Haecceity: An Ontological Essay

GARY S. ROSENKRANTZ University of North Carolina at Greensboro

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HAECCEITY An Ontological Essay

antoloq,cal assay 1 by Gary S. Ftosenkrantz, LPhtiospphIcel sTudles serlis 4 w. 671 p. cq. IneludeS tIbIlogrepqleal references E. xxx-xxx1 and tndaxatISBN 0-7923-2498-2 (ilk. pspari

I, HOGICCeity (PrtilOgephp B0395.5.R67 1993 III--dca

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GARY S. ROSENKRANTZ University of North Carolina at Greensboro

TABLE OF CONTENTS

HAECCEITY An Ontological Essay

PREFACE

ix

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINAIRES

1 6 11 16 22 42 53 56 69

CHAPTER 2 - THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION

72 72 77 82 93 97 106 124 130

I Metaphysical Explanations II Qualitatively Indistinguishable Concreta III Proposed Criteria of Individuation IV Principles of Evaluation for the Proposed Criteria V Evaluations of the Proposed Criteria VI The Haecceity Criterion: Neither Trivial Nor Circular VII Responses To A Priori Objections to Haecceity VIII Haecceity: A Metaphysical Explanation of Diversity CHAPTER 3 - HAECCEITIES AND NONEXISTENT POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON

1

I Haecceity: An Initial Account II Qualitative and Nonqualitative Abstracta III Controversies About Haecceities IV Modal Concepts V Cognitive and Linguistic Concepts VI Haecceities and Individual Essences VII Varieties of Realism and Anti-Realism VIII The Concrete/Abstract Distinction IX Qualitative and Nonqualitative Properties

I The Individuation of NEPs II The Individuation of Disjoint Objects III Objections To Unexemplified Haecceities: A Reply IV The Unity of Metaphysical Modalities CHAPTER 4 - SINGULAR REFERENCE AND UNEXEMPLIFIED HAECCEITIES

I Mereological Descriptions of Unexemplified Haecceities II Causal Descriptions of Unexemplified Haecceities

140 140 146 150 166 168 168 179

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I Haecceities and Acquaintance II Haecceities and Re-identification III An Argument for Premise 1 of R IV An Argument for Premise 2 of R V Synchronic Versions of R VI Objections to R and its Analogs: A Rebuttal VII Divine Cognition and Haecceities VIII The Objects of Acquaintance IX Objections to Russellian Objects of Acquaintance: A Response X Cognitively Inaccessible Haecceities

184 184 191 196 198 204 214 220 225 236 241

INDEX OF NAMES

245

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

247

CHAPTER 5 - ACQUAINTANCE

PREFACE Philosophical discussions of haecceity or "thisness" give rise to a number of controversies. One of these controversies concerns whether or not there are haecceities or "thisnesses". This controversy over the existence of such attributes is pertinent to a body of contemporary research in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language, including analytic investigations of Identity and Individuation, Modality and Possible Worlds, Propositional Attitudes, De Re Belief, and Names. For example, philosophers who accept the existence of haecceities have advanced the following claims. (1) Haecceities provide a criterion of identity across possible worlds for particulars.' (2) De re necessity can be understood in terms of de dicto necessity because individuals have haecceities. 2 (3) De re belief can be analyzed in terms of de dicto belief because individuals have haecceities. 3 (4) A person, S, grasps his own haecceity when he has a piece of selfknowledge expressible in first-person language, and S cannot identify an external thing, x, unless S uniquely relates x to himself in such a way that S grasps his own haecceity. 4 (5) In some contexts, haecceities of particulars are intensions of indexical expressions or proper names.' Of course, philosophers who deny that particulars have haecceities reject (1)-(5). Typically, these philosophers argue either that the notion of such a haecceity is obscure, or that haecceities of this kind are peculiar entities, or

See Robert Adams, "Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity," The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), pp. 5-26. 2 See

Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974).

3

See Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study (La Salle: Open Court, 1976), Chapter 1, and Appendix C. 4 Roderick

Chisholm, Person and Object, Chapter 1, and Appendix C.

5

See M. Lockwood "Identity and Reference" in M. Munitz, ed., Identity and Individuation (New York: New York University Press, 1971), pp. 199-211, and "On Predicating Proper Names," The Philosophical Review, 84 (1975), pp. 471-498. Also see Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, Chapter 1; and Nathan Salmon, Reference and Essence (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1981), pp. 21-22.

ix

PREFACE

PREFACE

X

that it is metaphysically extravagant to think that particulars have haecceities.' This book has three goals. First, to vindicate the thesis that particulars have haecceities. Second, to solve certain metaphysical, epistemological, and linguistic problems about haecceities. Third, to use premises about haecceities to justify a rare and very special variety of Extreme Realism about abstract entities. Chapter 1 is introductory in nature, and provides the groundwork for accomplishing the three aforementioned goals. Preliminary discussions of major topics are coupled with elucidations of key metaphysical, epistemological, and linguistic concepts, including the concept of haecceity. Philosophical analyses of two distinctions which are central to this project are provided, the first being the distinction between concreta and abstracta, and the second being the distinction between qualitative abstracta and nonqualitative abstracta. Chapter 2 examines the metaphysical problem of explaining the diversity of individuals at a time, or of providing a criterion of individuation for particulars, given the possibility of two qualitatively indistinguishable individuals. It is argued that the solution to this problem implies that particulars have haecceities. Chapter 3 provides justification for the controversial claim that there are unexemplified haecceities which have necessary existence and which could be exemplified by particulars. Chapter 4 argues for a somewhat surprising thesis: that we can pick out or identify some of the aforementioned unexemplified haecceities, and use definite descriptions of a certain kind to denote or make singular reference to them. Chapter 5 advances an epistemological argument which has three

xi

interesting implications. (1) There are some haecceities which no one is capable of grasping or expressing linguistically, for instance, haecceities of objects which are incapable of consciousness. (2) In some cases a haecceity can be grasped or expressed linguistically by one and only one person, for example, your haecceity can only be grasped or expressed linguistically by you. (3) There are some haecceities which can be grasped or expressed linguistically by many persons, for instance, the haecceity of a sharable characteristic such as Squareness. Some prefatory remarks about my approach to ontology and the relationship of this approach to the ontological problems dealt with in this essay will perhaps be helpful to the reader. Although I will defend a form of platonic realism, my conception of ontology is fundamentally aristotelian in nature. According to such a conception, ontology is a "first science" which studies fundamental categories of being or existence, otherwise known as ontological categories. There are two main branches of ontology: speculative ontology, and analytic ontology.' Speculative ontology attempts to ascertain what kinds of entities exist. It asks, for example, whether or not there are instances of ontological categories such as Substance, Event, Place, Time, Collection, Property, Relation, Proposition, and Number. Analytic ontology, on the other hand, attempts to give an account of what features various kinds of entities must have: it seeks to provide conceptual or philosophical analyses of ontological categories, without commitment as to whether or not there are instances of those categories. Accordingly, analytic ontology concerns itself with the nature of the more fundamental categories of concreta, for example, Substance, Event, Place, and Time, the nature of the more fundamental categories of abstracta, for instance, Property, Relation, Proposition, and Number, and the nature of any necessary interrelationships which hold among any of these categories. Speculative ontology, however, is concerned with whether or not there exist concreta or abstracta belonging to such categories.

6

See Roderick Chisholm, "Objects and Persons: Revisions and Replies," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 7/8 (1979), pp. 317-388, The First Person (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), and "Possibility without Haecceity," in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, II, Studies in Essentialism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 157-164. Also see Ernest Sosa, "Propositions and Indexical Attitudes" in H. Parret, ed., On Believing: Epistemological and Semiotic Approaches (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1983), pp. 316-332.

' This distinction was drawn by D. C. Williams in his Principles of Empirical Realism (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1966), p. 74. In a similar vein, Brian Carr has recently distinguished between categorial description and categorial realism. See Carr's Metaphysics: An Introduction (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1987),

Chapter 1.

xii PREFACE

Problems belonging to each of these branches of ontology shall be investigated in this essay. I will argue that the notions of Concrete Entity and Abstract Entity can be analyzed in terms of a hierarchy of ontological categories related to one another as species and genus. Such an argument is an instance of analytic ontology. I shall also argue that there are abstract properties, including both universals and haecceities of concreta. Here we have a piece of speculative ontology. Standard arguments given in support of Abstract Property-Realism include the following. First, sharable properties have been posited on the ground that they are part of the best explanation of one or more of the following six phenomena. (1) There being a number of concrete items which are of the same kind, for instance, numerous particulars which are white. (2) A person's having the ability to perceive that a number of concrete items are of the same kind. (3) A predicate's denoting numerous concrete items which are of the same kind. (4) The existence of a necessary truth such as if something is red, then it is colored. (5) The fact that there are nonactual possibilities like there being a purple horse. (6) The existence of logical and mathematical truths, for example, that all men being mortal is validly inferable from all men being animals and all animals being mortal, and that 7+5=12, respectively. Second, sharable properties have been postulated on the ground that there are truths about such properties, for instance, some shapes are never exemplified, or Honesty is a virtue, whose import cannot be adequately captured by any nominalistic translation. For most philosophers, the question of the existence of haecceities arises, if at all, only after the existence of sharable properties or universals like Triangularity, Catness, and Redness has been accepted. When confronted by this question, many philosophers decline to postulate haecceities of concreta, whether they be "thisnesses" of inanimate entities or ego-centric properties such as being identical with me. Such a posttilation is often viewed with deep suspicion because it appears to be unparsimonious, and indeed the charge of ontological profligacy is one that has been leveled against Property-Realism of any sort. My own argument is an attempt to show that, on the contrary, it is necessary to posit haecceities of concrete entities in order to explicate the state of affairs of two concreta's being diverse at a time.

PREFACE, xiii

The argument I present entails a radical or "giraffe" realism of properties. This radical realism not only implies that there are universals or sharable attributes, but implies that for any concrete entity, a, a has a haecceity, an irreducibly nonqualitative property or "thisness" of being identical with a. Haecceities of concrete entities are postulated on the ground that they are part of the best explanation of two concrete entities' being diverse at a time. Utilizing the premise that concrete entities have haecceities, I proceed to argue that there are unexemplified haecceities. According to my argument, some of these unexemplified haecceities are not equivalent to a conjunction of exemplified properties, and others of them are equivalent to such a conjunction. These conclusions are accepted on the ground that they are part of the best explanation of the fact that the number of individuals which could exist is greater than the number of individuals which do exist. Finally, I argue that many nonqualitative haecceities cannot be grasped by any of us, but that some of these haecceities can be picked out by us. This last argument has four noteworthy implications. First, a haecceity of an essentially nonconscious being is necessarily ungraspable. Second, an unexemplified haecceity cannot be grasped by us. Third, some unexemplified haecceities which are equivalent to a conjunction of exemplified properties can be picked out by us. Fourth, an unexemplified haecceity which is not equivalent to a conjunction of exemplified properties cannot be picked out by us. My overall argument implies an extreme realism of properties via an inference to the best explanation of the diversity of concrete entities. As far as I am aware, this is a hitherto untraveled route to Property-Realism. A number of acknowledgements are in order. I am indebted to my colleague (and erstwhile collaborator on other projects) Joshua Hoffman. He has helped me in writing this book in a myriad of ways, not least of which in providing difficult objections for me to attempt to surmount. I would also like to thank my teacher Roderick Chisholm, who is the source of my interest in the topic of Haecceity. Many of the leading ideas in this book are present in an earlier form in my doctoral dissertation Individual Essences, Brown University, 1976, written under the direction of Roderick Chisholm, Ernest Sosa, and James Van Cleve. In addition, I would like to express my gratitude to Arnold Cusmariu for his encouragement and helpful observa-

xiv PREFACE

tions. I benefitted significantly, as well, from the criticisms and suggestions for improvements proposed by an anonymous referee who reviewed an earlier draft of this book for Kluwer academic publishers. Thanks are also due to an anonymous referee who reviewed a manuscript containing some related material for Cambridge University Press, namely, my and Joshua Hoffman' s Substance Among Other Categories: A Conceptual Investigation. Finally, I wish to thank the Research Council of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro for supporting my work on this project during a leave in the spring of 1987. I have incorporated parts of the following articles of mine: "Acquaintance," Philosophia, 14 Nos. 1-2 (1984), pp. 1-23; "Nonexistent Possibles and Their Individuation," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 22 (1984), pp. 127147; "Haecceities and Perceptual Identification," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 9 (1979), pp. 107-119; "On Objects Totally Out Of This World," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 25/26 (1985/1986), pp. 197-208; with Joshua Hoffman, "The Independence Criterion of Substance," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51 (1991), pp. 835-853; also with Joshua Hoffman "J. Rudner Boscovich" and "Mereology" in Robert Audi, ed., The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); "Concrete/Abstract" in Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, eds., Companion to Metaphysics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993); and "Critical Notice: The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes by Edward Wierenga," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51 (1991), pp. 725-728. I would like to thank the editors of Philosophia, Grazer Philosophische Studien, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Basil Blackwell, and Cambridge University Press for kindly allowing me to include this material. -

Greensboro, North Carolina 1993

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES "There is a certaine singularitie, interest, and proprietie in euerie thing." [1583 Stubbes The Anatomie of Abuses II. 11 (1882)] That singularity which seemeth so close girt to every individual creature." [Beaumont Psyche, or love's mystery XXI. lii (1684)]

I - HAECCEITY: AN INITIAL ACCOUNT "There was nothing like it in the philosophy of Plato." (1782 Priestly An History of the Corruptions of Christianity I. I. 93)

What is a haecceity or "thisness"?' Informally speaking, we can say that a particular haecceity is the property of being identical with a certain entity. For example, if there are such properties as being identical with me, being identical with Socrates, and being identical with Gorbachev, then these properties are haecceities. If there are haecceities, then I exemplibi the property of being identical with me, and lack the property of being identical with Socrates. The relation

'The anglicized term haecceity derives from haecceitas, a term coined by Duns Scotus (1266-1308). Haecceitas is from Latin haecce, haece, fem. of hic this. Thus, the literal meaning of haecceity is thisness. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first appearance of the anglicized form in a text is in 1647: "Here club-fisted Logick with all her Quiddities...nor Scotus with his haeccities was able to dastardize or cow his spirits, but he made

her who first appeard like a Gorgons head, to prove a meer Bugbeare." (Robert Baron, The Cyprian Academy, Lib. I., p. 6)

2

CHAPTER

of lacking is the contradictory of the exemplification relation. When it is said that an entity, x, exemplifies a property what is meant is that x has that property; and when it is said that x lacks a property what is meant is that x does not have that property. For instance, when it is said that an object, o, exemplifies Sphericity, what is meant is that o has the property of being spherical; and when it is said that o lacks Greenness, what is meant is that o does not have the property of being green. It seems that we intuitively grasp what it is for something to have a property, just as it appears that we intuitively grasp what it is for something to have a part, though in either one of these two cases we would be hard pressed to provide a conceptual analysis of what it is that we intuitively grasp. Certain paradigm or core instances of Propertyhood are sharable qualities, properties which can be exemplified by a number of things at once, for example, qualities such as Redness, Squareness, and Catness. So, if at time t there are three cats Morris, Felix, and Garfield, then at t each of them exemplifies Catness or has the property of being a cat. On the other hand, a haecceity is not a sharable quality. For example, it is evident that the property of being identical with me cannot be exemplified by two things at once. It might be suggested that a formal account of haecceity can be provided in linguistic terms: a haecceity is a property designated by an expression of the form 'the property of being identical with N', where 'N' is a proper name or indexical indicator. However, since properties are not linguistic entities, it seems reasonable to ask for a nonlinguistic account of haecceity. Notice that my earlier informal characterization of haecceity is nonlinguistic. This informal characterization suggests that a nonlinguistic account of the concept of haecceity can be provided by employing existential quantification. As we shall see, the exact nature of such a nonlinguistic account depends on whether or not there could be an unexemplified haecceity. 2 According to some philosophers, an unexemplified haecceity is an impossibility. 3 If these philosophers are correct, then the concept of haecceity can be defined as follows. 2

By unexemplified I mean never-exemplified.

3 See

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

1

Robert Adams, "Actualism and Thisness," Synthese, 49 (1981), pp. 3-41.



3

(Dl) F is a haecceity =df. (3x)(F is the property of being identical with x.) 4 Unlike the linguistic account of haecceity given earlier, (Dl) is not formulated in terms of a relationship which a haecceity bears to a linguistic expression of a certain kind. In this sense, (Dl) provides a nonlinguistic account of haecceity. Since a haecceity is a property, and since a property has content, a haecceity has content. The content of a haecceity is an entity's individuality or identity, and (Dl) makes it clear in what sense a haecceity has, such a content.' Because nothing can be identical with more than one thing, there could not be an entity which exemplifies more than one haecceity. Plainly, a haecceity cannot be identified with a property such as: (i) being identical with something, or (ii) being an x such that (3y)(x=y), or (iii) being self-identical, or (iv) being an x such that x is identical with x. (i)-(iv) are necessarily coinstantiated, but a haecceity is not necessarily coinstantiated with (i)-(iv). For instance, although whatever exemplifies

4

In (D1), existential quantification is utilized to define the concept of haecceity. Existential quantification can be used in this way because a variable bound by an existential quantifier refers generally to an item without the variable expressing any attribute whatsoever. A variable of this kind does not express a haecceity of an item, since it makes no reference to anything in particular. Such a variable cannot be said to express an attribute of existence, since existence is what is expressed by the quantifier which binds the variable, Nor is there any other attribute which a variable of this sort could reasonably be thought to express. (DI) has the following implicit logical structure: necessarily, for any property y, y is a haecceity if and only if there exists an x such that Ryx, where R is the dyadic relation, _being the property of being identical with. 5

Compare Johannes Duns Scotus, The Oxford Commentary On The Four Books Of The Sentences (selections) in Hyman and Walsh, eds., Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Indianapolis:

Hackett, 1973), p. 588. Scotus characterizes a haecceity as a "positive entity intrinsically determining a nature to singularity." For a discussion of Scotus's conception of haecceity see John Boler, Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism, A Study of Peirce's Relation to John Duns Scotus (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963).

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

CHAPTER 1

4

being identical with me exemplifies being identical with something, a thing other than me exemplifies only the second of these properties. As I understand the notion of haecceity, a haecceity is an abstract entity. The distinction between abstracta and concreta seems to be indispensable in ontology: the debate between realists and anti-realists over the existence of universals presupposes this distinction. One traditional position in this debate is that of platonic or extreme realism. It maintains that attributes such as Triangularity, Horseness, and Redness exist apart from the mind, and can exist unexemplified: they belong to a transcendent realm of abstract entities, distinct from spatio-temporal reality. Less extreme in this respect is aristotelian or moderate realism. While moderate realism entails that the aforementioned abstracta exist apart from the mind, it is an immanent realism which holds that such an On the abstractum cannot exist unless it is exemplified by a concretum. other hand, anti-realism implies that there are no abstracta. For instance, nominalism maintains that only concreta or particulars exist, and hence that there are no abstract attributes. Conceptualism is a form of anti-realism which holds that entities like Triangularity, Horseness, and Redness are mental constructs, concrete mental entities which cannot exist apart from the mind. I assume (plausibly, I think) that this very general division between concreta and abstracta is exhaustive and exclusive: necessarily, every entity either belongs to the ontological category of the concrete or belongs to the ontological category of the abstract, and there could not be an entity belonging to both of these categories. To illustrate the concrete/abstract distinction, I will give examples of ontological categories which are species of abstracta and concreta, respectively, together with putative instances of (for these ontological categories.' Species of abstracta include Property example, Redness, Squareness, et cetera), Relation (for instance, Betweenness, Identity, and so on), Proposition (for example, that some animals are horses, that some animals are unicorns, and so forth), Set (for instance, the null set, the set of Plato and Aristotle, et cetera), and Number (for example,

6 The

intuitive notion of an ontological category will be discussed further in section VIII

of this chapter.

5

the number 8, the number 9, et cetera) Species of concreta include Substance (for instance, material objects and spirits), Event (for example, utterances and thoughts), Time (for instance, instants and durations), Place (for example, points and extended regions of space), Limit (for instance, corners and surfaces), Privation (for example, shadows and holes), Trope (for instance, the particular wisdom of Socrates, that particular squareness, et cetera),' and Collection (for example, the mereological sum of Mars and Saturn, the mereological sum of Mars, Saturn, and Neptune, and so on.) 8 The intuitive distinction between concreta and abstracta may be difficult to analyze, but it is serviceable nonetheless. A philosophical analysis of the concrete/abstract distinction will be offered in section VIII of this chapter.

7

The term 'trope' as a name for such concrete "properties" is due to D. C. Williams, The Principles of Empirical Realism (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1966). A trope such as Aristotle's wisdom would not, of course, itself be wise: it is Aristotle who is wise. Moreover, Aristotle's wisdom could only be possessed by Aristotle, though other wise individuals, for example, Socrates, possess a particular wisdom of their own which could not be possessed by anyone else. Likewise, the particular squareness of a certain object could only be possessed by that object, and each square object possesses its own particular squareness which no other square object could possess. Furthermore, the particular squareness of a certain object shares the spatial location of that object. In addition, it appears that the particular squareness of a certain object is square, and hence possesses spatial parts. Many modern trope theorists do not postulate both tropes and universals, and many identify either everyday things, or substances, with collections of tropes. Examples of trope theorists include D. C. Williams, G. F. Stout, "Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular," symposium in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 3 (1923), pp. 114-122, and Keith Campbell, Abstract Particulars (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). 8

The term, `mereological', derives from the Greek liapoc, meaning part. Accordingly, mereology is the theory of parts, or more specifically, S. Lesniewski's formal theory of parts. Typically, a mereological theory employs terms such as the following: proper part, improper part, overlapping (having a part in common), disjoint (not overlapping), mereological product (the "intersection" of overlapping objects), mereological sum (a collection of parts), mereological difference, the universal sum, mereological complement, and atom (that which has no proper parts). Formal mereologies are axiomatic systems. Lesniewski's Mereology and Nelson Goodman's formal mereology (which he calls the "Calculus of Individuals") are compatible with Nominalism, i.e., no reference is made to sets, properties, or other abstract entities. Lesniewski hoped that his Mereology, with its many parallels to set theory, would provide an alternative to set theory as a foundation for mathematics. Mereological theories of this kind are collectivistic: they imply that any individuals, no matter how scattered, have a mereological sum or comprise an object. For an authoritative discussion of the principles of formal mereological systems see Peter Simons Parts: A Study in Ontology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

6

CHAPTER 1

II - QUALITATIVE AND NONQUALITATIVE AB STRACTA "Reason..descendeth from generalles to specialles, & from them to particulars." (1594 trans. T. B. La Primaudaye's French Academie II. 162)

There is an intuitive distinction between general and nongeneral abstracta, for instance, general and nongeneral properties and propositions. The class of nongeneral properties includes haecceities of concreta, for example, being identical with Socrates, being identical with Gorbachev, being identical with me, and so on. It is plausible that there are haecceities of concreta if and only if there are nongeneral properties which are not haecceities, for instance, being next to me, being the successor of Gorbachev, and being a man in that room who is taller than any other man in that room. In contrast, the following are examples of general properties: being square, being a property, being self-identical, being identical with something, being next to someone, being next to a square, and being a square which is larger than any other square. To say that an abstract entity is nongeneral is to say that it pertains to a specific concretum in a certain intimate way, for example, being identical with Socrates and being next to me pertain to Socrates and me, respectively. On the other hand, to say that an abstract entity is general is to say that it does not pertain to a specific concretum in this intimate way, for instance, being identical with someone and being next to someone do not pertain to a particular concretum. Since a haecceity of a general abstract entity does not pertain to a specific concretum in the relevant sense, such a haecceity is a general property. For example, the haecceity of Squareness is being identical with Squareness - a general property. In contrast, some haecceities of abstracta resemble haecceities of concreta in being nongeneral. A case of a nongeneral haecceity of an abstractum is a haecceity of a (nongeneral) haecceity of a concretum, for instance, the property of being identical with the property of being identical with me. This last case is also a property which pertains to

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES



7

me. The distinction between general and nongeneral propositions parallels the distinction between general and nongeneral properties. The former distinction is illustrated by the following examples.

General Propositions Someone is white The tallest man is wise All men are men For every metal, there is a solvent

Nongeneral Propositions Jones is white That man is wise I am a man The tallest woman on Earth is black

Notice that a nongeneral proposition pertains to a specific concretum in a certain intimate way, for instance, I am a man pertains in this way to me. On the other hand, a general proposition, for example, all men are men, does not pertain to a specific concretum in this way. It is not easy to analyze the intuitive distinction between general and nongeneral abstracta. But even in the absence of an analysis, this distinction remains useful. An analysis of the distinction between general and nongeneral properties or propositions will be provided in section IX of this chapter. Standardly, a general property is called qualitative, and a nongeneral property is called nonqualitative. However, this practice is somewhat misleading. Inasmuch as 'quality' and 'property' are synonyms, a "nonqualitative property" appears to be a contradiction in terms. However, it seems that 'qualitative' and `nonqualitative' are meant to be understood in the technical senses of general and nongeneral, respectively. In that case, the notion of a nonqualitative property appears to be perfectly coherent. So as to conform with the customary practice of calling a nongeneral property nonqualitative, ' qualitative' and `nonqualitative' will henceforth be employed in the aforementioned technical senses. It is plausible that there are nonqualitative properties just in case there are nonqualitative propositions. It is no less plausible that there are qualitative properties if and only if there are qualitative propositions. Finally, it is plausible that there are qualitative properties just provided that there are

8

CHAPTER 1

relations which are general or qualitative in character, for instance, Betweenness, Love, Identity, and Diversity. Philosophers customarily distinguish relations from relational properties, for example, properties such as being identical with Squareness, being identical with Gorbachev, and being next to Gorbachev. However, this customary practice is somewhat confusing, since properties and relations differ in their structure. In particular, the exemplification of a relation, R, consists of an entity's bearing R to one or more entities, whereas the exemplification of a property, P, by an entity, x, that is, x's having P, does not consist of x's bearing P to one or more entities. In other words, a relation's exemplification, unlike a property's, involves more than one term. This is compatible with the fact that a thing can only bear a reflexive relation (such as Identity) to itself, since a relation of this kind is 2-termed. 9 The linguistic manifestation of this structural difference between properties and relations is that the former are expressed by one place predicates, and the latter are expressed by multi-place predicates. It follows that necessarily, Property and Relation are mutually exclusive categories. (Thus, a haecceity is one thing, and the reflexive relation of Identity is quite another.) Therefore, literally speaking, a relational property is a contradiction in terms. In this sense, there cannot be a relational property. However, it seems that if the notion of a "relational property" is understood in terms of the sort of linguistic expression which designates such a property, then this notion can be understood in a relevant nonliteral sense. On a linguistic understanding of this sort, a property, P, is relational if P's canonical name has the form 'the property of being Fa', where Fxy' expresses a relation and 'a' is a name of something. Such a linguistic criterion for a property's being relational does not have the absurd implication that a relational property is a relation, and the notion of a relational property it introduces is coherent. Thus, the preceding linguistic criterion appears to be serviceable. According to that criterion, properties such as being identical with Gorbachev, being next to Gorbachev, and being

9 Some philosophers employ the term 'attribute' to cover both properties and relations. In the system of classification adopted by these philosophers, my distinction between properties and relations reappears as the distinction between singulary attributes and nonsingulary attributes.

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES



9

identical with Squareness count as relational. My arguments imply that the existence of abstracta of any one of the three categories, Property, Relation, and Proposition, entails the existence of abstracta of the other two categories. It is plausible that these entailments hold because properties, relations, and propositions comprise a family of abstracta whose members differ from one another in the number of terms they possess: properties being one-termed, relations being multi-termed, and propositions being zero-termed. However, there is an objection to my claim that properties, relations and propositions form such a family. To begin with, it seems that not only propositions are termless. For example, it appears that tables are termless. Nevertheless, it would clearly be erroneous to say that a table is zero-termed. Accordingly, it might be charged that saying a proposition is zero-termed is equally erroneous. If this charge is correct, then it undermines my claim that properties, relations, and propositions form a family of abstracta of the aforementioned sort. In what follows, I answer this objection by clarifying this claim of mine. First of all, for each of the three species of abstracta under discussion, there is a corresponding kind of truth. Corresponding to properties, there is singular de re truth. Necessarily, if there is such a truth, then it exists in virtue of an individual's exemplifying a property. For example, it is a truth about Socrates that he is wise. This truth exists in virtue of Socrates's exemplifying the property of being wise, a 1-term abstract object. Corresponding to relations, there is relational de re truth. Necessarily, if there is a truth of this kind, then it exists in virtue of an individual's (or a number of individuals') entering into a relation. For instance, it is a truth about Socrates and Plato that the former teaches the latter. This truth exists in virtue of Socrates's bearing the teaching relation to Plato, a two-term abstract object. The existence of other relational de re truths entails the existence of a three-term abstract object, a four-term abstract object, a fiveterm abstract object, and so on. Corresponding to propositions, there is de dicto truth. Necessarily, if such a truth exists, then it exists in virtue of a proposition's being true. For example, it is a truth that if a man is wise, then he is wise. This truth exists in virtue of a proposition's being true, namely, the proposition that if a man is wise, then he is wise. Generalizing from singular and relational de re truths, we may infer that

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

1 0 CHAPTER 1



11

III - CONTROVERSIES ABOUT HAECCEITIES

there being a truth of a certain kind entails that there is an n-term abstract object appropriate to such a truth. A proposition is the appropriate sort of abstract object for a de dicto truth. Because the existence of a de dicto truth entails the existence of a proposition, and because every proposition is a termless abstract object, there being a de dicto truth entails the existence of a termless abstract object. Since there being a truth of a certain kind entails that there is an n-term abstract object appropriate to a truth of that kind, it follows that a proposition is a zero-term abstract object. The fact that propositions are zero-termed, properties are 1-termed, and relations are multitermed implies that necessarily, Property, Relation, and Proposition are mutually exclusive categories.

"Which Infatuation has proceeded from Scholasticks who have been so intemperate in the use of their words, that they could not make a rational discourse of anything, though never so small, but that they must stuff it with their Quiddities, Entities, Essences, Haecceities, and the like." (1678 Cudworth The True Intellectual System of the Universe I. ii. 8. 67) "Haecceitys, Ecceitys, Petreitys, Quidditys, Identitys...and whole Cart-loads of Qualitys." (1711 trans. Werenfels's Discourse of Logomachys, or controversys, about words vi. 101)

The existence of nonqualitative haecceities is especially controversial. There are three parties to the controversy, whose positions are as follows. (1) Nominalism. The existence of haecceities is denied by a nominalist, since a nominalist denies the existence of properties, whether qualitative or nonqualitative. (2) Qualitative Realism. A qualitative realist accepts the existence of properties, but maintains that all properties are qualitative. Hence, a qualitative realist rejects the existence of haecceities of concrete entities.' According to such a realist: (i) haecceities of particulars are peculiar entities, and (ii) if an ontology is rich enough to include particulars, qualitative properties, qualitative relations, and qualitative propositions, then it is unnecessary to posit haecceities of particulars within that ontology. (3) Nonqualitative Realism. According to a nonqualitative realist, there are haecceities of particulars. Thus, a nonqualitative realist accepts the existence

10

For a defense of Qualitative Realism see Roderick Chisholm, "Objects and Persons: Revisions and Replies," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 7/8 (1979), pp. 317-388, The First

Person (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), "Possibility without Haecceity," in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11, Studies in Essentialism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 157-164, and Ernest Sosa,

"Propositions and Indexical Attitudes," in H. Parret, ed., On Believing: Epistemological and Semiotic Approaches (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1983), pp. 316-332.

CHAPTER 1

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of nonqualitative properties. Moreover, it seems that if there are nonqualitative haecceities, then there are qualitative properties, since qualitative properties are paradigmatic or core instances of Propertyhood. For example, it appears that if there exists a nonqualitative property such as being identical with me, then there exist qualitative properties such as being identical with

Observe that the latter proposition is qualitative and says that something is identical with Redness. It is plausible that there is such a qualitative proposition if and only if there is the qualitative property of being identical with Redness. (Likewise, it is plausible that there is the proposition that (3x)(x=me), namely, the nonqualitative proposition that there exists something identical with me, just in case there is the nonqualitative property of being identical with me - a point which a qualitative realist accepts.) Inasmuch as an argument of the foregoing sort applies to any qualitative property, it follows that every qualitative property has a qualitative haecceity." Furthermore, the following metaphysical principle of parity is intuitively plausible.

12

something, being an entity, being concrete, being a person, being identical with Personhood, and so forth. Thus, a nonqualitative realist should accept the existence of both nonqualitative and qualitative properties. Since the existence of nonqualitative haecceities is rejected by nominalists and qualitative realists alike, and since the existence of qualitative properties is rejected only by nominalists, the existence of nonqualitative haecceities is more controversial than the existence of qualitative properties. And because the usual attempts to justify Realism only seek to establish Qualitative Realism, my attempt to justify Nonqualitative Realism is more ambitious than those attempts. Qualitative realists often support their rejection of nonqualitative properties by arguing that a nonqualitative property is odd or peculiar in a way in which a qualitative property is not. Their argument is based on two premises. Firstly, a nonqualitative property (unlike a qualitative one) is a kind of hybrid of an abstractum and a concretum. Secondly, such a hybrid is strange or unnatural. Therefore, nonqualitative properties are dubious entities. But the following considerations counter-balance such an argument. Suppose that there are qualitative properties, relations, and propositions. In that case, there is the qualitative proposition that something is red. However, it is prima facie plausible that this proposition exists if and only if there is the proposition that there is something identical with Redness. In other words, it seems that there is the proposition

13

Necessarily, if something has a haecceity, then everything has a haecceity. It might be objected to this principle of parity that the following picture of reality is acceptable: there are atoms of being, as well as complexes of these atoms, but only the former have haecceities. To set up my reply to this objection, I shall suppose that c is a complex of atoms, that a is an atom, and that every atom has a haecceity. Since a has a haecceity, it appears that there is the following true singular existential proposition about the atom a: ,

(3x)(x=a).

Because parallel considerations apply to every other atom, I conclude that for each atom, there is a corresponding true proposition of this kind which asserts the existence of that atom. Moreover, it is intuitively plausible that if there are such true singular existential propositions about atoms, and there exist complexes of atoms, then there are also true singular existential propositions about these complexes. This intuition is backed up by the following argument. Proposition is a category of logical entity, meaning that propositions have truth-values, possesses modal characteristics, serve as ,

that (3x)(x is red), just in case there is the proposition that (3x)(x=Redness).

I1

See Roderick Chisholm, "Objects and Persons: Revisions and Replies". On pages 319 and 349 Chisholm concedes that abstracta have haecceities even if concreta do not have them.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

relata of logical relations, and either have other propositions as logical parts or are themselves logical parts of other propositions. This being the case, it is plausible that for propositions of certain sorts, there must be a logically comprehensive variety of propositions of those sorts. And in particular, it seems that if for every atom, there is a true singular proposition which asserts the existence of that atom, and if there exist complexes of atoms, then

qualitative realist's rejection of nonqualitative properties is no less in need of justification than a nonqualitative realist's acceptance of such properties.

14

there must be a logically comprehensive class of propositions which both includes the former propositions about atoms, and includes, for every complex of atoms, a true singular proposition which asserts the existence of that complex of atoms. It follows that there is the following proposition about the complex of atoms c: (3x)(x=c). Furthermore, it appears that if there is the singular proposition that (3x)(x=c), then there must be the property of being identical with c - the haecceity of a certain complex of atoms. Since a parallel argument applies to any other complex of atoms, I conclude that every complex of atoms has a haecceity. Therefore, it seems that if atoms have haecceities, then complexes of atoms must also have haecceities. Consequently, it is not acceptable to picture reality as containing atoms which have haecceities and complexes of these atoms which do not have haecceities. I conclude that the foregoing objection to my principle of parity does not succeed. More generally, the need for a logically comprehensive range of propositions makes it natural to suppose that if there is a true singular proposition asserting the existence of an item in one case, then there is a true singular proposition asserting the existence of an item in every case. But in the light of the foregoing argument, it appears that if there is such a singular proposition, then there exists the haecceity of the item whose existence is asserted by the singular proposition in question. Thus, it seems that if something has a haecceity, then everything does. Since qualitative properties have haecceities, and since there are concreta, it follows that concreta have haecceities. Therefore, if there are qualitative properties, then there are nonqualitative properties. Hence, Qualitative Realism is false. Because the argument for this conclusion has considerable merit, it appears that a

15

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IV - MODAL CONCEPTS "There are two kinds of truths: those of reasoning and those of fact. The truths of reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is impossible. Those of fact, however, are contingent, and their opposite is possible." (1714 Leibniz Monadology 33)

As noted earlier, the controversy over the existence of haecceities is relevant to much current research on Modalities and Possible Worlds. Moreover, the concept of haecceity cannot be explored without making use of metaphysical modalities. Throughout this essay, the modalities employed are metaphysical, unless explicitly stated otherwise. A brief discussion of de re and de dicto metaphysical modalities is in order. For the purposes of this discussion, let us suppose that there are a full range of properties, relations, and propos .ons, including properties and relations which are unexemplified. In that case, we can characterize de re and de dicto modalities in terms of abstracta of these kinds. Let us begin by providing a characterization of de re possibility. De re possibility is an entity's possibly having some property or an entity's possibly bearing some relation to some thing(s). For example, a certain quantity of liquid water possibly has the property of being frozen, and possibly bears the betweenness relation to two other particular material objects. De re possibility can be used to characterize the notion of an accidental property. F-ness is an accidental (contingent) property of x <:=> x exemplifies F-ness, and x possibly lacks F-ness. To illustrate, Liquidity is an accidental property of a certain quantity of water. De re necessity is an entity's necessarily having some property or an entity's necessarily bearing some relation to some thing(s). For instance, a particular quantity of water necessarily has Extension. In other words, Extension is an essential property of that quantity of water. Similarly, the

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

17

quantity of water in question necessarily bears the relation of identity to itself. The concept of a de re necessary (essential) property can be characterized in terms of de re possibility as follows. x necessarily (essentially) exemplifies F-ness t=> (i) x exemplifies F-ness, and (ii) —(x possibly lacks F-ness). De re impossibility is an entity's not possibly having some property or an entity's not possibly bearing some relation to some thing(s). By way of illustration, a certain quantity of water does not possibly exemplify Sphericity and Rectangularity at the same time, and does not possibly bear the relation of diversity to itself. De re modalities are often interpreted in terms of possible worlds. For example, these modalities might be understood in the following way. x possibly exemplifies F-ness just in case (3y)(y-=x & in some possible world y exemplifies F-ness). F-ness is an accidental property of x just provided that x exemplifies F-ness & in some possible world x lacks F-ness. x necessarily exemplifies F-ness if and only if (3y)( -x & y exemplifies F-ness in every possible world in which y exists). x does not possibly have F-ness just when (Jy)(y=x & there is no possible world in which y exemplifies Fness). It should be noted that for each of the foregoing characterizations and understandings of de re modalities for properties, there is a parallel characterization and understanding of a corresponding de re modality for relations. For instance, x necessarily bears a relation R to y <=> (i) x bears R to y, and (ii) —(x possibly fails to bear R to y); and a necessarily bears a relation R to b if and only if (ay)(Bz)(y=a & z=- b & y bears R to z in every possible world in which y exists). A de re modality is a relation that holds between an item and some property, or among a number of items and some relation. On the other hand, the de dicto modalities of metaphysical possibility, necessity, impossibility, and contingency are properties of propositions. Intuitively speaking, a possible proposition is one which could be true, a necessary proposition is one which must be true, an impossible proposition is one -

-

-

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which could not be true, and a contingent proposition is one which could be true and could be false. For example, the proposition that all ravens are black is possible, the proposition that whatever is red is colored is necessary, the proposition that a spherical cube exists is impossible, the proposition that a cat exists is a contingent truth, and the proposition that no cat exists is a

contingent falsehood. A proposition, p, is necessary just provided that the negation of p is not possible. In formal terms, Op 74--- —0—p. In addition, Op ss —0—p. Furthermore, p is impossible if and only if —Op. Finally, p is contingent just when Op & 0—p. De ditto modalities can be understood in terms of possible worlds. A possible proposition is one which is true in some possible world. A necessary proposition is one which is true in all possible worlds. An impossible proposition is one which fails to be true in any possible world. A contingent proposition is one which is true in some, but not every, possible world. Next, let us consider certain existential modal concepts. To begin, a contingent being is an existent which could fail to exist. Such a being has contingent existence. On the other hand, a necessary being is an entity which must exist. A being of this kind has necessary existence. Thus, x is a contingent being just when x is an existent which is not a necessary being, and x is a necessary being just provided that x is an existent which is not a contingent being. In other words: x is a contingent being (or has contingent existence) if and only if (3y)(y=x & y is not a necessary being (or does not have necessary existence)); and x is a necessary being (or has necessary existence) when and only when (3y) (r-x & y is not a contingent being (or does not have contingent existence)). It might be said, following customary practice, that (i) something has necessary existence just in case it exists in all possible worlds, and (ii) something has contingent existence just when it exists in the actual world, but fails to exist in some other possible world. Typical concreta are contingent beings. Indeed, since the thesis that every concretum is a contingent being is not implausible, a treatment of modal concepts should not explicitly contradict this thesis. On the other hand, my treatment of modal notions in Chapter 3 generates an argument that abstracta such as properties and propositions are necessary beings.

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

19

(D1) is an adequate definition of the concept of haecceity only if every haecceity is exemplified. However, there might, exist an unexemplified haecceity which could be exemplified by a concretum. After all, it seems that there are cases in which the existence of a concretum is possible even though the concretum in question never exists. Let us call a possible concretum that never exists a nonexistent possible (a NEP). It might be said that x is NEP if and only if x is a concrete individual which exists only in possible worlds other than the actual world. In what follows, I describe various kinds of NEPs, and construct a definition of the concept of haecceity that is compatible with the existence of unexemplified haecceities. There are three kinds of NEP: a NEP is either a mereological product, a causal product, or else is mereologically and causally disjoint.' (1) A mereological product is a nonexistent possible material object which would be created by the assembly or arrangement of some bits of matter, for example, a material object which would be created if certain material objects were attached to one another in a particular way, when such attachment never occurs. (2) A causal product is a NEP which would be produced by some particular(s) under a nomologically possible circumstance, for instance, an organism which would result from a certain sperm fertilizing a certain egg under specified conditions, when such an episode of fertilization never transpires. (3) A NEP which is neither a mereological product nor a causal product is mereologically and causally disjoint. For example, it appears that a merely possible spirit or soul is a disjoint object. A spirit is an individual substance which is spatially unlocated or unextended and capable of consciousness: perhaps no spirit ever exists, but it seems that possibly, there are spirits. Another example of a disjoint object is provided by the following case. It seems that possibly, there exists an electron, e, in addition to all of ,

,

12

I employ the term 'disjoint' in this connection for two reasons. Firstly, in formal mereological theories, to say that x and y are disjoint is to say that x and y have no part in common. Similarly, a disjoint object (in my sense), existing in some other possible world, either has no part in common with any actual material object, or else has a proper part which has no part in common with any actual material object. Secondly, in an another (archaic) sense, `disjoint' means disconnected. However, a disjoint possible (in my sense) is causally disconnected from actual entities: it cannot be produced by such entities.

20

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

CHAPTER 1

the electrons that ever actually exist. In other words, there exists a set, S, which has every electron as a member, and it is plausible that S could coexist with an electron, e, which is not a member of S. It appears that such a merely possible electron, e, is a disjoint object. The foregoing remarks presuppose that electrons are necessarily indivisible fundamental particles. If this presupposition is mistaken, then we can replace the foregoing occurrences of 'electron' with another term which signifies a kind of possible essentially indivisible fundamental particle, for instance, Toscovichian point-particle having no proper parts'." Let us return to the matter of the definition of haecceity. Although some philosophers are skeptical of the existence of unexemplified haecceities which could be exemplified by concreta, I have noted that there might be such haecceities. On the other hand, it seems that there could not be a necessarily unexemplified haecceity: there couldn't be the property of being identical with a certain thing when this property is not possibly had by anything. Since there could not be a necessarily unexemplified haecceity, every unexemplified haecceity is possibly exemplified. The following revised version of (D1) allows for the existence of unexemplified haecceities.

13 Rudjer Josip Boskovic (1711-1787), or Roger Boscovich, is best known for his A Theory of Natural Philosophy Reduced to a Single Law of the Actions Existing in Nature. This work attempts to explain all physical phenomena in terms of the attractions and repulsions of pointparticles (puncta) which are indistinguishable in their intrinsic qualitative properties. According to Boscovich's single law, puncta at a certain distance attract, until upon approaching one another they reach a point at which they repel, and eventually reach equilibrium. Thus, Boscovich defends a form of dynamism, or the theory that nature is to be understood in terms of force and not mass (where forces are functions of time and distance). By dispensing with extended substance, Boscovich avoided epistemological difficulties facing Locke's natural philosophy and anticipated developments in modern physics. Among those influenced by Boscovich were Kant (who defended a version of dynamism), Faraday, James Clerk Maxwell, and Lord Kelvin. Boscovich's theory has proved to be empirically inadequate to account for phenomena such as light. A philosophical difficulty for Boscovich's puncta, which are physical substances, arises out of their zero-dimensionality. It is plausible that any power must have a basis in an object's intrinsic properties, and puncta appear to lack such support for their powers. However, it is extensional properties which puncta lack, and Boscovich could argue that the categorial property of being an unextended spatial substance provides the needed basis.

21

(D2) F is a haecceity =df. F is possibly such that: (ax)(F is the property of being identical with x.) It should be noted that (D2) characterizes the concept of haecceity in terms of de re metaphysical possibility. Three controversial claims about modality and haecceity are defended in Chapter 3. The first of these claims is that for any x, if x is a possible world, then x can be identified with an abstract entity which has necessary existence and which involves haecceities of concreta. The second claim is that there are unexemplified haecceities which correspond to NEPs, even in the case of NEPs which are mereologically and causally disjoint: 4 The third claim is that metaphysical modalities exhibit a kind of unity or interdependence explicable in terms of haecceities. This sort of unity or interdependence among metaphysical modalities has three components. (i) For every de re modal concept, there is an equivalent de dicto modal concept. (ii) For every de dicto modal concept, there is an equivalent de re modal concept. (iii) The notions of necessary existence and contingent existence can be understood in terms of either de re or de dicto metaphysical modal concepts. Finally, in Chapter 4 it is argued that we can pick out certain unexemplifled haecceities which correspond to mereological or causal products, and use definite descriptions to denote these unexemplified haecceities.

14

An unexemplified haecceity, H, corresponds to a nonexistent possible, i, if and only if H is necessarily such that it is exemplified if and only if i exemplifies it. r

22



CHAPTER 1

V - COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC CONCEPTS "As the hand is apt to take hold of all instruments; so is this power or facultie apt to apprehend the formes of all things, from whence grow the vniuersals." (1606 Bryskett A Discourse of Civill Life 124) "As these qualities or modes are only identified with the thing by a mental attribution, they are called attributes." [1838 Sir W. Hamilton Logic v. 1. 77 (1866)]

If there are properties, relations, and propositions, then people intellectually grasp or comprehend the content of some of them, and can use linguistic terms to express some of them. Some basic cognitive and linguistic issues about haecceity concern our grasping and linguistically expressing haecceities. In order to facilitate discussion of these issues I shall characterize the relevant concepts of grasping and linguistic expression, and describe their interrelationship. A person's (S's) grasping a property, relation, or proposition, P, is a direct cognitive relation which S bears to P: necessarily, if at time t S grasps P, then S does not do so by virtue of his grasping anything else at t, for example, a property, relation, or proposition other than P." It seems that if we grasp some properties, relations, and propositions, then we can grasp what it is for a conscious being to grasp a property, relation, or proposition, even if we are unable to provide a conceptual analysis of what it is for a person to grasp something. . An individual may come to grasp a property or relation through a process of abstraction. Such a process of abstraction can be partly understood in terms of the following moderate empiricist principle. I6

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

(P1) If P is a qualitative experiential or perceptual property which is possibly exemplified, then P may be grasped by a person, S, as a result of either (i) S's having one or more experiences or perceptions of some instance(s) of P, or (ii) S's having one or more experiences or perceptions of some instance(s) of another qualitative experiential or perceptual property, Q, such that: Q is possibly exemplified, and necessarily, (Vx)(Vy)(if x has P & y has Q, then x and y are similar with respect to x's having P and y's having Q). According to clause (i) of this principle, S may abstract P from his experiences of particulars which exemplify P. For example, as a result of perceiving a square thing, or a number of square things, a person, S, may come to know what it is for a thing to be square, and thus, S may be said to grasp the property of being square. However, according to clause (ii) of (P1), for S to grasp a property, P, as a result of having perceived a number of particulars, the particulars need not exemplify P. These particulars need only provide a semblance or an appearance of an actual or possible instance of P. Such a semblance or appearance, X, does not exemplify P, but is similar to an actual or possible instance of P. For this reason, it may seem to S that X is an instance of P or X may suggest an instance of P to S. For example, if a thing which appears square is examined under a microscope, then it is revealed that the sides of the object are not straight, but are somewhat jagged. However, S may come to grasp the property of being square as a result of perceiving such an object with the naked eye because, so perceived, an object of this kind provides a good semblance or likeness of a square. For similar reasons, S may come to grasp the property of being square as a result of perceiving an inexactly constructed figure which closely resembles a square, but does not literally appear square to S. It is plausible that if there are properties, then people can grasp some of them in the ways described above. If we can grasp properties in these ways, then we have innate capacities to form concepts in response to certain similarity classes of

t5 This is compatible with the moderate empiricist view that a person's grasping

P at a time tl may result in his grasping Q at a later time t2 if P and Q are diverse but similar properties. 16

My understanding of this process of abstraction is patterned after Roderick Chisholm's understanding of "intuitive induction" in The Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966), Chapter 5. Cf. Gary Rosenkrantz, "The Nature of Geometry," American Philosophical Quarterly, 2 (1981), pp. 101-110, and "Some Reflections on Perception and A

23

Priori Knowledge," Philosophical Studies, 40 (1981), pp. 355-362.

24



INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

CHAPTER 1

experiential stimuli. It is extremely plausible that we possess such capacities." A second way in which a person, S, may come to grasp a property is this. (P2) If S grasps a property, P, and S grasps another property Q, and there is the conjunctive property (P &Q), the disjunctive property (PvQ),

or the negative property P, then S may come to grasp (P&Q), —

(PvQ), or —P as a result of S's conjoining, disjoining, or negating his concepts of P or Q. For instance, if S grasps the property of being a horse, and S grasps the property of being horned, and there is such a property as being a horned horse, then S may come to grasp the latter property as a result of S's conjoining his concepts of being a horse and being horned. Similarly, if S grasps the property of being a horse, and there is such a property as being a nonhorse, then S may come to grasp the latter property as a result of his negating his concept of a horse." Conversely, if S grasps a conjunctive, disjunctive, or negative property, then this entails that S grasps each of the conjuncts or disjuncts of that property, or its negand. There is another role which grasping plays within a theory of properties. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that there are properties. In that

P " Radical Empiricism rejects (P1) in favor of a principle such as the following one. If is an experiential property which is possibly exemplified by a mental state of person, S, then S may come to grasp P as a result of S's introspectively experiencing one or more of S's mental states which are instances of P. Rationalism employs the distinction between a person's grasping a property in an occurrent sense, e.g., a person's attributing or contemplating a property, and a person's grasping a property in a dispositional sense, e.g., a person's having the ability to attribute or contemplate a property. According to Rationalism, a person has innate grasp of a property, and this ideas: in some cases a person is born with a dispositional disposition is not a result of his experiences. If, as a moderate empiricist believes, a person has an innate capacity to-grasp-a-property-in-response-to-his-having-experiences-of-certaM-sorts, then it does not follow that he is born with a dispositional grasp of a property. This is because one can have a capacity to do something without having the ability to do that thing, if experience is needed in order to cultivate that capacity. For example, I have the capacity to play the violin, but not the ability. ,

18 Note

that the principle illustrated by these examples, i.e., (P2), is endorsed by radical empiricists, moderate empiricists, as well as rationalists.

25

case, we can grasp many of them. Moreover, grasping a property is a direct cognitive relation between the grasper and what he grasps. Thus, it seems that we can discern properties via our intuitions about what properties we grasp. Although such a process of property-discernment is not infallible, it is highly reliable. Moreover, one's graspings, as well as one's intuitions about them, are directly accessible to one by means of introspection. Thus, the discernment of properties can be understood along internalist lines as follows. If there are attributes, and if a person attentively thinks that he grasps some attribute, then that person is prima facie justified in thinking that there is such an attribute. For instance, if there are properties, and if I attentively think that I grasp being square, or being a horned horse, or being a cat, or being stretchable, or being red, then I am justified in believing that there is such a property. To defeat a justification of this kind, evidence that I do not grasp what I think I grasp is required. D. M. Armstrong has advocated an externalist account of propertydetection which differs from my picture of property-discernment, and which might be thought to threaten it. His account entails the moderate realist thesis that all properties are exemplified. In Armstrong's view, questions about which properties exist are to be settled by "total science," which includes philosophy as a minor component, but which is mainly empirical scientific research. 19 He argues that unexemplified properties are transcendent platonic entities which cannot be objects of empirical scientific research. It appears that if there are unexemplified attributes, then we can investigate some of them only through either a priori or philosophical research. However, my argument for Extreme Realism will be based on considerations which are independent of any claims about property-discernment or the grasping of properties. Rather, these considerations depend upon claims about the best account of particulars' being diverse at a time, and the best account of the possibility of particulars which never exist in fact. Thus, my defense of Extreme Realism does not beg any questions about propertydetection which might be at issue between an Armstrongian and myself. So, if my philosophical argument for Extreme Realism succeeds, then the

19

See D. M. Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

26

existence of unexemplified properties is justified and all forms of Moderate Realism are undermined. Since an Armstrongian account of propertydetection implies Moderate Realism, if my argument in this book is justified, then an Armstrongian account of property-detection is unwarranted, and does not threaten my contention that we can identify attributes via our intuitions

about what attributes we grasp. Under what conditions are we justified in believing that an individual grasps a property? The following epistemic principle concerning a person's grasping a property is acceptable. (PG) If at time t it is plausible for Si that F-ness exists, and at t it is plausible for Si that S2 believes that something is F, then at t Si can infer that it is prima facie plausible (for SI) that S2 grasps Fness at t. 2° For example, it is plausible for me that Sheree believes that something is square. (I suppress temporal indices for ease of exposition.) Hence, if it is also plausible for me that Squareness exists, then I can infer that it is prima facie plausible for me that Sheree grasps Squareness. By the same token, if it is plausible for me that there is the property of being identical with Gorbachev, then I am able to infer that it is prima facie plausible for me that Raisa grasps this haecceity, since it is also plausible for me that Raisa believes that someone is identical with Gorbachev. However, prima facie plausibility does not entail truth, and such plausibility might be defeated by contrary evidence. Hence, the foregoing premises do not entail that Raisa grasps Gorbachev's haecceity. The following two examples illustrate the defeasibility of the justification (PG) provides for the claim that S grasps F-ness. Suppose at time tl it is plausible for us both that Redness exists, and that at tl Jones believes that something is red. In that case, (PG) enables us to infer that at tl it is prima facie plausible for us that Jones grasps Redness at tl. Still, even if Redness exists, it doesn't necessarily follow that at tl Jones grasps Redness. After

,

• . . In this principle F' i s a schematic letter which may be replaced by an appropriate predicate. 20

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

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27

all, it is possible that at t it seems to us that Jones has the belief in question, when he does not. For example, consider the following scenario. First, at tl we observe that Jones is facing a red apple with his eyes open, and is uttering the sentence 'The apple is red'. Second, at tl we have a justified false belief that Jones is sighted. Third, we subsequently discover at t2 that Jones is congenitally blind. Surely, in some possible cases of this kind, at tl it is plausible for us that at tl Jones believes that something is red, but at t2 we are justified in thinking that Jones did not grasp (phenomenal) Redness at tl. Hence, the prima facie plausibility which (PG) confers upon the claim that Jones grasps Redness at tl has been defeated. Alternatively, suppose at tl it is plausible for us both that the property of being non-self-exemplifying exists, and that at tl Jones (truly) believes that Redness is non-self-exemplifying. Then (PG) enables us to infer that at tl it is prima facie plausible for us that Jones grasps being non-selfexempling at tl. Nevertheless, even if at tl Jones has this belief, it does not necessarily follow that at tl Jones grasps the property of being non-selfexemplifying. For although at tl it is plausible for us that the property of being non-self-exemplifying exists, there could not be such a property. 21 Hence, at tl Jones does not grasp the property of being non-selfexemplifying, despite the fact that at tl Jones believes that something is nonself-exemplifying. Thus, possibly, at tl it is plausible for us that at tl Jones has this belief, but at t2 we are justified in thinking that Jones did not grasp the property of being non-self-exemplifying at tl. Therefore, the prima facie plausibility which (PG) confers upon the claim that Jones grasps being nonself-exempl i ing at tl has been defeated. Consider the following principle concerning a person's coming to grasp a haecceity.

