Heresy and Identity in Late Antiquity Edited by
Eduard Iricinschi. and Holger M. Zellentin
Mohr Siebeck
EDUARD IRIC...
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Heresy and Identity in Late Antiquity Edited by
Eduard Iricinschi. and Holger M. Zellentin
Mohr Siebeck
EDUARD IRICINSCHI, born 1968; MA in Philosophy from Bucharest University, and MA in Religious Studies from New York University; is finishing a doctorate in the Department of Religion at Princeton University. HOLGER M. ZELLENTIN, born 1976, is an Assistant Professor of Rabbinics at the Richard S. Dinner Center for Jewish Studies at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, California.
ISBN 978-3-16-149122-1 ISSN 0721-8753 (Texts and Studies in Ancient Judaism) Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. © 2008 Mohr Siebeck, Tiibingen, Germany. This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publisher's written permission. This applies particularly to reproductions, translations, microfilms and storage and processing in electronic systems. The book was printed by Guide-Druck in Tiibingen on non-aging paper and bound by Buchbinderei Spinner in Ottersweier. Printed in Germany.
Preface The colloquium held on January 16-18 2005, "Making Selves and Marking Others: Heresy and Self-Definition in Late Antiquity," follows in the steps of two earlier Princeton colloquia and volumes, which have gained wide academic attention. The series of colloquia was initiated by Peter Schafer in 2000, with generous funding from the Princeton University Graduate School, and continued in the following years under his tutelage.* Each year, two graduate students in the Department of Religion at Princeton University choose a topic of interdisciplinary interest and organize a semester-long workshop on the selected theme, followed by a colloquium. During the workshop, graduate students present their papers to colleagues and faculty from a variety of fields, and rework them into a formal presentation. At the concluding colloquium, the participants discuss their revised work with recognized scholars from Princeton University and other institutions, invited by the organizers to present their views on the same topic. We take this opportunity to express our sincere gratitude to our contributors, and to all who so generously supported the colloquium and this publication. As representative of all those who ensured our success, we have space to name only the most prominent ones. It is hardly possible to exaggerate Peter Schafer's initiative and support for this project. Annette Yoshiko Reed has considerably facilitated our task by providing us with invaluable academic and editorial advice. Bam Saul and Lorraine Fuhrmann have ensured a pleasant stay at Princeton for all participants of the colloquium. At Princeton University, the Center for the Study of Religion, the Department of Religion, and the Program in Judaic Studies generously provided office space and funding for the colloquium and the publication. Finally, Henning Ziebritzki and Tanja Mix from Mohr Siebeck guided the project to its present form. Holger Zellentin and Eduard Iricinschi * Adam H. Becker and Annette Y. Reed, eds. The Ways that Never Parted: Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, TSAJ 95 (Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003); and Ra'anan Boustan and Annette Y. Reed, eds., Heavenly Realms and Earthly Realities in Late Antique Religions (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). See now also Gregg Gardner and Kevin L. Osterloh, eds., Antiquity in Antiquity: Jewish and Christian Pasts in the Greco-Roman World (Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck, forthcoming); and the colloquium organized in January 2007 by Philippa Townsend and Moulie Vidas, "Revelation, Literature, and Community in Antiquity."
Table of Contents Preface ...................................................................................................... V EDUARD IRICINSCHI & HOLGER M. ZELLENTIN
Making Selves and Marking Others: Identity and Late Antique Heresiologies .................................................................. 1 KAREN L. KING
Social and Theological Effects of Heresiological Discourse ..................... 28 WILLIAM E. ARNAL
Doxa, Heresy, and Self-Construction: The Pauline Ekklesiai and the Boundaries of Urban Identities ..................................................... 50 AVERIL CAMERON
The Violence of Orthodoxy .................................................................... 102 Y ANNIS P APADOYANNAKIS
Defining Orthodoxy in Pseudo-Justin's "Quaestiones et responsiones ad orthodoxos" ............................................................... 115 CAROLINE HUMFRESS
Citizens and Heretics: Late Roman Lawyers on Christian Heresy .......... 128 RICHARD LIM
The Nomen Manichaeorum and Its Uses in Late Antiquity ..................... 143 KEVIN LEE OSTERLOH
Judea, Rome and the Hellenistic Oikoumene: Emulation and the Reinvention of Communal Identity ............................................ 168 JOHNG. GAGER
Where Does Luke's Anti-Judaism Come from? ...................................... 207 PHILIPPA TOWNSEND
Who Were the First Christians? Jews, Gentiles and the Christianoi ...... 212
VIII
Table of Contents
ELAINE PAGELS
The Social History of Satan, Part III: John ofPatmos and Ignatius of Antioch - Contrasting Visions of "God's People" .................................. 231 EDUARD IRICINSCHI
If You Got It, Flaunt It: Religious Advertising in the Gospel of Philip ........................................................................... 253 ANNETTE YOSHIKO REED
Heresiology and the (Jewish-)Christian Novel: Narrativized Polemics in the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies .................... 273 BURTON L. VISOTZKY
Goys '5I'n't Us: Rabbinic Anti-Gentile Polemic in Yerushalmi Berachot 9: 1 .................................................................... 299 GREGG GARDNER
Astrology in the Talmud: An Analysis of Bavli Shabbat 156 ................. 314 HOLGER M. ZELLENTIN
Margin of Error: Women, Law, and Christianity in Bavli Shabbat 116a-b ............................................... 339 ISRAEL JACOB YUVAL
The Other in Us: Liturgica, Poetica, Polemica ........................................ 364
List of Contributors ................................................................................. 387 Modern Author Index ............................................................................. 389 Subject Index ..........,................................................................. :.............. 397
Making Selves and Marking Others: Identity and Late Antique Heresiologies EDUARD IRICINSCHI & HOLGER M. ZELLENTIN
"The Other may not be very other at all." Kwame Anthony Appiahl
As influential catchwords, "heresy" and "identity" have recently acquired the sense of entitlement and hazard that only a dominant academic paradigm would impart. In a famous manifesto of the 1970s, for instance, sociologist Peter Berger associates modernity with the "universalization of heresy." According to Berger, the freedom to choose among different versions of plausibility characterizes the post-Enlightenment person. Under these new .circumstances, heresy surrenders itself to the imperative of multiple worldviews and becomes the very label of modern religious life: "For premodern man, heresy is a possibility - usually a rather remote one; for modern man, heresy typically becomes a necessity."2 Academic success has not been easy on "identity" either. In the last three decades of shifting cultural geographies, identity has become an everpresent theoretical tool in the Humanities and Social Sciences to the point where Sinisa Malesevic has invoked the utopia of an identity-less world. 3 A number of social scientists and historians concur that the birth of
* We would like to thank Adam Becker, Ra'anan Boustan, Gregg Gardner, Martha Himmelfarb, Annette Yoshiko Reed, Jeffrey Stout, Philippa Townsend, and Moulie Vidas for their careful reading, insightful critiques, and helpful suggestions for improving this text. 1 Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 2 Peter L. Berger, The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1979), 28. Closer to our disenchanted twenty-first century, Arthur Versluis identifies the origins of totalitarianism in "the emergence of historical Christianity," more precisely, in its incipient heresiology and the unabated history of witch-hunting in Christianity; The New Inquisitions: Heretic-Hunting and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Totalitarianism (Oxford: OUP, 2006), ix. 3 Sinisa Malesevic, Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism (Basingstoke U.K.; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 13-14.
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"identity" must be located at the advent of modernity.4 Anthony Giddens, for instance, argues that it was only "late" or "high modernity" that brought with it "transformations in self-identity."5 This raises the question: How legitimate is the search for identity formations in pre-modern texts?6 What are the benefits of projecting modern theoretical concepts of "identity" back into the Mediterranean and Near Eastern worlds of Late Antiquity? And, if modernity is indeed an age of heresy, then how might this skew our images of those deemed "heretics" in our pre-modern sources? What is the work that the categories of "heresy" and "identity" do, when applied to times so distant from our own? To these questions, the essays in the present volume offer a broad array of answers, drawing on sources ranging from Second-Temple Jewish and New Testament literature to late antique Christian and Rabbinic writings. They explore, in particular, how discourses of "heresy" relate to the formation of religious identities by Jews, Christians, and others. Taken together, they map the multiple functions of the discourse of "heresy" in late antique religions and their shifting relationships to "identity." Some essays focus on the ways in which (re)imagined dissenters are perceived, described, grouped, categorized, and/or disqualified in our late antique sources. Others consider the power of labels such as "heretic," "min," "Jew," "Christian," "gnostic," and "Manichean." The volume thus seeks to open a vista onto the varied ways in which late antique groups and communities defined their own socio-political borders and secured in-group identities by means of discourses about "heresy" and "heretics." The papers collected here put to work the methodological tools provided both by the recent scholarly emphases on textuality and by the social study of heresiology in order to reach a more 4 Roy F. Baumeister begins his research on basic conceptual issues with Descartes' dubitative formula and expands it to the development of the "hidden self' in the sixteenth century; see his Identity: Cultural Change and the Struggle for Self (Oxford: OUP, 1986), 11-50. 5 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 33. Critics of the now-popular notion of "identity" have drawn attention to its lack of analytical value. Malesevi6 holds that the malleability and vagueness of this "conceptually, operationally and politically seriously troubled idiom" causes identity to be just an "operational phantom" (Identity as Ideology, 56). In the most thorough critique to date, Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper advocate a complete dismissal of the project that attempts to strike the right chord between a "hard," essentialist conception of identity and a "soft," constructivist version of it ("Beyond 'Identity'," TS 29.1 [2000]: 1-47). See also Mervyn F. Bendle, "The Crisis of 'Identity' in High Modernity," BJS 53.1 (2002): 1-18; and Richard Jenkins, Social Identity (2d ed. London: Routledge, 2004). 6 On pre-modern attempts at self-understanding and identification, see e.g. Judith M. Lieu, Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World (Oxford: OUP, 2004); and discussion below.
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integrative understanding of late antique religious movements. They shift the focus away from "heretics" and "heresy" to heresiological discourse, by adopting literary approaches and by contextualizing the late antique Jewish and Christian groups that produced our extant literature. In the following section, we review recent developments on ancient heresiology and orthodoxy, connecting them to current discussions on the concept of "identity" in the study of religion. Finally, we introduce the papers in this volume with a focus on their novel approaches.
Hairesis in Modern Scholarship Early Christian hairesis emerged in part from the broader context of Greek Hellenistic culture. John Glucker describes the word's development, beginning with the classical Greek verb haireomai, "to choose." Its root underwent a series of different modifications. For instance, in the third century BCE, hairesis could mean a person's "attitude" or "disposition," and often had political connotations, while later Polybius applied the term to individuals as well as groups. 7 Heinrich von Staden traces the transition from individual to group applications first in the medical schools, then in philosophical schools of Hellenistic Alexandria. According to von Staden, in the Ptolemaic Alexandrian medical hairesis literature: [A] group with a fairly coherent and distinctive theories, with an acknowledged founder [ ... ], and with publicly identifiable leaders who articulate (a) their rejection of rival theories through theoretically founded polemics, as well as (b) their own systematic alternatives, would qualify as a hairesis. [ ... ] It is worth noting that, no later than the second century BCE, hairesis begins to occur in non-medical literature, too, as a designation for a group that is thought to be doctrinally distinctive, especially for a philosophical schooL ... In some of these non-medical texts "doctrine," "school," and "sect" all might be defensible translations of hairesis, but in each case it refers to a group phenomenon, not to individual choice. 8
The Alexandrian classification left a lingering imprint on the term hairesis. From the second century BCE onwards, hairesis had mostly referred in Greek literature to a group, usually associated with its founder. The term hairesis appeared in the titles of books concerning the opinions of philosophers or their respective doctrines, yet it did not initially signify the institutionalized schools. 9 The meaning of the term "heresy" as 7 John Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978), 168, 172-3. 8 Heinrich von Staden, "Hairesis and Heresy: The Case of the haireseis iatrikai, " in Jewish and Christian Self-definition, v. 3, Self-definition in the Greco-Roman World (ed. Ben F. Meyer and E.P. Sanders; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982),76-100, esp. 80. 9 Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy, 174-5.
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"philosophical school" became more common in the subsequent decades, and by the first century BCE it came to characterize precisely these philosophical institutions. 10 As early as 1979, Marcel Simon registered the similar use of orthodoxy and hairesis in Judaism and incipient Christianity. He pointed to the trajectory between the New Testament book of Acts (24: 14 and 26:5) and Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho, and most notably to a passage in the latter that describes Justin's branch of Christianity as a Jewish hairesis (Dial. 62.3; ca. 140-150 CE).l1 Semantically, hairesis remained an open term all through third century CE, according to Simon. Yet the consequences of such "choice" varied from case to case. For Origen, hairesis designated the necessary tools of paideia in the most relevant areas of human life, such as medicine, philosophy and Judaism; in the writings of Clement and Hippolytus, pagan philosophical schools receive a clearly better assessment than Christian heresies; finally, in Hellenistic philosophical writings, hairesis designates a highly qualitative choice. 12 Von Staden suggests that the relational character of haireseis in early Christian contexts divorced it from its more independent uses in Alexandrian medicine or in philosophical schools, such as "doctrine," "school," or "sect." Whereas these neutral descriptions underlined the discrete character of each philosophical or medical group and its leader, hairesis received new meanings in Patristic writings that described degrees of separation from the true church, such as "falling away," "breaking away," "separation," "estrangement," "alienation. "13 Even after hairesis developed into "heresy" in early Christianity, one of the term's most important denotations remained Hellenistic philosophy and its numerous schools. Consequently, ancient Greek thought provides modem scholars with one of the main contexts for most of the research on heresy. Understanding "heresies," however, in connection to philosophical schools has led scholars to describe them as real and concrete social movements, rather than as perceptions of a specific religious group or individual. In this sense, the history of the term "heresy" has long directed most scholars' analysis towards the study of genuine, discrete groups. 10 Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy, 182-184, cf. Alain Le Boulluec, La notion d 'heresie dans la litterature grecque, IT -IIT sieeles (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1985),47. 11 Marcel Simon, "From Greek Hairesis to Christian Heresy," in Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition: In Honorem Robert M Grant, TMologie historique 54 (ed. William R. Schoedel and Robert L. Wilken; Paris: Editions Beauchesne, 1979), 101-116, esp. 105-6. 12 Origen Contra Celsum 3.12-3; cf. 2.27; 5.61, Diogenes Laertius used it as a praise in Vito Phi/os. Introd; see Simon, "From Greek Hairesis to Christian Heresy," 108-111. 13 Von Staden, "Hairesis and Heresy," esp. 81,97-98.
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This approach to heresy changed a few decades ago, as Averil Cameron notes in the present volume. Currently, students of late antique MeditelTanean religions question the existence of heresies as deviant from orthodoxy .. The category of heresy, however, continues to fascinate scholars.
Heresiology and Difference Two works stand as milestones of scholarship on heresiology in the last century: Walter Bauer's Rechtgliiubigkeit und Ketzerei im iiltesten Christentum I4 and Alain Le Boulluec's La notion d'heresie dans la litterature grecque. I5 Bauer's book challenged the ecclesiastical understanding of heresy as a late offshoot of orthodoxy, and made room for reevaluating chronological priority in the study of local churches. Bauer's major thesis was that heresy mainly characterized Christian communities in the Roman provincial peripheries - that is Syria, Egypt, and Asia Minor, while orthodoxy grew out of a particular form of the Church of Rome. I6 Contesting early heresiological truth-claims put forward by ecclesiastical writers as well as later theological approaches to the study of ancient religions, Walter Bauer made the "contingent character of heresy" the cornerstone of historical reconstructions of Christian origins. 17 Bauer's Rechtgliiubigkeit und Ketzerei broadened the spectrum of possibilities for re-imagining early Christian groups, allowing later scholars to deemphasize the "history-of-ideas" mode of historical reconstruction and focus instead on social history. Positive German reviews of the first edition (1934) commended the ingenious approach and boldness of Bauer' vision; they joined, however, the more critical ones in underlining Bauer's use of the "argument from silence" and excesses of interpretation. 18 14 Walter Bauer, Rechtglaubigkeit und Ketzerei im altesten Christen tum (Tiibingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1934 [1964]); Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity (trans. by a team from the Philadelphia Seminar on Christian Origins, ed. by Robert A. Kraft and Gerhard Krodel; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971). 15 Le Boulluec, La notion d'heresie. 16 Bauer, Orthodoxy and Heresy, "Introduction" and ch. 5. 17 See Alain Le Boulluec, "Orthodoxie et heresie aux premiers siecles dans l'historiographie recente," in Orthodox ie, Christianisme, histoire (ed. Susanna Elm, Eric Rebillard, and Antonella Romano; Rome: Ecole Fran<;aise de Rome, 2000), 303-319, esp. 307-8. 18 See Georg Strecker, "The Reception of the Book" (rev. and augmented by Robert A. Kraft), in Bauer, Orthodoxy and Heresy, 286-316, esp. 290-295. Frederick W. Norris contests-the validity of Bauer's historical reconstruction, yet concedes to his critique of former theories of heresy ("Ignatius, Polycarp, and I Clement: Walter Bauer Reconsidered," VC 30.1 (1976): 23-44, esp. 41-44). See also D. J. Harrington, "The
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The discovery in 1945 of the Coptic documents at Nag Hammadi and their subsequent publication provided support for Bauer's earlier views, and did away with some of the accusations leveled against his use of the argument from silence. Scholars applied the methods of form and redaction criticism to some of the Coptic texts,19 looked carefully for their "social and political implications" by reading them together with the heresiological writings,20 and stressed new and innovative use of gender images in these ancient Christian texts. 21 Bauer's book and the discovery of the Nag Hammadi texts provided the major principles for a reevaluation of early Christian heresiologies. 22 The translation of the Nag Hammadi texts into modern languages, mostly during the 1970s, prompted scholars to inquire about ways to understand their mythological content and theological debates, and, in a parallel move, to reconstruct their social and political contexts. Attempts at locating more than theological dogmas and philosophical ideas in the heresiological treatises and the Nag Hammadi texts allowed Elaine Pagels, for instance, to describe heresiological writings and Valentini an mythological texts as performing different argumentative tasks in strengthening
Reception of Walter Bauer's Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity during the Last Decade," HTR 70 (1980): 289-298. More recently, see Lewis Ayres, "The Question of Orthodoxy," JECS 14.4 (2006): 395-398, as well as Walther Volker's 1935 review of Bauer's book in JECS 14.4 (2006): 399-405, trans. T. P. Scheck. 19 Helmut Koester, Ancient Christian Gospels: Their Hist01Y and Development (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1990). 20 Elaine Pagels, The Gnostic Gospels (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). 21 Karen King, ed., Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), eadem, The Gospel of Mary of Magdala: Jesus and the First Woman Apostle (Santa Ro~a, Calif.: Polebridge Press, 2003). 22 The publication of the texts discovered at Nag Hammadi led gradually to the consolidation of "Gnosticism" as an established academic category, a trend that described it as a religion in its own right, with two branches, Valentinianism and Sethianism. For "gnosticism" as a historical category, see Ugo Bianchi, ed., Le origini dello gnosticismo: Colloquio di Messina 13-18 Aprile 1966 (Leiden: Brill, 1967); Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Gnosticism, Stockholm August 20-25 1973 (Stockholm, Leiden: Almquist & Wiksell, E.J. Brill, 1977); Bentley Layton, ed., The Rediscovery of Gnosticism; I: Valentinian Gnosticism; II: Sethian Gnosticism (Leiden: Brill, 1981); and Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and Gnosticism (Leiden: Brill, 1977). Recently, careful reconsiderations by Michael A. Williams, Karen King, and Elaine Pagels have led scholars to question the usefulness of such a category as "gnosticism." See Michael A. Williams, Rethinking "Gnosticism": An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Karen L. King, What Is Gnosticism? (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003); and Elaine Pagels, "Irenaeus, the 'Canon of Truth,' and the Gospel of John: 'Making a Difference' through Hermeneutics and Ritual," VC 56 (2002): 339-371.
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or contesting ecclesiastical and spiritual authority.23 Furthermore, Pagels stressed that theological and political issues were not only connected but had remarkable relevance in early Christian communities. 24 Much of the recent research in this area looks for inspiration outside of the field of Religious Studies and the literature of Late Antiquity. Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault number among those theorists to whom scholars of late antique religions have turned for new perspectives on the historical categories of heresy and orthodoxy. As a result, the theological perspective on Christian Origins and the rise of orthodoxy, heavily influential until the 1970s, is being gradually displaced by sociological, textual, and historical approaches, marked by a strong emphasis on local diversity. If past studies typically assumed a clear-cut distinction between the winning orthodox party and losing heretical factions, more recent studies seem to signal a shift of interest from heresy toward heresiology. Moreover, they understand competition between diverse Christian groups as contentions between the competing orthodoxies and heresiologies within each of the respective groups. This shift is perhaps clear from the newlydeveloped vocabulary found in recent works, which includes terms such as "heresiological representations," "discourse," "insider/outsider," "identity formation," "ethnicity," "gender," "sexuality," "dissension," "exclusion," and "territoriality." The most prominent representative of this trend, Alain Le Boulluec, took into account some of the critiques aimed at Bauer and shifted the focus toward "the presuppositions of the heresiological discourses."25 Le Boulluec also took Bauer's efforts to de-legitimize the ecclesiastical position on the origins of heresy one step further and confined his analysis to the sole study of "heresiological representations." This approach reduces the risks of value judgments and, at the same time, makes clear the constructed character of "heresy." When seen from this new perspective, "heresy" becomes a discursive structure rather than an historical object. 26 23 Elaine Pagels, "The Valentini an Claim to Esoteric Exegesis of Romans as Basis for Anthropological Theory," VC 26 (1972): 241-258, eadem, '''The Demiurge and His Archons': A Gnostic View of the Bishop and Presbyters?" HTR 69.3/4 (1976): 301-324; eadem, The Johannine Gospel in Gnostic Exegesis: Heracleon's Commentary on John (Nashville & New York: Abingdon Press, 1973), esp. 56-7. 24 Pagels, "Demiurge and His Archons," 301-324; eadem, "Visions, Appearances, and Apostolic Authority: Gnostic and Orthodox Traditions" in Gnosis: Festschrift fur Hans Jonas (ed. B. Aland; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1978), 415-430; eadem. "Gnostic and Orthodox Views of Christ's Passion: Paradigms for the Christian's Response to Persecution?" in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism (ed. Bentley Layton; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980), vol. 1,262-283, and conference discussions at 283-288. 25 Le Boulluec, La notion d'heresie, vol. l. 26 Ibid., 1.19.
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The influence of Foucault, in particular, becomes clear in LeBoulluec' s examination of early Christian "institutional structures," "norms of belonging," and "sacramental disciplines" as well as in his purpose of detecting the reasons behind the "invention of a regulative and reductive scheme to master dissensions. "27 Le Boulluec proposes that Justin Martyr "invented" heresy around the mid-second century, by positing common traits between Christian "heresies" and "philosophical schools." This innovation was based in two models: the depiction of "schools of thought" in Greek historiography and the identification of the demonic origins of dissensions, the latter of which was applied to the biblical trope of the "false prophet." In addition, Le Boulluec presented Justin as the inventor of a new literary genre: his Against Heresies was the first example of what would become the Christian genre ofheresiology.28 Critics of Le Boulluec' s work have noted that he focuses on the "idea of heresy," leaving aside the question of ritual practice. 29 They have also objected to Le Boulluec' s identification of the beginnings of heresiology in Justin's writings. Rebecca Lyman, for instance, has placed Justin's heresiology in the context of middle-Platonic universalism. She points out that the claim to a single true hairesis might not be original to Christian heresiology; rather, it may have flowed out of Greek philosophical and Roman political constraints on religious debate. 3D To this, we might add that Le Boulluec mentions "Jewish precedents" to Justin's literary use of hairesis only in passing. 31 Since Justin explicitly describes Christianity as heresy from a Jewish point of view and compares Christian heresies to the Jewish ones that he claims to know, one might argue that Justin's budding 27 Ibid., 1.11-15, translated by the authors. 28 Ibid., 1.11 0-112, see also 42. 29 For instance, Elaine Pagels remarks that, despite the utter absence of the word "gnostic" in Justin's writings, Le Boulluec portrays Justin's heretics as "gnostics," thus importing the problematic tacit assumptions of this notion; see Elaine Pagels, "Irenaeus, the 'Canon of Truth,' and the Gospel of John," esp. 340-3. Extending Pagels' objection, one could question Le Boulluec's detection of ancient origins of heresy in Justin's work based solely on the occurrence of new meanings for hairesis. Le Boulluec identified nascent aspects of ancient Christian "heresy" in Justin Martyr's use of haireseis for false Christians as comparable to Greek philosophical schools. Yet, based on the' single reference and the ambiguous context, one could hardly be sure that Justin's lost treatise against haireseis made reference to Christian heresies rather than simply to contemporary philosophical schools, to which Justin devoted a considerable amount of his educational efforts; cf. Le Boulluec, La notion d'heresie, 1.37; see Justin, 1 Apol. 26, where Justin speaks about "Christian" heretics and explicitly draws the comparison to philosophical haireseis. See also Eusebius' discussion of Justin's treatise against all heresies (Hist. eccl. 4.11.10). 3D Rebecca Lyman, "2002 NAPS Presidential Address: Hellenism and Heresy," JECS 11.2 (2003): 209-222. 31 Le Boulluec, La notion d'heresie, 1.37.
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heresiology may have been formed in interaction with Jewish models, as Daniel Boyarin has recently emphasized. 32 Acknowledging the culturally-constructed character of heresy and orthodoxy, scholars of late antique religions have now applied Le Boulluec's insights to later periods and extended his approach to such categories as rhetoric, body, and gender. In Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire, for instance, Averil Cameron examines the making of Christian totalizing discourse through her analysis of ancient rhetoric, a focus on symbols of virginity, and on, ideas about representation. 33 Similarly, scholars such as Susanna Elm and Virgina Burrus have investigated the social and discursive connections between orthodoxy and heresy, as well as their reciprocal construction through "practices of bodily markings."34 The methodological shift from "heresy" to "heresiology" also raised the question of the ideological stakes of writing and reading heresiological literature. Cameron, for instance, proposes that Byzantine Christian heresiological writings were informed by earlier defensive rhetorical strategies against the Christians' Jewish and Gentile neighbors. In the 32 Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: U. of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 41. Justin used the term hairesis only seven times in his extant work, almost exclusively in the Dialogue with Trypho, apart from the reference to his Refutation in the First Apology. Most of his uses of hairesis seem to describe heresies from a Jewish perspective. According to this hypothesis, the search for the origin of heresiology points beyond Justin Martyr, toward the Jewish heresiology of or before Justin's time. 33 Averil Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1991), and review by G. Woolf in JRS 83 (1993): 257-258. See also Averil Cameron's earlier review article, "Redrawing the Map: Early Christianity Territory after Foucault," JRS 76 (1986): 266-271, for the restructuring of the late antique studies. Also Peter Brown, Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire (Madison: U. of Wisconsin Press, 1992), and, more recently, Fergus Millar, A Greek Roman Empire: Power and Belief under Theodosius II (408-450) (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 2006). 34 Susanna Elm, "Pierced by Bronze Needles: Anti-Montanist Charges of Ritual Stigmatization in Their Fourth-Century Context," JECS 4:4 (1996): 409-439. Harry O. Maier's inquiry into Leo's anti-Manichaean polemics employed other Foucauldian topoi, such as power, discipline and punishment; see Harry O. Maier, "'Manichee! ': Leo the Great and the Orthodox Panopticon," JECS 4.4 (1996): 441-460. Likewise, Virginia Burrus has explored the function of gender metaphors in "the construction of an orthodox subjectivity" in the early works of Ambrose; see Virginia Burrus, The Making of a Heretic: Gender, Authority, and the Priscillianist Controversy (Berkeley: U. of California, 1995); eadem, "Equipped for Victory: Ambrose and the Gendering of Orthodoxy," JECS 4.4 (1996): 461-475; and "The Heretical Woman as Symbol in Alexander, Athanasius, Epiphanius, and Jerome," HTR 84 (1991): 229-248. See also, for a nuanced correlation of heresy, gender, and magic, Todd Breyfogle, "Magic, Women, and Heresy in the Late Empire: the Case of the Priscillianists," in Ancient Magic and Ritual Power (ed. Marvin Meyer and Paul Mirecki; Leiden: Brill 1995), 435-454.
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process of constructing their own and others' identities, the authors of heresiological literature adopted verbal vituperation as a way to label the "heretics," and to prepare a cognitive niche for theological otherness in the "mutations" of the Christian system of knowledge. 35 Similarly, Herve Inglebert regards the history of heresies as a "way to write Christian history," similar to the ancient genres of biography and doxography. He thus situates the classical origins of heresiological genealogies within the larger process of integrating Greek paideia into doctrina Christiana. According to Inglebert, Greek paideia deeply informed the organizing system of the heresiological discourse through the genealogical model of Greek philosophical doxography.36 More recently, Denise Kimber Buell has called attention to early Christian identity-building through discursive practices and ethnoracial reasoning. According to Buell, early Christians employed ethnicity, race, and religion as social conventions with both a fixed and a fluid character, reflecting real or claimed kinship and descent. 37 Buell argues that the authors of the heresiological texts allowed fluidity for their own definition of race and ethnicity, to keep their doors open for converts, while assuming that their Christian rivals have a "fixed" race/ethnicity.38 The present volume calls into question the value of a distinct notion of "heresy" for the study of Late Antiquity and aims at repositioning heresiological discourse within the broader context of religious identities. As such, the papers proceed from the assumption that late antique "heresy" reflects the limits of its discursive construction by authors and groups who 35 Averil Cameron, "Apologetics in the Roman Empire - A Genre of Intolerance?" in "Humana sapit": etudes d'antiquite tardive offertes if Leilia Cracco Ruggini (ed. JeanMichel Carrie and Rita Lizzi Testa; Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 219-229; see also Averil Cameron, "Jews and Heretics - A Category Error?" in The Ways That Never Parted: Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (ed. Adam H. Becker and Annette Yoshiko Reed; TSAJ 95; Ttibingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003; reprint by Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007); and Averil Cameron, "How to Read Heresiology?" in The Cultural Turn in Late Ancient Studies: Gender, Asceticism, and Historiography (ed. Dale Martin and Patricia Cox Miller; Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 193-212. 36 Herve Inglebert, Interpretatio christiana: Les mutations des savoirs, cosmographie, geographie, ethnographie, histoire, dans I 'antiquite chretienne, 30-630 apres J.-C, Collection des etudes augustiniennes (Paris: Institut d' etudes augustiniennes, 2001), chapter 5, "L'histoire des heresies," 393-461, esp. 395-399,409,458. 37 Denise Kimber Buell, Why This New Race: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); eadem, Making Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), esp. 18, 81. Similarly, Susan Wessel's detailed analysis of the Nestorian controversy focuses on the rhetorical means through which its actors carried theological debates and reached their polemical purposes; see Susan Wessel, Cyril of Alexandria and the Nestorian Controversy: The Making of a Saint and of a Heretic (Oxford: OUP, 2004). 38 Buell, Why This New Race, 118, 145.
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made claims to orthodoxy and power and are shaped by social and cultural tensions. Hence, the heresy-making discourses under analysis in this volume will be best understood as representing specific late antique worldviews. Although we cannot ,posit a direct or self-conscious notion of religious identity in the late antique world, heresiological discourses provide us a lens for understanding Jewish or Christian identities as discursive and enduring processes of cultural negotiation with the "other."
Ancient Jewish and Christian Identity in Modern Scholarship Whereas the work of Bauer and Le Boulluec helped to open many new directions in research on early Christianity, scholars of Second Temple and Rabbinic Judaism did not initially engage with their views nor accept the applicability of the Christian categories of "heresy" and "heresiology" for the study of Judaism. Nevertheless, similar questions about difference, exclusion, and self-definition, have been richly explored in the context of the lively discussion of identity in the study of early Jewish self-definition as well as in the study of Jewish-Christian relations. This too is part of a broader trend: recent studies of Jewish-Christian relations have increasingly investigated the formation of religious identity as an ongoing negotiation and internalization of the "other." Blurring boundaries of the ancient "never-parting" ways between Judaism and Christianity, articulating a working definition of the religious "other," and taking advantage of postcolonial theories of difference and hybridity these strategies have led to the rise of a fertile field of research where ancient answers received completely new questions. 39 This approach to studying Jewish, Christian, and "pagan" traditions in concert draws on broader theoretical discussions of identity as well as critiques of older models for comparative research in the field of Religious Studies. In this, one of the most influential voices has been that of Jonathan Z. Smith.40 Smith sketches three main models of the "other" common in 39 See, for instance, E.P. Sanders, ed., Jewish and Christian Self-definition, vol. 1, The Shaping of Christianity in the Second and Third Centuries (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980); Jacob Neusner and Ernest S. Frerichs, eds., "To See Ourselves as Others See Us": Christians, Jews, "Others" in Late Antiquity (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1985); Becker and Reed, eds., The Ways That Never Parted; Judith Lieu, Christian Identity. 40 See his latest collection of essays, Jonathan Z. Smith, Relating Religion: Essays in the Study of Religion (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 2004). See also Malesevi6, Identity as Ideology, which sketches the trajectory of "identity" in the last century from logic and analytical philosophy, through neo-Freudian psychoanalysis and cultural studies, to contemporary social sciences and humanities. Malesevi6 argues that identity arrived on
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the fields of Religious Studies and Anthropology: [1] "the 'other' represented metonymically in terms of the presence or absence of one or more cultural traits"; [2] "the 'other' represented topographically in terms of center and periphery"; and, finally, [3] "the 'other' represented linguistically and/or intellectually in terms of intelligibility."41 According to Smith, these metonymical, topographical, and linguistic models of the "other" render it incomprehensible. By placing difference in specific political and economic terms, articulated by social interaction and reciprocity, Smith suggests reforming otherness as a relational and situational category - "a political and linguistic project, a matter of rhetoric and judgment. "42 The reconceptualization of identity and difference - as dynamic processes rather than static or self-evident categories - has proved fruitful when applied to early Jewish and Christian texts and authors. Research has progressed along two main lines: the examination of parallel developments in Jewish and Christian cultures and the investigation of the place of exclusion in the construction of Jewish and Christian identity. This doubled interest is already clear in the three volumes on Jewish and Christian Self-Definition, the result of E.P. Sander's 1978 project at the stage of social sciences as a replacement of three other key notions that had fallen in disrepute: "race," "national character," and "social consciousness." Whereas race or class consciousness compromised their theoretical legitimacy through their ideological associations with Nazism and, respectively, Communism, national character has been successfully replaced in its American context by Erik Erikson's notion of "identity." Malesevic concludes that it was the elusiveness of identity, its omnipresence and high rate of adaptability to social change that propelled it to the forefront of social sciences and humanities: '''Identity' is a fuzzy term for fuzzy times" (p. 16). 41 Jonathan Z. Smith, "Differential Equations: On Constructing the Other," in idem, Relating Religion, 230-250, esp. 231. 42 Jonathan Z. Smith, "What a Difference a Difference Makes," in idem, Relating Religion, 251-302, esp. 275. Conceptual haziness has not always been the main attribute of identity. Martin Heidegger's philosophy heralds a strong concept of "identity," charged with requirements such as unity, continuity, and authenticity. See Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference (trans. and Introduction by Joan Stambaugh; New York: Harper & Row, 1969 [originally published in 1957]); as well as Andre Gingrich's critique of Heidegger's use of identity and difference in "Conceptualizing Identities: Anthropological Alternatives to Essentializing Difference and Moralizing about Othering,:' in Grammars of IdentitylAlterity: A Structural Approach (ed. Gerd Baumann and Andre Gingrich; New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 3-17. Kenneth Burke's entry on "Identity, Identification," in his 1937 "Dictionary of Pivotal Terms," marks an important strand of the American discussion of identity; see Kenneth Burke, Attitudes toward History (3d ed.; Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1984), 267-269 and idem, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1969), 19). See also Beth Eddy, The Rites of Identity: The Religious Naturalism and Cultural Criticism of Kenneth Burke and Ralph Ellison (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2003, esp. 27, 55. We are indebted to Jeffrey Stout for calling our attention to this reference.
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McMaster University that brought together scholars of Judaism, Christianity, and Greco-Roman traditions to discuss ancient identity-formation. Sanders called attention to comparable tendencies toward regulative self-definition in both early Judaism and Christianity.43 Accordingly, participants analyzed these trends through a close look at the theological, social and political mechanisms of exclusion in the making of heresy and orthodoxy, Second Temple Judaism, and early Christianity. In spite of keeping their inquiries on Judaism, Christianity, and "paganism" distinct, the authors stressed that normative self-definition operates through separation, exclusion, and a heightened sense of religious identity, and regarding religious conflict and polemical attitudes as conducive to religious self-definition.44 In the three decades since the McMaster project, subsequent scholarship further applied the categories of identity and heresy to early Jewish texts and early Christian representations of Jews as well as charting the analogous historical formative processes in Judaism and Christianity. Following Smith, recent studies have tended to consider identity as a relational and situational category and focused, accordingly, on the rhetoric of difference and the process of differentiation. One notable example is Judith Lieu's recent analysis of the formation of Christian identity in the first three centuries. Lieu reads the representation of "the Jews" and "heretics" not as a direct reflection of social reality, but as rhetorical construction. 45 Lieu processes "otherness" in early Christian discourse by taking into consideration the convenient construction of a domesticated Jewish or heretic "other," stripped of threatening characteristics. Through "mystification of alternative voices within an actual diversity," the invention of these "others" amounts to effacing the similarities 43 E.g. E. P. Sanders, "Introduction" to Jewish and Christian Self-definition, 1.ix-x. See also E.P. Sanders, A.I. Baumgarten, and Alan Mendelson, eds., Jewish and Christian Self-definition, vol. 2, Aspects of Judaism in the Graeco-Roman Period (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981); Ben F. Meyer and E.P. Sanders, eds., Jewish and Christian Selfdefinition, vol. 3, Self-definition in the Greco-Roman World (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982). 44 R.A. Markus, "The Problem of Self-definition: From Sect to Church," in Jewish and Christian Self-definition, 1.1-15; Alan F. Segal, "Ruler of This World: Attitudes about Mediator Figures and the Importance of Sociology for Self-definition," in Jewish and Christian Self-definition, 2.245-268; John M. Dillon, "Self-definition in Later Platonism," in Jewish and Christian Self-definition, 3.60-75. 45 Lieu, Christian Identity. On the discursive construction of the "other"· in Late Antiquity, see also Elizabeth A. Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory: Early Christian Culture Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Aaron P. Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument in Eusebius' Preparatio Evangelica (Oxford: OUP, 2006); and David Frankfurter, Evil Incarnate: Rumors of Demonic Conspiracy and Ritual Abuse in History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
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between Jews and Christians as well as the similarities among various Christian groups. In Lieu's study, propaganda and textuality receive a critical role in early Christianity: "The creation of otherness is a literary enterprise, reproduced no doubt in worship and homily."46 Similarly, Lieu argues, early Christian authors waged hermeneutical battles for the right to read the Hebrew Bible and to remember Jewish textual pasts in ways suitable for various social and political settings. 47 Significantly for our purposes, the "other" has also received a number of important treatments in recent scholarly reconstructions of Second Temple and Rabbinic Jewish identities. In her work on Philo's construction of Jewish Diaspora identity in the Hellenistic setting of Egypt, for instance, Maren Niehoff argues that the Roman Empire provided Philo the blueprint upon which he envisioned first-century C.E. Egyptian-Jewish identity.48 According to Niehoff, Philo elevates Jewish values by aligning them to the contemporary Roman appropriation of the Greek past while harboring a sense of superiority toward the Greek present. 49 Similarly, in a survey of the use of the term Ioudaismos in Hellenistic and Rabbinic Jewish literature, Shaye J.D. Cohen suggests that a considerable degree of fluidity and elusiveness characterize the "uncertainty of Jewishness."50 The main cultural, ethnic and religious elements of Jewish identity (birth, marriage, the Hebrew Bible, and ritual) came together and reached canonical authority, according to Cohen, only in Rabbinic Judaism. 51 Even though questions of identity have been richly explored in research on Judaism, it is only recently that the themes of identity and heresiology have been brought together in scholarship on Rabbinic Judaism. In a 1980 article by Cohen we find an initial attempt to connect heresy and selfdefinition. Cohen's analysis set the ground for comparing Rabbinic Jewish and early Christian ideas of "heresy" in relation to each other; it also approached the study of heresiology with the purpose of illustrating the negotiation of ancient religious identities. 52 According to Cohen, Christian and Rabbinic heresiologies took shape in a similar manner, under the 46 Lieu, Christian Identity, 297. 47 Ibid., 33-35, 255. 48 Maren R. Niehoff, Philo on Jewish Identity and Culture, TSAJ 86 (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck,2001). 49 Niehoff, Philo, 48, 54-58, 62. 50 Shaye J.D. Cohen, The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1999). 51 Cohen, Beginnings, 343. See also John J. Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora (2d ed.; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2000). 52 Shaye J. D. Cohen, "A Virgin Defiled: Some Rabbinic and Christian Views on the Origin of Heresy," USQR 36.1 (1980): 1-11.
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influence of Hellenistic models of disputation among philosophical schools: "The fathers of the early Catholic church and of Rabbinic Judaism proposed nearly identical theories of self-definition and authentication. "53 Invoking the difficulties of dating Rabbinic texts, however, Cohen did not further explore the question of the primary location of this discourse or its subsequent adaptation in either Christianity or Rabbinic Judaism. 54 The 1990s saw a renewed interest in the question of Rabbinic heresiology, partly inspired by Cohen's suggestions. In a 1994 article, for instance, Richard Kalmin challenged the historicity of Rabbinic tales about minim, confirming for the study of ancient Judaism the pertinence of the findings of Le Boulluec and others for early Christian heresiology.55 In a 1996 article, Martin Goodman similarly highlights the parallels between Rabbinic representations of minim and their treatment of other "ambiguous" groups such as androgynous males and women. 56 Goodman proposed that the indeterminate character of minut stems from the Rabbinic intellectual impulse towards classification. Although Goodman did not go so far as to analyze the relevance of this indeterminacy for the making of Rabbinic identity, this question was picked up and explored by Naomi Janowitz, in a 1998 article. Janowitz proposed that "Constructing the 'min' constructs in turn a shield which deflects notice away from the fact that other rabbis hold the same opinion [as the heretic],"57 The question of Rabbinic and Christian heresiologies has been explored, most comprehensively, by Daniel Boyarin in his 2004 book Border Lines. This book examines ancient religious borders, limits, and labels in both Jewish and Christian literature. 58 For Boyarin, heresiology defines Christian identity not merely as the illustration of a third genos, but rather as a completely new ideological, political, and social formation, a religion. He further contends that the very process of creating in-group Christian borders through heresiological segregation and alienation led to the simultaneous and interdependent creation of the Christian religion as a 53 Cohen, "Virgin Defiled," 8. 54 In a similar analysis, Reuven Kimelman showed that early Rabbinic heresiology seems to have explicitly targeted only Jewish Christians as "heretics," overlooking the possibility of any relationship between Rabbinic and orthodox Christianity heresiology; "Birkat ha-Minim and the Lack of Evidence for an Anti-Christian Jewish Prayer in Late Antiquity," in Jewish and Christian Self-definition 2.226-44, 391-403. 55 Richard Kalmin, "Christians and Heretics in Rabbinic Literature of Late Antiquity," HTR 87 (1994): 155-169. 56 Martin Goodman, "The Function of Minim in Early Rabbinic Judaism," in Geschichte-Tradition-Reflexion: Festschrift fiir Martin Hengel zum 70. Geburstag (ed. H. Cancik, H. Lichtenberger and P. Schafer; Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 1.501-510. 57 Naomi Janowitz, "Rabbis and Their Opponents: The Construction of the 'Min' in Rabbinic Anecdotes," JECS 6 (1998): 449-462, esp. 460. 58 Boyarin, Border Lines.
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category, and of "Judaism," as the "other" of the newly created religious formation. 59 Boyarin reads the incipient Jewish-Christian relations as "dialogical relations between texts and traditions," between Jewish and Christian authors who claim the right to appropriate the Hebrew Bible. In a parallel movement, he argues, Rabbinic writers adopted similar heresiological strategies in their own attempts to define - and exclude from their midst - a Christian "other." Yet, Boyarin states, Rabbinic authors "only occasionally, ambivalently, and strategically" defined Judaism as religion. 60, Along with Cohen and Boyarin, the present volume extends the discussion begun in the McMaster project on "pagan," Jewish, and Christian self-definition. In doing so, the papers collected here reflect the effort to situate the developments they document in increasingly detailed and specific historical and intellectual settings. In recognizing the specificity of the discourses they discuss, however, the authors also suggest that the pairing of heresy and identity makes visible the integration, though not equivalence, of late antique Jewish and Christian discourses.
Ancient Heresy and Society Recent scholarship on heresiology and identity has also opened the way for new perspectives on the social history of Late Antiquity. Already in the late 1960s and early 1970s, for instance, Peter Brown's essays on the Pelagian controversy move beyond texts and discourses to place Pelagian theological debates in the social context of the fourth- and fifth-century Roman aristocracy.61 59
Ibid., 11.
60 Ibid., 224, cf. 13. See also Ra'anan Boustan's review in JQR 96.3 (2006): 441-446. A noteworthy ancient descriptive use of the "Other" occurs within the Rabbinic practice of referring to Elisha ben Avuya as Aher [Hb. "the Other"]. According to Boyarin, the heresy of which R. Elisha was guilty - tantamount to apostasy - was a type of binitarian theology which the rabbis yielded to Christianity and used as benchmark of Rabbinic orthodoxy (ibid., 142f). 61 Peter Brown, "Pelagius and His Supporters: Aims and Environment," JTS (1968): 93-114; idem, "The Patrons of Pelagius: The Roman Aristocracy between East and West," JTS (1970): 56-72. Both articles have been reprinted in Peter Brown, Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), 183-226. The importance of social dynamics to the formation of heresiology was further highlighted by sociological research in the early 1980s. George Zito, for instance, argued for the usefulness of the concept of heresy as a discursive procedure in a contemporary secular society; see his "Towards a Sociology of Heresy," Sociological Analysis 44.2 (1983): 123-130. Similarly, sociologist Lester R. Kurtz described heresy as having social
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That "heresy" consists of more than theological polemics is also shown by Elizabeth A. Clark in her 1992 book on the Origenist controversy. Clark employs network-theory to unravel the highly dense relations of "kinship, friendship, hospitality given and received, literary and financial patronage, religious mentorship, traveling companionship" which blended in the fourth- and fifth-century clash between Jerome and Rufinus. 62 The social implications of heresy dramatically changed as a result of the Christianization of the Roman Empire. In a 1999 article, Richard Lim presents the picture of an eclectic "religious landscape" in which the very isolation of marginal, "heretical" groups assured their survival. 63 In Constantine's time, orthodoxy had mostly a nominal character, as becomes clear from the spatial diversity of beliefs and practices across the Roman Empire. After Theodosius I, however, orthodoxy came to be defined in terms of "bishops," "creeds," and "councils." According to Lim, "heresy" did not vanish; it became intensely localized, and took advantage of theological rivalries between important urban centers. 64 Similarly, Caroline Humfress illustrates legal aspects of the procedural formation of orthodoxies in a 2000 article. Humfress here illuminates the links between theological positions on heresy and Roman juridical adaptations and innovations. 65 These legal categories enhance the "orthodox" cognitive capacity to name, define, classify, and legally origins and providing control over social arrangements; cf. Lester R. Kurtz, "The Politics of Heresy," AJS 88/6 (1983): 1085-1115. See also idem, The Politics of Heresy: The Modernist Crisis in Roman Catholicism (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1986). Such a sociological approach attributes to the "orthodox" party the creation of heresies, with the direct result of strengthening early Christian and Rabbinic in-group identities. 62 Elizabeth A. Clark, The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early Christian Debate (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). In an analogous study of the early Rabbinic movement, Catherine Heszer uses network-theory to situate the rise of the Rabbinic movement with reference to the concrete circumstances of travel, discipleship, economy, and power, as seen against the background of various intra-Jewish competitors for social and religious prestige; see Catherine Hezser, The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement in Roman Palestine, TSAJ 66 (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), and also Seth Schwartz, Imperialism and Jewish Society, 200 BCE to 640 CE (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 103-28. 63 Richard Lim, "Christian Triumph and Controversy," in Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Postclassical World (ed. G. W. Bowersock, Peter Brown, and Oleg Grabar; Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), 196-218, esp. 197-198. Earlier in the twentieth-century, A.H.M Jones had raised the question of the connection between heresies and national identities: "Were ancient heresies disguised social movements?" Jones' negative answer conveys skepticism concerning the difficult task of translating theological arguments into social causes. See A. H. M. Jones, "Were Ancient Heresies National or Social Movements in Disguise?" JTS 10.2 (1959): 280-297. 64 Lhn, "Christian Triumph and Controversy," 200-208. 65 Caroline Humfress, "Roman Law, Forensic Argument and the Formation of Christian Orthodoxy (III-VI Centuries)" in Orthodoxie, Christianisme, histoire, 124-147.
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categorize religious beliefs. The result was legal categorization of religious belief.66 The concept of a "weak" orthodoxy led an international team of scholars, including Susanna Elm, Eric Rebillard, and Antonella Romano, to explore the composite and constructed character of "orthodoxy" in 2001.67 According to these scholars, negotiation, process, and ecclesiastical geography are precisely those conjectural features of "orthodoxy" that enable it to become a criterion of differentiation for insiders and a boundary-setting device vis-a.-vis outsiders. They argue that social and political crises, expressed through theological arguments, made room for a constant redefinition and negotiation of boundaries and limits of orthodoxy in early Christianity. 68 In a 2005 article by Harry O. Maier, a focus on heresy similarly allows for the exposure of elements of continuity amidst these many changes of Christianity's first five centuries. Maier delineates the "territorial" character of Church and State after Theodosius, which forced dissenters to retreat into the privacy of their households. He contends that, in the fourthand fifth-century, the official ecclesiastical topography and confinement of public worship to private households thus led to a "topography of heresy [ ... ] that has its origins in the domestic patterns of meeting and organization of earliest Christianity."69 In Karen King's What is Gnosticism?, the connections between heresy, identity, and social history are brought to bear on both ancient "gnostic" texts and modern scholarship about them.7° For King, "the ancient construction of heresy and the modern construction of Gnosticism" can be read as two similar processes whose theological intersections give birth and strength to contemporary persistence of mislabeling ancient Christian groups as gnostic. 71 The puzzle that confronted early Christian authors was how to be different from other late antique religious groups, yet without being perceived as newcomers. According to King, these writers employed 66 Humfress, "Roman Law," 131. 67 See the papers of project carried at the Ecole Fran9aise de Rome between 1996 and 1998 in Elm, Rebillard, and Romano, eds., Orthodox ie, Christianisme, histoire. 68 Susanna Elm, Pierre-Antoine Fabre, Antonella Romano, and Claire Sotinel, "Introduction" to Orthodoxie, Christianisme, histoire, viii-xxv. 69 Harry O. Maier, "Heresy, Households, and the Disciplining of Diversity," in A People's History of Christianity, vol. 2, Late Ancient Christianity (ed. Virginia Burrus; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 213-233, esp. 222. See also Harry O. Maier, "Religious Dissent, Heresy, and Household in Late Antiquity" VC 49.1 (1995): 49-63, esp.49-50. 70 Karen L. King, What is Gnosticism? (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003). 71 Ibid., 21,53.
