OXFORD HISTORICAL MONOGRAPHS EDITORS R. R. DAVIES
R. J. W. EVANS
J. HARRIS
B. WARD-PERKINS
J. ROBERTSON
R. SERVICE...
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OXFORD HISTORICAL MONOGRAPHS EDITORS R. R. DAVIES
R. J. W. EVANS
J. HARRIS
B. WARD-PERKINS
J. ROBERTSON
R. SERVICE P. A. SLACK
. The Colony of Hong Kong (Source: Peter Wesley-Smith, Unequal Treaty –: China, Great Britain and Hong Kong’s New Territories. Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, , p. xvi)
Hong Kong and the Cold War Anglo-American Relations –
CHI-KWAN MARK
CLARENDON PRESS • OXFORD
3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Chi-kwan Mark The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN ––– 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2 Typeset by Hope Services (Abingdon) Ltd. Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This book has its origin in my D.Phil. dissertation, which I submitted to the University of Oxford in . I owe an especially large debt of gratitude to Professor Rosemary Foot, my supervisor, who taught me the art of history writing. I am also grateful to Dr John Darwin and Dr Peter Lowe who read my dissertation as examiners and gave me valuable comments. Dr Lowe deserves my especial thanks for assisting me in converting the thesis into a more readable book. So do the editorial professionals of the Oxford University Press especially Katie Ryde. In the course of my research, I have also benefited from discussions and correspondence at different stages with Professors Justus Doenecke, Edward Ingram, William Roger Louis, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, and Allen Whiting. They are, of course, not responsible for any shortcomings that remain in this book. My research was supported by the Swire/Cathay Pacific Scholarship, the Beit Fund, and various research and travel grants from St Antony’s College, the Centre for International Studies, and the Committee for Graduate Studies, for which I am grateful. I wish to thank the following archives and libraries for permission to publish material in this book: the Bodleian Library, Oxford University; the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; the Gelman Library, George Washington University; the Harry S. Truman Library; the Harvard University Archives; the Lauinger Library, Georgetown University; the Library of Congress; the National Archives and Records Administration; the Operational Archives Branch of the Naval Historical Center; Princeton University Library; the Public Record Office; and the Trustees of the Macmillan family. My thanks are due also to The International History Review for allowing me to reproduce, in slightly different form, my article, ‘A Reward for Good Behaviour in the Cold War: Bargaining over the Defence of Hong Kong, –’, in Chapter of this book. I use Pinyin for the transliteration of Chinese names and places, except where familiar ones might be confused if changed, such as Chiang Kai-shek and Quemoy and Matsu.
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CONTENTS List of Abbreviations
Introduction
viii
. Hong Kong in British, Chinese, and American Cold War Thinking
. Defending the Indefensible Colony: Anglo–American Exchanges over the Security of Hong Kong
. Meeting the Political Threat: Hong Kong in Britain’s and America’s China Policy
. Containing the Economic Warfare: Hong Kong and Export Controls against China
. Controlling the ‘American diaspora’ in Hong Kong: Intelligence, Covert Action, and Propaganda
Conclusion
Epilogue
Bibliography
Index
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ADR ANZUS ARCI BDCC(FE) BoT CA CAB CAT CF CFPF CIA C-I-C,FE CINCPAC CNO CO COCOM COS CRO DAD DDEL DDRS DEFE DF DSR ECOSOC EPAWF FAOHP FEER FO FRUS GCHQ GHQ,FE GU HK HKAR HKC
Annual Departmental Report by Director of Commerce and Industry Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals, Inc. British Defence Coordination Committee, Far East Board of Trade Office of Chinese Affairs Cabinet Civil Air Transport Incorporated Executive Secretariat, Conference Files Central Foreign Policy Files Central Intelligence Agency Commander-in-Chief, Far East Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Chief of Naval Operations Colonial Office Coordinating Committee British Chiefs of Staff Commonwealth Relations Office Records of the Division of Acquisition and Distribution, Office of Libraries and Intelligence, Special Assistant for Intelligence Dwight D. Eisenhower Library Declassified Documents Reference System Defence Decimal Files Department of State Selected Records Relating to the Korean War United Nations Economic and Social Council Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President (Ann Whitman File) Association for Diplomatic Studies, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program Far Eastern Economic Review Foreign Office Foreign Relations of the United States Government Communications Headquarters Government Headquarters, Far East Land Force Lauinger Library, Georgetown University Hong Kong Hong Kong Annual Report Hong Kong Consulate General, Classified General Records
List of Abbreviations HSTL INR IRD JCS JIC MoD NA NCNA NHC NSC NSCP OPC PRC PRO PSF RG RIO SANSAR SEATO SIGINT TP UN UNHCR UNREF USIA USIS USIS HK VOA WHO
ix
Harry S. Truman Library Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) Subject Files Information Research Department Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Committee Ministry of Defence National Archives and Records Administration New China News Agency Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center National Security Council National Security Council Staff Papers Office of Policy Coordination People’s Republic of China Public Record Office President’s Secretary’s Files Record Group Regional Information Office Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Signals intelligence Papers of Harry S. Truman United Nations United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Refugee Fund United States Information Agency United States Information Service Classified General Records of the United States Information Service Office, Hong Kong Voice of America White House Office
. East Asia after World War II (Source: William R. Keylor, A World of Nations: The International Order Since . Oxford University Press, New York, , )
Introduction At midnight on June , the United Kingdom restored the sovereignty of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China after more than one and a half centuries of British colonial rule. Present at the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was the American Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright. But this was not the only occasion when such a high-level US official demonstrated an interest in Hong Kong. Nor was the only year in the course of its colonial history when the future of Hong Kong was at stake. Forty years ago, in the British position in Hong Kong appeared to be uncertain, an uncertainty which worried even top decision-makers in Washington. Indeed, since the founding of the People’s Republic in , the fate of Hong Kong had been a subject of discussion, debate, and disagreement between the British and US governments. With the end of the Second World War, the British Labour government began the process of decolonization with the aim of transforming a formal empire into informal zones of influence. In Asia, Britain withdrew from India, Burma, and Ceylon before nationalism got out of control. In Malaya, the British held on until the communist insurgency was brought under control. The British also re-established their colonial rule in Hong Kong immediately after the defeat of Japan. But in a rapidly changing post-colonial, bipolar world, they soon found Hong Kong a colony too valuable to abandon in peace, and yet too peripheral to be worth committing scarce resources to for its survival at war. After , the British were acutely aware of the vulnerability of Hong Kong to China’s external attack and internal subversion. In retrospect, such a threat may have been more potential than real, and more serious for some officials at some times than others. But without the benefit of hindsight, no contemporary official could take for granted Beijing’s peaceful intentions, at a time when China was fighting the United States to a standstill in Korea, waging a proxy war in Indochina, and continuing the unfinished civil war in the Taiwan Strait. It was feared that Hong Kong would be attacked not as an isolated act, but in the event of the spread of hostilities between China and America over Korea, Indochina, or Taiwan. More importantly, the
Introduction
British sense of vulnerability stemmed not only from their assessment of the communist threat, but also from Britain’s imperial decline and America’s Cold War requirements. Given Britain’s limited resources and extensive overseas commitments, the level of garrison in Hong Kong had to be scaled down throughout the s (and beyond). Military strategists and advisors, who had to plan for a worst-case scenario, realized that Hong Kong was indefensible against a large-scale communist attack, and indeed its garrison was inadequate even to delay an enemy’s advance long enough to cover an evacuation. Their realization of Hong Kong’s military weakness thus reinforced the British sensitivities to a communist attack, however remote such a possibility. Added to the British worries was the ‘American threat’ of an indirect kind. With the intensification of the Cold War in Asia, the United States sought allies to contain Communist China and found Hong Kong a useful location for intelligence gathering, export controls, propaganda operations, and even covert action. The British were concerned that too close cooperation with the United States in Hong Kong or elsewhere in Asia would provoke Beijing into causing trouble in the territory, or worse still attacking Hong Kong in the event of a wider Sino-American war. For these reasons, the British were eager to engage US interest in the defence of Hong Kong on the one hand, and to restrain the more belligerent tendencies in America’s China policy on the other. This book will examine how Britain and America dealt with the vulnerability of Hong Kong in the age of decolonization and the Cold War. It will focus on four dimensions of Hong Kong’s vulnerability that had the greatest impact on the Anglo–American relationship: the external defence of Hong Kong; the political consequences for Hong Kong of American–Chinese confrontation; Hong Kong’s economic dependence on the mainland; and US overt and covert operations in the Colony. The year provides the departure point for this study. It was the time when the Attlee government and the Truman administration, confronted with the twin challenges of the victory of the Chinese Communists on the mainland and the future of Hong Kong, undertook extensive diplomatic consultations and policy coordination over such issues as diplomatic recognition, export controls, and Hong Kong’s defence. is taken as the concluding point to this book and needs justification. That year, the defence review under the new Macmillan government brought to the forefront the question of Hong Kong’s
Introduction
defensibility, and indeed raised the whole question of the British position in Hong Kong. was also a year of uncertainty in Anglo–American relations as a result of the Suez crisis the previous year and their disagreement over the China issue. By the end of , as a result of the restoration of the Anglo–American relationship, the two countries had reached a greater degree of understanding on defence planning for Hong Kong, export controls against China, and Chinese representation in the United Nations. This is not to suggest that the British had won over the Americans to their policy preferences or vice versa; nor was the vulnerability of Hong Kong any longer a problem. Nevertheless, this study will show that decision-makers in London and Washington saw Hong Kong not in itself but in the context of Anglo–American relations. Thus, is chosen as a crucial concluding year in order to demonstrate the extent to which the restoration of the Anglo–American ‘special relationship’ was manifested in perceptions and policies towards Hong Kong. While covering both British and US policies, this study will focus on their dynamic interactions. As such, the level of analysis will be twofold—the bilateral and individual levels of Anglo–American interactions. On the one hand, this study will detail the diplomatic consultations, military discussions, and actual cooperation between the British and US governments, from working level up to the Cabinet, both formally and informally. By concentrating on their bilateral interactions, I seek to find out how and to what extent Britain and the United States influenced each other over issues related to Hong Kong. On the other hand, at the individual or human level, I will explore how officials calculated the other party’s possible reactions, and how such calculations affected their own decision-making. In particular, the conflicts that were waged in the minds of individual officials, between the maintenance of the Anglo–American relationship and the preservation of Hong Kong interests, will be highlighted. By examining the individual level of Anglo–American interactions, we can get some insights into how British and US decision-makers perceived each other as allies, and how much they valued their partnership or could stretch the boundaries of their friendship. In short, the book focuses on the interactive process of policy-making: perceptions, calculations, and expectations of each other’s possible responses will be given as much attention as the actual decisions and policy outcomes. This study, therefore, places Hong Kong at the heart of the Anglo–American relationship in the wider context of the Cold War in
Introduction
Asia.1 It aims to complement the existing scholarship on Hong Kong, Britain, America, and China which concentrates mainly, if not exclusively, on either one of the following aspects: US policy towards Hong Kong;2 Hong Kong in Sino–British relations;3 and British colonial policy towards Communist and Nationalist activities in Hong Kong.4 Moreover, it will provide new information on a number of hitherto unexplored issues, while throwing new light on familiar events. It is 1 For the extensive scholarship on Anglo–American relations with reference to China (but not specifically Hong Kong), see Roderick MacFarquhar, ‘The China Problem in Anglo–American Relations’, in William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (eds.), The ‘Special Relationship’: Anglo–American Relations since (Oxford, ), –; Edwin W. Martin, Divided Counsel: The Anglo–American Response to Communist Victory in China (Lexington, Ky., ); Rosemary Foot, ‘The Search for a Modus Vivendi: Anglo–American Relations and China Policy in the Eisenhower Era’, in Warren Cohen and Akira Iriye (eds.), The Great Powers in East Asia, – (New York, ), –; James T. H. Tang, ‘Alliance under Stress: Anglo–American Relations and East Asia, –’, in R. O’Neill and B. Heuser (eds.), Securing Peace in Europe, –: Thoughts for the Post-Cold War Era (London, ), –; Peter Lowe, ‘Challenge and Readjustment: Anglo–American Exchanges over East Asia, –’, in T. G. Fraser and Peter Lowe (eds.), Conflict and Amity in East Asia: Essays in Honour of Ian Nish (London, ), –; Anita Inder Singh, The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo–American Relationship, – (London, ); Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese–British–American Relations, – (Kent, Oh., ); Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, – (Liverpool, ); Lanxin Xiang, Recasting the Imperial Far East: Britain and America in China, – (New York, ); and Victor S. Kaufman, Confronting Communism: U.S. and British Policies toward China (Columbia, Mo., ). 2 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, –: Uncertain Friendships (New York, ); Johannes Richard Lombardo, ‘United States’ Foreign Policy towards the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong during the Early Cold War Period, –’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Hong Kong, ; and Yu Qun and Cheng Shuwei, ‘Meiguo de Xianggang Zhengre (–)’ [‘The Hong Kong Policy of the United States (–)’], Lishi Yanjiu [Historical Research] / (), –. 3 Brian Porter, Britain and the Rise of Communist China: A Study of British Attitudes – (London, ); Robert Boardman, Britain and the People’s Republic of China – (London, ); James Tuck-hong Tang, Britain’s Encounter with Revolutionary China, – (New York, ); Ming K. Chan (ed.), Precarious Balance: Hong Kong between China and Britain (Hong Kong, ); Zhong-ping Feng, The British Government’s China Policy – (Keele, ); Michael Yahuda, Hong Kong: China’s Challenge (London, ); Aron Shai, The Fate of British and French Firms in China – (London, ); David Clayton, Imperialism Revisited: Political and Economic Relations between Britain and China, – (London, ); Peter Lowe, Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British Policies towards Japan, China and Korea, – (Manchester, ). 4 Steve Yui-sang Tsang, Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China, and Attempts at Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong, – (Hong Kong, ); idem, ‘Target Zhou Enlai: The “Kashmir Princess” Incident of ’, China Quarterly, (Sept. ), –; idem, ‘Strategy for Survival: The Cold War and Hong Kong’s Policy towards Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Activities in the s’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, / (May ), –.
Introduction
widely recognized that Hong Kong was used as an outpost for intelligence gathering, propaganda, and even covert action by the Americans, the Chinese Communists, and the Nationalists in one way or another.5 But Hong Kong’s roles in US policy and in the Cold War struggle have been somewhat exaggerated.6 In addition, the extent to which British and American officials on the ground cooperated with one another has been largely unexplored.7 Although the British could not avoid involving a ‘neutral’ Hong Kong in the containment of Communist China, neither were the Americans allowed to launch an unrestrained anticommunist crusade in the territory. The Hong Kong government reacted differently to US intelligence and propaganda operations, depending on whether they were ‘overt’ or ‘covert’ in nature. This would affect the extent of Anglo–American cooperation over Hong Kong, both in the field and at headquarters. But what caused the greatest differences and strains between (and within) the British and US governments was the introduction of export controls in Hong Kong, especially during the Korean War period. Most works on export controls against China, however, mention Hong Kong’s role only in passing, and if not, look mainly from the British perspective.8 A better 5 Richard Deacon, The Chinese Secret Service (London, ), –; William M. Leary, Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia (Ala., ); Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men: Four who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA (New York, ); John Prados, President’s Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II through the Persian Gulf (Chicago, ); Desmond Ball, ‘Over and Out: Signals Intelligence (Sigint) in Hong Kong’, Intelligence and National Security, : (July ), –; Johannes R. Lombardo, ‘A Mission of Espionage, Intelligence and Psychological Operations: The American Consulate in Hong Kong, –’, Intelligence and National Security, / (Winter, ), –. 6 e.g., Lombardo has exaggerated the scale of US propaganda activities in Hong Kong by ignoring the strict restrictions imposed by the colonial authorities. Lombardo, ‘A Mission of Espionage, Intelligence and Psychological Operations’ and his Ph.D. thesis. 7 An exception which focuses on Anglo–American intelligence cooperation (but not specifically about Hong Kong) is Richard J. Aldrich, ‘ “The Value of Residual Empire”: Anglo–American Intelligence Co-operation in Asia after ’, in Richard J. Aldrich and Michael F. Hopkins (eds.), Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British Policy in the PostWar World (London, ), –. 8 Yoko Yasuhara, ‘Japan, Communist China, and Export Controls in Asia, –’, Diplomatic History, / (Winter ), –; Qing Simei, ‘The Eisenhower Administration and Changes in Western Embargo Policy Against China, –’, in Cohen and Iriye (eds.), The Great Powers in East Asia, –; Burton I. Kaufman, ‘Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy with Respect to East Asia’, in ibid., –; Wenguang Shao, China, Britain and Businessmen: Political and Commercial Relations, – (London, ); Frank Cain, ‘The US-Led Trade Embargo on China: The Origins of CHINCOM, –’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, / (Dec. ), –; Aaron Forsberg, America and the Japanese Miracle: The Cold War Context of Japan’s Postwar Economic Revival, – (Chapel Hill, NC, ), –.
Introduction
understanding of Hong Kong’s role in the enforcement of these controls has to be set against the backdrop of the twists and turns of the Korean conflict and the Anglo–American relationship.9 Thus, the involvement of Hong Kong in the Cold War gives us a more complex picture than the existing literature has portrayed. This study will argue that Hong Kong became what might be called a ‘reluctant Cold Warrior’, since London wanted to demonstrate Britain’s value as a close ally of America by involving the Colony in the containment of China. But given its vulnerability in the shadow of China, Hong Kong’s role had to be as indirect, discreet, and non-confrontational in nature as possible. The study, moreover, will offer a fresh account of the external defence of Hong Kong by placing it in the context of the British general defence reviews, US military strategy, and Anglo–American diplomacy. Earlier accounts of the subject have tended to treat British and American policies in isolation, and have disagreed on whether there was a US commitment to Hong Kong.10 By taking at face value US policy statements and documents, some scholars have concluded that in the United States agreed informally to assist in the defence of Hong Kong, a conclusion based on, among other things, a letter from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill in which the former said that the United States ‘would expect to be with [Britain]’ if Hong Kong was in jeopardy.11 But as this study will show, given the hypothetical nature of the Chinese threat and the conditional character of the American pledges to defend Hong Kong, one can only grasp the full meaning of a US ‘commitment’ by exploring the underlying assumptions of American policy and their calculations of the other party’s
9 Both Schenk and Zhang did attempt to place Hong Kong’s role in export controls in the wider context of the Korean War, though their discussions are not comprehensive enough. Catherine R. Schenk, Hong Kong as an International Financial Centre: Emergence and Development – (London, ); Shu Guang Zhang, Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, – (DC, ). 10 On US policy, see Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, –, –; Tsang, ‘Strategy for Survival’, –; and Lombardo, ‘Eisenhower, the British and the Security of Hong Kong’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, / (Nov. ), –. On British policy, see James T. H. Tang, ‘From Empire Defence to Imperial Retreat: Britain’s Postwar China Policy and the Decolonisation of Hong Kong’, Modern Asian Studies, / (), –; Feng, The British Government’s China Policy, –; William Roger Louis, ‘Hong Kong: The Critical Phase, –’, The American Historical Review, / (Oct. ), –. 11 Raffi Gregorian, The British Army, the Gurkhas and Cold War Strategy in the Far East, – (Basingstoke, ), . Also see Lombardo, ‘Eisenhower, the British and the Security of Hong Kong’.
Introduction
possible reactions. Thus, to focus on whether the United States had committed itself, even informally, to Hong Kong has missed the point; what is important is to examine the American perceptions, assumptions, and expectations of Britain’s possible responses, and vice versa. The study will argue that Eisenhower saw the defence of Hong Kong not as a military asset to the United States, but as a diplomatic bargaining chip to obtain British support on such matters as Indochina, offshore islands, and Chinese representation in the United Nations. It was the British factor, not the significance of Hong Kong per se, that mattered to the US President. The book will also suggest that the British Empire in Hong Kong was more vulnerable than it appeared at the time, a vulnerability that culminated in the so-called ‘ Question’. That year, the British position in Hong Kong seemed to be more precarious than at any time since . In addition to the question of Hong Kong’s defensibility in the light of the general defence review, a number of issues also needed to be addressed by British officials and seemingly highlighted the precariousness of the Colony: Chinese and British merchants in Hong Kong could stand the embargoes on China no longer and were pressing for their relaxation; the colonial authorities were calling for international assistance to the ever-increasing Chinese refugees in Hong Kong; and even the closure of the Naval Dockyard in Hong Kong was seen by some Chinese as a sign of Britain’s retreat from Asia. Ironically, there was a gap between high politics and local situation. For all the debates over the defence of Hong Kong in Whitehall, the life of ordinary people in the territory went on as usual. For all the economic hardships as a result of the trade embargoes, from the late s onwards Hong Kong was on the road to becoming an export-oriented manufacturing centre. And for all the heavy drains on its finance, the Hong Kong government, supported by both local and international voluntary agencies, proved to be capable of resettling the tens of thousands of Chinese refugees. Nevertheless, the success story of Hong Kong in later decades should not eclipse the fact that its vulnerability in the Cold War had confronted the British with difficult dilemmas throughout the s. It should also be stressed that the transformation of Hong Kong into an industrial and later financial centre of the world should be attributed not only to such local factors as the availability of cheap labour, Chinese entrepreneurial skills, and the ‘laissez faire’ policy (or myth) of the Hong Kong government, but also to the success of the United Kingdom in minimizing the impact of the Cold War on Hong Kong. This book will add an
Introduction
international dimension to the history of Hong Kong’s transformations, and simultaneously write Hong Kong into the international history of East Asia. By using Hong Kong as a case-study in Anglo–American relations, this book combines Cold War international history, Anglo–American diplomatic history, and British imperial history. In order to highlight the global nature of the Cold War, the latest scholarship has reexamined the roles of small and middle-sized powers, and issues of less significance to the US–Soviet rivalry. There are now fascinating accounts of the role of secondary allies, from pro-Western Norway to the Russian-oriented Finland; Anglo–American policies towards authoritarian regimes, from Franco’s Spain to Sukarno’s Indonesia; and the development of Cold War tensions in remote places, from the North African desert up to the High Himalayas.12 Although Hong Kong was not an autonomous player in the post-war international system, its involvement in the Cold War or otherwise was a recurrent concern for the United States and Britain. This study seeks to uncover the precise role of Hong Kong in the Cold War in Asia, which has hitherto been dismissed or exaggerated. From a wider perspective, as British and US policies towards Hong Kong were centred upon their approaches to China, Hong Kong also provides a useful vantage point through which American–British–Chinese relations in the Cold War can be viewed. In addition, by focusing on the interaction of British and US policies this study will enhance our understanding of the so-called Anglo–American ‘special relationship’. But since Anglo–American relations were built upon many geographical and functional areas, the case of Hong Kong alone will not convincingly show how ‘special’ their relationship was. In this regard, the ideas and concepts developed by David Reynolds, Alex Danchev, and Ambassador Oliver Franks will be used in the analysis. They have argued that the Anglo–American ‘special relationship’ should not be taken to mean an alliance of equals, but a process of interaction laced with close consultation, informality,
12 Mats R. Berdal, The United States, Norway and the Cold War, – (London, ); Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Containing Coexistence: America, Russia, and the ‘Finnish Solution’, – (Kent, Oh., ); Jill Edwards, Anglo–American Relations and the Franco Question – (Oxford, ); John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian–Indonesian Confrontation, – (London, ); Saul Kelly, Cold War in the Desert: Britain, the United States and the Italian Colonies – (London, ); S. Mahmud Ali, Cold War in the High Himalayas: The USA, China and South Asia in the s (London, ).
Introduction
expectation, and mutual concession.13 In this study, the distinguishing features of that ‘specialness’ will provide the framework within which Anglo–American relations with reference to Hong Kong will be examined. If the Hong Kong case has also displayed these features, it may enhance the argument that the Anglo–American relationship was more special in quality than other alliance relationships. The case of colonial Hong Kong also addresses a number of themes in British imperial history. Apart from the issue of imperial defence, this study also sheds light on the ideas of ‘informal empire’ and ‘diaspora’. As William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson have put it: ‘Under the shadow of cold war, a once British Empire modulated strategically into an Anglo–American field of influence, and thence into a predominantly American commitment.’14 In other words, the Cold War came to the rescue of the British Empire, which was gradually transformed into an Anglo–American ‘informal empire’, with Britain assuming a junior role in the coalition. Viewed through a Cold War rather than an imperial lens, Geir Lundestad has argued that Britain (and other US allies as well) ‘invited’ the Americans to construct an ‘empire’ in Europe and in other parts of the world in order to contain Soviet Communism.15 Hong Kong, however, does not seem to fit into the thesis of ‘informal empire’ or ‘ “empire” by invitation’: after , it remained Great Britain’s formal colony. But, as John Darwin has pointed out, Hong Kong was ‘decolonised in substance, if not juridically, in the early s’; its ‘political future depended upon the decolonised power—China—being willing to observe the treaty terms’.16 It will be argued here that the success of the British in maintaining a ‘decolonized’ Hong Kong in China’s shadow also depended on the restraint of what might be called the ‘American diaspora’—consuls, information officers, covert specialists, 13 See David Reynolds, ‘A “Special Relationship?” America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War’, International Affairs, / (Winter /), –; Alex Danchev, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo–American Relations (London, ), –; Oliver Franks, ‘The “Special Relationship” –’, in William Roger Louis (ed.), Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain (London, ), –. 14 William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Decolonization’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, / (Sept. ), –. Quotation from . 15 Geir Lundestad, The American ‘Empire’ and Other Studies of US Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective (Oxford, ), –; and idem, ‘ “Empire by Invitation” in the American Century’, Diplomatic History, / (Spring ), –. 16 John Darwin, ‘Hong Kong in British Decolonisation’, in Judith M. Brown and Rosemary Foot (eds.), Hong Kong’s Transitions, ‒ (London, ), .
