner 1982, 1985; Turner et al. 1987, Turner et al. 1994). Essentially, in order to simplify a complex reality, individuals use heuristics to organise reality. A more sophisticated version of this type of approach is schema theory (see Morgan and Schwalbe 1990; Kihlstrom and Cantor 1984; Fiske and Taylor 1991), which argues that we have highly organised structures in memory that guide memory recall and the understanding/ perception of new information. Analyses investigating variation in individual-level identities have indeed indicated that those who have a stronger need for cognitive structure tend to use heuristics like stereotypes to a greater degree (Neuberg and Newsom 1993; Bodenhausen 1990; Freund, Kruglanski and Schpitizajzen 1985; Stangor and Duan 1991; Stangor and Thompson 2002). Evidence has also been found in support of the notion that those who have greater self-esteem requirements tend to use stereotyping and favour their in-group more than those who already have high self-esteem (Oakes and Turner 1980; Stangor and Thompson 2002), but evidence in this regard is at times mixed (Hogg and Abrams 1988; Rubin and Hewstone 1998). What is clear, however, is that group identity and protection of group do not stem from economic self-interest alone, nor necessarily from group-level economic interests. Instead (or in addition to these other factors), such protectionism seems to serve the purpose of protecting the norms, values and way of life of the group and maintaining group distinctiveness, which then, in turn, either helps group members to (a) maintain positive self-esteem or (b) maintain structure and order in a confusing world. In the next section, I discuss how these ideas can be applied to the study of attitudes to European integration.

Symbolic politics and opposition to European integration If the desire for group identity is so strong that the artificial creation of such an identity can occur even in a laboratory in a short period of time, what is likely to happen when an experimenter attempts to destroy identity? No such experiment appears to have been conducted, but especially in the case of long-established identities, we can only speculate

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that if such identities have been the major providers of positive self-esteem and/or cognitive structure for the individual during the course of her lifetime, then that individual should feel fairly threatened when her identity is on the verge of destruction (or is perceived to be on the verge of destruction). From where will this individual then draw her selfesteem if not from the group to which she has belonged all of her life? And how would this person cope with such a drastic change to the structure she has developed to simplify and understand her world? In the case of national identity – in contrast to laboratory experiments – there are actually tangible factors that might tie individuals to one another and make them feel distinct, and perhaps more importantly, superior to those not in the group. The most discernible of these is language, but there are likely to be other far less tangible things that make individuals feel loosely tied to one another, and these, like those discussed in the review above, can be summarised with the concept of ‘way of life’, or the ‘way things are done’. If people come to feel that their way of life is threatened somehow – as in the case of feelings toward African-Americans on the part of white Americans – they will be quite likely to resist any policy that poses such a threat. European integration clearly does pose the potential for such a threat in the European context. As argued by Waever et al. (1993: 70), ‘If you feel your identity is threatened by internationalisation of Europeanisation, you have to strengthen the expression of existing identities.’3 Some utilitarian approaches specifically contend that the threat posed by European integration should, in fact, be economic in nature, in that the integration process itself has been mostly economic (Gabel 1998a). However, it cannot simply be assumed that just because integration itself has been economic in nature that this is necessarily how ordinary Europeans have overwhelmingly perceived it. In addition, with the movement toward establishing a common citizenship with a common EU passport, the elimination of national currencies, co-ordination of asylum and immigration policies, and the creation of a European army (the Rapid Reaction Force), integration is beginning to appear less and less economic in nature. It is also important to note that while the process itself has focused on economics, the overriding goal of European integration has been to prevent war on the European continent. Considering that the two World Wars can be seen in the light of nationalistic expansion, it can be validly assumed that part of the goal of the economic integration process has been to reduce some of that nationalism in order to provide long-term peace. Naturally, European leaders have tried to be subtle about this – about the importance of trying

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to diminish strong feelings of nationalism – but it is unlikely that European citizens have missed this aspect of European integration. Thus, the EU poses the type of symbolic threat mentioned above. In turn, I expect that those who feel that it does pose such a threat should be quite strongly opposed to the integration process. As this chapter is about national symbols and national identity, the empirical portion of the chapter begins with an examination of national identity and European identity. Next, the relationship between specific symbolic concerns and opposition to European integration is explored.

National identity in Europe At one level, EU citizens ought to have little to fear symbolically from European integration. There have been no attempts by EU policy-makers in Brussels to standardise the language spoken across the continent; the EU itself works with translators for every recognised language within the EU and guarantees that information will be provided to citizens in their native tongues. On the other hand, less precise symbols of national culture may be perceived to be under threat by the integration process, with attempts at standardisation seen as coming clearly from Brussels. And while the role played by Brussels in cultural affairs is minimal, many Europeans are likely to perceive that the European project as a whole is designed to strip away their national cultures and identities. As discussed above, if such identities are serving as a source of self-esteem, it would not be surprising to find that people feel resistant to an organisation that they perceive as threatening such a key provider of their positive self-image. So how attached are Europeans to their national identities in the modern day? Finding evidence regarding levels of national identity is rather difficult because determining how to measure such a concept is highly ambiguous. However, we present some figures here from various data sources, beginning with the International Social Survey Program Survey on National Identity from 1995, which includes a subset of EU member states. Table 5.1 provides the percentages of individuals who claim to be proud of various aspects of their nation-states’ achievements.4 As indicated in the table, responses vary considerably, but an overwhelming majority in every country is proud of the country’s achievements in science, sports and the arts. High levels of pride in the way democracy works in the country can be found in western Germany, Britain, Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden; furthermore, Germans, the British, Austrians and the Irish tend to be proud of their

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Table 5.1: National pride Way Political Economic Social Scientific democracy influence achievements security achievements works in world system Germany (West) Germany (East) Great Britain Austria Italy Ireland Netherlands Sweden Spain

67.5

59.9

82.6

72.1

81.7

1282

34.4 68.2 71.2 25.7 75.1 83.6 64.4 53.8

62.4 54.8 63.2 22.5 79.3 49.5 41.1 40.4

82.8 44.4 82.2 40.3 81.9 78.2 17.4 41.3

39.4 48.3 83.6 27.7 64.7 82.6 64.7 53.5

87.1 88.1 87.3 82.1 81.4 85.6 86.0 71.4

612 1058 1007 1094 994 2089 1296 1221

Achievements Achievements Armed in sports in arts forces Germany (West) Germany (East) Great Britain Austria Italy Ireland Netherlands (NL) Sweden (S) Spain (E)

N

67.9 81.0 75.1 87.7 90.2 96.6 81.1 83.4 89.7

69.0 80.8 80.3 82.2 95.9 95.9 70.9 71.9 87.7

31.1 27.9 88.4 47.1 43.8 88.8 34.5 32.6 59.7

History

Fair treatment of groups

N

33.7 30.9 89.3 83.5 89.6 93.4 72.1 67.4 83.5

37.8 25.4 53.9 58.5 21.4 69.4 66.1 42.8 60.7

1282 612 1058 1007 1094 994 2089 1296 1221

Source: International Social Survey Program, Survey on National Identity (1995); numbers in cells represent the percentage feeling either very or somewhat proud.

countries’ political influence in the world. Pride in economic achievements is evident among the vast majority of Germans, Austrians, the Irish and the Dutch. In some countries, there is also a great deal of pride in the way the social welfare system works: a clear majority of western Germans, Austrians, Irish, Dutch and Swedish are proud of this element of the functioning of their political systems. Levels of pride in history are generally quite high, except amongst Germans. On the other hand, pride in the degree of equal treatment given to all groups is comparatively low, but a majority in Britain, Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain are proud of this factor. Thus, there is clear evidence of national pride in each of these eight EU member states.5 Degree of attachment to the country is also estimated in Eurobarometer 54.1 from Autumn 2000. Figure 5.1 is based on the following survey

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0 ia str Au en ed Sw d y lan an Fin rm Ge st Ea l ga rtu Po ain Sp ce ee Gr ark nm De d d lan lan Ire Ire ern rth No in ita urg Br o mb xe s Lu nd rla the Ne um lgi Be ly Ita e y nc an Fra rm Ge st We

Very attached Very/fairly attached

Figure 5.1: Attachment to country Note: Results are from Eurobarometer 54.1, Autumn 2000.

item: ‘People may feel different degrees of attachment to their own town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to . . . your town/village . . . your region . . . (OUR COUNTRY)...Europe’. The response choices are ‘very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, or not at all attached’. Figure 5.1 presents the results for attachment to country, and Figure 5.2, attachment to Europe. Examining the percentages of respondents who are ‘very attached’ to their countries (the dark bars), it appears that only Greeks openly express such extreme attachment to country: roughly 80 per cent of Greeks claim to feel very attached to Greece. In addition, 60 per cent or more feel very attached to their countries in Ireland, Northern Ireland, Denmark and Portugal, while 50 per cent or more feel very attached in Luxembourg, Britain, Spain, Finland, Sweden and Austria. The lowest levels of attachment appear to be in Germany – both East and West – Belgium and the Netherlands. However, if we examine both the ‘very attached’ and ‘fairly attached’ responses together (the grey bars in Figure 5.1), national attachment does seem widespread indeed: more

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100

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60

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0

ia str Au en ed Sw d y lan an Fin rm Ge st Ea l ga rtu Po ain Sp ce ee Gr ark nm De d d lan lan Ire Ire ern rth No in ita urg Br o mb xe s Lu nd rla the Ne um lgi Be ly Ita e y nc an Fra rm Ge st We Very attached Very/fairly attached

Figure 5.2: Attachment to Europe Note: Results are from Eurobarometer 54.1, Autumn 2000.

than 80 per cent claim to feel very or fairly attached to their countries – even in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. Moreover, this number is close to or greater than 90 per cent in most EU member states. By way of contrast, we can also examine levels of attachment to Europe. Based on Figure 5.2, it is clear that attachment to Europe is – as expected – far lower than attachment to its member states. The highest level of extreme attachment (the dark bars) can be found in Luxembourg, where more than 30 per cent claim to feel very attached to Europe. In other countries, the number is roughly 20 per cent or less. Combining the ‘very attached’ and ‘fairly attached’ responses (the grey bars), however, it is apparent that attachment to Europe is, in fact, high. Only in Britain, Northern Ireland and Greece do less than 50 per cent feel very or fairly attached to Europe. On the other hand, only in Luxembourg, Spain and Sweden do levels of attachment to Europe approach those of levels of national attachment. Thus, it should be noted that having a strong attachment to one’s country does not rule out the possibility of having a strong attachment to Europe, as will be discussed further below.6

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I also explore trends for the following question: ‘In the near future do you see yourself as (NATIONALITY) only, (NATIONALITY) and European, European and (NATIONALITY), or European only?’ It is important to note that almost everyone was able to answer this question (i.e. did not respond with ‘don’t know’), indicating that Europeans have fairly clear views on this issue. In terms of national identity placed vis-à-vis European identity, we see large variation across countries – and sometimes across time – in the percentages of respondents who claim that they see themselves as only French, only German, etc. Figure 5.3 provides the cross-time percentages of respondents who claim to be only Dutch, Belgian, etc. and is broken down by the time of entry of the country into the EU (for the sake of

60

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00

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0

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Figure 5.3: Feel nationality only

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E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

20

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93 19

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10

19 9

20

4

Greece Spain Portugal EU

19

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Denmark Ireland Great Britain EU 92

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Italy Luxembourg EU

19

France Belgium Netherlands W. Germany

19 93

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convenience). Among the Original Six member states, percentages of nationality-only identifiers remain under 50 per cent for the entire period in which this survey item was included. In many of the Original Six countries, this figure dipped to its lowest in 1994, but then gradually returned to 1992–3 levels, or surpassed them. Overall, among this group of countries, Italians and Luxembourgers, as well as the French, appear to be least tied to their national identities to the exclusion of other identities. In the First Enlargement countries there tend to be higher percentages who are attached to their national identities. In all of these countries, except Denmark, such attachment appears to decline in 1994, as was the case with many of the Original Six, but then rises again afterwards. In the case of Britain, even higher percentages of individuals claim that they see themselves as only British by the late 1990s as compared to earlier surveys. This figure is roughly 65 per cent in 1999, for instance. This can be compared to the country in the Original Six with the highest percentage of national identifiers, Belgium, where the maximum percentage claiming to hold only national identity does not even reach 50 per cent. It should also be noted that among the First Enlargement countries, the Irish tend to be least attached to their national identity. Even so, by 2000, roughly 50 per cent of Irish respondents claim that they see themselves as Irish only. The percentages for the Southern Enlargement countries are interesting in that at the start of the period, exclusive national identity seemed rather low – between 30 and 40 per cent of Greeks, Spaniards and Portuguese claimed that they saw themselves only in terms of their own nationalities. By the late 1990s, however, as many as 60 per cent of Portuguese and a slightly smaller percentage of Greeks claimed to feel themselves to be only of their own nationality. In other words, national identity seems to have increased considerably across the 1992–2000 period for these two small Southern European countries. The largest of the three Southern European countries, however – Spain – saw some increase in the percentage of national identifiers in the mid-1990s, but then this figure dropped again by 2000. Although eastern Germany entered the EU between the last of the Southern entries and the Eftan Enlargement, I include it with the latter for the sake of comparison. Overall, national identity appears to be higher in this group of countries (the Eftan countries) than among the Original Six. In other words, they seem closer to the First Enlargement countries, in that 50 per cent or more claim to feel themselves to belong only to their nationality. The percentage for

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eastern Germany was actually rather low in 1994, as was the case in Finland, in fact, but then increased – in both cases – to over 50 per cent shortly thereafter. In general, the analysis of both the levels of ‘attachment’ and the question of whether the respondent feels European and national indicates that overall, there is considerable variation in national identities. In other words, not surprisingly, some individuals feel themselves to be more attached exclusively to their national identity than others. Interestingly, this attachment seems to vary across time, as indicated by the question of whether the respondent feels European as well as her own nationality.7 Most likely, these fluctuations reflect events within the EU itself – particularly the excitement that resulted from government (and opposition) campaigns in support of the Maastricht Treaty which introduced economic and monetary union. We turn now to perhaps a more instructive analysis of whether a strong national identity necessarily implies that individuals are frightened of losing this identity to European integration. Table 5.2 combines two questions from Eurobarometer 54.1, one being the question about the degree of attachment to country discussed above, the other being a question about whether the European Union threatens national culture and identity.8 As indicated in Table 5.2, 50 per cent or more are both attached to their country and feel afraid that the EU threatens their national culture and identity in France, Britain, Northern Ireland, Ireland, Greece and Portugal. On the other hand, more than 50 per cent in Italy are attached to their country but are not afraid that the EU threatens national identity. In the rest of the countries, people seem to be fairly evenly divided between two groups (with large minorities in each): those who are attached to their countries but do not feel that European integration threatens their national identity and those who are attached to their countries and do feel that the integration process is a threat. Also, small minorities claim to not be attached to their countries at all, and these individuals seem to be fairly evenly divided between being afraid and not being afraid of the loss of national identity resulting from European integration. This initial evidence indicates that concerns regarding the loss of national identity and culture as a result of the European integration process do exist, but on the other hand, not everyone who feels strongly attached to their country also thinks that European integration poses such a threat. In other words, there is considerable variation, and I will contend below that this variation has an effect on levels of support for European integration itself. In other words, apprehension about the threats posed to national identity and

1. Attached to country & afraid of loss of identity to EU 2. Attached to country & not afraid of loss of identity to EU 3. Not attached to country & afraid of loss of identity to EU 4. Not attached to country & not afraid of loss of identity to EU N (weighted)

Attached to country & afraid of loss of identity to EU Attached to country & not afraid of loss of identity to EU Not attached to country & afraid of loss of identity to EU Not attached to country & not afraid of loss of identity to EU N (weighted)

1. 2. 3. 4.

61.2 29.6 4.8 4.4 911

65.9 24.4 7.9 1.9 267

Italy

947

38.2 52.5 2.7 6.4

Northern Ireland

956

909 Britain

50.5 40.4 4.8 4.3

France

39.8 46.9 5.2 8.0

West Germany

Table 5.2: Attachment and threat posed by EU to national identity

58.5 37.0 2.4 2.1 922

Ireland

926

35.9 44.7 9.5 9.9

Belgium

46.3 49.4 0.8 3.4 973

Denmark

949

36.6 42.9 6.8 13.6

Netherlands

65.1 29.9 3.4 1.6 946

Greece

42.3 48.5 3.2 6.0 934

Spain

559

47.8 45.0 2.1 5.0

Luxembourg

81

54.8 41.6 1.3 2.3 912

Portugal 38.7 45.8 6.1 9.4 923

East Germany

44.9 50.2 1.9 3.1 948

Finland

44.9 48.8 1.4 4.9 953

Sweden

41.9 49.2 3.5 5.5 950

Austria

Note: figures from Eurobarometer 54.1, Autumn 2000; cells are the total within-country percentages that fit within both categories (not row-computed or column-computed percentages).

1. Attached to country & afraid of loss of identity to EU 2. Attached to country & not afraid of loss of identity to EU 3. Not attached to country & afraid of loss of identity to EU 4. Not attached to country & not afraid of loss of identity to EU N (weighted)

Table 5.2: (continued)

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culture is one of the main predictor variables I employ in later analyses, although others are explored as well.

Symbols and opposition to European integration: empirical analysis To what degree do worries regarding national symbols have an impact on attitudes to European integration? As in Chapter 4, I draw upon two very different versions of questions related to national symbols, one within the context of threats from minorities already living within the country, the other within the specific context of the EU. From the Spring 2000 Eurobarometer, the following questions were selected to measure perceptions of threat by other cultures: • People from these minority groups are enriching the cultural life of (COUNTRY). • The religious practices of people from these minority groups threaten our way of life. • People belonging to these minority groups are so different, they can never be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society.9 As in Chapter 4, the above questions appear in a series of other questions about ‘these minority groups’, with ‘these’ referring to a previous question that asks whether the respondent feels that he belongs to one of the minority groups in the country, in terms of race, religion and culture. Also, as discussed in Chapter 4, evidence from data collected in 1988 (Eurobarometer 30) indicates that respondents are likely to be thinking about recent (post-World War Two) migrants to their country when answering these questions. To repeat a key point that was made in that chapter, these particular survey items are taken as indicators of general perceived threat posed by other cultures. For the first item above, those who claim that people from minority groups are not enriching cultural life in the country are likely to be more threatened by these cultures. The second item addresses a more specific element of minority culture that might be threatening – religion. Naturally, I am not arguing that people are likely to be threatened by European integration specifically because they fear the influence of other religions. However, in the realm of feelings about ethnic minorities, religious differences pose rather clear symbolic threats to the way of life of the dominant Christian (but secular) majority. A large portion of the ethnic minorities in European countries come from Muslim countries – from

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Turkey, Algeria, Morocco, Pakistan, etc. – and many of these individuals openly display their religious preferences via their attire. This open display of religious beliefs, along with the religious traditionalism and conservatism that it implies, is likely to be a threat to the morally liberal and secular nature of European society. Clearly this is not an economic threat such as those threats discussed in the previous chapter, but is instead a cultural/symbolic one. Again, I am not contending that Europeans fear European integration because they are worried about the religious beliefs of other participants in the European project. Instead, the religion item is taken as a measure of general levels of perceived symbolic threat. That is, those who feel threatened by minorities because of these cultural concerns are also likely to have fears related to the changing nature of their culture due to European integration. Figure 5.4 displays the percentages across the EU member states who are culturally threatened by minorities. Based on the first of these figures, it appears that approximately 30–40 per cent of the citizens of most member states are willing to admit that they do not think minorities are enriching cultural life (Figure 5.4a). On this item, Swedes appear to be the most tolerant, and Greeks are least tolerant. Examining the frequencies for the question about the threat that minority groups’ religions pose to the national way of life (Figure 5.4b), it appears that Spaniards and Finns are the least threatened while the Belgians, Greeks, Danes and French are most threatened. Finally, when asked to consider whether people from minority groups are simply too different to ever become part of the national culture and society, it appears that there is much more agreement among Europeans than was the case with the other cultural/symbolic threat items (Figure 5.4c). Forty per cent or more in Belgium, Greece and France agreed with this statement, and more than 30 per cent in several other countries (Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Britain, Sweden and Austria) also agreed. The smallest percentages here can be found in Spain, Northern Ireland and Finland. Thus, across these multiple items, we see quite different patterns from the ones that emerged in the realm of threat to specific resources like social benefits, education and jobs. That is, the degree of cultural animosity toward minorities appears to be far less related to a country’s history with immigration than was the case of feeling threat to group benefits and resources. Although symbolic threat measured by these survey items is likely to be connected to feelings of group threat, it is also likely to capture a fairly different sort of threat, as would be expected based on the overview of this approach provided above. Do perceived cultural threats from minorities have any effect on attitudes toward European integration? I will first investigate the

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(a) Minorities not enriching culture

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ia str Au den e Sw d lan ny Fin rma n e ai E.G t Brit ea Gr gal s rtu nd Po erla g th ur Ne mbo xe Lu d lan Ire ce n Fra n ai Sp ly Ita ce ny ee Gr rma Ge W. ark nm De um lgi Be

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ia str Au den e Sw d lan ny Fin rma n e ai E.G t Brit ea Gr gal s rtu nd Po erla g th ur Ne mbo xe Lu d lan Ire ce n Fra n ai Sp ly Ita ce ny ee Gr rma Ge W. ark nm De um lgi Be

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ia str Au en ed Sw d lan ny Fin rma n e ai E.G t Brit ea Gr gal rtu nds Po erla g th ur Ne mbo xe Lu d lan Ire ce n Fra n ai Sp ly Ita ce ny ee Gr rma Ge W. ark nm De um lgi Be

Figure 5.4: Symbolic threat from minorities, Spring 2000

85 Symbolic Politics and Integration

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inter-relationships amongst these three items in order to determine whether it is possible to combine them into a single index. These intercorrelations (using gamma coefficients) are presented in Table 5.3. As in the previous chapter, we see a few instances where gamma values drop to very low levels, but overall, the intercorrelations amongst these three items are high, and I will thus combine them into an additive index. Using the same measure of support for integration outlined in Chapter 2, the correlations between an index of the three symbolic threat items and support for European integration, along with the b-coefficients from bivariate regression analyses, are presented in Table 5.4. These figures indicate that there is indeed a relationship between perceptions of symbolic or cultural threats and attitudes toward European integration, with those feeling more threatened tending to be less supportive of the integration project. The strength of this relationship varies, however, with somewhat weaker relationships (Pearson’s r < 0.20) in Denmark, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Table 5.3: Correlations (gammas), cultural threat and support for integration, Spring 2000 Country

Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland N. Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

Culture not enriching with religion threatening .56 .54 .54 .27 .30 .27 .51 .03NS .43 .25 .31 .41 .42 .36 .57 .50 .40 .48

Culture not enriching with ‘so different’ .47 .38 .42 .14 .31 .19 .54 .34 .26 .06NS .43 .23 .36 .46 .49 .35 .41 .41

Religion threatening with ‘so different’

N

.53 .49 .50 .45 .50 .60 .52 .38 .50 .47 .37 .36 .45 .51 .52 .47 .31 .37

942 944 918 951 959 964 878 968 263 470 838 920 954 980 949 949 898 14,745

Notes: All correlations are significant at p ≤ .01 unless otherwise indicated; NS = not statistically significant.

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Table 5.4: Correlations (Pearson’s r), cultural threat and support for integration, Spring 2000 Country

Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland N. Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

r −0.31 −0.15 −0.35 −0.05NS −0.22 −0.18 −0.35 0.14 −0.31 −0.15 −0.18 −0.18 −0.30 −0.33 −0.18 −0.21 −0.19 −0.19

b coefficient −0.16 −0.11 −0.22 −0.03 −0.12 −0.11 −0.20 −0.07 −0.20 −0.08 −0.10 −0.09 −0.19 −0.20 −0.12 −0.17 −0.13 −0.12

Maximum impact (0–6)

N

0.96 0.66 1.32 0.18 0.72 0.66 1.20 0.42 1.20 0.48 0.60 0.54 1.14 1.20 0.72 1.02 0.78 0.72

942 944 913 951 959 964 878 968 263 470 838 920 954 978 949 949 898 14,738

Notes: All correlations are significant at p ≤ .01 unless otherwise indicated; NS = not statistically significant.

Portugal, Finland and Austria, and moderate to strong effects in the other countries. The strongest effects can be found in Belgium, Germany, France and Britain. How much of an impact does this variable have on level of support for the EU project, though? In Germany, France, Britain and Sweden, the impact is at least a one-point reduction in support for European integration when we compare those who are least threatened by minorities to those who are most threatened (see the ‘Maximum impact’ column). In Belgium, the effect is also close to one point. In addition, in most other countries, there is at least a onehalf point reduction in support for the integration process. Thus, in general, it appears that the same symbolic threats that minorities pose to national identity and integrity seem also to be triggered by European integration. As discussed in the previous chapter, we are exploring survey items gauging forms of threat that are not explicitly connected to the EU because of the difficulty in disentangling such threats when they are specifically connected to the EU (in survey questions). The above analysis

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indicates that general perceived cultural threat, as measured by attitudes toward minorities, does indeed have a negative impact on attitudes toward the EU. What happens when we investigate measures of threat that specifically address the question of symbolic threat resulting from European integration? The following two items (from Eurobarometer 54.1, Autumn 2000) were selected as measures of perceived cultural threat: • Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the European Union. Here is a list of things which some people say they are afraid of. For each one, please tell me if you – personally – are currently afraid of it, or not? Our language being used less and less (currently afraid of it, not currently afraid of it). • (Same list of items as above). The loss of our national identity and culture (currently afraid of it, not currently afraid of it). Looking first at the responses to these items across the EU (see Figure 5.5), it appears that there is considerable variation in levels of perceived symbolic threat from the integration process. Greeks and Luxembourgers tend to be the most threatened by the notion of their language being used less and less (Figure 5.5a), but in most of the other countries, it appears that somewhere between 40 and 50 per cent have such fears. Austrians are the least threatened, with approximately 30 per cent claiming they fear the loss of the use of their language due to European integration. In terms of concern for loss of identity and culture (Figure 5.5b), Greeks once again tend to be most threatened, but the British and Northern Irish also express considerable fear, with over 60 per cent claiming they fear that their national identity and culture will be lost in the integration process. Fifty per cent or more also express such fears in France, Ireland and Portugal. In most of the rest of the member states, between 40 and 45 per cent are fearful of this potential problem, with Italians expressing such fears in the smallest numbers (less than 40 per cent of the Italian sample feared losing their national identity and culture). How strongly do these symbolic concerns relate to general attitudes toward the EU itself, though? Some might expect fear of loss of national identity and culture to be the primary reason for opposition to European integration – those who have such fears should be strongly opposed to integration, whereas those who are not fearful should be far more supportive – implying a rather strong relationship. Based on the gamma coefficients in Table 5.5, however, the empirical evidence does not support this argument. This table investigates the relationship between each of the two measures of symbolic threat and overall support for

(a) EU means language used less 100

80

60

40

20

0

ia str Au en ed Sw d lan y Fin an erm in E.G Brita t ea Gr l ga s rtu Po rland the urg Ne o mb xe Lu d lan Ire e nc Fra ain Sp ly Ita ce y ee an Gr rm Ge W. ark nm De um lgi Be

(b) EU means loss of national culture and identity 100

80

60

40

20

0

ia str Au en ed Sw d lan y Fin an erm in E.G Brita t ea Gr l ga s rtu Po rland the urg Ne o mb xe Lu d lan Ire e nc Fra ain Sp ly Ita ce y ee an Gr rm Ge W. ark nm De um lgi

Be

Figure 5.5: Symbolic threat from EU, Autumn 2000

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

European integration. While there are some fairly strong relationships in this table, especially with regard to fear of loss of national identity and culture and level of opposition to the EU, the relationships are by no means perfect. In order to simplify the analysis somewhat, we have combined the two cultural threat items into a single index – the gamma coefficients in column one of Table 5.5 indicate that they are clearly strong enough to combine in this way – and used Pearson’s r to investigate the overall effect of perceived cultural threat resulting from European integration on general attitudes toward the integration process in Table 5.6. According to these correlation coefficients, there is a strong relationship between these two constructs in Belgium, Denmark, Western Germany, France, Britain, Sweden and Austria. Based on the b-coefficients and the estimated maximum impact of perceived cultural threat, it appears that in Denmark, Britain and Austria, a high degree of worry about the loss of national culture and language reduces level of support

Table 5.5: Correlations (gammas), cultural threat and support for integration, Autumn 2000 Country

Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland N. Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

Less use of language with loss of ID and culture 0.69 0.83 0.73 0.65 0.72 0.82 0.79 0.69 0.65 0.73 0.71 0.77 0.67 0.69 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.73

Less use of language with support for integration −0.26 −0.38 −0.27 −0.02NS −0.21 −0.18 −0.28 −0.08NS −0.20 0.03NS −0.15 −0.20 −0.32 −0.19 −0.11NS −0.30 −0.42 −0.17

Loss of ID and culture with support for integration −0.42 −0.54 −0.29 −0.17 −0.30 −0.14 −0.46 −0.12 −0.11NS −0.17 −0.20 −0.20 −0.45 −0.27 −0.31 −0.37 −0.51 −0.28

N

1048 1000 1013 1002 987 1000 1003 1001 313 609 1004 1000 1058 1014 1015 1000 1000 16,067

Notes: All correlations are significant at p ≤ .01 unless otherwise indicated; NS = not statistically significant.

