God's Rule: The Politics of World Religions

God's Rule

God's Rule

The Politics of World Religions

Jacob

Neusner,

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PRESS

Washington, D.C.

Editor

Georgetown University Press © 2003 by Georgetown University Press. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. 10

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2003

This book is printed on acid-free recycled paper meeting the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence in Paper for Printed Library Materials. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data God's rule : the politics of world religions / Jacob Neusner, editor, p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-87840-910-6 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Religion and politics. I. Neusner, Jacob, 1932BL65.P7 G635 2003 291.177—dc21

2002013810

Contents

Introduction: Religion and Politics—a Volatile Mix

1

William Scott Green One

Judaism

11

Jacob Neusner Two

Primitive and Early Christianity

37

Bruce D. Chilton Three

Roman Catholic Christianity

61

Charles E. Curran Four

O r t h o d o x Christianity

85

Petros Vassiliadis Five

Reformation Christianity

107

Martin E. Marty Six

Classical Islam

131

John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas Seven

M o d e r n Islam

159

John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas Eight

Hinduism

185

Brian K. Smith Nine

Confucianism Mark

Ten

213

Csikszentmihalyi

Buddhism: T h e Politics of Compassionate Rule

233

Todd Lewis Conclusion: Retrospective on Religion and Politics

257

Jacob Neusner Glossary

261

Contributors

267

Index

269

introduction I Religion and Politics-a Volatile Mix I William

Scott

Green

N O ISSUE HAS MARKED T H E TURN OF T H E CHRISTIAN MILLENNIUM MORE DEEPLY THAN

the relation of religion to politics. T h e S e p t e m b e r 11, 2001, assaults on the World Trade C e n t e r and the P e n t a g o n focused attention on a reality that m a n y t h o u g h t distant, d o r m a n t , or at least b e n i g n . D r a m a t i c a l l y a n d suddenly, religion has a s s u m e d a central place in c o n t e m p o r a r y global politics. U n d e r s t a n d i n g a religion's political vision is n o w as essential for m a n a g i n g o u r i m m e d i a t e w o r l d as is using the Internet. T h e events of S e p t e m b e r 11 did n o t e m e r g e from a v a c u u m . D u r i n g the 1990s, the use of religious language and s y m b o l i s m for political p u r p o s e s infected the globe like a cultural m a d c o w disease. T h e suicide b o m b e r s in the Middle East a n d t h e r a v a g e s of Bosnia are only t h e m o s t o b v i o u s e x a m p l e s . T h e Taliban d e s t r o y e d m a g n i f i c e n t B u d d h i s t s t a t u e s in B a m i y a n . H i n d u s d e m o l i s h e d centuries-old m o s q u e s in India. In a gesture the New York Times called "Welcome m a n of peace. Let's g o hate m y enemy," the president of Syria, in the presence of the p o p e , assailed Jews as the " e n e m i e s of all religions," the betrayers of Jesus, and t h e a t t e m p t e d m u r d e r e r s of M u h a m m a d . T h e A m e r i c a n federal g o v e r n m e n t l a u n c h e d a "faith-based" initiative that s e e m s to blend religion with g o v e r n m e n tal activity. In the Nation, Katha Pollitt expanded and illuminated the list: Think of all the ongoing conflicts involving religion: India versus Pakistan, Russia versus Chechnya, Protestants versus Catholics in Northern Ireland, Muslim guerrillas in the Philippines, bloody clashes between Christians and Muslims in Indonesia and Nigeria, civil war in Sudan and Uganda and Sri Lanka. It's enough to make one nostalgic for the cold war as if the thin film of twentieth-century political ideology has been stripped away like the ozone layer to reveal a world reverting to seventeenth-century-style religious warfare, fought with twenty-first century weapons. 1 All these instances give the topic of religion and politics an u r g e n t freshness and significance. For Americans, thinking a n e w a b o u t the relation b e t w e e n religion and politics is especially i m p o r t a n t , primarily b e c a u s e so m a n y of us think o u r society has solved the problem. T h e ideology of the separation of church and state and s o m e recent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the First A m e n d m e n t to the C o n s t i t u t i o n have conditioned Americans to regard religion and politics as distinct realms of experience. A n o r m of American life is that religion should not, and generally does not, express ι

2 I William Scott Green | itself doctrinally t h r o u g h the activities of g o v e r n m e n t . Most Americans take it as a given that there is a limit to the political expression of religion. T h e papers gathered in this v o l u m e will e n c o u r a g e us n o t to be naive about that assumption. Before c o n t i n u i n g , s o m e definitions are p e r t i n e n t here. For the p u r p o s e s of this v o l u m e , "politics" primarily m e a n s g o v e r n a n c e and s t a t e c r a f t — i n c l u d i n g such c o m p o n e n t s as the powers to tax, to wage war, to produce money, to enforce public order, to c o m p e l behavior, to justify obligations, and to m a k e the institutions of society w o r k for y o u r o w n ends. As for "religion," Melford Spiro's definition is a useful starting point: "an institution consisting of culturally p a t t e r n e d interaction w i t h culturally postulated s u p e r h u m a n beings." 2 Spiro uses the concept of " s u p e r h u m a n being" as the variable that distinguishes religion f r o m notreligion—from politics or philosophy, for instance. To Spiro's conception, we m a y add a n o t e of historical and p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l description. Religions exhibit a t e n d e n c y to totalize, to extend their reach to all d i m e n s i o n s of experience. T h e religions discussed in this v o l u m e c o m e to expression n o t only in speech and writing, b u t also in art, music, and dance, in smell and taste, in ethics and intellect. They have cosmologies (stories of the origin of the world) and eschatologies (stories of the end of the world), theories of n a t u r e , birth, morality, sexuality, marriage, suffering, and death. T h e comprehensiveness of religion allows it to t o u c h all the transition points of life, b o t h collective and individual, and thus to m a k e definitive claims on the total h u m a n being.

Religion

and Politics:

Different

but

Inseparable

T h a t religion and politics are necessarily c o n n e c t e d is n o t a n e w idea. As Brian Smith n o t e s in his discussion of H i n d u i s m b e l o w (chapter 8), G a n d h i observed t h a t " t h o s e w h o believe religion is separable f r o m politics u n d e r s t a n d n e i t h e r o n e . " Because religion is c o m p r e h e n s i v e , it is f u n d a m e n t a l l y a b o u t p o w e r ; it therefore c a n n o t avoid politics. Religion has the ability to g r o u n d the use of force in a cosmic and m o r a l order; therefore, religion constitutes the u l t i m a t e legitim a t i o n of any political system. Overtly and covertly, religion influences political structures and activity by e n c o u r a g i n g and enforcing s o m e attitudes and behaviors and by discouraging and disparaging others. It articulates frameworks of values and t r u t h that g r o u n d and i n f o r m a society's sense of destiny, leadership, community, and individuality. Max Stackhouse explains that authority in all civilizations is incomprehensive without attention to religion. That is, politics cannot be understood without recognizing that the contours of acceptable wisdom, and the definitions of which interests and which forms of rationality are to be given approval and which are to be repressed, are fundamentally shaped by a governing metaphysical-moral vision. The essence of this conviction is the surpassing conviction about what is 'really real,' the compelling sense of what consti-

I INTRODUCTION

t u t e s u l t i m a t e and w o r t h y p o w e r in a t r a n s c e n d e n t sense. W i s d o m , influence, interests, intelligence, and political force must serve—and must be understood to serve—powers, principles, or purposes beyond themselves. C o n c e r n for these, as well as beliefs and behaviors t h o u g h t to be appropriate to such concerns, are what h u m a n beings vaguely call "religion." ,

Because politics can c o m p e l behavior and thus shape i m m e d i a t e collective experience, it has an unusual capacity to validate or undermine a religion's worldview. A religion cannot persist if it cannot explain h o w the exercise of coercive power in the world of immediate experience c o n f o r m s to, is encompassed by, or at least does not refute the religion's o w n theory of h o w things are or ought to be. W h e t h e r or n o t a religion itself can legitimately deploy force to c o m p e l behavior, it m u s t be able to explain h o w such force is used in its o w n world. It must show its adherents that it is not mistaken about the world. The need for a theory of politics is greater for religions that are out of power than for those that are in power. If the ordinary, repeated experience of everyday life disconfirms w h a t a religion teaches, then the religion can lose plausibility, credibility, and membership. Religions that do n o t govern must explain why, if they are not running the government, the government is not running them. The relationship b e t w e e n religion and politics is b o t h unavoidable and systemically uneasy. Neither can afford to leave the other alone. With a focus on this inescapable interconnection, the chapters of this volume aim to offer a basic picture of the political visions of the world's great literate religions: Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Confucianism, and Buddhism. The chapter authors have not sought to supply a full history of the political activity of these traditions. Rather, each has sought to answer systemic questions about politics on the basis of one religion's classical sources. Each chapter thus illustrates h o w a religion expresses a political vision in its foundational texts and fundamental teachings. Beyond these individual examinations of the various traditions, a full-throated, comprehensive comparison of all of t h e m would constitute at least a volume in itself. But a preliminary observation perhaps will give readers a platform f r o m which to view and think about the traditions as a whole. There are, to be sure, diverse ways in which one might classify the religions discussed here to compare their political visions. O n e fruitful approach uses the category of transcendence as a guide. In his intelligent and systematic treatment of religion and politics, Stackhouse suggests four variables by which what he calls the "social logic" of a religion—which can g r o u n d its vision of politics—can be understood. Does a religion understand transcendence to be "pluralistic or unitary?" Does it view transcendence as "deep w i t h i n — a l t h o u g h hidden by—the realities of existence," or is transcendence beyond, over, or against existence? Is transcendence "personal or impersonal"? And finally, does transcendence involve "constant stability or dynamic change"?

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4 I William Scott Green | O n t h e basis of these variables, S t a c k h o u s e suggests that m o n o t h e i s t i c relig i o n s a p p r e h e n d t r a n s c e n d e n c e as unitary, b e y o n d and over existence, personal, and dynamically involved in change. As a c o n s e q u e n c e , m o n o t h e i s t i c religions distinguish b e t w e e n G o d and the w o r l d and reject political orders that are n o t in accord w i t h God's will. Alternatively, in the "ontocratic" religions of Asia, "true religion is life in accord w i t h n a t u r a l b e i n g and . . . the h a r m o n i o u s state is the s u p r e m e earthly e m b o d i m e n t of cosmic totality." 4 Stackhouse's f r a m e w o r k suggests h o w a religion's f u n d a m e n t a l metaphysical and theological principles can shape attitudes a b o u t the n a t u r e of the state.

Piety and Power: A Comparative

Grid

A possible alternative comparative grid e m e r g e s f r o m the chapters of this b o o k . Instead of c o m p a r i n g the six religions in t e r m s of their core theological doctrines, w e m i g h t classify t h e m according to their attitudes t o w a r d holding actual political power. T h a t is, w e m i g h t ask if the classical sources of each religion suppose that the religion holds, or m u s t hold, political p o w e r to c o m e to full expression. T o fulfill its goals, is it n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e religion t o rule? If w e follow this a p p r o a c h , t h e r e is an i n t e r e s t i n g coalescence. J u d a i s m a n d Christianity b e g i n w i t h o u t the a s s u m p t i o n of political power. Islam, H i n d u i s m , and C o n f u c i a n i s m , by contrast, appear to take such p o w e r for g r a n t e d . Buddhism stakes o u t a middle p o s i t i o n , in w h i c h it k n o w s it can r u l e b u t is p r e p a r e d n o t t o d o so. Let us examine this classification in m o r e detail. J u d a i s m and Christianity, and the H e b r e w Scriptures they share, reflect the circumstances and conditions of political subjugation. T h e foundational d o c u m e n t s of J u d a i s m and Christianity e m e r g e f r o m a context of imperialism, in which the religion itself did n o t and could n o t constitute a ruling g o v e r n m e n t . In the ancient M e d i t e r r a n e a n , Jewish religion t o o k shape and developed almost entirely u n d e r foreign political d o m i n a t i o n . Judaism—in all its f o r m s — w a s n o t a religion of free people. T h e P e n t a t e u c h (also called the Torah), w h i c h is basic to b o t h religions, w a s edited into its final literary f o r m u n d e r the d o m i n a t i o n of the Persian state. J u d a i s m later persisted in the ancient M e d i t e r r a n e a n in large m e a s u r e because of R o m a n indulgence. Julius Caesar g r a n t e d privileges to t h e Jewish religion that lasted for three centuries and m a d e J u d a i s m b o t h politically legitimate and politically d e p e n d e n t . T h e sources of J u d a i s m deal w i t h the lack of political p o w e r by p r e t e n d i n g n o n e exists. T h e Israelites receive their revelation f r o m G o d in t h e desert, t h e opposite of territory. Although they are a c o m m u n i t y and a nation, because they have n o m o n a r c h , they do n o t constitute a k i n g d o m . T h e Pentateuch barely mentions a k i n g f o r Israel, a n d it a s s u m e s that the m o n a r c h will consult t h e T o r a h before acting. In the biblical texts, Israel's k i n g plays n o role in Israel's worship or

