T HR Harvard Theological Review
103:2 APRIL 2010
ISSN 0017-8160
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Harvard Theological Review 103:2 ISSUED QUARTERLY BY THE FACULTY OF DIVINITY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY
The Harvard Theological Review is partially funded by the foundation established under the will of Mildred Everett, daughter of Charles Carroll Everett, Bussey Professor of Theology in Harvard University (1869–1900) and Dean of the Faculty of Divinity (1878–1900). The scope of the Review embraces history and philosophy of religious thought in all traditions and periods—including the areas of Hebrew Bible, New Testament, Christianity, Jewish studies, theology, ethics, archaeology, and comparative religious studies. It seeks to publish compelling original research that contributes to the development of scholarly understanding and interpretation. EDITOR
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The Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary: A Thought-Experiment in Medieval Philosophical Theology Marilyn McCord Adams University of North Carolina
Old Doctrine, New Standing On 8 December 1854, Pius IX issued Ineffabilis Deus, in which he dogmatized the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary. The bull reads, For the honor of the Holy and Undivided Trinity, for the glory and ornament of the Virgin Godbearer, for the exaltation of the catholic faith and the growth of the Christian religion, by the authority of Our Lord Jesus Christ, of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul, and by our own, we declare, pronounce, and dene the doctrine which holds that the Most Blessed Virgin Mary at the rst instant of her conception was by a singular grace and privilege of Almighty God, in consideration of the merits of Christ Jesus, the Savior of the human race, preserved immune from every stain of original guilt; that this was revealed by God and therefore is rmly and constantly to be believed by all of the faithful.1
Teachers are warned against thinking otherwise in their hearts and put on notice of canonical penalties should they dare to speak, write, or otherwise publish to the contrary. In the Middle Ages, the status quaestionis was different. From Anselm forward, the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary remained a controversial thought-experiment in philosophical theology, one in which the doctrine was oated and developed, defended and opposed, promoted and 1 Heinrich Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum Denitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum (Freiburg im Breisgau: B. Herder, 1911) #1641 (1502) 440.
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denounced, back and forth, with the verdict remaining outstanding for centuries, right down until 8 December 1854. Broadly speaking, thought-experiments explore the consequences of a set of assumptions without any prior commitment to their truth. Such analytical exercises are the stuff of medieval philosophy, whose students were trained in dialectic and practiced in the ars obligatoria, to sharpen their skills in tracking implications from posited cases (such as “if Socrates crosses over the bridge, my last statement was false”). Thought-experiments have a serious role in theory development. Setting out the axioms, postulates, and denitions, and proving many theorems, may furnish a detailed knowledge of Euclidean geometry, but appreciation for the system radically deepens when one runs the thought-experiment of Riemanian geometry by taking the parallel postulate away. Medieval philosophical theology mounts some thoughtexperiments to investigate what Scripture, ecclesial pronouncements, and tradition underdetermine (e.g., Anselm’s consideration of whether God originally intended heaven to be lled by angels only, or by humans as well); others to explore theses contrary to theological consensus and even dogmatic denition (e.g., the persistent interest in consubstantiation after IV Lateran). Some thought-experiments chart implications contrary to necessary fact (e.g., what could divine power do if it weren’t necessarily good?). Still others consider contrary to contingent fact conditions (e.g., would God have become incarnate anyway, even if Adam had not sinned?). Because philosophy is the backbone of medieval theology, its dogmatic tenets repeatedly provoked philosophical thought-experiments—transubstantiation, about whether Aristotelian accidents really had to exist in a subject; incarnation, about whether individual substance natures could quasi-exist in a subject after all; Trinity, about whether relations might ever constitute instead of presupposing their relata—and resulted in creative metaphysical innovations.2 In the Middle Ages, the thought-experiment about Marian immaculate conception was controversial, not only as to its substance, but also as to what sort of thought-experiment it was.
Background Soteriological Postulates–“In Adam’s fall, we sinned all.” Medieval thinkers explored the question of the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary in the context of a family of doctrines regarding Adam’s fall and its consequences. For them uncontestable were claims that as a matter of historical fact, Adam was the primal progenitor of all actual human beings; that although Adam began with a highly functional agency that was easily able 2
I explore some of these in the following articles: “The Metaphysics of the Incarnation in Some Fourteenth Century Franciscans,” in Essays Honoring Allan B. Wolter (Quincy, Ill.: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1985) 21–57; “Aristotle and the Sacrament of the Altar: A Crisis in Medieval Theology,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (suppl. vol. 17; 1991) 195–249; “The Resurrection of the Body according to Three Medieval Aristotelians: Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, William Ockham,” Philosophical Topics 20 (1993) 1–33; and “The Metaphysics of the Trinity in Some Fourteenth Century Franciscans,” Franciscan Studies 66 (208) 101–68. See also Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of Christology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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to meet its obligation to observe God’s commandments, Adam disobeyed God; that the consequences of the sin of the primal progenitor, of the rst parents, redound on their descendants and de facto on the whole human race (the way the family participates in the symbolic and concrete disgrace of the courtier); that the consequences include death, physical vulnerability, dysfunctional soul-body relations, and psycho-spiritual disarray. A further step explained the inheritance of consequences juridically or quasilegally in terms of inherited guilt (culpa) and liability to punishment, so that the consequences of Adam’s fall are justly visited as punishments, not only upon Adam but also on his descendants. Those who hold with inherited guilt proceeded to distinguish between the guilt or sin one has by virtue of one’s origin (original guilt or original sin) from that the individual incurs by reason of his/her own acts (actual guilt/sin). It was yet a separate and further step to posit a biological explanation of how such consequences are passed from primal progenitor to offspring through the generations. In some of his works Augustine had posited the seminal transmission theory. After the fall, soul-body disorder and psycho-spiritual disarray in the primal parents means that sexual intercourse is always accompanied by lust or concupiscence. Purity and delement conceptuality seized the foreground. Uncleanness is “catching.” Lustful sexual intercourse by the parents engenders contaminated esh, and the contaminated esh infects the offspring’s soul.
Beginning Systematically: Anselmian Intimations In Cur Deus Homo, Anselm’s focus is on Christ. He spends the whole rst book arguing that divine purposes for Adam’s race cannot be fullled without a God-man. In the second book, Anselm turns to further questions about what else would have to be true of the God-man to fulll the soteriological job Anselm has designed for Him. Adam’s race can render to God what it owes, its debt can be paid with justice, only if satisfaction is made by a member of Adam’s family. But Christ will not have any capital with which to pay the debt, if He is personally mired in the disabilities and liabilities that make it impossible for other members of Adam’s race any longer to render to God what they owe. The purity and delement calculus, the seminal transmission theory lurk in the background as Boso (Anselm’s interlocutor) asks: [H]ow did God assume from the sinful mass—i.e., from the human race, which was completely contaminated by sin—a sinless human nature (as something unleavened from something leavened)? For although the conception of this man was clean and free from the sin of carnal delight, nevertheless the virgin from whom He was assumed was conceived in iniquities, and her mother conceived her in sins; and this virgin was born with original sin, since she sinned in Adam in whom all have sinned.3 3
Cur Deus Homo II.16; Schmitt II.116,16–24.
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Contamination is catching. The Blessed Virgin Mary was seminally propagated and would have become contaminated by her parents. Even if Christ were not seminally propagated, even if the Blessed Virgin Mary were Christ’s only human parent, she was infected and Christ would have caught it from her. The challenge provokes Anselm to thought-experiments that bear the fruit of two different, to his mind, independently adequate responses. Neither focuses on, but both bear on the question of the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary. The Cur Deus Homo account contends that by virtue of being a God-man, Christ is pure through Himself. It appeals to the excellence of Christ’s saving work to explain how His humanity was not assumed from tainted forebears. Christ’s obedience to death was so pleasing to the Godhead that it is efcacious, not only for the then present but also future members of Adam’s race; it reaches backward to cleanse the elect who came before Him during their ante mortem careers. Anselm does not elaborate exactly when or from what they are cleansed, and so does not itemize the respects in which the Blessed Virgin Mary would have been immaculate. But the logic of the argument would require the elect to be free of whatever the offspring would have “caught” from them in the course of their biological derivation. Anselm observes that original sin is a topic in its own right, and returns to give it focussed attention in De conceptu virginali et de originali peccato. There Anselm makes three points that loomed large in later debates about the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary. First, Anselm insists that nothing merely material, but only the soul can be the subject of sin. God made rational creatures with reason and will and endowed their wills with a separable affectio iustitiae and freedom (the power to preserve justice). Creatures are unable to endow themselves with justice. Unlike God, if they are just, they are just through another (per aliud). They owe their justice to God, both in the sense of having it from God as the source, and in the sense of being obliged to God to preserve uprightness of will for its own sake. For Anselm sin is the failure to preserve justice, and original sin is the lack of required justice. Given the commonly held mediate animation theory—that what is seminally produced in the mother is not immediately animated (infused with a soul) but only after the material is shaped into an organic body (40–46 days after conception for males, 80 days for females)—Anselm concludes that original sin cannot begin at conception but only at animation. Because the parents produce only the esh and not the soul, original sin cannot be seminally transmitted in conception itself.4 Second, if the seminal transmission theory was a starting point for Boso’s question in Cur Deus Homo, Anselm’s denition of original sin and relocation of its subject brings him to refocus on the juridical or quasi-legal explanation of its inheritance. In De conceptu virginali, Anselm distinguishes between those of 4
De conceptu virginali et de originali peccato, chs. 1–4; Schmitt II.140–145; ch. 7; Schmitt II.147–149.
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Adam’s offspring whose propagation lies, broadly speaking, within the scope of natural human powers and the parents’ will to exercise them, from those whose propagation lies outside the scope of natural human reproductive powers. Paradigmatic of the former are human beings begotten the normal way by bisexual intercourse. Eve is an obvious example of the latter, since she was made from Adam’s rib. Anselm explicitly notes that biblical examples of children from overage parents (e.g., Isaac from Abraham and Sarah, John the Baptist from Zechariah and Elizabeth) belong in the rst category, because they are begotten by the will of their parents and through miraculously restored natural reproductive powers.5 Anselm then hypothesizes that God determined that if Adam did not sin, Adam’s natural offspring would be reproduced in the condition in which Adam himself was created; but if Adam sinned, Adam’s natural offspring would be reproduced in the condition into which Adam fell. Here condition includes both legal and concrete dimensions; in the latter case of fallen humanity it ranges over the quasilegal obligation to have justice and the liability to punishment for not having it, as well as the concrete punishments—psycho-physical dysfunction, psycho-spiritual disorder, physical vulnerability and mortality—themselves. Biological descent is relevant, not because the parents’ biological acts somehow cause original sin in the offspring, but because it makes the offspring members of the class to whom the laws apply. Christ’s human nature is excepted precisely because His reproduction was not natural in the relevant sense, but virginal.6 In De conceptu virginali, ch. 18 Anselm explicitly notes that on this juridical or quasi-legal explanation, Christ’s purity can be secured quite independently of whether or not his mother was pure. It is not necessity but propriety that drives the conclusion of Marian purity. In a statement much quoted in later debates (and this is the third salient point in the treatise), Anselm exclaims, “it was tting that the Virgin be beautied with a purity than which a greater cannot be conceived except for God’s,” because “the Son was naturally one and the same common Son of God the Father and of the Virgin.”7 Potuit, decuit, fecit, as the later slogan would say. What Anselm does not observe is how the soteriological statutes he attributes to God do not open any loophole that would except Mary from the common inheritance of Adam’s race, because traditional Marian infancy narratives model her conception on that of John the Baptist—another case of voluntary use of miraculously restored natural powers.
5
Ibid., ch. 16; Schmitt II.157–158. Ibid., chs. 10–13; Schmitt II.151–155. 7 Ibid., chs. 18–19; Schmitt II.159–160. 6
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Celebrating Mary Anselm’s Marian thought-experiments were occasioned by the systematic development of his distinctive soteriology. But there were other triggers in liturgical practice. Celebrating the feasts of the Annunciation and—thanks to Augustine among others—the Assumption was uncontroversial. In some places (notably England and parts of Gaul) the Conception was also being observed. Theory interprets, rationalizes and/or critiques praxis. Theologians and religious leaders began to comment on the propriety of this feast. One commonplace principle was that saints are to be celebrated for their sanctity, and hence only for those occasions in their lives at which they were sanctied. In a letter attributed to Anselm as late as the fourteenth century but probably actually due to Eadmer, the author reasons that the feast of the Conception ought to be celebrated because Mary was immaculately conceived. Eadmer bolstered this liturgical argument with an exegetical argument from the lesser to the greater: If Jeremiah (Jer 1:5) and John the Baptist (Luke 1:41–44) were sanctied in the womb before their birth, how much more should the queen of angels and the tabernacle of the Son of God be entirely free from sin from her very beginning.8 In his Letter to the Canons of Lyons,9 Bernard of Clairvaux reasoned from these principles in the opposite direction, warning against celebrating the feast of the conception, because Mary was—like all other bisexually propagated humans— conceived in original sin. Bernard was noted for his Marian devotion, and recognized Mary’s privilege as preeminent among the saints.10 Nevertheless, Bernard contended that immaculate conception for the Blessed Virgin Mary was a “false honor”11 that would actually undermine Marian privilege: Mary would no longer be the only member of Adam’s race to conceive a child without original sin; her mother, St. Anne, would have as well.12 Still more serious, immaculate conception for the Blessed Virgin Mary would undermine the preeminence of Christ. For a human being conceived without original sin would not need a savior. Christ will not be the universal savior unless the privilege of being conceived without original sin belongs to Him alone.13 For Bernard, Marian immaculate conception was a thought-experiment contrary to rmly established doctrinal tenets, one that ought to be denied liturgical expression. Yet, Bernard’s opposition provoked further thought-experiments: Does 8 Eadmeri monachi Cantueriensis tractatus de conceptione S. Mariae (ed. H. Thurston and T. Slater; Freiburg im Breisgau 1904) 1; among the Anselm spuria as Tractatus de Conceptione B. Mariae Virginis in PL 159, cols. 301–303. Cf. Allan B. Wolter and Blane O’Neill, John Duns Scotus: Mary’s Architect (Quincy, Ill.: Franciscan Press, Quincy College, 1993) III.56. 9 Bernard of Clairvaux, Epistola 174: Ad canonicos Lugdunenses de Conceptione S. Mariae, PL 182, cols. 332–336. 10 Ibid., secs.2–5; PL 182, cols. 333–334. 11 Ibid., PL 182, cols. 333. 12 Ibid., sec.7, PL 182, col. 335. 13 Ibid., sec.8, PL 182, col. 336.
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either the bisexual propagation of Mary by her parents, or the preeminence of her Son really rule out the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary?
Complications and Clarications Integrating Augustine and Anselm: Early Franciscans at Paris dug deeper into the nature and consequences of original sin.14 They were impressed with Anselm’s denition of original sin as lack of required justice, but were loathe to lose the prospects for causal analyses that Augustine’s seminal transmission theory seemed to afford. Alexander of Hales proposed treating “lack of original justice” as the formal aspect of original sin, while regarding concupiscence as its punitive consequence.15 Regarding the rst, Alexander identied original justice as a superadded habit that inclines the will to remain in a state of natural goodness. The loss of original justice means the loss of a positive inclination to good, which loss leaves the will able to incline to evil, but does not by itself constitute a positive inclination towards evil. So far as punitive consequences are concerned, Alexander surveys how they pervade the lower human dimensions—the esh; the vegetative, nutritive, and generative powers; the sense appetite—which in turn foment dysfunction. The esh excites the senses to perceive forbidden objects and then desire to seek them; the sense appetite excited by the esh moves the rational appetite—where alone original sin, strictly speaking, is located.16 Continuing to harmonize, Alexander wants seminal transmission to gure not only in the causal but also in the juridical or quasi-legal explanation of original sin: being bisexually propagated by members of Adam’s fallen race is what makes the offspring Adam’s heirs to whom the divinely instituted laws of inheritance apply. Inheritance of the bodily conditions is justied by the fact that the bodies of naturally propagated descendants of Adam are seminally contained in Adam. And the soul’s natural desire to be united to the body begets a natural tendency to be weighed down by its defects and to share in its punishment and thus to lack original justice.17 Alexander attempts a (justly neglected) metaphysical analogue of seminal transmission to explain why it is right for Adam’s descendants to inherit the obligation to have original justice: Namely, that in Adam’s soul was created not
14 D. O. Lottin surveys their views in his article “Le traité du péché originel chez les premiers maîtres franciscains de Paris,” Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses XVIII (1941) 26–64. He quotes long stretches of otherwise unedited manuscript material at length. I refer to these texts. For an incisive analysis of the material in connection with our topic, cf. Allan B. Wolter, “Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception in the Early Franciscan School,” Studia Mariana cura commissionis Marialis Franciscanae edita IX (1954) 26–69. 15 Lottin, “Le traité du péché originel chez les premiers maîtres franciscains de Paris,” 43–48, 62–64. 16 Ibid., 48–50. 17 Ibid., 45–46.
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only the individual but the universal nature of every soul, so that our souls were contained in Adam as particulars in a universal.18 Seminal transmission produces contaminated esh; mediate animation implies that the soul infused into contaminated esh will itself become contaminated. But “contamination” is now a broad category, including the whole multiplicity of effects consequent upon the fall—those in the body, in the vegetative and sensory appetites, and in the rational soul. Timing the Intervention(s): Even though none of these early Franciscans embraces the immaculate conception or even immaculate animation of the Blessed Virgin Mary, their further articulation of the consequences of Adam’s fall for his descendants forwards the debate by explicitly mapping the points at which God might intervene to cleanse her: 1) before conception by cleansing her parents from original sin and its effects, so that they could beget a child without passing it on; 2) at the moment of conception by divine action to prevent her parents’ lustful intercourse from causing the stimulus carnis (eshly urge) in her esh (immaculate conception); 3) at the instant of animation by divine action to prevent the stimulus carnis from causing the fomes peccati (tinder of sin) and by divine infusion of grace into her soul (immaculate animation); 4) after animation but before birth (either immediately after or after a span of time) by divine action to infuse grace into her soul; 5) after birth in any or all of these ways.
They agreed that 1) cleansing the parents would do no good, because sanctication affects the person not the nature, and baptism removes the guilt (the requirement to have original justice) but not the punishments (the stimulus carnis or the fomes peccati). The legal move of freeing the parents from guilt would not clear the offspring legally; and it is the punishments (in the parents’ esh and sensory appetites) that cause the contamination of the esh the parents engender in the child.19 The early Paris Franciscans likewise dismissed 2) immaculate conception not only for Bernard’s reason—that it would compromise the preeminence of Christ as universal savior—but also because of perceived metaphysical difculties. Sanctication is rebirth which would presuppose birth; yet, by mediate animation, her soul does not exist at the moment of conception. All that is there to be cleansed at the moment of conception is her esh. But if it were from the beginning scoured of the consequences of Adam’s fall, how do you explain the fact that she died?20
18
Ibid., 43–46. See Wolter, “Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception in the Early Franciscan School,” 42–43. He quotes at length from otherwise unedited texts by John of La Rochelle, Odo Rigaux, and William of Melitona. I draw on these. 20 Ibid., 44–45. 19
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For them, the preeminence of Christ as universal savior joined the reection that redemption presupposes sin to exclude 3) immaculate animation as well.21 For these early Franciscans at Paris, thought-experiments about immaculate conception and animation had already been conducted; a negative verdict on them, more or less settled by past debates. These friars were also convinced by past exegetical arguments from the lesser to the greater (from Jeremiah and John the Baptist) that 4) the Blessed Virgin Mary was cleansed of original sin before birth. Putting this conclusion together with the annunciation story (Luke 1:26–56), prompted a different thought-experiment, to ponder the difference between her rst in utero and her second ex utero sanctication. Original sin in the rational soul does not come in degrees; if the requirement of original justice is removed before birth, there is nothing further to be done. But concupiscence does come in degrees, which enabled them to reassert Marian privilege with respect to in utero sanctication: In the Blessed Virgin Mary, concupiscence was so diminished that she was conrmed in goodness, having no inclination either to mortal or to venial sin. In John the Baptist, only the inclination to mortal sin was altogether removed; he was able to sin venially, but not habitually so. In Jeremiah, concupiscence was diminished only to the extent of putting mortal sin out of reach. In her second ex utero sanctication, however, concupiscence was altogether extinguished in the Blessed Virgin Mary.22
Bonaventure’s Consolidation Bonaventure inherits this status quaestionis that gives presumptive weight to mediate animation and a hybridized Augustinian/Anselmian theory of original sin; that takes it for granted that the Blessed Virgin Mary as God-bearer was sanctied, and raises questions about when, to what extent, and in what respect? Like his predecessors, Bonaventure rejects both immaculate conception and immaculate animation. By contrast with his earlier confreres, he features both positions and gives the case for each extensive and respectful consideration.23 Celebrating the Conception: Bonaventure returns to the liturgical argument for immaculate conception from the local (English and Gallic) celebration of the feast of the Conception. If saints are to celebrated only for their sanctity and hence only for those occasions in their lives at which they were sanctied, the feast can be legitimate only if the Blessed Virgin can be sanctied before her animation. Bonaventure responds with a distinction: It is one thing to say that it is within divine power to cleanse her esh of all contaminants; and another to speak of her as being sanctied. Mediate animation makes the literal sanctication of the infant at its conception, impossible, because its soul does not exist yet. Neither could grace in her soul cleanse her esh before animation. Literal sanctication of the 21 22 23
Ibid., 45. Ibid., 38–40. Ibid., 58.
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parents at the time of conception has no direct effect on the child’s soul, because the parents do not produce the soul (rational souls are infused by God). Literal sanctication of the parents at the time of conception is likewise irrelevant to the purity of the esh they engender, because it is not the lack of justice in their souls but the presence of its punishments in their esh and sensory appetites, that causes contamination in the child’s esh. Nor does the fact that the Holy Spirit does one miracle in enabling pious old parents to reproduce, show that the Holy Spirit did another miracle to enable them to beget taint-free esh.24 Considered as arguments for the doctrine of immaculate conception, Bonaventure nds these liturgical considerations unpersuasive. But he does not conclude that the liturgical practice is therefore indefensible. Bonaventure is moved by the fact that even if the universal church does not celebrate a feast of Mary’s conception, some do celebrate it out of special devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary. Unlike Bernard who reproached the canons of Lyons for putting the feast on their calendars, Bonaventure says that he dare not altogether praise them, or absolutely reproach them. He dares not altogether approve, because authorities noted for their Marian devotion do not support the feast: Ancient fathers who did not issue decrees to celebrate it and more recently Bernard who adamantly opposed it. Moreover, their stance is bolstered by the liturgico-metaphysical argument—that saints are to be celebrated only for occasions at which they were sanctied, while literal sanctication at conception is metaphysically impossible.25 Nevertheless, Bonaventure dares not altogether reprove the celebration, rst because, some say it was commanded in a vision.26 Since the claim is not authenticated, Bonaventure reasons, we are not compelled to believe it. But since it is not contrary to orthodox faith, we are not compelled to deny it either.27 Moreover, liturgical practice admits of a more exible rationale than indicated above. Perhaps the solemnity celebrates the sanctication on the day of the conception, because the day of conception is certain while the day of sanctication is not. This is not a bad idea because one can give thanks to God not only for what is present but what is future, and celebrate even though there is a present defect that will later be supplied.28 Bonaventure concludes: I believe and confess that if anyone celebrates this solemnity not out of a love of novelty but rather out of devotion to the virgin, not believing it to be against what can be inferred from Sacred Scripture, the blessed Virgin accepts
24
Bonaventure, Sent. III.3.1.1.1; Quaracchi III.61–63. Ibid., 63. 26 Two works included among the Spuria of Anselm—Sermo de Conceptione Beatae Mariae; PL 159, cols. 319–324; and Miraculum de Conceptione Sanctae Mariae; PL 159, cols. 323–324—recount several visions in which the Blessed Virgin Mary commands the devotee to celebrate the feast of her conception. 27 Bonaventure, Sent. III.3.1.1.1; Quaracchi III.63. 28 Ibid. 25
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his devotion. If there is anything wrong with it, I hope it will be excused by the just judge.29
So far as Bernard’s opposition is concerned, Bonaventure speculates that Bernard was trying to rule out the error of believing the virgin sanctied in conception rather than trying to diminish our devotion.30 Immaculate Animation? Responding to the next question—whether the Blessed Virgin Mary was sanctied before contracting original sin, Bonaventure claries that. Since sanctication can happen only where there is a soul, the real issue is about immaculate animation—whether grace was infused into her soul at the rst instant of its creation, grace of such intensity as to overpower her corrupt esh’s tendency to contaminate her soul. Bonaventure treats immaculate animation as a live option, a respectable theological position. Rehearsing the case made by some unnamed and now unknown adherent, Bonaventure records much to be said in its favor. First, there are arguments from “t”: Surely Christ would obey the decalogue’s injunction to honor father and mother, and freedom from original sin would be the highest honor Christ could confer on the Blessed Virgin Mary.31 Again, Marian privilege recognizes how it is tting for the Blessed Virgin Mary to enjoy greater sanctity and worthiness than other saints (e.g., John the Baptist who was sanctied in the womb before birth).32 It is tting that there be an intermediate case between us—who have broad-sense original sin in both body and soul—and Christ, who has it in neither body nor soul: namely, the Blessed Virgin Mary who has it in body but not in soul.33 Second, there is a positive argument from the authority of Anselm in De conceptu virginali et de peccato originali, ch.18, in favor of making the Blessed Virgin Mary mediatrix in the sense of assigning her a degree of holiness higher than all of the other saints but lower than Christ’s.34 Third, and most strikingly, immaculate animation is not incompatible with Holy Scripture and the Christian faith, because—contrary to earlier critics—it does not violate christological preeminence. The immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary depends on Christ just as much as the graces of the other saints do. There is a difference between always having a trait and having that trait independently. Where others are freed from original sin by Christ after they fell, the Blessed Virgin Mary was sustained lest she fall.35 Other authorities that seemingly tell against immaculate animation can be construed to mean that the Blessed Virgin Mary was not free from the cause of the original infection (concupiscence in the 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
Ibid. Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,
63–64. 63, 66–67. 65–67. 67. 63, 67. 67.
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parents; contamination in the esh she receives from them), but they do not have to be taken to deny that she was free from the effect (original sin in the rational soul).36 Nevertheless, Bonaventure nds immaculate animation to be a controversial minority report, and judges the second opinion—that the sanctication of the Blessed Virgin Mary follows her contraction of original sin—to be “more common, more reasonable, and more secure.” More common, because almost everyone holds that the Blessed Virgin Mary had original sin, given the many penalties that she suffered, where it is not said (as with Christ) that she suffered them voluntarily for the redemption of others but that she contracted them involuntarily from her parents.37 More reasonable, because nature should precede grace in time as well as naturally prior to grace. Therefore, the soul is united to the esh (to give the human natural being) before grace is infused in the soul by God. Therefore, because the esh is infected, it is apt to infect the soul infused into it with guilt. Therefore, it is necessary that original sin precede sanctication.38 More secure, because it agrees more with the authorities of the saints, who usually make an exception only in Christ’s case. Even if piety honors the mother, it should honor her divine son more.39 Bonaventure cites both authorities (Rom 5 and 3:23; John 1; Augustine; Bernard) and arguments against this thesis, all but one of which focus on the pre-eminence of Christ as universal savior, redeemer, liberator, doors-of-paradiseopener. Christ plays this role in relation to all human beings. Immaculatists to the contrary notwithstanding, to say that the Blessed Virgin Mary was sanctied without contracting original sin, would imply that there was an exception to these rules with the result that he does not play this role in relation to His mother.40 Echoing earlier authors, Bonaventure speculates that the mother would be upset, if her excellence were so amplied as to diminish the glory of her Son. She wants her Son to be extolled more than she herself is, because the Creator should be honored incomparably more than the creature.41 Nor does Anselm, in De conceptu virginali et peccato originali, ch.18, mean to say otherwise: When he says that she is maximally pure, he means free from actual not original sin; to say that conception is from a maximally pure mother, is to imply that she is maximally pure at the time of Christ’s conception.42 Nevertheless, even if Bonaventure denies immaculate animation, he nds it defensible to claim that her soul was freed from original sin immediately after the rst moment of its existence.43 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid. Ibid., Ibid., Ibid. Ibid.,
68. cf. 66. 68. 66–67. 68. 71.