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Table 5.6: Correlations (Pearson’s r), cultural threat and support for integration, Autumn 2000 Country

Belgium Denmark W. Germany Greece Italy Spain France Ireland N. Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Britain E. Germany Finland Sweden Austria EU

r

b coefficient

Maximum impact (0–4)

N

−0.29 −0.38 −0.25 −0.08 −0.18 −0.13 −0.30 −0.10 −0.15 −0.07NS −0.15 −0.15 −0.34 −0.20 −0.18 −0.28 −0.39 −0.19

0.18 0.31 0.19 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.20 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.25 0.15 0.12 0.24 0.30 0.14

0.72 1.24 0.76 0.24 0.44 0.28 0.80 0.24 0.44 0.16 0.36 0.32 1.00 0.60 0.48 0.96 1.20 0.56

1048 1000 1013 1002 987 1000 1003 1001 313 609 1004 1000 1058 1014 1015 1000 1000 16,067

Notes: All correlations are significant at p ≤ .01 unless otherwise indicated; NS = not statistically significant.

for the EU by one full point or more on the support for integration index. In France and Sweden, the amount of change is also close to one full point. In most other countries, however, the total effect is approximately one-half of a point. The countries in which we find the weakest effects are Greece, Spain, Ireland and Luxembourg.

Conclusion This chapter ends in a similar manner to the previous one: identity and symbolic threats to national culture and way of life clearly play a role in determining people’s positions on the issue of European integration, but the effect is perhaps not as overwhelming as might have been expected. Worrying about the loss of national identity, language and the religious values of minorities living within the polity does indeed correlate with some anti-integration hostility, but there is still room for improvement in the explanation for this phenomenon. In the next chapter, the group-based economic threats discussed in Chapter 4 are

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combined empirically in the same model with the symbolic threats discussed in this chapter, along with the utilitarian model. In addition, as has been mentioned in previous chapters, the precursors of economic and symbolic threats are investigated in order to determine whether utilitarianism could be operating indirectly through these routes. As will be seen, the findings are rather surprising: individual-level economic utilitarianism does not predict perceived economic threat to the group, indicating that the latter are indeed quite distinct from personal self-interest.

6 Precursors to Group Conflict and Symbolic Threat: Rationality?

The previous chapters have presented three alternative approaches to the study of attitudes to the European Union integration project and have illustrated empirically that each is important in explaining support for (and opposition to) integration. This chapter addresses two main questions that have thus far been ignored in this book. First, what are the relative effects of each of the groups of variables measuring these approaches? Second, to what degree are attitudes that reflect feelings of group conflict and symbolic threat actually driven by economically self-interested, or utilitarian, concerns? The chapter begins with a review of the approaches that were introduced in previous chapters and adds a discussion of the potential inter-relationship amongst these approaches; the inter-relationships will then be investigated empirically.

Explaining support for integration: a review Generally, the types of explanations of variation in levels of support for European integration that have been the focus of this book can be clustered into the following two categories: selfish (or egoistic) concerns, involving the calculation of economic costs and benefits to the individual himself, and group-level concerns. The latter, in turn, consists of three subcategories: (1) costs and benefits that have actually accrued to the country, or what was referred to in Chapter 3 as ‘sociotropic utilitarianism’, (2) perceptions of threat to group (economic) resources, and (3) perceptions of threat to group identity and way of life.1 Egoistic concerns Recall that Chapter 3 provided an outline of the utilitarian theory, which postulates gains and losses thought to accrue to certain groups in 93

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society. Thus, well-educated individuals with high levels of job skills and high incomes were argued to be better placed within a free international market and thus to be more likely to be supportive of the European integration process. On the other hand, those with poor skills, education and low incomes were argued to be rather threatened by the competition that such a market is likely to provide. That is, people with poor skills are more easily replaceable by individuals who are willing to work at lower wages than are professionals and those with high levels of education. Freed capital markets were also thought to provide more benefits to individuals with greater wealth (or income), while the Maastricht Treaty’s Stability and Growth Pact was likely to prove threatening to those at lower income levels as governments slash welfare benefits in order to meet the requirements of this pact (i.e. a very limited amount of government borrowing to fund public welfare and services). Chapter 3 also presented clearer evidence regarding which of these groups actually perceives that they have received advantages or disadvantages in the European integration process. The results confirmed that professionals and those with higher income levels do indeed think that they personally have benefited from integration at much higher rates than do other categories of individuals.2 However, the results of that chapter indicate that those in professions requiring less skill and those with lower incomes do not perceive that they have incurred costs in the process of European integration at higher than average rates. Thus, as was argued in that chapter, the (economic) egocentric utilitarian model requires some rephrasing: those at higher ends of the labour and capital markets support integration because they personally feel that they benefit from freed markets, but those at lower ends of these markets support integration at lower rates because they do not perceive many costs or benefits for themselves. One question that is raised by these results is the following: are those at the higher ends of the labour market actually more supportive of the EU because of these perceived benefits, or are these simply also the people who are generally more attentive to politics and thus are better informed about the EU and its likely costs and benefits? That is, is their high degree of support for integration due to these cost-benefit calculations or to other factors, like cognitive mobilisation? In fact, as discussed in Chapter 1, early studies of support for European integration indicated a strong role for cognitive mobilisation (e.g. Inglehart 1970). The contention in those early analyses was that hostility to the integration process was simply a matter of information – those who are not very well informed about it are likely to be more fearful of the whole project, whereas those who are informed are less fearful and thus more supportive. The analysis below investigates whether the utilitarian

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95

calculations are indeed relevant in the face of controls for cognitive mobilisation. Sociotropic utilitarianism Economic utilitarian arguments also stretched beyond the notion of rational calculation on the part of the individual with regard to her own personal benefits and costs, and, in fact, can be construed as being extended to actual group-level gains and losses. As illustrated in Chapter 3, the benefits gained by member states as a whole in the realm of trade and budgetary outlays from the EU coffers have a rather large impact on feelings about the EU. Perceptions of threat to group resources Chapter 4 contended that one important part of the puzzle of variation in attitudes toward European integration that had been missed in prior work on the topic is related to in-group identity and thus group-level concerns as opposed to personal, individualistic concerns. In that chapter, however, it may have appeared to be unclear as to whether the phenomena being measured were indeed group-level concerns, or, in fact, were expressions of the individual’s concern for her own well-being. I address this potential problem head-on and in a relatively straightforward manner in this chapter. Namely, the potential (economic) egocentric worries about the effects of European integration are measured via the variables measuring the individualistic sorts of concerns discussed above, and people with low levels of education, low incomes and poor job skills are expected to be less supportive of the integration project because it conflicts with their own personal economic interests. Thus, if variables measuring concern for loss of social welfare benefits and jobs (measures that were argued in Chapter 4 to capture group-level concerns) maintain their significance in a model that also controls for these utilitarian concerns, this will provide initial evidence that these two sets of variables are measuring different, independently relevant phenomena. In addition, I will analyse the effect of variables measuring personal economic utilitarian concerns on perceptions of group conflict, with the following expectations. If our group threat measures are merely measures of egocentric utilitarianism, then the latter will be strongly related to the former. If, on the other hand, the two seem to be mostly independent of one another, we can take this to mean that they are measuring independent phenomena. It is in these two ways that we will try to answer the question of whether the variables presented in Chapter 4 are really just measures of personal economic utilitarianism rather than measures of group-level fears.

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Perceptions of threat to group identity Finally, it seems reasonable and straightforward to argue that European integration poses a threat to important symbols of national identity and culture, as we did in Chapter 5. Indeed, a major contention of this book is that it is unreasonable to concentrate solely on economic costs and benefits of integration. While much of the integration project has indeed been about economics and free trade issues, it has always been clear as to what the overriding goal of the process has been – the creation of stability and peace on the European continent by promoting lower levels of nationalist protectionism. Some might view this in terms of pooling sovereignty in order to protect the European nation-state from total destruction in war. Others, however, are likely to see it in terms of giving up sovereignty and losing the ability to protect national interests. In addition, for many individuals, Europe seems to be conceived of as being a direct threat to their national distinctiveness and thus their national identity (see Chapter 5). Recall that this is a very different argument to the others discussed in this book, and is based upon literature that contests the notion that attitudes toward public policy issues are based either on (a) personal self-interest or (b) group-self-interest, both of which are almost always phrased within the context of economic resources and threats to these resources. It should also be pointed out that while some readers might find the argument about group identity and opposition to European integration to border on the tautological – or at the very least to be trivial – the ‘utilitarian’ model discussed above indicates that not all researchers view the European project in identity terms. Thus, it also seems that many Europeans themselves might not view it in these terms either, and so variation in feelings of threat to culture and way of life might have very little to do with attitudes toward integration once we take into account the other variables discussed above.

Comparing models As with previous chapters, I rely here upon Eurobarometers 53 and 54.1 from the Spring and Autumn of 2000, respectively, to empirically investigate the above propositions. Although I have analysed these surveys on a country-by-country basis in previous chapters, this is no longer possible because two of the key independent variables (budgetary outlays and trade balance) are measured at the country level. Thus, it becomes necessary to ‘pool’ the countries. In order to correct for potential heteroskedasticity due

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to systematically different variance across countries, I will use White robust standard errors.3 Recall that the reason that these two Eurobarometers have both been analysed here is that they offer very different measures of feelings of group threat. The Spring survey provides measures of economic and symbolic threat that revolve around minority groups already living in the country. As has been argued in earlier chapters, these measures were expected to be related to level of support for European integration because they capture general feelings of threat. In order to confirm these results, I also turn to the Autumn 2000 survey because it includes measures of threat specifically related to the European integration process. Recall that the validity of relying upon this survey on its own was questioned, however, because of the potential difficulty of distinguishing these measures from the measure of the dependent variable (support for European integration). Thus, it is argued here that if these two different measures of group threat have similar effects on attitudes toward the EU, this will provide rather conclusive evidence as to the overall nature of the relationship between group-level threats and opposition to European integration. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 provide the results of the full regression models for the Spring 2000 and Autumn 2000 surveys, respectively. Model 1 in each of the tables is the estimated model without the group conflict and symbolic threat measures; that is, they are the utilitarian models with controls for age, gender, cognitive mobilisation and left–right selfplacement. Model 2 adds the group conflict and symbolic threat items to the equation. (The same measure of support for integration that has been used throughout this book is again used here.) If we focus upon variables that achieve statistical significance, it is apparent that the results for the two surveys – using vastly different measures of group and symbolic threat – are quite similar. Namely, being a professional or executive is significantly and positively related to support for integration in all of the models; the country’s budget balance with the EU is also a significant predictor of attitudes toward the integration project. In addition, the variables argued to measure group-level economic threat and symbolic threat both achieve statistical significance. The only variable for which the two sets of results are not quite as similar is income. In the models from Spring 2000, all of the income categories are significantly different from the lowest income category, which is the comparison group. On the other hand, in the Autumn 2000 models, only the highest income category reaches statistical significance. Note that education does not achieve statistical significance in any model, confirming the results of Chapter 3.4

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Table 6.1: Predictors of support for European integration, Spring 2000 Model 1 b Occupation Professional Executive Unemployed Retired Small business Farmer Student Housewife Other occupation Education Income Low-mid income Mid-high income High income Income – DK Budget balance, 1999 Intra-EU trade, 1999 Group threat (economic) from immigrants Symbolic threat from immigrants Age Female Cognitive mobilisation (political discussion) Left–right self-placement Constant Adj R2 SEE N

0.37 0.34 0.07 0.18 0.22 0.09 0.29 0.26 0.12 −0.01

Model 2

Robust SE

0.09*** 0.08*** 0.07 0.08* 0.08** 0.19 0.06*** 0.11* 0.05* 0.01

b

Robust SE

0.29 0.28 0.07 0.19 0.23 0.11 0.21 0.25 0.10

0.09** 0.08** 0.08 0.08* 0.08** 0.20 0.05*** 0.11* 0.04*

−0.01

0.01

0.07 0.20 0.23 0.19

0.05 0.07** 0.08** 0.08*

0.08 0.21 0.21 0.20

0.05 0.07** 0.08* 0.08*

0.00007 0.00001 –

0.00001*** 0.000002*** –

0.00007 0.00001 −0.05

0.00001*** 0.00000** 0.01***

–

–

−0.08

0.02***

−0.01 −0.11 0.12

0.00*** 0.05* 0.04**

−0.01 −0.13 0.10

0.00*** 0.04** 0.04*

0.00 2.77 0.07 1.17 14195

0.02 0.18***

0.02 3.12 0.10 1.15 14161

0.02 0.17***

Source: Eurobarometer 53. b = unstandardised OLS coefficient; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

As discussed above, it is possible that variables such as occupation and income are proxies for general attentiveness to politics, and that this attentiveness, as opposed to utilitarian concerns, is what is important in explaining support for European integration. To investigate this possibility, both models include a control for cognitive mobilisation (political discussion),5 which is statistically significant in all models. However, the

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Table 6.2: Predictors of support for European integration, Autumn 2000 Model 1

Occupation Professional Executive Unemployed Retired Small business Farmer Student Housewife Other occupation Education Income Low-mid income Mid-high income High income Income – DK Budget balance, 1999 Intra-EU trade, 1999 Group threat (economic) from European integration Symbolic threat from European integration Age Female Cognitive mobilisation (political discussion) Left–right self-placement Constant Adj R2 SEE N

Model 2

b

Robust SE

0.40 0.37 0.09 0.20 0.28 0.08 0.41 0.26 0.20

0.10*** 0.07*** 0.06 0.06** 0.06*** 0.22 0.08*** 0.08** 0.06**

−0.01

0.01

b

0.31 0.29 0.10 0.19 0.26 0.13 0.36 0.25 0.17

Robust SE

0.09** 0.05*** 0.05 0.06** 0.06*** 0.23 0.08*** 0.08** 0.06**

−0.01

0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07* 0.06

0.01 0.09 0.21 0.12

0.04 0.05 0.07** 0.06

0.02 0.10 0.18 0.12

0.00006 0.000008 –

0.00001*** 0.000002** –

0.000057 0.000007 −0.08

–

–

−0.09

0.02***

−0.01 −0.12 0.13

0.00** 0.03** 0.04**

0.00 −0.10 0.11

0.00* 0.03** 0.04*

−0.01

0.02

−0.01

0.02

2.81 0.06 1.18 15365

0.17

3.31 0.11 1.15 15365

0.000013*** 0.000002** 0.02***

0.16***

Source: Eurobarometer 54.1. * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

effects of occupation and income do not change much (if at all) once this variable is in the equation. Thus, we still have reason to believe that occupation and income capture the effects of personal economic utilitarianism on attitudes toward the EU.

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Because of the difficulty of interpreting these coefficients in comparison to one another, Figures 6.1a and 6.1b provide a means by which comparisons can be made.6 What is remarkable about these figures is that the effects of each group of variables are very similar. Namely, in models that use different measures of symbolic and group threat, personal utilitarianism has a maximum effect of about one-half of a point, budgetary outlays have a maximum effect of approximately one full point, trade balance with the EU, approximately one-half of a point, group-level economic threat, one-quarter to one-half a point, and symbolic threat, (a) Support for integration effects, Spring 2000 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 Personal utilitarianism

Sociotropic utilitarianism budget

Sociotropic utilitarianism trade Low

Group-level economic threat

Symbolic threat

High

(b) Support for integration effects, Autumn 2000 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0

Personal utilitarianism

Sociotropic utilitarianism budget

Sociotropic utilitarianism trade Low

Figure 6.1:

Group-level economic threat

High

Support for integration: effects of variables

Symbolic threat

Precursors to Group Conflict and Symbolic Threat

101

approximately one-half of a point. What is also remarkable is that the combined personal utilitarianism effects are equal to (or greater than) the effects of perceived economic threat from minorities or from the EU and the effects of symbolic threats. The latter is even more interesting, given that in Figure 6.1b, the symbolic threat variables employed refer to symbolic threats specifically from the European Union. Finally, if we wish to think about these effects in terms of which one has the largest impact on swaying the European public in one direction or another, that one is clearly the country’s budget balance with the EU. Not surprisingly, people living in the countries that have been the largest beneficiaries of the EU budget – Spain, Greece and Portugal – tend to be far more supportive of the integration process than those living in countries that are making the largest contributions to the budget (Germany and France, for instance). Another question to consider here is the degree to which personal utilitarianism and perceptions of threat are connected in their explanation of attitudes to European integration. That is, are professionals and those with better incomes simply less likely to report feeling threatened by the EU and threatened by minorities, thereby creating a high degree of overlap across these explanations? The running of two different models in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 was the first cut at investigating this question, and further investigation of indirect effects will also be conducted below. What the coefficients in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 reveal is that while there is some reduction in the effect of a few of the utilitarian variables once group-level threats are added to the equation, the change in effect size is not overwhelming. Certainly, threat does not come anywhere near to reducing the strength of the utilitarian explanation to nothing. Thus, it seems that these two explanations are mostly orthogonal to one another and are likely to stem from very different cognitive processes. Thus, overall, it appears that all models discussed in previous chapters are relevant in helping to explain levels of support for the integration project, and almost equally so. That is, personal economic utilitarianism appears to be of equal importance to things like group-level economic and symbolic threats. Is this really so, though? That is, could it be that the variables thought to capture personal cost/benefit analyses actually capture something else entirely? The next section explores this question by investigating the indirect effects of personal utilitarianism on feelings of group-level conflict over resources and symbolic threats.

Utilitarianism: a re-examination In Chapter 4, it was mentioned that the measures used to gauge perceptions of threat to group-level resources could, in fact, really be measures of

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personal utilitarianism. That is, people are likely to be afraid that schools will suffer, social welfare benefits will be abused, and unemployment will increase, all because they are worried about the effects of these problems on their own lives. In addition, the items gauging group threat from the integration project perhaps come even closer to potentially measuring personal utilitarianism than do those related to immigrants. Recall that those measures included items such as worry over the transfer of jobs and loss of social welfare benefits. For both of these sets of questions, however, it seems that, as with the case of integration itself, there are some who are likely to see more potential for personal loss than others. Executives and professionals who earn high salaries are not likely to worry about schools suffering (as they can send their children to private schools in any case), about social welfare benefits being abused or lost, about rising unemployment, nor about the transfer of jobs overseas. In contrast, these are likely to be major concerns of those with low incomes and poor occupational skills. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 investigate these possibilities empirically, with immigrants as the target for statements of conflict over resources in the former and the European integration process as a potential source of conflict over resources in the latter. The models for the two types of group conflict include almost identical predictors, with two exceptions. In the Autumn 2000 survey, attitudinal measures of perceptions of both personal and country-level economic conditions were included in the survey questionnaire and can thus be utilised to gauge whether concern over the loss of resources resulting from European integration is likely to be related equally to worries about one’s personal economic situation and to that of the entire country. That is, these measures make it possible to conduct a fairly clear examination of the question of whether the group conflict items do indeed measure group conflict or are instead a reflection of the individual’s own personal financial situation. First, however, I will begin with an analysis of the effect of occupation, education and income on perceived loss of benefits from these two different sources (i.e. immigrants and European integration). In fact, the results for each form of concern for loss of benefits are similar, providing some extra validation of the notion that they measure similar concepts. Specifically, in both models, professionals and executives tend to be considerably less threatened by the potential loss of group resources than do manual labourers (who are the omitted category). This is exactly what would be expected from an economic utilitarian model. Students also tend to be considerably less threatened, and as was argued in Chapter 3, this effect could also be seen in utilitarian terms – students likely see considerable potential in the integration process for themselves,

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Table 6.3: Predictors of perceived group conflict over resources from immigrants, Spring 2000

Occupation Professional Executive Unemployed Retired Small business Farmer Student Housewife Other occupation Education Income Low-mid income Mid-high income High income Income – DK Age Female Cognitive mobilisation (political discussion) Left–right self-placement Constant Adj R2 SEE N

b

Robust SE

−0.58 −0.42 0.09 −0.02 −0.06 −0.08 −0.61 −0.16 −0.14

0.12*** 0.07*** 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.11*** 0.11 0.08

−0.02

0.01*

0.10 0.13 −0.01 0.03 0.01 −0.11 −0.10 0.13 3.12 0.05 1.91 14638

0.05 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.00*** 0.04* 0.08 0.02*** 0.32***

Source: Eurobarometer 53. b = unstandardised OLS coefficient * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

in terms of studying abroad and obtaining well-paying jobs across Europe after completing their educational qualifications. In addition, given that they are currently pursuing a higher education or technical training, they are also unlikely to be worried about competition for resources from immigrants or from the transfer of jobs to other EU countries. The statistically insignificant findings are also important to note in these models, in that they give some initial signs of problems with an egocentric, economic formulation of utilitarianism. First, income does not achieve statistical significance with either version of group conflict over resources. That is, those at higher income levels do not appear to be any less threatened by the loss of economic sorts of resources, either from immigrants or from European integration than those at lower income levels. In addition, education only barely reaches statistical

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration Table 6.4: Predictors of perceived group conflict over resources from European integration process, Autumn 2000 b Occupation Professional Executive Unemployed Retired Small business Farmer Student Housewife Other occupation

Robust SE

−0.70 −0.62 0.07 −0.16 −0.20 0.27 −0.52 −0.13 −0.26

0.17*** 0.09*** 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.12* 0.08*** 0.09 0.07***

Education Income Low-mid income Mid-high income High income Income – DK

−0.01

0.01

0.10 0.17 −0.11 0.06

0.06 0.11 0.13 0.09

Future economic evaluations – country Future economic evaluations – personal Age Female Cognitive mobilisation (political discussion) Left–right self-placement Constant R2 SEE N

−0.15 −0.05 0.01 0.13 −0.09

0.02*** 0.03 0.00* 0.06 0.05

0.002 4.38 0.04 2.03 12953

0.02 0.23***

Source: Eurobarometer 54.1. b = unstandardised OLS coefficient * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

significance in the model for perceived group conflict from immigrants and does not achieve significance in predicting the other form of perceived conflict (i.e. from European integration). Thus, those with more education and greater wealth are generally no less (or more) threatened by the loss of group resources than are those at lower income and educational levels. As discussed above, in the model tested in Autumn 2000, where the measure of threat to the group is threat from European integration, we are also able to use a perceptual measure of the individual’s personal

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economic situation and the individual’s perception of the economic conditions of the country. Unfortunately, the battery of perceptual measures of the economy is not overly extensive and we are, therefore, only able to investigate short-term prospective evaluations.7 These questions begin as follows: ‘What are your expectations for the year to come: will 2001 be better, worse or the same, when it comes to...’ The items in the battery that are used for the measurement of evaluations of national economy are: • The economic situation in (OUR COUNTRY) • The employment situation in (OUR COUNTRY) The items used for the measurement of evaluations of one’s personal economic conditions appear in the same list but are the following: • The financial situation of your household • Your personal job situation The two groups of items were each combined into separate indices.8 As the results in Table 6.4 indicate, more positive evaluations of the country’s economic situation are indeed statistically significantly related to perceiving lower levels of economic threat resulting from European integration. That is, those who worry about the general economic and employment situation in the country tend to also be more worried about things like the transfer of jobs and reduction of social welfare benefits in the European integration process. On the other hand, egocentric economic concerns do not appear to be significantly related to feeling that the country’s resources are going to be lost in the process of integration. Specifically, those who have a more negative outlook on their personal financial and job situations are no more threatened by economic losses from integration than those who have very positive impressions of their own future financial and job situations. These results point to two conclusions. First, perceived threat in the realm of resources as measured here does indeed appear to be a groupbased threat rather than an individual, egocentric threat. The fact that sociotropic economic evaluations affect perceived threat whereas egocentric ones do not supports this contention. Second, the results call into question (to some degree) the extent to which variables like occupation are indeed measuring utilitarian concerns. That is, we would have expected perceptual measures of personal financial/job situation to be far better predictors of concern for the loss of resources due to European integration and thus to be strongly related to the latter;

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instead, what we see is that the occupational categories themselves are significant but worry about the loss of one’s job and income are not. Another indication that occupation, education and income may be capturing some phenomenon other than cost/benefit analysis lies in the relationship between these variables and perceptions of symbolic types of threat. The same models that were investigated above in the context of economic threat were also explored for this more symbolic form of threat – that is, general threat to national culture and identity. As indicated in Tables 6.5 and 6.6, ‘utilitarian’ measures also significantly predict symbolic threat. Thus, within the realm of threat from minorities living in the country (Table 6.5), it can be seen that professionals, executives and students, as well as those with higher levels of education, Table 6.5: Predictors of perceived symbolic threat from immigrants, Spring 2000

Occupation Professional Executive Unemployed Retired Small business Farmer Student Housewife Other occupation Education Income Low-mid income Mid-high income High income Income – DK Age Female Cognitive mobilisation (political discussion) Left–right self-placement Constant Adj R2 SEE N

b

Robust SE

−0.62 −0.41 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.21 −0.56 −0.03 −0.25

0.15*** 0.11** 0.07 0.10 0.18 0.20 0.08*** 0.10 0.08**

−0.04

0.01***

−0.01 0.06 −0.23 0.11 0.01 −0.13 −0.17

0.06 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.00** 0.04** 0.06*

0.13 2.47 0.08 1.84 14640

0.02*** 0.30***

Source: Eurobarometer 53. b = unstandardised OLS coefficient * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

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Table 6.6: Predictors of perceived symbolic threat from European integration process, Autumn 2000 b

Robust SE

−0.31 −0.27 −0.04 0.11 0.08 0.40 0.02 0.10 −0.08

0.09** 0.07*** 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.16* 0.08 0.11 0.07

Education Income Low-mid income Mid-high income High income Income – DK

−0.03

0.01***

0.06 0.04 −0.13 0.09

0.07 0.10 0.10 0.07

Future economic evaluations – country Future economic evaluations – personal Age Female Cognitive mobilisation (political discussion) Left–right self-placement Constant R2 SEE N

−0.08 0.004 0.01 0.09 −0.11

0.03** 0.02 0.00** 0.04* 0.04*

0.04 2.08 0.05 1.66 12953

0.02 0.19***

Occupation Professional Executive Unemployed Retired Small business Farmer Student Housewife Other occupation

Source: Eurobarometer 54.1. b = unstandardised OLS coefficient * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

tend to worry less about these minorities threatening the way of life in the country. Also, within the realm of threat to national culture and language resulting from the integration process (Table 6.6), professionals and executives tend to be somewhat less likely to express such feelings of threat, as are those with higher levels of education. In addition, the Autumn 2000 results (Table 6.6) indicate that a more favourable outlook on the country’s future economic situation tends to be associated with less concern about the loss of national identity and culture due to European integration. The effect for evaluation of one’s

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own personal situation is once again insignificant, however. It appears, then, that the same outlook that makes those of higher status in European society less fearful of losing national economic benefits tends also to make them less concerned over identity and symbolic issues, which is somewhat unexpected if we view higher economic status from the perspective of personal economic utilitarianism. Also of considerable importance is that while education failed to achieve statistical significance in the resource-based group threat model, in the symbolic threat model it is indeed statistically significant. That is, in contrast to what might be predicted from a utilitarian model, having a higher level of education does not appear to generate less worry about the potential loss of resources either to immigrants or to the EU. On the other hand, it does make EU citizens less fearful of the symbolic threats of both immigrants and the EU. The reasoning behind this can perhaps be traced back to arguments from the academic literature on political tolerance. Namely, it has been argued that the better educated are politically tolerant for the following reasons. First, university experience tends to involve learning alternative ideas and exposure to different lifestyles, including those of ethnic minorities and foreign students. This in turn creates a higher level of openness to diversity (Nunn, Crockett and Williams 1978). Presumably it also creates openness to alternative sorts of ideas and the ability to think beyond traditional norms and relationships (e.g. the nation-state). Second, some have argued that education brings about greater flexibility in cognitive styles, making individuals more tolerant of disliked groups (Stouffer 1955; Nunn, Crockett and Williams 1978; Bobo and Licari 1989). This alteration of cognitive style should also give citizens the flexibility to think differently about symbolic threats like European integration and immigration. Although one of the seminal works on political tolerance indicated that education had little direct impact on political tolerance (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1982), that was only after the authors controlled for the degree of perceived threat posed by the group in question (and various other psychologically based factors like psychological security). Presumably then, the less educated are more threatened by political enemies for the same reasons that they were argued to be intolerant of unpopular groups. Therefore, this approach would lead us to the conclusion that educated EU citizens are less symbolically threatened by minorities and the EU because the same measured response required for political tolerance is used when they contemplate minorities and the EU. Ultimately, then, it is likely to be the measured response rather than utilitarianism that makes

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the better educated less threatened, and in turn (and indirectly) more positive toward potentially threatening institutions like the EU.