I INTRODUCTION

sacrificial cult. M o r e i m p o r t a n t , the H e b r e w Bible as a w h o l e supposes that whereas God can be king, the Israelite king cannot be a god. It thus draws a clear distinction between religion and government. Jesus's f a m o u s admonition to render u n t o Caesar what is Caesar's and u n t o God what is God's assumes that Caesar is not (and cannot be?) God and thus presupposes this biblical distinction. The editors of the Pentateuch depict a cult w i t h o u t a kingdom—a pure religion, as it were. T h e picture is necessarily fictitious, of course, for n o centralized cult can operate without the support of attendant political structures that guarantee adequate taxation, public facilities, and social order. By portraying Israel's religion as a u t o n o m o u s f r o m politics, the Pentateuch's narrative disguises Israel's political dependence and creates an image of religion without politics that is basic in Western religious thinking about both. Jacob Neusner's discussion of Judaism shows h o w the biblical tradition of a fictive politics c o n t i n u e s in the Mishnah, t h e f o u n d a t i o n a l text of Rabbinic Judaism (chapter 1). H e lists four institutions of political sanction: God, the earthly court, the Temple in Jerusalem, and c o m m u n i t y consensus. N o n e of these acknowledges the reality of R o m a n imperial control over Judaism and its institutions. Moreover, the Temple had been destroyed for m o r e than a century by the time the rabbis finalized the Mishnah. And Jewish courts, despite the Mishnah's claim, almost certainly did not have authority to impose the death penalty. N e u s n e r suggests that the Mishnah's "politics . . . rehearses the m y t h of Adam and Eve in Eden," and focuses on the distinction b e t w e e n deliberate and inadvertent transgression. T h e Mishnah's politics centers on the interior motivations of individual actors, but it supplies n o suggestions or models of h o w to govern. Instead, it offers a Utopian vision of a balanced community, an image of a politics w i t h o u t power. As a renegade species of Judaism, early Christianity had neither hope of governance nor immediate legitimacy in the eyes of Roman authorities. Indeed, until the conversion of C o n s t a n t i n e in the f o u r t h c e n t u r y C.E., Christianity existed under Roman domination but largely outside of Rome's political structures. Early Christian writers, like the producers of the Mishnah, had to develop their religion in the absence of political power. W h a t the Pentateuch and the Mishnah accomplish through denial, Early Christian writing achieves through eschatology. Bruce Chilton suggests below that Early Christianity explained its status by simultaneously acknowledging the reality of alien political powers and denying t h e m ultimate religious significance (chapter 2). As an eschatological religion, Early Christianity focused on the divine k i n g d o m to come, not the world as it was. Chilton explains that Christianity's "literally otherworldly perspective results in a paradoxical acceptance of the institutions of this world. That acceptance is qualified, however, by the observation that all f o r m s of h u m a n government are provisional." This approach, which allowed Christians to "accept the legitimacy of insti-

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I William Scott Green

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tutions that are . . . u n j u s t , because they b e l o n g to t h e s t r u c t u r e of a world that is passing away," explicitly denies that attaining political p o w e r is a sine qua n o n for Christianity's religious fulfillment. T h e heritage of the H e b r e w Bible established the concept of a religion witho u t politics and m a d e the distinction b e t w e e n t h e m basic to W e s t e r n civilization. Because the m a n d a t e to govern was essentially excluded f r o m Judaism's and thus Christianity's earliest texts and visions of politics, the relationship b e t w e e n Christianity and politics has always b e e n s o m e w h a t labored and uneasy, and the integ r a t i o n of church and state remains p r o b l e m a t i c in t h e West. Indeed, the chapters on R o m a n Catholic, O r t h o d o x , and R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity (chapters 3, 4, a n d 5, respectively) suggest t h a t actually h a v i n g political p o w e r has created as m a n y p r o b l e m s for Christianity as it has solved. T h e struggles b e t w e e n popes and e m p e r o r s , Catholics and P r o t e s t a n t s , a n d a m o n g P r o t e s t a n t g r o u p s t h a t m a r k E u r o p e a n history amply testify to the challenges Christianity faced in a s s u m i n g political power. Discrete theologies can yield diverse politics. T h e chapters o n w h a t w e m i g h t call developed Christianity illustrate the impact of different religious e m p h a s e s o n the f o r m of a political vision. Charles C u r r a n succinctly describes the elaborate reasoning R o m a n Catholic Christianity used to think the state into its theolo g y ( c h a p t e r 3). Its f o c u s o n t h e c o m m o n g o o d , subsidiarity, a n d socialization reflects the church's distinctive t h e o l o g y of c o m m u n i t y and allows the state to have a l e g i t i m a t e religious p u r p o s e . C u r r a n also explains h o w t h e c h u r c h has developed its teachings in response to c o n t e m p o r a r y social conditions and pressures, particularly in the area of religious pluralism. In a different m o d e , O r t h o dox Christianity, as described by P e t r o s Vassiliades, derives its political t h e o r y f r o m the Liturgy a n d f r o m the t h e o l o g y of the Eucharist (chapter 4). Its singular m o d e l of shared p o w e r b e t w e e n e m p e r o r and patriarch echoes Early Christianity's relationship w i t h the ruling authorities. Finally, Martin Marty's lucid description of Reformation Christianity shows h o w its emphases o n God's control, script u r a l a u t h o r i t y , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n c h u r c h a n d state, a n d lay v o c a t i o n established a t e n d e n c y — n o t always realized—toward d e m o c r a c y (chapter 5). T h e chapters on Judaism and Christianity suggest that in the West religion and politics are necessary i n t e r l o c u t o r s b u t n o t n a t u r a l allies. Because J u d a i s m and C h r i s t i a n i t y w e r e b o t h f o u n d e d a p a r t f r o m g o v e r n m e n t , in principle n e i t h e r n e e d s — o r a s s u m e s the n e e d — t o rule politically to c o m e to full expression. T h e chapters o n Islam, H i n d u i s m , and C o n f u c i a n i s m (chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9 respectively) present a r a t h e r different picture f r o m those of J u d a i s m and Christianity. In each of these religions, there is an explicit a s s u m p t i o n that the realm of g o v e r n m e n t is a basic t h e a t e r of religious expression and m a n i f e s t a t i o n . All t h r e e religions exhibit a focus o n t h e religious c h a r a c t e r of t h e political leader that is largely absent f r o m the classical sources of J u d a i s m and Christianity.

I INTRODUCTION

According to Mark Csikszentmilhalyi, "The C o n f u c i a n canon played a central role in the [Chinese] e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m and d e f i n e d the e t h o s of . . . governm e n t " (chapter 9). T h e e m p e r o r c o n d u c t e d rituals and thus formally integrated religion and politics. T h e classical C o n f u c i a n sources emphasize the connection b e t w e e n the emperor's m o r a l perfection and his political authority. Tianming, the m a n d a t e of heaven, could affect and be affected by the c h a r a c t e r of the ruler. Confucianism acknowledges the reality of political power but claims that its legitimacy depends on conformity to religious values and principles derived f r o m the sacred realm (tian). T h e s a m e a p p r o a c h is e v i d e n t in Brian S m i t h ' s d e s c r i p t i o n of H i n d u i s m , w h o s e sacred texts also suppose an integration of religion and politics (chapter 8). Hinduism has a highly developed concept of sacral kingship, in which the king has divine qualities. As Smith explains, "Hinduism condones and legitimates political p o w e r that verges o n the dictatorial." But the king m u s t be self-disciplined and "in subordination to the Brahmins and the principles of religion they represent and e m b o d y . . . [to] effectively rule." Like C o n f u c i a n d o c u m e n t s , H i n d u texts acknowledge the b r u t e reality of political p o w e r and ambition—artha, the pursuit of e c o n o m i c and political self-interest, is a key c o n c e p t — b u t they t e m p e r politics with piety. In effect, H i n d u i s m politicizes the warrior and priestly castes and proposes a b o n d b e t w e e n k i n g and priest. Of all the religions discussed in the b o o k , Islam is p e r h a p s the m o s t explicit about the necessity of political power for religious expression. As a religion whose f o u n d e r spent the last decade of his life developing a religious state, this almost seamless integration is n o t surprising. It flows naturally f r o m the context of origination. As J o h n Esposito and N a t a n a De Long-Bas explain, in Islam, "faith and politics are inseparable" (chapters 6 and 7). More explicitly, they insist that throughout history, being a Muslim has been not just a matter of belonging to a community of fellow believers, but also to live in an Islamic community or state governed by Islamic law (in theory if not always in practice). In this Utopian vision of the Islamic state, political authority is understood to be the instrument for carrying out the divine message. Sovereignty, therefore, is the embodiment of the Word of God in the Shariah (Islamic law), rather than a power that belongs to the ruler or the clergy. Thus, the ideal Islamic state is a nomocracy (a community governed by God's law), rather than a theocracy or autocracy. Finally, in contrast to the o t h e r five religions, Buddhism appears to stake o u t a m i d d l e position. A c c o r d i n g t o T o d d Lewis, t h e Buddhist political p o s i t i o n assumes the reality, b u t n o t the necessity of kingship (chapter 10). T h e core concern of the Buddhist texts is n o t political control but rather the ability of householders to contribute to the Buddhist monastic communities. Thus, Buddhism in principle is prepared to cooperate with any political system that allows this activ-

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8 I William Scott Green | ity. If there are a Buddhist k i n g and a Buddhist state, Buddhist religious n o r m s m u s t govern. As in H i n d u i s m and C o n f u c i a n i s m , a Buddhist ruler acquires legitimacy by practicing Buddhist virtues, such as justice, charity, concern for the comm o n good, generosity, and forgiveness. This c o m p a r a t i v e grid helps t o display the discrete political visions of these five m a j o r religions n o t only in t e r m s of theological convictions b u t also in t e r m s of t h e explicit relationship b e t w e e n political p o w e r and religious expression. Judaism and Christianity begin as religions of politically d e p e n d e n t people, and their classical texts p r o m u l g a t e a vision of religion that does n o t d e m a n d to gove r n in order to save. T h e texts of C o n f u c i a n i s m , H i n d u i s m , and Islam project a different conception, in which overt political p o w e r is either assumed to be present or advanced as necessary for religious fulfillment. Buddhism seems prepared to go in either direction.

Concluding

American

Postscript

In a particular and w o n d e r f u l way, this b o o k is a profoundly American exercise. By m a n d a t i n g f r e e d o m of and f r e e d o m f r o m religion, the First A m e n d m e n t to the U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n m a d e religious diversity a defining trait of American life. Because of the First A m e n d m e n t , Americans as a society have n o need to decide which religion is legitimate or w h i c h religion should govern. To be sure, there are and have been Americans w h o would be content to see religion d o m i n a t e n o t only the public square b u t the halls of g o v e r n m e n t as well. But America's pluralist religious heritage—even if it was initially b o r n a m o n g Protestant denominations—is likely to keep that f r o m occurring. T h e A m e r i c a n e x p e r i m e n t in religious pluralism has allowed diverse traditions to flourish and has m a d e violence b e t w e e n religions almost unthinkable in an American context. T h e chapters of this b o o k show b o t h the distinction of the American position and the alternatives to it. In the a f t e r m a t h of S e p t e m b e r 11, Robert Stone w r o t e in the New York Times: We witnessed... the violent assault of one narrative system upon another.... The internal narrative of our enemies, their absolute ruthless devotion to an invisible world, makes them strong. . . . The power of narrative is shattering, overwhelming. We are the stories we believe; we are who we believe we are. All the reasoning of the world cannot set us free from our mythic systems. We live and die by them. 5 Stone's image of "ruthless devotion to an invisible w o r l d " is b o t h insightful and arresting. It suggests that, in the end, the m u r d e r s in N e w York and Washington, and of those on the airplane that crashed in rural Pennsylvania, and the range of o t h e r religious battles that n o w afflict the globe, are n o t — o r n o t only— a b o u t material property. T h e y are a b o u t the real stuff of life—dignity, identity,

I INTRODUCTION

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c o h e r e n c e , a n d security. T h e y u l t i m a t e l y are n o t a b o u t m o n e y ; they are a b o u t m e a n i n g . O u r s t a k e s in t h e s t o r i e s w e b e l i e v e a b o u t o u r s e l v e s a r e as h i g h as t h e y can be.

Acknowledgment T h e a u t h o r is g r a t e f u l t o J a m e s J o h n s o n , G e r a l d G a m m , E m i l H o m e r i n , a n d J o n a t h a n G e e n f o r h e l p in f o r m u l a t i n g a s p e c t s o f this i n t r o d u c t i o n .

Notes 1. Katha Pollitt, " G o d C h a n g e s E v e r y t h i n g , " The Nation, April 1, 2002, accessed at www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?=20020401&5=pollitt. 2. Melford E. Spiro, "Religion, Problems of Definition and Explanation," in Benjamin Kilbourne and L. L. Langness, eds., Culture and Human Nature: Theoretical Papers of Melford E. Spiro (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 187-222. 3. Max L. Stackhouse, "Politics and Religion," The Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. M. Eliade (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 408-23. 4. Stackhouse, "Politics and Religion," 413-15. 5. Robert Stone, "The Villain," New York Times Magazine, special edition, "Elements of Tragedy." September 23, 2001, 22.

9

One I J u d a i s m I Jacob

Neusner

W H E N T H E STATE OF ISRAEL CAME INTO BEING, IN 1 9 4 8 , N O O N E IMAGINED PUTTING

into effect, as state law, the Halakhah, or legal system of Scripture as extended and realized in the law books of formative Judaism, Scripture as amplified by the Rabbinic writings of the first six centuries C.E. T h e n e w state did n o t define its political institutions by opening Scripture and appointing a king, for example, or by opening the Mishnah, a second century philosophical system in the f o r m of a law code, and replicating its plan for a tripartite government of king, high priest, and sage. And the founding prime minister of the State of Israel, David Ben Gurion, was not anointed a prophet. So far as the state of Israel aspired to and did and does f o r m a Jewish state (according full rights of citizenship to its Moslem and Christian minorities), Judaism in its classical sources does not guide the formation of public policy. T h a t is because, as William Scott G r e e n m a k e s clear in his i n t r o d u c t i o n , Judaism, the religious system defined by Scripture and the authoritative writings of the Rabbinic sages, encompasses the issues of politics within its larger mythic framework, but does not contemplate the practicalities of governing the ethnic community, the Jews, as an a u t o n o m o u s sovereign entity: a state, possessing empowered rulers. Rather, what we see in the Judaic politics set forth in the Mishnah's laws is how politics serves as a m e d i u m for the concretization of the generative myth that animates the entire religious system. The practicalities of a fully embodied myth p e r m e a t i n g a political system and structure in charge of its own fate, able to negotiate as equal with other political entities, do not register. Rather, what we see is h o w politics forms a m e d i u m of expressing that foundation-story of the Israelite social order, as every other c o m p o n e n t of social culture embodies that same story in o t h e r contexts. T h e m a r k of a successful theological syst e m and structure lies in its coherence, its capacity to say the same thing about many things. That is what we identify in the story that follows.