21

The proof parallels Russell's demonstration that there is no such set as the set of all sets which are not members of themselves. The property of being non-self-exemplifying must either exemplify itself or not exemplify itself. The former entails that this property is non-selfexemplifying; and the latter entails that this property is self-exemplifying. It follows that the property in question must both exemplify itself and not exemplify itself. Therefore, it is impossible that there be such a property. Nevertheless, given the intemalist principle of property-detection defended earlier, it seems possible that there be individuals who are ignorant of this proof, and who are justified in thinking that there is a property of this kind.

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28

(P3) A person, S, may grasp a haecceity, 11, as a result of S's having one or more experiences or perceptions of an instance of H. (P3) is a moderate empiricist principle. It suggests that numerous individuals grasp Gorbachev's haecceity as a result of their abstracting it from their perceptions of Gorbachev. (P3) is not an unattractive principle. After all, (P3) is analogous to (P1), and (P1) is highly plausible. Nonetheless, in Chapter 5 an argument will be provided which implies the falsity of (P3). The notions of a person's grasping a property and a person's making use of a linguistic term to express a property are connected. When I say that a person, S, makes use of a linguistic term, T, to express a property, P, what I mean is that a particular usage of T at a certain time expresses P in S's idiolect. A person, S, uses a linguistic term to express a property, P, only if S grasps P; and in typical cases, if S grasps P, then S can use a linguistic term to express P. For instance, S uses a linguistic term to express Squareness only if S grasps Squareness; and typically, if S grasps Squareness, then S can use a linguistic term to express Squareness, for example, the linguistic term 'square'. Likewise, S uses a linguistic term to express Gorbachev's haecceity only if S grasps Gorbachev's haecceity; and in typical cases, if S grasps Gorbachev's haecceity, then S can use a linguistic term to express this haecceity, for instance, the linguistic term 'Gorbachev' or `identical with Gorbachev'. Some further distinctions can now be drawn. First of all, there is a distinction between a person's grasping a property and a person's identifying a property by description. This distinction is reminiscent of Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description." The following case shows how a person can identify a property by description without grasping that property. Case (1): Due to a genetic defect, Jones's visual cortex is dysfunctional. Such a defect always produces congenital blindness. As a result, Jones is never capable of having a visual experience. Because of these circum-

Bertrand Russell, On the Nature of Acquaintance," in Robert C. Marsh, ed., Logic and Knowledge (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956), pp. 127-174, and The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), Chap. 5. 22 See

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

29

stances, Jones is never capable of grasping (phenomenal) Redness. Nevertheless, Jones has a sighted acquaintance Smith with whom he has frequent conversations. Such conversations can occur because Jones has a full range of nonvisual perceptual experiences and nonperceptual mental states which enable Jones to both grasp a wide range of nonvisual properties, and adequately justify a wide range of true nonvisual beliefs. In particular, Jones knows that (3x)(x is the property most frequently said of apples and stop signs by Smith in his conversations with Jones). Jones grasps the requisite properties and relations for his having this piece of propositional knowledge, for example, the properties of being an apple, being a stop sign, and being a property, the relation, x being said of y, and so forth. After all, a person can grasp these properties and relations based upon his nonvisual perceptual experiences and nonperceptual mental states. In addition, as a matter of fact Redness=the property most frequently said of apples and stop signs by Smith in his conversations with Jones. Hence, although Jones is incapable of grasping Redness, he manages to identify Redness by description - as the property most frequently said of apples and stop signs by Smith in his conversations with Jones. A person's (S's) identifying a property, P, by description is an indirect cognitive relation which S bears to P. If S indirectly cognizes P, then S identifies P by virtue of his grasping some attribute, Q, other than P, such that P exemplifies Q. Furthermore, S's using a linguistic term to express a property, P, must be distinguished from S's using a linguistic term to designate or make singular reference to P, since S can refer to P by using a name or a definite description which designates or denotes P without S's using a linguistic term which expresses, P. For instance, possibly, in Case (1) Jones uses the definite description 'the perceptual property most frequently attributed to apples by my friends' to denote Redness, and Jones fixes the reference of the

30

name 'Redness' by using this definite description. In that event, Jones uses `Redness' to designate Redness. Still, since Jones is never capable of grasping Redness, and since S uses a linguistic term to express P only if S grasps P, Jones is never capable of using a linguistic term to express Redness.

Thus, the distinction between a person's using a linguistic term to express a property and a person's using a linguistic term to designate or make singular reference to a property parallels the distinction between a person's grasping a property and a person's identifying a property by description. Both of these distinctions apply to haecceities. Generally speaking, if an entity, x, has a haecceity, H, and a person, S, can designate x by using an indexical name or a proper name, then S can designate H by using a name of the form 'being identical with N', where 'N' is either an indexical name of x, for instance, 'me', 'this', or 'that', or a proper name of x, for example, `Gorbachev', 'Socrates', or 'Squareness'. By way of illustration, suppose that you, this table, Gorbachev, and Squareness have haecceities. Further suppose that you use the names 'I', , 'Gorbachev', and 'Squareness' to designate yourself, this table, Gorbachev, and Squareness, respectively. In that case, we may assume that you can designate these haecceities by using the names 'being identical with T, 'being identical with this', 'being identical with Gorbachev', and 'being identical with Squareness', respectively."

23 It

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also seems that one can refer to a haecceity by means of using a definite description. For example, it can be said that the haecceity of the man in front of me is the property of being identical with the man in front of me, provided that the definite description 'the man in front of me' is used referentially rather than attributively. For an account of the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions see Keith Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions," Philosophical Review, 75 (1966), pp. 281-304, and "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions," Synthese, 21 (1970), pp. 335-358. It should also be noted that some philosophers employ an alternative mode of expression in which haecceities are designated by expressions such as 'being me', 'being I', 'being this', `being Socrates', `Socrateity', and so forth. See Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974), and Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object (La Salle: Open Court, 1976). Also note the following passage from Boethius: "For were it permitted to fabricate a name. I would call that certain quality, singular and incommunicable to any other subsistent, by its fabricated name, so that the form of what is proposed would become clearer. For let the incommunicable property of Plato be called 'Platonity'. For we can call this quality

31

However, even if an entity, x, has a haecceity, H, and a person, S, designates H by using a name of the form 'being identical with N', where `N' is either an indexical indicator or proper name of x, this does not entail that S is capable of either grasping H or using a linguistic term to express H. After all, if x has a haecceity, then in some possible situations S descriptively identifies x's haecceity in much the same way as Jones descriptively identifies a color in Case (1). For instance, suppose that I never have the capability to grasp this table's haecceity. Still, I might identify this table's haecceity by description. For example, on the assumption that this table is the only table within a yard of me, I might identify this table's haecceity by my knowing that (3x)(x is the haecceity of the table within a yard of me). Similarly, suppose that I never have the capability to use a linguistic term to express Gorbachev's haecceity because I am never capable of grasping that haecceity. Nonetheless, I might name Gorbachev's haecceity with a linguistic term of the form 'being identical with N', where `N' is a proper or indexical name of Gorbachev. To illustrate, on the assumption that Gorbachev is the current president of the U.S.S.R., I might name Gorbachev's haecceity by my fixing the reference of the name 'being identical with Gorbachev' with the description 'the haecceity of the current president of the U.S.S.R.' The distinction I have drawn between grasping a property and descriptively identifying it parallels two other distinctions: (i) the de dicto belief/de .

`Platonity' by a fabricated word, in the way in which we call the quality of man 'humanity'. Therefore, this Platonity is one man's alone, and this not just anyone's but Plato's. For 'Plato' points out a one and definite substance, and property, that cannot come together in another." (Librium de Interpretation edito secunda, PL 64, 462d - 464c) Quoted in Alvin Plantinga, "The Boethian Compromise," American Philosophical Quarterly, 15 (1978), pp. 129-138, and Hector Neri Castafieda, "Individuation and non Identity: A New Look," American Philosophical Quarterly, 12 (1975), pp. 135-136. Finally, observe that depending on the context, tokens of a single name-type can designate -

-

diverse entities of different kinds, e.g., one Morris is a human and another Morris is a cat. Hence, a token of a name-type which designates a haecceity in one context might fail to designate a haecceity in another context. If Felicia Ackermann's theory of names is correct,

then in some contexts tokens of the name-types 'being identical with Socrates' and 'being identical with this' designate unanalyzable nondescriptive properties which are not haecceities. See her "Proper Names, Propositional Attitudes, and Nondescriptive Connotations," Philosophical Studies, 35 (1979), pp. 55-69.

32

CHAPTER 1

re belief distinction, and (ii) the direct de re belief/indirect de re belief distinction. Given the existence of a strongly realistic or platonistic domain of propositions, relations, and properties, it appears that (i) and (ii) can be characterized in terms of psychological relationships a person bears to properties, relations, or propositions. For instance, take a typical case of de re belief: Socrates is believed by Plato to be wise. Such a de re belief seems to be a triadic relation holding among a person (the attributor), a property (the property attributed), and a thing (the attributee). Thus, Socrates's being believed by Plato to be wise appears to be identifiable with Plato's attribution of Wisdom to Socrates. A de re belief appears (generally speaking) to be a person's attributing a property (or a relation) to some item(s). Observe that if a person, S, attributes a property (or relation) to some item(s), then S grasps that property or relation. Compare a case of de dicto belief: Pythagoras believes that all equilateral triangles are equiangular. In this case, what Pythagoras believes is the proposition that all equilateral triangles are equiangular. In general, a de dicto belief seems to be a dyadic cognitive relationship holding between a person (the believer) and a proposition (the thing believed). Notice that if a person believes a proposition, then he grasps that proposition. Let us apply the notions of de re and de dicto belief to Case (1). In Case (1), Jones identifies Redness by description. It can be argued plausibly that Jones's making this identification implies that Redness is believed by Jones to be a property, that is, (3x)(x-Redness & x is believed by Jones to be a property). Nonetheless, because Jones does not grasp Redness, Jones does not grasp the proposition which a sighted person believes when a sighted person believes that Redness is a property. Therefore, Jones does not believe this proposition, or equivalently, —(Jones believes that (3x)(x---- Redness & x is a property)). Compare this situation and the following possible case.

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

33

Case (2): Based on trustworthy testimony, Jones knows that the man in his kitchen is a philosopher. In addition, it is true that the man in Jones's kitchen=the redhead in Jones's kitchen. Yet, due to Jones's blindness, —'(Jones believes (3x)(x --the redhead in his kitchen & x is a philosopher)). Still, it can be plausibly argued that in these circumstances (ax)(x=the redhead in Jones's kitchen & x is believed by Jones to be a philosopher). 24 Jones's cognitive relationship to a concrete entity in Case (2) is analogous to Jones's cognitive relationship to an abstract entity in Case (1): in each case the cognitive relationship is indirect. If entities have haecceities, then a propositional conception of direct de re belief or strict de re belief can be defined in terms of de dicto belief as follows.2 5

24

Most writers on the topic of de re belief concur on this point. In other words, most of these writers agree that one's descriptively identifying an individual is sufficient for one's having a de re belief with respect to that individual. For example, see David Kaplan, "Quantifying In," Synthese, 27 (1968), pp. 178-214, Ernest Sosa, "Propositional Attitudes De Dicta and De Re," The Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1970), pp. 883-896, and Roderick Chisholm, "Knowledge and Belief: 'De Dicto' and 'De Re'," Philosophical Studies, 29 (1976), pp. 1-20. Like these writers, I am unaware of any compelling reason to limit the objects of de re belief to either objects of perceptual acquaintance or objects of Russellian direct acquaintance such as oneself, one's own mental states, and universals. 25

Compare Roderick Chisholm, The First Person, and Ernest Sosa, "Propositions and Indexical Attitudes". They develop qualitative realist positions on the nature of cognitive attitudes de dicto and de re. Chisholm and Sosa argue that we can understand these cognitive attitudes in terms of a person's standing in cognitive relationships to qualitative attributes or qualitative propositions, and they specifically tailor their views to avoid the implication that there are nonqualitative properties and propositions. However, aside from these similarities, Chisholm's and Sosa's positions are quite different.

34

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S directly attributes F-ness to x =df. (i) x exemplifies the haecceity, being identical with N, & (ii) S believes that something which is N is F, and in believing this S grasps the conjunction of x's haecceity and Fness. 26

For example, suppose that a sighted person, S, has a true de ditto belief that (3x)(x=Redness & x is a property). In believing this, S grasps the conjunction of the haecceity of Redness and Propertyhood. It follows that S directly attributes Propertyhood to Redness. On the other hand, a propositional belief which S has about x is an indirect attribution of F-ness to x by S if and only if S's propositional belief about x is an attribution of F-ness to x by S, but in making this attribution S does not grasp the conjunction of x's haecceity and F-ness. For instance, suppose that (ax)(x=Redness & x is believed by Jones to be a property) as in Case (1). In a situation of this kind, Jones's attribution of Propertyhood to Redness is a propositional belief, but Jones does not grasp the haecceity of Redness. Thus, Jones indirectly attributes Propertyhood to Redness. Similarly, suppose that the redhead in Jones's kitchen is believed by Jones to be a philosopher as in Case (2). In such a situation Jones indirectly attributes the property of being a philosopher to that redhead, since in making this propositional attribution, Jones does not grasp the haecceity of the redhead in his kitchen. There are obvious differences between direct de re belief and Russellian knowledge by acquaintance, although in some sense both are direct de re cognitive attitudes. According to Russell, knowledge by acquaintance is logically independent of knowledge of truths, and a person is acquainted with numerous multiply exemplifiable attributes, his own states of mind, and (probably) himself. A different conception of "knowledge by acquaintance" is advocated in Chapter 5. I argue that a person, S, is acquainted with an item, x, just in case S has a certain kind of direct de re knowledge about x,

26 'N' and 'F" are schematic letters which should be replaced with appropriate linguistic expressions. In clause (ii), the first occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of identity, and the second occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of predication. Note that substitution of a name 'N' for the schematic letter 'N' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition only if 'N' is a name of x, and the name 'being identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates x's haecceity.

35

where the definition of the notion of direct de re knowledge parallels that of the concept of direct de re belief. Thus, I understand "acquaintance" as a kind of propositional knowledge. Hence, unlike acquaintance in Russell's sense, acquaintance in my sense is logically dependent upon knowledge of truths. A person cannot have a direct de re belief about an entity, x, unless he grasps a conjunctive property one of whose conjuncts is x's haecceity. Since a person cannot grasp a conjunctive property without grasping each of its conjuncts, and since direct de re knowledge requires direct de re belief, a person cannot have direct de re belief about x, or direct de re knowledge about x, unless he grasps x's haecceity. Accordingly, in order to ascertain the objects of direct de re knowledge and belief, we need to determine which haecceities can be grasped by, a person. An answer to this question is defended in Chapter 5. This answer has two parts. (i) For any person S, S is incapable of grasping a haecceity of a physical object or person other than S (nor is S capable of grasping the haecceity of any other particular outside of the circle of his own ideas). Since some particulars located in the external world relative to S are inanimate, and therefore incapable of grasping a property, a corollary of (i) is that some haecceities of particulars are such that no one is capable of grasping them. (ii) Each of us can grasp his own haecceity, haecceities of some of his own mental states, and haecceities of some abstract entities. (i) and (ii) imply that the entities whose haecceities a person can grasp and Russellian objects of direct acquaintance are substantially one and the same. 27 Because a person, S, cannot have a direct de re belief about an item, x, unless S grasps x's haecceity, (i) and (ii) together entail that a person, S, is incapable of directly attributing a property to a particular in the external world relative to S, and that each of us can directly attribute properties to himself, some of his own mental states, and some abstract entities. In addition, (i) and (ii) have certain linguistic implications. Inasmuch as S uses a linguistic term to express a property only if S grasps that property, (i) 27

See Bertrand Russell, "On the Nature of Acquaintance," and The Problems of Philosophy, Chapter 5.

36





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implies that S is incapable of using an indexical name or a proper name, N, to express the haecceity of a physical object or person other than S (nor is S capable of using N to express the haecceity of a particular located in the external world relative to S). 28 Since if S grasps a property, then in typical cases S can use a linguistic term to express that property, (ii) implies that if

S uses N to designate himself, some of his mental states, or certain abstract entities, then typically S can use N to express the haecceity of such an entity. A related application of the haecceity notion in the cognitive field concerns psychological attitudes expressible in terms of first-person language, for example, my belief that I am alive. Consider a possible scenario of the following sort. 29 Upon awakening on the battlefield amidst a tangle of bodies, I glimpse a scratched leg extending from underneath a tarpaulin. Because there are many similar looking legs sticking out from underneath the tarpaulin, I am unaware of the fact that it is my leg which I see. I have a perceptual belief that this person's leg is scratched, but I do not believe that my leg is scratched, even though that person is identical with me." In the case described above, (3x)(x=me & x is perceptually believed by x to have a scratched leg). Hence, where being F is an attribute, my being believed by myself to be F is not a logically sufficient condition for my believing that I am F, even when the former de re belief is perceptual. Nor

M. Lockwood, "Identity and Reference," in M. Munitz, ed., Identity and (New York: New York University Press, 1971), pp. 199-211, and "On Predicating Individuation Proper Names," The Philosophical Review, 84 (1975), pp. 471-498. Lockwood is committed to the view that people use proper names of material objects or persons other than themselves to express haecceities of such material objects or persons. 28 Compare

29 As far as I know, cases of this kind were first proposed by Hector-Neri Castafteda. See his " 'He': A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness," Ratio, VII (1966), pp. 130-157, and his "The Phenomeno-logic of the I," Akten des XIV Internationalen Kongresses fur Philosophie, Vol. III (University of Vienna, 1969), pp. 260-266.

Person and 30 This example is an adaptation of one used by Roderick Chisholm. See his p. 37. In variations upon this case, I see myself in a mirror, but fail to recognize Object, myself, either because I glimpse myself from an odd angle, or because unbeknownst to me my appearance has totally changed, or because I am suffering from amnesia and I do not recall what I look like.



37

is my having some de re perceptual belief a logically necessary condition for my believing that I am F. After all, I could believe that I am thinking even when I am in a state of complete sensory deprivation, lacking any visual, tactual, auditory, gustatory, or olfactory experiences, and therefore not having any de re perceptual belief. What is it, then, for an individual to have a self-attributional belief which is expressible in first-person language? In other words, what is it for a person to self-ascribe a feature? An argument presented in Chapter 5 leads to what seems to be a plausible answer to this question. In Chapter 5, I shall argue both that (a) each of us can introspectively grasp his own haecceity, and (b) sensory perception does not enable anyone to grasp the haecceity of an object that he perceives. Given (a) and (b), haecceities can be used to explain how a person could have a perceptual belief about himself without his making a corresponding self-ascription. In that case, the idea that a self-ascription is a belief wherein the believer grasps his own haecceity is an extremely attractive one. In particular, an analysis of the concept of self-ascription along the following lines looks plausible. First, we formulate an analysis of what it is for me to believe that I am F. ,

I believe that I am F =ff. (i) I exemplify the haecceity, being identical with N, and (ii) I believe that something which is N is F, and in believing this I grasp the conjunction of my haecceity and the property of being F.' A parallel analysis applies to each of us, and a corresponding account of what it is for any person to have such a belief about himself can be stated as follows.

31,

N and 'F' are schematic letters which ought to be replaced with suitable linguistic

expressions. In clause (ii), the first occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of identity, and the second occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of predication. Observe that substituting a name 'N'

for the schematic letter 'IV' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition only if 'N' is a name of S, and the name 'being identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates S's

haecceity.

38

S believes that he himself is F =df. (i) S exemplifies the haecceity, being identical with N, and (ii) S believes that something which is N is F, and in believing this S grasps the conjunction of S's haecceity and the property of being F. 32 The phenomenon of self-ascription suggests that the concept of haecceity has an important role to play in elucidating the nature of our belief and knowledge of external things. To see this, consider the following thesis of the indispensability of first-person reference, a thesis which is suggested by Descartes's closing argument in the Second Meditation. 33 According to this thesis, a person cannot have a piece of knowledge, K1, about an external thing unless he has another piece of knowledge, K2, about himself which can be expressed in first-person language. This thesis seems to be true. It appears that a person, S, cannot have knowledge about an external thing, x, unless there is a cognitive, psychological, or referential way of being related to an item, such that S knows that he is related to something in that way, where S's knowledge can be expressed in first-person language. For instance, it seems that I cannot have perceptual knowledge that this is red, unless I have some such knowledge about myself as that I see something red, 34 I cannot have knowledge by description that the first president of the 32 'N' and 'F' are schematic letters which should be replaced with suitable linguistic expressions. In clause (ii), the first occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of identity, and the second occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of predication. Notice that replacing the schematic letter 'N' with a name 'N' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition only if 'N' is a name of S, and the name 'being identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates S's haecceity. 33 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy. This thesis is also suggested by the following remarks about demonstrative reference made by Stuart Hampshire. "The pronoun 'I', and the first person singular form in general is more than just one more demonstrative device in language, parallel and on the same level with 'this' and 'that', and with the other personal pronouns. The first person singular is the nucleus on which the other referential devices depend...The final point of reference, by which a statement is attached to reality, is the speaker's reference to himself, as one thing, and one person, among others." Thought and Action (London: Chatto & Windus, 1959), p. 87. 34 It

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might be objected that there could be a young child who has visual knowledge about an external object, x, e.g., knowledge that this is red, where x=this, but who does not know that he sees something red. But what reason is there for thinking that there could be such a child?

39

United States of America was a great general, unless I have some such knowledge about myself as that I think that someone was the first president of the United States of America, and I cannot know that Bill Clinton came from Arkansas, unless I have some such knowledge about myself as that I refer to somebody as 'Bill Clinton', respectively. Given the indispensability of first-person reference, it can be argued plausibly that there is a sense in which our knowledge of ourselves is more basic than our knowledge of external things. To set up this argument, consider the following possible case. I fall victim to an extreme form of amnesia in which I forget, irretrievably, everything I knew about particular things, while retaining mastery of a wide range of general concepts. In addition, at the onset of my amnesia I am in a state of total sensory deprivation, and remain so for an hour. If I were in circumstances of this kind, then for an hour I would not have any knowledge about an external thing. But during this hour I could have knowledge about myself, because I could be in such circumstances and have introspective knowledge that I am thinking. 35 It follows that a person can have knowledge expressible in first-person language about himself without his having knowledge about an external thing Since a person cannot have knowledge of an external thing unless he has knowledge expressible in first-person language about himself, we can conclude that an individual's knowledge of an external thing is asymmetrically dependent upon his having knowledge about himself expressible in first-person language. That is, a person can have such knowledge about himself without his having knowledge of an external thing, but a person cannot have knowledge of an external thing without his having knowledge of this kind about himself. Hence, there is a sense in which self-knowledge is more basic than knowledge of an external thing, and a sense in which

The rationale might be that possibly, a child, S, possesses the visual knowledge in question, but cannot articulate the sentence 'I see something red'. But this hardly provides a decisive reason for concluding that S would be ignorant of the fact that he sees something red. It may well be the case that S's inability to articulate this sentence is due to linguistic incompetence, and that S does know that he sees something red. 35

51-64.

Cf. Gary Rosenkrantz, "Cognition and Identifying Reference," Auslegung, 6 (1978), pp.

40



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CHAPTER 1

first-person reference is prior to reference to an external thing. Thus, if the object of a belief expressible in terms of first-person language is a proposition which involves the believer's haecceity, then it follows that a person, S, cannot have knowledge of an external thing, x, unless S knows a proposition which involves his own haecceity. If a person cannot have knowledge of an

external thing unless he knows such a proposition, then haecceities of thinking subjects play a fundamental role in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. At any rate, a large portion of a person's belief and knowledge about external things can be expressed in terms of first-person language. For example, in virtue of my knowing that the thing appearing at the center of my field of vision is purple, where x=the thing appearing at the center of my field of vision, x is known by me to be purple; and in virtue of my knowing that the first president of the country in which I reside was a great general, where George Washington=the first president of the country in which I reside, George Washington is known by me to have been a great general. Hence, if the notion of a belief expressible in terms of first-person language can be understood in terms of the concept of haecceity, then a person, S, often picks out or identifies an external thing, x, by uniquely relating x to himself in such a way that S grasps his own haecceity. Therefore, if the concept of a belief expressible in terms of first-person language can be understood in terms of the notion of haecceity, then the notion of haecceity has a large role to play in the elucidation of the nature of our thought about external things. Influenced by Russell's theory of knowledge by acquaintance and description, Roderick Chisholm has given the concept of haecceity an even larger role in explicating the nature of our thought about external things.' Chisholm's theory implies that necessarily, a person's knowledge about an external thing, x, is knowledge by description about x. His theory also entails that necessarily, in having knowledge by description about x, a person, S, uniquely relates x to himself in such a way that S grasps his own haecceity. According to the account Chisholm has developed, S may identify a first external thing, x, by uniquely relating it to himself, S may identify a

second external thing, y, by uniquely relating it to x, S may identify a third external thing, z, by uniquely relating it to y, and so on. For instance, I can identify the United States of America as the country a portion of whose land I see beneath my feet, Abraham Lincoln as the president who freed those enslaved in this country, and Mary Todd Lincoln as the wife of Abraham Lincoln, and so forth. In addition, Chisholm argued that a person's body of knowledge about external things is a network of such sequences of identifications, where each sequence in the network is noncircular and such that it has the person's identification of himself as its first member. If this argument is sound, then a person's body of knowledge about external things is ultimately anchored by his identification of a nonexternal thing, namely, himself. Furthermore, based upon his analysis of de re belief in terms of de ditto belief (an analysis which presupposes that concreta have haecceities) Chisholm has held that necessarily, if S has a belief about an external thing x, then S has knowledge about x. 37 If all of these Chisholmian positions are correct, then a person's self, as known to that person through his haecceity, is an archimedean point of reference upon which all of that person's thought about external things depends.

37

36 Roderick

Chisholm, Person and Object.

41

See Roderick Chisholm, "Knowledge and Belief: `De Otero' and `De Re''.

42



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INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

43

version of (D3) allows for (but doesn't logically entail) the existence of unexemplified individual essences, inasmuch as it only requires that an individual essence be possibly essential to an entity and necessarily repugnant to any other entity.

VI - HAECCEITIES AND INDIVIDUAL ESSENCES "This is why, Monsieur, it seems to me, that I ought to regard as involved in my individual concept only what is of such a nature that I would no longer be myself if it were

(D4) E is an individual essence =df. E is possibly such that: (3x)(x necessarily exemplifies E, and E is necessarily such that —(3y)(y#x & y exemplifies E)).

not in me, while on the other hand, everything which is of

such a nature that it might either happen to me or not happen to me without my ceasing to be myself, should not be considered as involved in my individual concept..." (Arnauld to Leibniz, May 13, 1686)

The concepts of haecceity and individual essence are closely related, an individual essence of an entity, e, being an essential property of e which could not be had by anything other than e As noted earlier, it has been maintained that there couldn't be an unexemplified haecceity. In a similar vein, some philosophers hold that an unexemplified individual essence is an impossibility. Provided that these philosophers are correct, the concept of an individual essence can be formally defined in the following manner, (D3) E is an individual essence =df. (3x)(x necessarily exemplifies E, E is necessarily such that —(3y) (y-Ax & y exemplifies E.))



and

If de re modalities can be understood in terms of possible worlds along the lines indicated earlier, then (D3) can be reformulated in terms of possible worlds. In particular: E is an individual essence =df. (3x)(x exemplifies E in every possible world in which x exists, and in no possible world is E exemplified by something other than x.) But it is not obvious that every individual essence is exemplified. After all, there might be an unexemplified individual essence which could be exemplified by a particular. However, just as it appears that there could not be a necessarily unexemplified haecceity, it appears that there could not be a necessarily unexemplified individual essence. Thus, I shall assume that every individual essence is possibly exemplified. The following amended

For example, suppose that Socrates has a haecceity, namely, being identical with Socrates. Call this haecceity H. Clearly, H satisfies (D4), since H is possibly such that: (3x)(x—Socrates and x necessarily exemplifies H, and H is necessarily such that —(3y)(y#x & y exemplifies H)). 38 Thus, H is an individual essence. Inasmuch as an argument of this kind applies to every haecceity, every haecceity is an individual essence.' However, I argue below that some individual essences are not haecceities. To begin, consider a property which everything has necessarily, for instance, being such that whatever is red is colored. A characteristic of this sort is a universal essential property. A conjunction of a haecceity and a universal essential property is an individual essence, for example, being identical with Aristotle and such that 7+5=12 (PI), being identical with Aristotle and such that 7+6=13 (P2), being identical with Aristotle and such 38

A nominalist or a qualitative realist rejects the existence of H. Nevertheless, both Nominalism and Qualitative Realism are least formally consistent with the following thesis: Socrates is essentially identical with Socrates, and Socrates is necessarily diverse from any entity other than Socrates. That is: (3x)(x=Socrates & x is necessarily identical with x & y)(y#x —> x is necessarily not identical with y) ). 39

Compare the following passage from Duns Scotus, The Oxford Commentary On the Four Books Of The Sentences (selections) in Hyman and Walsh, eds., Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 589. "And if you ask, 'What is this individual being from which individual difference is taken? Is it not matter, or form, or the composite?' I reply that every quidditative entity, whether partial or total of any kind, is of itself indifferent, as quidditative entity, to this entity and that one...just as being "this" does not belong to it, so the opposite is not repugnant to it from its own character. And just as the composite insofar as it is a nature does not include the being by which it is "this", so neither does matter insofar as it is a nature, nor form. Therefore, this being is not matter, nor form, nor the composite, insofar as any of these is a nature..." From this passage, it seems that Scotus would regard a haecceity as an individual essence.

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that 7+7=14 (P3), and so on. Assuming a conjunctive property's conjuncts are proper parts of that conjunctive property, it follows that Aristotle's haecceity is a proper part of P1, P2, P3, et cetera. Because it is impossible for something to be a proper part of itself, Aristotle's haecceity and P1, P2, P3, and so forth, are diverse. Hence, there are conjunctive individual essences which are not haecceities. Since a parallel argument applies to every haecceity, on the assumption that every entity has a haecceity, every entity has a conjunctive individual essence other than its haecceity. Although this argument is not implausible, it depends on the assumption that the conjuncts of a conjunctive property are proper parts of that property. A second argument which is plausible and which does not rely on this assumption goes as follows. For any properties P and Q, if P is possibly such that P has an attribute, A, or bears a relation, R, to something, z, (at a time) when Q does not have A or bear R to z, then P#Q. 4° Given that Aristotle has a haecceity, it seems possible that Aristotle grasps this haecceity by being aware of himself. Since it is possible that at some time Aristotle is aware of himself and mathematically unsophisticated, it appears possible that at some time Aristotle grasps his haecceity and fails to grasp either PI (the property of being identical with Aristotle and such that 7+5=12), P2 (the property of being identical with Aristotle and such that 7+6=13), or P3 (the property of being identical with Aristotle and such that 7+7=14), and so on. Hence, Aristotle's haecceity is diverse from P1, P2, P3, and so forth. Parallel arguments imply that P1, P2, P3, et cetera, are diverse from one another. Consequently, Aristotle has indefinitely many individual essences, only one of which is a haecceity. An argument of this kind applies to any haecceity exemplified by a person. Such an argument also applies to any haecceity of an abstract entity which could be grasped. Therefore, a person or an abstract entity of this kind has innumerable individual essences, only one of which is a haecceity.

40 This principle follows assuming the appropriate versions of the principles of The Diversity of The Dissimilar and The Necessity of Identity. According to the first principle, necessarily, for any x & y, and any time t, if at t x has an attribute A, or stands in a relation R then x^y. According to something z, and at t y lacks A, or y is such that it does not bear R to z, to the second principle, for any x & y, if x is identical with y, then x is necessarily identical with

y.

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

45

There are variants upon my first two arguments for saying that some individual essences of concrete things are not haecceities. These variants parallel the original arguments, and are at least as plausible as them, but are formulated in terms of different.universal essential properties. For example, instead of constructing individual essences by conjoining Aristotle's haecceity with properties like being such that 7+5=12, being such that 7+6=13, and being such that 7+7=14, individual essences can be constructed by conjoining Aristotle's haecceity with logically complex conditional properties such as (a) being colored if red, (b) being shaped if octagonal, and (c) being an animal if a cat. Like my second argument, these variants maintain that it is possible for Aristotle to grasp his haecceity without his grasping the conjunction of that haecceity and some universal essential property. It is just as plausible that possibly, Aristotle grasps his haecceity, and fails to grasp the conjunction of his haecceity with either (a), (b), or (c), as it was that possibly, Aristotle grasps his haecceity, and fails to grasp either P1, P2, or P3 (as defined above). Alternatively, an individual essence which is not a haecceity can be constructed by conjoining Aristotle's haecceity with a universal essential property such as being self-identical. Such a variant upon my second argument relies upon the following sub-argument in order to justify the premise that possibly, at some time Aristotle grasps his haecceity and fails to grasp the conjunction of that haecceity with being self-identical. First, Aristotle's haecceity pertains to a specific concretum, namely, Aristotle. In contrast, being self-identical is a wholly general property of which Aristotle is a particular instance. But, surely, in most cases an individual could grasp a property which pertains to a specific concretum before he grasps a wholly general property of which that concretum is an instance. After all, one's awareness of what is specific and concrete generally precedes, and causally contributes to, one's awareness of what is general. Furthermore, being selfidentical has a reflexive character which Aristotle's haecceity lacks. Hence, given that Aristotle could grasp his own haecceity, it seems possible that at some time Aristotle grasps his haecceity and fails to grasp being selfidentical. Moreover, Aristotle cannot grasp the conjunction of his haecceity with being self-identical, unless he grasps both conjuncts of such a conjunction. Thus, it appears possible that at some time Aristotle grasps his

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haecceity and fails to grasp the conjunction of his haecceity with being selfidentical. Another cogent reason for drawing such a conclusion here (as well as in the previous parallel cases) is that possibly, Aristotle suffers from a psychological disability which allows him to grasp each of the relevant conjuncts, but not their conjunction.

Additionally, it seems that Concreteness and Personhood are nonuniversal essential characteristics of Aristotle, and hence that the conjunction of either of these two characteristics and Aristotle's haecceity is an individual essence of Aristotle. It can be argued plausibly along lines parallel to those above (except that this parallel argument has nothing in it corresponding to the point about reflexivity in the earlier argument) that Aristotle could grasp his haecceity without grasping either of the two conjunctions in question, and that such conjunctions are individual essences which are not haecceities. A further argument is also worth considering. If it can be assumed that numbers exist, then it can be argued plausibly that a number has indefinitely many qualitative individual essences other than its haecceity. For example, if 2 exists, then 2's haecceity is the property of being identical with 2. But consider a qualitative individual essence of 2 such as being the even prime (Al), being the square root of 4 (A2), being the cube root of 8 (A3), and so on ad infinitum. Notice that possibly, 2's haecceity is grasped by a person at a time at which Al, A2, A3, et cetera, are not grasped by that person. Thus, an argument of the sort used in the preceding case implies that the qualitative individual essences, Al, A2, A3, and so forth, and 2's haecceity are diverse. In addition, parallel arguments imply that Al, A2, A3, and so on, are diverse from one another. Hence, 2 has indefinitely many qualitative individual essences other than its haecceity. For any number n, a parallel argument implies that n has indefinitely many qualitative individual essences other than its haecceity. Interestingly, haecceities and individual essences seem to diverge not only when logical or mathematical properties are involved, but also in the case of phenomenal qualities. For example, it can be argued plausibly that certain colors have individual essences which are not haecceities. Consider the color Orange. The haecceity of this color is the property of being identical with Orange. However, Orange has the following individual essence:

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

47

(El) being the color, x, such that: x is at the level of generality of Red and Yellow, x is other than these colors, x is similar to Red, equally similar to Yellow, and more similar to Red or Yellow than is any fourth color. The fact that (El) and the following individual essence are necessarily coinstantiated helps clarify the sense in which these colors are similar. (E2) being the color, x, such that: x is at the level of generality of Red and Yellow, x is other than those colors, and x is necessarily such that: at the level of generality in question, an instance of x is similar in color to an instance of Red, equally similar in color to an instance of Yellow, and more similar in color to an instance of Red or Yellow than is an instance of any fourth color. The notion of a color being at the level of generality of Red and Yellow is explicated below. Firstly, a color, Cl, is a variety of a color, C2, just provided that (i) O (Vx)(x has Cl —> x has C2), and (ii) 0 (3x)(x has C2 & x lacks C1). For instance, if something has Crimson, then it has Red, but possibly something has Red and lacks Crimson. Secondly, a color C is at the level of generality of Red and Yellow if and only if C is a color which is not a variety of another color. For example, Scarlet and Crimson are varieties of Red, but Red is not a variety of another color. A color which is not a variety of another color may be said to be a highest species of color. We can now see why it is plausible that (E2) is an individual essence of Orange which is other than Orange's haecceity. Notice that possibly, a person has visual experiences of red and yellow, but never has a visual experience of orange. It seems possible that such a person grasps (E2) without grasping Orange. Thus, it appears that possibly, a person grasps (E2) without grasping the haecceity of Orange. Inasmuch as (E2) is an individual essence of Orange, it seems possible that a person grasps an individual essence of Orange without grasping Orange's haecceity.

Moreover, it is possible that a person grasps the haecceity of Orange without grasping (E2), since (E2) is much more complex than this haecceity. Employing a pattern of argument introduced above, we can see that these







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INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

possibilities make it plausible that (E2) is an individual essence of Orange which is other than Orange's haecceity. Parallel reasoning leads to the conclusion that Red has the following individual essence other than its haecceity.

addition, it is possible that a person has visual experiences of black, lacks a visual experience of white, and has tactual experiences of hot and cold. It seems that possibly, a person of this sort grasps Blackness and Opposition without grasping Whiteness. Hence, it appears possible that a person grasps (E4) without grasping Whiteness's haecceity. Utilizing a by now familiar pattern of argument, we can see that these possibilities make it plausible that (E4) is an individual essence of Whiteness which is other than Whiteness's haecceity. A parallel argument shows that

48

(E3)being the color, x, such that: x is at the level of generality of Yellow and Orange, x is other than those colors, and x is necessarily such that: at the level of generality in question, an instance of x is similar in color to an instance of Orange, equally similar in color to an instance of Orange as is an instance of Yellow, and more similar in color to an instance of Orange than is an instance of any color other than x with the exception of Yellow. Next, consider the nonchromatic colors Blackness and Whiteness. The haecceity of Whiteness is being identical with Whiteness. In addition, Whiteness seems to have the following individual essence: (E4) being the opposite of Blackness. If there are negative properties, then some pairs of properties are formal contradictories, for example, being white and being nonwhite, being triangular and being nontriangular, and so on. Other pairs of properties are contraries, for instance, being white and being green. Contraries are not coinstantiable, but are not formally contradictory. Finally, some contraries are opposites, for example, Whiteness and Blackness, Hotness and Coldness, Smoothness and Roughness, et cetera. All opposites are contraries, but not all contraries are opposites. For instance, being triangular has no opposite, though it has contraries, for example, being square, being circular, being hexagonal, and so forth. We are now in a position to see why it is plausible that (E4) is an individual essence of Whiteness which is other than Whiteness's haecceity. Observe that possibly, a person has visual experiences of white, but lacks a visual experience of black. It seems possible that such a person grasps Whiteness without grasping Blackness. Consequently, it appears possible that a person grasps the haecceity of Whiteness without grasping (E4). In

49

(E5) being the opposite of Whiteness, an individual essence of Blackness, is other than the haecceity of Blackness (being identical with Blackness). Ernest Sosa has argued forcefully that if property A is the philosophical analysis of property B, then A=B, although it may (misleadingly) appear that possibly, somebody grasps B without grasping A.`" However, I will show that for each of the earlier sorts of cases in which it seems that possibly, someone grasps only one of two coinstantiated individual essences, there is a case of that sort in which neither one of two coinstantiated individual essences can be plausibly regarded as an analysis of the other. If I am right, then Sosa's argument does not undermine my claim that possibly, someone grasps only one of two coinstantiated individual essences. In the case of individual essences such as being identical with Aristotle, being identical with Aristotle and such that 7+5=12, being identical with Aristotle and colored i f red, being identical with Aristotle and self-identical, and so on, it is clear that none of these properties is an analysis of any of the others: none of these properties explicates or explains any of the others in the way required by a philosophical analysis. Parallel remarks apply to a pair of individual essences such as being identical with 2 and being the square root of 4. Turning to our pairs of individual essences of colors, I shall argue that either being identical with Orange is not analyzable as (E2), or being 41

See Ernest Sosa, "Classical Analysis," Journal of Philosophy, 80 (1983), pp. 695-710.



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INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

identical with Red is not analyzable as (E3), and either being identical with Whiteness is not analyzable as (E4), or being identical with Blackness is not analyzable as (E5). To begin with, suppose for the sake of a reductio that being identical with Whiteness is analyzable as (E4), and being identical with Blackness is analyzable as (E5). In that case, being white is analyzable as

requirement for a philosophical analysis.' I conclude that none of these examples is an authentic analysis. Similarly, it is evident that if (E2) is analyzable as being identical with Orange or (E3) is analyzable as being identical with Red, then a philosophical analysis can have an analysandum of greater logical complexity than its analysans. Since we have ruled out the possibility of such a philosophical analysis, neither of these cases is a genuine analysis. In sum, either being identical with Orange is not analyzable as (E2) and vice-versa, or being identical with Red is not analyzable as (E3) and viceversa; and either being identical with Whiteness is not analyzable as (E4) and vice-versa, or being identical with Blackness is not analyzable as (E5) and vice-versa. We have seen that for each of the earlier sorts of cases in which it seems that possibly, someone grasps only one of two coinstantiated individual essences, there is a case of that sort in which neither one of two coinstantiated individual essences can be plausibly regarded as an analysis of the other. Hence, Sosa's argument does not undermine my claim that possibly, someone grasps only one of two coinstantiated individual essences. Let us take stock for a moment. In the light of the foregoing arguments, two things are plausible. First, if there are haecceities, then some entities have a plurality of individual essences. Second, if there are haecceities, then some individual essences are not haecceities. 44 Of course, if an entity has

50

being the opposite of black, and being black is analyzable as being the opposite of white. But any attempt to analyze Whiteness in terms of Blackness while analyzing Blackness in terms of Whiteness is viciously circular. Hence, each of these pairs of supposed analyses contains at least one member which is not a genuine analysis. Likewise, assume for the purposes of a reductio that being identical with Orange is analyzable as (E2), and being identical with Red is analyzable as (E3). Surely, then, being orange is analyzable in terms of being yellow and being red, and being red is analyzable in terms of being yellow and being orange. However, any effort to analyze being orange in terms of being red while analyzing being red in terms of being orange is viciously circular. Therefore, at least one member of each of these pairs of supposed analyses is not a bona fide analysis. Moreover, in what follows I will argue that (E2), (E3), (E4), and (E5) are not analyzable as being identical with Orange, being identical with Red, being identical with Whiteness, and being identical with Blackness, respectively. Suppose for the sake of a reductio that either (E4) is analyzable as being identical with Whiteness or (E5) is analyzable as being identical with Blackness. In that event, either being the opposite of white is analyzable as being black or being the opposite of black is analyzable as being white. In either case,' we have a philosophical analysis whose analysans is less complex, logically speaking, than its analysandum. However, according to Sosa's conception of philosophical analysis, the analysans must be of greater logical complexity than the analysandum. 42 Moreover, this is a plausible

42 0n Sosa's view, an analysis resolves a complex attribute, A, into more basic components, viz., A's logical parts. His view implies that in an analysis the analysans must involve a logical complex, e.g., a conjunction, disjunction, negation, etc. This requirement does not seem to be satisfied if one either seeks to analyze (E4) as being identical with Whiteness or seeks to analyze

(E5) as being identical with Blackness.

51

43

Note that this requirement implies that being identical with Aristotle and such that 7+5=12 cannot be analyzed as being identical with Aristotle and being the square root of 4 cannot be analyzed as being identical with 2. This confirms some of the conclusions reached earlier about these and other similar examples. 44 Compare Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object; and Alvin Piantinga, "World and Essence," Philosophical Review, 79 (1970), pp. 380-386. According to their definitions of the term `haecceity', 'haecceity' means individual essence. Thus, given their definitions, the sentence 'All individual essences are haecceities' is trivially true. The truth of this sentence appears to be incompatible with my contention that some individual essences are not haecceities. However, I am not convinced that this appearance of incompatibility is more than a mere appearance, since I suspect that Chisholm and Plantinga introduce 'haecceity' as a technical term. If my suspicions are correct, then Chisholm's and Plantinga's definitions of 'haecceity' are stipulative, and do not reflect a substantive thesis about haecceities and individual essences. In any case, since my sense of haecceity is legitimate, and since it seems that some individual essences are not haecceities in that sense, it is a significant drawback of Chisholm's and

Plantinga's definitions of 'haecceity' that on these definitions the sentence 'Some individual



CHAPTER 1



52 a plurality of individual essences, then these essences are necessarily coexemplified.' Hence, it seems (as has oft been argued) that necessary coexemplification is not sufficient for property identity. If for any property A and any property B the necessary coexemplification of A and B is sufficient for A's being identical with B, then property identity is coarse grained. Otherwise, property identity is fine grained. In the light of the foregoing argument, it appears that if there are haecceities, then property identity is fine grained. Finally, note that no more than one of any plurality of coexemplified individual essences is a haecceity: the coexemplification of individual essences does not imply the coexemplification of haecceities.

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

45

P1 is necessarily A property PI and a property P2 are necessarily coexemplified =df.

such that for any x, x has P1 if and only if x has P2.

53

VII - VARIETIES OF REALISM AND ANTI-REALISM "In some shape or other, Nominalism and Realism still divide between them the empire of thought." (1864 Burton The Scot Abroad II. i. 16)

Since haecceities are properties, the existence, of haecceities entails Realism, the doctrine that properties exist. Of course, if there are properties, then a property cannot be eliminated in favor of an entity of another kind or ontological category, for instance, a concept, a linguistic expression, an event, a physical object, a trope, a collection, a relation, or a set. 46 However, Realism may be either Robust or Anemic. According to Anemic Realism, properties exist, but a property is reducible to or identifiable with a concept, an event, a physical object, a trope, a collection, a relation, a set, or the like." For example, one variety of Anemic Realism maintains that properties can be identified with concepts, a kind of mind-dependent concrete entity, for instance, the property of Horseness=the concept of Horseness, the property of Unicornicity= the concept of Unicornicity, and so forth. On the other hand, Robust Realism says that properties exist, and Propertyhood is a fundamental ontological category. Propertyhood is a fundamental ontological category just in case a property is not reducible to or identifiable with a concept, an event, a physical object, a trope, a collection, a relation, a set, or the like. Note that on my understanding of what it is for Propertyhood to be a fundamental ontological category, Propertyhood's having this status is consistent with the nonexistence of properties or with a property's being eliminable in favor of an entity of another kind or ontological category. Such eliminability of properties entails Anti-Realism, the doctrine that properties do not exist. Traditionally, Anti-Realism takes one of two forms. Nominalism denies that there are properties, maintaining that a property is 46

essences are not haecceities' is trivially false.



1f an entity, e, is eliminated in favor of e*, then e fails to exist.

471f an entity, e, is reduced to or identified with an entity, e*, then necessarily, e exists if and only if e* exists.

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a nonconcrete entity and only concrete entities exist. Thus, Nominalism implies that neither the property of Horseness nor the property of Unicornicity exists. Conceptualism adds to Nominalism the claim that there are concepts, and that a putative reference to a property can be replaced with a reference to a concept. In other words, Conceptualism is the thesis that properties can be eliminated in favor of concepts. For instance, although neither the property of Horseness nor the property of Unicornicity exists, concepts of Horseness and Unicornicity exist. Let us now return to a consideration of Robust Realism. A standard defense of Robust Realism is based on an argument in favor of the existence of qualitative properties. In Chapter 2, I will provide a nonstandard defense of Robust Realism, one which is based on an argument in favor of the existence of nonqualitative properties. There are two traditional varieties of Robust Realism: Extreme Realism and Moderate Realism. According to Moderate Realism, every property is exemplified, for example, Horseness exists, but not Unicornicity. On the other hand, Extreme Realism maintains that some properties are exemplified and some are not, for instance, Horseness and Unicornicity, respectively. Two opposing forms of Extreme Realism may be distinguished. According to Weak Extreme Realism, every unexemplified property can be identified with a logical complex of exemplified properties. For example, the unexemplified property of being a horned horse is a conjunction of two exemplified properties, namely, being horned and being a horse. Weak Extreme Realism would seem to be a cross between Extreme Realism and Moderate Realism. In contrast, Strong Extreme Realism maintains that some unexemplified properties cannot be identified with logical complexes of exemplified properties. In Chapter 3 I argue that (i) Strong Extreme Realism is true on the grounds that there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities which correspond to mereologically and causally disjoint NEPs and which cannot be identified with logical complexes of exemplified properties. Furthermore, I argue in Chapter 5 that (ii) it is impossible that anyone grasps or picks out an unexemplified haecceity of this kind, and (iii) some of these unexemplified haecceities are necessarily ungraspable. (i)-(iii) entails Radical Realism, a form of Extreme Realism holding that there are unexemplified properties

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

55

which cannot be identified with logical complexes of exemplified properties and which are mind-independent in the strong sense of (ii)-(iii). 48 Notice that if the existence of a property entails that there is a conscious being who can grasp or pick out that property, then there is a sense in which a property is mind-dependent. However, although Strong Extreme Realism entails that a property cannot be identified with a concept, this form of Realism is consistent with the claim that the existence of a property entails that God grasps or picks out that property. In contrast, since Radical Realism asserts that some properties are mind-independent in the strong sense of (ii)-(iii), Radical Realism is not consistent with this claim. Hence, Radical Realism is a higher grade of Realism than Strong Extreme Realism. If my argument in this book succeeds, then Radical Realism is justified.

48

The reader may find it useful to compare these positions on the ontological status of properties with the related traditional responses to the problem of universals described in Section II of this chapter. A relevant and up-to-date overview of various positions on the ontological status of properties is provided in H. Burkhardt and 13. Smith, eds., Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, 2 vols. (Munich: Philosophia, Verlag, 1991). The following handbook entries are especially relevant: Attribute (pp. 65 70), Abstract/Concrete, (pp. 4 5), Conceptualism (pp. 168-174), Metaphysics VI: Systematic Metaphysics (548-553), Nominalism (pp. 618 619), and Universals (pp. 921-553). -

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VIII - THE CONCRETE/ABSTRACT DISTINCTION "Logicians in almost every age have endeavoured to frame schemes of classification in which things should be arranged according to their real nature. To these the name of Categories-has been given." Outline of the Laws of Thought § 97) (1849

Abp. Thomson

Realists and antirealists presuppose an intuitive distinction between abstracta and concreta in their debates about the problem of universals and the ontological status of properties. In order to remind ourselves of the data for this distinction, let us look once again at examples which illustrate the distinction. Examples of abstracta are Triangularity (a property), Diversity (a relation), there being horses (a proposition), my singleton set, and the number 7. Examples of concreta are a stone (a material substance), God (a disembodied spiritual substance), Hurricane Carol (an event), instants and seconds (times), points and expanses of space (places), the particular squareness of a certain item (a trope), the sum of Venus and Pluto (a

collection), the Earth's surface (a limit), and shadows and gaps (privations). It is desirable that a philosophical analysis of the concrete/abstract distinction allow for the possibility of entities of any intelligible sorts, given some plausible view about the nature, existence conditions, and interrelationships of entities of those sorts. This desideratum seems to require allowing for the possibility of entities of the aforementioned kinds. Six attempts have been made to analyze the concrete/abstract distinction. (1) Unlike abstracta, concreta are spatially located or spatially related to something. (2) Unlike abstracta, concreta are capable of moving or undergoing intrinsic change. (3) Concreta have contingent existence, whereas abstracta have necessary existence. (4) Unlike concreta, abstracta are exemplifiable. (5) Unlike concreta, abstracta are (intellectually) graspable. (6) Unlike abstracta, concreta can be causes or effects. (1) is inadequate because a disembodied spirit is concrete but neither spatially located nor spatially related to something. Alternatively, we might

57

amend (1) to read as follows. (1') Unlike abstracta, concreta are spatially or temporally located, or spatially or temporally related to something. Arguably, it is necessary that a soul is temporally located or enters into temporal relations. Still, (1') is flawed: properties are abstract, but it seems that some properties enter into temporal relations, for example, Wakefulness is exemplified by Aristotle at one time and not at another. Although some philosophers claim that abstracta are outside of time, this claim is problematic, since as the example of Wakefulness and Aristotle implies, abstracta undergo relational change. An entity's being temporal does not imply that it undergoes nonrelational change, for instance, a sphere which does not undergo nonrelational change and which other spheres orbit is in time. (2) is inadequate because points and instants are concrete but incapable of either moving or undergoing intrinsic change. (3) is subject to three complaints or difficulties. Firstly, a being such as

the theistic God is concrete yet has necessary existence. Secondly, according to Aristotelian Realism a property cannot exist unexemplified. Aristotelian Realism implies that some properties are abstract yet have contingent existence. Thirdly, sets of ordinary concreta are abstract but seem to have contingent existence. (4) is objectionable because sets, propositions, and properties such as being a spherical cube are abstract but could not be exemplified. (5) is unsatisfactory because it seems that abstracta of certain kinds could not be grasped, for instance, sets of concreta or haecceities which can be exemplified by necessarily nonconscious material substances.' (6) is unsatisfactory for the following reasons. According to one camp, causes and effects are concrete events.' On this view, (6) has the absurd implication that substances are nonconcrete. One reply is that substances (but not abstracta) can be involved in causal relations. But, if causes and effects are concrete events, then it is hard to fathom the sense of "involve-

49

For an argument that such haecceities are ungraspable see Chapter 5, section X.