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More Evident Privileges: Having brought the issues of immaculate conception and immaculate animation onto center stage, Bonaventure turns to Marian privileges about which there was more consensus: namely, sanctication before birth and freedom from actual sin. The liturgical argument for the former is stronger, because the whole church celebrates Mary’s birth. Likewise in favor is the nowfamiliar exegetical argument from the lesser to the greater from Jeremiah and John the Baptist.44 Bonaventure rebuts the worry that Mary’s freedom from all actual sin would compromise the preeminence of Christ by insisting that He would still be freer of sin than she, because Christ was sin-free in every time and in every state and because He lacked original as well as actual sin; while the Blessed Virgin Mary was free from original sin sometime after animation but before birth, and immune from actual sin from the time she arrives at the use of free will.45 To theological authorities (e.g., Augustine and Bernard) that rmly support this conclusion, Bonaventure adds positive considerations of ttingness derived from the Blessed Virgin Mary’s soteriological roles. As God-bearer, she is “the spouse of God and of the whole Trinity” and “mother of the Son.” Purity and delement considerations make it appropriate that she be “immaculate in mind and spotless in esh.”46 Again, she is “an advocate for sinners.” But in a patron/client system, the advocate uses the favor she enjoys to plead the cause of others. If sin is what turns God against us, it is tting that the advocate for the human race have a clear conscience herself.47 Again, one-over-many intuitions are powerful, demanding a paradigm for every class. Marian privilege identies her as “the glory and crown of the just,” the one who exhibits the greatest sanctication to be found among naturally propagated merely human beings.48 Freedom from actual sin is not the greatest degree of sanctication logically possible for merely human beings, however. Putative facts of Marian biography (her bisexual propagation, her death), the seminal transmission theory, and christological preeminence have already weighed in to insist that her esh was infected with the consequences of the fall. Since the fomes peccati sets up a proneness to sin and a resistance to good that—without miraculous interference—make venial sin inevitable, the question arises whether the fomes peccati was merely dormant in Mary, or whether it was uprooted in one of her sanctications. To account for her freedom from actual sin, it would not be necessary to remove the qualities; it would be enough to obstruct their effects. Returning to the distinction between her rst in utero and her second ex utero sanctications, Bonaventure appeals to a principle of eshly conformity between parents and offspring and the purity and delement 44 45 46 47 48
Ibid., 71. Ibid., 73. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.
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calculus to insist that the fomes was repressed in her rst sanctication but eradicated in her second.49 What the Son of God has consecrated by inhabiting, should not be contaminated or violated in any way.50 Bonaventure recognizes this will constitute another Marian privilege insofar as no other mere humans are altogether conrmed in goodness before death.51 At the same time, conformity to Christ puts an upper bound on her ante-mortem perfection: it wouldn’t be tting for Christ to have an immortal mother since He was mortal.52
Inverting the Order of Consideration Bonaventure’s discussion proceeds from the more controversial—the sanctication of the esh before animation, the sanctication of the soul at the moment of animation—to the less controversial: the actual sinlessness, the repression and subsequent eradication of the fomes peccati, and the conrmation of her will in goodness. But the logical trend towards the magnication of Mary is best displayed when this order is turned upside down. 1) We begin with Mary’s conciliarly dened soteriological role as God-bearer. When we ask what the requirements would be for this job, we are helped by the biblical account of the annunciation in which the archangel Gabriel addresses Mary as full of grace at the time/moment of her conception of Jesus (Luke 1:28). The purity and delement calculus insists that this would mean uprooting of the fomes in the esh, conrming the will in goodness at the time of Christ’s conception and through her God-bearing by which consummation she is a spouse of God. The uprooting of the fomes peccati and conrmation of her will in goodness at the time of conception and throughout the God-bearing would be further supported by the principle of prima facie conformity between parent and offspring—itself a defeasible principle because Christ’s perfection will excel hers by virtue of hypostatic union. There is the further liturgical argument: The whole church’s celebration of the feast of the Annunciation, the immaculate conception of her Son. Insofar as the Annunciation is not only a feast of Christ but also of Mary, it tells in favor of some sort of sanctication for her at that time. 2) Temporal generalizing over her future life span is then rationalized. Appeal to the authority of Ambrose for the argument that the womb once consecrated by the indwelling of the God-man must never be violated afterwards, extends—by parity of reasoning—to freedom from fomes peccati and conrmation in goodness throughout her ante mortem career. Via the purity and delement calculus, the doctrine and the feast of the Assumption are justied: The esh that was the temple of the God-man should not be allowed to undergo putrefaction; the one who was spouse and co-parent of God should not be deled in the future. 49 50 51 52
Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,
75. 76. 78. 78.
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Backwards extensions are more difcult to justify. There is nothing explicit in Scripture about the Blessed Virgin Mary’s birth or childhood. She appears on the scene at the annunciation.53 So there have to be arguments from analogy and—taking it as a premise that the Mother of God is preeminent among the saints—from the lesser to the greater. 3) Sanctication in the womb is rationalized by reading Jer 1:5 and Luke 1:41–44 literally as opposed to metaphorically—to imply that Jeremiah and John the Baptist were sanctied in the womb. The inference is then drawn—from the lesser to the greater—that Mary was sanctied in the womb. This conclusion was again bolstered by liturgical practice: The universal church celebrates the feast of her birth. 4) Mary’s freedom from actual sin was reasoned to the same way. Taking for granted that sanctication was such as to keep Jeremiah from all mortal, John the Baptist from all mortal and from habitual venial sins throughout his life, the argument concludes—from the lesser to the greater—that Mary should be free from all mortal and from all habitual venial sins and further via Marian preeminence to the claim that she was free from all actual sin. 5) To return to immaculate conception or immaculate animation, a variety of arguments is deployed. Some read Jer 1:5—“before I formed you in the womb, I knew you”—literally to mean that sanctication precedes the organization of the fetal body and so precedes animation. Then, from the lesser to the greater, the same must be true of Mary. Alternatively, others argued via Marian privilege from the claim that Jeremiah and John the Baptist were sanctied in the womb after animation, to the claim that Mary’s condition must be even better: cleansed from conception, or sanctied at the instant of animation. Again, there is the idea that Christ would honor her as much as a mere human could/should be honored (perhaps in obedience to the decalogue), and that it is possible that she be cleansed from conception or at least from animation. All of these were reinforced by the liturgical argument: the still local but spreading celebration of the feast of the Conception. Emerging from this is the picture of “a great chain of sanctication” with Christ, the God-man, at the top and Mary in the middle, between Christ and other merely human beings. Mary stands ahead of biblical forerunners such as Jeremiah and John the Baptist who were preserved from mortal and/or habitual venial sins. Next come great penitents such as Mary Magdalene and Francis of Assisi, who were guilty of both original and actual sin but in their ante mortem life times crucied the esh with all its desires. Next come the other saints who more or less approach such mortication. This hierarchy is meant not to humiliate but to hearten us ordinary pilgrims. For though we are far behind, the lower participates in the higher, both concretely insofar as we enjoy their patronage, and symbolically
53
Ibid., 71. Bonaventure notes an effort to explain this away: That the new law begins with John the Baptist, and Mary comes before that.
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insofar as we share in the glory they bring to Adam’s family. That is why we give all thanks and praise to Christ and celebrate the feasts of the saints. From a systematic point of view, Mary becomes—like the human soul of Christ—a site for exploring how much and in what patterns God might sanctify human beings. There is the standard story of our experience, and the soteriological plot line as it applies to us ordinary mortals here below. But how could it be different? How much damage could a human being be spared, how much repaired, how much could a human being upgraded, how soon, and for what reason? Since we are in the realm of soteriology and eschatology, the thought-experiment probes the possibilities within the context of various narrative constraints. Aquinas thought the metaphysical proximity (via hypostatic union) of Christ’s human nature to the divine word would ood it with all of the excellence it could possibly hold. But this tide of upgrades has to be partially dammed up, so that Christ will have the passible and mortal esh He needs to accomplish His saving work. Likewise, the Blessed Virgin Mary does not have every privilege metaphysically possible for merely human being, because Marian biographical traditions insist that she was bisexually conceived, that she suffered and she died. Thought-experiments about Marian privilege—like that of all the other saints—are also subject to systematic constraints: Their degree of sanctication must be lower than Christ’s, dependent on Christ, and otherwise compatible with Scripture and ecclesial pronouncements. In the next generation, William of Ware structures the thought-experiment another way, in terms of metaphysical proximity to a divine person. For medieval Aristotelians, a person is a supposit of a rational nature, where a supposit is an individual substance subject (e.g., Socrates, Brownie the donkey, Beulah the cow). Normally and naturally, individual substance natures—this humanity, that donkeyhood, that bovinity—are individual substance subjects—Socrates, Brownie, and Beulah—and so are their own supposits. But an individual substance nature can—by divine power but not by any natural power—be assumed by an “alien” substance subject (e.g., an individual human nature by the divine word). Moreover, creatures are said to be in obediential potency with respect to states and conditions that cannot be produced by any created natural power but that are metaphysically possible and producible by divine power. Given these notions, Ware distinguishes three levels of metaphysical proximity. There is the obediential potency that creatures have insofar as they remain in their own supposit (e.g., of Jeremiah and John the Baptist, while remaining the very individual substance subjects that they are, to receive sanctifying grace at or after animation while still in the womb). There is the obediential potency of creatable substance natures to be supposited by something else (as was the case with the human nature of Christ). And in between, there is the obediential potency that pertains to a creature while remaining in its own supposit but bearing a special relation to the divine supposit: namely, Mary’s in being the Mother of God. In mothering, Mary remains the individual substance that she is, but is the one from
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whose esh is taken the esh that gets hypostatically united to the divine word. The Marian thought-experiment explores which divine special effects this intermediate level of metaphysical intimacy makes it tting for her to receive.54
Metaphysical Muddles: Simul Iusta et Peccatrix. Pace Bernard of Clairvaux, Bonaventure argued that to celebrate the feast is not necessarily to glorify Mary for her conception; one could observe the solemnity of the conception by reason of her sanctication which occurred at an unknown date. In Quodlibeta XV, q. 13, Henry of Ghent confronted a question (probably raised by the English students at Paris) designed to put him on the spot: Whether the Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary is celebrated precisely by reason of her conception?55 Henry promptly distinguishes two senses of “conception”—one referring to the initial mixing of seeds (conceptio seminis); the other, to animation (conceptio hominis). Since sanctication is possible only at or after the instant of animation, only the second sense is relevant.56 But was Mary immaculate at the instant of animation? Henry inherits the problematic: The liturgical argument drives towards an afrmative, while Mary’s bisexual propagation by Joachim and Anna and the seminal transmission theory demand a negative answer. Our text of Henry’s question reects many layers of redaction. If his contemporaries are to be believed, Henry’s rst bold response was to have it both ways.57 Philosophers distinguish, not only what is temporally prior, posterior, or simultaneous, but also—following Aristotle—what is naturally prior, posterior, or simultaneous, where natural order marks some sort (which sort was controversial) of explanatory priority. Just as they speak of instants of time (T1, T2, T3 . . .) in connection with temporal location, so Henry is willing to talk of signs or instants of nature (N1, N2, N3 . . .) to mark relative positions in the natural order. Moreover, since among those that are temporally simultaneous, one can be naturally prior to another (e.g., essential causes are temporally simultaneous with but naturally prior to their effects), it is possible to distinguish many signs or instants of nature at a single instant of time (e.g., the essential cause C exists and acts at [T1, N1], while its effect E exists at [T1, N2]). Why not say that at a single instant of time (Ta, the instant of animation), Mary’s soul is infused into contaminated esh and so has original sin, lacks grace, and is eligible for sanctication at the earlier sign or instant of nature (Ta, N1) and that her soul receives divinely infused grace at a later sign or instant of nature (Ta, N2)? To lend plausibility to this idea, Henry 54 William of Ware, Quaestio in Quaestiones disputatae de Immaculata Conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis (Quaracchi, 1904) 6–8. 55 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibeta, Paris 1518; reprint Bibliothèque S.J.: Louvain, 1961, ff. 584r Q-589r M. 56 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibeta XV, q.13, ff. 584v R-585r V. 57 Stephen D. Dumont reconstructs the history of this and other related disputations in his article “Time, Contradiction and Freedom of the Will,” Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosoca Medievale III.2 (1992) 561–97.
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offers the analogy of a bean that is thrown into the air but hit by a falling stone. Henry says, the last moment of the bean’s upward motion is the same as the rst moment of its downward motion.58 Godfrey of Fontaines59 and William of Ware60 countered, the reason not to say that the Blessed Virgin Mary is simul peccatrix et iusta is that it is obviously contradictory. Because instants of time are really indivisible, the distinction of signs or instants of nature within a single instant of time will have to be a distinction of reason (i.e., a function of the mind’s conceiving of the single instant of time in different ways). But no mere distinction of reason can underwrite the simultaneous inherence of real contraries in the same subject apart from any real division of signs/instants of nature and apart from any real division of the subject itself. Duns Scotus, who is himself attached to distinguishing instants of nature within the same instant of time or within God’s eternal now, agrees. Henry’s misuse of the metaphysical machinery—to allow a quality really not to inhere and really to inhere in the same subject simultaneously—provokes one of Scotus’s more explicit accounts of his own understanding of the notion. Taken one way, the naturally prior includes whatever a thing would have of itself apart from any external cause. This way, Mary’s not being justied would be naturally prior to her being justied, because—left to herself—Mary would not be justied but rather a daughter of Adam.61 Taken another way, natural priority abstracts from whatever is inessential and considers only what follows from the essential nature of a thing.62 This way, Mary in herself is naturally prior both to not being justied and to being justied, because neither is essential to being human. Neither way is it implied that Mary was really without grace at the time of her sanctication, because something external—namely, Christ—did cause her to have the grace which—left to herself—she would have lacked.63
Aristotelian Revisions Wounded Nature versus Lost Gift: Henry of Ghent picks up on Augustine’s remarks that the fall “wounds the nature” and his talk of the will’s originally having power to control all bodily movements and sensory appetites and so power to preserve uprightness and immortality. From this, Henry infers that original justice must be a
58 Henry’s position is discussed at length by Godfrey of Fontaines in Le huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines (ed. J. Hoffmans; Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l’Université, 1924) IV.51–60. For a helpful analysis, see Wolter, “Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception in the Early Franciscan School,” 60; Wolter and O’Neill, John Duns Scotus: Mary’s Architect III.59–60. 59 Godfrey of Fontaines, Le huitième Quodlibet, IV.51–60. 60 William of Ware, Quaestio in Quaestiones disputatae de Immaculata Conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis (Quaracchi, 1904) 2. 61 Scotus, Op. Ox. III.3.1.15; Wad VII.1.98. 62 Scotus, Op. Ox. III.3.1.16; Wad VII.1.98. 63 Scotus, Op. Ox. III.3.1.16–18; Wad VII.1.98–99.
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natural condition of the will in its purely natural state64—in particular, an inherent quality. This natural quality is lost by sin, which makes the straight will crooked and unable to control the lower powers or to secure immortality. Henry reasons that if original justice were a donum superadditum, a supranatural quality, then the purely natural state would lack original justice as much as the fallen state, and both would be equally worthy of punishment.65 Against Henry, Scotus counterposes an Aristotelian anthropology, which insists that human beings are essentially rational animals. So far from being a punitive consequence, the rebellion of the lower (animal) against the higher (rational) powers is natural to human beings—a natural consequence of what human beings are. Scotus explains that human beings have many sensory faculties; each sensory appetite, its own object. Moreover, sensory appetites act naturally--unless obstructed, to the limit of their powers—and so seek their objects as much as they can. Scotus adds a premise from Avicenna—that where multiple powers are in the same essence, the intense acts of one obstruct the acts of the other—and concludes that intense acts of sensory appetites would obstruct reason (make it difcult for reason to function and difcult for reason to control them), and that reason ought to try to obstruct sensory appetites.66 Moreover, Aristotelian animals are naturally mortal. What was given to Adam and Eve in the garden was not immortality in the sense of the impossibility of dying, but the possibility of not dying by eating of the tree of life, by protection from guardian angels, by divine protection, and by good self-government.67 Since it is the natural, not a punitive condition of Aristotelian animals to have conicting appetites and to be mortal, harmony of appetites and ability not to die must be attributed to dona superaddita.68 Demythologizing the Infection: One of the biggest obstacles to immaculate animation is posed by the seminal transmission theory of original sin, with its chain of contamination through inherence and being inhered in. The semen catches it from the animating soul of the parent, and the animating soul of the offspring catches it from the inseminated esh. Scotus records a row of objections that this is unscientic. First, the biology of Scotus’s day identied semen as an inanimate by-product of nutrition. But what the father’s soul does not animate, it does not “infect” by inherence.69 Even if parental lust were an efcient cause of some morbid quality in the inseminated esh, that quality would not remain to infect the child’s sensory appetites, because the inseminated esh undergoes many substantial
64 65 66 67 68 69
Scotus, Scotus, Scotus, Scotus, Scotus, Scotus,
Op. Op. Op. Op. Op. Op.
Ox. Ox. Ox. Ox. Ox. Ox.
II.29.u.1; Wad VI.2.919. II.29.u.2; Wad VI.2.920. II.29.u.3; Wad VI.2.921; cf. II.32.u.4; Wad VI.2.946. II.29.u.5; Wad VI.2.923. II.29.u.4; Wad VI.2.922; II.29.u.6; Wad VI.2.924. II.32.u.4; Wad VI.2.946.
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changes to turn it into an organic body t for animation, and Aristotelian qualities do not survive the corruption of their subjects.70 Juridical or Quasi-Legal Transmission: an Alternative Account: For his part, Scotus rejects all such traditional attempts to explain original sin in terms of the fomes and/or concupiscence. Taking his inspiration from Anselm’s De conceptu virginali et peccato originali, Scotus denes “original sin” as “lack of required justice” and offers his own juridical or quasi-legal explanation of its transmission. On Scotus’s account, original justice is a supranatural quality in the will that inclines the will to higher delectables, to God above all instead of the pursuit of whatever the sensory appetites propose. God gave original justice to the whole nature in Adam, and God justly requires it in all those to whom He gave it—namely, all those in whom the nature exists. Scotus makes it clear that the original donation is a matter of divine statute—that “divine law . . . lays it down” that so long as the father does nothing to forfeit the gift (by sinning), original justice will be given to the offspring with the same regularity as a natural process: Not because the father causes it to be passed on, but because God has made it a policy regularly to confer original justice on offspring of parents who keep God’s commandments, just as God now makes it a policy to create and infuse an intellectual soul into a human fetal body when it is perfectly organized.71 As with Anselm’s account in De conceptu virginali et de peccato originali, natural propagation is relevant, not because it naturally causes fomes in the esh or sensory appetite or because it naturally prevents original justice in the soul, but because it makes the individual fall under the law about Adam’s family, under the divine policy not to confer original justice on Adam’s descendants given that he sinned. Adam’s sinning is a positive demeritorious cause of original sin in his descendants, while God’s not giving justice is the negative cause.72 Scotus adds that if Adam hadn’t fallen but Cain had, the same legal situation would pertain to Cain’s descendants by virtue of being his descendants.73 Just as Anselm’s explanation in De conceptu virginali et de peccato originali makes irrelevant the esh’s infection or lack thereof, so also Scotus’s.74 Nevertheless, there is a sense in which the esh itself can count as an instrumental cause, not because it is an efcient cause of qualities in the child’s soul, but because the semen itself contains the active power of producing a child of Adam, and it is through being a child of Adam that someone falls under the law and so acquires a legal obligation to have original justice.75
70 71 72 73 74 75
Scotus, Scotus, Scotus, Scotus, Scotus, Scotus,
Op. Op. Op. Op. Op. Op.
Ox. Ox. Ox. Ox. Ox. Ox.
II.32.u.5; Wad VI.2.946. II.32.10; Wad VI.2.957/0; II.32.u.16; Wad VI.2.954. II.32.u.15; Wad VI.2.952–953. II.37.u.17; Wad VI.2.954. II.32.u.17; Wad VI.2.954. II.37.u.17; Wad VI.2.954.
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Christological Preeminence, Recalculated The other major objection was that immaculate animation for the Blessed Virgin Mary would be untting, because it would detract from the preeminence of Christ. Bonaventure’s immaculatist begged to differ: Because there is a difference between always having a property and having it independently, immaculate animation is compatible with salvation through Christ and hence does not jeopardize His preeminence as universal savior. William of Ware, Duns Scotus, and Peter Aureol go further, contending that maximally perfect mediation entails immaculate animation for some naturally propagated descendant of Adam. Once christological preeminence has been seen to demand the award, Marian privilege can take over to identify her as the winner of the prize. Given Scotus’s Anselmian denition of original sin, the issue of freedom from or infection with original sin doesn’t come up until the moment of animation. Immaculate animation is achieved by infusing grace in the soul from the rst moment of its existence. But for Scotus the role of the grace is not the efcientcausally overpowering of fomes in the esh (as it was for Aquinas and Henry of Ghent and later Aureol). Its relevance is instead legal: Namely, that for legal purposes the infused grace is equivalent to original justice, so that Mary’s having it satises the legal requirement for having original justice that divine statutes impose on every member of Adam’s race. Scotus argues for his major premise—that the maximally perfect mediator has a maximally perfect act of mediating for some person whose mediator he is76—from three angles. First, to be maximally well-pleasing to God, the mediator’s deed would have not simply to remove offense, but to prevent God from being offended in the rst place.77 Second, to be maximally efcacious in shielding the beneciary from evil, the mediator’s deed would have to take away the greater evil as well as the lesser—original sin which is worse than actual sin.78 Third, to be maximally obliged to the mediator, the beneciary would need to receive from him the maximal good that can be had from him—innocence or preservation from guilt and not just guilt removal.79 Scotus makes the same point with rhetorical questions: “why should many souls be indebted to Christ for grace and glory and none for innocence?” “There are many innocent angels. Why should there be no innocent souls in heaven but the soul of Christ?”80 Mary’s dependence on Christ means that she is still subject to what we might call “counter-factual contamination”: She would have been subject to guilt if grace had not been infused into her soul. Likewise, she is still subject to counter-factual
76 77 78 79 80
Scotus, Scotus, Scotus, Scotus, Scotus,
Op. Op. Op. Op. Op.
Ox. Ox. Ox. Ox. Ox.
III.3.1.4; Wad VII.1.92. III.3.1.5; Wad VII.1.92. III.3.1.6; Wad VII.1.92. III.3.1.7; Wad VII.1.92–93. III.3.1.7; Wad VII.1.93.
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exclusion: The door would have been closed to her by reason of her origin, if Christ had not opened it.81 Thought-experiments about what maximal perfection would do, easily discover premises that prove too much, that establish more than theological consensus can support, more than systematic considerations desire, and/or more than experience can bear out. The hypothesis that self-diffusing Goodness would share itself out as much as it can, would pour into creation as much as creation can receive, urgently raises the problem of evil in general. The claim that maximally perfect mediation would render the maximum benet and shield the beneciary from every evil, runs contrary to traditional Marian biography that she suffered hunger and thirst, fatigue and pain, and that she died. Systematic constraints impose, the benecial side effects of sanctication must be less in her than in Christ. Christ’s humanity was passible and mortal; He voluntarily assumed these conditions as a means to the end of His saving work. By analogy, Scotus reckons, Mary’s humanity was involuntarily subjected to only those defects that were useful for earning merit.82 Peter Aureol considers a different objection: By parity of reasoning, couldn’t we prove that Christ as maximally perfect redeemer would liberate all humans from their sins? For to free one human, is great; two, greater; all, maximal—what you would expect from a perfect redeemer. Yet this conclusion would be contrary to Scripture and hence to theological consensus.83 Aureol counters that perfect redemption does not maximize the number of individuals redeemed, but uses maximal methods of redeeming. Aureol oats the following analogy: By a given method of writing the letter “a”, a scribe can produce 100 or 1000 tokens; what makes one scribe more excellent than another is not the number of letters written but the way he writes them.84 Yet, if excellence in a scribe is expertise in the range, variety, and elegance of the styles in which s/he can write, should we not say that excellence in the redeemer is merely a matter of power to redeem? Aureol denies it, insisting that “redemption” signies not merely power but act: A maximally perfect redeemer would not remain in potency but would be in act with respect to redemption (i.e., the maximally perfect redeemer would not rest content with mere power or ability to redeem, but would actually exercise it to redeem someone).85
81
Scotus, Op. Ox. III.3.1.8; Wad VII.1.93. Ibid. 83 Aureol, Tractatus in Fr. Guilielmi Guarrae, Fr. Ioannis Duns Scoti, Fr. Petri Aureoli, Questiones Disputate de Immaculata Conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis (Quaracchi, 1904) 4.55. 84 Aureol, Tractatus 4.55–56. 85 Ibid. 82
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The Slippery Slope of Marian Privilege Entering the thought-experiment a generation after Scotus, Peter Aureol wrote two highly sophisticated treatises in defense of immaculate conception, from which there is space to lift out only the most salient developments.86 Refocussed Denition: Anselm and Scotus dene “original sin” as “the lack of required justice,” thereby indicating that what is at stake is not the mere absence or presence of a quality, but the fact that the one who lacks or has it owes it to God to have it. Because requirement is juridical or quasi-legal, they attempt to account for its application to Adam’s descendants in terms of divine legislation and its removal (e.g., from the baptized) in terms of legal waivers, and to separate this from biological or metaphysical causal considerations about qualities being produced in the esh (inanimate or otherwise) and in the soul. Certainly, Scotus thinks that what counts as meritorious, as prima facie or denitively worthy of eternal life, is dened by free and contingent divine statutes. Scotus recognizes, and Ockham after him emphasizes, how God could have refrained from establishing the category of merit, and could have laid down different positive laws governing it. Aureol nds it clearer to bring these convictions directly into the denition of “sin” generally and “original sin” in particular: What is essential is being offensive to God, being an object of divine hatred. Aureol distinguishes three norms against which sins (peccata) are measured. Philosophically, a peccatum is a deviation from the natural course or order (e.g., a three legged horse or a blind sheep). Ethically, a peccatum is a deviation from morals, from the judgment of right reason. Theologically, the norm is the divine will, and a peccatum is what is divinely nilled or hated by God.87 There may be extensional overlap (but not total coincidence) in what counts as sin relative to these criteria, but the formal denitions are different. For example, something may be morally wrong because it involves producing a natural defect or deprivation.88 Aureol goes along with the idea that—while it is contrary to divine Goodness to dispense from the rst table of the decalogue—God could dispense from the second table, even though adultery, theft, and homicide could not fail to be sins ethically speaking. Aureol insists, the divine will is a higher rule than right reason, which is the rule in mores and Aristotelian ethics.89 Even if habitual rebellion in the sensory appetite is what God actually hates, God would not have to hate it; those who have it would not have to be counted children of wrath. God could freely and contingently choose not to hate it. Indeed, God regularly does give up on being offended by such psycho-spiritual dysfunction in the baptized.
86 Peter Aureol, Tractatus and Repercussorium, in Fr. Guilielmi Guarrae, Fr. Ioannis Duns Scoti, Fr. Petri Aureoli, Questiones Disputate de Immaculata Conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis (Quaracchi, 1904). 87 Aureol, Repercussorium, T3.112. 88 Ibid., T3.113. 89 Ibid., T3.117–118.
