HUME'S THEORY OF THE PASSIONS AND OF MORALS: A Study of Books II and III of the Treatise

HUME'S THEORY OF THE PASSIONS AND OF MORALS A Study of Books II and III of the "Treatise"

BY Alfred B. Glathe UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY Volume 24 One of 30 copies printed on 100% rag paper UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS BERKELEY AND LOS ANGELES 1950 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY EDITORS DONALD S. MACKAY GEORGE P. ADAMS WILLIAM R. DENNES J. LOEWENBERG UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY EDITORS ( Berkeley): DONALD S. MACKAY, GEORGE P. ADAMS, WILLIAM R. DENNES, J. LOEWENBERG Volume 24, pp. vi + 1 - 175 Submitted by editors February 14, 1949 Issued April 7, 1950 Price, $2.50 CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS LONDON, ENGLAND PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Contents INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 4 § 1: THE HUTCHESONIAN-ORIGIN THESIS OF N. K. SMITH ..................................... 4 § 2: HUME'S THEORETIC AIM, METHOD, AND SUBJECT MATTER ....................... 20 § 3: THE RELATION OF BOOKS II AND III TO BOOK I OF THE "TREATISE" ......... 27 CHAPTER I: HUME'S THEORY OF THE INDIRECT PASSIONS ..................................... 31 § 1: THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PASSIONS ............................................................ 31 § 2: THE DOUBLE-ASSOCIATION THEORY OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY ............... 35 § 3: ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY .................................... 40 § 4: THE DOUBLE-ASSOCIATION THEORY OF LOVE AND HATRED.................... 48 § 5: THE ROLE OF INTENTION IN LOVE AND HATRED; THE LOVE OF RELATIONS AND ESTEEM FOR THE RICH AND POWERFUL ................................. 53 § 6: MIXED EMOTION'S INVOLVING LOVE AND HATRED ..................................... 58 CHAPTER II: HUME'S THEORY OF THE WILL AND THE DIRECT PASSIONS ......... 71 § 1: THE DETERMINATION OF THE WILL..................................................................... 71 § 2: THE DETERMINANTS OF THE WILL ....................................................................... 77 § 3: THE DIRECT PASSIONS; HOPE AND FEAR ........................................................... 85 CHAPTER III: HUME'S THEORY OF MORALS AND HUME'S THEORY OF JUSTICE PART I.......................................................................................................................................... 91 § 1: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 91 § 2: HUME'S THEORY OF JUSTICE, AN ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE. (PART I) ............... 103 CHAPTER IV: HUME'S THEORY OF JUSTICE, PART II: THE LAWS OF NATURE .. 110 § 1: THE ORIGIN OF JUSTICE AND PROPERTY; THE FIRST LAW OF NATURE . 110 § 2: THE SECOND LAW OF NATURE; THE CONSTITUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS.................................................................................................................................. 119 § 3: THE THIRD LAW OF NATURE; THE ANALYSIS OF PROMISES...................... 124 § 4: CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS UPON THE ARTIFICIALITY OF JUSTICE ..... 131 CHAPTER V: HUMES'S THEORY OF JUSTICE, PART III: POLITICAL THEORY ...... 134 § 1: THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT............................................................................. 134 § 2: THE DUTY OF ALLEGIANCE ................................................................................... 138 § 3: THE THEORY OF REVOLUTION AND THE RIGHT OF MAGISTRACY ......... 144

§ 4: INTERNATIONAL MORALITY; CHASTITY AND MODESTY ........................... 151 CHAPTER VI: HUME'S THEORY OF MORAL APPROBATION.................................... 156 § 1: THE GENERAL THEORY OF MORAL APPROBATION ...................................... 156 § 2: ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE GENERAL THEORY .................................................... 175

INTRODUCTION § 1: THE HUTCHESONIAN-ORIGIN THESIS OF N. K. SMITH IF THE philosophy of Hume is lacking in fundamental consistency and clarity of theoretic aim, it has surely met with the fate which it deserves; for not even the theories of Kant or Hegel, both supposedly much more obscure writers, have received a wider range of interpretation and evaluation. This variety of interpretation extends from the older version of T. H. Green, in whose portrayal Hume's philosophy is an "anachronistic" 1 and self-destructively skeptical development of principles inherited from Locke and Berkeley, to more recent readings in which the same philosophy appears as "not fundamentally sceptical" 2 but "positive, naturalistic, . . . and humanistic in tendency." 3 To seek to contribute further to the interpretative analysis of Hume's philosophy may, in the face of such extremes of scholarly opinion, seem an inefficient method of narrowing a choice already grown, to all appearances, maximally wide. But it is also possible that the range is not as wide as it may appear. T. H. Green's extensive analysis of the Treatise of Human Nature, so far from realizing its declared aim of turning the thoughts of young Englishmen away from anachronistic systems typified by Hume's, 4 has no doubt served as a major stimulus for much of the serious consideration of Hume's position by which it has been succeeded and superseded. And the superficiality of the usual historical treatment in which Hume appears as the last of a trilogy the other members of which are Locke and Berkeley has been amply demonstrated by the detailed analyses Cf. T. H. Green, "Introduction to the Moral Part of the Treatise", in The Philosophical Works of David Hume, eds. Green and Grose ( London, 1882), Vol. II, p. 71: "Our business, however has not been to moralise, but to show that the philosophy based on the abstraction of feeling, in regard to morals no less than to nature, was with Hume played out, and that the next step forward in speculation could only be an effort to rethink the process of nature and human action from its true beginning in thought. If this object has been in any way attained, so that the attention of Englishmen 'under fiveand-twenty' may be diverted from the anachronistic systems hitherto prevalent among us to the study of Kant and Hegel, an irksome labour will not have been in vain."

Unless it is otherwise specified, references to Hume Treatise are made throughout to the edition of L. A. Selby-Bigge, 1928. All numerals in parentheses throughout the present study represent page references to this edition of the Treatise. 2 N. K. Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume ( London, 1941), p. 155. 3 Ibid. 4 See note 1, above. 1

-1-

of Laird, 5 Laing, 6 and N. K. Smith, 7 to mention but three of Green's successors who have persisted in finding Hume's thought to be something other than the culmination of a played-out "philosophy based on the abstraction of feeling." 8 The virtual obsolescence of Green's approach to Hume leaves, however, only three major efforts among those of Hume's countrymen, in dealing with the philosophy of Hume as a whole, namely, those of Laird, Laing, and N. K. Smith. And as among these three, research into Hume's theory of the "passions" and of morals comes properly into its own, as regards ambition and comprehensiveness, only with N. K. Smith Philosophy of David Hume. Since the present essay is the result of a critical study of the psychology of the emotions and of the moral theory expounded by Hume in Books II and III of the Treatise--but a study conducted from a viewpoint other than Smith's--it is appropriate that some explanation be given of its relation to the materials which Smith has already investigated at some length. The ultimate aim of Smith's work is the same as that of the present essay; for each constitutes an attempt to understand the Humean position more thoroughly and to evaluate it more accurately. But there is considerable difference in the method by which this understanding is sought, as indeed there is also considerable difference in the results obtained. It will be most convenient to indicate first the difference in method. Smith's method consists in regarding the Treatise as a kind of riddle or cipher, to which there exists a "key" that in some way serves to unlock the whole. 9 The term "key" is Smith's own, 10 and what is offered by way of key is a certain series of contentions which are properly biographical in nature and which amount to a conjectural sketch of the

John Laird, Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature ( New York), 1931. B. M. Laing, David Hume ( London, 1932). 7 Smith, op. cit., in note 2, above. 8 See note 1, above. 9 Smith, op. cit. 10 Ibid., p. 10: "This was the spirit in which the youthful Hume set himself to the composition of the Treatise; and we are little likely to discover the key to it, unless we recognize that it was from the doctrines constituting his own distinctive supplement to the theory of ideas that the chief sources of his inspiration were drawn . . ." 5 6

origin of the Treatise in the mind of David Hume. We may call these contentions the "Hutchesonianorigin thesis." According to this sketch, Hume's first philosophical -2thoughts were directed to moral rather than to epistemological problems, 11 and "as a consequence," Smith adds, Books II and III of the Treatise were composed prior in time to the "working out of the doctrines dealt with in Book I."12 While thus preoccupied with the problems of morals, Hume came under the "direct influence" of Francis Hutcheson and was led by him to recognise that judgments of moral approval and disapproval, and indeed judgments of value of whatever type, are based not on rational insight or on evidence, but solely on feeling; and . . . what then 'open'd up to (him) a new Scene of Thought, which transported (him) beyond Measure' (giving birth in due course to the Treatise), was the discovery that this point of view could be carried over into the theoretical domain, and could there be employed in the solution of several of the chief problems to which Locke and Berkeley had drawn attention, but to which they had not been able to give a satisfactory answer. 13 This sketch of the genesis of the Treatise is the "key" to the philosophy of Hume offered by Smith. It may, at first glance, appear to consist in an allegation of historical fact, namely, that Hume's first philosophical reflections concerned the problems of morals, that his general conception of the basis of morality was formed under influence derived from Hutcheson, and that there followed (in time) the discovery that this same conception could (somehow) serve also to provide the solution of problems outside the domain of morals. Closer inspection of Smith's contentions shows, however, that there are actually involved two quite distinct points concerning the Treatise. One is the historical conjecture that Books II and III are chronologically prior, as regards their actual composition, to Book I. The other is an interpretation--already present by implication in the historical conjecture--of the nature of the doctrines constituting these Books: according to this interpretation, the doctrines expressed in Book I constitute a specific application of more general doctrines which happen to have been arrived at previously by Hume in the course of his reflections. The distinctness of these points from one another cannot be overemphasized. In general, it is impossible to suppose that merely because the construction of one set of statements is chronologically prior to that 11

Smith, op. cit., p. vi.

12

Ibid.

13

Ibid., p.13.

of another set, anything follows concerning the meaning of either set, or concerning their logical relationship to -3-

each other. Whether or not the doctrines of the Treatise, Book I, constitute the application to nonmoral problems of general principles enunciated (in Books II and III) in the context of moral theory is an issue which can be settled only by inspection of the doctrines in question, that is, by inspection of the statements that constitute these Books. If the set of statements composing Book I of the Treatise is indeed logically related to Books II and III in some such manner as was just indicated, it is so related regardless of the date of its composition or of theirs; and if it is not so related, then, equally regardless of dates, it is not so related. And to argue that the statements composing the three Books of the Treatise cannot be understood unless they are regarded as expressing doctrines logically related in some particular manner is to indulge in an obvious petitio. If the statements are in fact logically related in some particular manner, then, to be sure, they cannot be correctly understood except as standing in this relation; but the question as to the existence of the relation is to be settled ultimately--if at all--by reference to the statements, not by reference (and conjectural reference, at that) to the chronology of their composition or to the adolescent preoccupations of their author. Smith's "key" is a peculiar one indeed, for it consists in a conjectural account of the genesis of certain doctrines which is supposed to furnish the correct method of interpreting these doctrines, while at the same time it evidently constitutes in itself an interpretation of the same doctrines, namely, that they represent the extension to epistemological and metaphysical problems of principles originally advanced in the context of moral and psychological theory. Since it is plainly impracticable to discuss the genesis of the doctrines of the Treatise without there being some commitment made as to the nature and content of these doctrines, the effort to use information concerning the genesis of Hume's philosophy as an aid to its interpretation may be expected to move in a circle of petitio's; and in Smith's case this expectation is fulfilled. So much may be seen from inspection of the evidence offered for the Hutchesonian-origin thesis, to which we now turn. In support of this thesis, Smith adduces as "external evidence" 14 a well-known "draft letter which Hume composed while in London in March or April 1734, i.e., a few months prior to his settling in -4-

14

Ibid., pp. 14 ff.: "The External Evidence in regard to the Hutchesonian Origins of the Treatise."

France for the completion of the Treatise." There is no need to burden the present text with quotation of this letter, which is easily available to the scholarly world. 15 According to Smith, 16 there are two main points which stand out in this letter, and which bear on the origins of Hume's new way of thinking. There is first Hume's claim, thrice repeated, to novelty in his teaching--a 'new Medium', a 'new Scene of Thought', "scribled many a Quire of Paper, in which there is nothing contain'd but my own Inventions"--recurring in the Introduction to the Treatise as the claim that he is establishing metaphysics "on a foundation almost entirely new." Could these statements have been made, if his fundamental assumptions had been simply those of Locke and Berkeley? Could Hume have written in this way, or of the 'transports' which the 'new scene of thought' had opened out to him, had he been engaged merely in working out the consequences of Locke's principles? At the least he must be referring to his novel teaching in regard to the causal problems, as supplying the key to his treatment of 'inference', viz. as not being inference at all, but a feeling in the mind, and yet a feeling that is or involves belief. Smith's tacit substitution of the term "metaphysics" for Hume's expression "a compleat system of the sciences" 17 may be ignored, as may also the question whether according to Hume's published theory of causal inference, inference is not inference, but a feeling in the mind. And it may further be disregarded that it is mere conjecture that in the letter of 1734 "at the least he [i.e., Hume] must be referring to his novel teaching in regard to the causal problems." 18 What cannot be overlooked, however, is the fact that there has been nothing yet advanced which even suggests, not to say renders it probable, that Hume, influenced by Hutcheson, came to regard value judgments as based "solely on feeling" and that he subsequently discovered that "this point of view could be carried over into the theoretical domain." As for the question-intended to be rhetorical-whether the expressions quoted by -5As through J. Y. T. Greig, in whose The Letters of Hume ( Oxford, 1932) the text is quoted as letter 3 (Vol. I, pp. 12-18). 16 Smith, "op. cit.," p. 17. 17 Treatise, Introd., p. xx: "In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new . . ." 18 Cf. J. Y. T. Greig, "David Hume" ( London, 1931), pp. 77 ff.: "In the spring of 1729 he [i.e., Hume] found the new medium, or, to quote his own words to Cheyne, 'There seemed to be opened up to me a new scene of thought, which transported me beyond measure, and made me, with an ardour natural to young men, throw up every other pleasure or business to apply entirely to it.' It is not certain what he meant by this. Presumably, however, he is talking of the theory of causation . . ." 15

Smith from Hume could have been used by the latter had his "fundamental assumptions" been simply those of Locke and Berkeley, the answer is that they could certainly have been so used; and that the question whether or not there exist any such assumptions, not to mention the question whether they are identical with those of Locke and Berkeley, can be answered only by inspection of the philosophical statements contained in Hume's published works, not by reference to Hume's correspondence. It is clearly as possible for an author to misrepresent himself as it is for him to misrepresent (or be misrepresented by) others. Hume, that is to say, when he imagined that he was 'innovating in all the sublimest parts of philosophy,' 19 could very well have been merely repeating the assumptions of Locke and Berkeley. But whether (and if so, to what extent) Hume's statements constitute in fact such a repetition, can be decided only by examination of the statements, and not by reference to other statements the subject matter of which--not to say their truth or falsity--is only dubiously established. The second evidential characteristic of the letter in question is, according to Smith, the "prominence given [in it] to the problems of morals." 20 We may pass over the question whether Hume's use of the term "morality" in two of the twelve paragraphs of the letter in question is correctly described as "prominence given to the problems of morals." 21 This second piece of "external evidence" is at any rate used by Smith, together with the first piece above examined, as the basis for the following statement: 22 Thus far, therefore, there is nothing to prevent, and everything to favour, our holding that it was in connexion with the treatment of the problems of morals that his [i.e., Hume's] new philosophy first began to formulate itself in his mind--provided, of course, that it can be shown that there is a main road leading from his ethical teaching to what is central and distinctive in his general philosophy. Now it may be conceded that there is nothing to prevent our holding the biographical opinion that Hume's first philosophical thoughts were directed to the problems of morals. It is also safe to say that there is nothing to prevent, and, on the evidential basis constituted by the portion of Hume's correspondence in question, everything to favor, our holding a quite different biographical opinion, namely that Hume's first philosophical thoughts were directed to the problems of causal inference. -6-

See J. Y. T. Greig, The Letters of Hume, Vol. I, p. 187. Smith, "op. cit.," p. 17. 21 For the two occurrences of the term "morality," see Greig The Letters of Hume, Vol. I, pp. 13 f. and p. 16. 22 Smith, "op. cit.," p. 17. 19 20

For if, as Greig presumes 23 and Smith asserts, the expression "new Scene of Thought" refers "at the least to Hume's theory of causal inference" (as it is to be found in Hume's published works), then the evidence available for the latter biographical opinion is just as strong as that provided by Smith for the former; for the expression "new Scene of Thought" enjoys a prominence in the text of the letter of 1734 equal to that enjoyed by the term "morality." The plain fact of the matter is, however, that the precise meaning of Hume's statement embracing the expression "new Scene of Thought" is unknown and can be the subject only of conjecture. To introduce a subject of conjecture into a text as proof of another conjecture is to adopt a liberal canon of proof indeed. If it is mere conjecture 24 that the expression "new Scene of Thought" denotes the theory of causal inference which we know through the Treatise, it is even more conjectural that it denotes anything else. But let us return to the Hutchesonian-origin thesis, which reads, it will be recalled, as follows: 25 . . . it was under the direct influence of Francis Hutcheson that he [i.e., Hume] was led to recognise that judgments of moral approval and disapproval, and indeed judgments of value of whatever type, are based not on rational insight or on evidence, but solely on feeling; and that what then "open'd up to (him) a new Scene of Thought, which transported (him) beyond Measure," (giving birth in due course to the Treatise), was the discovery -723

See note 18.

To the literature of conjecture concerning the precise intention of Hume in his use of the expression "new Scene of Thought" we may here add a further conjecture--not with the notion, however, that any such conjectures can actually illuminate the Humean philosophy. The famous expression occurs in a letter of 1734 as follows: "After much study, & Reflection on this, [i.e., "some new Medium, by which Truth might be establisht"] at last, when I was about 18 Years of Age, there seem'd to be open'd up to me a new Scene of Thought, which transported me beyond Measure, & made me, with an Ardor natural to young men, throw up every other Pleasure or Business to apply entirely to it" ( Greig, The Letters of Hume, Vol. I, p. 13). Now, the statement immediately succeeding this statement, but not often quoted in connection with it, is as follows: "The Law, which was Business I design'd to follow, appear'd nauseous to me, & I cou'd think of no other way of pushing my Fortune in the World, but that of a Scholar & Philosopher" (ibid.). It is possible to infer from these statements, taken in conjunction, that Hume means only that he foresaw his future as devoted to reflective and scholarly pursuits, as opposed to the business of a law practice; no inference whatever need be drawn as to a specific philosophical tenet or set of tenets. 24

25

Smith, "op. cit.," pp. 12 f.

that this point of view could be carried over into the theoretical domain, and could there be employed in the solution of several of the chief problems to which Locke and Berkeley had drawn attention, but to which they had not been able to give a satisfactory answer. It is clear that in this passage Smith takes the "new Scene of Thought" to be identical with the field wherein the Hutchesonian point of view received its alleged application to problems other than moral problems; and it may be presumed that this field is regarded by Smith as including the problem of causal inference. This presumption is verified when Smith later claims of the expression "new Scene of Thought" that by means of it 26 at the least [i.e., Hume] must be referring to his novel teaching in regard to the causal problems, as supplying the key to his treatment of 'inference', viz. as not being inference at all, but a feeling in the mind, and yet a feeling that is or involves belief. From this statement it is to be seen that the novelty of Hume's treatment of causal inference consists in the fact that this treatment is constituted by carrying over the Hutchesonian viewpoint concerning value-judgments into the field of "the causal problems," so that Smith's citation of Hume's reference to a "new Scene of Thought" is clearly a petitio, and the expression "new Scene of Thought" is implicitly identified, on the basis of no evidence at all, with "Hume's treatment of the causal problems as influenced by Hutcheson," that is, as being constituted by the carrying over into the epistemological domain of principles originally enunciated in the field of moral theory. According to Smith, there is further "external evidence" 27 for the thesis in question. It is perhaps credible by now, however, that 26

Ibid., p. 17.

Such as " Hume's reference, in the Introduction to the Treatise, to those who had preceded him in the enterprise to which he is setting his hand--'some late philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing.' He [i.e., Hume] enumerates them as 'Mr. Locke, my Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Mandeville, Mr. Hutcheson, Dr. Butler, &c.'" ( Smith, "op. cit.," p. 18.) Smith points out that "Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler all agree in advocating a doctrine of moral sense, i.e., an immediate awareness of the distinction between virtue and vice, an awareness akin more to feeling than to reason" ( op. cit., p. 19). But he does not make it clear that Hume's reference to these individuals is no proof of anything whatever, for he does not point out why, if the inclusion of Hutcheson's name in the list is proof of the Hutchesonian origin of the Treatise, the inclusion of Dr. Butler's name is not proof of a Butlerian origin, or the inclusion of Locke's name a proof of a Lockeian origin. 27

no amount of such evidence can establish contentions the ultimate validation of which can come about only through reference to the statements constituting Hume's philosophy; and surely of this kind is the contention that the doctrines of the Treatise, Book I, embody the extension and application of principles laid down in Books II and III. It is scarcely surprising, then, to find Smith saying 28 of the Hutchesonian-origin thesis that what little external evidence is available . . . supports this contention; but the main evidence must be looked for in the Treatise itself, and will come up for consideration, in due course, as we proceed. But it is surprising that it should now be regarded as necessary to look within the Treatise for evidence with which to establish contentions the supposed function of which was originally to furnish the key to the riddle of the Treatise and throw needed light upon the way in which its various constituent statements are to be understood. For the Treatise of Human Nature is constituted by a certain group of statements, and it is plain that Smith does not intend to introduce any of these statements as "evidence" except under the presupposition that these statements are correctly understood as regards their meaning. But it is, then, not clear what philosophical purpose is served by assertions such as those making up the Hutchesonian-origin thesis, inasmuch as such theses presuppose the fundamental critical questions concerning the meaning and validity of the philosophical position examined as having been answered or, at least, as being answerable independently of the evidential role of this text in support of such special theses. And because of human fallibility alone it must sometimes occur that a philosophical statement is introduced as evidence for a special thesis under an interpretation other than that which careful inspection of its original context justifies. An example of such an occurrence is the interpretation placed by Smith upon what he refers to as Hume's "fundamental maxim that 'reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.'" 29 The full context of this often-quoted statement is as follows: Thus it appears, that the principle, which opposes our passion, cannot be the same with reason, and is only call'd so in an improper sense. We speak not -9-

28

Smith, "op. cit.," p. 42.

29

Ibid., p. 45. Note added to this page by Smith: "Italics not in text."

strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. 30 With respect to the meaning of the last of these statements, and in particular with respect to the meaning of the phrase "ought only to be," Laird's opinion seems correct that "Hume's point was, surely, that any theory of obligation would be mythical if it represented reason as other than it was." 31 In other words, the point in question has to do with the representation of reason, that is, with the question as to what reason is properly to be called, as to the sense properly to be ascribed to the term "reason" in view of the fact that reason is the slave of the passions, and as to how we are to speak about reason strictly and philosophically. Hume's point in this passage is simply that since reason is as a matter of fact--and this is what his analysis has shown 32 --the slave of the passions, the term "reason" ought not to be used in discourse that claims to be "strict" and "philosophical" as if it were synonymous with the term "the principle, which opposes our passion"; and the term ought not so to be used because so to use it is to speak loosely and unphilosophically. The "ought" applies, that is, not to the alleged slavery of reason, but to the way in which, in view of the de facto existence of this slavery, we are (at least in precise discourse) to refer to reason; it applies, that is, to usage of the term "reason," not to the denotation of this term, and Hume's statement is thus semantically equivalent to the two assertions (i) Reason is the slave of the passions; (ii) The term "reason" ought never (in precise discourse) so to be used that from this usage it can be deduced that reason is not the slave of the passions. If, however, this interpretation is correct, an elaborate theory constructed by Smith which reads (on the sole basis of a different interpretation of this single Humean utterance and without further independent textual confirmation) many novel "normative" doctrines into the Treatise, must be regarded as lacking foundation. For, according to Smith's interpretation, Hume's statement -10-

Treatise, Book I, Part III, sect. iii, p. 415. Italics not in Hume's text. Laird, "Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature" ( New York, 1931), p. 203. Italics not in Laird's text. 32 See chapter ii, § 2 and chapter iii, § 1. 30 31

that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions . . ." is semantically equivalent to the two assertions (ia) Reason is the slave of the passions; (iia) Reason ought to be the slave of the passions and ought to be nothing else, (or alternatively, reason is obligated to be the slave of the passions and is obligated to be nothing else). The difference between statement (iia) and statement (ii) is to be carefully noted. For, whereas in statement (ii) it is of a certain usage of the term "reason" that it is asserted that it ought to possess a certain characteristic, in statement (iia) it is of the denotation of the term "reason" that it is asserted that it ought to possess a certain characteristic. If an assertion is called "normative" when it states of a subject S that S ought (or is obligated) to possess a certain characteristic, then statements (ii) and (iia) are different normative statements, as differing, namely, with respect to their subjects. Now the aim of Smith's theory which we are at present discussing, is to justify, on the basis of his interpretation of Hume's statement that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions," the attribution to Hume of certain interesting normative doctrines as follows: 33 . . . that it is only causal inferences, i.e., that it is only those customs which can survive reflective scrutiny, which ought to be relied upon. Here, too, when he is viewing Nature in this normative fashion, he [i.e., Hume] views human nature as being the agency through which it acts. The 'natural beliefs,' in their character and functions, correspond in the theoretical field to the passions and sentiments in the field of morals. To such beliefs reason, Hume teaches, ought to be subservient. All too frequently we proceed otherwise, accepting as of equal authority what are no more than mere chance influences, and so bring 'reason' into conflict with itself, because into conflict with the uniformities which more widely prevail. When Hume says 'ought,' he means, of course, an 'ought' which he interprets in a sheerly naturalistic manner; it is a hypothetical, not a categorical 'ought.' The beliefs which ought to be accepted are, he teaches, beliefs that Nature itself marks out for us. In their fundamental forms, as 'natural' beliefs, we have no choice but to accept them; they impose themselves upon the mind. And as regards the derivative beliefs to which our specific experiences give rise, these too (like the artificial virtues in the field of morals) are determined for us: Nature has endowed us with the reflective powers which, when rightly directed, commit us to them. For Hume, that is to say, logic and ethics rest on one and the same basis: experience, as extended in and through our reflective activities, is normative for both. -11-

33

Smith, "op. cit.," p. 388. See also ibid., pp. 68, 143, 448, and 491.

For the attribution of this complex of doctrines no direct textual support is given by Smith. Such support as is obtainable from Smith's text consists rather in an argument in which the following are the chief steps. I. It is stated 34 that "the adventurous and difficult enterprise to which Hume had found himself committed" [in the composition of the Treatise] is "in effect nothing less than a resolute reversing--in respect of all matters of fact, though not of 'knowledge'--of the roles hitherto ascribed to reason and to feeling respectively." II. From the foregoing 35 (which is, be it noted, a consequence of the Hutchesonianorigin thesis) it is inferred that "If this be a correct reading of Hume's purposes, the conclusion to which we are brought is that what is central in his teaching is not Locke's or Berkeley's 'ideal' theory and the negative consequences, important as these are for Hume, which follow from it, but the doctrine that the determining influence in human, as in other forms of animal life, is feeling, not reason or understanding, i.e., not evidence, whether a priori or empirical, and therefore also not ideas--at least not 'ideas' as hitherto understood. 'Passion' is Hume's most general title for the instincts, propensities, feelings, emotions and sentiments, as well as for the passions ordinarily so called; and belief, he teaches, is a passion. Accordingly the maxim which is central in his ethics--'Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions'--is no less central in his theory of knowledge, assuming there the form: 'Reason is and ought to be subordinate to our natural beliefs.' In short, by assuming that according to Hume, instances of belief are passions, Smith deduces that since Hume states that reason ought to be the slave of the passions, Hume "teaches" also that reason ought to be the slave of certain beliefs designated as "natural," one consequence of this "teaching" being that "it is only causal inferences . . . which ought to be relied upon." The present discussion need not be delayed by investigation of the obvious lack of symmetry between Hume's contentions regarding the slavery of reason to the passions and the alleged bondage of reason to the "natural beliefs," such as the belief in causality. For if the subject of the normative part of the statement of Hume in question, that is, if the subject of statement (ii) above is, as interpreted with reference to its original context by Laird and the present author, not reason at all but rather the correct usage of the term "reason," Smith's argument fails, there being no textual evidence independently of his interpretation of this statement that Hume ever 'views Nature in a normative fashion.' It is to be noted -1234 35

Ibid., p. 11. Ibid.

that at one point Smith renders the "maxim which is central in his [i.e., Hume's] ethics" as "reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions"; 36 whereas Hume's text reads "ought only to be the slave." The omission of the adverb by Smith is significant. For if Hume had intended that reason itself not only is but also ought to be the slave, the addition of the adverb "only" would scarcely have been intelligible; since except by misrepresentation, something cannot possibly possess a character incompatible with those which analysis discloses it to have. The presence of the "only" in Hume's text is precisely what gives his statement the force of the contention "reason is, and ought only to be regarded as being the slave of the passions." If analysis discloses that reason is, in some defined sense, the slave of the passions, 37 it is only through the medium of erring discourse that reason can be otherwise: the normative assertion has to do not with reason itself but with our way of referring to reason, which ought of course to be the true way, the truth being--according to Hume--that reason is not identical with "the principle, which opposes our passion." 38 But even were it permissible to say that according to Hume, specific beliefs are passions, it obviously does not follow from the contention that the term "reason" ought not so to be used as to imply that reason is not the slave of the passions, that to certain beliefs reason itself, in some sense or other, ought to be subservient. This would follow (on the assumption that according to Hume specific beliefs are passions) only if, as has herein been denied, the purport of Hume's statement had been that reason, that is, the denotation of the term "reason," ought to be the slave of the passions. It has been noted that for his statements attributing to Hume such normative doctrines as that "the beliefs which ought to be accepted are beliefs that Nature has marked out for us," Smith gives no support in the form of references to Hume's text; the only basis he offers is the interpretation noted above of what is termed by Smith "Hume's fundamental maxim." It is indeed to be wondered whether Hume would have contended anything so idle as that we ought to accept beliefs concerning which he himself "teaches" 39 that "in their fundamental forms, as 'natural' beliefs, we have no choice but to accept them; they impose themselves upon the mind." -13-

See p. 12 above. See pp. 73 ff. 38 Treatise, Book II, Part III, sect. iii, p. 415. 39 See Smith as quoted, p. 11. 36 37

But there are other obstacles to compressing the Humean philosophy into a single, normative formula. No textual support is given, for example, for the premise indispensable to this attempt, namely, that "belief, he [i.e., Hume] teaches, is a passion." 40 The context of this assertion is: 41 "'Passion' is Hume's most general title for the instincts, propensities, feelings, emotions and sentiments, as well as for the passions ordinarily so called; and belief, he [i.e., Hume] teaches, is a passion." If to "teach" is "explicitly to assert," then Hume does not "teach" that belief is a passion. Smith's warrant for the opposite assertion is not to be found among the statements of Hume. Rather, it consists solely in an implication of the two statements, (a) that according to Hume, belief is either an instinct, a propensity, a feeling, an emotion, or a sentiment; and (b) that these entities are in Hume's text referred to as "passions." For statement (b), no textual support is forthcoming. Even if true, however, statement (b) would fail to serve the purpose at hand. For in Hume's statement that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions," the reference of the term "passions" is without doubt to "the passions ordinarily so called": the statement occurs in Hume's treatise upon the passions ordinarily so called, and Smith gives no evidence that the term is there intended by Hume to include belief-feelings. 42 We are, therefore, compelled to conclude that Smith has not escaped the danger of misinterpreting certain of Hume's statements in the effort to employ them as evidence on behalf of special theses which are radically unfitted for the purpose of being "genuinely of assistance in the critical study of Hume's central doctrines." 43 Now, the present essay is the result of critical study of the philosophy expounded by Hume in the Treatise, Books II and III, and its aim, like that of Smith's investigation, is better to understand in what this philosophy consists and how it is more adequately to be evaluated. The method of the present investigation, however, is not identical with the method an instance of -14-

Smith, op. cit., p. 11. Ibid. 42 If indeed any such entities are supposed in the Treatise. 40 41

Smith, op. cit., p. vii: "The value of my interpretation of Hume's teaching must ultimately depend upon the extent to which I may be judged to have succeeded in showing that it is genuinely of assistance in the critical study of Hume's central doctrines, as enabling us to understand better what these doctrines precisely are, and how far Hume's arguments in support of them can, or cannot, be allowed to be philosophically cogent." 43

which has been examined above. For the present investigation does not consist in the employment of the statements constituting the indicated portions of Hume's philosophy as evidence for special theses concerning the temporal order of the composition of Hume's statements; neither, on the other hand, does it employ conjectures about this order as a means of finding a "key" by which the totality of these statements may be unlocked. Indeed, the present essay does not begin with the assumption that to these statements there is a single "key" in any sense by means of which this metaphor may be explained. 44 It may naturally be assumed that these statements are unified in ways less trivial than that constituted by their common authorship, that they possess some unity of theoretic aim and some degree of logical interconnection and subordination. But this assumption can be tested as well as given concrete content only by means of independent reference to its subject matter; used ab initio as determining the interpretation of this subject matter, such an assumption effectively prevents the critical study of a philosophical position by begging major questions of meaning and validity. To say this is to say no more than that judgments as to the kind and extent of logical interconnection subsisting among the statements of a given philosopher presuppose the elucidation of these statements as an accomplished fact, and not vice versa. It would be a matter of the greatest convenience for students of the history of ideas if the propositions constituting the classical positions in philosophy were unified systematically and logically in such a manner that a few components would serve as "keys" to the rest. Whether this convenience is available, however, can be known only after an evidenced, elucidative examination of these positions,--an examination, that is, which assumes ab initio only that the formulation of critical generalizations upon a historical position in philosophy ought to be a cautious process, the results of which are both verifiable through reference to the statements which are its subject matter and are also accompanied by an elucidative examination of them. Since the method of the present essay differs thus from the approach to the Humean philosophy -15-

As (e.g.) a statement understanding of which is the necessary condition for comprehension of the totality of the philosophical statements in question, or as a statement (or group of statements) implicitly (or explicitly) contained in this totality, and from which by logic the remaining members of this totality may be derived, or as a statement (or group of statements) which may usefully be designated as constituting the "real position" of their author.

44

typified by employment of the Hutchesonian-origin thesis, the results may be expected likewise to differ. By way of validating this expectation, we shall set forth the estimate of the net theoretic accomplishment of Treatise, Books II and III, arrived at by the present study; and in the chapters following the present introduction, we shall present the evidence for this estimate. § 2: HUME'S THEORETIC AIM, METHOD, AND SUBJECT MATTER The question of Hume's theoretic aim has been investigated by W. B. Elkin, 45 who writes In the advertisement to the earlier work, [i.e., the Treatise] Hume said that his "design" was sufficiently explained in the introduction. Nevertheless, his readers have never arrived at any general agreement regarding what his design, or purpose, was. Entrance into debate upon this topic or decision between the alternatives instanced by Elkin 46 seems unnecessary. For knowledge of Hume's theoretic aim, for example, in the composition of the Treatise, takes the place neither of understanding the specific statements which constitute this work nor of recognizing their validity or invalidity. Hume's aim may have been "the destruction of what is to him superstition." 47 If, however, Hume sought to achieve this end by advancing propositions concerning psychological phenomena, we have still to deal with these propositions as constituting psychological theory, and as being true or false according to whether the objects of which they claim that they possess (or do not possess) certain properties, do or do not in fact possess these properties, and not according to whether there is or is not a causal -16-

W. B. Elkin, in Hume: The Relation of the Treatise of Human Nature to the Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding ( New York, 1904), p. 24. 46 Elkin, op. cit., pp. 24 f.: "Thus Mackintosh asserts: '( Hume) aimed at proving, not that nothing was known, but that nothing could be known;-from the structure of the understanding to demonstrate, that we are doomed for ever to dwell in absolute and universal ignorance.' Priestley: 'According to ( Hume's) own very frank confession, his object was mere literary reputation. It was not the pursuit of truth, or the advancement of virtue or happiness.' Stirling: ' Hume's final aim, of course, is the destruction of what is to him superstition.' Huxley: 'The aim of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft is essentially the same as that of the Treatise of Human Nature, by which indeed Kant was led to develop that critical philosophy with which his name and fame are indissolubly bound up.' Stewart: '( Hume's) aim is to establish a universal skepticism, and to produce in the reader a complete distrust in his own faculties.'" 47 See note 46, above. 45

relation between construction of these propositions and Hume's intention to destroy superstition. As will be seen from the following chapters, the range of the subject matter of Books II and III of the Treatise is wide, encompassing as it does such a diversity of objects as human (and animal) emotions, volition, virtue, vice, the constitution of property rights, and various political phenomena. But this diversity is not incompatible with the subsistence of a certain unity among its components, in accordance with the way in which this variegated subject matter is represented in Hume's statements. For, according to these statements, there are causal connections between, for example, the constitution of property rights on the one hand, and certain regular processes of human emotion and ideation on the other. Indeed, it is precisely this relation between statements assertive of the existence of regular processes of human emotion and ideation on the one hand, and statements descriptive of specific phenomena as instances of these general processes on the other, which is, as it is the aim of the following chapters to show, the most widely occurrent relation of logical subordination to be found in these portions of Hume's philosophy. Thus the double-association theory 48 of the "indirect" passions of pride and humility, love and hatred, is constituted by a group of causal laws descriptive of regular processes of emotion and ideation of which the central member is the following statement: That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion: From this double relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is derivld (286). Further laws are those descriptive of the association of ideas by resemblance, contiguity, and causation, 49 and of the association of impressions by resemblance in sensation (i.e., pleasantness or unpleasantness) 50 or in direction and tendency, 51 together with the statement that these two kinds of association "very much assist and forward each other."52 -17-

See chap. i, § § 1-4. See pp. 33 f. 50 See p. 33. 51 See pp. 59 f. 52 Treatise, p. 284. 48 49

Hume's description of the causes of pride and humility, 53 while consisting chiefly in the citation of empirical evidence for the statement that "the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion" (286), also introduces rules descriptive of the varying effects upon the passions in question of variation in the associative force of the relations of ideas between the stimulus-object and "the object, which nature has attributed to the passion" (286). Such a rule is the statement that "the same object causes a greater or smaller degree of pride, not only in proportion to the encrease or decrease of its qualities, but also to the distance or nearness of the relation" (306). The influence of relations of comparison is alluded to in the theory of pride and humility 54 but is discussed in detail later, 55 the following rule being given: "objects appear greater or less by a comparison with others" (375). Associated in Hume's account with this rule is the "general maxim, that no object is presented to the senses, nor image form'd in the fancy, but what is accompany'd with some emotion or movement of spirits proportion'd to it" 56 (373). In the theory of love and hatred57 another rule is given, namely that "the imagination passes easily from obscure to lively ideas, but with difficulty from lively to obscure" (339). In this context there are also introduced rules concerning the kinds of transition from one passion to another.58 Some use ill the explanation of specific phenomena is made by Hume of the principle that emotional excitement is pleasant. 59 In the same context the rule is introduced that the effect of the familiarity of objects is that when familiar, 60 "they appear in a stronger light; [and] are more agreeable" (355). Further rules given in this context are to the effect that "whatever is related to us is conceiv'd in a lively manner" (353), and that custom always "facilitates the entrance, and strengthens the conception of any object" (353). The general description of the process of sympathy is given below 61 and need not be summarized here. The extent of Hume's references to this process, in explanations of phenomena as diverse -18See chap. i, § 3. See p. 37. 55 See pp. 57 ff. 56 See p. 57. 57 See chap. i, § 4. 58 See pp. 46 ff. 59 See p. 51; cf. also pp. 64 ff. 60 See pp. 51 f. 61 See pp. 41 ff. Cf. also pp. 154 ff., below. 53 54

as the effect of praise upon vanity, on the one hand, and of moral approbation and disapprobation, on the other, will be evident from the following chapters. Hume's account of mixed emotions involving love and hatred introduces the rules that fusion is limited to impressions, 62 that sympathy may be limited or extensive, 63 and that "objects always produce by comparison a sensation directly contrary to their original one" (392). 64 The width of the range of phenomena causally explained in terms of the principles of comparison introduced in the account, encompassing as it does such diverse items as the expatriate's preference for anonymity and the alleged fact that the losers in intestine conflicts prefer to submit to foreign rule rather than to that of their victorious countrymen will be evident from the following chapters. 65 Like the theory of the indirect passions, Hume's theory (i.e., causal analysis) of the will and of the direct passions introduces a large number of empirical rules descriptive of regular mental processes. Indeed, apart from the arguments advanced to support the view that the will is regularly determined by motives 66 and to deny that reason (in the sense either of the apprehension of intensional connections of meaning on the one hand, or of causal judgments in general on the other) is a determinant of action, 67 the text is divided, on the one hand, between the statement of causal laws concerning the effect upon the vehemence of the passions of the mixture of emotions, 68 of the customary repetition of actions or ideas, 69 and of imaginative "contiguity, and distance in space and time" 70 (427), and, on the other, the analysis of the causal properties of hope, fear, and the love of truth. 71 The general character of these statements having been pointed out, however, their summarization at this point is unnecessary. It may be mentioned here, however, that certain of the phenomena analyzed by Hume in Treatise, Book I, are to be regarded as -19-