50

See Donald Davidson, "The Individuation of Events," in N. Rescher, ed., Essays in Honor of C. G. Hempel (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 216-234, "Causal Relations,"

Journal of Philosophy, 64 (1967),

Nous, IV (1970), pp. 25-32.

pp. 691-703, and "Events as Particulars,"

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58

ment" intended. For according to an event ontology, an event's occurring does not entail that a substance exists, and an event is not a substances's exemplifying a property at a time or the like. Moreover, since causal relations hold in virtue of laws correlating properties of things, in a sense abstracta are involved in causal relations. Finally, there is evidence that facts or the like can be causes or effects, but facts are abstracta. 51 Below, I attempt to devise an adequate analysis of the concrete/abstract distinction.' The basic idea of my analysis is that an entity is abstract or concrete in virtue of meeting certain conditions qua being an instance of the ontological category to which it belongs. This notion of an ontological category needs to be explained, since every entity is of many different kinds or categories of varying degrees or levels of generality or specificity. Thus, to develop my analysis I must specify the degree of generality of the ontological categories I have in mind. This is a kind of generality problem

51 These observations provide a reply to the following argument. (1) An abstract entity cannot enter into causal relations. (2) We have knowledge about an entity only if that entity enters into causal relations. Therefore, (3) We cannot have knowledge about an abstract entity. In the light of those observations, it would seem that either (1) or (2) is false. That is, either (1) is false because facts or the like are abstract and can enter into causal relations, or (2) is false for either of the following two reasons. (i) We have knowledge about material substances which cannot enter into causal relations. (ii) Although abstracta cannot enter into causal relations, there is a sense in which abstracta are involved in causal relations, and we can have knowledge about an entity if it is involved in causal relations in that sense. Compare Jaegwon Kim, "The Role of Perception in A Priori Knowledge: Some Remarks," Philosophical Studies, 40 (1981), pp. 339-354. 52 It

seems that a consideration of difficulties such as the foregoing ones have led some philosophers to doubt whether there is such a ""-g as the concrete/abstract distinction at all. For example, in "The Role of Perception in A Priori Knowledge: Some Remarks," p. 348, Jaegwon Kim wrote as follows. "The force of saying that something is 'abstract' or 'platonic' has never been made clear. One sense sometimes attached to 'abstract' is that of 'eternal'; an abstract object in this sense neither comes into being nor perishes. Another closely related sense is that of not being in space and time. Abstract entities in this sense are atemporal and nonspatial: they lack location in space-time. A third sense is that of 'necessary'; abstract entities in this sense are said to 'exist necessarily'. It is by no means obvious that these three senses are equivalent: for example, one traditional concept of God makes him abstract in the first and third sense but not in the second." Kim's skepticism about the very existence of the concrete/abstract distinction will prove to be unwarranted if I succeed in providing a philosophical analysis of this distinction, and in arguing that this analysis is adequate to the intuitions philosophers have had about how the distinction applies to particular cases.

59

(of which there are many examples in philosophy). I shall provide a solution to this problem by giving informal and formal accounts of the appropriate degree of generality of an ontological category or kind of entity. As I have indicated, ontological categories are of different levels of generality, and are related to one another as species and genus. Thus, these categories constitute a system of classification which reflects these logical relations. In what follows, I will (i) characterize this system, and (ii) analyze a level of generality (which I shall call level C) within this system which is crucial to my attempt to analyze the concrete/abstract distinction. Step 1 A category, Cl, and a category, C2, are equivalent just provided that Cl and C2 are necessarily coinstantiated; Cl is instantiable if and only if Cl is possibly instantiated; and Cl subsumes C2 just in case Cl and C2 are such that necessarily, any instance of C2 is an instance of Cl, and possibly, some instance of Cl is not an instance of C2. For example, being an event and being an occurrence are equivalent categories. Any two equivalent categories are at the same level of generality. On the other hand, if A subsumes B, then A is at a higher level of generality than B For instance, being an abstract entity subsumes being a property. Notice that in this technical or logician's sense of subsumption a noninstantiable category is subsumed by any instantiable category, and a category that must be universally instantiated subsumes any category that need not be universally instantiated. Step 2 There is an intuitive notion of a hierarchy of levels of generality among ontological categories." At the highest level (level A) is the category of being an entity which everything instantiates and which is therefore a kind of limiting case. At a lower level (level B) are the categories of Concreteness and Abstractness. At a yet lower level (level C) are the categories which are the various types of concreta and abstracta, just provided that these categories are instantiable. Below, I list typical or core categories that

53

See Gary Rosenkrantz and Joshua Hoffman, "The Independence Criterion of Substance," 853.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51 (1991), pp. 835

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are at level C on the foregoing proviso." List L: Property, Relation, Proposition, Event, Time, Place, Trope, Collection, Limit, and Privation.

Seemingly, some categories at C level are not on L, for example, Substance

and Set. At a level of generality lower than C (call it level D) are those instantiable ontological categories which are the various types of the categories at level C. For instance, at level D we find types of Substance, for example, Material Object, or Spirit; types of Event, for instance, Material Event, or Spiritual Event; types of Limit, for example, Surface, or Line, or Instant; and types of Privation, for instance, Shadow, or Hole. More specific types are at lower levels of generality.

Figure 1

Level C

Level D

Concrete

Abstract

Level B

Property Relation Proposition





(Al) There are at least two (nonequivalent) instantiable categories of concreta at level C (at least one of which is on L), and there are at least two (nonequivalent) instantiable categories of abstracta at level C (at least one of which is on L.) I employ intuitive conceptions of the categories on L, and presuppose (plausibly, I think) that not every instance (actual or possible) of a category on L is identifiable with an instance of another ontological category. (The irreducibility of a category on L that this implies is consistent with the eliminability of an entity of such a category in favor of an entity of another ontological category.) If the foregoing presupposition is mistaken, then the categories that make it so should be removed from L. The only limitation I place on this process of removal is that (Al) be true, and that whatever categories satisfy (Al) be compatible with the above presupposition. Step 3 (D1) A category Cl is at level C =df either (i) Cl is on L, and Cl is instantiable, or (ii) [(a) Cl is not on L, and Cl does not subsume an instantiable category on L, and no category on L subsumes Cl, and (b) there is no category C2 which satisfies the conditions in (ii)(a) and which subsumes C/1 55

Entity

Level A

61

Event Time Place Substance Limit Col ection Privation Trope

Material Object Spirit

Observe that by a 'category' I mean an ontological category in an intuitive sense, paradigm cases of which include Property,. Relation, Proposition, Set, Substance, Event, Time, Place, Trope, Collection, Limit, and Privation. Such categories are the more general or more fundamental kinds of being. A system of classification which is comprised of such categories and which is applicable to all possible kinds of beings helps clarify the nature of reality. Although the intuitive concept of a genuine ontological kind may be hard to analyze, it is necessary to use this notion both in the study of ontology in general, and in the framing of a particular ontology - enterprises involved in

Presumably, 55

54 Compare Aristotle, Categoriae, in J. L. Ackrill trans., Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).

That CI is instantiable if it is not on L is ensured by the condition in (ii)(a) that no L subsumes Cl, because (as noted earlier) a noninstantiable category is subsumed by an instantiable one, and because (A 1) implies that some category on L is instantiable. category on



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any attempt to provide a comprehensive understanding of the world. While all categories are properties, some properties are not categories, for example, Redness, Squareness, Bachelorhood, and (the disjunctive property of) being a substance or a surface.' A property which is not an ontological category ipso facto fails to satisfy (D1). As noted earlier, the categories of being a substance and being a set are not on L but are at level C (assuming they are instantiable and irreducible). A category of this kind satisfies (D1) by virtue of satisfying clause (ii) of (D1). This clause has two parts (a) and (b). Let us see why being a substance and being a set (if they are instantiable and irreducible) satisfy both of these parts. First of all, the category of Substance (Set) satisfies (ii)(a) because it is not on L and neither subsumes nor is subsumed by a category on L. In aristotelian terms, the category of Substance (Set) is neither a genus nor a species of a category on L. In addition, the category of Substance (Set) appears to satisfy clause (ii)(b), since it seems that every category that subsumes Substance (Set) also subsumes an instantiable category on L. For instance, given (Al), being concrete is a category that subsumes Substance, and being abstract is a category that subsumes Set.

Moreover, given (Al), being concrete subsumes some instantiable category on L, that is, being a time, or being a place, or being an event, and so forth, and being abstract subsumes some instantiable category on L, namely, being a property, or being a relation, or being a proposition, and so on. It seems that parallel considerations apply to, any category that subsumes Substance (Set)."

62

Figure Above C level Level C Below C level

2

Concrete Substance (off L) Event Time Place... (on L) Material Object Material Event

Figure 3 Above C level

56

Do Contingent Being and Necessary Being count as ontological categories? If the Contingent Being/Necessary Being distinction is necessarily coextensive with the Concrete/Abstract distinction, then perhaps they do. On the other hand, it has often been maintained that there is a concrete being that has necessary existence, e.g., the theistic God. If so, then some substances, e.g., tables, are contingent beings and some are necessary beings. It has also been held that there are sets of ordinary concrete objects which are abstract and have contingent existence. If so, then some sets are contingent beings and some, e.g., the null set, are necessary beings. In that case, even though Substance and Set are ontological categories, neither Substance nor Set is subsumed by either Contingent Being or Necessary Being. However, a classificatory system of ontological categories is a hierarchial system of genera and species in which every ontological category is a genus or species. If the universal category, Entity, were to be divided into Contingent Being and Necessary Being, and neither Substance nor Set were subsumed by either Contingent Being or Necessary Being, then neither Substance nor Set would be an ontological category which is either a genus or a species in the classificatory system in question. This is contrary to my assumption that Substance and Set are such categories. Hence, a classificatory system of the sort required has not been provided, and the modal categories of Necessary Being and Contingent Being are not genuine ontological kinds or categories. Analogously, assuming that Lion is a biological kind, a proper biological system of classification would not divide living things into two kingdoms Female and Nonfemale, since in that case Lion would not appear as a genus or species in the classificatory hierarchy: only Female Lion and Nonfemale Lion would so appear.

63

Level C

Abstract \■ Set (off L) Property Relation Proposition... (on L)

57Thus, my account of a level C category in terms of L and (DI) generates a "list" of categories of being that is open-ended. In other words, (DI) is logically compatible with two things. Firstly, that there are one or more level C categories which are not on L. Secondly, that one or more of the categories on L are not at level C (because they are not instantiable). Hence, (DI) differs from Aristotle's list of the categories of being, which has afixed membership. (See Aristotle, Categoriae, Chapter 4.) My general approach to the theory of categories is compatible with Brian Carr's account of the "metaphysical enterprise of categorial description" in his

Metaphysics: An Introduction

(Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1987), Chapter 1. On page 9, Carr states that such a descriptive enterprise "seeks to spell out the fundamental features of our thought and talk about reality, assuming neither the adequacy or

otherwise of such categories to reality in itself nor the fixed or changing nature of that thought and talk."

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It should also be observed that a category C* not on L which is at a higher level than C both fails to satisfy (i) of (D1), and fails to satisfy (ii)(a) of (D1) (because C* subsumes some instantiable category on L). Thus, such a category C* does not meet (D1). (An example is the category of being concrete.) Furthermore, a category C* (at a level lower than C) that is subsumed by a level C category on L fails to satisfy both (i) of (Dl) (inasmuch as C* either will not be on L or else will not be instantiable) and (ii)(a) of (D1) (because C* is subsumed by some instantiable category on L). Hence, a category C* of this kind does not satisfy (Dl). (An example might be the category of being a material event). In addition, a category C* (at a level lower than C) that is subsumed by a level C category not on L both fails to meet (i) of (D1) (since C* will not be on L) and fails to meet (ii)(b) of (D1). Therefore, such a category C* does not satisfy (D1). (An example might be the category of being a material object.) 58

58

Since (D1) presupposes (A1), which implies that there are at least two instantiable categories of abstracta at level C, a nominalist might object to (D1), arguing that no category of abstractum is instantiable. As I have implied, I framed (D1) in as ontologically neutral a fashion as possible. Nevertheless, an altemative to (D1) can be framed which is compatible with Nominalism. In that case, the category of being concrete would be necessarily coextensive with the category of being an entity, and categories of concreta such as Substance, Time, Place, etc., would be at the second level (level B). (Al) would be replaced with (A1*): there are at least two (nonequivalent) instantiable categories of concreta at level B (at least one of which is on L). A formal account of a category's being at level B would then parallel the account I provide of a category's being at level C in (DI), where the term, 'level C', is replaced with the term, 'level B'. Similarly, if an extreme platonist were to object to (DI) on the ground that no category of concretum is instantiable, (D1) could be revised in order to satisfy such a critic along lines parallel to the foregoing. Although I refer to various ontological categories, which I regard as abstracta, if the nominalist program were to be successful, it would have the resources to paraphrase all such references in nominalistic terms, including any references of these sorts which involve attributions of a metaphysical modality, de dicto or de re. For the purposes of my theory of categories, I do not rule out the possibility of the nominalist program being successful. However, since I argue in this book that a form of Property-Realism is correct, I do not take seriously the claim that no category of abstractum is instantiable when formulating my analysis of Concreteness in (D2) below. If no category of abstractum is instantiable, then my analysis of Concreteness in (D2) can be amended by replacing the term 'level C' with the term 'level B'.

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES



65

Step 4 (D2) x is concrete =df x instantiates a level C category which possibly has an instance having spatial or temporal parts. (D3) x is abstract =df. x is nonconcrete. 59 My analysis of the concrete/abstract distinction incorporates the classical notion that this distinction can be understood in terms of spatiality and temporality. Furthermore, it is not difficult to see that this analysis adequately handles the problem cases presented earlier. To begin with, notice that a disembodied spirit instantiates the level C category of Substance. Likewise, for a necessary being such as the theistic God. However, the category of Substance possibly has an instance having spatial parts, that is, a complex material substance. Hence, a disembodied spirit, or the theistic God, satisfies (D2): it instantiates a level C category which possibly has an instance having spatial parts. Thus, (D2) has the welcome implication that a disembodied spirit, or the theistic God, is a concretum. (D2) has this welcome implication even if God is a soul who has necessary existence and who is neither spatially located nor spatially related to anything. A point instantiates the level C category of Place, and an instant instantiates the level C category of Time. Yet, the former category possibly has an instance having spatial parts, for example, some expanse of space, and the latter category possibly has an instance having temporal parts, for instance, some period of time. Thus, (D2) has the happy consequence that

59

As (D3) illustrates, Abstractness can be explicated in wholly negative terms, inasmuch as the concrete/abstract distinction is exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Notice that a categorial division of this kind is possible only at level B. No intelligible ontological category below level B can be explicated in wholly negative terms. Attempting to explicate such a category, x, in wholly negative terms is, after all, not to distinguish x from other categories which are at the same level of generality as x and which can also be described in those negative terms. To explicate such a category and to distinguish it from other categories at the same level of generality, one must sufficiently characterize the positive nature of that category. Of course, these considerations do not apply to an explication of Abstractness, since it is at level B, and Concreteness is the only other category at level B.

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points and instants are concreta. (D2) has this happy consequence despite the fact that points and instants are incapable of either motion or intrinsic change. Notice that the level C categories of Property and Trope could not be coinstantiated. Unlike the category of Trope, the category of Property does not possibly have an instance which has spatial or temporal parts. A property does not satisfy (D2): it does not instantiate a level C category which possibly has an instance having spatial or temporal parts. Therefore, a property is not a concrete entity. Hence, (D3) has the desired result that a property is an abstract entity. (D3) has this desired result with respect to a property, P, even if P has contingent existence, P is necessarily unexemplified, P is necessarily ungraspable, P is temporally located, or P enters into temporal relations. Analogously to the level C categories of Property and Trope, the level C categories of Proposition and Event could not be coinstantiated. Unlike the category of Event, the category of Proposition does not possibly have an instance which has spatial or temporal parts. A proposition does not meet (32): it does not instantiate a level C category which possibly has an instance having spatial or temporal parts. Consequently, a proposition is not a concrete entity. Thus, (D3) has the desirable outcome that a proposition is an abstract entity. (D3) has this desirable outcome despite the fact that a proposition cannot be exemplified. Finally, the level C category of Set could not be instantiated by something having spatial or temporal parts. This follows from the fact that a set cannot have parts. Aside from any elements a set may have, a set has no parts. For example, the empty set has no parts. Although a set can have elements, it is demonstrable that an element of a set is not a part of that set. It is axiomatic that the relation of proper parthood is transitive: necessarily, if x is part of y, and y is part of z, then x is part of z. But the relation of elementhood is not transitive: for example, x is an element of {x}, {x} is an element of {{x} }, but x is not an element of {{x}}. Therefore, Elementhood cannot be identified with Parthood. Since aside from its elements a set has no parts, a set cannot have parts. Hence, unlike the level C category of Collection, the level C category of Set could not be instantiated by something having spatial or temporal parts. A set does not satisfy (D2): it

67

does not instantiate a level C category which possibly has an instance having spatial or temporal parts. Therefore, a set is not a concrete entity. Consequently, (D3) has the desired result that a set is an abstract entity.' (D3) has this desired result with respect to a set, S, even if S has contingent existence, S is necessarily unexemplified, or S is necessarily ungraspable. I shall conclude by answering a possible criticism of (D2) and (D3). It might be objected that (D2)'s account of Concreteness is viciously circular, on the ground that (D2) employs the notion of a level C ontological category, while my intuitive characterization of an ontological category's being at level C makes use of the level B distinction between Concreteness and Abstractness. However, although this is true of my intuitive characterization of what it is for an ontological category to be at level C, my formal account of this notion in no way utilizes the level B notions of Abstractness or Concreteness. My formal account captures the notion of a level C category solely in terms of certain logical relationships that such a category

60

In his Parts of Classes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), David Lewis argues that the singleton subsets of a set, s, are parts of s (though not spatial or temporal parts), and s is the mereological sum of those singletons. Unlike the elementhood relation, the subset relation is transitive. Yet, it is not clear that Lewis employs the standard notion of a set that I employ: he is explicitly skeptical about its intelligibility. If this notion is unintelligible, then my category, Set, is noninstantiable. Moreover, Lewis's view of the natures of sums and sets is incompatible with my classificatory system of ontic categories. He permits the mereological addition of any two entities (even assuming that there are both concreta and abstracta), but I cannot, because I uphold the concrete/abstract distinction as exhaustive and exclusive, and because the sum of a concretum and an (equally complex) abstractum, e.g., the sum of a point and a (simple) property, respectively, has an equal claim both to be concrete and to be abstract. Unless Lewis's conceptions of sumhood and sethood fit into an altemative system of ontic classification which is at least as good as the one that I have pic s cuted, these Lewisian claims about sums and sets can reasonably be rejected. I would argue that there is no such alternative system. Penelope Maddy, in her Realism in Mathematics (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1990), in contradistinction to Lewis, denies that sets of concreta are abstracta. However, Maddy operates with an inadequate understanding of abstractness. She accepts the view that abstractness can be identified with not being in space and time, a view whose inadequacy follows from a criticism presented earlier. In particular, souls would not be in space and time, but they would

not be abstract entities. Moreover, her substantive thesis that a set of concreta is located in

space and time is formally consistent with my claim that a set of concreta is an abstract entity which lacks spatial or temporal parts, since an entity's being located in space and time does not

entail that it has spatial or temporal parts, as illustrated by the possible case of a spatially and temporally located point-particle which lacks both spatial parts and temporal parts.



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must bear to my core list L of categories. Hence, (D2) is not conceptually circular in the way alleged, and the criticism under discussion is unsound. 61

IX - QUALITATIVE AND NONQUALITATIVE PROPERTIES

68

69

"These conceptions are either of particulars, viz., individual things, or of generals." [1773 Monboddo Of the Origins and Progress of Language I. i. 5 (1774)]

The distinction between qualitative and nonqualitative properties or propositions is often explained in linguistic terms. For example, a nonqualitative property is characterized as a property which is expressed by a predicate manufactured with the help of a proper name or indexical indicator designating a concrete object, and a qualitative property is characterized as a property which is expressed by a predicate which is free of any such singular term. Such a linguistic account is not wholly satisfactory. This is because an account of this kind characterizes a distinction among nonlinguistic entities, for instance, properties, by appealing to linguistic criteria. A deeper account of such a distinction characterizes it in terms of nonlinguistic criteria. A preliminary formulation of such an account is given below. (Dl) A property or proposition, P, is nonqualitative (i) there is a haecceity, H, which could be exemplified by a concretum, and (ii) P is necessarily such that whoever grasps P grasps H. (D2) A property or proposition, P, is qualitative tative.

6I This section is based on my article "Concrete/Abstract" in Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, eds., Companion to Metaphysics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993).

P is not nonquali-

Let us consider an objection to this initial formulation of my account. It might be argued that there are qualitative properties or propositions of infinite length, for example, ones which involve infinitely many conjuncts or disjuncts, and that an infinitely long qualitative property or proposition could not be grasped. According to this objection, since anything whatever follows from an impossibility, and since someone's grasping P is an impossibility, anything whatsoever necessarily follows from someone's

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grasping P. Hence, a qualitative property or proposition, P, which could not be grasped trivially satisfies both clauses of (Dl): (i) there is a haecceity, H, which could be exemplified by a concretum, and (ii) P is necessarily such that whoever grasps P grasps H. 62 In that case, (Dl) mistakenly implies that P is a nonqualitative property or proposition, and (Dl) does not provide a logically sufficient condition of a property's or proposition's being nonqualitative. There are two replies to this objection. First, even if there is a qualitative property or proposition, P, of infinite length which none of us could grasp, it appears possible that there be a conscious being who has infinitely many ideas and who grasps P. 63 In that case, the objection under discussion does not undermine either (Di) or (D2). Second, the preceding objection asks us to suppose that there are properties or propositions of infinite length. It seems that there is an intuitive notion of length applicable to a property or proposition. After all, it appears that there is a generic concept of length, species of which include spatial length, temporal length, and logical length. The concept of logical length stands to the concepts of spatial or temporal length as the concept of a logical part stands to the concepts of a spatial or a temporal part. Just as there is the aforementioned generic concept of length, there is a generic concept of parthood whose species are spatial, temporal, and logical parthood. Examples of Logical Parthood include abstracta which are conjuncts, disjuncts, or negands of other abstracta. Since the generic conceptions of parthood and length are comparable, and since the former conception seems to be legitimate, I conclude that the latter conception is also legitimate. When it is said that a property or proposition is finitely or

INTRODUCTORY PRELIMINARIES

infinitely long, the operative notion is that of logical length. Even if there are necessarily ungraspable qualitative properties or propositions of infinite length, it seems that we can capture the distinction between qualitative and nonqualitative properties or propositions along the following lines. (D3) A property or proposition, P, of finite length is nonqualitative =df. (i) there is a haecceity, H, which could be exemplified by a concretum, and (ii) P is necessarily such that whoever grasps P grasps H. (D4) A property or proposition, P, of infinite length is nonqualitative =df. (i) there is a haecceity, H, which could be exemplified by a concretum, and (ii) P has a finite stretch, F, which is necessarily such that whoever grasps F grasps H. (D5) A property or proposition, P, is nonqualitative =df. P is either a nonqualitative property or proposition of finite length, or a nonqualitative property or proposition of infinite length. (D6) A property or proposition, P, is qualitative =df. P is not nonqualitative.'

621t also follows that a nonqualitative property or proposition which could not be grasped trivially satisfies (Dl). (In Chapter 5, section X, I will argue that there are such nonqualitative properties.) However, unlike a qualitative property's satisfying (D1), this consequence is welcome! 63 Compare Roderick Chisholm, The First Person. Chisholm implies that all abstracta are qualitative, and that some abstracta are worlds or infinitely long conjunctive propositions. Since Chisholm maintains that every proposition could be conceived by someone, Chisholm is committed to the view that there are infinitely long qualitative propositions which are possibly grasped by someone.

71

64

Compare the account of the qualitative/nonqualitative distinction in Gary Rosenkrantz, "The Pure and The Impure," Logique et Analyse, 88 (1979), pp. 515-523.

THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION

CHAPTER 2 THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION "In Peter, James, and John, you may observe in each a Certain collection of Stature, Figure, Color, and other peculiar Properties, by which they are known asunder, distinguished from all other Men, and if I may say so, individuated." [from Berkeley Alciphron, or the minute philosopher VII 5 (1732)] "Of course, if provision is made only for his general humanity, and not for what makes him hic or ille, not for his haecceity as the schoolmen used to say, a man will have cause to complain." (Journal of Education I Nov. 1890 629/1)

I - METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATIONS "Metaphysics, even bad metaphysics, really rests on observations...and the only reason that this is not universally recognized is that it rests upon the kinds of phenomena with which every man's experience is so saturated that he usually pays no particular attention to them." [1898 C. Peirce Collected Papers Vol. 6 ¶2 (1935)]

A standard argument in favor of Realism about abstracta posits the existence of a property in order to explain why several particulars are of the same kind. For example: Argument A (Al) A number of particulars are red. (A2) There is something about these particulars in virtue of which all of them are red. 72

73

(A3) This something can only be their Redness, that is, each of them having the property of being red. Therefore, (A4) Redness exists. A is an argument from experience. Based upon our everyday experiences, we learn that a number of particulars are of the same kind or have some similarity. For instance, as a result of my having certain visual experiences I am justified in believing that an apple, a scarf, and a book are red, that Rover, Fido, and Spot are dogs, and that these three sticks appear bent. Thus, (Al) is a logical consequence of the empirically justified proposition that an apple, a scarf and a book are red. That a number of particulars have Redness is hypothesized as the best explanation of (Al). In other words, it is argued that because alternative hypotheses are less successful at explaining (Al) than the hypothesis in question, acceptance of this hypothesis is warranted. Thus, the argument is justified partly by an inference to the best explanation. Arguments of this kind imply that there are universals or sharable qualitative properties, for example, being red, being a dog, and being bent in appearance. If such arguments are sound, then a number of particulars' being red is best accounted for by those particulars' having Redness, a number of particulars' being dogs is best explained by these particulars' having Dogness, a number of particulars' appearing bent is best accounted for by those particulars' having the property of appearing bent, and so forth. In an explanation of this kind, traditionally known as a formal cause, the explanans provides a logically necessary and sufficient condition of the explanandum. For instance, a number of particulars' having Redness is a logically necessary and sufficient condition of their being red. Moreover, in an explanation of this sort the explanans provides a philosophical analysis of the explanandum, for example, a number of particulars' being red can be analyzed as their having Redness. It should be noted that to analyze a concept, C, is to explicate C, that is, to enhance one's understanding of C by explaining what it is for something to be an instance of C. In an analysis, in addition to the analysans and the

,Z4

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CHAPTER 2

analysandum's being necessarily equivalent, the analysans provides a certain kind of explanation of the analysandum. Most philosophers who reject the existence of abstracta admit that (Al) is well justified by experience. For this reason, most nominalists find themselves compelled to hold either (a) that (Al) is a brute fact that has no explanation, or (b) that there is an alternative explanation of (Al) which is superior to the realist's account. According to (a), the fact that a number of particulars are red is unanalyzable; whereas according to (b), this fact can be analyzed without recourse to an abstract entity. But it is not generally recognized that Realism about abstracta can be supported by an argument that posits the existence of a property in order to explain the diversity of particulars at a time. However, if the similarity of particulars might stand in need of explanation, then so might the diversity of particulars. Specifically, compare Argument A and the following: Argument B (B1) At a time t, a particular, x, and a particular, y, are diverse. (B2) There is something about x and y in virtue of which x is diverse from y at t. (B3) This something can only be that x has a property at t which y lacks at t. Therefore, (B4) A property exists. As with A, B is an argument from experience. The diversity or discreteness of particulars at a time is no less salient a feature of our everyday experience than their likeness or similarity. For instance, I can see that presently Rover and Fido are diverse individuals. Likewise, for this apple and that scarf, this stick and that stick, and so forth. Thus, (B1) is a logical consequence of certain empirically justified propositions, for example, that currently Rover and Fido are diverse particulars. Clearly, if at a time, t, a particular, x, is diverse from a particular, y, then in being diverse from y at t x is related to y at t. Hence, in seeking to explain x's being diverse from y at t, it is something relational whose explanation we are seeking. That particulars which are diverse at a time are individuated by their

75

properties is hypothesized as the best explanation of (B1). In other words, it is, argued that because alternative hypotheses are less successful at explaining (B1) than the hypothesis in question, belief in this hypothesis is justified. Therefore, as with the argument in favor of the existence of abstracta based on similarity, the argument in favor of the existence of abstracta based on diversity is justified partly by an inference to the best explanation. If such an argument is sound, then the diversity of a particular, x, from a particular, y, at a time t is best explained by there being some property, F, such that: (i) at t x has F, and (ii) at t y lacks F. Such an explanation provides a logically necessary and sufficient condition of x's being diverse from y at a time. Thus, an explanation of this kind provides a philosophical analysis of the diversity of x and y at a time. In particular, the explanation of the diversity of x and y at a time offered in (B3) entails that x is the only particular which has F at t, and that it is this which individuates x at t. The problem of accounting for the diversity of particulars at a time is traditionally known as the problem of individuation.' To solve this problem one must discover an appropriate principium individuationis or criterion of individuation. An appropriate principle or criterion of individuation provides an analysis of the diversity of particulars at time which is a logically necessary and sufficient explanation for the diversity of particulars at a time.' In aristotelian terminology, a criterion of individuation provides a

'For a historical introduction to this problem see Jorge Gracia, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1984). Compare Gracia's Individuality: An Essay on the Foundations of Metaphysics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988). 2

For example, Duns Scotus wrote as follows. "I first explain what I understand by individuation, whether numerical unity or through singularity: not, indeed the indeterminate unity according to which anything in a species is called one in number, but a unity demarcated as 'this', so that...it is impossible for an individual to be divided into subject parts. And what is sought is the reason for this impossibility. So I say that it is impossible for an individual not to be a 'this', demarcated by this singularity; and it is not the cause of singularity in general which is sought, but of this specially demarcated singularity, namely, as it is determinately `this'." See The Oxford Commentary On The Four Books Of The Sentences (selections) in Hyman and Walsh, eds., Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1973), p. 588.



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formal cause of the diversity of particulars at a time. 3 Most philosophers who deny the existence of abstracta allow that (B1) is sufficiently warranted by experience. Therefore, most nominalists find themselves forced to maintain either: (i) that (B1) is a brute fact that has no explanation, or (ii) that there is an alternative explanation of (B1) which is superior to the realist's account. According to (i), the diversity of particulars at a time is unanalyzable; whereas according to (ii), the diversity of particulars at a time is analyzable without appeal to an abstract entity. Independently of any case for Realism about abstracta based on similarity, I shall argue that the case for Realism about abstracta based on diversity is a success. As we shall see, an argument for Realism which infers the existence of a property as the best explanation of the diversity of particulars at a time implies that there are haecceities of particulars.

II - QUALITATIVELY INDISTINGUISHABLE CONCRETA

76

77

"They agree indeed so much...that their specificality is swallowed up in their general likeness." [1756 J. Clubbe Miscellaneous Tracts, Physiognomy 1. 20 (1770)]

Apparently, in the actual world no two particulars have the same qualitative properties, counting both those that are intrinsic, for instance, being a sphere, and those that are relational, for example, being next to a sphere. Hence, as long as we confine ourselves to the actual world, it seems that particulars can be distinguished from one another by differences in their qualitative properties. Some philosophers go further, arguing that it is impossible for there to be two particulars having the same qualitative properties. Leibniz, for instance, argued that any two entities must differ qualitatively!' Most philosophers now reject "Leibniz's Law" and allow for the possibility of two qualitatively indistinguishable concreta. 5 Two individuals of this kind would exist at the same times, and at any given time of their existence, would have the same qualitative properties. In a classic example, Max Black considers a possible universe consisting of two spherical objects, x and y (in a Euclidean space), which are exactly alike in all intrinsic qualitative respects. 6 Throughout their existence, x and y are composed of the same kind of stuff arranged in the same way, have the same shape, size, mass, color, and so forth. Obviously, x and y would have the same intrinsic

4

Leibniz based his argument on Theism and the principle of sufficient reason. God could not create two qualitatively indiscernible spheres x and y, since there would not be a logically sufficient reason for God's positioning x in some place rather than y, and vice-versa. In my judgement, Theism is subject to doubt, and the principle of sufficient reason should not be 3

1 am concerned exclusively with the concept of such a formal criterion of individuation. This concept should not be confused with the notion of an epistemic principle of individuation. A formal criterion of individuation specifies a condition which is logically necessary and sufficient for diversity, and which may (but need not) be experientially accessible. On the other hand, an epistemic principle of individuation specifies an experientially accessible factor which can rationally justify a belief in diversity, and which may (but need not) be logically necessary or sufficient for diversity.

accepted. In this book, I shall not presuppose either of them. 5 "Leibniz's Law" can be formulated as follows. Necessarily, for any x andy, and any time t, at t x=y for any property P, x has P at t y has P at t. `P' ranges over qualitative

properties, including intrinsic and relational ones. 6 See

Max Black, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," in M. Loux, ed., Universals and

Particulars (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 204-216.

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qualitative properties. But would x and y have the same relational qualitative properties? It might seem that they would, since each of them would have the property of being next to a sphere, and so forth. Nevertheless, this has been questioned. Ernest Sosa, for example, has argued that given a choice of the point of origin for a spatial coordinate system, there is a qualitative difference between positive and negative directions in that system. ? (Although the choice of the point of origin is an arbitrary one, Sosa would argue that this qualitative difference remains regardless of the point chosen.) If Sosa is right, then each of the relational qualitative properties, being at a finite distance from a sphere in a positive direction,

and being at a finite distance from a sphere in a negative direction, is had by only one of the two spheres. In that case, Max Black's two spheres do not have the same qualitative properties after all. Be that as it may, there are two variations on Max Black's example which succeed in showing that there could be two individuals with the same qualitative properties. In the first variant, noted by Sosa, instead of just two spheres with the same intrinsic qualitative properties, we suppose infinitely many such spheres, equally spaced, whose centers lie on a single straight line. In the second variant, we suppose just two spheres with the same intrinsic qualitative properties, but instead of a Euclidean space, we suppose a Riemannian or spherical space having a finite radius, and position the spheres so they are equidistant from one another in all directions. There are two other (more controversial) examples that might be put forward to illustrate the possibility of two particulars having the same qualitative properties. The first example presupposes that there could be "immaterial" or "ghostly" spatial objects. 8 These objects would be spatially located, mobile, and would have chApe, volume, color, and perhaps other qualities. However, they would lack impenetrability or inertial mass, the possession of which is often thought to be a necessary condition of something's being a material substance. Hence, two objects of this kind can

7 See Ernest Sosa, "Subjects Among Other Things," Philosophical Perspectives, 1, Metaphysics (1987), pp. 155-187. 8

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See John Pollock, Knowledge and Justification (Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 140-141.

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move towards each other, then totally interpenetrate, and then move away from each other, more specifically, they can pass through one another. Thus, two such objects can occupy the same place at the same time. According to this example, possibly, there is a universe consisting of two objects of this sort which occupy the same places at the same times and which at those times have the same intrinsic qualitative properties. Surely, these two objects have the same qualitative properties, including relational ones.' The second example presupposes that there could be either nonspatial Cartesian spirits or nonspatial Humean impressions,' and maintains that possibly, there is a universe consisting of two nonspatial spirits or two nonspatial impressions, x and y, such that: throughout their existence, x and y have the same intrinsic qualitative properties, for instance, the same intrinsic qualitative mental features or experiential characteristics. Clearly, x and y have the same qualitative properties, including those which are relational. In the light of the foregoing examples, it is highly plausible that there could be two qualitatively indistinguishable particulars. However, Ian Hacking claims that there is no fact of the matter as to whether or not there could be two qualitatively indistinguishable particulars." He argues that natural laws and theories of space and time are intimately interconnected, and these theories are underdetermined by empirical evidence. According to Hacking's argument, the descriptions 'at t the universe is a highly curved Riemannian space containing just one sphere' and 'at t the universe is a Euclidean space containing two spheres with the same qualitative properties' are alternative descriptions of a single possible universe. Hacking infers that no possible world must be described as containing two objects having the same qualitative properties. For Hacking, the alternative description we

9

Actually, according to a current physical theory some fundamental particles exhibit a phenomenon known as transparency: under certain conditions two fundamental particles of a certain kind can "pass through" one another, occupying for a moment the very same place. 10 See Rea Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditations II and VI. Compare David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, Selby-Bigge, ed. (Oxford, 1888), Part IV, Section V, p. 233. Nonspatial Humean impressions seem to be either nonspatial concrete events or nonspatial tropes.

"

Ian Hacking, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," The Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975), pp.

249-256.

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choose to apply to a possible universe is largely a matter of taste, and if we wish, we can adopt a meta-principle to the effect that no possible universe should be described as containing two objects having the same qualitative properties. As Hacking says, such a meta-principle is not true in each possible world. It is true

about possible worlds. It is a meta-principle

about possible descriptions.

Hacking's argument depends on his contention that the two aforementioned descriptions are alternative descriptions of a single possible universe. But this contention is unintelligible. No possible universe is such that both of these descriptions apply to it. The first of these descriptions applies to a possible world with a Riemannian space containing only one sphere, and the second of these descriptions applies to another possible world with a Euclidean space that contains two spheres. Consequently, Hacking's argument should be rejected. Thus, we are entitled to assume that there could be two particulars which have the same qualitative properties. I2 Since an adequate criterion of individuation for particulars provides logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the diversity of particulars at a time, this criterion must apply not merely to actual cases of particulars which are diverse at a time, but to all possible cases. Hence, a criterion of individuation must be adequate to the possibility of qualitatively indistinguishable particulars, at least in the case of the two Max Black variants. Of course, if the more controversial examples of qualitatively indistinguishable particulars are possible, then a criterion of individuation must be adequate to those examples too. With respect to each of the kinds of entity involved in these examples, namely, spatial objects which can literally interpenetrate one another, nonspatial spirits, or nonspatial Humean impressions, one can question whether it is possible for there to be entities of that kind. In each

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instance, it seems that an affirmative answer to such a question implies the possibility of the corresponding example of two qualitatively indistinguishable particulars. Are entities of the three kinds in question possible? They appear to be. In any case, the burden of proof is on those who believe that entities of these kinds are impossible. They need to provide good reasons for thinking that entities of these kinds are unintelligible. Joshua Hoffman and I have replied to arguments purporting to show that nonspatial spirits are unintelligible. ° Hence, there is some reason to require that a criterion of individuation be adequate to the more controversial 'examples. Even if we ought to suspend judgement on the possibility of these examples, all other things being equal, a proposed criterion of individuation which is compatible with their possibility is epistemically preferable to a proposal which is not. Nevertheless, in arguing for my solution to the problem of individuation, I will follow the most conservative course I can with respect to these controversial examples. I shall not reject competing proposals on the ground that they cannot accommodate these controversial cases, but I will require that my own proposal adequately handles them. This course is more than fair to the opposition. Furthermore, although I shall presuppose that there could be particulars, I will remain neutral about what kinds of particulars there could be. More specifically, I shall allow not only for the possibility of substances (for example, material objects and spirits), but also concrete events, places, and tropes (these latter being concreta such as the particular wisdom of Socrates or that particular redness). Max Black's example and its variants envision the possibility of two spherical material objects which are qualitatively indistinguishable. It should be noted that these examples can be reinterpreted or reformulated in terms of the possibility of two spherical places, events, or tropes that are qualitatively indistinguishable.

12

For an argument in support of the assumption that there could be two qualitatively indistinguishable particulars, and criticisms of Hacking's attack on this assumption see Robert Adams, "Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity," The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), pp. 5-26. Additional criticisms of Hacking may be found in Ronald Hoy, "Inquiry, Intrinsic Properties, and The Identity of Indiscernibles," Synthese, 61 (1984), pp. 275-297, which I draw on in my own discussion of Hacking.

13

Gary Rosenkrantz and Joshua Hoffinan, "Are Souls Unintelligible?" Philosophical

Perspectives, 5, Philosophy of Religion (1991), pp. 183-212.

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82

III - PROPOSED CRITERIA OF INDIVIDUATION All things counter, original, spare, strange; whatever is fickle, freckled (who knows how?)..." (1877 G. M. Hopkins Pied Beawy)

According to a qualitative criterion of individuation, a particular is individuated at a time by a qualitative property it has at that time. In formal terms: (P0) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. There exists a qualitative property Q such that: (i) at t x exemplifies Q, and (ii) at t y does not exemplify Q. (P0) is an implication of Leibniz's view that qualitatively indiscernible particulars are identical?' (P0) fails to provide a logically necessary condition for the diversity of particulars at a time, since it is possible that at a time two particulars have the same qualitative properties. Hence, (P0) should be rejected. Thus, the demand for a criterion of individuation seems to rest on something like the following three premises. (i) There could be two particulars, each of which have the same qualitative properties. (ii) For each of these particulars, there would be some fact about it that accounts for or explains its diversity from any other particular. (iii) In the case of qualitatively indistinguishable particulars, this fact can only be that each particular has either a nonqualitative property, or has a relationship to some other particular, that any other particular lacks

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x or y to a third entity z, whereas a nonontological response does not make such an attempt. I call a response of the former sort ontological because the attempt it makes to explain the diversity of x and y is ontologically committed to the existence of a third entity. On the other hand, I call a response of the latter sort nonontological because it does not attempt to explain the diversity of x and y by postulating the existence of any third entity: such a response has no ontological implications beyond the existence of x and y. An ontological response accepts premises (i), (ii), and (iii) stated above, but a nonontological response rejects either premise (ii) or (iii). According to a nonontological response, the diversity of x and y either has no explanation or can be explained without relating x or y to a third entity z. The failed attempt to provide a qualitative criterion of individuation in (P0) is an example of an ontological response, since it seeks to explain the diversity of x and y by relating x and y to a third entity z, namely, a qualitative property. In this case, x and y are related to z by the relations of exemplification and its complement, respectively. Other than a qualitative criterion, there are ten types of responses to the problem of individuation that need to be considered. Of these, eight are ontological responses, and two are nonontological responses. The first of the ontological responses is a material criterion. According to such a criterion, a particular is individuated at a time by the quantity or portion of stuff which constitutes it at that time, for example, a portion of material stuff such as iron, wood, water, or air. Put formally: (P1) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. There exists a quantity of stuff S such that: (i) at t x is constituted by S, and (ii) at t y is not constituted by S.' 15

In very general terms, there are two sorts of responses to the problem of individuation: an ontological response, and a nonontological response. An ontological response attempts to explain the diversity of x and y by relating

14

See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, section 8.

Why is the material criterion formulated as it is, rather than as follows? (P1') At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. There exists a quantity of stuff Si and a quantity of stuff S2, such that: (i) at t x is composed of SI, and (ii) at t y is composed of S2,

and (iii) S/#S2. (P1) has two advantages over (P1'). Firstly, (P1) is more economical than (P1'). Parallel considerations apply to (P0) and to (P2), (P3), (P4), (P5), (P6), and (P8) below.

Secondly, (P1') seems vulnerable to a charge of vicious conceptual circularity to which (P1) is immune: since a quantity of stuff composing a particular is itself a particular, it appears that clause (iii) of (P1') employs the very concept that (P1') attempts to explicate, viz., the concept

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THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION



85

(P1) resembles the thomistic view that a body is individuated at a time by its quantity of matter at that time." A second ontological response is a substratum criterion. A substratum is a propertyless or "bare" particular. According to substratum theory, any ordinary particular, that is, one which has certain properties, consists of a

time by the place it occupies at that time." The fourth ontological response is a mereological criterion. According to a criterion of this kind, concrete entities are individuated at a time by the parts they have at that time. More piecisely:

bare particular combined with those properties. The notion of a substratum

(P4) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular); =df. There exists a particular P such that: (i) at t P is a proper part of x, and (ii) at t y does not have P as a proper part.

is similar to the notion of formless matter suggested to some by Aristotle's form/matter distinction. According to a substratum criterion, a particular is individuated at a time by the substratum which supports it at that time. In

precise terms: (P2) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. There exists a substratum S such that: (i) at t x is supported by S, and (ii) at t y is not supported by S. Gustav Bergmann and Edwin Allaire are examples of philosophers who seem to accept a substratum or bare particular criterion." A third ontological response is a locational criterion. According to such a criterion, a concrete entity is individuated at a time by the place which it occupies at that time. Specifically: (P3) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. There exists a place L such that: (i) at t x occupies L, and (ii) at t y does not occupy L. (P3) recalls the traditional view, defended by contemporary philosophers such as Keith Campbell, that an individual substance is individuated at a

of the diversity of particulars at a time. Parallel considerations apply to (P2), (P3), (P4), (P5), and (P7) below. 16

See St. Thomas Aquinas, Concerning Being and Essence, George G. Leckie, trans. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965), pp. 3-38. 17

Gustav Bergmann, Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), and Edwin Allaire, "Bare Particulars" in M. Loux, ed., Universals and Particulars (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 235-244.

I do not know of a philosopher who defends a mereological criterion. The fifth ontological response is a causal criterion. According to such a criterion, particulars are individuated at a time by their causes or effects. Formally stated: (P5) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. Either (i) there exists a particular z such that: (a) at t z is a cause of x, and (b) at t z is not a cause of y, or (ii) there exists a particular z such that: (a) at t z is an effect of x, and (b) at t z is not an effect of y. (P5) reminds us of Donald Davidson's view that a concrete event El is identical with a concrete event E2 if and only if El and E2 have the same causes and effects.' 9 (P5) is also similar to a related view of William Mann's that a trope TI is identical with a trope T2 just provided that TI and T2 have the same causes and effects? ) According to Davidson, concrete events are the relata of the causal relation. However, Mann holds that tropes are relata of the causal relation. Others have thought that substances are

18 Keith

Campbell, Body and Mind (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 44-45.

19Donald Davidson, "The Individuation of Events," in N. Rescher, ed., Essays in Honor of C. G. Hempel (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 216-234. 20 See William Mann, "Epistemology Supernaturalized," Faith and Philosophy, 2 (1985), 436 456. Compare Gary Rosenkrantz, "Necessity, Contingency, and Mann," Faith and Philosophy, 2 (1985), pp. 457-463, and William Mann, "Keeping Epistemology Supernaturalized: A Reply To Rosenkrantz," Faith and Philosophy, 2 (1985), pp. 464-468.

pp.

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relata of the causal relation.' The sixth ontological response is a tropal criterion. According to a criterion of this kind, particulars are individuated at a time by the concrete "properties" or tropes they possess at that time. In formal terms:

(P7) is reminiscent of a thesis that seems to have been held by Jack Meiland: that it is spatial relations between bodies which individuate them.' Here, is another example of a relational criterion: At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. at t, x bears to y the relation of u being possibly such that u has a property, P, at a time t* and v lacks P at t". 24 The final ontological response is a haecceity criterion, often attributed to Duns Scotus. According to a criterion of this kind, a particular is individuated at a time by a haecceity it has at that time. Namely:

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(P6) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. There exists a trope T such that: (i) at t x possesses T, and (ii) at t y does not possess T. A tropal criterion appears to have been endorsed by G. F. Stout. 22 The seventh ontological response is a relational criterion. According to a criterion of individuation of this sort, particulars are diverse at a time because one bears a qualitative relation to the other at that time. Such a relation is irreflexive: it is a relation which nothing can bear to itself. Otherwise, the criterion does not provide a logically sufficient condition for the diversity of particulars at a time, and should be rejected for that reason. Examples of relations which appear to be irreflexive include x being to the left of y, x being spatially apart from y, and x being a soul which couldn't be directly aware of a mental state of a soul y. A relational criterion might be formulated in this way: (P7) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. at t, x bears the relation of spatial apartness to y.

' For example, see John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chap XXII. According to Locke: "Power being the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when they exert this power into act, are called causes; and the substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple ideas [qualities] which are introduced into any subject by the exerting of that power, are called effects." Compare George Berkeley's use of the related notion that there are agent causes, i.e., spiritual substances which are efficient or active causes. See Berkeley's Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, Second and Third Dialogues. 22 See G. F. Stout, "Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular,"

symposium in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. Vol. 3 (1923), pp. 114-122. On Stout, see Maria van der Schaar, G. F. Stout's Theory of udgement and Proposition (University of Leiden, 1991), especially pp. 120-122, and p. 164..

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(P8) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y = df. There exists a haecceity H such that: (i) at t x exemplifies II, and (ii) at t y does not exemplify H. Compare (P8) and the following proposal. (PW) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. There exists a nonqualitative property N such that: (i) at t x exemplifies N, and (ii) at t y does not exemplify N. Apparently, there are philosophers who would prefer (P8') to (P8). Such philosophers either doubt or deny the existence of nonqualitative haecceities, but nonetheless believe that a particular is individuated by its having a nonqualitative property other than a haecceity. A nonqualitative property of this kind might be a relational property such as being in that place, or being to the left of that sphere, or being diverse from that sphere, or being possibly to the left of that sphere, or being capable of direct awareness of a mental state of mine. However, there is good reason to think that (P8') is not preferable to (P8), as the following argument shows.

23

See Jack Meiland, "Do Relations Individuate?" in M. Loux, ed., Universals and Particulars (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 258-263. 24 `U ,

and

are (of course) variable letters.

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(1) Necessarily, a property is nonqualitative if and only if it pertains to a particular. Given our understandings of the notions of a nonqualitative property and of a property's pertaining to a particular, it is obvious that (1) is true. (2) Necessarily, there is a nonqualitative property which pertains to a particular, x, if and only if there is a haecceity which could be had by x. For example, surely, if there is a nonqualitative relational property such as being next to Jones, then there is a nonqualitative relational property such as being identical with Jones, and vice-versa. As examples of this kind indicate, (2) is highly plausible. (3) Necessarily, if there is a haecceity which could be had by a particular, then every particular has a haecceity. (3) is extremely plausible: considerations of parity, deriving from a need for logical generality, seem to demand that if there is a haecceity exemplified by a particular, or which can be exemplified by a particular, then every particular exemplifies a haecceity. If H is a haecceity which is, or could be, exemplified by a particular, then there must be a true singular existential proposition of the form `0(3x)(x=a)' which asserts the possibility of there being something which is identical with the particular in question. As I have argued, Proposition is a category of logical entity, meaning that propositions have truth-values, logical entailments, modal features, and so forth.' In that case, considerations of logical comprehensiveness like those discussed earlier seem to require that if there is a true singular existential proposition asserting the possibility of a particular's existence in one case, then there must be a true singular existential proposition asserting the possibility of a particular's existence in every case. But it appears that if there is a true singular existential proposition asserting the possibility of there being

25

See Chapter 1, section III.

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something which is identical with a certain particular, then there must be a haecceity, a property of the form 'being identical with a', which could be exemplified by the particular in question. Thus, it seems that necessarily, if there is a haecceity which could be had by a particular, then every particular has a haecceity. (4) Necessarily, if a particular, x, has a haecceity, then x has a nonqualitative property. Since it is evident that a particular's haecceity is a nonqualitative property, it is clear that (4) is true. (1), (2), and (3) together entail that Necessarily, if a particular, x, has a nonqualitative property, then x has a haecceity. The latter entailment and (4) together imply that (5) Necessarily, a particular, x, has a nonqualitative property if and only if x has a haecceity. Since (5) entails that (P8) and (P8') are necessarily equivalent, we should conclude that (P8') commits us to the existence of nonqualitative haecceities, just as (P8) does. Consequently, if one doubts the existence of nonqualitative haecceities, then this doubt should not lead one to prefer (P8') to (P8). Rather, it should lead one to doubt both (P8') and (P8). As far as I can see, (P8') is not preferable to (P8), and in any case the question of which one of them is preferable is unimportant. For the sake of convenience, I shall concentrate on (P8) rather than (P8'). The remaining two responses to the problem of individuation are nonontological. The first of these nonontological responses is a nonontological criterion. According to such a criterion, the diversity of concrete entities x and y at a time is analyzed or explained in terms of x's being irreflexively related to y in some manner. It is required that the manner in which x is related to y be irreflexive for reasons paralleling those which require that the relation used in a relational criterion be irreflexive. A

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nonontological criterion might be formulated in this fashion: (P9) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. at t, x is spatially apart from y. Notice that a nonontological criterion, unlike an ontological criterion, does not individuate a particular x from a particular y by relating x to a third entity z. 26 Since (P9) does not individuate a particular x from a particular y by relating x to a property, relation, or any other sort of abstract entity, (P9) is compatible with Nominalism. The second nonontological response to the problem of individuation is that there is no criterion of individuation. According to this response, the diversity of particulars at a time is primitive or unanalyzable. In other words, the diversity of particulars at a time is a brute fact, that is to say, a fact that has no explanation?' Material, substratum, locational, mereological, causal, tropal, relational, and haecceity criteria qualify as ontological responses, because they attempt to explain the diversity of particulars x and y by relating x and y to a third entity z. For instance, on a material criterion, x and y are individuated by relating them to another particular, namely, the quantity of stuff constituting x. In this case, the relevant relationships are those of constitution and its complement. On a substratum criterion, x and y are individuated by relating them to another particular - the substratum of x. Here the relationships in question are those of support and its complement. On a locational criterion, x and y are individuated by relating them to another particular, namely, the place x occupies. In this instance, the relationships involved are those of occupation and its complement. On a mereological criterion, x and y are individuated by relating them to another particular - a proper part of x. In

two other examples of nonontological criteria: (1) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y at t, x is not spatially coincident with y; and (2) At time t, a particular x is diverse from a particular y =df. at t, x is possibly such that (i) x occupies a place, p, at some time, 0, and (ii) y does not occupy p at t*. 26 Compare

27 See

Max Black, "The Identity of Indiscernibles". Black seems to argue that particulars have no criterion of individuation.

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this case, the relevant relationships are those of being a proper part and its complement. On a causal criterion, x and y are individuated by relating them to another particular, namely, a cause or an effect of x. Here it is the relationships of cause and effect and their corresponding complementary relationships which are brought into play. On a tropal criterion, x and y are

individuated by relating them to another particular - a trope of x. In this instance, the relationships in question are those of possession and its complement. On a relational criterion, x and y are individuated by relating them to another entity, an abstractum, namely, a qualitative irreflexive relation. In this case, the pertinent relationships are those of bearing and its complement. On a haecceity criterion, x and y are individuated by relating

them to (another) entity which is abstract - a haecceity had by x. Here it is the relationships of exemplification and its complement that are involved. On the other hand, both a nonontological criterion, and the claim that there is no criterion of individuation, are nonontological responses, because these replies do not seek to explain the diversity of x and y by relating x or y to a third entity z. Finally, it should be noted that a material, substratum, locational, mereological, causal, or tropal criterion, as well as a nonontological response, is consistent with Nominalism, whereas a qualitative, relational, or haecceity criterion presupposes Realism. What of the reply that the diversity of particulars at a time has no explanation? As a rule, when an explanation of X is requested, we are entitled to assume that there is some way in which X can be explained, unless we are given a good reason for supposing otherwise. Therefore, we are entitled to assume that there is some way in which the diversity of particulars at a time can be explained, unless we are given a good reason for supposing otherwise. In other words, there is a prima facie presumption in favor of (B2). This prima facie presumption is defeated if a cogent argument is presented which implies that there is no adequate account of the diversity of particulars at a time. The claim that the diversity of particulars at a time is a brute fact is acceptable only if all available explanations of the diversity of particulars at a time are undermined.

In what follows, I shall argue that a haecceity criterion ought to be accepted as the result of an inference to the best explanation, on the grounds

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that there are decisive objections to all of the other criteria, and no successful objection to a haecceity criterion.