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In the same vein, Aureol distinguishes between contracting original sin de jure and contracting it de facto. De jure guilt pertains to the whole nature as it was contained in fallen Adam, and to each individual in whom the nature exists. Materially, this means all descendants in which habitual rebellion is seminally transmitted by lustful bisexual intercourse. Guilt is remitted individual by individual so that de facto—e.g., after baptism—God does not take offense at the individual. Every descendant of Adam is by nature a child of wrath de jure, but some are liberated from it by grace so that it is not de facto imputed to them.90 Without metaphysical miracles, such an individual is simul iustus et peccator. With these tools in hand, Aureol turns to a threefold defense of the immaculate conception (= animation) of Mary: potuit, decuit, fecit. Potuit: So far as possibility is concerned, Aureol’s legal emphasis readily furnishes an argument from God’s role as chief legislator. divine will is the norm. Therefore, God has greater power to spare and dismiss offenses than any human being or other rational creature. But a human being can remit offense and guilt commited against him and freely forgive. Therefore, so can God forgive the guilt that the soul of the Virgin would have contracted at the instant of union with the esh.91 Again, the legislator who institutes a law, can—for good reason and singular privilege—make exceptions for some persons. God is the One Who instituted this law, that the soul would contract original sin from its union to esh that has been seminally produced by lustful bisexual intercourse. Therefore, if God wanted, God could make an exception to allow for immaculate animation in Mary’s case.92 Decuit: Aureol turns his re-denition of original sin to rhetorical advantage: Surely, it would be untting for the Mother of God to be hated by God at any time in her life. Aureol combines already secured Marian concessions with traditional exegetical conclusions to drive home the point. Theological consensus has it that the Blessed Virgin Mary has a lifetime immunity to venial and actual sin; and that her body is corporeally assumed and so preserved from worms, rotting, and incineration. But original sin is more hateful to God than any venial or actual sin. Likewise, spiritual pollution is more detestible than bodily pollution. Therefore, if it is tting for the Blessed Virgin Mary to be free from venial and actual sin and bodily decay, it is tting for her to be free from original sin from the beginning.93 Fecit: Arguments for t in the region of omnipotent goodness can seem tantamont to proofs of fact. But as we have seen, considerations of propriety are notoriously defeasible, because t can be calculated from so many angles. Our a priori estimates have to be weighed against one another and the testimony of Scripture, ecclesial pronouncements, secondary authorities, and experience. Scotus defends potuit and decuit, and ingeniously rebuts the charge that immaculate animation would run 90
Aureol, Tractatus 2.48. Ibid., 3.50. 92 Ibid., 3.51. 93 Ibid., 4.59–61. 91
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counter to the preeminence of Christ with the counter-argument that maximally perfect mediation seems to require it. Nevertheless, when it comes to fecit, Scotus response is terse and provisional. Whether the Blessed Virgin Mary had original sin in utero for a period of time, or for only one instant, or whether she was the subject of immaculate animation: God knows. But if it is not incompatible with the authority of the church or the authority of Scripture, it seems defensible that what is more excellent be attributed to Mary.94
Aureol also writes “without prejudice” to a wiser and truer opinion and with expressed willingness to accept correction from the apostolic see of Rome.95 But he is bolder and more expansive in declaring his conviction that “it can be held without danger to the faith that God preserved her de facto.”96 1) Bernard’s Letter to the Canons of Lyons is not decisive, because Bernard himself admits that he is not infallible on this subject by expressing his own willingness to accept correction from the church. 2) The English and the Gauls who celebrate the feast of the Conception sing antiphons and responses that wouldn’t be true or appropriate if the Virgin were conceived in original sin de facto as well as de jure.97 Nor should one stick on the fact that seminal conception is not to be feasted for itself. Rather the feast is proleptic, looking forward to immaculate animation and to Mary herself who shines through the conception.98 3) No creed or council determines this question. Neither part is dened. Therefore, either part can be soundly held.99 To the objection that councils dene the sayings of the saints as authoritative, Aureol replies that insofar as they are inconsistent with one another, the councils cannot be imposing them as infallible authorities, because this would lead to contradictory dogmas.100 In particular, since the saints come down on both sides of the question of immaculate animation, their testimony cannot be taken to exclude it as an acceptable position.101 4) More than his predecessors, Aureol squarely confronts the many proof-texts from the Bible and the saints that seem literally to imply that all were born in sin and all are redeemed by Christ. In reply, he appeals rst to the authority of traditional patterns of exegesis (found in Augustine inter alia), which treat such universal generalizations as loose usage and as admitting of exceptions. Otherwise, Aureol admits that Mary falls under these generalizations de jure (insofar as she is a member
94
Scotus, Op. Ox. III.3.1.9; Wad VII.1.95. Aureol, Tractatus 6.94. 96 Ibid., 5.71. 97 Ibid., 5.73–74. 98 Ibid., 6.94. 99 Ibid., 5.74. 100 Ibid., 5.74–75. 101 Ibid., 5.75. 95
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of the race to whom they apply) but not de facto (insofar as she is exempted by legal waivers and/or causal obstruction)102—simul iusta et peccatrix after all.
Picking the Fruits The harvest is plentiful. This fragment of the debate about immaculate conception is enough to illustrate how medieval thought-experiments—whether or not they produced agreement—bore the fruit of theoretical renements. By the beginning of the fourteenth century, the doctrine of original sin had become much more articulate than when Anselm’s speculation began. Augustine’s picture of the fall as wounding human nature and his seminal transmission theory of inheritance were subjected to philosophical and scientic critique. The then-up-to-date biology of mediate animation forced distinctions among kinds of contamination (whether of esh, sensory appetites, or the intellectual soul) as well as the identication of times at which and different ways and means by which such delements could be removed (e.g., because of mediate animation, infused grace comes too late to prevent but only in time to oppose or overpower morbid qualities in the esh). mediate animation also implied a distinction between immaculate conception and immaculate animation—one that the 1854 dogmatic denition fails to observe. Aristotle’s biology further challenged seminal transmission’s metaphor of infection by inherence (the father’s soul does not inhere in the matter of the semen, and any qualities the father caused in the semen would have been corrupted by its substantial changes into an organic body). Likewise, Aristotelian anthropology was brought forward to show that disharmony between esh, sensory appetites, and the rational soul comes naturally. So far from reecting damage, it is the outworking of what it is to be animal as well as rational, in short, of what it is to be a human being. Already in Anselm but re-emphasized in Scotus and Aureol, there is a breakthrough recognition that inheritance is not at bottom a biological but a juridical or quasi-legal category. The relevance of biological origins or concrete conditions of body and soul to legal standing depends on the legislator, on what the legislator makes of it. Since in this case God is the law-maker, and in soteriology God is free to do anything compatible with divine goodness, the way is open to say that Mary was legally in the clear ab initio, and to let the degree and nature of any continuing concrete dysfunctions be dictated by other desiderata in God’s plan. These shifts of attention got reected in refocussed denitions. If seminal transmission leads one to concentrate on concrete dysfunctions—ignorance, difculty, a morbid quality in the esh, and fomes peccati in the sensory powers— Anselm’s identication of the soul as the subject of sin, drives him and Scotus to dene “original sin” in terms of something that the soul lacks but ought to have. Aureol takes the statutory character of original sin more fully to heart when he locates its essence in being hated by God. 102
Ibid., 5.78–80.
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Besides all of this, the clarication of metaphysical notions about qualitative change and instants of nature, opened the way to distinguish always having a trait and having that trait independently—Mary is free of both original and actual sin throughout her existence, but she depends for this on the merits of Christ—and cleared the path for the startling conclusion that a maximally perfect mediator entails immaculate animation. Debate also exposed the exibility of tradition—how liturgical celebration is not in fact rigidly principled, and how traditional patterns of exegesis can easily be used to remove apparent contradictions between immaculate animation and Holy Writ. Such wealth of medieval analysis did not precipitate any denitive ecclesiastical determination, but it did allow negative presumptions to be lifted, and did put the church in a position to decide the question with open eyes.
Apophatic Strategies in Allogenes (NHC XI,3) Dylan Burns Yale University
If one does not nd doing negative theology a fairly agonizing business, one is not really doing negative theology at all.1
Plotinus, Porphyry, Zostrianos, and The Foreigner(s) Despite decades of research, it remains surprisingly difcult to identify the origins of the works preserved in the hoard of Coptic manuscripts discovered at Nag Hammadi in 1945. Even as unearthed “Gnostic” gospels continue to make headlines, many academics repent intoning these old, ery heretics, and some have even called for an all-out dispensation of the term “Gnosticism.”2 Yet a felicitous piece of external evidence seems to offer a more stable foundation for identifying the date and sectarian provenance of several of the most difcult works discovered at Nag Hammadi, the so-called “Platonizing” treatises of the “Sethian school” of Gnosticism.3 Porphyry, the top pupil of the Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus (third century C.E.), remarks that, 1
Arthur H. Armstrong, “Negative Theology,” DRev 95 (1973) 176–89, esp. 184. Michael A. Williams, Rethinking Gnosticism: Arguments for Dismantling a Dubious Category (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) esp. 51–53, 265. Karen King (What is Gnosticism? [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003] 168–69) offers a deconstruction of the category and its discursive baggage, without dismissing it altogether. Bentley Layton defends use of the category to designate ancients who called themselves “Gnostics” (“knowers”) and the coherent body of myths associated with them. (“Prolegomena to the Study of Ancient Gnosticism,” in The Social World of the First Christians: Essays in Honor of Wayne Meeks [ed. L. Michael White and Larry O. Yarbrough; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995] 334–50; for criticism, see King, Gnosticism?, 166–69). 3 These were famously identied by Hans-Martin Schenke as texts dealing with a complex of ideas including (but not limited to) the following: the identication of the pneumatic seed of Seth with the savior; the divine trinity of Father, Mother, and Son; the division of the aeon of Barbelo (the Mother) into the triad of Kalyptos, Protophanes, and Autogenes; the appearance of the “Four 2
HTR 103:2 (2010) 161–79
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there were in his [Plotinus’s] time Christians of many kinds, and especially certain heretics who based their teachings on the ancient philosophy. They were followers of Adelphius and Aculinus, who possessed a lot of writings by Alexander the Libyan, Philocomus, Demostratus and Lydus, and also brandished apocalyptic works of Zoroaster, Zostrianus, Nicotheus, Allogenes, Messus and others of that kind.4
The Nag Hammadi codices contain treatises which bear the titles of some of these “apocalyptic works”: “Zostrianos” and “Allogenes” (Greek for “foreigner,” or “stranger”). The texts feature distinctively Sethian mythologoumena, such as the titles of the various entities encountered in the story.5 They are visionary ascent narratives catalyzed by the visit of a divine intermediary to a seer, in these two cases the eponymous protagonists.6 Their genre notwithstanding, however, these Luminaries”; dwelling places for Adam, Seth, and his seed; and the idea of a rite of “Five Seals.” See Hans-Martin Schenke, “Das sethianische System nach Nag-Hammadi-Handschriften,” in Studia Coptica (ed. Peter Nagel; Berlin: Akademie, 1974) 165–72; idem, “The Phenomenon and Signicance of Gnostic Sethianism,” in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism: Proceedings of the International Conference on Gnosticism (ed. Bentley Layton; Suppl. Numen 41; Leiden: Brill, 1981) 588–616. Schenke’s “Sethian” texts are: Ap. John (NHC II,1; III,1; IV,1; BG,2), Hyp. Arch. (NHC II,4), Gos. Eg. (NHC III,2; IV,2), Apoc. Adam (NHC V,5) Steles Seth (NHC VII,5), Zost. (NHC VIII,1), Melch. (NHC IX,1), Norea (NHC IX,2), Marsanes (NHC X), Allogenes (NHC XI,3), Trim. Prot. (NHC XIII,1), Cod. Bruc. Untitled, and the individuals mentioned in Irenaeus, Haer. 1.29, Epiphanius, Pan. (trans. Frank Williams; 2 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 1987–1994) chs. 26, 39, and 40. Scholarship on Sethianism is voluminous, but see esp. Rediscovery (ed. Layton; vol. 2) and the criticism of Schenke within (Frederik Wisse, “Stalking Those Elusive Sethians”); John D. Turner, “The Gnostic Threefold Path to Enlightenment: The Ascent of Mind and the Descent of Wisdom,” NovT 22 (1980) 324–51, and other articles discussed below; for comprehensive survey of Sethianism’s relationship with Platonism, see idem, Sethian Gnosticism and the Platonic Tradition (BCNH Études 6; Louvain: Peeters, 2001). The category is discussed (but not exactly dispatched) in Williams (Gnosticism, 90–93), and King (Gnosticism?, 154–62, who notes the coherence of the category [or the categorizing approach itself, ibid., 158]). For recent re-evaluation of the category see Tuomas Rasimus, “Paradise Reconsidered: A Study of the Ophite Myth and Ritual and their Relationship to Sethianism” (Ph.D. diss., University of Helsinki, 2006) esp. 27–39, 51–56. Here I follow Rasimus in separating the Ophite materials—i.e., texts focusing on the serpent’s role in Paradise as revealer—from Sethian and Barbeloite texts. NHC XI’s Allogenes has apparently no Ophite features (but see below, n. 86, for complications ensuing with heresiological evidence) and so would still fall under the Sethian-Barbeloite rubric, featuring the usual mythologoumena. 4 Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, ch. 16, in Neoplatonic Saints: The Lives of Plotinus and Proclus by their Students (trans. Mark J. Edwards; Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000). For precise analysis of the language of the passage see, inter alii, Howard M. Jackson, “The Seer Nikotheos and His Lost Apocalypse in the Light of Sethian Apocalypses from Nag Hammadi and the Apocalypse of Elchasai,” NovT 32 (1990) 250–77, esp. 250–58; Christos Evangeliou, “Plotinus’s Anti-Gnostic Polemic and Porphyry’s Against the Christians,” in Neoplatonism and Gnosticism (ed. Richard T. Wallis; SNAM 6; Albany: SUNY University Press, 1992) 112–16; but esp. Michel Tardieu, “Les gnostiques dans La vie de Plotin,” in La vie de Plotin (ed. Luc Brisson; 2 vols.; Paris: Vrin, 1982–1992) 2:503–63; Ruth Majercik, “Porphyry and Gnosticism,” CQ 55 (2005) 277–92, esp. 277–78. 5 As discussed for example in Turner, Platonic Tradition, 108–25. 6 See John J. Collins, “Morphology of a Genre,” Semeia 14 (1979) 1–19, 9: “ ‘Apocalypse’ is a genre of revelatory literature with a narrative framework, in which a revelation is mediated by an otherworldly being to a human recipient, disclosing a transcendent reality which is both temporal, insofar as it
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works are replete with Neoplatonic jargon. They are contemplative texts, describing the voyage of philosophers into heaven towards ultimate being and beyond. Porphyry’s evidence is necessary but not sufcient for scholars attempting to date these treatises. Analysis of the texts’ contents has led Abramowski and Majercik to propose that Allogenes and Zostrianos are post-Plotinian works of the second half of the third century C.E., reecting the metaphysics of Porphyry.7 The works known by Plotinus under the same names would not, then, be those we have discovered at Nag Hammadi. Those works were Coptic translations of Greek versions composed around the turn of the fourth century.8 Turner and Corrigan respond that the characteristics of the Sethian treatises identied by Majercik as Porphyrian are simply Middle-Platonic.9 Corrigan, followed by Turner, further argues that the Sethian treatises are dependent on the anonymous Turin commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, which is actually pre-Porphyrian.10 Corrigan assumes envisages eschatological salvation, and spatial insofar as it involves another, supernatural world.” See also idem, The Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic Literature (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998) 1–42; for survey of scholarship on Gnostic apocalypses, see Harold W. Attridge, “Valentinian and Sethian Apocalyptic Traditions,” JECS 8 (1999) 173–211. 7 Probably through a lost commentary on the Chaldean Oracles 1:482–85. See Pierre Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus (2 vols.; Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1968), henceforth cited as Anon. Comm. Parm. (Hadot); idem, “La métaphysique de Porphyre,” Entretiens de la Fondation Hardt 12: Porphyre (Vandœuvres-Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1966) 127–63; John M. Rist, “Mysticism and Transcendence in Later Neoplatonism,” Hermes 92 (1964) 213–25, esp. 220; Luise Abramowski, “Marius Victorinus, Porphyrius und die römischen Gnostiker,” ZNW 74 (1983) 108–28, esp. 124–26; Majercik, “Gnosticism,” 280. Proclus’s testimony, located in In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii (ed. Ernst Diehl; 3 vols.; Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–1906) 3:64.8–65.8, is crucial, but see Mark. J. Edwards’s cautionary remarks in “Porphyry and the Intelligible Triad,” JHS 110 (1990) 14–25, esp. 15–19. Also of some importance is the anonymous commentary on the Parmenides, which also was a source for Victorinus and Synesius, as mentioned above. Ruth Majercik highlights the use ofY_TEV\Mb for the Chaldean existence-vitality-mentality triad and the shared afnity with Marius Victorinus’s Porphyrian metaphysics (“The Being-Life-Mind Triad in Gnosticism and Neoplatonism,” CQ 42 (1992) 475–88, esp. 478–79, 482–87. Abramowski looks at the doctrine of the “triple-powered,” and the use of paronymy (ibid., 113 esp. n. 32). In an important later article (“Gnosticism,” 282–84) Majercik adds possible references to Porphyry’s propaedeutic language in Ad Marcellam and his theory of categories; unfortunately, space does not allow full engagement with these arguments here, but the author nds them compelling new evidence in the debate. 8 Majercik, “Triad,” 486–88; idem, “Gnosticism,” 278; Abramowski, “Marius Victorinus,” 123–24; see also Andrew Smith, “Porphyrian Studies since 1913,” ANRW II:36.2:717–73, esp. 763 n. 282. 9 John D. Turner, “Typologies of the Sethian Gnostic Literature from Nag Hammadi,” in Colloque internationale sur les textes de Nag Hammadi, Université Laval, 15–22 Septembre, 1993 (Louvain: Peeters, 1994) 206; see also idem, “Gnosticism and Platonism: The Platonizing Sethian Texts from Nag Hammadi and their Relation to Later Platonic Literature,” in Wallis, Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, 433–36; Kevin Corrigan, “Platonism and Gnosticism: The Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides: Middle or Neoplatonic?” in Gnosticism and Later Platonism: Themes, Figures, and Texts (ed. John D. Turner and Ruth Majercik; SBL Symposium Series 12; Atlanta: SBL, 2001) 168–71. 10 Corrigan, “Platonism and Gnosticism,” 142–44; John D. Turner, “Setting of the Platonizing Sethian Treatises in Middle Platonism,” in Turner and Majercik, Gnosticism, 204–5. Scholarship attempting to date the Turin commentary remains at an impasse; Majercik, Wallis, and Dillon
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Plotinus’s knowledge of Nag Hammadi’s Allogenes; Turner suggests that it is a response to Plotinus’s critique of Zostrianos, made circa 240 C.E.11 For both, as for Layton and Tardieu,12 Porphyry’s evidence functions as a terminus ante quem for the Nag Hammadi documents themselves. Yet as Edwards has observed, “while all or most [Nag Hammadi texts] presuppose a Greek original, there is no presumption that this would be in every case an ancient one. . . . Even when the original is likely to have been of some antiquity, tentatively accept Hadot’s evaluation of the anonymous commentary as at least Porphyrian, if not Porphyry himself, as he claims. See Majercik, “Triad,” 477; idem, “Chaldean Triads in Neoplatonic Exegesis: Some Reconsiderations,” in CQ 51 [2001] 265–96; idem, “Porphyry and Gnosticism,” 278 n. 9; Richard T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995) 114–17; John M. Dillon, “Introduction,” in Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides (trans. G. Morrow and J. M. Dillon; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) xxx; Pierre Hadot, “Fragments d’un commentaire de Porphyre sur le Parménide,” REG 74 (1961) 410–38; Hadot, Porphyre; followed by Henri-Dominique Saffrey, “Connaissance et inconnaissance de Dieu. Porphyre et la Théosophie de Tübingen,” in Saffrey, Recherches sur le Néoplatonisme après Plotin (Paris: Vrin, 1990) 14; for handy summaries of which see Smith, “Porphyry,” 728–29, 737–41; Corrigan, “Platonism and Gnosticism,” 161–65. Corrigan, Turner, and Bechtle respond that the commentary is pre-Plotinian. See Corrigan, ibid., 144–56; John D. Turner “Introduction: Allogenes,” in L’allogène (ed. and trans. Wolf-Peter Funk, Paul-Hubert Poirier, Madeline Scopello, and John D. Turner; Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2004) 161; Gerald Bechtle, The Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s “Parmenides” (ed. and trans. Gerard Bechtle; Bern: Paul Haupt, 1999) 90–91, 221–22). For a critique of Bechtle, see now Marco Zambon, Porphyre et le moyen-platonisme (Paris, 2002) 40 n. 2; Edwards, “Intelligible Triad,” 21–25, both of whom argue that the text is post-Iamblichean. 11 Corrigan, “Positive and Negative Matter in Later Platonism: The Uncovering of Plotinus’s Dialogue with the Gnostics,” in Turner and Majercik, Gnosticism, 44 n. 77; Turner, Platonic Tradition, 721; idem, “Setting,” 199–201; idem, “Introduction: Marsanès,” in Marsanès, (ed. and trans. Wolf-Peter Funk, Paul-Hubert Poirier and John D. Turner; Louvain: Peeters, 2000) 169–72; Turner, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” in Zostrien (ed. and trans. Catharine Barry, WolfPeter Funk, Paul-Hubert Poirier and John D. Turner; Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2000) 145–49; Turner, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 3, 113–16, 161; idem, “The Gnostic Sethians and Middle Platonism: Interpretations of the Timaeus and Parmenides,” VC 60 (2006) 9–64, esp. 26–27, 52; idem, “Victorinus, Parmenides Commentaries, and the Platonizing Sethian Treatises,” in Platonisms: Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern (ed. Kevin Corrigan and John D. Turner; AMMTC: SPNPT 4; Leiden: Brill, 2007) 79–80. The argument retracts his earlier thesis that the Steles Seth, Zostrianos, and Marsanes are dependent on Allogenes; see Turner, “Gnosticism and Platonism,” 430, 455. Karen King (Revelation of the Unknowable God [Santa Rosa: Polebridge Press, 1995] 48, 60) essentially repeats Turner’s claim that Allogenes presumes Plotinian critique of Sethian metaphysics but elsewhere stresses that Plotinus probably knew the text. See ibid., 47–48, 50; Turner, “Introduction: Marsanès,” 172; idem, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 3. The chronology here is unclear: The Gnostic controversy broke out shortly after Porphyry’s arrival at Plotinus’s seminar in 263 C.E. for which see Michel Tardieu, “Recherches sur la formation de l’Apocalypse de Zostrien et les sources de Marius Victorinus,” ResOr 9 [1996] 7–114, 112), so how could Allogenes have been composed (240 C.E.) as a response to Plotinus twenty years prior to Plotinus’s Against the Gnostics? The end of the Großschrift was composed between 263 and 269 according to Porphyry, Vit. Plot., ch. 6]) To support a dating of Allogenes to the 240s, we must assume (reasonably, but beyond Porphyry’s evidence) that Plotinus was in debate with Gnostic ideas before Porphyry’s arrival at the school. 12 Bentley Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures (ABRL; New York: Doubleday, 1987) 122, 142; Tardieu, “Formation” 113.
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the vagaries of redaction and translation may have produced a work of quite a different character.”13 The conuence of titles and names of the sages invoked in the books of Plotinus’s opponents does not denote a coincidence of text but textual tradition. The assumption that these traditions are stable between the Greek versions known in 260s Rome and the Coptic versions in 350s Egypt needs to be validated by investigation of the texts’ content. A stable textual tradition for much of Zostrianos has been validated in just this way, for its doctrines seem to be very similar to those Plotinus attacks in Enn. II.9, “Against the Gnostics.”14 Can the same be said for Allogenes? The apparent absence of a direct response by a Neoplatonist forces its readers to begin with the text itself in an effort to contextualize its content in light of contemporary Platonic currents. A good start is the treatise’s most distinctive feature, its negative theology, long noted by scholars as resembling later Neoplatonic ideas.15 In Allogenes, the author describes the
13
Mark J. Edwards, “The Epistle to Rheginus: Valentinianism in the Fourth Century,” NovT 37 (1995) 76–91, esp. 77. Other fourth-century reminisces have been discovered in the Nag Hammadi Library: For references to the Arian Controversy and Julian the Apostate, see Raoul Mortley, “The Name of the Father is the Son,” in Wallis, Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, 239–52, and Francis E. Williams, Mental Perception, A Commentary on NHC VI, 4: The Concept of Our Great Power (NHMS 51; Leiden: Brill, 2001) lxii, respectively. For the importance of considering potential differences between the discovered Coptic treatises and their Greek antecedents, see Stephen Emmel, “Religious Tradition, Textual Transmission, and the Nag Hammadi Codices,” in The Nag Hammadi Library after Fifty Years (ed. John D. Turner and Anne McGuire; Leiden: Brill, 1997) 34–43; idem, “The Coptic Gnostic Texts as Witnesses to the Production and Transmission of Gnostic (and Other) Traditions,” in Das Thomasevangelium. Entstehung–Rezeption–Theologie (ed. Jörg Frey, Enno Edzard Popkes, and Jens Schröter BZNW 157; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008) 33–50. 14 Generally, see Tardieu, “Les gnostiques,” 538–43; Turner, “Victorinus,” 56–57 n. 2. Plotinus knew and attacked Zostrianos for its partition of intellect (Enn. II.9 [33] 1.6). Turner earlier thought (“Gnosticism and Platonism,” 432) Plotinus here targeted Allogenes. Plotinus also attacks Zostrianos’s doctrine of Sophia and her relationship with the demiurge (Enn. II.9 [33] 2, 10; 3.8 [30] 4; 5.8 [31] 3–5; NHC VIII,1.9.16–19). Corrigan (“Platonism and Gnosticism,” 44 n. 77) points out how the partition of intellect, “image of an image,” and incantations all have counterparts in the Enneads which are possible echoes of Gnostic inuence. However, cf. Majercik, “Gnosticism,” as noted above. 15 Curtis L. Hancock observes that, as in the thought of Iamblichus, Allogenes extends ineffability (and hence apophasis) beyond the One to the intermediary principle of the thricepowered (“Negative Theology in Gnosticism and Neoplatonism,” in Wallis, Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, 174–76, 180). He points out that Gnostic texts use negation all over the hierarchy of the cosmos, while Plotinus limits it to the One. Wallis (“The Spiritual Importance of Not Knowing,” in Classical Mediterranean Spirituality: Egyptian, Greek, Roman [ed. Arthur H. Armstrong; New York: Crossroad, 1986] 475–76) points out that Iamblichus and Proclus are more in line with the Gnostics than Plotinus on this point since they extend ineffability beyond the One to levels of the intelligible realm (as for example those above the “ower of intellect”). See also Michael A. Williams, “Negative Theologies and Demiurgical Myths in Late Antiquity,” in Turner and Majercik, Gnosticism, 301.