See p. 54. See pp. 61 ff. 64 See pp. 63 ff. 65 See p. 44 and also see Treatise, p. 379. 66 See chap. ii, § 1. 67 See chap. ii, § 2 and chap. iii, § 1. 68 See pp. 76 f. 69 See p. 77. 70 See pp. 78 ff. 71 See chap. ii, § 3. 62 63

being regularly in concomitance with the emotional and imaginative processes analyzed in Books II and III. In particular, when passions are referred to as excited by the ideas of their stimulusobjects, these ideas are to be regarded as having the vivacity which constitutes them beliefs in the existence of the objects which as ideas they represent.72 And on the other hand, there is, according to Hume, a reciprocal influence of passion upon belief. 73 Prominent in Hume's theory is the proposition that the ultimate objects of moral approval are motives and dispositional qualities of agents, their actions being praised or blamed derivatively as causal signs of the existence of these motives and qualities. 74 This statement in Hume's text is, as will be seen, not an axiomatic principle but an empirical generalization based upon observation of the way in which moral evaluation actually occurs. The propositions (a) that there is no unreflective or "natural" inclination to acts of justice 75 and (b) that "our sense of duty always follows the common and natural course of the passions" (484), 76 are similarly statements for which purely empirical reasons are adduced. Hume's speculative account of the formation of property rights consists largely in an empirical and historical hypothesis as to the social effects of the passions constituting what we will term "directed interest" 77 and of their relationship to certain regular processes of the imagination. A typical instance of such relationships is afforded by Hume's hypothesis concerning the selection of present possession as the temporally first specification of the right of ownership. 78 In this instance, it is directed interest, according to the hypothesis, which constitutes the willingness of men to abide by some property convention, while choice of the particular method -20-

Treatise, Book II, Part III, sect. vi, p. 427: "I have already observ'd, that belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression. This vivacity is a requisite circumstance to the exciting all our passions, the calm as well as the violent; nor has a mere fiction of the imagination any considerable influence upon either of them. 'Tis too weak to take any hold of the mind, or be attended with emotion." 73 Treatise, Book I, Part III, sect. x, p. 120: "As belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions, so the passions in their turn are very favourable to belief; and not only such facts as convey agreeable emotions, but very often such as give pain, do upon that account become more readily the objects of faith and opinion." 74 See p. 101. 75 See chap. iii, § 2. 76 See pp. 105 f. 77 See pp. 115 f. 78 See pp. 116 ff. 72

of assigning the title in question is explicable from two general principles, namely (i) that custom "not only reconciles us to any thing we have long enjoy'd, but even gives us an affection for it, and makes us prefer it to other objects, which may be more valuable, but are less known to us" (503) ; and (ii) that "the mind has a natural propensity to join relations, especially resembling ones, and finds a kind of fitness and uniformity in such an union" (509, n.). An analogous instance in which the same propensity is described as operating may be found later in connection with the magisterial right of succession. 79 Our purpose at present is not, however, to make an exhaustive compilation of the various processes of thought and emotion whose existence is asserted or implied by Hume but rather to give, by means of examples, concrete content to the notion--for which we have claimed preëminence in Books II and III of the Treatise--of a description of regular processes of emotion and ideation. 80 The evidence for the statement that the indicated portions of Hume's philosophy are unified in that they largely consist in the statement of general causal principles descriptive of such processes and in the causal explanation of specific phenomena in terms of them must, of course, be derived from the following chapters. If the statements descriptive of general processes of emotion and ideation, for example, statements descriptive of the process of sympathy, are regarded as constituting psychological theory (in a wide sense of the term), we arrive then at the conclusion that the major theoretic accomplishment of Books II and III of the Treatise is the absorption of moral theory 81 into empirical psychological theory through the representation of moral phenomena as exemplifying the causal laws which constitute this psychological theory. To designate the theory constituted by statements descriptive of regular processes of human emotion and ideation as "empirical" is to say, broadly, that these statements are nonanalytic and are verifiable (or the reverse) by observation. Adapting a remark of Boring concerning Wundt, we may say of Hume's procedure in the construction of statements concerning psychological processes that this method is "empirical but not experimental--if we may use the word empirical to designate the method by which the psychologizing philosopher consults his own experience and the casual experience of others without rigorous experimental control." 82 -21-

See pp. 144 ff. See p. 17. 81 Including the fundamentals of political theory. 82 E. G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology ( New York, 1929), p. 325. 79 80

The causal laws of emotion and ideation arrived at by Hume and in terms of which he endeavors systematically to explain what he takes to be the outstanding facts of moral evaluation are without exception descriptive and nonnormative. Hume is concerned, as it is hoped the following chapters will show, neither to defend nor to construct norms but to describe them and to show their genesis in what he regards as the fundamental traits of human nature. 83 He tells us, for example, the following: In the case of enormous tyranny and oppression, 'tis lawful to take arms even against supreme power; and . . . as government is a mere human invention for mutual advantage and security, it no longer imposes any obligation, either natural or moral, when once it ceases to have that tendency (563). This statement is, however, despite its possible appearance to the contrary, entirely nonnormative; it asserts only, as may be seen from the following study, a de facto property of human emotion and ideation; for the "natural obligation" of allegiance to the supreme power is constituted de facto by "directed interest," 84 just as the "moral obligation" is constituted by occurrent moral sentiments. The statement therefore does not tell us how we ought to -22-

In any evaluation of the contribution to philosophical thought represented by Books II and III of the Treatise, reference should be made to Hume's incisive objections to other points of view and to his pertinent challenges directed against alternative positions. Such a challenge is the demand for exhibition of the logical connections between propositions assertive of something that is the case on the one hand, and propositions assertive that something ought to be the case on the other hand, which must subsist if propositions of the latter kind are regarded as deducible from those of the former. (See Treatise, Book III, Part I, sect. i, pp. 469 f. and see also below, pp. 93 ff.) Another important challenge is constituted by Hume's arguments in refutation of the view that it is "possible, from reason alone, to distinguish betwixt moral good and evil" ( Treatise, p. 457). The effect of these arguments (see below, chap. iii, § 1), liberally interpreted, is to establish that "whether it is reasonable to be reasonable in sense IV--whether it is best for man to respect science, to develop his tastes in the light of information, to hold all his judgments on political institutions, as well as upon the subject-matter of the natural sciences, tentatively and subject to alteration, to sympathize and coöperate with his fellows in the advancement of such activities and the spread of such attitudes, to be kind and honest and 'decent'--is a question to which Reason I, II and III [i.e., reason as "science," "logic," and "philosophical analysis"] offer no answers." ( W. R. Dennes, in "The Appeal to Reason", Univ. Calif. Publ. Philos., Vol. XXI [ Berkeley, 1939], p. 38.) 83

84

See pp. 137 ff.

feel but rather how human beings as a matter of fact ordinarily do feel, under the indicated circumstances, and, of course, under the assumption of the reliability of its author's observations and empirical generalizations derived from them. Indeed, evaluation of the causal laws formulated by Hume and descriptive of regular processes of the emotions and of the associative patterning of ideas presupposes cognitive standards which are no different from those in accordance with which causal laws in the natural sciences generally are evaluated as regards their reliability. But, although certain prominent criticisms of Hume's procedure in the description of mental phenomena are perhaps misdirected, 85 the fact that Hume's results in this domain no longer possess scientific value can scarcely be denied. § 3: THE RELATION OF BOOKS II AND III TO BOOK I OF THE "TREATISE" An interesting and difficult question arises on the relation of the two Books studied in the present essay to the first Book of the Treatise. Concerning Books I and II, we have Hume's word that their subjects "make a compleat chain of reasoning by themselves," 86 while we have found reason, on the other hand, to indicate a certain continuity between Books II and III.87 Now the question of the unity and continuity of Books I and II cannot be settled except by study of the texts in question; for not only would an appeal to Hume's remark on this point be after all but an appeal to authority, but also this remark suffers considerably from vagueness of meaning. Although detailed study of Book I is beyond the scope of the present essay, a provisional attempt may be made to determine the kind and extent of such continuity as may exist between the unified discussions of Books II and III and the central discussion of Book I, which we here take to be the celebrated analysis of causation,--an analysis which is usually regarded as a -23-

Cf. P. Wheelwright (in "Introduction" to Berkeley: Principles and Hume: Treatise [ New York, 1935]), p. xxxii: ". . . Hume treats the mind as if it were composed of individual pieces of awareness. This theory of mental processes has been variously called 'associationism' and 'psychological atomism', and by Bergson the 'cinematograph theory', on the ground that it likens the mind to the distinct individual pictures which pass rapidly through a moving picture projection machine, whereas the mind is in reality more akin to the unbroken drama unfolding itself on the screen." 86 Hume, Advertisement to Books I and II of the Treatise (in Treatise, p. xi). 87 See pp. 21 f. 85

contribution to sceptical philosophy. 88 We have already proposed that the unity of the discussions of Books II and III consists in the predominance in each of the assertion of principles descriptive of certain regular processes of human emotion and ideation and in their exhibition of moral phenomena as causally determined by these processes. And attention may now be directed to a principle which is perhaps, in terms of the richness of its application to specific phenomena, the most important single statement of all those comprising Hume's philosophy of human nature,--the principle, namely, that the "vivacity" of impressional materials may be conveyed to ideas appropriately related to these materials, or, more generally, that vivacity tends to be transferred from points of greater to points of less intensity, provided that there are associating relations between these points. 89 As the following chapters will show, this principle is illustrated by the process of sympathy so prominent in Hume's account of moral approbation: according to this account, the process in question consists in the enlivening of ideas (ideas, namely, of the passions and sentiments of other persons) through the relation of these ideas to the lively "idea, or rather impression, of ourselves" (317). But this principle is also illustrated by the theory of causal inference developed in Book I, Part III. For causal inference is there described as the transition from an impression of a given kind to the idea of its customarily experienced impressional attendant, the vivacity of this idea, constitutive of belief in the existence of the object it represents, having been derived from the related impressional attendant. 90 Thus, in common life, causal inference is instanced, according to Hume's account, by such ordinary occurrences as the belief in the existence of an aeroplane overhead when the silence of one's study is intruded upon by a certain familiar noise. And likewise, what Hume terms "sympathy" is instanced in common life by disagreeable emotions of disgust and indignation arising from acquaintance with (or belief in the existence of) human actions and motives which are recognizedly prejudicial to the happiness and welfare of other persons, these emotions constituting moral disapproval of the causal source of these actions or motives, namely, their -24-

As recently, e.g., by Russell. See A History of Western Philosophy ( New York, 1945), pp. 670 f. 88

89 90

See pp. 41 ff. See p. 42, and cf. Treatise, Book I, Part III, sect. xiii, pp. 153 f.

owners. Consideration of these two instances may suffice to exhibit the significance of the principle which they illustrate. This principle is, as has been observed, embodied in the proposition that the vivacity of impressional materials is conveyed to ideas appropriately related to them; and explanation of this conveyance and of the relations upon which it depends constitutes explanation of the way in which these ideas, although but derivative from the realities present to mind in the form of impressions, nevertheless affect human emotion and action as if the impressions themselves rather than their surrogates were present to mind. 91 Hume's position, unlike that of Kant, does not seem to rest upon an assumption that the manifold of sensation is intrinsically disorderly and chaotic, requiring to be categorically synthesized by higher faculties. But Hume's explanations of causal inference, on the one hand, and of psychological and (in particular) moral phenomena as discussed in Books II and III, on the other, are such as presuppose that the manifold of impressions of the individual mind, that is, the impressional content of the individual mind, is in a sense incomplete, namely, in the sense that it is not such as serves alone fully to account for certain prominent characteristics of human action and emotion. Thus we may bring our lawn furniture indoors not only while it is raining but merely at the sight of cloudy skies,--or, if we are more careful yet, at the sight of a falling barometer. And, similarly, we experience a wide variety of emotion at events with which we do not at the time have impressional acquaintance. And we experience unpleasant emotions at the sight or thought of the suffering of others, although with this original suffering a spectator can never have impressional acquaintance. In the explanations of these phenomena offered by Hume there is an essential reference to thought, considered not as a mere pictorial representation of impressional reality but as a complex process -25-

Belief, Hume's analysis of which engrosses Book I of the Treatise, is one of the fundamental processes in which this function of ideas is exhibited: "Wherever we can make an idea approach the impressions in force and vivacity, it will likewise imitate them in its influence on the mind; and vice versa, where it imitates them in that influence, as in the present case [i.e., of belief], this must proceed from its approaching them in force and vivacity. Belief, therefore, since it causes an idea to imitate the effects of the impressions, must make it resemble them in these qualities, and is nothing but a more vivid and intense conception of any idea. This, then, may both serve as an additional argument for the present system, and may give us a notion after what manner our reasonings from causation are able to operate on the will and passions." ( Treatise, Book I, Part III, sect. x, pp. 119 f.). 91

in which the determination exercised upon the human organism by impressional reality is continued and extended by ideas in their various relations to the impressions from which, in general, they are derivative. The domain of these ideas is the human imagination; and we may therefore regard the statements descriptive of the various processes by which ideas of the imagination derive from their relationships with impressions the vivacity of the latter and thereby its effects upon human action and emotion--the statements, for example, which propound the theory of causal inference, or which describe the process of sympathy or the various imaginative tendencies which determine property relationships-as constituting Hume's theory of the imagination. The language of this theory is at times extremely awkward 92 and its mechanical analogies serve only too well to suggest--and sometimes, perhaps, to justify--charges of "mechanistic bias" or "atomism" in the treatment of mental phenomena which, it is averred, have a nonmechanical order and continuity. 93 The question concerning the continuity of the mental processes themselves is beyond the scope of the present essay and is in fact, as well as in accordance with the procedures adopted by Hume in the investigation of such phenomena, a question to be raised in connection with the experimental and observational methods of empirical science. But a question within the scope of the present study relates to the nature of Hume's contribution to the history of ideas. In reply to a challenging note by Hendel, 94 in which it is said that "we cannot afford ever to lose sight of the biography of a man of letters," we hereby declare that the intention of the present essay is to exhibit the results of study of Hume not as a "man of letters" but as a philosopher. As a philosopher, Hume is known only through the statements which--for us--are his philosophy; and it is to consideration of these that we now turn. -26-

Cf. Hume's apology for the crucial term "vivacity" in Treatise (Appendix), pp. 628 f. See note 85. 94 C. W. Hendel, Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume ( Princeton, 1925), p. 19. 92 93

CHAPTER I: HUME'S THEORY OF THE INDIRECT PASSIONS

§ 1: THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PASSIONS THERE IS no single place in the philosophical writings of Hume in which a comprehensive classification of the passions clearly indicative of their status with respect to the other "perceptions of the mind" may be found. Such a listing can be obtained piecemeal, however, from the opening sections of the first and second Books of the Treatise. "All the perceptions of the human mind" (1) are divided by Hume, at the outset of the Treatise, into impressions, or "all our sensations, passions and emotions" (ibid.) and ideas, or "the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning" (ibid.). The differentia for the first division is the controversial one of degree of "force and liveliness" (ibid.); by this division, the passions are among the impressions. Impressions and ideas are both divided next into the simple, or those unanalyzable into perceptions, and the complex, or those analyzable into perceptions (2). So far, then, we have four classes of perceptions: impressions, simple or complex, and ideas, simple or complex. In Book I, Part I, section ii, Hume divides impressions into "those of SENSATION and those of REFLECTION" (7). This division presumably extends to ideas, and also presumably supervenes upon the differentiation previously made of both impressions and ideas into simple and complex; so that there are now four classes of impressions and four of ideas. The class of impressions of sensation is exhausted by the impressions of the senses, along with bodily pleasures and pains; 95 the class of impressions of reflection is constituted by our "passions, desires, and emotions" (8). The differentiation of impressions of sensation from those of reflection requires some clarification. The impressions which are to be regarded as furnished by the senses are said to be such as arise "in the soul originally, from unknown causes" (7); all others are "derived in a great measure from our ideas" (ibid.). This is how the distinction is drawn in Book I. In Book II (Part I, sect. i), -27-

95

This is first made explicit in Book II of the Treatise (p. 275).

impressions of sensation, now called "original" impressions, are defined to be "such as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul" (275); and it is stated that these impressions, while making their appearance in the soul "without any introduction" (ibid.), nevertheless "depend upon natural and physical causes" (ibid.). Hence the phrase "without introduction" can mean only without introduction in the sense in which ideas (as copies of impressions) are introduced by the impressions from which they are derived; in the sense of having causes, these impressions must be admitted to be introduced by these causes; and the problem arises as to how these impressions are differentiated from impressions of reflection. For impressions of reflection, now (i.e., in Book II) called "secondary" (275), are defined to be "such as proceed from some of these original ones, either immediately or by the interposition" (275) of their ideas. A distinction, whatever its implications for other parts of Hume's philosophy, between the mental and the nonmental may be seen to underlie this distinction between impressions of sensation and those of reflection: impressions of sensation are lively mental entities having nonmental causes; while impressions of reflection are lively mental entities having for their proximate causes only mental entities, namely impressions or ideas of sensation. Hume instances a fit of the gout (276) as a bodily pain "not deriv'd immediately from any affection or idea" (ibid.), that is, as having only nonmental causes, if any, which "produces a long train of passions, as grief, hope, fear." (Ibid.). 96 Having distinguished between impressions of sensation and impressions of reflection, and having included under the first "all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures" (275), and under the second "the passions, and other emotions resembling them" (ibid.), Hume adopts for the further division of the class of reflective impressions a differentia admit-28-

Laird statement in Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature ( New York, 1931), pp. 27 f., that "impressions of reflection,' contrariwise, were secondary, although they were genuine 'impressions' because they 'arise originally in the soul, or in the body, whichever you please to call it, without any preceding thought or perception'" is in error. For the entities of which Hume said that "they arise originally in the soul . . ." are "bodily pains and pleasures," i.e., impressions of sensation. The full context in Hume is as follows: "Bodily pains and pleasures are the source of many passions, both when felt and consider'd by the mind; but arise originally in the soul, or in the body, whichever you please to call it, without any preceding thought or perception." ( Treatise, p. 276). 96

tedly "vulgar and specious" (276), in accordance with which such impressions are either calm or violent (ibid.). This "vulgar" distinction is expositorily convenient because confinement of the term "passion" to the more violent impressions is in accordance with ordinary usage, 97 but it is "far from being exact" (276), since the same impression may appear either violently or calmly, although in general the impressions constituting "love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility" (ibid.) are "more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity" (ibid.). To the reflective impressions usually appearing in a calm form, that is, as emotions, not passions in the vulgar sense, Hume later adds "benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children" (417), together with "the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such" (ibid.). The passions, vulgarly so called, are next divided by Hume into the direct, 98 or "such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure" (276), and the indirect, or "such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities" (ibid.). As indirect are listed "pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependents" (276 f.). As direct are listed "desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and security" (277). A problem is introduced in connection with the direct passions by Hume's distinction among them of some that arise not from pain or pleasure but "from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable" (439) and which "properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections" (ibid.). This group, constituted by "the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites" (ibid.), to which are added "the love of life" -29-

"What we commonly understand by passion is a violent and sensible emo- tion of mind, when any good or evil is presented, or any object, which, by the original formation of our faculties, is fitted to excite an appetite" ( Treatise, p. 437). 98 Volition, defined by Hume as "the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind" (399), is treated in Book II, Part III, together with the direct passions because of its similarity with them in being one of the "immediate effects of pain and pleasure" (ibid.). It is, however, expressly excluded by Hume from the passions: "properly speaking, it be not comprehended among the passions" ( Treatise, p. 399); and Laird's remark (op. cit., p. 202) that "the 'will,' according to Hume, was a direct passion" has therefore little foundation. 97

(417) and "the affection of parents to their young" (398), exemplifies a contradiction to the rule laid down that "the passions, both direct and indirect, are founded on pain and pleasure" (438). For this reason, N. K. Smith has distinguished these passions as "the primary, i.e., sheerly instinctive passions, arising from a natural impulse or instinct not founded on precedent perceptions of pleasure and pain" 99 from "the secondary passions, founded on, i.e., aroused in and through, precedent impressions of pleasure and pain," the secondary passions (in this sense of the term) dividing further into direct and indirect, and the direct into violent and calm. 100 The difficulty remains, however, that if the rule to the effect that impressions of reflection are such as are causally posterior to impressions (or ideas) of sensation is taken as definitive, there can be no instinctive passions, that is, impressions of reflection that do not stand in the relation of causal posteriority to impressions or ideas of sensation. The mark of an "instinctive" quality is precisely that it is not known from what other properties, if any, it is derived; and to call an impression both "instinctive" and "reflective" is at least prima facie contradictory. Hume, in fact, vacillated with respect to hunger, which was at first referred to as an impression of sensation (7-8) and then later as a "direct passion" (439). This flaw in Hume's scheme of the impressions of reflection having been noted, however, we shall find it convenient to follow Smith's classification of the passions. We obtain, accordingly, four groups, as follows: I. The primary: hunger, lust, and other bodily appetites; benevolence, resentment or revenge, love of life, parental love. II. The secondary, direct and violent: desire, aversion, joy, grief, hope, fear, despair, security, "along with volition." 101 III. The secondary, direct and calm: the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. IV. The secondary and indirect: pride, humility, love, hatred, ambition, vanity, envy, pity, malice, and generosity, "with their dependents." Hume's discussion of specific passions begins with an examination of pride and humility that occupies over two-thirds of the text of the second book of the Treatise. Like all other passions, pride and humility are said to be "simple and uniform impres-30-

99

N. K. Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume ( London, 1941), p. 168.

100 101

Ibid. See note 4, above.

sions" (277) and incapable of definition (ibid.). Hume later defined, presumably in a different sense of "definition," the word "pride" as "that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches, or power makes us satisfy'd with ourselves" (297), "humility" standing for the opposite impression (ibid.). And he alleged that of the impressions represented by "pride" and "humility," "every one, of himself, will be able to form a just idea" (277). Hume allowed himself considerable terminological latitude, however; and "pride" in his account is replaced at times by "vanity," 102 "self-applause" (290), "self-satisfaction" (293), and "self-esteem" (332); while "humility" is replaced (inferentially) by "shame" (302). Hume specifically mentioned certain passions as manifesting themselves in different "sub-divisions" "shapes," or "appearances" 103 while being "at the bottom . . . the same affections" and arising "from the same causes, tho' with a small variation" (448); so that we may be justified in regarding this variation in terminology, where it is not merely stylistic, as not indicative of a difficulty unforeseen by Hume. Hume's discussion of pride and humility falls into two parts, the first comprising sections ii to vi inclusive and the second sections vii to xi, section xii constituting a confirmatory appendix to the preceding discussion drawn from the subject "of the pride and humility of animals." The first of these parts consists in an explanation of the double-association theory of the causes of pride and humility; in the second, we are invited to "proceed to examine the causes of pride and humility; and see, whether in every case we can discover the double relations, by which they operate on the passions" (294). We shall follow Hume's discussion in accordance with this division of the subject matter. § 2: THE DOUBLE-ASSOCIATION THEORY OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY The statement of the double-association theory of pride and humility presupposes certain distinctions, the first of which is between the "cause and the object of these passions; betwixt that idea, which excites them, and that to which they direct their view, when excited" (278). The object of pride and humility is "self, or that -31-

102 103

See Treatise, pp. 279, 290, 292, 338; and cf. also Treatise, p. 332. See Treatise, pp. 447 f.; and cf. also Treatise, pp. 337, 367, and 608, n.

succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness" (277). Such an object is requisite for pride because "when self enters not into the consideration, there is no room either for pride or humility" (ibid.). But the object cannot be identical with the cause of either passion because the passions, while sharing the same object, are contrary; and "'tis impossible a man can at the same time be both proud and humble" (278) in virtue of the same cause. With respect to such of the ordinary causes of pride, however, as "our country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths" (279), a further distinction can be made "betwixt that quality, which operates, and the subject, on which it is plac'd" (ibid.). Thus one (himself the object of the passion) is proud of a beautiful house (the cause of the passion) considered as one's own property or contrivance (the subject) for its beauty (the operative quality); and in the absence of some associative relation of the subject to the self, or of an efficacious quality such as beauty, the passion would not be excited. These distinctions of object, cause, quality, and subject being made, the inquiry turns to the question as to "what determines each of them to be what it is, and assigns such a particular object, and quality, and subject to these affections" (280). The question is whether the object and the causes of pride and humility are natural or original, "naturalness" here meaning de facto uniformity in all observed instances, while "original" means "adapted to these passions by a particular provision, and primary constitution of nature" (281). "Originality" hence entails "naturalness," but not conversely. Hume finds the object of the passions to be both natural and original, the causes merely natural. That the property of having self for object is a natural property of these passions is seen from "the constancy and steadiness of its operations. 'Tis always self, which is the object of pride and humility" (280). The argument for the originality of this property, however, is purely verbal. 104 As for the causes, they are seen to be natural when we "consider that in all nations and ages, the same objects still -32-

Hume's argument that "unless nature had given some original qualities to the mind, it could never have any secondary ones" (280) is a tautology and hence generally true; but it does not prove that the particular quality in question is "original." The most, perhaps, that can be said for this point is that it is part of the meaning of "pride" that it is an emotion aroused by some object (or quality of it) associated with oneself; and in the Dissertation on the Passions Hume said little if anything more than this: "With regard to the first relation, that of ideas, there can be no question. Whatever we are proud of must, in some manner, belong to us. It is always our knowledge, our sense, beauty, possessions, family, on which we value ourselves" (in The Philosophical Works of David Hume, ed. Green and Grose [ London, 1875], Vol. IV, p. 146). 104

give rise to pride and humility" (281). In view, however, of the "prodigious number" (ibid.) of the causes of pride and humility and of the diversity in turn of their causes, which include "industry," "caprice," and "good fortune" (ibid.), these passions cannot plausibly be supposed to respond to each of these diverse objects as qualitatively distinct stimuli but rather to them as "partaking of some general quality, that naturally operates on the mind" (ibid.). The causes are thus natural or uniform in their operation on the mind, but not in virtue of any original qualities possessed by them or by the mind. The supposition that it is the same characteristic of each of the different causes of pride that is efficacious, that is, the supposition that the causes are "natural" (and hence explicable) rather than "original" (and hence inexplicable), is but a special case of the supposition of the simplicity of nature: "we find in the course of nature, that tho' the effects be many, the principles, from which they arise, are commonly but few and simple" (282). Hume considers next in the theory of the indirect passions "certain properties of human nature, which tho' they have a mighty influence on every operation both of the understanding and passions, are not commonly much insisted on by philosophers" (283); these are, namely, the association of ideas and the association of impressions. The theory of the association of ideas is, in Hume's pages, a description of the types of transitions of thought or of ideas which usually occur, and of the mutual relations of the components involved in these transitions. Of these transitions there are classes based upon the relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causation. Thus a transition from the idea of A to the idea of B occurs if A has been experienced as resembling, or being contiguous with, or being the cause or effect of B. For impressions, however, there is only association by resemblance in pleasantness or unpleasantness, or, as is later pointed out, 105 in direction or tendency. -33-

105

See pp. 59 f.

In illustration of the first type of association of impressions Hume says "grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole circle be compleated" (283). Hume's object at this point is to establish that these two kinds of association "very much assist and forward each other, and that the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same object" (284); and he instances the direction, by a man who has received injury from another, of "discontent, impatience, fear, and other uneasy passions" (ibid.) to "a hundred" other subjects, and especially to subjects "in or near" (ibid.) the original one. In this case Those principles, which forward the transition of ideas, here concur with those, which operate on the passions; and both uniting in one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse. The new passion, therefore, must arise with so much greater violence, and the transition to it must be render'd so much more easy and natural (ibid.). The brevity of this description of the double association of ideas and impressions, which is in fact nothing other than the basic mechanism of the indirect passions, conceals a number of difficulties. 106 It is advisable, however, not to insist upon these at present but to follow Hume in regarding the preliminaries of the theory of the indirect passions as established. There remains, as regards these modes of association, "to consider how we shall apply them" (285) in explaining the causes of pride and humility. With respect to the qualities of the causes of these passions, it is supposed, on inductive grounds, that they agree in being pleasurable or painful independently of their causal relation to the passions themselves (285). With respect to the subjects bearing these qualities, it is inductively supposed that these subjects are "either parts of ourselves, or something nearly related to us" (ibid.). In addition to these suppositious properties of the causes, there are two "estab-34-

The metaphorical expression "bestow on the mind a double impulse" seems unjustified, for the only "impulse" in question is that of the pleasure or pain produced by the quality of the cause-object. This is true a fortiori of the "direct" passions, which are described as arising solely from pleasure or pain. But it is also true of the indirect passions, in the case of which the source of the pleasure or pain must be associated in idea with the object of the passion. For while--so Hume alleges--this passion cannot arise from pleasure or pain without the association of ideas, the association of ideas has itself no emotional value and may be regarded as a mere necessary condition for the production of the passion in question, or--to resort to metaphor--as a catalytic agent in the transformation of pleasure or pain into indirect passions. (See pp. 38 ff.) 106

lish'd properties of the passions" (286) of pride and humility themselves, namely, that they share the self as object and that their sensations are respectively pleasant and painful (ibid.). Of the existence of the latter characteristic, "our very feeling convinces us; and beyond our feeling, 'tis here in vain to reason or dispute" (ibid.). Regarding the suppositions as true and considering them together with the established properties of the passions in question, Hume arrives at the double-association theory of pride and humility: That cause, which excites the passion, is related to [i.e., associated in idea with] the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion: From this double relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is deriv'd (ibid.). The theory, then, is that pride is a kind of pleasant impression distinguished from all others by the peculiarity of the possession of an object, namely, self, to which, when the impression occurs, attention is directed by the owner of the impression; while humility is an unpleasant impression with the same peculiarity. The transition to pride (or humility) from the pleasant (or unpleasant) impression arising from a subject related to self is therefore an instance of the association of impressions by resemblance; the transition from the idea of the subject to the idea of the self exemplifies the association of ideas. The task indicated by the development of the theory to this point is the analysis of certain acknowledged causes of pride and humility in order to show the necessity and sufficiency of this double association for constituting them causes of the passions in question. To this task Hume addresses himself in sections vii to xi, inclusive; but before turning to it he notes certain limitations of the circumstances under which pride and humility may be expected to occur, as follows: I. The relation of the subject to the object of the passion must be a "close one, and a closer than is requir'd to joy" (291); for the relation is needed not only as in joy "in order to approach the object to us, and make it give us any satisfaction," but also "to convert the satisfaction into vanity" (ibid.). II. The cause of the passion must be "peculiar to ourselves, or at least common to us with a few persons" (ibid.). III. The cause must be "very discernible and obvious, and that not only to ourselves, but to others also" (292). IV. The cause must have a duration comparable with that of the self (ibid.). -35-

"Limitation" V is the observation that the degree to which we love or hate an object, are proud or humble because of it, is determined to a large extent by custom, which "readily carries us beyond the just bounds in our passions, as well as in our reasonings" (293). § 3: ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY The central and unifying accomplishment of sections vii to xi (inclusive) of Part I, Book II of the Treatise is the disclosure, by analysis of some of the acknowledged and familiar causes of pride and humility, of the double association of ideas and impressions as the modus operandi of these causes. These sections are concerned, that is, to supply empirical evidence for the supposition already made that "all these causes are related to self, and produce a pleasure or uneasiness separate from the passion" (294-295). Since the requirement that the causes of the passion be related (associatively) to the self is "in a manner self-evident" (295), what needs proof is merely that these causes agree in being pleasant (or unpleasant) independently of producing pride (or humility). Thus--to begin with cause-qualities which of all can be most intimately related to the self--virtue or vice, wit or the lack of it, and beauty or ugliness have in common that they are pleasant (or unpleasant) in abstraction from association with the self; whereas, when associated with the self, they are causes of pride (or humility). Wit, according to Hume, not only produces pleasure but is rather to be defined as consisting in a kind of pleasure; and it can be the cause of pride, therefore, only through the pleasure which constitutes it. And wit is constitutively pleasant since "'tis only by taste we can decide concerning it" (297), this taste being "plainly nothing but a sensation of pleasure from true wit, and of uneasiness from false, without our being able to tell the reasons of this pleasure or uneasiness" (ibid.). Like "true wit," moral and aesthetic beauty may be analysed hedonistically as consisting in pleasure rather than being accompanied by it. This analysis, were it tenable, would provide an "undeniable proof" (297) of the present theory, since the pride or humility which result from these qualities (or their opposites) would then be the effect of pleasure and pain (together with the presupposed associative relation to self) and of nothing else. If such an analysis -36-

is not tenable, however, it must nevertheless be allowed that virtuous qualities, no matter how constituted, "charm and delight us" (296), whereas vicious qualities "displease from their very nature" (ibid.); and these qualities are thus still able to cause pride and humility through their sensation and association with self. Similarly, aesthetic beauty, however constituted, always gives pleasure (and ugliness displeasure) and agrees with moral beauty in this single respect. Since both kinds of beauty and ugliness occasion pride and humility (respectively), these passions (as their common effect) must proceed from what is common to their causes, namely, pleasantness and unpleasantness (300). The quality of being surprising, which is evidently "nothing but a pleasure" (301), namely, the pleasure "arising from novelty" (ibid.), furnishes a proof of the necessity and sufficiency of the double association in that the surprising adventures of others are pleasing but cause no pride in oneself because of the lack of relation to self; while they cause a pride in those who have undergone them and indeed are invented by liars who enjoy the vanity arising from imagined participation in adventures and dangers (ibid.). Hume brings to a close "this system with regard to our body" (302) by accounting for the failure, ordinarily, of the keen pleasures of health or pains of illness to cause pride or humility in their subjects. Health and illness are usually neither peculiar to oneself nor of long duration; 107 and although constitutional and grave illnesses do produce humility, this effect is tempered so far as "the custom of estimating every thing by comparison more than by its intrinsic worth and value, makes us overlook these calamities, which we find to be incident to every one" (302-303). The pleasant and unpleasant qualities productive of pride and humility thus far analyzed by Hume have been qualities of subjects which would be conceded to be closely related to self, however the question, indifferent to Hume, 108 of the externality of the body to self be decided. The inquiry turns next to qualities characterizing subjects related to self but in a manner relatively remote; these subjects are therefore termed "external advantages and dis-37-

See "Limitations" II and IV, p. 35. "Whether we consider the body as a part of ourselves, or assent to those philosophers, who regard it as something external, it must still be allow'd to be near enough connected with us to form one of these double relations, which I have asserted to be necessary to the causes of pride and humility" ( Treatise, p. 298). 107 108

advantages," and in connection with them, the question of their associative relation to self becomes more interesting, because "tho' these external advantages be in themselves widely distant from thought or a person, yet they considerably influence even a passion, which is directed to that as its ultimate object" (303). The possible associating relations between the subject of the passion and the self are resemblance, contiguity, or causation; 109 but these are not of equal value in their effects upon the passions, resemblance being the weakest. In general, an associatively "perfect" relation occurs when the transition of thought from A to B is "easy and natural" (284), and when the converse transition, from B to A, is just as easy (355). The logical properties of relations are, of course, distinct from their associative properties; every relation has a converse, but this has nothing to do with the question whether for a given easy transition of thought with a given sense there is a corresponding transition with the same components but with an opposite sense (355-356). The usual transitions of thought are influenced by various causes, which may be regarded as special and perturbative; such special causes account for the relative weakness of resemblance as a cause-factor in pride and humility. 110 It is a cardinal point of Hume's present theory that the occurrence of an associative transition of ideas is per se devoid of emotional value; "it produces no emotion, and gives rise to no new impression of any kind, but only modifies those ideas, of which the mind was formerly possess'd, and which it could recal upon occasion" (305). 111 Experience shows that an associative relation between the subject and the object is requisite for the production of pride or humility "because when we cut off that relation the passion is -38-

See p. 33. For the weakness of resemblance as an associating relation in pride and humility Hume gives several reasons, of which the most important is that "if we resemble a person in any of the valuable parts of his character, we must in some degree, possess the quality, in which we resemble him" ( Treatise, p. 304); and the imaginative circuit from this quality, as placed on a subject closely related to self, to self is shorter and easier than from that quality as related to self "by reflexion in another person" (ibid.). 111 The present description of the associative mechanism of ideas seems, with respect to this characteristic, incompatible with the account given in Book I of causal inference. For there, the causal association of an idea with an impression, or of an idea with an idea, is alleged to consist in the fact that an idea acquires a felt connection in the imagination with an impression or with another idea, this felt connection being an impression of reflection and the impressional archetype of the idea of (causal) necessity. See Treatise, pp. 164-165, and cf. also Laird, op. cit., p. 129. 109 110

immediately destroy'd" (301). Since the relation is necessary, and yet produces no emotion, its function can consist only in its "forwarding the transition betwixt some related impressions" (306), that is, the transition from the separate pleasure (or "uneasiness") produced by the cause-quality to the pleasant impression of pride (or to the unpleasant impression of humility). The associative relation of ideas may, therefore, be conceived as a conductor along which the impressional materials flow, and the character of the impressional transition is a function of isolable properties both of the impressional materials and of the conductor. Thus, "the same object causes a greater or smaller degree of pride, not only in proportion to the encrease or decrease of its qualities, but also to the distance or nearness of the relation" (ibid.). The beauty of a country, a county, or a parish may give a pleasure independently of any close relation to self; but with the addition of such a relation to self, pride occurs, a phenomenon hence describable as "the transition of affections along the relation of ideas" (ibid.). The pride-producing qualities of one's own self retain much of their efficacy "when discover'd in persons related to us" (307). Thus the wealth of one's ancestors is a cause of pride and their poverty a cause of humility: the thought of wealth (for reasons later explained) 112 alone gives pleasure, which is converted into pride when one is connected by the relation of parent and child to the subjects of this quality (307). The associative relation, and consequently the pride, is strengthened by identity of possession, and again by transmission of possession exclusively through the male side (308). Property is suited to cause pride by double association and is indeed a "perfect" associative relation; 113 for "the mention of the property naturally carries our thought to the proprietor, and of the proprietor to the property" (310). All that is further required for the production of pride in possession is that the object possessed give a separate pleasure; and we see "by the most cursory view of human life" (ibid.) that possession of whatever is "useful, beautiful, or surprising" (311), or is related to such, gives pride, which is therefore the common effect of what is common to these objects, namely, capacity for producing pleasant impressions independently of pride. -39-

112 113

See pp. 52 ff. See p. 38.