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IV - PRINCIPLES OF EVALUATION FOR THE

PROPOSED CRITERIA "That is to prove the same by the same, or else to argue circularly." (1651 Baxter Plain Scripture Proof of Infants' Church Membership and Baptism 35)

I begin by setting forth principles for evaluating the preceding proposals for a criterion of individuation. Those proposals seek to provide a formal principle of individuation for entities belonging to a certain very general ontological category - the category of Particular or Concretum. Since a criterion of individuation for concreta is an analysis of the diversity of concreta at a time, a proposed criterion of individuation for concreta is inadequate if it possesses any of the following five defects. (1) The proposal fails to provide a logically necessary condition of the diversity of concreta at a time. (2) The proposal fails to provide a logically sufficient condition of the diversity of concreta at a time. (3) The proposal is conceptually circular. Such conceptual circularity occurs just when there is an attempt to analyze a concept in terms of itself: a purported analysis, A, of a concept, X, is conceptually circular if and only if X is employed in A's analysans. For example, the following proposed analysis is (obviously) conceptually circular: A particular, x, is diverse from a particular, y, at t =df. x is diverse from y at t, Given that an analysans, 1 , could be grasped, it is plausible that a concept, X, is employed in Y just in case necessarily, if a person, S, grasps Y, then S grasps X. Since an analysis provides a certain kind of explanation of what is analyzed, and since it is impossible that something help explain itself, it is impossible that an explanation be circular. Consequently, conceptually circular analyses are viciously circular. It follows that a purported analysis 7

of the diversity of particulars at a time suffers from vicious conceptual

circularity of the sort in question if and only if it employs the concept of the

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diversity of particulars at a time in its analysans. (4) The proposal exhibits familial triviality. A purported analysis, A, of a concept, X, suffers from familial triviality just when A's analysans employs another concept Y such that X and Y belong to a family of logically interrelated concepts whose members stand equally in need of analysis. Two

concepts belong to such a family only if a logically necessary and sufficient condition for either concept can be stated by employing just the other concept and logical notions. For instance, the concepts of de dicto possibility, necessity, and impossibility form a family of this kind. Thus, it is trivial to propose an analysis of one of these modal concepts in which another one of these modal concepts is employed in the analysans. Likewise, the notions of the diversity of particulars at a time and the identity of particulars at a time form a family of logically interrelated concepts whose members stand equally in need of analysis. Accordingly, a particular's (x's) being nonidentical with a particular, y, at t is logically necessary and sufficient for x's being diverse from y at t, and x's being nondiverse from y at t is logically necessary and sufficient for x's being identical with y at t. Therefore, a purported analysis, A, of the diversity of particulars at a time in which the concept of the identity of particulars at a time is employed in A's analysans is trivial. For instance, the analysis proposed below is trivial: A particular, x, is diverse from a particular, y, at t =df. x is not identical with y at t. (5) The proposal presupposes circular individuation. For any ontological category, C, an attempted explication, E, of the diversity at a time of instances of C presupposes circular individuation if in every possible case E seeks to explain two instances' of C being diverse (x and y's being diverse) at any time, t, by relating x (or y) to another entity, z, which is an instance of C at t, in such a way that x and z's (or y and z's) being so related entails that x#z (or y#z). In particular, a purported analysis, A, of the diversity of concreta at a time has this defect if in every possible case A seeks to explain two concreta x and y's being diverse at t by relating x or y to another concretum z existing at t in such a way that x and z's (or y and z's) being so

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related entails that x#z (or y#z). In what follows, I give a formal statement of conditions under which a proposed analysis of the diversity of particulars at a time presupposes circular individuation, and explain why an analysis of the diversity of particulars (x and y) at a time, t, cannot presuppose circular individuation. A proposed analysis, A, of x's being diverse from y at t presupposes circular individuation if A meets the following three conditions. (CI) (i) It is possible that A's analysandum and A's analysans are jointly satisfied, and (ii) Where being a G is a category, either A has the structure: (S1) A particular, x, is diverse from a particular, y, at t =df. There is a G, z, such that (i) x is related in way R to z at t, and (ii) y is not related in way R to z at t, or A has the structure: (S2) A particular, x, is diverse from a particular, y, at t =df at t, x is related in way R to y, and (iii) When A has structure (S1), it is necessarily true that if A's analysandum and A's analysans are satisfied, then z is a particular which is diverse from x (or y) at t; and when A has structure (S2), it is necessarily true that if A's analysandum and A's analysans are satisfied, then y is a particular which is diverse from x at t. Let me explain why an analysis of the diversity of particulars at a time cannot presuppose circular individuation as specified in (CI). To begin with, suppose that A is a proposed analysis of the diversity of particulars at a time which satisfies (CI). In that case, A entails that if x and y are particulars, then x is individuated from y by virtue of x's being related in a certain way to something, z, at t (clause (ii) of (CI)), and z is a particular other than x (clause (iii) of (CI)). If there are particulars, and if A explicates their diversity at a time, then it follows that one particular is individuated from another by virtue of a particular's being related in a certain way to another particular which exists at that time. Specifically, when A has structure (Si), a particular, x, is individuated from another particular, y, by virtue of x's being related in a certain way at t to a third particular, z, and when A has structure (S2), a particular, x, is individuated from a particular, y, by virtue of x's being related in a certain way at t to y. However, p by virtue of q entails that q helps to explain p. For example, if the car moves down the



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road by virtue of the car's wheels rotating, then this entails that the car's wheels rotating helps to explain why the car moves down the road. Therefore, if A is an analysis of the diversity of particulars at a time, then a particular's being related in a certain way to another particular at a time helps to explain why a particular is diverse from a particular at a time. But

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this consequence is an impossibility. That a particular is related in a certain way at a time to another particular could not help to explain the diversity of particulars at a time, since any such attempt to explain the diversity of particulars at a time seeks to explain a fact in terms of itself - something which is viciously circular. This means that A's being an analysis of the diversity of particulars at a time implies an impossibility. Since whatever implies an impossibility is itself impossible, A could not be an analysis of the diversity of particulars at a time. Hence, an analysis of the diversity of particulars at a time cannot presuppose circular individuation as specified in (CI). It should be noted that a proposed criterion of individuation for particulars can presuppose circular individuation without satisfying (CI). As we have seen, a proposal which is an instance of (CI) is ruled out because a particular's being related to another particular at a time could not help to explain (in every case) the diversity of particulars at a time. Thus, a proposal which implies that such a thing could help to explain (in every case) the diversity of particulars at a time is inadequate. A proposal, X, is inadequate for this reason if X meets two conditions. First, X's analysandum and analysans could be jointly satisfied. Second, X's analysans is a disjunction or conjunction one of whose disjuncts or conjuncts is the analysans of a proposal which is an instance of (CI). A proposal presupposes circular individuation if it either satisfies (CI) or is a disjunctive or conjunctive proposal of the sort described above.

97

You dispute in a circle as all Logicians know." (1647 H. More A Platonicall Song of the Soul I. II. lxxx)

We now possess the tools to evaluate (P1)-(P9). I will argue that (P1)-(P7) and (P9) do not provide a satisfactory criterion of individuation for particulars, but that (P8) does provide such a criterion. Crucial to my argument is the claim that (CI) militates against (Pi)-(P7) and (P9), but not against (P8). To begin with, note that most of our proposals for a criterion of individuation for particulars have structure (Si), namely, (P1)-(P4), (P6), and (P8). (P5) can also be grouped together with these, since its analysans is a disjunction of the analytical portions of two proposals which have structure (S1). On the other hand, relational and nonontological criteria such as (P7) and (P9) have structure (S2). For the sake of argument, I grant that (P1)-(P9) satisfy clause (i) of (CI). That is, I grant that in each of (P1)-(P9) the analysandum and the analysans could be jointly met. The purpose of clause (i) of (CI) is to prevent a proposal whose analysandum and analysans are not jointly satisfiable from trivially satisfying (CI). Henceforth, we may ignore this clause of (CI). Let us first consider relational and nonontological criteria, for example, (P7) and (P9). Because proposals of these kinds have structure (S2), they satisfy clause (ii) of (CI). In addition, since such a proposal's analysans consists of a particular, x, that is irreflexively related to a particular, y, such an analysans necessitates that x and y are diverse. Hence, proposals of these sorts meet the requirements of clause (iii) of (CI) for proposals which have structure (S2). Because relational and nonontological criteria satisfy all of (CD's clauses, criteria of this kind presuppose circular individuation.' 28

If a relational criterion such as (P7) is modified by replacing the reference to an irreflexive relation (an abstract entity) with a reference to a corresponding relational trope, then a criticism of the same kind applies to the modified criterion, as such a concrete "relation" is also irreflexive.

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The remaining proposals for a criterion of individuation are ontological in character, that is, (P1)-(P6) and (P8). I aim to show that (P1)-(P6) presuppose circular individuation, whereas the haecceity criterion, (P8), does not presuppose circular individuation, and is otherwise unobjectionable. As we shall see, my argument also generates counter-examples to a number of these proposals. Based on these considerations, (P8) will be inferred as the

best explanation of the diversity of particulars at a time. With regard to (P1), it is necessarily true that a quantity of stuff which constitutes a particular is itself a particular. Because (P1) covers anything belonging to the category of particulars, it follows that such a quantity of stuff itself falls under the scope of (P1). Therefore, inasmuch as (P1) proposes that a particular, x, is individuated by a quantity of stuff that constitutes x, (P1) raises the specter of a quantity of stuff's constituting a particular and this quantity of stuff's being itself constituted by a quantity of stuff. Since the relevant relation of constitution can only hold between a quantity of stuff and an object which is not a quantity of stuff, for instance, as when a quantity of bronze constitutes a statue, such a state of affairs is absurd. On the one hand, there could not be a quantity of stuff which is constituted by another quantity of stuff. On the other hand, it is impossible that there be a quantity of stuff which is constituted by itself Although we may assume that there could be a quantity of stuff which is identical with

itself this is a quite different matter. Because there could not be a quantity of stuff which is constituted by a quantity of stuff, any two particulars which are quantities of stuff fail to meet (P1)'s requirement that each of these particulars be constituted by a quantity of stuff. Since there could be particulars, and since (P1) proposes that a particular, x, is individuated by a quantity of matter which constitutes x, it follows that (P1) fails to provide a logically necessary condition of the diversity of particulars at a time. It can now be argued that (P1) satisfies (CI). Because (P1) has structure (S1), (P1) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with 'quantity of matter' being substituted for `G'. We can demonstrate that (P1) satisfies clause (iii) of (CI) by examining clause (i) of (P1). Clause (i) of (P1) says that at t a quantity of stuff S constitutes a particular x. There are two crucial points which relate to clause (i) of (P1) and which are based on the foregoing

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critique of (P1). First, it is impossible that a quantity of stuff constitutes itself Second, it is a necessary truth that if a quantity of stuff constitutes a particular, then that quantity of stuff is a particular. Given these two points, it is evident that clause (i) of (P1) necessitates that S is a particular which is other than x. Therefore, it clear that (P1) satisfies the part of clause (iii) of (CI) covering proposals having structure (Si). Inasmuch as (P1) satisfies all of the clauses of (CI), (P1) presupposes circular individuation. As we shall see below, similar arguments apply to (P2)-(P6). With respect to (P2), it is a necessary truth that a substratum of a particular is itself a particular. Due to the fact that (P2) covers anything which is a particular, it follows that such a bare particular falls under the scope of (P2). Hence, since (P2) proposes that a particular, x, is individuated by a substratum that supports x, (P2) confronts us with the strange prospect of a substratum's supporting a particular and this substratum being itself supported by a substratum. But such a state of affairs is incoherent. An ordinary particular is alleged to be some sort of combination of a substratum and properties. However, since a substratum is "bare", it seems that there could not be a substratum which is itself some sort of combination of a substratum and properties. Thus, there could neither be a substratum which is supported by another substratum, nor be a substratum which is supported by itself While some philosophers are willing to assume that there could be a substratum which is identical with itself, this is something altogether different. Since there could not be a substratum which is supported by a substratum, any, two particulars which are substrata fail to satisfy (P2)'s requirement that each of them be supported by a substratum. Because there could be particulars, and because (P2) proposes that a particular, x, is individuated by a substratum which supports x, it follows that (P2) does not provide a logically necessary condition of the diversity of particulars at a time. I am now prepared to argue that (P2) satisfies (CI). Since (P2) has structure (Si), (P2) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with 'substratum' being substituted for 'G'. It can be shown that (P2) satisfies clause (iii) of (CI) by examining clause (i) of (P2). Clause (i) of (P2) says that at t a substratum S supports a particular x. There are two key observations which relate to clause (i) of (P2) and which derive from the preceding criticism of (P2).

Thron yliopis to

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First, it is impossible that a substratum supports itself. Second, it is necessarily true that if a substratum supports a particular, then that substratum is a particular. Given these two observations, it is clear that clause (i) of (P2) entails that S is a particular which is diverse from x. Thus, it is evident that (P2) meets the requirements which clause (iii) of (CI) prescribes for proposals having structure (S1). Inasmuch as (P2) satisfies all of (CI)'s clauses, (P2) presupposes circular individuation. Moving on to (P3), it is necessarily true that a place occupied by a particular is itself a particular. As (P3) covers every particular, we should conclude that such a place falls within the scope of (P3). Thus, since (P3) proposes that a particular, x, is individuated by a place which x occupies, (P3) raises the bizarre prospect of a particular's occupying a place and this place itself occupying a place. However, since the relevant relation of spatial occupation can only hold between a nonplace and a place, for example, as when a body or an event is in a place, a state of affairs of this kind is absurd. For one thing, there could not be a place which occupies another place. For another, it is impossible that there be a place which occupies itself Although it may be assumed that there could be a place which is identical with itself, this is a very different affair. It is also true that every place is either a proper or improper part of some place, and stands in spatial relations to other places, for example, relations of distance. But these facts certainly do not imply that a place occupies (or is in) a place. Inasmuch as there could not be a place which occupies a place, any two particulars which are places do not meet (P3)'s requirement that each of these particulars occupy a place. Since there could be particulars, and since (P3) proposes that a particular, x, is individuated by a place that x occupies, we should conclude that (P3) fails to give a logically necessary condition of the diversity of particulars at a time. Now I am ready to argue that (P3) satisfies (CI). Because (P3) has structure (S1), (P3) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with 'place' being substituted for 'G' . We can see that (P3) satisfies clause (iii) of (CI) through an examination of clause (i) of (P3). Clause (i) of (P3) says that at t a particular x occupies a place L. There are two crucial points which relate to clause (i) of (P3) and which derive from the foregoing counter-example to (P3). First, it is impossible that a place occupies itself. Second, it is a

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necessary truth that if a place is occupied by a particular, then that place is a particular. Given these two points, it is evident that clause (i) of (P3) necessitates that L is a particular which is other than x. Consequently, it is plain that (P3) satisfies the part of clause (iii) of (CI) covering proposals having structure (S1). Inasmuch as (P3) satisfies all of the clauses of (CI), (P3) presupposes circular individuation. The argument that (P4) satisfies (CI) is straightforward. Since (P4) has structure (S1), (P4) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with 'particular' being substituted for ' G' . We can verify that (P4) satisfies clause (iii) of (CI) if we examine clause (i) of (P4). Clause (i) of (P4) says that at t a particular P is a proper part of a particular x. But it is impossible that a particular be a proper part of itself. Hence, clause (i) of (P4) necessitates that P is a particular which is other than x. Therefore, (P4) satisfies the conditions in clause (iii) of (CI) pertaining to proposals having structure (S1). Inasmuch as (P4) satisfies all of the clauses of (CI), (P4) presupposes circular individuation. Notice that (P5) is the only one of our proposals whose analysans consists of a disjunction of the analytical portions of two proposals. Specifically, the first disjunct of (P5)'s analysans concerns causes, and the other disjunct of (P5)'s analysans concerns effects. There is a rather direct argument that the proposals corresponding to (P5)'s first and second disjuncts satisfy (CI). Because these proposals have structure (S1), they satisfy clause (ii) of (CI), with 'particular' being substituted for ' G' in each case. We can confirm that these two proposals satisfy clause (iii) of (CI) by examining clause (a) of (P5)'s first disjunct and clause (a) of (P5)'s second disjunct. Clause (a) of (P5)'s first disjunct says that at t a particular z is a cause of a particular x, and clause (a) of (P5)'s second disjunct says that at t a particular z is an effect of a particular x. However, it is impossible that a particular be a cause (effect) of itself. Therefore, clause (a) of (P5)'s first disjunct necessitates that z is a particular which is diverse from x, and likewise for clause (a) of (P5)'s second disjunct. Hence, the proposals corresponding to (P5)'s first and second disjuncts meet the conditions in clause (iii) of (CI) covering proposals having structure (S 1). Since the proposals corresponding to (P5)'s first and second disjuncts satisfy all of the clauses of (CI), these proposals presuppose circular individuation. But if a proposal, X, presupposes circular ,

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individuation, then so does a proposal, Y, meeting the following two conditions. First, Y's analysandum and analysans are jointly satisfiable. Second, Y's analysans is a disjunction of X's analysans and the analytical portion(s) of one or more other proposals. Because (P5) is a proposal whose analysans is a disjunction of the analytical portions of two proposals which presuppose circular individuation, and because the analysandum and analysans of (P5) are jointly satisfiable, (13 5) presupposes circular individuation. Finally, let us consider the reasons for thinking that (P6) satisfies (CI). According to a theory of tropes, a trope is a "property" or "relation" that is a concrete individual, for instance, the particular wisdom of Socrates, or that particular squareness. If a concrete individual, x, possesses a trope, T, then either (i) in an intuitive sense T is in x, or (ii) T is a proper part of x. For example, either (i) the particular wisdom of Socrates is in Socrates in something like the way Aristotle seems to have thought, or (ii) the particular wisdom of Socrates is a proper part of Socrates, as maintained by those philosophers who identify Socrates with a complex of tropes. However, it is impossible for a concrete individual to be in itself in the intuitive sense in question. (Of course, it is possible for a concrete individual to be identical with itself, but that is an altogether different case.) Nor is it possible for a concrete individual to be a proper part of itself. Hence, it is impossible that a trope possesses itself. Furthermore, it is a necessary truth that a trope possessed by a particular is itself a particular. Since clause (i) of (P6) says that at t a particular x has a trope T, we should conclude that clause (i) of (P6) entails that T is a particular which is other than x. Because (P6) has structure (S1), (P6) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with 'trope' being substituted for 'G' , and it follows that (P6) meets the conditions in clause (iii) of (CI) covering proposals having structure (S 1). Inasmuch as (P6) satisfies all of the clauses of (CI), (P6) presupposes circular individuation.' Since (P8) has structure (S1), (P8) satisfies clause (ii) of (CI), with `haecceity' being substituted for 'G' . But (P8) fails to satisfy the conditions

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in clause (iii) of (CI) which pertain to proposals having structure (Si). We can appreciate (P8)'s failure to satisfy clause (iii) of (CI) if we study clause (i) of (P8). Clause (i) of (P8) says that at t a particular x exemplifies a haecceity H. However, a particular's haecceity is an abstract entity, and so not a particular. Therefore, clause (i) of (P8) does not necessitate that H is a particular which is other than x. Hence, (P8) does not meet the requirements of clause (iii) of (CI) for a proposal having structure (S1). Consequently, (P8) does not presuppose circular individuation as specified in (CI). The moral of this story is that an attempt to individuate a particular qua particular by relating it to another particular commits us to circular individuation as specified in (CI), whereas trying to individuate a particular qua particular by relating it to an abstract entity does not commit us to such circular individuation. Analogously, an attempt to analyze the concept of the diversity of particulars in terms of itself is conceptually circular, but trying to analyze this concept in terms of the concept of the diversity of abstract objects is not circular in this way. For example, it is conceptually circular to claim that particulars x and y are rendered diverse at t by x and y's having different particulars as proper parts at t, whereas it is not conceptually circular in this way to claim that x and y are rendered diverse at t by x and y's having different properties at t. The fact that (P8) does not presuppose circular individuation as specified in (CI) is not (P8)'s only advantage. For one thing, on the assumption that particulars have haecceities, there is no good reason to doubt that (P8) provides a logically necessary and sufficient condition for the diversity of particulars at a time. Indeed, (P8) can even accommodate the possibility of the following sorts of particulars, which are exotic or whose possibility is controversial: nonspatial souls, nonspatial Humean impressions, spatial objects which literally interpenetrate one another, Boscovichian pointparticles, and random quantum events which have no causes or effects. In contrast, criteria such as (P3), (P7), and (P9) which rely on spatial factors cannot accommodate the possibility of nonspatial particulars, either souls or Humean impressions, or spatial objects which literally interpenetrate one .

another; a mereological criterion such as (P4) cannot accommodate the 29 If

a relational criterion such as (P7) is modified by replacing the reference to an irreflexive relation (an abstract entity) with a reference to a corresponding relational trope or concrete "relation", then the modified criterion does not escape this sort of criticism, as it is impossible that a trope be related to something by itself.

possibility of simple objects such as nonspatial souls or Boscovichian pointparticles; and a causal criterion such as (P5) cannot accommodate the

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possibility of random quantum events which have no causes or effects. Note that if particulars of these kinds are possible, then (P3), (P7), (P9), (P4), and (P5), respectively, fail to provide a logically necessary condition of the diversity of particulars at a time." Although an entity's haecceity is a relational property, an entity's intrinsic nature includes its haecceity.' After all, the haecceity of an entity does not pertain to anything other than that entity. Indeed, for every complex object, x, there are relational properties of x which pertain to entities other than x and which are components of x's intrinsic nature, namely, relational properties of the form 'having y as a proper part'. Thus, in typical cases some of the properties included within an entity's intrinsic nature are relational. No matter how tempting it might be to do so, it would be wrong to declare an entity's intrinsic nature nonrelational by definition. Since an individual's intrinsic nature includes the haecceity of that thing, (P8)'s explanation of an individual's (x's) being diverse from an individual, y, in terms of the haecceity of x explains x's being diverse from y in terms

30 Recall that a recent theory in physics implies that two fundamental particles having the same intrinsic qualitative properties can wholly coincide in space. As noted earlier, if this theory is correct, then there is a possible world consisting of two spatially coincident particles of this kind which have the same qualitative properties. Thus, premises drawn from empirical science arguably lead to the conclusion that fundamental particles have haecceities. In a similar vein, on some interpretations of certain quantum mechanical theories, fundamental particles can move in a spatially discontinuous manner. If fundamental particles can "leap" through space in this way, then the most popular criterion of the identity over time of particles is mistaken, that of spatio-temporal continuity. For an argument that such a criterion of identity through time is mistaken (even if it is supplemented with causal constraints on temporal stages being stages of the same body), see my and Joshua Hoffinan's Substance Among Other Categories: A Conceptual Investigation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), Chapter 5, Section 9. That spatio-temporal continuity together with these causal constraints fails to furnish a criterion of identity through time for fundamental particles suggests that haecceities are needed to provide this criterion. Thus, there are reasons to suspect that theoretical developments in empirical science lead to the conclusion that fundamental particles have haecceities. 31 AII I mean by the intrinsic nature of a thing is the conjunction of all of a thing's intrinsic properties, and an intrinsic nature of a thing is simply any intrinsic property of a thing. An intuitively plausible example of an intrinsic property of some item is the property of being square. An example of a nonintrinsic property of some item is the relational property of being between a rock and a tree.

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of an intrinsic nature of x. 32 But explaining x and y's being related in way, W, in terms of an intrinsic nature of x or y (or both) is a natural mode of explanation in cases of a certain kind. For instance, if a is related to b by a's being taller than b, then a's being related to b in this way is explained by certain facts about the intrinsic natures of a and b, say, that a is 6 feet tall and b is 5 feet tall. A dyadic relation, R, holding between x and y may be said to be supervenient if R could not cease to hold between x and y (while x and y continue to exist) without there being a change in the intrinsic nature of x or y. Clearly, being taller than is a supervenient relation. On the other hand, distance is not a supervenient relation. However, diversity qualifies as an (extreme case) of a supervenient relation: if diversity holds between x and y, then it could not cease to hold between them (while they continue to exist) without x and y's becoming identical, a most radical change in their intrinsic natures! Furthermore, explaining x and y's being related in way, W, in terms of an intrinsic nature of x or y (or both) is a natural explanatory pattern when x and y's being related in way. W supervenes upon an intrinsic nature of x or y (or both). In addition, we have seen that an entity's intrinsic nature includes its haecceity. It follows that (P8)'s explanation of x's being diverse from y in terms of the haecceity of x is a natural one.

321t

should be noted that since a haecceity is an individual essence, such an intrinsic nature of x is also essential to x.





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THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION

VI - THE HAECCEITY CRITERION: NEITHER TRIVIAL NOR CIRCULAR

particular's bearing the relation of identity to itself at a time. In addition, (C3) The diversity of particulars at a time cannot be analyzed in this way, since any attempt to do so suffers from (familial) triviality. Therefore, (C4) A particular is not. individuated by its having a haecceity.

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"This he explodes as a circle, and so derides it." (1659 South. Sermons Preached Upon General Occasions 1. 101) "The triflingnes of this discourse, is much too much enlarged." [1581 Sidney An Apologie for Poetrie (Arb.) 71]

Despite (P8)'s advantages, some philosophers have rejected it on the ground that it is trivial. Such a charge is based on the following argument, whose first premise admits of several variations. Argument C (C1) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identical with a, and to say that a has this property is to say that a is identical with a. 33 Consequently, (C2)' If a particular is individuated by its having a haecceity, then the diversity of particulars at a time can be analyzed in terms of a

33 For example, see Max Black, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," p. 206. Actually, Black's protagonist claims that "All that you mean (my italics) when you say 'a has the property of being identical with a' is that a is a." According to this claim, to say a has the property of being identical with a is to say a is a, and vice-versa. However, notice that in some cases to say p is to say q, and vice-versa, and in other cases, to say p is to say q, but not vice-versa. For example, to say that something is green and round is to say that something is green and round, and vice-versa, whereas to say that something is green and round is to say that something is green, but not vice-versa. (Seemingly, if it is possible that someone says p, then to say p is to say q just in case a person's saying p necessitates his saying q.) In (C1), it is claimed that to say a has the property of being identical with a is to say a is a, but the converse is not claimed. Hence, Black's protagonist's claim is stronger than the corresponding claim in (Cl). Moreover, Black's protagonist's claim appears to be false, since to say that a has the property of being identical with a is to say that something has a property, whereas to say that a is a is not to say that something has a property. Clearly, though, this is no reason to reject the corresponding claim in (C1). Furthermore, it is just as plausible that the latter claim implies (C2) as it is that Black's protagonist's claim implies (C2). For these reasons, Argument C is the formulation of choice for this sort of triviality objection.

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My reply to Argument C begins with the observation that in (C1) the expression 'to say that a is identical with a' is ambiguous. This expression refers to either a relational statement that a is identical with a, or an attributional statement that a is identical with a. The statement referred to is relational if and only if that statement ascribes to a the qualitative reflexive relation _ being identical with_, and the statement referred to is attributional just in case that statement ascribes to a the nonqualitative property (haecceity) of being identical with a. Since a haecceity, a so-called relational property, is not a dyadic relation or two-termed abstract entity, like Identity, but is rather a property, an abstract entity with but a single term, the attributional statement that a is a cannot be identified with the relational statement that a is a. More specifically, to make the attributional statement that a is a is not to say what is said by making the relational statement that a is a, and to make the relational statement that a is a is not to say what is said by making the attributional statement that a is a. Nevertheless, either an attributional statement or a relational statement can be made by uttering the sentence `a is identical with a'. Finally, there are parallel distinctions which can be drawn between a relational thought (or belief) that a is a and an attributional thought (or belief) that a is a. Accordingly, if in (Cl) the expression 'to say that a is identical with a' picks out an attributional statement, then (Cl) seems true, but adequate reason has not been provided to believe that (C1) implies (C2); and if in (C1) the expression 'to say that a is identical with a' picks out a relational statement, then although (Cl) entails (C2), (C1) is false. Either way, we do not have adequate reason to think that C is sound. Thus, Argument C does not give us a good reason to believe that (P8) is trivial. So, although it is trivial to propose analyzing the relation of diversity for particulars in terms of a particular's bearing the relation of identity to itself,

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analyzing the former relation in terms of a particular's having a certain kind of property might not be trivial in this way. The analysis of particulars' being diverse at a time proposed in (P8) commits us only to there being an analysis of the latter sort, as (P8)'s analysandum consists of a particular's (x's) being related to a particular, y, by x's being diverse from y, and (P8)'s analysans consists of x's having a certain property which y lacks. In the following four variants of Argument C, (C1) is revised, but (C2) and (C3) remain unchanged. According to the first variation, (C1) is replaced with (Cla) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identical with a, and this property is identical with the ordered pair of a and the identity relation. Is (Cla) acceptable?' A number of considerations speak against (Cla). First of all, a haecceity is a property and an ordered pair is a set. Yet, it is intuitively plausible that Property and Set are nonoverlapping categories of abstracta. Hence, it seems that (C1 a) is false. In other words, it can be argued plausibly that the identification of a haecceity with an ordered pair is an example of a Rylean category mistake. Moreover, the following related line of reasoning implies that (C1 a) is false. Necessarily, a haecceity is a property which can be exemplified, but it is impossible that a set (an ordered pair) be exemplified; and necessarily, an ordered pair is a set which has elements, but it is impossible that a property (haecceity) has elements. For these reasons, it is a necessary truth that a haecceity and an ordered pair have different characteristics. It follows that there could not be a haecceity which is identical with an ordered pair of the identity relation and an object. Thus, (Cla) should be rejected, along with the corresponding revised version

34 According

to some philosophers, a haecceity may be represented (in a model) by the ordered pair of the identity relation and an object. For example, see Felicia Ackermann, "Proper Names, Propositional Attitudes, and Nondescriptive Connotations," Philosophical Studies, 35 (1979), pp. 55-69. However, a haecceity's being represented in a model by such an ordered pair does not imply that a haecceity can be identified with an ordered pair of this kind. After all, a thing can be used in a model to represent something other than itself: what is represented depends upon the intended interpretation of the model.

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of Argument C. The second variation on Argument C replaces (C1) with (Clb) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identical with a, and this property is identical with a collection (sum) of a and the identity relation. It would appear that (C1 b) is unacceptable. For one thing, (Clb) is untrue if Property and Collection are nonoverlapping ontological categories, and it is intuitively plausible that this is so. Moreover, the following related argument entails that (Clb) is untrue. Necessarily, a haecceity is an abstract entity, and an abstract entity does not have a particular as a part. Thus, a nonqualitative haecceity does not have a particular as a part. However, necessarily, a collection of a particular, a, and the identity relation, has a particular as a part. It follows that necessarily, a nonqualitative haecceity and a collection of a particular and the identity relation have different properties. Hence, a nonqualitative haecceity cannot be identified with a collection (sum) of the identity relation and a particular. Therefore, (Clb) and the corresponding version of Argument C ought to be rejected. According to the third variation on Argument C, (C1) is replaced with (Clc) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identical with a, and this property is identical with the property of being an x such that x is identical with a. A proponent of this variant presupposes that the phrase 'x is identical with a' as it occurs in (C1 c) ascribes the qualitative dyadic relation of identity. Should we accept (Cl c)? One argument which supports (Cl c) is based on the following two premises. (a) The property of being identical with a and the property of being an x such that x is identical with a are necessarily coinstantiated. (b) If a property A and a property B are necessarily coinstantiated, then A=B.

110

(b) represents a coarse grained view of property identity, and there is good reason to reject such a view in favor of a fine grained view of property identity. A fine grained view can be justified by appealing to the fact that sometimes a property A and a property B are necessarily coinstantiated, but it is nevertheless possible that a person grasps A without his grasping B. For

example, Trilaterality and Triangularity are necessarily coinstantiated, but a person could grasp either without his grasping the other. In other words, there could be a person who has the concept of a three sided closed plane figure, but lacks the concept of a three angled closed plane figure, and conversely. However, for any properties, x and y, if x is possibly such that x has a certain property or bears a certain relation to a particular thing, when y does not, then x#y. 35 It follows that Trilaterality and Triangularity are different properties despite their necessary coinstantiation. Hence, property identity is a fine grained affair. 36 According to Ernest Sosa, two properties can seem to differ in their cognitive content, and yet be identical, if one of them is an analysis of the other.' But this argument does not suggest that Trilaterality—Triangularity. After all, it is intuitively plausible that being a trilateral is not an analysis of being a triangle, and vice-versa. This intuition is supported by two arguments. First of all, if A is an analysis of B, then A explains B. Since A explains B entails '-(B explains A), if A is an analysis of B, then B is not an analysis of A. 38 However, the claims that something is a triangle because it is a trilateral, and that something is a trilateral because it is a triangle, appear to be epistemically on a par. If one of these claims is more plausible than the other, then either

35

See Chapter 1, section VI.

36 For a defense of the claim that property identity is fine grained see Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object (La Salle: Open Court, 1976), pp. 117-120. 37

Ernest Sosa, "Classical Analysis," Journal of Philosophy, 80 (1983), pp. 695-710. See the discussion of Sosa's "Classical Analysis" in Chapter 1, section VI. 38

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(A explains B) entails —(B explains A) whenever the sense in which it is said that A explains B is the same as the sense in which it is said that B explains A - which is the case in the example at hand.

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(i) X is a closed plane figure with three straight sides because X is a closed plane figure with three angles having straight sides, is epistemically preferable to its converse, or vice-versa. But (i) is not epistemically preferable to (i)'s converse, and (i)'s converse is not epistemically preferable to (i). Second of all, Sosa's view implies that an analysis resolves a complex attribute, A, into more fundamental structural units, namely, A's logical parts. Two implications of such a view should be noted. (1) In an analysis, the analysandum is a term, 7', which is neither conjunctive, disjunctive, nor negative, but which represents a complex concept or attribute, P, involving a conjunction or disjunction of factors, or a negation of a factor, et cetera. (2) The complex, P, is represented in the analysandum as the simple, T, because our initial grasp of P does not reveal P's conceptual or logical complexity, inasmuch as we initially grasped P from a nonreflective intuitive perspective. Thus, for Sosa, in an analysis, the analysandum is a nonconjunctive, nondisjunctive, and nonnegative term which is analyzed by a complex term in the analysans which is conjunctive, disjunctive, negative, and so forth. It is easy to see that this requirement is not met if one sets out to analyze Triangularity as Trilaterality, or vice-versa. The terms representing these properties are either both noncomplex or both complex, and either way Sosa's requirement is not satisfied. For these reasons, it is implausible that Triangularity is analyzable as Trilaterality, and vice-versa. Thus, Sosa's views on property identity do not suggest that Triangularity is identical with Trilaterality. 39 Yet another way of justifying a fine grained view of property identity is by appealing to the fact that sometimes a property A and a property B are necessarily coinstantiated, but A involves an abstract object that B does not involve.' If A involves an abstractum that B does not involve, then A and ,

39

From what he says in "Classical Analysis" there is reason to think that Sosa would concur

in this judgement. 40

A graspable property or proposition, P, involves a property, proposition, or relation, Q, just in case P is necessarily such that whoever grasps P, grasps Q. On the other hand, if there is a nongraspable property or proposition, P1, which shares a generic logical structure, K, with

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B differ in their intrinsic nature. For example, Trilaterality and Triangularity are necessarily coinstantiated, but each involves an abstractum which the other does not involve. In particular, the former involves the property of being three-sided, whereas the latter does not, and the latter involves the property of being three-angled, whereas the former does not. However, if a property X involves a property, Z, and a property Y does not involve Z, then X#Y, since if x has a certain attribute or bears a certain relation to a particular thing, when y does not, then x#y. Hence, Trilaterality and Triangularity are different characteristics, despite their necessary coinstantiation. Therefore, property identity is fine grained. I am now prepared to argue that there is no reason to think that the variant of Argument C based on (C1 c) is sound. In the first place, suppose for the sake of argument that a person, S, could grasp the property of being identical with a. In that case, it seems that S could grasp the former property without S's grasping the property of being an x such that x is identical with a. That is, it seems metaphysically possible that S has the relatively uncomplicated concept of being identical with a without S's having the more sophisticated concept of being an x such that x is identical with a, since the latter concept, but not the former one, is a concept of being an x such that x is related in a certain way to a. Utilizing a by now familiar pattern of argument, we may conclude that the property of being identical with a and the property of being an x such that x is identical with a seem not to be identical with one another. Furthermore, the property of being identical with a and the somewhat gerrymandered property of being an x such that x is identical with a appear to differ in their intrinsic logical structure. In particular, these properties seem to involve different abstract objects: the latter property appears to involve the dyadic relation of identity, but the former property seems not to involve this relation. Employing a pattern of argument utilized earlier, it again follows that being identical with a and being an x such that x is

a graspable property or proposition, P2, then it seems clear that PI involves abstracta of the same kind as P2 involves. If an abstractum, Al, involves an abstractum, A2, then Al's involving A2 is an intrinsic feature of Al. For example, in virtue of their internal structure, a conjunctive, disjunctive, or negative property or proposition, P1, involves another property or proposition, P2, which is a conjunct, disjunct, or negand of Pl.

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identical with a appear to be different properties. Since being identical with a and being an x such that x is identical with a seem to be diverse based on the criteria of grasping and involvement, (C1 c) appears to be false. It seems that these two properties are identical only if either the former property is analyzable as the latter property, or viceversa. However, it does not appear to be true that something's being an x such that x is identical with a is a philosophical analysis of something's being identical with a. For one thing, this putative analysis does not seem to have the required explanatory power: it may be trivial. After all, something's being an x such that x is identical with a hardly seems to explicate what it is for something to be identical with a. In addition, a putative explication of this kind does not analyze the property of being identical with a into logical parts, for instance, conjuncts, disjuncts, or the like. Finally, a property such as being an x such that x is identical with a appears to be in some sense a jury-rigged property which is less fundamental than the property of being identical with a. Thus, it seems incongruous to suppose that the property of being identical with a is analyzable as the property of being an x such that x is identical with a. For all of the above reasons, it does not appear to be true that the property of being identical with a is analyzable as the property of being an x such that x is identical with a. Accordingly, let us ask whether the latter property is analyzable as the former one. The claim that the property of being an x such that x is identical with a is analyzable as the property of 11 eing identical with a is also open to question. This is because such a propos d analysis does not analyze the former property into logical parts of the aforementioned sort. Thus, it may be true that the necessary equivalence of being identical with a and being an x such that x is identical with a is a mere equivalence, so that neither one of these properties is an analysis of the other. If this is true, then this state of affairs parallels the one which holds (I have argued) in the case of Trilaterality and Triangularity. On the other hand, if the property of being identical with a is a philosophical analysis of the property of being an x such that x is identical with a, then the former property explicates the latter one. In that case, although (Cl c) is true, we have been given no reason to think that (Cl c) implies (C2). For all of the preceding reasons, I conclude

that there is no justification for believing that the variant of Argument C

1 14

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based on (Cie) is sound.' As we have seen, the property of being identical with a is not a mereological compound, or an ordered set, of the relation of Identity and the object a. Nor, as I have argued, is this property plausibly identified with a property like being an x such that x is identical with a. Nevertheless, it might be claimed that the property of being identical with a is a logical offshoot of

Identity and a, and has Identity and a as logical constituents or ingredients. (By the way, this objection has the .consequence that the existence of the property of being identical with a logically entails the existence of Identity and a.) Accordingly, the fourth and final variation upon Argument C replaces (Cl) with (Cid) The haecceity of a particular, a, is the property of being identical with a, and this property has a and the relation of Identity as logical constituents. An advocate of (Cid) maintains that the idea behind this premise can be understood from the fregean perspectives of linguistic expression, sense, and reference. From the perspective of linguistic expression, a name such as `being identical with a' is created from the predicate `_is identical with_' by "plugging in" two names 'a' and 'bo' to produce the sentence 'a is identical with b', "plucking out" 'a', and nominalizing the result. From the perspective of sense, it is impossible to grasp the sense of 'being identical with a' without grasping the senses of the identity predicate and the name `a'. From the perspective of reference, the compound relational property of being identical with a derives from a's being "plugged" into the right hand variable position in the relation, _being identical with_, resulting in the monadic attribute _being identical with a. 42

41 If (Clc) is amended so that it proposes that the property of being identical with a=the property of being an x such that x bears Identity to a, then an argument of the same kind applies. 42This objection is based upon a criticism raised by an anonymous reviewer for Cambridge University Press. Edward Zalta has used the term "plugging" to refer to a putative logical analog of the linguistic operation of partially saturating a multi-place predicate with a name. See Zalta's Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics (Dordrecht: D. Reidel,

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In my reply, I consider the perspectives of expression, sense, and reference in turn. In the first instance, the fact that a property-designating expression has a certain structure does not provide a conclusive reason for thinking that the property it designates has constituents corresponding to each of the parts of that expression. Consider, for example, the expression 'being a believer in Santa Claus'. This expression has the same general structure as 'being identical with a'. Are we to conclude that Santa Claus is a constituent of a compound property whose other constituent is the relation x being a believer in y? It seems not. Since a property is not a linguistic entity, the determinants of a property's logical ingredients are to be found at a level deeper than the superficial one of property-designating expressions and their linguistic form. Accordingly, let us proceed, first, to the level at which senses are grasped, and second, to the level of reference, which are such (apparently progressively) deeper levels. The crucial question about grasping is whether or not it is possible for a person to grasp a's haecceity, being identical with a, prior to his grasping the sense of the identity predicate, the two-term relation of Identity. As the following discussion makes clear, it seems that this is possible. The distinction I drew between the relational thought or belief that a is a and the attributional thought or belief that a is a can be used to help us understand such a possibility. If a person has an attributional belief that a is a, then he attributes to a the property of being identical with a - a's haecceity. On the other hand, if a person has a relational belief that a is a, then he relates a to itself by attributing a two-place reflexive relation of Identity to a. Therefore, it is possible that a person has an attributional thought that a is a without his having a relational thought that a is a, and it is possible that a person has a relational thought that a is a without his having an attributional thought that a is a. Thus, it appears that to have an attributional thought that a is a is not to have a thought of the reflexive two-place relation of Identity in which one relates a to itself by attributing that relation. Rather, having the former thought is having a thought of the property of being identical with a, and attributing that property to a. Hence, it seems possible that at a time t a person attributes a's nonqualitative haecceity to a without thereby grasping

1983).

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the qualitative reflexive relation of x being identical with y. Once this is admitted, there is no reason whatsoever for saying that necessarily, such a person grasps the Identity relation at a time earlier than t. Surely, there could be a being whose first beliefs, including his initial beliefs about the identity of things, consist of property-attributions, and who makes his first

relation attribution at a later date. (Indeed, this might be true in our own -

case.) Such an individual's initial grasping of "identity" would occur within the context of some attributional belief in which he attributes a haecceity to something, for example, himself. At that point, the individual would not yet have grasped the two-place reflexive relation of Identity, and would not yet have had a relational thought in which he attributes this relation to something. I conclude that from the perspective of the grasping of senses, there is reason to believe that the Identity relation is not a logical ingredient of (and is not involved in) a haecceity. Finally, from the perspective of reference, it is of questionable coherence to say that the property of being identical with a derives from a's being "plugged" into the "right hand" variable position of the Identity relation. How does a, a concrete entity, "plug into" the Identity relation, an abstract entity? "Plugging" is not any intuitive or familiar relation which holds between properties or relations and concreta. Since one place in a dyadic relation can be "plugged" without "plugging" the other place, it is possible for a relation to be "plugged" without its being exemplified. Thus, "plugging" is not an exemplification relation of the sort that relations bear to concreta. If the relevant conception of "plugging" is not to be a mystery, an explanation of this conception is needed. But it is problematic whether such an explanation is available. Furthermore, the notion that an abstract entity has a concrete entity as a logical constituent or ingredient appears to be unintelligible. To appreciate the difficulty of conceiving of a haecceity as a relational property having Identity and an object as logical constituents, consider the following argument. (1) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a haecceity, then x is a property. (2) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a property, then x is an abstract entity. (3) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a property, then x is a one-place or monadic attribute.

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Consequently, (4) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a haecceity, then x is a one-place or monadic abstract entity. Furthermore, (5) Necessarily, for any x, if x is an abstract entity which consists (logically speaking) of a two-place relation one of whose places is "plugged" by an item, then x is a two-place abstract entity. Therefore, (6) Necessarily, for any x, if x is a haecceity, then x does not consist, logically speaking, of a two-place relation one of whose places is "plugged" by an item. We can now see that (a), (b), and (c), below, should be distinguished from one another: (a) _being identical with_ (Identity has two places, both of which are "unplugged"), (b) _being identical with a (A haecceity is a property and has one place), and (c) _being identical with a (Since this putative entity has two places [one of which is "plugged" by a], it is not a property). According to my argument, if Identity and a are logical constituents of the property of being identical with a, then (b) is identical with (c). Since, as I have argued, this implies a contradiction, I conclude that Identity and a are not logical constituents of the property of being identical with a. For this reason, it appears that the claim that a haecceity, is a relational property having Identity and an object as logical ingredients is untenable. The conception of haecceity embodied in this claim seems to be ill-conceived, or of dubious coherence, for a haecceity which satisfies this conception apparently exemplifies contradictory features characteristic of abstract entities belonging to different ontological categories, that of Property and Relation. For the preceding reasons, I believe that this conception of haecceity involves a category mistake: a categorial confusion between a property and a relation. Given such a conception, haecceities are fantastical and

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monstrous entities which seem even less intelligible than the singing and dancing teapot depicted in Disney's animated film version of Beauty and the Beast.' Now that we understand the serious problems faced by the idea that a concretum's haecceity has Identity and a concretum as logical constituents, it is clear that (Cid) and the corresponding version of Argument C should be rejected. It might be countered that although a partly "plugged" relation being identical with a cannot be identified with a haecceity, a haecceity somehow emerges from a partially "plugged" relation. In that case, a haecceity is dependent upon a partly "plugged" relation, and perhaps a nonqualitative haecceity is "constituted" by an object and such a relation in some sense. However, a notion of an entity's emerging from another more basic entity naturally arises in a domain of a certain kind. In particular, such a domain has members which either (i) have spatial or temporal parts, or (ii) can undergo a change in their intrinsic properties. For example, arguably, an ice cube emerges from, and is in some sense constituted by, a quantity of water, and arguably, a spherical surface emerges from, and is in some sense dependent upon, a spherical object. In the first of these examples, the idea seems to be twofold: (a) an ice cube cannot exist without a quantity of water, but a quantity of water can exist without an ice cube, and (b) the melting of the ice cube necessitates its destruction, but typically, the quantity of water continues to exist after the ice cube melts. In the second of the foregoing examples, the idea appears to be that a spherical surface is somehow parasitical upon a spherical object. Whatever one might make of such notions of emergence, they appear to be meaningless in a domain whose members are immutable, that is to say, incapable of undergoing a change in their intrinsic properties, and whose members have neither spatial nor temporal parts. Yet, since haecceities are abstract properties, they belong to a domain of this latter sort. 44 Therefore, the notion that a haecceity somehow emerges out of a partly "plugged" relation seems to be senseless. In the light of the foregoing arguments, there is no reason to think that a

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viable explanation of a haecceity's derivation from Identity and an object is available. The notion that haecceities are somehow "compounded" out of Identity and objects can now be seen to be a rather implausible one. Why is this notion as widely accepted as it is? A reasonable hypothesis is that the notion results from a common tendency to conflate characteristics of a property-designating linguistic expression and characteristics of the property it designates.' More exactly, in the case of haecceities, there appears to be a confusion of the features of a haecceity-designating linguistic expression, compounded out of the identity predicate and a name of an object, and the features of the haecceity it designates. As we have seen, although a haecceity is designated by a compound expression of this kind, the notion that a haecceity is itself a compound of Identity and an object seems to be groundless. Another possible source of the idea that an abstract object, in this case a nonqualitative haecceity, is "built" or "constructed" by "combining" an object and a relation, is the notion that abstract properties are mental constructs. However, this idea is incoherent: since a mental construct is a concrete entity, namely, a mental state or the like, an abstractum cannot be identified with such an entity. A final objection can be stated as follows. In my definition of the concept of haecceity given in Chapter 1, section IV, there is quantification into the object-place of expressions for haecceities. According to this definition, F is a haecceity =df. F is possibly such that (3x)(F is the property of being identical with x). But, the objection goes, "if a haecceity is not logically compounded of Identity and an object, then we should not be able to quantib, into the objectplace in the compound predicate: it should be an inviolable logical unit."' Hence, a haecceity is logically compounded of Identity and an object.

45

43

Cf. Chapter 1, section II, where it is argued that a "relational property" cannot be identified with a relation, and that the sense in which such a property is "relational" can be understood in terms of the sort of linguistic expressions which designate such properties.

44

1 quote an anonymous reviewer who read an earlier version of this book for Cambridge University Press.

Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), p. 97, ¶ 282. See the discussion of these characteristics of abstracta in Chapter 1, section VIII.

46

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However, there is no reason to accept this argument, unless there is a true general principle to the effect that whenever there is quantification into the object-place of a compound predicate which is part of a referential expression, the value of the quantified variable is a constituent of the referent of that referential expression. Unfortunately for this objection, this general principle is subject to a wide range of counter-examples of the following sort. (1) Suppose that Hillary=the wife of Bill. Then, (3x)(3y)(x=Hillary & y=Bill & x is the wife of y). But, it is false that Bill is a constituent of Hillary. (2) The number 8-=the predecessor of the number 9. Hence, (ax)(3y)(x=the number 8 & y=the number 9 & x is the predecessor of y). Yet, it seems incoherent to say that the number 8 has the number 9 as a constituent. (3) Let S=the surface of the Earth. In that case, (3x)(3y)(x=S & y=the Earth & x=the surface of y). Surely, though, it is absurd to suppose that the surface of the Earth has the Earth as a constituent. (4) Finally, suppose that e=that event which is Jones's falling. In consequence, (3x)(3y)(x=e & y=Jones & x=the falling of y). However, this consequence does not seem to provide us with a good reason for rejecting Donald Davidson's view that an event does not have an object as a constituent. 47 However, the aforementioned consequence should

47

See Donald Davidson, "The Individuation of Events," and "Events as Particulars," Nous,

IV (1970), pp. 25-32.

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provide us with such a reason if it is true, as a general principle, that whenever there is quantification into the object-place of a compound predicate which is part of a referential expression, the value of the quantified variable is a constituent of the referent of that referential expression. Hence, it seems that this general principle is false. Given the foregoing counter-examples to the general principle in question, this principle should be rejected. Once this is recognized, we have no reason to accept the proposition that if we can quantify into the object-place of expressions for haecceities, then a haecceity has an object as a constituent. Thus, we have not been presented with any evidence that my quantification into the object-place of expressions for haecceities implies that a haecceity has an object as a constituent. I conclude that the objection under discussion is without merit. Having surveyed a wide range of arguments which purport to imply that (P8) suffers from familial triviality, and having found all of these arguments deficient, I infer that there is no reason to believe that (P8) is guilty of this charge. Does (P8) suffer from vicious conceptual circularity? (P8) is viciously circular just in case (P8)'s analysans employs the concept of the diversity of particulars at a time. Since the concept of this relation does not appear to be employed in (P8)'s analysans, (P8) does not appear to be viciously circular. (P8)'s analysans employs the concept of the relation of diversity for particulars only if a person's grasping (P8)'s analysans necessitates his having the concept of the relation of diversity for particulars. However, it appears to be metaphysically possible that a person grasps (P8)'s analysans without his having the concept of the dyadic relation of diversity for particulars. It might be objected that if a person grasps (P8)'s analysans, then he must have some sort of general or singular conception of a particular's (x's) being diverse from a particular y. I am not sure that this premise is true, but it might be. In any case, the premise may be granted. For it is possible that when a person has some sort of general or singular notion of x's being diverse from y, this notion is attributional, and either ascribes a concept of the nonqualitative property of being diverse from y to x, or ascribes a concept of the qualitative property of being diverse from something to x. Furthermore, there could be an individual who has an

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attributional conception of x's being diverse from y, but lacks a relational conception of x's being diverse from y. Unlike ourselves, an individual of this kind would fail to grasp the dyadic relation of diversity for particulars. Hence, even if a person's grasping (P8)'s analysans necessitates his having some sort of general or singular concept of x's being diverse from y, it is nevertheless possible that a person grasps (P8)'s analysans without his having a concept of the dyadic relation of diversity for particulars. Therefore, it seems that (P8) does not suffer from vicious conceptual circularity. To recapitulate, (P8) does not presuppose circular individuation as specified in (CI), and does not suffer from either familial triviality or vicious conceptual circularity. As far as I can tell, the superficially plausible charge that (P8) is in some sense trivial or circular is unjustified. Let us take stock. As we have seen, proposal (P0) does not provide a logically necessary condition of the diversity of particulars at a time, proposals (P1)-(P4), (P6), (P7), and (P9) presuppose circular individuation as delineated in (CI), and proposal (P5) presupposes circular individuation, since (P5)'s analysandum and analysans are jointly satisfiable and (P5)'s analysans is a disjunction of the analytical parts of proposals which meet (CI). Recall that a proposal, X, presupposes circular individuation if X meets two conditions. Firstly, X's analysandum and analysans are jointly satisfiable. Secondly, X's analysans has as a disjunct or conjunct the analysans of a proposal which meets (CI). Therefore, if a proposal's analysandum and analysans are jointly satisfiable and the proposal's analysans has one or more of the analytical parts of (P1)-(P7) or (P9) as a disjunct or conjunct, then the proposal in question presupposes circular individuation. It follows that among all of the aforementioned proposals, including any of these disjunctive or conjunctive ones, only (P8) is viable. As far as I can see, the range of proposals reviewed is comprehensive enough that there is no need for us to consider any other proposals. It is arguable that if none of these proposals provides a criterion of individuation for particulars, then the diversity of particulars at a time is a brute fact. 48 Thus, it seems that

(P8) can be inferred as the best explanation of the diversity of particulars at a time, unless there is a plausible a priori objection to the possibility of nonqualitative haecceities. Accordingly, the next order of business is to address a priori objections to the possibility of nonqualitative haecceities.

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48

This seems to be Max Black's position in "The Identity of Indiscemibles".

.