Summary and conclusions This chapter (a) investigated the comparative effects of the models of attitudes to European integration discussed in previous chapters and (b) explored the potential precursors to one of the key models, group conflict over resources. The findings from the first of these endeavours indicated that variables thought to measure egocentric utilitarianism (particularly occupation and income) carry as much weight in predicting levels of opposition to European integration as the group-level concerns introduced in this book. In the second part of the chapter, however, evidence was presented that called into question the notion that occupation and income were, in fact, capturing personal economic utilitarianism, and indicated that perceived group conflict does not have its basis in concerns for one’s personal economic situation. Thus, as contended in Chapter 4, group-level concerns are a different matter than personal concerns, and the former are likely to play as great a role (or greater) in explaining attitudes to European integration as the latter. The last part of the chapter also questioned the notion that the variable education actually measures economic utilitarianism and contended instead that the same components of education that generate political tolerance also generate a reduced level of symbolic threat. In addition, it was determined that concerns about the national economy – and not personal economic situations – make EU citizens worry about the threat to group resources. Ultimately, then, I am contending that much of the opposition to European integration stems from perceptions of loss to (a) group resources, (b) group symbols, and from (c) individual-level, non-utilitarian factors that make respondents predisposed to political tolerance rather than from egocentric utilitarianism.9 In the next chapter we will continue to investigate the utilitarian and group-based models in the realm of attitudes to specific EU-level policies; in Chapter 8, we will apply the same model to the new member states, where we will find evidence that new member state citizens may be considering the EU in more egocentric terms than appears to be case with citizens of the older member states.

7 Attitudes to Policy-making in the EU

Previous chapters have concentrated upon general attitudes to European integration. This chapter changes focus and explores support for EUlevel policy-making in several specific policy areas: environmental policy, social welfare policy, immigration and asylum, foreign and defence policy, and economic and monetary union. The chapter begins with an overview of the nature of policy-making in each of these areas as well as cross-time support for EU-level policy-making. We then turn to the main question of the book: to what extent are attitudes to policymaking in the EU driven by identity-related concerns and preferences for maintaining the distinctiveness of the nation-state and to what extent might they be explained by self-interest?

Overview of policy-making in the EU and trends in policymaking preferences The set of policy areas chosen for investigation are certainly not exhaustive, but they do represent a wide range of the more important issues that have been on the EU’s agenda for the past few decades. They also represent the varying degrees of integration across policies. On the lowest level of co-operation and co-ordination are foreign and defence policy and social policy; at the higher levels of integration are economic and environmental policies. The other categories analysed are somewhere between these in terms of co-ordination across member states. I begin the discussion with one of the most integrated and generally least controversial of these – environmental policy-making. The discussion then proceeds to another relatively uncontroversial area – at least according to European publics – social policy – and then slowly progresses to the more controversial and divisive of the EU’s policy areas. 110

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Environmental policy Although environmental policy was not envisioned in the early design of the European Coal and Steel Community or European Economic Community, member state governments began to take an interest in co-ordinating environmental policies at the European Community level in the early 1970s and formally decided to create a competency for the EC in environmental policy in 1973. EC-level legislation on bathing and drinking waters was passed shortly thereafter, and by the early 1980s, pressures were increasing for more EC-level policies, particularly from German industrialists who were being held to different environmental standards than their European competitors. Environmental policy-making was finally given a legal, constitutional basis with the adoption of the Single European Act, and several environmental policies were brought under the procedure of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers. The Treaty on European Union then brought further areas of environmental policy under QMV. The Treaty of Amsterdam also addressed environmental policymaking and simplified decision-making in this area. Most environmental policy areas are now subject to QMV, with the notable exceptions of land use planning, fiscal measures to achieve environmental goals, energy, and water resources (see Sbragia 2000). There have traditionally been vast differences in member state approaches to the field of environmental policy-making (Sbragia 1996). The customary divide – particularly between the UK and Germany – however, appears to have shifted considerably in the 1990s (Sbragia 2000; Borzel 2002). Traditionally, because of the above-mentioned concerns of German industrialists, the German government was seen as one of the key movers (or leaders) in EU environmental policy-making. As the 1990s brought economic downturn – in great part a result of German reunification – Germany became less of a mover and indeed less supportive of stringent policies proposed by other governments. The UK government, on the other hand, had a reputation in the 1980s for favouring economic growth at the expense of environmental protection. UK governments tended to be supportive of environmental policies, as long as those would not be overly expensive or burdensome to business. By 1990, however, the UK had switched to being a sometimes-leader or pace-setter, as the national-level Environmental Protection Act of 1990 brought the country’s environmental regulation into compliance with EU legislation. With regard to the other member states, the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, Sweden and Finland have also been amongst the pace-setters.

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The Netherlands has been particularly keen to have environmental policies co-ordinated across the EU and has been instrumental in working out complicated deals that could accommodate most member state interests. Denmark takes a somewhat different position, tending to focus on fighting pollution via national legislation but not being opposed to EU legislation – so long as it does not restrict member states from taking more stringent action than that required in EU legislation (Borzel 2002). How do EU citizens view the role of the EU in environmental policymaking, though? Do they believe the EU should be the prime mover when it comes to this policy area? Or should such policy-making be reserved for national governments? Figure 7.1 provides cross-national trends in preferences to have the national government conduct environmental policy-making. (Note that the graphs for preferring EU management of policies are generally almost mirror images of those for national government policy-making control.) The figure indicates a slight overall increase of approximately 10 per cent for those wanting environmental policy handled by the national government between 1989 and 2000 (from roughly 30 to 40 per cent). There is also a corresponding overall decrease in desire to have this policy made at the EU level (from approximately 67 to 57 per cent). Given the increased feelings of being ‘nationality only’ reported in Chapter 5, it is not surprising that citizens in EU member states may be becoming more nationalistic in the realm of policy-making as well. The Original Six tend to be close to the EU average, or in the case of the Netherlands, far less likely than average to want the national government to manage this policy area and more likely to want the EU to be in control of it. For instance, 70–80 per cent in the Netherlands prefer the latter. Thus, the Dutch government behaviour at the EU level tends to be consistent with the preferences of Dutch citizens. Amongst the First Enlargement member states, Britain is close to the EU average, particularly in the mid-1990s, which is again consistent with the approach of the British government at that time. Roughly only 30 per cent or so of British respondents preferred environmental policy to be handled at the national level during this time, while approximately 65 per cent would have liked to have seen environmental policy made at the EU level. In the late 1990s, the British public increasingly diverges from the EU average, and by 2000, the difference between these is about 10 per cent, with smaller percentages in the UK preferring EU-level environmental policy-making. In contrast, the other two first enlargement countries (Denmark and Ireland) have been consistently above the EU average

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in their levels of support for national level environmental policy-making and below average in support for EU-level environmental policy-making, which is consistent with both governments’ ambivalent views on EU environmental policy. Note, however, that Ireland had moved further toward the EU average by 2000. The Southern Enlargement countries have tended to be fairly close to the EU averages, with Spaniards being particularly favourable to EU-level environmental policy-making. The Portuguese have tended to be very close to the EU average for most of the decade, but diverged in the late

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1990s, during which there was a 15 per cent difference between the EU average and the Portuguese average support for allowing environmental policy-making at the EU level. When examining preferences for environmental policy-making at the national level, the difference between Portugal and the EU in the late 1990s was approximately 10 per cent, with the Portuguese feeling relatively more negative about integration of this policy-making area. The Eftan Enlargement countries have tended to be the most hostile to allowing the EU to have competency in environmental policymaking, with lows of around 35–40 per cent in Finland claiming that this is their preference. Swedes and Austrians are also somewhat sceptical of handing this policy area over to the EU, but not quite as sceptical as Finns. Indeed, the majority in Austria support the idea of having environmental policy handled by the EU. In contrast, the majority in Finland and Sweden believe this policy should be dealt with by national governments. Thus Eftan citizens’ views regarding this policy area tend to be in stark contrast to their governments’ active pursuit of EU environmental policy. Although East Germany has been grouped with the Eftan countries for sake of convenience, it is obvious that it is different from the latter with regard to its preferences for environmental policy-making. East Germans have tended to be far more favourable toward allowing the EU to make environmental policy, and across the 1990s less than 30 per cent have wanted the German government to retain sole policy-making power in this area. In fact, in comparison to their West German counterparts, they are even more supportive of EU-level policy-making in this field. Social policy: unemployment and welfare benefits The early days of the EU saw some degree of interest amongst elites in providing social welfare benefits. One of the concerns expressed at the time of the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community was the possible dislocation and unemployment of coal and steel workers. Thus, funds were established to help workers in this industry with job dislocation problems (Dinan 1999; Nugent 2003). In addition, social cohesion policies adopted at the time of the SEA and TEU were directed toward the possible economic damage of those treaties (and subsequent implementing legislation) to the poorer member states of the Union. While funds were not directed specifically to individuals but to regions, it was expected that individuals within these poorer regions would benefit from the social cohesion policies.

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The TEU, however, prompted considerable academic and policymaking debate regarding the potential social welfare problems that have been created by an ever-increasingly integrated economic and monetary marketplace. This is because of the convergence criteria that were necessary for member states to meet if they were to join the new common currency, along with the requirement that most of these criteria be maintained once the currency had been adopted. As discussed in previous chapters, the major constraint in question was a restriction on the amount of budget deficit a country was/is allowed to maintain.1 Traditionally, one of the fiscal tools that European member state governments could use to provide social welfare benefits was the running of budget deficits. Thus, even in bad economic times, it could be expected that social security benefits like unemployment payments and state pensions would not be reduced, state jobs would not necessarily be lost, etc. Although governments can still use taxation, particularly income tax, to raise the necessary revenues, most EU governments in the 1990s instead chose to use the strict criteria to attempt major reforms to their system of social benefits and to reduce the size of state bureaucracies. These policies, however, have coincided with increasing economic difficulties, including double-digit unemployment. In addition to the problem created by budgetary restrictions, yet another fiscal tool has also been removed from member state control, and that is the use of interest rate policy to stimulate growth. This policy-making power has now moved to the hands of the European Central Bank, and as many academics point out, the ECB, along with the system of setting centralised interest rates, simply does not have the capability to combat pockets of unemployment that have cropped up in many regions of the EU (Forder 1999; Eichengreen 1992). Thus, many have argued that the removal of a strong system of social benefits (or its potential removal) has been a major negative consequence of the integration process (Liebfried and Pierson 2000). Furthermore, as contended by Fritz Scharpf, ‘the policy-making capacities of the union have not been strengthened nearly as much as the capabilities at the level of member states have declined’ (1994: 219). That is, EU-wide social welfare and cohesion policies have not been responsive to the increasingly changed structure of economic policy-making across the EU. The next stage in the integration process would thus seem to be increased social welfare policy-making co-ordination or centralisation. Some degree of policy-making in this field is indeed occurring, much of it via European Court of Justice decisions. Most of the important

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decisions coming out of the Court have dealt with the issue of gender equality and with attempts by member states to restrict the recipients of state welfare benefits to their own citizens who reside in the state of origin. In fact, up until the early 1990s when the member states themselves started taking a more active role in social welfare policy coordination, many of these policies were being made by the Court.2 In the early 1990s, all indications were that many member states wanted to create an EU-wide social welfare system, and accordingly adopted the Protocol on Social Policy, incorporating it into the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) took cohesion in social policy one step further by outlining the specific areas that the member states wished to co-ordinate.3 Also important is that while the UK opted out of the former, the Labour government brought Britain into this Social Chapter in 1997. Some of the new policies adopted as a result of increased integration in social welfare policy were that gender equality was switched from being an area requiring unanimous voting to one that only required qualified majority voting. In addition, two new competences were included under the QMV umbrella – worker information and consultation, and the integration of people excluded from the labour market. Several new areas were also explicitly mentioned in the Amsterdam Treaty (although they were subject to unanimous decision-making): protection of workers when the employment contract is terminated, social security and protection of workers generally, financing for the integration of the economically excluded, collective interest representation, and employment of third country nationals. There are three areas that were also specifically mentioned as being excluded from social policy-making, and these were pay, the right of association, and the right to strike (see Liebfried and Pierson 2000: 273). While policy-making is clearly moving forward in the realm of social welfare, overall this is considered to be an underdeveloped policy area at the EU level. Part of the explanation for this lies in the increasing weakness of labour unions and the general weakness of forces that might have pressed for EU-level policies.4 Also key, however, is the very firm perspective on the part of national governments that social welfare policy-making belongs in their hands only. As argued by Liebfried and Pierson, ‘The welfare state remains one of the few key realms of policy competence where national governments still appear to reign supreme. Given the popularity and the electoral significance of most social programmes, national executives have usually resisted losses of social policy authority’ (2000: 270). The question to which this chapter now

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turns is where mass publics in the EU would place social welfare policy-making responsibility. Do they believe it should lie with the EU or do they take a more traditional approach and contend that it lies squarely with their national governments? In general, Figure 7.2 provides some indication as to why national governments might be hesitant to move quickly on an integrated welfare policy. The EU public’s average percentages across the 1990s clearly places this policy with the national government. Turning first to the Original Six member states and welfare policy preferences, apart

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from one of these member states (Italy), the Original Six member states generally seem to hover around the EU average, as was the case with environmental policy (Figure 7.2). However, it is important to note that in this case, the majority in each of these countries (again, apart from Italy) believes that welfare policy ought to be conducted at the national rather than EU level. This very much confirms the idea that policymaking in this field continues to be seen as being within the remit of national governments. The case of Italy is important to note, however. While the Italian public was almost identical in its feelings about environmental policy to that of the rest of the EU (including the other Original Six member states), when it comes to welfare policy, Italians seem to take a somewhat different view regarding the appropriate level of policy-making. In fact, the Italian figures here are far closer to those of the Southern Enlargement countries. That is, higher than average percentages in Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal would like to see the EU take the lead in social policy. In the cases of Greece and Italy, this number at times approaches 50 per cent of the population (whereas 40 per cent or less across the EU prefer EU-led welfare policies). It must be added that it is still not an overwhelming majority in Southern Europe that prefers EUlevel policies, but the difference between these countries and the rest of the EU is noteworthy and perhaps reflects the notion that those living in countries with failing national level policies and institutions (such as social welfare institutions) look to the EU to provide better policies and institutions (see Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). Amongst the First Enlargement countries, we also find that Britain and Ireland are hovering very close to the low EU average. That is, roughly 30–40 per cent in these countries would like the EU to take over social policy-making, while approximately 60 per cent prefer that this area remain within the realm of the national government. In Denmark, however, the level of support for EU-level welfare policy is even lower: less than 20 per cent would support such an idea, whilst more than 80 per cent think welfare policy belongs squarely in the hands of the Danish government. We see an even stronger consensus in one of the other member states touted as having the strongest welfare state, Finland. Less than 10 per cent of the Finnish population would be willing to hand welfare policymaking over to the EU. Surprisingly, the figures for Sweden – also known for its well-developed welfare state – vary much more. In surveys conducted shortly after Sweden’s entry to the EU, ‘only’ about 70 per cent wished to have welfare policy in the hands of the Swedish govern-

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ment, and about 30 per cent were willing to turn this over to the EU. In 1999, this changed dramatically, and approximately 90 per cent of the Swedish population thought welfare policy should be in the hands of the national government. By 2000, on the other hand, the figure had dropped dramatically to approximately 60 per cent. It is highly likely that the campaigning for the 1999 European Parliamentary (EP) elections provoked the higher levels of hostility in this particular survey. The country would be turning to the euro referendum campaign shortly after these particular EP elections, and anti-EU parties were already gearing up for this particular battle, contending that – amongst other things – participation in the euro zone would damage Sweden’s system of social welfare benefits. Even generally pro-European parties like the Swedish Moderate Party were arguing specifically for keeping social policy at the national level during the 1999 European Parliament election campaign (and before this election as well).5 The other Eftan country – Austria – however, appears to be relatively close to the EU in terms of individual-level preferences for welfare policy-making, as does East Germany. EU citizens have also been asked since the early 1990s about their preferences regarding unemployment policy. That is, should policies to combat unemployment be handled jointly within the EU or should national governments retain competence in this policy area? This item appears to evoke a somewhat different response than the previous one (Figure 7.3). Namely, to begin with, the EU average reflects an evenly divided public. Whereas clear majorities in most member states thought that welfare policy ought to be handled by their national governments, in the case of unemployment policies, only near-majorities believe the latter, while near-majorities believe the EU ought to be in control of this policy area. While the Original Six linger close to this average, many of them contain clear majorities in favour of EU-led unemployment policy (as opposed to keeping this in the hands of the national governments). Once again, this is particularly true in Italy, presumably for the same reason mentioned above regarding welfare policy. The other Southern Enlargement countries also tend to linger around the EU average, with the Greeks being the most supportive of EU-led unemployment policies. Only a minority in Spain supports this idea in the early 1990s, but by the middle of the decade, the majority seems to be in favour of EU-wide policy. It is also interesting to note that support of the latter drops from approximately 60 per cent to 45 per cent in Portugal between 1992 and 2000, which is similar to the trend found in the realm of environmental policy attitudes.

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Amongst the First and Eftan Enlargement countries, similar patterns to those for welfare policy-making are found. Namely, people in Denmark and Finland are amongst the least supportive of joint unemployment policy. However, opposition to such an idea is not quite as strong as was the case with welfare policy. Also, unlike the situation with welfare policy, the British public seems to be far away from the EU average when it comes to unemployment policy. However, British responses to this item are more consistent with British responses to the question about welfare policy – that is, the

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British public is equally hostile to both. This is likely to be due to the differential experience with unemployment in Britain vis-à-vis continental Europe. Namely, the former has managed to escape the high levels of unemployment experienced by the rest of the EU throughout much of the 1990s, and thus people in the UK are less likely to see any realistic need for EU-level co-ordination, as their government appears to have managed to stave off this particular economic problem. Immigration and asylum The movement toward co-ordination of immigration and asylum policies in the EU got off to a comparatively late start (vis-à-vis other policy areas) and began with the second Schengen Agreement of 1990.6 Prior to this, member states were mostly content to set their own immigration and asylum policies. With regard to immigration policy, many of the EU member states had been engaging in active recruitment from poorer countries in order to fill their labour shortages after World War Two (Hammar 1985). However, with vastly different citizenship and naturalisation policies (Brubaker 1992), the co-ordination of entry and the terms of gaining citizenship were far beyond the interests of most member states. By the mid-1980s, the major recipient countries (e.g. Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands) had lost considerable control over entry, though, particularly of family members of migrant workers (Esser and Korte 1985; Ornbrant and Peura 1993). One of the major problems for these countries was their acceptance of the European Convention on Human Rights, which includes a right to family life, a right which many national courts have interpreted as applying to established immigrants (Soysal 1996). Thus, a potential benefit was seen in terms of taking immigration law out of the hands of national courts and transferring it to the EU level. In addition, by the early 1990s the need for co-ordination of asylum policy had become apparent as the Balkans quickly exploded into civil war. While EU member states had previously faced steady applications from other parts of the world (e.g. Kurds from Turkey and Iraq), the scale of flows from Central Europe was unprecedented. In a pre-emptive move, member states signed the Dublin Convention in 1990 (and the Convention came into force in 1997), the purpose of which was to avoid asylum shopping and passing the responsibility for considering asylum claims to other member states: ‘This was necessary to avoid situations where refugees are shuttled from one Member State to another, with none accepting responsibility, or to prevent multiple or simultaneous applications.’7 The overall policy is geared toward reducing the

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number of applications; restricting the possibility of submitting applications in different states, in turn, reduces the likelihood of being accepted at all (Huysmans 2000). In 1992 the Treaty on European Union finally brought immigration policy within the realm of treaty law by creating the new third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs and the K4 Council committee on asylum, visa and migration policy. Movement toward co-ordination was still very slow, however, and over the next five years, the JHA Council only agreed on one joint position (on the definition of ‘refugee’) and on five legally binding joint actions: school travel for children of third country nationals, airport transit procedures, a common format for residence permits, burden sharing for displaced persons, and human trafficking (Guiraudon 2000). However, as the numbers of asylum seekers have continued to rise, there has been more interest in co-ordination, and according to Kostakopoulou (2000) the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty finally represented a partial communautarisation of migration issues. While much of community law regarding asylum seekers was to remain subject to unanimous decision within the Council of Ministers for five years and the decision was taken at the Nice Council meeting to not shift to QMV, recent measures in the JHA Council have indicated that the EU will indeed be moving toward QMV, which was scheduled to come into force in April 2005.8 It should be noted, however, that Denmark, Ireland and the UK have at all times retained the right of opting out of co-ordinated asylum policy-making, with the UK and Ireland wishing to opt in at times when it suits them and Denmark usually expressing no interest in opting in at all. As mentioned above, national governments have been extremely resistant to giving up control over immigration and asylum policies. It is indicative of general feelings amongst elites that one of the member states that had seemed enthusiastic about the idea – Germany – eventually insisted on keeping these policies within the realm of unanimous decision-making (and thus having national vetoes) in the Amsterdam Treaty (Kostakopoulou 2000). We turn now to the question of mass perceptions of these policy-making areas. As with other policy areas, by 2000 there was clearly a downward trend in interest in co-ordinating immigration policy at the EU level. However, very much unlike the other polices investigated so far, the EU average support stands at approximately 50 per cent or more support for co-ordination throughout most of the 1990s and then drops rather abruptly in the late 1990s and 2000 by approximately 15 per cent. In addition, there has been a corresponding increase in the preference to

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keep immigration policy within the realm of the national government. Similar trends are apparent when we examine attitudes to asylum policy (Figures 7.4 and 7.5). With regard to both of these, we tend to see the usual country-level trends and patterns, with most of the Original Six lingering close to or above the EU average and Italy being amongst the most supportive of co-ordination. At the same time – and as was the case with environmental policy – the Dutch are among the most supportive of co-ordinated asylum policy in particular (when compared to other EU member states,

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that is). Amongst the First Enlargement countries, Danish and British citizens are the least supportive of co-ordinating either of these policies, with only 30–40 per cent supporting such co-ordination across the 1990s and 2000. Again, citizen views in these countries tend to mirror those of their governments. The Southern Enlargement group of countries also contains the familiar patterns, with the decline in support for co-ordination being most marked in Portugal (for instance, support for co-ordinated asylum policy declines from 60 per cent in 1992 to close

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to 30 per cent in 2000). Finally, Finns are again the least supportive amongst the Eftan Enlargement member states, with less than 20 per cent in that country supporting EU-level immigration policies; with regard to asylum policy, support is close to 40 per cent in the mid-1990s but also drops to the mid-20s by 2000. Austrians tend to be quite similar to the other Eftan citizens and are only marginally more supportive of EU-level asylum and immigration initiatives. Thinking of this in alternative terms, by 2000, approximately 70 per cent in Finland and Austria wanted asylum policies handled at the national level, and an even more overwhelming 80 per cent in Finland wanted immigration policies addressed by the national government only. Thus, while their national governments may be interested in increasing co-operation in these areas, citizens in these countries would not like to see these JHA competencies transferred to the EU. Foreign and defence Along with immigration and asylum policies, two other issues that go to the very heart of national sovereignty are foreign and defence policies. Indeed, member state governments have been extremely reluctant to move policy-making in these areas completely to the EU level. This is not to say that the EC/EU has avoided these issues. In fact, interest in defence co-ordination was evidenced in the early 1950s with the Pleven Plan for a European Defence Community (EDC) and the de Gasperi Plan for a political superstructure to give the EDC direction. As Forster and Wallace point out, these plans ‘would have transformed the Six into an effective federation’ (2000: 463). Shortly thereafter, the plan for an EDC was defeated by the French National Assembly and to replace it, the Western European Union – a union with very little power outside the realm of NATO – was created. While there were further discussions and negotiations and the development of plans like the Fouchet Plan and the Franco-German Elysée Treaty, movements toward a federalised foreign and defence policy had mostly ground to a halt by the mid-1960s (see Nugent 2003; Dinan 1999). From this point forward, co-ordination of foreign and defence policies has been through the intergovernmental European Political Cooperation process, which produced very little in the way of concrete results. Attempts at reinitiating intense co-operation (e.g. via the Genscher-Colombo Plan of 1982) floundered in the face of reluctance from governments like Denmark, the UK, Ireland and Greece, all of whom were concerned about giving up sovereignty in the area of national defence. Pressure from the US to remain loyal to NATO also

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made closer intra-EC co-operation difficult. By the end of the 1980s, while intergovernmental discussion at the level of foreign ministers had increased considerably, this did not promote defence co-operation at all, as defence ministries were excluded from these discussions. Nor did it seem to promote a convergence of attitudes (Forster and Wallace 2000). Although the Intergovernmental Conference held in 1991 was to be focused on monetary integration and the writing of the TEU, the Yugoslav crisis prompted member states to add CFSP to the agenda. However, the language of the resulting Maastricht Treaty ‘represented a modification of existing institutional arrangements rather than a real change’ (Forster and Wallace 2000: 473). In addition, while the British and French positions on CFSP – which had previously been at odds with one another – had started to converge by the time of the 1996–7 IGC, there were other internal disputes and hesitations amongst member states that prevented any major movement forward in co-operation in foreign and/or defence policy. However, after the seemingly inauspicious start that was the Amsterdam Treaty, co-operation began to increase considerably. This was in great part a result of the new UK government’s attempt to produce better Franco-British relations. Thus, one of the major movements was the creation of a new SecretaryGeneral and the agreement that this was to be a major political post rather than simply a person who would assist the Council Presidency; the point was to address the general problem raised by Henry Kissinger many years earlier related to not knowing who to call when he wanted to speak to the person in charge in Europe. While co-ordination within CFSP and the improvement in British–French co-operation was severely damaged by disagreement over the role of Europe in the second Persian Gulf War, by the end of the time period analysed here (2000), it seems possible that the improvement in co-operation amongst member state governments might have produced an increase in positive feelings about allowing the EU to make common foreign and security policy. Unlike many of the other policies investigated in this chapter, attitudes to the handling of foreign policy remained relatively stable across the 1989–2000 period (see Figure 7.6). The only countries in which there are fairly large cross-time fluctuations are Greece and Portugal. In 1989 in Greece, only about 40 per cent of the public wanted foreign policy handled at the EU level. By the early 1990s, there was a bare majority in favour of shifting foreign policy-making to the EU level. Across the mid and late 1990s, however, these figures continued to fluctuate and by 2000, a majority was once again happy to allow the EU to

