Hungarian Linguistics

HUNGARIAN LINGUISTICS

LINGUISTIC & LITERARY STUDIES IN EASTERN EUROPE (LLSEE) The emphasis of this scholarly series is on recent developments in Linguistic and Literary Research in Eastern Europe; it includes analysis, translations and syntheses of current research as well as studies in the history of linguistic and literary scholarship.

Founding Editor: John Odmark † General Editor: Philip A. Luelsdorff

Volume 4

Ferenc Kiefer (ed.) Hungarian Linguistics

HUNGARIAN LINGUISTICS

edited by FERENC KIEFER University of Budapest

JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY AMSTERDAM / PHILADELPHIA 1982

© Copyright 1982 - John Benjamins B.V. ISSN 0165 7712 / ISBN 90 272 1508 1 No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any other means, without written permission from the publisher.

CONTENTS Introduction Marianne Bakró-Nagy

1

On the reconstruction of proto-meanings 7 Ivan Fônagy He is only joking (Joke, metaphor and language develop­ ment) 31 Péter Hajdú On the syntax of the negative auxiliary in Samoyed...109 Robert Hetzron Non-applicability as a test for category definitions.131 Sándor Károly Intransitive-transitive derivational suffixes in Hunga­ rian 185 János Kelemen Lukács ' s ideas on language

245

István Kenesei The reincarnation of raising (or how to raise NPs with­ out a raising rule) 269 Ferenc Kiefer The aspectual system of Hungarian. 293 Katalin E. Kiss Samuel Brassai's theory of the sentence

331

András Komlósy Deep structure cases reinterpreted 351 Ilona Molnar Existential relations in "hogy"-sentences in Hungarian 387

Ferenc Papp Foreign language environment and linguistic change: two examples 427 Csaba Pléh Subject and topic in Hungarian: some psycholinguistic evidence to increase the confusion 447 Katalin Radics Affixed person-marking paradigms - a history and typolo­ gy 467 Anna Szabolcsi Model theoretic semantics of performatives 515 Zsigmond Telegdi On the formation of the concept of 'linguistic sign' and on Stoic language doctrine 537 Robert Vago Abstract /w/ in Hungarian 589

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Marianne Bakró-Nagy, Institute of Linguistics, Hungarian Acade­ my of Sciences, 1014 Budapest, Szentháromság u.2. Ivan Fónagy, CNRS-Paris , 1, squ. Claude Debussy, 9 2160 Antony, France and University of Szeged, Hungary. Peter Hajdú, Institute of Linguistics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1014 Budapest, Szentháromság u.2. Robert Hetzron, Department of Germanic and Slavic Languages, Uni­ versity of California, Santa Barbara, CAL 93106. Sandor Karoly, Department of General Linguistics, University of Szeged, Hungary and Institute of Linguistics, Hungarian Aca­ demy of Sciences, 1014 Budapest, Szentháromság u.2. Janos Kelemen, Institute of Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1054 Budapest, Szemere utca 10. István Kenesei, Department of English, University of Debrecen, Debrecen. Ferenc Kiefer, Institute of Linguistics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1014 Budapest, Szentháromság u.2. Katalin E.Kiss, Department of English, University of Budapest, 1054 Budapest, Pesti Barnabás u.l. András Komlósy, Institute of Linguistics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1014 Budapest, Szentháromság u.2. Ilona Molnár, Institute of Linguistics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1014 Budapest, Szentháromság u.2. Ferenc Papp, Department of Slavic Languages, University of Deb­ recen, Debrecen, Hungary. Csaba Pléh, Department of Psychology, University of Budapest, 1054 Budapest, Pesti Barnabás u.l. Katalin Radies, Institute of Linguistics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1014 Budapest, Szentháromság u.2. Anna Szabolcsi, Institute of Linguistics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1014 Budapest, Szentháromság u.2. Zsigmond Telegdi, Department of General Linguistics, University of Budapest, 1054 Budapest, Pesti Barnabás u.l. Robert Vago, Department of Linguistics, Queens College, The City University of New York, Flushing, New York 11367.

I n t r o d u c t i o n This volume contains papers on general linguistics written by Hungarian scholars. The term 'general linguistics' is not easy to define. Is a paper on Hungarian at the same time a study in general linguistics? Certainly not. But it could be considered so if it contained some general conclu­ sions concerning the structure of language. In general, a study in general linguistics should tell us something novel about the structure of language. Evidently, then, my prima­ ry concern has been to select papers which contain, beyond the descriptive aspect, some general linguistic insights as well. Of course, various linguistic schools may require dif­ ferent degrees of explicitness. This is true of Hungarian lin­ guistics as well. It should not be surprising then that the general linguistic aspects are not always made fully explicit in the papers of the present volume. General linguistics does not mean theoretical linguis­ tics. Not all linguistic schools or trends can be said to have already acquired the status of a theory. Although the ultimate goal of linguistic research is (or should be) the construction of an appropriate theory, this goal cannot be achieved but gradually. Present-day general linguistics includes therefore theoretical approaches as well as descriptive ones. Given this state of the art it does not come as a surprise that the papers of the present collection show an unequal degree of

2

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

theoretical orientation. Some of them have been conceived of in a more descriptive spirit, others have put more emphasis on theoretical issues. It is perhaps worthwhile to point out that none of the papers of this volume represents Hungarian linguistic tradi­ tion, that is, given the Hungarian linguistic context, none of them can be termed traditional. In order to provide some back­ ground against which these papers should be evaluated, let me briefly evoke some of the most salient features of Hungarian linguistic tradition. (This tradition was predominant between the two World Wars but for various reasons it was rather in­ fluential until quite recently.) (i) The Neogrammarian school's' influence on Hungarian linguistics was more lasting than in the neighboring coun­ tries (especially Czechoslovakia and Rumania) or in Western Europe. The study of contemporary language was a relatively late achievement. Until rather recently (the late fifties) des­ criptive studies were not considered to be a worthy scholarly enterprise. Hence no descriptive tradition could develop in Hungary. Research in linguistics focused on etymology, histo­ rical phonetics, morphology and (to a lesser extent) on histo­ rical syntax. (ii) Linguistics was part of cultural history. Cultural history also includes literature. Linguistics and literature were thus close allies in Hungarian tradition. To study the language of writers and poets was one of the favorite research topics. Everyday language was not even envisaged (except for dialects) as a possible subject of investigation. (iii) The description of the Hungarian dialects was con­ sidered as one of the main tasks of linguistic scholarship. However, it was not the descriptive aspect per se that was im­ portant since dialectology, too, served historical purposes. The description of dialects was utilized for making inferences about earlier stages of language development ('geographic

INTRODUCTION

3

mappings'). (iv) In grammars which, of course, existed but were written mostly for elementary and secondary education, linguistic examples would exclusively be taken from literary works. John Lotz whose Hungarian grammar was the first descriptive grammar of Hungarian conceived of 'outside of' Hungarian linguistic tradition (published in Stockholm in 1938) had to point out clearly and resolutely that he had invented all his examples but these examples were as good Hungarian as cited examples would have been since he was a native speaker of Hungarian. Other Hungarian grammars were definitely prescrip­ tive rather than descriptive. (v) From what has been said so far the next feature of Hungarian traditional linguistics already follows: it was al­ most exclusively data-oriented. It produced a series of impor­ tant dictionaries: etymological dictionaries, writers' dictio­ naries, explanatory dictionaries, dictionaries of place names, descriptions of dialectal words, etc. (vi) Hungarian linguistics was not completely free from certain nationalistic traits. There are multifarious social and political reasons which may explain nationalism in scholarship and even justify it to some extent. At this place, however, I cannot go into the details of this question. To be sure, to inquire into the past of the Hungarian people meant to further national consciuosness. Linguistics being part of history had to take its share in this work. The historical-cultural tradi­ tion was soon labelled Hungarian tradition and linguistic trends coming from abroad in modern times were alien to this tradition and thus they were looked upon with suspicion. (Nota bene: Hun­ garian linguistics was quite open to foreign influence in the 19th century and during the first two decades of the 20th cen­ tury) . Two outstanding exceptions should however be remembered: Gyula Laziczius and Zoltán Gombocz, professors at Budapest Uni­ versity. Unfortunately, their influence on Hungarian linguistics

4

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

remained rather sporadic. (vii) Until the late fifties Hungarian linguistic life could go on according to tradition. The Prague school, in spite of the geographical nearness, had practically no influence on it. De Saussure's or Hjelmslev's works were completely unknown. Psychological theories of by-gone times have lived a lasting and secret life in the views of many Hungarian linguists. These views together with the alliance with history and literature meant a definite refusal of any logical (exact, formal) approach to language study. (viii) At the end of the fifties the situation began to change. Descriptive studies were furthered and appreciated. One could often encounter the names of Bloomfield, Sapir, Harris, and de Saussure in linguistic writings, though, of course, there was no question of a descriptive breakthrough. Mathema­ tical methods, too, became popular and in the early sixties several researchers were working in the area of computational linguistics. By the mid-sixties the first generative studies on Hungarian appeared. Historical linguistics, especially Uralistics, became more receptive to new ideas. Quite a few lin­ guists got interested in problems of the philosophy of language, psycholinguistics and language typology. In sum, Hungarian lin­ guistic life has became more diversified and more international, My characterization of Hungarian traditional linguistics in no way implies that I do not acknowledge the results obtained by this school. Traditional linguistics did a good deal of im­ portant work in various fields. I have already mentioned the large number of dictionaries compiled which are undoubtedly in­ dispensable for most (including, of course, descriptive) lin­ guistic work. The recording and the description of historical documents, too, were important achievements. But traditional linguistics was definitely one-sided and biased in many res­ pects and it was too 'national' in its methodology and philo­ sophy.

INTRODUCTION

5

It should be clear by now why the papers in this anthology are not traditional: they are not traditional because neither descriptive nor theoretical orientation belonged to tradition. The present anthology is thus not meant to provide a comprehensive overview of Hungarian linguistic life. Lingustic works conceived in the spirit of Hungarian tradition have not been included in this volume. Neither have been works in the fields of aDplied and computational linguistics. On the other hand, however, the present collection is meant to be represen­ tative with respect to Hungarian general linguistics. Most of the approaches are represented in this volume. Thus, the papers may give the reader an idea of what kind of topics are dealt with in present-day Hungarian general linguistics. The topics include the philosophy of language (J.Kelemen), psycholinguistics (Cs. Pléh), generative syntax (I.Kenesei), historical linguistics (M.Bakro-Nagy and to some extent F.Papp), the history of lin­ guistics (Zs.Telegdi), the history of Hungarian linguistics (K.E.Kiss), language typology (A.Komlósy and K.Radies), genera­ tive phonology (represented here by a paper by R.Vago who lives in the U.S.A.), Montague grammar (A.Szabolcsi), more or less theo­ retically oriented descriptive studies of various linguistic phenomena as negation, suffixation, aspect, focus, existential sentences (P.Hajdú, R.Hetzron (U.S.A.), I.Molnár, F.Kiefer, S. Karoly) and 'interdisciplinary' (I.Fónagy). Of course, these labels are not exclusive, several articles could be classified according to more than one label. As to the qualification 'Hungarian' it should be noted that it does not mean 'living in Hungary'. But it certainly means that the person's work either centers around the Hungarian language or it has close ties to present-day Hungarian linguis­ tics, or both. The study of the particular features of Hungarian may provide important contributions to general linguistics. And the label 'Hungarian general linguistics' should cover this as­ pect as well. In this sense Hungarian general linguistics can be done anywhere in the world: in Paris and New York, in Santa

6

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Barbara and Stockholm just as well as in Hungary. Most of the papers were originally written in Hungarian. I wish to express my gratitude to Farrel Ackerman (Berkeley) who took upon himself the laborious work of checking the English of the translations. Without his help this anthology would con­ tain even more flaws. I hope that the English reader will for­ give the remaining stylistic blunders and clumsy formulations. Paris, September 1979

Ferenc Kiefer

ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PROTO-MEANINGS Marianne Sz.Bakró-Nagy 1.0. The aim of this paper is to show how componential analysis can be made use of in diachronic semantic analysis, more exactly, in determining meanings of lexemes belonging to a reconstructed proto-language, that is, proto-meanings. What I am going to say at this place will exclusively apply to unwritten languages and families of languages — in par­ ticular, the Uralic family. In order to reconstruct the ori­ ginal (proto-) language (s) of such families, some methods that would possibly be discarded elsewhere may be called for. I take componential analysis to be one such method, fit for the semantic investigation of the original, common word stock of languages lacking written documents. My reasons for this are as follows: (a) Research in historical semantics tries to throw light on relations of known (documented) meanings. "With written languages of different levels scholars can check hy­ potheses in two directions because they have documented veri­ fication which provides relative chronology. Scholars who work with unwritten languages cannot do this in quite the same way since they have only one DOCUMENTED time-point, namely the present." (Haas 1970:116) The task of reconstruction, therefore, is, by exploring common features of present-day,

8

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

known mean ings, to try to set up the original, or primary, meaning(s), out of which the daughter language meanings can be deduced. (b) According to current practice - at least as far as Uralistics is concerned - meanings reconstructed for the protolanguage are given in some natural language, which is wrong in two respects. On the one hand, if we take our proto-language to be a hypothetical, metalinguistic system that was never spoken as a natural language in the form we reconstructed it, then each item of this metalinguistic system is necessarily metalinguistic. On the other hand, if we claim that all seman­ tic features which we use to describe meanings in daughter lan­ guages are items of a metalanguage, then in postulating a protomeaning we cannot

'translate' a cluster of these features, or­

dered in some hierarchy, into any natural language, even if there happens to be a natural language in which the meaning concerned is absolutely identical with the reconstructed meta­ linguistic

(proto-) meaning. Moreover, it is highly

improbable

that a natural language could be found in which for any lexeme all meanings could be matched exactly, say, with the correspon­ ding proto-meanings reconstructed for Proto-Finno-Ugric forth PFU)

(cf. the features of the proto-meaning

(hence­

reconstructed

below, e.g. with those of h i t ) . (c) The inquiry into semantic changes may reveal inter­ mediate levels that may have existed between the level of pro­ to-meanings and the level of present-day meanings

(cf. the

tables depicting the direction of semantic changes b e l o w ) . Con­ sequently, there remains less possibility of explaining

changes

in matters and things by virtue of semantic changes. 1.1. The first step towards the reconstruction of a proto-meaning is an analysis of the semantic features of related lexemes. As is known, the only type of meaning that can be ana­ lysed by means of componential analysis is denotative

(or cog­

nitive) meaning. Notice.that though an etymologist, in setting up meaning correspondences, has to consider all meanings of a

ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PROTO-MEANINGS

9

particular word at the beginning, when he is confronting mean­ ings in various languages; he can only work with one type of meaning, namely denotative meaning. He filters out of the to­ tal meaning at his disposal (representing diverse types of meaning) just what is identical in all individual senses, what is relatively constant, that is, the core meaning. Of course, the investigation of semantic changes is another matter, since such changes can be induced by connotation. In sum, then, we can state that in setting up semantic correspondences we can only work with a type of meaning that can be described in terms of semantic features. 1.2. Feature analysis may be connected with certain tech­ nical problems. Let me mention but one of these problems here. It is well-known, at least for Uralists, that our data about Uralic languages differ widely both from a qualitative and a quantitative point of view. There are languages and dialects about which we have plenty of reliable material but there are also some others of which we know quite little. In many cases we have at our disposal one dictionary meaning only for a given lexical item. This uneven supply of data may make analysis and reconstruction uncertain. However, Uralistics always had to put up with scanty information. Our results can be easily modified as soon as new data become available. "But more evidence, or dif­ ferent evidence - the discovery of a new daugther language, for instance - can bring new insights which may at any time make it necessary to change the reconstruction..." (Haas 1970:130). 1.3. I claim that in analysing meaning we have to first define the semantic field to which the given meaning belongs (cf. Bakró 1978:388). This claim needs justification. Semantic fields and semantic features are very closely interrelated (cf. e.g. A.Lehrer 1974:66-72, Nida 1975:174-193, but cf. also Lyons: 326 for the opposite view). Lexemes belonging to the same field will exhibit some common features and whether certain lexemes belong to the same field or not can only be decided on the ba­ sis of shared features. Which is primary then: the investigation

10

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

of field relations or componential analysis? "...domains can­ not be set up without at least a preliminary analysis of the componential structure, and the resulting componential analy­ sis reflects the domain classification. It is true that such an approach runs the risk of circular reasoning, but this dan­ ger is inherent in the analysis of any system. It is impossible to understand completely the relevance of any part of the whole until the whole has been analyzed, and yet one cannot under­ stand the structure of the whole until its parts have been ana­ lyzed." (Nida et al. 1977:148) It would lead us far from our main topic if we dwelt on this problem at more length - all I want to point out here is that defining the appropriate field seems to be primary since this field will coincide to some ex­ tent with the respective notional sphere. Subsequent feature analysis will settle the question of whether the preliminary field assignment was right or not. An inquiry into semantic fields excludes preliminary in­ ternal reconstruction, however. Let me give some reasons for this . Let us assume that there is a language in which a given lexeme has the following denotative meanings: 'hit', 'kill', 'resemble'. If we disregard what we know wbout Hungarian which would suggest a connection between üt 'hit' and megöl 'kill' through agyonüt 'strike dead 1 , and a connection between iit 'hit' and hasonlít 'resemble' through (apjâra) lit 'take after (one's father)' - we shall have to say that in this case, at least from a synchronic point of view, we have to do with ho­ monyms. It is easy to see that these meanings belong to three different fields: 'hit' belongs to the field which also contains 'strike', 'slap', 'smack', 'smite', 'beat' and the like; 'kill' to the field which also contains 'murder', 'smash to death', 'strike dead', 'beat to death', etc., while 'resemble' to the same field as 'remind', 'take after' and others. Conse­ quently, 'hit', 'kill' and 'resemble' can only be analysed with­ in their own separate semantic fields. Let us assume further-

ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PROTO-MEANINGS

11

more that this lexeme has etymological correspondences in ge­ netically related languages with the meaning 'cut1. By apply­ ing the internal reconstruction of meanings for 'hit', 'kill' and 'resemble' the only common feature would be [Event] .('hit' and 'kill' have additional features in common as [Change] , [Activity] , e t c but. these do not appear in 'resemble' since this lexeme contains [State] , etc.) It is quite evident that the feature [Event] is not sufficient in order to relate our lexemes to 'cut'. If, however, we treat 'hit', 'kill' and 're­ semble' separately by comparing each of them with 'cut', it can be seen that one gets a satisfactory match between 'hit' and 'cut' while 'kill' and 'resemble' can be traced back to 'hit' as secondary meanings. In sum, then, I shall set out to analyse the denotative meanings of the corresponding words in each related language in terms of semantic features. Next, these features will be exa­ mined within the appropriate semantic fields. 2.0. Let me start with some preliminary remarks. (1) In the analysis below I shall not present in their entirety the field to which the particular meanings under discussion be­ long; the enumeration of all the data and all the sources would be a lengthy enterprise. But in order to justify the selection of a feature I shall in each case specify which other meanings motivate the type of opposition expressed in that particular feature. In the selection of features, that is, in the setting up of oppositions I have taken Leech (1974:95-125) as a point of departure. For the sake of illustration consider the follow­ ing example. Numbers are used to facilitate reference. Vogul (Northern dialects)

'kick'

Oppositions (1)

[+Event]

↔

[-Event] : (i)

[+Entity ]

12

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(2)

[+Change ]

↔

(3)

[+Activity]

(4)

[+Physical activity]

[-Change] : (ii)

↔

[+State]

[-Activity] : (iii) [+Process] ↔

:

(iv)

(v)

(vi)

(5)

[+Contact]

↔

[-Contact] :

(vii)

[+Communication]

( v i i i ) [+Motion] (ix)

[+Transfer]

(x)

[+Physiological]

(xi) (6)

[+Animate]

(7)

[+Human]

↔

(xii)

↔

[-Human]

(8)

[+with part of body]

(9)

[+with foot]

↔

↔

[+Inanimate] :

(xiii)

[+Animal]

(xiv)

[+Plant]

[-with part of body] : (xv) [+with whole body] [-with foot] : (xvi)

↔

(10) [+Inanimate object] (11)

[+Discrete]

(12) [+Forcefully]

↔ ↔

(xvii) [+Animate object] [-Discrete]

: (xviii) [+Continuous]

[-Forcefully] : (xix) [+Softly]

Features

(1)-(12) are the semantic features of 'kick', while features (i)-(xix) are the features that are in opposition to

the features (1)-(12). Let me mention a few examples for features (ii)- (xix) :'

ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PROTO-MEANINGS

13

(ii)

[+State] : 'feel cold' [ +Physical] ; 'know' [+Intellectual] ; 'fear' [+Emotive] , etc. (iii) [+Process] : 'freeze' [+Physical] ; 'think' [+Intellectual] ; 'come to hate'[+Emotional] ;'see' [+Sensoryl , etc. (iv) [+Intellectual activity] : 'learn', 'decide', etc. (v) [+Emotive activity] : 'mourn', etc. (vi) [+Sensory activity] : 'look', 'listen to', etc. (vii) [+Communication] : 'talk', 'show', etc. (viii) [+Motion] : 'take flight', 'dive', etc. (ix) [+Transfer] : 'get', 'steal', etc. (x) [+Physiological] : 'drink', 'eat', etc. (xi) [+Complex activities] : 'build', 'cook', etc. (6) and (xii) are features describing the agent of the activi­ ties. Verbs having an agent [ +Inanimate] cannot be described by the features [+Process] or [+Activity] . For example, 'freeze' is [+Process] when speaking of humans or animals but +Change ] when speaking of inanimates (e.g. water) because in the former cases [-(-Process] can be opposed to something else - [+Activity] - but in the latter one it cannot be opposed to anything. The same applies to plants too (see below). (xiii) (xv)

[+Animal] : 'stamp (horse)', 'swoop (kite)', etc. [+with whole body] : 'lean on', 'kock against', 'push',

(xvi)

etc. [fwith other parts of body] : 'grasp', 'bite', 'touch',

etc. (xvii) [+Animate object] : a feature describing the object of the activity, e.g. 'bring down', etc. (xviii) [+Continuous] : 'catch', 'smooth', 'trample', etc. (xix) [+Softly] : 'smooth', 'touch', etc. (2) Since only denotative meanings can be taken into account in setting up correspondences, I shall dispense with the presenta­ tion of any nondenotative meaning in my data.

14

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(3) In an etymology (whenever possible) only root stems are to be considered. In field investigation, however, meanings of derivatives nave to be taken into consideration as well. 2.1. In selecting my example it was not my aim to find an etymology involving many languages, revealing very compli­ cated semantic relations and leading to a proto-meaning which is hard to reconstruct. On the contrary, I have tried to find an example which can also illustrate the theoretical problems raised in the first part of this paper (see also Bakró 1978), and one which we do not encounter so frequently in the litera­ ture. PFU *caŋ3-

'hit'

Mordvin Erza dial, čavo-, Moksha dial, šavo- 'hit', 'beat', 'strike/beat sy dead' (Erza and Moksha dials.); 'kill' (Moksha dial.) ~ Cheremis Mountain dial, čan e-, Uržum dial, ćoŋe-, Biask čoŋe, ferie- 'make a cut', 'carpenter a blockhouse' (Mount, dial., Uržum dial.) ; 'carve (a cutting in) ' (Biask dial.) ~ Ostyak Vah-Vasyugan dial, čo -, Tremyugan dial. čok-, Demjanka dial, čon , Nisjam dial, šun _, Kasim dial . šoŋχ Obdorks dial, soŋχ 'kick our (horse) , kick, trip sy up, swoop (up)on sg, sy (kite)' ~ Vogul Tavda dial, šaŋk-, LowerLosva dial. sanV-,Middle-Losva dial, sēŋk-, Pelym dial, sank-, Northern dial, san w- 'kick, kick out (horse)'. These correspondences were first set up by L.Honti (1978:370). It may seem curious that I have chosen an etymology that con­ tains the reconstructed proto-meaning as well - but at the end of the analysis it will be shown why and in what way this pro­ to-meaning is in need of correction. In my analysis I shall not distinguish between 'semantic markers' and 'distinguishers' (cf. Fodor-Katz 1964:497), that is, I subscribe to Weinreich's (1971) and Bierwisch's (1969) view that such a distinction is unwarranted. Nor shall I categorize features in any other way, contrary

ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PROTO-MEANINGS

15

to e.g. Nida's (1975:32-87) conception. I have drawn largely on the papers by Voyles (1973) , Fillmore (1971) and Gulstad (1974). Let us proceed in the order of languages as given in the etymology above. All features should be taken to have the specification '+' . Mordvin As we saw above, both dialects share the meanings I. 'hit', II. 'strike dead' and III. 'beat', while the Erza dialect also has the meaning IV. 'kill'. I.

'hit' Event Change Activity Physical Contact Human with hand/tool Object Discrete Forcefully

The verb refers to a [Physical activity] , as opposed to all verbs denoting an intellectual, emotive and sensory activity. The agent of the action is [Human] as opposed to activities done by animals (though these can in many cases coincide with actions done by humans). The feature [Contact] opposes this verb to other meanings such as communication, motion, etc. The feature [with hand] refers to the instrument of the action. This latter feature opposes our verb to others having [Contact] which have the feature [with whole body] , 'push', 'thrust' , or where the contact is carried out by some other part of the body, e.g. [with foot] : 'tread', 'kick' ; [with finger] : 'knock', etc. The feature [with tool] figures optionally in

16

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

connection with the feature [ with hand] , for in both Mordvin dialects there are other meanings in which [with hand] and [with tool] go together, but we also find meanings where this is not the case, for example, when we have to do with the mean­ ing 'coming into contact with some particular instrument, e.g. with a stick as in 'strike', 'slash', 'stab', etc. The feature [Discrete] stands in contrast with meanings denoting conti­ nuous action, e.g. 'press', 'smooth', etc., the feature [Force­ fully] is needed in order to keep apart 'hit' from activities involving comparatively lesser force, e.g. 'touch', 'feel', 'stroke', etc. Finally, the feature [object] refers to the thing which undergoes, or is affected by, the action (it can be both animate and inanimate). Other features come readily to mind as well, e.g. a fea­ ture specifying the speed of hitting since the semantic field in question also includes meanings referring to quick hitting. On the other hand, there are no lexemes referring to slow hitting. It is quite possible, however, that the neutral 'hit' stands for slow hitting. Since, however, we do not want to allow for features that are used merely to distinguish the meaning of two lexical items, the feature about speed will not be included among the semantic features. Another candidate is the sound or loudness of hitting: we can find lexemes within the semantic field of hitting whose meanings can differ in this respect {'e.g. swish, crack, etc.) but, once again, there are no lexemes referring to 'hitting without sound' and it would seem that from a semantic point of view the information about the loudness of hitting seems to be irrelevant for the description of 'hit'. It seems to be equally implausible to postulate a feature for the re­ sult of hitting in order to account for the results of acti­ vities such as those denoted by the English verbs 'strike down', 'strike into', 'strike off', 'strike through', etc. II.

'strike/beat dead'

ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PROTO-MEANINGS

17

Event Change Activity Physical Contact Human with hand/tool Human/Animal Continuous Forcefully Cause-not-living The first six features are the same as above, the feature [Human/ Animal] contrasts with all meanings denoting an activity that re­ fers to hitting an [ Inanimate object] or [plant] , while the feature [Cause-not-living] stands in opposition to the fea­ ture [Cause-living] . As we can see, two features sharply distinguish 'hit' and 'strike/beat dead' from each other. The last feature specifies the meaning in question is belonging to a separate semantic field in the Erza dialect. III.

'beat, thrash' Event Change Activity Physical Contact Human with hand/tool Animate object Continuous Forcefully

Most of these features are the same as above, the feature [Ani-

18

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

mate object] contrasts with the meaning of the objects of e.g. 'destroy', 'smash', etc. IV.

'kill' Event

1

Change Activity Physical Contact Human with hand/tool Animate object Continuous Cause-not-living The first nine features link up this meaning to the preceding one but IV. belongs to a different semantic field from III. becai; of the presence of the last feature [Cause-not-living] . This feature implies that the action can only affect an animate being, it cannot have an [ Inanimate object] . The same feature contrasts this meaning with those meanings that have the fea­ ture [ Cause-living] , as e.g. 'bear', etc. It should be noted that [ Cause-not-living] permits, as the performer of the action, not only [Animate] but [inanimate] as well: a living creature can also get killed by lightning. This latter interpretation is, however, excluded for IV. because of the presence of the feature [Physical activity] (the latter interpretation would only be compatible with the feature [physical process] ) . Cheremis Here we have to analyse three meanings: Meaning V. 'make a cut' and Meaning VI. 'carpenter (a blockhouse)'

can be found

both in dialects Mountain and Uržum, Meaning VI. calls for

ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PROTO-MEANINGS

19

some comments. It seems to be evident that this meaning in­ volves the construction of a roughly carpentered wooden buil­ ding. We know that the Cheremis lived in blockhouses. These houses as well as other buildings were carpentered out of logs. Notice that Meaning VII. in dialect Mountain also refers to carpentering blockhouses. Logs were fitted together according to a certain system (bond). To make them join they were carved in the appropriate places. Hence we have to do with the meaning 'carve a cutting (in a log)' in this case. V.

'make a cut' Event Change Activity Physical Contact Human with tool Cause-enter Inanimate object Discrete

Again, the first six features coincide with those of 'hit'. The feature [ with tool] contrasts this meaning with all mean­ ings in which the feature [with part of body] occurs . The fea­ ture [ Cause-enter] can also appear in the meanings of 'cut', 'slash', 'cleave', 'sever', 'peel', 'flay', 'carve', 'prick', 'stab' and others. VI.

'carpenter (a building)' Event Change Activity Physical

20

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

The feature [ Complex activity] is in opposition to the fea­ tures [Contact] , [Movement] , etc., the feature [creation] to the features [Cooking] , etc., the feature [Building] (descri­ bing the result of creation) to the features [Furniture] , [vehicle] etc. VII.

'Carve (a cutting in a log)'

All features coincide with the features of meaning V. 'make a cut' except for the feature [Cause-not-continuous] . This feature is opposed to [Cause-continuous] which occurs, for example, in the meaning of 'plaster up'. Ostyak In Ostyak we encounter four meanings: VIII. 'kick out (horse)', IX. 'kick', X. 'trip sy up' and XI. 'swoop (kite)'. This time we shall depart from this order of the meanings and start with the description of meaning IX. 'kick'

since this

ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PROTO-MEANINGS

21

will make the analysis of meaning VIII. easier. IX.

'kick'

Here we have to posit the feature [Human] since - at least as far as the Ostyak material is concerned - the agent can only be a human being. We also encounter here the feature [Con­ tact] but, unlike in the case of 'hit' , it is not associated with the feature [with hand] or with the feature [with tool] but rather with the feature [with foot] . The feature [Dis­ crete] opposes this meaning to meanings with [continuous] such as 'tread' and the feature [Forcefully] to meanings con­ taining the feature [Softly] such as 'smooth', 'touch', etc. It is easy to see that the only important feature of IX. not shared by 'hit' is [with foot]. VIII.

'kick out (horse)'

22

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

The meaning VIII. thus differs from that of 'kick' insofar as it contains the features [ Motion] and [Animal] . On the other hand, there is no need of further specifications with respect to what kind of animal performs the action since from the point of view of semantic description it is immaterial whether we have knowledge of other animals that can kick out like a horse. The feature [Animal] is sufficient in order to keep apart this meaning from similar meanings referring to a [Human] activity. X.

' t r i p sy

up'

The f irst seven features in X. are the same as in 'kick'. No­ tice that the feature [with foot] must be posited here because a person can be hampered in moving in other ways, with other parts of the body as well, e.g. [with hand] : 'hold' , 'grasp', 'clutch', etc., [with tool] : 'bind', 'trap', etc. The fea­ ture [Cause-not-move] is necessary in order to contrast this meaning with other meanings containing the feature [Cause-move] , e.g. 'throw', 'shoot (an arrow)' or 'kick away' which may, of

ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PROTO-MEANINGS

23

course, have any one of the features [with hand], with tool] and [with foot]. One may wonder whether tripping somebody in fact stops him from moving. From a semantic point of view, however, it is completely irrelevant what happens to the person who is tripped. XI.

'swoop

(kite)'

The first five features are the same as in the meaning of 'kick', the last three are shared by the meaning of 'trip sy up'. The feature [with whole body] , however, is not present in the meanings discussed thusfar. Otherwise, it would be superfluous to specify - in terms of features - whether the kite really performs the action with its whole body or just with its wings, talons, etc., since there are no other lexemes which would differ from XI. or from each other in this respect. Vogul We are faced with two meanings here: Meaning XII. 'kick out (horse)' and'Meaning XIII. 'kick, keep on kicking'. Both meanings also occur among the meanings found in Ostyak; nence they need not be analysed here.

24

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

2.2. On the basis of the above analysis the following seman­ tic fields emerge: all meanings belong to the field of physi­ cal activity. Within this field four major subfields can be discerned: the field of contact, the field of killing, the field of motion and the field of complex activity (creating in­ volved) . Within the field of contact further subfields can be determined: hitting ('hit', 'beat', 'strike dead'), kicking ('kick'), hampering ('trip U P ' , 'swoop') and cutting ('make a cut', 'carve'). 2.3. The next step consists in the selection of common fea­ tures. The features and the meanings discussed are summarized in Appendix 1 in order to facilitate survey. Appendix 1 clearly shows which features occur most fre­ quently in the 13 meanings. These meanings have the following four common features: [Event] , [change] , [Activity] , and [physical J . The features [contact] and [Human ] occur ten times, the feature [Discrete] nine times, the feature [Force­ fully] seven times, the features [Animate object] and [inani­ mate object] six times. A feature which describes the instru­ ment of the action occurs 17 times. I want to stipulate that it is from these features that the proto-meaning should be constructed. 2.4. By making use of the most frequent features in the des­ cription of the meanings I.-XIII., we end up with the follow­ ing specification of the proto-meaning at hand: x'a physical ac­ tivity during which a person comes into contact with somebody or something once, forcefully, and with some instrument'. As can be easily seen, this definition roughly corresponds to the meaning of the English verb hit. Hence we are entitled to posit PFU *čaŋ3- 'hit'. In an etymological dictionary in which we want to include the entire common word stock of a family of languages such lengthy, inferred definitions would certainly impair intelli­ gibility. Once we realize, however, that (a) proto-meanings are not elements of a natural language but hypothetical constructs

ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PROTO-MEANINGS

25

and that (b) the meaning of a lexeme taken from a natural lan­ guage, however strongly we try to abstract from our knowledge of that meaning, will influence our thinking, eliminating such definitions does not seem at all expedient. For nothing can assure us that in the semantic structure of that hypotheti­ cal proto-language hit would assume the same position as it does, for example, in English. Therefore, we are not allowed to trans­ gress the limits of a metalanguage, for if we do that, the re­ sults of our investigations become at once dubious and uncer­ tain. Consequently, it is better to replace the originally re­ constructed proto-meaning *'hit' with the definition (or with the set of its components) proposed above. 3.0. The relationship between the reconstructed proto-meaning and the meanings in the daughter languages, as well as the pro­ bable direction of semantic changes can be seen in the charts of Appendix 2. x

M1 comprises the most frequent common features, that is, the features of the supposed PFU proto-meaning, xM2 reflects a later level, realized in the meaning 'hit' that can be documen­ ted in Mordvin but which represents a deducible intermediate level only which is prior to documented meanings in Cheremis. Through this level, labelled xM2 all Mordvin and Cheremis meanings can be appropriately derived. For Ostyak and Vogul, it is the meaning 'kick' that represents this documented interme­ diate level. As shown by the charts, Mordvin and Cheremis mea­ nings are closer to each other with respect to the feature [with h a n d ] / [ w i t h t o o l ] , whereas Ostyak and Vogul meanings are closer to each other with respect to the feature [with f o o t ] This bifurcation of the primary meaning is likely to have occur­ red prior to the desintegration of PFU. Notice that the proto-meaning of the etymology at hand reconstructed by Honti according to traditional comparative methods, is also *'hit' , a fact that lends further support to our analysis.

26

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

APPENDIX 1

I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. Χ. XI. XII. XIII. Event Change Activity Physical Motion Contact + Complex action Creation Human + Animal Bird with hand + with tool + with foot with body Animate + object Inanimate object + Discrete + Continuous Forcefully + Cause-notmove Cause-notliving Cause-notcontin. Cause-enter Building

+ + + +

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

13

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

13 13 13

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+ +

+

+

+

+

+

+

2 +

+

1

+ +

+

+

+

1 +

+

+

+

+

+

+

+ + +

+

3 4

+

+

6 +

+

+

+

+

+

+ +

lo 1

+ +

lo

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

6 1

+ +

ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PROTO-MEANINGS

27

APPENDIX 2 Mordvin (XM2

1 Event Change Activity Physical Contact Human Animate Object Inanimate Obj. Instrument Discrete Forcefully

+ + + + + + + + with hand with tool + +

-> III. + + + + + + + + + Continuous +

-* II.

-> IV.

+ + +

+ + + + + + +

+ + + +

+ + +

+ + + + Cause-notliving

Cheremis M

l

Event Change Activity Physical Contact

Human Animate Object Inanimate Obj. Instrument Discrete Forcefully

+ + + + +

+ + + with hand with tool + +

VII.

» VI.

+ + + + +

+

+ + + +

+ +

+ + + Complex activity Creation +

Continuous

Cause-enter Cause-not-

28

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Ostyak M

l

Event Change Activity Physical Contact Human

ΙΧ.ΧIII.+ + + + +

Animate Object Inanimate Object + Instrument with foot Discrete + Forcefully +

Vogul > VIII.XII. + + + + Motion Animal

X. + + + + + +

> XI. + + + + + Animal Bird + +

with foot

with body

+

+

+

+

Cause-not move

ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PROTO-MEANINGS

29

References Bakró-Nagy, M. (1978) , Az alapjelentés rekonstrukciójának kérdéséről (On the question of proto-meaning reconstruction), Part I. Nyelvtudomanyi Közlemények 80:381-389. Bierwisch, M. (1969), On certain problems of semantic representa­ tion, Foundations of Language 5:153-185. Fillmore, C.J. (1971), Types of lexical information, Semantics (D.D.Steinberg, L.A.Jakobovits, eds.), London & New York: Cambridge University Press, 370-392. Fodor, J.A. & J.J.Katz, (1964), The structure of a semantic theory, The Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Lan­ guage , Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. Gulstad, D.E. (1974), Reconstruction in syntax, Historical Lin­ guistics (J.M.Anderson, C.Jones, eds.),Amsterdam:NorthHolland Linguistic Series Vol.12, 117-158. Haas, M.R. (1970), Historical linguistics and the genetic relation­ ship of languages, Current Trends in Linguistics Vol.3. (Th. Sebeok, e d . ) , Theoretical Foundations, The Hague:Mouton, 113-153. Honti, L. (1978), Etimologiai adalékok (Etymologies), Nyelvtudo­ mányi Közlemények 80:370. Leech, G.N. (1974), Semantics, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Lehrer, A. (1974), Semantic Fields and Lexical Structure, Amster­ dam: North-Holland Publishing Co. Lyons, J. (1977), Semantics, London:Cambridge University Press. Nida, E.A. (1975), Componential Analysis of Meaning, The Hague: Mouton. Nida et al. (1977), Nida, E.Α. & J.P.Louw & R.B.Smith, Semantic domains and componential analysis of meaning, Current Issues in Linguistic Theory (R.W.Colse, e d . ) , Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 139-167. Voyles, J.B. (1973), Accounting for semantic change, Lingua 31: 95-124. Weinreich, U. (1972) , Explorations in Semantic Theory, The Hague: Mouton.

HE IS ONLY JOKING (Joke, metaphor and language development) Ivan Fonagy

If we do not regard children as little adults, and if we acknowledge their presence in our conversations, we unwill­ ingly change our manner of speaking, and become somewhat more serious than usual. I realised this, when, for the sake of children, I often needed to follow my childless friend's re­ marks with the comment: "Dont' worry, he is only joking", or "He didn't mean it". There may have been an occasion, when my two year-old son was in the middle of dinner, focusing his attention on a bowl of spinach, the signs of which were all over his hands and face. A friend of ours arrived, went through the children's room and said to my son: "It's a good tning if one first puts one's hand into the spinach and then wipes them on Daddy's book. Like this (making the appropriate gesture). It would make a nice illustration". The book was actually a half-filled diary about the children's verbal and cognitive development containing also their drawings. On an­ other occasion my friend L.B. came into my room where I was attempting to add the words to an extremely long reel of soundpressure measurements: "You are being lazy again", he said. Our four year-old daughter was present, so my wife

32

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

added: "Don't worry, uncle L. is only joking". The first remark hardly needs elaboration. It refers to an old weakness of mine for collecting illustrations typical of the children or of their age-group, and which at a later stage might be of interest. Of course, it never crossed my mind to make print of my boy's dirty hand. L.B. deliberately stepped over the borders of reality: he was joking. The subsequent scene needs some explication. L.B. considered the whole business of "scientific" measuring and my activities in the field of phonetics as not too serious, and he believed that I attempted to avoid dealing with subjects of greater importance or of a more personal nature by spending time doing routine work. Here my wife had to step in. (In the case of spinach there was little likelihood that my son would take the proffered advice seriously.) But jokes aimed at the children were really more dan­ gerous. For example, the crude jokes of the janitor's wife, meant to be educational, were simply frightening for the two year-old boy: "If you don't wipe your feet on the mat I'll cut them off!", or: "Do you see that man?", pointing to the shabbily dressed rag-and -bone man carrying his sack, "He will take you away in his sack if you are naughty". It was never her intention to harm the child. She new very well that the rag-and-bone man was an exceptionally placid fellow, and this made her remark still more amusing to her, because of its greater distance from reality. The children were amused by the suggestion about the spinach, but they were not at all amused by the threats of the janitor's wife. The formula: "Don't worry, she didn't mean it" had little effect in these cases. We are, however, more concerned with the structural part of the problem. What have these remarks in common? What is the underlying pattern of the "funny remarks"? To what extent are they related to the kind of jokes we tell and are told at

HE IS ONLY JOKING

33

parties? Are there other structurally similar phenomena in language? What is the cause of their popularity and aesthetic power? Implicit joke marks A funny remark can be regarded as a verbal act immediatly followed by its invalidation: "I didn't mean it, I am only joking". Both phases may be contained in a single speech act, and such cases represent the basic form of the funny re­ mark: the assertion invalidates itself through exaggeration. Absurdity functions as an implicit joke mark, a signal that implies the assertion is not to be treated seriously. The process may be seen as an inverse of euphemism. In the case of both the funny remark and of euphemism a shift along the dimension of decency and sociability accompanies the change in intensity (damping vs. amplification). With euphemism the shift is from indecent to more decent, whereas with the funny remark the opposite shift occurs, from decent to scandalous and unsocial. (In the absence of a qualitative, evaluative shift, exaggeration would simply result in hyperbole, and dimi­ nution would give rise to litotes.) In terms of Bühler's theory of language ( Sprach theorie 1933), the assertion is invalidated, since it is contradicted by the situation or the deictic field which under normal circum­ stances would serve to complete the message and make it con­ crete, actual and explicit. The child has to learn how to use this deictic field. Initially he often does it in an inappro­ priate way. He may fail to realise that a simple "I" or "me" is much less effective over the telephone than in normal faceto-face communication. The joker artificially creates a con­ flict between the deictic field and the verbal field (Sprachfeld). His statement is purposely contradicted by the situa­ tion (which in this case may be broadened to include general beliefs and moral principles). This artificial conflict be-

34

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

tween the two fields is the basic strategy of funny remarks and paradoxical statements in everyday life, as well as at a higher literary level: "If there is anybody a young English girl hates even more than her mother, it is her elder sister" (G.B.Shaw) The question arises what can be the purpose of making an assertion if it is immediately denied. It seems, that, al­ though denied, the statement 'on some level must stand. Verbal structure of jokes The conflict between the deictic field and verbal field which gives rise to absurdity is the basic component of all verbal humour. It is a necessary but not a sufficient condi­ tion of jokes as artistic products. Jokes follow the strategy of the funny remarks, and comply moreover with a number of constraints operating on the level of form and content. In contrast to the structural and functional diversi­ ty of jokes the behavioural response elicited is uniform: a smile or laughter. Various explanations have been proffered over the years, two,millenia in fact, and different common denominators have been suggested. Notwithstanding recent lin­ guistic and semiotic approaches to the subject, I think that the most adequate and comprehensive structural and functional analysis of jokes is that of Freud published in 1905 (Stand­ ard Edition Vol.VIII). This appears to be the only account in

For more or less detailed reviews of classical and modern literature see: Freud, (1905), Greig, (1923), Gregory, (1924), Milner, (1972), Fonagy P. (1974), Johnson, (1975), (1976). 2 A systematic linguistic analysis of puns has been proposed by Duchaček (1970). Milner's semiotic theory of humour (1972) is based on the role of inversion in humour on both the formal and the social level, (footnote 2 continued)

HE IS ONLY JOKING

35

which causal connections between the form and function of jokes are established and where links are made between mech­ anisms responsable for humour and other psychological proc­ esses such as those involved in dreaming, parapraxis and neu­ rotic symptomatology. In this way, the mechanism of humour is placed within a broad framework of psychologic structures, united by analogous organisational principles. Freud's theory has withstood the test of time a good deal better than his 3 sample of turn-of-the-century Austro-Hungarian humour. Freud enumerated most types of jokes, and upon detailed analysis found that economy of mental expenditure played a central role in the technique of jokes. This saving of mental effort functions as an incentive (Verlockungsprämie) for fur­ ther and greater saving through the release of energy devoted (footnote 2 continued) He refers to Freud's work on jokes, the system of classification developped by Milner is nevertheless incompatible with the Freudian view. He distinguishes three types of reversal: syntagmatic, paradigmatic and paragrammatic reversals. Purely syntagmatic reversals cannot be viewed in the framework proposed by Freud, since the sequential disposi­ tion alone does not allow for saving of mental effort through condensation of different, manifest and latent, messages. John­ son (1976) criticised Milner for the arbitrariness of his clas­ sification. Indeed his examples illustrating syntactic rever­ sals could better fit into his paradigmatic categories. His example of syntagmatic morphological reversal: "I assure you that you are, sir, my obedient servant" implies the conventional, somewhat oldfashioned, closing of a letter, and also alludes to the change of roles between elec­ tor and representative in the period preceding parlamentary elections. In an unpublished manuscript Michel Martins Baltar attempts a detailed linguistic classification of the corpus of Freud's jokes, which I hope will soon be more generally available. 3 In this paper I retained the same cultural context for the examination of the structure and function of jokes. It should be noted, however, that ethnographic studies have shown varia­ tions in humour accross societies (cf. Douglas 1968, Milner 1971, 1968, Johnson 1976).

36

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

to the suppression of conflicting sexual and aggressive con­ tent. In the chapter on the technique of jokes, he describes the mechanisms which insure the saving of mental expenditure, Following his approach, but taking into account present day linguistic and semiotic conceptual framework, I will attempt to outline the most typical verbal and logical structures involved in jokes, and also the structure of content in jokes. Jokes can be classified according to the way in which the saving of expenditure has been achieved. Two fundamental principles seem to be involved: (a) condensation of two differ­ ent, contrasting messages (bi-sociation according to Koestler (1964), superposition of the expected and the unexpected in Janet Holmes' wording, (1973); (b) prevalence of more primi­ tive, less demanding manners of processing experiences. The two tendencies are intimately interrelated. Double meaning is achieved verbally in different ways. 1. The most direct but highly agrammatical procedure is the mixing up of two words belonging to the two contrasting mes­ sages . (1) Heine, in the "Reisebilder" introduces the lottery agent Hirsch-Hyacinth who boasts to the poet of his relations with Baron Rotschild: "And, as true as God shall grant me all good things, Doctor, I sat beside Salomon Rotschild and he treated me quite as his equal - quite familionairely" (cit. Freud, SE = Stand Edition VIII, 16) Freud gives a diagrammatical picture of the composite struc­ ture "famillionnairely", famillionär in German: FAMILI AR MILIONÄR FAMILIONAR The components are key-words of the two opposite messages: R.treated me quite familiär he treated me as a Millionär (Freud op.cit.19).

HE IS ONLY JOKING

37

2. Two circles of ideas can be brought together by the same word, making use simultaneously both of its primary and sec­ ondary meaning (use or abuse of polysemy). Freud (op.cit. 120) and later on Koestler (1964, 85) compare the procedure to short-circuiting. (2a) In Vienna before the first world war, a dashing young Austrian officer tried to obtain the favours of a fashion­ able courtesan. To shake off this unwanted suitor, she dec­ lared that "her heart was, alas, no longer free". He replied politely: "Mademoiselle, I never aimed as high as that". Koestler (op.cit. 36) comments: "High is bi-sociated with a metaphorical and a topographical context. The coat is turned first metaphorically, then literally". The effect may be reinforced by a chiasmatic double re­ version : (2b) In Vienna, during the same period, Mr. and Mrs. X live in fairly grand style. Some people think that the husband has earned a lot and so has been able to lay a bit away ("sich etwas zurücklegen"), others again think that the wife has lain back a bit ("hat sich etwas zurückgelegt") and so has been able to earn a lot (cit. Freud SE VIII, 33) A slight violation of a semantic rule might equally enhance the humorous effect: (2c)

- Do you like your Mummy? - Oh yes! - Then have some more. A [+human] substantive in the place of an object pre­ cludes the interpretation 'to like eating', especially if a possessive pronoun precedes the substantive. 3. Bi-valence may be the result of an accidental formal iden­ tity, i.e. the homonymy of two expressions: (3) Oyster: a lift in East London (cit. Holmes 1973) The opposition of hoister and oyster is neutralised in cockney English. Thus, the reader may enjoy at the same time his social superiority, after having enjoyed the pleasure of mishandling language (Holmes).

38

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

4. Double meaning may be the consequence of a simultaneous synchronic and diachronic (etymologic) analysis of an expres­ sion. The first reading is based on the actual semantic value of the expression, it is followed by a second reading which reevaluates the original meaning of the components. (4) The first Jew asks: - Have you taken a bath? The second replies asking the other in return: - Why? is there one missing? (cit.Freud SE VIII,49) Freud pointed out a simultaneous shift of emphasis: bath is stressed in the first question, whilst the stress is shifted on taken in the second (SE VIII, 50 f.). 5. The etymologic interpretation may be arbitrary, factitious: (5) A young man was introduced into a Paris salon, who was a relative of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and bore his name. Moreover he was red-haired. He behaved so awkwardly that the hostess remarked critically to the gentleman who introduced him: - Vous m'avez fait connaître un jeune homme roux et sot, mais non pas un Rousseau (cit.Freud SE VIII,30). 6. The ambiguities of grammatical surface structure are a per­ manent potential source of double meaning provided that the context does not exclude either of the two possible interpre­ tations . (6) Once again a joke presented and analysed by Freud takes us back to the first decade of the twentieth century. A lieu­ tenant in the Austro-Hungarian army asks a private; - Now tell me,,Bacharach, why should a soldier gladly offer up his life for his king? - You're absolutely right, Sir! Why should he? (Reik, 1929, 10) The surface structure offers two possible modal interpreta­ tions of the sentence, one of which could be intended (and indeed was meant) as a real wh-question; and the other of which could be (and indeed has been) interpreted as a rheto­ rical question, i.e. a negative assertion ("It is certainly not a pleasure to offer his life"). In fact, the lieutenant's question was much more like a professorial examinatory ques­ tion, and consequently its pragmatic matrix of the type sug-

HE IS ONLY JOKING

39

gested by Peter Ladányi (1965) comes close to that of a rhe­ torical question:

True question Examinatory question Rhetorical question

Knowledge of answer in questioner and responder Questioner Responder knows the answer + + +

?(+/-) +

7. Certain minor violations of grammatical rules may reflect interference between two simultaneous and contradictory se­ mantic interpretations. Thus for instance, Heinrich Heine frequently and succesfully violates the (as yet unwritten) rules governing enumeration. (7) In a passage of the Harzreise Heine remembers the school in which he had to put up with: "so much Latin, caning and geography)" (cit. Freud SE VIII, 69). Since a writer is not supposed to switch during enumeration 4 from one semantic category to another , we are apt to con­ sider caning as a regular subject of the school curriculum. In such cases it is the sudden fall in transition probability that prompts the reader to reconsider his first semantic interpretation . 8. In other examples mentioned by Freud this unexpected in­ crease in information is not associated with any violation of grammatical rules. We are simply reminded of another, under­ lying sequence characterized by a very high transition prob­ ability . 4 In previous papers I attempted to define semantic categories that must not be transgressed in discursive enumerations, and other rules governing enumeration (Fonagy 1975b, 1975e).

40

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(8) "Ein junges Mädchen kaum zwei Moden alt" (A girl scarcely twelve modes old.)

(Lichtenberg).

The German reader will automatically susbtitue Monde for Moden

(moons)

(modes), and will interpret "zwölf Moden alt

modes o l d ) " as an allusion to "zwölf Monde alt

(twelve

(twelve moons

o l d ) " , suggesting that the changing fashion might be used as a method of determining a woman's age

(Freud SE V I I I , 7 6 ) .

Moden, is a perfect anagram of Monde. The humorous effect could be directly proportional to the phonetic distance:

semantic distance humorous effect phonetic

distance

9. A sentence without being idiomatic may have both a gen­ eral meaning and restricted meaning, this latter due to the frequent use of the sentence in a typical, recurrent situa­ tion

(Fonagy 1971c). The latent double sense may become

apparent in jokes playing on the contrast of the restricted and the general meaning of a statement such as Ich kann mich nicht beklagen, On peut pas se plaindre

(I cannot complain),

implying either that one has no reason to complain meaning) or that one must not complain

(restricted

(general s e n s e ) .

(9) An immigrant has come to France from a country having a tough dictatorial regime. Here is why he emigrated: - Was the living standard so low? - N o , I couldn't complain. - Were the housinq conditions so bad? - N o , I couldn't complain. - Was unemployment so high? - I couldn't complain. - Why did you come to France then? - Because here I can complain. 10. A perfectly grammatical sentence can be "out of context" even without having a special restricted meaning. The sentence spoken in the inappropriate situation evokes the situation to which it belongs. Thus two situations are superimposed much in the way an improper term evokes its proper context

(cf.8).

HE IS ONLY JOKING

41

Janet Holmes (19 73) interprets such jokes in terms of incongru­ ous physical setting. She quotes the following anecdote: (10) Many people are leaving Seattle to live elsewhere be­ cause of the financial hardship due to cuts in the space Pro­ gramm. Two young businessmen erected a huge billboard on the Highway for motorists heading out of the city. Its message reads: WILL THE LAST PERSON LEAVING SEATTLE TURN OUT THE LIGHTS -UPI This is a sentence that we would normally find as a sign on the wall in a flat placed there by a person who left earlier than the others, and, consequently, could not be responsible for turning off the light. As a result, we are inclined to confuse the city Seattle with a flat inhabited by three or four persons. This sudden shrivelling of the town, due to a pragmatic transfer of a sentence may give rise to a mild comic effect. 11. On the basis of contrary presuppositions the speaker and the hearer may interpret the same unequivocal sentence in two widely differing ways. (11) A governess tells her young charge: - Just imagine, Franzi, last night, when I started home so late, there was a suspicious-looking man standing by the house! Oh how I started to run! Franzi : - Well, did you manage to catch him? The presuppositions were obviously different for Franzi and the governess. The governess, proverbially an unmarried woman ("Fräulein", "Mademoiselle") might be inclined to see an ag­ gressor in any man she should happen to meet in the dark, and to think "the worst"; Franzi, as an adolescent, might think quite differently of the attitude of his governess towards For a detailed analysis of the theory of presuppositions,cf. Kiefer 1978. In the case of Franzi and the governess we must consider a whole set of presuppositions constituting two dif­ ferent frames of reference.

42

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

men, with the malice appropriate to this age. As a young child, he would probably conceive of running as a competi­ tion and a game. In both cases the presuppositions of the speaker and the hearer would be diametrically opposed, and the result would necessarily be contrasting interpretations of the sentence: "Oh how I ran". 12. The complementary message, in fact the essential one, may be "erased", but suggested by the context and the situation. (12) Freud relates an anecdote about a pugnacious journalist in Vienna, whose biting invective has repeatedly led to his being physically maltreated by the subjects of his attacks. On one occasion, when a fresh misdeed on the part of one of his habitual opponents was being discussed, somebody exclaim­ ed: - If X hears of this, he'll get his ears boxed again. The story is nonsensical without inserting: "he'll write such a scathing article on the man that... (Freud SE VIII, 77 f.). 13. The contradiction between the verbal message conveyed by the sentence and the factual message conveyed involuntarily by the speaker's behaviour may result in the condensation of contrasting meanings. (13) Mr X turns to his neighbour in the Opera to ask him towards the end of the third act of Carmen: - Please, could you tell me when the swan is supposed to arrive? - The swan? But Carmen is on. - Carmen? replies Mr X disappointed, ready to leave, Carmen? I know every note by heart. The wording of the verbal message ("I. know every word by heart") is the complete opposite of the simultaneous behav­ ioral message (the complete ignorance of both pieces). The verbal strategies previously reported (1-12) strive successfully toward the same goal - that of the saving of menta.1 expenditure through condensation of widely different messages. A basic assumption underlying the theory of mental economy was not stated explicitly by Freud. In order for the theory to be valid, we must assume that preconscious mental activity con­ sumes significantly less energy than conscious one. For the time being this supposition is impossible to verify. It is,

HE IS ONLY JOKING

43

however, consistent with the observation that the paraphras­ ing of a joke completely eliminates its humorous content.0 There is experimental evidence to show that the amount of paraphrasing needed to explain a humorous item is positively 7 correlated with "its humorous effect. Deviant semiotic strategies Anecdotes characterized at the psychological level by a "displacement of accent" (Freud, SE VIII, 50-56) always involve a shift in semiotic interpretation. (14) A car dealer boasting about a new sports model to a pros­ pective client: - You get into this car at midnight and at 4 o'clock you are in Grimsby. The customer is indignant: - What should I be doing in the middle of the night in Grimsby? (Koestler's modernised version (1964) of Freud's horse-dealer joke (SET VIII, 54) There is obviously a "shift of emphasis from the essential to a detail" (Freud op.cit 50-56, 156 f., 165 f.). We could add, however, that this shift of emphasis is based on a semiotic misinterpretation of an example. Examples are arbitrarily cho­ sen illustrations illuminating a statement. They are imaginary phenomena, only indirectly related to real events, just as linguistic signs are. The customer puts the fact and the ex­ ample on the same level and that enables him to create a causal

John Locke was perhaps the first author who compared joke, metaphor and conscious thought from the point of view of men­ tal economy. Judgement has to "separate carefully one from another ideas wherein can be found the least difference", whereas "no labour of thought" is required in metaphor, allu­ sion and wit (Essay (1960) 1924, 85 f.). Peter Fönagy (19 74) measured the extent of condensation by asking subjects to explain the source of humour in various (footnote 7 continued)

44

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

relation between the purchase of the car and the noctur­ nal trip to Grimsby ("If I buy the car, I will have to drive to Grimsby this night") A still more striking semiotic error which rarely occurs in normal adults is the confusion between dream and reality. (15) A young lady notices from her bed that a strongly built naked black gentleman is climbing through the window. He comes closer and closer, whereupon she exclaims: - What do you want with me? The stranger answers : - Sorry, it's your dream. The frightning persecutor appears concurrently at two semiot­ ic levels: in the dream and outside the dream. He is a char­ acter in the lady's dream, and a spectator who comments on the dream. In the latter case he assumes almost the role of the psychoanalyst reminding the dreamer that it is her fantasy which may represent a wish fulfillment. (Actually, the fright­ ening persecutor could be the analyst on a third level: that of the latent dreamthought.) Faulty thinking as a structural principle Nonsensical jokes are based either on semiotic errors (like 13, 14) or on faulty reasoning. In both cases economy of mental expenditure is due to a more primitive processing of human experience. In most of Freud's examples "faulty rea­ soning can be described as 'automatic'" (Freud SE VIII, 64). A human activity is 'automatic' if it is controlled by a nonsufficiently specified program which has not been adapted to the concrete situation a person will have to face. (footnote 7 continued) jokes. A highly significant correla­ tion (r = .90) was found between funniness ratings and the number of words used by subjects to explain a joke.

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(16) When .. Lawrence joined the ranks as private Shaw, Noel Coward wrote a letter to him which began: "Dear 338171 (may I call you 338?)" (cit. Koestler 1964, 67). The faulty inference underlying this joke may be paraphrased in the following form: "If we may call Frederic simply Fred, or Susanna simply Sue, we may also call the private 338171 by his first 2 or 3 numbers in order to establish intimacy. The automatic thinking here is obviously meant to parody mechani­ sation of human life in the army. "If it is admissible to call a human being 338171, we also have to accept 338 as a pet name." Since this would be absurd, the military organisation that reduces .. Lawrence to a six-place number is just as absurd. The apparent logical error is a condensed (elliptic) expression of the evidentiary rule called apagoge (deductio, reductio ad absurdum). False syllogism is grafted on automatic thinking in a well-known anti-clerical anecdote. (17) A mourner commands a funeral oration from the priest. - I'11 deliver an oration that will make even the grave-digger weep for $ 300. - Well, as you see I am a poor man, I don't care about the grave-diggers. - O . K . I will make a speech for $ 200. It'll move the mourners. - Sorry, $ 200 is too much. People's feelings don't bother me. - Whatever you like. I'll deliver one for $ 100. The family will still weep. - We have wept enough. I'll give you $ 50. - All right, I have an oration for $ 50 too, but it has a touch of humour in it. A correlation is implicitly established here between degrees of an emotional and a financial scale: Weeping 1 300

1/2

1/4

0

200

150

100

1/4

1/2

50

25

Laugning 1 0

The switch from weeping to laughter is hardly appropriate;

46

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

a scale going from maximum weeping to zero weeping would be more realistic. Unless we acknowledge the underlying false syllogism: "if there is laughter then there is no weeping. Hence, if there is no weeping, then there is laughter". Again, absurd reasoning is intended to parody a no less absurd though generally accepted social act, in which a total stranger re­ minds the mourners of the extent of their loss, and for this service demands a considerable sum from the family of the de­ ceased. The laxness of the logical structures underlying lin­ guistic categories facilitates faulty thinking. Thus, for instance, the class of adjectives comprises words such as green, good which are function names and can figure in linguistic func­ tions of one variable, (x) f (x), ("spinach is green", "spinach is good"); words such as greener, better corresponding to a function of two variables, (x,y) f (x,y) ("spinach is better than haricot"); words such as equal implying a logical opera­ tion, that of equivalence, f = df (x) =. (y) . A number of jokes is based on the "logical homonymy" of the adjectives. (18) All animals are equal, but some are more equal than oth­ ers (Orwell, Animal Farm) The word equal corresponding to equivalence, a symmetrical relation, f (x,y) of (y,x) (cf. for the notation of logical functions Reichenbach 19 47) figures in a comparison, an essen­ tially asymmetrical relation, just as other adjectives (green, good) fit for figuring in a comparison. In the context of Animal Farm the sharp contradiction inherent in "more equal" is a highly condensed, parodical form of ideological criticism. Freud distinguished two types of faulty-thinking jokes: jokes based on automatic thinking, and jokes based on sophis­ tical reasoning (SE VIII, 64). Hypostasis is, besides false syllogism (cf, 16), one of the most recurrent types of error. (19) In the temple at Cracow the Great Rabbi N. was sitting and praying with his disciples. Suddenly he uttered a cry: "At this very moment the Great Rabbi Löw has died in Lemberg."

47

HE IS ONLY JOKING

The community put on mourning for the dead man. In tne course of the next days people arriving from Lemberg were asked how the Rabbi died. They knew nothing about it, and had left him in the best of health. At last it was established with cer­ tainty that the Rabbi Low was still alive. "That makes no difference", replied one of the disciples, "what is essential is his magnificent Kück (distant look) from Cracow to Lemberg". This reasoning disconnects the second member of an implica­ g , where represents Rabbi N, f represents tion  f the predicted death of Rabbi Löw, and g the telepathic power of Rabbi N. According to this implication the truth value of g depends on that of f . For the disciple of the Rabbi the essential thing is the "telepathic look" in itself, whether or not Rabbi L was still alive, in terms of linguistic func­ tions: f Λf g The hypostasis, self-content truth, is meant as a parody of pseudo-scientific argumenta­ tion which serves like camouflage for unquestioning faith. Logical errors in jokes are implicit critical stateo

ments, just as deficient verbal strategies are. Thus, faulty thinking saves mental expenditure in two different ways: by allowing mental regression to a more primitive and less demand­ ing level of processing, and through condensing spoken and un­ spoken messages. This is equally true of condensation by other verbal means such as expressive change of word order (syntagmatic distortion) or of word classes (paradigmatic distortion). Com­ munication by means of meaningful distortion, conveying 'stylistic' messages, represents a more primitive level of verbal processing.

"The technique of the nonsensical jokes which we have so far considered really consists... in presenting something that is stupid and nonsensical, the sense of which lies in the revelation and demonstration of something else that is stupid and nonsensical" (Freud, SE VIII, 58). Similarly, "the absurdity in the content of the dream takes place of the judgement 'this is a piece of nonsense' in the dream-thought" (op.cit. 175).

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The structure of content Citing an aphorism quoted by Karl Fischer: (20) Experience consists of experiencing what we do not wish to know (Fischer 1889, 59) Freud compares unexpected (paradoxical) statements substitut­ ing commonplace phrases to puns. In both cases a deviance induces condensation of two messages. "I should like to name this process 'unification'. It is clearly analoguous to conden­ sation by compression of two words into the same word" (SE VIII, 66 f.). In fact, the content of jokes is always structured ac­ cording to the principles governing the verbal structure of a punch-line. The aphorism (19) quoted as an example of unifi­ cation could equally well serve as an illustration of inver­ sion, the identification of opposites. One would normally con­ sider experience as something to strive for, the joke presents it, on the contrary, as "experiencing what we do not know". Inversion seems to be one of the fundamental structural prin­ ciples of content organisation in jokes (cf. Milner 1972), but it appears in many different forms. If we look again at some of the earlier examples, in joke (2 a) the officer shows deep deference and addresses the courtisan with words chosen with great care to convey the basest and most offensive message possible. His verbal behaviour is a parodistical mirror image of the courtesan's words who expressed her reluctance in a virginal innocent style, though the reasons are of the least elevated financial kind. Thus, we have in joke (2 a) the same form of reversal on the verbal level and on the level of con­ tent. In joke (2 b) the structure of the plot follows the same dynamic pattern, chiasmus, we already met on the level of expression: from a naive viewpoint the husband has earned; through honest work enough money to put some aside; from a cynical point of view the wife through less honest hard work ensured the relative prosperity of the couple. In joke (2 c)

HE IS ONLY JOKING

49

a seemingly polite invitation contrasts with the tragic re­ velation reminiscent of some cruel scenes of Greek (or Af­ rican) mythology. Double inversion, or the inversion of inversion, gov­ erns the syntax of a well known Jewish anecdote, especially meant for semioticians. (21) Two businessmen met in a Warsaw railway station. One walked up to the other and asked: - Where are you going? - I am going to Minsk. - So, you're going to Minsk (suspiciously). You tell me you're going to Minsk because you want me to think you're going to Pinsk. But I happen to know that you really are going to Minsk. So why do you lie? Lie could be conceived of as an inversion of truth. In the anecdote the truth is presented as a lie, since a lie is con­ sidered to be a simple stylistic transformation of a true statement. In this frame of reference the true statement appears as a double transformation (truth —> lie —> truth) , as an attempt to misguide the hearer by telling the truth. It is surprising to find even more complex forms of double inversion in the most popular twelfth and thirteenth century comic genre, in French fables (fabliau-s). (22) The priest angrily burst into the peasant's house. - Have you no shame, in broad daylight, making love without even drawing the curtains. The peasant in vain explains that his wife and himself were sitting at the table having their diner. - Then the fault must be in the window, says the priest The peasant wants to make sure how things stand, and follow­ ing the priest's advice he climbs the tree opposite the win­ dow. After a while he returns to the room much surprised. - Looking through the window it really looks as if two people were making love. (Du prestre ki abevetie) . The superficial, physical chiasmus is the change of places: first the priest looks at the peasant and his wife, then the peasant observes the amurous behaviour of the priest and his wife. At a deeper level of the joke, reality and il­ lusion are crossing over. The peasant and his wife are in

50

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

reality sitting at the table, but the priest claims that looking through the window it appeared as if they were' making love. Subsequently the priest and the wife in reality make love, but the peasant accepts that it was only an illusion. In other words, the priest supports his lie about the window by deceiving the husband in front of his very eyes. The un­ derlying rule may be put in these terms: two wrongs make a right, two lies make a truth, just like double negation has 9 the same value as positive statement. According to the number of manuscripts reserved one of the most popular fables based on double lie, or lie on the second power, was the Vair palefroi (The trout coloured stal­ lion) . (23) The husband returning home unexpectedly found a troutcoloured stallion in his courtyard and a red garment in his bed. The wife explained that her brother offered to him the red garment and also the stallion. Meanwhile the hidincr cav­ alier succeeded in putting his garment on, jumped on his horse and rode away. In the morning the husband asked for the rea garment. "What red garment?" asked the wife surprised. "The one I received as a present?" "Are you a jester that you should be given garments?" Then he searched for the stallion. "What stallion?" asked the wife. "The one I got from your brother." "My brother?! But you know he has not been here for months!" She then sent her husband on a pilgrimage to St. Arnold, the patron saint of the insane, and spent months with the cavalier undisturbed. The heroine of the fable deceives the deceived husband by offering a fantastic interpretation to account for the pres­ ence of the corpus delicti. In a second phase, the situation

The last rule provides the structure of a whole series of fables (Trois aveugles de Compiegne, De l'enfant qui fu remis au soleil, Du prestre crucefié, Du chevalier à la robe vermeil­ le, Das tresces, De la sorisete des estopes, Du vilain de Bailluel, De la dame qui fist entendant son mari qu'il sonjoit, Du prestre teint, Des trois dames qui trouverent l'anel, Du vair palefroi). Recurrent double deceiving in fables gave rise to a special term: enfantômer.

HE IS ONLY JOKING

51

is reversed: it is now the absence of the corpus delicti that betrays the unfaithful wife. Paradoxically, the her­ oine, saves the situation by declaring that the explanation she herself gave is obviously untrue and absurd (negation of negation). Reversing the roles, she attributes the fan­ tastic story aimed at deceiving the husband to the husband himself. A further form of inversion frequently found in fables, and later on in European comedy, is that of the deception of the deceiver (Borgoise d'Orliens, Ben Jonson's Volpone). From the point of view of mental economy, inversion of roles, attitudes or facts in jokes or fables is comparable to the unification of opposites on the verbal level (antinomy, semantic inversion). On both levels, in spite of the seemingly maximal distance between two terms, antinomy is merely a hid­ den form of repetition: repetition concealed by negation (a multiplication by - 1 ) . Similarly, the inversion of roles, a complete change (180°) in the course of events, is highly surprising and yet more predictable than a less radical change. Inversion and antinomy economise mental expenditure also in an other way: the unexpected event is superimposed on the expec­ ted one, just like the unexpected term on the expected term, and the reader is prompted to create a link between both terms. Further structural patterns characterising the plot in jokes or fables remind one of other verbal techniques. Thus for instance double interpretation of the same event - qui pro quo - is a kind of epical or dramatic homonymy (see also 20,22) Again, fables of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries offer a more sophisticated variety of epical homonymy: reversed homo­ nymy, or pseudo-homonymy. (24) The husband happens to visit his friend at exactly the same time when the latter is meeting his wife. The friend ad­ mits. that he has a lady guest, moreover he shows her to his friend covering only her face. The husband appreciates his friend's success, and is sorry that he married too early. (Les deux changêors)

52

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Homonymy is apparent identity: identical forms cover­ ing different contents. In fable (23) the husband believes that the resemblance between the uncovered female body and the body of his wife is only fortuitous. He interprets iden­ tity in terms of homonymy. This is the inverse of the error that consists in confounding the wife of a friend with the legal consort: a more banal example of the unification of diverse units. The contradiction reaches its climax in the punch-line: the husband becomes envious of his own wife, of an object he already possesses. She is considered as a hin­ drance preventing him to possess her. Verbal patterns such as repetition, variation, inversion, etc., called "figures" in ancient and modern rhetoric (anti­ thesis, chiasmus, epanodos, redditio, gradatio, etc.) are re­ dundancy rules applicable to all linguistic levels including the paralinguistic. Roman Jakobson convincingly showed in a series of publications that these rules govern both the or­ ganisation of expression and content (Jakobson 1966 a, b, 1968, 1970, 1973). The verbal structure as action Freud considers the pleasure offered by the structure of jokes to be an incentive bonus (Verlockungsprämie, Ges. Werke VI, 153), i.e. as a small amount of pleasure,a forepleasure (SE VIII, 137) which comes to help in order to lift internal inhibitions and to release aggressive and sexual energies (1.c.). "...from the stage of the jest onwards, opens new sources of pleasure for itself by lifting inhibitions. The pleasure in play or pleasure in lifting inhibitions, can invariably be traced back to economy in psychical expenditure..." (SE VIII, 137 f. ) . The transition from the level of expression to the level of content is facilitated by a certain isomorphism between the two mental procedures. Increasing tension and the sudden re­ lease of tension in the last words of the joke could be inter-

HE IS ONLY JOKING

53

preted as the verbal portrayal of gradual increase and sudden release of sexual tension (climax, orgasm). Koestler lays more emphasis on the aggressive aspect of this technique, and com­ pares the punch-line to a sudden explosion. The two interpreta­ tions are by no means exclusive. Both are involved in the Hun­ garian idiomatic expression elsiiti a viccet 'he fired the joke', or, in a case of an unsuccessful attempt, ellotte a viccet 'he misfired the joke' (remembering the universal sym­ bolism of guns and shooting). Freud repeatedly compared jokes with a striptease act (Entblössung), and attributes a comical effect to a sudden stripping. Reik (Leid 1929, 93) refers to the experience of the goddess Demeter who whilst searching her daughter Per­ sephone who has been abducted by Hades, comes to the home of Dysaules and his wife Baubo. As she refuses food and wine in her great sorrow, Baubo suddenly strips off her clothes and makes the goddess laugh. Reik draws a parallel between allu­ sion, as an essential feature of joke-mechanism, and strip­ tease, partial unveiling (op.cit. 91-98). Partial unveiling seems to be more effective than nakedness, i.e. outspoken truth. The term of mishandling language which has been assigned to other, no less typical, verbal mechanisms inherent in jokes (see Holmes 1973) clearly interprets voluntary grammatical er­ rors in terms of an aggressive manipulation of the verbal sub­ stance. We are reminded of the pleasure experienced by the child taking pleasure while wilfully damaging his toys. In the case of jokes it is the verbal tool that is destroyed on the phonetic, lexical or syntactic level. Doctor Bartolo in Ros­ sini's "Barbier de Seville" reacts with evident annoyance as count Almaviva, disguised as a drunken officer, repeatedly distorts his name (calling him doctor Balordo, doctor Barbaro). Reversal, a structural principle of the organisation of joke content, in its multiple forms, as well as a structural feature of the verbal expression, can easily be traced back to diverse forms of undisguised aggressive activities. To turn things upside down is obviously a subversive activity, in the

54

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

literal sense of the term. Chiasmus deprives the legal owner of his property (let us say a substantive of its usual attrib­ ute) which is given to his opponent (assigned to the other substantive). There is a manifest parallelism in French medi­ eval fables between structural inversion and the expropria­ tion of the property of one's fellowman, including the appro­ priation of his wife. Negation, the logical operation underlying antithesis, is a moral principle attributed to God's inverse, the Devil 1 (the incorporation of negation in Madách's Tragedy of Man). The German word vernichten 'to destroy' originally meant 'to negate'. A more disguised form of aggression is the omission of essential elements of the sentence or of the plot, although the words describing this act as a suppression, erasion are eloquent enough. A hostile impulse may be displaced, transfer­ red from its real object on to the verbal substance. An anec­ dote quoted by the English biographer of Proust reveals the emotional background of ellipsis. (25) - Dou you think I am still the same now after five years? asked Antoine Bibesco his friend Proust. - You are less (Tu es moins), answered Proust. - Less what? less intelligent? less handsome? - Less, that's all, answered Proust relentlessly. (Painter, Proust 1966 I, 320) (cf. also the joke 11.) In a case study Reik (1929, 25-32), following Freud (SE IX, 169-175) considers the compulsive idea (Zwangsidee) of a patient as a fragment of a complex statement Reversal and negation, the essential particularities of the Devil, are at the same time characteristic of unconscious pro­ cesses, especially of dreams, as has been pointed out by Jones (1931, 184 f.). The Devil represents the violent libera­ tion of suppressed sexual and, chiefly, aggressive impulses. No wonder that laughter has something diabolical; it is primarily diabolic according to Baudelaire 1962, the expression of contradictory feelings which accounts for the convulsive char­ acter of laughter (op. cit. 249-251).

HE IS ONLY JOKING

55

made incomprehensible by the erasion of the most important part of it. The omission is traced back by Reik, in neurosis and joke technique, to the repressed tendency to annihilate the object "he should not be thought of again" (op.cit. 28). Thus, in a certain sense, style goes beyond content in the realisation of the repressed thought. On the level of con­ tent, aggressive or erotic fantasies are more or less clearly formulated, described by means of words. The "manner of ex­ pression" is however real activity, a partial realisation of the repressed impulses, though the acting-out is displaced from the real object to verbal activity. It does not take place in the world around, but in the oral cavity or on a sheet of paper, strongly reminding one of sympathetic magical practice, injuring or destroying an enemy by injuring or de­ stroying an image of him. Ontogenetic aspects of jokes What was the joke like before it became a joke? We con­ sidered the "funny remarks" as the basis of jokes: jokes without structure. Both contain a "childish" statement - a thought at once attractive and unacceptable; both follow the same strategy: invalidating the expressed childish thought through exaggeration, The structural elements of jokes are equally "childish": they can be traced back to verbal, logical, semiotical opera­ tions and attitudes characteristic of an early phase of mental development. Freud's theory of jokes is essentially ontogenet­ ic. Word associations, absurdities inherent in jokes are re­ garded as attempts to re-establish old liberties without pay­ ing regard to the compulsion of logic (SE VIII, 127). Some years before the publication of Freud's work Bergson (1900, 68 ff.) already mentioned the infantile sources of the comic. I should like to illustrate and concretise the parallels between joke techniques and the verbal and cognitive behaviour of children. The child's attitude towards language differs fundamen­ tally from the adult's. The child takes verbal signs much more

56

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

seriously, since he is closer to the great event when their appearance put order into the preverbal chaos (let us remind ourselves of the verbal experience of Helene Keller who re­ conquered language at the age of seven, and with language the faculty to organise the surrounding universe, Geschichte meines Lebens s.d. 20 ff.). At this stage words are still closely linked to the objects they denote and seem to be en­ dowed with magical properties (Ferenczi, Entwicklungstufen (1913), in: Bausteine 1927, 62-83). The unquestioning faith in language excludes even the slightest linguistic criticism The phonetic and the semantic component, the significans and significatum, form an indivisible unit in the child's con­ sciousness. Jakobson's statement about rhymes, "words similar in sound are drawn together in meaning" (1960, 371) is one of the child's basic linguistic tenets. Thus, homonyms are in­ variably confounded. I remember that as a five year old child I equated the Hungarian noun ég 'sky' with the verb ég 'it burns'. The semantic gap was bridged by the heat and light of the sun. (26) A Hungarian girl, Rati, said at the age of 3;6 - They are going to the cemetery to put flowers on the grave (Hungarian sir / ∫ i : r / 'grave'), now uncle Michael (the dead) won't weep (Hungarian sír / ƒ i:r/ 'he weeps') anymore. The child will be even less willing to keep apart the shades of meaning of the same word. The semantic distance between original, primary "concrete" meaning and the derived, secondary "abstract" meaning is greatly reduced in the child's mind, if not totally obliterated. The child is generally un­ willing to renounce the concrete sensual interpretation of a word or idiom. (27) Books are printed again, says Peter's mother, if children like them. - And if they are not sweet? asks Peter (2;9 years old)

"Kritik der Sprache", according to the terms of Fritz Mauthner 1923, and the principles layed down by Locke in his Essay in 1690.

HE IS ONLY JOKING

57

(28) - What do you like most? - I like most poppy-seed rolls, stories and Mummy (Steven, 2 ; 8 years old) . The equivalence of food, entertainment and love reminds us of the sick humour of joke (2 c) based on the merger of loving mother and liking food, deeply rooted in the earliest phase of psychic development concurrent with breast-feeding. The child's refusal of homonymy and polysemy offers an appropriate basis for similar confusions in jokes such as (1 4). It is also his faith in the veracity of words which prompts the child to preclude random events from language, to refuse instinctively and categorically the consequences of the arbitrariness of linguistic signs. (29) Emanuel, a French boy at the age of 2;0 thought that his Italian friend was not in the swimming pool, since he was called Paolo, in French interpretation /pa o lo/ pas au l'eau 'not in the water', and that another boy, Paschio was certainly not warm, pas chaud 'not warm'. (30) Eva, a Hungarian girl, five years old, and also Peter at the age of three, were very upset when gran'dad was inhaling i.e. took a breathing cure, (Hungarian inhalál 'he inhales' for a cold; they were afraid he might die (Hungarian halái 'death'). (31) An outstanding Hungarian scientist felt as a six-year old there was some mystery behind the Hungarian word anyacsavar 'female screw' (anya 'mother', csavar 'screw'), which was reminiscent of certain Itabooed words such as anyatej 'breath milk' (anya 'mother', tej 'milk'), anyamén (mother) womb'. His beliefs were confirmed in his opinion by the adults' reactions who significantly smiled at each other as he men­ tioned his conjectures. (32) "Why asztal (table)?" asked Peter at the age of three. Here we have found, I think, the source of playful ety­ mologising in jokes (5). Representation by the opposite, reversal, which occurs in so many forms in jokes and other humorous genres, can be traced back to different infantile factors, intellectual as well as instinctual. Children of 2-5 years (sometimes even beyond this age) easily confuse antonyms especially antonymic adverbs. (33) Eva and Peter at the age of 2-3 years repeatedly sub­ stituted tegnap 'yesterday' for holnap 'to-morrow', regen

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'long ago' for sokàra 'in a long time', mindig 'always', for soha 'never', korán 'early' for kèsőn 'late'. Mér jöttél olyan koran, késon? 'Why did you come so early, late? (Peter 2; 7) ." (3 4) The same children, also less frequently, confused meleg 'hot' with hideg 'cold', melegít '(he) warms (something) up' with hut (he) cools (something) down', and a number of other nominal and verbal antonyms. Being asked by mother during lunch whether the food was not too hot: -Majd megmelegítem 'I'll warm it up' (Peter 2 : 9 ) . Majd ha kicsi lesz, akko(r) 'When he will be little u . e . big) only then.' (Eva 2 ; 1 ) . In some cases an ambivalent attitude may facilitate or induce the substitution of a word unconsciously intended for the term consciously chosen: (35) Meg akarom piszkolni 'I want to make (them = his hands) dirty' instead of: Meg akarom mosni 'I want to clean them' (Peter 2 ; 6 ) . Both of two mutually exclusive attitudes may appear side by side, in the same sentence, and the child does not seem concerned by or even conscious of the inconsistency. (36) Nagyon jol érzem magam, haza szeretnék menni 'I am enjoy­ ing myself very much here, I'd like to go home' (letter of an eight-year old Hungarian boy written to his parents from holi­ day) . Inversion, especially double inversion, chiasmus, could be considered as a verbal projection of typical childhood fan­ tasies directly expressed in games: "Now I will be Daddy, and 12 (Peter five years o l d ) .

Daddy will be little Peter"

Answering No automatically, or with an antonym, any statement, especially those made by the parents, is a fre­ quent, almost normal reaction of the child at a certain age (2-4 years, at times even at later s t a g e s ) . (37) Mother: Vigyàzz, meleg! 'Pay attention, it (the bath) is hot. Eva (1;10), before getting into the bath: Nem meleg, hideg 'It's not warm, it's cold'.

I attempted in previous publications to develop these sugges­ tions in the case of chiasmus and other figures

(1972, 1975).

HE IS ONLY JOKING

59

(38) A little girl of three years, Christina, spat in the street. She is reproved by her mother. - I didn't spit. The mother gives her a slap. Christina sniffling: - I didn't spit, and I didn't get a slap. We are here not concerned with the instinctual (analsadistic) basis of negation and defiance (cf. Freud, Analcharakter /1908/ in: SE X 226-227). It is sufficient to state that this attitude is typical at a particular age (which jus­ tifies our use of the term 'childish defiance' referring to that of adults), and note that inversion and representation by the opposite in the joke has the same instinctual source as defiance in the child. We know that the instinctual basis of stubbórn silence is identical to that of negation. To deny, to negate, to sup­ press form a homologous series. We already considered the con­ nection between the suppression which is part of all jokes and aggressivity implied by denial and suppression. Ellipsis has another infantile source that we discussed in relation to the deictic field. The child relies so heavily on the deictic field; as the result of its projective thinking (Ferenczi, Entwicklungsstufen /1913/, in: Bausteine 1927), its egocentricity (Piaget 1955), he can hardly imagine that some­ thing that to him is perfectly clear might not be clear for another person. The elliptic style of jokes may be pleasurable also because it leads us back to the child's universe governed by the pleasure principle. An inverse error, also related to the faulty use of the deictic field, is ignoring the transformational power of the deictic field, converting statements being in diametrical opposition to the deictic field into "funny remarks". (39) - The weather is wonderful, says the 6-year old girl looking out of the window which is completely obscured by rain. - Yes, it is a fine day, echoes in all seriousness a 4year old boy, relying on the judgement of the big sister, and not knowing that a statement which sharply

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contrasts with reality must be converted into its opposite. This naive attitude is adopted by the joker who is supposed to tell the absurdities contained in the joke in all serious­ ness. In some cases a 2-4-year old child is present in the joke. He is the one who interprets the sentence literally, making sure that the two simultaneously incompatible interpreta­ tions of the sentence become evident. Playful distortion of words and sentences, the genera­ tion of nonsense sequences, is the earliest verbal play, the proto-joke of the child. It may have widely differing motives: regression to the preverbal phase of babbling, parodistic imitation of the adults' nonsensical discourse, mishandli.ig language, as the most innocent kind of destruction. (40) Peter, at the age of 2;2-2;6 repeatedly distorted the word api 'Daddy'. This verbal play always elicited bursts of laughter from him. Freud retraces the absurdity inherent in the structure of jokes to an infantile type of mental activity (SE VIII, 170). It might be useful to make an explicit link between a number of typical joke structures and corresponding logical errors of the child. The most common error, automatic think­ ing (cf. joke 16, 17) results from an insufficiently speci­ fied program. (41) Laurent (2;4) is flirting with the light bulb. "Watch it, it's very hot", warns his mother. Laurent blows on the bulb carerully, repeatedly. (The program underlying his preventative action was apparently too general: "If any object is hot you blow on it before con­ tacting it" . ) Many jokes are based on the confusion of independent and relational features (cf. 18). (42) Our children between the ages 3-5 when asked which of two books or cakes they liked best, generally answered: "I like both the best." There is experimental evidence to show that true comparatives,

HE IS ONLY JOKING

61

more, less are regularly preceded by a non-relational inter­ pretation (many, few, cf. Clark (19 70), Donaldson and Wales (1970)) . Parental relations equally tend to be realised as in­ dependent properties: (x) f (x), instead of (x,y) f (x,y), For instance, a mother is simply a mother, and not the mother of X. (43) Peter, who at the aqe of three had precise understanding of the process of multiplication of the numan species, said at the age of four to his mother: "When I was a little, very little boy, you were not yet born, only Daddy." The most frequent false syllogism underlying errors stylized by jokes is the well-known false syllogism: if a. then b; b consequently a. (44) Eva (five-years old) looked enviously at Peter who was drinking his chocolate, and said: "He is so lucky, he likes chocolate!" If somebody likes chocolate (1) and has chocolate (c_) then he is happy (h): Hence, in order to be happy you have to like chocolate, which is evidently a false conclusion: but nevertheless a good reason to be envious of one's little brother. Displacement of emphasis in jokes (cf. 13) is based on semiotic fallacy which reproduces the child's attitude to­ wards fiction or humour. Just as verbal expressions are always motivated for the child, fiction in jokes or on stage is near to the level of real events. The child shouts at the ac­ tors, warns Little Red Riding-Hood about the approaching dan­ ger. Similarly, following the punch-line of jokes he will ask for further details concerning the characters in it. Precisions and corrections From à semiotic view-point it is in general terms true that the structural elements of the joke are made up of ontogenetically primitive forms. To this category belong the in-

62

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

fantile treatment of language and logic. As a consequence, the child, whose way of thinking and whose attitude towards language conocitute the structure of jokes, is himself "with­ out feeling for the comic" (Freud SE VIII, 222). This appar­ ently paradoxical statement is fundamentally trivial. The child obviously cannot enjoy a regression to his proper age level. We must become adults in order to enjoy childish ver­ bal, semiotic and logical strategies. First a minor qualification: the child is also able to enjoy humour, he also experiences economy of mental expend­ iture through homonymy, as soon as he recognizes homonymy and, at least partially, accepts the principle of arbitrariness of linguistic signs. (45) Eva, at the age of 1 ; 7 wanted to have some biscuits, in Hungarian keksz /keks/, from English cakes; kekszet 'biscuits (acc.)' pronouncing /keset/ instead of /kekset/. Keszer /keset/ was interpreted by her mother as kezet 'hand (acc.) 1 . As soon as Eva realized that /keset/ could mean kezet ('hand (ace.)1) for Mummy though she meant kekszet 'biscuits1 sne burst out laughing. Such examples, neither frequent nor exceptional, clearly show that even a 1;7-year old child is occasionally able to notice homonymy, and to enjoy the freely fortuitous coincidence of two words widely differing in meaning. The joke does not only preserve the shortcomings of in­ fantile cognition. Within the content of the joke, and also in its structure, the openness and unconventional mode of ex­ pression of the child are also maintained. We may best appre­ ciate the importance of this component through our reaction. The genuine expression of the child's experience has an effect bordering on the joke. If we take a closer look at some in­ consistencies in the child's statement, it appears that they reflect inconsistencies present in reality. (46) A three-year old boy, Stephen, speaking about his little brother, concludes: "I like little Mike very much. But I don't like it that he exists."

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63

This statement goes beyond the expression of ambivalent feel­ ings. It separates the, generally amusing, aspects of the newcomer from the frustrating fact of his arrival. (4 7) Peter (at 3;6): "Mummy, I can see in your eyes that I was lying again." Self-contradiction as a form of self-criticism is combined with inversion and condensation by omission. He perceives only the reflection of the lie, mirrored in the eyes of the mother. Severa] links in a sequence of ideas are suppressed (aposiopesis, according to classical rhetoric): I was lying, you saw through it, and now you are angry. The wish to demotivate and invalidate a statement or action is present at an early age. The invalidating spell "I am only joking" also appears. (48) Peter (2;6 years old): "Huram" (oral gesture, pretending to swallow his mother) "I am eating Mummy :" (the same gesture to­ ward his father) "I am eating Daddy:" (49) Peter (3;2): "Daddy is not allowed to eat my pudding." (He is reproved by Gran'dad.) "I was just kidding." Such examples illustrate that the phrases "only joking", "just kidding" solely serves the purpose of demotivation. Joke is equivalent to any pretended, nonreal activity. (50) Peter (3;9) listened to a pretend-quarrel recorded for purely phonetical, experimental purposes, as his parents made clear to him: "It is funny, isn't it?" he said. Poetry is also joking The putting into words of an unacceptable thought and the immediately following invalidation we encountered in "funny remarks" is the common foundation of jokes and poetic word plays which are referred to as "metaphor", "metonymy", and "synecdoche". If we read poems to our children like the following ex­ tract from the song of a dancing bear: (51) A feje a nêninek The head of the lady Eppen jo lesz pemszlinek. Will make a fine paint-brush. (Attila Jôzsef, Medvetanc - Bear-dance)

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an apologetic, explanatory remark must follow immediately: "The bear is only joking. He just thought of a brush as he looked at the lady's head; she was probably also very thin like the handle ot a brush, and her hair reminded the bear of the hair at the end of a paint-brush." Adult readers would scarcely need any explanation. The type of poetic statement we call metaphoric - in the broadest, and at the same time the liter­ al sense of the term - forms a violent and intentional con­ trast with common sense, it prompts us to go beyond the "face value" of the statement, and look for a solution, that is, for some underlying statements which may resolve the tension creat­ ed (cf. Anderson (1964), Ortony, Reynolds, Arter (1978)). Saying something different, allegorein, in order to be able to say more ("Zweifaches in Eins zu fügen", in Hegel's words, 1955, II,3) is a common feature of the joke and the metaphor. This suggests that through the metaphor as well as through the joke, mental energy is saved. In the metaphor similarly to jokes the surface meaning is in Hegel's terms aufgehoben, simultaneously invalidated and preserved. The poet behaves as the joker, as­ suming the responsibility for the incongruity. There are other similarities between metaphor and joke. The pleasure of rediscovering something which is familiar to us, is, according to Freud, one of the fundamental processes in jokes (SE VIII, 120 ff.). It is "easier to understand new things, if they are cast in terms of old" point out the authors of a recent review paper on metaphor (Ortony, Reynolds and Arter (1978, 937)). They define metaphor as "tension-resolvable contextual anomaly" (op.cit. 9 40), a view which comes close to Freud's dynamic theory of jokes. In both cases, the demotivated sentence of the surface structure appears to be closer in content to the unconscious thoughts than the implied one. The metaphor and the joke: disparities Dissimilarities are, however, even more important than

65

HE IS ONLY JOKING

similarities, otherwise how could we explain why we are amused by a joke or a funny remark, and why we do not laugh at a metaphor. A beautiful metaphor may elicit, occasionally, a smile of satisfaction. Laughter is elicited by the sudden discovery of a hidden meaning: the joker leaves the conscious level for a split of a second (Freud SE VIII, 166). Reik associates the German words Witz 'joke' with Blitz 'lightening' (1929, 69). Jokes are ambiguous in the strict sense of the word, they have two clearly defined meanings. The two interpretations involved 13 are contrasting, highly polarised. In contrast to the clean-cut semantic limits within the joke, the genuine metaphor is "open", "unset" according to Hegel ("nicht gesetzt", 1955, 396), admitting an unlimited number of convergent interpreta­ tions. The vagueness of metaphor is irreducible; metaphor 14 cannot be paraphrased (Campbell, 1975). Contradictory com­ mentaries in existence on Mallarmé's metaphoric verse-lines could be considered a natural semantic experiment in vague­ ness. The extraordinary length of these commentaries further indicates the high semantic density of the metaphors (Michaud 1953, Fonagy 1961) . The centrifugal semantic tendencies inherent in jokes seem' to support Imre Hermann's theory which postulates (on the basis of experiments with children and adults) a polarising tendency dominating primary-process thinking, (Hermann 1923)). 14 Individual jokes and metaphors diverge, of course, in their degree of vagueness, and this is apparent periments (Peter Fónagy

from semantic ex­

(1974), Ivan Fonagy (1975f)). The ob­

tained values for the two sets, jokes and metaphors, how­ ever, are not overlapping.

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HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

The metaphor moves in an open semantic space. The openness of the metaphor could be considered a consequence of its dynamic character. A static model which defines the metaphor in terms of partial overlapping of underlying con­ cepts (Pelc 1961, Rubinstein 1971, Lehmann 1975) or in terms of common semantic features (Stern /1923/ 1931, 301, Bickerton 1969, Matthews 1971,Abraham 1975) misses the most fundamental aspect of transfer, rightly emphasized by classical rhetorics and Sanscrit poetics. The transfer according to Quintilian "confers motion and emotion to the sentence" ("motus dat quendam et affectum", Institutiones oratoriae 2, 13, 9 ) . Quintilian uses the model of Miron's Discóbolos: the unusual, contorted position implies a series of subsequent gestures by the discusthrower. Metaphor is thus not an image in the strict sense of this term, but rather a series of images, a motion-picture. (Konrad Lange (1901), and more recently Hankiss (1969)) see meta­ phor as an oscillatory movement between different levels of interpretation. Movement implies direction. The two sides of a mathemat­ ical equation are interchangeable. This is certainly not true for poetic equations underlying metaphors, even in cases of apparent reflexivity. Victor Hugo repeatedly identifies snowflakes with butterflies, and butterflies with snowflakes, as it appears from Huguet's comprehensive analysis of Victor Hugo's images (1904-1905). Snowflakes changing into butterflies, on the one hand, and butterflies changing into snowflakes, on the other, evoke entirely different images and create different atmospheres. 1 5

Few poetic metaphors comply with the postulate of Aristotle who states that the metaphor must always be reversible (Rhet­ orics 1457b, 1407a). The asymmetry of metaphor (and of simile) is particularly evident in pejorative, cacophemistic images, such as: (footnote 15 continued)

HE IS ONLY JOKING

67

Metaphor not only implies movement: it is the semantic movement implied. I should like to illustrate this statement by the dynamic interpretation of one of the synesthetic meta­ phors of the Hungarian poet Arpad Tóth (1886-1928), submitted previously to a formal semantic analysis by Ρetőffi (1969) . (52) ... es nem tudja más, Hogy csöndem éjén milyen jajok égnek. ( ... and no one may know What cries burn in the night of my silence) Petőfi defines an image as "any part of a text made up of at least two syntactically related but semantically incompatible elements" (op.cit. 191).16 Thus incompatibility arises in the possessive construction sőndern éjén 'in the night of my silence', since éj 'night' belongs (according to Petofi) to the visual field, and csendem 'my silence' to the auditory sphere. The theory cannot fully account for the poetic effect of the metaphor, as this effect would be much reduced by inverting the order of the two terms: éjem csöndjén 'in the si­ lence of my night', and would completely vanish by omitting the possessive morpheme in éjem: az éj csöndjében 'in the silence of the night'. If we consider, however, as the source of the effect of the metaphor the relation of two terms which belong to different sensory domains, the change of order should not reduce or abolish the aesthetic effect of the phrase. We may approximate more closely the poetic message in­ herent in this metaphor if we regard it as the end result of a series of successive transformations. The last of these (footnote 15 continued) FALSTAFF: Sblodd, you starveling, you elf-skin, you dried neat's tongue, you bull's pizzle, you stock-fish (Henry IV, part 1). As has been pointed out by Alexander Szalai (in a letter) it is unlikely that we could find in literature a stock-fish or a bull's pizzle identified as one of the characters of a drama. 1f

This definition is comparable to (footnote 16 continued)

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transformations could have been the transposition: csöndem êien

in the night

of my silence

êjem csöndjên

in the silence

of my night

"In the silence of my night" could be conceived of as an in­ tegration of (a) "in the silence of the night", and (b) "it is my night". The expression "the silence of the night" is a frozen grammatical transfer which corresponds to the "si­ lent night". Both involve a frozen lexical metaphor implying the personification of the night. In "In the silence of the Night we find ourselves in the domain of the Night goddess (the con­ cretized silence suggests such a domain). We are induced by the poet to revive these frozen metaphors, since he refers to these structures in creating a new, personal myth, making a universe out of silence, where night and day are alternating, and where the poet is at present plunged into darkness. Col­ lective or personal myths, however, do not furnish us with an explanation. In fact they require one. Stripping the allegoric statements of their mythical character generally involves a transformation of the substantive ("...of my silence") into a corresponding verb or adjective ("...I am silent"). Thus, we would obtain the somewhat flat discursive statement: "I am si­ lent in the night". Since we feel this interpretation is unsatisfactory, we are forced to return to the expression csöndem éjén 'in the night of my silence' for some residual information . We are reminded of the German romantic theories of the nocturnal side of nature (die Nachtseite der Natur), involving the creative (footnote 16 continued) Weinrich's view who considered a metaphor any semantic unit contradicted by its context ("ein Wort in einem konterdeterminierten Kontext", Weinrich 1967).

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deeper layers of our consciousness (studied by the doctor Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert 1808, 1814). In Hungarian the link between night and depth is tightened by the phonetic similari­ ty of éjén /e:je:n/ 'in the night (of)' and mélyén /me:je:n/ 'in the depth (of) 1 , 'at the bottom (of)'. Depth is explicit­ ly linked with the (personal) night in the poem: S én lent vergodöm es nem tudja más, hogy csöndem éjén milyen jajok êgnek. (And I struggle down below, and no one may know What cries burn in the silence of my night.) At the same time, night and silence are the negation of day and of life. The "burning cries" are banished into the poet's night: they are negated and reduced to silence. There is a further reason which compels us to interpret the metaphor as a semantic movement. This movement, for in­ stance, the cross-over movement, the chiasmus we postulated in the metaphor of Arpad Tóth, could have a symbolic value. The chiasmatic inversion might be considered a dynamic abstract representation of the lyrical "plot" of the poem. The theme of the work concerns the poet's discontent about the injustice of his position in an upside down world, where undeserving nobod­ ies are exalted, and he, the poet, is condemned to hopeless struggles, helplessness and isolation.; The chiasmus anticipates the change of positions which the poet evokes in the last stanza. Such an interpretation of a concrete metaphor is neces­ sarily subjective, I presented here my personal reading of the metaphor which probably does not entirely coincide with the interpretation of other Hungarian readers, since genuine meta­ phors cannot have socially agreed upon meanings. This is a con­ sequence of the open, unset nature of metaphor. Infantile sources of metaphor The structural characteristics of metaphors have their origin in infantile verbal and mental activities, in the same way as the formal features of jokes may be traced back to the verbal and mental organisation of the child.