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VII - RESPONSES TO A PRIORI OBJECTIONS TO HAECCEITY "Every attribute is what the ancients called an universal." (1785 Reid

Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man 440)

"Quality is used as the generical name of every thing in objects, for which a seperate notation is required." [1829 JAS. Mill

Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind xiv. II. 60 (1869)]

A priori objections to the possibility of nonqualitative haecceities imply that a haecceity, an abstract property, has a feature which is incompatible with Propertyhood or Abstractness. Given my arguments in favor of the existence of nonqualitative haecceities, if these objections to the intelligibility of nonqualitative haecceities can be answered, then the conclusion that particulars have haecceities is warranted. The first of these objections infers the impossibility of a particular's having a haecceity from two premises. (1) The haecceity of a concretum, x, is an abstract entity which consists of two parts: the identity relation, and x, respectively. (2) It is impossible that an abstractum has a concretum as a part. An objection of this kind is unsuccessful for the following reasons. First of all, how are we to understand (1)'s implication that an abstract entity and a concretum are parts which together comprise the nonqualitative haecceity of that concretum? Surely, they are not spatial or temporal parts of such an abstract entity. Nor are they conjuncts, disjuncts, or any other sort of logical part of a nonqualitative haecceity. It seems that the haecceity, H, of a concretum, x, has x as a part only if H is some sort of collection or sum of

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the identity relation and x. 49 However, if (2) is true, then we should infer that a collection which has a concretum as a part is not an abstract entity. Because a haecceity is an abstract entity, it follows that the haecceity of a concretum, x, cannot be identified with a collection of the identity relation and x. Hence, if (2) is true, then (1) is false. Furthermore, since (2) is quite plausible, it seems that (1) is false. For the foregoing reasons, the first of these objections is unsound. The response might be to revise (1) and (2) as follows. (1') Although the haecceity of a concretum, x, does not have x as a part, there is a sense in which such an abstract entity intimately involves x. (2') It is impossible that an abstract entity involves a concretum in such a sense. A weakness of this revised objection is that it is unclear in what sense the haecceity of a concretum is supposed to "intimately involve" that concretum. For this reason, it is problematic whether (1') is true. Perhaps there is a sense of Constituenthood which differs from Parthood or Elementhood, and which is the intended sense of "intimate involvement" in this objection. However, if the haecceity, H, of a concretum, x, has x as a constituent, then x must be a proper constituent of H, otherwise H would be identical with x, which is obviously absurd. But if something has one proper constituent, then it must have another. If a concretum, x, is a proper constituent of the haecceity of x, then what other proper constituent does x's haecceity possess? My reply to the contention that it, is viciously circular or trivial to analyze the diversity of concreta at a time in terms of their haecceities seems to imply that such a haecceity does not have the identity relation and a concretum as proper constituents, and does not involve the relation of identity. However, it appears that if a haecceity of a concretum, x, has proper constituents, then x and the identity relation are among them. Hence,

49

Note that such a collection is not a set, since it is possible that a set have elements, but not parts. The relation of proper parthood is transitive and irreflexive, whereas the relation of elementhood is not transitive and (on some views) not irreflexive.

,

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it seems that a concretum x is not a proper constituent of the haecceity of x, and (1') is false if Constituenthood is the intended sense of "intimate involvement" in (1'). Because a haecceity, H, of a concretum, a, that is, being identical with a, appears to have neither the identity relation nor a as an element, part, or constituent, and because H seems not to involve the identity relation, it is

appropriate to designate such a haecceity with a hyphenated expression such as 'identity-with-a', as Alvin Plantinga has done." The objection based on (1') and (2') may also be unsound due to the falsity of (2'). After all, possible abstracta include sets of concreta, and they intimately involve concreta in the sense that they have concreta as elements (though not as parts or constituents.) In a somewhat similar vein, Chisholm has argued against the possibility of nonqualitative haecceities based on two premises. 51 (1) Necessarily, if P is a property, then an individual's conceiving P does not entail his conceiving of a particular concretum. (2) Necessarily, if an individual conceives the haecceity of a concretum, then by conceiving this property he conceives of a particular concretum. According to (1), Qualitativeness is a logically necessary condition of Propertyhood, and according to (2), the haecceity of a concretum is nonqualitative. Although (2) is true, why should we accept (1)? After all, the haecceity of a concretum seems to have a feature which is a logically sufficient condition of Propertyhood, namely, being monadic and exempli-

127

fiable. 52 Thus, there is no reason to accept (1), and Chisholm's objection does not succeed. A similar objection deduces the impossibility of a concretum's having a haecceity from the two premises stated below. (1) Necessarily, if P is a property, then P is possibly exemplified by something, x, and P is possibly exemplified by something, y, which is not identical with x. (2) Necessarily, the haecceity of a concretum is a property which could not be exemplified by something other than that concretum.

(1) advances the thesis that a logically necessary condition of Propertyhood is that a property be capable of exemplification by different things. But there is no good reason to accept this thesis, since, as noted above, a haecceity appears to have a feature which is a logically sufficient condition of Propertyhood, that is, being monadic and exemplifiable, despite the fact that a haecceity is not capable of being exemplified by different things. Furthermore, it seems that there are properties which are possibly exemplified by something and not possibly exemplified by anything else, for example, being even and prime, being the successor of 1, and being identical with 2, which appear to be possibly exemplified by the number 2 and not possibly exemplified by any other thing. Thus, the first premise of the objection under discussion seems to be false. Alternatively, the impossibility of there being a particular which has contingent existence and which has a haecceity might be inferred from the following two premises. (1) The haecceity of a concrete contingent being is an abstract entity which has contingent existence.

50

See Alvin Plantinga, "The Boethian Compromise," American Philosophical Quarterly, 15 (1978), pp. 129-138. 51

Roderick Chisholm, The First Person (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 7-8.

52

Notice that property exemplification and tropal possession are different relations, inasmuch as it is possible that an abstract entity bears the former, but not the latter, to a

concretum.

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(2) It is impossible that an abstract entity has contingent existence. However, it is not obvious that (1) is true, and I shall argue later that haecceities of concrete contingent beings have necessary existence. In any case, for present purposes it suffices to point out that (2) seems to be false.

For it appears possible that there be an abstract entity which has contingent existence, for instance, a set of contingent concreta which exists if and only if its elements exist. Another sort of objection to the possibility of nonqualitative haecceities goes as follows. The haecceity of a concretum is supposed to be a property, but such a haecceity has a diaphanous quality indicative of its lack of content. Since a property must have some content, there could not be a nonqualitative haecceity. My reply is that the content of a concretum's haecceity is a concretum's individuality or identity in a sense which is quite fundamental. Some philosophers may be led to think that nonqualitative haecceities are contentless by their inability to grasp the content of certain nonqualitative haecceities. Nevertheless, whether a nonqualitative haecceity has content, and whether that content is graspable by someone, would seem to be different questions. A related objection to the possibility of nonqualitative haecceities is based on the following two premises. (1) If concreta have haecceities, then there could be a property, namely, some concretum's haecceity, which is necessarily ungraspable. (2) Necessarily, a property is possibly grasped. I am prepared to grant that (1) is true. As we shall see later, it can be argued plausibly that there are haecceities which can be exemplified by necessarily unconscious material substances and which could not be grasped by anyone. • Is there a good reason to accept (2)? Of course, if there are properties, then we grasp some of them. Yet, our grasping some properties does not entail that every property is graspable. On the other hand, if properties can

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be identified with ideas or concepts, then (2) is true. However, the contention that properties are identifiable with such mental entities is unintelligible. After all, a property is an abstract entity and mental entities of this kind are concrete, and no entity can be both abstract and concrete. (In contrast, the thesis that properties are eliminable in favor of ideas or concepts is intelligible.) It might be argued that an omniscient being is possible, and that this possibility entails (2). But must an omniscient being grasp every property, or could a being be omniscient and fail to grasp a property provided that this property couldn't be grasped by anyone? If the former, then how do we know that an omniscient being is possible, given (1) and (2) above? If the latter, then the possibility of an omniscient being does not entail (2). Either way, the premise that an omniscient being is possible does not provide a good reason to accept (2). In addition, even if some haecceity is necessarily ungraspable, we have seen that it nonetheless has a characteristic which appears to be a logically sufficient condition of Propertyhood, namely, being monadic and exemplifiable. As far as I can see, there is no reason to accept (2), and the objection under discussion is unsuccessful.

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VIII - HAECCEITY: A METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION OF DIVERSITY That form which specifies the matter is more powerful than other forms." (1750 trans. Leonardus's Mirror of Stones 59)

Since it appears that a priori objections to the existence of nonqualitative haecceities can be answered, we are entitled to infer the existence of nonqualitative haecceities as a plausible hypothesis which helps to explain the diversity of particulars at a time. At this point, let us return to the argument concerning the diversity of particulars with which we began. Argument B (B1) At a time t, a particular, x, and a particular, y, are diverse. (B2) There is something about x and y in virtue of which x is diverse from y at t. (B3) This something can only be that x has a property at t which y lacks at t. Therefore, (B4) A property exists. Our acceptance of (B1) is justified on empirical grounds. In addition, we are entitled to assume that (B2) is true, unless we are given good reason for supposing otherwise. It is arguable that this prima facie presumption in favor of (B2) is defeated if we have good evidence that all available accounts of the diversity of particulars at a time are inadequate. But I have tried to show that such evidence is lacking. If (P8) is warranted, then so is (B3), and the property referred to in (B3) and (B4) is a nonqualitative haecceity. Since (B) is valid, and since (P8) is inferable as the best explanation of the diversity of particulars at a time, (B) is a plausible argument for Realism about properties. It might be charged that a scotistic ontology which posits nonqualitative haecceities is over-inflated. An ontology of this kind is a full-blown realism of qualitative properties, relations, and propositions, as well as of nonqualitative properties and propositions. After all, if there are nonqualitative

131

haecceities, then there are also abstract entities of these other sorts.' However, to say that such a version of Realism is over-stuffed is to say that it multiplies entities beyond necessity, thereby violating Ockham's Razor. Hence, if my argument that nonqualitative haecceities are needed as part of the best explanation of the diversity of individuals at a time is successful, and if we are justified in believing that the existence of haecceities implies the existence of abstract entities of the other aforementioned kinds, then a full-blown realism is required if there is to be an explanation of particulars' being diverse from one another. In this case, an ockhamist cannot justifiably dismiss nonqualitative haecceities either on the ground that their postulation is unparsimonious, or on the ground that the overall-ontology to which they belong is over-inflated. Moreover, if the ockhamist claims that nonqualitative haecceities do not provide an acceptable solution to the problem of individuation, then he ought to either give a reason for thinking that some other proposal offers a superior solution or else explain why my proposed solution in terms of nonqualitative haecceities is defective. A possible worry about the adequacy of my proposed solution arises as follows. It appears that our notion of concreta's being diverse is conceptually prior to our notion of a concretum's having a haecceity. That is, it seems that we acquire the former notion before we acquire the latter one. This might be thought to constitute a reason for doubting that concreta's being diverse can be analyzed or explicated in terms of something's having a haecceity. But it is not such a reason. For as Aristotle recognized in the Physics, our preanalytic or prescientific ideas about things are epistemically prior to the first principles which are discovered through analytical inquiry and which explain the nature of things.' Similarly, our prescientific idea of light is conceptually prior'to the notion of a photon, but the fundamental laws which explain the nature of light tell us that light is a stream of photons. Thus, it is to be expected that if a concretum's having a haecceity can be used to explain why concreta are diverse, then our notion of concreta's being diverse is conceptually, prior to our notion of a concretum's having a haecceity. ,

53 See

Chapter 1, sections II and III.

54 Aristotle,

Physics, Book I, Ch. 1, 184a-184b.

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Surely, if concreta have haecceities, then abstracta have them as wel1. 55 Since it seems that concreta have haecceities, it appears that abstracta have them too. However, for any x, x is either concrete or abstract. I conclude that every entity has a haecceity. Does this imply that the diversity of abstracta at a time is analyzable?' I do not believe so. First of all, an analysis of the diversity of entities which instantiate some category, say, being abstract, at a time, t, analyzes the diversity of entities belonging to that category at t by relating them to entities which instantiate some category at t, either the category of being concrete or the category of being abstract. But, for any ontological category, C, an attempted analysis, A, of the diversity of two instances of C at t presupposes circular individuation if A implies that possibly (there are two entities x and y belonging to C at t, and the diversity of x and y at t can only be explained by relating x (or ),) to another (third) entity, z, belonging to C at t in such a way that x and z's (or y and z's) being so related entails that x#y (or y#z), z's being diverse from some fourth instance of C at t can only be explained by relating z (or that fourth instance) to a fifth instance of C at t in such a manner that z and that fifth instance's (or the fourth instance

55

This premise can be defended as follows. As we have seen, it seems that if concreta have haecceities, then there are abstracta, including properties and propositions, both qualitative and nonqualitative. Moreover, as I argued in Chapter 1, section III, Proposition is a category of logical entity, i.e., propositions have truth-values, logical entailments, modal properties, and so on. Therefore, it is plausible that if there is a proposition, then for certain kinds of propositions, there must be a logically comprehensive variety of propositions of those kinds. Specifically, it is intuitively plausible that if there are abstracta of the aforementioned sorts, and A is an abstract entity, then there is the proposition that (3x)(x=A). But this proposition says that some•:'-g is identical with A. It is plausible that if there is a proposition of this kind, then there is the property of being identical with A. Hence, it seems that if concreta have haecceities, then abstracta have haecceities. Notice that this conclusion is based upon a need for logical generality: it has not been argued that haecceities of abstracta are needed in order to explain the diversity of abstracta. In fact, i shall argue in the text below that haecceities of abstracta cannot help to explain the diversity of abstracta. 56

According to some philosophers, abstracta are outside of time. If these philosophers are correct, then abstracta are not diverse at a time. In that case, the only kind of diversity which abstracta can have is timeless diversity, and the question in the text should be replaced with 'Is there an analysis of the timeless diversity of abstracta?' However, the claim that abstracta are outside of time is problematic, since it seems that properties, relations, and propositions undergo relational change, e.g., Sobriety is exemplified by Socrates at one moment and not at another.

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and the fifth instance's) being so related entails that they are diverse, the fifth instance's being diverse from some sixth instance of C at t can only be explained by relating this fifth instance (or the sixth instance) to a seventh instance of C at t in such a fashion that the fifth instance and the seventh instance's (or the sixth instance and the seventh instance's) being so related 'entails their diversity, and so on ad infinitum). The inadmissibly circular character of an attempted analysis of this kind is analogous to that found in the earlier attempt to analyze or explain the diversity of concreta at a time by relating one concretum to another concretum. In other words, such an attempt to explain why an instance of an ontic category, C, is diverse from another instance of C by relating an instance of C to another instance of C is viciously circular. Thus, any proposed analysis which presupposes such circular individuation is fatally flawed, including one which attempts to analyze the diversity of abstracta at a time by relating abstracta to abstracta. 57 However, the attempts to analyze the diversity of abstracta at a time by relating abstracta to abstracta which need concern us presuppose circular individuation of this very sort. For example, it might be proposed that: (AB) At time t, an abstractum A is diverse from an abstractum B =df. There exists a property P such that: (i) at t A exemplifies P, and (ii) at t B does not exemplify P.

57

Note that conditions or criteria such as those we usually employ to differentiate one property from another cannot be used to construct an analysis or explanation of the diversity of properties at a time. For example, at t, property A 1#A2 if at t, Al and A2 are not necessarily coinstantiated; and at I, property A 1#A2 if at t, AI is possibly grasped without A2's being grasped. Such conditions, or criteria involving them, distinguish Al and A2 by irreflexively relating AI to ,42: they distinguish abstracta (properties) from one another by relating abstracta (properties) to other abstracta (properties) in such a way that these abstracta's (properties') being so related entails their diversity. Consequently, such conditions or criteria presuppose circular individuation. Thus, criteria or conditions of this sort cannot provide an analysis or explanation of the diversity of properties at a time. Nonetheless, conditions or criteria of this kind have an epistemic utility: they can provide intellectual justification for the claim that certain properties are diverse. Parallel remarks apply to abstracta such as propositions and relations, and the criteria we customarily employ to differentiate them. See footnote 3 in this chapter for a discussion of the distinction between formal criteria and epistemic principles of individuation.

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But in some possible circumstances, two abstracta, for instance, the properties Red and Round, can be distinguished from one another only in terms of (second-order) properties they exemplify which are other than Red and Round, for example, being a color and being identical with Red (Red's haecceity), these two (second-order) properties can be distinguished from one another only in terms of (third-order) properties they exemplify which are other than the second-order properties in question, the preceding two (thirdorder) properties can be distinguished from one another only in terms of (fourth-order) properties they exemplify which are other than the aforementioned third-order properties, and so on ad infinitum." Consequently, (AB) implies that the diversity (at a time) of a pair of n-order abstracta in such a possible hierarchical series can only be explained by using the relation of Exemplification to relate an n-order abstractum to an (n+1)-order property it exemplifies, for instance, its haecceity. Because (AB) implies that such explanations are possible, and because an abstractum's (A's) exemplifying a second (or higher)-order property, P, entails the diversity of A and P (with P itself being an abstractum), (AB) violates the prohibition on circular individuation formulated above.' It follows that the diversity of abstracta

58 Presumably, Red and Round are not self-exemplifying: they are first-order properties, properties which could only be exemplified by concreta. On the other hand, a second-order property is one which could only be exemplified by a first-order property, a third-order property is one which could only be exemplified by a second-order property, and so forth. 59 Observe that although my argument for this conclusion resembles the earlier argument, based on (CI), which rules out circular individuation in the case of concreta, these arguments are not completely parallel. Because the exemplification relation seems not to be irretlexive, in constructing the present argument it was necessary to diverge somewhat from the pattern of the earlier argument. As a result of the apparent nonirreflexivity of exemplification, there appears to be a possible case in which a property A exemplifies A, and some other property, B, does not exemplify A. For example, possibly, the property of being grasped by someone has the property of being grasped by someone, and some other property, say, being red, does not have the property of being grasped by someone. Hence, (AB)'s analysans seems not to entail that P is an abstract entity which is other than A. Notice that my argument for the conclusion that a proposal such as (AB) is inadmissibly circular does not imply that there is such an entailment, unlike an argument for this conclusion based on a principle which parallels (CI) and which results from replacing each occurrence of 'particular' in (CI) with an occurrence of `abstractum'.

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at a time cannot be analyzed by relating abstracta to abstracta. Second of all, since we have analyzed the diversity of concreta at a time by relating concreta to abstracta, we cannot also analyze the diversity of abstracta at a time by relating abstracta to concreta, on pain of vicious circularity. 60 Hence, the diversity of abstracta at a time cannot be analyzed by relating abstracta to concreta. And it was shown above that the diversity of abstracta at a time cannot be analyzed by relating abstracta to abstracta. However, it appears that every entity is either abstract or concrete. Therefore, it seems that the diversity of abstracta at a time is an unanalyzable brute fact. As we have seen, an attempt to both analyze the diversity of concreta at a time by relating concreta to abstracta, and analyze the diversity of abstracta at a time by relating abstracta to concreta, is viciously circular. But even aside from this point, there appears to be no way to analyze the diversity of qualitative abstracta at a time by relating qualitative abstracta to concreta. Qualitative abstracta are related to concreta by the converse of Exemplification, namely, being exemplified by. It seems that there is no relation between abstracta and concreta which is any more useful than this converse relation for analyzing the diversity of qualitative abstracta at a time. Yet, a qualitative property's (P Ps) being exemplified by a concretum, x, at a time t and a qualitative property's (P2's) not being exemplified by x at t, is not a logically necessary condition of the diversity of P1 and P2 at t, since a concretum can exemplify two qualitative properties at once. On the other hand, a nonqualitative haecceity is a kind of property such that a concretum could only exemplify one property of that kind at a time. Thus, a nonqualitative haecceity is a kind of abstract entity whose diversity at a time might be analyzable by using the converse of exemplification to relate abstracta to concreta. Specifically, the following analysis might be proposed.

60 The

general principle at work here can be stated as follows. Where being F and being

G are diverse ontological categories, attempting to both analyze the diversity of Fs at a time by

relating Fs to Gs, and analyze the diversity of Gs at a time by relating Gs to Fs, is viciously circular.

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(H) A nonqualitative haecceity, HI is diverse from a nonqualitative haecceity, H2, at a time t =df. there is a concretum x such that (i) HI is exemplified by x at t, and (ii) H2 is not exemplified by x at t. ,

Of course, it is viciously circular to try to analyze the diversity of nonqualitative haecceities at a time by relating them to concreta as in (H), while trying to analyze the diversity of concreta at a time by relating them to nonqualitative haecceities as in (P8). Thus, if (P8) is accepted as an analysis, then (H) should be rejected as an analysis; and if (H) is accepted as an analysis, then (P8) should be rejected as an analysis. Therefore, we have two options, we can either (1)

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accept (P8) as an analysis, and reject (H) as an analysis,

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qualitative abstracta and concreta as lacking a principle of individuation, and distinguishes them from certain nonqualitative abstracta which have a principle of individuation. In other words, (02)'s distinction not only fails to correspond to the core concrete/abstract division, but in lumping together qualitative abstracta and concreta it seems not to correspond to any intelligible classificatory system of ontological categories. For these reasons, (01)'s account of diversity at a time in (P8) provides a greater degree of systematization and explanatory coherence, and so is a better explanation, than (02)'s account of diversity at a time in (H). Consequently, (01) or. (P8) is intellectually preferable to (02) or (H). I conclude that the diversity of abstracta at a time is an unanalyzable brute fact, unlike the diversity of concreta at a time 6 1 There being such a brute fact is incompatible with the claim that for every ontological category, there must be a principle of individuation for entities of that category. My argument that concreta have a principle of individuation is not based on such an assumption, but rather on an inference to the best explanation: it is based on the idea that an analysis of the diversity of concreta at a time in terms of nonqualitative haecceities is the best of all available explanations of their diversity at a time. But on the assumption that the ontological categories of the abstract and the concrete are fundamental, it might seem to be somewhat of an anomaly that there is no explanation of the diversity of abstracta, when there is an explanation of the diversity of concreta. However, if abstracta are ontologically prior to concreta, then this is not an anomaly. After all, if entities of one kind are ontologically prior to entities of another kind, then it is natural to explain the diversity of entities of the second kind in terms ,

Of

(2)

accept (H) as an analysis, and reject (P8) as an analysis.

Is there any reason to prefer one of these options to the other? The following considerations count decisively in favor of option (01). If we take option (02), then although we might be able to explain the diversity of nonqualitative abstracta at a time, we cannot explain either the diversity of concreta at a time or the diversity of qualitative abstracta at a time. On the other hand, if we select option (01), then we can explain the diversity of concreta at a time, but not the diversity of abstracta at a time. The point which tips the balance decidedly in favor of option (01) concerns the way in which the explanations put forward by (01) and (02) correspond to an adequate classificatory scheme of ontological categories. According to (01), concreta have a principle of individuation, and abstracta lack one: a distinction neatly corresponding to the core ontological division between the categories of the concrete and the abstract. In this sense, the distinction in question is a natural and intuitive one. In contrast, (02)'s distinction between those entities which have and those entities which lack a principle of individuation is gerrymandered and unintuitive: it lumps together

61 The extreme realism of properties that I defend in this book entails that abstracta lack spatial location. Even if moderate realism can be used to defend the idea that abstract properties are spatially located where they are exemplified, there could be coexemplified properties which are spatially coincident. Consequently, spatio-temporal location cannot be a principle of individuation for abstracta. However, as the numerical diversity of abstracta is a brute fact, abstracta have no need of a principle of individuation. Thus, the fact that spatio-temporal location cannot serve as a principle of individuation for abstracta is of no comfort to a nominalist. Nor does the fact that the numerical diversity of abstracta is inexplicable give the nominalist grounds for complaint, since my argument implies that the numerical diversity of concreta is inexplicable unless there are abstracta, viz., nonqualitative haecceities.

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of entities of the first kind, and it is not anomalous if the diversity of entities of the second kind is explicable, and the diversity of entities of the first kind is an inexplicable brute fact. In what follows, I describe my reasons for thinking that abstracta are ontologically prior to concreta. To begin with, consider the traditional view that abstracta are necessary beings, whereas concreta are contingent beings. If this view is correct, then abstracta are ontologically prior to concreta: necessarily, if there are concreta, then there are abstracta, but possibly, there are abstracta and no concreta. Moreover, in the next chapter I argue that if there are nonqualitative properties, then properties, relations, and propositions, whether qualitative or nonqualitative, have necessary existence. If we suppose that abstracta of these kinds have necessary existence, then concreta are asymmetrically dependent upon abstracta, even if some abstracta have contingent existence or some concreta have necessary existence. In the relevant sense of asymmetrical dependence, an entity which instantiates an ontic category, Cl, is asymmetrically dependent upon an entity which instantiates an ontic category, C2, just in case there being an instance, i,, of Cl entails that i, bears a certain relation to an instance of C2, and there being an instance, i2 , of C2 does not entail that i2 bears the converse relation to an instance of Cl. Supposing that abstracta of the aforementioned kinds have necessary existence, concreta are asymmetrically dependent upon abstracta in the foregoing sense. For in that case, necessarily, if x instantiates the ontic category of being concrete, then x bears a relation to something which instantiates the ontic category of being abstract, but possibly, there is something which instantiates the latter ontic category and which does not bear the converse relation to something which instantiates the former ontic category. For example, if we assume that properties, relations, and propositions, whether qualitative or nonqualitative, have necessary existence, then necessarily, if there is a concretum, x, then x exemplifies properties, but possibly, there is a property which is not exemplified by a concretum; necessarily, if there is a concretum, x, then there are propositions which are true of x, but possibly, there is a proposition which isn't true of a concretum; necessarily, if there is a concretum, x, then x enters into relations, for example, Exemplification, but possibly, there is a relation, R, such that no concretum enters into R; and necessarily, if there is a concre-

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turn, x, then there is a set of which x is an element, but possibly, there are sets, for instance, the null set, which do not have a concretum as an element. If the existence of nonqualitative haecceities implies that abstracta are ontologically prior to concreta in the way indicated, then there is nothing anomalous about concreta's having a principle of individuation and abstracta 's lacking one.' An upcoming argument implies that the existence of nonqualitative haecceities has this very consequence. The time has come for a summary of the implications of my arguments for the existence and nature of properties. Firstly, there are nonqualitative haecceities. Secondly, a nonqualitative haecceity is a property, a kind of abstractum. Thirdly, a nonqualitative haecceity cannot be identified with an abstractum of another category such as a relation, a proposition, or a set. Hence, it would appear that there are properties, and that Propertyhood is a fundamental ontological category. In other words, it would seem that Robust Realism is true.

Since the diversity of abstracta is unanalyzable, it clearly follows that the diversity of 62 Since entities in general is unanalyzable. Of course, this conclusion is compatible with my claim that the diversity of concreta is analyzable.

NONEXISTENT POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS

CHAPTER 3 HAECCEITIES AND NONEXISTENT POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS "Conception is often employed about objects that neither do, nor did, nor will exist." (1785 T. Reid Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man iv. i. Wks. 368/1) "I and all the world are in a difficulty about the non-existent." [Jowett The Dialogues of Plato (ed. 2) I. 230 (1875)]

I - THE INDIVIDUATION OF NEPS "Essence, in its primary signification, means the principle of individuation, the inmost principle of the possibility of anything, as that particular thing." [from Coleridge Biographia Literaria 175 (1817)]

I have argued that there are nonqualitative haecceities,' and that if this is the case, then there is a full range of qualitative and nonqualitative properties and propositions.' I conclude that there exists a full range of qualitative and nonqualitative properties and propositions. It seems that if there are abstracta of these kinds, then metaphysical possibility can be understood in terms of them. Therefore, it appears that metaphysical possibility can be understood in terms of qualitative and nonqualitative properties and propositions. In particular, it is highly plausible that a possibility or possible world is identifiable with an abstractum, that is, a proposition or property,

or conjunction of them.' Using a term coined by Alvin Plantinga, the view which endorses such an identification will be called Modal Realism. 4 I shall argue that the postulation of unexemplified nonqunlitative haecceities is justified because Modal Realism requires the existence of such properties. To begin with, recall that there is a distinction between NEPs which are mereological or causal products and NEPs which are mereologically and causally disjoint.' For example, consider two particular steel blocks which are never joined in a certain fashion to create a third material object, but which could be joined in that fashion to create such a material object. A possible material object which would be created if the two blocks were joined in some manner is both a mereological and a causal product. A mereological or causal product is a NEP which is connected to concrete existence in the sense that it either would be created by the assembly or arrangement of certain objects, or would be produced by certain items under some nomologically possible circumstance. On the other hand, since a mereologically and causally disjoint NEP is neither a mereological nor a

3 For instance, see Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974). Notice that any property, proposition, or state of affairs which can be identified with a possible world or universe must be very large and "maximal" or suitably complete. For an account of possible worlds as possible complete states of affairs see Alvin Plantinga, "Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals" in M. Loux, ed., The Possible and The Actual (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 147. According to Plantinga: "A pair of states of affairs S and S' may be so related that it is not possible that both obtain, in which case S precludes S'; and if it is impossible that S obtain and S' not obtain, then S includes 5... Still further, a state of affairs S may be such that for any state of affairs S, S either includes or precludes S', in which case S is maximal. Now we may say that a possible world is just a maximal possible state of affairs." On Plantinga's conception of a possible world, the maximal possible state of affairs which obtains is the actual world, and a maximal possible state of affairs which does not obtain is a possible world which is merely possible. To allow for the fact that some states of affairs, for example, Socrates's drinking, occur at some time, but not others, Plantinga revises his account in the following way. A temporally invariant state of affairs is one that necessarily, either always occurs or never occurs. A possible world is a possible state of affairs which is temporally invariant and maximal with respect to temporally invariant states of affairs. See Alvin Plantinga, "Self-Profile" in James Tomberlin and Peter Van Inwagen, eds., Alvin Plantinga (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), pp. 90-91.

'See Chapter 2.

4

See Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity.

2

5

See Chapter 1, section IV.

See Chapter 1, section II.

140

141

142

causal product, such a NEP is not connected to concrete existence in this sense. It is intuitively plausible that some NEPs neither would be created by assembling or arranging actual bits of matter, nor would be produced by actual items under a nomologically possible circumstance, including either some nonexistent possible spirits or material things which do not have a part or constituent present in the actual world.' Thus, it seems that some NEPs are mereologically and causally disjoint, including some nonexistent possible fundamental particles, some nonexistent possible nonfundamental material objects, and/or nonexistent possible spirits. I will argue that for each NEP there is a property which individuates that NEP. But what exactly is meant by saying that a property individuates a NEP? A large number of philosophers would find the notion of a property's individuating a nonexistent possible concretum to be a rather perplexing one. It is therefore crucial that this notion be precisely characterized. I define the concept of a property's individuating a NEP as follows. (D1) A property, P, individuates a NEP =df. (i) in some possible world there is an individual i which exemplifies P, i exemplifies P in every possible world in which i exists, and i does not exist in the actual world, and (ii) For any possible worlds W1 and W2, if in W1 there is an object o i that exemplifies P, and in W2 there is an object 02 that exemplifies P, then o1o 2 . 7 Assume that a property P satisfies (Dl). In that case, if we consider the totality of possible objects, actual as well as merely possible, we can see that

6 Note

that since a spirit is unlocated or unextended, it is a simple, as is a Boscovichian

point-particle. Cf. Chapter 1, section IV. 7 Compare

NONEXISTENT POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS

CHAPTER 3

Gary Rosenkrantz, "Nonexistent Possibles And Their Individuation," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 22 (1984), pp. 127-147. In that article, I implied that (DI) would be necessary and sufficient for a property's individuating a' NEP even without the inclusion of the phrase `i exemplifies P in every possible world in which i exists' in clause (i) of (Dl). This still seems to me to be the case, but for the broader purposes of this book it will prove useful to have a formulation of (Dl) that includes this phrase in clause (i). There are a number of alternative equivalent formulations of (D1), and the question of which one of them is to be preferred (if any) is of no great importance.

143

one and only one of them could exemplify P, and this possible object is a NEP. Thus, P individuates a specific NEP. However, suppose a property P is such that if in some possible world W, P is exemplified by an object o h then in some possible world W2 P is exemplified by an object 02 diverse from 0 1 . In that instance, P does not meet (D1), for either P is not exemplified by a NEP (clause (i) of (Dl) is not satisfied by P), or P is exemplified both by a possible object 0, in WI and by another possible object o2 in W2 (clause (ii) of (D1) is not met by P). Because of this, P fails to single out a specific NEP from among the totality of possible objects, both actual and merely possible. Therefore, P does not individuate a NEP. According to (D1), P individuates a NEP if and only if P is an unexemplified individual essence which is possibly exemplified by a concretum. Since all unexemplified haecceities which are exemplifiable by concreta are individual essences of this sort, (DI) implies that such an unexemplified haecceity individuates a NEP. On the other hand, it seems that some individual essences are not haecceities Thus, if NEPs are individuated by unexemplified individual essences, it is not obvious that these unexemplified individual essences are haecceities. However, I shall argue that NEPs are individuated by unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities. The first order of business is to show that Modal Realism requires NEPs to be individuated by unexemplified individual essences. To begin with, it is a datum that possibly, there exist objects which never exist in fact. In other words, surely, in one possible world or another there exist objects which do not exist in the actual world. Notice that this datum doesn't pick out a specific possible object. Rather, it uses a kind of quantification to talk about NEPs in purely general terms. However, there being a general possibility of this kind entails that there are specific possibilities which are instances of that general possibility. That is, there being such a general possibility presupposes the possible existence of specific objects which do not exist in fact, or the existence in some possible world of specific objects which do not exist in the actual world. Bearing this in mind, let o be a nonexistent possible, an object which does not exist, but which exists in some nonactual possible world W. Thus, the

8 See

Chapter 1, section VI.

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singular proposition about o that it exists is true in W. Call this proposition T. Recall that Modal Realism maintains that a possible world is an abstract entity. Accordingly, since W is a nonactual possible world, Modal Realism entails that W is a false or an unexemplified abstract entity, that is, either a complete conjunctive proposition with some contingently false conjuncts, one of which is T, or a complete conjunctive property with some contingently unexemplified conjuncts. In that case, inasmuch as there exists a full range of qualitative and nonqualitative properties and propositions, there is such a proposition as T. However, since T is a singular proposition about o to the effect that it exists, either (i) in some sense o itself is involved in T, or else (ii) T involves a property, P, 9 which can go proxy for o in the sense that o exemplifies P in some possible world, o exemplifies P in every possible world in which o exists, and in no possible world is there an object diverse from o that exemplifies P. Such a property, P, is an unexemplified individual essence which could be exemplified by o. With respect to disjunct (ii) above, notice, firstly, that the proposition that there exists a thing which exemplifies P is necessarily equivalent to T, and secondly, that P satisfies (D1) and hence individuates o. Thus, a property P of this kind might be able to serve as a proxy for o in T. For the purposes of a reductio, let us suppose that there does not exist an individual essence which individuates o. That is, there is no property which satisfies (D1). In this case, for any property, P, either P is not exemplified by o in W, or P is exemplified by an object other than o in some possible world. Plainly, this implies that there does not exist anything which can go proxy for o in T. Moreover, since o is nonexistent, there is obviously no sense in which T involves o itself. But, as I have argued, T either involves o itself or involves something which can go proxy for o. Hence, there is no such proposition as T. However, as argued above, on the modal realist view that a possible world is an abstract entity, if T is true in some possible world, then there is such a proposition as T. Consequently, there is no possible world in which T is true. So, there is no nonactual possible world W in which o exists, a result which contradicts our assumption that o is a

9

For an elucidation of the notion of a proposition's involving a property see Chapter 2, section VI, footnote 40.

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NEP. Thus, o's being a NEP is incompatible with the conjunction of Modal Realism and the claim that there is no property which individuates o: Modal Realism implies that for each NEP, there is an individual essence which individuates that NEP.

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II - THE INDIVIDUATION OF DISJOINT OBJECTS "Of all the infinite Number of Possibles." (1754 Edwards Freedom of Will 11. iii. 46)

I shall now argue that there isn't anything which individuates disjoint NEPs, unless disjoint NEPs are individuated by unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities. To begin, take any possible physical object or person whose existence or nonexistence is a contingent matter. As we have seen, it is intuitively plausible that for each such individual, there could be another object composed of numerically different stuff which is an exact double of it. ° Two such possible objects are numerically distinct but are indiscernible in their intrinsic qualitative properties throughout their histories. That is, at each moment of their existence they would be of the same kind, have the same color, shape, weight, size, internal structure, mental states, and so on. Thus, the following assumption is justified. For any physical object or person, o p which has contingent existence in a possible world, W1 , there is a possible world, W2, in which there is an object, 0 2 , such that: 02 is other than op 0 2 is made up of numerically different stuff than o / , and 0 2 and o, are twins in the sense that for any time t, o, has the same intrinsic qualitative properties at t in W2 as 0 / has at t in W,. Since it is plausible that 0 / could have such a twin 0 2 , considerations of parity make it plausible that 02 could have a twin o3 which is other than op o 3 could have a twin 0, other than 0, and 0 2 , and so forth. For parallel reasons, it is equally plausible that if o / is a disjoint object, then ever so many of o,'s possible twins are also disjoint. Furthermore, in some possible world W3 02 exists, o, never exists, and 0 2 occupies each space-time position that o, occupies in W,. In addition, o l could fail to exist and have its place taken in this way by a twin 0 2 , while everything else in W3 is the same as it is in W, - with the only possible exception being the existence of either parts of 0 2 , things in 0 2 's causal ancestry, descendants of such ancestors, or parts of these ancestors or

10

See Chapter 2, section II.

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descendants.. Let us say that things which stand in relation to an object in the ways in which things of the latter four kinds stand in relation to 02 are mereologically or causally related to that object. It follows that in some possible world W3 things are exactly as they are in W1 with the exception that neither 0 / nor a thing mereologically or causally related to 0 / ever exists, and their places are taken by twins. For example, suppose that in 1{ 7, o l is a material object which is created by the assembly of its right and left halves at a certain point in time. Then there is a possible world W3 such that: for any time t, a twin of 0 / is spatially located at t in W3 where 0, is located at t in W1 , a twin of 0,'s right half is positioned at t in W3 where 0,'s right half is positioned at t in W„ similarly for o l 's left half, and so on - with o, and each thing mereologically or causally related to o, having a twin occupy each one of its spatio-temporal positions. For any physical object or person, 0,, which has contingent existence in a possible world W 1 , there is a possible world W3 of the kind described. And a world W3 of this sort can involve any of the many possible twins of both 0 1 and each of the things mereologically or causally related to op Hence, for each world W1 , there are many such worlds W3. For the sake of argument, let us assume that there does not exist an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity of a disjoint object. In that case, the foregoing line of reasoning implies that there are worlds W 1 and W3 , and diverse twin disjoint objects o, in W1 and o, in W3 such that o, in PV/ and 0 2 in W3 are alike in all respects, with the only possible exception being that 02 has different disjoint things mereologically or causally related to it in W3 than o l has mereologically or causally related to it in Wp " However, we

I I ignore so-called world-indexed properties, whose existence was defended by Alvin Plantinga in The Nature of Necessity. Among such properties are those of the form 'being the so & so in W, where W' designates a specific possible world. Plantinga's theory implies that if a property of this form is instantiable, e.g., the property of being the first president of the U. S. A. in the actual world, then it is an individual essence. Still, a world-indexed property stands in need of analysis in terms of a maximal conjunctive proposition which is identical with the indexed world and which involves non-world-indexed individual essences of all entities in the indexed world. In other words, any attempt to individuate a NEP with a world-indexed property presupposes that the NEP in question is individuated by a non-world-indexed individual essence. Because my argument in the text is designed to show that all relevant properties which are not world-indexed fail to individuate a disjoint object, there is no need to consider world-indexed

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have seen that there can be a nonqualitative relational property which pertains to a concretum only if there are nonqualitative haecceities of concreta.' It follows that there can be a nonqualitative mereological or causal relational property which pertains to a disjoint object only if there are nonqualitative unexemplified haecceities which individuate disjoint objects. Thus, our assumption that there are no such haecceities implies that there are no relational properties of these kinds. Consequently, on this assumption o, in W1 and its diverse twin r)2 in W3 are alike in every respect whatsoever, whether qualitative or nonqualitative. This means that for any property P, if P is exemplified by o, in WI , then P is also exemplified by a diverse object o) 2 in W3. Hence, P fails to satisfy (D1). Therefore, P doesn't individuate a disjoint object. It follows that there is not anything which individuates a disjoint object. We can now argue as follows. Modal Realism implies that for every NEP, there is a property which individuates that NEP. And the intuition that some NEPs are disjoint presents us with a datum about what is possible with which Modal Realism should be compatible. Moreover, as we have seen, there exists something which individuates a disjoint object if and only if there exists an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity which individuates that disjoint object. Hence, Modal Realism implies that there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities of disjoint objects. Since Modal Realism is quite plausible, the claim that there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities which individuate disjoint objects is plausible too. My argument for this conclusion entails that an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity which individuates a disjoint object is equivalent to a conjunction of other properties only if at least one of the properties in that conjunction is a nonqualitative mereological or causal relational property which pertains to a disjoint object. Since such a relational property is unexemplified, an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity which individuates a disjoint object is not equivalent to a conjunction of exemplified properties. Notice that although my earlier analysis of the diversity of particulars at a time implies there are exemplified nonqualitative haecceities, this analysis

does not entail there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities. The argument I gave for Robust Realism is based upon the need for this analysis. ° However, in the light of our latest results, we can see that there is a need for unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities which individuate disjoint objects. Since it seems that there are unexemplified properties, we can infer that Extreme Realism is true. Moreover, inasmuch as an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity which individuates a disjoint object is not equivalent to a conjunction of exemplified properties, we are entitled to conclude that Strong Extreme Realism is true. Because in the actual world there exists such an unexemplified haecceity, H, which individuates a mereologically and causally disjoint object, o, and because it seems that in every possible world it is true that possibly, o exists, considerations of parity dictate that H exists in every possible world, W, in which o cannot be either assembled out of or produced by what exists in W. And obviously, if H exists in every such world W, then H exists in every possible world, W, in which o can be either assembled out of or produced by what exists in W. Thus, it seems that H exists in every possible world or has necessary existence. Certainly, if there are haecceities of this kind, then there are also unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities which individuate mereological or causal products and which possess necessary existence. Inasmuch as there are haecceities of the former sort, there are haecceities of the latter sort. Since a NEP is either a mereological or causal product, or else is disjoint, and since an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity individuates a NEP, an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity either individuates a mereological or causal product, or individuates a disjoint object. It follows that all unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities have necessary existence. Moreover, surely, if unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities possess necessary existence, then exemplified nonqualitative haecceities possess necessary existence as well. Hence, haecceities of the latter kind have necessary existence. In sum, every nonqualitative haecceity has necessary existence, including those which are exemplified and those which are not.

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properties in the text. 12

13

See Chapter 1, section II.

See Chapter 2.

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III - OBJECTIONS TO UNEXEMPLIFIED HAECCEITIES: A REPLY "For you will not find thought without what is, in relation to which it is uttered; for there is not, nor shall be, anything else besides what is..." (from Parmenides The Way of Truth) "Every Concept must denote some existing object, - existing that is, either really or potentially." [Bowen A Treatise on Logic IV. 61 (1864)]

Among those philosophers who think that concreta exemplify nonqualitative haecceities, there are some who would deny that there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities which individuate disjoint objects." A principal objection to the existence of such unexemplified haecceities is based upon the following principle of haecceity dependence. (HD) The existence of a haecceity, being identical with a, either entails the existence of a or entails the existence of objects whose assembly would result in a's creation. Evidently, (HD) is incompatible with the existence of an unexemplified haecceity which individuates a mereologically and causally disjoint object. Given the not implausible assumption that material objects or persons, and their parts, have contingent existence, (HD) implies that a haecceity of a material object or person has contingent existence. This entails that such a haecceity does not exist in every possible world. In what follows, I argue that (HD) should be rejected, and defend my argument against a number of possible rejoinders. To start with, consider 14 0ne such philosopher is Robert Adams. See his "Actualism and Thisness," Synthese, 49 (1981), pp. 3-41. For a response to Adams see Alvin Plantinga, "On Existentialism," Philosophical Studies, 44 (1983), pp. 1-20. My argument in this section is a descendant of an argument in Chapter 9 of my doctoral dissertation Individual Essences (Brown University, 1976).

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argument (A) below. (1) Haecceities are properties. (2) Properties have necessary existence. Therefore, (3) Haecceities have necessary existence. Given the not implausible assumption that material objects, persons, and their parts have contingent existence, (HD) and (A) conflict. On this assumption, (HD) implies that the haecceity of a material object or person has contingent existence, whereas (A) implies, that haecceities have necessary existence. Clearly, (A) is logically valid, and (A)'s first premise is true given my definition of the concept of haecceity. However, is there a good reason to accept (A)'s second premise? According to a position I shall call Bifurcated Realism, defended by philosophers such as Robert Adams, nonqualitative properties or propositions, unlike qualitative ones, have contingent existence.' Hence, Bifurcated Realism entails that (A)'s second premise is false. Bifurcated Realism gives a nonuniform account of the nature of abstracta: nonqualitative abstracta have contingent existence, and qualitative abstracta have necessary existence. The conflicting claim that properties, relations, and propositions have necessary existence will be called Platonic Realism. Platonic Realism entails the truth of (A)' s second premise, although it is consistent with the falsity of (A)'s first premise. Finally, Platonic Haecceitism is the thesis that qualitative properties, relations, and propositions, as well as nonqualitative properties and propositions, have necessary existence. Platonic Haecceitism entails that both of (A)'s premises are true. What is the bifurcated realist's reason for thinking that qualitative properties and propositions have necessary existence? Presumably, he has something like the following reason. There are qualitative propositions which are necessary truths, for example, if something is square, then it is square, Squareness is a shape, if something is red, then it is colored, and so forth. These qualitative necessary propositions are true in all possible

15

See Robert Adams, "Actualism and Thisness".

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worlds. Hence, these propositions, as well as the qualitative properties they involve, exist in all possible worlds or have necessary existence. But the platonic haecceitist can invoke a parallel argument which implies that nonqualitative properties and propositions have necessary existence. For example, the nonqualitative proposition (1) if I exist, then I exist appears to be a necessary truth. Thus, it seems that (1), as well as the nonqualitative haecceity (1) involves, have necessary existence. It might be thought that (1)'s being a necessary truth implies that / have necessary existence. But (1)'s being a necessary truth appears not to have this (absurd) implication. In particular, because (1) is a material conditional, and because a material conditional with a false antecedent is true, it seems that (1) would be true if its antecedent were false, that is to say, if it were false that I exist. Hence, it appears that (1) does not imply that I exist. Thus, it seems that (1)'s being a necessary truth does not have the absurd consequence that I have necessary existence. Moreover, since (1)'s being a necessary truth implies that (1) has necessary existence, (1)'s having necessary existence also appears not to have this absurd implication. To the claim that (1) is a necessary truth, the bifurcated realist would reply that although (1) is not a necessary truth, (1) has a feature easily confused with necessary truth. In particular, he would correctly note that (1) is essentially true: that (1) has the characteristic of being necessarily such that it is true or being true in every possible world in which it exists. (1)'s essential truth is compatible with (1)'s failing to exist in those possible worlds in which I fail to exist. Therefore, (1)'s essential truth is consistent with (1)'s not being true in all possible worlds. However, when a bifurcated realist asserts that a qualitative proposition is a necessary truth, his assertion is subject to a moderate realist reply which parallels the bifurcated realist's answer to the platonic haecceitist. To see this, consider the following three claims about the property of being red which a moderate realist would probably accept. First, Redness exists. Second, Redness exists if and only if a concretum exemplifies Redness or a concretum is red (a moderate realist maintains that every property is exemplified). Third, possibly, there does not

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exist a red concretum. These three claims together imply. that Redness has contingent existence. Thus, a moderate realist may well hold that the qualitative proposition (2) if something is red, then it is red has contingent existence, on the ground that (2) exists only if a red concretum exists. After all, (2) does not exist unless Redness exists, and Redness has contingent existence. It follows that (2) is not a necessary truth which is true in all possible worlds. There are possible worlds in which a red concretum does not exist, and (2) isn't true in those worlds. In contrast, a bifurcated realist would claim that (2) is a necessary truth. To this claim, our moderate realist would reply that although (2) is not a necessary truth, (2) has a characteristic easily confused with necessary truth. Specifically, he would correctly note that (2) is essentially true: (2) is true in every possible world in which (2) exists. However, if (2) isn't a necessary truth, then no proposition is a necessary truth. Thus, Moderate Realism implies that there are no necessary truths, only essential ones. Bifurcated Realism can regard (2) as a necessary truth only if it discounts the moderate realist's claim that (2) is merely essentially true. But then it would seem that a bifurcated realist is not justified in rejecting (1)'s necessary truth in favor of (1)'s essential truth. Thus, the bifurcated realist's claim that every necessary proposition is qualitative is questionable. In other words, there might be a nonqualitative proposition which is necessary. And since a necessary proposition has necessary existence, there might be a nonqualitative proposition which has necessary existence. Hence, the bifurcated realist's claim that every nonqualitative proposition has contingent existence is problematic. Moreover, nonqualitative propositions involve nonqualitative properties, and if abstracta of the former sort have necessary existence, then abstracta of the latter sort have necessary existence. Consequently, the bifurcated realist's contention that nonqualitative properties have contingent existence is problematic as well. For these reasons, the bifurcated realist's rejection of Platonic Haecceitism should be regarded with suspicion. Yet, Moderate Realism implies that a haecceity cannot exist unless it is exemplified: a concretum's haecceity cannot exist unless that concretum

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exists. Thus, Moderate Realism entails (HD), just as Bifurcated Realism does. In attempting to show that (HD) ought to be rejected, I shall argue that Bifurcated Realism as well as Moderate Realism merit rejection (in that order). To begin this task, compare (HD) and the following principle of qualitative property dependence.

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Notice that if W is an empty world, then every red concretum which exists in a possible world other than W is mereologically and causally disjoint relative to W.' 8 This suggests that Redness wouldn't exist if there were never a concretum

is epistemically on a par with (QD) The existence of a qualitative property, being F, either entails that an F exists or entails that a concretum exists. I will try to establish that (HD) and (QD) are epistemically on a par. If I am. right, then (HD) and (QD) are equally plausible or implausible, and they stand or fall together. Let us make the not implausible assumption that a concretum has contingent existence. It is desirable that treatments of modal and metaphysical topics be compatible with this assumption. I6 Given our assumption, (QD) implies that the property of being red fails to exist in some possible world, for instance, a possible world in which there is not a red thing, or a possible world in which there is not a concretum. Of course, the property of being red exists in other possible worlds in which there are red concreta. Hence, if (QD) is true, then the property of being red has contingent existence. Observe that necessarily, (QD) is true just provided that a firstorder qualitative property, for example, being red, does not exist in an "empty world", namely, a possible world in which there does not exist a concretum." On the other hand, Platonic Realism or Bifurcated Realism implies that a qualitative property such as Redness has necessary existence, or exists in all possible worlds, even in an empty one. Therefore, both Platonic Realism and Bifurcated Realism reject (QD). (QD) expresses an aristotelian or moderate realist view of the existence conditions of qualitative properties.

16 may also be desirable that treatments of modal and metaphysical topics be compatible It with the claim that some concretum has necessary existence. 17

A first-order property is a property which could only be exemplified by a concrete entity.

the nonqualitative haecceity of a concretum, x, would not exist if x, and objects whose assembly would result in the creation of x, had never existed.

After all, in each case (i) there is nothing which could exemplify the property in question, and (ii) there are no things whose assembly would create an instance of the property in question. Still, there is a certain dissimilarity between Redness and a nonqualitative haecceity. So it might be thought that (i) and (ii) are more damaging to the idea that a concretum's haecceity exists independently of any concretum, than they are to the idea that Redness exists independently of any concretum. The dissimilarity I have in mind is that the nonqualitative haecceity of a concretum, x, pertains to x, whereas a qualitative property such as Redness does not pertain to a particular concretum. 19 Nevertheless, because Redness could only be exemplified by red concreta, Redness appertains generally to red concreta. Therefore, in the final analysis (i) and (ii) appear no more damaging to the idea that a concretum's haecceity exists independently of any concretum, than they are to the idea that Redness exists independently of any concretum. Thus,

18

The notion of a concretum's being disjoint relative to a possible world can be defined in two steps as follows. A concretum, x, is a mereological or causal product relative to a world

W =df. (i) x does not exist in W and (ii) in W, either x would be created by the assembly or arrangement of some bits of matter which exist in W, or x would be produced by some particular(s) which exist in W under a nomologically possible circumstance. A concretum, x, is disjoint relative to a world W =df. (i) x does not exist in W, and (ii) x is not a mereological or causal product relative to W, and (iii) x exists in some possible world. 19

See Chapter 1, section 11.

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Redness wouldn't exist if there were never a concretum seems to be epistemically on a par with

the nonqualitative haecceity of a concretum, x, would not exist if x, and objects whose assembly would result in the creation of x, had never existed Finally, an argument of this kind applies to any qualitative property. For these reasons, it seems that (HD) and (QD) are epistemically on a par. Since (HD) and (QD) appear to be equally plausible or implausible, the claim that there does not exist an unexemplified haecceity of a disjoint object, and the claim that Redness does not exist in an empty world, seem to stand or fall together. Because Bifurcated Realism rejects (QD) and accepts (HD), and because (QD) and (HD) appear to be epistemically on a par, Bifurcated Realism seems to be untenable. Moreover, given the bifurcated realist or platonic realist position that qualitative properties have necessary existence, (QD) should be rejected. Inasmuch as (HD) and (QD) appear to be epistemically on a par, it seems that (HD) ought to be rejected as well. Hence, (HD) cannot be used to provide a plausible defense of Bifurcated Realism. As we have seen, (HD) is plausible only if the aristotelian view expressed in (QD) is plausible. Consequently, if (QD) is implausible, then (HD) cannot be used to justify either the claim that there are no unexemplified haecceities which individuate disjoint objects, or the claim that a haecceity of a material object or person has contingent existence. A bifurcated realist would probably respond by trying to refute the crucial claim that (HD) and (QD) are epistemically on a par. In making such a

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response, he argues that (HD) is plausible and (QD) is not. A bifurcated realist might argue, firstly, that nonqualitative haecceities have a peculiar feature, F*, which qualitative properties lack, and secondly, that since properties of these two sorts differ in this way, (HD) is plausible and (QD) is not. F* is either the property of having a concretum as a part, element, or constituent, or the property of having a name of a concretum as a part, or the property of essentially making singular reference to a concretum. Let F* be identified with any one of these properties. If a nonqualitative haecceity has F*, then a haecceity which individuates a disjoint object either has a disjoint concretum as a part, element, or constituent, or has a name of a disjoint concretum as a part, or essentially makes singular reference to a disjoint concretum. A bifurcated realist can argue plausibly that a NEP which is mereologically and causally disjoint is not a part, an element, or a constituent of anything, is, not named by anything, and is not an object of singular reference. Thus, if it is plausible that a nonqualitative haecceity has F*, then (HD) appears to be true. In that case, it seems that there does not exist an unexemplified haecceity which individuates a disjoint object. On the other hand, a bifurcated realist can plausibly maintain that a qualitative property does not have F*. Consequently, there is no good argument concerning qualitative properties which parallels the foregoing argument about nonqualitative haecceities and which implies (QD). Thus, (HD) and (QD) are not epistemically on par: (HD) appears to be true and (QD) does not. This counter-attack makes the crucial assumption that a nonqualitative haecceity has F*. In what follows, I argue that since this assumption is mistaken, the counter-attack is unsuccessful. Firstly, I have already argued that a nonqualitative haecceity does not have a concretum as a part, element, or constituent, otherwise such haecceities would not provide a nontrivial criterion of individuation for concreta. 2° Secondly, a name is a linguistic item and a property is not.. Perhaps some linguistic items have a name as a part, for example, the predicate 'is identical with Smith', which has the name 'Smith' as a part; but it is absurd to suppose that a property, for instance, a nonqualitative haecceity, has a name

20

See Chapter 2, sections VI and VII, where I defend the thesis that haecceities provide an

adequate criterion of individuation for concreta.