Introduction
etc.—who sojourned in Hong Kong for Cold War purposes. In other words, Hong Kong should not become part of the American ‘informal empire’, either by British invitation or American imposition. This study will integrate the concepts of ‘informal empire’ and ‘diaspora’ into the analysis of American activities in Hong Kong, thereby throwing more light on Anglo–American relations and British colonialism at the local level. The study is based mainly on archival materials in the United Kingdom and the United States, many of which have hitherto been unused, and some only recently declassified. They include Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Ministry of Defence, Cabinet, and Prime Minister’s Office records in the Public Record Office; Harold Macmillan Papers and Alexander Grantham Oral History Interview in the Bodleian Library of Oxford University; records of the US State Department, the Defense Department, and the Consulate General in Hong Kong in the National Archives and Records Administration; materials in the Harry S. Truman Library and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; records in the Operational Archives Branch of the US Naval Historical Center; Karl Rankin Papers in the Princeton University Library; and the foreign service oral history interviews at the Lauinger Library of Georgetown University. Although it focuses mainly on high politics, this study also provides some assessment of public views, as expressed in US and British newspapers, in so far as they shed light on policymaking. Selective use will be made of Chinese materials, including published documents, memoirs, officially compiled monographs, and newspapers in order to illuminate the Chinese Communist and Hong Kong perspectives. My book will not discuss events chronologically, but within a thematic framework that highlights the different dimensions of Hong Kong’s vulnerability in the Cold War—military, political, economic, and internal. Each of the four thematic chapters, covering events from to , also highlights the different strategies by Britain of meeting the external and internal threats to Hong Kong, which could be summarized as: defence; diplomacy; (economic) development; and ‘de-politization’. Chapter will first discuss, in three separate sections, British, American, and Chinese Communist perceptions of Hong Kong’s role in the Cold War. The aim is to provide an understanding of the broad framework within which Britain and the United States approached the Hong Kong issue in the next four thematic chapters. Chapter examines the Anglo–American exchanges over the external defence of Hong Kong,
Introduction
and Chapter Britain’s diplomacy of engagement with China and restraint over America. In Chapter , Hong Kong’s role in the enforcement of export controls on China and its impact on Anglo–American relations will be discussed. Chapter will assess the Anglo–American cooperation and conflict over intelligence, propaganda, and covert operations in Hong Kong. The book will conclude with a chronological overview of Hong Kong in Anglo–American interactions between and , and a discussion of the broader implications of the Hong Kong case for Cold War international history and Anglo–American diplomatic history. The epilogue examines briefly events and developments beyond .
Hong Kong in British, Chinese, and American Cold War Thinking Britain and the United States perceived Hong Kong’s role in the Cold War differently. To London, Hong Kong was an economically valuable colony and a symbol of Britain’s great power status. Yet the British also realized that its future was inextricably linked with the People’s Republic of China that was founded in . At first glance, the Americans did not have great economic and military stakes in Hong Kong, but they gradually defined a vital strategic role for Hong Kong in the containment of China. The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, found British Hong Kong a useful window to the outside world and a wedge against the Anglo–American alliance. This chapter will delineate Hong Kong’s significance in British and American official thinking, and in Chinese Communist calculations. But, first of all, it is necessary to give a brief survey of Hong Kong history in order to provide the local setting.
Located off the southeastern coast of the Chinese mainland and the mouth of the Pearl River delta, Hong Kong became a Crown Colony of the British Empire in three stages. In , Hong Kong island was ceded in perpetuity to Britain after the defeat of China in the First Opium War. The British enlarged their colonial presence in the Hong Kong area when they acquired the Kowloon peninsula and the Stonecutters island at the end of the Second Anglo–Chinese War in , and got a ninety-nine-year lease of the New Territories and some two hundred islands during the scramble for concessions in .1 The 1 For general accounts of Hong Kong, see Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (London, ); Roger Buckley, Hong Kong: The Road to (Cambridge, ); Judith M. Brown and Rosemary Foot (eds.), Hong Kong’s Transitions, – (London, ); and Steve Tsang, Hong Kong: An Appointment with China (London, ). Scholarly works which approach Hong Kong’s history from the Hong Kong Chinese point of view
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three treaties gave British Hong Kong a land area of approximately square miles. Though lacking natural resources, the Hong Kong that Britain acquired was far from being a small fishing village; indeed, different kinds of economic activities had existed there for centuries, for example pearl-gathering and salt industries.2 Hong Kong became a thriving British trading post, but its economic role was soon eclipsed by Shanghai in the north of China until the second half of the twentieth century.3 In the early days of British rule, Hong Kong was preoccupied with problems, such as crime, legal discrimination, and conflicts between the colonial authorities and the Chinese people.4 Power was concentrated on the Governor and his appointed Executive and Legislative Councils. But British rule was ‘indirect’, in that the colonial government was supported by traditional Chinese communal organizations, and in that the customs of the local people were not interfered with as long as they did not pose a threat to the authorities. The history of British Hong Kong was significantly shaped by, and also helped shape, developments in mainland China. Protected by British law and enjoying relative stability, Hong Kong became an operational base, and a refuge as well, for anti-Qing revolutionaries from the mainland in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the meantime, the Hong Kong Chinese frequently identified with political causes on the mainland. In the s and early s, competing Hong Kong merchants financed rival governments in Guangzhou (Canton) and Beijing (Peking), whilst anti-imperialist Hong Kong Chinese joined their Guangzhou comrades in general strike against the British in –.5 In addition, local Chinese merchants were actively involved in the Asian regional economic trade in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Hong Kong served as the centre of the overseas Chinese business networks that connected China, especially its southern part, and Southeast Asia. As a free port, Hong Kong was the main conduit include Tak-Wing Ngo (ed.), Hong Kong’s History: State and Society under Colonial Rule (London, ); and Wang Gungwu (ed.), Xianggang Shi Xinbian [Hong Kong History: New Perspectives], Vols. and (Hong Kong, ). 2
Liu Shuyong, An Outline History of Hong Kong (Beijing, ), –. For an analysis of the changing roles of Hong Kong in Britain’s China trade, see Robert Bickers, ‘The Colony’s Shifting Position in the British Informal Empire in China’, in Brown and Foot (eds.), Hong Kong’s Transitions, –. 4 Christopher Munn, Anglo–China: Chinese People and British Rule in Hong Kong, – (Richmond, Surrey, ). 5 Stephanie Po-yin Chung, Chinese Business Groups in Hong Kong and Political Change in South China, – (London, ); Chan (ed.), Precarious Balance. 3
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through which people, money, and goods flowed between the mainland and Southeast Asia.6 For all the problems and challenges it faced, British Hong Kong survived the collapse of the Qing dynasty, the chaos of warlordism, and the Guangzhou–Hong Kong general strike in the first two and a half decades of the twentieth century. But Japanese aggression in China in the s posed the greatest threat to British rule in Hong Kong since . British strategic planners and political leaders including Winston Churchill concluded that Hong Kong was not worth committing Britain’s scarce resources to for a successful defence against a possible Japanese attack. Britain would not reinforce Hong Kong, with the exception of a two-battalion reinforcement from Canada. The result was that it took merely eighteen days for Japan to defeat the British and to begin its occupation of Hong Kong on Christmas Day, December . The Japanese occupation of Hong Kong, which lasted for three years and eight months, brought much suffering to the Hong Kong Chinese and British and foreign expatriates alike.7 In August , the Japanese, defeated by the United States, surrendered Hong Kong to Britain. After , and especially after the communist revolution in , Hong Kong’s triple roles as a British colony, a Chinese community, and, in a sense, a world city, witnessed both continuities and changes. The post-war recovery of Hong Kong was fast and remarkable. In a matter of eight months, the military administration restored power to the civil government under the returned Governor, Mark Young. Building activities were resumed, factories reopened, and trade connections reestablished. By , Hong Kong had restored its pre-war role as a great entrepôt. As Far Eastern Economic Review, an informed economic magazine in Hong Kong, put it: ‘In three glorious years of boom with trade touching record figures year by year, with ever mounting profits in business, and a higher standard of living for most of the inhabitants, Hong Kong has been able to rebuild its shattered portals, grasp in ever larger handfuls the entrepot trade of Eastern Asia and to emerge commercially stronger and more powerful than at any time in its history.’8 Politically, the British contemplated the introduction of constitutional reform in Hong Kong. In May , Young announced his plan 6 Stephen Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking’s Changing Policy – (Cambridge, ), –. 7 Philip Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the Japanese Occupation (New Haven, ). 8 FEER, Dec. , Vol. , No. , .
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for local self-government in order to help the Hong Kong Chinese ‘develop an active sense of citizenship’. The Young Plan, as it came to be known, focused on an elected Municipal Council. But Young’s municipal scheme was not shared by the unofficial members of the Legislative Council, who put forward an alternative to the Young Plan in . The then Hong Kong Governor, Alexander Grantham, was also not eager for constitutional reform, believing that the Hong Kong Chinese would never develop a British allegiance and that Hong Kong would have to return to China in . In order to keep the British promise of reform, however, Grantham suggested in an enlarged Legislative Council, with a majority of unofficial members, partly elected by a restricted franchise. But any attempt at constitutional reform was finally abandoned in , thanks to the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the unofficial members, Grantham, and the British government.9 The result was that Hong Kong remained a ‘colonial’ system, or what might be called a ‘benevolent autocracy’, until the late s or even later. Despite the lack of democracy, the British sought to provide the Hong Kong people with efficient administration, freedom, and the rule of law. In fact, after the British position in Hong Kong was never the same again, thanks to the existence of a powerful regime on the mainland. ‘The Chinese Communist is knocking on Hongkong’s door,’ a local newspaper warned shortly after the founding of the People’s Republic, and ‘there is no one who can predict with certainty what lies ahead and what their attitude will be.’10 Although subsequent developments were to show that Beijing would leave Hong Kong alone, the British could not simply ignore the ‘China factor’ in governing Hong Kong. As Governor Grantham has recollected, ‘Hong Kong’s basic problem is her relationship with China.’11 Successive Hong Kong governors were eager to avoid provoking Beijing. In the meantime, both pro-communist and proNationalist elements in Hong Kong saw the Colony as another battleground for the unfinished Chinese civil war. They sought to win the hearts and minds of the Hong Kong Chinese in the fields of education, labour, and publishing. The Hong Kong government had to deal with this challenge by pursuing a policy of neutrality and non-provocative firmness. 9
For a detailed account, see Tsang, Democracy Shelved. Hong Kong Standard, Oct. . 11 Sir Alexander Grantham Oral History Interview, Aug. , , MSS. Brit. Emp. s., Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies at Rhodes House, Oxford, . 10
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Neither communist nor Nationalist activities would be tolerated if they were seen as a challenge to law and order.12 If its political system remained unchanged, this was not true of the character of Hong Kong’s society and economy. As a result of the Chinese civil war of –, tens of thousands of Chinese refugees fled to the Colony, bringing with them capital, entrepreneurial skills, or simply an industrious mentality. When Hong Kong was liberated in , the population was merely ,, but it increased to ,, by mid-. Among the refugees, industrialists from Shanghai reestablished their operations in Hong Kong, whilst the unskilled Chinese, mainly from Guangdong and Fujian, served as a cheap labour force for the burgeoning light manufacturing industries that had begun in the s.13 For a long time, despite the rise of a few prominent local Chinese businessmen, the large British merchant houses, or hongs, had enjoyed a dominant position in the economy of Hong Kong, which concentrated on trading, shipping, and other commerce-related activities. Indeed, the British colonizers, it has been argued, were only interested in the promotion of entrepôt trade, and neglected the development of manufacturing industry.14 For the sake of survival in post-war Hong Kong, Chinese entrepreneurs from the mainland chose to develop light industries, such as textiles, a sector which had not been the traditional domain of the British hongs. The introduction of an embargo on China in and the re-orientation of China’s economy to the Soviet bloc in the s significantly reduced the volume of Hong Kong’s trade with China. These factors, however, speeded up the industrialization of Hong Kong, though somehow by default. By early , Hong Kong’s industries had made ‘remarkable progress’ since the war in both the volume of output and the variety of products and in the scope of markets.15 Operating mainly on a small scale, the Chinese entrepreneurs were involved not only in production, but also in the marketing of their products abroad. Some of the Chinese manufacturing firms later developed into large business conglomerates, rising to a position that could challenge the traditionally dominant British merchant houses in Hong
12
Tsang, ‘Strategy for Survival’. Wong Siu-lun, Emigrant Entrepreneurs: Shanghai Industrialists in Hong Kong (Hong Kong, ). 14 See Tak-Wing Ngo, ‘Industrial history and the artifice of laissez-faire colonialism’, in idem (ed.), Hong Kong’s History, –. 15 FEER, Jan. , Vol. , No. , . 13
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Kong.16 As a Hong Kong economic commentator put it: ‘Some people think only of the British aspect of the Colony, forgetting the two-anda-quarter million Chinese who are here and who, directly or indirectly, do the trade . . . It is their will, no less than that of the British, that the Colony should maintain its status, its law and order, its freedoms and all the other things they fled from China to enjoy here.’17 In short, the Chinese refugees and immigrants, both rich and poor, were to play a significant role in the long-term economic transformation of Hong Kong. Despite the remarkable economic recovery and growth, the life of the majority of ordinary Chinese in Hong Kong remained difficult in the s. The influx of tens of thousands of Chinese refugees resulted in serious housing shortage, overcrowding, and health and fire hazards in the squatter areas. As the Hong Kong government annual report wrote of its repercussions: ‘The very face of Hong Kong underwent a rapid and ugly change. Squatter townships spread in an unsightly rash round the permanent buildings of [the Hong Kong island city of] Victoria and Kowloon, filling the valley floors and mounting the steep hillsides.’ ‘The Colony’s land hunger, always acute, was now approaching famine proportions’, it concluded.18 Until the mid-s, the Hong Kong government provided just minimum welfare services to the poor, in order not to attract more Chinese refugees to Hong Kong. The Chinese refugees and immigrants had to take care of themselves, or to be assisted by voluntary and missionary associations, both local and overseas. But as a result of the Shek Kip Mei fire in , which left more than , squatter residents homeless, the Hong Kong government began a massive resettlement programme.19 The aim was to build multi-storey resettlement blocks and low-cost housing estates for the poor, thus eliminating health and fire hazards in the shanty towns, and clearing occupied lands for normal development.20 Coupled with the provision of housing to the ever-growing 16 Stephen Chiu, The Politics of Laissez-faire: Hong Kong’s Strategy of Industrialization in Historical Perspective, Hong Kong Institute of Asian Pacific Studies Occasional Paper No. (), . 17 18 FEER, Jan. , Vol. , No. , –. HKAR , –. 19 David Faure has argued that the Shek Kip Mei fire was not the reason behind, but simply a convenient excuse to overcome opposition from Chinese members of the Legislative Council for a programme of subsidized housing. Such a programme had been recommended by British officials as early as , and Governor Grantham himself was in support of welfare service as early as . See David Faure, ‘In Britain’s Footsteps: The Colonial Heritage’, in David Faure (ed.), Hong Kong: A Reader in Social History (Hong Kong, ), –. 20 See HKAR , –.
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population was increasing government spending on schools, hospitals, roads and other community needs. By , as Grantham reflected on the achievement of his ten-year governorship: We had more schools and more hospitals than ever before. Nearly finished was a brand new airport, capable of taking the world’s largest aircraft, good progress was being made in slum clearance; a ten-million pound reservoir had been put into service . . . All this could be termed normal progress for a growing and progressive city such as Hong Kong.21
Despite the rosy picture painted by Grantham, thousands still lived in shanty towns and on rooftops. In the s, the mass of the Hong Kong populace still had to struggle for survival: material comfort and political aspiration were beyond their reach.22 In contrast, the foreign expatriates (and some Chinese elites) in Hong Kong lived a privileged and comfortable life. During the s, the foreign and Chinese communities were socially segregated, enjoying their own circles of friendship and entertainment. Although the British and other foreigners were less snobbish and exclusive than they had been prior to the war, some of them still had a sense of superiority over the Chinese. Intermarriage was still uncommon in executive and professional business circles, and close interaction beyond the working environment was rendered difficult by the language barrier and differences in habits. Ironically, the two races coexisted peacefully in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Chinese were generally tolerant of British rule, whilst the British colonizers did not exploit Hong Kong in a way that aroused strong anti-foreign feeling.23 Occasionally, there were violent protests against the British administration in Hong Kong, but not serious racial and political conflicts as had occurred in other British colonies. In short, Hong Kong remained a harmonious society despite the many problems and challenges the bulk of the Chinese faced in the post-war period. The coexistence of the two races was indicative of the cosmopolitan nature of Hong Kong, a meeting point between East and West.24 21
Alexander Grantham, Via Ports: From Hong Kong to Hong Kong (Hong Kong, ),
. 22 David Faure (ed.), A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Society (Hong Kong, ), , . 23 James Hayes, ‘East and West in Hong Kong: Vignettes from History and Personal Experience’, in Pun Ngai and Yee Lai-man (eds.), Narrating Hong Kong Culture and Identity (Hong Kong, ), –. 24 For an analysis of the (superficial) Westernization of Hong Kong, see Joseph Agassi and I. C. Jarvie, ‘A Study in Westernization’, in idem (eds.), Hong Kong: A Society in Transition: Contributions to the Study of Hong Kong Society (London, ), –.
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Thus, the character of Hong Kong underwent significant changes as a result of the founding of the People’s Republic on its doorstep. Although Hong Kong remained British, the colonial authorities had to live in the shadow of Communist China. Hong Kong, the Chinese city, was transformed by the massive influx of refugees and immigrants from the mainland, who constituted the bulk of the population, and who contributed to the economic take-off of the territory in the s. Hong Kong’s place on the international stage was also changing in the post-war period. Its central role in overseas Chinese business networks was eclipsed by China’s integration into the socialist economy and decolonization and political instability in Southeast Asia, which curtailed the China trade. But from the late s, Hong Kong acquired a new role as a manufacturing, and later financial, centre of the world. What is more, after Hong Kong also became a ‘Cold War city’, in that it was influenced by, and helped influence, the confrontation between America and China. ‘The mood and the conviction in Hongkong now is that we are no longer an issue by ourselves alone’, the Hong Kong-based Far Eastern Economic Review argued, ‘but that we are absorbed within the vast orbit of the conflict of two worlds and two ways of life; and that the great change here will be part of the greater change that must come when the final chapter of the cataclysm is written.’25 On such issues as Cold War diplomacy and strategy, it was the ‘official mind’ that mattered.
, , ’ After the end of the Second World War, despite granting independence to India and Pakistan in , and Palestine and Burma the next year, the British Labour government was determined to hold on to Hong Kong. Its retention was important to the United Kingdom for prestige, economic, and, with the intensification of the Cold War, strategic reasons. The fall of Hong Kong into Japanese hands during the Pacific War had represented a humiliation for the British Empire and despite the reservations of Chiang Kai-shek26, the British were eager to recover 25
FEER, Jan. , Vol. , No. , . In , the Chinese Nationalist government might not have lacked the military might to march towards Hong Kong. But without US political support, and with the resumption of the civil war in sight, Chiang chose to act with restraint by not resisting the British reoccupation of Hong Kong. Tsang, Hong Kong, –; Louis, ‘Hong Kong’, . 26
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the territory from the Japanese in . In response to the hope of the US President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, for the return of Hong Kong to China after the war, the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, had declared: ‘Hong Kong will be eliminated from the British Empire only over my dead body!’27 In the post-war world, Britain still aspired to be a world power in spite of its own decline and the dominance of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, hoped to organize ‘a Western Europe system’, backed by ‘the power and resources of the Commonwealth and of the Americans’, so that British influence would be ‘equal [to] that of the United States of America and the USSR’.28 The retention of Hong Kong was consistent with the preservation of Britain’s world power status. Economically, Hong Kong was a free and efficiently run port, providing storage, insurance, banking, and shipping facilities for international trade in the Far East. The Colonial Office and the Board of Trade regarded it as ‘the chief base in the Far East for United Kingdom and Hong Kong industrialists, traders, bankers, and shipowners and a useful market for United Kingdom exports’.29 Throughout the s, the United Kingdom enjoyed a favourable balance of trade with Hong Kong.30 As part of the Sterling Area, Hong Kong held its currency balances in London, thus helping to support the pound and contributing to Britain’s dollar resource.31 On the debit side, the financial cost to the British government of holding Hong Kong was ‘extremely small’. After , apart from a three million pound loan for the airport, Hong Kong did not require financial assistance from London. The colonial authorities were able to balance the annual budget. Although the United Kingdom still bore the greater part of the cost of its garrison, Hong 27 Buckley, Hong Kong, ; Churchill’s remarks quoted in Xiang, Recasting the Imperial Far East, . 28 CP(), Jan. , CAB /, PRO. 29 CRO to UK High Commissioners, Sept. , FO /, F//G; Draft Minute to Prime Minister, enclosed in FO Minute by Dalton, Feb. , FO /, FC/, PRO. Jürgen Osterhammel, ‘British Business in China, s–s’, in R. P. T. Davenport-Hines and Geoffrey Jones (eds.), British Business in Asia since (Cambridge, ), –. 30 Clayton, Imperialism Revisited, . 31 Catherine R. Schenk, Britain and the Sterling Area: From Devaluation to Convertibility in the s (London, ), –, . The existence of a free market for US dollars in Hong Kong meant that the Colony could satisfy most of its dollar requirements without draining the dollar reserves of the UK Treasury. But when sterling was exchanged at a heavy discount on the free market, there would be an appreciable loss of dollars. See Catherine R. Schenk, ‘Closing the Hong Kong Gap: The Hong Kong Free Dollar Market in the s’, Economic History Review, / (May ), –.
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Kong was ‘incidentally the only Colony apart from Aden which makes an Imperial Defence Contribution’.32 The actual value of Hong Kong to the British economy is difficult to gauge, but London certainly perceived it as too economically valuable and efficiently run a colony to abandon.33 As the communist threat to Asia became increasingly acute by the late s, the retention of Hong Kong in British hands acquired strategic importance. Apart from ‘certain obvious strategic advantages’, such as being a listening post on China and controlling communications in the China seas,34 British decision-makers defined Hong Kong’s significance in Cold War terms. From , Britain had been fighting the communist insurgency in Malaya, a vital dollar-earning colony.35 With the impending communist victory in mainland China in , it also saw the importance of defending Hong Kong for psychological reasons. Thinking in terms of what later came to be known as the domino theory, the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, agreed with the view that ‘failure to meet this [communist] threat to the security of Hong Kong would damage very seriously British prestige throughout the Far East and South-East Asia’, and ‘the whole common front against Communism in Siam, Burma and Malaya was likely to crumble’.36 Drawing parallels between the two Cold War outposts, Bevin looked upon ‘the position in Hong Kong rather in the same light as that in Berlin’. ‘As in the case of Berlin’, he stated, ‘it was difficult to foresee the course which events might take, but it was, nevertheless, essential for us to maintain our position in Hong Kong.’37 Although British strategic planners regarded 32 Hong Kong contributed roughly £. million out of £. million for the garrisons p.a. But the net cost to London of keeping troops in Hong Kong was just £. million p.a., since even if these troops were not kept in the territory, it would still cost London £ million for their deployment in Britain, and, in that case, Hong Kong would not pay the £. million towards their cost. CO Minute, July , CO /, FED //, PRO. 33 It should be noted that Hong Kong was more important to certain British mercantile interests than to the British economy as a whole. With the rapid growth of Hong Kong’s manufacturing industries since the mid–s, the United Kingdom had to face competition from Hong Kong’s low-priced products, especially cotton textiles. Draft Minute to Prime Minister, Feb. , FO /, FC/, PRO; Clayton, Imperialism Revisited, . 34 CRO to UK High Commissioners, Sept. , FO /, F/, PRO. 35 See Thomas Kaplan, ‘Britain’s Asian Cold War: Malaya’, in Anne Deighton (ed.), Britain and the First Cold War (London, ), –. 36 CM(), May , CAB /, PRO. 37 Note of meeting between Bevin and Commonwealth Ambassadors in British Embassy, Washington, Sept. , FO /, F///G, PRO.