Classical

Sources of Judaism

on

Politics

W h e r e a s the world knows as "Judaism" a variety of kindred religious systems, all Judaic systems fall into a single category. That is because, f r o m antiquity to the present, all Judaisms have regarded as authoritative the H e b r e w Scriptures of ancient Israel (a.k.a., Christianity's "Old Testament"), which they have called "the

II

12 I Jacob Neusner \ T o r a h , " m e a n i n g i n s t r u c t i o n . Each c o m m u n i t y of J u d a i s m , f u r t h e r m o r e , has regarded itself as a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the "Israel" of w h i c h Scripture speaks. F r o m late antiquity to the present, moreover, m o s t ( t h o u g h n o t all) c o m m u nities of J u d a i s m have i n t e r p r e t e d Scripture in light of the d o c u m e n t s called collectively, " t h e O r a l T o r a h " (in c o n t r a s t t o S c r i p t u r e , k n o w n as " t h e W r i t t e n Torah"). T h e s e texts f o r m e d the c o r p u s of Rabbinic writings f r o m the Mishnah (ca. 200 C.E.), a philosophical law code, to the Yerushalmi, T a l m u d of the Land of Israel (ca. 400 C.E.), t h r o u g h the Bavli, the T a l m u d of Babylonia (ca. 600 C.E.), a c o m m e n t a r y t o the Mishnah, a l o n g w i t h certain compilations of biblical interp r e t a t i o n k n o w n as Midrash b o o k s of t h e s a m e p e r i o d . W h e n w e refer to the f o u n d a t i o n a l d o c u m e n t s of Judaisms over time, w e always begin w i t h Scripture and ordinarily p r o c e e d to the d o c u m e n t s of the Oral Torah. T h e r e w e find a p r o f o u n d l y political c o n c e p t i o n of religion. T h e P e n t a t e u c h p o r t r a y s Israel as "a k i n g d o m of priests and a holy people," and f u r t h e r takes for g r a n t e d that the " k i n g d o m " or "people" f o r m s a political entity, capable of exercising l e g i t i m a t e violence. By "Israel," t h e social entity b r o u g h t i n t o b e i n g by those that accepted God's rule set forth in the Torah, Instruction, of Sinai, Script u r e t h e r e f o r e u n d e r s t a n d s n o t m e r e l y a c h u r c h or a v o l u n t a r y c o m m u n i t y b u t an e m p o w e r e d society, w i t h a g o v e r n m e n t , laws, and institutions. Scripture's o w n portrait of the type of g o v e r n m e n t varies. T h e P e n t a t e u c h read w h o l e takes for g r a n t e d that Israel is g o v e r n e d by G o d t h r o u g h the p r o p h e t , Moses. Moses further appoints an administration to deal w i t h conflict and secure the public order, and that administration exercises a u t h o r i t y and inflicts the death penalty for civil and religious infractions. O t h e r writings describe an Israelite monarchy, still others, a g o v e r n m e n t by the priesthood based o n the T e m p l e in Jerusalem. T h e picture of Israel as a family, descended f r o m A b r a h a m and Sarah, conflicts with this a c c o u n t of Israel as an e m p o w e r e d a n d political entity and plays n o role in the articulation of the politics of the holy people. T h e Rabbinic c a n o n of antiquity carries forward the premise of Scripture that the holy people f o r m a political entity in the h e r e and now, n o t merely a supernatural c o m m u n i t y of the faithful at the end of days such as is the conception of Israel reflected in the library of the Jewish sectarian religious c o m m u n i t y living in caves l o c a t e d in t h e m o u n t a i n s o v e r l o o k i n g t h e D e a d Sea. T h e politics expressed t h r o u g h the M i s h n a h ' s J u d a i s m speaks of a social entity t r e a t e d as a political o n e as well, of t h e h o l y p e o p l e of "Israel" classified as a state. T h e J u d a i s m of the Mishnah set forth for its social entity (called, as the social entity of every J u d a i s m is called, "Israel") n o t merely a m y t h i c and theological picture b u t also a political structure. W h e n people w o u l d speak of "a state of (being) Israel," therefore, they w o u l d also address "the State of Israel," the Jewish State, u n d e r s t a n d i n g that they spoke of a political entity like o t h e r such political entities. T h e r e f o r e , this J u d a i s m

I JUDAISM

became in mind and imagination a state not only of (autonomous) being but also of (shared and social) doing, not alone of ontology but of society. That is why this Judaism defines a locus for inquiry into more than theological science, into, especially, social science: economics, politics, and philosophy. The key generative problematic of the Mishnah is the interplay of divine will and the h u m a n will, and the relationships that require political scrutiny are between God and Israel, not a m o n g citizens or between the state and its citizens. Religion and politics are integrated. At issue in a politics is w h o does what to w h o m , so we turn forthwith to the Mishnah's account of the sanctions that accompany the law, and w h o enforces those sanctions, God or the Temple authorities or the sages of the Torah, its three institutional foci of power. T h e encompassing f r a m e w o r k of rules, institutions, and sanctions is explained and validated by appeal to the m y t h of God's shared rule. T h a t dominion, exercised by God and His surrogates on earth, is focused partly in the royal palace, partly in the Temple, and partly in the court. The political myth of Judaism thus explains w h o exercises legitimate violence and under w h a t conditions, and f u r t h e r m o r e specifies the source for differentiation. T h e m y t h consequently serves a particular purpose—which is to answer that particular question. Indeed, the Judaic political myth comes to expression in its details of differentiation, which permit us to identify, and of course to answer, the generative question of politics. Analyzing the myth by explaining sanctions draws our attention to the modes of legitimate violence that the system identifies. There we find four types of sanctions, each deriving f r o m a distinct institution of political power, each bearing its own mythic explanation: 1. T h e first comprises what God and the Heavenly court can do to people. 2. T h e second comprises what the earthly court can do to people. That type of sanction embodies the legitimate application of the worldly and physical kinds of violence of which political theory ordinarily speaks. 3. T h e third comprises w h a t the cult can do to people. T h e cult t h r o u g h its requirements can deprive people of their property as legitimately as can a court. 4. T h e fourth comprises conformity with consensus—self-imposed sanctions. Here the issue is, W h o s e consensus? And defined by whom? Across these four types of sanctions, four types of coercion are in play. They depend on violence of various kinds—psychological and social as m u c h as physical. Clearly, then, the sanctions that are exercised by other than judicial-political agencies prove violent and legitimately coercive, even t h o u g h the violence and coercion are not the same as those carried out by courts. Predictably, w h e n we w o r k our way t h r o u g h sanctions to recover the mythic premises thereof, we begin with God's place in the institutionalization and exe-

I

13

14 I Jacob Neusner \ cution of legitimate violence. Of course, the repertoire of sanctions does encompass G o d ' s direct intervention, b u t that is hardly a preferred alternative or a comm o n one. Still, G o d does c o m m o n l y intervene w h e n oaths are violated, for oaths are held to involve the person w h o invokes God's n a m e and God. Further, whereas w h e n faced w i t h an insufficiency of valid evidence u n d e r strict rules of testimony, the earthly c o u r t c a n n o t penalize serious crime, the Heavenly c o u r t can and does i m p o s e a penalty. Clearly, t h e n , G o d serves to j u s t i f y t h e politics a n d a c c o u n t f o r its o r i g i n . A l t h o u g h G o d is never asked t o j o i n in m a k i n g specific decisions and effecting policy in t h e everyday politics of the state, deliberate violation of certain rules provokes G o d ' s o r the Heavenly c o u r t ' s direct intervention. T h u s o b e d i e n c e to the law clearly represents submission t o G o d in Heaven. Further, f o r m s of Heavenly coercion suggest a complex m y t h i c situation, w i t h m o r e subtle n u a n c e t h a n the claim that, overall, G o d rules, w o u l d indicate. A politics of rules and regulations cannot admit God's ad hoc participation, and this system did n o t d o so. G o d j o i n e d in the system in a regular and r o u t i n e way, and the rules t o o k for g r a n t e d God's part in the politics of Judaism.

Judaism's

Theory

of

Politics

At stake in the politics of Judaism is God's rule on earth. In simple terms, Judaism p r e s u m e s the direct involvement of t h e sacred in the h u m a n realm. Practically speaking, this m e a n s that the K i n g d o m of H e a v e n is realized by the s u p e r n a t u ral, holy c o m m u n i t y of Israel (not to be c o n f u s e d w i t h an ethnic g r o u p of the s a m e n a m e , or a nation-state of the s a m e n a m e ) as it exercises political p o w e r in accordance w i t h every detail of the dictates of the law given by G o d to Israel. As was discussed above, the w r i t t e n T o r a h (Scripture), w h i c h gave rise to the Oral Torah, g o v e r n e d personal, social, a n d political life. Politics, articulated t h r o u g h n o r m a t i v e law, f r o m the Mishnah f o r w a r d f o r m s the key to Judaism. To examine the politics of the Mishnah in its historical context, w e m u s t recall that, a m o n g prior Judaisms only the scriptural system finally defined with the closure of the P e n t a t e u c h had set forth a politics at all. T h e appeal to politics in setting f o r t h a t h e o r y of the social o r d e r of their particular "Israel" will have prov o k e d s o m e c u r i o s i t y a m o n g , f o r o n e e x a m p l e , t h e f r a m e r s of t h e J u d a i s m p o r t r a y e d by the library uncovered at Q u m r a n , and, for another, the f r a m e r s of the Christianity of t h e Land of Israel in t h e first century. Both g r o u p s , heirs of the ancient Scriptures as m u c h as w e r e the f r a m e r s of the Mishnah, f o u n d in politics n o i m p o r t a n t c o m p o n e n t of the systemic s t r u c t u r e they set forth. By contrast, the integration, within a systematic a c c o u n t of the social order, of a politics will n o t have surprised t h e g r e a t figures of G r e c o - R o m a n philosophy, such as Plato and Aristotle. T h a t fact takes on c o n s e q u e n c e w h e n w e n o t e

I JUDAISM

that the Pentateuch simply does not prepare us to make sense of the institutions that the politics of Judaism for its part designs. T h e Pentateuch's politics invokes priest and prophet, Aaron and Moses, but knows nothing of a tripartite governm e n t involving king, priest, and sage; n o r do the royal narratives c o n c e d e e m p o w e r m e n t to the priest or sage. Yet knowledge of the Politics of Aristotle and the Republic of Plato to the contrary gives perspective u p o n the politics of the Mishnah. The Pentateuch contributes nothing to the Mishnah's scheme of routine gove r n m e n t by king and high priest and sages' court. T h e Pentateuch's prophetic rule and constant appeal to God's immediate participation in the political process, and, in particular, in the administration of sanctions and acts of legitimate violence, by contrast fall into the category of a politics of charisma. T h e difference is not merely that the Pentateuchal institutions appeal to p r o p h e t and priest; it also is a difference in h o w the structure works as a political system. For the Pentateuchal m y t h that serves to legitimate coercion—rule by God's prophet, in the model of Moses, governance t h r o u g h explicitly revealed laws that God has dictated for the occasion—plays n o active and systemic role whatsoever in the formulation and presentation of the politics of Judaism. Philosophical systems use politics, by contrast, to set forth the rules and u n c h a n g i n g order of legitimate exercise of power, its teleology and its structure. Plato and Aristotle m a k e n o place for godly intervention on any particular occasion. And for their part, a m o n g the types of political authority contained within the scriptural repertoire, the o n e t h a t the M i s h n a h ' s p h i l o s o p h e r s reject is the prophetic and charismatic, and the one that they d e e m critical is the authority governing and governed by rules in an orderly, rational w a y The principal political figures—king, high priest, the disciple of the sage—are carefully n u r t u r e d t h r o u g h l e a r n i n g of rules, n o t t h r o u g h cultivation of gifts of the spirit. T h e authority of sages in the politics of Judaism in particular does n o t derive f r o m charisma, for example, revelation by G o d to the sage w h o makes a ruling in a given case, or even general access to God for the sage. So the politics of the Pentateuch—structure and system alike—in n o way forms the model for the politics of the Mishnah.

The Medium

of Expressing

Politics

in

Judaism

That brings us to the n u b of the matter: the exercise of legitimate violence in the law of Judaism from the Mishnah forward. How, specifically, do the sanctions that e m b o d y J u d a i s m ' s politics yield an a c c o u n t of the g o v e r n i n g political myth? In the Mishnah's picture, some of the same crimes or sins for which the Heavenly c o u r t imposes the penalty of extirpation are those that, u n d e r appropriate circumstances (e. g., sufficient evidence admissible in court) the earthly c o u r t

I

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6

I Jacob Neusner \ i m p o s e s t h e d e a t h penalty. T h a t is, t h e H e a v e n l y c o u r t and t h e e a r t h l y c o u r t impose precisely the s a m e sanctions for the s a m e crimes or sins. T h e earthly c o u r t t h e r e f o r e f o r m s d o w n h e r e the exact replica and c o u n t e r part, within a single system of power, of the Heavenly c o u r t u p there. T h e r e are crimes for w h i c h the earthly c o u r t i m p o s e s penalties, b u t for w h i c h the Heavenly c o u r t does n o t , a n d vice versa. T h e earthly and Heavenly c o u r t s share jurisdiction over sexual c r i m e s a n d over s e r i o u s religious c r i m e s against G o d . T h e H e a v e n l y c o u r t p e n a l i z e s w i t h its f o r m of t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y f o r religious sins against God, in w h i c h instances a person deliberately violates the taboos of sanctification. And that fact calls o u r a t t e n t i o n to a third p a r t n e r in the distribution and application of power: the Temple, w i t h its system of sanctions that cover precisely the s a m e acts subject to the jurisdiction of the Heavenly and earthly courts. T h e c o u n t e r p a r t o n e a r t h is n o w n o t the earthly c o u r t b u t the Temple. This is the institution that, in theory, automatically receives t h e a p p r o p r i a t e offering f r o m the person w h o inadvertently violates these s a m e t a b o o s of sanctification. But this is an odd choice for the Mishnah, since there was t h e n — a t a b o u t 200 C.E.—no T e m p l e o n earth. T h a t h a d b e e n destroyed in 70 C.E. T h e juxtaposition appears t h e n to involve courts and Temple, and the u p s h o t is that b o t h are equally m a t t e r s of theory. In t h e t h e o r y at h a n d , then, t h e earthly c o u r t , for its part, penalizes social crimes against the c o m m u n i t y that t h e Heavenly c o u r t , o n t h e o n e side, and the Temple rites, on the other, do n o t take into account at all. T h e s e are m u r d e r , apostasy, kidnapping, public defiance of the court, and false prophecy. T h e earthly c o u r t f u r t h e r imposes sanctions o n m a t t e r s of particular c o n c e r n to the Heavenly court, with special reference to taboos of sanctification (e.g., negative c o m m a n d m e n t s ) . T h e s e three institutions, therefore, exercise concrete and material power, utilizing legitimate violence to kill s o m e o n e , exacting penalties against property, a n d inflicting pain. T h e sages' m o d e s of p o w e r , by c o n t r a s t , stand quite apart, apply mainly t o their o w n circle, and w o r k t h r o u g h the intangible t h o u g h n o less effective m e a n s of inflicting s h a m e or paying honor. P o w e r flows t h r o u g h three distinct b u t intersecting dominions, each w i t h its o w n concern, all sharing s o m e interests in c o m m o n . T h e Heavenly c o u r t attends to deliberate defiance of Heaven, the T e m p l e to inadvertent defiance of Heaven. T h e earthly c o u r t attends to m a t t e r s subject to its jurisdiction by reason of sufficient evidence, p r o p e r witnesses, and the like, and these same m a t t e r s will c o m e u n d e r Heavenly j u r i s d i c t i o n w h e n t h e e a r t h l y c o u r t f i n d s itself u n a b l e t o act. Accordingly, w e have a tripartite system of sanctions—Heaven c o o p e r a t i n g with the T e m p l e in s o m e matters, w i t h the c o u r t in others, and, as n o t e d , each bearing its o w n distinct media of enforcing the law as well. W h a t t h e n can we say conc e r n i n g t h e s y s t e m i c m y t h of politics? T h e f o r m s of p o w e r a n d t h e m o d e s of m e d i a t i n g legitimate violence d r a w o u r attention to a single political m y t h , o n e that we first c o n f r o n t e d , if merely as a generality and c o m m o n p l a c e to be sure,