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take responsibility for foreign policy. In Portugal, the level of support for moving foreign policy to the EU level rose dramatically from around 45 per cent in 1980 to over 60 per cent in 1992. Support for this idea then dropped immediately and has hovered around 50 per cent since then. In the other member states, the familiar patterns are witnessed. Clearly, all of the Original Six member states are above the EU average in their levels of preference for shifting foreign policy-making to the

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EU, with Italy and the Netherlands tending to be the most supportive (approximately 80 per cent in each country claim the EU as their preferred centre for policy-making in this realm). On the other hand, Denmark and Sweden are amongst the least supportive, but it should be noted that even in these countries, approximately 50 per cent would prefer that foreign policy be made by the EU rather than by their national governments. We see very different responses, however, when it comes to defence policy. First of all, the overall EU average support for a common defence policy is approximately 10 per cent lower than is the level of support for a common foreign policy. In addition, opinion in countries like France, where citizens are strongly supportive of the latter, is far less supportive of the former. Moreover, in all of the First Enlargement countries, only a minority supports the idea of a common defence policy. Most of the Eftan member states are even less supportive, with a low of approximately 10 per cent in Finland and approximately 20 per cent in Sweden wishing to have defence policy handled by the EU. Even amongst the Southern European countries, there is much less willingness to hand defence policy over to the EU (see Figure 7.7). Thus, the same inconsistencies between foreign and defence policy co-ordination found at the EU level are, in fact, reflected in public perceptions regarding where policy-making in this area should lie. EMU and the common currency9 Given that currency policy is within the realm of economic policymaking, it is no surprise that the need to co-ordinate currency policy has been recognised since the early days of the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC (1957). It took another thirty-five years for member states to finally agree to the establishment of a single currency (and even then, three of the member states – the UK, Denmark and Sweden – refused to join). This is, of course, despite the fact that member states agreed to the co-ordination other economic policies that would presumably not run nearly as smoothly in the face of fluctuating prices and exchange rates (i.e. the common market and the common agricultural policy). However, in these early days, European currencies were set to the Bretton Woods system and were very much tied to the US dollar. In addition, EC member state governments were still pursuing Keynesian economic policies and thus had little interest in creating a co-ordinated monetary policy. While there was indeed co-ordination of exchange rates in the 1970s, this system collapsed because of economic difficulties, and the next

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movement toward EMU followed in 1979 with the establishment of the European Monetary System. EMS worked similarly to the previous ‘snake’ system of limiting the range of fluctuation of exchange rates, but in the 1980s, there was a more concerted effort to stabilise prices and interest rates, which made the fluctuations around the new European currency unit (ecu) much smaller than the pre-1979 fluctuations around the Deutschmark. However, it should be noted that the system still revolved around the Deutschmark and the German

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economic priority of low inflation. It is also important to note that the UK stayed out of the EMS until 1990. This system also eventually failed because of the 1992–3 exchange rate crisis, which was prompted by increasingly difficult economic times and pressures to indirectly inflate via government spending. Prior to this, plans for a common currency had already been in the making, and the common currency was seen by many – particularly in the Commission – as the next logical step in the completion of the common market. However, until the failure of the ERM in the early 1990s, the impetus to create such a currency was not yet there. Some have also argued that one of the main driving forces behind the agreement was the reunification of Germany, along with dissatisfaction with the degree to which German economic and currency policy was dictating policies of the other member states, with the other member states having little voice in the currency policy. Thus, EMU was ultimately a way for member states to gain some control over economic policy-making. It may have also been seen as a way to gain control in a situation of increasingly globalised markets over which member states might have been losing control (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989). In terms of public support for the common currency, it is expected that citizens who were living in member states with relatively weak currencies and more severe economic difficulties (like inflation) would be the most supportive of the currency, as it would be seen as a way of bringing economic stability to the country. In many other countries, though, there has been a feeling of protectiveness of the nation’s currency, and the national government’s ability to control fiscal and monetary policy independently of EU regulations (i.e. the requirements to maintain a relatively small budget deficit). This latter group of countries – UK, Denmark and Sweden – have opted to remain outside the currency zone, the UK as a result of a government decision and Denmark and Sweden as a result of public opposition in the face of government support for joining the common currency. Rather surprisingly, German citizens are argued to have grown more negative about the currency after the Treaty on European Union of 1992. Many bankers in Germany were openly arguing against the common currency, and this, combined with pride in the post-war German economic miracle and stable currency, is said to have contributed to hostility on the part of the German public in the run-up to the switchover to the new currency in 2002. It is arguable that the common currency is the most divisive issue for European citizens, mostly because – unlike common defence – it is very

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much a reality and may serve as an immediate threat. We now turn to public opinion data on the question of where control over currency policy ought to lie. Rather interestingly, in almost all of the member states – including the three that opted out of the common currency – in 1998, there was a sharp decline in levels of support for keeping currency policy with the national government, but then the percentages generally returned to pre-1998 levels shortly thereafter (Figure 7.8). In addition, as mentioned above, amongst the Original Six member states, Original Six

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western German citizens are clearly the most hesitant regarding the common currency, with a bare majority supporting it by 2000. The most sceptical of the common currency are – as would be expected – the UK, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. It is rather interesting, though, that at the start of the period under investigation here, Denmark was very close to the overall EU average, but then support for the common currency policy declined steadily, particularly at the time of the Maastricht referendum in 1996. While those favouring a common currency boosted their numbers amongst the public after that, there was still less than a clear majority in Denmark supporting the common currency.10

Summary of policy-making in the EU In 2000 – the year of the surveys used in the rest of this chapter – the average level of preference for EU handling of policies like defence, immigration and health and social welfare tended to be relatively low, with larger percentages wishing national governments to (continue to) conduct these policies. Naturally, these percentages vary by country, with only roughly 10 per cent of Finnish citizens preferring that the EU handle defence policy and a not-so-overwhelming majority in the Benelux countries, Germany, Italy and France preferring that the EU handle this policy area. Even in countries that are not overwhelmingly Eurosceptic like Portugal and Greece, only small minorities prefer defence policy to be controlled by the EU. Similarly, only about 41 per cent of EU citizens prefer immigration policy to be in the hands of the EU, again with Finland being the most resistant to this idea (only 15 per cent of Finns support EU policy-making in the realm of immigration in 2000). Italy, on the other hand, was the most favourable, with 67 per cent wanting to allow the EU to make immigration policy. In the realm of health and social welfare policy-making, there seems to be even more consensus that the EU is not the appropriate level at which to make such policy. The average level of preference in 2000 for EU policy-making in this area is approximately 29 per cent, with a low of 9–10 per cent in Finland and Sweden and a high of approximately 50 per cent in Greece. For the most part, however, less than 35 per cent in most EU countries would like to see health and social welfare policymaking occur at the EU level. Also, although there is less than overwhelming support for an EU-wide unemployment policy, most of the member states’ citizens do support co-ordination in this area. In contrast to defence, immigration and asylum, and social welfare policy-making, the average level of preference for the handling of

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environmental, currency and foreign policy puts such policy-making in the hands of the EU. The latter of these is most surprising, given that in 2000 only 41 per cent wanted defence policy to be made by the EU (whereas 66 per cent would like foreign policy to be made jointly within the EU). Even the lowest levels of support for this idea are not all that low in 2000: over 50 per cent in all countries would like to see foreign policy made jointly within the EU, with a high of 80 per cent in Belgium and a low of 50.5 per cent in Sweden. For environmental policy-making, the averages are less clear-cut. While 56.7 per cent across the EU would like environmental policymaking to occur at the EU level, in Finland and eastern Germany only 41 per cent across the EU prefer that environmental policy-making be conducted in the EU, whereas a high of 72.5 per cent in the Netherlands prefer to see this policy area handled by the EU. Finally, the issue of currency policy-making is – not surprisingly – extremely divisive. Overall percentages indicate clear majority support across the EU for having currency policy handled in the EU. However, the level of support within member states varies widely, with 79 per cent in Italy supporting EU-level currency policy-making and a low of 22 per cent in Britain preferring the latter. Rather surprisingly, by 2000 only 44 per cent in Portugal, 40 per cent in Finland, and 54 per cent in Austria prefer currency policy to be handled by the EU. (This is surprising because these countries have already adopted the euro.)

Explaining the public’s policy-making preferences in the EU Having reviewed the state of policy-making in the EU and citizen preferences across various policy areas, we now return to the main topics of this book. Although the last chapter ended by shedding some doubt on the egocentric utilitarian model and contending that attitudes to European integration were likely to have more to do with group-level concerns – that is, those related to the loss of group resources and symbols – we further investigate all these approaches here based on the assumption that feelings about turning certain policy areas over to the EU may be far more connected to personal utilitarianism than were general feelings about European integration. Thus, the questions posed in this section are as follows. To what degree do policy-making preferences stem from utilitarian cost-benefit analyses about the impact of policy on the individual’s own life and circumstances? Are EU-level policy-making preferences driven by concerns related to the symbolic threat posed by the EU? And do perceptions of group-level threat to

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resources explain attitudes to having certain kinds of policies being made at the EU level? Finally, are there specific circumstances that each EU member state faces that explain why its citizens may be more or less supportive of EU-wide policy-making in a particular policy area? Note that because this chapter analyses multiple policies across fifteen member states, tabular presentations are unwieldy and so the bivariate results will be discussed here without tables; tables will, however, be provided for the multivariate analyses. Personal utilitarianism As discussed in previous chapters, personal utilitarianism in the context of European integration tends to refer to the occupation, education and income of the individual and the potential effect of Europe-wide policies on a person’s status and income. As mentioned above, although the previous chapter called the utilitarian model into question, we will continue to investigate the model, this time in the realm of specific EU policies. If utilitarianism holds, it is expected that status and position in life are likely to better explain attitudes to policy-making at the EU level for some policies than others. For instance, professionals and executives in big businesses, along with those of higher income levels, have been said to be amongst the strongest supporters of a common currency and monetary policy because of the reduced costs of financial transactions across borders. I would thus expect individuals from these groups to be far more supportive of the common currency than individuals who do manual labour (and thus may see no real personal benefit of a common currency). In addition, executives are likely to be less accepting of varying environmental regulation regimes cross-nationally because of the variable financial costs that are associated with production in more or less environmentally friendly ways. A common environmental policy levels the playing field of the market to some degree, and thus gives businesses a fairer chance of competing more freely with one another. Thus, on average, I would expect executives and professionals to care more about co-ordinated environmental policy than those who are engaged in other occupations. Alternatively, it might be expected that those working at lower skills levels would be more resistant to co-ordinated immigration and asylum policy, preferring that these be kept at the national government level instead. This is because turning these policies over to the EU may imply a loss of national control over the entry of new migrants, and in turn, increased migration from poorer countries and thus competition for

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low-skilled posts. Similarly, those with lesser job skills may fear the loss of control over unemployment and health and social welfare policy because of a perception that their interests would not be adequately considered at the EU level. With regard to attitudes to foreign and defence policy-making, I have no theoretical reason to expect that status and income will matter for utilitarian reasons. The findings (not shown)11 indicate that – as expected – the largest difference between those who are doing well economically and statuswise (executives with high levels of education and high incomes) and those who are not (manual workers with low levels of education and low incomes) lies in their attitudes to currency and environmental policies. As predicted, the former group is far more supportive of EUlevel environmental and currency policies than is the latter group. The effects of utilitarianism on attitudes to other policy-making areas are smaller, but it does appear that the better-off in life are more supportive of EU-wide unemployment, immigration, asylum and defence policies. There is no difference across groups in levels of support for co-ordinated health and social welfare and foreign policies, however. Thus, most of the expected effects are supported empirically, although it is unclear as to why those at higher status levels would necessarily be more supportive of a common defence policy. Perceived group threat to resources In Chapter 4, it was contended that attitudes to the integration process generally are likely to be affected by worries about the potential loss of national benefits and resources. Recall that two different measures of this concern were investigated – one related to the threat posed by immigrants and minorities and the other posed by European integration itself – and that both of these were significant in predicting attitudes to integration. Do concerns for the loss of national-level group benefits have any impact on attitudes to the co-ordination of particular policies at the EU level, though? It is expected that those feeling the most threat to the group’s resources would also be the most likely to wish to keep health and social welfare, immigration and asylum, and EMU policies at the national level because all of these are directly connected to national resources. Foreign and defence, along with environmental policies, would seem to be far less related to the economic resources that those who feel threatened worry about – jobs, the national economy, and the abuse and decline of welfare services – and thus should be less directly affected by fears about the loss of these resources.

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The empirical results indicate that predicting policy-making attitudes depends more on the stimulus used to measure group threat than had been the case with general attitudes to integration. 12 With perceived threat of immigrants as the stimulus, there is very little impact of group threat on policy-making preferences. However, with a stimulus that includes threats posed by the EU, group threat does have some effect on attitudes to many of the policy-making areas investigated here. For instance, those most threatened (i.e. those who worry about the loss of social benefits, about the EU creating more difficulties for farmers, and about the transfer of jobs to countries with lower production costs) tend to prefer to keep health and social welfare, unemployment, immigration, asylum, foreign, and currency policies at the national level. That is, the only policy areas for which resource-based perceived group threat has little impact are defence and environment. These findings are quite consistent with the above-stated expectations, but it is also unexpected that threat from minorities fails to have any impact on attitudes to policy-making, whereas it did have an effect on general attitudes to European integration. Symbols and national identity We next turn to the question of whether concern for the loss of national symbols and identity has any effect on preferences regarding where policy-making occurs. It is expected that the idea of the EU making policy in certain areas would be likely to stimulate a strong nationalist reaction (see de Winter and Swyngedouw 1999). These would be areas that are seen to be particular threats to national security (broadly defined to include economic security and immigration – see Waever et al. 1993) such as foreign and defence, asylum and immigration, and currency policies. The initial empirical evidence indicates that concern for loss of national identity and symbols does seem to matter more in some policy areas than others. On the one hand, policies like health and social welfare do not seem to be affected much by this variable: people in most member states overwhelmingly believe that responsibility for these policy areas lies with the national government regardless of their worries over the loss of national identity. On the other hand, there are a few policy-making areas in which concern for loss of national identity is indeed at play. Currency policy is the most divisive in this regard. Overall, of those who are not worried about the loss of national identity and culture because of the EU, 66.5 per cent prefer currency policy to be made at the EU level, whereas 47.7 per cent of those who do have concerns related to the loss

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of identity and culture would like to see this handled at the EU level. The country where this is most divisive is Denmark: only 21.6 per cent of those who are afraid of loss of national identity and culture want currency policy handled by the EU, whereas 57 per cent of those who are not worried about loss of identity and culture would, in fact, like to see currency policy handled by the EU. Given the huge national debate on the euro and its potential effects on national sovereignty in Denmark, it is not surprising that Danish preferences for having a common currency policy are driven by perceptions of loss of national identity. However, Denmark is not the only member state for which national identity issues help to explain currency policy-making preferences. Nor is the other ‘usual suspect’, Britain. In fact, France, Austria and Finland are three other countries in which the populations seem to divide fairly severely over currency. In France, only a bare majority of those who are concerned about national identity and culture want currency policy to be made at the EU level, whereas 80 per cent of those who are not fearful of the former are happy to have the EU in charge of currency policy. In Austria, the split is even more relevant: only a minority of those fearing loss of identity and culture want the EU to be making currency policy whilst 67 per cent of those with no concern for loss of identity and culture prefer currency policy to be in the hands of the EU. A similar finding appears in the Finnish survey, although with overall levels of support for EU level currency policy being considerably lower. Although not quite as conflict-ridden, attitudes to immigration and asylum policies, as well as to defence and environmental policymaking, are also partly driven by concerns for loss of national identity and culture. Immigration is particularly divisive in Belgium, where 48 per cent of those not fearing the loss of identity and culture would allow the EU to make immigration policy, while 66 per cent of those who are not afraid of any loss of national identity wish to see immigration policy-making moved to the EU level. Asylum policy also appears to divide Belgians in this way. Similarly, amongst Germans, for those who are afraid of the loss of national identity and culture, only 31 per cent think asylum policy ought to be made at the EU level, while 49.5 per cent who are not afraid of the loss of identity would transfer this area to the EU level. In the realm of defence policy, while only 43 per cent of French respondents who are afraid of the loss of their identity wish to have EU policy-making occur at the EU level, a clear majority (61 per cent) who are not worried about the loss of identity want the EU to lead the way

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

in defence policy-making. Somewhat surprisingly, foreign policy does not appear to be quite as divisive. As discussed above, though, more Europeans are happy to move foreign policy-making to the EU than would allow defence policy-making to be handled there. In Denmark and Britain, the expected pattern emerges even for foreign policy however: 46–48 per cent in each of those countries who worry about the loss of identity would allow EU policy-making in foreign policy, while approximately 61.5 per cent who do not fear the loss of identity are quite happy to transfer foreign policy-making to the EU. Finally, given that preferences for health and social welfare policymaking do not seem to be driven to a great degree by fear of loss of national identity and culture, it is somewhat surprising that attitudes to fighting unemployment are more divisive in this regard. As discussed above, more Europeans think that this battle ought to be waged by the EU as a whole than was the case with health and social welfare. In addition, however, preferences for EU unemployment policy do seem to divide based on feelings about the loss of national identity. For instance, in western Germany, 47 per cent of those who are afraid of a loss of identity would allow the EU to make unemployment policy, while 62 per cent of those who are not afraid of the loss of identity would turn this over to the EU. Similar figures can be found in France, and Austrian opinion is similarly divided over unemployment policymaking by the fear of loss of identity. As with the effect of resource-based threats, however, the impact of symbolic threat also varies to some degree by the type of stimulus used. For instance, with regard to unemployment, immigration, asylum and foreign policies, it is actually the symbolic threat posed by immigrants that makes respondents most hostile to co-ordinated EU-level policy. This particular type of threat also has a stronger impact on attitudes to currency policy co-ordination than does the threat posed specifically by the EU. However, the overall impact of symbolic threat is fairly similar when either measure is used, indicating that the threat to national symbols has a far more powerful, consistent impact on attitudes to policy-making than the threat to national resources. We return to these findings in the multivariate analyses below. Context In addition to individual-level explanations of attitudes to EU policymaking, it is possible that certain country-level contexts create more or less hostility to transferring policy to the EU level. For instance, it may be the case that a greater general concern for environmental degrada-

Attitudes to Policy-making in the EU

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tion makes Europeans in some countries feel that co-operation is the best way to protect the environment. Similarly, higher unemployment levels are likely to induce citizens to look to the EU for help with resolving this particular problem. In addition, it could be the case that in countries where there are already large numbers of immigrants, there is a perception that the national government has not adequately contained the influx of new migrants and thus preferences would be for EU-level co-ordination in areas like immigration and asylum policies. Finally, in countries with ongoing problems related to prices (inflation), citizens are likely to be more supportive of the common currency as a way of keeping their traditionally volatile currencies under control. Alternatively, in countries that spend large amounts of national budgets on health and social welfare benefits, citizens may be more reluctant to turn such spending over to the EU for fear of loss of those benefits; at the same time, in countries where social welfare provision is low, it may be preferred that the EU take over this policy-making area in hopes that welfare provision would improve.13 Also, countries that spend larger amounts on defence may be more hesitant to relinquish those expenditures and control over foreign and defence policy to the EU. The effect of these national contexts may, however, be secondary to two others that have been argued to be important in explaining attitudes to integration generally. These others relate to the aggregate benefits gained by participating in the EU (sociotropic egoistic concerns), particularly with regard to the EU budget and intra-EU trade (see Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). Specifically, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 6, citizens living in countries that have either been net beneficiaries of the EU budget or run a positive trade balance with the rest of the EU should be more supportive of European integration as a whole and thus more supportive of the specific policies included within the concept of European integration (see de Winter and Swyngedouw 1999). Multivariate analysis The multivariate models in Table 7.1 include all of the potential explanations for differences in support for EU-level policy-making discussed above. (Figures reported in Table 7.1 are predicted probabilities from logistic regressions; full logistic regression results appear in the Appendix at the end of this chapter.) To what degree are the above expectations fulfilled?14 We begin with a discussion of the effects of the aggregate-level variables, the measures for which are summarised in Table 7.2. First, it appears that a stronger national-level culture of concern for protecting the environment in the form of willingness to

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

Table 7.1: Policy-making preferences logistic regression predicted probabilities of supporting national-level policy-making Environment

Health and Unemployment Immigration social welfare

EB53 EB54.1 EB53 EB54.1 EB53 EB54.1 EB53 EB54.1 Personal util low1 Personal util high2 Group threat low3 Group threat high Symbolic threat low4 Symbolic threat high Age low5 Age high Gender male Gender female Cog mob low6 Cog mob high Left7 Right Policy var = low8 Policy var = medium Policy var = high Budget bal = low9 Budget bal = high Trade bal = low10 Trade bal = high

.49 .32 .42 .42 .35 .54 .39 .45 .40 .43 .47 .35 .41 .43 .33 .41 .54 .58 .29 .55 .18

.49 .33 .37 .43 .37 .45 .38 .44 .40 .42 .46 .34 .39 .43 .33 .40 .51 .53 .31 .49 .25

Asylum

.74 .70 .67 .72 .67 .72 .67 .73 .69 .71 .73 .66 .69 .70 .51 .71 .77 .67 .73 .73 .64

.73 .75 .61 .75 .70 .71 .66 .75 .69 .72 .74 .65 .69 .73 .58 .71 .75 .70 .71 .72 .67

Defence

.53 .42 .46 .49 .42 .56 .46 .49 .45 .50 .52 .41 .47 .48 .55 .46 .39 .50 .45 .51 .39

.57 .47 .44 .54 .48 .57 .48 .53 .49 .52 .54 .46 .47 .55 .59 .49 .41 .51 .50 .53 .45

.64 .55 .54 .61 .54 .65 .54 .63 .58 .59 .60 .56 .54 .63 .55 .58 .63 .71 .46 .71 .28

.62 .56 .48 .63 .54 .62 .55 .60 .56 .59 .60 .54 .50 .66 .54 .58 .64 .67 .49 .65 .40

Foreign policy Currency policy

EB53 EB54.1 EB53 EB54.1 EB53 EB54.1 EB53 EB54.1 1

Personal util low Personal util high2 Group threat low3 Group threat high Symbolic threat low4 Symbolic threat high Age low5 Age high Gender male Gender female Cog mob low6 Cog mob high

.62 .50 .51 .59 .50 .65 .54 .59 .55 .57 .58 .53

.59 .49 .44 .60 .50 .58 .52 .56 .53 .55 .57 .50

.60 .52 .54 .57 .50 .65 .53 .60 .54 .58 .59 .52

.61 .55 .51 .61 .61 .64 .54 .61 .55 .60 .61 .52

.34 .29 .27 .30 .25 .37 .24 .35 .28 .29 .29 .29

.31 .31 .22 .32 .25 .31 .23 .34 .27 .28 .28 .28

.52 .32 .36 .42 .33 .51 .34 .47 .36 .43 .44 .34

.51 .38 .32 .49 .36 .50 .38 .48 .40 .45 .47 .36

Attitudes to Policy-making in the EU Left7 Right Policy var = low8 Policy var = medium Policy var = high Budget bal = low9 Budget bal = high Trade bal = low10 Trade bal = high

.53 .59 .52 .56 .62 .70 .43 .70 .25

.48 .61 .50 .54 .62 .62 .47 .61 .39

.52 .60 .53 .55 .64 .59 .53 .70 .24

.53 .62 .57 .57 .57 .55 .59 .65 .40

.29 .28 .26 .28 .37 .36 .23 .41 .11

.27 .29 .26 .27 .35 .32 .25 .35 .15

.41 .38 .35 .39 .45 .69 .19 .58 .11

141

.42 .44 .42 .42 .43 .66 .24 .56 .18

1

low education, manual worker, low income. high education, executive or professional, high income. low = 0; high = 6. 4 low = 0; high = 4. 5 low = 18; high = 75. 6 low = 0; high = 2. 7 left = 1; right = 10. 8 asylum policy low = 0.70, medium = 3.12, high = 7.93; defence policy low = 1.5, medium = 4.7, high = 16.4; foreign policy low = 1.5, medium = 4.7, high = 16.4; currency (inflation) low = 0.50, medium = 1.30, high = 2.50. 9 low = −11,216; high = 6,702. 10 low = −17,434; high = 56,349. 2 3

pay more for environmental protection actually corresponds to a preference for keeping this policy area in the hands of the national government.15 It is important to note which countries are at the high and low ends of this aggregate variable, however. It seems that citizens in the countries that have been known to be amongst the most Eurosceptic are also the most willing to sacrifice higher tax money for environment related expenditures. Included in this group are Sweden and Denmark, for instance. Alternatively, Germans tend to be the least willing to sacrifice their finances for more expenditure on environmental protection – perhaps because so much of the German budget is already devoted to this cause – but are amongst the least likely to want environmental policy-making to be handled by the national government.16 When it comes to social protection spending, as predicted, in countries that spend a larger portion of their budgets on such protection, there is considerably less willingness transfer this policy area to the EU level. In addition, this relationship is quite robust even after trade and budget balance statistics are added to the equation. The probabilities in Table 7.2 indicate that in a country like Ireland, which spends only 14.7 per cent of its budget on social welfare protection, the probability of wanting the national government to

27.30 30.00 25.50 25.20 20.20 30.20 14.70 21.70 28.00 22.60 26.80 31.80 28.90 26.40 29.60

8.6 4.8 11.8 11.3 12.8 10.5 5.6 2.4 3.2 4.5 10.2 6.7 3.9 5.9 8.4

Unemployment 1999 c

3.35 3.75 1.11 1.31 0.89 4.02 0.70 3.85 3.12 1.30 1.26 3.90 7.93 2.26 6.72

% Foreign 1998 d

3.10 4.20 16.40 4.70 6.10 5.90 2.60 2.00 5.90 5.40 4.50 5.50 1.50 6.90 4.70

Military expenditures 1999 e

1.10 2.10 2.10 1.70 2.20 0.60 2.50 1.00 2.00 2.20 1.30 0.60 0.50 1.30 0.60

Inflation 1999f

EU trade balance 1999h 17476 1632 −13546 1407 −17434 −6201 1407 NA 56349 −10139 3192 2943 −9407 −12528 36258

EU budget balance 1999 g −1365 −139 3660 −1793 6702 −1139 1827 −101 −3351 2700 −296 −1202.2 −828 −5283 −11216

b

From World Values Survey, 1999–2000 wave. Eurostat European Social Statistics: Social Protection Expenditure and Receipts Data 1992–2001, 2004 edition. c Eurostat Yearbook 2004. d Eurostat European Social Statistics: Migration 2000 edition; percentage represents the percentage of total population of non-EU origin. e United States State Department. f Eurostat Yearbook 2004. g Eurostat Yearbook, The Statistical Guide to Europe, 2001, in millions euro. h Eurostat’s External and Intra-EU Trade Statistical Yearbook, Data 1958–2000, in millions euro.

a

45.70 65.10 64.80 43.60 49.00 37.20 40.00 55.00 55.30 45.40 50.90 76.90 37.80 51.10 25.70

Increase Social protection taxes for spending 1999 b environment a

Aggregate policy-related variables

Belgium Denmark Greece Italy Spain France Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Finland Sweden Austria United Kingdom Germany

Country

Table 7.2:

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Attitudes to Policy-making in the EU

143

maintain control over policy-making in this field is approximately 0.58 (in EB 54.1), whereas in the higher spending states like Sweden, France and Germany, the probability of a respondent wanting to keep social protection at the national level is 0.75. 17 It must be noted that benefits received from the EU budget and individual-level fear of loss of identity are already controlled for in this equation, and so it is likely that these overall levels of social expenditure capture something different than simple diffuse opposition or support due to either of these factors. Also as expected, higher levels of unemployment tend to be associated with a reduced willingness to keep unemployment policy-making at the national level. Thus, where unemployment is low – e.g. 3.2 per cent in the Netherlands – the probability of wanting to make unemployment policy at the national level is 0.59 (in EB54.1); where unemployment is high – e.g. 12.8 in Spain – the probability of wanting to continue to allow the national government to continue making unemployment policy is only 0.41.18 As for immigration and asylum policies, higher levels of non-EU immigrants coming to the member state tend to be associated with a higher likelihood of preference for the national government to make policy in these two areas. For instance, in Austria, where 7.93 per cent of the population is of non-EU origin, the predicted probability of wanting to maintain national-level immigration policy is 0.64 and for asylum policy, 0.62. In contrast, the Irish, with approximately 0.70 per cent of the population being of non-EU background, have a probability of 0.54 of wanting the keep immigration policy-making at the national level and of 0.50 for wanting to keep asylum policy at the national level. Similarly, in countries that spend more on defence (e.g. Greece), the preference to maintain national level control over the fields of foreign and defence policies tends to be much higher than in countries that spend little on defence (e.g. Austria). However, it should be noted that this relationship decreases considerably (in EB 53) or becomes nonexistent (in EB 54.1) once the variables of intra-EU trade and budget balance are introduced. Finally, it appears that national levels of inflation have little to do with attitudes to a common currency policy.19 By the time of the surveys used here, all EU member states had managed to gain considerable control over inflation, and it is thus unlikely that citizens of member states that traditionally had difficulties with inflation (e.g. Italy) still perceived that it was a major problem.