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several distinct "theological, political and rhetorical tools" to fashion early Christian self-definition. As new categories of outsiders, "Jew" and "pagan," received their conceptual double in the "heretic," the antagonist Christian insider who errs by adopting outside traditions from either side of this heresiological construct. More than an intellectual category, King argues, heresy itself fulfils the role of an assessment tool that distorts religious proximity and sameness into textual difference and social exclusion. 72 Most recently, Daniel Boyarin and Virginia Burrus portray Christian and Rabbinic heretics as the product of orthodox attempts to create clear insider/outsider categories. By engaging with Homi Bhabha's "Of Mimicry and Man," they further suggest that the idea of the heretic opens the possibility of a hybrid space, a third possibility between the self and the other, ancient Judaism and Christianity - or, in Bhabha's words, "a difference that is almost the same, but not quite. "73 In line with Boyarin and Burrus' insight, we might notice that Irenaeus and Tertullian's heresiological accounts of Marcion and Valentinus proceed by what James Boon designates as a "cultural exaggeration" in anthropological research, an intensification of perceived cultural differences within a shared discursive space. 74 Complementary to this, Rabbinic heresiology acknowledges the proximity of the heretic arguably to secure its community boundaries through narrative and legal exclusion of the interpellated min. To paraphrase Franz Fanon: The heretic is comparison. 75 As the ultimate other, the concept of the "heretic" allows for the comparison, distortion, and dissimulation of "real" Jews and Christians, turning their caricature into an ideological tool whose main role is to evaluate and craft orthodox identities. Asking "cui bono?" reminds us that theological categories are never devoid of social context; that ancient heresiologies and vivid Nag Hammadi mythologies put their performative features of creating heretics
Ibid., 22-25, esp. 24. Daniel Boyarin and Virginia Burrus, "Hybridity as Subversion of Orthodoxy? Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity," Social Compass 52.4 (2005): 431-441. Homi Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse" October, Discipleship: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis 28 (1984): 125-133. 74 James A. Boon, Other Tribes, Other Scribes: Symbolic Anthropology in the Comparative Study of Cultures, Histories, Religions, and Texts (Cambridge: CUP, 1982), esp.26. 75 "The Negro is comparison. There is the first truth. He is comparison: that is, he is constantly preoccupied with self-evaluation and with the ego ideal"; Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press 1967), 211. See also Diana Fuss, Identification Papers (London: Routledge, 1995), 144. Our thanks to Anthony Pietro who called our attention to this title. 72 73
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at work in very detailed social and political contexts of late antique societies. Thus, the ancient act of naming "heretics" provides scholars with an open window onto the formation of recently Christianized and, respectively, rabbanized state apparatuses (in Althusser's description of ideological functions) in the post-Constantinian period. 76 From the very same perspective, the act of "interpellating" late antique individuals with comparable religious practices and ideas within a heresiological context transforms them into the "other" and, at the same time, identifies them as "heretics. "77 The lines of research sketched above point to the power of naming to shape the perception and organization of social space, political status, and group boundaries. The present volume builds on the premise that one profitable way to approach heresiological writings is as "performative discourses" that strive to bring "the heretic" into being by the "social magical" act of naming - whether performed from within ecclesiastical structures of power or as expressions of fantasies of such power,78 In our view, the main tasks of ancient heresiologies included comparing and assessing similar ideological/religious formations. In the process, ancient heresiological discourses re-read similarity as difference; they turned religious formations akin to their own into utterly different configurations through appellation, the construction of hybrid genealogies, andlor the exaggeration of existing differences. To study such processes thus requires critical self-reflection on the part of the scholar, as Boyarin, Buell, King, and others have shown. Particularly in its incipient stages, the modern study of pre-modern religions was arguably shaped by the very modes of heresiological thinking and writing that we find in our late antique sources. Just as heresiology is a tool that generates comparisons and thrives on them, so ancient heresiological discourses readily served as a blueprint for modern attempts to understand a whole range of patterns in the history of religion. In some cases, modern scholars thus preserved and reproduced the image of the "heretical other"
76 Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)," in idem, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 127-186. 77 "I shall then suggest that ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or 'transforms' the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing." (Althusser, "Ideology," 174). 78 Pierre Bourdieu, "Identity and Representation: Elements for a Critical Reflection on the Idea of Region," in idem, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Polity and Basil Blackwell, 1991),220-228, esp. 223-4.
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in colonial projects in non-Western regions,?9 As a result, however, the question of the relationship of heresy and identity in our late antique sources is arguably an important and timely question, with the potential to touch upon theoretical issues beyond the confines of specialist scholarship.
Making Selves and Marking Others This volume originated in a conference convened at Princeton University on January 16-18, 2005, on the topic of "Making Selves and Marking Others: Heresy and Self-Definition in Late Antiquity." In organizing this conference, we sought to explore the ways in which different late antique groups and communities defined their own socio-political borders and secured in-group identities by means of discourses about "heresy" and "heretics." Moreover, we sought to explore the value and challenges of bringing Jewish and other Greco-Roman materials to bear on the scholarly study of heresiology, which has previously been dominated by questions and considerations related specifically to Christianity. In this, our project extends the conversation of the earlier conferences in a series of books, as organized within the Department of Religion at Princeton University under the guidance of Peter Schafer. The previous two conferences explored the shared discursive contexts of Jews, Christians, and "pagans" in Late Antiquity.80 For the conference on which this volume is based, we sought to continue these inquiries with a sustained consideration of the ancient construction of the "other" as "heretic" in various religious formations. 79 Karen King has already established that modern students and defenders of the category "Gnosticism" follow in the steps of the ancient heresiologists; see What is Gnosticism? 18-19. Jonathan Z. Smith announced the end of comparison in the study of religion, not without connecting the dots between ancient and medieval heresiological discourses and early modern comparative explorations of the non-European religious landscapes; "Epilogue: The 'End' of Comparison: Redescription and Rectification," in A Magic Still Dwells: Comparative Religion in the Postmodern Age (ed. Kimberley C. Patton and Benjamin C. Ray; Berkeley: U. of California Press, 2000), 237-241; idem, "Classification," in Guide to the Study of Religion (ed. Willi Braun and Russell T. McCutcheon; London; New York: Cassell, 2000), 35-43, esp. 39-40; see also idem, "Religion, Religions, Religious," in Critical Terms for Religious Studies (ed. Mark C. Taylor; Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1998),269-284. 80 Adam H. Becker and Annette Y oshiko Reed, "Introduction: Traditional Models and New Directions," in Ways that Never Parted, 2. See also Ra'anan Boustan and Annette Yoshiko Reed, eds., Heavenly Realms and Earthly Realities in Late Antique Religions (Cambridge: CUP, 2004); and Gregg Gardner and Kevin Osterloh, eds., Antiquity in Antiquity: Jewish and Christian Pasts in the Greco-Roman World, TSAJ (Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck, forthcoming).
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The present volume grows out of the rich and varied discussions of this topic at the conference. The contributions draw from multiple literary corpora and genres, bringing a variety of late antique perspective to bear on the question of the association between heresy-making discourses and constructions of identity which we sought to sketch above. In addition, they reflect on how heresiology and self-definition create ideological boundaries through rhetorically immutable yet historically alterable names and metaphors. 81 The structure of this volume reflects the dual focus of the Princeton University colloquium. Whereas the first part problematizes ancient heresy and orthodoxy in light of critiques of the categories by Bauer and Le Boulluec, the second part investigates the predicament of identity from the perspective of different Jewish and Christian texts and traditions. The first three papers introduce the reader to problematic applications of labels and names, by exploring the social, political, and theological conditions of ancient discourses on heresy and orthodoxy. Karen L. King's paper explores the social and literary implications of heresiology by considering the "Social and Theological Effects of Heresiological Discourse." She argues that one cannot read ancient heresiology based on modern conceptions of objectivity or authorial intent. Instead, one should understand each heresiologist in light of the group dynamics and rhetorical effects which informed his own literary goals and strategies. In her main example, she proceeds to a close reading of Against Heresies by Irenaeus of Lyon together with the Secret Revelation of John. This allows her to reevaluate the two texts' real differences by weighing them against a large number of convergences. She insists on placing ancient heresiology within the social framework of identity-formation, but at the same time shows that a real, if distorted, dialogue took place between ancient factions on relevant matters such as body symbolism, the nature of justice, human and divine governance. William E. Arnal, in "Doxa, Heresy, and Self-Construction: The Pauline Ekklesiai and the Boundaries of Urban Identities," broadens the definition of heresy to a thoroughly social category. This move allows him to consider Paul and his communities in light of recent sociological attempts to define orthodoxy, heterodoxy, and heresy. Despite the scarcity of sources, Paul can be seen as heterodox vis-a.-vis Judaism, yet still within it. For Arnal, however, the far more important context against which he understands Paul's heterodoxy is that of the Roman Empire. He places Paul's figure within the model of Roman urban identities, which he presents as the underlying structure of imperial culture and politics. Amal also shows that Paul's attempt to redefine mostly disenfranchised 81
Cf. Lieu, Christian Identity, 98-99.
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foreigners as part of a universalized Judaism challenged the very foundations of Roman society. Adapting Bourdieu's notion of doxa, the unspoken agreements on whose self-evident nature a society is built, Arnal portrays Paul's communities as heterodox in relation to the Roman Empire's view of ethnicity. Averil Cameron, in "The Violence of Orthodoxy," explores the shift which led the study of heresy from a plainly "social" to a more nuanced literary and "discursive" approach. She asks what happened to "orthodoxy" in the recent focus on "heresy,"· and shows that orthodoxies are not only the result of heresiology, but also a center of violent self-affirmation. She calls for a reevaluation of the constructed character of orthodoxy, presented here as a process in which rhetorical and social violence present more relevance for the historian than the recently scriptural fundamentalism or an exclusive focus on heresiology. Her paper suggests that any attempt to the critical study of heresiology to question the construction of the "orthodox" center producing heresiological discourses. The next three papers apply this approach to the specific situation of the Christianizing Roman Empire. They illustrate the making of orthodoxy in ancient classrooms and law courts, and by pointing to the difficulties of "assigning" heresy to Manichean texts. Yannis Papadoyannakis' "Defining Orthodoxy in Pseudo-Justin' s 'Quaestiones et responsiones ad orthodoxos'" shares Cameron's recommendation and illuminates the late antique Byzantine search for new directions in the making of "orthodoxy." Away from the imperial centers of Roman orthodoxy, he finds the making of orthodoxy also in a school setting of questions and answers. His paper captures the historical process by which school "debates, polemics, and discussions" brought Christian orthodoxy to fruition as a new, specialized form of knowledge in the time of a Christianized empire. Papadoyannakis shows that Christian orthodoxy, even when it confronted dissenters with the imperial power of the state, continued to negotiate its own identity in response to those who objected and challenged it, and that the newly gained power did not entirely replace more dialogical forms of contact. Caroline Humfress' "Citizens and Heretics: Late Roman Lawyers on Christian Heresy" describes how, after Constantine, state-sanctioned orthodoxy adopted a more concrete and legal form of persecuting heresy. Her attempt to uncover the "criminalization of heresy under the Christian empire" engages with the legal practices of Late Antiquity. She explores the new legal strategies at work after heresy became an infamia perpetrated by religious offenders, as well as the social and economic consequences of the official attempts at penalizing heretics. Post-Constantine imperial bureaucracy did not produce these laws, but adapted Roman antecedents on
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dealing with matters of citizenship, religious disturbance, and governing structures. Richard Lim investigates the branding and classification of heretics in his paper, "The Nomen Manichaeorum and Its Uses in Late Antiquity." Lim examines the uses of nomen Manichaeorum as a sectarian label, circulated mostly by those who sought to suppress this religion. Yet, the efforts of the Roman Church and Empire to classify socially dangerous groups and religious orientations have rarely been met by an equally clear "heretical" self-designation. He further argues that late antique Manichean identity was regularly crafted by orthodox Christian writers with the purpose . of classifying and condemning it, while those labeled "Manicheans," in their own records, tended to represent themselves as "Christians" in the Pauline tradition. Lim shows how the processual character of "orthodoxy" influenced the fashioning of "Manichean" religious identities. The next cluster of papers shifts the focus toward identity and the "intimate enemy," and grounds the discussion in the historical frame of Second-Temple Judaism, Jesus movement, and early Jewish Christianity. In "Judea, Rome and the Hellenistic Oikoumene: Emulation and the Reinvention of Communal Identity," Kevin Lee Osterloh looks at the formation of Jewish identity and its relationship to Hellenistic and Roman cultural and political systems. He advances the hypothesis according to which the "communal reinvention" of Jewish identity in 1 and 2 Maccabees took place within a "shared Seleucid-Judean and pan-eastern Mediterranean discourse." Osterloh interprets Judean elite's redefinition of their collective identity as thoroughly consistent with similar efforts in the Hellenistic world of the second century CE, and in particular as an emulation of Roman elite self-understanding through the "cooption and subversion of Greekness." The Jewish encounter with Hellenism and the invention of Jewish national identity in the time of the Maccabees through conflict with Hellenistic neighbors established several key concepts of later discourses on Christian and Jewish heresy. John G. Gager develops an insight of Lloyd Gaston about the "close enemies" in "Where does Luke's Anti-Judaism Come from?" Scrutinizing Luke-Acts' efforts at self-definition as an expression of anti-Judaism, Gager looks for an answer not among Luke's Jewish neighbors but among Jewish-Christian (or Christian-Jewish) groups. Gager argues that one of the greatest threats to the self-understanding and identity of the early Jesus movement, as it is expressed in Luke-Acts, did not come from any Jews outside it. It originated instead from the "intimate enemy," namely similar Jewish Christian groups whose internal disputes have been projected outward as anti-Jewish writings.
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In order to trace the possible genesis of the term "Christians," Philippa Townsend's "Who Were the First Christians? Jews, Gentiles and the Christianoi" pays attention to the earliest members of the Jesus movement who did not view themselves as part of Judaism. Re-examining classical passages as well as Roman imperial history, she argues for a history of the term "Christianoi" which can be outlined as follows: the Pauline designation hoi tau Christou (which Paul used in 1 Corinthians and Galatians) is employed by Paul and his followers to designate their group. The term cannot easily be translated into Latin, but the most obvious Latin rendering is christiani; this then is the term Roman authorities would most likely have used to designate such Gentile Jesus-believers. Later, the Latin term was re-appropriated by Gentile followers of Jesus, such as the author of Acts and Ignatius, who re-translated the Latin term into Greek: Christianoi, a term which now included a self-definition distinct from Judaism. Elaine Pagels suggests in "The Social History of Satan, Part III: John of Patmos and Ignatius of Antioch - Contrasting Visions of 'God's People' " that in Revelation 12, John of Patmos combines the Leviathan and Satan traditions to show his readers that they have to fight against insiders among Jesus' followers and against the outsiders epitomized by the Roman Empire. Engaging in current discussion of boundaries between Jews and Christians in antiquity, Pagels agrees with those who show that John of Patmos sees himself asa Jew devoted to Jesus Christ. Pagels also sees Johns' denunciation of insiders as secret allies of "the beast" aimed against such converts who, in his view, neglect "the commandments" and, as he caricatures them, teach people to "eat meat offered to idols" and "practice fornication." Comparing John's ecclesiology with that of his near contemporary Ignatius of Antioch helps Pagels show how these two polemicists offer contrasting views of Jesus' followers, making antithetical claims about who really are "God's people." The next cluster of papers explores the ways in which heresy-making discourses relate to the interstitial category of "Jewish Christianity," and the rhetorical roles played by the "Hebrews" and "minim" in establishing it. Eduard Iricinschi, in "If You Got It, Flaunt It: Religious Advertising in the Gospel of Philip," explores the rhetorical role of the "Hebrews" and their connection to the origin myth of the double names in this text found at Nag Hammadi. He suggests that the author of the Gospel of Philip attempted to attract converts to his community by representing rival Pauline groups as "Hebrews." These other communities used the same Pauline proselytizing language as the Gospel of Philip, but according to this Gospel's author, the words of the rival group do not match their heavenly meanings. The author of the Gospel attempts to explain issues related to resurrection and to the rituals of baptism, chrism, and the bridal
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chamber in terms of appropriate access to the primordial language. Iricinschi's paper contributes to the study of a text once considered heretical, and reads it against the complex social fracturing of secondcentury Antioch. Annette Yoshiko Reed, in "Heresio10gy and the (Jewish-)Christian Novel: Narrativized Polemics in the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies," explores the literary making of an "orthodoxy" and its respective heresio10gy in a so-called "Jewish-Christian" text. Scholars have studied the authors/redactors of the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies mostly in terms of the "heresy" of the Ebionites. She argues, however, that these fourthcentury "Jewish-Christians" stand firmly within the heresio10gy and historiography of their time, sharing rhetorical and discursive aims with Christian heresio10gists, such as Epiphanius, no less than with tales about the disputation between Rabbis and minim in Rabbinic sources such as Bereshit Rabbah. Burton L. Visotzky, in "Goys '.5I'n't Us: Rabbinic Anti-Gentile Polemic in Yerusha1mi Berachot 9: 1" gives a detailed study of the aforementioned Rabbinic literary genre - "conversation with a min," the refutation of heretical stock characters by witted rabbis. Starting from the point of view that such conversations mainly serve Rabbinic self-affirmation, Visotzky differentiates between two levels of the passage in question. On the microlevel, Visotzky argues, only the first part of the passage deals with Christianity in its reference(s) to Biblical trinitarian testimonies, whereas the second part deals with patronage in a Gentile Greco-Roman setting. Re-eva1uating the redaction history of the text, he concludes that on the macro-level, the entire passage was composed to refute Christian claims and that in the present form the entire text answers to Christianity: the min in the first part is understood as representative of Christian concerns just as well as the statements on patronage in the second part aim at the image of Christ as universal ruler. With the l'lst group of papers, we tum to the question of the construction of otherness in Rabbinic literature. Gregg Gardner, in his "Astrology in the Talmud: An Analysis of Bavli Shabbat 156," looks at deviant insiders of Babylonian Rabbinic Judaism: astrologers. He employs source criticism to highlight the cultural differences between the Babylonian Talmud and its Palestinian Rabbinic sources with respect to Jewish astrologers. Gardner shows that the redactors of the Talmud ridiculed astrologers, and used astrology as a _boundary marker between Israel, whose people are immune to the power of the stars as long as they fulfill the commandments, and the Gentiles, whose subjection to stars is acknowledged. Ho1ger M. Zellentin revisits a classic Talmudic passage in "Margin of Error: Bavli Shabbat 116a-b as Polemics, Apology, and Heresio10gy." He
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shows that its author had an intimate knowledge of Christian writings such as the Gospel of Matthew and its Syriac interpretation, and was familiar enough with this material to play out the former against the latter. The result of this analysis.suggests the possibility of a Talmudic parody whose heresiology equally works on the level of Jewish apologetic and antiChristian polemic. According to Zellentin, the Talmud attacks an interior enemy of the rabbis, symbolized by a rabbi's erudite sister, about whom it implies to have approached Christianity for mere social and financial benefits. The text simultaneously refutes some major Christian claims about the abrogation of the Torah and the exile of the Jews, and undermines Christian triumphalism by exposing internal Christian incongruence and moral corruption. Israel Jacob Yuval, in "The Other in Us: Liturgica, Poetica, Polemica," works at the nexus of Jewish heresiology and anti-Christian polemics. He looks at the history and meaning of a number of passages in the Jewish Morning Prayer (or Shaharit): the opening section, Pesukei de-Zimra, (especially its added subsection Ashrei); and its conclusion, Tahanun, (especially its opening Vehu Rahum and Psalm 20) and Uva Ie-Zion. Each time, Yuval demonstrates that these prayers have developed in response to Christian theology or liturgy, and have changed their meanings accordingly over the centuries. His contribution shows once more how from Late Antiquity to the early Middle Ages the opponents which most threatened to blur Jewish identity from within and without were perceived as close to Christianity and its theology, liturgy, and exegesis. Challenged to rethink "heresy" and "orthodoxy" in a relational, contextual, and discursive perspective, the contributors to this volume engaged the above questions, found themselves in disagreement with some positions, refined others, and opened new views on heresy and identity in Late Antiquity. What the essays share is an attempt to de-familiarize their readers from the safe topoi of Jewish and Christian history. They invite us to explore the discursive construction of the "other," unravel the "imagined communities" and "ethnic identities," and re-create the multiple voices textured in the intense dialogue between the "orthodox" and "heretical" writers. In the process, they expose ideological hideouts of modem repercussions of ancient heresiology - spots usually shadowed by ethnic reasoning, theological preconceptions, and scholarly anti-Semitism.
Social and Theological Effects of Heresiological Discourse KAREN L. KING
In taking up the topic "Making Selves and Marking Others," our conveners have asked us "to consider the different functions of 'heresy' -making discourse, as a simultaneous process of perceiving, describing, and disqualifying groups of (re )imagined dissenters, often by branding them with labels." This formulation recognizes that orthodoxy and heresy are not essential qualities that groups or ideas possess, but correlative and mutually reinforcing categories belonging to the dynamics of socialpolitical and intellectual processes of boundary-setting and identity formation. The question I want to raise here concerns the social-historical and theological-historical effects of this kind of discourse. If heresymaking discourse "makes and marks" both self and other, what difference does it make to approach the task of reconstructing ancient Christian history and theology from such a perspective? First of all, an author's inscribed perspective is not taken as the definitive expose of the situation. Rather, the work's goals and strategies become sites for interrogation and analysis. It becomes apparent that the "others" inveighed against by the heresiologists are always represented according to selective strategies and varied ends. l A polemical writer like Irenaeus, for example, can be quite forthcoming and specific about his goals, opponents, and strategies. In his major work, Against Heresies, he explicitly tells readers that his goal is to set out and defend the apostolic truth and the unity of the one true church. He readily gives us the names of his opponents, describes their objectionable teachings and reprehensible deeds, and pointedly depicts what is at stake for salvation should these heretics be believed: eternal damnation. His strategies are clearly set out when he puts in place a rule of faith and appeals to apostolic lineage or when he limits the number of gospels that should be considered 1 This is not to claim that the effects of such discourse are always the result of conscious intention on the part of an author; such discourse can have effects that extend in unintended directions. An example would be the impact of a particular theological position after a significant shift in historical-political positionality; one specific example discussed below concerns the acceptability of Irenaeus' and SRJ's (Secret Revelation of John) portrait of imperial power.
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authoritative. Yet because Irenaeus is seeking to persuade us to see the situation and the issues at stake as he constructs them, we come to mistrust the transparency of his presentation. Indeed as scholars have assessed the adequacy of Irenaeus' portraits of his opponents, his partiality and tendentiousness have become more clear. Moreover, his tone of derogation and ridicule are judged antithetical to modern canons of impartiality and even appear unseemly, intolerant, and uncivil. Not only his accuracy but his moral character have come into question. This approach thus can give rise to a new difficulty by impugning the character of authors and with it the trustworthiness of our sources as well as their transparency. The problem of trustworthiness can turn on a debate over the guilt or innocence of the author or over whether mistakes arise from purposeful misrepresentation or from ignorance. There are several reasons, however, why a moral test of character is not the best way to frame the issue of historical reliability. First of all, it does not seem appropriate to judge ancient authors by canons they would very likely reject as unprincipled. Would any of the early Christian polemicists have thought that truth was a matter of impartial objectivity? Did they not rather argue that verity was a matter of taking a stand on the side of God revealed by the Savior? It is not necessary to give up modern commitments to impartiality in order to see that Irenaeus does not share them. Instead we might ask, what difference does it make to represent truth through a discourse of orthodoxy and heresy rather than one of impartial objectivity? Second, it does not seem good to base historical reliability on authorial intentionality. Critics like Michel Foucault and Roland Barthes have argued that identifying the psychology of persons from their literary work is a slippery slope; they have pointed out that the notion of the "author" has its own history that has to be taken into account; and they have noted that appeal to authorship sometimes appears only as a modern strategy whose aim is to freeze a mono logical reading of a text as its one true meaning by extracting it from the flow of history.2 Moreover, the process of establishing authorial intent (through circular logic) by identifying it with a text's inscribed goals merely works to re-categorize one type of data (literary goals) as evidence of something else (the mentality of an individual). Rather, a text's inscribed goals and strategies (including its depiction of "heretical others") are better considered as reliable historical evidence of a particular positionality within a dialogical complex of voices that shift over time and place. From this perspective, the fact that the 2 See, for example, Michel Foucault, "What is an Author?" in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism (ed. Josue V. Harari; Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), 141-160; Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author," in idem, Image, Music, Text (trans. Stephen Heath; New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 142-148.
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evidence Irenaeus offers is not an objective and transparent account of the "others" he attacks does not mean that it is not reliable evidence of something. The question is what are our textual remains evidence of? One aspect of this problem lies in determining the social-historical status of such rhetorically constructed "others." Are they merely rhetorical tools to think with, imaginary entities whose fleeting existence is only an effect of polemical argument? Are they evidence of independent or identifiably distinct social groups, the phenomena of early Christian diversity? But even if such others existed, are heresiological representations so distorted that they cannot be taken as objective description of the phenomena they are constructed to control intellectually and politically?3 This is not to say that heresiologists like Irenaeus offer nothing of importance about their opponents' views and practices; it is to say that what they tell us (i.e., what the evidence is evidence of) cannot be assessed without understanding each work's particular discursive goals and strategies, as well as its carefully constructed theology and social-historical positionality. In order to understand the dynamics of group definition, scholars recognize that we need to analyze the specific kinds of discursive strategies at work in order to inquire into their possible social effects.4 The issue is important not only for learning about these "others," but also in properly understanding the heresiologists themselves. It is widely recognized that Irenaeus formulated his own theological positions in the context of his refutation of other early Christian views. In so doing, he became one of the most significant theologians of the second century, and his constructive response to his opponents shaped the direction that many aspects of future orthodoxy would take. We can only appreciate the enormity of what he accomplished in relation to the multiform struggles in which he participated. 5 Yet if, in reconstructing Irenaeus' theology as a 3 This problematic applies as well to boundary setting vis-it-vis non-Christians, especially in the Christian invention of "paganism" and a "usable Judaism" (see the discussion in Karen L. King, What is Gnosticism? (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003), 20-54. 4 Although my language here may sound as though I am pursuing issues of causality ("strategy causes social effects"), the goal is rather to analyze the nexus of discursive practices of polemics ("heresiology") with other kinds of practices of identity formation. Neither should this analysis be viewed in terms of identifying authorial intent since not all effects of discourse are consciously intentional, given the subconscious workings of habitus (in the sense of Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990) and given the multiple fragmentations beyond any author's control. 5 Adolf von Harnack, for example, insists that "the theology of Irenaeus remains a riddle so long as we try to explain it merely from the Apologists and only consider its antithetical relations to Gnosis" (History of Dogma, vol. 2 [trans. from the 3d. German ed., New York: Dover Publications, 1961], 231, n. 1).
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response to his opponents, they are merely reinscribed from his own rhetorical construction of them, the historical account has not moved beyond Irenaeus' own partial perspective. In moving beyond this impasse, scholars have focused in particular on analyzing the rhetorical strategies of the discourses of orthodoxy and heresy employed in each case, and on assessing the polemical treatises with regard to external social-historical data and especially new textual finds, like those from Nag Hammadi and elsewhere, which represent positions similar to the persons and/or groups he was arguing against. Such work offers considerable insight not only into the theological perspectives of the heresiologists and those they opposed, but it also lays bare the complex and passionate ferment in which Christians engaged each other in their multifarious doings. Ancient Christian discourses of orthodoxy and heresy deployed a limited number of strategies, variously used to various ends. 6 These included inter alia: contrasting the unity of the true Church with the divisiveness of heretics; attacking the character of one's opponents; devising competing genealogies (e.g., from Christ versus Satan); alleging that heresy is produced by outside contamination of an originally pure faith; asserting that orthodox truth is chronologically prior to the inventions of the heretics; and institutionalizing certain structures of authority (delimiting the canon of Scripture to certain texts, limiting who was allowed to interpret Scripture and how, establishing a rule of faith, rationalizing a hierarchical leadership structure, regulating ritual practices, and so on). In practice, early Christian discourses of difference operated by treating differences differently. Some are emphasized or even created (e.g., to sharpen boundaries). Others are harmonized to make them disappear (e.g., to give the appearance of internal uniformity). Others are simply ignored, never rising to the level of discursive employment (these are differences that didn't make a difference). Where do we see these discursive strategies operating in early Christianity and what specific effects did they produce?7 6 See Alain Le Boulluec, La notion d'hiresie dans la litterature grecque Ir-IIr siecies (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1985); King, What is Gnosticism? 7 I focus here only on the practices of the early polemicists, especially Irenaeus, without consideration of how their rhetoric continues to produce suspect categories such as Gnosticism; see Morton Smith, "The History of the Term Gnostikos," in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism: Proceedings of the International Conference on Gnosticism at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, March 28-31, 1978, vol. 2: Sethian Gnosticism (ed. Bentley Layton; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981), 796-807; Frederik Wisse, "Stalking Those Elusive Sethians," in Layton, The Rediscovery of Gnosticism, vol. 2, 563-576; Bentley Layton, "Prolegomena to the Study of Ancient Gnosticism," in The Social World of the First Christians: Essays in Honor o/Wayne A. Meeks (ed. L. Michael White and O. Larry Yarbrough; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995),334-350; Michael A.
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Two brief examples will suffice here to illustrate the kind of approach I am suggesting.
The Call to Unity and the Production of Division One strategy with multiple effects involved rhetorically contrasting the unity of the true Church with the divisiveness of heresy by fabricating heretics. It would appear, for example, that Epiphanius invented whole cloth groups that never existed, such as the Stratiotics and Socratites. Not only are these groups mentioned nowhere else in ancient literature, but his presentation of eighty heresies to match the profligacy of Solomon's concubines suggests creative hermeneutics rather than careful sociological description. 8 In this case, the lack of corroborating external evidence for these groups' existence, along with the appeal to allegorical interpretation of Scripture, supports a judgment that these (and perhaps other) groups may have been invented solely to multiply the role call of heretical groups and thereby create the rhetorical impression of error by emphasizing a chaos of conflicting beliefs and disunity. Another creative effect of this discourse may have been to turn multiform phenomena into monolithic entities. An example here would be the Ebionites. Taylor has suggested that the patristic term "Ebionites" functioned to mass together a variety of persons or groups "who followed Jewish customs for various reasons and in various ways in order to present a precise identifiable heresy .... It is by no means the case that they would have defined themselves as sectarian or given themselves a name."9 From this perspective, the production of "Ebionism" as a monolithic entity would appear to be the effect of heresiological polemics, not sociological description. But in contrast to Epiphanius' Stratiotics or Socratites, Ebionites do not appear to have been invented whole cloth. As Taylor documents, there is widespread evidence of a range of Jewish practices within Christian communities. Indeed defining the proper relationship to Judaism was one of the most hotly contested issues among Christians in Williams, Rethinking 'Gnosticism ': An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); King, What is Gnosticism?; or Jewish Christianity, see Joan E. Taylor, "The Phenomenon of Early Jewish-Christianity: Reality or Scholarly Invention?" VC 44 (1990): 313-34; Adam H. Becker and Annette Yoshiko Reed eds., The Ways that Never Parted: Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003); Karen L. King "Which Early Christianity," in The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies (ed. Susan Ashbrook Harvey and David Hunter; Oxford: OUP), forthcoming. 8 See Epiphanius, Pan arion 1.35,3,5. 9 Taylor, "The Phenomenon of Early Jewish Christianity," 324.
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the first centuries. The construction of "Ebionites" may then be a sign that some Christians wanted to construct clear boundaries of who was in and who was out in situations that were in fact ambiguous, or at least contested. In this light, polemic against "Ebionites" seems to be evidence not of a well-defined group or groups of Jewish-Christians (however defined),l0 but evidence of the variety of contested ways in which Christians were defining the relationship to Jewish Scripture, practices, and worshiping communities.l 1 We see here, too, that a sharpening of the boundaries with outsiders requires a reciprocal tightening of conformity within. Another effect of this discourse may have been reform. Einar Thomassen has recently argued that at some point in second-century Rome, the "idea of the unity of 'the church' " led some Christians, such as Hermas, Marcion, and Va1entinus, to regard "the existing diversity among Christians ... as intolerable." This dissatisfaction led, he suggests, to attempts at reform that were intended to institute moral, ritual, and/or doctrinal uniformity.12 These efforts may have had the concomitant, but perhaps unanticipated effect of accentuating differences and hardening lines of division. In this way, the rhetoric of church unity itself may have contributed to division. Along similar lines, Peter Lampe has argued that until the episcopacy of Victor (c. 189-199 CE), Christianity in Rome was made up of "topographically separate house churches" (a condition he calls "fractionation"). As Lampe points out, despite the fact that beliefs and practices might differ among these churches, "hardly any Roman Christian group excluded another group in the city from communion of the faithful apart from a few significant exceptions."13 Lampe has argued for the Roman situation that "fractionation into house congregations does not exclude that the Christian islands scattered around the capital city were aware of being in spiritual fellowship with each other, of perceiving themselves as cells of one church, and of being united by common 10 For more on the problematic designation "Jewish-Christianity," see Taylor, "The Phenomenon of Jewish-Christianity," esp. 319-320, where she notes that in third-century Egypt, Origen of Alexandria refers to people who attend the synagogue on Saturday and the Church on Sunday; in Syria, Ephrem notes Christians who shared the Passover supper with Jews; and in the fourth century, John Chrysostom wrote eight homilies to discourage Christians from celebrating the Jewish festivals. See also the discussion of Jewish Christianity in Becker and Reed, Parting of the Ways, 1-24. 11 See King, "Which Early Christianity? 12 See Einar Thomassen, "Orthodoxy and Heresy in Second-Century Rome," HTR 97.3 (2004): 241-56. 13 Peter Lampe, From Paul to Valentinus: Christians at Rome in the First Two Centuries (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003),385.
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bonds. "14 How and why did this change? He agrees with Thomassen that some (Marcion, Cerdo, and some Christians who maintained certain Jewish practices) may have withdrawn in the interest of reform or purity but these in his view only constitute "the significant exceptions. "15 The major change to the situation of inclusivity apparently occurred when Victor attempted to institute a monarchical episcopate over the previously favored system of collegial presbyterial governance by excommunicating dissenters.16 Here practices of institutionalization come to the fore in conjunction with a discursive emphasis on unity. Although Victor's actions had significant consequences for the eventual shape of Christian orthodoxy, it would probably be wrong to think that the motives of Victor differed significantly from the impulses of other reformers who aimed to bring real unity to the churches. The excommunications by Victor were similarly directed at the formation of a hierarchical institutional order which claimed both to embody and to protect that unity. Only the strategies differed. Again, one effect of the early Christian rhetoric of unity and uniformity may have been the production of division. Although differences had existed from the first century and continued to exist, division would not necessarily have resulted from those differences apart from the discursive emphasis on unity, at least in the forms it took by Victor in Rome. The reason is that a particular kind of unity was being imagined. As the case in Rome illustrates, difference per se and even some social distinctiveness did not in that case disturb unity (although there are limits to tolerable difference, as we will see below). It was only when unity was understood to require an enforced uniformity that charges of heresy could be made and exclusive social divisions produced. Another kind of case would be Montanism. 17 While this movement has long been a regular item in the usual heresy lists, scholars are unsure exactly why, given that there is no sound evidence of sharp doctrinal or behavioral "deviation." The supposed problem is said to be their "spiritual enthusiasm" (e.g., that their discipline was too strict and they were too eager for martyrdom). Yet it is hard to say why long fasts, eschewing second marriage, or specifying the exact length of women's veils would be so problematic as to lead to charges of heresy and exclusion. Moreover, 14 Lampe, From Paul to Valentinus, 398. 15 Ibid, 392-394. 16 Ibid, 397-408. 17 For sources and a general introduction to Montanism, see Ronald E. Heine, The Montanist Oracles and Testimonia (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1989); William Tabbemee, Montanist Inscriptions and Testimonia: Epigraphic Sources Illustrating the History of Montanism (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1996); Christine Trevett, Montanism: Gender, Authority and the New Prophecy (Cambridge: CUP, 1996).
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Tabbernee has argued that "the attitudes of the Montanists to martyrdom did not differ substantially from those of their orthodox opponents,"18 so why was their "enthusiasm" so roundly condemned? Some scholars have suggested that the primary problem may have concerned authority, given that Montanists gave great authority to prophets and allowed women's leadership, as funerary inscriptions from Phrygia have confirmed. 19 It would, nonetheless, seem that over the years, the rhetorical condemnation of Montanists was extremely effective; Montanists apparently did become increasingly separate from other forms of Christianity. In this case, the rhetorical charge of heresy did not merely describe schism but may have actually produced it. The situation is somewhat different with what might at first glance appear to be a similar case: Valentinians. Our earliest evidence suggests that in the second century they were part of the mix of Roman Christianity, until polemicists worked so hard to paint them as heretics and exclude them from shared fellowship. The last we hear of a Valentini an institution is a report of monks burning a Valentinian church in 388. 20 Here again it would seem that polemics (and the violence that could accompany them) were highly effective. In contrast to the Montanists, however, the Valentini an case is less one of magnifying minor differences than of deciding where the limits of tolerable difference lay. Elaine Pagels has recently argued that issues of practice were crucial in determining which doctrinal differences might be problematic. She points out that as long as Christians could affirm the same central beliefs and practices, a certain latitude in how certain doctrines were conceptualized or precisely how certain practices were performed did not require schism. Even Irenaeus "encouraged his fellow believers to tolerate certain variations of viewpoint and practice," for example in accepting not just one but four variant gospels, and not insisting that all Christians celebrate Easter on the same day. The problem, she argues, came with the Valentinians' practice of a second baptism because it introduced division within congregations. 21 At this point, the difference became intolerable - at least for Irenaeus. But to further complicate matters, it is clear that his refutation was not universally 18 William Tabbernee, "Early Montanism and Voluntary Martyrdom," Colloquium 17 (1985): 43. 19 See Trevett, Montanism, 146-150; Tabbernee, Montanist Inscriptions. 20 Klaus Koschorke, "Patristische Materialen zur Spatgeschichte der valentinianischen Gnosis," in Gnosis and Gnosticism: Papers Read at the Eighth International Conference on Patristic Studies (Oxford, September 3rd_S 1h , 1979) (ed. Martin Krause; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981); Einar Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed. The Church of the 'Valentinians' (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2006), 491-508. 21 Elaine H. Pagels, Beyond Belief The Secret Gospel of Thomas (New York: Random House, 2003), 131-141.
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effective, for in the fourth century we find Valentinian texts still in the hands of (supposedly) orthodox Pachomian monks, as the discovery at Nag Hammadi illustrates. 22 For the fourth-century monks of Egypt, perhaps adherence to ascetic practice proved more pertinent to unity than arcane baptismal rituals. In this case, we may very well have to distinguish between the existence of sectarian groups of Valentinians and a much wider circulation of Valentini an texts that either ignores such borders or provides evidence of a continued intermingling and muddied identity among Christians of various stripes well into the fourth century. The point is that these matters were not settled once and for all; we have to contend with the continuing contestation over which differences should make a difference. In conclusion, we can see from this brief sketch that at least one discursive element - the emphasis on unity - could have been a factor in producing division. It also illustrates how the real problem in drawing boundary lines could often be similarities. Even where fundamental - and intolerable - differences exist, similarities worked to muddle clear boundary-setting. To clarify the lines, it was necessary for discursive rhetoric to establish clear differences and as much as possible to erase similarities. This leads to the next line of approach: If we want to understand the theological arguments in which Christians engaged, we have to understand that the rhetorical efforts to produce clear social boundaries could work to obscure what the early Christians were arguing about and what was at stake. Here is where the new texts help.
Deploying Body Symbolism: Irenaeus and the Secret Revelation of John In Against Heresies (AgHer),23 Irenaeus' rhetoric works hard to draw sharp lines of differentiation between himself and his opponents. In the process, those theological views he shares with them are obscured and differences are accentuated, producing a highly polarized portrait. He sets the agenda of the debate in how he characterizes these "others." Generally speaking, Irenaeus condemns his opponents as heretics because, he claims, they 22 See the discussion of James E. Goehring, Ascetics, Society, and the Desert: Studies in Early Egyptian Monasticism (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press, 1999), 173-179. 23 All references to Against Heresies from the critical edition of Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, Irenee de Lyon, Contre les heresies, 5 vols. (Paris: Les Editions de Cerf, 1979); English translation (sometimes modified) from A. Cleveland Coxe, The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus, vol. 1 of The Ante-Nicene Fathers, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1885, repr. 1979).
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rejected the God of the Hebrew Bible as the true God and creator of the cosmos. Against what he saw as the clear evidence of Scripture, they denied the divine goodness of both the creator and the creation. The heretics practiced asceticism, but only as hatred of the flesh. Moreover, they undermined salvation and the meaning of the eucharist by denying both that Jesus had a physical body and that believers would physically rise from the dead even as Jesus had. Instead, Irenaeus claimed, the heretics presumptuously claimed that only a spiritual elite would be "saved by nature" owing to their heavenly origin; salvation came not by faith in Christ but through knowledge revealed only to them. In Irenaeus' view, such a position was arrogant as well as erroneous. 24 Due to discoveries in the Egyptian desert, we now possess copies of one work that Irenaeus opposed: The Secret Revelation of John (SRJ).25 If we were to try to formulate its response to Irenaeus, our interlocutor might say something like: Irenaeus has mistaken the world creator, whom Scripture clearly shows to be a jealous, violent, and vengeful pretender-God (Satan), for the true God. Thus he has denied the divine goodness of the true God and Creator who is purely goodness, light, compassion, and truth by falsely attributing to God all manner of evil and all the ills of the world: suffering, death, unjust rule, violence, jealousy, and their like. By insisting that the physical body is the self, such people as Irenaeus have forgott~n that the flesh is manifestly perishable while God is imperishable. While the body can indeed be purified and perfected from passion, ignorance, and sin, it is not immortal even though it has been stamped with the divine image. Irenaeus further impugns the goodness of God by condemning the majority of (carnal) humanity to eternal death, suggesting that he and those who agree him alone possess the Spirit and have been destined for salvation, while in fact Christ teaches that the true God saves all (except those few apostates who blaspheme the Spirit). Such people as Irenaeus wrongly and arrogantly claim that only they have the true teaching of Christ that leads to salvation. 26 Although this imaginative exercise in mirror-imaging illustrates some important points about the differences between Irenaeus and SRJ, it focuses our understanding of the conflict solely on differences. It may also falsely impute a kind of mutuality and reciprocity of interests that is misleading; that is, what is at stake for Irenaeus may be different from See the discussion of King, What is Gnosticism? 26-27. See Karen L. King, The Secret Revelation of John (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 7-24. All references to SRJ follow the numbering of the translation in King, The Secret Revelation of John; corresponding numerations of the four manuscripts are provided in an appendix. 26 Irenaeus can speak of the "genus" of those who were saved from the beginning (Ag Her IV.28.2). 24 25
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what is important to SRJ. If comparison of the two were to include both similarities and differences, a more complex dynamic appears and other issues come to the fore. A full list of similarities would require more space than can be allotted here, but certain striking features stand out. Irenaeus and SRJ share a basic theological and cosmological schema. For both the divine sphere is headed by a Divine Triad with numerous lower divine beings (angels, archangels, lights, aeons). Both describe the fall of a heavenly being .(Satan or Sophia/Yaldabaoth) as crucial to the nature and origin of evil. Both affirm that humanity was created in the image of God, and understand salvation as perfecting that resemblance to God though the reception of the Spirit, baptism, and moral purification. They agree that the true revelation comes through Christ, and that the human self (body, soul, and spirit) is the primary site of divine revelation in the world. Both divide those who will be saved into three groups, and both exclude those who are lost as apostates. Within this shared schema, notable differences appear. For example, the Divine is gendered as male or neuter in Irenaeus (Father/Son/Spirit), while it is male and female in SRJ (Father/Mother/Son). While both agree that the true God is the creator of all that truly exists, Irenaeus assumes this to include creation of the lower world by the true God while SRJ attributes it to the fallen being, Yaldabaoth. For Irenaeus, the world is thus the perfect creation of God, while for SRJ it is a parodic imitation of God's true heaven above. For Irenaeus, human salvation requires the resurrection of the flesh; while for SRJ, the flesh has no part in eternal life in the Divine Realm. Numerous other points could be made, but these are sufficient to show substantive differences incapable of harmonization even by the most skilled hermeneut. Although no theological "system" is ever totalizing in logic or practice, the inclusivity of alternative voices has limits. It is hard if not impossible to see how any group could hold at once the view that the true God both did and did not create the world; that the fleshly body is both resurrected and has no part in eternal life, and so on. But admitting these limits to tolerable difference only raises more sharply the question of what was at stake in how one viewed God, creation, and the body. Surely Irenaeus would not have spilled so much ink, so much passion, and such vituperation if his opponents' views did not seem plausible or even preferable. I want to suggest that more was at stake here than Irenaeus lets us see. Comparing these two works shows that both are committed to a portrait of God as good and just; both are fundamentally interested in addressing the problem of human suffering and salvation; and both understand the human body to be fundamental to revelation and salvation.
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Differences arise primarily from where they focus when conceptualizing justice and in their very different deployments of body symbolism. We can start with Irenaeus' allegation that heretics claim God is not able to vivify the flesh with immortality (e.g., AgHer V.3.3). That is of course quite provocative since it suggests that the heretics limit God's power. 27 But at least SRJ says no such thing. In an elaborate discourse on God as the transcendent One, it affirms that the God and Father of All cannot be limited, but exists as a monarchy with nothing ruling above It (SRJ 4.2, 13). God "is the immeasurable light, the pure one who is holy and unpolluted, the ineffable one who is incorruptibly perfect" (SRJ BG 4.20-21). In contrast, matter and the flesh are associated with limitation, corruption, and suffering. Far from thinking that God is not able to vivify the flesh, SRJ does not seem to think one would want a fleshly resurrection. To return to God means to leave the flesh behind, for God transcends the material realm. Moreover, God's goodness would preclude corruptibility and death - and hence the physical body - from the Divine Realm. Irenaeus agrees in characterizing God as transcendent and in associating the flesh with suffering, subjection, and corruptibility, but he insists that justice requires recompense must be given in kind. Because unjust suffering and endurance in trials such as martyrdom occurred in the body, the righteous should be rewarded in the body. For it is just that in that very creation in which they (the righteous) toiled or were afflicted, being proved in every way by suffering, they should receive the reward of their suffering; and that in the creation in which they were slain because of their love to God, in that they should be revived again; and that in the creation in which they endured servitude, in that they should reign. For God is rich in all things, and all things are His. It is fitting, therefore, that the creation itself, being restored to its primeval condition, should without restraint be under the dominion of the righteous (AgHer V.32.1).28
But Irenaeus goes further and argues that suffering is positively useful. It can be pedagogical and work to edify one's moral and spiritual character. Even death and the dissolution of the body are viewed this way. So also our bodies, being nourished by it [eucharist], and deposited in the earth, and suffering decomposition there, shall rise at their appointed time. The Word of God grants them resurrection to the glory of God, even the Father, who freely gives to this mortal immortality, and to this corruptible incorruption, because the strength of God is made perfect in weakness, in order that we may never become puffed up, as if we had life from 27 A third-century text offers a counter-claim: Against those who believe in the resurrection of the flesh, The Testimony of Truth 37.5-9 reads, "They do not know the power of God, nor do they understand the interpretation of the Scriptures on account of their dou.ble-mindedness." 28 Coxe, Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. I, 561. Irenaeus then cites Romans 8.19-21 in support.
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ourselves, and exalted against God, our minds becoming ungrateful; but learning by experience that we possess eternal duration from the excelling power of this Being, not from our own nature, we may neither undervalue that glory which surrounds God as He is, nor be ignorant of our own nature, but that we may know what God can effect, and what benefits man receives, and thus never wander from the true comprehension of things as they are, that is, both with regard to God and with regard to man (AgHer Y.2.3).29
If reward must come in the same coinage for the recompense to be fitting, and suffering is necessary to instruct humanity in the truth, then the fleshly body is necessary to salvation. This is why Christ came in the flesh. For Irenaeus, the body is necessary to perfect humanity's likeness to God. 30 True humanity is composed of spirit, soul, and body (AgHer V.6.1). Created in the divine image and likeness, the likeness to God was lost due to apostasy (by the sin of Adam and Eve through the temptation of Satan). Yet all human beings, body and soul, retain the image of God and hence in some sense are the fleshly revelation of God in the world. But this revelation is imperfect because the likeness to God was lost. Christ, who is the perfect revelation of God, came to restore that full likeness by granting humanity a vision of God revealed in the incarnation of Christ and in his ministry, death, and resurrection: [F]ollowing the only true and steadfast Teacher, the Word of God, our lord Jesus Christ, who did, through His transcendent love, become what we are, that He might bring us to be even what He is Himself '" For in no other way could we have learned the things of God, unless our Master, existing as the Word, had become human. For no other being had the power of revealing to us the things of the Father, except His own proper Word. For what other person "knew the mind of the Lord," or who else "has become His counselor?" Again we could have learned in no other way than by seeing our Teacher, and hearing His voice with our own ears, that, having become imitators of His works as well as doers of His words, we may have communion with Him, receiving increase from the perfect One, and from Him who is prior to all creation ... Since the Lord thus has redeemed us through His own blood, giving His soul for our souls, and His flesh for our flesh, and has also poured out the Spirit of the Father for the union and communion of God and humanity, imparting indeed God to human beings by means of the spirit, and on the other hand, attaching humanity to God by his own incarnation, and bestowing upon us at His coming immortality durably and truly, by means of communion with God - all the doctrines of the heretics fall to ruin (AgHer V. preface-I. 1),31
29 Coxe, flnte-Nicene Fathers, vol. I, 528.
The discussion of Irenaeus' theology is extensive; see, for example, Eric Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), 211-231; Jules Gorss, The Divinization of the Christian according to the Greek Fathers (Anaheim: A&C Press, 2002), 120-131; Ysabel de Andia, Homo vivens: Incorruptibilite et divinisation de /'homme selon Irenee de Lyon (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1986). 31 Coxe, Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. I, 526-527. 30
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Salvation takes place through reception of the Spirit perfecting the body and soul. As Irenaeus emphasizes, "This does not take place by the casting away of the flesh, but by the impartation of the Spirit ... (which) will render us like unto God, and accomplish the will of the Father; for it shall make humanity after the image and likeness of God" (AgHer V.7.1; see also V.1.3; VJ.8.1; V.36.3). The transformation of humanity to be like God means that the corruptible flesh will become immortal; suffering and death will not pertain to the resurrected body. While this position overcomes SRJ's difficulty with Irenaeus including the limitations of the material body in the immortal realm, it simultaneously requires Irenaeus to redefine the material body fundamentally. Irenaeus discursively deploys the ancient conceptualization of the body to symbolize corruption and change, but in two contrasting modes: on the one hand, bodily suffering and death symbol human sinfulness; on the other hand, bodily changeability is refigured as the possibility of ultimate transformation to a state beyond all change and beyond mortality itself. For Irenaeus, the history of salvation is the history of bodily creation, fall, and restoration. 32 Thus in Irenaeus' hands, the body symbols both the mutability of human degradation and the capacity for divine immutability. Irenaeus would have his readers believe that in contrast to his positive representation of the body's capacity for divine transformation, heretics hate the body, polluting its divine likeness through sin and error. Denying that human flesh was created by God, they could never understand the potency of Christ's incarnation nor the effectiveness of baptism, the eucharist, and bodily practices of virtue. If we were to follow his perspective, we might expect these heretics to show little preoccupation 32 These states are at times presented as sequential episodes in the history of salvation, but in other contexts they appear as stages in a soul's progress: "The presbyters, the disciples of the apostles, affirm that this is the gradation and arrangement of those who are saved, and that they advance through steps of this nature; also that they ascend through the Spirit to the Son, and through the Son to the Father, and that in due time the Son will yield up His work to the Father" (Irenaeus, AgHer V.36.1-2; Coxe, Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1, 567, modified). Or again, Irenaeus writes of salvation as "the Spirit indeed working, and the Son ministering, while the Father was approving, and humanity'S salvation being accomplished" (AgHer V.20.6). Donovan understands these stages as different ways in which God can be seen: "These differ in kind through time, and also according to which of the Three (God, Spirit/Wisdom, or Word/Son) is acting. . .. The Spirit prepares human beings in the Son of God, and the Son leads them to the Father ... Prophetic seeing is a preparatory seeing under the guidance of the Spirit. Adoptive seeing happens through the ,agency of the Son, and there Irenaeus intends the incarnate .Son. Paternal seeing has to do with the state of glory, where the Father gives eternal incorruption, the final gift to those who see God" (Mary Ann Donovan, One Right Reading? A Guide to Irenaeus, Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1997, 117).