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Momentary controlled regression producing the metaphor, however, may go back much further into the ontogenetic past than jokes do. The structure of jokes playfully reproduces the verbal, semiotical and logical blunders of the 2-5-year old child. The metaphor restores the period which coincides with the separation of the self and the non-self (Fenichel 1946, 46). The metaphoric process is started by the rejection of a word and its underlying concept: by a kind of voluntary aphasia. The poet must first become an in-fans, a non-speaker, in order to produce the new word, the new, dynamic concept. The various types of semantic transfers (tropes) can all be traced back to particular deficits in the child's cognitive functioning which are characteristic of early stages. (Most of the examples provided belong to later periods, and are only derivatives of the original, supposedly real and total confusions.)17 a) Identification of closely connected objects (metonymy): (53) Hilda (0,10) the daughter of Clara and Gustav Stern used the word didda (derived from tic-tac) to refer to the watch and the chain of the watch (Stern K. w. 1928). (54) Steven ( 1 ; 6) called auk 'hole' the keyhole as well as the key (Oksaar 1970) (55) Eva (2;1) pointed to Gran'dad's spectacles: Szeme Nagypapának "Eyes of Gran'dad'. (56) Laurent (2;6) wanted to send to his grandfather a piece of the cake he was eating, whilst he was listening to him on the telephone. His first attempt consisted of trying to put the cake into the receiver through which he was listening to grandfather; but on finding that in this way he could not hear him, he replaced the receiver at his ear, and proceeded to stick the cake into his other ear. He apparently thought that this procedure was just as effective as the first one (and it really was).

Although I refer to these shortcomings of the child using the word confusion, clearly, this term does not accurately portray the complexity of the processes which must be involved in these errors. This thorny problem which needs further elab­ oration emerged in a discussion with Peter (26; 8).

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b) Confusion of the content and the container (metonymy): (57) Eva (1 ; 10) noticed a hole in her father's stocking: /luka/ la:bi/ Lukas lab 'Hole in the foot'. - Similarly, Edmond (3;0) referred to his father's foot when he meant his slippers: est cassé le pied de Papa (Grégoire (1947, 225)). c) A part of the body is identified with the whole body (syn­ ecdoche) : (58) Mother's big toe showed through her slipper. Peter (2;7): Egy bâcsi van a lábadba 'There is a man (lit.: an uncle) in your foot'.18 d) Confusion of the owner and his property (metonymy): (59) Eva (1;4) on seeing mother's morning gown after she left: /ani/ /kukuc/ /it/ /ani/ Anyi'Mummy' kukucs 'peek-a-boo' itt 'here'.19 (60) Dominique (1;7) pointing to his mother's empty car: Maman. e) Identification of the author and his work (metonymy): (61) Eva (6 years old) asked to say whether something was alive or not: "The dog?" -Alive. "The geranium?" -Alive. "The book?" -Alive. "Why?" -Because the man who wrote the book is alive.

The "synecdoche" is combined with a "metonymy" (confusion of foot and slipper). The example is contestable. The toe was, of course, not identified with the mother, but considered as a sort of Liliputian man. Thus, the confusion could be inter­ preted in terms of similarity as well. This seems to be in agreement with the doubts concerning the frequency of synecdoches expressed by Ruwet (1975). 19 It is not easy, and sometimes arbitrary, to differentiate be­ tween the different kinds of contiguity confusions. Mother's morning gown could be considered as the container of the mother as well; the socks (57) as a property. The relevant dis­ tinction between different tropes and the confusions made by children seems to be the contiguity/similarity opposition (Jakobson and Halle 19 56).

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f) Confusion of similar objects: (62) /mata:j/ Madár 'bird' said Eva (1;6) seeing a fly. (6 3) Itt a nap" 'Here is the sun', Peter at 2;2 on looking at

a white l i g h t - b u l b . (64) Eva (1;8) asked for a toothbrush: /tseuza:t/ Ceruzát 'Pencil (acc.)'. g) Polysemy, going far beyond the limits we ever meet in the speech of adults, seems to be a child-language universal (Bühler 1929,. and W.Stern 1929,Scupin 1907,Kaverina 1950,Kënyeres 1927) (6 5) Eva (1;2), starting from gomb 'button1, formed a highly variable one-word sentence, both at the level of expression /momp/~//bomp/~/lomb/~/mompu/ etc. - and at the level of meaning: it could refer to anything that was round and/or could be taken into the mouth (among other things to buttons). During the same period she used the word /powoc/~ /pobos/~/poboc/ from dobοz 'box' which could refer to boxes, to the bucket, the radio to the tape-recorder, to books, and occasionally used to refer to the rectangular waves contained in Martin Joos' book Acoustic phonetics. (66) Karl Abraham observed similar verbal behaviour in a twoyear old German girl. She spent a great deal of time at the cage of a canary-bird called "Hans". She also referred as Hans to feathers the bird lost, and later to any feather; then label­ led her Mother's hat which was adorned with feathers Hans, as well as mother's hair and her own hair, a soft cushion, finally anything soft or pleasant to touch became Hans (Abraham /1923/ in Werke II, 197l", 189-193) . In fact, the child perceives familiar objects in less familiar ones, emotionally relevant objects in emotionally neutral ones, disregarding essential distinctive features which do not concern him at that time (cf. Ferenczi /1919/, in: Bausteine I (1927, 103), Jones /1916/ (1961, 87-144)). Thus, the first one-word sentences of children appear to create a whole series of metaphors. In fact, metaphor gives back some of the liberties we freely enjoyed in the verbal Paradise lost; through it we return to an early diffuse con­ cept formation governed by the pleasure principle. The metaphoric process largely dispenses with the Ding-an-sich (Kant), the essential features of real objects. The sole concern of the poet is the Ding-für-mich: the object as it appears to him in a particular situation, at a given moment. Consequently,

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metaphors show the same amazing variability as the first oneword sentences. The same term can apply to a variety of objects (70), and the same object can be interpreted in highly differ­ ent ways (67, 68, 69). Huguet's study of Victor Hugo's imagery demonstrates that the possibilities offered by metaphor in de­ scribing objects in terms of a variety of other objects are almost limitless, and compare favourably with the first oneword sentences. (67) Words nave been represented by stones (Rilke, "Ein Prophet"), paving-stones (Baudelaire, "Le soleil"), by walls (Dylon Thomas, "Shut too in a tower of words"), metal (Apollinaire, "L'assassin") daggers (Heine, "Die Tendenz"), stars (Apollinaire, "Les fian­ çailles") , strawberries (Dzsida, "Pelyhes pillanatok" (Downy in­ stants) ) , clots of blood (Attila József, "öda 5"), fishes (VignyJ "Le mont des Oliviers"), lions (Arpad Tóth, "Berzsenyi"), black birds (Rilke, "Die Sybille"), warm bodies (Illyés, "örizetben" (Under arrest)), etc. (6 8) Within the same poem of Petőfi the soul takes the form of a book, of an iron ring, a column, a rock, an angry cloud, and the prophet Elijah ("Arcképemmel" (With my portrait)). (69) Law "is the sun", "the wisdom of the old", the "senses of the young", "the clothes men wear", "is Good-morning and Good­ night" in Auden's poem ("Law"). (70) The word or concept of rragrance stands for memories (in Heine's "Der Strauß·", Arpád Tóth, "Orgona" (Lilacs)), for thought (in Dylan Thomas, "Light breaks"), for time (in Symons' "Modern beauty"), etc. h) The child interprets "abstract", that is, intellectual, moral, social phenomena by means of a perceptual mapping. (71) In her dream, Eva (9 years old) met Mrs X in  though she was living in A, and Mrs Y in A though she was living in B: - Olyan görbét álmodtam ('I had such a crooked dream'). (72) Gustav Lindner's son (2;2) was asked whether his mother was good.. "Not good, sour." (Werner 1933, 69). (73) A 2;9 year old Hungarian boy who recently received a present from his gran'ma said: - Édes, piros Nagymama 'Sweet, red Granny' "Concrete abstraction", perceptional mapping of ideas satisfies both the realistic adaptive needs and the instinc­ tual needs by preserving the contact with perceptible objects (thus yielding to the instinct of grasping, postulated by Hermann 19 37),

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i) Synaesthesia, the transfer from one modality of perception to another , is especially frequent in the first years of language acquisition. (74) Jo szaga van a cseresznyének, piros szaga van 'The cherry has a pleasant odour, a red odour' ( E m 2; 1 ) . (75) "Na da mußte doch die Augen aufmachen, sonst weißte doch nicht, was ich gesagt hab" 'Open your eyes or you won't hear what I am saying' (Scupin 1910, 134). Peter, at the age of nine, proposed a psychologic theory of synaesthesia. (76) He said spontaneously one evening: "Black is a bad colour, it is frightening, the nignt is dark. (=Red is the best colour, it has to be sweet (cf. 72. 73)).: Yellow is very, very sour," (he was not referring to lemons). Peter's theory seems to be quite reasonable: sensory stimuli transmitted by different sensory organs but related to the same experience are interchangeable. This has been con­ firmed in individual cases of synaesthesia where it was found that it reflected repressed early traumatic experiences (Pfister (1912), Hug-Helmuth (1911)). Synaesthesia has been traced back to the earliest experiences of the child already by Bleuer and Lehman (1881). j) Projection is the earliest form of the discovery of the world around us (Ferenczi /1913/ in Bausteine I (1927, 73)). The animation of inanimate objects, the personification of object, plants and animals are the most conspicuous manifesta­ tions of the projective discovery procedure. (77) The father: "Leave it now. Put down your trumpet." Peter (2;9): "ElrâradtaK?" (Have they got tired?) (78) Peter (4;1): "That's fine, big pair or pants. It may be four years old, just as myself. No, I am four years old_, but the brief must be five years old, it's too big for me." Animation of inanimate objects may also underlie phobic fear of certain objects. (79) At the age of three years Eva reacted with anxiety to the sight of an open black umbrella placed on the floor. Her little brother, two years later, at the same age, developped a similar phobic fear of the same object. Eva, some five years later, still remembered her fear, and explained to her parents that an open umbrella represented the wide open mouth of a devil

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or an ogre. For Peter, it was a wolf. There are no sharp borders between the personal, sub­ jective and the real universe which surrounds the child. (80) Dominique (5;1) has an otitis media "Maman, écoute mon oreille i" ('Mummy, listen to my ear!') (81) The father: "Don't you remember Mr B, he used to bring you chocolate?" Peter (3;9): "Now I remember, but he does not have a head." (For further examples, see Grégoire (194 7, 2 36 ff.)) ) The metaphor changes the world and its dimensions to fit the child's perspective, regressing to a period preceding the stabilization of size constancy. Hermann Helmholtz (1856, 623) related in one of his major works that as a child looking out of the window he believed that the people walking in the street were tiny puppets, and remembered asking his mother to give him the church tower. In Victor Hugo's poems, according to the Register of Huguet's Les métaphores (1904-1905 I, 15 ff.), the ship faraway on the sea is a paper-built toy-ship, the roof becomes a hat, 20 the river a snake which meanders in the valley; the night appears as a black door on which the setting sun is a glowing red key-hole (Nuits d'hiver II). In one of Heym's poems ("Prin­ temps"), the farmer who stands near by is a giant leading two giant cows in front of him. In one of his other poems ("Die blinden Frauen"), the blind woman stabs her hand into the sky. Similarly : (82)

Or moi, bateau perdu... Moi qui trouait le ciel rougeoyant comme un mur (Now I, a boat lost... I who pierced the sky red like a wall) (Rimbaud, "Le bateau ivre")

Respecting Victor Hugo's genius, Huguet gives a quite differ­ ent explanation for the poet's optical illusions: Hugo was such a great man that all objects appeared quite small to him.

76 In one of

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS Attila Jozsef's poems the fine glass of the air

is scratched by pointed branches of trees ("Téli éjszaka" ("Winternight")). In another one the clouds become warm eider­ downs ("Dead country"). Structure and function of metaphors The deep regression implied by the structure of the metaphor takes us back to the formation of ego boundaries when the dividing wall separating conscious and unconscious thought was still permeable. This may account for the partial uncovering of unconscious symbols: between the town and the 21 female body: (83) Ich bin der Leib voll ausgehöhlter Qual, In meinen Achseln rotes Feuer hängt. (I am the body full of cavernous pain, Red fire hangs in my armpits) the landscape and the woman's body (Baudelaire, "La géante"); between death and woman, death and the mother: (84) They lay neatly side by side, With open eyes, the lonely orphans, She who bore them there she stands, Their ruthless mother, death. (Kosztolányi, "Együgyú' ének" (Naive song)) Unconscious representations may come to the surface because 22 this is "only the surface", the poet is only joking. We know, however, that only "semi-metaphors" (BrookRose 1958) contain both the real object meant by the poet (the "tenor" according to Richard 19 36) and the fantastic object which is substituted for the real one ("vehicle" accord­ ing to Richard). Even in that case the tertium comparationis (the "base" for Richard) is only implied and may be entirely un­ conscious. Thus, for instance, the hilly landscape is iden­ tified with the female body in Baudelaire's "La géante". The 21

Cf. Otto Rank, Um Städte werben,. (1925, 158 ff.) 22 I attempted to outline unconscious messages conveyed by naetaphor in previous papers (Fonagy 1965a, 1965b).

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poet imagines that he is sleeping, careless, under the hill of her breath: (85) Dormir nonchalemment à l'ombre de ses seins, Comme un hameau paisible au pied d'une montagne. We may infer that remote memories of the dual-unity (Dualeinheit, cf. Hermann (1936)) of the child and the mother con­ stitute the missing links between nature and the female body. The inference seems to be supported by the unusual dimension of the female body, though this remains a pure hypothesis. 23 "Real" metaphors,. statements containing only the last link of a chain of associations, the "vehicle", the fantastic object, leave even more room for more or less arbitrary con­ jectures (cf. also 52). (86) Let us consider one of the most transparent poems of Mallarmé, also taken for an occasional piece, "The Fan of Mademoiselle Mallarmé".24 0 reveuse, pour que je plonge Au pur délice sans chemin, Sache, par un subtil mensonge, Garder mon aile dans ta main. The Fan addresses his dreamy female proprietor (reveuse), the poet's daughter, to hold it tight by its wing. The identifica­ tion of the fan with a bird is facilitated through the analogy between gently fanning and the flutter of wings : Une fraîcheur de crépuscule Te vient à chaque battement Dont le coup prisonnier recule L'horizon délicatement. The imaginary bird is held captive, thus his vertiginous flight broadening the horizon is also imaginary. Christine Brook-Rose (1958) considers explicit identifica­ tions of type "a is b". Danielle Bouverot (1969) restricts the term "metaphor" to images which contain only the "vehicle". Images of the type "a is b", or "a, b") i.e. equations and appositions, are called identifications, and are kept apart. For a detailed analysis, see Michaud (1953), Fonagy (in pre­ paration) .

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Vertige! voici que frissonne L'espace comme un grand baiser Qui, fou de naître pour personne Ne peut jdillir ni s'apaiser. Space trembles like a great kiss, it came into being for nobody, it cannot burst, it cannot be appeased. Sens-tu le paradis farouche Ainsi qu'un rire enseveli Se couler du coin de ta bouche Au fond de l'unanime pli. The charming young lady ("untamed Paradise") leans the fan against her lips, and her laughter pours into the "unanimous fold" of the fan. Le sceptre des rivages roses Stagnants sur les soirs d'or ce l'est, Ce blanc vol ferme que tu poses Contre le feu d'un bracelet. The young lady closes now the fan, still set against her lips, the "rose banks", then she leans the fan on her brace­ let. For Guy Michaud (1953, 119 ff.) the fan is at the same time the poem (supposed to be written on the fan), and the young girl, the dreamer, is the poet himself, unwilling to give free course to poetic imagination (to let the poem soar freely), "le poème se clôt sur lui-même" (op. cit. 120), the poem forms a closed circuit. In a broader context, with reference to Mallarmé's analogous images contained in other poems, and on the basis of unconscious symbolism, revealed in dreams and myths, other readings are equally possible.in Placet futil Amor's wing is identified with a fan. The terms que je plonge au pur délice (I, 1-2), vertige, frissonne equally favor a sexual inter­ pretation of the fliqht.plonge evokes at the same time the poem "Pitre châtié" where the lover literally plunges into the eye of the beloved, after having transformed the eye into a lake. The transformation might have been facilitated by the unconscious identification of the eye and the female

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genitals (Freud, Ges. Werke II/III, 364, Ferenczi, "Augensymbolik" , In: Bausteine II (1927, 264) Taillard (1944, 181 ff.)). The imaginary, fictitious flight could be interpreted in this framework as imaginary intercourse. This, of course, would lend a very concrete and embarassing meaning to the first stanza. In the same frames of reference the rivages roses (rose banks) could be linked with the étrange bouche pâle et rose of "Une négresse", the euphemistic metaphor for the female genitals. But even if we hold by the first interpretation (riv­ ages roses : the lips of the young girl) , once we admit the sym­ bolic meaning of sceptre (a typical phallic symbol), the first line of the last stanza will by no means be quite innocuous. The unanime pli seems to be complementary to sceptre, represent­ ing, at the same unconscious level, the female genitals. The metaphor, however, freely moving between the diverse (or even contradictory) representations, readily disclaims the elicited interpretations. In contrast to daring, blatant jokes, metaphors seem to be more cautious. The more unconscious, re­ gressive material they contain, the vaguer, the hazier the image becomes. It is almost as if there existed a kind of homeo­ stasis/ a compensatory mechanism which ensured clear rep­ resentation for innocuous, trivial content,; and also ensured ambiguity and vagueness when unconscious, "dangerous" material was involved. "Homeostasis" might be, however, an artifact of the increasing role played by primary mechanism of thinking in metaphors which express unconscious material. The descent towards deeper levels imposes a barrier to conscious under­ standing of metaphors. Vagueness is inherent in the structure of "real" meta­ phor, precluding any reference to meaning or to the thing meant. Consequently, in some cases it is not evident whether a given expression is to be interpreted metaphorically or taken literally without looking for an underlying meaning. (87) Thus, Mallarmé's sonnet, "Surgi de la croupe et du bond", describing a room, has been interpreted in different ways.

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The verse-line Le pur vase d'aucun breuvage (III,1) refers to a lustre without light ("sans fleur") according to Mauron (1950, 190, f.): it is a metaphor. Chasse(1954, 13) thinks,however,that Le pur vase is not a metaphor but an empty vase. Similarly, Moi, sylphe de ce froid plafond (II, 4) is an image for Michaud (1953, 65),the curve described by the vase reminiscent of a sylph "impalbable genie de l'air". According to Chassé (1954, 139), the poet compares himself to a sylph "mure par les hommes dans un froid plafond". Mauron (1950, 190), however, sees a sylph paint on the ceiling. Poetic images are regressive both on the level of ex­ pression and on the level of content. On each level they can be more or less deeply regressive. If we give full credit to the linguistic form, a "real" metaphor presenting only the "vehicle", the "fantastic" or "delusive" object, for instance the female body in thinking of a town (83), can be considered as more deeply regressive than an implicit comparison which takes the form of a hypothetical case of self-deception (atishadzokti in Sanskrit poetics): (89) ...å le voir on dirait à coup sûr Une pierre de plus dans les pierres gothiques. (Musset, "Don Paez", Part II) or a comparison explicitly stating the similarity of two not obviously similar objects, relating both by means of a copula such as like, or a verb such as resemble. There is of course no real confusion between phantasy and reality in the poet's mind, and the "regressiveness" of "real" metaphor is only formal. There is, however, a clear relationship between the formal regressiveness of images, and the more or less regressive semantic trends inherent in the same images. I compared,on the basis of French and Hungarian poetry of the 19th and 20th century, two groups of images, on the one hand "real" and "half" metaphors (cf. p. 20),

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implicit and explicit comparisons on the other , and I found that images more rational in structure (comparisons) are also less regressive on the level of content (cf. Figure 1 ) . Projec­ tive (autistic) images describing animals as human beings, per­ sonifying objects and ideas are associated with the first group of images (metaphors). Rational structures (comparisons) either compare people with people, or reduce more complex phe­ nomena to less complex ones : humans to animals, living beings to inanimate objects, thus use the comparison as a tool of analysis. As we know, purely verbal (structural) features are frequently remotivated in psychosis. The patient genuinely confuses objects which are identical on the verbal level. Thus, he is compelled to take poetic verbal joking seriously. A fe­ male patient of Bleuler (1911 , 349)reported real anxieties about being burned by the fire of love. The patients regress to a period where the rationalizing spell of resembles, like, as if has not yet come into being. The re­ discovery of like often marks a turning point in the process of recovery. (90) A patient of Wendell Muncie suffered from the delusion that knives were being driven into his brain. He also felt anxiety because "people looked down on him". After improvement he was able to add the liberatory as if. The use of simile instead of metaphor may be considered a sign of improvement, suggests Muncie (1937). Joke-land and Metaphoria: a tentative synthesis Structure, function and content are in perfect harmony, in metaphor, just as in jokes. A sudden regression to the agelevel of the 2-5 year-old child in jokes shows^ the world un­ disguised, reveals the naked truth. Playful discarding of logical conventions allows us to see through fallacious "se-

The results are discussed in detail in Fônagy (1975 d) .

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rious" arguments and attitudes sanctioned by tradition. The joke casts a sharp light into dark corners, and destroys laboriously built self-deceptive social constructs. The lib­ erated aggressive and sexual energies are used in a highly, though indirectly, constructive manner: for the negation of the negative elements of our culture. "A joke...is the most social of all the mental functions that aim at a yield of pleasure", writes Freud (SE VIII, 179). "The joke works only, as pointed out by Mary Douglas( 1968, 371) when it mirrors social forms; it exists by virtue of its congruence with social structure". She considers joke as an anti-rite. The authors (Freud, Koest­ ler, Fry, Milner, Johnson) rightly consider joke as a safety valve. (The court-jester, the king's fool was inviolable and admired, at the same time deeply despised: the court could not do without him, and they were ashamed of the need of him.) The joke-strategy itself is essentially social: the joke pre­ supposes the presence of a listener who is the one who decides whether the joke-work has succeeded in its task (Freud, SE VIII, 143 f.). The joke teller is supposed to withhold laugh­ ter waiting for his partner's reaction to the joke. Only after the partner gave his assent breaking into laughter can We enjoy freely the joke with all its implications (Freud op.cit. 204, Reik (1929, 83 ff.)). The functions and strategies of the metaphor are dif­ ferent. The essential task of the joke is to express freely unexpressable thought. The metaphor needs to go much further, and tell us something we do not know, what has never been verbalized before. In rejecting the conventional term, the poet removes the conceptual framework; he is invaded by sensa­ tions coming from 'an untamed, non-conceptualized universe. (9 1) Peter at the age of five during an excursion stood on his head for some seconds on the side of a hill, and was very im­ pressed by the unusual sights that his unusual posture led him to. "Oh, it's really beautiful!" he said.

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Standing on his feet again, he asked surprised and disappointed : "Where has the sea gone?" He discovered something that was usually denoted and concealed by the word "sky". Peter's exceptional experience was due to a gymnastic meta­ phor, a reversal. The world around him turned upside down and became again perceptible. This is exactly what takes place within the metaphoric process. (92) L'éther, cet océan, si liquide et si bleu. (Victor Hugo, "Au bord de la mer") (9 3) Similarly, Keats traces a thorough parallel between the heavenly blue and the blue of the ocean, the life of heaven and the life of waters (Blue!...) The genuine metaphor always implies a reorganisation of our universe (Black 1962), the production of new meaning (Heynes 19 75). Metaphor is the most powerful tool of the poetic dis­ covery process. The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling, Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven; And, as imagination bodies forth The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing A local habitation and name. (Shakespeare, "Midsummer-night's dream", Act 5, scene 1) The eidetic, exploratory function of metaphor accounts for the fact that metaphor generally coincides with the predica­ tive element of a phrase or sentence (Table 1). It is cen­ tered significantly more often on the predicate than on the subject, on the adjective, than on the qualified substantive, more often concentrated in the adverb than in the specified verb. In order to accomplish this highly social role, the metaphor must accomplish a strategic retreat to a pre-social, autistic stage of mental development. In contrast with jokestrategy the metaphoric process does not involve the presence of the listener: it is a solitary game which accounts for the vagueness inherent in metaphor.

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Mon discours est obscur parceque je suis seul (Eluara, "La volonte d'y voir clair ) The essential differences between the structure of the joke and the metaphoric process are made explicit at the level of content. What happens in Joke-land? Fables of the 12th and 13th centuries (21, 22, 23) could be rightly considered as the Joke-land of their time. While in the "roman courtois" the knight exposes himself to the greatest dangers (he fights having the beloved lady's shirt tor armour), accepts years of renouncement in the hope that the lady for whose name he is fighting will reward him with a smile. Whilst in the world of fables the woman is seduced upon the very grave of her husband (asking her lover devoutly to caress her to death)/ 57% of the fables are about physical love with strong emphasis on technical details; the lover in 89% of the above cases is a clergyman. 26% of the fables celebrate the victory of vio­ lence . Accepting the metaphoric fictio, we gain access into a dream-land. In Metaphoria seeds of happiness grow and blos­ som roses (Petőfi, ''Bells of Eger"), moonshine changes into silver coins (Kosztolányi, "Capricious passages about the Moon"), "a big and silent snail-shell is built out of humility" (Arpad Tóth, "Fringe of the forest"): everything is changeable, in­ constant, in the making, only submitted to the laws of fantasy. Children's metaphors "There is substantial evidence (that)... children do not use metaphors", writes Helmer (1972, 9 f.), attributing children's "metaphors" to anachronistic interpretation of adults. He states further that "no person without capacity for metalanguage can be said to use metaphor...Metaphor is an example of metalingual competence" (op.cit. 12). Children certainly have no metalinguistic competence of metaphor just as they possess no metalinguistic competence of syntactic rules which they, of course, fully master. We must make a distinction between practical and theoretical compe-

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tence in the use of metaphor. The experiments of Asch and Nerlove (1960) seem to in­ dicate that children apply adjectives such as sweet, hard,cold ,first to objects, and even when they apply them to people the words have a separate meaning; the children cannot explain the connection. Reviewing this paper, Ortony Reynolds and Arter (1978, 926) rightly suggest that this does not justify the conclusion that the metaphor was not un­ derstood. What does seem certain, however, is that children easily answer nonsensical questions suggested by the metaphoric ter­ minology of ancient and modern phonetics such as "which of the two sounds is darker, /i/ or /u/?" "Which of the two sounds is more humid, the /n/ or the /η/?" "Which of the two sounds is stronger, / 1 / or /r/?" Experiments carried out with 25 children under school age show that children are surprisingly consistent in their answers to these questions (cf. the results contained and interpreted in an earlier study (Fonagy 1963)). During an informal inquiry, one of the subjects, , whom I asked whether the sound /i/ has fair or blacK nair, answered unhesitat­ ingly but somewhat astonished, that /i/ was blond, adding: "Why do you ask? You didn't know?" Her question seems to mean that she found my question as natural as if I had asked whether her doll's hair was blond or black; as if the question did not imply a transfer of meaning, the infraction of a semantic rule. We might be tempted to infer that the children's answers were based on primary confusion, and not on the metaphor re­ plicating the confusion on a verbal joke level. On a subsequent occasion I put a direct question concerning articulatory fea­ tures to Eva: "Is the /i/ in front or behind?" She answered again promptly: "In front", and added somewhat later: "I said this just as I said fair 'haired' ". Her last comment indicated that she might have felt that there was a difference between

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a direct question and a metaphoric one. Since we lack ex­ perimental evidence concerning the semantic operations which may underlie the child's answers to metaphoric questions, let us suppose that these answers are based on confusion in a first period, followed by a gradually increasing distinction between the assignment of proper (direct) and improper (in­ direct) qualities. This probably holds for the case of the creative meta­ phors of the children already cited (53-55, 62-66) and con­ sidered as reflecting primary confusion (see, however,fn. 17). In some other examples the confusion is certainly apparent. (9 4) Peter (2;3) looked at the photo of him he found in Gran'dad's wallet: - Peter tükörbe 'Peter in (the) mirror'. (9 5) Peter, at the same age, turning pages and looking for pictures in the book: "Betük úsznak" '(The) letters (are) swimming'. (96) Eva (1;9) at lunch, looking at the stuffings, said: "Ez is hógolyó" 'This is also a snow-ball'. (9 7) Eva (1;8) sucks her thumb, laughing: "Eszem ujjamat" 'I eat my finger'. (98) Béla (4;0), by now a leading authority in a field of ex­ perimental psychology, tried to explain to his father that his foot went to sleep, since he did not know the metaphor adults use, he had to invent a new one: "I have soda water in my foot." Eva at the age of two several times tasted stuffing as well as fresh snow; she could not possibly confuse the stuffing with a snow-ball (96), nor could Peter confound a piece of photographic paper with a mirror (94). Eva would not have laughed at the idea that she was really swallowing her fin­ gers. Yet, another child's metaphors are sometimes corrected or refused (laughed at) by older children. (99) A three-year old girl was looking at a photo of her dead aunt ; "Is she still alive?" "No, she does not live anymore." "She died into the picture." (Belehalt a képbe.) Eva (seven years old) listens to the story and comments laugh­ ing: "Little fool, one dies into a coffin, not into a pic­ ture . "

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Children seem to have easier access to hidden analogies (unconscious links) between different objects. (100) Peter (6;0) playing with his sister: - The locomotive is Daddy. The coach is Mummy. The lorry, the cylinder, the ambulance are the children, they are boys. Eva (8;3) : - You little silly thing, the ambulance is a girl. And this is correct at the level of unconscious dream symbolism. Language is joking Children's metaphors such as (9 4-9 8) are, in terms of classical rhetoric, examples of chatacresis, that is,they are transfers ex inopia, due to verbal penury. "In the absence of a proper term one takes the nearest one" ("non habentibus nomen suum accomodat quod in proximo est", Quintilian 8,6,34). In other words, metaphors invented by children have not aesthetic pretentions (do not belong to the ornatus), but are close­ ly related to scientific metaphors, the principle tools of scientific research at an early stage of its development. The child as well as the scientist tries to consolidate a vague notion by means of an improper term, or, at an earlier phase, to apprehend by means of the metaphoric process a still lack­ ing notion. Grammarians without conscious knowledge the articulatory features of aspirated plosives called them "rough" ι, and the unaspirated ones "smooth", "chauve" "hairy" ( ; they qualified palatal consonants as "moistened" with­ out knowing that the surface of contact between tongue and palate (two moistened bodies) is considerably larger in pro­ nouncing /c/ than /t/, ' than d, than /n/. Let us add that in this respect genuine poetic transfers do not differ from scientific metaphors: the poet also attempts to grasp a new, unknown aspect of even the very familiar ob­ jects such as lady's hair, a flower, or a lamp. Semantic trans­ fer is the only vehicle which can take us beyond conscious knowledge. Metaphor could be compared to the rope that the

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Indian magician throws up into the air. The rope seems firmly attached to an invisible object, and the magician can now climb up the rope and reach it. The mishandling of language by means of jokes and meta­ phors cannot be regarded as something imposed upon the lan­ guage from the outside; the forces that transform language originate within language. This, of course, is a paradox. Lan­ guage is only joking. How can we conceive of a grammar which generates sentences that are in contradiction to the rules of the same grammar? This is, however, a paradox governing linguistic change, and linguistic and mental evolution. Recent controversies concerning the principles of a linguistic analysis of the metaphor revolve around contra­ dictions which are most likely inherent in the metaphoric pro­ cess, Are metaphors "rule guides" or are they rule breaking? Goodman (1968), who raised the question, states that the metaphor is not irregular, no more than a game of poker is, when one of the gamblers has four aces (op.cit. Helmer (1972)). The question is not that easy to answer. Drange (1966) considers metaphor an unthinkable proposition. Bickerton (1969) replied that since such unthinkable phenomena suc­ ceed in getting into the language, Drange's theory of unthink­ able propositions is unthinkable. Bickerton defined metaphor as an extension of the system of attribute assignment. Such a semantic extension is only possible, according to the author, on the basis of specific attributes assigned fairly arbitrari­ ly to a particular sign. For example, the attribute 'harness' attached to 'iron' marks the word as potential metaphor aña gives leave to 'iron will'. In all other cases, the extension would be simply deviant (for instance, in the case of a steel will). Matthews (1971) considers Bickerton's argument circular, since our judgement of the markedness of iron is based on meta-

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phoric expressions such as ' iron will' . According to Matthews, the problem of metaphor can be solved within the framework of generative grammar; "the presence of a selectional restriction violation is...a necessary and sufficient condition for distinguishing metaphor from nonmetaphor" as far as the sentence was intended to be meaning­ ful (op.cit. 242). Price (1974), in a critical paper on Matthews' critical appraisal, wonders whether the speaker's intention could be considered a sufficient condition for distinguishing the meta­ phor from agrammatical deviance. He also expressed doubt about the metaphor being successfully treated in a grammatical frame­ work. In his paper on the degrees of grammaticalness (1962, reprinted 19 65) Chomsky considered metaphor as semi-grammat­ ical. Genuine metaphor presupposes a linguistic creativity which changes the set of grammatical rules, as in the case of analogic changes (Chomsky 1967,22). The hearer has to impose his interpretation on metaphoric statements, whereas there is no question of such an interpretation in the case of wellformed sentences (Chomsky (1965, 112)). Both Matthews (1971) and Lehmann Metaphern (19 75) see in metaphor an example of linguistic creativity; according to Matthews, metaphor is based on the "extension of the system of attribute assignment" which is fundamentally equivalent to Lehmann's "feature deletion" (Merkmaltilgung, op. cit. 105).

For German, French or Hungarian speakers 'hardness' marks steel as well as iron because volonte d'acier, stählerner Wille, acèlos akarat are by now conventional metaphors, prob­ ably under the impact of genuine poetic or literary metaphors (based on natural, encyclopedic "markedness" of steel and iron in any language).

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Feature deletion, initially based on individual competence, is "the starting point and the vehicle of rule-transgression dynamics inherent to language"("Ausgangspunkt und Träger der regelüberschreitenden Dynamik der Sprache", loc.cit.). Indi­ vidual competence, adds Lehmann, is in its turn a reflection of the socially-bound linguistic system ("Reflex des sozialen Systems der Sprache" (loc. cit.). The linguistic joke underlying the paradoxical state­ ment that metaphor is a linguistic rule about transgressions of linguistic rules arises out of the double meaning of lan­ guage (or German Sprache), denoting both the concepts which were carefully distinguished by Saussure in his Cours de lin­ guistique générale (/1916/ 1976, 112) : langue and langage. Langage comprises both the linguistic system (langue) and speech activity (parole). Verbal performance is governed,on the one hand,by the rules constituting the linguistic system, and on the other, by another set of rules which transform the products generated by the langue, or the grammar (accord­ ing to the generative transformational conceptual framework). This latter set of rules operates on the same levels as lin­ guistic rules but differs essentially from these in different respects. The rules of the transformer are "parasitical": they apply to sentences generated by the grammar (langue). They distort the grammatical sentences on the phonetic, syntactic and lexical levels according to para-linguistic transformation rules. 27 The generator of meaningful distortions is linked to the grammar in two ways: (a) it operates, as already mentioned, on sentences generated by the grammar, and (b) distortions, when they are frequently recurring, are fed back to the gram­ mar. Consequently, the grammar starts to produce the distor­ tions which will no longer be perceived as "semi-grammatical" deviances.

I have attempted to describe these rules in previous papers (Fónagy (1971b, 1978)).

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Distortion is only a special, extreme case of second­ ary encoding in speech. The linguistic system leaves a cer­ tain margin of freedom (as in fact all biologic systems do) in the realisation of linguistic units. Let us think of the extreme variety of concrete speech sounds representing the same phoneme. There is a certain play within the linguistic system. It is worthwile noting that in different languages the word play denotes both a 'part of mechanism having free movement' and 'amusing oneself' or 'employing oneself in a game' (Concise Oxford Dictionary (1951)) with a possible metaphoric extension of "sexual game". It is common experience that non-linguistic verbal communication within the margins left free by linguistic 29 rules is more pleasurable than strict obedience to lin­ guistic rules. Verbal activities such as expressive vowel

Huizinga (1938) considers the principal characteristics of play: free activity standing outside ordinary life, the liberty of choice, independent of the struggle for life, a peculiar order reigning inside of the playground, the charac­ ter of fiction, voluntarily accepted illusion. Simultaneous shades of meaning of polysemic words as well as etymologies reveal the relationship between playing and joking: Latin ludus 'playing, mocking'; Hebrew s-h-q 'to play, to laugh'; Arabic la'iba 'playing, teasing'; and between playing and love making: Sanscrit kridati 'to play, to copulate', Algon­ quin koani 'to play, to make love'; Old High German leikan 'to play' corresponding to Swedish leka 'coupling in birds'. 29 I prefer to restrict the term 'linguistic' to what is deter­ mined by the langue, whilst 'verbal' may cover a broader area, comprising all language (langage) phenomena, including nonconventional shifts of stress, agr.ammatical pauses, genuine transfers, etc.

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lengthening, expressive shift of stress, expressive change of word-order, "mishandling" of language in jokes and genuine lexical transfers, all fit into the category of "verbal play within the linguistic limits". The question arises : why is it more rewarding to follow the rules reigning on the "play-ground" than those constituting the dominant linguistic system? The reasons are multiple and diverse. The secondary message is created through the meaning­ ful modulation or distortion of the primary message generated by the grammar. This secondary message is superimposed upon the primary message, and is perceived as its realisation, as one of the possible ways of providing the abstract unit, pho­ neme, word or sentence. Thus, for instance, a laryngeal stop preceding a vowel (in languages having no laryngeal stop pho­ nemes) is interpreted as manner of pronouncing the vowel which reflects a definite attitude (firmness, aggressivity). 31 Thus, expressive transformation necessarily implies condensation of different messages, since the primary message and the second­ ary "stylistic" message are integrated into one act of commu­ nication. It saves mental expenditure.

The term 'modulation' should cover choices made within the margins left free by the linguistic system (langue), the term 'distortion' the choices which transgress the lin­ guistic rules. Both modulation and distortion are governed by the same rules constituting the system of secondary encoding, the modulator or distorter. The term 'modulator' is more appro­ priate, since it may cover both modulations and distortions. 31 I attempted to outline the mechanism of "stylistic encoding" (Fόnagy (1964, 1971d)) and the nature of the messages conveyed by secondary encoding (Fónagy (1971b, 1970, 1971a)) elsewhere.

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The handling of a "natural" code consisting of motivated rules , based on the isomorphism of expression (significans) and content (significatum) is easier, requires less mental energy. For instance,the rules governing English wordstress (cf. Chomsky and Halle (1968), Halle and Keyser (1971), Vanderslice and Ladefoged (1971) , Lieberman and Price (1977) , Kiparsky (1977), Guierre (1979) are less easy to memorize than isomorphic rules such as "the more intense the emotion, the more intense the stress". Rules governing word-order in a given language are less easy to memorize than isomorphic rules such as "to express impatience let the more important part of the message precede the less important one". At the same time, isomorphic, motivated rules are closer to real activity than arbitrary ones. Thus, for instance, "mishandling of language" by means of changes in word order (tearing the sentence into pieces) by "distorting" words, by infringing, "violating" grammatical rules is more directly related to aggressive behaviour, hence more relieving than a simple statement such as "I am very angry". The verbal transformation of an opponent into an ass, a swine is reminiscent of Kyrke's magic (the transformation of the companions of Odysseus into animals), and hence more satisfactory than a belittlement expressed by means of primary messages ("You're not intelligent", "You're immoral"). The rules of secondary encoding can be regarded as the 32 vestiges of a pre-linguistic system of communication. As we saw above, verbal operations we encounter in metaphors and jokes appeared to be demotivated errors. This was particularly apparent in the case of jokes falling into the categories of clumsy handling of language (2c, 3, 4, 6, 7 ) , semiotic blunders (13, 14), logical errors (15-18). Metaphors replicate 32 I have outlined tnis hypothesis in previous papers (especially in Fonagy (1978)).

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even more basic verbal and mental inadequacies: loss of words and concepts, confusion of contiguous objects (metonymies) of similar phenomena (metaphor 67-70), lack of size-constancy, personification of inanimate objects. The reviving of paleological (Arieti (1971)), infantile mental mechanism, dominated by the pleasure principle accounts for the great attractive force of jokes and metaphors, and, more generally, of all forms of verbal play governed by the modifier-system. Language could dispense with jokes - though the high number of changes of meaning originating in jokes show their 32 importance in verbal interaction - but it could by no means dispense with metaphor. The linguistic relevance of metaphor has been repeatedly stated in the course of recent debates on metaphor. "A semantic theory must account for the process of metaphorical invention" (Bolinger 1965). "Any psycholinguistic theory that does not handle metaphor is incomplete, and any that cannot handle metaphor is inadequate" (Orthony, Reynold, 32 The vocabulary of any language is a depository of jokes and metaphors. Probably the oldest joke we can reconstruct is implicitly contained in the word head, German Haupt, Latin caput: its original meaning was probably 'pot, vessel' in the Indo-European dialects spoken some 5000-6000 years ago (date of the joke),(WaldeHofmann (1938)). It was presumably not the first, and certainly not the last time that the head of a human being was discourtously compared to a pot or a cup. A similar joke was repeated by German speakers with some knowledge of Latin who compared the head of the partner or of a third person to a cup, Latin cupa, German Kopf, between the 1st and the 5th century A.D., after Latin /u/ changed to /o/ and before Germanic /p/ changed to /pf/. - Let us add that language can store jokes based on metaphor.

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and Arter (1978)) . Transfer of meaning is the principal means of conceptual reorganisation on both the lexical and the grammatical levels. Such a reorganisation originates from playful, strategic mental regressions. The recurrent metaphoric excursions, registered by the grammar, constitute the semantic structure of lexical and grammatical signs. Semantic structure recapitulates the conceptual evolution due to controlled regressions. 33 The statement that "metaphorical meanings can no more be listed in a dictionary than sentences" (Cohen and Margalit (1970, 471)) holds only for genuine metaphors which cannot and must not be predicted. The integration of recurrent lexical and grammatical transfers is, however, of vital interest for language development. The "residual vagueness" of words (op.cit. 484) is due both to the "infinite potential for new metaphors" (op.cit. 471) and the highly complex semantic structure of lexical and grammatical signs due to preceding transfers integrated into language (langue). Language offers still other examples of poetic residues, plainly justifying Emerson's characterisation of language as "fossil poetry". Abstract nouns, for instance, are potential allegories, the grammatical category of abstract nouns such as happiness, dear, super-ego is a container of demotivated, ossified myths. Poetic or didactic allegories, schizophrenic delusions, phobic fears of personified qualities (101) are occasional, infantile or pathological remotivations of antiquated, demotivated misconceptions integrated into language which could not dispense with such categories. 33 Thus, for instance, the polysemy of possessive constructions in English, French, German, Hungarian, and Turkish can be interpreted in terms of residual effects ("precipitations") of successive grammatical metaphors (Fônagy (1975a)).

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(101) Anna (2 years old) discovered the word and concept of darkness : "Darkness comes. Don't come, Darkness! I said 'don't come, Daikness!' Mummy she sees Darkness." Anna did not know yet that language is only joking. In one way or the other adults too risk being taken in by language, that is by paleological thinking, hypostasis, hidden metaphors, double meaning inherent in language. Locke warned us from such an "abuse of words" (1924, III, χ ) , other philosophers were still more passionately critical about language (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Mauthner). But even these deceptions, imperfections are "deceptive", only apparent. Language is only joking: the integration of pre-linguistic communication into language, the verbal mapping of paleological mental categories, result in a highly flexible, dynamic communication system, superior in expressive as well as in organisatory power and evolutive capacities to any other semiotic system. Language is inclined to joke and play probably because playing is at the origin of language. Playful performance of an action implies partial demotivation and constitutes a first step towards communication (semiosis). Let us think of well known examples such as the cackling of a cockerel imitating the hen as a sign of submissiveness, or the similar behaviour of a young ape producing the female sexual display in front of a hierarchically superior male as an expression of sur­ render. The showing of the white of the teeth, as an allusion to the attack, may dispense the ape to attack really. Accord­ ing to Hooff (1974), the apes' aggressive mimetic display is at the origin of laughter: our joke response.

Humans

Humans

animals

Humans

Humans

Ideas

Humans

Plants

Humans

Humans

Plants

Humans

Inan.Nat.

Humans

Ideas

Relative frequency

(in p.c.) of metaphoric links or "centres" in different syntactic structures

in Rimbaud's Bateau ivre.

based on 952 metaphors in Victor Hugo's Contemplation I-XV, Baudelaire's Tableaux parisiens, and

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Acknowledgement This paper, which I signed alone as the sole person responsible for the statements it contains, is in fact a joint publication without joint liability. Most of the material was supplied by my children, Eva and Peter, at the ages of 1-6 years. Somewhat later Peter, at present lecturer in the Department of Psychology of the University of London, as­ sisted me very effectively with his critical remarks and suggestions. I am at the same time much intebted to Miss Vanessa! Moore for her precious help in revising the English version of my article.

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ON THE SYNTAX OF THE NEGATIVE AUXILIARY IN SAMOYED Péter Hajdứ 0. At a conference held in Budapest on The Grammar and Semantics of the Verb, Paavo Siro delivered a paper entitled "The Syntactic Constituents of the Negative Verb Forms in Finno-Ugric Languages" in which he analyzed Finnish verb forms in the first place, al­ though, in brief, he also dealt with other Balto-Finnish lan­ guages (Estonian and Livonian), with languages of the Volga re­ gion and with Permian languages ( Siro 1968). As to Finnish, the author points out that one of the basic features of that lan­ guage is the occurrence of a negative verb which is used to ex­ press negation. The negative verb has exactly the same number of forms as the corresponding positive verb, that is, the occurrence of the negative verb doubles the number of verb forms within a paradigm. The positive (affirmative) forms of the Finnish verb are either simple (e.g. Ind.Present sano-η 'I say' = V + Vx , Ind.Imperf. sano-i-n 'I said' = V + Pret + Vx, Conj. sano-isi-n 'I would say' = V + Mood - (Tense) + Vx) or complex (e.g. Ind. Perf. ole-η sano-nut 'I said'= Existential verb + VxlSg + Main verb +Partic , ole-mme sano-neet 'we said' = Existential verb + VxlPl + Main verb + Partic + Plur, Ind.Plusquamperf. ol-i-mme sano-neet 'we had said' = Existential verb + Past + VxlPl + Main verb + Partic + Plur, Cond.Perf. ol-isi-n sano-nut 'I would have said' = Existential verb + Mood + (Tense)+ Main verb + Partie +

110

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Sing). In the latter case, the verbal paradigm consists of the finite form of the existential verb (ole-) which receives the Tense and Mood markers as well as the endings denoting Person and Number (Vx) and of the infinite form of the main verb which can stand either in singular or in plural. The structure of the complex forms can thus be rendered by the following formula: Existential verb + Mood + (Tense) + Person + Number + Main verb + Tense + Number Negated verb forms are always complex in Finnish. This is true of both simple affirmative sentences and complex or compound sen­ tences. All negative forms must contain the negative auxiliary e- . E.g., Ind.Present e-η(Sgl) sano (root) 'I don't say', Ind.Im­ peri. e-η sano-nut(Partic) 'I didn't say', Ind.Perf. e-η ole (root) sano-nut (partie) 'I didn't say', e-mme (VxPlurl) ole (root) sano-neet (Partic.Plur) 'we didn't say' , Ind.Plusquamperf. e-mme (VxPlurl) olleet (Existential verb, ParticiplePlur) sano-neet (Main verb, ParticiplePlur) 'we didn't say'. These forms thus have the following general structure: The root of the negative auxiliary (e_-) + Person + Num­ ber (Vx) (+Existential verb (+ Part (+Plur))) + Main verb (root) (+ Partie ( + Plur)) Further inquiry into verbal forms shows that in positive (affir­ mative) sentences the verbal root can only receive one Tense or Mood marker. If a further marker is needed, then another verbal root is required. In the latter role, as a constant element, we find the auxiliary ole- which receives the endings of Person and Number (and eventually those of Tense and Mood). The situation is thus similar to what we have in the Hungarian forms mentem volna (Cond.Past) 'I would have gone' or mentem volt (arch. Plusquamperf.) 'I had gone'. The Hungarian forms differ from the corresponding Finnish forms in two respects: (i)in Hungarian the auxiliary follows the main verb, in Finnish the order is the opposite, (ii) verbal endings (Vx) are attached to the main verb

THE NEGATIVE AUXILIARY IN SAMOYED

111

in Hungarian whereas they are associated with the auxiliary in Finnish. In negative sentences the endings denoting Number and Per­ son are attached to the negative auxiliary e-, the Tense and Mood markers to the main verb or, in constructions where there is an existential verb, to the existential verb. There is one notable exception: the imperative where the Mood marker appears on both the auxiliary and the main verb. Siro points out that Lappish has similar negative construc­ tions. Other Finno-Ugric languages, however, deviate more or less from the Finnish pattern in this respect. Thus, for example, in Southern-Estonian and Livonian the Past Tense marker gets attached to the negative auxiliary. The same holds true for Cheremis and to some extent for Erzja-Mordvin as well. Cheremis, Zyrjen and Votjak have a 'perfect' negative auxiliary since it can receive - in addition to the endings of Person and Number Tense markers and in some cases even Mood markers (cf. Siro, 3615). Siro remarks that the Samoyed languages, too, have a nega­ tive auxiliary, but he does not discuss the negative constructions in these languages. In the present paper I wish to examine the negative con­ structions of Yurak in some detail. Yurak belongs to the Samoyed-group of languages. We shall see that Jenisej-Samoyed (Enets) and Tawgy (Nganasan) are similarly built up in this respect. In Selkup, on the other hand, negation is expressed by several ne­ gative particles. It should also be noted that a fairly detailed description of the forms of negation in Yurak (=Nenets) can be found in A.M.Scerbakova (1954). This paper can aptly serve as a basis for theoretically oriented accounts of negation. Some of the examples used in the present paper were taken from Scerba­ kova 's work. 1. In Nenets the structural pattern of negative sentences coin­ cides with that of positive sentences only if the negative sense

112

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

derives from the semantic content of the verb itself. The verb is of course used in its positive form in such cases. Verbs used in positive form but with a negative meaning in­ clude, for example, jārnkoś 'not to be available', jāPmāś 'not to be able to', jexeràs 'not to know', jarmeś 'not to know', widarāś 'not to know, not to hold out', puptas 'not to meet', woltāś 'not to like', ńerćideś 'not to love', etc. When these verbs are used, the structure of the negative sentence coincides with that of the positive sentence:

V' and Prx can further be split up as follows: V' — > νB (+Der) Prx > M + Vx + Nu + Te The above symbols should be read as follows: A ranges over (com­ binations of) Px, Emph-Det and Nu (that is, N can receive maxi­ mally Px + Emph-Det + Nu), where Px stands for possessive per­ sonal endings, Emph-Det for emphatic and/or determining elements, and Nu for number. A is optional. X and Y stand for any construc­ tions (possibly zero) which are dependent on N and V, respecti­ vely, i.e. they denote nominal and verbal complements. Prx de­ signates perfectivizing elements and various suffixes. V' is the verb base. M stands for the Mood marker, Vx for verbal suf­ fixes, Te for the Tense marker. E.g., xarmi jänku 'I miss my knife, I do not have a knife', pajoc jä?mādu? 'they cannot reach it', niśar tlikl serkad jarme 'your father does not know of this matter', etc. At present, however,

THE NEGATIVE AUXILIARY IN SAMOYED

113

we are not concerned with an analysis of such verbs and sentence structures since they are formally assertive sentences involving verbs whose lexical meanings already include negation. 2. The internal structure of VP's in negative sentences requires some new rules:

V stands for the (full form of the) negative auxiliary, neg ' V _ denotes the root form of the negated verb. This form J posBneg is formally identical with the 2nd Person Imperative of the indeterminate form of the corresponding intransitive verb. As can be seen from our rules, the negated root of the main verb stands at the end of the sentence and the perfective verbal en­ dings are attached to the negative auxiliary. Consequently, the main difference between negative and positive sentences is that in the latter the elements denoting Number, Person, Mood and Tense are attached to the main verb and come last in the sentence structure, while in the former all these elements are attached to the auxiliary and thus occur in preverbal position. Schemat­ ically we have

2.1. The rule

means that the morphophonological realization of the negative auxiliary is the segment ni which can, however, receive a pre­ fix (Pref) , wu or w_i, whose function is not quite clear (it is perhaps an emphatic element). The two morphemes may yield a new negative lexeme: wuni or wini. The constituent Pref is given

114

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

in parentheses because its use is optional. The morpheme ńí is the permanent part of the negative auxiliary. The symbol 'Der' indicates that various derivational suffixes can be added to the negative auxiliary. They are inserted between ńí and the verbal suffixes (Prx). Such derivational suffixes include -ne to form participles,-rxa to derive comparative forms, the diminutiveaugmentative suffix -rka, the hortative suffix -xV, etc. E.g., ni-rka-we-dams tosa? 'I was not really being careful', ńí-raxawe-n xo 'you can't have found' (Scerbakova 218, 216), no-xo-w? xodoIP'I wish I did not cough~I only wish I did not cough'. Some Mood markers can be considered as derivational suffixes, but they may equally well be regarded as constituting a separate class. I think, however, that they can be treated more adequately within the category Prx (see 2.2.). As a striking anomaly it should also be noted that in some dialects the iterative derivational suffix -seti is added to the negative auxiliary while in some others it goes with the main verb, cf. Bol'šaja Zemlja ñi-seti-wa? xarwa? Jamal, Tajmir ni-wa? xarwa-seti? 'we don't want (it) forever' (cf. Terescenko 1965). 2.2. V neg

is followed by the endinas of the Derfective verb forms -

(Prx): Prx > M + Vx (+ Nu + Te + + Emph-Det) In other words, only Mood and Person are obligatorily marked on the negative auxiliary. The indication of Tense, Number and em­ phatic stress is optional. Of course, the obligatory elements can also be realized as zero morphemes, namely in the following cases : Vx3 > ø Mind ----> ø That is, in the case of a 3rd Person verbal ending and in the case of the Mood marker for the Indicative Mood. 2.2.1. The Number marker 'Nu' is given in parentheses because it occurs only in the Dual and Plural. Nevertheless, Vx and Nu are

THE NEGATIVE AUXILIARY IN SAMOYED

115

closely related categories (for instance, in Past Tense forms Nu can only be interpreted as a morphonological variant of the Tense marker), and therefore the question arises why the complex unit Vx + Nu is not denoted by a common symbol. However, a se­ parate symbol for Nu is motivated on the following two grounds : (i) Vx3→ ø even in the Du and Plur forms of the inde­ terminate conjugation, while in such cases the Du and Plur mar­ kers function as independent morphemes if used with base forms of nominals. (ii) The glottal stops of the Dual and Plural verbal en­ dings fuse with the Past Tense markers and this gives rise to a twofold morphological alternation (depending on whether the glottal stop represents the nasalized -_? of the Dual or the nonnasalized -?? of the Plural morpheme):

2.2.2. Vx (+Nu) can be realized in a number of ways. The negative auxiliary may take indeterminate, determinate or, for that matter, reflexive verbal personal endings. Their selection depends on whether the main verb is used in indeterminate, determinate or reflexive form in the (perhaps only imaginary) assertive sen­ tence which serves as a basis for the derivation of the negative sentence. This fact also shows that the negative verb has no semantic features apart from Negation. It functions rather as a 'negative dummy' which carries grammatical morphemes and at the same time turns the semantic content of the main verb into negative. Examples : Indeterminate conjugation: 'not I give ~I don't give', want

~

I don't want'.

(VxlSglndet) tat? VxlSglndet) xarwa? 'not I

116

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Determinate conjugation: ńī-w(VxlDet) ηamt? 'not I (that) heard ~ I didn't hear it', ńī-w (VxlDet) menku ? 'not I (that) take ~ I didn't take it'. Reflexive conjugation: ńī-?(Vx3SgRefl) täew? 'not he (himself) arrive ~ he himself didn't arrive', ńo-xo(adhort)-w? (VxlSgRefl) xodol? 'not let me cough ~ I wish I didn't cough', pido? (PronPers3Person) ríi-d ?(Vx3PlunRef1) jamdanku ? 'they not they(themselves) set out with the caravan ~ they are not setting out with the caravan'. 2.2.3. In the case of negative sentences, Mood is usually express­ ed in the same way as in the case of positive sentences. Of course, in negative sentences the Mood markers are attached to the nega­ tive auxiliary. (i) Imperative : (Pref)ńīńo-, (nu)ńo-, (ńi)ńo- . E. g. ,ηο (imp)-r (Vx2SgDet) ta? 'not you (that) bring ~ don't bring it', ríinu(imp)-n(Vx2SgIndet) to? 'not you come ~ don't come', ńo (Imp) -da? (Vx2PlurIndet) toŕenor ? 'not you cry ~ don't cry', nuno (Imp)-r (Vx2 SgDet) māda?'not you(that) cut~ don't cut it through', (ii) Adhortative : B2 + -xV, where B2 stands for the base form ńo- of the negative auxiliary. E.g. wewa ser-t(Lat-Dat) ńo(Imp)-xo(Adhort)-naj(Vxl PlurDet) xäm?'bad thing in only-not we(that) harm ~ I wish we didn't get into big trouble', tad nerna?ji-t? (Dat) ńo(Imp)-xo(Adhort)-dm(VxlSglndet) xā? 'if inthe-future water-in not-only-I die ~ I wish I wouldn't drown'. B + (iii) Conjunctive I : 1 where 'B1 ' refers to the base form ńī of the negative auxiliary. E.g. nuíī ńi-je(ConjSg3Indet) xâń? 'completely not leave ~ I wish he would never leave', ńī-ji(Conj)mda?(Vx3SgReflimp) tarp?'not go out(from the tent)~

THE NEGATIVE AUXILIARY IN SAMOYED

117

that he should not leave the tent', ńi-jī(Conj)-n (Vx2SgIndet)-aś(Past) padan? 'not ... write ~ he would not have written' (Ščerbakova 202). (iv) Conjunctive II : B, + -rwa (in Forest Nenets: -rmeä) E.g., ńi-r(Frequ)- wa(Partic)-xa?(VxDu3Indet) naw? 'not ... eat ~ they should eat', Forest Nenets ńir(Frequ)-meä(Partie) ø=(VxPlur3) tāŕī-ŕi? 'not... stealonly ~ if they only don't steal'. Note: Frequ + Partie make up Conj (v) Conjunctive III : Conditional Gerund + Vx (+Nu). E.g. ,ńi-p-ti? (Cond.Gerund Du2) manas ? 'if you-two not look ~ if you don't see', ńī-bat(Cond.GerundSg2) tumt? 'if you not know ~ if you don't know'. (vi) Probabilitivus I : B, + -ńekī- . E.g., ńī-ne (Partic) -ki?(Probab)-_?(Vx3PlurInd) namtor? 'not probably listen ~ they probably don't listen to this', Kanin tarem? ńī-ńī (Partie)-ki(Probab) a ? 'so not probably is ~ it is probably not so'. Note: Partie + Probab make up the category Aor Probab. (vii) Probabilitivus II : 1 + -wī + -kī —> 1 + -wekī ńī-we (Past Part)-kī. (Probab) 'not been was ~ probably it wasn't'. Note: Past Part + Probab make up the category Past Pro­ bab (i.e. Probabilitivus II). (viii) Probabilitivus III : 1 + -rxa . E.g.,Forest Nenets ni-rxa-?(VxPlur3lndet) nae? 'not like (probably) they are ~ probably they really are not', and ni-wcā(Der?)-rxa-m(VxlSgPet) siertae? 'notlike- I do ~ I probably don't do it'. (ix) Probabilitivus IV : 1 + -wneä- (= -wi Part + ne Cond) Forest Nenets ńi-wneä(Probab)-t(VxlSglndet) käj? 'not ... go ~ of course, I would go there'.

118

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS Forest Nenets ńi-wńeä(Probab) taŕem nā?(nei) 'not so is (be?) ~ how come that it isn't so'. Note: the forms given in Probabilitivus III and IV are only known in Forest Yurak. Semantically there is no difference between these forms and Probabilitivus I.,II. (x) Superprobabilitivus : ΒΊ + -wankab ' e-. E.g. ,xib'efi xibe-xert (Priv.suffix) ńi-wan (Inf) -kab 'e (Probab) ρ'in?'man(somebody) nobody certainly afraid ~ one is certainly not afraid of anyone'.(Scerbakova 222) Note: Inf and Probab yields Superprobab. (xi) Obligativus I :  + -bcu- . E.g.,xa-ba?an(Cond.gerund Sgl) xa-bcum(Oblig), ni-ba?an ni-bcum 'dying...I die must, if not not-must-I ~ If I die I have to die, if I don't die I don't have to' (proverb, Ščerbakova, 2o2). (xii) Obligativus II : B, + -bca- + -ki . E.g.,ue-koci(Dim.suffix)-d(Px2Pl) ni-bca(Oblig)-kl (Probab)-?_(Vx3PlIndet) xan? ' deer-little-your not go surely they ~ your little reindeer surely (certainly) don't go away' (Ščerbakova, 2o2). (xiii) Auditivus : B, + -wonon- . E.g.,xanese-do?(Px3Pl)tana? (is ¡? - t'uku po-xona(Loc) ni-wonon(Audit)-do?(Vx3Pl) xada ? 'Have they got any prey? — I have not heard that they have got any this year.

2.2.4. In Nenets the ways of expressing Tense differ from the tense structure of Finno-Ugric languages. In this language, Tense can be marked not only morphologically: some kind of reference to Tense is also involved in the Aktionsart of the verb. The only Tense marker is the morpheme -s which denotes Past Tense. The root of the main verb in a negative sentence also carries some temporal value but the Tense marker -s is always attached to the negative auxiliary. In other words, the possibilities for

THE NEGATIVE AUXILIARY IN SAMOYED

119

the negative auxiliary to indicate Tense are rather limited and the temporal value of a negated structure depends most of all on the Aktionsart of the main verb. The negative auxiliary which is burdened with a number of other grammatical morphemes as well, can only take the Past Tense marker -s (and possibly the Part Perf derivational suffix -wī):

V posAperf _ _

refers here to the Derfective Droperties of the main .. verb (achievement, completion or instantaneousness).

Examples : (a) ńī(Sg3Indet) xā? 'not die ~ he didn't die' ńī-dm (VxlSglndet) tu ? 'not come~I didn't come' In both cases: Vpos + Perf (instantenous) = VposAimperf (b) ńī(Sg3lndet) n? 'not is ~ he is not' , nl-dm(VxlSglndet) tut? 'not coming ~ I don't come' . In both cases: Vpos + Imperf (continuous) = VposAimperf (c) ńī-dam (VxlSglndet) -s (Past) tu ? 'not ... come ~ I didn't come', Forest Nenets ńī-tā(VxlSglndet)-s(Past) ηamt? 'not... hear ~ I haven't heard'. Notice,incidentally, that in Forest Nenets VxlSglndet is realized as -t (cf. Hajdu 1959, 2 2 5 ) . (d) jorce-?(Plur) xāl'e-m?(Ace) ni-wī?(Part +Plur =Vx3Plur Past) xāda? 'fishers fish not catch ~ the fishermen had not got any fish' , Forest Nenets jāmp apej n i mej(PartPerf=VxSg3Past) n_? 'long worm (=dragon) not is ~ the dragon was no longer there'.

120

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS In Forest Nenets V

neg

+ wī- yields

-mej

The above examples suggest that the negative auxiliary with -ś or -wï (examples

(c) and

(d)) may have the function of the Plu­

perfect. 2.2.4.1. In Nenets the Past Tense morpheme -_ś is a typical final position morpheme. Still, it is very difficult to distinguish the morpheme ś from it which, too, is a Past Tense marker and which appears between them stem and Vx in the allomorphic form -sä- : (a) man (Proni) ni-sâ (Past ) -dm (VxlSglndet) na? 'I not is ~ wasn't I?' (Ščerbakova 2 o 3 ) , (b) man (Proni) wīn-sä (Past )-w (VxlSgDet) xa j ? 'I not ask ~ I didn't ask', (c) pī jämba-n(Dat) w u n i - s a ( P a s t S g D e t ) xonu? 'night during not spleep

~

he didn't sleep during the night', (Scer­

bakova 2o3) , (d) Forest Nenets man wińi-sea(Past)-m(VxlSgDet)

(=wi-sea-m)

meator ? 'I not ask ~ I didn't ask' (Cf. Lehtisalo 1956, 7 3b, man wińīm meator?'I haven't ask you n o w ' ) , (e) Forest Nenets ńi-sO(Past)-tu?(Vx3Pl) ηamt? 'not hear ~ you didn't hear'. How can this peculiar

phenomenon be accounted for? Notice, first

of a l l , that the infix -sā- is characteristic not so much of the above negative constructions but rather of sentences which ex­ press an emphatic assertion

(of the negative auxiliary). E.g.,

(a) man nineka-n(PxlSgGen) ńā? (Postpos) sid'e-mpo-näe (Num. Adv jīl'e? ńī-sā (Past) -ni (VxDul) -m? (Emph) two-much

'I brother-with

(=we two) live not ~ I did ,live with my elder

brother' , (b) suxuńe nińeka ήe-ηäej (Filling element) waj ? (Gen) ńā? (with) tu? ni-sā(Past)-xa(Du3)-m?(Emph)

'suxuńe uncle

woman waj-with come not ~ Uncle Suxuńe has indeed arrived with his waj-woman',

THE NEGATIVE AUXILIARY IN SAMOYED

121

(c) man t e e w ? ńi-śa (Past) -w(VxlSgDet) - ow?(Emph) 'I know not ~ I did know'. Such emphatic sentences are characterized by inverted word or­ der (see 5. below). One may wonder if this kind of emphasis has morphological consequences as well. On closer inspection, we may see that just as the order of the main verb and the auxi­ liary is inverted in emphatic sentences, the 'converse world' of emphatic assertion is reflected by the inverted order of the Tense marker and Vx within the negative auxiliary. The fre­ quent occurrence of the Past Tense infix -śā- in emphatic struc­ tures certainly suggests that this infix could originally have arisen in such structures and has subsequently spread over to negated structures. This would not rule out the possibility that the original order of morphemes is found in emphatic structures. The above conjecture is supported by the fact that in other Samoyed languages the Past Tense marker -ś- occurs in prefinal position and not in final position as in Nenets. In other words, it usually appears between the stem and Vx. 2.2.5. Prx may also contain optional suffixes and/or particles that have an emphatic function:

Up to now the morpheme (infix) -sä- has been interpreted dif­ ferently. In general, it was not considered to be a Past Tense marker. Scerbakova (op.cit. 203), for instance, thinks that -saoccurs only in questions and is thus an interrogative particle. In another place, however, she cites Rozin's view according to which -sä- functions as emphatic assertion. Morphological ana­ lysis does not support either of these views, -śā- can by no means be identified with the interrogative morpheme -sā and its main function is to express Past Tense.

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

122 Examples :

(a) ήο-η (Vx2Sg) -wa (Partic) xań 'not go-out out'

~don't

go

(Ščerbakova 2 0 2 ) ,

(b) jā mād 'iko-xona (Loc)

jīl'e-b?nana?(Cond.gerundPll)

xib'eri-rxa-wa?(VxPllPred) ni-weca -ne?(Particle) na?

'earth cottage-in live-by man-similar-are-we

not-is

~

when we were living in the cottage, we

did not have, a life like men

(Scerbakova, 2 0 5 ) ,

(c) man ńi-m(VxlSg)-no?(Emph) mańije?

'I not

see~I

really don't see it', (d) mā-ta (Px3Sg) ńi-no (Emph) nad ? 'tent not be-seen ~ his tent really cannot be seen'

3. In Nenets nominal phrases in predicative function can be supplied with indeterminate verbal personal endings, as in man ńiśam ńisa

'I am a father', pidar ńisan 'you are a father', pida 'he is a father', etc.

(cf. nisa

'father'). Notice that

the Past Tense morpheme - ś , too, can be added to these ver­ balized nominals: pidar niśa-s

ńisan-aś

'you were a father', pida

'he was a father', etc. Negation in such sentences ex­

hibits the following interesting property. Verbalized nouns are not genuine verbs. This is also shown by the fact that 2 they do not possess all verbal qualities. Thus, for example, they do not have a negative verb stem. That is why the nomi­ nal with a predicative personal ending is retained unchanged. It is followed by the negative auxiliary which receives per­ sonal endings in agreement with the nominal and by the nega­ tive stem form of the existential verb

(which can be omitted).

For example, pidar ńisan ńīn na?

or pidar ńisan ńīn

'you are not a father', etc.

For more details, see Hajdú 1975a and 1975b.

123

THE NEGATIVE AUXILIARY IN SAMOYED

When sentences with predicative nominals are negated, the structure of the predicate appears in the following shape:

I would like to suggest that this particular negative form of the verbalized nominal arises out of a fusion of two sentences, an assertive statement and a negation. Consider (1) pidar wesakon 'you are old' + (2) pidar ńīn na? 'you are not ' Schematically, the structures of these two sentences can be rendered as follows : (1)

N

+

V

+

Prx

(2)

N

+

V'

+

V

+

Prx'

neg pidar

wesako-

η

pidar

na?

ńī-

-n

A movement transformation turns (2) into (2'): (2')

pidar ¿In na?

The fusion of (1) and (2') yields (3): (3)

pidar wesakon ńīn (na?)

The identical components of these two sentences are deleted. The element Prx', however, cannot be deleted since it makes the negative auxiliary perfective and it cannot be separated from the stem nî-. On the other hand, Prx in the first sen­ tence is not superfluous either, since its occurrence on the nominal assures the verbal character of the latter. Recall that the verbalized noun is a pseudo-verb, it does not have a negative verbal stem, therefore the only sign of its verbal nature is the element Prx. Consequently, the sentence (3) arising out of the fusion of (1) and (2') must include both Prx and Prx'. But of the two elements V one can easily be dispensed with. V' contains only information already provided by V. Hence V' can be omitted. 4. It is very important to note that in Nenets negation can

124

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

be brought about not only by means of the negative auxiliary but also through a very peculiar construction. In this con­ struction the participle of the main verb appears with a mor­ phologically not quite clear form of the positive auxiliary (the copula). This form of the copula (existential verb) contains, in addition to the stem, the morpheme -wna (as well as personal endings). One may wonder whether this mys­ terious morpheme could be identified as the manifestation of Probabilitivus IV. I have to leave this question unan­ swered here, however. The negative construction in question can be described by the following rule: VP

>

V

+ Part

+ Cop

+ -wna-

+ Vx

pos For example, (a) t ' ikinda t'I namkeda xarada

näe-wl(PartPerf)

näe-wna(Probab ) 'there something was would-be

~

nothing happened there', (b) namke p o n ? mimi näe-wna-m? 'by going rather long if I were

~

I didn't go long',

(c) namke ponjī? nawormī näe-wnī-ni?

'for a rather

long time it was if I had eating ~ we have not been eating for a long time'. In these cases the existential verb

(copula) carries a negative

value: its original function is reversed.

5. A similar process of inversion takes place in cases of reassertion, i.e. of the emphatic assertive use of the nega­ tive auxiliary. In affirmative uses the negative

auxiliary

always follows the main verb, occupying thus the final po­ sition in the sentence. The emphatic assertion contradicts a previous

(sometimes only imaginary) statement and reasserts

the occurrence of an event or the existence of a certain state of affairs. In Nenets emphatic assertion

(reassertion) has the

125

THE NEGATIVE AUXILIARY IN SAMOYED following structure : VposBneg _

+

Vneg

+

Prx

For example, (a) man pidar ńābakow na? ńi-dam?(VxlSg) 'I your sister being am not

~

I am still your elder sister',

(b) mat? t'u? nI-m?(VxlSg) 'tent come-in not ~I did go in into the tent'. Even sentences with a negative auxiliary, if used affirmatively, may contain an Emph-Det-element at the end of the auxiliary. E.g. , (a) pīn? tarp? ni?-im?

'out go not

~

he did certainly

go out', (b) xant?

ńīn-aw?

'but you are

(c) ma ń ī x i - m ? 'but they

going away',

(two) did say it',

(d) Forest Nenets tajeä mi ? ni-t(VxlSg)-awj 'but I am here', (e) Forest Nenets xomāt na?

Ai-sä"(Past)-t(VxlSg)-aw?

'but I was good'.

6. The above examples suggest that an originally positive verb may receive a negative value in certain syntactic constructions. Furthermore, in cases of reassertion the negative copula al­ ways assumes a positive and affirmative function. Essentially, this shift in the value of the copula does not differ from the adversative semantic fluctuations one finds with antonyms, e.g., Nenets mal 'end' and and

'to be saint', sance

'beginning', xāebo

'deep' and

'to be sinful'

'high', etc. This situa­

tion may prompt the question as to whether the positive and negative copulas in Nenets

(or, to put it differently, the

verb of negation and the existential verb) are genetically related. I think that this can be a plausible hypothesis. It would mean that one could think of the auxiliaries

'to be' and

126

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

'not to be' in Nenets as having developed from a common root, just as did the Hungarian verbs aid 'bless' and átkoz 'damn', or the Finnish verb siunata 'bless' and the Estonian verb siunata 'enchant, bewitch'. As an analogical case we may re­ fer to Mongolian and Tunguz, where the relationship between the verb of negation and the existential verb can be documented. Thus, N.Poppe (1955, 286) derives the negative particle *bu in Mongolian from the imperative form of the existential verb *bü. In Mandzhu the auxiliary a- 'not to be' is considered to be related to the Monqolian existential verb a- 'to be' (cf. Ramstedt 1924, 200-1). 3 6.1. Notice that our hypothesis passes the test of historical phonetics as well. Compare the data of the following table where the roots of the existential verbs and those of the verbs of negation in the Samoyed languages are given.

The following additional remarks may be in order at this noint. Koryak, Kerek and, to a smaller extent, also Kamchadal make use of negative prefixes and particles in negative constructions. If, however, Person and Number are to be indicated in these constructions, this is done by means of the appropriate per­ fective forms of the auxiliary be. Cf. (Korsakov 1939, 311-2), (Skorik 1965:330), (Volodin-Zukova 343-4). A somewhat similar phe­ nomenon can be observed in Chukchee, too (Skorik 1961:287-8). Recall furthermore that the existential verb assumes a nega­ tive meaning in the following German expression: Es sei denn, dass er krank ist 'unless he is ill ~ provided he is not ill'. In present-day Hungarian, too, one often encounters emphatic negation expressed by means of assertive exclamations or ques­ tions, e.g. Tehetek én arrol? 'Am I to blame for that?', Szép is az' 'A pretty kettle of fish', Mész innet?! 'Get out of here'. On the other hand, negative interrogative sentences may have an emphatic assertive meaning, e.g. Hat nem megmondtam? 'Didn't I

THE NEGATIVE AUXILIARY

Nenets

127

IN SAMOYED

Enets

Nganasan

i-, e-, r^ua-

pos. copula

n-,na-,ni-

a-, e-,

neg. copula

nl-, no-

i-, ne-,

ni-,

Selknp

Kamassin

e-

i-

—

-,-

niIn these data the word initial nasal elements (η-, ń-) are se­ condary developments. In Northern Samoyed a tendency prevailed (to a varying degree, depending on the language or dialect in question) which resulted in the elimination of the vowels from word initial position by attaching η- to initial velar vowels and n- to initial palatal vowels. This process applied to loanwords as well. For this reason, in Common Samoyed the copula can be reconstructed as * i - ~ *  - . Perhaps, alongside of these forms, there was also a velar variant *-. In Northern Samoyed, then, the palatal copula developed into a negative verb whereas the existential verb arose from the velar copula. In Southern Samo­ yed, on the other hand, the palatal variant was retained in the positive copula as well. Despite this formal and functional split, traces of the palatal/velar alternation have survived and can still be found in the negative auxiliary of modern Ne­ nets. Cf. ńī- ~no-. It should also be noted that a similar al­ ternation exists in the Ob-Ugrian languages and, though in a slightly different manner, in Finnish, too (cf. Rédei 1969, 104). The forms na- and ńī- in Nenets, a- and ne- in Enets, nuaand ni- in Nganasan bear the same genetic relationship to each

(footnote continued) tell you?', Hová nem mennék veled? 'Where wouldn't I go with you?', etc. Finally, according to Rédei's account of the negative particle nem in Hungarian, this particle may be derived from an indeterminate pronominal stem just as rien in French (Rédei 1969, 105-6).

128

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

other as the Nenets näewa, Nganasan naiwua 'head' and Nenets nemaj 'brain' or the Nenets name and nimńe and Nganasan ńimi 'suck', or the Nenets nańi, Nganasan nameaj and Nenets ńābi 'the other' (cf. also Enets ena ~ n), etc. 6.2. Finally, notice that B.Collinder does not rule out a pos­ sible genetic relationship between the positive and the negative auxiliaries in the Uralic languages either (Collinder 1955:lo). 7. In Uralic languages the negative auxiliary has developed in­ to a particle in several cases (Selkup, Hungarian, Vogul, Ostyak, in one of the Mordvin dialects, and in Estonian dialects). On the other hand, the Finno-Ugric and the Samoyed negative auxili­ aries have many things in common. First of all, they carry the bulk of grammatical information. This is similar to the pheno­ menon where in complex predicates the function of the copula is merely to unburden the main verb by taking over grammatical information from it. The Hungarian construction mentem volna 'I would have gone', mentem volt 'I had gone' differs drastical­ ly from the former type of construction since here the main verb, too, carries grammatical information. The Hungarian construction is not only typologically different from what we encounter in other Uralic languages but its genesis, too, must be independent 5 of these languages. 4 For more details on this point, cf. Hajdú 1954. The present paper is a revised version of Hajdu 1970.

THE NEGATIVE AUXILIARY IN SAMOYED

129

References Collinder, B. (1955) Fenno-Ugric Vocabulary, Stockholm:Almqvist & Wiksell. Hajdú, P. (1954) Die sekundären anlautenden Nasale (η-, η-) im Samojedischen, Acta Linguistica IV., 17-67. Hajdú, P. (1959) A jurák-syamojéd nyelvtan két kérdésérol (On two problems of the grammar of Yurak-Samoyed), Nyelvtudomānyi Közlemények 62, 223-46. Hajdú, P. (1970) Zur Syntax der negativen Verbalformen im Samojedischen, Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen. Philologisch-historische Klasse 76, 90-106. Hajdú, P. (1975a) Prädikative Nominalflexion in den samojedischen Sprachen, Acta Linguistica Hung. XXV, 1-30. Hajdú, P. (1975b) Samojedologische Schriften, Studia UraloAltaica VI, 115-40. Korsakov, G.M. (19 39) Nymylansko-russkij slovar', Moscow:Ucpedgiz . Lehtisalo, T.V. (1956) Juraksamojedisches Wörterbuch, Helsinki: Societas Fenno-Ugrica. Poppe, N. (1955) Introduction to Mongolian Comparative Studies, Mémoires de la Société Finno-ougrienne 110, 300 pp. Ramstedt, G.J. (1924) Die Verneinung in den altaischen Sprachen, Mémoires de la Société Finno-ougrienne 52, 196-215. Rédei, K. (1969) Szôfejtêsek (Etymologies),Nyelvtudományi Köz­ lemények 71, 104-6. Scerbakova, A.M. (1954) Formy otricanija v neneckom jazyke, Ucennye Zapiski Leningradskogo Pedagogiceskogo Instituta, Fakul'tet narodov Severa 101, 181-231. Siro, P. (1968) A finnugor nyelvek tagado igealakjainak mondattani összetevoje (The syntactic constituents of the negative verb forms in Finno-Ugric languages), Nyelvtudományi Közle­ mények 70, 361-5. Skorik, P.Ja. (1968) Kerekskij jazyk, Jazyki narodov SSSR V. Leningrad:Izd.Nauka, 310-33.

130

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Skorik, P.Ja. (1961) Grammatika cukotskogo jazyka I., MoscowLeningrad :Izd.Nauka, 448 pp. Terescenko, N.M. (1965) Nenecko-russkij slovar', Moscow:Izd. Sovetskaja Enciklopedija, 942 pρ. Volodin, A.P., A.N.Zukova (1968) Itel'menskij jazyk, Jazyki narodov SSSR V., Leningrad :Izd.Nauka, 343-51.

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS Robert Hetzron 1. Introduction When the linguist has established the inventory of grammatical elements in a given language on the basis of the meaningful formal units attested, the next step is to find out the meaning of each unit. Often, a number of sup­ plementarily distributed units combine into sets to be un­ derstood as major grammatical categories that need to be first defined, then their constituent units can be situated within them. Such are the case-systems composed of cases, verbal or pronominal paradigms containing persons combined with number and genders, tense and aspect systems, etc. The meaning of these units is not trivial for the description. It is important to find out why Aspect A is used in one in­ stance and  in another, why they are not interchangeable

I am grateful to F. Kiefer for giving detailed comments on the first version of this paper. It is clear that our concept of 'aspect' is not the same, but this disagreement apart, his remarks have been relevant and have been taken into account in the final version. Pertinent observations by K.E. Kiss helped me to weed out some errors of interpretation.

132

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

in a given context, or if they are, in what manner the sub­ stitution of one for the other modifies the communiationa1 content of the sentence or of that portion of the discourse. Yet, finding semantic definitions for the categories that also have the explanatory power to answer all these ques­ tions may sometimes be a frustrating exercise. It may be re­ latively simple (though not necessarily without complications) to define the persons of a conjugation, but in other situa­ tions linguists have contented themselves with assigning la­ bels such as 'past', 'perfective', etc., for categories that fulfill much more complicated functions than the literal mean­ ing of the labels or their 'universal' definition would sug­ gest. Also, a formal category may correspond to several func2 tional categories, and it would be futile to attribute a sin­ gle supermeaning to it. Finally, for case-systems in many lan­ guages or for the verbal derivation system in Semitic and Cushitic, taking two examples, idealized semantic definitions valid only for a minority of the uses (though probably origi­ nally omni-valid) have been proposed with the proviso that the majority of actual uses are lexically determined and are thus devoid of independent meaning. However, the difficulty or even impossibility of attributing appropriate semantic de­ finitions to some formal categories should not deter the lin­ guist from trying to establish them. What is not successful for one type of category may be perfectly feasible for others. Now, even when the category examined can be consider­ ed to be subject to a single and always valid semantic defini­ tion, the acceptability of the actual definition (which may or 2 For example, English Verb-ed forms are used as a past in most contexts, but as a fictitious, unreal present after if or I wish, the former in conjunction with a clause containing a conditional verb form.

.NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 133 may not be clearly formalizable) will also depend on the writer's skill at concise expression (which is an artistic concept) and on the framework in which he chooses to set his 3 definition. Here the crucial question is whether the defini­ tions are testable, verifiable, whether there exist criteria which, in addition to stylistic considerations like Hjelm­ slev's 'conciseness' principle, allow the linguist to select the best one. One needs a test through which wrong defini­ tions may be proven wrong and henceforth eliminated. Several formulations may survive such a test, and these may then be judged along stylistic lines, or alternatively used according to the need. In this study, such a test is proposed. Given Category A and Category  that constitute the two terms of a set, and given a context in which the opposition between A and  is neutralized (either only one of them may be used: without its special meaning, or both indifferently, or else a third ele­ ment appears which may formally be a mixture of A and Β ) , if it follows from the semantic definition of that context that the semantic distinction stated between A and  is not applicable here, there is a good chance that all the semantic definitions proposed, that of the context and those of Cate­ gories A and B, are correct. Naturally, this constitutes no unequivocal proof that they are all correct. There may be misrepresentations in all of them, a bias in the same direc­ tion, or they may be so broad that they accommodate more than just the elements involved. Yet the test may also be applied in the opposite direction. If the definition of the context does not explain the non-applicability of the categories as defined, unless some other factors are involved (formal neu­ tralization, etc.), at least one of the definitions is likely

 Because of this, two apparently different definitions may sometimes turn out to be essentially the same.

134

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

to be wrong. In the illustrations below Hungarian examples are used. The categories involved are among the most delicate and most disputed in Hungarian grammar. In most instances, the present author's own interpretations, not necessarily accepted by oth­ ers, are used to set up a chain of reasoning. While the indi­ vidual interpretation and definitions on which the entire rea­ soning reposes may be challenged by others, the soundness of the whole network of arguments may be taken as an evidence that the bases are solid themselves, in the spirit of the testing method proposed here.

Or else, those other factors will eventually be found. For example, in many languages, the tense system of the negative verbs is poorer than that of the affirmative ones. In Ethio­ pian Semitic languages that distinguish between a past and a present perfect, e.g., Amharic, there is only one negative form corresponding to both. In Western Gurage, a single neg­ ative nonpast corresponds to a present, a definite future and an indefinite future, three different tenses in affirma­ tion. One may think up semantic excuses for these discrep­ ancies, such as the irrelevance of some distinctions in re­ lating non-occurences, but these are not binding. Many lan­ guages have separate negative present perfect forms, includ­ ing the Gojjami dialect of Amharic itself. Here the explana­ tion is historical : innovated tenses usually have not devel­ oped their negative counterparts as this would have involved some morphological complications. Yet the semantic 'excuses' are not entirely futile here. They provide an a. posteriori justification for why these languages could afford not to develop negative forms here, and could go on using the older stock of negative tenses. The distinction between 'has not happened' and 'did not happen' is possible, but not crucial.

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 135 2. The two Gap-Fillers 2.1. Prominentia! categories. In all languages, one may con­ struct sentences which consist of a string of components to be divided, according to the general standards of parsing, into major components such as Subject and Predicate, each further broken down to lower level components as the case may be. On the other hand, languages have special devices for conferring special prominence on any major component of the sentence, showing its particular importance, privileged communicational status within the sentence. The existence of such phenomena has long been recognized, but not the fact that there is a well-definable group of such prominentia! categories, each having its own justification for being sin­ gled out and elevated above the rest of the sentence. In the past, terms such as '(contrastive) emphasis', 'topic(alization)', 'focus', 'foregrounding', 'highlighting', etc. have been somewhat indiscriminately used by some authors for any or all of the categories. Cleft-constructions and what has been called 'pseudo-cleft' have been the only ones to be given special treatment, because of their formal properties which made them noticeable. Yet, recently, the awareness of the existence of several such categories has emerged. Many linguists distinguish now between 'focus' and 'topic'. It has even been recognized that there may be different kinds of topic, so that this is a class of categories, rather than a single one. The present author distinguishes between two major classes of prominential categories (i.e. categories the only shared feature of which is being elevated above the normal level of the sentence as far as communicational importance is concerned): (A) Piscourse-directional ones such as Topic (a link to the preceding context) and Presentative (prepara­ tion for the subsequent context, see Hetzron 1975), both of

136

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

which are primarily expressed by positional modification: sentence-initial for the former and sentence-final for the latter (accompanied or not by other markers). Both admit various degrees of intensity (Topic may represent the con­ tinuation of preceding items or stand in contrast with them, the 'As for' type, etc.). They are thus bundles of categories rather than single ones. The second class is (B) Gap-Fillers where the sentence describes an event or fact already known, presupposed, guessable from the preceding context (linguis­ tic or pragmatic) or merely trivial, - yet one (or more, see below) component of it constitutes novel, truly relevant in­ formation. In other words, the starting point is a sentence with (at least) one component left unspecified, and it is that component that is revealed by uttering the sentence with a specific construction,this being the very reason for utter­ ing the sentence. Thus, the Gap-Filler is the important part of the communication, the rest is basically a frame for it. The communicational downplayedness of the rest of the sen­ tence is to be viewed as a cline from true presupposition (i.e., it is the object of earlier knowledge) to information triv­ ial by itself, subordinated to the Gap-filler, showing what gap it actually fills. 2.2. The two Gap-Fillers. In my theory, there are two kinds of Gap-Fillers: (i) Focus where the Focused element appears

The much used concept of 'new information' ought to be de­ fined very carefully and has been the object of many misunder­ standings in the past. It need not refer to completely new participants, these may be old ones that have already appear­ ed in the discourse, but their emergence in this specific context may have special importance as it has not been fore­ seen (see (3) below and cf. Chafe 1976:30). Another applica­ tion of the concept 'new information' to events (~ Comment) is to be distinguished from this.

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 137 in its slot in explicit opposition to anything else that may reasonably appear there, and (ii) Replacer where the Replacive element appears in explicit opposition to something that has appeared in that slot earlier, either as a correction of a previous erroneous statement or assumption, or as an addition to an earlier statement or assumption the essence of which also applies to other entities.

6

In principle, anything is in opposition with anything else that may occur in the same slot. What I mean here is explicitly marked opposition, calling the attention to the fact that other elements could occur there, but they do not. 7

In my earlier publications, I called these 'Emphasis' and 'Contrast' respectively. By adopting 'Focus' instead of 'Emphasis', I have joined the common practice in recent writings, though my definition of Focus may somewhat differ from what others understood by it. I am proposing the term 'Replacer' (Replacement, Replacive) instead of 'Contrast' because the latter may lead to misunderstanding, which can be illustrated by the following. Bierwisch (1966:150-2) and Kiefer (1969:97-8) use the term 'primary (or main) stress' in two senses. The first one is unmarked, automatic main stress which, in the absence of a Focus element, normally strikes the last word of the sentence in languages like German, English, Modern Hebrew (but not Hungarian!). The other one is for marking the element that corresponds to Focus. Even though they are in complementary distribution, the non-functional and the functional uses have to be distinguished. In dealing with the main stress, Bierwisch refers to Kiparsky (1966:89-92), but his presentation of the points is somewhat infelicitous. Bierwisch (1966:151) offers the examples: Der Arzt hat den Patienten untersucht 'The physician (footnote 7 continued)

138

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(footnote 7 continued) examined the patient' with the main stress on the last word - our first, unmarked use, and Per Arzt hat einen Patienten untersucht 'The physician examined a patient' where it is the indefinite object that attracts the strongest stress. He concludes that this stress is placed on the non-thematic, i.e. newly introduced element. The im­ pression this creates is that the main stress is associated with the indefiniteness of the noun, and this is wrong as it stands. What Kiparsky (1966:89-92) actually shows is that the indefinite nouns of his examples (the above one and Ein Brief kam 'A letter came') obligatorily attract the main stress, and this is a phenomenon to be dealt with apart (also in Hun­ garian, article-less non-specific subjects are obligatorily Focused). Yet, as an alternative to the unmarked form, the definite noun may also carry the strongest stress (Der Arzt hat den Patienten untersucht) and this will perfectly corre­ spond to Focus. Such nouns are not 'newly introduced', only 'novel' or 'unexpected' in that context in the restricted sense of note 5. As can be seen, our Focus corresponds to the 'main stress'-marked element of Bierwisch and Kiefer - in the sec­ ond sense, when it is not automatically placed at the end. These authors use the term 'Emphasis' for what I originally called 'Contrast', now 'Replacer'. The term 'Contrast' was used by them in a completely different sense. Let us take Kiefer's example (1969:97, cf. Bierwisch 1966:151 (3)): Péter Ròmàban él, Pal pedig Becsben. 'Peter Rome-in lives, Paul on-the-other-hand Vienna-in' This written sentence may have three different prosodic readings, (i) With Mid stress on all nouns, it is a neutral gapped coordinate construction, (ii) What Bierwisch and Kiefer call 'Contrast' is what I would call an 'Enumerative construc­ tion'. In this Hungarian construction, the syllable Ro- would be considerably lowered in sharp contrast with the subsequent (footnote 7 continued)

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 139 Otherwise stated, Focus expresses explicit opposition in principle, whereas Replacing constitutes concrete opposi­ tion in the discourse. These are the notional, semantic de­ finitions . On a general scale, the formal distinction between the two is stronger-than-normal stress for Focus and an even 

stronger one for Replacement.

In many languages, cleft-con-

(footnote 7 continued) rise of the comma-intonation; Becswould be raised, followed by a steep descent (in the corre­ sponding German construction, all the nouns would have the primary stress, i.e. two occurences of such stress in each clause). This is definitely not a case of Gap-Filling, (iii) This string may also correct earlier misconceptions, e.g., the belief that Peter lives in Turin and Paul in Salzburg. In this situation, the corrective elements, here the place-names, will carry the Ultrahigh stress (see note 11 below): my earlier 'Contrast', now 'Replacement', Bierwisch's 'Emphasis'. This tangle of terminology may only be remedied by proposing new labels for the categories involved. 

The failure to distinguish between the two Gap-Fillers has been the source of a great deal of confusion in the litera­ ture. One should heed Bolinger's warning (1965:103) when he points out that My móther is coming implies indeed a contrast with father or sister (my Replacement), but 'if we fit the examples into a different context, for instance Why are you in such a hurry to get home? My móther is coming. the accent on a prior word does not imply contrast.' This latter case is what I consider Focus. One point may be added here, however: in the first type, where My móther is so stres­ sed as to dispel misconceptions about the identity of the vis­ itor (not my father, etc. ) , the pitch will be higher than in (footnote 8 continued)

140

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

structions are used for that polar case of Focus where the downplayed part of the sentence is truly presupposed or even 9 pre-known. While only one component of a sentence may be Focused (see Kiefer 1969:103 and Horvath 1976 for details), several elements may be Replaced (Hetzron 1972). 2.2.1. Gap-Fillers in Hungarian. For Hungarian, the rule is that the Focus element must directly precede the tense-car­ rier (which may be Focused itself, in which case this word order rule is vacuous), and if this one happens to be a con­ sisting of a Preverb and a Base, the Preverb will be dis­ placed so as to allow direct contact between the Focus ele(footnote 8 continued) the simple Focus construction. Chafe (19 76:34 and elsewhere) does indeed recognize that 'contrast­ ive sentences [my Replacement, RH] are qualitatively differ­ ent from those which supply new information from an unlimited set of possibilities [my Focus, RH ] ', though Chafe's 'contrast' embraces both Replacement and Enumeration ( (ii) above). 9 See now the insightful study of English cleft-constructions by Prince (1978) where some subsidiary functions are also pointed out. In particular, one should note the InformativePresuppositional one (89 8sq) where there is no true presup­ position, only the impression is consciously created that the backgrounded part is an established fact that ought to have been known by the hearer. Another source of misunderstandings and misinterpreta­ tions: the cleft-construction combined with a specially strong stress may also be optionally used to express Replace­ ment. Thus, there is in English a distinction between It was in the dráwer that I found the money (after having looked for it for an hour - Focus) and It was in the drAwer that I found the money (and not in the safe where it was supposed to be,Replacement), the latter with a higher pitch.

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 141 ment and the tense-carrying Base. Moreover, the Focus element will have a High stress. 11 See (1) for examples of Focus. For Replacement, the first Replacive element will occupy the same pre-tense position as the Focused one, but will carry a higher: Ultrahigh stress. There may be several Replacive elements in a sentence. In that case, each one of them will be marked by the Ultrahigh stress and all of them may be aligned in front of the tense-carrier, or, with the restriction that at least one of them should occupy the pre-tense position, part or all of the rest may be placed in any postverbal position (see Hetzron 1972 for examples and details). See (2) for cases of Replacement. 10 I am making a terminological distinction between displacement of the preverb and postposing the preverb. With a Focus element, the preverb is most neutrally right after the verb, but it may appear elsewhere as well (see the second alternative in (1b)), even before the Focus noun in a situation of Topicalization : Be_ csak Sandor dugta a_ fejet. 'In only Alexander tucked the head-his-Acc.'. Hence my calling this 'displacement'. The term 'postposing' will be reserved to the aspectual phenomenon where the preverb has to appear after the verb (most often directly after it, but not necessarily so, yet never in a position preceding the verb, see Section 3 below). 11 I am using below a tonological notation as proposed in M H Hetzron, forthcoming: for Mid, the unmarked stress; for High, the Focus-stress; for Ultrahigh, the Replacement stress, 0 for zero, marked only where the stress has been reduced to nil (but not when it is zero to begin with). A further level,

for Low, the stress of non-initial words in

a composite Noun Phrase, is not needed in the present discussion (see (25) below). This notation is tonemic. Expres(footnote 11 continued)

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

142

A Mid-stressed word will lose its stress if it follows a High or Ultrahigh-stressed one (and will be marked ø). In the following illustrations, I am providing a min­ imal context to make the distinction between Focus vs. Replace­ ment reasonably clear. In (1), the opening of the door makes it probable that someone (or something, as in (d-e)) is about to enter the scene. It is the identity of the newcomer that constitutes the novel, truly relevant information in (1b).In (2) a wrong assumption is corrected. If the wrongness of a preceding assumption is already known at the time of its utte­ rance, the element to be Replaced may carry an anticipatory Ultrahigh stress, but High is also acceptable: (2a): (1) FOCUS (a) 'Out-opened the door and Alexander in-thrust the head-his-Acc.' ('The door opened and Alexander looked in', - here A. has already been present on the scene, this is a neutral construction) (b) (Here the preverb be- has been displaced. The sub­ ject, Alexander, is under Focus, either for being a new participant or to express the idea of 'he of all people who could have done that', i.e. a certain degree of unexpectedness, also compatible with a situation where A. had already been on the scene) (c) 'Out-opened the door and the hát-his-Acc. thrust (footnote 11 continued) sive intonation, downdrift and other secondary phenomena are not marked.

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 143 in someone' ('The

door opened and someone stuck his hat in',

here the grammatical object is under Focus) (d)

M

Kinyílt

az

M

ajtó

M

és

egtelt

a M szoba 12

'Out-opened the door and "up"

M

napfénnyel.

-was-filled the

room sunlight-with' ('The

door opened and the room became filled with

sunlight', a neutral construction. The door may have been opened precisely to let the light in) (e)

M

Kinyílt M

az

M

ajto es

H

napfennyel

ø

telt

M

meg a

szoba.

'Out-opened the door and sunlight-with

was-filled

"up" the room' (The Focus is on

'sunlight'. The central event is

the appearance of the sunlight. When the door opened, the room could have been filled with the smell of garlic, with the sound of the chattering of children playing outside, but of all things, the sunlight is what appeared) (2) REPLACEMENT (a)

Fülöpre øszámítottam, de M M tottam meg az ajtoban.

U

Sândort

ø

pillan-

'PHILIP-onto I-counted but ALEXANDER-Acc. I-glimpsed "up" the door-in' ('I

counted on Philip, but it was Alexánder whose

sight I caught standing in the doorframe') 12 The Hungarian preverb m e g - , etymologically

'to behind' but

having lost this sense, is impossible to translate

(see Perrot

1966 for a detailed treatment of its functions, also Kiefer 1979). Here I arbitrarily use "up" which sometimes

translates

it in English. The double quotes are necessary to distinguish it from fel-, the preverb that actually means

'up(ward)'.

144

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (b)

H

Ø M Fülöp ^jött be az Majton. 'Philip came in the door-on [ =through] ' (Subject-Focus)

A says:

 replies :

Nem! M

Téveds!

Sandor Øjött Mbe az

ajtón.

'No! Your-are-mistaken! ALEXANDER came in the door-on' U

(C)

Ø

Sándor jöjtt Ø

M

be és

Ø

nem

U

Fulöp (or es_ Unem

Fülöp).

'ALEXANDER came in and not PHILIP' U

(d)

Sandor Øjött

M

be U Fülöppel.

'ALEXANDER came in PHILIP-with' (and not JOHN with JIM) In (1a) and (1d), neutral constructions fitting into an even sequence of events are contrasted with Focus-containing ones: (1b) and (1e) where the newcomer is given special promi­ nence. The High stress in (1b-c-e) and the Ultrahigh one in (2) are phonetically clearly distinct. (2c) illustrates that the practice in the literature of adding 'and not' phrases to Focus constructions is ill advised. Such negation, already implied when the assertion is uttered and it is uttered to be corrective, automatically makes it an instance of Replacement, not Focus. (2d) is a case of two Replacers in the same sen­ tence . Finally, since the examples in (1) and (2) contain verbs of emergence and their Focused noun is new on the scene by de­ finition, in order not to create the wrong impression, it is necessary to present another illustration involving another kind of verb: (3)

(a)

M

NYivanvalo

volt, hogγ

Sandor

eloltotta a Mvil-

lanyt. 'Obvious was that Alexander away-extinguished the electricity-Acc.' (b) MNyilvánvaló volt, hogy H Sandor Øoltotta lanyt.

M

el a M vil-

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINI N y i l v á n v a l ó v o l t , hogy M S á n d o r H e l o l t o t t a a 0 villanyt. () is a neutral construction: 'It was obvious that Alexander had turned off the light'. It is the reality of the entire happening that is declared to be obvious. In (3b), where the preverb el- 'away' appears after the verb, the light had al­ ready been found turned off', and 'obvious' refers to 'Alex­ ander': 'It was obvious that it was Alexander who had turned off the light' - of all people who could have done that. Fi­ nally, in (3c) we find Verb-Focus, with the preverb in its basic position, marked only by prosody. The translation is 'It was obvious that Alexander hád turned off the light', doubts about whether it did happen or not are dispelled here. 2.3. Totalizers. There are syntactic reasons for setting up a category of 'Totalizers' in Hungarian: for Noun or Adverbi­ al Phrases containing (a) an element mind- or equivalent, meaning 'all', 'every', 'entire', or (b) is 'also', (c) for some adverbs like 'already', 'still', 'almost', etc., and (d) for adverbs expressing high degree of performance, like jól 'well', gyorsan 'fast' (which may also be used as non-Total­ izers), see Hetzron 1964. The semantic feature that charac­ terizes them is that they refer to complete, closed sets of elements. This is very clear for the first type. In (b) with 'also', an arbitrary completeness is established through the addition of a new element marked by 'also'. The semantic im­ port is that an earlier statement or assumption would not be complete without including the element as well. For the third type (c) , suffice it to say here that al(1)" type components are often used in their formation in English; French has tou­ jours 'always' for 'still' also. The semantic justification for this would deserve a longer treatment, (d) refers to to­ tal realization of an action. The special syntactic properties of sentences containing Totalizers have already attracted the attention of Hungarian (c)

Μ

146

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

linguists

(who used the term összefoglaló mondatok

'summariz­

ing sentences'). The striking fact is that a Focused Total­ izer does not require, or even allow, the displacement of a preverb from its neutral pre-verb base position: (4)

(a)

H

(b)

H

Ø

Mindenki

bejött/

* Ø jött

M

be.13

'Everyone in-came/*came in' Ø

Sandor is

M

bejött/ * j ö t t

be.

'Alexander also in-came/*came in' (c)M SandorH maidnemØ Haejött/ * Ø jöttM be. 'Alexander álmost in-came/*"came in' M

(d)

Sandor

H

gyorsan

Ø

≠ M Sandor

ejött.