I JUDAISM

I

at the very outset. T h e unity of that m y t h is underlined by the simple fact that the earthly court enters into the process right alongside the Heavenly court and the Temple; as to blasphemy, idolatry, and magic, its jurisdiction prevails. So a single m y t h must serve all three correlated institutions. It is the m y t h of God's authority infusing the institutions of Heaven and earth alike, an authority diffused a m o n g three principle foci or circles of power, Heaven's court, the earthly court, and the Temple in between. Each focus of power has its own jurisdiction and responsibility, Heaven above, earth beneath, the Temple in the position of mediation—transmitting as it does f r o m earth to Heaven the penalties handed over as required. And all media of power in the m a t t e r of sanctions intersect at some points as well: a tripartite politics, a single m y t h drawing each c o m p o n e n t into relationship with a single source and origin of power, God's law set forth in the Torah. T h e point of differentiation within the political structures, supernatural and natural alike, lies in the attitude and intention of a h u m a n being. We differentiate a m o n g the application of power by reference to the attitude of the person w h o comes into relationship with that power. A person w h o comes into conflict with the system, rejecting the authority claimed by the powers that be, does so deliberately or inadvertently. The m y t h accounts in the end for the following hierarchization of action and penalty, infraction and sanction: 1. If the deed is deliberate, then one set of institutions exercises jurisdiction and utilizes supernatural power. 2. If the deed is inadvertent, another institution exercises jurisdiction and utilizes the power m a d e available by that same supernatural being. A sinner or criminal w h o has deliberately violated the law has by his or her action challenged the politics of Judaism. Consequently, God or God's surrogate imposes sanctions—extirpation (by the court on high), or death or other appropriate penalty (by the court on earth). A sinner or criminal w h o has inadvertently violated the law is penalized by the imposition of Temple sanctions, losing valued goods. People obey because God wants t h e m to and has told t h e m what to do, and w h e n they do not obey, a differentiated political structure appeals to that single hierarchizing myth. This m y t h has t w o components: first, God's will, expressed in the law of the Torah; second, the h u m a n being's will, carried out in obedience to the law of the Torah or in defiance of that law. T h e political m y t h of Judaism has to explain the differentiation of sins or crimes, with their associated penalties or punishments, and so sanctions of power. And in Scripture there is a very precise answer to the question of h o w to differentiate a m o n g sins or crimes and why to do so. Given the position of the system of the Mishnah, the point of differentiation must rest with one's attitude or intentionality. We do have a well-known story of h o w the

17

24 I Jacob Neusner

p o w e r of G o d conflicts w i t h the p o w e r of h u m a n i t y in such wise as to invoke the penalties a n d sanctions in precisely the differentiated m o d e s w e have b e f o r e us. T h a t story of p o w e r differentiated by the will of the h u m a n b e i n g in c o m m u n ion or conflict with the w o r d of the c o m m a n d i n g G o d c o m e s to us f r o m the Gard e n of Eden. We c a n n o t t o o o f t e n reread the following astonishing words: The Lord God took the man and placed him in the garden of Eden . . . and the Lord God commanded the man, saying, "Of every tree of the garden you are free to eat; but as for the tree of knowledge of good and bad, you must not eat of it; for as soon as you eat of it, you shall die." . . . W h e n the w o m a n saw that the tree was good for eating and a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was desirable as a source of wisdom, she took of its fruit and ate; she also gave some to her husband, and he ate . . . T h e Lord God called out to the m a n and said to him, "Where are you?" He replied, "I heard the sound of You in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked, so I hid." Then He asked, " W h o told you that you were naked? Did you eat of the tree from which I had forbidden you to eat?" . . . And the Lord God said to the w o m a n , "What is this you have done!" So the Lord God banished him f r o m the garden of Eden. (Genesis 2:15-3:23 passim)

N o w a reprise of the exchange b e t w e e n God, A d a m , and Eve tells us that at stake was responsibility: w h o has violated the law, b u t w h o bears responsibility for deliberately violating the law: "The w o m a n You put at my side—she gave m e of the tree, and I ate." "The serpent duped me, and I ate." Then the Lord God said to the serpent, "because you did this . . . "

T h e u l t i m a t e responsibility lies w i t h t h e o n e w h o acted deliberately, n o t u n d e r constraint or o n account of deception or m i s i n f o r m a t i o n , as did A d a m and Eve. T h e n the sanction applies m o s t severely to the o n e w h o by intention and an act of will has violated God's intention and will. Adducing this story by itself poses several problems. First, the storyteller does n o t allege that A d a m intended to violate the c o m m a n d m e n t ; he followed his wife. Second, t h e penalty is n o t extirpation b u t b a n i s h m e n t . T h a t is w h y to establish w h a t I conceive to be the generative m y t h , I t u r n to a second story of disobedience a n d its consequences, t h e tale of Moses's hitting the rock: The community was without water, and they joined against Moses and A a r o n . . . . Moses and Aaron came away f r o m the congregation to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting and fell on their faces. The Presence of the Lord appeared to them, and the Lord spoke to Moses, saying, "You and your brother Aaron take the rod and assemble the community, and before their very eyes order the rock to yield its

\

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water. T h u s you shall produce water for t h e m from the rock and provide drink for the congregation and their beasts." Moses took the rod f r o m before the Lord as He had c o m m a n d e d him. Moses and Aaron assembled the congregation in front of the rock; and he said to t h e m , "Listen, you rebels, shall we get water for you out of this rock?" And Moses raised his hand and struck the rock twice with his rod. O u t came copious water, and the c o m m u n i t y and their beasts drank. But the Lord said to Moses and Aaron, "Because you did not trust m e e n o u g h to affirm My sanctity in the sight of the Israelite people, therefore you shall not lead this congregation into the land that I have given t h e m . " Those are the waters of Meribah, meaning that the Israelites quarreled with the Lord—through which He affirmed His sanctity. ( N u m b e r s 20:1-13)

Here we have not only intentional disobedience, but also the penalty of extirpation. Both this myth and the myth of the fall make the same point. They direct attention to the generative conception that at stake in power is the will of God over against the will of the h u m a n being, and in particular, the Israelite h u m a n being. The political myth of Judaism now emerges in the Mishnah in all of its tedious detail as a reprise—in now-consequential and necessary, stunning detail—of the story of God's c o m m a n d m e n t , humanity's disobedience, God's sanction for the sin or crime, and humanity's a t o n e m e n t and reconciliation. The Mishnah omits all explicit reference to myths that explain power and sanctions, but invokes in its rich corpus of details the absolute given of the story of the distinction between w h a t is deliberate and what is mitigated by an attitude that is not culpable, a distinction set forth in the tragedy of Adam and Eve, in the failure of Moses and Aaron, and in countless other passages in the Pentateuch, Prophetic Books, and Writings. T h e n the Mishnah's is a politics of life after Eden and outside of Eden. T h e upshot of the m a t t e r is that the political m y t h of Judaism sets forth the constraints of freedom, the h u m a n will b r o u g h t to full and unfettered expression, imposed by the constraints of revelation, God's will m a d e known. Because it is the freedom of humanity to make decisions and frame intentions that f o r m s the point of differentiation a m o n g the political media of power, we are required, in my view, to return to the paradigmatic exercise of that same freedom, that is, to Eden, to the m o m e n t when Adam and Eve exercise their own will and defy God. Because the operative criterion in the differentiation of sanction— that is, the exercise of legitimate violence by Heaven or by earth or by the Temple—is the h u m a n attitude and intention in carrying o u t a culpable action, we m u s t recognize the politics before us rehearses the m y t h of A d a m and Eve in Eden—it finds its dynamic in the correspondence between God's will and humanity's f r e e d o m to act however it chooses, thus freely incurring the risk of penalty or sanction for the w r o n g exercise of

freedom.

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20 I Jacob Neusner \ At stake is w h a t A d a m a n d Eve, M o s e s a n d A a r o n , a n d n u m e r o u s o t h e r s intend, propose, plan, for that is the point at w h i c h t h e politics intervenes, making its points of differentiation b e t w e e n and a m o n g its sanctions and the authorities that i m p o s e those penalties. For that p o w e r to explain difference, which is to say, t h e capacity t o represent and a c c o u n t for hierarchy, w e are required, in m y opinion, to t u r n to the story of the fall of A d a m and Eve f r o m Eden and to count e r p a r t stories. T h e reason is that t h e political m y t h derives from that same m y t h of origins its points of differentiation a n d explains by reference to the principal c o m p o n e n t s of that m y t h — G o d ' s and h u m a n i t y ' s will and p o w e r — t h e d y n a m ics of t h e political system at h a n d . G o d c o m m a n d s , b u t h u m a n i t y does w h a t it t h e n chooses, and in the interplay of those t w o p r o t e a n forces, each p o w e r in its o w n right, the sanctions and penalties of the system apply. P o w e r c o m e s from t w o conflicting forces, the c o m m a n d i n g will of G o d and the free will of the h u m a n being. P o w e r expressed in i m m e d i a t e sanctions is also m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h these s a m e forces, H e a v e n above, h u m a n beings below, w i t h t h e T e m p l e m e d i a t i n g b e t w e e n t h e t w o . P o w e r w o r k s its w a y in t h e interplay b e t w e e n w h a t G o d has set forth in the law of the T o r a h and w h a t h u m a n beings do, w h e t h e r intentionally, w h e t h e r inadvertently, w h e t h e r obediently, w h e t h e r defiantly. T h a t is why the politics of J u d a i s m is a politics of Eden. And that furt h e r explains w h y sages' systemic s t a t e m e n t t u r n e d to politics as the necessary m e d i u m for its full f o r m u l a t i o n . Q u i t e h o w m a t t e r s w e r e to be p h r a s e d as this J u d a i s m crossed the frontier f r o m the realm of t h e o r y and t h e o l o g y to practical issues of public policy is n o t t o be predicted o n t h e basis of the systemic statem e n t w e have e x a m i n e d , which, w e n o w see, in n o way m a d e provision for the complexities of an ordinary, diverse society. But, then, systems never do. And that accounts, also, for the incapacity of the Judaic system to negotiate with—differentiate a m o n g — o u t s i d e r s , as w e shall see b e l o w

The Message

of Judaism's

Politics

A religion that expresses its theology t h r o u g h law, the Judaism set forth in the classical c a n o n delivers its political s t a t e m e n t t h r o u g h its legal system. This is called "the Halakhah," m e a n i n g , "the n o r m s of correct conduct," as distinct from "the Aggadah," meaning, the rules of correct conviction, exegesis, interpretation. T h e Halakhah has always served as the m e d i u m of theological expression in Judaism, and it contains the message of the politics as well. T h e s t a t e m e n t that is m a d e by the Halakhah may be set forth in t w o parts, the o n e describing the p r o b l e m facing G o d in t h e e n c o u n t e r w i t h H u m a n i t y , t h e o t h e r t h e s o l u t i o n p u t f o r t h at Sinai t h r o u g h the Halakhic account of the regenerate social order Israel is to realize. First, t h e p r o b l e m : G o d created n a t u r e as the setting for his e n c o u n t e r w i t h humanity. Creation was m e a n t as G o d ' s K i n g d o m for h u m a n i t y ' s bliss. But w i t h