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with the body, except perhaps to condemn it. This proves not to have been the case. An extensive portion of SRJ - almost a quarter of the longer version - is taken up with describing the human body. The discursive deployment of body symbolism, however, differs markedly from Irenaeus' use. SRJ follows the ancient pattern in which the human body is represented as a microcosm of macro cosmic reality. In SRJ, materiality is itself an indissociable effect of power dynamics. 33 The human body came into being only in the play of the forces of power to control the Spirit, and in that sense, it is the effect of a power struggle. This fact is apparent in the body's double genealogy - made in the image of the First Human who appears in a luminous male form on the waters below, and formed in the likeness of Yaldabaoth and his minions. Thus Adam is perfect insofar as he is the image of divine perfection, but he is simultaneously flawed by possessing the characteristics of the world rulers who formed him. Their power over his psychic and physical body penetrates all of its parts, including the senses, the material elements, and the passions. This bodily SUbjection is the basis. of all human suffering. And yet the bodily nature is not itself the problem, for Christ says that when the first human body received the Spirit of Sophia and moved, it was free from wickedness, wiser than the rulers, and luminous. In the end, the flesh itself is not an impediment to salvation. As Christ tells John: Those upon whom the Spirit of the Life will descend and (with whom) it will be powerfully present, they will be saved and will become perfect. And they will become worthy of the great realms. And they will be purified in that place from all evil and the concerns of wickedness. Then they will not take care for anything except the imperishability alone, attending to it from this point on without anger or envy or jealousy, or desire or greed of anything at all. For they are not restrained by anything except the reality of the flesh alone, which they bear while fervently awaiting the time when they will be visited by those who will receive (them). For such as these are worthy of the imperishable eternal life and the calling (SRJ II 23 .4-11).
While the flesh is a constraint, people can overcome evil by concerning themselves with what is imperishable. In the end, despite all the temptations and violence to which humanity is exposed, and all the sins and impurities they commit in ignorance of the truth, humanity will be saved and brought back to the Light Aeons that have been prepared for them from eternity. This hope is based on creation in the image of God. The task of salvation is to conform fully to that pure image by overcoming 33 See, for example, Judith P. Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" (New York: Routledge, 1993). Some of the discussion which follows uses her approach (esp. pp. 2-3) as a cipher for reading bodies and sexualities in The Secret Revelation of John.
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humanity's likeness to the world-rulers. The real struggle is not the spirit against the body; rather the human body is the battlefield upon which the opposing forces of the true Spirit and the counterfeit spirit struggle. In SRJ, salvation is not understood as the atonement of Christ for human sin, but as a restoration of proper order to the divine household. The Divine Realm is represented on the model of the patriarchal household: Father, Mother, and Son, along with various other relatives and associates of the extended ancient familia. 34 It is thus an entirely traditional, if somewhat idealized model of the perfectly ordered household; its harmony and unity are ensured by proper lines of ruling and obedience following the hierarchy of origin, power, and preeminence. Sophia disrupts this order by acting without the consent of the Father or her male partner. Salvation therefore requires the "restoration of primordial household order," which, as Michael Williams points out,35 is one of Pronoia' s declared purposes for her descent in the final hymn of the longer version (SRJ II 26.12-13). For SRJ as for Irenaeus, the body manifests both the image of God in the world and reveals the nature of evil in the world. It is an important site of divine revelation. In SRJ, the suffering of the body and the human experience of injustice expose the truth of the world rulers' nature: they are evil and ultimately destined for dissolution. In ethics, too, the body reveals the nature of good and evil by exposing the lower creator gods for what they are: malignant rulers and false gods who seek only to dominate that which is superior to them through lies and violence. SRJ here discursively deploys the body to symbolize corruption and subjection; while the body may be cleansed and freed, it is not fundamentally transformed. Yet the human body is also simultaneously the revelation of the image of God in the world and the site of salvation through its capacity for purification from sin and passion. Bodily practices of baptismal ritual, instruction, and moral virtue manifest the presence of the Spirit laboring for the salvation of her seed. To say that SRJ considers the body to be evil by nature misses the complexity of the text's presentation of the human body as both map and territory,36 as both revelation and battleground, as the soul's ally and the demiurgic weapon against which it must struggle. 34 On the topic of "family as divine image," see the important discussion of Williams, Rethinking "Gnosticism," 154-157. He suggests that SRJ provides a model for reordering relationships of the social family into a greater likeness to the divine. 35 Williams, Rethinking "Gnosticism, " 155. 36 See Paula M. Cooey, Religious Imagination and the Body: A Feminist Analysis (Oxford: OUP, 1994), who talks about the body as site and as sign, linking the two by what she calls "mapping." The point is precisely not to give priority to the physical as a "given-real" and see signification as secondarily added on by culture; rather the body is always both site and sign. Or to put it another way, from this theoretical perspective, the
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We can now see the considerable similarities between Irenaeus and SRJ and start to consider the implications of their differences. For both, elaboration of the Genesis doublet "image and likeness" shapes their articulation of the human condition and human salvation. "Image" stands for the divine character of humanity, a status never lost to any person, and the basis for hope in ultimate salvation. "Likeness" stands for what went wrong and needs to be fixed. In these ways, both Irenaeus and SRJ inscribe directly onto the human body the tensions between image and likeness, creation and fall, spiritual perfection and sin, life and death. It is in explicating "likeness" that the major difference appears. For Irenaeus, "likeness" refers to the perfection intended by God at creation but lost through arrogant disobedience and sin. Salvation requires the restoration of that likeness by following the model of the incarnate Christ, in whom both the divine image and likeness appear in unsullied purity and power. At the final judgment, the perfect will be separated from the imperfect. 37 The perfect are those "who have had the Spirit of God remaining in them, and have preserved their souls and bodies blameless, holding fast the faith of God, that is, that faith which is directed toward God, and maintaining righteous dealings with respect to their neighbors" (AgHer V.6.1).38 The imperfect is a person in whom the Spirit is wanting, "who is such of an animal nature, being left carnal, possessing indeed the image in his formation but not receiving the likeness through the Spirit" (AgHer V.6.1). The flesh of believers will be transformed, its mortality being rendered immortal. 39 body is not a blank slate onto which culture writes its messages or constructs social order. 37 Irenaeus divides the perfect into three groups, graded according to their worth: those who are· worthy of an abode in heaven, those who shall enjoy the- delights of paradise, and others who shall possess the splendor of the city (Irenaeus, AgHer V.36.12). So, too, SRJ distinguishes among souls based on how well they do, dividing them into three categories: those who are perfect; those who are not perfect, but whom the Spirit strengthens and keeps from wickedness; and those who are purified from wickedness only after reincarnation (23.1--40). 38 Coxe, Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. I, 532. 39 It is less clear what happens to those who are condemned. It may be that the carnal do not receive the resurrection, but have death as their eternal punishment: "But on as many as, according to their own choice, depart form God, He inflicts that separation from himself which they have chosen of their own accord. But separation from God is death, and separation from light is darkness; and separation from God consists in the loss of all the benefits which He has in store. Those, therefore, who cast away by apostasy these fore-mentioned things, being in fact destitute of all good, do experience very kind of punishment. God, however, does not punish them directly of Himself, but that punishment falls upon them because they are destitute of all that is good. Now, good things are eternal and without end with God, and therefore the loss of these is also eternal and never-ending" (AgHer V. 27.2 Coxe, Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. I, 556).
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For SRJ, "likeness" refers to the arrogant wickedness of the world creator and his rulers, whose ignorance and disobedience are the whole cause of injustice and suffering. When humanity was formed in their counterfeit likeness, the luminous divine image of humanity was obscured by the darkness of fleshly passions and sin. Salvation requires overcoming that likeness by following and perfecting the model of the divine image in which one was created, as revealed by Christ and other divine messengers sent by the Mother. Christ teaches John that the human psyche and the material body are perfectible by -conforming to the image of God in which they were created, which is their true spiritual identity. The Mother sends the Spirit of Life to awaken the spiritual nature that people already possess and perfects them by making them truly human, spiritual people and members of the immovable race. 40 In the end, the spiritually perfected soul is taken up from the mortal flesh to eternal rest in the places that have been prepared for it. 41 What is at stake in how body symbolism is deployed? One major issue concerns the nature of justice. Both Irenaeus and SRJ are deeply invested in negotiating the moral terrain of social and political relations in the world. SRJ's cosmology is structured toward a radical social critique of power relations in the world below. The critique operates by sharply contrasting the ideal realm of the divine with the mundane world. The portrait of the transcendent Deity represents the utopian commitments of the SRJ, while the lower god and his minions exemplify everything that is wrong. The breach between them marks the nearly unbridgeable gap between the imagination of how things were supposed to be and how they were experienced. Christ repeatedly represents evil as hierarchy overturned, both in the deadly sway of the passions over the soul and in the inverted governance of the cosmos and the rulers' malicious attempts to deceive and entrap humanity. In this mythic economy, the inferior wrongly attempt to rule the superior. They rule not for the good of the governed but to satisfy their own arrogance and corrupt desire to dominate. Their repeated resort to deception and violence to maintain their illusory power merely underscores again and again the illegitimacy of their right to rule. This portrait leads ineluctably into a foundational critique of power relations in the world. 42 The path of salvation is modeled in SRJ by the 40 Wolf-Dieter Hauschild, Gottes Geist und der Mensch: Studien zur fruhchristlichen Pneumatologie (Munich: Kaiser Verlag, 1972),235,247. 41 These places are designated by four Aeons: Adam belongs to the aeon of Harmozel; Seth, to Oroiael; the seed of Seth to Daveithe; and the souls of those who didn't repent immediately but eventually did, to Eleleth (see SRJ9.1-14). 42 The reading of "gnostic" myth as social criticism is not new. Hans Jonas (Gnosis und spatantiker Geist: 1. Die mythologische Gnosis, 3d ed., Gottingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1964, 214-215, 226-227), Hans G. Kippenberg ("Versuch einer
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disciple John. At the beginning of the story he is filled with doubt and perplexity. By the end he is confident, knowing the truth. Like John, those who gain salvation know who they truly are, where they belong, and how to gain peace and stability in a world of violence and deception. They know that they are the undimmed light of the world, the light that shines in the darkness and the darkness cannot overcome it. Their goal is to be freed, no longer a pawn and dupe of the powers that rule the world, but purified from all sin and evil. Baptismal ritual conveys the power of the Spirit, sealing and protecting humanity against the evil machinations of the world rulers and against all suffering. In contrast to this position, Irenaeus insists that all governance comes from God for human benefit. At AgHer V.24,43 he argues that the devil lied at the beginning when he claimed that the power to appoint the rulers of the kingdoms of this world belonged to him. It is not Satan, but God who appoints rulers - and not merely angelic powers or invisible principalities, but actual human authorities. Because of human anger, greed, and violence, God imposed "the fear of man upon man since they did not acknowledge the fear of God, in order that, being subjected to the authority of men, and kept under restraint by their laws, they might attain to some degree of justice, and exercise mutual forbearance through dread of the sword suspended full in their view." Even rulers who rule with deception, disgrace, and pride are from God. Nonetheless, all magistrates must answer for their conduct to God, with the result that those who subvert justice will perish in the end. In this schema, Irenaeus insists that Satan's power extends only so far as he is an apostate angel who works "to deceive and lead astray the mind of man into disobeying the commandments of God, and gradually to darken the hearts of those who would endeavor to serve him, to the forgetting of the true God, but to the adoration of himself as God." He does this "with greater and greater determination, in opposition to humanity, envying his life, and wishing to involve him his own apostate power." (Notably, this is essentially the same function as that served by the counterfeit spirit in SRJ). God, however, grants humanity the strength to deprive Satan of this power by returning again to God through repentance. Like suffering and death, violent and unjust government is pedagogical and punitive for Irenaeus. In very sharp contrast, SRJ contrasts God's goodness with the violence and injustice of the lower world rulers. For SRJ, justice soziologischen Verortung des antiken Gnostizismus," Numen 17 [1970]: 211-231), Kurt Rudolph (Gnosis: The Nature and History of Gnosticism, San Francisco, Harper and Row, 1983,264-268,292), and Walter Wink (Cracking the Gnostic Code: The Powers in Gnosticism, Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993) have made similar suggestions, albeit for "Gnosticism" as a whole. 43 Coxe, Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. I, 552-553; see also AgHer IV. 28.1.
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consists in the restoration of the proper rule and order of God's household, not the rule of the righteous in the world below. Some have said "Gnosticism" faded away or merely hardened into anachronism because it was too negative about life in the world to not support a positive new order. 44 I don't think that's quite right. It isn't because SRJ was too "otherworldly," but because such an uncompromising critique of ruling power in the world below could ever have been compatible with the radical shift in the political condition of Christianity from persecuted sect to imperial favor, such as was established after the Emperor Constantine converted to Christianity in the fourth century. In an oration given at the celebration of Constantine's Tricennalia, the church historian Eusebius extravagantly praised the Emperor's sovereignty as a mirror of God's heavenly monarchy.45 Such a theology could never have squared with Christ's revelation in SRJ. Irenaeus' insistences that all governing power comes from God and that God holds those in power responsible were much more palatable to imperial rule. But Irenaeus and SRJ were writing in an earlier age, a time when Christians were dying for their "atheism" and "treason" in refusing'to give divine honors to the emperor. Indeed through the four hundred year period from the Republic to the Empire, judicial punishments in general became increasingly savage and increasingly public. Because' those with class privilege and ruling power could exercise arbitrary viciousness with impunity under the name of "law and order" over those who suffered without recourse, oppressive violence was associated with ruling power and privilege. 46 It was in this period that Irenaeus and SRJ produced their theologies. Irenaeus seems to have focused on the issue of martyrdom and formulated the issue in terms of God's justice: that suffering in the flesh is recompensed by reward in the flesh. He states that the whole reason for the Father revealing the Son is justice: justly to admit those who believe to 44 For a nuanced and articulate example, see Jonas, Gnosis und spiitantiker Geist, 1:227,n.2. 45 Laus Constantini (appended to Eusebius, Life of Constantine), cited from the discussion of Frances Young, "Christianity," in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (ed. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield; Cambridge: CUP, 2000), 651-653. 46 See Ramsey MacMullen, "Judicial Savagery and the Roman Empire," in idem,' Changes in the Roman Empire: Essays in the Ordinary (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 214-217. MacMullen notes that the habit of punishment was tied to the distance of rank and status that set apart those who ordered punishments and those who suffered them, a situation which allied violence with rank. Some scholars have been led by this to suggest that those who wrote and read the Secret Revelation of John were part of the elite classes who might be expected to exert power but who in the face of Roman imperium were relatively disenfranchised (see Rudolph, Gnosis, 288-292; Kippenberg, "Versuch einer soziologischen Verortung").
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eternal life, and justly to condemn those who do not. God here is the judge who mercifully saves and justly condemns. The main issue of justice for SRJ focuses instead upon a critique of unjust power relations in the world, and its theology distinguished sharply between the gracious rule of God and the impious attempts at domination by the world ruler. The main theological issue therefore was not, as Irenaeus would have it, a matter of heretics denying the power of God to vivify the flesh. The more fundamental issue was the nature of God's goodness and justice. Irenaeus was not oblivious to this fact. He argues against other Christians whom he claims look to God's acts of compassion in coming to save those who receive Him, but keep silent about God's judgment of those who have not followed His commands. Instead, he says, they "try to bring in another Father" (AgHer IV.6.5, 7). For SRJ, the "other Father" is precisely the lower god, who is the author of violence and injustice. Irenaeus tries to protect the notion of God's goodness by insisting that God does not punish sinners himself directly, but rather "that punishment falls upon them because they are destitute of all that is good" (AgHer V. 27.2).47 Nonetheless, SRJ demonstrates that not all Christians could square God's goodness with the notion that he sponsors wicked rulers to chastise a sinful humanity and institutes suffering as spiritual pedagogy. Some Christians apparently did not believe that martyrdom, death, and other suffering were always so clearly deserved or so spiritually useful. The comparison of Irenaeus and SRJ shows too that they are mobilizing the symbolizing and structuring potential of human bodies to do different kinds of work, to articulate different kinds of theological positionalities. It is not that one has a favorable view of the body and the other a negative view. For SRJ the body is map and territory of the cosmos, the revelation of the structure and substance of all that exists, and the ground on which the battle between the true Spirit and the counterfeit spirit is waged. The physical body, including sexuality, is perfectible through the reception of the Spirit, but ultimately will not be saved. For Irenaeus, the flesh is the creation of the true God, made in the divine image, but it requires the Spirit to perfect it, the Son to reveal its likeness to God, and the Father to grant it incorruptibility and glory. To reduce this complexity of bodily symbolism to a static polarization makes it impossible to see the dynamic intersections of sameness and difference that lie behind the struggles and negotiations of early Christian theological polemics. Here the discursive polemics of orthodoxy and heresy have worked to obscure the similarities between Irenaeus and SRJ both in substance and in strategy, as well as where the differences lie and what was at stake. By examining these, it becomes possible to see where 47 Coxe, Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. I, 556.
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there was (perhaps mutual?) incomprehension, where they simply have different theological foci or where they side-step, ignore, or simply fail to be cognizant of the interests of the other.
Conclusion In contrast to approaches to "orthodoxy and heresy" or "early Christian diversity" that define the task' of reconstructing early Christianity as a matter of identifying the lines of theological difference and social division, our conveners have asked us "to consider the different functions of 'heresy' -making discourse, as a simultaneous process of perceiving, describing, and disqualifying groups of (re )imagined dissenters, often by branding them with labels." This kind of approach suggests that the task is not merely to identify more precisely divisions that were simply there, but rather to ask about the social and theological effects of discursive rhetoric. The two examples above offer an initial indication of how these questions might be investigated. To what degree did such rhetoric produce divisions, hide theological similarities, or obscure the issues under debate and what was at stake in them? What difference does it make to represent truth through a discourse of orthodoxy and heresy rather than one of impartial objectivity? All this might then lead us to discuss early Christian diversity not in terms of a sociology of heresy, but within a general framework of early Christian identity formation - one in which discourses of orthodoxy and heresy are perceived as social and intellectual activities in need of analysis as much for their effects on early Christian life as for what they reflect of it.
Doxa, Heresy, and Self-Construction The Pauline Ekklesiai and the Boundaries of Urban Identities WILLIAM E. ARNAL
More and more, I am convinced, these [indigenous] people are "marginal" to history and modernity in nobody's eyes but our own. Indeed, at the point of the social action, the field on which indigenous people struggle to encompass what is happening to them in the terms of their own world system, theirs is the encompassing move on a peripheral culture of modernity. - Marshall Sahlins 1 Victi victoribus leges dederunt. - attributed to Seneca, On Superstition2
Introduction It is something of a common-place that imposing the categories of "heresy" and "orthodoxy" onto the earliest period of the Jesus-movements is extremely misleading - perhaps even impossible. Since "heresy" must be viewed as a relational term, that is, as existing in a structural position with respect to an "orthodoxy" in terms of both its identification and its contents, "we cannot assume that heresy has a fixed, immutable, ahistorical essence. Accordingly, the definition of heresy cannot be predicated on its contents."3 Heresy requires an orthodoxy, and both phenomena assume a fixed ideological standard against which to evaluate 1 Marshall Sahlins, Culture in Practice: Selected Essays (New York: Zone Books, 2000),9-10. 2 According to Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans [William H. Green, LCL], 360. This quotation was brought to my attention in Jack N. Lightstone, The Commerce of the Sacred: Mediation of the Divine among Jews in the Graeco-Roman Diaspora, Brown Judaic Studies (Chico: Scholars Press, 1984),92. 3 Jacques Berlinerblau, "Toward a Sociology of Heresy, Orthodoxy, and Doxa," HR, 40 (2001): 331. See also, for example, Jeffrey Burton Russell, "Heresy: Christian Concepts," in Encyclopedia of Religion, vol. 4 (gen. ed. Mircea Eliade; New York: Macmillan, 1987),276.
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ideas, whereas no such standard actually existed - at least for the "religious" beliefs of the Jesus-people - in the first or even second centuries, in which the churches were instead radically diverse and lacking in any central authority to impose theological conformity.4 The retrojection of much later standards of acceptable belief is poor historical method. It treats the eventual and perhaps fortuitous ascendancy of particular groups, along with their favorite texts and doctrines, as somehow pertinent for the ages prior to that ascendancy. 5 And to assess "heresy" or "orthodoxy"
4 That the normative forms of later Christian orthodoxy were not dominant from the earliest historical periods - and hence that "heresy" cannot be described as a deviation from the first century's core doctrines - was famously argued by Walter Bauer, Rechtglaubigkeit und Ketzerei im altesten Christentum (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1934, repr., 1964); on which see Hans Dieter Betz, "Orthodoxy and Heresy in Primitive Christianity," Interpretation, 19 (1965): 310. "Orthodoxy in these terms is simply the final stage of a syncretistic process which after adaptations, influences, modifications, and the like, comes to a kind of 'establishment' "; and especially Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament (trans. K. Grobel; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951-55), 2:137-38: " ... by the triumph of a certain teaching as the 'right doctrine' divergent teachings were condemned as heresy ... the 'great church' is only the most successful heresy .. , the differentiation of the various shades of teaching did not first arise in the post-apostolic period but was already present in the time of Paul ... " The diversity of even the most ancient forms of "Christianity" is emphasized also by Helmut Koester, "GNOMAI DIAPHOROI: The Origin and Nature of Diversification in the History of Early Christianity," in James M Robinson and Helmut Koester, Trajectories through Early Christianity (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 114-57; idem, "The Structure and Criteria of Early Christian Beliefs," in J. M. Robinson and H. Koester, Trajectories through Early Christianity, 205-31. See also Rowan Williams, "Does It Make Sense to Speak of Pre-Nicene Orthodoxy?" in The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick, (ed. Rowan Williams; Cambridge: CUP, 1989, repr., 2002), 1-23. More recently, such terms as "Gnosticism" have been called into question as retrospective and polemical constructs; see especially Michael Allen Williams, Rethinking "Gnosticism ": An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Karen L. King, What Is Gnosticism? (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003). Even in the second century, the development of a discourse of exclusion and inclusion did not straightforwardly take the form of the exclusion - institutional or rhetorical - of those ideas which later generations found unacceptable. The process was much more complex, and occasionally was initiated by the "heretics" themselves. For a fascinating discussion of Valentinus' relations with the church at Rome, and an explanation for that church's failure to eject him, see Einar Thomassen, "Orthodoxy and Heresy in Second-Century Rome," HTR 97 (2004): 241-56; for the role of Justin Martyr in "inventing" Christian heresiology, and an interpretation of his work as an effort to conceptualize Hellenistic universalism, see Rebecca Lyman, "2002 NAPS Presidential Address: Hellenism and Heresy," JECS 11 (2003): 209-22. 5 So. also Russell, "Heresy: Christian Concepts," 276: "It is thus intellectually impossible (as well as morally undesirable) to judge a person's orthodoxy or heresy by the standards of another period, although tendencies to do so have marred both Catholic
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apart from the explicit "insider" discourse thereof runs the risk of imposing a normative judgment of one's own, insofar as it implies that later or extraneous standards are essentially correct, and so can be used to evaluate the validity of conceptions and practices that they were· not formulated to assess. 6 Presumably, it is for reasons such as these - and no doubt others besides - that so few of the papers for this colloquium deal with firstcentury "Christian" materials. Such considerations, however, need not require that a discussion of heresy be obsolete, unproductive, or inapplicable to the first-century Jesusmovements. Clearly enough, a discourse of heresy and orthodoxy appears within the Christian movement in later periods, even when these terms are not explicitly invoked, and even if not always in the same terms, or with the same norms and suppositions, from one period to another. 7 If such a discourse can be analyzed, then it may also be possible to analyze its ostensible referents or functions. And indeed, this discourse does seem to refer to a genuine sociological phenomenon, one that is broader than the discourse's own quite particular frame of reference. Once we strip away the distinctively "religious" and late antique Christian (and, later, Muslim [bid 'a, "innovation"]) terminology through which the phenomenon receives its distinctive and quite narrow expression, what emerges is the reality of group insiders who redeploy "our" values and discursive tropes
and Protestant historical writings for centuries." Cf. Lyman, "Hellenism and Heresy," 210. 6 As is shown by Elaine Pagels, The Gnostic Paul: Gnostic Exegesis of the Pauline Letters (Harrisburg: Fortress Press, 1975, repr., 1992), esp. 158-163, the claim of the orthodox upon Paul and his letters as theologically authoritative was a later development, following from and endeavoring to repudiate gnostic (and especially Valentini an) exegesis of Paul's Letters. The subsequent appropriation and canonization of Paul cannot be used as evidence that these gnostic readings were invalid, or that the much later orthodox reading of Paul is the correct one. Cf. also the dismissal of dogmatic or theological judgments of "orthodoxy" or "heresy" offered by Kurt Rudolph, "Heresy: An Overview," in Encyclopedia of Religion, vol. 4 (trans. by M.J. O'Connell; gen. ed. Mircea Eliade; New York: Macmillan, 1987),271. 7 Paul himself in fact uses the term that later comes to mean "heresy" - hairesis - in 1 Corinthians 11: 19 and Galatians 5 :20, in both cases to denote factionalism as such (in Gal 5:20, the term is included in a list of vices, and is bracketed by dichostasiai [dissensions], on the one hand, andphthonoi [envy, jealousies] on the other) rather than "incorrect" opinions, though the former reference (1 Cor 11:19) does suggest that the presence of factions will illuminate who is "genuine." Cf. also the interesting (if nonPauline) use of hairetikon anthropon at Titus 3: 10, which the NRSV translates as "anyone who causes divisions." We can hardly regard these uses of the term, however, as being invested with its later significance, and thus cannot speak of Paul engaging in a discourse of "heresy" within his own ekklesia{
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in unacceptable ways.8 Obviously, such a description of "heresy" views it as a social fact like many others, one whose boundaries are artificially circumscribed by neither "religious" subject-matters nor by explicit invocation of the relevant terminology;9 in any instance in which we have such insider departure from the institutionalized norms or assumptions about behavior or belief, we have, de facto, heresy.lO This redefinition 8 The importance of "insider" identity is apparent even in the term used ("faction" implies a break from within), and is stressed as definitional by various scholars. See, e.g., George V. Zito, "Toward a Sociology of Heresy," Sociological Analysis 44 (1983): 125. "In heresy, the speaker employs the same language as the parent group, retains its values, but attempts to order its discourse to some other end," in contrast to apostasy, in which one leaves the groups and as a result "speaks some other language." Cf. Berlinerblau, "Sociology of Heresy," 335. This distinction is maintained in emic uses of the terminology as well; thus: "A heretic had to be a Christian; Jews, pagans, atheists, Muslims, or other non-Christians were held to be guilty of 'infidelity' rather than heresy," in Russell, "Heresy: Christian Concepts," 276. 9 Antique (and perhaps all) religion can be seen as a discourse of social self-definition - inclusion and exclusion - and so its own discussions of proper "religious" belonging (i.e., heresy and orthodoxy) are simply one aspect of a larger phenomenon. As Zito argues, heresy" ... is not, strictly speaking, a religious phenomenon, but an institutional phenomenon. It arose first within religion only because of the religious institution's central position in governing the discourses of a particular historical moment," Zito, "Sociology of Heresy," 126; cf. Berlinerblau, "Sociology of Heresy," 334. Cf. also Bourdieu's application of the language of heresy and orthodoxy to (secular) academic discourse in Pierre Bourdieu, "Vive la Crise! For Heterodoxy in Social Science," TS 17 (1988): 773. The centrality of "religious" discourse for social self-definition is also stressed by Martin Goodman: "It has long been claimed, with some justification, that the rites which enshrine human attitudes to the divine played a special role in reinforcing the norms of human relations. Although ancient societies possessed other devices to indicate the limits of membership, it was often primarily by common participation in, and adherence to, a particular series of religious rituals, that a social group defined its identity and excluded those who did not belong, and the nature of the rituals reflected or symbolized the social structure either as it was or as those responsible for such rituals believed it should be." Martin Goodman, Mission and Conversion: Proselytizing in the Religious History of the Roman Empire (Oxford: OUP, 1994, repr., 2001), 16. While some may claim that it is precisely in this period that "religion" emerges as a distinctive sphere of life (so, e.g., Goodman, Mission and Conversion, 17-18), I have argued elsewhere (William E. Arnal, "Definition [of Religion]," in Guide to the Study of Religion [ed. Willi Braun and Russell T. McCutcheon; London and New York: Routledge, 2000], 21-34), following Talal Asad (Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1993], esp. 28, 39-43, 47-48), that "religion" as we currently understand it is a distinctively modern concept, and that its distinction from other social realms is itself a social act of political self-definition. 10 So Zito, "Sociology of Heresy," 125: "It is clear that heresy is not merely a 'difference of opinion,' although some dictionaries make this claim. Heresy includes an attack, veiled or quite open, upon an institutionalized way of speaking about the world. It is therefore a thing of a distinctly social kind, directly related to social deviance."
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allows us to speak more broadly, and genuinely socially, about a phenomenon which, if restricted to its emic referents, is "protected" by its religious subject-matter, and reduced to simple disputes about the correctness of (often obscure and highly technical) ideas. Such a redefinition of heresy as a sociological rather than exclusively ideological (and "religious") phenomenon returns the first-century Jesuspeople to our consideration, since we no longer need compare their ideas to a Christian religious orthodoxy (which did not exist at the time), but can instead examine whether any given first-century group of Jesus-people appears to have transgressively redeployed identity-language. As it happens, there are some compelling reasons to think that the concept of heresy - counterintuitive though such an application might seem - would be positively helpful for understanding Paul and the reception of his activity. In the case of the Pauline ekklesiai, we have direct, primarysource evidence, not only for overt and emphatic hostility directed against the foundation of these groups on the part of their social compatriots (that is, both ethnic Jews and urban authorities in Paul's case [e.g., 2 Cor 11 :2326], and fellow urban citizens in the case of his adherents [e.g., 1 Thess 2:2; 3 :3-4]), but also of a proliferation of identity-language on Paul's part, deployed in odd ways. Paul seems to have been engaged in a process both of creating new groups 11 and redefining extant ones,12 and this action, in 11 That is, his ekklesiai, which he describes in language that strongly implies that he himself has actually founded or established these groups as groups. It must be stressed, however, that this rhetorical presentation, too often taken as accurate social description, in fact serves Paul's argumentative ends and is invoked for this very reason. Moreover, Paul's "foundation" language seems to apply only to the groups' constitution as ekklesiai, and not necessarily to their constitution as groups in the first place. Some recent work has begun to call into question the sufficiency of this Pauline presentation. Burton Mack, for instance, asserts that, "planting" and "foundation-laying" language not~ithstanding, Paul did not found the Corinthian church (Burton L. Mack, Who Wrote the New Testament? The Making of the Christian Myth [San Francisco: Harper, 1995], esp. 104, 126); Jonathan Z. Smith goes so far as to speculate that the group Paul is addressing in Corinth is a not a "church" at all, but a collection of displaced peoples of various ethnic backgrounds attempting to remain in communion with ancestral and homeland practices, a group from which Paul gains a hearing and henceforth (deliberately?) misunderstands as a "church" (Jonathan Z. Smith, "Re: Corinthians," in Relating Religion: Essays in the Study of Religion [Chicago: U. Press of Chicago, 2004], esp. 340-61). More straightforwardly, and in my view, extremely plausibly, Richard Ascough has suggested ("The Thessalonian Christian Community as a Professional Voluntary Association," JBL 119 [2000]: 311-28) that, at least in Thessalonica, what Paul has done is provide an existing trade association with a new patron deity: Christ. For my purposes here, it hardly matters whether Paul is genuinely constituting new groups more or less ex nihilo (an implausible and unrealistic scenario, on the face of it), or is assigning new identities to extant groups; the point is that Paul is deeply engaged in reconceiving and manipulating identities of various sorts. Indeed, it is likely enough to be
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turn, seems to have elicited hostility from Gentiles - possibly including civic authorities - and from his fellow Jews (whether synagogue authorities or Jewish Jesus-people). Paul was - clearly and unquestionably - redeploying identity language, and it may have been a perception that this redeployment was transgressive of taken-for-granted assumptions that prompted opposition to him; in short, Paul may have been a "heretic" within the social frameworks of both first-century Jewish assumptions about ethnic identity, and first-century Graeco-Roman assumptions about civic identity. In what follows,· I aim in part to test the applicability of "heresy" as a productive analytic category in a case in which it is not explicitly invoked, but seems to be sociologically indicated; and in the process I hope to shed some light on my substantive subject-matter, the Pauline ekldesiai.
Bourdieu, Doxa, and Heresy Before wading into such murky waters, however, it would probably be wise to spell out as explicitly as possible precisely how I am defining "heresy," how it functions socially, and how it relates to "orthodoxy." Here I draw on the conceptions provided by Pierre Bourdieu,13 whose his obviously strong and repeated interest in the discourse of identity that has led to the almost-universal view of him as a creator of new groups. 12 As is evident from Paul's references to "his" groups as ekklesiai, a term which has ambiguous and prodigal connotations. Obviously, Paul is also recasting his followers in terms of Jewish identity by making them (honorary or adopted) heirs of Abraham, a point especially emphasized in Galatians, albeit with rather thin logic. 13 My wording here is carefully and deliberately chosen: I am not adopting Bourdieu's sociological approach in general nor the whole package of conceptions with which he works, instead opportunistically appropriating those conceptions (and their theoretical baggage) that strike me as most likely to be productive for this investigation. It does seem to me that Bourdieu's emphasis on discourse as practice, and as determined (to some degree) by both its own internal logics and extra-discursive practice - sthat discourse is intentional and meaning-making, on the one hand, and involves rationalization and contestation of power-relations, on the other - is extremely useful, and helps avoid simplistic (idealistic "vulgar materialist") reductions of discourse to a distinct epiphenomenon of practice (no less a figure than Joseph Stalin asserts emphatically than language cannot be an aspect of the superstructure; see Marxism and Problems of Linguistics (Moscow: 1954; repr., U. Press of the Pacific, 2003), 7-15; this reference would never have come to my attention had it not been cited in Jonathan z. Smith, "When the Chips Are Down," in Idem, Relating Religion, 3). At the same time, I remain rather suspicious of Bourdieu's treatment of status as practically an entity in itself, and his tendency to treat cultural operations as distinguishable from and parallel to economic operations (cf. Bourdieu's treatment of "symbolic capital," e.g., in Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (trans. R. Nice; Cambridge: CUP, 1972, repr.,
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social theories have focused to a tremendous degree on the reproduction of dominant discourses, and who has, as a result, formulated analytic tools that may allow us a more genuinely systematic and sociological understanding of heresy and its relationship both to orthodoxy and to social change. 14 While it is Bourdieu's notion of habitus that is theoretically central, and that has garnered the most attention from commentators, for my purposes it is his concept of doxa - developed in connection with orthodoxy and heterodoxy and drawing its name from what they have in common - that will be of most use. Doxa, for Bourdieu, is the "universe of the undiscussed,"15 that which is taken utterly for granted within a given social formation and hence is not subject to differing opinions or even explicit articulation. 16 This undiscussed doxa receives its force not only from its undiscussed status - that it "goes without saying because it comes without saying"17 - but also and equally from its conformity to external or objective structures; doxa can remain unquestioned because it "fits" with the world as it is perceived and experienced. 18 Bourdieu himself frames the matter most elegantly:
1977), 171-83; and the chart in idem, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action (Cambridge, UK: Polity 1998), 5; in idem and LOIC J. D. Wac quant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1992), esp. 173-74, Bourdieu accounts for and partially justifies this conception with reference to the near-universal inferior of status of women, without appearing to recognize that the fundamental and irreducible difference between men and women is precisely their differential productive capacities - i.e., the inability of men to reproduce society itself by bearing children rather than any necessary symbolic difference). For a sympathetic presentation and defense of "symbolic capital," however, see Bridget Fowler, Pierre Bourdieu and Cultural Theory: Critical Investigations, (London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1997), 20-40. 14 Karen King offers similar reasons for drawing on Bourdieu; see King, What Is Gnosticism?, 241: "Discourse analysis, it seems to me, provides a method to understand the processes of the regulated practices of habitus in operation. Bourdieu's work is more useful than Foucault's in understanding the practical aims and effects of discursive formations in the material and social world. Bourdieu emphasizes not only the regularity of practice, but also its improvisational character and rhetorical logic. Moreover, Bourdieu's social theory allows for a framework that rejects both essentializing and functionalist approaches to the study of religion." And cf. David Swartz, "Bridging the Study of Culture and Religion: Pierre Bourdieu's Political Economy of Symbolic Power," SR 57 (1996): 71-86, for another assertion of the value of Bourdieu's work for analysis of religion. 15 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 168. 16 In general, see the discussion in ibid., 165-71; idem, Practical Reason, 56-57; cf. also Berlinerblau, "Sociology of Heresy," 346. 17 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 167. 18 Ibid., 165-67.
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In a determinate social formation, the stabler the objectiv~ structures and the more fully they reproduce themselves in the agents' dispositions, the greater the extent of the field of doxa, of that which is taken for granted. When, owing to the quasi-perfect fit between the objective structures and the internalized structures which results from the logic of simple reproduction, the established cosmological and political order is perceived not as arbitrary, i.e., as one possible order among others, but as a self-evident and natural order which goes without saying and therefore goes unquestioned, the agents' aspirations have the same limits as the objective conditions of which they are the product. 19
Doxa is thus the realm in which opinions are not possible; or rather, it is the framework within which' opinions, discourse, arguments must operate. 20 Once a view about the world becomes subject to discussion, a matter of opinion, a point sufficiently visible to be argued about, it ceases to be doxa. There are at least two different ways of understanding the relationship of heterodoxy and orthodoxy to doxa, even in Bourdieu's own work21 ; they might be thought of as two distinct and incompatible theories of the development of heretical discourses, but it may be more useful and generous to think of them as different and potentially supplemental models for such development. 22 According to one such model - and this seems to be the one that Bourdieu has first and foremost in view when he formulates his concept of doxa - heterodoxy and orthodoxy share doxa, it represents the common ground and shared values which are not a matter of opinion. 23 Indeed, what is doxa at any given moment may represent a suppression and removal from discourse of opinions that were contested in the past today's orthodoxy becomes tomorrow's doxa. 24 According to such a Ibid., 165-66. See the graphic rendition of this conception in ibid., 168. 21 As Berlinerblau says, "Bourdieu's discussions of doxa ... [are] somewhat obscure ... " ("Sociology of Heresy," 330). 22 If different theories, then (at least at the most basic level) they are incompatible: at best, one is wrong and one is right (at worst, both are wrong, though still incompatibly with one another). If different models, then both can be equally valid, but applicable to different phenomena, describing different types of heretical developments, different stages of the same phenomenon, or even adopting different heuristics vis-a-vis precisely the same data. 23 See Berlinerblau, "Sociology of Heresy," 346. 24 See Bourdieu, Practical Reason, 56-57: "It should not be forgotten that such primordial political belief, this doxa, is an orthodoxy, a right, correct, dominant vision which has more often than not been imposed through struggles against competing visions. This means that the 'natural attitude' mentioned by the phenomenologists, that is, the primary experience of the world of common sense, is a politically produced relation, as are the categories of perception that sustain it. What appears to us today as self-evid~nt, as beneath consciousness and choice, has quite often been the stake of struggles and instituted only as the result of dogged confrontations between dominant and dominated groups." 19
20
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conception, views characterized as heterodox participate in doxa just as much as the "approved" views identified as orthodox, essentially by definition, since once a view becomes open to dispute and discussion even a "correct" orthodox view supported by a repressive apparatus - it moves out of the realm of the taken-for-granted and undiscussed. 25 As Bourdieu puts it: The truth of doxa is only ever fully revealed when negatively constituted by the constitution of a field of opinion, the locus of the confrontation of competing discourses whose political truth may be overtly declared or may remain hidden, even from the eyes of those engaged in it, under the guise of religious or philosophical oppositions. It is by reference to the universe of opinion that the complementary class is defined, the class of that which is taken for granted, doxa, the sum total of the theses tacitly posited on the hither side of all inquiry, which appear as such only retrospectively, when they come to be suspended practically. 26
In addition, this perspective implicitly places orthodoxy prior to heterodoxy, both temporally, as heresy is a departure from an alreadyconstituted orthodoxy; and conceptually, as heterodoxy is identifiable only as a deviation from orthodoxy and indeed only in terms of orthodoxy's repressive activity.27 Put slightly differently, orthodoxy and heresy both differ from doxa in being explications of deeper and shared norms which remain unexplicated as such: orthodoxy is the dominant representation of 25 An excellent example of this movement back and forth between doxa and orthodoxy - and one which meshes with intuitive understandings of orthodoxy, as well as being defined in precisely such terms - is afforded by the centuries-long development of trinitiarian doctrine within Christianity. A matter that was at first genuinely open to dispute eventually became quite strictly defined, with opposing views labelled as heretical. Since the matter was still under discussion at this point, the prevailing trinitarian doctrine was merely orthodox, with countervailing views being at least conceptually possible. With the passage of time, however (certainly by the Middle Ages), this orthodoxy became doxa - the undisputed basis of agreement among theological disputants. The reformers and the papacy, for instance, agreed on (or at least did not dispute about) trinitarian matters and took them for granted while bitterly disputing other points. Since the Enlightenment, in isolated instances from Thomas Jefferson on, trinitarian doctrine has been called into question again, with various popular rejections of the divinity of Jesus. While, in clearly Christian contexts, such a view has not prevailed, the fact that it has come under discussion renders trinitarian doctrine once again an orthodoxy, a matter potentially under discussion and no longer part of the undisputed universe of discourse. 26 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 168. 27 Similarly, Berlinerblau, "Sociology of Heresy," 334-35, who stresses, " ... the importance of identifying some fundamental sociological criteria to account for where the heresy/orthodoxy nexus can be said to exist," and who finds such a criterion in the existence of a repressive or ideological apparatus of some sort: "In order for heresy to 'arise' there must exist an authoritative political apparatus (i.e., an orthodoxy), one capable of identifying heretics and effectively 'managing' them."
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doxa, while heresy endeavors a redeployment or differing rendering of the very same assumptions; here we have more a disagreement about expression than a rejection of shared values, or a battle for control over their expression, which is just as we would expect given that the heretic is an "insider" by definition.28 This model of heterodoxy seems valid enough, but may not get at what is most distinctive and intriguing about Paul's identity-language, or, indeed, about heresy as social phenomenon in general. For the sake of clarity, I will henceforth reserve the term heterodoxy for such departures ,from orthodoxy as are described by this model. Happily, Bourdieu somewhat inconsistently provides a different model for the relationship of doxa to orthodoxy and heresy - and heresy is the term I will use henceforth to distinguish this conception from the heterodoxy described above. Here both the temporal and analytic priority of orthodoxy to heresy is reversed, with heresy becoming the more basic pole of the opposition. If we are to regard heterodoxy as a departure from orthodoxy, then we will need to see heresy as a departure from some elements of doxa. According to this view, there is a much stronger linkage between orthodoxy and doxa than was posited in the first model: orthodoxy is an explicit retrenchment of a challenged doxa,29 which has of 28 Such an approach is taken by the extended definition of heresy provided in Berlinerblau, "Sociology of Heresy," 340. An illustrative example from our own time and experience is the doxic field ofthejamily, an example Bourdieu himself cites: "The nearperfect match that is then set up between the subjective and objective categories provides the foundation for an experience of the world as self-evident, taken for granted. And nothing seems more natural than the family; this arbitrary social construct seems to belong on the side of nature, the natural and the universal," Bourdieu, Practical Reason,67. The debate over gay marriage - one that has, in different ways, marked political discourse in both the United States and Canada over the past few years - has tended not to call into question the value of marriage or family at all, but to interpret or render that value differently. Both sides of the debate claim that they are defending the family and the institution of marriage: one side by entrenching its traditional parameters, the other by extending it. Clearly the (for now) orthodox view is that which asserts that marriage is heterosexual by definition, and the heterodox view is that marriage can also apply to two men or two women. But neither side is questioning the value of being married, or the restriction of marriage to people (as opposed to animals), or to two people (as opposed to several), or to adults (as opposed to children) - the rhetoric of some defenders of traditional norms notwithstanding. And proponents of the heterodox view are defending it by claiming that it adheres to shared values about family, child-rearing, love and commitment, and the like. Of course, this example also illustrates the limits of this particular way of viewing the relationship between heresy and doxa (on which see further below): the heterodox view that homosexuals can marry has called into question and ren4ered discuss-able the formerly doxic assumption that marriage is exclusively heterosexual. 29 So also Bourdieu, Practical Reason, 56-57.
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course ceased to be doxa by virtue of its exposure to disputation. This model places doxa temporally first (however initially established), being maintained by its fit with objective social structures. Social circumstances change over time, however, as social circumstances always do, and this fit is disrupted, at least for certain social groupings, exposing belief as belief, exposing social structures as artificial by virtue of their inconsistency and lack of self-evidence. 3o This breakdown in doxa is precipitated by circumstance, not by thought, as thought itself cannot penetrate doxa, since it is precisely what is not thought, not thinkable: "The practical questioning of the theses implied in a particular way of living that is brought about by 'culture contact' or by the political and economic crises correlative with class division is not the purely intellectual operation which phenomenology designates epoche, the deliberate, methodical suspension of naive adherence to the world."31 From such a context arises heresy: the intentional redeployment of socio-cultural tropes and other symbolic signifiers (still socially shared, of course) to reconfigure fundamental beliefs about the world by those groups for whom shared assumptions have lost their self-evident quality. 32 Heresy functions at a rather more subliminal level than does heterodoxy, as it constitutes an attack on "what 30 For Bourdieu's stress on the necessity of fit between objective social structures and internalized conceptions of the world (as well as the internal consistency of the symbolic order) to sustain a doxic field, see, inter alia, Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 167-69; idem, Practical Reason, esp. 55-57, 67, 81. On the consequences of the exposure of belief as belief, see especially id., Outline of a Theory of Practice, 170: "The boundary between the universe of (orthodox or heterodox) discourse and the universe of doxa ... represents the dividing-line between the most radical form of misrecognition and the awakening of political consciousness"; likewise ibid.,168-69: "The critique which brings the undiscussed into discussion, the unformulated into formulation, has as the condition of its possibility objective crisis, which, in breaking the immediate fit between the subjective structures and the objective structures, destroys self-evidence practically. It is when the social world loses its character as a natural phenomenon that the question of the natural or conventional character (phusei or nomo [sic]) of social facts can be raised." 31 Ibid., 168; cf. also Craig Calhoun, "Habitus, Field, and Capital: The Question of Historical Specificity," in Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives (ed. C. Calhoun; E. LiPuma, and M. Postone; Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1993),80. 32 Note that such an understanding of heresy and doxa redefines the import of the heretic's "insider" status. In both models, heretics are by definition insiders, and share extensive elements of the discourse with their orthodox opponents. But in the first model, which stresses the solidary aspects of a social body, it is fundamental values and epistemic assumptions that are held in common. In the second model, by contrast, which stresses the fractured nature of the social body (at least the way I have described it), values and epistemic assumptions are not held in common (at least not wholly); what is common is the use of a shared symbolic language. Situationally, heretics are marginal insiders.