H

gyorsan

Ø

jött

be. 'Alexander rápidly in-came' 'Alexander rápidly

came

in' (4c) means that the likelyhood of A's coming was high, yet he did not show up after all. Focused gyorsan means

'quickly,

soon, without delay' in the first, Totalizer construction of (4d), whereas in the second, non-Totalizer use it means

'fast'

referring to the gait or manner of locomotion. Furthermore, unlike in the case of usual Focus, there may be more than one Focused Totalizers : (5) (a)

H

Mindenki

H

mindig

Ø

bejött.

'Éveryone álways in-came' (b)

H

Tegnap is

H

mindenki

H

mégis

Ø

jött.

'Yesterday also everyone nevertheless in-came' In

(5) each one of the stacked Totalizers carries the

High stress. Yet only the first one is bound to have it, the others may have 0, but they are still understood to be Focused in that position. Thus,

(5a) with M-H-0 would have Focus on

'always' only, but H-Ø-Ø is double Focus like H-H-0;

(5b) may

also be stressed H-H-Ø-Ø or H-Ø-H-Ø while all three Totalizers

13 This is nt to be confused with

M

Mindenki

M

jött

M

be. 'Every­

body was coming in' where there is aspectual preverb-postposing, See Section 3.

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 147 are under Focus. No clear difference in meaning between H- or 0-stressed non-initial Totalizers could be detected though, obviously, H gives the element more individuality. A clue is provided by the following: (6)

(a)

(b) The impossibility of 0-stress on a non-initial'also' Phrase suggests that the use of the High stress conveys a stronger impression of novelty or unexpectedness/surprise, and the 'also' Phrase, as it always implies novelty and addition, is blocked from 0 which would de-emphasize that. Yet this remains to be examined further. Finally, a further non-Totalizer Focus element, stressed H or 0, may be inserted between Focused Totalizers and the verb, causing a preverb-displacement: (7b). The verb itself may be Focused in such conditions, with no preverb-displace­ ment: (7c)(note the subsequent Ø stress):

(7)

'Everyone álways ín-came the theater into' (triple Focus; cf. (c) in η. 31) the substitution of Ultrahigh to High in Totalizers will not make much difference. It may make the expression somewhat more insistent, an expressive function, but the context would be the s ame: (8) (a) 'I believed that I could count on the girls only, but éveryone showed up'

148

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

'They announced a meeting for the evening and éverybody showed up' On a general scale, (8a) looks like a Replacement (the 'counting on the girls only' creates a context for correction) and (8b) has a context eliciting Focus only. Yet both the High and the Ultrahigh stresses may be used in each, the latter indicates surprise or pride of the speaker about the fact that not one was missing, the boys came as well. Thus, there is only a difference of expressive value, not the usual distinction between Focus and Replacement. Consequently, with a Totalizer the Focus/Replacement dichotomy as expressed by the distinct functions of the High and the Ultrahigh stresses, is neutralized. This leads us to the main point. The two Gap-Filler categories have been defined as explicit opposition to anything for Focus and to something for Replacement. This is inapplicable in the case of Totalizers. 'All' is opposed only to its own parts. 1 4 If the 'all' Phrase is meaningful and refers to a group known to the interlocutors, any portion of that group is automatically part of that knowledge. Thus, a prominentialized Totalizer is always opposed to something it includes, which is both something as it is referential by implication being part of the group which is subject of earlier knowledge, but it is also anything within that totality, an ad hoc delimited universe. In summary, we find that the formal distinction between Focus and Replacement is neutralized in the case of Totalizers which then can appear only in a single type of Gap-Filling the 14 On speculative grounds, one might think that the opposite of 'everything' is 'nothing*. In these examples of prominentialized Totalizers, it is clear that the opposite is 'part' rather than 'none'.

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 149 formal properties of which constitute a separate set (resem­ bling, but not identical with, those of Replacement). This is in agreement with the fact that the semantic definitions proposed: explicit opposition to something for Replacement and explicit opposition to anything for Focus, are void when applied to 'everything'. Thus, one might conclude that the formal neutralization is a direct consequence of the semantic categories involved, hence the semantic definitions proposed have a good chance to be correct. 2.4. Pronominal questions and their answers. Similar consider­ ations are valid for the interrogative (wh-) pronouns and to the words that replace them in the answer (cf. Chafe 1976:36). Here are the formal facts : (9)

Question: Answer :

nap) . 'Yésterday I-arrived "up"' (or 'Yesterday') Here again, the distinction between H and U belongs to the domain of expressivity. The latter indicates more interest for the question and more persuasive power for the answer, but nothing like the distinction between Focus and Replace­ ment is found here. The interrogative pronoun and the answer word always have to be before the tense-carrier in Hungarian, leading to the displacement of the preverb. Unlike for Focus, there may be several interrogative pronouns in one sentence: (10) (a) (b) 'When how you-arrived "up"?' Note that within one question both interrogative pronouns have the same stress. As shown in Hetzron, forthcoming, (10a) is a

150

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

double question with two unknowns asked about. (10b), on the other hand, is a 'combinatory' question where several times and several manners of arrival are known to the asker and the scope of the question is how they are to be combined, which manner was used at which time. Now, (10a) is not entirely 'de­ viant'. Also in Focus, one may have a Conjoined Phrase connected by 'and' , each carrying the High stress. 1 5 (10b), with its lack of 'and' is, on the other hand, unparallelled in Fo­ cus, but is found in Replacement. Normally no Focus and Replacement may co-occur in the same sentence. Yet, an interrogative pronoun is indeed com­ patible with a Replacer, which will either precede the pronoun or be sentence-final. The interrogative pronoun will then lose its stress (and the verb will remain stressless) : (11) (a) (b) '(And) when came in the BOY?' ('And the boy, when did he_ come in?') Here the discontinuity in (11b) would parallel the Replacement (2d), but not the fact that the interrogative pronoun is un­ stressed. This is, again, a behavior pattern closely resembling Replacement, yet different from it in some respects, and no distinction is made between Focus and Replacement. Interrogative pronouns express ignorance as to one com­ ponent of the information contained in the sentence. Now, taking 'when' for illustration, one may say that 'when' is 15 Naturally, a crucial difference is that the conjoined phrases contain the same part of speech in a stricter sense, whereas what is conjoined here is a time-adverb and a manneradverb.

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS

151

opposed to any possible time when the event may have taken place since it is an open non-specification (^Focus), but, on the other hand, it can also be said to be opposed to some time, to a time assumed to be specific by the asker yet not known to him, and hoped to be known to the askee (~Replace­ ment) . Moreover, one may also say that the answer word, here 'yesterday', is in explicit opposition to any other time when the event may have occurred (~Focus), but it is also in ac­ tual opposition to something in the discourse: to the 'I don't know time' expressed by 'when'. Consequently, the answer is also a correction/completion of a previously uttered sentence: the question (~Replacement). This is thus another construction where the distinction between Focus and Replacement is formally neutralized (and some individual features appear), and this is justified by the vacuousness of the semantic distinction between the two in this context. Here is a bound discourse situation which evokes Replacement, but it is also compatible with the idea of opposition to anything (as it completes more than corrects), meaning Focus. 3. Aspect in Hungarian There is no doubt that the categories of Hungarian ver­ bal morphology also include aspect. Yet no satisfactory de­ scription of Hungarian aspect has been hitherto offered. This must be attributed to two reasons. One is that the preverbs, which play a crucial role in aspectual alternations, almost always carry a further lexical meaning of their own, definable with relation to the verbs

The statement by Sauvageot (1951:258): 'L'aspect n'affleure jamais à l'état pur' reflects this problem, but it cannot be entirely accepted. As shown below, there exist indeed purely aspectual oppositions.

152

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

they are attached to (in that their meaning is not entirely autonomous in most cases, see below). Moreover, most verbs take more than one preverb, allowing for modification of the basic meaning in several directions. The second reason is disagreement about what is to be understood as aspect in Hungarian. My general definition of the category is the following: aspect is a category both terms of which may be applied at the time of the utterance to ex­ actly the same event. The choice between the two values de­ pends on the needs of the context and represent the different perspectives adopted when viewing that event. Consequently, the opposition between ugrik 'jump' and ugràl 'bounce' is not aspectual because the meanings of the two are not coextensive as far as the reality covered is concerned. The former de­ scribes a single action, the latter a repeated performance. The second implies the first, but not vice versa. This type of correlation has traditionally be recognized to be distinct from aspect and has been called Aktionsart or 'made/manner of action'. The present writer goes farther and suggests that the same is true of pairs like ír/megír 'write/write com­ pletely ~create a written document' where the second member of the correlation implies the first one, but not vice versa: the communication about writing does not say about whether the task was achieved and the document created or not. Thus the two cannot always be used to refer to the same event. 1 7

A little complication arises when these two are used in a quotative construction: irta, hogy jön 'he-wrote that he-comes' means 'he wrote that he would come', he sent a message by writ­ ing, whereas megirta, hogy jön 'he-"up"-wrote that he-comes' implies that his projected coming Is already known, but now he even put it in a letter. Here one can see that sameness has to be interpreted quite strictly, even 'inform by writing' and (footnote 17 continued)

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 153 What complicates the matter, however, is that the two members of this correlation do indeed belong to two aspects. My claim is that this is not the only difference between them, they do not constitute an aspectual minimal pair. Examples (13)-(15) below will formally substantiate this claim: the perfective verb exhibits the aspectual dichotomy by itself. I am thus suggesting that perfectivity, as expressed by the addition of a preverb (mostly meg-, sometimes el-'away') is a non-aspec­ tual category, just like the directional and other modifica­ tory meanings of other preverbs (or of meg- and el- in other cases). The essence of Hungarian aspect must lie outside of 18 perfectivity. (footnote 17 continued) 'put information on paper' are not identical in coverage. This can also be proved by the tests proposed below. 18 Comrie (1976:3) defines aspects in general as 'different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situa­ tion'. Kiefer (1979, 2.3.) proposed the following: 'By aspect we shall understand the internal time structure of the situa­ tion' and further adds 'Aspect is thus a property of situa­ tions'. For him, 'situation' means 'the various verbal expres­ sions of the same state of affairs'. These definitions are not in contradiction with mine. They also imply the subjectivity of 'aspect' (cf. Comrie 1976:4) as against the objectivity of 'tense' and 'Aktionsart'. Yet I find it unnecessary to limit the aspect to internal time, i.e. whether the action is con­ ceived as of dividable duration or not. In some cases, such as (16), dividability does not seem to be the relevant cri­ terium. In 3.3. I shall propose a definition for Hungarian aspects using discourse as the proper frame for it. The in­ volving of 'time' makes the definition pseudo-autonomous, ex­ pressible within the boundaries of a sentence, while this is not the case, (footnote 18 continued)

154

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

3.1. The meaning of preverbs. The semantic contribution of the preverbs is the most transparent, even autonomous, with verbs of motion, such as megy 'go' which, by itself, repre­ sents one aspect, whereas the lexical forms of its combina­ tions with preverbs stand for the other aspect, e.g. bemegy 'go in' kimegy 'go out', felmegy 'go up', lemegy 'go down', elmegy 'go away', körülmegy 'go around', àtrnegy 'go through, over, across', etc. In addition to megir 'write completely' mentioned above (also 'inform by writing of a fact already known' , cf. note 17) , ir 'write' may be fitted with any of the above preverbs, with a sense inspired by the 'literal' meaning of the preverb, but not necessarily predictable from it: beír 'write in, register, enroll (=insert in a document) 1 , kiir 'write in a public place for everyone's attention (~post)' or 'spell out (in letters)' or 'copy out' or even 'grant sickleave' (put on the 'out' list), felír 'write down, note' or 'write on a conspicuous high place' or 'make a citation (po­ lice)', leír 'write down' or 'describe', elír 'make a mistake in writing', körülír 'périphrase, say in circumlocution', àtír 'transcribe' or 'rewrite' or 'copy over', etc. This list is far from being exhaustive and not all the meanings have been given, but it suffices to show the enormous riches of expression the manipulation of preverbs may create. 1 9 It is clear that for an ideal aspect system, one expects to find correlative minimal pairs where no added meanings contributed by the preverb may be detected. (footnote 18 continued) Naturally, in the grammar of a specific language, one may choose to use the term 'aspect' according to the need. In Slavic, 'aspect' is used for morphological pairs of verbs, where the meaning differences may involve several categories: perfectivity most generally, but also types of Aktionsart. 19 As the glosses show, this is by no means unique to Hungarian.

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 155 If the semantic contribution of the preverbs is that important, it would be hard to imagine that the preverbmodified verb is doomed to appear in one aspect only, with no direct counterpart in the other one in most cases. And indeed, Hungarian does have a device for producing the aspec­ tual dichotomy without dropping the preverb. The first aspect of verbs with meaningful preverbs may be formed by means of an inversion, the postposing of the preverb after the verb base (normally right after it). The prosodic pattern of such postposing will be Mid stress both on the verb base and the preverb (unlike in the case of Focus-triggered displacement where the verb loses its stress, see Sauvageot (1951:260, 297), cf. notes 10 and 13 above). Compare: (12) (a) (First aspect) 'The boy went the room-into' ('The boy was going to (ward) the room') (b) (Second aspect) 'The boy in-went the room-into' ('...entered/went into...') (c) (First aspect) 'The boy went in the room-into' ('...was entering/on his way to...') (12a) has a neutral 'going' with the target specified. (12b) states that the entering has taken place. (12c) is more telic (goal-oriented) than (12a). This is not mere going, but going with a purpose, yet, unlike in (12b), it is not yet completed. Furthermore, the verb of (12c), but not of (12a), makes the commitment that the target is to be specified as the inside of something. In many cases of such postposing, inserting an adverb èppen 'just' (preverbally in a neutral construction) may make the expression sound more natural (see end of 4.3.3. for éppen). Finally, the directional preverb may here be augmented by an element -fele '-ward', béfele 'inward' in (12c), to make the progressive reading more explicit.

156

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS For perfective verbs formed with the preverb m e g - ,

the

creation of the first aspect through the postposing of the preverb may involve some difficulties for pragmatic reasons: these ought to be non-completed actions where the idea of completion is looming about. This can be plausibly done in somewhat unusual situations: (13)

(a)

'The director already wrote also would the letterAcc. , but mind-his-into

came...'

(First aspect)

(b)

'The director already "up" also wrote would...' (Second

aspect)

(c)

'...already wrote also would "up"...' (14)

(a)

(First aspect) (First aspect)

'The cat just ate the soup-my-Acc.' (b)

(Second aspect) 'The cat "up"-ate the soup-my-Acc.'

(c)

(First aspect) 'The cat just ate "up" the soup-my-Acc.'

(15) (a) (First aspect) 'The women just cooked the

(shoe-)sole-. dinner-

onto[=for] (b) (Second aspect) 'The woman "up"-cooked the

(shoe-)sole-.dinner-

onto ' (c) ra.

(First aspect)

'The woman just cooked "up" the

(shoe-)sole-.

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 157 dinner-onto' The (a) and (c) examples ought to be translated by the Progressive in English (cf. note 24). In (13), a whole arse­ nal of devices is used to make (c) plausible: mar 'already', is 'also': here approximately 'indeed', and the conditional mood. The meaning of all the three sentences of (13) may be rendered by 'The director was already willing/about to write the letter, but then it occurred to him...'. (13b) means that he was willing to compose the letter, while (13a) and (13c) make it almost visualizable: he was just about to grab the pen and... Now, (13c) is a more efficient expression when what occurred to him was a reason against writing the letter, whereas (13a) is more neutral in this respect: what occured to him may have merely been that he had an urgent appointment, though he did not object to the letter. In other words, (13c) is more telic, it is the creation of the letter that plays a more important role, while (13a) has the activity in focus. (13b) and (13c) are both telic, but while the former communi­ cates willingness only, the latter further implies that he was just about to start working on it (with the intention to fin­ ish it, which is unmarked in (13a)). In (14), the cat's breach of etiquette creates the spe­ cial situation. (14b) communicates a fait accompli : 'The cat had eaten my soup'. Both (14a) and (14c) refer to the act in progress, but (14c) is more forceful because it puts more emphasis on the expropriation this means. (14a) may be just tasting, but in (14c) the cat seems to have taken possession of the soup and was about to eat it all up. Note that this pragmatic peculiarity also appears in English: as against * I was eating up my soup, the Progressive and the Perfective are compatible, in an expropriatory acceptation, in The cat was eating up my soup. Finally, in (15), the mention of the purpose ('dinner'), as the target of the absurd object of cooking, the sole of a shoe, make the construction justifiable. (15b) goes too far

158

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

by stating that the sole of the shoe had actually been pre­ pared for consumption. (15a) is a neutral statement about the sole of a shoe being boiled for later consumption. The most effective expression of the absurdity is (15c) which shows the woman in the middle of her work, it does not claim she had been successful as (15b), but it says clearly, unlike (15a) which is neutral in that respect, that the woman expects the sole of a shoe to be served as food for dinner, again the telic implication. We can see that in the (c) examples of ( 13)- ( 14)-(15) the perfective meaning is preserved in the first aspect: even though the action is still in progress, its completion, its expected result does play a communicational role, it is being done with full intention to finish it. This leads to the con­ clusion already announced above that the perfective meaning of meg- has the status of a lexical contribution which can survive also in the first aspect and is therefore not iden­ tical with aspect. As a working hypothesis in agreement with the intuition of Hungarian linguists, we have adopted the view that the Preverb-Verb group represents the second aspect, whereas both M M the preverb-less Verb and the ' Verb Preverb' group express the first one. However, in the cases hitherto treated and in most actual instances, the difference between a Verb, and a corresponding Preverb-Verbі group will not consist of one as­ pect vs. the other only, but additional semantic contributions, specifiable in the lexicon, are also involved. On the other hand, the contrast between Preverb.-Verb. and erb. Preverb. group will indeed constitute a purely and exclusively aspectu­ al opposition, and establishing the meaning of aspect in Hun­ garian should be primarily based on these examples. It follows from this that if any purely aspectual Verb./ Preverb-Verb. pairs exist at all in Hungarian, they should be recognized by the fact that the postposing of the preverb

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 159 will either be ungrammatical or its presence will have no semantically interpretable consequences, since in a posi­ tion where it cannot fulfill its aspectual function it will possess no function at all (see (22) below for another test for purely aspectual preverbs). And such pairs do exist, testable in the manner just described, and along with pairs like (b) and (c) in ( 1 2 ) -(1 5) ,,they will also provide a clue to the real meaning of Hungarian aspect. 3.2. Some purely aspectual preverbs 3.2.1. Static adverbs. In Hungarian, verbs of spatial refer­ ence: staying, existence, emergence, motion, actions taking place in space, etc. may be preceded by locative adverbs coreferential with Locative Phrases co-occurring in the same sentence. The verbs are unstressed, just like after other preverbs. These constructions have been treated in detail in Hetzron 19 66. Here are some examples: (16)(a) (b) (c)

M MM A lâny ült a szobában. (First aspect) 'The girl sat the room-in' M 20 A benn ült a (Second aspect) 'The girl there/inside sat the room-in' A ült a . (Second aspect) 'The room-in there sat the girl'

20 The claim is here that these static preverbs have no inde­ pendent semantic contribution, a claim that is apparently belied by the fact that the adverbs benn 'inside' or fenn 'up(stairs)' may be used here, indicating that the room is viewed from outside or from below. However, even though the choice of the adverb does contribute to communication in practice, and provides extra information to the hearer, - from the speaker's point of view this is an agreement with reality, the introduction of an extra datum, rather than a modification of the meaning of the verb.

160

HUNGARIAN GENERAL L I N G U I S T I C S M M M M M 21 M

(d) *A lány ült ott/  mindig' a szobában.

21 1 'The girl sat there/inside always the room-in' Both (16a) and (16b) may be translated as 'The girl was sitting in the room'. To show the difference between them, (16b) may be paraphrased as 'There was the girl, sitting in the room'. Conversely, (16c) may be rendered with some freedom as 'Sitting in the room, there was the girl'. As I have shown in Hetzron 1975, (16b-c) are presentative constructions (i.e. preparations for the subsequent discourse). (16b) makes the scene, the 'room', a more important element, to be remembered later, whereas (16c) makes the girl's appearance on the scene the essential link to the next portion of discourse. Note that this may be compared with the effect of preverbs in transitive verbs that often make their object communicationally more important than in the corresponding preverbless construction (what has been called 'telic' above, cf. (13)- ( 14)- ( 15). As a· consequence of the obligatory coexistence of the presentative function, the 'there+Verb' group may never be sentence-final. A presentative NP must stand at the end. In this type of construction, the verb may also be dynamic. By substituting járkált 'was walking about' to ült 'sat', we obtain basically the same results. Furthermore, even verbs with no direct spatial reference but referring to an action or event taking place in space may appear in this construction: verbs like írt 'was writing' or búsult 'was sad'. In fact, it is this construction that yields the only direct 21 The insertion of an extra element, most conveniently a timeor manner-adverb, is needed here to prevent a possible misunderstanding. Without mindig, (16d) would be acceptable, with ott or benn being part of the Locative Phrase: 'there in the room'. In other words, '...sat J there in the room' is correct, whereas '...sat there ] in the room' is not. The inserted element assures that the construction will not be misinterpreted (cf. Hetzron 1966:39-40).

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 161 second aspect counterparts (with no further meanings added) of these verbs in frames like (b) and (c), conveying the idea of noticing the subject in the process of writing or in a state of sadness. Since the preverb does not survive postposing in (16d), we must assume that the difference between the expressions (16a) on the one hand, and (16b-c) on the other, is purely aspectual. The fact that for the second aspect there are two alternatives only goes to prove that aspect is basically a discourse phenomenon (cf. Hopper-Thompson, forthcoming). Presentativeness and the second aspect seem to be interwoven, using the same exponents. Yet,, though different according to the context, both (16b) and (16c) will fit into the same de­ finition as far as aspect is concerned. See further the first paragraph of 3.2.3. 3.2.2. Preverbs with no additional meaning. There are also some verbs that take 'traditional' preverbs which fulfill an 22 aspectual function only. Here are two such verbs for illus­ tration: a punctual one indul 'start moving' and one neutral in that respect: kínál 'offer something to be partaken of (as a sign of friendship or hospitality), say "please have some..."' (17)(a) A Mvonat Mindult. or Mindult a Mvonat.23 (First aspect) 22 It is not clear whether these verbs constitute a natural class or a number of natural classes, - or they are simply those that, accidentally or for pragmatic reasons, did not develop added meanings for the Preverb-Verb group. I suspect the latter to be true, but this deserves a longer investigation. A few further verbs of this type: ígér/megígér 'promise' (for this and for kínál, see Perrot 1966:14), születik/megszületik 'be born' (ibid. 32), öl/megöl 'kill' (see (22c) and (23) with details below), etc. 23

The latter word order is the unmarked one. (footnote 2 3 con­ tinued) .

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

162

(b)

'The train started' or 'Started the train' M M A vonat megindult. (Second aspect)

()

'The train "up"-started' * M M M A vonat indult meg.

(Second aspect)

'The train started/was starting "up"' M , M (18) (a) A

M

fiú

indult

az

iskolaba.

(First aspect)

'The boy started the school-into' school') M M (k)

A

fiu

('...set out for

M elindult az

iskolaba. (Second aspect)

'The boy away-started the school-into' school') M > M^ (°)

.

f i u

M

( eppen)

indult

('...left for

M

M

( el_) reggel az

iskolaba.

(First aspect) 'The boy

(just) started

(away) in-the-morning the

school-into' M M (19) (a)

A

haziasszony

ket.

M barackpalinkaval kinàlta a

vendége-

(First aspect)

'The lady-of-the-house apricot-brandy-with

offered

the guests-Ace.' (b)

A

haziasszony

linkaval.

mecrkinalta a

vendegeket

barackpa­

(Second aspect)

'The lady-of-the-house

"up"-offered the guests-Ace.

apr.-brandy-with' (c)

A

haziasszony

( eppen)

kmalta

? ( meg) a vendege-

ket... 'Thecontinued) lady-of-the (just) offered ? typically ("up") the (footnote 23 Thehouse Verb-Subject order is guests-Ace. .. ' individuality of the subject is downplayed and used when the only the event matters, e.g. in meteorological statement Fuj a szèl 'Blows the wind'. Naturally, Hungarian word order can be reshuffled a great deal and, if the context requires, (17b) may also have the Verb-Subject sequence.

NON- APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 163 (17a) is neutral communication of an event. (17b) concentrates on the change involved: the train that has just now been sta-tionary finally starts moving. *(17c) is ungrammatical, ostensibly because the difference between (17a) and (17b) is merely aspectual, which makes postposed meg- superfluous. Thus, the correct definition of the difference between (17a) and (17b) is one application of the general definition of Hungarian as­ pect. (18) contains the same verb, with a human subject and with specification of the target. Though the aspectual preverb could be meg- or el- for either (17) or (18), what is present­ ed here is felt to be the more felicitous use. In (18c), un­ like in *(17c), the preverb is allowed to remain, but its pres­ ence or absence makes absolutely no difference. Except for the specification 'in the morning' (see note 21) and for the adverb 'just' which could also appear with (18a), (18c) has exactly the same meaning as (18a). The word order difference between (19a) and (19b) is not relevant for our discussion. Other word orders are possible, these are the most neutral ones. (19a) is a descriptive state­ ment. Of its two readings: iterative and punctual (e.g. with time adverbials like 'for two hours' vs. 'at 5 o'clock'), only the latter is considered here. This is what would be used in a reporting of the scene observed. It may be followed by a sen­ tence referring to the reaction of the guests: acceptance or refusal. This is also possible after (19b), but this one is more appropriate when the next sentence speaks of another, subsequent event, not necessarily related to this manifesta­ tion of hospitality. (19b) merely says that this action did take place. The last word, 'apricot brandy', may also be presentative, i.e. play a role in the subsequent discourse (e.g. 'The guests started to sip it'.) (19c) is impeccable without meg-. With meg- it is not entirely ungrammatical, but strong­ ly infelicitous (some of my informants declared it to smack

164

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

of uneducated speech). With or without it, (19c) is equivalent to (19a) . To sum up, the (a) sentences may all be fairly well 24 rendered by the English Progressive form (less so for (19a) ) and refer to events as they are taking place. The (b) sentences, on the other hand, rather concentrate on the fact that the events did take place and the narrative can go on to the next event. In (18b), the school as a target may be more important for the subsequent discourse than in (18a). In (19b) we learn that the lady of the house has done her duty as a gracious hostess. The (c) sentences are problematic. (17c) is ungrammatical, (18c) is acceptable with the preverb, (19c) is of doubtful acceptability with meg-. Yet they do not differ in meaning from the corresponding (a) sentences, their preverb may be omitted with no consequences. See (23) below for another purely aspectual preverb. 3.2.3. Monoaspectual verbs. In the beginning of 3.1., I have shown that the verbs megy 'go' or ír 'write' will always have their meaning modified if a preverb is added. Yet these verbs 24

A contrastive study of texts should show to what extent the English Progressive and the Hungarian first aspect are to be equated. It is certain that there is no complete equivalence between them. The ungrammaticality of *he is knowing is quite well justified in the framework of English. The Progressive aspect is typically used for actions or situations the duration of which includes the duration or happening of another event, and know is not associated with duration (though the constraint is partly lexicalized, as, in principle, one could find justification for *When I was knowing how to swim; on the other hand, even for states the Progressive is allowed if they are supposed to have limited duration: You are being silly). In Hungarian, on the contrary, tud 'know' may appear only in the first aspect, consistently with the general aspectual system of Hungarian (see 3.2.3.) .

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 165 may also have their minimal counterpart in the second aspect by means of the presentative construction described in 3.2.1.: ott megy and ott ír with ott 'there'. The two constraints: the requirement of the cooccurrence of another Locative Phrase in the same sentence and the concomitant presence of the presentative function, are quite significant. They show that static or durative actions/situation's may be represented as mere facts (divested of their durative implication) when they are shown to be observed in space. The presentative function assures that the discourse should go on to the next step, just like in other second aspect constructions. On the other hand, static verbs with no spatial reference, the denotatum of which cannot be visualized, do not enter into this construction and are inexorably associated with the first aspect only. Such are verbs like tud 'know' where the addition of the preverb meg- would create an inchoative 'learn, come to know' (cf. Kiefer (1979:6.3). megtud There in no *ott tud. Conversely, some verbs may occur in the second aspect 25 only, such as felfog 'grasp, understand', megcsòvàl 'make 25 These definitions are in agreement with, and to a great extent inspired by, Perrot's investigation of the preverb megin Hungarian. One of the functions of meg- is, according to Perrot (1966:11), opposing action or activity (cselekves, an indefinite concept) and act (cselekedet, well-defined and delimited) , e.g. csíp/megcsíp 'sting', the former either for the potential of bees, nettle, etc. or for the lasting sensation their stinging causes, and the latter for denoting a single event, a pinching. In my opinion, or rather according to my criteria, this is not an aspectual minimal pair, the punctuality of the latter constitutes an added meaning, but the distinction formulated by Perrot is useful in general. Elsewhere (p.52) he opposes process (folyamat) corresponding to (footnote 25 continued)

166

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

a single wag (e.g. a dog with its tail)'. No

*M

éppen

M

fogja

M

fel/ Mcsóvalja Mmeg is conceivable for a first aspect. These are momentary verbs which cannot be viewed as a process. 'Grasp' is a switch from non-understanding to understanding, too rapid to be caught. For 'wag' there is the verb csòval, and megcsoval says that there was one wagging only (Kiefer 1979, (52)(53)). Since not all the static and durative verbs are blocked from adopting the second aspect and not all punctual/momentary verbs are excluded from the first aspect (e.g. (17a)), one more factor must be involved in their monoaspectuality. This seems to be 'non-observability' through vision or other senses. This is clear for the static or durative verbs like tud 'know' and for a punctual verb like felfog 'grasp', both referring to mental processes. For 'make a single wag', the wagging itself is observable in principle, but a single wag observed does not allow the prediction that it will remain the only one, hence only csòvál is truly observable, what makes megcsÓvál different is not perceivable by senses while still in progress. 3.3. Factual vs. Descriptive aspect. At this stage, we are prepared to attempt to propose a definition for the Hungarian aspects, based on the pairs (12c/b), (13c/b), (14c/b), (15c/b), (16a/b-c), (17a/b), (18a-c/b) and (19a/b), and many other pairs considered but not reproduced here, - a definition that must be compatible with those cases where a preverbless verb is con­ trasted with one with a preverb that also modifies its meaning (12a/b), (14a/b), (15a/b), etc., and further consistent with (footnote 25 continued) 'action', and esemèny; event as the punctual memory of a happening with duration, corresponding to what I mean by 'fact'. For the meaning of meg- Perrot also uses the term effective, which was used for the second aspect in Hungarian in Hetzron (1966) (on the basis of an earlier synopsis of his study by Perrot).

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 167 the results attained in 3.2.3. where it is shown that static verbs may not appear in the second aspect unless they may be represented as punctualized observations in space and some punctual verbs may not appear in the first aspect. The common denominator of all the occurences of the first aspect seems to be the fact that the sentences containing them communicate events, actions, happenings or states per se as they are taking place or are going on being true. We shall label this the Descriptive aspect. As shown above, the formal expression of this aspect is either a preverbless verb or a Mid-stressed verb with its preverb postposed, removed from its lexically pre-verbal position. On the other hand, the second aspect, formally characterized by the presence of a preverb directly preceding the verb base and constituting one word with it, points to the fact that the event does/did indeed take place. It is more dynamic and puts the emphasis on the change that the action or event occassions, on the modification of the situation, on the achievement. Hence it is often connected with the presentative (as defined in Hetzron (1975)), i.e. the denotatum of the final word of such a sentence may play a role in the next sentence. The essential communicational contribution of the sentence may this be outside of the action proper expressed by the verb. We can call this the Factual aspect. The Factual aspect is the dis­ course-chain aspect par excellence (cf. Hopper-Thompson, forth­ coming) . The concatenation of a sequence of events into a nar­ rative is realized through the Factual aspect, whereas the De­ scriptive aspect lingers on the actions, events or states them­ selves, takes their duration into account, describes them more vividly. The functioning of the aspectual dichotomy may also be illustrated by developments in the colloquial language, where a number of verbs underwent a spontaneous addition of preverbs, e.g. leközöl 'down-publish' on the basis of közöl 'publish'.

168

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

However condemned by normativists, these colloquial extensions have their deep roots in the aspectual system and fit into the grammatical pattern of Hungarian perfectly. 'Publishing' means making some material available to the public through printing in a circulated document, - and not keeping it available. The momentary-inchoative association attached to this meaning warrants the use of the preverb to create the appropriate second aspect. The colloquial has now an aspectual pair közöl/leközöl corresponding to the descriptive/factual dichotomy (still blurred by the fact that the normativist approve of közöl only and propose no factual form to be used in a context that requires it) . Finally, it is worth while returning to the particle èppen 'just' that has been used above in several examples of the descriptive aspect. This is not an adverb with aspectual functions. Quite on the contrary, like its English gloss, it is strongly aspect-sensitive. With the descriptive aspect, its reading is 'right at this moment, in progress', but with the factual aspect it may be used to express immediately pre­ ceding completion often translatable as 'has/had just finish­ ed doing'. See (20) below for some aspectually constrained adverbs. 3.4. Aspect and Gap-Fillers. The definition of the Gap-Fill­ ers, as proposed above, is: a Prominential element which is contrasted with some/anything else that may reasonably appear/ has appeared in the same slot, - within a sentence the rest of which is previously known, presupposed, follows from the pre­ vious context, guessable or trivial. It is thus clear that when non-Verb Gap-Filling is present, the information con­ veyed is not the event, the action expressed by the sentence, not the process involved, nor the result, the achievement im­ plied, but the fact that of all possible comparable elements it is precisely the Gap-Filler that figures in that specific slot. The full sentence stands there merely as a frame for

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS

169

the Gap-Filler element, a reminder of what the slot it fills is really about. In brief, it is the identity of the Gap-Filler element that constitutes the only truly relevant information. It follows from this reasoning that non-Verb Gap-Filling and aspectual alternation must be incompatible in Hungarian. The function of Gap-Filling is to distract the attention from the happening itself, everything but the Gap-Filler is pushed back in the background. Therefore, in the presence of a GapFiller, neither the process or state nor the fact are really communicated, and the distinction between the two aspects be­ comes functionally superfluous. It is the thesis of the present writer that verbal as­ pect is neutralized in Hungarian in the presence of a GapFiller. This has not been noticed by Hungarian linguists be­ cause the preverbs are not dropped when Gap-Filling occurs, they are only displaced. This is mainly due to the additional semantic contribution of most of them, which makes them an indispensable component of the sentence. We shall see below that even the meaningless, purely aspectual preverbs may stay on, but their presence or absence will make absolutely no difference as far as the informational content is concerned. They may play a stylistic role in the rhythm of the sentence, but no more. In the following, examples of Focus will be used for 26 See Hopper (1978) for types of interaction between aspect and focus. In Malay, the focus particle -lah is attached to the verb to mark 'kinetically new events' - what would correspond to the Hungarian Factual aspect. This means in practice that, since only one -lah per sentence is allowed, Noun-Focus may not coexist with the aspectually interpretable Verb-Focus - a situation quite parallel to Hungarian, see 3.5. below. In Russian, the imperfective aspect 'is typically used when one of the constituents receives alone the central focus of (footnote 26 continued)

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

170

illustration, but it should be remembered that the other GapFiller: Replacer will also be understood to be subject to the same rules and same restrictions. To demonstrate our thesis, let us take an aspectual distinction, contrasting a Preverb-Verb group with a Verb Preverb sequence where both have the Mid stress. The respective sentences also contain an adverb which can co-occur with one aspect only: hirtelen 'suddenly' qualifies a factual verb only, whereas jÓ sokáig 'for a long time' (lit.: 'good for+ long+time-until') is only compatible with the descriptive aspect.

Hirtelen M kinézett az M ablakon. (Factual aspect) 'Suddenly he-out-looked the window-on' ('Suddenly he looked out of the window') (b) JÓ M sokáig M nêzett Mki az M ablakon. (Descriptive asp.) 'Good long-time he-looked out the window-on' ('He was looking out of the window for a long time') (c) *JÓ M sokáig M kinézett az M ablakon. (Factual) 'For a long time he looked out of the window' (d) *M Hirtelen M nézett Mki az M ablakon. (Descriptive) 'Suddenly he was looking out of the window' Examples (20 c-d) illustrate the incompatibility between a durative adverb and the Factual aspect and between a punctual 27 adverb and the Descriptive . Now consider the following: (20)(a)

M

(footnote 26 continued) information', cf. 3.5. below for the underlying similarity of this with the situation in Hungarian. 27 One may actually obtain a string quite similar to *(20d), but with the adverb unstressed: Most meg hirtelen M nezett M ki M az ablakon ('Now and suddenly...') for 'And now, suddenly, he was [observed/noticed] looking out of the window' where the adverb qualifies the perception implied.

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS

171

Hirtelen ønézett Mki az Mablakon. (Preverb postposed) ('He looked out of the window suddenly') (b) Jó Hsokáig ønézett Mki az Mablakon. ('He was looking out of the window for a lóoong time') (c) Az Hablakon ønézett Mki Mhirtelen. ('Suddenly he looked out of the window') (d) Αz Hablakon ønézett Mki jó Msokáig. ('It was through the window that he looked out for a long time') Here both adverbs appear in the same construction containing Focus, they may be Focused themselves (21a-b) or another ele­ ment may be under Focus: (21e-d). Since the adverbs themselves do go on carrying their original reading, the aspectual distinction is preserved through them. Yet nothing indicates it (21)(a)

H

in the verb. The mere expression Az Hablakon ønézett Mki. represents a neutralization between the Factual an readings, it may be the Focused counterpart of either M Kinézett az Mablakon. 'He looked out of the window' (Factual) or M Nézett Mki az ablakon. 'He was looking out of the window' (Descriptive). This has been a case of a verb with a preverb that has a clear semantic contribution independently of aspect. There­ fore it cannot be omitted without substantially altering the meaning. Purely aspectual preverbs, on the other hand, need not be preserved when aspect is neutralized. However, Hungarian allows their postposed appearance even with a Focus element, but they will have no actual function at all and may be omitted with no consequence. This fact constitutes the best test for verifying whether the preverb is merely aspectual or also contributes to the lex­ ical interpretation, and, moreover, for pinpointing that contri­ bution. When, in a Focus-containing sentence, the presence or absence of the preverb does not alter the meaning, this pre-

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

172

verb is purely aspectual. On the other hand, when the all-over meaning is modified and the sentence with the preverb is not a perfect equivalent of the sentence without the preverb, that modification interpreted in semantic terms will constitute the contribution of the preverb to the sense of the Preverb-Verb Verb.28

group as opposed to the mere

Here are some examples of

meaningless preverbs which are omissible and have stylistic functions at best: (22) (a)

H

A

lany

ø

ült

( M ott) M mindig a

M

szobában. (cf. (16))

'The gírl sat (there) always the room-in'

(Subject-

Focus) (b)

Az

H

iskolába

ø

( M el) a

induit

'The schòol-into started (c)

Csak a

ø

gyerekeket

öli

M

fiú. (cf. (18))

(away) the boy' (Complement-Focus) ( M meg) ez a

M

etegsèg.

(cf.

23)) 'Only the children-c kills

("up") this the disease'

('This disease only kills children') (d)

Barackpálinkával M

vendègeket.

ø

( M meg) a

kínálta

M

(Object-Focus) hàziasszony a

(cf. (19))

'Apricotbrandy-with offered

("up") the hostess the

guests-Ace.' ('The lady of the house offered/served àpricot 28 For example, this is how I realized that the following pair is not purely aspectual. Compare: (a)

Az

H

osztálytársait

ø

verte

a

M

fiú.

'The classmates-his-Acc. beat the boy' Az

H

osztálytársait

ø

verte

(a) and (b) are not equivalent,

M

meg a

M

fiú. (with "up")

(a) refers to what was taking

place, a fight in progress; (b) means that the boy managed to beat up(!) his opponents. Here

(b) is perfective which, in my

opinion, is not an aspectual category in Hungarian.

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS

173

brandy to the guests' or 'It was apricot brandy that the lady...') With Verb-Focus, on the other hand, the aspects are not neutralized. The dichotomy of factuality/descriptivity is still functional when its locus coincides with the locus of the Gap-Filler, so that the verb is not demoted communicationally: (23) (a)

H

öli a øgyerekeket ez a

M

etegsèg!

(Descriptive aspect)

'Kills the children-. this the disease' Megöli a. øgyerekeket ez a Mbetegseg! (Factual as­ pect) '"Up"-kills the children-. this the disease' Aspect-wise, the first sentence conveys the idea that a kill­ ing disease rages among the children. (23b), as against this, means that any child contracting this disease is likely to die. Thus, (23a) is a tragic happening, whereas (23b) speaks of the fate of the children. The additional Focus makes this sentence practically exclamatory. An approximate rendering of the two is (23a): 'This disease is killing the children' vs. (23b) 'This disease does kill (or kills) the children'. It should be pointed out that the aspectual opposition is neutralized in the presence of meaningful (non-verbal) Focus only, motivated by communiational considerations. In Hungarian, the negative word nem 'not' and the interrogative pronouns (see (25b-c) below for sentence questions) have obligatory Focus in the event that no other, discourse-motivated Focused element is found in the sentence. The obligatorily Focused categories involve no neutralization of the aspects. Compare : (b)

(24)

H

(a)

A M bátyám a M színházban v o l t . ( D e s c r i p t i v e 'The brother-my the t h e a t e r - i n was'

(b)

A M bátyám M benn v o l t a

M

színházban.

aspect)

(Factual aspect)

'The brother-my inside was the theater-in'

174

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(c)

(d)

A H bátyám volt ( M benn) a M színházban. (SubjectFocus ) 'The bròther-my was (inside) the theater-in' A Hszínházban volt ( M benn) a M bátyám. (ComplementFocus) 'The théater-in was (inside) the brother-my'

A Mszínházban H nem volt a M bátyám. (Descriptive Negative) 'The theater-in not was the brother-my' (f) A Mszínházban nem volt M benn a. M bátyám. (Factual Negative) 'The theater-in not was inside the brother-my' (g) H Mikor volt a Mszínházban a M pátyám? (Descriptive Interrogative) 'When was the theater-in the brother-my' (e)

Mikor volt benn a Mszínházban a bátyám? (Factual Interrogative) 'When was inside the theater-in the brother-my' (24a) is a simple statement about my (elder) brother's where­ abouts, namely his being at the theater (in the building, whether watching a performance or in another quality). (24b), the Factual aspect statement, on the other hand, expresses that he was indeed there. This would be an appropriate expression when he was found there after having been looked for elsewhere; when he is known to go there irregularly, and this is one of those days when he happens to be in; or when his visiting the theater has special importance, he had some communicationally relevant business there (the presentative meaning, cf. Hetzron 1975), etc. In summary, the 'theater' as the 'medium' of my brother's presence is not just a casual thing as in (24a), but something of significance. (24a) may set the scene for further events, (24b) is an event by itself on the same footing as the others. (h)

H

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS

175

Now, in (24c-d) the above distinction is not found. The static preverb benn 'inside' is tolerated, but its omission does not modify the meaning. In the presence of Focus, the aspects are neutralized. But this is not so in the negative sentences (24e-f) and the interrogative ones (24g-h).29 (24f) negates the expectation that my brother ought to be found in the theater, the negative counterpart of (24b), whereas (24e) simply states that he was not there, negating (24a). In these two examples, the Locative Phrase is initial, but the Subject-Neg.-Verb-Loc. order is also possible, with essentially the same distinction: (24f) in either order expressing that he never showed up there, or was not found there when looked for. The distinction is the same in (24g) and (24h), which also have the potential for other word orders. (24g) is a neutral inquiry about my brother's past time table, while (24h) is asked in order to find out when he made his planned visit, or when he 'honored' the theater with his presence. Thus, automatic Focus in negation and interrogation does not lead to a neutralization of the aspects. This follows from the fact that there is nothing wrong with the distinction between negating factuality, denying that a special event took place, and negating porcess or state, that a certain situation 29 (24g-h) are examples of pronominal interrogation, but the same is true of sentence-questions, see (25b-c) below. 30 Nevertheless, the aspects are neutralized in the answers which also obligatorily contain a Focus element, the one that replaces the interrogative pronoun, or the predicate in answer to a sentence question. Here the compulsory Focus is not imposed by the inherent features of the element involved, but by the context, the preceding question. Therefore, Focus is functional in this context.

176

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

existed in a given time. Likewise, one may inquire about a presupposed definite event through the Factual aspect, or, using the Descriptive aspect, about the occurence of a possible situation. With some simplification, one may render negated or interrogative Descriptive sentences in English by adding 'at all', whereas this is not possible for the Factual ones. Here again, the semantic definitions of the categories explain the facts. Now, the examples of (24) belong to the category where purely aspectual preverbs are used. In the most frequent situations, where the preverb is the carrier of additional meaning and cannot be deleted, on the other hand, the aspects are neutralized also in negation and pronominal interrogation for formal reasons: the preverb is always in a post-verbal position the verb is unstressed because of the preceding High stressed Neg. or Wh-element, so that there are no formal means to distinguish between the aspects. In (24e-f-g-h) the absence or presence of the preverb expresses aspect. Here, with the preverb always present and always post-verbal, one cannot tell whether the preverb was driven out from its preverbal position by the High-stressed element only, or it had already moved there, voluntarily, to express the Descriptive aspect. In sentence-questions, on the contrary, there is no preverb-displacement, and the positioning of the preverb is still available as an exponent of aspectual distinctions: (25) (a) Az Möreg Lnénikék Hnem ønéztek Mki az Mablakon. 'The old aunties not looked out the window-on' ('The little old ladies did not look [from nem+ kinéztek ] /were not looking [from nem+ néztek M ki] out of the window' - a distinction in English which, being a type of absolute neutralization, cannot be considered valid in Hungarian), but (b) Az Möreg Lnénikék Hnéztek-e øki az Mablakon? (Descriptive aspect)

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 177 'The old aunties looked-Q out the window-on' ('Were the little old ladies looking out of the window?') (c) Az Möreg Lnénikék Hkinéztek-e az øablakon. (Factual) In Hungarian sentence-questions, in the absence of discourse-motivated Focus, the tense-carrier takes the Focus stress. In addition, the tense-carrier is either followed by a particle -e which, this being the simpler construction, is presented above, or the last two syllables of the question have a Ultrahigh-Mid prosody. The latter creates an inter­ ference with the High stress on the predicate, with phonetic complications that do not belong in the present study (see Hetzron, forthcoming). 3.5. Explanatory power. The explanation given above for the neutralization of the aspects after a Focus (or Replacer) was semantic: the definitions of the two aspects are inapplicable when a Gap-Filler is present. On the other hand, while in ne­ gation such a neutralization is not expected and not found with purely aspectual preverbs: (24d-e), with meaningful preverbs the neutralization does occur - for formal reasons: since the preverb is non-deletable and has to be displaced anyhow, no device is left for the aspectual dichotomy to manifest itself. One then may also suggest that the neutral­ ization of aspect after Focus is due in general not to se­ mantics, but to the formal behavior of Focus expressions which require the displacement of the preverb automatically, thereby crippling it an an expressor of the aspect. The pre-verbal po­ sition, the formal exponent of the Factual aspect, is denied to it with a non-Totalizer Gap-Filler present. Purely aspec­ tual preverbs would then follow by analogy. Yet, one must approach this problem from the opposite side, and that will provide strong support to the semantic motivation explanation. There is no a. priori reason for why the preverb should be displaced after a Focus element. In

178

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principle, the Focus element could precede an undisturbed Preverb-Verb group with equal efficiency and clarity as it indeed does when the Focus element is a Totalizer (see 2.3. above). In fact, the displacement may be viewed as the result, not the cause, of the neutralization. Since no aspectual di­ chotomy is expected to exist after a Focus element, the preverb is defused as an aspect-marker and, removed from its bound position where it appears in the lexicon, it is trans­ ferred to a neutral place where it can perform its other du­ ties, those of semantic modification. But one may even go one step further and adduce a better justification. The displace­ ment of the preverb after normal Focus resembles the postposing of the preverb for the Descriptive aspect. One may thus state that while there is formal and semantic neutralization, the external manifestation of the aspect-neutral verb serving a Focus element is like the Descriptive form. This is possibly not accidental. In the theory proposed by Hopper and Thompson (forthcoming), Factual aspect represents foregrounding, i.e. constitutes the poles over which the wires carrying the flow of discourse are stretched, whereas the Descriptive aspect or the English Progressive or the French Imperfect, etc. are all backgrounding devices. Now, in a Focus-containing sentence, the non-Focus portion is also backgrounded, even more radi­ cally than in the above cases. Consequently, there is some similarity, and analogy may operate. The denial of the pre-verbal position to the preverb may be viewed as a general backgrounding device, serving here two different kinds of backgrounding (cf. note 26 for a comparable situation in Rus­ sian) . Conversely, it is to be noted that the Hungarian system is ultimately not unlike that of Malay (note 26). Both the Factual aspect and Focus mean foregrounding (Hopper 1978:18). Even though grammatically only a component of a sentence, the Focus element stands out in the chain of discourse on the same

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 179 level as a sentence containing the Factual aspect. All the other elements or sentences remain in the background. It is this analogy that was exploited, as shown by Hopper, by Malay where a Focus-marker was taken over to mark what corresponds to our Factual aspect. The end result is the same in both lan­ guages: the foregrounded Phrase, the Focus element, and the foregrounded event-indicator, the Factual aspect, are in com­ plementary distribution since they fulfill the same discourse function. One question still remains: why is then the preverb kept in its pre-verbal position after a Gap-Filling Totalizer (2.3.). Here I am offering a tentative explanation. The Factual aspect communicates the fact that the event has/will have taken place. A sentence with a Gap-Filling Totalizer communicates the fact that what is said is true not only for part of a group, but to its entirety. While normal Focus usually refers to a single event and is compatible with the idea of process, state or fact equally well (i.e. it does not matter whether the sen­ tence in which a gap is filled it to be viewed as a state or process or as a fact), Totalizers typically presuppose multi­ ple states or happenings and what is communicated is the fact that each one of the possible candidates for participation is included in them, no matter exactly when and how. Thus, as for the Factual aspect in general, the meaning is basically resultative, the process of the event is disregarded. This is why the external feature of the Factual aspect, the preposed pre31 verb, is adopted (or preserved) after a Focused Totalizer. 31 Another issue is : what is used when a Gap-Filling Totalizer and a verb with a purely aspectual preverb are combined? Lim­ itations of space prevent me from treating this in detail. Suffice it to say that the general rule is that such a preverb is proscribed if there is another non-specific NP in the sen(footnote 31 continued)

180

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

4. Summary The following definitions have been proposed here: GapFillers : elements that come to fill originally unspecified slots in sentences presupposed or of limited communicational importance by themselves. Focus : a Gap-Filler that is in explicit opposition with anything that could appear in the same slot. Replacer : a Gap-Filler in explicit opposition with some-

(footnote 31 continued) tence: (a); obligatory when there is no other NP or there is a specific one (carrying a definite or indefinite article): (b). Apparent counterexamples, where the other NP is not specific yet there is no preverb, can be shown to be cases of additional Predicate-Focus

(since after a Gap-

Filling Totalizer one more Focus is still allowed, cf. (7)): (a)

H

Minden

ø

ø

szemétdombon

kapirgál

M

csirke.

'Every garbage-heap-on scratches-about chicken' (b)

H

Minden

ø

szemétdombon

ø

ott

kapirgál egy/a

csirke.

'Every garbage-heap-on there scratches-about a/the chicken' (c)

H

Minden

ø

szemétdombon

ø

kapirgál

a

M

csirke.

(a) and (b) are more or less equivalent generic statements about the presence of at least one chicken on every garbageheap inspected, probably as a sign of good poultry raising culture,

(c) says that the instinct of a chicken

(generic as

well) is to start scratching about as soon as it gets to a garbage-heap. 'Does scratch' is a reasonably adequate rendering. N o t e , however, that the Focused verb carries zero stress as in (7c) yet the subsequent stress is not reduced from Mid to zero, unlike in (7c) and (3c)/(23) respectively. The explanation for the discrepancy between

(a) and (b)

is that only a specific NP qualifies for the presentative function, which ott can fulfill here without any concomitant aspect.

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS 181 thing that has appeared in the same slot in a previous ut­ terance or in an assumption. Factual aspect: where the fact of having taken place, achievements, the modifications the event occasions are the relevant information, vs. Descriptive aspect: where the state or happening itself, in its duration, is communicated. The contrast between Focus and Replacer is neutralized with Totalizers because the opposite of 'all' is 'part', and the distinction between 'any' and 'some' is void in this con­ juncture. The same is true of interrogative pronouns which are not in true opposition with anything, but express lack of information in one respect, and of the answer words that re­ place them, which are in opposition with these pronouns. The contrast between the Factual and Descriptive aspects is neutralized in the presence of non-verbal Gap-Fillers, because the sentences containing Gap-Fillers primarily communicate the identity of the entity that comes to fill the gap, and the rest of the sentence is backgrounded to the extent that it does not matter whether they are to be viewed as facts or descriptions. The Factual aspect means foregrounding and here we inevitably have backgrounding. The essence of the com­ munication is not the event, but a component thereof. The fact that the semantic definitions proposed account for the syntactic phenomena observed in a compact and plausi­ ble manner makes it highly likely that the definitions are in­ deed correct.

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HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

References Bierwisch, Manfred. 1966. 'Regeln für die Intonation deut­ scher Sätze', Studia Grammatica. VII. Untersuchungen über Akzent und Intonation im Deutschen. 99-201. Bolinger, Dwight L. 19 65. 'Contrastive accent and contrastive stress', in D.L. Bolinger, Forms of English, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 101-116 (originally Language 37.83-96 (1961)). Chafe, Wallace L. 1976. 'Givenness, contrastiveness, subject and topics', in Charles Li, ed. Subject and topic. New York: Academic Press. 27-55. Comrie, Bernard. 1976. Aspect. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. Hetzron, Robert. 1964. 'Les syntagmes à totalisateur du hon­ grois', Word 20.55-71. Hetzron, Robert. 1966. 'L'adverbe explétif ott et l'aspect hongrois', Linguistics 5.99-113. Hetzron, Robert. 1972. 'Disjoining conjoined structures', Pa­ pers in Linguistics 5.99-113. Hetzron, Robert. 19 75. 'The presentative movement, or why the ideal word order is V.S.O.P.', in Charles Li, ed. Word order and word order change. Austin: University of Texas Press. 347-88. Hetzron, Robert. Forthcoming. 'Izelito a magyar tonoszintakszisbol'. Hopper, Paul J. 19 78. 'Some observations on the typology of focus and aspect in narrative language', NUSA, Linguistic Studies in Indonesian and Languages of Indonesia, 4.14-25. Hopper, Paul J. and Sandra A. Thompson. Forthcoming. 'The discourse basis of Transitivity'. Horvath, Julia. 1976. 'Focus in Hungarian and the X notation', Linguistic Analysis, 2.175-97. Kiefer, Ferenc. 1969. 'Az emfázis kérdéséhez', Magyar Nyelvőr, 93.97-115. Kiefer, Ferenc. 1979. 'The aspectual system in Hungarian'. In

NON-APPLICABILITY AS A TEST FOR CATEGORY DEFINITIONS

183

this volume. Kiparsky, Paul. 1966. 'Über den deutschen Akzent', Studia Grammatica, 7.69-98. Perrot, Jean. 1966. Adalékok a meg igekötő funkciójának vizsgálatához a mai magyar nyelvben. Budapest: Akademiai Kiadó. Prince, Ellen F. 1978. 'The comparison of wh-clefts and itclefts in discourse', Language, 54.883-906. Sauvageot, Aurélien. 1951. Esquisse de la langue hongroise. Paris: Klincksieck,

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN Sándor Károly "Verborum Ungaricorum etiam eiusdem radicis tanta est foecunditas, ut summa admiratione digna videatur." György Komáromi Tsipkés 1.1. Hungarian verb forms are extremely rich in expressive power. Apart from tense and mood markers and the personal endings of the determinate conjugation, the synthetic character of the language and its power to condense syntagms is due to the complex system of verbal derivational suffixes. The Hungarian deverbal derivational suffixes can be grouped into three classes: suffixes of iterative-frequentative verbs, suffixes of transitive-intransitive verbs, and the suffix -hat, which is used to form verba potentiale. On the basis of -het the lexical meaning and the syntactic function of their deriva­ tional suffixes and with respect to their position in the sys­ tem of Hungarian verbal paradigms, the verbs of these classes constitute separate homogeneous units, i.e. subsystems. In the relevant literature one may often find that verbs and verbal derivational suffixes are classified with no attention paid to these criteria. As a consequence the subsets of verb clas­ ses established on the basis of various criteria get mixed up

186

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

1 eclectically. The above three classes of verbal derivational suffixes constitute three classificatory criteria for verbs. The first two roughly correspond to the verb categories known as 'vid' and 'zalog' in the pertinent Russian literature. They may be rendered roughly as 'aspect' and 'voice' in English. Aspect or vid includes iterative and instantaneous derivational suf­ fixes, while voice or zalog covers reflexive, passive and causative derivational suffixes, i.e. suffixes that form tran-

Eclectic classification is without any homogeneous basis. S.Ullmann, for example, regards Carnoy's classification of se­ mantic change as eclectic because "Carnoy's scheme lacks the comleteness, homogeneousness and fundamentum peculiar to sci­ entific classifications" (Ullmann 1957: 244). A similar mistake is made by those who classify Hungarian deverbal derivatonal suffixes into the following groups: itera­ tives, instantaneous verbs, inchoatives, causatives, passives, reflexives, and verba potentiale. Such classification is erroneous, because it is based on three distinct criteria: first, the deriva­ tional suffix expresses the duration or instantaneous charac­ ter of the action (iterative, instantaneous and inchoative verbs); second, the suffix shows how the action is related to the subject and the object of the action (causative, factitive, passive and reflexive verbs); and third the derivational suf­ fix may express the possibility or ability of the action (verba potentiale). Instead of basing verb classification on derivational suffixes, it is more appropriate to classify verbs on the basis of independent criteria, for example, on the basis of the meaning of the verbs. In order to do justice to linguistic facts, it is necessary to assign both derived and non-derived verbs to a common class whenever they belong to the same semantic class. The same semantic class is charac(footnote 1 continued)

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN 187 (footnote 1 continued) terised by homogeneous syntactic be­ haviour. Notice, furthermore, that any classification aiming at completeness should work with complementary classes. The complementary class of modals is the class of nonmodals; the two classes cover exhaustively the whole range of verbs. I wish to claim that verbs can be classified on the following grounds : Class 1 is defined on the basis of whether the meaning of the verb is durative or instantaneous (aspect); Class 2 is established on the basis of the relationship be­ tween action and agent and between action and object (voice); Class 3 is based on the possibility or ability of the action (modal verb forms). This classification meets the requirements of classification discussed above, namely, it has homogeneous defining criteria and it contains distinct subsets. (One and the same verb cannot express durative and instantaneous, causa­ tive and reflexive or possible and impossible action at the same time.) To provide a justification for the above three defining criteria in a structural framework lies outside the scope of the present paper. The question now is how this classification scheme re­ lates to the classification of verbs into transitive and in­ transitive. Does the latter dichotomy represent a sepa­ rate classificatory criterion? Let us assume for a moment that it does. Let us now first classify verbs according to voice types, say, into the classes that are familiar from Hungarian grammars; active, passive, causative and reflexive verbs. Active verbs should further be divided into active transitive and active intransitive verbs, because this guaran­ tees the unity of the defining criterion (relationship of the action to its agent and its object) and because transitive and intransitive verbs bear distinct relations to the rest of verbs. The classification is now based on the syntactic criterion of whether the verb can co-occur with an object in the accusative case or not. It is clear that this criterion (footnote 1 continued)

188

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

sitive or intransitive verbs. The function of the verba potentiale is of a modal-pragmatic character. Essentially the above categories are equally valid for Hungarian. 1.2. A synchronic study of verbal derivational suffixes in­ volves the following tasks. 1.2.1. Grammatical analysis will comprise (a) the sorting out the derivational suffixes that are closely related; (b) the analysis of the subsystems (i) distributionally, by examining the contexts in which the derived and non-derived forms occur, (footnote 1 continued) will yield sub-classes that never in­ tersect (voice types) . Passive and reflexive verbs are always intransitive, causatives are always transitive. It is thus reasonable to classify verbs according to both the criteria I have suggested and the transitive-intransitive distinction. The classificatory criterion that is based on the cate­ gory of voice can be defined following Guxman (1964:8) who speaks of centrifugal and centripetal oppositions. In the first case, the action is directed outward from the subject (tran­ sitivity) , in the second case from outside towards the object (passive meaning). The terminology indicates the relationship on which the classification is based. We shall return to this relationship later on. 2 The term 'voice' "refers to the active and passive 'forms' of the verb (The traditional Latin term for this... sense was species or genus ...) The traditional Greek term for 'voice' as a category of the verb was diathesis 'state', 'disposition', 'function', etc., and some linguists prefer to use 'diathesis', rather than 'voice', in this sense of the term." (Lyons 1968: 372.) 3 The verbal derivational suffixes of Hungarian were first treated by Majtinskaja (1959: 243-8) as part of a compre­ hensive analysis of the whole system of word derivation.

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN 189 (ii) transformationally, by analysing the synonymy relations that obtain between the derived and the corresponding nonderived forms, and (iii) morphophonemically; (c) the analysis of the interrelation between the various subsystems, the linear combinatory possibilities of the various derivational suffixes and their order; the examination of the morphological properties arising from the combination of suffixes. Early Hungarian grammarians, from Istvan Geleji Katona (1645) to Miklós Révai (1803-6), interpreted language in a far more generative way than later grammarians have done in the sense that they did not limit their inquiries to finding out what was given by corpora but sought to discover possible forms as well. They set up an elaborate combinatory system for deriva­ tional suffixes. For example, György Komáromi Tsipkés (1655) established as many as 80 verb forms by means of a systematic combination of six derivational suffixes (-hat, -het, causative, passive, medial, reflexive and iterative suffixes), though he did not consider variations in person, tense and mood. Révai established 17 basic types out of iterative, instantaneous, reflexive and denominal derivational suffixes, with each type having five further derivations by means of causative, potential, passive, causative + potential, and passive + potential derivational suffixes. This amounted to 105 verb forms alto­ gether. However, it is certainly an exaggeration to regard the system of Hungarian verb derivation as revealing such a high level of grammaticality. The following points should be noted. (1) Verbal derivational suffixes show a much higher degree of grammatical regularity and productivity than what one would gather from The Explanatory Dictionary of the Hun­ garian Language. In this dictionary the selection of lexical entries was based on frequency considerations, hence derived forms such as trombital-tat (fact.) 'let trumpet', dajkál-tat (fact.) 'vt. nurse' which are rare but entirely regular and

190

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

usable forms, were excluded; (2) the three groups of verbal derivational suffixes mentioned above actually do fulfill grammatical roles, though the productivity of certain deriva­ tional suffixes is limited. As regards grammatical produc­ tivity, -HAT, -AT and -GAT are entirely regular derivational suffixes, -ATIK is passing out of use but continues to be entirely productive and -ÓDIK is on the rise. 1.2.2. Semantic analysis. In connection with derived words, it is always important to find out whether a given deriva­ tional suffix has any specific meaning which would bring about a change of meaning of the whole derived word. By means of this change of meaning the derived word emerges as a new lexical item. In the present study we shall not be concerned with this problem, however. 1.2.3. Stylistic analysis. Both grammatical and semantic anal­ ysis of derivational suffixes will lead to a systematic pres­ entation of semantic differences in distribution and function which obtain between derived words and the corresponding syntagms, between sentences with derived words and those with no such words, and between derived and non-derived words. 2.1. Transitive and intransitive verbs can be ordered accord4 ing to degrees of transitivity. (See Appendix I.) First in

The expression "degrees of transitivity" is of course not intended to mean various degrees to which the verb may take an object in the accusative case. The concepts which I have in mind here can perhaps better be expressed by the terms 'centripetal' and 'centrifugal'. The stages termed 'transitive verbs', verbs with semantic objects and verbs of outward direction reflect, in this order, an increasingly wider, more general interpretation of the transitive, centrifugal char­ acter of verbs. Notice furthermore that phrases like gondol vaiamit 'think sg', and gondol valamire 'think of sg' are (footnote 4 continued)

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN 191 order is the passive verb which is characterized by a total lack of transitivity, while on the other end we find purely transitive verbs. One group can be transformed into the other: Erzsi mossa a ruhát 'Elsie washes the dress' (*) A ruha mosatik Erzsi aitai 'The dress is washed by Elsie'. (The passive verb form, which is always a derived form, is now becoming obsolete, hence sentences containing such passive verb forms are accept­ ed by Hungarian speakers with reluctance only; this is what the asterisk is meant to indicate.) The rest of the verb forms between passive and purely transitive verb forms can be ar­ ranged hierarchically with binary divisions. Thus, passive (footnote 4 continued) related with respect to centrifugality. Riedl (1864) also noticing this outward direction, called such verbs 'object verbs'. I am not aware of any other attempt to classify verbs in terms of this dichotomy, however. The term ' inward direction ' (Hung. bennható) was used to refer to a sub-class of intransitive verbs in the work A magyar nyelv rendszere ['The System of the Hungarian Language'], published in 1846, and in Jozsef Szvorényi's grammar (1864). The terms 'active, acting, action' were used by Albert Szenczi Molnar, (1610), Miklos Rêvai (1803-6) and Szende Riedl (1864) with respect to transitive verbs. 5 On the left-hand side we find a verb class to which a group of verb classes corresponds on the right-hand side. This group is then further sub-classified. The interdependence of the categories is indicated by the arrows on the left-hand side of Appendix I. Ruong (19 43) attempted to organize intransitive-tran­ sitive derivational suffixes without using hierarchic binary divisions. He allocated the categories of 'voice' and 'as­ pect' along the same dimension.

192

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

verb forms can be contrasted with nonpassive forms. These forms can be split up into a middle (medio-passive) and an active group. The majority of middle verbs are derived; there is only a handful of nonderived forms such as fagy 'freeze1 or híz-ik 'grow in weight' with the ending -ik. The derived verbs are either denominal such as sarg-ul 'become yellow', dombor-odik 'vi. bulge' or deverbal, e.g., csavar-odik 'vi. turn', bemocskol-ódik 'vi. soil'. Quite a few verbs are derived directly from roots, e.g., fak-ad 'vi. spring (forth)', szor-ul 'be squeezed into'. This category closely resembles the category of passives, but in the former action is conceived of as occurring without an agent. (Cf. Komáromi's remark on ver-ődöm 'beat against sg' : "verberor sine verberante exter­ no" .) The passive character of middle verbs is also shown by the fact that they can nearly always co-occur with an adverb ending in -töl 'by'. The category at hand includes verbs where the relation between the stem and the suffix contains some passive element, e.g., bemocskol-ódik 'vi. soil', that is, some­ thing is being made dirty, and verbs where the action is not initiated by some external agent but comes about by itself. Notice, however, that these verbs are not genuine reflexive verbs, cf. for example regenerál-ódik 'vi. regenerate'. This latter group contains fewer verbs, however. Active verbs can be verbs of inward direction (cf. (3)) and verbs with a no­ tional object. Verbs of inward direction ( Hung, bennhato igék) do not have semantic object. Naturally, these verbs cannot have an accusative object either. Verbs of inward direction are either nonderived, for instance, sétál 'walk', mozog 'move'; or derived. If derived they can be either de­ nominal, eg. ügyes-kedik 'show oneself to be clever, fukarkodik 'be miserly', ügyvéd-eskedik 'be a lawyer', or deverbal. The latter include either verbs directed at some external object, e.g., hurcol-kodik 'vi. move', rak-odik 'load', épitkezik 'vi. have a house built', locsol-kodik 'vi. sprinkle', árul-kodik 'play the informer', or those with a reflexive ele-

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN

19 3

ment, e.g., belop-ódzkodik 'steals himself in', von-akodik 'refuse to do sg', fur-akodik 'push', alkalmaz-kodik accom­ modate oneself'. There is no adverb which would exhibit a cooccurence relation with verbs of type (3). Verbs which contain semantic objects express the fact that the action is directed at some object. In the case of reflexive verbs (cf. (4)) this object is identical with the subject of the action itself. Hun­ garian has relatively few genuine reflexive verbs, here belong mos-akodik 'wash oneself', fésül-ködik 'comb oneself', véd-ekezik 'defend oneself', aláz-kodik 'humiliate oneself'. The derivational morpheme is usually equivalent to the reflexive pronoun magát 'oneself'. Ferenc Verseghy (1818) and Szende Riedl (1864) would consider transitive verbs with reflexive pronouns such as szereti magát 'he likes himself' , jól érzi magát 'he feels quite well' to be reflexive verbs. The remaining verbs with se­ mantic objects are made up of verbs of outward direction, i.e. where the action is oriented at some external object. This feature is not manifest yet in its pure form in the case of reciprocal verbs (cf.(5)), which express the mutual charac­ ter of the action. These verb forms are situated halfway, as it were, between passive and transitive verb forms because the action denoted is directed at an external object and at the same time at the (external) agent itself. They co-occur with adverbs ending in -val, -vel 'with' or they can be com­ plemented with the pronoun egymást 'each other', e.g., marakodik 'quarrel', pofoz-kodik 'box one another on the ear', ismer-kedik 'make acquaintances', ver-ekedik 'fight', perlekedik 'litigate' valakivel 'with sy'. They are all derived words and relatively few in number. The rest of the verbs express pure outward direction. They can be transitive verbs, that is verbs with an object in the accusative case and in­ transitive verbs with outward orientation (cf. (6)). With such verbs the accusative case is replaced by some adverbial in-

19 4

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

flectional suffix, e.g., gondol-kodik valamin 'speculate on sg', csodál-kodik valamin 'wonder at sg', seg-it valakin 'help sy' emlék-szik valamire 'remember sg'. Transitive verbs can be subdivided according to whether the action is directed at the object directly or not. If the object is indirectly involved, that is, if the subject of the sentence gets the action done by somebody else, then we have to do with factitive verbs (cf. (7)). Here the object can be either active or pas­ sive depending on whether the verb is derived from a transitive or an intransitive verb, for example, hiz-lal (caus.) -tat (fact.) 'let fatten', sétál-tat (caus.) -tat (fact.) 'let take out for a walk' and also ir-at(fact.) 'have written sg'. If the object is directly involved, it can be active or passive. An active and directly involved object corresponds to the subject of an active sentence. This feature characterizes causative verbs (cf.(8)). Pure transitive verbs have passive, directly involved objects (cf. (9)). Sentences containing a pure transitive verb can be transformed into passive sentences: transitive verbs thus may become passive verbs. 2.2. The nine categories listed above behave differently as regards transformational derivation as well. The initial sen­ tence contains a verb without any derivational morphemes, the latter being added in the course of transformations. The trans­ formations are wholly syntactical in character since only relational elements undergo changes and content words are never deleted. Although the initial sentence underlying fac­ titive verbs would generally contain expressions such as

The transformational rules given below have been set up ac­ cording to the following principles: (1) we take sentence structure; (2) this sentence structure consists of ele­ mentary class symbols connected with relational symbols; (3) elementary class symbols (N, V) correspond to basic parts of speech, while relational symbols represent inflectional suffixes (t, n, val etc., i.e. case suffixes) or derivational morphemes ( V ; at, kodik, etc.). (footnote 6 continued)

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN 195 parancsàra 'on sb's order', feIsζ6litasara 'on sb's demand', megbizàsàbòl 'on sb's authority', meghagyàsâbol 'on behalf of sb' and the sentence underlying causative verbs expressions such as közremüködèsèvel 'by the agency of sb', segitsëgèvel 'with his help', hatàsâra 'under his influence' or words which can sometimes be replaced by the inflectional ending -tol, -tol 'by' or the postposition aitai 'by' which are all deleted in the course of transformations, these elements or expressions may be conceived of as performing purely grammatical functions. The semantic specialization of the derived word constitutes an additional process. Transformations 1 9 —> Ί : N

2 + V + N

—>

Erzsi mossa a ruhat —> 'Elsie washes the dress' (x) A ruha mos-atik (Erzsi ai­ tai) 'The dress is washed by Elsie'

(footnote 6 continued) Following Uriel Weinreich (1963; 116), symbols denoting basic parts of speech can be called des­ ignators (classes of content words) and those denoting rela­ tional elements formators. Syntactic formators always indicate a relation between two designators (syntagmatic relation). -(4) The operation of transformations is subject to the following conditions: (a) any given structure is changed without the des­ ignators undergoing any change. (b) Formators do undergo changes (deletion, substitution, permutation). (c) It is required that if two designators are related in the initial structure, they must also be related in the resulting trans­ formed structure, that is, they must be connected by formators. (d) The way formators can change structures is also determined. Whenever necessary, formators may be rewritten as free mor­ phemes or zero morphemes. In order to simplify notation the formators of the subject and the predicate have been ommitted

196

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

9 → 2 : Ν 1 + V + Ν 2 —►

Α sar bemocskolja a runát — > 'The mud makes dirty the dress' A ruha bemocskol-ódik (a sártól) 'The dress is made dirty by the mud' Péter fogy a fürdéstől —> 'Peter loses weight by bathing'

2 2 ~ 3 → 8 : Ν 1 + V + Ν tól —>

N1 + VV'

Ν2

+

8→1 : N1 + VV'tat + N2t —>

9—>7 : N1 + V + N2t +

3 pNa r . →

2 N 3 + VV' at + N t +

8—>7: N1 +

N3 +

9—>3 : N1 + N1 +

Ν1 val

Α füérds fogy-asztja Pétert 'Bath makes Peter lose weight' Az apa sétál-tatja a fiat —> Father makes his son walk' (x) A fiú sétál-tat-tatik (az apja aitai) 'The son is made walk by his father' K l á r i mossa az e d é n y t az a n y j a → parancsára 'Clare washes up the dishes on the order of her mother' Az anya mos-atja az edenyt

Klárival 'The mother makes Clare wash up the dishes' 2 3 —> Panna híz-lalja a disznót a szomVV' lal + Nt + Nmegb széd megbizásábol — > 'Annie fattens the porc on behalf of the neighbour' VV' V' + N2 + Ν 1 A szomszéd hiz-lal-tatja a lal tat t val disznót Pannával 'The neighbour lets fatten the pore by Annie' V + vmit/vkit—> A csősz gyaláz valamit/valakit → 'The park-keeper abuses sg (sy)' VV' + ø A c s s z gyalázkodik kodik 'The park-keeper uses abusive language'

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN 19 7

9 →4: Ν1 + V + magát Ν1 +

VV' + kodik

→

A vádlott védi magát

ø

'The accused defends himself' Α vadlott ved-ekezik

→

'The accused defends himself' 9 → 5 : N + N +VV'+ egymást→ Péter és Pál veri egymást → 'Peter and Paul are beating each other' 1 VV' Péter és Pál ver-ekednek N + N2 + kod-nak 'Peter and Paul are beating each other up' 9 → 5 : N1 + V + N2t Péter veri Palt → 'Peter is beating Paul' → 2 1 N + V + Nt Pál veri Pétert 'Paul is beating Peter' N 1 + VV'kodik + Ν2val Péter ver-ekedik Pállal 'Peter is fighting with Paul' N2 + VV' + Ν1 Pál ver-ekedik Peterrel kodik val 'Paul is fighting with Peter' 1 2 9→6 : N + V + Nt Az orvos szánja a beteget → 'The doctor pities the patient' 1 2 N + VV' + N Az orvos szán-akozik a betegen kodik on 'The doctor feels pity for the patient' As to the use of symbols: N = noun; V = verb; V' = verbal derivational suffix; (x) denotes a sentence which is not gen­ erally accepted. It should also be noted that one suffixal form has been chosen to represent all other forms within a given group, thus -at. represents -aszt, -kodik, -kozik, etc., as well. For the sake of simplicity, parts of speech categories are only represented by the relative order of the constituents. At this point it seems to be worthwhile to comment on the van -va, -ve construction. We shall abstain from a precise formulation of the relevant rules, however and shall be con­ tent with some examples. Notice that content words can be in­ terpreted as standing for word classes. 1

2

198

Type 9

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 1. Megírták a levelet. → A level meg van írva. 'The letter has been written.'

2. Megnézték a levelet.→ X A levél meg van nézve. 'The letter has been regarded.' Type 2 3. A ruha bemocskolódott.→ A ruha be van mocskolódva. 'The dress was made dirty.' 'The dress is dirty.' The relevant transformational rules can be defined in the fol­ lowing way: The adverbial participle can be derived from Type 9 (pure transitive) verbs as well as from middle verbs (Type 2 ) . It should be made clear, however, that this derivation is possible only if the subject of the verb of Type 9 is in­ definite, if the verbs are perfective and if the meaning of the verb makes it clear that the action has brought about a change in the state of the object. This last constraint suggests that the traditional division of objects into objects of result and directional objects is not sufficient. Direc­ tional objects must further be divided into objects undergoing change and unchanging objects. In line with the threefold division of objects, transitive verbs too, can be divided into creative, change-causing and directional verbs. Only the first two types play a rôle in the derivation of the adverbial participle, that is, only objects of result and objects under­ going change are involved in this process. The transformations adduced above clearly show that various verb classes are defined on the basis of the relationship between verb and subject and verb and object. It is important to emphasize this point because one often encounters defini­ tions of verb classes in which there is a complete lack of re­ ference to the role of subjects and/or objects. 2.3. The nine verb categories listed above are not on a par 7 In the present paper we are not concerned with the question of how the pairs of transformations listed above have been replaced by each other in the course of the history of the language.

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN 199 with respect to productivity. The categories 9→1 , 9→7, as well as 2 → 8 and 3 → 8 are fully productive, that is, they can with few limitations be derived from any sentence containing the base word. Concerning the derivation of the remaining intransitive categories, there is no general rule covering every verb; thus, from the sentence Péter fésüli magát 'Peter combs himself' one can derive Peter fèsülködik 'idem' (N + V + magát→Ν + VV' ) , but from the sentence Péter tr intr nézi magát 'Peter looks at himself' no sentence Peter nézekedik or the like can be formed without creating nonsense sentences. (The sentence Péter trombitá-1-tatja Jánost 'Peter let rumpet John' is at most unusual but is quite sensible.) The same applies to the transformations 9 → 3 , 9→5 9→2

and 9 → 6 . The derivational suffix -ódik of category is currently turning into a full-fledged productive

suffix, as in mechanizál-òdik 'is mechanized', akklimatizálódik 'get acclimatized'. In the less productive categories semantic specialisation is the rule. In such cases the dif­ ference in meaning between the sentence containing the base word and the one with the derived word cannot be expressed by a transformational rule alone, because there are other semantic differences between them as well. The difference between épít

'build' (houses) and épít-kezik 'have a house

build' is not only that the latter is intransitive but also that the derived word refers to a building activity of a larger scale stretching over a longer period of time. Hun­ garian intransitive deverbal verbs tend to take on a more or less specialised shade of meaning, e.g. árul-kodik 'play the informer' versus (el)àrul 'betray'. This example is in­ teresting from quite a few points of view . (1) The earlier 1 2 semantic difference (polisemy) between árul 'sell' and árul 'betray' disappeared, the latter meaning has been taken over by the preverb.(Earlier phrases such as halálra árul, literal­ ly 'betray sy to death', and marháját elárulja 'he sells his ox' were quite current) (2) The form àrul-kodik 'play the in2 former' can be derived from árul 'betray' only. (3) Once the semantic difference between árulkodik and el- or beárul

200

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

must have been of a purely grammatical character (cf. His­ torical Dictionary of Hungarian), whereas today the meaning of árul-kodik contains some mitigating element (it denotes an action that falls under a more lenient moral evaluation). (4) The derivational suffixes whose role is predominantly grammatical are not uniformly productive either as regards the particular meanings of a polisemous word. Arul1 'sell' is currently in a transitory stage between full use and ob­ solescence, being increasingly replaced by árus-it (suff. verbal); its derived forms árul-ó (suff. nominal), and árulás (suff. nominal) are in a further stage of this develop­ ment: they mostly occur with the meaning 'betray', while their use with the meaning 'sell' is replaced by the forms aru-s (suff. nominal) and árus-it (suff. verbal)-as (suff. nominal). This example is particularly well suited to show the importance of idiosyncratic developments. It is by no means accidental that in Hungarian the specialis­ ing role of transitive deverbal suffixes is far more limited than that of transitive suffixes. Hungarian, with a lexical base which tends toward intransitivity (see below), is more productive in the intransitive→transitive direction than the other way around both as regards grammatical function and morphological structure (causation is expressed mostly by a derivational suffix containing t) . This fact points to a more general rule: The higher grammatical productivity a given derivational suffix has, the less it will exhibit semantic specialisation and vice versa. That is why the specialising rôle of transitive (causative) derivational suffixes is much less marked than that of intransitive suffixes. Sometimes the two uses exist side by side: Talicskát tolat a fiúval .

-

'He makes the boy shove a barrow' A mozdony tolat 'The engine shunts'. Appendix II sums up the various forms of the derivation of voice types in a systematic way. Three types of lines (—, -.-, - -) refer to three types of transformation. To make the discrimination of transformational types more acces-

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN

201

sible this appendix also contains a simplified form of the transformational rules. Nouns occurring in the sentences are identified with indices on N.

2.4. When treating derivational suffixes of voice types Hun­ garian grammarians tend to commit the following two mistakes. (1) They blur the distinctions between three different deriva­ tional suffixes

(modal, aspectual and voice suffixes) which

stand in opposition to each other, and they fail to give a structural analysis of the features which distinguish them. (2) When positing subcategories they do not distinguish bet­ ween productive grammatical categories and semantic

specializa­

tion. 2.4.1. A mistake of the first kind is also committed when one fails to realise the close interconnection between the tran­ sitive-intransitive opposition and the category of voice. The transitive-intransitive opposition and the categories of voice type

(active, passive, causative, etc.) are actually not

independent characteristics of the verb b u t , as a careful study of the structure of the language reveals, transitivity rather constitutes an essential defining property of the category of voice. This is how it was looked upon by early Hungarian grammarians, w h o , when positing the three cate­ gories: active, middle and passive, associated active verbs with transitivity, middle verbs with intransitivity and consi­ dered passive verbs as constituting a third category

(evidendly

on the basis of Greek grammars). Notice that this old conception amounts to a transformational approach to verb classification in so far as passive is re­ garded as derived from active, while the middle or neutral form is defined by the fact that it cannot have a passive form.

(Cf. Albert Szenczi Molnar's grammar

Molnar to Szende Riedl and József Szvorényi

(1610)). From Albert (1864), verbs were

classified in terms of activity, middleness and passivity. It should be pointed out, however, that these categories were

202

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

often complemented by the categories iterative, instantaneous and modal (verba potentiale) without any further qualification. Nevertheless, as regards voice types, their approach was basically sound. As shown in Appendix I, in accordance with this tradition, I too consider passive and transitive verbs as the two extreme points between which the various types of intransitive verbs are situated. The approach taken by Zsigmond Simonyi (1869) and József Szinnyei, ( 1896) , presumably under the influence of German, brought about a radical turn in the classification of verb types since, as we shall see shortly, this change amounted to the adoption of the approach of German grammarians. From this time onwards the intransi­ tive, middle or neutral category was referred to as "reflex­ ive", that is, grammarians employed a category label which had been a subcategory in earlier tradition. This terminologi­ cal change affected the whole conception: intransitive derived verbs were classified in terms of reflexivity with the result that a new category, that of pseudo-reflexivity, had to be created. This terminological change yielded an ironic consequence: the majority of reflexive verbs had to be down-graded to pseudoreflexives, consequently the defining term which gave name to the whole category applied only to a négligeable number of verbs be­ longing to that class. This new conception has had a negative influence on Hungarian grammatical writing ever since, for it gives a distorted picture of the existing relations in the language. In German intransitive verbs are derived with the help of the reflexive pronoun sich, therefore these verbs are always more or less related to reflexive verbs, although, of course, the majority of the intransitive verbs derived with "sich" do not express 'genuine' reflexivity. Sich has two functions in German: it is a genuine reflexive pronoun

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN 20 3 as in Ich sehe mich and it is a syntactic marker for intran­ sitive verbs as in Ich freue mich/ Ich bewege mich. (Cf. M.M. Guxman 1964 :207-14.) The situation is similar although not exactly the same, in Russian. It should be made clear that the Hungarian intran­ sitive derivational suffixes have a function which can hardly be related to reflexive verbs because they express pure in­ transitivity and, in categories 3 and 6, covert and overt outward direction, respectively. Even in category 2 there is some latent passivity involved in the majority of cases, that is, rather than being directed at itself from within, the action is brought about by some external factor. Histo­ rically, the question is more complicated because the va­ rious functions of intransitive verbs could arise indirect­ ly from the reflexive function through multiple analogies. And, since in Hungarian the passive verb form developed not from the reflexive but from the factitive, the medio-passive or middle-form (Tyne 2) need not derived from the reflexive either. 2.4.2. Failure to distinguish grammatical function from specialization leads to spurious assignments of subtypes. The nine verb types presented in Appendix I differ from each other in their syntactic environment as well as in deriva­ tional history. At the same time, however, the difference between the base word and the derived word in the case of these types does not necessarily involve any semantic speciali­ zation. In other words, from the meaning of the base word and the transformational rule we will automatically know the mean­ ing of the derived word and its use in the sentence. If the difference between the base and derived words involves some­ thing in addition to this grammatical difference, then it should be attributed to specialization. Even if found with several derivational suffixes, this specialization cannot

204

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

yield categories which would be on an equal level with the nine sub-types. Much confusion surrounds the "pseudo-factitive" and "pseudo-reflexive" verb types. In his Hungarian Comparative Grammar Szinnyei distinguishes two types of pseudo-factitives: those with a meaning involving permission for the action to take place such as kicsúsz-tat 'vt. slip /out/', rászed-et 'let deceive', szid-at 'let chide', and those which are reports of an action e.g. fájd-it 'complain of pain in sg.', hal-at 'vt. die'. These categories and examples are taken over by the grammar. In The System of. Present-Day Hungarian only the last two examples are replaced by hibaz-tat 'blame' and szarmaz-tat 'vt. originate', respectively. It is clear that these examples were assigned to different groups because they involve some spe­ cialized meaning, but they belong to one of the verb categor­ ies of 1 → 9 , namely, kicsusz-tat to 2 →8, szid-at to 9→7 , hibáz-tat to 3 → 8 etc. To remain with Szinnyei's work, the author distinguishes the following sub-types within pseudoreflexives: (1) pseudo-passives elad-odik 'is sold'; (2)(a) verbs expressing mutuality ver-ekedik 'fight'; (b) iteration, duration dobál-ódzik 'keep throwing', biz-akodik 'have con­ fidence in'; (c) inchoativity lehever-edik 'lie down at full length', megfájd-ul 'begin to hurt'; (d) instantaneous action ford-ul 'turn'. Hence it is an extraordinarily heterogeneous group. It includes our groups 9 → 2 (elad-ódik) , 9 → 5 (ver(dobál-ódzik) and dispersed into three groups ekedik) , 9 → 3 we find transitive verbs whose base is intransitive (bizakodik , megfájd-ul) or verbs which are derived from a root: ford-ul. The "pseudo" -character of the former is terminologically motivated, as we saw earlier, while the latter do not form a separate class. In the case of iterative, inchoative and instantaneous verbs the derivational suffixes mark off a sub-type of the category of aspect. They should be regarded as underived words, hence they belong to the intransitive

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN 20 5 categories of 2 or 3. The reason for this confusion is that categories like causation, reflexivity were interpreted ac­ cording to the etymological meaning of causation, reflexivity and not as they should be, i.e. as grammatical categories es­ tablished on the basis of the structural behaviour of the elements they include. Recent structural analysis thus shows closer affiliation with the views of early grammarians than with subsequent traditions. 3. The rest of this paper will be devoted to questions concern­ ing the history of transitive-intransitive derivational suf­ fixes. I shall attempt to set down the tendencies that are sug­ gested by the historical evidences available on the Hungarian language. Some comparison will be made with certain Uralic lan­ guages as well. Our discussion will be far from exhaustive for that period for which there is extant documentation. Concern­ ing the time which precedes documantation we will of course have to confine ourselves to mere hypotheses. 3.1. The present voice types mostly exhibit a single paradigm, that is to say, all transitive and intransitive derivational suffixes occupy the same position in the morphological structure of verbs. This is similar to the behaviour of personal endings or mood markers: they can be replaced by each other, but they cannot follow each other. (Cf. A Grammar of the Vienna Codex, 20) The qualification "mostly" was used because sometimes one comes across types 8 → 7 and 8 → 1 as well, e.g., fogy-aszt-(caus.) -at (fact.), sétál-tat (caus.) -tatik (pass.). In former times two or more paradigms were more frequent: híz-lal(caus.)tat(fact.)-tatik(pass.) 'let to be fattened', fogy-at(caus.)koz(intr.)-tat(caus.) 'use up', csal-at(caus.)-koz-(intr.)-tat (caus.) 'make suffer disappointment', valtoz-tat(caus.)-tatik (pass.) 'let to be changed'; for denominal verbs cf. alkalmatlan-kod(intr.)-tat(fact.) 'let inconvenience', ézes-ül(intr.-

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

206

-tet(caus.)-tetik(pass.) 'let to be sweetened'. Sometimes derivational suffixes of opposite meanings (transitive and intransitive) neutralise each other, as in fogy 'lessen' = = fogy-at(caus.)-kozik(intr.) 'lessen', fogyaszt 'use up' = = fogy-at(caus.)-koz(intr.)-tat(caus.) 'use up'. Words whose syntactic structure is different but which essentially have the same meaning constitute one of the sources for synonyms (fogy fogy-at(caus.)-kozik(intr.), arch, vált and vált-oz (intr.)-tat(caus.) but they can also give rise, through semantic differentiation, to new words, though perhaps only in the case of certain derivations, cf. mod, valt 'vt. change' and vált-oz(intr.)-tat(caus.) 'vt. change', válik 'separate (from)' and vál-t(caus.)-ozik(intr.) 'vi. change', fogyás and fogy-at(caus.)-koz(intr.)-as 'shortcoming/fault' (cf. also holdfogyatkozás 'lunar eclipse'). The process of diminishing paradigm systems squares well with the general tendency reflected by the diminishing use of derivational suffixes in general. 1. The most prevalent present-day system of voice type paradigms (1)

Stem i

+ (der.

suff.caus.

)

sétál + (tat)

(2) Stem tr + (der. suff.fact. )

ír

+ (at)

(3) Stem tr + (der. suff.i ) (4) Root + der. suff.i. (5) Root + der. suff.tr. + (der. suff. f a c t . )

mocskol+ fak + ad fak + aszt + (at)

2. The voice type paradigms formerly in use: (1)

Stem i

+ (der. suff.

(2)

Stemi

+

(3)

Stem. +

s

caus. é t

)

sétál á

l

+ (tat) +

setal +

]

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN 20 7 (4) Stemtr + (5) Root + der.suff.i +

kapar + (der.suff.caus·

)

fak + ad + (tat)

1. and 2. are depicted in Appendix III. 3.2. Hungarian belongs to the so-called double (transitive and intransitive) base languages, that is, it has a fully develeoped derivational system in both directions. This fea­ ture is particularly evident in verbs formed from common roots (rep-ül 'vi. fly'~ rep-ít 'vt.let fly'), (fak-ad 'vi. spring (forth)'~ fak-aszt 'vt. cause to spring (forth)') and with denominal verbs, such as szép-ül 'vi.grow more beautiful' ~ szép-ít 'vt. beautify', bátor-odik 'vi. take courage'~ bátorit 'vt. encourage', fehér-edik 'vi. whiten'~ fehér-ül 'vi. whiten' ~ fehér-ít 'vt. whiten'. With respect to the transitiveintransitive distinction denominal verbs should be regarded as roots because they are neutral with respect to this distinco

tion in the same way as verbal roots are.

8 Double base verb stems formed from common roots / rep-ül 'fly'~ ~ rep-it 'let fly'/ arose on the analogy of productive derived verbs with stems such as forr 'heal(over)': forr-ad 'heal(over)' ~ forr-aszt 'solder'; él 'live': él-ed 'vi. revive'~ el-eszt 'vt. revive', d was originally an iterative suffix and so was probably l. T in the transitive pairs is an ancient FinnoUgric causative suffix that can already be abundantly encountered in the earliest Hungarian texts, e.g., terem-t 'create', men-t 'save', ég-et 'vt. burn' kel-t 'wake /up/', arch, az-t 'vt. soak', szül-et 'bear', arch, iml-et 'give suck', ill-et 'concern /sy sg/'. Sz_ was probably an iterative suffix which was mostly used to form opposition such as nyug-oszik 'vi.rest', sér-eszik 'be injured', til-oszik' is prohibited', al-szik 'sleep', fek-szik 'lie' with causative suffixes nyug-tat 'vt. (footnote 8 continued)

208

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(footnote 8 continued) rest'~ arch, nyug-at 'idem', sér-t 'injure', til-t 'prohibit', al-tat 'make sleep', fek-tet 'put / to bed / '~ arch. fek-et, although sometimes t can be added to sz, as in nyug-oszt 'vt. rest' , vig-aszt 'make merry'. Furthermore, it seems plausible to assume that the ending szt originally arose on the analogy of words ending in sz taking the suffix szt, whereby the iterative suffixes l or d were used to derive intransitive forms: osz-t 'vt. divide'~ osz-ol 'get divided', fosz-t 'vt. strip' fosz-ol 'vi. fray'; the formation of szt as a single derivational suffix was perhaps facilitated by verbs whose intransitive form was derived by means of the suffix d. In such cases the opposition between d and t was phonetically not distinct enough, e.g. el-ed 'vi. revive': él-et 'vt. revive'; fak-ad 'vi. spring / forth /': fak-at 'cause to spring / forth /'; ar-ad 'vi.flood': ár-at 'vt. flood'; szár-ad 'vi. dry': szár-at 'vt. dry'. As a con­ sequence in several phonetic positions the difference between the two forms was blurred, e.g., before -n_i, -va, -ve, -na, -ne, -nak, -nek, the past tense suffix t and even in cases where complete assimilation did not take place. Besides -szt, other derivational suffixes could also be used to maintain the original distinction; causative suf­ fixes included -jt, -lal and -tat. Where both -at and -aszt exist side by side -at is often the older form cf. fogy-at 'use up' and fogy-aszt 'idem'. The variety of causative suf­ fixes also gave rise to synonyms and words with new meanings, cf· fog-at 'have sy catch sg' and fog-lal Occupy', él-eszt 'vt. revive' and él-tet 'keep alive'. Therefore the originally iterative suffixes d and 1 combined with some variant of the causative t also assumed the function of the transitive-in­ transitive opposition and constituted a source for a great number of new words, often with onomatopoetic stems. As regards adjectives, the suffixes -od and -u_l stand in opposi­ tion to -ít which stems from -t. The transitive-intransitive (footnote 8 continued)

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN

209

The double base with common roots provides equal possibilities for both transitive and intransitive verbs. This is particu­ larly true of denominal derivations, which, like deverbal verbs, belong to the system of transitive-intransitive verbs. This high degree of grammaticalization of denominal verbs is an in­ teresting feature of Hungarian, which assures the concise (syn­ thetic) character of the language. Cf., e.g., pairs such as szépül : szép-ít, and pairs of intransitive verbs such as okos-odik 'become prudent 1 : okos-kodik 'reason'. Almost all adjectives denoting mental processes or character features have two cor­ responding intransitive verbal forms, one representing Type 2, the other Type 3. In addition, denominal verbs have become completely productive in Category 3 with respect to a certain semantic field, e.g. ügyvéd-eskedik 'practise law', tanar-oskodik 'teach (in school). All these features show the promi­ nence of verbs in Hungarian and the double base - character of the language. We have to do with a transitive base if, instead of having the possibility of parallel derivations like gazdag-ul: gazdag-odik 'become rich', the nominal root gives rise to a transitive verb from which then an intransitive verb is formed, e.g. Russian obogascat' 'vt. enrich' →obogaščat'sja 'vi.get rich' or if the intransitive verb is derived anal­ ytically: German bereichern→ sich bereichern. (footnote 8 continued) opposition has become the most gramma­ tically regular and productive opposition with adjectives. That is why oppositions like -ad.: -asz ;-ul : ít, etc., once became established. It is thus incorrect to consider intran­ sitive suffixes as iterative suffixes as most Hungarian gram­ mars do. The fact that intransitivity is in a way related to iteration is a different matter, which will be discussed below. Here we are dealing with a secondary, accompanying feature of intransitive suffixes only.

210

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Apart from the case of parallel derivations from a common root, such verbs can best be given in the form of a list for they can no longer be regarded as productive, there are other cases which point to a double base. There are intransitive verbal roots to which a transitive derivational suffix can be added, and transitive roots with intransitive suffixes, as we saw above. Particularly interesting features of this double base can be observed with cases where the same concept is expressed in two ways, by an intransitive root or by the combination of a transitive root and an intransitive suffix. Consider the following examples: hull 'fall' = szóródik 'vi. sprinkle', szór 'vt. sprinkle' = hull-ajt 'let sg fall', kopik 'vi. wear off' = nyüv-odik 'is worn down', nyu 'wear down' = kop-tat ' vt. wear off', jut 'come (to)' = adatik 'is given' , ad 'give' = jut-tat 'get (sg)to' , sometimes such correspondences are incomplete, eg.g. visz 'carry' = száll-ít 'carry' but száll 'fly' has no corresponding form derived from visz 'carry' except in very limited contexts, eszik 'eat' = fogy-aszt 'use up' but fogy 'lessen' ≠ evődik 'is eaten'. Cases involving verbs derived from roots also include nyel 'swallow' = csusz-tat 'let slip', csuszik 'vi.slip'= nyel-odik 'is swallowed', önt 'pour' = foly-at 'let flow', folyik 'flow' = öm-lik 'flow', tesz 'do, make' = all-it 'vt. stand', nyom 'press' = hátral-tat 'hinder', küld 'send' = meneszt 'let go', szúr 'prick' = lyuk-aszt 'vt. make a hole', szúr-ódik 'is pricked' = lyuk-ad 'vi.get holed', dob 'throw' = rep-it 'vt. let fly', vet-odik 'throw oneself' = rep-ül 'vi. fly', süt 'shines (sun)' = meleg-ít 'warm'. As it appears from these examples, one of the members often carries a figurative meaning. It is often the case that parallel expressions evidence semantic differentiation. The correspondences listed above are particular cases of double base. They throw light on an interesting feature of word meaning: the action denoted by the verbal root breaks

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN

211

down in to two components as regards transitivity. According9 ly, the verb can be generated from two other elements. The double base manifests itself differently when one part of the vocabulary has a transitive base whereas another part has an intransitive base, cf. zavar 'disturb': zavar-odik 'become turbid', csuk 'vt. close': csuk-ódik 'vi. close' versus fő 'vi. cook' : fő-z 'vt. cook' , bújik 'hide oneself' : búj-tat 'hide', úszik 'vi. swim': úsz-tat 'vt. swim' ír 'write': írat 'have written sg'. From among the most widespread European languages German, French and Russian are languages with a transitive base because they usually form their intransitive words from transitive roots by means of intransitive deriva­ tional suffixes (or corresponding words, especially grammaticalised pronouns) cf. Hung, nyílik 'open': Germ, sich+öffnen : Fr. s'+ouvrir: Russ. otkryvat'+sja. While Hungarian is a double base language, its intransitive base is predominant. This is shown by the following facts: (a) the use of transitive derivational suffixes is more regular, more grammaticalised, as was pointed out above; (b) the forms of the transitive derivational suffixes are older, more balanc­ ed and uniform, mostly consisting of just -t, while intransitive suffixes are more varied; furthermore in this rôle they are not of Finno-Ugric origin, they are the result of secondary development; (c) passive derivational suffixes are formed with the help of the transitive suffix: -at + ik; (d) the number of root words which can be expressed through a combination of root + transitive suffix is much higher than those which can be expressed by means of roots + intransitive suffixes. In Russian, which has a transitive base, the situation is just

Cf. kauzirovat' + imet '—►dat' ['to cause' + 'to have'—►'to give' (op. cit., p.105). This would correspond to the following deri­ vation: ad = bír + at (cause to have).

212

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

the opposite: (a) intransitive derivational suffixes are gram­ matical in character, transitivity being expressed in Russian by means of periphrastic constructions; (b) as to their form intransitive derivational suffixes are homogeneous : -sja; passive verb forms, too, are formed by means of this suffix; (c) quite a few Hungarian words with the structure 'intransitive root + transitive derivational suffix' have a corres­ ponding simple transitive root in Russian and vice versa: an intransitive Hungarian root corresponds to a 'transitive root + an intransitive derivational suffix', e.g., búj-tat 'hide' = prjatat', bújik 'hide oneself' = prjatat' + sja; kop-tat 'vt. wear off' = iznasivat', kopik 'vi. wear off' = iznašivat' + sja. The intransitive (Hungarian) base in which could be taken as representing an older stage in language development, shows clearly that instead of looking for some latent reflexive derivational suffix in the intransitive derivational suffixes, one should rather account for reflexivity in terms of a secondary function of the iterative derivational suffix. The intransitive function of iterative derivational suffixes was brought into being by the ending -ik. To be sure, it oc­ curs only in the third person notice, however, that (1) in speech the use of third person forus is predominant, (2) in the language of the codices intransitive derivational suffixes were already formally distinct from iterative derivational suffixes (cf. for derivational suffixes, cf. The Grammar of the Vienna Codex Karoly (1965)). The ending -ik spread from the passive use, the intransitive verb category par excellence , towards other intransitive uses and according to the most creditable accounts their passive use must have originated from the causative. To counterbalance the tendency of iterative derivational suffixes taking on intransitive functions, the need for genuine transitive iterative verbs arose, especially since the meaning of intransitive verbs

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN 213 usually carried some iterative element. To express transitive iteration the derivational suffix -gat/-get was developed out of the iterative suffix -g and the causative -t and this new suffix became increasingly prominent until it became the only suffix expressing this function. Szinnyei employs an excellent method to account for the analogical rise of this derivational suffix. He analyzes morphological oppositions such as hábor-og 'grumble': hábor-gat 'vt. disturb', hábor-gat: hábor-it 'vt. disturb'; pattog 'vi. sparkle': pattog-at 'vt. puff', pattog-at: patta-nt 'vt. crack'; forog 'vi. turn': forg-at 'vt. turn'; forg-at: for-dul 'vi. turn'; for-dít 'vt. turn'. Szinnyei's explanation for the form of the derivational suffix is impeccable. But it is inadequate as an explanation of the history of the linguistic forms at hand since it fails to give an answer to the question why a given element begins to spread and how it comes into general use. From the point of view of language use and the "anthropocentric approach" to language this question is of at least the same importance as the question of the preconditions for the rise of one linguistic form out of another. The change in the sys­ tem of transitive-intransitive derivational suffixes discussed above, that is, the shift of iterative suffixes towards an in­ transitive function and the subsequent need for transitiveiterative derivational suffixes provides, no doubt, the expiation required. To fill this role the causative derivational suffix -gat/-get , ultimately of transitive origin, proved most suitable. The ending -t of the suffix showed its relation to transitive derivational suffixes, its whole form had a pleasant ring phonetically, being in harmony with the rhythmic pattern of Hungarian words. It also had the advantage over other iterative suffixes that it did not end in z or 1, as do most of the verbs in Hungarian, and thus the phonetic body of the verbs containing it became more varied.