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the retention of Hong Kong as ‘not essential in a world war’, this was not the case in the Cold War, for its loss would have ‘grave political and morale implications in Asia’.38 Thus, the defence of Hong Kong became a vital link in the containment of communism in Asia.39 The maintenance of Hong Kong’s status quo was also closely bound up with the preservation of British economic interests in China.40 To Great Britain, ‘the primary justification for the retention of Hong Kong as a British colony’ was ‘the position of Hong Kong as an imperial trading base’.41 Traditionally, Hong Kong was seen essentially as a ‘treaty port’, whose economic function was to serve Britain’s ‘informal empire’ in China.42 As a result of the turmoil on the mainland, Hong Kong increasingly became the main base of operations for British mercantile interests. After the outbreak of the Sino–Japanese War in , such large British business firms as Butterfield and Swire, Jardine Matheson, and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation gradually reoriented their priorities and operations from the mainland, especially Shanghai, to Hong Kong—a process that was intensified after . By the early s, as a result of communist protracted appropriation and discriminatory measures, British businesses in China proved untenable and were forced to withdraw to Hong Kong.43 The British then shifted their emphasis from trade in to trade with China. Hong Kong’s role as the main base of Britain’s China trade appeared more important than ever, however disappointing the result turned out to be.44 From a regional perspective, Britain’s conciliatory approach towards Communist China was shaped by, and helped shape, its general containment strategy in Asia. Britain’s Cold War strategy was predicated on its postwar military and economic weaknesses, so that diplomacy would 38
JP(), Apr. , DEFE /, PRO. On the linkage between the preservation of the British Empire and the Cold War, see John Kent, British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War – (London, ). On Hong Kong in particular, see Tang, ‘From Empire Defence to Imperial Retreat’, . 40 Simply put, there were two categories of British economic interests in China: ) industrial enterprises and real estates which carried out trade in China; ) import-export and shipping firms which engaged in trade with China. FO Minute, Feb. , FO /, F//, PRO. 41 Paskin to Dening, May , FO /, F//G, PRO. 42 On this argument, see Bickers, ‘The Colony’s Shifting Position in the British Informal Empire in China’, –. 43 Feng Bangyan, Xianggang Yingzi Caituan [The British Business Groups in Hong Kong] (Hong Kong, ), –; Shai, The Fate of British and French Firms in China. 44 Clayton, Imperialism Revisited, . 39
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be the main instrument to preserve its influence and great power status in the world. According to the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee, which acted as a policy planning body, the Russian threat to Asia was ‘unlikely to be a military one’, and the main danger would be communist political infiltration. This made large-scale military aid unnecessary. Instead, economic aid, backed up by US finance, should be the medium ‘to build up the habit of co-operation’ between the Asian and Western countries against communist penetration. With its ‘large potential resources of all kinds’, India was regarded as ‘the key to the whole problem of South-East Asian regional co-operation’, and ‘the lead she can give to other countries’ in the region ‘a major factor in resisting the spread of communism’.45 Thus, in Asia, what the British government envisaged was a defensive strategy of containment, in which the Asian Commonwealth members, especially India, would play an important role, based on regional economic and political collaboration at first and eventually enlarged into some kind of military arrangement.46 As far as Communist China was concerned, the British attitude was more or less in line with India’s. It was the Indian view that, while organized along orthodox Marxist lines, the Chinese Communists ‘would be Chinese first and Communists second and that they would not be controlled by Moscow’. To the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘China would remain independent of Moscow in its foreign policy and . . . Chinese instinctive distrust of all foreigners would not exclude the Russians’.47 Britain also believed that over time nationalism would emerge stronger than communism in China. According to the Foreign Office, ‘the only hope of encouraging the emergence in China of a less anti-Western tendency’ was to give Beijing time to realize both the ‘necessity of Western help in overcoming its economic difficulties’ and the ‘incompatibility of Soviet imperialism with Chinese national interests’.48 Thus, peaceful diplomacy, not hostile military measures, should be adopted to drive a wedge into Sino–Soviet relations and to contain communist expansion in Asia. 45 PUSC()Final Approval, July , FO /, F//G; PUSC()Final Approval, Aug. , ibid.; CP(), Mar. , CAB /; CM(), Oct. , CAB /; PUSC()Final Approval, Aug. , FO /, F//G, PRO. 46 On this line of argument, also see Singh, The Limits of British Influence. 47 Record of meeting, May , FO /, F//G; New Delhi to CRO, June , FO /, F//G, PRO. 48 FO Reports, Aug. , enclosed in CP(), Aug. , CAB /, PRO.
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But while Britain depended on Chinese goodwill to maintain the status quo in Hong Kong, it also relied heavily on the United States for the preservation of its power and influence in the post-war world. By the end of , Bevin’s idea of creating a ‘third world force’ independent of the two superpowers proved unattainable.49 The Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee concluded that the basis of British foreign policy should be the maintenance of a close Anglo–American alliance, a conclusion endorsed by the Attlee Cabinet.50 Not only was Britain dependent on US financial aid for its economic recovery, it also had to count on the United States for the protection of Western Europe against the Soviet Union.51 After the Suez Crisis of , the Conservative government recognized that Britain could not afford to be a world power without the backing of the United States.52 As long as the unity of the Commonwealth was not upset, and essential resources were not diverted from Europe, Britain would stay in close step with Washington in the Cold War.53 For Prime Ministers Winston Churchill and Harold Macmillan, the maintenance of a ‘special relationship’ with the United States was a higher priority in British foreign policy than Sino–British relations. Half American himself, Churchill enjoyed a close personal relationship with President Dwight D. Eisenhower since their wartime experiences together. On foreign affairs, Churchill was uninterested in the China problem, and was suspicious of the PRC. Instead, he was preoccupied with the revival of Anglo–American cooperation to the wartime level as well as the search for a détente with the post-Stalin Soviet Union. Macmillan, too, had a similar American background and wartime experience with Eisenhower. On the other hand, Clement Attlee had not been 49 Many West European countries were more attracted to federal ideas than to the idea of a ‘third world force’ led by Britain. Britain also lacked the means to mobilize Commonwealth and African resources, while the United States refused to give formal support. John Kent, ‘The British Empire and the Origins of the Cold War, –’, in Deighton (ed.), Britain and the First Cold War, –. 50 Ritchie Ovendale, ‘William Strang and the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee’, in John Zametica (ed.), British Officials and British Foreign Policy – (Leicester, ), –. 51 David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart: The Relationship between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century (New York, ), –. 52 Lord Beloff, ‘The Crisis and its Consequences for the British Conservative Party’, in William Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds.), Suez : The Crisis and its Consequences (Oxford, ), –; William Roger Louis, ‘The Dissolution of the British Empire’, in Judith M. Brown and William Roger Louis (eds.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. : The Twentieth Century (Oxford, ), . 53 For the impact of the ‘three circles’ of Western Europe, the Commonwealth, and the Atlantic alliance on British decision-making, see Kaufman, Confronting Communism.
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so close to President Harry S. Truman, though this was partially compensated for by the good working relationship between their foreign secretaries, Ernest Bevin and Dean Acheson.54 Personal friendships, however, could not hide the conflicting national interests between Britain and America, even though their policy differences may have been centred on means rather than on ends. Indeed, Churchill also had a lot to disagree with Eisenhower over—détente, Indochina, and Taiwan—but he hoped to exploit his ‘special relationship’ with Eisenhower to serve Britain’s national interests. At times, he was willing to subordinate Hong Kong to the broader interests of the Anglo–American relationship. Thus, Hong Kong presented the British government with a persistent problem: accommodating the PRC and simultaneously maintaining solidarity with the United States. Such a dilemma more or less reflected the potential conflict between, on the one hand, the Colonial Office and the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, which put the interests of Hong Kong and relations with China first, and, on the other hand, the North America Department of the Foreign Office, the British Embassy in Washington, together with Cabinet ministers who emphasized the Anglo–American relationship and the wider aspects of the Cold War.55 What made the British balancing act a most delicate one was the attempt by the PRC to exploit the Hong Kong issue to split the Anglo–American alliance. Throughout the s, British officials generally assumed that provided the Chinese Communists were not unduly provoked, they would leave Hong Kong alone because of its economic usefulness as a window to the outside world, its political value in driving a wedge into the Anglo–American relationship, and Beijing’s realization of ‘a terminal date’——for British colonial rule in Hong Kong.56 Before we move forward to discuss US perceptions of Hong 54 Alistair Horne, ‘The Macmillan Years and Afterwards’, in Louis and Bull (eds.), The ‘Special Relationship’, ; Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary – (New York, ), . Under the Labour government, the British Ambassador to the United States, Oliver Franks, was also close to Acheson, and played an important role in cementing the Anglo–American relationship. Danchev, On Specialness, , . 55 Louis further distinguished between the views of the China desk of the Foreign Office and those of the Colonial Office, with the former seeing Hong Kong essentially from the perspective of Anglo–Chinese relations, and the latter viewing it as a colonial dependency moving towards the path of self-government. Ironically, the Hong Kong Governor, Alexander Grantham, held more to the Foreign Office view, in that Hong Kong was essentially a treaty port for China trade, rather than a colony for constitutional reform. Louis, ‘The Critical Phase’, , . 56 Humphrey Trevelyan, Worlds Apart: China –, Soviet Union – (London, ), –; Grantham to CO, July , CO /, /; Black to CO, Oct. , CO /, FED //, PRO.
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Kong in the Cold War, it is necessary to look at Chinese Communist attitudes in order to put Anglo–American policies in perspective.
Long before their coming to power in , Chinese Communist leaders, especially Mao Zedong, aspired to transform the Chinese state and society, and to restore China’s central position in the world. After a century of internal chaos and humiliation by the West, Mao was eager to destroy traditional Chinese society and to construct a revolutionary state based on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and China’s unique historical experience. Mao desired to make a ‘fresh start’ in China’s foreign relations by ‘building a new stove’, ‘cleaning the house before entertaining guests’, and ‘leaning to one side’. The Chinese government would eliminate all imperialist influence on the mainland, develop diplomatic relations with all countries on an equal footing, and re-orient China’s economy and foreign relations towards the socialist bloc. Only in this way could Mao demonstrate to the outside world that the Chinese people had really ‘stood up’.57 The Chinese Communists regarded the three treaties that governed the status of Hong Kong and the New Territories as ‘unequal’.58 To them, these ‘unequal treaties’ were invalid, and the principle of China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong was unassailable. But after the Second World War, the return of Hong Kong was not a priority for Mao, who was preoccupied with the civil war with the Chinese Nationalists, and later the Cold War with the Americans. As early as , Mao, speaking to a group of Western journalists, reportedly said that ‘China has enough trouble on her hands to try and clean up the mess in her own country, leave [sic] alone trying to rule Formosa, for us to clamour for the return of Hong Kong’.59 In January , during the visit of Joseph Stalin’s representative, Anastas Mikoyan, Mao spelt out his view on 57 ZhouEnlai Waijiao Wenxuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy] (Beijing, ), –. For an analysis, see Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York, ), –. 58 They were the Treaty of Nanking of , which ceded Hong Kong island to Britain; the Convention of Peking of , which ceded the Kowloon peninsula and the Stonecutters island; and the Second Convention of Peking of , from which Britain got a -year lease of the New Territories and some islands. 59 Quoted in Tsang, Hong Kong, .
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Hong Kong when talking about China’s internal and foreign policies: ‘At present, half of the territory is still unresolved. It is of no great meaning to resolve the Hong Kong–Macau question quickly.’60 At the time, the main concern of the Chinese Communists was to defeat the Nationalist government on the mainland, and Hong Kong could be useful in that regard. Historically, Hong Kong had served as a regional centre to coordinate and supervise the war effort in south China. In , a Hong Kong–Macau Work Committee was created under the Chinese Communist Party’s Southern Bureau, later the Guangdong Provincial Committee, to facilitate the civil war in south China. It publicly functioned as a branch of the New China News Agency (NCNA) in Hong Kong, which was also set up that year for propaganda and united front work.61 It has been argued that the decision not to press for the return of Hong Kong for the time being was made by Mao between the communist crossing of the Yangtze River in the spring of and the establishment of the PRC in October. In spite of its toleration of British colonial rule, the Chinese Communist leadership regarded Hong Kong as an important issue. Through the Hong Kong–Macau Leading Group under the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council, the Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, together with other leaders such as Chen Yi and Liao Chengzhi, directed the work of the Hong Kong–Macau Work Committee. A few days after the founding of the People’s Republic, Zhou instructed Qiao Guanhua, who headed the NCNA in Hong Kong, about China’s Hong Kong policy. According to Zhou, Hong Kong was a problem ‘left behind by history’, and only history would suggest ‘the timing and condition’ for its resolution. Although China would ‘not recover’ Hong Kong at present, it did not mean it would ‘abandon’ or ‘withdraw’ from Hong Kong. Rather, the resolution of the Hong Kong problem would be ‘a long-term task’.62 Thus, when the People’s Liberation Army came close to the Hong Kong border in mid-October, it was instructed to avoid any incident with the British. 60 Qi Pengfei, Richu Riluo: Xianggang Wenti Yibaiwushiliu Nian (–) [Sunrise, Sunset: One Hundred and Fifty-Six Years of the Hong Kong Problem (–)] (Beijing, ), –. 61 Xu Jiatun, Xu Jiatun Xianggang Huiyilu [Xu Jiatun’s Hong Kong Memoirs], Vol. (Taipei, ), . 62 Jin Yaoru, Zhonggong Xianggang Zhengce Miwen Shilu [A Secret Record of the Chinese Communist Hong Kong Policy] (Hong Kong, ), –. The author had been responsible for press and propaganda work in the Hong Kong–Macau Work Committee of the NCNA since .
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The Chinese Communist determination to maintain the status quo in Hong Kong was not even changed by the Soviet Union. During Mao’s visit to Moscow to negotiate a Sino–Soviet alliance in early , Stalin tried to encourage the Chinese leader to seize Hong Kong because ‘there are a lot of imperialist agents in this city’. What concerned Stalin, it seemed, was not the elimination of British ‘imperialist’ influence in Hong Kong, but the possibility of a normalization of Sino–American relations. In January , the British government had accorded diplomatic recognition to Beijing. Stalin worried that the United States might also try to wean Mao from Moscow by establishing contact with the PRC. A Chinese attack on Hong Kong, Stalin calculated, would thwart the development of possible ties between Beijing and Washington, for in that case the United States would come to the rescue of Britain. Nevertheless, Mao was determined to leave British Hong Kong alone.63 The retention of Hong Kong in British hands served China’s political and economic objectives, particularly after the outbreak of the Korean War in June . When meeting with Huang Zuomei, then head of the NCNA in Hong Kong, in the spring of , Zhou spelt out in detail his views on Hong Kong. China’s Hong Kong policy was ‘part of the strategic arrangements for the general East–West struggle’, and should ‘not be measured by the narrow principle of territorial sovereignty’. By recognizing the PRC, Zhou said, the Attlee government hoped to ‘preserve the strength of the politico-economic sphere of influence of the British Empire in the Far East’. But there were ‘contradictions and struggle’ between Britain and the United States. By allowing Hong Kong to be held in British hands, the Chinese Communists could ‘hold the initiative’, and could ‘widen and utilize’ the Anglo–American ‘contradictions’ in the Far East. Besides, Hong Kong could serve as ‘a window’ for China to the outside world and as ‘an outpost to break the blockade and embargo imposed on China by the US-led Western coalition’. Zhou stressed that the ‘great strategic significance’ of preserving the status quo in Hong Kong had to be recognized.64 In short,
63 Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif., ), . 64 Quoted by Nan Shan and Nan Zhu, Zhou Enlai Shangping [A Life of Zhou Enlai] (Changchun, ), –. Throughout the Korean conflict, Hong Kong was being used for the smuggling of goods, strategic or otherwise, to the mainland. Although the exact volume of these goods is difficult to gauge, some of the Hong Kong merchants involved in smuggling did benefit greatly and get rich later. Xu, Xu Jiatun Xianggang Huiyilu, –; Grantham, Via Ports, .
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the guiding principles of the PRC’s Hong Kong policy were what later became known as ‘long-term planning and full utilization’.65 China’s policy towards Hong Kong remained unchanged after the conclusion of the Korean War in July . From onwards, the Chinese Communists adjusted their revolutionary foreign policy approach by calling for ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the West in order to split the ‘Free World’.66 Britain was an important target for their ‘peaceful coexistence’ initiative, not least because of its concerns over the China trade and Hong Kong. During the Geneva Conference on Indochina in , Zhou and the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, were apparently impressed by each other’s pragmatism in achieving a peace settlement despite US intransigence. In the course of their meetings in June, Zhou and Eden agreed to upgrade Anglo–Chinese diplomatic relations to the chargé level. Shortly after the Geneva Conference, a British Labour Party delegation visited Beijing. When receiving the British guests, Zhou talked at great length about how to promote Sino–British relations and to enhance peaceful cooperation. But Zhou stressed: ‘Don’t talk about premature questions, such as the question of Hong Kong. The [Chinese] government has not considered whether we have to recover Hong Kong and how to recover it.’67 The Chinese toleration of British rule in Hong Kong was not without limits, however. When the Hong Kong Governor, Alexander Grantham, met with Zhou during his private visit to Beijing in October , the Chinese Premier reportedly mentioned several ‘rules of conduct’ for Hong Kong. The British presence in Hong Kong would be tolerated provided that Hong Kong was not used as an anti-communist base; that no activity which undermined the PRC was allowed in Hong Kong; and that the colonial authorities would protect the Chinese government’s representatives and organizations in the territory.68 In his memoirs, Grantham recorded his conversation with Zhou, but made no reference to the ‘rules of conduct’. While in Beijing, according to the memoirs, Grantham and Zhou talked about the scheduled celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Portuguese 65 Wong Man Fong, China’s Resumption of Sovereignty over Hong Kong (Hong Kong, ), ; Qi, Richu Riluo, . 66 For an analysis of Zhou’s strategy of ‘peaceful coexistence’, see Ronald C. Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai (London, ). 67 ZhouEnlai Waijiao Wenxuan, . 68 Luo Ya (Lo Ah), Zhengzhibu Huiyilu [Memories of the Special Branch] (Hong Kong, ), ; and Byron S. J. Weng, ‘Taiwan–Hong Kong Relations, – and Beyond’, American Asian Review, / (Winter ), .
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Colony of Macau. Zhou stated that ‘the Chinese government and the Chinese people did not like these celebrations, nor would the Chinese in Macau and Hong Kong’. To Grantham, the last was ‘a thinly veiled threat that the communists would stir up trouble, and probably serious trouble, in the two colonies’.69 As the US Army Liaison Officer of the American Consulate in Hong Kong assessed it: ‘The warning given to Sir Alexander Grantham in Peking regarding Macau was actually meant for Hong Kong consumption.’70 Thus, whether Zhou had explicitly told Grantham the ‘rules of conduct’ for Hong Kong, or merely conveyed the message implicitly by way of the Macau example is beside the point. What matters is that the British understood that the PRC would react vigorously to what it saw as provocative activities in Hong Kong, as with regard to the proposed celebration in Macau. This meant that both London and Beijing were particularly sensitive to the possible use by Washington of Hong Kong as a base for subversion against the mainland. Did the United States contemplate such a role for Hong Kong?
-, -, ‘ ’ In the course of the Pacific War, President Roosevelt, a follower of the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination, called several times for the end of British rule in Hong Kong after the war. In a secret meeting with Stalin during the Yalta conference in February , Roosevelt expressed his hope of ‘giv[ing] back the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China’ and making the territory an ‘internationalised free port’. As the war progressed, however, the US enthusiasm for supporting Chiang Kai-shek’s demand for the return of Hong Kong gradually cooled because of his presumed incompetence on the one hand, and the increasing importance of Britain on the other. On August, with the acquiescence of the Truman administration, the British Commander, Rear-Admiral Harcourt, received the surrender from the Japanese forces in Hong Kong.71 69 Grantham, Via Ports, –. In the event, the proposed celebrations in Macau were cancelled. 70 Rittgers to Drumright, Nov. , RG , USIS HK –, Box , NA. 71 On US attitudes towards the decolonization of Hong Kong during the Second World War, see Chan Lau Kit-cheng, ‘The United States and the Question of Hong Kong, –’, Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, (), –; William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the
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Nevertheless, after Britain could not take for granted US support for its colonial rule in Hong Kong. During the Cold War, the United States remained anti-colonialist in principle, if not in practice, and was keen to avoid identifying too closely with European colonialism.72 In considering whether ‘the Hong Kong problem’ should be referred to the United Nations in mid-, the State Department was of the view that ‘this would provide the Communists with an opportunity for appearing in a role having wide popular appeal, and would prove embarrassing to this Government in connection with . . . the colonial problem’.73 In a staff study on Hong Kong in , the NSC Planning Board made plain: Despite a consistent record of good government, with substantial achievements in economic and social fields, Hong Kong remains an example of paternalistic white colonial rule over an Asian territory acquired by the techniques of imperialism. In former colonial areas of Asia and Africa, overt American identification with British rule in Hong Kong would be a political liability.74
In other aspects, British Hong Kong did not appear to be vital to US national interests. In , US exports to Hong Kong were less than one per cent of the total, whilst its imports were even more negligible. As a result of the Chinese intervention in the Korean War in late , the US and UN strategic embargoes on the mainland brought US–Hong Kong trade to a standstill. By , despite the gradual relaxation of export controls, the trade did not rise to its level in .75 Less than a thousand Americans lived in Hong Kong in , increasing to a little more than two thousand eight years later. From the viewpoint of security, the JCS believed in that the United States had little military or strategic interest in the British retention of Hong Kong, however serious the psychological impact on the British Empire of its loss. This belief was maintained by the US military in the s.76 British Empire, –, paperback edn. (Oxford, ), –, ; and Andrew Whitfield, Hong Kong, Empire and the Anglo–American Alliance at War, – (Basingstoke, ). 72 David Goldsworthy, ‘Britain and the International Critics of British Colonialism, –’, The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, / (Mar. ), . 73 Sprouse to Butterworth, Aug. , G./–, RG , DF –, Box , NA. 74 Staff Study on Hong Kong, enclosed in Note by Executive Secretary to NSC, NSC , July , DDRS, , Fiche . 75 Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Statistics, – (Hong Kong, ), , ; B. R. Mitchell (ed.), International Historical Statistics: The Americas – (London, ), . 76 See Ch. .
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As the Cold War intensified in the late s, however, the United States gradually saw great value in using colonies and ex-colonies in the global containment of communism. In a sense, the Cold War came to the rescue of the British Empire, which was gradually transformed into an Anglo–American ‘informal empire’, with Britain playing a junior role in the coalition.77 Anti-colonialism as a force in the US policy process had to be balanced against other security and political considerations, such as the global power balance and allied solidarity.78 As one scholar has argued, the willingness of the United States to apply direct pressure for European decolonization was ‘greatest where the colonial power was weak and the liberation movement clearly anti-communist’.79 In the case of Hong Kong, unlike the Dutch East Indies, Britain was not as weak a colonial power as the Netherlands and thus the Truman administration did not press hard for the end to colonial rule. Instead, with its numerous military bases and intelligence collection sites scattered around the world, the British Empire was valued by the United States in the anti-communist struggle. In addition, there was no strong demand for independence, nor even self-government, among the Chinese in Hong Kong, many of whom had fled from the mainland to escape communist rule. Indeed, after , the end of British colonial rule in Hong Kong would mean Chinese Communist domination, since independence was not a feasible option for Hong Kong. Whatever reservations they harboured about European colonialism, the post-war US administrations generally regarded Hong Kong as an exception in the process of decolonization. With the establishment of the PRC in , and the outbreak of the Korean War in , the United States began to define a role for Hong Kong to serve its foreign policy objectives. To begin with, Hong Kong was used for intelligence gathering and ‘China-watching’. That Hong Kong could contribute to US intelligence efforts was the result of three favourable factors: its geographical proximity to the mainland; the availability of Chinese talent; and the convenience of the British facilities. In , the United States, as the first foreign government, opened a consulate in British Hong Kong.80 The coming to power of the Chinese 77
On this argument, see Louis and Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Decolonization’. William Roger Louis, ‘American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire’, in Louis and Bull (eds.), The ‘Special Relationship’, . 79 Geir Lundestad, East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics – (Oslo, ), . 80 Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, . 78
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Communists in brought new significance to the American Consulate General in Hong Kong. As a result of the communist treatment of US consuls in Shenyang, the Truman administration decided to close all US embassies and consulates in mainland China in the winter of –. Consequently, all the consular and reporting work was transferred to the US Consulate in Hong Kong, which was then turned from ‘a quiet post, with a small staff’ in into ‘a busy center, with heavy loads in visa, citizenship, shipping, propaganda, and political and economic intelligence and reporting functions’ by .81 In addition, the consolidation of communist control on the mainland in the early s increased the difficulty of running human agents in a totalitarian state.82 Because of its strategic location, Hong Kong became a principal US listening post on the periphery of the PRC, at a time when Washington had no formal diplomatic contact with Beijing, and lacked even a formal base for operations inside the mainland.83 Intelligence was obtained by interrogations of refugees and through press monitoring.84 Another important aspect of US intelligence operations in Hong Kong concerned economic reporting and export control work. Shortly after the North Korean invasion of South Korea in , the United States secured the agreement of other Western European countries to introduce export controls against the PRC, and, after a series of Chinese Communist offensives in Korea in late and , the approval by the United Nations to impose a strategic embargo on the mainland. In the State Department’s view, Hong Kong, owing to its traditional position as an entrepôt for China, presented ‘an ever-apparent and highly publicised danger to the enforcement of the United States policy of denying the Chinese Communist goods and foreign exchange’.85 In order 81 Rankin to Wright, Nov. , Karl Rankin Papers –, Correspondence (Apr. –May ), Box , Folder , Manuscripts Division, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library; Memo. on Hong Kong, Mar. , RG , CA –, Reel , NA. 82 McConaughy to Acheson, June , RG , The Murphy Collection on International Communism –, China, Box , NA. 83 Flake to McConaughy, May , RG , CA –, Reel ; McConaughy to Burns, Oct. , RG , CA –, Miscellaneous File , Box , NA. As Russell Jack Smith, Chief of the Far East Staff of the CIA’s Office of National Estimates, recollected: ‘Hong Kong became an American watchtower on China [after ] . . . In actuality, the China-watchers had few advantages that analysts in Washington did not have. But they did have propinquity to China itself, not an insignificant advantage.’ Russell Jack Smith, The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency (Washington, ), . 84 See Ch. . 85 Memo. on Hong Kong, Mar. , RG , CA –, Reel , NA.