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The impact of national trade and budget balances with the EU is quite variable across policy areas. First, both of these seem to be of considerable importance in predicting attitudes to environmental policy-making: countries that are either net beneficiaries of the EU budget or that carry a larger, positive trade balance with the EU tend to be less inclined to keep environmental policy-making at the national level. In contrast, these variables appear to have little influence over opinions regarding health, social welfare, and unemployment policymaking. For these policies, it seems to be national level factors like current social protection spending and unemployment levels that are key. In the realm of immigration and asylum policy-making, a better budget or trade balance with the EU is associated with less concern for keeping these policies at the national level. There are similar findings with regard to foreign and defence policy: those who have benefited from the EU budget or EU trade surplus are far more likely to want to shift decision-making in these areas to the EU level. Finally, budget and trade beneficiaries are also happier to see currency policy moved to the EU level than are citizens living in countries that run a trade deficit with the EU or that pay more into the EU budget than they receive. Thus, gaining country-level financial benefits from European integration not only impacts general support for integration; it also makes citizens more supportive of EU-level co-ordination of policy across most policy areas. Moving now to the individual-level explanations of support for Europe-wide policy-making, even after controlling for the effects of symbolic and perceived group threat, personal utilitarianism as measured by occupation, education and income still has an impact on attitudes to environmental policy-making, unemployment policy, immigration and asylum policies, and currency policy. Those with a combination of lower levels of job skills, income and education tend to prefer the maintenance of national-level policy-making in these areas while those with better market-oriented skills are more likely to prefer EU-level policy-making. Recall that Chapter 6 questioned the notion that variables like education, occupation and income were necessarily gauging utilitarianism, and evidence was presented indicating that personal financial circumstances may, in fact, have little to do with general attitudes to integration. Applying those findings to the current chapter, my expectation would have been that if SES was capturing some phenomenon other than utilitarianism that was making respondents positively disposed to integration, the effect of SES in predicting the probability

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145

of support for EU-level policy would have been similar across policy areas. That is, the generally positive feelings about integration would translate into positive feelings about integrating all policy areas. Instead, what we see is that preferences for co-ordinating policies like environment and currency are predicted by SES in the multivariate models, whereas others like foreign and defence are not. In addition, as in Chapter 6, I have reanalysed the Autumn 2000 survey and included the measures of perceptions of one’s personal economic situation and the country’s economic situation (analysis not shown). These variables do not change the effects of the utilitarian variables, nor do they have an impact on attitudes to policy-making in any of the policy areas studied here. One explanation for these findings may be that utilitarianism is indeed at play in explaining attitudes to co-ordination of specific policy areas. Turning to the group-level variables that are the focus of this book, the results indicate that – as with the bivariate analyses discussed above – the impact of perceived group threat varies considerably across the two surveys. When using the EU as the source of group threat, this variable has an impact on attitudes to unemployment, immigration, asylum, defence, foreign and currency policies, with the most threatened also being the more likely to wish to maintain national level control over these policies. If minorities are the sources of threat, threat to group resources has very little effect on attitudes to any of the policy-making areas analysed here. Thus, as discussed above, while threat to group resources from minorities clearly had an effect on general attitudes to European integration, it does not seem to have a similar impact on attitudes to policy-making at the EU level (e.g. in terms of making citizens feel more protective of national-level policy-making). The impact of symbolic threat (once again) also varies somewhat by the stimulus used to measure it, but far less consistently than grouplevel threat. For instance, symbolic threat from minorities has a much larger impact on attitudes to environmental, defence and foreign policy-making than the symbolic threat from the EU; the impact of the former is also somewhat larger in the realms of unemployment, immigration, asylum and currency policy-making. It appears, then, that symbolic threats posed by minorities tend to make EU citizens wish to turn to their national governments for specific policy decisions, whereas threats to resources by minorities makes some EU citizens prefer an EU-led solution and others prefer a national-level solution at roughly equal levels.

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

Summary and conclusions This chapter provided an overview of the nature of policy-making at the EU level along eight different policy dimensions: environmental policy, health and social welfare policy, immigration and asylum, foreign and defence policy, and economic and monetary union. As expected, some of the least co-ordinated policy areas, such as defence, asylum and immigration policies, tend to divide EU citizens over whether the EU or national governments ought to have competence in these areas. On the other hand, another of the least co-ordinated areas – health and social welfare – is not divisive at all; Europeans tend to be clear about keeping this within national government competence only. As contended by de Winter and Swyngedouw (1999), issues like social protection tend to be situated at the national level and it is thus not surprising that mass publics also place these firmly in the hands of national governments. At the same time, one policy that is already extremely co-ordinated – EMU – is still highly divisive by 2000. Foreign and unemployment policies also tend to divide Europeans into two opposing camps. The chapter then turned to explaining policy-making preferences with the concepts of utilitarianism, group-level resource-based and symbolic threats, as well as context-specific variables. The empirical analysis indicated that utilitarianism does seem to explain why citizens wish to keep policy areas like the environment, unemployment, asylum and currency policy at the national level. That is, those with better job skills – particularly executives and professionals – and those with higher incomes tend to prefer more EU-level co-ordination in policies that are likely to have a major impact on business competitiveness and exchange of goods across EU member state borders. The impact of group-level threat was more variable and tended to only appear when the specific stimulus of threat from the EU was used. Feelings of threat to group resources had an impact on attitudes to unemployment, immigration and asylum, defence, foreign and currency policies, with those most threatened by the EU’s drain on jobs, social welfare benefits, and farmers preferring to keep these policy areas within the realm of the national government. The effect of symbolic threat also varied to some degree by stimulus. Mostly, it was the symbolic threat posed by minorities that tended to make respondents prefer to keep most policies within the reserve of their national governments. Thus, the symbolic threat presented by minorities and immigrants makes respondents hostile to the general notion of integration (as indicated in Chapter 5) and to the co-ordination

Attitudes to Policy-making in the EU

147

of most policy areas as well. That is, it is a very robust predictor of hostility to integration. Overall, then – in terms of the theoretical approaches that are the focus of this book – it appears that perceptions of where policy-making should lie are driven partly by utilitarian calculations and partly by symbolic concerns. The fact that threat to group resources is far less robust and predictable at explaining policy-making preferences indicates that ordinary Europeans may have difficulty calculating the costs and benefits of specific policies to their national groupings, even though they appeared to have clear perceptions about group-level costs of European integration in general. At the same time, however, the specific threat posed by European integration (as opposed to minorities) to group resources does seem to make Europeans hostile to many of the policy areas analysed here. The effect of aggregate-level variables on policy-making preferences is also interesting to note. As predicted, countries that spend more on health and social welfare contained citizens who were far less likely to want to turn this area over to the EU. On the other hand, where unemployment was high, interest in EU co-ordination of unemployment policy was also higher. Higher percentages of non-EU citizens in the country also tended to make citizens turn inward and wish to rely on national government policy-making for immigration and asylum. In addition, citizens in countries spending more on their own defence also tended to prefer to keep foreign and defence policy-making with their national governments at higher levels. Finally, maintaining a large positive trade or budget balance with the rest of the EU tended to make respondents more likely to wish to have policy-making in most areas made at the EU level. The exceptions to this were health and social welfare, unemployment, and defence. Thus, even ‘getting the goods’ from the EU fails to push respondents toward EU-level policy-making in these areas once we take into account other factors like national government spending on health and social welfare, levels of unemployment, and a country’s level of defence spending.

0.284 0.353 0.139 0.110 0.117 −0.276 0.116 0.044 0.148 0.008 0.049 0.110 0.218 0.140 −0.003 −0.129

B

0.124 0.085 0.089 0.077 0.090 0.155 0.080 0.078 0.064 0.004 0.062 0.064 0.068 0.057 0.011 0.011

S.E.

EB53

***

*** **

*

* ***

Sig. 1.328 1.423 1.149 1.116 1.124 0.759 1.123 1.045 1.160 1.008 1.050 1.116 1.243 1.150 0.997 0.879

Exp(B) 0.050 0.278 0.083 0.175 0.142 −0.081 0.152 0.189 0.174 0.018 0.004 0.099 0.101 0.072 −0.041 −0.082

B

Environment

0.115 0.081 0.086 0.071 0.084 0.146 0.077 0.072 0.060 0.004 0.059 0.061 0.064 0.055 0.009 0.011

S.E.

EB54

*** ***

* ** ** ***

**

***

Sig.

Logistic regression of EU-level policy-making preferences

Professional Executive Unemployed Retired Small business owner Farmer Student Housewife Other Education Income2 Income3 Income4 Incomedk Group conflict Symbolic threat

Appendix:

1.051 1.320 1.087 1.191 1.153 0.922 1.164 1.208 1.191 1.018 1.004 1.104 1.106 1.074 0.960 0.921

Exp(B) 0.152 0.293 0.210 0.232 0.495 0.065 0.139 0.066 0.137 −0.021 0.068 0.113 0.217 0.235 −0.042 −0.027

B 0.127 0.087 0.094 0.083 0.092 0.166 0.084 0.084 0.069 0.005 0.068 0.070 0.072 0.062 0.011 0.012

S.E.

EB53

** *** *** *

* ***

*** * ** ***

Sig. 1.164 1.341 1.233 1.260 1.641 1.067 1.150 1.068 1.147 0.979 1.070 1.119 1.242 1.265 0.959 0.974

Exp(B)

S.E. 0.120 0.086 0.093 0.079 0.088 0.155 0.082 0.078 0.065 0.004 0.065 0.067 0.069 0.060 0.010 0.012

0.240 0.125 0.198 0.311 0.433 0.217 0.067 0.355 0.200 −0.024 −0.012 0.022 0.109 0.160 −0.109 −0.004

EB54 B

Health and social welfare

** ***

*** ** ***

* *** ***

*

Sig.

1.272 1.133 1.220 1.365 1.541 1.243 1.070 1.427 1.221 0.976 0.988 1.022 1.115 1.173 0.897 0.996

Exp(B)

148

0.010

−0.011

−0.017 0.002 *** 0.00007 0.00001 *** 0.00002 0.00000 *** 1.162 0.139 ***

0.002 ** 0.039 *** 0.030 ***

−0.004 −0.138 0.243

Log likelihood (−2) 17599.92 Cox & Snell R2 0.68 Nagelkerke R Square 0.91 % Correctly predicted 61.8

Age Female Cognitive mobilisation Left–right self-placement Policy variable Budget balance, 1999 Trade balance, 1999 Constant

0.983 1.00007 1.00002 3.195

0.989

0.996 0.871 1.276

19449.36 0.045 0.061 61.3

−0.015 0.00005 0.00001 0.943

−0.016

−0.004 −0.077 0.252

0.002 0.00001 0.00000 0.134

0.010 *** *** *** ***

0.001 ** 0.037 * 0.028 *** −0.013

−0.005 −0.132 0.146 0.011

0.002 ** 0.041 *** 0.032 ***

16342.31 0.029 0.042 69

0.986 −0.068 0.005 *** 1.00005 −0.00002 0.00001 ** 1.00001 0.00001 0.00000 *** 2.567 1.423 0.185 ***

0.985

0.996 0.925 1.286

0.935 0.99998 1.00001 4.150

0.987

0.995 0.876 1.157

0.010 *

0.002 *** 0.040 *** 0.030 ***

17650.06 0.032 0.046 69.8

−0.047 0.005 *** 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 ** 1.330 0.179 ***

−0.022

−0.008 −0.152 0.207

0.954 1.00000 1.00000 3.779

0.979

0.992 0.859 1.230

149

0.083 0.307 0.072 0.151 0.224 0.008 0.075 0.061 0.189 −0.001 0.080 0.135 0.144 0.131 −0.023 −0.091

B

0.117 0.081 0.086 0.075 0.088 0.152 0.077 0.076 0.062 0.004 0.060 0.062 0.065 0.056 0.010 0.011

S.E.

EB53

* * * * ***

**

* **

***

Sig. 1.087 1.360 1.075 1.163 1.251 1.008 1.078 1.063 1.208 0.999 1.084 1.144 1.154 1.140 0.977 0.913

Exp(B) 0.289 0.232 0.112 0.183 0.319 0.375 0.172 0.245 0.162 0.006 0.039 0.202 0.100 0.103 −0.063 −0.061

B

Unemployment

** **

0.111 0.077 0.084 0.070 0.082 0.143 0.074 0.071 0.059 0.004 0.058 0.060 0.062 0.054 0.009 0.011 *** ***

***

** *** ** * *** **

Sig.

S.E.

EB53

Logistic regression of EU-level policy-making preferences

Professional Executive Unemployed Retired Small business owner Farmer Student Housewife Other Education Income2 Income3 Income4 Incomedk Group conflict Symbolic threat

Appendix:

1.335 1.261 1.119 1.201 1.375 1.454 1.188 1.278 1.176 1.006 1.039 1.224 1.105 1.108 0.939 0.941

Exp(B) 0.229 0.266 0.189 0.233 0.331 −0.100 0.153 0.182 0.128 −0.004 0.003 0.088 0.188 0.198 −0.052 −0.082

B 0.119 0.083 0.089 0.079 0.090 0.163 0.079 0.079 0.065 0.004 0.063 0.065 0.067 0.057 0.010 0.011

S.E.

EB53

** *** *** ***

* * *

* *** * ** ***

Sig. 1.257 1.305 1.208 1.262 1.392 0.905 1.166 1.199 1.137 0.996 1.003 1.092 1.207 1.219 0.950 0.921

Exp(B)

0.147 0.209 0.116 0.123 0.265 0.023 0.163 0.244 0.092 −0.001 −0.017 0.011 0.045 0.107 −0.104 −0.078

B

Immigration

1.158 1.233 1.123 1.131 1.304 1.024 1.177 1.277 1.096 0.999 0.983 1.011 1.046 1.113 0.902 0.925

Sig. Exp(B) 0.113 0.079 ** 0.087 0.073 0.084 ** 0.152 0.076 * 0.073 *** 0.061 0.004 0.060 0.062 0.064 0.055 * 0.009 *** 0.011 ***

S.E.

EB54

150

Log likelihood (−2) Cox & Snell R2 Nagelkerke R Square % Correctly predicted

Age Female Cognitive mobilisation Left–right self-placement Policy variable Budget balance, 1999 Trade balance, 1999 Constant

0.010

−0.006

18537.02 0.025 0.034 56.7

−0.014 0.005 ** 0.00001 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 *** 0.541 0.170 ***

0.002 0.038 *** 0.029 ***

−0.002 −0.176 0.239

0.986 1.00001 1.00000 1.718

0.994

0.998 0.839 1.269 0.009 ***

0.001 * 0.036 ** 0.028 ***

20325.88 0.022 0.029 55.3

−0.009 0.005 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.485 0.164 **

−0.042

−0.003 −0.106 0.165

0.991 1.00000 1.00000 1.624

0.959

0.997 0.900 1.180 0.010 ***

0.002 *** 0.039 0.030 **

17636.83 0.054 0.073 61.3

−0.045 0.011 *** 0.00006 0.00001 *** 0.00002 0.00000 *** 0.384 0.131 ***

−0.039

−0.006 −0.052 0.084

0.956 1.00006 1.00002 1.468

0.962

0.994 0.949 1.088 0.010 ***

0.002 * 0.037 ** 0.028 ***

0.932

0.997 0.910 1.137

19366.07 0.046 0.062 60.7

−0.058 0.011 *** 0.943 0.00004 0.00001 *** 1.00004 0.00001 0.00000 *** 1.00001 0.731 0.126 *** 2.076

−0.071

−0.003 −0.094 0.128

151

0.271 0.310 0.218 0.192 0.307 0.042 0.188 0.161 0.142 0.000 0.009 0.051 0.169 0.158 −0.054 −0.098

B

0.119 0.083 0.089 0.079 0.090 0.159 0.079 0.080 0.065 0.004 0.063 0.065 0.067 0.058 0.011 0.011

S.E.

EB53

** ** *** ***

* * *

* *** ** ** ***

Sig.

1.311 1.363 1.244 1.211 1.359 1.043 1.206 1.175 1.152 1.000 1.009 1.053 1.184 1.172 0.947 0.907

Exp(B)

B 0.099 0.259 0.125 0.147 0.420 0.138 0.213 0.240 0.174 0.007 −0.047 −0.046 0.042 0.055 −0.111 −0.086

Asylum

0.113 0.079 0.087 0.072 0.084 0.148 0.077 0.073 0.060 0.004 0.060 0.062 0.064 0.055 0.009 0.011

S.E.

EB54

*** ***

** *** **

* ***

***

Sig.

Logistic regression of EU-level policy-making preferences

Professional Executive Unemployed Retired Small business owner Farmer Student Housewife Other Education Income2 Income3 Income4 Incomedk Group conflict Symbolic threat

Appendix:

1.104 1.295 1.133 1.158 1.522 1.148 1.237 1.271 1.190 1.007 0.954 0.955 1.043 1.057 0.895 0.918

Exp(B) 0.134 0.410 0.111 0.206 0.297 0.083 0.104 0.145 0.189 −0.019 −0.040 0.165 0.190 0.241 −0.026 −0.104

B 0.121 0.084 0.090 0.079 0.092 0.162 0.081 0.081 0.065 0.004 0.064 0.066 0.068 0.058 0.011 0.011

S.E.

EB53

** ** *** ** ***

** ***

** ***

***

Sig. 1.144 1.507 1.117 1.229 1.346 1.087 1.110 1.157 1.208 0.982 0.961 1.180 1.209 1.272 0.974 0.901

Exp(B)

B 0.202 0.308 0.089 0.224 0.234 0.222 0.142 0.240 0.135 −0.011 −0.033 0.103 0.105 0.133 −0.071 −0.126

Defence

0.114 0.079 0.087 0.073 0.086 0.151 0.077 0.075 0.061 0.004 0.061 0.062 0.065 0.056 0.009 0.012

S.E.

EB54

* *** ***

*** * **

** ***

***

Sig.

1.224 1.361 1.093 1.251 1.264 1.248 1.153 1.271 1.144 0.989 0.968 1.109 1.111 1.142 0.931 0.881

Exp(B)

152

Age −0.004 0.002 * 0.996 −0.003 0.001 * 0.997 −0.005 0.002 ** 0.995 −0.006 0.002 *** 0.994 Female −0.057 0.039 0.945 −0.072 0.037 * 0.930 −0.166 0.039 *** 0.847 −0.194 0.037 *** 0.824 Cognitive 0.092 0.030 ** 1.096 0.138 0.028 *** 1.148 0.143 0.031 *** 1.154 0.182 0.029 *** 1.199 mobilisation Left–right −0.024 0.010 * 0.976 −0.061 0.010 *** 0.941 −0.035 0.010 *** 0.966 −0.039 0.010 *** 0.962 self-placement Policy variable −0.059 0.011 *** 0.943 −0.068 0.011 *** 0.935 −0.030 0.006 *** 0.971 0.000 0.006 1.000 Budget balance, 1999 0.00006 0.00001 *** 1.00006 0.00003 0.00001 *** 1.00003 0.00001 0.00001 ** 1.00001 −0.0000 0.00001 0.99999 Trade balance, 1999 0.00003 0.00000 *** 1.00003 0.00001 0.00000 *** 1.00001 0.00003 0.00000 *** 1.00003 0.00001 0.00000 *** 1.00001 Constant 0.294 0.130 * 1.341 0.700 0.126 *** 2.014 0.559 0.134 *** 1.749 0.495 0.128 *** 1.640 Log likelihood (−2) 17589.05 19393.65 17256.23 19114.2 Cox & Snell R2 0.062 0.052 0.083 0.059 0.069 0.111 0.079 Nagelkerke R Square 0.083 59.6 62.9 61.9 % Correctly predicted 60.2

153

0.089 0.221 −0.044 0.226 0.384 0.275 0.040 0.091 0.178 −0.021 0.149 0.306 0.344 0.342 −0.027 −0.097

B

0.129 0.091 0.095 0.083 0.101 0.169 0.088 0.085 0.070 0.004 0.066 0.070 0.073 0.061 0.012 0.012

S.E.

EB53

** *** * *** *** *** * ***

** ***

*

Sig.

1.093 1.248 0.957 1.254 1.468 1.316 1.041 1.095 1.195 0.980 1.161 1.358 1.411 1.407 0.973 0.908

Exp(B) −0.019 −0.011 0.090 0.053 0.173 0.434 0.102 0.306 0.106 −0.013 0.051 0.179 0.199 0.130 −0.086 −0.074

B

Foreign policy

0.124 0.087 0.096 0.078 0.094 0.169 0.087 0.082 0.067 0.004 0.065 0.068 0.071 0.060 0.011 0.013

S.E.

EB54

** ** * *** ***

**

***

**

Sig. 0.982 0.989 1.094 1.055 1.188 1.544 1.107 1.358 1.112 0.987 1.052 1.196 1.220 1.139 0.917 0.929

Exp(B)

Logistic regression of EU-level policy-making preferences

Professional Executive Unemployed Retired Small business owner Farmer Student Housewife Other Education Income2 Income3 Income4 Incomedk Group conflict Symbolic threat

Appendix:

0.490 0.642 0.265 0.491 0.477 0.447 0.283 0.457 0.295 0.002 0.094 0.302 0.320 0.394 −0.048 −0.117

B 0.142 0.095 0.099 0.087 0.111 0.222 0.092 0.093 0.072 0.005 0.068 0.073 0.076 0.065 0.012 0.012

S.E.

EB53

*** *** *** *** ***

*** *** ** *** *** * ** *** ***

Sig. 1.633 1.900 1.303 1.634 1.611 1.563 1.327 1.579 1.343 1.002 1.099 1.352 1.377 1.483 0.953 0.890

Exp(B)

0.394 0.356 0.048 0.226 0.368 0.116 0.401 0.390 0.167 −0.003 −0.019 0.212 0.219 0.275 −0.119 −0.149

B

Currency

0.120 0.082 0.088 0.073 0.087 0.148 0.080 0.075 0.061 0.004 0.061 0.063 0.066 0.056 0.010 0.012

S.E.

EB54

*** *** *** *** ***

*** *** **

** ***

*** ***

Sig.

1.483 1.427 1.049 1.254 1.445 1.123 1.494 1.477 1.181 0.997 0.981 1.236 1.244 1.317 0.887 0.861

Exp(B)

154

Log likelihood (−2) Cox & Snell R2 Nagelkerke R Square % Correctly predicted

Age Female Cognitive mobilisation Left–right self-placement Policy variable Budget balance, 1999 Trade balance, 1999 Constant

0.011

0.002 *** 0.042 0.033

1.006

0.991 0.947 1.001

15416.31 0.046 0.066 70.4

−0.032 0.006 *** 0.968 0.00003 0.00001 *** 1.00003 0.00002 0.00000 *** 1.00002 1.714 0.140 *** 5.549

0.006

−0.009 −0.054 0.001 0.011

−0.010 0.990

0.990 0.954 1.010

16489.59 0.042 0.06 71.2

−0.030 0.006 *** 0.970 0.00002 0.00001 *** 1.00002 0.00002 0.00000 *** 1.00002 2.046 0.139 *** 7.740

0.002 *** 0.041 0.031

−0.010 −0.047 0.010 0.012

0.002 *** 0.044 *** 0.035 ***

13496.14 0.094 0.127 65

0.059 0.013 *** 0.00007 0.00001 *** 0.00003 0.00000 *** 0.172 0.165

0.015

−0.008 −0.310 0.241

1.060 1.00007 1.00003 1.188

1.015

0.992 0.734 1.273 0.010

0.002 *** 0.038 *** 0.029 ***

18602.38 0.098 0.131

−0.011 0.036 0.00010 0.00001 *** 0.00002 0.00000 *** 1.078 0.140 ***

−0.009

−0.008 −0.211 0.230

0.989 1.00010 1.00002 2.938

0.991

0.992 0.810 1.259

155

8 New Member States, Utilitarianism, Perceived Threat and Opposition to European Integration

On 1 May 2004, the EU completed a process that formally began in 1997 with the opening up of accession talks to eight Central and East European countries and informally began in the early 1990s with the collapse of communism in the Soviet-dominated East. Thus, this was to be a historic occasion that would fulfil the Western aspirations of many formerly communist countries. While initial levels of support for joining the EU were high in most of these countries, it is argued that enthusiasm has since waned, with Central and East European (CEE) citizens becoming more sceptical over time. In many ways, this is only to be expected. The prospect of EU membership was posed in the context of euphoria over the collapse of authoritarian rule and establishment of new, more open regimes. Hopes for the future were likely to be unreasonably high, and so some levelling off after experiencing the reality of regime change and economic reform is not surprising. Also relevant, however, is the EU’s lukewarm embrace of these candidates. The response to the events in CEE in the late 1980s (other than the reunification of eastern and western Germany) was quite slow and measured, and restrictions placed on the CEE countries as new EU members have been fairly severe. For instance, new member states will not be eligible for full agricultural subsidies from the EU for the first nine years of EU membership, and many of the established EU member states also placed a seven-year waiting period on the free movement (of persons) provisions of EU law. Thus, not only has the reality of economic reform served to temper enthusiasm for Western models of democratic capitalism generally, but also the reality of EU membership and the lack of an open-armed welcome from the EU have made citizens of the new member states more sceptical than they were previously. 156

New Member States and Opposition to Integration 157

Still, despite rather low turnout for many of the candidate countries’ referenda on joining the EU, citizens who did vote in these countries voted overwhelming to join.1 In most of these countries, there was a very weak ‘no’ campaign that in part tried to draw upon fears of the loss of sovereignty, but it seemed that the biggest concerns of citizens related to worries about price increases, lower living standards, and worsening employment opportunities (see, for instance, Hanley 2004). The purpose of this chapter is to try to further contemplate the sources of opposition to or support for EU membership (and the process of European integration as a whole) in these new member states. To what degree is opposition (or lukewarm support) a result of economic concerns about job loss and competition from a potentially better trained Western labour force, and to what degree are citizens of new member states worried about the loss of identity, culture and sovereignty in the integration process?