The explanation of pride in riches, is, however, more complicated; for wealth is to be considered as "the power of acquiring the property of what pleases" (311); and the question arises as to the nature of this power and how it can afford the requisite pleasant impression. In general, the power of "man [or] any other being" (ibid.) to perform a certain action under given circumstances cannot be estimated independently of the probability, "discover'd by experience and the practice of the world," (313), that under these circumstances, and by this agent, the action will be performed: in the case of persons, the power to perform an action x is attributed to an agent A when it is concluded from past experience that under given circumstances, x will probably occur; and the same power is denied to A when the existence of strong deterrent motives is known, the efficacy of the motives being gathered by inference from past experience. The removal from A of strong deterrent motives to an action x is interpreted as the possibility or probability that x will occur; and the imaginative anticipation of the existence of x upon the removal of these motives is pleasant or unpleasant according as x is a good or an evil from the viewpoint of the anticipator. In general, where an action, for example, the exchange of money for pleasurable goods, that is ultimately productive of pleasure is judged by agents to be possible or probable, "their imagination easily anticipates the satisfaction, and conveys the same joy" (314) as if they were persuaded of the real existence of the pleasure; and, in general, the probability that the pleasure resulting from the spending of money will exist is high among moneyed men, "as all men desire pleasure" (314). The miser, however, has, strictly speaking, no power of procuring pleasure through the spending of his wealth; for there is no probability ascertainable through past experience that he will exchange this wealth for pleasurable goods. But through his ignorance of the motives deterring him from spending his money, he falsely imagines himself free to procure purchasable goods, and from this imagination receives a pleasure. The imagining is false, so far as the inference that he will not spend his wealth is justified by past experience; and he has, in fact, no power to procure these pleasures, since we mean by the denial that A has the power to perform x only that it is false that A possibly or probably will perform x, the probability existing only in relation to experi-40-

ence. But whether the imaginative anticipation of pleasure from wealth is founded or unfounded in probabilities based on experience, "this anticipation of pleasure is, in itself, a very considerable pleasure; and as its cause is some possession or property, which we enjoy, and which is thereby related to us, we here clearly see all the parts of the foregoing system most exactly and distinctly drawn out before us" (315). Hume ends his inquiry into the relation of power to pleasure (and hence to pride) by observing that power over persons produces pride (and slavery, humility) "for the same reason, that riches cause pleasure and pride, and poverty excites uneasiness and humility" (ibid.). Hume considers next (and finally) as causes of pride and humility "our reputation, our character, our name" (316). The chief problem here again is to account for the pleasure produced by fame apart from pride and the "uneasiness" produced by infamy apart from humility. Hume's discovery of the source of this pleasure or pain is at the same time the discovery of the requisite association of ideas, for such relations of ideas are requisite in sympathy; and the pleasure of fame and the pain of infamy will be seen to arise not from the satisfaction of some "original instinct" (321) in accordance with which we seek praise and avoid blame but rather from the sympathetic "communication of sentiments" (324). The general mechanism of sympathy has, therefore, to be explained. Sympathy is constituted by the process in which "the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent" (319). The conversion of an idea into an impression is to be understood as the acquisition by the idea in question of the vivacity characteristic of impressions; for, ideas and impressions differing only with respect to vivacity, an idea, for example, of a passion, when sufficiently "enlivened," becomes "the very sentiment or passion" (ibid.). The principle that the vivacity of impressional materials may be conveyed to ideas appropriately related to these materials, is perhaps the most important in Hume's entire philosophy of human nature; and it is without doubt the widest principle--in terms of the richness of its use in the explanation of specific phenomena--common to the theory of the imagination in Book I, on the one hand, and to Books II and III, on the other. "What is principally remarkable in this whole affair is -41-

the strong confirmation these phænomena [i.e., of sympathy] give to the foregoing system concerning the understanding, and consequently to the present one concerning the passions; since these are analogous to each other" (319). Since the most general principle common to the theory of cognition and to that of the emotions (and via these, to the theory of moral conduct) is the notion that impressional vivacity tends to be transferred from a point of greater to a point of lesser intensity along an associative relation which serves as conductor, 114 an exemplification of this principle requires, accordingly, a source of vivacity and a conducting relation. Sympathy is the enlivening of one's idea of another's passion to the extent that the idea becomes an impression, that is, an instance of the passion itself. The source of the vivacity requisite for the enlivening process is "the idea, or rather impression of ourselves" (317), which is "always immediately present with us" and which "gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it" (ibid.). The beginning of the process of sympathy is belief in the existence of an affection belonging to another person; this belief is the result of a causal inference 115 from data constituted by "those external signs in the countenance and conversation" (317) of another which are causally associated with the affection in question as its customary effects. The causal inference establishes only the belief in the existence of another's emo-42-

Thus the fundamental operation of the understanding, outside the domain of analytic judgments, is the judgment of matter of fact "beyond the present testimony of the senses or memory"; this judgment is, according to the epistemological theory of Book I, in every case a causal inference consisting in the transition from an impression of a given kind to the idea of its customarily experienced impressional attendant. The belief attending the inferred idea consists in its peculiar vivacity; and the only explanation for the acquisition of vivacity by this idea is that the vivacity has been transferred to it from the present impression: "'Tis by habit we make the transition from cause to effect; and 'tis from some present impression we borrow that vivacity, which we diffuse over the correlative ideal" ( Treatise, pp. 153-154). Nevertheless, the "transfer" or "diffusion" of vivacity can be understood only metaphorically. As we are often told (e.g., in Treatise, Appendix, p. 625), vivacity is not a separable characteristic of impressions or ideas and cannot literally be detached in whole or part from one perception, thereafter to be reattached to another. "Transfer of vivacity" can mean only that a given instance of this characteristic is followed by another and that the succession or transition is explicable in terms of definable relations, such as that of customary temporal conjunction, between these instances. 115 The term "causal inference" is here used in the meaning assigned to it in Hume's epistemological theory. See notes 17 and 20, above. 114

tion; 116 given the belief in the existence of this emotion, the question arises as to the quarter from which the additional vivacity may be obtained that is requisite for the conversion of the idea constitutive of this belief 117 into an impression; and this quarter is, as was just noticed, the lively idea of self. The associating relations requisite in order to "convey the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others" (318) are primarily, resemblance and contiguity, secondarily, blood relationship, "a species of causation" (ibid.), and acquaintance or familiarity. The resemblance between the mind and body constituting oneself and the mind and body constituting another self is such, when assisted by contiguity, as to make the idea of the passion, originally associated with the idea of another, become associated with the idea of oneself and partake thereby of the vivacity of this latter idea, the two selves being, as it were, substitutable for each other, in virtue of their resemblance, as subjects of the affections. In sympathy, resemblance and contiguity "can entirely convert an idea into an impression" (320); hence it is not surprising that the more complex "relation of cause and effect alone, may serve to strengthen and inliven an idea" (ibid.). The question to be answered by reference to sympathy is how the praise and blame, constitutive of our good reputation or infamy, produce a pleasure and pain which may be connected, by our relation to the praiser or the blamer, with pride and humility; and, briefly, the answer is that to take pleasure in the praise of others is the same as sympathetically to place oneself in the position of another who is one's admirer and to feel the admirer's pleasure, induced by qualities of ourselves and constitutive of his admiration of them; while to feel pain at one's infamy is to feel, by sympathy, the displeasure of one's condemner. The qualities exciting praise -43-

"When any affection is infus'd by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects . . ." ( Treatise, p. 317). Also cf. Treatise, pp. 317 f.: "Resemblance and contiguity are relations not to be neglected; especially when by an inference from cause and effect, and by the observation of external signs, we are inform'd of the real existence of the object, which is resembling or contiguous." 117 Use of the questionable expression "idea constitutive of this belief" is necessitated by Hume's epistemological theory, according to which "an opinion, therefore, or belief may be most accurately defined, A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION" ( Treatise, p. 96). That is, as has been observed, " Hume had no theory of propositions. To assert a proposition, or to have a belief, consisted, according to him, in the fact that we had a lively idea." ( P. Marhenke, "Hume's View of Identity", Univ. Calif. Publ. Philos., Vol. XX [ 1937], p. 171). 116

are all such as produce pride in their possessors; they must therefore be such as give a pleasure separate from these passions and would at first give, "if a person consider'd himself in the same light, in which he appears to his admirer, . . . separate pleasure, and afterwards a pride or self-satisfaction, according to the hypothesis above explain'd" (ibid.). Thus it is that praise and blame are not indiscriminately liked and disliked, as would be the case "if the mind receiv'd from any original instinct a desire of fame, and aversion to infamy" (321) but rather "the praises of others never give us much pleasure, unless they concur with our own opinion, and extol us for those qualities, in which we chiefly excel" (322). From the fact that "men of good families, but narrow circumstances" (ibid.) prefer the relative anonymity of expatriate life to the contiguity of friends and relatives, several conclusions may be drawn concerning the force of associative relations in sympathy. Expatriation, by preventing the convergence upon the same persons of the associative relations of kinship and contiguity, weakens the association of ideas between oneself and others and at the same time exhibits the necessity of these relations in sympathy by diminishing the communication of blame and its consequence, humility (322-323). The habit of the impoverished expatriate to conceal his birth from his neighbors confines the pain of the comparison of his present with his previous fortunes to such as arises from his own thought and reflection; in this case, "he never receives it by a sympathy with others; which must contribute very much to his ease and satisfaction" (324). And certain apparent exceptions to the explanation of the pleasure of praise and pain of blame through sympathy are readily eliminated. 118 § 4: THE DOUBLE-ASSOCIATION THEORY OF LOVE AND HATRED The indefinable impressions love and hatred, "sufficiently known from our common feeling and experience" (329), are explained as arising, in precise analogy with pride and humility, from the double association of ideas and impressions; although, according to Hume, between these pairs of impressions there is an important difference, pride and humility being "pure emotions in the soul, -44-

Thus, for example, "Proud men are most shock'd with contempt, tho' they do not most readily assent to it; but 'tis because of the opposition betwixt the passion, which is natural to them, and that receiv'd by sympathy" ( Treatise, p. 324). 118

unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action" (367), while love is "always follow'd by a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd, and an aversion to his misery: As hatred produces a desire of the misery and an aversion to the happiness of the person hated" (ibid.). As far, however, as the mechanism of their production is concerned, the similarity of love and hatred to pride and humility is such that it is possible to use, in establishing that the causes of the former agree only in being pleasurable or painful independently of the pleasure and pain of the love and hatred of which they are the causes, the arguments for the same point already adduced with respect to pride and humility. The object of love or hatred is "some other person of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious" (329). 119 Whatever it is to which reference is made by the term "self-love," it has nothing, Hume observes, in common with "that tender emotion, which is excited by a friend or mistress" (ibid.). This object, being common to the contrary impressions, cannot be their cause; and their cause is complex, as may be illustrated from the "esteem" for the princely possessor of a stately palace: beauty, as operative quality, characterizes the palace as its subject; and together these compose the cause of the esteem whose object is the prince (330). That an associative relationship, such as ownership, is required between the cause and the object of love is "not only probable, but too evident to be contested" (331). The satisfaction of the other requirement of the double-association theory, however, that the quality of the subject give a pleasure or pain independently of the pleasantness or painfulness of the impressions of love and hatred themselves, is "not so evident at first sight" (ibid.). A short proof, "founded on unquestionable experience" (ibid.), can be obtained, however, if it is granted in accordance with previous argument that the operative qualities in pride and humility agree in producing a separate pleasure and pain: we need then only to observe that men expect "the love and approbation of mankind" (331-332) for the same qualities upon which is based their pride or selfesteem. It is evident that "we always put to view those particulars with which in ourselves we are best satis-45-

We do not, of course, share the immediate experience of another person through sympathy: "No passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind. We are only sensible of its causes or effects. From these we infer the passion: And consequently these give rise to our sympathy" ( Treatise, p. 576). 119

fy'd" (332), a procedure which would be absurd if the expectation of esteem were not usually fulfilled, although the procedure is itself rather the result of "a kind of presensation" (ibid.) of the effect of our own qualities upon others than a deliberate calculation. Without pausing to give the obvious extension of this argument for the unpleasantness of the causes of hatred, Hume proceeds to a series of eight "experiments to confirm this system" (ibid.), prefaced with the description (333) of what might be termed the "square of opposition" of the indirect passions and which is constructible as follows: The system to be experimentally confirmed is the doubleassociation theory of the origin of these passions; but the "experiments" which Hume adduces go beyond the exhibition of the necessity and sufficiency of the double association of ideas and impressions for the production of these passions, and include the question of the transition from one of these passions to another. This question is complicated by the fact that the associative transition of ideas involved in a transition of the indirect passions is influenced by certain properties of the imagination having no analogues for impressional transitions and in some cases opposed to the tendency of the latter transitions. The first three (333-335) of Hume's experiments aim to establish respectively that given a self, another person, and a causeobject constituted by a quality "plac'd upon" a subject, no passion results (i) if the cause-object produces neither pleasure nor pain -46-

and has no associative relation to either person, (ii) if the causeobject is associated in idea with either person but is sensationally indifferent with respect to pleasure or pain, and (iii) if the causeobject produces a sensation which is pleasant or unpleasant but bears no associative relation to either person. In the fourth (336337) experiment, both relations are supplied, and the result is a passion: virtue, separately pleasing, placed upon self, results in pride. Variations follow. A change of the associative relation of ideas from possession of virtue by self to possession of virtue by another person is accompanied by a change of the passion from pride to love; replacement of the virtue of this other person by vice changes the passion from love to hatred; change of the subject of the vice from another person to self gives humility; and substitution for one causeobject of another similar to it in sensation (e.g., beauty for virtue, or poverty for vice), provided an associative relationship of ideas is retained, is seen to be possible. The fifth experiment (337-338) discloses that there is a transition from love (of a brother for his virtue) to pride, or from hatred (of a brother for his vice) to humility; but the sixth experiment (338341) discloses that if the cause-qualities vice and virtue are originally placed on self, there is no transition from the pride or humility they occasion to the love or hatred of a person closely associated with self: "we never love or hate a son or brother for the virtue or vice we discern in ourselves; tho' 'tis evident the same qualities in him give us a very sensible pride or humility" (339). The difficulty here is that apparently the conducting relation of ideas required for a transition of impressions is present; but the transition does not occur: "If a person be my brother I am his likewise: But tho' the relations be reciprocal, they have very different effects on the imagination" (340). This difference is accounted for by Hume in terms of the principle that "the imagination passes easily from obscure to lively ideas, but with difficulty from lively to obscure" (339), together with the fact that the idea of self enjoys a vivacity superior to that of the idea of another person: the transition of ideas from the object of love to the object of pride is easy and so also is the related transition of the passions peculiar to these objects. But the opposite transition of ideas (and therefore of the related passions) is difficult if not impossible, for "when self is the object of a passion, 'tis not -47-

natural to quit the consideration of it, till the passion be exhausted; in which case the double relations of impressions and ideas can no longer operate" (341). The seventh experiment exhibits the effect upon the transition of passions of opposed idiosyncratic properties both of the imagination (and consequently of the transition of ideas which serves as conductor of the impressions) and of the passions themselves. The data of the experiment are "an identity of impressions with a relation of ideas" (341); for example, love directed at two related objects, such as a father and his son. A problem is posed by the fact that even within the limits of data of this kind a diversity of phenomena exists: "Thus 'tis more natural for us to love the son upon account of the father, than the father upon account of the son; the servant for the master, than the master for the servant" (341-342). If the transition of affections depended upon the usual tendency of its assisting transition of ideas, its direction should be from love of son to love of father, "since the fancy finds the same facility in passing from the lesser to the greater, as from remote to contiguous" (343); the latter tendency explains, as just seen above, why there is no transition from pride to love. Since in the phenomenon under examination there is a particular transition of thought made contrary to the general tendency of the imagination, a perturbative influence must be sought in the domain of impressions (ibid.). Several laws governing the transition of passions are to be noticed. There are two kinds of transitions of passions, one in which the transition to the second passion destroys the first, and one in which the first passion continues to exist and mingles with the second. In transitions of the first kind, the difficulty of transition is proportional to the difference in degree or kind of the two passions; in transitions of the latter type, however, "the case is entirely alter'd" (344). Here "a weak passion, when added to a strong, makes not so considerable change in the disposition, as a strong when added to a weak" (ibid.), so that in this case there is an easier transition from stronger to weaker passions than from weaker to stronger. Given the principles, then, that "the degree of any passion depends upon the nature of its object" (ibid.), and that "the affections are a more powerful principle than the imagination" (ibid.), the apparent anomaly of the phenomenon in question disappears: "The idea of the servant conveys our -48-

thought most readily to the master; but the hatred or love of the master produces with greater facility anger or good will to the servant" (345). In the eighth and last experiment of the series, Hume reverts to the subject of the sixth. In general, there is, as was seen in the sixth experiment, no transition from pride or humility to love or hatred, the explanation lying in the difficulty of the imaginative transition of ideas from the contiguous to the remote. There is, however, one explicable exception: "viz. when the very cause of the pride and humility is plac'd in some other person" (346). Here, the usual difficulty of the transition of affections across an associative transition of ideas the sense of which is from self to another person, is nullified by the intimacy of the causal relation between the other person and our passion of pride: in this case, the imagination is obliged to consider the other person and cannot fixate upon self. § 5: THE ROLE OF INTENTION IN LOVE AND HATRED; THE LOVE OF RELATIONS AND ESTEEM FOR THE RICH AND POWERFUL The remainder of Book II, Part II, is unevenly divided between a short section of "difficulties solv'd" and a number of sections of which the first two consider "the love of relations" and "our esteem for the rich and powerful" respectively, while the remainder (save for the usual final section adumbrative of animal analogies) consider "the compound affections, which arise from the mixture of love and hatred with other emotions" (347). 120 The chief difficulty solved concerns the role of intention in actions provocative of love or hatred. To the opinion that "any person acquires our kindness, or is expos'd to our illwill, in proportion to the pleasure or uneasiness we receive from him" (348), there are some "who add another condition, and require not only that the pain and pleasure arise from the person, but likewise that it arise knowingly, and with a particular design and intention" (ibid.). Hume's thesis here is twofold. On the one hand, since the pleasant or unpleasant qualities of others that are "constant and inherent" (348) in their persons or characters, such as ugliness or folly, occasion love and hatred independently of intention, an -49-

Hume's terminology is careless here; for compassion, when described as "sympathy with uneasiness," is not a compound passion, nor are malice and envy, when similarly described as passive. See pp. 55 ff. 120

intention is requisite in the case of a pleasant or unpleasant action, which, like all actions, is "produc'd and annihilated in a moment" (349), because the intention "shews certain qualities, which remaining after the action is perform'd, connect it with the person, and facilitate the transition of ideas from one to the other" (ibid.). On the other hand, an intention "is often necessary to produce a relation of impressions, and give rise to pleasure and uneasiness" (349). For the chief part of the pain of an intentional injury arises from the hatred inferentially conveyed by the intention, while the chief part of the pleasure of a good office consists in that it "is a proof of the kindness and esteem of the person, who performs it" (ibid.). The unqualified view that "by the intention we judge of the actions, and according as that is good or bad, they become causes of love or hatred" (348), cannot be supported as against Hume's position that "there is a natural connexion betwixt uneasiness and anger, and that the relation of impressions will operate upon a very small relation of ideas" (350). For if the removal of intention partly removed the association of ideas and impressions but wholly removed the passions attendant upon the actions in question, we should have in this a proof that the passions depend upon the intention and not upon the associating relations. Granted, however, that the removal of intention partly reduces the associative force of the relations, it likewise by no means wholly removes the passions. Thus not only is the anger of men often excited by "injuries, which they themselves must own to be entirely voluntary and accidental" (ibid.), but also by actions performed out of "an acknowledg'd necessity and duty" (350), as in the execution of judicial sentence. And often, so far from being the cause of hatred, an intention to harm is an effect of this passion, as being ascribed, frequently without foundation, to anyone whose action produces pain. In this case, the hatred arises without knowledge of an intention, and "afterwards we seek for reasons upon which we may justify and establish the passion" (351). The imputed motives in such cases serve to prolong the passions and are an expression of the natural tendency of all passions to avoid diminution (ibid.). Hume considers next what he terms the "love of relations" (ibid.), that is, of blood relations, compatriots, neighbors, business friends, professional colleagues, and even namesakes (352); and he cites as "parallel" phenomena the love of acquaintances, that -50-

is, of persons with whom we "have contracted a habitude and intimacy" (ibid.), the affection arising between persons of similar disposition, and the effect upon desire and pride of the familiar as opposed to the unfamiliar among inanimate objects. Difficulty for the double-association theory of love and hatred is offered by the phenomena grouped under "love of relations" through the fact that a proxy must be found for the separately pleasurable quality which must characterize a subject associated in idea with the object of love; for "whoever is united to us by any connexion is always sure of a share of our love, proportion'd to the connexion, without enquiring into his other qualities" (352). The proxy found by Hume is the pleasure arising from the company of those related to us in the indicated ways. In such cases, the companionship of the object of our esteem must be regarded as a pleasurable quality of that object; and this "quality" is, of course, a relational property of that object, namely "being the companion of," so that its assimilation to the double-association theory as the "quality plac'd upon the subject" required by the theory is Pickwickian. The same relational property, when characterizing persons otherwise unrelated to us and in whom we have not been able to "discover any very valuable quality, of which [they are] possess'd" (ibid.), makes them objects of love. The question next arises how the companionship of relatives and nonrelatives pleases; and Hume's answer is that in both cases, the companionship of persons pleases by the enlivening of all our ideas, and especially those of our passions (353), since it is natural for us to seek "to excite our spirits from the languid state, into which they fall, when not sustain'd by some brisk and lively emotion" (352). The company of relations enlivens one's ideas because "whatever is related to us is conceiv'd in a lively manner" (353); and the company of acquaintances has the same effect because acquaintance is but a species of custom, which always "facilitates the entrance, and strengthens the conception of any object" (ibid.). The connection of acquaintance with pleasure is to be seen also from its effect in rendering pleasant to us a nonsocial environment which, when unfamiliar, was distasteful to us (354-355); and pride in possessions is strengthened by their familiarity, by which "they appear in a stronger light; are more agreeable; and consequently fitter subjects of pride and vanity, than any other" (355). -51-

Having accounted for the pleasure by connection with which relations and acquaintances and the similarly disposed become objects of love, Hume considers some variations of the passions consequent upon variation of the associative force of consanguineous relationship. Children's love for their mother diminishes after her second marriage and for their father after his; but the latter diminution is not so great as the former (ibid.). In each case the diminution of affection is caused by the perturbation of the original association between the child and its parent through the entrance of the parent into new and foreign associations constituted by that parent's relation to the second spouse and the second spouse's family. The male parent, however, is under any circumstances an object endowed with greater force over the imagination than the female; and it has already been noticed that "tho' the imagination goes easily from the view of a lesser object to that of a greater, yet it returns not with the same facility from the greater to the less" (356-357), so that the perturbative effect of the extraneous associations is reduced in the case of the father, but not in that of the mother, by the countereffect of his superiority in force over the imagination. Hume observes, finally, that the maternal-filial association, and the love dependent upon it, is not weakened by its being shared with the father, nor the filialparental because shared with a brother: in these cases, the persons sharing the association are themselves associated, and the imaginative circuit is closed with respect to each triad. Hume considers next the source of "our esteem for the rich and powerful." There are three distinguishable pleasures associated with the view or thought of the rich and powerful which may occasion our esteem for them: "the agreeable idea of those objects, which riches afford the enjoyment of" (360), "the agreeable expectation of advantage" (ibid.), and sympathetic participation in the proprietor's enjoyment of his assets. Hume has little difficulty in showing the predominance of the third factor among these causes of esteem. The thought of the pleasing objects possessed by the rich itself gives pleasure, for "every thing, which is agreeable to the senses, is also in some measure agreeable to the fancy" (358). The strong associative relation of ownership between "houses, gardens, equipages" (357-358) and their possessor entails, however, that the fancy is carried irresistibly from the -52-

thought of the possessions to the idea of their possessor, and this transition is aided by the fact that the possessor, as object of the relatively feeble esteem excited by the pleasant idea of his possessions, strongly resembles his admirer "and has by that means an advantage above any other object, in operating on the imagination" (359). The situation is thus prepared for the conversion of the idea of the possessor into the vivid thought of his enjoyment of his possessions, in which case "the third principle is more powerful and universal than the first" (ibid.). As for the expectation of advantage as a source of pleasure which might found esteem for the wealthy, it is to be noted that the friendship and good will of the possessor of wealth and influence are already presupposed if there is any probability that we benefit by them; but, as a matter of fact, we esteem and respect the rich before we know their disposition toward us, and even when they are seen to be in such circumstances that, although favorably disposed, they cannot benefit us (361). Also, men are treated by strangers with respect proportioned to their wealth, where these strangers have no expectation, and perhaps even no desire, of sharing it. The counterargument that by a general rule we esteem persons similar to those from whom we have benefited in the past, is false for the simple reason that not enough persons have benefited at the hands of the wealthy for such a rule to have had its inception (362). Hence, "upon the whole, there remains nothing, which can give us an esteem for power and riches, and a contempt for meanness and poverty, except the principle of sympathy, by which we enter into the sentiments of the rich and poor, and partake of their pleasures and uneasiness" (ibid.). By this conclusion, the doubleassociation theory of love and hatred receives a confirmation: riches satisfy their possessor, and the observer receives this satisfaction, resembling love in its pleasantness, through sympathy. The satisfaction is placed upon, or "proceeds from a thinking conscious being, which is the very object of love. From this relation of impressions, and identity of ideas, the passion arises" (ibid.). A digression at this point upon the "force of sympathy thro' the whole animal creation" (363) depicts sympathy as the "soul or animating principle" (ibid.) of all the passions, gregarious animals, and man above all, being constantly influenced by the -53-

thoughts and sentiments of others as sympathetically communicated, and desiring this influence since "every pleasure languishes when enjoy'd a-part from company, and every pain becomes more cruel and intolerable" (ibid.). The beauty of all convenient and useful articles is constituted by the pleasure, sympathetically received by the observer, which these articles afford their users and owners (364). The rule of art that figures be placed "with the greatest exactness on their proper center of gravity" (ibid.), is based upon the fact that an unbalanced figure "conveys the idea of its fall, of harm, and of pain: Which ideas are painful, when by sympathy they acquire any degree of force and vivacity" (364-365). And the principal part of personal beauty is nothing but the pleasure of possessing "such a construction of members as promises strength and activity" (365) communicated sympathetically to the observer. Indeed, an impression communicated by A to B may be reflected again to A; for "the minds of men are mirrors to one another" (ibid.). 121 § 6: MIXED EMOTION'S INVOLVING LOVE AND HATRED In his discussion of the "compound affections, which arise from the mixture of love and hatred with other emotions" (347), Hume includes benevolence and anger, compassion, malice and envy, respect and contempt, the "amorous passion," and the mixtures of benevolence with pity and of anger with malice. And he prefaces his analysis with the unargued statement that fusion is limited to impressions, ideas being "endow'd with a kind of impenetrability, by which they exclude each other, and are capable of forming a compound by their conjunction, not by their mixture" (366). In discussing benevolence and anger, Hume first disposes of the analysis of love and benevolence according to which love is nothing but the desire of the happiness of a person endowed with a pleasing quality, together with the corresponding analysis of hatred as identical with the desire of the unhappiness of a person who -54-

The mirroring process could be continued, Hume thought, even to the "third rebound of the original pleasure" ( Treatise, p. 365). For example, let A be a proprietor and B the observer. Then (i) A has the pleasure of his possessions; (ii) B receives the pleasure by sympathy and becomes the subject of the pleasant emotion of esteem for A; (iii) A perceives that he is esteemed, and sympathetically shares the pleasure of the esteem, which pleasure excites his vanity, upon which (iv) B's pleasure is increased through sympathetic participation in A's (pleasant) vanity! 121

displeases. Such an analysis is "evidently contrary to experience" (367), for the desires constitutive of benevolence and malevolence "arise only upon the ideas of the happiness or misery of our friend or enemy being presented by the imagination" (ibid.); and the passions of love and hatred "may subsist a considerable time, without our reflecting on the happiness or misery of their objects" (368). Love is always followed by benevolence and hatred by anger, but of this conjunction we may say only that it represents "the original constitution of the mind" and that, so far from being necessary, it can be conceived to be oppositely disposed, with malevolence conjoined with love, benevolence with hatred (ibid.). Benevolence, the desire of the happiness of a person loved and aversion to his misery, and anger, the desire of misery to a person hated and aversion to his pleasure (367), are partially "counterfeited" by pity and malice, pity being "a concern for, and malice a joy in the misery of others, without any friendship or enmity to occasion this concern or joy" (369). Pity, as analyzed by Hume, is sympathy with sorrow and misery: it is the enlivening of A's idea of B's unhappiness, assisted by the general resemblance of human beings and by "the contiguity, and even sight of the object" (370). The strengthening of pity by contiguity with the object is a proof that the passion cannot, as some would have it, be derived "from I know not what subtile reflections on the instability of fortune, and our being liable to the same miseries we behold" (ibid.). The pity aroused by tragic drama must be accounted for in terms of sympathy, on pain of our being obliged to maintain that "every distinct passion is communicated by a distinct original quality" (369). A peculiarity of pity is that this impression "sometimes acquires strength from the weakness of its original, and even arises by a transition from affections, which have no existence" (370). Thus, a strong pity may be excited by the misfortune of one whose "greatness of mind" prevents his feeling sorrow; in this case, the pity arises from the influence of general rules over the imagination, there being a usual, although exceptionable, connection of sorrow with the circumstances constituting misfortune; so that the idea of sorrow may appear as the result of a fallacious inference from the sight or idea of these circumstances (371). On the other hand, "we have also instances, wherein an indifference and insensibility under misfortune encreases our concern for -55-

the misfortunate even tho' the indifference proceed not from any virtue and magnanimity" (ibid.). Here, as before, the imagination is carried, in accordance with the general rule, to a lively idea of sorrow, which is further enlivened by the contrast between it and that of the "security and indifference, which we observe in the person himself" (ibid.). Hence, "'tis an aggravation of a murder, that it was committed upon persons asleep and in perfect security" (ibid.). Hume's account of malice, supposedly the reverse of pity, labors under the confusion of an ambiguity in the term itself. Pity and malice were introduced as "counterfeiting" benevolence and anger. This "counterfeiting" could be at best but poor; for benevolence and anger are desires and aversions and are hence active emotions, while pity and malice are first introduced as passive, pity being a "concern for, and malice a joy in the misery of others" (369) independently (and in this respect differing from benevolence and anger) of prior friendship or enmity with the object. In this sense, malice is correctly described as "a kind of pity reverst, or contrary sensations arising in the beholder, from those which are felt by the person, whom he considers" (375). But malice is incompatibly described by Hume when, in attempting to differentiate malice and envy, he says "the only difference betwixt these passions lies in this, that envy is excited by some present enjoyment of another, which by comparison diminishes our idea of our own: Whereas malice is the unprovok'd desire of producing evil to another, in order to reap a pleasure from the comparison" (377). The extrication of this account of malice from inconsistency can be accomplished, perhaps, by supposing that under certain circumstances there is a natural transition from malice in its passive to malice in its active form, and for this supposition there is some textual justification. Thus, of a "kind of malice against ourselves" (376), which "makes us rejoice for our pains, and grieve for our pleasures" (ibid.), Hume observes that "a person may extend this malice against himself, even to his present fortune, and carry it so far as designedly to seek affliction, and encrease his pains and sorrows" (ibid.); and he calls this extension of malice against self, which is a form of remorse, an irregular appetite for evil (ibid.). The chief emphasis in Hume's treatment of malice falls, however, upon the impression conceived as the above-mentioned passive -56-

emotion; and the burden of the discussion is the effect of comparison in producing this impression. The principle from which Hume attempts chiefly to explain the passions malice and envy is "that objects appear greater or less by a comparison with others" (375). That this principle holds is in any case impossible to dispute, Hume thinks (ibid.), but he prefaces its application to the passions in question with an elaborate explanation of it in terms of "an impression, that secretly attends every idea" (ibid.). Comparison has an effect upon the passions, or "sentiments and opinions" (372), and upon certain sensations such as heat and cold, or pleasure and pain, by "an original quality of the soul" (ibid.); and from this original effect, with the aid of other principles, Hume endeavors to account for the effect of comparison upon our estimation of the magnitude of "virtue and vice, wit and folly, riches and poverty, happiness and misery, and other objects of that kind" (374). The original effect of comparison is as follows: a less intense emotion or sensation following a more intense appears even smaller; while a more intense emotion following a less seems even greater in intensity (372). This type of transition may even reverse the sensation as between pleasure and pain; for "any gentle pain, that follows a violent one, seems as nothing, or rather becomes a pleasure" (ibid.), and vice versa. Hume next establishes, with the aid of a fallacy of division, 122 the "general maxim, that no object is presented to the senses, nor image form'd in the fancy, but what is accompany'd with some emotion or movement of spirits proportion'd to it" (373), and he adds that although "custom may make us insensible of this sensation" (ibid.), it is, with care, experimentally distinguishable from the object or idea which it accompanies. He next calls attention to the habit of the fancy, in being guided by general rules, to form a lively idea of B' upon the occasion of an impression A, if B' resembles B, the usual com-57-

Hume's argument is from the premises (i) "any very bulky object, such as the ocean . . . or any very numerous collection of objects, such as an army . . . excite in the mind a sensible emotion" ( Treatise, p. 373), and (ii) "this admiration encreases or diminishes by the encrease or diminution of the objects" (ibid.) to the conclusion that "Every part, then, of extension, and every unite of number has a separate emotion attending it, when conceiv'd by the mind . . ." (ibid.). But the fact that a parade of a thousand soldiers excites a large admiration, of a hundred but a small, scarcely proves that an individual soldier cannot be thought of but with a determinate degree of admiration. 122

panion of A, although B' and B differ in "very material circumstances" (374). The theory resulting from these premises is as follows: a large perceptual object or imaginative image following a smaller introduces with itself the more intense emotion "proportion'd to it" as the successor of the less intense emotion peculiar to the smaller object or image. By the "original" effect of comparison, the second emotion appears even more intense; and the fancy, heedless of the exaggerative effect of comparison upon the emotion, rashly regards this emotion as of the sort that usually accompanies an object that is great independently of comparison, so that by this operation of general rules upon the fancy, the exaggerative effect upon the emotion is introduced into the estimation of the magnitude of the object (ibid.). Having achieved this explanation of the effect of comparison, Hume accounts, in terms of it (and quite briefly), for malice as "a joy in the sufferings and miseries of others, without any offense, or injury on their part" (372), and for envy as a pain at the happiness of others without antecedent enmity: the happiness of another, if greater than that of the observer, makes that of the observer appear still smaller and ultimately converts it into the pain which is envy; while the misery of another, if greater than that of the observer, causes that of the observer to appear still smaller and ultimately converts it into the pleasure that is malice (375). "Here then is a kind of pity reverst, or contrary sensations arising in the beholder, from those which are felt by the person whom he considers" (ibid.). Some peculiarities of envy may be noticed. Although "the enjoyment, which is the object of envy, is commonly superior to our own" (377), there is a species of envy, namely that "which men feel, when they perceive their inferiors approaching or overtaking them in the pursuit of glory or happiness" (ibid.), which involves the comparison of our enjoyment with that of an inferior. Thus, while comparison of our own with an inferior enjoyment gives a malicious pleasure, the increase of the inferior enjoyment does not merely reduce the pleasure of the observer but converts it into an envious pain; "what should only have been a decrease of pleasure, becomes a real pain, by a new comparison with its preceding condition" (ibid.). Hume ends his discussion of malice and envy with a closer examination of the relations involved in comparison. In this ex-58-

amination there is found a confirmation of the general principle that "the relation of ideas must forward the transition of impressions" (380). Thus in envy, "'tis not the great disproportion betwixt ourself and another, which produces it, but on the contrary, our proximity" (377), a common soldier envying his sergeant more intensely than his general (ibid.). The effect of the reduction of proximity in reducing the envy is explicable as its constituting a reduction of the facility of the imaginative transition from the idea of the one to the idea of the other of the objects entering into the comparison. Hume's treatment of the mixtures formed of "love or tenderness with pity, and of hatred or anger with malice" (381) is noteworthy for its introduction of a new associative characteristic of certain of the passions; it is noteworthy also for its interpretation, essential to the theory at this point but incompatible with much said elsewhere, 123 of pity and malice as appetites. The new associative characteristic of the passions is resemblance of their "impulses or direction"; and it is a possible characteristic, of course, only of "such affections, as are attended with a certain appetite or desire" (382). In the case of such an affection, its character is determined, not by "the present sensation alone or momentary pain or pleasure" (381), but by "the whole bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end" (ibid.). The problem to be solved in terms of this principle is how the mixture, which always occurs, of "love or tenderness with pity, and of hatred or anger with malice" (ibid.), is possible: "For as pity is an uneasiness, and malice a joy, arising from the misery of others, pity should naturally, as in all other cases, produce hatred; and malice, love" (ibid.). This problem Hume solves in the following way: benevolence, as has been seen, is connected "by a natural and original quality" (382) with love. But benevolence is "a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd, and an aversion to his misery" (ibid.); while pity is "a desire of happiness to another, and aversion to his misery" (ibid.), malice being the "contrary appetite" (ibid.). That is to say, pity and malice are desires of the happiness of others simpliciter, or without antecedent friendship or enmity. 124 Pity is, therefore, asso-59-

Cf. pp. 57 f. Laird errs in charging Hume at this point with "a slip . . . in which benevolence was said to be only similar to itself" ( Laird, op. cit., p. 200). The passage containing the alleged slip is as follows: "Benevolence or the appetite, which attends love, is a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd, and an aversion to his misery; as anger or the appetite, which attends hatred, is a desire of the misery of the person hated, and an aversion to his happiness. A desire, therefore, of the happiness of another, and aversion to his misery, are similar to benevolence; and a desire of his misery and aversion to his happiness are correspondent to anger" ( Treatise, p. 382). From this it is evident, however, that the "desire . . . of the happiness of another," which is said by Hume to be similar to benevolence, is not benevolence but pity: "Now pity is a desire of happiness to another, and aversion to his misery, as malice is the contrary appetite. Pity, then, is related to benevolence; and malice to anger . . ." ( Treatise, p. 382). 123 124

ciated with benevolence by similarity of "direction or tendency to action" (382) and is, therefore, compatible with love, which is always conjoined with benevolence. Likewise, malice is parallel in tendency with anger and is, therefore, associated with hatred, the concomitant of anger (ibid.). In this solution, it is to be noted that pity and malice have, within the limits of one section, been treated as both passive emotions, namely an uneasiness and a joy, respectively, and also as tendencies to action. Some adjustment is clearly needed, therefore, and might perhaps take the form of supposing that the tendencies of pity and malice stand to the passive emotions as benevolence and anger stand to love and hatred. Hume continues, however, without making this or a similar adjustment, and contends, in his explanation of the mingling of love and pity, hatred and malice, that it is "founded on sufficient experience" (ibid.). Thus the total mixture of pity and benevolence, or of malice and anger, is as understandable as, if not more so than, the analogous mixture of other motives such as self-interest, duty, and honor (ibid.). Further, "benevolence and anger, and consequently love and hatred, arise when our happiness or misery have any dependence on the happiness or misery of another person, without any farther relation" (382-383), and this effect can be explained only if the tendencies of the passions are taken into account. Our happiness or misery may depend upon that of a rival and that of a partner; but, although the rival's loss gives pleasure and the partner's pain, the pleasure and pain do not cause love and hatred respectively: "whether the fortune of a rival or partner be good or bad, I always hate the former and love the latter" (383). Nor can the love of a partner "proceed from the relation or connexion betwixt us" (ibid.) since "a rival has almost as close a relation to me as a partner" (ibid.). The explanation rather depends upon the parallelism of the direction of -60-

desires. Out of self-interest we have a desire for the happiness of a partner; a desire for the happiness of another is similar in tendency to benevolence, which is linked with love; hence our love for a partner, regardless of our momentary pleasures or pains at his gains or losses (384). On the other hand, we desire, out of self-interest, the pain of a rival; this desire runs parallel with anger, which is linked in turn with hatred; hence the hatred of a rival, even when his loss is pleasurable to us (ibid.). In general, a desire for good to others, from any motive, produces some love of them; while a desire for their injury causes some degree of hatred, although these phenomena "may be in part accounted for from other principles" (ibid.). At this point Hume again shows, by way of meeting an objection, the difference made to the passions according as the double association of ideas and impressions chiefly involves only the similarity in sensation of the latter or the similarity of their tendency. The objection is that pity seems to give rise to the contrary passions of love and hatred (385). For on the one hand, the hatred which may be occasioned in the observer for the victim of poverty and meanness is explained as the effect of the sympathetic communication to the observer of the unhappiness of the person subject to these disadvantages; and this phenomenon is typical of those explained by the double association of ideas and of impressions by simple resemblance of sensation as pleasant or unpleasant. But on the other hand, "pity or a sympathy with pain produces love, and that because it interests us in the fortunes of others, good or bad, and gives us a secondary sensation correspondent to the primary; in which it has the same influence with love and benevolence" (ibid.). The question arises, therefore, "why does sympathy in uneasiness ever produce any passion beside good-will and kindness?" (ibid.). Hume's answer to this question is, on the one hand, that a transition of passions may arise from "a double relation of ideas and impressions, and what is similar to it, a conformity in the tendency and direction of any two desires, which arise from different principles" (ibid.), and, on the other hand, that "when a sympathy with uneasiness is weak, it produces hatred or contempt by the former cause; when strong, it produces love or tenderness by the latter" (ibid.). Sympathy with a sufferer may be weak and "limited to the present moment" (ibid.); in this case, -61-

we share with him only the unpleasant present sensation of which he is the original subject, and this sympathetically received displeasure, by the double association of ideas and impressions, produces hatred or contempt. In this case, that is, "I am not so much interested as to concern myself in his good fortune, as well as his bad" (386). This accounts for the production of hatred by pity or sympathy with uneasiness; and the question now remains as to the circumstances under which sympathy with uneasiness may "run parallel with benevolence" (387), thus producing benevolence and its inevitable companion, love, by an association of tendencies. Now, sympathy, when strong, not only enlivens the observer's idea of the sufferer's present misery but also gives the observer "a lively notion of all the circumstances of that person, whether past, present, or future; possible, probable or certain" (386). Such an extensive sympathetic concern for both the good and the bad fortunes of the sufferer resembles benevolence, now defined as "an original pleasure arising from the pleasure of the person belov'd, and a pain proceeding from his pain: From which correspondence of impressions there arises a subsequent desire of his pleasure, and aversion to his pain" (387). The difference between a limited and an extensive sympathy depends upon the vivacity of the sympathetically received impression of misery, for it is upon this source of vivacity that the ideas of the past, present, and future circumstances of the subject of sympathy depend for their enlivening. Hence "a strong impression, when communicated, gives a double tendency of the passions; which is related to benevolence and love by a similarity of direction; however painful the first impression might have been" (ibid.). In strong sympathy, the effect of the quality of the sensation is outweighed by its tendency; in limited sympathy, there is no tendency and, consequently, the usual effect of the unpleasantness of the received impression, that is, hatred, occurs. "Benevolence, therefore, arises from a great degree of misery, or any degree strongly sympathiz'd with" (ibid.). Thus a small degree of poverty causes contempt, while a great causes benevolence (ibid.), and the weak sympathy with the inhabitants of a "barren or desolate country" (388) causes contempt for them, while the profound sympathy with the survivors of a burnt-out city occasions benevolence, "because we then enter so deep into the interests of the miserable -62-

inhabitants, as to wish for their prosperity, as well as feel their adversity" (ibid.). Hume concludes his inquiry into this topic with an instance "which makes most clearly for my hypothesis" (ibid.): if we consider B as a sufferer and A as the cause of his pains, we find that we hate A but love and pity B, and that we hate A the more intensely as we feel a greater compassion for B. In this case, the contrary effect of pity in augmenting opposite passions is explained by the fact that the inflicter of suffering is associated only with the sympathetically received impressions of pain; "whereas in considering the sufferer we carry our view on every side, and wish for his prosperity, as well as are sensible of his affliction" (389). Hume's discussion of respect and contempt, which, together with the discussion following it of "the amorous passion, or love betwixt the sexes," brings to a close his examination of the indirect passions, turns largely on the role of relations of comparison in the causation of these composite affections. Respect is a mixture of love and humility, contempt of hatred and pride (390); and these mixtures depend upon a "tacit comparison of the person contenm'd or respected with ourselves" (ibid.). Thus, one who exceeds us in good qualities excites our love, so far as these qualities are regarded "as they really are in themselves" (389); but if at the same time we "make a comparison betwixt them and our own qualities and circumstances" (390), these good qualities of another arouse humility, since "objects always produce by comparison a sensation directly contrary to their original one" (392), and this humility, mingling with the love, gives respect. Similarly, one who exceeds us in bad qualities excites our hatred so far as we consider these qualities independently of comparison, but also excites our pride so far as we consider them in comparison with our own qualities; and the result is contempt, "when we join these two methods of consideration" (390). Since "the mind has a much stronger propensity to pride than to humility" (ibid.), there is more love than humility in respect and more pride than hatred in contempt. At this point Hume notices a problem peculiar to this account of respect and contempt: on the one hand, pleasant qualities which cause pride when considered as characterizing the self, also cause -63-

love when considered as characteristic of another person, "and consequently ought to be causes of humility, as well as love, while they belong to others, and are only compar'd to those, which we ourselves possess" (391). On the other hand, unpleasant qualities which when placed on self cause humility, provoke hatred when belonging to others, and should produce pride so far as they are considered by comparison as belonging to another as opposed to self; so that the problem arises "why any objects ever cause pure love or hatred, and produce not always the mixt passions of respect and contempt" (391). To this problem Hume proposes a somewhat abstruse solution. Love and pride, hatred and humility, are contrary in sensation, love and pride being agreeable, hatred and humility disagreeable; but along with these agreements and differences there are others. Thus pride and vanity, like hatred and anger, invigorate and enliven the soul (ibid.), while love and humility "deject and discourage us" (ibid.). This being so, it is possible to explain why love and pride, both pleasant in sensation, and hatred and humility, both unpleasant, although excited by similar qualities, are excited by them in different degrees, that is, to explain (a) why some qualities are better fitted to produce pride when placed upon oneself than love when placed upon another, and (b) why some qualities are better fitted to produce humility when placed upon oneself than hatred when placed upon another. Thus "genius and learning are pleasant and magnificent" (ibid.); they therefore bear a single associative resemblance, by their agreeableness, to love and a double resemblance, through their capacity to enliven the spirits, to pride. Similarly, "ignorance and simplicity are disagreeable and mean, which in the same manner gives them a double connexion with humility and a single one with hatred" (392). Now, if a quality Q, placed upon another person, makes us humble by comparison, then Q, placed on ourselves, causes pride, and vice versa (ibid.). If, therefore, Q is a quality better adapted to produce love than pride, 125 then, if Q is placed on another person, it excites a strong degree of love, but, since its being placed upon self would excite only a weak pride, it produces by comparison only a weak humility, and consequently the "latter -64-