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to ensure that embargoed strategic goods would not find their way into China, the US Consulate in Hong Kong was charged with the responsibilities of extensive export checks and exhaustive investigations into Hong Kong’s import requirements.86 Hong Kong’s proximity to the mainland made it possible, but also highly necessary, for the Americans to oversee the enforcement of export controls in the territory.87 In Hong Kong, the Americans also obtained intelligence by covert means. In , the US intelligence services established a listening post in the Colony.88 The CIA Hong Kong station was attached to, and under cover of, the US Consulate General.89 After the CIA had purchased the Civil Air Transport Incorporated (CAT) as its air arm in covert operations in , Hong Kong became the financial and managerial headquarters of CAT.90 Just as the American Consulate expanded in scope after the closure of the US embassies in China in , the CIA Hong Kong station also grew in size and importance in the s to cope with the ever increasing demands for intelligence on the PRC.91 Claiming that Stockholm was ‘not a major intelligence center’ in the early s, William Colby, a former CIA operative in Scandinavia and later Director of the CIA, thus wrote: ‘The great challenges to secret intelligence gathering were elsewhere, in Berlin, Vienna and Hong Kong.’92 The United States benefited from the British signals intelligence (SIGINT) post in Hong Kong in the field of technical intelligence collection. Under the UK–USA Security Agreement in , SIGINT collection responsibilities were divided on a geographical basis among the United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. While covering mainly the Soviet Union east of the Urals and Africa, the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) maintained control of the SIGINT facilities in its colonial outposts all over 86
Richard E. Johnson Oral History Interview, Jan. , FAOHP, GU, –. 88 See Ch. . Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, . 89 Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA: Revealing the Secrets of the World’s Most Powerful Spy Agency (New York, ), . 90 CAT was originally founded by General Claire Chennault and Whiting Willauer to assist Chiang’s war efforts against the Chinese Communists. After the CIA had purchased CAT in , General Chennault was ‘promoted’ to the chairmanship in Taipei, whilst Willauer acted as president based in Hong Kong, the new financial and managerial headquarters of CAT. Alfred Cox, the CIA station chief in Hong Kong, became vice-president of CAT, assuming managerial duties for the airline in addition to his own responsibilities for CIA covert actions in Asia. Leary, Perilous Missions, –; Prados, President’s Secret Wars, –. 91 Aldrich, ‘ “The Value of Residual Empire” ’, –. 92 William Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York, ), . 87
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the world, though, in some places, operating jointly with other SIGINT organizations.93 In the late s, the British established the main SIGINT station at Tai Po Sai in Kowloon under the Signals Unit of the Royal Air Force, which was then moved to Little Sai Wan on Hong Kong Island in . Targeted mainly at the southeastern sector of mainland China and across the South China Sea, the Hong Kong SIGINT station was maintained jointly by the British GCHQ and the Australian Defence Signals Directorate, with the presence of American liaison personnel. The signals intelligence collected was shared within the UK–USA intelligence community.94 After the outbreak of the Korean War, intercepting Chinese Communist military communications became all important for the UN war effort. The British SIGINT facilities in Hong Kong were deemed important enough that Britain and the United States planned for the possible emergency evacuation of these facilities in case of a Chinese attack.95 Even though the vast majority of its intercept coverage focused on south China, with the Hong Kong station providing little, if any, signals intelligence on the movement of Chinese Communist troops in the north,96 the United States remained eager to take advantage of the many convenient listening posts of the British Empire in the Cold War.97 The US Navy, in addition, valued the ‘rest and recreation’ facilities in Hong Kong for its servicemen. One of the great advantages which attracted US naval visits to Hong Kong was its deep-water harbour. According to a briefing pamphlet for the Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Fleet, ‘Hong Kong Harbor is so well charted that normally 93 Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries—the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Boston, ), –, –. According to intelligence historian Christopher Andrew, the date of the secret UKUSA Agreement should be , not as most scholars (including Richelson and Ball) had recorded. Christopher Andrew, ‘Intelligence and International Relations in the early Cold War’, Review of International Studies, / (), . 94 See Ball, ‘Over and Out’, –. 95 See James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America’s Most Secret Agency (Boston, ), –. 96 Matthew M. Aid, ‘American Comint in the Korean War: From the Chinese Intervention to the Armistice’, Intelligence and National Security, / (Spring ), . 97 During the s, a US plan to build a SIGINT station in Thailand close to the PRC met with local resistance, notwithstanding the US–Thailand Mutual Security Alliance of . On the other hand, the National Security Agency was allowed to establish a Communications Intelligence Relay station in Hong Kong, linking it to the one in the Philippines. Aldrich, ‘ “The Value of Residual Empire” ’, ; Ball, ‘Over and Out’, .
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no navigational difficulties should be encountered.’ Besides, ‘adequate wharf and pier facilities are available’, and ‘[p]rivate dock facilities are quite sufficient to handle ordinary ship repairs of an emergency nature’, with the nearest US Navy repair facilities in the Philippines.98 As Admiral Arthur Radford, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific in the early s, vividly described it: ‘The quiet, the good food and European comforts of Hong Kong convinced me that the Crown Colony should become a major rest and recreational center for men and officers of the fleet.’99 The Commander of the Seventh Fleet, in particular, regarded Hong Kong as one of the best liberty ports and was eager to schedule ‘[a]s many ships as possible’ for visits to the Colony. As a report on its operations between mid- and mid- noted: ‘The regular scheduling of ships of the Seventh Fleet to visit various ports in the Far East for leave and recreation has been a positive morale-builder and an effort is made to schedule each ship for a visit to Hong Kong at least once during its tour.’100 As a production and coordination centre of anti-communist materials for Southeast Asia, Hong Kong contributed to the US psychological warfare against Communist China. Established in , the United States Information Service in Hong Kong (USIS Hong Kong) was of a special character owing to the favourable situation of Hong Kong—its proximity to China, the availability of talented Chinese, and low production costs. As the State Department’s program inspector, Theodore B. Olson, reported on USIS Hong Kong in mid-: ‘Hong Kong’s real importance is twofold: ) as a window looking into Communist China and a door opening both inward and outward; ) as a reservoir of Chinese intelligence and Chinese talent which can be used most effectively on the spot in preparing materials for Chinese audiences elsewhere’. ‘The USIS operation in Hong Kong’, he continued, ‘is relatively small in dimensions but more than usually complex. It is addressed not to one audience group but to at least four; not to a single country but to seven or more’. Although based in Hong Kong, USIS ranked the Hong Kong audience, including both Chinese and British, ‘only third
98 CINCPACFLT Briefing Pamphlet No. –, Apr. , RG , CA –, Reel , NA. 99 Quoted in Association for Radical East Asian Studies, Hong Kong: Britain’s Last Colonial Stronghold (London, ), . 100 Commander of Seventh Fleet to CNO, Aug. , Post Reports, Box , NHC.
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and fourth in priorities’, behind overseas Chinese and mainland Chinese audiences. Although anti-communist materials were produced in Hong Kong, they were used mainly by other USIS posts in Southeast Asia and other agencies in Washington.101 USIS Hong Kong was primarily responsible for producing Chinese language anti-communist materials—in printed form, for radio broadcasts and on film. Its main publications included World Today (or America Today prior to ), a semi-monthly magazine attributed to USIS, and Four Seas, a monthly pictorial which was unattributed. It also produced pamphlets and motion picture leaflets, and assisted local publishers with the production and translation of books. Chinese language scripts were produced for the Voice of America broadcasts from transmitters in Manila and Honolulu.102 In August , the Eisenhower administration established the United States Information Agency (USIA) to take over all overseas information programmes, formerly under the supervision of the Department of State, and to implement the planning of the newly created Operations Coordinating Board.103 USIA approved Country Plans submitted by USIS posts all over the world, and provided guidance on official propaganda to further US national interests.104 It signified an intensified effort of overt or white propaganda, in addition to the psychological and covert operations undertaken by the CIA.105 Nevertheless, US strategic, economic, and military interests were global in nature. It is one thing that Washington regarded Hong Kong as useful for intelligence gathering, overt propaganda, and export controls against China. It is quite another that the administration would necessarily follow the policy recommendations of the American Consulate in Hong Kong,106 let alone committing the United States to the defence of the British Colony. Indeed, Taiwan also played an important role in intelligence gathering on Communist China. With its huge CIA station of staff, the presence of military intelligence units, and the stationing of sophisticated telecommunications monitoring
101 Inspection Report to State by Olson, June , RG , USIS HK –, Box , NA. 102 HK to USIA, Mar. , RG , USIS HK –, Box , NA. 103 Scott Lucas, ‘Campaigns of Truth: The Psychological Strategy Board and American Ideology, –’, The International History Review, / (May ), –. 104 Hans W. Tuch, Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas (New York, ), . 105 See Ch. . 106 Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, –.
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facilities after , the United States made full use of its ally’s territory for intelligence and covert operations.107 If the British government had Hong Kong in mind in dealing with the PRC, the US administration was certainly more concerned about American domestic politics and the global struggle with the Soviet Union than about the fate of the Colony. In the course of the s, the United States, gradually and sometimes reluctantly, increased its commitment to Taiwan by providing substantial economic and military assistance, concluding a mutual defence pact, and supporting its continued representation in the United Nations and other international organizations. On the other hand, the Truman administration after Chinese intervention in Korea and the Eisenhower administration after sought to weaken the PRC by political isolation, economic containment, and military encirclement. A hard-line wedge strategy against China, it was hoped, would increase Beijing’s dependence on Moscow, create unfulfilled expectations and impractical demands between the two socialist brothers, and finally contribute to the collapse of the Sino–Soviet alliance.108 In short, Hong Kong was only a peripheral factor in US global considerations. If Hong Kong per se was not central to US global interests, Britain as a junior partner in the Cold War certainly was. With Germany and France seriously devastated in the immediate aftermath of the war, Britain remained a principal power, and helped galvanize other European countries to support the US strategy of containment. The United States needed Britain’s contribution to the defence of Western Europe, and expected Britain to play a leading role in European integration. Until the Suez Crisis in , the Americans basically regarded the Middle East as a British responsibility.109 In Asia, however, the socalled Anglo–American ‘special relationship’ appeared more problematical. However close was his friendship with Churchill, Eisenhower did not want to appear to give a privileged status in Britain, which he saw as just ‘one among a number of allies’.110 In private, though, Eisenhower
107 See John W. Garver, The Sino–American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia (Armonk, NY, ), –. 108 On the US wedge strategy against the Sino–Soviet alliance, see John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York, ), –. 109 David Reynolds, ‘Great Britain’, in idem (ed.), The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (New Haven, ), –. 110 Ritchie Ovendale, Anglo–American Relations in the Twentieth Century (London, ), .
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did expect more from the British. Especially in times of crisis, the United States was eager to work in concert with its allies in order to reduce the burden of containment. In practice, Britain thus stood out as the closest of all US allies in the Cold War.111
111 Dobson has distinguished between formal and informal, or de facto, special relationship between Britain and the United States. See Alan P. Dobson, ‘Informally Special? The Churchill–Truman talks of January and The State of Anglo–American Relations’, Review of International Studies, / (), –.
Defending the Indefensible Colony: Anglo-American Exchanges over the Security of Hong Kong 1 The most serious challenge to the British retention of Hong Kong since the Japanese occupation and Chiang’s unsuccessful claims came in when the Chinese Communists were about to gain complete victory over the Nationalists in the Chinese civil war. The Labour government sent reinforcements to Hong Kong twice in order to deter, but failing that, to defend against a possible communist attack. In the event, Hong Kong survived the establishment of the PRC in October. Its military vulnerability in the shadow of Beijing nonetheless continued to worry London throughout the s, as conflicts in Korea, Indochina, and the Taiwan Strait raised the spectre of an attack in the context of a wider Sino–American war; and as the British domestic economy and defence policy necessitated the reduction of overseas garrisons, rendering Hong Kong indefensible against an external attack save with outside assistance. In , the question of Hong Kong’s defensibility again came to the forefront in the light of the general defence review under the new Conservative government. The Hong Kong garrison would be reduced to a level such as was inadequate to fulfil the main tasks of internal security. Throughout this period, US air and naval support for Hong Kong was considered to be vital for defending the indefensible Colony. To the United States, the defence of Hong Kong was important not in itself, but rather for its international implications, notably for Anglo–American relations. US military officials evaluated the security of Hong Kong in accordance with their assessments of the communist threat and of British intentions and capabilities to hold the Colony. When considering a possible US commitment to Hong Kong, however,
1 This chapter is a revised version of my article, ‘A Reward for Good Behaviour in the Cold War: Bargaining over the Defence of Hong Kong, –’, The International History Review, / (Dec. ), –.
Defending the Indefensible Colony
decision-makers in Washington placed more emphasis on London’s probable support for the United States elsewhere in Asia. By the same token, calculations and expectations of US reactions were vital to the British in planning for the defence of Hong Kong.
From late onwards, the future of British Hong Kong became uncertain in view of the communist defeat of the Nationalists in Manchuria and North China. In early , the British did not worry about a direct communist attack on Hong Kong; rather, their worries were internal unrest caused by the influx of refugees, communistinspired strikes, and local guerrilla attacks.2 As the British defence policy for Hong Kong since was to abandon the Colony in the event of a global war or a large-scale attack, the garrison there consisted of just one infantry brigade. This strength was considered by the Colonial Office to be ‘seriously insufficient’ to cope with the probable refugee problem and guerrilla attacks. But it was not until after the outbreak of the Amethyst Incident on April, which dealt a great blow to British prestige in the Far East,3 that the Cabinet decided (eight days later) to strengthen the Hong Kong garrison by one brigade group.4 As the Chinese Communists continued their advance south in May, the British began to be concerned not just about internal unrest, but also about the risk of a direct communist attack. Both the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office believed that the authorized reinforcements would
2 CO Memo. for COS Secretariat, enclosed in Paskin to Dening, Jan. , FO /, F//G; MoD to GHQ,FE, Jan. , F//G, PRO. 3 On April, the Royal Navy frigate, HMS Amethyst, while sailing from Shanghai to Nanjing, came under heavy communist artillery fire and was grounded in the Yangtze River, with serious casualties and damage. Several attempts by the Royal Navy to rescue Amethyst failed and resulted in more deaths. Although Amethyst finally managed to escape in late July, the incident had become a subject of hot debate in Parliament, and exposed the limits of British power in the Far East. According to Tsang, the decision to reinforce Hong Kong was aimed mainly at restoring confidence in the Far East as a result of this humiliating incident. Tsang, Hong Kong, –. For a comprehensive account of the Amethyst Incident, see Malcolm H. Murfett, Hostage on the Yangtze: Britain, China, and the Amethyst Crisis of (Annapolis, Md., ). 4 CO Memo. for the COS Secretariat, Jan. , FO /, F//G; CM(), Apr. , CAB /, PRO.
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not be able to meet a major attack and that additional forces should be sent in order to show British determination to defend Hong Kong.5 The Attlee Cabinet increasingly saw the issue in Cold War terms: failure to meet the communist threat to Hong Kong ‘would damage very seriously British prestige throughout the Far East and Southeast Asia’, and ‘the whole front against communism in Siam, Burma and Malaya was likely to crumble’. On May, the Cabinet decided to send further reinforcements to Hong Kong, bringing the army strength up to a division plus a brigade, supported by heavy guns, tanks, and sea and air forces.6 In the meantime, the Hong Kong government passed a number of ordinances to increase its power in dealing with the internal security situation, for example the power of curfew, suppression of illegal strikes, registration of persons, and expulsion of undesirables.7 With the much strengthened garrison and the control of air and sea, the British were confident about deterring a communist attack, and if that failed, putting up the best fight with the available forces while appealing to the United Nations for help. But by committing such a large force (a total of five brigades) to Hong Kong, they increased its significance, for its loss would have serious consequences for British prestige and imperial defence.8 Thus, despite its confidence in Hong Kong’s defence, the Labour government still hoped to obtain promises of support from the Commonwealth countries and especially the United States. However close Anglo–American relations were in Europe, London could not take US support for British colonial rule in Asia for granted. As the Acting UK High Commissioner in Canada reported in early , ‘the whole idea of colonial rule was repugnant to North American thought’, and Britain ‘would need to have a very strong case indeed if she was to secure backing whether in Canada or in the United States for maintaining by force of arms British sovereignty in a Crown Colony’.9 In order to rally US support, the British calculated that the defence of Hong Kong should be presented as ‘a decision to resist [communist] aggression’, not a policy to preserve British colonial rule.10 To Ernest 5 CP(), May , CAB /; Memo. by Attlee, May , FO /, F//G, PRO. 6 CM(), May , CAB /, PRO; HKAR , . 7 Lieutenant Colonel D. H. Oxley (ed.), Victoria Barracks – (Hong Kong, ), . 8 Tsang, Hong Kong, . 9 Acting UK High Commissioner in Canada to CRO, May , FO /, F//G, PRO. 10 CM(), May , CAB /, PRO.
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Bevin, London had to be ‘very cautious’ in its approach to Washington. What the British government wanted at this stage was US ‘moral support’, not ‘a public statement by U.S. Government’ on defending Hong Kong, since this might ‘create difficulties for the U.S. Administration, particularly while the ratification of the [North Atlantic] Pact and the Arms Bill are still under consideration’. Ambassador Franks agreed that the matter should be handled very carefully, so that ‘the Americans should not get the impression that we are forcing them’.11 In early , the Far East was not high on the global agenda of the Europe-oriented Truman administration, preoccupied with the Berlin Blockade and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty. Given the lack of a great US stake in Hong Kong, the State Department regarded its uncertain future in view of the Chinese Communist advance as ‘a British problem’, and recommended that the administration should not take the initiative in raising the question with the British.12 Thus, when, on the occasion of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington in early April, Bevin mentioned to Dean Acheson that ‘it was most important that we should stand firm’ in Hong Kong, the latter ‘had no particular comment to make’. The Foreign Office minuted that this was ‘(n)ot very encouraging’, and thus every effort should be made to convince the Americans that ‘Hong Kong is just as useful to U.S. business in the Far East as it is to British.’13 Two days later, Bevin told Acheson that, as regards Hong Kong, ‘the United Kingdom intended to stand firm, making it, if necessary, a sort of “Berlin of the East”, which could be used to influence the Chinese situation whatever might eventuate’. To Acheson, ‘the thought of another Berlin, if this involved another airlift, filled me with considerable distaste!’14 In fact, at this stage, the Truman administration was not clear about Britain’s long-term policy with regard to Hong Kong. Owing to the Foreign Office’s desire to keep on good terms with the Chinese 11 FO to Paris, May , FO /, F//G; Paris to FO, June , F//G; Franks to FO, June , FO /, F//G, PRO. 12 Memo. by Davies, May , enclosed in Sprouse to Butterworth, May , RG , CA –, Reel , NA. 13 Franks to FO, Apr. , FO /, F//; Minute by Coates, Apr. , ibid., PRO. 14 Memo. of Conversation, Apr. , FRUS, , , pt. , –. As Tsang and Louis forcefully argued, the British defined the significance of Hong Kong in Cold War terms in order to rally US support, not to turn the Colony into another flashpoint like Berlin. Tsang, ‘Strategy for Survival’, ; Louis, ‘Hong Kong’, .
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Communists, the Labour government had refrained since the end of the war from making any firm statement on British intentions in Hong Kong. Even after the Cabinet had decided to reinforce the Hong Kong garrison in April–May, as late as mid-June it had yet to devise a longterm policy regarding Hong Kong’s future.15 In response to Acheson’s query about how to discuss the Hong Kong question with the British, George Kennan, the head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, stated that ‘it would be somewhat academic on our part to come up with policy suggestions prior to knowing at least what the British intentions are’, and recommended that, if Bevin raised the issue, Acheson adopt ‘a Socratic approach’ by asking questions to clarify the British view.16 Such an opportunity occurred during the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris on May. Bevin handed Acheson a memorandum announcing the British decision to send further reinforcements to Hong Kong, and asking for ‘the moral support’ of the United States ‘as representing a contribution to the general aim of us all to resist Communist expansion’.17 When Bevin’s advisor, R. E. Barclay, raised the issue of Hong Kong some days later, Acheson expressed the view that, in an unprovoked military attack on Hong Kong, which the State Department thought to be unlikely, the United States would give ‘moral support’ to the British and support them ‘in an appeal to the United Nations’. Acheson then asked how the British would respond to the communist pressure of boycotts and blockades, which was believed to be ‘the most probable course’, and what they expected from an appeal to the United Nations, when ‘the issues might not be very clear and when the offending party would not be a member of the United Nations’. He added that a British reply to these questions ‘would help to clarify American thinking on this whole problem’. When meeting with Bevin on June, Acheson again asked what the British would do if the Chinese Communists ‘resorted merely to economic pressures’, a question to which Bevin ‘did not make any direct answer’.18 In 15 Not until June did the Cabinet decide to undertake at once a ‘thorough review of long-term policy in respect of Hong Kong’. On British attitudes towards the status of Hong Kong in the early post-war period, see Tsang, Hong Kong, –. 16 Kennan to Butterworth, May , G./–, RG , DF –, Box , NA. 17 Memo. by Bevin to Acheson, in Paris to Dening, June , FO /, F//G, PRO. 18 Memo. of Conversation, June , RG , CA –, Reel , NA; Paris to FO, June , FO /, F//G, PRO; Memo. of Conversation, June , FRUS, Memorandum of the Secretary of State, – and Meetings and Visits of Foreign Dignitaries –, Microfiche Supplement, Fiche .
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short, this exchange of views on Hong Kong was purely exploratory. Without knowing accurately British intentions in Hong Kong and probable reactions to communist actions, the Truman administration remained non-committal. If the American estimate of British intentions was uncertain, their assessment of the communist threat to Hong Kong seemed more definite. A report from the US Consulate General in Hong Kong in early June pointed out that the Chinese Communists would not launch a military attack against the Colony, and would instead use such economic weapons as cutting water and food supplies and stopping rail services.19 The US Ambassador in China, John Leighton Stuart, drew a similar conclusion in his communication to the State Department.20 According to a CIA estimate in mid-June: ‘The eventual return of Hong Kong to China . . . appears probable, but not within the calendar year of .’21 Despite the rather optimistic intelligence estimate of communist intentions in Hong Kong, the US military could not completely ignore the possibility of a communist attack, since this might have ‘serious military implications affecting the long-range security interests of the United States in the Pacific’. In a study of the implications of a possible communist attack on foreign colonies in South China, the US Army highlighted the Chinese Communist capability of subjecting Hong Kong to attack, and drew out seven general courses of action open to the administration, including military assistance to the British, appropriate action under the North Atlantic Treaty, and introduction of the problem to the United Nations, with the last being the ‘most feasible and desirable’.22 Based on this study, the JCS offered their military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the NSC. Geographically, Hong Kong lacked ‘natural defensive strength and the depth necessary for defense by large forces and for the security of vital installations’. A successful defence of Hong Kong would require ‘the establishment of a military position well inland’, which in turn would involve ‘a movement of largescale forces into China’. Thus, ‘unless we are willing to risk major military involvement in China and possibly global war’, it would be ‘unwise’ for the United States to contribute forces for the defence of 19
HK to State, June , RG , HKC –, Box , NA. Stuart to Acheson, June , FRUS, , , –. 21 ORE –, CIA, June , TP, PSF, Intelligence File, Box , HSTL. 22 Memo. by Chief of Staff, US Army, June , in Note by Secretaries to JCS, JCS /, June , RG , Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part : –, The Far East (China), Reel . 20
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Hong Kong.23 Indeed, US strategy in the Pacific up till the outbreak of the Korean War avoided military entanglement in continental Asia, and instead relied on the so-called ‘defensive perimeter’ that stretched through the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan to project US power. In , Acheson excluded Taiwan, Korea, and Indochina, not to mention Hong Kong, from this perimeter.24 Just as the Americans were assessing British intentions and capabilities to hold Hong Kong, the British too were calculating the responses of the Commonwealth countries as well as the United States to their requests for assistance to the Colony. On June, the Cabinet was informed that, except for New Zealand and, to a lesser extent, South Africa, other Commonwealth governments were reluctant to commit themselves to the British position in Hong Kong. As regards those questions raised by Acheson and the State Department, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, said that ‘they raised the whole problem of long-term policy in respect of Hong Kong’, and thus it was time to ‘review that problem afresh in the light of the changed conditions in China’. Bevin stated that, in the light of the Commonwealth and US responses, the British government, it appeared, ‘would have to bear the main responsibility for devising effective measures of safeguarding British interests in Hong Kong’. It was agreed that the government should ‘undertake at once a thorough review of longterm policy in respect of Hong Kong’.25 This was completed two months later, and the Cabinet concluded on August that the British government would be prepared to discuss the future of Hong Kong only with a central Chinese government that was ‘friendly, stable and in control of a united China’. Such a Chinese government, it was noted, ‘did not exist at present’, and until conditions changed, the British intended ‘to retain their position in Hong Kong’.26 23 A Report to NSC by Secretary of Defense, NSC , July , RG , NSC Policy Paper File, Box , NA. 24 For a critical analysis of the ‘defensive perimeter’ strategy, see John Lewis Gaddis, ‘The Strategic Perspective: The Rise and Fall of the “Defensive Perimeter” Concept, –’, in Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs (eds.), Uncertain Years: Chinese–American Relations, – (New York, ), –. 25 CM(), June , CAB /, PRO. 26 The Cabinet endorsed the conclusion ‘as an interim policy’, after omitting the words ‘and democratic’ from the original statement (CP()). It also agreed that further consideration should be given to the suggestion that Hong Kong be brought ‘under some system of international control’. On September, the Foreign Office ruled out the possibility of ‘an international regime’ for Hong Kong due to foreseeable difficulties. In the circumstances, the UK government considered that it was ‘not possible or desirable’ to determine
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The future of Hong Kong became a greater concern for the United States in the late summer of . By that time, the Truman administration was undertaking a ‘very thorough study and reexamination of our [US] policy in the Far East’ in view of the impending communist victory on the mainland and the growing divergence in Anglo–American policies. Acheson desired to have ‘a frank exchange of views’ with the British in order to find out how far they would support the United States on such issues as continued recognition of Nationalist China, trade control policy, and Chinese representation in the United Nations.27 The Hong Kong issue also came up in the Anglo–American discussions as part of their policy coordination. On September, the Assistant UnderSecretary of the Foreign Office, Esler Dening, told his US counterpart, Walton Butterworth, that the British forces in Hong Kong ‘would be adequate to deal both with a frontal attack and internal unrest at the same time, if necessary’. In reply to those questions raised by Acheson in June, Dening stated: ‘It was not possible to estimate how long the resistance would have to be maintained but, as with Berlin, the British Government faced the prospect with resolution.’28 Three days later, Bevin reiterated to Acheson the British view that they could defend Hong Kong from both external attack and internal trouble. Bevin then read out a statement that Britain would only ‘discuss the future of Hong Kong with a friendly and stable Government of a unified China’, and until such conditions came, it ‘intend[ed] to remain in Hong Kong’. Acheson commented that the conclusion was ‘a sound and reasonable one, which should receive the support of the U.S. Government’, and Bevin replied that ‘our agreement would be encouraging to his Government’.29 It became clear to the Truman administration that Britain was determined to hold on to, and felt confident of defending Hong Kong.30 In the meantime, US intelligence sources continued to suggest that an a long-term policy for the future of Hong Kong, and that ‘until conditions change our policy must be to remain in Hong Kong’. Thus, the ‘interim policy’ of Aug. became de facto ‘long-term policy’. CM(), Aug. , CAB /; Scarlett to Barcley, Sept. , FO /, F//G; CRO to UK High Commissioners, Sept. , F//G, PRO. 27 Acheson to Douglas, July , FRUS, , , –. 28 Conversation between Dening and Butterworth, Sept. , FO /, F//G, PRO; Memo. of Conversation, Sept. , RG , CA –, Reel , NA. 29 Memo. of Conversation, Sept. , FRUS, , , –; FO Memo., Sept. , FO /, F//G, PRO. 30 A Report to NSC by Acting Secretary of State, NSC /, Sept. , RG , NSC Policy Paper File, Box , NA.