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depths of reality,16 but then is visited by the angel Youel,17 who guides him further into the aeon of Barbelo. “Luminaries” intervene and tell the seer his ascent must end, but they will describe, as much as possible, what the ultimate divinity above is like.18 What follows is some of the most startling Neoplatonic negative theology of the Nag Hammadi discoveries, yet, as King notes, “the precise logical status of negation in Allogenes remains undetermined.”19 In the following I will attempt to clarify the logic, epistemology, and praxis of negation in Allogenes. The text’s mysticism is distinct from that of Middle Platonism and Plotinus, employing jargon and techniques more reminiscent of theurgic Neoplatonists like Iamblichus and Proclus, and, at times, the Chaldean Oracles, the anonymous commentary on the Parmenides, and Porphyry.20 This distinctively theurgic Neoplatonism invites a re-consideration of the dating of the redaction of the text preserved at Nag Hammadi. While it seems that the Coptic version of Zostrianos known today was similar to, if not a direct translation of, the Greek version mentioned by Porphyry (as Corrigan and Turner argue), the same cannot be said for Allogenes. Rather, the text bears the marks of a post-Plotinian redaction and should be dated to the turn of the fourth century.21
Apophatic Strategy in Allogenes Let us begin with the logic of negation in Allogenes. After Youel initiates Allogenes’s ascent into heaven, the seeker falls into a suprarational cognitive state. That is, knowledge is explicitly acquired, but only of a paradoxical sort that cannot be rationally apprehended: “I became full of revelation, through a primary revelation of unknowing (BUTPVXO'). Because I did not apprehend it, I apprehended it 16 NHC XI,3.45.6–57.24b. Below I have generally followed the most recent edition of the text, L’allogène (Funk/Scopello) noting a few discrepancies with King (Revelation) and Layton (text: Coptic Gnostic Chrestomathy [Louvain: Peeters, 2003]; translation: Scriptures) and occasionally modifying the translation. 17 Maddalena Scopello, “Youel et Barbélo dans le Traité de l’Allogène,” in Colloque international sur les textes de Nag Hammadi (ed. Bernard Barc; Louvain: Peeters, 1981) esp. 374–76. The gure seems to be derived from speculation about Metatron in intertestamental Jewish apocalyptic literature (ibid., 377–80). 18 NHC XI,3.59.7b. 19 King, Revelation, 19. 20 Williams (“Negative Theologies,” 290), observes that Allogenes uses language reminiscent of much later Western mysticism. See also Turner, “Gnosticism and Platonism,” 448; Saffrey, “Connaissance et inconnaissance,” 20; Wallis, “Spiritual Importance,” 470. King (Revelation, 12, 49) considers that Allogenes’s approach to ritual and revelation is much more in line with theurgic Neoplatonism than Plotinus’s mysticism. John Finamore gives a careful and fruitful comparison of ontology (“Iamblichus, the Sethians, and Marsanes,” in Turner’s and Majercik’s Gnosticism, 232–38). 21 See also Finamore, “Iamblichus, the Sethians, and Marsanes, 238 n. 37, on the topic of ontological generation; Puech, too, assigns Nag Hammadi’s Zostrianos to that encountered by Plotinus, but is not sure about Allogenes; see Henri-Charles Puech, “Plotin et les Gnostiques,” in idem, En quête de la Gnose, vol. 1. La Gnose et le temps et autres essais (Paris: Gallimard, 1978) 116.
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(FJF/BUFJNFB~FJ·
) and received power from it.”22 He continues as follows: “through a primary revelation of the rst thing unknown to all I saw the deity elevated beyond perfection and the triple power that exists in them [all beings]. I was seeking the ineffable and unknowable God.”23 What follows is classic negative theology. As King points out, the text (61.32b –62.24a) asks if existence can be predicated of the rst principle; the answer is no, for it does not possess mind, life, or substance ()VQBSYJT); nor can one predicate its existence with reference to its products.24 As the “powers of the luminaries” say, “neither does it have need of mind or life or indeed anything at all, since it is superior to (F'TPUF) the entireties25 by virtue of its privation26 and its incomprehensibility; that is, its substance is not subject to becoming (/OBUWXQF)”.27 The next section (62.27b–63.28a) combines a series of negations (PVUFBO QF . . . PVUFBO[“it is not . . . nor . . .”] constructions) and paradoxes quite similar to a section of the Apocryphon of John, with whom Allogenes here likely shares a source:28 “Neither is it boundless nor is it bounded by any other thing, but rather it is something which is superior. It is not corporeal; it is not incorporeal. It is not great; it is not small; it is not quantity; it is not quality.”29 The text goes on to discuss other categories of Platonic provenance, all of them inadequate: number, time, eternity, etc.30; extensive use of the appellation “superior to,” (TPUF) is 22
NHC XI,3.60.37–61.1. NHC XI,3.61.11–14. 24 This is an interesting departure from Plotinus, who says “we have it [i.e., the One] in such a way that we speak about it, but do not speak it. For we say what it is not, but we do not say what it is: so that we speak about it from what comes after it” (Enn. V.3 [49] 14.5–8). See also for its relative utility to kataphasis and silence, VI.8 [39] 18.1–2: “And you when you seek, seek nothing outside him, but seek within all things which come after him; but leave himself alone.”) 25 With Layton, Scriptures, pace King, Unknowable God, 160: “all of them”; Turner, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 185: “the Totality”; Scopello, ibid., 225: “aux Touts.” 26 UN/U)BFwith King (Unknowable God) and Turner (L’allogène, 185) pace UN/UºBU»)BF (Layton, Chrestomathy, 126; idem, Scriptures, 146; Funk L’allogène, 224). 27 NHC XI,3.62.18–24. 23
28 BG 24.6–25.10; NHC II,3.17–36, 5.2–6.3; NHC IV,4.28–5.23. Antoinette Wire sees a direct literary dependence (“Introduction,” in Nag Hammadi Codices XI, XII, XIII [ed. Charles Hedrick; Leiden: Brill, 1990] 177). Michel Tardieu thinks both refer to Plato, Parm. 137C–142A (Écrits gnostiques [Paris: Cerf, 1984] 249–51). Raoul Mortley agrees and points out further that the “neither x nor y” construction is particularly reminiscent of the sixth hypothesis (“the One is not”), Parm. 163B–164A (From Word to Silence: The Way of Negation, Christian and Greek [2 vols.; Bonn: Peter Hanstein, 1986] 2:30). See also Turner, “Introduction: Marsanès,” 87–88; idem, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 78–79; idem, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 52–56, 117–18. I accept Tardieu’s (Écrits gnostiques, 251) argument that UBNJP translates a corruption of TSMDSR to TSMLXSZR. 29 NHC XI,3.63.1–8. 30 Ibid., 63.8–27. “The presentation of the Unknowable in 61.32–67.38 is based on a denial that any of the Platonic and Aristotelian attributes or categories given for anything which exists or is intelligible can be applied to the Unknowable” (King, Unknowable God, 18). By this she refers to the ve attributes for existents in Sophist 254D–255E (being, movement, rest, identity, and diversity)
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made.31 However, the basic pattern—the Unknowable is neither this, nor that, but is greater—is the same.32 This pattern is clear enough to compare to contemporary Platonic currents. The Platonists of Late Antiquity followed Aristotle in holding that negation can be conceived of in three general ways: 33 at-out denial of an attribute (ENTSZJEWMb), abstraction of a particular by removal of accidental attributes (ENREZPYWMb or ENJEMZVIWMb), and privation (WXIZVLWMb). Bare ENTSZJEWMb is a clumsy tool: The statement that “it is not a horse” is true of everything but horses.34 Meanwhile, privation was of little service to metaphysicians outside of Aristotelian commentators.35 Abstraction, however, dominated Middle Platonic36 and Plotinian37 negative and Aristotle’s ten categories (substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, and affection). Allogenes thus knows Plotinus’s attack (Enn. VI.1 [42] 2.13–16) on use of the categories to describe intelligible (King, Unknowable God, 18). 31 NHC XI,3.62.33; 63.4–5, 12, 19. King translates TPUFas “exquisite”; Turner, “superlative” (Platonic Tradition, 686; idem, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 186). See also the use of F'KPTF F (NHC XI,3.66.33–38). 32 See also the detailed account of Turner, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 120–21. 33 For privation vs. negation in Aristotle see Metaphysics 1022b 33; John Whittaker “Neopythagoreanism and Negative Theology,” SO 44 (1969) 109–25, 119) who sees WXIZ V IWMb as a subdivision of EN T SZ J EWMb, pointing to Meta. 1056a 24, 1011b 19. Sometimes they mean the same thing (ibid., 120–21). For Aristotle, “Privation should be understood as the absence of a quality from a given substratum or entity, and that it be perceivable as an absence.” Hence “a vegetable has no eyes” is a privation because it is an intelligible statement, unlike “a vegetable has no innity” (unintelligible, for nothing can have innity). See Raoul Mortley, “The Fundamentals of the Via Negativa,” AJP 103 (1982) 429–39, 434. But cf. the account of Stephen Gersh, Neoplatonism after Derrida: Parallelograms (Leiden: Brill, 2006) 52–54 n. 85, who adds I.X IVSZXLb, HMEJSVEZ, and I.RERXMSZXLb and describes similar, if more complex, models. 34 As Mortley, “Via Negativa,” 436. 35 Such as Syrianus (Mortley, Silence, 85–89). 36 Mortley, “Via Negativa,” 435–38; John P. Kenney, “Ancient Apophatic Theology,” in Turner’s and Majercik’s Gnosticism, 268–69. The mathematical negative theology of abstraction, meanwhile, is also in Alcinous (Didaskalos, X.5, 7), perhaps thinking of Aristotle, Meta. 1061a 28. See further Plutarch (Quest. plat. 1001e–1002a), Celsus (apud Origen, Cels. 7.42), and Clemens Alexandrinus (Strom. V.71.2); cit. Whittaker, “Negative Theology”; see also Turner, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 118–19). ENREZPYWMband ENJEMZVIWMbmean the same thing in Middle Platonic sources; see Whittaker, “Negative Theology,” 113; Henny F. Hägg, Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Apophaticism (OECS; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 223. 37 Harry H. Wolfson (“Albinus and Plotinus,” HTR 45 [1952] 115–130, esp. 119–22) argues that Plotinus follows Alcinous (Enn. VI.7 [38] 36.7). For them both, the process of saying what something is not without saying what it is—ENJEMZVIWMb—is tantamount to ENTSZJEWMb, negation, in its Aristotelian sense. Whittaker (“Negative Theology,” 122–23) disagrees concerning Alcinous but does see the strategy in Plotinus (e.g., Enn. VI.8 [39] 21). He is followed by John Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus (Philos. Antiq. 49; Leiden: Brill, 1988) 114–15, who rejects Mortley’s sharp distinction between abstraction and negation (ibid., 195). See Mortley, Silence, 2:20–24, 56–57 for the relationship of ENJEMZVIWMbto contemporary mathematical currents. Deirdre Carabine thinks, contra Mortley, thatENJEMZVIWMbdoes not predicate anything beyond RSYDb and is more of a via remotionis than a via negativa; mystical knowledge only emerges in Numenius and Plotinus (The Unknown God. Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena
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theology. Plotinus likes to say that “since he (the One) is none of these things, one can only say that he is beyond them INTIZOIMREXSYZX[R,”38 charging his reader to abandon the necessarily dualistic operation of intellect by stripping away its thoughts, like an initiate disrobing for the mysteries.39 In Plotinus, “the normal use of intellect involves predication, which introduces plurality since the logic of predication involves the multiple structures of the subject and the predicated quality.40 Abstraction has an opposite logic, since it involves subtracting from the subject rather than adding to it.”41 Abstraction is productive: to use the common Middle Platonic geometric analogy, negating a line means “not-line”; abstracting from a line gives a point. Allogenes does share with Plotinus a pattern of “neither/nor/but beyond,”42 but it is hardly signicant that a standard Platonic expression was common to these texts. Moreover, Allogenes delights in paradox far more than Plotinus, as, for example, at 47.19–32: “for this one is One who is situated as a cause of Being and a source and an immaterial matter and a numberless number and a formless form and a shapeless shape and a powerless one with power and a nonsubstantial substance . . . and an inactive activity, also being a provider of provisions and a divinity of divinity.”43 The relentless piling of negations, specically of opposite qualities, is [LTPM 19; Peeters: Louvain, 1995], 80, 83). Zlatko Pleše agrees (Poetics of the Gnostic Universe. Narrative and Cosmology in the Apocryphon of John [NHMS 52; Leiden: Brill, 2006] 82–91). 38 Enn. V.5 [32] 6.9. “It is certainly none of the things of which it is origin; it is of such a kind, though nothing can be predicated of it, not being, not substance, not life, as to be above all of these things” (XSY.TIVTEZRXEEYNX[DR). Enn. III.8 [30] 10.27–31; see also VI.7 [38] 32; VI.9 [9] 3.41–55; VI.9 [9] 6 passim; see also the anonymous Turin commentary—Anon. Comm. Parm (Hadot) XIII.23, 2:108–109, XIV.1–4, 2:108–109. 39 Enn. I.6 [1] 1.7; see also his injunction, E?JIPITEZRXE at the conclusion of V.3 [49]; see also I.6 [1] 8.25–26; VI.3 [44] 19; VI.7 [38] 34–35, 38; VI.8 [39] 8.13–16, 20–22; for its relative utility to kataphasis and silence, VI.8 [39] 11.34–36; see Whittaker, “Negative Theology,” 123. Plotinus’s negative theology is largely epistemological. References to alienation and otherness (I.6 [1] 5, I.8 [51] 14, etc.) are not concerned with the One. Raoul Mortley, “Negative Theology and Abstraction in Plotinus,” AJP 96 (1975) 363–77, esp. 375; Whittaker, “Negative Theology,” 123–24. However, Bussanich points out that the process is no less “existential” than negation (Plotinus, 195). 40 As for example Enn. VI.7 [38] 41.12–17; VI.8 [39] 15; VI.9 [9] 2.36–39. 41 Mortley, “Plotinus,” 377; idem, From Word to Silence, 2:19, where the process is contrasted with Proclus’s more apophatic approach; also ibid., 48–56. In ibid., 27, Plotinus is charged with eschewing “systematic stage-by-stage deconstruction of entities.” Carlos Steel is in full agreement (“Beyond the Principle of Contradiction? Proclus’s Parmenides and the Origin of Negative Theology,” in Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag [ed. Martin Pickavé; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2003] 585). 42 Turner focuses on the “but” clause always being positive: “but it is something else above, beyond, superior to the previously negated predications” (“Setting,” 185). See idem, “Gnosticism and Platonism,” 450–51, with reference to Enn. VI.9 [9] 3; see also idem, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 204; idem, Platonic Tradition, 668; idem, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 120–22. 43 See also NHC XI,3.47.9–48.2, 48.8–32, 63.17–21, 65.30–33; Anon. Comm. Parm. (Hadot) XIV.26–34, 2:112–113; Plotinus does occasionally experiment with paradoxical language (Enn. V.5 [32] 7.36: I?RHSRE?VEL@ROEMSYNOI?RHSREY@ [not negative theology but a description of the “oscillation
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not characteristic of Plotinus, Porphyry, or the anonymous commentary.44 It can be found, however, in post-Plotinian Neoplatonism. The treatises where Iamblichus most likely discussed negative theology are lost to us,45 but his approach is probably preserved by Proclus, who usually replicates Iamblichaean thought in matters theurgic.46 In his commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, Proclus formulates a second-order apophasis, a “negatio negationis,” or “negation of negation.” Proclus wrestles with how to interpret Parmenides’ lemma at the end of the discourse about the rst hypothesis (Parm. 142A); he thinks Plato means that the paradoxical negations of the One themselves are negated.47 This approach to Parmenides interpretation falls under the rubric of
between within and without” prior too union. See Bussanich, Plotinus, 139]; Enn. V.5 [32] 7.29–30). See also Finamore, “Iamblichus,” 236–38; Turner, “Gnosticism and Platonism,” 431–32. 44 King (Revelation, 97–98) recalls Plotinus (Enn. V.1 [10] 7.18-27, VI.7 [38] 17—“formless form”; one should add Iamblichus, On the Mysteries [ed. and trans. Emma C. Clarke, John M. Dillon, and Jackson P. Hershbell; WGW 4; Atlanta: SBL, 2003] I.7.21.15: divine nature is “formless [ENRIMZHISR] so as to not be bounded by form” and Whittaker (“Transcendent Absolute,” 77), notes that Plotinus’s One transcends opposites (transcendence #2) without combining them (transcendence #1), since the predicates listed are not really opposites but privative qualities. However, such expressions are not terribly common in Plotinus, even when he discusses abstraction, and King elsewhere (Revelation, 165) recognizes Allogenes’s synthesis of opposites as extreme. Porphyry does discuss ENJEMZVIWMb but in contexts outside of negative theology. See, for example, Sententiae (ed. Erich Lamberz; Teubner: Leipzig, 1975) chs. 32, 43. As Bechtle observes, the negative theology of the anonymous commentary resembles that of the Alcinous more than Plotinus’s or Proclus’s (Anonymous Commentary, 242–47); see also the more general discussion of Saffrey, “Connaissance et inconnaissance,” 8–9. Finally, Zostrianos also occasionally uses paradox, yet neither in a systematic fashion (NHC VIII,1. 65.21-66.7, 118.4; on 74.16–8, see below, n. 83) or even a negative theological context (21.5–7, on the omnipresence of souls). 45 These would include his treatises On the Gods, The Chaldean Theology, and so forth. See John Dillon in Iamblichus, Iamblichi Chalcidensis. In Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta (ed. and trans. J. Dillon; Leiden: Brill, 1973) 23–25. Given Iamblichus’s proclivity for discussing supra-rational faculties and techniques in ritual contexts (e.g., de Mysteriis.; see for example, Gregory Shaw, “After Aporia: Theurgy in Later Platonism,” in Turner and Majercik, 74–82), it is difcult to imagine that he showed no interest in the negative theology of his predecessors, or that Proclus’s apophatic advances beyond Plotinus are entirely unique to him. “The emphasis on notknowing in theurgy suggests that it was integrally related to negative theology.” (idem, “Theurgy: Rituals of Unication in the Neoplatonism of Iamblichus,” Traditio 41 [1985] 1–28, 18) 46 See for example Eric. R. Dodds in Proclus, Elements of Theology (ed. and trans. Eric R. Dodds; Oxford: Clarendon, 1963) xxii–xxiii; Wallis, Neoplatonism, 142, 145, 153–55. Proclus does engage—and disagree with—Iamblichus’s Parmenides commentary at length, but on the generation of gods, not negative theology. See Carlos Steel, “Iamblichus and the Theological Interpretation of the Parmenides,” SyllClass 8 (1997) 15–30; John Dillon, “Porphyry and Iamblichus in Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides,” in Gonimos: Neoplatonic and Byzantine Studies presented to Leendert G. Westerink at 75 (ed. John Duffy and John Peradotto; Buffalo: Arethusa, 1988). 47 See his notion of “hyper-negation,” as mentioned at Comm. Parm. 1172.35. Morrow and Dillon (ibid., 523 n. 33) note that the Y.TIVETSZJEWMb is of Stoic provenance and simply results in an afrmation (~P = P), while for Proclus it reects the transcendence of opposites. See also Steel, “Negatio Negationis,” 362–63; Wallis, Neoplatonism, 150–51; Proclus, Comm. Parm. 1172.35, 1076.10–12; idem, Théologie platonicienne (ed. and trans. Henri-Dominique Saffrey and Leendert
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“faith,” the “theurgic” virtue,48 and so is a kind of verbal, or discursive, theurgy (for more on which see below). Our copy of his commentary, like Parmenides at the end of the rst hypothesis, famously culminates in silence, the negatio negationis.49 Plotinus, too, ends his discourse on the One with silence,50 but, as noted above, he has taken a different route there. There is no formal “negation of negation” at Nag Hammadi; but given Proclus’s susual reliance on Iamblichus, something like it was probably available around the turn of the fourth century C.E., likely in the form of verbal theurgy.51 Allogenes seems to employ the kind of systematic, apophatic paradox emblematic of Proclus (and his most famous reader, Pseudo-Denys), eschewing the more conventionally Middle Platonic and Plotinian ENJEMZVIWMb. Moreover, Plotinus’s strategy ultimately terminates in, as Rist says, waiting for “grace.”52 Proclus’s strategy climaxes in an explicitly articulated supra-rational cognitive state, “faith.” Allogenes does too, for its apophatic strategy culminates in the acquisition of knowledge—unknowable knowledge, that is. G. Westerink; 6 vols.; Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1967–1997) 1:12, 57.21–24; ibid., 2:10–12, 61–73, but esp. 2:10, 63.18–64.5 [trans. mine]: the manner of negations (EZTSJEWIZ[R) in question is thus transcendent, primordial, having exceeded the whole universe by an unknowable and ineffable superiority of simplicity. And it is necessary, having attributed to the rst God the aforementioned manner, to next sort out the negations themselves; for it could have no “name or description,” says the Parmenides [142a3]. But if there is no proposition of this sort, it is clear that there is not a negation (for everything is posterior to the One, not only the objects of knowledge but knowledges and the instruments of knowledge themselves) and an impossibility appears, so to speak, at the end of the hypothesis. For if there is no single discourse on the subject of the One, the present discourse itself, which submits these theses is not germane to the One. Furthermore, it’s no surprise if someone, wanting to make the ineffable known by means of a discourse, leads the discourse into an impossibility, since all knowledge which is applied to an object of knowledge with which it is not really concerned, dissolves its own force. 48 The language of TMZWXMb is used to describe reading the Parmenides in the context of union with the One at idem, Comm. Parm. VI.1241.42K; for the “theurgic virtue,” see idem, Plat. Theo. 1:25. For analysis, see Rist, “Mysticism and Transcendence,” 224; idem, Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) 231–46; Dylan Burns, “Proclus and the Theurgic Liturgy of Pseudo-Dionysius,” Dionysius 22 (2004) 111–32, 118–21. 49 “It is with silence, then, that he [the negative theologian or theurgist] brings to completion the study of the One” (Proclus, Comm. Parm. VII.1242.76K). 50 As at Enn. VI.8 [39] 11.1–5 and the conclusion of VI.9 [9]. 51 Iamblichus’s defense of theurgy “results in a kind of positive theology, but one based on henological ineffability rather than ontological perfection” (Shaw, “Rituals of Unication,” 18). For dating of Iamblichus’s “Porphyrian” period to 280–305 C.E. (i.e., after De myst., ca. 280) see Dillon in Iamblichus, Iamb. Chal., 18–19; he dates De myst. later (early fourth century?) in “Iamblichus of Chalcis,” ANRW II:36.2 (1986) 862–909, esp. 875. 52 Rist, “Mysticism,” 219; Armstrong, “Plotinus,” in Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (ed. Arthur H. Armstrong; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) 259–60; idem, in Plotinus, Enn. V p. 135 n. 1. Plotinus admits that even the greatest philosophers can only prepare themselves for the vision of the One, a preparation that culminates in passivity. See Enn. V.5 [32] 8.3–6; V.8. [31] 11.2; but cf. V.5 [32] 12.33–35; Pierre Hadot, Plotinus. Or the Simplicity of Vision (trans. Michael Chase; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998] 57; Zeke Mazur, “Unio Magica: Part II: Plotinus, Theurgy, and the Question of Ritual,” Dionysius 22 (2004) 29–56, 40–42, esp. n. 43.