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cannot be said for lack of an available discourse,"33 and so is forced to construct a discourse from extant symbols to express something those symbols have not hitherto been used to express. Heresy is radically subversive for this reason: it is not only that "the subversive power of the heretic is predicated on the fact that she or he is 'one of us,' "34 but additionally that the heretic renders explicit - if sometimes only obliquely - what has up to that point derived its stabilizing and hegemonic force precisely from remaining unarticulated. 35 Heresy can (and as conceived here, in opposition to heterodoxy, must) thus arise without a concomitant orthodoxy - it is a deliberate disruption of doxa predicated on the antecedent disruption of the circumstances to which that doxa conformed;36 and heresy's articulation or, better, exposure of doxa can precede its positive articulation, at which point doxa is no longer doxa, but orthodoxy. This perspective also is advanced by Bourdieu himself: The dominated classes have an interest in pushing back the limits of doxa and exposing the arbitrariness of the taken for granted; the dominant classes have an interest in defending the integrity of doxa or, short of this, of establishing in its place the necessarily imperfect substitute, orthodoxy ... [Then] the arbitrary principles of the prevailing classification can appear as such and it therefore becomes necessary to undertake the work of conscious systematization and express rationalization which marks the passage from doxa to orthodoxy. Orthodoxy, straight, or rather straightened, opinion, ... aims, without ever entirely succeeding, at restoring the primal state of innocence of doxa ... 37
Put differently and somewhat paradoxically, then, heresy creates orthodoxy, by forcing the articulation of what had up to that point remained unnecessary to say.38 Doxa, by this model, is disrupted and 33 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory ofPractice, 170. 34 Berlinerblau, "Sociology of Heresy," 335. 35 And as a result, "the group thinks it punishes the heretic for the violation of the symbol, when in reality the crime is against group unity," Berlinerblau, "Sociology of Heresy," 344. Cf. also Georg Simmel, Essays on Religion (trans. H. J. Helle and L. Nieder; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), esp. 114-15. 36 Note that Bourdieu is advanced by Berlinerblau as a way of bridging the gap between agency-oriented sociology (a la Weber) and a structure-oriented sociology in which the agents are not conscious of what they are doing (a la Durkheim). The formulation I offer here retains both such elements. This is discussed clearly and explicitly by Bourdieu in "Vive la Crise!," 780-84, with reference to his concept of habitus; and cf. Berlinerblau, "Sociology of Heresy," 341-45; Fowler, Bourdieu and Cultural Theory, 2-3. 37 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 169. See also Berlinerblau, "Sociology of Heresy," 347; and somewhat less helpfully, Bourdieu and Wac quant, Invitation, 25051. 38 Similarly, Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (trans. Peter Collier; Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1988), 116: "On the side of the institution, the lector finds himself obliged to erect as orthodoxy, as explicit profession of faith, the doxa of the doctors, their
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dissolved by heresy, and reaffirmed in the form of orthodoxy, but in the process is transformed by the loss of its implicit self-evidence. This second model - which I have chosen to distinguish from the first by referring to it as heresy, rather than heterodoxy - promises considerable insight into the real ramifications of heresy as it is actually encountered, including how it is actually presented in Paul. In spite of my phrasing in terms of ideas and conceptions, what is really at issue for both the heretic and those who aim to suppress heresy is a way of living, a set of structured assumptions built into social practice to the benefit of particular groups of people, which heretical ideas or, better, expressions,39 threaten to disrupt. It is for this reason that genuine heresy elicits such a strong repressive reaction, rather than what would appear to be a more commensurate response: a rejection or disputation at the level of discourse alone. Instead, as Zito asserts: What we recognize in a statement as heretical is its ability to produce in the faithful a cry of outraged hostility. This had led in the past to vindictive persecution of the heretic, who is then literally or figuratively burned at the stake ... The true believers sense that in some way their innermost selves have been violated, their moral values usurped, their very existence as a moral community placed in jeopardy.40
Zito's explanation for this is that: The true believer finds, in the case of heresy, that the beliefs he has devoutly held may lead to quite other [i.e., non-doxic] consequences than [the unstated assumptions of] his faith has led him to expect. A heresy accordingly places the true believer in a state of cognitive dissonance, imbalance, or incongruity. Heresy plays with the cognitive base upon which beliefs and meanings are erected and from which action is presumed to flow. 41
These observations are thoroughly explicable in light of what Bourdieu has said about doxa. It is heresy's violation and exposure of doxa, and the implications of this sacrilege for social practice and identity, that generate the sense of outrage, the sense that the heresy is an overt assault on self and society. But Zito' s comments also draw our attention to the reaction such infractions elicit, and such a reaction meshes with what we know about how Paul was received. 42 Paul certainly complains of extensive hardship silent beliefs which have no need for justification: challenged to produce in broad daylight the unconscious thoughts of an institution." 39 Since the necessarily subliminal character of heresy's departure from doxa may manifest itself more concretely in behaviors than in speech alone. 40 Zito, "Sociology of Heresy," 126. 41 Ibid., 128. 42 A similar claim is made by John M. G. Barclay, "Deviance and Apostasy: Some Applications of Deviance Theory to First-Century Judaism and Christianity," in
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and opposition with reference to himself and his adherents, using terms denoting affliction and persecution (e.g., Rom 5:3; 8:35; 12:14; 2 Cor 1:48; 4:7-12,17; 7:4-5; 8:2; 12:10; Gal 5:11; 6:12; 1 Thess 1:6; 2:2; 3:3-7), as well as describing what appear to be judicial punishments (e.g., 2 Cor 11:23-26; Phil 1:7, 12-14; Phlm 1, 9-10); indeed, he indicates (e.g., 1 Cor 15:9; Gal 1:13,23; Phil 3:6) that he himself saw reason to "persecute" the Jesus-movement. Paul attributes hardships, including persecution, to the intervention of Satan (e.g., 2 Cor 12:7; 1 Thess 2:18; 3:5) or to the opposition of all things worldly to all things godly (2 Cor 4:7-12, 17-18; 12:8-10); that these claims constitute no acceptable explanation for the phenomenon is so obvious that it is almost never stated outright, but unfortunately this neglect also extends to the provision of an explanation for a phenomenon that Paul himself saw as sufficiently important, and sufficiently extraordinary, to account for in extravagant theological terms. The "persecution" of Paul and his adherents is most frequently treated as a product of simple disagreement, and "explanation" consists of an elaboration of what that disagreement is, rather than why disagreement over the points in question elicited repressive measures. 43 If we understand heresy, however, as an attack on doxa, in Bourdieu's formulation, the persecution of the Pauline ekklesiai may point to heretical aspects of these novel formations, thus providing both an explanation for the hostility engendered by Paul's practices, and directing our attention to those aspects of Pauline thought and practice - particularly those concerned with identity, with making selves - that violated contemporary unspoken sensibilities about social belonging. 44 Modelling Early Christianity: Social-Scientific Studies of the New Testament in Its Context (ed. Philip F. Esler; London: Routledge, 1995), esp. 122-23, i.e., that Paul was a deviant of some sort on the grounds that he was clearly perceived as such. Unfortunately, the treatment does not go beyond this simple claim, and, moreover, erroneously and anachronistically describes Paul as an apostate, a very different status than that of heretic, and one that the evidence simply does not support. 43 See, e.g., Lloyd Gaston, Paul and the Torah (Vancouver: U. of British Columbia Press, 1987), 32; E. P. Sanders, Paul: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: OUP, 1991, repr., 2001), 6-11. 44 Bourdieu's approach also has the following advantages with respect to analysis of Paul: 1) His emphasis on the embodiment of power relations and discourses (i.e., habitus) at least meshes with, and at most may go some way to accounting for, Paul's negative obsession with "the body" in general and his own body in particular - for the centrality of which see, e.g., Krister Stendahl, Final Account: Paul's Letter to the Romans, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993, repr., 1995), 1-2; 2) his careful mediation between agency-oriented and structural analyses of social phenomena means that we can pay attention to Paul's own intentions and self-presentation, but without having to assume that he is conscious of or, better, intends the social results of his actions; 3) by viewing Paul as a heretic in this framework, we can appreciate and understand what is distinctive
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Identity in the Roman W orId Given this theoretical model, it would probably be ideal to precede a discussion of Paul with a consideration of the doxa of Paul's world, particularly as it applies to issues of identity. Such an approach, however, will be constrained both by the length of this paper and by the profusion of data that could potentially be applied to this issue. It should also be noted that Paul's lifetime was a period of intense reconfiguration and alteration of social identities, an integration of the massive political changes that had occurred over the past few centuries - in the consolidation of Roman control over the eastern Mediterranean, and the past few decades - in the consolidation of one family's control over the Roman state, these features together establishing the imperial Principate. Nonetheless, a few salient generalizations can be made. 45 about Paul, but without thereby making him inexplicable or "unique"; 4) Bourdieu directs our attention to the nexus of discourse and practice, rather than one to the exclusion of the other, and thus focuses our attention on the practical and applicative aspects of Paul's theology, rather than his ideas in the abstract; indeed, I think that a strong case can be made that it is practice and application that is "heretical" about Paul, not the basic ideological building blocks, which are in fact drawn from a variety of contemporary discourses (e.g., Jewish beliefs about Abraham, adoption practices and beliefs regarding Caesar, etc.). In all of these respects, Bourdieu provides a superior analytic framework for understanding Paul in particular. This paper is of too limited a focus, insufficiently steeped in Bourdieu's overall approach, and simply too short, to fulfill all the promise suggested here, but it is to be hoped that a more systematic application of Bourdieu's sociology to the Pauline ekklesiai might be forthcoming at some point. 45 These generalizations are intended only to be suggestive: what really needs to be done is to study the civic ideology of the individual poleis with which Paul corresponded and indicate the ways in which they differed from one another as well as their ideological commonalities. In addition, both to flesh out these descriptions and to use Bourdieu properly, more deductions need to be drawn from concrete data, particularly the architecture of civic buildings and public areas, city layouts, and the like, but also data from inscriptions and other archaeological remains. A great deal of excellent work has already been done both on local histories, e.g., Peter Lampe, From Paul to Valentinus: Christians at Rome in the First Two Centuries (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003); Richard S. Ascough, ed., Religious Rivalries and the Struggle for Success in Sardis and Smyrna, Studies in Christianity and Judaism (Waterloo, Ont.: Published for the Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion, 2005); Magnus Zetterholm, The Formation of Christianity in Antioch: A Social-Scientific Approach to the Separation Between Judaism and Christianity (London: Routledge, 2004); Terence L. Donaldson, ed., Religious Rivalries and the Struggle for Success in Caesarea Maritima, Studies in Christianity and Judaism (Waterloo, Ont.: Published for the Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion, 2000), and on the ideological consequences of the shaping of civic space, see especially now Harry O. Maier, "Barbarians, Scythians and Imperial Iconography in the Epistle to the Colossians," in Picturing the New Testament: Studies in Ancient Visual Images,
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Corresponding to the two primary social institutions of early Imperial Roman antiquity - family and state 46 - were two essential sorts of affiliations marking fundamental aspects of identity: ethnic affiliation, rooted in the family; and political affiliation, rooted in the state, principally at the level of the polis. Cross-culturally and trans-temporally, these two forms of primary identity often overlap, as when the state appeals to ethnicity for its legitimacy or for the legitimacy of its particular boundaries. In such instances, the state of course does not supplant the family (however conceived), but it does appeal to common ancestry (often rendered "self-evident" by possession of a common language) as its normative basis. 47 The rough identity of state and nationlethnos was a feature of several ANE temple-states, most clearly and notably, Egypt and Israel (and to more limited degrees, Mesopotamian states). In the case of ancient Israel, appeal to a fictitious common ancestor (Abraham, Jacob) WUNT (ed. A. Weissenrieder, F. Wendt, and P. von Gemunden; Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005). Pursuing this material, however, would tum an already too-long paper into a book. 46 The identification of the primary social role of family and state in antiquity, with other types of social practice or affiliation being embedded in these two institutions, is the great contribution of those approaches to antiquity that identify with "cultural anthropology," particularly as promoted by Bruce Malina. For the nature of religion as "embedded" within family and/or state, see, e.g., among many others, K. C. Hanson and Douglas E. Oakman, Palestine in the Time of Jesus: Social Structures and Social Conflicts (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998) 132-33; and Stephan J. Joubert, "Managing the Household: Paul as Paterfamilias of the Christian Household Groups in Corinth," in Modelling Early Christianity (ed. P. F. Esler), 213. 47 Many modem nation-states - particularly in Europe - are ostensibly based on ethnicity, and indeed the conception of "nation" (i.e., ethnos) here is foundational for the state; one is e.g. German by virtue of ancestry, i.e., being born into a German family, as evidenced by speaking German as one's first tongue, and the German state is then roughly coextensive with the regions in which this characterization applies to the majority of the people. As the example chosen here suggests, too, when the borders of modem states do not correspond to ethnic (and secondarily, linguistic) boundaries, this can be a source for conflict, and specifically for claims that the borders of the state should be redrawn. Thus the belief that the German state should correspond more closely to the distribution of the German nation (i.e., ethnos) served as a rationale for Hitler's creation of a "Greater Germany" (absorbing German-speaking Austria, and predominantly German regions of Czechoslovakia and Poland); similar reasoning has been invoked more recently for the partition of Czechoslovakia, the breakdown of the Soviet Union, separatist sentiment in Quebec, and - most perversely - "ethnic" warfare in Yugoslavia. The identity of ethnos and state is more problematic in Canada and the United States, as both countries are somewhat ethnically heterogeneous, and since both are dominated by non-indigenous populations. Since, however, both ethnicity and indigeneity (closely related as they are) are artificial, i.e., socially-constructed and synthetic notions, the factual status of Americans and Canadians as of heterogeneous descent is no real obstacle to a future construct of Canadian or American ethnicity.
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was used transparently to fabricate or express the existence of a people, and to rationalize the existence of a state "representing" that "ethnic" group. In such cases, religion is used to foster the linkage between ethnicity and the state: the Davidic line, for instance, is chosen by God "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob." In the case of the great empires of a later period - those of Persia, of Alexander and his generals, and of Rome - such a complete fusion of state and ethnos was not possible, as the state was comprised of a multinational and multicultural empire embracing various peoples speaking various languages. State power in these empires tended therefore - albeit inconsistently48 - to focalize at levels both higher and lower than that of the ethnos/nation. This was certainly the case for the Roman state in our period, in which ultimate power over multiple nations was vested in the imperial capital, Rome, while the political power that tended to affect people most at the quotidian level- criminal and civil law, tax collection, maintenance of public order - was vested in the polis, at a level of specificity below that of the nation. 49 In terms of "religion," i.e., cultic devotion to deities, sacrifice, etc., this meant that even political religion had a more centrifugal social effect than was ideal, as it tended to focus and express loyalty to the individual city and its deities (even in the case of the imperial cult, which was organized at the civic level and with city honor in mind 50 ), or at the familial-ethnic level, tended to highlight 48 The characterization of the great empires as focusing power both above and below the ethnic-national level applies better to Rome than to either of the others, as Persia appears to have used claims to ethnic identity as a basis for provincial administrations and local law; see now Lisbeth S. Fried, The Priest and the Great King: Temple-Palace Relations in the Persian Empire (Biblical and Judaic Studies, vol. 10; Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2004), and as at least one of the successor-empires of Alexander, the Ptolemies, appears to have been closely associated with - though certainly not identical to - a particular national identity, i.e., Egyptian. 49 In other words, several cities may be "Greek" or "Jewish," etc., but not under the de facto control of any central ethnic-national power. Ironically, this basis in the polis is true of the supra-ethnic imperial power as well, which is, after all, vested in Rome (a city, first and foremost) rather than a broader ethnos (however conceived: Italy, Latinspeakers, descendants of some eponym, etc.). The social wars of the late Republic appear in part to have been fought over this very point: to preserve Rome's privileged standing as a city over against the unifying and potentially nation-building aspirations of Rome's Italian allies. The situation here, however, is' not clear-cut: both sides employed ethnic tropes in different ways, and there was always - including in our period - some ambiguity or ambivalence regarding the standing of Rome as polis or ethnos. 50 The apparent origins of the imperial cult in the independent actions of eastern cities (on which see John Dominic Crossan and Jonathan L. Reed, In Search of Paul: How Jesus's Apostle Opposed Rome's Empire with God's Kingdom (San Francisco: Harper, 2004), 59; my understanding is that the first temple erected to Roma was established in Smyrna in 195 BCE) underscores its civic focus in practice, in spite of its "theological" orientation to Rome itself. The situation would have been different had the imperial cult
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differences between individuals under the same political umbrella (whether city or empire).51 In any case, unlike the ANE norm, in our period political identities and ethnic identities are capable of considerable distinction from one another, and, at least in urban settings, ethnicity tended to be rooted more exclusively in the family than in state and citizenship. Consider the (fictional) character of "Paul" in Acts of the Apostles - a man invested with a Jewish ethnic background, by virtue of his birth family, ancestral language (as reflected in his name, Saou/, Acts 7:58; 8:1; 9:4,17; etc.), and upbringing; but who was actually born outside of Palestine, in Tarsus (Acts 22:3), possessed Tarsian citizenship (Acts 9: 11; 21 :39), and had also (inherited) Roman citizenship (Acts 16:37-39; 22:22-29).52 Other types or aspects of identity and social organization did of course exist in this period, and were founded on actual bases other than state and family, including occupational contacts, neighborhood ties,53 and cultic connections. 54 Thus, for example, voluntary associations - intensely
actually been established in the city of Rome, or involved the adoption of Roman civic deities. 51 Nowhere is this more clear than in the deployment of religion during the successive Jewish revolts of 66-73, 115-117, and 132-135 CE, where religious ideology was used to express and enhance the division of Judea from the empire as a whole, and of Jewish residents from the remainder of the populace of individual cities in which they resided. See, e.g., Philip F. Esler, "God's Honour and Rome's Triumph: Responses to the Fall of Jerusalem in 70 CE in Three Jewish Apocalypses," in Modelling Early Christianity (ed. P.F. Esler), 239-58, for a description of the deployment of apocalypses as expressions of ongoing conflict even after the cessation of military hostilities in the revolt( s). 52 Note that Acts 22:22-29 stresses Paul's inheritance, rather than purchase, of Roman citizenship, which seems in this story to be a status issue. Paul thus inherits both his ethnic standing as a Jew and his political standing as Roman by virtue of his birth; nonetheless, the two are in no way confused by Luke, who clearly does not regard Paul as an ethnic Roman. I want to stress that my point here is not in any way to suggest that Paul himself, as an actual historical figure, possessed any of these traits. Indeed, most of them - especially the "Jewish" name, education in Jerusalem, and possession of both urban and imperial citizenships - fit too well with Lukan redactional interests to take seriously as historical data, especially as Paul's own Letters nowhere confirm such information. I treat the "Paul" of Acts as a fictitious character created by the text's author. My point, however, is that a writer of the late first or (more likely) early second century could regard such features as unexceptional and in no particular need of explanation or justification. 53 As distinct from city of birth, which I am treating as an essentially political affiliation. 54 See the excellent discussion of social networks offered in Philip A. Harland, "Connections with Elites in the World of the Early Christians," in Handbook of Early Christianity: Social Science Approaches (ed. A.J. Blasi, J. Duhaime, and P.-A. Turcotte; Walnut Creek, Calif.; Oxford: AltaMira Press, 2002), 389-91, preparatory to defining the pre-existing social ties that influenced group formation, particularly that of voluntary
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studied of late, especially in relation to Pau15 5 - may have been modeled on civic or familial associations, and may even have had civic or familial bases in many cases, but could also be organized around pre-existing neighborhood or occupational connections. 56 One might also cite patronclient connections as potentially identity-creating, though it would seem that such structures were very closely associated with household and family relationships. And in fact, this ultimate reliance on either ethnicfamilial or political (and especially urban, polis-based) definitions of identity remained the dominant mode of expressing social placement in spite of the existence, especially in large urban centers, of alternative possibilities for actual interpersonal contacts. Religious behaviors and the social contacts created by these contacts were not conceptualized as a distinct realm of social practice, and were so integral to many expressions of identity that they necessarily remained embedded in either family or civic life. The so-called "mystery cults" - whose proliferation and multiplicity appears as a distinctive feature of the Hellenistic and Roman worlds - tended to fall back or rely upon civic institutions (e.g., public temples to such deities as Asklepios, Artemis, Dionysos, etc., in Greece and Asia Minor) or ethnic affiliations (e.g., cultic groups oriented toward Serapis, Yahweh, Isis, the Great Mother, etc., all associated with specific national-ethnic groups; family links, as well, played a part in decisions to become an initiate in a particular cult), at least in their communal manifestations. Obviously a significant portion of activity that we might describe as "religious" involved practices oriented toward specific associations. In this segment of the article Harland identifies five types of such ties: familial, occupational, neighborhood, cultic, and ethnic. 55 Among many other studies, see, e.g., Richard S. Ascough, "Translocal Relationships Among Voluntary Associations and Early Christianity," JECS 5 (1997): 223-41; idem, What Are They Saying About the Formation of Pauline Churches (New York: Paulist Press, 1998); idem, Paul's Macedonian Associations: The Social Context of Philippians and 1 Thessalonians, WUNT (Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003); Philip A. Harland, Associations, Synagogues, and Congregations: Claiming a Place in Ancient Mediterranean Society (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003); John S. Kloppenborg and Stephen G. Wilson, eds., Voluntary Associations in the Graeco-Roman World (London: Routledge, 1996). 56 See especially Harland, "Connections with Elites," 391-94, for a discussion of Christian groups organized upon these lines or influenced by such connections. For an identification of (some of) Paul's ekklesiai as occupationally-based groups, see especially Ascough, "Thessalonian Christian Community"; idem, Paul's Macedonian Associations. Note that I have set aside consideration of "religious" (cultic, sacrificial, etc.) bases for group developments, as there are considerable complications here, since a great many religious practices or institutions allude to or are associated with ethnic, familial, or political institutions - thus association with a particular cult, and the connections between people thereby generated, may ultimately reduce to a form of political or ethnic association, at least symbolically.
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personal goals (health, love, curses upon enemies, prosperity, and the distinctive "magical" practices or functional deities associated with these specific goals) and did not necessarily have a strong social component. Neighborhood and occupational roles either were not cited as fundamental for one's place in the social body, or were coordinated with and appeal to other more established types of belonging to anchor, reinforce, or rationalize their identity-creating function, invoking linguistic and other symbolic reference to ethnos or polis. 57 Ethnic identity appealing to descent and family origin remained a fundamental expression of belonging; identity in the city (the actual locus of social life for the vast majority of ancient urbanites) continued to be expressed in the differential and multiple terms of ethnic affiliation and related aspects of social identity linked to descent and family, and in terms of belonging in the city itself, most clearly expressed by taking up a particular civic political role, but evident as well in the urban fractions of neighborhood, occupational, or even cultic identity. Ethnic subcultures in urban contexts also assumed this fractional role, thus mixing the two primary forms of social identification but not fusing them, for the two exist in a clearly distinct and hierarchical relationship, with ethnicity articulated as a subculture or subgroup within a given city and hence subordinate to it. 58 Structurally, this subordinate 57 See the discussion of neighborhood and occupation-based associations in Harland, Associations, Synagogues, and Congregations,36-41, where he points out that neighborhood associations were actively involved in civic celebrations or underwrote honors to civic functionaries, and that occupational groupings intersected with family and household ties, both devolving from them (as occupations tend to be inherited) and influencing them (as occupational contacts may lead to marriages and other links between families). Harland also notes inscriptional evidence from Philadelphia suggesting both that occupational groups were fundamental to the civic constitution, and that this role was fused with ethnic classifications ("the sacred tribe [phyle] of the woolworkers [eriourgon]"), drawing together and confusing occupation, civic role, and ethnic-familial identity (ibid., 105-06). In addition, see Robert Jewett's description of the civic usurpation of the Cabirus cult in The Thessalonian Correspondence: Pauline Rhetoric and Millenarian Piety (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 130-32, as an example of the tendency of an occupational organization - of course using cultic devotion to express its identity - to be absorbed by civic institutions and consequently dominated by the local political elite. Similar is the absorption of the Asklepios cult - in which physicians had a special role - into the overall civic religion of Athens. 58 I am speaking here primarily of those ethnic groups alien to the ethnos of which the city in question is itself a part, thus Jews in Corinth, Egyptians in Athens, Tyrians in Puteoli, and so forth; I am not referring to the status of Greeks in Athens, Syrians in Antioch, Jews in Jerusalem, and the like, although it should be noted that even in these instances, e.g., with Romans in Rome or Jews in Jerusalem, "tribal" and similar descentbased groupings serve as fractions of the polis. When it comes to urban subcultures comprised of Greeks or Macedonians and their colonies in the east (including Alexandria), or of Romans anywhere in the empire, the situation could be quite different,
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posItIon corresponded to the dominated position of the nations that constitute the empire - city microcosm reproduced imperial macrocosm. It is around this last point that I think the unspoken doxa of identity in the Roman period was organized. Because of the extreme diversity and flux that normally accompany ethnic and political identities in an imperial situation - especially as multi-layered and complex an imperial situation as that of the Roman Empire in the eastern Mediterranean59 - it is extremely difficult to fasten upon a single definition of identity, or to define even a limited set of acceptable mechanisms for expressing identity in the polis, or indeed simply to find just about any generalization for which there are no exceptions, so multiple, nuanced, and situationally contingent were the circumstances in which identity was worked out from one location to another. This is clear even within Paul' s (genuine) letters themselves, written as they were by a single person, and - ostensibly - to a single type of institution,60 yet betraying an almost unlimited set of strategies for
for reasons I will endeavor to explicate as aspects of the doxa of imperial identity. Note that this sub-cultural or subgroup expression of ethnic bodies was one (among several) impediments to trans-local associational links, though these links did exist more commonly than is typically recognized; see Ascough, "Translocal Relationships." 59 The history of the region fostered this complexity, as Roman domination was laid on top of multiple layers of previous domination and other forms of interaction. In any given locale, there may be millennia-old traditions of interaction between different groups, upon which is overlaid a history of eastern imperial domination (i.e., Persian), which in its tum has been supplanted by Greek-influenced Macedonian domination, shifting domination by Alexander's successor empires, and finally seizure by Rome, itself culturally influenced by Greece. To trace out in detail the shifting identities and allegiances such a complex history might generate is obviously beyond the parameters of this paper; it would require a book to exhaust the issue in even a single locale, not to speak of the entire "east." 60 I say "ostensibly" because there are good reasons for thinking that "Paul's" ekklesiai might have been pre-existing institutions of various that Paul redirected toward his own gospel. Thus for instance Ascough, "Thessalonian Christian Community," suggests that the Thesssalonian church was originally a trade association of which Paul effectively seized control. Smith, "Re: Corinthians," similarly, suggests that the Corinthian group may have been a multi-ethnic association devoted to honoring the ancestors in a context in which the ancestors' graves and monuments were no longer present, which Paul attempted to reorient toward his gospel. See note 11, above. Considered together, these two claims, if both valid, would point to differing social and organizational bases for two separate groups, both of which Paul himself - rather misleadingly - designates with the singular term, ekklesia. Such a conclusion is inherently plausible, it seems to me, and helps explain some of the glaring social differences between Paul's Thessalonian and Corinthian congregations. I also note that in the one instance in which Paul writes to a group for which he himself claims no foundational role - Romans, which is universally treated as addressed to a church - Paul never uses the term ekklesia, and in fact completely fails to identify the actual group
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marking and elaborating the identity of their recipients. Outside of such a strictly limited corpus, examples of practically every conceivable form of identity-transition, maintenance of multiple identities, and mutual influence and cross-fertilization can be found, from the "barbarian" to the Greek, the Greek to the Roman, and vice-versa, and employing mechanisms ranging from the formal conferral of citizenship or civic office and the legal adoption of individuals - or their enslavement - into new families with the concomitant identification with the ethnic background of those families; to semi-formal mechanisms such as crosscultural relations of benefaction or clientage, sub-group participation in civic life or the organization of public festivals and other cultural performances for those associated with a minority ethnic identity; to the wholly informal processes of personal friendships, exchange of ideas, and ad hoc appropriation of individual features of ethnic culture. 61 Very tentatively, however, certain unstated norms can be identified lurking underneath this extraordinarily diverse range of discourses. My hypothesis for the purposes of this paper - a conjecture that obviously still requires more detailed working out - is that the doxa of first-century imperial identity discourses appears to be the unspoken but loosely and circumstantially enforced double-standard by which ethnic and political identities are related to one another, a double-standard dictated, of course, by the concrete power relations that governed the empire, specifically Roman imperial domination of multiple ethne. According to this unspoken double-standard, ethnic identities are fractions of urban political identity, on the one hand, kept distinct from it and subordinate to it. The various forms of activity by which these ethnic subgroups participate in civic life reinforce this subordination and distinction, and the allowable influences, transitions, and relationships are those in which subordination and distinction are expressed or at least maintained. On the other hand, however, Roman ethnic identity was thoroughly assimilated to political power, essentially coextensive with it, its gods and religious rites never absorbed as a fraction within the dominant cultural fabric of foreign lands but instead standing at its pinnacle, its people and institutions theoretically
basis of this apparently collective entity (I am treating chapter 16 here as a fragment of a Letter from Corinth, on the basis of both manuscript evidence and internal indications). 61 See, as but one example of the types of cross-cultural or polyethnic links that could be made in antiquity, Shaye Cohen's typology of the possible Gentile engagements with Judaism, ranging from the most informal and uncommitted - interest in Jewish ideas - to the most formal and committed - outright conversion: Shaye J. D. Cohen, "Crossing the Boundary and Becoming a Jew," HTR 82 (1989): 13-33. The same basic range should probably be posited for any number of other cross-group contacts, with appropriate changes in details.
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never subject to cultural absorption.62 In short, forms of identity, including the possibilities for cultural and ethnic expressions of identity, were to reflect the political supremacy of Rome, and, in an imperial situation, the social supremacy of political identity, which was in fact Roman ethnic identity. The power and supremacy of Rome itself, of course, was an obvious feature of the socio-political landscape, and there is nothing particularly surprising about these conclusions. But they encode a set of assumptions that - differentially applied, albeit without saying so fostered both multicultural integration in urban centers and Roman supremacy at the same time. The genuinely multicultural aspects of the empire, the very real differences in practice and belief that existed among the different subunits of this far-flung state, were permitted - even promoted - and used as a vehicle and outlet for a continued sense of identity within long-standing cultural entities, now constructed, however, as aspects of the imperium. Relatedly, the state could make use of local traditions - and the elites whose positions were justified by those traditions - to rule through mechanisms already in place and acceptable,63 and so establish a sovereignty that was total, in lieu of a genuinely totalitarian hegemony (a goal which has remained practically unfeasible until now). In such a system, the maintenance of ethnic identity and its symbolic markers served as an actual technique of rule. But this technique could only be sustained so long as each of the ethnic constituents of empire recognized first its status as a fraction, rather than a totality; and relatedly its consequent subordination to an international and hence superior, nonfractional, overarching political order, focalized in the cities but imperial in character. Thus while ethnic identities could be and were freely expressed and embodied, they had to be discursively subordinated to the political structures of the empire. Conversely, the actual ethnic and fractional basis of the empire - the fact, that is, that its rulers were not actually representative of the social totality of the state, but were themselves a fraction of it - had to be discursively repressed in order to 62 This is not to say, of course, that Roman citizens or even formal Roman institutions were not actually subject to external cultural influences, but simply that the operative theory is that they were not. When external influences did make a strong impact on Roman people and Roman culture, those influences were absorbed by Roman culture and became hallmarks of Roman identity, rather than signs of foreign influence. Again, this characterization is at the level of ideology, and is theoretical: I am attempting to capture the prevailing attitudes about culture and identity, not the realities of such phenomena as viewed from without. 63 Indeed, in so doing, the state makes such mechanisms more popularly acceptable, as structures and institutions that might previously have been viewed as oppressive or subject to critique now assume the guise of vehicles for self-expression under an imperial hegemon. Thus do restrictions appear as liberties.
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maintain the convenient but false distinction between ethnicity and politics; in order, that is, to conceal the extent to which the political structures did privilege a particular ethnicity, to conceal the fact that the Romans who ultimately controlled the political apparatus were themselves an ethnos. 64 Put simply, the doxa of identity construction in the Roman period is the same old ideological contrivance whereby a (hegemonic) part 64 This became decreasingly the case over time as the empire became more and more culturally integrated, and, partly as a result, its actual ruling classes less and less Roman. Eventually Roman citizenship itself became a purely political marker, indicating simply a subject of the Roman state, with no ethnic signification at all (when the citizenship was extended to all free residents of the empire in 212 CE by Caracalla). The point I am making here may be illustrated by modern analogues, as this type of ideological maneuver seems to mark systems of domination across and between historical epochs. As many feminist theorists have noted, gender distinctions do not represent a balanced and reciprocal type of classification, but rather a marking of one group women - as defined by gender, and the other group - men - as undefined by it, as, essentially, lacking gender. In the terms of such a system of classification, it is never necessary overtly to assert the superiority of men to women; one simply assumes that men, because they are not marked by or classified according to gender, are the universal or paradigmatic human type and hence can speak for all of "mankind," whereas women are a deviation from the generic human type, and hence constitute a subgroup capable only of speaking for itself. This doxa of gender differentiation not only accounts for the perverse insistence on maintaining exclusive language in popular discourse, but even more obviously for the peculiar belief that describing God in feminine terms is limiting or sexualizing, while describing "him" in masculine terms is universalizing and maintains "his" transcendence! The same technique is still used for ethnic identities as well. For instance, in the violently racist settler culture of Western Canada in which I live, European ethnic identity of nearly all types remains unmarked; white, Europeanderived Canadians living here are simply "people," and so can speak for the totality of the culture, for "human" norms, for law, decency, and the Canadian way - and this is true even for individuals like myself, who were not born in Canada and who have only recently come to live here. By contrast, the indigenous Cree, whose ancestors have lived in this region for centuries, and compared to whom all other Canadians living in this region are the most recent of immigrants (permanent white/European settlements were only established here by the 1870s), are constituted discursively as an ethnic subgroup. As such, they are "managed" in part by being encouraged to maintain ancestral customs and various traditions of self-rule; but always at the cost of being constructed as a fraction of the total political culture, a culture which is de facto a white and European fraction itself. Because of the unstated and taken-for-granted character of this doxa, the actual double-standard is very difficult to see or even to describe (I assume that it is in part my status as an outsider who has lived most of his life elsewhere that allows me some insight into it). It can be viewed, however, in extremely pointed fashion, by considering patterns of the disposition of children. While it is routine for white/European couples to adopt or foster Cree children (many of whom have been forcibly taken from "unfit" Cree parents), we hear little of the adoption by Cree couples of white babies - as an ethnic fraction, the Cree are only permitted authority over their ethnic counterparts; whereas because whites are unmarked and therefore not perceived as a fraction, they are permitted universal authority.
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is misrecognized as a social whole, the social totality represented by a concealed synecdoche, offering an implicit but unstated rationalization for the rule of some over all - a rationalization which derives much of its power from not needing to be said (and therefore submitted to examination or contestation). It is, I think, for reasons such as these that Juvenal, for example, speaking as a Roman to Romans, presents adherence to Jewish customs as being as contemptible and ridiculous as homosexuality: from Juvenal' s perspective, both of these practices represent a failure to maintain the norms of dominance, in one case with respect to the codes of manliness and gender dominance, and in the other with respect to the codes of Roman-ness and political dominance. 65 Acts of the Apostles, similarly, asserts that adoption of Jewish customs by Romans is actually illegal. Acts 16:20-21 presents Paul as being brought before the magistrates in the Philippian forum and accused (falsely, from the author's perspective) of attempting to impose Jewish customs on Romans: "These men are Jews, and they are disturbing our city. They advocate customs which it is not lawful for us Romans to accept or practice." And while this doxa primarily serves the interests of Rome, the subcultures that participate in it - and indeed owe their continued existence and their carefully-circumscribed but still-powerful authority to it - obviously have an investment in it as well. Their very identity is at stake in the arrangement; a careful self-policing is necessary to protect what remains of communal existence; in the presence of individual members of the community who repudiate this modus vivendi, communal destruction is a genuine possibility: "If we let him go on thus, everyone will believe in him, and the Romans will come and destroy both our place and our nation."66 Josephus provides an excellent example of this defensive and accommodating attitude in his Jewish War, where he offers a description - and rationalization - of the events leading up to the war and the ultimate resolution of the. hostilities in the Roman victory and the destruction of the temple. In this account, Josephus goes to great lengths to demonstrate that the Roman victory is a function, not of the defeat of the Jewish God, but of that God's decision to abandon his 65 For Juvenal's characterization of homosexuality (or, more precisely, the adoption by men of the passive role in anal sex), see Decimus Junius Juvenal, The Satires of Juvenal (trans. H. Creekmore; New York: New American Library, 1963), 35-36 (book 2, lines 9-22); for his views on the influence of Judaism, alongside other foreign cults, see Satires of Juvenal, 112-14 (book 6, lines 511-564); also note his characterization of Egyptian religion in Satires of Juvenal, 230-34 (book 15, lines 1-83). 66 John 11 :48, as supposedly spoken by the synedrion regarding Jesus; cf. also John 19: 12-16, where the dominated ethnos must make a display of loyalty to the emperor and empire that is more extravagant than that of the actual Roman political functionary, Pilate.
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impious people, thereby turning the Romans into an instrument of divine judgment. 67 In so doing, Josephus saves his own God, but at the cost of a complete surrender to the validity of Roman rule and the use of extreme and violent force to maintain that rule. And so both the representatives of the Roman state and the representatives of subaltern identities within that state have a shared interest - one imperial, the other defensive - in maintaining the status quo boundaries of the doxic field of identity construction, with their continued subordination of ethnic to political identity. The concomitant segregation of subaltern identities as, precisely, ethnic in their basis (and hence overtly fractional), is established through, inter alia, fixing such identities as only capable of articulation in terms of familial relationships.
The Pauline Ekklesiai, Ethnicity, and Identity When we turn to Paul's letters with these aspects of urban identity in mind, we can see a complex interaction in them with the norms of urban identities and the various possibilities for altering or effecting transitions between these identities. 68 In this respect, at least, Paul is firmly a product of his time and environment, an ethnic outsider operating within cosmopolitan and polyethnic Greek and Asian cities, and attempting to establish or manipulate group identities in precisely that context. While there is no doubt that Paul himself is an ethnic Jew and identifies himself as such (see especially Phil 3:4-6), the field of his activity appears to be almost exclusively Gentile. His letters indicate that he is writing to people who live in the large cities of Greece and Asia Minor and who do not come from a Jewish background,69 and is operating in those cities himself (i.e., 67 See the brilliant treatment of Josephus' agenda offered recently in Nicole Kelley, "The Cosmopolitan Expression of Josephus's Prophetic Perspective in the Jewish War," HTR 97 (2004): 257-74. Interestingly, the author of the Gospel of Mark offers a similar "explanation" for the defeat of the Judean "insurgents" by the Romans, i.e., their abandonment by God (symbolized by the tearing of the temple curtain in Mark 15:38) due to their impious actions (in the treatment of Jesus). This motif is actually one promoted by the Romans themselves, who at times identify their dominance as a function of their superior piety (so Crossan and Reed, In Search of Paul, 58-59, citing Cicero). The Roman practice of evocatio, whereby the gods of an enemy are entreated to abandon them, is discussed in John Kloppenborg, "Evocatio deorum and the Date of Mark," JBL 124.3 (2005): 419--450, with reference to the Gospel of Mark's appeal to this practice. 68 The most thorough recent discussion of Paul in terms of Roman urban life is Crossan and Reed, In Search of Paul, which addresses these aspects of urban life much more concretely than is done here, and situates Paul firmly within this context. 69 See Paul's various statements in the Letters (e.g., 1 Thess 1:9; Gal 4:8) to the effect that his auditors have turned to the living God, or were formerly enslaved to non-gods,
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Ephesus, Corinth, Athens, Thessalonica, Philippi, etc.). His own selfpresentation is as an apostle expressly called by God to a distinctive mission to the Gentiles (see, e.g., Gal 1:15-16; 2:8-9; Rom 1:5; 15:15-18). The influence of Acts - which for its own theological purposes presents Paul's mission and church-founding activities as originating in the Levant, as taking place preeminently in synagogues, and as going to Jews first and only to Gentiles subsequently - as well as the polemics of the Reformation over "works versus faith" have obscured this critically important point, with the result that Paul's theology as expressed in his letters, his polemics against circumcision, his apparent hostility to the Jewish Torah, have all been understood as essentially universal and abstract comments on the validity of the "Jewish religion," rather than as comments specifically directed to Gentile adherents, as in fact they were. 70 This recognition will mean, on the one hand, that Paul is at least partially "saved" for Judaism,71
statements that would have been inaccurate and insulting addressed to Jews. Likewise, many of the issues Paul deals with are issues that simply would not have occurred to, or been relevant to, Jews. The most obvious example of such an issue is the question which occupies the bulk of Galatians and is also raised, albeit far less extensively, in Philippians 3:2-3 - whether the adherents of the ekklesiai need to become circumcised. Obviously, if this is in question, these adherents are not circumcised, and hence, presumably are not Jews by descent or by conversion. Likewise, the question of "meat sacrificed to idols" (ta eidolothyta), dealt with in 1 Corinthians 8-10, implies a Gentile audience, as such a question would already have been addressed within a Jewish community. The examples could be multiplied. Perhaps the clearest indication of the composition of Paul's groups - as well as the sources of hostility directed against such groups - occurs in 1 Thess 2:14: "you suffered the same things from your own countrymen (hypo ton idion symphyleton) as they did from the Jews/Judeans." Birger Pearson, however, has argued influentially that this text is a post-70 interpolation in Birger A. Pearson, "1 Thessalonians 2:13-16: A Deutero-Pauline Interpolation?" HTR 64 (1971): 79-94. The article makes some solid points, but none of them are unanswerable; for a defense of the authenticity of the text, see John C. Hurd, "Paul Ahead of His Time: 1 Thess 2: 13-16," in Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity (ed. Peter Richardson and David Granskou; Waterloo, Ont.: Published for the Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion by Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986), 31-36; and Abraham Smith, "'Unmasking the Powers': Toward a Postcolonial Analysis of 1 Thessalonians," in Paul and the Roman Imperial Order (ed. Richard A. Horsley; Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press International 2004), esp. 58-60 and accompanying notes. 70 This is an extraordinarily important point, and its increasing recognition throughout Pauline studies represents a major shift of direction in the field. Prominent scholarship promoting this new perspective on Paul includes Stendahl, Final Account; Stanley K. Stowers, A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Gaston, Paul and the Torah; and John G. Gager, Reinventing Paul (Oxford: OUP, 2000). 71 See Gaston, Paul and the Torah, 15-34; Gager, Reinventing Paul, 17-18, 54-57. Note especially ibid., p. 57 (emphasis original): "In the end, are-Judaized Paul leads to a
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since we can no longer read his apparently negative comments on circumcision or "works of the Law" as outright and principled condemnations of these institutions, but rather as rejections of their applicability to Gentiles. This conclusion applies particularly to Paul's expression of "the curse of the Law," which has now been convincingly reinterpreted as Paul's view that the Law stands as a curse against the Gentiles, precisely by virtue of their not possessing it. 72 On the other hand, these conclusions - and this has not yet been sufficiently recognized - will also lead to a "de-Judaization" at least of Paul's letters, since we are now forced to understand those letters as addressed, precisely, to Gentiles, and so interpret them within Gentile frames of reference. Thus for example debates about the allusive import of the term ekklesia - is the term an allusion to the assembly of Israel, as per the LXX, or to the body of citizens, as per standard urban usage?73 - must take into account that Paul's auditors would certainly have heard in this term a reference to the political structures with which they were most familiar before detecting an allusion to Israel, even if one were intended by Paul (as I think was in fact the case). The appeal to "God-fearers" (theosebeis) as Paul's primary audience and the main constituents of his groups74 seems to me an attempt to have it both ways: to establish Paul's primary audience as ethnic Gentiles but (more or less) ideological Jews, and to retain the Acts' presentation of Paul's focus of activity as the synagogue while rejecting the supersessionist implications of that presentation. I remain unconvinced by this suggestion, however. It owes too much to the exceedingly tendentious - and in my view, fictitious - presentation of Paul in Acts/ 5 which is in reversal of the law noted earlier: Christian readers no longer feel compelled to insulate Paul from Judaism, while Jewish readers no longer strive to protect Judaism from Paul." 72 So Gaston, Paul and the Torah, 28-33; Gager, Reinventing Paul, esp. 58, 86-89. 73 See, e.g., Wayne A. Meeks, The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 79. 74 So, e.g., Gager, Reinventing Paul, esp. 51,63,67-68; Crossan and Reed, In Search of Paul, 34-41; Lampe, Paul to Valentinus, 69-72; and many others. For critical discussion of such proposals, see Ascough, Formation of Pauline Churches, 11-28. 75 Crossan and Reed rather disingenuously imply that this motif is not compatible with the authorial redaction of Acts: "We do not accept that Paul always went first to the synagogue and tried to convert Jews to Jesus as Messiah. But we do accept something that Acts tells us in that very same context, because it is neither derived from nor congruent with Luke's own Jew/Gentile dichotomy" (In Search of Paul, 35, emphasis added). In fact, the motif is as important to the author of Acts as the more basic claim that Paul's preaching took place primarily in synagogues. Indeed, the author of Acts uses this device to explain precisely how it could be that Paul was a devout Jew preaching in synagogues and yet acquired a Gentile following (a function it continues to serve for those scholars who assert that Paul's mission was to Gentiles, and yet wish to link this
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fact the only place we are told that Paul engages in evangelization in or around synagogues, and is the only place in which he is regularly confronted with hoi phoboumenoi ton theon (Acts 13: 16, 26; cf. 17:4: ton te sebomenon hellenon; and 17: 17: en te synagoge tois ioudaiois kai tois sebomenois; etc.); Paul himself says nothing of the sort, and we would hardly think of it were it not for Acts,?6 Conversely, there is some positive evidence against such a view, or in favor of alternative scenarios irreconcilable with ekklesiai comprised of synagogue hangers-on. One such consideration is that "god-fearers" as a sizable and well-delineated group may not have existed at all: the specific terminology of Acts is nowhere duplicated, and the inscriptional evidence is ambiguous. 77 Another consideration is that some of the very comments in the Pauline corpus that prevent us from identifying his adherents as Jewish seem almost as unlikely to have been directed at anyone devoted to the Jewish God. Paul's assertions that the Thessalonians, in welcoming him, "turned to God from idols, to serve a living and true God" (1 Thess 1:9), or that the Galatians "did not know God [and] were in bondage to beings that by mission with synagogue Judaism). But more than this, the author of Acts is particularly concerned to present the Gentile church of his own day as a legitimate and especially a continuous development out of Judaism - the "god-fearers" are one device for so doing. That this is precisely the way the author is using these figures is most readily apparent from his depiction of the first Gentile convert, Cornelius - a convert of Peter, not Paul being precisely such a "devout man who feared God" (eusebes kai phoboumenos ton theon, Acts 10:2; cf. 10:22). Similarly, see Ascough, Formation of Pauline Churches, 17-18. 76 Gager, Reinventing Paul, 51, essentially cites this fact as an advantage of the hypothesis: it allows one to avoid jettisoning the historicity of Acts' presentation altogether. I am not quite sure why this is an advantage, why the burden of proof should rest on denials, rather than assertions, of historicity. Equally weak is the effort of Crossan and Reed to find indirect evidence for a Pauline mission to hoi phoboumenoi in his own Letters, asserting that only people already familiar with Jewish practice and Scripture would have been able to follow Paul's arguments as they appear in the Letters (Crossan and Reed, In Search of Paul, 39). Aside from some generalities, which constitute a very basic core of Pauline belief, Paul's arguments seem to me - with the possible exception of Romans - to assume very little by way of specifically Jewish theological content. 77 See especially A. Thomas Kraabel, "The Disappearance of the 'God-Fearers,' " Numen 28 (1981): 113-26; and Ascough, Formation of Pauline Churches, 16-20, who note particularly that the inscriptional evidence is significantly later than Paul, and in any case fails to establish those honored as theosebeis to be a distinctive class of Gentile synagogue-adherents, as per Acts. For an argument that inscriptional evidence does support the existence of "God-fearers," see Crossan and Reed, In Search of Paul, 23-25. They focus, however, on the same third-century inscription from Aphrodisias whose late date constitutes an obstacle for Kraabel and Ascough. It is not to be doubted, of course, that some Gentiles were attracted to Judaism; what is open to question, in my view, is whether such Gentiles constituted a large, distinctive, and identifiable class of people more or less formally associated with Jewish synagogues.
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nature are no gods" (Gal 4:8) prior to their acceptance of Paul's gospel, do not really apply to people who had already demonstrated a commitment to the Jewish God, and might even be construed as offensive to such people. It is also difficult to see what possible advantage hangers-on at the Jewish synagogues could possibly derive from adherence to the Pauline ekklesiai that they did not already possess by virtue of being "god-fearers" - if anything, joining up with Paul would have meant a more tenuous and dubious relationship to Judaism than they already had. Moreover the circumstances behind Galatians, at least, in which some of Paul's adherents there were actually being circumcised (see, e.g., Gal 1:1:6; 3:13), seem rather unusual for people who were initially constituted as an identifiable group (i.e., "god-fearers" rather than converts) precisely by their very unwillingness to accept circumcision! Finally, alternative models have been suggested for Paul's missionary activity that have better grounding in his own statements and in the apparent characteristics of his adherents, most notably the assertion that Paul's workspace was a major locus for the proclamation of his gospel.78 Richard Ascough' s development of the claim that the Thessalonian church, at least, was originally an occupational association79 would seem to rule out a group primarily constituted by "God-fearers"; Ascough goes so far as to suggest that the evidence does not permit us to assume any institutional or organized Jewish presence in Macedonia during Paul's time at al1. 80 Since it appears that Paul's ekklesiai are heterogeneous in their social constitution (i.e., one ekklesia is constituted differently than the next), and since at least in the case of Romans it is wholly unclear just who is being addressed, it would be a mistake to claim that none of Paul's adherents were former (or still!) synagogue hangers-on, or even that none of his ekklesiai may have been primarily constituted by such individuals. But it would equally be a mistake, and for much the same reasons, to conclude that all of his ekklesiai must have been constituted primarily of theosebeis. This seems especially true of some groups, such as those in Thessalonica or Galatia, which, on the basis of what Paul says to these people in his letters, were very likely to have been comprised of Gentiles with little commitment or exposure to formal Jewish institutions prior to their "conversion. " 78 So, e.g., Ronald F. Hock, The Social Context of Paul's Ministry: Tentmaking and Apostleship (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980); Meeks, First Urban Christians, 29; Sanders, Very Short Introduction, 24-25. 79 So Ascough, "Thessalonian Christian Community"; idem, Macedonian Associations; idem, "A Question of Death: Paul's Community-Building Language in 1 Thessalonians 4: 13-18," JBL 123 (2004): 509-30. 80 Idem, Macedonian Associations, esp. 191-212.
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To invoke the heterodoxy versus heresy typology I described earlier, in the context of a proclamation to and for Gentiles it is quite clear that Paul is politically heterodox,81 and sufficiently so as perhaps to account for the opposition he and his adherents encounter, without our needing to invoke the murky realm of doxa and heresy. Paul's implicit and overt opposition to or, better, repudiation of the Roman imperium has been neglected in most traditional scholarship (focusing as it does on "religious" issues more or less in isolation), but has lately come under quite extensive scrutiny, especially by Richard Horsley,82 and now most recently by John Dominic Crossan and Jonathan Reed. 83 One need only consider the implications of Paul's apocalyptic message in his earlier letters,84 especially for nonJewish listeners, who would not hear in such material simply groupaffirming echoes of an old national epic, nor visionary scenarios in the heavens, but instead a real threat and promise to destroy all forms of earthly rule. 85 Urban Gentiles could not fail to hear in Paul's statements a brazen and direct substitute for and counter to imperial eschatology.86 81 I actually think that the recognition that Paul is addressing his comments to Gentiles - and Gentiles as such - makes his message more politically charged than if it had been addressed to Jews. For in a Gentile context the apocalyptic and anti-worldly aspects of his message would have their most obvious application as a genuine repudiation of actual worldly structures rather than as mere familiar theological tropes. 82 See especially the three recent anthologies he has edited: Richard A. Horsley, ed., Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society (Harrisburg: Trinity Press, 1997); idem, Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, Israel, Imperium, Interpretation (Harrisburg: Trinity Press, 2000); idem, Paul and the Roman Imperial Order (Harrisburg: Trinity Press, 2004). 83 Crossan and Reed, In Search of Paul. 84 I am assuming here a particular sequence of Paul's Letters, namely (from earliest to latest): 1 Thessalonians, 1 Corinthians, most of the fragments of 2 Corinthians (which I believe to be comprised of at least four and probably five letter fragments, of which 2 Cor 6:14-7:1, if genuinely Pauline, is the only one to predate 1 Corinthians), Galatians, Romans (minus chapter 16), Philemon, most of the letter fragments from Philippians (which I believe to be comprised of three letter fragments, the two of which dealing with Epaphroditas are probably to be dated roughly to the same time as Philemon, and in any case as among the latest of Paul's surviving Letters; the remaining fragment may be somewhat earlier). I do not regard any of the disputed "deutero-Paulines," i.e., 2 Thessalonians, Colossians, or Ephesians, to be authentic. While Paul's apocalypticism has been made much of, it seems to me that it is concentrated in his earlier Letters, and fades significantly with time. I do not see the same centrality of apocalypticism in, say, Galatians or Romans as is encountered in 1 Thessalonians or, already to a more attenuated degree, 1 Corinthians. I cannot therefore treat apocalypticism as the generative fount of Pauline thought, though in places it is influential. 85 See especially the discussion in Neil Elliott, "The Anti-Imperial Message of the Cross," in Paul and Empire (ed. Horsley), 176-83. 86 So, e.g., Neil Elliott, "The Apostle Paul's Self-Presentation as Anti-Imperial Performance," in Paul and the Roman Imperial Order (ed. Horsley), 67-68. See also
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Paul's message redeploys and appropriates to his own ends terminology associated with imperial ideology: good news,87 parousia, 88. son of God,89 Lord,90 and so on. In 1 Thessalonians 5:3, Paul assures his auditors that "when people say, 'there is peace and security' " - pax et securitas, the eschatological blessings of imperium91 - "then sudden destruction will come upon them." Likewise in 1 Corinthians 15:24, Paul asserts that after Christ, at his parousia, makes alive those who belong to him, "then comes the end, when he delivers the kingdom to God the Father after destroying every rule and every authority and power." In 1 Corinthians 2:6-8, Paul describes "the rulers of this age" (ta archonta tou aionos) both as "doomed to pass away" and as having "crucified the Lord of Glory."92 This last claim - that it was the "rulers of this age" who crucified Christ - directs us to another subversive feature of Paul's gospel: the centrality of crucifixion, as such, to his version of the story of Jesus. The political implications of this aspect of Paul's gospel are frequently overlooked because two thousand years of Christian history have made it unthinkable to imagine Jesus without thinking of the cross; the term now serves merely as a metonym for Jesus' death. But in a context in which the cross would be understood first and foremost as a Roman method of execution, and without the "natural" association we make between crucifixion and Jesus, there is nothing innocuous about describing Jesus' death in this way - the use of the term makes it explicitly clear that it was the Romans who executed Jesus. 93 There is little in the logic of Paul's myth that requires that the mode of Jesus' death be specified, nor, for that matter, was Helmut Koester, "Imperial Ideology and Paul's Eschatology in 1 Thessalonians," in Horsley, ed., Paul and Empire, 166: "Paul envisions a role for the eschatological community that presents a utopian alternative to the prevailing eschatological ideology of Rome. In doing so, he radicalizes traditional apocalyptic topics." 87 So Dieter Georgi, "God Turned Upside Down," in Paul and Empire (ed. Horsley), 148-49. 88 Koester, "Imperial Ideology," 158-59. 89 So Abraham Smith, "Unmasking the Powers," 57, with reference to the emperor as divifilius. 90 Ibid., 60 and n. 60. 91 So Koester, "Imperial Ideology," 162; Abraham Smith, "Unmasking the Powers," 48. 92 It is unfortunate that a single Pauline text from an uncharacteristic Letter - namely, Romans 13:1-7 - has been used to control the interpretation of Paul's politics, when so many other indications point in exactly the opposite direction. I think it is important to consider here that Paul is writing to a group he is unfamiliar with and has not established, or even met, himself. For an interesting - if, to my mind, not completely convincing reinterpr~tation of Romans 13: 1-7, see Georgi, "God Turned Upside Down," 156. 93 See the excellent discussion in Elliott, "Anti-Imperial Message." Cf. also Crossan and Reed, In Search of Paul, 40.