Image of EU and support for EU membership I begin the analysis with a cross-time exploration of general attitudes to the European Union amongst the new member states prior to the granting of their official candidacies and in the early days of their candidacies. Figure 8.1 provides estimates of the perceived image of the EU amongst the CEE countries up to the point that accession negotiations were opened to these countries in 1997. The figure illustrates empirically the declining image of the EU in CEE. However, it is important to note that even in the early 1990s, only a bare majority in the CEE countries claimed to have a clearly positive image of the EC. That level of positive feeling then declined in most countries and by the mid-1990s, only about 30 per cent or so said they had a positive image of the EU; in Lithuania, it was an underwhelming 20 per cent who claimed to have positive feelings about the EU. On the other hand, while the EU’s image was declining amongst most of the candidate countries, in Romania and Poland that image was becoming more positive over time. It is also important to note that in places where positive feelings for the EU were in decline in the mid-1990s, the EU’s image actually improved by 1997, the year in which accession talks were finally opened to most CEE countries. Also important is that it is not the case that the EU’s image became more negative over time. In fact, citizens of CEE countries seemed to mostly become more neutral toward the EU than previously (see Figure 8.2).2

158

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

Mean positive image of EC/EU

70 65 60 55 Bulgaria Czech Rep Estonia Hungary Latvia

50 45 40 35 30 25 20 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Year

Mean positive image of EC/EU

70 65 60 55 Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia

50 45 40 35 30 25 20 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Year

Figure 8.1: Positive image of EU

As mentioned above, in December 1997, the EU made the decision to open up accession negotiations with all of the CEE candidates, along with Cyprus and Malta. Thus, in the post-1997 period, the Eurobarometer survey questions changed focus and asked respondents living in the candidate countries whether they thought their countries’ memberships of the EU will be a good thing or not. As shown in Figure 8.3,

New Member States and Opposition to Integration 159

Mean neutral image of EC/EU

60 55 50 45 Bulgaria Czech Rep Estonia Hungary Latvia

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Year

Mean neutral image of EC/EU

60 55 50 45 Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Year

Figure 8.2: Neutral image of EU

there is a fairly stable level of feeling that membership would indeed be good. Positive feelings drop somewhat at the start of 2004, around the time most of the countries joined the EU (with the exceptions of Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey).3 Also, the perception of membership of the EU being a good thing was fairly lukewarm across the 1999–2004 period in several of the countries, particularly in Latvia and Estonia; Czech perceptions of EU membership became rather lukewarm by 2002 as well.

160

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20

Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania

1999.2 2001.2 2002.1 2002.2 2003.1 2003.2 2004.1 Year 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20

Malta Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Turkey

1999.2 2001.2 2002.1 2002.2 2003.1 2003.2 2004.1 Year Figure 8.3: Membership of EU a good thing

New Member States and Opposition to Integration 161

Explaining Euro-enthusiasm and Euro-scepticism We now turn to an investigation of the reasoning behind variation in individual perceptions of the EU amongst the candidate countries prior to their entry into the EU.4 As with previous chapters, we will focus here on utilitarianism and perceptions of group-level threat. Utilitarianism (perceptions) As with the EU-15 member state surveys, the Candidate Country Eurobarometers included questions regarding the perceived personal benefits that respondents believed they would receive as a result of their countries joining the European Union. This was asked in two different formats, but these yield fairly similar overall results, and so we will examine the version of the question that was similar to that presented in Chapter 3: ‘Do you think that (COUNTRY) becoming a member of the European Union would bring you personally many more advantages, more advantages, as many advantages as disadvantages, more disadvantages, or much more disadvantages?’ Table 8.1 presents the positive responses to this question from Spring 2001 through Autumn 2003. These results indicate that in contrast to the EU-15 member states, far more of the citizens in the candidate countries perceived that they would gain personal benefits from their country’s membership of the EU. The only candidate countries that came close to the EU-15 average on this Table 8.1: Personal benefits from EU membership (receive more advantages)

Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Turkey Candidate Av.

Spring 2001

Spring 2002

Spring 2003

Autumn 2003

57.6 48.0 36.4 35.8 48.5 38.6 52.9 37.2 45.9 66.1 48.7 33.1 60.5 47.0

53.2 36.4 39.5 37.6 49.9 38.8 50.9 45.8 46.3 67.3 43.2 32.7 69.5 47.3

57.0 59.5 37.2 36.3 43.9 38.3 63.2 52.4 47.9 56.0 39.7 43.6 71.1 49.0

57.2 44.1 35.1 36.5 40.8 44.2 59.7 49.7 42.7 62.3 36.5 40.7 65.8 47.1

Source: Candidate Country Eurobarometers.

162

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

item are Slovenia, Czech Republic, Estonia and Malta in Spring of 2001, when only approximately 33–37 per cent thought that they would personally benefit from their country’s EU membership. Latvians are also amongst the more sceptical in early 2001, but by Autumn 2003, they became more optimistic; the Maltese became far more optimistic over this two-year period as well. On the other hand, Cypriots, Hungarians and Slovakians moved closer to the EU-15 average (that is, became less optimistic about their own personal benefits) by Autumn 2003. The most hopeful about receiving personal benefits are Bulgarians, Lithuanians, Romanians and Turks. So, is it the case that in the countries with the more pessimistic respondents, citizens are worried that they will incur costs or disadvantages as a result of their country’s EU membership? Table 8.2 indicates that – as in the EU-15 member states (see Chapter 3) – when enthusiasm is low, it does not mean that there are fears of personal disadvantages from membership of the EU.5 Instead, people perceive that they will gain some advantages and incur some disadvantages. The largest level of fear or worry amongst a national community is in the Czech Republic, where 34 per cent believe that they will do poorly as a result of integration into the European Union. Citizens in the candidate countries were also asked about their perceptions of who is likely to benefit when their country joins the EU. Table 8.2: Perceived advantages or disadvantages, CCEB Autumn 2003 More disadvantages

Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Turkey Candidate Av.

8.5 17.6 29.4 34.2 21.3 28.1 18.8 24.6 25.2 6.1 26.8 9.8 15.1 20.6

As many advantages as disadvantages

More advantages

34.3 38.2 35.5 29.4 37.8 27.7 21.5 25.7 32.1 31.5 36.6 49.6 19.2 32.3

57.2 44.1 35.1 36.5 40.8 44.2 59.7 49.7 42.7 62.3 36.5 40.7 65.8 47.1

Source: Candidate Country Eurobarometer 2003.4 (Autumn 2003).

New Member States and Opposition to Integration 163

The results were quite similar to those of the EU-15. On the one hand, those who speak foreign languages, large businesses, politicians, professionals and young people were predicted to be the largest beneficiaries. On the other, farmers and inhabitants of rural areas were thought to be in most danger of being disadvantaged, and in many countries, there was also a perception that the unemployed, pensioners, the elderly, and small and medium sized businesses would be harmed by EU membership. Status and personal utilitarianism We next turn to the question of whether status translates into personal utilitarianism in similar ways in the candidate countries (that is, new member states) as is argued by the utilitarian approaches to be the case with the EU-15. That is, do individuals who hold better personal human resources favour their country’s EU membership and European integration at higher levels? And do they actually perceive that they will receive more advantages after their country has become an EU member state? Although earlier studies indicate that the standard utilitarian model may not transfer well to the new member states (Cichowski 2000; Ehin 2001; Tucker et al. 2002; Tverdova and Anderson 2004), it is entirely possible that citizens in candidate countries were becoming more like their EU-15 counterparts as economic reforms progressed and membership of the EU drew nearer. As Tables 8.3 and 8.4 indicate, there is indeed some difference across socio-economic groups in levels of support for their country’s membership of the EU. Note that as in Chapter 3, those at lower levels of socio-economic status have been chosen as the comparison category. While professionals are significantly more favourable to joining the EU than are manual workers in a handful of candidates, executives in a wider range of the candidate countries were more positive about EU membership. Also of note is that retired individuals and farmers were comparatively more negative about EU membership than manual workers in several of the candidate countries, while students tended to be more positive in a few countries. In addition, those with higher levels of education tend to be more supportive of EU membership in almost every candidate country. The effects of income, on the other hand, are more complex (Table 8.5). In 2001, income had a significant and strong impact in all candidates except Latvia, Slovenia and Turkey. By Autumn 2003, however, the effect had been reduced considerably in many of the candidate countries, and income was still significantly related to attitudes to the EU only in Bulgaria, Hungary, Malta, Romania and Slovakia. Thus, while lower income groups may have worried about the effect of EU membership on

Spring 2001 Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Turkey Cand Av.

Country

Table 8.3:

−.05 .60 0.55** −.02 .06 .21 .33* 1.20* .13 .03 .39* .51* −.08 .16**

Professional

.30* .94*** .66*** .16 .49** .20 .23 1.22*** .09 −.10 .33** .19 −.29 .22***

Executive

−.18 −.22 −.13 −.06 .10 −.02 −.19 −.02 −.30* .07 .14 .16 −.06 .03

Unemployed

−.31*** .32 −.10 −.31** −.36*** −.28* −.18 .16 −.40** −.21** −.17 .20 .08 −.14***

Retired

.22 −.01 .60*** −.03 .19 −.40 .02 .50 −.09 .05 .51*** .34 −.13 .17**

Small business −1.03** −.15 −1.27** −.50 .11 −.02 −.18 .98 −.70*** −.11 – .11 −.45** −.28***

Farmer

.17 .55** .70 .42*** .26 .20 .32* .71* .25 −.05 .49*** .26 −.18 .18***

Student

Occupation and support for European integration, CCEB2001.1 and CCEB2003.4

.36 .10 .06 −.03 −.02 −.17 −.03 .04 −.23 −.17 .21 −.24 −.31* −.20***

Housewife

.05 .33 .15 .10 .09 .01 .13 .82*** −.01 .06 .29** .05 −.15 .03

Other

.05 .03 .08 .04 .05 .02 .03 .05 .04 .01 .05 .004 .01 .01

Adj. R2

991 498 976 985 1018 977 999 529 998 995 997 992 999 11,966

N

164

.26 .52 .69*** .10 .31 .11 .31* .79 .32 .06 .66*** .66** −.34 .26***

.31* 1.10*** .85*** .29 .07 .06 .30* .90*** .10 −.07 .39* .53*** .37 .32***

−.16 .55 −.08 −.09 .03 −.36* −.23 .01 .03 .18 .07 −.15 .39* −.001

−.35*** .38* −.16 −.17 −.25* −.18 −.43*** .48* −.36** −.03 −.11 −.02 −.15 .13*** .16 .50* .55*** .01 −.14 .001 .21 .79* .02 .23 .48** .62** −.25 .12*

−.74* −1.68** −.25 −.40 −1.14** −.20 −.16 – −.72*** .15 .17 −1.03** .24 −.11 .18 .48* .74*** .42*** .22 .20 .52*** .64* .38** .15 .39** .41*** .06 .28***

−.40 .33 .69* .10 −.25 .07 −.11 .41 −.23 −.09 .02 −.26 −.12 −.001 .11 .28 .32* .05 .22 .01 .11 .67* .20 .16 .24 .19 .10 .10*

.05 .05 .08 .02 .03 .01 .09 .01 .05 .01 .03 .06 .01 .02

995 496 975 1006 1016 992 994 499 989 1035 1061 990 994 12,054

Note: Figures in cells are unstandardised regression coefficients (OLS); manual workers are the omitted category. * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. (EB 54 results in italics)

Autumn 2003 Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Turkey Cand Av.

165

166

Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

Table 8.4: Education and support for European integration, CCEB2001.1 and CCEB2003.4 Spring 2001 Country Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Turkey Cand Av.

Autumn 2003

b

Adj. R2

N

b

Adj. R2

N

.01*** .01*** .01*** .01*** .01*** .005** .006*** .01* .01*** .003* .01*** .002 −.001 .005***

.02 .02 .02 .03 .01 .01 .01 .01 .02 .004 .02 .001 −.001 .01

980 498 968 985 1013 938 967 511 979 964 988 915 917 11,635

.01*** .004 .01*** .01*** .01*** .004* .01*** .004 .01*** .01** .01** .01*** .003 .01***

.02 .004 .02 .03 .01 .01 .06 .001 .03 .01 .01 .01 .001 .01

970 494 974 1006 1013 992 969 491 955 995 1061 977 917 11,826

Note: Figures in cells are unstandardised regression coefficients (OLS); * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

their incomes in early 2001, by the end of 2003, they seemed as positive (or negative) about EU membership as the higher income groups. Even more to the point, do any of these groups perceive that they will personally benefit from their country’s membership of the EU? Once again, analyses were conducted for both 2001 and 2003, but the results from these are almost identical, with one potentially important exception. In 2001, fewer unskilled manual workers were – on average – under the perception that they would receive more advantages from the country’s EU membership than other economic groups, whereas by 2003, the average of the former is quite similar to the average across other occupational groups (Table 8.6). That is, unskilled manual labourers appear to have become more hopeful about their prospects on the European market. The only other group to believe that it would not get many advantages from EU membership was retired people, and this is consistent across both surveys. This is also fairly consistent with a utilitarian argument, in that retired individuals are not likely to feel that they will gain much from a Europe-wide market, as they usually do not bring high levels of job skills or large incomes to such a market. In contrast, the groups that had been predicted to gain more benefits from European integration amongst the older member states also tend

Income2

.23 .07 −.08 −.14 .08 .41 .06 .49** .10 .33* .30* −.24 .30*** .16***

Spring 2001 Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Turkey Cand Av.

.24* −.11 .39* −.01 .46** .23 .30* .86*** .36** .66*** .33** −.36 .25 .22***

Income3

.40*** .39 .13 .02 .38* .33 .24 .67** .18 .64*** .38** −.17 .31 .24***

Income4

.35** .31 .23 .17 .39* .32 .20 .88*** .07 .68*** .42** −.18 −.33 .26***

Income5

.54*** .16 .20 .27 .72*** .66 .33* .77** .68*** .71*** .38* −.20 .61* .37***

Income6

.52*** .66* .47** .34* .68*** .49 .54*** 1.25*** .41* .91*** .62** −.11 .08 .42***

Income7

.74*** .51 .61** .59*** .89*** .50 .69*** .97** .46** .53* .26 −.05 .11 .49***

Income8

.79*** .80** .55* .47* .95*** .70 .69* – .51** .74 .26 −.27 .57 .45***

Income9

Income and support for European integration, CCEB2001.1 and CCEB2003.4

Country

Table 8.5:

.52*** .40 .69*** .54 .99*** .51 .52 – .40* 1.07** .83** −.12 .40 .46***

Income10

Adj.R2

.45*** .05 .12 .03 .35* .03 .26 .02 .58*** .06 .45 .004 .25* .02 .73*** .04 .26* .01 .64*** .06 .23* .01 −.37 −.001 .12 .01 .15*** .01

Income DK/Ref

991 498 976 985 1011 977 999 529 998 995 997 992 999 11,966

N

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.53*** .15 −.18 −.05 .55** .36 .32 .38 .005 .39*** .18 −.07 −.30 .12*

.40** .16 −.07 .11 .56** .16 .31 −.14 .32 .48*** .39 −.09 −.14 .17**

.56*** .10 .24 −.10 .75*** .13 .27 .74** −.09 .31** .56** .35 .20 .27***

.50*** .23 .25 .29 .92*** −.02 .38 .89** .51* .43*** .58** .27 −.11 .36***

.66*** −.15 .27 .22 .85*** −.02 .16 .90** .24 .42*** .74*** .06 −.19 .32***

.84*** .55 .57* .42* .88*** −.30 .56 .80** .39 .50*** .83*** .45 .05 .50***

.31* −.18 −.10 .10 .58*** .05 .07 .16 .10 .20* .39* −.09 −.05 .05

Income DK/Ref

.05 .01 .05 .02 .03 .004 .02 .04 .02 .03 .03 .02 .02 .02

Adj.R2

995 496 975 1006 1016 992 994 499 989 1035 1061 990 994 12,054

N

Note: Figures in cells are unstandardised regression coefficients (OLS); manual workers are the omitted category. * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. (EB 54 results in italics)

.30* −.16 −.47 −.02 .34 −.06 .10 .41 −.07 .37*** .30 −.22 −.16 .03

.24 −.18 −.48 −.25 .59*** −.18 −.21 .07 −.03 .21* .19 −.35 .45 −.02

Autumn 2001 Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Turkey Cand Av.

.13 −.10 −.64* −.32 .59** .08 −.17 .43 −.07 .26** .19 .06 .09 −.01

Income2 Income3 Income4 Income5 Income6 Income7 Income8 Income9 Income10

(Continued )

Country

Table 8.5:

168

New Member States and Opposition to Integration 169 Table 8.6: Perceived personal advantages by occupation, 2001.1 and 2003.4 Spring 2001 Disadv. Same Adv. Responsible for ordinary shopping Student Unemployed Retired Farmer Fisherman Professional Owner of a shop Business proprietors Employed professional General management Middle management Employed at desk Employed but travelling Service job Supervisor Skilled manual worker Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant Candidate average

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Disadv. Same Adv.

N

27.0

32.2

40.7

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30.4 49.2

8.4 20.1 24.6 29.2 50.0 9.4 20.8 10.8 12.9 11.1 11.9 15.9 14.3 18.0 21.5 19.6 23.9

27.6 30.4 41.2 28.1 25.0 28.1 24.6 28.5 33.3 24.8 31.8 36.1 32.4 34.1 29.2 34.9 38.1

64.0 1012 49.5 937 34.2 2324 42.7 178 25.0 4 62.5 128 54.6 370 60.8 186 53.7 348 64.1 117 56.2 603 48.0 573 53.3 259 47.9 522 49.2 65 45.5 868 38.1 331

8.5 23.9 29.3 23.1 50.0 13.8 22.9 11.0 14.0 10.1 10.6 16.4 17.1 18.4 26.0 22.6 23.6

23.5 30.7 38.8 25.6 25.0 19.1 28.2 29.5 32.2 26.1 30.5 34.3 33.9 32.7 28.8 33.6 32.6

19.1

33.9

47.0 9635

20.6

32.4 47.0 10388

67.9 45.5 31.9 51.3 25.0 67.0 48.9 59.5 53.8 63.8 58.9 49.3 49.0 48.9 45.2 43.8 43.8

799 1253 913 2719 195 4 94 362 173 342 69 604 651 292 532 73 991 322

to be the ones in the candidate countries that believe they will indeed benefit. That is, professionals, business proprietors and managers are quite positive about getting personal benefits out of EU membership. Also very similar to the findings from the EU-15 is that the groups that do not perceive that they will benefit also do not believe they will lose out from EU membership. That is, they do not claim that they will receive more disadvantages than advantages. Thus, once again, we see a situation in which some individuals perceive themselves as winners of European integration, and others are not necessarily losers, but are indifferent. Also as with the citizens of the EU-15, individuals with higher levels of income in the candidate countries tend to believe that they will get more advantages out of EU membership (see Table 8.7). Roughly 40 per cent of those at lower income deciles claim that they will be advantaged by EU membership, while approximately 60 per cent of those with the highest income feel that they will receive personal advantages as a result of EU membership. Once again, however, it is not the case

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Table 8.7: Perceived personal advantages by income, 2001.1 and 2003.4 Spring 2001 Disadv. Same Adv. 1st (lowest) income decile 2nd income decile 3rd income decile 4th income decile 5th income decile 6th income decile 7th income decile 8th income decile 9th income decile 10th (highest) income decile DK/no opinion Refusal/NA Candidate Average

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N

25.3

30.5

44.2

1004

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544

23.8 22.2 20.9 19.0 15.9 13.2 11.2 13.7 9.1

33.5 34.8 37.1 35.1 36.5 34.6 31.6 30.8 29.9

42.7 43.0 42.0 45.9 47.6 52.2 57.2 55.5 61.0

1062 1090 991 931 882 684 509 409 328

29.8 27.4 23.1 21.2 17.4 17.5 14.2 13.5 10.6

32.0 35.7 36.8 32.7 34.1 32.0 30.8 30.3 27.1

38.2 37.0 40.2 46.1 48.5 50.5 54.9 56.2 62.3

943 866 976 973 918 880 801 653 814

17.5 20.1 19.1

29.3 35.7 33.9

53.2 44.2 47.0

634 1151 9675

18.6 24.3 20.6

26.8 34.3 32.3

54.5 838 41.5 1208 47.1 10414

that those at lower incomes feel particularly disadvantaged either. That is, only a minority in these lower income categories worry that they will be personally disadvantaged by the EU. The general utilitarian model We begin this section by examining the general utilitarian model, which includes the egocentric utilitarian variables of education, occupation and income as predictors of attitudes to the European integration (measured in the same way as outlined in Chapter 2);6 also included are two sociotropic utilitarian variables – trade with the EU and amount of funding received from the EU to prepare for EU membership. As was the case with the EU-15, respondents living in candidate countries with relatively higher (positive) trade balances with the EU are expected to be far more favourable toward their countries’ memberships of the EU than respondents living in candidate countries that run large trade deficits with the EU;7 furthermore, those living in countries that receive larger amounts of funding to make economic and political reforms would be expected to be more supportive of integration.8 Table 8.8 indicates that many of the personal utilitarian measures do, in fact, significantly predict attitudes to the EU. The most consistent effect is that of income – those at higher income levels are generally more favourable to European integration. Amongst the job categories,

New Member States and Opposition to Integration 171 Table 8.8: Utilitarian predictors of attitudes to European Union 2001.1 and 2003.4 Spring 2001 b Occupation Professional Executive Unemployed Retired Small business owner Farmer Student Housewife Other

Robust SE

Autumn 2003 b

Robust SE

0.088 0.144 0.069 −0.084 0.135 −0.212 −0.245 −0.135 −0.009

0.095 0.094 0.073 0.050 0.076 0.093* 0.169 0.112 0.054

0.147 0.230 0.043 −0.073 0.075 −0.054 −0.131 0.063 0.063

0.104 0.084* 0.052 0.053 0.097 0.220 0.121 0.078 0.043

Education Income Income2 Income3 Income4 Income5 Income6 Income7 Income8 Income9 Income10 Incomedk

0.007 0.162 0.213 0.227 0.240 0.327 0.364 0.415 0.360 0.345 0.067

0.003* 0.058* 0.081* 0.099* 0.115 0.113* 0.097** 0.107** 0.151* 0.133* 0.090

0.007 −0.008 −0.021 −0.010 0.072 0.103 0.184 0.265 0.194 0.365 −0.071

0.002*** 0.105 0.089 0.084 0.084 0.068 0.087 0.090** 0.115 0.095** 0.087

Trade with EU 2000 Financial assistance Constant R2 Root MSE N

0.000 0.000 2.447 0.030 1.130 11636

0.000 0.000 0.119***

0.000 0.000 2.669 0.03 1.15 9922

0.000 0.000 0.128***

Notes: * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

individuals from only two occupational groupings appear to have significantly different opinions of integration: farmers in Spring 2001 are more hostile to the European integration project while executives in Autumn 2003 are more positive about their country’s integration with the EU. Note that these coefficients are only significant at the 0.05 level, though, which decreases confidence in the conclusion that these occupational groups really are that different from the others. As for the final egocentric utilitarian predictor, education appears to have a far more consistent impact than was the case with the EU-15. The better educated in the new member states are, on average, more

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supportive of integrating with Europe. Moreover, by Autumn 2003, the significance level on this coefficient is strong enough to make us quite confident that there is indeed a relationship between education and attitudes to integration. (Recall that this conclusion is generally supported by the findings in Table 8.4.) In contrast to the findings for the EU-15, level of trade with the EU-15 and funding assistance from the EU seem to have very little impact on support for integrating with the European Union.9 Thus, it would appear that these levels of trade and assistance have not been strong enough to have much effect on new member state preferences for integration with the European Union.

Group-level realistic threat Recall that in older member states, one of the key factors explaining opposition to European integration was the worry on the part of members of the mass public that group-level resources would be harmed as a result of EU membership. I expect that the same sorts of fears will be widespread in the candidate countries. However, the fears of those in older member states should generally not be the same as the concerns of citizens of new member states. For older member states, it was expected that the most relevant of the group-level fears was the fear of the transfer of jobs to poorer member states, the loss of social benefits, and more difficulties to farmers in the country. For the candidates-cum-new-member-states, I expect the biggest concerns to be the perceived financial costs of joining the EU and the problems that it will create for farmers, as farmers in new member states must adapt to modern systems of farming without initially receiving the same sorts of support received by farmers in older member states. I would not expect the potential loss of social benefits to be as much of a concern in the new member states, as social welfare provision does not tend to be of the same standards as in wealthier older member states. Note that I am unable to investigate the effect of group threat from minorities because measures of this are unavailable in the CCEBs. Thus, only questions pertaining to threats from the EU could be investigated. With regard to the expense of joining the EU, this does indeed appear to be a considerable fear of candidate country citizens. Majorities or near majorities in most of these countries claim to be afraid of this particular problem (see Figure 8.4). Thus, candidate country citizens seem to be quite concerned about the potential economic damage that EU membership will inflict on their countries’ economies.

New Member States and Opposition to Integration 173

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Fear joining EU will cost too much money

In addition, as expected, people in candidate countries were fearful about the futures of the country’s farmers (see Figure 8.5). In fact, this was a concern for majorities in every candidate country other than Bulgaria and Romania.10 Turks also had a relatively low level of worry about farmers. The findings regarding these three countries are not surprising: for the rest of the candidates, EU membership was imminent, and it was apparent that when these countries joined the EU, farmers would be forced to compete against farmers in the EU-15 for

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Figure 8.5: Difficulties for farmers

markets, again, without receiving the same subsidies received by EU-15 farmers. The blatant discrimination and disparity of this regime would have become more apparent in the candidates scheduled to enter the EU in 2004 than in the candidates for whom a definite entry date had not yet been set. It should be pointed out that in the older member states, concern for the difficulties of farmers also tended to be rather high, and interestingly, the highest levels of such concern were in two of the (poorer) Southern European states – Greece and Portugal.

New Member States and Opposition to Integration 175

In general, majorities in many other EU-15 member states also expressed fear for the future of their countries’ farmers, indicating that this is a concern shared across much of the new EU-25. Finally, as expected, the fear of loss of social benefits as a result of European integration generally does not seem to be nearly as strong in the candidate countries as was the case with older member states (Figure 8.6). In no candidate country was there a majority who expressed worry about the loss of social benefits that would result from European integration. The highest levels of concern about this were in

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Figure 8.6: Fear of loss of social benefits

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Malta, Slovakia and Turkey. Still, significant minorities in these and other candidate countries did claim to be worried about the potential for reduced social benefits in the integration process. Before exploring the impact of these variables on general attitudes to the European Union, I will first investigate their intercorrelations to determine whether combining them into a single summated index is appropriate.11 The gamma values in Table 8.9 indicate that the correlations are strong enough to lead us to the conclusion that they are measuring an underlying dimension and will thus be combined for later analyses (average Cronbach’s alpha was 0.63; the lowest gamma values were in Cyprus and Hungary, where Cronbach’s alpha values were approximately 0.50). As indicated in Table 8.10, the impact of realistic group threat on attitudes to integration (measured the same here as in Chapter 2) is quite powerful. The correlation values are moderate to high for most candidate countries, and the maximum impact of the combined index is – on average – more than a one-point reduction in support for European integration. The maximum effect ranges, however, from a low of one-half of a point in Romania to more than two points in Malta. It is clear from these results that when candidate country citizens leaned

Table 8.9: Intercorrelation of realistic threat items Joining expensive Joining expensive & Harm to farmers & & harm to farmers loss of social loss of social (gamma) benefits (gamma) benefits (gamma) Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Turkey Candidate Av.