125

Hume instances "good nature, good humour, facility, generosity, beauty" ( Treatise, p. 392).

passion is scarce felt in the compound" (392) and the emotion excited by it is virtually pure love. Similarly, if Q when placed on others is able to produce a strong degree of hatred although when placed on self but a weak humility, then, if Q is placed on another, it excites hatred in a strong degree but, by comparison, only a weak pride; and hence the emotion caused by Q is virtually pure hatred (ibid.). Hume ends the discussion of respect and contempt by accounting for "a pretty curious phaenomenon, viz. why we commonly keep at a distance such as we contemn and allow not our inferiors to approach too near even in place and situation" (392-393). It is not possible to view a nobleman or a porter "with entire indifference" (393); the view of such as the former is attended with some respect, of such as the latter with some contempt. The relation of contiguity between the causes of these passions serves, in accordance with the general theory of the double-association of ideas and impressions, to permit the mingling of the impressions in an unpleasant contrariety, which we desire to prevent by elimination of the conducting relation, namely contiguity. Of the subjects of qualities producing emotion, it is true in general that "a great difference inclines us to produce a distance" (ibid.) between them; and this is why "any great difference in the degrees of any quality is call'd a distance by a common metaphor" (ibid.). Hume's analysis of sexual love reveals it to be compounded from the pleasure arising from beauty, the pleasant "bodily appetite for generation" (394), and benevolence (ibid.). Since the origin of benevolence from the love excited by the pleasurable beauty of its object is evident, what requires explanation is only the assistance of the bodily appetite given by the beauty of its object (ibid.). The impressions composing sexual love are "evidently distinct, and has each of them its distinct object" (395396), so that the problem is one of discovering the associative relations by which "they produce each other" (396). Now, there is an associative resemblance of sensation between the bodily appetite, which "when confin'd to a certain degree, is evidently of the pleasant kind" (394), and the pleasurable sense of beauty. But the sense of beauty has another connection with the bodily appetite. In general, a principal appetite "may be attended with subordinate ones" (ibid.), and the latter, if strengthened by a -65-

separate cause, strengthen the principal, provided that they are parallel in direction with it. Thus hunger, as the principal desire, may be accompanied with the subordinate desire of approaching food (394-395). The pleasant appearance of food, itself the object of the principal desire, separately strengthens the subordinate desire, which in turn strengthens the principal through their concurrence in direction, namely, toward the same pleasantly appearing object. So that the effect of human beauty upon the appetite for generation is in its principle identical with the effect of the pleasant appearance of food upon hunger (395). The connections among the sense of beauty, the bodily appetite, and the third ingredient of sexual love, "a generous kindness or good-will" (394), are so strong that these ingredients "become in a manner inseparable" (395). Thus lust usually leads to kindness (if only short-lived) for its object and to the idea, often exaggerated, that its object is beautiful; and kindness, on the other hand, often leads to lust (ibid.). Commonly, however, the response in sexual love is first to beauty, with lust and benevolence following: "the love of beauty is plac'd in a just medium betwixt them, and partakes of both their natures: From whence it proceeds, that 'tis so singularly fitted to produce both" (ibid.). Besides the resemblance of the impressional ingredients of the sexual passion in their agreeable sensations and parallel directions, there is required, however, the relation of ideas between self and object of love. "The beauty of one person never inspires us with love for another. This then is a sensible proof of the double relation of impressions and ideas" (396). -66-

CHAPTER II: HUME'S THEORY OF THE WILL AND THE DIRECT PASSIONS

§ 1: THE DETERMINATION OF THE WILL HUME'S examination of the will is made in connection with his inquiry into the passions because "the full understanding of its nature and properties, is necessary to the explanation of them" (399). The relation between the two inquiries is clear: Hume wishes to show first that the will is determined by motives, and next that these motives are passions and emotions, and not anything properly describable as "reason." It is first undertaken, accordingly, to refute the "fantastical system of liberty" (404) and to explain the prevalence of this doctrine "however absurd it may be in one sense, and unintelligible in any other" (407); and next, to disclose "the influencing motives of the will" (413). Hume's discussion of liberty and necessity has to do, however, entirely with the voluntary actions of human agents; and in this discussion no use is made of the introductory definition of "will." This fact is understandable from the unusual lack of clarity in Hume's introduction of the present subject. The will, according to Hume, is an internal impression which is not a passion but which, like the direct passions desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear, arises "immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure" (399). On the same page this impression is described as "the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind" (ibid.). It is difficult otherwise to interpret these two statements concerning the will than as together implying that every voluntary action is performed upon the perception 126 of pleasure or pain: for if the will as just described is distinct from desire or aversion but arises immediately from pleasure or pain as the accompaniment of voluntary actions, these actions must arise immediately themselves from pleasure or pain. Thus Hume chooses a definition of "will" which begs the -67-

"Perception" is here used in Hume's broadest sense of the term, according to which to be perceived is to be present to mind as a perception, that is, as either an impression or an idea. 126

question in favor of his position, later argued, that the influencing motives of the will are ultimately pleasure and pain, through the passions which these sensations characterize. In his attempt to differentiate the will from desire and aversion, 127 Hume later states that "The WILL exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attain'd by any action of the mind or body" (439). Here the will is identified with a faculty productive of voluntary actions: this identification has the advantage that it is apparently significant to inquire whether a faculty is free or necessitated in its operation, while it is certainly nonsignificant to make the same inquiry with respect to an internal impression; but it has the disadvantage of being incompatible with the original definition. And it has also the disadvantage that "faculty," as designating an entity known only through, or rather postulated only for the sake of the explanation of phenomena which are regarded as inexplicable as other than its effects, is nonsignificant according to the epistemological analysis of the causal relation with which Book I, Part III, is engrossed and the results of which govern, as will be seen, the present analysis of the question of the liberty or the necessitation of the will. Hume's account of the will is thus rather obscure as regards the meaning in which he intends the crucial term to be understood; 128 but from this it does not follow that his discussion of freedom and necessity, or even the discussion conducted under the title "Of the influencing motives of the will", is equally obscure. For Hume's discussion of liberty and necessity concerns voluntary actions, that is, actions which would be said, prior to agreement as to the correct analysis of this statement, to proceed from the will only of the agent in question; so that Hume's analysis of the causation of voluntary actions stands independently of his contention--which is probably without foundation-that every such action is accompanied by a sensation peculiar thereto. Hume attacks the question of the necessitation or determinism of voluntary actions by arguing, in a recapitulation of the episte-68-

A differentiation often carelessly overlooked, as in Treatise, pp. 414, 416, 417, and 439. Cf. E. G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology ( New York, 1929), p. 340: "Intelligence, for example, proves to have scientific meaning, because there is a method for it. Will, on the other hand, still lacks scientific significance because there has never been any experimental research that sufficiently defined the concept." 127 128

mological analysis of Book I, Part III, that the meaning of the necessitation acknowledged (400) to characterize events in matter (that is, events other than human actions) is exhausted in the attribution to these events of regular sequence and mutual inferribility and that since "no one has ever pretended to deny, that we can draw inferences concerning human actions, and that those inferences are founded on the experienc'd union of like actions with like motives and circumstances" (409), these actions are "in this respect on the same footing with matter, [and] must be acknowledg'd to be necessary" (400). The acknowledged necessity of the actions of matter consists in the fact that through their constant conjunction in experience, events of different kinds have acquired such a connection in the imagination that if an event of the one kind be present to mind as either impression or idea, there is an immediate transition, occurring with a felt determination, to the idea of an event of the other kind. There can be no extraexperiential origin of the idea of necessity, 129 so that "Here then are two particulars, which we are to consider as essential to necessity, viz. the constant union and the inference of the mind; and wherever we discover these we must acknowledge a necessity" (400). For establishing the statement that human actions are uniformly connected with the "motives, tempers, and circumstances" (401) of their agents, "a very slight and general view of the common course of human affairs will be sufficient" (ibid.). There is great regularity in the actions and passions characteristic of the sexes (ibid.). There is uniformity in the changes in the minds of human beings from infancy to old age (ibid.). Civil society itself is the uniform result of human foresight of the inconvenience attending the separation of children from their parents (402); and distinctions of property inseparable from society regularly produce "industry, traffic, manufactures, law-suits, war, leagues, alliances, voyages, travels, cities, fleets, ports, and all those other actions and objects, which cause such a diversity, and at the same time maintain such an uniformity in human life" (ibid.). The unpredictability of some human actions, like that of some physical -69-

"It has been observ'd already, that in no single instance the ultimate connexion of any objects is discoverable, either by our senses or reason, and we can never penetrate so far into the essence and construction of bodies, as to perceive the principle, on which their mutual influence depends" ( Treatise, p. 400). 129

events, is not proof of indeterminism but only of our "imperfect knowledge" (404) of their causal context. Common sense betrays its confusion on the present subject by holding that madmen are not free agents, although the irregularity of their actions is incompatible with necessity (ibid.). Having indicated that the uniformity of human actions in their connection with the motives and circumstances of agents is the same as the uniformity with which physical events of different kinds precede or follow each other, Hume establishes that "its influence on the understanding is also the same, in determining us to infer the existence of one from that of another" (ibid.). Moral evidence is regarded as a "reasonable foundation" for both speculation and practice; it is, however, "nothing but a conclusion concerning the actions of men, deriv'd from the consideration of their motives, temper and situation" (ibid.). Our conclusion that the statements of historians are veracious is subsumable under "moral evidence," and "the same kind of reasoning runs thro' politics, war, commerce, oeconomy, and indeed mixes itself so entirely in human life that 'tis impossible to act or subsist a moment without having recourse to it" (405). Thus the merchant who "looks for fidelity and skill in his factor or super-cargo" (ibid.), makes an inference in virtue of the experienced uniformity of the actions and motives of the agent; and this inference is "nothing but the effects of custom on the imagination" (ibid.). In the case of the motions of matter, their experienced uniformity produces a felt connection of their ideas in the imagination, and this felt connection constitutes the necessity of these motions. This effect of uniformity in producing a felt connection, and consequently the necessity thereby constituted, is the same when the uniformity is of human actions and motives, whose connection is therefore necessary (406). Natural and moral evidence are in principle identical: "the same experienc'd union has the same effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volitions and actions; or figure and motion" (406-407). To deny that the idea of cause and effect is constituted by that of "objects constantly united" (405) or that their necessary connection is "not discover'd by a conclusion of the understanding, but is merely a perception of the mind" (405-406), is to change the meanings of these terms; according to these definitions, causation and motivation entail -70-

necessity; while liberty, because incompatible with necessity, is incompatible with causation and "is the very same thing with chance" (407). There are three reasons for the prevalence of the doctrine of freedom of the will 130 which is either absurd, as denying the evident uniformity of human actions, or unintelligible, as ascribing to physical events a necessity of which the will is supposed to be free. In the first place, the idea of necessity is confused with that of "force, and violence, and constraint" (ibid.). The operation of motives in voluntary actions is conceded, and this operation is, as was just seen, necessary; but being unattended by violence and constraint, the operation of motives is, by this confusion, supposed not to be necessary (407). In the second place, "we feel that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions, and imagine we feel that the will itself is subject to nothing" (408). The necessity of actions is constituted by the determination of the mind to pass, in the process which is causal inference, from the idea of the motive and character of the agent to that of the action customarily following these; but this determination is not usually felt while, as an agent, one is performing the action itself. This lack of felt determination is similar to that "certain looseness" (408), constitutive of liberty or chance, "which we feel in passing or not passing from the idea of one to that of the other" (ibid.); and this similarity results in a confusion which "has been employ'd as a demonstrative or even an intuitive proof of human liberty" (ibid.). An agent subject to this confusion imagines, after he has performed an action without at the same time inferring this action from its motive, that in place of this kind of action he could have performed one of any other kind; but his "proof," consisting in the subsequent performance of one of these imagined alternatives, is fallacious: in this case, "as the desire of showing our liberty is the sole motive of our actions; we can never free ourselves from the bonds of necessity" (408). An observer "perfectly acquainted" -71-

Hume's argument for determinism is compatible, of course, with the description of voluntary actions as "free" in the sense of "being such as require in the description of their causes no reference to the motives, character, or circumstances of any but the agent in question." Free action is thus opposed, in this sense, not to determined but to constrained action, that is, to action in the causal description of which reference is made to the motives, character, and circumstances of an agent other than the owner of the action in question. Cf. Treatise, p. 407. 130

with the motive and the circumstances could infer the action, and this inferribility is "the very essence of necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine" (409). The third reason for the denial of the determinism of voluntary actions is the seeming support which this denial gives to religion, "which has been very unnecessarily interested in this question" (ibid.), the doctrine contrary to that of liberty being regarded as false because of its supposed dangerous consequences to morality and religion. But although in general, no doctrine is false merely because dangerous in its effects, the doctrine of the necessity of voluntary actions is, Hume shows, not only innocent with regard to morality and religion, but even of advantage to them. In the first place, necessity, whether regarded as the regular sequence of events or their mutual inferribility, has "universally, tho' tacitely, in the schools, in the pulpit, and in common life, been allow'd to belong to the will of man" (409); and as far as human actions are concerned, the only difference, with respect to determinism, between the present doctrine and its antithesis is one of words, namely, whether uniformity or inferribility shall be called necessity." In the second place, the supposition not of necessity but of anything incompatible with it "is entirely destructive to all laws both divine and human" (410). Both human and divine laws are founded upon rewards and punishments, which are thus acknowledged to have a regular influence upon the minds of agents and hence upon their voluntary actions, regardless of whether this influence be called "necessitation." Further, the justice of an act of the deity as "the avenger of crimes merely on account of their odiousness and deformity" (411) entails that the criminal deeds have a necessary connection with "some cause in the characters and disposition of the person, who perform'd them" (ibid.). An agent cannot with justice or moral equity be blamed for an action unless responsible; but moral responsibility for an action can be placed upon the agent only so far as the action is produced by the agent, that is, only so far as there is a causal relation between the action and the character and motives of the agent. Necessary connection with motives is thus presupposed in the acquisition by an agent of either merit or demerit in virtue of an action. Yet on this point there is usually much confusion, for the same persons who argue that such necessity is incompatible -72-

with distinctions of moral worth also refuse to condemn agents "for such evil actions as they perform ignorantly and casually, whatever may be their consequences" (412). Repentance, like praise and blame, presupposes a necessary connection of action with motive and character. The recognition of repentance and reformation as absolving the agent from guilt is inexplicable except as being also the recognition that his actions are blameable only as indicative of his character through their causal relation to it: "actions render a person criminal, merely as they are proofs of criminal passions or principles in the mind; and when by any alteration of these principles they cease to be just proofs, they likewise cease to be criminal" (412). § 2: THE DETERMINANTS OF THE WILL Having thus established "that all actions of the will have particular causes" (412), Hume turns in a celebrated argument to discuss the nature of these motives. The discussion has two parts, the first being an analysis of "the suppos'd pre-eminence of reason above passion" (413) as a motive of the will, the latter part disclosing the nature of the real motives and explaining the common error about their identity. The "greatest part of moral philosophy" (ibid.) is based, Hume contends, upon the notion that there can be a conflict of reason and passion for the directorship of our actions, and upon the accompanying notions that reason ought to be preferred to passion as a motive and that virtue consists in reason's victory over passion in their conflict. Nevertheless, this "greatest part of moral philosophy" is false; for two propositions fatal to it can be established, (i) "reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will" (413), and (ii) reason "can never oppose passion in the direction of the will" (ibid.). In favor of (i), it is to be noted that reason, as identical with the operation of judgment, "exerts itself after two different ways, as it judges from demonstration or probability" (ibid.). 131 Now, in demonstrative reasoning per se, the mind is connected only with certain rela-73-

"Probable" is used here in the widest sense in which the term is used in the epistemological theory of Book I, that is, as coextensive with the domain of synthetic as opposed to analytic propositions, and hence as opposed not to "certain" but only to "certain, because analytic." Cf. Treatise, pp. 70 ff. and also p. 124. "Analytic" and "synthetic" are, of course, not Hume's terms; but they adequately represent his familiar contrast between propositions expressive of "relations of ideas" on the one hand, and of "matters of fact" on the other. 131

tionships of abstract ideas, while in volition the mind is related to realities or existences; hence "demonstration and volition seem, upon that account to be totally remov'd, from each other" (ibid.). Thus in mechanics, demonstrative reasoning may be applied to realities, but only for the purpose of guiding our judgment concerning causes and effects, that is, our probable judgments. 132 Probable or causal judgments, however, have no original influence on conduct because they are not made unless their subject matter is already the object of some passion: "it can never in the least concern us to know, that such objects are causes, and such others effects, if both the causes and effects be indifferent to us" (414). The second proposition follows as a corollary from the first, granted that "nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse" (415); for in this case, the counterimpulse is nevertheless an impulse, that is, an original effect upon action, which is what, according to (i), reason, as demonstrative or causal judgment, cannot be (ibid.). "Thus it appears, that the principle, which opposes our passion, cannot be the same with reason, and is only call'd so in an improper sense" (415). Opposition to passion cannot be understood as consisting in contradiction to truth and reason (415), for the passions, unlike ideas, are nonrepresentative and hence insusceptible of qualification by logical or semantic properties such as consistency, truth, or falsehood. 133 A passion, consequently, may intelligibly be said to be unreasonable only if it is accompanied by a false judgment concerning the existence of its object or of the means requisite for obtaining or avoiding it, and "even then 'tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment" (416). There can thus be no such combat of passion and reason as is contemplated in moral philosophy, for only passions and emotions -74-

Judgments of causation are, as analyzed in Treatise, Book I, without exception synthetic and hence "probable" as opposed to "analytic." 133 "A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification" ( Treatise, p. 415). It is to be noted that this passage makes the alleged property of ideas to "copy" impressions dependent upon the representative or referential property of ideas; while in Book I (Part I, sect. i, pp. 2 ff.) the referential property is regarded as dependent upon the copying property. Between these views, then, there is composed the supposed equivalence of the referential and of the copying properties, a supposition the untenability of which is shown by Laird in Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature ( New York, 1931), p. 32. 132

are capable of exciting us to action; 134 and the question arises as to how these motives could have come to be regarded as a species of reason. Hume answers this question in terms of his often-cited principle that resembling entities are easily mistaken for each other. 135 Reason, as demonstrative or causal judgment, "exerts itself without producing any sensible emotion" (417); so that if there are any passions resembling reason in this respect, they may be readily confused with the latter (ibid.). And there are indeed such passions: "'tis certain, there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, tho' they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation" (417). Hume instances the "instinctive" 136 passions of benevolence and resentment, love of life, and parental love, on the one hand, and "the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such" (417) on the other; for when these passions are calm, 137 the actions proceeding from them as motives are erroneously thought to be the results of "the same faculty, with that, which judges of truth and falshood" (ibid.). The same passions, however, may occur with vio-75-

Hume's later admission of an "oblique" ( Treatise, p. 459) or a "mediate" (ibid., p. 462) influence of reason upon conduct, constituted by the operation of reason "either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion" (ibid., p. 459), is, of course, not incompatible with the present position. No more, either, is the admission of an effect of reason when it shows us either the nonexistence of the supposed object of a passion or the unsuitability of any chosen means towards the gratification of it; for in this case, there is no combat of reason and passion; "the moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any means our passions yield to our reason without any opposition" ( Treatise, p. 416). The object is desired as existent and not as nonexistent; hence it is, strictly speaking, not reason but the nonexistence of the object which removes the desire. Similarly, the means to gratification of a passion are chosen as suitable and not as unsuitable; hence it is the unsuitability of the means, which happens to become known through reason, that (strictly speaking) destroys the desire to pursue them. 135 Cf. Treatise, Book I, Part II, sect. v, p. 61. 136 See pp. 29 ff. 137 "When any of these passions are calm, and cause no disorder in the soul, they are very readily taken for the determinations of reason, and are suppos'd to proceed from the same faculty, with that, which judges of truth and falshood." ( Treatise, p. 417; italics not in Hume's text). Inspection of this passage reveals that Laird has missed its point in saying ( Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature, p. 205): " Hume's statement that 'calmness' and 'rationality' were commonly confused, was not at all plausible. 'Reason' need not be calm and may be a consuming flame. It often is. Again our appetite for good may be so little 'calm' that it makes crusaders and zealots of us, as it did in the instances of Bentham and J. S. Mill." 134

lence ( 418); and the will is determined at times by calm and at. other times by violent passions (ibid.), although "the common error of metaphysicians has lain in ascribing the direction of the will entirely to one of these principles" (418). Thus agents can act "knowingly" against their own interest: this is said to occur when they are actuated by a violent passion, such as fear; while on the other hand, violent passions may be counteracted by calm, if some large interest of the agents is at stake, so that "'tis not therefore the present uneasiness alone, which determines them" (ibid.). Great difficulty in the reading of human motives is occasioned by this contrariety and strife of the passions in the direction of action; and strength of mind, which "implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent" (ibid.), is never the permanent possession of any man. Having thus distinguished between the calm and violent passions, Hume points out that it does not follow from this distinction that a violent passion is necessarily a stronger determinant of action than a weak one (418). A passion which over a period of time has gained ascendancy over others becomes a "settled principle of action" (419), and is thus a powerful determinant of action, although because of the lack of opposition to it from other passions, "it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation" (ibid.). Nevertheless, when it is desired to provoke a person to action, the excitement of his violent passions is usually more effective than the appeal to "what is vulgarly call'd his reason" (ibid.), that is, his calm passions. The determinants of the degree of violence of a given passion are several, and Hume's description of them is minute. All the passions "pursue good, and avoid evil" (ibid.), that is, pleasure and pain, 138 and are calm or violent in proportion to the magnitude of the good or evil; but this magnitude is itself a function both of the nature of the good (or evil) and also of its distance, so that "the same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one" (ibid.). In the second place, since "any emotion, which attends a passion, is easily converted to it" (ibid.), 139 a passion which is already predominant by its violence may be increased through the addition -76-

For the identification of good with pleasure and evil with pain, see Treatise, pp. 276, 399, 438, and 439. This "conversion" of one emotion into another is to be understood, analogously with the phenomenon referred to as the "transfer of vivacity" (see above, chap. i, § 3, p. 42 and note 20), as a metaphorical description of the fact that simultaneously with the appearance of a subordinate emotion (of a given kind), or shortly after it, the predominant passion gains in felt vehemence. 138 139

to it of the force of a lesser accompanying emotion; and this is true when the accompanying emotion is different from or even contrary to the superior, 140 jealousy, for example, serving to augment love (420). Again, passions may be reinforced by opposition, as when desire is increased by forbidding access to its object (421), or by uncertainty, where "the effort, which the fancy makes to compleat the idea, rouzes the spirits, and gives an additional force to the passion" (422). The repetition of an idea or action has, according to Hume, two original and derivative effects upon the passions. The original effects are that repetition first gives "a facility in the performance of any action or the conception of any object; and afterwards a tendency or inclination towards it (422); 141 the derivative effects are that (within limits) it increases or diminishes the violence of passions and that (again, within limits) it converts painful objects or actions into pleasurable, and vice versa. Discussion of the circumstances controlling the vehemence of emotion is continued by Hume under the title "Of the influence of the imagination on the passions." 142 This rather misleadingly entitled section describes, somewhat sketchily, the way in which the vivacity of an idea is connected with the strength of a related emotion in accordance with the principle that "wherever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions become more violent; and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations" (424). Thus the superior vivacity to the mind of a pleasure of recent rather than of remote memory has a superior effect upon -77-

Hume's full treatment of the contrariety of passions is given later in connection with hope and fear. See pp. 82 ff. 141 Laird's remark in this connection ( Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature, p. 201) is scarcely intelligible when he writes: "The 'facility,' however, was the only 'inexplicable' fact that he [i.e., Hume] needed. The 'tendency' was but a 'hypothesis' to account, illegitimately, for the recurrent 'facility.'" There is no hypothesis needed for the explanation of a recurrent facility, because there is nothing in Hume's text to suggest that Laird's use of this term is significant. The connection in which Hume is interested at this point is not that of facility with inclination--for his point is precisely that there is no such connection--but of inclination with custom; and the point here made is that it is an ultimate fact that repetition breeds inclination to activities which would not be, independently of repetition, objects of inclination because devoid of the immediate agreeableness which ordinarily constitutes an object as one of inclination. 142 Treatise, pp. 424 ff. 140

the passions and the will; for in this case the vivacity of the memory idea is transferred to the idea of the same pleasure thought as occurring in futurity, the vivacity being transmitted from the memory to the anticipation along the relation of resemblance between the ideas (426). Similarly, belief, being nothing but "a lively idea related to a present impression" (427), is a general prerequisite for the effect of any idea upon the passions, whether calm or violent, the faintness of imaginative fictions rendering them incapable of "any considerable influence" (427) on the passions. Hume considers next the effects upon the force of passion of "contiguity, and distance in space and time" (ibid.). In each of the two sections on this topic, the attempt is made to establish a triad of principles. Hume's arguments at this point provide exceptionally clear examples of his associationistic method, so that we shall analyze the arguments for the first triad in some detail, those for the second being analogous. 143 The first triad is as follows: (i) the distance in space or time of an object weakens the idea of this object and the passion excited by it; (ii) distance in time weakens the idea and passion more than distance in space; and (iii) distance in past time weakens the idea and passion more than distance in futurity. Hume's explanations follow, in order. The general effect upon the imagination of the contiguity of an object consists in the fact that every object contiguous with us in space or time is vividly conceived by reason of the transfer to its idea of vivacity from the lively idea of self: "Ourself is intimately present to us, and whatever is related to self must partake of that quality" (427). The question arises, however, with respect to an object which is not contiguous with us, as to why its idea, when it has lost all the force derivable from contiguity, should become even weaker, in its effect upon the passions and will, as the object is conceived to be even further removed; that is to say, not all of the effects of distance can be regarded as attributable to the fact that distance is the opposite of contiguity. Now, Hume's explanation of principle (i) is that this principle follows from the fact that the more steps the imagination has to make in order to arrive at the idea of an object, and the more uneven the path thereto, the less vivacity is possessed by the idea -78-

143

Ibid., pp. 432 ff.

when it is finally arrived at (428). Removal in space and time lengthens the path to the idea; for the imagination, even if only "in a cursory manner" (ibid.), has to traverse all the points constituting the distance. Again, the path to the idea is made uneven by the interruptions in the progress of the imagination which are occasioned by the fact that the imagination is constantly recalled to the present situation of the self because of the superior vivacity that this situation enjoys in virtue of its contiguity to self (ibid.). Thus we find in common life that more concern is occasioned by the contiguous than by the remote in time and space: no passion is founded upon the supposition of one's condition thirty years hence (428-429), but "the breaking of a mirror gives us more concern when at home than the burning of a house, when abroad, and some hundred leagues distant" (429). Hume's explanation of principle (ii) involves the different properties of imagined time and space. Space consists of coexistent parts disposed in a certain order; a number of them are capable of being present to mind in a single act of perception, and this "union to the senses" (ibid.) is reproducible in the imagination. The parts of time, on the other hand, are incompatible with each other: they have no coexistence to sense and can acquire none in the imagination (ibid.). Hence, while in thinking of an object spatially removed, the imagination can grasp in one act the entire extension from the objects adjacent to self to those distant from self, in thinking of an object temporally removed the imagination must make a separate effort at conceiving each of the events occupying the interval from the present to the temporally removed event. The path to the idea of an object temporally removed is therefore less smooth than that to one spatially removed; from this difference the indicated difference in vivacity and in the effect of the idea upon the passions and will results. In connection with principle (iii), Hume observes that "as none of our actions can alter the past, 'tis not strange it shou'd never determine the will. But with respect to the passions the question is yet entire, and well worth the examining" (430). His treatment of this question is as follows: in conceiving an object removed from the present in either futurity or in past time, the imagination has to traverse the intervening events; but the path from present to past is more difficult to traverse than that from present to -79-

future. The tendency of the imagination is to arrange its ideas from before to after in the order of time; and "we may learn this, among other instances, from the order, which is always observ'd in historical narrations" (430). Hence in going from present to future, the imagination makes a transition which is easy because identical in sense with the general tendency, namely, from earlier to later; whereas the reverse transition is difficult because opposed to the customary. The difficulty of the transition weakens the idea arrived at as its terminus, and consequently any passion related to this idea. Again, given two temporal intervals equally distant respectively in past and in future time from the present, "we consider the one as continually increasing, and the other as continually diminishing" (432); so that the idea of the future object gains vivacity by seeming to gain in contiguity, while the idea of a past object loses vivacity by receding. Hume's explanation of this phenomenon is as follows: one can, in imagining his existence, imagine it as "in a point of time interpos'd betwixt the present instant and the future object," (431), that is, as at some relatively close future instant as opposed to one in the remote future. In this case, the imagination, in reaching this point, travels away from the past, which consequently seems to recede, and toward the future (ibid.). On the other hand, "in supposing ourselves existent in a point of time interpos'd betwixt the present and the past, the past approaches to us, and the future becomes more distant" (ibid.). As between these modes of conceiving our existence, however, the imagination, in accordance with its preference for temporal series the sense of which is from earlier to later, always chooses the former: "we advance, rather than retard our existence" (432). The advancement being easier for the imagination than the retardation, the ideas reached by the former process are more vivid than those reached by the latter. Hume concludes his description of the factors governing emotional intensity with the observation that what is regarded as a strife between reason and the passions is, in fact, a strife between the calm and the violent passions. In this strife, which "diversifies human life, and makes men so different not only from each other, but also from themselves in different times" (438), the violent passions are neither always nor necessarily victorious; for "the calm ones, when corroborated by reflection, and seconded by reso-80-

lution, are able to controul them in their most furious movements" (437-438). Not only do different passions successively assume prominence, but the same passion may change from calm to violent; and only the grosser mechanisms of these changes, such as those just indicated, can come under the scrutiny of philosophy, the others being "dependent on principles too fine and minute for her comprehension" (438). § 3: THE DIRECT PASSIONS; HOPE AND FEAR Having concluded his account of the will, its motives, and the major circumstances controlling their vehemence, Hume concludes his philosophy of the passions with a penultimate section on the topic "Of the direct passions," which is largely devoted to the analysis of hope and fear and a final section "Of curiosity, or the love of truth." The direct passions, except those which "arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable" 144 (439), are proximately caused by good and evil, "or in other words, pain and pleasure" (439). No reason can be given, however, why pleasure and pain, sensed or imagined, so move us. 145 The direct and indirect passions can obviously reinforce one another, since pleasure and pain are cause-factors of both and since the passions themselves are agreeable or disagreeable. Thus a handsome object gives pleasure by its handsomeness, and the pleasure awakens desire; if possessed, the object gives pride, and "the pleasure, which attends that passion, returns back to the direct affections, and gives new force to our desire or volition, joy or hope" (439). As Laird has implied, 146 Hume's "governing interest" is not in the direct passions; and the only members of this group which receive analytical attention are hope and fear. As for the rest, it is observed merely that joy arises from a good that is certain or probable, grief or sorrow from an evil that is "in the same situation" (439); and desire and aversion arise from goods or evils "consider'd simply" (ibid.). Hope and fear, however, are complex and involve, at least in one of their forms, a peculiar mingling of the contraries joy and grief. -81-

See pp. 29 ff. Treatise, p. 438: "The mind by an original instinct tends to unite itself with the good, and to avoid the evil, tho' they be conceiv'd merely in idea, and be consider'd as to exist in any future period of time". 146 Laird, op. cit., p. 192: "Hume's governing interest, however, was in the 'indirect passions'. . ." 144 145

In connection with the passions hope and fear, Hume raises the question in general of the fusion and contrariety of passions, to which we presently turn. Three questions arise in relation to the presentation (to sense or to the imagination) of objects which excite contrary passions: (i) why the contrary passions sometimes exist in alternation; (ii) why they are sometimes mutually destructive "and leave the mind in perfect tranquillity" (442); and (iii) why they sometimes "subsist together, and produce a third impression or affection by their union" (ibid.). Hume's explanations are given in terms of the general principle of the double-association theory of the passions, in accordance with which there can be a transition from a passion excited by an object A to one excited by an object B only if A is associated in idea with B. 147 In accordance with this principle, the phenomenon referred to in (i) occurs when the objects of the contrary passions are not associated in idea, "the want of relation in the ideas seperating the impressions from each other, and preventing their opposition" (441). Thus the contrary passions excited by the "loss of a lawsuit" and the "birth of a son" (ibid.) alternately occupy the mind. The second phenomenon occurs when the object or event presented or considered "is of a mixt nature" (442) and has both good and bad aspects or implications. In this case, the aspects and implications are cause-factors in the production of contrary passions; and these aspects and implications are closely associated in idea, since they characterize an identical object or event. In this case, therefore, the passions, if not contrary, would mingle perfectly; the same circumstance, however, namely a close association of ideas in their cause-factors, which would otherwise assure their fusion, in this case causes, on account of the contrariety of the passions, their mutual destruction. Hume adds that for this nullification of passions it is required that "their contrary movements exactly rencounter" (442) and be opposite in direction as well as in sensation. 148 The third phenomenon occurs where an event or object is regarded as an unmixed good or evil, that is, where the event, should it happen, or the object, should it be found to exist, would produce unmixed pleasure or pain, but where it is not certain that -82-

See pp. 33 ff. This limitation can apply, obviously, only to such of the passions as possess "direction," for example, to benevolence or malice but not to pride or humility. 147 148

the event will happen or that the object exists, although there are considerations of probablity favorable to both alternatives. In this case, the considerations favorable or unfavorable to the occurrence of the event are, properly speaking, the excitants of the contrary passions, through the pleasure or displeasure with which these considerations are regarded. The associative connection between these considerations lies in strength between the nullity of case (i) and the strong relation of case (ii); for while these probability considerations are related, as being probabilities of the same event, they cannot, however, be so closely associated as to permit the mutual destruction of the contrary passions they excite, "since some of the chances lie on the side of existence, and others on that of non-existence; which are objects altogether incompatible" (442). The imagination can consider the probabilities but alternately; and if the uncertain object is good, and hence desired, the consideration of the probabilities favorable to its existence gives joy, and of the probabilities unfavorable, grief. If, on the other hand, the object is evil, and hence one of aversion, the consideration of the favorable probabilities excites grief, that of the unfavorable, joy. The question arises, however, as to why the transition of thought from the favorable to the unfavorable probabilities, of, for example, the existence of a good object or event, is accompanied by the mingling of the emotions, namely, joy and grief, corresponding to these probabilities rather than by their alternation; and Hume's answer is that "the imagination is extreme quick and agile; but the passions are slow and restive" (441). Thus the joy excited by the thought of the favorable probabilities does not entirely disappear upon the transition of thought to the unfavorable chances but continues throughout this transition, thereby mingling joy with the grief produced by consideration of the unfavorable chances. Now, it is from a mingling of joy and grief, whether caused by the fluctuation of the imagination between opposed probabilities or by any other similar unsteadiness of thought, that Hume proposes to explain the passions of hope and fear. His analysis, however, is confused as to the object of hope or fear. As these passions are first described, either may be excited by a good and either by an evil object, provided that its existence is not certainly known. "When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to FEAR or -83-

HOPE, according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or the other" (439). Thus an object that is good and therefore desired, if thought of as more likely to exist than not, excites hope; if thought of as more likely not to exist, it excites fear. Similarly, an object that is evil and is therefore an object of aversion, if thought of as more likely to exist than not, excites fear; if thought of as more likely not to exist, it excites hope. This account is contrary to ordinary usage, in accordance with which it would not be said, except with deliberate paradox, that evil is hoped for or good feared; and it is contrary also to Hume's later statement: "'Tis evident that the very same event, which by its certainty wou'd produce grief or joy, gives always rise to fear or hope, when only probable and uncertain" (439-440). It is in terms of this latter statement, which accords with ordinary usage in allowing only evil to be the object of fear, and only good the object of hope, that the remainder of Hume's analysis is conducted, apart from a passage which is enigmatic except as a consequence of confusion between the original and later descriptions of hope and fear. In this passage we are told that "the passions of fear and hope may arise when the chances are equal on both sides, and no superiority can be discover'd in the one above the other" (443). In this case, it is to be noticed, the differentiation of the passions is possible only in terms of the differentiation of their objects, that is, if their objects are intrinsically different, namely evil and good respectively for fear and hope; for the probabilities of existence and nonexistence are ex hypothesi equal. Hume invites us to add, in connection with an implied initial state of hope, "a superior degree of probability to the side of grief" (443), in which case "you immediately see that passion diffuse itself over the composition, and tincture it into fear" (ibid.). He adds that upon the continuous increase of grief, "the fear prevails still more and more, till at last it runs insensibly, as the joy continually diminishes, into pure grief" (ibid.). Upon the continuous diminution of grief, the passion "changes insensibly into hope" (444) and ultimately into joy; and Hume asks of these procedures whether they "are not as plain proofs, that the passions of fear and hope are mixtures of grief and joy, as in optics 'tis proof, that a colour'd ray of the sun passing thro' a prism, is a composition of two others, when, as you diminish or encrease the quantity of either, you find it -84-

prevail proportionately more or less to the composition" (ibid.). Unfortunately for the proposed "experiment," however, the sequence suggested, that is, hope, fear, grief, hope, joy, is impossible. For we have just observed that the arising of hope or fear "when the chances are equal on both sides" (443) as regards the existence or nonexistence of the object of the passion in question, entails that the object of hope must be good only; of fear, evil only. But this being so, it is evidently impossible to construct the series hope, fear, grief, and grief, hope, joy by changing the likelihood of the existence or occurrence of the same object or event: in proposing these series, Hume has confused the original and the later descriptions of hope and fear, quoted above, 149 and has tacitly altered the definitions of joy and sorrow. The remainder of Hume's analysis of the direct passions is confined to the topic of fear. In this discussion, however, the original attempt to describe fear as a mingling of grief and joy is virtually abandoned: "fear" is now treated as designating any of a family of similar impressions of which the mixture of joy and grief is but a member, the general causal principle of these interresembling impressions being that "whatever causes any fluctuation or mixture of passions, with any degree of uneasiness, always produces fear, or at least a passion so like it, that they are scarcely to be distinguished" (447). Uncertainty and any fluctuation of thought resembling it contribute to hope as well as to fear; uncertainty, however, is unpleasant independently of the unpleasant sensation of fear which it produces (447), and is therefore better adapted to produce fear than hope, uncertainty being thus twice related to the former passion. 150 Indeed, the connection of fear and uncertainty is so strong that "any doubt produces that passion, even tho' it presents nothing to us on any side but what is good and desireable" (447). Fear, like love, has its species: among those of the former are "terror, consternation, astonishment, anxiety" (ibid.), those of the latter being "tenderness, friendship, intimacy, esteem, good-will" (448). Hume's inquiry into the passions closes with the description of the causes of "curiosity, or the love of truth" (448 ff.), the passion -85-

See pp. 83 ff. Cf. the account given above (chap. i, § 6, pp. 64 f.) of qualities better adapted to the production of pride and humility than to that of love and hatred. 149 150

which is "the first source of all our enquiries." Hume distinguishes between scientific curiosity, or "the love of knowledge, which displays itself in the sciences" (453) and "a certain curiosity implanted in human nature, which is a passion deriv'd from a quite different principle" (ibid.). Both of these passions are desires, and arise from pleasure; the question, therefore, is how the discovery of truth can please, and please even those who--theoreticians and gossips alike--make no practical use of their information (450). For scientific investigation, Hume finds two pleasant stimuli. In the first place, the discoverer of a truth of which advantage can possibly be taken receives, although he has himself no share in this advantage, a faint, disinterested pleasure through a "remote sympathy" (ibid.) with those who, unlike himself, may make a useful and therefore pleasing application of the truth in question. The second and major source, however, is the pleasurable exercise of the faculties involved in truth seeking, the sympathetic pleasure assisting this exercise by fixing our attention (451). To remain pleasant, this exercise must, Hume adds, result at least sometimes in "the discovery of the truth we examine" (ibid.). Similarly, a game without stakes is uninteresting but with stakes is enjoyed even though ultimately unprofitable (452); for a pleasurable goal is required in order to concentrate our attention upon an activity which, so attended to, is pleasant, but otherwise is not. 151 As for unscientific curiosity, or the love of gossip, there is here neither a pleasant exertion of mind nor the suggestion of utility in the information received (453). Hume's explanation is accordingly that the knowledge of "the actions and circumstances of their neighbours" (ibid.) gained by gossips both puts an end to what is--for them--an unpleasant uncertainty as to such facts and also affords them the pleasure which generally accompanies vivid ideas: "By the vivacity of the idea we interest the fancy, and produce, tho' in a lesser degree, the same pleasure, which arises from a moderate passion" (ibid.). -86-