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attention to this detail universal among the earliest Christians. 94 Burton Mack has argued that Paul's basic myth of Christ is a derivation from an earlier martyr-myth, which understood Jesus as a figure whose death is "for" a specific group of people, and so establishes a community that in turn memorializes that death. Such a story, according to Mack, requires only the virtuous death of the righteous one, and not a specification of either the manner of death or the identity of the tyrant who is responsible for that death. But Paul, says Mack, adds precisely that gratuitous specification by virtue of adding and emphasizing the detail that Jesus was crucified. 95 We may view the Christ-myth operative in Paul's ekklesiai as having relatively innocuous analogues of various sorts: heroes who die for their cities, or "mystery" deities whose mythic tribulations are ritually enacted and mirrored by initiates. What distinguishes Paul's Christ from these other myths and legends is the identification of the hero's or deity's adversary as the very state under which Paul and his adherents live. As with other initiation deities, Christ's ultimate enemy is a transcendent entity, or an abstraction - death itself (so 1 Cor 15:26: "the last enemy to be destroyed [by the returning Christ] is death"), as is also the case for, e.g., Demeter, whose story represents a victory over death and winter, or Isis, who battles death and chaos. 96 Unlike these other deities, however, the 94 Neither Q nor the Gospel of Thomas presents Jesus' death in terms of crucifixion, although both are aware of it (see Q 14:27; Thomas # 55). For Thomas, Jesus' death is not especially theologically important, and for Q, while Jesus' death is exemplary of the fate of the prophets, the actual mode of his death is irrelevant. 95 So Burton L. Mack, "Rereading the Christ Myth: Paul's Gospel and the Christ Cult Question," unpublished manuscript, 2004. It is interesting that Paul does not specify that Jesus was crucified in his earliest Letter, 1 Thessalonians. It is possible that Paul had not yet developed this specification in the formulation of the martyr myth he inherited by this point, and allowed apocalyptic scenarios - more prominent here than in any of the later Letters - to bear the weight of his condemnation of "this age." As the apocalyptic elements of Paul's message fall by the wayside in his later Letters, however, the more pointed assertion that Jesus died specifically by crucifixion comes to carry the weight once borne by these elements. 96 The term thanatos occurs 44 times in the authentic Pauline corpus, though many of these instances do not have a theological or mythological referent. I note that Jonathan Z. Smith warns about comparisons between Paul and the so-called "mysteries"; see particularly his Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity (Chicago: U. Press of Chicago, 1990). I think, however, that it makes a certain amount of sense to set Paul's mythology within the context of other initiation cults which focus on a myth of deity or hero who encounters and vanquishes tribulations, though the point is well-taken that such figures should probably not be characterized as "dying and rising gods"; and in any case, my conclusions here are rather congruent with (though not identical to) those of Smith. Where he finds a departure, in Paul's "utopianism," from the locative orientation of both other forms of Christianities and the "mysteries," I find a departure, in Paul's specification of the Romans as the
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agent of that metaphysical entity - the agent of death itself - is Rome. A group constituting itself by virtue of allegiance to and identification with a criminal executed by the state power - executed in a manner restricted to non-citizens,97 slaves, or traitors - is heterodox at the very least. The structure of the Christ myth itself, even without an explicit reference to crucifixion and hence to state power, should not be ignored in any discussion of the politically heterodox implications of Pauline mythology. The outline of the myth, especially as it relates to social characteristics of those who have adopted it, may reveal a great deal about its implications and functionality. Here comparison with analogous mythic structures may be useful. The one I have in mind - culled from Jonathan Smith's work - involves the myth of Hainuwele, or "coconut girl."98 Among the many fascinating features of this story is its symbolic reconfiguration of a concrete social reality: the presence of Europeans among the Pacific islands and particularly the excessive and over-abundant consumer goods which mark their special status. Hainuwele is presented as producing such goods by defecation. The image stands as a striking condemnation of this alien super-abundant wealth (such wealth is shit), as well as a sense of befuddlement and disapproval as to its origins (it is not produced by work or growth, but essentially springs into being magically and ex nihilo). The decision of the other women to kill coconut girl also expresses disapproval of "unnatural" wealth, and at the same time attempts to assimilate commercial wealth to the natives' own, traditional, understanding of wealth as food: Hainuwele is not simply killed, but afterwards, as tubers arise from her dismembered body, becomes a source of a new and - from the native perspective - better kind of wealth. enemies of Christ, from the lack of such specification in the "mysteries" and the efforts on the part of other Christianities to avoid such a specification - witness the efforts of Q and Thomas to direct attention away from crucifixion, and the efforts of the gospel writers, at extreme cost to logic and plausibility, to explain away the crucifixion as ultimately the responsibility of (other) Jews. Paul alone both focuses on crucifixion and foregoes any effort to explain it away. To some degree I am guilty of homogenizing the "mysteries" to use as a foil for Paul; it remains to be seen whether the generalization I have offered here stands up to scrutiny. 97 See Elliott, "Anti-Imperial Message," 168. This strikes me as an extremely significant point. The adherents to Paul's ekklesiai belong to the group by virtue of an adherence to and identification with a man whose manner of execution not only marks him as an enemy of Rome, but also as, specifically, a non-citizen. It is details like this that convince me that Acts' claim that Paul was a Roman citizen is a tendentious invention on the part of the author. 98 Jonathan Z. Smith, "A Pearl of Great Price and a Cargo of Yams," in Idem, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: U. Press of Chicago, 1982), 90-101. The interpretation of the Hainuwele story that follows is entirely either reiteration of, or extrapolation from, points made by Smith in this article.
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Overarchingly, the narrative may be imagined to suggest also an inversionary restoration: by the end of the story, excrement has been transformed into food, rather than, as is the usual state of affairs, food becoming excrement. One of the most striking features of at least 1 Corinthians - a feature that extends to the other letters as well, if less blatantly - is its rather excessive language of inversion, and more specifically, its inversionary characterization of the transformation of the adherents of the ekklesia from lowly to lofty standing: Consider your own call, brothers: not many of you were wise according to the flesh, not many were powerful, not many were of noble birth. But God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise; God chose what is weak in the world to shame the strong; God chose what is low and despised in the world, things that are not, to reduce to nothing things that are, so that no flesh might boast in the presence of God. (1 Cor 1:26-29)
This is applied also to Paul's own central myth: God decided, through the foolishness of our proclamation, to save those who believe. For Jews demand signs and Greeks desire wisdom, but we proclaim Christ crucified, a stumbling block to the Jews and foolishness to Gentiles, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God. For God's foolishness is wiser than human wisdom, and God's weakness is stronger than human strength. (1 Cor 1:21-25)
And indeed this sort of imagery - applied by Paul both to himself and his adherents - coheres very well with the fundamental Pauline myth of Christ's death and resurrection. That story traces out a movement from worthlessness, physical and social degradation (execution as a criminal), and indeed the non-being (ta me onta) of death, to infinite value, exaltation, and new life. The Christ myth and the social self-perceptions of Paul are evidently parallel to each other. What is striking here is how extensive and detailed an analogy this Pauline Christ myth makes to the story of Hainuwele, especially when the former is coordinated with Paul's description of the supposed "social" transformation it effects on its adherents. Both are accounts of a kind of rectifying inversion; an imaginary transformation that benefits the tradents of the respective stories by restoring to them some highly prized item that is currently elusive - appropriate wealth in the case of Hainuwele, appropriate status or identity in the case of Christ. Both stories revolve around contradictory juxtapositions of value with debasement: wealth with excrement, or what is "low and despised," foolishness, with wisdom and power. We might say that in the Hainuwele story, wealth is shit, while in the Christ story, shit is wealth, i.e., what is degraded in the world is exalted in the eyes of God. The Hainuwele story can be and has been understood as an effort to assimilate or make sense of alien, incomprehensible, and
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detrimental social changes - changes that can be identified with some specificity. I see no reason not to understand the Christ myth analogously, with comparable social processes at work. 99 A similar analogy might be found in my own part of the world with the Ghost Dance phenomenon of the later nineteenth century, a pan-Indian, thoroughly syncretistic theological innovation, which predicted and aimed to initiate a spiritual intervention that would lead to the destruction of colonial power and the renewal of the old ways of life. loo In this case, the reaction is almost as important as the initial phenomenon. Although - as with most ancient Christianities - the prophets of the ghost dance were appealing to, and apparently relying upon, supernatural interventions rather than their own revolutionary behavior, United States military personnel determined that the movement constituted a rebellion, and acted accordingly, outlawing the Ghost Dance and, famously, perpetrating a massacre of Ghost Dancers at Wounded Knee, North Dakota in 1890. The "religious" nature of the movement was insufficient to prevent a recognition of its political content. Presumably, examination of a variety of colonial situations would yield any number of analogues to Paul's theological opposition to the Roman imperium, and analogues, as well, to the reaction thereto. This is, however, mere heterodoxy, a more or less open polemic proffered directly against the Roman state. Moreover, it is a relatively unthreatening one, in which the overthrow of the present order is predicated on the intervention of God, and is only manifested in the 99 For a similar kind of comparison between the Pauline groups and colonized indigenous groups, specifically Melanesian "cargo cults," see, e.g., John G. Gager, Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early Christianity (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975); Jewett, Thessalonian Correspondence. 100 Instituted according to the prophecies of Wovoka, a Paiute from Nevada, the dance and its corresponding doctrines spread - with changes - to other western aboriginal groups, most famously (and disastrously) the Sioux of the Great Plains. The syncretism of the movement is perhaps most visible in its prediction that the performance of the dance would result in the return of the dead, accompanied by a cloud-like figure associated with Jesus. One wonders whether Wovoka had been reading 1 Thessalonians! Eventually, in its Sioux manifestations, the ultimate results of this return of the dead would be not only the reestablishment of large game, particularly the buffalo, but also the driving away or extermination of the white settlers. In terms of the actual situation of the proponents of this movement; in terms of the use of tradition, syncretism, and innovation; in terms of ideology and structure; in terms of evangelization and the spread of the message; in terms of the variety of its various manifestations; and in terms of the reaction of the ruling military powers, I can think of no better analogue to ancient Christianities. I continue to hope that as careful a study and comparison of the Ghost Dance with ancient Christianity as has been offered with Melanesian cargo cults will be some day forthcoming.
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present time in spiritual and relatively private ways.101 As the example of the Ghost Dance indicates, it would foolish to claim that such a message as Paul's could not have generated active and even formal opposition. Certainly it is possible to understand Paul's beatings (see 2 Cor 11 :25), his imprisonment (see Phil 1:7, 12-14; Ph1m 1), or the hostility he suggests was endured by both himself and the adherents of his ekklesiai (l Thess 2:2; 3:3-5; Phil 1:28), as elicited quite naturally by an openly subversive message,102 though it would remain difficult under such a scenario to account for the obstacles he encountered with his fellow Jews. 103 Still, I would like to explore a further ramification of Paul's activity, one characterized by a major difference between his action and theology and that of the analogous purveyors of the Hainuwe1e myth or the tradents of the Ghost Dance.104 What that significant difference is should be immediately obvious, and I have already alluded to it: Paul's fundamental project is to constitute Gentiles - as such - as members of a Jewish polity. In so doing, his potentially subversive political agenda is extended beyond the nostalgic and ethnically-circumscribed "national" imaginations so effectively co-opted and channeled into de facto submission by the Romans and their system of rule. Paul turns the world upside down, 101 It is clear that Paul is not interested in human social reform, at least not of society at large outside of his ekldesiai, but expects some kind of divinely-initiated transformation of the world. The members of his groups are thus encouraged to live quietly and set positive examples for outsiders (e.g., 1 Thess 4:11-12; 1 Cor 14:23), and not engage in open rebellion against the civic authorities (e.g., Rom 13: 1-7). 102 So also Georgi, "God Turned Upside Down," 157: "The difference between Paul's arraignment and the later persecutions (and convictions) of the Christians would be that Paul's crime was not passive resistance (refusal to sacrifice to the emperor). Rather, it was an active one, an act of political aggression." 103 In fact, it seems to me that an inability to account for Jewish persecution of Paul is perhaps one major defect of nearly every analysis of his message and activity that I have seen, save perhaps that of Crossan and Reed, who account for such opposition on the grounds that Paul was stealing away Gentile hangers-on and potential benefactors from the synagogue, see In Search of Paul, 39--40; cf. Gerd Theissen, The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth (trans. J.H. Schlitz; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982, repr., 1989), 104. Such an explanation, however, while reasonable enough, depends on the view, in my opinion untenable, that Paul's primary missionary target was the "God-fearers." Gaston appears to recognize at least one aspect of this problem of Jewish "persecution": "If Paul's central theological concern was not a negative disparagement of the significance of the Torah for Israel, then what did he have against other Jews? If what I have sketched is correct, Paul says nothing against the Torah and Israel but simply bypasses them as not directly relevant to his gospel" (Gaston, Paul and the Torah, 3233). 104 I am bearing in mind here Jonathan Z. Smith's point (Drudgery Divine) that what is most instructive in comparing analogous entities are the differences between them, rather than their similarities.
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discursively at least, by making the Roman oikoumene itself into a vehicle for the subjection of the entire world under the rule and protection of the Lord God of Israel, rather than the entity to which that world "naturally" belonged, Rome, her emperors, her gods. Such a move is typical enough for a Paul who is constantly invoking inversions, sometimes extravagant, to explore and elaborate his own vision,105 but it offers an instructive contrast to the Hainuwele story or the Ghost Dance movement, as an effort not simply to overturn the hierarchy of domination or to shake off the yoke of foreign rule, but actually to colonize the colonizers. An ethnic alien in a foreign polis, Paul takes his own ancestral traditions (i.e., being the chosen people of the creator of the world) so seriously as to apply them to a situation to which they were not obviously applicable, seeing in his ancestry a gift or requirement to be extended to his "foreign" neighbors, rather than seeing in himself a foreigner who is to remain segregated and submissive until privileges are extended to him by the "natives."I06 In so doing, Paul reorganizes notions of identity as such by
105 For instance, the Christ myth itself, as discussed above. See also Paul's various invocations of his own weakness, ill-health, and social standing; the social standing of his converts; the equation of persecution and hardship with success by divine standards; and so on. 106 That Paul seems to do this so naturally and thoughtlessly may account for the failure of so many historians to consider the disadvantages and subordinate status of being a Jew in a Greek, Italian, or Asian city in terms analogous to those of other foreigners. As usual, of course, we moderns in hindsight and also for theological reasons tend to privilege Judaism in ways we would never dream of doing for Syrians, Arabians, Phoenicians, or Egyptians residing in, say, Thessalonica. For the latter we might hear about minority status and the political, social, and even economic costs of that status, with very little consideration of the advantages of foreign origins. Yet for Jews we tend to hear very little about the disadvantages, and a great deal about how "Gentiles" (the "other" category only for Jews, and not for most urban residents, who would instead divide the world into Greeks [et al.J and barbarians) must have been attracted to Judaism, how being Jewish allowed one to tap social and even economic links otherwise unavailable, and so forth. In addition to what I suspect is the enduring belief that Jewish claims of superiority were true, and therefore natural, and therefore not to be imagined for non-Jews (e.g., Phoenicians), we also have the evidence of Paul, whose application to foreign poleis of an ethnic sense of superiority is, I am arguing, extremely unusual. I want to stress that I am not intending here to invoke the stale and tendentious old dichotomy of a universalizing and liberal Christianity over against a narrowly nationalistic and parochial Judaism. For one thing, the Paul I am describing in this paper is not a Christian at all. In addition, the terms I have in mind here are essentially political rather than "religious," and should be understood not in terms of parochial versus universalistic, but rather in terms of submissive (being willing to restrict Jewish identity to the familial sphere) versus aggressive (being unwilling to do so, and instead seeking to extend the sphere of Israel wider and wider). I would therefore claim that the dichotomies with which Christian exegetes are accustomed to congratulate themselves are not exactly
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synthesizing ethnicity and political identity in Jewish terms, and thus in a way fundamentally at odds with the contemporary doxa I have attempted to describe. Paul is involved in the project of making Jews, but this project is defined precisely by its failure to make Jews in strictly and circumscribed ethnic terms. It is not as though Paul is unaware of or unconcerned with Jews in the ethnic sense; he carefully describes both himself and some of his opponents as Jews in this restricted and specific sense, and regards ancestry as a still-meaningful mark of distinction even among Christ-adherents. 107 But being the people of the Jewish God is for Paul no longer confined to an ancestral and thus familial practice - it is an identity extended to all nations,108 with blessings should they accept it, and curses should they not: "Weare the temple of the living God; as God said, 'I will live with them and move among them, and I will be their God, and they shall be my people (laos)' " (2 Cor 6:16). In so doing, Paul has created a synthetic, multi-ethnic, politeuma (Phil 3 :20: "Our commonwealth [politeuma] is in heaven"), one that mirrors and replaces that of the Greco-Roman polis, 109 ironically and inversionarily casting nonread into the text ex nihi/o, or simply invented, but represent a misinterpretation (albeit a fairly gross one) of something that is, in fact, there. 107 For examples in which Paul defines Judaism at least in part via lineage, see, e.g., Philippians 3:4-5 ("If any other man thinks he has reason for confidence in the flesh, I have more: circumcised on the eighth day, of the people of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew born of Hebrews"; regarding the link between circumcision and birth lineagy, see further below); Galatians 1:14 ("I advanced in Judaism beyond many of. my own age among my people [en to genei mou], so extremely zealous was I for the traditions of my fathers [ton patrikon mou]"); Galatians 2:15 ("We ourselves, who are Jews by birth [hemeis physei ioudaioi] and not Gentile sinners"); 2 Corinthians 11 :22 ("Are they Hebrews? So am 1. Are they Israelites? So am 1. Are they descendants of Abraham? So am I?"); etc. For discussions of achievement-oriented versus ascriptionoriented definitions of Jewish belonging, see Stowers, Rereading of Romans; and Caroline E. Johnson Hodge, " 'If Sons, Then Heirs': A Study of Kinship and Ethnicity in Paul's Letters" (Ph.D. diss., Brown University, 2002; now published as If Sons, Then Heirs: A Study of Kinship and Ethnicity in the Letters of Paul, Oxford: OUP, 2007). 108 For readers who fear I am slipping again into the old assertions about the universality of Christianity over against the particularism of Judaism, see note 106. 109 Harland notes inscriptional occurrences of the term politeuma: "There were associations of Lycians (from both Kaunos and Pinara) and Pisidians (from Termessos) living in Sidon in Syria in the Hellenistic era (Macridy 1904:549-56 [po liteuma]) , and there were associations of Lycians, Cilicians, and Ionians (some of them soldiers) in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt (SB 6025, 6664, 7270 [politeuma]; OGIS 145--48, 157 [koinon]; SB 8757 = IGR I 1078) ... A group of Sardians met regularly in Rome (IGUR 85, 86, 87), as did the Ephesian shippers and merchants, for instance (IGR I 147; cf. IGUR 1355, 1491, 1563). The "corporate body" (politeuma) of Phrygians devoted to the Great Mother at Pompeii (IGR I 458 ... ) had its counterparts at Rome, where these associations consisted, in part, of freedmen and slaves of Phrygian background who belonged to the imperial household." Harland, Associations, Synagogues, and
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Jews as welcome and subsumed "foreigners,"ll0 in lieu of an acceptance of Jewish strangeness in the imperial polis. There has, of course, been extensive and excellent discussion of the motif of ethnicity in Paul,lll and I do not presume to correct or supplement that scholarship here so much as briefly discuss a few of its implications with respect to the unspoken norms of ancient identity-construction. I think such an approach has the potential to draw together the important insights of those like Stowers who argue that the issue of ethnicity is absolutely essential for understanding Paul,1.12 and those like Horsley who emphasize the anti-imperial implications of Pauline theology and activity. I am somewhat inspired in this regard by an article by Wayne Meeks - "The Corinthian Christians as artificial aliens"l13 - in which he argues that The household groups organized by Paul under the patronage of Stephanus, Gaius, Prisca, Chloe, and others, all together gathering occasionally at Gaius's place as the "civic assembly of God in Corinth," was like an association of, as it were, artificial immigrants - made aliens by their conversion to the God of Israel and baptism into Messiah Jesus. While their form of community was in many ways necessarily unique, it
Congregations, 35-36. The replication of this language - as also with the use by various associations of such terms as ekklesia and the other nomenclature of the Greco-Roman city administration - should not divert us from what is distinctive about Paul's ideology. The issue here is not, as is sometimes simplistically claimed, that Paul appropriates political terminology; such usage, as Harland makes exceptionally clear, can reflect accommodation just as much as appropriation. The difference here is that the politeuma to which Paul refers is not subordinated to that of the city or the imperial order, is not constructed as familial or otherwise as a constituent of this larger order, but is presented as itself the larger order to which all other identities are subordinated. Related to this presentation, as I will consider below, is the apparent exclusivity of the Pauline ekklesiai. 110 On the irony of Paul's construction of identity, see Stowers, Rereading of Romans, 271: "Medea stood for foreigners who corrupted the purity of the citizen body ". I find great irony in the fact that Paul the Jew resonates these allusions back to Greeks and Romans who apparently now see themselves as Gentiles, outsiders to Judaism described as immoral foreigners." Stowers is referring specifically to the use of a particular rhetorical trope, but his comment applies equally to the more general inversion by Paul of insider versus outsider identity. 111 See, among many others, Hodge, "If Sons, Then Heirs"; Stowers, Rereading of Romans; Daniel Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1994). 112 On the topic of the construction of ethnicity in Paul, I am drawing mainly from three sources: Stowers, Rereading of Romans; Hodge, "If Sons, Then Heirs"; and a very suggestive article: Pamela Eisenbaum, "Paul as the New Abraham," in Paul and Politics (ed. Horsley), 130-45. 113 Wa,yne A. Meeks, "Corinthian Christians as Artificial Aliens," in Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide (ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 129-38.
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drew from its closest model, the Jewish immigrant associations of the Diaspora cities, probably including the one closest at hand, in Corinth itself.114
But I think Meeks has put the cart before the horse, using theological convictions to explain social circumstance, rather than the reverse. I would argue, by contrast, that Paul has assembled associations of real aliens, individuals who are already without meaningful lineage, without a communal sense of identity, without homeland, subsumed under the aegis of the polis but without citizenship rights or other benefits of municipal identity;1l5 and he has turned them into artificial Jews. Paul appears to accomplish this remarkable feat via his myth of Christ, who is with some consistency invoked as the spiritual (kata pneuma, en pneumati) ancestor of the adherents of Paul's ekklesiai. As Stowers presents it, Paul imagines Jesus, an ethnically-Jewish and human messianic figure with divine powers and the Spirit of God, come to judge the world and free his people from domination (by both the unrighteous Judeans and the Gentile Romans) - and thus also to condemn the Gentiles, who stand under the curse of the Law - as having instead and unexpectedly, in faithful obedience to God's righteousness and promises, chosen to act passively, to refrain from subduing the wicked world, thus allowing himself to be crucified. In so doing, Christ's faithfulness and love for those alienated from God delayed God's wrathful judgment against the world, giving time for the Gentiles to be incorporated into God's people. It is in this fashion that Jesus' faith "saves us from the wrath to come" (l Thess 1:10), and it is for this reason that Jesus' death can be described as/or the Gentiles. In return for his faithfulness, God not only will, as Jesus trusted, "allow him to fulfill his messianic role in the future," but in addition has, via the resurrection, exalted Jesus to the spiritual realm, thereby "making 114 Meeks, "Artificial Aliens," 137-38. 115 Obviously I am assuming here a fairly low social status for the bulk of the membership in Paul's ekklesiai, with allowance for variations between ekklesiai in different cities. I want to stress that I am not denying that some of Paul's adherents may be well-off economically, but in these cases I would expect considerable "status inconsistency." Presumably some members of the ekklesiai will have fairly high status, at least at the local level, but I think that we should agree with Paul (1 Cor 1:26-27) in seeing such individuals as anomalies rather than the norm. The evidence of prosopography has, I think, been somewhat distorted; the presence of Roman or Latin names among the adherents of the ekklesiai - including Paul's own - hardly need indicate high social status, or even actual Roman descent. The fact that Paul himself, with his Roman name, is clearly and emphatically not of Roman descent should make us suspicious of any such conclusions (cf. also the Greek and Roman names among those whom Paul identifies as "relatives" [syngenes] in Romans 16:7, 11,21). It would be more in line with what we otherwise know about the constituency of the ekklesiai if such individuals were instead understood as descendants of slaves or freedmen of Romans, taking on the names of their former owners upon manumission.
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him the pioneer of the world's renewal."II6 This renewal - that is, the inclusion of the Gentiles within God's people - is effected through the resurrection of Christ, just as it was the goal of his death. By virtue of his new existence in the spiritual realm - and this is precisely what resurrection means for Paul - Christ can now serve as a mechanism and means for the creation of new forms of existence and hence identity. Those who are "in Christ" constitute a new, spiritual, social reality, in which prior social identities in the flesh are now irrelevant, as is expressed in the famous text of Galatians 3:27-28: "For as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus." As Christ himself is a descendent of Abraham, this implies participation in Abraham's lineage as well, and so the text continues: "And if you are Christ's, then you are Abraham's offspring, heirs according to the promise" (Gal 3 :29; cf. verse 26, where the Galatians are also described as "sons of God"). Moreover, as Stowers notes, the conception of being "in Christ" and "one in Christ" itself seems indebted to the metaphor of lineage: Gentiles have kinship with God and with the lineage of Abraham by incorporation into Christ by his generative faithfulness. Paul's language of belonging to Christ, being in Christ, and belonging to his body treats Christ and his family as one entity.II7
A linkage akin to that of birth but quite distinct from it - especially in Paul's mind - is created spiritually. As Christ possessed the spirit of God, so Paul and his adherents possess the spirit of Christ (e.g., Romans 8:911), and in some instance it appears even that his adherents possess the spirit of Paul himself (see, e.g., 1 Cor 5:3-4), thus establishing a lineage based not on birth, that is, kata sarka, but based on transmission of spirit. It is, I think, for this reason that Paul so frequently employs parental metaphors for his role - most striking are those in which he appears to cast himself as the spiritual mother of his adherents: "I fed you with milk, not solid food; for you were not ready for it; and even yet you are not ready, for you are still of the flesh" (1 Cor 3:2-3; cf. 1 Thess 2:7-8). The brotherhood of the members of the ekklesiai, denoted by Paul's frequent vocative address, adelphoi, is not "fictive" at all, for those he addresses are of the same lineage in Christ and share common descent from the spirit of GOd. II8 The ekklesiai do not join the ethnic nation of Israel kata sarka, through physical descent or incorporation into individual families, but 116 The summary is from Stowers, Rereading of Romans, 213-15; the two direct quotations are from p. 214. What follows represents my own extrapolation from Stowers' presentatjon, though there are many points in common. 117 Stowers, Rereading of Romans, 230, emphasis added. 118 So also Hodge, "If Sons, Then Heirs," 219.
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spiritually and collectively, via the spirit of Christ. And unlike the Judean nation according to the flesh, which is in colonial slavery to the Gentiles and the unrighteous, the spiritual people of God are free: Hagar is Mount Sinai in Arabia; she corresponds to the present Jerusalem, for she is in slavery with her children. But the Jerusalem above is free, and she is our mother ... Now we, brethren, like Isaac, are children of promise. But as at that time he who was born according to the flesh persecuted him who was born according to the spirit, so it is now. (Gal 4:25-26, 28-29)
Paul's desire to reinforce this particular conception of descent goes some way to explaining his aversion to circumcision, which is very strongly linked in Paul's mind to notions of physical descent. When Paul describes his own Judean identity "in the flesh," in Philippians, he does so partly in terms of his having been circumcised (Phil 3:4-5), a familial act and one described here as such by Paul. As Boyarin points out, this association makes a great deal of sense symbolically: Paul thinks of lineage in patriarchal fashion as descent from male ancestors,119 and the penis is the instrument of such fleshy generation; therefore, an identity-marker inscribed on the penis itself is of preeminent import to "fleshy" identity.1 20 By becoming circumcised, as commentators have long recognized, Paul's Galatian adherents are adopting Judean identity according to fleshy or "literal" membership in the lineage of Abraham - they are seeking to become the people of God by familial or generative incorporation into the Judean ethnos; whereas according to Paul's proclamation, adoption as God's people has been accomplished spiritually, through Christ, and brings with it all the promises to Israel, so that his adherents become "children of Abraham" according to the promise, but not children of Abraham in terms of physical genealogy, as implied by circumcision: The purpose was to make [Abraham] the father of all who believe without being circumcised and who thus have righteousness reckoned to them ... The promise to Abraham and his descendants, that they should inherit the world, did not come through the Law but through the righteousness of faith ... That is why it depends on faith, in order that the promise may rest on grace and be guaranteed to all his descendants - not only the adherents of the Law but also to those who share the faith of Abraham, for he is the father of us all, as it is written, "I have made you the father of many nations. (Rom 4:11,
13,16-17)121 119 So, most emphatically, Stowers, Rereading of Romans; and Hodge, "If Sons, Then Heirs." 120 So, with a little creative extrapolation on my part, Boyarin, Radical Jew, 68-69. 121 Abraham seems to represent for Paul a nexus between "natural" or fleshy ethnicity and descent, on the one hand, and the promises of God resulting from faithfulness, on the other. Like circumcision itself, Abraham is invoked by Paul as a sign of physical or fleshy ethnicity (see Rom 4: 1; 11: 1; 2 Cor 11 :22). Yet Paul is at great pains to stress that Abraham's own faith and God's grace were what established his descendants as God's
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Christ - and even Paul himself122 - operate in a fashion akin to Abraham, his call by God and his faithfulness to that call establishing a lineage allied to God. Adoption into the people of Judea at the familial - "natural," "fleshy" - level via the markers of ethnic subculture such as circumcision or the Law undoes the whole point of the new spiritual lineage and so - as Paul himself explicitly states - nullifies the value of Christ's death: "if justification were through the law, then Christ died to no purpose" (Gal 2:21; cf. 5:2-5; Rom 4:13-15). The Gentiles who comprise the ekklesiai, therefore, are a reconstituted "people" generated by a spiritual lineage and so turned into "spiritual Judeans" under the rule and protection of God, but without being drawn into Israel as a physical ethnos: "because you are
people (on which see further below). Eisenbaum, "Paul as the New Abraham," argues quite convincingly that Paul views both the Judeans and those Gentiles who belong to his ekklesiai as relatives and God's children by virtue of common descent from Abraham, but via different lineages and so still constituting two distinct entities. This argument is similar to the one I offer here, but differs in details. It should be stressed that while the figure of Abraham is of great significance in unraveling what Paul thought about ethnicity, and so is rightly emphasized by Eisenbaum, "Paul as the New Abraham"; Stowers, Rereading of Romans; Hodge, "If Sons, Then Heirs" and others; Paul's own Letters do not suggest that he himself placed the figure of Abraham in a position of prominence. Aside from Romans and Galatians, where Abraham is central to the specific arguments, he is referred to only in 2 Corinthians 11 :22, and then only as an ancestor of Paul. This limitation applies to the very notion of the Law itself, which, like Abraham, appears to be associated by Paul with the "natural" lineage of the Judeans (see Phil 3:46, where Paul associates and conflates identity drawn from descent, from circumcision, and from legal obedience). Each of Paul's Letters addresses different groups with different sets of issues, often with ad hoc argumentation, abandoned in later epistles. It is for this reason that I am not convinced of the centrality for Paul of the opposition he constructs in Galatians and Romans between "works of the Law" and "faith." Paul's concern with sidelining the Judean Law in Galatians arises out of a specific and identifiable context - the adoption by his adherents of circumcision, apparently at the behest of outside influences (my own view is that Paul's ekklesiai were being approached by emissaries of Peter and/or James). In the case of Romans, which is often treated as a systematic exposition of Pauline thought, but which is just as context-bound and audience-oriented as any of Paul's other Letters, I do not feel sufficiently confident in that audience's identity or situation to treat its motifs as representative. In any case, most of Paul's Letters either do not contain any reference to the Law at all (1 Thess, 2 Cor [which does, however, mention Moses], Phlm) , or treat it perfunctorily and even as a source of positive injunctions (1 Cor, Phil). "Freedom from the Law" is an implication of the central motifs of Paul's thought, not actually one of those motifs; and it is an implication that emerges only when challenged. On the other hand, the consistency with which Paul addresses himself to Gentiles strikes me as likely enough to emerge out of a somewhat systematic set of principles, or at the very least out of an enduring central conviction. 122 So especially Eisenbaum, "Paul as the New Abraham."
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sons, God has sent the spirit of his son into our hearts" (Gal 4:6).123 As we might expect from a figure so fond of inversions as Paul, and who habitually treats things spiritual as reversals of things fleshy, lineage, descent, and kinship in his ekklesiai are derived not via birth but through death - the death of Christ reenacted in baptism (e.g., Rom 6:3-11). Paul has not simply chosen one of the options for the Gentiles then available in Jewish thought - eschatological extermination, or eschatological incorporation 124 - but has rather, no doubt in part because of his conviction that the eschatological events have already in some degree come to pass, in effect created a new laos of God, united "spiritually" with Judeans but still ethnically distinct from them. 125 While I have referred to this process as one of creating "artificial Jews," a construction of a "people" by virtue of divine fiat rather than "natural" descent, its artificiality should not be exaggerated or viewed as utterly unique and unaccountable. Ethnicity itself, though appealing to "natural" characteristics as the basis for identity, is itself as much a social fabrication as any other form of identity-construction. 126 More than this, Paul himself seems to recognize that while the status of Judeans as an ethnos may be attributable to descent, the status of this particular ethnos as the people of God is due only to God's mercy and grace in his arbitrary call to Abraham (as well as Abraham's faithful response to that call):
123 Again I must stress how telling it is that Paul's adherents in Galatia are apparently so attracted by the prospect of circumcision. This indicates, as I argued above, that we are by no means in the presence here of "God-fearers" or people attracted to Judaism for merely philosophical reasons. In addition, the ease with which these individuals seem to accept circumcision suggests to me an interest or already-present sense within the group of being part of Israel. This in tum supports my claim that such belonging is precisely what Paul is promising his ekklesiai, and that it is for this reason that circumcision appears to be such a natural next step for these people. 124 See the discussion in Gager, Reinventing Paul, 60-63. 125 Paul preaches the inclusion of Gentiles, but Gager raises precisely the critical question: inclusion in what? His answer - acceptance and redemption by God, but without inclusion in Israel (ibid., p. 53) strikes me as essentially right, but with the caveat that Paul's failure to incorporate the Gentiles into the people of Israel applies only to that entity conceived in terms of "natural" or "fleshy" ethnicity. As noted by Hodge, "If Sons, Then Heirs," 219-20, many of the specific interests and terminology of ethnic groups are lacking in Paul's assemblies, which she attributes to "a conscious effort to distance the assemblies from traditional ethnic groups" (ibid., p. 219). I believe that this effort at distance, combined with the emphasis on ethnic conceptualizations of Paul's groups as is also noted by Hodge, is explicable precisely in light of Paul's spiritual versus fleshy distinction: we have here two different kinds of "ethnicity," which Paul is at pains to keep distinct. 126 For an amusing case in point, see Hodge, "If Sons, Then Heirs," 223-26.
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Not all who are descended from Israel belong to Israel, and not all are children of Abraham because they are his descendants; but "through Isaac shall your descendants be named." This means that it is not the children of the flesh who are the children of God, but the children of the promise are reckoned as descendants. (Rom 9:6-8; cf. 9:10-13; Gal 4:21-31)
If a people of God can be created in this fashion, Paul seems to reason, then a similar mechanism can be applied to nations other than Judeans. The fact that Christ himself is a descendent of Abraham lends the schema further legitimacy, as well as an appealing symmetry. Paul does, therefore, constitute a nation or people amongst his ekklesiai, of a different kind than would be effected by the incorporation of individual Gentiles into the Judean ethnos, but joined with Jews in sharing the promises to Abraham and the rule of God. As a result, the novel "nation" thus created is no longer rooted in and restricted to actual familial relations, even though the metaphor of adoption is used by Paul to express the relationship of the ekklesiai to GOd. 127
Paul's groups thus come to represent a Judean culture within the polis that is no longer appropriately fractional in its self-presentation and selfconception, an identity with free-floating and independent import: de facto, an overarching or potentially hegemonic identity genuinely in competition with the doxic hegemony of the imperium and its local political articulations. Paul may express himself in terms of a kind of "spiritual ethnicity," but what this really means is a national identity not based on physical lineage, and so Paul has in fact created entities of a national and political character. Moreover, Paul reflects this political identity in his copious use of political terminology to characterize his groups, ranging from the nomenclature of ekklesia itself128 to the identification of Jesus as Kyrios. 129 It is one thing to proclaim the superiority of your gods and traditions - to invert Graeco-Roman versus "barbarian" superiority and proclaim your own people superior to all outsiders - behind closed doors and amongst a naturally restricted group with a self-limiting definition of identity; it is quite another to do so in an association with open and avowedly universal membership, an association· marked by active 127 Albeit not very frequently: the term huiothesia occurs only four times in the entire authentic corpus: Romans 8:15, 23; 9:4; Galatians 4:5. 128 I suspect that the ambivalent nuances of this term - as referring to the civic assembly, and/or to the congregation of Israel- are quite intentional on Paul's part: he is deliberately (if subtly) saying that his groups are both of these things. 129 See Joubert, "Managing the Household," 217: "Apart from Paul's use of kinship terminology to describe the Corinthians and Jesus' relationship to God, he also referred to Jesus by means of a term borrowed from the political sphere, namely 'Kyrios' (1 Cor 8:6; 12:3). Oriental-Hellenistic deities such as Serapis, Isis and Osiris were also addressed as Kyrios/Kyria, as well as the Roman emperors."
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recruitment and open contempt for civic norms, one which offers itself as a replacement of the civic order, which is now "imperially Jewish" rather than a constituent element of the Roman world. The extreme violation of the taken-for-granted norm of Roman universality, or of the ostensibly non-ethnic character of Roman identity, and its replacement with a contradictory and subversive notion of Jewish universality130 implied in Paul's ideology and activity is perhaps most evident in his "collection for the saints" (see, e.g., Rom 15:25-26; 2 Cor 9:1; etc.).131 We may conceive of the symbolic payload of this extended project as either an incorporation of the nations into Israel by virtue of honoring its God and becoming subject to a kind of replacement "temple tax," or as an inversion of the tribute paid to by Jews to Rome now being paid by Gentiles to Jerusalem, or both.132 In any case, the result is an inversion of the "natural" political order and a replacement of implicit Roman sovereignty with the sovereignty of a dominated constituent of the empire. Something similar is implied by the "religious" exclusivity of the Pauline ekklesiai, an exclusivity too often misunderstood as merely an aspect of Jewish theology and without any consideration of its import for the Gentiles newly adopting it. But at the level of the polis, "the gods brought the citizens together in a glow of proud social unity, as they had always done,"133 and so a repudiation of these gods is an overt repudiation of the authority or jurisdiction of civic institutions. Again, it is one thing for a circumscribed ethnic group to reject such affiliation on the basis of family membership and ancestral tradition; it is quite another for various 130 See the similar claims of Elliott, "Anti-Imperial Message," 176: "We should marvel ... that [Paul's] indictment goes beyond Pilate [because he does not mention him] to include all the powers of heaven and earth together that stand hostile to God ... Far from 'denationalizing the cross,' Paul has, so to speak, internationalized it. He insists that the Roman colonists of Corinth, thousands of miles from the troubles in Judea, must mold their lives into a constant remembrance of one particular crucifixion in Judea, because through that crucifixion God has revealed the imminent end of the Powers and has begun to bring 'the scheme of this world' to an end (1 Cor 7:31)." 131 Political implications of the collection are also discussed, albeit from a rather different perspective, by Sze-kar Wan, "Collection for the Saints as Anticolonial Act: Implications of Paul's Ethnic Reconstruction," in Paul and Politics (ed. Horsley), 191215. 132 After the Jewish War, Vespasian made the original temple tax payable to Jupiter Capito linus, "which was a very transparent statement of the superiority of the Roman god over the Jewish one" (Esler, "God's Honour," 245). Decades prior to this, Paul asserts Jewish superiority by having Gentiles pay tribute to their God, justifying it thus (Rom 15 :27): "They were pleased to do this, and indeed they owe it to them; for if the Gentiles have come to share in their spiritual blessings, they ought to be of service to them in material things." 133 Goodman, Mission and Conversion, 17.
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people of various ancestry to do so for ideological reasons, and without the warrant and constraint of a specific minority ethnicity,134 Even more fascinating, in 1 Corinthians 8-10 Paul rather condescendingly permits participation in aspects of polytheistic worship, provided that the participant recognize the meaninglessness of such worship: As to the eating of food offered to idols (ton e idolo thy ton ), we know that an idol has no real existence (ouden eidolon en kosmo) and that there is no God but one. For although there may be so-called gods (eisin legomenoi theoi) in heaven or on earth - as indeed there are many gods and many lords -·yet for us there is one God, the Father ... and one Lord, Jesus Christ ... However, not all possess this knowledge. But some, through being hitherto accustomed to idols, eat food as really offered to an idol; and their conscience, being weak, is defiled ... Take care lest this liberty of yours somehow become a stumbling block to the weak. (1 Cor 8:4-7, 9)
In yet another breathtaking inversion of normal practice, Paul allows an essentially private maintenance of civic religious observances - as if such observances represented a tolerated ethnic subculture! If the foregoing analysis is at all correct, then the offense Paul produced with his communities of "artificial Jews" - unrooted in actual familial identity and so uncontained by fractional ethnicity - was really an offense first and foremost to Gentiles, not Jews; to the Roman political order, not the Jewish religious order.135 And indeed we do not actually hear of Jewish persecution directed against Paul's adherents or ekklesiai, but against Paul himself; the persecution endured by these adherents appears to come from their Gentile compatriots. 136 Paul himself is "shamefully treated," 134 So Crossan and Reed, In Search of Paul, 40: "Pagans might have disliked the idea of pagan sympathizers with Judaism, but they would have disliked even more the idea of pagan converts to Christianity. Judaism as 'superstitious atheistic misanthropy' with an ancient country was bad enough, but Christianity as 'superstitious atheistic misanthropy' without any country was surely worse. No wonder, therefore, that Paul was attacked on both sides, by both Jews and pagans"; and: "As Jews they would be recognized, accepted, and protected by Rome, but as Christians they were followers of a leader executed by those same Romans." 135 See Jonathan Z. Smith, "What a Difference a Difference Makes," in idem, Relating Religion, 275: "While the 'other' may be perceived as being either LIKE-US or NOT-LIKE-US, he is, in fact, most problematic when he is TOO-MUCH-LIKE-US, or when he claims to BE-US. It is here that the real urgency of a 'theory of the other' emerges. This urgency is called forth not by the requirement to place the 'other,' but rather to situate ourselves. It is here, to invoke the language of a theory of ritual, that we are not so much concerned with the drama of 'expulsion,' but with the more mundane and persistent processes of 'micro-adjustment.' This is not a matter ofthe 'far' but, preeminently, of the 'near.' A 'theory of the other' is but another way of phrasing a 'theory of the self'." And it is precisely this - the regnant ancient theory of the self - that Paul is threatening, claiming simultaneously civic and Jewish identity for his ekklesiai. 136 Clearly so in 1 Thessalonians 2: 14, which is however of disputed authenticity; less clearly so in such texts as 1 Thessalonians 1:6 and 2:2, both of unquestioned authenticity.
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apparently by Gentiles, in Philippi; he is subjected to CIVIC corporal punishment (2 Cor 11:25); he is imprisoned by Gentiles (Phil 1:12-14; 2 Cor 11 :23); and states explicitly that he has been "in danger from Gentiles" (2 Cor 11 :26). In addition, and because of his own ethnic Judaism, Paul is "in danger from [his] own people" (2 Cor 11 :26), and beaten in the synagogues (2 Cor 11 :24), by those Jews who wish to "hinder us from speaking to the Gentiles" (1 Thess 2: 16). One might surmise that the motivation for Jewish persecution of Paul (and Paul alone) is precisely the threat his message poses to the modus vivendi that allows such subcultures to continue to exist meaningfully under foreign domination. The problem is not that Paul threatens particularistic Jewish pride by "allowing" Gentiles to participate in Jewish identity, as the old story has it; it is that Paul threatens continued Jewish existence as such by seeking to extend this identity beyond the parameters allowed by Rome. In any case, the clearest evidence we have for Paul's persecution is indicative of state opposition to his message, rather than Jewish opposition. However much Paul may complain about travails, it is his factual assertions of imprisonment (and perhaps a death sentence; see Phil 1: 12-26) - which must be imposed by the political authorities and not his fellow Jews - that are least subject to dispute or rhetorical exaggeration. Paul's supposedly "theological" message of Gentile inclusion in the people of God has brought to bear against him the coercive power of the state, because this message violates and so exposes the contemporary doxa of differential application of identity-markers that fosters multi-cultural integration in the cities (at the level of ethnicity) and Rome's supremacy (at the level of politics),137 And Paul himself seems to be aware of this. He explicitly states that being circumcised allows the followers of Jesus to avoid persecution in general (which, I am claiming, is encountered more frequently and concretely by Paul and especially by his adherents from Gentiles, not Jews): "It is those who want to make a good showing in the flesh that would compel you to be circumcised, and only in order that they may not be persecuted for the cross of Christ" (Gal 6: 12; cf. 5: 11). Paul's activity, then, and his chief offense, is to use the myth of God's 137 All of this is really just another way of articulating - and, in this case, drawing out the political dimensions of - Jonathan Z. Smith's typology of locative versus utopian religion, with the chief exemplar of the latter being Paul; see Drudgery Divine. This typology has, happily, been somewhat clarified in his recent essay, entitled - with inspiration from Dr. Seuss - "Here, There, and Anywhere" in Relating Religion, 323-39. In this essay, Smith describes the religions of "anywhere" as a kind of "new polity," and further notes their appeal with the displaced (332-33). He is careful to note, unfortunately, that he does not intend the "here, there, and anywhere" typology to be understood as exactly commensurate with the "locative versus utopian" typology. See Smith, "Here, There, and Anywhere," 335 n. 9.
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resurrection of Christ as a vehicle for the creation of a new and nonfractional identity for those who lack identity, the ones "who are not," thereby threatening and calling into question the identities of those "who are": "God chose what is low and despised in the world, the things that are not (ta me onta), to bring to nothing the things that are (ta onta)" (1 Cor 1:28).138 While not directly relevant to Paul himself and his particular ekklesiai, the subsequent history and self-expression of the Jesus movement - as well as the reactions to it by outsiders - would seem to support these conclusions. As Lampe has shown, the Christian communities of Rome tended to cluster in immigrant areas. 139 Later Christians, as well, invoked much more explicitly than Paul an "artificial" ethnic identity as a "third race," and this at times in explicit opposition to political or ethnic identity: If heroic enough in facing martyrdom, a Christian like a deacon from Vienne named
Sanctus might even profess his faith alone in answer to an official request to name his nationality and city (Euseb. Hist. Eccl. 5. 1. 20). Non-Christians are usually described in the texts of the early Church as outsiders - 'nations' or ethne (cf. Euseb. Hist. Eccl. 5. 7. 5), the equivalent of goyim for the Jews. 140
And of course the official and semi-official reactions to Christianity in the second century and beyond do what orthodoxy always attempts in the presence of heresy: to retrench as the only acceptable course the assumptions and norms that previously had been unstated and unchallenged. The fact that this orthodox reaction took the form of efforts to force Christians to offer symbolic homage to the emperor supports my claim that the doxa in question - something that went without saying before the Christian challenge - was precisely the monopoly held by Rome and Romans over political universality.
138 Cf. also Romans 4: 17 (kathos gegraptai hoti patera pollon ethnon tetheika se [Gen 17:5], katenanti hou episteusen theou tou zoopoiountos tous nekrous kai ka/ountos fa me onta has onta), where Paul actually links the call to the Gentiles with both the characterization of God creating "the things which are not" and the resurrection. It may worth noting that Paul uses participial forms of onta in three ways: 1) to indicate a state; 2) to indicate location; and 3) to indicate belonging (to the day, to the flesh, to the circumcision, to one's members, etc.; see, e.g., Rom 8:5, 8; 12:3; 1 Thess 5:8). 139 I.e., the fringes of the city, outside the pomerium. See especially Lampe, Paul to Valentinus, 42-46. For Lampe, this is evidence of the originally Jewish nature of the Christian groups. But in fact, as he recognizes, it is most unassailably evidence of their immigrant status. 140 Goodman, Mission and Conversion, 14.
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Conclusions To return to the theme of this symposium, and in conclusion, I have endeavored to show how Paul had constructed a movement that was "heretical" as a function of his interest in identity-construction. While I have not pursued this motif here in as much detail as it deserves, I should also add that I believe the attractiveness of this message must have been a function of the already-constituted identity-problematics of those who heard his message. That is, to put it as bluntly as possible, it was precisely those whose identity was denied - ta me onta - who were called to a new conceptualization of this standing as "the people of God." By imputing an essentially Jewish identity to the displaced of the empire, Paul and his adherents called into question the unspoken doxa of the imperial order and so became heretics, and were persecuted as such. Such a conclusion, if it can be sustained, tells us a great deal about Paul. Most usefully, it allows us to construct his theology as a comprehensible social intervention, rather than as a set of abstract "religious" ideas. Paul's activity emerges as meaningfully social and political, but not at the cost of treating his theological conceptions as mere ciphers. 141 But there are also methodological or theoretical implications here, implications that may be sustained even if my central thesis is found wanting. I have attempted to suggest - or better, to illustrate - how we need not presume that the discourse of heresy is simply invoked as an identity-creating gesture, but how nearly the reverse may be true: that it is the already-uncomfortable or anomalous distinctions of identity, and especially the efforts to formulate, justify, rationalize, codify, or entrench those distinctions, that generate a situation in which the label of heresy makes intuitive sense, and in which the previously-silent assumptions of doxa require retrenchment via an explicit orthodoxy. At least one of the specific circumstances from which such a situation can arise occurs when the self-recognition of a subaltern and previously unrecognized social reality - a social role submerged, that is, within a false totality in which its members do not actually fully participate - becomes the occasion for explicit articulation of a distinctive and separate identity, with the 141 At the same time, Paul is subject to doxa too. While he rejects in practice and thereby exposes the unspoken assumption of the non-ethnic character of the political order, or rather inverts it, at the same time he unable to think of establishing a new order without invoking adoption, sonship, and other familial metaphors. Paul does violate the doxa of Roman imperialism, but he also seems unable to imagine even the political constitution of his ekklesiai without adoption by God. This specific metaphor is actually not an especially frequent one in Paul, but it is telling nonetheless that it was precisely adoption by the god Julius that (discursively) justified Augustus' placement at the pinnacle of political power.
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implication that such a group need no longer be subsumed under the dominant identity, thus threatening the organization and self-conception of that dominant order. Here heresy is not invoked to make selves or mark others; instead, it is the existence or creation of a new identity that leads to heresy, as indeed the very word implies. In this manner, we might then understand heresy as an actual social entity or operation, rather than as only an empty discursive tag. I do not, finally, want to fall into the abstract and theoretical trap so attractive to academics today" in which we discover, reconstruct, or celebrate discursive subversions because real change seems out of reach. I am not, therefore, holding up Paul as a shining example of radical liberation. The phenomena I have described here are mainly discursive, and their liberating potential is accordingly restricted. Paul did not manage to overturn the imperium, he did not liberate anyone from its real domination, and in fact his message was used - with appropriate changes to defend and entrench that imperial order and its heirs for centuries since. Paul, like so many intellectuals, brought words to a gunfight, and suffered the predictable consequences. I should also stress, however, that his words were accompanied by concrete community organizing, and that this is the only reason they have survived and come down through the ages for us to analyze. What value there might have been in Paul's heretical ideas was realized, to whatever extent it was realized, only through the effective embodiment of those ideas in the actual life of actual communities. 142
142 I ,cannot resist noting that Paul's response to the death of Jesus thus seems to conform to the dictum given by Joe Hill at the time of his execution: "Don't mourn. Organize."