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Self-Reexive “Unknowable Knowledge” The (variously framed) paradoxical jargon of “unknowable knowledge” describes what the text’s negative theology produces.53 The “primary revelation of the Unknowable One” continues, as the luminaries describe it as epistemological faculty and object: Neither is it anything that exists such that it is possible for one to know it, but rather it is something else that is superior, something that is impossible for someone to know, a rst revelation and gnosis which knows (FJNF) itself.54 Is this unknowable knowledge not that thing in whose respect it exists? And it is joined to that unknowability which sees it. How is it unknowable? Or, is there anyone who sees it as it exists in its entirety? If one would say that it exists as a form of gnosis, that one has been impious and has been judged as having not known God.55
Of course this doctrine of “unknowable knowledge” is nowhere to be found in Plotinus,56 who discusses supra-noetic contemplation of the One but assigns no such systematic, paradoxical epistemological category to it.57 But Porphyry, the This jargon is, as far as I can tell, unsystematic; FJNF/BUFJNF: NHC XI,3.59.31–32, 61.2, 61.17-19; BUTPVXO': 59.29–32, 61.16, 63.30, 67.26; HOXTJT/BUTPVXOT64.10–11. 54 Ibid., 63.9–16. “Invisible Spirit” seems to designate “the Unknowable” (ibid., 66.16 and 66.30–38, cited in King, Unknowable God, 19) in terms of its relationship to the generation of the plurality. See also Turner “Introduction: Allogenes,” 52–56. 55 NHC XI,3.64.10–23. Turner (Platonic Tradition, 688; “Introduction: Allogenes,” 99, 187; followed by Scopello, L’allogène, 229) inserts “whether one sees” (a “solution problématique d’une difculté qui persiste”—Funk [ibid., 228]) before /BW /)F 'F /OBUTPVXO', concluding that “to equate him with either knowledge or non-knowledge is to miss the goal of ones’ quest.” King (Revelation, 169) and Layton (Scriptures, 147) translate the statement as questions: “how is it unknowable . . .?” 56 With Corrigan, “Platonism and Gnosticism,” 159, esp. n. 65. 57 Turner (Platonic Tradition, 689) recalls Enn. III.8 [30] 11 (see also Corrigan, “Matter,” 44 n. 77), VI.9 [9] 6.43–45, V.3 [49] 12–13, cited by Turner, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 208–9). All three passages refer not to a supracognitive contemplative faculty but the Good’s lack of need of Intellect (or anything else), contra, probably, Origen the Platonist (for whose doctrine of an intelligible demiurge as First Principle see Proclus, Comm. Tim. 1:303.27–29; idem, Comm. Parm. I.635–638 [per Morrow and Dillon in ibid., xxvi–xxvii]; Proclus, Plat. Theo. 2:4; Saffrey and Westerink, x–xii). See also the debate between Anthony C. Lloyd (“Non-Propositional Thought—an Enigma of Greek Philosophy,” PAS 70 [1969–1970] 261–74; idem, “Non-Propositional Thought in Plotinus,” Phronesis 31 [1986] 258–65) and Richard Sorabji (“Myths about Non-Propositional Thought,” in idem, Time, Creation, and the Continuum. Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983]) on the “non-propositional” thought in Plotinus’s conception of RSYDb, which, according to Lloyd (“Plotinus,” 264; see also idem, “Enigma,” 286), implies “thought without language.” Sorabji (“Non-Propositional Thought,” 152–54) responds that it is not a kind of thought at all. Either way, the noetic faculty in question is not ineffable but tautological. We do nd Plotinus using language not entirely alien to “learned ignorance”: the One is known by “simple intuition (INTMFSPLD ENUVSZE),” which is akin, “if not identical to, the One’s self-directed activity” (Enn. III.8 [30] 9.21. For discussion see Rist, Plotinus, 47–51; Bussanich, Plotinus, 94–95, for Epicurean provenance, Plotinian parallels, and reception). See also TVSWFSPLZ (III.8 [30] 10.33), 53
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anonymous commentary on the Parmenides, and the Chaldean Oracles do,58 anticipating Iamblichus’s and Proclus’s plumbing of contemplation of the One through speculation on the Chaldean E?RUSbRSYD.59 Allogenes’s epistemology, then, does have parallels in pre-Plotinian mysticism—the Oracles, and (depending on how one dates it) the anonymous commentary.60 However, Allogenes’s epistemology of “unknowable knowledge” differs in several key ways. First, the Sethian text uses the vocabulary more often than do the Oracles and the Parmenides commentary, where its presence is interesting but not central. Secondly, the Oracles and Parmenides commentary do not develop it into a consistent practice, much less one couched in repetition of apophatic paradox (as described above) that leads to Lesemysterium (as described below). Third, Allogenes transforms the doctrine by assigning it self-reexivity:61 “for it ENTSQERXIYZWEWUEM (VI.7 [38] 29.22), and Y.TIVRSZLWMb (VI.8 [39] 16.33), a property of the One, not a mystic. The intellect attempting to conceive “that which is beyond” continually draws itself back into multiplicity (V.3 [49] 11.1–4), so it must “let go of learning” (VI.7 [38] 36.15–16; see also III.8 [30] 9.28–32) and is “lled with wonder” if it practices ENJEMZVIWMb (III. 8 [30] 10.31). See also above, n. 39, 40. In toto, Plotinus sees contemplation of the One as taking place beyond intellect, and in this he is in agreement with Allogenes (and many other contemporary Platonists); he differs on terminology, both in his refusal to systematize it and to embrace paradoxical expression, and this is a signicant difference. 58 Porphyry, Sent. ch. 10, line 4; ch. 25, line 15 (“While a great deal can be said after the fashion of Intellect concerning that which is beyond Intellect, nonetheless it is better contemplated by means of a certain absence of Intellect than by intellection”[trans. mine]), ch. 26, line 15; Porphyry in Theosophorum Graecorum Fragmenta (ed. Harmut Erbse; Stuttgart: Teubner, 1995) ch. 65, line 183, cited in Saffrey, “Connaissance et inconnaissance,” 16; Anon. Comm. Parm. (Hadot) 2:27–31; 2:70; V.7–15, 2:78; VI.10–12, 2:82; IX.24–26, 2:94; Chaldean Oracles (ed. and trans. Ruth Majercik; SGRR 5; Leiden: Brill, 1989) fr. 1; see also Wallis, Neoplatonism, 114–16; Turner “Introduction: Allogenes,” 99–102, 155–60; Turner, Platonic Tradition, 689; Turner, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 209–10; Majercik, “Gnosticism,” 283–86. 59 Iamblichus, De myst. II.11.96, II.11.98.6–10; idem, Comm. Parm (Dillon) frgs. 2A, 2B; Proclus, Comm. Tim. 3:296; idem, Comm. Chald. (in Oracles Chaldaïques [ed. Édouard des Places; Paris: Les belles lettres, 1971]) IV.153.20, IV.156.23, IV.157.28; Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (SPP 8; Leiden: Brill, 1978) 119–21 n. 200; idem, Parallelograms, 192 n. 36; Christian Guérard, “L’hyparxis de l’âme et la eur et l’intellect dans la mystagogie de Proclus,” in Proclus, Lecteur et Interprète des Anciens (ed. Jean Pépin and Henri-Dominique Saffrey; Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientique, 1987) 336–40, 344; Sarah Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism: Non-Discursive Thinking in the Thought of Plotinus, Proclus, and Damascius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 178–80; Anne Sheppard, “Proclus’ Attitude to Theurgy,” CQ 32 (1982) 212–24, esp. 221; Majercik, “Reconsiderations,” 284–85. 60 For a late second-century dating of the Oracles, see Iamblichus in Chald. Or., 1–2; des Places in Or. Chald., 7–11. For a status quaestionis on (and rejection of) the Oracles’ inuence on Plotinus, see Ruth Majercik, “The Chaldean Oracles and the School of Plotinus,” Anc W 29 (1998) 91–105; for a response asserting Plotinian knowledge of the oracles, see John Finamore, “Plotinus, Psellus, and the Chaldean Oracles: A Reply to Majercik,” Anc W 29 (1998) 107–10. For the debate over dating the Turin commentary, see above, n. 10. 61 For which see Anon. Comm. Parm. (Hadot) V.34, II:82. See Turner, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 155, who highlights the similarities between the doctrines of learned ignorance in these two
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is a comprehension of itself, since it is something unknowable of this sort, and since it is in its unknowability superior to those which are good.”62 Knowledge of the Invisible Spirit is therefore the Invisible Spirit’s knowledge of itself, and the Invisible Spirit’s knowledge of itself is unknowable knowledge.63 The collapsing of epistemology, ontology, and soteriology ultimately derives from Aristotle’s well-known principle of assimilation of the subject and object of thought.64 This self-reexivity also, however, extends to discourse. If knower and known are one and the same (like the Invisible Spirit) then so are an accurate description of Youel’s revelation as recorded for Messos (the text of Allogenes) and the revelation itself (Allogenes’s subject). Or, as Gersh has put it, “both the enactment and the description are of negative theology itself.”65 It follows that the description of this disintegration is a disintegration, this time between the reader and book. Reading the revelation in Allogenes is itself the revelation, whose content is ontological assimilation to the Invisible Spirit.66 This is a jump that is not made by the anonymous commentary, the Chaldean Oracles, or Plotinus. In the former cases, the vocabulary of “unknowable texts and speculates that “the author of Allogenes had consulted the anonymous Parmenides Commentary (or one similar to it) not only in matters of his triadic metaphysics, but also for his epistemological doctrine.” 62 NHC XI,3.63.28–31b [italics mine]. Turner ((Platonic Tradition, 686) here recalls Anon. Comm. Parm. (Hadot) IX.20–26, 2:94–95, X.25–29, 2:96–97. 63 Although the luminaries warn the seeker not to conceive of it as knowledge at all. But see also King (Revelation, 170), who holds that NHC XI,3.64.16–21 precludes the possibility of any knowledge about God whatsoever. Thus, the primary revelation of the unknowable can only be privative. The problem depends on whether Allogenes’s author considers HOXTJT in this passage to include HOXTJT/BUTXPV/. 64 Self-reexive unknowable knowledge is predicated of the Unknowable One as part of the greater negative theological “primary revelation” beginning at ibid., 60.37–61.14. For the identication of subject and object of thought, see Aristotle, De Anima 3.2 425b–426a26, 3.8 431b28–432a1, working from Physics 3.3; following the discussion of Sorabji, ”Non-Propositional Thought,” 144–47. Indeed, following this onto-epistemological breakdown Allogenes shifts back to kataphatic statements with privative value: the Invisible Spirit is “a breathless and boundless place,” (NHC XI,3.66.23–25) “it receives all, tranquil, standing still” (ibid., 66.28–30). Indeed, “it is from that one who stands still forever that eternal life appeared” (ibid., 66.30b-33). See also Williams, Immovable Race, 86–96. The phrases about “standing still” and “the immovable race” may both refer to internal, contemplative practices stemming from the Jewish apocalyptic motif of standing still in a court before God. 65 Gersh, Parallelograms, 193. 66 Turner, Platonic Tradition, 662, with reference to Plotinus, Enn. III.8 [30] 8, V.4 [7] 2.46; Porphyry, Sent. chs. 40, 51–56: “the contemplation of entities on ever higher ontological levels is characterized as a form of the contemplator’s self-knowledge, suggesting that the consciousness of the knowing subject is actually assimilated to the ontological character of the level that one intelligizes at any given point. Having becomes inactive, still, and silent, indeed incognizant even of himself, he has taken on the character of the Unknowable One, and is one with the object of his vision.” See also Turner, Platonic Tradition, 664; idem, “Setting,” 214; idem, “Gnosticism and Platonism,” 448; idem, “Introduction: Marsanès,” 147–48; idem, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 119–31; idem, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 97; with focus on the textual aspect of the assimilation, see King, Unknowable God, 56.
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knowledge” is not self-reexive, as it is in Allogenes. In the latter, the supra-rational cognitive state is described, but not enacted.
Lesemysterium Allogenes’s negative theology ascends from apophatic negation to an outright dissolution of the boundaries between seeker, “unknowable knowledge,” and First Principle—between the reader and the text. The result is an absence of discourse, a “stillness” or “calmness,” as the text intones.67 With respect to practice, Allogenes parts ways with Middle Platonism, Zostrianos, and Plotinus, who employed abstraction not to elicit mystical experience but to prepare oneself for it. The latter opined that after a mystical experience one could talk about it rationally, but it was pointless to try to describe it, much less play esoteric, discursive games in hopes of generating it.68 Allogenes, on the other hand, does not simply describe mystical ascent, but performs it. Once the distinction between reader and text breaks down, the text has become the reader’s performative (perlocutionary) speech-act, i.e., a mode of discourse whose purpose is to accomplish a task (as, for example, the phrase “I thee wed”).69 In Allogenes this performance is the acquisition of self-reexive “unknowable knowledge,” assimilation to the Invisible Spirit, by describing the “primary revelation” of it. Nearly a century ago (1912), Reitzenstein coined the term “Lesemysterium” to describe the “textual initiation” of Hermetic literature.70 The term can be aptly applied to Allogenes, which is a “reading-mystery” that attempts to swallow and transform the reader.71 As is well-known, Platonizing 67
NHC XI,3.59.37, 60.24, 66.22 passim; see also Plotinus, Enn. V.5 [32] 4.8–11. During union, “it is absolutely impossible, nor has it (intellect) time, to speak; but it is afterwards that it is able to reason (WYPPSKMZ^IWUEM) about it” (Enn. V.3 [49] 17.26–28). This of course is exactly what he does at VI.9 [9] 11; see also VI.8 [39] 19. 69 Uttering a performative “is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it; it is to do it.” (John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962] 6) See also Catherine Bell, Ritual (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 68–70; Roy A. Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity (CSSCA 110; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 113–14; cf. the caution of Jonathan Z. Smith, “Great Scott! Thought and Action One More Time,” in Magic and Ritual in the Ancient World (ed. P. Mirecki and M. Meyer; RGRW 141; Leiden: Brill, 2002) 90. 70 Specically, Corpus Hermeticum XIII. See Richard Reitzenstein, Hellenischen Mysterienreligionen. Nach ihren Grundgedanken und Wirkungen (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1956) 51–52, 64. See also Turner, who recalls Reitzenstein in the context of the diagrams of the Book of Jeu and Marsanes (“Ritual in Gnosticism,” in Turner and Majercik’s Gnosticism, 124; idem “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 74, respectively). 71 Particularly striking, on this reading, is Allogenes’s appropriation of the apocalyptic cliché of book-burial. See Francis T. Fallon, “The Gnostic Apocalypses,” Semeia 14 (1979) 123–58, 125; examples include but are not limited to 1 Enoch 81, 93, 106, 2 Enoch 54, 4 Ezra 12:35-39. At the end of the text, the protagonist is told to write down the revelation (i.e., the text we have just read) and store it in a mountain: “[It] said [to] me, ‘write down [whatever] I shall tell you and remind you about, for the sake of those who will, after you, be worthy.’ And you shall place this book 68
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Sethians, inspired by the baptismal rites of their forebears (the so-called rite of the “ve seals”), created Platonic manuals for eliciting visionary ascent.72 Allogenes takes the Sethian internalization of ritual one step further by abandoning the baptismal context and rendering the description and reading of visionary exercise a performance itself. Yet again, Allogenes is in line with later developments in Neoplatonic mysticism. As Rappe, van den Berg, and others have demonstrated, Proclus, following Iamblichus,73 developed a kind of “verbal theurgy” whereby the initiate interacted with discourse as “internal WYRULZQEXE”74 As mentioned above, apophatic theology, exemplied in Parmenides interpretation, had a theurgic context.75 This internal theurgy, associated with the Chaldean “ower of the whole soul,” seems to have taken place at the level of the noetic monad, also known as “the One-Being,”76 or, in Barbeloite jargon, the “triply-powered.”77 Naturally, Allogenes’s negative
upon a mountain, and you shall invoke the guardian of death, Phriktos (‘dreadful one’)” (NHC XI,3.68.16–23). See NHC II,1.31.28–34 (Ap. John), NHC IV,2.80 (Gos. Eg.), NHC V,5.85 (Apoc. Adam), NHC VI,6.68 (Og. and Enn.). How better to nish a book-mystery than describe the fate of the book being read? The motif is re-constellated to describe, perhaps, the safeguarding of our own self-reexive text. However, any reading of this section of the document can only be provisional, given the mutilated state of the manuscript. 72 Although baptismal language in the ascent texts is often retained, esp. in Zostrianos. See John D. Turner, “Sethian Gnosticism: A Literary History,” in Nag Hammadi, Gnosticism, and Early Christianity (ed. Charles W. Hedrick and Robert Hodgson, Jr.; Peabody: Hendrickson, 1986) 59; idem, “Ritual,” esp. 96–97, 128–31; idem, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 71–75; idem, “Introduction: Marsanès,” 49–54, 164–68; idem, Platonic Tradition, 64, 80–84, 238–47; more generally on the ve seals, see Schenke, “Phenomenon,” 599–607; Rasimus, “Paradise,” 242–45; Alastair H.B. Logan, “The Mystery of the Five Seals: Gnostic Initiation Reconsidered,” VC 51 (1997) 188–206. The standard work on Sethian ritual in general is Jean-Marie Sevrin, Le dossier baptismal séthien. Études sur la sacramentaire gnostique (BCNH Études 2; Québec, Laval University Press, 1986). 73 Verbal theurgy for Iamblichus deals primarily with the names of the Gods as anagogically efcacious WYRULZQEXE. (Iamblichus, De myst. I.12.42.5–13, VII.4.254.9–256.2; see also Shaw, Theurgy, 175–77, 189–215). 74 See esp. Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 173–81; for verbal WYRULZQEXE see Proclus, Comm. Chald. I.148.16–19, V.159.8–11. More generally, see Sheppard, “Theurgy,” 223–24; Robert M. van den Berg, Proclus’ Hymns: Essays, Translation, Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 2001) 79–81; Werner Beierwaltes, Proklos: Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik (Leiden: Brill, 1965) 327; Carine van Lieferringe, La Théurgie. Des Oracles Chaldaïques à Proclus (Kernos Supplément 9; Liège: Centre international d’étude de la religion grecque antique, 1999) 263–64 (emphasizing the break with Plotinus). See also Proclus, Plat. Theo. 4:11.19–20 on the WYRULZQEXERSZLXE through which the hypercosmic gods are known. 75 With Gersh, Parallelograms, 192, n. 236: “one is tempted to speculate further on the relation between the performative and negative theology in the context of Neoplatonic theurgy.” 76 Iamblichus, Comm. Parm. (Dillon) frgs. 2A, 2B; Proclus, Comm. Chald. IV.153.20, IV.156.23, IV.157.28; Rist, “Mysticism and Transcendence,” 215–18, 224; Dillon in Iamblichus, in Plat. Dia. 389–92. For possible Plotinian antecedents, see Mazur, “Unio Magica: Part II,” 47–51. 77 King, Unknowable God, 29; “The Triply Powered One of Zostrianos and Allogenes corresponds almost precisely to the pregurative existence of the (anonymous) commentary’s ‘Second One’ in the First” (Turner, Platonic Tradition, 725; for more see idem, “Introduction: Marsanès,”
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theology is described by luminaries of the aeon of Barbelo.78 They describe what takes place at the level of the “triply-powered” in the ascent to the One, the Invisible Spirit. The text’s mystical praxis employs similar performative speech-acts and deals with the same ontological depths as does Neoplatonic verbal theurgy.
Conclusion In the above, I have tried to contextualize Allogenes’s negative theology in the greater history of Platonism. The text’s apophatic approach to the One, its selfreexive epistemology of the unknowable, and its performative mystical praxis is reminiscent of techniques associated with Iamblichus’s famous “theurgic turn” around the turn of the fourth century C.E.79 On several occasions Turner has loosely described the astrological theory and practices of Marsanes (NHC X,1) as “Sethian theurgy”;80 in the case of Allogenes’s, the word can be used more concretely to describe the text’s negative theology and Lesemysterium. The question is then whether Allogenes’s redactor developed these practices independently of and prior to “mainstream” Platonists (dating the text as prePlotinian) or picked up on the nascent theurgic movement emerging around Iamblichus (dating the text as post-Plotinian). Hitherto, Allogenes’s fate has been tied to that of its sister Sethian textual tradition known in Plotinus’s school, Zostrianos. Abramowski and Majercik notwithstanding, a stable textual tradition between Plotinus’s school and Nag Hammadi has been defended for the latter treatise, on the grounds of great similarity to the doctrines attacked by Plotinus himself in Ennead II.9 and its shared theological source with Marius Victorinus.81
90–102; idem, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 81–94). The term seems to have been of Gnostic coinage, used in Platonic circles only rarely and late (Majercik, “Triad,” 480–81). 78 NHC XI,3.59.4–9. 79 See the oft-quoted remark of Damascius, Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo II (ed. Leendert G. West-erink; Amsterdam, 1977) 105. 80 See Turner, “Introduction: Marsanès,” 231–34; idem, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 72–75; idem, Platonic Tradition, 614–33. 81 For the shared source (a Parmenides commentary) of Zostrianos (NHC VIII,1.13–66.11; 66.14–68.13; 75.12–21) and Marius Victorinus Adversus Arium (Marius Victorinus: Traités théologiques sur la Trinité [ed. Paul Henry; trans. Pierre Hadot; Sources Chrétiennes 68–69; Paris, 1960] 1:49.9–40;; 50.10–6, 50.7–10, 50.5–8; I:50.18–21, respectively), ), see Tardieu, “Formation”; Formation”; ”; Pierre Hadot, “Porphyre et Victorinus: Questions et hypothèses,” ResOr 9 (1996) 117–25; Turner, “Introduction: Zostrianos,” 76–77; “Commentary: Zostrianos,” in Zostrien, 579–608 (ed. Barry et al.);; idem, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 141–54; idem, “Gnostic Sethians,” 42–51; idem, “Victorinus,” 72–79. Tardieu (“Formation,” Formation,” ,” 100–1) and Saffrey (“Connaissance et inconnaissance,” 4–5) point out that the Turin commentary has a line (IX.1–4, 2:90–93) which draws from Chald. Or Or. fr. 3 and the source (Adv. Ar. 1:50.10; NHC VIII,1.66.14–20) common to Marius Victorinus and Zostrianos (for which see Tardieu, “Formation.”). Perhaps it was written by Numenius, as argued by Tardieu (ibid., 112) and Luc Brisson, “The Platonic Background of the Apocalypse of Zostrianos,” in Traditions of Platonism (ed. John J. Cleary; Aldershot: Ashgate, 1990) 179–82; Corrigan (“Platonism “Platonism and Gnosticism,” 156) suggests Cronius. See also Bechtle, Anonymous Commentary, 237–42.
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On the other hand, Allogenes’s paradoxical apophasis does not appear in Plotinus, but the later Neoplatonists. Its Lesemysterium operates on the same metaphysical levels and textual interface as later Neoplatonic theurgy. Like Zostrianos, it may share a Platonic theological source with Marius Victorinus’s Adversus Arium,82 but unlike Zostrianos, its source is systematically mixed in with un-Middle Platonic apophatic paradox.83 Finally, Allogenes is already known to have a complex textual tradition, for Epiphanius mentions “books of Allogenes” in the plural in the hands of both Sethians and Archontics.84 In fact, we possess another one of these books in Codex Tchacos, whose version of Allogenes is an apocalyptic discourse apparently bereft of Platonic inuence.85 It is possible, then, that there were at least three “books of Allogenes” in Late Antiquity: rst, the Allogenes of Codex Tchacos (unPlatonic); second, that known in Plotinus’s seminar ([Middle] Platonic enough to merit his ire); third, the Allogenes of NHC XI (theurgic Neoplatonism; possibly a revision of Plotinus’s).86 82 Turner (“Gnostic Sethians and Middle Platonism,” 48) points out that Adversus Arium and Allogenes both hold that the One is “without existence, life, or intellect” (1:49.17–18; NHC XI,3.61.36–37), and that the One’s power of existence contains the “powers of life and blessedness” (1:50.12–15; NHC XI,3.49.26–37). Thus “a similar—if not identical—source may have been available also the author of Allogenes” (“Gnostic Sethians and Middle Platonism,” 48–49; see also idem, “Introduction: Allogenes,” 149–54; idem, “Victorinus,” 76–79). 83 Adversus Arium, 1:50.16–17 (“non-existent existence”), an interesting example because it crops up among the epithets for the transcendent drawn from the shared source with Zostrianos (NHC VIII,1.75.13–25; as Turner, “Gnostic Sethians,” 45, and Brisson, “Apocalypse of Zostrianos,” 176, observe, the text is distinctively Middle Platonic). Whether the paradoxical epithet belongs to Victorinus himself or the source he shares with Allogenes cannot be determined, since lines following the source in the latter (NHC XI,3.50.1–5) are badly mutilated; however the narrative turn in the text (49.38–39) seems to depart from a context where such an epithet would be appropriate. Regardless, it clearly does not come from the source shared with Zostrianos. 84 Epiphanius, Panarion ch. 39.5.1, assigned to Sethians; ibid., ch. 40.2.2, assigned to Archontics; see also the Archontic books named for the “foreigners,” the sons of Seth. (ibid., ch. 40.7.4–5) 85 For commentary and translation see Turner, “Allogenes the Stranger”; for text see The Gospel of Judas: Critical Edition (ed. and trans. R. Kasser et al.; Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 2007). 86 Which of these—if any—are those known to Epiphanius and, perhaps, Theodore bar Konai (who knows a “Book of the Foreigners” [/XoZoH¸RYOVS]I] and an “Apocalypse of the Foreigners” [+IP]SRIL H¸RYOVS]I] Text: Librum Scholiorum [ed. Addai Scher; Louvain: Impr. orientaliste L. Durbecq, 1954] ch. LXIII, 319.29-320.26; trans.: Livre des scolies [recension de Seert] [trans. Robert Hespel and René Draguet; CSCO 431–32; Louvain: Peeters, 1981–1982] LXIII, 238–39; cit. Henri-Charles Puech, “Fragments retrouvés de l’Apocalypse d’Allogène,” in idem, La Gnose]) is hard to say. Puech (ibid., 284, 294) suggests that Plotinus, Epiphanius, and bar Konai were all dealing with the same body of texts, originating among the Sethians and Archontics and ending up in the hands of the Audiani (for whom see idem, “Audianer,” in RAC 1 [1950] cols. 910–15). After the Nag Hammadi discovery, Puech indicated (“Plotin,” 92) a shared text between one of Theodore’s fragments and NHC II,3.89.3–4, Reality of the Rulers (in Nag Hammadi codex II, 2–7 : together with XIII, 2*, Brit. Lib. Or.4926(1), and P.OXY. 1, 654, 655 [ed. Bentley Layton: Leiden: BNNS 20; Brill, 1989]), namely, the archon’s suggestion to rape Eve: “come, let us sow our seed in her.” As Rasimus (“Paradise,” 116 n. 57) notes, bar Konai (II.79) mentions snake-worshippers (i.e., Ophites) who deal with typically Ophite theriomorphic archons. The complex of Sethian (bar
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By assigning Allogenes’s negative theology to a post-Plotinian provenance I do not seek to minimize Gnosticism’s impact on the Platonic tradition.87 In fact, recent research has emphasized Sethian inuence on Plotinus, especially in his early years.88 It does not seem, however, that this inuence is evident in the negative theology of NHC XI,3. Rather, it appears that at least one Sethian contemplative chose to stay abreast of developments in Neoplatonic mysticism. Allogenes is a witness to Sethianism’s persistent involvement in and contribution to Neoplatonism through the turn of the fourth century. Nor is NHC XI,3 merely an adoption of theurgic ideas. It is a renement; the sophistication of its systematic, ritualized negative theology is unparalleled in extant sources until Proclus in the mid-fth century. Second, its subtle Lesemysterium anticipates the shape of internalized, textbased apophatic praxis that, via the dissemination of the Corpus Dionysiacum, would dominate the mystical tradition of medieval Christendom89 and is currently experiencing a revival through Deconstruction’s encounter with negative theology.90 Third, ideologically speaking, little could be farther from the Hellenic TEMHIMZE prized by the theurgists than Allogenes’s apocalyptic visionary narrative. Allogenes engages Neoplatonism on the common ground of metaphysics and mysticism. Apparently, for the author of Allogenes, the genre, idiom, and colour of Barbeloite Sethianism were too precious to concede.91* Konai’s Apocalypse of the Foreigners, and, more widely, the tradition of writing books ascribed to Allogenes), Archontic (Epiphanius’s testimony that Seth and his sons are called “foreigners” with eponymously titled books), Ophite (bar Konai’s snake-worshippers), and, in Rasimus’s nomenclature, Barbeloite-Ophite (Reality of the Rulers) “mythologoumena,”of interest, awaits further study. 87 As do Edwards, “Intelligible Triad,” 25; Majercik, “Triad,” 488. 88 See for example Corrigan, “Matter,” 44 n. 77; Mazur, “Unio Magica: Part II”; Theo G. Sinnige, “Gnostic inuence in the Early Works of Plotinus and in Augustine,” in Plotinus amid Gnostics and Christians: Papers presented at the Plotinus Symposium Held at the Free University, Amsterdam on 25 January 1984 (ed. David Runia; Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1984). 89 With Williams, “Negative Theologies,” 290. For surveys see Bernard McGinn, The Foundations of Mysticism (New York: Crossroad, 1991); Carabine, Unknown God. 90 Important texts include Jacques Derrida, On The Name (ed. Thomas Dutoit; trans. David Wood, John P. Leavy, Jr., and Ian McLeod; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); idem, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Derrida and Negative Theology (ed. H. Coward and T. Foshay; Albany: SUNY Press, 1992); John Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (ISPR; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); Jean-Luc Marion, “In the Name: How to Avoid Speaking of ‘Negative Theology’,” in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism (ed. John Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon; ISPR; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric, and Truth (ed. Wayne J. Hankey and Douglas Hedley; Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Hent de Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999). For analysis from the Neoplatonic angle, see Gersh, Parallelograms. 91 See Alan B. Scott, “Churches or Books?: Sethian Social Organization,” JECS 3 (1995) 109–22. The importance of genre for determining the social character of Sethianism in its Neoplatonic context remains to be determined. * This article is a revision of “Apophatic Strategies in Allogenes (NHC XI,3),” delivered to the Society of Biblical Literature in San Diego, California, 17 November 2007. The author is indebted to the criticisms and suggestions of the SBL panel and audience, the anonymous reviewers of HTR, and discussions with Harold Attridge, Bentley Layton, John D. Turner, and Tuomas Rasimus.
The Egyptian Gods in Midrashic Texts Rivka Ulmer Bucknell University
The engagement with Egypt and the Egyptian gods that transpired in the Hebrew Bible continued into the texts produced by rabbinic Judaism. Rabbinic texts of late antiquity and the early medieval period frequently presented images of Egypt and its religion. One of the critical objectives of these portrayals of Egypt was to set boundaries of Jewish identity by presenting rabbinic Judaism in opposition to Egyptian culture. The Egyptian cultural icons in rabbinic texts also demonstrate that the rabbis were aware of cultures other than their own.1 The presence of Egyptian elements in midrash had previously been noted to a very limited extent by scholars of the Wissenschaft des Judentums (the science of Judaism), and it has not escaped the attention of more recent scholarship. The Wissenschaft scholars were motivated to expand the research of Jewish topics and nd “oriental” and “Near Eastern” inuences in rabbinic literature.2 The lexicographer Samuel Krauss, for example, identied the names of a very small number of Egyptian gods in rabbinic literature.3 Recent scholars, like Gideon 1 The trade contacts between Egypt and the land of Israel were well established. During the rst six centuries of the Common Era there was extensive importation into the land of Israel of beer, sh, medical remedies, and chemicals from Egypt; during the same period substantial exports were sent to Egypt from the land of Israel (see Daniel Sperber, “Objects of Trade between Palestine and Egypt in Roman Times,” JESHO 19 [1976] 113–47). Generally, there were close ties between the Jews of Egypt and the land of Israel, especially with Jerusalem, in the last centuries B.C.E. and the early centuries C.E. Intellectual and religious contacts between the two countries included educational and methodological exchanges (e.g., teachers of Jewish traditions came to Israel from Alexandria). 2 Moritz Güdemann, Religionsgeschichtliche Studien (Schriften des Israelitischen LiteraturVereins 2; Leipzig: Oskar Leiner, 1876); Bernard Heller, “Egyptian Elements in the Haggadah,” in Ignace Goldziher Memorial Volume (ed. Samuel Löwinger and Joseph Somogyi; Budapest: [s.n.], 1948) 1:412–18; Jakob Horovitz, Die Josephserzählung (Frankfurt am Main: Kauffmann, 1921), and others. 3 Samuel Krauss, “Aegyptische und syrische Götternamen im Talmud,” in Semitic Studies in Memory of Rev. Dr. Alexander Kohut (ed. George A. Kohut; Berlin: Calvary, 1897) 339–53, esp. 344.