0.46 0.37 0.63 0.59 0.61 0.51 0.50 0.58 0.60 0.43 0.59 0.44 0.64 0.55

0.43 0.44 0.59 0.58 0.29 0.50 0.53 0.70 0.64 0.55 0.60 0.54 0.58 0.53

0.55 0.26 0.44 0.53 0.29 0.51 0.45 0.69 0.48 0.57 0.56 0.39 0.66 0.49

Source: CCEB 2003.4; all coefficients statistically significant at the 0.001 level.

Min N

994 500 990 1009 1014 1000 1005 499 995 1025 1065 989 993 12,082

−0.38 −0.19 −0.31 −0.35 −0.18 −0.33 −0.31 −0.61 −0.29 −0.23 −0.30 −0.07NS −0.25 −0.32

−0.15 −0.30 −0.45 −0.39 −0.25 −0.36 −0.31 −0.59 −0.41 −0.19 −0.42 −0.32 −0.25 −0.34

−0.44 −0.41 −0.49 −0.40 −0.46 −0.38 −0.46 −0.80 −0.51 −0.41 −0.52 −0.32 −0.34 −0.45

Loss of social benefits (gamma) −0.36 −0.35 −0.45 −0.39 −0.35 −0.36 −0.40 −0.68 −0.43 −0.28 −0.43 −0.26 −0.29 −0.39

Index (gamma) −0.30 −0.32 −0.41 −0.38 −0.31 −0.35 −0.36 −0.64 −0.39 −0.21 −0.39 −0.24 −0.28 −0.36

Pearson’s r

Source: CCEB 2003.4; all coefficients statistically significant at the 0.001 level unless otherwise indicated.

Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Turkey Candidate Av.

Harm to farmers (gamma)

Joining expensive (gamma)

Table 8.10: Impact of realistic threat items on attitudes to European integration

−0.15 −0.20 −0.26 −0.22 −0.21 −0.22 −0.20 −0.37 −0.22 −0.09 −0.22 −0.12 −0.17 −0.21

Unstand Reg. Coef −0.90 −1.20 −1.56 −1.32 −1.26 −1.32 −1.20 −2.22 −1.32 −0.54 −1.32 −0.72 −1.02 −1.26

Maximum impact

992 497 968 1003 1014 992 985 499 986 1022 1051 980 988 11,977

Minimum N

177

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toward the negative in their attitudes to European integration, one cause was concern for things like the expense to the country of joining the EU, the problems for a specific group of countrymen – farmers – and an even further reduction in social welfare benefits as their governments tightened economic belts in order to gain entry into the European Union. In fact, as will be seen below, the maximum impact of the realistic group conflict variable exceeds that of symbolic threat.

Symbolic threat: fear of loss of national identity and language To what degree do individuals in the candidate countries/new member states worry about the potential loss of national identity as a result of joining the EU? It is expected that citizens in these countries will be fairly worried about this prospect. While some unique identity was maintained during the Cold War, it is likely that citizens were looking forward to greater development and expression of identity in the postCold War period (see Weiss 2003: 377). While connecting themselves to the European Union provides a new sort of identity, it also poses the prospect of diminishing the unique component of identity as well. The chapter thus turns to the question of how concerned citizens in candidate countries were about this prospect. As with resource-based group threat, symbolic threat from minorities cannot be examined here because of the lack of similar survey questions as those used for the EU-15 in Chapters 4 and 5. Figure 8.7 presents the results for 2001 and 2003, the earliest and latest Candidate Barometers that include questions about fear of loss of identity. The greatest concern for the potential loss of identity is in Turkey. At the end of 2003, approximately 60 per cent of Turks claim to be afraid that the building of Europe will mean a loss of national identity and culture. Also, in 2001 50 per cent or more shared such fears in Cyprus, Estonia and Malta. However, in most countries, the level of fear dropped between 2001 and 2003, and by 2003, only minorities appear to worry about the loss of their national identities due to European integration. Figure 8.8 also explores the degree to which individuals in the candidate countries were worried about the potential for declining use of their language as a result of the building of the EU. In 2001, this seemed to be an even larger concern than was the loss of national identity. In that year, at least 50 per cent of Cypriots, Czechs, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Maltese, Slovenian and Turks were worried that their languages would be used less and less as European integration continues. However,

New Member States and Opposition to Integration 179

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Figure 8.7: Fear of loss of national identity

for most candidate countries, the level of fear dropped by about 10 per cent between 2001 and 2003. The only country for which there was a rise in fear of language being used less was Turkey. Moreover, by 2003, the only other country where 50 per cent or more still shared this fear was Estonia. Thus, comparing perceptions of symbolic threat to perceived threat to resources, it appears that citizens in CEE are consistently more concerned with the latter than with the former. That is, they are more worried about the harm that European integration will do to the national economy than about the damage to national symbols and culture.

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Figure 8.8: Fear that language will be used less and less

As in the previous chapters of this book, these two items were combined into a single index, in great part to reduce the complexity of the interpretation. Table 8.11 provides the intercorrelations (using gamma values) of these two variables in the CEE countries. The results indicate that – as expected – they are indeed strongly related in these countries and can thus be validly combined.12 So what was the impact of symbolic threat on general attitudes to the European Union and to European integration in the candidate

New Member States and Opposition to Integration 181 Table 8.11:

Intercorrelation of symbolic threat items gamma

Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Turkey EU

0.70 0.74 0.73 0.80 0.72 0.71 0.67 0.83 0.80 0.74 0.79 0.70 0.72 0.75

Minimum N 996 500 991 1009 1012 1000 1009 500 995 1030 1069 990 997 12,098

Source: CCEB 2003.4; all coefficients statistically significant at the 0.001 level.

countries shortly prior to their entry into the EU? Table 8.12 includes the correlations between each of the two symbolic threat indicators and attitudes to European integration, and also examines the overall effect of the combined index. The gamma and Pearson’s r values for the effect of the combined index indicate that there is a moderate to strong effect in several of the candidates, with the largest of these occurring in Malta. At the same time, the relationship in some of the countries is moderate to weak (e.g. Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey). The column labelled ‘Maximum impact’ provides an estimate of the degree to which symbolic threat impacts feelings about European integration. Again, the largest effect can be found in Malta, where moving from the lowest level of symbolic threat to the highest produces an average drop of 1.72 on the index of attitudes to integration (the total range for which is 0–4). Strong effects are also seen in Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, where a change from being least threatened to being most threatened would lower a person’s score on attitudes to integration by approximately one full point. In most other countries, there is an effect of at least three-quarters of a point, with the minimum effect being approximately one-half of a point (in Latvia, Romania and Slovenia).

−0.46 −0.39 −0.50 −0.30 −0.41 −0.30 −0.38 −0.76 −0.51 −0.48 −0.46 −0.34 −0.28 −0.41

−0.37 −0.30 −0.39 −0.23 −0.35 −0.16 −0.29 −0.59 −0.42 −0.27 −0.35 −0.24 −0.20 −0.32

−0.42 −0.34 −0.45 −0.25 −0.38 −0.21 −0.34 −0.67 −0.47 −0.39 −0.40 −0.29 −0.25 −0.36

−0.29 −0.28 −0.38 −0.21 −0.30 −0.19 −0.29 −0.55 −0.35 −0.23 −0.32 −0.23 −0.22 −0.30

−0.19 0.19 −0.28 −0.15 −0.24 −0.14 −0.19 −0.43 −0.28 −0.14 −0.23 −0.15 −0.18 −0.21

−0.76 0.76 −1.12 −0.60 −0.96 −0.56 −0.76 −1.72 −1.12 −0.56 −0.92 −0.60 −0.72 −0.84

994 497 969 1003 1012 992 989 500 986 1027 1055 982 992 11998

Fear use of lang Index (gamma) Pearson’s r Unstand Reg. Coef Maximum impact Minimum N decrease (gamma)

Source: CCEB 2003.4; all coefficients statistically significant at the 0.001 level.

Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Turkey Candidate Av.

Fear of loss of id (gamma)

Table 8.12: Impact of symbolic threat items on attitudes to European integration

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New Member States and Opposition to Integration 183

Utilitarianism, perceived threat and attitudes to European integration: empirical analysis The question to which we turn now is that of the relative impact of utilitarianism and realistic and symbolic threats. In general, the results indicate that utilitarianism as measured by education and income continues to explain attitudes to European integration and that resourced-based group threat and symbolic threat are significant predictors of attitudes to European integration as well (see Model 2 of Table 8.13),13 with the latter groups of variables explaining a larger percentage of the variance than utilitarianism (see column 1 of Table 8.13 for the basic utilitarian module).14 In terms of the size of the effects of each of these, it is perceptions that the EU threatens group resources that has the largest impact: those who are most worried about the expense of joining the EU, the harm to the nation’s farmers, and the further loss of social benefits are almost one full point lower on support for integrating with Europe (which ranges from 0–4). The impact of symbolic threat is roughly half the size of realistic group threat. Finally, the combination of being in the highest income decile and leaving school at a later age (e.g. 22 as opposed to 16) only increases support for integrating with Europe by 0.35. Thus, in contrast to the EU-15, where realistic group threat, symbolic threat, and personal utilitarianism (as measured by occupation, education and income) were roughly equal in their impacts on attitudes to integration – particularly when the former were measured by items pertaining to the EU – in the candidate countries, it is clearly realistic group threat that is most important for explaining feelings about European integration. As in Chapter 6, in order to further explore the question of whether socio-economic status necessarily implies that the individual is thinking about the EU in utilitarian terms, perceptions of the country’s economic resources as being under threat by the EU were predicted from education, occupation and income. The expectation here is that those who are likely to gain the most from EU membership will feel the threat to group resources less acutely. Indeed, those with higher levels of education and in executive-level jobs do tend to be least threatened by the possibility of the EU harming the national economy and national social welfare benefits (see Table 8.14, Model 1). As with the Autumn 2000 Eurobarometer, we are also able to investigate the impact of perceptions of personal economic situations and perceptions of the country’s economic situation using the survey items discussed in Chapter 6.15 Model 2 of Table 8.14 indicates that – again in contrast to the EU-15 – worries about the harm that the

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Table 8.13: Utilitarian, symbolic and group-based threats and opposition to European integration in the candidate countries Model 1 b

Model 2

Robust SE

Coef.

Robust SE

Occupation Professional Executive Unemployed Retired Small business owner Farmer Student Housewife Other

0.184 0.201 0.003 −0.113 0.107 −0.331 −0.109 0.044 0.063

0.089 0.076* 0.054 0.040* 0.085 0.203 0.125 0.092 0.032

0.138 0.136 −0.018 −0.058 0.077 −0.245 −0.116 0.042 0.037

0.073 0.062 0.058 0.048 0.070 0.140 0.106 0.086 0.037

Education Income Income2 Income3 Income4 Income5 Income6 Income7 Income8 Income9 Income10 Incomedk

0.008 −0.020 −0.015 0.003 0.100 0.127 0.156 0.270 0.221 0.375 −0.062

0.002** 0.099 0.096 0.093 0.087 0.078 0.104 0.096* 0.117 0.103** 0.098

0.006 0.009 0.018 0.012 0.104 0.121 0.184 0.243 0.176 0.309 −0.043

0.001** 0.087 0.080 0.080 0.083 0.072 0.099 0.089* 0.121 0.107* 0.091

0.000 0.001

0.000 0.001

2.531 0.05 1.12 9922

0.141***

0.000 0.001 −0.154 −0.114 3.249 0.18 1.04 9922

0.000 0.001 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.115***

Trade with EU 2002 Funding assistance 2000 Realistic group threat Symbolic threat Constant Adj R2 MSE N

Note: Unstandardised OLS coefficients and robust standard errors; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

EU will do to national resources can be explained both by perceptions of one’s own personal economic situation and those of the country. The latter is far more powerful in its impact, indicating that our measures of perceived threat to group resources are actually group-related in content. At the same time, it is clear that those of executive status with higher levels of education and those who feel positive about their personal economic situations are significantly less worried about the

New Member States and Opposition to Integration 185 Table 8.14:

Precursors to realistic group-based threats, CCEB 2003.4 Model 1 B

Occupation Professional Executive Unemployed Retired Small business owner Farmer Student Housewife Other Education Income Income2 Income3 Income4 Income5 Income6 Income7 Income8 Income9 Income10 Incomedk Personal economic situation Country economic situation Constant Adj R2 MSE N

Robust SE

Model 2 B

Robust SE

−0.277 −0.448 −0.136 0.178 −0.135 −0.153 0.052 −0.112 −0.131

0.143 0.123** 0.089 0.109 0.120 0.507 0.180 0.096 0.079

−0.182 −0.336 −0.183 0.146 −0.125 −0.124 0.209 −0.026 −0.083

0.134 0.116** 0.081* 0.099 0.102 0.407 0.184 0.087 0.079

−0.010 0.148 0.201 0.078 0.154 0.064 0.146 −0.029 −0.055 −0.177 0.162

0.003** 0.140 0.132 0.129 0.143 0.145 0.157 0.166 0.150 0.130 0.157

−0.009 0.177 0.211 0.085 0.181 0.096 0.191 0.015 −0.008 −0.081 0.151

0.003** 0.132 0.120 0.116 0.125 0.130 0.134 0.148 0.141 0.132 0.149

−0.085 −0.332 4.031 0.07 1.97 11846

0.038** 0.050*** 0.255***

3.372 0.02 2.03 11846

0.245***

Note: Unstandardised OLS coefficients and robust standard errors; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

EU’s threats to national resources than are those with lesser job skills, low levels of education, and those in more dire economic circumstances. Recall that in the case of the EU-15 – in contrast to these findings for the candidate countries – fears of threats to national resources seemed to be quite distinctive from concerns for personal welfare. That is, people who worried that the EU was a threat to group resources felt this way not because they were concerned for their own pocketbooks, but because of concern for the well-being of the national economy as a whole. Again, however, given that executive job status and education remain statistically significant in the candidate countries after controlling for perceptions of

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one’s financial economic outlook may indicate – as with the EU-15 – that these variables could be capturing something beyond utilitarianism. As in Chapter 6, I also examine the impact of variables like education, occupation and income on perceptions of the symbolic threat posed by the EU. Recall that the hypothesis was that if these socio-economic variables were truly measuring utilitarianism, they should have little impact on symbolic threat; if, on the other hand, they are measuring something more along the lines of cosmopolitanism or exposure to alternative ideas and cultures, they would be likely to have an impact on levels of symbolic threat. In fact, examining Model 1 of Table 8.15, Table 8.15:

Predictors of symbolic threat, CCEB 2003.4 Model 1 B

Robust SE

Model 2 B

Robust SE

Occupation Professional Executive Unemployed Retired Small business owner Farmer Student Housewife Other

−0.114 −0.130 −0.152 0.019 −0.027 0.043 0.243 0.263 −0.117

0.154 0.117 0.101 0.086 0.117 0.155 0.337 0.186 0.079

−0.082 −0.092 −0.167 0.008 −0.022 0.051 0.295 0.292 −0.101

0.157 0.121 0.099 0.083 0.116 0.169 0.329 0.190 0.082

Education Income Income2 Income3 Income4 Income5 Income6 Income7 Income8 Income9 Income10 Incomedk

−0.005 −0.016 −0.050 −0.051 −0.075 −0.050 −0.027 −0.306 −0.246 −0.270 −0.112

0.005 0.090 0.082 0.127 0.139 0.157 0.140 0.136* 0.214 0.248 0.126

−0.004 −0.006 −0.047 −0.049 −0.066 −0.039 −0.013 −0.291 −0.230 −0.238 −0.115

0.005 0.088 0.078 0.128 0.139 0.157 0.139 0.133 0.214 0.247 0.122

Personal economic situation Country economic situation Constant Adj R2 MSE N

1.705 0.01 1.61 11868

0.159***

−0.033 −0.102 1.920 0.02 1.60 11868

0.028 0.039* 0.135***

Note: Unstandardised OLS coefficients and robust standard errors; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

New Member States and Opposition to Integration 187

we see that the only one of the SES variables that has such an impact is income. Those at higher income deciles are less worried about the loss of their language and national culture because of European integration, although this is only true for the 8th decile and the effect is only significant at the 0.05 level. In Model 2, it also appears that a positive outlook on the household financial situation is associated with less worry about losing one’s national identity, but again, with minimal statistical significance. However, when we enter the index measuring perceptions of the nation’s future economic situation, the effect of personal financial situation dwindles to the point of insignificance. It must be noted, though, that perceptions of the national-level economic situation only have a minor impact on symbolic concerns. It is also extremely important to note that education and occupation have no effect at all on symbolic threat, indicating that in the candidate countries, these variables might indeed be capturing utilitarianism to a greater degree than was the case in the EU-15. That is, if education in particular was measuring level of exposure to alternative ideas and the degree to which an individual will take a ‘sober second thought’ (Stouffer 1955), it would be expected that this variable would have a powerful effect on fears of loss of identity and culture, as was the case in the EU-15. Instead, we see here that those of all education levels are equally fearful (or not fearful) of the loss of identity, culture and language.16

Conclusion The findings of this chapter indicate that in the time period immediately prior to entry into the EU, the candidate countries that became full EU member states in May 2004 were in some ways very similar to the older member states. Enthusiasm for the EU had been tempered and the initial fear of loss of identity and language declined such that by the Autumn of 2003 only minorities in most candidate countries held such fears – as had been the case in the EU-15. On the other hand, citizens in candidate countries appear to perceive the EU in slightly more personal utilitarian terms than was the case with the EU-15. While perceptions of group threat were indeed partly motivated by worries about loss to the group (or country) as a whole, unlike the EU-15, such threat perceptions also came from worries about the harm of the EU to personal economic situations. Furthermore, personal utilitarianism variables had little impact on perceptions of symbolic

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threat, indicating that – again unlike the EU-15 – ‘utilitarianism’ variables are more likely to be gauging personal utilitarianism in the candidate countries and that people facing difficult personal economic situations are no more or less likely to feel that symbols like identity and language are under threat than are those facing promising economic outlooks.

9 Conclusion

As argued in the Introduction, it has become increasingly apparent that EU governments and leaders cannot ignore public opinion without risk to the integration project as a whole. This book has investigated two of the major approaches to these opinions. One of these takes as its basic assumption that people generally perceive politics in terms of the potential financial costs and benefits to themselves. The alternative approach to this one begins with the contention that political attitudes are not always formed by economically driven egocentric concerns. As outlined in Chapter 4, multiple analyses of political attitudes and behaviours point to this conclusion. In fact, as with other political institutions, the European Union creates the potential for multifaceted responses that would include both utilitarian, cost-benefit calculations and non-economic reactions. For some Europeans – particularly the elites of society (i.e. the winners in life who have excellent incomes, job statuses and educational qualifications) – the integration project may present countless opportunities to draw upon one’s skills and finances. For the vast majority of Europeans, however, contemplating the specific benefits – or costs – of integration is likely to be difficult, and as was shown in Chapter 3, non-elite groups do indeed fail to detect any personal benefits or costs of integrating Europe. Thus, if calculating potential costs and benefits only applies to a small portion of the European public, the next question must then be: how does the rest of the European public determine its positions on the issue of European integration? Based on the assumption that, for many of these individuals, the integration project serves as a threat to one of their most relevant in-groups – the nation – the book expanded theories of out-group rejection that were developed by researchers trying to explain prejudice toward minority groups. There are two key approaches 189

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

within this body of literature that were argued to be of relevance to the rejection of the European Union: resource-based group threat and symbolic threat. There are, in fact, several national resources that might be perceived as coming under threat by the EU. Some countries have exemplary social welfare systems in which benefits have tended to be reserved mostly for those who are part of these systems by means of their citizenship (or the potential for citizenship in the case of new migrants). The possibility of transferring these benefits to an EU-level social welfare system creates the potential for (a) the current exclusivity related to group benefits becoming non-existent, and (b) the demise of the vast welfare systems in the countries in question. We have seen in Chapter 7 that there is indeed considerable opposition to transferring competence for health and social welfare policy-making to the EU. Other individuals may worry about the loss of jobs to citizens of other EU member states. In most cases citizens may not believe this applies directly to them, but instead counts as a loss for their countrymen and women. In still other countries, there may be a great deal of pride in specific aspects of the running of the economy (low unemployment and stable growth in the UK, low inflation in Germany, etc.), with attempts at integrating economies across the EU creating the possibility of a decline in the national economy. Once again, in most of these cases, the direct impact on most citizens is likely to be minimal, and the concern tends to be for the resources of the major in-group, the nation. However, there are far less tangible national ‘resources’ that new multi-level, cross-national institutions of governance may threaten, and these relate to the general symbols associated with the nation – that is, the nation’s language and culture, its ‘way of doing things’. It has been argued in this book that Europeans are likely to turn to these sorts of symbolic concerns whenever contemplating the EU. Moreover, it was assumed that this would be true for more than just the ‘usual suspects’ of Britain, Denmark and Sweden. Thus, the overall analysis focused on varying levels of explanations of attitudes to European integration: the individual-level egocentric concerns, the sociotropic resource-based concerns, and the loss of important national symbols and culture. The findings indicate that the traditional egocentric utilitarian arguments about why some people support the integration project may be correct. That is, groups like professionals, executives and those with higher incomes appear to (a) generally be more supportive of the integration project, (b) be systematically more supportive of the co-ordination of specific policies like environmental and currency policies, and

Conclusion

191

(c) perceive themselves to have gained more advantages than disadvantages via the integration project. On the other hand, applying the utilitarian argument to those in the negative human capital category is more problematic. Europeans do not seem adamantly opposed to the EU because they have failed to receive any personal benefits or because they cannot take advantage of the Europe-wide market; instead, those at lower levels of job skills and incomes generally tend to be lukewarm about the whole project. That is, when it comes to egocentric explanations, while there may be individuals who perceive themselves to be clear winners, there do not appear to be many losers. For some analysts this may be encouraging because it means that the building of Europe does not need to overcome the extremely divisive, conflict-ridden problem of legitimacy that can result when large groups of citizens feel that their very livelihoods are at stake (see Lipset 1959 for a similar argument regarding the building of democratic institutions). By introducing perceived threats to group-level economic resources and symbols, we have explained an added component of attitudes to integration. However, we have also introduced the basis for different types of legitimacy problems that may be just as difficult to resolve as those that revolve around self-interest. Indeed, we have seen that significant numbers across Europe (a) still strongly identify with their national communities, (b) worry that the EU poses threats to the resources of those communities, and (c) feel that the EU serves as a realistic threat to national symbols, including the use of national languages. Moreover, these fears were shown to be as strongly connected to general attitudes to European integration as personal utilitarianism, and were related to attitudes to policy-making at the EU-level as well. In addition, further evidence from the EU-15 indicated that perceptions of group threat to resources really were about group resources and not individual resources. Thus, for some, support for integration may be a utilitarian-based form of specific support; for others, however, opposition to integration stems from concern over the degradation of the national community’s symbols, identity and resources. The good news for those worried about legitimacy problems in the EU is that in only a handful (roughly five or six) of member states do the majority of citizens profess rejection of the notion of feeling European at all or profess to be afraid of the loss of identity and language due to European integration. Also encouraging is that it was less than a majority of Europeans who were symbolically threatened by ethnic and cultural minorities (see Chapter 5). On the other hand, far more Europeans admitted to feeling resource-based threats both from the EU and from

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Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration

minority groups, and again recall that these were shown in Chapter 6 to be truly group-based in the EU-15 and had little to do with feeling that one’s own resources would be harmed. Thus, while the building of Europe may have to overcome perceptions of symbolic threat to identity and culture amongst a significant minority of Europeans, perhaps more important is the problematic perception that other national groupings are taking the resources (or are likely to take the resources) that belong to one’s major in-group or ‘terminal community’ (Carey 2002). In shifting focus to the new member states, however, it was clear that group-level and individual-level resources were not as clearly separated. That is, when respondents expressed fear regarding the economic costs of joining the EU, this, in part, had its basis in the effect that these costs would have on the individual herself. And citizens in the new member states were indeed quite worried about these costs, more so than they worried about the loss of identity and language. That is not to say that the latter was completely irrelevant. Indeed, roughly similar percentages of citizens of the new member states to those in the EU-15 were worried about the symbolic threats of the EU by the Autumn of 2004, and these concerns translated into significantly lower levels of support for integrating with Europe. At the same time though – as with the EU-15 – far more citizens of the new member states were worried about the economic costs of joining the EU – costs in terms of the amount of money spent to prepare for EU membership and also in terms of harms to groups like farmers. Again, however, there is evidence to suggest that people in the new member states were to some degree concerned about the implications of these costs for their own financial situations. Thus, in facing its legitimacy problems in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU will indeed need to overcome the perception that personal resources are being sacrificed for the sake of the country’s EU membership. Moreover, as with the EU-15, citizens in CEE will also need to be able to feel that their own national groups’ economic resources are not being harmed while other national groups are benefiting. It is, of course, entirely possible that the EU could continue indefinitely with the current levels of Euroscepticism, both in terms of apathy and open hostility. However, in the realm of the ongoing enlargement process and the desire to create a European Constitution, the symbolic and resource-based threats discussed in this book are likely to produce rather negative consequences. First, while group-based threats to resources have traditionally been a cause of concern for large numbers in the EU-15, the entry of ten relatively poor new member states can be expected to intensify hostility to the project even further. This will

Conclusion

193

become fairly problematic when old member states finally agree to incorporate the new member states into the systems of social benefits that already exist at the EU level – the social cohesion and CAP funds. It is also possible that national groupings in the EU-15 will come to feel that jobs and social welfare benefits for their countrymen and women are being taken by citizens of these new member states once a freer system of movement of labour is instituted across the entire EU-25. Furthermore, the possibility of enlarging the EU to include Turkey has already begun to promote a major cultural divide across Europe.1 It is expected that as Turkish membership of the EU becomes a clearer reality, issues of identity – both at European and national levels – will be raised and threats posed to identity will further deepen overall hostility to the entire project. Finally, these same concerns have very likely played a role in the scuppering of further integration plans via the French and Dutch referenda on the proposed European Constitution. Although the proposed Constitution hardly represented a major breakthrough in terms of supranational governance or changes to the functioning of the EU, the reference to the new treaty as a ‘Constitution’ very likely created considerable backlash about the desirability of having a Constitution that does not represent any particular national grouping. That is, because of worries about national symbols and resources, many citizens of Europe rejected the legitimacy of the new Constitution, and in turn, rejected the Constitution itself. This is not to deny the importance of factors like utilitarianism and opposition to the government of the day in explaining rejection of the treaty, but to emphasise that the causes for the rejection were likely to be many and included the symbolic and group-conflict-based concerns discussed in this book. Ultimately, then, the scope of projects that have been undertaken by the EU in recent years (i.e. the proposed constitutional treaty and enlargement) could provoke further feelings of group conflict over resources and symbols which threaten to derail the project as a whole. Member state leaders will eventually be forced to face these questions openly and to develop solutions that satisfy the symbolic and resource-based demands of their publics.

Notes 1.