The Violence of Orthodoxy AVERIL CAMERON
Not so long ago it was possible to write about heresy as though it was something that really existed and to debate whether "it" was a social or a religious phenomenon. A.H.M. Jones's famous article, "Were Ancient Heresies National and Social Movements in Disguise?" springs to mind though indeed that was written over half a century ago now. 1 But so much has changed since Jones's article and the debate surrounding William Frend's work on the Donatists,2 that it now seems a contradiction in terms to give a book a title such as A History of Heresy, 3 as several authors have done recently. In contrast, the conference on which this volume is based defined itself in terms of discourses and construction, or self-definition, and in the description of its scope the words "heresy" and "heresies" were surrounded by quotation marks. What has happened? Have discourse 1 A.H.M. Jones, "Were Ancient Heresies National or Social Movements in Disguise?" JTS 10 (1959): 280-298, now available in Orthodoxy, Heresy, and Schism in Early Christianity: A Collection of Scholarly Essays, Studies in Early Christianity (ed. Everett Ferguson; New York: Garland, 1993), 314-332; see also W.H.C. Frend, "Heresy and Schism as Social and National Movements," in Schism, Heresy and Religious Protest (ed. D. Baker; Cambridge: CUP, 1972), 37-56; R.A. Markus, "Christianity and Dissent in Roman North Africa: Changing Perspectives," ibid., 21-36. See also the notion of "popular" heresy in the bibliography on medieval heresy, e.g. J. Nelson, "Society, Theodicy and the Origins of Medieval Heresy," ibid., 65-77; Jeffrey B. Russell, Dissent and Reform in the Early Middle Ages (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1965); Malcolm Lambert, Medieval Heresy: Popular Movements from Bogomil to Hus (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1977). 2 W.H.C. Frend, The Donatist Church (Oxford: OUP, 1952), on which see Peter Brown, "Religious Dissent in the Later Roman Empire: the Case of North Africa," History 46 (1961): 83-101, repr. in his Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), 237-59. The Donatists and North Africa tend to be left out of the large bibliography on heresy and identity in the early Christian period (for which see below), but for similar approaches in this field and for a successful deconstruction of the "circumcellions," frequently viewed as leaders of social and economic protest, see Brent Shaw, "Who Were the Circumcellions?" in Vandals, Romans and Berbers: New Perspectives on Late Antique North Africa (ed. A. H. Merrills; Aldershot; Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2004), 227-58, with ample bibliography. 3 David Christie-Murray, A History of Heresy (Oxford: OUP, 1989); G.R. Evans, A Brief History of Heresy (Oxford: OUP, 2001); cf. G. Liidemann, Heretics: The Other Side of Early Christianity (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1996).
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theory, postcolonialism and other such rhetorical tropes between them made heresy the great unmentionable? In a world in which we no longer speak of Christianity but of Christianities, the forging of identity and the processes of self-definition have become the key topics of discussion. 4 It is the new orthodoxy to point out that heretics are made, not born; that the "genealogies of heresy" traced in early Christian authors such as Clement of Alexandria and others are devices by which the prevailing group can contrast the supposed pedigrees of their rivals with their own. 5 Apologetic techniques in early Christian literature also incorporated not only defensive explanations but also strategies of separation whereby Jews and heretics were labeled as "other."6 As for Late Antiquity, to quote only from a recent paper by Fergus Millar, no postmodernist himself: "It perhaps hardly needs to be stated that the characterization, and naming, of groups within Christianity as 'heretical' represents a process of construction by others, and, as expressed by contemporaries (and indeed by modems), can never be taken as constituting simple reports on observable realities."7 The extent to which early Christian heresy can be objectified in modern scholarship is limited indeed. Only, it would seem, if the central orthodoxy - the "dominant ideology" - is capable of being formulated, can "heresy" be defined; yet the identification of heresy by early Christian authors was part and parcel of their own attempts to formulate Christian orthodoxy, a 4 See for example Rebecca Lyman, "The Politics of Passing: Justin Martyr's Conversion as a Problem of 'Hellenization, '" in Conversion in Late Antiquity and the Early Middles Ages. Seeing and Believing (ed. Kenneth Miles and Anthony Grafton; Rochester, NY: U. of Rochester Press, 2003), 36-60, with extensive bibliography on theoretical approaches. 5 From many examples see Virginia Burrus, The Making of a Heretic: Gender, Authority, and the Priscillianist Controversy (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1995); D. Kimber Buell, Making Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); eadem, Why This New Race? Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 6 See for instance Judith M. Lieu, Image and Reality: The Jews in the World of the Christians in the Second Century (Edinburgh: T &T Clark, 1996); idem, Neither Jew nor Greek? Constructing Early Christianity (Edinburgh: T &T Clark, 2002); eadem, Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World (Oxford: OUP, 2004); M. Edwards, M. Goodman, S. Price, eds., in association with C. Rowland, Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians (Oxford: OUP, 1999). 7 Fergus Millar, "Repentant Heretics in Fifth-Century Lydia: Identity and Literacy," Scripta Classica Israelica 23 (2004): 111-30; cf. also idem, "Christian Emperors, Christian Church and the Jews of the Diaspora in the Greek East, CE 379-450," JJS 55 (2004): 1-24. For Late Antiquity see also for example the papers in section two of W. E. Klingshim and M. Vessey, eds., The Limits of Ancient Christianity: Essays on Late Antique '{hought and Culture in Honour of R.A. Markus (Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan Press, 1999), and on identity, R. Miles, ed., Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity (London: Routledge, 1999).
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pedagogic device which at the same time signaled both a real struggle and a dynamic and interactive process. Christian orthodoxy is still fought over. If it is "something" at all, it took time and effort to develop in Late Antiquity and after, and this development was part of a complex cultural process. In our own day traditionalist Christians and true believers might look to an unchanging core of Christian belief, but most scholars will reject that as a satisfactory methodology, and even were it to be accepted, the problem remains of agreeing what that core actually is or on what it is based. In Late Antiquity, both before and after the reign of Constantine, orthodoxy was highly contested, as is shown by the numerous synods, church councils, depositions and polemical writings by Christians. It is now amply apparent from the deluge of modem work on the subject that the struggle over orthodoxy which was given impetus by the Christian empire was already well underway in the earlier period. Lyman writes of the multiple identities and necessary negotiation of a figure such as Justin, and scholars such as Judith Lieu have drawn attention to similar issues in relation to Christians and Jews in the second century. 8 Tessa Rajak memorably renamed Justin's "dialogue" with Trypho as "Talking at Trypho."9 The so-called dialogues written by Christians and purporting to record discussions between Christians and Jews were very far from being innocent or inclusive; their outcome was predetermined, and their tone often enough normative and even harsh. Writing of Paul, Daniel Boyarin asks why it was that Paul's "universalism," the desire to unite everyone in the faith of Christ, in fact has seemed to be "conducive to coercive politico-cultural systems that engage in more or less violent projections of the absorption of cultural specificities into the dominant one," and of the effect of "coercive discourses of sameness" to deny difference. 10 The logic is inexorable: if faith in Christ is necessary for all, then all must be converted, brought to believe. 11 There is no room here for difference. There is a good deal at stake here for today's world. This paper approaches the question from the point of view of early Christianity. Boyarin comes to it in a further book from the perspective of Judaism, in which he writes movingly in the preface about the personal cost to him of
8 In addition to the works cited at n. 6 see Judith M. Lieu, "The Forging of Christian Identity," Mediterranean Archaeology 11 (1998): 71-82. 9 Tessa Rajak, "Talking at Trypho, Apologetics as anti-Judaism in Justin's Dialogue with Trypho the Jew," in Edwards, Goodman and Price, eds., Apologetics in the Roman Empire, 59-80. 10 Daniel Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1994), esp. 228,233. 11 Ibid., 232.
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adopting a constructivist view of Jewish orthodoxy.12 He has much to say on the techniques of heresiology, and is right to see the latter's usefulness for this process of construction, controlled by '~religion police" and "border-guards" (p. 14), but his argument is about the (late) separation which produced "Judaism" and "Christianity," with the theme that it was the latter which in fact stimulated the former to become "orthodox Judaism." My paper is confined to early Christianity, and is therefore open to challenge from those who, like Boyarin, would put early "Christianity" and "Judaism" on a continuum from Marcionites at one end to Jews for whom Jesus meant nothing on the other.13 It is salutary therefore to be reminded of this wider context in which the concept of "orthodoxy" operates. In tracing the development of what Boyarin calls "the discursive institution of orthodoxy" (p. 29), the study of labeling and naming is enormously fruitful. I would want to stress the important role of lists and classification in the process of developing a Christian knowledge which would indeed be all-embracing; that is, one way in which the other is defined as unacceptable is by imposing a name on it. This process is brought out extremely well by Herve Inglebert in his book Interpretatio Christiana. 14 He traces the many different ways in which Christians in Late Antiquity developed an all-embracing scheme of knowledge which could subsume every branch of intellectual activity, and at the heart of which was redefinition, or renaming. Within all this strenuous intellectual effort the labeling of "heresies" was only one element, but it was a key one. The listing and naming, or name-calling, of heresies, formed part of every Christian writer's repertoire, whether it was to trace th,e genealogy of heresies, or their inter-relationships, or to collect them like Epiphanius of Salamis in an artfully contrived and elaborate calling-to mind of biblical numbers. Writing was a central technique. I have elsewhere called heresiology, the literary form which resulted from this impetus, "the Cinderella of early Christian literature."15 However, Cinderella it is no longer. Great strides forward have been made in a very short period to understand what often seems to be an unpleasant and indeed tedious body
12 Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: U. of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), xii-xv. 13 Ibid., 17. 14 H. Inglebert, interpretatio Christiana. Les mutations des savoirs (cosmographie, geographie, ethnographie, histoire) dans l'Antiquite chretienne 30-630 apres J.-c. Collection des etudes augustiniennes (Paris: Institut d'etudes augustiniennes, 2001). 15 Averil Cameron, "How to Read Heresiology," JMEMS 33.3 (2003): 471-492 (repr. in Dale Martin and Patricia Cox Miller, eds., The Cultural Turn in Late Ancient Studies: Gender, Asceticism and Historiography, Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).
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of material,16 and the existence of this volume bringing together the work of scholars not just of early Christianity but also of Judaism and of late antique religion more generally, is an indication of that heightened consciousness. So the study of "heresy" has moved, like so much else, from social history into the study of discourse. 17 But one cannot have heresy without orthodoxy. It is indeed to mark something which is held to contrast with generally received views that the word "heresy" is generally used today, for instance in a lively book of essays by the political scientist John Gray, which is simply entitled Heresies. 18 Science has also advanced through the gradual acceptance of theories that were when first put forward regarded as heresies, in the process called paradigm change. In contrast, religious orthodoxy of its nature seeks to suppress or deny difference, and the religious orthodox, today's fundamentalists no less than the orthodox Christians of Late Antiquity, take their stand on tradition, literalism and continuity; their stance is thus diametrically opposed to the prevailing intellectual currents which emphasize postcolonialism, hybridity and difference. More recently therefore I have been turning my mind from heresy to the concept of orthodoxy,19 and to the related topics of promotion, enforcement and repression. 2o Seen from this perspective, the discourses of orthodoxy in early Christianity would count as 16 See the discussion of heresiology in relation to late antique North Africa by Shaw, "Who Were the Circumcellions?" 232-50, an excellent discussion of the corpus of material and its success in constructing heresy and blackening the record of the supposed enemies of orthodoxy. This material is making things difficult for historians by doing violence to the real situation and Shaw has some trouble with it, as can be seen from his description of Augustine's De haeresibus as "a turgid list" and "a re-canned work quickly put together from other existing sources" with "a few supernumerary heresies" added to the earlier list by Filastrius (p. 238); but Shaw's main argument is that the heresy lists "are not an innocent phenomenon. They are linked to the specific power aims of the central Church" (238). 17 At any rate for historians, though more is at stake for theologians. Cf. Rowan Williams, "Does It Make Sense to Speak of pre-Nicene Orthodoxy?" in The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick (ed. Rowan Williams; Cambridge: CUP, 1989), 1-23. 18 John Gray, Heresies (London: Granta Books, 2004). 19 Boyarin's argument in Border Lines is that in Late Antiquity Christianity, but not Judaism, became a "religion," defined as "an orthodoxy whereby heterodox views, even very strange opinions, would make one an outsider" (13). This orthodoxy is about belief; he does not allow that like Judaism, orthodox Christianity as a "religion" included a bundle of practices as well as a set of beliefs. In fact Christian heresiology was very interested in differences of practice, some of them seemingly rather trivial. 20 See Averil Cameron, "Enforcing Orthodoxy in Byzantium," in Discipline and Diversity in the Church, Studies in Church History (ed. Kate Cooper and Jeremy Gregory; forthcoming).
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"deformations," in the language of Edward Said, moves in "border wars," denials of difference and "expressions of essentializations. "21 What therefore was this "orthodoxy" which was so contested in early Christianity, and why did identifying orthodoxy seem to matter so much? In Late Antiquity all Christians who asked themselves the question called themselves orthodox, no matter what their position; indeed the aspiration to universalism was not given up even when the reality of division seems to us to have been undeniable. To describe oneself as a heretic is in essence a logical contradiction. Late antique Christians shared the belief that there was indeed such a thing as a "true" faith, and believed that their version corresponded to it. The bottom line must be that our academic talk of constructing "the other," or defining heresy and so on, bypasses the problem that orthodoxy mattered in Late Antiquity because the question was seen as a matter of truth. Some methodological questions are therefore in point. Triumphalist explanations of the rise of Christianity are certainly out of fashion in academic history, and sectarian interpretations are frowned upon in secular educational contexts. It is not difficult to offer instead a materialist explanation of the importance placed on the definition of orthodoxy in early Christianity, or an explanation of particular forms of alternative beliefs in terms of social history. Yet this seems ultimately inadequate to the issues. Peter Berger seems to be coming nearer to it when he says in The Sacred Canopy that if late antique Christianity had not been able to provide a formula which accounted for both the divine and the human natures of Christ it could not have fulfilled the requirement of providing an adequate explanation of the Incarnation in terms of theodicy.22 However this line of argument also fails when one takes into account the nonChalcedonians at both ends of the christo logical spectrum. Weare still left wondering why orthodoxy - even an orthodoxy defined in doctrinal terms - mattered so much. Living as we now do in an age of religious fundamentalism, is there not an imperative to ask what was really going on in all this late antique argument? I hope to extend the same questions in another study to the study of Byzantium, a society in which orthodoxy somehow grew into Orthodoxy, and in relation to which social or reductionist explanations of "heresy" seem particularly unhelpful. And I want to ask how attitudes to heresy in Late Antiquity differed from, or 21 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf 1993), 310-11; cf. Boyarin, Border Lines, 13-22; for hybridity see Romi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London; New York: Routledge, 1994); against this prevailing ambivalence and diversity,. orthodoxy inserts itself as a "fact-stating discourse," ibid., 239. 22 Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967),67.
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resembled, the ways in which the issue was approached in the late medieval and Reformation West. In their attitudes to heresy and heretics, did people in Late Antiquity place most emphasis on converting the heterodox, or on developing their own self-understanding? And did they think, like their later successors, that recantations must be obtained at all costs, in order to save souls that would otherwise be damned? Or that they would be doing God's will in putting unrepentant heretics to death? At what point, if at all, did Late Antiquity become a persecuting society (to use the well-known term),23 and if it did not, why didn't it? Meanwhile I suggest that we need to change tack somewhat and think harder about what was meant by orthodoxy and why and how it was developed and maintained in late antique Christianity. Though it had much to do with hermeneutics, it was not about Scriptural fundamentalism. Its development started long before there could be any question of biblical literalism; indeed, when the canon was eventually established, even the most "literal" late antique exegesis was willing to preserve the integrity of the Scriptural text by imaginative sleights of hand which modern fundamentalists would hardly accept. It has been tempting to say that the process really got going only once the state entered the scene, since more was clearly now at stake in terms of which groups would gain in the competition for power and influence. But that does not account for early writers like Justin, or Irenaeus or Clement, each of whom had a well-developed taxonomy of heresy. 24 I still want to ask, therefore, why did the concept of orthodoxy matter so much? What really hung on it? It seems important not to lose sight of the fact that orthodoxy (despite its appropriation of the Greek word for "opinion") was felt to be about truth. This is a problem for modern scholarship. Historians of Late Antiquity currently tend to think of heresy not as a deviation from the truth but as something constructed for the sake of identity, or for branding the "other" in a one-way relationship because truth, after all, became problematic quite a long time ago; many scholars writing today have now grown up, as it were, with the idea that truth is not an absolute. Late antique studies have drawn on the constructivism which has also taken over in other disciplines and periods, from anthropology to history.25 Thus the search for identities and construction is both an expression of late 23 R.1. Moore, The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950-1250 (London: Blackwell, 1987; repr., 2007); see for Late Antiquity, S. Elm, E. Rebillard, E., and A. Romano, eds., Orthodoxie, christianisme, histoire (Rome: Ecole Fran~aise de Rome, 2000). 24 The classic account is by A. Ie Boulluec, La notion d'heresie dans fa litterature grecque Ir-IIr siecles 2 vols. (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1985). 25 For history, see Elizabeth Clark, History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).
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twentieth-century postmodernism and an obvious tactical move in something as awkward and unpalatable for modern historians as the study of heresy. But to collapse heresy into the search for identity risks losing sight of orthodoxy altogether. This is a problem for academic theologians as much as for historians, and faced with this dilemma, some Anglican theologians in Cambridge have initiated a movement known as Radical Orthodoxy, which represents an attempt to rescue orthodoxy and get round their dissatisfaction with the relativism of philosophy in its postmodem state. 26 The solution they have found is to return to a pre-modern and preReformation world-view, presented as Augustinian or even Platonist, which is comprehensive and unifying, and harmonizing rather than agonistic for the very reason that (in their eyes) it is based on certainties. It is "orthodox," and at the same time "radical," because it literally goes back to roots. It engages directly with political liberalism, from whence it has naturally provoked a hostile reaction. 27 In a complete reversal, Radical Orthodoxy even turns things on their head and calls the arguments of secular (post-Enlightenment) rationalism "heresy." The agendas here are religious ones. Nevertheless, one of the more arresting aspects of Radical Orthodoxy is its claim that orthodoxy in this sense brings peace, against what its advocates see as the violence and power politics inherent in postmodemism. This is an extraordinarily paradoxical claim. While the scholars in question may assert an Augustinian vision of heavenly peace or order, historians know that the search for orthodoxy in Late Antiquity brought anything but peace, indeed quite the contrary. Christians attacked each other, in words and competition, and even literally in outbreaks of physical violence. 28 When the arm of the law was added to the mix, it brought both real and metaphorical violence in its train.29 The voices of Radical Orthodoxy want 26 See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: OUP, 1990); Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: OUP, 1997); John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology (London: Routledge, 1999). 27 See Christopher. J. Insole, "Against Radical Orthodoxy: the Dangers of Overcoming Political Liberalism," Modern Theology 20.2 (2004): 213-241. 28 See Richard Lim, Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1995); Brent Shaw, "War and Violence," and Richard Lim, "Christian Triumph and Controversy," in Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Postclassical World (ed. G.W. Bowersock, Peter Brown and Oleg Grabar; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) 130-69; 196-218. 29 Cf. Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 256: "The judicial process is an institution integral to every kind of state, and it is always based on coercion .... it punishes transgressions (of commission and omission) by the exercise of violence."
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to see orthodoxy as a unifying force. 3o Yet they are themselves far from displaying peaceful toleration of their critics, who must after all, in their view, qualify as heretics and are even described as such by them. There is a logical as well as a commonsense problem with the notion of orthodoxy as bringing peace. It can seem inevitable that a religion based on revelation, with sacred books in need of exegesis, and with an overt philosophical terminology for describing the deity, should develop the notion of correct and incorrect doctrine. 31 But if the revelation is held to be true, and Christians are enjoined to "believe," to have faith, how then can they be tolerant of others who disagree? This is a problem with which fundamentalist Christians are still struggling. Alongside questions of orthodoxy and heresy in early Christianity, the subject of religious toleration has also been receiving attention. 32 Some have argued for toleration, for instance Harold Drake writing on Constantine. 33 But toleration is not the natural accompaniment of a belief in the absolute rightness of one's beliefs, neither does it sit easily with a developing theory of heresy. To quote from Graeme Clarke, what remained after the apparently tolerant Edict of Milan was "an unresolvable factor the exclusivity of Christianity."34 According to Wolfgang Liebeschuetz, intolerance was one of the chief contributions of Christianity to the Roman Empire. 35 It is necessary to work quite hard to dismiss the superficially very intolerant statements of late antique Christian writers when faced with heretics or indeed Jews, and to maintain an argument for tolerance on their part. One of the most striking kinds of Christian writing, though the least attractive to modern sensibilities, is the very large body of polemical works, or even casual asides, addressed in Late Antiquity towards heterodox Christians, or towards Jews, with whom the former are often 30
See R.R. Reno, "The Radical Orthodoxy Project," First Things 100 (2000): 37--44.
31 On the violence inherent in the Christian appropriation of Jewish and orthodox Scriptures see G. Stroumsa, "The Christian Hermeneutical Revolution and Its Double Helix," in The Use of Sacred Books in the Ancient World (ed. L.V. Rutgers, P.W. van der Horst, H.W. Havelaar, and L. Teugels; Leuven: Peeters, 1998),9-28. 32 See for example Graham N. Stanton and Guy G. Stroumsa, eds., Tolerance and Intolerance in Early Judaism and Christianity, (Cambridge: CUP, 1998); Lellia Cracco Ruggini, 'Tolleranza e intolleranza nella societa tardoantica: il caso degli ebrei', Ric. di St. Soc. eRe!' 23 (1983): 27--44; P.F. Beatrice, ed., L 'Intolleranza cristiana nei confronti dei pagani (Bologna: EDB, Edizioni Dehoniane Bologna, 1993). 33 H.A. Drake, Constantine and the Bishops: The Politics of Intolerance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2000). 34 Graeme Clarke, "Third-Century Christianity," Cambridge Ancient History XII (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), 587-669, esp. 661. 35 J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz, Continuity and Change in Roman Religion (Oxford: OUP, 1979),293.
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conflated. 36 If we move into later periods, this trait becomes even clearer: the heresiological literature of the Byzantines is an abusive literature which developed a highly stylized and technologized repertoire of vituperation, caricature and polemic. This was of course a strategy of separation, but "textual wars" were hard fought, and orthodoxy was the territory fought over. 37 The notion of tolerance as a late antique Christian virtue is counter-intuitive, not to mention anachronistic, arising from liberal academic agendas, and indeed the discourse of heresy became more abusive the more highly developed it became. Christian disagreement could indeed at times also produce actual violence or rioting. 38 As Peter Brown has written, "religious toleration was, at best, a fragile notion. "39 It is indeed ironic to find the proponents of Radical Orthodoxy arguing in favor of orthodoxy against the violence that they see as basic to postmodernism. My suggestion in this paper, therefore, is that instead of assuming orthodoxy and reading heresy as a discourse of the "other," it could be useful to start from the concept of orthodoxy itself. What makes orthodoxy orthodox, and how is orthodoxy violent? First, words. The very concept, "orthodoxy," is verbal; it recalls Platonic philosophical debate about truth and falsehood, and insofar as doxa implies "belief," it also implies that that belief can be stated in words. But the first part of the word "orthodoxy" also implies drawing a line, between true and false, between correct and wrong. In other words, "orthodoxy" claims to be true, and condemns everything else to the realm of falsehood. It is not benign; it entails demarcation and condemnation. The words in which orthodoxy is expressed impose themselves on and condemn all else to the realm of falsehood. Words were also inherent in early Christian and late antique techniques of confirming and stating orthodoxy. Why else did early Christians and 36 For the latter cf. e.g. Averil Cameron, "Blaming the Jews: the Seventh-Century Invasions of Palestine in Context," Travaux et Memoires (Melanges Gilbert Dagron) 14 (2002): 57-78. 37 Averil Cameron, "Texts as Weapons: Polemic in the Byzantine Dark Ages," in Literacy and Power in the Ancient World (ed. Alan Bowman and Greg Woolf; Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 198-215; Rajak, "Talking at Trypho," 80, makes a similar point about religious identity in an earlier period. 38 See H.A. Drake, ed., Violence in Late Antiquity: Perceptions and Practices (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006); there was certainly an element of wishful thinking about some of the more violent prescriptions in the legal sources: see Peter Brown, "Christianity and Religious Conflict," in The Cambridge Ancient History XIII (Cambridge: CUP, 1998), 632-664, esp. 638-641; trouble could easily happen, cf. p. 646 on "the decade of violence" (the 380s-390s). 39 Ibid., 643.
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Christians in Late Antiquity feel impelled to write so much? Books and books, on every conceivable theme, letters and homilies, treatises, commentaries. The books were not innocent; they were written to persuade, to castigate, to reprove, to chasten. While seemingly scholarly in its approach, exegesis served similar purposes. Elizabeth Clark has shown just how powerfully exegesis could be put to the service of a religious agenda. 40 Christian writers used exegesis to promote their own versions of orthodox belief, and visual art was used in the same way. The Christian art of Late Antiquity and Byzantium is exegetical and doctrinal; it does not reflect the spiritual creativity of the artist, so much as the concept of orthodoxy as understood by the artist or patron. At times it did so overtly, by depicting, from the eighth century onwards, the sequence of councils at which orthodox doctrine was laid down.41 During the arguments about Byzantine iconoclasm, the respective merits of words and images were debated precisely in terms of how closely either came to expressing orthodox doctrine. Contemporaries were uneasily aware that both texts and images could mislead - that is, either might fail in their attempt to convey orthodoxy. No uncertainty could be allowed, no room for doubt or disagreement must remain. But this means that the words or images must IMPOSE the message of orthodoxy on a recalcitrant and dangerous pluralism. The fact that Christianity had sacred texts which were often obscure or contradictory necessitated the search for orthodox interpretation. Late antique Christians were not like modem fundamentalists: they were only too well aware that the Scriptures were often obscure and contradictory. But they shared with modern fundamentalists the idea that everything must be there, if only it was expounded correctly. To preach or expound orthodoxy in this sense was as much of an imperative as to promote asceticism; in fact orthodoxy WAS asceticism, the asceticism of words and belief whose imperative was the rejection of all else. 42 It is only too clear from the sheer effort involved in trying to expound it, and to condemn the alternatives, that the search for orthodoxy did violence to the varieties of religious expression and experience that actually existed. Thus the concept of orthodoxy itself becomes an instrument which does violence to actual pluralism. It then engendered 40 E.A. Clark, Reading Renunciation: Asceticism and Scripture in Early Christianity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 41 C. Walter, L'iconographie des conciles dans la tradition byzantine (Paris: Institut Fran9ais d'etudes byzantines, 1970). 42 G. Harpham, The Ascetic Imperative in Culture and Criticism (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1987); see also Derek Krueger, Writing and Holiness: The Practice of Authorship in the Early Christian East (Philadelphia: U. of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
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more violence as generations of later Christian writers struggled to expound, explain and promote this elusive central concept. The violence of the verbal struggle could also be turned on its head. Several emperors tried to command silence - which is itself a violent infringement of speech and writing. Constantine himself started off by exhorting Arius and Alexander to keep their disagreement to themselves and stop arguing. 43 Zeno attempted to quell discussion with his Henotikon of 482. Actual imposition of silence was tried, for example, by the seventh-century emperors who tried to impose Monotheletism as the new orthodoxy. The so-called Ekthesis promulgated by Heraclius in 638 forbade talk of "energies" and decreed the doctrine of one will; it was followed by threats of deposition and excommunication for clergy who disobeyed. Ten years later his successor issued a Typos which forbade all debates about energies or wills, again with sanctions. 44 These attempts may seem like desperation, but were in fact dictatorial interventions, the verbal equivalent of the book-burning practiced for the same reasons by the same emperors. The more obvious kind of violence is of course the violence of enforcement,45 or at times, of persecution. A well-known unpublished paper by Geoffrey de Ste Croix which is soon to appear in print, claims that more Christians were persecuted by other Christians in Late Antiquity than ever Christians by the pagan state. 46 I would not want to go so far, but it is nevertheless true both that the concept of orthodoxy gave rise to a kind of discourse that was authoritarian and intolerant in the extreme, that emperors in Late Antiquity resorted at times to actual persecution and that heresy became a crime, just like paganism. 47 The rise of the
43 Eusebius, Vita Constantini II.71; this letter has attracted attention recently, and is discussed by Boyarin, Border Lines, 44. Like him I see it as preventing discussion, which is to be confined to Arius and Alexander themselves, not opening it up. 44 See the discussion by W. Brandes, "Orthodoxy and Heresy in the Seventh Century: Prosopographical Observations on Monotheletism," in Fifty Years of Prosopography: Rome, Byzantium and Beyond (ed. Averil Cameron; Oxford: OUP, 2003), 103-18, esp. 106-8, 114. 45 See for the later part of the period Pauline Allen, "The Definition and Enforcement of Orthodoxy," Cambridge Ancient History XIV (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), 811-854. 46 See J. Streeter and M. Whitby, eds., Christian Persecution, Martyrdom and Orthodoxy (Oxford), forthcoming, chapter five. 47 For Constantine, see Elaine Pagels, Beyond Belief The Secret Gospel of Thomas (New York 2005), chapter five, "Constantine and the Catholic Church," 143-185; also Millar, "Christian Emperors, Christian Church." It is also relevant, though often forgotten, that Gibbon's Constantine is a Christian tyrant. For the legislation against heresy see Caroline Humfress, "Citizens and Heretics: Late Roman Lawyers on Christian Heresy," in this volume.
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institutionalized church certainly fostered the process, but I think it is too simplistic to make that the whole explanation. To conclude, then, the concept of orthodoxy implies not only intolerance but also violence. Given the current tendency to define "heresy" as a construct, how can one fail to do the same with "orthodoxy," or to place the word "orthodoxy" in the same inverted commas? But then orthodoxy falls prey to just the ontological doubts which assail the notion of truth. Historians of our period face a dilemma. Neither orthodoxy nor heresy can any longer be treated as objects of study in themselves, that is, essentialized. If it is an effect of postmodernism that "heresy" is now a contested term, then the same must be true of "orthodoxy." But any view, such as that of Radical Orthodoxy, which wants to return to orthodoxy as an essence must fall into the trap that such a concept is itself inherently violent. Such views are not "radical," but reactionary, and Christians through the centuries have indeed harried, tortured, and burned others in the name of this elusive orthodoxy. The dilemma, I would contend, leaves historians with a challenge: not how to read "heresy," but how to understand the mirage of "orthodoxy."
Defining Orthodoxy in Pseudo-Justin' s "Quaestiones et responsiones ad orthodoxos" Y ANNIS PAP ADOYANNAKIS Debate and disputation played an important role in late antique society and were integral parts of the process that led to the formation of Christian orthodoxy.1 From the wealth of material that has come down to us from that period, this paper will focus on a very-little studied collection of questions and answers, probably from early fifth-century Syria, the "Quaestiones et responsiones ad orthodoxos" (hereafter QRO). Falsely attributed to Justin, the QRO is a collection of 161 questions and answers (in the longer recension) dealing with a wide range of problems, including cosmology, biblical exegesis, Christology, apologetics, magic, medicine, demonology and so forth. While various suggestions have been made concerning its authorship, the question has to remain open pending a more detailed study of the text, which still lacks a critical edition. 2 This collection of erotapokriseis is valuable not only as a glimpse into the process of the formation of Christian orthodoxy,3 but also because it highlights features of this process which are not easily recoverable from 1 See Averil Cameron, "Dispute Poems and Dialogues in the Ancient and Mediaeval Near East," in Dispute Poems and Dialogues in the Ancient and Mediaeval Near East: Forms and Types of Literary Debates in Semitic and Related Literatures (ed. G.J. Reinink and H.L.J. Vanstiphout; Leuven: Peeters 1991), 91-108. Idem, "Texts as Weapons: Polemic in the Byzantine Dark Ages," in Literacy and Power in the Ancient World (ed. A.K. Bowman and G. Woolf; Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 198-215; see also Richard Lim, Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1995). 2 On the authorship see Adolf von Harnack, Diodor von Tarsus: Vier pseudojustinische Schriften als Eigentum Diodors nachgewiesen, TU 21.4 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1901), 33-44. Franz Xavier Funk, "Pseudo-Justin und Diodor von Tarsus," in Kirchengeschichtliche Abhandlungen und Untersuchungen, vol. 3 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1907), 323-50. See, recently, Christoph Riedweg, "Iustinus Martyr II (Pseudo-justinische Schriften)," Reallexikon fiir Antike und Christen tum, 19, 1998, cols. 848-873, esp. 868-869. For the purposes of this paper I use the edition of A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus (St. Peterburg, 1895, reprint, Leipzig, 1975). All translations of the QRO are my own. Much remains to be done for a complete study of this corpus of literature. that merits wider attention. This paper forms part of a broader book-length study that I am preparing on late antique and Byzantine collections of erotapokriseis. 3 On this see also Averil Cameron, "The Violence of Orthodoxy," in this volume.
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other, more formal, accounts and sources. In cognitive terms they illustrate not only how religious instruction operated, but also some of the mechanisms that shaped religious views and opinion. The collection seeks to provide orthodox teaching on ethical, theological, liturgical and scriptural problems that arose in the religious environment within which its author lived. The main concern of many Christian authors in the fifth century was how Christian the empire had become. 4 This concern permeates the QRO.5 From this perspective, the inquiries on theodicy, cosmology, exegesis among others cease to be isolated instances and, emerge as essential parts of the process of the restructuring of religious belief.
Nature of the Work With regard to its literary form, the work belongs to the early Christian question-and-answer literature of erotapokriseis. 6 The form was widely used in Greek and Roman literature because of its great didactic potential and value. In Christian literature it was used first - interestingly enough by Marcion, Apelles, Tatian and their students, to raise objections to passages in the Bible.? Thus the erotapokriseis were associated with debate, polemics and apologetics, but also instruction and catechesis. 8 Origen, Basil and Eusebius employed the literary form of erotapokriseis to solve exegetical and philological problems in Scripture. Other important authors such as Theodoret, Cyril of Alexandria, and Zacharias of Mytilene,
See Robert Markus, End of Ancient Christianity (Cambridge: CUP, 1990),31-35. See for instance Q. 143, p. 132. 6 See Gustave Bardy, "La litterature patristique des 'Quaestiones et responsiones' sur l'Ecriture Sainte," Revue Biblique 41 (1932): 210-236; 341-369; 515-537; 42 (1933): 14-30; 211-229; 328-352. Also Lorrenzo Perrone, "II genere delle 'Quaestiones et responsiones' nella letteratura cristiana antica fino ad Agostino," in "De divers is quaestionibus octoginta tribus," "De diversis quaestionibus ad simplicianum," di Agostino D 'Jppona (Rome: Citta nuova editrice, 1996), 11-44. For the most recent approach to this literature see Annelie Volgers and Claudio Zamagni, eds., Erotapokriseis: Early Christian Question-and-Answer Literature in Context (Louvain: Peeters, 2004). 7 Bardy, "La litterature patristique des 'Quaestiones et responsiones' sur l'Ecriture Sainte," Revue Biblique 41 (1932): 217-224. 8 For the didacticism and the catechetical dimension of these collections, see Yannis Papadoyannakis, "Instruction by Question and Answer in Late Antiquity: The Case of Late Antique and Byzantine Erotapokriseis," in Greek Literature in Late Antiquity: Dynamism, Didacticism, Classicism (ed. Scott Johnson; Aldershot, forthcoming), 91105. 4 5
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made use of erotapokriseis and dialogue to refute criticisms and give solutions to various problems that were posed to them. As it has been recently shown in the case of Eusebius' s Solutiones, the questions read like exercises in tackling difficult and not always easy to solve questions, a feature that ties them to their philosophical and philological predecessors. 9 This accounts for a certain openendedness of some answers which are rather tentative, perhaps only intended to be suggestive. The question of the literary form and process is thus relevant not only for understanding the' collection as a whole, but also for the mechanisms and rhetorical strategies employed for the formation of orthodox belief and practice in general. When assessing the QRO it is worth noting that we are dealing with a miscellaneous collection. Each pair of questions and answers is numbered by the ancient editor. Sometimes the questions are linked in sequence by some common theme: eschatology, cosmology, demonology, or magic. At other times they are unrelated. Some questions are more complex and closely-argued than others. The answers are of varying lengths and can take the form of longer disquisitions. 10 Throughout the collection, the kind of language employed is meant to create the feel of the classroom for the reader even if we are dealing with a written collection of these aporiai. This is obvious not only from the requests of the inquirers to the teacher (didaxon: teach [us], mathomen: let us learn, diasaphenison: clarify this for us and so forth)l1 but also from the answers that are given. There are also indications as to the proper procedure and the limits for the exercise of curiosity. For example in Q. 41 a question deals with the ability of certain people to cause rain through the manipulation of the clouds: Q.: If the clouds send forth the rain to the earth by means of a divine command, why do the so-called cloud-impellers prepare some incantations whereby they want to hurl forth hail and heavy rain? 12
To this the author of the collection responds: A.: This is not attested in the Scriptures and is therefore not to be believed. And you who asked this question, [you] did nor ask the question based on what you saw happening, but based on hearsay. 13
9 See Allan E. Johnson, "Rhetorical Criticism in Eusebius' Gospel Questions," Studia Patristica 18.1 (1989): 33-39. 10 For instance Q. 41, p. 49 is of the shortest while Q.161, p. 146-150 is the longest. 11 Q. 31,11-12, p. 40, Q. 37,24, p. 45, Q. 77,10-11, p. 74, Q. 83,2, p. 79, Q. 58, 17, p. 61, Q . .103, 21, p. 94. 12 Q. 41, 13-16, p. 49. 13 Q. 41, 17-20, p. 49.
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Although the focus keeps shifting from one question to another, there is an overriding use of certain techniques and arguments. In Q. 159, we see the anonymous Christian teacher at work as he tries to steer the inquirer through the lessons he has to teach about the rules of inquiry: This question is unbecoming of either a Christian or a Greek (pagan). [ ... ] One must not construct an inquiry from things that are agreed upon (homo10goumenon) but from disputed issues. 14
Features such as the rich dialogical elements, and the seemingly random way in which the questions arise - so as to suggest a feeling of free association - and the seeming extemporized solutions offered to some aporiai imitate the actual performance of the teacher. In fact, this may be as close to the process of Christian schooling as we can get. On account of this, it is plausible to assume that pseudo-Justin's QRO developed from some pedagogical process, for example as versions of a lecture notebook containing problems for discussion or alternatively of notes from classroom discussion. 15
Content In terms of content the QRO is a very mixed bag. As mentioned already, the questions range from exegesis of difficult biblical passages to explanation of specific terms,16 religious practice and contemporary issues. Several questions echo well-known objections to Christianity that ultimately go back to Celsus, Porphyry and Julian, while others aim to refute heretical and Manichaean arguments. Following the literary precedent of other early Christian authors, a good deal of pseudo-Justin's erotapokriseis aim at refuting these criticisms and accusations using the rhetorical method of anaskeue and kataskeue. 17 On account of this, there is a strong apologetic dimension in these questions and answers directed not
14 Q. 159, 7-11, p. 146. For this mode of argumentation that goes back to Aristotle see Ann Blair, "The Prob1emata as a Natural Philosophical Genre," in Natural Particulars: Nature and Disciplines in Renaissance Europe (ed. A. Grafton and N. Siraisi; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), 171-204. For a similar use of argumentation by Christians see Henriette M. Meissner, Rhetorik und Theologie: der Dialog Gregors von Nyssa De anima et resurrectione (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1991), 115-175. 15 See Harnack, Diodor von Tarsus. Vier pseudojustinische Schriften, 19. 16 For instance Q. 98, p. 91. 17 See A. E. Johnson, "Rhetorical Criticism in Eusebius' Gospel Questions," 33-39.
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only against pagans but also against heterodox Christians, Jews and Manichaeans. 18 These questions referred to commonly known problems that needed to be addressed and were, therefore, intended for wider circulation: hence the indices that preface the collection making it easier for consultation. 19 In fact G. Dagron, the only scholar who has recently touched briefly upon this text, has shown that especially the questions that deal with historical issues, paganism and heresy stand in tension - and at times in stark contrast - with evidence from contemporary hagiography. 20 Dagron has also argued persuasively that on the basis of these collections we can get closer to the realities of the fifth and sixth centuries.
Challenges to Orthodoxy While QRO is made up of many strands, I will draw on select issues to highlight the process rather than the overall content of the collection. Confrontation with, and responses to, challenging inquiries are what led the author to define Christian orthodoxy. Question 16 deals with the persistence of heretics, Greeks and Jews. The objection raised reads as follows: Q.: If God abolished the ancient worship, because it did not please Him, and introduced that of the Christians because He liked it and [if] only orthodox Christians are pleasing to God, how are they less in number than the Greeks, Jews and all the heretics? How is the fact that error is not uprooted not proof of the lack of power since He chose this worship over the other? Why is the abolition of this error not useless since a different error prevails in the world?21
To this our anonymous author responds that instead of accusing God of lacking power, it would make more sense to blame for their negligence those who did not care to believe or to understand the teachings of Christianity properly. To a similar question, Q. 143, where the inquirer asks about the numerical superiority of the pagans, heretics and Jews taken together, the anonymous author replies:
18 See Giancarlo Rinaldi, "Tracce di controversie tra pagani e cristiani nella letteratura patristica delle 'quaestiones et responsiones,' " Annali di Storia deU'Esegesi 6 (1989): 99-124. 19 For indications of the popularity (or so the author of the collections wants us to believe) of at least some questions see Q. 31, 12, p. 40 20 Gilbert Dagron, "L'ombre d'un doute: L'hagiographie en question, Vle-Xle siecle," Dumbarton Oaks Papers 46 (1992): 59-68. 21 Q. 16, pp. 29-30.
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To rule earthly things in the present life in the manner of a king, is not the legacy of true Christians ... He who wants to know the power of the true Christians has to look to the future condition. For the power in the present over things material is not a recompense for the faith of the Christians, but rather a [form of public] service according to God's plan (diataxis) for the constitution of a well-ordered human polity that has been handed down to people, sometimes to Christians, sometimes to heretics, and sometimes to the Greeks. For as long as the Christians struggle for the sake of virtue and they walk on the "narrow" and "hard path" [Matt 7. 14], they are set before all [lie exposed] (prokeimenoi) as assistance to anyone who wants to press them into service they are not considered rulers.
This is a stunning statement in light of the triumphalism more typically encountered in contemporary Christian sources. 22 Pseudo-Justin's reply connects the QRO with contemporary debates over the role of the Church in the empire, as well as with discussions about the spread of Christianity. Similar arguments are employed by Antiochene authors, such as John Chrysostom, whose view partly coincides with and partly departs from the author's view. 23 Another contemporary author, Theodoret of Cyrrhus, is sensitive to what seem to be criticisms of the spread of Christianity due to imperial patronage. Theodoret's approach has affinities with pseudo-Justin's in that neither takes the alliance of the Church with imperial authority for granted. In their view, Christianity is not co-terminous with the empire. 24 Occasionally questions that may reflect concerns about the impact of imperial legislation against heretics 25 find their way into the collection: Q.: If heretics have striven with all their power to know and safeguard the truth of the doctrines without being able to, why is it not unjust to subject them to punishments for having (allegedly) strayed from the truth?26
22 For evidence that supports this non-triumphalist view and the existence of uncertainty see also Fergus Millar, "Christian Emperors, Christian Church and the Jews of the Diaspora in the Greek East, CE 379-450," JJS 55 (2004): 1-24, esp. 15-16. 23 For Chrysostom's view see Isabella Sandwell, "Christian Self-definition in the Fourth Century AD: John Chrysostom on Christianity, Imperial Rule and the City," in Culture and Society in Later Roman Antioch: Papers from a Colloquium, London, 15 th December 2001 (ed. Isabella Sandwell and Janet Huskinson; Oxford: Oxbow Books; Oakville, CT: David Brown Book Co., 2004), 58-84. I discuss the fifth-century debate about the expansion of Christianity in Y. Papadoyannakis, "Therapeia" and "Politeia": The Apologetics of Theodoret of Cyrrhus against the Greeks (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2004), ch. 3,46-67, and ch. 4, 68-89. 24 Ibid., 57-58. 25 On heresy and Roman law see Caroline Humfress, "Citizens and Heretics: Late Roman Lawyers on Christian Heresy," in this volume. 26 Q. 19, p. 32.
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Attachment to the old gods attracts the attention of the author at least as much as heresy. The relationship between Christianity and Hellenism was no less contested and debated. Q.: If God is the Creator and Lord of the creation, how do Apollonius's miraculous works have potency on the parts of the creation? As we see, they prevent/hinder the winds and the inroads of mice and wild beasts. And if the miracles that the Lord performed lay only in the narratives, whereas most of his [Apollonius' miracles] are proven by the facts, how does he [Apollonius] not deceive those watching? And if on the one hand this was done by divine permission, how is it that this divine consent does not lead to Hellenism? If this is not so, how are these things done with the power of the demons? Then again if God played a role in this, - pleased because what happened was good - why did these things not happen through the prophets or the apostles? If He was not pleased because this was bad, for what reason did He not immediately prevent this or did put an end to this after a short time but instead allowed this to prevail for the duration of the time of this creation.
The question is elaborately constructed, and contrasts the miracles of Jesus that happened in a distant past with the continuing miraculous activity of Apollonius in the present. Apollonius stood for the hallowed traditions of Hellenism and for patterns of religiosity from the past that were still active in the Christian present. 27 What gives the inquirer pause is the co-existence of an alternative religious system that is still active, despite Christian claims to exclusivity. Another question reveals an even greater concern with the past, and illustrates the complexity of the task that the Christian authors were faced with when struggling to re-structure the attitudes of people as they were trying to come to terms with religious change. Q.: If God rewards the pious with eminence in this life, just as [He did] with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and their people [rewarding them] with wealth, children, and abundance of crops, how is Hellenism not proven more holy [divinely sanctioned, pious]? When it prevailed in the cities, all the cities and the countryside were prospering and flourishing (while they were not fought against more often). But after the Christian teaching prevailed they (cities) lost their houses and their tenants and the entire prosperity and only the remains of the buildings built by the Greeks demonstrate that
27 On the differing attitudes of pagans and Christians towards Apollonius see Wolfgang Speyer, "Zum Bild des Apollonius von Tyana bei Heiden und Christen," Jahrbuch fur Antike und Christentum 17 (1974), 47-63. For the popularity of Apollonius in Late Antiquity and Byzantium see Maria Dzielska, Apollonius of Tyana in Legend and History (trans. P. Pienkowski; Roma: "L'Erma" di Bretschneider, 1986). Also Christopher Jones, "Apollonius of Tyana in Late Antiquity," in Greek Literature in Late Antiquity: Dynamism, Didacticism, Classicism (ed. S. Johnson; Ashgate, 2006), 49-64; and W. L. Duliere, "Protection permanente contre des animaux nuisibles assuree par Apollonius de Tyane dans Byzance et Antioche: Evolution de son my the," BZ 63 (1970): 247-77.
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these were cities; the former prosperity and the latter devastation are offering each one of them the reasons for the [practice] of these two religions. 28
The appeal to historical events and arguments from history had an indisputable allure in ancient society, especially as a way of legitimizing religious claims. Interestingly enough, the contrast that is articulated here is between Hellenismos and Christianismos as two competing religious systems. Elsewhere the term Ioudaismos is employed to the same effect. 29 As an interesting testimony to the fact that people thought in these categories, the inquiry juxtaposes an immemorial belief in the divine reward for piety and punishment for failure to uphold the old ways as well as an inextricable link between the practice of religion and fertility, growth of the crops and the livestock. Both cohere very forcefully. Against this time-honored pattern of thought, pseudo-Justin argues that instead of focusing on such external arguments from history (which even on that level do not favor Hellenism), one should focus on the fact that God rewards the good moral intentions with which Christians have chosen to act in their religious practice as opposed to Greeks who sacrificed to lifeless idols and demons. The same relentless scrutiny on the historical implications of religious practice resurfaces in Q. 55: If demons do not hold sway over parts of the created world, why, when the oracles were not heeded by the Greeks, did they [demons] bring punishments upon them, whereas when the idols were reverenced they put an end to the punishments and they [demons] provided goods instead? Whence did their power come for either act?30
In the light of this evidence, what seem to be isolated concerns or hesitations in fact echo continuing debates about the role of Hellenic and Jewish past in a Christian present. The question of "how much of the past could be allowed to be put in the past, and how much could be allowed to linger in the present"31 was a challenge that faced Christians both in the East and the West during the fifth century. The intense focus on unremitting inquiry comes across elsewhere too, in questions on the resurrection and the final judgment. "If both Christians and pagans are punished in the Second Coming in a similar manner, what is the benefit for the Christian as opposed to the Greek [viz. pagan]?"32 "If, 28 Q. 136, pp. 125-126. On this see also Walter E. Kaegi, Byzantium and the Decline of Rome (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 74-75, 158-160. 29 Q. 16, p. 29. 30 Q. 55, 17-21, p. 58. 31 Peter Brown, "Conversion and Christianization in Late Antiquity: The Case of Augustine," in The Past Before Us: The Challenge of Historiographies of Late Antiquity (ed. Carole Straw and Richard Lim; Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 103-117, esp. 116. 32 Q. 18, p. 32.
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as you said, there is no recompense for the [good] works, what is the benefit for the robber, his soul having been introduced in paradise, and how much more when paradise is sensible, while the essence of the soul is intelligible?"33 Some inquiries deal with gaps in the Gospels, such as Q. 127: If the Lord rose from the tomb and left His burial clothes in the tomb, how is it that after His resurrection the Scripture did not depict Him as been seen naked or wearing a tunic from elsewhere? If He did not receive clothes from elsewhere, and He did not appear naked to those who saw Him, how is it true that He left His clothes in the tomb?34
In his reply the author tries to refocus the inquiry, claiming that, Since many are the things that the Lord said and did, the accounts of which the Holy Scripture does not contain, one of which is the clothes of the Lord, it is not reasonable to inquire into the cause of something that has not been recounted from all the things that have not been recounted. One must not construct an inquiry about the garment of the Lord from something that has not been recounted but [one must take faith] from His power. 35
Other inquiries such as Q. 72 and 73 illustrate competing cosmological and anthropological conceptions and the difficulties encountered by early Christian authors in creating a cosmology in opposition to Greek cosmology. Central to the definition of orthodox Christianity is the focus on correct practice as seen in Q. 129, which deals with the question of the theological significance of the East, and why Christians should face the East when praying. The author of the collection feels the need to defend the practice, arguing for its apostolic origin. 36 At issue here is the legitimacy of this practice that is questioned indirectly by the anonymous inquirer. In the same vein a question is posed about baptism and the practice of anointing with oil. 37 Equally indicative of the desire to define Christian ritual unambiguously against heretics, is what we find in Q. 27, where the question deals with admission of heretics, back to the Orthodox church. If the baptism that is provided by heretics is false and not valid, why do the orthodox Christians not baptize the one who seeks refuge to the orthodoxy but instead they accept the baptism as valid? If this person [viz. the ex-heretic] was ordained and they [viz. the
33 Q. 88, pp. 82-83. 34 Q. 127, pp. 118-119. 35 Ibid., pp. 118-119. 36 See Alexander Podossinov, "Himmelsrichtung," Reallexikon fur Antike und Christentum, 15, 1991, cols. 233-286, esp. cols. 273-274. Also E. von Severus, "Gebet I," Reallexikon fur Antike und Christentum, 8, 1972, cols. 1134-1258, esp. cols. 12161218, 1228-1229. 37 Q. 154, p. 142.