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the sin of H u m a n i t y committed in rebellion against God's will, the loss of Eden, and the advent of death began the long quest for the regeneration of humanity. In the unfolding of generations, ten f r o m Adam to Noah, ten from Noah to Abrah a m and thence to Sinai, it was only Israel that presented itself for the encounter. But then Israel too showed itself to be h u m a n . For on the other side of Sinai came the celebration of the golden calf. Second, the Halakhic solution: W h a t to do now? It is to rebuild God's Kingd o m a m o n g that sector of h u m a n k i n d that undertakes to respond to God's selfmanifestation in the Torah and to realize God's dominion and imperatives: the Torah, the C o m m a n d m e n t s . God provided for Israel, surrogate of humanity, the C o m m a n d m e n t s as a m e d i u m of sanctification for the reconciliation with God and renewal of Eden, the triumph over the grave. Freed of sin through offerings that signified obedience to God's will, by reason of repentance and atonement, signifying h u m a n i t y ' s acceptance of God's will over his or her o w n , which to begin with had b r o u g h t a b o u t the fall f r o m Eden, either might m e e t God, the t w o in mutual and reciprocal c o m m i t m e n t . W h e r e Israel atoned for sin and presented itself as ready for the meeting, there G o d and Israel would f o u n d their Eden, not a place but an occasion. In overcoming the forces of death and affirming life t h r o u g h purity, Israel brings into being such an occasion. T h e Halakhah t h e n serves as the m e d i u m of sanctification of Israel in the here-and-now, in preparation for the salvation of Israel and its restoration to Eden. T h e classics of Rabbinic Judaism., the Mishnah, Midrash, and Talmuds, set forth in the Halakhah a systematic and coherent response to the Torah's account in the Pentateuch, Genesis t h r o u g h Deuteronomy, and in the Prophetic Books, Joshua through Kings and Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the Twelve. That account portrays the tragic situation of H u m a n i t y f r o m Eden onward, the hopeful situation of Israel f r o m Sinai onward. The Halakhah lays out h o w Israel's entire social order may be constructed to realize the situation represented by Eden n o w and to restore Eden then. But it would be this time through the willing realization of God's rule, b o t h in the present h o u r and at the end of days. That actualization takes place within Israel. H o w will it happen? Tutored by the Torah to w a n t by nature what God wants but will not coerce them to want—"the C o m m a n d m e n t s were given only to purify the heart of man"—Israel makes itself able to realize God's will and to f o r m his k i n g d o m within its holy community. T h r o u g h examining the Halakhah in its native categories or tractates, these propositions are shown to animate the entire Halakhic corpus, which is thus proved to e m b o d y a theological system, one that rests firmly upon the foundations of Scripture whole and in detail. In fact, we have in the Halakhah a reworking of t w o parallel stories, first the story of the creation and fall of Adam and Eve f r o m Eden, then the story of the regeneration of h u m a n i t y t h r o u g h the Torah's formation of Israel. The t w o sto-

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22 I Jacob Neusner \ ries t h e n are linked in the e n c o u n t e r of Israel and the nations, represented by the uncleanness of death that, t h r o u g h the disciplines of purity, Israel is to overcome. T h e tension b e t w e e n t h e m c o m e s to its resolution in the resurrection of Israel, f r o m death, those w h o k n o w G o d b e i n g destined for eternal life. T h e t w o stories, a d u m b r a t e d in the heads of the outline that follows, represent the native categor y - f o r m a t i o n s of the Aggadah, and, as is clear, the native c a t e g o r y - f o r m a t i o n s of the H a l a k h a h are folded into the Aggadic f r a m e w o r k : The story of humanity and rebellion, sin and atonement, exile and restoration » W h e r e and w h e n is Eden? » W h o o w n s Eden? The parallel story: Israel and God, sin and just punishment,

repentance and

atonement,

forgiveness and restoration » Israel's A d a m and Eve » Sin and a t o n e m e n t » Intentionality and the civil o r d e r The story of Israel and the nations, specifically, Israel and the Torah, the gentiles lacking the Torah » E n e m i e s of Eden, tangible and invisible » T h e contest b e t w e e n d e a t h and life » O v e r c o m i n g death » T h e K i n g d o m of G o d T h r o u g h the sages' philosophical reading of Scripture—its H a l a k h a h and its Aggadah alike—the Torah's a c c o u n t of h u m a n i t y ' s story is t r a n s f o r m e d into the design for Israel's social o r d e r : G o d ' s K i n g d o m , Eden realized now, restored at the end. Let us n o w see things whole. H e r e are the specific Halakhic tractates that convey the message t h r o u g h the n o r m s of public conduct, and the specific details of that message, viewed whole: Where and when is Eden? » Shebi'it » Orlah » Kilayim » Shabbat-Erubin By Eden, Scripture m e a n s t h a t place w h o l e a n d at rest t h a t G o d sanctified; "Eden" stands for creation in perfect repose. In the Halakhah, Eden stands for n o t a particular place b u t n a t u r e in a defined condition, at a particular m o m e n t : creation in Sabbath repose, sanctified. T h e n a place in repose at the climax of creation, at sunset at the start of the seventh day, w h o l e and at rest, embodies, realizes Eden. T h e H a l a k h a h m e a n s t o systematize the condition of Eden, to define

I JUDAISM

Eden in its normative traits, and also to localize Eden within Israel, the people. H o w so? Eden is the place to the perfection of which God responded in the act of sanctification at the advent of the seventh day. While the Land in the Written Torah's explicit account of matters claims the right to repose on the seventh day and in the seventh year of the septennial cycle, it is the location of Israel wherever that may be at the advent of sunset on the eve of the seventh day of the week of creation that recapitulates Eden: Who owns Eden? » Ma'aserot » Terumot » Hallah » Ma'aser Sheni » Bikkurim » Pe'ah » Dema'i T h e story expands, within the motif of Eden, to the matter of ownership and possession as media for the expression of the relationship between humanity and God. God accorded to Adam and Eve possession of nearly everything in Eden, retaining ownership—the right to govern according to His will—for Himself. The key to the entire system of interaction between God and Israel through the Land and its gifts emerges in the Halakhah of Ma'aserot and its companions, which deal—along the lines of Shebi'it and 'Erubin—with the difference between possession and ownership. God owns the world, which he made. But God has accorded to h u m a n i t y the right of possession of the earth and its produce. This he did twice, once to the primordial h u m a n beings—Adam and Eve—in Eden, the second time to Israel in the Land of Israel. And to learn the lesson that humanity did not master, that possession is not ownership but custody and stewardship, Israel has to acknowledge the claims of the creator to the glory of all creation, which is the land. This Israel does by giving back God's share of the produce of the land at the time, and in the manner, that God defines. T h e enlandized (situated within the land) c o m p o n e n t s of the Halakhah therefore f o r m a single, cogent statem e n t of matters: Adam and Eve » Qiddushin » Ketubot » Nedarim » Nazir » Sotah » Gittin

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24 I Jacob Neusner | » Yebamot » Sacralization and intentionality T h e Halakhah of the family, covering the act of sanctification of a w o m a n by a m a n (Qiddushin), the marriage a g r e e m e n t (Ketubah), vows and special vows, the disposition of a charge of unfaithfulness against a w o m a n , and the severance of the marital bond of sanctification through a writ of divorce or death, does not ubiquitously invoke the m e t a p h o r of Adam and Eve in Eden. O u r task, then, is to identify the principal foci of that Halakhah and to investigate the appropriate context in which it is to be interpreted. H o w here does Eden figure? T h e connection is m a d e articulate by the (possibly later) liturgical f r a m e w o r k in which the Halakhah plays itself out. There, in the liturgy of the marriage canopy, the act of creation of humanity is recapitulated, the bride and g r o o m explicitly compared with Adam and Eve. Not only so, but the t h e m e of the land and Israel intervenes as well—two motifs d o m i n a n t in the Halakhic theology examined to this point: Sin and atonement » T h e new moral entity » Sheqalim » Tamid and Yoma » Z e b a h i m amd Menahot » Arakhin » Bekhorot » Meilah » Temurah T h e Halakhah takes account of the tragedy of Eden and provides for a new m o r a l entity, a r e f o r m e d transaction accorded that entity, one n o t available to Adam and Eve. For God at Eden m a d e n o provision for a t o n e m e n t for sin, but, in the unfolding of humanity's story, God grasped the full measure of mortals' c h a r a c t e r and d r e w the necessary conclusion and acted on it. E n d o w e d with a u t o n o m o u s will, h u m a n beings have the p o w e r to rebel against God's will. Therefore the Halakhah finds urgent the question, h o w is humanity, subject to God's rule, to atone for the sin that, by their rebellious nature, m e n and w o m e n are likely to commit? To answer that question, the Torah formulates the rules that govern h u m a n i t y b o t h (1) w h e n u n d e r G o d ' s d o m i n i o n and (2) w h e n in rebellion against God's will. These represent the two aspects of the one story that c o m m e n c e s with Eden, leads to the formation of Israel through Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, G o d ' s a n t i d o t e s t o A d a m , and climaxes at Sinai. But Israel also is h u m a n , so that story a c c o m m o d a t e s both Adam's fall and Israel's worship of the golden calf, and, as the d e n o u e m e n t , Adam and Eve's exile from Eden and Israel's

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ultimate exile f r o m the land. How, then, does God propose to repair the world he has made to take account of humanity's character and Israel's own proclivity? Intentionality and the civil order » Legitimate violence: w h o does what to w h o m » Keritot » Sanhedrin-Makkot » Baba Qamma-Baba Mesi'a-Baba Batra » Horayot » Shebuot T h e Halakhah dictates the character of (its) Israel's civil order—its political institutions and system of criminal justice. It undertakes a labor of differentiation of power, indicating w h a t agency or p e r s o n has the p o w e r to precipitate the w o r k i n g of politics as legitimate violence. W h e n we understand the differentiating force that imparts to politics its activity and dynamism, we grasp the theology that animates the structures of the politics and propels the system. T h e details of the Halakhah, in particular the sanctions assigned to various infractions, effect the t a x o n o m y of power, which f o r m s an implicit exegesis of the story of Eden, translated into reflection on the power of intentionality: Enemies of Eden, tangible and invisible » Tangible enemies: Abodah Z a r a h » Invisible enemies: death, Ohalot » Negaim » Z a b i m and Niddah T h e enemies of Eden take shape around the grand struggle between life and death, in the here and n o w m e a n i n g Israel and the gentiles, at the end of days meaning those w h o will stand in j u d g m e n t and go onward to the world to c o m e and eternal life, and those w h o will perish in the grave. Specifically, the world b e y o n d the limits of Israel f o r m s an u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d realm of idolatry and uncleanness. T h e n h o w is Israel to negotiate life with the world of gentiles and their idolatry, corpses and their contamination? A m o n g the sources of uncleanness, tangible and invisible, we begin with the gentiles and proceed to corpse- and comparable kinds of uncleanness. But the two—gentiles and corpses—form a single domain. T h e f o r m e r bears exactly the same uncleanness as the latter. Gentiles, defined as idolaters, and Israelites, defined as worshippers of the one and only God, part c o m p a n y at death. For the m o m e n t Israelites die—only to rise f r o m the grave. Gentiles die for eternity. T h e roads intersect at the grave, each c o m p o n e n t of humanity taking its own path beyond. Israelites—meaning, those possessed of right conviction—will rise f r o m the grave, stand in j u d g m e n t , but then enter u p o n eternal life, to which n o one else will enjoy access:

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26 I Jacob Neusner \ The contest between death and life » Uncleanness and sanctification » Makhshirin » Tohorot » Uqsin » Kelim T h e sources of change and disruption that t h r e a t e n the cleanness, h e n c e the s a n c t i f i c a t i o n , of t h e T e m p l e are t h e s a m e s o u r c e s t h a t t h r e a t e n t h e n o r m of cleanness of the h o u s e h o l d . If the s a m e uncleanness affects the Temple and the table, t h e n t h e only difference is o n e of d e g r e e , n o t of k i n d , as t h e H a l a k h a h states explicitly. And the rest follows. T h e w e b of relationships b e t w e e n sanctification a n d uncleanness spins itself o u t into every c o r n e r of the Israelite household, w h e r e the system m a k e s a difference. And it is the will of the h o u s e h o l d e r that d e t e r m i n e s the difference that the distinction b e t w e e n clean and unclean is g o i n g t o m a k e . E v e r y t h i n g is relative t o the h o u s e h o l d e r ' s will; he has it in his p o w e r t o d r a w the h o u s e h o l d table into alignment with the altar in the Temple, that is to say, to place the table and the f o o d set t h e r e o n into relationship, o n t o a c o n t i n u u m , w i t h the altar and the H o l y T h i n g s of the cult. This h e can accomplish t h r o u g h an act of will that motivates an attitude of constant w a t c h f u l n e s s in the h o u s e h o l d for those very sources of c o n t a m i n a t i o n that Scripture identifies as d a n g e r to the Lord's altar in t h e J e r u s a l e m Temple: Overcoming death » Parah » Miqvaot » Tebul Yom » Yadayim » H o m e and t e m p l e in hierarchical f o r m a t i o n : H a g i g a h » Cause and effect: w h e r e and w h y h u m a n i t y ' s will m a t t e r s F r o m death and its effect u p o n f o o d and drink, that is, the uncleanness caused by, and analogous to, death, w e t u r n t o the media for the restoration of life. Still w a t e r u n a f f e c t e d by h u m a n agency restores the n a t u r a l condition disrupted by u n c l e a n n e s s o t h e r t h a n that of the c o r p s e a n d its analogues, while by c o n t r a s t p u r i f i c a t i o n - w a t e r systematically s u b j e c t e d to h u m a n i n t e r v e n t i o n — c o n s t a n t attention, deliberate action, start to finish—alone removes corpse-uncleanness. We have t h e n t o a c c o u n t for the exclusion of h u m a n i t y f r o m the o n e process, along w i t h the radical insistence u p o n h u m a n i t y ' s inclusion, in full deliberation, within the other. Uncleanness that c o m e s a b o u t by reason of any cause b u t death and its analogues is removed by the Heaven's o w n dispensation, n o t by h u m a n i ty's intervention: rainfall, sunset suffice. Ordinary purification is d o n e by nature,

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resulting f r o m natural processes. But as to persons and objects that have contracted uncleanness f r o m death, nature on its o w n cannot produce the kind of water that bears the power to remove that uncleanness and restore the condition of nature. Only h u m a n beings can. And m e n and w o m e n can do this only by the highest level of concentration, the most deliberate and focused action. O n e person's act of will overcomes the uncleanness of death, just as one person's act of deliberate rebellion brought about death to begin with. H u m a n i t y restores what humanity has disrupted. Had the Halakhah wished in its terms and categories to accomplish a reprise of the story of h u m a n i t y ' s fall, it could n o t have m a d e a m o r e eloquent statement than it does in the contrast between the Halakhah of Miqvaot and that of Parah. The Kingdom of God » Accepting the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven and the C o m m a n d m e n t s » Berakhot » Hullin » Megillah » Rosh Hashanah » Pesahim » Sukkah » Mo'ed Qatan » Besah » Ta'anit As m u c h as m e n and w o m e n by their nature rebel against God, these same people tutored by the C o m m a n d m e n t s willingly accept God's will and therefore his rule. W h a t are the Halakhah's media for the reformation, regeneration, and renewal of humanity? T h e Halakhah here legislates for n o t Eden b u t the kingd o m of God. For Sinai's answer to Eden's question transcends the matter of sin and a t o n e m e n t and encompasses the conduct of the ordinary, everyday life lived under God's rule. T h e normative deals with the normal, so the final solution to God's dilemma with h u m a n i t y — h o w to accord m e n and w o m e n free will but to n u r t u r e in t h e m freely given love for God—lies in the Torah. That way of life in accord with God's rule means to f o r m the Paideia, the character-building education to t r a n s f o r m h u m a n i t y by m a k i n g Israelite m e n and w o m e n ' s freely given obedience to God as natural as was Adam and Eve's obstinate rebellion against God. That is why the Halakhic provision for life in God's kingdom moves from the ordinary day and its duties to the table and its everyday nourishment, then to the meeting with God that is seasonal and temporal, and finally to the climax of the system, confrontation with routine crisis. This brief precis s h o w s h o w a few large motifs f o r m of the details of the Halakhah a single coherent system, one that tells a story. Clearly, the Halakhah