214

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

At this place it may be worth while to point out that, because of the predominantly transitive use of the deriva­ tional suffix -gat/-get,Hungarian also shows an opposition, though sporadically, which is quite systematic in Nenets (a Samoyed language): The same root may take both a transitive and an intransitive iterative suffix (the intransitive verbs correspond to Category 3 with more or less specialised mean­ ing) , cf. dob-ál-gat 'throw one after the other': dob-álódzik 'keep throwing', ad-ogat 'keep giving': ad-akozik 'contribute to charity', épít-get 'vt. build gradually': épít-kezik 'vi. have a house built', csodal-gat 'vt. wonder, at length ': csodál-kozik 'vi. wonder at', ver-eget 'beat (gently)': verekedik 'fight' , üt-öget 'keep hitting' üt-közik 'vi. knock into' etc. The adoption of the ending -ik as the mark of intransitivity, the widespread use of the passive derivational suf­ fix -atik in mediaeval literature and its survival in official language up to the 20th century as well as the increasing productivity of the suffix -òdik in recent times provide evi­ dence for the tendency towards a stronger transitive base in Hungarian. This phenomenon is another example where Hungarian conforms to other European languages, a tendency which can be observed in other areas of the language as well. Languages can be classified according to the strength of the transitive or intransitive base. In addition to the three types discussed above (transitive, intransitive and double base) there is also a fourth type: one in which words can be used either transitively or intransitively without any formal distinction. English is a typical example of this type while Hungarian exhibits only one or two verbs of this type, e. g. tart' as in Az Iroszövetség gyűlést tartott 'The writers' association held a meeting' (Type 9) and tart in A gyűlés egészen estig tartott 'The meeting lasted until evening' (Type 2 in transition towards Type 1). In English, on the other hand,

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN 215 it is quite common to express transitive or intransitive uses of the same lexical meaning by means of the same stem, e.g. 1 2 1 hush ,'to become quiet' and hush 'to quiet', hurry 'to move 2 with haste' and hurry 'to cause to move with speed'. The various types of lexical base are summed up in Appendix IV. 3.3. In the following sections I shall summarise my findings with respect to the development of the form and function of derivational suffixes in Hungarian. 3.3.1. The Hungarian causative and factitive derivational suf­ fix belongs to the oldest and most productive derivational suffixes. The causative function seems to appear first (cf. R. Ernö Baboss (1938)). The earliest data already document this function: terem-t 'create', él-eszt 'vt. revive' (Halotti Beszéd 'Funeral Sermon' (1200)); ill-et 'concern (sy sg)', iml-et 'give suck', é-tet 'give (sy) to eat' (Königsbergi Töredék 'The Königsberg Fragment' (1350)); vál-aszt 'choose' (Maria Siralom 'Marian Lament' (1300)). The Becsi Kodex 'Vienna Codex' (1450), too, contains much more causative verbs than factitives. The factitive function is first documented in the Jókai codex in the form ír-tat ( = írat) 'have written sg'. 3.3.2. One generally derives passive verbs from factitives, which is justified by a common property of these two forms: the subject of the sentence is not identical with the agent. However, the particular explanations proposed for this deriva­ tion are not always convincing. It is striking that while the Latin Funeral Sermon con­ tains several passive verb forms, these are lacking in its Hun­ garian counterpart. For example, "cuius corpusculum hodie sepulture traditur = kinec ez nopun tertet tumetivc". Later on, however, Latin texts came to be translated on large scale which resulted in an increasing use of the passive verb form. The recent decline of the passive verb form is further

216

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

reinforced by the rise of verbs derived by means of the deriva­ tional suffix -odik. These verbs partly exhibit Function 2 (medio-passive) but have gained currency in some dialects as genuine passive verbs with Function 1. 3.3.3. The following changes can be registered in the use of the Hungarian intransitive derivational suffixes. (1) The suffix -odik /-odik was in older times often used to render the Latin deponentiae, e.g. fon-ódik: complector, forg-òdik: versor, kér-ődik: ruminor. The category of deponentiae in Latin is a predominantly morphological category without any particular function and may correspond to any of our intran­ sitive verbs, especially to Types 3, 6 but also to Type 9. However, the derivational suffix -odik was also frequent in Function 2, 3 and 4, as in berek-eszt-ődik 'get locked', bezabáll-ódik 'vi. stuff (oneself), dorgál-ódik 'is scolded'. More recently, -odik,has come to be used exclusively in Func­ tion 2 and as such has become quite productive. Notice, how­ ever, that the function of -odik is not that of the passive: a passive action is viewed as taking place by itself (without an agent), as it were. The differences between Categories 1 (passive), 2 (mediopassive) and 3 (verbs of inward direction) are well illustrated by the sequence intéz-tetik 'is arranged', intéz-odik 'take care of itself', and intéz-kedik arrange for doing sg' or nekiüt-tetik 'is dashed' , nekiüt-ődik 'vi.bump' and nekiütközik 'vi. impact with'. In standard written language Function 1 is not expressed by passive verb forms but rather, just like once in the remote past, by means of sentences contain­ ing an indefinite subject: intézték 'they have arranged', nekiütötték 'they have dashed'. (2) The derivational suffixes -kodik, -kozik, -odzik, -ozik, -odik have been used in Categories 3, 4,5 and 6 throughout the documented history of Hungarian. The choice between those forms was not accidental but was determined by the phonetic

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN 217 character of the stem ending, namely, -kodik followed z, szt and 1; -kozik followed t, at and 1; -ódzik came after-gat, while -ozik occurred most frequently after jt and lt; -ódik was the preferred suffix after -kal and -dos. The distribution of the particular derivational suffixes is motivated by the need for appropriate variety in phonic structure and the rhythmic pattern of the words. (3) From among the denominal derivational suffixes -ul had a higher frequency at the expense of -odik: gonosz-ul 'become evil', bátor-ul 'vi.take courage', maghazas-ul 'marry' are all used with -odik today. On the other hand, there are much fewer examples for a change in the opposite direction. (One may reasonably assume that -ul, archaic -ol, is a reflexive derivational suffix and for this reason it does not occur with the ending -ik. ) The dnominal -kodik, -lkodik was more frequent in older times, today -skodik is the general ending with noun stems, cf. arch. akadály-kodik 'find fault', babonálkodik 'be superstitious', dics-őlködik 'vi.boast', dajká-lkodik 'vi. be a nurse'. Currently derivations like ügyvéd-eskedik 'practise law', mérnök-ösködik 'be an engineer', turistá-skodik 'be a tourist' etc. are entirely productive. The distribution of individual derivational suffixes as to form and function and the historical changes observed above are illustrated in Appendix V. Appendix VI shows how Uralic languages differ in their functional distribution of deriva­ tional suffixes. Capitalization of the derivational suffixes is meant to indicate that no formal variants are given. 3.4. The system of transitive and intransitive derivational suffixes of a language do not only serve to bring about cer­ tain grammatical changes in the word and to modify the syntac­ tic role of the word. These derivational morphemes are also used to create new words and lexical meanings.

218

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

3.4.1. It often happens that Hungarian derives a new word with a transitive suffix, the meaning of which can be ex­ pressed in other languages by separate words. For example, from the word menekül (arch.men-ik) 'flee', men-t 'save' can be formed by means of a derivational suffix, while in Russian there are separate words for these meanings: bezat1 and spasti. In German the derivation is reversed: retten → sich retten. To take another example, in Hungarian one can form etet 'give (sy) to eat' from eszik 'eat', while in Russian they are rendered by est 'and kormit'. In a number of cases the connection between the transitive and intran­ sitive verb is not so evident, for example, it is by no means compelling to derive terem-t 'create' from terem 'bear, pro­ duce' and ill-eszt 'fit (to, into)' from illik 'fit (sg)', cf. German gedeihen and schaffen. The derived word often acquires a specialised meaning, e.g. tolat (shunt), futtat (favours), hågat (mates), ültet (plants, flowers), etc. 3.4.2. Intransitive derivational suffixes are frequently used to create new words. This is quite understandable in view of the fact that Hungarian intransitive suffixes are less productive. Recall that the higher grammatical role and regularity a derivational suffix has, the less the semantic specialization will be and vice versa. Among Hungarian verbs formed with intransitive deriva­ tional suffixes, semantic specialization is quite widespread, e.g. ada-kozik (to give sg. free and repeatedly), épít-kezik (to carry out a large scale construction), rak-odik (load sg. lengthily or rearrange things). Intransitive derivational suffixes are used especially often to form active verbs of Type 3, which become members of Category 3 through Category 4. The derivational suffix has a metaphoric reflexive meaning (Category 4 ) , as it were. In such cases reflexivity is a faded inner motivation underlying the derived word. These verbs include a great number of motion verbs such as

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN 219 lop-ódzkodik, lop-akodik 'go stealthily', lit. 'steal oneself somewhere', arch, takar-odik 'covers, gathers, drives oneself' , tör-ekedik 'breaks oneself', arch, csavar-odik 'wrings itself', arch, hordoz-kodik lit. 'carries oneself', rug-aszkodik lit. 'springs oneself', beszur-odik 'infiltrates itself' and beiv-ódik 'absorbs itself'. The difference between the base and the derived word is based on the metaphoric use without the intermediary re­ flexive element: áskál-ódik 'intrigue', keres-kedik 'trade', kötöz-ködik 'provoke'. One cannot speak of specialization if the derived word corresponds to a meaning of the base word as in A fiu vonzza őt 'The boy attracts her'→ ő vonz-ódik a fiúhoz 'She feels attracted by the boy' but A mágnes vonzza a vasat 'Magnet attracts iron'→*A vas vonz-òdik a mágneshez 'Iron feels attracted by magnet'. 3.4.3. Intransitive derivational suffixes can be added to intransitive verb stems as well. In such cases the iterative character becomes more prominent and justification to classi­ fy the suffix intransitive - which can be open to doubt - is provided merely by the ending -ik_. Semantic specialization often takes place here, too: készül-odik 'get ready for', búcsú-z-kodik 'take leave of', gyül-ekezik 'assemble'/ siránkozik 'lament'. 4. In the body of the paper I have attempted to prove, by means of linguistic data, the theses put forward in Section 1. I have also intended to show that a systematic and un­ prejudiced study of linguistic data always yields new results. Distribution and transformation belong to the most general methods of establishing linguistic structures which are least influenced by subjective considerations. These two methods correlate with the various functions of linguistic elements. Ultimately, these functions culminate in the communicative function of language which constitutes the decisive

2 20

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

justification for any linguistic analysis. It may lead

linguistics

to a better understanding of the use of the language, that is, to a study of man as a rational social being. Any particular study, including the present one, is justified only in this perspective.

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN

221

References Baboss, R. Ernő (1938) A causativ igeképzés. Budapest: Akademi ai Kiadò. Geleji Katona, István (1645) Magyar Gramatikatska. Gyulafehérvár: Corpus Grammaticorum Linguae Hungaricae. Ed. by F. Toldy. Pest: Eggenberger. Guxman, M.M. (196 4) Razvitie zalogovyx protivopostavlenij v germanskix jazykax. Moscow: Akademija Nauk SSSR. Karoly, Sandor (1965) A Bécsi Kodex Nyelvtana I. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. Komáromi Tsipkés, György (16 65) Hungaria Illustrata. Corpus Grammaticorum Linguae Hungaricae. Ed. by F. Toldy. Pest: Eggenberger. Lyons, John (19 68) Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Majtinskaja, K. Je. (1959) Vengerskij Jazyk. II. Moscow: Akademija Nauk SSSR. Révai, Miklós (1806) Elaboratior Grammatica Hungarica. I., II. Pest: Trattner. Riedl, Szende (1864) Magyar Nyelvtan. Pest: Pfeifer. Ruong, Israel (1943) Lappische Verbalableitung dargestellt auf Grundlage des Pitelappischen. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell. Simonyi, Zsigmond (1869) A visszaható igének egy különösebb használata. Magyar Nyelvor. 7. 489. Szenczi Molnar, Albert (1610) Novae Grammaticae Ungaricae. Corpus Grammaticorum Linguae Hungaricae. Ed. by F. Toldy. Pest: Eggenberger. Szinnyei, József (1902) Magyar Nyelvhasonlítás. 2. ed. Budapest: Hornyánszky. Szvorényi, József (1864) Magyar Nyelvtan. 2. ed. Pest: Heckenast. Tompa, József, Ed. (1961) A mai magyar nyelv rendszere. I. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.

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Ullmann, Stephen (1957) The Principles of Semantics. GlasgowOxford: Jackson-Blackwell. Verseghy, Ferencz (1818) Magyar Grammatika. Buda: Kiralyi Magyar Universitas. Weinreich, Uriel (1963) On the Semantic Structure of Lan­ guage. In: Universals of Language. ed. by Joseph H. Greenberg, Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press.

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN 223

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS Appendix II. Generation of voice types

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN 225

Appendix III. Present-day and old paradigms of voice types

ø

suff

stem

root i

tr

caus tr

suff fact tr

suff

i

intr

226

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Appendix IV. Typology according to the lexical base

1. Intransitive base

INTRANSITIVE-ΤRANSITIVE

DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN

227

Appendix V. Formal differentiation According to

According to the form

the function

old.

of the stem

d e v e r b a l contemp.

-ODIK

2-6

2(3)

-KODIK -KOZIK -0(D) ΖIK

3-6 3-6 3-6

3-6 3-6 3-6

-OZIK

3-6

3-6

old.

d e n o m i n a l contemp.

KODIK

3

3

SKODIK

(3)

3

LKODIK

3

3

ODIK

2

2

UL

2

(2

fúródik R.betakaródik furakodik bocsátkozik betakaródzik kiáltozik

verbs

KAL-, DOS

rugdosodik

Z-, SzT-, L- ragaszkodik T-, AT-, L- ütközik GAThallgatòdzik JT-, LT-

rejtezik

verbs

heveskedik, R. akadálykodik butáskodik, M. ügyvédeskedik büszkélkedik, R. babonálkodik hevesedik, R. búsodik szépül, R. behártyásul, R. begyepül, R. bátorul, R. megházasul, R. megdühösül, R. bokrosul

Opposition of transitive and intransitive verbs

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

228

Appendix VI. Uralic system of derivational suffixes and the intransitive transitive function

Ostyak

Votyak

1 -J 2-6 -S -ANT 5 -S 7 -Τ 8 -PT

1 -S' 2-6 -SK

Vogul

Hungarian 1 , 7 , 8 -TAT 2 -OD 3-6 -KOD -KOZ

1 -V 2-6 - -AXT 7 -L, -Τ 8 -Τ

Zyrian 1 -S' 2-6 -S' -Z' 7 -T 8 -ØD

Cheremis

Mordvin

Finnish

Samoyed

1-6 -LT

1-6 -V

1, 7, 8, -Τ 2-6 -U 4 -

3,6 -NG 4 -U 7 -DA

7 -VT

7-8 -T, -D

8 -T

Distribution of transitivity according to centuries (Words beginning with letter g) 15-16. cent.

2-9 3 4 5 6 9 !

18-19. cent

20. cent. 12: 9

7:40

9 :10

5:30

35:41

29: 9,5 43:14,5 122:41

5:30

1: 1 36:41

5: 1,5 101:33,5

6: 4 47:36

88

300

132

6: 7

2

ö.

16-18. cent.

17

22:17 45:34

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN 229

Glossary ad ad-akozik ad-atik

give contribute to charity is given

ad-ogat akadály akadály-kodik akklimatizál akklimatizál-ódik alá alá-z alá-z-kodik alkalom alkalm-atlan

keep giving

alkalm-atlan-kodik

vi. inconvenience let inconvenience

+alkalm-atlan-kod-tat alkalm-az alkalm-az-kodik áli áll-ít alszik al-tat ár 1 ár-ad ár-aszt

ár2 ar ár-ú ár-u-1 áru-1-kodik ás ás-kál ás-kal-odik ázik + áz-t

obstacle find fault vt. acclimatize get acclimatized under humiliate humiliate oneself occasion unadapted for

apply accomodate oneself vi. stand vt. stand sleep make sleep flood vi. flood vt. flood price article sell play the informer dig dig repeatedly intrigue vi. soak vt. soak

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

230 az-tat

vt. soak

babona

superstition

baboná-lkodik

be superstitious

bátor

courageous

bátor-ít

vt. encourage

bátor-kodik

vi. dare

bátor-odik

vi. take courage

bátor-ul

vi. take courage

be

preverb into

be-árul

denounce

gyep +be-gyep-ül

become overgrown with grass

grass

hártya

pellicie

hártyás

pellicular

+be-hártyá-s-ul iszik be-iv-odik követ be-követ-kezik lop

become pellicular drink be absorved into vt. follow ensue vt. steal

be-lop-ódzik

vi. steal into

be-lop-ódz-kodik

vi. steal into

mocsok

dirt

be-mocsk-ol

vt. soil

be-mocsk-ol-ódik

vi. soil

rekeszt be-rekeszt-ődik szur be-szűr-ődik takar

vt. close vi. close vt. filtrate infiltrate vt. cover up

+be-takar-ódik

is covered up

be-takar-ódzik

vi. cover oneself up

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN zabál +be-zabál-odik bízik biz-akodik bocsát bocsát-kozik bokor bokr-os bokr-os-ul búcsú bûcsû-zik búcsú-z-kodik bûjik búj-tat bus +bús-odik buta butá-s-kodik büszke büszké-lkedik

cáfol1

cáfol2 csal csal-at csal-at-kozik csal-at-koz-tat csavar csavar-odik esoda csodá-1 csodá-1-gat +csodá-l-kodik

231

gobble up vi. stuff oneself vi. have confidence in have confidence in vt. allow vi. enter into bush bushy become bushy leave (-taking) t a k e l e a v e of t a k e l e a v e of hide oneself hide sorrowful become sorrowful foolish vi. behave foolishly proud vi. be proud of vi. flout vt. flout cheat cheat vi. be disappointed make suffer disappointment vt. turn vi. turn wonder vt. wonder at vt. wonder at lengthy vi. wonder at

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

232

csodá-1-kozik csuk csuk-ódik csúszik csúsz-tat

vi. vt. vi. vi. let

dajka

nurse

wonder at close close slip slip

dajka-1

vt. nurse

+dajká-l-kodik dajká-1-tat dicső +dicső-l-ködik dob dob-ál dob-ál-gat dob-ál-ódzik domborû dombor-odik dorgál +dorgál-ódik

vi. be a nurse vt. nurse glorious vi. boast throw trow one after the other throw one after the other keep throwing bulging vi. bulge vt. scold

ég ég-et el el-ad el-ad-ódik ár 2

vi. burn vt. burn p r e v e r b away sell is sould

ár-ú ár-u-1 el-árul él

article sell betray live vi. revive

él-ed él-eszt

is scolded

price

vt. revive

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE

él-tet emel emel-get emlék emlék-ezik ép ep-ít ép-ít-get ép-ít-kezik ép-ül ér(-)ed er(-)eszt érint érint-get eszik e(-)tet +ézes +ézes-ül +êzes-ül-tet +ézes-ül-tetik +ézes-ül-tet-tetik fagy

DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN

keep a l i v e lift keep lifting souvenir remember whole vt. build vt. build gradually vi. have a house build vi. be built spring from pour out touch touch repeatedly eat vt. give sy to eat sweet become sweet vt. sweeten is sweetened is sweetened

fehér fehér-edik fehér-ít fehér-ül

vi. freeze hurt complain of a pain in sg begin to hurt vi. spring forth vt. cause to spring forth white vi. whiten vt. whiten vi. whiten

fekszik

lie

fáj fáj-dít fáj-dul fak(-)ad fak (-) a s z t

2 33

234

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

fek (-)tet +fek(-)et fesu fésű-1 +fêsü-l-odik fésü-1-ködik fog fog-at fog-lal fogy fogy-aszt +fogy-at fogy-at-kozik fogy-at-koz-tat folyik foly-at for(-)dít for(-)dul for(-)gat for(-)og forr forr-ad forr-aszt fosz-lik fosz (-)t fő fo-z fukar fukar-kodik fúr fur-akodik fúr-ódik fut fut-tat1 fut-tat2

put to bed put to bed comb vt. comb vi. comb vi. comb catch have sy catch sg occupy lessen use up use up lessen use up flow let flow vt. turn vi. turn vt. revolve vi. revolve heal over heal over solder vi. fray vt. strip vi. cook vt. cook miserly be miserly bore push bury itself in run make sy run vt. run a candidate

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE

gazdag gazdag-odik +gazdag-ul gondol gondol-kodik gonosz +gonosz-ul gyaláz gyaláz-kodik gyűlik gyül-ekezik

DERIVAT

)NAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN rich become

rich

become

rich

think think

about

evil become

evil

vt.

abuse

vi.

use

abusive

assemble assemble

hábor(-)gat hábor(-)ít h a b o r (-) og hág

vt.

disturb

vt.

disturb

hág-at hal

have covered vi. die

+hal-at hallgat

vt. die listen to

hallgat-ódzik hátra hátrá-1 hátrá-1-tat heves heves-edik heves-kedik hiba hibá-z(ik) hibá-z-tat hízik hiz-lal hiz-lal-tat

language

vi.

be

discontented

cover

keep listening back/wards/ vi. back hinder violent become violent be hot-tempered mistake make a mistake blame grow fatten let fatten

2 35

2 36

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

hiz-lal-tatik

is fattened

hiz-lal-tat-tatik

is fattened

hord

carry

hord-oz

keep carrying

+hord-oz-kodik

vi.

hull

fall

hull-ajt

let sg fall

hurcol

vt.

drag

hurcol-kodik

vi.

move

húz

draw

huz-at 1

have sg drawn

huz-at 2

get sy play an air

drag

illik

fit sg

ill (-)eszt

vt.

fit to

ill-et

concern sy sg

+imlik

suck

+imlet

give suck

intéz

arrange

intéz-kedik

arrange for doing sg

intéz-odik

take care of itself

intéz-tetik

is arranged

ír

write

ír-at

have written sg

ír-atik

is written

ismer

know

ismer-kedik

make

jut

come to/get to

jut-tat

get sg to

kapar

scratch

kel

rise

kel-t

wake up

keres

acquaintances

look for

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE

DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN

keres-kedik kszül készül-ődik kiált kiált-ozik ki ki-csúszik

trade get ready for get ready for shout shout preverb out vi. slip out vt. slip out

ki-csúsz-tat kopik kop-tat köt köt-öz köt-öz-ködik küld

vi. wear off vt. wear off bind bind up provoke send

lát lát-ogat le le-hever le-hever-edik

see visit preverb down lie down lie down at full length

locsol lop lop-akodik lop-ódz-kodik lyuk lyuk-ad lyuk-aszt

vt. sprinkle vi. sprinkle steal go stealthily vi. steal hole vi. get holed vt. make a hole

locsol-kodik

mar

bite

mar-akodik

quarrel

mechanizál

mechanize

mechanizál-ódik meg

is mechanized

237

preverb for perfective aspect of the verb

2 38

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

meg-bukik düh düh-ös +meg-dühös-ül fáj meg-fáj-dul ház ház-as meg-ház-as-ul hiú meg-hiúsul meg-néz meg-zökken meleg me leg-ít +menik menekül men(-)eszt men (-)t merül merül-tetik mérnök mörnök-ös-ködik mos mos-akodik mos-atik mos-ogat mozog művel művel-tet

fail fury furious become furious vi. hurt begin to hurt house married marry vain fail regard jolt warm vt. warm go flee let go save dive

neki

preverb to him

üt

dive engineer be an engineer wash have a wash is washed wash up move do, act let do, let act

strike, hit

neki-üt

dash

neki-üt-közik

vi. impact with

neki-üt-ődik

vi. bump

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE neki-üt-tetik néz

+nêz-ekedik nyel nyel-ődik nyilik nyom nyug(o)szik nyugo(-)szt nyű nyűv-ődik okos okos-kodik

DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN

is dashed look vi. look around swallow is swallowed vi. open press vi. rest vt. rest wear down is worn down

osz(-)ol

clever reason become prudent vi. get divided

okos-odik osz (-)t

vt. divide

öm(-)lik

flow

ön(-)t

pour

patt(-)an patt(-)an-t patt(-)og patt(-)og-at per per-el

vi. crack vt. crack vi. crack vt. make crack action at law take action

per-eskedik

litigate litigate

per-1-ekedik pofoz pofoz-kodik ragaszt ragasz-kodik , rak rak-odik rá

2 39

slap in the face box one another on the ear vt. stick vi. stick to put load C preverb) on

240

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS rá-szed

deceive

rá-szed-et

let deceive

regenerái

vt. regenerate

regenerál-ódik

vi. regenerate

rejt

vt. hide

rejt-ezik

vi. hide

rep(-)ül

vi. fly

rep(-)ít

vt. let fly

rúg

kick

rug-asz-kodik

dart at

rug-dos

vt. keep on kicking

rug-dos-òdik

vi. keep on kicking

sarga

yellow

sårg-ul

become yellow

segít

vt. help

segít-kezik

vi. help

+sêrszik

be injured

sér(-)t

injure

sétál

walk

sétál-tat

take out for a walk

sétál-tat-tat

let take out for a walk

sétál-tat-tatik

is taken out for a walk

sír

cry

sír(-)ánkozik

lament

sü(-)l

vi. bake

sü(-)t

vt. bake

sü(-)t-tet

have sg baked

szak ( - ) ad

vi. tear

szak (-) aszt

vt. tear

szán

vt. pity

szån-akozik

vi. pity

száll

fly

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE

DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN

száll-ít szar(-)ad szár(-)aszt +szár(-)at származik származ-tat szél szél-ed

carry vi. dry

+szél-et szél-eszt szép szép-ít szép-ül szeret szíd szíd-at szór(-)ít szor(-)ul szór

szül-etik

vt. disperse vt. disperse beautiful vt. beautify vi. grow more beautiful love chide let chide press be squeezed into vt. sprinkle vi. sprinkle prick is pricked bear be born

takar takar-odik tanár tanár-kodik +tanár-oskodik tart1

cover vi. assemble teacher teach in school teach in school vi. last

tart 2 ternet

vt. hold bury

terem terem-t

bear, produce creat

szór-ódik szúr szúr-odik szül

vt. dry vt. dry vi. originate vt. originate edge vi. disperse

241

242

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

tesz

do, make

+tiloszik

is prohibited

til(-)t

prohibit

tol

shove

tol-at

shunt

tör

break

tör-ekedik

endeavour

trombita

η. trumpet

trombitá-1

vi . trumpet

trombitá-1-tat

let trumpet

tud

know

+tud-akoz

vt. ask after

tud-akoz-òdik

vi. ask after

turista

tourist

turistá-skodik

be a tourist

úszik

vi. swim

ûsz-tat

vt. swim

ügyes

clever

ügyes-kedik ügyvéd ügyvéd-eskedik

show oneself to be clever

practise law

ül

sit

ül-tet

plant

üt

vt. knock

üt-közik

vi. knock into

üt-öget

vt. keep hitting

vál(-)aszt

vt. separate

válik

vi. separate from

vál(-)t

vt. change

vál(-)t-ozik

vi . change

lawyer

vál(-)t-oz-tat

vt. change

vál(-)t-oz-tatik

vi. is changed

INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE DERIVATIONAL SUFFIXES IN HUNGARIAN 243 vál(-)t-oz-tat-tatik

von(-)z-ódik

vi. is changed vt. defend vi. defend beat beat gently fight let beat throw throw oneself merry make merry oneself make merry make merry carry draw refuse to do sg attract feel attracted by sy

zavar zavar-odik

disturb become turbid

véd véd-ekezik ver ver-eget ver-ekedik ver-et vet vet-odik víg +vig-aszik +vig-at +vig-aszt visz von von-akodik von (-)z

Notation:

+ = - = (-)= vi.= vt.=

obsolete word the limit between two morphemes the limit between two morphemes is blurred verb intransitive verb transitive

LUKÁCS'S IDEAS ON LANGUAGE Janos Kelemen Western philosophy cherished for decades the illusion that the problems of man manifested in the unanswerable 'metaphysical questions originate in language. The strongest trend of the philosophy of this century owes its existence to that illusion, since the recognition of the cause of the trouble was followed in due course by the discovery of the remedy: the analysis of language. The neopositivists, who carried out the "linguistic turn" of philosophy, were imbued with the reforming spirit of enlightenment: they firmly be­ lieved that the recognition of a few simple truths and, equivalently, a reform of language would put human minds right. When the illusions had melted away, which was largely due to Wittgenstein's profound and severe criticism, more realistic conceptions emerged. The analytical philosophers following Wittgenstein accepted and examined language in its real nature, in its normal and ordinary use. Even if they abandoned reforming language, this lofty dream of a logically transparent and crystal-clear ideal language, they did not cease to regard philosophy as therapeutic: the analysis of words was to become the only method of discussing the traditional problems of philosophy and their only form of solution was sought in re­ ducing those problems to rules of the use of words.

246

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

However, ontological problems do not wither away if pushed aside as pseudo-problems. If philosophy is to fulfil its legacy, it is also bound to say something about man and the world he lives in. This is self-evident for Marxism, since it could not otherwise endeavor to become the means for the practical transformation of the world. This is why the traditional "great metaphysical systems" were able to survive after the semicentennial domination of neopositivism and ana­ lytical philosophy. At the same time, it is not by pure in­ cident that linguistic reflections assumed such an important place in Heidegger's monumental metaphysical and ontological system, one of the most impressive efforts of this century. Heidegger's word-analyses are well-known; almost reminiscent of the procedures of analytical philosophy, they are invoked to shed light upon one or another philosophical problem. However, with him language appears in another meaning as well: not only and not in the first place as a medium of analysis but also and in the first place as something given for our being, as an ontological category. In the technical language of philosophy it is not quite unfounded to say that there are two major trends in the 20th century: the analytics of language (Wittgenstein and the neopositivists) and the hermeneutics of language (Heidegger and phenomenology on the one hand, and the French School represented by Ricoeur, Foucault and Lacan, on the other). Nowadays it is natural to ask the question whether the problem of language has any place in Marxism. This is equivalent to the question whether the problem of language is a philosophical problem for Marxism, and if so where its place is to be sought within the system of questions raised by Marxism. Does Marxism provide an alternative to the analitics and hermeneutics of language? György Lukács was perhaps the first to notice (though in the form of parenthetical notes only) that the first

LUKACS'S IDEAS ON LANGUAGE

247

question can be answered in the affirmative through a close reading of Marx's works. Even if he never speaks of the philosophy of language in his extensive oeuvre, nor does he of course elaborate as a watertight discipline some philo­ sophy of language, Lukåcs does discuss language in a philo­ sophical manner. Now that his unfinished Ontology is be­ coming available, its outlines are beginning to take shape in front of our eyes and the time has come for a systematic and comprehensive study of Lukács's work, it is worthwile to ponder what kind of answers Lukács has to offer to the above questions. In the present paper I wish to contribute, on the basis of but a small number of works, to the recon­ struction or the theoretical considerations of language implicit in Lukács's investigations. When examining the various forms of appearance of reification in his History and class consciousness, Lukács quotes a passage from German ideology in which Marx states that "private property alienates not only the individuality of men, but also of things", and refers to Marx's subsequent remarks: "Marx goes on to make a number of very fine ob­ servations about the effects of reification upon language. A philological study from the standpoint of historical mate1 rialism could profitably begin here." In the passage referred to, Marx analyses the meaning of certain words and shows that these words are used in both "mercantile" and "individual" senses: for instance, "propriété", "Eigentum" and "Eigenschaft"; "property", "Eigentum" and "Eigentümlichkeit"; "valeur", "value", "Wert" etc. It is not useless to quote here Marx's general comment before the examples just cited: "Der Bourgeois hat es um so

Georg Lukács: History and class consciousness. Studies in Marxist Dialectics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press 1971, p. 209.

248

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

leichter, aus seiner Sprache die Identität merkantilischer und individueller oder auch allgemein menschlicher Bezie­ hungen zu beweisen, als diese Sprache selbst ein Produkt der Bourgeoisie ist und daher wie in der Wirklichkeit, so in der Sprache die Verhältnisse des Schachers zur Grundlage 2 aller andern gemacht worden sind." Lukács's interpretation is precise: Marx indeed says that the structures of reification penetrate into language too, they extend to linguistic structures as well. What is more, he concludes that this language is a bourgeois lan­ guage, it is "the product of the bourgeoisie". This remark contains the outlines of a critique of language of a radical­ ly new type as against the rationalist conceptions of the Modern Age, which weighed the advantages and "imperfections" of language from the point of view of universal rationality. He does not hesitate to say that class relations and class ideologies are anchored in language and in the manner of language use. If we wish to provide a grammatical interpreta­ tion for his examples, it is easy to see that they will be semantic: they can be translated into our present concepts in the following way: social relations and ideologies are manifested in the form of special semantic subcodes on the level of the formal organisation of language as well. All that is a further actualization of Marx's concep­ tions as regards the inherently social nature of language. The problem of the social nature of language is not exhausted in that "die Sprache entsteht, wie das Bewußtsein, erst aus dem Bedürfnis, der Notdurft des Verkehrs mit anderen Menschen", 2 Marx-Engels: Über Sprache, Stil und Übersetzung. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1974, p.123. 3 Marx-Engels: Über Sprache, Stil und Übersetzung, p.43.

LUKACS'S IDEAS ON LANGUAGE

249

that is, it constitutes not only one aspect of the social nature of man in general, but it also includes the above connections, the intrusion of the historically concrete social structures and ideologies into the formal characteris­ tics of language. The bourgeois can "prove from his language" the identity of "mercantile" and "general human aspects", he can claim that the properties of the bourgeois individual are the human properties in general, because the ideology declaring this came to form, as it were, part of the linguis­ tic code, and the linguistic code itself makes one accept the conceptual schemes anchored in it with a spontaneous naturalness. If it is added to the above that "die Ideen 4 existieren nicht getrennt von der Sprache", and that "die Gedanken der herrschenden Klasse sind in jeder Epoche die herrschenden Gedanken," then it is not without foundation that we attribute to Marx the view that the intellectual power of the ruling class constitutes linguistic power as well. This is the logical place for a critique of language and a philosophical analysis of language within Marxism. A criticism of ideologies necessarily involves a linguistic demystification based upon the comprehension of the connec­ tions between ideologies and language. When Lukács took heed of these ideas of Marx's, he proceeded to formulate a highly important scientific pro­ gramme - well ahead of his time. The problems quoted have in the meantime been incorporated into the objectives of the disciplines concerned with language (semiotics, sociolinguistics, etc.), but what is called by Lukács "a philo­ logical analysis in the manner of a historical materialism" and what ought to be understood as the historical investiga­ tion of the relationship between the dominant ideas of the various ages and their linguistic expression remains even today mostly a programme for Marxism. 4 Marx-Engels : Über Sprache, Stil und Übersetzung, p.82. 5 Marx-Engels: Über Sprache, Stil und Übersetzung. p.94.

250

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

It is easily discernible that there is a more or less elaborate conception of language contributing to the theore­ tical foundations of Lukacs's Aesthetics, and by virtue of its very role it claims to be more general and to grasp comprehensive tendencies of human language. At the same time, this conception reflects a radical change in Lukacs's scien­ tific and philosophical orientation. It is an accident of history that the statements con­ cerning language in Marxist philosophy were for decades in­ fluenced predominantly by a single discipline: Pavlovian physiology and psychology. This inevitably involved theore­ tical dogmatism even if the rigid application of certain concepts in Pavlov had not by itself brought along natural­ istic traits into the interpretation of linguistic phenomena, since the one-sided orientation to physiology excluded not only a generalization of the achievements of the other rele­ vant disciplines, such as linguistics, but also an investiga­ tion into the logico-conceptual facet of the problem of lan­ guage. Even Lukács could not help conforming to the contempo­ rary situation of Marxism. That is why the conception of language in his Aesthetics displays as one of its most sub­ stantial constituents of Pavlov's doctrine, which was de­ veloped into the hypothesis of "primary signal system". The unwary observer may have the impression that insofar as Lukács relies exclusively upon a single physiolog­ ical doctrine while discussing the problem of language he comes to be opposed to not only his previous conception of the social nature of language but also to the whole of his philosophical and aesthetic ideas, in whose core lies Marx's conception of the socio-historical nature of man. This is far from the truth as is best shown by the fact that although Lukács accepts without reservation Pavlov's physiological theory, he at the very outset subjects to criticism the tendency to examine the problems of the secondary signal

LUKACS'S IDEAS ON LANGUAGE

251

system as abstracted from the wider implications of social practice and to take it as the basis of the interpretation of language: "Pavlov's statements must of course be always understood and interpreted in the sense of dialectical materialism. For however essential Pavlov's secondary signal system may be from the point of view of discriminating between man and animal, its true sense, and its highly fruitful significance will be manifest only if, like Engels, we sufficiently stress the simultaneous rise of labour and language, their objective inseparability. Man's "message", which is beyond the sphere of the animal kingdom, originates directly in labour and unfolds - directly or indirectly, and later through a good deal of mediation - in correspondence with the development of labour." From a critical point of view even more unambiguous is the remark which demurs against the confusion of psychic phenomena in man and animal (in fact, image and concept in animals): "Our objection, or rather, our supplementary proposal can be summarized as follows:

"Freilich müssen die Feststellungen Pawlows stets im Sinne des dialektischen Materialismus aufgefasst und ausgelegt werden. Denn so fundamental dessen zweites Signalsystem der Sprache für diese Abgrenzung zwischen Mensch und Tier sein mag, seinen wirklichen Sinn und seine ausgiebige Fruchtbarkeit erhält es erst, wenn, wie bei Engels, auf das simultane Ent­ stehen, auf die sachliche Untrennbarkeit von Arbeit und Sprache das nötige Gewicht gelegt wird. Dass der Mensch 'etwas zu sagen' hat, was jenseits des Gebiets des Tie­ rischen liegt, entstammt direkt der Arbeit und entfaltet sich - direkt und indirekt, später oft durch sehr viele Vermittlungen - in Zusammenhang mit der Entwicklung der Arbeit." (Georg Lukács: Werke, Band 11. Ästhetik, Teil I. Die Eigenart des ästhetischen, 1, Halbband. Neuwied am Rhein: Sammlung Luchterhand, 196 3, p.38.)

252

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Pavlov is in the right when stating that the secondary sig­ nal system and actual thought in terms of concepts are in­ separably interrelated, upon which all scientific thought is based. But he does not even hint at the interrelation of the secondary signal system, speech, and labour. Pavlov is never concerned with historical and genetic questions. He is content to state the interrelation of the development of man and speech.[ ...1 The lack of the genetic link between labour and speech, since it is a very important irrela­ tion, blurs to some extent the fact that the secondary signal system is a special human manner of apprehension and expression. „7 Lukács's objection is all the more legitimate since by exploring the mechanism of reflex activity Pavlov not only endeavours to explain the physiological components of speech and thought, but he also believes to have grasped their specific essence.

Kurz zusammengefasst lässt sich unser Einwand, besser gesagt unser Ergänzungsvorschlag, so formulieren: Pawlow statuiert richtig den unlösbaren Zusammenhang zwischen Signalsystem 2 und Denken im eigentlichen, begrifflichen Sinne als Grundlage eines jeden wissenschaftlichen Denkens. Es fehlt jedoch bei ihm jede Andeutung darüber, dass das Signalsystem 2, die Sprache, mit der Arbeit zusammenhängt. Freilich geht Pawlow nirgends auf Fragen historisch-genetischer Art ein. Er be­ gnügt sich damit, die Tatsache des Zusammenhangs zwischen Auftreten des Menschen und der Sprache festzustellen. Das Fehlen der genetischen Verbindung zwischen Arbeit una Sprache bringt jedoch bei der Wichtigkeit dieses Zusammenhangs in die Bestimmung des Signalsystems 2 als spezifisch mensch­ liche Auffassungs- und Ausdrucksweise eine gewisse Verschwom­ menheit hinein." (Georg Lukács: Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen. 2. Halbband. p. 21.)

LUKÁCS'S IDEAS ON LANGUAGE

253

However, when explaining the nature of these phenomena it must be taken into account that they are the interiorizations of the specific human activity that constitutes their basis both in a historico-genetic and in a structural sense. In accordance with this view, when describing the essential features of language (as well as when discussing the aesthetic sphere as a whole), Lukács makes use of the principle that a phenomenon can be understood in its entire depth only if we consider the genesis and the tendencies of development of the totality to which the phenomenon in ques­ tion specifically belongs. That is why there are so numerous references to ethnography on the pages devoted to the dis­ cussion of the essential features of language. The remarks on "primitive languages" are intended to illustrate the idea that the property that, according to Lukács, counts as the essential feature of language and which is some kind of "twofold motion", that is, "overcoming the limits of the actual immediacy by means of generalization and the retrans­ formation of the result thus achieved into a new, more com­ prehensive immediacy of higher power and better differentiao

tion" , is at the same time the law of real history, of the real development of language. Thus the problem which submerged with Pavlov onto a mere physiological level as­ cends into historical dimensions, notwithstanding the fact that the data Lukács cites from Levy-Bruhl and others can hardly be interpreted unambiguosly. "If we observe the language of a primitive people chosen at discretion, we shall realise that their derivation of words is incomparably closer to Q

"das durch Verallgemeinerung erreichte Überwinden der Schranken der jeweiligen Unmittelbarkeit und das Rückverwandeln des so Erreichten in eine neue Unmittelbarkeit höherer Potenz" (Georg Lukács: Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen. 1. Halbband p. 88.)

254

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

perception and farther from concept than ours,"9 states Lukács on the assumption that primitive languages are capable of naming sensually concrete objects only and have no means to express the concept of genus. Now the considera­ tions that start out from the assumption that primitive lan­ guages have no concepts for genus ascribe an exaggerated significance to a single aspect of language. To put it more exactly, they compare "civilized" and "primitive" languages from a single aspect: on the basis of lexical characteris­ tics. It is doubtful whether this leads to a correct typolo­ gy. Incidentally, considerations like the ones mentioned above served for Lévy-Bruhl as arguments for the justification of the existence of some "prelogical" primitive mentality, which, as it were, should correspond to an infantile level of thought. This conception queries the universality of the basic course of human thought (prevalent even among the various kinds of the concrete sociohistorical characteristics) and, in the last analysis, the uniformity of the human spe­ cies, which contributed greatly to the legitimate criticism of structural and functional ethnology 1 0 in this connection. As regards our basic problem it is, however, far more im­ portant to note that the facts described by Levy-Bruhl do not constitute conclusive evidence. Boas was already able to de­ monstrate that the examples used to illustrate that the "concrete" nature of the "primitive languages" radically different from European languages are not generally valid: there exist primitive languages which, in spite of our 9 "Betrachtet man die Sprache eines beliebigen primitiven Volks, so sieht man, dass ihre Wortbildung unvergleichlich wahr­ nehmungsnäher, begriffsferner ist, als die unsere." (G.L.: Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen. 1. Halbband. p. 57.) 10 C1. Lévi-Strauss: La science du concret. In: La Pensée Sauvage. Paris: Plon, 1962, pp. 4-47.

LUKÁCS 'S IDEAS ON LANGUAGE

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scientific superstitions, abound in abstract terms which are also used as expressions of concepts for genus. 1 1 This may well raise doubt as to the well-foundedness of some of the theoretical statements on language in Aesthetics but it does not exert a fatal effect on the evaluation of the substantial part of Lukács's position, nor does it hinder, in some degree, the acknowledgement of the concrete linguistic relevance of these very statements. In sum, Lukács regards it as the general trend in the development of language that "linguistic forms reflecting concrete objects gradually disappear from language and are replaced by much more general common nouns." He continues to say that from this it does not follow that "language loses the ability to concretely designate every concrete object", since "in our relation to the world sentences acquire an increasing significance" [ ·,.] "the complicated syntactic relations of the words determine their senses more and more in the concrete contexts of their application", and "by virtue of the relations of the words arranged in sentences more and more sophisticated linguistic devices come into being for the purpose of demonstrating concrete objective relations." 1 2 Minimally one of the presuppositions of these 11 Fr. Boas: Handbook of American Indian Languages. Part 1. Bulletin 40, Washington, D.C.: Bureau of American Ethnology, 1911, p. 657. 12 "...dass derartige, Konkretheiten wiederspiegelnde Sprach­ formen immer mehr aus der Sprache verschwinden, um den viel allgemeineren Gattungswörtern den Platz zu überlassen." (G.L.: Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen 1. Halbband p.88.) "Muss aber dadurch die Fähigkeit der Sprache, jeden konkreten Gegenstand konkret zu bezeichnen, unmissverständlich zu machen, verloren gehen?" (p. 89.) "Man vergesse aber nicht, dass in unserer sprachlichen Beziehung zur Wirklichkeit der Satz eine immer grössere Bedeutung erhält, dass komplizierte syntaktische Verbindungen der Worte immer stärker (footnote 12 continued)

256

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

statements is false, viz., that at the earlier stages of language development, thus in primitive languages, sentences had less significance and they turned into being a more and more essential element of linguistic activity 'as it were' simultaneously with the eclipse of the words having concrete meaning. Another point on which I disagree with Lukács is that the ability to concretely designate objects was previously based on the semantic properties of words (on the concrete perceptual nature of their meaning). In his polemic with Locke, Leibniz (whom, incidentally, Lukács himself cites) demonstrated that words can a priori be nothing but general. "General expressions" are not incidental facts of language or facts occurring merely at certain stages of historical development, or - as Leibniz puts it - "serve not only for the perfection of language, but they are indispensable for its essential structure." It is thus logically impossible for words taken in themselves to relate to individuals. In Leibniz's parlance "particular things" can be spoken of on this level only if "species (logically) ínfimas" are understood by them. 1 3 At the same time, it should be made clear that sentence construction is an a priori property of linguistic avtivity: man speaks in sentences at whatever stage of development. Granting that language has a general trend of development, this comes to the fore not in the (footnote 12 continued) ihren Sinn im konkreten Anwendungszusammenhang bestimmt, dass sich immer verfeinerte Sprach­ mittel ausbilden, um konkrete Gegenstandsbeziehungen durch das Verhältnis der Worte zueinander im Satze sinnfällig zu machen." (p.89.) 13 "Les termes généraux ne servent pas seulement à la perfec­ tion des langues, mais meme ils sont nécessaires pour leur constitution essentielle." (Leibniz: Nouveaux Essais sur 1'entendement humain. III. 1. § 3. God. Guil. Leibnitii Opera Philosophica. Pars Prior. Ed. J. E. Erdmann. MDCCCXL. p.297.)

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increase of the significance of sentences but in the in­ creasing complication of sentence structure, and Lukács's statements quoted above can be accepted only if this is meant by them. All that is, however, a psychological rather than a linguistic problem. Despite their problematic nature, in a roundabout way Lukács's statements are meaningful and that is why they do have scientific relevance. Note that what Lukács tackles is the problem of reference and singular description. In this connection he attains, with the informal means of philoso­ phical analysis, the same results which can be achieved through a logical and grammatical analysis of linguistic structures. On his view reference (the function of designat­ ing concrete objects) is not a separate relationship between the sign and the signified but a function of the relations within the sentence. Although expressions are a priori gen­ eral, individual objects can be grasped by linguistic means, which are provided for by syntax: among the conditions of singular description we find rules which are clearly syntactic. To put it more general: the relationship of concrete reality and language is not only a semantic but also a syntactic problem. "Only an advanced syntax can designate individuality by means of the linguistic reproduction of ostension," 1 4 claims Lukács in his Ontology. It is trivial, though perhaps not needless, to recall that the theory of language in Aesthetics is related to the theory of everyday thinking. Lukåcs himself calls attention to the inherent relationship between the two problems: "The pecularities of everyday thinking could perhaps be expressed 14 "Erst die entwickelte Syntax ist imstande, die Einzelheit in der sprachlichen Reproduktion des sinnlichen Hinweises zu bezeichnen." (G.L.: Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins. Reproduktion. Manuskript, p. 87. Archiv Lukács, Buda­ pest)

258

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

most successfully if speech were subjected to a thorough analysis from this specific angle." 1 5 The central core of the problems of Aesthetics is thus occupied by ordinary language and this is an important fact. If a philoso­ phy of language is viable at all it can set its foot at nothing but ordinary language, for - as is shown by Lukács himself - the sign systems carrying higher mental objectiviza­ tions emerge from the tendencies extant in ordinary language; similarly, these higher mental objectivizations are themselves built upon the general foundation of everyday life and every­ day thinking in order to constantly enrich this foundation with their results. If by abstraction we consider solely the subject of the discussion, placing ordinary language in such a central position may relate Lukács's theory of language to ordinary language philosophy, even if otherwise Lukács is opposed to those views of the analytical philosophers that limit the possibilities and objectives as regards the "Weltanschauung" of philosophy. Notice that the position of analytical philoso­ phers, according to which important logical distinctions can be discovered by exploring the rules of the use of words and by doing this we may get closer to understanding the con­ ceptual frames determining thought, has led to the elaboration of procedures that cannot be neglected by Marxism either. However, Lukács's example in this connection is a warning to the effect that while most of the analytical philosophers stop short of the description of the use of individual words or the logical relations of individual linguistic sectors and accept these as eternally fixed and given, as the ulti­ mate and unalterable frame of our life and thought, Marxism 15 "Vielleicht am plastischsten käme die Eigenart des Alltagsdenkens zum Ausdruck, wenn man die Sprache von diesem be­ sonderen Standpunkt einer eingehenden Analyse unterworfen würde." (G.L.: Die Eigenart des Ästh. 1. Halbband. p. 57.)

LUKACS'S IDEAS ON LANGUAGE

259

cannot dispense with the interpretation of language as an entirety in historical process or the study of the compli­ cated mediating system of other forms of expression based upon ordinary language. Ordinary language is the starting point of the investigation, but it is only a starting point. It is worth while to pay heed to a few points within Lukács's description of ordinary language, especially to the dialectical contradiction which, according to Aesthetics, is the central organizing principle of the problems arising here. One of the aspects of this contradiction is that while lan­ guage is the substantial property of mind ("the practical mind itself"), as regards its functioning, the movement of its structures, it is unconscious. This point is expressed by Lukács in another way: by means of the category of "mediation", but owing precisely to this category he goes beyond a simple description of the paradox in question: "people necessarily relate to speech immediately, though as regards its nature it 1 fl

is a system of more and more complicated mediations." Through such an application of the category of mediation the problem of language is placed in the light of the comprehensive proper­ ties of human life activity. According to this, any new achiev­ ement involves a higher complication of determinations and a further articulation of the social conditions of life, and at the same time it becomes a "natural", spontaneously manifest element of activity and thought extremely simplifying the relations of people to the world and one another. It is here that the source of the further aspects of the dialectical contradiction stressed by Lukács lies: it is the spontaneous "...sie sich zur Sprache - obwohl diese ihrem Wesen nach ein System von immer komplizierteren Vermittlungen ist - not­ wendig unmittelbar verhalten." (G.L.: Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen. 1. Halbband. p. 59.)

260

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

naturalness of language that makes available all that is not immediately given to us, and the very same spontaneous availability hampers the "unbiassed take-in" of the world. This last remark refers to a problem which is not examined by Lukåcs in detail, but to which he undoubtedly ascribes due significance. It can be summarized as follows: the structures of language influence the course of cognition in a definite direction. Another momentum or rather consequence of the same contradiction is the two contrary tendencies influencing the whole dynamics of ordinary language, which are called by Lukåcs, in a metaphorical phrase, though rather accurately, "the tendencies towards rigidity and plasticity." Mentioning these two tendencies uncovers a comprehensive set of problems that belong to the sphere of various dis­ ciplines and delineate the core of a philosophical theory of language. The following question arises at this point: inso­ far as thought indeed presupposes language and insofar as the structures of the different human languages indeed deter­ mine thought, how is the universality of cognition possible? In answering the question much can be gained from a study of linguistic productivity. Lukåcs is not concerned with the linguistic or technical side of the question but it amounts to no exaggeration to say that the significance of the con­ ception of language in Aesthetics consists in stressing the tendencies mentioned above. And grasping these tendencies fixes a tie between the problems of ordinary language, on the one hand, and those of the sign systems carrying higher objectivizations: scientific and artistic language, on the other. It is to be expected on the basis of the discussion outlined in the foregoing that a number of important cate­ gories in Lukåcs's Aesthetics are connected to considerations of the theory of language and that - conversely - certain categories will induce questions concerning the theory of language. For example, this is the case with the differentia­ tion between "whole man" and "the whole of man" ("Das

LUKACS'S IDEAS ON LANGUAGE

261

Menschenganze") or with the interpretation of "unconscious". However, within the problems of the theory of language in Aesthetics, the central place is undoubtedly occupied by the hypothesis of the "primary signal system". Incidentally, judging from the viewpoint of psychology the hypothesis is rather doubtful. Thus, the only sensible question to ask is what problems the introduction of the con­ cept of the primary signal system would have been evoked to solve and whether the phenomena Lukács wishes to account for by means of this concept are indeed important from the point of view of our general problem of language. In this case, Lukács's hypothesis must by all means be regarded as a basis for discussion and a conception worthy of further contempla­ tion even if otherwise it ought to be discarded as a scientific explanation. It is reasonable to assume that later on Lukács .himself considered his ideas about the primary signal system in a similar way. In the chapter on reproduction in Ontology we find the following: "Subtlety increases in speech and in listening, and in my Aesthetics I called it the sphere of the knowledge of man (the correct knowledge of the individual partner) and I used the expression 'primary signal system1 to denote its organ." 1 7 Thus not even Lukács claims that this concept describes some kind of psychic reality, rather he holds it to be the name of a problem, a metaphorical circum­ locution of a set of phenomena. Paradoxically, as early as in Aesthetics the hypothesis of the primary signal system is expounded in a way which goes beyond a simple elaboration of Pavlov's doctrines. 17 "Es entsteht auch im Sprechen und Zuhören eine zunehmende Nuancierung, die ich in meiner Aesthetik als Gebiet der Menschenkenntnis (richtige Kenntnis des individuellen Part­ ners) beschrieben und als deren Organ ich dort das Signal­ system 1' bezeichnet habe." (G.L.: Zur Ontologie... p. 92)

262

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Moreover, though Lukács modestly speaks of a "supplementary proposal", he clearly starts from the recognition of the weakness of the explanatory power of Pavlov's reflex theory with respect to the phenomena he was mainly interested in. For the division according to,the paired categories of the primary and the secondary signal systems cannot comprise the totality of specific human utterances. According to the logic of this division, any response that cannot at all or can only defectively be verbalized counts as a simple con­ ditioned reflex; consequently, the specific human nature of the specific psychic quality inherent in these responses will become inapprehensible. The fact that the primary signal system is created to fill in that blank space is best evidenced by Lukács's lucid critical comments, one of which will be quoted below. Pavlov recounts a case of aphasia, a patient who completely lost his ability to speak after a fit of epilepsy but could make himself understood by means of drawings. Pavlov judges the case to be an example of a possible separation of the primary signal system from the secondary. The assessment shows that Pavlov considers nonverbal messages as the operation of the primary signal system. He seems to assume also that the secondary signal system is simply added to the first in man, that is, he does not look upon the two planes of signals as an organic whole within which the lower plane is rendered under the higher one and undergoes a substantial structural change compared to the reflex activity in animals. Lukács unequi­ vocally asserts the doubtfulness of this view: "The drawing of an object - in contradiction to Pavlov - can in no wise be conceived as conditioned reflex. If the word 'tree' must be interpreted as a signal of signals, then the tree drawn in the same manner contains the generalizing apprehension of the tree immediately perceived which in its immediacy elicits

LUKACS'S IDEAS ON LANGUAGE

263

unconditioned or conditioned reflexes." It should be clear from the examples that Lukåcs's hypothesis had a number of justifiable motives and the con­ siderations underlying it have contributed to an overall specification of the problem of language . This specification takes into account not only a few conspicuous forms of lin­ guistic activity but is based on a comprehensive view of the relevant phenomena. Today, however, these phenomena can be accounted for far more successfully by means of the concep­ tual apparatus of linguistics (for instance, by demonstrating the coding of paralinguistic elements), the devices of com­ munication theory, psycho- and sociolinguistics, or the creation of a general semiotic framework. While analysing the dialectics of the conscious and un­ conscious, Lukåcs points out that in the dynamic structure of ordinary language the most general characteristics of human practice and social development are expressed. 1 9 In this respect language is not only a system of signs, an ex­ ternal mediator of internal psychic contents but is the category of practice in a definite sense. Marxist works on language have not yet raised the question to what extent this influences the formal represen­ tation of language. With no respect to whether and to what extent Lukâcs's analyses can be made to correspond to the formal models of language, the theoretical connection between 18 "Das Zeichen eines Gegenstandes kann - im Gegensatz zu Pawlow - unter keinen Umständen als einfacher bedingter Reflex aufgefasst werden. Wenn das Wort Baum als Signal von Signalen ausgelegt werden muss, so enthält ein gezeichneter Baum ebenso eine verallgemeinernde Fassung des unmittelbar wahrgenommenen Baums, der in seiner Unmittelbarkeit einen unbedingten order bedingten Reflex auslöst." (G.L.: Die Eigenart des Ästhe­ tischen. 2. Halbband p. 85.) 19 G.L.: Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen. 1. Halbband, p. 61.

264

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

language and practice marks the point which separates the Marxist conception of language from all traditional posi­ tions. This is where Ontology takes up the thread of anal­ ysis: "Such an analysis of the continuity of social existence will necessarily lead us to language as an important complex 20 developed within this complex of social existence." Thus, the problem of language is raised by the analysis of social existence itself, and language as such must be construed as a complex within social existence, one connected to the sphere of social existence. This gives rise to the most general defini­ tion of language: " [language is J the organ and medium of the 21 continuity realized in social existence." However simple and self-evident this definition may be, assuming its central position in the theory sheds new light upon the whole problem of language. For the tradition of linguistics and philosophy has placed the definition of language as the instrument of thought and communication in the centre. This definition, no doubt, is correct, though it needs further elaboration since it does not contain, not even in an abstract manner, refer­ ences to social needs developed through history which lan­ guage must in the first place satisfy. Now, in Lukacs's opinion, every kind of explanation for language presupposes the know­ ledge of these needs, which emerged from the most general structure of social existence. Logically, the category of reproduction allows for a detailed account of these problems. 20 "Diese Analyse der Kontinuität im gesellschaftlichen Sein führt notwendig zur Sprache als zu einem wichtigen Komplex innerhalb dieser Komplexität des gesellschaftlichen Seins." (G.L.: Zur Ontologie ... p. 79.) 21 "Organ und Medium der Kontinuität im gesellschaftlichen Sein" (G.L.: Zur Ontologie ... p. 80.)

LUKACS'S IDEAS ON LANGUAGE

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Such a change in the logic of the question has the consequence that the theory of the nature and genesis of lan­ guage must form a unified theory at least on the most general level, and this must be thought of as a general semiotic framework which provides an outlook on the problems of animal communication alongside with human communication. What was said in the foregoing also makes it possible for the significance of the relationship of labour and lan­ guage to be presented in a more comprehensive way. Labour is not only the driving force of the genesis of language but also the explanatory principle for the structural characteristics of language. In other words, what should be noted in Lukåcs's work is not simply that the historical occurrence of labour accounts for the historical occurrence of language but that the structures of language continually embed into the struc­ tural relations of the labour process. Note in this connec­ tion Lukàcs's remark that the tendency towards "species being" ("Gattungswesen"), which objectively emerges from the struc­ ture of labour, "develops further" in language. That is, since "the most ordinary words express the generality of the object, the genus or the species, and not the individual instance, Γ... Ί the objective intention of language is directed ab ovo to the regularity of the subject, to the objectivity of the 22 object designated by it." Incidentally, it is worth noticing that contrary to some of his earlier remarks Lukács regards the striving for generality and the objectivity of the object as an ab ovo tendency of language. That "it is linguistical­ ly impossible to find a word that defines unambiguously the 22 "...jedes einfachste, alltäglichste Wort stets die Allge­ meinheit des Gegenstandes ausdrückt, die Gattung, die Art, nicht das Einzelexemplar ..."; "...ist in der Sprache von Anfang an eine objektive Intention auf die Gesetzmässigkeit des Subjekts, auf die Objektivität im von ihr bezeichneten Gegenstand wirksam." (G.L.: Zur Ontologie ... p. 87.)

266

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

individuality of some object" is tantamount to saying that it is a logical property of language independent of factual and historical circumstances. According to Leibniz's account, individuality can be approached but cannot be attained through the most concrete possible designation of the species. Thus particularity will serve as the special sphere of the linguistic expression endeavouring to grasp individuality. As has been shown, the act of referring, in which concrete objects are referred to and which involves the application of proper names or singular descriptions, is a function not of the concreteness of meanings but of "ad­ vanced syntax". The connection of the structural characteristics of language and the basic structure of labour is with Lukács not equivalent to stating some kind of isomorphic corres­ pondence. This must be made clear, since in the recent lit­ erature of semiotics one is likely to come across certain trends to "shortcircuiting" the relationship of labour and language: they subsume even the concrete categories of lin­ guistics under the politico-economic category of labour, which may well lead to "labour" left as a metaphor explaining everything and nothing at the same time. However, besides the structural interrelations shown in this context, Lukács stresses also the autonomy of language, which is expressed (in the phraseology of his categories) by stating the essential difference between labour and language with respect to the orientation towards "species being" as well as es­ tablishing the relationship of the individual and the general. The basis of the necessary generality of language is the fact that prior to any act of cognition labour is itself an ob­ jective process of generalization. In labour, however, whatever 23 "...ja dass es sprachlich einfach unmöglich ist, für die Einzelheit irgendeines Gegenstandes ein dieses eindeutig bestimmendes Wort zu finden." (G.L.: Zur Ontologie ... p. 87.)

LUKACS'S IDEAS ON LANGUAGE

267

is merely particular is eliminated so that the "objectively optimal", the "species being" should have preference, whereas, according to the above, language must have the tendency to individualization besides (and on the strength of) generaliza­ tion. Moreover, "the more the original community of purely particular individuals changes to a community of personali­ ties, the more linguistic expression must tend to individual„24 ïze. When commenting on this statement, we can call atten­ tion to an interesting methodological principle. Lukács cla­ rifies the logical properties of language, such as the ability to express the general and the individual, starting from the social relations of people and their communities, thus he is not content to emphasize merely cognitive aspects. Another point of importance as regards the problem touched upon here is that the structural determination of language by labour, on the one hand, and the autonomy of the logical structure of language, on the other, can be understood from the tele­ ology of labour. Yet this is not tantamount to explaining the nature and genesis of language on the basis of teleology. All that is at stake here is merely that the objective teleological structure inherent in labour, which is also the basis of all subjective teleology, creates the "communicative content" for man. Just as labour and the division of labour are a priori simultaneous (that is, the division of the activity is genetically fixed), so are the creation of all real teleological relations and the articulation of the global 24 "Je mehr sich die ursprüngliche Gemeinschaft aus bloss partikularen Einzelnen sich zu der von Individualitäten, von Persönlichkeiten entwickelt, desto mehr muss der sprachliche Ausdruck auch seinerseits auf Individualisierung gerichtet werden." (G.L.: Zur Ontologie ... p. 9 2.)

268

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

objective of the total activity simultaneous. This is how the property of all animal species disintegrates the prop­ erty that the members of a species all "know" the same, or, in Lukacs's words, the reproduction of the species takes place within a world "known" in the same way. The articula­ tion of the objectives entails the attainablity of the ultimate and global objective of collective activity only through the conscious or unconscious interaction of people. That is what the following definition means: "Orignially language is a means to effect certain teleological supposi­ tions ("teleologische Setzungen") whose aim is to induce 25 other people to make certain teleological suppositions." Recall that it does not follow from Lukacs's thesis that teleology becomes absolute, or its significance exaggerated in an idealist manner. For his statements do not include the claim that language as the product of the teleology of labour and the means of the execution of the teleology of labour is in any sense a result of conscious creation and a prior setting of objectives. As was shown above, the whole of Lukacs's explanation of language is footed on different grounds. The most important of its moral is the necessity to understand language as a category of existence before any interpretation of it as a category of social and individual consciousness. Even if Lukacs's analyses do not support our work in the grammatico-logical description of the formal characteristics of language and even if some of the details of Lukacs's theory may well be criticized in the light of anthropology and formal theories of language, the above statement can be overlooked by noone who intends to find a place for the issue of language among the problems of Marxism. 25 "sie ist ursprünglich das gesellschaftliche Instrument, jene teleologischen Setzungen zur Geltung zu bringen, die das Ziel haben, andere Menschen zu bestimmten teleologischen Zetzungen anzuleiten." (G.L.: Zur Ontologie ... p. 90.)

THE REINCARNATION OF RAISING (or how to raise NPs without a raising rule) Istvan Kenesei 0. For some it has been considered an undisputed fact that trace theory is incompatible with Subject-to-Object raising rules. Evidence in support of Raising has been claim­ ed to query the tenability of trace theory on the one hand, and, on the other, trace theorists have argued from the be­ ginning that there are metatheoretical as well as empirical reasons why Raising should be annihilated. However, recent modifications in trace theory have had considerable impact on the original arguments against Raising; this paper will try to show that Subject-to-Object Raising is now readily re­ concilable with trace theory since the argumentation used to refute it has collapsed owing to modifications by its very proponents in the meantime. 1. Trace theory made its first appearance in the context of efforts to show the universality of certain constraints on

*This is a slightly revised section from my dissertation Trace theory and relative clauses (1978), where the proposals men­ tioned here, such as those concerning wh Movement and filters, are discussed and criticized at some length.

270

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

the application of transf orm.ations

(Chomsky 1973). There were

three transformations involved: NP Movement, wh Movement, and each Movement, and the domain of their operation was the cy­ clic nodes. Of the three transformations each Movement will be the least interesting since it has been dropped from the grammar. This rule was meant to bring into correlation sen­ tences of the type of (1)

(2)

(1-2):

(a)

They each like the others.

(b)

They each appeared to John to like the others.

(a)

They like each other.

(b)

They appeared to John to like each other,

which were regarded as synonymous pairwise. But it was more in accordance with the general outline of the theory to construe each other as base generated

(like

reflexives, which show an amazing syntactic similarity to each o t h e r ) , and it was also demonstrated that the rule of interpretation applying to other(s) is not part of sentence grammar

(cf. Chomsky 19 73:254; Chomsky

1976:18ff; Dougherty

1974). NP Movement is an operation moving the constituents of a noun phrase of a proper factorization into another NP node filled by e_, the terminal identity element

(i.e. Emonds' 1970

dummy node on one interpretation; for the other see b e l o w ) . This transformation provides for Passive

(in both sentences

and noun phrases) and various kinds of promotion rules or Raising. To illustrate the effect of NP Movement consider

(3)

and (4): (3)

where

()



el seems

(b)

Γ

Johnl seems

Γ

el

in

Γ

Γ Γ

John I to know the secret [Np e 1 to know the secret 1

(3b) is the trace of the moved NP John.

(To

Note that the syntactical identity of dummy NPs and trace is the device which makes it possible for NP Preposing to apply in passivization.

271

THE REINCARNATION OF RAISING

avoid confusion NP will be used for the dummy N P and in gen­ eral the categorial symbol for the dummy category, and t for traces.) (4)

(a) NP is tough for us [- ^ John

(b)

^ for]

[g PRO to beat

NP ] ] is tough for us k

John

[for] [PRO to beat t ]]

where t_ is the trace of the NP John and PRO is best to con­ sider for the time being as a pronominal element inserted in­ to deep structure and assigned control by rules of interpreta­ tion. The third major transformation, w h Movement, affects question words and relative pronouns or phrases them

containing

(in short, w h - p h r a s e s ) , and moves them into clause-ini­

tial position, i.e., into the COMP node, as is shown in

(5)

and (6): (5)

(a) John wondered (b)

(6)

L

[ COM p N

John wondered  [     w

P + W H n o

] [s Peter kissed w h o ] ]

+WH] [

Peter kissed t ] ]

(a) [ N p the girl [ § ^ 0 Μ ρ NP -WH ] ^ Peter kissed who ]] ] (b) [ N p the girl

where the feature

[g [ COMp who - W ^ fe Peter kissed t ] ] ]

Γ+ W H ] differentiates

(embedded) questions

from relative clauses. In main clauses the same device is used to derive questions as in ( 7 ) : (7)

(a) [- [ COMp NP + W H ] [ S Peter kissed who ]] (b)

[s [COMP

who + W H

] [s P e t e r

kissed

t 1]

from which the root transformation Subject-Auxiliary

Inversion

will form the grammatical surface string (7c): (7)

(c) who did Peter kiss t

2.1. The structures and transformations shown in (3) to

(7)

comply with generally accepted views of transformational gram­ mar as modified according to the requirements of trace theory and by Emonds'

(1970) and Bresnan's

(1970) proposals concern­

ing the structure preserving hypothesis and the node Comple­ mentizer, respectively. One analysis might, however, look

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

272 surprising.

It used to be self-evident to suppose that verbs and adjectives of the type seem, appear, likely, certain, etc., which allow Subject-to-Subject Raising in the pre-tracetheoretical jargon, have an infinitival subject 1967 analysis, cf.

deep structure with a dummy it_ as subject cf.

(Rosenbaum's

(8a)), or have a sentential complement in (Emonds' analysis,

(8b)). Except for this difference, the derivations were

essentially the same: (8)

(a)

[

[

it

[

for John to like Mary]]

(b)

Γ

it seems

(c)

 John seems

(d)

John seems to like Mary.

Γ

for John to like Mary]] Γ

for to like Mary]]

The move to replace deep structures like by ones like

seems]

(8a) or

(8b)

(3a), which contains the embedded sentence as

a complement to the verb, and to prepose the embedded sub­ ject into the matrix subject position directly was probably the result of various, though not unrelated, reasons. First of all, the number and types of transformations can be reduced by eliminating one rule of Raising, as we shall see immediately. Secondly, the remaining rule of Rais­ ing

can be incorporated into NP Movement, which is then

much easier to state as a general rule of movement. Finally, 'in consequence of the elimination of the introduction of complementizers

transformational

(the Bresnan contra Rosenbaum

argument), there is no longer a common transformational path for tensed sentences and infinitival constructions - in addi­ tion to the nominal complement constructions separated the rest beforehand. This move is independently

from

approved of

by the X-Bar Theory of base rules. Thus the four structures (9a-b-c-d) now each go back to a different deep structure (10a-b-c-d), respectively: (9)

(a)

Peter believes that John is quiet,

(b)

Peter believes John to be quiet.

273

THE REINCARNATION OF RAISING

(10)

(c)

John is believed to be quiet.

(d)

Peter's belief that John is quiet.

(a)

[Peter believes

(b)

[Peter believes [John to be quiet]]

(c)

[NP believes

(d)

[Peter's [belief

[that John is quiet]]

[John to be quiet]] [that John is quiet]]]

However, the traditional distinction between and

'transitive'

'raising' verbs is not obliterated, since only in

but not in

matrix verb in deep structure, cf. (11)

(12)

(a)

(11a),

(11b), can the NP John be the direct object of the (12a-b):

John was forced to be quiet,

(b)

John was believed to be quiet.

(a)

NP forced John

(b)

NP believed

[PRO to be quiet]

[John to be quiet]

Clearly, the transformation moving the embedded subject John into matrix subject position in (12b) is the same as the one which applied to (3a). 2.2. When this was put forward in Chomsky

(1973), it already

indicated the shaping of a new, goal-oriented principle, which was more fully elaborated in Chomsky and Lasnik "One would assume that performance systems would

(1977): 'prefer' a

grammar in which the relation between deep and surface struc­ ture is as close as possible to be biunique." The problem of structures like

(462)

(10b) is, however, not

one of metatheoretical principles, but of a truly empirical kind. That was why Paul Postal, having had access to a prelim­ inary version of Chomsky

(1973), wrote a voluminous book on

the sole question whether or not there are rules of Raising. Observe that Chomsky has never denied that the NP moves, as it were, from subject to subject in case of, for example, (3), so the arguments and counterarguments are interesting to us insofar as they are concerned with Subject-to-Object

Rais­

ing .

3. If one wanted to evaluate the arguments against Raising

274

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(hereafter Raising is always meant as Subject-to-Object Rai­ sing unless otherwise stated) in Chomsky's "Conditions on Transformations", he would have to face quite a difficult task. One of the arguments is based on the factorization of the Passive transformation (which is later to become NP Move­ ment) given as (13): (13) X, N£, V, NP, Y. Now this would include in its domain not only (14a), but also (15a), which in turn underlies an ungrammatical sentence, (15b) : (14) (a) NP believe L [ the dog] to be hungry] (b) The dog is believed to be hungry. (a)

NP believe Γς Γ ρ the dog] is hungry] *The dog is believed is hungry. But "it would require an extra condition on the transformation to exclude [14a] from the domain of Passive with the structur­ al condition [l5a]" (237). Therefore, it is more expedient to add the universal constraint (16), of which an interim formula­ tion is quoted here: (16) The Tensed Sentence Condition "No rule can involve Χ, Υ in the structure ...X [¿. . . Z_ ... -WYV . . . ] ... where Y is not in COMP and oC is a tensed S." (244) The TSC (for short) of (16) will preclude the extraction of NP from (15a) but will allow extraction from (14a) . 3.1. The universality of the TSC was soon refuted by Bach and Horn (1976), who cited a sentence from Amharic as a counter­ example. If the TSC is correct, (17) should be ungrammatical, which it is definitely not, say  and H: (17) Yohannisinen habtam naw 1. John me rich is said 'John said I was rich.' "By any definition we can think of the internal clause of this sentence is tensed: naw is the third person masculine singular (15)

(b)

THE REINCARNATION OF RAISING

275

form of the verb meaning 'to be'. The form inen is marked with the definite object marker. ···] < most obvious [analysis for sentences like (17)] is that there is a rule of raising into object position that can apply to the subject of the em­ bedded sentence. . . .1 "But even if we adopt the . . .] Chomskyan analysis of [17 J and say that no raising has taken place, the Tensed Sen­ tence Condition must fall. For on the one hand 'morphological material' (in the form of the definite object marker -n on ¿nen) has been introduced in a tensed clause. [. . .1 And, on the other hand, . . .1 Passive can apply to structures immedi­ ately underlying [l 7] . " (Bach and Horn 1976:288) 3.2. Even if the TSC is deprived of its universality, it could still be a valid observation as far as English is concerned. But that depends partly on the identification (in the relevant respects) of the structures of (14a) and (15a). Now for the sake of argument suppose that the structure underlying sentences which contain verbs of the believe type is not as given in (14a) but something like the one in (18a), to which NP Movement can apply with the result as shown in (18b) : (18) (a) Peter believes NP [g COMP [g  John! to be quiet]] (b) Peter believes  John] [- COMP  t to quiet]] In effect, this analysis states minimally that Raising is not a structure-building rule, it does not 'construct' new nodes, but complies to Emonds' typology of transformations. The rules generating structures like (18a), which is given below in the form of a tree-diagram (19), have independent motivation in view of sentences such as (20a-b).

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

276 (19) COMP

(20)

(a) John forced Peter [COMP PRO to leave] (b) John persuaded Peter [cOMP PRO to leave] As is well-known, all empty nodes must be motivated inde­ pendently of the transformation/s/ which utilize them, ac­ cording to the basic tenets of Emonds' dissertation (1970: 37ff). They require that there be a phrase structure rule that, in this case, generates the string V-NP-S. And it is beyond all doubt that the relevant phrase structure rule does contain the sequence in question: , V NP S * (21)

VP

—>

Then verbs like force, persuade, as well as believe, expect, 2 etc. would all be specified for contexts —   si. The independ­ ently needed transformation NP Movement will move the subject NP of the embedded sentence to any appropriate (empty) NP in the matrix sentence: (22) (a) John expected NP [cOMP [ Peter] to leave] (b) John expected ^ Peter] [cOMP t to leave]

Further subcategorization of the verbs would contain features specifying what complementizers and what other contexts they can cooccur with.

THE REINCARNATION OF RAISING

277

The transformation cannot have moved any other NP because of the Specified Subject Condition (see below in (55)), and if the rule were to move the embedded subject directly into the matrix subject position, as in (23a-b), the resulting struc­ ture would be marked as ungrammatical on account of its con­ taining an empty node. (23) (a) NP expected NP [COMP [ John] to leave] (b) Γ John] was expected NP [COMP t to leave] If, finally, all NP slots are lexically filled in deep struc­ ture, as in (24), rules of interpretation will asterisk the structure, just like they do in the case of structures con­ taining the verbs s m or persuade when all slots are filled, cf. (25a-b) (24) John believes Mary [cOMP Peter to be quiet] (25) (a) John seems [COMP Mary to have left] (b) John persuaded Mary [COMP Peter to leavej Such a solution is, however, out of the question for trace theory as developed so far for what might be termed metatheoretical reasons. Chomsky himself, as well as a number of his followers, have remarked that Raising is objectionable because it does not change the order of elements but only re­ arranges constituent structure: Raising "is a rule which in any event does not modify the form of the terminal string [and since] there is no necessity for a rule raising the subject of an embedded sentence to the object position of the matrix sentence [owing to TSC, one] might then raise the question whether cyclic transformations should not be constrained so as to forbid operations that never change the terminal string of a phrase marker but only its structure, as in the original formulations of subject rai­ sing to object position." (Chomsky 1973:254; cf. also Lightfoot 1976) However, in a note appended to the refutation of the rule, Lightfoot gives a counterexample to the above proposal, which is

278

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

based on to contraction. Whenever t_o Contraction may apply, it is a rule that does not change the terminal string but only constituent structure as is clear from Bresnan's for­ mulation :

(26)

[s X Y, t o Ζ Y ] —*-

[s X V + to V Y ]

But let us suppose with Lightfoot that all cliticization rules (of which (26) is one) are excepted from the scope of the principle, and examine whether Raising as formulated here stands up to scrutiny - at least as well as other rules pro­ posed by Chomsky or his collaborators. Sure enough, Raising as described in (18a-b) is simply not a distinct rule of the grammar, but one subcase of the general rule NP Movement. 3.3. The question now is whether or not Raising changes the order of elements in the terminal string under these circum­ stances, and if not, whether it is in general possible to allow rules which do not meet Chomsky's proposed constraint. The answer to the first half of the question depends crucially on how we construe the node Complementizer. When Chomsky formulated the constraint to prohibit, among others, the inclusion of Raising in the grammar, he assumed there was no COMP node in the infinitival complements to believe-verbs. Obviously, it was impossible for Raising to rearrange the order of elements. However, in Chomsky and Lasnik (1977) we find the following base rules: (27) (a) s" ■- COMP S (their (46a))  VIE)

(b)

COMP — —

J for 

(their (84a))

l~J

Note that the null complementizer (0), in which we are now interested, is not a zero constituent; it is morphologically on a par with any other constituent. Besides, it cannot be null simply because no phrase structure rule is allowed to

THE REINCARNATION OF RAISING

279

have a zero outcome (cf. Chomsky's 1965 definition of re­ writing rules). What is more, in neither of the alternative solutions  and L discuss is the relevant COMP node morphol­ ogically null: "we would take 'overt complementizer' to mean any complementizer morpheme generated in the base, whether it is phonetically realized or not" (477; emphasis supplied). That is tantamount to saying that Raising does rearrange or­ der. Now suppose that Chomsky's proposed constraint is re­ placed by a much stricter one, which requires that rules change the order of what are to become phonetically realized elements. Apart from the near-impossibility of stating such a constraint (which would anyway be suspect of being a global rule), it would fatally destroy another general rule in trace theory: wh Movement. 3.4. In answer to the second half of our question (whether it is possible to allow rules that do not rearrange order), we may recall the transformation wh Movement, which places (con­ stituents containing) question words or relative pronouns, i.e. wh-phrases, into the COMP node (cf. (5-6-7)). When, however, a wh-phrase is the subject of the sen­ tence in the domain of wh Movement, it will undergo the op­ eration as shown below in (28-29): (28) (29)

(a) [g [ NP +WH] [g who saw John]] (b)  g Fwho + W H ] [t saw John]]

(a) |-Np the man tø [CQMp NP -WH] [g who saw John]]] (b)  the man   who -WH [t saw John]]] Needless to say, neither the original nor the strict version of Chomsky's proposed constraint would allow structures like (28b) or (29b) to be generated. Of course arguments of this kind are uninteresting, since wh Movement is a single rule and is to be verified or refuted as such. But so is NP Move­ ment in all relevant respects. We can conclude then that both the claim against the universality of Raising and the meta-

280

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

theoretical arguments to oust it from the grammar are un­ substantiated. 4. Let us now see arguments the some four hundred pages solely to considerations of Linguistic Inquiry it would to draw on.

of a more empirical nature. Given of Postal's On Raising, devoted this kind, and the rejoinders in be hard to say there is too little

4.1. The attacks Postal makes upon Chomsky's view of the non­ existence of Raising are, according to Lightfoot (1976), twopronged: one type of arguments is used to prove that the se­ quence NP-to-VP is not one constituent (recall that it is dom­ inated by S in trace theory), and another set of arguments shows that some rules apply to derived subjects but not to derived objects, while others to derived objects but not to derived subjects, and all of the latter (but none of the for­ mer) are applicable to 'raised' NPs, which must then be con­ sidered as object NPs of the matrix verb. Before I outline Postal's reasoning, it seems necessary to evaluate the rather unusual dispute Postal's book induced. In the paragraph above we showed how Lightfoot analyzes the types of arguments Postal makes use of. Bresnan (1976), how­ ever, spares no effort to show in what way Postal's objec­ tions are, or are not, capable of destroying Chomsky's con­ ceptions, but attacks Postal's arguments one by one citing what she means to be examples of the force of counterarguments, but what in effect are counterexamples at their best, or even exceptions. That such a distinction is very much in order is a consequence of Chomsky's own position in this issue: "To find evidence to support or to refute a proposed condition on rules, it does not suffice to list unexplained phenomena; rather, it is necessary to present rules, i.e., to present a fragment of grammar. The confirmation or refutation will be as convincing as the fragment of rules presented. [*···] The status

THE REINCARNATION OF RAISING

281

of conditions on rules is empirical, but evidence can only be indirect and the argument, one way or another, is neces­ sarily rather abstract and 'theory bound'." (Chomsky 1977: 74; emphasis added) On the assumption that the above statement can be applied not only to conditions on rules but also to rules proper I will refer to this quotation as Chomsky's principle of grammatical argument. Now Bresnan claims Postal (1974) is subject to similar criticism in that it sets up no rules at all to account for the data he presents. But Postal (1977) in answer to Bresnan remarks that the rule of Raising is self-explanatory on the one hand, and, on the other, it is Bresnan herself who gives "absolutely none" of the formalizations she blames Postal for failing to supply. It might be discerned from the foregoing that these mutual accusations are only important insofar as they point at the defects of both Postal's and Bresnan's approaches, since our own proposed rule of Raising is part of the general system of rules and observes all the relevant conditions in the spirit of Chomsky's principle of grammatical argument. By being unable, or simply neglecting, to show how the edge of Postal's arguments can be blunted, Bresnan commits the error of leaving Postal's claims unanswered; so it is fully legit­ imate for us to use them as possible counterarguments against a non-raising grammar. 4.2. Having now more or less clarified the status of Bres­ nan' s objections, let us take a closer look at Postal's book. Again recall that in trace theory believe-verbs take the con­ text S, where S can be both NP-t£-VP and that-S, omitting complementizers for the moment. The sequence NP-to-VP is sup­ posedly a single constituent (with or without the complement­ izer) dominated by an S node, so, according to Postal, it should undergo all the operations whose domain includes an S

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

282

node. The result undoubtedly supports Postal's case. For example, there is a well-known transformation, nicknamed Right Node Raising (RNR), which can be roughly described as "given certain paired sequences of identical constituents in distinct clauses, RNR places the double of the sequence on the right by Chomsky adjunction, and de­ letes all original occurrences." (Postal 1974:126) Then, following Postal, the sentence (30) is derived from (31a) through RNR and Equi-deletion as in (31b) : (30) Jack may be - and Tony certainly is - a werewolf. (31)

(a)

Jack may be [a werewolf]

0

Tony certainly is [a werewolf]

0

Whatever the formal derivation may be, some transformation like RNR is operative also in case of full complement sen­ tences, e.g. in (32): (32)

(a)

Henry claimed that Tom is dishonest, but nobody has so far proved that Tom is dishonest.

THE REINCARNATION OF RAISING

283

(b)

Henry claimed - but nobody has so far proved that Tom is dishonest. However, nothing of the kind seems to be available for NPto-VP sequences, cf. (33) (a) Henry claimed Tom to be dishonest, but nobody has so far proved Tom to be dishonest, (b) *Henry claimed - but nobody has so far proved - Tom to be dishonest. Bresnan's objection to this reasoning seems to have little force if any. She cites (34) as a counterexample: (34) I find it hard to believe - but Joan finds it easy to believe - Tom is dishonest. and claims that "RNR is a sufficient but not necessary test for constituency, ... From the fact that A cannot be a right node it does not follow that A cannot be a constituent" (Bresnan 1976:493), but Tom is dishonest is a constituent. That is true; however, Bresnan's failure to account for how structures like (32b) are generated, while (33b) and (34) are blocked, surely disregards, if not violates, Chomsky's princi­ ple of grammatical argument. For (34) is not derived by first deleting the complementizer that and then moving the rest of the S by means of RNR, but rather vice versa. No similar pro­ cedure is available for (33a-b) since nothing has been deleted. Therefore the explanation must be sought elsewhere, and until it is found, Postal's argument stands to reason. The argument from RNR was just one among those directed against contemplating the surface string NP-to-VP as a single constituent. 4.3. The other type of arguments serves to show that the NP of the sequence NP-to-VP is a surface object rather than subject. One rule indicative of that is the Comples NP Shift, which moves 'heavy' objects from their original position to the right of the clause they are in (according to Ross 1967), cf.

284 (35)

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(a)

I showed the cookies to Jack.

(b)

'I showed to Jack the cookies.

(c)

I showed to Jack all the coffee ground and lettuce cookies.

The same operation is inapplicable in case of either a that-clause or a for+S construction, even if the embedded

subject

NP is extremely heavy; cf. (36)

(a)

Allen showed that those teachers who

continually

gave him poor grades were Martians, (b)

*Allen showed that were Martians those teachers

(a)

It would be tragic for all the girls who got

who continually gave him poor grades. (37)

pregnant to have abortions. (b)

*It would be tragic

(for) to have abortions all 3

the girls who got pregnant.

But Complex NP Shift works all right on NP-to-VP construc­ tions, cf. (38)

(a)

Allen showed those teachers who continually gave him poor grades to be Martians,

(b)

Allen showed to be Martians those teachers who continually gave him poor grades.

4.4.

A third type of argument which is utilized by Postal

but overlooked both in Bresnan

(1976) and Lightfoot

(1976)

is perhaps more interesting than those reviewed above. Its absence from both criticisms of Postal was probably due to the fact that the section in which it was published was en­ titled

'Potential arguments', as it w e r e , letting everyone

underrate its contents. One of the arguments in this group involves the scope of quantifiers and draws on the various possibilities of interpretation sentences containing quanti­ fiers can offer.

In this case, for cannot be moved with the NP; the rule pre­ cludes this possibility by being specifically stated as in­ volving NPs.

285

THE REINCARNATION OF RAISING

Postal found that sentences like

(39) are ambiguous

depending on whether the quantifier has a 'narrow' or a 'wide' scope, and can be paraphrased roughly as the

(1) and

(2) readings, respectively, in (40): (39)

(a)

I believe that someone insulted Arthur.

(b)

The FBI proved that few students were spies.

(c)

Melvin showed that none of the formulas were theorems.

(40)

(a1) I believe that there is someone who insulted Arthur. (a2) There is someone who I believe insulted Arthur. ()

The FBI proved that there were few students who were spies.

(b2) There were few students who the FBI proved were spies. (c1) Melvin showed that there were no formulas which were theorems. (c2) There were no formulas which Melvin showed were theorems. However, if the NPs containing the quantifiers are part of the V-NP-to-VP

sequence, the narrow scope

and we are left only with the wide scope

(1) readings vanish (2) interpretation -

small wonder if we accept a raising analysis

(or its equiv­

alent) , but incompatible with the V-S analysis of Chomsky's version of trace theory; cf. (41)

(a)

I believe someone to have insulted Arthur.

(b)

The FBI proved few students to be spies.

(c)

Melvin showed none of the formulas to be theorems.

Such a difference between what were alleged to be identical structures with respect to semantic interpretation is unjus­ tified and inexplicable in the framework of a non-raising anal. 4 ysis. 4 The proposed principle of surface structure

interpretation

is of no help here for the non-raising analysis, since the (footnote 4 continued)

286

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

5. If we now wanted to examine the genuine empirical argu­ ments against Raising put forward by the proponents of trace theory, it will come as a surprise that either they were too weak from the beginning or the context in which they were formulated has since been found ill-conceived and has been altered by the very people who advanced them, there­ by disqualifying their own arguments. 5.Ί. One such group of arguments involved each Movement, but I will refrain from discussing them since each Movement has proved to be a nonexistent transformation. 5.2. The only other truly empirical argument I have found is based on tough Movement, itself a rather ill-understood phe­ nomenon. Its main point is that NPs that are the true objects of verbs embedded under tough-prediates can undergo tough Movement, but NPs which are not cannot; cf. (42)

(a) (b)

NP was easy for Jones [for PRO to force Smith [PRO to recover]] Smith was easy for Jones to force to recover.

(43)

(a)

NP was easy for Jones [for PRO to expect

[Smith to recover ] ] (b) * Smith was easy for Jones to expect to recover. The V-S analysis in (42a-43a) indeed shows why there can be no Raising in the context of believe-verbs. Although Postal tried to fend off the fatal effects of this argument by pointing out that Raising is acceptable in case of predicative adjectives (e.g. Jones is hard to consider competent.), he failed to give any indication of how (43b) could be blocked. So this is the only argument that stays afloat and provides evidence against Raising. However, in view of data which showed that tough Movement violates the Speci­ fied Subject Condition (see below in (55)), Chomsky (1977) (footnote 4 continued) wide-scope reading is not available for an embedded quantifier under any circumstances. Some facts of the scope and interpretation of quantifiers are obscure in this context, especially those connected with the use of the indefinite article as a (footnote 4 continued)

287

THE REINCARNATION OF RAISING

substantially revised tough/easy + complement constructions, with the side effect of weakening his own argument against Raising. According to this revision, the general rule wh Movement swallows up a number of various transformations including tough Movement. The new analysis of tough Movement phenomena posits (44a) as underlying (44b), which is derived through wh Movement into COMP : (44)

(a)

John is easy (for us) Ν

ΓCOMP

NP

~WH

for

]

PR0

t0

please who] (b) John is easy (for us) ["■= [who fori PRO to please t. ] The structure (44b) will then undergo wh- and for-deletion yielding the familiar sentence: (45) John is easy (for us) to please. Now if this reanalysis is applied to (42)-(43), the transforma­ tion wh Movement will change the deep structures (46a) and (47a) into the intermediary structures (46b) and (47b), respec­ tively : (46) (a) Smith was easy for Jones 1"·= for PRO to force who fg PRO to recover]] (b) Smith was easy for Jones fe who for PRO to force ¿ f"g PRO to recover]] (47) (a) Smith was easy for Jones [■= for PRO to expect |"^ who to recover]! (b) Smith was easy for Jones - who for PRO to expect ^ t. to recover ] ] In order to account for the ungrammaticality of (43b), (47b) must be blocked, that is, wh Movement in the embedded sen­ tence must be prohibited. However, the sentences in (48) show that wh Movement is perfectly possible in the relevant con­ texts : (footnote 4 continued) quantifier /cf. Bach 19 77/. But the systematic behaviour of the quantifiers in /39-41/ must be accounted for by any analysis and raising grammars meet the challenge with. ease.

288 (48)

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(a) Who do you expect to recover? (b) The man (who) I expect to recover The only solution Chomsky's framework allows would follow from the requirement that "the underlying structure must contain an embedded S as complement to easy, with an obli­ gatory PRO subject." (Chomsky 1977:103) That restriction is necessary to block the occurence of wh-phrases in subject position, thus preventing ungrammatical sentences such as (49b) from being generated: (49) (a) John is easy [for who to talk] (b) *John is easy to talk. This is simply a new way of stating the familiar restriction on the transformation tough Movement, viz. that it is not permitted to operate on embedded subjects. Suppose that we extend this restriction to subjects in 'lower' sentences say­ ing that however deeply embedded the subject is, it cannot be moved if it is a wh-phrase in the complement to tough-predicates. (Note that it can only be carried out in a non-raising grammar.) Putting aside all possible reservations which may arise from formulating the constraint and conceding that it would handle one type of irregularity, let us now see another that no constraint mentioning subjects could deal with. Nei­ ther of the pair of sentences (50a-b) seems to go through, al­ though both of (50c-d) are grammatical: (50) (a) * The police are easy to arrest us. (b) *The police are easy for us to be arrested by. (c) It is easy for the police to arrest us. (d) It is easy for us to be arrested by the police. Although all proposed analyses of the constructions in ques­ tion can block (50a), none of them (including Chomsky's) can prevent (50b). One possible explanation we can envisage would rely on referring to the information 'deep agent', since in the cases of (43b), (49b), and (50b) it is apparently the deep agent of some one of the embedded sentences in the complement to easy that cannot be associated with the surface subject of easy.

THE REINCARNATION OF RAISING

289

Owing to its neutrality with respect to the existence of Raising, this solution will, incidentally, deprive (42-43) of their value as a counterexample to Raising. 6. It must by now be evident that there are in fact no gen­ uine empirical arguments against Raising, or rather, against Raising as incorporated into NP Movement. The analyses that have been brought up against Raising depend crucially on the framework they have been formulated in. And, as frameworks - alas - often change, the force of the arguments wanes. But before we draw any final conclusion let us now re­ turn to the problem of NP Movement, i.e. Passive, in (14) and (15), repeated here somewhat simplified as (51) and (52), which so far have not been accorded any reasonable explana­ tion in our conception of Raising: (51) (a) NP believe [the dog to be hungry] (b) The dog is believed to be hungry. (52) (a) NP believe [the dog is hungry 1 (b) *The dog is believed is hungry. If the factorization of NP Movement as given in (13) is ac­ ceptable, which we have no reason to doubt, it is now neces­ sary to account for the ungrammaticality of (52b) . However, recent revisions of trace theory have rendered this task superfluous. Chomsky and Lasnik (1977) postulate a framework in which no deletion transformation precedes any movement transformation. Clearly, for (52a) to arise that deletion must have applied on the structure immediately underlying it. But once a deletion transformation has worked on a structure, no movement is possible, so (52b) simply cannot be derived. If, in turn, the factorization of NP Movement were modiThere was yet another argument against Raising, from the so-called picture-nominals. But this context was again equivocally treated, and has remained a nebulous area (cf. Chomsky 1973:249f, 1977; Bach and Horn 1976).

290

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

fied to allow for the non-contiguity of V and NP, which in­ stead of or in addition to (52b) would permit structures like (53) to be generated: (53) *The dog is believed that is hungry. Chomsky and Lasnik's filter (68) - quoted here as (54) would mark the resulting structures ungrammatical. (54)

* Γ- that Γ

el . . .] , unless S or its trace is in the context: Γ

NP

... ]

where e_ stands for trace. The filter (54) allows contiguous sequences of that and a verb only in relative clauses, thus excluding NP Movement from the subject positions of tensed clauses. As for extraction of NPs from postiions other than subject in embedded sentences, this operation is blocked by the Specified Subject Condition (55): (55) "No rule can involve Χ, Υ in the structure ... X ... [a. . . Z_ ... WYV . . . ] ... where Z_ is the specified subject of WYV in oC." (Chomsky 19 73:239) (For a more recent formulation, see Chomsky 1977:78). Needless to say the same condition (55) will see to it that, after the embedded subject has been "raised" as in (56-b) , its trace, which has the status of a specified subject, be used to block the promotion of any NP from the embedded sentence. 7. In this paper I have tried to show why it was necessary to refuse the inclusion of Raising in the first version of the Revised Extended Standard (i.e. trace) Theory of syntax, how the metatheoretical arguments against Raising were ren­ dered irrelevant in consequence of new developments in the theory, and what empirical evidence there is for the revival of Raising in its new shape. As it stands, Raising has indeed no chance of survival; but the fairly general rule of NP Move­ ment cannot avoid incorporating it, precisely because of its comprehensiveness. In other words, Raising will no longer be regarded as a separate rule (a position ardently supported by Postal), but will be subsumed under NP Movement - automatical­ ly, as it were.

THE REINCARNATION OF RAISING

291

References Bach, Emmon (1977), "Review of Postal [1974], " Lg. 53. , 621-654. Bach, Emmon, and George G. Horn (1976), "Remarks on 'Condi­ tions on transformations'," LI 7., 265-299. Bresnan, Joan (1970), "On complementizers: toward a syntactic theory of complement types," FL 6. (1976), "Nonarguments for Raising, "LI 7,, 485-502. Chomsky, Noam (1965), Aspects of the theory of syntax, Cam­ bridge: ΜΓΤ Press. (1973), "Conditions on transformations," In: S.Anderson and P. Kiparsky (eds.), Festschrift for Morris Halle, New York: Holt, pp. 232-286. (1976), "Conditions on rules of grammar," LingAn. 2., 303-351. (1977), "On wh-movement," In: Culicover et al. pp. 71-132. Chomsky, Noam, and Howard Lasnik (1977), "Filters and control," LI 8., 425-504. Culicover, Peter W., Thomas Wasow, Adrian Akmajian (eds.) (1977), Formal syntax, New York: Academic Press. Dougherty, Ray C. (1974), "The syntax and semantics of each other constructions," FL 12. Empnds, Joseph (1970), Root and structure preserving trans­ formations , unpublished Doctoral dissertation, M.I.T., Cambridge. Lightfoot, David (1976) , "The theoretical importance of sub­ ject raising," FL 14. Postal, Paul M. (1974), On Raising: one rule of English gram­ mar and its theoretical implications, Cambridge: MIT Press. (1977), "About a 'nonargument' for Raising," LI 8., 141-154. Rosenbaum, Peter S. (1967), The grammar of English predicate complement constructions, Cambridge: MIT Press.

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN* Ferene Kiefer 1. The aim of this paper is to define various aspectual cate­ gories and then examine how the defined aspectual system can be used to describe certain phenomena in Hungarian. In particu­ lar, we shall be concerned with the question which predictions can be made as to the meaning of prefixes in Hungarian. These predictions will then be checked on the class of verbs which may be prefixed with meg-. Although Hungarian is in general not considered to be a par excellence aspectual language it will be shown that the meaning of prefixes can largely be de­ termined by means of aspectual categories . The descriptive apparatus to be used will contain certain novel features which might prove useful in the discussion of the aspectual system of other languages as well. * I wish to express my gratitude for commenting on an earlier version of this paper to the following persons: Ilona Molnar, Katalin Radies, Robert Hetzron and Julius Moravcsik. By defining the notion of aspectual language one generally takes into consideration lexically given aspectual oppositions only. It goes without saying that there is no par excellence aspectual language if aspect is conceived of as belonging to the overall structure of sentences.

294

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

2. Before embarking on the discussion of the various aspec­ tual categories, I shall have to make some general remarks. 2.1. The first remark concerns the category of time. To be sure, time is a complex category. In the present context, however, it will suffice to make some elementary distinctions. First of all, it is evident that sentences may exhibit two different types of temporal categories. The first type situ­ ates the sentence with respect to utterance time. According to Reichenbach, temporal specification involves three notions of time: Speech Time, Reference Time and Event Time which we 2 . Speech Time is

may denote by St , Rt and Ε , respectively

the time at which a given sentence is uttered, that i s , the moment of utterance

(=utterance t i m e ) . Reference Time is the

time indicated by the sentence which, of course, need not be the same as Speech Time. Consider ( 1)

I see you.

(2)

I saw you yesterday.

In

(1) St abd Rt are identical, in

( 2 ) , on the other hand,

Rt, is prior to S . Event Time refers to the moment at which 3 the relevant event or state occurs . Notice that Et is iden­ tical to Rt in both (1) and (2) but not in ( 3 ) : (3)

I had already seen you last week.

In this sentence, St is the moment when given by the temporal expression

(3) is uttered, Rt is

'last week' and Et is an un-

2 Cf. Reichenbach

19 47. We do not have to bother with the vari­

ous possible refinements of Reichenbach's system, since we are not concerned here with the details of deictic time. 3 One should perhaps already at this point distinguish between events, states, circumstances, processes, etc.

(Cf. Vendier

1967 for an illuminating discussion of these distinctions.) For our present purposes it is sufficient, however, if we use the cover term 'event time' for all these categories.

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

295

specified time prior to last week. In order to understand the temporal specification of a sentence, one must know the values of S , Rt and Ε , and their relations to each other. St is the most important part of the temporal system since Rt is always oriented to it. Present Time means that Rt is simultaneous with S , Past Time means that Rt precedes St and Future Time means that Rt, fol­ lows S . Et is generally given in relation to Rt if the two times differ. The time specification we have been talking about is clearly deictic: henceforth we shall refer to it as external time specification. In contrast to the external time specification, the second type of temporal categories does not situate the event at hand with respect to the time of utterance, it rather de4 scribes the time during which this event takes place . These temporal categories belong to the internal specification of events, and they will be referred to as internal temporal cate­ gories and the specification they provide as internal time specification. Internal time specification plays an essential role in the description of the difference between Simple Pres­ ent and Present Continuous: (4)

John writes letters.