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orthodox] accept this ordination as valid (bebaia), why are both the one who was admitted [to the church] and the ones who accepted him blameless?
In his reply the author lays out what looks like standard procedures for the admission of a former heretic in the Orthodox church. Provided that the person has changed his or her mind away from false belief, these procedures involve, for those baptized by heretics, the anointing with holy myrrh by the orthodox; for those ordained by heretics, the laying of hands by the orthodox. 38 After these procedures the error from heretical rituals is dissolved. 39 The same concern with correct practice and its origin is evident in Q. 126 on the practice of genuflection. If the practice of genuflection during the liturgy attracts God's grace more, why do the faithful not genuflect during the period between the Easter Sunday and the Pentecost? In his answer the author of the collection employs a traditional argument taken from Irenaeus who provided a justification for the practice. 40 The practice of circumcision is the focus of Q. 113: Why was the foreskin of the Jews circumcised as redundant, if God created nothing redundant in the human body? And if the practice had some usefulness why is this operation not practiced today by Christians?41
The question, that echoes Julian's critique in his Contra Galilaeos,42 entwines an historical and exegetical interest in both the legitimacy of the practice and also Christianity's departure from it. The author in his response seeks to place the practice in its historical context, arguing that precisely because it is attested as an historical event in the history of the Jews, it is not binding for Christians who now, following the words of apostle Paul, have "put on the Lord Jesus Christ" (Rom. 13, 14).43 Here, as 38 See the discussion by Cyril Vogel, "Handauflegung," Reallexikon fur Antike und Christentum, 13, 1986, cols. 482-493, esp. cols. 486, 488; Miguel Arranz, "Les sacrements de l'ancien euchologe constantinopolitain," Orientalia Christiana Periodica 49(1983): 42-90, esp. 48-60, 80-84. 39 Q. 27, p. 38. 40 See Franz D6lger, "Das erste Gebet der Tauflinge in der Gemeinschaft der Bruder: Ein Beitrag zu Tertullian de baptismo 20," Antike und Christentum: Kultur- und Religionsgeschichtliche Studien 2 (1930) ': 142-155, esp. 145, n15. Also E. von Severns, "Gebet I," esp. cols. 1216-1218, 1228-1229. 41 Q. 113, p. 105. 42 Flavius Claudius Iulianus, Contra Galilaeos (ed. Masaracchia), fr. 85, 351A. G. Bardy in his article, "La litterature patristique des 'Quaestiones et responsiones' sur l'Ecriture Sainte," Revue Biblique 42 (1933): 214-215, mentions Harnack's view according to which this criticism derives from either Marcion's Antitheses or the Syllogisms of Apelles. 43 Q. 113,26-27, p. 105. Given the existence of flourishing Jewish communities in Antioch and in northern Syria as well as of Judaizers who felt the attraction of Judaism,
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in other inquiries, the author is defining Christianity explicitly against alternative opinions. In another interesting issue that is raised, we see the manner in which orthodox religious practice is demarcated in opposition to heretics. Question 118 deals with the use of liturgical chanting. The inquirer asks why chanting is used in the churches of the orthodox, given that the practice was initially introduced by heretics and Jews. 44 The reply defends the practice, with reference to the uplifting effect of chanting in the church, claiming that it is orthodox because of the exclusion of dancing and of all musical instruments. 45 In question 111, an objection is raised that miracles occur in heretical churches toO.46 In his answer, the anonymous author is willing to concede that miracles are not necessarily the touchstone of true faith, and that their occurrence does not separate true from false faith. The QRO bring into sharp focus in their concreteness (and in their casuistry) the tensions that run through the religious culture of the early fifth century, as well as a sense of its infinitely variegated array of differing beliefs, which come alive in the text's echoes of contemporary preoccupations. They make us realize the extent to which these issues remained unresolved, only to be settled by debate and disputation. As this collection shows, the transition from a pagan society to a Christian one was neither as sudden nor as complete as has been assumed. 47 What sets the QRO apart is that, instead of being a formal, finished, static, unchanging treatise, it represents a collection of problems - some of them recurring (hermeneutic) - with their answers. The objections represent different viewpoints that are not glossed over. Instead, they stand on their own as carefully crafted arguments sharpened by debate, and they allow us to see more clearly what the author is responding to and how he arrives at the more orthodox positions.
the inquiry may have had a contemporary relevance. For the attraction of Judaism in Antioch see Robert L. Wilken, John Chrysostom and the Jews: Rhetoric and Reality in the Late 4th Century (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1983), 66-94. 44 Discussed also by Johannes Quasten, Music and Worship in Pagan and Christian Antiquity (trans B. Ramsey, Washington, D.C.: National Association of Pastoral Musicians, 1983), 74-75. 45 Q. 118,22-24, p. 110. 46 For the debates on the role of miracle see Francesco Mosetto, I miracoli evangelici nel dibattito tra Celso e Origene (Rome: LAS, 1986). 47 On. this see also Peter Brown, "Christianization and Religious Conflict," in The Late Empire: 337-425, The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 13 (ed. Averil Cameron and Peter Garnsey; Cambridge: CUP, 1998),632-664.
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Dagron makes the point that some of the questions sound like provocations. 48 But more than provocations, they are problems in the true sense of the word, namely "something difficult to overcome or 'to solve, a knotty problem".49 Such a view of the QRO as a text that continually poses questions and answers has various implications. It requires us to see the definition of Christian orthodoxy as an ongoing process, in which pseudoJustin's "questions and the answers" represent a particular, significant, stage. Contrary to other catalogues of correct and wrong belief, and despite evidence of literary patterning, the QRO preserves the voices of orthodox and heterodox posed in questions and objections. They help us to understand the kinds of perplexities that were being raised in the Christian communities of Late Antiquity as they negotiated a lively and contentious religious and social landscape, and they highlight the multifarious issues which Christian leaders had to be prepared to deal with in their pastoral, pedagogical, and apologetic work. At the same time the QRO must be seen as an attempt by Christian authors to work out how Christianity was to define its position with regard to Hellenism and Judaism in a period still characterized by considerable fluidity and change. 50 More than a literary process aimed at refuting objections or illuminating difficult Biblical passages, collections such as pseudo-Justin' s highlight a pedagogy with significant cognitive implications. For through the interaction between the author and the inquirer( s) over exegetical, ritual, historical issues, we see the way that Christianity was defined, practiced, defended, and understood, and the importance that accrued to this process. This accords well with what has been described as a broader cognitive process: that of reformulating and controlling human knowledge on the
48 Dagron, "L'ombre d'un doute," 61. 49 Blair, "The Problemata as a Natural Philosophical Genre," 171-204, discusses the etymology and the development of the term thus: " 'p ro ballo, ' 'to set out as an obstacle,' was probably first used in an intellectual rather than its original military context by Plato when describing the tactics of the Sophists defending themselves. By extension, the problema became something difficult to overcome or to solve, a knotty problem." 50 Dagron remarks: "Le ps.-Justin des Quaestiones ad orthodoxos, qui est peut-etre Theodoret de Cyr lui meme, en toute cas l'un des ses contemporaines [.. ] nous place, comme les Vies du ye siecle, au carrefour de deux mondes, entre un paganisme qui n'est plus un rival, mais une composante culturelle encore mal assimilee, et une foi nouvelle qui explore un autre corpus de textes et a decouvert la voie parallele d'une histoire veterotestamentaire." See G. Dagron, "Le saint, Ie savant, l'astrologue: Etude de themes hagiographiques a travers quelques recueils de 'Questions et reponses' des ye-Ylr siecles," in Hagiographie, cultures et socifites: IVe-XIJe siecles: actes du colloque organise a Nanterre et a Paris, 2-5 mai 1979, Centre de recherches sur l' Antiquite tardive et Ie haut Moyen Age, Universite de Paris X (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 1981), 144.
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nature of God, anthropology, cosmology and morality, and of defining deviance in terms of what Christianity was not to be. 51 Orthodoxy is sometimes described by historians as if it were merely the sum of successive imperial interventions. The QRO illuminates the creation of orthodoxy instead as the outgrowth of low-visibility cognitive processes, whose existence has been alluded to, but not sufficiently taken into account, by historians of the formation of Christian orthodoxy.
Conclusion In its engagement with critical issues, the QRO interweaves a set of disparate problems. Clearly the QRO does not work by trying to cover the whole range of possible problems. However the processual nature of this text is striking, and reminds us that Christian orthodoxy arose to a large extent as a response to objections and challenges. This is not to overlook or downplay the importance of other factors, such as the role of Church and imperial politics, councils and the theological stature of the figures involved, but these are only part - albeit perhaps the better known one - of the picture. What can be said of pseudo-Justin's attitude towards orthodoxy is akin to what Andrew Louth has recently stated when speaking of John of Damascus: When we think of Byzantine Orthodoxy, the theology of the Oecumenical synods [ .... ] we are apt to think of a somewhat triumphalist progress of Orthodoxy, protected by the Emperor, and both able and willing to call on the power of the State to persecute those who opposed what they called orthodoxy. There is some truth in this, and it is a truth that is often ugly. But it is a truth that does not apply at all to the theological task in which John of Damascus was engaged. 52
The attempts at refining and defining Christian orthodoxy that the pseudoJustin is engaged in emphasize a different aspect of the process that led to the formation of orthodoxy than do the more formal or triumphalist narratives on which standard accounts of Christianization have traditionally rested. This process of defining orthodoxy took place in the context of debate, polemics, and discussion. What we see in pseudoJustin's QRO is orthodoxy in the making.
51 See Averil Cameron, "Education and Literary Culture," The Late Empire: 337-425, The Cambridge Ancient History, vol 13, 665-707, esp. 702-703. See also idem, "How to Read Heresiology," JMEMS 33 (2003): 471-492. 52 Andrew Louth, St. John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 14.
Citizens and Heretics Late Roman Lawyers on Christian Heresy CAROLINE HUMFRESS
Introduction: Roman Citizenship and "Catholic" Christianity In Roman myth, at least, the idea of a potentially universal and timeless community of Roman citizens dates back as far as the city of Rome's very foundation. In 212 CE, however, the Emperor Caracalla apparently took the concrete step of granting citizenship to all the free inhabitants of the Roman Empire. l The famed third century jurist U1pian merely comments that: "Everyone in the Roman world has been made a Roman citizen as a consequence of the enactment of the Emperor Antoninus."2 As it stands, chopped up by the Emperor Justinian's legal commissioners in the early sixth century, and divorced from its context in the rest of U1pian's text, this statement is inaccurate: even leaving to one side the vexed question of application, not everybody was transformed into a citizen either in the year 212 CE or indeed subsequently. 3 Slaves were not made free and Caracalla apparently took this exclusion as being so obvious that he did not need to spell it out in his text. On the other hand, peregrini dedicitii, technically 1 For discussion see Catharine Edwards and Greg Woolf, "Cosmopolis: Rome as World City," in Rome the Cosmopolis (ed. Catharine Edwards and Greg Woolf; Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 1-20. On the changing forms of Roman citizenship see Claude Nicolet, The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome (London: Batsford Academic and Educational, 1984). 2 Digest 1.5.17, Ulpian ad edictum: In orbe Romano qui sunt ex constitutione imperatoris Antonini cives Romani effecti sunt. 3 The following discussion is indebted to Peter Garnsey, "Roman Citizenship and Roman Law in the Late Empire," in Approaching Late Antiquity: the Transformation from Early to Late Empire (ed. Simon Swain and Mark Edwards; Oxford: OUP, 2004), 133-55, esp. 138 and 143-45. On the dating and (fragmentary) papyrus text of the Constitutio Antoniniana see Heinrich Wolff, Die Constitutio Antoniniana und Papyrus Gissensis 40 I (Diss., Cologne, 1976); for its local impact see James G. Keenan, "The Names Flavius and Aurelius as Status Designations in Later Roman Egypt," ZPE 11 (1973): 33-63; and 12 (1974): 183-304; and Dieter Hagedorn, "Marci Aurelii in .Agypten nach der Constitutio Antoniniana," Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists 16 (1979): 47-59.
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free men but lacking all public rights and citizenship, were explicitly excluded from Caracalla's grant. Likewise peregrines (or "foreigners") finding themselves on imperial territory after 212CE had no right of automatic citizenship merely by force of domicile. Lastly, individuals who had been deprived of their citizenship because they had fallen foul of the law did not get their slates automatically wiped clean in 212CE. Thus even if we boldly presume that the majority of the inhabitants of the late Roman Empire did have Roman citizenship and chose to assert it, they remained liable to lose its benefits - either wholesale or in part. The idea of a universal and timeless community of Christians, on the other hand, is rooted in the texts of the New Testament. In the mid-second century CE Celsus famously baited his Christian contemporaries with the taunt that they could only dream of a day when their lex (their "law" or way of life) would be diffused throughout the habitable world (oikoumene).4 For Celsus, the Christians of his day were idle dreamers in supposing that their lex could ever be catholica, general or universal. Certain of Celsus' Christian contemporaries, however, were already developing the idea of a lex catholica in quite different terms. In the late second-century the Christian apologist Tertullian spelt out a rather technical argument, whereby those who followed the lex christiana (the general or universal "way of Christ") could be distinguished from those Christians who did not. For Tertullian, adherence to the lex catholica marked out true "catholic" Christians from heretics. 5 Only catholic Christians, according to Tertullian, had any legal title to use and interpret Scripture; and only the universal catholic church was de facto in communion with the apostolic church. With these arguments Tertullian took his place within a specifically Christian evolution in the meaning of the term catholicus: the word was nothing less than a title to Christian orthodoxy. 6 Almost exactly one hundred years after the Emperor Caracalla's "grant of citizenship" the Emperor Galerius issued his so-called "grant of toleration." Galerius' measure, posted at Nicomedia on 30 April 311, marks the winding down of a Tetrarchic period of Christian persecution and the beginning of an era in which the practice of Christianity was officially declared to be compatible with Roman citizenship. 7 Galerius Origen, Contra Celsum 8.72 (PG XI, 1580). Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum 30.2, with reference to the heresies of Marcion and Valentinus. 6 Compare Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, VII, 17 (PG IX, 552) and Cyprian of Carthage, Ep. 25 (ed. Hartel, II, 600). 7 Lactantius, De morte persecutorum 33. 11-35.I; Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 8.16.1 and 8.17.1-11. For discussion see Simon Corcoran, The Empire of the Tetrarchs 4 5
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permitted his Christian subjects to worship their god and assemble together openly, provided that they kept the civil peace. In this sense Galerius adhered to traditional Roman policy: "The crux for conformity was the link between Roman citizenship and Roman religion."8 Under the Republic and the early empire matters concerning religion were classified as part of the ius civile, specifically under the branch of Roman public law: Public law is concerned with the Roman "state," while private law is concerned with the interests of individuals, for some matters are of public and others of private interest. Public law comprises religion, priesthoods, and magistracies. 9
David Johnston has recently highlighted the fact that the Classical Roman jurists were notoriously uninterested in defining the ius publicum. However, Johnston goes on to note that the jurists did at least use the expression: Roman jurists used the expression ius publicum in various senses: sometimes to denote the whole legal order of Rome, sometimes to refer to rules of law which were inderogable, and then sometimes in contexts clearly of private law: so, for example, institutions such as marriage, dowry, and tutors are said to belong to public law, but by this what appears to be meant is that they serve the public good: they are particularly important for the maintenance of civil society. 10
Whatever we are to make of Ulpian's celebrated attempt at parceling out the ius civile into "public" and "private" spheres, his definition clearly demonstrates an intimate connection between sacred and temporal matters within the sphere of public law. Correct relationships between men and gods were part of the utilitas publica, as was the correct handling of res sacrae - even if the classical jurists seem not to have been particularly interested in working this branch of Roman law out for themselves. 11 (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 186-87; and Timothy D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981),39. 8 Rebecca Lyman, "Hellenism and Heresy, 2002 NAPS Presidential Address," JECS 11.2 (2003): 209-222, esp. 214. 9 Digest 1.1.1.2, Ulpian Institutes bk. 1: ... pUblicum ius est quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat, privatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem; sunt enim quaedam publice utilia, quaedam privatim. Publicum ius in sacris, in sacerdotibus, in magistratibus consistit. 10 David Johnston "The General Influence of Roman Institutions of State and Public Law," in The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law: Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays, Schriften zur Europiiischen Rechts- und Verfassungsgeschichte, Bd. 20 (ed. David L. Carey Miller and Richard Zimmermann; Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997), 87-101, esp. 88. 11 We know that books of Roman sacral law existed, we also know that certain important jurists wrote commentaries on them - but Justinian's Digest excerpted none of this material. For discussion see Aldo Cenderelli, Varroniana, Istituti e Terminoiogia
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In the texts of thirdcentury CE jurists public law was increasingly connected with the maintenance of civil society and the public good or public interest (utilitas publica). 12 Hence the jurist Marcian advises that it is the duty of provincial governors to track down and punish those who commit sacrilege against the gods, as well as thieves, kidnappers and hijackers - all four threaten the peace and security of the province: It is laid down further in the mandata (imperial mandates) on sacrilege that provincial governors are to track down those who commit sacrilege, brigands and kidnappers, and punish each according to the degree' of his offense. And so it is provided in the constitutions, that those who commit sacrilege are to be punished with a fitting penalty extra ordinem. 13
The Emperor Constantine's personal conversion to Christianity, however, upped the stakes: ensuring the public good now necessitated that a correct relationship was maintained between the inhabitants of the Roman Empire and the Christian God. An imperial constitution of 407, nominally addressed to a Prefect of the City of Rome, states the traditional principle succinctly with reference to certain groups of heretics: "In the first place, it is Our will that it [their heresy] shall be considered a public crime, since whatever is committed against divine religio rebounds to the detriment of all. "14 Just as third century imperial officials could be expected to track down and punish those who committed sacrilege against the gods, so too could the officials who worked under Christian emperors be expected to track down and punish Christian "heretics."
Giuridica nelle Opere di M Terenzio Varrone (Milan: A. Giuffre, 1973), 101-09, ch III "Norme e Istituzioni Sacre"; also Ittai Gradel, Emperor Worship and Roman Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), esp. 9-10 on the juristic development of lex sacra. 12 Johnston, "The General Influence of Roman Institutions," 89. See also Max Kaser, "Ius publicum und ius privatum," Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschichte (Romanistische Abteilung) 103 (1986): 1-101. 13 Digest 48.13.4.2, Marcian Institutes Book 14: Mandatis autem cauetur de sacrilegiis, ut praesides sacrilegos latrones plagiarios conquirant et ut, prout quisque deliquerit, in eum animadvertant. et sic constitutionibus cauetur, ut sacrilegi extra ordinem digna poena puniantur. Compare Digest 1.18.13pr, Ulpian On the Office of Proconsul, Book 7 = Basilica 6.1.46: Congruit bono et gravi praesidi curare, ut pacata atque quieta provincia sit quam regit. Quod non difficile optinebit, si sollicite agat, ut malis hominibus provincia careat eosque conquirat: nam et sacrilegos latrones plagiarios fures conquirere debet et prout quisque deliquerit, in eum animadvertere,receptoresque eorum coercere, sine quibus latro diutius latere non potest. 14 Theodosian Code (henceforth CTh) 16.5.40.1: Ac primum quidem volumus esse publicum crimen, quia quod in religion em divinam conmittitur, in omnium fertur iniuriam.
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Religio Post-Constantine: the View from the Imperial Bureaucracy As a result of the Emperor Justinian's sixth century hatchet job on Classical juristic texts, it is easy for legal historians to forget that things human and divine were an important part of Roman law from the archaic all the way through to the postclassical periods. 15 We should not view post-Constantine Roman law as a "secular" legal system in search of (a) religion - nor does it make sense to speak of late Roman law as a "pagan" system which was "Christianized," except from a perspective which is already inherently christianizing. In other words, Christianity entered the late Roman law codes within an already existing framework of understanding; and the late Roman drafters of imperial constitutions, whatever their personal beliefs,16 did not necessarily assume a harmonious or easy fit between the utilitas publica and the fides catholica. Legal officials under Christian emperors were placed in a tricky situation: how far should they go in attempting to balance the welfare of the Christian faith against the welfare of the empire as a whole? Could their concerns extend to defining "Catholic" doctrine, for example? The latter question was, of course, not simply an ideological battleground for "Church"/"State" relations, but was frequently forced by concrete events on the ground. For example, in 383 the Praetorian Prefect Cynegius was petitioned by two priests who had been accused of suspect doctrinal positions. The bewildered Prefect sought clarification from the Emperor Theodosius I, who replied that "the emperor cannot add even a jot to divine law"; a pious response, but presumably not much help to Cynegius. In 404 the Emperor Honorius had occasion to remind his brother and coEmperor Arcadius that "the interpretation of matters divine is the concern of bishops, compliance with religio is ours." There was, however, apparently still some confusion in the year 445 about whether a ruling by the Pope in Rome applied to the Church in Gaul, without imperial
15 Book XVI of the CTh should thus be understood in its original context as a book concerning right relations between Romans and god(s), in the spirit of the traditional lex sacra, rather than the later medieval sense of a book about the Christian religion per se. It is worth noting in this context that the text chosen to head CTh Book XVI at title 1.1 under the rubric de fide catholica - reads in its entirety: Quisquis seu iudex seu apparitor ad custodiam templorum homines christianae religionis adposuerit sciat non saluti suae, non fortunis esse parcendum (Valentinian to Symmachus PD, 365). 16 See CTh 16.5.40, section 7 (given at Rome, February 22 407): against governors deferring the trials of Manichees, "Phrygians" and "Priscillianists" through connivance or favoritism.
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endorsement. 17 Alongside their duties of ensuring "compliance with religio," the emperors' bureaucrats also had a duty to ensure that the church did not detract from the public good. In 439 a quaestor drafting laws for the troubled Western Emperor Valentinian III could flatly assert that there were too many Christian clerics for the public goOd. I8 The idea that there could be "too many Christian clerics for the public good," is a salient reminder that, in the minds of late Roman legislators, the interests of the Catholic religion had to be constantly weighed against the interests of public utilitas. The extant late Roman legislation agrees, in principle, that heresy is detrimental to the peace and security of the Catholic faith; and it also recognizes that the safeguarding of the Catholic faith is essential to the peace and security of the empire. Late Roman legal rhetoric thus exhibits a traditional Republican concern with the dangers of pollution and contagion in the religious sphere - but the offenders who are now to be exiled from the cities (or in extreme cases deported from Roman soil) are no longer disruptive devotees of the cults of Bacchus or Isis, but "heretical" Christians. I9 An Eastern constitution issued in 388 is typical in this respect: We command that the Apollinarians and all other followers of diverse heresies shall be prohibited from all places, from the walls of the cities, from the congregation of honorable men, from 'the communion of the sacred' ... They shall go to places which will seclude them most effectively, as though by a wall, from human association. 2o
Heretics are polluted and contagious; according to the drafter of this imperial constitution they are to be excluded from both Roman civil society and the communio sacrorum (once again a term taken from the traditional vocabulary of Roman religious law2I ). A 379 constitution, 17 Theodosius I and Cynegius, Collectio Avellana 2a; Honorius and Arcadius, Collectio Avellana 38.4; Imperial endorsement of papal rulings, Valentinian Novels 17.1.2. 18 Nov. Val. 3pr (439, to Maximus Praetorian Prefect) noted by Tony Honore, Law in the Crisis of Empire 379-455AD: The Theodosian Dynasty and its Quaestors (Oxford: OUP, 1998),262. See also CTh 16.2.3 (320), CTh 8.5.46 (385) and CTh 14.4.8, 1 (408). 19 For discussion of the periodic exclusions of "religious" groups under the Republic and early Empire see John Scheid, "Le delit religieux dans la Rome tardo-republicaine," in John Scheid ed., Le delit religieux dans la cite antique, Collection de l'ecole fram:;aise de Rome, 48 (1981): 117-171. 20 CTh 16.5.14 (given March 10, 388): Apollinarianos ceterosque divers arum haeresum sectatores ab omnibus locis iubemus inhiberi, a moenibus urbium, a congressu honestorum, a communione sanctorum. Adeant loca, quae eos potissimum quasi vallo quodam ab humana communi one secludant. 21 For other examples of late Roman legislators using religious vocabulary (and concepts) inherited from an earlier age see Giuliano Crifo, "Considerazioni suI linguaggio religioso nelle fonti giuridiche tardo-occidentali," Cassiodorus 5 (1999): 123-
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issued at Milan to the Praetorian Prefect Hesperius, restates the principle "All heresies are forbidden by both divine and imperial laws and shall forever cease." However, it continues: "If any profane man by his punishable teachings should weaken the concept of God, he shall have the right to know such noxious doctrines only for himself but shall not reveal them to others." Likewise he who performs second baptisms" .. .shall know such doctrines for himself alone, and he shall not ruin others by his nefarious teaching."22 In time-honored fashion, the late Roman imperial authorities were primarily interested in the social reproduction of deviant belief and its effects - the Christian heretic was permitted to know such doctrines for him/her self, but not to "infect" civil society with them. 23 From the late fourth century onwards various groups of heretics were also excluded from specific branches of imperial service. 24 A constitution from 410 states that Montanists, Priscillianists and other types of "nefarious superstition" are to be excluded from imperial service, however the text goes on to state that any individual who has the birth status of a decurion, or who is obliged as a member of a municipal senate is not to be released from his obligations. And here is where the balancing act between excluding heretics from Roman society, whilst still maintaining the interests of public utilitas, comes into sharp focus: 142. Elisabeth Magnou-Nortier, Le Code Theodosien, Livre XVI et sa Reception au Moyen Age (Paris: 2002),218, interprets the phrase differently, however: "Les empereurs expriment ici leur volante de voir les Mretiques 'ecartes de la communion des saints,' autrement dit excommunies par les eveques orthodoxes." 22 CTh 16.5.5 = CJ 1.5.2 (given at Milan, August 20, 379): Omnes vetitae legibus et divinis et imperialibus haereses perpetuo conquiescant. Quisquis opinionem plectibili ausu dei profanus inminuit, sibi tantummodo nocitura sentiat, aliis obfutura non pandat. Quisquis redempta venerabili lavacro corpora reparata morte tabificat, id auferendo quod geminat, sibi salus talia noverit, alios nefaria institutione non perdat. See also CTh 16.6.2, section 1 (given at Constantinople, October 17, 377): Quod si errorem suum diligunt, suis malis domesticoque secreta, soli tamen, foveant virus impiae disciplinae. 23 Compare CTh 16.5.44 (given at Ravenna, November 24, 408 and addressed to the proconsul of Africa): The "new and unaccustomed audacity" of Donatists, heretics and Jews is a " ... pestilence and a contagion, if it should spring forth and spread abroad more widely." On the medical terminology see Ferdinanda Zuccotti, "Furor Haereticorum": Studi sui Trattamento Giuridico della Follia e sulla Persecuzione delle Eterodossia Religiosa nella Legislazione del Tardo Impero Romano (Milan: Giuffre, 1992), esp. 233259. 24 See CTh 16.5.25 (given March 13, 395 at Constantinople, addressed to Rufinus, Praetorian Prefect), Eunomians have no right to enter the imperial service; CTh 16.5.29 (given at Constantinople November 24, 395 and addressed to Marcellus, Master of Offices) orders the rooting out of "heretics" (Eunomians?) within the imperial service; and CTh 16.5.42 (given November 14, 408 addressed to Olympius, Master of Offices and Valens, Count of the Troops), orders that no person hostile to the Catholic sect is to perform Palatine service.
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We command that they [the heretics] shall continue to be bound to such services, in order that they may not elicit for themselves the support of a desired exemption from them, under the color of a condemned religion. For it is our pleasure that they shall not be released from the compulsory services of imperial service on the gubernatorial office staffs or of the municipal councils in accordance with the law which was promulgated in the Western part of the Empire and which so condemned the aforementioned cults that it forbade their adherents to enter into any contracts and almost removed them from association with the Roman world. 25
If we read between the lines here we can uncover the chain of events which lies behind the issuing of this text: certain heretics in the Eastern half of the empire have claimed exemption from municipal obligations and imperial service on the grounds of being heretics. They have cited an earlier Western law, which makes no mention of exemptions or obligations to official duties, but does state that heretics "shall have no customs and no laws in common with the rest of mankind."26 Obviously, on the basis of this Western law, one cannot be both a heretic and, (for example) a functioning member of a municipal council. Deliberately pleading a "heretical" identity thus takes its place as one among many of the brilliant ruses developed by late Romans to get out of their compulsory munera. Given the legislative rhetoric about heretics being mad, bad and dangerous to know we cannot blame such "heretics" for effectively trying it on. The Praetorian Prefect, Anthemius, was obviously unsure about the correct course of action in response to a plea of "heretical exemption," so he relayed his concerns to the Eastern court. The imperial quaestor duly replied that heretics must fulfill their civic obligations and bureaucratic functions. In other words, the needs of the cities and the imperial administration outweighed the dangers posed by the individual heretics. The same scenario was replayed during the reign of Justinian in the early sixth century. The preamble to Justinian's Novel 45 upbraids the then Praetorian Prefect, John of Cappadocia, for accepting certain heretics' pleas that they are exempt from curial obligations "because of the detest which they are held in by imperial constitutions." The drafter of Novel 45 points out, rather curtly, that if this were the case there would be an uncontrollable flood of converts to heretical doctrines. 25 CTh 16.5.48 (Given February 21 at Constantinople, addressed to Anthemius Praetorian Prefect): ... si quos vero ex his curialis origo vel ordinum nexus aut cohortalinae militiae inligat obsequiis et functionibus, his adstringi praecipimus, ne sub colore damnatae religionis eliciant vacationis cupitae sibi suffragia. Nec enim placet ex lege, quae in occidentalibus partibus promulgata praedictas caerimonias ita insecuta est, ut ab omni contractu eos et propemodum Romana conversatione submoverit, cohortalis militiae vel curiarum eos necessitatibus liberari. 26 Thi~ text was most probably the constitution later excerpted and included at CTh 16.5.40 (given at Rome, February 22, 407).
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Individual heretics were to be tolerated in the practical day-to-day interests of the municipalities and the fabric of the empire, but convocations of heretics were not. 27 Roman authorities had always maintained an uneasy relationship with voluntary associations, and traditionally kept a tight rein on any so-called "rights" to voluntary assembly. In the later Empire, curtailing the rights of certain heretical groups to assemble openly in public extended to forbidding the building or ownership of churches, as well as curtailing the ability of groups of "heretics" to meet each other (in private) in municipal dwellings or rural estates. 28 However, the legislators' overall concern was to stamp out any kind of assembly - "heretical," "orthodox" or even "schismatic"29 - which threatened the public peace. Hence, having carefully restricted the right of voluntary (religious) assembly, a 386 constitution goes on to specify that: If those persons who suppose that the right of assembly has been granted to them alone should attempt to provoke any agitation against the regulation of our Tranquillity, as authors of sedition and as disturbers of the peace of the church, they shall pay the penalty of high treason with their lives and blood. 30
In other words, those who had been granted the right of assembly could lose it (and their lives), if they failed to keep the civil peace.
27 On the exclusion of named groups of heretics from cities and villages see: CTh 16.5.3 (372, Manichees); CTh 16.5.6 (381, Photinians, Arians, Eunomians); CTh 16.5.7, section 3 and CTh 16.5.9 (381 and 382, Manichees and "fake" Manichee sects); CTh 16.5.12 and CTh 16.5.13 (383 and 384, Eunomians, Arians, Macedonians, and Apollinarians expelled from Constantinople in particular); CTh 16.5.18 (389, Manichees expelled from Rome in particular); CTh 16.5.34 (398, Eunomians and Montanists); CTh 16.5.62 and 64 (425, Manichees, heretics, schismatics, astrologers and "every sect inimical to Catholic religio' expelled so that the ... cities might not be contaminated by the contagious presence of criminals"). 28 See for example CTh 16.5.2 (326, Novatians are condemned, but they can possess church buildings and property); CTh 16.5.3 (372, houses and dwellings where Manichees meet to be appropriated to imperial fisc); CTh 16.5.8 (381, Eunomians, Arians and followers of Aetius have no right to build churches, any existing or future properties appropriated for imperial fisc); CTh 16.5.10 (383, Tascodrogitae should not be evicted from their dwellings, but crowds of them cannot convene at any church); CTh 16.5.11 and 12 (383, naming Eunomians, Arians, Macedonians and Apollinarians); also CTh 16.5.20 (391) and CTh 16.5.65 (428). 29 See CTh 16.4.6 (given at Constantinople, November 18, 404): Rectores provinciarum moneantur, ut conventus eorum arceantur illiciti, qui orthodoxarum religione subfulti spretis sacrosanctis ecclesiis alio convenire conantur. 30 CTh 16.1.4 (given at Milan, January 23, 386), this particular section is also excerpted at CTh 16.4.1: His, qui sibi tantummodo existimant colligendi copiam contributam, si turbulentum quippiam contra nostrae tranquillitatis praeceptum faciendum esse temptaverint, ut seditionis auctores pacisque turbatae ecclesiae, maiestatis capite ac sanguine sint supplicia luituri.
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The tendency for emperors to grant and revoke rights of assembly to individual bishops (often, of course acting in accordance with the decisions of Church councils, as in CTh 16.5.35) created a complex situation on the ground, which could not be controlled through imperial legislation alone. "Heretics" did not embroider the scarlet letter 'H' on their togas or tunics. A passage - styled as a first-hand account - from Epiphanius' Panarion gives us some sense of how the identification of so-called "heretical groups" might have operated on the ground. Whilst fleshing out his rhetorical categorization of the "gnostic sect" Epiphanius explains that he happened on this group himself and was "actually taught these things in person, out of the mouths of practicing gnostics." After a (rhetorically prescribed) period of madness, seduction and flirtation with the "gnostics," Epiphanius states: I lost no time in reporting them to the bishop there, and finding out which ones were hidden in the church, they were expelled from the city, about eighty persons, and the city was cleared of their tare-like thorny growth. 31
According to Epiphanius, at least some members of the so-called "gnostic sect" were flushed out from the bishop's own congregation - which begs the question of how distinct or readily identifiable this "gnostic group" really was, before the eighty or so expulsions took place. 32
Citizens and Heretics in Court: the Penalty of Infamia And the definition of a crime and misdemeanor is what? The proof of it in a court of law. 33
All criminal convictions under Roman law carried the sentence of infamia and late Roman convictions for the public crime of heresy were no exception. In essence, a sentence of infamia prevented an individual from accessing the legal rights of Roman citizenship; in reality the people and the offences to which it applied varied widely from case to case. When a Epiphanius, Panarion, Section II 26.17. 1-8. On Epiphanius and the gnostics see Gerard Vallee, A Study in Anti-Gnostic Polemics: Irenaeus, Hipp0 lytus, and Epiphanius (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1981), 63-91. Heresiological handbooks could be used to instruct catechumens and baptized Christians in how to spot a "heretic" (essential if you are entering an unfamiliar city, for example, and need to ask for directions to the "church" as Cyril of Alexandria and Augustine both point out, how can you know which "church" you are being directed to?). For further discussion of the heresiological literature see Judith MyClure, "Handbooks against Heresy in the West, from the Late Fourth to the Late Sixth Centuries," JTS 30 (1979): 186-97. 33 Libanius, Oration XLV.2, AD 386 (Selected Orations of Lib ani us II, p. 161, LCL). 31
32
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late Roman magistrate issued a penalty of infamia what that penalty amounted to was a loss or diminution of civil status - with both strictly legal and more "social" effects (such as loss of face, shame and deprivation of honor). The threat of infamia to an individual with rights and property to lose can be seen in Ulpian's reassurance that infamia cannot be inflicted through off-the-cuff comments made during a court hearing, but has to be specifically delivered as part of a magistrate's sentence at the end of a case. 34 It would have been Ulpian's private clients - "the haves" of Roman society - who had the most to fear. By innovating in this area and identifying new activities such as heresy or apostasy as "infamous" the imperial legislators of the fourth and early fifth centuries singled out new groups of individuals as potential social outcasts. 35 Thus on a concrete level, a sentence of infamia fitted neatly with the late Roman legislative rhetoric of excluding heretics from human association. The named heretical groups targeted by sentences of infamia included Manichees, Eunomians, Macedonians, Arians, Apollinarians, Phrygians, Priscillianists, Donatists (alongside "those who profane the holy mysteries by repeating baptism") and Eutychians. 36 Adherents of these sects were variously deprived "under the perpetual brand of just infamy" of the right to make a will or to bequeath any gifts. The Manichees were, of course, the most persecuted and extirpated of all the heresies within imperial legislation; hence the drafter of a 445 constitution shows a rare, if wry, sense of humor in specifying that Manichees are to lose the right to sue for insults (Nov. Val. 18.4). A sentence of infamia could also specify the loss of the right to take an inheritance - the property thus implicated would be appropriated to the resources of the imperial treasury. As well as being a money-spinner for the imperial fisc, a sentence of infamia created manifold complications in terms of socio-legal relations. Manichees, Eunomians and Donatists were deprived of the right to leave legacies or bequests to each other, or to their religious groups or associations: Augustine comments on the confiscation of Donatists' property and also notes: They [the Donatists] bring forward wills. "See" they say "the act by which Gaius Seius made a grant of an estate to the church headed by Faustinus." Of which church was
34 Digest 3.2.13.6, Ulpian ad. ed. Book 6: Quantum ad infamiam pertinet, multum interest, in causa quae agebatur causa cognita aliquid pronuntiatum sit an quaedam extrinsecus sunt elocuta: nam ex his infamia non irrogatur. 35 Compare CTh 4.6.3 (336) against CTh 16.5.36 (399). Infamia as a punishment for apostasy to paganism or the "rites of the Jews" is implied in CTh 16.7.3 (383). 36 See CTh 16.5.7 (381); CTh 16.5.17-18 (389); CTh 16.7.4 (391); CTh 16.5.54 (414); CJ 1.5.8 (455).
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Faustinus bishop? What is this church? "The church over which Faustinus presided," said he. But Faustinus presides not over a church, but over a sect. 37
Augustine explains: Indeed clear laws are to be read, by which the emperors have directed that no persons can dare to possess anything in the name of the church who, being outside the communion of the Catholic Church, usurp to themselves the name of Christians, and are not willing in peace to Worship the author of peace. 38
By the end of the fourth century, moreover, it was possible for any given individual to oppose their father's will (say) or undo any gifts made during his lifetime, simply by arguing that the beneficiary was a Eunomian, a Manichee, a Donatist etc. The case would thus come to court as one concerning inheritance and property, but it would tum on the proof of an accusation of heresy. Inevitably, those who considered themselves to be vulnerable to an accusation of heresy also attempted to exploit loopholes in the imperial legislation, through which they could protect their estates and inheritance strategies. Thus in 415 we find the emperors attempting to close the gaps: No Eunomian shall be permitted to make a testament in favour of a Eunomian; no person of the aforesaid perversity shall receive anything under the testament of an Eunomian; no person shall give to a Eunomian nor any Eunomian receive from a Eunomian the gift of landed estate or house, even if, through an interposed person of another sect or under title offictitious sale, some fraudulent scheme to circumvent the law should be devised. 39
Reading between the lines of this constitution we can surmise that Eunomians were in fact attempting to circumvent the law by "fraudulent schemes": making gifts and legacies over to a third person of a different sect or effecting a fictitious sale. The ingenuity of these Eunomians should remind us that, for certain heretics, stricken with civil disabilities, it was worth spending time and money on dodging the law. Conversely, for some private individuals it also became worth spending time and money to get
37 Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John V1.25: Proferunt testamenta hominum. Ecce ubi Gaius Seius donavit fundum ecclesiae, cui praeerat Faustinus. Cuius episcopus erat Faustinus ecclesiae? quid est ecclesia? Ecclesiae, dixit, cui praeerat Faustinus; sed non ecclesiae praeerat Faustinus, sed parti praeerat. 38 Ibid.: Leguntur enim leges manifestae, ubi praeceperunt imperatores eos qui praeter ecclesiae catholicae communionem usurpant sibi nomen Christianum nec volunt in pace colere pacis auctorem nihil nomine ecclesiae audeant possidere. 39 CTh 16.5.58 section 4 (given at Constantinople, November 6, 415): Nulli penitus testari liceat eunomiano in eunomianum, nulli eiusdem perversitatis ex testamento quicquam percipere eunomiani; nemo donet nec eunomianus ab eunomiano liberalitatem praedii vel domus accipiat, etiamsi per interpositam alterius sectae personam vel titulum venditionis imaginariae fraus quaedam legi fuerit excogitata.
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an official denunciation for heresy against an existing or potential opponent in a legal suit. The different rules and regulations concerning who exactly had the civil capacities to do what, became extremely complex - and late Roman legislators were forced to issue more legislation in an attempt to clear up the legal mess. One example from the procedural law of the mid-sixth century will suffice to illustrate the point. Section 1 of Justinian's Novel 45 restates the principle (established in the fifth century) that "heretics" cannot testify when "orthodox" persons are engaged in litigation with each other. The text further specifies that heretics can testify in a case where both parties are heretics, or they can testify where one party is orthodox and the other party is heretical and their testimony is in favor of the orthodox party. However, a problem has arisen with reference to cases where an orthodox individual is seeking a release from their curial obligations; apparently it has been argued in court that heretics cannot testify to an orthodox litigant's civil status, despite the fact that this testimony would be in favor of an orthodox party, as the heretical witness would in fact be testifying against the interests of the. "orthodox" government! The important and general point here is that legislation concerning the civil disabilities of heretics was being implemented in practice, by interested private parties; and that practice had a way of bringing up new issues which in turn demanded new imperial responses. The loss of Roman citizenship rights, either wholesale or in part, thus became a standard legal punishment for deviant religious practice. It is at this point that the concept of Roman citizenship, or rather the threat of losing specific legal capacities, proved especially useful to Christian legislators. Depriving an individual of their rights of citizenship, such as the capacity to make a testament, bequeath a legacy, act as a witness or indeed partake in Roman private law at all, allowed the imperial legislators to carefully nuance the punishment, or more euphemistically the "correction," of specific named heretical groups. It is also worth noting again that some heretics would have had more to lose than others; those with extensive property and a high social status suffered more under a sentence of infamia than those lower down the social ladder. Thus the "deterrence" factor of imperial legislation could be carefully focused on the upper levels of Roman society. Rather than attempting to revolutionize the social order, by enforcing Catholic orthodoxy as a pre-requisite for Roman citizenship, fourth and fifth century legislators employed a tried and tested means of social exclusion. With the application of the penalty of infamia, the rights of citizenship (or rather the lack thereof) were intimately woven in with trials against both Christians and non-Christians on the basis of their religious
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affiliations. In the sixth century the Eastern Emperor Justinian was, of course, more forthcoming about the nitty-gritty details of the relationship between citizenship and religion: one of his first legislative acts was to issue a constitution stating that "heretics cannot be forensic advocates as they are ignorant of the precepts of divine law, which human law makes concrete" (el 1.5.12.8, 527). Divine law was thus equated with orthodox Christian faith, and the purpose of human law was to make that faith concrete. Under Justinian Catholic religious belief became a sine qua non for exercising any legal rights as a Roman citizen. As we have seen, however, the impact of Constantine's religious conversion on Roman citizenship was more subtle and complex than reading backwards from these Justinianic texts would suggest.
Conclusion The criminalization of heresy under the Christian empire was a major innovation, and it carried significant social and economic as well as more narrowly religious implications. We have been exploring some of the legal consequences, as those who were on the receiving end of the new laws sought to protect their interests, and legislators to block their escape routes. Not everything was new: in particular, the connection between Roman citizenship and religious practice was a traditional one, forged well before Christian emperors arrived and began to employ their officials to draft laws which penalized heretics. Late Roman legislators extended the application of the penalty of infamia associated with loss of citizenship to take in new groups of religious offenders. Thus lawyers now had a new arena in which to practice their skills in interpreting the law - or bypassing it. I conclude with the suggestion that, although the "anti-heretical" and "pro-Catholic" rhetoric of the laws is very conspicuous, interest in, or obsession with, the advancement of Catholic orthodoxy cannot be assumed to have been universal among Roman lawyers and legislators. Two quaestors were even capable of applying the term haeresis in a traditional, non-religious sense, to the corporation responsible for shipbuilding. A law of 417 reads as follows: [After other matters] It is our will that the haeresis of shipmasters shall be guarded in all its particulars, so that even if any landholdings whatsoever have been sold up to twenty years before this time in a state auction, and because of a state contract have been separated from this haeresis of shipmasters, and if it should appear that such properties
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were subject to this burden formerly, they shall again be held obligated to the due performance of this service [Etc]. 40
An excerpt from the 423 constitution runs: If no solicitude has recalled any landed estate, in any place whatsoever in African country districts for a period of fifty years, to the performance of the compulsory service of shipmasters, if it should appear that no suit has been brought in this matter at any time within the designated series of years, and if such landed estate has passed the course of the aforesaid years without any legal summons to the haeresis of shipmasters, We do not allow this estate to be disturbed by any solicitude. 41
It is striking, even bizarre, to find haeresis being used as a neutral term approximating to "guild" or (corporate) group in early fifth century Western legislation at a time when heresy as erroneous belief was apparently a major preoccupation of Roman legislators. Around two weeks later, and at the Eastern rather than Western capital (Constantinople as opposed to Ravenna), a quaestor does produce a law against "heresy" in the religious sense, but not without complaining that "listing the names of heretical sects is boring. "42 These texts are a reminder that the attitude of late Roman lawyers to heresy is not to be taken for granted. The more general inference is that in approaching the Roman legislation in question, we must constantly balance any general observations we might be inclined to make on the attitude of late Roman lawyers to heresy against a careful analysis of each individual constitution: we must ask who was responsible for drafting it, what concrete circumstances had prompted its issuing, to whom it was addressed and - most importantly - how it was applied and subverted in practice.
40 CTh 13.6.9 (given at Ravenna, May 14, 417 and addressed to an otherwise unknown Count Sebastius): Post alia: navalem haeresim in omnibus volumus custodiri, ut usque ante viginti annos quaecumque possessiones sub hastaria sorte distractae sunt et propter contractum pUblicum navali fuerant haeresi separatae, si huic oneri ante eas subiacuisse constiterit, rursus ad debitam functionem teneantur obnoxiae. Et cetera. 41 CTh 13.6.lOpr (given at Ravenna, May 18 427 and addressed to the Praetorian Prefect Proculus): Si quod praedium in quolibet africani cespitis loco per quinquaginta annorum curricula ad navalem functionem nulla sollicitudo revocavit nee pulsatum aliquando intra designatam annorum seriem super hac parte constiterit ac praedictae annositatis cursum sine ulla navalis haeresis conventione transcenderit, nullis patimur sollicitudinibus agitari. 42 CTh 16.5.60; noted by Honore, Law in the Crisis of Empire, 109-110.
The Nomen Manichaeorum and Its Uses in Late Antiquity RrCHARDLrM
In 405/6, a certain Secundinus' boldly identified himself in a letter as a Manichaeus. 1 This educated man from Italy was then responding to Augustine's polemical treatise against him, the Contra Secundinum, which in turn was occasioned by a letter he had written earlier. 2 Addressing his correspondent as dominus, Secundinus began by invoking the Trinity, albeit in a self-consciously unorthodox manner: " ... the ineffable God, his First-born, King of all Lights Jesus Christ" and the Holy Spirit, followed by citations from the sayings of Paul the Apostle. 3 In so doing, he aimed to underscore the point that Paul and Mani shared consonant views: "This is what Paul testifies and this is what Manichaeus himself testifies."4 This letter provides us with an interesting starting point for examining the uses of the nomen Manichaeorum in Late Antiquity. At a time when the teachings of Mani had already been proscribed by imperial laws and condemned by ecclesiastical authorities, Secundinus displayed no shyness in declaring his adhesion to the teachings of Mani and, moreover, did so while maintaining a claim to being a Christian, indeed, a Christian of a superior disposition. The "Manichaean name" stood for him as a badge of honor, an honor he bestowed upon himself but refused to concede to Augustine, even to the younger Augustine from the time when the latter was a Manichaean auditor. Indeed Secundinus went so far as to criticize Augustine for never having properly understood - let alone followed - the teachings of Mani and thereby made himself worthy of the nomen Manichaeorum, a position that was diametrically opposite to that of Julian of Eclanum, who contended that Augustine never ceased to be a 1 Secundinus, Ad sanctum Augustinum epistuia, Joseph Zycha, ed., Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 25.2 (Vienna/Prague/Leipzig 1891), 893-901. On this figure, see Janine Desmulliez et ai., eds., Prosopographie Chretienne du BasEmpire, 1112. Prosopographie de i'Italie Chretienne (Paris/Rome: Ecole Franr;:aise de Rome, 2000), 2008-9, s.v. "Secundinus 2." 2 Augustine, Contra Secundinum Manichaeum, Zycha, ed., CSEL 25.2, 905-47. 3 Secundinus, Ad sanctum Augustinum epistuia, Zycha, ed., CSEL 25.2, 893: "Habeo et ago gratias ineffabili ac sacratissimae maiestati eiusque primogenito omnium luminum regi Iesu Christo, habeo gratias et subplex sancto refero spiritui." The title "King of All Lights" unambiguously refers to the dualistic teachings of Mani. 4 Secundinus, ibid., 894: "hoc Paulus, hoc ipse testatus Manichaeus."
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Manichaean even after he had become a catholic Christian priest and bishop.5 In thus employing the nomen as a term of praise reserved for the "lovers of truth," Secundinus was distinctly in the minority - even close to being unique - among the extant writers of Late Antiquity. For him, to be Manichaean was to think and act as a "rationalist" and a true philosopher. Augustine was for Secundinus not so much a follower of Mani, the purveyor of truth, as that of the ars rhetorica. 6 This invocation of the categorical distinction between sophists and philosophers recalls Jerome's self-accusation of having been a Ciceronian rather than a Christian. As such, the charge appears to stem from the world of the literati and philosophers rather than the rough-and-tumble scene that characterized late antique religious controversies. The cultural snobbery of the Greco-Roman elite and its observed reluctance to admit that Christians constituted a "Third Race" indeed surfaced in Secundinus' suggestion that Augustine, by forsaking the doctrines of Mani, had "gone over to the Jewish tribes with their barbaric customs."7 Should Secundinus' positive construal of the Manichaean name be read as a quaint exception during a time when a variety of public statements, ranging from imperial laws to sermons from the pulpit, portrayed Manichaeans as belonging to an evil and foreign sect? This begs the further question of how the nomen Manichaeorum was more commonly employed in Late Antiquity and to what ends. My paper will examine this question, focusing on the period of the late fourth and fifth centuries when the contestations over the meaning of name remained in flux. See below n. 23. Secundinus, ibid., 895: "uisus enim mihi es - et pro certo sic est - et numquam fuisse Manichaeum nec eius te potuisse arcana incognita secreti cognoscere atque sub Manichaei nominee persequi te Hannibalem atque Mithridatem. (For it seems to me ... that you have never been a Manichaean, and never been able to discover the unknown mysteries of his secret, and that under the name of Manichaeus you are attacking Hannibal or Mithridates)"; English translation in text from lain Gardner and Samuel N.C. Lieu, eds., Manichaean Textsfrom the Roman Empire (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 138. 7 Secundinus, ibid., 896: "0 utinam a Manichaeo recedens academiam petisses aut Romanorum bella, quia omnia superarunt, interpretatus fuisses! Quam magna ibi, quam egregia conperisses, et non castus homo utique totius pudicitiae et pauperitatis isses ad ludaeorum gentes barbaras moribus. (How much better it would have been if when you left Manichaeus you had joined the Academy or written an exposition of the wars of the Romans who conquered the world. What great and noble achievements you would have found there, and you, a chaste man of absolute modesty and poverty, would not have gone over to the Jewish tribes with their barbaric customs.") Trans. in Manichaean Texts (ed. Gardner and Lieu), 13 9. On the uses of the notion of Christians as the tertium genus, see Judith M. Lieu, Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 260-65. 5
6
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At first glance, the nomen Manichaeorum belonged generically to the class of sectarian labels that identifies the follower in reference to the founder of the religion or philosophical sect. Insiders often came to embrace terms of abuse by outsiders as sources of positive identity. Such has traditionally been thought to be the case with the nomen christianum. 8 According to the author of Luke-Acts, the citizens of Antioch first coined the Christian name to mock the so-called followers of Christ. 9 This name later turned from an outsiders' term of derision to the self-chosen label of those so derided.lO By the early second century, the religious insiders' identification with the Christian name had become so complete that public persecutions against Christians turned on, and could be made to tum on, whether accused individuals would, of their own volition, assert a form of self-identification with the nomen. Geoffrey de Ste Croix has observed that, "from at least 112 onwards, the normal charge against Christian was simply 'being Christian': they are punished, that is to say 'for the Name,' the nomen Christianum."l1 In Christian acta martyrum, presiding Roman magistrates would typically inquire of those brought before them whether they were Christians or not, and would proceed to punish only those who persisted in replying in the affirmative. Tertullian (Apologeticus tiber) and Minucius Felix (Octavius) were two apologists who challenged those who used the nomen Christianum as the basis for persecuting Christians to justify how they could condemn individuals by associating with a group identity that had itself not been incontrovertibly linked to the commitment of punishable crimes. This last point, that crimes Christians were accused of remain unprove, was indeed confirmed by Pliny the Younger in his letter to Trajan c. CE 111. 8 See, e.g., Elias Bickerman, "The Name of Christians," HTR 42 (1949): 109-24; Harold Mattingly, "The Origin of the Name Christiani," JTS n.s. 9 (1958): 26-37; Orsolino Montevecchi, "Nomen Christianorum," in Paradoxos Politeia: Studi Patristici in onore di Giuseppe Lazzati, Studia Patristica Mediolanensia 10 (ed. Raniero Cantalamessa and Luigi F. Pizzolato; Milan: Pubblicazioni della Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 1979), 485-500; and Justin Taylor, "Why Were the Disciples First Called 'Christians' at Antioch? (Acts 11,26)," RB 101 (1994): 75-94. 9 Acts 11 :26. 10 See Philippa Townsend's article in this volume, "Who Were the First Christians? Jews, Gentiles and the Christianoi," which argues convincingly that the original usage of the name hoi Christianoi was used to refer to Gentile Christians. 11 Geoffrey E.M. de Ste. Croix, "Why Were the Early Christians Persecuted?" Past and Present 26 (1963): 6-38; esp. 9: "This is quite certain, from what the Christian apologists say in the second and early third centuries, from several accounts of martyrdoms, and from the technical language used by Pliny and Trajan ... " See also Judith M. Lieu,. " 'I am a Christian': Martyrdom and the Beginning of 'Christian Identity,' " in Neither Jew nor Greek: Constructing Early Christianity (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 211-31.