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w o r k s f r o m S c r i p t u r e f o r w a r d . 1 But, b e i n g t h e o l o g i a n s , s y s t e m a t i c t h i n k e r s , intent on a philosophical reading of religion in quest of a coherent, p r o p o r t i o n ate, and rigorously argued s t a t e m e n t , they d o n o t r a n d o m l y r e w o r k this detail or that. Rather, the sages' philosophical reading of Scripture—its H a l a k h a h and its Aggadah alike—produces a c o h e r e n t theology. It leads t o the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the Torah's account of h u m a n i t y ' s story into the detailed design for Israel's social order. T h e details all find their place within the s t r u c t u r e of the whole, and in its workings, the system that sages have c o n s t r u c t e d a n i m a t e s the whole, the parts w o r k i n g well t o g e t h e r t o m a k e a simple s t a t e m e n t . T h a t is easily set f o r t h . In its actualities Israel e m b o d i e s — o r is m e a n t t o e m b o d y — G o d ' s plan for h u m a n k i n d , n o t o n the individual level, b u t as a social entity: God's Kingdom, Eden b o t h realized in the h e r e and n o w and restored at the e n d of time. T h e Rabbinic J u d a i s m e m b o d i e d , actualized, and realized in the H a l a k h a h is the religion that publicly, in the sight of all humanity, realizes n o w and for eternity the imperatives of God, m a d e manifest at Sinai, in the Torah, and that thereby shows the way to eternal life w i t h God. So w e have followed the story a b o u t the interior architectonics of Israel's being that the H a l a k h a h tells t h r o u g h concrete action-symbols. T h e H a l a k h a h brings a b o u t t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e h e r e a n d t h e now, of t h e p a r t i c u l a r occasion (thus: place a n d t i m e a n d event, m o s t l y in n a t u r e ) i n t o t h e e m b o d i m e n t , t h e exemplification, of the abstract g r o u n d of being. Involved is the relationship of realms of the sacred: t h e rules of e n g a g e m e n t b e t w e e n a n d a m o n g God, land, Israel, time, place, circumstance. T h r o u g h the fabric of everyday life of the land lived o u t in the h o u s e h o l d , village, and the holy metropolis, J e r u s a l e m (the three d i m e n s i o n s of t h e social o r d e r of w h i c h t h e H a l a k h a h takes account), Eden is read n o t as historical m o m e n t b u t as situation a n d occasion. T h a t t h e n precipitates t h o u g h t a b o u t the h u m a n condition. But Eden does n o t impose n a r r o w limits o n the amplification of that t h o u g h t . It is n o t the only condition. T h e r e is also the situation b r o u g h t a b o u t by the second great t h e m e , besides Eden, that is implicit in the Halakhah. It is God's self-manifestation in the Torah: the occasion for the r e f o r m and renewal of h u m a n i t y t h r o u g h Israel, the count e r p a r t and opposite of h u m a n k i n d . T h e H a l a k h a h t h e r e f o r e will be s h o w n to begin w i t h Eden b u t to progress to the realization of God's Kingdom within holy Israel's social order, conceiving of Israel b o t h enlandized (defined as being situated w i t h i n t h e Land) a n d Utopian (located a n y w h e r e ) , as t h e c a t e g o r y of t h e H a l a k h a h requires. A third massive m o t i f involves Eden once m o r e , this t i m e u n d e r G o d ' s rule, a n d it t o o e n g a g e s w i t h t h e T o r a h ' s a c c o u n t of Israel at Sinai. It c o n c e r n s t h e r e e m b o d i m e n t of Israel, t h e restoration that c o m e s a b o u t n o t alone in the end of days w h e n t h e Messiah c o m e s , b u t in t h e h e r e - a n d - n o w of t h e w o r k a d a y

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w o r l d . It is there that Israelite h u m a n beings f o r m e d by the discipline of the Torah learn both to atone for, and to overcome, their natural propensity willfully to rebel against God. Within the social order of an enlandized Israel m o r a l humanity constructs a godly society. That reading of the Written Torah and translation of its law into the canons of ordinary life speaks in the acutely present tense to portray for h u m a n i t y a worthy future well within their own capacities to realize: "The C o m m a n d m e n t s were given only to purify the heart of Man," and 'AllMerciful wants the heart," as the Talmud frames matters. Therein, I identify the political theology of the Halakhah: a massive, closed system that, in dialogue with the Aggadah b u t in its o w n c a t e g o r y - f o r m a t i o n s and language, says the same thing about many things, n u m e r o u s details bearing a single message.

Judaism

and Nonbelievers:

Politics

and People outside

the

Tradition

At the end we turn to how the Halakhic system sets forth the relationship of holy Israel with everybody else, meaning in the context of the system only one thing: idolaters, severally and jointly. Idolatry represents the tangible e n e m y of God. W h e n the H a l a k h a h takes u p the w o r l d b e y o n d Eden, it invokes its o w n m e t a p h o r s for death: the gentiles in the tangible world outside the genealogical frontier of Israel, corpse-uncleanness in the invisible, if equally tangible, world beyond the limits of the altar, the Temple, and Jerusalem. The world beyond the bounds of Israel—the people in its household walls, the land within its frontiers— forms an undifferentiated realm of idolatry and uncleanness. T h e n h o w is Israel to negotiate life with the world of gentiles and their idolatry, corpses and their contamination? T h e Halakhah constructs, indeed defines, the interiority of an Israel sustaining God's service in a world of idolatry: life against death in the t w o concrete and tangible dimensions by which life is sustained: trade and the production of food. N o w o n d e r Israel m u s t refrain f r o m engaging with idolatry on days of the festivals for idols that the great fairs e m b o d y — t h e n especially. A m o n g the sources of uncleanness, tangible and invisible, we begin with the gentiles and proceed to corpse-uncleanness and comparable kinds of uncleanness. As p o i n t e d o u t previously, the two—gentiles, c o r p s e s — f o r m a single domain. T h e f o r m e r bears the same uncleanness as the latter. A picture in cartographic f o r m of the theological anthropology of the Halakhah, indeed, would portray a many-colored and much-differentiated Israel at the center of the circle, w i t h the p e r i m e t e r c o m p r i s e d by all-white gentiles. For white is the color of death, h o w the unclean graves are m a r k e d off to w a r n priests and others concerned with cleanness. Gentiles, like their idols, constitute a source of uncleanness of the virulence of corpse-uncleanness. W h a t detail of the Halakhah embodies the principle that Israel stands for life, the gentiles like their idols for death?

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An asherah tree, like a corpse, conveys uncleanness to those w h o pass u n d e r n e a t h it, so M. A b o d a h Z a r a h 3:8: "And h e s h o u l d n o t pass u n d e r n e a t h it, b u t if h e passed u n d e r n e a t h it, he is unclean." N o t only so, b u t gentiles, always m e a n i n g idolaters, and Israelites, defined as w o r s h i p e r s of t h e o n e a n d o n l y G o d , p a r t c o m p a n y at d e a t h . O n l y f o r t h e m o m e n t d o Israelites die, for they are to rise f r o m the grave. T h e roads intersect at t h e grave, e a c h c o m p o n e n t of h u m a n i t y t a k i n g its o w n p a t h b e y o n d . Israelites—meaning those possessed of right conviction—will rise f r o m the grave, s t a n d in j u d g m e n t , b u t t h e n e n t e r u p o n e t e r n a l life, to w h i c h n o idolater will enjoy access. So, in substance, h u m a n i t y viewed w h o l e is divided b e t w e e n those w h o get a share in the world to c o m e and w h o will stand w h e n subject to divine j u d g m e n t and those w h o will not. And h u m a n i t y also is divided b e t w e e n Israel, acutely susceptible to a b r o a d variety of sources of uncleanness b u t also capable of attaining purity, and the gentiles, u n i f o r m l y unclean always. T h a t is the m e a n ing of the fact that all gentiles—even r i g h t e o u s o n e s — a r e sources of the undifferentiated uncleanness of the corpse. W h e n a gentile a b a n d o n s idolatry and accepts the d o m i n i o n of G o d exercised t h r o u g h His self-manifestation in the Torah, he loses the corpse-uncleanness that afflicted h i m , is i m m e r s e d a n d t r a n s f o r m e d , a n d as if newly b o r n in the rite of i m m e r s i o n . N o t h i n g in his past affects his n e w status as part of Israel ( t h o u g h his status within Israel is subject to those s a m e criteria of hierarchization and differentiation that g o v e r n all o t h e r s w i t h i n Israel in o n e way o r a n o t h e r ) . T h e n the Halakhah distinguishing those w h o love f r o m those w h o hate G o d takes as its religious p r o b l e m the concretization of that distinction, the d e m o n s t r a t i o n of w h e r e and h o w the distinction in theory makes a h u g e difference in the practice, the conduct, of everyday affairs. And, as w e shall see, invisible, t h o u g h tangible, sources of uncleanness also f o r m analogues to death. Idolatry—rebellious a r r o g a n c e against G o d — e n c o m p a s s e s rejection of t h e entire Torah. T h e religious d u t y to avoid idolatry is primary; if o n e violates the religious duties, he breaks the yoke of C o m m a n d m e n t s , a n d if he violates that single r e l i g i o u s duty, h e violates t h e e n t i r e T o r a h . V i o l a t i n g t h e p r o h i b i t i o n against idolatry is equivalent to transgressing all Ten C o m m a n d m e n t s . Differentiated by g e n e a l o g y and o t h e r indicators, all Israelites are defined by submission to G o d and acceptance of the T o r a h as God's will. T h a t conclusion is sustained by a simple inversion of subject and predicate in the Halakhic definition of Israel, w h i c h w e have already e n c o u n t e r e d . T h e H a l a k h a h states, "All Israelites have a share in the w o r l d to c o m e . And these are the ones w h o have n o p o r t i o n in the w o r l d to c o m e : H e w h o says, the resurrection of the dead is a teaching that does n o t derive f r o m t h e Torah, a n d the T o r a h does n o t c o m e f r o m Heaven; and an Epicurean" (Mishnah Sanhédrin 10:1). T h e n w e m a y say, those w h o have a share in the w o r l d to c o m e are those w h o a f f i r m God, self-manifest in the Torah.

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W h a t accounts for the identification of idolatry with death? The transaction of Eden lies at the foundation, namely, in the act of rebellion. Idolatry f o r m s a deliberate act of rebellion against God. Gentiles are deniers, their status imposed by their own act of will. That is why, in full deliberation, they are unreconstructed h u m a n k i n d , destined for the grave and classified as corpses even while alive. So the Halakhah maintains that Israel encompasses those w h o will enjoy eternal life, gentiles are those w h o perish at the grave. T h e contrast b e t w e e n life and Israel, death and gentiles, is concrete and practical, for the spit and urine of the gentile are unclean, since gentiles are classified as a Z a b (Leviticus 15). T h a t means even a gentile w h o accepted the seven C o m m a n d m e n t s that pertain to the children of Noah falls outside of the system of differentiated contamination that pertains to Israel, for example, they are not subject to the uncleanness described at Leviticus 13-14, and Israelite itself before the giving of the Torah was not subject to that uncleanness. If Eden stands for life with God, then beyond the limits lies the realm of death, tangible in gentiles, invisible in corpse-uncleanness and other sources of uncleanness, including the idol. In this world, death is to be held at a distance, uncleanness is to be kept away, f r o m the Temple altar, and, by analogy, f r o m the table of the Israelite household, and, in the world to come, gentiles, idolaters, molder in the grave and death itself will die. H o w does the Halakhah respond in practical terms to these convictions? T h e Halakhah takes as its task the negotiation between Israelites and the pagan world in which they live: h o w are they to conduct themselves in accord with the Torah so that at n o point and in n o way do they give support to idolatry and so betray the o n e and only God. In its basic exposition of the t h e m e of idolatry, the Halakhah rests squarely on the foundations of Scripture, supplying rules and regulations that carry out the fundamental scriptural C o m m a n d m e n t s about destroying idols and everything that has to do with idolatry. But the Halakhah so formulates matters as to transform the entire topic of idolatry into an essay on Israel's relationships with the gentiles, w h o , as I said, are idolaters by definition. T h e Halakhah addresses the condition of individuals, the ordinary life of c o m m o n folk, rather than concentrating on the situation of all Israel, viewed as a collective entity. The Halakhah therefore tends to find its problem in the condition of the private person and in the interiorities of his life in the Israelite community. For the Written Torah, the c o m m u n i t y at large forms the focus of the law, and idolatry is not to be negotiated with by the collectivity of holy Israel. In its land Israel is to wipe out idolatry, even as a memory. Scripture is clear that Israel is to obliterate all m e n t i o n of idols (Exodus 23:13), not b o w d o w n to gentiles' gods or serve t h e m but overthrow t h e m and break t h e m into pieces (Exodus 23:24): "You shall break d o w n their altars and dash in pieces their pillars and h e w down their Asherim and b u r n their graven images with fire" ( D u e t e r o n o m y 7:5). Israelites are c o m m a n d e d along these same lines:

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You shall surely destroy all the places where the nations w h o m you shall dispossess served their gods, u p o n the high m o u n t a i n s and u p o n the hills and u n d e r every green tree; you shall tear down their altars and dash in pieces their pillars and burn their Asherim with fire; you shall hew down the graven images of their gods and destroy their n a m e out of that place. (Dueteronomy 12:2-3)