Laird, in saying "Indeed, Hume thought, scientific investigation was very like hunting, and not at all unlike a game" (op. cit., p. 206), obscures Hume's point that the "passion of gaming" ( Treatise, p. 452) to which the passion for truth is being compared is, of course, the passion for gambling, an entertainment for which "many leave a sure gain" (ibid.). 151

CHAPTER III: HUME'S THEORY OF MORALS AND HUME'S THEORY OF JUSTICE PART I § 1: INTRODUCTION THE POINT OF departure for Hume's inquiry into morals is the much controverted denial 152 that the distinction between moral good and evil is "deriv'd from reason." Hume's position may be epitomized in the contention that the activities of moral approbation and disapprobation are not among the activities ascribable to reason. For reasoning consists, according to Hume, in the judging of either analytic or synthetic truth, that is, in the judging of ideas with respect to whether they agree (i) with each other (458) or (ii) with "real existence and matter of fact" (ibid.). The object of reasoning is, therefore, as Hume implies, always propositional in character. 153 There are two arguments which can be given, on this view of reason, for the exclusion of moral approbation and disapprobation from rational activities. One is that the objects of moral approval or disapproval are always nonpropositional in character; the other is that the activities of moral approval and disapproval have effects not shared by the activity of reasoning. Hume introduces the latter point first. Common experience shows, so this argument runs, that the various modes of regarding an action morally, for example, as being a duty, or as being unjust, -87-

Thus, for example, Laird states, after summarizing Hume's position: "The objections to these arguments are, I believe, overwhelming'. ( A Study in Moral Theory [ London, 1926], p. 126); while, according to Broad: "The upshot of this matter is that, on this vitally important point, Hume has neither proved his own case nor refuted that of his opponents." ( Five Types of Ethical Theory [ New York, 1930], p. 114). 153 Hume has no formal theory of propositions (see note 23 to chap. i, § 3, on p. 43). He often uses the word "proposition," however, in accordance with the traditional usage in which the proposition is identified with that which is susceptible of truth or falsity. It is in this sense that the notion of the proposition is implied by Hume in the following: "Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood. Truth or falshood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason" ( Treatise, p. 458). Compare Treatise, pp. 95, 97, n., 469, and 613. 152

or as being virtuous, have an influence upon conduct: men are often "deter'd from some actions by the opinion of injustice, and impell'd to others by that of obligation" (457). 154 The conclusion is immediate: "Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason" (ibid.). The impotence of reason "in this particular" Hume regards as already established in Book II 155 and observes that the repetition of the arguments presented there would be "tedious" (ibid.). Hume's second argument, namely, that while the objects of reason are propositional in character, the objects of moral approval are nonpropositional, has the effect of denying that the predicates "conformable to reason" and "contrary to reason" can be applied significantly to the objects of moral approbation and disapprobation. 156 Hume identifies "conformity with reason" and "contrariety to reason" with "truth" and "falsity," respectively (458); and this identification, together with the fact that passions, volitions, and actions, being nonreferential (that is, being "original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions" [458]), are insusceptible of truth or falsity, implies that passions, volitions, and actions are not meaningfully asserted to be either in accordance with reason or not in accordance, that is, either reasonable or unreasonable. This conclusion, Hume argues, serves doubly to prove that moral distinctions "are not the offspring of reason" (458). For since actions and passions do not conform or fail to conform with reason, "laudable or blameable, therefore, are not -88-

In connection with the effect upon action of moral distinctions, Hume observes that "philosophy is commonly divided into speculative and practical" ( Treatise, p. 457), "morality" being "always comprehended under the latter division" (ibid.) as influencing the passions and conduct. Hume's own moral theory, however--apart from a eulogy of sympathy and of the social virtues ( Treatise, pp. 619 f.) and from isolated remarks such, e.g., as that "private benevolence is, and ought to be, weaker in some persons, than in others" (ibid., p. 483)--is, in Hume's sense, "speculative." Thus Hume symbolizes the relation of his own role as speculative moralist to that of the "practical" moralist by the relation of the anatomist's role to that of an artist. (Cf. Treatise, pp. 621 f.) 155 See chap. ii, § 2. 156 For the purpose of the present argument, Hume assumes the objects of moral approval to be "our passions, volitions, and actions" ( Treatise, p. 458). It is later noticed, however, that the primary objects of moral approbation and disapprobation are motives, the moral value of actions being derivative from that of their motives. (See Treatise, pp. 477 ff.) 154

the same with reasonable or unreasonable" (ibid.). And in the second place, since the perception of moral worth influences conduct, that is, since "the merit and demerit of actions frequently contradict, and sometimes controul our natural propensities" (ibid.), reason, having to do only with truth and falsity, does not decide concerning the laudable and the blamable and therefore does not decide concerning virtue and vice. Having given the grounds for his conclusion that "reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals" (458), Hume proceeds to examine the question as to whether an action may be said derivatively to be conformable with reason or contrary to it in virtue of the conformability or contrariety to reason of a judgment which is either (α) the mediate cause of the action, or (β) one of its effects. Now there are two kinds of judgments which "mediately" 157 or "obliquely" (459) influence conduct: (i) the judgment that x, an object adapted to excite some passion, exists, and (ii) the judgment that y is a means of obtaining x. Hume's answer to the present question as it concerns judgments of type (α) is as follows: we may judge, for example, x to be pleasant, and desire x upon this supposition; whereas in fact x is not pleasant. Or we may judge y to be a means suitable for the procurement of x, when in fact it is causally impossible to obtain x by means of y. Thus judgments of types (α) (i) and (α) (ii) may both be false and hence, in this sense, contrary to reason; and under such circumstances the desire for x and the adoption of y may be said derivatively to be "unreasonable," although only "in a figurative and improper way of speaking" (459). But this derivative unreasonableness is not a moral characteristic, for "'Tis easy to observe, that these errors are so far from being the source of all immorality, that they are commonly very innocent, and draw no manner of guilt upon the person who is so unfortunate as to fall into them" (459). For this fact there are two reasons. In the first place, the errors are errors of fact, "which moralists have not generally suppos'd criminal, as being perfectly involuntary" (ibid.). The reply that "tho' a mistake of fact be not criminal, yet a mistake of right often is; and that this may be the source of immorality" (460) is easily set aside -89-

"Reason and judgment may, indeed, be the mediate cause of an action, by prompting, or by directing a passion" ( Treatise, p. 462). 157

by the consideration that an error of right presupposes a right, that is, presupposes, or implies the existence of, a moral distinction constituted independently of the judgment in question. In the second place, were the moral value of an action determined only and solely by the truth or falsity of a judgment which is its mediate cause, no differences in the objects of such errors, such, for example, as the differences between "an apple [and] a kingdom" (ibid.), could entail differences in the moral value of actions therewith connected, which ( Hume does not trouble himself to add) is absurd. In the third place, the consequences for morality of a true or false judgment would be unalterable regardless of the avoidability or unavoidability of judgmental error (ibid.). And finally, since error in judgment does not admit of degrees, "all virtues and vices wou'd of course be equal" (ibid.). Hume's answer to the present question 158 with respect to judgments of type (β), that is, with respect to judgments which are the effects of our actions "and which, when false, give occasion to pronounce the actions contrary to truth and reason" (461), is a devastating critique of Wollaston's proposal159 that the truth or falsity of judgments of this kind constitutes moral good and evil. An action, it is admitted by Hume, in causing a false judgment in its observer, may resemble a lie; this resemblance, however, is accompanied by a difference "which is material" (ibid.), namely, that unlike a lie, the action is not intended to cause a false judgment. An action is thus false or deceitful only by "some odd figurative way of speaking" (ibid.); and the entire position is easily shown by Hume to be vulnerable to a series of insurmountable objections. 160 -90-

That is, the question whether an action may be said derivatively to agree or disagree with reason in virtue of a judgment related to the action. 159 Advanced in "The Religion of Nature delineated." See Gizycki, Die Ethik David Hume's (Breslau, 1878), pp. 6 f. 160 Of Hume's arguments (in notes to Treatise, pp. 461 f.) may be mentioned the final (and in Hume's opinion "very conclusive") contention that Wollaston's position is forced to assume the meritoriousness of truth and the viciousness of falsehood--an assumption that can be vindicated only at the expense of abandoning the original position. There is a slip in Hume's text at this point, which is uncorrected in either Selby-Bigge's or Green and Grose's editions, the text reading, "And as to the judgments, which are caused by our judgments, they can still less bestow those moral qualities on the actions, which are their causes" ( Treatise, pp. 462 f.); whereas the context evidently requires, "And as to the judgments, which are caused by our actions, they can still less, etc." 158

From the critique of the attempt to assimilate good and evil to truth and falsity, Hume turns to the critique of the opinion 161 "very industriously propagated by certain philosophers, that morality is susceptible of demonstration" (463). Now, according to the epistemological theory of Book I, analytic or demonstrable truths 162 are such as express an agreement or disagreement of ideas involving the relation of these ideas in one of the following ways: (i) by resemblance; (ii) by contrariety; (iii) by degrees (in quality); and (iv) by proportions (in quantity and number). 163 Since, however, "there is no one of these relations but what is applicable, not only to an irrational, but also to an inanimate object" (464), it follows that "morality lies not in any of these relations, nor the sense of it in their discovery" (ibid.). There are two major requirements which must be satisfied by those who maintain the demonstrability of morality. The first of these is the twofold requirement (a) of the indication that there are demonstrable relations other than those enumerated, or (b) of a proof that some of the enumerated relations can hold only "betwixt internal actions, and external objects" (465). While awaiting his opponents' answer to requirement (a), 164 Hume proceeds to the consideration of (b). Since "moral good and evil belong only to the actions of the mind, and are deriv'd from our situation with regard to external objects" (464), a relation supposedly constitutive of moral worth could relate only the motive, on the one hand, and the action in its external context, on the other. For were morality constituted by a relation, for example, of motives to motives, "we might be guilty of crimes in ourselves, and independent of our situation, with respect to the universe" (465); while were morality constituted by a relation of actions or external objects with other actions or external objects, "even inanimate beings wou'd be susceptible -91-

The word "opinion" is used here in courtesy; for Hume claims that "no one has ever been able to advance a single step in those demonstrations" ( Treatise, p. 463). Cf. his statement that in terms of his theory of morals, the question as to the virtuousness or viciousness of an action or sentiment may be answered "without looking for any incomprehensible relations and qualities, which never did exist in nature, nor even in our imagination, by any clear and distinct conception" ( Treatise, p. 476). 162 See note 6 to chap. ii, p. 73. 163 See Treatise, Book I, Part III, sect. i, pp. 69 ff. 164 "To this" (i.e., the supposition of another, but unspecified relation), Hume states, "I know not what to reply, till some one be so good as to point out to me this new relation. 'Tis impossible to refute a system, which has never yet been explain'd" ( Treatise, p. 464). 161

of moral beauty and deformity" (ibid.). However, "it seems difficult to imagine" (ibid.) any specific relation which could take as terms only internal actions, i.e., motives, volitions, and passions, on the one hand, and actions and external objects, on the other. The first requirement seems incapable, therefore, of being satisfied. The second requirement which must be met, according to Hume, by a theory upon which moral worth is constituted by the subsistence of certain relations is that these relations, after their existence has been indicated, must be exhibited (i) as having an effect upon the will and (ii) as having the same effect upon all wills (ibid.). There can be, however, no logically necessary connection between the will, on the one hand, and knowledge of these supposed relations, on the other; for "these two particulars are evidently distinct. 'Tis one thing to know virtue, and another to conform the will to it" (ibid.). On the other hand, these particulars are also causally unconnected, that is, "even in human nature no relation can ever alone produce any action" (466), as follows from the "impotence" of reason above discussed. The second requirement, therefore, of a proof a priori that "these relations, if they really existed and were perceiv'd, wou'd be universally forcible and obligatory" (ibid.), cannot be met. Hume undertakes, by illustration, to "make these general reflexions more clear and convincing" (466). The philosophical question with respect to the morality of the genus ingratitude as exhibited in its species parricide is not that of its guilt, which is admitted by "all mankind, philosophers as well as the people" (ibid.), but rather that as to "whether the guilt or moral deformity of this action be discover'd by demonstrative reasoning, or be felt by an internal sense, and by means of some sentiment, which the reflecting on such an action naturally occasions" (ibid.). The decision in favor of demonstrative reasoning implies that the guilt of the action is constituted by the mere subsistence of certain relations; but "we can show the same relations in other objects, without the notion of any guilt or iniquity attending them" (ibid.). Hume instances an oak or elm ultimately destroyed by its own sapling (467) and incest among animals (ibid.). The tempting objection to the first instance, that in the case of the tree, "a choice or will is wanting" (ibid.), is met 165 by the observation that "in the -92-

With an adequacy which has not been granted by all of Hume's critics. Cf. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory ( New York, 1930), p. 111. 165

case of parricide, a will does not give rise to any different relations but is only the cause from which the action is deriv'd; and consequently produces the same relations, that in the oak or elm arise from some other principles" (ibid.). The equally tempting objection to the second instance, namely that incest "is innocent in animals, because they have not reason sufficient to discover its turpitude" (467), is easily shown by Hume to be question begging. 166 Having supported by these arguments his contention that "morality consists not in any relations that are the objects of science" (468), Hume asserts a second proposition which, according to one of his critics, is "quite unsupported by the excellent reasons which he gave for the first." 167 This is the contention that "morality consists not in any matter of fact, which can be discover'd by the understanding" (468). Hume implies, however, that both contentions are supported by the same line of reasoning; 168 so that the argument in favor of the second contention ought to be no less excellent than that in favor of the first. It may be useful, therefore, to make out--as it is indeed not clearly indicated in the Treatise--the unifying connection between these two contentions. Hume's second argument consists in a contention, on the one hand, and in a challenge to his opponents, on the other. The contention is that in the examination of any admittedly vicious action, such as murder, "You find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object" (468). The challenge is, with respect to such an action, to "examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice" (468). It is evident, when the challenge and contention are regarded together, that Hume identifies "matter of fact" with "real existence" and intends the denotation of these terms to include "certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts." Hence the challenge, as put, is indeed unanswer-93-

"For before reason can perceive this turpitude, the turpitude must exist; and consequently is independent of the decisions of our reason, and is their object more properly than their effect" ( Treatise, p. 467). 167 Broad, op. cit., p. 108. 168 "Nor does this reasoning only prove, that morality consists not in any relations, that are the objects of science; but if examin'd, will prove with equal certainty, that it consists not in any matter of fact, which can be discover'd by the understanding" ( Treatise, p. 468). 166

able, the implied answer, consisting in the attempt to represent what is designated by "vice" as a particular occurring with and in addition to the other particulars (i.e., the passions, motives, volitions, and thoughts of the agent together with the action and its environing circumstances) constitutive of the moral situation, being, of course, nonsensical. Vice, in other words, obviously cannot be regarded as a particular constituent of the transaction which is vicious; and it is consequently not capable of being the terminus of an inference to it from other given particulars. Nor is it capable, therefore, of being an object of reason in the sense of "reason" in which reason is the activity of executing such inferences. Now--to extend Hume's present argument for the purpose of showing its connection with the previous conclusion that morality cannot consist in "any relations that are the objects of science" (468)--either the viciousness or virtuousness of an action or motive which occurs or of a relation which subsists is distinguishable from the occurrence of the action (or subsistence of the relation) or it is not. From the alternative of indistinguishability, it follows that the relation cannot subsist, or the action occur, without there occurring also an instance of vice or virtue: to say, then, that the relation or action is vicious or virtuous is to say no more than that it occurs. And this alternative is clearly incompatible with such moral distinctions as are actually made. 169 On the other alternative, to which we are accordingly driven, the attribution to the action, motive, or relation of a moral characteristic is (if it is a cognitive matter at all) always synthetic: the moral characteristic is not contained in the subject. Those who would make the best of two worlds and maintain that the moral characteristic of certain actions, motives, or relations, while distinguishable from the mere occurrence of these actions, motives, or relations is nevertheless inseparable from such occurrences, have, according to Hume, two methods of supporting their posi-94-

As Hume, speaking with reference to ingratitude (taken by him as the genus of parricide), points out in a later work: "In the case stated above, I see first good-will and good-offices in one person; then ill-will and ill-offices in the other. Between these, there is the relation of contrariety. Does the crime consist in that relation? But suppose a person bore me ill-will or did me illoffices; and I, in return, were indifferent towards him, or did him good-offices: Here is the same relation of contrariety; and yet my conduct is often highly laudable." ( An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, in The Philosophical Works of David Hume, eds. Green and Grose [ London, 1875], Vol. IV, p. 260). 169

tion, both of which are fallacious. The first consists in maintaining that a moral characteristic characterizes an action, motive, or situation in virtue of the subsumption, performed by reason, of the action or motive or situation under a "rule of right." This procedure, however, is circular. 170 The second procedure consists in the attempt to analyze the attribution of an ethical characteristic as what we should now describe as a judgment synthetic a priori; 171 and it is scarcely necessary to remark the inadmissibility of this procedure for Hume. Hence, upon any tenable analysis of reason, reason is concerned only with that which is; it is not concerned with that which, like virtue, ought to be, or with that which, like vice, ought not to be, and this is the result upon which Hume's two contentions converge. 172 For Hume regards himself as having established that (a) inasmuch as virtue or vice cannot be regarded as the termini of inferences from particular facts to particular facts or as characteristics analytically connected with nonethical characteristics, and (b) that inasmuch as the functions of reason are exhausted by the execution of inferences of these two kinds, 173 virtue and vice cannot be objects of reason. The viciousness of murder, therefore, as Hume says (see overleaf), -95-

Of the supposed rule, Hume asks, "In what does it consist? How is it determined? By reason, you say, which examines the moral relations of actions. So that moral relations are determined by the comparison of actions to a rule. And that rule is determined by considering the moral relations of objects. Is not this fine reasoning?" ( "An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals," in Works, eds. Green and Grose, Vol. IV, p. 261). 171 Cf. the proposal by Broad of an "a priori concept analysis" as an alternative to Hume's position ( Broad, op. cit., pp. 109 ff.). 172 This point is made in another way by Hume when he contends that a certain "small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason" ( Treatise, p. 470). For this "small attention" is an attention to the change, in ethical writings, from the copulation of sentences by means of "is" and "is not" to that by means of "ought" and "ought not" (ibid., p. 469). Propositions about that which ought to be are not deducible from those about that which is: "For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it" (ibid.). Hume thus implies that reason is concerned exclusively with that which is, since he argues that the noncoincidence of ought and is implies that morality is not based upon reason, i.e., that were morality based upon reason, ought would coincide with is. 173 Cf. Treatise, p. 463: "As the operations of human understanding divide themselves into two kinds, the comparing of ideas, and the inferring of matter of fact, etc." 170

entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object (468-469). Hume's identification of the constitutive source of moral distinctions as consisting in sentiments of approbation or disapprobation carries with it the exemption of this source from two objections to which its identification with reason was seen to be subject, 174 namely, (i) that the objects of moral approbation and disapprobation are nonpropositional and (ii) that moral distinctions have an influence upon conduct. For, in the first place, when moral approbation or disapprobation occurs, the relation of mind to the object of approval or disapproval is not judgmental but causal; the relation an instance of which occurs is that of emotion to stimulus. 175 Hume explains the erroneous attribution of the function of moral approval to reason as deriving its plausibility from the fact that in its calmness, the sentiment of moral approval feels to the mind like a cognitive process, such processes being "calm and indolent" (457). In the second place, moral approvals and disapprovals, being passions in the technical sense of "impressions of reflection," are motives to conduct. For moral theory, however, the identification of what is known as "moral judgment" with a noncognitive operation of mind has as its most important result an effect in determining the kind of question to which moral theory may address itself. Consideration of this effect is delayed by Hume, however, until he has specified more exactly the character of the feelings which constitute moral approbation. The impressions which constitute moral approval and disapproval are respectively "agreeable" and "uneasy" (470); "the distinguishing impressions, by which moral good or evil is known, are nothing but particular pains or pleasures" (471). Since moral approval is not, properly speaking, a judgment but is rather the occurrence of an impression of a particular kind, moral approval is not an inference from an impression to its cause. To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes -96-

174 175

See pp. 87 ff. "Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judg'd of" ( Treatise, p. 470).

our praise or admiration. We go no farther; nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous (471). Hume's objection to the contention that morality is constituted by the mere subsistence of relations, namely, that on this view manifestly nonmoral entities such as inanimate objects or the lower animals become subjects of virtue and vice, seems capable of being turned against the present analysis as a retort; for on this analysis, it seems that "any object, whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational, might become morally good or evil, provided it can excite a satisfaction or uneasiness" (ibid.). Hume meets this objection with two considerations, of which the first is another twofold consideration the first half of which is the observation that since pleasures are by no means all identical (472), there is no more difficulty in distinguishing between the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from inanimate objects on the one hand and from "the character or sentiments of any person" (472) on the other, than there is in distinguishing between the pleasure constitutive of the goodness of a wine and that constitutive of the excellence of a "composition of music" (ibid.). The second half of the first consideration is the observation that only some among the pleasant or unpleasant sensations excited by "characters and actions" (472) constitute moral approbation or condemnation. No pleasure which consists merely in the satisfaction (and no pain which consists in the frustration) of one's peculiar interest is moral: "'Tis only when a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil" 176 (472). The second consideration makes use of the theory of the indirect passions. Virtuous and vicious qualities, that is, qualities exciting moral approval and moral disapproval, are respectively pleasant and unpleasant, are in other words excitants respectively of the pleasant emotion of approbation and of the unpleasant emotion of disapprobation. These qualities "must necessarily be plac'd either in ourselves or others" (473); so that they must necessarily also give rise to the indirect passions (i.e., love and hatred, pride -97-

The present observations do not exhaust the description of the moral sentiments, discussion of their "disinterested" character being deferred until the "natural virtues" are described. See pp. 168 f. 176

and humility) which are excited by pleasant and unpleasant qualities associated with the object of the passion in question; and this fact "clearly distinguishes" (473) the pleasantness of morally approved and the disagreeableness of morally disapproved qualities from "the pleasure and pain arising from inanimate objects, that often bear no relation to us" (ibid.). Hume observes further that it is contrary "to the usual maxims, by which nature is conducted" (ibid.) to suppose that of the multitudinous objects of moral approval and disapproval each is adapted to produce the constitutive pleasures and pains of approval and disapproval by "an original quality and primary constitution" (ibid.), that is, by means of specific excitation of a specifically disposed mental organ. On the other hand, the discovery of "some more general principles, upon which all our notions of morals are founded" (ibid.) cannot be regarded as consisting simply in the discovery that the objects of moral approval are all natural, or that virtue is natural and vice unnatural; for everything in this question "depends upon the definition of the word, Nature, than which there is none more ambiguous and equivocal" (474). If "natural" is taken, trivially, as coinciding with "nonmiraculous," the sentiments of morality may be as trivially taken to be natural (ibid.). And moral sentiments being almost inextirpable from the human mind, they are as justly called "natural" as is anything whatever (ibid.). If "natural" is opposed, however, to "artificial," that is, depending upon the "designs, and projects, and views of men" (474), there can be genuine controversy as to whether "our sense of some virtues is artificial, and that of others natural" (475); but there is no doubt that in this sense of the term, all actions which are morally regarded are artificial, since they are all "perform'd with a certain design and intention" (475) in the absence of which they could not be regarded morally at all. Hume concludes that "'Tis impossible, therefore, that the character of natural and unnatural can ever, in any sense, mark the boundaries of vice and virtue" (ibid.). Hume next considers briefly the question noticed above, 177 namely, that of the effect upon the character of moral theory in general of "our first position, that virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain, that any action, sentiment or character gives -98-

177

See p. 96.

us by the mere view and contemplation" (475). 178 The general problem to the solution of which moral theory addresses itself is to "shew the origin" (ibid.) of the "moral rectitude or depravity" (476) of any action or sentiment. And to show this, it is necessary and sufficient to show "why any action or sentiment upon the general view or survey, gives a certain satisfaction or uneasiness" (475). Moral theory is thus, according to Hume's conceptions, an empirical, descriptive study of the emotions of moral approval and disapproval, conducted, to borrow words from his work on the other passions, by means of "an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them." 179 It is apparent that moral theory thus conceived is not a "normative study" in the sense of a study within whose purpose it falls, not merely to describe the circumstances environing such moral emotions as actually occur, but also to debate and decide their legitimacy. Hume's inquiry into morals is but a continuation of his theory of the passions. § 2: HUME'S THEORY OF JUSTICE, AN ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE. (PART I) Hume's theory of justice consists in an explanation of the proposition "that the sense of justice and injustice is not deriv'd from nature, but arises artificially, tho' necessarily from education, and human conventions" (483). And his explanation consists in showing that the sense of duty (out of which those actions which are just are performed and those which are unjust abstained from) is neither an original moral motive nor a secondary motive derivative from a primary, spontaneous, natural inclination but is rather a secondary motive based upon conventions, which themselves are patterns of behavior resulting from the coöperation of certain natural inclinations and the causal foresight, or ability to judge the suitability of means for reaching given ends, of which human beings are capable. By there being no "original" motive to acts of justice is meant that there is no instinctive and underivative tendency to perform such acts. The performance of acts of justice may, to be sure, actually be unreflecting and spontaneous in a given social context at a given time; but this unreflecting performance represents not the action of a fundamental human propensity but only the habitual continuation of a pattern of actions which was originally (i.e., at the beginning of society) instituted with the deliberate aim of attaining certain desired ends. 180 -99-

The emphatic terminology "mere view and contemplation" is probably used in order to indicate the nonreflective immediacy of the impressions constituting moral sentiments. 179 Treatise, Book II, Part I, sect. ii, p. 277. 180 See note 32, below. 178

The sense of justice, then, is not an original and naturally virtuous motive, but is a motive which can be regarded both as coming into existence and as acquiring its morality only under social conditions which depend in turn upon the establishment of society itself by means of the voluntary and deliberate, hence "artificial," 181 adoption, out of nonmoral motives, 182 of certain rules prescriptive of a pattern of behavior adherence to which becomes virtuous for "man in his civiliz'd state, and when train'd up according to a certain discipline and education" (479). Hume's explanatory program thus consists of two parts, the first of which is negative and the second positive. The negative part consists, in turn, of two denials, (i) that the sense of justice is an original moral motive, and (ii) that the sense of justice is a secondary motive based upon a natural, unreflective inclination. From either denial it follows that justice is not a natural virtue, for naturally virtuous actions are actions performed either immediately from a natural inclination (such as benevolence) which is virtuous, or from a secondary, derivative motive consisting in a sense of the virtuousness of such actions as usually proceed from virtuous natural inclinations. 183 The alternative left by these denials is that the sense of justice is derivative from a reflective natural inclination, that is, from a -100-

"Artificial" or conventional actions are, of course, determined or "necessary." "We readily forget, that the designs, and projects, and views of men are as necessary in their operation as heat and cold, moist and dry: But taking them to be free and entirely our own, 'tis usual for us to set them in opposition to the other principles of nature" ( Treatise, p. 474). 182 See pp. 113 ff. 183 Cf. Hume's later characterization of natural duties as "those, to which men are impelled by a natural instinct or immediate propensity, which operates on them, independent of all ideas of obligation, and of all views, either to public or private utility. Of this nature are, love of children, gratitude to benefactors, pity to the unfortunate. When we reflect on the advantage, which results to society from such humane instincts, we pay them the just tribute of moral approbation and esteem: But the person, actuated by them, feels their power and influence, antecedent to any such reflection." ( Of the Original Contract, in Works, eds. Green and Grose, Vol. III, pp. 454 f.). With these duties are contrasted conventional duties such as "justice or a regard to the property of others, fidelity or the observance of promises" (ibid., p. 455), which "are not supported by any original instinct of nature, but are performed entirely from a sense of obligation, when we consider the necessities of human society, and the impossibility of supporting it, if these duties were neglected" (ibid.). It may be seen from this contrast that what Hume denotes by "artificial virtue" is as well called "reflective virtue," provided that this usage is not taken to imply that in the case of justice, the role played by reflection is contrary to that permitted to it by Hume's general view of the relation between reason and the passions, and provided that "reflective" is not given any eulogistic connotations. 181

natural inclination guided by the understanding to the means of its own gratification; and this is actually Hume's positive view. But we shall examine the negative part of Hume's theory first. In order to establish his first denial, namely, that the sense of justice is an original virtuous motive, Hume observes that "all virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous motives, and are consider'd merely as signs of those motives" (478). 184 From this observation Hume deduces the principle which, as Laird remarks, "governed Hume's entire exposition," 185 namely, that "the first virtuous motive, which bestows a merit on any action, can never be a regard to the virtue of that action, but must be some other natural motive or principle" (478). The contrary contention involves its assertor either in a denial of the premise that actions are virtuous only derivatively as being the effects of virtuous motives or else in circular reasoning. This is easily seen if the premise mentioned is assumed to be accepted and if we denote by "M2" the supposed motive for an action A consisting in "sensing the positive moral worth of A"; for the definition of "M2," in containing a reference to the moral worth of A, contains implicitly a reference to a motive for performing A, since the worth of any action depends, according to the premise, upon the worth of its motive. If, therefore, this second motive, denotable by "M1" is identical with M2, the definition is circular; while if M1 and M2 are not identical, it is M1, and therefore not M2, which is the first, or original virtuous motive to A. Now benevolent actions are virtuous as proceeding "from the antecedent principle of humanity, which is meritorious and laudable" (478); and the motive to their performance which consists in regarding them as meritorious is consequently but a "secondary consideration" (ibid.). Hence the general maxim is that "no action can be virtuous, or morally good, -101-

Hume's principal, or rather sole argument for this point is the observation that the condemnation of the omission of a morally requisite action is withdrawn upon the discovery that the motive to it existed, the action being prevented, however, for reasons other than that of the absence of intention. The existence of the intention alone is the sufficient basis, therefore, for moral evaluation of the agent. 185 Laird, Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature, p. 217. 184

unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality" (479). The establishment of this maxim is the establishment of denial (i), the denial, namely, that the sense of justice is an original moral motive; for the maxim entails that no virtue can be constituted by actions proceeding from a sense of duty independently of the existence of any other separate motives for the same actions; the sense of duty, regardless of its possible psychological ultimacy for the agent in individual cases, 186 cannot be constituted generally as other than a "secondary consideration." Now, the examination of a typical act of justice, such as the restoration of a loan, discloses a marked and fundamental difference between honesty and, let us say, benevolence. An honest action cannot, consistently with the general maxim just mentioned, be said to be constituted as regards its positive moral worth merely by its proceeding from the motive which is an appreciation of the honesty of the act; so that "'Tis requisite, then, to find some motive to acts of justice and honesty, distinct from our regard to the honesty; and in this lies the great difficulty" (480). This "difficulty" Hume undertakes to exhibit as in fact an impossibility, that is, he gives reason to believe that there is no natural, nondeliberate inclination to perform the actions which are separately and secondarily motivated by the sense -102-

The sense of duty may, of course, be psychologically ultimate after the observance of the rules of justice has become customary in society: it is the moral theorist, not the moral agent, who is concerned to recognize with respect to the moral sense that "its apparently ultimate decisions might have a subtle, sinuous, and largely forgotten social origin." ( Laird, op. cit., p. 234.) Just this ultimacy is responsible, Hume elsewhere points out, for the difficulty with which the conventional basis of justice is recognized by moral agents after it has been described to them by the moral theorist: "what alone will beget a doubt concerning the theory, on which I insist, is the influence of education and acquired habits, by which we are so accustomed to blame injustice, that we are not, in every instance, conscious of any immediate reflection on the pernicious consequences of it. . . . The convenience, or rather necessity, which leads to justice, is so universal, and every where points so much to the same rules, that the habit takes place in all societies; and it is not without some scrutiny, that we are able to ascertain its true origin." ( An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, in Works, eds. Green and Grose, Vol. IV, pp. 195 f.). But an action (such as the rewarding of a benefaction) of the sort which ordinarily proceeds from a natural inclination (such as gratitude) may, Hume admits, proceed merely from "the sense of morality or duty" ( Treatise, p. 479), although "this is no objection to the present doctrine" (ibid.), since "still this supposes in human nature some distinct principles, which are capable of producing the action, and whose moral beauty renders the action meritorious" (ibid.). It is in cases of this sort that it may be said, paradoxically, that for a certain agent, gratitude (e.g.) is a "mere convention." 186

of justice. This negative contention is thus the same as what we have above called Hume's "second denial," namely, the denial that the sense of justice is derivative from a natural inclination. A difference between Hume's first and his second denial is to be observed, however. The first denial, embodied in the general maxim, is logical in character, that is, consists in a deduction from the premise that motives are the primary objects of the moral sentiments. The second of Hume's denials can be established, however, only by the elimination, one by one, of such plausible candidates for the role of "the natural inclination to the observance of justice" as may occur; so that the validity of the second denial is contingent upon the thoroughness with which the field of possibilities is canvassed. 187 In beginning the process of elimination, Hume observes that the supposed original motive of an act of justice, that is, the motive to which the sense of the honesty of the act is a "secondary consideration," cannot be "a concern for our private interest or reputation" (480), for from this the absurd conclusion "wou'd follow, that wherever that concern ceases, honesty can no longer have place" (ibid.). Nor can it be "the regard to publick interest" (ibid.). In favor of this contention there are four considerations: (i) public interest is, of course, served by the rules of justice, but only after their institution, to which such a concern is not the motive, as is later to be seen (ibid.); 188 (ii) honesty is required in -103-

This is not to imply that Hume's examination is in fact subject to any obvious incompleteness, but merely to point out that the establishment of the conventionality of justice depends upon empirical considerations to which the denial of the moral ultimacy (and temporal priority) of the sense of justice is not subject, when once its premise has been accepted. This difference between the denials affects, however, the relation between the negative and positive parts of Hume's theory of justice. Since Hume cannot eliminate by logical means the possibility of a spontaneous inclination to justice, his negative contentions serve only to reduce the plausibility of such an explanation of its origin; and the plausibility is further reduced when in the positive part of the theory it is shown that the postulation of a special instinct is unnecessary because the phenomena in question are sufficiently explained (a) in terms of passions which are nonspecific in relation to acts of justice, together with (b) their direction by the understanding. "Nature has, therefore, trusted this affair entirely to the conduct of men, and has not plac'd in the mind any peculiar original principles, to determine us to a set of actions, into which the other principles of our frame and consitution were sufficient to lead us" ( Treatise, 526). Were the supposition of an instinct eliminated logically, the negative thesis could, of course, not be further confirmed by the positive, which would merely be its logical consequence. 188 Hume is unaware this his first consideration is not a reason but a questionbegging repetition of the point to be proved. 187

particular cases in which the public is not interested (481); (iii) ordinary experience shows that men "look not so far as the public interest, when they pay their creditors, perform their promises, and abstain from theft, and robbery, and injustice of every kind" (ibid.); and (iv) there is "no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal qualities, of services, or of relation to ourself" (481). Concern for the happiness or the misery of others is the effect merely of sympathy, and "is no proof of such an universal affection to mankind, since this concern extends itself beyond our own species" (ibid.). It may be said that man in general is the object of love, but it has been shown in the theory of the passions that the object of love is distinct from its cause (481-482). As for "private benevolence, or a regard to the interests of the party concern'd" (482), this cannot be the original motive to acts of justice because, among other reasons, the interest of the party concerned, in the present case the one to whom restoration is due, is often not served by an act of honesty: "What if he be a miser, and can make no use of what I wou'd deprive him of? What if he be a profligate debauchee, and wou'd rather receive harm than benefit from large possessions" (482)? The plausible candidates being exhausted, there seems to remain no original motive for the observance of justice "but the very equity and merit of that observance" (483), that is, the very sense of morality which, according to the general maxim above introduced, cannot be the primary motive of any virtuous action. Nature cannot be regarded, however, as having "establish'd a sophistry" (483), namely, that of a motive the existence of which is incompatible with the maxim and which thus compels its own circular definition. Still, as long as the maxim holds, the sense of justice is at the most, but also at the least, a secondary motive for any act of justice. It follows from the maxim, however, that a primary motive must exist; and since no unconventional primary motive, that is, no motive explicable without reference to the "designs, and projects, and views of men" (474), seems capable of discovery, it is plausible that the sense of justice is affected by these designs and views and is indeed "artificial" or a "consideration" which is "secondary" to motives which are natural inclinations, modified, however, by causal foresight and calculation of the consequences of actions. -104-

The negative part of his argument being completed, Hume next undertakes to "examine the nature of the artifice" (477) from which the sense of justice arises. Before undertaking this examination, however, he makes an observation of importance, namely, that what is regarded as the proper force and direction of the (necessarily secondary) sense of duty attached to some actions is a function of what is regarded as the proper force of the independent and primary motives to the same actions. Estimation of the proper force of these motives distinct from the sense of duty is made in accordance with "the natural and usual force of the passions" (483), and "if the passions depart very much from the common measures on either side, they are always disapprov'd as vicious" (ibid.). Thus one's duty to a son is really greater than that to a nephew, because love for the former relation is naturally and usually greater than that for the latter; and "hence arise our common measures of duty, in preferring the one to the other. Our sense of duty always follows the common and natural course of our passions" (484). -105-

CHAPTER IV: HUME'S THEORY OF JUSTICE, PART II: THE LAWS OF NATURE

§ 1: THE ORIGIN OF JUSTICE AND PROPERTY; THE FIRST LAW OF NATURE ACCORDING to the first half of the negative part of Hume's theory of justice, the adoption of rules, observance or infraction of which constitutes just or unjust behavior, cannot have been motivated-from the beginning of society--merely by a sense of morality; and according to the second half of the same part of Hume's argument, such adoption was not, as a matter of fact, motivated by a sense of justice which is derivative from any naturally virtuous motive. Since, however, there is a sense of justice, its development must be regarded as having been posterior in time to the establishment of the rules definitive of the distinction between justice and injustice, rules which Hume allows may be referred to as the "laws of nature." 189 In Hume's treatment, attention is confined to those three laws of nature which are "fundamental" (526, 541) in the sense that while their establishment is coeval with that of society, 190 they are "antecedent to government, and are suppos'd to impose an obligation before the duty of allegiance to civil magistrates has once been thought of" (541). These fundamental laws consist of rules (i) definitive of the circumstances under which property exists, (ii) of the circumstances under which property is to be regarded as transferable, and (iii) of rules defining the duty of fidelity. Since the establishment of these rules is the effect neither of a naturally virtuous motive nor of a sense of justice secondary thereto, the motivation of the establishment of the laws of nature is nonmoral in character 191 and is, as is shortly to be seen, a propensity (namely, self-interest) influenced, that is, directed to the means of its own satisfaction, by the causal foresight and ability to choose means for the attainment of given ends which the -106-

"Tho' the rules of justice be artificial, they are not arbitrary. Nor is the expression improper to call them Laws of Nature; if by natural we understand what is common to any species, or even if we confine it to mean what is inseparable from the species" ( Treatise, p. 484). 190 Cf. Treatise, pp. 540 f. 191 See pp. 113 ff. 189

human understanding supplies. The question as to the moral worth of the observance or transgression of the rules of justice is thus distinct from any question as to the moral worth of the motives involved in their invention; and Hume discusses these questions separately, the questions, namely, "concerning the manner, in which the rules of justice are established by the artifice of men; and concerning the reasons, which determine us to attribute to the observance or neglect of these rules a moral beauty and deformity" (484). We shall, in the present section, examine Hume's treatment of the first question. Hume's answer to the question as to the temporal origin of justice consists in a number of inferences drawn from the assumption of the existence of certain relatively permanent conditions of human life; and his discussion may be epitomized in the statement that on the assumption of these conditions, society is seen to be causally necessary for the preservation of mankind, while justice is causally necessary for the preservation of society. Two related questions are thus implied, (i) as to the origin of society, and (ii) as to the origin of justice and its effect in enabling the continuance of social forms of life. Now, a social form of life is dictated for man by his "unnatural conjunction of infirmity, and of necessity" (485); and apart from society, he would lose the advantages, requisite if he is to "supply his defects, and raise himself up to an equality with his fellow-creatures, and even acquire a superiority above them" (ibid.), of an increase of his power (by means of "the conjunction of forces" [ibid.]), of his ability (by means of the "partition of employments" [ibid.]), and of his security (through "mutual succour" [ibid.]). Although social union, once established, does as a matter of fact remedy the necessities constituted for a nonsocial individual by his insufficiency of power, ability, and security, social union nevertheless cannot be supposed to have been deliberately entered upon with this remedial effect in view; for as a remedy of these necessities, the social union is relatively "remote and obscure" (486)--at least to men living ex hypothesi in the dawn of society. Social union first takes place, rather, as the obvious remedy for a more obvious necessity, "which may justly be regarded as the first and original principle of human society" (ibid.). This necessity is "no other than that natural appetite betwixt the sexes, which unites them together, and -107-

preserves their union, till a new tye takes place in their concern for their common offspring" (486). The family is thus the first social context to exist; and it is through life within the family, governed by the superior strength of parents who are "restrain'd in the exercise of their authority by that natural affection, which they bear their children" (ibid.), that children become "sensible of the advantages, which they may reap from society" (ibid.), as well as disciplined for participation in it. As potent, however, as is the passion originally impelling social union, there are others which, operating in connection with a "peculiarity in our outward circumstances" (487), are "very incommodious, and are even contrary to the requisite conjunction" (486). These other passions are the various degrees of generosity ordinarily manifested toward relations and friends and of selfishness toward strangers (487), -passions which result in the variable and unequal treatment of other persons according as they are friends, relations, or strangers. The "outward circumstance," without which "this contrariety of passions wou'd be attended with but small danger" (ibid.), is the easy transferability, without loss or alteration, of "such possessions as we have acquir'd by our industry and good fortune" (487) 192 together with "their scarcity in comparison of the wants and desires of men" (494). No other passions, such as vanity, pity, love, or even revenge stand as immediately opposed to the continuance of any social union as does cupidity. "This avidity alone of acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends, is insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society" (491 f.). The question thus arises as to how motives may be found that are capable of counteracting this natural avidity and variable generosity and thus of preventing the turmoil which, because of the scarcity of desired goods, must result from the uninhibited expression of greed in action. Were the sense of morally correct behavior as regards the goods which others have ac-108-