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Bohak4 and I,5 have researched Egyptian religious concepts in rabbinic texts. Bohak has described rabbinic notions of idolatry and paganism and he established that the rabbis had knowledge of Egypt based upon their own experience or that of others. He gathered and presented the evidence for rabbinic knowledge of Egyptian festivals, objects, and magical practices. In my previous work I have advanced an Egyptological perspective and applied semiotics and iconography in contextualizing Egyptian icons in rabbinic texts. This article will demonstrate further a signicant awareness of Egyptian gods in rabbinic texts; the analysis will focus upon the identity of these gods, the contexts of their manifestations, as well as their function and assumed power. The question must be raised: Why did the rabbis mention Egyptian gods and integrate them into their discourse? One response to this question is that the rabbis continued to oppose the culture and religion of Egypt, since Egypt was for the rabbis the ultimate symbol of the “Other.” The purpose of invoking Egyptian icons was to establish rabbinic concepts in contrast to competing ideologies, such as those of the Egyptians specically, but also of new religious groups, like Christians and Gnostics, who laid claim to the Hebrew God. The rabbis frequently utilized Egyptian icons as a metaphor for Rome and these new religious groups. In this article I will be focusing on Egyptian religious views, rather than those instances in which Egypt was only a cipher for some other group. Rabbinic texts utilized portrayals of Egyptian gods to demarcate rabbinic Judaism from other cultures. Some Egyptian elements in midrash are fairly accurate depictions of HellenisticRoman customs,6 while other references to Egypt are consistent with images and customs found in earlier periods of Egyptian history. Among the numerous 4 Gideon Bohak, “Rabbinic Perspectives on Egyptian Religion,” Archiv für Religionsgeschichte 2 (2000) 215–31. 5 Rivka Ulmer, “Zwischen ägyptischer Vorlage und talmudischer Rezeption. Josef und die Ägypterin,” Kairos 24/25 (1992/93) 75–90; idem, “Discovering Mosaistics: Israel’s Egyptian Roots,” Bulletin of the Israeli Academic Centre in Cairo 18 (1994) 24–27; idem, “The Divine Eye in Ancient Egypt and in the Midrashic Interpretation of Formative Judaism,” Journal of Religion and Society 5 (2003) 1–17; idem, “Visions of Egypt in Midrash: Pharaoh’s Birthday and the Nile Festival,” in Biblical Interpretation in Judaism and Christianity (ed. Isaac Kalimi and Peter Haas; New York: T&T Clark, 2006) 52–78; idem, “Visions of Egypt and the Land of Israel under the Romans: A Dialectical Relationship between History and Homiletical Midrash,” Frankfurt Jewish Studies Bulletin 33 (2006) 1–33; idem, “Visions of Egypt in Midrash: The Nile as the Landscape of the Other,” in Discussing Cultural Inuences: Text, Context, and Non-Text in Rabbinic Judaism (ed. Rivka Ulmer; Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2007) 193–234; idem, “Egyptian Magic and the Osiris Myth in Midrash,” in Midrash and Context (ed. Lieve Teugels and Rivka Ulmer; Piscataway, N.J.: Gorgias, 2007) 139–79; idem, “Cleopatra as a Cultural Icon in Rabbinic Literature,” Hen 29 (2007) 327–53; idem, “Some Remarks on the Egyptian Language (Coptic) in Rabbinic Texts,” in Interpretation, Religion and Culture in Midrash and Beyond (ed. Lieve Teugels and Rivka Ulmer; Piscataway, N.J.: Gorgias, 2008) 79–89. 6 See, for example, Jack Lindsay, Daily Life in Roman Egypt (London: F. Muller, 1963) 160–75, and Alan Bowman, Egypt after the Pharaohs, 332BC–AD 642: From Alexander to the Arab Conquest (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986; repr., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
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Egyptian elements eliciting religious responses found in different midrashim are the Nile inundation,7 the Nile god,8 mummy portraits and funeral customs,9 the Egyptian language,10 Egyptian festivals,11 as well as Queen Cleopatra.12 Egyptian elements were immediately recognizable as Egyptian, including the gods Anubis,13 Osiris,14 Isis and Serapis, 15 Ra‘16 and Horus.17 Greco-Roman Egypt and the spread of Hellenism were the main cultural conduits for Egyptian and the “Egyptianizing” concepts in rabbinic texts. The Egyptian gods appear in disparate passages in rabbinic literature; often an earlier passage is cited and reworked in a later text. This article will not attempt to write a comprehensive history of the development of conceptions of Egyptian gods in the rabbinic corpus. However, I have noticed a greater involvement with Egypt as a theological construct in the later, medieval and homiletical midrashic texts.
The Power Struggle between the Egyptian God Ra‘ and the Hebrew God Animosity between the Hebrew God and the Egyptian gods are found already in some of ancient Israel’s earliest writings. The Bible states: “And against all the gods of Egypt I will execute judgments” (Exod 12:12). The Hebrews in the Nile Delta region of Egypt during the time of the Exodus would have been familiar with the Egyptian god Ra‘, since there were temples dedicated to Ra‘ in this region. A priest of Ra‘ is referred to in the Hebrew Bible in regard to the marriage of Joseph to the daughter of the priest Potiphera (Gen 41:45, 46:20; Gen 41:50: “Before the years of famine came, Joseph had two sons, whom Asenath, daughter of Potiphera, priest of On, bore to him”). These passages from Genesis resonated with the rabbis and were a source for their own understanding of Egyptian religion. Potiphera was a priest of Ra‘ at On (wnw, Heliopolis). The name Potiphera (Egyptian: THNT V" [he who was given by Ra‘]) identies him as a High Priest of Ra‘.18 The name Potiphera (or its variation: Potiphar) is Egyptian; however, as set forth below, the rabbis deduced their own reading of the name, which was not based upon the 7
Gen. Rab. 13:9 and parallels. Gen. Rab. 69:4 and parallels. 9 Pesiq. Rab. 17:13, Ulmer, ed. and parallels. 10 Esth. Rab. 4:12 and parallels. 11 Exod. Rab. 11:11 and parallels. 12 t. Nid. 4:17 and parallels. 13 Pesiq. Rab Kah. 11 and parallels. 14 Mek. Beshallah 1 and parallels. 15 t. Avod. Zar. 5:1. 16 Yal. 1, 372 Ki tissa and parallels. 17 y. Mo’ed Qat. 3:7, 83c and parallels. 18 See Donald B. Redford, A Study of the Biblical Story of Joseph (Genesis 37–50) (VTSup 20; Leiden: Brill, 1970) 211–14; Gary A. Rendsburg, “The Egyptian Sun-God Ra in the Pentateuch,” Hen 10 (1988) 3–15, and the literature cited therein. 8
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Egyptian language. The name was merely recognized as foreign in rabbinic texts (e.g., Gen. Rab. 86:3; Tanh., Buber ed., Vayeshev 14; b. Sotah 13b).19 Gen. Rab. 86:3, Theodor/Albeck, p. 1054: Potiphar, [an ofcer of Pharaoh’s, the captain of the guard, an Egyptian bought him] (Gen. 39:1) is Poti-phera. He was called Potiphar because he fattened bull calves []VTJTQ] for the purposes of idolatry; “Poti-phera,” because he used to uncover [V?[T] himself in idolatry, but when the bull calf [Joseph] came there, [Potiphar] was enlightened [J[XIMRSZb]. A eunuch of Pharaoh (ibid.)—[This means] he was castrated, teaching that [Potiphar] purchased [Joseph] for the purpose of intercourse, whereupon the Holy One, blessed be He, emasculated [Potiphar].
The names of Potiphar are deconstructed and read as Hebrew roots, rendering terms that are related to idolatry. The rabbis recognized that the names “Potiphar” and “Potiphera” were related names of an Egyptian priest without providing any specic reference to the Egyptian god he served. The above text mentions bull calves that could be construed to reect an Egyptian god in pure animal form, such as Apis20 (e.g., Apis of Memphis or the Menevis bull of Heliopolis).21 The Apis bull was worshiped commencing in the Early Period in Egyptian history in Memphis;22 the animal chosen as the divine bull possessed special features. Osiris-Apis was incarnated into the Apis bull and the visible rituals of the bull worship related to this embodiment of Osiris-Apis; the bull mainly symbolized the life cycle, from birth to death and resurrection, from Apis to Osiris-Apis. The rabbis utilized the Joseph story and the deconstruction of “Potiphar” and “Potiphera” in order to engage in speculative etymology that shaped their understanding of the nature of Egyptian religious practices. The usage of Egyptian theophoric names in rabbinic texts is a fairly rare occurrence; the exception to this statement is the usage of the Egyptian names of biblical characters such as PinÜas23 and Zaphnat Pa‘neah.24 This latter name is the name that Pharaoh gave to Joseph (Gen 41:45), and Joseph’s Egyptian name may be translated as follows: “Ptah maintains the life of . . .” The Egyptian etymology of some of the Hebrew names in rabbinic documents demonstrates the pervasiveness and the awareness of Egypt in Jewish memory. It should be emphasized that only a few Egyptian gods are specically mentioned in rabbinic 19
See Ulmer, “Zwischen Zwischen ägyptischer Vorlage,”” 85. Alfred Hermann, “Der letzte Apisstier,” JAC 3 (1960) 34–50. 21 Erik Hornung, Conceptions of God in Ancient Egypt: The One and the Many (trans. J. Baines; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982) 109, 136; E. A. Wallis Budge, The Gods of the Egyptians (2 vols.; London: Methuen & Company, 1904; repr., New York: Dover, 1969) 1:195–201. 22 Michael Jones, “Memphis, Apis Bull Embalming House,” Encyclopedia of the Archaeology of Ancient Egypt, 491–93. 23 Abraham S. Yahuda, The Language of the Pentateuch in its Relation to Egyptian (London: Oxford University Press, 1933) 99. 24 Yahuda, Language of the Pentateuch, 31–32. 20
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texts; this may be due to the fear of mentioning a foreign god by name, which could possibly invoke its magical potency. By contrast, the Greek Magical Papyri, written by Jews in Egypt, are lled with references to Egyptian gods and their Greco-Roman or Coptic derivatives. The Egyptian god Ra‘ was the powerful sun-god, who was mainly depicted in human form and worshiped as the one who created and sustained the world.25 By day Ra‘ traveled in his barque through the sky and by night he passed through the underworld; he was reborn and he aged. Ra‘ is referred to in the Bible at Exod 10:10. Additionally, several biblical expressions refer to Ra‘: “the eye of the whole land.”26 The Hebrew root [L]?V in the Bible often signies Ra‘ specically instead of “evil,” which is the more common meaning associated with this root. Thus, the terms “evil eye” or “evil” in some instances refers to the Egyptian sun-god.27 In midrash this connection between evil and Ra‘ is recognized in a medieval compendium: Yal. 1, 15 Joshua (Yal. 1, 372 Ki tissa): Pharaoh said to Israel: Look, evil [Ra‘ L?V] is before you (Exod 10:10). And he said: I see in my astrological constellations that one star rises against you; his name is Ra‘, he signies blood and carnage. When Israel sinned through the calf in the desert the Holy One, Blessed be He, wanted to kill them.
The parallel passage, Yal. 1, 392 Ki tissa, has a variation as its text continues: “the Egyptians said: One rises against you, his name is Ra‘.” Rashi also refers to a midrash in his commentary on Exod 10:10. This verse reads, “And he said to them, Let the Lord be with you, if I will let you go, and your little ones. Look, evil (L?V) is before you.” Rashi comments: “I have heard that in midrash aggadah there is a certain star, the name of it is L?V [Ra‘]. Pharaoh said to [the Hebrews], Through my astrology I see that star rising towards you in the desert …” This comment by Rashi, as well as the above citations from the Yalqut, suggest that rabbinic interpretation claimed that the god Ra‘ persecuted the Israelites during the Exodus. The following midrash has an additional reference to the god Ra‘ in his role of persecuting the Israelites. Exod. Rab. 20:6: Another interpretation: And it came to pass, when Pharaoh let the people go (Exod 13:17). It is written: Our soul escaped as a bird out of the snare of the fowlers (Ps 124: 7). Israel may be compared to a dove, which was detected by REÝEWL Ra‘ while sitting in her nest. This was the case with Israel in Egypt, where the snake [REÝEWL] Pharaoh used craftiness against them and 25 Hornung, Conceptions, 281; Alexandre Piankoff, The Litany of Re (Bollingen Series XL; New York: Pantheon, 1964); Ulmer, “The Divine Eye.” 26 Rendsburg, “The Egyptian Sun-God,” 7. Although the focus of Rendsburg’s article is the Bible, he included several midrashic interpretations. 27 Umberto Cassuto, Perush ‘al sefer shemot (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1965; repr., Jerusalem: Magnes, 1982) 72–73.
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he said: Come, let us deal wisely with them (Exod 1:10); and he is compared to a snake, as it says: Prophesy against Pharaoh […] the great snake (Ezek 29:3).
In the above passage the phrase REÝEWL Ra‘ means “an evil snake” or more correctly, “the snake of Ra‘.” The text combines the persecution by the god Ra‘ and the persecution by Pharaoh, who in conjunction acted as co-persecutors of the Israelites. To clarify this sentence it should be understood that Pharaoh himself was perceived by Egyptians as the son of Ra‘. This is also indicative of the perceived combat between the Hebrew God and the major Egyptian god Ra‘. Another midrashic text, Mek. Beshallah 2,28 refers to the pursuit of the Israelites by a snake and a hawk: “If she [Israel] enters, there is the serpent. If she stays out, there is the hawk. In such a plight were the Israelites at that moment, the sea forming a bar and the enemy pursuing.” The snake and the hawk could relate to Egyptian gods protecting Pharaoh; the hawk may represent Horus, the Egyptian god who guarded the Egyptian king and the snake may represent the uraeus snake29 on his headdress. Frequently in midrash a snake may represent Egypt or the Egyptian king. In a biblical passage that speaks about Egypt’s destruction, Jeremiah compares Egypt to a “hissing” snake: “Her [Egypt’s] sound is like that of a snake on the move” (Jer 46:22). The Egyptian hissing snake, which, again, is related to the uraeus snake, a symbol of Pharaoh,30 is also found in the following midrashic text: Exod. Rab. 3:12: R. Ele’azar said that [Moses’] rod was converted into a snake corresponding to (OIRIKIH) Pharaoh, who was called a snake, as it says: “Behold, I am against you, Pharaoh King of Egypt, the great-snake.” (Ezek 29:3)
This midrashic text elaborates upon the term “snake.” In the extended text of this midrash a snake god is mentioned by a Roman lady (marônâ), which is a rhetorical device to create a dialogue. However, the crucial question is why the rod of Moses was transformed into a snake. The midrashic term OIRIKIH creates an antithetical comparison between Pharaoh’s snake (the uraeus) and Moses’ snake, implicitly also between Pharaoh’s rod (a scepter) and Moses’ rod.31 The competition between Moses and the Egyptian magicians was conducted by the respective representatives of the Hebrew God and the Egyptian god. The image of the Egyptian snake is elaborated upon in the following midrash: Tanh. Va-era’ 432: When Pharaoh shall speak unto you, saying […]” (Exod 7:9). Let our rabbi instruct us []IPEQQIHIRYVEFFIRY]: May someone who is bitten by a snake 28
Lauterbach ed., 211. See Ulmer, “The Divine Eye,” 3. 30 Pharaoh is said to be like a snake in Exod. Rab. 9:4; 20:6. 31 See Ulmer, “Egyptian Magic,” 167–68. 32 Exod. Rab. 9:3, with variations. 29
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during the XIJMPPEL stop praying? Our Rabbis taught [m. Ber. 5:1]: Even if the king salutes, one may not return his greeting, and even if a snake is twisted around one’s heel one may not interrupt the XIJMPPEL. Why did the sages compare a snake that is twisted around someone’s heel with the kingdom of Egypt? R. Joshua b. Pazzi said, as it is written: Her sound is like that of a snake on the move; for they shall march with force, and come against her with axes, like wood cutters” (Jer 46:22). Just as the snake hisses and kills, so the kingdom of Egypt hisses and kills.
The citation of a mishnaic statement in the ]IPEQQIHIRY passage in the above text (“let our rabbi instruct us”) presents two cases involving the interruption of prayer. As a continuation of the above passage from midrash 8ERÝYQE these two scenarios (snake bite and royal salutation) are connected to the Scriptural passage or "-R]ER (Exod 7:9) of the homiletic discourse by means of the question: “Why did the sages compare a snake that is twisted around someone’s heel with the kingdom of Egypt?” The answer to this question posits: “Just as the snake hisses and kills, so the kingdom of Egypt hisses and kills.” The above midrashic unit, like some other midrashim, is bi-directional; the interpretation ows in one direction and then turns around in the opposite direction. From the Scriptural verse (Exod 7:9) which mentions Pharaoh the passage proceeds to a Mishnah citation that mentions a snake. In the subsequent portion of this text the interpretation returns to Egypt. In short, the text moves away from Egypt and then returns to Egypt. The Mishnah occupies the pivotal position in this reversal of direction. The Mishnah interprets Scripture; Pharaoh is understood to be both a king and a snake. The word “Egypt” in the concluding sentence in the above passage illuminates the Mishnah. Even the attack of the snake, representing Egypt, does not interrupt one’s compliance with God’s commandments, including the XIJMPPEL. Any memory or allusion of the Egyptian god Ra‘ had to be immediately erased and supplanted by the Hebrew God.
Egyptian “Animal Worship” The rabbis knew of idolatrous worship of Egyptian gods, which could have the appearance of animals.33 The following animals are mentioned in rabbinic texts in discussions of Egypt: snake,34 ram (lamb),35 hawk (falcon),36 jackal (dog),37 crocodile,38 frog,39 and bull.40 These animals were manifestations of Egyptian gods. 33
See Erik Hornung, “Die Bedeutung des Tieres im alten Ägypten,” StG 20 (1967) 69–84. Exod. Rab. 20:6. 35 Exod. Rab. 16:2. 36 Mek. Beshallah 2 (Lauterbach ed., p. 211). 37 See Ulmer, “Egyptian Magic,” 168–69; Pesiq. Rab Kah. 11, Vayehi beshallah (Mandelbaum ed., 187–88). 38 See Ulmer, “The Nile,” 207–8; Tanh. Bereshit 7. 39 See Ulmer, “The Nile,” 208–9; Exod. Rab. 10:2–3. 40 See Ulmer, “Egyptian Magic,” 163–64; b. ‘Avod. Zar. 43a; Gen. Rab. 86:3. 34
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Egyptian gods existed in multiple forms; the multitude of visible images and the denite animal species relating to a god “make[s] the god more accessible.”41 The view that Egyptians worshiped animals was a common misconception in antiquity, shared by the Romans42 and the rabbis. Divine animals and statues representing gods were rejected by Judaism in rabbinic texts.43 The existence of animal worship in general, without specic mention of Egypt, is addressed in the following text: b. Zev. 114a: But as for an animal set apart [for idolatrous practices] and an animal worshiped [as an idol, is it correct that] no one can forbid that which does not belong to him?
This talmudic passage raises the “jurisdictional” issue as to whether the rabbis had the authority to forbid animal worship if the animals were owned by idolaters. In short, it could be argued that animal worship could be permitted to the idolaters. The rabbis perceived such animal worship as the cult of the “Others,” "jF|HlL^EVE. Whether the golden calf (Exod 32:4)44 was an Egyptian god is disputed.45 However, some midrashic and related texts interpret the calf as an Egyptian god. For example, a late midrash states that “the Egyptians are carrying their gods and they are singing and reciting hymns before it. . . . Make a god like the Egyptian god for us” (Pirqe R. El. 46).46 This is based upon a long chain of interpretations that claim that the golden calf was a statue of the Egyptian god Apis.47 Although it has seemed reasonable to some scholars to assume that a group that had just left Egypt would create an Egyptian god, the polemic may, instead, have originally been directed against a Canaanite god with whom the editors of the Bible were likely
41
Hornung, Conceptions, 137. See Klaas A. D. Smelik and Emily A. Hemelrijk, “’Who Knows not what Monsters Demented Egypt’s Worship?’ Opinions on Egyptian Animal Worship in Antiquity as Part of the Ancient Conception of Egypt,” ANRW II.17.4, 2337–57. 43 See Meyer Reinhold, “Roman Attitudes toward Egyptians,” Ancient World 3 (1980) 97–103; Holger Sonnabend, Fremdenbild und Politik. Vorstellungen der Römer von Ägypten und dem Partherrreich in der späten Republik und frühen Kaiserzeit (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1986) 19. Josephus, however, contains comparisons of Judaism to Egyptian religions: “Again the contrast between the two cults created bitter animosity, since our religion is as far removed from that which is in vogue among them as is the nature of God from that of irrational beasts. For it is their national custom to regard animals as gods, and this custom is universal, although there are local differences in the honours paid to them.” (C. Ap. 1.224–225). 44 For the “calf” ($IKIP) in the golden calf episode (Exod 32:1–33:23) as a young ox or a bull see Nahum Sarna, The JPS Torah Commentary: Exodus (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1991) 203. 45 The American Israelite, 35, 16 (Oct. 19, 1888) 4, presented this claim; Allan M. Langner, “The Golden Calf and Ra,” JBQ 31 (2003) 43–47, esp. 44. 46 See also Tg. Yer. to Exod 32:5; y. Sotah 3:4, 19a; Exod. Rab. 9:49. 47 Philo and additional sources are cited in Jan Assmann, Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997) 71–72. 42
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to have been more familiar.48 It is clear, however, that the rabbis understood the calf to be an Egyptian deity and Egyptological comparisons support the premise that their interpretations were informed by some knowledge of Egyptian religious customs. The Egyptian worship of lambs is mentioned in midrashic text, as well as in the Talmud (Tanh., Buber edition, Bo 3; b. Shabb. 89a): “the Egyptians were bowing down to lambs.” In fact, the Israelites were requested to slay the Egyptian lamb god: Exod. Rab. 16:249: You nd that when the Israelites were in Egypt, they worshiped idols and were reluctant to abandon them, for it says: “They did not cast away the detestable things their eyes fasted upon [nor did they forsake the idols of Egypt]” (Ezek 20:8). God said to Moses: As long as Israel worships Egyptian gods, they will not be redeemed; go and tell them to abandon their evil ways and to reject idolatry. This is the meaning of, “draw out and take you lambs” (Exod 12:21). [This means:] Draw away your hands from idolatry and take for yourselves lambs, thereby slaying the gods of Egypt and preparing the Passover; only through this will the Lord pass over you. This is the meaning of, “Through returning and resting will you be saved.” (Isa 30:15)
The above reference to lambs may refer to the Egyptian gods Amun or Khnum.50 Both of these gods were frequently depicted with ram’s horns. These Egyptian gods were also known in Greco-Roman times, for example, Khnum51 was occasionally identied as Amun52 and the combination of Zeus and Amun was designated as Zeus-Ammon.53 Several centuries earlier there had been conicts in the fth century B.C.E. between the Egyptian priests of Khnum in Yev (Elephantine; Egyptian: Abu) who worshiped rams (lambs) and their neighbors, the Jewish priests of the local temple of Yah(o), who sacriced lambs;54 this tension transpired on the same island in the Nile.55 Khnum, the ram-headed creator god, was worshiped together with 48 Nahum M. Sarna, Exploring Exodus: The Origins of Biblical Israel (New York: Schocken, 1986) 218, states that there is “no need to turn to Egypt.” 49 Num. Rab. 16:25; Shir Rab. 2:45. 50 Hornung, Conceptions, 274, 278. Concerning a Khnum amulet found in Israel, see Gideon Bohak, “A Note on the Chnoubis Gem from Tel Dor,” IEJ 47 (1997) 255–56. 51 Herodotus, Hist. 2.28 mentions Khnum as the guardian of the Nile source and as a horned ram, ibid. 2.42; 4.18. 52 See Stefan Pfeiffer, “Die Entsprechung ägyptischer Götter im griechischen Pantheon,” in Ägypten, Griechenland und Rom. Abwehr und Berührung. Städelsches Kunstinstitut und Städtische Galerie, 26. November 2005–26. Februar 2006 (Frankfurt: Liebighaus, 2005) 285–90. 53 See Stefan Schmidt, “Ammon,” in Ägypten, Griechenland und Rom, 187–94. 54 Herodotus, Hist. 2.38, 41, 42, 45, claims that the Israelites sacriced sacred animals, e.g., the sacred cow of Isis. 55 The temple of Yah at Elephantine and its sustaining Jewish community demonstrate “clear signs of the penetration of Egyptian religious cults into the life of the community,” according to J. Gwyn Grifths, “The Legacy of Egypt in Judaism,” CHJ 3 (2000) 1025–51, esp. 1029. Bezalel Porten,
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Satis, goddess of the rst Nile cataract, and their daughter, Anukis, and represent the principle triad of Egyptian deities at Elephantine (Khnemu, Satet, Anqet). Names of Egyptian Gods: Neith, Nephthys, and Haroeris There is evidence that the names of some Egyptian gods were assimilated into Hebrew personal names, which is an indication of the close relationship that Jews in Egypt had with their surrounding culture. In her research of personal names from Egypt that appear in Jewish texts from antiquity, Tal Ilan56 lists the name of a proselyte, W]]JTR, transcribed as “Neptis.” This name may be based upon the Egyptian goddess Nephthys (nebt-het), which is also mentioned by Plutarch57 in his conation of the Osiris myth. Similarly, the name “Neptis”58 W]JT]R in b. Yevam. 98a could also relate to the goddess Nephthys, who was married to her brother, Osiris, since problematic marriage practices are involved in the passage set forth below. This appears to be a singular usage in rabbinic literature of the name Nephthys. b. Yevam. 98a: Come and hear what R. Jose said: A case involving the proselyte Nephthys, who married the wife of his maternal brother, and when the case was submitted to the Sages their verdict was that the law of matrimony does not apply to a proselyte.
Several names of Egyptian gods are attested to in rabbinic literature, for example, the phrase in b. ‘Avod. Zar. 11b “there are those who say: RMXFEVI EVFXR,” may contain a combination of Neith and Phre according to Samuel Krauss.59 b. ‘Avod. Zar. 11b: R. anan b. isda in the name of Rav, others say: R. anan b. Rava in the name of Rav said: There are ve appointed temples of idol-worship: The Temple of Bel in Babel, The Temple of Nebo in Kursi, Tar‘ata in Mapug, Zerifa in Ashkelon, Nishra in Arabia. When R. Dimi came [he said], they added to these the market-place in ‘En-Bekhi [and] the Nidbakhah of Acco; there are those who say: the Nitbara of Acco. Rav Dimi of Nahardea recited these in the reversed order: The market-place of Acco, the Nidbakhah of ‘En-Bekhi. Archives from Elephantine: The Life of an Ancient Jewish Military Colony (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968) 279–93; Alexander E. Cowley, Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1923; repr., Osnabrück: Zeller, 1967) 21, provides the so-called “Passover papyrus;” see also Detlef Franke, “Elephantine,” The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt, 1, 465–67; Lester L. Grabbe, A History of the Jews and Judaism in the Second Temple Period, vol. 1, Yehud: A History of the Persian Province of Judah (London: T&T Clark, 2004) 211–12; Assmann, Moses the Egyptian, 61–64. 56 Tal Ilan, Lexicon of Jewish Names in Late Antiquity (TSAJ 91; 2 vols.; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002) 1:48, 50. 57 Plutarch, Is. Os., 12–19. 58 Ilan, Lexicon, 1:335. 59 Krauss, “Aegyptische,” 344.