Accordingly, so far as t h e W r i t t e n T o r a h supplies t h e f o u n d a t i o n s f o r t h e t r e a t m e n t of the m a t t e r by the Oral Torah, the focus of discourse concerning the gentiles is idolatry. Scripture's H a l a k h a h does n o t c o n t e m p l a t e Israel's coexisting, in the land, w i t h gentiles and their idolatry. But the H a l a k h a h of the Mishnah-Tosefta-Yerushalmi-Bavli speaks to a world that is n o t so simple. T h e land belongs to Israel, b u t gentiles also live t h e r e — a n d r u n things. T h e H a l a k h a h of the Oral T o r a h c o m m e n c e s w i t h the premise that gentiles live side by side ( w h e t h e r o r n o t in t h e Land of Israel) w i t h Israelites. T h e n Israelites have to sort o u t the complex p r o b l e m s of coexistence w i t h idolatry. And that coexistence involves n o t w h o l e c o m m u n i t i e s , c o r p o r a t e Israel, and the peoples, w h o e v e r they m a y be, b u t individuals, this Israelite living side by side w i t h that gentile. T h e H a l a k h a h deals first w i t h c o m m e r c i a l relationships; second, w i t h m a t t e r s p e r t a i n i n g to idols; and finally, w i t h the particular prohibition of wine, p a r t of which has served as a libation to an idol. T h e w h o l e is regularized a n d ordered. T h e r e are relationships w i t h gentiles that are absolutely prohibited, particularly o c c a s i o n s of idol w o r s h i p ; t h e H a l a k h a h r e c o g n i z e s t h a t these are m a j o r c o m m e r c i a l events. W h e n it c o m e s to c o m m e r c e w i t h idolaters, Israelites m a y n o t sell or in any w a y benefit from certain things, m a y sell b u t may n o t utilize certain others, and m a y sell and utilize yet others. Here, w e see i m m e diately, t h e c o m p l e x a n d s y s t e m a t i c m o d e of t h o u g h t t h a t g o v e r n s t h e O r a l Torah's t r e a t m e n t of the topic vastly transcends the rather simple conception that a n i m a t e s Scripture's discussion of t h e s a m e m a t t e r . T h e r e are t h e s e u n s t a t e d premises within the Halakhah: 1. W h a t a g e n t i l e is n o t likely t o u s e f o r t h e w o r s h i p of an idol is n o t prohibited. 2. W h a t m a y serve n o t as p a r t of an idol b u t as an a p p u r t e n a n c e t h e r e t o is prohibited for Israelite use b u t p e r m i t t e d for Israelite c o m m e r c e . 3. W h a t serves idolatry is prohibited for use and for benefit. In reflecting u p o n relationships w i t h the gentiles, m e a n i n g idolaters, the Oral T o r a h m o r e o v e r takes for g r a n t e d a n u m b e r of facts. T h e s e t u r n o u t to yield a single generalization: Gentiles are a s s u m e d routinely to practice bestiality, m u r der, and fornication. F u r t h e r negative stereotypes c o n c e r n i n g idolaters occur. T h e H a l a k h a h t h e n serves as the m e a n s for the translation of theological conviction into social policy. Gentiles are assumed to be ready to m u r d e r any Israelite they can get their hands on, rape any Israelite w o m a n , c o m m i t bestiality with any

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Israelite cow. T h e Oral T o r a h cites few cases to indicate that that conviction responds to ordinary, everyday events; the hostility to gentiles flows from a theory of idolatry, n o t the facts of everyday social intercourse, which, as we have seen, sages recognize is full of neighborly cordiality. T h e n why take for granted gentiles routinely c o m m i t the mortal sins of not merely idolatry b u t bestiality, fornication, and murder? That is because the Halakhah takes as its task the realization of the theological principle that those w h o hate Israel hate God, those w h o hate God hate Israel, and God will ultimately vanquish Israel's enemies as His own—just as God also was redeemed from Egypt. So the theory of idolatry, involving alienation f r o m God, accounts for the wicked conduct imputed to idolaters, w i t h o u t regard to whether, in fact, that is h o w idolaters c o n d u c t t h e m selves. That m a t t e r of logic is stated in so m a n y words: Sifré to N u m b e r s 84:4: " . . . and let t h e m that hate you flee before you:" And do those w h o hate [come before] him w h o spoke and b r o u g h t the world into being? T h e p u r p o s e of the verse at hand is to say that whoever hates Israel is as if he hates h i m w h o spoke and by his word b r o u g h t the world into being.

T h e same proposition is reworked. God can have n o adversaries, but gentile enemies of Israel act as t h o u g h they were his enemies: A l o n g these s a m e lines: "In the g r e a t n e s s of y o u r m a j e s t y you o v e r t h r o w y o u r adversaries." (Exodus 15:7) And are there really adversaries before him w h o spoke and by his word brought the world into being? But Scripture t h u s indicates that w h o e v e r rose u p against Israel is as if he rose u p against the Omnipresent.

Israel hates God's enemies, and Israel is hated because of its loyalty to God (a m a t t e r to which we shall return below): "Do I not hate those w h o hate you, Ο Lord? And do I not loathe t h e m that rise up against you? I hate t h e m with perfect hatred, I count t h e m m y enemies." (Psalm 139:21-22) And so Scripture also says, "For whoever lays hands on you is as if he lays hands o n the apple of his eye." (Zechariah 2:12) R. Judah says, " W h a t is written is not, 'the apple of an eye' but 'the apple of his eye,' it is as if Scripture speaks of him above, but Scripture has used an euphemism."

Now the consequences of these propositions are drawn: And whoever gives help to Israel is as if he gives help to him w h o spoke and by his word brought the world into being, as it is said, "Curse Meroz, says the angel of the

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T h e proposition a n n o u n c e d at t h e outset is fully articulated—those w h o hate Israel h a t e God, those w h o are e n e m i e s of Israel are e n e m i e s of God, those w h o help Israel help G o d — a n d t h e n systematically spelled o u t t h r o u g h examples and by facts set forth in Scripture. In line w i t h its focus u p o n issues of intentionality, the H a l a k h a h insists that, just as gentiles m a k e choices willfully, so in dealing w i t h idolatry and the gentiles, Israel t o o m a y exercise its o w n will. U n d e r all conditions, the H a l a k h a h assumes, Israelites possess f r e e d o m of will: they are always h u m a n beings, "in o u r image." T h e H a l a k h a h presupposes n o t gentile h e g e m o n y b u t only gentile power. It furt h e r takes for g r a n t e d that Israelites m a y m a k e choices, m a y specifically refrain f r o m t r a d i n g in w h a t gentiles v a l u e in the service of t h e i r gods, and m a y h o l d back f r o m gentiles w h a t gentiles require for that service. Israelites m a y live in a w o r l d governed by gentiles, b u t they f o r m intentions and carry t h e m out. T h e y m a y decide w h a t to sell and w h a t n o t to sell, w h o m to hire for w h a t particular act of labor and to w h o m n o t to sell their o w n labor. And above all, Israelite traders m a y d e t e r m i n e to give up opportunities denied t h e m by the circumstance of gentile idolatry. T h e H a l a k h a h therefore m a k e s a f o r m i d a b l e s t a t e m e n t of Israel's f r e e d o m to m a k e choices, its o p p o r t u n i t y w i t h i n the context of everyday life to preserve a t e r r i t o r y free of idolatrous c o n t a m i n a t i o n , m u c h as Israel in e n t e r i n g the land w a s t o create a t e r r i t o r y free of t h e w o r s h i p of idols a n d their presence. In the setting of w o r l d order, Israel m a y find itself subject to the will of others. But in the h o u s e of Israel, Israelites can and should establish a realm for God's rule and presence, free of idolatry. A n d if t o establish a d o m a i n for G o d , Israelites m u s t practice self-abnegation, refrain f r o m actions of considerable weight and consequence, well, m u c h of the T o r a h c o n c e r n s itself w i t h w h a t people are n o t supposed to do, and G o d ' s rule c o m e s to realization in acts of restraint. So m u c h for the life of Israel u n d e r the C o m m a n d m e n t s . T h e H a l a k h a h , to be sure, recognizes that gentiles also are subject to G o d ' s C o m m a n d m e n t s . T h e r e are seven s u c h religious obligations t h a t apply t o t h e children of N o a h . It is n o t surprising—indeed, it is predictable—that the definition of the m a t t e r should find its place in the H a l a k h a h of A b o d a h Z a r a h : Concerning seven religious requirements were the children of Noah admonished: setting up courts of justice, idolatry, blasphemy [cursing the N a m e of God], fornication, bloodshed, and thievery. (Tosefta-tractate Abodah Zarah 8:4-6)

T h e H a l a k h a h constructs, indeed defines, the interiority of an Israel sustaining God's service in a world of idolatry: life against death in the t w o concrete and

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tangible dimensions by which life is sustained: trade and the production of food, the foci of the Halakhah. N o w o n d e r Israel must refrain f r o m engaging with idolatry on days of the festivals for idols that the great fairs e m b o d y — t h e n especially. So m u c h for the visible enemies of Eden: animate corpses. T h e key to the system presents itself in its account of the outsider. T h e politics of Judaism is a politics of life against death: forming God's Kingdom in particular, yielding life eternal. T h e entire politics comes to expression in this language, cited above: All Israelites have a share in the world to come, as it is said, "Your people also shall be all righteous, they shall inherit the land forever; the b r a n c h of m y planting, the w o r k of my hands, that I may be glorified." (Isaiah 60:21; Mishnah-tractate Sanhédrin 10:1)

Conclusion With the classical political construction fully exposed, we can see the sources for the political confusion that overtakes the religious system and structure of classical Judaism w h e n the practical world of p o w e r relationships intervenes. T h e aspiration on the part of the political parties of the Torah c a m p to realize the Halakhah, all or in part, in the governance of the State of Israel conflicts with the contents of the canonical Halakhic d o c u m e n t s , the Mishnah, Tosefta, t w o Talmuds, and related writings. To state the source of the conflict simply: T h e Halakhah certainly accommodates contemporary practical circumstances and can be extended to serve as a law code for the society of J u d a i s m , b u t the political t h e o l o g y that explains the Halakhah proves i n c o n g r u e n t to the task of politics. T h a t is, the theology that animates the political system of Rabbinic Judaism, beginning in the relationships of Adam and Eve with God and focusing on matters of attitude and intentionality, scarcely intersects with the p r o g r a m of questions of legitimate power that other religious systems of politics address. Brilliant exegetes of the Halakhah have kept up with the practicalities of the everyday world. T h e substance of the legal system can be m a d e to work, b u t the why and wherefore of the political myth that explains the whole and makes the parts cohere, addresses the theological condition of the holy people and not the power relationships that require explanation. Judaism sets forth laws, but n o politics. T h e classical Judaic system sets f o r t h an a c c o u n t of h o w the social o r d e r should function, but not a transcendent validation of the state as the m e d i u m of humanity's regeneration and society's reconciliation with God. In the theology of Judaism, there can be a state encompassing a large ethnically Jewish population. But to witness the formation of a state of Judaism, that is, in Hebrew, med-

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\

inat Yisrael, m e a n i n g f o r J u d a i s m a s t a t e t h a t e m b o d i e s Israel t h e h o l y p e o p l e in a political s t r u c t u r e in G o d ' s s e r v i c e , o n e m u s t a w a i t t h e c o m i n g o f t h e M e s s i a h a n d t h e advent of G o d ' s realized politics o n e a r t h for eternity. T h e politics of J u d a i s m t h e n is p o s t p o n e d until t h e e n d of days, w h e n t h e royal Messiah will raise t h e d e a d , a c c o r d i n g e t e r n a l life t o t h e citizens o f P a r a d i s e redivivus.

Note 1. See Jacob Neusner, The Torah and the Halakhah: The Four Relationships (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2003), for a systematic discussion. The present argument does not address the historical question of how the Halakhic system took shape over time. That is a separate matter; see Neusner, From Scripture to 70 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999), and Neusner, The Four Stages of Rabbinic Judaism (London: Routledge, 2000).

Suggested

Readings

Avery-Peck, Alan J., Jacob Neusner, and William Scott Green. Encyclopaedia of Judaism. 3 vols. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1999. Elazar, Daniel J. The Jewish Polity: Jewish Political Organization from Biblical times to the Present. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. Finkelstein, Louis, ed. The Jews: Their History, Culture, and Religion. 2 vols. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1966. Neusner, Jacob. The Economics of the Mishnah. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998. .Judaism: An Introduction. London and New York: Penguin, 2002. . Rabbinic Political Theory: Religion and Politics in the Mishnah. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. Roth, Cecil, ed. EncyclopaediaJudaica. Jerusalem: Keter Publishing, 1971. Scholem, Gershom G. Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism. New York: Schocken Books, 1995. Sicker, Martin. What Judaism Says about Politics: The Political Theology of the Torah. Northvale, N.J.: Jason Aronson, 1994. Walzer, Michael, Menachem Lorberbaum, N o a m J. Zohar, and Yair Lorberbaum, eds. The Jewish Political Tradition. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000.