The goods which shall be referred to throughout as "transferable" constitute the last of three classes distinguished by Hume, the others being first, "the internal satisfaction of our minds" ( Treatise, p. 487), and the second, "the external advantages of our body" (ibid.). The basis of these distinctions is that "we are perfectly secure in the enjoyment of the first. The second may be ravish'd from us, but can be of no advantage to him who deprives us of them. The last only are both expos'd to the violence of others, and may be transferr'd without suffering any loss or alteration; while at the same time, there is not a sufficient quantity of them to supply every one's desires and necessities" ( Treatise, pp. 487 f.). 192

quired through industry or good fortune derivative from natural inclination, that is, did we come to regard actions as morally good which are separately motivated by our natural inclinations with respect to such goods, the sense of justice would express itself in the unequal treatment of others, the kind of treatment being determined in each particular case by the degree of generosity borne toward the person in question. We should, for example, feel obliged to protect the goods acquired by friends or near relations but not those of strangers. For, since the common measures of duty reflect the strength and direction of the original motives, 193 the sense of justice should, under these circumstances, reflect the partiality of the inclinations from which it would then have been derived: "this partiality, then, and unequal affection, must not only have an influence on our behaviour and conduct in society, but even on our ideas of vice and virtue" (488). Hence the regard for the goods of others requisite for correcting the "partiality of our affections" (489) cannot be secondary to and derivative from our natural inclinations with respect to these goods. "The remedy, then, is not deriv'd from nature, but from artifice; or more properly speaking, nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding, for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections" (ibid.). This remedy, which is contrived when men become conscious of the "infinite advantages" (489) that result from social union and also of the fact that "the principal disturbance in society arises from those goods, which we call external, and from their looseness and easy transition from one person to another" (ibid.), is nothing but a "convention enter'd into by all the members of the society to bestow stability on the possession of those external goods, and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry" (ibid.). Concerning this convention institutive of the "distinction of property" (491) or of the "stability of possession" (ibid.) there are a number of observations to be made. In the first place, the necessity of such a convention as well as its obviousness render it plausible that "'tis utterly impossible for men to remain any considerable time in that savage condition, which precedes society; but that his very first state and situation may justly be esteem'd -109-

193

See pp. 105 f.

social" (493). The Hobbesian supposition of a "state of nature" is thus to be regarded as a fiction "not unlike that of the golden age" (ibid.); but as a fiction, it may be useful for illustrative purposes. 194 In the second place, if society is coeval with the adoption of the convention of "abstinence from the possessions of others" (490), so likewise the distinction between justice and injustice is coeval with the origin of society: for after the convention is in force "and every one has acquir'd a stability in his possessions, there immediately arise the ideas of justice and injustice; as also those of property, right, and obligation" (490491). Nor can property, right, or obligation be defined independently of the notion of justice; for our property is nothing but those goods, whose constant possession is establish'd by the laws of society; that is, by the laws of justice . . . (491). 'Tis very preposterous, therefore, to imagine, that we can have any idea of property, without fully comprehending the nature of justice, and shewing its origin in the artifice and contrivance of men (ibid.). In the third place, the nature of the convention institutive of property and the motivation of its adoption require examination. This convention or social agreement does not involve the making of a contract or the giving of promises, for "even promises themselves, as we shall see afterwards, arise from human conventions" (490). 195 It is, however, an agreement, in the sense, it may be said, of "actions performed with the expectation of reciprocal action on the part of another": I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually express'd, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour (490). The motive for entrance into the convention is thus the very passion of self-interest, or natural inclination of "acquiring goods -110-

As indeed Hume uses it at Treatise, pp. 502 f.: "To illustrate this, I propose the following instance. I first consider men in their savage and solitary condition . . ." Cf. also Treatise, pp. 497, 505, and 534. 195 In illustration of the notion of a nonpromissory agreement Hume observes that "Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho' they have never given promises to each other. . . . In like manner are languages gradually establish'd by human conventions without any promise. In like manner do gold and silver become the common measures of exchange, and are esteem'd sufficient payment for what is of a hundred times their value." ( Treatise, p. 490). 194

and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends" (491-492), which was said to be, when unrestrained by convention, directly destructive of society; and the question arises as to the correct analysis of the notion "restraint of self-interest by convention." For in view of Hume's contention that "'tis certain that no affection of the human mind has both a sufficient force, and a proper direction to counterbalance the love of gain, and render men fit members of society, by making them abstain from the possessions of others" (492), it may appear either that no restraint is possible, or else that the restraint of self-interest is imposed, paradoxically, upon self-interest by itself. Precisely this latter alternative is taken by Hume when he concludes that "there is no passion, therefore, capable of controlling the interested affection, but the very affection itself, by an alteration of its direction" (ibid.). There is no paradox, however, when it is realized that the alteration of the direction of self-interest is the effect of the influence upon selfinterest of a causal judgment, the judgment, namely, "that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me" (490). Hume's emphasis on the term "provided" is justified; for abstinence from such goods as could be possessed through the use of force and in unconcern for the desires of others, is advantageous only if mutually practiced by all parties concerned, that is, only if the abstinence is conventional. Under the assumed circumstances of limited benevolence and scarce goods, the unreciprocated abstinence of a few would be folly; while under the circumstances of universal generosity or of effortlessly obtainable goods, abstinence by any would be unnecessary. 196 Under the assumed conditions, however, of limited generosity and scarce goods, the causal judgment just mentioned is valid; hence the alteration of the direction of self-interest constituted by the influence on this passion of that judgment "must necessarily take place upon the least reflection; since 'tis evident, that the passion is much better satisfy'd by its restraint, than by its liberty" (492). The question arises, however, as to whether the influence here admitted of reflection or judgment upon passion (and thus derivatively upon action) is consistent with Hume's general position 197 concerning the relation of reason to the passions. This position, it is to be remembered, admits two "oblique" or "mediate" effects of reason upon passion and hence upon conduct; reason can excite a passion by presenting the mind with the belief in the existence of an object x which is naturally adapted to the excitation of some passion, or reason can effect the choice of y, the means to an object such as x; and passions excited in either of these ways disappear should the judgments which are their mediate causes become known to be false. -111196 197

See p. 114. See pp. 89 ff.

We may call the judgment that y is the means appropriate for obtaining a desired object x a "judgment of utility." The effect, then, of reflection or judgment upon self-interest referred to by Hume as the "alteration of its direction" is the effect of a judgment of utility and represents, therefore, no incompatibility with the general position of Hume concerning the relation of reason to the passions. 198 The reflection upon which The opposite of this point of view is taken by I. Hedenius, who comments on Hume's statement that "the remedy, then, is not deriv'd from nature, but from artifice; or more properly speaking, nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding, for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections" ( Treatise, p. 489), as follows: " Hume's theory that justice arose through reason 'restraining' the partial passions is an attempt to reconcile two opposite ideas, both of them equally necessary from a logical point of view. If the idea that there exists no public benevolence is strictly adhered to, the theory that the origin of justice is due to the intervention of reason must imply that reason is a motive which overcomes affections, for only reason can be impartial. But, at the same time, the motive as such must be a partial affection. We must keep this logical situation in mind when we consider Hume's proposition that though the original motive of artificial virtue is a partial passion, it is modified by reason. Of course we cannot expect any enlightenment from Hume himself concerning the import of the coöperation between reason and the partial passions in the establishment of justice. Sometimes he contents himself with saying that self-love takes 'a new and more convenient direction' (543). In one passage he contends, with reference to the theory of the impotence of reason, that the restraint imposed by reason on a partial passion must consist in the passion restraining itself, 'by an alteration of its direction' (492 f.). But he does not explain what he means by this enigmatical statement. In that case he would not have disguised the necessity of looking upon the passions as absolutely independent of reason and his theory of artificial virtue would have broken down" ( Studies in Hume's Ethics [Upsala, 1937], p. 441, with italics added). To justify her objections, however, Miss Hedenius merely points to Hume's "well-known . . . view that reason alone can never produce any action, that ideas are absolutely powerless against passions" (op. cit., p. 441). For all its supposed familiarity, however, this view of Hume's has been misinterpreted by Miss Hedenius. For in the sense of excluding the "oblique" or "mediate" effects of reason upon passion and action, it is simply not Hume's doctrine that reason and passion are "absolutely independent." Miss Hedenius' argument, which is, in effect, that because just actions are impartial, while all motives are partial, therefore just actions are motivated by reason, "for only reason can be impartial," is a non sequitur. Impartiality does indeed happen as a matter of fact, according to Hume, to characterize acts of justice; but such actions are not executed for the sake of being impartial but only because each individual sees it of advantage to himself as such to leave others in undisturbed possession of certain goods, regardless of the relationship of these persons to his friendship, enmity, or indifference, if (and only if) he has a causally reliable expectation of their reciprocal treatment of himself. Acts of justice are therefore advantageous only if rendered conventional; and conventional actions are, from their nature, impartial. But it is from the desire of securing the advantage constituted by maintenance of the convention (even when the actions necessary for this maintenance are not such as would be motivated by benevolence or even by self-interest, in abstraction from all reflection upon the consequences of a breach of convention) that actions of justice arise, and not from the desire to be impartial. It is, of course, on Hume's theory, precisely the fact that actions of justice have characteristics, namely impartiality and "a direct and evident tendency to public good" ( Treatise, p. 528), to which no natural desires correspond, that suggests the artificiality of these actions, suggests, that is, that these effects of the actions in question are merely accidental, the actions being performed for the sake of quite another end. Hume's doctrine is thus the general form of which Smith's theory of the "unseen hand" that guides the economic relations of a 198

the adoption of the convention of stability of possession is based is that mutual abstinence from transferable goods is the means to the gratification of one's interests through prevention of the descent of man into that "solitary and forlorn condition, which must follow upon violence and an universal license" (492) and of which a foretaste is constituted, even after the convention is established, "by our repeated experiences of the inconveniences of transgressing it" (490). The sole basis for the convention foundational to the distinction between justice and injustice is thus the utility to each individual of participation in it; 199 and the illustrative value of the notion of a "golden age" is just that it shows the dependence of justice upon utility by depicting the abolition of distinctions of property as the effect of the increase of human generosity and of the bounty of nature. 200 The motive for entrance into the convention of stability of possession is thus a natural propensity influenced by the reflection and causal foresight of which human beings are capable. Our -113-

community is but a special case, as may be seen with special clarity from the following passage, in which with reference to the laws of nature, Hume writes "'Tis self-love which is their real origin; and as the selflove of one person is naturally contrary to that of another, these several interested passions are oblig'd to adjust themselves after such a manner as to concur in some system of conduct and behaviour. This system, therefore, comprehending the interest of each individual, is of course advantageous to the public; tho' it be not intended for that purpose by the inventors" ( Treatise, p. 529). 199 Hume's view of justice is thus, to paraphrase words applied by Laird to Hobbes ( Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature, p. 223), "the only device by which a rational being of limited benevolence can obtain not all he wants but all he is, in the social relationships indispensable to his existence, likely to get." 200 See Treatise, pp. 494 f.

second observation concerning this motive is that it is nonmoral. Neither approval nor disapproval of the motive which leads to that system of mutual restraints which permits the continuance of social union, is intelligible; for there is no conceivable way in which persons acting in accordance with this motive may be reformed. For, on the one hand, there is no passion uninfluenced by causal foresight which inhibits self-interest to the extent necessary for the maintenance of society; indeed, the supposition of the existence of such a passion is equivalent to the assumption of an extensive benevolence which, were it only to exist, would render the rules of justice and property unnecessary. 201 The restraint imposed upon the expression of self-interest by the acceptance of convention, on the other hand, is not contrary to the selfish passions per se but only to "their heedless and impetuous movement" (489). Self-interest is thus neither a virtue opposed by a vice, nor a vice opposed by a virtue. for whether the passion of self-interest be esteemed vicious or virtuous, 'tis all a case; since itself alone restrains it: So that if it be virtuous, men become social by their virtue; if vicious, their vice has the same effect (492). Hume thus arrives at the position that "'tis only from the selfishness and confin'd generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin" (495). From this general position Hume draws the not unexpected inference "that the sense of justice is not founded on reason, or on the discovery of certain connexions and relations of ideas, which are eternal, immutable, and universally obligatory" (496). For if the obligations of justice, like the propositions of logic, were founded on connections of ideas, these obligations could not be altered without an alteration of these connections, which is to say, they could not be altered at all. However, the obligations of justice -114-

Against this argument, which is prominent in Hume's text, Broad contends ( Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 98) that it is conceivable that circumstances arise "where justice has neither utility nor disutility, as in the case of the shipwrecked sailors with a single biscuit which is not enough to keep one of them alive"; and of this instance he says, "I think it is plain that we should approve of a just distribution of the biscuit and disapprove of a bestial scramble for it. We should all hope that, if we had to starve along with others, we should have the grace to starve decently and in order, and that they would do likewise" (ibid.). It is apparent, however, that in this case, the utility of a "just distribution" of the biscuit has not vanished; for its use is, in this case, quite evidently to ward off the undesired "bestial scramble." 201

are alterable, for their character and even existence is a function of alterable circumstances. Now, it seems impossible to suppose that an alteration of such circumstances as the generosity of men or the availability of desired goods can change or abolish a connection of ideas, that is, an intensional relation between terms, whereas it is evident that a change of actually existing circumstances may alter or abolish the utility of the rules of justice: "'tis evident, that the only cause, why the extensive generosity of man, and the perfect abundance of every thing, wou'd destroy the very idea of justice, is because they render it useless" (496). Now, the utility of an object depends not upon the character of our ideas but upon that of our impressions, for to be useful is to be fitted to attain a desired end, and without desires, there would be no ends: "the sense of justice, therefore, is not founded on our ideas, but on our impressions" (ibid.). Since a detailed treatment of the moral character of justice, namely, of the question "why we annex the idea of virtue to justice, and of vice to injustice" (498), cannot be given, according to Hume (ibid.), except in connection with the analysis of the natural virtues, we continue with the investigation of Hume's theory of justice conceived simply as a device, or rather a connected set of devices, for securing to the maximum extent the private interests of individuals by providing a stable social context in which alone an optimum satisfaction and realization of basic human needs, desires, and ambitions is possible. § 2: THE SECOND LAW OF NATURE; THE CONSTITUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS The second and third of the fundamental laws of nature which define the concept of justice independently of and antecedently in time to the creation of positive laws within organized governments, consist, according to Hume, in rules definitive of the transference of property by consent and of the obligation to perform promises. We shall consider these in turn. The motive for the establishment of the laws of nature is, as has been seen, self-interest directed toward the means for achieving its optimum satisfaction by the causal judgments supplied by the understanding. We shall henceforth call motivation of this type "directed interest"; and the problem at hand is thus the -115-

exhibition of the role of directed interest in the formulation of the second of the three conventions foundational to justice. The second convention is an agreement to regard ownership as transferable by the consent of the owner. Now, the role of directed interest in the convention institutive of ownership has already been analyzed in some detail, but at the expense of neglecting, momentarily, consideration of the exact circumstances under which property shall be said to exist. Since according to Hume's account, the second law of nature is invented in order to remedy a "grand inconvenience" (514) arising in connection with the establishment of rules definitive of the exact circumstances under which the concept of ownership has application, it is necessary first to direct attention to Hume's hypothesis concerning these rules. An agreement to regard possession in general as stable would be useless, Hume points out, unless accompanied by further agreements, embodied in prescriptive rules, as to methods in accordance with which "we may distinguish what particular goods are to be assign'd to each particular person, while the rest of mankind are excluded from their possession and enjoyment" (502). The value of such methods, like that of the convention of stability of possession to which they lend specification, consists in their being adapted to "cut off all occasions of discord and contention" (ibid.). It is therefore not to be supposed that a criterion for the existence of property should ever be that of the demonstration of "any utility or advantage, which either the particular person or the public may reap from his enjoyment of any particular goods, beyond what wou'd result from the possession of them by any other person" (ibid.). Such a requirement would provoke rather than prevent contention, partly because the same object may be of use or advantage at once to many persons (ibid.), but chiefly because men's judgments of particular utilities and proprieties would be irremediably partial and controversial (ibid.). "It follows, therefore, that the general rule, that possession must be stable, is not apply'd by particular judgments, but by other general rules, which must extend to the whole society, and be inflexible either by spite or favour" (ibid.). Hume regards the choice of the rules definitive of the circumstances under which property exists as conditioned, on the whole, more by the conformity of certain alternatives to the propensities of the imagination than by the foresight of the -116-

causal consequences of their adoption which is supplied by the understanding. 202 The problem of the choice of such rules is the problem of selecting some relation between persons and goods to be considered as constitutive of the ownership of these goods; and the complexity of the circumstances environing this selection is such that it must often occur either that a choice must be made as between alternatives equivalent in public utility, or that the more natural though less useful of the alternatives is chosen. The characteristics of "being adapted to secure the peace of society" and of "conforming with the habits of the imagination" are diverse and do not always characterize the same procedure; so that the rules of ownership are therefore not uniformly adapted to secure the public interest and often occasion rather than prevent controversy, both as to the existence and also as to the extent of ownership; "and these disputes are often susceptible of no decision, or can be decided by no other faculty than the imagination" (507). Now, the temporally first specification of the convention of property is unique; for while its adoption, occurring by supposition immediately "after the general convention for the establishment of society, and for the constancy of possession" (503), is virtually coeval with the beginning of society, "yet its utility extends not beyond the first formation of society; nor wou'd any thing be more pernicious, than the constant observance of it; by which restitution wou'd be excluded, and every injustice wou'd be authoriz'd and rewarded" (505). This first specification of ownership is in this way distinguished from those later rules whose force begins and continues "after society is once establish'd" (ibid.), and which are gathered for discussion by Hume under the titles of occupation, prescription, accession, and succession (ibid.). According to Hume, the "most natural" (503) temporally first specification of ownership is supposed to be the decision that "every one continue to enjoy what he is at present master of, and that property or constant possession be conjoin'd to the immediate possession" (ibid.). Present possession is thus the first relation chosen as constitutive of ownership; and for this particular choice there are several reasons. Its naturalness is constituted in that it is a special case of the principle els ewhere invoked 203 that custom -117-

202 203

See Treatise, p. 504 n. See p. 51.

"not only reconciles us to any thing we have long enjoy'd, but even gives us an affection for it, and makes us prefer it to other objects, which may be more valuable, but are less known to us" (ibid.). The choice illustrates also another general principle, namely, that "the mind has a natural propensity to join relations, especially resembling ones, and finds a kind of fitness and uniformity in such an union" (509, n.). Property is "nothing but a constant possession, secur'd by the laws of society" (504, n.); and the addition to this relation of the relation of present possession is therefore an instance of this propensity. It is apparent that this rule combines both public utility and conformity to the habit of the imagination; for custom-bred satisfaction with one's present (de facto) possessions must serve to diminish covetousness and attendant controversy, while this satisfaction itself is attributable to the imagination. The adoption of this rule necessitates the adoption of further rules, however; for present possession is highly changeable, and were property constituted merely by present possession, property would consequently become unstable, that is, would cease, as such, to exist. Present possession thus confers ownership, according to Hume, only once, namely, at the formation of society; thereafter, the right to possess is defined by other rules. Hume's account of these rules, 204 --those, namely, defining property in terms of first possession, long possession, accession, and succession--is astute and circumstantial; but as an example of the associationist method it adds little to what may be gained from the description (already examined) of the right of ownership as constituted by present possession. We pass, accordingly, to consideration of the second "law of nature," namely, that property shall be regarded as transferable with the consent of the proprietor, a law invented, according to Hume, in order to remedy a "grand inconvenience" (514) arising in connection with the first law. The rules definitive of the existence and extent of property embody methods of determining property in which consideration of the appropriateness of particular possessions to particular persons does not enter; and the exclusion of this consideration is necessary if the end of the first law of nature is to be achieved. 205 The exclusion of this consideration has the effect, however, that the appropriateness of possessions to their possessors must "de-118-

204 205

Treatise, pp. 505-513. See p. 116.

pend very much on chance" (ibid.). Forcible seizure by each man of "what he judges to be fit for him" (ibid.) would be no remedy, as being incompatible with the very stability of possession upon which the peace of society depends (ibid.). The best decision is therefore the "obvious" (ibid.) one that ". . . possession and property shou'd always be stable, except when the proprietor consents to bestow them on some other person" (514). Of the adoption of this convention, which is indispensable, among other things, to the usefulness of the division of labor and to commerce, Hume observes that it is so far "determined by a plain utility and interest" (515). As much is not true, however, of the procedure of "delivery, or a sensible transference of the object" (ibid.); here, the imaginations of lawyers and moralists resort, although quite naturally, to rank fiction in order that they may "satisfy themselves concerning the transference of property by consent" (516). Property per se, so Hume's argument runs, obviously cannot be physically translated since it is constituted--despite popular misconception--not by an object but rather by the entrance of an object into complex moral relationships involving the laws of justice and, ultimately, the social sentiments of morality and selfinterest. The transference of property per se is therefore nonsense, but nonsense which has to be taken seriously. The remedy which suggests itself is to regard as the transference of property in an object the actual or physical transference of the de facto possession of the object "to the person, on whom we wou'd bestow the property" (515). The naturalness of this expedient Hume explains in terms of the principle that "nothing more enlivens any idea than a present impression, and a relation betwixt that impression and the idea" (ibid.). 206 The impressional materials constituted by the sensible delivery of a tangible object serve in this case, however, to vivify an idea (namely that of the physical translation of the intangible relationships constitutive of ownership) to which they, of course, cannot be related by resemblance, the idea being a confusion of incompatible elements. The result of the expedient is only to "deceive the mind, and make it fancy, that it conceives the mysterious transition of the property" (ibid.). That delivery is required because without this "false light" (ibid.) for the imagination the transfer of property would be altogether incompre-119-

hensible, appears from the fact that men resort, when real delivery is impracticable, (ibid.) to the utterly superstitious procedure of "symbolical delivery" (ibid.), taking the granary keys for title to its corn, or stone and earth for "the delivery of a mannor" (ibid.). 206

See pp. 41ff.

§ 3: THE THIRD LAW OF NATURE; THE ANALYSIS OF PROMISES The last of the three fundamental laws of nature treated by Hume is "the rule of morality, which enjoins the performance of promises" (516). The position of this law is one of peculiar importance in Hume's account of justice as an artificial virtue. The central notion of this account is that of convention, or agreement in the performance of certain actions which are motivated by a directed interest, namely, by the judgment that such performance is causally connected with the existence of optimum conditions for the satisfaction of the individual's interests, these actions being motivated by a sense of duty and acquiring their moral character only subsequently in time to their performance out of the motive of directed interest. Since there is admittedly a moral obligation to perform promises, it is essential to Hume's account that this moral characteristic of promise keeping be exhibited as posterior to convention, that is, that it be shown "that fidelity is no natural virtue, and that promises have no force, antecedent to human conventions" (519). For were conventional agreements indistinguishable from promises, and were fidelity a natural virtue, the distinction between artificial virtues and natural virtues would collapse, the rules of justice deriving their moral character, in that case, from the primitive, natural morality of promise keeping. Hume's account of the "obligation of promises" 207 thus consists of two parts, the first of which is a proof of the proposition "that the rule of morality, which enjoins the performance of promises, is not natural" (516), and the second of which exhibits the specific interests for the satisfaction of which the convention of promises is entered into. We shall examine these parts in turn. Hume's demonstration of the conventionality of the rule that promises be performed is twofold and consists respectively of considerations having reference to the analysis of the act of promising, on the one hand, and to the motives for the performance of promises, on the other. Let us consider the latter first. -120-

207

Treatise, Book III, Part II, sect. v, pp. 516 ff.

The governing consideration with respect to the motive for the performance of promises is that this motive is a sense of duty. "Now 'tis evident we have no motive leading us to the performance of promises, distinct from a sense of duty. If we thought, that promises had no moral obligation, we never shou'd feel any inclination to observe them" (518). This being the case, the artificiality of the virtue of fidelity follows immediately from "that reasoning, which prov'd justice in general to be an artificial virtue" (ibid.). This reasoning, it is to be remembered, proceeded by establishing in the first place that the sense of duty cannot intelligibly be regarded as literally the original motive (in the temporal sense of the term) to the actions in question, 208 that is, that "no action can be laudable or blameable, without some motives or impelling passions, distinct from the sense of morals" (483). The next step in this argument was the denial with respect to a typical act of justice 209 that for an action of this type a motive distinct from the sense of duty can be found other than the interest which each agent has in such performance provided that his neighbors reciprocate the performance under similar circumstances--a motive, that is, other than perception of the advantage to be gained from the endowment of actions of this type with a conventional status. The motive for the formation of a convention we have termed "directed interest," since this motive consists of self-interest directed by a causal judgment to entrance into a conventional pattern of behavior as the most efficient means to its own gratification. 210 The general position established by Hume is thus that wherever an action is performed from a sense of duty without natural inclination, that is, an inclination uninfluenced by causal foresight of the consequences of the action and of their good or evil for the agent, it is necessary to infer a social origin of this sense of duty consisting in the fact that actions of the kind in question were originally, in the temporal sense of the term, performed from the motive of directed interest. There being no moral motive for the keeping of a promise other than the sense of its obligatoriness, it follows from the general position just outlined "that promises are human inventions, founded on the necessities and interests of society" (519). With this observation, Hume's proof of the con-121-

See chap. iii, § 2. For example, the restoration of a loan. (See Treatise, pp. 479 ff.) 210 See pp. 115f. 208 209

ventionality of promise-keeping from considerations relative to its motivation is completed. We examine next those considerations based upon an analysis of the act of promising. There is an apparent possibility of evading the consequence of the foregoing considerations, namely, that the original motive to fidelity is a directed interest, by maintaining that the obligatoriness of promises is explicable without reference to convention for the reason that the obligation to perform a promise is intrinsic to a certain mental act which is, properly speaking, constitutive of the promise itself and the occurrence of which is merely reported by the use of linguistic expressions such as "I promise that x." There is in this case no social origin of the moral character of promise keeping (although there is, of course, a conventional origin of the linguistic method of denoting the occurrence of an act of promising), for there was never a time at which the keeping of promises was motivated by a directed interest. Fidelity, under these circumstances, would be a natural virtue; perception of the moral obligation intrinsic to and created by the mental actions constitutive of promises would be the natural and sole motive for their performance. That no such explanation is possible, however, Hume undertakes to show through an analysis, which constitutes the remainder of his demonstration of the conventionality of the virtue of fidelity, of the act of promising. The result of this analysis is to deny the possibility of such an explanation of the moral obligation of promises as was just proposed, on the ground that there is no "peculiar act of the mind, annext to promises" (519), that is, that "a man, unacquainted with society, could never enter into any engagements with another, even tho' they could perceive each other's thoughts by intuition" (516). In the light of this analysis, that is, the mental act ordinarily regarded as constitutive of an act of promising and the occurrence of which is supposed, by those who regard the making of a promise as "intelligible, before human conventions had establish'd it" (516), to be reported by means of the use of expressions of the form "I promise x" is seen to be fictitious. The peculiarity of an act of promising is that this act renders an event, namely, the action promised, obligatory with respect to the promiser. For this reason, the supposed action of the mind constitutive of a promise to perform x cannot be identical with a resolution to perform x, -122"for that alone never imposes any obligation" (ibid.). Desires and volitions are likewise eliminated as candidates for the role of the mental action in question: one's promise of x can be given in the absence of a desire to perform "declar'd and avow'd" (ibid.), and a volition influences an occurrent action, not a promised (i.e., future) action (ibid.). Hume concludes from this eliminatory process that "since the act of the mind, which enters into a promise, and produces its obligation, is neither the resolving, nor willing any

particular performance, it must necessarily be the willing of that obligation, which arises from the promise" (ibid.). And indeed, it is ordinarily said that "we are bound by our own consent, and that the obligation arises from our mere will and pleasure" (517). In relation to Hume's analysis of obligation, however, these "common ways of thinking and of expressing ourselves" (ibid.) are absurd. An action is obligatory "when the neglect, or nonperformance of it" (517) excites the feeling of moral disapproval. This being the case, it follows that there is no such function as that of the willing of an obligation; for we cannot, "by a single act of our will, that is, by a promise, render any action agreeable or disagreeable, moral or immoral; which, without that act, wou'd have produc'd contrary impressions, or have been endow'd with different qualities" (ibid.). The proposed method of assimilating fidelity to the natural virtues rests, therefore, upon an uncritical conception of the act of promising. Hume concludes the present discussion of the supposed act of the mind constitutive of the promise with the obvious corollary that "if there was any act of the mind belonging to it, it could not naturally produce any obligation" (518). It is to be seen that according to Hume's analysis of promises, the act of promising is constituted by what is ordinarily regarded as merely the conventional expression of the occurrence of this act, namely, by the employment of the form of words "I promise x." There remains to inquire, therefore, concerning the end served by employment of this form of words, once the usual view, namely, that this end is to report the occurrence of the mental act which is the promise, has been rejected. Hume's answer to this query is that the form of words in question is used in order "to distinguish those two different sorts of commerce, the interested and the disinterested" (521-522). Disinterested commerce consists in -123-

the donation to another of one's property or services from the motives of benevolence or gratitude "without any prospect of advantage" (521), while interested commerce consists in such transactions involving property or services as are entered into in the absence of benevolence or gratitude and solely from the expectation of gain. There are considered in Hume's account two principal types of interested transactions, namely, the exchange of property and the exchange of services, for which the procedure of promising is essential. The exchange of property, on the one hand, could not be carried on merely with the aid of the law institutive of the transfer of title by consent. Such transference was instituted, it is to be recalled, as a remedy for inconvenient adjustments of property to possessors; but "the transference of property, which is the proper remedy for this inconvenience, cannot remedy it entirely; because it can only take place with regard to such objects as are present and individual, but not to such as are absent or general" (520). Contractual procedures, the essential element of which is a promise, are thus requisite if the ownership is to be transferred interestedly (i.e., for compensation) of, for example, "a particular house, twenty leagues distant; because the consent cannot be attended with delivery, which is a requisite circumstance" (520). And such procedures are also requisite to enable the transfer to be made of title to such goods as "ten bushels of corn, or five hogsheads of wine, . . . because these are only general terms, and have no direct relation to any particular heap of corn, or barrels of wine" (ibid.). Such transactions being by hypothesis interested and also such that simultaneous exchange of de facto possession of the properties involved is impossible, an assurance is required by the parties to the transaction that reciprocal relinquishment of de facto possession will in fact occur, or that delivery of the objects will be made, even though the halves of the exchange must be completed successively; and it is the function of the promise to provide such assurance, the assurance constituted by the kindness and benevolence of the parties concerned being, by definition, not an element of an interested transaction. Promises are requisite, on the other hand, in order to render possible transactions involving "services and actions, which we may exchange to our mutual interest and advantage" (ibid.); for where A's services to the advantage of B are completed before B's -124-

services to the advantage of A, A requires some assurance other than that of the existence of B's gratitude (which by hypothesis is not present) that his services to B will be reciprocated in full. Again, it is the function of the promise to provide such an assurance; and the question arises how the promise performs this function. The assurance provided for the promisee must consist in the known existence of a motive to perform, other than benevolence or gratitude, on the part of the promiser. This motive cannot consist merely in the promiser's resolution to perform; for "were there no more than a resolution in the case, promises wou'd only declare our former motives, and wou'd not create any new motive or obligation" (522). Could a resolution, however, be so made by the person from whom assurance of performance is desired as in some manner to accompany itself with a penalty for its own nonfulfillment, the expression of such a resolution would constitute the assurance required, the motive to perform being the desire of the resolver to avoid the penalty. Now, according to Hume, the promise is precisely such a device for accompanying a resolution with a penalty for its own nonfulfillment. When a man says he promises any thing, he in effect expresses a resolution of performing it; and along with that, by making use of this form of words, subjects himself to the penalty of never being trusted again in case of failure (522). The promise is thus a symbol devised for the use of those who wish to be trusted in order interestedly to engage in those exchanges of goods or services the halves of which must be completed successively; and its use conveys that the user is aware that performance is to his own advantage, since the transaction for the execution of which it is requisite is an interested one. Hence it is that "after these signs are instituted, whoever uses them is immediately bound by his interest to execute his engagements, and must never expect to be trusted any more, if he refuse to perform what he promis'd" (522). The invention of the promise thus arises, according to Hume's theory, "when experience has taught us, that human affairs wou'd be conducted much more for mutual advantage, were there certain symbols or signs instituted, by which we might give each other security of our conduct in any particular incident" (ibid.). And -125-

after the invention of promises, promise keeping is originally motivated by self-interest directed by the understanding to the endowment of their performance with the status of a convention: "nor is there any thing requisite to form this concert or convention, but that every one have a sense of interest in the faithful fulfilling of engagements, and express that sense to other members of the society" (522-523). As in the case of the observance of property rules, the observance of promises acquires a moral character through a process the details of which are later analyzed by Hume. When fidelity has acquired its moral character, that is, when promise keeping comes to be motivated by a sense of duty independently of any directed interest, it is natural, as has already been observed, to seek to explain the moral character of fidelity as deducible from the nature of the promise itself. This attempt meets with the difficulty that neither the resolution which constitutes "the natural act of the mind, which promises express" (522) nor the promissory word formula is able to create a moral obligation; and this difficulty is met by means of a fiction: "we feign a new act of the mind, which we call the willing an obligation; and on this we suppose the morality to depend" (523). Hume concludes his analysis of fidelity with the observation that the general acceptance of the invalidation of contracts entered into under duress "is a proof, that promises have no natural obligation, and are mere artificial contrivances for the convenience and advantage of society" (525). As a motive, the force which invalidates a contract made with a robber is "not essentially different" (ibid.) from the fear of death and hope of recovery which motivate a contract with a surgeon; and the difference in the moral effects of these motives can be explained only by the fact that the enforcing of contracts with robbers would be socially intolerable, while fidelity to contracts with surgeons is socially desirable.

§ 4: CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS UPON THE ARTIFICIALITY OF JUSTICE The theory of promises concludes Hume's detailed treatment of the three laws of nature which define the concept of justice prior to the formation of civil government based upon the obligation of allegiance. 211 Before advancing to discussion of the origin of government and of the laws and duties connected therewith, Hume appends, however, "some farther reflexions concerning justice and injustice" (526 ff.). These "reflexions" being of unequal importance, we shall consider only the first, the point of departure for which is consideration of the "vulgar definition of justice" (526) as "a constant and perpetual will of giving every one his due" (ibid.). Hume's argument is somewhat compressed and is usefully expanded with a recapitulation of the foregoing notions tacitly presupposed in it. According to these notions, the distinction between justice and injustice is possible only after it has been agreed conventionally that possession shall be stable. After this convention is established, it is just to preserve the constancy of possession, unjust to disturb it. The convention is entered upon out of the motive of self-interest directed by a causal judgment to the effect that maintenance of such a pattern of behavior is essential to the continuance of society, upon the survival of which the satisfaction of interests depends. When it is perceived of actions tending to preserve the stability of possession, actions which may be called for present purposes "P-actions," that they promote the peace of society, these actions excite the pleasant impression of approval and are on that account denominated "virtuous," while actions which deviate from the pattern excite disapproval and are therefore denominated "vicious." After the P-actions have become approved because of their effect in preserving the peace of society, they come to be performed solely out of a sense of duty because they are approved, or rather because actions deviating from their pattern are disapproved. The P-actions at this point constitute a virtue, namely justice, which is called "artificial" because the P-actions were originally conventional and are not motivated by a spontaneous, natural inclination. Now, the P-actions consist in preserving the constancy of possession; but constant possession established by P-actions, that is, by acts of justice, is property. Hence property is the result of P-actions, and not conversely. This point Hume wishes to establish by examining anew the nature of property as it is constituted after the Pactions have come to be motivated by a sense of duty. An object x--so his argument runs--can be the property only of an "intelligent and rational" creature (527) y, and only then by standing in some relation R, for example, that of first possession, -127211

See pp. 106 f.

to y; and this relation Hume calls "external" (ibid.) and observes of it that it "may be the same betwixt inanimate objects, or with regard to brute creatures; tho' in those cases it forms no property" (ibid.). The external relation is therefore not identical with the property relation: first possession, for example, "is not of itself imagin'd to be the property of the object, but only to cause its property" (527). Property is therefore an effect of the external relation, and this effect consists in the fact that it has "an influence on the mind, by giving us a sense of duty in abstaining from that object, and in restoring it to the first possessor" (ibid.). But abstention from goods which others have occupied and the maintenance of them in their possession are P-actions, that is, "are properly what we call justice" (527), so that property is the effect of acts of justice and cannot therefore intelligibly be regarded as subsisting independently of justice or antecedently to it. From this, the inacceptability of the "vulgar definition" of justice is an immediate consequence. For in this definition, what is intended by the word "due" evidently cannot be explained without a reference to right and property, that is, without reference to justice, so that the definition has a circularity which is removable only by the supposition that "there are such things as right and property, independent of justice, and antecedent to it; and that they wou'd have subsisted, tho' men had never dreamt of practising such a virtue" (526-527). But this supposition is precisely that which has been shown to be impossible by the analysis of the propertyrelation just given. Without this supposition, the definition in question is, of course, circular: in effect, it equates justice, that is, P-actions, with preserving the property of each, that is, with preserving the relations preserved by P-actions; and from this, some persons attempt to infer that justice (i.e., the P-actions) is a natural virtue because preserving property is naturally approved. While it is true, however, that preserving property is naturally approved, 212 it cannot be concluded from this fact that justice is a natural virtue; for it has already been seen that the existence of property as such depends upon the performance of P-actions, and the performance of these actions out of a sense of duty and without natural inclination points, in accordance with Hume's now familiar line of reasoning, to their origin in convention. The -128-

212

See Treatise, pp. 533 f., and cf. also Treatise, pp. 499 f.

circularity of the definition could be removed by the equation of "justice" (i.e., the Pactions) with "preserving the (de facto) possession of each," that is, with the preservation of the "external relation" between the possessor and the possessed. "Thus the restoring a man's goods to him is consider'd as virtuous, not because nature has annex'd a certain sentiment of pleasure to such a conduct, with regard to the property of others, but because she has annex'd that sentiment to such a conduct, with regard to those external objects, of which others have had the first or long possession, or which they have receiv'd by the consent of those, who have had first or long possession" (528). In this case, however, the desired conclusion, namely, that justice is a natural virtue, does not follow, because there is, as a matter of fact, no natural inclination to preserve the (de facto) possession of each, that is, there is no "original pleasure or uneasiness" 213 (528) excited by the preservation or disturbance of possession; and "if nature has given us no such sentiment, there is not naturally, nor antecedent to human conventions, any such thing as property" (ibid.). This conclusion Hume reinforces by two observations. In the first place, were there any such natural inclination to preserve the relations (i.e., first possession, long possession, etc.) between persons and things regarded as constituting property, this inclination "wou'd have been as evident and discernible as on every other occasion" (528) and there would have been no temptation to define justice in terms of actions with respect to property rather than with respect to certain objects standing in de facto relationships to persons, "and at the same time to make use of the notions of justice in the definition of property" (ibid.). In the second place, the rules definitive of the relations constituting property "have in them no marks of a natural origin, but many of artifice and contrivance" (ibid.). These marks are their numerosity (ibid.), their changeability by human laws (ibid.), and the fact that they "have all of them a direct and evident tendency to public good, and the support of civil society" (ibid.). Even the supposition, regarded by Hume as false, that an inclination to act in accordance with the public good (i.e., the pleasure of others) is the motive for the establishment of these rules, "as much as the public good is their natural tendency" (529), is not incompatible with the artificiality of the rules in the sense that they are "purposely contriv'd and directed to a certain end" (ibid.). And indeed, were there such a benevolent motive to justice, there should have been no need for the restraints embodied in the rules, "so that the laws of justice arise from natural principles in a manner still more oblique and artificial" (ibid.). -130-

213

Italics not in original text.