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As mentioned above, Krauss contends that: RMXFEVI may contain a combination of Neith and Phre. However, Krauss does not explore the multiple possible derivations of the word Phre. In my judgment, if the second element of the term RMXFEVI is in fact Phre, it may be derived from the Egyptian p3 r‘, which also occurs in Gen 41:45 as part of the name of the priest Potiphera. As mentioned above, Potiphera was a priest of Ra‘ at On. Additionally, one of the names of the Egyptian kings, containing the element Phre, related the king to the sun-god. On the other hand, Phre may be related to pr-‘3, the term for “pharaoh.” Alternatively, in the Greek Magical Papyri a spell for invisibility contains the element Phre in a series of names that mention other Egyptian gods in a Hellenized form: “I am Anubis, I am Osir-Phre, I am OSOT SORONOUIER, I am Osiris whom Seth destroyed.”60 It should be emphasized that the evidence is inconclusive in regard to the meaning of the assumed element Phre in the talmudic term RMXFEVI (b. ‘Avod. Zar. 11b). Based upon comparative Egyptian descriptions of the goddess Neith, it appears likely that the talmudic term RMXFEVI may contain the theophoric name of Neith and one of her attributes: “Neith created.” In Egypt, and in particular in temples from the Greco-Roman period (e.g., Esna), Neith was viewed as a creator goddess. Furthermore, Neith was frequently identied with Isis.61 If RMXFEVI means “Neith created,” then the Bavli text above should be understood to claim that a statue of this particular manifestation of the Egyptian goddess Neith had been erected in Acco. The same passage in b. ‘Avod. Zar. 11b contains the variant reading “RMHFEOLEL,” which could refer to the Syrian god Zeus Madbachos. This explanation of this variant reading is not to be preferred. While this variant reading may have been emended to refer to a Syrian manifestation of Zeus or a different incarnation of Neith, the preferred reading more directly conrms the contention that the Bavli refers to a cult statue of an otherwise known manifestation of Neith. There is a more likely explanation for the variant term, “RMHFEOLEL,” which retains an element similar to the name of the Egyptian goddess Neith (nit) and despite grammatical difculties could be translated: “Neith wept.”62 The weeping Neith could relate to the mourning and weeping Nephthys in some versions of the Osiris myth.63 The reading of “RMHFEOLEL” is attested to in a manuscript (MS The Jewish Theological Seminary, Rab. 15, EOFHR[ or LOFHR). However, two other manuscripts of the Talmud have a Hebrew transcription of the name of the goddess “Neith” that is closer to the Egyptian name: MS Munich, cod. Hebr, 95, fol. 375v: [O?Fp ‘OFXR[ and MS Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Suppl. Heb. 1337, fol. 136a, which has “Nitbakhah” twice: LOFXR[LOFXR]VQEHEO]E[O?Fp, “and Nitbakhah in Acco, and there are those who say Nitbakhah.” My interpretation is based upon the above 60
PGM I, 247–62. Herodotus, Hist. 11:59; 11:62 mentions the annual festival of Isis-Neith at Saïs. 62 Gary Greenberg, “Neith and the Two Biblical Deborahs: One and the Same,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Research Association in Egypt, 1995. 63 See Ulmer, “Egyptian Magic,” 152. 61
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spelling in MS Munich, which supports my contention that the term in question contains “Neith.” In my opinion, Krauss was mistaken in his contention that Phre was a component of the talmudic term nitbare; however, he was correct that “Neith” was probably a signicant component of this term. The name of the Egyptian goddess Neith (njt)64 was thought to be part of the Hebrew name XRWE (“Asenath,” Gen 41:45, 50; 46:20); however, according to some Egyptologists, deriving this name from an articial Egyptian term nsnt meaning “belonging to Neith”65 is no longer tenable. Rather, a reconstruction of the Egyptian elements in Asenath’s name could possibly render the meaning “she belonged to her father.”66 In my view, the name of Asenath does not contain the theophoric element of Neith. The statues representing Egyptian gods were visible manifestations of Egypt and its religions not only in Egypt, but also in the land of Israel and the Diaspora. The Egyptian god Arueris67 (©%VSYZLVMb; the elder Horus, Haroeris) is presented as a powerful idol in rabbinic literature. We nd the admonition: “Close his eyes when you walk by his statue” or “Stomp out his eyes” in several Yerushalmi passages (y. ‘Avod. Zar. 3:11, 43b; y. Sheqal. 2:5,47a; y. Mo’ed Qat. 3:7).68 There are variant spellings of the name of the Egyptian god, Arueris, in the Yerushalmi passages, including “Aduri” and “Arura.” To summarize this section I suggest the following: personal names in rabbinic literature sometimes reect Egyptian gods; direct references to the Egyptian gods 64 Neith had different attributes; often she was depicted as “the terrifying one” with arrows and a shield. Herodotus identied her with Athena (Neith-Athena, see Olaf Kaper, “Stele für Tutu mit Neith-Athena und Nemesis,” in Ägypten, Griechenland und Rom, 619). Alternatively she was a serpent goddess, see Erika Feucht, “Ein Bildnis der Neith als Schlangengöttin,” in Egyptian Religion: The Last Thousand Years, Studies Dedicated to the Memory of Jan Quaegebeur (ed. Willy Clarysse, Antoon Schoors, and Harco Willems; OLA 84–85; Leuven: Peeters, 1998) 105–15. Neith was also a primeval goddess involved in creation and protecting the pharaoh (Hornung, Conceptions, 280); see also Susan Tower Hollis, “Five Egyptian Goddesses in the Third Millenium B.C.: Neith, Hathor, Nut, Isis, Nephtys,” KMT 5/4 (1995) 46. 65 Redford, A Study of the Biblical Story of Joseph, 229. 66 See James K. Hoffmeier, Israel in Egypt: Evidence for the Authenticity of the Exodus Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) 85, who provides this explanation, summarizes the research, and states that “no example of the name ns-nt is known in ancient Egyptian onomastics.” Kenneth A. Kitchen, “Genesis in the Near Eastern World,” in He Swore an Oath: Biblical Themes from Genesis 12–50 (ed. R. S. Hess et al.; Cambridge: Tyndale House, 1993) 77–92, esp. 79–80, argues that the translation “belonging to (her father)” makes sense in both the Hebrew and the Egyptian. In the Jewish-Hellenistic novel Joseph and Aseneth, Asenath is renamed “city of refuge.” 67 Krauss, “Aegyptische,” 345; on Arueris, see Plutarch, Is. Os., F 355 (trans. Frank Cole Babbitt; LCL; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949) 33. 68 The variants include, but are not limited to, the following:]V[HE in y. ‘Avod. Zar. 3:11, 43b (Krotoshin); ]V[HLE in y. Ber. 2:5, 4b (ed. Peter Schäfer et al., Synopse zum Talmud Yerushalmi.I/1-2 [TSAJ 31; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1991]), y. Ber. 2:11, MS Paris Bibliothèque Nationale Heb. 1389 and MS London British Library Or. 2822–24 EV[VE, ed. Amsterdam (1710) LV[VLEH; E]V[HEH in y. Sheqal. 2:5, 47a (ed. Venice, 1523: EV[HEH), Synopse II/5–12 (2001, TSAJ 83), y. Sheqal. 2:6, Oxford EV[[]N and in the Bavli, Munich, 2:6 EV[VN, MS London: EV[VE; ]V[HE in y. Mo’ed Qat. 3:7, 83c.
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themselves are also found in rabbinic literature; there are possible manifestations of “Neith,” as well as a reference to a statue of this goddess; deriving “Asenath” from “Neith” is no longer tenable; the statue of the Egyptian god Haroeris is also referred to in rabbinic texts. Additional Egyptian gods that are extensively cited in rabbinic literature include Isis and Serapis in Greco-Roman garb,69 the Romanized Nile god (Nilos), and the view that Pharaoh was a god. 70
The Cult of Isis and Serapis The cult of Isis and Serapis and sacrices to Ammon, Osiris, and Nephthys were prevalent even in remote corners of the Roman Empire.71 Egypt under the Ptolemies and, in particular, under Roman rule had returned to many former religious manifestations of Egyptian culture. The multifaceted phenomena of Egypt were, often in a supercial manner, integrated into other texts, including the rabbinic corpus. In Rome Egypt was understood to be the original source of wisdom, yet they found numerous aspects of Egyptian cult practices rather disturbing and abhorrent.72 It was difcult for Romans to inculcate such traditions as that of the divine bull, Serapis. Nevertheless, in Roman religions Serapis was a divine entity, usually in human form. The cult of Neotera-Isis was practiced in Roman Palestine, making it likely that the rabbis had some exposure to this Egyptian export. The titles of Cleopatra VII (Philopator, reigned 51–30 B.C.E.) on coins include XLIERI¢XIVE, which may refer to Cleopatra as Isis-Aphrodite73 or Hathor (the Hellenized Aphrodite-Hathor).74 For example, this title is engraved on a tetradrachma from Ashkelon from around 37 B.C.E., toward the end of her rule. In contrast to the coins from her earlier reign, which followed Greek conventions, this type of coin is Roman in style; the image is markedly different from the softer images of Hellenistic queens and the coin’s less elegant depiction reects the Roman inuence. The meaning of Cleopatra’s title, 5)%2);8)6%, is somewhat ambiguous; it could mean “the newer goddess,”75 a role that Cleopatra assigned to herself (Isis-Aphrodite). Cleopatra VII drew upon the cults of the Egyptian gods—Isis, Osiris, and Apis—in order to rmly establish her rule and to Egyptianize her image. The Isis cult and its derivatives were also found in the land of Israel,76 in places such as Raphia, Gaza, and Ashkelon. Additionally, 69
t. ‘Avod. Zar. 5:1; Ulmer, “Cleopatra,” 341–43. See Ulmer, “The Nile,” 217–24. 71 See Sarolta A. Takâacs, Isis and Sarapis in the Roman World (Leiden: Brill, 1995). 72 See Smelik and Hemelrijk, “Who Knows not;” Reinhold, “Roman Attitudes toward Egyptians,” 97–103; Sonnabend, Fremdenbild, 19. 73 For example, Heidelberg, Ägyptologisches Institut der Universität, exhibit no. 961. 74 Kleopatra. Ägypten um die Zeitenwende. Kunsthalle der Hypo-Kulturstiftung, 16. Juni–10. September 1989 (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1989) 191 (no. 57u). 75 Frédéric Manns, “Nouvelles traces des cultes de Néotera, Sérapis et Poséidon,” Liber annuus 27 (1977) 229–38, 233 discusses &%7-0-77%/0)34%86%5)%2);8)6%. 76 Nicole Belayche, “Les dévotions à Isis et Sérapis dans la Judée-Palestine Romaine,” in Nile into 70
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in the Land of Israel there had been earlier combinations of features of Isis with the local goddesses, such as Astarte. Another combination of Isis with Agape in an oath formula appears in the Bavli as ETK ]EQ[VH, “By the Roman [a]gape!”77 Amulets with Isis and representations of Isis lactans (i.e., Isis as a breast-feeding mother) were common in late antiquity and there are numerous depictions and cameos from the Roman era depicting Isis and Serapis together.78 The reference to depictions of Isis79 and Serapis in the Tosefta was in all likelihood added to the other prohibited representations in this rabbinic text in second century Palestine.80 According to Marmorstein,81 R. Judah’s statement in the passage set forth in the Talmud and in its earlier version in the Tosefta (t. ‘Avod. Zar. 5:1, Zuckermandel, 468), refers to Isis worship in his time. If one nds a seal ring with an image of a breast-feeding woman or the image of Serapis, the nder is required to dispose of the ring in the Dead Sea, i.e., dumping the object into the Dead Sea. This early reference in rabbinic literature reads: t. ‘Avod. Zar. 5:1:
NPQL]PÞ]P[]Ú[UVHXV[\LRFPXV[\LQNXV[\[]P?[X?FJE\Q 82 WTVW[ÚU]RQX[QHE[ Someone who found a ring with a representation of the sun, a representation of the moon or a representation of a HIVoU|R [serpent] should take it to the Dead Sea. [MS Vienna: R. Judah said] And also if [there is] an image [X[QH] of a breastfeeding woman or of Serapis [on a ring that someone has found, he should take it to the Dead Sea].
Tiber; Egypt in the Roman World. Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference of Isis Studies, Faculty of Archaeology, Leiden University, May 11–14, 2005 (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 448–69; Jodi Magness, “The Cults of Isis and Kore at Samaria-Sebaste in the Hellenistic and Roman periods,” HTR 94 (2001) 157–77. 77 Samuel Krauss, Griechische und lateinische Lehnwörter im Talmud, Midrasch und Targum (2 vols.; Berlin: Calvary, 1898) 2:182; J. Gwyn Grifths, “Ïsis and Agape,”CP 80 (1985) 139–41. 78 For example, cameos in Kunsthistorisches Museum, Antikensammlung, Vienna, IX A 8, and the Brooklyn Museum, 73.85, Charles Edwin Wilbur Fund. 79 According to Moritz Güdemann, “Mythenmischung in der Hagada,” MGWJ 5 (1876) 177–195; 6 (1876) 225–31; 7 (1876) 255–61, the Tosefta and the Bavli clearly refer to a representation of Isis holding Horus, 225; see also Heinrich Blaufuss, Götter, Bilder und Symbole nach den Traktaten über fremden Dienst (Aboda Zara) in Mischna, Tosefta, Jerusalemer und Babylonischem Talmud (Nuremberg: Stich, 1910) 19; Krauss, “Aegyptische,” 346; Saul Lieberman, Hellenism in Jewish Palestine (New York: JTS, 1962) 136–38. 80 Margarete Schlüter, ‘Derãqôn’ und Götzendienst (Judentum und Umwelt 4; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1982) 126–27. 81 A. Marmorstein, “Egyptian Mythology and Babylonian Magic in Bible and Talmud,” in Dissertationes in honorem dr. Eduardi Mahler (Budapest, [s.n.], 1937) 469–87. 82 The Toseftan context refers to the moon and the stars on white garments symbolic of Isis, see Blaufuss, Götter, Bilder und Symbole, 30, 44.
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The breast-feeding woman in this Toseftan text may refer to Isis or another mothergoddess.83 An image of a breast-feeding woman on a seal ring is not permitted; this prohibition implies that such representations were in existence. Additionally, the term HIQYX, which is found in this passage, is often related to divine appearances in rabbinic literature.84 In all probability an image of the goddess Isis as a breastfeeding goddess is the subject of this prohibition. The above passage from the Tosefta is cited as a FEVEMXE in the Bavli (b. ‘Avod. Zar. 43a)85 within the talmudic discussion of foreign, idolatrous worship and the rejection of Hellenism.86 The context of the talmudic passage apparently mandates reading the image of the breast-feeding woman as a foreign goddess. The talmudic passage states: b. ‘Avod. Zar. 43a: For it has been taught: R. Judah adds the image [X[QH] of a breastfeeding woman and of Serapis87 [or: Sar Apis, W]TEVW[]. A breastfeeding woman— because of Eve who breastfed the whole world; Serapis—because of Joseph who ruled/was a WEV [VW] and appeased [W]TQ] the whole world. [Serapis refers to Joseph when he is represented as] holding a measure [E[]VK] and is measuring [grain], and [the breastfeeding woman refers to Eve] when she is holding a child and breastfeeding him.
This talmudic passage mentions Serapis and the grain measure (QSHMYW) he is holding. In the manner of midrashic R|oVU|R, the name of Serapis is divided into two words that serve as the basis for the ensuing interpretation. Serapis is identied with Joseph in the talmudic passage based upon the premise that both provided grain during periods of famine. Identifying Serapis with Joseph is a common theme in Jewish and early Christian literature.88 As mentioned above, Isis and Serapis 83 84
Schlüter, Derqôn, 126–28. Marcus Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the
Midrashic Literature (2 vols.; New York: Pardes, 1950) 1:312b, s.v. X[QH. 85 See Schlüter, Derãqôn; Emmanuel Friedheim, “Who Are the Deities Concealed behind the Rabbinic Expression ‘A Nursing Female Image’?” HTR 96 (2003) 239–50, maintains that the “nursing female” refers to Nysa-Atargatis, Dionysus, and Jupiter Heliopolitanus. 86 Martin Hengel, The ‘Hellenization’ of Judaea in the First Century after Christ (Philadelphia: Trinity, 1989). Munich Cod. Hebr. 95 has Serapis in one word [W]TVW]. Suidas, Lexicon, s.v. 7EZVETMb; Horovitz, Josephserzählung, 120–28; Gerard Mussies, “The Interpretatio Judaica of Serapis,” in Studies in Hellenistic Religions (ed. M. J. Vermaseren; Leiden: Brill, 1979) 189–214, esp. 212; Güdemann, “Mythenmischung,” 255; Lieberman, Hellenism, 138 n. 87. Midrashic references to Osiris in the Horus and Osiris myths have little in common with Osiris-Apis, i.e., Serapis. The equivalence of Joseph and Serapis is in all likelihood based upon Manetho’s etymology of Osarsyph (Josephus, C. Ap. 26.26). Mussies, “Interpretatio Judaica,” 193, states that this identication dates at least from the second century B.C.E. Giuseppe Veltri, Eine Tora für den König Talmai. Untersuchungen zum Übersetzungsverständnis in der jüdischhellenistischen und rabbinischen Literatur (TSAJ 41; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1994) 69, mentions that the identication of Serapis with Joseph in b. ‘Avod. Zar. 43a could have derived from the 87 88
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often appeared in tandem. It is therefore probable that the breast-feeding mother in the text is Isis, since the breast-feeding woman and Serapis are mentioned in tandem in this passage. If one attempts to locate the icon of Serapis in rabbinic texts, one should consider that Serapis is a Romanized deity that is based upon an Egyptian god. The Greeks perceived Serapis as Pluton or Helios, as well as other gods. The prevailing view89 in respect to Serapis has been that this god is a Ptolemaic invention, which combined the Egyptian gods Osiris (wsjr) and Apis (hp).90 Ptolemy I (367–283 B.C.E.) is said to have construed Serapis as the major god of the state that was populated by Greeks and Egyptians. However, this previously held thesis in regard to the formation of the Greco-Roman god Serapis needs to be challenged. The possible revision of this thesis draws upon Egyptology; a more comprehensive understanding of Serapis may contribute to the interpretation of this god in rabbinic passages. Additionally, the Egyptian composite elements of Serapis need to be reexamined in order to identify the iconography of Serapis or Sarapis91 (Sar Apis) in rabbinic texts. Arguably, Serapis should no longer be viewed as purely resulting from a combination of Egyptian and Hellenistic features and as an invention of the Ptolemaic rulers of Egypt.92 The ancient Egyptian Apis93 (hpwj) and Osiris-Apis (wsjr hp) had a cult center in Memphis millennia before the rst Greeks entered Egypt in the seventh century B.C.E. After death the Apis bull was mummied; it was believed that the bull renewed its existence. In regard to the burial and mummication of the bull in a Serapeum in Greco-Roman Egypt, one may note that from the period of the New Kingdom in Egypt the Apis bulls were buried in the Serapeum in Sakkarah. Based upon Egyptian evidence, this form of Osiris is identical with Serapis.94 The Egyptian Memphis continued to be a cult center and a god named “Oserapis” (©3WSVEZTMb) was venerated by Greeks in the fourth century B.C.E.95 identication of Joseph with a bull since Serapis was a designation of the divine Apis. However, I agree with Mussies that there is no relation between the bull in Deut 33:17 and Serapis, the god who may have had the form of a bull. 89 See John E. Stambaugh, Serapis under the Early Ptolemies (Leiden: Brill, 1972). 90 For Hellenistic and Romanized descriptions of Apis, see Herodotus, Hist., 3.28, 38, 41; Strabo, Geogr. 17.17, 22, 23; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. Hist. 1.25; Aelian, Nat. an. 11:11; Plutarch, Mor., Is. Os. 56, 43; Cicero, Resp. 3.9.24. 91 Günther Hölbl, “Serapis,” LÄ 5, 870–74, s.v. states that “Serapis” is a more recent form of “Sarapis.” In rabbinic literature the spelling uctuates between one word and two words (Serapis or Sar Apis); however, other than the nôrîqôn method there does not seem to be any meaning attached to this difference. 92 Peter Mayr, “Serapis: Göttliche Interpretationshilfe,” Antike Welt 35 (2004) 30. 93 Jean Vercoutter, “Apis,” LÄ 1, 338–50. 94 See Philippe Borgeaud and Youri Volakhine, “La formation de la légende de Sarapis. Une approche transculturelle,” Archiv für Religionsgeschichte 2 (2000) 37–76, 53–55. 95 ©3WSVEZTMb is the same as the Egyptian wjr p (Osiris-Apis). Alternatively, the name of Serapis may have been derived from sr p (Apis prophesying). Mussies, “The Interpretatio Judaica,” 210, offers a reasonable explanation of “Osarseph” based upon the Egyptian name w jr sp3 (Osiris-Sepa).
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The introduction of the Serapis cult in Alexandria and the building of a Serapeion96 in that area may have occurred in the third century B.C.E. or, alternatively, this cult may have been derived from an earlier Serapis cult that utilized the site of a previous cult.97 One purpose of this cult may have been to integrate and unite the multi-cultural inhabitants of Alexandria under one god by following the precedent of other cities that had one main god.98 The Serapis cult in Alexandria may be reected in the Septuagint. In Jer 26:15 (=MT Jer 46:15) the LXX inserts “Apis” into its translation:: “Why does Apis ee from you? Your choice ox does not continue . . .” In Ptolemaic Egypt we encounter the dual nature of gods, as gods of the Greeks and gods of the Egyptians: Serapis was and remained the form attributed to Osiris in Memphis.99 In Hellenistic Egypt, Serapis was venerated in Memphis and in Alexandria; he was viewed as the god of salvation after death, as the one who listened to prayers and as the god who healed people following the custom of staying overnight in his sanctuary.100 Although Serapis was mainly revered as healing the sick, a multitude of other representations of Serapis developed, including motifs borrowed from statues of Greek gods. The portrayal of Serapis with ve curls of hair on his forehead was prevalent in the land of Israel and probably derived from the second century C.E. imperial Rome, however, earlier references to Serapis from the third century B.C.E. were also present in Samaria. 101 An important feature of the Hellenistic Serapis was his frequent depiction with a OEPEXLSW—a bushel measure for grain—on his head, which meant by the talmudic reference to be “a measure,” in the excerpt above. A modius—a beaker to measure grain—was being held by Serapis in that description.102 The distinction between 96 D. Kessler, “Das hellenistische Serapeum in Alexandria und Ägypten in ägyptologischer Sicht,” in Ägypten und der östliche Mittelmeerraum im 1. Jahrtausend v. Chr.: Akten des interdisziplinären Symposions am Institut für Ägyptologie der Universität München 25.–27.10.1996 (ed. M. Görg and G. Hölbl; Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2000) 163–230, esp. 217. Other locales included Letopolis, Prosopites, Saïs, and Sakkarah. 97 See Stefan Schmidt, “Serapis—ein neuer Gott für die Griechen in Ägypten,” in Ägypten, Griechenland und Rom, 291–304, for a review of the literature. 98 Schmidt, “Serapis,” 294; J. Gwyn Grifths, Plutarch’s De Iside et Osiride (Cambridge: University of Wales Press, 1970) 43, states: “In the Roman era . . . at Memphis and Abydos there was a revival of Oserapis.” 99 Günther Hölbl, A History of the Ptolemaic Empire (trans. Tina Saavedra; London: Routledge, 2001) 100, notices the shifting nature of Isis and Serapis. The temple of Edfu, outer hypostyle, interior, north wall, depicts Ptolemy VIII offering a pectoral to Osiri; see Marco Zecchi, A Study of the Egyptian God Osiris Hemag (Archeologia e Storia della civiltà egiziana e del vicino oriente antico 1; Imola: Editrice la mandragora, 1996) 42. 100 Vespasian sought the counsel of Serapis during his stay in Alexandria in 69/70 C.E. 101 Coins issued in Jerusalem from the time of Hadrian to Valerianus depict Serapis; additionally, there is a second century inscription referring to Serapis in Jerusalem, see also Mussies, “The Interpretatio Judaica,” 191. For further discussions of the Serapis cult in the land of Israel, see Manns, “Nouvelles,” 235, who specically refers to the identication of Joseph with Serapis in the Tosefta and the Bavli. Representations of Osiris were found in Gezer and Ashkelon. 102 Mussies, “The Interpretatio Judaica,” 194, states that the modius is mentioned by Firmicus Maternus (346–350 C.E.) and others.
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gods holding their attributes in their hands or carrying them upon their heads is rather insignicant. The QSHMYW, like the horns of the ancient Egyptian main god Amun and the locks of the Greek god Zeus, often served to identify Serapis.103 In comparison, Isis occasionally has been depicted iconographically with grain on her head or carrying a cornucopia.104 During the Roman period Isis frequently had a sun disc on her head, anked by stalks of grain. We may note that Egyptian deities mainly wore their identiable symbols on their heads. Based upon the above examination of the evolution of Isis and Serapis, I suggest that the rabbinic passage t. ‘Avod. Zar. 5:1 (cited in b. ‘Avod. Zar. 43a), which juxtaposes a breast-feeding woman (probably Isis) and Serapis, manifests an iconographic nexus: The god Serapis takes a form of Osiris; Isis is depicted in relationship to Osiris.
The Nile God and Moses as the Child of the Nile The Roman predilection of assigning gods to rivers also applied to the Nile. The term “Nilos”105 (2IMDPSb) refers to the river-god Nilos, as well as to the river Nile itself in Greco-Roman Egypt. In rabbinic literature the term Nilos occurs frequently and usually refers to the Nile river.106 Nilos is used to identify the location of Joseph’s cofn that Moses had to retrieve during the time of the Exodus.107 Nilos also appears in midrash in reference to the Nile as a source of water108 and in regard to a Nile festival,109 which celebrated Egyptian divinities. The rabbis described W[P]R[], the Nile festival, to include such activities as idolatrous sacricial offerings to the Nile god in observance of the Nile inundation and spectacles, as well as circus performances. Rabbinic texts from the third to the sixth century utilized the term Nilos more frequently than the other terms for the Nile (e.g. ]q SV, RoLoV). In late midrashic texts from the medieval period the authors of these texts revert to the biblical term ]q SV in order to archaize their texts. A perceived Egyptian etymology of the name of Moses110 (1[Y"WLZb) is found in Philo, Mos. 1.17: “for the Egyptians call water mou;” Josephus, Ant. 2.228, 103 For example, a bust in Ägyptisches Museum, Berlin, 11 479, second century B.C.E., from the nome of Arsinoë; see Osiris, Kreuz, Halbmond: 5000 Jahre Kunst in Ägypten (ed. E. Brunner-Traut, H. Brunner, and J. Zick-Nissen; Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1984) 143 (no. 116). 104 See, for example, the description of Isis-Tyche in Campbell Bonner, Studies in Magical Amulets (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1950) 273. 105 Jastrow, Dictionary, 2:904. 106 The Vulgate contains the term “Nilus” (Isa 23:3). 107 An early attestation of the retrieval of Joseph’s cofn from the Nile is found in t. Sotah 4:7 (ed.Lieberman ); see also Mek. Beshallah (Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishma’el (ed. Horovitz and Rabin; 2d ed.; Jerusalem, 1970); Exod. Rab. 20:19; Pesiq. Rab Kah. 11; Tanh. Beshallah 2; Yal. 1, 247 Beshallah; Midr. Aggadah 13. Mishnat Rabbi Eliezer 19: “they put him into the ocean.” 108 Sifre Deut. 38; Midr. Tannaim 11:10; Gen. Rab. 13:9; Tg. Yer. Gen. 47:7. 109 Pesiq. Rab. 6:2, Ulmer ed.; Gen. Rab. 87; 13:7; Exod. Rab. 11:11, (ed. Shinan). Rashi on Gen. 39:11 refers to the Nile festival. 110 The biblical etymology of Moses’ Hebrew name is found in Exod 2:10; in David’s song of deliverance (2 Sam 22:17 = Ps 18:17), the same Hebrew root is utilized.
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states: “for the Egyptians call water môu and those who are saved esês.”111 These two terms are transcriptions of the Coptic words for “water” and “saved.”112 With regard to an Egyptian etymology of the name of Moses we may add that “Moses” may be based upon msw, “child of . . . ,”113 which possibly could be completed as “child of the god Ra‘ ” as in the Egyptian name Ramose. Thus, the name Moses could have been an abbreviation of a theophoric name, omitting the name of an Egyptian god.114 Another derivation is to read Moses as “to conceive, to bear.”115 However, Abraham H. Yahuda, based upon the spelling in the Hebrew Bible, derives the name of Moses from Egyptian “water” or “seed” and “pond, lake, expanse of water”; thus, Moses would mean “Child of the Nile” (mw-še).116 In this author’s view, “Child of the Nile” is the most likely derivation of the Hebrew name Moses as it appears in the Bible. In midrashic literature it is emphasized that Moses is an Egyptian name, given to him by the daughter of Pharaoh. The etymology explaining the name of Moses in midrash is the same as in the Bible, which is “drawn out of the water.”117 However, the midrash poses the question as to whether this name would be the correct grammatical Hebrew form for someone drawn out of the water.