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The growth of the phenomenon of Christian martyrdom turned the Christian name into the privileged possession of those who would follow Christ even unto death in imitation of his passion. 12 Yet we do well to recall that not all "followers of Christ" at the time invested their identities in martyrdom or indeed in the Christian name. Christians who professed docetic beliefs did not think that the "real" Christ was hung on the cross and that he indeed merely appeared to have been crucified; they would have accordingly interpreted the injunction to imitate Christ in a different manner from those who actively sought martyrdom as the path toward the imitatio Christi. 13 These men and women were also less likely to believe that the defense of the Christian name was somehow a core aspect of their religious self-identities. But as many Christians increasingly defined theirs as the church of the martyrs and the Christian name as a badge reserved for those with a commitment to martyrdom, Christians with docetic and gnostic leanings increasingly became marginalized and even categorized as "non-Christians." 14 Labels of religious ethnicity were rarely ones that remained stable over time and their ascribed meanings were often fiercely contested during periods of foment. The meaning of the name of Jew (JudaiosIJudaeus) came to be sharpened on account of the confrontations of certain Jews with the Roman authorities. In the aftermath of the Bar Kochba evolt in 135 CE, the emperors briefly imposed the fiscus judaicus, which converted the traditional contributions that Jews made to the temple cult into a tax paid to the imperial fisc. 15 Jews would then have had the choice to decide whether they wished to pay the tax; if they did not wish to do so they could simply not identify themselves as Jews. By thus increasing the cost of being a self-declared Jew, the authorities arguably caused many Jews to reinvest in their inherited identity with deliberate and meaningful action. In Late Antiquity, Christian and Jewish self-identities came more and more to be associated with their respective religious labels. In contrast, 12 See Daniel Boyarin, Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), esp. 10-21. 13 See, e.g., Jean Doresse, "Le refus de la croix: gnostiques et manicheens," La Table Ronde 102 (1957): 89-97. 14 The seminal work on this topic remains Alain Le Boulluec, La notion d'heresie dans fa litterature grecque, Ir-IIr sieeles, 2 vols (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1985). There is a copious, burgeoning literature that uses theories of cultural identity to elucidate the process of religious identity-formation. Many of the basic ideas behind this approach are expounded in Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (rev. ed.; London: Verso, 1991). 15 See Martin Goodman, "Nerva, the Fiscus Judaicus and Jewish Identity," JRS 79 (1989): 40-44. For a fine study of the intricate processes that shaped the formation of a Jewish identity, see Seth Schwartz, Imperialism and Jewish Society, 152 BCE-640 CE (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
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"Manichaeans" in the Roman world by and large did not seem to have exhibited a comparable degree of identification with the nomen Manichaeorum. Instead, efforts to turn that name into a meaningful religious label were made mostly by those who would suppress it. Indeed we owe the sense of a distinctive Manichaean identity to the works of catholic/orthodox Christian writers who, in accordance with the tendencies of heresiography and their growing alliance with the Roman state following the reign of Theodosius I, sought to invent the image of an alien Other so as to be able to condemn more efficaciously the specific practices, beliefs and persons. 16 It is a well attested but often overlooked nostrum that people whom we have grown accustomed to calling Manichaeans mainly represented themselves as Christians. Throughout his own writings, Mani invariably styled himself an apostle of Jesus Christ after the fashion of Paul. 17 In the Living Gospel, he introduces himself as "Mannichaeus (sic), apostle of Jesus Christ ... "18 The same reference appears in one of his epistles discovered at Ismant el-Kharab: "Manichaios, apostle of Jesus Christ ... "19 Throughout the Coptic Kephalaia, Mani represents himself as an apostle or phoster who engages in a dialogue with disciples. 20 16 See Samuel N.C. Lieu, "Some Themes in Later Roman Anti-Manichaean Polemics," Bulletin of the Johns Rylands University Library of Manchester 68 (1986): 434-69; rev. version in idem, Manichaeism in Mesopotamia and the Roman East (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 156-202; and Sarah Stroumsa and Gedaliahu A.G. Stroumsa, "Aspects of the Anti-Manichaean Polemics in Late Antiquity and under Early Islam," HTR 81 (1988): 37-58. 17 See Ernst Waldschmidt and Otto Helmut Wolfgang Lentz, Die Stellung Jesu im Manichiiismus, Abhandlungen der preuBischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1926, Phil.-hist. Klasse 4 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1926); and Eugen Rose, "Die manichaische Christologie," Zeitschrift fur Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 32 (1980): 219-31. The Jesus that Mani invokes is often termed the Iesus Patibilis, a cosmic docetic figure, to distinguish him from the "historical" Jesus. 18 Cologne Mani Codex 65.23-68; ed. cit., 44-5, English translation by Judith M. and Samuel N.C. Lieu, cited in Manichaean Texts (ed. Gardner and Lieu), 156. 19 A critical edition of this text is currently under preparation by lain Gardner and Wolf-Peter Funk. English translation in text from Manichaean Texts (ed. Gardner and Lieu), 167. 20 Carl Schmidt and Hans Jakob Polotsky, "Ein Mani-Fund in Agypten: Originalschriften des Mani und seiner SchUler," Sitzungberichte der preuJ3ischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse (Berlin, 1933), 1-90, esp. 20-21. See lain Gardner, The Kephalaia of the Teacher (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 15ff. The Berlin Papyrusbuch also contains this form of self-representation: "Manichaios, der Apostel Jesu Christi"; see Schmidt and Polotsky, "Ein Mani-Fund," 24. This usage of "Manich~ios the Apostle of Jesus Christ ... " appears also in the Acta Archelai, see Hegemonius, Acta Archelai 5.5.22, in Charles Henri Beeson, ed., Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte 16 (Leipzig, 1906) [= Epiphanius,
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This was such a consistent practice that outsiders took note of it. In the Epistula Fundamenti, preserved in Augustine's Contra Epistulam Fundamenti (396/97) and referred to as one of the most widely read Manichaean texts in Roman North Africa, the same Pauline echoes are evident: "Mani, apostle of Jesus Christ ... "21 Augustine himself regarded this as a common practice in Manichaeans texts. In his Contra Faustum, he said that everyone of Mani's epistles begins this way, with "Mani, Apostle of Jesus Christ. "22 Educated men were well apprised of this practice, so much so that Julian of Ec1anum, in his attack on Augustine's former association with Manichaeans, also took note of this fact in the so-called Letter of Menoch, likely a forgery.23 This epistle begins with these words: Panarion Haer. 6.6, in Karl Holl, Epiphanius III: Panarion haer. 65-80, De Fide, (Berlin, 1933), 25, 14; rev. ed. Jiirgen Dummer, Berlin, 1985]. On this problematical source, see Samuel N.C. Lieu, "Fact and Fiction in the Acta Archelai," in Peter Bryder, ed., Manichaean Studies I, 69-94; and Madeleine Scopello, "Hegemonius, les Acta Archelai et l'histoire de la controverse anti-manicheenne," in Studia Manichaica: IV. Internationaler KongreJ3 zum Manichaismus, Berlin, 14.-18. Juli 1997 (ed. Ronald E. Emmerick, Werner Sundermann and Peter Zieme; Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2000), 52845. 21 Augustine, Contra epistulam Fundamenti 5.10-11, Zycha, ed., CSEL 25.1, 197: "Manichaeus apostolus Iesu Christi." Erich Feldman, Die "Epistula Fundamenti" del' nordafrikanischen Manichaer: Versuch einer Rekonstruktion (Altenberge: CIS Verlag, 1987) discusses this form of self-address as used in North Africa. This Augustinian text is one of the few works in which he uses direct quotations from a work of Mani to structure his polemical treatise, see Madeleine Scopello, "L 'epistula Fundamenti a la lumiere des sources manicheenes du Fayoum," in Augustine and Manichaeism in the Latin West, Proceedings of the Fribourg-Utrecht International Symposium of the lAMS (ed. Johannes Van Oort, Otto Wermelinger and Gregor Wurst; Leiden: Brill, 2001), 20529, esp. 206, 209ff. The formula was well-known and was uttered by Felix in his disputation with Augustine, see Augustine, Contra Felicem 1.1, Zycha, ed., CSEL 25.2, 801. 22 Augustine, Contra Faustum 13.4, Zycha, ed., CSEL 25.1, p. 381: "Omnes tamen eius epistulae ita exordiuntur: Manichaeus apostolus Iesu Christi." See also Aug. De haeresibus 46: "unde se in suis litteris Iesu Christi apostolum dicit." On Augustine'S engagement with this form of address, see Julien Ries, "Jesus sauveur dans la controverse anti-manicheene de saint Augustin," in Augustine and Manichaeism in the Latin West (ed. Van Oort, Wermelinger and Wurst), 185-94. 23 Preserved in Augustine'S Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum, in CSEL 75.1 (Vienna, 1974). English translation by S.N.C. Lieu and Stephen R. Llewelyn, in Manichaean Texts (ed. Gardner and Lieu), 172-74. On the emerging scholarly consensus against the authenticity of this letter, see G.J.D. Aalders, "L'epitre a Menoch, attribuee a Mani," VC 14 (1960): 245--49 and M. Stein, Manichaica Latina, Bd. I, epistula ad Menoch. Abhandlungen der Nordhein-Westfalischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Sonderreihe Papyrologica Coloniensa 2711 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998). On the controversy between Augustine and Julian, see Robert A. Markus, "Augustine's Confessions and the Controversy with Julianum of Eclanum: Manicheism Revisited," Augustinianum 41 (1991): 913-25.
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"Manes the apostle of Jesus Christ to Menoch his daughter ... " Generally, the catholic Christian authorities bridled at the thought that Mani might have thought of himself an agent of Christ and the ecclesiastical abjuration formulae required of suspected Manichaeans denounced Mani for "having dared to call him the Paraclete and Apostle of Jesus Christ. "24 If Mani' s preferred self-address blurred the distinction between himself and [other] Christian teachers, his followers likewise did not always mark themselves off as distinct from [other] Christians. Despite Mani's elaborate measures to establish and disseminate his teachings and ecclesial institutions, he had not insisted upon a distinctive name for his church. Mani's contrast of the earlier churches with his own church (ekklsia) comes through in a number of texts, including the Coptic Kephalaia. 25 However, Mani's ekklsia was simply, for him at least, the one true church. When first identified as a distinctive group within the Roman Empire, the so-called Manichaeans were called Akouanitai after Akouas, whom some have equated with Mar Zaku, a noted Manichaean missionary.26 Elsewhere, leaving aside the debates over the ~tymology of the word Mani, it was opponents who likely first devised the term "Manichaios" both as an epithet for the founder of the religion (as one finds in Coptic texts) and his individual follower. 27 Many were indeed fond of stressing the similarity of Mani as well as Manichaios to maneis, "mad," or mania, "madness," in Greek. 28 In the late third century, a Christian bishop from Egypt warned against the false teachers who were the Manichaeans and claimed to have received a Manichaean text, which he refers to as "the document of the madness of the Manichaeans."29 Eusebius of Caesarea calls Mani a "madman" and an Anti -Christ, from whom "the profane name of Manichaean is still commonly on man's lips to this day."30 Polemicists thus took great delight in taunting the followers of Mani by calling their religion the "madness of the Manichaeans (he ton Manichaion mania)." Such a usage became as common as it was to appear (virtually) 24 Waldeschmidt-Lentz, Stellung Iesu, 1 c. 59ff., cited in Schmidt and Polotsky, "Ein Mani-Fund," 26. 25 Schmidt and Polotsky, "Ein Mani-Fund," 42, 43, 45. 26 Epiphanius, Panarion 66.1.1; see discussion in Gedaliahu Stroumsa, "Gnostics and Manichaeans in Byzantine Palestine," Studia Patristica I, Papers of the Ninth International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford 1983 (Kalamazoo, 1985),273-78, esp.275. 27 Schmidt and Polotsky, "Ein Mani-Fund," 26 n5. 28 See Lieu, "Some Themes," 160-69. 29 P. Rylands Greek 469.12--42. See Colin H. Robert, Catalogue of Greek and Latin Papyri in the John Rylands Library Manchester, Vol. III: Theological and Literary Texts (Manchester: University Press 1938), 42--43. Cited in Manichaean Texts (ed. Gardner and Lieu), 114-15. 30 Eusebius of Caesarea, Hist. ecc!. 7.31 (J.E.L. Oulton, LCL).
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tautological. A slightly different context obtained in the west where the Latin term Manichaeus. While learned authors such as Augustine who knew Greek and had access to Greek sources were aware of this word play, the same in-built imputation of irrationality did not obtain on a more popular level. 31 Perhaps for this reason it was instead given a negative charge by being associated with particular crimes (of which more later). One group that did much to reify the identity of Manichaeans was the Roman emperors who issued laws that targeted them. In 302, Diocletian famously first persecuted Manichaeans, not Christians, in a rescript sent to Julianus, proconsul of Africa, in which he links Manichaeans with Rome's enemy Persia. 32 That North Africa offers up this evidence occasions little surprise. The same context of official persecution and judicial inquiries that had made the nomen christianum a bone of contention and for a time the cornerstone of official Roman anti-Christian policy greeted the attempts to invoke the Manichaean name. Condemnatory rhetoric issuing from the emperors and orthodox Christian authorities came to include crimina in the bill of indictment against the Manichaeans. 33 In a manner, this repeated the tactic of those earlier critics of Christianity who had, unfairly according to apologists 31 See Augustine, Contra Iulianum 1.5 on his debt to the Cappadocians for the use of certain anti-Manichaean arguments. 32 Collatio Mosaicorum Mosaicorum et Romanorum Legum 15.3-4; in M. Hyamson, ed., Mosaicorum et Romanorum Legum Collectio (Oxford: OUP, 1913), 131-33: "De qui bus sollertia tua serenitati nostrae retulit, Manichaei, audivimus eos nuperime veluti nova et inopinata prodigia in hunc mundum de Persica adversaria nobis gente progress a vel orta esse et multa facinora ibi committere, populos namque quietos perturbare nec non et civitatibus maxima detrimenta inserere: et verendum est, ne forte, ut fieri adsolet, accedenti tempore conentur per execrandas consuetudines et scaevas leges Persarum innocentioris naturae homines, Romanam gentem modestam atque tranquillam et universum orbem nostrum veluti venenis de suis malivolis inficere." English translation from Gardner and Lieu, eds., Manichaean Texts, pp. 117-18: "As regards the Manichaean, concerning whom your carefulness has reported to our serenity, who, in opposition to the older creeds, set up new and unheard-of sects, purposing in their wickedness to cast out the doctrines vouchsafed to us by divine favour in olden times, we have heard that they have but recently advanced or sprung forth, like strange and monstrous portents, from their native homes among the Persians - a nation hostile to us and have settled in this part of the world, where they are perpetrating many evil deed." 33 Generally, see Peter Brown, "The Diffusion of Manichaeism in the Roman Empire," JRS 29 (1969): 92-103. On imperial legislations against "Manichaeans" in particular, see Per Beskow, "The Theodosian Laws against Manichaeism," in Manichaean Studies, Vol. I. Proceedings of the First International Conference on Manichaeism, August 5-7, 1987 (ed. Peter Bryder; Lund, Sweden: Plus Ultra, 1988), Ill. Also Erich-Hans Kaden, "Die Edikte gegen die Manichaer von Diokletian bis Justininan," in Festschrift Hans Lewald bei Vollendung des vierzigstens Amtsjahres als ordentlicher Professor im Oktober 1953 (Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn 1953),55-68.
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such as Minucius Felix and Tertullian, previously used the nomen christianum, and an implicit association of the name to crimes, to persecute Christians. In 381 Gratian, Valentinian II and Theodosius, in an edict to Eutropius, praetorian prefect, imposed the penalty of perpetual infamia upon any male or female "Manichaean" by denying him or her the ability to make a binding will, or to pass on or receive property through the Roman laws of inheritance. 34 The emphatic nature of the emperor's displeasure was underscored by the fact that they stipulated that its provisions were to be retroactive, contrary to customary Roman legal usage. This was done knowingly, as the law explains the provision as follows : "We sanction the severity of the present statute not so much as an example of a law that should be established but as one that should be avenged, so that the defense of time also shall not be an advantage to them."35 So extraordinary was this aspect of the anti-Manichaean legislation that a subsequent edict was issued in 383 to limit its retroactive scope. 36 The efficacy of such laws, if they are not strictly to be read as pieces of moral legislation, required first that it be practicable for particular individuals to be definitively labeled as Manichaeans. There were in fact many obstacles in the path of easy "identification." Some of the difficulty arose because the followers of Mani did not generally demonstrate the same commitment to the nomen Manichaeorum that earlier Christians had shown with respect to the nomen christianum. There are few documented 34 CTh 16.5.7; PhalT, ed., p. 451: "If any Manichaean man or woman (Manichaeus Manichaeave), from the date of the law, as previously and originally issued by Our Fathers, has transmitted his own property to any person whatsoever, by the execution of a testament or under any title of liberality whatever or any kind of gift, or if anyone of the aforesaid persons has become enriched by the bestowal, through any form whatever, of an inheritance upon which he has entered, inasmuch as We forthwith deprive the aforesaid persons under the perpetual brand of just infamy of all right to make a will and to live under the Roman law (sub perpetua inustae infamiae nota testandi ac vivendi iure Roma) ... The inheritance of paternal or maternal goods shall be bestowed only upon those children who, although born of Manichaeans, nevertheless are immune from such a crime ... and have dedicated themselves to the pure religion." 35 CTh 16.5.7.1; Pharr, ed., 451. 36 CTh 16.7.3; Pharr, ed., 466: " ... those who at any time prefer to frequent the nefarious retreats and the wicked seclusion of the Manichaeans (Manichaeorum nefanda secreta) shall be pursued constantly and perpetually by that penalty which even Our progenitor Valentini an, of sainted authority, has prescribed and which Our decrees have no less frequently commanded ... But in order that the dead may not be harassed by the perpetual outrage of criminal accusation or that questions of inheritance which have been extinguished through various lapses of many years may not be continually agitated into revived conflicts, We prescribe a time limitation [of five years] for such inquisitions ... " For a discussion of this law, see Caroline Humfress's article in this volume, "Citizens and Heretics: Late Roman Lawyers on Christian Heresy."
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cases from this time in which individuals would actively claim the name when faced with severe sanctions. This is not to say that there were no "Manichaean" equivalents to those Christian martyrs whose literary history we know so very well. It would appear that Diocletian's persecutions against Manichaeans yielded some "martyrs" in Egypt at any rate. 37 But in the cities of the empire, "Manichaeans" appeared but only as shifting and elusive targets. In one instance, the emperors were informed either by their local agents or by catholic Christian leaders that various individuals who had been charged as Manichaeans were in the habit of denying the nomen Manichaeorum. These persons indeed were said to have claimed that they were the followers of other sectae that had not as yet been banned by imperial law. Attempting to end what they saw as an evasive tactic, the emperors revised their ban in the following manner: 38 Now with malignant fraud they should defend themselves under pretence of those fallacious names, by which many, as we have discovered, desire to be called and to be designated as of approved faith and of rather chaste course of life; especially since some of these persons desire themselves to be denominated Encratitans, Apotactitans, Hydroparastatans, or Saccoforians and by a variety of diverse names falsify - as it were the services of their religious profession. For it is not proper that all these persons should be protected by a profession of names, but should be held notorious and execrable by the criminality of their sects.
The textual logic of this imperial law presumes that Manichaeans were in the habit of dissimulating their religious identities to avoid detection and persecution. Such a view was certainly that of the emperors and many of the catholic bishops. But what if we indeed have here a situation in which individuals or groups that really did not regard themselves as Manichaeans were being assigned that name by detractors to serve the latter's agendas? There is certainly ample evidence that the practice of labeling one's religious rivals Manichaeans became a common practice during the later Christological controversies. 39 Wandering ascetics, for example, especially those who followed a vegetarian diet, were routinely called Manichaeans 37 See the Coptic hymns lauding these "Manichaean" martyrs; in A. Allbery, A Manichaean Psalm Book, 142. The author links these martyrs to Mani as well as other well-known Christian martyrs including the apostles and Jesus himself. This material is nicely discussed and set in context in David S. Potter, The Roman Empire at Bay, AD 180-395 (London: Routledge, 2004),320-21. 38 CTh 16.5.7.3: "Nec se sub simulatione fallaci eorum scilicet nominum, quibus plerique, ut cognovimus, probatae fidei et propositi castioris dici ac signari volent, maligna fraude defendant; cum praesertim nonnulli ex his Encratitas, Apotactitas, Hydroparastatas vel Saccoforos nominari se velint et varietate nominum diversorum velut religiosae professionis officia mentiantur. Eos enim omnes convenit non professione defendi nominum, sed notabiles atque execrandos haberi scelere sectarum." 39 See above n. 16.
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by others regardless of whether they themselves participated in a Manichaean self-identity or not. 40 What becomes abundantly clear from the late fourth-century laws is that finding and labeling individual Manichaeans was no straightforward matter. Eventually, the emperors appointed special agents, inquisitores, to look into the matter closely. What did these imperial inquisitores find? There is little in our evidence that what they reported back to the emperors allowed the latter to devise a successful strategy to attach individuals to the Manichaean name. Instead the emperors continued to fire large rhetorical salvoes at the perceived problem. In a 383 law to Postumianus, praetorian prefect, they included "Manichaeans" with several other groups in a list of proscribed heretical sects: 41 All persons whatsoever who are tossed about by the false doctrine of diverse heresies, namely, the Eunomians, the Arians, the Macedonians, the Pneumatomachi, the Manichaeans, the Encratites, the Apotactites, the Saccophori, and the Hydroparastatae, shall not assemble in any groups, shall not collect any multitude, shall not attract any people to themselves, shall not show any walls of private houses after the likenesses of churches, and shall practice nothing publicly or privately which may be detrimental to the Catholic sanctity.
One could argue that, in serially listing all the names that belonged to the growing catalogue of "heresies," the emperors had simply given up on trying to determine the interrelationship of these groups. While two years earlier they had postulated that the ascetic groups called Encratitae, Apotactitae, Saccofori, Hydroparastatae were in fact all "cryptoManichaeans," the new law makes no mention of this link. Instead, all the named groups are cited individually and, moreover, are put together with Eunomians, Arians, Macedonians, and Pneumatomachians, other groups of banned "heretics." What the special imperial inquisitores failed to find out surprisingly also eluded the catholic Christian authorities. While the latter may be seen as the lynchpin in the imperial campaign to suppress the religion of Mani, they were in fact often the most interested parties who had petitioned for 40 For a study of how the enactment of rituals shaped the body and in turn contributed to the construction of "Manichaean" identity in both east and west, see Jason D. BeDuhn, The Manichaean Body in Discipline and Ritual (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). 41 CTh 16.5.11; English translation in text from Pharr, ed., 452: "Omnino, quoscumque divers arum haeresum error exagitat, id est Eunomiani, Arriani, Macedoniani, Pneumatomachi Manichaei, Encratitae, Apotactitae, Saccofori, Hydroparastatae nullis circulis coeant, null am colligant multitudinem, nullum ad se populum trahant nec ad imaginem ecclesiarum parietes privatos ostendant, nihil vel publice vel privatim, quod catholicae sanctitati officere possit, exerceant."
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the various imperial rescripts in the first case. On the other hand, because of their local network and knowledge, they were also the ones who might be expected to be able to identify Manichaeans. Indeed, none more so than Augustine of Hippo. Yet, his own works at times reveal how challenging this task could be even for those in the know. In De Haeresibus, Augustine discusses how an alleged splinter group from the Manichaeans modified the Christian eucharistic rite by adding human semen to the flour that made up the Host. Some contemporaries regarded these Purifiers, or Catharists, so called because of their alleged concern to liberate Light elements trapped in matter by ingesting human seed, as Manichaeans. Others, however, vehemently denied that these "Purifiers" were Manichaeans at all. Augustine was of the former opinion and tried to persuade his readers that this disavowal of Manichaean identity was just the kind of ruse one would expect from heretics. Indeed, such a notion was popularized by Epiphanius of Salamis who equated heresy to a many-hued snake that seeks to deceive the human eye so as to impart a deadly sting to the unsuspecting. 42 How are modern historians to approach this question? Quite often, scholars' understanding of this and similar situations are heavily reliant upon a master narrative of Manichaeism as both a clearly distinct religious tradition and as one that habitually deceived others regarding its own identity in order to attract gain adherents. 43 Augustine, in one of his letters to a bishop in Mauretania, called attention to the alleged subterfuge of a certain Victorinus, formerly a subdeacon in the church of Malliana. 44 Some time after 395, Victorinus was denounced to Augustine as a "Manichaean" and the latter questioned him before the matter reached the level of a public trial with witnesses. Augustine said: He was so well known that I questioned him before he could be arraigned by witnesses; he could not deny the accusation (negare non posset), for he knew that there were many such to whom he had incautiously given himself away. He would have appeared altogether too bold, not to say out of his mind, if he had tried to deny it. He admitted that he was indeed a Manichaean hearer (auditorem .,. Manichaeorum) but not an elect (non electum).45
Cf. Ambrosiaster, Epistula ad Timotheum. 2.3.6-7. Decret, "bu bon usage du mensonge et du parjure. Manicheens et Priscillianistes face it la persecution dans l'Empire chretien IIVe-Ve siec1es," in Melanges Pierre Leveque I (ed. Marie-Madeleine Mactoux and Evelyne Geny; Paris: Belles lettres, 1990), 111-49. 44 Augustine, Ep. 236; A. Goldbacher. ed., CSEL 57 (Vienna/Leipzig, 1911),523-24. 45 Augustine, Ep. 236.1; CSEL 57, 524; English translation in text from Wilfrid Parsons, ed., St. Augustine. Letters, Vol. 5 (Letters 204-70), Fathers of the Church Series 32 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1956), 180. 42
43 Fran~ois
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At this point Augustine offers an extensive gloss regarding the activities and beliefs of Manichaean auditors and what they shared (and did not share) with the elect: 46 Those who are called hearers among them eat meat, till the soil, and, if they wish, have wives, but those called elect do none of these things. The hearers kneel before the elect that these may lay a hand on the suppliant, and this is done not only toward their priest or bishops or deacons, but toward any of the elect. Like these, they adore and pray to the sun and moon. Like them, they fast on Sundays; like them, they believe all the blasphemies for which the heresy of the Manichaeans is to be abominated; denying, for example, that Christ was born of a virgin, claiming that his body was not real but apparent, and for this reason insisting that his passion was apparent, too, and that there was no resurrection ...
Note, however, that while Victorinus owned up to being a Manichaean hearer, what someone might understand such a statement to mean has been deftly shaped by Augustine through the insertion of this extensive gloss; Victorinus himself had not stated either that he did or believed in the specific things that are enumerated in Augustine's gloss. After this, Augustine went on to describe the activities that Victorinus was actually alleged to have engaged in and the negotiations that had taken place between the two men: 47 That subdeacon, posing as a Catholic, not only believed those intolerable blasphemies as the Manichaeans do, but he taught them as vigorously as he could. He was discovered by his teachings (docens pate/actus est) when he trusted himself, so to speak, to his pupils. Indeed, he asked me, after he had confessed that he was a Manichaean hearer (Manichaeorum auditorem), to lead him back to the way of truth of the Catholic doctrine, but I confess I was horrified at his duplicity under his clerical guise and I took steps to have him confined and driven from the city.
If this scenario appears unremarkable, it does so because it conforms to our expectations of what Manichaeans tended to do. Here, it seems, we have yet another case of a crypto-Manichaean whose disguise was stripped bare thanks to the vigilance of the catholic Christian authorities. Yet Augustine's own statement of what Victorinus owned up to is suspiciously lacunose. He failed to mention that Victorinus had connected himself with a Manichaean community or with particular electi; the suspected "heretic" was evidently not required to identify individual Manichaeans with whom he had associated, a common enough line of questioning in such proceedings that this particular argumentum e silentio may have some force. Nor was Victorinus condemned in Augustine's narrative for possessing Manichaean books to which the non-elect would not have had ready access to at any rate. 46 47
Augustine, Ep. 236.2; CSEL 57, 524; English in text from Parsons, ed., 180. Augustine, Ep. 236.3; CSEL 57, 525; English in text from Parsons, ed., 181.
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So in what manner was Victorinus a Manichaean? We may surmise that he was denounced as a Manichaean to the authorities for teaching dualistic doctrines of a certain sort. But a propensity for dualistic teachings pervaded the early Christian communities, especially in so-called gnostic and Valentini an circles. Could it be that Victorinus simply regarded himself as a Christian and therefore saw nothing amiss in holding forth on his own views on good and evil while discharging the duties of a lay subdeacon? Augustine was the one who thought the two roles incompatible and did his utmost to make it so for everyone else. A traditional scholarly interpretation would represent Augustine as playing the part of protoinquisitor whose diligent work unmasked Victorinus' subterfuge. And yet if we regard the former's role not so much as a "discoverer" of Manichaeans as the "inventor" of them, we will have instead a case in which the nomen Manichaeorum was invoked principally to serve the agenda of the self-identified orthodox group. Finally, Victorinus' allegedly confessed that he was a Manichaean hearer. Such a term readily invites scholars to place him within the table of organization of the highly structured two-tiered communities with which Manichaeans everywhere were associated. But was he a hearer in that sense? Perhaps this was simply a way for Victorinus to represent himself as someone with an interest in the teachings popularly attributed to Mani? Instead of being seen as a crypto-heretic who in actuality belonged to another church, which was how Augustine represented Victorinus to us, could the man not just as readily be seen as a pious person whose pursuit of truth led him to eclectic (i.e., unorthodox) choices in authoritative texts and ideas? Victorinus' public confession was in any event likely to have been agreed upon in advance. Making such a declaration allowed him to state for the record that he was not a "real" Manichaean, that is, a Manichaean elect; he would also thus be able avoid a public trial and evaded serious consequences such as the demand that he receive re-baptism. In turn, this scripted public performance allowed Augustine to claim to have successfully uncovered a crypto-Manichaean and, through the exercise of episcopal authority and pastoral care, made safe the catholic flock. In the end, Augustine arranged to have Victorinus expelled from the Christian church without the opportunity for rehabilitation; on the other hand, he did not press for more substantial punishments to be imposed upon him. Augustine and other catholic hierarchs could have prosecuted suspected Manichaeans under the authority of the imperial rescripts that associated the nomen Manichaeorum with crimina. The list of these alleged misdeeds instantly recalls the accusations that were made against Christians in the earlier centuries. One crimen associated with the Manichaean name was
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the eating of hosts that had been tainted with human semen. Yet this charge, even if it could be substantiated - and there is little reason to believe that it could be, given its previous history of being directed against Jews and Christians48 - properly condemned only the elect; hearers could at best be accused of having been accomplices by providing them with the offensive "props" for the sacrilegious rite. Catholic Christian priest and bishops such as Augustine in fact took an active role in the circulation of such stories, which, together with imperial rescripts that formally condemned Manichaeans, gave the authorities needed ammunition to exact "confessions" from those whom they suspected of being Manichaeans. Augustine narrates just such a confession (c. 421-8) that Ursus, an imperial functionary holding the office of a tribunus, extracted from a woman named Eusebia. Augustine, in recounting the incident, identifies the woman in question as a female Manichaean elect: 49 Their elect are forced to consume a sort of eucharist sprinkled with human seed in order that the divine substance may be freed even from that, just as it is from other foods of which they partake. However, they deny that they do this, claiming that some others do it, using the name of the Manichaeans; but they were exposed in the church at Carthage, as your know, for you were a deacon there at the time when, under the prosecution of Ursus the tribune, whom was then prefect of the palace, some of them were brought to trial. At this time a girl by the name of Margaret gave evidence of their obscene practices and claimed, though she was not yet twelve years old, that she had been violated in the performance of this criminal rite. Then with difficulty he compelled Eusebia, some kind of Manichaean nun, to admit that she had undergone the same treatment in this regard, though at first, she maintained that she was a virgin and insisted on being examined by a midwife. When she was examined and when her true condition was discovered, she likewise gave information on that whole loathsome business at which flour is sprinkled beneath a couple in sexual intercourse to receive and commingle with their seed. This she had not heard when Margaret gave her testimony, for she had not been present.
According to the text, Eusebia's confession was obtained using the leverage of an earlier "confession" by a twelve-year old girl named Margaret. Historians these days no longer regard "confessions" gathered through inquisitorial techniques as revealing much aside from what the interrogators most wished to hear. 50 The formal proceedings and allowed 48 On similar accusations, see Albert Henrichs, "Pagan Ritual and the Alleged Crimes of the Early Christians," in Kyriakon: Festschrift J. Quasten I (ed. P. Granfield and J. A. Jungmann; Munster: Aschendorff, 1970), 18-35; and Andrew McGowan, "Eating People: Accusations of Cannibalism against Christians in the Second Century," JECS 2 (1994): 413-42. 49 Augustine, De haeresibus 46.9; English translation in text from Manichaean Texts (ed. Gardner and Lieu), 144. 50 On how early modem European inquisitorial records might be used as historical sources contra extreme skeptics, see Carlo Ginzburg, "The Inquisitor as Anthropologist,"
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rules of evidence described above fell far short of the high standards upheld by enlightened imperial governors such as Pliny the Younger, who quite wisely thought little of the truth-value of any confessions obtained under such duress. The ecclesiastical authorities were themselves not above employing similar tactics either. Overt manipulation of the proceedings is clearly evident in Augustine's dealings with a certain Viator who was suspected by some of being a Manichaean. When examined by catholic Christian authorities, Viator confessed that he indeed had knowledge of the practice of eating semen-laden hosts but insisted that it was exclusive to a group that called itself the Catharists. Augustine was not content to allow such a defense to stand and pressed him further. Viator's subsequent admissions raise more questions than they answer, as evidenced by Augustine's reportage of his claims: 51 Nevertheless, though he asserted that there are other groups of the Manichaean sect divided into Mattarii and especially Manichaeans, he could not deny that all of these three forms [that is, Catharists, Mattarii and Manichaeans] were propagated by the same founder and that all of them are, generally speaking, Manichaeans.
What follows in Augustine's account is an elaborate gloss that is as lawyerly in its argumentation as it is suspect: 52 Surely the Manichaean books are unquestionably common to all of them, and in these books are described these dreadful things relating to the transformation of males into females, and of females into males to attract and to loosen through concupiscence the princes of darkness of both sexes so that the divine substance which is imprisoned in them may be set free and escape. This is the source of the obscene practices which some of the Manichaeans refuse to admit pertain to them. For they imagine that they are imitating divine powers to the highest degree and so they attempt to purge a part of their god, which they really believe is held befouled just as much in human seed as it is in all celestial and terrestrial bodies, and in the seeds of all things. And for this reason, it follows that they are just as much obliged to purge it from human seed by eating, as they are in reference to other seed which they consume in their food. This is the reason they are also called Catharists, that is, purifiers; for they are so attentive to purifying this part that they do not refrain even from such horrifying food as this.
At this point we would logically wish to examine how bonafide Manichaeans employed the nomen Manichaeorum when not made to confess to that identity before imperial officials and catholic bishops. in his Clues, Myths and the Historical Method (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 156-64. I thank Eduard Iricinschi for this helpful reference. Note, however, that Augustine in the above text presents us with an ex post Jacto third-person narrative and not the verbatim transcript of the proceedings presided over by Ursus. 51 Augustine, De haeresibus 46.9-10. 52 Ibid.; English translation in text from Manichaean Texts (ed. Gardner and Lieu), 145.
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Unfortunately, our sources are reticent on this matter. Indeed, few Manichaean texts refer to the community of the faithful as Manichaeans, preferring, as one might reasonably expect, more metaphorical and scriptural labels such as "the just" or "righteous ones." Evidence that reveals clear "self-identification" with the nomen Manichaeorum is rare. In Mark the Deacon's Life of Porphyry of Gaza, the bishop confronted Julia who "declared that she was Manichaean (hoti Manichaia etugchanen)."53 But Julia's reported self-identification with Mani not only appears within an orthodox religious narrative; in that narrative itself it only arises as a direct response to specific posed question regarding whose teachings she was in fact following. She may therefore be described as a Manichaean in the sense that she followed the teachings of Mani rather than held active membership in a socio-religious institution called the Manichaean "church." Was she essentially a female counterpart to Secundinus then, that is, a Christian who regarded Mani's teachings as a superior, more philosophical brand of the Christian truth? To confuse matters even more, Julia was in fact not identified as a Manichaean electa in the Georgian version of Mark's vita at all but rather as a female philosopher. 54 There exist a number of cases that appear to suggest rather strong personal identifications with the nomen Manichaeorum. Specifically, we know of two instances in which the Manichaean name was invoked within the context of the marking of the body and burial. In the first case, a woman who was buried in Salona (Dalmatia) receiving this following epitaph: "Bassa, virgin [from] Lydia, Manichea."55 What is the date and likely context of this epitaph? The epigraphical style of the inscription suggests a date of late third to early fourth century. There is furthermore a supposition that such a frank and public declaration of one's Manichaean identity was hardly practicable after Diocletian's edict. 56 Yet even if this 53 Mark the Deacon, Life of Porphyry of Gaza 87. Henri Gregoire and Marc-Antoine Kugener, eds., Marc Ie Diacre, Vie de Porphyre, eveque de Gaza (Paris 1930), 68; English translation in text from Manichaean Texts (ed. Gardner and Lieu), 127. 54 See Paul Peters, ed., "La vie georgienne de Saint Porphyre de Gaza," Analaecta Bollandiana 59 (1941): 65-217. 55 "Bassa parthenos Ludia Maniche[aJ"." Text and discussion in Franz Cumont and M.-A. Kugener, Recherches sur Ie Manicheisme II, Extrait de la CXXIIIe Homelie de Severe d'Antioche. III. L'inscription de Salone (Brussels, 1912), 175-77; Franyois Decret, L 'Afrique manicheene (IV" - V" siecles): Etude historique et doctrinale (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 1976), II, 96 n.68; and idem, Mani et la tradition manicheene (Paris: Seuil, 1974). 56 Ibid., 176: ". "notre fragment." doit etre place it un moment OU Ie manicheisme jouisssait d'une tolerance assez large pour qU'une profession de foi publique ne constituat pas un danger, peut-etre sous Ie regne de Julien ou sous celui de Constantin ou meme plus anciennement encore, avant Ie premier edit par lequel Dioc1etien ordonna de poursuivre la secte 'venue de Perse.' "
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dating is secure, interpreting such a laconic and atypical inscription poses a considerable challenge. One cannot assume a priori that the term Manichea or Manichaia on the inscription must be translated as "a female Manichaean" because it remains highly unclear whether such a term meant especially given its completely unknown context. The explicit citation of religious affiliation, as opposed to the mention of religious offices held, may be said to be an unusual feature within the corpus of Greco-Roman funerary inscriptions generally. Cumont and Kugener have acknowledged this fact, suggesting that such a usage is in accord with the reference to Lydia, from which Bassa presumably hailed, where we find some of the earliest inscriptions referring to individuals as Christianoi. 57 They go on to suggest that the terms parthenos and Manichea derive from the fact that Bassa was one of the Manichaean electae mentioned in other sources. 58 Still, the evidence does not rule out possibility that the term Manichea on Bassa's epitaph meant much the same as Manichaeus does in Secundinus' writings, that is, as a way to refer to a philosophically inclined Christian who has chosen to follow the superior teachings of Mani. Just as there is little reason to suppose that Secundinus was one of the male elect simply because he called himself a Manichaeus, one cannot assume that Bassa, because she is referred to on the inscription as a parthenos, was a female Manichaean elect. In general, Manichaeans were, according to the teachings established by Mani, not to invest great significance in their own physical bodies. In a monastic text from the Tunhuang Manichaica (the cache of "Manichaean works in Chinese discovered at Dunhuang), corpses of Manichaeans, presumably both elect and hearers, were to be buried without clothes, bodily adornment or any other grave goods. 59 But, at least in one case, we hear of the self-marking of the body as part of "Manichaean" practice in the later fifth century. Victor of Vita, in his history of the Vandal persecution, mentioned that an ascetic named Clementianus had inscribed on his own femur bone the following words: "Manichaeus discipulus Christi Iesu.,,60 Aside from the fact that this reference issues from the See Cumont and Kugener, Recherches sur Ie manicheisme, III, 177. There is also the mysterious Manichaean mythological figure of the parthenos tou photos, see Ernst Artur Voretzsch, "Parthenos tou photos. Archaologisches Material aus Turfan zur Deutung der manichaischen Lichtjungfrau," in Atti dell VII Congresso Internazaionale di Storia della Religioni (Florence, 1956),218-21. 59 Eduard Chavannes and Paul Pelliot, Un traite manicheen retrouve en Chine (Paris, 1913),338,355-56. 60 See Peter Brown, Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 197-200; and Mark Gustafson, "Inscripta in fronte: Penal Tattooing in Late Antiquity," Classical Antiquity 16 (1997): 79-105, esp. 98. 57 58
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stylus of a hostile critic of things Manichaean, the meaning of the "tattooed" words remains highly ambiguous, perhaps deliberately so. Do the words amount to an unequivocal declaration of the man's own Manichaean religious identity so that they should be translated as follows: "I am a Manichaean, a disciple of Jesus Christ"? Or is it not in fact a restatement of the religious claim that we have encountered so often before, to wit: "Mani[chaeus is a/the] disciple of Jesus Christ"? If the latter, then this tattooed message should be interpreted not as a clear declaration of Manichaean religious self-identity but rather as a forceful declaration of Christian self-identity on the part of those who followed the teachings of Mani. In Arian-ruled Vandal Africa, where the very notion of orthodox Christianity remained an unsettled question during this time, such a claim to Christian identity actually makes a certain sense. 61 But in the broader context of the times, it would have constituted a defiant statement of religious identity given the authorities demanded of suspected "Manichaeans" a public ritual of abjuration in which they must reject the name and teachings of Mani. 62 Unfortunately, we cannot know the impact of sustained persecution on the outlook of individuals thought to have been Manichaeans due to the nature of the sources. It would hardly be surprising, should some "Manichaeans" find in religious oppression the impetus that helped them crystallize their own religious self-identity. But the fact that many persisted in maintaining that they were Christians speaks to the problem of using the nomen Manichaeorum as a straightforward religious label to designate the essential religious identities of such persons. An ancillary question that emerges in the course of these controversies is whether the nomen Manichaeorum ought to be applied to the hearers also, or only to the elect. The Manichaean text from Tebessa clearly shows that the two grades were clearly distinguished even if the relationship between them was intimate. Outsiders did not always perceive the difference clearly and, on the whole, it was to the elect that the term "Manichaean" was mainly applied. Thus a law of 382 describes Manichaeans as solitarii, a Latin translation of hoi monachoi perhaps.63 In Eutychius's description of the life of Timothy of Alexandria (380-85), the 61 On the religious situation of Vandal Africa at the time of Victor of Vita's Historia persecutorum, see Hans-Joachim Diesner, "Religionen, Konfessionen und Haresien im vandalenzeitlichen Nordafrika," Forschungen lind Fortschritte 41 (1967): 88-90. 62 See Samuel N.C. Lieu, "An Early Byzantine Formula for the Renunciation of Manichaeism - the Capita VII contra Manichaeos of ," Jahrbllch fiir Antike lind Christen tum 26 (1983): 152-218; rev. version in idem, Manichaeism in Mesopotamia and the Roman East, 203-305. 63 CTh 16.5.9. Yet other laws (see above) suggest that hearers (who held property and had children) were to be labeled Manichaeans.
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Manichaean name was associated with those who practiced a form of vegetarianism. While this ought only to apply to the elect, the author blurred the distinction by saying that, while initially vegetarians, hearers later took to eating meat when it was feared that their abstemiousness would expose them to persecution by catholic Christians. 64 The self-identity of Manichaean hearers remains an elusive topic for modern scholars. While belief in Mani's teachings played some role to be sure, it was also to a great extent created around the acts of almsgiving and sociability within particular networks of itinerant ascetics and supporters. Augustine was the one Manichaean hearer we know the most about. 65 Yet his evidence, which heavily colors our understanding, may in fact distract more than it enlightens. He, having been repeatedly accused by opponents due to his former association with Manichaeans, was greatly concerned to demarcate the boundaries between catholic Christianity and Manichaeism in his writings. In the disputes with the Italian bishop Julian of Eclanum, a devotee of the teachings of Pelagius, Augustine's relationship with the religion of Mani became a central issue in the early 420s, a time when socalled Manichaeans were being pursued openly in Carthage. In Book One of Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum, Augustine affirmed his wholesale rejection of Manichaean teachings and insisted upon the incompatibility of Manichaean identity and that of a (catholic) Christian: 66 Consider, you who so often accuse us of Manichaeism, if you are alert, whom and what kind of men and what great defenders of the Catholic faith you dare insult with such a detestable charge.
In any event, he claimed that while he was a hearer among the Manichaeans he not only did not know what went on among the elect but 64 Eutychius, Annales, in Michael Breydey ed., Das Annalenwerk des Eutychius von Alexandria, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium 472, Series Arabica 45 (Louvain: Peeters, 1985), 83. English translation in text by S. Calderini, in Manichaean Texts, (ed. Gardner and Lieu), 122. This text is discussed in Gedaliahu Stroumsa, "The Manichaean Challenge to Egyptian Christianity," in The Roots of Egyptian Christianity (ed. Birger Pearson and J. E. Goehring; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986),307-19. 65 J. Kevin Coyle, "What did Augustine Know about Manichaeism when He Wrote his Two Treatises De moribus?" in Augustine and Manichaeism in the Latin West (ed. Van Oort, Wermelinger, and Wurst), 43-56. 66 Augustine, Contra Iulianum 1.3; English translation in text from Matthew A. Schumacher, ed., Saint Augustine. Against Julian, Fathers of the Church 35 (New York, 1957),6-7. On Julian of Eclanum, his own conception as a philosopher and his views on the teachings of Mani, see Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1967), 370, 386 and 393; Josef Lossl, Julian von Aeclanum: Studien zu seinem Werk, seiner Lehre und ihrer Oberlieferung (Leiden: Brill, 2001), esp. 129-30; and Mathijs Lamberigts, "Was Augustine a Manichaean? The Assessment of Julian of Aeclanum," in Augustine and Manichaeism in the Latin West (ed. Van Oort, Wermelinger, and Wurst), 113-36.
The Nomen Manichaeorum and Its Uses in Late Antiquity
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that he also did not know that he was actually departing from the worship of Christ. Did he even regard himself as a "Manichaean" rather than a Christian? He would naturally consider the two identities as incompatible by his own writings after he became priest and bishop. At the same time he was also quick to point out that the distinction was not so clear to him then. Thus he made the following observation in his Contra Epistulam Fundamenti (396):67 When I was a hearer among you, I frequently asked why it was that the paschal feast of our lord was celebrated with little or no interest, though sometimes there were a few halfhearted worshippers, but no special fast was prescribed for the hearers, - in short, no solemn ceremony, - while great honour is paid to your (feast of the) bema, that is, the day on which Manichaeus was martyred ...
The reply that Augustine reported as having been given was that: [T]he day to observe was the day of the passion of him who really suffered, and that Christ, who was not born, but appeared to human eyes not in real but a semblance of flesh, did not endure but feigned suffering.
If we grant this reportage, it would appear that the local "Manichaean" community was having its cake and eating it too. The interlocutor subscribed to a docetic Christo logy and yet also expressed the wish to commemorate Christ's passio at a time when the passiones of martyrs, those imitators of Christ, were widely celebrated throughout North Africa and elsewhere. There is ample evidence to suggest that many who were called Manichaeans in Late Antiquity regarded themselves quite simply as Christians. This was similarly the case with many who were labeled gnostics. In rejecting the teachings of the Old Testament as the creation of the Demiurge, "Manichaeans" shared a basic outlook with docetic and gnostic Christians. 68 This all contributed to their conceit that they were "superior" Christians who did not subscribe to a carnal or literal understandings of Scriptures that marked the general tendency of the Church catholic in the post-Constantinan era. Such a construction of what the teachings of Mani meant to local individuals in Late Antiquity draws on hints regarding the local understanding of what the teachings meant rather than on a god's eye view of "Manichaeism" as a stand-alone universal religion. In this manner, one could give due consideration to the possibility that not all religious 67 Augustine, Contra epistu/am Fundamenti 8; Zycha, ed., CSEL 25.1, 202; English translation in text from Manichaean Texts (ed. Gardner and Lieu), 237. 68 On the affinity between the so-called Manichaeans and gnostics and their possible conflation in the literary testimonia, see the enlightening study by Gedaliahu G. Stroumsa, "Gnostics and Manichaeans in Byzantine Palestine."
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identities were regarded as exclusive and that being a follower of Mani would have been for many another - indeed a more rigorist - way to follow Christ's teachings. 69
Conclusion Within the Byzantine Empire and medieval west, to accuse someone of being a Manichaean served as a well-known smear tactic. 70 The employment of the label often accompanied the spread of spurious rumors in the manner of urban legends. Thus we learn of a tradition in which two merchants described by the orthodox narrator as Manichaeans confessed to selling the host. 71 The story belongs to the genre of tales of demonic possession and exorcism, since the merchants allegedly found their bodies constrained as if bounded by irons after they sold the host to the Devil in the Fayum (Egypt). The text goes on: Judas sold the lord once; these men, on the other hand, have sold him many times. The Jews crucified the lord once; these men, on the contrary, have crucified the lord many times.