CHAPTER V: HUMES'S THEORY OF JUSTICE, PART III: POLITICAL THEORY

§ 1: THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT HUME'S THEORY of government extends the theory of justice with an account of the origin of "civil society or government" (545) and an analysis of the virtue of allegiance, or loyalty to magisterial authority. The connection of this virtue with civil society is not accidental, since (according to Hume) the distinction between a civil and a "natural" society is the same as the distinction between a society in which the obligations of justice are defined by the three fundamental laws of nature 214 and one in which in addition to these duties there are others, such as allegiance, which reflect the existence of magisterial power. The question thus arises as to the circumstances under which a transition occurs from the natural to the civil form of society; for according to Hume, every society is at least a natural society: "society is as antient as the human species, and those three fundamental laws of nature as antient as society" (542). Hume treats this question, however, after he has described the function of government, and to his description we now turn. Government or the establishment of a magistracy is, according to Hume, a device contrived by men for the principal object of counteracting a natural tendency to violation of the "laws of justice and equity" (537). Since the laws of justice which exist antecedently to civil laws presupposing government are none other than the laws of nature just mentioned, and since also the original motive to the observance of these laws is a directed interest which "is palpable and evident, even to the most rude and uncultivated of [the] human race" (534), it is clear that in breaking the laws of nature, men must be described as acting "in contradiction to their known interest" (535); and the question arises as to the correct analysis of this description. 215 Hume's analysis involves two -131-

See page 106. Action contrary to a "known interest" and at the behest of passion is an instance of the opposition of passion "to what in an improper sense we call reason," ( Treatise, p. 536), the impropriety of this sense of the term "reason" having been previously indicated by Hume. (See p. 74.) Use of the term "known" in the expression "known interest" does not entail, of course, that a motive is ever constituted merely by the occurrence of a cognition: the motive, properly speaking, is the correlate to some desireor aversion or other passion which is present to mind through an act of cognition, the role of which in motivation is, according to Hume, exhausted by this presentational activity. 214 215

principles, of which the first is the fact that "tho' the rules of justice are establish'd merely by interest, their connexion with interest is somewhat singular" (497). The second principle is that there exists a "violent propension to prefer contiguous to remote" (537). The singularity of the connection between acts of justice and the selfinterest which is directed to them as the most efficient means to its own satisfaction consists, it is to be recalled, in the fact that these acts lead to this satisfaction in "an oblique and indirect manner" (497). Justice is advantageous to each individual because justice secures the peace of society, which is advantageous to each individual; but no single act of justice secures the peace of society, which is rather constituted by the prevalence of justice and thus depends upon "the whole system of actions, concurr'd in by the whole society" (498). An act of justice may be without value for its agent and thus offer no motive for its performance except that which consists in its being a part-cause of the advantages inherent in an orderly social life; for any single act of justice may be the whole cause of certain disadvantages to its agent, as would be the case, for instance, if a man "impoverish himself by a signal instance of integrity" (497). If circumstances arise, therefore, under which the disadvantages consequent upon an act of justice and "impossible to separate" (ibid.) from its fixed advantage as a contribution to the security of society should appear to the agent as greater than this fixed advantage, the interest of the agent in performing an act of justice must disappear in supersedure by his interest in avoiding the disadvantages of justice or of procuring the advantages of injustice. Now, the circumstances under which this supersedure is possible are analyzed by Hume in terms of the propension to prefer that which, being contiguous, is present to the imagination in the form of a "strong and lively idea" (534) to that which, being remote, "lies in a more obscure light" (535). "The consequences of every breach of equity seem to lie very remote, and are not able to counterballance any immediate advantage, that may be reap'd from it" (ibid.). Thus it is that we may be "fully convinc'd" (ibid.) that any disadvantage related to an act of justice is "amply compensated by the steady prosecution of the rule, and by the peace and order, which it establishes in society" (497) and nevertheless choose to act with injustice: "we are not able to regulate our actions by this judgment; but yield to the sollicitations of our passions, which always plead in favour of whatever is near and contiguous" (535). That the idea of the consequences of injustice is feeble does not entail, however, that the consequences themselves are innocuous; and injustice, once practiced, propagates injustice. -132-

Your example both pushes me forward in this way by imitation, and also affords me a new reason for any breach of equity, by shewing me, that I shou'd be the cully of my integrity, if I alone shou'd impose on myself a severe restraint amidst the licentiousness of others (535). An acute question arises as to the quarter in which a remedy for the propensity to injustice may be found, since "the remedy can only come from the consent of men; and if men be incapable of themselves to prefer remote to continguous, they will never consent to any thing, which wou'd oblige them to such a choice" (535536). There is, nevertheless, as the existence of justice shows, a genuine desire to defeat the operation of the propensity in question; for when both are viewed at an imaginative distance, 216 justice and injustice exchange places as regards their effect upon preference, and inability to retain the preference of justice when it comes into imaginative proximity is felt as disagreeable. "This natural infirmity I may very much regret, and I may endeavour, by all possible means, to free my self from it" (536). Now, government is a device by which men, without extirpating the propensity to be determined in preferences by the degree of imaginative proximity of the object, counteract its effects and "lay themselves under the necessity of observing the laws of justice and equity" (537). For government consists in the emplacement of a few persons in a position, "impracticable with respect to all mankind" (ibid.), such that their immediate interest is the execution of justice "and its violation their more remote" (ibid.). Thus the propensity which in the case of the multitude of men operates against justice is made, in the case of "civil magistrates, kings and their ministers, our -133-

216

See Treatise, p. 536.

governors and rulers" (ibid.), to operate in favor of justice; for these men, "being indifferent persons to the greatest part of the state, have no interest, or but a remote one, in any act of injustice" (ibid.). Further functions of the magisterial power are similarly remedial of socially unfortunate characteristics of the passions. Thus, because of men's partiality in their own interest, their governors are empowered not only to execute the laws of justice but also to "decide all controversies concerning them" (538). And the fact that men, while approving the construction of necessary and convenient public works, nevertheless seek to avoid the attendant labor and expense, leads to placing it within the power of magistrates to force men "to seek their own advantage, by a concurrence in some common end or purpose" (ibid.), the magistrates having an evident interest in the successful completion of such projects. Having thus described the functions of magisterial authority, Hume returns to the question mentioned above, namely, that as to the circumstances under which such authority is created, or under which a society passes from the natural to the civil form. It is not to be supposed, Hume points out, that the propensity to injustice just analyzed is sufficient to lead to the creation of the governmental authority which counteracts its effects; for "this weakness is less conspicuous, where the possessions and the pleasures of life are few, and of little value, as they always are in the infancy of society" (539). It is thus only with the "encrease of riches and possessions" (541) that injustice assumes such proportions as to jeopardize the social union as such, with the result that recourse is had to the expedient of government. A natural society whose foundations are still unshaken by intestine quarrels and inequities, cannot, however, survive a nonintestine quarrel without immediate recourse to government; for "foreign war to a society without government necessarily produces civil war" (540). Hume supposes hence "the first rudiments of government to arise from quarrels, not among men of the same society, but among those of different societies (ibid.), a supposition which we find verified in the American tribes, where men live in concord and amity among themselves without any establish'd government; and never pay submission to any of their fellows, except in time of war, when their captain enjoys a shadow of authority, which he loses after their return from the field, and the establishment of peace with the neighbouring tribes (ibid.). -134-

It is plausible also to suppose hence that "all governments are at first monarchical" (ibid.) because the prototype of monarchical authority is military chieftainship and not "patriarchal government, or the authority of a father" (541); for not only is the civil successor to war-engendered military authority likely to resemble its predecessor (ibid.), but it is possible, also, for many families to constitute a society without government of any sort and therefore without patriarchy (ibid.). § 2: THE DUTY OF ALLEGIANCE Having made these observations as to the interests in the satisfaction of which government functions, and these conjectures as to the historical circumstances under which creation of magisterial authority is plausibly supposed to have taken place, Hume is in position to consider next the moral character of government and, in particular, the duty of allegiance, or "obedience to the magistrate" (544), which it imposes. Hume's consideration of allegiance is partly expository and partly polemical. The expository portions of his theory consist in such propositions as establish a "principle of moment" (542), namely that "tho' the duty of allegiance be at first grafted on the obligation of promises, and be for some time supported by that obligation, yet it quickly takes root of itself, and has an original obligation and authority, independent of all contracts" (ibid.). The polemical portion largely consists in indication of the incompatibility of this position with the unqualified position of Locke and others to the effect that men "are bound to obey their magistrates, only because they promise it; and if they had not given their word, either expressly or tacitly, to preserve allegiance, it would never have become a part of their moral duty" (ibid.). Hume observes, 217 in the first place, that the position attacked by him is, when interpreted as applying only to the men who first establish a governing power, the same as the first half of his own position; for when men have once perceiv'd the necessity of government to maintain peace, and execute justice, they wou'd naturally assemble together, wou'd chuse magistrates, determine their power, and promise them obedience. As a promise -135-

See Locke, "An Essay concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government", chap. 8 (in Two Treatises on Civil Government [ London, 1884], ed. Morley). 217

is suppos'd to be a bond or security already in use, and attended with a moral obligation, 'tis to be consider'd as the original sanction of government, and as the source of the first obligation to obedience (541). This being the case, however, the artificiality of allegiance is obvious; for allegiance to government "upon its first establishment" (ibid.) is only a special case of fidelity, already proved to be an artificial virtue. 218 Indeed, allegiance can be plausibly represented as a natural virtue, according to Hume, only by means of two inadmissible steps, namely, by unqualifiedly reducing allegiance to fidelity and then by "taking advantage of the antiquity, and obscure origin" (542) of the law of nature enjoining fidelity in order to deny its origin in "interest, and human conventions" (543); and both steps are necessary because allegiance, regarded as an autonomous virtue, is but very implausibly represented as natural, since "all government is plainly an invention of men, and the origin of most governments is known in history" (542). 219 The problem to which Hume accordingly turns is that of establishing the autonomy of allegiance as an artificial virtue and its distinctness, after the institution of magistracy, from fidelity, whereby it possesses an "original obligation and authority, independent of all contracts" (ibid.). There are thus two points to be proved, namely, that of the artificiality of allegiance and that of the distinctness of its moral obligation from that of fidelity. These points together imply that "these two kinds of duty are exactly on the same footing" (543), so that "there is, then, no pretext of reason for founding the one upon the other" (545). 220 Hume's proof is twofold and consists in showing that "'tis not only the natural -136-

See pp. 120 ff. The expository and polemical portions of Hume's text are intermingled to a degree which renders it virtually impossible to treat them in strict separation from one another. 220 The motive for the attempt to represent allegiance as a natural virtue is, according to Hume, the desire to discover "a stronger foundation for our political duties than interest, and human conventions" ( Treatise, p. 543). As to the strength of the foundation in interest, Hume's remarks are worthy of quotation as a reply to those who may find themselves tempted to regard the whole conception of justice as an "artificial virtue," a degradation of it to the status of "mere convention." "The interest, on which justice is founded, is the greatest imaginable, and extends to all times and places. It cannot possibly be serv'd by any other invention. It is obvious, and discovers itself on the very first formation of society. All these causes render the rules of justice stedfast and immutable; at least, as immutable as human nature. And if they were founded on original instincts, cou'd they have any greater stability?" (Ibid., p. 620). 218 219

obligations of interest, which are distinct in promises and allegiance; but also the moral obligations of honour and conscience" (ibid.). The first half of Hume's proof is itself twofold in effect, since the assertion of the distinctness of the natural obligations of interest entails that the natural obligations of these virtues are constituted by interest. Hume's proof rests upon a principle tacitly assumed in the text, namely that moral obligations are differentiated derivatively through the differentiation of their corresponding natural obligations; and this principle requires some comment. What Hume terms "natural obligation" is, in the case of the natural virtues, the antecedently virtuous natural inclination 221 from which, in the case of such actions as proceed from this inclination, the sense of their obligatoriness, that is, the motive constituted by moral disapproval of the omission of the performance, is derived, the omission of the performance being disapproved derivatively as indicative of a "defect or imperfection in the mind and temper" (518). 222 It is clear, then, that no problem can arise as to the differentiation of the obligations involved in the natural virtues, since these obligations are derivative from utterly distinct natural motives. 223 Hume extends the term "natural obligation," however, into the theory of the artificial virtues, in which domain it can have a significance only analogical with that which it possesses in relation to the natural virtues, since the characteristic selected by Hume as definitive of artificially virtuous actions, for example, such actions as constitute conformity with the laws of nature, is that these actions are performed out of a sense of duty which is not derivative from any natural (i.e., unreflective) inclination and therefore not from any naturally virtuous motive. In accordance with Hume's governing position there must, however, be discoverable some motive from which the sense of duty is capable of having developed in time; and this motive has been discovered by Hume to be, in the case of such actions as are at some given time performed merely as duties, what -137-

See chap. iii, § 2. Cf. Treatise, p. 518: "Tho' there was no obligation to relieve the miserable, our humanity wou'd lead us to it; and when we omit that duty, the immorality of the omission arises from its being a proof, that we want the natural sentiments of humanity." 223 For example, affection for children (cf. Treatise, p. 478) and benevolence or humanity (cf. ibid., p. 518). 221 222

we have termed "directed interest." 224 This interest, therefore, stands to the moral obligation of the artificial virtues as the virtuous natural inclination stands to the moral obligation of the natural virtues; and it is in virtue of this analogy that Hume extends the term "natural obligation" in application to this interest. Since all artificial virtue is derivative from interest, however, this extension creates a problem as to the differentiation of the moral obligations of the artificial virtues. In one respect, they are all identical, namely as derivative from interest; they can be differentiated, therefore, only as the interest is itself differentiated, and the interest is differentiated so far as it chooses various means to various constituent forms of its own satisfaction. 225 The first half of Hume's proof of the distinctness of the moral obligations of fidelity and allegiance thus consists in the exhibition of the distinctness of the interests from which they are derived and to which they are secondary motives. Now, fidelity has already been analyzed in detail as defined by one of the three fundamental laws of nature invented by men "when they observ'd the necessity of society to their mutual subsistance, and found, that 'twas impossible to maintain any correspondence together, without some restraint on their natural appetites" (543). It has likewise already been argued that government is established "when men have observ'd, that tho' the rules of justice be sufficient to maintain any society, yet 'tis impossible for them, of themselves, to observe those rules, in large and polish'd societies" (ibid.); so that the "principal object of government is to constrain men to observe the laws of nature" (ibid.), including that law enjoining the performance of promises. The interests served by the two schemes of conduct, that is, their natural obligations, are thus distinct. To obey the civil magistrate is requisite to preserve order and concord in society. To perform promises is requisite to beget mutual trust and confidence in the common offices of life. The ends, as well as the means, are perfectly distinct; nor is the one subordinate to the other (544). -138-

See p. 115. Self-interest in Hume's theory is not a single passion with a central reality "underlying" or "behind" its diversifications but is rather to be conceived as a group of passions comprising all those which are such that, unlike benevolence, their satisfaction and enjoyment does not involve (causally) the satisfaction and enjoyment of similar passions, desires, and interests in other persons. 224 225

Under these circumstances, "we must allow of a separate obligation" (ibid.). In order "to make this more evident" (ibid.) Hume observes that the attempt to fortify the moral obligation of allegiance by adding to it that of promise keeping is fruitless, since this entails the addition of the corresponding natural obligations. Since, however, this latter addition of interests is useful only if the interest added is greater than the interest added to, and since too the interest in obedience to magistrates is in every respect comparable to that of the performance of promises, neither can fortify the other through addition to it. Thus, for example, men give promises of "what it wou'd have been their interest to perform, independent of these promises" (544), because, in general, these idependent interests are of less magnitude than that of maintaining fidelity to one's pledges, which is an interest "general, avow'd, and of the last consequence in life" (ibid.); so that, in general, the receipt of a promise fortifies our expectation of the performance of an action, regardless of other known interests of the agent in this performance. The interest of men in submission to magistrates, however, is just as great as that in the performance of promises; for without obedience, no government cou'd subsist, nor any peace or order be maintain'd in large societies, where there are so many possessions on the one hand, and so many wants, real or imaginary, on the other. Our civil duties, therefore, must soon detach themselves from our promises, and acquire a separate force and influence (544). Since the claim that in general, the obligation of allegiance is strengthened by its assimilation to that of promises, is not supported by fact, it must be admitted that "each of them must have a peculiar authority, independent of the other" (545). Hume's next argument for the distinctness of fidelity and allegiance consists in an indication of the distinctness of their "moral obligations of honour and conscience" (545). The obligation to each kind of action consists in the disapproval of violation of the rule which prescribes actions of the kind given; the contemplation of violations of obedience, especially those committed by other persons, 226 "naturally gives us an uneasiness . . . and makes us -139-

"But tho' a present interest may thus blind us with regard to our own actions, it takes not place with regard to those of others; nor hinders them from appearing in their true colours, as highly prejudicial to public interest, and to our own in particular" ( Treatise, p. 545; cf. also ibid., p. 499). 226

attach to them the idea of vice and moral deformity" (ibid.); and it is in the same way that violations of the laws of nature, and especially the "breach of promises" (545-546), become morally reprehensible. But, although both allegiance and fidelity are indistinguishable qua morally obligatory in the sense that their omission is disapproved, they are distinguishable in the sense that these disapprovals have distinct origins. We blame all treachery and breach of faith; because we consider, that the freedom and extent of human commerce depend entirely on a fidelity with regard to promises. We blame all disloyalty to magistrates; because we perceive, that the execution of justice, in the stability of possession, its translation by consent, and the performance of promises, is impossible, without submission to government (546). Indeed, so far from its being plausible to subordinate allegiance to promise keeping, any dependence is likely rather to be the reverse; for the public interest would be better served by government in the absence of promises than by promises in the absence of government (ibid.), which reflection "separates the boundaries of our public and private duties, and shews that the latter are more dependent on the former, than the former on the latter" (ibid.). There is no evidence that the members of society regard their acknowledged duty of allegiance as depending upon a promise given either explicitly or tacitly. 227 And that the magistrates themselves, on the other hand, do not regard allegiance as resting upon promises is to be seen from the consideration that were this the sanction of government, our rulers wou'd never receive it tacitly, which is the utmost that can be pretended; since what is given tacitly and insensibly can never have such influence on mankind, as what is perform'd expressly and openly (547). Further evidence of the separateness of the obligation of allegiance from that of promises is constituted by the incompatibility of the contrary position with established notions of justice. In particular, civil disobedience is not regarded at present as excusable unless the culprit has previously promised to obey the government;228 and no time is marked out by the laws as that in which, in the absence of an express promise, "a tacit consent at least might be suppos'd" -140-

227 228

See Treatise, pp. 547 f. Ibid., p. 548.

(549). The rejoinder that "by dwelling in its dominions" (548), people "in effect consented to the establish'd government"229 (ibid.), is useless, for persons can literally be said to consent only "where they think the affair depends on their choice" (ibid.), which is what, in this case, they do not think. Further, absolute government, "being as natural and common a government as any, it must certainly occasion some obligation" (549), which, however, is impossible if allegiance depends upon consent, since by its nature, absolute government "depends not on consent" (ibid.). Hume concludes the present discussion with the observation that the duties of allegiance and fidelity are ordinarily kept "perfectly distinct and separate" (ibid.), since "where no promise is given, a man looks not on his faith as broken in private matters upon account of rebellion" (ibid.). Further aspects of the virtue of obedience to government are considered by Hume under the headings of the "measures" 230 and the "objects" 231 of allegiance, to which we now turn. § 3: THE THEORY OF REVOLUTION AND THE RIGHT OF MAGISTRACY Hume's description of the measures of allegiance is an account of the ethical status of civil disobedience, that is, of the circumstances under which the obligation of allegiance ceases to exist, as implied by the foregoing analysis of allegiance, together with polemical observations on the inadmissibility of the theory of revolution deduced from the view, already rejected, that the obligation of allegiance to government "in all its ages and situations" (542) is of the nature of a contract. Now according to the view that the right of magistracy is constituted by a rule the obligation of which is, in turn, constituted by a promise of obedience on the part of certain members of the society to certain others, who become, by receipt of this promise, the lawful rulers of the promisers, government must be regarded as an interested transaction between governors and the governed; for use of the promise in any transaction is, as has already been noticed, 232 a sign that the transaction is interested: "whoever proposes to draw any profit from our submission, must engage himself, either expressly or tacitly, to make -141-

Italics not in Hume's text. See Treatise, pp. 549 ff. 231 Ibid., pp. 553 ff. 232 See pp. 123 ff. 229 230

us reap some advantage from his authority; nor ought he to expect, that without the performance of his part we will ever continue in obedience" (550). The circumstances under which the obligation of allegiance ceases are, according to these premises, obvious; for the contractual part of the magistrate is to furnish the protection and security of his subjects, so that "when instead of protection and security, they meet with tyranny and oppression, they are free'd from their promises, (as happens in all conditional contracts) and return to that state of liberty, which preceded the institution of government" (ibid.). Now, the principle embodied in this conclusion, namely that there do exist circumstances, as in the case of an "egregious tyranny in the rulers" (549), under which the obligation of allegiance vanishes, is, according to Hume, "perfectly just and reasonable" (ibid.) but is presented by the contract theorists (such as Locke) in a "fallacious and sophistical" (ibid.) form, a form, namely, which would rest allegiance upon promises, and regard the obligation of promises as ultimate and underivative. As regards this confusion Hume observes: I perceive, that a promise itself arises entirely from human conventions, and is invented with a view to a certain interest. I seek, therefore, some such interest more immediately connected with government, and which may be at once the original motive to its institution, and the source of our obedience to it. This interest I find to consist in the security and protection, which we enjoy in political society, and which we can never attain, when perfectly free and independent (550 f.). The deprivation of security and protection of the subjects through actions of the magistrates has the effect of cancelling the obligation of allegiance, therefore, not through its constituting a violation of contract but through its removing the satisfaction of those interests the satisfaction of which constituted the original motive for obedience, and which led causally to the acquisition by this scheme of conduct of the moral character of obligatoriness. It may be objected to this "doctrine of resistance" (554), however, that in general the moral obligation to actions of a certain kind is not extinguished immediately upon the failure of actions of this kind to satisfy the interests for the satisfaction of which solely the actions were originally performed and through the satisfaction of which they "acquire their moral sanction" (543); for when an action has become morally obligatory, it has also become habitual, -142-

and may continue to be regarded merely by habit as obligatory, although it no longer continues to satisfy those interests through the satisfaction of which it originally became morally obligatory. It may, therefore, be thought, that in the case of allegiance our moral obligation of duty will not cease, even tho' the natural obligation of interest, which is its cause, has ceas'd; and that men may be bound by conscience to submit to a tyrannical government against their own and the public interest (551). This principle Hume accepts as correct; but he denies its applicability to allegiance. For the force of habit through which "we often carry our maxims beyond those reasons, which first induc'd us to establish them" (ibid.), is diminished by a number of considerations which "induce us to open the door to exceptions, and must make us conclude, that we may resist the more violent effects of supreme power, without any crime or injustice" (552). The chief of such considerations is that "those, whom we chuse for rulers, do not immediately become of a superior nature to the rest of mankind, upon account of their superior power and authority" (ibid.); for rulers are not cured of the tendency to injustice but are merely so situated that their immediate interest is in the execution of justice and even then merely "among their own subjects" (ibid.). Further, "we may often expect, from the irregularity of human nature, that they will neglect even this immediate interest, and be transported by their passions into all the excesses of cruelty and ambition" (ibid.); and the truth of these considerations is borne out by acquaintance with human nature and history, and by "our experience of present times" (ibid.). It is, therefore, not surprising that "no nation, that cou'd find any remedy, ever yet suffer'd the cruel ravages of a tyrant, or were blam'd for their resistance" (ibid.), or that "in all our notions of morals we never entertain such an absurdity as that of passive obedience" (ibid.). The sentiments of mankind thus concur in approving resistance to magisterial authority in just those cases in which this authority no longer has the effect of promoting the common interests of protection and security; and from this fact two inferences are permissible. In the first place, there can be no further question as to the moral legitimacy of resistance, that is, no question as to whether the moral obligation to obey really does vanish upon the abuse of magisterial power to the extent just mentioned, for -143-

the concurrence of sentiment just mentioned is constitutive of the positive moral value of revolution. "The general opinion of mankind has some authority in all cases; but in this of morals 'tis perfectly infallible" (552). In the second place, since the moral sentiments of mankind concur in regarding rebellion as permissible in just those instances in which magisterial power is exerted to the detriment of the common interest of men in "the preservation of order and the execution of justice" (ibid.), although few men can "distinctly explain" (ibid.) the relation between this common interest and the moral obligation derivative therefrom, it is permissible to infer "that all men have an implicit notion" (553) of this relation and "are sensible, that they owe obedience to government merely on account of the public interest" (ibid.). 233 Hume's description of the circumstances under which the obligation of allegiance ceases to exist is followed by the description of five sources of the "title of sovereigns" (558), 234 that is, of five circumstances under which the "right to authority" (557) or authority de jure, defined as "the constant possession of authority, maintain'd by the laws of society and the interests of mankind" (ibid.) exists. 235 In Hume's account these sources bear many analogies to the various constitutions of the right of property, the chief of which lies in the uniqueness of what, according to the theory, is the temporally first circumstance selected as defining property on the one hand, and magistracy on the other. Property, it is to be recalled, is first regarded as constituted, according. to Hume, by present possession, this definition having force, however, only at the beginning of society, after which it gives way, for reasons already discussed, 236 to other methods of determining property. Similarly magistracy, upon its first establishment, is constituted de jure by the promise of obedience on the part of certain persons who by this promise become obligated to allegiance to the promisee; and it is to this extent that Hume's hypothesis is in agreement with that of the contract-theorists. This temporally -144-

See p. 150. The five sources analyzed by Hume are (i) long possession of de facto authority ( Treatise, pp. 556 ff.); (ii) present possession of de facto authority (ibid., pp. 557 f.); (iii) conquest (ibid., pp. 558 ff.); (iv) succession (ibid., pp. 559 ff.); and (v) positive laws (ibid., pp. 561 ff.). 235 Cf. the definition of property as "nothing but a stable possession, deriv'd from the rules of justice, or the conventions of men" ( Treatise, p. 506). 236 See pp. 117 ff. 233 234

original definition of the right of magistracy is unique, however, in being, like the original definition of property, entirely superseded by later determinations; for when government has been establish'd on this footing for some considerable time, and the separate interest, which we have in submission, has produced a separate sentiment of morality, the case is entirely alter'd, and a promise is no longer able to determine the particular magistrate, since it is no longer consider'd as the foundation of government. We naturally suppose ourselves born to submission; and imagine, that such particular persons have a right to command, as we on our part are bound to obey (554 f.). Just as with property, where the same directed interest which is satisfied through the adoption of present possession as entitling constant possession requires for its continued satisfaction the adoption of other conventions, so also in the case of magistracy, while it is useful to originate authority by the consent of the governed, its continuance by the same means should involve men in "endless confusion, and wou'd render all government, in a great measure, ineffectual" (555). 237 Beyond the origination of government, men must lose the opportunity of the choice of governors. The same interest, therefore, which causes us to submit to magistracy, makes us renounce itself in the choice of our magistrates, and binds us down to a certain form of government, and to particular persons, without allowing us to aspire to the utmost perfection in either (ibid.). As with property, so also with the magistracy, the problem must arise as to which are to be chosen of the many possible means of satisfying the major interest in question, 238 which remain even after it is agreed that we must "proceed by general rules, and regulate ourselves by general interests" (ibid.); and in such choices, inferior and seemingly frivolous interests must come into play, as well as imaginative propensities such as were found to determine the choice of methods of property determination and the chief of which is the alleged propensity to relate objects antecedently related and thus to "compleat any union" (504, n.). Thus, in the case of accession, the fruit of a tree, for example, is associated (by causation) with the tree, which in turn is antecedently associated with its proprietor; and this imaginative propensity results naturally -145See Treatise, p. 555. That is, the preservation of order in society, in the case of justice, and the execution and decision of justice, in the case of magistracy. 237 238

in extension of the property from the tree to the fruit. Similarly, with respect to magistracy, where the right is constituted neither by long possession, present possession, or conquest, on the one hand, nor by positive laws on the other, "as when the first sovereign, who founded any monarchy, dies" (559), the natural expedient for fixation of the title to authority is that of succession by the son. The adoption of this expedient is motivated, according to Hume, by considerations of interest with which, however, "there concur some principles of the imagination" (ibid.). The chief consideration of interest is that "which the state has in chusing the person, who is most powerful, and has the most numerous followers" (ibid.); but the question remains as to why the son of the late monarch happens to be such a person. This question Hume answers in terms again of the propensity involved in the constitution of property-rights by accession, namely that if two objects A and B are associated imaginatively, that is, in idea, and there is a further association of Q with A, Q tends to become associated also with B. The royal authority seems to be connected with the young prince even in his father's life-time, by the natural transition of the thought; and still more after his death: So that nothing is more natural than to compleat this union by a new relation, and by putting him actually in possession of what seems so naturally to belong to him (559). Hume concludes his analysis of the circumstances regarded as constitutive of the magisterial right with some reflections of an evaluative character. The lesson of "the history of the several nations of the world" (562) is that with respect to the rights of princes, "a strict adherence to any general rules, and the rigid loyalty to particular persons and families, on which some people set so high a value, are virtues that hold less of reason, than of bigotry and superstition" (ibid.). Government being established by men after the establishment of the laws of nature "as a new invention to attain their ends, and preserve the old, or procure new advantages, by a more strict execution of justice" (543), political controversies are most reasonably regarded as controversies over means, and should be regarded as "incapable of any decision in most cases, and as entirely subordinate to the interests of peace and liberty" (562). The rights constituted by long possession and the like are "justly regarded as sacred and inviolable. -146-

But when these titles are mingled and oppos'd in different degrees, they often occasion perplexity; and are less capable of solution from the arguments of lawyers and philosophers, than from the swords of the soldiery" (ibid.). Thus philosophy, while explaining the extent to which the "doctrine of resistance" (554) is "authoriz'd by common sense, and the practice of all ages" (563), namely, that the obligation of allegiance ceases to exist "in the case of enormous tyranny and oppression" (ibid.), fails to "establish any particular rules, by which we may know when resistance is lawful; and decide all controversies, which may arise on that subject" (ibid.). Hume adds to his view of revolution, however, one further general principle, namely, that the "silence of the laws" (ibid.) which may occur concerning the extent of magisterial authority even in a form of government based upon the restriction of this extent, that is, in a limited monarchy, does not constitute an obligation of unlimited obedience: 'tis certain, that the people still retain the right of resistance; since 'tis impossible, even in the most despotic governments, to deprive them of it. The same necessity of selfpreservation, and the same motive of public good, give them the same liberty in the one case as in the other (563 f.). Indeed, there are more occasions for resistance in a mixed than in an absolute government, for "not only where the chief magistrate enters into measures, in themselves extremely pernicious to the public, but even when he wou'd encroach on the other parts of the constitution, and extend his power beyond the legal bounds, it is allowable to resist and dethrone him; tho' such resistance and violence may, in the general tenor of the laws, be deem'd unlawful and rebellious" (564). The denial of this view, unworthy of a serious answer (ibid.), is the absurdity of admitting "that the supreme power is shar'd with the people, without allowing, that 'tis lawful for them to defend their share against every invader" (ibid.). Hume concludes his reflections on obedience and disobedience by noticing two points in relation to the Glorious Revolution apart from the question, into which Hume does not care to enter, as to its morality in accordance with the views upon allegiance just presented. 239 The first of these points is an explanation of the col-147-

"I am better pleas'd to leave this controverted subject, if it really admits of controversy . . ." ( Treatise, pp. 564 f.). 239

lapse of allegiance to the heir of a deposed monarch, which presents a problem inasmuch as "when a king forfeits his authority, his heir ought naturally to remain in the same situation, as if the king were remov'd by death; unless by mixing himself in the tyranny, he forfeit it for himself" (565). The prevalence of contrary opinion and practice Hume explains by reference to the fact that "the mind naturally runs on with any train of action, which it has begun; nor do we commonly make any scruple concerning our duty, after the first action of any kind, which we perform" (ibid.). The second point is the observation that although "nothing may, at first sight, appear more unreasonable" (566), it is nevertheless true that "princes often seem to acquire a right from their successors, as well as from their ancestors; and a king, who during his lifetime might justly be deem'd an usurper, will be regarded by posterity as a lawful prince, because he has had the good fortune to settle his family on the throne, and entirely change the antient form of government" (ibid.). In this case, it is custom and its effect upon the imagination which validates the title of the usurper's posterity; but it is in accordance with the now familiar propensity of the imagination to "compleat any union" (504, n.) that the mind, "returning back upon its footsteps, transfers to their predecessors and ancestors that right, which it naturally ascribes to the posterity, as being related together, and united in the imagination" (566). § 4: INTERNATIONAL MORALITY; CHASTITY AND MODESTY Hume brings to a close his general theory of the artificial virtues by drawing some confirmation of its central position from consideration of the "laws of nations" 240 and of "chastity and modesty." 241 This central position is that there are certain actions possessed of a moral character consisting in the fact that they are performed from a sense of duty, the temporally original motive to which must be supposed to have been perception of a causal relation between the social prevalence of actions of the kind in question and the satisfaction of self-interest. Since there is, according to the theory, such a causal dependence of moral obligation upon the satisfaction of interest, it may be expected that a -148-

240 241

Treatise, pp. 567 ff. Ibid., pp. 570 ff.

variation of the character of the interest, and therefore of its satisfaction, will be accompanied by a variation in the character of the moral obligation. Such a variation would be inexplicable were the moral obligation constituted as an object of reason (in any sense of the term "reason" in which its objects are logical in nature); its discovery, on the other hand, should offer confirmation of the general hypothesis of the dependence of the moral obligation upon the satisfaction of interest. Now it is in the domain of international morality that Hume discovers such a variation and confirmation; and to his discussion we may here return. The commerce of sovereign states with sovereign states partly resembles that among individuals of the same state and partly differs from it; so that some of the moral duties of states have analogy with those of individuals, while others do not. The latter are defined by the "laws of nations" (567) properly so-called. "Under this head we may comprize the sacredness of the persons of ambassadors, the declaration of war, the abstaining from poison'd arms, with other duties of that kind, which are evidently calculated for the commerce, that is peculiar to different societies" (ibid.). The fundamental resemblance of the relations among states to those among individuals consists in the fact that, like individuals, states also "require mutual assistance; at the same time that their selfishness and ambition are perpetual sources of war and discord" (ibid.). Since the invention and observance of the three fundamental laws of nature was necessitated in the case of individuals by this combination of circumstances and the interests to which it gives rise, we "extend to different kingdoms the same notions of justice, which take place among individuals" (568); for among nations, "where possession has no stability, there must be perpetual war. Where property is not transferr'd by consent, there can be no commerce. Where promises are not observ'd, there can be no leagues nor alliances" (567). This extension to states of the morality defined by the laws of nature has a peculiarity, nevertheless; for "there is a maxim very current in the world, which few politicians are willing to avow, but which has been authoriz'd by the practice of all ages, that there is a system of morals calculated for princes, much more free than that which ought to govern private persons" (568). In its obvious interpretation this maxim does not contradict, according to Hume, the -149-

allegation just made to the effect that the duties defined by the three fundamental laws are regarded as extending to sovereign states, the contradiction having such absurd results as that "the most solemn treaties ought to have no force among princes" (568). Its correct interpretation is therefore that "tho' the morality of princes has the same extent, yet it has not the same force as that of private persons, and may lawfully be transgress'd from a more trivial motive" (ibid.). The explanation of this "shocking" (ibid.) proposition consists, according to Hume, in the fact that the interests served by observance of the laws of nature among nations are smaller than those served by similar observance among individuals: "tho' the intercourse of different states be advantageous, and even sometimes necessary, yet it is not so necessary nor advantageous as that among individuals, without which 'tis utterly impossible for human nature ever to subsist" (569). From the fact that there exists this co-variation of magnitude of interest served by the performance of the actions in question on the one hand, and intensity of moral obligation to these actions on the other, together with the fact that this variation occurs spontaneously, the "practice of the world" (ibid.) rather than the deliberations of philosophers determining the proportion between private and international morality, 242 Hume makes this inference: All men have an implicit notion of the foundation of those moral rules concerning natural and civil justice, and are sensible that they arise merely from human conventions, and from the interest, which we have in the preservation of peace and order. For otherwise the diminution of the interest wou'd never produce a relaxation of the morality, and reconcile us more easily to any transgression of justice among princes and republics, than in the private commerce of one subject with another (ibid.). The confirmation chiefly drawn by Hume for the theory of artificial virtue from consideration of the rules of of chastity and modesty is different from that drawn by him in the foregoing referenees to international morality: his object in the former consideration is to take advantage of the more generally acknowledged artificiality of these rules by analyzing the circumstances of their invention and observance as "still more conspicuous instances of the operation of those principles, which I have insisted on" (570), (i.e., in relation to justice) in the expectation of removing a prejudice -150-

242

Cf. p. 144 and cf. also p. 152.

against the same analysis of the rules of justice that arises "with regard to the universal approbation or blame, which follows their observance or transgression, and which some may not think sufficiently explain'd from the general interests of society" (ibid.). As for the artificiality of the rules of chastity and modesty, Hume observes: "I believe I may spare myself the trouble of insisting on so obvious a subject, and may proceed, without farther preparation, to examine after what manner such notions arise from education, from the voluntary conventions of men, and from the interest of society" (ibid.). The interest satisfied by the imposition upon women of rules prescriptive of chastity and modesty is constituted by the fact that "men are induc'd to labour for the maintenance and education of their children, by the persuasion that they are really their own; and therefore 'tis reasonable, and even necessary, to give them some security in this particular" (571). Since the determination of paternity is difficult, legal proof of "any transgressions of conjugal fidelity on the part of the wife" (ibid.) is also difficult; so that the motive constituted by reluctance to violate civil law is insufficient to secure fidelity on the part of women. Similarly, the motive constituted by the attachment of "a peculiar degree of shame to their infidelity, above what arises merely from its injustice" (ibid.), together with praise of chastity, while strong, is insufficient as the sole guarantor of fidelity; for the contrary temptation is even stronger, and "a woman easily finds, or flatters herself she shall find, certain means of securing her reputation, and preventing all the pernicious consequences of her pleasures" (571 f.). The problem of the discovery of such a guarantor, as difficult as it might seem to a philosopher "if he had not a percfect knowledge of human nature" (572), is solved in society by addition to "the infamy attending such licenses" (ibid.) of modesty, or "a repugnance to all expressions, and postures, and liberties, that have an immediate relation to that enjoyment" (ibid.). Thus it is that "those, who have an interest in the fidelity of women, naturally disapprove of their infidelity, and all the approaches to it" (ibid.), the rest being "carried along with the stream" (ibid.). The enjoinment of the duties of chastity and modesty, which "have a plain reference to generation" (ibid.), upon "the whole sex, from their earliest infancy to their extremest old-age and infirmity" -151-

(573) is explained by Hume as an instance of the propensity of the imagination to carry general rules beyond the domain of their first establishment (ibid.). In addition to their foundation in interest, there is a further analogy between the duties of chastity and modesty and those of justice, namely, that as in the case of international morality, the moral obligation of the action is relaxed where the interest served by its performance is reduced. Hence it is that men "impose not the same laws, with the same force, on the male sex" (ibid.), since while "'tis contrary to the interest of civil society, that men shou'd have an entire liberty of indulging their appetites in venereal enjoyment" (ibid.), the interest satisfied by the restraint of men in this respect is not as great as that satisfied by the corresponding restraint of women. As in the case of international morality, Hume infers from the relaxation of the moral obligation where the interest is smaller that men "have undoubtedly an implicit notion" (ibid.) of its foundation in the satisfaction of this interest (ibid.). -152-

CHAPTER VI: HUME'S THEORY OF MORAL APPROBATION

§ 1: THE GENERAL THEORY OF MORAL APPROBATION IT IS IN the final Part of Hume's work on morals that the general position defended in the first Part receives specific application and elaboration. This general position, it is to be recalled, is the view that "the approbation of moral qualities most certainly is not deriv'd from reason, or any comparison of ideas; but proceeds entirely from a moral taste, and from certain sentiments of pleasure or disgust, which arise upon the contemplation and view of particular qualities or characters" (581). Moral theory for Hume is thus, as has been noticed above, 243 not a normative inquiry: it is not a theory to the effect that certain actions or motives ought to be regarded as morally valuable or the reverse, but an analysis and description of such instances of moral value as are found, from data supplied by observation of "common life and conversation" (599) as well as by history (ibid.), 244 actually to occur. Hence the governing question for moral theory with respect to any action or sentiment, namely, the question as to "the origin of its moral rectitude or depravity" (475 f.), is identical with the question as to why "upon the general view or survey" (475) it "gives a certain satisfaction or uneasiness" (ibid.). This question is to be understood, however, in the light of a qualification, namely, that "we are never to consider any single action in our enquiries concerning the origin of morals; but only the quality or character from which the action proceeded" (575). Actions are thus approved or disapproved only derivatively as "indications of a character" (ibid.), that is, as indicative of "durable principles of the mind, which extend over the whole conduct, and enter into the personal character" (ibid.). The governing question for moral theory thus becomes, in view of this observation, the question why, "upon the -153-

See p. 99. Cf. Treatise, Introduction, p. xxiii: "We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science [i.e., moral philosophy] from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures." 243 244

general view or survey," a given mental quality or element of character, produces satisfaction or uneasiness, is agreeable or disagreeable. It may be asked at this point what sort of answer this question may be expected to receive, and there are two possibilities. For it may be possible to assert no more than that a given "mental quality" (574) Q simply does excite, in all or most men and under certain conditions feelings of approbation or disapprobation. Or it may be possible to explain such effects of Q through reference of them to general processes involving classes of qualities similar to Q. There is a presumption, according to Hume, in favor of the latter type of explanation for the excitation of moral sentiments; for "'tis absurd to imagine, that in every particular instance, these sentiments are produc'd by an original quality and primary constitution (473) . . . 'Tis necessary, therefore, to abridge these primary impulses, and find some more general principles, upon which all our notions of morals are founded" (ibid.). These abridging principles relate to the operation of sympathy, to a review of the characteristics of which it may be useful now to turn. Sympathy has already been analyzed by Hume as a process in which an observer O's idea E′ of a subject S's emotion E is "so inliven'd as to become the very sentiment or passion" (319); the idea is present to the imagination of O as the result of a causal inference and is enlivened to the point of becoming itself an instance of the emotion of which it is the idea through the influence upon the imagination of certain relations, notably that of resemblance, between O and S. 245 The causal inference involved is performed upon the observation of the customary concomitants, that is, either the causes or effects, 246 of emotions similar to E; and the observation of this concomitance does not of course entail that direct inspection by O of S's emotion is possible. 247 A consequence of this analysis is that a sympathetic emotion may arise in O "by a transition from affections, which have no existence" (370); observation by O of an event Q (e.g., a deliberate injury) which -154-