The Dog-Headed God Anubis Anubis is the god responsible for embalming and is the lord of the necropolis,118 who is often depicted in the form of a dog or a jackal watching over the tombs. Traces of the Egyptian god Anubis are found in midrashic texts that refer to the dogs guarding the Egyptian tomb of Joseph in a necropolis.119 In midrashic texts these watchdogs of the tombs were juxtaposed to the “barking” dogs in the Scriptural reference from the Exodus narrative. Thesetwo features of barking and watching are consistent with references in Roman and Egyptian texts that refer to Anubis.120 111 Josephus V. Jewish Antiquities (trans. H. St. J. Thackeray; LCL; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1930). See Lester Grabbe, Etymology in Early Jewish Interpretation: The Hebrew Names in Philo (BJS 115; Atlanta: Scholars, 1988) 188, refers to Philo’s interpretation and its difference from the LXX.
Gesenius, Hebräisches und Aramäisches Handwörterbuch, 17th ed., s.v. LpQ. Rainer Hannig, Die Sprache der Pharaonen. Gro es Handwörterbuch Ägyptisch-Deutsch (2800-950 v. Chr.) (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1995), s.v. ms, 361. 114 Thomas A.G. Hartmann, “Moses und Maria–‘Amuns Kind und Liebling’—Auf den ägyptischen Spuren zweier biblischer Namen,” ZAW 116 (2004) 616–22, esp. 618. 115 WÄS, 2:137, s.v. Q], meaning “to conceive, bear.” See also John Gwyn Grifths, “The Egyptian Derivation of the Name Moses,” JNES 12 (1953) 225–31. Donald B. Redford, “Moses,” The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt, 2:438–39, relates the name Moses to the same Egyptian root msi (to bear), but also considers the Canaanite serpent god, Mu. 116 Yahuda, Language of the Pentateuch, 258. 117 Midrash Ha-Gadol Shemot 2:10 and Midrash Tehillim 90. 118 Hornung, Conceptions, 275; Apuleius, Metam. 11. 119 See Ulmer, “Egyptian Magic,” 169. 120 Reinhold Merkelbach, “Diodor über das Totengericht der Ägypter,” ZÄS 120 (1993) 71–84, in 112 113
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There are opposing powers that Moses has to combat when attempting to locate Joseph’s cofn at the time of the exodus from Egypt. Exod. Rab. 20:19: . . . and the Egyptians had constructed dogs made of gold which, by means of magic, barked for forty days whenever a man approached the sarcophagus, however, Moses made them shut up, as it is said: “But not a dog shall growl at any of the Israelites [not at people, not at animals, so that you shall know that the Lord makes a distinction between Egypt and Israel].” (Exod 11:7)
Within the different cycles of the Joseph legend in midrash, 121 we nd “magical dogs” or “articial dogs” (Pesiq. Rab Kah. 11:5) that are rendered powerless by Moses. These dogs are fashioned from gold, which was frequently utilized in funeral rites and funeral furnishings in Egypt because of the eternal value of the material. The dogs are identied as watching over the tombs in some versions of the midrashic texts. The dog motif may refer to practices associated with the jackal-headed god Anubis (inpw),122 who was a gure prominent in the rites of embalming.123 This custom continued into Greco-Roman and Coptic Egypt.124 On a shroud painting from Coptic Egypt (ca. 180 C.E.) we nd Anubis attending to the deceased, a man in Roman garb representing the mummied Osiris.125 Anubis was also known to Roman writers and he is found on Jewish amulets from the rst through third centuries C.E.;126 signicantly, some of these amulets had mixed inscriptions, for his analysis of the nal judgment according to Diodorus Siculus refers to the voice of Anubis, 77; see also Günter Vittmann, “Von Kastraten, Hundskopfmenschen und Kannibalen,” ZÄS 127 (2000) 167–82, esp. 167; Josephus, C. Ap. 2.85, mentions Anubis. Propertius, Elegies 1, 39 writes that [Cleopatra] “dared to pick barking Anubis against our Jupiter,” and Mark Anthony is said to have been accompanied by Egyptian gods in the battle against Octavian, such as “Anubis the barker” (Virgil, Aeneid 8.698–700). 121 Tanh. Beshallah 2:5; Eqev 6:5 Mek., Beshallah, Petihta (ed. Horovitz and Rabin); Deut. Rab. 11:5 (Vilna: Romm, 1887); Pesiq. Rab Kah. 11:5; Midr. Petirat Moshe in Bet ha-Midrash, 1:115–16; Midr. Shir ha-Shirim, ed. Grünhut, 13a–b; Midr. Aggadah, 13; Pesiq. Zut. Shemot 13:19; Divre Ha-yamim shel Moshe, Bet-Ha Midrash, 2:10–11; Pereq R. Yoshiahu, Bet Ha-Midrash, 6:112–13 (repr., Otzar Midrashim; Midrash Ha-Gadol, Bereshit on Gen 50:24); Yal. 1, 226 Beshallah, passim; t. Sotah 4:7 (ed. Lieberman; ed. Zuckermandel, 299–300); versions in: b. Sotah 13a; Bereshit Rabbati, Va-yehi 264; Tg. Ps.-J. to Exod 13:19 and Gen 50:26. 122 Brigitte Altenmüller, “Anubis,” LÄ, 1:327–33. 123 Pyramid Texts 1122c–d; the Tomb of Rai, Dra Abu el-Naga, 18th dynasty, 1300 B.C.E. (Staatliche Sammlung Ägyptischer Kunst München, 1996); Der el-Medina, Tomb No. 1; Papyrus Rhind (ca. 9 B.C.E.); Reinhold Merkelbach, “Diodor über das Totengericht der Ägypter,” ZÄS 120 (1993) 71–84, 77, refers to the voice of Anubis; Günter Vittmann, “Von Kastraten, Hundskopfmenschen und Kannibalen,” 167; Josephus, Ant. 18.65. 124 An Alexandrian tomb, the Tigrane Tomb, which was moved to Kom el-Shoqafa, depicts a corpse anked by two jackals, cf. Susan Marjorie Venit, Monumental Tombs of Ancient Alexandria: The Theater of the Dead (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) plate X. 125 Christian Cannuyer, Coptic Egypt: The Christians of the Nile (New York: Abrams, 2001) 12, depicts a shroud in Staatliche Museen Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Ägyptisches Museum, Berlin. 126 Geraldine Pinch, Magic in Ancient Egypt (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995) 166.
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example, in the name of the Hebrew God in hieroglyphs. Furthermore, Anubis is often depicted with a key (ankh) and in the Greek magical papyri Anubis carries the key to the tombs of the dead;127 this may be a precursor for the key of resurrection of the dead in the midrash of the three keys.128 In this midrash God keeps this unique key to the tombs.129 Although the name of the Egyptian god Anubis is not directly mentioned in midrashic literature, one may ask the question as to how the rabbis could have depicted barking dogs watching over tombs in Egypt, if they were totally oblivious to the role of the Egyptian deity Anubis? Furthermore, the rabbis were very reluctant to actually name foreign gods, since such an act of naming could bestow power upon such gods.
The Snake Apopis The Egyptian Apopis, the huge snake-god that threatens the barque of the sun-god every morning,130 is also mentioned in rabbinic texts. Y. Ned. 11:1, twice contains an oath formula: ]T[T]E “By Apopis!”131 This is a non-binding oath and a Jew should avoid swearing in the name of idolatrous gods. Krauss emphasizes that the term Apopis is not equivalent to the term TMTM (Tetragrammaton), which appears often in the Greek magical papyri.132 I agree with Krauss that the term Apopis, as it appears in the Yerushalmi, is denitely not a reference to the God of Israel and the ineffable name. Apopis was a hostile power that had to be adjured in order to balance good and evil. In Egyptian magic there were multiple descriptions and rituals to overcome the attacks of Apopis and to paralyze his powers. These apotropaic rites reverberate in the talmudic oath formula, ]T[T]E “By Apopis!” Rabbinic texts merely record the name of this Egyptian divine snake as part of an oath in the vernacular of Roman Palestine.
The Condemnation and Destruction of Egyptian Gods The biblical lemma, “On all the gods of Egypt will I execute judgments” (Exod 12:12), has been interpreted to mean that God battled and destroyed Egyptian gods in inner biblical, as well as in rabbinic interpretation. The destruction of the Egyptian gods together with the Egyptian kings is also mentioned in Jeremiah: “Behold, I will bring punishment to Amon of No, and Pharaoh, and Egypt, with their 127
Siegfried Morenz, “Anubis mit dem Schlüssel,” in Religion und Geschichte des alten Ägyptens (ed. Elke Blumenthal and Siegfried Hermann; Cologne: Wöhlau, 1975) 510–20. 128 Gen. Rab. 73:4; Deut. Rab. 7:6; Pesiq. Rab. 42:6 (ed.Ulmer); b. Ta‘an. 2a; b. Sanh. 113a. 129 See Rivka Ulmer, “Consistency and Change in Rabbinic Literature as Reected in the Terms ‘Rain’ and ‘Dew’,” JSJ 26 (1995) 55–75. 130 Book of the Gates, tomb of Ramses VI (1142–1135 B.C.E.); in the Greco-Roman period Apopis is thought to have been created by Neith (Esna temple). In Coptic Egypt Apopis is also mentioned, see Joris F. Borghouts, “The Evil Eye of Apopis,” JEA 59 (1973) 114–50. 131 Robert K. Ritner, The Mechanics of Ancient Egyptian Magical Practice (SAOC 54; Chicago: The Oriental Institute, 1993) 147, mentions Apopis as the enemy of Horus. 132 Krauss, “Aegyptische,” 346–48.
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gods, and their kings; even Pharaoh and all them that trust in him” (Jer 46:25). This passage from Jeremiah was interpreted by the rabbis as an attack on the Egyptian gods. Rabbinic interpretation used the Bible as a resource for addressing Egyptian religion. The divine battle against the gods of Egypt is also a topic in midrashic texts (e.g., Gen. Rab. 96:5; Num. Rab. 16:25; Song Rab. 2:29). Num. Rab. 16:25: Moses said to Him: “The inhabitants of the land . . . have heard that You, Lord, are in the midst of the people . . . now if You will kill this people as one man” (Num 14: 14–15). He meant: Do not do this that the nations of the world will not say: The gods of Canaan are more difcult to overcome than the gods of Egypt; the gods of Egypt are false, but those of Canaan are strong.
Rabbinic interpretations of passages that deal with the destruction of Egyptian gods are based upon attitudes found in the Hebrew Bible. Israelite worship of Egyptian gods is condemned in Josh 24:14, a dialogue between the Israelites and Joshua, in which serving the Lord, as opposed to worshiping other gods, is emphasized: “Put away the gods that your ancestors served beyond the River and in Egypt. . .” This passage indicates that the Israelites had actually worshipped Egyptian gods. This idolatrous worship of Egyptian gods is also condemned in Ezek 20:7–8: “Do not dele yourselves with the idols of Egypt . . . not one of them cast away the detestable things their eyes fasted upon, nor did they forsake the idols of Egypt.”133 A midrashic text continues this theme of the condemnation of the worship of Egyptian gods. The “Hebrews” are rebuked for worshipping Egyptian gods in Egypt. Pesiq. Rab Kah. 5:7: Our Master Moses, How can we be redeemed, seeing that the land of Egypt is lled with the lth of idolatry? [Moses] said: Since God wishes to redeem you, He will overlook your idolatrous worship.
Following biblical paradigms rabbinic literature viewed Egyptian gods in the context of having been worshiped by the Hebrews in Egypt and consequently, these idols had to be rejected. In this rejection of Egyptian gods it becomes evident that the rabbis had some knowledge of different Egyptian divinities. These rabbinic texts demonstrate that Egypt was not a mere abstraction of which the rabbis had no real knowledge.
Conclusion Jewish perceptions of Egyptian gods in midrashic texts were transmitted through biblical interpretation; alternatively, they were often derived from the surrounding Greco-Roman culture—the culture that dominated the era during which rabbinic texts were created. Egyptian gods in midrash facilitated the establishment of 133
See also Ezek 23:3, 8.
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theological positions in which the God of the Israelites displaced the Egyptian gods. It can be surmised that perhaps the rabbis deliberately invoked Egyptian gods in order to reafrm the supremacy of the God of Israel and, by extension the rabbinic perspective of Judaism. Egyptian gods are referred to in the following midrashic contexts: 1) in opposition to the Israelite God in narrative and homiletic passages, 2) as gods worshiped by idolaters, 3) as elements of theophoric names, 4) as statues of foreign cults, 5) on objects, such as a ring, 6) in oaths. The rabbis composed some remarkably accurate passages concerning Egypt and its gods. However, describing the Egyptian gods was not the primary focus of the midrashic corpus; the major concern in midrash was the idea of “opposing” the land, culture, and religions of Egypt. It is critical that one recognizes the disempowered relationship to “Egypt” of the writers of midrash and the role Egypt plays rhetorically and polemically in their texts. Ultimately, Egypt was a symbol of the “Other” whenever it was the focus of the hermeneutics of midrash. The rst inversion of Egyptian concepts arguably transpired in the Hebrew Bible when Egyptian practices were deemed to be abominations. The cultural practices of the “Others,” as well as their deities, were summarily rejected. The second inversion of the “Otherness” of Egyptian culture was willfully created by the rabbis in midrashic texts.134 In Egypt, the gods were viewed as supremely positive symbols indicative of power, life, and eternity, while in the midrashic texts the Egyptian gods were transformed into negative symbols, indicative of idolatry, persecution, and death. It is clear that the rabbis possessed a basic knowledge of Egypt, but they manipulated this information to serve their own polemical purposes in their texts. In their portrayals of Egyptian gods the rabbis included topics and themes that were motivated by ideological and religious norms wholly different from those of the Egyptian religionists. The purpose of manipulating these Egyptian ideas and customs was to establish rabbinic concepts in contrast to Egypt, Rome, new religious groups, as well as against others who laid claim to the Hebrew God. Egypt had become more of a theological position rather than a real place. This theological position served as a trope for rhetorical effect in the rabbinic struggle against religious and cultural threats posed by life in Roman Palestine and in the Diaspora. In many respects these environments were viewed as another Egypt. Rome, the ruling power in the Land of Israel in late antiquity, was fascinated with Egypt; Rome also adopted Egyptian gods, such as Isis and Serapis that offered new religious perspectives and who were both viewed as representatives of an ancient and exotic culture. The rabbinic discussions textualize these Egyptian icons in the polemical or dialectical engagement of the rabbis with foreign cults and beliefs. A further aspect of rabbinic references to the Egyptian gods is that they serve as not only links to the past, but as a catalyst for current obligations, the continuous 134 The theory of inversion is based upon Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (trans. E. B. Ashton; New York: Seabury Press, 1973, repr., 1994; Negative Dialektik [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp; repr., 1975]).
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performance of the divine commandments. Midrash serves as a sacred way for textual engagement and, in the case of homiletic texts about Egyptian gods, midrash offers a narrative for the Jews that reveals the relevant, true meaning of God. The rabbinic texts utilized portrayals of Egyptian gods in order to make statements of their own values and ideologies. Rabbinic texts referred to Egyptian cultural icons, which served to demarcate rabbinic Judaism from Egyptian and other foreign cultures. Throughout late antiquity the rabbis continued to affect and alter received traditions. What we call rabbinic Judaism was in an enormous state of ux and self-examination, while Judaic culture was a work in progress. In the midst of this dynamic tension, the rabbis and their associates still contributed to their community’s identity. Like the biblical writers, who struggled with the concept of the “Exodus from Egypt” and dened Judaism in opposition to Egyptian customs, the rabbis expressed their perspective of this struggle in their own evolving terms. Reengaging with Egypt and its gods in order to shape and dene Judaism was a way of conducting one’s life within the philosophical framework of one’s community, aspiring to an ethical ideal of differentiating oneself from the majority culture that was viewed as the “Other.”
Was There a “Reformation Doctrine of Justication”?* David C. Fink Duke University
In this essay I take up cudgels against a central construct in the confessional historiography of the Protestant Reformation: The notion that there existed a clear, well-dened doctrine of justication shared by all the major reformers from the earliest stages of the conagration and that this “Reformation doctrine of justication” served as the “material principle” in the formation of the emerging Protestant self-identity.1 In contrast with this traditional view, I argue that the rst*An earlier version of this essay was presented at the 2007 annual meeting of the Sixteenth Century Society in Minneapolis, Minn. I am especially grateful to David Steinmetz, Scott Manetsch, Greg Lee, and John Slotemaker, all of whom carefully read subsequent drafts and offered numerous helpful criticisms. Abbreviations—BC: The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (ed. Robert W. Kolb and Timothy K. Wengert; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000); BSLK: Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelischlutherischen Kirche (3d ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956); BSRK: Die Bekenntnisschriften der reformierten Kirche (ed. Ernst Friedrich Karl Müller; Leipzig: Deichert, 1903); CCER: Collectio confessionum in ecclesiis reformatis publicatarum (ed. Hermann Agathon Niemeyer; Leipzig: Klinkhardt, 1840); CCFCT: Creeds and Confessions of Faith in the Christian Tradition (ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Valerie Hotchkiss; New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003); CCFR: Confessions et catéchismes de la foi réformée (ed. Olivier Fatio; Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1986); CR: Corpus Reformatorum: Philippi Melanthonis opera quae supersunt omnia (ed. Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider and Heinrich Ernst Bindseil et al.; 28 vols.; Halle: Schwetschke, 1834–60); LW: Luther’s Works (55 vols.; St. Louis: Concordia [1–30]; Philadelphia: Fortress [vols. 31–55]; 1955–86); MSA: Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl [Studienausgabe] (ed. Robert Stupperich; 7 vols.; Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1951–75); OER: Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation (ed. Hans Hillerbrand; 4 vols; New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); OS: Ioannis Calvini Opera Selecta (ed. Peter Barth and Wilhelm Niesel; 5 vols.; Munich: Kaiser, 1926–1936); Schaff: Creeds of Christendom (ed. ed. Philip Schaff; 6th ed.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1983); WA: D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (65 vols.; Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1883– ); WABr: D. Martin Luthers Werke: Briefwechsel (18 vols.; Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1930–78). 1 August Twesten is widely regarded as the rst scholar to identify justication as the principium essendi of the Reformation in the initial volume of his Vorlesungen über die Dogmatik der evangelischlutherischen Kirche (Hamburg: Perthes, 1826). This notion was further developed by Albrecht Ritschl, in his landmark work, Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung (Bonn: A.
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generation reformers, galvanized by Luther’s protest against the indulgence trade, adopted a common “rhetoric of dissent” aimed at critiquing the regnant Catholic orthopraxy of salvation in the interest of a common set of primarily existentialreligious concerns. During the course of the next several decades following the initia Lutheri, however, an “orthodox” doctrine of justication quickly emerged— several of them, in fact. The Roman Catholic church and the emerging Protestant confessions, Lutheran and Reformed, quickly found it necessary to formulate their teachings in increasingly precise terms, so as both to integrate their central soteriological afrmations within a wider body of contested doctrines and practices and to demarcate clearly the boundaries of confessional identity in opposition to competing confessions. As with earlier periods of intense theological controversy within the Christian tradition, this conict represented not a sudden breakthrough, but rather “a search for orthodoxy, a search conducted by the method of trial and error.”2 Unlike earlier debates, however, what emerged in the aftermath of the Reformation was not a single, dominant orthodoxy which carried the eld, but rather multiple, competing orthodoxies, each one with its own Gospel. This essay will focus on the emergence of one of those gospels, the Protestant doctrine of justication by faith alone. The break with the medieval church occasioned by Luther’s theological protest resulted in what I shall describe as an invention of orthodoxy—understood here in the usefully ambiguous sense of the Latin term inventio, as both discovery and contrivance. Protestant theologians were adamant that they were not presenting the world with novel teaching. Rather, they insisted that in confessing the faith in their distinctive way they were simply carrying forward Luther’s “rediscovery of the Gospel”—which was, after all, simply a more accurate reading of St. Paul.3 On the other hand, the rise of confessional conict in the years following this “rediscovery” demanded a coordinated response. Protestant leaders had to craft a new theological grammar which would not only preserve and defend a set of common commitments but also clarify those insights for the catechetical task and allow for their ready defense against Catholic and radical polemicists. They had to articulate an “ancient” Gospel in an unprecedented new context in which opposing conceptions of the Gospel itself were rapidly hardening into what would become a permanently factionalized state of intra-Christian conict: the confessional era.
Marcus, 1870), whence it passed into general usage. ET: A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justication and Reconciliation (trans. John S. Black; Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1872). See Konrad Raiser, “Protestantism,” in The Encyclopedia of Christianity (ed. ed. Edwin Fahlbusch et al.; 4 vols.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2005) 4:395. 2 I have adapted this characterization for the present context from Richard P. C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy, 318–381 (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2006) 13. 3 David C. Steinmetz, “Luther and Calvin on Church and Tradition,” Michigan Germanic Studies 10 (1984) 108.
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My argument in this essay proceeds in three stages. First, I survey recent historical scholarship which has highlighted the importance of confessionalization as an interpretive category for the social and cultural history of early modern Germany, and I suggest that this concept has been under-utilized in analyzing the development of Christian doctrine. Second, I engage in some detail with a seminal essay by Berndt Hamm, in which I critique what I take to be the strongest version on offer of the traditional synthetic account of the “Reformation doctrine of justication.” With these methodological and critical pieces in place, I attempt in the nal section of the essay to reframe the question more plausibly on historical grounds by tracing out a skeletal account of the emergence of the confessional consensus on justication through a survey of creedal and catechetical statements between Augsburg (1530) and the Formula of Concord (1577).
Confession, Confessionalization, and Post-Confessional History The emergence of this permanently factionalized state of intra-Christian conict in Western Christendom has been described by historians in the last generation as a process of Konfessionsbildung, or “confession-formation,” a process running parallel in Lutheran, Reformed, and Roman Catholic contexts and affecting not only the ecclesiastical, but also the political and social spheres of life. Each confessional church quickly came to view itself as a universal confessio catholica, vested with divine authority as the exclusive mouthpiece of revealed truth and entrusted with the task of safeguarding the doctrine, ritual, and discipline of its members.4 This task involved not only specifying the content of Christian teaching with ever increasing precision, but doing so as to highlight theological differences with rival confessions. More recently, this notion of Konfessionsbildung has been incorporated into a broader category, that of Konfessionalisierung, or “confessionalization,” a concept including not only the formation of distinct and opposing ecclesiastical identities, but also describing the relationships which developed between these confessional churches and the emerging nation-states of early modern Europe.5 4 Ernst Walter Zeeden, Konfessionsbildung. Studien zur Reformation, Gegenreformation und katholischen Reform (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1985) 67. 5 The literature on the so-called Konfessionalisierungsthese is immense, but it is limited, for the most part, to scholarship originating in Germany. Seminal contributions include Heinz Schilling, Konfessionskonikt und Staatsbildung. Eine Fallstudie über das Verhältnis von religiösem und sozialem Wandel in der Frühneuzeit am Beispiel der Grafschaft Lippe (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1981); Wolfgang Reinhard, “Konfession und Konfessionalisierung in Europa,” in Bekenntnis und Geschichte. Die Confessio Augustana im historischen Zusammenhang (ed. Wolfgang Reinhard; Munich: Verlag Ernst Vögel, 1981) 165–89. See also the essays from the following symposia on confessionalization by the Verein für Reformationsgeschichte, in Die lutherische Konfessionalisierung in Deutschland. Wissenschaftliches Symposion des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte 1988 (ed. Hans–Christoph Rublack; Gütersloh: Mohn, 1992); Die katholische Konfessionalisierung: wissenschaftliches Symposion der Gesellschaft zur Herausgabe des Corpus Catholicorum und des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte 1993 (ed. Wolfgang Reinhard and Heinz Schilling; Gütersloh:
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Confessionalization is thus presented as a fundamental social process running parallel to the rise of the modern state and the formation in early modern society of disciplined subjects, beginning as a symbiotic relationship between church and state, but ending with the monopolization of religious life by the latter.6 The “confessionalization thesis” has generated an impressive body of scholarship aimed at reevaluating, among other things, the place of religion in macro-historical descriptions of the social, political, and cultural development of early modern Europe. Not all historians are convinced that this paradigm has quite the explanatory power urged by some of its most vocal proponents;7 nevertheless, it seems clear that this trend has at the very least secured a prominent place for the role of religion in early modern European history, even as it has challenged the privileged place of the Reformation in accounting for the origins of European modernity. As Heinz Schilling explains: In light of the insights of scholarship on confessionalization during the last decade, we will not be able in the long run to avoid the recognition that the societal changes effected by confessionalization were more profound than the changes directly effected by the Reformation. Of course, we must not fail to notice that confessionalization is unthinkable without the Reformation, even as the Reformation itself is unthinkable without the preceding late medieval reform. . . . The late Middle Ages were the boarding, the Reformation was the runway, and confessionalization was the take-off of European modernization.8
Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1995). For a recent survey in English of the scholarship on confessionalization, Thomas A. Brady, Jr., “Confessionalization: The Career of a Concept,” in Confessionalization in Europe, 1555–1700: Essays in Honor and Memory of Bodo Nischan (ed. John M. Headley, Hans J. Hillerbrand, and Anthony J. Papalas; Burlinton, Vt.: Ashgate, 2004) 1–20; Ute Lotz–Heumann, “Confessionalization,” in Reformation and Early Modern Europe: A Guide to Research (ed. David Whitford; Kirksville, Mo.: Truman State, 2008) 136–57. 6 Heinz Schilling, “Die Konfessionalisierung von Kirche, Staat und Gesellschaft: Prol, Leistung, Dezite und Perspektiven eines geschichtswissenschaftlichen Paradigmas,” in Katholische Konfessionalisierung, 41. 7 Winfried Schulze, for example, focuses on the growth of skepticism and “free–thinking” during this period, as well as with the emerging ideals of tolerance and religious freedom to argue that confessionalization paved the way the real main event of early modernity, secularization, in “Konfessionalisierung Konfessionalisierung als Paradigma zur Erforschung des konfessionellen Zeitalters,” in Drei Konfessionen in einer Region. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Konfessionalisierung im Herzogtum Berg vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert (ed. Burkhardt Dietz and Stefan Ehrenpreis; Cologne: Rheinland, 1999) 15–30. Legal historians have also pointed out that it was during the supposed peak of confessionalization that the secularization of imperial law rst got underway. See, for example, Michael Stolleis, “ ‘Konfessionalisierung’ oder ‘Säkularisierung’ bei der Entstehung des frühmodernen Staates,” Ius Commune 20 (1993) 1–24. 8 Heinz Schilling, “Reformation. Umbruch oder Gipfelpunkt eines Temps des Réformes?” in Die fruhe Reformation in Deutschland als Umbruch. Wissenschaftliches Symposion des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte 1996 (ed. ed. Stephen E. Buckwalter and Bernd Moeller; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1998) 24; cited in Hans J. Hillerbrand, “Was There a Reformation in the Sixteenth Century?” CH 72 (2003) 549.
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This renewed focus on religion has not come without certain ironies, however. With all the attention given to Konfessionsbildung, Konfessionalisierung, and Konfessionalismus, the central term in metonymic relation to which all these concepts stand is often overlooked: confession. While it is now almost universally acknowledged that confessionalism—“salvation within, perdition without,” in one critic’s snappy phrase9—played a central role in the social and political history of early modern Europe, relatively little heed has been paid either to the intellectual history of the confessions themselves or to the effects of this process on theology and exegesis. This ought not to be viewed as a failing of the confessionalization thesis itself, a paradigm which has, from the beginning, been presented as a conceptual model for understanding the social and cultural history of early modern Europe.10 Yet the implications of this approach for intellectual history—and for the history of Christian doctrine in particular—have yet to be fully explored.11 At one level, of course, it might seem strange to suggest that the intellectual history of the confessions themselves has not been sufciently examined. After all, the confessional theology of none of the three traditions has ever wanted for careful, even loving, historical attention