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overt Chinese military attack on Hong Kong was unlikely, although communist subversive activity remained a threat.31 This was confirmed by the US Consulate in Hong Kong after the founding of the PRC on October, which reported that developments along the Hong Kong frontier were regarded as ‘gratifying to the British authorities’, since regular communist troops ‘did not approach closer than twenty-five miles from the frontier’.32 If the US assessment of the communist threat to Hong Kong was optimistic, its estimate of British capabilities to hold the Colony was not. After studying the British view regarding the defence of Hong Kong, the JCS concluded that their British counterparts were ‘over optimistic’ in believing that they could withstand determined communist attacks, or even a Chinese boycott or blockade. In addition, from the viewpoint of US security, the JCS had ‘little military or strategic interest’ in the British retention of Hong Kong, since US war plans did not call for the retention by force of ‘any foothold in continental China or Korea’ in the event of war; nor could the United States contribute forces for the defence of the Colony ‘without risking major military involvement and possibly global war’.33 On October, the NSC endorsed the JCS view that the United States would ‘not provide military support’ to the British for the defence of Hong Kong in the event of a communist military attack; instead, it would provide ‘moral support’ in an appeal to the UN. To the NSC, the latter course would not involve the use of US forces, for the Soviet Union ‘would certainly veto any Security Council action involving employment of armed forces under UN auspices’. Approved by Truman the next day, NSC Action No. was to guide the US approach towards the defence of Hong Kong until it was superseded by a more comprehensive NSC policy statement in .34 In , after a series of discussions in the context of the Anglo–American response to the rise of Communist China, the Truman administration was impressed by the British argument of the significance of Hong Kong in the Cold War. Nevertheless, the United States was
31 See HK to State, Oct. , RG , HKC –, Box , NA; ORE –, CIA, Oct. , TP, PSF, Intelligence File, Box , HSTL. 32 Rankin to Acheson, Nov. , FRUS, , , –. 33 A Report to NSC by Secretary of Defense, NSC /, Oct. , RG , NSC Policy Papers File, Box , NA. 34 Minutes of th NSC Meeting, Oct. , RG , NSC Meeting, Box , NA.; NSC Action No. b, Oct. , TP, PSF, Subject File, National Security Council (A–D), Box , HSTL.
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unwilling to commit its scarce resources and sacrifice its priorities in Europe by giving more than ‘moral support’ to the Labour government. But this ‘moral support’ was all that the British sought, at a time when they were confident of deterring, and probably defending Hong Kong against, a communist attack.35
Although Hong Kong survived the establishment of a communist regime on its doorstep in , the North Korean invasion of the South in June and the massive Chinese intervention in November again raised questions about its external defence. The British main worries were not an isolated attack by Beijing on Hong Kong, but a possible communist attack on Taiwan which would lead to hostilities between the United States and the PRC. In such a situation, the British would be caught in a policy dilemma: their support for the United States in defending Taiwan might provoke the PRC into attacking Hong Kong; while their non-involvement in a Sino–American war would split the Anglo–American alliance.36 The British policy was to restrain Washington from extending the conflict beyond the Korean peninsula, an extension which would trigger a Chinese attack and present London with difficult choices. In this regard, Hong Kong would be ‘defended’ by a diplomacy of restraint on the part of Britain.37 In essence, the British sense of vulnerability over Hong Kong stemmed from the weakness of its much reduced garrison vis-à-vis China’s growing military strength. Earlier in March–April, the worsening situation in Malaya, where a counter-insurgency was waging, had necessitated the dispatch of two brigades ( Gurkha and Commando Brigades) from Hong Kong to that more critical theatre.38 By the time the Korean War started, there were only two brigades and two squadrons in the Colony, a garrison which was considered inadequate to hold a serious attack. In addition, the concentration of Chinese troops 35 As Louis has argued, Bevin wanted ‘to secure general American endorsement for the British stand but to leave it at that’. Louis, ‘Hong Kong’, –. 36 Crowe to Garner, July , CO /, /; GHQ,FE to MoD, Aug. , ibid., PRO. 37 See Ch. . 38 DO(), Mar., CAB /; DO(), Apr. , ibid., PRO.
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in Guangzhou close to Hong Kong left the British with little or no advance warning of a communist attack.39 Thus, in view of the US demands for a British commitment to the Korean campaign, the Chiefs of Staff thought it ‘militarily unsound’ to send any land or air forces from Hong Kong or Malaya to the peninsula. Even when Prime Minister Attlee, for ‘strong psychological reasons’, decided in late July to commit British forces to Korea, it was stressed that the proposed Brigade Group ‘should not be formed at the expense of the Hong Kong Garrison’.40 But the critical situation in Korea in late August could not await the slow formation and deployment of Independent Infantry Brigade from faraway Britain. Under tremendous US pressure, the Cabinet, for the sake of the Anglo–American relationship, had to send immediately from Hong Kong the two-battalion th Brigade to help defend the Pusan perimeter.41 All these developments as a result of the Korean War called into question the existing British defence policy for Hong Kong. While Britain’s global strategy in the event of a world war was to abandon the Colony (and indeed the Far East as a whole), British military officials and strategists now had to ponder a situation in which Hong Kong would be ‘attacked by China, covertly supported by Russia, as part of a limited war’, a war which would involve China and Britain only without ‘becoming a world war’.42 To the Chiefs of Staff, ‘it is problematical whether Hong Kong could be considered defensible’ in such a limited war. To meet this threat, it was necessary ‘to increase considerably the land and air forces in Hong Kong’, the consequence of which, however, would ‘gravely undermine our efforts in the Cold War elsewhere and our readiness for the Hot War’. But these had to be balanced against ‘the very serious effects in the Far East of losing Hong Kong in the face of a local attack’. The British Chiefs thus suggested that Britain should ‘deter Communist China from attacking Hong Kong by giving the impression that there would be strong opposition’—i.e. ‘a policy of bluff’.43 On September, the Cabinet Defence Committee concluded as the interim Hong Kong defence policy that Britain would not rein39 40 41
Gregorian, The British Army, –. DO(), July , CAB /; DO(), July , ibid., PRO. Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War (Manchester, ),
–. 42
MoD to BJSM, Washington, July , FO /, FC//G, PRO. COS(), July, , DEFE /; COS(), Aug. , DEFE /, PRO. 43
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force the Colony with forces other than the replacement of the two battalions sent to Korea,44 and would appeal to the United Nations in the event of a Chinese attack. Britain would try to deter the PRC from attacking Hong Kong and avoid provoking Beijing. In the meantime, the British also considered the possibility of seeking US assistance in the event of an attack on Hong Kong.45 Indeed, the North Korean invasion had prompted Attlee to suggest to Truman in early July the holding of high-level staff talks in Washington to examine the political and military implications of the crisis for the world situation. At the first meeting with the Chairman of the JCS, General Omar Bradley, on July, Franks and Dening indicated that Britain had ‘sufficient forces’ to maintain internal security in Hong Kong, and to resist a ‘small-scale’, though not a ‘major’, attack by Beijing. They also stated that an armed attack on Hong Kong ‘would result in a virtual state of war [between Britain and China] and that they would appeal to the UN’. The next day, in reply to an American inquiry, the British said that they would not consider ‘the possibility of a UN trusteeship over Hongkong’ as ‘a possible means of forestalling a Communist attack’, and would discuss the future of Hong Kong ‘only with a friendly, united and democratic China’.46 Apart from discovering British intentions in Hong Kong, the Americans also assessed the changing security situation there. The US Consulate in Hong Kong reported to Washington that a direct communist attack on Hong Kong ‘cannot be ruled out’ since there were ‘nearly , Communist troops massing in the Canton area with only half of them scheduled to move north’. The external security of the Colony, moreover, had been ‘considerably weakened’ by the recent communist conquest of the Manshan islands, a series of Sino–Hong Kong border incidents, and the Western embargoes on China of gasoline and other strategic items which lessened Hong Kong’s economic usefulness to Beijing. The one bright spot was the internal situation, which remained relatively calm and stable at this stage.47 44 For the British military’s deliberations over the return of the th Infantry Brigade to Hong Kong, see Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, Vol. : An Honourable Discharge (London, ), –. 45 MoD to GHQ,FE, Oct. , FO /, FC//G, PRO. 46 Summary Notes of st and nd Meetings, and July , TP, DSR, Document File [No.], Box , HSTL; COS(), July , DEFE /, PRO. 47 Daily Summary Excerpt, July , in Woodrow J. Kuhns (ed.), Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years (DC, ), ; HK to State, Aug. , G./–, RG , DF –, Box , NA; Grantham, Via Ports, .
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What concerned the Truman administration most was not the security situation in Hong Kong, but the changing perception of the US position in the world as a result of the North Korean invasion. Even before the war broke out, by the spring of the US attitude towards the communist world had hardened as a result of the Soviet acquisition of the nuclear bomb in August , the signing of the Sino–Soviet alliance in February , and the formulation of NSC in April. The Korean War seemed to confirm the global nature of Soviet aggression and to intensify the American sense of ‘vulnerability’ in the military balance of power.48 In August, US decision-makers pondered various courses of action in response to possible further Soviet moves in the light of the Korean situation, as contained in an NSC staff study. Although regarding communist-incited internal unrest as ‘more likely’, the NSC staff did not rule out the possibility that the Soviet Union ‘might inspire aggression by satellite forces’ against Hong Kong, warning that an increase in Chinese Communist capabilities, by whatever means, would ‘contribute to the over-all capabilities of the USSR’. The NSC staff thus suggested: ‘If such aggression were directed against Hong Kong the United States should consider furnishing relief assistance to the British and such military assistance as may be appropriate in the light of our own military commitments and capabilities at that time.’49 On the th, the NSC approved the staff study as ‘a working guide’ (NSC /) for the coming few months, but agreed that final recommendations to the President regarding US actions in the event of any contingencies would be deferred ‘until it is established that the event is certain to occur’.50 Thus, shocked by the perceived Kremlininspired North Korean attack, the United States, more belligerent towards the communist bloc, was inclined ‘to wrest the initiative’ by risk-taking.51 But as far as American military assistance to Hong Kong was concerned, there was no promise of any sort unless and until the 48 Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, – (Stanford, Calif., ), –. On the concept of ‘window of vulnerability’ in American thinking, see Marc Trachtenberg, ‘A “Wasting Asset”: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, –’, in idem, History and Strategy (Princeton, ), –. 49 Note by Executive Secretary to NSC, NSC /, Aug. , TP, PSF, National Security Council File—Meetings, Box , HSTL. 50 Minutes of th NSC Meeting, Aug. , ibid.; Memo. for President, Aug. , ibid., Box , HSTL. 51 On this line of argument, see Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif., ), –.
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Chinese Communists made a direct move against it, and the US President made a final decision on the American response. The massive Chinese intervention in Korea in November and their New Year offensive in January sent further shock waves through the Truman administration. As the situation in Korea became critical by January —a forced US/UN evacuation from Korea was not an impossibility—Americans in Hong Kong had to prepare for the worst. Though the local security situation by no means reached crisis proportions, there were widespread rumours of an escalated Sino–American war and an enormous sense of uncertainty within the American community.52 Thus, in early January, the US Consulate General in Hong Kong, without prior consultation with the colonial authorities, offered evacuation advice to American dependents in the colony, with the result that hundreds of Americans (mostly women and children) and some American business corporations (e.g. the Chase Bank) left. The JCS directed CINCPAC to prepare evacuation plans in the event of the spread of hostilities between the United States and China. Meanwhile, arrangements were made between the Americans and the British to coordinate evacuation plans. For the purpose of evacuation, a US naval transport vessel was to be stationed in Hong Kong harbour.53 The unilateral decision by Washington to evacuate American residents was not to the liking of some British officials in Hong Kong and London, for it was thought that this would spread alarm and aggravate the internal security situation.54 Added to this were the British reservations about the US adoption of a rigid licencing policy for Hong Kong and its pressure for a total embargo on China. Indeed, from the British point of view, the American attempts to intensify the economic warfare against the PRC during the Korean War posed as great a threat to Hong Kong as a possible military attack by the Chinese Communists, preoccupied with the fighting in the peninsula.55 Nevertheless, as the war front in Korea stabilized with the opening of armistice negotiations in July, the uncertainty over Hong Kong’s safety also began to dissipate: by late , US dependents who had left earlier returned; and the US Navy maintained its presence in the harbour. 52 FE(O)(WP)(), Jan. , CAB /, PRO; Ambassador Arthur William Hummel Jr. Oral History Interview, June , FAOHP, GU, . 53 Memo. by Office of Chinese Affairs, Jan. , RG , CA –, Reel , NA; Decision on JCS /, Jan. , RG , Geographic File –, Box ; Memo. of Conversation, Feb. , RG , CA –, Reel , NA. 54 COS(), Jan. , DEFE /, PRO. 55 See Ch. .
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As the most critical phase of the Korean conflict had passed, the British Chiefs of Staff revised the interim defence policy for Hong Kong approved in September . By mid-, they held a ‘more optimistic view’ as to the defensibility of Hong Kong, partly based on the British experience in Korea against China. It was now estimated that if air superiority could be maintained, Britain ‘could probably hold the Colony’ even with three brigades (not the previously assumed three divisions). On May, the British Chiefs agreed, subject to ministerial approval, that in the event of a Chinese attack on Hong Kong ‘other than as part of global war’, Britain’s policy ‘should be to defend the Colony and appeal to the United Nations’. In the meantime, the Hong Kong garrison ‘should not be reduced’, and all practical measures should be taken ‘to deter the Chinese from attacking Hong Kong’.56 Later that year, the new Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, argued that Britain ‘should regard an attack on Hong Kong as a major issue involving a declaration of war against China, a war in which we should hope for the support of the Americans’.57
As the Korean War dragged on through , the United States and its allies became increasingly worried about communist aggression on another front—Indochina. Since , the French had been fighting a colonial war against the Viet Minh, who received military assistance and political advice from the Chinese Communists.58 It was the fear of Chinese direct intervention in Southeast Asia that prompted the military representatives of America, Britain, and France, later to include Australia and New Zealand, to gather to discuss possible courses of military action, without commitment by government, to meet such aggression.59 At the British request, Hong Kong was put on the agenda 56
COS(), Mar. , DEFE /; COS(), May , ibid., PRO. Churchill’s view summarized in JP()(Final), Mar. ; COS(), Mar. , DEFE /, PRO. 58 See Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, – (Chapel Hill, NC, ), –. 59 The origins of the Five Power Military Conferences on Southeast Asia, as this series of military talks were called, could be traced back to the Tripartite Military Conference on Southeast Asia in Singapore in mid-May . See Historical Division of the Joint Secretariat, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam: History of the Indochina Incident –, Vol. (Wilmington, Del., ), –. 57
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of the Five-Power Military Conferences.60 During the Five-Power Military Conference in early February , the British sought to discover the US attitude towards military assistance to Hong Kong. They got to know that the United States did not consider the retention of Hong Kong as ‘necessary or desirable in the face of Chinese aggression’, and would not provide ‘any direct assistance in the defence of the colony’, except ‘such Naval and Air assistance as might be available from their forces in the Far East’ for the purpose of evacuation.61 With the deterioration of the French position in the Tonkin area in mid-, however, the defence of Southeast Asia became more vital to overall US national security interests.62 On June, the Truman administration approved NSC /, which, as part of the US strategy to meet communist aggression in Southeast Asia, called for US ‘[a]ssistance to the British to cover an evacuation of Hong Kong, if required’.63 Responsibility for the purpose of developing evacuation plans fell onto CINCPAC. In late , Admiral Arthur Radford, then CINCPAC64 and later the Chairman of the JCS, made his longest ever trip to Southeast Asia to examine the problems in the region. In Hong Kong, Radford discussed the Colony’s defence with the Commander of the British Forces. The Admiral was impressed by what the British had done to turn Hong Kong into ‘a costly target’ for Chinese Communist attack, although it was still ‘not completely defensible’ without US air and naval support.65 Radford was a staunch anti-communist and a strong advocate of the use of air and sea power.66 To him, ‘the retention of Hong Kong in friendly hands was important to our [US] interests’.67 At the ANZUS 60
JP()(Final), Jan. ; COS(), Jan. , DEFE /, PRO. Memo. by the US Member of the Five-Power Ad Hoc Committee on Southeast Asia to JCS, Feb. , FRUS, –, , pt. , –; JP()(Final), Mar. , DEFE /, PRO. 62 Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, –. 63 Report to NSC by Executive Secretary, NSC /, June , FRUS, –, , pt. , –. 64 Radford held two positions—as the Commander-in-Chief of the land, air and sea forces in the Pacific, and as the Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Fleet. 65 Stephen Jurika, Jr. (ed.), From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford (Stanford, Calif., ), –. 66 Arthur W. Radford, ‘Our Navy in the Far East’, The National Geographical Magazine, / (Oct. ), –; Michael T. Isenberg, Shield of the Republic: The United States Navy in an Era of Cold War and Violent Peace, Vol. : – (New York, ), , . According to military historian Edward J. Marolda, because of its role in the Pacific War, the US Navy had a traditional Asian-orientation and believed in the efficacy of force. Edward J. Marolda, ‘The U.S. Navy and the Chinese Civil War, –’, Ph.D. thesis, George Washington University, . 67 Memo. of Conversation, Feb. , FRUS, –, , pt. , –. 61
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(Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) Council meeting in August, Radford argued that ‘Hong Kong could and should be held’. Later, he reiterated the view to the Hong Kong Governor, Alexander Grantham, and suggested the holding of staff talks to plan for the defence of Hong Kong.68 Radford’s confidence was encouraging. Apart from his view, by early the British Chiefs of Staff had also discerned other ‘indications that the Americans attach[ed] importance to the defence of Hong Kong’. They were impressed by a study prepared by the military staff planners of the ANZUS Council in November which stressed the ‘strategic importance’ of Hong Kong as ‘the only remaining beachhead in friendly hands on the mainland of China’ and as ‘a useful point of contact with anti-Communist elements in Communist China’. In addition, during his visit to London in February , John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State of the newly-inaugurated Eisenhower administration, asked whether the British considered Hong Kong to be ‘defensible’. The Minister of Defence, Lord Alexander, replied that the land defence was ‘good’, but the ‘weakness’ lay in the vulnerability of the airfields which were within communist artillery range. Nevertheless, if the British ‘retained command on the sea and in the air’, they could ‘hold out, even against a major attack, for about a fortnight’. Dulles told the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, that ‘he was relieved to learn that we [the British] thought Hong Kong could hold out long enough for reinforcement to be received’. Dulles also asked ‘whether Britain had been given any clear understanding of the American attitude in the event of an attack on Hong Kong’, and, if not, ‘whether any had been sought’.69 The perceived US interest in Hong Kong affected British defence planning in a positive way. Earlier in March , the British Chiefs of Staff had concluded that, in the event of a major attack, either in a global war or in a major Chinese aggression, ‘Hong Kong was indefensible’. Future planning should be based on the assumptions that the garrison in Hong Kong should be maintained at a level sufficient to ‘ensure internal security’, and, in the case of attack, to ‘delay any major Chinese advance overland long enough to ensure the orderly evacuation of civilians’. This was due mainly to the increase in Chinese Communist military strength, especially the effectiveness of their Air Force, so much so that the balance of air power, which was ‘the key to the successful 68 COS to Scott, Jan. ; Admiralty to C-I-C,FE, Feb. , DEFE /, PRO. 69 JP()(Final), Mar. ; COS(), Mar. , DEFE /, PRO.
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defence of Hong Kong’, was ‘now most unfavourable’ to the British. Also, the military discussions at Washington had made plain that Britain could not rely on America for ‘direct assistance in the defence of the Colony’.70 By early , however, the perceived US interest in Hong Kong led the British to reconsider their assumptions of defence planning. On March, the Cabinet Defence Committee agreed to hold military discussions with the Americans on the defence of Hong Kong when the opportunity arose, without commitment to governments. The British wanted to find out whether the JCS shared Radford’s sympathetic views on Hong Kong. Such talks could also help make clear US strategic thinking on Hong Kong’s place in the allied strategy for the Far East, and the attitude of the new Republican administration towards Hong Kong as a whole.71 As it turned out, Radford’s was a lone voice in the Pentagon. When approached by the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General John Harding, at the NATO meeting in Paris in April , the Chairman of the JCS, General Bradley,72 said that, in view of the present commitments in Korea, the United States would not be prepared to assist Britain to hold Hong Kong, though it ‘might be able to support us [the British] temporarily with sea and air forces to cover evacuation if that was forced upon us’. Besides, General Bradley did not perceive Hong Kong as a base for large-scale land operations against China in general and Guangzhou in particular: it ‘would be costly in resources and unlikely to be profitable’.73 Given his emphasis on NATO, General Bradley, not surprisingly, did not share the view of the ‘Asia-first’ Radford regarding the use of air and naval power to defend Hong Kong.74 On the other hand, the British, it seemed, had also misread Dulles’s expressed interest in Hong Kong.75 As the British Ambassador to the United States, Roger Makins, astutely observed, Dulles might ‘only have been making an enquiry’ since he was ‘entirely new in office’, and thus it was ‘over optimistic to imagine that U.S. 70
JP()(Final), Mar. , DEFE /; COS(), Mar. , ibid., PRO. D(), Mar. , CAB /; COS(), Mar. , DEFE /, PRO. 72 General Bradley was a hangover from the Truman administration until Admiral Radford took over in Aug. . 73 Paris to MoD, Apr. , DEFE /, PRO. 74 As Radford recollected in his memoirs, his seniors in the JCS had given too much attention to Europe at the expense of Asia. Jurika (ed.), From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam, . It should be noted that, when Radford himself became the JCS Chairman, he in turn had to consider the wider strategic picture, and did not press hard for a US commitment to Hong Kong. 75 For the possible reasons behind Dulles comment on Hong Kong, see Chs. and . 71
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policy as such at present envisages the defence of Hong Kong’.76 This was particularly so since the US Secretary ‘was not informed that we [Britain] would be at war with China if Hong Kong was attacked’, a war in which the British hoped for US support. Robert Scott of the Foreign Office also believed that when commenting on Hong Kong, Dulles ‘was not thinking of a formal state of war between the United Kingdom and China, but was only expressing satisfaction that if the Chinese attacked Hong Kong they would be letting themselves in for a regular military operation of no short duration’.77 In the spring of , the Eisenhower administration was still devising its national security policy. By October , the Eisenhower administration had finished its review of national security programmes. Parallel with the approval of the ‘New Look’ (NSC /) was a policy statement on Communist China (NSC /). Taking into account the ‘altered structure of power’ brought about by the Chinese Communist regime and the Sino–Soviet alliance, NSC / called for the reduction of the relative power position of China in Asia by ‘means short of war’. In building up its military strength in the Far East, the United States relied largely on the British in Malaya and Hong Kong, the French in Indochina, as well as on the indigenous forces of Korea, Vietnam, and Nationalist China.78 This shift also had an important bearing upon US defence planning for Hong Kong. In order to maintain a state of immediate readiness for renewed fighting in Korea, and to prepare for eventualities associated with the deteriorating situation in Indochina, CINCPAC became more involved in strategic planning.79 In early , the previous JCS directive which restricted US planning for the defence of Hong Kong to assistance in evacuation only was removed. In February, the JCS authorized CINCPAC ‘to coordinate with [the] British in planning studies for assistance in [the] defense of Hong Kong’, with the understanding that this involved ‘no commitment’ on the part of the US government.80 Between and April, CINCPAC planning staff officers and the staffs of the three British service forces in Hong Kong held talks in Singapore, which, from the British point of view, resulted in ‘a 76
Makins to FO, Apr. , DEFE /, PRO. [Emphasis in the original] Scott to Cabinet Office, Mar. , DEFE /; MoD to GHQ,FE, Mar. , ibid., PRO. 78 Report to NSC, NSC /, Oct. , FRUS, –, , –. 79 CINCPACFLT Annual Report July — June , Post Jan. Command File, NHC. 80 JCS to CINCPAC, Oct. , RG , Geographic File –, Box ; JCS to CINCPAC, Feb. , RG , Geographic File –, Box , NA. 77
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valuable preliminary basis for the co-ordination of United States assistance in the defence of Hong Kong’. The discussions covered different aspects of the defence problem, such as command and control, operations, communications, electronic equipment, and logistics, but not the scale of US assistance.81 Notwithstanding their misperception of US intentions in , the British were again encouraged by the renewed US interest in Hong Kong in early . As the British Joint Planning Staff estimated, the Americans ‘have recently shown interest in the defence of Hong Kong in the context of their overall strategic interest in the Far East’.82 Anglo–American relations in Hong Kong had apparently improved to such a point that the US Consulate General in Hong Kong brought to the attention of the State Department in late January ‘the high degree of friendly cooperation’ between the US and UK military service personnel in the territory. As a result, Washington authorized the US Consulate and the American Embassy in London to indicate to appropriate British officials ‘U.S. appreciation for the splendid co-operation’ which had developed between the two countries in Hong Kong.83 All these developments occurred at a time when the Churchill government was undertaking a radical review of defence policy in order to reduce the strength of UK military forces to a level even lower than that suggested by the Paper on Defence Policy and Global Strategy.84 At their meeting in February, the Chiefs of Staff pointed out that, as a result of the radical review discussions, the reduction of the Hong Kong garrison from two brigade groups (with certain ancillary troops and three Royal Air Force Squadrons) to one brigade group and one squadron was ‘inevitable’ and only a ‘question of timing’. But they worried that the reduction of forces to the level capable of only token resistance ‘would be apparent to the Americans, and their continued interest in the defence of Hong Kong could not be counted on’ as a result.85 Thus, when the Cabinet Defence Committee decided in principle in mid-April to reduce the Hong Kong garrison ‘by gradual and unobtrusive stages to the level required for internal security purposes’, 81
JP()Note , July ; COS(), July , DEFE /, PRO. JP()(Final), Feb. , DEFE /, PRO. 83 State to London, Jan. , FO /, FC/; FO to War Office, Feb. , ibid., PRO. 84 See Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy – (Oxford, ), –; John Baylis and Alan Macmillan, ‘The British Global Strategy Paper of ’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, / (June ), –. 85 JP()(Final), Feb. ; COS(), Feb. , DEFE /, PRO. 82
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it agreed that the decision would be ‘kept most secret’. Neither the Hong Kong Governor and the British regional commanders nor the Eisenhower administration would be informed at this stage, for US knowledge of the reduction ‘would prejudice the prospects of establishing a system of collective defence in South-East Asia and the Western Pacific’. Execution of the decision had to wait until further review after the coming Geneva conference on Korea and Indochina, and, if possible, be ‘linked with any general reduction of forces in Korea’. The decision of reduction, however, ‘in no way affected the intention of H.M.G. to defend the Colony with the forces available’.86 But the British certainly realized that US air assistance to Hong Kong, especially the provision of UHF Radio and IFF Mark equipment, would be vital to its successful defence.87 In short, the British government had to take the American factor into serious account in defence planning for Hong Kong.