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as a part. Therefore, a concretum's nonqualitative haecceity does not have a name of that concretum. as a part. Finally, the idea that a nonqualitative haecceity makes singular reference to a concretum is problematic. It seems that the only things which can refer (in a primary sense of the term) are either conscious beings or linguistic expressions. A linguistic item such as a name may be said to make singular reference to a concretum, but in normal circumstances it is incongruous to suppose that a property or a nonqualitative haecceity refers to something. Therefore, we should not assume that a nonqualitative haecceity essentially makes singular reference to an object. 21 The foregoing line of reasoning shows that a nonqualitative haecceity lacks F* on any of the three interpretations of F*. Since the preceding counter-attack on my position assumes that a nonqualitative haecceity has F* on one of these interpretations, this counter-attack does not succeed. Nonetheless, it can be argued plausibly that nonqualitative haecceities essentially have a function resembling reference. Let us call this function "quasi-reference". It seems that the nonqualitative haecceity, H, of a concretum, x, quasi-refers to x in virtue of H's being necessarily such that H is exemplified if and only if x exists. Similarly, since H is exemplified by x in every possible world in which x exists, and since in no possible world is H exemplified by an entity other than x, in a strict sense H individuates x. It follows that in a manner of speaking H quasi-refers to x. Such quasi-reference resembles singular reference, that is, the sort of reference that holds between a name or a definite description and its unique referent. Let quasi-reference of this kind be called quasi-singular reference. These reflections on quasi-singular reference suggest a new defense of the bifurcated realist's claim that (HD) is plausible and (QD) is not. According to this latest defense, a nonqualitative haecceity necessarily makes quasi-singular reference to a concretum, whereas a qualitative property does not essentially make quasi-singular reference to a concretum. The 21 Perhaps

a person could stipulate that a certain nonqualitative haecceity is to serve as a proper name of some concretum. However, in such an unusual case this haecceity would accidentally be a name of that concretum. Thus, the haecceity in question would not essentially be a name of some concretum. The most that such an unusual case shows is that it is possible for a property to be used as a symbol or a linguistic expression.

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bifurcated realist needs to establish that if a nonqualitative haecceity and a qualitative property differ in this way, then (HD) is plausible and (QD) is not. He attempts to establish this by means of the following argument. First of all, a nonqualitative haecceity necessarily makes quasi-singular reference to a concretum. For this reason, an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity which individuates a disjoint object makes quasi-singular reference to a nonexistent possible concretum which is mereologically and causally disjoint. Yet, there couldn't be anything that makes quasi-singular reference to a nonexistent possible concretum which is mereologically and causally disjoint. It follows that (HD) is true and a nonqualitative haecceity couldn't make quasi-singular reference to such a merely possible concretum. Hence, there does not exist an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity which individuates a disjoint object. On the other hand, a qualitative property does not necessarily make quasi-singular reference to a concretum. Consequently, there is no good argument concerning qualitative properties which parallels the foregoing argument about nonqualitative haecceities and which implies (QD). Hence, (HD) and (QD) are not epistemically on a par: (HD) is plausible and (QD) is not. I argue below that this defense of Bifurcated Realism is no more successful than the earlier ones. In the first place, singular reference is not the only kind of reference: there is also denotational reference, the sort of reference that holds between a general term and its extension, that is, each of the items which satisfies the general term. For example, the general term `dog' denotes each dog, that is to say, Rover, Fido, Spot, and so on. It can be argued cogently that a first-order qualitative property necessarily quasirefers to a concretum in a manner which resembles a general term's reference to each of the items in its extension. Let quasi-reference of this kind be called quasi-denotational reference. The argument that a qualitative property makes quasi-denotational reference to a concretum goes as follows. A first-order qualitative property, being F, is necessarily such that it is exemplified if and only if it is exemplified by an F. Since being F is exemplified by an F in every possible world in which an F exists, and in no possible world is being F exemplified by a non-F, it appears that being F necessarily has a function which resembles the denotational reference of a

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general term 'F' to Fs. Notice that this argument for saying that (QQ-DR) a qualitative property essentially makes quasi-denotational reference to concreta,

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(HQ-SR*) In the actual world, there is an unexemplified haecceity which individuates a disjoint object, o, and this haecceity makes quasi-singular reference to a possible concretum which does not exist in the actual world and which is disjoint relative to the actual world, namely, o.

is parallel to the bifurcated realist's argument for saying that (HQ-SR) a nonqualitative haecceity essentially makes quasi-singular reference to a concretum. Quasi-denotational and quasi-singular reference are quite analogous: the former occurs in virtue of there being a property which could only be exemplified by things of a certain kind, and the latter occurs in virtue of there being a property which could only be exemplified by a certain thing. I conclude that (QQ-DR) and (HQ-SR) are epistemically on a par. Therefore, since the bifurcated realist accepts (HQ-SR), he should accept (QQ-DR). However, I argue below that the bifurcated realist's acceptance of (QQ-DR) commits him to the possibility of certain cases of quasidenotational reference, cases whose possibility is no more plausible than the cases of quasi-singular reference to disjoint objects which the bifurcated realist finds impossible. To start with, notice that a bifurcated realist supposes that a first-order qualitative property exists in an empty world. If this supposition and (QQDR) are true, then (QQ-DR*) In an empty world, W, there is a first-order qualitative property, being F, and this unexemplified property makes quasi-denotational reference to possible concreta which do not exist in W and which are disjoint relative to W, namely, each F in a possible world other than W. Because a bifurcated realist should accept (QQ-DR), it follows that a bifurcated realist ought to accept (QQ-DR*). On the other hand, recall that a bifurcated realist would deny the possibility of

If there exists an unexemplified haecceity which individuates a disjoint object, and (HQ-SR) is the case, then (HQ-SR*) is true. Notice that (HQSR*) and (QQ-DR*) are analogous: each implies there is an unexemplified property, P, in a possible world, W*, such that P quasi-refers to a concretum which is mereologically and causally disjoint relative to W*. Given the analogy between (QQ-DR*) and (HQ-SR*), the bifurcated realist's denial of the possibility of (HQ-SR*) does not square with his commitment to (QQDR*). The incongruity of the bifurcated realist's position is brought into sharper focus by the following example which illustrates (QQ-DR*). In (QQ-DR*), let being F=being concrete. In actuality, there are concreta. Of course, this implies that concreta are possible. But even if there were never any concreta, concreta would be possible. Notice, that being, a concretum is a qualitative property, and according to Bifurcated Realism such a property has necessary existence. Assuming this, (QQ-DR*) implies that if, counter to fact, there were never a concretum, then there would be an unexemplified qualitative property, being a concretum, which would make quasidenotational reference to every possible concretum, each of which is mereologically and causally disjoint relative to the counter-factual situation in question. Moreover, since we may assume that in some possible situation there is never a concretum, it follows that in such a situation an unexemplified qualitative property, being a concretum, makes quasi-denotational reference to each of the possible concreta which exist in every other possible situation. But if such quasi-denotational reference is possible, then isn't quasi-singular reference to a disjoint object possible too? Thus, it seems that there could be an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity which makes quasisingular reference to an object which is mereologically and causally disjoint. Furthermore, it appears that if there exists an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity, H, which individuates a disjoint object, o, then H makes quasi-

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singular reference to o. Because the bifurcated realist's argument for the claim that (HD) is plausible and (QD) is not, implies that such quasi-singular reference is impossible, his argument seems to be unsound. In the light of the foregoing argument, we can see that the bifurcated realist's hybrid of Extreme or Platonic Realism and Moderate or Aristotelian Realism is an unstable union. Accordingly, Bifurcated Realism ought to be rejected. With the demise of Bifurcated Realism, there are only two other views which need to be considered. (1) Moderate Realism, a view which implies that qualitative properties have contingent existence, and (2) Platonic Realism, a view which implies that qualitative properties have necessary existence. However, there is good reason to accept the platonic idea that qualitative properties have necessary existence. In the first place, we may assume that possibly, no concretum ever exists. Thus, we may suppose that in some possible world there does not exist a concretum. Ex hypothesi, in a world of this kind it is true that there does not exist a concretum. Surely, given Modal Realism, 22 and given that qualitative propositions or properties exist, it follows that in a world devoid of concreta there exists either the qualitative property of Concreteness or the qualitative proposition a concretum does not exist. Moreover, it is plausible that necessarily, there are qualitative propositions only if there are qualitative properties. Hence, in a world devoid of concreta the qualitative property of Concreteness exists, a property involved in the qualitative proposition that a concretum does not exist. Therefore, Concreteness exists in a world in which no concretum exists, and the moderate realist's (QD) is false. Certainly, if Concreteness exists in a world of this sort, then it also exists in a world in which there is a concretum. It follows that Concreteness exists whether or not a concretum ever exists. This means that Concreteness exists in every possible world or has necessary existence. Parallel arguments show that every qualitative property has necessary existence. Hence, Moderate Realism should be rejected in favor of Platonic Realism. Consequently, (QQ-DR*) should be accepted. Furthermore, in the preceding section I argued that there are unexemplified haecceities which individuate disjoint objects, while in this

22

Modal Realism was defended in section I of this chapter.

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section I argued that such a haecceity makes quasi-singular reference to a disjoint object provided that (QQ-DR*) is true. I conclude that (HD) which cannot be upheld by an appeal to either Bifurcated Realism or Moderate Realism - ought to be rejected, and that (HQ-SR*) should be accepted. Since (QQ-DR*) and (HQ-SR*) jointly entail Platonic Haecceitism ), Platonic Haecceitism ought to be accepted. That is, we should accept the idea that qualitative properties, relations, and propositions, as well as nonqualitative properties and propositions, have necessary existence. Let us consider a final reply available to the moderate realist. The moderate realist might appeal to a parmenidean argument to justify his rejection of (QQ-DR*) and (HQ-SR*). ,

(1) If a property, P, makes quasi-singular (quasi-denotational) reference to a NEP, then quasi-singular (quasi-denotational) reference is a relation which could hold between two terms, one of which exists and

the other of which fails to exist. (2) It is impossible for a relation to hold between two terms, one of which exists and the other of which fails to exist. Therefore, (3) It is impossible for a property, P, to make quasi-singular (quasidenotational) reference to a NEP. But there is no reason to think that the first premise of this argument is true. If an unexemplified haecceity, H, makes quasi-singular reference to a NEP, a, then it can be denied that H's quasi-singular reference to a is a relation H bears to a. Instead, it can be said that H's quasi-singular reference to a is a property of H. In particular, if H is the property of being identical with a, then Hs quasi-singular reference to a consists in H's having the nonqualitative property of being only possibly exemplified by a. Similarly, if a property, F-ness, makes quasi-denotational reference to nonexistent possible Fs, then it can be said that this property's quasidenotational reference to Fs is not a relation holding between F-ness and those Fs. Instead, we can say that this property's quasi-denotational reference to Fs is a property of F-ness. Specifically, F-ness's quasidenotational reference to Fs consists in F-ness's having the property of being

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only possibly exemplified by an F. Moreover, there is no more reason to think that the properties of being only exemplifiable by a and being only exemplifiable by an F contain or involve a relation,' or have a relation as a part or constituent, than there is to think that the property, being identical with a, contains or involves a relation, or has a relation as a part or

constituent. But as we've seen, being identical with a neither contains or involves a relation, nor has a relation as a part or constituent. 24 Hence, the properties of being only exemplifiable by a and being only exemplifiable by an F neither contain nor involve a relation, nor have a relation as a part or constituent. Thus, the first premise of the parmenidean argument should not be accepted, and the attempt to use this argument to justify Moderate Realism does not succeed. There is one other somewhat different objection to the existence of unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities. It goes as follows.' The claim that (1) there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities, implies that (2) there are nonexistent possible concreta. Inasmuch as (2) is self-contradictory, (1) is false. However, (2) is ambiguous between two readings. On one of these

23

The concept of a property's involving a relation is explained in Chapter 2, section VI, footnote 40. 24

See Chapter 2, sections VI and VII.

This objection is suggested by the following remark from John Pollock's paper "Thinking about an Object" in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, Studies in Epistemology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), p. 498. "Propositions have been supposed to be abstract entities having necessary existence, but if a de re proposition can only be entertained by a single individual, it is at least plausible to suppose that its existence is contingent upon the existence of that individual. To suppose otherwise smacks of talk of 'merely possible objects,' which I at least find repugnant."

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readings, (2) says that there exists a nonexistent possible concretum something which is an absurdity. But on that reading (1) does not imply (2): because an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity is neither nonexistent nor concrete, there being such a haecceity does not imply that there exists a nonexistent possible concretum. On the other reading, (2) is just a somewhat misleading way of saying that there are cases in which the existence of a concretum is possible even though the concretum in question never exists, or of saying that in some possible world there exists a concretum which does not exist in the actual world. On that reading, (1) seems to imply (2), but (2) appears to be true. Since (2) cannot be derived on the first reading, and since (2) is not self-contradictory on the second reading, the foregoing objection fails to show that there are no unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities. In sum, none of the foregoing objections undercut Platonic Haecceitism. As far as I can see at present, there is no reason to abandon the idea that there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities which individuate disjoint objects and which have necessary existence.

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IV - THE UNITY OF METAPHYSICAL MODALITIES "Man loves the Universal, the Unchangeable, the Unitary." [a 1842 Channing The Perfect Life 64 (1888)]



167

attributions of de re necessity. (D4) x has necessary existence a (i) there is a haecceity, H, and (ii) x exemplifies H, and (iii) H is necessarily such that it is exemplified.

Because properties, relations, and propositions have necessary existence, and because everything has a haecceity, 26 there is a kind of unity or interdependence among metaphysical modalities. This unity or interdependence is demonstrated in the following series of definitions. These definitions show that attributions of de re necessity and de dicto necessity are intertranslatable, and that attributions of necessary existence are translatable into attributions of either de re necessity or de dicto necessity.

(D4) demonstrates that attributions of necessary existence are translatable into attributions of de re necessity (in conjunction with the use of other nonmodal concepts).

(D1) H is an exemplified-haecceity =df. (3x)(H is the property of being identical with x).

(D5) shows how attributions of necessary existence can be translated into attributions of de dicto necessity (together with the use of other nonmodal concepts). Moreover, attributions of de dicto necessity and other cognate de dicto metaphysical modal notions are intertranslatable. 39 In addition, attributions of de re necessity and other cognate de re metaphysical modal notions are intertranslatable. 3° Furthermore, attributions of necessary existence and contingent existence are intertranslatable. 31 Three consequences follow. (i) For every de dicto modal concept, there is an equivalent de re modal concept. (ii) For every de re modal concept, there is an equivalent de dicto modal concept. (iii) The notions of necessary existence and contingent existence can be understood in terms of either de dicto or de re modal concepts.

(D2)x is necessarily F <=> (i) there is an exemplified-haecceity, being identical with N, and (ii) x exemplifies this haecceity, and (iii) the proposition that whatever is N is F is necessary.' (D2) demonstrates that attributions of de re necessity can be translated into attributions of de dicto necessity (together with the use of other nonmodal concepts). (D3) The proposition, p, is necessary a p is necessarily such that it is true. (D3) shows how attributions of de dicto necessity can be translated into

26

See Chapter 2, section VIII, and Chapter 1, section III.

definition is schematic, and the letters 'F' and 'N' should be replaced with an appropriate predicate and name, respectively. Note that substitution of a name 'N' for the schematic letter 'N' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition only if 'N' is a name of x, and the name 'being identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates x's haecceity. 27 This

(D5) x has necessary existence a (i) there is an exemplified-haecceity, being identical with N, and (ii) x exemplifies this haecceity, and (iii) the proposition that N exists is necessary. 28

28

This definition is schematic, and the letter 'N' ought to be replaced with an appropriate name. Observe that replacing the schematic letter 'N' with a name 'N' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition only if 'N' is a name of x, and the name 'being identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates x's haecceity. 29

See Chapter 1, section IV.

30

See Chapter 1, section IV.

31

See Chapter 1, section IV.

SINGULAR REFERENCE AND UNEXEMPLIFIED HAECCEITIES

CHAPTER 4 SINGULAR REFERENCE AND UNEXEMPLIFIED HAECCEITIES "The conversion...of these innate potentialities into actual existences." [from Huxley Hume iii. 85 (1879)] "What is and will be latent is little better than nonexistent." [Sir T. Browne Christian Morals 75 (1716)]

I - MEREOLOGICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF UNEXEMPLIFIED HAECCEITIES "Particularize a few drops of the sea, by filling a glasse full of them; then that glasse-full is distinguished from all the rest of the watery Bulke." [1643 Digby Observations upon Religio Medici 84 (1644)]

169

to my argument were also answered in that chapter,' there seems to be no barrier remaining to the acceptance of Strong Extreme Realism. Accordingly, in the arguments to follow I assume that Strong Extreme Realism is true, and hence that no form of Moderate Realism is correct. Supposing, then, that there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities which individuate nonexistent possible concreta, it would be most surprising to discover that we can grasp any of these haecceities. 3 After all, it is questionable whether any of us can even grasp an exemplified haecceity of an external concretum. However, even if I lack the ability to grasp the haecceity of the pen in my hand, I can nonetheless pick out this haecceity by description, for example, as the haecceity of the pen in my hand.' Of course, in this case, unlike the first, the haecceity in question is exemplified, and it would be rather surprising to learn that we can pick out certain unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities by description. Nevertheless, I shall argue that there are cases in which we can use a definite description to pick out or denote an unexemplified nonqualitative haecceity of a mereological or causal product.' Let us begin with a discussion of the notion of a piece (or mass) of matter. Roughly speaking, by a piece of matter I mean a number of bits of matter attached or bonded together to form a complex material object. 6 A ,

"Let but a sharp cold come, and they unite, they consolidate, these little atoms cohere." (1690 Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II.

2

See Chapter 3, section III.

3 Our

inability to grasp such an unexemplified haecceity will be demonstrated in Chapter

5.

xxiii. § 26)

4

In the preceding chapter, I argued that there are unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities which individuate nonexistent possible concreta, including both nonexistent possible concreta which are mereologically and causally disjoint, and nonexistent possible concreta which are mereological or causal products.' As noted earlier, this line of reasoning implies that Strong Extreme Realism is true. Since bifurcated and moderate realist objections

'See Chapter 3, section II.

168

That I have this ability even if I am unable to grasp the pen's haecceity was shown in Chapter 1, section V. That I am unable to grasp the haecceity of an external concrete thing will be established in Chapter 5. The distinction between grasping a property and identifying a property by description is discussed in Chapter 1, section V. 6

It seems that if two objects x and y bond with one another to form a complex material object at a time t, then at t there must be a definite distance d such that if x were farther than d from y at t, then x and y would not bond with one another. However, physicists tell us that x and y never actually touch because of repulsive forces between fundamental particles. However, notice that the assumption that d>0 does not entail there is no distance d of the sort that appears to be required. For example, there might well be a precise positive distance (or a definite spatial region) at which (or within which) the forces which bind x and y together and

170

piece of matter of this sort is a kind of community of material parts. There is a sense in which such an assemblage can be identified or differentiated in terms of its parts. That an assemblage of this sort can be identified or differentiated in this way seems implicit in the very meaning of a sortal or count term like 'piece of matter' or 'mass of matter'. More specifically, given the sense of such a sortal or count term the following argument appears plausible. Suppose that in some possible world W there is a piece of matter m. If in W or some other possible world there is a piece of matter, m', which does not have one of the fundamental particles composing m in W as an attached part, then m ' is diverse from m. And if in W or some other possible world there is a piece of matter, x, which is composed of the same parts as m is in W, then x is identical with m. The foregoing argument is highly plausible based in purely a priori or intuitive grounds, and I know of no good counter-argument.' The thesis of mereological essentialism endorsed above can be interpreted in at least two ways, one strict, and one loose. The strict interpretation or strict essentialism can be formulated as follows: (i) if in some possible world there is a piece of matter, m, then m is composed of the same parts joined together in every possible world in which m exists; and (ii) for any possible worlds W & W2, if in W1 there is a piece of matter o composed of certain parts, and in W2 there is a piece of matter 0 2 composed of the same parts, then 0 1 =02 . On this interpretation the term 'part' is understood in a strict sense, as illustrated in the following example. There are two pieces of matter x and y, and x is composed of a right half r and a left half 1. If x and y are joined with their surfaces and edges aligned in a certain way, then a piece of matter is assembled which has an object made up of r and y as a part. However, if x and y are joined with their boundaries aligned in a

the repulsive forces which keep x and y apart come into a sort of balance or dynamic equilibrium, and it would be plausible to identify d with this distance (or with the maximum width of the region in question). I shall understand the attachment or bonding of two pieces of matter x and y, or the joining of a surface or edge of x to a surface or edge of y, in such a way that it is compatible with, but does not require, x's literally touching y. 7

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Further support for the conclusion of this argument can be found in Roderick Chisholm's Person and Object (La Salle: Open Court, 1976), pp. 145-158.

171

different way, then a piece of matter is assembled which does not have an object made up of r and y as a part, but has an object made up of 1 and y as a part. Hence, clause (i) of strict essentialism implies that the piece of matter assembled in the first instance is not identical with the piece of matter assembled in the second instance. I call a piece of matter to which strict essentialism is applicable a strict mereological assembly (an SMA). Given the foregoing explanation of the term 'part', we can see that clauses (i) and (ii) of strict essentialism together entail that if there is an SMA in some possible world, the (arrangement of) parts of this SMA is both essential to it and necessarily repugnant to any other possible SMA. A less strict interpretation or loose essentialism was apparently held by John Locke.' According to this interpretation, (i) if in some possible world there is a piece of matter, m, then m is composed of the same fundamental particles attached to one another or bonded together in every possible world in which m exists; and (ii) for any possible worlds WI & W2, if in W1 there is a piece of matter o i composed of certain fundamental particles, and in W2 there is a piece of matter 02 composed of the same fundamental particles, then 0 1 =02 , regardless of the arrangement of the fundamental particles composing o i or 02 . A piece of matter of this sort retains its identity even though its fundamental particles have been rearranged. Thus, I call a piece of matter to which loose essentialism is applicable a plastic mereological assembly (PMA).

The formulation of loose essentialism stated above presupposes that a body is ultimately composed of indivisible particles. It should be noted that loose essentialism can be formulated independently of this presupposition. Let the mereological sum of all of a piece of matter's parts be called the piece of matter's sum. Loose essentialism can then be stated like this: (i) if in some possible world there is a piece of matter, m, then m consists of the same sum of parts joined together in every possible world in which m exists; and (ii) for any possible worlds W, & W2, if in W there is a piece of matter o i having a certain sum, and in W2 there is a piece of matter 02 having the same sum, then 0 1 =0 2 .

8

See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter XXVII, Section 4.

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There seems to be a sense in which strict and loose essentialism are each true of some type of physical entity or other. As a first step towards seeing this, consider the following thesis. When a complex material object is in a place, p, at a time, t, there are at least two spatially coincident entities in p at t: an SMA and a PMA. Since SMAs and PMAs have different identity criteria (strict and loose essentialism, respectively), an SMA and a PMA are diverse objects of different kinds. And there is no reason why two such objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time. Moreover, the thesis that some SMAs and PMAs are diverse objects which are spatially coincident at a given time appears to be just as plausible as another view which it is reasonable to accept, namely, the view that when a bronze statue occupies a place, p, at a time, t, there are at least two items which spatially coincide in p at t: the statue, and a piece of matter. These items are diverse either because (i) when some such piece of matter is melted into a blob, a piece of matter which was spatially coincident with the statue survives the melting, but the statue thereby ceases to be, or because (ii) when a tiny bit of bronze is chipped off the edge of the statue, the statue continues to exist after this alteration, but a piece of matter which was spatially coincident with that statue thereby perishes. Cases such as (i) and (ii) above lead me to conclude that a statue, a table, a ship, a tree, et cetera, and a spatially coincident piece of matter are diverse entities of different kinds. Because this conclusion is justified, and because the thesis that SMAs and PMAs are diverse objects sometimes located in the same place at the same time is equally plausible, our acceptance of this latter thesis is warranted. Furthermore, cases like (i) and (ii) above illustrate the fact that neither strict nor loose essentialism is true of an object such as a statue, a ship, and so on. Hence, the identity criteria that apply to SMAs and PMAs do not apply to statues and the like. Analogous reasoning explains how it is that a piece of matter and the sum of that piece of matter's material parts can be in the same place at once. For pieces of matter and sums have different identity criteria. Thus, a piece of matter made up of two bodies x and y is not identical with the sum of x and y. The latter exists if x and y exist and they are unjoined. But the former does not exist under these conditions - it exists only if x and y are joined. In other words, pieces of matter cannot

survive disassembly, whereas a sum of objects exists both when those objects are joined and when they are not. It should now be clear that there is a significant sense in which each of the identity criteria I have mentioned is applicable to some physical item, either an SMA, a PMA, an ens successivurn like a ship, or a sum. What we have in all such cases are physical items distinguished from one another by their characteristic identity criteria. Of course, one could raise issues about the ultimate ontological status of such physical items. One could ask, for example, if in the final analysis they (or some of them) are genuine substances, dependent entities, or logical constructions. But issues of this kind are not easy to resolve, and detailed discussion of them falls outside the scope of this book. For the purpose of my argument, I shall assume (plausibly, I believe) that either SMAs or PMAs exist. Below, I argue that a person can pick out or refer to an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA or PMA by using a definite description that denotes this unexemplified haecceity. To begin, it seems that there are physical items which could be assembled but never are. For example, it is likely that the PMA spatially coincident with my kitchen sink at time t is never joined to the PMA spatially coincident with the bookcase in my living room at t. Even more probable is the claim that the SMAs spatially coincident with these two PMAs are never assembled. Yet more likely is the claim that these SMAs are never assembled with their boundaries aligned in a certain way that is possible. Since innumerable claims of these kinds are probable, the following things are quite plausible. First, there are many cases of PMAs that are never joined but could be. Likewise for SMAs. Finally, there are numerous instances in which SMAs could be assembled with their surfaces and edges aligned in a particular way, but never are. Given these assumptions, it is not difficult to show that a person can use a definite description to denote the unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA. To see this, consider a situation like Case (1) below. There exist two SMAs a and b. a and b are congruent cubical pieces of steel. f is one of a's faces, and g is one of the edges along / fl is one of b's faces, and gi is one of the edges along f,. In fact a and b are never attached to one another. But it is possible for a and b to be attached to one another to form an SMA as specified in the following definite description:

172

.

173





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`the x such that x is an SMA, a is half of x, b is half of x, and the halves of x are attached so that every part off is joined to some part off,, and every part of g is joined to some part of gl . 9 Let us call this description Da. Now, consider the following definite description:

It is clear from the foregoing description of Case (1) that in some possible world there exists an individual, i, which satisfies the condition in Da. Clause (i) of strict essentialism implies that i exists in a possible world only if in that world i is composed of a and b joined together. Since by hypothesis a and b are in fact never joined, i does not exist in the actual world. Thus, such an individual i is a nonexistent possible. Furthermore, assume that in a possible world WI there exists an object 01 satisfying the condition in Da, and in a possible world W2 there exists an object 0 2 satisfying the same condition. Thus, in W1 there is an SMA o composed of the SMAs a and b joined in the exact way specified in Da, and in W2 there is an SMA 0 2 made up of the SMAs a and b joined in the precise fashion delineated in Da. Moreover, clause (i) of strict essentialism implies that an SMA (such as a or b) consists of the same parts joined together in every possible world in which it exists. Consequently, in WI 0 1 is an SMA composed of the same parts as an SMA 0 1 is composed of in W2 . This consequence and clause (ii) of strict essentialism together imply that 0 1 =0 2 . Hence, one and only one possible entity could satisfy the condition in Da, and this possible concrete entity is an SMA which does not exist. Moreover, as argued in the preceding chapter, a nonexistent possible concretum is individuated by an unexemplified haecceity. Furthermore, corresponding to a given nonexistent possible individual, there is but one such haecceity." It follows that there is one and only one haecceity which meets the condition in Da*, and it is an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA. Therefore, Da* denotes an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA. Da* picks out this unexemplified haecceity by specifying a definite way in which certain actual objects could be joined to form the only possible object that could exemplify this haecceity. Clearly, there are innumerable similar descriptions, each of which denotes a different unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA. Such descriptions pick out these unexemplified haecceities by specifying different ways in which various physical items, including macroscopic things and any microscopic or basic

174

'the haecceity, x, which is necessarily such that x is exemplified by an SMA, y, if and only if one half of y=a, the other half of y=b, and the halves of y are attached in such a way that every part off is joined to some part off! , and every part of g is joined to some part of g1 '.

Let this definite description be called Da*. 1°

a



b

A representation of an SMA satisfying the condition in Da

9

The letters a , b , f , etc., are schematic, and are to be replaced with names of particular actual items of the appropriate sorts. Thus, we do not really have a definite description here, just a definite description form. Nonetheless, to avoid awkwardness I shall speak of this form as if it were a definite description - and likewise in other parallel cases later on. 10

Da* specifies that a certain seven-term relation necessarily holds of x and the other six things named in Da*. Thus, the metaphysical necessity involved here is de re. Parallel remarks apply to the other similar definite descriptions constructed below. See Chapter 1, section IV for a discussion of attributions of de re necessary properties and relations to things. Suppose it is insisted on Russellian grounds, or the like, that 'a', 'b', etc., be replaced by definite descriptions such as 'the object in the right half of my field of vision', 'the object in the left half of my field of vision', etc. Such a Russellian assumption is not incompatible with Da* specifying the desired condition. This is because in Da* the terms 'a', '6', etc., fall within the scope of a de re necessity operator. The context thereby created in Da* is one that is with respect to x and the objects designated by 'a', 'b', etc., regardless of the way in which these singular terms designate their referents. Consequently, Da* and other parallel descriptions specify the desired conditions regardless of the mode of designation of the referents of singular terms like 'a', 'b', etc. Thus, it is not necessary to assume either that 'a', 'b', etc., connote individual essences or that these singular terms are logically proper names or rigid designators. In other words, "rigid reference" does not require the use of rigid designators, but only the use of de re modal operators.

175

.

physical items composing such things, could be assembled or arranged.

11

That there couldn't be an entity which has two haecceities was established in Chapter 1, section I.

1

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But what if the boundaries or positions of physical items are ontologically vague? Such items have no precise corners, edges, and surfaces, or no exact locations. One might question the coherence of such an idea, but putting this aside, let us see what it entails. Apparently, it follows that in some sense items have approximate boundaries. But this seems to imply only that there are descriptions which denote unexemplified haecceities of nonexistent possible SMAs by specifying various ways in which certain actual physical items could be joined or configured in terms of such approximate boundaries or positions. In any event, there are descriptions that denote unexemplified haecceities of NEPs without specifying a boundary of an object or a particular way in which things could be arranged, for example, a description like `the haecceity, x, which is necessarily such that x is exemplified by a PMA, y, if and only if y's sum=the mereological sum of a's sum and b's sum'. Call this description Db *, and let the description 'the x such that x is a PMA whose sum=the mereological sum of a's sum and b's sum' be called Db. To see that Db * denotes, recall the argument which shows that descriptions like Da* pick out unexemplified haecceities of nonexistent possible SMAs. An analogous argument in which we speak of the sum of a possible PMA and presuppose loose essentialism, instead of talking about the parts of a possible SMA and presupposing strict essentialism, implies that descriptions like Db* denote unexemplified haecceities of nonexistent possible PMAs. I have argued that unexemplified haecceities of nonexistent possible SMAs are denoted by descriptions specifying ways in which various physical items could be attached or configured. But do we ever produce a description of this kind, and determine with respect to it, that it denotes such an unexemplified haecceity? If we can ascertain the true boundaries of a physical item, then perhaps the answer is yes. But it seems that the most accurate measurements we can make are trustworthy only within a certain limited range. For example, as an object is examined under progressively stronger microscopes, this object appears to have different boundaries. Furthermore, microscopes and all other measuring instruments are inherently limited in

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their resolving power and are subject to experimental error. Consequently, if an item's boundaries or position are of a precise nature, then it seems that we cannot ascertain them. However, suppose that the boundaries of a physical item are ontically vague or approximate in character. In that case, since our best measurements are authoritative insofar as they are regarded as highly accurate approximations, there appears to be a better chance of our having the ability to determine the true boundaries of a physical item. Of course, all of the issues raised by these reflections cannot be settled here. But let us see what follows if we cannot determine the true boundaries or position of a physical item, inasmuch as there is a good chance that this is the case. It follows that there is no description (such as Da* or the like) specifying a definite way in which particular physical items could be joined or arranged, such that we can determine with respect to it, that it denotes an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible S'MA. But this is compatible with our knowing that there is some such description which denotes an unexemplified haecceity of this kind. Indeed, since a physical item has boundaries (or if it is a point-particle position only), it is quite plausible to suppose that there are innumerable denoting descriptions of this sort. And although there being such denoting descriptions is compatible with no one ever producing one, the claim that we never employ such a description appears unwarranted. If we happen to use one of these descriptions, then we have denoted an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA even if we do not know that we have. For example, we can produce one of these descriptions under such conditions of ignorance if we measure the boundaries of certain things as accurately as technologically possible and correctly conjecture the boundaries of these things based on those measurements. On the other hand, issues about boundaries are irrelevant when it comes to the denotation of an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible PMA. As we have seen, Db * picks out an unexemplified haecceity of this type, and it does not specify a boundary or position of a thing. Because of this, doubts raised about our abilities to ascertain an item's boundaries or position do not discredit either the claim that we use descriptions like Db * to denote unexemplified haecceities of nonexistent possible PMAs, or the

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claim that we have good reason to believe in particular cases of this kind that we have employed a description which accomplishes this. And given my arguments, these two claims are plausible.

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II - CAUSAL DESCRIPTIONS OF UNEXEMPLIFIED HAECCEITIES "A causall definition geuen by the Cause efficient." (1570 Billingsley The Elements of Geometrie of.. Euclid XI. def. xii. 316)

There also seem to be descriptions that denote unexemplified haecceities of nonexistent possible SMAs by specifying laws of nature and initial conditions, rather than by literally specifying arrangements of objects. To see this, consider a situation like Case (2) below. In room r at time t there exist two pieces of clay d and e. d and e are six inches apart at t. d has been loaded onto a catapult like device, and if at t I were to press a button, then d would be shot towards e in a particular way w, that is, with a specific force and direction. d could be propelled towards e, but in fact it never is. If at t d were pushed towards e in way w, then this would result in a piece of clay (mostly or completely made up of stuff that came from d) being joined to another piece of clay (mostly or completely made of stuff that came from e). In this manner, an SMA (mostly or completely made up of stuff that came from d or e) would be assembled at t+1. Given the circumstances, just one SMA would satisfy the following condition at t+1: (1*) being the largest and most massive SMA assembled in room r at t+1. 12 In addition, there are certain conditions obtaining at t such that: if at t d were pushed in way w, then these conditions would be causally relevant both to their being just one SMA satisfying (1*) at t+1, and to such an SMA's being composed of certain parts - in the strict sense of the term 'part'. Let these conditions be called C, and call the laws of nature L. Included in C

12 (1*) is compatible with the fact that if two pieces of clay were joined, numerous SMAs would be formed, many of which would be unarticulated and nested inside of others.







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are the positions of d and e, their temperatures, their masses, their degrees of hardness, the external forces acting on d and e, and so forth. The conjunction, (L & C & (at t, d is pushed in way w)), is physically contingent and logically contingent, and logically implies both that there is just one SMA satisfying (1*) at t+1, and that such an SMA is composed of particular actual bits of matter m 1 , m2 , m,, et cetera, joined together in a specific way R, in other words, attached along certain of their boundaries. Finally, it is possible for m 1 , m 2 , m3 , and so on, to be joined in way R, but in fact m l , m 2 , m 3 , and so forth, are never joined. Let us now consider the following two descriptions. Firstly: 'the x such that x is an SMA which would satisfy (1*) at t+1 if d were pushed in way w at t and L & C obtain'. Call this description Dc. Secondly:

together imply that certain actual bits of matter would be joined in a specific fashion to assemble a definite object. ° However, to employ a description such as Dc* one need not be in a position to enumerate the laws and conditions in question. It is enough to pick out these laws and conditions in the way that I did when I described Case (2). That is, it is sufficient to pick them out as L and C, where the reference of 'L' and 'C' is fixed with the aid of descriptions like 'the laws of nature' and 'the relevant conditions'. Furthermore, a person, S, can use Dc* to denote an unexemplified haecceity even if certain microscopic particles that did not come from d or e would be parts of the SMA which would satisfy (1*) at t+1 if d were pushed in way w at t and L & C obtain, and certain microscopic particles that came from d or e would not be parts of that possible SMA, and S is ignorant of these things. Clearly, then, being in a position to pick out an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA by picking out laws of nature and initial conditions does not require being in a position to literally specify the parts that would be had by that possible SMA. Nor does it require being in a position to specify how those parts would be arranged. Hence, the doubts raised earlier concerning our ability to ascertain an object's exact boundaries or position do not discredit either the claim that we

18 0

`the haecceity, x, which is necessarily such that x is exemplified by an SMA, y, just in case y satisfies (1*) at t+/ if d is pushed in way Wat t & L and C obtain'. Call this description Dc*. In the light of the aforementioned implications of the conjunction, (L & C & (at t, d is pushed in way w)), we can see that it is a necessary truth that the condition specified by Dc is satisfied by an object if and only if this object is the SMA composed of m i , m 2 , m 3 , et cetera, joined together in way R or attached along certain of their boundaries. Hence, Dc is necessarily equivalent to a description which literally describes a particular arrangement of particular bits of matter to form an SMA. In other words, Dc is equivalent to some description similar to Da. Moreover, the bits of matter under discussion are never joined, but these bits could be joined in the way in question. Hence, an argument based upon strict essentialism which is parallel to the one used to establish that Da* denotes an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA, shows that Dc* denotes an unexemplified haecceity of this kind. Notice that unlike Da*, a description like Dc* does not pick out an unexemplified haecceity by literally specifying the (arrangement of) parts of the only possible object which could have this unexemplified haecceity. Rather, such a description denotes an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA by specifying laws and initial conditions which

13

181

It might be objected that some form of indeterminism is true which implies that there are no laws and circumstances which logically determine the exact composition of an object. If so, then there are no situations like Case (2), and a description like Dc fails to denote an unexemplified haecceity of a nonexistent possible SMA because two or more possible SMAs satisfy the condition on x in Dc. However, this objection is quite problematic. For it may be that determinism is true. Or perhaps determinism is false, but the form of determinism required by the objection is not true. In any case, there being descriptions which denote an unexemplified haecceity by specifying laws and initial conditions is compatible with the claim that the laws are probabilistic or nondeterministic. To see this, consider the following hypothesis. Whenever a series of events would result in an object's being assembled, the laws of nature, L*, and the initial conditions together imply that a number of assemblies could result, i.e., each has a nonzero probability less than 1. This supposition is compatible with the claim that L* and the initial conditions assign a probability to one of these possible assemblies which they do not assign to any other one of them, and this possible assembly is never actualized. If this claim is correct, then an unexemplified haecceity is denoted by a description identifying the probability of the possible assembly in question given L* and certain initial conditions, e.g., a description of the form 'the haecceity, x, which is necessarily such that x is exemplified by an SMA, y, just in case y is the thing which most probably satisfies (1*) at t+ I if d is pushed in way w at t & L* and C obtain'.

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use descriptions making reference to laws and initial conditions to pick out unexemplified haecceities of nonexistent possible SMA s, or the claim that we have good reason to believe in particular cases of this kind that we have employed a description which accomplishes this. And given my arguments, these two claims are not implausible. Analogous arguments show that it is at least equally plausible to suppose that corresponding claims are true of

certain descriptions which denote the haecceities of nonexistent possible PMAs by referring to laws and initial conditions. In this latter sort of case, the laws and conditions in question need only determine the sum of matter that would compose a nonexistent possible PMA, and not the way in which its parts would be arranged. Let us now take stock. There are two sorts of descriptions that denote unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities of mereological or causal products, that is, mereological ones like Da*, Db*, et cetera, and causal ones such as Dc*, and in some cases we can use descriptions of these sorts to denote unexemplified haecceities of this kind, and apparently have good reason to believe that we have done so."

183

In the light of my argument, we can see that Russell's account of the singular reference of definite descriptions is compatible with a person's picking out an unexemplified haecceity. Russell's account implies that there are occasions on which a person picks out an item, x, even though he never identifies x either by direct/ostensive means or in virtue of a causal connection between himself and x. On Russell's account, an actual object is sometimes an item of this kind, whereas on my account an unexemplified haecceity of a NEP (a mereological or causal product) is sometimes such an item. But on either account, when a person, 5, picks out such an item, x, he accomplishes this (typically) by uniquely describing x in terms of one or more existing items he has identified. For the purposes of my argument, I leave open the way in which S identifies such an actual item, for instance, whether it is by direct/ostensive means, an identifying description, or in virtue of a causal connection between S and that item.'

14

Suppose for the sake of argument that some possible tables, ships, trees, and persons are mereological products, and neither strict nor loose essentialism is true of such products. Are unexemplified haecceities of products of these and similar kinds denoted by descriptions? Our supposition is consistent with the claim that for any mereological product, o, o has the same original composition in every possible world in which o exists, and there is no possible world in which o has the same original composition as does a diverse physical object of the same kind in another possible world. If this claim is correct, then there is a description that denotes o's unexemplified haecceity by specifying a way in which certain actual objects could be arranged or assembled to originally compose o, e.g., 'the haecceity , x, which is necessarily such that x is exemplified by a table, y, if and only if y is initially made up of a and b joined in way R*'. Alternatively, suppose either that an atom which is originally part of o in one world is not originally part of o in another world in which o exists, or that the objects which originally compose o are aligned (at the time of o's origin) in a slightly different manner in one world than they are in another world. This is compatible with o's being such that in every world in which it exists it is originally composed of at least 99% of the parts of a thing made up of a and b joined in way R*. If o's identity involves such a "threshold" of 99% or some other high percentage of such parts, then the unexemplified haecceity of o is denoted by a description like `the haecceity, x, which is necessarily such that x is exemplified by a table, y, just in case y is originally composed of 99% of the parts of a thing made up of a and b joined in way R*' On the other hand, suppose that none of the matter which originally composes o in a world, W„ originally composes o in another world, W„ in which o exists, and that o in 11/1 and a

diverse physical object of the same kind in W2 (made of the matter composing o in W1 ) are mereologically indistinguishable from one another throughout their histories in W, and W 2 . It then follows that o's unexemplified haecceity cannot be denoted by a mereological or causal description of the sort I have constructed. However, it is not clear that this sort of extreme mereological inessentialism is true of mereological products like pieces of matter, tables, ships, etc. 15

Elsewhere I have argued that mereological and causal descriptions such as Da, Db, and Dc make a kind of singular reference to nonexistent possible concreta, viz., certain mereological and causal products. In contrast, my current argument is not that there is a kind of singular reference to nonentities of a certain sort, but rather that some singular terms denote unexemplified nonqualitative haecceities - which are abstract entities. See Gary Rosenkrantz, "Nonexistent Possibles and Their Individuation," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 22 (1984), pp. 127-147; and "Reference, Intentionality, and Nonexistent Entities," Philosophical Studies, 58 (1990), pp. 163171. Compare Roderick Chisholm "Monads, Nonexistent Individuals, and. Possible Worlds: Reply to Rosenkrantz," Philosophical Studies, 58 (1990), pp. 173-175; and Gary Rosenkrantz, "On Objects Totally Out of This World," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 25/26 (1985/1986), pp. 197-208.

ACQUAINTANCE

CHAPTER 5 ACQUAINTANCE "The phenomenon or sign of the being or of the thatness which itself ever eludes us." [E. B. Bax Outlooks From The New Standpoint III. 183 (1891)] "But that which is properly himself, that which constitutes his essence, cannot be perceived from without, being internal by definition, nor be expressed by symbols, being incommensurable with everything else. Description, history, and analysis leave me here in the relative. Coincidence with the person himself would alone give me the absolute... There is one reality, at least, which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is...our self which endures... an inner, absolute knowledge of the duration of the self by the self is possible." (1903 Bergson An Introduction To Metaphysics)

I - HAECCEITIES AND ACQUAINTANCE "There are two sorts of knowledge: knowledge of things and knowledge of truths." [1902 Bertrand Russell The Problems of Philosophy V. 46 (1943)]

Russell drew a distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description.' He regarded the former as a kind of direct awareness of an item, and the latter as a kind of indirect knowledge of an item. Russell maintained that unlike knowledge by description, knowledge by acquaintance is logically independent of all knowledge of truths. He also held that an individual is acquainted with his own sense-data, various

'See Bertrand Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," Mysticism and Logic (London: Allen and Unwin, 1917), pp. 209-232, and "On the Nature of Acquaintance," in Robert C. Marsh, ed., Logic and Knowledge (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956), pp. 127-174.

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abstract entities, and (in all likelihood) himself, but not with physical objects or persons other than himself. 2 I shall argue that there is a conception of acquaintance other than Russell's which is definable in terms of a person's grasping a haecceity. Although similar to Russell's conception of acquaintance in some ways, my conception of acquaintance differs from Russell's in a crucial respect, since according to my conception a person's being acquainted with an item entails that he knows a truth about that item. Nevertheless, my argument is Russellian in spirit. Utilizing my sense of acquaintance, I will argue that an individual is acquainted with himself, certain of his own mental states, and some abstract entities, but not with physical objects or persons other than himself. However, my argument for this claim will be quite different from any which Russell offered. 3 The following definition will help me to explain the way in which Russellian acquaintance and acquaintance in my sense are similar. Let us say that an identifying property is a characteristic which is possibly had by something, but not possibly had by more than one thing at a time. 4 Haecceities are identifying properties, but so are other characteristics such as being the oldest man, being the president of the U.S.A., being the even prime number, and being the thing I perceive. The distinction between an identifying property of this kind and a haecceity is analogous to the distinction between two kinds of singular terms: those that are definite descriptions, for instance, 'the oldest man', and those that are indexical indicators or proper names that do not function as concealed definite

2

See Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), Chapter 5. 3

1 was not the first to suggest a parallel between Russell's views and Haecceitism. See David Kaplan, "How to Russell a Frege-Church," The Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975), pp. 716-729. Kaplan believes that there is a metaphysical parallel in that both Russell and the haecceitist accept the existence of singular propositions about individuals. In contrast, I discern an epistemological parallel concerning the objects of direct acquaintance. 4

Here I borrow from Roderick Chisholm. I define an identifying property in the same way as he defines an individual concept. See Person and Object (La Salle: Open Court, 1976), pp. 23-52.

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descriptions, for example, T. 5 Hence, there is an analogy between a haecceity and such an indicator or name. I have argued that if entities have haecceities, then there is a propositional conception of direct or strict de re belief which is definable in terms of the notion of haecceity. 6 I have also argued that every entity has a haecceity.' Based on these arguments, I infer that there is such a propositional conception of direct de re belief. This strict conception of de re belief can be defined as follows. (DI) S directly attributes F-ness to x =df. (i) x exemplifies the haecceity, being identical with N, and (ii) S believes that something which is N is F, and in believing this S grasps the conjunction of x's haecceity and F-ness. 8 There is a corresponding conception of direct or strict de re knowledge, definable in the manner below. 9

5

1 presuppose a Russellian analysis of definite descriptions or singular terms of the form `The so and so'. According to such an analysis, a proposition expressed by a sentence of the form 'The so and so is F', e.g., 'The oldest man is wise', is analyzable as (i) There exists at least one so and so, and (ii) there exists at most one so and so, and (iii) whatever is a so and so is F. 6 7

See Chapter 1, section V. See Chapter 2, section VIII, and Chapter 1, section III.

8 'N' and 'F' are schematic letters which should be replaced with an appropriate name and predicative expression, respectively. In clause (ii), the first occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of identity, and the second occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of predication. Replacement of the schematic letter 'N' by a name 'N' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition only if 'N' is a name of x, and the name 'being identical with 'N' (formed from 'N') designates x's haecceity. 9

1n the definition which follows, 'N' and 'F' are schematic letters which ought to be replaced with appropriate linguistic expressions. In clause (ii) of this definition, the first occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of identity, and the second occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of predication. Substitution of a name 'N' for the schematic letter 'N' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition only when 'N' is a name of x, and the name 'being identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates x's haecceity.

(D2) x is directly known by S to be F =df. (i) x exemplifies the haecceity, being identical with N, and (ii) S knows that something which is N is F, and in knowing this S grasps the conjunction of x's haecceity and F-ness. Finally, the concept of haecceity can be used to define an intuitive notion of knowledge by acquaintance, that is, a direct cognitive relation between a person and an object. The conception of knowledge by acquaintance I have in mind is definable in the following way. 19 (D3) S is acquainted with x =df. (i) x exemplifies the haecceity, being identical with N, and (ii) S knows that there is something that is N, and in knowing this S grasps x's haecceity." Suppose that a person, S, has direct de re belief or knowledge about an item, x, as in (D1) or (D2), or is acquainted with x as in (D3). In that event, S's belief or knowledge about x involves his attributing x's haecceity to x, and thereby involves his grasping the haecceity of x. Such belief or knowledge about x is as direct or unmediated as propositional belief or knowledge of an item could be. As we have seen, there is an analogy between a haecceity and an indexical indicator or proper name which does not function as a concealed definite description. Moreover, a person can express his thought when he grasps x's haecceity just provided that he uses an indexical indicator or name to designate x, and this indicator or name does not function as a concealed definite description. An exactly parallel remark applies to a person's ability

10

Compare Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, pp. 23-52. He argues, in a somewhat similar vein, that a person individuates a particular per se when he grasps its haecceity. Chisholm argues forcefully against this view in The First Person (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981). 11

The letter 'N' is schematic and may be replaced by an appropriate nominative expression. In clause (ii), the second occurrence of 'is' is the so-called is of identity. Replacing the schematic letter 'Ar by a name 'N' can result in the satisfaction of this schematic definition only if 'N' is a name of x, and the name 'being identical with N' (formed from 'N') designates x's haecceity.

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to express his thought if he has Russellian acquaintance with x. For these reasons, Russellian acquaintance and the kind of acquaintance defined in (D3) are analogous. On the other hand, while Russell holds the controversial view that knowledge by acquaintance is logically independent of all knowledge of truths, clause (ii) of (D3) ensures that if a person is acquainted with an item, then this logically entails that he knows some truth about that item. A person, S, is acquainted with an item, x, only if S grasps the haecceity of x. Hence, if it is impossible for S to grasp the haecceity of x, then it is impossible for S to be acquainted with x. Duns Scotus wondered whether it is possible for any of us to grasp a haecceity. He wrote as follows. I concede that a singular is intrinsically intelligible on its side. But if it is not intrinsically intelligible to some intellect, for instance, ours, at least this is not an impossibility on the part of the singular, just as it is not on the part of the sun that to see at night is impossible, but rather on the part of the eye. I2

However, there is some reason to think that each of us grasps his own haecceity as well as the haecceities of numerous physical objects and persons in his environment. This follows from a principle deemed acceptable earlier, namely, (PG). 13 (PG) If at time t it is plausible for SI that F-ness exists, and at t it is plausible for SI that S2 believes that something is F, then at t Si can infer that it is prima facie plausible (for Si) that S2 grasps F-ness at t." Given my earlier arguments, it is plausible for me that everything has a haecceity, including myself. Thus, I am justified in believing that my

12

Duns Scotus, The Oxford Commentary On The Four Books Of The Sentences (selections) in Hyman and Walsh, eds., Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1973), p. 589. 13 14

See Chapter 1, section V.

1n this principle '' is a schematic letter which may be replaced by an appropriate predicate expression.

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haecceity exists. In other words, it is plausible for me that there exists the property of being identical with me. Inasmuch as it is also plausible for me that I believe that something is identical with me, (PG) enables me to conclude that it is prima facie plausible (for me) that I grasp my haecceity. (I ignore temporal indices here for the sake of simplicity.) Moreover, I can argue in a parallel fashion with respect to each of us. For instance, it is plausible for me both that the property of being identical with Clinton exists, and that Clinton believes that someone is identical with Clinton. Thus, I am in a position to infer that it is prima facie plausible (for me) that each of us grasps his own haecceity. Alternatively, suppose that I make a demonstrative perceptual identification of a physical object or person, x, that is to say, I perceptually identify x as this. It is plausible for me that everything has a haecceity, including this. Therefore, I am warranted in believing that the haecceity of this exists. In other words, it is (now) plausible for me that there exists the property of being identical with this. Since it is also (now) plausible for me that I have the perceptual belief, there is something that it is identical with this, it follows via (PG) that I can (now) infer that it is prima facie plausible (for me) that I grasp x's haecceity. Based on parallel arguments, I am in a position to infer that it is prima facie plausible (for me) that each of us grasps the haecceities of many physical objects and persons in his environment. However, this prima facie plausibility could be overridden or defeated (at a later time) by a suitably strong counter-argument. I shall present such a counter-argument: an argument which shows that none of us grasps the haecceity of a physical object or person other than himself. Nor will I stop there. I shall argue further that it is impossible for anyone to grasp the haecceity of a physical object or person other than himself, and hence that it is impossible for a person to be acquainted with such an object. Russell held the view that perceiving a physical object or person does not provide any of us with an avenue for acquaintance with it. Russell's argument for this view presupposes the questionable doctrine that sense-data are a 'veil' cutting a person off from acquaintance with the external world. Other arguments advanced in favor of Russell's view rest on controversial claims of Cartesian or foundationalist epistemology, for example, that perceptual beliefs are uncertain, or that such beliefs can only be inferentially



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justified. I will argue that perceiving a physical object or person does not provide any of us with an avenue for acquaintance with it in the sense of acquaintance defined in (D3), but my argument shall not presuppose any of the questionable or controversial epistemological claims mentioned above.

II - HAECCEITIES AND RE-IDENTIFICATION

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"A matter of deduction and inference." (1736 Bp. Butler The Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed II. vi. 36)

What does it mean to say that perception of a physical object or person is an avenue for acquaintance with it? Suppose I perceive a single object. During such a perceptual episode I can identify the thing I perceive as this. Alternatively, I can baptize the object. For example, we may assume that I name the thing I perceive Adam. My perceiving the object enables me to be acquainted with it just in case both of the following things are true. (i) In the circumstances described above, if I identify the object by means of knowing that the thing I perceive is this, then I know that there is something that is this, and I grasp the object's haecceity - the property of being identical with this Hence, I'm acquainted with the object (ii) In the circumstances described above, if I identify the object by means of knowing that the thing I perceive is Adam, then I know that there is something that is Adam, and I grasp the object's haecceity - the property of being identical with Adam. Consequently, I am acquainted with the object. The point in distinguishing (i) and (ii) is to allow for the possibility that haecceities can be expressed by either indexical indicators or proper names. Of course, although in the preceding example I am the perceiver, remarks parallel to the foregoing ones apply to any perceiver. Philosophical reflection raises doubts about whether sense-perception is an avenue for acquaintance with objects. For example, consider these remarks made by Scotus. Sincere truth is not grasped by the senses in such wise as to enable them to perceive the immutability of the truth they apprehend, or for this matter, the immutability itself of the object; for the senses perceive present objects only as long as these are present...even supposing that I should have the object A uninterruptedly in my presence, and that I should gaze upon it without intermission, so that my vision would retain the same grade of sharpness

throughout the whole process, I would still be unable to perceive the immutability of A, for at each moment of my vision I would perceive the object precisely as it is constituted at that

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same moment... 15

It is sufficiently clear from this passage that Scotus is not a skeptic about sense-perception: he presumes that we have perceptual knowledge of external objects. Nevertheless, it is evident that Scotus finds sense-perception

wanting in some respects. Similarly, while I assume that we have perceptual knowledge of external things, I will argue that an individual's perception of a physical object or person fails to provide him with an avenue for acquaintance with it. Moreover, my argument for thinking that perception fails to provide such an avenue is related to Scotus's reasons for regarding perception as wanting in some respects. To see this, compare Scotus's remarks in the passage quoted above to the following preliminary version of my argument. 1. If perceiving a physical object or person enables any one of us to be acquainted with it, then he has the ability to identify an object x he presently perceives with an object y he perceived earlier, by grasping the haecceities of x and y, comparing them, and seeing that they are the same.

t5

Duns Scotus, Metaphysics I, q. 4, n. 23; VII, 65a. Quoted by Peter C. Vier in Evidence and Its Function According to John Duns Scotus (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1951), pp. 154-155. Compare Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, p. 34. Chisholm observes that "If today I individuate something per se as being that thing and if tomorrow I individuate something per se as being that thing, I may well have picked out two different things; whereas if today I individuate something per se as being identical with me and if tomorrow I individuate something per se as being identical with me, then I will have picked out one and the same thing." In his endnote 24, on the passage just quoted, Chisholm alludes to an earlier version of the argument I will present in the text. This argument originated in my doctoral dissertation, Individual Essences (Brown University, 1976). Also compare Frederick Copleston's account of De Anima (imputed by many to Scotus) in A History of Philosophy (New York: Doubleday Image Books, 1985), Volume II, p. 493. Copelston remarks: "If two material things were deprived of all difference of accidents (of place, colour, shape, etc.), neither sense nor intellect could distinguish them from one another, even though their 'singularities' (Scotus's haecceitas) remained, and this shows that we have, in our present state, no clear and complete knowledge of the singularity of a thing." For a general discussion of Scotus's views on sense-perception and epistemology, as well as their influence, see Katherine Tachau, Vision and Certitude In The Age Of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology, And The Foundation Of Semantics, 1250-1345 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988).