(5)

John is writing letters.

In fact, internal time is one of the key notions in the de­ finition of aspect, as we shall see presently. 2.2. The second remark concerns time adverbials. There are time adverbials which are mostly used to indicate

external

time and time adverbials which are generally used to express internal time. Time adverbials which are used to express external time are:

yesterday, now, soon, tomorrow, two years ago, in a

4 That is, we have to do here with the internal structure of

296

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

couple of weeks, etc. Time adverbials or adverbial expressions which are used to indicate internal time are: during his illness, whole day, since he fell sick, when John arrived, for many hours etc. Some time adverbials express internal time delimited by external time-boundaries, e.g. since yesterday, in an hour, during next week. Time adverbials expressing internal time can often be used to determine the internal time structure of sentences. By appending such a time adverbial A to a sentence S we get a well-formed sentence S'if and only if the internal time structure of S is compatible with the internal time indicated by A. For example, a sentence with momentary internal time cannot be combined with a durative adverbial (*He started reading for three hours). Similar compatibility or noncompatibility relations can be formulated for other aspectual cate­ gories as well. 2.3. The third remark, too, is meant to prepare the defini­ tion of aspect. Although aspect is not restricted to de­ claratives, we shall make here the simplifying assumption that we only have to do with declarative sentences . Thus, when we will be talking about sentences we shall always have declarative sentences in mind. Now, sentences are said to describe states of affairs. States of affairs are objective entities which exist independently of whether we perceive them or not, or whether we speak about them or not. Imagine now the following state of affairs. A person called John is sitting in his study and is engaged in writing a letter. This very state of affairs may be expressed by the speaker

Notice, however, that it would not be too difficult to ex­ tend the present analysis to nondeclaratives as well. For this purpose one could simply adapt one of the methods used in logic for the truthfunctional analysis of nondeclaratives.

297

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

in various ways. Either one of the following sentences would correctly express the state of affairs at hand. (6) (a)

Janos levelet ír. approx. 'John is doing letter writing'

(b)

Janos ír egy levelet. 'John is writing a letter'

(c)

Janos irja a levelet. 'John is writing the letter'

(d)

Janos ir. 'John is writing'

The sentences

(6) (a)-(d) express the various ways in which

the speaker views the state of affairs at hand: He may be more or less specific; and this need not have to do with differences in knowledge. He may know exactly what John is writing. But depending on his communicative intention he may just say

(6)

( d ) , i.e. the least specific statement, or

(6)(c), i.e. the most specific statement. Sentences

(6)(a)-

(d) are not only different with respect to the degree of specificity, however. They also express various aspects, as we shall see immediately. We shall say that the various verbal expressions of the same state of affairs various situations. Thus, in brief,

represent

(6) (a)-(d) are said to

express or to represent various situations. Paraphrasing B.Comrie, we may now define the notion of 7 aspect in the following fashion . By aspect we shall

understand the internal time struc­

ture of a situation.

Lyons

(op. cit. p. 483) uses the term situation as a cover

term for states, events, processes and actions. 7 Cf. Comrie 1976 for the definition of aspect (p.3.) and for an inspiring discussion of the various aspectual oppo­ sitions. Cf. also Lyons 1977. It should be noted, incidental­ ly, that one may simply use the term 'sentence' instead of 'situation' in the definition of aspect.

29 8

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Aspect is thus a property of situations. Situations are expressed by sentences. Hence aspect is a property of sentences and not of verbs. In the present framework it does not even make sense to speak of the aspect of verbs. There are various factors which contribute to the aspect of the sentence, the form of the verb is only one of them. In addi­ tion to the form of the verb at least the following elements may contribute in an essential way to the aspect of the sen­ tence: time adverbials, place adverbials, the form of noun phrases cy

(definite, indefinite, zero article), and the valen­

(or case) structure of the predicate. In a certain sense, however, we may speak of the aspect

of verbs. Informally, one may, for example, define it in the following way: The aspect of a verb is its contribution to the aspect of the sentence. This contribution may be lexical­ ly determined - as in the case of pairs such as ír (imp.) megír

(perf.)

'write', or it may be the result of the Mood,

Tense, etc. specification of the verb. We are now in a position to embark on the discussion of the various aspectual categories which are essential for the description of the Hungarian aspectual system-.

3. Most of the distinctions to be made in this section are well-known from the literature. We shall, however, diverge from tradition at several points, as will be seen directly. 3.1. Static and dynamic

situations

Our intuitive understanding of these terms is this: static situations describe states, dynamic situations describe pro­ cesses, events or activities. In general, a sentence de­ scribing a static situation would contain a stative predi8 cate .

In the sense of Lakoff 1966.

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

299

Static situations can be distinguished from dynamic situa­ tions by means of various tests. Thus, for example, only sentences describing dynamic situations can be answers to questions of type (7). (7)

What does χ do?

Thus, sentences as sentences (8)

(9)

(8)(a)-(c) express dynamic situations, where­

(9)(a)-(c) express static situations.

(a)

John is eating.

(b)

The car is moving.

(c)

Mary is building a house.

(a)

The book belongs to John.

(b)

The big box contains cakes.

(c)

John knows that Mary is clever.

The fact that something is being done can be expressed by the predicate feature DO as

(x,y). Dynamic situations

such

(8)(a)-(b) could thus be given a schematic semantic rep­

resentation (10). (10)

D0(x,y) & A(x) & B(y)

The variables χ and y may take various values, e.g. χ may be 'John' and y 'eating', or χ may be

'car' and y

'moving', etc.

As for static situations, one may stipulate - analo­ gously to (11)

(10) - the following schematic representation: STATE(x,y) & A(x) & B(y)

where STATE(x,y) means that χ is in the state y. 3.2. Imperfective and perfective

situations

If the internal time structure of a sentence can be split up into discrete time points, the sentence describes an im­ perfective situation, if this is not the case, we have to do with a perfective situation. In other w o r d s , the internal time structure of a perfective situation is viewed as an undivisible whole. This difference in internal time structure can clear­ ly be seen from the following examples:

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

300 (12)

(a)

Amikor Anna írja a lecket, nem szabad ot zavarni. 'When Ann prepares her homework, she must not be disturbed'

(b)

*Amikor Anna megírja a lecket, nem szabad ot zavarni.

(Of course, amikor 'when' has to be interpreted here as re­ ferring to the internal time of the work' . ) (12)(b) differs from

'preparing of the home­

(12)(a) only in that the ad­

verbial clause contains a perfective predicate

(i.e. a pre­

dicate which may bring about a perfective situation).

'To

prepare the homework' in the imperfective sense has an in­ ternal time structure with various discrete time points: during the time of Ann's homework writing several other things may happen: somebody may wish to talk to her or to play with her, etc. If, on the other hand, 'to prepare the homework' is taken in the perfective sense, this is not pos­ sible. This does not m e a n , however, that perfective situa­ tions cannot be extended in time, in fact, they very often can, as we shall see presently. In Hungarian we often find imperfective-perfective 9 pairs. Consider

Sentences such as

verb

(13)(a)-(b) can, in fact, be used as tests,

i.e., for deciding whether we have to do with genuine perfective-imperfective verb pairs. The following sentences are, for example, ungrammatical. (a)

*Péter nemcsak látja, hanem meg is látja Annat. 'Peter does not only see Ann, but he also catches sight of her'

(b)

*Anna nemcsak fut, hanem el is fut az üzletbe. 'Ann is not only running, she is running into the shop'

301

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

(13)

(a)

Peter nemcsak olvassa, hanem el is olvassa a könyvet. 'Peter will not only read the book, but he will also read it to the end'

(b)

Anna nemcsak szépült, hanem meg is szepült. 'Ann has not only become prettier, she has become pretty'

In these sentences we find the imperfective-perfective pairs olvas - elolvas, szepül - megszepül. Each

verb

sentence

contains an imperfective situation and a perfective situa­ tion which are contrasted with each other. This contrast can be paraphrased as follows: action versus completed ac­ tion. There are perfective verbs that do not have imperfec­ tive counterparts. (14)

(a)

Anna nagyapja tegnap meghalt.

(b)

A szekreny megmozdult.

(c)

Peter elkezdett tanulni.

'Ann's grandfather died yesterday'

'The wardrobe moved

'Peter started

(=made a movement)'

learning'

But here, too, the perfective situation expresses an event whose time structure is an indivisible whole. This follows in the present case quite naturally from the fact that

(14)

(a)-(c) describe momentary events. Notice, incidentally, that the verbs in

(15)(a)-(c)

can also occur without prefixes: h a l , mozdul, kezd. These verbs, too,are perfective though only the last one can replace its prefixed form:

(15)(c) is fully equivalent with

(14)(c). As

to the other two verbs it may be noted that hal is distributionally different from meghal and occurs mainly in expres­ sions such as

(15)(a). In contrast to megmozdul the verb moz ­

dul requires an object, that i s , we have to say something like

(15)(b).

302 (15)

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(a)

Anna nagyapja hősi

halàlt halt.

'Ann's grandfather died in the war

(lit.died

a hero's d e a t h ) ' (b)

A szekreny mozdult egyet.

(c)

Peter kezdett tanulni.

lit.

Sentences

'The wardrobe made a movement'

(14)(b) and

(15)(b) are not fully equivalent,

though. We shall return to this question presently. Perfective situations thus differ from other dynamic situations in that that they have an indivisible internal ti­ me structure. Schematically: (16)

DO(x,y) & A(x) & B(y) Condition: E

indivisible

Situations that express momentary events which bring about a change of state

(cf. (14)(a) and

the presupposition (17)

(14)(c)) are associated with 1

(17)(a) and the entailment

(a)

At

t1

<

Εt

χ is in state S.

(b)

At

t2

>

Et

x is in state S ?

and S1 is the negation of For

(17)(b)

S2

(14)(a) S 1 = Ann's grandfather is alive, S = Ann's grand­

father is dead, for

(14)(c) S 1 = Peter was not learning, S =

Peter was learning. As to imperfective situations, the only thing we have to do is to alter the condition in

(16). For imperfective

situations, Ξt will be divisible. So far we have only considered dynamic

imperfective

situations. Does it make sense to speak of static imperfec­ tive situations? The answer depends on whether the internal time structure of static situations is

(or can be) divisible.

10 In the case of momentary events, it does not make any sense to say that the event didn't take place at t 1 and it did take place at t 2 . In fact, there is no t2 indistinguisha­ ble from E . (17)(a)-(b) will also be the property of a fur­ ther class of perfective situations, however, to be discussed later on.

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

303

It is easy to see that static situations do not have a divisible internal time structure. One cannot say *Amikor János látja Annát, ez es ez történik

'When John sees Ann, this and this happens'.

When-clauses in the intended meaning are impossible with static situations. This does not mean, however, that static

situations

have an indivisible internal time structure. It would seem that static situations do not have any internal time structure at all, their time structure is unspecified and they are almost timeless. 3.3. Durative and nondurative

situations

Durative situations are extended in time, nondurative situa­ tions are not. These two situations can often be distinguished by means of adverbials. Notice that adverbials can also be classified according to whether they express extension in time or punctuality. This classification cuts across the classifica­ tion given in Section 2., where we discussed the classes of in­ ternal and external time expressions. Durative adverbials are, for example, whole night, dur­ ing two days, for five hours 7 etc. Punctual adverbials are, for example, at 8 o'clock,

at

the beginning of this month, in 1956, before, after, etc. Durative situations, in general, admit both durative and nondurative adverbials, whereas nondurative situations do not admit durative adverbials. Consider (18)

(a)

John is working on his thesis the whole night.

(b)

John is working on his thesis at 8 o'clock.

(c)

*John started working the whole night.

Compare also the Hungarian sentences in (19). (19)

(a)

A kerek öt óra hosszat mozgott. 'The wheel has been moving for five hours'

(b)

*A kerek öt óra hosszat megmozdult. 'The wheel has made a movement for five hours'

In order to characterize durative situations we have to as­ sume that E

does not mean a single time point but rather an

304

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

interval (t', t') such that (10) holds for any t. which falls into this interval. Thus, dynamic durative situations are specified by (20)(a) and dynamic nondurative situations by (20)(b). (20)

(a)

D0(x,y)

(b)

D0(x,y)

for any t. of a time interval (t', t'') for a single time point t (=E )

The opposition durative - nondurative does not make any sense in the case of static situations, since these are neither durative nor nondurative. Notice also that one cannot say (21): (21)

Janos öt óráig látja Annát. 'John is seeing Ann for five hours'

Imperfective situations are clearly always durative, since divisibility of time implies duration. As to perfective situations, however, we are at a loss since perfective situa­ tions (sentences) are never compatible with durative adverbi­ als. Not only (19)(b) is a bad sentence (which contains the momentary verb megmozdult) but also the sentences in (22): (22)

(a)

(b)

*Peter öt ora hosszat irta meg a levelet. 'Peter has written (perf.) the letter for five hours' *Anna egesz nap fozte meg az ebedet.

'Ann has prepared (perf.) the dinner whole day' Yet there seems to be a clear difference between momentary events and situations describing activities such as 'writing (up) a letter' or 'preparing a dinner'. In a way, (22)(a)-(b) represent durative situations. In order to be able to distinguish between durative and nondurative perfective situa­ tions, we have first to proceed and discuss a further type of aspectual opposition, namely the opposition telic-atelic. Be­ fore doing this, however, we shall have to make some further remarks on perfective situations. In some cases it would seem that nondurative situations do admit durative adverbials. Consider

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

(23)

(a)

305

A fiúk két nap alatt elérték a hegycsucsot. 'The boys have reached the top of the moun­ tain in two days'

(b)

Peter néhány ora alatt rajött a megoldásra. 'Peter has discovered the solution in a couple of hours'

(c)

Anna nagyapja öt ora alatt meghalt. 'Ann's grandfather died in five hours'

Notice, however, that in these sentences the preposition alatt means

'(with) in' rather than

'during'. E

is in all

these cases just a single time point and not an interval. The interval indicated by the time adverbial is the time which was needed in order to reach the event described by the situation. Consequently, it is still true that nondura­ tive situations in general do not admit durative adverbials. Cf. the examples examples

(18) and

(19). Notice furthermore that the

(23)(a)-(c) would be ungrammatical if the preposi­

tion alatt were replaced by the preposition at. meaning

'dur­

ing' which is used to construct durative adverbials. (24)

*A fiúk két napon át érték el a hegycsucsot.

There seems to be only one exception to the above rule. In some cases durative adverbials may give rise to an iterative interpretation. In this way, the contradiction between the durativity of the adverbial and the nondurativity of the ori­ ginal situation is resolved. (25)

Consider

(a)

Péter több napon át nyert.

(b)

Anna több napon át kapott levelet Petertol.

'Peter won during several days'

'Ann has received letters from Peter during several days' The situations without the time adverbial are clearly non­ durative. Still they admit the nondurative adverbial több na­ pon át. (25)(a) can, however, only be interpreted

iteratively:

Peter won several times during the given interval. Similarly (25)(b): Ann received several letters from Peter during the

306

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

given time interval. In cases when the iterative interpreta­ tion is not possible, the use of durative time adverbial re­ sults in an unacceptable sentence. It would thus seem that

'durative adverbial + nondura­

tive situation' may give rise to an iterative

(or durative)

interpretation. Whether this is possible or not

(or whether

the interpretation is durative rather than iterative) will depend on several factors : on the meaning of the verb, on 1 1 the form of the object, etc. 3.4. Telic and atelic situations A telic situation contains a goal, towards which it is d i ­ rected. Atelic situations are not directed towards a goal. In the case of telic situations, if the goal has not been reached the situation is incomplete, the process or activity has been interrupted in some way. In the case of atelic situa­ tions, on the other hand, the situation is complete at what­ ever time point it terminates. Sentences in telic situations, those in

(26)

(a)

(26) exemplify

(27) atelic situations.

Anna egy l e v e l e t

ir.

'Ann is writing a letter' (b)

Janos egy házat épít.

(a)

Peter játszik.

(b)

Janos fut.

'John is building a house' (27)

'Peter is playing'

'John is running' If the process or activity described by sentences

(27)(a)-(b)

1 Ί (25)(a)-(b) are examples for the iterative

interpretation.

The durative interpretation prevails in cases such as (a)

Több napon at esett az eso.

(b)

Peter egész heten at nem ivott.

'It was raining during several days'

'Peter didn't drink during the whole week'

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

307

is interrupted, one may still say that 'Peter was playing' 'John was running' but, of course, one cannot say that 'Ann 12 wrote a letter' or 'John built a house' . Sentences such as (27)(a)-(b) seem to have an implication not shared by sentences of type (26)(a)-(b). We shall refer to this implication as atelic entailment. Some scholars have stipulated that the atelic entailment could be used as a test in order to distinguish between telic and atelic situations: only atelic 13 situations exhibit atelic entailments . Unfortunately, however, the test breaks down if one considers a fuller range 14 of sentence structures, as we shall see immediately It is an interesting feature of Hungarian that sentences with zero article corresponding to (26)(a)-(b) describe atelic situations. (28) (a) Anna levelet ir. (b) Janos házat épít. There is no goal toward which the activities described here would be directed 1 5 12 It is not always easy to give the correct English translations of the Hungarian sentences. The entailments given here seem to be ambiguous between a telic and an atelic reading whereas the Hungarian counterparts would be unambiguously telic. 13 Cf. Comrie 1976:44-48. I don't know with whom the idea of atelic entailment originates. At any rate, it is also mentioned in Klein 1974. 14 A criticism of atelic entailment can also be found in Dahl 1978. Constructions such as (28)(a)-(b) belong to the particularities of Hungarian. The objects are in a way incorporated into the meaning of the verbs. What one predicates in (28)(a) of 'Anna' is 'letter-writing'. Similarly, the predicate in (28)(b) is 'house-building'. If one (footnote 15 continued)

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

308

There is also an essential difference between

sentences

with indefinite objects and sentences with definite objects. Consider (29)

(a)

Anna írja a levelet.

(b)

Janos epíti a hazat.

'Anna is writing the letter'

'John is building the house' Now the interesting thing about these sentences is that they seem to have atelic entailments inspite of the fact that they are intuitively

felt

to be clearly describing goal oriented

activities. One may interrupt these activities and still say that 'Ann was writing the letter' or 'John was building the house'. It is also evident that if the activities in

(29)(a)-

(b) are fully completed, then there will be a letter and a house whereas such a thing cannot be said of the situations described by trasting

(26)(a)-(b). This can clearly be seen by con­

(30) (a) and

(30) (a)

(b)16 .

Peter épít egy hazat, de sosem kesziil el vele. 'Peter is building a house, but he will never finish it'

(b)

*Peter epiti a hazat, de sosem készül el vele. 'Peter is building the house, but he will never finish it'

(footnote 15 continued) were to use the indefinite

article

in these sentences, one would automatically turn them into descriptions of telic situations. 16 It was pointed out to me by R. Hetzron that word order and emphasis may change the situation. Cf. (a)

*Péter egy széket csinal, de sosem kesziil el vele .

instead of (b)

(30)(a), and Peter csak csinálja a széket, de sosem kesziil el vele. lit.

'Peter is just making the chair but he will

never finish it'

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

309

This is, however, not the whole story. There is also a dif­ ference between 'effected objects' ('objects of result') and 'affected objects'. (31) (a) Peter olvas egy ujsagot. 'Peter is reading a newspaper' (b) Peter olvassa az ujsagot. Peter is reading the newspaper' Sentences (31)(a)-(b) contain 'affected objects': they seem both to express atelic situations. Nothing indicates that the activity of reading has as its goal the reading of the news­ paper from the beginning to the end or the completion of the reading of things which one generally reads in a news­ paper. Let us contrast next the following sentences : (32) (a) Peter épített egy hazat. 'Peter has built a house' (b) Péter épitette a házat. lit. 'Peter has been building on the house' Clearly, only (32)(a) entails that there is a house. In order to distinguish between these two telic situations (cf. also (26)(a)-(c) and (29(a)-(c)) we shall say that situations whose linguistic expressions contain an indefinite object of result are resultative whereas situations whose linguistic expressions contain definite objects of result are nonresultative. Resultativity thus distinguishes between two telic situations. Atelic entailments are characteristic of nonre­ sultative but not of resultative situations. Nonresultative situations can, however, easily be turned into resultative situations: they have to be looked upon from a perfective point of view. To put it differently, they have to be 'perfectivized'. That is, the following situations are already resultative: (33) (a) Anna megírja a levelet. (b) Janos megépíti a házat.

310

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Notice furthermore that the perfective form of the verb csinál 'do', i.e. megcsinal, if used instead of the imperfective form in (32)(a), would not change anything on the as­ pectual structure of the sentence. (34)

Peter megepített egy hazat. 'Peter has built a house' Now, whatever the difference between (32)(a) and (34) may be, it certainly does not concern the telic or perfective charac­ ter of the situation at hand. Consequently, it seems reason­ able to assume that (32)(a) is not only telic but also perfec­ tive. If, however, one uses the Present Tense forms of the verbs épít - megepít, the situations described will be dif­ ferent. (35)(a) is telic but not perfective, (35)(b) is both telic and perfective. (35) (a) Peter épít egy házat. 'Peter is building a house' (b) Peter megépít egy házat. This seems to indicate that there is an intricate interplay between reference time and the internal time structure of the situation. In Hungarian some of the aspectual oppositions seem to be neutralized in Past Tense, as we saw above. We shall have to say no more about this topic here, however. The question is now how telic situations can be charac­ terized more formally. Let us first try to answer the ques­ tion of what goal oriented activity means. Recall that both telic and atelic situations are durative situations. Conse­ quently, both situations take place in a time interval (t', t''). In the case of atelic situations any phase of the ac­ tivity or process in question is the same, i.e. for any t., t.є (t', t1') and ti. ≠ tj. the corresponding phases are iden­ tical. If John is running during the interval (t', t''), his running at time point t. (phase f.) cannot be distinguished from his running at time point t. (phase f.) where ti., tj.є (t', t ' ' ) . It is different with telic situations, however.

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

311

If we have a telic situation, then at least some of the phases of the activity or process in question must not be identical. One cannot build a house by repeating all the time exactly the same activity. Normally each phase brings us closer to what can be considered to be the goal: to fin­ ish the house, to complete the singing of a song, to drink up all the wine, etc. Typically, the goal is given by the direct object of the verb but this need not be so. It would seem that telic situations represent quantifiable processes or activities. This is corroborated by the fact that one may ask a question such as (36) How far has χ come with y? only in the case of telic situations. As possible answers we may get 'He is almost ready', 'It is almost finished', 'it has made a great progress', etc. Telic situations may thus be given the following representation: (37) MoreDO(x,y) & A(x) & () (37) is associated with the following condition: (38) There are at least two time points t., t.є (t', t ' ' ) , where (t', t'') is the time interval during which the situation at hand takes place, such that the activity or process described by the situation is closer to its goal at tj. than at tj .(tj. > ti.) . It goes without saying that telic situations are auto­ matically durative and dynamic but they are also imperfective since t is divisible. Atelic situations are representable as dynamic situa­ tions. They are always durative, dynamic and imperfective. Before concluding this section let us have a look at a further type of telic situation represented by (39)(a)-(b). (39) (a) Anna szépül. 'Ann is getting prettier' (b) Peter csunyul. 'Peter is getting uglier'

312

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

These processes are clearly goal-oriented. Notice furthermore that (39)(a)-(b) are associated with atelic entailments: after the pertinent processes have set in, independently of at which point they terminate (they may be interrupted at any point) one may always say that 'Ann has become prettier' or 'Peter has become uglier'. That is, with (39)(a)-(b) we have a further case where telic situations bring about atelic entailments . If the situations (39)(a)-(b) are perfectivized we get (40) (a) Anna megszépül. (b) Peter megcsunyul. For (40)(a)-(b) the presupposition (17)(a) and the entailment (17)(b) obtain. In general, we shall say that a situation is inchoative if and only if the situation is associated with (17)(a)-(b). Inchoative situations thus constitute a subgroup of perfective situations. Notice, incidentally, that one might think of all perfective situations, except nondurative and noninchoative perfective situations, as being associated with something like (17)(a)-(b). If Peter is building a house, then, when this activity has been completed, there will be a house, and this represents a new state. This new state did not exist before the completion of the action. Thus viewed the presupposition and entailment associated with inchoative situations would only be a special case of a more general phenomenon 1 7 In sum, then, perfectivity has two sources, one is the structure (37), the other the structure (10) with condition (20)(b). Only in the former case can perfectivity be interpreted as 'completed action', 'achievement of the goal', etc. 17 I discuss various aspects of inchoativity in Kiefer (forthcoming) . There I also make an attempt to define inchoativity more precisely and thus delimit it vis-à-vis other perfective situations.

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

313

Perfective situations which are nondurative (momentary) can­ not be interpreted in this way. Recall now that we have not as yet defined what should be understood by a durative perfective situation. We may now stipulate that perfective situations which result from telic situations be considered durative and perfective situations which have other sources be considered nondurative. 3.5. Summary of the aspectual oppositions In discussing the aspectual structure of situations we have encountered the following types of internal time structure: (41) (a) Et is divisible i.e.E t can be split up into discrete time points (b) Et is indivisible i.e. Et cannot be split up into discrete time points (e) Et is durative i.e.Et lasts for some time (d) E is momentary i.e.Et cannot last (e) Et is unspecified i.e.E t has practically no internal time structure These are the elements of our time logic. This time logic should be able to account for the fact that if Et is momen­ tary it is also indivisible and if Et is divisible it is also durative. Let us denote the time specifications of (4Ί)(a)-(e) by td'tid'tdu'tmandtus'respectively. Furthermore, let us assume that time specification is part tion of predicates. We get (42) (a) DO(x,y, tm )  DO(x,y, (b) DO(x,y, t d ) D DO(x,y, Let us represent the time structure of

of the characteriza­ tid) tdu) dynamic situations by t

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

314 t

can be either one of t d , t i d , tdu,

tm

.

The various aspectual situations can schematically be represented as follows. (43)

(a)

Static situations

(b)

Dynamic

STATE(x,y,t d ) & A(x) & B(y) situations D O ( x , y , t u s ) & A(x) & B(y) (c)

Durative

situations

PRED(x,y,tdu) (d)

Nondurative

(e)

Telic situations

& A(x)

& B(y)

situations

DO(x,y, t m ) & A(x) & B(y) MoreDO(x,y, td,) & A(x) & B(y) (f)

Atelic

situations DO(x,y, t d ) & A(x) & B(y)

(g)

Perfective

situations

DO(x,y, t i d ) & A(x) & B(y) MoreDO(x,y, t i d ) & A(x) & B(y) (h)

Imperfective

situations

PRED(x,y, t d ) & A(x) & B(y) From these specifications we may read off the following rela­ tions : (44)

(a)

Static situations are opposed to dynamic situations but they do not enter into the oppositions durative - nondurative, perfective - imperfective and telic atelic.

(b)

Nondurative situations are perfective. Formally

(c)

Both telic and atelic situations are always

[-durative] → [+perfective]

imperfective, durative and dynamic. Formally -perfective| +durative -static

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

315

It is evident that from among the four oppositions discussed the opposition static-dynamic is the most basic one since it yields a dichotomy of all situations. The oppo­ sitions durative-nondurative and perfective-imperfective classify dynamic situations only. The opposition telic-atelic provides a partitioning of durative situations. To these we may add the opposition inchoative-noninchoative which gives a subclassification of perfective situations. Let us restrict ourselves to the oppositions static-dynamic, durative-nondura­ tive, perfective-imperfective for a moment. For simplicity's sake we shall refer to these by means of the binary features . These features give us the following combinations :

From these we can eliminate the last matrix since it contains the inadmissible feature combination: [-durative], [-perfective J Recall that all nondurative situations are automatically per­ fective. After the application of the redundancy rules (44)(a)(b) we get the following matrices:

If we now want to take into account the telic-atelic opposition as well, then the only thing we have to do is to subdivide the matrix (45)(c). On the other hand, if we want to include the opposition inchoative-noninchoative, this can be done by sub­ dividing the matrices (45)(b) and (d). In what follows we shall consider the subdivision of (45)(c) only. We thus end up with the following classification:

316

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS e.g. megszépül 'is becoming pretty or prettier', elbutul 'is becoming stupid', megírja a lecket 'is writ­ ing the homework', megissza a bort 'is drinking up the wine' e.g. fut 'is running', énekel 'is singing', setal 'is making a pro­ menade ' e.g. írja a lecket 'is writing the homework', issza a bort 'is drink­ ing the wine', csinál egy széket 'is making a chair' e.g. elkezd 'begins', meghal 'dies', megmozdul 'makes a move', elindul 'start going'

By looking at the situations (43)(a)-(h) it is easy to see that not all aspectual oppositions involve different internal time structures. Take, for example, (43) (a)-(b). There is no opposition as to internal time structure between static and dynamic situations since, properly speaking, static situations do not have any internal time structure. Similarly, the oppo­ sition (41) (e)-(f) has nothing to do with internal time struc­ ture either, both telic and atelic situations have the time structure t.. Thus, strictly speaking, (43) (a)-(b) and (43) (e)(f) cannot be considered as aspectual oppositions. What makes up the opposition in the case of (43)(a)-(b) is the fact that one situation describes states and the other processes, activ­ ities, etc. The opposition (43) (e)-(f), on the other hand, is based on the fact that one type of situation is goal oriented whereas the other is not. These differences do not involve a dif­ ference in internal time structure though they may have some bearing on this structure. Thus, as we saw above, only goaloriented activities or processes may give rise to perfective situations for only dynamic situations can be non-

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

317

durative etc. The differences between states and processes, on the one hand, and goal oriented processes and non-goal oriented processes, on the other, express the way in which the process takes place. We may refer to such types of oppositions informally as oppositions of Aktionsart. We are, then, left with the genuine aspectual oppositions durative-nondurative, perfective-nonperfective. On the basis of the distinction between aspect and Aktionsart proposed above one can easily assign some further types of situations to either aspect or Aktionsart. Inchoative situations, as we saw, constitute a subclass of perfective situations. Inchoative situations may be either durative or nondurative. The same holds for noninchoative situations. The opposition between inchoative and noninchoative situations thus does not seem to involve differences in internal time structure and one may conjecture that this opposition, too, is one of Aktionsart rather than one of aspect. There is certainly much more to say about this topic, 18 unfortunately, however, we cannot pursue it any further 4. Some remarks on the prefixai system of Hungarian 1 9 We are now prepared to have a look at the question in which way prefixes contribute to the structure of situations. To simplify exposition, we shall sometimes speak of the static, dynamic, durative, etc. meaning of verbs. 18 One may speculate on the status of other aspectual oppositions, for example, on whether iterativity is a category of aspect or of Aktionsart. I would conjecture that iterativity, too, belongs to Aktionsart rather than to aspect. I shall not discuss this question here, however. 19 For a description of the Hungarian prefix system, cf. Soltész (1959), Perrot (1966) and the reference grammar of Hungarian, A Mai Magyar Nyelv Rendszere, 1970.

318

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

One of the most important functions of Hungarian prefixes is undoubtedly perfectivization. In the case of the prefix meg this seems to be the only function. In other cases, for example, in the case of fel 'up', le 'down', el 'away', the prefix may also determine the direction of the movement. Thus, the primary function of these prefixes is to bring about telic situations (goal-oriented activities, movements, etc.). Depending on further conditions, they may also perfectivize but this need not be the case. The perfectivizing function can, roughly, be put in this way: 'make the internal time structure of the situation indivisible'. 4.1. Static verbs The class of static verbs comprises, among others, the verbs van 'be', letezik 'exist', tartalmaz 'contain', tartozik 'belong', tud 'know', ismer 'know' (cf. German kennen, French connaître), lát 'see' hall 'hear', szeret 'love' örül 'be happy', haragszik 'be angry'. Static situations, as we saw above, cannot be perfective. Nevertheless, some of the static verbs mentioned above seem to have perfective forms: megtud, megismer, meglát, megnall, megszeret, megörül, megharagszik. Notice, however, that all these verbs seem to be related in a rather straightforward way: they all express the beginning 20 of a cognitive or emotional state . In other words, static verbs in Hungarian fall into two groups: (a) verbs expressing existence, appurtenance, possession, etc. and (b) verbs expressing cognitive or emotional states. Now, the perfective prefix meg can only occur with this latter group and the meaning of the verb 'meg + cognitive or emotional state' is always 'the beginning or setting in of a cognitive or emo20 One notable exception to this generalization is the form megvan from van 'be'. Megvan may mean 'we have found it, it is ready', i.e. the beginning of some kind of 'subjective' existence. (R. Hetzron, personal communication)

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

tional state'

319

. This means that it is not the static situa-

tion that is made perfective, it is rather the case that the perfective prefix meg is used to derive new verb meanings in a systematic way. Taking together the meaning of meg and the meaning of emotional or cognitive state, the resulting apparent contradiction can only be resolved if the resulting prefixed verb is interpreted as meaning either the the

(sudden) beginning or

(sudden) end of a state. States can never be dynamic,

hence perfective. It is now an interesting fact about Hungarian that the end of states never occurs as the meaning of static verbs prefixed with meg. This must thus be accounted for in the grammar of Hungarian rather

than in linguistic

theory. 4.2. Nondurative

situations

Since nondurative situations are also perfective and nondurative verbs cannot in general be derived from durative verbs we may have three different cases: (a) the nondurative verb is prefixed, the corresponding nonprefixed verb has a meaning which is not relatable in any systematic way to the meaning of the prefixed verb, (b) the nondurative verb is prefixed and there is no corresponding unprefixed verb and, finally, (c) the nondurative verb can be either prefixed or unprefixed, the two verbs do not exhibit any aspectual difference. Examples for

(a) are megpillant

' l o o k ' ) , abbahagy

'interrupt'

'catch sight of sb'

(hagy 'leave'), rájon

(pillant 'realize'

21 One could try to separate the two groups of stative predicates by means of the following test. It is possible to say 'x begins to y' with the second but not with the first group of verbs. Thus, (a) is quite possible whereas (b) is ungrammatical. (a)

Anna elkezd örülni. 'Ann starts to be happy'

(b)

+A doboz kezdi tartalmazni ceruzát. 'The box begins to contain the pen'

320

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(jön 'come'), felfedez 'discover' (fedez 'protect'), etc. Case (b) can be exemplified by befejez 'finish' (?fejez), eler 'reach' (?er) and case (c) by kezd-elkezd 'begin', hal­ me gh a 1 'die'. It can never be the case that the prefixed verb is nondurative and the unprefixed verb is durative and the two verbs differ from each other with respect to the perfective-imperfective opposition only. 4.3. Telic and atelic situations Both telic and atelic situations contain unprefixed verbs, as expected. 4.4. Perfective and imperfective situations One may expect perfective - imperfective verb pairs in those cases only when this opposition appears within a given aspec­ tual category. Static situations cannot be perfective hence no perfective - imperfective verb pairs will appear within static situations. Nondurative situations cannot be imperfec­ tive, hence they cannot give rise to imperfective - perfec­ tive verb pairs either. Durative situations can be both per­ fective and imperfective, they are, however, further subdi­ vided into telic and atelic situations. Atelic situations can only be imperfective, and they cannot be turned into perfec­ tive situations . Telic situations, on the other hand, can be 'perfectivized'. Consequently, we may expect to find perfective - imperfective verb pairs in the case of verbs with the structure MoreDO(x,y). Thus, the following pairs are genuine imperfective-perf ective-pairs : ir 'write', megir, olvas 'read'- elolvas, énekel 'sing- elénekel, szepül 'to be­ come prettier'- megszépül, no 'grow'- megno, etc. Verbs which are typical for atelic situations may sometimes get the per­ fective prefix but then we get a new meaning for the verb which is in no systematic relation to the original meaning: beszél 'talk'- megbeszel 'discuss', mond 'say'- elmond (which is factive), játszik 'play'- megjatszik 'pretend', etc. If a perfective situation is expressed by an unprefixed verb, the prefixed verb will not bring about any change in

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

321

the situation. For example, (47)

(48)

(a) (b) (a) (b)

Peter épített egy házat. 'Peter has built a house' Péter megepített egy házat. Anna öt órakor kezdett dolgozni. 'Ann started working at 5 o'clock' Anna öt órakor kezdett el dolgozni.

5. The relation between perfective - imperfective situations and locative expressions It has often been observed that imperfective situations are compatible with place adverbials but not with directional adverbials whereas perfective situations behave in the oppo22 site way . Static situations thus cannot contain directional adverbials. (49) (a) John is standing in front of the door, (b) *John is standing into the house. Atelic situations are only compatible with place adverbials, telic situations with directional adverbials : (50) (a) John is running in the garden, (b) John is running into the garden. (50)(a) describes an atelic situation and (50)(b) a telic situation. It is clear why this is so: the directional loca­ tive into the garden turns the process of running into a goaloriented activity. To turn now to Hungarian examples, notice first that the prefixes which indicate direction stand for directional adverbials, they have the same function as such adverbials. It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that the following situations are telic: (51) (a) Péter kijön. 'Peter is coming out' (b) Peter bejön. 'Peter is coming in' Cf. Comrie (19 77:98-106) and Anderson (1973).

322

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(c)

Peter jön k i .

(d) In addition, 23 perfective

Peter jön b e . (51)(a)-(b) are perfective and

6. Are prefixes

(51)(c)-(d) im-

predictable?

It is quite natural that one would like to predict both the meaning of a prefix and its occurrence. The preceding discus­ sion might give us some hope that this is not a completely impossible enterprise. In what follows we shall restrict our­ selves to the prefix meg. Now, in order to answer our ques­ tion we should be able to show that the meaning of meg is predictable, on the one hand, and that the situations in which we may expect meg to occur, too, are predictable, on the other. We shall claim that meg has only one meaning: it makes a situation perfective. Or, to put it differently, it has a perfectivizing function. The Hungarian Explanatory Dic­ tionary

(Magyar Ertelmező Kéziszótár, henceforth EKsz) men24 tiones 11 uses of meg

In sentences

(51)(c)-(d) the verb receives main stress and

the prefix has to be pronounced with middle high stress, i.e. these sentences must be distinguished from the sentences in which

'Peter' is emphatic.

Notice, by the way, that this type of middle stressed postverbal position of the prefix is not always possible. It seems to be restricted to directional prefixes. But the situation is anything but clear and much further research is needed in or­ der to see exactly what is going on here. 24 Cf. EKsz:89 7. It should be made clear that the dictionary mentions 11 uses and not 11 meanings. Grammatical

tradition

has in general acknowledged the fact that meg has only one meaning and that this meaning has to do with perfectivity. The notion of perfectivity h a s , however, been interpreted in (footnote 2 4 continued)

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

323

6.1. If the verb is telic, but not inchoative it can always be perfectivized and the result is "the expression of the successful completion of the activity or process" (EKsz:897). Ε ·g· megir 'write1, megtanul 'learn', megcsinál 'make1, megfoz 'cook', etc. 6.2. If the verb is telic and inchoative, it can always be perfectivized and the result is "the expression of the par­ tial or complete accomplishment of the process or activity". E.g, megszépül 'become prettier or pretty', megokosodik 'be­ come cleverer or clever', megöregszik 'become old', megfeketedik 'become black', megbetegszik 'become ill 1 , etc. These two groups make up the majority of verbs with 25 the prefix meg . As we saw just now the meaning difference between the two groups has nothing to do with meg : it depends solely on the opposition inchoative - noninchoative. 6.3. If the verb describes a cognitive, emotive state or pro­ tracted perception (i.e. a static situation with certain se­ mantic properties), it can be perfectivized and the prefixed verb will mean the beginning of this cognitive or emotive state, or, of the protracted perception. The situation itself cannot be made perfective, the beginning of a static situa­ tion, however, ijs perfective. E.g. megtud 'get to know' megismer 'get to know', meglat catch sight of sb', meghall 'hear', megszeret 'start to love', meggyulöl 'start to hate', etc. 6.4. There is a class of nondurative verbs in Hungarian which are often referred to as momentary verbs ("mozzanatos igék"). (footnote 24 continued) a way which is quite different from the one given in this paper. Cf. also the critical remarks on the traditional interpretation of the function of meg in Perrot (1966:48-55). 25 There are approximately 1000 verbs with the prefix meg listed in EKsz. More than half of them belong to the telicperfective category, nearly 40% to the nondurative-perfective category.

324

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Notice, however, that the momentary aspect in the meaning of these verbs is not due to the prefix meg but rather to the presence of a certain suffix belonging to a larger class of suffixes which are used to derive verbs with momentary mean­ ing. These suffixes contribute in two different ways to the momentary meaning: (a) they may be used to derive verbs ex­ pressing one single and abrupt activity or process and (b) they may lead to verbs which express the setting in of a process. To (a) belong the following suffixes: -en, -an, -int, -ant, -ent, -it, -amlik, -emlik, -all, -ell and to (b) the suffixes: -.ad, -ed, -amodik, -emedik, -od (ik) , -ed (ik) , -dul, -düi, -dit. Thus, the verb mocean 'make a sudden move1 itself expresses already a momentary activity, that is, there is no difference in this respect between mocean and megmoccan: both verbs express momentary, abrupt activities, which means that both are nondurative, hence perfective. The two verbs have different distributional properties, however. Consider, for example, moccant egyet 'has made a sudden move' but +megmoccant egyet and nagyot moccant 'has made a big and sudden move' but +nagyot moccant meg, +nagyot megmoccant. These dif­ ferences may have deeper reasons but at present I cannot say more about them Let us have now a look at a verb which expresses the setting in of a process or activity. Lendül is such a verb.

It is possible that mocean-megmoccan, mozdul-megmozdul are examples of a further aspectual distinction not accounted for in the present paper. It goes without saying that both (a) and (b) represent perfective situations: (a) A szék mozdult egyet. lit. 'The chair made a move' (b) A szék megmozdult. Also, both (a) and (b) express momentary events. Yet the two situations are by no means identical, (a) vizualizes the move, (footnote 26 continued)

325

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

(Cf. the above list of suffixes.) But the same meaning is also expressed by meglendül: both have the meaning

'start

swinging'. Both verbs are nondurative and perfective. And they show the same distributional differences as mocean and megmoccan. We may thus conclude that meg cannot be used to ex­ press momentariness in any of the two senses discussed above. If, however, an unprefixed verb has this meaning, it can be prefixed with meg without affecting thereby the aspec­ tual situation. 6.5. According

to EKSz the prefix meg can also be used

to express single events. Of course, in some sense all per­ fective situations express single events. But what seems to be at stake here is this: some verbs seem to be able to ex­ press habitual or iterative meaning in virtue of their lexi­ cal potential. E.g. csókol 'praise', dörzsöl

'kiss', csovál 'wag', dieser

'rub', harap 'bite', kapar 'scratch', kos-

tol 'taste', latogat

'visit', etc. Consider now the following

situations : (52)

(a)

A kutya csóválja a farkat.

(b)

Peter csokolja Katit.

'The dog is waving with his tail'

'Peter is kissing Kati' (c)

A kutya harap.

(d)

Anna kóstolja a levest.

(e)

Janos Marit látogatja.

'The dog bites'

'Ann tastes the soup'

'John visits Mary' In all these cases we have to to with habitual or iterative meaning. As soon as these situations are turned perfective, however, the habitual or iterative meaning disappears

and

(footnote 26 continued) it expresses immediate perception whereas

(b) is more like a factual statement.

ful to R. Hetzron for this observation)

(I am grate­

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

326

what is left is the meaning referred to as "single event". (53)

(a)

A kutya megcsóválja a farkat.

(b)

Peter megcsókolja Katit.

(c)

A kutya megharap.

(d)

Anna megkóstolja a levest.

(e)

János meglátogatja Marit.

We may thus conclude that whenever a verb can express

(or

does generally express) habitual or iterative meaning, perfectivization is possible in spite of the fact that we may 27 have to do with an atelic situation

. The result of per-

fectivization is the interpretation of a single event. 6.6. Apart from the case discussed in the previous

section

atelic situations cannot be perfectivized. If we neverthe­ less find typical atelic verbs with the prefix meg, the meaning of the new verb will not necessarily be perfective or, at least, it will not be relatable to the original mean­ ing in any systematic way. There are numerous examples for this case: meggondol'weigh megfut

(the i d e a ) ' from gondol

'flee' from fut 'run', megesik

'think',

'happen' from esik

'fall', megel 'earn one's living' from el 'live', megfogad 'pledge' from fogad

'bet', etc. We cannot account for the

meanings of these cases in any systematic way but we may predict that this is what we may expect. 6.7. The prefix meg can also occur with denominal verbs. The meaning of the noun may already indicate that what we may expect is a perfective situation. If this is so, then there should not be any unprefixed verb derivable from the noun. Some examples will suffice to illustrate sit 'make a film of sg' from film

this point: megfilme-

(+filmesit),megbosszul

'avenge' from bosszú 'vengeance', megboszorkányoz bewitch' from boszorkány korona

'witch', megkoronáz

'enchant,

'crown' from

'crown', etc.

27 Iterativity, too, can be tested by means of adverbials, cf. Fabricius-Hansen (1975:51).

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

327

6.8. It has often been pointed out that prefixed verbs often require an object whereas the corresponding unprefixed verbs 28 take optionally an object . Once again, this has nothing to do with the meaning of meg, it is rather a straightforward consequence of the fact that perfective situations are very often derived from telic situations. Telic situations are goal oriented and the goal is often provided by the direct object. 6.9. If a verb has several meanings and some of them express telic situations and others atelic situations, then, - as expected - only telic meanings can be perfectivized. Thus, for example, among the meanings of ereszt (EKSz: 328) we find the atelic meanings (a) "to let out gas, liquid, air", e.g., vizet ereszt 'to let out water', ereszt az elso kerék 'the front tire leaks', etc., and (b) 'to be in a certain mood or emo­ tional state', e.g., bunak ereszti a fejèt 'feel grief at sg' and (c) "let sb come near". It is thus not at all surprising that we cannot find the corresponding meanings among the mean­ ings of the verb megereszt. In this way more than 90% of the verbs with the prefix meg can be accounted for. In sum, meg has only one meaning: it makes a situation perfective. This can be done in various ways depending on the 'input' situation. By knowing what this input situation is and by knowing what perfectivization means we can derive the meaning of the resulting situation in the vast majority of cases. The aspectual system discussed in some detail in the first part of my paper has thus proved useful in the analysis of Hungarian. The success of this analysis is, of course, not yet complete. Meg is only one of the prefixes in Hungarian. It is hoped, however, that the present analysis can easily be extended to cover the other prefixes as well. This hope is justified: meg seems to be more complicated than the other Cf., for example, Perrot (1966:56-57).

328

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

prefixes in various ways. In particular, meg does not seem to carry any lexical meaning apart from its perfectivizing function. All the other prefixes, on the other hand, have a clear lexical meaning and are related in a systematic way to adverbials from which they have been derived diachronically. The fact that the aspectual oppositions put forward in this paper could successfully be applied in the analysis of Hun­ garian is an indication of the viability of the theoretical approach which I have been advocating in the present paper. It goes without saying that there remain quite a few unsolved problems in the realm of aspect. The discussion presented here is by no means complete and it is evidently in many re­ spects not sufficiently exact. However, the clarification of the loose ends as well as the introduction of further aspec­ tual distinctions along the lines sketched in this study have to be relegated to subsequent research.

THE ASPECTUAL SYSTEM OF HUNGARIAN

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References A Mai Magyar Nyelv Rendszere (The System of the Hungarian Language), Vol.I.-II., Budapest : Akademiai Kiadó, (1970). Anderson, J. (197 3) An Essay Concerning Aspect, The Hague: Mouton. Comrie, B. (1976) Aspect, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Dahl, Ö. (1978) "On the Definition of the Telic/Atelic (Bounded/Non-Bounded) Distinction", Gothenburg Papers in Theoretical Linguistics 36. Fabricius-Hansen, C. (1975) Transformative, intransformative und kursive Verben, Tübingen:Niemeyer. Kiefer, F. (forthcoming) Az előfeltevesek elmelete (The Theory of Presuppositions), Budapest : Akadémiai Kiadó. Klein, H.G. (1974) Tempus, Aspekt, Aktionsart, Tübingen: Niemeyer. Lakoff, G. (1966) "Stative Adjectives and Verbs in English", NSF-Report 17, Cambridge .Harvard University. Lyons, J. (1977) Semantics, Vol. I.-II., Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Magyar Ertelmezo Keziszotar (Hungarian Explanatory Dictionary), Budapest:Akadémiai Kiadó (1972) . Perrot, J. (1966) "Adalékok a meg igeköto funkciójának vizsgálatához a mai magyar nyelvben" (On the functions of the Prefix meg in Contemporary Hungarian), Nyelvtud.Ert. 52.sz. Reichenbach, H. (1947) Elements of Symbolic Logic, Berkeley: University of California Press. J.Soltész, K. (1959) Az osi magyar igekötok (The Old Hungarian Prefixes), Budapest:Akadémiai Kiadó. Vendler, Z. (1967) Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca : Cornell University Press.

SAMUEL BRASSAI'S THEORY OF THE SENTENCE Katalin Ê. Kiss 1. The aim of this article is to call attention to the fact that the idea of the so-called communicative, or "actual", sentence articulation first appeared in the sen­ tence theory of a 19th century Hungarian linguist, Samuel Brassai (1789-1889). The syntactic theory of Brassai, unknown abroad und long forgotten in Hungary, deserves tobe reviewed not only because of its historical interest - al­ though the general belief that it was Georg von der Gabelentz who discovered communicative sentence structure also has to be rectified - but also because of the current relevance of its results, which are worth considering and checking fur­ ther even today. As will be shown, Brassai's ingenious universal framework of sentence description also rendered it possible for him to outline the only Hungarian syntax up until very recently that does not content itself with stating that Hungarian is a free word order language, but provides rules for the synthesis, i.e. generation of Hungarian sentences. That despite all their merits, Brassai's ideas sank into oblivion, can be attributed to various facts. Abroad, they necessarily remained unknown since they were published in Hungarian. As for Hungary, his ideas may have been too

332

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

new to fit into the system of linguistic thought of the day. Besides, Brassai, a professor of mathematics, an ac­ tive researcher of botany and several other branches of natural science, an expert in Sanskrit, a musicologist, an author of studies on philosophy, logic, aesthetics, eco­ nomics, etc., was looked upon not so much as a linguist but as a polyhistor, so his linguistic theory may simply not have been considered seriously enough by his contem­ poraries. However, it might well have been the case that the secret of his originality, of his being ahead of his time by about 100 years, lay precisely in his "amateurish1 status; he was not influenced by preconceptions and pre­ judices . 2. Brassai first formulated his theory in a lecture en­ titled "Tapogatódzások a magyar nyelv körül" 'Exploring the Hungarian language' held at the Hungarian Academy of Sci­ ences (Brassai 1852), but the most complete elaboration of it was in his study A magyar mondat 'The Hungarian sentence' published between 1860-65 (Brassai 1860, 1863-65). In the middle of the 19th century, when the basic unit of both comparative and descriptive linguistic research was the word - when, according to a saying attributed to Jakob Grimm, syntax came only half within the notion of grammar - it was considered a novelty, ahead of the time, that Brassai put the sentence into the focus of his inves­ tigations concerning the rules of Hungarian. "The charac­ teristics of a language dwell in the characteristics of the sentence," he wrote (1860:304), so not only descriptive research but also historical and comparative investigation should center on syntax. The methodology and structure of Brassai's argumenta­ tion also contain some remarkably modern elements - espe­ cially in (Brassai 1860, 1863-65). Brassai considers lin-

SAMUEL BRASSAI'S THEORY OF THE SENTENCE

333

guistics a natural science, the task of which is to set up laws and systems inductively through the observation of linguistic facts, and then to apply these laws and systems to the description of empirical phenomena - just as in, e.g., physics or botany. Accordingly, when he sets out to de­ scribe the Hungarian sentence, in (Brassai 1860, 1863-65), he first establishes the universal and typical character­ istics of the sentence as such on the basis of such remote languages as, e.g., French, Classical Greek, Hebrew, Tibetan, Turkish, and Hungarian, and then, in the second part of the study, he analyzes the Hungarian language from the point of view of those syntactic aspects which have turned out to be universally relevant and on the basis of the sentence pattern which has turned out to be universally valid. The first part of the study, contrasting, from a syn­ tactic point of view, languages of various origin is ac­ tually an early example of typological research. Brassai himself was aware of its novelty: "I have outlined a new, syntactic type of language comparison," he wrote. "The individual syntactic features or the groups of them often indicate linguistic relationships which are quite different from the etymological ones. Saying this, I by no means wish to underrate the importance of the latter, neither do I wish the solid results gained from the latter to be dis­ carded for the former... As etymology establishes the notion of physical relationships, syntax establishes that of spirit­ ual relationships" (1860: 397-398). 3. Looking for the universal characteristics of the sen­ tence, Brassai comes to the conclusion that the sentence except for the set of sentences containing a copula and expressing a logical judgement - is not built on the dichot­ omy of the subject and the predicate, but only has a single supporting-pillar: the verb. It is only under the influence

334

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

of logic, by analogy with logical judgements, and also because linguists base their supposedly universal state­ ments on the little group of Indo-European languages of West-Europe that they assign to the subject such an out­ standing role. If the subject is, indeed, an indispensable basic unit of the sentence, why can it so often be omitted e.g. in Hungarian or Latin? Actually there is no linguistic interpretation of the subject by means of which it would be possible to determine it in every sentence. If we regard that part of the sentence about which the predicate is as­ serted as the subject, then in the following sentence the dative is to be identified as the subject. (1)

Ennek a falunak csökken a lakossága. 'To this village decreases the population.' If the subject is defined as the noun in the nominative, it cannot be distinguished from the object e.g. in English and in French, i.e. in languages with no declension. For these languages, it would not be sufficient to define the subject as the noun at the head of the sentence, either, since this would mean that only the analysis of sentences was possible, but not the synthesis of them, as we would not know which word to put at the head of the sentence. The definition of the subject as that which in the case of an active verb acts, in the case of a passive verb un­ dergoes the action, while in the case of a middle verb is in the state or in the course of the event expressed by the verb, would not be of much use, either, since e.g. in Tibetan the agent of a transitive verb is in the instru­ mental. If in the sentences of the different languages the subject had common semantic or conceptual features, it could not happen that what is the subject in one language (Ich habe) is expressed by a dative in another (nekem van 'to me is'). These facts indicate that instead of forcing the term subject, borrowed from logic on the syntactic struc­ ture of sentences, it is better simply to speak about the

SAMUEL BRASSAI'S THEORY OF THE SENTENCE

335

nominative, and there is no reason not to consider the nominative to be of the same rank as the other complements of the verb. Semantic considerations also lead Brassai to believe that the central and most important constituent of sentence structure is the verb and only the verb. Language was born for the coordination of collective human activities, and serves primarily for the denomination of events, actions, happenings, so it is the verb, expressing the action or happening, that must play the central role in it. The casemarked nouns and adverbs are merely subordinate complements (in Brassai's terminology, determiners) of the verb, since they only "support it; explicate, explain, expand, restrict its meaning; denote circumstances belonging to it" (186 3-65: 185) - Brassai claims, anticipating the theory of Fillmore and others. Naturally, the assumed universal, "deep" sentence struc­ ture, consisting of a verb and its complements subordinated to it, has various realizations in the different languages. The characterization of the sentence structure of a given language must specify at least the following aspects: The "quality" of complements, i.e. the presence or lack and distribution of case-marked, prepositional and postpositional nouns. The number of the different kinds of complement. Word order, including both the order of the complements and the verb, and the inner order of the complements. (A novelty, since word order was very much neglected in the syntactic descriptions of the day.) The quality and number of tenses and moods. (Brassai sets up an abstract tense system, and examines which con­ cepts of this system are marked in the given language.) The various non-finite verb forms. The system of pronouns; the presence or lack of

336

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

cliticization. The article. The use of conjunctions; the distribution of coordina­ tion and subordination. etc. 4. Of the chapter investigating the universal and typical features of the sentence, the section dealing with word order contains the most fully valid and ingeniously novel ideas, some of which are revelations even today. Seeking an answer to the question as to whether there is some common feature which may be generalized inductively in the differ­ ent sentence types of the known languages, Brassai reaches a positive conclusion: both the fixed and the free word order languages display a sentence structure which begins with one or more complements carrying information already known. These complements "practically lay a basis for the meaning of the sentence in the listener's mind, i.e. they are calling attention, and pointing forward, connecting the mental activity of the listener with that of the speak­ er" (1860:341). He calls this initial part of the sentence subject in a different sense of the word (Brassai 1852), inchoativum (1860, 1863-65), introduction (1874), finally, preparatory part (1885). The second part of the sentence, including the verb, is the predicate (1852) , or bulk (Hun­ garian zöm) (1860, 1863-65), or message (1874), or principal part (1885). The function of this second part is "the com­ munication of an action, or a circumstance of an action that the speaker supposes to be unknown to the listener" (1874: 72). Besides the new ideas, the known ones that were not thought necessary to be set off as an introduction are also to be found in the bulk. The bulk, which is more important by virtue of its informative value, is present in every sentence; the inchoativum, however, may also be missing. It can be omitted (i) if the speaker does not think it

SAMUEL BRASSAI'S THEORY OF THE SENTENCE

337

necessary to prepare the listener for the comprehension of the bulk; or (ii) if the preparatory idea has been implicitely or explicitely included in the precedings; or (iii) if the speaker is in such a hurry to communicate his message that he forgets to prepare the listener for it. So not every sentence initial constituent is an inchoativum; sentence initial position can also have an emphasizing effect, e.g. in French in the case of the fronting of the phrases vainment, en vain, â peine, souvent, rarement. The sentence structure consisting of inchoativum and bulk seems to be a universal characteristic of languages. Which complements can serve as inchoativum, on the other hand, is specific to a given language. E.g. in the Semitic languages and in Hungarian every kind of complement can function as inchoativum, while in the Romance languages the inchoativum is usually the nominative. In German the in­ choativum always consists of a single complement. while in Hungarian it can also consist of two or more. It might also be characteristic of a language if its sentences neces­ sarily, often, or rarely begin with an inchoativum. 5. It is a general surmise in linguistics that the first intuition concerning this kind of "communicative", or "actual" sentence structure appeared in a study of Henri Weil in 1844; while the first elaboration of the idea as well as the introduction of the terms psychological subject and psychological predicate are due to Georg von der Gabelentz (1869, 1875). Brassai came to know the articles of Gabelentz, and he dedicated a whole study to showing that Gabelentz's theory is not only later than his own, but is also inferior to it both in respect of clarity and coherence (Brassai 1885). Gabelentz could not cut completely free from the traditional subject-predicate articulation of logical origin. E.g., he defines the psychological subject

338

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

as "about which we assert something", although this defini­ tion does not in the least suit the initial element of the following sentence, e.g.: (2) Tegnapelött láttam egy legênykêt az utcán. 'The day before yesterday I-saw a laddie in the street.' Brassai raises the following major objections to Gabelentz's theory: (i) Gabelentz does not answer the question of whether the psychological subject and predicate are equally indis­ pensable or whether one of them can be omitted in certain cases. In Brassai's (1860, 1863-65) study, on the other hand, it is clear that only the bulk is a fundamental part of the sentence; the inchoativum is less important and can also be missing. (ii) Gabelentz does not say whether or not there is a dividing line between the psychological subject and the predicate, and if there is a dividing line, how it is real­ ized in the different languages. From Brassai's study, on the other hand, we learn that the two parts are separated from one another by means specific to a given language: e.g., in Hungarian the division is indicated by the sentence stress on the first syllable of the bulk, while in French and German, the word order marks it. (iii) Gabelentz does not clearly specify their defin­ ing features. Brassai's syntactic and semantic characteriza­ tion of the inchoativum-bulk structure, on the other hand, according to which the inchoativum is a (sequence of) com­ plement (s) in sentence initial position, having a prepara­ tory function, and carrying known information, while the bulk is the rest of the sentence, including the verb, and partly or fully conveying new information, is considered basically correct even today. With Gabelentz, the psychological subject always con-

SAMUEL BRASSAI'S THEORY OF THE SENTENCE

339

sists of a single constituent of the sentence, while with Brassai, it can consist of several constituents, or, for instance, also of a subordinate clause. Brassai also men­ tions that Gabelentz only investigates isolated sentences; he does not notice the text-creating role of the psycholog­ ical subject-predicate structure, although "speech never serves to express merely single thoughts, but sequences of them, and just as every word, every form has a certain word order value, every sentence, every structure of thought has a given sentence order value" (1885, 30-31): Brassai also corrects such minor mistakes of Gabelentz's as claiming that compounds are put together according to the same prin­ ciples as syntagms, or as maintaining that a question and an answer together constitute a single psychological subjectpsychological predicate structure, the question representing the former, the answer, the latter. It also annoys Brassai - with good reason - that Gabelentz claims to perform ethnopsychological language comparison as opposed to the usual language comparison of genealogical purpose. Brassai mentions that, on the one hand, the so-called genealogical language comparison does not al­ ways give a clue to the genealogy of peoples, and, on the other hand, that the so-called ethnopsychology (Völkerpsycho­ logie) is too obscure a notion to be admitted to science, since there can be greater differences between the mentali­ ties of two Germans than between those of say, a German and a Frenchman. Both Gabelentz and Brassai perform syn­ tactic language comparison, which should also have a role in the comparative linguistic research of "genealogical purpose". 6. Brassai's theory excels not only Gabelentz's study in clarity and coherence, but also a considerable part of the whole literature of "actual" or "communicative" sen-

340

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

tence articulation. This literature has grown out of Gabelentz's theory; it was his inexactly and intuitively defined notions that became implanted in international linguistics, and have continued to develop - sometimes in diverse directions. The actual sentence articulation has been investigated by H. Paul, and W. Wundt, among others, and since the 19 30s primarily by the Czech School: Mathesius, later Danes, Firbas, Sgall, Hajicová, Benesová, etc. The terms psychological subject and predicate have been replaced by theme-reme, then topic-comment, or in the present-day terminology of the Czech School, by topic-focus, but there are other current designations, too, e.g., theme-proposition (Elekfi 1968), or, in the Soviet Union, logical subject-pre­ dicate (cf. Danes 1974). There are not only various terms, but also various definitions in use. A group of definitions are based on the division of the sentence into parts carry­ ing known and new information (e.g. early Czech School). In other cases Gabelentz's definition survives: about whom or about what something is asserted versus what is asserted about him or about it (Sgall 1967, 1974, Kuno 1972). Some theories (e.g. Halliday 1967, Dressier 1974, Kiefer 1977) distinguish both sentence structures. Enriched by certain syntactic, semantic, and phonological aspects, the former interpretation, based on the known-unknown character of the information carried by the sentence parts, has become in­ dependent, and has acquired a role in transformational generative grammar as the presupposition-focus dichotomy (cf. Chomsky 1970, Jackendoff 1972). It has also recently been shown about the latter type of sentence articulation that - as Brassai pointed out as early as 1860 - it serves not only to create text coherence and to express semantic nuances and emphasis, but also has a - sometimes decisive role in the syntactic structure of sentences, which is specific to a given language, and thus constitutes a possible

SAMUEL BRASSAI'S THEORY OF THE SENTENCE

341

basis for syntactic typology. These findings are mainly due to the discovery that certain languages, e.g., Japanese, Korean, the Burmese Lahu and Lisu, unambiguously mark the topic (i.e. Brassai's inchoativum) by a morpheme, so on the basis of these languages the defining features of the topic can be determined exactly. The topic features estab­ lished in this way practically coincide with the defining features as identified by Brassai: (i) sentence initial position, (ii) a particular morpheme, or stress and into­ nation pattern, or relative word order position, or a combination of these, (iii) the given, known character of the information conveyed. It has also been proved again that the topic is not an indispensable part of the sentence; there are also sentences consisting of a mere comment. A study by Li and Thompson (1976), typologizing the languages of the world on the basis of whether it is the subject or the topic that plays a more decisive role in the syntactic structure of their sentences, also corroborated another claim of Brassai's, according to which the topic-comment (i.e. inchoativum-bulk) structure is common to all human languages, even though it is realized in various ways in them. In a particular respect Brassai's theory even sur­ passes that of Li and Thompson. In the so-called subjectprominent languages, Li and Thompson regard only certain rare, highly marked sentence types as topic-comment struc­ tures, e.g. in English, the structures derived by Left Dislocation and Topicalization (e.g. As for John, I hate him; John, I hate) - so they do not realize that the unmarked topic-comment structure can be found in these languages, too, only it usually coincides with the subject-predicate structure. That is, the topic-prominent and subject-promi­ nent languages differ in the respect that while in the former any sentence constituent can function as topic, in the latter the topic must be identical with the subject. The subject,

342

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

however, need not always be a topic in the latter type of languages, either; it can be stressed, in which case the sen­ tence beginning with it has no topic at all. Brassai ob­ served as early as 1860 that "there is a slight difference in quality between the inchoativums of the Semitic and the Romance language families. Namely, in the former, the in­ ch oativum can include all kinds of cases, while in the latter, it usually appears in a caseless, i.e. nominative form..." (1860:345); that is, "the subjects, i.e. nominatives, of the West-European languages (such as the Romance family, the new German family, English) correspond to the notion of 'inchoativum1 and fulfil its role" (1860:342). 7. Brassai's actual Hungarian syntax (worked out most fully in the second part of (1860, 1863-65)), the proper, scien­ tific solution of which represented the motivation for the elaboration of his general theory, was not less pioneering in character than the general framework itself. Brassai was the first, and, up until very recently, the only person in the history of Hungarian linguistics to identify an invariant structure in Hungarian sentences, which are generally considered to have an idiosyncratic, "free" word order, i.e. surface structure. This invariant structure is as follows : Hungarian sentences fall into two main units: the inchoativum and the bulk. Their order cannot be reversed, but the inchoativum can be missing, i.e. the sentence can consist merely of bulk. The two units are sepa­ rated formally by stress and intonation: the inchoativum is not stressed, while the bulk begins with the highest stress in the sentence and a high fall. The inchoativum is rep­ resented by one or more complements of the verb that carry known information. As for the bulk, its most highly stressed first position is reserved for the constituent representing the most emphatic element of the semantic contents of the

SAMUEL BRASSAI'S THEORY OF THE SENTENCE

34 3

sentence, "which we assume the speaker or listener would ask about"

(1863-65:19 7 ) .

(The part of the sentence carry­

ing new information, i.e. the focus, is identified in gene­ rative grammar and in the Czech School by a question test even today.) This first position of the bulk is usually filled in by a complement, or rarely, by the verb itself. In the former case, the verb occupies the second slot of the bulk. The complement standing before the verb and carrying the sentence stress is called by Brassai attribute, since "it bears practically the same relationship to the verb as the adjective to the noun"

(186 3-65:201).

In both cases, the

attribute and the head constitute a semantic unit; the attri­ bute immediately precedes the head; and the attribute is stressed, while the head is not. An attribute + verb con­ struction can always be turned into an attribute + noun struc­ ture : (3)

a rigò fütyöl

-

'the thrush sings' (4)

szépen

ír

'the thrush's singing' -

'beautifully writes' In the light of the X theory

a rigó fütyölése

szép iras 'beautiful writing'

(cf., e.g., Chomsky 1971) Brassai's

use of the term attribute no longer seems as bizarre as it used to. Namely, the position of the attribute is most typical­ ly filled in by a complement of reduced independence, represent­ ed by a mere N or Adv, e.g. (5)

Moziba ment.

(6)

Könyvet olvas.

'To cinema went-he.'

'Book+acc reads-he.' (7)

El

ment.

(- traditionally spelt as Elment.)

'Away went-he.' This reduced complement, constituting a close syntactic, phonetic and semantic unit with the verb, seems to function as a complement of the V within V, so it, indeed, falls together within the X theory with the adjective, which is

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

344

a complement of N within N. If it is the verb that conveys the most important part of the message in the sentence, the verb will stand first in the bulk and will bear the sentence stress. Complements can also stand behind the verb: they are called supplements

('egeszitvenyek'). If a supplement conveys

new information, it will have secondary stress; if it expres­ ses a known idea, i.e. it could just as well have been front­ ed as an inchoativum, it is unstressed. So Brassai's model of the Hungarian sentence is as follows : (8) a. b.

sentence =

(inchoativum) + bulk

bulk

(attribute) + verb +

=

(supplements)

E.g. (9) a.

sentence = A taníto

+

'The teacher

up praised

(inchoativum) b.

bulk =

meg

(attribute)

meg dicsêrte a gyermeket. the child.'

(bulk) + dicsêrte (verb)

+

a gyermeket (supplement)

Brassai identifies this structure not only in indicative sentences but in the various kinds of interrogative and im­ perative sentences, too. What is more, he formulates his find­ ings not only in the form of a procedure for the analysis of Hungarian sentences, but also in the form of an

'algorhithm'

for the production, generation of them. His aim is to estab­ lish a set of rules on the basis of which a foreigner can also learn how to produce Hungarian sentences, and, on the other hand, on the basis of which it can be objectively decided if a sentence is good or bad. So his approach anti­ cipates in a certain respect the programme of generative grammar. No wonder that the attempt at outlining a Hungarian generative syntax practically lead to the rediscovery of Brassai's long forgotten results

(see Ê. Kiss 1977, and

forthcoming).

8. The structure this generative syntax assigns to Hungarian

SAMUEL BRASSAI'S THEORY OF THE SENTENCE

345

sentences differs from Brassai's in a single minor respect: in it the unit corresponding to Brassai's attribute is not a sister of the verb and the postverbal complements but the sister-node of a node S' dominating the verb and the postverbal complements :

= an a r b i t r a r y number of complements, i.e. maximal major categories)

Translating the rules into a tree, and naming the im­ mediately dominated by S" topic, and the X immediately dominated by S' focus renders it even more obvious that the topic corresponds to Brassai's inchoativum, the S', to Brassai's bulk, while the focus, to Brassai's attribute:

It is assumed that the topic and focus slots are gene­ rated as empty positions in the deep structure, and are filled out optionally, by the leftward movement, i.e. the Focusing and Topicalization, of maximal major categories fol­ lowing the verb in S :

346

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

It is furthermore assumed that a stress rule assigns sen­ tence stress (to be denoted below by an accent mark) to the first major category in S' . Thus, a Hungarian speaker has the following options in organizing a verb with two complements, e.g. eszi Péter az almat 'eats Peter the apple+acc', into a sentence: (i) He does not perform either Focusing or Topicalization, in which case the stress will fall on the verb: (11) Eszi Peter az almat. or: Eszi az almat Péter. (The order of maximal major categories is free in S.) (ii) He performs Focusing, but no Topicalization: (12) Péter eszi az almat. or: Az almat eszi Péter, (iii) He performs Topicalization, but no Focusing: (13)

Péter eszi az almat. or: Az almat eszi Péter. or: Peter az almat eszi. (iv) He performs both Focusing and Topicalization: (14) Péter az almat eszi. or: Az almat Peter eszi. These would be the variants produced by Brassai's algorhithm, too. From the whole literature of Hungarian traditional linguistics, Brassai's forgotten theory has come closest to the idea of generating all and only the grammatical permutations of a verb and its complements.

SAMUEL BRASSAI'S THEORY OF THE SENTENCE

347

References Brassai, Samuel (1852) Tapogatódzasok a magyar nyelv körül [Exploring the Hungarian Language 1 Pesti Naplò 1852: no. 802, 803; 1853: no. 861, 862, 865, 876, 877, 878, 885. Brassai, Sámuel (1860) A magyar mondat I. [The Hungarian Sentence] Magyar Akadémiai Êrtesitő. A Nyelv- es Széptudomànyi Osztâly Közlönye 1, 279-399. Brassai, Samuel (1863-65) A magyar mondatròl II-III. [About the Hungarian Sentence 1 Magyar Akadémiai Êrtesitö. A Nyelv- es Széptudomânyi Osztàly Közlönye 3, 3-128, 173409. Brassai, Samuel (1874) Laelius. Hogyan kell es hogyan nem kell magyaràzni az iskolâban a latin auktorokat? LaeLius. How to explain and how not to explain the Latin authors at school?] Kolozsvár, Stein. Brassai, Samuel (1885) A mondat dualismusa [The Dualism of the Sentence J Êrtekezések a Magyar Tudomånyos Akademia Nyelv- es Széptudomânyi Osztàlya Köréböl 12. Chomsky, Noam (1970) Deep Structure, Surface Structure and Semantic Interpretation, in R. Jakobson and S. Kawamoto (eds.) Studies in General and Oriental Linguistics, Tokyo: TEC Corporation for Language Research. Chomsky, Noam (1971) Remarks on Nominalization, in: R.A. Jacobs and P.S. Rosenbaum (eds.) Readings in English Transformational Grammar, Waltham, Massachusetts, Ginn And Company. Danes, Frantisek et al. (1974) Zur Terminologie der funk­ tionalen Satzperspektive, in: Danes (ed.) Papers on Functional Sentence Perspective, Prague: Academia. Dressler, Wolfgang (1974) Funktionelle Satzperspektive und Texttheorie, in: Danes (ed.) Papers on Functional Sen­ tence Perspective, Prague: Academia. Elekfi, Laszlo(1968) Mondatformak es mondathangsulyok fonetikai vetiilete Γ The Phonetic Reflection of Sentence Forms

348

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS and Sentence Stresses] Nyelvtudomânyi Közlemênyek 70, 329-370.

Fillmore, Charles J. (1968) The Case for Case, in: E.Bach and R.T. Harms (eds.) Universals in Linguistic Theory, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Firbas, Jan (1974) Some Aspects of the Czechoslovak Approach to Problems of Functional Sentence Perspective, in: Danes (ed.) Papers on Functional Sentence Perspective, Prague: Academia. Gabelentz, Georg von der (1869) Ideen zu einer vergleichenden Syntax - Wort und Satzstellung, Zeitschrift für Völker­ psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft 6, 376-384. Gabelentz, Georg von der (1875) Weiteres zur vergleichenden Syntax, Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprach­ wissenschaft 8, 129-165. Halliday, Michael A. K. (1967) Notes on Transitivity and Theme in English II, Journal of Linguistics 3, 199-244. Jackendoff, Ray S. (1972) Semantic Interpretation in Generative Grammar, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The M.I.T. Press. Kiefer, Ferene (1977) Functional Sentence Perspective and Presuppositions, Acta Linguistica Hung. 27/1-2, 83-109. Ê. Kiss, Katalin (1977) Topic and Focus in Hungarian Syntax, Montreal Working Papers in Linguistics 8, May, 1-42. É. Kiss, Katalin (forthcoming) Syntactic Relations in Hun­ garian, to appear in Linguistic Inquiry. Kuno, Susumu (1972) The Categorial and the Thetic Judgement: Evidence from Japanese Syntax, Foundations of Language 9, 153-185. Li, Charles N. and Sandra Thompson (1976) Subject and Topic: A New Typology of Languages, in Li (ed.) Subject and Topic, New York: Academic Press. Mathesius, V. (1929) Zur Satzperspektive im modernen Englisch, Archiv für die neueren Sprachen und Literaturen 155, 202-210.

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Sgall, Petr (1967) Functional Sentence Perspective in Generative Description, Prague Studies in Mathematical Linguistics 2, 203-225. Sgall, Petr, Eva Hajičová and Eva Benesová (1973) Topic/Focus and Generative Semantics, Kronberg-Taunus, Scriptor Verlag. Weil, Henri (1844) De l'ordre des mots dans les langues an­ ciennes comparées aux langues modernes, Paris.

DEEP STRUCTURE CASES REINTERPRETED András Komlósy 1. In the Fillmorean generative model deep structures for sentences consist in the unity of the predicate and the (in fact, unordered) set of NPs related to it; furthermore, NPs are dominated by the type of role they play in the action identified by the predicate. These function types are re­ garded by Fillmore as deep structure cases, and their con­ tents are given a verbal characterization (Fillmore (1968a)): Agentive (A): the case of the typically animate per­ ceived instigator of the action identified by the verb Instrumental (I): the case of the inanimate force or object causally involved in the action or state iden­ tified by the verb Dative (D): the case of the animate being affected by the state or action identified by the verb Objective (0): ...things which are affected by the action or state identified by the verb. (...) and so forth In his later works Fillmore has himself also altered the above system by introducing new categories and eliminat­ ing the category of Dative, whose content has been absorbed either by the Object or by the newly created categories (Goal, Experiencer); but the basic principles of categoriza-

352

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

tion have remained unaltered (Fillmore (1968b) and (1971)). However, the observance of the inherent properties of the nouns in defining cases seems to be a matter of inconsist­ ency in Fillmore's system: it is my impression that, in his original intention, cases should denote types of relations, that is, they would correspond to roles played by the actual NPs in relation to different verbs. If one sticks to this idea consistently, it will become obvious that the properties of the NP playing a certain role should belong to the characterization of the "player of the role" rather than that of the "role". This remains unchanged by the fact that some of those roles can be mostly fulfilled by NPs having certain properties only. In order to make my point clearer, let us compare the following two sentences: Peter threw the sack into the river. Peter threw Paul into the river. The roles of Paul and the sack in the action are iden­ tical, and the fact that Paul but not the sack is animate seems to be irrelevant in determining this role. Therefore, although the pragmatic probability of occur­ rence in certain roles obviously depends on the inherent prop­ erties of the NP to a great extent, I assume that the type of case is exclusively determined by the function played in the action; that is, the inherent features of the NP are irrele­ vant from this point of view. (They become relevant, of course, in connection with other grammatical operations, which do not concern us at present.) 2. One of the purposes of my paper is to show that, on the one hand, inherent features of NPs are not needed for determin­ ing deep structure cases, and, on the other hand, that at least some of the deep structure cases can be determined by using functional features only. In showing this I shall rely on the syntactic properties of various languages, primarily

DEEP STRUCTURE CASES REINTERPRETED

353

on those of the so-called ergative languages. Furthermore, I shall attempt to show that the system of functional features characterizing subtypes of A and 0 can be assumed to be universal, so that characteristic syn­ tactic structures for languages of various syntactic types 1 (accusative , ergative, active etc.) can be deduced from it, and the range of use of those structures in any language can be accounted for by simple neutralization processes. My attention will be primarily directed towards syn­ tactic structures with verbs whose case-frame does not in­ clude any categories other than A and 0: that is, in Fill­ more's notation, they have a case-frame These verbs will be referred to as 'the class of verbs'. This label is intended to refer to the fact that verbs with "abstract" meanings (expressing mental or psychic states, phenomena; relations, possession, etc.), which usually also include an E(xperiencer) in their case frames, do not fall into this set. Verbs marked whose syntactic structures are radically different from those of verbs in the languages investigated, will be considered only per tangentem. 1.1. In some languages, e.g., European Indo-European and also Hungarian, surface structures of active sentences with predicates having an case-frame will typically appear as follows: the subject of the sentence is the Agent in unmarked form (nominative); the object of the sentence is the Object in the marked form (accusative). From now on I shall call ' In this paper I term languages commonly called 'nominative' as 'accusative', because (i) the other types are also named after the marked case ('ergative' and 'active'), and (ii) I will reserve the term 'nominative' for the case of simple naming in all languages, and, therefore, this term is not sufficient for the intended distinction.

354

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

this construction of transitive sentences an o'bject)-mark­ ing transitive pattern'; languages or subsystems of languages with this type of transitive sentence construction will be called '0(bject)-marking languages and systems', respectively. In many languages, e.g., many Amerindian, Caucasian, etc., languages, the typical pattern for sentences with predicates having an Γ A, 0 1 case-frame is just the reverse of the former: the Object is the morphologically unmarked category (expressed by casus rectus in languages with nominal declen­ sion) , and the Agent is marked. This construction of transi­ tive sentences will be called an 'A(gent)-marking transitive pattern'. Until recently it was common to consider that the whole set of languages with an Α-marking transitive pattern repre­ sents a uniform syntactic type opposed to the type of 0-marking ("accusative" or "nominative") languages. There are dif­ ferent names in use for the grammatical cases expressing the Agent; most wide-spread are terms like 'ergative' and also 'active' and 'agentive'. Consequently, these languages are usually called 'ergative languages' or 'active' or 'agentive languages'. For the time being, I am going to use the least common term, that is, the grammatical case expressing the Agent of the Α-marking transitive pattern will be called 'agentive' (regardless of what other sentence-types and what other functions this form serves to fulfil in the given lan­ guages) . However, I suggest that this term will only serve

Note that neither of the interpretations of 0-marking and Amarking transitive patterns is restricted to languages with nominal declension. Reference to nominal cases here only serves to make the argumentation easier to understand. The distinction of 'marked' and 'unmarked forms' in the defini­ tion may be applied to any kind of morphological realization. The unmarked form is in general identical to the form ex­ pressing the Object of intransitive stative verbs.

DEEP STRUCTURE CASES

REINTERPRETED

355

as an auxiliary notion for the explication of the following, and will give way later to other terms. For the sake of simplicity, the grammatical case expressing the Object of the Α-marking transitive pattern will be called nominative for the moment. For the sake of symmetry in terminology, those languages and systems in which transitive sentences are typically Α-marking will be called 'Α-marking languages and systems'. Differences between O-marking and Α-marking transitive patterns can be illustrated by the following example: O-marking transitive pattern (Hungarian):

beside the wall" 3 Α-marking transitive pattern (Georgian ) :

beside the wall." Sentences with predicates having an

case-

frame do not pose difficulties concerning the categories categories A and 0 either in Α-marking or in O-marking sys­ tems, since in both patterns Agent and Object are assigned

Georgian is not a purely Α-marking language; it depends on tense whether the sentence is Α-marking or O-marking.

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

356

different suffixes in an unambiguous manner (O-marking: Anom, O-acc; Α-marking: A-ag, O-nom). We arrive at a more complex picture if intransitive verbs are also involved. Α-marking languages show a very heterogeneous picture from the point of view of sentence constructions with [-abstract J intransitive verbs. 1.2.1. The simplest insight is given by that group of Amarking languages in which all sentences with [-abstract J intransitive verbs are constructed according to one and the same pattern as follows: the surface realization of the only deep structure case related to these verbs is always (i.e., independently of whether it is an A or an 0) identical to the formation of the Object of verbs having an I A, 0 ] case-frame; that is, they are expressed by the nominative in languages with nominal declension. All this can be demon­ strated by the following Avar sentences : Avar : Vasa - s (A) stakan (0) bekana

boy-ag

glass(nom) broke

"The boy broke the glass" stakan (o bekana glass(nom) broke "The glass broke" vas (A)

ana

boy(nom) went "The boy went" It is these languages that Fillmore calls 'ergative-type lan­ guages1 ; the distribution of surface forms as outlined above 4 is represented by him as follows :

This figure and all the others attributed to Fillmore come from Fillmore (196 8a).

DEEP STRUCTURE CASES Fig.

REINTERPRETED

357

I

This is the ideal pattern of languages referred to as 'lan­ guages with ergative construction' by Soviet Caucaseologists. Following this tradition, I will call this subtype of A-marking languages 'ergative languages'. If this system were shared by all Α-marking languages, a simple explanation for the distribution of the surface forms could be given (as, in fact, it has traditionally been given in the literature on ergative languages) in terms of transitivity and intransitivity. However, the situation is not this simple in all Α-marking languages. 1.2.2. In Georgian, the subject of sentences with intransitive predicates does not have a uniform surface realization in the aorist group of tenses, where the transitive pattern is Amarking. On the basis of morphological and syntactic charac­ teristics Georgian grammars distinguish between two groups of intransitive verbs that of the medio-active and that of the medio-passive ones. In a sentence with a medio-active predicate in one of the aorist tenses, the subject appears in the agentive (the commonly used term is 'ergative') case, that is, in the form of the Agent of a transitive sentence:

'wo subtypes of ergative languages can be distinguished on the basis of whether the Agent of transitive sentences is marked in case the Object is unspecified or it is unmarked as if the verb were intransitive, cf. 3.

358

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

The subject of a medio-passive predicate is always realized in the nominative (i.e. the form of the Object in transitive sentences):

"The plate fell/has fallen" The personal affixes are the same in both groups of verbs, i.e. they are independent of whether they relate to a subject in the nominative or to one in the agentive. The subject of most medio-actives is typically Agent and that of most medio-passives is typically Object; never­ theless, there are several counter-examples, as is shown by the diversity of the groups below. The group of medio-active verbs includes among others du s_ 'boil', goravs 'roll', tiris 'weep', curavs 'swim, float', cvets 'drip'; that of the mediopassives dgas 'stand', midis 'go', cevs 'lie, recline', hsoravs 1 move off' . In virtue of these data it would be an oversimplifica­ tion to say that agentive subjects always express underlying Agents, while the nominative case is a reliable signal for the subject's being an underlying Object or Experiencer. Even if we were to disregard this problem, the mere fact that in this language there are two forms for expressing the subject of an intransitive sentence such that the one of them is identical with the surface realization of the Agent, the other with that of the Object of transitive sentences, neces­ sarily draws our attention to a theoretical problem (which could only be passed over in the case of the languages of the former group): what are the criteria on the basis of which the type of the single case-relation of an intransitive

DEEP STRUCTURE CASES REINTERPRETED

359

verb could at all be determined? There is a large number of intransitive verbs for which our intuition also would be at a loss in deciding whether their only NPs are Agents or Objects. It seems rath­ er obvious that the NP of the intransitive verb walk can only play the role of an Agent and anything that breaks is an Object, but it is not much more doubtful either that the subject of a verb like spin or fly can represent either an underlying Agent or a deep structure Object. (E.g., The danc­ er (A) is spinning on the stage; The humming-top (0) is spin­ ning on the floor; The stork (A) was flying towards the pond; The stone (0) was flying towards the pond.) Verbs of the latter sort show that any attempt to identify the type of the case-relation in any given in­ stance solely on the ground of the meaning of the verb would be logically wrong. The point is that if any meaning differ­ ence can be postulated between the two uses of verbs like spin (one with an Agent, the other with an Object), the en­ tire difference would consist precisely in the verb's having an Agent in one case instead of an Object in the other - so this explanation would be necessarily circular. It is because of a similar circularity that it is not advisable to base a general definition of deep cases on the semantic features of the verbs either: if the changing of the case-frame of a verb can itself cause a change in the meaning of that verb, then the meanings of the verbs depend on the definitions of the cases in general. Therefore, the latter have to be independent of the meanings of the verbs. (If, on the other hand, a change in the case-frame never changed the meaning of the verb itself, then - though verbal meanings would obviously be independent of the definitions of the cases - it would be even more evident that case-relations may not be determined in terms of verbal meanings.)

This is not meant to say that the set (footnote 6 continued)

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

360

It has already been mentioned that inherent

features

of the NP characterize the "player" NP rather than the type of the case-relation; it follows then that the definitions of the deep structure case-relations have to be independent of the features of both the verb and the NP attached to it. Taking all this for granted, there are at least two more closely related questions left: 1) Are the case-relations unanalyzable entities, i.e. primitive terms, needing no definitions? 2) What are the primitive terms on which the defini­ tions of the case-relations depend if they are not the prim­ itive terms

themselves?

1.2.3. The clue to the solution of the last question is probably offered by a third group of Α-marking

languages

where there is a possibility of constructing two different surface structure sentences out of the same intransitive verb and the same N P :

In sentences

(la) and (2a) the subject has a form identi­

cal to the surface realization of the Agent of transitive sen­ tences, whereas the form of the subject

(lb) and (2b) is the

same as the surface realization of the Object in a transitive sentence.

(footnote 6 continued) of case-frames

(Fillmore's

'frame

feature' in (1968a) 27) of the verb would also be independent of its semantic features but rather on the contrary: seman­ tic features of the verb probably uniquely determine it. 7 All the Bats examples and their interpretations are based on Deseriev

(1953) .

DEEP STRUCTURE CASES

REINTERPRETED

361

The meanings of these sentences are also different. E.g., the meaning of sentence (la) includes that it is only myself who is to blame for my falling down, i.e. that the agent of the event was me - at least in the sense that it took place as a consequence of my acts exclusively, as no­ body pushed me nor did the earth give way under me; on the other hand, in (lb) I could not be the agent myself, and similarly for (2a-b). It seems to me that the differences (in form as well as in meaning) between the members of the above sentencepairs have to be accounted for by the NPs bearing an A-relation to the verb in sentences (a) and an O-relation in sen­ tences (b). In any case, it is only the type of case-rela­ tions which can be supposed to be different in the deep structure, since the contrasted sentences can be built up out of the same inventory of lexical items and have identi­ cal structures in terms of subject and predicate as well as topic and comment. Systems that are similar to Georgian and Bats are com­ monly called 'active', as opposed to 'ergative'. Such a language is Dakota, whose system of oppositions is illustrated by Fill­ more as follows : Fig. II

Nevertheless, it seems to me that this figure rather corresponds to systems in which the alternation demonstrated by the Bats examples is extended, at least in principle, to all

[-atract]intransitive

verbs, that is, where surface

form is a direct function of the deep structure case. The descriptions available to me (Boas (1911), Boas and

362

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Deloria (1932)), seem to suggest that, in addition to the fact that Dakota does not represent this "ideal" pattern, there is not even a limited number of Dakota verbs besides which surface structure would be directly determined by the actual role of the NP. Dakota rather seems to fall into the same type as Georgian. This type may be called the lexicalized variant of the above (II) system. The reason is that in­ transitive verbs divide into two groups both in Georgian and Dakota (the group af active, or dynamic and the group of in­ active, or stative verbs) and the surface form is determined by the typical, and not the actual, role of the NP; in other words, surface form is determined by the fact that the verb belongs to the one group or the other. This system may be illustrated as follows: Fig. III

The differences between systems in Fig. II and Fig. III seem to be fundamental enough to me to render them to distinct types, even though I know of no language representing type II in a pure form. Bats is basically like Dakota, too, and the agentive/nominative alternation has only been recorded for a few verbs. Nevertheless, the principle manifesting itself in this alternation necessitates the postulation of type II. From now on I will reserve the term 'active' for this ideal sys­ tem, and type III will be called 'the lexicalized variant of the active type'.

DEEP STRUCTURE CASES REINTERPRETED

363

1.2.4. Sentences with [+abstract]predicates may also show a contrast parallel to what we found in the Bats examples (la-b) and (2a-b) above. Most Α-marking languages have a special surface pat­ tern for these sentences, which is different from that of sentences with [-abstract] predicates. In such languages with nominal declension, the normal way of expressing the Experiencer of these predicates is to put it in the dative case. In some cases, however, it is possible to construct a parallel sentence by putting the only NP of the same [+abstract]verb into the agentive case (this may or may not be accompanied by a change in the verb form, depending on lan­ guage) . The difference between the meanings of such sentence pairs is similar to what we found in cases of agentive/nominative alternation besides one and the same verb in the Bats examples analyzed above. Note that such dative/agentive pairs occur in Georgian as well although agentive/nominative alter­ nation is unknown. Consider the following Georgian sentences:

"he/she(dat)fell asleep"

"he/she(ag) fell asleep"

"he/she(dat) awoke"

"he/she(ag) awoke"

"he/she(dat) smiled"

"he/she(ag) smiled"

In most contexts, the members or each pair can be in­ terchanged quite freely, without the native speaker's notic­ "he/she(dat) was glad" "he/she(ag) was glad" ing any change in the meaning. It is nevertheless impossible 

The interpretations of the examples come from informants.

364

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(unless the purpose is to mislead the hearer) to use, e.g., man daiʒina (he/she fell asleep) if the speaker knows that the person referred to fell asleep as a consequence of hav­ ing drunk some drug slipped into his/her glass by somebody else in secret. Accordingly, it would be wrong to use man gai viʒa (he/she awoke) if one knows that the awakening was brought about by a loud noise in the middle of the night. The same kind of relation can also hold if the sen­ tences have, in addition, a deep structure Object. It ap­ pears in both sentences in the nominative case, but it will only be the subject in the sentence with the Experiencer in the dative case (sentences (a) below). Since the ExperiencerNP in the dative is an indirect object, this member of the pair is intransitive. Substituting the dative case form of this intransi­ tive pattern for an agentive, we arrive at the typical tran­ sitive pattern of Α-marking languages. The second member of the pair is, therefore, a simple transitive sentence with the subject in an agentive case form (the deep Experiencer of the former sentences) and a direct object (representing the deep structure Object) in the nominative case: Bats (la) Mitu-in h o

gu

(b) Mito-s

"Mito sees you" (2a) Sandru-in

ho

"Mito sees you"

jecino Moskowa (b) Sandro-s

"Sandro liked Moscow" Georgian (la) "Peter liked the decision"

gu

jecino Moskowa

"Sandro liked Moscow"

DEEP STRUCTURE CASES REINTERPRETED

(lb) Petre-m

mo

i

con - a

365

gadacqvetileba

"Peter assented to the decision" (2a) "Peter thought Paul was a clever man" (2b)

"Peter found out a new game" Again, it seems to me that the differences (both in form and meaning) have to be accounted for by the sentences' having different case-relations in their deep structure: an Ε-relation in the one of them and an A-relation in the other. 2.1. It is intuitively quite obvious that some concept of activity has to be involved in any characterization of that role which is to be matched by the category 'Agentive'. On the other hand, it is far less obvious to our intuition what 9 "activity" exactly must mean in this context . We have already mentioned that there seems to be no difference in the deep structure of the sentences compared in sections 1.2.3. and 1.2.4. other than that of the type of the case-relations. We can therefore assume that the meaning r

differences between the sentences straightforwardly represent the differences between the case-relations involved. The data of sections 1.2.3. and 1.2.4. then show that the meaning of Fillmore uses the property "instigating the action identified by the verb". But instigating a transitive action inevi­ tably includes exerting some influence on another NP (it is impossible to instigate a transitive action without this), which, on the other hand, is excluded if the action is in­ transitive. The phrase "instigating the action", therefore, (footnote 9 continued)

366

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

an A-relation can differ from the meaning of an O-relation in the same way as it does from that of an Ε-relation. This can only be explained if case-relations are not primitive terms but defined in terms of distinctive features. It seems, in fact, very probable that it is the pres­ ence in the Agentive relations (and the absence in the other two) of one of those features which underlies the meaning differences in our examples. Since the meaning difference itself clearly consists in that the NPs in the agentive case are in some sense "more active" than the same NPs in the nom­ inative or dative case in the parallel constructions, I will call this feature the feature of "activity". On the basis of our data, the following interpretation should be given to this feature: the activity of an NP means that its motion, change etc. identified by the predicate is not brought about by external (causal) effects. This inter­ pretation of the feature [+active] makes the feature [+animate] superfluous in defining the case-relationship and, at the same time, it gives the opportunity to distinguish the different case-relations in sentences like Peter(A) is spin­ ning (as he wants to) and Peter(0) is spinning (because Paul is spinning him around). 2.2. Let us now return to the [-abstract] verbs and try to characterize the roles of their NPs. The verbs with the feature [-abstract]are the predi­ cates of those sentences which refer to "chains of causa­ tions" of the physical reality: some object exerts some influence upon another, this has an effect on a third, and so on. In a very simple way, we can schematically represent chains of causations by using circles for their elements (the objects) and arrows for the effects they have on the (footnote 9 continued) obviously refers to different roles in relation to transitive verbs, on the one hand, and in­ transitives, on the other.

DEEP STRUCTURE CASES REINTERPRETED

367

next as follows: 0 0 0

0 0



("chain of zero degree" or "a single element chain") According to the functions they play in the chain we can state three types of elements (starting, intermediate, closing) which can be characterized by two properties and their negations : starting: affecting, non-affected intermediate: affecting, affected closing: non-affecting, affected The fourth type is represented by the only member of the sin­ gle element chain: single: non-affecting, non-affected In addition to this, elements can differ according to whether the influence is taken over and passed on by them in an inert manner or merely has the role of a stimulus to them that evokes their own activity. This difference is entirely parallel to the presence or absence of the feature of activ­ ity, described above. If we attempt to use corresponding features in characterizing the deep case-relations of sen­ tences referring to chains of causations, we come to the fol­ lowing system: active affecting affected +

+

+

+

+

-

+ +

-

+ -

Peter makes Paul write the let­ ter Peter is writing a letter. Peter Peter Peter ling, voze)

makes Paul jump. makes Paul jump. is jumping. Peter is fal­ (cf. the Bats sentence as

368

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS + +

+

Peter is writing with a pencil. 10 The wind banged the door.

+

Peter is writing the letter. Peter is pushing Paul. Peter is tall. Peter is falling«· (cf. the Bats sentence so voze) The features have been established on the basis, and for the explanation, of syntactic (i.e. formal) differences and are therefore syntactic features. Nevertheless, they can be given interpretations as follows : Γ+ active]: the immediate source of the motion, change, state, relation etc. (hence: motion) of the NP is the NP itself. In other words: its motion cannot be regard­ ed as a mechanical result of some external effect. [*+ affecting]: the motion of the NP includes its exerting some influence upon, or passing (some of the) influence exerted upon it to another NP. This by no means implies that the motion of the second NP should be a mechanical consequence of this influence: this influence can func­ tion as a mere stimulus which triggers its own activi­ ty. Γ+ affected]: the NP is influenced by some external force. 2.3. Since these features are primitive terms, the above char­ acterizations are their interpretations rather than defini­ tions. The features themselves are metalinguistic terms; i.e. they by no means refer to real phenomena in the outer world. They characterize and distinguish some of those, presumably universal, syntactic categories (case-relations) that can have expression in natural language. After all, the features involved in the deep structure of every concrete sentence characterize those roles that are attributed to the objects or persons referred to by the NPs

See footnote 12 .

DEEP STRUCTURE CASES REINTERPRETED

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by the user of the sentence. Theoretically, this has nothing to do with the inher­ ent features, to which certain sets of categories can only be related in stylistically unmarked sentences even in practice. In the Hungarian folktale the pork cheese that starts wander­ ing plays the role of an agent through the whole tale and the stylistic value of the tale derives (at least partially) from the very fact that this role is out of keeping with the in­ herent features of the pork cheese. I believe that the interpretations of the first four combinations of features characterizing four (sub)types of A-relations need no further explanation. It also goes without saying that the Object of a transitive action has the feature Γ- active , - affecting, + affected 1 , the Object of an in­ transitive action the features - active, - affecting, - af­ fected , and the Istrument is typically characterized by the features [- active, + affecting, + affected! . It is somewhat more difficult to find a plausible inter­ pretation for the remaining combination of features Γ- active, + affecting, - affected 1 . I cannot propose a fully satisfac­ tory solution at present; nevertheless, this problem being of rather secondary importance from the point of view of the questions I am discussing here, I may refrain from going into details at this point. It may be noted though that this combi­ nation may perhaps be correlated to the role played by embedded sentences (and nominalizations derived from them) in the place

Each combination of features corresponds to a particular role and therefore might be individually named. Since how­ ever their groups closely correspond to the traditional cate­ gories of A, 0, and I, I will maintain these latter terms and whenever a particular subtype needs specification, I will give the appropriate combination of features.

370

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 12

of x in relations of the type χ causes y. 3. Let us put the above system of features aside for the mo­ ment and return to the various types of Α-marking languages. It is common to all Α-marking languages that the Agent of transitive sentences is expressed by a marked form (in case the object is specified, cf. footnote 5) and its Object

12

Sentences may not presumably have the feature [+active I , nevertheless, the situation described by a sentence may bring about another situation and thus sentences may be [+affectingl +affectedl , e.g. [The lion is growling 1. causes and [Trees are trembling 1c where S. is [-active, +affecting, -affected] and S« is [-active, -affecting, +affected"|. The subject of S ? is non-affected and therefore in accusative languages it is in the nominative as long as the element cause is not built into the verb of S«. The building of cause into the verb (i.e. transitivization of the verb) transfers affectedness from S~ onto its subject, which therefore becomes an affected Object and is realized on the surface in the accusa­ tive (The growling of the lion makes the trees (them!) trem­ ble) . The meaning of cause may, however, also remain outside of S 2 and be attached to the nominalization of S- in the form of a nominal affix (From the growling of the lion trees are trembling). From this point of view, "natural forces" behave like sentences, e.g. The wind (flood, thunderstorm, etc.) caused [the house collapsed "1 and The wind (flood, thunder­ storm, etc.) made the house collapse or The house collapsed from the wind (flood, thunderstorm, etc.). This suggests that the combination [-active, +affecting, -affected J corresponds to the subtype of Instrument Fillmore assigns to natural (footnote 12 continued)

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is in an unmarked form. We have seen that the surface case of the Object is generally also unmarked besides intransitive verbs However, we have found considerable diversity in the surface structures of sentences in which the "activeness" of the NP falls between the two extremities. (The word "active­ ness" here and in the following passages does not correspond to the feature [+active] as defined in 2.2. - that is, it is not a technical term, as indicated by the quotation marks.) The Agent of transitive sentences is obviously the "most ac­ tive" NP - since it exerts an influence upon another NP with its own energy -, whereas the Object is the "least active" it has no energy (or if it has, that does not come to play in the situation), and it does not even pass the energy it receives to another NP (as opposed to the Instrument, which does). (footnote 12 continued) forces. It seems to be a common property of such NPs that they may only be subjects of sur­ face sentences in which the verb can be interpreted as a caused intransitive, e.g. The wind painted the door. 13 There are, however, Α-marking systems in which subjects of all intransitive verbs (should they be an A or an 0) are ex­ pressed by the same marked form as the Agent of transitive sentences, and it is only the Object of transitive sentences which is unmarked. I will call this system, which is the "negative" of accusative systems, a 'subject-marking' system. The aorist tense group of the closest relative of Georgian, i.e. Megrelian belongs here, for instance, where, probably starting from a state similar to present-day Georgian, the use of the agentive has been extended to all intransitive verbs. Maidu seems to be a pure subject-marking language (see Dixon (1911)) .