In the spring of , Eisenhower was apparently more willing to help to defend Hong Kong as a result of the deteriorating situation in Indochina. The United States hoped to secure support from Britain and other allies for ‘united action’ in Indochina to relieve the French troops under communist siege at Dien Bien Phu. From the Five-Power Military Conferences on Southeast Asia, the Americans realized that the British were reluctant to take action against the Viet Minh, which might provoke Beijing into attacking Hong Kong. Thus, on April, Eisenhower wrote personally to Churchill: ‘The coalition we have in mind would not be directed against Communist China. But if, contrary to our belief, our efforts to save Indochina and the British Commonwealth position to the south should in any way increase the jeopardy to Hong Kong, we would expect to be with you there.’88 Eisenhower calculated that, by suggesting possible US assistance to Hong Kong, he might convince a reluctant Churchill to help rescue the French forces in Dien Bien Phu. If France could not get out of the Indochina imbroglio, Eisenhower feared, its support for the rearmament 86
CC(), Apr. , CAB /; COS(), Mar. , DEFE /, PRO. COS(), July , DEFE /, PRO. 88 Eisenhower to Churchill, Apr. , in Peter G. Boyle (ed.), The Churchill–Eisenhower Correspondence, – (Chapel Hill, NC, ), –. 87
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of West Germany within the European Defence Community would be put at risk. At stake was the concept of European security, not the defence of a strategically insignificant British colony.89 Thus, Hong Kong was seen by Eisenhower as a diplomatic carrot to be used to encourage Britain to align more closely with the United States during the crisis. As Eisenhower later explained to the Republican leaders, ‘if we all went in together into Indochina at the same time, that would be fine but if they don’t go in with us, they can’t expect us to help them defend Hong Kong’.90 When Churchill spoke of Eisenhower’s ‘united action’ idea in a Cabinet meeting, Eden said that the ‘proposal to organise the collective defence of South East Asia’ was ‘to be welcome’, as it ‘could remove the anomaly of our [Britain’s] exclusion from ANZUS and contribute to the security of Hong Kong and Malaya’. But Eden also expressed his ‘grave misgivings’ about the timing of the proposed arrangement since it would jeopardize the prospect of peaceful negotiation at the Geneva conference on Indochina.91 Churchill too was not convinced by Eisenhower, the US President’s assurance over Hong Kong notwithstanding. On foreign affairs, Churchill himself did not spend much time on China, let alone Hong Kong. And as far as the Far East was concerned, he believed that ‘our main sector must be Malaya’.92 In , the aging Prime Minister was preoccupied with arranging a summit meeting with the post-Stalin Soviet leaders. To Churchill, the success of any détente with the Soviet Union depended, in no small part, on the avoidance of conflict with the PRC.93 Fearing that it would trigger a third world war, split the Commonwealth, and alienate domestic opinion, Britain at last refused to participate in ‘united action’ in Indochina. Without British support, the United States was unwilling to act alone, and the French forces in Dien 89 On the linkage between NATO and Indochina, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, ‘The United States, NATO, and French Indochina’, in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Denise Artaud, and Mark R. Rubin (eds.), Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco–American Relations, – (Wilmington, Del., ), –. 90 Quoted in Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, Vol. : – (London, ), –. 91 Geoffrey Warner, ‘Britain and the Crisis over Dien Bien Phu, April : The Failure of United Action’, in Kaplan and others (eds.), Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco–American Relations, –. 92 Churchill to Eisenhower, June , PREM /, in Andrew N. Porter and A. J. Stockwell (eds.), British Imperial Policy and Decolonisation, –, Vol. : – (London, ), . 93 John W. Young, Winston Churchill’s Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War – (Oxford, ), –.
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Bien Phu surrendered in early May. After the partition of Vietnam at the Geneva conference, the United States concentrated its efforts on forming a collective security organization in Southeast Asia. Yet again, the Hong Kong issue was to raise its head in negotiations for the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in mid-. From the beginning, Dulles wanted to leave out Hong Kong: its inclusion ‘would involve an extremely significant additional commitment on the part of the United States’. Besides, the Eisenhower administration worried that the inclusion of Hong Kong in a treaty from which Nationalist China was excluded ‘would raise a problem for us’ in Taipei as well as with the China lobby in Congress, which might refuse to ratify the treaty.94 The British, however, insisted that Taiwan should not be brought into SEATO, as it would alienate the Asian Commonwealth and preclude Indian participation. Thus, they did not press for the inclusion of Hong Kong at this stage in order to reduce US pressure for Taiwan’s inclusion, which would be ‘disastrous for the success of the scheme as a whole’.95 At the final meeting of the US–UK Study Group on July, which was held to draft a treaty, the US representatives stated that ‘in the U.S. view, commitments under Paragraph c() [‘the use of armed forces’ in the event of ‘overt Communist aggression’] did not apply to Hong Kong’.96 The British agreed to this, provided any explicit reference to the exclusion of Hong Kong should not appear in the Study Group report, but only in a separate US record of the meeting.97 There was no misunderstanding between Britain and the United States this time: Hong Kong was not to be included in SEATO. Any differences arose from the British assumption that Hong Kong would not be excluded from American protection, whether it was covered by SEATO or not. The Americans might have given the British such an impression during the US–UK Study Group meetings. At the second meeting on July, the Under-Secretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith, spoke of the ‘difficulties’ about the inclusion of Hong Kong in the treaty, suggesting that ‘perhaps some separate arrangement about Hong Kong was possible’. Smith added that he was himself ‘confident [that] it could be 94 Memo. of Meeting, Aug. , RG , CF –, Box ; US Minutes of nd Meeting of US–UK Study Group, July , ibid., Box , NA. 95 COS(), Aug. , DEFE /; CO to FO, Aug. , FO /, D//G, PRO. 96 State to Geneva, July , RG , CF –, Box , NA. 97 Makins to FO, July , FO /, D/, PRO.
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defended by the joint efforts of Britain and the United States’.98 At the next meeting two days later, Smith asked the Minister at the British Embassy in Washington, Robert Scott, whether the word ‘general’ should be added to the phrase ‘area of Southeast Asia’, as this ‘might enable the U.S. Government to act in the event of an attack on Hong Kong without having to get Congressional approval specifically to cover Hong Kong’. In reply, Scott said that he was ‘personally not so concerned by an absence of direct reference to Hong Kong. An attack by the Chinese Communists on Hong Kong would be “out of the blue sky” and would be a prelude to general war.’99 As the Foreign Office minuted later: ‘It is after all clear that in the event of a Chinese Communist attack on Hong Kong the U.K. Government would be faced with so serious a situation that it would be tantamount to an attack on the United Kingdom itself. All the consequences of such an attack from a Southeast Asia Defence Organization point of view might be expected to follow whether Hong Kong is included or not.’100 The British Embassy in Washington also assumed that ‘If Hong Kong is attacked, the Americans will be with us: we do not think there is the slightest doubt about it . . . But that has nothing to do with any new commitments which may arise out of the Southeast Asia Treaty . . .’101 In this regard, the British expectation of US assistance to Hong Kong was based not on Smith’s personal and informal remarks at the Study Group meetings, but rather on the assumption that an attack on Hong Kong would mean war between Britain and China, in which case the United States would be involved from the beginning.102 In other words, it was the perception of the United States as a close ally of Britain, not the existence of any specific US undertaking over Hong Kong, that mattered.103 Whether a misperception or not, British ministers and officials 98 Record of nd US–UK Study Group meeting, July , FO /, D/, PRO. 99 Record of rd US–UK Study Group meeting, July , FO /, D/, PRO; US Minutes of rd US–UK Study Group meeting, July , RG , CF –, Box , NA. 100 FO Minutes, Aug. , FO /, D/, PRO. 101 Washington to FO, Aug. , FO /, D//G, PRO. 102 COS(), July , DEFE /, PRO; London to State, Nov. , .G/–, RG , DF –, Box , NA. 103 According to Lombardo, the British believed that there was an informal US commitment to Hong Kong in the course of the SEATO discussions since US officials had intimated to them that defence arrangements for Hong Kong could be made separately if the Colony was not included in SEATO. But Lombardo has not shown what this ‘separate arrangement’ was in contributing to the British belief in US protection of Hong Kong. Lombardo, ‘Eisenhower, the British and the Security of Hong Kong’, , .
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in the Foreign Office, who were dealing regularly with their American counterparts in Washington, were inclined to believe that the United States would come to the rescue of Britain when the chips were down. The outbreak of another crisis in Asia in late again cast a shadow over the external defence of Hong Kong. On the eve of the Manila conference to launch SEATO in September, the Chinese Communists began their bombardment of the Nationalist-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Strait.104 Earlier in August, British ministers had decided in principle to reduce the garrison in Hong Kong to the level necessary for internal security, but in view of the new tensions the decision had yet to be implemented. The crisis escalated in early , when the Chinese Communists captured the Dachen Islands, the US Congress passed the Formosa Resolution which authorized the US president to deploy forces to defend Taiwan and the ‘related’ areas, and Eisenhower threatened the PRC with nuclear attack. With the deterioration of the situation, the British Chiefs of Staff had to reconsider the reduction in the Hong Kong garrison. Essentially, the Taiwan Strait crisis highlighted once again the British dilemma of defending Hong Kong in the Cold War. As a Joint Planning Staff study made plain: ‘The cold war political aims of United Kingdom policy in the Far East are in conflict with military capabilities where Hong Kong is concerned.’ Politically, Britain’s policy was to ‘demonstrate her intention of holding the Colony’; but militarily, it was clear that ‘Hong Kong is indefensible without considerable United States aid.’ Whilst the present garrison in Hong Kong should not be reduced until circumstances in the Far East became more favourable, the study argued, reinforcement ‘can only be justified to maintain our political aims in the Colony’. Nevertheless, the British Chiefs firmly believed that ‘there is no question of surrendering the Colony without resistance’. It was thus ‘more important than ever to avoid any indication, to China and the United States or to the world at large, of weakening our determination to resist Chinese aggression against the Colony’.105 Despite tensions in the Taiwan Strait, US officials on the ground found a relatively calm situation in Hong Kong.106 In reviewing whether 104 See Gordon H. Chang and He Di, ‘The Absence of War in the U.S.–China Confrontation Over Quemoy and Matsu in –: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence?’, American Historical Review, / (Dec. ), –. 105 COS(), Jan. , DEFE /; JP()(Final), Feb. , ibid.; JP()(Final), Feb. , ibid., PRO. 106 HK to State, Oct. , G.(w)/–, RG , DF –, Box ; HK to State, Feb. , G.(w)/–, RG , DF –, Box , NA.
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US policy towards Hong Kong was adequately covered by the general Far Eastern policy (NSC /) on reaction to communist aggression against a country not covered by US treaty obligations, the NSC planning staff concluded in March that, pending further study, NSC Action No. , which was approved by Truman in , should not be superseded.107 But Eisenhower, who always approached the issue of Hong Kong from the perspective of the broader Anglo–American relationship, wrote to Churchill on February pledging some sort of support for Hong Kong: ‘It would surely not be popular in this country if we became involved in possible hostilities on account of Hong Kong or Malaya, which our people look upon as “colonies”. . . Nevertheless, I do not doubt that, if the issue were ever framed in this way, we would be at your side.’108 Notwithstanding a seeming meeting of minds on Hong Kong, Eisenhower sent his letter at a time of serious Anglo–American disagreements over the disposition of the offshore islands. The British felt that, whilst Taiwan should not be allowed to fall into communist hands, this was not the case with Quemoy and Matsu, which they regarded as part of China. The Eisenhower administration, however, could not agree with the abandonment of Quemoy and Matsu, owing to pressure from the government in Taipei and the military and Congress at home.109 In essence, Eisenhower’s letter was one in a series of exchanges with Churchill, in which each tried to convince the other of the importance of Nationalist possession of, or withdrawal from, Quemoy and Matsu. It seemed that Eisenhower did have the offshore islands in mind when hinting at possible US support for Hong Kong. Later, Admiral Felix Stump, Radford’s successor as CINCPAC, probably best captured Eisenhower’s thinking in his letter to Churchill: ‘Hong Kong is an offshore island which is indefensible without immediate U.S. naval and air support. As such it might be a useful quid pro quo to secure more courageous British support for a firm U.S. policy with respect to the defense of Kinmen [Quemoy] and Matsu.’110 107 Memo. for NSC, Mar. , WHO, SANSAR –, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box , DDEL. 108 Eisenhower to Churchill, Feb. , in Boyle (ed.), The Churchill–Eisenhower Correspondence, –. 109 For details, see Michael Dockrill, ‘Britain and the First Chinese Offshore Islands Crisis, –’, in Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (eds.), British Foreign Policy, – (London, ), –; Foot, ‘The Search for a Modus Vivendi’, –. 110 Memo. for Stump, Plans Division, USARPAC, Dec. , , Strategic Plans Division Records, OP–S/OP–S Subject & Serial Files (Series XVI), , Box , NHC.
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Churchill’s view on the defence of Quemoy and Matsu and of Hong Kong was consistent with his attitude towards the proposed ‘united action’ in Indochina a year ago: the avoidance of conflict with the PRC. To Churchill, who always hoped for a détente in Europe during his premiership, China was ‘not important enough to be a case of major hazards’; it was ‘Soviet Russia that ought to dominate our minds.’111 Undoubtedly, Churchill was not moved by Eisenhower’s vague promise to defend Hong Kong in the event of a wider war with China, a war which Britain wanted to avoid in the first place. Indeed, it was the British Chiefs’ view that ‘the defence of Hong Kong in war is disproportionate to its strategic value’.112 To Britain, the best defence for Hong Kong was a diplomacy of restraint, one which should influence the United States to resolve the crisis peacefully.
? It was Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai who defused the Taiwan Strait crisis at the Bandung conference in April by offering to negotiate with the Americans. With the lessening of tensions in late , the British Conservative government agreed to reduce substantially the garrison in Hong Kong to the level required for internal security on a gradual basis.113 This aroused US concern. Having learnt that the British would soon cut nearly two-thirds of their , troop numbers, the US Consul General in Hong Kong, Everett Drumright, brought this to the attention of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter Robertson, in January . Drumright stated that he did not know why the British had to reduce their military strength at this particular time, and wondered whether it was related to the state of the British economy, the demands of Malaya and the Middle East, or to the first step ‘to pull out bag and baggage from the Far East’. ‘What concerns me most is not the weakening of Hong Kong’s defenses’, Drumright continued, ‘but rather the psychological impact it will have on the Chinese here and on the indigenous peoples in this part of the 111
Quoted in Young, Winston Churchill’s Last Campaign, –. COS(), Mar. , DEFE /, PRO. 113 According to the British plan, subject to review in the light of the political situation, the present garrison of two brigade groups (six infantry battalions, five artillery regiments and one armour) would be reduced to one brigade group (or six units) by . COS(), Jan. , DEFE /, PRO. 112
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world’, particularly at a time when ‘the tide is running against us’ as a result of the Sino–American ambassadorial talks in Geneva and the ‘weak-kneed attitudes’ shown by the US allies towards the communists.114 Notwithstanding the British efforts to play down the troop reduction,115 Robertson replied to Drumright in February that the strength of the British military forces in Hong Kong was of ‘an important token significance as a sort of index of British intentions’, and was ‘necessary to carry out the delaying action’ for the successful implementation of the British and American emergency evacuation plans, the latter of which had to be re-examined in the light of the British decision.116 While the United States was watching closely, the British were calculating the possible American reaction. At the ANZUS meeting in Melbourne in January , Admiral Stump, CINCPAC, stated that ‘Hong Kong was defensible’. The British Joint Planning Staff estimated that, although the British government had not told the Americans officially its decision on troop reduction, ‘it seems probable that Admiral Stump was aware of our policy to reduce the Hong Kong garrison when he made his assertion’. Regardless of his intentions, the British, encouraged by Stump’s expressed confidence in Hong Kong, were keen to find out whether the United States would agree to bilateral talks on the territory’s defence.117 In essence, apart from Stump’s remarks, the British military commanders in the Far East also believed that, from early , the Eisenhower administration was taking greater interest in Hong Kong. At the inter-departmental British Defence Coordination Committee, Far East (BDCC[FE]) meeting in mid-April, the Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Air Force, Air Marshal Francis Fressanges, raised the topic of the US interest in the air defence of Hong Kong by reporting that arrangements had been made with CINCPAC for ‘the supply of [modern radar] equipment to Hong Kong to facilitate the control of U.S. carrier borne aircraft’. He stated that ‘[i]f the Americans were prepared to make a contribution to its [Hong Kong’s] defence of a formidable force of carrier borne aircraft, we should do everything we can to increase our 114 Drumright to Robertson, Jan. , G./–, RG , DF –, Box , NA. 115 Memo. of Conversation, Feb. , RG , CA –, Geographic File , Box , NA. 116 Robertson to Drumright, Feb. , RG , CA –, Miscellaneous File , Box , NA. 117 JP()(Final), Mar. , DEFE /, PRO.
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own contribution and to maintain the goodwill now being shown by the U.S. over this question’. Robert Scott, now Commissioner-General in Southeast Asia, claimed that ‘the United States were clearly showing considerable interest in the defence of Hong Kong’.118 The enhanced US interest in the air defence of Hong Kong occurred not in isolation, but against the backdrop in of a strengthening of ties between the US and British Air Forces at the strategic nuclear level. As Britain now possessed a limited number of nuclear weapons, and was deploying the V-bomber, the Eisenhower administration hoped to coordinate strategic planning with the British and to assist them to develop a credible nuclear deterrent.119 Similarly, in the Far East, strategic thinking began to converge. After the formation of SEATO, the defence of Southeast Asia became an allied responsibility. British strategic planners assumed that the main deterrent to communist aggression in Southeast Asia was the US nuclear capability and willingness to retaliate. The inauguration of the thermonuclear age and the development of tactical nuclear weapons meant that a limited war in the Far East would not necessarily lead to global war.120 Thus, there was a growing emphasis on nuclear deterrence in British strategic planning, an emphasis which constituted what might be called Britain’s ‘New Look’ strategy. As Air Marshal Fressanges explained in a BDCC(FE) meeting, ‘the new look in the [British] Defence Policy in the Far East was, in fact, the revived U.S. interest in Hong Kong and South East Asia. It was important that this change of view of the United States should be emphasized in our planning.’121 In this regard, the British were right in assuming that the United States saw the defence of Southeast Asia as a single entity, and that Eisenhower’s strategy rested on massive nuclear retaliation against the source of communist aggression. The growing US interest in Hong Kong in also took place at a time when the Eisenhower administration was attaching more importance to Southeast Asia as a whole. Despite the relative peace in Indochina after the partition of Vietnam, US decision-makers were preoccupied with a sense of impending regional crises—from Burma to Indonesia to South Vietnam—and were determined to combat signs of 118
BDCC(FE)(), Apr. , DEFE /, PRO. John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy – (Oxford, ), –. 120 W. David McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy and Diplomacy, – (London, ), –; Martin S. Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning, – (Oxford, ), –. 121 BDCC(FE)(), June , DEFE /, PRO. 119
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neutralism, radical nationalism, or communism.122 In September, the United States assumed full responsibility in South Vietnam through its ‘nation-building’ programmes. What is more, it was confronted with a new kind of threat from the communist call for ‘peaceful coexistence’. Zhou’s success at Bandung in April , and Nikita Khrushchev’s economic offensive in Asia and Africa from late onwards intensified US interest in the Third World.123 With the increasing US commitment to Southeast Asia, CINCPAC had to draw up contingency plans for likely trouble spots.124 In July, Admiral Stump proposed the holding of informal staff-level discussions, without committing governments, on the defence of Hong Kong against overt Chinese aggression in conditions short of global war. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed soon after.125 The US–UK talks took place in Hong Kong from to September between the staff officers of CINCPAC and the British Far East Land Forces. They agreed on a ‘broad concept of operations’ upon which plans for the possible defence of Hong Kong might be based: phase one involved resistance and maintenance of law and order by the British; phase two included counter-attack by US air and naval forces; and phase three called for destruction of enemy ground forces, in which reinforcement of the garrison might be required.126 When discussing the staff report, the BDCC(FE) was of the view that the ‘underlying assumptions implicit’ in the joint US–UK concept should be stressed: That the U.K. intends to defend Hong Kong. That the U.S. is not prepared to see Hong Kong fall into Communist hands. That there would be continuing and close alignment of Anglo–American policies in respect of Hong Kong. That both Governments are prepared to see nuclear weapons used in the defence of the Colony.127
In other words, the joint concept for the defence of Hong Kong was based on the ‘assumption’ that the United States might employ nuclear weapons to carry out the second and third phases of the plans. As Air 122 On this theme, see Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II (New York, ), –. 123 Chang, Friends and Enemies, –. 124 CINCPACFLT Annual Report Jul. — Jun. , Post Jan. Command File, NHC. 125 COS(), July , DEFE /; COS(), Aug. , DEFE /, PRO. 126 JP()(Final), May , DEFE /, PRO. 127 [Emphasis added] BDCC(FE)(), Nov. , DEFE /, PRO.