See pp. 41 ff. "When I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion, as is presently converted into the passion itself. In like manner, when I perceive the causes of any emotion, my mind is convey'd to the effects, and is actuated with a like emotion" ( Treatise, p. 576). 247 That is, the concomitance in question is established only within the experience of each observer. 245 246

is accompanied (when suitably related to O) by an emotion (e.g., resentment) may produce in O a secondary, sympathetic resentment if Q is similarly related to S, although for special reasons S is at the time not experiencing resentment; and this phenomenon is an instance of the imaginative propensity to be "affected by the general rule" (371) and thus to overlook the special circumstances of the case in question. For the excitement of a secondary, sympathetic emotion E′ upon the contemplation of Q by O, it is therefore not requisite that Q be accompanied at the moment by the primary emotion E in S; it is requisite only that Q be such an entity as has often in experience been so accompanied. Thus, to use an example similar to Hume's, 248 the sight (or thought) of an implement of torture may be disagreeable at a time t because of the known tendency of such an object to occasion pain in subjects S when they stand to it in certain relations, although no S stands in such relations at the time t; the disagreeableness of the impression (or idea) in question is nevertheless to be ascribed to sympathy with the S's. In general, then, the observation of, or reflection upon, whatever entity Q has a known tendency to produce an emotion in subjects resembling the observer, is accompanied by a sympathetic emotion of the observer. The ethical importance of this notion of sympathy consists in the fact that it is only through sympathy that the emotions (and especially the pleasures or pains) of a subject S can affect, pleasantly or unpleasantly, an observer O where S is not an object of some passion of O, for example, where S is not an object of love and benevolence to O: "the pleasure of a stranger, for whom we have no friendship, pleases us only by sympathy" (576). When B is the object of A's love, B is always the object also of A's benevolence, for "love is always follow'd by a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd, and an aversion to his misery" (367); and in this case, B's pleasure is pleasant to A because it satisfies the benevolent appetite of A for B's happiness, while B's unhappiness is unpleasant for A because (in this case) it is naturally constituted as an object of aversion to A. Since few members of society are mutually objects of benevolence, the supposition of this limitation of benevolence being a major premise in the theory of artificial virtue, 249 it is sympathy which accounts in most instances for the concern constituted for individuals by -155-

248 249

Cf. Treatise, p. 576. See pp. 108 ff.

the happiness or unhappiness of others. The process of sympathy is not only of ethical but also of aesthetic importance: "our sense of beauty depends very much on this principle; and where any object has a tendency to produce pleasure in its possessor, it is always regarded as beautiful; as every object, that has a tendency to produce pain, is disagreeable and deform'd" (576). Thus a conveniently constructed house is beautiful largely because of the pleasure which this convenience affords its user (ibid.), who is regarded by the observer not as an object of benevolence but simply as a being similar to himself. With these preliminary explanations made, we are in position now to consider Hume's analysis of the morality of the artificial virtues; and we shall follow Hume in treating justice and injustice as prototypical of artificial virtue and vice. 250 Now, the central result of the theory of justice already examined is that patterns of just and unjust behavior, when first instituted, have no moral character whatever; for the first establishment of the conventions definitive of justice is attributable only to the nonmoral motive of directed self-interest. It is indeed a defining characteristic of artificially virtuous actions that their natural obligation is thus nonmoral. 251 Qua virtuous, however, as these actions unquestionably are in mature societies, such actions are performed only from a sense of their morality, or a feeling of their incumbency, which must have become associated with them through some process. Hume's account of this process is as follows: the conventions definitive of justice were entered into by the members of society for the satisfaction of the interests of these members; and adherence to them has therefore a tendency to the good of these members, most of whom are not objects of benevolence to one another, while deviation from them has the opposite tendency. Nevertheless, although the patterns of just behavior are originally established and sustained out of the nonmoral motive of directed interest, adherence to these patterns becomes the object of a strong moral approval and deviation from them the object of disapproval. "No virtue is more esteem'd than justice, and no vice more detested than injustice; nor are there any qualities, which go farther to the fixing the character, either as amiable or odious" (577). Questions thus -156-

To the remaining artificial virtues of allegiance, international justice, chastity and modesty, Hume adds "good-manners" ( Treatise, p. 577). 251 See p. 114. 250

arise why on the one hand behavior having a tendency to satisfy the interests of individuals who are not objects of the benevolence of the observer nevertheless pleases the observer, and why, on the other hand, behavior having a tendency to defeat the interests of individuals who are similarly not objects of the benevolence of the observer displeases the observer; and Hume's answer to these questions is that the pleasure of the observer is explicable as being the result of sympathy with the pleasure of those whose interests are satisfied by the exercise of justice, while the displeasure of the observer is similarly the result of sympathy with those whose interests are frustrated by the practice of injustice. Justice is a means for securing the good of society; but "as the means to an end can only be agreeable, where the end is agreeable; and as the good of society, where our own interest is not concern'd, or that of our friends, pleases only by sympathy: It follows, that sympathy is the source of the esteem, which we pay to all the artificial virtues" (577). As for injustice, "we consider it as prejudicial to human society, and pernicious to every one that approaches the person guilty of it. We partake of their uneasiness by sympathy; and as every thing, which gives uneasiness in human actions, upon the general survey, is call'd Vice, and whatever produces satisfaction, in the same manner, is denominated Virtue; this is the reason why the sense of moral good and evil follows upon justice and injustice" (499). This account of the moral character of justice and injustice has been rendered so far, however, only in terms of the pleasure or displeasure of the observer of actions and characters other than his own; and the question arises as to the effect upon the observer of his own character and actions in regard to justice and injustice. This question Hume answers very briefly with two observations. In the first place, the sense of justice originally "deriv'd only from contemplating the actions of others" (499) is extended "even to our own actions" (ibid.); and this is treated as an instance of the principle, often invoked by Hume, that "the general rule reaches beyond those instances, from which it arose" (ibid.). The justice (or injustice) of an agent A sufficiently resembles, we must suppose, that of an agent B to permit the imagination to overlook the difference of the agents; and the sentiments aroused by the justice or injustice of the one may therefore be aroused by that of the -157-

other. In the second place, "we naturally sympathize with others in the sentiments they entertain of us" (499), so that an agent receives by this process the pleasure or displeasure occasioned in others by his justice or injustice, and thus acquires the sense of the incumbency of justice not merely as upon others but also as upon himself, that is, acquires the secondary (and moral) motive to acts of justice, which it was found impossible to regard as their temporally original motive, 252 constituted by his "regard to justice, and abhorrence of villainy and knavery" (479). 253 Although the mechanism, namely, sympathy, by which justice, as a "constant principle" (575) of behavior, becomes constituted as an object of moral approbation, operates naturally or undesignedly, 254 it is possible by artificial means to "encrease our esteem for justice" (500). These means are the "public praise and blame" (ibid.) bestowed upon justice and injustice by politicians on the one hand and, on the other, the private education and instruction of children by their parents in the "principles of probity" (ibid.), which gives the sense of justice a force comparable to that of "those principles, which are the most essential to our natures, and the most deeply radicated in our internal constitution" (501). The power of such indoctrinating procedures is so great, indeed, as to render it a tempting error to suppose them capable of being the "sole cause of the distinction we make betwixt vice and virtue" (500). The supposition is erroneous, nevertheless; for were there no feelings of approval or disapproval, they could not, of course, be excited by use of the terms "honourable or dishonourable, praiseworthy or blameable" (500), which should then "be perfectly unintelligible, and wou'd no more have any idea annex'd to them, than if they were of a tongue perfectly unknown to us" (ibid.). Hume notices further that "after the opinion, that a merit or demerit attends justice or injustice, is once firmly establish'd among mankind" (501), there arises a further motive to the performance of acts of justice, namely "the interest of our reputation" (ibid.). The value of a good reputation and its dependence upon "our -158-

See pp. 99 ff. Cf. below, note 13. 254 "Tho', justice be artificial, the sense of its morality is natural. 'Tis the combination of men, in a system of conduct, which renders any act of justice beneficial to society. But when once it has that tendency, we naturally approve of it; and if we did not so, 'tis impossible any combination or convention cou'd ever produce that sentiment" ( Treatise, pp. 619 f.). 252 253

conduct, with relation to the property of others" (ibid.), are obvious; and it is indeed recognition of this value which motivates parents to associate justice in the minds of their offspring with the "worthy and honourable" (500), injustice with the "base and infamous" (500 f.). In general, then, Hume's explanation of the moral character of all conventional virtues is that they consist in "durable" (575) mental qualities, such, for example, as a steady approbation of justice and aversion to injustice 255 (evidenced to the observer by the actions to which they give rise), which "acquire our approbation, because of their tendency to the good of mankind" (578). 256 The mechanism of this acquisition of moral worth by the traits and actions in question is thus an extensive sympathy; and the question now arises as to whether there are other virtues and vices the constitutive approbations and disapprobations involved in which are explicable in terms of the same mechanism "without any suspicion of the concurrence of another principle" (ibid.). 257 Hume's answer to this question is that since the publicly beneficent tendency of behavior accounts, in the case of the artificial virtues, for "the strongest approbation and esteem" (ibid.), there is no need to suppose, in the case of any further qualities which -159-

The moral worth of the sense of virtue out of which artificially virtuous actions are performed (and which is the sole moral motive to their performance) is constituted, as is the moral worth of the passions motivating naturally virtuous actions, by the fact that it is an object of approbation; and this circumstance Hume regards as advantageous to his analysis. "Those who resolve the sense of morals into original instincts of the human mind, may defend the cause of virtue with sufficient authority; but want the advantage, which those possess, who account for that sense by an extensive sympathy with mankind. According to their system, not only virtue must be approv'd of, but also the sense of virtue: And not only that sense, but also the principles, from whence it is deriv'd. So that nothing is presented on any side, but what is laudable and good" ( Treatise, p. 619). 256 Hume's use of the term "tendency" is explained by some observations contained in a letter to Hutcheson: "Now, I desire you to consider, if there be any Quality, that is virtuous, without having a Tendency either to the public Good or to the Good of the Person, who possesses it. If there be none without these Tendencys, we may conclude, that their Merit is deriv'd from Sympathy. I desire you wou'd only consider the Tendencys of Qualitys, not their actual Operation, which depends on chance. Brutus riveted the Chains of Rome faster by his Opposition; but the natural Tendency of his noble Dispositions, his public Spirit & Magnanimity, was to establish her Liberty" ( J. Y. T. Greig, The Letters of David Hume [ Oxford, 1932], Vol. I, p. 34 f.). 257 The "other principles" recourse to which Hume exhibits such anxiety to avoid, are such as would render an associationistic explanation of the moral sentiments impossible, that is, are qualities concerning which it may be asserted only that they are naturally fitted to occasion moral sentiments, their underlying modus operandi, if any, being unknown. 255

both possess such tendencies and also are approved, a cause for this approbation other than just the tendencies in question, "it being an inviolable maxim in philosophy, that where any particular cause is sufficient for an effect, we ought to rest satisfied with it" (ibid.). But such further qualities are readily found; for "meekness, beneficence, charity, generosity, clemency, moderation, equity, bear the greatest figure among the moral qualities, and are commonly denominated the social virtues, to mark their tendency to the good of society (ibid.). Our approval of these natural qualities is therefore, by analogy with the artificial virtues, legitimately explained as arising merely because of this tendency. This tendency, however, operating as it does to produce the pleasure of subjects who are not mutually objects of benevolence, can affect these subjects only through the process of sympathy; "and consequently 'tis that principle, which takes us so far out of ourselves, as to give us the same pleasure or uneasiness in the characters of others, as if they had a tendency to our own advantage or loss" (579). For the theory of moral approbation, the "only difference" (ibid.) between the artificial and the natural social virtues is that every action proceeding from the latter is advantageous to some part of society, "whereas a single act of justice, consider'd in itself, may often be contrary to the public good; and 'tis only the concurrence of mankind, in a general scheme or system of action, which is advantageous" (ibid.). From this circumstance, Hume infers that the explanation already given of the approbation of justice applies a fortiori to the social virtues. For the tendency of justice, which is advantageous in a social way only generally but not in every case, 258 is nevertheless sufficient to account for its approbation, and this despite the fact that "the imagination is more affected by what is particular, than by what is general." (580); so that to the tendency of the social virtues, every exercise of which is beneficial "to a particular person, who is not undeserving of it" (ibid.), the approbation identified by Hume as being the constitutive source of their moral worth is ascribed "with better reason" (ibid.). -160-

In Hume's opinion, the proportion of cases in which the decision of justice is actually advantageous to the parties concerned is low indeed. "But if we examine all the questions, that come before any tribunal of justice, we shall find, that, considering each case apart, it wou'd as often be an instance of humanity to decide contrary to the laws of justice as conformable to them" ( Treatise, p. 579). 258

Before raising the question as to whether there are still further qualities whose moral worth is similarly explicable in terms of their tendency to pleasure or displeasure and an extensive sympathy with such persons as are affected by these tendencies, Hume considers two objections to the theory just advanced. The first of these objections is based upon the fact that the intensity of sympathetically received sentiments varies with the variation of certain relations, for example, contiguity and degree of customary association, 259 between the original and the secondary possessor of these sentiments: But notwithstanding this variation of our sympathy, we give the same approbation to the same moral qualities in China as in England. They appear equally virtuous, and recommend themselves equally to the esteem of a judicious spectator. The sympathy varies without a variation in our esteem. Our esteem, therefore, proceeds not from our sympathy (581). On the assumption that morality is determined by sentiments, Hume adds, the present objection "must have an equal force against every other system, as against that of sympathy" (581); for all sentiments, and hence moral sentiments, whether produced sympathetically or otherwise, are subject to such variation (ibid.). Nevertheless, the objection, Hume contends, "has no force at all; and 'tis the easiest matter in the world to account for it" (ibid.). The answer proposed by Hume is that the imagination selects from the totality of the various relations which may occur between the moral spectator and the actions, sentiments, and characters whose tendencies occasion his sympathy (and which, because various, vary this sympathy) "some steady and general points of view" (581 f.)-selects, that is, some of these relations as constituting standard positions on the basis of the sympathy occurring in which the verbal expression of praise or blame is performed. The felt variations of the feelings of approval and blame are thus discounted: these variations we regard not in our general decisions, but still apply the terms expressive of our liking or dislike, in the same manner, as if we remain'd in one point of view. Experience soon teaches us this method of correcting our sentiments, or at least, of correcting our language, where the sentiments are more stubborn and inalterable (582). -161-

The effect of custom upon sympathy has been treated by Hume in the theory of the passions. See Treatise, Book II, Part I, sect. xi, p. 318. 259

The experience which teaches us this method is that of the "continual contradictions" (581) which arise among moral judgments if made by each observer of "characters and persons, only as they appear from his peculiar point of view" (ibid.) and the removal of which is necessary if we are ever to "make use of language, or communicate our sentiments to one another" (582). This discounting of the variations of the moral sentiments has, according to Hume, an analogy for the sense of beauty and for sense perception in general. Thus the pleasure constitutive of "external beauty" (ibid.) varies with the relation of the observer to the object, while the aesthetic judgment remains constant; for the judgment is rendered on the basis of the most convenient of the relations occuring between the spectator and the object, others being neglected: 'tis evident, a beautiful countenance cannot give so much pleasure, when seen at the distance of twenty paces, as when it is brought nearer us. We say not, however, that it appears to us less beautiful: Because we know what effect it will have in such a position, and by that reflexion we correct its momentary appearance" (582). The analogy for sense perception, although not here developed by Hume, would seem clear; pennies, for example, are said in common discourse to be round, the judgment presupposing the assumption of a favored point of view from which pennies are in fact round, their other appearances being discounted. The question arises, however, as to the nature of the favored imaginative position from which moral judgments are pronounced; and Hume's answer to this question is that such judgments are pronounced with the thought in mind of "the influence of characters and qualities, upon those who have an intercourse with any person" (582), that is, on the basis of "a sympathy with those, who have any commerce with the person we consider" (583). These persons are predominantly strangers to the spectator and far removed from him in time and place; and the sentiments of pleasure or displeasure produced through sympathy with them are thus much fainter than those produced by the contemplation of a character the tendency of which is beneficial either to the spectator himself or to persons who are objects of his passions, for example, of his benevolence or anger. Nevertheless, this remote sympathy has, as a basis of moral judgment, the advantage of avoiding the "many contradictions to our sentiments in society and conversation" (583) -162-

and the uncertainty created by "the incessant changes of our situation" (ibid.), in both of which should be involved "our judgments of persons, merely from the tendency of their characters to our own benefit, or to that of our friends" (ibid.). Approbations or disapprobations constituted by this remote sympathy are properly, and indeed analytically, regarded as following "the determination of our judgment" (583) as opposed to that of the passions: for it has already been observed 18 that "that reason, which is able to oppose our passion" (583) is the genus of which the moral sentiments are species, that is, is "nothing but a general calm determination of the passions, founded on some distant view or reflexion" (ibid.). Thus it is that when judging reasonably, "we blame equally a bad action, which we read of in history, with one perform'd in our neighbourhood t'other day" (584), despite the livelier feelings excited by the latter; but it must be admitted that in this sense of the term, rather too few of men's judgments are reasonable. 260 The second objection to the doctrine of sympathy considered by Hume is disposed of more readily. This objection is the observation that were moral approbation or disapprobation of a character or action constituted by sympathy with those to whose satisfaction or dissatisfaction the character or action tends, the satisfaction or dissatisfaction must actually occur and the character or action actually exert its effect; whereas, it is acknowledged that "virtue in rags is still virtue; and the love, which it procures, attends a man into a dungeon or desart, where the virtue can no longer be exerted in action, and is lost to all the world" (584). Hume's solution makes use of the fact, remarked above, 261 that we may be said to sympathize with "affections, which have no existence" (370). It is therefore not necessary that a character C, having a known tendency to produce satisfaction in certain subjects under certain conditions, actually produce this satisfaction in order to excite a sympathetic satisfaction in the observer of this character; it is requisite only that the character be recognized as having the tendency in question, that is, as being "fitted to be beneficial to society" (585); for "the imagination passes easily from the cause to the effect, without considering that there are still some circumstances wanting to render the cause a compleat ____________________ 18 See pp. 74 ff. -163-

260 261

See Treatise, p. 583. See p. 154.

one" (ibid.). A character, the advantage of whose tendency is actual rather than imagined, produces a "more lively" (ibid.) sentiment of approbation: "we are more affected by it; and yet we do not say that it is more virtuous, or that we esteem it more" (ibid.). Any tendency to alter the verbal judgment 262 in accordance

Moral judgment properly speaking is constituted, according to Hume's analysis, by the occurrence of feelings of moral approbation (or disapprobation). But Hume unfortunately does not analyze the meaning of verbal judgments of the form "x is virtuous" or "x is vicious," and their relation to the moral feelings. Such indications as are to be found of the direction that such an analysis might have taken are not unambiguous. At one point the suggestion seems to be made that a verbal judgment of the form "x is vicious" is intensionally identical with statements of the form "I feel, from the constitution of my nature, a sentiment of blame occasioned by the contemplation of x." "So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it" ( Treatise, p. 469). Hume speaks elsewhere, however, of continuing to "apply the terms expressive of our liking or dislike" (ibid., p. 582, with italics added), which suggests that the verbal judgment has not the significance peculiar to assertions but only that very different significance possessed by a symptom, namely, of the occurrence of a moral sentiment, just as a subject's use of the exclamation "Oh" is symptomatic of his surprise, although by no means identical with the assertion "S is surprised." In the light of this suggestion, the first of Hume's statements cited in the present note may be interpreted as contending in effect that when one pronounces any action or character to be virtuous or vicious, what he is doing is to express or symptomize the occurrence of a moral sentiment arising from contemplation of that action or character. An analysis of this kind is not incompatible with the fact that moral judgments are made with the expectation of social concurrence (see above, pp. 161 ff. and also note 27, below). For this expectation itself need not be asserted but only symptomized, e.g., by the choice of one's words, the words chosen being such as express (under given circumstances) sentiments in which, as a matter of fact, there is social concurrence. In the same way, the public speaker who mounts a platform in a throng symptomizes (without asserting) his desire to be heard, by assuming a position causally associated with being heard. For an able analysis of the emotionally persuasive function of moral judgment on Hume's and other similar theories, see Stevenson Ethics and Language ( Yale University Press, 1944). 262

Broad's account ( Five Types of Ethical Theory, pp. 114 f.), credits Hume with a position as follows: "Suppose that A thinks that X is right, and B thinks that X is wrong . . . If Hume's theory be true, this means that A thinks that most men would feel an emotion of approval on contemplating X, whilst B thinks that most men would feel an emotion of disapproval on contemplating X. Now this is a question which can be settled by experiment, observation, collection of statistics, and empirical generalisation. This seems to me simply incredible." But in addition to being incompatible with such suggestions as are to be found in Hume's text concerning this point of analysis, Broad's interpretation has the disadvantage of representing each moral spectator as unable to render his own opinion; A, when asked what he opines as to the moral rectitude of X, replies by stating an opinion as to the opinions of other observers. But the moral worth of a quality can be constituted by the fact that it is approved, without its following therefrom that the statement that it has this worth is the same as the statement that it is approved; just as the medicinal worth of a drug can be constituted by the fact that it is a soporific, although the statement that the drug possesses medicinal worth is not identical with the statement that it is a soporific. -164-

with this superior liveliness of the feeling upon which it is based is counteracted by the reflection that "an alteration of fortune may render the benevolent disposition entirely impotent" (585). Variation of sentiment thus does not produce unreasonable judgments, for a reasonable judgment is, in the context of Hume's moral theory, to be understood as constituted by the occurrence of a calm passion, and thus never by a vehement sentiment such as one uncorrected by the type of reflection just indicated. Hume concludes his consideration of these two objections by noting that there is no contradiction "betwixt the extensive sympathy, on which our sentiments of virtue depend, and that limited generosity which I have frequently observ'd to be natural to men, and which justice and property suppose, according to the precedent reasoning" (586). Generosity (or benevolence) pleases only when the pleasure of its object exists; given a quality Q, that is, which is fitted to produce the pleasure of a subject S who is an object of the benevolence of a spectator O, the quality Q wins the approbation of O only by actually operating to produce the pleasure of S and thus by satisfying O's desire for this pleasure. Sympathy presupposes no such desire of another's happiness; it presupposes only that the quality Q be fitted to produce an emotion E in a subject S. "My sympathy with another may give me the sentiment of pain and disapprobation, when any object is presented, that has a tendency to give him uneasiness; tho' I may not be willing to sacrifice any thing of my own interest, or cross any of my passions for his satisfaction" (586). Sympathetic impressions may arise, indeed, even when Q is not fitted to produce E, but merely appears to be so: "when a building seems clumsy and tottering to the eye, it is ugly and disagreeable; tho' we be fully assur'd of the solidity of the workmanship" (ibid.). Furthermore, Hume concludes, the calm emotions produced by thought of the apparent tendencies of qualities Q (whether these appearances be veridical or otherwise) are "different in their feeling" (ibid.) from such emotions as presuppose desires or aversions in their subjects or in any other way "arise from our particular and momentary situation" (587), such special ends and aims being unable to engender moral values. Hence it is possible at the same time to admire the fortifications of an enemy city through reflection on their tendency to the security of the inhabitants and a remote sympathy with them, while -165-

yet wishing "that they were entirely destroy'd" (ibid.). The feelings are contrary, but can subsist together because of their peculiar difference in quality. From this explanation of the moral character of artificial virtue, on the one hand, and of such of the natural virtues as tend, like the artificial virtues, to the advantage of persons other than their possessors, Hume turns to the consideration of a third set of morally valuable qualities, namely those which render men "serviceable to themselves, and enable them to promote their own interest" (ibid.). Among these qualities are "prudence, temperance, frugality, industry, assiduity, enterprise, dexterity" (ibid.); and the process by which they enjoy the approbation which constitutes them as virtuous is, as in the case of the artificial and social virtues, sympathetic. "In this case the qualities that please me are all consider'd as useful to the person, and as having a tendency to promote his interest and satisfaction. They are only regarded as means to an end, and please me in proportion to their fitness for that end. The end, therefore, must be agreeable to me. But what makes the end agreeable?" (588). Hume's answer is that this end, being the "happiness and good" (ibid.) of persons who are objects neither of interest nor benevolence to the observer, can please only through sympathy (ibid.). The same explanation applies, mutatis mutandis, to the disapprobation of such qualities as are disadvantageous to their possessors, for example, to the disapprobation excited by "a blundering understanding, and a wrong judgment of every thing in life; inconstancy and irresolution; or a want of address in the management of men and business" (587 f.). Not only does the possession by an individual of a quality "which originally is only incommodious to himself " (589) render that individual through the operation of sympathy an object of the disapprobation, and thence of the hatred of others, but similarly, "one whose character is only dangerous and disagreeable to others, can never be satisfied with himself, as long as he is sensible of that disadvantage" (ibid.); for the disapprobation of others is shared with them sympathetically by the offender, giving rise in him to the disagreeable passion of humility. Similar considerations apply to qualities advantageous in tendency either to oneself or to others, so that it is the operation of sympathy which explains "why the same qualities, in all cases, produce both pride and love, -166-

humility and hatred; and [why] the same man is always virtuous or vicious, accomplish'd or despicable to others, who is so to himself" (ibid.). Indeed, so disinterested is the process of sympathy that we may even be "displeas'd with a quality commodious to us, merely because it displeases others, and makes us disagreeable in their eyes; tho' perhaps we never can have any interest in rendering ourselves agreeable to them" (ibid.). With these observations, Hume has completed an analysis of the moral worth of three groups of qualities which is unified by the attribution in each case of the sentiments constitutive of this worth to a sympathy with individuals to whom the tendencies of the qualities in question are favorable or unfavorable, that is, conducive to pleasure or the opposite. Since (in Hume's opinion) in relation to other sources of moral feelings, "reflexions on the tendencies of actions have by far the greatest influence, and determine all the great lines of our duty" (590), the foregoing analysis of virtue constitutes a unified theory of the origin of "the most considerable part of morality" (619). The same explanation cannot be given, however, of the nature of the remaining parts of morality; for there are some mental qualities which are constituted as objects of approbation or disapprobation although devoid of any "tendency to the happiness of mankind, and of particular persons" (589); and the agreeableness or disagreeableness of such qualities may thus be termed "immediate." 263 The class of immediately agreeable qualities is constituted by two subclasses, of which one consists in such qualities as are immediately agreeable to their possessors (590 f.) while the other is composed of such qualities as are "immediately agreeable to others, without any tendency to public interest" (590). The agreeableness of qualities to their possessors resists explanation in terms of any general mechanism; such qualities therefore constitute instances in which moral sentiment is "produc'd by an original quality and primary constitution" (473). Or rather, according to Hume, a general explanation is, in these cases, not requisite; for to its possessor, "each of the -167-

Since in Hume's analysis all of the qualities which are constituted as objects of moral approval are pleasant and therefore in one sense of the term immediately pleasant, Hume's contrast between immediately agreeable qualities and useful qualities is not to be understood as the contrast between qualities which are and which are not immediately agreeable (in this sense) but rather as the contrast between qualities the immediate agreeableness of which is or is not explicable by reference to the fact that they are conducive to pleasure. 263

passions and operations of the mind has a particular feeling, which must be either agreeable or disagreeable. The first is virtuous, the second vicious. This particular feeling constitutes the very nature of the passion; and therefore needs not be accounted for" (590). The same is true of some of the qualities which are immediately pleasing to persons other than their possessors, that is, "some of these qualities produce satisfaction in others by particular original principles of human nature, which cannot be accounted for: Others may be resolv'd into principles, which are more general" (ibid.). Instances of the first kind are "wit and eloquence" (612) and also "a certain je-ne-sçai-quoi of agreeable and handsome, that concurs to the same effect" (ibid.); while love is an example of the second. 264 It is possible, nevertheless, to explain, on the one band, why qualities immediately (and "originally") agreeable to their possessors excite the approbation of persons other than their possessors, and, on the other hand, why "we approve of a person, who is possess'd of qualities immediately agreeable to those, with whom he has any commerce; tho' perhaps we ourselves never reap'd any pleasure from them" (590); and there is in these explanations a "considerable dependence on the principle of sympathy so often insisted on" (ibid.). There are thus, according to Hume, four ways in which a mental quality may occasion the approval of a moral spectator, namely, by being "naturally fitted to be useful to others, or to the person himself" (591) or by being "agreeable to others, or to the person himself" (ibid.). The remaining question is why the pleasure (or displeasure) of the spectator, when causally dependent upon one or more of these "four different sources" (ibid.) is moral; and Hume's answer to this crucial question--which will also be found to depend considerably upon "the principle of sympathy" (590)-is that the agreeable and disagreeable impressions which constitute moral approbation and disapprobation are such as depend causally upon assumption by the spectator of a favored position with respect to the subject of the mental qualities the contemplation of which is accompanied by approval or disapproval. There are thus two further questions, namely, why a favored position is requisite for the morality of a judgment, and also what is the nature of this position; and these questions may be discussed in -168-

264

See Treatise, pp. 604 f.

turn. Now, a favored position is requisite, according to Hume's analysis, in order to provide for certain characteristics essential to moral judgments as they are ordinarily understood. In particular, it is analytically necessary that moral judgments be disinterested: "'tis only when a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil" (472). 265 Moral judgments are made with the expectation of social concurrence in the sentiments they express, 266 and such concurrence is possible only in the case of disinterested judgments. Every particular person's pleasure and interest being different, 'tis impossible men cou'd ever agree in their sentiments and judgments, unless they chose some common point of view, from which they might survey their object, and which might cause it to appear the same to all of them (591). The favored position described by Hume is "that of the person himself, whose character is examin'd; or that of persons, who have a connexion with him" (ibid.). This position can, of course, be assumed by the spectator only by means of sympathy. Thus a mental quality Q of a subject S which is either useful or pleasant to others, is judged by its pleasant or unpleasant effect upon "those, who have any immediate connexion or intercourse with the person possess'd of it" (603); while a quality Q which is useful or pleasant to S is judged by the utility or pleasure which it constitutes for S. It is hence the pleasant or unpleasant impressions arising from sympathy, either on the one hand with S or on the other hand with those who are so related to S as to receive pleasure or displeasure causally but nonsympathetically from the mental qualities of S, that "are alone admitted in speculation as the standard of virtue and morality" (591). The favored position constitutive of the moral spectator is thus the imaginative stand. point from which uniform moral judgments are possible; and it is to be observed that on Hume's analysis, this position is neither -169-

Hume adds, however, that "'Tis true, those sentiments, from interest and morals, are apt to be confounded, and naturally run into one another. It seldom happens, that we do not think an enemy vicious, and can distinguish betwixt his opposition to our interest and real villainy or baseness. But this hinders not, but that the sentiments are, in themselves, distinct; and a man of temper and judgment may preserve himself from these illusions" ( Treatise, p. 472). 266 See note 21, above. 265

arbitrary nor determined either by caprice or, on the other hand, by a tacit and question-begging consideration to the effect that it is only from such a standpoint that the "real value" of the qualities in question can be appreciated. 267 Rather, on Hume's analyses, the position is determined as being that from which the judgments made will have the characteristics ordinarily expected of judgments that are moral. And social concurrence, which presupposes disinterestedness and therefore a favored standpoint, is the most important of these characteristics; for A's judgment that -170-

The charge of petitio is laid by Selby-Bigge (in British Moralists [ Oxford, 1897], Vol. I, Introd., pp. lviiilix): "He [i.e., Hume] also has to admit that sympathy itself is partial and varies with the proximity and relationship of the other persons whose supposed pleasure causes ours, whereas our moral esteem is impartial and does not vary. To get over these difficulties Hume has to call in the assistance of 'general rules' by reference to which we correct the natural variations and deficiencies of our sympathy, . . . But the whole difficulty which the theory of sympathy is invoked to solve is the difficulty of explaining how such a 'creature of feeling' such as Hume supposes man to be, can form or subject himself to general rules of judgement. It is difficult to acquit Hume here of a 'suppositio probandi' of a very flagrant kind." Now, there is no question but that Hume's language and examples are such as to invite criticism of this sort. Not only does the use of the term "correction" seem to imply the existence of a standard requiring for its defense a new theory of value, but also as applied to phenomenal occurrences of moral sentiment, the term seems devoid of meaning, each such occurrence being just the datum that it is and incapable of alteration, not to say correction. At least both of these disadvantages characterize the following analogy offered by Hume: "The case is here the same as in our judgments concerning external bodies. All objects seem to diminish by their distance: But tho' the appearance of objects to our senses be the original standard, by which we judge of them, yet we do not say, that they actually diminish by the distance; but correcting the appearance by reflexion, arrive at a more constant and establish'd judgment concerning them" ( Treatise, p. 603). It may be allowable, however, to substitute for this analogy one less subject at least to such criticism as SelbyBigge's. Thus what has been called (see above, p. 168) the "favored position" constitutive of the moral spectator may be compared to standard conditions (such as illumination by sunlight and normal physiological conditions in the observer) for the determination of the color of surfaces, conditions which are chosen for the sake of obtaining conveniently uniform judgments by various observers and by the same observer at various times. The color reported to occur under such standard conditions is referred to as "the color" of the surface in question, such facts being discounted as that the surface presents another color under monochromatic light or to an observer stimulated with certain drugs. As for the justification of this process of discounting other appearances, it can only be said that for certain purposes, such as the purchasing of cloth, the description of color is always rendered on the tacit assumption of ordinary conditions, a reference to which is thus implicit in the notion of "the color" of the surfaces in question, although this fact need not be noticed, of course, by those who render such descriptions but only by those who analyze them. Similarly, it is not incumbent upon Hume (as an analyst of moral value) to justify the assumption of a favored position by the moral spectator, but merely to point out that reference to such a position is implied in the ordinary notion of moral judgment. 267

B is virtuous or vicious is not regarded as a moral judgment at all if its ground is discovered as being merely that B is pleasant or useful to A; in cases of this sort, the sentiments involved are not moral but are rather the interested sentiments of friendship or hatred. 268 Still another characteristic of the moral sentiments consists in the fact that they produce the impulse to reward virtue and to punish vice; for virtue and vice are among the causequalities of love and hatred, 269 to which benevolence and anger are respectively linked "by the original constitution of human passion" (591). § 2: ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE GENERAL THEORY At this point, Hume sees it as proper "to illustrate this general system of morals, by applying it to particular instances of virtue and vice, and shewing how their merit or demerit arises from the four sources here explain'd" (592). We shall examine Hume's explanations in relation to the group of mutually similar qualities which encompasses "every thing we call great in human affections" (602) and which is composed of pride, together with "courage, intrepidity, ambition, love of glory, magnanimity, and all the other shining virtues of that kind" (599 f.), which "have plainly a strong mixture of selfesteem in them, and derive a great part of their merit from that origin" (600). With respect to these qualities, Hume's datum is the proposition that "the world naturally esteems a well-regulated pride, which secretly animates our conduct, without breaking out into such indecent expressions of vanity, as may offend the vanity of others" (600); and esteem of this quality Hume finds attributable to "its utility and its agreeableness to ourselves; by which it capacitates us for business, and, at the same time, gives us an immediate satisfaction" (ibid.). On the other hand, "an excessive pride or over-weaning conceit of ourselves is always esteem'd vicious, and is universally hated; as -171-

What is perhaps Hume's clearest expression of this point is contained in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (in Works, eds. Green and Grose [ London, 1875], Vol. IV, p. 248): "When a man denominates another his enemy, his rival, his antagonist, his adversary, he is understood to speak the language of self-love, and to express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular circumstances and situation. But when he bestows on any man the epithets of vicious or odious or depraved, he then speaks another language, and expresses sentiments, in which, he expects, all his audience are to concur with him." 269 See chap. i, § 4. 268

modesty, or a just sense of our weakness, is esteem'd virtuous, and procures the goodwill of every-one" (592), the viciousness of the former quality being constituted by its immediate disagreeableness to others and the virtuousness of the latter by its immediate agreeableness to others (ibid.). The immediate disagreeableness of conceit Hume finds to be explicable, although in somewhat recondite fashion. The central point of this explanation is that the ill-founded self-satisfaction of a man "whom we are really persuaded to be of inferior merit" (595) is communicated sympathetically to the observer with precisely the degree of vivacity to occasion a humiliating (and therefore disagreeable) comparison of the observer's own feeling of merit with the feeling entertained by the over-complacent individual of his merit; "our idea is here precisely in that medium, which is requisite to make it operate on us by comparison" (ibid.). A stronger sympathy with the subject's feeling of merit, such as would occur if the subject's merit were believed by the observer to exist, should eventuate in love, which, mixed with the humility arising from comparison with self, becomes respect, "according to our foregoing reasonings on that passion" (ibid.). It is not within the choice of the observer to esteem the vainglorious man, for, as Hume attempts to show, 270 the process by which one's idea of his selfsupposed merit attains just enough vivacity for the excitation of a disagreeable comparison (and no more) is automatic and to some degree independent of "the particular temper of the person" (594). The over-valuation of oneself hence "must be vicious; since it causes uneasiness in all men, and presents them every moment with a disagreeable comparison" (596). The "propensity of men to overvalue themselves" (598) being "almost universal" (ibid.), rules of good-breeding have been established "in order to prevent the opposition of men's pride, and render conversation agreeable and inoffensive" (597). These rules require, in conversation and action, the appearance of humility. But it would be an error, Hume argues, to suppose therefrom that this humility is expected to go "beyond the outside, or that a thorough sincerity in this particular is esteem'd a real part of our duty" (598); for "we may observe, that a genuine and hearty pride, or self-esteem, if well conceal'd and well founded, is essential to the character of a man of honour, and that there is -172-

270

See Treatise, p. 594.

no quality of the mind, which is more indispensibly requisite to procure the esteem and approbation of mankind" (ibid.). The meritoriousness of pride is further attested by the historical observation that "all those great actions and sentiments, which have become the admiration of mankind, are founded on nothing but pride and self esteem" (599). The moral feelings of men are mixed, however, with respect to another pridelike quality, namely "heroism, or military glory" (600). For this quality has a tendency, painful to contemplate, to the "subversion of empires, the devastation of provinces, the sack of cities" (601); and when this tendency occupies the imagination, the quality in question appears as vicious rather than virtuous. "But when we fix our view on the person himself, who is the author of all this mischief, there is something so dazling in his character, the mere contemplation of it so elevates the mind, that we cannot refuse it our admiration. The pain, which we receive from its tendency to the prejudice of society, is over-power'd by a stronger and more immediate sympathy" (ibid.). Similarly, his pride will assure for the hero "the admiration of posterity; at the same time that it ruins his affairs, and leads him into dangers and difficulties, with which otherwise he wou'd never have been acquainted" (600); for pride, when no longer useful to its subject, nevertheless "is still agreeable, and conveys an elevated and sublime sensation to the person, who is actuated by it" (ibid.). Hume concludes his description of the various circumstances under which pride is meritorious (or otherwise) with an account of the viciousness of insolence in which the role of sympathy is especially prominent. Since insolence, or "any expression of pride and haughtiness" (601), is disinterestedly condemned even in one's friends or in historical personages, "it follows, that our disapprobation proceeds from a sympathy with others, and from the reflexion, that such a character is highly displeasing and odious to every one, who converses or has any intercourse with the person possesst of it" (601 f.). The displeasure sympathized with, however, is itself the effect (in part) of sympathy with the offender's exaggerated feeling of his own merit; so that "we may here observe a double rebound of the sympathy; which is a principle very similar to what we have observ'd on another occasion." 271 -173-

271

See note 27 to chap. i, on p. 54.

With the provision of such illustrations of his theory, Hume's present inquiry into morals is virtually complete. As might be expected from the general character of this theory, however, Hume argues against the exclusion, "usual in all systems of ethics" (606), of the "natural abilities," such as "good sense and genius" (608), or "wit and humour" (ibid.), from the domain of moral approbation. While it may be admitted, so Hume's argument runs, that the natural abilities excite somewhat different sentiments from the other virtues, it is true likewise that "each of the virtues, even benevolence, justice, gratitude, integrity, excites a different sentiment or feeling in the spectator" (607); the virtues of a Caesar, for example, are "amiable" (608), those of a Cato "awful" (ibid.). There is, however, a peculiarity of the natural abilities, insufficient indeed to exclude them from the moral domain but sufficient to motivate the attempt, at this exclusion by "legislators, and divines, and moralists" (609). For natural abilities and virtues are contrasted in that "the former are almost invariable by any art or industry; while the latter, or at least, the actions, that proceed from them, may be chang'd by the motives of rewards and punishments, praise and blame" (ibid.). Such a boundary between the moral and nonmoral is not drawn, however, where, as "in common life and conversation" (ibid.), there is no intention to "produce additional motives for being virtuous" (ibid.); so that the generality of men "consider prudence under the character of virtue as well as benevolence, and penetration as well as justice" (ibid.). As for the approbation of the natural abilities, it arises, as in the case of industry, perseverance, patience, and the like, from the source constituted by usefulness "to the person, who is possess'd of them" (610), from agreeableness to others, as in the case of "wit and eloquence" (611), and from agreeableness to self, in the case of "good humour" (611). And, of course, it is sympathy which explains how qualities pleasant and useful to their owners excite the approbation of other persons. Since the pattern of this explanation is now familiar, we may omit further examples of it and pass directly to Hume's final observation in the Treatise,--an observation, namely, of "the flexibility of our sentiments, and the several changes they so readily receive from the objects, with which they are conjoin'd" (617). It is, in Hume's view, the character of the object that determines the feeling with which its -174-

contemplation is accompanied, rather than the way in which the object operates on mind, that is, whether immediately and inexplicably or with equal immediateness but explicably, through the mechanism of sympathy. The peculiar difference of moral from aesthetic approbation is thus determined by the difference of their objects, namely, mental qualities respectively and "visible objects" (ibid.). The pleasure constitutive of aesthetic beauty "is pretty much the same, tho' it be sometimes deriv'd from the mere species and appearance of the objects; sometimes from sympathy, and an idea of their utility" (ibid.); and the same holds, mutatis mutandis, for the pleasure constitutive of moral beauty. But the approbation of a house is never moral, or that of a character aesthetic. "A convenient house, and a virtuous character, cause not the same feeling of approbation; even tho' the source of our approbation be the same, and flow from sympathy and an idea of their utility. There is something very inexplicable in this variation of our feelings; but 'tis what we have experience of with regard to all our passions and sentiments" (ibid.). -175-