372

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Among Α-marking languages we find ones in which the NPs attached to intransitive verbs may be in the agentive, but also ones in which the Agent of transitive verbs is also un­ marked in case the object of the action is not specified in the sentence. Data of Ibero-Caucasian languages suggest, howe­ ver, that the range of uses of agentive forms is by no means accidental. Although the degrees of "activeness" demanding the use of the agentive are different in those languages, those degrees always mark a boundary: the language will em­ ploy the nominative case if the "activeness" of the NP is below that degree whereas it will employ the agentive case if the "activeness" of the NP reaches or surpasses it. 14 Let us consider the following types of sentences: 1. V [ A, 0 , Α, o]: Peter is writing the letter 2. V [ A, 0 , A ] : Peter is writing 3. V [ A (/0) , A ] : Peter is walking, Peter is falling4. V Γ (A/) 0 , O] : Peter is ill, Peter is falling2 Peter's "activeness" is evidently decreasing in the above order of the sentences. The first sentence expresses that Peter affects a certain object. The second sentence (similarly to the third) only asserts that Peter is engaged in a certain activity, nevertheless, that activity is necessarily realized in affecting some object even if that point is irrelevant for the utterance. There is no such affecting in the third sen­ tence, and in the fourth Peter is unambiguously inactive. 14 Besides the case-frame you find the complements realized in the sentence. In types 3 and 4 I united two case-frames, the one of which in both cases is [ A /°]· This notation indicates that A and 0 are in complementary distribution besides the verb (see earlier examples like fly, spin, fall) . This caseframe is united with [ A] in type 3 and with [ O] in type 4.

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The case of Peter in the above sentences is realized in different languages as follows: I 1. 2. 3.

I II III IV V VI

nom nom nom nom

II II ag nom nom nom

III III

IV IV

VV

VI VI

ag ag

ag ag

ag ag

ag ag ag g ag

nom g a ag a 4. nom nom The columns correspond to the following types : O-marking (accusative): e.g., English, Hungarian

Even a quick glance at these data will reveal that out of the possible variations of surface forms these languages only employ those in which (in the above order of sentence types) agentive forms follow one another in one block uninter­ rupted, and are then followed, similarly in one block, by the nominatives. Therefore whenever one of the four sentence types contains an agentive NP in a language, all the other sentence types with smaller numbers will contain an agentive NP in that language. The same general principle is realized in the lexical­ ized variant of the active type as well (V), but, as a result

Not all the subsystems of the*languages in the examples be­ long to the type indicated. Dakota and Maidu have no nominal declension, thus my claim does not hold for them in terms of agentive/nominative, but is realized in two paradigms of personal affixes. Note that accusative, ergative (both), active (both) and subject-marking systems may be defined as systems marking only complements with the features [+affected] , [+affecting] , [+active] and [-affected] ,respectively. Cf. 4.2. 16

Cf. footnote 13.

374

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

of lexicalization, the boundary between the uses of agentive and nominative forms is not exactly between the above sen­ tence types 3 and 4 but rather between sentences with dynamic or stative verbs (as explained earlier). 4.1. In this section I will make an attempt at formulating a hypothesis concerning the set of all human languages by using purely deductive arguments. My point of departure will be the interpretation of Fillmore's Agent and Object as modified above. We have seen that natural languages employ several dif­ ferent systems for the surface realization of Agent and Ob­ ject occurring in transitive and/or intransitive sentences. I have already given a sketch of the systems characteristic of accusative, ergative, and active languages; we have not ex­ hausted all possibilities by these, however, as is shown by, among others, Sapir's description of the pronominal systems of some American Indian languages. Sapir used the following chart to characterize the op­ positions of "pronominal forms" in five American Indian lan­ guages, as occurring in the sentence types discussed so far (intransitive sentences with an Agent, transitive sentences with both Agent and Object, and intransitive sentences with 17 an Object).

Sapir (1917). I do not know what the (footnote 17 continued)

DEEP STRUCTURE CASES REINTERPRETED

375

The properties of these systems are perspicuously il­ lustrated in Fillmore's pictorial representation of the dis­ tribution of personal pronominal forms. Fillmore assigns complements with the same surface realization to the same set. Thus the properties of the systems discussed by Sapir are represented as follows: (b) Takelma (c) Chinook (a) Dakota

Out of these systems (d) is typical of accusative and "sub­ ject-marking", (a) of active, and (c) of ergative languages. Since the above classification is based on the observa­ tion of a limited number of languages, one cannot exclude the possibility that natural languages may employ further systems of oppositions as well. It seems quite probable though that the vast majority of languages actually employs one of these five systems, since they do not only exhaust the possibilities realized in accusative, active, and erga­ tive languages but also include a system unknown in any (footnote 17 continued) situation is in Paiute and Yana, but the other three languages have no nominal declension and what Sapir calls 'pronominal forms' are not independent pro­ nouns but personal suffixes on the verb.

376

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

of those three (namely, (b)). More interesting is the question why, out of the 15 theoretically possible systems of oppositions (see below), languages seem to prefer these five (and perhaps one or two further ones) oppositions. 4.2. The most natural way of explanation seems to be to take the opposition of the functions of Agent and Object as a point of departure. As long as we use Fillmore's own defini­ tions, however, we· can only account for systems (a) and (e): (a) reflects the difference of their functions whereas (e) neutralizes it. As long as the contents of Agent and Object are opposed to each other as unanalyzable units, we cannot account for either of those systems in which Agent or Object has some particular surface realization in the one type of sentence whereas in the other type of sentences it is real­ ized identically to the other category (in the very same language). Such problems arise in connection with the two different realizations of Agent in (c), of Object in (d), and of both Agent and Object in (b). If however we do not regard the contents of these cate­ gories as unanalyzable units but rather characterize them with the absence or presence of the same elementary proper­ ties, then the number of neutralizational possibilities con­ siderably increases since in that case even elementary prop­ erties (or groups of them) may be neutralized. If subtypes of Agent and Object are characterized with the combinations of features introduced above (2.2.), we should speak of four, rather than two, categories in the sen­ tence types considered by Fillmore. Each of the four cate­ gories is defined by the absence or presence of the same three features:

DEEP STRUCTURE CASES REINTERPRETED

377

A

[+

-

-]

A

[+

+

0

-]

[-

-

+]

O

[- - -] (We only indicate whether the category in question is ac­ tive, affecting and affected, respectively.) The above discussed five systems of surface realiza­ tions of these categories can now be explained as follows : 18

(1) In system (e) all differences are neutralized. (2) In system (a) the only feature relevant in the choice of the surface case is [± active]. (3) In system (c) the only relevant feature is [± affecting]. (4) In system (d) the only relevant feature is [± affected]. (5) In system (b) both the relevant feature of (c) and the relevant feature of (d) are relevant. It is to be noted that out of the three features these two mutually pre­ suppose each other (in the sense that if a sentence con­ tains a complement which is [±affecting ] then it also has a place for another complement which is + affected], and vice versa). The typical principle governing surface realization seems to be the following: if the relevant feature is nega­ tive for a category then it is realized in an unmarked form, whereas if the relevant feature is positive for a category 18 It appears of course very probable that in languages in which these four categories are morphologically indistin­ guishable, differences are expressed by word order opposi­ tions. I have not investigated this aspect of the problem, however.

378

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

then it is realized in a marked form. 1 9 Thus if the language has nominal inflection at all, then in active languages (a): a [-active] complement is in ergative (c): a [- affecting] complement is in j casus accusative (d): a [- affected] complement is in J rectus whereas in the same languages (a): a [+ active] complement is in casus activus, (): a [+ affecting] complement is in casus ergativus, (d): a [ + affected] complement is in casus accusativus. In accordance with this we may well assume that in system (b) [- affecting, - affected 1 complements (i.e. the Agent and the Object of intransitive sentences) are unmarked. Common to all the five systems is the property that if these categories are distinguished at all then the distinction is based either on a single feature or on the interdependent features [±affecting] and [± affected] . This also means that whenever at least two categories are realized identically, then the identically realized categories share at least one such feature which neither of the differently realized cate­ gories have (except for the case of complete neutralization, of course). The shared features in our examples are: and [- affected] ; system (a) : [+ active] [- active] and [- affecting] system (b): [- affecting] and [- affected] system (c): [- affecting] system (d): - affected ] 4.3. What has been said so far may also explain why these five surface systems are the most widespread (if not the only possible) out of the 15 theoretical possibilities. In all the remaining cases not only neutralizational processes would be much more complicated but it might also happen that 19 Although the reverse may also occur, as witnessed by 'subject-marking' languages.

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while categories without any shared feature get identical realization, similar functions get realized in different surface forms. It seems highly improbable, however, that there might exist a system in which identically realized categories do not share a single feature which is exclusive­ ly characteristic of them. Let us now examine the remaining ten possibilities from this point of view.

We can certainly exclude all the combinations in which the [+ + - ] Agent and the [- - +] Object (which share no common feature) get such an identical surface realization that is at the same time in opposition to some other surface form. The only system we know about in which these two cate­ gories are realized identically is (e) - note, however, that in (e) the oppositions are neutralized. Cases in I are there­ fore ruled out. We can also exclude combinations in which the whole set of features shared by the identically realized categories

380

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

turns up in one (or more) differently realized category. On this basis we can exclude the possibilities in which the surface realization of the [+ - - ] Agent is identical to that of the [- - + ] Object alone, and/or the surface real­ ization of the [+ + -] Agent is identical to that of the Γ- - -] Object alone. Cases in II are thus ruled out. There are three possibilities left over (13, 14 and 15). None of them can be excluded on the basis of the above ar­ gumentation, since the whole set of features shared by iden­ tically realized categories is not characteristic of any oth­ er category. Nevertheless, practically it is not too probable that they may exist since some of their distinctions would be superfluous. We may not ignore the fact that whenever the morphological realization of Agent is different from that of the Object (as in system (a)), then the question as to which of their subtypes occur in a given sentence is already un­ ambiguously determined by the transitivity or intransitivity of the sentence. Therefore a system in which not only Agent and Object are distinguished but the two subtypes of either of them are also morphologically different would be uneconomically redundant. That this claim holds is even more strongly supported by the fact that the observed languages show that it is not necessary for each of the four subtypes to be distinguishable on the basis of surface structure. This actually only happens in that single system (a) which 13, 14 and 15 can be regarded as further refinements of. On the other hand, none of the other observed systems makes it possible to distinguish between Agent and Object in intran­ sitive sentences. 4.4. We have so far examined the theoretically possible sys­ tems of the surface realization of Agent and Object and sin­ gled out those systems whose functioning can be described on the basis of our modification of the notions of Agent and Object. For a more exact interpretation of my points of view

381

DEEP STRUCTURE CASES REINTERPRETED with respect to the classification at hand the

following

remarks should be borne in mind: (1) We assume our conclusion to hold for any kind of morphological distinctions of subtypes of Agent and Object. The kind of morphological distinction is arbitrary: it may be realized by case suffixes of the noun, or personal suf­ fixes and/or class-markers of the verb

(in languages without

nominal inflection), or by both simultaneously, or in any other way. (2) We discussed types of the surface realization of Agent and Object, which does not yield a typology of lan­ guages in any straightforward way. It is not necessary for a language to employ only one of those systems, and some lan­ guages may actually reflect the state of transition from one type into another. (3) The types of sentences we considered are

(i) in­

transitive sentences, with predicate and Agent, (ii) transi­ tive sentences, with both Agent and Object besides the pred­ icate, and

(iii) intransitive sentences with predicate and

Object. Strictly speaking, our classification is airtight in "pure" cases of these types only. Spelling out this restric­ tion in detail, our classification is intended for sentences whose predicate is

Γ- a b s t r a c t ] (that i s , it does not

express some psychological or intellectual process or state, or possession, or a relation, e t c . ) , whose verb in type

(i) is truly intransitive (that is, it

is not a transitive verb used intransitively), whose Object in type

(ii) is definite and is not de­

leted. The construction of sentences not satisfying the above requirements may be different from that of the "pure" types. For instance, if the Object is unspecified, indefinite or de­ leted in a transitive sentence, then the morphological form of Agent may be identical to that of the Agent of intransitive sentences, etc.

382

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

4.5. If it happens that out of a rather limited number of mathematically possible realizations of a certain phenomenon only a small subset is observable in about three thousand natural languages, then it would be unjustified to regard the actually realized possibilities as matters of mere chance. Nevertheless, the question as to which possibilities are actu­ ally realized can only be decided by empirical research. Given that at the present stage of our knowledge about language there is no phenomenon such that we know how it is realized in all natural languages (aside from some very general con­ straints) , the possibility that further research may discover new variants remains always open. New variants discovered by empirical research always provide further criteria for measuring the acceptability of previous theoretical explanations : theories that have pre­ dicted the occurence of those variants gain weight, whereas theories that have excluded those variants lose credit. Never­ theless, newly discovered data do not increase the probabili­ ties of all theories compatible with them to the same extent. Among rival hypotheses that are equally compatible with those new data, it is the one that allows the smallest number of possibilities (whose constraints are the strongest) that will gain more weight from those data. The reason is that in case empirical research only happens to discover facts compatible with this hypothesis then its rivals turn out to be too weak since they also allow possibilities that are not observable in reality. Our hypothesis concerning the possible systems of real­ ization of Agent and Object in transitive and intransitive sentences can presumably be regarded as a rather strong hypo­ thesis. The reason for this claim is that all the possibili­ ties it excludes (should they get realized in spite of the fact that our hypothesis excludes them) might function just as well as any of the observed variants. None of them would

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cause great troubles in communication, as is shown by the fact that complete neutralization is among the observed variants. Therefore, our hypothesis gains empirical support from all newly discovered systems corresponding to one of the variants the hypothesis allows. At the same time, our hypothesis would of course lose considerable credit if it can be proved that any of the variants 6-12 does in fact function in some natural language· In other words, our hypo­ thesis provides us with the possibility of justifying or dis­ carding on the basis of empirical data the use of deep struc­ ture categories characterized by functional features in gram­ matical description.

384

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

References Abitov, M.L., et al. (1957). Grammatika kabardino-cerkesskogo literaturnogo jazyka, Moscow. Boas, F. (1911). Chinook Handbook of American Indian Languages Part 1. F. Boas (ed.), Washington D.C., pp. 559-677. Boas, F., and E. Deloria (1932) . "Notes on the Dakota. Teton dialect", U A L Vol. VII. No. 3-4. 97-121. Boas, F., and J.R. Swanton (1911). Siouan. Dakota (Teton and Santee dialects), Handbook of American Indian Languages Part 1. F. Boas (ed.), Washington 875-975. Bokarev, A.A. (1949). Sintaksis avarskogo jazyka, MoscowLeningrad . Bokarev, E.A., et al. (eds.) (1967). Jazyki narodov SSSR IV. Iberijsko-kavkazskie jazyki, Moscow. Deseriev, Ju.D. (1953). Bacbijskij jazyk, Moscow. Dixon, R.B. (1911). Maidu, Handbook of American Indian Languages Part 1. F. Boas (ed.), Washington D.C., pp. 679-734. Fillmore, Ch.J. (1968a) The Case for Case, In: Universals in Linguistic Theory, E. Bach and R.T. Harms (eds.), New York pp. 1-88. Fillmore, Ch.J. (1968b). Types of Lexical Information, Working Papers in Linguistics 2. 65-10 3. Ohio State University, Computer and Information Research Center. Fillmore, Ch.J. (1971). Some Problems for Case Grammar, Working Papers in Linguistics 10. 245-265. Ohio State University Computer and Information Research Center. Jakovlev, N.F. (1948). Grammatika literaturnogo kabardinocerkesskogo jazyka, Moscow-Leningrad. Jakovlev, N.F. and D.A. Asxamaf (1941). Grammatika adygejskogo jazyka, Moscow-Leningrad. Klimov, G.A. (1973). Ocerk obscej teorii ergativnosti, Moscow. Magometov, A.A. (1970). Agulskij jazyk, Tbilisi. Mescaninov, I.I. (1967). Ergativnaja konstrukcija predlozenija v jazykax razlicnyx tipov, Leningrad.

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PancviƷe, VI. (1974) . Uduri enis gramatikuli analizi (Gramma­ tical Analysis of the Udi Language),Tbilisi. Rudenko, B.T. (19 40) . Grammatika gruzinskogo jazyka, MoscowLeningrad . Sani3e, A. (1953) . Kartuli gramatikis sapu^vlebi I. Morpologia. [Fundamentals of Georgian Grammar I. Morphology], Tbilisi. Sapir, E. (1917). C.C. Uhlenbeck: Het Passieve Karakter van het Verbum Transitivum of van het Verbum Actionis in Talen van Noord-Amerika U A L 1, 82-86. Sapir, E. (1922). The Takelma Language of South-Western Oregon. In: Handbook of American Indian Languages Part 2. F. Boas (ed.), Washington D.C., pp. 1-297. źirmunskij, V.M., et al. (eds.) (1960). Voprosy grammatiki. Sbornik statej  75-letiju Akademika I. I. Mescaninova, Moscow-Leningrad. Zirmunskij, V.M., et al. (eds.) (1967) . Ergativnaja konstrukcija predlozenija ν jazykax razlicnyx tipov, Leningrad .

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY'- SENTENCES (SENTENCES CON­ TAINING A THAT-CLAUSE)

IN HUNGARIAN

Ilona Molnar 1. By way of introduction it may be useful to make clear that the use of well-known semantic or logical concepts in the following arguments and discussions is not meant as adherence to any of the current directions in semantic theorizing. Neither is it meant to signal an intention to criticize, or propose further developments in, any pro­ pagated semantic theory. The system to be presented - or, rather, to be skeched - below relies on a syntacto-semantic classification of Hungarian complex sentences constructed with the connective 'hogy' (translatable in most cases by 'that')/ which I discussed in detail in several of my earlier studies. This classification deviates from approaches considered as traditional in Hungarian linguistics. More­ over, it does not follow any of the contemporary approaches either. However, I have made use of a number of theses and concepts put forward by these approaches. At this point I

For a summary, see Molnar, Ilona, Semantic structure of Hungarian complex sentences with 'hogy'. Acta Linguistica (Budapest), to appear.

388

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feel obligated to enumerate a number of works which will implicitly inform the discussion which ensues. The tradi­ tion of research associated with the name of Zsigmond Simonyi as well as works on Hungarian grammar by Laszlò Hadrovics and János Zsilka have had some influence on my work. The problems to be discussed are also related to factivity as formulated by P. and C. Kiparsky and L. Karttunen and the theory of presuppositions applied to Hungarian material by Ferene Kiefer. My investigations bear impressions of numerous other authors and are related to various further specific topics. These include, among other things, U. Weinreich's semantic theory, linguistic aspects of modality. The arguments to be presented could not have been construed without taking into consideration certain findings in fields outside the boundaries of linguistics as well. Especially certain assumptions of epistemological or psychological nature seem worth mentioning in this con­ nection . At the same time, it is hoped that the approach ad­ vocated in this paper can shed some light on aspects of sentence structure that have escaped attention thus far. It goes without saying that there are several ways to ex­ plain the structure of sentences with the connective 'hogy'. The traditional principle of 'parsing out functional consti­ tuents' (making distinctions among subject clauses, object clauses, and the like) has, in my opinion, not lost all of its relevance even if a system built merely upon it has in many respects become outdated. Also, great importance will be attributed to contemporary analyses focussing on the truth value of the propositions expressed by subordinate clauses. Another serviceable tool for probing into sentences with 'hogy' seems to be the sign combinations (linking, nesting) proposed by Weinreich. It is hoped that the rela­ tions to be discussed in this article will prove useful

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY'- SENTENCES

389

for the description of sentences with 'hogy' as well, since they might be particularly suitable to express the cognitive content communicated by the linguistic medium (for this as­ pect of semantics, see, inter alia, Le Ny (1975); Vasil'ev (1974)). 2. I will present a brief characterization of the main types of 'hogy'- constructions. In addition, I will describe the methodology employed in this paper. 2.1. Earlier analyses were based mainly on the hypothesis that each subordinate clause with the connective 'hogy' could be assigned a noun, mostly of abstract reference, appearing in the main clause and naming the situation or quasi-situation depicted in the subordinate clause. Such a noun could also perform the function of relating the situa­ tion or quasi-situation to semantic categories like 'fact', 'situation', 'state', 'event', 'act(ion)', 'idea', 'feeling', 'message', 'sentence', to mention only the most frequent ones. A token of similar nouns (which henceforth will be called 'sentential nouns') can appear in everyday sentences (1) as well: (1) Peterben felmerült az a gondolat, hogy Peter-in emerged that the idea [inessive [pronom. suffix] correlate] ir egy levelet. write a letter †acc. suffix

that

'Peter came to the idea to write a letter'. In other cases no sentential noun appears, but such a noun can be inserted into the sentences without any loss of acceptability (parallel to the way the noun 'fact' can be

390

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

inserted as a test of factivity). Cf. (2) Péter hajlando arra Peter willing

that-

(2), (3):

(a cselekvésre) ,

hogy

the action + superess.

that

[pronom.

suffix

correlate + superess. 1 írjon

egy levelet.

write + conj.

a

letter + acc. suffix

'Peter is willing to write a letter'. (3) Peter azt

(a mondatot) mondta, hogy ir majd egy levelet.

'Peter said

(the sentence) that he would write a letter'.

I have examined a large number of sentences with respect to sentential nouns. On the basis of my investigation it seems that the most significant categories among sentential nouns are:

(real) situation, event, a c t ( i o n ) , psychical

and communication

activities

(speaking, gestures). In order to determine

the sentential noun categories I have made use of various philosophical and semantic criteria. I shall not discuss these criteria here, however. It should be made clear that by means of these criteria it was possible to avoid cir­ cularity. 2.2. Apart from the syntactic complex made up of a sentential noun and the subordinate

(complement) clause, sentences contain,

in a number of cases, an additional predicate ly several predicates). Cf. the predicates

(or occasional­

'felmerül' 'emerges',

'hajlando' 'is ready' or 'is willing' and, at least formally, 'mond'

'says' in the above examples. Furthermore, I have examined

the relations between the sentential noun - complement

clause

complex and the predicates with which they co-occur from the point of view of mutual determination. The inquiry

suggested

a division into three sentence types symbolized by

( A ) , (B(1)),

and

(B(2)), respectively

(see b e l o w ) .

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY'- SENTENCES

391

2·3. Type (A). The relation between the semantic components in question is unrestricted, i.e., components do not exert mutual delimitative influence on each other (cf. (4)). (4)

Peter megebedelt azután (az után az esemény után), hogy megirta a levelet. 'Peter had his dinner after (the event of) having written the letter.'

Environments of the components 'the event of having dinner' and 'the event of writing (the) letter' could be filled by almost any other event in this structure (provided that it is compatible with the temporal relationship expressed in the sentence). Cf. (5), (6): (5)

Peter ábrándokba meruit azután, hogy megirta a levelet. 'Peter gave himself up entirely to his daydreams after having written the letter.'

(6)

Péter megirta a levelet azután, hogy lecsillapodott a vihar. 'Peter wrote (finished) the letter after the storm had calmed down.'

Unrestrictedness of Type (A) seems to characterize the sen­ tences with 'hogy' in which the subordinate clause does not constitute an argument of the predicate in the main clause. In other words, the subordinate clause in these sentences is a free constituent or, syntactically speaking, a circumstan­ tial adverbial phrase (like a temporal or manner adverb). Because of this unrestrictedness of the components I shall neglect structures of Type (A) in the further analyses. Type (B). The components of the sentence are semantically dependent upon each other. Cf. (7); (7)

Péter tudomására hozta Mariának, hogy megirta a levelet. 'Peter informed Mary of his having written the letter.'

The complement of the predicate phrase 'tudomására hoz' ('inform sy of sg') is semantically constrained. Cf. (8),

392

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

which is unacceptable : (8) *Péter tudomására hozta Márianak a ceruzáját. 2 'Peter informed Mary of his pencil. The set of predicates which may govern the component a. level megiràsa 'writing the letter' is equally constrained. Cf. the ungrammaticality of (9): (9) *Leesett a földre Péternek az a tette, hogy megirta a levelet. 'The action of Peter to have written (of having written) the letter fell to the ground.' In (9), leesett a földre '(it) fell to the ground' describes a physical event. The structural type (B) seems to be characteristic of sentences with 'hogy' in which the subordinate clause has a (syntactically) predicative function or constitutes an argument of the predicate in the main clause. Within Type (Β), two types of semantic relations can be rather clearly distinguished (although the differences may be often blurred). 2 Such a sentence can be acceptable in Hungarian provided that (a) ceruza ' (the) pencil1 does not refer to a physical object but to some accidental fact in connection with it; e.g., if ceruza is meant to imply az, hogy a ceruza elveszett '(the fact that) the pencil has been lost'; az, hogy ceruzára van szüksèg '(the fact that) a pencil is needed1 , or the like. At first sight, the constraint stated appears to exclude the use of words with concrete reference in certain positions in the sentences with 'hogy'. It is easy to see that this is not so. For a detailed account of the relationship between words with abstract reference and sentences with 'hogy1, see my paper cited in fn. 1.

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY' - SENTENCES

393

R e l a t i o n ( ( 1 ) ) : SentN CompCl the relation between the subordinate clause and the sen­ tential noun referring to it (the latter may be present or inserted post hoc facto). This is the relation already mentioned, cf. also examples (10): (10)(i) ... az az esemény, (ii) ... az a cselekvês, hogy P é t e r l e v e l e t i r t . . . (iii) ... az a benyomas, (iv) ... az a közlemény, '... the event of Peter's having written a letter...' '... the action of Peter's having written a letter...' '... the impression that Peter has written a letter...' '... the message (saying) that Peter has written a letter...' Most simply, what we see here is the identifying-referring function relation of a Pro sentential form. The sentential noun provides a general frame to which the subordinate clause belongs. The subordinate clause represents a token of the general frame. That is, in both cases almost the same enti­ ties are referred to, once in a general and once in a con­ crete way. This relation will be called 'internal connection'. It should be noted that in certain structures with in­ ternal objects the function of a sentential noun may be ex­ pressed by verbs (verb phrases) as well. With respect to the relations under discussion, sentence pairs such as (11) or (12) are equivalent : (11) (i) Az az êrzésem, hogy. .. (ii) (12)(i) (ii)

'I have the feeling (that)...' Ugy (azt az érzést) erzern, hogy... 'I feel like (I feel the feeling of...)...' Az a mondat, hogy... 'The sentence is (that)...' Azt (a mondatot) mondja, hogy... 'The sentence is said (by him/her) that...'

394

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

The structure containing the internal connection is an obli­ gatory component of sentences with 'hogy'. Occasionally, it may occur in sentences such as (13)-(15). (13) Peter azt tette, hogy írt egy levelet. 'Peter performed the writing of a letter.' (14) Az az érzésem, hogy Peter fáradt. 'I have the impression that Peter is tired.' (15) Peter azt mondta, hogy ír majd egy levelet. 'Peter said that he would write a letter.' Relation (B(2)) : [sentN - CompC1 ] - Ρred the relation between the structural complex including the internal connection, and a predicate ranging over it (usual­ ly a predicate of evaluation, qualification, or attitude); see structures in (16)-(19): (16)

(17)

(18)

(19)

Helyes volt (a cselekvês), hogy Peter levelet irt. 'It was correct (the action was correct) that Peter has written a letter.' Maria elhitte Peternek azt a kijelentêsét, hogy levelet fog írni. 'Mary gave credit to Peter's statement that he would write a letter.' A mai este jó alkalom lesz arra (a cselekvésre), hogy Péter megirja a levelet. 'This evening will be a favourable occasion for Peter's writing the letter (for the action of Peter to write the letter).' Nem beszé Item arról az érzésemről, hogy Peter fáradt. 'I did not mention my impression that Peter was (is) tired.'

As the above predicates of evaluation or qualification are ranging over entities which exist independently of these predicates, the relation between them and the complex described under (B(1)) will be termed 'external connection'.

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY'- SENTENCES

39 5

The distinctness of the two types of relations discussed above can be assessed by various methods. Initially, the test of logical conjunction appeared to be the only more or less reliable criterial procedure. Structures with internal connection cannot be expressed by conjoined sentences. Cf. (20)-(21), where (i) and (ii) are not equivalent. (20) (i) Peter azt tette, hogy levelet írt. 'Peter performed the act of writing a letter.' (ii) Péter levelet írt, es ezt tette. 'Peter wrote a letter and he did that.' Márianak az a benyomàsa, hogy Peter levelet fog (21)(i) irni. 'Mary has the impression that Peter will write a letter.' (ii) Peter levelet fog írni, es Márianak az a benyomàsa. 'Peter will write a letter and Mary has that im­ pression .' On the other hand, sentences with external connections can easily be expressed by conjoined sentences. Notice that (i) and (ii) in (22)-(25) are equivalent. (22) (i) Helyes volt, hogy Péter levelet írt. 'It was correct that Peter wrote a letter.' (ii) Peter levelet írt, es ez helyes volt. 'Peter wrote a letter and that was correct.' (23)(i) Mária elhitte Peternek azt a kijelentését, hogy levelet fog irni. 'Mary gave credit to the statement of Peter (which said) that he would write a letter.' (ii) Péter kijelentette, hogy levelet fog irni, es ezt Maria elhitte. 'Peter stated that he would write a letter and this (24)(i)

(statement) was given credit by Mary.' A mai este jó alkalom lesz arra, hogy Péter megírja a levelet.

396

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

'This evening will be a favourable occasion for Peter to write the letter.' (ii) Péternek szükséges megírni a levelet, es erre a mai este jo alkalom lesz. 'Peter needs to write the letter and for that (action) this evening will be a favourable occasion.' (25)(i) Nem beszêltem arról az érzésemről, hogy Peter fáradt. 'I did not mention my impression that Peter was/is/ tired.' (ii) Az volt az érzésem, hogy Peter fáradt, de errol az érzésemrol nem beszéltem. 'I had the impression that Peter was tired but I did not mention that impression.' 2.4. According to what has been said thus far, a semantic structure of sentences of Type (B) can be schematically re­ presented as follows: [External predicate (internal connection) J The structure can be viewed as the outcome of a (perhaps also psychologically real) mechanism of sentence construction which first produces the complex of internal connection and then builds up the entire structure by adding external predicates in a second step. (It might be objected that actual language use does not always construe sentences with 'hogy' via the same succession of operations. The discussion of this problem is not part of my task. I do not deny, however, that other mechanisms in actual performance may be relevant to the un­ veiling of semantic interrelations.) 2.5. The picture presented above may be completed by taking into consideration that both the set of sentential nouns and that of external predicates (as could be readily predict­ ed from earlier findings) are lexically more or less delimitable. I have already mentioned several sentential nouns. Some of the most current external predicates are given below.

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY' - SENTENCES vaiami feladat szokás

4

397

something is to be done is a habit

kezdete valaminek vége valaminek elokészület valamire alkalom valamire borzaszto

is is is is is

csodálatos furcsa

is wonderful is strange

meglatszik

a start for sg the end of sg a preparation for sg an occasion for sg terrible

shows itself

divatba jön valaki biiszke valamire someone hibås valamiben haj lamos valamire kifárad valamiben valaki egyetêrt valamiben someone hozzászokik valamihez kêszül valamire vitatkozik valamiröl mosolyog valamin örül valaminek sajnál valamit

becomes fashionable is proud of sg is to blame for sg is ready for sg becomes tired of sg consents to sg gets used to sg prepares for sg discusses sg smiles at sg is happy about sg is sorry for sg

valaki megtanul valamit tud valamit ellenez valamit megcåfol valamit tamogat valamit hasznosit valamit

learns sg (to master) knows sg opposes sg denies sg supports sg utilizes sg

megerdemel valamit elër valamit

someone

deserves sg achieves sg

4 The pronouns vaiami 'something', valaminek 'of something', etc., are attached as a vague reference to the syntactical position of a possible Hungarian subordinate clause.

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

398

megfejt valamit átgondol valamit leir valamit lerajzol valamit

solves sg (reveals sg) thinks sg over writes sg down draws sg

and so on. 2.6. Before proceeding, it seems useful to note that acceptable Hungarian sentences with 'hogy' can occur in a great number of structures for which the above schemes offer no immediate analysis. But even such cases have provided an indirect justi­ fication of our schemes; the exceptional, transitional or deviant character of such sentences can be more easily under­ stood on the basis of the given schemes. 3. In what follows I shall provide further criteria for dis­ criminating between relations of Type B/1 and relations of Type B/2. It will become rapidly evident that these criteria are only plainly stateable after some digression. This is, no doubt, due to the semantic complexity of 'hogy'- sen­ tences. However, it is hoped that the very necessity for such digression suggests the far-reaching inter-relatedness of the phenomena under examination. 3.1. The problem I shall turn to in this section is the in­ terrelation between internal and external structures and factivity. From what has been said so far one might gather that factivity is related to some aspects of the system outlined. Factivity and nonfactivity, internal and external structure yield, however, distinct partitionings of the set of predicates. Often the two systems are overlapping. In­ ternal relation covers a number of nonfactive predicates while external relation covers a series of factive and implicative predicates. I must admit that by analysing external predicates I have unceasingly been haunted by factive verbs, and it has always been an intriguing question to me to find out the exact nature of the connection between these two categories.

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY'- SENTENCES

39 9

As is well known, factive presuppositions can be checked by the negation test. When the sentence is negated the truth value of the complement will remain unchanged. However, it can be demonstrated that identical or similar behaviour is characteristic of not only factive predicates but of virtual­ ly all external predicates, factives and nonfactives alike. Consider examples (26)-(27): (26) Maria

(azt az állitást), hogy

Peter megírta a levelet. 'Mary

credit to the statement that

Peter had written the letter.' (27) Maria

arra az eshetőségre (=lehetseges

esetre), hogy sok vendég érkezik. 'Mary

prepared for the possibility

(= possible event) that a great number of guests would come.' Sentences (26) and (27) contain nonfactive predicates. Still, something remains unchanged under negation: the information that a statement or a possibility existed (or exists) is not subjected to any change. Notice that elhisz valamit 'gives credit to sg' and felkészül(t) valamire 'is prepared for sg' or 'prepares himself/herself for sg' are external predicates. As a proof, cf. (28) and (29): (28) Valaki àllitasa az volt, hogy Péter megirta a levelet, es ezt (az állitást) Maria elhitte. 'It was someone's statement that Peter had written the

400

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

letter and that (statement) was given credit by Mary.' (29) Fennállt az az eshetosêg, hogy sok vendég érkezik, es erre (az eshetöségre) Maria felkészült. 'There was a possibility that a great number of guests would come and for that (possibility) Mary was prepared.' The problem at hand can be approached from other angles as well. Another criterion for deciding whether a verb is factive or not is the insertion into the main clause of the noun 'fact'. Our argument is not affected by the fact that other sentences might be supplemented by other nouns in the position of 'fact'. What is important is that the assignment of the subordinate clause to one of the general categories (see Section 2.1) remains invariable under negation. Cf. (30)-(32) : (30) Maria

azt az igéretét, hogy

meglatogat. 'Mary

her promise that

she would come to see me.' (31) Maria

azt a kérésèt (vagy: mondatat),

hogy mentsék fel a vizsga alól. 'Mary

her request (application, sen­

tence, utterance) that she be exempted from the examina­ tion . '

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY'- SENTENCES

401

(32)

be solved. Another observation to be accounted for is that sentences with factive verbs can be supplemented by nouns other than 'fact'. (33)

Mariának tetszett Peternek az az őtlete , hogy vegyenek egy csònakot.

'Mary was pleased by Peter's idea of buying a boat.' Máriára nagy hatással volt az a h ír, hogy a tudosok êrtelmes lények jelzêseit észlelték a világurben. 'Mary was greatly moved by the news that scientists had detected signals emanating from intelligent creatures in outer space.' We might also follow an alternative train of thought. That subordinate clauses embedded under nonfactive predicates can be assigned to general categories like állaspont 'stand­ point', vélemény 'opinion', érzés 'feeling', gondolât 'idea', problema 'problem', döntés 'decision', tétel 'thesis', mondat 'sentence', üzenet 'message', vallornas 'confession', hiedelem 'belief', and the like, needs no demonstration. One might be tempted to believe that the above nouns, together with comple­ ment clauses attached to them, retain their nonfactive character in all environments. Data do not show this to be the case, however. When complexes with the above nouns appear as arguments of certain predicates in sentences with hogy, it follows that the psychical phenomenon, communication, utterance, etc. described by the sentence exists irrespective of whether the sentence is affirmed or negated. Let me adduce some further examples : (34)

402

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(35) Maria

Péternek azon a vallomà-

sàn, hogy szeret egyedül lenni. 'Mary

on Peter's confession that

he liked to be alone.' (36) az az ållåspont, hogy el kell töröIni a vizsgát. 'The opinion that the examination should be abolished dominant.' Such sentential patterns are quite often derivable from a more analytical, hierarchically organised, structure. This structure would include the above arguments and the element equivalent to 'fact'. Cf. (37) as derived from (38): (37)

Emlékszem arra az üzenetre, hogy... 'I remember the message that...' (38) Emlékszem arra a tényre, hogy azt üzentek, hogy... 'I remember the fact that a message had been sent (saying) that...' A derivation of this type, however, proves unsatisfactory in other cases. (39) cannot be derived from (40), nor can (41) from (42) . (39) Győzött az az álláspont, hogy... 'The opinion that... became dominant.' (40) Gyozött az a tány, hogy látezett az az ållåspont, hogy... 'The fact that there existed an opinion (saying) that... became dominant.' (41)

Mária elgondolkodott Péternek azon a vallomåsån, hogy...

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY'- SENTENCES

40 3

'Mary meditated on Peter's confession that...' Maria elgondolkodott azon a tényen, hogy Peter bevallotta, hogy... 'Mary meditated on the fact that Peter confessed that...' As was pointed out earlier, one can find sentences in which entities in the subordinate clause are not interpretable as factually existing but are, instead, incipient or merely possible. The latter properties will again be independent of the affirmative or negative form of an external predicate. Cf. (43) : (43) (egy) olyan álláspont, hogy el (42)

kell törölni a vizsgát. 'An opinion

being gradually developed that

the examination should be done away with.' 3.2. The facts and considerations presented above may lead to the assumption that sentences with 'hogy' can be character­ ized, apart from truth, by another semantic relationship as well. The latter can be based on a different system of 'values' which will undoubtedly correspond to what we called 'external' and 'internal' connections (see 2.3 above). It may be worth mentioning that also factivity can be accounted for by this system. The relationship mentioned above will hereinafter be termed 'existential relation'. By this term we will refer to the mode (or form) of existence which is displayed by the semantic components in the sentence. In other words, such a relation will characterize the mode in which entities denoted by the semantic components in the sentence are stated to exist. The mode of existence of the entity denoted by the subordinate clause can be indicated by the main clause which may tell us whether the description in the subordinate clause is about

404

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

an actual situation, about a person's assumptions, impres­ sions, utterances, etc. Sentential nouns belong therefore to the existential features of the subordinate clauses. The concept of existence is a semantic concept which, just like all other concepts in my system, is adapted to the linguistic information or blocks of-such information about reality reflected in language. We are now in the position to formulate a hypothesis concerning the interaction of negation and existential relations : Negation changes the existential relation of the subordinate clause in internal, but not in external, connec­ tions . (Note that truth values do not come into play directly at this level of discussion; in other words, it is a property of certain subtypes of existential relations only that their stability can be checked against the truth value test.) Let us adduce an example for both internal and external structures. (44) contains an internal structure: (44) , hogy fáradt. that he was tired.' The negative sentence tells us that the reported sentence has not been uttered by Peter, i.e. it does not (did not) exist. Negation thus alters here the existential relation of the affirmative sentence. (45) represents an external structure : (45) P éternek azt a közlését, hogy fáradt. the message of Peter (saying) that he was tired.' In (45), in both cases the subordinate clause reports on a message actually uttered by Peter. The existential relation of the subordinate clause has thus not been affected by negation here.

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY'- SENTENCES

405

The examples (44) and (45) illustrate cases where neither the (subordinate) clause of the internal nor that of the external structure need be true. Our hypotheses can, however, also be motivated by taking subordinate clauses whose truth is guaranteed. The present observations square well with Frege's thesis according to which truth values of subordinate clauses embedded under certain predicates, e.g., 'say', 'take something for granted', 'believe', etc. are neutral from the point of view of the truth value of the whole sentence. This can be explained, as Frege puts it, by claiming that in such cases the subordinate clause constitutes only part of the idea expressed by the entire sentence. In the present frame I designate as 'constructions with internal connection' such complex sentences which admit an adequate assignment of truth values to the whole sentence complex but not to the subordinate clause alone. The truth value of the subordinate clause seems to covary with that of the main clause.

This observation is supported by the fact that a negated internal complex cannot be an argument of a further predica­ tion. This is so because the scope of negation in the case of an internal complex embraces not only the sentential noun but also the subordinate clause. Cf. the following example: *Peter nem mondta azt, hogy fáradt, es en ezt a bijelentëst jol megjegyeztem. 'Peter did not say that he was tired, and I kept this utter­ ance firmly in mind.' No doubt, this problem would deserve a more elaborate dis­ cussion. Space limitations prevent me from going into further details in this paper, however.

406

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

From Frege's examples it seems that by a 'non-independent idea' he meant all descriptions which designate, instead of a true or false state of affairs, entities like someone's (existing) ideas, theses, messages, utterances, etc. Frege qualified the predicate 'doubt something' exclusively on the grounds as to whether the clause governed by it was true or false. Accordingly, he considered it to be a par with predicates of the type 'say' or 'believe'. It should be recognized, however, that there are things that can be said to exist irrespective of their truth or falsity, e.g. theses, statements, theories and the like. In linguistic and cognitive operations such things are treated just like (actually) existing situations; in Fregeian parlance, their descriptions are attributed an independent sense. A scienti­ fic thesis retains its mode of existence (remains a thesis) irrespective of the attitude one entertains towards it. It remains a thesis even if disproved. Situations realizable in the future (e.g., plans), events with imminent outcomes, and other emergent circumstances are similarly characterizable. It is therefore necessary to consider the mode of existence of the subordinate clause, in addition to its truth value. In what follows I shall provide a brief survey of my results obtained thus far. These results comprise: (i) a system of features for the description of existential relations in subordinate clauses with 'hogy', which system is needed in order to permit the discrimination of variance/ invariance in existential relations; (ii) empirically or deductively compiled lists mirroring the distribution of existential relations; the same lists will include data showing the influence of various predicate types (among external predicates) on (the change'or stability of) existential relations under negation. Unfortunately, it would take far too much space to motivate the categories and theses in full detail. Nor can I presently solve all the related issues of the problem. I hope, however,

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY'- SENTENCES

407

that the following sketch will give adequate illustration of my assumptions and conclusions. 4. Existential relations of subordinate clauses with 'hogy' will be defined by deriving a system of features from a hypothetical, invariant semantic construct symbolized as 'QS' (= a quasi-situation). 4.1. Focussing on the aspect of subordinate clauses with 'hogy' pointed out above, QS will be specified by means of features based on three groups of features (I, II and III). Groups I and II provide features for internal structures (these features are assigned to quasi-situations in arbitrary combinations); more exactly, these features describe the existential relations of the internal complex. From this the structure ' ['external' predicate ('internal' complex)]' will be constructed utilizing features out of Group III.

The construct of quasi-situations is based on an analysis of statements about facts-in-reality uttered in actual conversation. Notice that this is based on the observation that a subordinate clause with 'hogy' usually conforms to a regular subject- predicate pattern with the exception of quotations which may display various irregularities. (Cf. the concept of 'sentence root'; e.g., Altrichter (1975), pp. 86-88.) Quasisituations are left undefined here with respect to actual sentences. They are taken to be based on actual statements of facts. This means that all prerequisites for the statement of facts are necessarily present in statements-of-facts, including the relations identified thus far and those not discussed in this paper. At the present stage of research it would be impossible to enumerate all significant relations inherent in actual statements of facts since many of them are as yet unknown. The concept of quasi-situations is therefore construed in a fragmentary way; all that can be ascertained at present is that it is a semantic complex at a pre-sentential stage.

408

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

The feature system is built up as follows. Let "Jancsi játszik (játékszerekkel)" 'Johnny is playing (with toys)' be a complex describing a quasi-situation to be subjected to experimental variations. Group of features I The sphere of existence. This existential feature is ex­ pressed by the sentential noun. The subordinate clause can express the following types of existence: (i) Reality. This is the 'literal' meaning sphere of QS; this relation will express whether a QS can or cannot be a description of a fact, or be (meant and) understood (in a sentence with 'hogy') as a fact. The QS Jancsi jàtszik 'Johnny is playing' can be comprehended/taken as a fact when included in a sentence with 'hogy' if it is qualified as an objective activity or an objective condition. The QS Jancsi boldog 'Johnny is happy', a psychical state, can likewise amount to a fact if it is rendered as an (actual) state or condition (as contrasted to being rendered as someone's impression or someone's assertion, judgement, etc.) QSs like Jancsi szeretne jàtszani 'Johnny would like to play' or Jancsi legyen boldog 'Let Johnny be happy' can also be subsumed under the sphere of Reality if they are meant (and understood) as sentences about actual playing or happiness but represented as a possible activity or desired state. Consequently, the feature Reality does not express whether the QS at hand is actually taking place (being valid) or not. Thus, by our examples it is not implied that Johnny is ac­ tually playing. Nor is it implied that he would actually like to play. What is merely implied is that all further relations (see Groups II and III) will be based on this sphere which may be called the ' sphere of reality in everyday language'. Reference to this sphere is made by everyday phrases such as 'this is not a dream, mere chattering or empty words but reality' or 'this is to be turned from day-

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY'- SENTENCES

409

7 dreams into reality'. The above discussion of the Reality concept was also necessary in order to be able to treat any complex derived structure as QSs. Thus, for example, Péternek az lesz a benyomasa, hogy Maria fáradt 'Peter will have the impression that Mary is tired' will possibly be classed as a quasi-situation under the sphere of Reality provided it is qualified by the sentential noun körülmèny 'condition', 'circumstance'. Cf. (...) az a körülmèny, hogy Péternek az lesz a benyomása... '(...) the condition that Peter will have the impression that Mary...'. Sentential nouns which express Reality are: állapot 'state', szituácio 'situation', körülmèny 'condition', esemény 'event', cselekvés 'action', tevékenység 'activity', etc. 7 That everyday language use is referred to at this place is no accident. As already mentioned, I intend to adapt the proposed system of features to linguistic categories and concepts. It should be made clear, however, that this question can also be viewed from a much more general aspect, that of praxeology (a theory of practice). The problem concerning the conditions under which an entity not immediately exposed to observation can be considered as real can also be formulated as a praxeological question. We might thus inquire what is reflected in everyday utterances of the following type: Ez nem igazi együttérzés! 'This is not genuine sympathy'; Ez àlhazafisàgl 'That is (a) false patriotism'; Ez csak latszat-eredmeny1 'This is but a sham result'. In my eyes praxeology needs a basic concept of reality on which further operations of existence ('is', 'is not', 'can be', 'should be', etc.) can be performed.

410

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(ii) Psychical Categories. QS appears as the expression of a person's mental state. Sentential nouns pertaining to the Psychical sphere are: gondolat 'idea', vèlemêny 'opinion', benyomàs 'impression', érzés 'feeling', etc. If we assign such a category to a QS the relation we get will be one representable in a form like (...) az a gondolat, hogy Jancsi jàtszik... ' (...) the idea that Johnny is playing.. .' . Expressions of socialized psychical products will also be marked with the above feature. Cf. (vitatott) problema 'a (debated) issue'; (bizottsági) döntés '(committee) decision' etc. (iii) Communication. By this feature QSs are qualified as socialized forms of message. The pertinent sentential nouns are: mondat 'sentence', közlemény 'message', kérdés 'question', válasz 'answer' , (uj sag)hir 'news(in the press) ' etc. When this feature is assigned to a QS we get something like ... az a vàlasz, hogy Jancsi jàtszik ... ' ... the answer that Johnny is playing ...' Group of features II (Persons, times, and modalities.) It is by feature(s) of this group that we can build up sen­ tences with 'hogy' from QSs already qualified by a 'Group I'-type feature. The components in the resultant structure will be linked by the 'internal'-type relation. A system of features will be satisfactory only if it embraces all relevant categories of person, time and modality. For our present purpose, however, the categories of person will not be of prominent importance. The category of time will not play a significant role either. From a methodolo­ gical point of view it is important that the sentences should be as neutral as possible with respect to communicative variables. Therefore, variations in person will be ignored in the present treatment altogether, and time will not be taken

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY'- SENTENCES

411

into consideration at every point either. In addition, for the simplicity of exposition we shall restrict ourselves to the kinds of alethic modalities most frequently

interpreted

linguistically. Accordingly, we shall have the following features: (i)

Time·

(a) Present (b) Past (c) Future

E.g. , ... az a helyzet

(körülmény, stb.) hogy

Jancsi játszik... játszott... játszani fog... 1

... the situation

(circumstance, etc.) that Johnny

is playing... was playing... will play...' 

(ii) Modality.

(a) Assertorical, (b) Problematic, (c) Apodeictical.

E.g., Fennáll az a körülmény, hogy Jancsi játszik.

(a)

'It is the case that Johnny is playing.' Jancsi játszik.

(a)

'Johnny is playing.' Lehetséges, hogy Jancsi játszik.

(b)

'It is possible that Johnny is playing.' Szükséges, hogy Jancsi játsszon.

(c)

'It is necessary that Johnny be playing.' Jancsi játsszon!

()

'Let Johnny play'; 'Johnny is to play.' The features under I and II permit us to construct with

'hogy' with any type of internal relation. Cf.

sentences (46)

cf. Lukasiewicz, Aristotle's syllogistic from the standpoint of modern formal logic, Oxford, 1957.

412

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

where the features Psychical activity, Past, and Problematic are combined: (46) Máriának lehetett az a benyomása, hogy Jancsi játszik. 'Mary may have had the impression that Johnny was playing.' Note that the feature specifications on Time and Modality can be applied to a specification of the Sphere of existence feature rather than directly to the QS (cf. (46) as opposed to (47) (i) ) : (47)(i) Máriának az a benyomasa, hogy Jancsi esetleg (valosziniileg) játszott. 'Mary has the impression that Johnny may have been playing.' If Person is disregarded the postulated features yield 27 feature combinations or, to put it differently, a QS can have 27 modes of existence in the available system. Existential relations can quite naturally be subjected to negation. In this context, however, negation can only mean a negation of the whole complex of features (including Person specification). Notice also that the concept of 'fact' appears natural­ ly in our system. It arises as a complex of the following features: Reality; Present or Past; Assertorical. Factivity will therefore be expressed in the system as a triple con­ sisting of the above feature specifications. Group of features III Operations. I use the cover term 'operation' for all operations, qualifica­ tions, evaluations, attitudes, attributions, and the like, which are fit to be applied to QSs already delimited as to their mode of existence. 'Operational' predicates will in­ clude, among others, kellemes '(is) pleasant', fontos '(is) important', ostobaság '(is) nonsense' hosiessèg '(is) a heroic deed', figyelembe vesz 'takes sg into consideration1, elosegit 'facilitates sg', akadàlyoz 'hinders sg', érdeklodik 'inquires about sg' or, '(is) interested in sg', haragszik

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY'- SENTENCES

413

'(is) angry about sg', felreert 'misunderstands sg'. As an illustration let us apply a predicate meaning 'pre­ vention' to the sentence (47)(i). This yields the sentence (47) (ii) : (47)(ii) Vaiami miatt nem következett be Mariának az a (lehetséges) benyomása, hogy Jancsi játszik. 'Something prevented Mary from having the (pos­ sible) impression that Johnny was playing.' 4.2. A thorough inquiry into the syntactic mechanisms which are used to construct more complex structures would go beyond the present enterprise. It should, however, be pointed out that the same semantic structure (the same mode of existence) can manifest itself in a more implicit fashion than suggested by the former examples. In such cases, much will depend on the meaning of the 'external' predicate as well. (Namely, predicates occurring in the lexicon of a given language may drastically delimit the varieties of ex­ istential expressions). Moreover, the system proposed is not intended to solve the problem of whether the existential relation in the 'internal' complex is implied by the 'ex­ ternal' predicate or conversely, the 'external' predicate is chosen on the basis of a given 'internal' existence. Compare e.g. (48) with (47)(ii): (48)

Jancsinak tegnap volt ideje arra, hogy játsszon. 'Yesterday Johnny had time to play.' In the case of (47)(ii) the feature specification Problematic is expressed more or less analytically (as a 'possible im­ pression'). In (48), an identical pair of features (Past; Problematic) co-occur, instead of Psychical activity, with a Reality feature. However, Possibility has been expressed in (4 8) in a more implicit way. (The sentence implies that the playing of Johnny was among his possible activities in the given period.)

414

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

5. After this discussion of the modes of existence in sub­ ordinate clauses we are ready to make our final move. We shall examine whether the mode of existence of subordinate clauses is affected by the negation of the sentence. 5.Ί. First of all, some basic principles must be made clear, without which one can get hopelessly lost in the maze of in­ finite relations extant in any actual sentence. Only a small part of the possible emerging questions will be treated, however. (i) The existential relation of the subordinate clause has to be evaluated from the viewpoint of the speaker. We shall however conceive of sentence meaning as if it were unmodified by speakers' attitudes in the present paper. The speaker's viewpoint becomes especially important if the speaker is not identical with the Agent or the Experiencer expressed in the sentence. In this case the Agent or Ex­ periencer may of course have a view of the mode of existence of the subordinate clause which is different from that of the speaker. To be sure, in the strict sense of the word the Agent or Experiencer cannot have views since the sentence is not uttered by him. Problems of this kind arise with socalled emotive factive verbs [first investigated thoroughly on Hungarian material by Ferene Kiefer (Kiefer (1978))]. An adequate explanation of the behaviour of emotive factives (as well as of some classes of non-emotive verbs) can be offered in the present framework by means of pragmatic or psychical factors. Of course, the influence exerted by pragmatic and psychological factors is discernible in the syntactic and semantic structure of sentences. One of the basic factors among them is the empathie attitude of the speaker towards the person denoted by the subject of the sen­ tence i.e. when the speaker reports on the cognitive state or attitude of that person. (As to the 'wider' concept of quoting, cf. Török (1972) or Molnár (1974). For empathy as a psychical phenomenon, see, e.g., Wallon (1934)).

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY'- SENTENCES

415

As an example, consider (49) (Kiefer's sentence): (49)

Péter haragszik, hogy Anna elment, pedig Anna nem ment el. 'Peter is angry about Anna's having gone, although Anna has not gone.' From a logical or psychological point of view, the subordinate clause introduced by 'hogy' can be regarded as the speaker's recollection of Peter's (= the person denoted by the subject of the sentence) feeling. It lends itself, just like the related structures (see (50)-(52)), to an analysis resembling that of quotations in a narrower sense. (50)

Péter dicsekszik, hogy sokat keres. 'Peter is boasting that he earns a lot of money.'

(51)

Peter gondolkodott, hogy mit is tegyen. 'Peter was thinking about what to do.'

(52)

Peter biztatta Jancsit, hogy játsszon. 'Peter encouraged Johnny to play.' We may thus say that the existential sphere of (49) is Psychical since what is manifested here is the speaker's attitude which consists in quoting a feeling of the person 9 denoted by the subject of the sentence. (ii) Linguistic negation, as indicated by a number of findings, should be distinguished from logical negation (whose realiza­ tion in natural language may often be rather clumsy). Nega­ tion in language is interwoven with several other linguistic mechanisms. Nor is it free of the effects of pragmatic factors (cf. Greene (1972)). Consider now (53):

There are further problems to be investigated here. A number of expressions which supposedly originated in empathie re­ lations have become fixed norms in Hungarian. Thus, very often the speaker is no more aware of his/her 'empathic attitude'. An inquiry into this question would require a thoroughgoing ana­ lysis of 'linguistic thinking' .

416 (53)

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS Az ünnepély nem azzal fejezodött be, hogy kiosztottàk a díjakat.

lit. 'The celebration did not come to an end by prizegiving. ' The Hungarian sentence is multiply ambiguous. It may mean that there was no prize-giving at all and the celebration was finished by some other agenda, or that the prize-giving was followed by another act. What is, however, really im­ portant from a logical point of view (with respect to nega­ tion) is that if prize-giving is a fact it cannot be quali­ fied by the predicate 'the end of the celebration'. Another example is given in (54): (54)

Nincs akadálya, hogy Peter kumiszt igyon. 'Nothing prevents Peter from drinking koumis.' When using a token of (54) in everyday language one would rarely if ever think of the possibility that Peter can set out for a journey to Mongolia and drink koumiss when he arrives there. At the same time, however, the real possibility of koumiss drinking is clearly felt in (54). In everyday lan­ guage the sphere of existence of the subordinate clause tends to be more (real) when embedded under nincs akadálya 'there is no obstacle present', 'is hindered by nothing' than when it is embedded under van akadálya 'there are obstacles present'. This difference may be due to pragmatical factors, tiii) In assessing existential relations of subordinate clauses we shall not consider implications brought about by specific predicates. Cf. (55): (55)

Peter elérte azt, hogy felvegyék az egyetemre. 'Peter managed to be admitted to the university.'

This sentence implies that Peter as a fact was admitted to the university. Yet, in the present framework, the subordinate clause will be qualified by the feature Problematic. The reason for this is to be sought in the use of the verb elér 'manage' by the speaker. We cannot ignore the fact that the same state-of-affairs can be rendered linguistically by

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY'- SENTENCES

417

means of various semantic tools. (iv) The verb mode used in the subordinate clause provides no premisses for assessing existential relations. For in­ stance, a verb in the imperative does not exclude the pos­ sibility that the mode of existence of the subordinate clause could be characterizable by the feature Problematic. 5.2. This section will be devoted to a brief presentation of cases of invariance and cases of change in the existen­ tial relations. (i) Changes in existential relations Type 1 (see example (56)):

(56) , hogy valamelyik lift mindig rossz. lit. The situation

that one of the

elevators is always out of order.' An existential specification Fictitious appearing here for the first time has been introduced with the following ra­ tionale. It has already been mentioned that (as example (56) shows) negation affects the sentential noun together with the subordinate clause. In other words, negation in­ validates an affirmative sentence as a whole. Speakers, however, are not impeded in speaking about nonexistent 10 Each type will be exemplified by only one example. The examples are arbitrarily chosen from among the possible combinations of features. However, my claims about the behavior of the totality of feature combinations will only be hypothetical since I have not examined the linguistic properties of each combination. The arrow indicates the way in which negation affects the type of existence revealed by the 'hogy'-clause.

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

418

situations and can readily describe their details. Such an ability may go back to several reasons. The speaker may know that a similar situation obtained at an earlier date or he may have heard a statement which he would reject. Existential relations of subordinate clauses brought about in the above ways will be subsumed under the feature Ficti­ tious.

(For this concept, see also Török

(op.cit.), pp.

423-427; the role of negation is discussed, e.g., in Greene (1972)). Predicates used in such structures include állapot 'state', jelenség

'phenomeon', körülmény

cselekvés Type 2

'action', történik

(see example

'condition', eset 'event',

'happens', tesz

'does' etc.

(57)) :

(57) Peter 'Peter

hogy tízkor kezdodik az előadas. that the lecture begins at

ten o'clock.' Pertinent predicates include àllàspont 'standpoint', elv 'principle', érzès 'feeling', érez 'feels', képzel 'imagines', dont 'decides', gondol 'thinks', etc. Type 3 (see example (58)) :

(58) Péternek

kèrdêse, hogy mekkora az

uszomedence. 'Peter's question

how big the swimming

pool was.' Characteristic predicates include: hir 'new', kérdés 'ques­ tion', válas ζ 'answer', mond 'says', iabál 'shouts', üzen

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY'- SENTENCES

419

'sends a word to someone', etc. (ii) Invariance of existential relations This case has proved to be more varied than the one under (i). It seems useful to sort out certain feature combinations as sub-types under specific labels which are meant to reflect the lexical facts and semantic relations in concrete sentences more adequately. To be sure, this may result in a loss of the internal coherence of the feature system. On the other hand, we shall gain the advantage of moving closer to lin­ guistic facts. It should also be made clear that the system presented here is neither final nor complete; further research may change it in several respects. In what follows I shall introduce some novel modes of existence which will be exempli­ fied at the requisite places. Type 1 (cf. example (59)):

(59) hogy Jancsi jatszik. that Johnny was playing.' To this type belong both factive predicates in the narrower sence (predicates which allow the noun 'fact' or its equival­ ent to be inserted in the sentence) and those predicates that apply to actual situations, events or actions. Type 2 (cf. example (60)):

(60) A rossz id a festek.

, hogy gyorsan megszaradjon

420

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

'Bad weather

the

drying-up

of the paint.' It is a characteristically human faculty to be able predict (under normal circumstances) the occurrence of certain events. This provides grounds for the description of the existential relations of sentences such as (61)-(64) as predictable future event or (in slightly different cases) a well-founded or wellplanned future event. (These concepts do not coincide with the concept of necessity in a philosophical sense.) (61) Hamarosan besötétedik. 'It will grow dark soon.' (62) A festék fél ora múlva szàraz lesz. 'The paint will dry up in half an hour.' (63) A jövo hònaptol emelik Peter fizetúsét. 'Peter's salary is going to be raised next month.' The concepts introduced for the present purpose harmonize with an everyday view (based on personal experiences) of "the future event which is expected to occur if nothing in­ tervenes" . There are quite a few predicates expressable by this feature complex; these include belenyugszik valamibe 'resigns oneself to sg' , elkerül valamit 'avoids sg' , ellenez valamit 'opposes sg', előkészül valamire 'prepares to sg', összefog vaiami ellen 'collaborates against sg', etc. Pre­ dicates of the above type are related to factive verbs in the sense that the subordinate clause can describe, under normal circumstances, a future event considered as a fact. Type 3 (cf. example (64)):

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY'- SENTENCES

421

(64) Ez a kanna

arra, hogy olajat tárol-

janak benne. 'This can

suitable for storing oil in.'

It is characteristic for this feature complex that the per­ tinent subordinate clauses depict - in the majority of cases socially acknowledged situations or activities which are therefore in general, possible. In some special cases, how­ ever, they may fail to obtain or may require some sort of special qualification. Pertinent predicates include: valaki haj landò valamire 'someone is ready to do sg' , valakinek feladata vaiami 'someone has the duty of doing sg', valaki erdemes valamire 'someone merits sg', valakinek van ideje (kedve, pènze) arra, hogy (...) 'someone has (enough) time (motivation, money) to do sg', etc. Type 4 (cf. example (65)):

(65)

. Peter

.

. . . azt a dilemmáját, hogy Mariát

keresse fel vagy Jánost. 'Peter

solved his dilemma whether he should

go to see Mary or John.' The question in which ways diverse variants of Psychical existence can be realized in concrete sentences is rather complicated. Details will not be given in the present dis­ cussion. Pertinent predicates include felhasznal 'makes use of sg', ved 'protects', egyetèrt valamiben 'consents to sg', elgondolkodik valamin 'meditate on sg', elterjed vaiami 1 (an idea) is spread', etc. Within the domain of the modes of existence characterized

422

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

as Psychical activity, it seems worthwile to distinguish a subgroup on the basis of the external character of the respective predicates. This subgroup contains sentential nouns such as têtel 'thesis', igazság 'truth', elmèlet 'theory', hipotèzis 'hypothesis'. As was mentioned earlier, such modes of existence can be described as socialized intel­ lectual products expressed by language (see example (66)). (66) Az adatok

azt a têtelt, hogy a

vitatott szô török eredetü. 'Data

the claim that the word

under discussion was of Turkish origin.' Other features of the sphere of existence which call for a special treatment are téma 'topic', kérdés 'question', prob­ lema 'problem'. Cf. (67) and (68): (67) Pêtert az a téma, hogy mi irânyitja a divatot. 'Peter

interested in the question of what the

factors controlling fashion are.' (68) A lapok sokat

arròl, hogy ki a

legnêpszerübb szinêszno. 'Papers

chattering much about who the most

popular actress is.' Type 5 (cf. example (69)):

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN

'HOGY'- SENTENCES

(69) Maria

423

azt a hírt, hogy megtalálták

az elveszett gyermeket. 'Mary

on the news that the lost child

had been found.' Space limitations prevent us from engaging in a more detailed inquiry into the variants of existence. Some of the pertinent predicates are: elhisz 'gives credit to sg', megismetel 'repeats', elfogad 'accepts', mosolyog valamin 'smiles at sg'. I would now like to offer some summarizing and concluding remarks : (i) A subordinate clause with the feature specification Assertorical can have, at least if it is embedded within certain predicates, a limited interrogative form: (70) , hogy mit mond anyja. '

what his mother is

saying.' The interrogative form can sometimes be a device for expressing actual ambiguity (possible disjunctive choice); cf. (71): (71) A munka befejezése , hogy jó lesz-e az idojåras. 'The completion of the work

on whether

the weather will be good.' (ii) Observations with respect to the pragmatics of language may also be relevant in the present context (see Kiefer (op. cit.); Elekfi ( 1976); Habermann (1978)). To adduce but one example, Elekfi correctly points out that subordinate clauses

424

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

embedded within predicates of communication are generally interpreted, (at least) in specific contexts, as facts. Cf. (72) and (73) : (72) Êdesanyám írta, hogy felemelték a nyugdíját. 'Mother wrote that her pension had been raised.' Olvastam a hírt, hogy Péter megnosült. 'I read the news that Peter had got married.' (iii) The results obtained in the present study can be gen­ eralized as follows. A structure of the 'internal' type represents a single mode of existence although it is made up of two components (the sentential noun and the subordinate clause). Therefore, all operations performed directly on the type of existence expressed by the sentential noun will affect the type of existence of the whole structure: That is when subjected to various operations, the whole structure will change. It appears to be a regularity that the 'internal' type of structure characteristically changes its mode of existence. On the other hand, the 'external' type of struc­ ture includes at least two independent existential relations (the relation between external predicate and internal complex and the relation inherent in the internal complex). According­ ly, operations performed on the external predicate will not affect the existential relation in the internal complex. That is, external structures can be called existence preserving. The two independent existential relations can be jointly altered only by subjecting them to separate operations. (73)

So far only one operation, that of negation, has been considered. Let us briefly try another operation. We will successively assign the feature specification Problematic to an 'internal' and then to an 'external' predicate: (74) V a l ó s z i n t i l e g az t ö r t ê n i k m a j d , hogy J a n c s i j à t s z a n i fog. 'What will probably happen is that Johnny will play.'

EXISTENTIAL RELATIONS IN 'HOGY'- SENTENCES

425

(75)

Arra valószinüleg lesz ideje Jancsinak, hogy játsszon. 'Johnny will probably have (enough) time to play.' In the case of (74), probability is ascribed to the whole structure (the possible future event is Johnny's playing). In (75), on the other hand, the adverbial 'probably' does not tell us anything about the probability of playing, its scope embraces 'having time' only. (iv) There are several classes of predicates which have not been built into the system proposed. The reason for this is connected with the intricate problems raised by such predi­ cates. They include predicates of wanting, aspiring, wishing and predicates of interpersonal (psychical) influences (en­ couraging, advising, prohibiting, ordering) as well as other classes. Particular attention should be paid to the sentences that contain a sentential noun that refers to a "prefabri­ cated" verbal product. Cf. '... the voice (word, adage, song, poem, tale, etc.) that ...'. It is hoped that further inquiry into these will corroborate the assumption that relations of the 'internal' type are characterized by change of existence while those of the 'external' type by existence-preservation. It is a methodological problem whether one should regard the interrelationship between negation and existence (or that between other logical operations and existence) as a possible criterion for distinguishing between internal and external structures or rather as a linguistic phenomenon, as a property - sometimes manifest, sometimes only latent - of sentences with 'hogy' which may help us to shed light on yet uncovered semantic relations. The two approaches are not neces­ sarily incompatible. It is, however, equally possible that the two approaches suggest different explanations of linguistic data. In that case, the second approach may turn out to be more productive.

426

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

References Altrichter, F. (1975) Hozzaszólás Kiefer Ferene előadásához. [A comment on the paper by Ferenc Kiefer] Nyelvtudományi Közlemények 77. 395-401. Elekfi,L. (1976) Tagmondatok igazságértéke. [The truth value of clauses] Budapest, Manuscript. Frege, G. (1892) Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, Neue Folge 100. 25-50. Greene, J. (1972) Psycholinguistics. Chomsky and psychology. Harmondsworth: Penguin Education. Habermann, G.M. (1978) Truth value assignment in comprehen­ sion and storage of Hungarian predicate complement con­ structions. Acta Linguistica, to appear Kiefer, F. (1978) Factivity in Hungarian. Studies in Lan­ guage 2.(2). 165-197. Le Ny, J.-F. (1975) Sémantique et psychologie. Languages, 40. 3-29. Molnár, I. (1974) A Dicsekszik, hogy... mondattípusról. [On the sentence type 'Dicsekszik, hogy...] Magyar Nyelvör 98. 398-405. Török, G. (19 72) József Attila-kommentárok XIV. [Commen­ taries to Attila József. Part XIV.] Magyar Nyelvőr 96. 423-439. Vasil'ev, S. A. (19 74) Filosofskij analiz gipotezy lingvističeskoj otnositel nosti. [A philosophical analysis of linguistic relativity] Kiev. Wallon, H. (1934) Les origines du caractère chez 1'enfant. Les préludes du sentiment de personnalité. Èaris: Boivin. (Reprinted in 1954 by Presses Universitaires de France.)

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ENVIRONMENT AND LINGUISTIC CHANGE: TWO EXAMPLES Ferene Papp . The ancestor of the contemporary Hungarian language became separated from the Ob-Ugrian languages, its closest relatives, 2500-3000 years ago, and came to live at first mainly in the vicinity of Turkic and Iranian languages, and has lived among the same Slavonic, Germanic and Neo-Latin languages for the past 1000-1100 years. This latter period of the language is fairly well documented. In this way, it may serve as a model for any inquiry concerning the effect on a language of immer­ sion in such an abidingly alien environment. If an ant is sin­ gled out of its kin and is placed in another nest, it does not take the alien ants several thousand years to kill it. Similar­ ly, if a piece of live tissue is transplanted into another or­ ganism, it is likewise soon thrust out. The situation here is more like the one when a fig-tree is planted to the north of its natural range of occurrence, say, in Southern Hungary: the plant will somehow get used to the new ecosystem in the new climate. (In the case of the Hungarian language, even the control necessary for scientific experiments can be examined: Ostyak and Vogul, its closest relatives, remained close to each other, not far from the original home, and, until rather recently, did not have the same kind of intensive contact and its attendant areal influence as Hungarian. However, I do not

428

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

wish to enter into this question here.) It is a well-known fact that in the course of the past 1000-1100 years several phonemes have disappeared from the former system of Hungarian and, on the other hand, a few new ones have appeared. The domestication of loanwords reveals some peculiarities in the field of their phoneme stock. Below, how­ ever, rather than dealing with this, I shall tackle a hitherto little studied question, namely whether it is possible to point out a change in the morphological or phonological system of Hungarian, in which the large-scale lexical borrowing of the past 1000-1100 years also interacted. Or, to approach the prob­ lem from another angle: the question is whether or not loan­ words from entirely alien systems surrounding the Hungarian lan­ guage were able to blend into the morphological system of Hun­ garian without difficulty, in view of the fact that the latter had originally been formed to treat lexemes of Finno-Ugric or­ igin (i.e., of native and Turkic origin - but there was no prob­ lem concerning the structure of these). One may wonder whether the morphological or phonological system, which can be conceived of as an automaton processing the new data, did not have to change a little, too, when lexical items of alien structure en­ tered it on a large scale, and also whether this incursion of alien elements disturbed its usual routine. The weight of the problem can be characterized by the following figures (cf. Papp 1967, 520-1). Of the 60,000 word entries in the Explanatory Dictionary of the Hungarian Language (=ED), merely 6000 indis­ putable stems can be found. 43% of these are represented by ob­ vious recent borrowings and international loanwords. Of the few thousand stems that are left, not more than 614 are of FinnoUgric origin (and, for example, the number of Slavonic and Ger­ man loanwords is 569 and 330, respectively). It is true though that these 614 native words are very active both lexicological­ ly and in texts (these gave disproportionately many derivatives and are very frequently parts of compounds; on the whole their

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ENVIRONMENT

429

occurrence in texts is rather high), nevertheless it is obvious that, at every turn, the Hungarian 'morphological automaton' has to operate on input sign strings whose structure is gener­ ally alien to it. During the past millenium the Hungarian 'mor­ phological automaton' has undergone adaptive changes which have been principally promoted by (a) the necessity to attend to the increasingly better systematization of language-internal re­ quirements, (b) the necessity to do something with the flood of data showing alien features.1 This adaptive change will be examined in two respects: in connection with vowel harmony (=VH) and the recognizability of stems (=RS). 1. Vowel harmony 1.1. Practically, VH means that every stem can contain only phonemes identical in some respects; the 'morphological auto­ maton' must assure that all inflected word forms must have the same vowel structure. For instance, let's say, vowels must be identical in terms of the parameter front/back. This happens to be the case in Hungarian. Then every stem must contain either only back vowels or front vowels. Suffixes containing vowels have two variants: that variant which is harmonic with the re­ levant vowel in the stem must be used. For example, ember 'man' contains only front vowels and can take only endings with such vowels: embernek 'to the man', embertol 'from the man', etc. On the other hand, alma 'apple' can only have back vowel suf-

Considering the present state of development of the mass media as well as the possibilities for their future development, the same issue may arise as a more or less pivotal one for perhaps all the languages of the world in our own era. Thanks to te­ levision and the radio, at the time these lines are being writ­ ten, a host of Iranian, Viatnamese, Khmer and Chinese names and common words are entering the language.

430

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

fixes as in almanak 'to the apple', almától 'from the apple', etc. But what happens if defective lexemes emerge, i.e. lexemes which contain heterogeneous vowels disruptive of VH? The 'automaton' that operates in accordance with the function­ al principle outlined just now will not be able to generate the different forms of defective lexemes: it will not be able to choose the appropriate suffix from the two available allomorphs. Furthermore, in the classical, pure, and simple form described here, VH fulfills a cohesive and delimitative func­ tion: it holds together the given word-form and separates it from others. Now even these functions seem to be weakened. Such defective lexemes do begin to appear in Hungarian rather early. In 1.2. - 1.4. the causes and consequences of this fact will be outlined. 1.2. Among other things, Szépe (1958, 128) enumerates the fol­ lowing inner causes in connection with the appearance of de­ fective lexemes (the causes will be given in my formulation): (i) the back vowel ± is on the way to becoming a front vowel and phonetically coincides with the front vowel i It is of course simultaneously retained in the system of lexemes having back VH originally. Stems containing a former back ± will con­ tinue to take back vowel suffixes even after full phonological change has disguised its original quality. This accounts for the emergence of defective stems and word forms with defective suffixes: fiứ 'boy' with an i turned palatal and a velar (=back) u ; írok 'I write': a palatalized stem with a velar suffix, etc. (ii) Compound words also present themselves. Nothing can of course ensure that back-vowel stems and front-vowel stems should be combined to give compounds only according to VH, therefore compound words as lexical entries are often defective. As a result of compounding, word formation, etc., word-forms become longer, thus the first stressed syllable will lose some of its prominence (so far it has been possible to operate with the principle: "the quality of the first stressed syllable deter-

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ENVIRONMENT

431

mines that of the rest"). 1.3. Finally, Szépe correctly notes (op.cit.) that through "the legion of alien words" lexemes of the above-described structure enter the word-stock. Indeed, when one comes to think of it, from the viewpoint of the source languages, Slavonic, German, etc., or that of international loanwords, it was utterly inci­ dental whether they gave 'pure' velar/palatal stems or mixed ones in the lexicon of Hungarian. In respect of the main con­ sequence to be noted in 1.4., Szépe does not consider the role of this large-scale borrowing as very significant. 1.4. What are the consequences of the new situation or, to put it in another way, how does the Hungarian 'morphological auto­ maton' behave under the influence of the increased influx of defective lexemes deriving from inner and outer sources? It would be theoretically conceivable that the VH part of the 'mor­ phological automaton' begins to function worse and worse, with a lot of random solutions, then falls apart and ceases to func­ tion altogether: VH as such ceases to exist. It is very essen­ tial to state that this does not happen, however. As can be seen at the end of this section, VH emerges with its full range of action in the language system of contemporary Hungarian. 1.4.1. In some cases of simple program modification, the VH 'automaton' works according to expectation: if a defective le­ xeme turns up, it will optionally give out both kinds of inflec­ ted forms. Merely 16 8 root lexemes were found in the ED to be­ have as follows: harakiri - harakirije or harakirija 'his/her harakiri', hotel - hotelok or hotelek 'hotels' (pl.), etc. These parallel output data indicate the helplessness of the 'automa­ ton' construed in the old way. If such cases had been more fre­ quent, this would have meant the weakening, then the complete breakdown of the VH 'automaton'. In the process of communication these parallel forms indicate that some speakers choose one al­ ternative, while others the opposite. Moreover, the same speak­ er may also generate these forms alternatively, mostly without

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any functional-stylistic differences whatever. (Cf. Papp 1975, 165 ff and Ohe ms. for more details.) 1.4.2. An attempt to solve the present problem presents itself fairly early in Hungarian morphology: a new 'automaton' was created which transformed defective lexemes into lexemes hav­ ing the necessary Hungarian form. Thus, the Slavonic loanword eresbnja 'cherry' makes its first appearance in Hungarian in 1256 in this form: cheresna, i.e. with a final -a., but, almost at the same time (1257), it also turns up as cheresne: the latter conforming to VH. The contrivance changed the Slavonic word cel'ad in both potential directions, thus in present-day Hungarian cseléd 'servant' and csalàd 'family' have front vowels and back vowels, respectively. In contrast to 1.4.1. above, which in fact indicated the helplessness of the system, this is a feasible attempt at solution. This would perhaps have been sufficient for the solution of the problem if defective lexemes had only made their way into the lexicon from external sources and in small numbers. It is well-known, however, that neither of these optimal conditions obtained. 1.4.3. That is why the more complex solution, namely the par­ tial reorganization of the VH 'automaton', was necessitated. This reorganization runs as follows: VH previously conditioned by the stressed first syllable of the stem is replaced by VH re­ gulated by the last syllable of the stem. As a consequence of this, the stem can be of any length and may contain any kind of vowels. The correct allomorph of suffixes is automatically predictable on the basis of the quality of the vowel in the stem final syllables. At the same time, this new rule also en­ sures the cohesion between stems and suffixes. The word de­ limitation function of VH, however, is substantially weakened. That is, words can no longer be automatically separated on the grounds that Hungarian texts have the structure tatatatetetetatatatetete, etc. (Notice, incidentally, that this func­ tion could not have been too strong earlier either, for dis-

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tinct word forms having the same vowel harmony could often follow one another.) The behavior of compounds as a class fits well into the disruptive pattern evidenced by loanwords. As pointed out in 1.2., compounds, in fact, are one of the internal sources for the appearance of defective lexemes. Cf., for example, hàtradől 'sit back 1 , hat-ökör 'perfect ass', por-hüvely 'human body', os-haza 'original home', etc. It is important to note that com­ pounding is an extremely productive process in contemporary Hungarian. In addition to 6000 stems, the ED contains well over 20,000 compounds. Originally, inflection and derivation were also instances of compounding: suffixes came into being from separate words that became the posterior constituents of com­ pounds. The majority of these suffixes were formed during the first centuries of the past 1000-1100 years. These suffixes were created almost exclusively from words having front vowels. Harmonizing with the first vowel of the stem, they formed a velar allomorph in accordance with the old rule concerning VH, when they were attached to velar stems. Thus, in the first com­ prehensive written record of the Hungarian language from the end of the 12th century, the following word form is found: milostben, which corresponds to present-day malasztban 'in di­ vine grace'. For the contemporary form to emerge, (i) it was necessary for the contrivance described in 1.4.2. to come into being: milost> malaszt (the stem itself is of Slavonic origin, that is why it is defective), (ii) the independence of -ben had to cease, it was changed to -ban. In modern compounds, how­ ever, the posterior constituent does not change, and the suf­ fixes on compounds appear in conformity with the requirements of the new VH 'automaton', i.e., they depend on the vowel qua­ lity of the last syllable of the posterior constituent. Notice, furthermore, that, when in the contemporary language the abovementioned 168 fluctuating stems, allowing for parallel forms, figure as posterior constituents in compounds, the new com-

434

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

pound lexemes will not fluctuate in most cases: they will re­ ceive the appropriate inflectional allomorph corresponding to the last vowel of the posterior constituents (cf. Papp 1975, 169). E.g., bab-konzerv-ben, rather than bab-konzerv-ban 'in canned beans', bor-fotel-ben, rather than bőr-fotel-ban 'in (a) skin armchair', kártya-partner-rel, rather than kártyapartner-ral 'with (a) partner in a card-game'. The new VH 'automaton' is in full swing. It must also be noted that, in view of the reasons partly outlined above, the existence of vowels neutral with respect to VH, namely [i] , [i:] and [e:], must also be assumed to exist in the nev/ VH system. For this reason, VH seems to operate cyclically: if the last vowel is one of these neutral ones, the 'automaton' takes the preceding one, etc., until it reaches the first conditioning vowel. If it runs short of vow­ els, i.e., the word contains only neutral vowels, the vowel harmony of the word is, ordinarily, palatal, e.g., vigec-ek 'drummers', gebics-ek 'shrikes', ringlispil-ek 'turnabouts', pipiter-ek 'camomiles', etc. 1.5. At this point it is worth commenting on all this from the diachronic and the synchronic points of view. 1.5.1. In the course of the past millenium, both the Hungarian word-stock and the Hungarian texts have become more and more velar (they tend to contain an increasing number of back vow­ els). This can be elucidated and illustrated by the following quantitative data: (i) if individual etymological layers of the word-stock of contemporary Hungarian are considered, and the ratio of front and back vowels in these layers is estab­ lished (excluding the vowels i and í) , the percentage of velar vowels presents the following picture (100 = all the vowels of a given etymological layer, without i and í) : Finno-Ugric 55, Turkic 59, of uncertain or unknown origin 61, the result of internal development in Hungarian 65, German 72, Slavonic 76, Neo-Latin 81, Latin and Greek 81. (Cf. Papp 1975, 259) It can

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ENVIRONMENT

435

be seen that the 'legion' of loanwords also meant an increase in the number of back vowels, (ii) In some Hungarian texts the percentage of velar vowels can be given as follows (100= all vowels of a given text, cf. Papp 1977, 72, supplemented by hitherto unpublished results of my investigations): 12th century (Halotti Beszèd 'Funeral Sermon') 40, 16th century 42, 19th century Petofi 47, Arany 47, 20th century 47. It should be noted here that, given the relative equality of the velar/ palatal opposition in the word stock, the markedly palatal cha­ racter of early texts can only be accounted for by the very frequent occurrence of certain front-vowel words in this early period (and in preceding centuries). This is also corroborated by the fact mentioned earlier that those frequently used lexe­ mes that became suffixes were palatal. The predominance of pa­ latal vowels was only later diminished as a result of the in­ creasing number of velar loanwords. 1.5.2. In our period - which period designates the present to the time of Petöfi and Arany , i.e., the middle of the 19th cen­ tury, as can be seen from the above figures - a relatively equal balance has been reached in texts : texts contain nearly as many (only somewhat fewer) velar vowels as palatal ones. From the standpoint of VH, this state is probably ideal, since its power is greatest when front and back vowels show equal dis­ tribution . 2. Recognizability of stems (RS) 2.1. Whereas VH is a fairly well-known phenomenon, the concept of RS is rather new. In 19 75 I attempted to formulate RS on the basis of certain data provided by the Hungarian language (op. cit. 109 ff). According to my treatment, one must assume that individual word-forms are automatically analyzable during the course of communication; it must be possible to differentiate between stems and inflections without recourse to a dictionary

436

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(or consulting it only when absolutely necessary). This pre­ sents no problem and that is why it is not even raised as a question in languages that use so few inflections as, e.g., En­ glish. The word final segments must serve as an immediate in­ dication that autobus is not the plural of *autobu. Similarly, stems ending in -ing, e.g., bring, in contrast to forms like going, must also be categorially discriminable. There are few suffixes in English, therefore there are few possibilities for mistaken analysis, and this makes RS quasi-superfluous here. There are relatively more suffixes -in Russian, but it should be rather easy to establish that sal'ami is not the plural in­ strumental of a noun *sal, and that in the word pal'to '
FOREIGN LANGUAGE ENVIRONMENT

437

ly, a reason which I regard as major: in keeping with the cha­ racteristics of an agglutinative system, one has to deal with more than one stem (each of which can take a morph designating 3 a case). E.g. hotel 'hotel'- hotel-em 'my hotel'- hoteled 'your hotel (sg.)'- hotelj a 'his/her hotel'... - hotelek 'ho­ tels', etc. Just like some root stems, some derived stems are relatively rare. These stems can be recognized as readily as the Russian examples mentioned above. However, at least three root stems must be automatically recognizable on account of their high frequency of occurrence: (i) the stem of the bare singular: hotel; (ii) that of the bare plural: hotelek; and (iii) that of the 3rd person singular possessive construction: hotel;] a. Oppositions found with (ii) are not of great importance, owing partly to the relatively low frequency of occurrence of (ii) (cf. the figures in fn.4), and partly because the word final segment  , which could eventually be mistaken for the plural suffix k, is not very frequent in word-final position

 The common part of the paradigmatic forms, the part "which can take the morph for case/the morphs for different cases" is the sense in which we use the term 'stem' in Latin, Russian, etc. It is in this sense that a Hungarian noun has exactly 42 different (derived) stems (see Antal 1961, 50). One and the same lexeme has 42 nominatives, accusatives, instrumentais, and so on. At least the most important stems (both root stems and derived stems) must be easily recognizable, distinguishable. This requirement is symbolized by 'RS'. 4 In Janos Arany's heroic epic entitled Toldi there are about 2700 nominal forms. In 63% of these the stem is immediately followed by some case ending, in 33% by some possessive suf­ fix (most often, of course, the one for the 3rd person) and in almost 5% of the cases by the plural suffix. Similar dis­ tributions can be found in other texts as well.

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of possessive forms and is even less typical in final position of bare stems. In v/hat follows, therefore, (with the exception of one example of minor importance) the opposition of (i):(iii) will be dealt with. That is to say, it will be specifically examined how, when perceiving the form hotelj a, the addressee is able to know automatically (without having recourse to the dictionary stored in his memory) that he has to deal with the 3rd person stem of the noun hotel, rather than with a bare stem like hotelja, and that all the twenty inflected word forms he may encounter: hotelj at, hoteljànak, hotelj atol, etc. must be segmented in the following way: hotel-jà-t, hotel-já-nak, hotel-já-tol, etc. The crucial role of the segment j_a must be recognized on a higher level, that of syntactic analysis, since it is this morph that is indicative of a possessive relation­ ship. A morph-to-morph translation of az aparn hoteljàban 'in the hotel of my father' would give us 'the father-my-hotel-hisin', therefore the loss of the segment jà would be equivalent to the loss of the possessive function expressed by of in En­ glish. The code must somehow protect this element which is also so essential for syntactic analysis. (It should be noted, however, that in English, too, there is occasionally some dif­ ficulty with this crucial element, cf. our father's hotel our fathers' hotel, etc.) 2.2. By the dawn of the period in question, i.e., about 10001100 years ago, the following situation had emerged: (i) the full declension of possessive suffixes came into existence, (ii) the 3rd person singular possessive suffix ('his/her', 'the ...of') was realized as à and é in the case of velar and pa­ latal VH, respectively. Later these suffixes became shorter and the velar ones more labial, which, however, is of little relevance to the point at issue, (iii) Word-forms modified by these suffixes were not originally mistakeable for suffixless bare stems. However, at the beginning of the period under in­ vestigation, misconstrual became a factor to be accounted for.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ENVIRONMENT

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Consider, for example, fá. 'tree', a bare stem, and hal-å 'the fish ... of', which both had an a in final position; (iv) As a result of historical accidents, velar stems (bare or root stems of the fá - type are relatively more numerous than stems with a final é , the latter having an extremely low occurrence. There­ fore, the danger of misconstrual noted under (iii) is prevalent among back-vowel words; (v) after stems ending in vowels, the element j appears before the suffix a to fill in a hiatus: fàà > fàjà (in the sense of (ii), this gives us the present-day form faja 'the tree of ...', 'his/her tree'). This element j, which originally thus had a very modest function, had vast, though unpredictable, possibilities ahead of it. In summary, when the original Hungarian speaking tribes arrived in the Car­ pathian basin, the system had the single innocuous weak point, noted under (iii), which was due to internal causes confined to back vowel words. 2.3. From the beginning of the Hungarian occupation of the Car­ pathian basin and the adoption of Christianity in Hungary, a dramatic statistical tendency made itself felt, namely that the legion of Slavonic and, later, Latin loanwords mostly ended in -a. It is not difficult to see why: feminine and neuter Slavo­ nic loanwords had the nominative case suffix -a., others were borrowed in their genitive form ending in the same back vowel. All these borrowings increased the number of nouns ending in -a.. (35% of the 6000 stems proper in the ED end in -a; from another aspect, 38% of words borrowed from Slavonic languages end in -a. also, and there is a host of Latin loanwords ending in -a in indisputable root stems.) Words ending in -e_ , which were extremely sparse in the language earlier, also became more numerous, though they did not approach the increase in words ending in -a. Furthermore, a considerable number of con­ sonant-final borrowings (especially from the Slavonic languages, later from German as well) were defective in that they ended in consonant clusters that had not been possible in final po-

440

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

sition at an earlier stage of Hungarian. If nouns ending in such consonant clusters required the possessive suffix -a or -e, this suffix was liable to disappear, i.e., it olended into the stem by being added to the unwelcome consonant cluster and thus appeared stem-final. (See below in 2.4.2. the clusters -lm, -mb, -ck, etc.) 2.4. What happens at this stage? Such phenomena can only be accounted for by assuming the existence of a tendency to RS. It is essential to note that if the original unproblematic state had been retained, it would not even have come to light that RS was needed. 2.4.1. A root stem is defective if it ends in -k (as this can also function as the plural suffix), and, above all, if it ends in -a or -é, since these can also function as possessive suffixes. The simplest way of counteraction is to sever the ambiguous final element. There are indeed examples of such a process, but so far no account has adequately handled them. In Slavonic cardak > Hung, csárda, the final  disappeared. Chan­ ges of the following type are more numerous: Slavonic beseda >Hung. beszéd (notice, incidentally, that this change simul­ taneously restored vowel harmony) ; Italian volta > Southern Slavonic bolta > Hung, bolt; Slavonic kolbasa > Hung, lbász ; Slavonic ladija, ladijka, etc. >Hung. ladi ; Slavonic lopata >Hung. lapat; Italian piazza > Hung. piac; Slavonic polica > Hung, pole; Slavonic szobota (with a nasal  in the first syl­ lable) >Hung. szombat, etc. 2.4.2. The kind of truncation operative above, however, does not offer a satisfactory explanation for all our problematic cases. In word forms with a possessive suffix the element j , whose original function was to fill in a hiatus, is increasing­ ly used whenever it can appear phonetically at all, after con­ sonants in cases when it has to be clearly indicated that it is not a question of a root stem ending in -a/-e but a stem en­ ding in a possessive suffix. In such cases, therefore, the ele-

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ENVIRONMENT

441

ment j gives a signal, as it were, for automatic analysis: "start the analysis from here, the subsequent -a/-e segment is part of the agglutinative (possessive) cluster of suffixes, and does not belong to the stem!" Here is an example to illus­ trate this analysis: if the element j did not figure after a consonant in this new function, the form in question of the word gomb 'button' would run as follows :*gomba 'his/her button' and similarly Ace.*gombàt, Dat.*gombànak, etc. In this way, the root stem gomba 'mushroom' and its paradigmatic derivatives, Acc gombàt/ Dat. gombànak, etc., would be homonymous with the forms given above. It should be noted that from the viewpoint of RS it is not always necessary to assume such a total homonymy, it is enough to consider that the word-form-end -mba is ambiguous as to its morphological structure: either -mb + POSS or the root-stem-end -mba. This ambiguity makes unambiguous morphological analysis impossible right from the outset. No­ tice that in the case of pairs such as gomb - gomba it is not of much help if the dictionary is consulted: there both forms can be found as root stems, therefore a semantic analysis of the message must start before the beginning of the morpholo­ gical processing. In the case of native senders and addressees, one might be liable to assume that 'they know whether it is a question of a button or a mushroom', that is, they start the morphological analysis by way of a semantic one - this is re­ ferred to by the assumption 'they know'. That the situa­ tion is not that simple is clearly shown by RS. In what follows we shall not consider root stems ending in vowels since they naturally continue to be modified by the element j which fulfills its ancient function: it fills in a hiatus (cf. alma 'apple' - almàja 'his/her apple'). Stems end­ ing in sibilant consonants will also be omitted as they can­ not be followed by j for phonetic reasons. Through the adop­ tion or non-adoption of j, the rest of the consonantal stems (there are more than ten thousand such stems in the ED alone)

442

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

show neatly where it was necessary to indicate the stem sepa­ rately for RS, where there was greater need than elsewhere, etc. Here are some facts to illustrate this point: (i) 40% of all velar stems under investigation are modified by j, while only 15% of all palatal stems take j (the reason for this should be clear from the above analysis), (ii) 27% of the ele­ ments that can only be used as nouns require the element j . Elements that, in addition to functioning as nouns, can also function as adjectives require j_ in 74% of the cases (it must be emphatically pointed out that it is really a question of nouns here). (iii) Elements modified by frequently occurring or productive suffixes, of which hundreds or thousands can be found in the KD, require j only in 0-10% of the cases. Elements with less productive suffixes take j in 25-50% of the cases, whereas those with unproductive suffixes almost always demand j. Observing the different kinds of suffixed forms together, one finds that merely 2.5% of them require the element j , in contrast with the 66% of suffixless root-nouns: it is clear that a suffix can just as unambiguously indicate the word end as the element j. Frequent word-ends of foreign origin (mostly Latin: -or, -um, etc.) occupy a characteristic middle position in this respect: 28% require j , considerably more than suffixed forms of native origin do, but considerably less than root stems with a completely 'individual' word-end do. (iv) Whereas, as has been seen, 66% of root-nouns require the element j, this percentage is only 33.5% among compounds consisting of two or more stems. One would expect to find the same percentage with compounds as with root-nouns, since, after all, the same rootnouns enter into compounds. But, as can be seen, this is not the case: frequent posterior constituents in compounds indica­ te the word-end nearly as unambiguously as a suffix would. (More precisely, as frequent word-ends of foreign origin, cf. the above numerical data.) (v) If, for historical reasons, a stem

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ENVIRONMENT

443

suffers some change before the possessive suffix, j never appears. For example, film 'film' - filmje 'his/her film', where j shows up (notice, incidentally, that -1m is a rather unusual consonant cluster in final position in Hungarian), but türelem 'patience' - türelme 'his/her patience', without a j, for the alternation of the stems türelem - türelem unambiguously indicates the word-end. The last example shows that RS can provide a rational explanation for certain phenomena that otherwise appear to be unaccountable for (why filmje but türelme in the case of the same final cluster -1m). Similarly, pairs like láb 'foot, leg' - láb a 'his/her foot', without j,but comb 'thigh' - comb ja 'his/ her thigh', where j_ appears or ablak 'window' - ablaka 'his/her window', but barack 'apricot' - barackja 'his/her apricot', etc., appeared to be incomprehensible. The rule is this: when a lexeme ends in one single consonant, e.g. b, k, etc., j_ does not show up. In cases when the consonant cluster at the end of the stem is already difficult to pronounce, the element j is added to the stem. This results in monstruous consonant clus­ ters, e.g., -mbj-, -ckj-. This fact is all the more noteworthy because in Hungarian, in contrast to the neighboring Slavonic languages and German, consonant clusters are infrequent owing to phonetic constraints. Also, consonants are often omitted or vowels added to such consonant clusters in loanwords. Obvious­ ly, morphology interferes here in a forceful way and creates clusters which would otherwise be phonetically inconceivable. Finally, one must note that a relatively large number of lexemes exist in which there is an alternation between the pre­ sence or absence of j . (See below, 2.4.3.) In these cases, it is not clear whether these lexemes should be considered defec­ tive or not. Depending on our decision, either j may indicate the unusual stem ending or j is superfluous. 2.4.3. Two further comments can be made on the effect of RS from the synchronic point of view.

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As could be seen under 1., contemporary texts contain palatal and velar elements in a relatively balanced proportion, and the same is true of nouns occurring in these texts. One gets a disproportionate picture, however, if the appearance of j after consonants is considered: in texts of considerable length (as in the whole of the heroic epic entitled Toldi mentioned earlier), j does not even occur after consonants in the case of palatal stems. From a lexicological point of view the following remark can be made. The KD contains approximately 35,000 nouns and el­ ements that, in addition to functioning as some other part of speech, can also function as nouns. About 1500 words of this group can have alternative endings (palatal or velar, possessive suffix with a j or without one, and other alternations) in some of its forms. This 4% must be regarded as an unsolved problem: the morphological 'automaton' must, of course, operate unambiguously by giving only one particular form. If these 1500 ele­ ments are taken as equal to 100, it becomes evident that 12% of them fluctuate as to VH and 6 8% according to the presence or absence of j.. Fluctuations of any other type need not be mentioned in the present context. In sum, then, the main source of unsolved morphological problems in contemporary Hungarian must be sought in the sphere of RS, rather than in that of VH. The alien environment, which has existed for more than a millenium, has merely changed the main condition of VH and the language system has been able to solve the concomitant problems relatively unambiguously through the reorganization of the VH 'automaton'. RS, on the other hand, causes a major problem because a new rule had to be created.

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References Antal, László (1961) A magyar esetrendszer (The Hungarian Case System), Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. Ohe, M. von der (1978) Vokalstruktur und 'Vokalharmonie' der ungarischen Stammwörter, Dissertation, Leipzig: University of Leipzig. Papp, Ferenc (1967)"A magyar szokincs gépi feldolgozásának egyes eredményei és további problémái"(Some results of, and fur­ ther problems in, the computer analysis of the Hungarian word-stock), A magyar nyelv története és rendszere (The His­ tory and System of the Hungarian Language), S.Imre and I. Szathmári, eds., Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 518-22. Papp, Ferenc (1975) A magyar főnév paradigmatikus rendszere (The Paradigmatic System of the Hungarian Substantive), Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. Papp, Ferene (1977) "Nekotorye količestvennye pokazateli vengerskix i russkix tekstov na urovne fonem", Slavica XIV, (Debrecen) 67-73. Szépe, György (1958) "Vegyes magánhangzόju szavaink illeszkedêsênek kêrdêséhez" (On choice of suffixes in the case of lexemes with mixed vowels), In: Magyar hangtani dolgozatok (Papers on Hungarian Phonetics), L. Benko, ed., Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 105-29.

SUBJECT OR TOPIC IN HUNGARIAN: SOME PSYCHOLINGUISTIC EVIDENCE TO INCREASE THE CONFUSION Csaba Pléh 1. Introductory remarks 1.1 The traditional problem of differentiating between "logi­ cal", "grammatical" and "psychological" subject has once more become a favorite topic of linguistic discussions during the last decade. The terminology is as confused as it ever had been; some authors prefer to talk about 'topic' and 'comment', others about 'theme' and 'rheme', while still others about 'given' and 'new information'. It would be too ambitious to give even a terminological overview of these various concepts proposed to characterize "thematic structure" in language. (For a good review and analysis of these different approaches, see Chafe (1976) and É. Kiss (1979)). The purpose of the present paper is to give an account of a psycholinguistic experiment on the relative importance of subject and topic in the interpretation of anaphora in Hun­ garian. It is hoped that the experimental evidence about in­ terpretation performance would give some further arguments about the relative role of these two grammatical concepts in the structure of Hungarian. In this context it is worth to mention that the dif­ ferent conceptions about thematic structure are based mainly

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on the intuitions of sophisticated linguists, and there is a great deal of psychological speculation connected with these problems. A paradigmatic example is the characterization of given information as the thing the speaker presupposes to be in the "consciousness" of the listener at the moment of the utterance (Chafe (1976)). 1.2. This confusion calls for psycholinguistic investigations of the related phenomena, especially if we take into account the arguments raised against the unreliability of the lin­ guist's intuition when dealing with such sophisticated lin­ guistic distinctions (see Bever (1971), Labov (1971)). However, factors within the development of experimental psycholinguistics have also played a part in the increase of empirical work in this area. The development of models of sentence verifica­ tions, and those of information integration in understanding connected dicourse, has made it apparent that some kind of "thematic organization" has to be considered to explain the experimental results. To mention just one example: Hornby 1974 has clearly shown, that the thematic sturcture of a sen­ tence influences the attention of subjects when they compare sentences against pictures presented for a short time (i.e. against the state of affairs represented by the pictures). In cleft sentences for example (It is the boy who is petting the cat), there is a tendency to check only the truth value of the new information (Is it a boy?), taking the given in­ formation for true. That is to say, presuppositions are in fact treated as presuppositions by the subjects. Herbert Clark and his coworkers (Clark and Clark (1977), Clark and Haviland (1977)) have elaborated an ambitious general theory on the basis of similar experiments. The essence of the theory (the "given - new contract") is a cognitive con­ versational postulate: the speaker has to construct his sen­ tences in such a way as to enable the listener to recover one unique antecendent in his memory for the given information

SUBJECT OR TOPIC IN HUNGARIAN

449

of a sentence, and this antecendent should be the intended one. On the other end, the listener always divides the sen­ tence into a given and a new part, searches for an ante­ cedent in his memory for the given part, and attaches the new information to this "node" in his memory. Quite a few phenomena of comprehension are accounted for by this model. Specifically, the model includes some predictions - partly supported by experimental data - about the relationship between the given-new listener strategy and the interpretation of anaphoric pronouns. We shall return to some of these later. At the moment, it suffices to point out that while this model explicitly relates thematic organization to the interpretation of anaphora in a psycholinguistic framework by emphasizing general information processing principles, it neglects the possible relevance of inter-lingual differences in the process. Some facts and theories about anaphora in Hungarian 2.1. Among the linguistic approaches to the analysis of thema­ tic structure, one of the most interesting ones is the typo­ logy proposed by Li and Thompson (1976) . In their theory, one consequence of topic prominence as opposed to subject prominence in certain languages is related to coreference. They suggest that in topic-prominent languages it is the topic rather than the subject that triggers off dele­ tions in the case of coreference. In Hungarian, there are several phenomena relevant to this issue. The basic phenomena concern deletions and pronominalizations of repeated subjects. Noun phrases repeated in subject positions are deleted across sentence boundaries as well as within one sentence, as seen in (1). (Provisionally, we shall mean by "subject" the noun phrase in the nominative

450

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

case.) (1)

A fiú megismerte a ferfit.Ø Odament hozzá.

lit. 'The boy recognized the

man.Ø

Went-over to-him'

On the other hand, if a previous nonsubject NP appears as subject in the following sentence, it is pronominalized to a demonstrative pronoun: az

('that'),

as seen in example 2

below. (2)

A lány sürgette a fiút. Az megértette miről van szó.

lit. 'The girl hurried the boy. That realized what it was about' 2.2. There are several possibilities to account for the basic regularities in this contrastive use of anaphoric elements. (The zero is clearly an anaphoric element here; it stands for the nominative third person personal pronoun which is manifest in contrastive and emphatic positions only.) In a previous paper

(Pléh and Radics

(1976)), an interpretation based on the

notion of subject was suggested within the framework of the generative Standard Theory. The three basic rules of this model can be summarized informally as follows: I. If a deep structure subject is referentially

identical

with the subject of the previous sentence, it has to be deleted in the second sentence.