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2. None of us has such an ability. Therefore, 3. Perceiving a physical object or person does not enable any of us to be acquainted with it. Before attempting to demonstrate the cogency of this argument, I shall restate it by revising the premises in certain ways, and providing a precise meaning for these revised premises. In particular, the restated argument will employ the notion of (i) a person's re-identifying an object from one perceptual situation to another, and (ii) the kind of inference a person performs if he identifies an object he presently perceives with an object he perceived earlier by grasping the haecceity of the object. In what follows, I shall attempt to clarify these ideas. If I assert that the thing I perceive at t2 is the thing I perceived at ti (t, > t1 ), then I am making a re-identification claim. A person S re-identifies an object from one perceptual situation to another if and only if S knows that the thing he perceives at t2 is the thing he perceived at t1 , where there is a time between t1 and t2 at which S does not perceive this object. For example, suppose that t1 t2 , and t3 are particular times (t3 > t, > t1 ). If I know that the thing I perceive at t3 is the thing I perceived at t1 , and at 1,1 do not perceive this object, then I have re-identified an object from one perceptual situation to another. It is important to emphasize that the inference a person performs if he re-identifies an object from one perceptual situation to another by grasping its haecceity is a deductive inference. In what follows, I will characterize the premises from which such a person deduces a re-identification claim, and indicate the kind of deduction he performs. The premises in the deduction are statements which are singular perceptual observation reports of the form 'The thing I perceive at t is IV', where 't' designates a particular time, where 'IV' is either the indicator 'this' or a proper name with which the observer baptizes an object when he perceives it, and where 'I' refers to the observer. Let such a statement be called a perceptual observation statement (POS). Here is an example of a POS: 'The thing I perceive at t1 is this'. Suppose that perceiving an object acquaints me with it. Given this ,

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supposition, if I know a POS or a statement of the form 'The thing I perceive at t is N', then I grasp the haecceity of an object, namely, a property of the form 'being identical with N', and hence I am acquainted with that object. This is implied by what was said about my perceiving an object in the first paragraph of this section. If I know a POS, then I attribute an identifying property to an object, for example, being the thing I perceive at t,. Such an identifying property can be had by at most one item throughout all of time. I call an identifying property of this kind a fixed property, and I define this notion as follows.

perceived at t2 is the thing I perceive at t3 , and if I also know that the thing I perceived at t, is the thing I perceive at t3 , then I can deduce that the thing I perceived at t2 is the thing I perceived at t,. I call a simple deduction in accord with (Al) an SD. Since a haecceity is a fixed property, SD is the kind of deduction an individual performs if he re-identifies an object from one perceptual situation to another by using its haecceity to deduce a re-identification claim from POSs. In particular, the deduction goes like this. Where being identical with N is the haecceity of an object: I know that the thing I perceive at t2 is N, and I also recall that the thing I perceived at t, is N. Since being identical with N is a fixed property, I can deduce that the thing I perceive at t2 is the thing I perceived at t, by performing SD in accord with (Al). We are now prepared to reformulate our original argument. Let the ability to re-identify a physical object or person from one perceptual situation to another by using its haecceity to perform SD from presently known and remembered POSs be called A.

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F is a fixed property =df. F is an identifying property such that: it is impossible that (ax)(3y)(30(1 1 )(x*y & x has F at time t & y has F at time t'). The identifying property, being the thing I perceive, is not a fixed property. On the other hand, the property of being the thing I perceive at t,, and similar temporally indexed properties involving t2 , t3 , or any other particular time, are fixed properties. Another kind of fixed property is a haecceity. The notion of a fixed property can be used to explicate the notion of a reidentification claim broadly understood. The statement that the G is the F is a re-identification claim if and only if (i) being F is a fixed property, (ii) being G is a fixed property, (iii) –0(x)(Gx --> Fx), and (iv) –E1(x)(Fx Gx). 16 If a person uses a haecceity to deduce a re-identification claim from POSs, then he is reasoning in accord with the following axiom concerning fixed properties. (Al) For any fixed properties F, G, and H, if the thing that has G has F, and the thing that has H has F, then the thing that has G has H.

(Al) is a necessary truth, and a person can perform simple deductive inferences in accord with it. For example, if I know that the thing I

16

The letters 'F' and `G' are schematic and may be replaced by an appropriate predicate expression.

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1. If perceiving a physical object or person enables any one of us to be acquainted with it, then he has A. 2. None of us has A. Therefore, 3. Perceiving a physical object or person does not enable any of us to be acquainted with it. Call this revised argument R.

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III - AN ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE 1 OF R It follows by easy and irrefragable deduction." (1789 Belsham Essays, Philosophical, Historical, and Literary I. i. 4)

Imagine that c is both the thing I perceive at t1 and the thing I perceive at t2 , where t2 is a minute later than 1'1 , and there is a time between ti and t, at which I do not perceive c. Suppose that during these perceptual episodes I either identify c as this, or bestow a proper name upon c. Further suppose that during each perceptual episode I know a POS containing an indexical indicator or proper name designating c. In other words, what I know at t, is the thing I perceive at t 1 is N (call this statement p), and what I know at t, is the thing I perceive at t, is N (call this statement q). p and q are schematic and the POSs known result from replacing occurrences of 'N' with either the indicator 'this' or a proper name. Assume for the sake of argument that perceiving c acquaints me with it. Then my knowing p at t1 acquaints me with c. That is, by knowing p at t 1 I know that there is something that is N, and I thereby grasp the haecceity of c - the property of being identical with N. Furthermore, my knowing q at t, acquaints me with c. Thus, I grasp the haecceity of c by knowing q at t2 . These conclusions follow from what was said about my knowing a POS in section II. Notice that my argument here presupposes that perceptions of c which occur at different times under similar conditions have an equal claim to be an avenue for acquaintance with c. Because I have the ability to remember things I knew a short time ago, we may assume that at t, I remember what I knew at ti when I knew p. It follows that at t, I remember (and hence know)

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the thing I perceived at t, is N (call this statement r). By my knowing r at t2 I grasp the haecceity of c, and in so doing I'm acquainted with c. My argument here presupposes that if I grasp the haecceity of c, then I have the ability to remember that haecceity. Notice that if I know q and I know r, then I have the ability to know (q & r). Since I know both q and r, we may assume that at t2 I know (q & r). The haecceity of c, namely, being identical with N, is a fixed property. Hence, by (Al) it is a trivial deductive consequence of (q & r) that the thing I perceive at t, is the thing I perceived at t 1 (call this re-identification claim s). As I have the ability to perform simple deductive inferences, we may assume that at t2 I deduce s from (q & r) by performing SD in accord with (Al). At this point I know s because I have deduced it from (q & r). Thus, I have exercised A by using c's haecceity to perform SD from the conjunction of the presently known POS q and the remembered POS r. Hence, if perceiving c acquaints me with it, then I have A. Inasmuch as an argument of this kind applies equally well to any of us, we should conclude that premise 1 of R is true."

17 0f course, there are persons, e.g., amnesiacs and idiots, who lack either the ability to remember or the ability to perform deductions. However, since a person who possesses these abilities is in at least as good a position to be acquainted with an object as one who lacks them, this fact is compatible with my argument for premise 1 of R.

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IV - AN ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE 2 OF R "A joyful mother of two goodly sons....the one so like the other As could not be distinguished but by names." (1590 Shakespeare The Comedie of Errors Act I Scene I)

"These two Antipholus', these two so like...I know not which is which." (1590 Shakespeare The Comedie of Errors Act 5 Scene I) "You must take up with Induction, and bid adieu to Demonstration." (1734 Berkeley The Analyst § 19)

In this section I argue that A is an extraordinary epistemic ability which none of us possesses. My argument will involve an analysis of certain kinds of evidence available for re-identification claims. Reports of observed similarities in the sensory properties of material objects justify re-identification claims about such objects. By sensory properties I mean shapes, sizes, colors, odors, tastes, sounds, temperatures, textures, degrees of bulk and hardness, and properties which fix, or partially fix, the spatial location of an object (and do no more). Let us consider a representative case in which observed similarities in sensory properties provide evidence for a re identification claim. Let the property of being spherical & 2 inches in diameter & orange & fuzzy & soft & cold & sweet & at place p be called being EP. Suppose I know that the thing I perceive at t2 is (ID and the thing I perceived at t 1 was 43, where there is a time between ti and t2 at which I do not perceive the thing I perceived at tp My knowledge of this similarity in sensory properties provides me with prima facie evidence for the re-identification claim, the thing I perceive at t2 is the thing I perceived at tp This prima facie evidence is normally defeated if I have reason to believe that there is another object in the vicinity at the time which has the same qualitative sensory properties as the thing I perceive at t2 , for example, an exact look-alike. In the case described above the statement 'the thing I perceive at t2 is 4. & the thing I perceived at t1 was justifies the re-identification claim 'the thing I perceive at t2 is the thing I perceived at t; . However, the former -

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statement does not logically entail the latter claim, and the justificatory relationship between them is a nondeductive or inductive one. In general, the justificatory relationship between statements asserting the existence of observed similarities in sensory properties and re-identification claims is an inductive (nondeductive) one.' The following discussion brings out the character of certain typical grounds for re-identification claims which do not consist solely in observations of similarities in sensory properties. Suppose that at t1 I perceive a single object. I then fall asleep for an hour. At t2 I wake up and perceive a solitary object in the same place. Let the claim, the thing I perceive at t2 is the thing I perceived at t1 , be called m. If at t2, I know that the object I perceived an hour ago has been locked in a bank vault for the past hour, then I can justify m by arguing that under the circumstances it is causally impossible that the object I perceived an hour ago has been replaced by another object. Or suppose I know that the object I perceived an hour ago was the item in the top draw of my desk, and that such an item's being replaced by another one has been an infrequent occurrence in the past. Then I can justify m by arguing that in the circumstances it is improbable that the object I perceived an hour ago has been replaced by another object. Or imagine that when I awake I notice that the thing I perceive is a pool of water, and I recall that the thing I perceived an hour ago was a hunk of ice. In this event, I can justify m by arguing that it is the best explanation of what I have observed. Finally, imagine that someone assures me that there has been just one object there all along. Then I can justify m by appealing to his testimony on this matter. Thus, each of the following procedures can be employed in the justification of re-identification claims: observations of similarities in sensory properties, causal reasoning, enumerative induction, inferences to the best explanation, appeals to testimony, and similar inductive techniques. I call such procedures inductive methods, and any evidence provided by such methods inductive evidence. The discussion above provides a representative sampling of the ways in which inductive methods 18

Compare John Pollock, Knowledge and Justification (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), Chapter 6. Pollock argues that justifying a re-identification claim ultimately requires an appeal to observations of similarities in sensory properties which inductively confirm some re-identification claim.

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can be used to justify a re-identification claim, doubtless it is true that these methods can be used to justify such claims in a variety of other ways. We are now in a position to show that none of us has A. My strategy for showing this involves doing two things: (a) Specifying circumstances which are logically sufficient for anyone's exercising A if he possesses such an ability; and (b) Showing that if any one of us is in such circumstances, then this does not logically entail that he exercises A. (a) and (b) together imply that none of us has A. 1 will accomplish (a) by describing a situation which may obtain under typical conditions, and involves circumstances logically sufficient for anyone's re-identifying a particular object from one perceptual situation to another by exercising A if he possesses such an ability. Such circumstances are optimally favorable for the exercise of A. I9 An individual S (who may be any one of us) is in this situation. I will accomplish (b) by showing, first, that it is possible for S to be in this situation and have inadequate inductive evidence for re-identifying the object in question, and second, that if this possibility is realized, then S does not re-identify this object. The situation to which I refer is described below. Situation (1): S knows that there are two objects which have the same qualitative sensory properties in the vicinity because he observes his friend Mo displaying two such objects. Then Mo puts both of these objects behind his back where S cannot perceive them. Following this, at 1, Mo displays a single one of these objects (call this object o). At t1 o is the thing S perceives, and S either identifies o as this or bestows a proper name upon o. Then Mo puts o behind his back where S cannot perceive it. A minute later at t2 Mo displays o again. At 12 o is the thing S perceives, and S either identifies o as this or bestows a proper name upon o. From his perceptions at 1 1 and t2 , S knows POSs containing indexicals or proper names which designate o. In other words, what S knows at t, is



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the thing he perceives at t 1 is N (call this statement pi ), and what S knows at t2 is the thing he perceives at 1 2 is N (call this statement q 1 ). p1 and q1 are schematic and the POSs known by S result from replacing occurrences of 'N' with either the indicator 'this' or a proper name. At t2 S remembers what he knew at t1 when he knew p 1 . Hence, at t2 S remembers the thing he perceived at t 1 is N (call this statement r1 ). At t, S knows (q 1 & 1. 1 ). At t, S meets the following condition. For any statements p and q, if he knows p, and p trivially entails q, then if he attempts to deduce q from p he succeeds in performing this deduction. A person who meets this condition will be said to be logically accomplished. Finally, at t2 S attempts to deduce the following statement from (q 1 & r 1 ) by performing SD: the thing he perceives at 12 is the thing he perceived at t, (call this re identification claim s1 ).

,

19

0f course, one who possesses an ability may fail in an attempt to exercise it. However, this can occur only if one is not in optimally favorable circumstances for the exercise of that ability. Hence, if a person possesses A, then this does not entail that he exercises A whenever he attempts to do so. However, if a person possesses A and attempts to exercise A when in optimally favorable circumstances for the exercise of A, then this entails that he exercises A.

Initially, one should notice four things about Situation (1). (i) S is logically accomplished. (ii) S knows (q, & r1 ). (iii) Given the nature of A, if S possesses A, then (q1 & r1) trivially entails s 1 . (iv) S attempts to deduce s 1 from (q1 & r 1 ) by performing SD. (i)-(iv) together imply that necessarily, if S has A, then in situation (1) he deduces s1 from (q1 & r 1 ). Given the nature of A, we should conclude that if S possesses A, then in Situation (1) S is in circumstances which are logically sufficient for his re-identifying o from one perceptual situation to another by exercising A. To say that S is in such circumstances is equivalent to saying that if S has A, then he is in circumstances which logically entail that he both knows s, and deduces s 1 from (q1 & r1 ) by exercising A. Finally, notice that Situation (1) may obtain under typical conditions. In sum, by describing Situation (1) I have

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accomplished (a). In what follows I accomplish (b). Remember that in Situation (1) the two objects involved have the same qualitative sensory properties, for example, they look exactly alike, they feel exactly alike, and so on. Moreover, it is possible that in Situation (1) at t2 S has inadequate inductive evidence for Let us suppose that this is actually the case. I will argue that given this supposition, S does not re-identify o from one perceptual situation to another in Situation (1). In other words, I shall argue that if at t2 S lacks adequate inductive evidence for s 1 , then in Situation (1) he does not know s l , and he does not deduce si from (q1 & r 1 ). To begin, notice that in Situation (1), the evidence provided for s i by S's observations of similarities in sensory properties is defeated by S's knowledge that there is a "look-alike" in the vicinity. And since we are supposing that S has inadequate inductive evidence for s i , it is also true that he is not justified in believing that in the circumstances it is causally impossible that the thing he perceived at t1 has been replaced by another object during the interval between t1 and t2 . For the same reason, he is not justified in believing that in such circumstances an object's being replaced by another one has been an infrequent occurrence in the past, and he lacks adequate testimonial evidence for s i . Similar remarks apply to the other kinds of relevant inductive evidence which S lacks. If as supposed, S has inadequate inductive evidence for s1 in Situation (1), then the hypothesis that the thing he perceives at t2 and the thing he perceived at t 1 are different objects which look like one another, is compatible with everything S knows. That is, without additional information he does not know whether he has perceived the same object at t1 and t2 or diverse "look-alikes". It follows, first, that in Situation (1) S does not know s1 because he has inadequate inductive evidence, and second, that in Situation (1) S does not deduce s from (q, & r 1 ). But it has already been shown that if S possesses A, then in Situation (1) S is in circumstances which logically entail that he both knows s 1 , and deduces s, from (q, & rd. Consequently, S lacks A. Since the above argument holds equally well at any time during S's life, it follows that S never possesses A. Thus premise 2 of R is true. Now that both premises of R have been demonstrated, we should conclude that perceiving a physical object or person does not acquaint

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any of us with it.'

• tuatton (1) is a case in which o has a "look-alike" in the vicinity, and in certain Si circumstances this results in S's failing to re-identify o from one perceptual situation to another because he has inadequate inductive evidence for a re-identification claim. Analogous cases can 20

also be used in my argument. For example, a case in which o radically changes its sensory properties, and in certain circumstances this results in S's failing to re-identify o from one perceptual situation to another because he lacks adequate inductive evidence for a re-

identification claim.

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V - SYNCHRONIC VERSIONS OFR "Perceiving is a general term for hearing, seeing, tasting, touching, smelling." [1762 Kames Elements of Criticism 475 (1833)] "The same material thing....can be present to our senses in many different ways...." [1932 H. H. Price Perception 145 (1964)]

Some philosophers have argued that physical objects and persons consist of a sequence of temporal slices, each slice being an essentially ephemeral and nonrecurrable particular. It is impossible for such ephemera to be reidentified from one perceptual situation to another. This means that a person's being acquainted with a temporal slice does not imply that he is able to re-identify it from one perceptual situation to another. Hence, the strategy employed in R cannot be used to show that a person's perceiving an object does not acquaint him with its present temporal slice. However, I shall argue that considerations similar to those employed in defense of R imply that an individual's perceiving a physical object or person, x, neither acquaints him with a temporal slice of x, nor acquaints him with x. These considerations concern a person's perceiving a single object by means of two sensory modes at once, for instance, simultaneously touching an object with both your right and left hands. We should affirm the following principle of parity concerning sensory modes (call it the principle of equal treatment): if two observations of an item, x, 0, and 02 , are alike in all relevant cognitive respects, then the hypothesis that 0, provides an avenue for acquaintance with x is on a par with the hypothesis that 02 provides an avenue for acquaintance with x. For example, the following sensory modes have an equal claim to be an avenue for acquaintance with an item: seeing it with the naked eye, seeing it with the aid of eyeglasses, seeing it through a periscope, and seeing it via its reflection in a mirror. Furthermore: (i) glimpses of an item taken from different vantage points have an equal claim to be an avenue for acquaintance with that item, and (ii) looking at an item with both eyes, looking at it with the right eye, and looking at it with the left eye, have an equal claim

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to be an avenue for acquaintance with that item. Points analogous to the ones made concerning sight in (i) and (ii) also hold for the other four senses. It is also plausible to suppose that each of the five senses has an equal claim to be an avenue for acquaintance with objects. If so, then if one sense is not such an avenue, none of them is. But there is an objection to this. If one sees or touches an object, then one is aware of a definite boundary between that object and the rest of the world. But this is not true of, perceiving an object with one of the other three senses. Because of this, sight and touch are superior to the other three senses as avenues for acquaintance. Whether or not this objection succeeds, it seems safe to say that if seeing or touching an item does not provide an avenue for acquaintance with it, then neither does perceiving it with one of the other three senses. A case in which a person simultaneously has two distinct visual perceptions of a single object can be used to show that seeing an item does not acquaint one with it. As a first step towards describing such a case, imagine a device consisting of two long, straight, hollow ocular tubes mounted so that a person can look through them in the same way as he looks through binoculars. The tubes can be adjusted so that they are either parallel or skew to one another. Call such a device a binocularscope, and imagine that an individual is looking through one. The tubes may either be positioned so that each of his eyes sees a different object, or be positioned so that each of his eyes sees the same object. In appropriate circumstances, the former situation causes him to have two distinct simultaneous visual perceptions of different objects; and the latter situation causes him to have two distinct simultaneous visual perceptions of a single object. Moreover, if he is in the former situation and sees a pair of look-alikes, then his visual experiences are qualitatively indistinguishable from the ones he has in the latter situation. Hence, in the latter situation a person is seeing a single object, but without additional information he literally does not know whether he is seeing one object or a pair of look-alikes. The following case in which I observe an object through a binocularscope can be used to show that my seeing a physical object or person, x, neither acquaints me with a temporal slice of x, nor acquaints me with x. Case (1): Mo informs me that in the next room there are two objects having the same qualitative sensory properties which are within the

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immediate vicinity of one another, and that he will soon take me into the room and allow me to see at least one of these objects. Mo attaches my eyes to the ocular tubes of a binocularscope. However, since the ends of the tubes have been covered with black paper I do not see anything. While I cannot see, Mo brings me into the room and adjusts the binocularscope so that if he removes the blinders then I see just one object, but have two distinct visual perceptions of it. Then Mo removes the blinders, and at t1 I have two distinct visual perceptions of a single object. Let the object I am seeing (or a temporal slice of it at ti ) be called d. Under these conditions, d is both the thing I see with my right eye at t1 , and the thing I see with my left eye at t 1 . At t1 , based on each one of my visual perceptions of d, I either identify d as this or bestow a proper name upon d. In other words, at t1 I know that the thing I see with my right eye at t 1 is N (call this observation statement P2), and at t1 I also know that the thing I see with my left eye at t 1 is N (call this observation statement q2). p2 and q 2 are schematic, and the statements I know result from replacing occurrences of 'IV' with the indicator 'this' or a proper name. At t1 I am logically accomplished, I know (p2 & q2), and I attempt to deduce the following claim from (p2 & q 2) by performing SD: the thing I see with my right eye at t 1 is the thing I see with my left eye at t1 (call this identity claim r2). Finally, I neither remove my eyes from the binocularscope, nor perceive any of the objects around me in any other way. Now let us see how Case (1) can be used to show that my seeing d does not acquaint me with it. Suppose that my seeing d acquaints me with it.

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Then the principle of equal treatment implies that in Case (1) each of my two visual perceptions of d acquaints me with it. Thus, at t, I am acquainted with d both by knowing p2 and by knowing q2 . That is, at t l I know that there is something that is N both by knowing p2 and by knowing q2 . Hence, at t1 I grasp the haecceity of d, namely, being, identical with N, both by knowing p 2 and by knowing q2 . Therefore, an argument analogous to the one for premise 1 of R has the following consequence.' If my seeing d acquaints me it, then in Case (1) I have the ability to come to , know r2 by using the haecceity of d to deduce r2 from (p2 & q 2) through performing SD in accord with (Al). I will refer to this ability as A'. I shall argue below that in Case (1) I lack A', and hence that my seeing d does not acquaint me with it. First of all, if I possess A', then in Case (1) I am in circumstances that are logically sufficient for my exercising it I am logically accomplished, I know (p2 & q 2), and I attempt to deduce r2 from (1,2 & q 2) by performing SD. This is true because given the nature of A', what was said of A in the next to last paragraph of section IV holds analogously for A'. In what follows, I demonstrate that my being in Case (1) is not logically sufficient for my exercising A', and hence that I lack A'. I will accomplish this by showing, first, that it is possible for me to be in Case (1) and have inadequate inductive evidence for r2 , and second, that if this possibility is realized then in Case (1) I do not exercise A'. To begin, an identity claim like r2 can be justified by employing inductive methods. For example, I am using such methods if I justify r2 by inferring it from premises like these: when I have had two visual perceptions of objects which look exactly alike, I have usually had two perceptions of the same object; when I put my finger down near the open end of one tube of the binocularscope this is accompanied by my having two perceptions of an object having a finger looking exactly like mine next to it; someone tells me

21

This analogous argument differs from the one for premise 1 of R in just two noteworthy respects. Since this analogous argument concerns cases in which someone has two perceptions of an item at once: (i) it applies to temporal slices, and (ii) it does not presuppose that if someone grasps a haecceity, then he has the ability to remember that haecceity. Neither (i) nor (ii) is true of the argument for premise 1 of R, because in the cases relevant to this argument a person has perceptions of an item at different times.

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that I am seeing just one object, and so on. In Case (1), any evidence provided by the first premise I mentioned is defeated by my knowledge that there is a pair of look-alikes in the vicinity. Now, it is possible that in Case (1) at t, I have inadequate inductive evidence for r2 . Let us suppose that this is actually the case. Given this supposition, the hypothesis that I see two things which look exactly alike, is compatible with everything I know. That is, without additional information I do not know whether I am seeing one object or a pair of look-alikes. Hence, in Case (1) I do not know r2 because I have inadequate inductive evidence, and I do not deduce r2 from (p2 & q2). Since to exercise A' is to come to know r2 by deducing it from (p2 & q 2), it follows that in Case (1) I do not exercise A'. But it was shown earlier that if I possess A', then in Case (1) I am in circumstances which logically entail that I exercise it. Consequently, I lack A'. Notice that my argument for this conclusion is analogous to the one for premise 2 of R. Since I have already shown that if my seeing d acquaints me with it, then in Case (1) I possess A', we should conclude that my seeing d does not acquaint me with it. Of course, the same argument applies equally well to any of us at any time. Therefore, an individual's seeing a physical object or person neither acquaints him with it, nor acquaints him with one of its temporal slices. It might be thought that this argument is needlessly elaborate. Specifically, one might think that the conclusion of this argument can be established based on not much more than Cartesian epistemology, and that my introduction of the binocularscope is unnecessary. In response, I remind the reader that my argument does not assume the requisite controversial claims of Cartesian or foundationalist epistemology: that perceptual beliefs are uncertain, and that such beliefs can only be inferentially justified. Rather, the assumption of my argument is that one's identification of an object from one perceptual mode to another depends upon an inductive connection between perceptual premises and the identification. This latter assumption is much less controversial than the two aforementioned claims of foundationalist epistemology. Case (1) is a situation of the following kind: I perceive a single object, but in certain circumstances I do not know whether I perceive one object or two because I lack adequate inductive evidence for an identity claim. In a case of this kind I may have two simultaneous perceptions of a single object with

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a particular sense, for example, two simultaneous visual perceptions of an object, two simultaneous tactual perceptions of an object, two simultaneous auditory perceptions of an object, and so on. If there is such a case, and we spell out the details in a way analogous to the details in Case (1), then it can be used to show that perceiving an object with a particular sense does not acquaint one with it. For each one of the remaining four senses, this can be shown by means of an argument parallel to the one based on Case (1). For example, the view that a person's touching an object acquaints him with it can be refuted with the help of the following analog of Case (1). Case (2): Mo informs me that in the next room there are two objects having the same qualitative sensory properties which are within the immediate vicinity of one another, and that he will soon lead me into the room and allow me to touch at least one of these objects. However, since I have been blindfolded I do not see anything. While I am blindfolded, Mo brings me into the, room, and at t1 he puts the tip of my right index finger on the right side of an object, and puts the tip of my left index finger on the left side of the same object. Let the object I am touching (or a temporal slice of it at t1 ) be called e. Under the circumstances, e is both the thing I touch with my right index finger at t1 and the thing I touch with my left index finger at t 1 . I have two distinct simultaneous tactual perceptions of e, and based on each one of them, at t1 I either identify e as this or bestow a proper name upon e. Thus, I have the following items of perceptual knowledge concerning e: at t1 I know that the thing I touch with my right index finger at t 1 is N (call this statement p3), and at t, I also know that the thing I touch with my left index finger at t 1 is N (call this statement q3). Occurrences of 'IV' in these schemas are replaced by either 'this' or a proper name. At t1 I am logically accomplished, I know (p3 & q 3), and I attempt to deduce the following claim from (p3 & q 3) by performing SD:

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the thing I touch with my right index finger at t 1 is the thing I touch with my left index finger at t 1 (call this identity claim r3). Finally, I do not perceive any of the objects around me in any other way. Let me explain how Case (2) can be employed to demonstrate that my touching e does not acquaint me with it. Suppose that touching e acquaints me with it. Then the principle of equal treatment implies that in Case (2) each of my tactual perceptions of e acquaints me with it. Hence, arguments like those based on Case (1) imply that if my touching e acquaints me with it, then in Case (2) I have the ability to come to know r3 by using the haecceity of e to deduce r3 from (Th & q3 ) via the performance of SD in accord with (Al). I will refer to this ability as A". I shall argue below that in Case (2) I lack A", and hence that my touching e does not acquaint me with it. First of all, if I possess A", then in Case (2) I am in circumstances which are logically sufficient for my exercising it, that is, I am logically accomplished, I know (113 & q3), and I attempt to deduce r3 from (p3 & q 3) by performing SD. This is true because given the nature of A", what was said of A' in the argument based on Case (1) holds analogously for A". Another analogy with Case (1) is that as with r2 , inductive methods can be used to justify an identity claim like r3 . For instance, I am employing such methods if I infer r3 from premises like these: when I have had two tactual perceptions of objects which feel alike, I have usually had two perceptions of the same object; when I press against the right side of the thing I am touching with my right index finger I feel an equal pressure against my left index finger; someone tells me that I am touching just one object, and so on. In Case (2), any evidence provided by the first premise I mentioned is defeated by my knowledge that there are two objects in the vicinity which feel the same. Moreover, it is possible that in Case (2) at t i , I have inadequate inductive evidence for r3 . If in Case (2) I lack adequate inductive evidence for r3 , then I do not know r3 and without additional information I do not know whether I am touching the opposite ends of one object or two different objects which feel alike. Consequently, arguments like those based on Case (1) imply that in Case (2) I lack A". Since I have already shown that if my touching e acquaints me with it, then in Case (2) I possess A", it follows that

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my touching e does not acquaint me with it. Thus, there is an argument based on Case (2), parallel to the one based on Case (1), which implies that an individual's touching a physical object or person neither acquaints him with it, nor acquaints him with one of its temporal slices. One might think that for my argument to succeed I need to show that a person's simultaneously seeing and touching an object does not acquaint him with it. A case which can be used to show this can be constructed by combining (1) and (2) in the following way. Case (3): As I am looking through the binocularscope at d (and having two distinct visual perceptions of d), Mo puts my fingers in contact with d in the same way as he puts them in contact with e in Case (2). I have two distinct and simultaneous joint visual/tactual perceptions of d. d is both the thing I see with my right eye at t1 and the thing I touch with my right index finger at t1 , and d is both the thing I see with my left eye at t1 and the thing I touch with my left index finger at t1 . From my perceptions, at t1 I know p2 and I know q2 . At t1 I am logically accomplished, I know (p2 & q 2), and I attempt to deduce r2 from (p2 & q 2) by performing SD. Finally, I neither remove my eyes from the binocularscope nor perceive any of the objects around me in any other way. Let us see how Case (3) can be utilized to establish that my simultaneously seeing and touching d does not acquaint me with it. Suppose that my perceiving d acquaints me with it. Then the principle of equal treatment implies that in Case (3) each of my joint visual/tactual perceptions of d acquaints me with it. Hence, arguments like those based on Case (1) imply that if simultaneously seeing and touching d acquaints me with it, then in Case (3) I possess A'. I will argue below that in Case (3) I lack A', and consequently that perceiving d in this way does not acquaint me with it. First of all, observe that it is possible that in Case (3) I have inadequate inductive evidence for r2 . And just as in Case (1), if this is actually the case then in Case (3) I do not know r2 , and without additional information I do not know whether I see a single object or a pair of look-alikes. For this reason, arguments like those based on Case (1) imply that in Case (3) I lack A'. Since I have already shown that if my simultaneously seeing and touching d acquaints me with it, then in Case (3) I possess A', it follows that my perceiving d in this way does not acquaint me with it. Hence, there is

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an argument based on Case (3), parallel to the one based on Case (1), which implies that an individual's simultaneously seeing and touching a physical object or person neither acquaints him with it, nor acquaints him with one of its temporal slices.' There are arguments, parallel to the ones I have advanced to show that a persons's seeing or touching a physical item, x, does not acquaint him with x, which show that a person is not acquainted with x either by perceiving x with one of the other three senses, or by simultaneously perceiving x with any combination of the five senses. Such arguments may involve analogs of Case (1), Case (2), and Case (3), in which a person listens to an object by using earphones attached to each ear, smells an object by using tubes attached to each nostril, tastes an object with each side of his tongue, and so forth. Strategies like the ones I have developed in this chapter can also be used to show that a person's perceiving an object does not acquaint him with a nonsubstantial physical entity such as an object's surface or a temporal slice of an object's surface. In other words, entities of these kinds can either be perceived at different times or be perceived by two modes of perception at once, and arguments parallel to R, or its synchronic analogs, apply to them.

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Because these parallel arguments are substantially the same as those already discussed, I forego any further discussion of them here. Each of us can identify a particular physical object or person other than himself in a variety of ways, for example, by perceiving it, by reading about it, and so on. None of these ways has a better claim to be an avenue for acquaintance with it than perceiving it. Consequently, since I have shown that perceiving a physical object or person does not acquaint any of us with it, it follows that none of us is acquainted with a physical object or person other than himself. Analogous arguments imply that none of us is acquainted with items of the following kinds: temporal slices of physical objects or persons other than himself, surfaces of such objects, and temporal slices of such surfaces. Surely, if any one of us ever grasps the haecceity of a physical object or person other than himself, then he thereby does so when he knows a perceptual observation statement about an object of this kind. But as we have seen, when one of us knows such a POS, he does not thereby grasp the haecceity of a physical object or person other than himself. It follows that none of us ever grasps the haecceity of a physical object or person other than himself. 23 For parallel reasons, none of us ever grasps haecceities of items of the following kinds: temporal slices of physical objects or persons other than himself, surfaces of such objects, and temporal slices of such surfaces.

22

Below, I describe three analogs of (1), (2), and (3) whose details can be spelled out in a way parallel to the details in (1), (2), and (3). If these details are provided, then there are arguments based on these analogs which are parallel to the ones based on (1), (2), and (3), and have the same conclusions. (1') At t, I know that there is a pair of look-alikes in the vicinity. At t, I have two distinct simultaneous visual perceptions of a thing because I look at a thing which is in front of me and at the same time look at that thing either through a periscope or via its reflections in a number of mirrors. (2') At t, I know that an object in the vicinity has been broken in half, and thus that there are now two objects there instead of one. At t, I perceive a single object and notice its right and left halves. But I do not perceive the middle portion of this object because it is covered. (3') At t, I know that there are two objects in the vicinity which are not joined together to form a single object. I also know that if I were to perceive these objects, then they would appear to be a single object either because they are an imperceptible distance from one another, or because they are in contact but not joined. At 1, I perceive a single object by looking at it and/or touching it, or by enclosing it in my hand. (1), (2), (3), and their analogs, are cases of the following kind: I perceive a single object, but in certain circumstances I do not know whether I perceive one object or two because I have inadequate inductive evidence for an identity claim.

23

Clearly, since none of us can grasp a haecceity exemplified by a material object or person other than himself, none of us can grasp a haecceity which is unexemplified (and so other than one's own haecceity) and such that if it were exemplified, then it would be exemplified by a material object or person.

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VI - OBJECTIONS TO R AND ITS ANALOGS: A REBUTTAL "There is a reality that is external and yet given immediately to the mind. Common sense is right on this point, as against

the idealism and realism of the philosophers." (1903 Bergson An Introduction to Metaphysics) "We can always easily convert an hypothetical syllogism of one form into another, the modus ponens into the modus tollens." [a 1856 Hamilton Lectures on Metaphysics & Logic I. 344 (1860)]

A possible objection to R goes as follows. R's conclusion is that none of us grasps the haecceity of an external object. However, as we have seen, it is prima facie plausible that each of us grasps the haecceity of an external object. Since R is a logically valid argument whose conclusion is incompatible with something which is prima facie plausible, it is likely that R has a false premise. In particular, it is probable that perception enables us to be acquainted with physical objects, but either none of us can recall a proposition involving the haecceity of an external object, or none of us can know a conjunction of two propositions which involves such a haecceity. In other words, it is likely that premise 1 of R is false. My reply is this. In the first place, the prima facie plausibility of the claim that each of us grasps the haecceity of an external object is based on (PG), a principle which makes the plausibility of this claim dependent upon the plausibility of the claim that external objects have haecceities. However, it is obvious that if external objects do not have haecceities, then none of us grasps the haecceity of an external object. Hence, (PG) does not make the claim that each of us grasps the haecceity of an external object any more plausible than the claim that external objects have haecceities. But the latter claim is based on highly theoretical considerations such as those advanced in Chapter 2. Although considerations of this sort make the claim that external objects have haecceities plausible, this claim seems less plausible than the claim that each of us can recollect things he has recently learned, and can know conjunctive propositions. After all, it is evident that humans

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have these epistemic abilities. Furthermore, it appears that each of us can recall propositions involving his own haecceity, or haecceities of certain abstract entities, and in many cases can know a conjunction of two such propositions. For example, it seems that I can recall that the color I was thinking of a moment ago is Redness, and, that I can know both that I recall this and that the color I am now thinking of is. Redness. Thus, it is difficult to believe that if perception enables us to be acquainted with physical objects, then none of us is able to recall a proposition which involves a haecceity of an external object, or know a conjunction of two such propositions. For these reasons, when forced to choose between accepting R's conclusion that none of us is acquainted with an external object, and rejecting R's presupposition that each of us has the epistemic abilities in question, we should choose the former. Hence, this objection to R does not succeed. But a naive haecceitist would assert that when he perceives an external object he has a self-evident intuition that he grasps the haecceity of that object. Presumably, if a naive haecceitist grasps a haecceity of an external object in this way, then he can know that he grasps this haecceity. Thus, a naive haecceitist might argue that since he knows he grasps the haecceity of an external object, he knows some premise of R is false. Such a naive haecceitist rejects R on the ground that he knows its conclusion is false. However, I do not have a self-evident intuition that when I perceive an external object I grasp the haecceity of that object. For this reason, I do not attach any credibility to the naive haecceitist's claim to know that R has a false conclusion. It would appear that if a person's perception of an external object is the occasion for his having a self-evident intuition of his grasping the haecceity of that object, then he has such an intuition in virtue of an innate epistemic ability. Surely, such an epistemic ability would be possessed by all human perceivers. But, since I am a human perceiver and I lack a self-evident intuition of my perceptually grasping the haecceity of an external object, I conclude that it is not likely that the naive haecceitist has a self-evident intuition of his perceptually grasping the haecceity of an external object. Thus, I find the naive haecceitist's objection to R unacceptable. However, one might object to R and its synchronic analogs on the basis

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of a theory of sophisticated perceptual haecceitism. Such a theory has three components. (1) Any one of us, S, frequently grasps the haecceity of an external object, x, when he perceives x at different times or by means of different sensory modes. (2) Each of these episodes of perceptual acquaintance is characterized by a different cognitive perspective which determines a unique way in which either x's haecceity is grasped by S at a particular time or x's haecceity is grasped by S via a particular sensory mode. (3) Just as S's re-identification of an object from one perceptual situation to another can only be inferentially justified by using inductive methods, S cannot inferentially justify the claim that the haecceity he grasps from one of these cognitive perspectives is identical with the haecceity he grasps from another one of these cognitive perspectives except by employing inductive methods. Sophisticated perceptual haecceitism is a rather unintuitive theory: there is simply no intuition that for each perceptual occasion or sensory mode there is a corresponding unique cognitive perspective of the sort required. Furthermore, if there were such cognitive perspectives, then it is likely that their existence would be reflected in the structure of our language or in our linguistic practices. Since there is nothing in these linguistic phenomena to suggest that there are perspectives of this kind, it seems that there are no such perspectives. In the light of the foregoing observations, we can see that the theory of sophisticated perceptual haecceitism preserves the idea that we grasp haecceities of external objects only by postulating an infinite number of apparently ineffable cognitive perspectives. Surely, such a theory is unacceptable. Before considering the next objection, notice that my defense of premise 1 of R presupposes that in a case of a certain sort, if I know a nonqualitative proposition ((p & q) & (p & q) —> r), and I believe r as a result of deducing r from ((p & q) & (p & q) —> r), then I know r. Recall that in a case of this sort, (p & q) involves a haecceity of a physical object or person, I deduce r from (p & q) via SD in virtue of (Al), and by knowing r I re-identify the physical object or person in question from one perceptual situation to another. It might be urged against premise 1 of R that knowledge is not closed under logical deduction: there could be a case in which I know a proposition (a & (a b)), I believe b as a result of deducing b from (a & (a —> b)),

but I do not know b. My argument for premise 1 of R might be rejected on the ground that deductive closure does not apply in cases relevant to an assessment of this premise. I am inclined to regard the principle that knowledge is closed under logical deduction as something I know a priori. According to this principle, it is a necessary truth that for any person, S, if S knows a proposition (a & (a --> b)) and S believes b as a result of his deducing b from (a & (a —> b)), then S knows b. Thus, I view putative counter-examples to deductive closure with suspicion. Furthermore, even if genuine counter-examples exist, deductive closure usually applies in cases of knowledge. Finally, deductive closure seems to apply in all of the relevant parallel cases in which a person knows a proposition involving his own haecceity or a haecceity of an abstract entity. For these reasons, we may assume that deductive closure applies in the cases relevant to an assessment of premise 1 of R, until we are given good reason to suppose otherwise. One could try to provide such a reason by drawing a parallel with the following argument. According to philosophers such as Robert Nozick, accepting the existence of failures of deductive closure is the price we must pay in order to avoid skepticism about external objects.' For example, I know that

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(a) I am in Greensboro, entails (b) — (I am a brain in a vat on a spaceship in the Andromeda galaxy). Nevertheless, Nozick would hold that although I know (a), I am not in a position to know (b). If I am not in a position to know (b), then I am ignorant of (a) and skepticism about external objects ensues, unless there is a failure of deductive closure. Nozick assumes that skepticism about external objects is an extremely

24 See Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 167-288.

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undesirable conclusion, and that accepting failures of deductive closure is a reasonable price to pay for avoiding that conclusion. He argues that deductive closure fails to apply when a person does not track the proposition he deduces. On Nozick's conception of tracking, a person tracks a proposition, p, just in case (i) ifp were false, then S wouldn't believe p, and (ii) if p were true, then S would believe p. Apparently, if (b) were false, that is, if I were a brain in a vat, then I would nonetheless believe (b), in other words, I would think that I was not a brain in a vat. It follows that in the case under discussion (b) violates (i). This means I do not track (b). According to Nozick, it is my failure to track (b) which explains why there is a failure of deductive closure when I infer (b) from [(a) & [(a) --> (b)]]. But notice that in cases relevant to an assessment of premise 1 of R I do track the re-identification claim r. In particular, (i) if r were false, then I wouldn't believe r: I would grasp different haecceities (belonging to diverse objects) at t1 and t2 , and so I would not think that the thing I perceive at t2 the thing I perceived at t1 ; and (ii) if r were true, then I would grasp the same haecceity (belonging to the same object) at t1 and t2 , and so I would think that the thing I perceive at t 2=the thing I perceived at t2 . 25 According to one of Nozick's rules, S's deductive inference of a from b (which is known) yields knowledge that a on this condition: if a were false, then S wouldn't believe b (or S wouldn't infer a from b). Nozick would say that in the case at hand my deduction of r from my knowledge that ((p & q) & (p & q) ---> r) yields knowledge of r if this rule is satisfied: if r were false, then I wouldn't believe ((p & q) & (p & q) ----> r) (or I wouldn't infer r from ((p & g) & (p & q) r). It isn't difficult to see that Nozick's rule is satisfied in this case. Firstly, if r were false, then I would fail to believe either p or q. After all, p and q involve the haecceity of the same object, but if r were false, then either my belief that p or my belief that q would be

25 See Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, pp. 179-185. Nozick refines his account of tracking in order to deal with various problem cases, primarily ones in which either a different method of acquiring knowledge is utilized in a close counter-factual situation or multiple methods of acquiring knowledge are employed. But none of Nozick's refinements have any effect on my verdict in the case under discussion. In this case only a single method is involved, and in my assessment of the relevant counter-factuals I hold the method of acquiring knowledge fixed, as Nozick requires.

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replaced by a belief in another proposition which involves the haecceity of a different object. Hence, if r were false, then I wouldn't believe ((p & q) & (p & q) r). Secondly, it was shown above that if r were false, then I wouldn't believe r. It follows that if r were false, then I wouldn't infer r from ((p & q) & (p & q) -> r). For these reasons, Nozick's rule for the transmission of knowledge from the premises of a proof to its conclusion is satisfied in the case under consideration. I conclude that the sort of failure of deductive closure postulated by Nozick does not include failures of closure in deducing r from ((p & q) & (p & q) r) in cases relevant to an assessment of premise 1 of R. Still, it might be argued along Nozickian lines that accepting failures of deductive closure for propositions involving the haecceities of external objects is the price we must pay for sustaining the belief that we grasp haecceities of external objects. But despite the analogy between such an argument and Nozick's, there are two reasons why these arguments are not comparable in plausibility. First of all, our belief that we have knowledge about external objects possesses greater prima facie plausibility than the belief that we grasp haecceities of external objects. In this connection, notice that a person's having knowledge of an external object does not entail his grasping a haecceity of such an object, since a person can have indirect knowledge of an external object. Second of all, sustaining the belief that we grasp haecceities of external objects is of far less importance to us than sustaining the belief that we have knowledge of external objects. Even if accepting the occurrence of certain failures of deductive closure is a reasonable price to pay for sustaining the latter belief, it seems that accepting the occurrence of failures of deductive closure in cases which are relevant to an assessment of premise 1 of R is too high a price to pay for sustaining the former belief. On a final note, observe that replies parallel to those given in defense of R in this section can be used in defense of R's synchronic analogs.

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VII - DIVINE COGNITION AND HAECCEITIES "To distinguish well between Knowables and Unknowables." (1725 Watts Logick: Or the Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry After Truth I. vi. § I)

Although I have argued that none of us ever grasps the haecceity of a physical object or person other than himself, I have yet to argue that a person's grasping the haecceity of a physical object or person other than himself is an impossibility. Edward Wierenga is an example of a philosopher who believes it is possible for someone to grasp the haecceity of a person other than himself. 26 Although Wierenga concedes it is plausible that none of us can grasp the haecceity of a person other than himself, he maintains there is no reason to deny that God grasps the haecceities of persons other than himself. I will argue that Wierenga's position is untenable, and that a person's grasping the haecceity of a physical object or person other than himself is an impossibility. To start with, where P is a person, it is at least frequently true that P's bearing a cognitive attitude to a particular, x, is P's bearing a cognitive attitude to a state of x, where a state of x is either x's being characterized in some way or x's being related in a certain way to one or more items. Likewise, it is at least often true that P's bearing a maximally direct cognitive attitude to x is P's bearing a maximally direct cognitive attitude to a state of x. It seems that P grasps the haecceity or nonqualitative "thisness" of x only if at some time P bears a maximally direct cognitive attitude to x that enables P to grasp x's haecceity. Apparently, the most direct cognitive attitude P bears to a physical object or person other than himself is a perceptual one. Consequently, it seems that P does not grasp the haecceity of a physical object or person other than himself unless at some time P has

26

Edward Wierenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989). Compare Gary Rosenkrantz, "Critical Notice: The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes by Edward Wierenga," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51 (1991), pp. 725-728.

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a perception of a physical object or person, x, which enables P to grasp x's haecceity. However, the following considerations make it plausible that P has no perception of this kind. As we have already learned, if P's perceiving x enables P to grasp x's haecceity, then P has the ability to identify x from one perceptual occasion or mode to another by means of a deductive inference from perceptual premises, without P's justification for this identification depending upon an inductive connection between the perceptual premises and the identification. Since none of us has this ability, perception does not enable any of us to grasp the haecceity of a physical object or person. Is divine perception superior to our own in this respect? We may assume that God perceives an object, an event, or a qualitative attribute that we fail to perceive, for example, an electron, a radio wave, or a transpectral color. But it seems that such a superhuman perception would no more reveal the haecceity of an individual thing than would a human perception. However, it might be argued that a divine perception is more direct than a human perception. After all, a human perception is causally mediated by physical states of a sense-organ and the nervous system, but if an omniscient spirit such as God has a perception, then there is no need to suppose that this perception is mediated by a physical state. For this reason, it appears that a state, 0, of a physical object or nondivine person, x, would directly cause God to have an internal perceptual state of 0, whereas 0 can at best cause a human perceiver to have an internal perceptual state of 0 via a causal chain of intermediary states. It might then be inferred that God would have a perception of 0 which is more direct than a human perception of 0. Be that as it may, I shall argue that this perceptual awareness which God would have of 0 is not a maximally direct cognitive attitude, for it is not as direct as the introspective awareness which God would have of one of his own internal perceptual states. I begin by clarifying the notions of an internal perceptual or experiential state and God's introspective awareness of such a state. An internal perceptual or experiential state is either an individual's having a percept, for instance, my having a blue sense-datum, or an individual's being characterized in some experiential psychological way, for example, my being appeared to bluely. For any perceiver, P, and any state, 0, of a physical

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object or person, x, if P has a perception of 0, then P has this perception because P is in a certain internal perceptual or experiential state which is caused by 0. It follows that God's perceptual awareness of a state, 0, of a physical object or nondivine person is causally mediated by another state, namely, an internal perceptual state of God. However, necessarily, a person's awareness of a physical or mental state, 0, of a particular, x, is an instance of a maximally direct cognitive attitude just provided that 0 directly causes that person's awareness of 0, that is, 0 is directly impressed upon his consciousness in virtue of 0 causing his awareness of 0 without the causal mediation of any other state. Surely, if God is introspectively aware of one of his own internal perceptual or experiential states, 0, then God's introspective awareness of 0 is an instance of a maximally direct cognitive attitude. Clearly, when an individual is introspectively aware of one of his own internal perceptual or experiential states, X, this awareness is not via his awareness of some other perceptual or experiential state which is caused by X. Moreover, if the individual engaged in introspection is an omniscient spirit such as God, then such an awareness is not causally mediated by any other sort of state, for example, a brain state. It follows that God's introspective awareness of one of his own internal perceptual states is not causally mediated by any intervening state. In contrast, we have seen that God's perceptual awareness of a state, 0, of a physical object or nondivine person, x, is causally mediated by another state, namely, an internal perceptual state of God. Hence, the perceptual awareness that God has of a state of a physical object or nondivine person is not a maximally direct cognitive attitude: such perceptual awareness is not as direct as God's introspective awareness of one of his own internal perceptual states.' Moreover, an omniscient God's perceptual awareness of a physical object or nondivine person, x, is an instance of a maximally direct cognitive relation only if an omniscient God's perceptual awareness of a state of x is a maximally direct cognitive relation. Thus, divine perception of things or their states, like human perception of

such items, is not a maximally direct cognitive attitude. Since a person grasps the haecceity of a particular, x, only if at some time he bears a maximally direct cognitive attitude to x that enables him to grasp x's haecceity, perception does not enable anyone to grasp the haecceity of a physical object or person. No means other than perception is available for grasping the haecceity of an external physical object or person. For the foregoing reasons, it seems that God, along with the rest of us, cannot grasp

the haecceity of a material object or person other than himself. Since even God would be unable to grasp such a haecceity, I conclude that it is impossible for anyone to grasp a haecceity of this kind.' Thus, there could not be an omniscient being, in the sense of a being who knows (and therefore grasps) every true proposition.' In what follows, I answer three possible objections to the preceding argument. According to the first objection, God has a nonperceptual way of experiencing a physical object or person other than himself, and this form of divine experience is more direct than any perception God could have of such a thing But what could the nature of such a divine experience conceivably be? Of course, there are nonperceptual modes of awareness: a person can experience himself and his own mental states introspectively, and a person can be aware of some abstract entities in an intellectual manner. However, this argument is of no help in understanding how God could nonperceptually experience a physical object or person other than himself, since it is impossible that a person has either introspective awareness, or the relevant kind of intellectual awareness, of a physical object or person other than himself. Indeed, it seems that we cannot conceive of a nonperceptual experience of an external thing. Thus, acceptance of the response under discussion entails acceptance of an incomprehensible mystery. Such an

28

Clearly, since it is impossible for anyone to grasp a haecceity instantiated by material object or person other than himself, it is impossible for anyone to grasp a haecceity which is unexemplified (and thus other than one's own haecceity) and such that if it were exemplified, then it would be exemplified by a material object or person. 29

27

1 assume that physical objects or persons other than God are not identifiable with divine ideas or mental states, or sets or collections of such, items of which God is introspectively aware.

For an opposing view, see Jonathan Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All Knowing God (New York: St. Martin's, 1986), pp. 26-71. However, my argument is compatible with the claim that (i) there is an omniscient being, and (ii) omniscience does not require knowledge of every true proposition. .



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irrational belief is out of place in a proper philosophical argument. The second objection contends that God has innate ideas of nonqualitative haecceities of physical objects and persons other than himself. 3° I answer this as follows. It is difficult enough to conceive of a person, S, who has an innate idea of a qualitative property such as Pain or Pleasure, or (phenomenal) Redness or Greenness, which is possibly an intrinsic characteristic of S. But it is more difficult yet to conceive of a person, S, who has an innate idea of a nonqualitative haecceity of a physical object or person other than himself, a characteristic which is necessarily repugnant to S. Thus, it does not appear possible that God has an innate idea of a nonqualitative haecceity of such an external thing. According to the third objection, God grasps a nonqualitative haecceity, H, of a physical object or person other than himself by abstracting H from his own nonqualitative haecceity or the nonqualitative haecceities of his own mental states. But it seems that no first-order nonqualitative haecceity, H, bears a similarity to other first-order nonqualitative haecceities which would enable a person to abstract H from these other haecceities. Furthermore, an abstractive process of the sort in question can occur only if there is such a similarity. Therefore, it appears that God couldn't grasp a nonqualitative haecceity, H, of a physical object or person other than himself via the abstractive process envisioned by this third objection.

VIII - THE OBJECTS OF ACQUAINTANCE

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"The Sight of the Mind differs very much from the Sight of the Body." (1735 Bolingbroke A Dissertation Upon Parties 135)

In his early writings Russell was inclined to believe that a person is acquainted with himself, his own sense-data, and certain abstract entities. In this section I argue that it is plausible that each of us is acquainted (in my sense) with himself, some of his own mental states, and a variety of abstract entities. Since sense-perception does not acquaint any of us with physical objects or persons, none of us is acquainted either with his body or with himself by means of sensory perception. However, it may be argued that a person is acquainted with himself by nonsensory means, namely, introspection?' Typically, if a person has an item of self-knowledge, then he uses the idiom of the first-person to express what he knows. Bearing this in mind, let us consider the following case. Case (4): At t1 I know that

the thing I am thinking of at t, is me. Then I fall into a deep dreamless sleep for 10 minutes. Upon awakening at 6, I know that

the thing I am thinking of at t 2 is me (call this statement q 4). At t2 I remember (and hence know) that

the thing I was thinking of at t, is me (call this statement r4). 31

30

For a person, S, to have an innate idea of F-ness is for S to have an innate ability to classify something as an F, an ability S does not have because of some perception S has of an F. See Chapter 1, section V, and particularly footnote 17.