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Marshall Fressanges explained at the BDCC(FE) meeting in November: ‘Although Hong Kong was not in the SEATO area’, Dulles’s statement that ‘nuclear weapons would if necessary be used by the United States in the event of any attack on SEATO nations’ could ‘probably be taken to cover Hong Kong also’. Scott agreed but added the qualification that ‘if the United States thought that Hong Kong was being attacked as an isolated action against British interests, entirely divorced from any other aggression, it was quite possible that they might not assist in the defence of the Colony’. He suggested that the Chiefs of Staff should ask the British government whether it would accept these ‘political assumptions’.128 But before the British could explore further the feasibility of US nuclear support for the external defence of Hong Kong, they had to reassess its internal security situation because of events there and at home. On October, during the Republic of China national day celebration, riots, triggered by a dispute about the display of Guomindang flags, broke out in Kowloon and Tsuen Wan and led to serious clashes between Nationalist supporters and Chinese Communist sympathizers in Hong Kong. Shortly after the riots, Zhou Enlai claimed that the residents in Kowloon had ‘no confidence’ in the Hong Kong government and the Chinese government had a ‘duty [to] protect them’.129 Zhou warned that ‘Communist China could not permit further Hong Kong disorders on the doorstep of China.’ The US Consulate in Hong Kong reported that, despite the initial investigation which showed no evidence of involvement by the Taiwan authorities, Governor Grantham did ‘take a serious view of Peiping’s “menacing” attitude’, especially Zhou’s claim that the Chinese People’s government had ‘a duty to protect the Chinese residents of Hong Kong’.130 What worried Grantham most was that the riots had called into question the adequacy of the Hong Kong garrison even to maintain internal security. After the riots, he came to believe that there had to be enough troops in Hong Kong to cope with possible subversion and riots, which might lead China to intervene on the grounds of safeguarding its nationals: ‘We cannot afford to take time in suppressing disorder. Unless any future disturbances are brought under control very rapidly, 128
BDCC(FE)(), Nov. , DEFE /, PRO. HK to State, Oct. , G./–, RG , DF –, Box , NA. 130 New York Times, Oct. ; HK to State, Oct. , G./–, RG , DF –, Box ; HK to State, Oct. , G.(w)/–, ibid., Box , NA. 129
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the Chinese Government will be tempted to intervene, as they have already threatened to do next time.’131 But by this time, British ministers had decided that the RAF Squadron and armoured regiment would have to withdraw early in , and by the end of that year, only a Gurkha Infantry Brigade (two Gurkha and one British battalion) supported by a field regiment would remain. According to the latest estimate of the Commander of British Forces, Hong Kong, shortly after the riots, the reduction would render the Hong Kong government unable ‘to preserve internal security in its fullest sense’, since, in the event of civil unrest, all three battalions were required to maintain ‘law and order in the towns’, and no troops would be available for ‘a show of force on the frontier’. Also, evacuation of foreign nationals could not be completed under such circumstances. Grantham was deeply concerned that the decision on reduction would also create a ‘morale problem’ not only for ordinary civilians, but also for the Police, if there existed ‘doubts about the ability of H.M.G. to hold Hong Kong’.132 After reassessing the force requirements for internal security, Grantham and the Commander of the British Forces asked for seven battalions.133 However, their request came at a time (early ) when the new Conservative government under Harold Macmillan, eager to make substantial defence cuts for the sake of the economy, was undertaking a thorough review of long-term British defence policy.134 To the Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys, the garrisoning of Hong Kong was ‘a costly military commitment’ and, for the sole purpose of ‘maintaining law and order’, not for ‘the defence of the territory’, six major units including four infantry battalions, one armoured regiment and one field artillery regiment should be enough. In addition to the reduction of the land garrison, the Royal Naval dockyard and the Air Force base in Hong Kong would have to be closed down.135 In short, colonial interests had to be sacrificed by the metropole. From the American point of view, the security situation in Hong Kong after the riots was not of particular concern. The US Embassy in London was surprised that the publication by the Hong Kong government of the official report on the riots in early had 131
DC(), Mar. , CAB /, PRO. COS(), Dec. , DEFE /; COS(), Dec. , ibid., PRO. 133 DC(), Jan. , CAB /, PRO. 134 For background, see Philip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez – (London, ), –. 135 DC(), Feb. , CAB /, PRO. 132
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‘attracted comparatively little attention’ in the communist press. Even the subsequent statement by the Chinese Foreign Ministry criticizing the report, as the US Consulate in Hong Kong commented, ‘does not herald the adoption of any sanctions against the Colony by Peiping’.136 But if the communist threat to Hong Kong was not so worrying, British intentions regarding the Colony were. The Macmillan government’s contemplated reduction in Britain’s worldwide commitments led to public speculation about possible British withdrawal from Hong Kong. An article entitled ‘Hong Kong’s Future’ in the February issue of Newsweek magazine wrote: ‘It won’t happen tomorrow or the day after, but the British are seriously weighing the return of Hong Kong to Communist China. Since the island is almost impossible to defend, some British strategists feel voluntary withdrawal might pay dividends . . .’ The publication of the article in the Hong Kong press ‘under large headlines’ led to such heated speculation in Hong Kong that the Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, had to make a statement in Parliament on February denying the claims.137 In essence, the Eisenhower administration’s concern over the future of Hong Kong arose from its worries that the proposed reduction in Britain’s worldwide commitments might require a US takeover of Britain’s former overseas obligations. After the Suez crisis of , the United States had deepened its involvement in the Middle East.138 Whatever reservations about the re-assertion of British influence in Egypt, Washington still hoped to see Britain continue to play the role of a world power, albeit one that was staying closely in step with the United States. Thus, apart from ‘restor[ing] confidence in the Anglo–American relationship’, another principal objective of the Bermuda conference between Eisenhower and Macmillan scheduled for March was ‘to ascertain the extent of the reduction of British overseas military and economic commitments’.139 The Eisenhower administration wanted to find out the extent to which London’s defence cuts were likely to affect the British presence in places ‘such as Malaya, Hong Kong, etc., particularly if there is any possibility that the Americans would have to consider themselves 136 London to State, Jan. , G./–, RG , DF –, Box ; HK to State, Jan. , G.(w)/–, ibid., Box , NA. 137 CO to HK, Feb. , FO /, F/; CO to HK, Feb. , F/, PRO. 138 Alan P. Dobson, Anglo–American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers (London, ), . 139 Elbrick to Dulles, Feb. , RG , CF –, Box ; Memo. of Conversation, Feb. , ibid., NA.
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stepping in’.140 According to a conference brief prepared by the State Department, ‘it is highly desirable that the British be urged, within their financial limitations, to maintain as much of their overseas obligations as possible’.141 When they arrived in Bermuda on March , Eisenhower and Dulles dined with Macmillan and his Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, at the Mid-Ocean Club. The subject of Hong Kong was touched upon in the course of their dinner conversation. Macmillan remarked that ‘they were considering abandoning Hongkong’ because it was ‘a costly business to hold it’. In response to Dulles’ comment that ‘it was generally assumed that Hongkong was profitable’, the Prime Minister explained that ‘it might be profitable to some of the Chinese traders in Hongkong but not profitable to the UK’, and the Colony was kept only ‘for strategic reasons and because of concern for the future of the population if they were abandoned’. Dulles replied that ‘Hongkong could be regarded as part of the insular and peninsular positions which it was important for the free world to hold.’ And ‘if the UK policy in China were aligned with ours’, he continued, ‘we might be able to help to hold it’. When discussing China later in the conversation, Dulles explained that what Washington wanted was London’s ‘wholehearted’ support for the exclusion of the PRC from the United Nations, and hinted that this would ‘make it easier’ for the administration to meet the British demands for the relaxation of the China trade differential.142 It is not clear, from the US record of the conversation, whether Macmillan was persuaded to consider not ‘abandoning Hongkong’. But as the Director of Chinese Affairs at the State Department, Ralph Clough, recollected later, the Americans ‘were startled at the time that such a suggestion should come from so authoritative a British quarter’.143 In April, the Macmillan government, having finished its review of long-term British defence policy, published the Sandys White Paper. To compensate for a substantial reduction in service manpower, Britain would emphasize nuclear deterrence and rely on mobile reinforcement forces.144 Uncertain, pending Sandys’ visit, how many troops would be 140
Washington to FO, Feb. , FO /, ZP/, PRO. Briefing Paper, BEM D–/, Mar. , RG , CF –, Box , NA. 142 Continuation of Memo. of Dinner Conversation, Mar. , RG , CF –, Box , NA. The trade issue will be examined in Ch. . 143 Clough to Martin, Oct. , RG , CA, , Country File , Box , NA. 144 For an analysis of the White Paper, see Wyn Rees, ‘The Sandys White Paper: New Priorities in British Defence Policy?’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, / ( June ), –; Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, –. 141
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withdrawn from Hong Kong, Grantham raised the question of the adequacy of the garrison’s size at the Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting in late July. ‘If therefore it was really Her Majesty’s Government’s intention to persist with the cuts in defence forces, to a point where the forces available in the Colony would be of insufficient strength to suppress rioting’, Grantham argued, ‘it would be better to surrender our position voluntarily and so avoid the ignominy of a forced evacuation.’145 Whether Grantham was merely trying to persuade a reluctant government to commit more troops to Hong Kong, or was seriously calling for a British pullout from Hong Kong is difficult to tell.146 But what is certain is that Grantham was not alone in advocating the reconsideration of Hong Kong’s future. The Chiefs of Staff agreed that if certain minimum forces could not be maintained in Hong Kong on a permanent basis, ‘[u]rgent consideration should be given to some sort of negotiated settlement with the Chinese Communists concerning the future of the Colony’. They felt that Grantham’s views ‘were of such importance that they should be brought to the notice of Ministers’.147 In addition, an inter-departmental Working Party on Hong Kong had been formed in ‘to take stock inter-departmentally of our [British] position in Hong Kong’.148 The riots and the proposed cuts in the Hong Kong garrison led the Foreign Office representatives to ponder in early whether ‘we shall have to cut our losses before very long’, and ‘the likelihood that from now on the position, as far as our retention of the Colony is concerned, is likely to continue to deteriorate’.149 Nevertheless, one still cannot tell from the declassified British documents how serious the British were, Macmillan’s remarks at Bermuda notwithstanding. Suffice to say, Macmillan was temperamental in character, willing to change course whenever necessary.150 Besides, the 145
COS(), July , DEFE /, PRO. Suffice to say, Grantham took for granted that Hong Kong would be returned to China in , when the -year lease for the New Territories expired. He also held the view that Hong Kong should always have been regarded as part of China, and that the Hong Kong Chinese would not develop a British allegiance. Grantham, Via Ports, ; Louis, ‘Hong Kong’, , , . 147 COS(), July , DEFE /; COS(), July , DEFE /; COS(), Aug., DEFE /, PRO. 148 The Working Party had been formed some time in . That year, it held its first meeting, based on an FO memorandum. Since then, its work was held up by the defence review and the uncertainty over the level of armed forces in Hong Kong. Ashton to Wallace, Oct. , CO /, FED//, PRO. 149 Dalton to Johnston, March , , ibid. 150 e.g. Macmillan changed course ° during the Suez crisis. Louis, ‘The Dissolution of the British Empire’, 146
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Sandys White Paper did not suggest the abandonment of British overseas commitments, but the maintenance of the same obligations with much reduced forces.151 From an economic point of view, the ‘costbenefit’ analysis of empire, which was undertaken by high-ranking officials in Whitehall between February and September at Macmillan’s request, provided no clear answer as to the value of Hong Kong to the United Kingdom because of its unique position in the Sterling Area and its role as a financial and commercial centre for the Far East.152 By , despite the independence of Malaya, Macmillan certainly had little intention of abandoning Britain’s world role east of Suez.153 What is clear, nonetheless, is that the Eisenhower administration was sceptical of the British determination to remain in Hong Kong in . Against this background, the National Security Council undertook in July–August its review of US policy on Hong Kong, an issue which had not been raised since March .154 On July, the NSC Planning Board gave preliminary consideration to a draft statement of policy on Hong Kong (NSC ) and an enclosed staff study. The Planning Board raised the issue of ‘current British intentions regarding Hong Kong’, because of their indication to Eisenhower at Bermuda of ‘an interest in Hong Kong considerably less than vital’, and asked whether the British ‘intend to stay as long as they can, or merely stay until Chinese Communist pressure reaches a point prompting the British to evacuate rather than fight’.155 Later, the draft was revised to include a statement regarding British intentions in Hong Kong framed ‘in such general terms that it does not make clear whether we believe the British will fight to keep Hong Kong’. The revised draft also deleted ‘all mention of a “deal” with the British’, as US assistance 151 Rees, ‘The Sandys White Paper’, –; Michael Dockrill, British Defence Since (Oxford, ), . 152 D. J. Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development Vol. : Guidance towards Self-Government in British Colonies, – (London, ), . For an insightful account of Macmillan’s ‘cost–benefit’ or ‘profit–loss’ analysis of empire, see Tony Hopkins, ‘Macmillan’s Audit of Empire, ’, in Peter Clarke and Clive Trebilcock (eds.), Understanding Decline: Perceptions and Realities of British Economic Performance (Cambridge, ), –. 153 Even the decolonization of Malaya was seen as the means to preserve Britain’s influence in the region. John Subritzky, ‘Macmillan and East of Suez: The Case of Malaysia’, in Richard Aldous and Sabine Lee (eds.), Harold Macmillan: Aspects of a Political Life (London, ), –. 154 Memo. for NSC, Mar. , , WHO, SANSAR, –, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box , DDEL. 155 Note by NSC Planning Board, July , WHO, NSCSP, –, Special Staff File Series, Box , DDEL.
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to be provided would be ‘of sufficient[ly] limited nature as to make doubtful any willingness from the British to pay the price for it’.156 According to the staff study, the British intended to remain in Hong Kong ‘so long as they can do so without critically endangering relations with Communist China’ but would, in the case of communist attack, ‘accede rather than attempt to maintain their position by force of arms’. The staff study doubted whether British forces in Hong Kong could, unaided, provide ‘the necessary time for an evacuation of the European residents’. Nonetheless, the Chinese Communists would ‘leave Hong Kong alone’ for the present because of the Colony’s usefulness for espionage and subversion, and in driving a wedge between America and Britain. Thus, in the event of direct or indirect communist attacks on Hong Kong, the NSC Planning Board suggested, the United States would support Britain in the United Nations and would ‘intervene to the extent necessary and practicable with armed forces’ for evacuation of Americans and other nationals of interest, but would ‘not provide armed forces to assist the British in quelling disorders in Hong Kong’.157 When considering the draft policy statement at the NSC meeting on August, Eisenhower expressed reservations about even providing support for evacuation of Americans in Hong Kong. He asked ‘what so many Americans were doing in Hong Kong’, and suggested ‘restrict[ing] U.S. visas to Americans who really had an obligation to be’ in the Colony. This demonstrated once again that Hong Kong in itself was not of much significance to Eisenhower. The JCS Chairman, Admiral Radford, however, saw no urgent need to restrict the entry of Americans into Hong Kong, feeling that any evacuation could be completed in a short time since there were enough ships in the harbour. After a short debate, the Council approved NSC .158 By August , then, US policy regarding Hong Kong in the event of a Chinese attack did not go beyond the evacuation of American civilians. Why, despite the earlier hints and offers, did the Eisenhower administration remain non-committal to the Colony’s defence? The answer lies in the US perceptions of British determination to hold Hong 156 Briefing Note for Planning Board Meeting, July , ibid. The price which the Americans had in mind was probably Britain’s wholehearted support for the exclusion of Communist China from the United Nations. See Ch. . 157 Staff Study on Hong Kong, Note by Executive Secretary to NSC, NSC , July , DDRS, , Fiche ; Memo. for NSC, NSC , Aug. , RG , NSC Policy Paper Series, Box , NA. 158 Memo. for th NSC Meeting, Aug. , EPAWF –, NSC Series, Box , DDEL.
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Kong and their willingness to support Washington over Chinese representation in the United Nations. When Eisenhower’s NSC gave consideration to the draft policy statement on Hong Kong in July–August, the security situation in the Colony did not appear particularly threatening. Nor did London ask Washington for support at the time.159 But, as the Special Assistant to the President for the Operations Coordinating Board, Frederick Dearborn, pointed out later, NSC was approved ‘in such haste without waiting for the field’s views’.160 The Eisenhower administration, doubtful of the British willingness to fight to hold Hong Kong, seemed eager to reach a decision.161 Later, in correspondence with Clough, Drumright confirmed that ‘the British Government has actually given serious consideration to the possibility of abandoning Hong Kong or at least withdrawing all defense forces’. Clough agreed, and brought the assessment to the attention of Assistant Secretary Robertson. Referring to Macmillan’s remarks in March, Clough replied to Drumright that ‘the casual mention of such a possibility at Bermuda might have been merely a diplomatic device by which to encourage us to make commitments with respect to Hong Kong either military or economic’, but ‘I infer from your letter that it goes deeper than that’.162 More importantly, Eisenhower always regarded Hong Kong as a possible bargaining chip to obtain British support in the containment of Communist China. At Bermuda, Dulles had hinted that if London 159 In May, the Chiefs of Staff agreed that it was premature to hold talks with the US government at the political level until further military recommendations concerning the feasibility of using nuclear weapons to defend the Colony were available. JP()(Final), May ; COS(), May , DEFE /, PRO. 160 On July, the draft staff study on Hong Kong was sent to the US Consulate in Hong Kong for comment, when Consul General Drumright was on leave. The comments by the US Consul, Thomas P. Dillon, on the draft reached Washington on Aug., but days after NSC had been approved. And it was not until Aug. that the State Department sent the approved policy statement to Dillon. Drumright to Clough, Sept. , /G/–, RG , DF –, Box ; Clough to Dillon, July , RG , CA , Country File , Box , NA; Dillon to Clough, Aug. , DDRS, , Fiche ; Clough to Dillon, Aug. , .G/–, RG , DF –, Box , NA. 161 In his article, Lombardo has suggested that the indefensibility of Hong Kong, which ‘was further complicated by the apparent lack of willingness of the British to defend Hong Kong’, was one of the two ‘major reasons’ behind the NSC decision not to commit to the defence of Hong Kong in August. But he failed to grasp the full salience of the ‘British factor’ in the formulation of NSC . Lombardo, ‘Eisenhower, the British and the Security of Hong Kong’, –. 162 Drumright’s letter of Sept., to Clough is still classified in the National Archives. But part of its content is mentioned in Clough’s reply to Drumright. Clough to Robertson, Oct. , RG , CA , Country File , Box ; Clough to Drumright, Oct. , RG , CA , Subject File , Box , NA.
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agreed to cease pressing for the admission of the People’s Republic into the United Nations, Washington would reciprocate by helping to hold Hong Kong. But as late as August (two days before Eisenhower and his advisors met to consider NSC ), the administration still had ‘not yet received definite word that the British will support the moratorium on the issue of Chinese representation’ at the coming session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.163 The Eisenhower administration certainly saw no need to follow up its conditional offer with regard to Hong Kong. But it did not take too long for Eisenhower and Macmillan to have another chance for bargaining over the defence of Hong Kong. The new NSC decision, of course, remained secret from the British. But since the US–UK staff talks, British military commanders and strategic planners increasingly harboured doubts about the feasibility of US nuclear support for Hong Kong embodied in the joint concept of operations. They realized that two factors were important for a successful defence of Hong Kong: the availability of ‘sufficient ground forces’ in the Colony to take ‘the brunt of the first attack before United States nuclear interdiction took effect’ and ‘the timely arrival of United States forces to neutralise the enemy air and isolate Hong Kong from enemy reinforcement’.164 But the Commander of British Forces, Hong Kong, and the British Chiefs were too aware that a garrison of four infantry battalions would be unable to prevent the attacking force from reaching Kowloon for seventy-two hours, thus making any nuclear counter-action by America ineffective. Besides, the previous estimate that, with fortyeight hours warning, the United States would be in action within twelve hours of Chinese attack was too optimistic, in view of ‘the delay inherent in obtaining political approval’ from the US President for the use of nuclear weapons.165 Nonetheless, such doubts did not prevent the British Chiefs of Staff from continuing to coordinate Anglo–American planning on a purely military basis, without commitment to government. Indeed, continued engagement of US interest in Hong Kong became more important than ever once the Defence White Paper had been published, and the reduction of the Hong Kong garrison decided upon. As Sandys told his 163 Memo. from Wilcox to Dulles, Aug. , FRUS, –, , –. Not until Aug. did the British officially inform the US delegation at the United Nations that they would support a moratorium (deferring discussions about the issue). See Ch. . 164 Report by the Conference Secretary, Sept. , DEFE /, PRO. 165 DCC(FE)(), Nov. , DEFE /, PRO.
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military staff in September, ‘the only real security for Hong Kong lay in the realization by the Chinese that an attack on the Colony would bring in the United States’.166 In other words, the only way of defending the indefensible Hong Kong would be by strategic deterrence—to deter a Chinese attack in the first place, thus making any US response unnecessary. The conclusion was hardly a new one, but it was confirmed and reinforced by debates at the highest level of British government throughout late and .
Defending Hong Kong in the Cold War proved to be a difficult task for Britain. Whilst Britain had no strategic interest in retaining Hong Kong in a global war, it was an entirely different matter in the event of a limited war and the Cold War. Although the British did not predict an overt Chinese attack on Hong Kong as likely throughout the s, they could not rule out the possibility that the Colony would be attacked in the event of the spread of hostilities between China and America over Korea, Indochina, or Taiwan. Such a feeling of vulnerability was reinforced by their stark realization that, except for a short period after reinforcement in , the garrison in Hong Kong would be unable to defend against a large-scale attack, however remote it might be. By –, the British were gravely concerned that the garrison would be inadequate to fulfil even the main tasks of internal security (maintenance of law and order, a ‘show of force’ on the frontier, completion of evacuation plans, etc.). To them, internal security was always regarded as a greater threat than external security, although the two had become blurred after the riots. Nevertheless, from time to time, some British officials were encouraged by the perceived US interest in Hong Kong. The United States assessed the defence of Hong Kong primarily in Cold War terms. This does not mean that either the Truman or Eisenhower administrations regarded Hong Kong as ‘the Berlin of the East’ and were willing to commit scarce resources, even risk global war, for its survival as a British colony. Quite the contrary, the retention of Hong Kong in British hands was not strategically vital to US national interests. Nevertheless, Hong Kong sometimes still received attention at the highest level of US government. US decision-makers who wanted 166
BDCC(FE)(), Sept. , DEFE /, PRO.
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to contain communist aggression in Korea, bolster the French in Indochina, pacify the British over Quemoy and Matsu, and secure Britain’s support for the international isolation of China paid the price in bargaining over the defence of Hong Kong. Throughout this period, US officials estimated that the greatest threat to Hong Kong was not an external Chinese attack, but communistinspired internal unrest. The US assessment of British intentions and capabilities to hold Hong Kong was less consistent and clear. In , the Truman administration had great doubts about British capabilities, if not their intentions, to hold Hong Kong. By , the Eisenhower administration, certain of the inadequacies of the British forces even to cover an evacuation, was sceptical about British determination to fight to remain there. Militarily, a successful defence of Hong Kong would require the establishment of a stronghold on the mainland. Neither Acheson’s defensive perimeter concept nor Eisenhower’s strategy of massive retaliation justified a static defence of territories such as Hong Kong. Above all, the defence of Hong Kong was more a political than a military decision for the administration. Despite the fact that US and British strategic planners had conducted contingency planning and agreed on joint operations, these were merely hypothetical exercises, which did not commit governments. Given its scarce resources in the Far East and important priorities in Europe, the United States was unwilling to make a political commitment to the British Colony. Although Eisenhower and Dulles had offered to help defend Hong Kong, their main calculations were to encourage Britain to support the United States in other policy areas. Without a definite statement by London to stand firm on the issue of Chinese representation, Eisenhower concluded in August that the United States would not assist Hong Kong beyond evacuation of civilians. Nevertheless, some British officials did suppose that the United States would defend Hong Kong in the case of communist attack. This was based on three assumptions. First, as Scott believed, ‘Hong Kong would never be attacked except as part of a global war, in which case the United States would be involved from the beginning.’ Secondly, in Lennox-Boyd’s view, ‘A Chinese attack on Hong Kong would mean World War III, since the British would fight for Hong Kong and the United States would come to the assistance of the United Kingdom.’ Lastly, the British Joint Planning Staff assumed that, although ‘Hong Kong is not within the SEATO boundary . . . its defence against overt Chinese attack is generally covered by the U.S. nuclear deterrent in the
Defending the Indefensible Colony
Far East. The United States [is] not, however, specifically committed to its defence.’167 Not all British officials agreed that a Chinese attack on Hong Kong would necessarily lead to global war.168 But there was little doubt that such an attack would be seen as so serious an issue that it would lead to war between Britain and the PRC, and the rescue by the United States of its ally, perhaps by using nuclear weapons. The British were correct in assuming that Eisenhower’s strategy in Southeast Asia rested on massive retaliation, and that a US response to communist aggression would not be restricted to the area nominally covered by SEATO.169 But as Eisenhower and Dulles wanted to keep the enemy guessing about possible US reactions, the United States would not commit itself to particular courses of action, nor allocate its forces to specific contingencies.170 Thus, no one—neither the communists, the British, nor Eisenhower himself—could be sure whether tactical nuclear weapons would be used in a limited war such as a Chinese attack on Hong Kong. That Hong Kong was protected by the US nuclear umbrella might have been wishful thinking on the part of British strategic planners and regional commanders. But the interest shown by CINCPAC in the defence of Hong Kong, the series of studies undertaken with US strategic planners, and the assurances given by Eisenhower and Dulles, however conditional, might also have misled the British, and raised their expectations of US help. The expectation that the United States would behave as a close ally might have been confined to a handful of British officials, such as Scott and Lennox-Boyd. But it was the CommissionerGeneral in Southeast Asia and British regional commanders who were responsible for Hong Kong’s security, and their military views upon which ministers based their political decision. More importantly, given the hypothetical nature of the Chinese military threat to Hong Kong, perception and expectation of US support mattered as much as a 167 COS(), July , DEFE /, PRO; London to State, Nov. , .G/–, RG , DF –, Box , NA; JP()(Final), July , DEFE /, PRO. 168 Both the First Sea Lord, Lord Mountbatten, and Grantham believed that a limited war with China without the involvement of the Soviet Union was a possibility. COS(), July , DEFE /; BDCC(FE),, Sept. , DEFE /, PRO. 169 Memo. for Secretary of Defense by JCS, Feb. , RG , Geographic File –, Box ; Memo. for Secretary of Defense by JCS, Nov. , ibid., Box , NA. 170 David Lee, ‘Australia and Allied Strategy in the Far East, –’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, / (Dec. ), –; Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New Look National Security Policy, – (London, ), –.