Introduction

1. The latest – and perhaps most accurate – description of the EU is that of ‘multi-level governance’ (see Hooghe and Marks 2001). 2. Note that these rules have very recently (March 2005) been made more flexible, allowing temporarily large budget deficits. 3. Although the proposed Constitution was mostly a compilation of the past treaties and decisions handed down by the European Court of Justice, the creation of a ‘Constitution’ in itself plus one of its innovations – the introduction of a new EU foreign minister – was perceived by many commentators as a further diminishment of member state sovereignty. 4. German in the case of the Hapsburg Empire and Ottoman Turkish in the case of the Ottoman Empire; Ottoman Turkish was a mix of Persian and Arabic and was not the same as common Turkish. The Habsburg Empire spanned what is now Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Croatia, Serbia, etc., and thus German was not the common language of most individuals living within the empire. 5. Of course, it did not, in fact, have much impact at all and had the member states not launched other communities afterwards, the ECSC would be viewed today as a complete failure. 6. For instance, disputes regarding what counts as a ‘spirit’, ‘beer’, ‘chocolate’ and ‘pasta’ have plagued the EU into the twenty-first century. 7. See note 2 above. 8. To the point of running large deficits and facing reprimands and fines from the European Commission. 9. It is also expected that some of the ‘no’ votes in these referenda were based on opposition to the national government of the day (see Franklin et al. 1994; Franklin et al. 1995). 10. Referenda have been held in Norway in 1972 and 1994. 11. See Garry et al. 2005 for an analysis of voting in the Nice Treaty. 12. See ‘Blair’s euro enthusiasm’, BBC News online (http://news.bbc.co.uk), 15 May 2002; ‘Blair stops wobbling and begins euro battle’, The Guardian online (http:// www.guardian.co.uk), 29 June 1999; ‘Why single currency will be a hard sell for PM’, The Guardian online (http://www.guardian.co.uk), 23 May 2000. 13. Interested readers should consult the following sources: Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997; Clarke and Dutt 1991; Clarke et al. 1999; Davis and Davenport 1999. 14. Linde and Ekman (2003) also contend that satisfaction with democracy refers to satisfaction with the way democracy is working now rather than with democracy as a system of governance. 15. I do not particularly agree with the notion that utilitarianism necessarily means economic utilitarianism but will avoid engaging in an argument over semantics here. 194

Notes

2.

195

Opposition to European Integration: the Data

1. The time span ranges from 1984 to 1995, depending upon the time of entry of the individual member state to the European Union. All data used in the analyses in this book were made available by the UK Data Archive (www.dataarchive. ac.uk). 2. Gamma values are generally more appropriate for ordinal-level variables, but Pearson’s r is often used in political science research instead. 3. EFTA (the European Free Trade Area) was an association created by non-EU countries in 1960 as an alternative free market for industrial goods. The UK, Ireland and Denmark were members of this organisation (indeed, Britain led the way in creating the organisation), and once they joined the EU, there were very few EFTA countries left. Of these, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995, leaving only Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein as EFTA members). This last enlargement is thus referred to as the Eftan Enlargement. (Note that Portugal was also a member of EFTA that joined the EC – in 1986.) 4. The percentages are as follows:

Finland Sweden Austria

1994

1995

66% 57% 55%

64% 60% 58%

(Percentages either very much in favour or in favour of efforts to unify Europe.)

5. Note that those who gave a response of ‘don’t know’ were investigated further to determine where they might fit in this ordering, and unsurprisingly, they fit fairly closely within the ‘same’ category. That is, they cannot be distinguished from this category on other variables, such as the question of whether EU membership is a good thing or not. Thus, rather than losing these observations, the ‘don’t know’ responses were combined with the ‘same role’ responses.

3.

‘Rational’ Explanations of Support for European Integration

1. Note that accounts of utilitarianism in this literature do not assign the word ‘egocentric’; the term has been added here in order to distinguish between this form of utilitarianism and another discussed below, which I refer to as ‘sociotropic utilitarianism’. My usage of the terms in this way borrows from the economic voting literature (see Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Lewis-Beck 1990). 2. It must be noted that in the early twenty-first century, many member states were refusing to comply and were facing economic sanctions as a result. In March 2005, member states agreed to allow for temporary increased budget deficits. 3. Note that ordered logistic regression was also used to confirm the OLS results. Given the large number of coefficients reported already, it was decided that reporting ordered logit results would make tables unnecessarily difficult to read.

196

Notes

4. Education is the age at which the respondent stopped studying. 5. Note that there will be some discussion of the cross-national differences in responses to this survey question later in this chapter. 6. Note that enlargement had not yet occurred by the time the surveys used in this analysis were conducted. 7. Note that these percentages include the occupational groupings just mentioned. However, the frequencies were recompiled after removing the relevant group, and the results were almost identical to those presented in Table 3.7. 8. The Autumn 2000 results are not shown because they are almost identical to those from Spring 2000. 9. Budget balance statistics are from Eurostat, Statistical Guide to Europe, 2001. 10. Trade statistics are from Eurostat, External and Intra-EU Trade Statistical Yearbook, Data 1958–2000. 11. The latter analyses also include outliers (Germany and the Netherlands), and these two observations are driving the slight negative relationship between trade balance and attitudes to European integration.

4.

Group Conflict Theory and European Integration

1. Unemployment figures were taken from OECD Main Economic Indicators. 2. Gamma statistics are used in this table because the scale of the variables is ordinal, containing only three ordered options (disagree, don’t know, and agree). 3. Pearson’s r between the two sets of coefficients is 0.66 when Sweden and Denmark are excluded, indicating a very strong connection between the size of the effects even when using two quite different measures of group conflict.

5.

Symbolic Politics and European Integration

1. Note, however, that later strands of this research point to more ambiguous conclusions (Sears et al. 1997; see Krysan 2000 for a thorough review). 2. Later findings in this regard are mixed, however. Long and Spears (1998) find, for instance, that higher levels of personal self-esteem tended to be associated with greater levels of in-group bias, whereas those with low levels of collective self-esteem showed the greatest in-group bias. See also Rubin and Hewstone (1998), Fiske (2000) and Blank (2003). 3. Although Waever et al. (1993) also make a strong case for the distinctiveness of political versus ethnic community, I am contending here that for many Europeans the distinction may not, in fact, be all that clear. 4. The questions begin with the following: ‘How proud are you of (R’s country) in each of the following?’, and then ask about the various dimensions that appear in Table 5.1. The percentages in the table are those who feel either very or somewhat proud. 5. As the ISSP is not conducted by the European Commission, not all EU member states were surveyed for it. 6. Anthony Smith (1992 International Affairs) also mentions the possibility of multiple identities in the European context; see also Waever et al. (1993).

Notes

197

7. Unfortunately, the previous item asking about attachment to country has not been included in the Eurobarometer series often enough to provide similar cross-time figures. 8. The exact question is: ‘Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the European Union. Here is a list of things which some people say they are afraid of. For each one, please tell me if you – personally – are currently afraid of it or not? . . . The loss of our national identity and culture’. 9. All of these questions had response choices of ‘tend to agree’, ‘tend to disagree’ or ‘don’t know’. They were coded as 0–2 scales, with high values representing feeling more threatened (depending on the question wording), low values representing less threat, and the ‘don’t know’ category being placed in the centre.

6.

Precursors to Group Conflict and Symbolic Threat

1. It should be noted that many of the ideas presented in Chapter 5 could fit within the realm of ‘egoistic’, ‘rational’, ‘utilitarian’ concerns, in that it was argued there that one potential reason for strong feelings of protectiveness of group norms and ways of life is that it serves to build or support self-esteem. However, I will avoid committing one of the ‘Historians’ fallacies’ described by D. H. Fischer (1971) – focusing one’s research on questions of semantics and nomenclature. Thus, the reader should read the ‘egoistic’ concerns discussed in this book as specifically ‘economic utilitarianism’, which I have argued to be conceptually quite different from the group-level concerns discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. This point will be addressed empirically in the pages that follow. 2. The evidence was less clear with regard to education. 3. Multi-level modelling was ruled out because it is generally inappropriate when the number of observations at the aggregate level is less than approximately 30. 4. That is, once we take income and occupation into account, education has no direct impact on attitudes to integration in either of these surveys. 5. ‘When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?’ 6. The bars were created by setting each group of relevant variables in Model 2 of Tables 6.1 and 6.2 to their maximum and minimum levels while holding all other variables constant at their means (or setting them to zero, in the case of dichotomous independent variables). For instance, the personal utilitarian effects are illustrated by first setting professional = 1 and high income = 1, with education budget balance, trade balance, group threat, symbolic threat, age, cognitive mobilisation, and left–right self-placement set to their means; gender is set to female = 0. Next, the professional and high income values are set to 0 (to represent a lack of utilitarian concern). 7. Ideally, perceptions of the economic situation in the past (retrospective evaluations) would also be incorporated. However, such measures are not included in the survey used for this analysis. Given that much of the voting behaviour literature indicates that prospective evaluations matter more than retrospective ones, however, I do not believe this is likely to be a major omission.

198

Notes

8. High values on the indices represent more positive outlooks on the economic situation. 9. Note that very recent work (Kritzinger 2005) contends that creation of the symbols of European identity can, in fact, be conducted via utilitarianism.

7.

Attitudes to Policy-making in the EU

1. Changes have been adopted in March 2005, however, allowing member states to run temporary budget deficits without incurring any punishment. 2. In 1991, the Aytpical Work Directive was passed and in 1992, the Maternity Directive was passed. These are now considered to be amongst the earliest active decisions taken by the EU member states to deal with social welfare problems. 3. See the EU’s website at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cha/c10101.htm for further details. 4. This is in contrast to the increasing strength and voice of big business within the EU. 5. See http://www.sweden.se/templates/cs/Article_332.aspx and http://212.67. 202.147/~ivnet05/article.php3?id_article=51 (both referenced 30 March 2005). 6. The first Schengen Agreement of 1985 focused on free movement of workers and abolition of borders but contained no mention of migrants, asylum seekers, or refugees (see Lavenex 2001), thus leading to the lack of clarity regarding the EU-level treatment of third country nationals (Geddes 1998; Guild 1998; Hansen 1998; Kostakopoulou 1998). 7. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/asylum/criteria/printer/fsj_ asylum_criteria_en.htm (accessed 27 October 2004). 8. ‘Blunkett claims EU victory on asylum’, The Guardian, 26 October 2004, viewed online. 9. General questions regarding the locus of control of economic policy-making were not included in the Eurobarometer surveys and thus cannot be explored here. 10. These numbers have also been reflected in the other referenda – for instance, on joining the euro in Denmark in September 2000. 11. Again, the large number of variables, policy areas and countries makes tabular presentation unwieldy. 12. See note 11, above. 13. This is similar to Sanchez-Cuenca’s (2000) contention that support for integration is driven by perceptions that the national political system fails to function properly and thus citizens in those states are happy to transfer governance to the EU level. 14. Note that controls for age, gender, cognitive mobilisation and left–right self-placement were also included in the equations. 15. I interpret a change in probability of 0.10 across maximum and minimum values of an independent variable to mean that the variable has some impact on attitudes to policy-making. 16. It should be noted that these percentages are similar across the east and west of Germany and thus the low level of willingness to increase taxes for environmental protection is not driven by reluctance solely on the part of East Germans.

Notes

199

17. All other variables in the equation are held at their means. 18. Again, other variables in the equation are held at their means. 19. Note that inflation from earlier time periods was also introduced into the equation but had little impact on attitudes to currency policy as well.

8.

New Member States, Utilitarianism, Perceived Threat and Opposition to Integration

1. In some cases – like Hungary – the failure to turn out was partly because of the perceived lack of contestation in the referendum and partly an expression of growing doubts about the short-term implications of EU membership (see Fowler 2004; also see generally the 2004 special issue (no. 4) of West European Politics). 2. The exact question wording is ‘As you might know, 15 states of “Western” Europe form together the “European Union”. Would you say that your impressions of the aims and activities of the European are generally positive, neutral or negative?’ Question wording available from http://www.gesis.org/ en/data_service/eurobarometer/search/index.htm. 3. Turkey was granted candidacy status in the December 1999 European Council meeting in Helsinki. 4. Post-entry data are unavailable at the time of this writing. The percentages thinking EU membership is a good thing in the most recent report by the European Commission (for Eurobarometer 62) indicate that while there may have been a small post-entry surge in positive responses to this item, for most of the candidates, the change was not that dramatic. The report also indicates that the ten new member states tend to be the least enthusiastic regarding EU membership (see http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/ archives/eb/eb62/eb62first_en.pdf, accessed 11 April 2005). 5. Only the most recent of the Candidate Barometers is used for the analysis here. Prior CCEBs point to the same conclusions, however, and thus have been omitted for the sake of simplification of presentation of results. 6. Note that all variables in the equation are measured in exactly the same way as in previous chapters unless otherwise indicated. 7. These data can be found at http://www.fifoost.org/EU/statistik/. 8. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare/statistics/ for information regarding funding assistance granted to candidate countries. 9. A large number of observations has been lost due to the incorporation of the variables representing funding assistance from the EU, which could only be found for the CEE candidates. Note that the analysis was also conducted after omitting this variable (that is, with the entire group of candidates), and the results were virtually identical. Also, again note that the first and last of the CCEBs are both analysed here, in case there were major changes across these two. 10. Note that even when farmers are omitted from the analysis, the percentages who worry about harm to farmers were virtually identical to those displayed in Figure 8.5. 11. We again switch to an analysis of the most recent Candidate Eurobarometer only to avoid over-complicating the display of results.

200

Notes

12. Note that the analysis now focuses on the most recent of the Candidate Barometers to avoid over-complicating the display of results. 13. Again, we analyse the Autumn 2003 survey only for the sake of keeping presentation results manageable. 14. Analyses of attitudes to the EU in CEE have also indicated that attitudes to political and economic reform are important in explaining support for joining the EU (Cichowski 2000; Christin 2005; Rose and Haerpfer 1995), but these variables are omitted from the analysis here in order to maintain consistency with the rest of the book. 15. The items used to construct the index of perceptions of personal and national economic situations are as follows: ‘What are your expectations for the year to come: will 2004 be better, worse or the same, when it comes to . . . (a) your life in general, (b) the economic situation in (COUNTRY), (c) the financial situation of your household, (d) the employment situation in (COUNTRY), (e) your personal job situation’. Items (b) and (d) were combined to create the variable, perceptions of country’s economic situation, and items (c) and (e) were combined to create the variable, perceptions of personal economic situation. The index is coded such that high values represent a more positive outlook. 16. It could, of course, be contended that the better-educated simply have not yet been ‘bought off’ by the benefits of EU membership to the degree that this would impact symbolic sorts of threats (thus turning to the utilitarian argument to explain fears of loss of national identity); however, recall that the evidence regarding the EU-15 presented in Chapter 6 indicated that the better educated had not been ‘bought off’ at all when it came to their general attitudes to integration and that unlike in the candidate countries, education was not statistically significant in explaining attitudes to integration. It only became significant in explaining fear of loss of national identity and culture, as well as explaining variation in perceived symbolic threat from minorities.

9.

Conclusion

1. See ‘Britain faces battle to steer crisis-hit EU’, EUBusiness online (http:// www.ebusiness.com), 25 June 2005; ‘Can the constitution be saved?’, Economist online (http://www.economist.com), 18 April 2005.

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Index affirmative action 70 American Declaration of Independence (1776) 3 Anderson, Benedict 4 Anderson, Christopher 15, 16 Anderson and Guillory 15 Anderson and Reichert 16, 44 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 1 asylum policy, EU see immigration and asylum policies attachment to Europe 77, 191, 198 Balkans 7 Berghe, Pierre van den 5, 19 Blair, Tony 11, 194 Blank, Thomas 196 Blumer, Herbert 50 Blunkett, David 198 Bobo, Lawrence 50 Bobo and Kluegel 51 Bobo and Licari 108 Bodenhausen, Galen 72 Borzel, Tanja 111, 112 Bosch and Newton 24 Bretton Woods system 128 Brubaker, Roger 121 budget balance, EU 44–6, 47–8, 65, 96, 97, 101, 196 budget balance, EU and policy-making preferences 144, 147 Carey, Sean 28, 53, 69, 192 Carrubba, Clifford 11 Central and East European attitudes to EU 156–88, 192, 199, 200 Central and East European Enlargement, referenda 157, 199 Central and Eastern Europe/Central and East European Enlargement 156–7 Chong, Citrin and Conley 52 Christen, Thomas 200

Cichowski, Rachel 163, 200 citizens and the EU 2, 7, 8–12, 55 citizenship policy 121 Clarke, Harold et al. 194 Clarke and Dutt 194 cognitive mobilisation 14, 94–5, 98–9, 197 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 8, 11, 16, 42, 193 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) see foreign and defence policy-making, EU common market 7 Connor, Walker 3 context and policymaking preferences 138–9, 139–43, 146–7 cosmopolitanism 7, 12, 13 Council of Europe 8 cultural threat and minorities 83–7 currency, common 9, 10 currency policy-making see Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) customs union 7, 8 Davis and Davenport 194 defence policy-making see foreign and defence policy-making, EU de Gasperi Plan 125 democracy and the EU 21 Depression, Great 13 Dinan, Desmond 114, 125 Dublin Convention 121 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) policy-making 9, 128–30, 190 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) policy-making, attitudes 130–2, 133, 134–47, 190, 198 economic situation, personal (perceptions) 105, 107–8, 198, 200 209

210

Index

economic situation, country (perceptions) 105, 107, 198, 200 economic utilitarianism see utilitarianism economic voting 51, 195, 197 economy, and support for EU 16 education and group conflict 101–9 education and identity 4, 5 education and minority groups 56–7 education and policy-making preferences 134–5, 144–5, 146 education and support for EU 17, 32, 35–6, 46, 94–5, 97, 196, 197, 197 education and support for EU, new member states 163–72, 183–8, 200 egocentric utilitarianism 32, 38, 48, 63, 93–5, 190–1, 195, 197 Ehin, Piret 163 Eichenberg and Dalton 16, 44, 139 Eichengreen, Barry 115 Elysée Treaty 125 Enlargement, CEE 10–11, 156–7, 196 Enlargement, First 24, 25, 26–7, 79, 112, 118, 120–1, 124, 128 Enlargement, Eftan 25, 79–80, 114, 118–19, 120, 125, 128 Enlargement, Southern 24–5, 27, 79, 113, 118, 119, 124 Enlightenment 4 environmental policy, EU 111–12 environmental policy-making attitudes 112–14, 133, 190 Esser and Korte 121 ethnic minorities 50–1, 53, 54–8, 61–3, 69–70, 83–7, 191 euro 9, 11, 32, 59, 67, 115, 137, 198 European Central Bank (ECB) 9, 115 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 7, 8, 111, 194 European Commission 12 European Constitution 2, 10, 192, 194, 200 European Convention on Human Rights 121 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 115–16, 194 European Defence Community (EDC) 125

European Economic Community (EEC) 8, 111, 128 European Free Trade Area (EFTA) 1, 195 European Monetary System (EMS) 16, 129 European Political Cooperation (EPC) 125 Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 32, 130 farmers and support for EU 39–41, 42, 60–1, 63 farmers and support for EU, new member states 163–72, 199 Fichte’s Addresses 3 Fiorina, Morris 51 First Partition of Poland (1775) 3 Fischer, D. H. 197 Fiske, Susan 196 Fiske and Taylor 72 Forder, James 115 foreign and defence policy-making, EU 125–6 foreign and defence policy-making attitudes 126–8, 132, 133, 134–47 Forster and Wallace 125, 126 Fouchet Plan 125 Fowler, Brigid 199 Franklin, Marsh and McLaren 15, 194 Franklin, van der Eijk and Marsh 12, 194 Franklin and Wlezien 9, 12 free movement 31–2 French National Assembly, and EDC 125 French Revolution (1789, 1792) 3, 4 Freund, Kruglanski and Schpitizajzen 72 Funk 52 Funk and Garcia-Monet 51 Gabel, Matthew 14, 17, 22, 28, 32, 44 Garry, John et al. 194 Geddes, Andrew 198 Geertz, Clifford 5 Gelissen, John 52 Genscher-Colombo Plan 125

Index Gevers, J. M. P 52 governing party, support for 15–16 Green and Gerken 52 group conflict 17–19, 27, 49–68, 70, 100–1, 189–93 group conflict, measurement 53–61, 63 group conflict and new member state citizens 172–8, 183–8, 192 group conflict and policy-making attitudes 133, 135–6, 145, 146 group conflict and utilitarianism 101–9, 191 group identity 2, 10, 17–19, 50, 70–2, 96–109 group interest 51–2, 53, 56, 72, 95, 96–109 group self-interest 51–2, 69 Guild, Elspeth 198 Guiraudon, Virginie 122 Hammer, Tomas 121 Hanley, Sean 157 Hansen, Randall 198 Hapsburg Empire 3, 194 heuristics 72 historical institutionalism 2 Hobsbawm, Eric 5 Hoffman, Stanley 8 Hogg and Abrams 72 Hooghe and Marks 10, 69, 194 Hutchinson and Smith 4 Huysmans, Jef 122 identities, multiple 196 identity 5, 6, 7, 17–19, 70–92, 96–109, 191–2, 197, 198 immigration and asylum policies, EU 121–2, 198 immigration and asylum policy-making attitudes 122–5, 132, 134–47 immigration and immigrants, attitudes to 53–8, 63, 67, 83–7 income and group conflict 101–9 income and policy-making preferences 134–5, 144–5, 146 income and support for EU 17, 32, 35, 36–8, 41–2, 46–7, 94–5, 97–9, 190–1

211

income and support for EU, new member states 163–72, 183–8 individualism 49, 51 Inglehart, Ronald 13,14, 95, 194 in-group and in-group favouritism 2, 51, 71, 189, 190, 196 integration, European 6–7, 8–12 Intergovernmental Conference, Treaty on European Union 126 intergovernmentalism 2 International Social Survey 17, 74, 196 Janssen, Joseph I. H. 14 Jencks, Christopher 50 Justice and Home Affairs 122 K4 Council committee 122 Katz and Wessels 11 Kihlstrom and Cantor 72 Kinder, Donald 51 Kinder and Kiewiet 51, 195 Kinder and Sears 51 Kissinger, Henry 126 Kostakopoulou, Theodora 122, 198 Kritzinger, Sylvia 198 Krysan, Maria 196 Lahav, Gallya 12 language and nationalism 3, 4, 5 legislation, EU 1, 9, 11 legitimacy and the EU 191, 192, 193 Levine and Campbell 50 Lewis-Beck, Michael 51, 195 Liebfried and Pierson 115, 116 Lindberg and Scheingold 8 Linde and Ekman 194 linguistic threat and the EU 74, 88–91 Lipset, Seymour Martin 191 Long and Spears 196 Luther, Martin 4 Maastricht Treaty see Treaty on European Union Mansbridge, Jane 50 Maslow, Abraham 13 McLaren, Lauren 53, 69 minimal group experiments 70–2

212

Index

minorities and minority groups 50, 53, 54–8, 61–3, 69–70, 83–7, 97, 189, 191 modern European state 2, 3–6, 7 monetary policy see Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) policymaking monetary union 7 Monnet, Jean 6 Monroe, Hankin, and van Vechten 71 Morgan and Schwalbe 72 multilevel governance 1, 194 Napoleon 6 national attachment 75–7, 80 national identity 3–6, 7, 17–19, 71, 73–83, 189–91 national identity, new member states 178–82, 183, 186–8, 190 national identity and policy-making preferences 136–8, 145, 146, 191 national identity, threat of EU 7–10, 72–4, 96, 190 national interest 51, 96 national pride 74–5 national resources 53, 68, 190, 191–2 nationalism 2, 3–6 nations, nation-states 2, 3–6, 50, 53, 74 neofunctionalist 2 Neuberg and Newsom 72 Nice Treaty 10, 122, 194 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1, 8 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 125 Norton, Philip 1, 11 Nugent, Neill 114, 125 Nunn, Crockett and Williams 108 Oakes and Turner 72 occupation and group conflict 101–9 occupation and policy-making preferences 134–5, 144–5, 146, 190–1 occupation and support for integration 17, 32, 35, 39–41, 42–4, 46, 94–5, 97–9, 101, 190–1

occupation and support for integration, new member states 163–72, 183–8 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 8 Original Six 24, 25–6, 79, 112, 117–18, 119, 123, 127–8, 131–2 Ornbrant and Peura 121 Ottoman Empire 3, 194 out-group derogation 71 perceived winners (EU) see utilitarianism, perceptions permissive consensus 8 Persian Gulf War, second 126 Pleven Plan 125 policy-making preferences 116–21, 122–5, 126–8, 130–2, 133–46 policy-making preferences and national context see context and policy-making preferences political tolerance 108–9 poor member states (EU-15) and group conflict 65–7 post-materialism 12–14 Protocol on Social Policy 116 proxy model 15–16 Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) 116, 122 Quillian, Lincoln 50, 53, 111 race and racism 54, 55, 70 rationalism 16–17, 19, 31–48, 49, 51, 197 realistic group conflict 50–1, see also group conflict referenda, constitutional 10, 193, 194 referenda, EU 10–11, 15, 193, 194, 194, 198 regional loyalties 17 religious practices of minorities 83–7 resources, competition for or threat to 50, 55–6, 68, 69, 70, 71, 95 Rohrschneider, Robert 21 Rose and Haerpfer 200 Rubin and Hewstone 72, 196

Index Sanchez-Cuenca, Ignacio 198 Sandholtz and Zysman 130 satisfaction with democracy 15–16 Sbragia, Alberta 111 Scharpf, Fritz 115 schema theory 72 Schengen Agreement 121, 198 Sears and Funk 49, 51, 52 Sears, Hensler and Speer 70, 196 Sears and Lau 52 self-categorisation theory 72 self-esteem 18, 71, 72, 74, 196, 197 self-interest 49–50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 69–70, 93–6 Sen, Amartya 50 Shepherd, Robert 16 Single European Act (SEA) 8–9, 31, 111, 114 Sinnott, Richard 12 Smith, Anthony 196 social benefits and European integration 58–9, 63, 67, 190, 193 social benefits and minorities 57–8 social charter 59 social cohesion policies 114, 193 social identity theory 18, 70–2 social policy, EU 114–16, 190, 198 social policy-making attitudes 116–21, 132, 134–47, 190 social protection 32 societal interest 52 sociotropic evaluations 52 sociotropic utilitarianism 44–6, 63, 95, 190, 195 sovereignty 7, 8 Soysal, Yasemin 121 Stability and Growth Pact 1, 9, 94, 194, 195, 198 Stangor and Duan 72 Stangor and Thompson 72 state see modern European state stereotypes and cognitive structure 72 Stouffer, Samuel 108, 187 students and support for integration 35, 39–41, 42–4, 102–3

213

students and support for integration, new member states 163–72 Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 108 support for European integration, measurement 21–30 symbolic politics, symbolic threat 17–19, 27, 69–92, 100–1, 106–9, 189–92, 192–3 symbolic politics and new member state citizens 178–82, 183, 186–8, 190 symbolic politics and policy-making attitudes 133, 136–8, 145, 146 symbolic racism 70 symbolic threat measurement 83–91 Tajfel, Henri 18, 70, 71 taxation 9 Thomassen and Schmitt 10 trade benefits, EU 7, 8, 16, 44–6, 48, 96, 196, 196 trade benefits and policy-making preferences 144, 147 transfer of jobs, concerns in EU-15 59–60, 63, 190 Treaty of Amsterdam 111, 116, 122, 126 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty; TEU) 10, 11, 15, 80, 94, 111, 114, 116, 126, 130, 132 Tucker, Joshua et al. 163 Turkey and the EU 193, 199 Tverdova and Anderson 163 unemployment and minorities 58 unemployment policy, EU see social policy unselfish behaviour 50 utilitarianism 10, 16–17, 19, 31–48, 49–50, 69, 73, 93, 95–109, 189–91, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198 utilitarianism and new member state citizens 161–72, 183–8, 192 utilitarianism and policy-making attitudes 133–5, 144–5, 146 utilitarianism, perceptions 38–44, 49, 94, 191

214

Index

utilitarianism, perceptions, new member state citizens 161–3, 192 Waever et al. 73, 136, 196, 196 Weiss, Hilde 178 welfare policy, EU see social policy

Westphalia, Treaty of 3 de Winter and Swyngedouw 136, 139, 146 World Trade Organization (WTO) 8 World War Two 6, 13, 14, 73 Yugoslavia

126