For example, see Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, Chapter 1. He argues that each of us grasps his own haecceity when he knows that he has a self-presenting state. Compare The First Person, in which Chisholm attacks the position he held in Person and Object on this matter.

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Lastly, at t2 I am logically accomplished, I_know (q, & r„), and I attempt to deduce the following claim from (q, & r,): the thing I am thinking of at t 2 is the thing I was thinking of at t i (call this re-identification claim s4). Notice that because (q, & r„) trivially entails s„, in Case (4) I come to know 54 by deducing it from (q, & r„). If I perform this deduction by using my haecceity to perform SD, then I am acquainted with myself. Is there an argument like R which shows that in Case (4) I do not perform this deduction in this way? There is such an argument only if in Case (4), if at t2 I lack adequate inductive evidence for s 4 , then I do not deduce 5 4 from (q, & r„). But in Case (4), it seems that when I deduce s„ from (q, & r,) I am relying only on introspection and my memory of what I introspected, neither of which involves any inductive methods. Thus, as far as I can see at present, in Case (4) I deduce s„ from (q, & r4) even if I have inadequate inductive evidence for 54 . For this reason, it appears that strategies similar to those employed in defense of R cannot be used to construct a sound parallel argument which implies that none of us is acquainted with himself. Observe that a case in which I lack memory knowledge of r, cannot be used to construct a parallel argument of this kind, since such a parallel argument requires that I fail to come to know 5, by deducing it from (q, & r4) in a case in which I possess memory knowledge of r„. For example, suppose I forget r„. In that case, I do not come to know 54 by deducing it from (q, & r„), since I do not know r,. However, because I do not have the requisite memory knowledge of r„, this does not suggest there is a good argument parallel to R which implies I am not acquainted with myself. Alternatively, imagine that an extraterrestrial with a duplication machine is in the neighborhood. He sneaks up on people while they are asleep and duplicates them. A duplicate has the same apparent memories as the original, at least to the extent that this is possible. I have just learned of the extraterrestrial's activities, and I am worried that I am a freshly created duplicate. As it happens, I am not. In such a case, it seems that I would not come to know s, by deducing it from (q, & r„). But this is because my

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knowledge of the activities of the extraterrestrial defeats the justification of my memory belief in r,. Thus, once again the requirement that I have memory knowledge of r, is not met. What of my freshly created duplicate? He too fails to have the required memory knowledge: he does not remember that the thing he was thinking of at a certain earlier time is himself: since he was just created, none of his apparent memories are true. Moreover, even if my duplicate soon acquires some true apparent memories, so long as he does not have more true apparent memories than false ones, and remains unable to detect the falsity of his mistaken apparent memories, he continues, it seems, to be in no position to possess the requisite memory knowledge. Hence, cases of these kinds do not suggest there is a good argument parallel to R which implies that a person is not acquainted with himself. Turning to the case of sense-data, they can be thought of as essentially fleeting and nonrepeatable particulars. In that case, it is impossible for a sense-datum to be re-identified. Given this conception of sense-data, an argument like R cannot be used to refute the thesis that a person is acquainted with his own sense-data. Moreover, it is impossible for there to be two simultaneous introspective experiences of a single sense-datum. It follows that an argument like the one brought to bear on temporal slices of physical objects in the preceding section cannot be used to discredit the claim that a person is acquainted with his own sense-data. Similar considerations apply to the claim that if a person, S, knows, at a moment t, that the time at which something is happening is now, then at t S is acquainted with t. 32 Notice that a person can have an awareness of t as now only at t. Hence, no argument like R can be used to refute the thesis that S is acquainted with t. Furthermore, it appears that a person cannot be aware of t as now by means of two modes of awareness at once. Thus, it seems that no argument like R's synchronic analogs can be used to discredit

32

Compare Ernest Sosa, The Status of Becoming: What is Happening Now?" The Journal

of Philosophy, 76 (1979), pp. 26-42.

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the thesis that S is acquainted with t. 33 Finally, let us look at a representative case in which a person is aware of an abstract entity, for instance, a property. Case (5): At t, I know that

the color I am aware of at t, is Red. Then I fall into a deep dreamless sleep for 10 minutes. At t2 I awaken, and I know that

the color I am aware of at t2 is Red (call this statement g5). At t2 I remember that

the color I was aware of at t, is Red (call this statement r5). Lastly, at t2 I am logically accomplished, I know (q5 & r5), and I attempt to deduce the following claim from (q 5 & r5):

the color I am aware of at t 2 is the color I was aware of at ti (call this re-identification claim s5). Notice that since (q5 & r5) trivially entails s5 , in Case (5) I come to know s5 by deducing it from (g,& r 5). If I perform this deduction by using the haecceity of Red to perform SD, then I am acquainted with this color. Is there an argument like R which shows that in Case (5) I do not perform this deduction in this way? There is such an argument only if in Case (5), if at

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t2 I lack adequate inductive evidence for s5 , then I do not deduce s5 from (q5 & 1.5). But in Case (5), it seems that when I deduce s5 from (g, & r5) I am relying only on my grasping the property of being identical with Red and my remembering my grasping this property, neither of which involves any inductive methods. Thus as far as I can tell, in Case (5) I deduce ,s5 from (q 5 & r5) even if I have inadequate inductive evidence for s5 . For this reason, it appears that strategies similar to those used in defense of R cannot be employed to construct a sound parallel argument which implies that none of us is acquainted with an abstract entity. As we saw above, in Cases (4) and (5) a person seems to epistemically justify re-identification claims about himself or an abstract entity on noninductive grounds, whereas none of us ever justifies a re-identification claim about a physical object or person other than himself on, such grounds. Notice that this epistemological asymmetry is explicable on the hypothesis that a person grasps his own haecceity, or the haecceities of some abstracta, but does not grasp the haecceity of a physical object or person other than himself. According to such an explanation, in Case 4 [Case 5] I justify s4 [55] by using a haecceity to deduce 5 4 [5.5] from (p„ & q 4) [(p 5 & q 5)] via SD; whereas none of us ever utilizes a deductive method of this kind to justify a re-identification claim about a physical object or person other than himself. The fact that the epistemological asymmetry in question is explicable on the aforementioned hypothesis is a point in favor of that hypothesis. As shown earlier, the claim that we grasp our own haecceities is prima facie plausible?' Moreover, arguments like R do not defeat the plausibility of this claim. Furthermore, we have seen that the claim that a person grasps his own haecceity has a certain explanatory utility?' Hence, until there is good reason to think otherwise, it is quite plausible to think that we grasp our own haecceities. I have , argued that the existence of abstracta is plausible, including the

33

0n the other hand, it is clear that an argument parallel to R does yield the conclusion that nobody has direct knowledge of a place when he identifies it as here. For relevant, historically important, material on the identification of bodies, souls; places, times, and other concreta see Franz Brentano, Theory of Categories, Roderick Chisholm and Norbert Guterman, trans. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981). Compare Brentano's Philosophical Investigations on Space, Time and the Continuum, Barry Smith, trans. (London: Croom Helm, 1988). Here Brentano maintains that a time, a place, or a soul is individuated by its "individual peculiarity," but that none of us can grasp such a differentia individualis.

34 35

See section I of this chapter, and also Chapter 1, section V.

The claim in question not only affords an explanation of the aforementioned epistemological asymmetry, it yields an analysis of a person's self-ascription of a property. For an argument in support of the latter point, and a description of other possible explanatory roles of the haecceity notion in the cognitive area see Chapter 1, section V.

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existence of haecceities of abstracta. For example, it appears that both Redness and being identical with Redness exist, the latter property being the former property's haecceity. And since it seems that a person believes there is something which is identical with Redness, (PG) makes it prima facie plausible that a person grasps the haecceity of Redness. Furthermore, it appears that there is no argument resembling R which defeats this prima facie plausibility. Thus, until we have good reason to believe otherwise, the claim that we grasp the haecceity of Redness is plausible. Since parallel considerations apply to numerous other properties, as well as to numerous relations and propositions, it is prima facie plausible that we grasp haecceities of abstracta of these sorts. When it comes to the question of whether any of us grasps the haecceity of an item, x, there is a difference between a case in which x is a person or an abstract entity and a case in which x is a sense-datum or a time. The difference is this: I have argued that abstracta exist, and it is evident that persons exist, but I have not argued that sense-data or times exist, and it is not clear that the existence of sense-data or times is acceptable. However, unless it is plausible that sense-data or times exist, there is no haecceity, H, exemplifiable by a sense-datum or time of which we can plausibly say that it exists. But given the structure of (PG), (PG) can make it prima facie plausible for us that we grasp haecceities of sense-data or times only if there is such a haecceity H. Hence, I doubt that (PG) can make it prima facie plausible for us that we grasp haecceities of sense-data or times. Accordingly, I do not claim that we are acquainted with items of either of these two sorts. However, it appears that whether or not sense-data or times exist, a person's momentary occurrent mental states exist. For example, presently there is a momentary state my thinking that I see something red, 5 seconds earlier there was a momentary state my feeling sad, and 5 seconds later there will be a momentary state my being appeared to greenly. Clearly, arguments like those based on (PG) which make it prima facie plausible that we grasp our own haecceities and haecceities of certain abstract entities, make it prima facie plausible that we grasp the haecceities of some of our own momentary occurrent mental states. Below, I try to show that there is no argument like R or its synchronic analogs which defeats this prima facie plausibility.

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To begin with, there are two conceptions of a momentary occurrent mental state: necessarily, either (i) such a state is nonrepeatable and cannot be introspectively experienced at two different times, or (ii) such a state is repeatable and capable of being introspectively experienced at two different times. In the first case, if a momentary state, x, is earlier or later than a momentary state, y, then x is diverse from y. In the second case, a momentary state x's being F exists if and only if x has the property of being F. Only in the latter case is it possible for a person to re-identify one of his own momentary occurrent mental states. But it appears that in this latter case each of us can re-identify such a mental state in a way analogous to which I re-identify myself or an abstract entity in Case (4) or (5). Consider, for instance, the following state of affairs. Case (6): At t1 I know that the state I am introspectively experiencing at t 1 is my being appeared to redly.

Then I fall into a deep dreamless sleep for 10 minutes. At t2 I awaken, and I know that the state I am introspectively experiencing at t2 is my being appeared to redly (call this statement g6).

At t2 I remember that the state I was introspectively experiencing at t 1 is my being appeared to redly (call this statement r6).

Finally, at t2 I am logically accomplished, I know (q 6 & r6), and I attempt to deduce the following claim from (q 6 & r6): the state I am introspectively experiencing at t 2 is the state I was introspectively experiencing at t, (call this re-identification claim s6).

Notice that because (q 6 & r6) trivially entails s6, in Case (6) I come to

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know s6 by deducing it from (q6 & r6). If I perform this deduction by using the haecceity of my being appeared to redly to perform SD, then I am acquainted with this state. Is there an argument like R which shows that in Case (6) I do not perform this deduction in this way? There is such an argument only if in Case (6), if at t2 I lack adequate inductive evidence for s6, then I do not deduce s6 from (q 6 & r6). But in Case (6), it seems that when I deduce s6 from (q 6 & r6) I am relying only on my introspecting that I am being appeared to redly, my grasping the property of being identical with my being appeared to redly, and my remembering my grasping this property, none of which involves any inductive methods. Thus as far as I can tell, in Case (6) I deduce s6 from (q 6 & r) even if I have inadequate inductive evidence for s 6 . For this reason, it appears that strategies similar to those used in defense of R cannot be employed to construct a sound parallel argument which implies that none of us is acquainted with one of his own repeatable momentary occurrent mental states. On the other hand, if a momentary occurrent mental state is nonrepeatable, then it also follows that there is no argument resembling R which discredits the thesis that we are acquainted with some of our own momentary occurrent mental states. Hence, it seems that there is no argument like R which defeats the prima facie plausibility of the claim that we grasp the haecceities of some of our own momentary occurrent mental states. In addition, it appears impossible for a mental state to be introspectively experienced by means of two modes of awareness at once. Consequently, it seems that there is no argument resembling a synchronic analog of R which undermines the thesis that we are acquainted with some of our own momentary occurrent mental states. Therefore, it appears that no argument of this kind defeats the prima facie plausibility of the claim that we grasp the haecceities of some of our own momentary occurrent mental states. The key cognitive and linguistic implications of my argument can now be summarized. First of all, it seems that if a person grasps the haecceities of certain entities, then he is acquainted with these entities. Of course, in my sense of acquaintance the converse is obviously true. Hence, it appears that an individual grasps the haecceities of certain entities just provided that he is acquainted with those entities. Similarly, one of us can have direct de re propositional belief or knowledge about an item, x, if and only if he grasps

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the haecceity of x. Likewise, one of us can use a proper name or indexical indicator to express the haecceity of item, x, just in case he grasps the haecceity of x. However, it seems that we can grasp our own haecceities, haecceities of some of our own mental states, and haecceities of certain abstract entities. Three consequences follow. Firstly, there is reason to think that each of us is acquainted with items of these kinds. Secondly, it appears that we can have direct de re propositional belief or knowledge with respect to such items. Thirdly, it seems that each of us can use a proper name or indexical indicator to express haecceities of items of these sorts. For example, apparently, I can use `Rosenkrantz' or 'I' to express my haecceity; I can use 'this' to express the haecceity of some of my mental states; and I can use 'Redness' to express the haecceity of Redness. But it is impossible for anyone to grasp the haecceity of a physical object or person other than himself, or the haecceity of a surface of such a thing, or the haecceity of a temporal slice of a particular of any of these kinds. Three consequences ensue. First, no one can ever be acquainted with such a particular. Second, no one can ever have direct de re propositional belief or knowledge about a particular of this kind: our propositional de re belief or knowledge about a particular of this sort is indirect. Third, no one can ever use a proper name or indexical indicator to express the haecceity of such a particular. 36 Thus, any version of the causal theory of reference or 36 According to Roderick Chisholm's view in Person and Object, when I introspectively identify myself as 'I', I grasp my haecceity or individual essence, viz., the property of being identical with me; but when I perceptually identify an external object as 'that thing' I do not grasp the haecceity of that object. Alvin Plantinga criticized Chisholm's position in "De Essentia," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 7/8 (1979), pp. 101-121. Plantinga rejects Chisholm's argument for the claim that we do not grasp haecceities of external objects, and then seems to reject the claim itself. I cite some of Plantinga's critical remarks below. In interpreting those remarks, three things should be kept in mind. Firstly, Plantinga is attacking the foregoing Chisholmian view. Secondly, Plantinga is using the term 'essence' as a synonym for Chisholm's term `haecceity'. Finally, Plantinga is assuming (for the sake of argument) that Chisholm is right when he says a thing has just one haecceity or individual essence. In reference to Chisholm's argument, Plantinga says the following. "These considerations, therefore, do nothing to show that the phrases 'that person' and 'that thing' don't typically express or intend essences. And isn't that the natural account to give of those phrases? Suppose I refer to Zwier as that person: surely he couldn't have existed but lacked the property of being that person, i.e., the property expressed on that occasion by 'that person'; and surely no, one distinct from him could have been that person. So when I use the phrase to refer to Zwier, it

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the semantics of direct reference which implies that we can employ a proper name or indexical indicator to express the haecceity of a particular of this type is mistaken. 37 Three additional linguistic conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, there are some haecceities which no one is capable of grasping or linguistically

expressing, for example, haecceities of nonsentient physical objects. Secondly, in some cases a haecceity can be grasped or expressed linguistically by one and only one person, for instance, haecceities of certain persons and mental states. Finally, there are some haecceities which can be grasped or expressed linguistically by many people, for instance, haecceities of abstracta such as Redness and Squareness. 38 We have seen that a person can be acquainted with (or can grasp the haecceities of) certain nonexternal items and first-order qualitative properties, but that no one can be acquainted with (or can grasp the haecceities of) external things and their spatio-temporal slices. Surely, if any one of us can grasp a haecceity, H, of a concretum or first-order qualitative property, then he can grasp a higher-order property, If, which is the haecceity of H, and no one can grasp If unless he can grasp H. For example, I can grasp the first-order property of Identity-with-me by thinking that something is identical with me, if and only if I can grasp the second-order property of Identity-with-Identity-with-me by thinking that something is identical with Identity-with-me. Likewise, I can grasp the second-order property of Identity-with-Redness by thinking that something is identical with Redness,

expresses an essence; and when I use it to refer to someone else it expresses a different essence just as the word 'I', when you use it expresses an essence, and a different essence from the one it expresses when I use it." (p. 106) "Phrases like 'that person' do indeed express essences, so that if I know such a proposition as that person is elegantly attired, I know a proposition entailing someone else's essence." (p. 107) From what Plantinga says in "De Essentia," he appears to be committed to the view that we grasp haecceities of physical objects and persons other than ourselves, and use indexical indicators to express those haecceities. 37

For example, see M. Lockwood, "Identity and Reference" in M. Munitz, ed., Identity and Individuation (New York: New York University Press, 1971), pp. 199-211, and "On Predicating Proper Names," The Philosophical Review, 84 (1975), pp. 471-498. 38 Earlier versions of arguments supporting these conclusions can be found in my articles "Haecceities and Perceptual Identification," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 9 (1979), pp. 107119, and "Acquaintance," Philosophia, 14 Nos. 1-2 (1984), pp. 1-23.

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just provided that I can grasp the third-order property of Identity-withIdentity-with-Redness by thinking that something is identical with Identitywith-Redness. Since a person can be acquainted with an item just in case he can grasp that item's haecceity, it follows that a person can be acquainted both with haecceities of the indicated nonexternal items (including himself and some of his own states of mind) and with haecceities of some first-order properties, but that no one can be acquainted with either haecceities of physical objects or persons other than himself or haecceities of spatiotemporal slices of such external things. Hence, any one of us can have direct de re propositional belief (or knowledge) with, respect to haecceities of the nonexternal items and abstracta in question, but a person cannot have this sort of belief or knowledge with respect to haecceities of the relevant external entities. Similarly, it follows that each one of us can use proper names or indexical indicators to express the haecceities of haecceities of the former nonexternal items and abstracta, but a person cannot use names or indicators of this kind to express the haecceities of haecceities of the latter external entities.

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IX - OBJECTIONS TO RUSSELLIAN OBJECTS OF ACQUAINTANCE: A RESPONSE "Each man is at once profoundly unitary and almost infinitely composite." [a 1901 F. W. H. Myers Human Personality I. p. xxvi (1903)]

It might be objected that an argument resembling a synchronic analog of R refutes the claim that a person is acquainted with himself. According to this argument, a person can have a divided consciousness: a single person can have two centers of consciousness at once, each with its own introspective experiences. However, it is not obvious that there could be such a person. On the other hand, there are two sorts of cases in which a person, S, might have a divided consciousness: (i) S has a multiple personality disorder, and (ii) S's right and left brain hemispheres are no longer connected by the corpus callosum. 39 I shall argue that S's having a divided consciousness does not lead to an argument which resembles a synchronic analog of R and which militates against a person's being acquainted with himself. To begin with, notice that a person's (S's) perceiving an object, x, by two modes of perception at once can be used show that S's perceiving x does not acquaint S with x only if S compares his two perceptual experiences of x, or more precisely, S knows a conjunctive proposition whose conjuncts correspond to his two pieces of demonstrative perceptual knowledge about x. Likewise, there could be a plausible argument which resembles a synchronic analog of R and which implies that S is not acquainted with himself only if possibly, at t S has two introspective experiences of himself, and at t S compares these two experiences, or more exactly, at t S knows a conjunctive proposition whose conjuncts correspond to the two pieces of

39

It should be noted that in split brain cases only one side of the brain exhibits linguistic competence, suggesting (though not proving) that there is only one center of consciousness in the person. Furthermore, the typical case of multiple personalities is one in which the personalities surface diachronically, suggesting that there is only one center of consciousness in the person at a time. It would be bizarre to suppose that two such personalities manifest themselves synchronically, e.g., one by speaking, and the other by writing. Nonetheless, such a phenomenon is conceivable.

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introspective knowledge he has about himself at t. But suppose for the sake of argument that at t S has two separate centers of consciousness, and at t each of these centers of consciousness has a separate introspective experience of S. Since these introspective experiences belong to different centers of consciousness, at t S does not compare the two introspective experiences in question: at t S does not know a conjunctive proposition whose conjuncts correspond to the two pieces of introspective knowledge under discussion. Consequently, such a case of divided consciousness does not generate an argument which resembles a synchronic analog of R and which discredits the claim that a person is acquainted with himself. Likewise, if at t S has two centers of consciousness, and there is a mental state, M, or a property, P, such that each of these centers of consciousness either introspects M, or grasps P, or is aware of t as now, then at t S does not know the relevant conjunction of propositions about M, P, or t. Hence, a case of divided consciousness cannot be used to construct an argument which resembles a synchronic analog of R and which militates against our being acquainted with some of our own mental states, certain properties, or times. Although I contend each of us can grasp his own haecceity, some philosophers sincerely avow that when they reflect upon themselves it seems to them they fail to find such a property." Yet others have the opposite intuition. An eloquent evocation of this opposing intuition may be found in the notebooks of the English poet Gerard Manley Hopkins.'" Hopkins wrote as follows: 42

40

For example, see Jaegwon Kim, "Critical Notice: The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality by Roderick Chisholm," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 46 (1986), pp. 488. Kim writes that "Chisholm is surely right about this: I have no idea what my own "me-ness" is like. There is no sense of 'conceive' that I can even faintly understand in which I think I can conceive this me-ness." 41

Incidentally, Hopkins was an admirer of Duns Scotus, finding him "Of realty the rarestveined unraveller; a not. Rivalled insight, be rival Italy or Greece." See Hopkins's poem Duns Scotus's Oxford (1879). 42

The Notebooks And Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins, Humphry House, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 309-310.

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When I consider my self being, my consciousness and my feeling of myself, that taste of myself, of I and me above and in all things, which is more distinctive than the taste of ale or alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnutleaf or camphor, and is incommunicable by any means to another man (as when I was a child I used to ask myself: What must it be to be someone else?). Nothing else in nature comes near this unspeakable stress of pitch, distinctiveness, and selving, this selfbeing of my own. Nothing explains it or resembles it, except so far as this, that other men to themselves have the same feeling. But this only multiplies the phenomena to be explained so far as the cases are like and do resemble. But to me there is no resemblance: searching nature I taste self but at one tankard, that of my own being. The development, refinement, condensation of nothing shews any sign of being able to match this to me or give me another taste of it, a taste even resembling it. One may dwell on this further. We say that any two things however unlike are in something like. This is the one exception: when I compare my self, my being-myself, with anything else whatever, all things alike, all in the same degree, rebuff me with blank unlikeness; so that my knowledge of it, which is so intense, is from itself alone, they in no way help me to understand it. And even those things with which I in some sort identify myself, as my country or family, and those things which I own and call mine, as my clothes and so on, all presupposes the stricter sense of self and me and mine and are from that derivative.43

It would be fair to say that when Hopkins reflects upon himself it seems

°Compare the poet and the philosophers: Gottlob Frege, Edmund Husserl, and H. D. Lewis. "Now everyone is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is present to no-one else. So, when Dr. Lauben thinks that he has been wounded...and says 'I have been wounded', he must use the 'I' in a sense which can be grasped by others, perhaps in the sense of 'he who is speaking to you at this moment'..." Gottlob Frege, "The Thought: .A Logical Inquiry," Mind, 65 (1956), p. 398. "The word 'I' names a different person from case to case, and does so by way of an ever altering meaning. What its meaning is at the moment, can be gleaned only from the living utterance and from the intuitive circumstances which surround it. If we read the word without knowing who wrote it, it is perhaps not meaningless, but it is at least estranged from its normal sense... In solitary speech the meaning of 'I' is essentially realized in the immediate idea of one's own personality... Each man has his own I-presentation (and with it his individual notion of I), and that is why the word's meaning differs from person to person." Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 315-316 (Investigation I, Section 26). "When I lose my memory I am no longer aware of who I am - in one sense, namely that I do not remember my name, where I live, what I have been doing in the past and so on. I cannot place myself in the sense in which the outside observer would place me on the basis of what is known about me. But I do all the same recognize myself as the unique person I am. It is particulars of my past history and situation that I cannot recover. In a more basic sense I have no doubt who I am - I am myself, the being I expressly recognize myself to be in a way which is not possible for knowledge of any other." H. D. Lewis, The Elusive Mind (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969), p. 235.

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to him that he finds his haecceity! Nevertheless, to base the claim that we grasp our own haecceities on intuitions like those of Hopkins invites a deadlock with those philosophers who have opposing intuitions. Since these conflicting intuitions epistemically counter-balance one another, I set them both aside. In the following passage, Chisholm gives reasons for doubting that any of us ever grasps his own haecceity. It seems doubtful that I can ever be said...to grasp my individual essence or haecceity. If I were to grasp it, shouldn't I also be able to single out its various marks? I can single out some of the marks of my individual essence - if I have one. Thus it may include various universal essential properties (for example, being red or non-red, or being a musician if a violinist). And perhaps I can single out certain non-universal essential properties (for example, being an individual thing and beings person). But if I can grasp my individual essence, then I ought to be able to single out in it those features that are unique to it. If being identical with me is my individual essence and being identical with you is yours, then, presumably, each analyzes into personhood and something else as well - one something in my case and another in yours - but I haven't the faintest idea what this something else might be as

I am puzzled by the argument in the preceding passage. On the one hand, if my haecceity is a simple unanalyzable property, then my haecceity is not analyzable into personhood and something else. In that case, Chisholm's assumption that if I have a haecceity, then it is analyzable into personhood and something else is mistaken. On the other hand, if my haecceity is analyzable into personhood and something else, then why should I be expected to have an idea of what this something else might be? After all, I might reasonably believe that knowledge is analyzable as justified true belief and something else, and yet have no idea of what this something else might be. Thus, Chisholm makes an unwarranted assumption: that if my haecceity is analyzable into personhood and something else, then I have an idea of what this something else might be. Nor is it clear why we should accept Chisholm's assumption that if my haecceity is analyzable, then it is analyzable into personhood and something else. Let us grant that being a

"Roderick Chisholm, "Objects and Persons: Revisions and Replies," Grazer Philosophische Studien, 7/8 (1979), p. 322.

CHAPTER 5

ACQUAINTANCE

person is logically necessary for being identical with me. Still, consider the following parallel case. On the assumption that knowledge is analyzable as justified true belief of a certain sort, the fact that grasping a proposition is logically necessary for knowing a proposition does not seem to imply that propositional knowledge is analyzable in terms of grasping a proposition and something else. Hence, Chisholm's assumption that if my haecceity is analyzable, then it is analyzable into personhood and something else does not seem to be justified. If my haecceity is analyzable, then perhaps it can only be analyzed in some other way. For example, if my haecceity is analyzable, and if I am identical with a complex material object, then perhaps my haecceity can be analyzed wholly in terms of the haecceities of my parts (given principles of mereological essentialism stated earlier which Chisholm would accept') For the foregoing reasons, it appears that Chisholm's doubts about our grasping our own haecceities are unfounded.

X - COGNITIVELY INACCESSIBLE HAECCEITIES

240

241

"The Unknowableness of Real Essences." (1697 J. Sergeant Solid Philosophy Asserted

Against the Fancies of the Ideists 301)

My argument implies that any individual, S, whose awareness of a physical object or person other than himself depends upon his perceptual experiences could not be intimately enough acquainted with such an object or person to grasp its haecceity. But, clearly, if S could not grasp the haecceity of a perceptual object of this kind, then S could not grasp an unexemplified haecceity which individuates a NEP that (of course) he lacks perceptual acquaintance with. In other words, an individual who is able to grasp such an unexemplified haecceity can be directly aware of a physical object or person other than himself without his having a perceptual experience of that physical object or person. However; it appears that an awareness of this kind is impossible. Thus, it is plausible that there couldn't be anyone who grasps a haecceity which individuates a NEP. Hence, it seems impossible that there be someone who grasps a haecceity which individuates a disjoint object.' However, it is possible that a person picks out a property by description even though he is incapable of grasping that property.' Thus, it is still an open question whether there could be someone who picks out an unexemplified haecceity which individuates a disjoint object. In what follows, I argue that it is impossible for a person to pick out or make singular reference to such a haecceity. To make this argument as strong as possible, I shall understand the descriptive identification of an item in a most liberal fashion: S picks out an item, x, by description just when S truly believes that something is F, where

46

This is compatible with the fact that some unexemplified haecceities which individuate disjoint objects are possibly grasped, e.g., an unexemplified haecceity which individuates a disjoint person is possibly exemplified by a person who grasps that haecceity. 45

47

See Chapter 4, section 1.

See Chapter 1, section V.

CHAPTER 5

ACQUAINTANCE

the property of being F is an identifying property exemplified by x. Surely, if we are capable of picking out a property, P, which nobody is ever capable of grasping, then this entails that at some time someone is capable of picking out P by description. Moreover, necessarily, someone is capable of picking out P by description only if someone is capable of grasping an identifying property which P exemplifies. As we saw earlier, there couldn't be anyone who grasps a haecceity, H, which is never exemplified and which individuates a disjoint object. This implies the impossibility of someone's grasping a nonqualitative relational property which pertains to a disjoint object. Moreover, an earlier argument implies that a disjoint object, 0 1 , which could exemplify H is individuated only by such a relational property." Similarly, H is necessarily coinstantiated with a property, P, only if P is a relational property of this kind. After all, H could only be instantiated by o 1 , and o f in a possible world, WI , has a disjoint twin 02 in a possible world, W3, where o 2 in WI and 0 2 in W3 differ from one another (apart frorti ° I 's and o 2 's haecceities) only to the extent that 0 2 and 02 are mereologically or causally related to different disjoint objects in WI and W3, respectively. The fact that His necessarily coinstantiated with a property, P, only if P is a nonqualitative relational property which pertains to a disjoint object, together with the fact that it is impossible for anyone to grasp an unexemplified property such as H, implies that every identifying property exemplified by H is a relational property of the aforementioned sort. Because it is impossible for anyone to grasp a property of this sort, there couldn't be an identifying property had by an unexemplified haecceity like H which anyone is capable of grasping. Moreover, necessarily, someone is capable of picking out a property, P, by description only if someone is capable of grasping an identifying property which P exemplifies. It follows that it is impossible for anyone to pick out an unexemplified property such as H by description. As it is also impossible for anyone to grasp an unexemplified property of this kind, we should

conclude that there couldn't be an individual who picks out such a property.' Likewise, singular reference to an unexemplified property like H is impossible: there couldn't be a definite description, name, or indexical indicator which refers to an unexemplified property of this sort. In addition, if there is a haecceity, H, which could only be exemplified by a nonconscious physical object, then H could not be grasped by anything which exemplifies H. Since it is impossible that a person grasps the haecceity of a physical object other than himself, H could not be grasped by anyone who does not exemplify H. Thus, there couldn't be anybody who grasps H. It appears that there are such necessarily ungraspable haecceities. After all, it seems that possibly, some physical objects are nonconscious in virtue of certain natural laws. Stones and electrons might be examples of such objects. It also appears that possibly, there are objects of this sort which are essentially subsumed under the natural laws in question. Thus, it seems that there could be essentially nonconscious physical objects. Since there are haecceities which could be exemplified by objects of this kind, it appears that certain haecceities could only be exemplified by nonconscious physical objects. Inasmuch as such a haecceity, H, could neither be grasped by an object which exemplifies H, nor be grasped by anything else, it seems that some haecceities are necessarily ungraspable. Perhaps some haecceities exemplified by physical objects are of this sort. In any case, it appears that certain unexemplified haecteities which individuate disjoint physical objects are of this kind."

242

243

49

This is compatible with the fact that a haecceity of this kind is possibly picked out by someone. Such a haecceity, H, is never exemplified and individuates a disjoint object. Yet, H is possibly such that H is exemplified and somebody picks out or makes singular reference to H by description, e.g., as the haecceity exemplified by the object I see on the left. 50

Compare Alvin Plantinga, "Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism," Philosophical Perspectives, 1, Metaphysics (1987), p. 190, and footnote 3, p.

226. According to Plantinga, "Every proposition is such that it is possibly believed or possibly disbelieved or both." As he notes in this connection, "According to the classical theist, every proposition is in fact (and, indeed, necessarily) believed or disbelieved - by God, who is a necessary being and essentially omniscient." Plantinga makes clear that he is committed to the

48

existence of propositions involving nonqualitative haecceities. Such a proposition cannot be grasped without grasping a nonqualitative haecceity. However, given my understanding of what it is to grasp a proposition, believing a proposition requires grasping that proposition. I See Chapter 3, section II.

244

CHAPTER 5

A summary of the implications of my argument for Realism about abstract entities is in order. Robust Realism is justified: my argument that particulars have haecceities implies that there are properties and that Propertyhood is a fundamental ontological category.' Strong Extreme Realism is warranted: there seem to be unexemplified properties which cannot be identified with logical complexes of exemplified properties, namely, haecceities which individuate disjoint objects.' Finally, Radical Realism is justified: it is impossible for anyone to grasp or pick out a haecceity which individuates a disjoint object, and some of these haecceities appear to be necessarily ungraspable. If I am right, then we are warranted in accepting a view which is the very apotheosis and quintessence of Property-Realism.

conclude that Plantinga's views about these matters imply that every nonqualitative haecceity is graspable. Likewise, for the Chisholm of Person and Object, see pp. 117-120. 5t

See Chapter 2.

52

See Chapter 3.

INDEX OF NAMES

Channing, William E. 166 Chisholm, Roderick M. ix, x, xiii, 11, 13, 22, 30, 33, 36, 40, 41, 51, 70, 110, 126, 127, 170, 183, 185, 187, 192, 225, 228, 233, 237, 239, 240, 244 Church, Alonzo 185 Clubbe, John 77 Coleridge, Samuel Taylor 140 Copelston, Frederick 192 Cudworth, Ralph 11 Cusmariu, Arnold xiii Davidson, Donald 57, 85, 120 Descartes, Rene 38, 79 Digby, Sir Kenelm 168 Donnellan, Keith 30 Duns Scotus, Johannes 1, 3, 43, 75, 87, 188, 191, 192, 237 Edwards, Jonathan 146 Faraday, James 20 Frege, Gottlob 185, 238 French, Peter A. x, 11, 164 Goodman, Nelson 5 Gracia, Jorge 75 Guterman, Norbert 228 Hacking, Ian 79, 80 Hamilton, Sir William 22, 214 Hampshire, Stuart 38 Hempel, Carl G. 57, 85 Hoffman, Joshua xiii, xiv, 59, 81, 104 Hopkins, Gerard Manley 82, 237-239 House, Humphry 237 Hoy, Ronald 80 Hume, David 79, 168 Husserl, Edmund 238

Ackermann, Felicia 31, 108 Ackrill, J. L. 60 Adams, Robert ix, 2, 80, 150, 151 Allaire, Edwin 84 Anscombe, G. E. M. 118 Aquinas, St. Thomas 84 Aristotle 60, 63, 84, 102, 131 Armstrong, D. M. 25 Arnauld, A. 42 Audi, Robert xiv Baron, Robert 1 Box, E. Belfort 184 Baxter, Richard 93 Beaumont, Joseph 1 Belsharn, William 196 Bergmann, Gustav 84 Bergson, Henri 184, 214 Berkeley, George 72, 86, 198 Billingsley, Sir Henry 179 Black, Max 77, 78, 80, 90, 106, 122 Boethius 30 Boler, ;John 3 Bolingbroke, Viscount Henry St John 225 Bowen, Frank Charles 150 Boscovich, Roger xiv, 20 Brentano, Franz Clemens 84, 228 Browne, Sir Thomas 168 Bryskett, Lodovick 22 Burkhardt, H. 55 Burton, John Hill 53 Butler, Bishop Joseph 191 Campbell, Keith 5, 85 Carr, Brian xi, 63 Castafieda, Hector-Neri 31, 36

245

246

INDEX OF NAMES

Huxley, Thomas H. 168 Hyman, Arthur 3, 43, 75, 188 Jowett, Benjamin 140 Kames, Lord Henry Home 204 Kaplan, David 33, 185 Kant, Immanuel 20 Kelvin, Lord William Thomson 20 Kim, Jaegwon xiv, 58, 68, 237 Kvanvig, Jonathan 223 Leckie, George G. 84 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 16, 42, 77, 82 Leonardus, Camillus 130 Lesniewski, S. 5 Lewis, David 67 Lewis, H. D. 238 Locke, John 20, 86, 168, 171 Lockwood, Michael ix, 36, 234 Loux, Michael 77, 84, 87, 141 Maddy, Penelope 67 Mann, William 85 Marsh, Robert C. 28, 184 Maxwell, James Clerk 20 Meiland, Jack 87 Meinong, Alexius 84 Mill, James 124 Monboddo, James Burnett 69 More, Henry 97 Munitz, Milton ix, 36, 234 Myers, Frederic W. H. 236 Nozick, Robert 217-219 Ockham 192 Parmenides 150 Parret, Herman x, 11 Peirce, Charles Sanders 3, 72 Plantinga, Alvin ix, 30, 31, 51, 126, 141, 147, 150, 233,'234, 243 Plato 1 Pollock, Jonathan 78, 164, 199

Price, H. H. 204 Priestly, Joseph 1 Primaudaye, Pierre De La 6 Reid, Thomas 124, 140 Rescher, Nicholas 57, 85 Rosenkrantz, Gary xiv, 22, 39, 59, 71, 81, 85, 104, 142, 150, 183, 192, 220, 234 Russell, Bertrand 27, 28, 34, 35, 40, 183185, 188, 189, 225 Salmon, Nathan ix Selby-Bigge, L. A. 79 Sergeant, John 241 Shakespeare, William 198 Sidney, Sir Philip 106 Simons, Peter 5 Smith, Barry 55, 228 Sosa, Ernest x, xiii, xiv, 11, 33, 49, 50, 68, 78, 110, 111, 227 South, Robert 106 Stout, G. F. 5, 86 Stubbes, Philip I Tachau, Katherine 192 T. B. 6 Tomberlin, James 141 Thomson, Archbishop William 56 Uehling, Theodore E. x, 11, 164' Van Inwagen, Peter 141 Van Cleve, James xiii van der Schaar, Maria 86 Vier, Peter C. 192 Walsh, James 3, 43, 75, 188 Watts, Isaac 220 Werenfels, Samuel 11 Wettstein, Howard K. x, 11, 164 Wierenga, Edward xiv, 220 Williams, D. C. xi, 5 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 118 Zalta, Edward 114

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Abstract entities x-xiii, 117, 228-230 de re beliefs about 31-33, 233-235 descriptive identification of 28-31 grasping of 22-37 individuation of 132-139 qualitative and nonqualitative Ch. 1, sect. IX Abstraction 22-24,-28,224 Accidental properties 16, 17 Acquaintance 28, 33-36, 40-41, 220-223, Ch. 5 and abstracta 22, 28, 33-35, 185, 228230, 233-235, 237 and one's body 225, 228 and one's mental states 33-35, 185, 230235, 237 and oneself 34, 37, 40-41, 185, 188, 189, 225-227, 229, 233-240 and physical objects and persons other than oneself 35, 37, 40, 41, 185, 188, 189-224, 228, 229, 233-235 and places 228 and sense-data 184, 227, 230 and souls 228 and surfaces of external objects 212-213, 233-235 and temporal slices of physical objects and persons 233-235, 204-209, 211213 and temporal slices of surfaces 213, 234, 235 and times 227, 228, 230, 237 Actual world 19, 161, 165 Amenesia 36, 39, 197, 238

Analysis x, xi, 5, 43, 49-51, 73-76, 110, 111, 113, 130, 239, 240 Anti-realism 4, Ch. 1, sect. VII Atemporality 17, 57, 58, 132 Atoms 5, 13, 14 Attributes ix, 1-4, 9, 25, 26, 34, 36, 44, 50, 55, 116 see properties Attribution direct 186 indirect 34 self- 36-41, 229 Baptism 191, 193 Belief 26, 27, 29, 32, 36, 40 189, 208, 219 de dicta ix, 32-34, 41 de re ix, 32-38, 40, 41, 186, 232, 233, 235 direct de re 32-35, 186, 187, 232, 233, 235 indirect de re 32, 34, 233 Bonding 169-171 Boscovichian point-particles 20, 103, 142 Boundaries 173, 176, 177, 180, 205 Brute fact 74, 90, 91, 122, 135, 137, 138

-

Categories xi, xii, 4, 5, Ch. 1, sect. VIII, 108, 109, 117, 132, 133, 137, 138 Category mistake 108, 117, 118 Causal products 19, 141, 142, 149, 155, 168, 182, 183 Causal theory of reference 233, 234 Cause and effect 57, 58, 85, 86, 91, 103, 104, 146, 147, Ch. 4, sect. II, 221, 222

247

248

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

agent cause 86 efficient cause 86, 179 formal cause 76 Change 56, 57, 66, 118, 132, 203 Circular individuation 94-103, 122, 132136 Collections xi, 5, 53, 60, 66, 109, 124, 125, 222 Collectivism 5 Colors xii, 46-51, 215, 228, 229 Conceptual circularity 50, 67, 68, 83, 93, 94, 103, 121, 122, 125 Conceptualism 4, 54, 55 Concepts (ideas, mental constructs) 24, 53, 55, 70, 119, 129 Concrete/abstract distinction x, xi, xii, 12, 55, Ch. 1, sect. VIII, 129, 135-139 Concrete entities ix, x, xi, 93 individuation of Ch. 2 Conjuncts 24, 34, 35, 37, 50, 69, 96, 111113, 122, 124, 141, 144, 147, 148, 197, 201, 206, 209, 211, 214, 215, 236, 237 Constituents 114-121, 118, 125, 126, 157 Contingent propositions 17, 18 Contingent existence 18, 21, 57, 62, 127, 128, 138, 150, 156 Contradictories 48 Contraries 48 Corpus callosum 236 Deductive closure (of knowledge) 216-219 Definite descriptions x, 21, 29-31, 158, 169, 173-183, 185-187, 243 causal Ch. 4, sect. I mereological Ch. 4, sect. II Descriptive identification 28-35, 40, 169, 173, 177, 181--185, 241-243 Determinism 181 Disjuncts 24, 50, 62, 69, 96, 101, 102, 111-113, 122, 124 Diversity at a time (explanation of) x, xiii, Ch. 2, 157

Diversity of the dissimilar 44 Divine cognition Ch. 5, sect. VII Dynamism 20 Edges 173, 174 Electrons 20, 221 Elements 66, 67, 108, 125, 126, 128, 139, 157 Elimination 53, 54, 61, 129 Emergence 118 Entities 59, 60, 64, 62, 139 Epistemic principles 25-27, 188, 189 Epistemology ix Essential properties 16, 17, Ch. 1, sects. VI and VI Euclidean space 77, 79, 80 Events xi, 5, 53, 57-60, 63, 66, 79, 81, 85, 103, 120 Exemplification 1, 2, 12, 83, 91, 127, 134, 135, 138 Explanation x, xii, xiii, 73, 75, 91, 123, 131, 133, 137 Expression linguistic expressions 2, 3, 8, 22, 28-31, 35, 36, 53, 114, 115, 119-121, 158 a term's expressing a property ix, xi, 8, 22, 28-31, 35, 36, 233-235 Externalism 25 Faces 173, 174 Facts 58 Familial triviality 94, 106-108, 121, 122, 125, 157 First-person language ix, 36-41, 225, 235 First science xi Foundationalism 189, 208 Fundamental laws 131 Fundamental particles 20, 79, 104, 142, 169-171, 175 Geometry 22 Genus xii, 59, 62 God 56-58, 62, 65, 77, 220-224, 243

Grasping ix, xi, x, 2, 22-32, 34-37, 44-49, 56, 57, Ch. 1, sect. IX, 110-116, 128, 129, 188, 189, Ch. 5 passim

Haecceities ix, et passim as abstract entities 4, 91, 107, 109, 118, 119, Ch. 2, sect. VII, 103, 134, 139 of abstract entities 6, 7,;13, 132, 134, 228, 230, 233-235 and acquaintance Ch. 5 defmition of xiii, 3, 20, 21 versus individual essences Ch. 1, sect. VI and introspection Ch. 5, sects. VIII and IX and nonqualiative properties & propositions Ch. 1, sect II as a principle of individuation for concreta Ch. 2 and re-identification Ch. 5, sects. II-VII and sense-perception Ch. 5, sects. II-VII unexemplified haecceities andnonexistent possible individuals Ch. 3, Ch. 4 Haecceitism 185 naive 215 platonic 151-153, 163, 165 sophisticated perceptual 216 Holes 5, 60 Idealism 214, 222, 241 Identification ix, 40, 41, Ch. 5, 213 Identifying property 185 Identity of Indiscernibles 77, 79, 80, 82 Identity ix, 17, 44, 104, Ch. 2, sect. VI, 124-126 Immutability 57, 166 Impossibility 17, 18, 69 Impressions 79, 80, 103

Indeterminism 181 Individual concept 185 Individual essence Ch. I, sect. VI Individuation ix, x of abstract entities 137-139

249

of concrete entities Ch. II passim the problem of 74-76 causal criterion of 85, 90, 91, 97, 98, 101-104 epistemic, criterion of 76 formal criterion of 76 haecceity criterion of 87, 90-92, 97, 98, 102-105 locational criterion of 84, 90, 91, 97, 98, 100, 101, 103, 104 material criterion of 83, 84, 90, 91, 97-99 mereological criterion of 85, 90, 91, 97, 98, 101, 103, 104 nonontological criterion of 89-91, 97, 103, 104 qualitative criterion of 82, 83, 91, 142145 relational criterion of 86, 87, 90, 91, 97, 103, 104 substratum criterion of 84, 90, 91, 97-100 tropal criterion of 86, 90, 91, 97, 98, 102 Individuals see concrete .entities Inductive methods of re-identification 198200, 202, 203, 207, 208, 210, 226, 229, 232 Innate ideas 24, 224 Instantiability 59-64, 67 Intellectual awareness 223 Internalism 25, 27, 40, 41 Interpenetrating physical objects 78, 79, 103, 104 Intrinsic nature or, property 79, 104, 105, 112, 224 Introspection 24, 25, 39, 222, 223, 231, 225, 226 Intuitive induction 22 Knowledge 239, 240

by acquaintance 28, 33-35, Ch. 5, 40 by description 28, 28, 38, 40, 176, 177, 184 de ditto 34 de re 34, 35, 38-41, 186, 187, 232, 233

250

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

direct de re 34, 35, 186, 187, 232, 233, 235 indirect de re 184, 219 intellectual 223 introspective 222, 223, 225-227, 231, 232, 236, 237 perceptual 38, 39, 191-202, 206, 207, 209-211, 213, 215 -219, 221-223, 225 memory 195-197, 201, 207, 214-215, 225-229, 231, 232 self- ix, 38, 39-41, 59, 225 Leibniz's Law 77 Length 70, 71 Light 20, 131 Limits 5, 60 Logic xii, 1, 46 Mass 20, 78 Mathematics xii, 46 Mereology xiv, 5 Mereological assemblies 169-177, 179-182 essentialism 170, 171, 175, 176, 180, 240 inessentialism 183 products 19, 21, 141, 149, 155, 168, 182, 183 sums 5, 109, 114 Mereologically and causally disjoint objects 19-21, 54, 141, 142, Ch. 3, sects. II and III, 155, 159-161, 168, 241-243 Modalities ix, Ch. 1, sect. N, Ch. 3, sect. N, Chs. 3 and 4 passim Modal Realism 141, 143-145, 148, 162 Moderate empiricism 22, 24, 28 Multiple personality disorder 236 Names ix, 2, 29, 30, 31, 36, 69, 157, 158, 174, 185-187, 191, 200, 201, 206, 209, 233-235, 243, Necessity de dicto ix, 17, 18, 94, 166, 167

de re ix, 16, 17, 166, 167, 174 Necessary being 18, 62 equivalence 3, 47, 52, 59, 62, 64, 74, 109-113 existence x, 18, 21, 58, 128, 138, 149, 151, 154, 162, 165-167 property 16, 17 proposition 17, 18 Negation 24, 48, 50, 111, 112 Negative definitions 65 Nominalism xii, 4, 11, 12, 25, 43, 53-55, 64, 76, 90, 91, 137 Nonexistent possible individuals (NEPs) xiii, 19-21, Ch. 3, sects. I and II, Ch. 4, 168, 169, 173-183, 241-243 Nonqualitative properties x, Ch. 1, sects. II, HI, and IX Nonqualitative propositions x,,Ch. 1, sects. II and IX Numbers xi, 4, 5, 46, 120

Ockham's Razor 131 Omniscience 129, 221-223, 243 Ontology xi, xii, 61, 62, 130 Ontological categories xi, xii, 4, 5, Ch. 1, sect. VIII Opposites 48-50 Parmenidean argument 163 Particulars see concrete entities Parts 2, 5, 14, 19, 44, 50, 65-67, 70, 104, 109, 113, 118, 124-126, 146, 147, 157, 158, Ch. 4, 170, 171, 179, 181, 240 Photons 131 Places xi, 5, 60, 63-65, 81, 228 Plugging 114, 116-118 Point-particles 20, 67, 142, 177 Points 5, 56, 57, 66, 67 Possibility 16-18, 21 Possible proposition 18 Possible worlds ix, 16-18, 21, 42, 70, 140-

INDEX OF SUBJECTS 144, 147, Ch. 3, Ch. 4 Privations 5, 56, 60, 61 Probability 173, 181 Properties xi, 1-4, Ch. 1, sect. II, 8, 12, 2236, Ch. 1, sect. VII, 60, 62, 63, 66, 67, 108, 117, 124, 126, 127, 133, 139, 163, 164, 244, et passim ego-centric xii intrinsic 77-79 nonqualitative Ch. 1, sect. II, 54 qualitative x, Ch. 1, sect. II, 54, 77 relational 8, 9, 78, 79, 87, 88, 104, 107, 114, 116-118, 242 unexemplified x, xiii, 2, 16, 19-21, 25, 26, 42, 43, 54, 55, 57, 66, 67, 138, 139, 143-149, Ch. 3, sect. III, Ch. 4, 169, 173, 175-178, 213, 223, 241244 world-indexed 147 Propositions xi, 4, Ch. 1, sect. II, 11-14, 16, 22, 32, 60, 63, 66, Ch. 1, sect. IX, 88, 132, 133, 139, 220, 230 Qualitative properties x, 46, 77, Ch. 1, sects. H, ILL and IX relations x, 8-10 propositions Ch. 1, sects. II and IX Qualitatively indistinguishable individuals x, 20, Ch. 2, sect. II, 104 Quantification 2, 3, 119-121, 143 Quantum mechanics 103, 104 Radical empiricism 24 Rationalism 24 Realism 214 Realism (Property-Realism) xii, xiii, 12, 24, 26, 32;64, 72, 74, 76, 91, 130, 131 anemic 53 bifurcated 151-154, 156, 157, 159-163, 168 moderate (or aristotelian) 4, 25, 26, 54,

57, 137, 152-154, 156, 162-16 168, 169 nonqualitative 11, 12, 15 platonic or extreme x, xi, xiii, 4, 25:32, 54, 55, 137, 149, 151, 152, 154, 156, 162, 244 qualitative 11-15, 33, 43 robust 53, 54, 139, 149, 244 strong 32 strong extreme 54, 55, 149, 168, 169, 244 weak extreme 54 Reductive identification 53, 61, 62, 129, 139 Reference x, 29-31, 38, 114-116, 157-159, 168, 169, 173, 175-183, 241, 243 Relations xi, 4, 8, 12, 16, 17, 22, 32, 53, 60, 63, 86, 89, 91, 97, 105, 107-110, 114-119, 121, 122, 133, 139, 163, 164 Re-identification Ch. 5, sects. II-VII Riemannian space 78, 80 Rigid designators 174 Self-ascription see self-attribution Self-evidence 215 Semantics of direct reference 233-234 Sense 114, 115 Sense-data 184, 189, 225, 227, 230 Sense-perception 36-40, 189-225, 236, 241 Sets 4, 5, 53, 57, 56, 60-62, 66, 108, 114, 125, 126, 128, 139, 222 Shadows 60 Similarity 23, 73-75, 198, 199, 202, 203, 205, 212, 224 Souls (spirits) 5, 19, 56, 60, 65, 67, 79, 80, 81, 86, 103, 142, 222, 228 Spatial discontinuity 104 Spatio-temporal continuity 104 Species xii, 4, 5, 47, 59, 62, 70, 75 States 9, 33, 34, 146, 220-222, 225, 230235 Substances xi, 5, 19, 20, 56-58, 60, 62,65,

252

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

81, 84, 86 173 Subsumption 59, 61, 62 Sufficient Reason (Principle of) 77 Sums 5, 67, 114, 124, 171-173, 176 Supervenience 105 Surfaces 5, 56, 60, 62, 118, 120, 173, 212, 213, 233-235

Translation xii Transparency 79 Tropes 5, 53, 56, 60, 61, 66, 79, 81, 85, 97, 127 Truth 9 de dicto 9, 10 de re 9, 10

Temporal slices 104, 204-209, 211-213, 227, 233-235 Thatness see haecceity Thisness see haecceity Times 4, 5, 20, 60, 63-65, 227, 228, 230, 237

Universal essential properties 43-46, 239 Universals xii, 4, 5, 22, 33, 55, 56, 73 Vagueness 177

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES Founded by Wilfrid S. Sellars and Keith Lehrer

Editor:

KEITH LEHRER, University of Arizona Board of Consulting Editors:

Jonathan Bennett, Allan Gibbard, Robert Stalnaker, and Robert G. Turnbull 1. JAY F. ROSENBERG, Linguistic Representation, 1974. / WILFRID SELLARS, Essays in Philosophy and Its History, 1974. 3. DICKINSON S. MILLER, Philosophical Analysis and Human Welfare. Selected Essays and Chapters from Six Decades. Edited with an Introduction by Lloyd D. Easton, 1975. 4. KEITH LEHRER (ed.), Analysis and. Metaphysics. Essays in Honor of R. M. Chisholm. 1975. 5. CARL GINET, Knowledge, Perception, and Memory, 1975. 6. PETER H. HARE and EDWARD H. MADDEN, Causing, Perceiving and Believing. An Examination of the Philosophy of C. J. Ducasse, 1975. 7. HECTOR-NERI CASTAREDA, Thinking and Doing. The Philosophical Foundations of Institutions, 1975. 8. JOHN L. POLLOCK, Subjunctive Reasoning, 1976. 9. BRUCE AUNE, Reason and Action, 1977. 10. GEORGE SCHLESINGER, Religion and Scientific Method, 1977. 11. YIRMIAHU YOVEL (ed.), Philosophy of History and Action. Papers presented at the first Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter, December 1974, 1978. 12. JOSEPH C. PITT, The Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and Extensions, 1978. 13. ALVIN I. GOLDMAN and JAEGWON KIM, Values and Morals. Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt, 1978. 14. MICHAEL,J. LOUX, Substance and Attribute. A Study in Ontology, 1978. 15. ERNEST SOSA (ed.), The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher: Discussion and Replies, 1979. 16. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Retribution, Justice, and Therapy. .Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 1979. 17. GEORGE S. PAPPAS, Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology, 1979. 18. JAMES W. CORNMAN, Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation, 1980. 19. PETER VAN INWAGEN, Time and Cause. Essays presented to Richard Taylor, 1980. 20. DONALD NUTE, Topics in Conditional Logic, 1980.