Hong Kong
formal commitment. After all, the presence of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait, and the visit of US sailors on leave to Hong Kong did comfort the British, and could act as an immediate deterrent to communist attack.171 In leaving Hong Kong alone, Beijing might not have been ‘deterred’ by the American nuclear retaliation. But informed public opinion in Hong Kong and London did predict a US response to a Chinese attack.172 The strategy of deterrence seemed to have worked. In a sense, the Anglo–American discussions over the defence of Hong Kong were academic. To the British, as the Chinese Communist threat was more a political than a military one, the retention of Hong Kong depended as much on diplomatic engagement with the PRC as on defence arrangements with the United States. 171 FO Minutes by Wilkinson, Apr. , FO /, FC/, PRO; HK to State, Nov. , G./–, RG , DF –, Box , NA; Black to CO, Oct. , CO /, FED //, PRO. 172 See Xianggang Shibao, Feb. ; Xingdao Ribao, Sept. ; Daily Express, Sept. in FO Minute, Sept. , FO /, F/, PRO.
Meeting the Political Threat: Hong Kong in Britain’s and America’s China Policy The victory of Mao Zedong in the Chinese civil war in confronted the Labour government not just with the problem of defending Hong Kong, but also the question of dealing with a communist regime on the mainland. The future of Hong Kong, it was believed, was inextricably linked with Britain’s relations with the new China. In order to preserve their colonial rule in Hong Kong, the British had to seek a modus vivendi with its giant neighbour. This was particularly so since they were all too aware that Hong Kong could not be defended by military means. It should be stressed that the Hong Kong factor alone did not dictate Britain’s China policy: the maintenance of British economic interests on the mainland and the strategy of driving a wedge into the Sino–Soviet partnership equally necessitated a diplomacy of positive engagement. But at a time when foreign (mainly British) investments on the mainland were being squeezed out by the Chinese Communists, and when Beijing remained closely aligned with Moscow, the political vulnerability of Hong Kong became a more immediate concern for British governments during the s. Moreover, in times of war and crisis, there were critical junctures when deteriorating international and local events rendered Hong Kong particularly vulnerable in British eyes. In the day-to-day operations of diplomacy, British officials were conscious of avoiding unduly provoking the PRC. Thinking in global terms and constrained by domestic politics, both the Truman (after ) and Eisenhower administrations adopted a hard-line approach towards the PRC, while keeping Taiwan out of communist hands. Hong Kong was not a factor of great weight to the United States. But if Hong Kong per se was not a major concern, Britain as a principal partner in the Cold War certainly was. US decision-makers realized that Britain was reluctant to cooperate with America against China if such action were to expose Hong Kong to
Hong Kong
communist retaliation. In order to secure British support, President Eisenhower, for example, had to pay a price by demonstrating an interest in the Colony. Hong Kong, however unimportant in itself, became an important factor in the calculations of US decision-makers. This chapter focuses on how Britain attempted to ‘defend’ Hong Kong by diplomacy—accommodating the PRC on the one hand, and restraining the United States on the other.
In the course of its deliberations over defence arrangements for Hong Kong in , the Labour government realized that the Chinese Communists, which were emerging victoriously in the civil war, should not be unduly provoked. In May, the Foreign Office expressed concern over a possible announcement on the British decision to defend Hong Kong: ‘if we show too provocative an attitude over Hong Kong in public we may force the Communists to take action against it as a matter of prestige’.1 In the long term, the British believed that the viability of Hong Kong depended as much on the acquiescence of the Chinese Communists as on defence preparations by Britain. ‘[T]he aim of our policy’, the Attlee Cabinet concluded on May, ‘should be to find a basis on which a Communist Government of China could acquiesce in our remaining in Hong Kong.’2 And what made the Chinese Communists tolerant of the British colonial rule was Hong Kong’s economic value to the mainland. But by this time, the Truman administration was contemplating using export controls as an instrument to change the political orientation of the Chinese Communists, about which the British had severe reservations. As Bevin put it bluntly in a Cabinet meeting, ‘the Chinese do not love Hong Kong because it is governed by the British, but because it offers safe and profitable trading facilities’. If ‘these trading facilities are restricted or cut off’, he
1
Dening to Mayhew, May , FO /, F//G, PRO. CM()(), May , CAB /, PRO. According to Michael Yahuda, from onwards, there was a sort of tacit understanding between London and Beijing that Chinese tolerance of British rule in Hong Kong would be predicated on British consent to a non-confrontational approach towards the mainland and no attempt at the introduction of democracy or self-government in Hong Kong. Yahuda, Hong Kong, –. 2
Meeting the Political Threat
continued, ‘then the Chinese interest in our retention of the colony will dwindle or disappear’.3 To the Labour government, then, the best way of safeguarding Hong Kong was by a combination of defence and diplomacy. The British were inclined to develop formal diplomatic and economic relations with the communist regime, rather than using trade controls as a lever to change its political orientation as suggested by the Americans. But British ministers also realized that they had to drive home to the US administration that London itself had legitimate reasons to accord diplomatic recognition to the PRC. They had to impress upon the Americans that Hong Kong’s future necessitated an accommodation with the Chinese Communists. In this regard, Hong Kong served as both a reason for, and a justification of Britain’s conciliatory China policy. Given their differences over the introduction of export controls in particular and diplomatic recognition in general, the British and the Americans undertook extensive consultations and discussions with a view to aligning their policies. On September, the British Embassy in Washington sent an aide-memoire to the State Department, stating that there was ‘no difference’ between them as to the objectives of not increasing the military strength of China, and of combating the spread of communism. Indeed, ‘because of their position in Hong Kong and South-East Asia’, the aide-memoire noted, the British had ‘immediate and compelling reasons for being anxious to secure the achievement of both objectives’. But the British government was ‘sceptical of the efficacy of export controls aimed at a modification of the political alignment of the Chinese Communist regime’, which it believed was ‘unwilling to modify political principles for the sake of commercial advantages’.4 The next day, during their meeting in Washington, Acheson told Bevin that ‘[w]e don’t feel there is any point in engaging in economic warfare but we think China should pay its way’, and that ‘we should not extend any extra facilities to a Chinese Communist regime’. In reply, Bevin said that ‘the British were not in a hurry to recognize but that they have big commercial interests in and trade with China and were not in the same position as . . . [the Americans] were relatively and absolutely’. ‘Also the British had to keep an eye on Hong Kong’, he stressed. Nevertheless, Bevin concluded that London would ‘proceed with caution’, and have 3 Memo. by Attlee, May , FO /, F//G, PRO. Also, see Ch. . 4 Aide-memoire by British Embassy, Washington to State, Sept. , FRUS, , , –.
Hong Kong
‘close consultation’ with Washington on the question of recognition. He emphasized that ‘the difference was in tactics and not in objectives’, and Acheson agreed.5 Chinese Communist Attitudes towards International Obligations Truly, the Americans believed that a decision on recognition should not be made until and unless the Chinese Communists could satisfy the three conditions laid down by Acheson on May: the new Chinese government should achieve ‘de facto control of territory’, enjoy ‘general acquiescence’ of the Chinese people, and be willing ‘to discharge its international obligation’.6 When meeting with Bevin and his advisers in Washington in September, Acheson insisted that ‘the Communists recognize international obligations in full as a prerequisite to recognition’. The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Walton Butterworth, further raised the question that ‘the Communists have stated they intend unilaterally to abrogate the various treaties regardless of the provisions for termination’, which the United States regarded as ‘intolerable’. ‘It was possible that denunciation of the treaties’, he continued, ‘might include denunciation of those respecting Hong Kong.’ Bevin replied that he ‘could not imagine Russia advising China to abrogate treaties’. He also expressed his belief that the Chinese Communists would not attack Hong Kong directly, and his confidence at the time that Hong Kong could be defended as a result of the reinforcements.7 Certainly, the Truman administration attached great importance to the need for the Chinese Communists to respect international law and treaties before formal diplomatic recognition could be granted to the new Chinese government. The communist treatment of Angus Ward since late 8 had led Washington to question their willingness to follow the basic principles of international relations. On October , Ward and four of his staff were formally arrested by the communist authorities in Shenyang. This hardened the US attitude towards the recognition of the PRC.9 A State Department’s briefing paper for the 5
Memo. of Conversation, Sept. , ibid., –. Acheson to Stuart, May , ibid., –. 7 Memo. of Conversation, Sept., RG , CF –, Box , NA. 8 In Nov. , the communist authorities placed under house arrest Angus Ward, the US Consul General in Shenyang, and his staff on the grounds of espionage. See Hua Qingzhao, From Yalta to Panmunjom: Truman’s Diplomacy and the Four Powers, – (Ithaca, NY, ), –. 9 Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War, . 6
Meeting the Political Threat
Washington meeting noted that recognition by other friendly countries ‘while this flagrant instance of treatment of foreign officials remains unsettled would have the effect of acquiescing in, if not condoning, such practice and could serve as a precedent for the Communists’.10 Thus, by raising with Bevin the question of possible communist denunciation of international treaties respecting Hong Kong, Butterworth might well have intended to raise some doubts in British minds about Communist China’s willingness to act as a responsible member of the international community. But after the establishment of the PRC in October, the Labour government believed that recognition could not be unduly delayed. On November, the British Embassy in Washington informed the State Department in a memorandum that the Cabinet was in favour of granting de jure recognition to Communist China, but would make no decision until after consultations with the administration and British representatives and colonial governors in Southeast Asia.11 When discussing the memorandum with Graves the same day, Butterworth asked if the absence of any reference to obtaining communist assurances about respect for international obligations prior to extending recognition ‘indicated that the British Government would not expect to obtain any quid pro quo’. In reply, Graves expressed his government’s view that ‘the disadvantages of nonrecognition were so great as to outweigh any possible advantages to be obtained from securing Chinese Communist assurance of respect for international obligations’. Nevertheless, Graves added that ‘the British Government would expect to obtain Chinese Communist assurances regarding observance of the Kowloon lease agreement prior to extending recognition’, but ‘the question of Hong Kong did not arise since this was British territory ceded by treaty’.12 Notwithstanding Graves’s comments, the Labour government was under no illusion that the fate of Hong Kong could be separated from that of the New Territories.13 Even before the PRC was founded, the 10
Memo. by Perkins, Nov. , FRUS, , , –. British Embassy, Washington to State, Nov. , ibid., –. 12 Memo. of Conversation, Nov. , ibid., –. 13 e.g., as early as July , George Kitson, the head of the Foreign Office’s China Department, had noted in his revised memorandum on ‘The Future of Hong Kong’: ‘Any attempt on our part to draw a distinction between Hong Kong and the New Territories would simply be treated as legal casuistry. The two have become inseparable in the Chinese mind, and no solution can be satisfactory unless it treats the problem as a whole.’ Quoted in Peter Wesley-Smith, Unequal Treaty –: China, Great Britain, and Hong Kong’s New Territories, rev. edn. (Hong Kong, ), . 11
Hong Kong
Cabinet had concluded that ‘both Nationalists and Communists in China are likely to aim at eventual recovery not only of the leased territories but also of ceded areas of the Colony’. It seemed unlikely that any Chinese Government would be prepared to renew the lease of the New Territories which was to expire in , but for the time being, it was believed, the Chinese Communists would not agitate for the return of Hong Kong.14 In late August, the Cabinet concluded that the British would not discuss the future of Hong Kong with the new Chinese government ‘unless it were friendly, stable, and in control of a united China’. The reasons were that, if the British were negotiating with ‘an unfriendly Government’, they would be ‘under duress’. If the Chinese government was not ‘stable’, the British government ‘could not rely on it to preserve Hong Kong as a secure free port’. And if China was ‘not united’, the future of Hong Kong ‘would be likely to become a pawn in the contest between conflicting factions’. Since such a ‘friendly’, ‘stable’, and ‘united’ Chinese government did not exist in or in the foreseeable future, the British policy was to remain in Hong Kong.15 In short, the Labour government did not want to make the future of Hong Kong an issue with the Chinese Communists during its deliberations over diplomatic recognition. Military Aid to Nationalist China and American Domestic Politics The British were also concerned about the continued supply of US arms to the Nationalist government. Early in , Dening argued that ‘there is no hope that the Nationalists will be able to offer effective resistance to the Communist advance’. ‘Therefore if the Communists are going to overrun South China’, he continued, ‘it follows that any arms we supply will fall into their hands, and such arms may subsequently be used against us [in Hong Kong] or against the French in Indo-China’. Later, Bevin approved the recommendation that a ban should be imposed and be rigidly enforced on the supply of arms and equipment to any part of the mainland of China, whether under Nationalist or 14 From Feb. onwards, a number of leftist newspapers in Hong Kong, under the direction of Beijing’s propaganda machine, have conveyed the message that Hong Kong’s future would be secured under the new China—indeed, the two were portrayed as inextricably linked. See Yuan Xiaolun, Zhanhou Chuqi Zhonggong Yu Xianggang Jinbu Wenhua [The CCP and Leftist Culture in Hong Kong during the Early Post-war Period] (Guangzhou, ), –. 15 CP(), Aug. , which is similar to CRO to UK High Commissioners, Sept. , FO /, F//G, PRO.
Meeting the Political Threat
Communist control. For that purpose, he needed to secure the cooperation of the US administration.16 While the Attlee government wanted to stop further supply of US arms to Nationalist China for the sake of Hong Kong, the Truman administration was constrained by domestic politics and priorities in Europe in its efforts to disengage from the Chinese Nationalists. Indeed, by early , Washington had come to acknowledge the virtual defeat of the Nationalist regime, and thus shifted its strategy from direct support to Chiang Kai-shek to more subtle political and economic means. On February, Truman approved a recommendation to stop all military supplies to the Nationalists. But owing to opposition from Congress and the China lobby, Truman had to reverse his decision on suspension, and instead ordered a slowing down in the pace of military deliveries. It was hoped that limited military aid to the Nationalists could delay the communist victory on the mainland, and demonstrate US credibility to the ‘Free World’.17 In the spring, domestic pressure for continued support to the Guomindang government gained momentum, at a time when the Chinese Communists were about to cross the Yangtze. More importantly, at the time, the Truman administration was eager to secure congressional approval of the second installment of European recovery aid (or Marshall Aid) for the fiscal year . As a result, Acheson believed that he had to make a compromise on China for the sake of Europe. He agreed to permit the unobliged portion of the $ million in military aid under the China Aid Act of to be spent beyond the expiration date of April . In a word, domestic politics meant that the Truman administration could not abandon outright Nationalist China.18 The British government was not unaware of the domestic pressure on the US administration for supporting the Chinese Nationalists. In May, the British Embassy in Washington reported to London the State Department’s view that US military aid to the value of $ million remained to be supplied under the China Aid Act of . ‘In view of 16 FO Minute by Dening, Apr. , FO /, F//G; Minute by Bevin to Attlee, June , ibid., F//G, PRO. 17 Chester J. Pach, Jr., Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, – (Chapel Hill, NC, ), –; Ronald L. McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia (New York, ), –. 18 James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World (New York, ), ; Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino–American Conflict, – (Princeton, ), –.
Hong Kong
Congressional origin of this military aid programme’, according to the State Department, ‘it is not likely to be suspended unless National Government disintegrates completely.’19 In a minute to Bevin, Dening recorded that ‘the Americans, who are somewhat afraid of Congressional opinion, are not prepared to place a complete ban on the shipment of arms, but are in fact sending such shipments to Formosa, and not to China proper’.20 Notwithstanding their view that the whole of mainland China would soon fall into communist hands, by mid- the British still hoped that ‘Formosa will not come under Communist domination’. Thus, in view of the US attitude, London did not at this stage press for an absolute ban on military supplies to Taiwan (as distinct from China proper); indeed, it might also consider applications for shipment of arms to Taiwan on their merits.21 By the autumn of , however, the dust of the Chinese civil war seemed to be settling: the Chinese Communists proclaimed the establishment of the PRC in October; and the Nationalist government retreated from Guangzhou to Chongqing and, by the year’s end, to Taipei. Taiwan’s deteriorating situation aroused the concern of the British government. During the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris in November, Bevin told Acheson: ‘We were holding the position in Hong Kong well, but I was worried about events in Formosa.’ The British Foreign Secretary mentioned some reports which suggested that the Chinese Nationalists had ‘large supplies of arms and equipment in Formosa which the UK assumed would fall to the Communists without much resistance’. Bevin feared that this supply of arms would be used ‘not as a potential force against the Communists, but rather as a potential source for the Communists which might be used against Hong Kong or Indochina’. Bevin hoped that the US administration would examine whether arms were still being supplied to the Nationalists on Formosa.22 Later, in a memorandum to Livingston Merchant of the State Department, the Counsellor of the British Embassy in Washington, Hubert Graves, noted that a hundred tanks, eight B– bombers, and a significant amount of aviation spirit, which were purchased by the Nationalists through a private American concern, had 19
Washington to FO, May , FO /, F//, PRO. Minute by Dening to Bevin, May , FO /, F//G, PRO. 21 Minute by Bevin to Attlee, June , ibid. 22 Paris to FO, Nov. , FO /, F//, PRO; Minutes of US, UK, and French Foreign Ministers Meeting in Paris, Nov. , RG , CF –, Box , NA. 20
Meeting the Political Threat
recently been unloaded, and that further large consignments of military equipment could be expected.23 Nevertheless, the British realized the difficulties faced by the US administration in stopping all military supplies to Taiwan. ‘It seemed doubtful however whether success would attend these efforts’, the Cabinet Defence Committee was told, ‘as the State Department appeared to be unwilling to step in and prevent completion of deliveries which had been sanctioned by Congress.’24 As a matter of fact, no sooner had the European Recovery Program been renewed by Congress in April than the Truman administration started lobbying for the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty and the approval of the Military Assistance Program. Unprecedented in terms of the scale of expenditure and the nature of the commitment to allies in peacetime, the Military Assistance Program met with great resistance from Capitol Hill. It was only after heated debates, substantial cuts in the proposed appropriations, and the shock of a successful Soviet atomic explosion that the Mutual Defense Assistance Act was finally approved in October. But, in the process, the China Lobby in Congress succeeded in securing from a reluctant White House an additional $ million in military aid for ‘the general area of China’. The Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, wanted to earmark part of the military aid for Taiwan, but the State Department had already allocated much of it to Indochina, Korea, and the Philippines. Although the US government would not provide new military assistance for the Nationalists, it allowed the completion of military aid to Taipei under the China Aid Act.25 On December, Oliver Franks expressed to Acheson concern about the further US shipment of military supplies to Taiwan, especially medium and heavy tanks and aircraft, since ‘Formosa would sooner rather than later pass into the hands of the Chinese Communists who might well at some stage use such material and weapons against Hong Kong.’ In reply, Acheson spelt out the status of military shipment to Taiwan under the $ million in the China Aid Act. He stressed ‘the implications both foreign and domestic of our [US] arbitrarily cutting off remaining shipments to Formosa which would amount to less than $ million (as of November ) of the $ million’. Any action to stop further shipments at this stage would be of ‘insignificant practical value’. 23 Memo. by Graves to Merchant, Dec. , Papers of Dean Acheson, Memoranda of Conversations, Box , HSTL. 24 DO(), Dec. , CAB /, PRO. 25 Christensen, Useful Adversaries, –; McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves, –.
Hong Kong
Nevertheless, Acheson agreed ‘to look into the question of medium and heavy tanks’ since, according to Franks, ‘the British military in Hong Kong had not now in their possession anti-tank weapons that could deal with other than light tanks’. In response to an enquiry by Franks as to whether the US attitude towards Formosa had changed since the conversations in Washington, Acheson concluded that his government would not employ military forces to prevent the fall of Taiwan into communist hands, but would seek ‘by political and economic means to do everything feasible to prevent that’.26 If the Labour government felt that it had legitimate reasons to recognize a government that had established effective control over much of the mainland, the Truman administration was propelled by domestic politics to prolong the life of a regime that had lost the ‘mandate of heaven’. Agreement to Disagree on Recognition During diplomatic consultations with the Truman administration in , the Labour government realized that it could not easily change the US policy of ‘waiting for the dust to settle’, not least because of domestic politics in Washington. What the British wanted, however, was to justify their own decision on recognition of Communist China. As Dening summarized it in a draft Cabinet paper: ‘Other Powers will not necessarily follow suit immediately. But this is a case where our own interests are so vital (even more vital in Malaya and Hong Kong than in China proper) that we should be prepared to take the consequences of a unilateral decision.’27 After the Cabinet had finally decided in mid-December to accord de jure recognition to the PRC, Bevin sent a personal message to Acheson: [W]e have deferred a decision on this matter as long as we felt able, but having taken into account all the circumstances and all the views expressed by other Governments, we nevertheless feel we must now proceed to recognition. There are some factors which affect us specially not only our interests in China but the position in Hong Kong and also in Malaya and Singapore, where there are vast Chinese communities.28
26 27 28
Memo. of Conversation, Dec. , FRUS, , , –. Dening to Strang, Dec. , FO /, F//, PRO. British Embassy, Washington to State, Dec. , FRUS, , , –.
Meeting the Political Threat
By frequently pointing out the vulnerability of Hong Kong, the British sought to impress upon the Truman administration the necessity of a conciliatory approach towards the Chinese Communists. Whatever its reservations, the US State Department came to accept that the British had legitimate reasons to recognize the PRC, not least because of Hong Kong. A position paper prepared for Acheson during his forthcoming meeting with Bevin in Paris thus suggested: It would also be well for the Secretary to keep in mind the attitude of the British with respect to Hong Kong. If the British should, because of pressure from the United States, withhold recognition of the Chinese Communists for a considerable period, it is possible that complications over Hong Kong would arise which might lead to a Chinese Communist attack on the Colony.29
US decision-makers realized that China was an area more important to Britain than to the United States.30 So long as disagreement over China did not spill over into cooperation in other parts of Asia and, more importantly, in Europe, the top priority for both countries, the United States agreed to disagree with Britain on the issue of recognition.
On January , the Labour government accorded de jure recognition to the PRC. But this did not immediately gain the goodwill of the Chinese Communists. In reply three days later, Beijing expressed its willingness to start negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations. Anglo–Chinese negotiations, however, turned out to be protracted, and were discontinued when the Korean War broke out in June.31 The Chinese Communist leadership blamed the British for failing the tests of sincerity, because of their continuing support for Nationalist China in the United Nations, and their attitudes towards Guomindang organizations and Chinese national properties in Hong Kong.32 The latter included the 29
Memo. by Perkins, Nov. , ibid., –. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese–American Relations and the Recognition Controversy – (New York, ), . 31 For Anglo–Chinese negotiations until the outbreak of the Korean War, see Tang, Britain’s Encounter with Revolutionary China, –. 32 The PRC Foreign Ministry and the CCP Central Documentary Research Department (eds.), MaoZedong Waijiao Wenxuan [Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Diplomacy] (Beijing, ), . 30
Hong Kong
dispute over the ownership of seventy-one aircraft grounded in Hong Kong between late and .33 The aircraft dispute was illustrative of the British dilemma of safeguarding Hong Kong, when Beijing exploited the Hong Kong issue to split the Anglo–American alliance, and equally when the US Congress manipulated it to criticize the administration. On November , the managing directors and staff members of the China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC)—a Hong Kongbased company with the Guomindang government holding a majority of its share—and the Central Air Transport Corporation (CATC)—an official agency of the Nationalist government—defected to the newlyestablished PRC with eleven aircraft, leaving behind seventy-one aeroplanes in the Colony. The Chinese Communists then claimed that these seventy-one aeroplanes were the property of the PRC. In order to deny the aircraft to Beijing, the Nationalist government immediately transferred the ownership of CNAC and CATC to the Civil Air Transport (CAT) under General Claire Chennault, the pro-Chiang ‘Flying Tiger’ pilot, and Whiting Willauer, his business partner. Caught between these claims and counter-claims, the British resorted to legal means to decide the fate of the aircraft. On February , the Hong Kong court ruled that the seventy-one airplanes belonged to the PRC. This did not mark the end of the dispute, however. Beijing demanded the immediate transfer of the aircraft to China, whilst Washington brought pressure to bear on London to prevent the planes from falling into communist hands. In his oral communication of March with John Hutchison, the British representative who was sent to Beijing to negotiate for the establishment of diplomatic relations, Zhang Hanfu, the Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, asked London to clarify its relations with Taipei in view of its earlier abstention on a Soviet resolution to unseat the Chinese Nationalist representative in the United Nations, and its attitude towards the disputed aircraft in Hong Kong. In the light of the unsatisfactory British reply of March, Zhang asked Hutchison on May to make further clarification of the British failure to fully protect the aeroplanes, seven of which had been sabotaged, and to allow their early return to China.34
33 For a standard account of the aircraft dispute, see Tang, Britain’s Encounter with Revolutionary China, –; Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle, –. 34 FO to British Representatives Overseas, June , FO /, FC/, PRO; Martin, Divided Counsel, –, –.
Meeting the Political Threat
Chinese Communist leaders did have genuine grievances about the British handling of the aircraft dispute. But the role of the incident in their refusal to establish diplomatic relations with the British government should be put in perspective. It is true that Mao desired to establish formal diplomatic relations with all countries, including the Western ones. But he insisted that they first curtail all links with the Chinese Nationalists. Their failure to do so simply demonstrated that Western imperialist powers still refused to recognize the emergence of the new China, and to treat the PRC with equality and respect. Besides, the Chinese Communists made a distinction between recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations. Before the establishment of formal relations with certain countries, further negotiations were necessary in order to