(See 'the boy' in

II. If the subject in a sentence is referentially

1.) identical

with a non-subject NP in the previous sentence, it appears as the demonstrative pronoun a_z ('that') in the second sen­ tence.

(See 'the boy' in 2.)

3. All other repeated referentially identical NPs are pro­ nominalized as personal pronouns. in

(See 'the man' - 'to-him'

(1).) This account has several inherent weak points, one of

which should be mentioned here. This is the case of sequences where the first sentence contains an experiencer and an object, realized in Hungarian with certain verbs as dative and nomina-

SUBJECT OR TOPIC IN HUNGARIAN

451

tive, respectively. (About the experiencer in Hungarian, see Füredi

(1976)). In these sentences, the neutral word order is

the one with the dative experiencer at the beginning of the sentence, like in (3)

(3) and (4).

A tanárnak két fia van.

lit.'The teacher +dat two boys + poss is'. (4)

A szinésznek tetszett a rendezo.

lit. 'The actor+dat liked the producer' The interesting point for us is' the fact, that if sentences like

(3)-(4) are followed by anaphoric forms, the zero sub­

ject is coreferent with the experiencer in the previous sen­ tence, and the demonstrative pronoun T h u s , if

(4) is followed by

in sentence

(5), while if

(DP) with the nominative.

(5)(a), 'the actor' is the agent

(5)(b) follows

(4), then

'the pro­

ducer' gives ideas for the actor. (5)(a) lit. (5)(b) lit.

Ø

Minden nap új ötleteket adott neki. '0 Every day new ideas gave him.' Az minden nap új ötleteket adott neki. 'That every day new ideas gave him'.

Construction

(5)(a) shows that the grammatical factor gov­

erning deletion can in no way be the surface subject , that is to say,the surface structure nominative

. One can find an al­

ternative explanation for the behavior of these sentences in some semantic notions

(we shall return to this later on), or

the experiencer can be treated as 'deep subject' in the Standard Theory. A third alternative would be to make use of the concept of topic : one could argue that it is the repeated topic that is deleted rather than the repeated subject. 2.3. It is just this type of interpretation that was put forward in the dissertation of Katalin Ê. Kiss

(1979). In ac­

cordance with her general grammatical conception, which emphasizes the role of topic

in the organization of Hungarian

Topic is used here as a purely syntactic term; it denotes the unstressed initial

(sequence of) complement(s) in a sentence.

452

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

sentences, she proposes the following rules to account for sentence pairs like (1) and (2). I. Delete the topic if it is coreferent with the topic or with the subject of the previous sentence. In cases of con­ flict between these two possible interpretations - when the subject is not topic in the first sentence - she suggests that the topic governs the interpretation. II. If an NP "has several syntactically possible antecendents and is coreferent with the non-subject of the previous clause" (É. Kiss (1979, p. 163)) it is realized as a demonstrative pronoun. DP is also used when a previous non-topic appears as topic. The topic-centered model suggests about the same effects concerning the personal pronouns as the other, subject-cen­ tered one. In this paper one main difference should be em­ phasized between the two conceptions: while the first relies on the notion of subject,the second one is based on the no­ tion of topic in explaining the selective use of anaphoric devices in Hungarian. However, both interpretations incor­ porate the possible relevance of the other factor. The model based on the subject gives some allowance for the topic, al­ though not in the basic grammatical model. The model was supplemented by some ideas about the recovery procedure the listener uses when he interprets sentences with anaphoric elements. In this perceptual model the topic position of the deep structure subject was suggested to be an important sur­ face clue for the interpretation process. And, as it has already been mentioned, the dative-experiencer constructions can also be treated by using the concept of topic. In the topic-centered model, the relevance of the subject is incorporated in the basic rules themselves, as already indicated.

SUBJECT OR TOPIC IN HUNGARIAN

453

3. A simple experiment on the factors determining the inter­ pretation of anaphora in Hungarian 3.1. Some evidence about the relative weight of subject and topic in anaphoric reference can be obtained by actual inter­ pretation performance of comparatively naive subjects. This is a worthwile enterprise even with a simple methodology, because a major part of the evidence supporting the grammat­ ical models already comes from interpretation data - from the linguists. Furthermore, since anaphoric reference is in­ fluenced by pragmatic factors, the danger of using pragmatical­ ly "inflated" examples as evidence for one theory or the other can be avoided only if we use systematically designed series of examples. The relevant results of a pilot experiment will be summarized below, without going into the technical details of presentation and data processing(for a detailed experi­ mental account, see Pléh (1979)). It has to be mentioned at the outset that the experiment originally was not planned with the aim to contrast topic and subject. Its original purpose was to test the relevance of the subject-centered model, with an additional emphasis on word order effects. Therefore, the different sentence pairs used in the experiment do not exhaust all the word orders and other variables which would be relevant to the subject - topic problem. 3.2. Summary of the procedure and the design of the stimulus material The investigation started with the construction of a list of sentence pairs consisting of 25 tokens. The list consisted of five tokens of each for five different rela­ tionships between the two sentences of a pair. The different relationships will be discussed together with examples below; in each pair, the first sentence contained several (two or

454

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

three) definite NPs with a head noun, while in the second sentence, one or two instances of anaphoric coreference with the first sentence were used. The subject of the second sentence was always either deleted or pronominalized to DP, and in some pairs, there was a third person personal pronoun in the second sentence as well. Out of these 2 5 pairs, 4 experimental lists were con­ structed. The different versions enabled us to vary the word order in the first sentences of the pairs, and to control the possible pragmatic effects. For example, in one list the same sentence pair was presented with a zero subject in the second sentence, while in another with a DP subject. All nouns in all sentences were [+ animate], and with a few exceptions [+ human], in order to reduce pragmatic effects. Four groups of twenty subjects (all of them university students) worked with each list. Their task was to read each sentence pair, and answer the question following each pair. Wh -questions were used, which either asked for the agent of the second sentence or for the object or another argument of the verb. Is topic or subject coreferent with the zero element? The first type of sentence pairs relevant to answering this question was like (6). The first sentence contains a transitive verb; version (a) shows the neutral SVO word order, where the topic is at the same time the grammatical subject and agent; in version (b), (OVS), the object in the ac­ cusative case is the topic of the sentence, (i) and (ii) are the second sentences with zero and DP subject, respectively. In the four lists both (a)-(b) were combined with both (i)-(ii). (6) (a) A sofőr kihívta a titkárnőt (i) Ø Felvette a kabátját lit. 'The driver called out the secretary. 0 Put on coatposs '

SUBJECT OR TOPIC IN HUNGARIAN

455

(6)(b)

A titkárnot kihívta a sofor. (ii). Az felvette a kabátját. same as (a) but reverse order, same as (i) but DP subject The results of the interpretation can be expressed as av­ erage percentages of answering to the question with the grammati­ cal subject or the grammatical object of the first sentence. (The question in (6) was: Who has put on the coat? Here, 'the driver' as an answer would be subject, 'the secretary' object.) As shown in the table, the zero element is in fact in­ terpreted to correspond to the previous subject NP (the overall difference is highly significant). DP as a subject, on the other hand, is mainly interpreted as corresponding to the pre­ vious nonsubject. (See Table 1) Word order, however, has an effect here: if the subject is [- topic] in the first sentence (OVS word order), the main effect of subject vs. nonsubject is less strong. This is sig­ nificant in the case of DP sentences: the demonstrative is sometimes interpreted to be coreferent with the previous -topic ] subject. This effect is even stronger in sentence pairs where the first sentence contains an experiencer-dative such as (7).(The meaning of the letters and numbers is the same as in (6)). (7)(a) A sebésznek imponált a pénztarosnő.(i).Ø Minden nap lit. 'The surgeon + dat impressed the cashier. Ø

elment mellette. Every day passed by her'. (7)(b) A pénztárosnő imponált a sebésznek.(ii). Az minden nap elment mellette. The question for this pair was: Who went by? Table 2 shows the average percentage of answering with the first sentence experiencer ('the surgeon' in this case) or surface subject ('secretary') to the question. The theory operating with the concept of deep subject predicts in these cases the zero

456

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

subject in the second sentence to appear coreferent with the 1st sentence experiencer, while the DP with 1st sentence surface subject, independently of word order. The topiccentered theory, on the other hand, predicts that the zero element is coreferent with the previous topic. Thus, depend­ ing on word order, it would be coreferent once with the ex­ periencer and once with the surface subject of the first sen­ tence . The values in Table 2 indicate that the zero subject is coreferent with the previous experiencer, independently of the Γ + topic] position of the latter. This contradicts an explanation of the parallel behavior of agent-subject and experiencer-dative constructions on the basis of topicality. One possible explanation of the experiencer's peculiarity might be sought along along semantic/pragmatic lines. One could propose that the experiencer in these sentences is more "active" than the surface subject (or, using Givόn's termino­ logy (Givόn (1976), it is more "involved"). Proceeding with this argument, one could suggest that the agent is more active (or 'involved') than the experiencer, the experiencer more active than the object and this activity hierarchy might be responsible, at least in part, for the coreference interpretation in case of zero subjects. Word order is an important factor in the interpreta­ tion of sentences with a demonstrative pronoun: it would seem that in these sentences DP was interpreted as a sign of change of topic. If the experiencer is [-topic] in the first sentence, it is frequently associated with DP. Thus, while zero is coreferent with the most active element (agent or experiencer) in the first sentence, the DP is a sign of change. In the case of agentive constructions it is mainly a sign of the change of subject but in cases where there is no agent in the antecedent, it is more likely to be taken as a sign of topic change. This results in a spe­ cial type of ambiguity: the same [-topic ] experiencer is interpreted once as corresponding to the zero element, once

SUBJECT OR TOPIC IN HUNGARIAN

457

as corresponding to the DP. 3.4. Some data on three NP sentences Since both the subject and the topic-centered models deal only with the differential effects of subject-nonsubject or topic-nontopic on anaphoric phenomena, neither of them dif­ ferentiates between several possible nonsubject and/or nontopic antecedents. Neither the subject, nor the topic cen­ tered original model has any clear predictions in cases where after a sentence with three NPs we find a sentence containing a DP subject +topic ] . (Of course, they both get better pre­ dictions if the second sentence has a zero subject,) In the experiment, the interpretation of three NP sentence pairs was studied with pairs such as (9). (9)(a) A festő meglátta a kőművest a műszerésszel. lit. (b)

'The painter noticed the mason with the mechanic', A festő meglátta a műszerésszel a kőművest. Az kért tőle egy huszast.

lit.

'That asked of it a twenty forint bill'.

The first sentences consisted of an agent-subject in topic position, an object and an additional - mainly adverbial NP. The word order variation moved the object and the third NP relative to each other (but never to a topic or focus position). With these sentence pairs, one half of the subjects had to answer a question about the agent (Who asked for the money?), the other half had a question about the other participant in the second sentence (represented by the personal pronoun - Whom did he ask the money from?) The subject and topic centered theories can only ex­ clude the first sentence [+ topic] subject ("the painter") from the possible candidates for coreference with DP (since there was a change of subject and/ or topic). However, the experiment has demonstrated some non-random effects here. First, as it is seen in Table 3, the experimental subjects

458

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

tend to answer much more frequently with the previous sen­ tence object to the question "Who" than to te question "whom, to whom etc." (The numbers in the table indicate average percentages of answering with the previous object to the question in (9) - 'the mason'.) This significant effect is also influenced by word order. The tendency is much stronger when the object is in the last position in the first sentence. Since the object is in  [- topic] [- focus] position in both cases, the reason for the word order effect is probably a purely linear one: at least in such written tasks, there might be a tendency to associate the "change sign" anaphoric DP with the rightmost element. Springston (cited in Clark and Haviland (1977)), in his general theory about pronominal interpretation, suggests an explanation for this effect: the search for antecedents is going linearly backwards, and the first possible coreferent would have an advantage in ambiguous cases. Another interesting effect found with the 3 NP sentence pairs is that the personal pronoun in the second sentence is interpreted as coreferent with the first sentence subject + topic] above chance level. In three out of the five sen­ tence pairs this effect is very significant. In the two deviant cases the deictic verbs in the first sentence may influence the interpretation. For example, if the sequence is some­ thing like this: The waiter sent the guest to the doorman. (lit.) That (DP) asked the time from him, the deictic compo­ nent in sent raises the probability that the person sent was talking to the one to whom he was sent and not to the one who sent him. Without considering word order effect, the results with this limited sample of ambiguous 3 NP sentences suggest that in the case of several antecedents there is a tendency to associate the pronouns with the more basic elements (object and subject versus other noun phrases) of the previous sentence, within the restrictions characterizing the use of these ana­ phoric elements.

SUBJECT OR TOPIC IN HUNGARIAN

459

4. Speculative conclusions 4.1. Concerning the relative importance of subject and topic in the interpretation of anaphoric elements, the results suggest a slightly asymmetric interpretation procedure. It would seem that zero subject (and zero topic) and the DP pro­ nominal subject are treated differently by native Hungarian speakers. The recovery of the antecedent for a zero subject is not influenced by the thematic organization of the previous sentence: the zero subject tends to be interpreted as cor­ responding to the previous most active or most involved participant. In the case of sentences with an experiencer, this does not correspond to the surface structure nominative. Somehow the interpretation procedure uses information about the basic semantic characteristics. However, the interpretation of sentences with a demon­ strative subject (and at the same time topic) is influenced by thematic structure. The DP in subject position is inter­ preted as a sign of change; a change either - and mainly of the subject or that of topic. Thus, on the basis of performance criteria one can conclude that with respect to anaphora identification-inter­ pretation Hungarian is subject prominent in some cases and topic prominent in others, but the role of subject is more expressed. For more detailed statements further research with more varied material is needed. Specifically, the thematic position of the anaphoric elements has to be varied, too, since in this experiment subject and topic always coin­ cided in the second sentence. 2. Further studies have to clarify the relative weight of two possible influencing factors in such interpretation tasks, too. Specific interactions may be involved between actual influences and influences based on the general linguistic experience of the speaker/hearer. This can best be shown in connection with topic. The experiment reported here has

460

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

demonstrated the influence of the actual thematic organiza­ tion of the antecedent sentence. However, another important determiner might be the general "knowledge" of the speaker about the relative frequency of certain "cases" in topic positions. For example, if the experiencer is more frequently topic than object, this factor can very well influence the decision of the interpreter when he finds a sentence with an anaphoric subject [+topic J in it. If nothing speaks against it, he may tend to give more chance for the previous expe­ riencer to be the topic and the subject in the second sentence. 3. To return to the starting point of this paper, on the basis of the preliminary results summarized here, it seems promi­ sing to undertake empirical studies concerning the relation­ ships between thematic structure and anaphora interpretation in languages where thematic structure has a more pronounced role. While in the studies done on English material the thematic organization, word order and similar phenomena have mainly been proved to influence speed of processing and direc­ tion of attention, the Hungarian data suggest that in more topic-centered languages the same characteristics have a clearer influence on the "content" of anaphora interpretation. Further research, using more naturalistic interpretation tasks, with the control of reading and answering time, may bring to the fore interesting inter-lingual processing contrasts.

SUBJECT OR TOPIC IN HUNGARIAN

461

References Bever, T.G. (1970) The cognitive basis for linguistic struc­ tures. In: Hayes, J.R. (ed.): Cognition and the development of language. New York: Wiley, 279-352, Chafe, W. L. (1976) Givenness, contrastiveness, definiteness, subjects, topics, and point of view. In: Li, C. N. (ed.): Subject and topic. New York: Academic Press, 26-55. Clark, H. and Clark, E. (1977) Language and psychology. New York: Harcourt Brace. Clark, H.H. and Haviland, S.E. (1977) Comprehension and the given-new contrast. In: Freedle, R.O. (ed.) : Discourse produc­ tion and comprehension. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing Co, 1-40. Ê. Kiss, K. (1979) A magyar szintaxis egy generativ transzformációs megközelítése. 'A generative transformational approach to Hungarian syntax'. Unpublished Dissertation, Budapest (In Hungarian), Füredi, M. (1976) Adalékok a magyar aktivum és passzivum leírásához esetgrammatikai keretben. 'Contributions to the description of Hungarian active and passive constructions in a case-grammatical framework'. Altalános Nyelvészeti Tanulmányok, XI, 93-113. (In Hungarian), Giv6n, T. (1976) Topic, pronoun and grammatical agreement. In: Li, C. N. (ed.): Subject and topic. New York:Academic Press, 151-188. Hornby, P. A. (1974) Surface structure and presuppositions. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13, 530538. Labov, W. (1971) The study of language in its social context. In: Fishman, J. A. (ed.): Advances in sociolinguistics. Vol. I. The Hague: Mouton, 152-216. Li, C.N. and Thompson, S.A., 1976. Subject and topic: A new typology of language. In: Li, C.N. (ed.): Subject and topic. New York: Academic Press, 457-489.

462

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Pléh, Cs. (1979) Anaphoric devices and perceptual strategies in psycholinguistics: Some relevant data from the Hungarian language. In: Kardos, L. and Pléh, Cs. (eds.): Problems of the regulation of activity. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, Pléh, Cs. and Radics, K. (1976) "Hiányos mondat", pronominalizáció és szöveg. ["Truncated sentence", pronominalization and text] Általános Nyelvészeti Tanulmányok, XI, 261-277. (In Hungarian)

463

SUBJECT OR TOPIC IN HUNGARIAN Table 1 .

Percentage of choosing the subject or the object of the 1 st sentence as coreferent with the anaphoric element in the second sentence in agent-subject sentence pairs

Word order in st

l

sent.

coreferent

5

16 84

subject object

79 21

38 32

subject

87 13

27 73

subject SVO

OVS

both orders

Subject Subiect in second sentence DP Ø

object

object

95

464

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Table 2. Percentage of choosing the experiencer or the surface subject of the first sentence as coreferent with the anaphoric element in the second sentence in sentence pairs with an experiencerdative construction in the first sentence

Word order in 1st sent. Exp.

V

S

Exp.

V

S

both orders

coreferent Exp Subj

Subject in second sentence DP Ø 80 23 20 77

Exp Subj

73 27

60 40

Exp

76 24

59

Subj

41

465

SUBJECT OR TOPIC IN HUNGARIAN Table 3.

Percentages of using the first sentence object as coreferent with the DP subject and with the other pronominal argument of the verb in the second sentence in 3 NP sentence pairs

Word order in first sentence

1st sentencecoreferentwith DP subjectPersonalpronounnonsubject

S-V-O-other NP

57

28

S-V-other NP - 0

81

17

69

21

both orders

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS — A HISTORY AND TYPOLOGY* Katalin Radics . The aims of the investigation 0.1. In a paper published in 1964, W.S. Allen put forth ample empirical evidence demonstrating that, in general, there ex­ its a great number of parallelisms between transitive and possessive constructions; in particular, he argued that the subject of (primarily perfective) transitive sentences is both formally and semantically correlated to the possessor in pos­ session-sentences or possessive contructions. Drawing on Allen's more general claim, I will at­ tempt to show that there are further functional, morphologi­ cal, and syntactical parallelisms between transitive and pos­ sessive constructions. Namely, I will outline a type of lan­ guage in which the most significant (though not the only) cor­ relation can be found, not between the subject of the transi­ tive verb and the possessor, but between the affixed personmarking (PM) paradigms of the transitive verb, on the one hand, and those of the possessed noun of possessive constructions, on the other. Affixes of number will not be considered in the

*The work reported here was in part supported by a grant from the Research Center for the Language Sciences, Bloomington, Indiana.

468

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

paper. (Verbal or possessive person-marking can be inter­ preted as agreement if there is another constituent in the syntactic structure -- subject, object, or possessor -- with the very same reference. Although the question whether the affixes under consideration can be regarded as morphemes of agreement or just as person-markers is probably not unrelated to the problems at issue, this question will only be dealt with at one point in the present paper, and therefore I will always use the more neutral term 'person-marking'.) The languages to be studied have been selected on the basis of whether the person of the possessor is marked in an affixed form (concerning the languages investigated, see Appendix 1). In this way, I ruled out languages in which PMs are exclusively, or predominantly free morphemes (that is, possessive pronouns). 0.2. Following the usual practice of typology, I will first survey the correspondences between the serial properties and person-marking patterns of these languages. On the basis of these correlations I will draw conclusions for the historical processes of the formation and change of affixed person-mark­ ing, as compared to other types of change. The correlations I found between serial properties and person-marking patterns suggest that the history of these paradigms is to be placed within the VSX-SOV-TVX period (Sec­ tions 1 and 2 ) . As to more concrete types of change, I will claim that these paradigms are formed in a period when the placement of PM affixes is positionally identical with that of lexical NP complements. Therefore, suffixed markers will be de­ rived from the VSX period and prefixed ones from the SOV pe­ riod (Section 3). I will argue that it is not necessary to involve topicalization processes in the explanation of PM paradigms if we can satisfactorily account for the origin of third person (zero and non-zero) affixes (Section 4 ) . On the basis of Ian-

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

469

guages that are in a state crucial for the history of the affixes, I will formulate conditions for the formation of types of person-marking paradigms . I will illustrate the formation of three kinds of paradigm types -- pronominal, adaptational, and prepositional -- in various languages (Sec­ tion 5 ) . I will conclude that the formation as well as the placement of the third-person marker may be radically differ­ ent from that of the first and second person affixes (Sec­ tion 6 ) . Outlining and interpreting the phonological similari­ ties between verbal and possessive paradigms, I will argue that the distribution of verbal paradigms corresponds to the ergative and nominative patterns of nominal case-systems (Section 7 ) . Finally (Section 8) I will try to motivate why the pres­ ent kind of affixed PM is more conservative than serial change in language, on both linguistic and anthropological grounds. 1. Correlations in the properties of person-marking(PM) para­ digms 1.1. Appendix 2 contains data from 19 languages. Four of the indexes serve to determine the serial type of the language ((ii) the order of primary constituents, (ii) the order of the possessive construction, (iii) the type of the relative clause, (iv) the place of case-marking) and three of them for the de­ termination of the relevant properties of PM affixes ( (v) the place of the PM affix on the possessor, (vi) its place on the verb, (vii) the person of which complement is marked on the verb). I will now summarize the relevant correlations sug-

All necessary and sufficient conditions might be formulated by comparing the properties and historical changes of affixed person-marking languages with those of languages from which such paradigms are absent.

470

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

gested by these paradigms. The first correlation consists in the fact that in each of these languages, a PM in the possessive construction co-occurs with a verbal PM. 1.1.1 If the possessive person-marking paradigm is affixed in a language, then the verbal person-marking paradigm is also affixed. The reversal of this thesis does not hold: affixed verbal person-marking does not imply affixed posses­ sive person-marking (e.g., Estonian, French, German). The second empirical generalization is also intuitively obvious : 1.1.2 In languages with affixed possessive person-marking the verbal person-marking affix is positionally parallel (i.e. prefix, infix, or suffix) to the possessive one. This second universal does not require that, within a language, all PM affixes should follow a single positional pattern. In fact in some languages prefixes, suffixes, and infixes can all be found. Nevertheless, this universal holds for such miwed cases as well: in these languages (Assiniboine, Jacaltec, Blackfoot) the morphemes of the same grammatical categories (number, person, gender) occupy the same positions in the possessive and verbal paradigms (or at least in a ma­ jority of verbal paradigms). 1.1.3 The next observation is not intuitively predictable, however. In 17 cases out of 19, the verb agrees not only with its subject but also with its object. It is highly probable that in languages with affixed possessive person-marking the verbal pradigm marks the person of more than one complement; in particular, not only the person of the subject but also that of the object. Another noteworthy observation is that in many cases there is material identity, or at least significant simi­ larity, between the phonological shape of the possessive paradigm and one or more verbal paradigms. 1.1.4 It is highly probable that in languages with affixed possessive person-marking the phonological shape of the pos-

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

471

sessive paradigm is identical, or similar, to some or more of the verbal paradigms. 1.2 The above observations can be given a brief historical interpretation at this point. Universal 1.1.1 obviously sug­ gests that -- in case PM paradigms are formed and lost -- pos­ sessive paradigms either arise and disappear at the same time as verbal ones, or verbal paradigms come first and possessive paradigms disappear first. As to formation at least, Univer­ sals 1.1.2 and 1.1.4 suggest that the two paradigms arise at the same time and derive from the same source. Later in the paper I will argue that we can also set up a more exact chro­ nology and elaboration than this and sketch the development of these paradigms. 2. The position of person-marking (PM) affixes and the serial type of the language 2.1 As is well-known, affixed PM is not one of those lin­ guistic properties that facilitate the determination of type for any given language. That is, there is no regular corres­ pondence between the existence of PM affixes and the linear order of other grammatical morphemes (e.g. particles of ques­ tion, negation, modality, and case marker) and the order of S, 0 and V. Inversely there does seem to be a correspondence between the serial type and the presence of the PM affixes in question: I have not found a single pure SVO language in which the person of the possessor is affixally marked on the possessed. This morpho-syntactic phenomenon is, therefore, probably inconsist­ ent with the joint occurrence of the following properties : SVO, NG, NAdj, Postnominal RC, Prepositions for case-marking, Auxiliary for Q, Neg, Mod. 2.2 The distribution of the serial types in languages with the investigated affixation pattern is as follows :

472

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

SOV 10 TVX 5 VSX 4 I classed languages as TVX if the word order was quite free but if with respect to their other properties, they looked much like SOV languages. With some licence Hungarian has been classed among these languages, though strictly, its word order may differ from TVX; this difference is evident when a focussed constituent immediately precedes the predi­ cate (see Ê. Kiss 1978): TVX: A kenyer-et meg-ette Peter. the bread- Prefix-ate Peter 'As for the bread, Peter ate it.' TFVX: A kenyer-et a konyhå-ban ette meg Peter the bread- the kitchen-in ate Prefix Peter 'As for the bread, it is in the kitchen that Peter ate it.' Thus affixed possessive PM appears to be most character­ istic of SOV languages, which is in accordance with their bas­ ically aggluninative character (Vennemann 1974). Nevertheless, the history of these paradigms runs through three typological periods: VSX, SOV, and TVX. 2.3 In a detailed and, to some extent, empirically supported hypothesis Vennemann (19 74, 19 75) proposed the following directions of change between language types :

Accepting his claim , the history of our paradigms must be 2 Vennemann worked out his proposal primarily for the SOV —» TVX —> SVO change; the motivation he offers for the other directions is rather sketchy. I am sure that, in its present (footnote 2 continued)

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

473

placed and explained within the VSX-TVX period. In order to learn more about the history of these paradigms, however, it is worthwile to take a closer look at the position of affixes relative to the stem. 2.4 PM affixes are almost always pronominal in their origin (as shown by the historical investigations of many languages) and their functions also evidence, at least, partical iden­ tity with those of pronouns. In most languages the position of pronominal complements is usually identical to the position of lexical NP complements. For instance, it is probable that the subject will be found on the same side of the verb, re­ gardless of whether it is expressed by a pronoun or a lexical NP. To a smaller extent, this trend seems to hold for the object as well (one of the counterexamples is provided by French). Consequently, one might expect that the affixes re­ ferring to the subject and the object should normally be found on the same side of the verb as the respective lexical NPs (subject and object). In analogy with this, PM affixes in pos­ sessive constructions ought to be placed on the same side as the lexical NP possessor, that is, prefixed in SOV and suf­ fixed in VSX languages. Nevertheless, some of the data con­ tradict this expectation (Givòn 1971, Ingram 1975). As to serial type and place of affixation, the languages in the sample give the following distribution: (footnote 2 continued) form, it also leaves gaps: for in­ stance, it is quite conceivable that we can postulate direc­ tions other than those in his figure; that we can refine the causal relations governing changes: that the operation of "natural" change will be necessary to be kept apart from the changes resulting from language contacts. In spite of all this, however, Vennemann's appears to be the only model of change at hand by which analogous-looking historical processes of genet­ ically unrelated languages can be grasped.

474

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS The place of person-marking affixes Prefix SOV or TVX 4 VSX 2

Suffix 10 2

In the SOV type we would obviously expect prefixes. TVX lan­ guages are in many respects SOV-like and thus we might regard similar prefixing in those as well. Instead, we find that out of 14 SOV and TVX languages, 10 place the affix on just the opposite side of the verb, while half of the VSX lan­ guages use prefixes and half of them suffixes. (Assiniboine is regarded as a prefixing SOV language since, although its number marker is suffixed, the category of person is expressed by prefixes. In the language missing from the table, Blackfoot, we find person-markers in mixed positions.) 2.5 The contradiction revealed by this disharmony obviously needs to be resolved somehow. One way to resolve it is to give up the claim that person-marking affixes are of pronominal origin; a claim that has been amply supported by historical evidence. Or, we may claim that in languages where the place­ ment of affixed morphemes is disharmoniC with the order of the sentential constituents, these paradigms were formed in a serial typological period different from the one the language presently shows; that is, they were formed in a period in which the order of the constituents was compatible with the placement of the affixes we observe now (Givon 1971). In both cases we are likely to encounter serious objections. The latter alternative seems aspecially vulnerable because, in the view

These data are in accordance with Lehmann's (1973) claim that PM affixes do not follow the "placement principle", according to which nominal and verbal modifiers - case-markers, particles of question, negation, and modality - are placed on the oppo­ site side of the noun and the verb than the lexical NP comple­ ments.

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

475

I have advanced, the ultimate cause of serial type change is to be found in the reduction of word endings - and personmarkers are placed predominantly at the ends of words since they are mostly suffixed. It would seem quite unreasonable to deny on the other hand the pronominal origin and nature of person-marking. Nonetheless, in the following sections I will try to argue in favor of both of these alternatives. I will attempt to prove that in some languages one member of the paradigm (the third person) is not directly pronominal in its origin, and, further, that the phenomenon of affixed person-marking at issue changes more slowly than the commonly enumerated typolo­ gical indices whose sum constitutes given types. 3. Directions of typological changes in the languages investi­ gated 3.1 I have already mentioned that the history of affixed PM paradigms is to be placed within the VSX-TVX period. In ac­ cordance with the directions pointed out by Vennemann we may establish a trend in which the formation of suffixed personmarkers is dated for the VSX period since in that serial type the place of the suffixes is harmonic with that of lexical or pronominal NPs. We claim that these suffixes survive the change to SOV (for some reason to be elaborated later) and, further, that PM remains suffixed even if the SOV language develops TVX features. The following languages with suffixed paradigms represent these three historical periods:

vsx

SOV

Agta Bella Coola

Amharic Buriat Eskimo (Gr.) Quechua Nenets Tatar

V Hungarian Sierra Miwok Siuslaw Takelma

476

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

3.2 The directions of change in languages with prefixed paradigms do not conform to Vennemann's model, however, since prefixing is harmonic with the SOV pattern, its formation should be dated from that period. Vennemann proposes a single direction of change from SOV, that is, SVO through TVX. Affixed possessive PM not being characteristic for pure SVO, however, our paradigms might not survive the SVO period. Having found prefixed paradigms in VSX languages we are thus forced to pos­ tulate an SOV — VSX change too. The following languages would belong here: SOV —> VSX Assiniboine Aztec Diegueno Jacaltec Navaho Ubykh 4. The origin of person-marking (PM) affixes 4.1 Historical and comparative investigations in numerous languages have proved that their PM affixes are of pronominal origin. These pronouns were first cliticized and then agglu­ tinated to the stem. Support for this hypothesis comes from morphological phenomena in several languages: unstressed pronouns indeed form a single stress group with the verb and the possessed while in addition various kinds of phonological interactions are possible at the boundary of two morphemes: Je demande... French Je crois... Je t'en prie

The case of Jacaltec is much more complicated than this classification would suggest. The presence of positionally mixed affixes makes it difficult to decide whether this lan­ guage belongs to this group of VSX languages or to the former group of VSX languages.

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

English

477

J'avais... mon oncle I told you... I've got... You know. . . your picture. . .

There is little doubt of a general tendency for cliticization and subsequent agglutination of unstressed possessive and personal pronouns for 1 and 2 persons, but as soon as we turn to the third person, it is quite difficult to see why an overt pronoun should get into the possessive or verbal construction, even in cases when the complements of the verb, or the possessor, are already expressed with a lexical NP . In other words, the phonological behavior of these unstressed pronouns provides a natural explanation for those cases in which person-marking is equivalent to pronominalization; it does not explain agreement, however. Presumably this is why Givón (1975) traced back agreement (and implicitly, also person-marking) to topicalization processes. His "topic-shift reanalysis as neutral construction" process would in fact suffice to motivate the presence of overt PM affixes in sen­ tences with lexical NPs. 4.2 I propose that in the languages with these paradigms there is no need to involve topicalization processes in the explanation of the formation of person-marking paradigms; their appearance can be sufficiently motivated on the basis of the above described behavior of unstressed pronouns. 4.2.1 It seems justifiable to ignore topicalization processes because in the overwhelming majority of these languages, at least one (subjectival or objectivai or both) third person verbal affix is zero. What may have happened in these para­ digms is this: the first and second person pronouns were agglutinated to the verb stem via cliticization - but nothing

478

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

like that happened in the third person. One reason is to be found in the fact that in many sentences the third person complement is expressed with a lexical NP; another reason is that in some of these languages the third person pronoun is zero. As a result of agglutination in 1 and 2 person an incomplete verbal paradigm is established: incomplete here consists in the gap left by the absence of similar agglutina­ tion for the 3rd person. It is this gap which present-day lin­ guists interpret as a zero morpheme. Nevertheless, the his­ torical antecedent of this theoretically postulated zero is nothing. Thus Givón is right in claiming that "languages which use zero anaphoric pronouns in topic-shift constructions, will not develop subject-verb or object-verb agreement" (Givón 1975, 151), since we have no reason to assume that, say, in a Hun­ garian sentence like 'A vadàsz lő' "the hunter shoots" his­ torically there is a zero agreement morpheme attached to the verb. It is likely, however, that affixed person-marking paradigms can develop even in languages in which the cliticization-agglutination process takes place solely in the first and second persons. Nevertheless, there arises the theoretical question of when and why it is justified to postulate a zero third person marker in such cases, with respect to synchronic, diachronic, and panchronic investigations. In the following sections I will continue to use the term "zero" however, in acknowledged disregard of a possible answer to this question. 4.2.2 How can we now account for the cases (which are numer­ ous) where the third person member of the verbal paradigm is not zero? I claim that precisely in this case the immediate historical antecedent of the overt affix is not a pronoun (see 5.2. and 5.3.), but the result (1) of an adaptation of a suffix which bears special functions, or (2) a case-marker that has been somehow retained in the syntactic structure. 4.2.3

Notice that for some time we have been neglecting

possessive paradigms. In these paradigms we only find a zero

AFFIXED ΡERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

479

third person affix if the noun is inherently possessed (Assiniboine). This is in fact quite easy to understand since conversely, nouns which would otherwise not be interpreted as being possessed, must evidence an overt marker to signal such provisory inherence. Nevertheless, the occurrence of overt third person markers in addition to lexical possessors needs to be explained here, too. The topicalization hypothesis will not work since topicalized possessive constructions are very rare, or are even ungrammatical in some languages. Thus there is no reason that "topic-shift —> neutral reanalysis" in possessive constructions should give rise to possessive paradigms in so many languages. For such a process, we ought to assume the frequent occurrence of the following construc­ tions as underlying possessive paradigms : Hungarian ?? Péter, az ő könyve English ? Peter, his book Nevertheless, one cannot exclude the possibility that such a 5 process may also produce possessive paradigms. The Assiniboine and Agta constructions to be presented indicate, however, that the topicalizational explanation may be ignored even in the case of possessive paradigms, and possessive PM affixes can be derived simply from unstressed possessive pronouns. Assini­ boine exemplifies the situation of a language in which there exists a stage during which only pronominal, but not lexical, possessor NPs are accompanied by third person affixes. It is also probable, that affixed marking can be analogically ex­ tended to constructions with lexical possessors, too (see

Edith Moravcsik (personal communication) has drawn my atten­ tion to a Sierre Leone creole language, Krio, in which the possessive construction is quite clearly topicalized in her opinion: di tica i pus [the teacher his cat 1 'the teacher's cat'. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether this struc­ ture is not a mere product of creolization, i.e., whether it is a product of "natural" change or an effect of the contact of two languages.

480

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

later). On the other hand, data from Agta suggest that the third person marker is not necessarily of pronominal origin. 5. Types of affixed person-marking (PM) paradigms 5.0 In what follows I will illustrate the conditions for the formation of three types of paradigms, and will primarily refer to languages which represent the initial stage of this development. In each case I assume that the existence of the paradigms is a result of the cliticization-agglutination of unstressed personal and possessive pronouns and whenever this process in itself does not offer satisfactory motivation for the third person forms I will look for further factors. 5.1 The_pronominal pattern. Suppose that the cliticization and agglutionation of personal and possessive pronouns is simply the result of a natural process. First and second persons are necessarily expressed by pronouns and therefore in these cases affixation will be developed in subject, and possessive positions as well. Third person complements are, however, very frequently expressed with lexical NPs (so there is no pronoun in the sentence) and, in addition, in some lan­ guages the unstressed pronouns are also zero. Moreover, the verb itself may also quite indicate (semantically or morpho­ logically) what kind of complements may be in the construction. It is therefore quite conceivable for verbal paradigms that while the first and the second persons are marked with affixes of pronominal origin, the third person will be marked with zero in the case of a lexical complement or anaphoric pronominalization. Providing that the semantic or morphological structure of the verb makes the number and nature of its complements relatively unambiguous, it is also possible that the person-markers of both subject and object be zero. It is also natural for the first and second persons of

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

481

the possessive paradigm to derive from unstressed possessive pronouns. When the lexical possessor-NP is present, there is no pronoun in the construction and therefore there will be no third person affix either. With a pronominal possessor, how­ ever, the affix cannot be zero since in that case the mere NP would not be interpreted as being possessed (unless in­ herent possessions constitute a separate category in the lan­ guage) . Thus it should be possible to schematize the paradigmatic pattern of purely pronominal origin as follows: Verbal constructions Transitive Intransitive Vx 1

Vx 2

Vx 3

1Pers

A



E

2Pers

B

D

F

3Pers

Ø

Ø Ø

Possessive constructions Lexical Pronominal possessor

possessor

Px G 1Pers 2Pers H unmarked 3Pers I 5.1.1 But is there such a language at all?

Here and in the following passages I shall concentrate on the person-markers alone (1Pers, 2Pers, 3Pers) since number-markers are rather independent of these. The abbreviations in the table are borrowed from Finno-Ugristics: Vx stands for "verbal affix" and Px for "possessive affix". The Vx of an intransitive verb marks the person of the subject, and those of a transitive verb mark the persons of the subject and object. I will ignore the occurrence of fusional morphemes in this latter case, and for the moment phonological similarities between Vx's and Px's will also be left out of consideration (cf., however, Section 7.)

482

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Yes, there is. In Assiniboine (a Siouan language, Levin 1967) prefixes correspond to the category of person and suffixes to the category of number. (This language has also some infixes.) In the third person singular the markers of both the subject and the object are zero, whereas the other persons are marked overtly when occurting in subject and object position: wicásta ne púza wazí Ø-Ø-apá (Levin 31) man Part cat he-it-hit 'the man hit a cat' uk-a-ni-pe-pi (Levin 34) we-you-wait-Plur 'we are waiting for you' Possessed nouns denoting parts of the body or relations get zero in the third person, whereas non-inherently possessed Ns are marked with a non-zero form even in the third person. Constructions with lexical possessors are of the GN order and unmarked : ta-wícu (Levin 24) his-wife 'his wife' Viola hiknáku Tom cicá (Levin 60) Viola husband Tom son 'Viola's husband' 'Tom's son' It is to be noted that Assiniboine belongs to the SOV serial type and has prefixed person-markers, which, in our hypothesis, means that it is in the stage when the process of affixation has just begun and when the place of the affixes is harmonic with the order of lexical constituents. Assiniboine is the only purely pronominal type language in my sample. Nevertheless, certain features of this pronominal type also occur in the other two types of paradigm. Note that the principles of this pronominal pattern would also allow for the possibility that there be languages in which third person pronominal complements are marked by non-zero

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

483

affixes of pronominal origin in the verbal paradigm whereas the corresponding marker of lexical NP complements is zero (similarly to the Assiniboine possessive). Nevertheless, there was no such an affixation type in my sample. 5.2 The adaptational pattern. I found two languages in which many details of at least some of the paradigms can be explained along the lines of the above pronominalization pattern. They deviate from this pattern at two important points, however, and these deviations indicate that these languages represent in fact another type. The deviations are also motivated by the fact that these are TVX languages and contain suffixed person-markers - i.e. the principle of affixation may be very old in them and may have already undergone significant changes. 5.2.1 In the isolated Penutia language, Takelma, 11 verbal paradigms have been recorded (Sapir 1922). In 7 out of 11, the third person of the subjectival and objectivai paradigms is zero, that is, these paradigms resemble the Assiniboine ones. The structure of the possessive paradigm is unlike Assiniboine, however, as not only pronominal but also lexical possessors are accompanied by person-markers (in this case, suffixes): hap'-da sgi'si hap'-da (Sapir 1922, 292) son-his Coyote son-his 'Coyote's son' 'his son1 There are two conceivable explanations for this. The first (and more probable) one is that the possessive paradigm was not formed in the same way and at the same time as verbal paradigms with zero in the third person but rather with those verbal paradigms in which there are overt third person markers; the second explanation might be that the third person possessive suffix attached to lexical possessors is result of analogical extension. The first alternative is supported by the fact that in his grammar Sapir relates the possessive paradigm to one of those with overt third person morphemes (see Sapir 19 22, 231). But the second alternative is not unreasonable either: it is quite easy to imagine that in a language in which unmarked

484

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

possessive constructions co-exist with overtly marked ones, the marked pattern should be extended to the unmarked one too. There are plenty of sentence types facilitating such an ex­ tension; most prominent among them is that case when the possessor is named but does not stand in a genitive relation to the possessor in the sentence, e.g.: Mary took her bag. The old man wrote a letter to his son. Peter realized that his pipe had been left at home. Extension is even more likely since in a language of the SOV serial type the underlined constituents always stand next to each other in the surface structure (even in sentences like our third example, that is, when the possessor and the pos­ sessed belong to two different clauses). Whichever alternative we take, we must assume that overt person-marking can be present in constructions with lexical possessor-NPs too. The other point where Takelma differs from Assiniboine represents, however, a PM pattern which is very significantly different from the paradigm type of pronominal origin. As noted above, the PM suffix of the third person subject and object of Takelma verbs is zero in the majority of the paradigms. Since, however, subject and object are not dis­ tinguished by case-markers and the order of the NP complements is not fixed either, interpretation becomes difficult in two rather frequent sentence types; that is, in a sentence com­ posed of a transitive verb plus one lexical NP you cannot tell whether that NP is the subject or the object, and simi­ larly, when there are two NPs but, semantically speaking, both might play the role of either the subject or the object. This ambiguity is resolved by an interpretation principle and a (probably newly adapted) affix. In view of the interpretation principle the [+ human] complement is regarded as subject and the [-human] complement as object. An adaptive extension of this interpretation principle is the appearance of the affix-

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

485

-kwa(-gwa) which suspends the validity of this principle by indicating that the object of the sentence is Γ+ human] (Sapir 1922, 158, 168-9): t!ibisi t!ayak-Ø-Ø ants

found-he-it/them

'He found the ants' t!ibisi t!aya-Ø-kwa ants found-it/they-him 'the ants found him' it!anahi-Ø-Ø held-he-it 'he held it' it ! anaha-Ø-gwa held-he-him 'he held him' mena yap!la t !omo-Ø-kwa bear man killed-it-him 'the bear killed the man' Now, the origin of this disambiguating morpheme -kwa (-gwa) is quite remarkable: aside from the case mentioned above, transitive verbs take on this suffix if the object is identical to the subject (i.e. it marks reflexivity), or, if the object which is incorporated in the verb is possessed by the subject (e.g. it is a part of the body). It may be interesting to con­ sider the Takelma examples together with French constructions which, although making use of different grammatical devices, display features very similar to Takelma (Sapir 148): igaxaga'x-gwa-n scratch-Refl-I 'I scratch myself' sin-it'gili's-gwa-Ø nose-scratch-Refl-he 'he scratched his own nose'

486

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

The same kind of morphemes are affixed to the Takelma verb and the French verb, in a mirror-image fashion:

In summary, the verbal paradigm adapted this reflexive -kwa (-gwa) morpheme, which is actually related to objectivai and possessive relations, for the purposes of disambiguating NPs in transitive constructions. Takelma illustrates the rise of a new type of paradigm. The initial stage was like Assiniboine: in the third person, the subjectival and objectivai paradigm contained a zero, whereas the possessive paradigm contained an overt morpheme (here even besides lexical possessors). Nevertheless, a stage seems to be forming in which the zero third person affix of the transitive verbal paradigm alternates with an overt third person morpheme. This new overt morpheme is a result of adapta­ tion; adaptation, on the other hand, was necessitated by ambiguity. I find this type of person-marking and its formation especially important because it seems to suggest that it is unnecessary to postulate underlying topicalization processes, even in cases when the third person of a paradigm is marked overtly'. Note that in this type the overt third person morpheme arose later (by adaptation) than the first and second person markers. 5.2.2 In Sierra Miwok (Penutia Phylum, Miwok Family) we find a situation similar to that in Takelma. Sierra Miwok has a very complicated system of PM, whose forms interact with tense and mood; namely, we find three kinds of subjectival and ob­ jectivai paradigms. The first system contains special multifunctional morphemes which serve for all possible combinations of persons for subjects and objects. These multi-functional morphemes distinguish both persons and syntactic functions. In the second system we find that the subject can be marked

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

487

with possessive affixes and the object with affixes different from these. Since the two sets of affixes are distinct and there is, in addition, a case-system in the language, the identification of the syntactic function of a complement poses no difficulty. In the third system, however, the persons of both subject and object are marked by means of the very same paradigm - that is, two members of this paradigm co-occur in a transitive verb. This system immediately permits the appearence of problems concerning the correct interpretation of certain constructions. The author of the grammar mentions only one such problem, so I will accordingly restrict myself to it. If neither the object nor the subject is named with a lexical NP and if one of them is in the third person (the person-marker of which is zero) while the other is not, it is impossible to tell whether the only overt person-marker marks a subject or an object. Different dialects of the language resolve this ambiguity in different ways. The solution of one particular dialect is of special relevance here: if the (unnamed) third person com­ plement happens to be the subject, a third person possessive affix is added to the overt morpheme on the verb. This Sierra Miwok dialect resembles Takelma by virtue of the fact that it is the interplay of an interpretation principle and a special adapted affix that resolves ambiguity. The interpretation principle is as follows: it is "natural" for that complement to be the subject whose person is closer to the person of the speaker; if this does not obtain, i.e. if the third person complement happens to be the subject, an adapted possessive person-marker signals this "anomaly". E.g. (Freeland 55): ?ivi?i-0-t ?ivi?-te?-si eat-it-I

eat-me-his

'I shall eat (it)' ?ivi?i-0-tokni eat-it-you

'he will eat me» ?ivi?-tokni?-si eat-you-his

'you will eat (it)'

'he will eat you

488

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

?ivi?i-Ø-m ?ivi?i-me?-si eat-it-we eat-us-his 'we shall eat (it)' 'he will eat us' Sierra Miwok is interesting not only in its resemblance to Takelma but also because its adapted affix happens to be the third person possessive person-marker. Remember the quasiuniversal empirical claim we made at the outset of this paper, namely, that the phonological form of the possessive paradigm is very likely to be identical, or at least similar, to one of the verbal paradigms. This thesis will be elaborated later but we can already note that, at least for the third person, the phonological coalescence may have been supported by the fact that, similarly to Sierra Miwok, the third person form of the possessive paradigm was adapted to resolve ambiguity in verbal constructions. 5.2.3 Takelma and Sierra Miwok exemplified the process of adaptation; now we turn to a language in which such an adap­ tation has taken place very long ago and, further, in the third person (or, as sometimes termed in Indian linguistics, in the third and fourth persons) we find several overt mor­ phemes for resolving possible ambiguities. In Navaho (Atapascan Phylum, Apachean Family), possessive PM prefixes are phonologically identical to some of the objec­ tivai PM prefixes in the verbal paradigm (Sapir-Hoijer 1967, 86-87) : 1Pers ši- j aad 'my leg' n-ši-nliteeh 'you put me down' 2Pers ni-jaad 'your leg' n-ni-lteeh 'he puts you down' dis-0-teeh 'I begin to carry him' 3Pers bj-jaad 'his leg' bi-dilteeh 'he begins to carry him' yi-dilteeh 'he begins to carry him' ha-jaad 'his leg' ni-ho-nsteeh 'I put him down' ?á-dilteeh 'he begins to carry ¿á-jaad 'someone's leg' someone'

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

489

So far there is nothing surprising about this, in view of the general claim concerning phonological similarities. What is more interesting is the question concerning which third person morpheme is to be used under which circumstances. The picture of the possessive paradigm is relatively simple: if the reference is definite, the first form (bi-) may be applied for both animate and inanimate possessors, whereas the second form (ha-) applies to animate possessors only. If the possessor is animate, the choice is based on whether the possessor is a foregrounded, important, and sympathetic person (bi/-) , or whether the possessor is merely a marginal figure in the story, his relation to the speaker cool and formal (ha-). The third prefix ( ?a) applies to possessors with indefinite reference (Sapir-Hoijer 69). The same rules are valid for the verbal bi-, ho-, and ?a- prefixes, nevertheless, we have two more prefixes here. There is an optional zero prefix if the subject is in the first or second person, and yi- clearly serves to distinguish subject and object. Recalling the situation in Takelma and Sierra Miwok it is easy to see that the use of the zero allomorph is governed by a similar interpretation principle: in the natural case, the person closer to the speaker is the subject of the sentence. yi.- plays the role of the (probably adapted) disambiguating affix in the following manner. There being no case-marking or fixed word order in the language, if both the subject and the object are in the third person, it is impossible to tell which NP plays which of these roles. The subjectival prefix does not help since, although its position is fixed, its third person form is zero. (That is, we can detect the pronominal pattern here, since the subjectival third person is always zero and the objectivai third person has a zero allomorph.) Another interpretation problem arises when only one third person NP precedes the verb (i.e., it is ambiguous between being subject or object). Interpretation

490

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

problems are resolved by PM prefixes: yi- is used if the complement immediately preceding the verb is the object, and bi- is to be used otherwise (Sapir-Hoijer 86): ?askii yi-dilteeh boy him-carry 'he begins to carry the boy' ?askii bi-dilteeh boy him-carry 'the boy begins to carry him' diné ?askii yi-dilteeh man boy him-carry 'the man begins to carry the boy' diné ?askii bi-dilteeh man boy him-carry 'the boy begins to carry the man' Third person affixes also play an effectively similar dis­ ambiguating role in embedded sentences (for a detailed analysis, see mjian-Anderson 1970). In Navaho this large number of third person morphemes and the striking complexity of their rules of application seems to provide grounds for a further generalization: Third person morphemes may not only take over the role of distinguishing the subject and the object (by adapting overt morphemes to the PM paradigm), but may also distinguish definite and indefinite objects, and, as exemplified by the prefixes bi- and ho-/ha-, may also signal certain pragmatic distinctions. 5.2.4 Finally, we may note that some data of Hungarian may perhaps also be interpreted along the lines of adaptation (although somewhat less convincingly than data of Navaho). Hungarian has an elaborate case system; if the complements

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

491

are not expressed with NPs, PM morphemes take over the roles of unstressed subjectival and objectivai pronouns. In matrix sentences we find no trace of these PM suffixes being dis­ ambiguating morphemes; in embedded sentences, however, there is a case which can be interpreted in this way. In present-day Hungarian there are two different relativeclause forming strategies. The one (which is probably older) is prenominai; in this case the relative clause is transformed into a participle construction. The other one (which is pre­ sumably a manifestation of the SOV — Τ(F)VX change) is post­ nominal; in this case we have a clause beginning with a rela­ tive pronoun: Prenominai: a beszél-ő ember the talk-ing man Postnominal: az ember, aki beszél the man who is-talking If we have a present or future participle or a past participle of an intransitive verb in the prenominai clause, there are no interpretation problems. If, however, the past participle derives from a transitive verb, the head noun may either be its object or its subject. In addition, in certain somewhat archaic constructions the relative clause contains an unmarked object, and therefore neither the embedded nor the head noun signals which of them is to be the object and which the subject. In such cases the participle takes on a third person possessive PM suffix if the head noun is its subject: világ world

lát-ott-ø

ember

see-past part.-Vx3pers man 'man who has seen the world'

szine hagy-ott-ø kabát colour lose-past part.-Vx3pers coat 'coat which has lost its colour' madár

lát-t-a

kenyér

bird

see-past part.-Px3Pers

bread

'bread which has been seen by birds'

492

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

pek süt-ött-e cipo baker bake-past part.-Px3Pers loaf 'loaf which has been baked by a baker' Assuming the validity of the thesis that embedded sentences are more conservative (which has in fact: been proved for many languages) we can say that third person suffixes in this con­ struction distinguish the subject and the object in an ancient fashion. Nevertheless, the examples can also be interpreted without clause boundaries, and the historical rule can thus be hypothetically extended over matrix sentences too: if the object immediately precedes the verb (i.e., if the sentence follows the old SOV pattern), the personal suffix on the verb is zero; if however the subject is placed in front of the verb (OSV), the adapted overt affix may have indicated that this order is anomalous. 5.2.5 The adapted pattern may be schematized as follows: Verbal constructions Intransitive VX

1Pers

A

2Pers 3Pers



1Pers 2Pers 3Pers

ø

1

Transitive. Vx 2 Vx3 C D

E F

Transitive^ Vx 2  D

Vx 3 E F

Z ø Possessive constructions Pronominal Lexical possessor possessor Px

ø

G H

I I where A through I are derivatives of the corresponding personal and possessive pronouns; the appearence of I on the possessed NP in a possessive complex which includes a lexical NP (for contrast see 5.1.) is a result of analogy; Ζ is the appearence of an older (original) affix which was later adapted into the verbal paradigm in order to disambiguate subjects from objects.

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

493

It may also be the case that Ζ = I. 5.3 The prepositional pattern. The person-marking paradigms of Agta (a Malayo-Polynesian language, Healey 1960) indicate that the first and second person affixes can be derived from the same kind of unstressed pronouns as the respective persons in the pronominal or adapted pattern. It is again in the third person that we encounter significant deviations. 5.3.1 Agta is a fairly consistent representative of the VSX serial type. It has suffixed paradigms for marking the person of the subject on transitive verbs and for marking the person of the possessor on possessed NPs. The unstressed pronouns of intransitive subjects are not affixed (their third person form is zero), and a pronominal transitive object is affixed only if it is in the first person singular and, if simultane­ ously the subject of the sentence is marked with a PM affix (Healey 23, 35-37). These facts seem to indicate that the principle of affixed PM must be very recent in Agta, which is also supported by the absence of affixed paradigms from re­ lated Malayo-Polynesian languages. The person-markers of tran­ sitive subjects are phonologically identical to those of possessors and different from those that modify transitive objects and intransitive subjects. These latter are marked mostly with free morphemes. Consequently, Agta follows an ergative PM pattern. Syntactic functions like subject and object are marked with prepositions. The case-marking pattern of prepositions is also ergative: there is one preposition for transitive subjects and another for transitive objects and intransitive subjects. The order in possessive constructions is NG, and if the possessor is expressed by a lexical NP it is marked with a preposition; a preposition which is identical to that which precedes the transitive subject. (This squares well with Allen's observation concerning the parallelisms between tran-

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

494

sitive and possessive constructions.) What is remarkable about all this is that the affix of the third person transitive subject and possessor is identical to the preposition of the transitive subject and the lexical possessor. Moreover, if the transitive subject or the possessor is expressed by a lexical NP, there is no person-marker - that is, we find no agreement in such cases. A few examples: (Healey 34) pinaligat na abbing-en ya kabayuq-en hit Erg child-the Abs horse-the 'the child hit the horse1 iqaray-na

ya

tobáko

(Healey 36)

arrange-between-bamboos-he Abs tobacco 'he's arranging tobacco between bamboos' fun

na

hila

(Healey 27)

base Gen tongue 'root of the tongue' bari-na

gadwa-na

(Healey 30)

body-her half-its 'her body' 'half of it' Now, I will assume that the third person verbal and possessive PM affix in Agta derives from a case marker pre­ position . It is placed on the verb or on the possessed NP if the verbal complement i.e. the transitive subject) or the possessor is not expressed with a lexical NP. It is necessary to retain the preposition because otherwise the verbal con­ struction might be misinterpreted as intransitive or even passive, and the unmarked possessed-NP would no longer be a member of possessive construction. The preposition may be affixed to the verb, because (i) it is unstressed and, normally, forms a single stress group with the noun following it, but, in the absence of its own

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

495

governing noun (ii) it cannot be attached to anything else but the preceding verb, since the morpheme following it is an un­ stressed preposition itself. Agta is in a state when only the pronominal transitive subject, some objects, and possessors appear in an agglutinated form. We may well assume that agglutination will be extended over all the pronouns. It is probable that as a general pattern, this preposition, when occuring with lexical NP's, will begin to gradually attach itself to the stress group of the verb or the possessed-NP. We may therefore predict that the above Agta sentence and possessive construction will look like this: pinaligat-na abbing-en ya kabayuq-en fun-na hila That is to say, the VSX → SOV change is not only triggered by topicalization but also by the fact that agglutination arises in verbal and possessive constructions - which is in­ consistent with the VSX serial type -, and therefore the impulse for typological consistency will be realized by word order change. 5.3.3 When sketching the scheme of the prepositional pattern I will assume that unstressed first and second person pronouns are always agglutinated to the verb or the possessed-NP: Verbal constructions Transitive, Intransitive

1Pers

A

2Pers

B

(lexical NPs) Vx 2 VX 3 E C D F

3Pers

ø

ø

Vx 1

ø

Transitive2 (pronominal NPs) Vx 2 C D Prep

Possessive constructions Lexical Pronominal possessor possessor 1Pers 2Pers 3Pers

G H Prep

PreP

VX 3 E F

ø

496

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

where A through H are derivatives of the corresponding per­ sonal and possessive pronouns; the Prep member of Vx and Px is phonologically as well as historically identical to the preposition which distinguishes verbal complements and geni­ tive relations. 5.3.4 Agta provides valuable information concerning the rise of affixed PM in languages belonging to the VSX —» SOV —> TVX trend. There are indications, however, that the third person marker may derive from a case marker even in languages of the SOV —» VSX trend. (In this instance, case markers are post­ positions or suffixes.) The word order and serial type of Ubykh (a Northwestern Caucasian language) is consistently SOV; both verbal and pos­ sessive person-markers are prefixed. The principle of affixed PM in this language is probably very old since all the other Caucasian languages contain affixed paradigms. It also seems likely that various free morphemes got attached to both the verb and the possessed element in several earlier periods. The following phonological coalescences indicate that 3Pers morphemes derive from case markers : the ergative suffix is -n(a); the genitive and dative suffixes are formally iden­ tical to the ergative suffix. In turn, the verbal paradigm shows an rv^ allomorph when it marks the 3Pers transitive subject : the-brother-Erg his-sister-Dat a-book-Abs it-he-gave 'the brother gave a book to his sister' The case suffix of the intransitive subject and the transitive object is zero and, parallelly, one of the verbal 3Pers markers of the respective constituents is also zero. Nevertheless, this zero person-marker may only be used if the intransitive subject or the object immediately precedes the verb: (Dumézil 55) a-tit' Ø-k'äka the-man he-came 'the man came'

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

497

It seems, however, that this clearly ergative pattern has combined with another set of PM affixes. Contrary to expectations, the 3Pers possessive affix is not n- but a- (and its allomorphs) which seems related to the i-/ -allomorphs in the verbal paradigm. 5.4 Let me briefly summarize my claims about the origins of affixed person-marking paradigms. I assumed that in the lan­ guages studied PM affixes mostly derive from unstressed pro­ nouns. The data suggested for each case that the initial stage is one in which there are no overt 3Pers pronouns either because lexical complements are rather frequent or because the 3Pers form of the personal pronoun itself is zero. Affixes of the pronominal pattern all derive from un­ stressed pronouns. Whenever no pronoun can be assumed in the original construction, person-marking is identified by a zero (or, the category unmarked). The adaptational pattern represents a possible later stage in the development of the pronominal pattern. It is characterized by the fact that in some of the transitive con­ structions an overt morpheme has been adapted to a 3rd person function, in order to resolve ambiguity. Furthermore, the languages in the sample show that the overt 3Pers possessive affix turns up in possessive constructions with lexical pos­ sessors as well. The prepositional (or, postpositional) pattern : 1Pers and 2Pers affixes derive from unstressed pronouns, whereas 3Pers affixes in the verbal as well as the possessive paradigm de­ rive from case markers. 6. 1Pers and 2Pers versus 3Pers We derived person-marking affixes from three kinds of sources : 1Pers and 2Pers: unstressed pronoun (verbal and possessive paradigms)

498

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

3Pers:

unstressed pronoun (possessive paradigms) adapted affix (verbal paradigms) case marker (verbal and possessive paradigms). 6.1. In the languages mentioned so far the placement of affixes of various origins has been uniform: affixes of all three persons were found on the same side of the verb, that is, either prefixed or suffixed. This uniform behavior is by no means necessary, since the origins of the PMs in any given language split along 1st and 2nd vs. 3rd axis has always been dissimilar. There are languages in which the placement of the affixes follows a different but still re­ gular pattern: 1Pers and 2Pers markers are on the one side of the stem and the 3Pers marker is on the opposite side. On the one hand, these latter examples serve as indirect evidence for the claim that 1Pers and 2Pers markers derive from sources different from those of 3Pers markers. On the other hand, they sopport the thesis (which is implied by our hypothesis) that morphemes deriving from different sources need not behave uniformly nor need they necessarily come from one and the same age either. 6.2 Upper Chehalis (Salish Family) exemplifies the case when 1Pers and 2Pers possessive markers in the singular are prefixed whereas the 3Pers marker is suffixed (Ingram 168). We find an even more convincing exemple in Algonquian (Bloomfield 1964, 94-95, Frantz 1966, 52-54, Voorhis 1974, 53-73) - a schema that is in general strange but fits well into our hypothesis. One group of paradigms is purely prefixed, another group purely suffixed, whereas a third is mixed. In the mixed paradigms the 1Pers and 2Pers markers are on one side and the 3Pers marker (plus the plural) is on the other. Or, more exactly: 1Pers and 2Pers are prefixed while 3Pers is prefixed and suffixed, or merely suffixed. 7. Similarities between verbal and possessive person-markers 7.1. So far we have found only fragmentary motivation for the

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

499

claim we made in 1.1.4, namely, that the phonological shape of the possessive paradigm is very likely to be identical, or similar, to one or more of the verbal paradigms. For one, we noted in connection with the overt 3Pers verbal affix in Sierra Miwok the fact that some languages borrow their 3Pers verbal affix from the possessive paradigm and that this may have contributed to their similar appearence. On the other hand, in Agta and Ubykh the two prepositions (ergative and genitive) from which we derived 3Pers affixes were identical. Nevertheless, we have not yet found any explanation for the fact that the two paradigms are often identical in all the three persons. It seems that the scope of this empirically supported claim is not restricted to the range of PM affixes. At the outset of the paper I referred to Allen's article, in which the author based his claim concerning the parallelisms between transitive and possessive constructions primarily on case markers. As for the motivation, we can only say that there certainly are theoretically justifiable similarities which manifest themselves in several parallel features of the two constructions. Even though Allen worked these out for case markers, it should certainly also hold for pronominal systems in subject and object positions that a set of those pronouns overlaps with the set of possessive pronouns; that is why a subset of agglutinated verbal pronouns, when forming an affixed paradigm, should be identical with the agglutinated possessive paradigm. Along the lines of such correspondences I will point out that the distribution of affixed verbal PM paradigms mirrors the formal distribution of case marking systems. 7.2. As a point of departure let us assume that in simple sentences (with a subject and perhaps an object) languages must distinguish three complements - regardless of whether they are lexical NPs or simply pronouns. These complements are the transitive subject, object and intransitive subject, abbreviated as S , 0 and S. respectively. Provided that the

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

500

person of these is marked on the verb, with two paradigms at hand we have three different theoretically possible distributions of subject and object marking: 2 nd paradigm 1 paradigm S

VS

o, s

i tr VS O Si , Si VS Si Str , O The table shows that the possessive paradigm may in principle be related to any of six verbal paradigms, that is: 1. Px S tr 2. Px O 3. Px si 4. Px o,si 5. Px s t r , si 6. Px Str, O Even though our sample languages were not too numerous, each of the six correlations was borne out by the data: 1 .Px Agta, Jacaltec, Sierra Miwok 2. Px Navaho 3. Px Bella Coola, Takelma 4. Px Assiniboine

5. Px 6. Px

Quechua Hungarian, Nenets

The remaining languages fall into two groups: in Buriat and Tatar the possessive paradigm was not identical to any of the verbal paradigms whereas in Blackfoot and Eskimo each of the three complements (S t r , O, S.) was marked with morphemes similar to the possessive affixes. 7.2.1. The above schematization served to demonstrate the corresponding variations between possessive and verbal PM affixes. Nevertheless, it obscured and, to some extent, also distorted the diversity of the paradigms. I will now attempt to restore their complex clarity. At the beginning I postulated the existence of two paradigms whereas in many languages (e.g.,

AFFIXED ΡERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

501

Blackfoot, Sierra Miwok, Amharic, Takelma, etc.,) we find more than two paradigms, depending on factors like: the gender of the complements; the type of the finite verb or predicative nominal; the tense and mood of the verb etc. In view of these facts the first correlation mentioned above, for instance, may be reformulated as follows: 1. "There is an Str affixed verbal PM paradigm that is identical, or very similar, to the possessive person marking paradigm" and so on. This seems to suffice for the present typological purposes; when descibing some of these languages such rough and ready statements can be made more precise. The scheme also obscured the fact that in several cases we may trace smaller scale similarities between the possessive paradigm and some details of a verbal paradigm different from the one distinguished above. Such partial correlations seem worthwhile to investigate; still, the above classification may be justified since in each case it was based on an ex­ plicit statement of the writer of the respective grammar. Finally there are languages with several possessive paradigms, depending on whether the possessed denotes a part of the body, a kinship term, an inherent or accidental pos­ session and so on. Identity, or similarity, in such cases holds for one of those paradigms (although, these paradigms do not tend to be very different from one another). 7.3. The correspondence variations of verbal and possessive PM paradigms make it very clear that the distribution of verbal paradigms resembles the distribution of morphological case markers on the NP complements of transitive and intransitive sentences. Which is of course not surprising since in our hypothesis, a rather large proportion of the affixes derive from subjectival and objectivai pronouns and, on the other hand, overt morphemes had either been adapted in order to resolve subject-object ambiguities (and are thus related to

502

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

case marking) or are directly of case marker origin. Spelling O, the above claim out in detail, 1. /Px Str / and 4. /Px S,/ correspond to the ergative pattern whereas 2. /Px 0/ and 5. /Px Str , S./ correspond to the nominative pattern. 7.3.1. This neat system of correlations, however, is too good to be true. It is suspicious, to say the least, that we find several Px S. cases, too. It is suspicious because, in our present knowledge of typology, there is no language in the nominal case system of which S. would have a separate case marker as opposed to Str and 0, provided that there are two cases in the language (Anderson 1978). If we look closely at the data our suspicions are justified since both Bella Coola and Takelma contain paradigms with fusional morphemes for S t r s and Os; from a historical point of view, these fusional morphemes, certainly in Bella Coola (Newman 1969b, 299) and most probably in Takelma, contain the original morphemes of S. (when marking Str ) . That is, the Px = S. correlation must be left empty and, contrary to superficial appearence, Bella Coola and Takelma must be reclassified with Quechua, that is, under the rubric Px = S t r , S i . For the same reason the languages under the Px Str, 0 rubric need to be reclassified as well. Here we encounter the complementary situation: nominal case systems may not be such that S t r and 0 are marked with the same (overt) morpheme as opposed to S i Remember that Str and 0 are not marked by two distinct paradigms, each of which corresponds to Px but rather by a single paradigm which employs multi-functional morphemes (the same morpheme marks Str and O on one and the same verbal stem). This analysis may of course change if there is reason to postulate zero morphemes in the system. In principle, we may obtain two different results if we assume that the structures of nominal case systems are also valid here and thus that the above distribution of

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

503

paradigms is merely an illusion. We may either reinterpret Px Str' O as px str or px str ' Si . In other words, we must arrive either at the ergative or the nominative pattern. Since the languages in question are Nenets and Hungarian, members of the Uralic family whose structure is commonly in­ terpreted as being nominative, we prefer the assignment of the nominative pattern (for a detailed analysis presenting data provided by historical and comparative analysis, see Radies, forthcoming). 7.4. The above modifications lead to the following reclas­ sification of the languages : Nominative pattern Px Str' Si Bella Coola, Hungarian, Nenets, Quechua, Takelma Px 0 Navaho Ergative pattern Px Str Agta, Jacaltec, Sierra Miwok Px

S., 0 Assiniboine Consequently, the distribution of verbal paradigms resembles the distribution of morphological case markers, or, it is traceable back to such systems. 8. Conservativity of affixed person-marking

8.1. In the course of establishing the temporal development of the paradigms for the periods VSX → SOV → TVX, and S O V — VSX, I claimed that the lifetime of PM affixes is much longer than that of particular serial types. In other words, the principle of affixed PM changes more slowly than the serial type of a given language. This thesis seems to contradict the common view that word endings tend to be reduced over time. Therefore, one can reasonably ask, why mostly suffixed PMs resist this tendency? I believe there are three factors which facilitate the

504

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

survival of verbal and possessive paradigms, despite the usual tendency for suffixal reduction. 8.1.1. The closed structure of person-marking paradigms. There are very few types of paradigms in language displaying a character so closed and ordered as that of person-marking. It is easy to see why: the three persons and the two numbers are universally distinguished categories (although the latter only with a very high statistical probability). It is of vital interest for any language to maintain the distinction between the members of this paradigm at each stage of its development since, save for a rather small proportion of sen­ tences (impersonal constructions, ellipses, interjections) it is always necessary to mark grammatical person. The dimensions of the internal structure of these paradigms probably derive from the very simple constellation of human speech situation: JE am talking to you about something. Possibilities for further category refinements are present primarily in the third person and in the category of number. On the other hand, other grammatical subsystems of central importance in language usually correspond to far more complex constellations; see, for instance, the fascinating diversity of distinctions case marking systems may reveal (cf. Komlósy, in this volume) which go far beyond the rather simplified picture of the ergative-nominative distinctions used in this paper. Consequently, the dimensions of organization of personmarking and the smaller number of those categories will con­ stitute a more strict and uniform structure within the given subsystem than dimensions and categories of other subsystems. The borderlines of the systems of PM paradigms can usually be drawn fairly unambiguously. Nevertheless, this fact cannot be explained on the basis of the small number and rather universal character of the categories involved alone. It is presumably also important to note that while the boundaries of other subsystems tend to squish (see, for

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

505

instance, the boundaries between case-marking and localtemporal relations), this hardly ever happens in person-marking systems. It is in this sense that I take the structure of PM paradigms to be closed. The survival of the paradigms is further facilitated by the fact that affixed person-marking is used in two syn­ tactic key-positions : in possessive and in (transitive and intransitive) verbal constructions. Moreover, it is also supported by the material identity between the possessive paradigm and at least part of the verbal paradigm. 8.1.2. The grammatical nature of pronouns; restricted participation in serialization. Person-marking affixes are almost purely pronominal, considering their origin as well as their function. This pronominal character has particular consequences for their behavior. As is well-known, the impulse for typological con­ sistency was motivated in Bartsch and Vennemann (1972) by the thesis of "natural serialization" on the basis of model theoretic semantics. In this view, word order correlations tend to be uniform because only this may ensure the correct correlation of unidirectional mappings between operators and operands throughout the sentence. This unidirectionality may be regarded as a special manifestation of the principle of least effort (cf. Martinet 1963) in language. Nevertheless, these mappings have no equal relevance for all constituents. The consistent serial placement of lexical NPs receive a twofold motivation from these: on the one hand, in most sentences they are modified by an adjective, a possessor or a relative clause, on the other hand, lexical NPs are also arguments of the main predicate. Thus for natural serialization to be realized throughout the sentence, lexical NPs must be so placed that the semantic mappings have the same directions in the case of all grammatical relations into which lexical NPs may enter.

506

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

On the other hand, pronouns and PM affixes are in­ fluenced by the needs of far less numerous operations since they are practically never modified by adjectives, possessors or relative clauses and therefore their participation in natural serialization is much more restricted. Consequently, the changes in the placement of pronouns and PM affixes may be more slower and more conservative than those of "more in­ volved" lexical NPs. 8.1.3. Accumulation of functions; Romer's Law in language. As already noted by Sapir, Bloomfield, Whorf and others, Amerindian languages are rich in affixed PMs and these PMs bear strikingly many functions in them. In addition to the original function of person-marking, in many languages these morphemes also serve to fulfil other fundamental functions like distinguishing subjects from objects, marking the definiteness of the object, marking the referential identity or nonidentity of two constituents, marking the syntactic relations in subordinate clauses (Jacaltec, Navaho), marking the very fact of subordination (Amharic, Ubykh) and so on. That PM affixes may take over all these functions is possible because, on the one hand, being of pronominal character, they are closely related to the semantic task of referring and, on the other hand, they are already related to case-marking since one member of the paradigm may have originally been a case-marker and other members could have come from subjectival, objectivai or possessive pronouns. Whenever some important distinction disappears in a language for whatever reason, it is very likely that the first attempt at its restoration will be one that preserves the original type of the language. In anthropology, the phenomenon that living beings tend to adapt themselves to new circumstances by introducing in­ novations that make the continuation of the traditional way of life possible is referred to as Romer's Law (see HockettAscher 1964). Similarly, if in an SOV language for instance,

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

507

the loss of word endings damages or even eliminates the case system, the traditional agglutinative "way of life" and the word order type can be maintained through the in­ novation that affixed person-markers begin to distinguish cases. Or, suppose that the marking of the definiteness of the object becomes necessary. The SOV type may be preserved if PMs undertake this task; so there will be no need for an SVO variant in the word order or for the development of articles; and so on. The very accumulation of different functions within a single element is likely to increase the formal survival of that element too, such a multi-functional element is very difficult to dispense with. 8.2. The above three arguments serve to support the claim that the system of person-marking paradigms, if once developed, will change more slowly than expected, even though they usual­ ly appear at the ends of words. In connection with the resolu­ tion of this problem, however, we have to emphasize a further restriction. Namely, it is only the principle of affixed personmarking that is conservative; the phonological form of personmarkers is very likely to change even more rapidly than other morphological elements (owing to its word-final position). This is indicated by the fact that many languages have several PM paradigms (depending, on tense, mood, aspect, voice, etc. of the verb); and also by the fact that (cf. Lehmann 1973) the relative order of PM affixes and verb-modifying affixes - and, let us add, the relative order of possessive PM affixes and case-markers - is not very regular even in genetically related languages. In this latter case, these affixes have probably been created, or re-created, in dif­ ferent ages. There are innumerable instances showing the substitution of one phonological form of an affixed PM by another. According to our hypothesis, the explanation of such substitutions is this: as a result of the tendency for loss of endings, the function of person-marking had been weakened at some points and grammatical person had become impossible

508

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

to distinguish. Nevertheless, this distinction being a prime necessity, the language immediately created or adapted a new morpheme for that place - a new morpheme that immedia­ tely fit into the already existing paradigm of affixes.

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

509

APPENDIX 1 Language Sample Affiliation

Language Agta Amharic

Malayo-Polinesian Semitic, Ethiopian

Location Philippines Ethiopia

Assiniboine

Macro-Siouan,

USA, Montana

Data Source Healey 1960 Cohen 1936, Titov 1976 Levin 1967

Siouan Aztec

Uto-Aztec

Bella Coola

Salish

Blackfoot

Algonquian

Buriat Diegueño Eskimo (gr.)

Altaic, Mongol Eskimo-Aleut

Hungarian Jacaltec

Uralic, Ugric Penutia, Mayan

Navaho

Hokan, Yuman

Mexico Canada, British Columbia USA, Montana

Whorf 1946 Newman 1969 a,b

Frantz 1966, 1971 USSR, Buriat R. Poppe 1960 USA, California Langdon 19 70 Swadesh 1946 S-Greenland Thalbitzer 1911

Hungary Guatemala USA, Arizona Na-Dene, Athapascan

Day 1973 Sapir-Hoijer 1967,

Nenets Quechua Sierra Miwok Siuslaw Takelma Tatar Ubykh

Akmaj ianAnderson 19 70 USSR, W-Siberia Hajdu 1968 Uralic, Samoyed Lastra 1968 Andean-Equatorial, Peru, Bolivia Parker 1969 Andean USA, California Freeland 1951 Penutia, Miwok Frachtenberg USA, Oregon Penutia, Yakonan 1922 Sapir 1922 USA, Oregon Penutia, isolated USSR, Tatar R. Poppe 19 68 Altaic, Turkish Northwest Caucasia;η USSR, Caucasus Dumézil 1931 Area

S,O

sov

Eskimo

Postnominal

sov

Navaho

GN

TVX

GN

sov

sov

Tatar

Ubykh GN

GN

TVX

Takelma

Siuslaw

GN

TVX

Sierra Miwok

Suffixed

Suffixed

Suffixed

Suffixed

Suffixed

Prenominai Suffixed R-Extraposed ? Prefixed Inflexional Suffixed Prenominai Postnominal Prenominal Suffixed Prenominal Suffixed

Prenominai Postnominal

GN

sov

Quechua

Prenominai

S, 0

Prefixed Suffixed

Prefixed Suffixed Suffixed

Suffixed

Suffixed

Prefixed

Suffixed Prefixed

Suffixed

Suffixed

Suffixed

Suffixed

Suffixed

Prefixed

Suffixed Prefixed

Suffixed

Suffixed

Suffixed

Suffixed

Suffixed

Prefixed

'



1,2Pers

S S, 0, I0

S, 0

S, 0, I0

S, 0

S

S, 0

3pers

S, 02,3Pers

O, IO

S, 0 S,

Prefixed Prefixed (Proclitics) (Proclitics) S, 0 Suffixed

Suffixed

Suffixed

Prefixed

s

S, 0

Suffixed

Suffixed

S, 0

Prefixed

Suffixed

Prefixed Suffixed Prefixed

S, 0

Str

Constituent Marked by PM

Prepositional I Suffixed

(vi) Suffixed, (Enclitics) Suffixed

PM on the Verb

s, 

Suffixed Suffixed

I (v )

PM on the Possessor

Prefixed Suffixed

Suffixed

(iv) Prepositional

Case marking

, Suffixed

Prenominai Replacive R-Extraposedl

Postnominal

GN

sov

Nenets

GN

NG

vso

Jacaltec

Prenominai Postnominal

GN

Prenominai

Replacive

Prenominai

GN

GN

GN

GN

Postnominal ?

GN NG

Postnominal

Prenominai

(iii) Postnominal

GN

GN

NG

TVX

(ii)

Hungarian

(gr.)

sov

sov

Diegueno

Tνχ

Blackfoot

Buriat

vso

Bella Coola

vso, sv

SOV

Aztec

SOV

Assiniboine

VSO

(i)

Order of Order of Constituents Possessive Type of RC Constr.

Amharic

Agta

Language

APPENDIX 2

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

511

References Allen, W.S. (1964): Transitivity and Possession. Language, 40:337-343. Akmajian, A. and Anderson, S. (1970): On the use of fourth person in Navajo, or Navajo made harder. U A L 36: 1-8. Anderson, J.M. - Jones, C. (1974) (eds.): Historical Linguistics I-II. Amsterdam, North Holland Anderson, S. (1978): Inflectional Morphology. Miemo, to appear in : Language Typology and Syntactic Field Work Bartsch, R. and Vennemann, T. (1972): Semantic Structures: a Study in the Relation between Semantics and Syntax. Frankfurt am Main, Athenäum Bloomfield, L. (1946): Algonquian. In: Osgood (1946), 85-130. Boas, F. (1911) (ed.): Handbook of American Indian Languages. Part 1, Washington Boas, F. (1922) (ed.): Handbook of American Indian Languages. Part 2, Washington Cohen, M. (1936): Traité de langue Amharique. Paris Day, C. (1973): The Jacaltec Language. Indiana University Publications, Bloomington. Dumézil, G. (1931): La langue des Oubykhs, Paris. Frachtenberg, L.J. (1922): Siuslawan (Lower Umpqua). In: Boas (1922), 431-631. Frantz, D.G. (1966): Person indexing in Blackfoot. IJAL 32.1: 50-58. Frantz, D.G. (1971): Toward a Generative Grammar of Blackfoot. Summer Institute of Linguistics, Norman, Oklahoma. Freeland, L.S. (1951): Language of the Sierra Miwok. Indiana University Publications in Anthropology and Linguistics, Memoir 6. Givon, T. (1971): Historical syntax and synchronic morpho­ logy: an archeologist's field trip. In: Papers from the 7th Regional Meeting, Chicago Linguistic Society, 394-415.

512

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Givón, T. (1975): Topic, Pronoun and Grammatical Agreement. In: Li (1975), 149-188. Hajdu P. (1968): Chrestomathia Samoiedica. Tankönyvkiado, Budapest. Healey, P.M. (1960): An Agta Grammar. Summer Institute of Linguistics, Manila. Hockett, C.F.-Asher, R. (1964): The human revolution. Current Anthropology, S: 135-147. Ingram, D. (1975): A note on word order in Proto-Salish. IJAL 41 : 165-168. É. Kiss K. (1978) : A magyar mondatok egy szintaktikai modellje. NyK. 80: 261-286. Langdon, M. (1970): A Grammar of Diegueño. University of California Publications, Linguistics 66. University of California Press. Lastra, Y. (1968): Cochabamba Quechua Syntax. Mouton. Lehmann, W.P. (1973): A structural principle of language and its implications. Language 49:47-66. Levin, N.B. (1964): The Assiniboine Language. Indiana Uni­ versity, Bloomington. Li, Ch.N. (1975): Word Order and Word Order Change. Univer­ sity of Texas Press, Austin and London. Martinet, A. (1963): Eléments de linguistique generale. Librairie Armand Colin, Paris 3 e édition Newman, S. (1969a): Bella Coola Grammatical Processes and Form Classes. U A L 35: 175-180. Newman, S. (1969b): Bella Coola Paradigms. U A L 35: 299-306. Osgood, S. (ed.) (1946): Linguistic Structures of Native America. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, Number Six. Parker, G.J. (1969): Ayacucho Quechua Grammar and Dictionary. Mouton.

AFFIXED PERSON-MARKING PARADIGMS

513

Poppe, N. (1960): Buriat Grammar. Indiana University Publi­ cations, Uralic and Altaic Series 2. Poppe, N. (1968): Tatar Manual. Indiana University Publi­ cations, Uralic and Altaic Series, Vol. 25. Radics K. (forthcoming): Typological notes to the reconstruc­ tion of PM suffixes in the Uralic languages. Sapir, E. (1922): The Takelma language of South-Western Oregon. In: Boas (1922), 1-297. Sapir, E. and Hoijer, H. (1967) : The Phonology and Morphology of the Navaho Language. University of California Publica­ tions, Linguistics 50, University of California Press, Swadesh, M. (1946): South Greenlandic (Eskimo). In: Osgood (1946), 30-55. Thalbitzer, W. (1911): Eskimo. In: Boas (1911) 967-1069. Titov, T.T. (1976): The Modern Amharic Language. "Nauka" Publishing House, Moscow. Vennemann, T. (19 74) : Topics, subjects and word order: from SXV to SVX via TVX. In: Anderson-Jones (1974), T. 339377. Vennemann, T. (1975): An explanation of drift. In: Li (1975), 269-307. Voorhis, P.H. (1974): Introduction to the Kickapoo Language. Indiana University, Bloomington. Whorf, B.L, (1946): The Milpa Alta Dialect of Aztec. In: Osgood (1946), 367-398.

MODEL THEORETIC SEMANTICS OF PERFORMATIVES

Anna S z a b o l c s i Existing proposals for the treatment of performatives in Montague's framework1, share the common feature of assimi­ lating performatives to propositions. In the light of the fact that model theoretic semantics takes the descriptive function of language as a point of departure, this procedure may seem only natural; nevertheless, it does not seem to cap­ ture the intuition I believe to underlie Austin's theory. Rather than attributing the peculiarities of performatives to nothing but conventions of use, in this paper I approach the problem from the other way round: from what we know about the use of performatives I try to work out what their correspond­ ing meanings can be in terms of model theory.

I greatly benefited from comments on earlier versions of this paper, made by Ferenc Altrichter, Harry Bunt, and Zeno Vendler. 1

For instance, David Lewis, General Semantics, in: Davidson and

Harman (eds.) Semantics of Natural Language, Reidel, 19 72. and Roland Hausser, Surface Compositionality and the Semantics of Mood, in Groenendijk and Stokhof (eds.) Amsterdam Papers in Formal Grammar, Vol. II., Centrale Interfaculteit, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1978.

516

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Naturally, one may not expect that model theoretic se­ mantics should incorporate some particular theory of speech acts, it can only be expected to grasp some relevant facet of the phenomenon those theories are concerned with. Explicit performatives play a distinguished role in speech act theo2 ries (both historically and conceptually) and it is the "per­ formative phenomenon" that seems justifiable to belong within the scope of model theory. As a first step, the performative phenomenon can be characterized as follows: formally declar­ ative sentences divide into two groups with respect to what happens when they are uttered. In saying 'I congratulate you' it is possible to perform the act of congratulating, that is, the very act referred to in the sentence, whereas in saying 'I am walking1 it is impossible to perform the act of walking. It would of course be an illusion to believe that theo­ ry can be completely peeled off this phenomenon. The very fact that one finds it remarkable is already a consequence of some theoretical background. Therefore, we first have to show that Austin's original observation is not so alien to model theory that the latter may not find remarkable what he found See Zeno Vendler, Res Cogitans, Cornell University Press, 19 72. p. 8: "We may recall that Austin's investigations be­ gin with an attempt to draw a distinction between "performa­ tive" and "constative" utterances. As this task cannot be accomplished to his satisfaction, he develops the theory of illocutionary acts, that is, of illocutionary forces accom­ panying all "happy" or "successful" utterances. In this new perspective the performative-constative distinction fades away and what he previously called "performative" utterances retain no special status except for a stronger emphasis on some illocutionary force or another. Nevertheless, and exact­ ly because of this emphasis, the intuitive notion of an illo(footnote 2 continued)

MODEL THEORETIC SEMANTICS OF PERFORMATIVES

517

so, and secondly, we have to point out to what extent Austin's explanation is compatible with model theory. These will be the tasks of Section 1. In analysing Austin's texts I will not try to be faithful to the history of science, I will only investi­ gate his claims as challenges to present-day model theoretic semantics. My main point will be to draw a sharp line between the semantic and pragmatic aspects of performatives and there­ by discover a gap in Austin's treatment. This will in my view naturally lead to the proposal in Section 2, that is, to treating performatives as denoting changes in intensional mod­ els. The rest of Section 2 will be concerned with the status of felicity conditions and a tentative extension of Montague's The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English. In this paper I do not offer an exhaustive analysis of performatives in Montague's framework. I concentrate on a few problems I believe to be both performative-specific and com­ mon to all performatives. As regards to any particular sen­ tence, I let the independent results of the theories of speech acts and grammar have the final word of judgement. Section 1 1.1. Austin's distinction revisited In "Performative Utterances" Austin introduces his topic as follows: "I want to discuss a kind of utterances which looks like a statement and, grammatically, I suppose, would be classed as a statement, which is not nonsensical, and yet is not true or false (...) if a person makes an utterance of this sort we should say that he is doing something rather (footnote 2 continued)-cutionary act remains dependent upon the previously described characteristics of performative utterances." (Emphasis supplied)

518

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

than merely saying something (...) in all these cases it would be absurd to regard the thing I say as a report of the performance of the action which is undoubtedly done -the action of betting, or christening, or apologizing. We should rather say that, in saying what I do, I actually perform that action (...) Now these kinds of utterances are 3 the ones that we call performative utterances." As opposed to my innocent characterization of the per­ formative phenomenon, as given above, the first theoretical surplus in Austin's text is the immediate opposition of per­ formativity and truth-falsity. The notion of truth playing an important role in model theory as well, Austin's observa­ tion counts as an obvious challenge. The status of his dis­ tinctions needs to be revised, however, as it is by no means unambiguous what he means by the term "utterance", namely, whether he thinks of what we utter or of the act of uttering it. The first interpretation seems to be supported by the fact that in Austin's view, "utterances" are grammatically (i.e. syntactically) classifiable, further, that some "utter­ ances" are statements and can thus be true or false, and fi­ nally, by his expression "the thing I say". On the other hand, the act-interpretation is supported by the fact that the per­ formative character of an utterance can be demonstrated in a speech situation ("in saying what I do, I actually perform 4 that action") .

J.L. Austin, "Performative Utterances," in Philosophical Pa­ pers, Oxford, 1976. p. 235. 4 See also the following loci in How to Do Things with Words, ed. by J.O. Urmson, Oxford, 1962. p. 6: "What are we to call 2 a sentence or an utterance of this type? I propose to call it a performative sentence or a performative utterance, or, for short, a 'performative' (...) (footnote 4 continued)

MODEL THEORETIC SEMANTICS OF PERFORMATIVES

519

This ambiguity - which leads to an ambiguity between the levels of semantics and pragmatics - can be traced in all his works, although their overall spirit is in the di­ rection of pragmatics. This ambiguity is apparently rather irrelevant for Austin himself, it is most relevant to us, however. The scope of model theoretic semantics only includes the relation between expressions and things in the models of the world, where those models only contain constructs neces­ sary for interpreting the literal meanings of expressions. The question of what happens in particular situations in which those expressions are uttered belongs to the scope of the theory of language use, or pragmatics . Although at present we know of no full-blown pragmatic theory based on model theoretic semantics and using similarly advanced math­ ematical tools, we can form a conception of it on the basis of less mathematical-minded explorations. I imagine that this pragmatics has to account for the characteristics of language use taking into account both the communicative function and the social embedding of language but, most importantly, has to rely upon the abstract linguistic system. Semantics in

(footnote 4 continued)

'Sentences' form a class of 'utter­

ances' , which class is to be defined, so far as I am con­ cerned, grammatically" p.11: "In no case do we say that the utterance was false 1 but rather that the utterance - or rather the act , e.g. the promise - was void (...) 1 We shall avoid distinguishing these precisely because the distinction is not in point." The kind of indexical pragmatics Montague devised will fall within semantics in this sense. In fact, no matter how many tuples indices should be as long as the "model of the world" does not involve self-contained models of the internal struc­ ture of the speech situation.

520

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

turn has to play in the hands of pragmatics: it has to define the meanings of expressions in a way which explains the possibilities of their uses. This requirement is already satisfied in the case of statements. It is a par excellence semantic property of the sentence

'I am walking' that it can be true or false. Regard­

less of whether this sentence is ever uttered, its meaning can be defined by specifying which states of affairs it is true of and which of them it is false of. This kind of treat­ ment is motivated by the underlying conviction that the rela­ tion of this sentence to facts of the world is descriptive (truth and falsity are but auxiliary notions for expressing t h i s ) . The primary end to which one may use this sentence when uttering it is to perform an act of describing, or re­ porting. Now, when Austin claims that "performative utter­ ances" differ from statements in that they cannot be true or false one might expect that he is going to point out some par excellence semantic difference since, obviously, the one kind of semantic characterization

(i.e. the potential of being true

or false) ought to be opposed to another one. Surprisingly enough, however, aside from giving a possible list of syntac­ tic characteristics of "performative utterances" Austin only characterizes performatives pragmatically

(as he only concen­

trates on speech acts themselves). As long as the distinction of statements and performatives is maintained, truth or fal­ sity is opposed to felicity or infelicity, that i s , a seman­ tic qualification to a pragamtic one. It needs to be empha­ sized, however, that this level switching is by no means ex­ plicit in Austin as this switching is only possible thanks to the non-distinction of semantics and pragmatics

(which is fa­

cilitated by the ambiguous use of the term "utterance"). In spite of this inevitable asymmetry in the distinction of statements and performatives, Austin's claim still presents a challenge for model theory. If we project the facts of use back to the abstract linguistic system to a permissible

(and

MODEL THEORETIC SEMANTICS OF PERFORMATIVES

521

necessary) extent, we must be able to explain why 'I con­ gratulate you' and 'I am walking' can be (or, are bound to be) used so differently. It seems reasonable to accept that 'I congratulate you' and its brothers cannot be called true or false. Nevertheless, the question for model theory now is how to fill the above discovered gap in semantics; in oth­ er words, how to characterize 'I congratulate you' at the level of pure semantics then. 1.2. Austin's objection revisited Rather than to proceed to the actual proposal directly, an excursus seems to be in order here. When setting out to base an argument on the distinction of statement and performative one must not forget about the fact that, having elaborated it, Austin also did his best to raise doubts with respect to this appealing distinction. Therefore it needs to be shown that, at least from our particular point of view, Austin's conclu­ sion that there is no essential difference between "perform­ ative utterances" and the rest is not inescapable. When discarding the original distinction Austin observes that all kinds of sentences and non-sentences can be "perform­ ative utterances"; that "utterances" carelessly qualified as performatives are not always performative; that the classifi­ cation of the type 'I state that...' is paradoxical; that truth and falsity are but gross labels and statements can al­ so be infelicitous etc. It would be far too lengthy to con­ sider each of these points in detail so I merely indicate the main scheme of my argument. It appears that, similarly to the case with setting up the distinction, in arguing against it Austin continues to make use of the non-distinction of seman­ tics and pragmatics. This tendency is most perspicuous perhaps in the treat­ ment of non-explicit performatives. The expression 'Bull' or 'The bull is to charge' can in certain cases be uttered with the same force as the expression 'I warn you that the bull is

522

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

to charge', nevertheless, this sameness of force can only be a property of utterances in the act-sense whereas we find no trace of such an equivalence in the meanings of the corresponding expressions. Tested against the criterion of "in saying what I do, I actually perform that action" as well, only 'I warn you that... ' will turn out to be performative (since when uttering 'Bull' I neither say what I do nor perform the action (?) that bull, and similarly for the other example) . In order to disambiguate the term "utterance" I shall from now on use the term "performative sentence" for expressions called "explicit performatives" by Austin. The act of uttering those expressions may still be called a "performative utterance" but in the case of uttering other expressions this term seems either unjustified or simply tautologous. It may also be useful to dwell on the infelicities of statements for a while, in order to demonstrate that they do not' obscure the intended distinction, either. The violation of presuppositions can be handled by any not purely two-valued logic at the very level of semantics. The question whether a statement (e.g. 'France is hexagonal') is exact or rough presents no unsolvable problem either. One possibility is to use fuzzy logic, where the truth value of a statement specifies the measure of its truth. It needs to be emphasized,

The relation between certain explicit performatives and certain non-declaratives is a slightly different matter since the sameness of force in the case of 'I order you to leave' and 'Leave' is not so much a function of the particular speech situation but a systematic phenomenon. Still, their equivalence is also merely pragmatic. For a treatment of imperatives and interrogatives see Hausser (1978), whose analyses I fully accept although my proposal for explicit performatives is at variance with his.

MODEL THEORETIC SEMANTICS OF PERFORMATIVES

5 23

however, that model theoretic semantics assigns truth values to sentences not with respect to actual reality but with respect to its mathematical models. It is one question whether France is really hexagonal and another is whether we can model it so. In case we choose to, this sentence will be true even in usual two-valued logics. Such a distinction between reality and its models is not merely playing with mathematics, however: it corresponds to what Roman Jakobson expresses by saying that linguistic signs refer to an internalized world of human experiences. Finally, it seems to be a matter of pragmatics whether we actually believe what we say and whether we are entitled to saying so (e.g. to say that someone else is not well). Austin's programmatic conclusion was: "stating something is performing an act just as much as is giving an order or giving a warning (...) What we need besides the old doctrine about meanings is a new doctrine about all the pos7 sible forces of the utterances" . As it will have become clear from what has been said above, I do agree that all cases of saying something should be studied as acts. Which, however, does not amount to also agreeing to abandoning semantics for the sake of pragmatics and, further, I see no reason why we should not distinguish between performative sentences and other expressions in semantics. Assuming that the lack or presence of each of the following properties can be decided on independent grounds (for any language and any expression), I take the class of performative sentences to include formally declarative sentences which (i) contain a so-called performative verb, that is, which are explicit, (ii) whose syntactic form can be characterized, language-specifically, with the tense, aspect, mood, person etc. of the performative verb and with the nature of its possible comple7

Performative Utterances, p. 251

524

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

ments (also admitting that this syntactic characterization need not be unique and therefore performative sentences may be homonymous with some statements, which causes no trou­ bles in interpretation as long as we provide different deriva­ tions for the performative and the constative versions), and (iii) to which the "in saying what I do, I actually perform that action" test applies. Finally, it should be noted that I cannot accept the second part of Austin's program, as cited above, on its lit­ eral form. While condemning the old doctrine about meanings for being fully descriptive, Austin does in fact rely upon it as it is clear from his notion of locutionary meaning. Locutionary meaning, however, cannot exhaust the full meaning of a performative sentence, only relates certain parts of it. It seems that what we need beside that old doctrine about mean­ ings is not only a new doctrine about forces but also a smaller-scale new doctrine about the meanings of performative sentences. Section 2 2.1. Denoting changes Recall that Austin opposed the active character of perform­ atives to "merely saying something". In what sense can this opposition be regarded as valid, considering that all speech acts have an influence on the speech situation (factors like the hearer's knowledge or state of mind also included under this general label)? To describe some state of affairs is merely saying something in the sense that it leaves the state of affairs in question untouched. Whereas all speech acts are "active" or "performative" from a pragmatic point of view, only the making of an explicit performative utterance has the additional property that the primary influence it has should be described in terms of its literal content. In

MODEL THEORETIC SEMANTICS OF PERFORMATIVES

525

other words, explicit performatives are active in relation to the matters their literal meanings are concerned with, and constatives (or other expressions) are by no means ac­ tive in this sense. This in turn suggests that the unique active nature of explicit performatives is a semantic prop­ erty . We can say in general that an act is something that brings about some change. Speech acts in general bring about changes in the speech situation and should therefore be Characterized in those terms, which I call pragmatic terms8 . At the level of semantics, however, models of the world only picture things our expressions refer to. Since explicit per­ formatives are active in this very relation, I propose that performative sentences should denote changes in the models. In intuitive terms we can say that the literal meaning of a performative sentence specifies how the world would change if the sentence were uttered (under appropriate circumstances). More precisely, I take a change to be a transition from one state of affairs into another. Correspondingly, the denot­ ation of the sentence 'I congratulate you' at an index a is a transition from a to another index b. The nature of this particular transition, or change, can be characterized by the fact that b is such that there it is true that the person denoted by 'I' has congratulated the person denoted by 'you'. Note that the sentence denotes the change and not the result­ ing state of affairs b and is therefore crucially different from statements. Yet, the above characterization of b pre9 serves all its "descriptive content" .

See for instance H.C. Bunt, Dialogue Analysis and Speech Act Theory, Institute for Perception Research, Manuscript no. 330/II. Eindhoven, 1978. 9 I assume that b follows a in time and that they are identical, (footnote 9 continued)

526

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

In order to incorporate this proposal into Montague semantics we have to make an important alteration on cur­ rently used models of intensional logic. Those models are static - there are no changes in them. This may sound sur­ prising: how is Montague then capable of accounting for such everyday sentences as 'Peter enters' - does this sentence not denote some change? Here the difference between reality and its models needs to be emphasized again. In reality, entering is a change and standing still is not; Montague, however, neutralizes this difference in the course of mod­ elling when he captures the meanings of both of the verbs 'enter' and 'stand still' with (intensions of) sets. Those sets are quite alike in a mathematical sense; only when we confront-model and reality does it turn out that the set of those entering is a set of moving people while the set of those standing still is not. This procedure is justified since language itself seems to neutralize this difference, 10 at least to a certain important extent . Nevertheless, lan­ guage does not seem to neutralize the difference between 'I congratulate you' and 'I am walking' (or, 'I am congrat­ ulating you') in the same sense. The treatment of perform­ ative sentences may thus be a good reason for making inten­ sional models dynamic, that is, to allow for changes to hap­ pen, not only in reality (as they do in the case of entering) but also in the models of reality. Changes in intensional models can be represented by (footnote 9 continued) except for the result of the change in question. Note that in the present formulation performative sentences are not self-verifying. 10 That both the qualifications "certain" and "important" are necessary becomes clear if we think of accomplishment verbs (cf. D. R. Dowty, Toward a Semantic Analysis of Verb Aspect..., Linguistics and Philosophy 1977/1).

MODEL THEORETIC SEMANTICS OF PERFORMATIVES

527

functions whose domains and ranges both contain (indices of) states of affairs. Such functions map states of affairs into others and are thus mathematical representatives of the no­ tion of change as sketched above. The necessary extension of intensional logic (as a mere mathematical possibility) has already been introduced by Daniel Gallin 11 . In distinction to the original definition by Montague, in which s was not a type, Gallin's definition of types is as follows: (i) e, t, s Є T' (ii) α, β ЄT' →<α, β>Є T' By introducing s as a type it becomes possible to define func­ tions of type <(s,s)> , which serves as the type of possible de­ notations of performative sentences. (Obviously, the term "sentence" should rather be reserved for truth value denoting expressions but I assume that the maintenance of this jargon will not be confusing here.) Correspondingly, the meaning of a performative sentence is represented by the intension of all 19 possible changes it denotes and is of type <s , <s,s>> . 2.2. The status of felicity conditions The first problem arising in connection with this proposal is concerned with the initial index a.. Is it necessary to impose restrictions on the domain of the change function and if so, then what kinds? The confrontation of speech act theory 11 D. Gallin, Intensional and Higher Order Modal Logic, § 8 Two-sorted type theory, pp. 59-63, Elsevier, 1975. 12 The idea of accomodating changes in intensional models is by no means unprecedented in literature. The semantic effect of state-switchers and predicate transformers used by van Emde Boas and Janssen (Montacfue Grammar and Programming Lan­ guages , in Groenendijk and Stokhof (eds.), 1978) is similar to that of our change functions; nevertheless, those being operators, the corresponding changes cannot be denotations of expressions.

528

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

and model theoretic semantics makes the need for such restric­ tions at least questionable. Nevertheless, I will not take sides here, only indicate my doubts. It is necessary to impose restrictions on a only if we think that there are states of affairs from which there can be no transition to any other via 'I congratulate you' or 'I promise to come' etc. From this claim there follow two conclusions, namely, (i) restrictions on a may be concerned with felicity conditions, and (ii) the theoretical status of those restrictions may be similar to that of presuppositions. Presuppositions are usually handled by excluding states of affairs in which the presuppositions of the statement are not fulfilled from the domain of the function that assigns truth values to the sentence. The situation may be similar in our case: we might restrict the domain of the change function so that it may not turn states of affairs lacking certain proper­ ties into others. When trying to handle felicity conditions similarly to presuppositions the first problem we are faced with is this: the fulfilment of presuppositions is necessary for a state­ ment even to be false - are there (some) felicity conditions that are necessary for the speech act even to be infelicitous? 13 we find that Studying Searle's analysis of promising he makes no such a distinction. Nevertheless, although he merely qualifies preparatory conditions as sine quibus non for felicitous promising, this class of felicity conditions might perhaps be taken as necessary conditions for a promise to be infelicitous as well. Namely, the two preparatory conditions of promising in Searle's view are (roughly) that one may only promise something that is good for the addressee, and that one may only promise something that would not obvi­ ously happen anyway. Now we might say that these two condi­ 13 J.R. Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge, 1970. pp. 57-62.

MODEL THEORETIC SEMANTICS OF PERFORMATIVES

5 29

tions are also necessary for making an infelicitous (e.g. insincere) promise. In this case we should regard insincere promises as promises (although infelicitous ones) whereas "promises" concerning bad or obviously happening things will not be regarded as promises at all. If we subscribe to this view then in our framework, at the level of pure semantics we can proceed as follows. Possible preparatory conditions of the speech act will be represented by restrictions on the domain of the change function (indicating that the change in question is impossible to conceive of unless the initial 14 situation conforms to those requirements) . In case those requirements are satisfied, the change function corresponding to 'I promise that . .. ' will turn a into another b (indicating that, by uttering that sentence, the act of promising can be performed, whether happily or unhappily). What Searle calls sincerity and essential conditions, however, need not be treated in semantics since they are conditions only for felicitous speech acts and insofar as they are given in the very notion of 'promise'. Note however that only an independent analysis of speech acts may prove that preparatory conditions (or some other felicity conditions) are really necessary for infelicitous promising as well. Given the possibility that the results of such an analysis may be negative, we may have already taken the 'wrong path in trying to treat some of the felicity conditions, in analogy to presuppositions, as restrictions on a. The consideration of a further question may cast another kind of doubt on the whole procedure of imposing restrictions 14 These restrictions would seem possible to handle similarly to stage-descriptions in Hausser (1978). Note however that questions like what can be good for the addressee are very difficult to decide without reference to the actual speech situation, which may go beyond what those stage descriptions are supposed to take care of.

530

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

on a. Namely, several scholars have suggested that felicity conditions are already included in the lexical meaning of the performative verb 1 5. Since however those suggestions have been associated with assimilating performative sentences to propositions, it is not uninteresting perhaps to point out that their claim seems to hold even if explicit performatives are assigned a special semantic status. Interestingly enough, researchers who find the felicity conditions of 'I promise that...' or 'I congratulate you' so complex and necessary to study closer never devote much attention to the "special truth conditions" of 'Peter is congratulating Mary' or 'Yesterday Peter promised that...', although it is inevitable that in deciding whether Peter is in the set of those who are congratulating Mary etc. one should consider the very same questions. That is, the problem of felicity conditions is not specific for performative sentences but arises in connection with all occurrences of the verb. Which suggests that felicity conditions are indeed included in the lexical meanings of performative verbs, and therefore it is only necessary to make them explicit in word-semantics and (possibly) in pragmatics, whereas sentence semantics (which is the very object of model theory) only has to take an implicit recognition of them. 2.3. A grammar of performative sentences One of the crucial arguments for treating performatives on a par with statements has been that they belong to the same syntactic paradigm. In the light of this claim any attempt to assign some special semantic status to performatives seems to be doomed to failure as soon as one wishes to incorporate it into a grammar. That is, such an attempt is liable to at 15

E.g., Hausser (1978) and J. Allwood, A Critical Look at

Speech Act Theory, in Ö. Dahl (ed.) Logic, Pragmatics and Grammar, Dept. of Linguistics, University of Göteborg, 1977.

MODEL THEORETIC SEMANTICS OF PERFORMATIVES

531

least one of the following grave errors: (i) the violation of a significant syntactic generalization, by deriving per­ formative sentences completely differently from statements, and (ii) the violation of the compositionality principle, by assigning interpretations to performative sentences in an arbitrary fashion, i.e., independently of their derivations. It seems to me, however, that if there is an independent mo­ tivation for distinguishing between statements and perform­ atives in semantics then these flaws must be possible to be avoided somehow. Therefore I present a tentative (and sketchy) extension of PTQ, enriched with change denoting performative sentences. It needs to be emphasized that I do not regard this solution as the solution to the problem; its presentation rather serves to indicate along which lines I imagine the task to be possibly solved. Having surface structures in mind we may say that per­ formative sentences constitute a subset of declarative sen­ tences. In other words, there are sentence structures that can be structures of both statements and performatives (e.g. the ones whose main verb is in the simple present etc.) whereas other structures can by no means be structures of perform­ atives (e.g., the ones whose main verb is in the present pro­ gressive etc.). I take these facts to be the ones that a pos­ sible grammatical framework has to account for. This suggests that we must distinguish between syntactic rules (or opera­ tions) that allow for the resulting sentence to be perform­ ative and those that do not. Naturally, this could only be done if we had both a complete English syntax and an exhaus­ tive taxonomy of performative sentences at hand; nevertheless, even now we may point out that the operations in Montague's S17 (rules of tense and sign) are, for instance, reasonable candidates for being elements of the set of those operations that are responsible for the fact that the resulting sentence cannot be performative (regardless of whether it has a so-

532

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

called performative verb in the appropriate position). All this also suggests that some derivations can, up to a certain stage, be derivations of either performative sentences or statements and it is the application of an nth syntactic rule that cancels the possibility that the result be performative. Let us now consider the following extension of English syntax. Cat, or the set of syntactic categories, is to be the smallest set such that (1)

e, t, s

Є

Cat

(2)

If Α, Β

Є

Cat, then Α / Β , Α//Β

Є

(3)

Є

Cat

Cat

The introduction of s among the elements of Cat is already necessitated by the claim that performative sentences denote functions of type

< s , s > . The new category

(which I will

abbreviate as t) behaves exactly like simple t and certain syntactic rules in fact reduce it to t. Traditional

categories

like intransitive verb phrases and term phrases are now all redefined in terms of e's and t's

( t/e and t/(t/e) , respec­

t i v e l y ) , t-reducing rules will be of the form as S 1 7 ' : S17'. If oc Є Ρ· ,/ ./e) and

δ Є Ρ ,/e then F14(oc,δ)

Є

p

t

where F14, (α, δ) = α δ ' , and δ' is the result of re­ placing the first verb in

δ by its

present perfect form, and all

(appropriate)

's in the preceding

derivation are replaced by t's. As opposed to S 1 7 ' , S4' will retain "t's in the categories since this rule may participate in the formation of perform­ ative sentences

(provided that the arguments of F4. are appro­

priately marked expressions, e.g. the IV-phrase contains a performative verb, and also provided that the value of F. will not get embedded by the subsequent application of S 7 ' , for instance). This kind of proposal seems to give an adequate

account

MODEL THEORETIC SEMANTICS OF PERFORMATIVES

533

for the fact that (i) no special syntactic rule is needed for performative sentences - it is in fact in this sense that they belong to the normal paradigm, but (ii) not all syntactic rules may participate in the formation of perform­ ative sentences. The retrospective t-reduction does not seem to cause troubles sinces it actually does not change the deri­ vation, only indicates that a possibility that has previously been present is cancelled. Note also that this proposal relies on a principle similar to the one Montague used in PTQ, name­ ly, that in case a certain phenomenon has both "simple" and "complicated" variants (as is the case with extensional and intensional readings, or with proper nouns and quantifiers as term phrases) then the simpler one should be treated as a special case of the more complicated one. In the above anal­ ysis statement structures are treated as special cases of per­ formative structures. In sum, we have so far concluded that 'I congratulate you' is in category _, whereas 'I have congratulated you' is in category t, everything else (save for tense) being the same in their derivation. Let us now turn to the semantic aspects of this propos­ al. The necessary extensions of intensional logic are as fol­ lows : Type, or the set of types, is the smallest set such that (1)

e, t, s

Є

Type

(2) lf .α, ß Є T y p e , t h e n < α , ß > Є Type (3) < s , s > \ < s , t > 6 Type Here <s,s> is the type of functions from indices to indices (as in Gallin (1975)), and <s,s>|<s,t> is but a subtype of those functions, as to be defined below. Let w be a variable of type s. To the definition of meaningful expressions of IL we add the clause If α Є

ME <s,t>

then λw. w [ α] Є

ME

<s,s>\<s,t>·

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

534

and for the extension of such an expression with respect to ,i/j/g: If α Є M E / then <s,t>

λw.

tion h that assigns to < i , j > j'> j and

w[α]

,i,J,g

another



is identical to < i , j > V

ble) difference that [ α ]

­­­­­

is

that funcsuch that

with the (possi­

= l.

That is, the expression λw. w [ α ] denotes a change func­ tion whose argument and value are identical except that a 16 certain statement is true at its value. For translating English categories into types of IL we extend f so that (1) (2) (3) (4)

f (e) = f (t) = f(s) = f (/)

e t s = f(A//B) = « s , f (B)> , f (A)> whenever A,B Є Cat

(5) f = <s,s> \ <s,t> (Clause (5) is rather awkward as it translates both s/s and t to the opposite of what could be expected on the basis of (1)(4); nevertheless, at present I see no better way to ensure both that performatives themselves get extensional readings and that the statements specifying the nature of the change may not be interchanged on the basis of identical truth val­ ues . ) Finally, let us exemplify the translation rules corre­ sponding to syntactic rules producing performative sentences with T4': T4' : If α Є. Ρ , ,■ , and δЄ Ρ and α,δ translate /e /( /e) into α',δ' respectively, then F4.F4(α,δ)translates as λw. w [ A q ] , where q is the translation of F 1 4 ( α, δ ) . In other words, a sentence like 'I congratulate you' is trans1 fi

I avoided the explicit treatment of indexical expressions like 'I' and 'you', since it is not specific for performatives.

MODEL THEORETIC SEMANTICS OF PERFORMATIVES

5 35

lated into an IL-expression denoting a change function such that its argument and value are identical indices, with the possible difference that at its value it is true that 'I have congratulated you'. This will indeed obtain in case the sen­ tence 'I congratulate you' has been (happily) uttered at a previous moment j.

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE* Zsigmond Telegdi (I) (1) A ¡perception turns into a sign for us as soon as we gather something from it that is different from what it is as such, some content that is different from that which it has in itself. This means that the quality of being a sign is never attributable to a perception as such: the latter is a sign only to the extent that it actually produces some certain effect : that it functions as a sign. The smoke that a hiker may see rising behind the trees of some forest is, strictly speaking, no more than just smoke, "air containing gaseous agents, carrying finely di­ vided solid and liquid particles stemming from combustion processes"; but if it indicates to him a fire that he cannot see it turns into a sign for him, a sign of a special kind: an indication. So a person's peculiarly staggering walk is a sign of his drunkenness, a certain group of symptoms is a sign of a certain disease, a scar is a sign of an earlier wound, the fresh trail of an animal is a sign of the animal

This is an abbreviated and reworked version of an earlier paper which appeared in Acta Linguistica 26, 267-305 (1976).

538

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

not being very far away, a rapidly falling barometer is a sign of a storm approaching, etc.; in all these cases we face indications. Indications include the paralinguistic particulari­ ties of a discourse which, in the mind of the hearer, com­ plements the sense of that discourse - a sense that lies in its strictly linguistic aspects, i.e., in the complexes of abstract linguistic signs produced - by adding a great deal of varied information on the speaker's emotions, on the attitude he has adopted to what he says and on his personality in general. (2) As the above-mentioned examples show, an in­ dication is a state-of-affairs pointing to another stateof-affairs. More precisely, it is a state-of-affairs that assures the person who perceives it (i.e. "who has actual knowledge of its existence") of the existence of some other state-of-affairs ; in Husserl's words: a person interpreting a state-of-affairs as an indication experiences the con­ viction of the presence of this state-of-affairs as a motive convincing him of, or making him surmise, the pre­ sence of another state-of-affairs. We have defined 'indication' as a state-of-affairs. This definition might seem rather narrow: smoke, which is air saturated with particles stemming from combustion pro­ cesses, is a substance; but we also described as indications the scar on a living body and the trail of an animal, which could be much more aptly described as objects. The way in which we expressed ourselves in line with common linguistic

Husserl, 1928, 25. Lalande defines 'indication' as a "perception actuelle, justifiant, d'une manière plus ou moins sûre, une assertion relative à quelque autre chose." (Lalande, 1960, 991).

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND

5 39

ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE usage is, after all, inaccurate. What serve as indications for us in our particular cases are the states-of-affairs that some certain man, some individual, has a scar on his body or that the trail left by some animal is visible at a certain place in a forest, etc. It is indeed always possible to give the interpreta­ tion of an indication the form of an inference in which the indication, exactly like the states-of-affairs indicated, is represented by a sentence; e.g., "If there is smoke rising behind the trees, there must be a fire there." The Stoics did in fact go so far as to define 'indication' as the truthful antecedent of some hypothetical complex sentence 2 whose consequent is truthful as well. It would, however, be inappropriate to equate indication with a logical category. Husserl reminds us that wherever we "einsichtig" ('insightfully') deduce the existence of one state-of-affairs from another, we do not call the latter an indication of the former; he demands - and I think rightly so - that we should distinguish between hint and proof, between the empirical interpretation of the indication, on the one hand, and proof, which uncovers an objectively necessary connection between states-of-affairs, on the other; that is why he says that the indication is experienced as a "nienteinsichtig" ('non-evident') motive giving rise to the conviction or surmise of the existence 3 of some other state-of-affairs. (3) In all the cases we have hitherto been considering there was an inherent causative relationship between the 2 See further below. Husserl, loc. cit., 25-28.

540

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

indication and the state-of-affairs indicated by it. Smoke is a product of combustion processes; the characteristic staggering walk of a drunken person results from the state he is in; a scar stems from a wound sustained earlier on and healed by now; etc. In cases of this kind, man comes across a state-ofaffairs which is what it is; and it is interpreting man who, since this state-of-affairs is linked with another in a causative relationship, ascribes to it the nature of an indication. There is, however, also another very different kind of indication: things and processes, or qualities of them, created for the purpose of making them function as indications. A custom is observed in many parts of the world that is very ancient indeed: the custom of putting brands on cattle to mark the animals as the property of a community or some individual; but monograms put on laundry are own­ ership marks, too. Pottery made in Mesopotamia in the fourth 4 millenium B.C. was found to bear workshop or foreman marks, which, very much like the trademarks of today, had been meant to make the products of a certain factory distinguish­ able from similar ones made by other factories.; But man-made indications are not only used as dis­ tinctive marks. A postage stamp on an envelope indicates that a fee has been paid for the delivery of the particular letter; the imprint of a seal on a document indicates the latter's authenticity; a death's-head on a box or bottle indicates that its contents are dangerous; and road signs are also indications, provided they give information rather than signalize instructions or prohibitions. Even linguistic signs can occasionally function as indications. E.g., a password serves as an indication that a person who proves to know it is entitled to enter a prohibited area.

Deshayes, 1969, 389f.

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND 541 ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

There are scholars who seek to draw a strict line between signs of this kind - man-made indications - and natural signs and wish to classify the former and linguistic signs together. Charles Bally, e.g., distinguishes between "indices", by which he exclusively means the natural indications, and "signes", which for all their differences have one thing in common: they are human creations. He refers in particular to the fact that man's relationship to a natural indication is receptive: it is given to him, and he limits himself to interpreting the natural indication on the basis of a causative relationship linking one state-of-affairs with another; and he also refers to the fact that, on the con­ trary, the act of using a conventional sign - perhaps a 5 linguistic indication - is under man's control. Now there is certainly a difference between man in­ terpreting states-of-affairs he may have come upon as indications, on the one hand, and himself arbitrarily

Bally (1969). The subdivision of signs into natural and man-made ones appears to go back to Augustine ("signa natu­ ralia", contrasted with "signa data", see: De doctr. christ. II 2 ) . He is likely to have been the - direct or indirect source of the Logique de Port-Royal with regard to the subdivision of signs into "signes naturels" and "signes d'institution et d'établissement". La Logique ou 1'art de penser (1re Partie Chap. IV.). - The essential relationship between natural and man-made indications has been illus­ trated by Husserl in particular (Husserl, 1928, 24f.). Benveniste also gives a definition of "signal" comprising both natural and man-made indications: "Un signal est un fait physique relié à un autre fait physique par un rapport naturel ou conventionnel ..." (Benveniste, 1966, 27).

542

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

creating indications for using them as means of communica­ tion, on the other. But this difference, however important it may otherwise be, does not alter the fact that a manmade indication functions as a sign in exactly the same way as a natural indication does, and is therefore no less an indication than the latter. The essence of indicating lies in so presenting a connection between two states-of affairs that the perception of the one bears witness to the existence of the other and justifies the assumption that the latter exists as well. The fact that this connec­ tion is conventional in the case of the man-made indica­ tion does not remove the essential difference between the indicating sign and the representing, linguistic, sign. (4) In linguistic science - and also far beyond its boundaries - speech is regarded as communication by signs. This view is well-founded indeed. Let us consider the utterance realizing the sentence There is a fire burning behind the trees. This utterance acts (functions) as a sign so far as it conveys to the hearer some contents that are thoroughly divergent and utterly distinct from its own contents, from what it ac­ tually is: an acoustic event. But the capacity of a lin­ guistic sign is radically different from that of an indica­ tion. As we have seen, the interpretation of an indication is representable in the form of an inference linking two statements; it, is, in other words, the formation of a hypothesis. Interpreting a sentence - like the one cited above -, however, means apprehending a type of state of affairs without inferring the existence of a corresponding actual state of affairs from the fact of the verbal rep­ resentation. A further difference is the following. An indication is a perceived state-of-affairs, one of whose existence the observer has actual knowledge; this implies

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND 543 ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

that it is a singular state-of-affairs, as is the state-ofaffairs whose existence it indicates. One can say in gen­ eral that a seal indicates the authenticity of documents. But a seal functions in this way and becomes an actual sign only if put on a particular document, and then indicates the authenticity of that document. Language, however, not only provides us with means to represent generalized states of affairs, rules, or scientific laws; it can express - to use Hegel's words - basically nothing else but the general. Against this statement that "the individual resists language" we are frequently referred to proper names. But a proper name, provided it says anything about its bearer, certainly says nothing individual. If I know that someone is called John, all I can infer from this is that he is of the male sex and perhaps a few other such generalities. The representation capacity of the sentence is based on the fact that the sentence is formed according to socially fixed rules from components (chains of phonemes) to which meanings are attributed, so that the sentence as a whole expresses a coherent combination of meanings: a meaning complex. Meaning is a linguistic concept. Speaking of the meaning of an indication (e.g., The smoke we see rising means that there is a fire burning over there), we in fact mean the state-of-affairs indicated. (5) The opinion is wide-spread that in speech the very sounds rendering a sentence or its significant components act in themselves as signs; hearing of linguistic signs, one thinks of them in the first place. But, on closer in­ spection, this opinion proves inadequate. An utterance acts as a sign - and a sound sequence refers to some object - only to the extent that they are linked with a meaning; only this combination forms a linguistic sign. This is nothing new. Even Dante, in his unfinished treatise De vulgari eloquentia, seeks to show that the lin-

544

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

guistic sign is necessarily of a double nature: that man, because of his very nature, needs a sign for communication that is perceptible and rational at the same time: per­ ceptible to the extent that it is sound, and rational to the extent that it has by agreement been assigned a mean6 mg. Saussure follows up this tradition by emphatically defining the linguistic sign as a combination ("un être double") . But since he draws a strict line between lan­ guage ("la langue") and the use made of it in speech, he excludes the perceptible from the concept of linguistic sign and says that the two components combined in the con­ cept are psychical; he describes the linguistic sign as an 8

"entité psychique à deux faces".

In order to arrive at

a terminological differentiation between the whole of the sign and the components that it combines, he made several attempts 9 , introducing in the third cours the expressions signifiant and signifié; these expressions, he says, offer the additional advantage of marking the opposition not only between the components themselves, but also between them 10 together and the whole whose parts they are. "Oportuit ergo genus humanum ad comunicandas inter se conceptiones suas aliquod rationale signum et sensuale habere;... Hoc equidem signum est ipsum subiectum nobile de quo loquimur: nam sensuale quid est in quantum sonus est; rationale vero, in quantum aliquid significare videtur ad placitum" (Dante, 1968, 6 ) . 7

Godel, 1957, 190.

8

Saussure, 1972, 99. 9

Godel, 1957, 192f. 10 Saussure, 1972, 99.

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND 545 ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

(6) As is well-known, these expressions were not thought up by Saussure. The source from which he immediately took them may be uncertain; but it is pretty clear that they in the final analysis go back to antiquity and were first used in Stoic philosophy. In this connection we will have to take a closer look at the details of Stoic doctrine. Although they agreed that logic was one of the three constituents of philosophy, the Stoics were divided on the question of what its parts are. 1 1 Some said that it consisted of two parts, rhetoric and dialectics, the former being concerned with speaking well in continuous discourse and the latter dealing with speaking correctly in discussion based 12 on questions and answers. So logic was mainly seen as the 13 theory of logos as far as this word means "speech". But there was also another view: some assumed that, apart from rhetoric and dialectics, there were two further parts, in which epiatemology and the theory of definitions were given separate treatment. As to the subdivision of dialectics, we do not hear of any differences of opinion. Proceeding from their

11

Cf. Zeller, 1909, 65ff.; and Barwick, 1957, 13f. 12

DL VII 42; Seneca. Epist. 89.17. ("Superest ut rationalem partem philosophiae dividam. Omnis oratio aut continua est aut inter respondentem et interrogantem discissa; hane dialektiken, i 11am rhëtorikën placuit vocari."). Plato (Kratylos 39oc) says that a dialectician is a person who knows how to ask and how to answer. In the Stoic view, it is not possible without dialectics to ask and answer in a methodical manner. Cf. "Logic in Stoicism may perhaps best be described as the science of rational discourse" (Long, 1974, 122).

546

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

analysis of speech in general, the Stoics all regarded it as consisting of two main parts: one was to be concerned 14 with linguistic expression, the other with meaning. The terms that they used in this connection - sēmainon, "the thing that signifies", and sēmainomenon, "the thing that is signified" - denote expression and meaning as the two poles - the active pole and the passive pole - of the semantic relationship. They are exactly in line with the two expressions signifiant and signifié, which Saussure in­ troduced into modern linguistics, expressions that are in­ deed translations of those two Greek words. T. De Mauro writes that the Stoics, using the verbal pair of semainon and sēmainomenon, had accepted a "conceptual­ ly and terminologically" Aristotelian differentiation (1968, 347f.)· To prove his point, he cites two passages from Aristotle's writings, one from the third book of Rhetoric (1405b), the other from Poetics (1457a). In the first passage the philosopher says that the beauty of a noun, "as Likymnius says", lies either in its sounds (psophoi) or in its meaning (semainomenon) and that ugliness is to be found there, too; and in the second he says that a compound is made up of either a meaningful and a meaningless part (sēmainon:asēmon) or of two meaningful parts. So the expressions semainon and semainomenon are in­ deed used in Aristotle's works; but in neither passage do they appear side by side, in antithetical combination: semainomenon is contrasted with psophoi, and sēmainon with asemon. Apparently, a terminologically stable combination of the verbal pair, which is formed from the same stem,

14

DL VII 43, 62; SE. P. h. II 214; Seneca. Epist. 89. 17. ("Dialektike in duas partes dividitur, in verba et significationes, id est, in res quae dicuntur et vocabula quibus dicuntur"). 15 It is a queer reversal of the position for R.H. Robins to say that he finds the Stoic terms (footnote 15 continued)

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

547

cannot be found before the Stoics; and whoever has used it after them goes directly or indirectly back to them. And there can be no question that the Stoics were wholly in­ dependent in the view they took of the semainomena. (7) Saussure was in a position to adopt the Stoic terms since they admit of, and seem to embody, an inter­ pretation that is in line with his view of the linguistic sign. Language, he teaches, is a form rather than a sub­ stance. Sound and thought as such are outside language; only their combination - the way in which a language re­ lates them to each other - is linguistic: the linguistic sign is a relation, rather than a sequence of syllables; it is a sequence of syllables so far as some certain meaning 17 is attributed to it. Saussure accordingly detaches "phona­ tion" from language: the materialization of an ideal complex 1 of signs is in his view extrinsic to language. If we now consider the Stoic terms - the names sēmainonta and sēma­ inomena for the two components of an utterance -, we are struck by the fact that these names are relative : that they are confined to denoting the elements of a relation on the basis of their relation to each other, whatever the qualities that these elements as such may have. Yet in the minds of the Stoics, semainonta and sema­ inomena are not confined to the relation after which they have been named. It is significant that the additional term phone (footnote 15 continued) "strictly reminiscent of Saussure's signifiant and signifié." (1967, 16). 16

Saussure, 1972, 155ff. (2ème partie, ch. IV). 17 Godei, 1957, 190 (from the second cours). 18 Saussure, 1972, 36; Godei, 1957, 30.

548

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

('voice') is used as a name for the "things that signify"; "dialectics," we read, "falls into a section on sēmainomena 19 The book in which Diogenes of and another on phōnē." Babylonia, one of the most important pupils of Chrysippus, head of the school after Zeno of Tarsus, discussed the theory of semainonta, is cited as Peri phones (techne). The word phone originally denotes the voice, the voice of both man and animal. But man, the Peripatus says, does not express himself through his voice as such, but through 21 its modifications (pathē). This refers to the articulation of the voice, its division into linguistic sounds. The name "voice" is therefore also used to denote a sound sequence as such; used like this, phone is a class that does not only include individual linguistic sounds and syllables (the "combination" of such sounds), but also words and sentences - but noun, verb and logos have the distinctive feature of being phōnai sēmantikai, i.e. meaningful sounds, sounds that convey meanings. The Stoics accepted the idea that the human voice is differentiated from that of animals by articulation (i.e. that the human voice is, in essence, linguistic expression); and they also adopted the application of the word phone to a sound sequence in general considered as a separate entity, in abstraction of the meaning that may be ascribed to it. So it is easy to see why the Stoics were in a position to give phone the same meaning as they gave semainonta; for it 22 is, (although not every 19 after all, the phōnai that mean DL VII 43. 20 Ibid. 55, 57. Problemata Χ 39. 895a ("esti de ho logos ou to tẽ phōnẽ. semainein, alla toĩ's pathesin autẽs ... ta de grammata pathe esti tẽs phōnẽs" ) . 22 Cf. "ha men sēmainei, ha de sēmainetai; sēmainousi men hai phōnai, sēmainetai de ta lekta..." (footnote 22 continued)

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND 549 ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

phōnē is a sēmamon) . (8) Saussure introduced the Stoic expressions into modern linguistic science so as to provide a terminological differentiation between the components of the linguistic sign and the linguistic sign itself. He thus removed an irritating imperfection: he did away with the ambiguity of the term sign, which had been seen as referring to the com­ bination of expression and meaning on some occasions and as referring only to expression - the sound sequence - on others. But historical study cannot help asking whether Saussure's use of the verbal pair corresponds to the original one, i.e., whether the Stoics also regarded the sēmainon and the sēmainomenon as components of some higher entity which they defined as a kind of sign. One might at first be inclined to answer in the af­ firmative: the idea is, after all, inherent in the Greek names that the objects denoted by them are linked in a (footnote 22 continued) (SE A. m. VIII 264), 'there are things that signify and things that are signified; those which signify are phōnai and those which are signified are lekta 23 The grammarians, too, are familiar with the terms sēmainomena and phōnai when it comes to contrasting meaning with expression. E.g., ou gar phōnaĩs memeristai ta toữ logou mere, sēmainomenois de, 'the classification of the parts of speech is not based on sound, but on meaning' (Apollonius in: Grammatici Graeci II/I fase. 1.67); ou gar mallon hai phonai epikratousi kata tous merismous hos ta ex auton semainomena (ibid. II/II. 150; the editor quotes the corresponding passage from Priscianus's writings: "igitur non voces magis valent in partitione dictionum quam earum significationes"). But while sēmainomenon, 'meaning', (footnote 23 continued)

550

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

special way: that they refer to each other and presuppose each other, thus forming a unity; and what unity should that be, if not the linguistic sign? This consideration may have led R. Jakobson to believe that Saussure adopted the Stoic concept of the linguistic sign by defining it as a combination of the two components signifiant and signifié. We read in a paper by Jakobson that "at the very end of his academic activities Saussure adopted the Stoic conception of the twofold verbal sign composed of the perceptible signans and the intelligible signatum." 24 But investigating the source material that we gain our knowledge of ancient Stoic doctrine from, we do not find any confirmation of this assumption. The sources do not pro­ vide the least bit of evidence to show that the Stoics re­ garded the sēmainon and the sēmainomenon as two aspects of the linguistic sign. (9) Admittedly, the writings by Stoic authors that have been preserved were all written as late as the period of the Roman emperors (like Seneca's writings; Epictetus' Discourses and Handbook by Arrian, and Mark Aurelius' Soliloquies). As regards the earlier, truly creative centuries of the Stoic school, we are compelled to rely on fragments and on accounts of the school's general doctrine or of individual doctrines of its exponents. Some of the accounts are not immediately based on writings by Stoic philosophers, but on summaries of Stoic philosophy or one or other of its parts. Diogenes Laertius, whose writings date back to the beginning of the third century, produced a survey of Stoic logic (VII 48-82), that he said he had taken word by word from a paper written (footnote 2 3 continued) is often found in Apollonius's writings, sēmainon, 'expression', is not, according to Schneider's index, part of his vocabulary. 24

Jakobson, 1970, 457.

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND 551 ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

by Diocles of Magnesia, one of his predecessors, around the middle of the first century B.C. J. Mau conjectures 25 that Sextus Empiricus, the Sceptical doctor, to whom we are in­ debted for a great wealth of valuable information on Stoic 26 logic, drew from the same or a very similar textbook. This state of affairs often places hardly surmountable obstacles in the way of a more profound research into Stoi­ cism; it makes it very difficult, in particular, to follow the historical development of that doctrine. But the source material that we do have is on the whole rich and authentic enough to justify our saying that it can hardly be accidental that all this material does not seem to contain any evidence to say.that the Stoics believed the sēmainon and the sēmainomenon to have entered into a unity to form the linguistic sign. (10) If we in this way take guidance from our sources, we are bound to realize that the distinction between semainon and sēmainomenon in ancient Stoic doctrine was not linked with the sign theory of language; there is nothing that might point to speech being considered in it as communication by signs. 25 Mau, 19 57, 149. - A survey of what has come down to us is t o b e found in: Pohlenz, 1949, 9-11; Long, 1974, 115-18. The sources telling us about Stoic logic were given detailed treatment by Mette, 1951, 31-36. The fragments left of the writings by the older Stoics (from Zeno to Antipatrus) were compiled by Hans von Arnim in the three volumes of Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (Leipzig 1903, 1905); work on this collec­ tion was finished only in 1924, when the fourth volume ap­ peared, containing indices arranged by M. Adler. A new impression came out in Stuttgart in 1964. "Sextus is our best single authority for Stoic logic" (Kneale and Kneale, 1962, 141.

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HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

We must, however, take a further step. When Stoic philosophy emerged - Zeno, its founder, probably began giving lectures of his own before the end of the fourth century B.C. and died in 26 2 B.C. - the view had already appeared that we communicate in speech by means of signs. The "stranger from Elea", who in Plato's Sophistes runs the conversation in Socrates's place, refers to noun and verb - the words that need to be linked if a sentence is to be framed - as sound signs (sēmeĩa tẽs phōnes or ta tẽs phones sēmeĩa); in doing so, he appears to presuppose that this view of the word is well-known to his partner in the conversation (Theaetetus who, only a boy at the time of the dialogue, became one of the most brilliant mathema­ ticians of his generation) and does not require explanation. Aristotle begins his treatise De interpretatione by saying that the utterances in sound language (ta en tẽ phōnẽ) are signs (symbola) for the states of the soul (ta en tẽ. psychẽ pathēmata) , and that what is written, in turn, con27 stitutes signs for the former.

He says that not only ut­

terances but also the words that they consist of are signs, signs that owe this value to a convention; he underlines that no sound is a word by nature and that, to become a word, a sound must turn into a symbolon, a conventional 28

sign. Accordingly, there is an essential difference between sounds (i.e. the sound sequences that our speech is made up of) and the states of the soul, for which the former are signs (semeia) in the first place: the sounds are not the same for everybody, just as much as the written characters are not: the states of the soul, however, are the same for Soph. 262a, d. - Cf. "Ecce sic peragitur sermo noster per signa sonantia" (Aug. Conf. IV 10.15). 27 De interpr. 1.16a 3-4. 28 Ibid., 2.16a 26-28; cf. also 4.17a 1-2.

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

55 3

everybody, just as much as the things are that they represent. Zeno of Citium on Cyprus and Chrysippus, the second founder of Stoicism, who came from Soloi in Cilicia, turned philosophers in Athens and worked there. One of Zeno's teachers was the Academist Polemon; Chrysippus is said to have first heard lectures by Arcesilaus and Lacydes, philo­ sophers of the Middle Academy. Their independence as thinkers is unquestionable. But the assumption cannot be rejected that they were familiar with Aristotle's major teachings 29 De interpr. 1.16a 5-8. - Aristotle alternatingly calls linguistic signs (utterances and words) symbola and semeia (cf. also De interpr. 3.16b 8.10.22; 13.24b 2; De soph, el. 16 5a 8; De audibilibus 4 37a 15; Metaph. Gamma 7.1012a 24). In this connection it has been repeatedly claimed that semeTon, unlike symbolon, actually means the natural indica­ tion (cf. Waitz, 1844, 324f.; Aubenque, 1962, 109; Kretzmann, 1974); the conclusion then is that Aristotle expresses himself imprecisely, referring to signs that he considers conventional as semeia, or that he (according to Kretzmann) using different expressions, means different things. - The claim that semeion can refer to a conventional sign only if it is used in its non-strict sense was already rightly rejected by Steinthal (countering Waitz): Steinthal pointed out that even flags and seals are called semema (Steinthal, 1863, 182 Α. 1.). The reason for that mistake is that ever since Aristotle (ef. Anal, pr. c 27; Rhet. I. c. 2; II. . 22-24) it had been the custom in logic and rhetoric to deal with the natural indication under the general name of semeion. 30 Cf. Long, 1974f 9f

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HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

and received a good deal of varied stimulation from the Academy and the Peripatus generally; the view has even been expressed that "there [is] hardl a concept, hardly a theorem of Stoic logic that was not stimulated by Aristotle's Organon or did not originate from early 31 Academic, early Peripatetic discussion." In these -circumstances we can hardly assume that they had no knowledge of the sign theory of language. The fact that this theory did not become part and parcel of their doctrine can only mean that they rejected it deliberately. So the question arises of what the reasons might have been for that rejection. To find an answer, we have to return to the view that the Stoics took of the sign (sēmeĩon). But this first of all requires taking a look at their theory of meaning (sēmainomenon). (II) (1) The accounts of Stoic language doctrine handed down to us from antiquity define neither the semainomenon nor its correlate, the sēmaĩnon. The word generally denotes the "contents" that linguistic expression - provided we understand it - conveys to us, i.e. the "contents" contained in it in this respect; and we are left to gather from our source material what particular view the Stoics took of these contents. For this purpose we will be well-advised to start from a passage in Sextus Empiricus's writings. "The Stoics," it says, "say that three things combine [in speech] : meaning (semainomenon), expression (sēmaĩnon) and object /of reference./ ( tynchanon ). Of these, expression refers to sound ( phōnē ), like Dion;'meaning' is the thing itself 31 Mette, 1951, 36 - Pohlenz (1939) points out connections between Aristotelian and Stoic language doctrine.

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

555

(pragma) as revealed by the former and which we apprehend as subsisting with our thought, but the barbarians don't understand, even though they hear the sound; and, finally, the 'object' is that what exists outside, like Dion himself." 32 In this passage the first thing to note is that the Stoics differentiated radically between the contents of an expression and the object to which it relates: its reference. This differentiation is the result of scientific reflection; but put in these general terms, it is not typically Stoic yet. Aristotle taught already (as we have seen) that utterances in sound language are signs of the states of the soul and that these provide a link between the things they represent and the conventional signs of language. We receive further clues from the context in which the passage finds itself. Sextus reports there on an argument revolving around the basic philosophical question of logic, the question of what is actually called true or false: what kind of things really deserve the label of "true" or "false". This question, he says, has been answered in different ways by different philosophical trends. The followers of Epicurus and Straton (a Peripatetic) ascribe truth to the sound, i.e. to linguistic expression; others ascribe it to the "movement 32 The term tynehanon to denote what exists outside and can become the object of our speech - i.e., the reference - is peculiar to the Stoics; otherwise pragma is used in this sense (this Stoic deviation from what is customary is expressly referred to by commentators on Aristotle, cf. SVF II 236, and Mighnucci, 1965, 89 n. 58). The introduction of a new term to denote things concrete is explained by the fact that pragma was given a different meaning by the Stoics, who use it to refer to the thing as it is contained in the sentence, as it is expressed, "meant", by the sentence, i.e., the semainomenon.

556

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

of thinking", i.e. to the psychical act of judgement; but the Stoics ascribe it to the sēmainomenon. 33 This reveals that according to Stoic doctrine the sēmainomenon, which constitutes the specific contents of linguistic expression, is not to be sought in the activity Of thinking, in "states of the soul": that it is of a nonpsychical nature 34 . This view is also manifest in the fact that the sēmainomena are declared to be incorporeal: the activity of thinking, the Stoics maintain, consists in a 35 material change of the soul as a body. (2) The Stoic view is not self-explanatory. Speech is utterance;i.e. exteriorization. To put it more scrupulously: it is our immediate, endlessly repeating experience that we exteriorize something in speech that goes on in our minds and is not accessible to others: something to which we lend existence outside ourselves. It seems to follow from this that the contents of our speech must just be what is inside us: the psychical. Yet it was realized very early indeed that an assump­ tion of this kind - however natural it may appear to be - is inadequate and that it would in particular be impossible to say true or false things with an objective claim to validity, if speech were the immediate expression of psychical proces­ ses. One need only read on in Sextus's text to find out that he, too, realized that. In the course of his discussion, whose opening remarks we have quoted, he seeks to refute a view he himself mentioned earlier on: the view that the 33

SE. A. m. VIII 13. 34 Cf. "The fundamental point is their recognition ('their'

refers to the Stoics, the author) that the meaning of a sen­ tence ... cannot be reduced to any physical or psychological state of affairs though it depends on both of these" (Long, 1971, 137). SVF II 801.

35

558

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

But if meanings are essentially different from lin­ guistic expression (the semainonta), on the one hand, and from psychical processes (the "movements of thinking"), on the other, then it is only natural for them to become the subject of a discipline of their own: the theory of sēmainomena. (3) Having explained the three factors of speech in accordance with the Stoic view, Sextus continues his account, saying: "Two of these [factors] are bodies - the sound and the object -; one, however, is incorporeal: the thing signified (to sēmainomenon prãgma); and this is a lekton: what is true or false." (A. m. VIII 12). The term lekton ('what is said'), which is used here, takes the place of sēmainomenon in two passages, which are parallel to those cited; the first passage (P. h. II 84) is about the three views concerning the nature of that which is true or false; and the second (A. m. VIII 75) is about the three factors of speech. We have to take a closer look at the concept denoted by this expression; it is one of the most important in Stoic language doctrine, even in Stoic dialectics in general. The word lekton was a technical expression; and it was therefore given a proper definition. This definition has come down to us in Sextus's and Diogenes Laertius's writings; 37 and it reads: a lekton is that which subsists hyphistatai in conformity with a rational presentation. This formula is an attempt at answering the question of how the incorporeal, objective lekton - lekta are sēmainomena, after all - is connected with the corporeal, subjective activity of thinking; the formula makes clear that the lekton does not enjoy an existence independent of the latter. But it 37

SE. A. m. VIII 70; DL VII 63.

558

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

But if meanings are essentially different from lin­ guistic expression (the semainonta), on the one hand, and from psychical processes (the "movements of thinking"), on the other, then it is only natural for them to become the subject of a discipline of their own: the theory of sēmainomena. (3) Having explained the three factors of speech in accordance with the Stoic view, Sextus continues his account, saying: "Two of these [factors] are bodies - the sound and the object -; one, however, is incorporeal: the thing signified (to sēmainomenon prãgma); and this is a lekton: what is true or false." (A. m. VIII 12). The term lekton ('what is said'), which is used here, takes the place of sēmainomenon in two passages, which are parallel to those cited; the first passage (P. h. II 84) is about the three views concerning the nature of that which is true or false; and the second (A. m. VIII 75) is about the three factors of speech. We have to take a closer look at the concept denoted by this expression; it is one of the most important in Stoic language doctrine, even in Stoic dialectics in general. The word lekton was a technical expression; and it was therefore given a proper definition. This definition has come down to us in Sextus's and Diogenes Laertius's writings; 37 and it reads: a lekton is that which subsists hyphistatai in conformity with a rational presentation. This formula is an attempt at answering the question of how the incorporeal, objective lekton - lekta are sēmainomena, after all - is connected with the corporeal, subjective activity of thinking; the formula makes clear that the lekton does not enjoy an existence independent of the latter. But it

37

SE. A. m. VIII 70; DL VII 63.

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND 559 ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

presupposes a practical knowledge of what the word

lekton

is t o m e a n . It w i l l t h e r e f o r e h a r d l y b e h e l p f u l to us at this p o i n t . The authors of our source m a t e r i a l , however, tell us m o r e a b o u t t h e d i f f e r e n t t y p e s of l e k t a . T h e y d i s t i n g u i s h f i r s t of a l l b e t w e e n i n c o m p l e t e and complete

lekta

(lekta e l l i p e a n d lekta a u t o t e l e ) . T h e

c o m p l e t e n e s s of a l e k t o n , t h e y s a y , c a n b e s e e n from t h e e x p r e s s i o n e m b o d y i n g i t : f r o m w h e t h e r this e x p r e s s i o n is s e l f - c o n t a i n e d o r n o t . T h e v e r b form g r a p h e i , 'is w r i t i n g ' , e . g . , e x p r e s s e s an i n c o m p l e t e l e k t o n , " b e c a u s e w e a r e b o u n d to w a n t t o k n o w : w h o i s ? U ;

a sentence

like g r a p h e i

Sōkratēs,

' S o c r a t e s is w r i t i n g ' , h o w e v e r , is t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f a c o m 38 plete lekton. C o m p l e t e l e k t a a r e , as t h e e x a m p l e s h o w s , s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g s ; t h e i r t y p e s - t h e r e a r e said t o b e t e n o f t h e m (among t h e m t w o t y p e s o f q u e s t i o n s , e r o t e m a , ' s e n t e n c e tion', and pysma,

'word q u e s t i o n ' )

ques­

- correspond to the types

of s e n t e n c e d e s c r i b e d in o u r g r a m m a r s . T h e y i n c l u d e t h e a x i o m a , w h i c h in S t o i c p a r l a n c e is w h a t is t r u e o r f a l s e : t h e p r o p o 39 sition. We know already that the Stoics ascribed truth or false­ h o o d as t h e c a s e m a y b e - t o m e a n i n g . A s w e n o w s e e , t h e i r d o c t r i n e says t h a t w h a t h a s a t r u t h v a l u e is m o r e 38

closely

DL VII 63.

39 In some other passage

(VII 63), Diogenes mentions four

types of complete lekta: propositions

(axiōmata), syllogisms

(which do not really belong here since they link propositions), sentence questions and word questions. G. Nuchelmans supposes that we here have the trace of an earlier stage of develop­ ment before us. He reminds us that the dialectical investiga­ tion of an issue moves between question and answer; he assumes that the starting point of the theory of complete lekta, which forms part of Stoic (footnote 39 continued)

560

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

defined as the meaning of a sentence of a certain type; as such, it belongs to the same class - and consists of the same "substance" - as linguistically expressed questions, invitations, etc. But if propositions are lekta, i.e. sēmainomena, they have to be dealt with by the theory of sēmainomena, just as much as both the combinations of proposi­ tions formed from them and the inferences consisting of propositions have to; so logic, as we see it, is considered by the Stoics as a part of the theory of meaning. (4) In the literature on Stoic linguistic doctrine we occasionally come across the view that the Stoics, when speaking of "incomplete lekta", meant word meanings in general (or, more precisely, the meanings of nouns and verbs). This view is held, e.g., by Rudolf Schmidt, the author of the first - and so far only - monograph on Stoic language doctrine. According to Zeiler, the Stoics divided the " incomplete lekta" into two classes, the class of names and adjectives and the class of verbs. Pohlenz, in his paper on the foundation of Western language theory by the Stoic school, says that lekta 40 are the "incorporeal contents of words". But when we examine our sources more closely, we find that this view is a misunderstanding. It has to be noted in the first place that our sources expressly ascribe the quality of being an incomplete lekton only to the predicate, to which, in terms of parts of speech, the verb corresponds. 41 (footnote 39 continued) dialectics, must have been the study of sentence questions and the answers given to them (Nuchelmans, 19 73, 62f.) 40

R. Schmidt, 1839, 57; Zeiler, 1909, 91; Pohlenz, 1939, 158. - Cf. also "Deficient lekta seem to have been divided into predicates (katēgorēmata) and subjects (ptoseis)." (Kneale and Kneale, 1962, 144; but this claim is virtually corrected on ρ. 14 9.)

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND

561

ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

After relating the subdivision of lekta into incomplete and complete ones and giving a verb form (graphei, 'is writ­ ing') to illustrate the former, Diogenes Laertius ends the particular paragraph by making this general point: "In­ complete lekta include the predicates (kategoremata); complete lekta include the propositions (axiōmata), the syllogisms, the sentence questions and the word questions." 42 In the following paragraph (VII 64) he gives three definitions of the predicate. The third reads: The predicate is an incomplete lekton linked with a nominative (not another lekton!) to make a proposition. It should be mentioned in this connection that in a list of objects discussed by the Stoics in the section on sēmainomena we find autotelẽ and kategoremata placed side 43 by side; they are clearly designed to denote the two types of lekta; so kategoremata is used with the same meaning as (lekta) ellipe is. The definition of the predicate, which we quoted just now, points to the reason why the Stoics considered the predicate as an incomplete lekton. The reason becomes even clearer when we look at the way the Stoics subdivided the predicates. 44 It is quite significant that the point of departure is the question: what additions are required for a predicate, an incomplete lekton, to turn into a complete one, i.e. into a proposition? The outcome is a subdivision based on two binary features. There are predicates that as such are (footnote 41 continued) 69 n. 2; Long, 1971, 104f.; NucheImans, 19 73, 57. 42

DL VII 63.

43

DL VII 43.

44

SVF II 184.

562

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

complete, i.e. predicates as they are linked with a complete ones, which turn when a noun in an oblique

that form a proposition as soon noun; and there are others, in­ into a complete predicate only 45 case is added. On the other hand,

predicates fall into two classes, depending on whether one of the nouns that they link up with to form a sentence is in the nominative case or not. These features - [+ complete ] and [+ linking up with a nominative noun] - provide the basis for distinguishing between four types of predicate, which are each given a special name. Every one of the types is illustrated by an example (with the name, the technical term, given in brackets): (1) Sokrates peripateĩ, 'Socrates is walking about' (katēgorēma or symbama); (2) Sōkratei metamelei, 'Socrates repents' 45 Diogenes of Babylon defined the verb as a part of speech meaning a simple (literally: non-compound) predicate (DL VII 58); Pohlenz concluded that the Stoics had distinguished be­ tween simple and compound predicates, and assumed that they con­ sidered those predicates as compound which are expressed by a combination of the copula and a noun (Pohlenz, 1948, 47). In SVF II 184 we do, however, find a Stoic subdivision of predicates. We are at once struck by the fact that the predicative expressions given there are only verbs. We also notice that a line is drawn there between one-word and multi­ word predicates, i.e. predicates expressed either by a mere verb or by a combination of a verb with a noun (like Piona phileĩ). I find it more natural to assume that the Stoics understood by "compound predicates" predicates of the latter kind. See next page fn.

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND

56 3

ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

(parasymbama); (3) Platōn Diōna phileĩ, 'Plato loves Dion' (elatton ē kategorema); (4) Sōkratei Alkibiadou melei, 'Socrates is attached to Alkibiades' (elatton e parasymbama). (In (1) and (3) the predicate is linked with a noun in the nominative case, in (2) and (4) it is linked with a noun in an oblique case.) This classification of the predicates implies a view of sentence structure that is utterly different from the conven­ tional one, i.e., the one that we were taught at school. Ac­ cording to the latter, a sentence is made by so linking two constituents (words or groups of words) that they become a subject and a predicate forming a unity. This view is, so to speak, given tangible expression in a theory that once commanded a good deal of influence: that every sentence con­ tains an expressed or virtual copula, a constituent whose functions include that of linking the constituents of a 46 sentence as if they would not stick together otherwise. In the Stoic view, however, - this is clear from what has gone before - one of the two constituents, the predicate, is not self-contained - it is "unsaturated" - to the extent

While the Greek original uses an oblique case, the English translation has to use what is tantamount to a nominative case (= subject case) instead. The translator. 46 Cf., e.g., "Vocula ista, quae nexum pradicati et subjecti significat, dicitur Copula ... Copula in propositione vel expresse ponitur, vel in termino, qui ad praedicatum pertinet, latet" (Chr. Wolff in: Delbrück, 1893, 25); "Toute proposi­ tion n'est autre chose que l'expression d'un jugement de notre esprit ... La proposition devant être le tableau de ce jugement de notre esprit, ..., elle doit nécessairement exprimer un sujet, un attribut, et l'existence de ce sujet avec sa relation à l'attribut" (Sacy, 1831, 119f.).

564

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

that it has the peculiar feature of determining how many nouns should be added, and what their cases (syntactic function) should be, to create a complete lekton; so, a sentence emerges (structurally) as a result of following the plan contained in, and thus predetermined by, the predicate. 47 The predicate - and the predicate alone - is therefore a lekton ellipes, i.e., an incomplete sentence (or, more precisely, an incomplete sentence meaning). Only modern logic permitted a correct assessment of this view of the Stoics : the Stoics realized in a way that a verb is not a mere word, but a propositional function, i.e., an expression containing one or more undetermined constituents such that, when values are assigned to these constituents, the expression becomes a proposition. So, incomplete lekta are not word meanings in general; the meaning of a word is covered by this concept only to the extent that a particular word is in reality a sentence, though admittedly an incomplete one, a sentence requiring addition. (5) The grammarians of antiquity, from Dionysius Thrax to Apollonius, said that the distinctive feature of the sen­ tence is that it expresses a complete thought (dianoian autotelẽ). 48 The idea of basing the definition of the sen47 Cf. "A kategorema was seen as a kind of schema for axiomata: by filling in the name positions around the given predicate one forms a full-blown assertion" (Nuchelmans, 1973, 57). 48 Dionysius gives the following definition of the sentence: Logos esti peze lexeon synthesis dianoian autotele delousa (Dionisio Trace. Techne grammatike. Testo critico e commento a cura di G.B. Pecorella. Bologna 1962). Wouters (1975) points out that the version peze lexeon synthesis - in contrast to pezes lexeos synthesis found in the older edition by Uhlig is confirmed by a papyrus fragment. (Wouters wishes to in­ terpret the phrase peze lexeon synthesis as meaning "the combining of words in general".) The (footnote 48 continued)

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND

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ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

tence on this feature clearly goes back to Stoic language doctrine, which defined the contents of a sentence as a lekton autoteles. 49 The grammarians, adopting the idea, also adopted the Stoic expression for completeness. True enough, this term is not a creation of the Stoics; it is already found in Aristotle's writings. But it is noteworthy, after all, that authors who, although not Stoics themselves, relate Stoic views or allude to them, repeatedly replace autoteles by synonyms such as teleios (SVF II 182. 184) or pleres (ibid. 99) . But the grammarians did not in this case simply adopt Stoic dogmas: they deviated from them to a considerable extent. The logos of the grammarians, unlike the Stoic lekton, denotes the expression (the phōnē), and what this expression reveals is not a sēmainomenon as the Stoics saw it; but it is a thought (dianoia), i.e. something psychical. It should furthermore be noted that the Stoics contrast the lekton autoteles with the lekton ellipes, which belongs to the same class and is also a lekton, though an incomplete one. The grammarians, who did not adopt the idea that the verb is a (footnote 48 continued) sentence definition given by Apollonius reads in Priscian's Latin version: Oratio est ordinatio dictionum congrua, sententiam perfectam demonstrans (Dionysii Thracis Ars Grammatica. Edidit G. Uhlig. Lipsiae 1883. 23. ) . 49

Cf. Pohlenz, 1939, 181; Kneale and Kneale, 1962, 143.

Apollonius even calls the intransitive verb autoteles so far as it, as a predicate, is complete, i.e. that it does not require the addition of a noun in an oblique case to function as a predicate (Apollonii Dyscoli. De constructione libri quattuor. Recensuit G. Uhlig, Lipsiae 1910, 161. 4-7; 402f.). As Ammonius's account of the Stoic subdivision of predicates shows, this is originally Stoic doctrine.

566

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

sentence function, give the completeness of the sentence a different meaning: the sentence is complete vis-à-vis the units, words and word groups in general that are in­ corporated in its structure, and all of these,the verb included,differ from it as to class. (6) Yet the close relationship between predicate (katēgorēma) and sentence meaning (lekton autoteles) - the fact that the two belong to the same class - rests not only on linguistic foundations, but also on ontological ones. To use Seneca's explanation of an important tenet of Stoicism: 5 1 when I see Cato walking about and proceed to make a corresponding statement, then the subject of my pro­ position is Cato, who is walking about, a body; but my statement, the lekton expressed by the sentence Cato ambulat, 'Cato is walking about', is of a very different nature: it is incorpored (asēmaton). The contrast between body and the incorporeal, however, has a significance of its own in Stoic ontology. The Stoics say that the criterion for the reality of a being is his ability to produce or suffer an effect. But they attribute this ability to bodies only; and on the strength of that very criterion they deny that the asōmata enjoy existence in the strict sense of the word: they belong to the me onta. 52 This is not meant to say that there are no asomata at all; to be incorporeal is an improper way of being, which is ascribed to four things: time, space, void and the lekta. 51 Seneca. Epist. 117. 13. - The Seneca passage is translated and discussed in: Long, 1971, 77f. 52 SVF 329-35; 357-68. - Brehier devoted an important mono­ graph to the issue of "the incorporeal" in Stoicism. It was first published in 1908, cf. References.

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

56 7

A lekton is not a thought in the sense of a moment in the course of the activity of thinking going on in somebody's mind; this is in the Stoic view something physical, real; the lekton does not exist in isolation, but only in connec­ tion with our thinking: it coexists (paryphistatai) with the latter, i.e. it exists only to the extent that it is (uttered and) thought; it does not have an existence independent of thinking. 53 Since only bodies in the strict sense of the word are according to the Stoics real, there is nothing in reality that corresponds immediately to a proposition, the representa­ tion of a state of affairs in thought. In this respect, a proposition like Cato is walking about is a creation of thinking man. But there is a correspondence between this axioma and reality to the extent that the truth of the former can be checked in the latter: the former is true if Cato is indeed walking about and it is wrong if he is not. 54 The axioma Cato is walking about is incorporeal since it is a proposition about a body. But strictly speaking, the proposition lies in the predicate (the katēgorēma); the other part of the axiōma defines the object to which the predicate is ascribed. So the kategorema is also an asōmaton; and it proves also from this angle to be a structure different from the lekton autoteles only in that it is incomplete ("unsaturated"). 53 54

SE. A. m. VIII 12; Simplicius in: Long, 1971, 80.

SE. A. m. VIII 100; DL VII 65. - Apparently, the Stoics distinguished also terminologically between proper existence and improper existence: to express the sense of 'be', they used hyparchein of the really existing bodies, and hyphistasthai of asōrnata (see SVF II 509. 521; SE. P. h. II 80). Cf. (Long, 1971 , 91 . ) .

568

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

(7) What now remains for us to do is to end our considerations about lekta by adding a few further points. The name of lekta is transparent in form; it is a verbal adjective forming part of the system of the lexeme legein, 'say1; so it generally means 'what is said', 'the thing said',when used as a noun. To understand the technical use of the word, in which it denotes sentence meaning, you have to take into account that legein, a transitive verb, is usually followed by a complement referring to the contents of what is said. Stenzel says that it always means 'to mean something' ("ti legeis?" is invariably: "what do you mean?"); and Martha Kneale thinks that the best literal English translation of lekton is probably 'what is meant'. The Stoics furthermore emphasize the difference between legein, 'say', and propheresthai, 'bringing forth (a word or a sentence as a sound sequence)'. "Saying is different from bringing forth; for what is brought forth are sounds, but what is said are things (pragmata), which are therefore also 57 writes Diogenes Laertius (VII 57), lekta (things said)," who in the final analysis takes his material from the textbook on sound (i.e. on the sēmainonta) written by Diogenes of Babylon. The difference is enormous indeed; it concerns the ontological status of sound and lekton: sound belongs to the bodies, the lekton, however, is incorporeal. But their combination does not only serve the purpose of communica­ tion: it has deeper roots.

Stenzel, 1957, 81. - As to the semantics of legein, cf. also Von Fritz, 1971. 405f., 556. 56

Kneale and Kneale, 1962, 140. 57 Propherontai men gar hai phonai, legetai de ta pragmata, ha de kai lekta tynchanei. - Cf. also SE. A. m. VIII 80.

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND 569 ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

The lekton is brought forth by thinking. Speech in general - and the lekton is what is said - is according to Stoic doctrine a function of human thinking: 5 8 the voice of an animal is a percussion of air brought about by natural impulse, the voice of man is articulate and sent forth by reason. 59 Peculiar to man are rational presentations and a rational presentation is one (phantasiai logikai); in which what is presented (to phantasthen) can be shown forth in speech. The lekton, on the other hand, is defined as that which subsists (hyphistatai) in conformity with a rational presentation; and just as much as it originates in thinking, it is, like other asōmata, apprehended by thinkm g . 63 Linguistic form is not, however, a kind of on a thought which as such is independent of it; is realized in this form and is inseparable from Stephanus describes this relationship very aptly

dress put the lekton it.64 H. when he,

Cf. proegeítai ... he phantasia, eith' he dianoia eklaletike hyparchousa, ho paschei hypo tes phantasias, touto ekpherei logcj), 'the presentation comes first; then thinking, which, as it possesses the capacity for expression, manifests in speech what it experiences from ("suffers through") the presentation1 (DL VII 49.). 59 DL VII 55. 60

Ibid., 51.

61

SE. A. m. VIII 70.

62

D.L. VII 63; SE. loc. cit.

63

DL VII 51.

64

Cf. Mignucci, 1965, 89 A. 56; Nuchelmans, 1973, 117.

570

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

in his translation of Sextus's Pyrrhōneiōn hypotypōseis, paraphrases Greek lekton with phrases like in dicto seu dictione consistens or quod in verbo consistit. Sextus seeks to prove in A. m. VIII 69ff. that there are no lekta and, as a result, no propositions (axiōmata). That is why he refers among other things to the fact that according to the Stoics every lekton must be said, but that it is in reality impossible to produce the sound structure that is to express a lekton: a whole whose parts do not exist simul­ taneously with it does not itself exist; yet since speech is linear in nature, a sentence can be articulated only in the course of time, one bit of it after another. (8) Defining an axiōma as a lekton, we say no more than that it is a "thing said", the contents of some (produced) sentence. But how can we give a closer definition of this "thing said"? What is it in actual fact? The Stoics answer: a pragma, a "thing". This was already said in the statement on the difference between propheresthai and legein that we quoted above : "... what is brought forth are sounds, but what is said are things (pragmata) ..." We also saw that Sextus declares the sēmainomenon to be the thing itself, which is revealed by sound. In some other passage (A. m. VIII 80) he relates that according to Stoic definition legein is "bringing forth the sound meaning the thing thought." Prãgma is therefore used as a synonym of lekton. Diogenes Laertius offers three definitions of the predicate (VII 64); the first definition does not mention the class, the second calls it prãgma, and the third calls it lekton. According to DL VII 63, the axiōma belongs to the complete lekta, but in c, 65 it is defined as a complete pragma; Gellius cites the same definition, but makes lekton the name 65

Fabricius, 1841, 1. 142. - Cf. also R. Schmidt, 1839, 55. footnote.

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

571

of the class (Noctes Atticae XVI, 8, 4 ) . The various types of sentence (question, imperative, etc.) are according to Sextus (A. m. VIII 70) types of the complete lekton; the definitions given in Diogenes Laertius's paper (VII 66-68) call the genus proximum prãgma. We will have to deal with this synonymy in greater detail. Let us first consider the examples again that Diogenes Laertius cites to illustrate the incomplete and the complete lekton: graphei, 'is writing', and graphei Sōkratēs, 'Socrates is writing'. In either case an action is mentioned that is predicated of a subject; in the first case the subject is not identified and in the second it is: it is called by name. In other words, the "thing said", the prãgma, is an action in either case. These examples are typical: the sentences that Stoics cite to illustrate their theories are as a rule verbal sen­ tences; even in their classification of the predicates, which we discussed earlier on, they consider only those which consist of a verb or a verb group. The principles of Stoicism reveal a rather peculiar view of what an action or - to put it in a more general 67 way - an event, a process is. Only bodies can partake, actively or passively, in a process: the processes themselves are incorporeal effects of causes, which are necessarily bodies; on the other hand, a body can never be the cause of another body, but only of a process going on at another body. To take an example: fire - a body - occasionally becomes the 66

Cf. Steinthal, 1863, 612f.; Nuchelmans, 1973, 51.

67

Cf. Bréhier (1909). 68

Cf. Stōikoi men pãn aition sõma phasi sōmati asōmatou tinos aition ginesthai, 'according to the Stoics, every cause is a body that becomes the cause of something incorporeal to a body' (SE, A. m. IX 211).

572

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

cause to the burning occurring at another body: wood; the process, unlike the two bodies, is an asōmaton: it is in­ corporeal. Existence in the strict sense of the word is, however, (according to Stoic doctrine) attributable to bodies only. Processes, since they are incorporeal, are also unreal (and, since they are only effect and can never be cause, are ineffective); they are merely thought and "said". In our particular instance the sentence Socrates is writing as a whole correctly represents a state of affairs existing in reality and is, in so far as it does so, true; but the pragma, the incorporeal action, which is denoted by the words is writing, does not enjoy any existence of its own - any existence independent of thinking - and can therefore be said: it can be a lekton. In consequence, the words pragmata and lekta are synonyms because pragmata are said and are in essence "things said". 69 What has gone before explains - and this might at first seem surprising - that the Stoics used the expressions katēgorēma and lekton also to denote (predicated) actions and states of affairs as these are incorporeal effects of bodies that constitute causes. Zeno taught that the cause is a body, the effect, however, a predicate (SVF I 89). Clement of Alexandria relates that, as the Stoics saw it, effects are incorporeal - they are predicates according to one view, and (complete) lekta according to another -; and he adds that there is a third view, according to which 69 G. Nuchelmans assumes that the Stoics primarily understood by prãgma some action or suffering predicated of a body as a cause of the prãgma, and that they accordingly used lekton originally in the sense of 'predicate' (cf. SVF III p. 263) and only secondarily applied the word to the proposition (axioma) (Nuchelmans, 1973, 45ff.)

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

5 73

some effects (like temnetai, 'is being cut') are predicates and others (like naus ginetai, 'a ship is being built') are propositions (SVF III p. 262 sq.). The preceding explanations show that the concept of lekton is firmly integrated in Stoic doctrine: that it is very closely interwoven with it. So it is not surprising that the concept has hardly spread beyond the Stoic school and was not adopted by the grammarians, in particular. (11) This survey of Stoic semantics could hardly have been done without: the Stoics indeed regarded the sign (sēmeĩon) as a sēmainomenon. Strangely enough, Sextus is our one and only source con70 cerning their sign theory. We know from him in particular that they defined the sign as a statement (axioma), as the true antecedent of a conditional statement (implication), 71 whose consequent (the sēmeiōton) is equally true. "The 72 sign must be true and indicate a truth." But this is not yet an adequate description of the sign: used as an antecedent, it must also "reveal" the consequent, i.e., it must state something from the existence of which we can infer what is said in the consequent; e.g., "if this woman has milk in her breasts, she has conceived." This latter definition is to exclude compound statements like "if day has come, it is bright"; what is here stated in the consequent 73 is not revealed by the antecedent, but perceived separately. 70 P.h. II 104-06; A. m. VIII 244-56. Sextus also ascribes to the Stoics the differentiation between two types of signs: "hypomnestic" and "endeictic" ones (P.h. II 97-101; A. m. VIII 143. 151-55); but cf. Heintz, 1932, 47ff.; Pohlenz, 1949, 127. 71

P.h. II 101; A. m. VIII 245, 250.

72

A. m. VIII 249.

73

P.h. II 106; A. m. VIII 250-53.

574

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Finally, another definition says that the sign, as it is present, is to be the sign of something present, i.e. that the two components of the compound statement are to state something that exists at present. This definition seems to be contradicted by sentences such as "if this man has a scar, he must have been wounded" or "if this man's heart has been stabbed, he will die." But this objection is dis­ missed by the Stoics as a misunderstanding. The wounding, they say, is indeed an event that belongs to the past; but the sēmeiōton, i.e. the inference that this man has been wounded, is a proposition that, although it is about a past event, itself exists and is true at present. Things are similar in the other example: the proposition exists at present, even though the event that it refers to will come to pass only in the future. 74 What has gone before shows that the Stoics, in their logical considerations, meant the (natural) indication when they spoke of the sēmeion. This was one of the traditional uses of the word; the particularity of their view was that they, as we have seen, regarded the indication as a proposi­ tion and, in consequence, as a lekton, as a thing that cannot be perceived with the senses, but is thought: as something intelligible (noeton). 75 Such a conception of the sign (in Greek the indication is simply called sēmeĩon), however, makes it impossible to extend the notion 'sign' to linguistic utterances, in which the Stoics, too, distinguish between perceptible expression (phone) and rational meaning. It is thus no 74 75

A. m. VIII 254-56.

A. m. VIII 244. - Sextus says (loc. cit., 177) that Epicurus and his followers, in contrast to the Stoics, declared the sign to be perceivable by the senses (aistheton). As to the controversy on the sign between the Stoics and the Epicureans, cf. Ph. and E.A. De Lacy. Philodemus: On Methods of Inference. Pennsylvania 1941; (footnote 75 continued)

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5 75

accident that our sources nowhere attribute to them the view that sēmaĩnon and sēmainomenon (expression and meaning) are the components of one linguistic sign. (12) Sextus seeks to prove that the Stoics contradict themselves, defining the sign as a proposition. On the one hand, he refers to the fact that the func­ tion that turns something into a sign, the act of indicating (endeiknysthai), is an activity and points out that Stoic doctrine maintains that only bodies can be active and that incorporeal lekta cannot. On the other hand, he tacitly equates indicating with meaning (sēmainein) ; and it follows from this that the signs belong to the sēmainonta, which are bodies, and cannot be propositions since these, in their 77 capacity of lekta, are, after all, incorporeal sēmaincmena. B. Mates, author of a pioneering monograph on Stoic logic , also says that the Stoics equated sēmaĩnon with sēmeĩon, and therefore believes that Sextus discovered a "radical difficulty" in the Stoic theory 79 . He has to admit, however, that where the "sign" is defined as the antecedent of certain conditional statements, only semeion is used, (footnote 75 continued) Brehier, 1955, 185-92. As to the difference between the Aristotelian and the Stoic view of the sign, cf. Mignucci, 1969, 720-22. 7

fi

—

But he uses semainein only by way of exception in order to denote the function of the semeion; see Heintz, 1932, 54, footnote 1 (on p. 55). 77 A. m. VIII 262-64. 78 Stoic Logic. Berkeley-Los Angeles 1961 (Published for the first time in 1953). 79 Loc. cit., 13.

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HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

and that in passages that draw a line between "sign", and lekton, only sēmaĩnon is used; he therefore conjectures that in Stoic terminology ("in technical Stoic language") sēmaĩnon and sēmaĩon "may" not have been synonymous. The problem disappears as soon as one realizes that by sēmaĩnon the Stoics understood linguistic expression (an articulated sound sequence), and by semeion the (natural) indication, and that these are utterly different things in­ deed. I am not going to answer the question of whether the Kneales do not go too far when they in this connection accuse the Sceptic of a complete lack of intellectual conscience; they are no doubt right when they say: "The relation between sēmainon and sēmainomenon is that between language and what it expresses, while the relation between sēmeĩon and sēmaiōton is what is known first and what is known through it." 8 Loc. cit. footnote 16. - The description of the Stoic theory of "sign, sense and denotation" in the second chapter of the book is misleading to the extent that its author presupposes that it is established that the Stoics equated sēmaĩnon and sēmeĩon. (The chapter opens with the announ­ cement: "The chapter is divided into two sections. The first contains an account of the Stoic distinction between the sign, the significate ... and the physical object to which the sign refers" ) . 81 Kneale-Kneale, 1962, 142. Cf. also Long, 1971, 84ff. R.A. Markus also assumes that in the opinion of the Stoics, the expressions sēmaĩnon and sēmeĩon had the same meaning, and he therefore gives a thoroughly mistaken description of Stoic views (Markus, 1957, 61f.)

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND 577 ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

(III) (1) I hinted on an earlier occasion that the Stoics, by refusing to regard the means of linguistic expression as —sēmeĩa, virtually refused to extend the sphere of applica­ tion of this word (or of the concept of sign) beyond its traditional limits. This view will now be substantiated in some detail. Going through the entry on sēmeĩon in the well-known 82 dictionary by Liddell and Scott , we find a great abundance of uses for the word. On closer inspection, however, every­ thing falls into place, however chaotic it may have seemed at first. It becomes clear that these uses, for all their variety, invariably represent one of two types of sign: in practically all cases registered in the dictionary the word denotes a perceived state of affairs functioning either as a (conventional or natural) indication indicating the existence of some other state of fact (the sign on a shield; a cut stone that is set in a ring and whose imprint can serve to certify a document; a tombstone; a boundary mark; a password; an omen sent by a god; the trail of an animal; a pathological symptom; etc.); or as a signal inducing a certain activity and controlling the activity of those for whom it is a signal (e.g. a flag signal conveying the command of a general). This linking of indication and signal by means of a common name goes far back into history. In ancient Greek semeion is a comparatively young word; it is found neither in Homer's nor in Hesiod's works. Derived from sema, it has adopted the meanings of this word and then forced it back to a considerable extent, especially in prose. The older word is isolated in Greek, not derivable 8 2

A Greek-English Lexicon. Compiled by H.G. Liddell and R. Scott. New (ninth) edition completed 1940. Oxford.

578

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

from any other word; it appears to be inherited, but a convincing etymology has yet to be detected. We can easily see that even sema does not distinguish between the two types of sign mentioned above, but that it can be used to refer to the one as well as to the other. In Book XXIII of Homer's Odyssey the word refers to the in­ dication allowing Penelope to recognize her husband with certainty; but it is also the name of the signal (Od. 21. 231) that is to make Odysseus's faithful servants Eumaius and Philoetius to fulfil their commission of helping him to settle accounts with the suitors; and in the Homeric poems the verb sēmainein (properly: 'give a sign'), a deriv­ ative from sẽma, is most frequently used in the sense of 'give a command'. But on the other hand, the two words (sẽma and sēmeĩon) share a significant restriction: they are never used of the linguistic sign; and this means: the thinking that had moulded the semantics of these words separated speech clearly from communication by indications and signals. This restric­ tion is surprising for us since we are used to regarding the doctrine of the sign nature of language as a fundamental tenet of linguistic science; on closer inspection we must, however, admit that the restriction is natural. There is indeed a radical difference between the signs in the narrower sense of the word (indication and signal) and linguistic expression. A state of affairs perceived turns into an indication or signal by our interpreting it in a certain manner: but if this interpretation is to be given a communicable form, i.e., if it is to be made explicit - perhaps in answer to the question about the sense of a road sign -, we have to depend on language and have to clothe our interpretation in words. The relationship is not reversible. Even a word or a sentence may be unclear to the hearer and require inter­ pretation; but also in a case like this we use language, and we use it as its own meta-language: the interpretation is

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

5 79

made in the form of some (more or less proper) definition or paraphrase. What is more, the natural indications (much as those sent by gods) are ambiguous in themselves: their sense in a particular case is established only through lin­ guistic interpretation; and, on the other hand, the establish­ ment of man-made indications or signals requires some express convention, an explanation by means of language. (2) What has been said helps us towards a better un­ derstanding of the evolution of the meaning of the verb sēmainein. Analyzing the Stoic view of meaning and truth, Martha Kneale makes a remark on the difference between the Greek verb and English me an ; the latter, she says, can be used of a person as well as of a sentence; the Stoics, on the other hand, had two different verbs where English has only one, "for Greek uses legein of persons and semainein of sen­ tences." 83 This remark - in so far as it is correct - refers to later linguistic usage; earlier on, there was some other difference between legein and sēmainein. Sẽmainein is only indirectly related to sẽmeĩon; the relation is created by the fact that the two are derived from the same primary word, sema; but the verb - this is even shown by the stem form sẽman-, which was used for derivation is several centuries older. It at first meant (1) 'mark' in the sense of 'attach a sign to something to allow it to be distinguished from other things or to be recognized' and (2) 84 'give a sign' , i.e. 'indicate' or 'command', in line with the two meanings of sẽma ('indication' and 'signal').

83

Kneale and Kneale, 1962, 157.

84 Cf. Nee ulla causa est nobis significandi, id est signi dandi ... (Augustin. De doctr. christ. II 3; so: significare = signum dare).

580

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Originally, sēmainein therefore appears to have been said of beings capable of performing the activities mentioned above - the activities of creating signs or expressing themselves through signs -, i.e. of people (the Homeric 85 86

poems use the verb in this way only), gods or animals On this level, its peculiar semantic contents, which distin­ guish it from legein, are based on the fact that the primary word (sẽma) means 'indication' or 'signal' only and is not used of linguistic expression. A tale in Herodotus' work (IV 113) has a Scythian and an Amazon face each other. They cannot communicate through talking: they speak different languages. She cannot tell him what she means; all she can do is sēmainein, i.e., hint to him through signs (made by hand). Remarkable is the difference between legein and sēma87 ho anax, hoữ to manteĩon inein in a saying by Heraclitus: esti to en Delphoĩs, oute legei, oute kryptei, alia sēmainei "the Lord who owns the oracle at Delphi neither speaks nor hides his meaning, but indicates it by a sign". So, semainein 85 — "Sēmainein ist Terminus der Orakelsprache" (W. Kranz in: Diels - Kranz 1, 1956, 494). Cf. he men onữ phōnē toữ hedeos kai lyperou esti semeion, dio kai tois allois hyparchei zoois (mechri gar toutou he physis auton elelythe, tou echein aisthesin lyperou kai hedeos kai tauta semainein allelois, 'the voice is a sign of things pleasant and unpleasant, and that is why it is also attributable to the rest of the living beings; for this is how far their nature goes of perceiving things pleasant and unpleasant (pleasure and pain) and hinting at it to one another' (Aristotle, Politica 2. 1253a 13). 87

Diels - Kranz 1, 1956, 172.

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

581

is something in between saying and not saying: although mortal man, when he turns to the oracle, receives an answer clothed in words, the sense of the words is only an indication, a sign hinting at the actual message from the god. 88 A similar relationship between legein and sēmainein is revealed to us by another passage in Herodot's writings (II 54-57). The historian relates there that according to the priestesses of Dodona the famous oracle was founded on a command by Zeus proclaimed to the inhabitants by a black dove. He considers this tale a legend. In his opinion, the establishment of the oracle goes back to a priestess from Thebes in Egypt, who, after her abduction by the Phoenicians, came to the Thesprotians; and he finds an allusion to that in the legend itself: "... and when they [the inhabitants] say that the dove was of black colour, they are hinting that the woman was from Egypt (melainan de legontes eĩnai ten peleiada semainousi hoti Aigyptie he gyne en)."89 So, semainein also here means hinting at the actual message (the historical truth) by means of what is said (the fable), as if by sign. (3) If, however, semainein originally required an animate subject and referred to a communication by signs - in contrast to linguistic communication -, how has it come to be used of linguistic expression (the word and the sen­ tence) for the purpose of denoting its function of meaning, its function of conveying intelligible contents? What has been handed down to us does not allow us to follow the

88

Cf. hoi d'au elegon tas neas semainein ton theon, 'yet others said that the god hints at the ships [with the wooden walls] 1 (Hdt. VII. 142). 89 Hdt. II 57.

582

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

details of the process that led to this result; but in postHomeric literature, well before it adopted the sense of 'mean', we see sēmainein push back the first barriers that were placed around it by its origin. It did so in two directions. Fifth-century writers like Herodotus or the Attic tragedy writers were familiar with the use of semainein in the sense of 'indicating (orally)' and 'reporting'. In Aeschylus's works Oceanus comes hurrying to offer help to Prometheus, who has been put in shackles, and says to him: Sēmain' ho ti chrē soi symprassein, 'Tell me what assistance 90 to give you.' Herodotus says (I 43) that after Atys's tragic end somebody hurried to Croesus, his father, to bring him the news and, after he had arrived in Sardes, told (esemene) him about his son's death. On the other hand, semainein has - certainly from very ancient times - been metaphorically applied to inanimate things. As we have seen ,the verb originally meant 'give a sign in order to hint at something'; furthermore, the hint is attributed to the sign itself. So it is occasionally said of a dream or an amazing, extraordinary incident (teras) that they sēmainousi (i.e., hint at) the coming of a certain event; 9 1 Aristotle uses the verb of the comets, whose fairly frequent incidence is said to indicate winds and dry spells 92 Even further removed (sēmainousi pneumata kai auchmous). from the original meaning is the meaning in the phrase used by Plato on several occasions: hōs logos semainei, 'as reason indicates';9 3 yet one can also say - as Euripides 94

- to ergon auto sōmaneĩ, 'the action itself will

writes 90

Prom. 91

Hdt.

295.

I.

34; 78.

Meteorologica I 7. 344b 19. 93

E.g., Gorgias 511b; 527c, e ; Theait. 160c.

94 Euripides. Androm. 265.

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND 583 ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

reveal it', i.e. it will reveal an intention kept secret for the time being (the logous that have not been voiced yet) . Another metaphorical use of the verb is saying sema­ inein of the instrument serving to bring forth the sign. In a special use the verb means 'convey a command to the army by means of a trumpet signal'. This is actually an action performed by a trumpeter, but the signalizing can also be attributed to the instrument, which is then considered personified; cf. epeidan hē salpinx sēmēnē, tō. stratopedo., 'when the trumpet signalizes to the army'.95 However, if we ask what the origin of the use of the verb semainein is in so far as it is linked in the sense of 'mean' with a linguistic expression as the subject, it is not enough just considering the earlier uses of the word. In this use the verb is a technical term, whose formation is connected with a crucial step ahead in the considerations regarding the nature of language. In naive pre-scientific discourse, sound and sense form a simple unity in speech. Phōnē is not only 'voice' or 'sound', but also 'language'; phōneĩn is not only 'bring 97 forth a note', but also 'speak a language'; conveying a sense figures as a capacity (dynamis) of (articulated) sound. The development, however, that has led to the use of sēmainein in the sense of 'mean' goes hand in hand with the knowledge that speech is of a double nature - that it unites 95

Aristot. De mundo. 6.399b 2.

96

Hdt. IV 111; V 5 8. Xenophon. Anabasis IV 8.4. Arrianus. Alexandrou anabasis I 12. Phonesai men ouk eiche ou gar syniesan allelon, ·she could not speak [i.e. she was unable to express herself in lan­ guage], for they did not understand each other' - this is what is said of the Amazon in the passage from Herodotus' writings cited on an earlier occasion.

584

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

heterogeneous components, i.e.: with a clear distinction between sound, which is sound only, and what it "reports" (sēmainei). This distinction allows sēmainein to change from a metaphor - for this is what it at first is, if said of linguistic expression - into a technical term of language doctrine. On the other hand, the strict separation of sound and sense indicates a view according to which linguistic units may be considered as signs of a certain kind: if sense is extrinsic to sound, speech also shows something perceptible saying something different from what it as such is. We come upon this view for the first time when Plato describes words as "sound signs"; but behind that there is certainly the great spiritual movement of the fifth century, in particular the discussion on "the correctness of names", i.e., on their relationship to reality, about which we talk with their help.

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

585

References Arnim, Hans von (1909) "Die europäische Philosophie des Altertums," Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie von Wilhelm Wundt u.a., Berlin und Leipzig. Aubenque, Pierre (1962) Le problème de l'être chez Aristote. Paris. Bally, Charles (1969) "Qu'est-ce qu'un signe?" In: A Geneva School Reader in Linguistics. Ed. by R. Godei. Bloomington and London. Barwick, Karl (1957) Probleme der stoischen Sprachlehre und Rhetorik. Berlin. Benveniste, Emile (1959) Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes. I-II. Paris. Benveniste, Emile (1966) Problèmes de linguistique gnerale. Paris. Brehier, Emile (1908) La théorie des incorporels dans l'ancien stoicisme. Paris. (Third edition 1962) Bréhier, Emile (1955) Etudes de philosophie antique. Paris. Dante Alighieri (1957) De vulgari eloquentia. Ridotto a miglior lezione, commentato e tradotto da A. Marigo. Terza ed. a cura di G. Ricci. Firenze. Dante Alighieri (1968) De vulgari eloquentia a cura di P.V. Mengaldo. Padova. De Mauro, Tullio (1968) F. de Saussure. Corso di lin­ guistica generale. Introduzione, traduzione e commento du Tullio De Mauro, Bari. Deshayes, Jean (1969) Les civilisations de l'Orient ancien. Paris. Diels, Hermann (1954) Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Griechisch und deutsch von Hermann Diels. Fabricius, Io. Albertus (1841) Sexti Empirici Opera graece et latine. Graeca ex MSS. codicibus castigavit ... et toti operi notas addidit -. Editio emendatior. I-II. Lipsiae, 1841. Fehling, D. (1958) "Besprechung von Barwick (1957)", GGA 212 (1958) 161-173.

586

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Frege, Gottlob (1967) Kleine Schriften. Hg. von I. Angelelli. Hildesheim. Frege, Gottlob (1971) Schriften zur Logik und Sprach­ philosophie. Aus dem Nachlaß. Mit Einleitung ... und Register hg. von G. Gabriel. Hamburg. Fritz, Kurt von (1971) Grundprpbleme der Geschichte der antiken Wissenschaft. Berlin und New York. Godei, Robert (19 5 7) Les sources manuscrites du Cours de linguistique generale de F. de Saussure. Genève et Paris. Guthrie, W.K.C. (1962) A History of Greek Philosophy. I. The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans. Cambridge. Haller, Rudolf (1962) "Untersuchungen zum Bedeutungsproblem in der antiken und mittelalterlichen Philosophie". Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 7, 57-119. Heintz, W. (1932) Studien zu Sextus Empiricus. Vorgelegt von R. Harder. Halle/S. (Unveränderter reprograph. Nachdruck. Tübingen 1972.) Husserl, Edmund (1928) Logische Untersuchungen. 2. Bd. I. T. Vierte Aufl. Halle/S. Jakobson, Roman (1970) "Linguistics," Main Trends of Research in the Social and Human Sciences. Paris - The Hague, 419-63. Jakobson, Roman (197-1) Selected Writings. Vol. 2. The Hague. Kneale, William C. and Martha Kneale (1962) The Development of Logic. Oxford. ' Kretzmann, Norman (19 74) "Aristotle on Spoken Sound Significant by Convention," In: Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretations., Ed. by J. Corcoran. Dordrecht - Boston. 3-21. Lalande, André (1960) Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie. 8. éd., revue et augmentée. Paris. Long, A.A. (1971) "Language and Thought in Stoicism," In: Problems in Stoicism. Ed. by A.A. Long, London. Long, A.A. (1974) Hellenistic Philosophy. Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. London.

ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'LINGUISTIC SIGN' AND 587 ON STOIC LANGUAGE DOCTRINE

Markus, R.A. (1957) "St. Augustine on Signs," Phronesis 2, 60-83. Marrou, Henri-Irénée (1958) Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique. 4. éd., Paris. Mates, Benson. (1961) Stoic Logic. Berkeley-Los Angeles. (Originally published in 1953). Mau, Jürgen. (1957) "Stoische Logik. Ihre Stellung gegenüber der Aristotelischen Syllogistik und dem modernen Aussagenkal­ kül," Hermes 85, 147-58. Mette, Hans Joachim. (1951) "Besprechung von Pohlenz (1948, 1949)," Gnomon 23, 27-39. Mignucci, Mario. (1965) Il significato della logica stoica. Bologna. Mignucci, Mario (1969) Aristotele. Gli Analitici Primi. Translated, introduced and commented by Mario Mignucci. Naples. Nuchelmans, Gabriel. (1973) Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity, New York. Patzig, Günther. (1970) Sprache und Logik. Göttingen. Pohlenz, Max. (1948, 1949) Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung. 2 Bde., Göttingen (4. Auflage 1972). Pohlenz, Max (1965) Kleine Schriften. 2 Bde. Hildesheim. Prantl, Carl (1855) Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande. I. Bd., München. Robins, R.H. (1970) Diversions of Bloomsbury. Selected Writings on Linguistics. Amsterdam. Ross, W. D. (1945) Aristotle. 4th ed., revised. London. Saussure, Ferdinand de (19 72) Cours de linguistique générale. Édition critique préparée par T. De Mauro. Paris. Schmidt, Rudolphus (18 39) Stoicorum grammatica. Halis. Simone, R. (1969) "Semiologia agostiniana," La Cultura 7, 88-117. Steinthal, H. (1863) Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Logik. Berlin.

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HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

Stenzel, Julius. (1957) Kleine Schriften zur griechischen Philosophie. Darmstadt. Waitz, Th. (1844) Aristotèlis Organon Graece. Edidit Th. Waitz. Pars Prior. Lipsiae. Wouters, Α. (1975) "Dionysios Thrax' Definition of the logos (sentence) and P. Yale I. 25," Orbis 24, 217-23. Zeller, Eduard (1909) Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung dargestellt. 3. T. 1. Abtg. 4. Auflage hg. von E. Wellmann, Leipzig. Books Referred to by Initials DL SE. A. m. SE. P. h. SVF

= Diogenes Laertius. Philosophōn bion kai dogmatōn synagōgē. = Adversus mathematicos. = Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes. = Stoicorum Veterum Fragments.

ABSTRACT /w/ IN HUNGARIAN Robert M. Vago 1 . Introduction The abstractness of phonology has been one of the most widely discussed and hotly debated issues in the literature of the late 19 60s and early 19 70s. Hungarian phonology has significant contributions to make regarding this debate. See for example the discussion on the abstractness of Hungarian vowel harmony in Vago (1973), Vago (1976), Vago (1978), Jen­ sen (1978), Phelps (1978), Ringen (1978), and the references cited in these works. The present article discusses still another piece of evidence from Hungarian for the abstractness of phonology. The facts are drawn from a set of verbal root alternations. A number of possible analyses are contemplated, and it is concluded that the one which assumes the abstract under­ lying segment /w/ is the most plausible account of the facts.1 1

The evaluative criteria used in comparing alternative analyses are, of course, open to debate. For some relevant discussion, see the works cited above.

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

590 2. The Facts

There is a generalization to be made about Hungarian 2 verbal roots: they are consonant final. However, a handful of historically old roots seem to contradict this general­ ization. These roots have a vowel final alternant in some environments. Let us look at the present, past, and condi­ tional inflections of the verb Lő 'shoot', in both the defi3 nite and indefinite conjugations: (1)

a.

Definite Conjugation Present löv-öm

Past lő-tt-em

Conditional lő-ne-m

2sg

löv-öd

lő -tt-ed

lő-né-d

3sg

löv-i

lő -tt-e

lő-ne

1sg

b.

1pl

lő-jük

lő-tt-ük

lő-né-nk

2pl

löv-itek

lő -tt-etek

lő-né-tek

3pl

löv-ik

lő -ff-Pk

1ő —né—k

Indefinite Conjugation Present

Past

Conditional

1sg

löv-ök

lő-tt-em

lő-né-k

2sg

lo-sz

lő-tt-él

lő-né-1

3sg

lo

1ő-tt

lő-ne

1pl

löv-iink

lő-tt-iink

lő-né-nk

2pl

lő-tök

lő-né-tek

3pl

lő-nek

lő-tt-etek lő-tt-ek

lő-né-nek

2 This generalization is true of stems as w e l l , where stem is defined as root plus a series of optional derivational affixes. The term root will be used throughout, since deri­ vational affixes will not enter into the discussions. Other verbs that pattern like lő are: fő 'cook (intransi­ tive) ' nő 'grow', ró 'scribble', and sző 'weave'. Two other verbal roots are mentioned in footnote 7.

ABSTRACT /w/ IN HUNGARIAN

591

In (1), -tt and -ne/né are the past and conditional markers; there is no overt marker for the present. The re­ maining suffixes are person markers. The root is löv- be­ fore a vowel initial suffix and lő- word finally and before a consonant initial suffix. Which of these alternants, if either, should be assumed to be basic? This question is ex­ plored in the following sections. 3. The Vowel Final Analysis We can immediately dispense with assuming that the vowel final alternant is underlying and that the consonant final alternant is derived by a rule which inserts v before a vowel initial suffix. For one thing, this analysis would destroy the otherwise valid generalization that (basic) ver­ bal roots are consonant final. But even more significantly, v insertion would not work in case the suffix initial vowel is epenthetic. There are sound reasons to suppose (Vago to appear) that in the present tense paradigms the first person singular personal suffixes are /m/ in the definite conjuga­ tion, and /k/ in the indefinite conjugation. The vowel o, al­ ternating with ö and e according to the general patterns of vowel harmony, is inserted by a rule which breaks up a conso­ nant cluster which arises as a result of appending a word fi­ nal suffix consisting of one or two consonants to a consonant 4 final morpheme:

(2)

ø

⇒

 / +

 () #

Rule (2) is operative in deriving könyök-öm 'my elbow' from /könyök+m/, but not in hajo-m 'my ship'. Note also üt-öm 'I 4 In the noun system, rule (2) applies in a slightly modified version. See rule (4.42) in Vago (to appear).

592

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

hit it 1 , from /iit+m/, and üt-ök 'I hit' from /üt+k/. The problem with the vowel final analysis is that rule (2) cannot apply to a representation like /lö+k/, where there is no consonant cluster to be broken up. Consequently, forms like löv-ök cannot be derived. We therefore must reject de­ riving the consonant final root alternant in (1) from the vow­ el final alternant. 4. The v-Final Analysis The alternative analysis to be considered at this point is whether the reverse analysis can be maintained, namely de­ riving the vowel final alternant from the consonant final al­ ternant by a rule that deletes the root final consonant word finally and before a consonant initial suffix. All indications are that a consonant final root analy­ sis works. For example, löv-öm can be derived from something like /löv+m/ by the vowel epenthesis rule (2). Furthermore, assuming an underlying final consonant for roots like lő/lövallows one to make the general statement that all Hungarian verbal roots are consonant final underlyingly. The most likely candidate for the consonant in root fi­ nal position appears to be v, since this consonant shows up in the observed root alternations. However, two arguments can be made against assuming /v/. First, there exist some verbs (hív 'call', ív(ik) 'spawn', ov 'caution', szív 'inhale', vív 'fence') and a host of nouns which end in v but which do not follow the alternation pattern of lő/löv-. These roots do not lose their final v. Compare for example ro 'scribe', ro-nak 'they scribe' (rov-ok 'I scribe') with óv, *ó 'cau5 There is no epenthesis before the present indefinite second person suffix -£Ζ_: cf. lo s ζ , * lövösz .

593

ABSTRACT /w/ IN HUNGARIAN

tion', óv-nak, *ó-nak 'they caution' (óv-ok 'I caution'). If roots like lő/löv- and ró/rov- end in v underlyingly, then all other v-final roots in the language would have to be ex­ empted from undergoing the putative rule of v-deletion which deletes root-final v word finally and before a consonant. Ob­ viously, this is not a satisfactory analysis, as the large number of exception features would add considerable complex­ ity to the grammar. Nor would this analysis capture the gener­ alization that v-final roots are perfectly regular and expec­ ted in the language. Another argument against postulating /v/ for roots like lo/löv- is that the indefinite past third person singular forms cannot be derived by independently justified rules. The indefinite past third person singular inflections are formed by attaching the past tense suffix -tt/t, underlying /tt/, to the root; the third person singular suffix is -0. Some roots take an epenthetic mid vowel, others do not. Vowel epenthesis is conditioned by the root final consonant. Consider the fol­ lowing forms : (3)

a.

b.

néz 'look' hoz 'bring' lök 'push' nyom 'press'

nez-ett hoz-ott lök-ött

'he looked'

'he pressed' 'he received' 'he let'

kap 'receive'

nyom-ott kap-ott

hagy 'let'

hagy-ott

ás 'dig' kér 'ask for' kíván 'wish' beszel 'speak'

as-ott ker-t kivan-t beszel-t buj-t hany-t

buj 'hide' hány 'throw' The roots in

'he brought' 'he pushed'

'he dug' 'he 'he 'he 'he 'he

asked for' wished' spoke' hid' threw'

(3a) end in either an obstruent or in an

anterior and non-coronal sonorant

(m). The short mid vowel £

is inserted between these consonants and the past tense suffix

594

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

/tt/. The epenthetic vowel later undergoes vowel harmony; we can observe the expected alternation o/ö/e in (3a). The roots in (3b) end in a sonorant consonant which is either coronal and anterior ( n , 1 , r) or non-coronal and nonanterior ( n y , j ) . There is no epenthesis following these con­ sonants. Rather, the past-tense suffix undergoes the indepen­ dently motivated process of degemination and shows up as -t.. The two sets of root-final consonants are described by the following distinctive feature combinations :

It is apparent that (4b) describes a natural class of consonants, while (4a) does not. It is therefore preferable to insert  generally and delete it subsequently in case the root final consonant belongs to the class described by (4b). In fact,  can be inserted by rule (2), which is needed in the grammar anyway. Now let us consider the underlying representation /löv+ tt/ 'he shot'. Rule (2) applies, and after harmonizing the epenthetic vowel, /löv+ött/ is derived . The problem with as­ suming root final ν is that the epenthetic vowel cannot be deleted since ν is not a sonorant consonant having the same value for the features [anterior] and [coronal]. Indeed, the epenthetic vowel stays following uncontroversial v-final roots: cf. hív-ott 'he called', óv-ott 'he cautioned'. In brief, *lövött and not correct lőtt is obtained if we assume the underlying root-shape /löv/. /Γ

It is important to note that the putative v-deletion rule is ordered after rule (2). This is clearly seen in deriva­ tions like /löv+m/ = löyöm, where rule (2) bleeds v-deletion.

ABSTRACT /w/ IN HUNGARIAN

595

5. The Minor Rule Feature Analysis If one wishes to maintain an underlying /v/ for roots like lő/löv-, then there is still another way to account for the fact that these verbs delete their final v, while others, like hiv, do not. A minor rule deleting root final v before # or  can be postulated: the class represented by lo/löv- is lexically marked for undergoing this rule, while the class represented by hív is not. The minor v-deletion rule must be ordered after rule (2): /löv+k/ becomes lövök, not *lők. Of course, the problem still remains that v is not deleted before word final -tt: /löv+tt/ becomes lövött, not *lött. Another lexical feature could exempt roots like /löv/ from undergoing rule (2) precisely before the past tense suffix. In that case, v is followed by a consonant, and vdeletion can apply correctly. While this analysis grinds out the facts, it is highly complex and has no explanatory force whatsoever. Consequently, we reject the minor rule analysis as a valuable description of the facts. 6. The Allomorphy Analysis A still different descriptive device is to assume two allomorphs for roots like lő/Vlöv- : /lő*/ if a consoant initial suffix or no suffix follows, and /löv/ if a vowel-initial suf­ fix follows. However, this analysis fails in case the root is fol­ lowed by a derived vowel. Thus, for example, if the indefinite present first person singular suffix /k/ is appended to the root, the variant /lo/ is chosen for the root. However, rule (2) is inapplicable to the representation /lo+k/. Consequently, *lők is derived instead of lövök.

596

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

7. The Abstract Analysis In the preceding sections we have considered a number of alternative descriptions of the conjugational paradigms of the verb lő/löv-. We have concluded that the root should have a final consonant underlyingly but that if v is chosen, each of the aforementioned analyses is inadequate on empirical and/or theoretical grounds. To add more substance to the crit­ ical evaluation of these analyses, an empirically valid and explanatorily attractive analysis must be found. It is such a description to which we now turn. If we reject v as the final underlying consonant of roots like lő/löv-, then which other consonant should we pos­ tulate? Clearly, we should be guided by at least three cri­ teria: a, the root-final consonant should be as close to v phonologically, i.e. in distinctive feature composition, as possible; b, it should be deleted in the appropriate con­ texts by a general rule; and c, it should condition the de­ letion of the epenthetic vowel in the indefinite past third person singular inflection. It will be recalled that two classes of consonants trigger epenthetic vowel deletion: anterior and coronal sonorants, and non-anterior and non-coronal sonorants. Of the existing sonorants, l, r, n, ny, and j belong to either of these categories. But we cannot postulate any of these as the final consonant of roots like lo/löv-, since these con­ sonants cannot be deleted by any well motivated rule: cf. the verbs in (3b). The only other alternative is to assume a consonant which does not appear in surface representations. Our three criteria lead to a unique choice: /w/. w and v are phonologi­ cally similar (indeed, they often alternate and are histori­ cally related in numerous languages); w can be deleted be­ fore # and  by a general rule formalized below; and finally,

ABSTRACT /w/ IN HUNGARIAN

597

w can condition epenthetic vowel deletion, since it is [+sonorant], [-anterior], and [-coronal]. As can be observed from the paradigms in (1), the de­ letion of /w/ is accompanied by a concomitant lengthening of the preceding vowel. These two changes can be described by a transformational rule : 7

/w/ is an abstract segment in that it never appears in pho­ netic representations. If w is not deleted, it is neutrali­ zed with /v/ unconditionally: w ⇒ v (6) Rules (5) and (6), applying in that order, jointly account for the root alternations observed in (1). 8. Conclusion In this article, we have considered the description of a set of verbal root alternations in Hungarian. We have found that the best motivated analysis was the one which assumed the abstract segment /w/ in basic representations. The choice of /w/ as the underlying abstract segment was not arbitrary; rather, it was based in part on evidence extracted from the phonological patterning of certain verbal inflections. The 7

Vowel lengthening may be extracted from rule (5). In all of the w-final verbs w is preceded by either  or o_· These vowels may be lengthened by a separate rule which accounts for the fact that Hungarian has no morpheme final short  or o. The verbs ri 'cry' and nyu 'wear down' are w-final roots also, but they have a long vowel even when w is deleted. We will assume underlying long vowels; the vowel lengthening part of rule (5) applies vacuously.

598

HUNGARIAN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

general conclusion to be drawn is that phonological theory should make abstract underlying segments and contextfree (absolute) neutralization rules available for the de­ scription of phonological structure. While this article adduced support for abstract /w/ only from a limited set of verbal root alternations, the evidence actually is much stronger. Additional arguments for setting up /w/ in the nominal root alternations and case inflections are made in Vago (to appear). It is unreasonable to expect that the analysis offered here will find universal acceptance, given that the abstractness of phonology is a controversial issue. It was not the purpose of this article to attempt to resolve this important problem. Rather, the intention has been to point out one more case where an abstract analysis seems to be the most efficacious description of the facts.

ABSTRACT /w/ IN HUNGARIAN

599

References Jensen, John T. (1978) "Reply to 'Theoretical Implications of Hungarian Vowel Harmony', "Linguistic Inquiry 9.89-97. Phelps, Elaine (1978) "Exceptions and Vowel Harmony in Hungarian," Linguistic Inquiry 9.9 8-104. Ringen, Catherine 0. (1978) "Another View of the Theoretical Implications of Hungarian Vowel Harmony," Linguistic In­ quiry 9;105-115. Vago., Robert M. (1973) "Abstract Vowel Harmony Systems in Uralic and Altaic Languages," Language 49.579-605. Vago, Robert M. (1976) "Theoretical Implications of Hungarian Vowel Harmony," Linguistic Inquiry 7.2 43-26 3. Vago, Robert M. (1978) "Some Controversial Questions Concer­ ning the Description of Vowel Harmony," Linguistic Inquiry 9.116-125. Vago, Robert M. (to appear) The Sound Pattern of Hungarian, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.