Two I Primitive and Early Christianity I Bruce D. Chilton

" M Y KINGDOM IS NOT OF THIS W O R L D " ( J O H N 1 8 : 3 6 ) . T H E J O H A N N I N E ATTRIBUTION

of this statement to Jesus may fairly be questioned, owing to the abstract nature of the assertion, and to its legendary setting in an extensive interaction between Pontius Pilate and a provincial criminal w h o (after all) enjoyed no civil rights. But there is n o doubt that this principle does represent the conviction of many primitive churches with regard to their loyalty to their heavenly Lord and their earthly masters. This dual loyalty is a persistent dynamic within Christian theology, and the sources of Early Christianity permit us to observe how it emerged, and how the sometimes asymmetrical demands of God and Caesar were sorted out. Within the present chapter, it is useful to make a distinction between primitive Christianity and early Christianity. T h e Scriptures of Israel have always been valued within the church, in Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek. T h o s e were the only Scriptures of the church in its primitive phase, w h e n the N e w Testam e n t was being composed. In their meetings of prayer and worship, followers of Jesus saw the Scriptures of Israel "fulfilled" by their faith: their conviction was the same Spirit of God which was active in the p r o p h e t s was, t h r o u g h Christ, available to them. T h e N e w Testament was produced in primitive communities of Christians to prepare people for baptism, to order worship, to resolve disputes, to encourage faith, and like purposes. As a whole, it is a collective document of primitive Christianity compiled during the last decades of the first century C.E. Its purpose is to call out and order true Israel in response to the t r i u m p h a n t news of Jesus's preaching, ministry, death, and resurrection. Early Christianity (between the second and the f o u r t h centuries C.E.) designates the period during which the church f o u n d e d theology on the basis of the Scriptures of b o t h the "Old T e s t a m e n t " and "New T e s t a m e n t , " and it did so w i t h o u t the recourse to the institutions of Judaism that is characteristic of primitive Christianity. F r o m thinkers as different f r o m one another as Bishop Irenaeus in France and Origen, the speculative teacher active first in Egypt and then in Palestine, a c o m m o n l y Christian philosophy began to emerge. Early Christianity might also be called a "Catholic" phase, in the sense that it was a quest for a "general" or "universal" account of the faith, but that designation may lead to confusion with Roman Catholicism at a later stage. To trace the political d e v e l o p m e n t that is o u r c o n c e r n , a chronological approach to the sources is followed here, so that (for example) a consideration of 37

44 I Bruce D. Chilton | Paul precedes a consideration of the Gospels, because the scholarly consensus is that Paul w r o t e his letters b e f o r e the Gospels w e r e w r i t t e n d o w n in their final f o r m . As we engage in this approach, we will consider five central issues. Initially, we will consider 1. H o w the conviction that believers are called by the Spirit of G o d influenced their view of earthly authorities, 2. H o w their c o n s e q u e n t acceptance of m a r t y r d o m related to distinct kinds of eschatology, and 3. H o w each of these e s c h a t o l o g i e s e v e n t u a t e d in characteristic a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d the entire project of h u m a n governance. O n c e those issues have b e e n traced, we can t u r n o u r attention to 4. H o w Christians w e r e called practically t o a d j u s t t o the d e m a n d s of this world and its authorities, and 5. W h e r e they saw the sequence of history as leading t h e m . Classical

Sources of Primitive

Christianity

on

Politics

Christianity conceives of people as having a d e e p affinity with God, and at the s a m e t i m e it a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t b e t w e e n G o d a n d h u m a n i t y a s e e m i n g l y u n b r i d g e a b l e c h a s m s o m e t i m e s intrudes. As recorded in the N e w T e s t a m e n t , Paul is t h e p r e e m i n e n t t h e o l o g i a n of t h e a m b i v a l e n c e of this relationship. H e w r o t e extensively t o C h r i s t i a n c o m m u n i t i e s in R o m e a r o u n d 57 C.E. His l e t t e r t o t h e R o m a n s is t h e result, t h e fullest e x p l a n a t i o n of Paul's theology, and at the same time the earliest example of political theology in the Christian tradition. In an o p e n i n g section, Paul concerns himself with the issue of h o w G o d m a y be conceived of as j u d g i n g p e o p l e , w h e n they d o n o t even k n o w H i m . Paul's response is that God's p o w e r and divinity are ingrained in the very nature of the created universe, and thereby evident to people f r o m the world a r o u n d t h e m : W h a t is known of God is evident to them, because He has manifested it to them. His invisible qualities, His eternal power and divinity, have been demonstrated perceptibly f r o m the creation of the world by the things that have been made. (Romans 1:19-20)

T h e issue of j u d g m e n t illuminates h o w Paul understands G o d to be k n o w n to h u m a n i t y at large. To Paul, t h e p a r t i c u l a r qualities of G o d , b e c a u s e they are behind the world rather than in it, are invisible. God's being G o d m e a n s that H e is transcendent in His divinity, beyond the t e r m s of reference of time and space. But His p o w e r is also evident, as d e m o n s t r a t e d by o u r perception of things m a d e in the world a r o u n d us. T h e world is n o t just an accident of o u r environ-

I P R I M I T I V E A N D EARLY C H R I S T I A N I T Y|45

ment, but that which is created by God. Paul's conviction is consonant with the story of the creation in Genesis 1, and with m u c h else in the Scriptures of Israel. W h e n , in Galatians 1:15, Paul refers to God separating him f r o m his mother's womb, there is nothing abstract or theoretical about the imagery of creation. The emphasis rather falls on the immediate and personal link between God and Paul's o w n being. The imagery is not original with Paul; he is picking u p the language of the Old Testament. For example, Psalms 22:9 and 71:6 offer praise to God for taking the speaker f r o m the w o m b and keeping him safe f r o m childhood. T h e image is also used in the prophetic literature, w h e n the p r o p h e t is said to have been taken from the w o m b for the purpose of giving his prophecy (see Isaiah 49:1 and Jeremiah 1:5). In all these cases, as in Paul's usage, the imagery expresses not only a sense of being in an ordered creation but also of experiencing God's care within that creation. T h e prophetic usage enhances the emphasis on one's personal sense of p u r p o s e by applying the image to a particular mission one is to accomplish. Paul shares that emphasis as well. T h e prophetic dimension of Paul's reference to God comes o u t again in his description of G o d "calling" him. "Calling" is u n d e r s t o o d to establish a link b e t w e e n G o d and the p e r s o n H e calls, so t h a t God's w o r d may be delivered. W h o is called? It might be a prophet, or all Israel, or Jesus himself. Matthew 2:15 presents the infant Jesus as b e i n g called f r o m Egypt for his vocation in Israel, which echoes the prophetic b o o k of Hosea (11:1). Hosea applies "Out of Egypt I called m y Son" to the people Israel, liberated at the time of the Exodus. That w o r d i n g is t h e n i n t e r p r e t e d afresh in M a t t h e w to refer to Jesus. M a t t h e w can apply Hosea's prophecy to Jesus because m u c h of the language of the Old Testament, including reference to God's calling and God's separating a person f r o m the w o m b , is deliberately developed in the New Testament. The usage of the Old Testament is the point of departure for n e w applications and unusual developments, designed to convey a sense of intimacy with God. God initiates the biblical call, but the call must be answered by s o m e o n e for it to achieve the goal of communicating with people. Indeed, the fact of God's call can be the basis u p o n which people take it u p o n themselves to call u p o n God. 'Answer m e when I call, Ο God of my righteousness" (Psalm 4:1) is an appeal that is predicated on the prior response of the psalmist, and the psalmist's community, to God's call. Paul particularly develops the reciprocity of call and response in his teaching about the Spirit of God. 1 Corinthians 2 shows how, in a letter written a year or two before Romans, Paul sees God's Spirit at work. If one asks h o w we can know what God has prepared for us, the answer is that Spirit alone is able to c o m m u nicate divine purposes. The initial terms of Paul's knowledge of God, then, are his awareness of God's power and care, and his access to the Spirit of God (see 1 Corinthians 2:9 above all).

46IBruce D. Chilton | But that is by n o m e a n s the w h o l e of Paul's conception of k n o w l e d g e of God. Its distinctive feature is that G o d was pleased "to reveal his Son in m e " (Galatians 1:15): that is h o w Paul k n o w s in t h e first place that he has b e e n separated f r o m the w o m b and called by God. T h e revelation of God's Son in the midst of one's b e i n g is the distinctive basis of Christian k n o w l e d g e of G o d . In fact, Paul conceives of the m o m e n t of receiving God's Spirit in a highly specific m a n n e r , linked inextricably to Jesus (Galatians 4:6): Baptism is the m o m e n t at which, by accepting the revelation of the Son, one can accept that Spirit which is truly divine. Only w h a t has c o m e f r o m G o d can acknowledge and respond to God: that is the revelation of G o d ' s Son within. Paul brings us, then, to the m o s t characteristic aspect of the Christian understanding of the k n o w l e d g e of God—its emphasis u p o n Jesus, the Son of God, as t h e c e n t r a l m e d i a t o r of t h a t k n o w l e d g e . O n e ' s o w n a c k n o w l e d g m e n t of a n d response to G o d remain vital, but they are u n d e r s t o o d to be possible only because G o d has already b e e n at w o r k within, shaping a spiritual eye to see H i m at w o r k and a spiritual ear to h e a r His call. As Paul conceives of Jesus, he is first of all the Son of G o d revealed within us. O f course, Paul is aware of the primitive teaching c o n c e r n i n g j e s u s ' s deeds and teaching, including a graphic account of his crucifixion (see Galatians 3:1). But his interest in Jesus is n o t historical. Rather, his attention is taken u p by h o w the revelation of the Son of G o d m i g h t shape o u r m i n d s and hearts to k n o w God. T h e m o s t f a m o u s expression of this t h e m e occurs in the letter t o the Philippians, which was probably c o m p o s e d after Paul's death, by his follower T i m o t h y (ca. 90

C.E.).

It represents a m a t u r e Pauline theology, m u c h of it o n the basis of

w h a t Paul personally had t h o u g h t . It was c o m p o s e d at a time at which Christians in the G r e c o - R o m a n world w e r e largely of the servant class, so that its appeal to the f o r m of Jesus as a servant is especially poignant: Let this thought prevail a m o n g you, which was also in Jesus Christ: W h o , being in God's form, did not consider the presumption of equality with God, but emptied himself, taking a servant's form; existing in men's likeness, and found as a man in shape, he h u m b l e d himself, b e c o m i n g obedient u n t o death, death on a cross. (Philippians 2:5-8)

T h e point of Paul and T i m o t h y t o g e t h e r (see Philippians 1:1) is that it is possible, o n the basis of the revelation of the Son of G o d within a person, to think as Jesus did, a l t h o u g h in o n e ' s o w n c i r c u m s t a n c e s . H e r e is an e x a m p l e of t h e imperative t o imitate Christ within the N e w T e s t a m e n t . Its object is n o t a slavish m i m i c r y of the historical p e r s o n b u t an e m b r a c e of that h u m b l e disposition of Christ t h a t m a k e s t h e k n o w l e d g e of G o d possible, p r o c e e d i n g as it d o e s f r o m G o d ' s o w n loving nature.

I PRIMITIVE A N D EARLY CHRISTIANITY

K n o w l e d g e of God, t h e n , involves the capacity to a c k n o w l e d g e G o d as the source of one's being, the ability to respond to God's call and to hear H i m , and an acceptance within oneself of Christ's o w n loving disposition—his humility u n t o death. Christianity's a n t h r o p o l o g y directly reflects its call to h u m a n i t y to e n t e r into the vision of G o d and to be t r a n s f o r m e d by the divine Spirit. O n a political level, this literally o t h e r w o r l d l y perspective results in a paradoxical acceptance of the institutions of this world. T h a t acceptance is qualified, however, by the observation that all f o r m s of h u m a n g o v e r n m e n t are provisional. T h e s a m e Paul w h o w o u l d die in R o m e d u r i n g Nero's persecution of Christians could insist in R o m a n s 13:1-2: Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instated by God. Therefore one who resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment. Peter is said to have died in the same persecution (crucified, rather than beheaded, as it is said Paul was), 1 and yet the letter called 1 Peter (composed a r o u n d 90 C.E., during another period of persecution) attributes the following advice to h i m (4:19): "Therefore let those w h o suffer according to God's will do right and entrust their souls to a faithful Creator." U n d e r such adverse conditions, there is every intellectual and practical reason to deny that current experience comes from God. Yet that is exactly w h a t primitive Christianity did n o t do, and as a result a qualified acceptance of h u m a n institutions of governance is articulated.

Early Christianity's

Theory of

Politics

O u t of the spiritual t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of individual lives, and the c o m m u n a l experience of persecution, Early Christianity developed f r o m its N e w T e s t a m e n t a t h e o r y of politics predicated o n God's ultimate control of all creation. Believing that G o d is b o t h the creator and savior of the world allowed Christians to accept suffering at the h a n d s of civil authorities, a n d paradoxically to give their allegiance to this s a m e ruling g o v e r n m e n t , because G o d had vested the ruler w i t h power. T h e r e is a particularly poignant passage f r o m w h a t is called "The Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs" in which a R o m a n judge attempts to reason with s o m e people w h o have b e e n d e n o u n c e d for t h e i r Christianity b u t are n o t guilty of any o t h e r crime. H e explains to t h e m , very patiently, that they can easily walk away f r o m the court, simply by b u r n i n g s o m e incense before an image of the emperor, and swearing an oath of allegiance to h i m as God's son. His patience extends to a conscientious recognition that the act does n o t actually require belief; only c o n f o r m i t y to the due f o r m is required.

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48IBruce D. Chilton | M a n y Gnostic Christians w o u l d have h a d n o difficulty c o m p l y i n g w i t h the judge's request, and n o doubt there were other Early Christians, loyal to the Apostles' Creed of Catholic Christianity, w h o nonetheless w e n t along with such friendly advice. But, to the judge's exasperation, the Scillitan m a r t y r s oblige the j u d g e to c o n d e m n t h e m to death, which he eventually does. To his m i n d (as to that of Marcus Aurelius; Meditations

11:3), they w e r e obstinate. Christians were p r o u d

of such behavior in their ranks, and they p r o d u c e d an entire literature of mart y r d o m g r o w i n g o u t of stories of such single-minded allegiance to God. T h e insistence in 1 Peter 4:19 provides the key to this Christian persistence (or obstinacy, depending u p o n one's point of view). T h e fact of God's creation of this world seals it as ultimately good, n o m a t t e r w h a t o u r i m m e d i a t e experience of it m i g h t m a k e it seem. T h e b e g i n n i n g of the passage m a k e s its perspective clear: Beloved, do not be surprised at the fiery ordeal that is taking place a m o n g you to test you, as though something strange were happening to you. But rejoice insofar as you are sharing Christ's sufferings, so that you may also be glad and shout for joy when his glory is revealed. (1 Peter 4:12-13)

God's creation of this world in 1 Peter, in the N e w Testament as a whole, and in the rule of faith as articulated in the Apostle's Creed, is n o t to be u n d e r s t o o d simply as a t h e o r e t i c a l expression of w h e r e t h i n g s originally c a m e f r o m . O f course, Christians do and always have u n d e r s t o o d that God is good and that w h a t he m a d e (and makes) is very good, in the unmistakable assertion of Genesis 1:31. But they do n o t say on that basis that w h a t seems bad is really good, or that evil is m e r e l y illusory or t h e w o r k of s o m e o t h e r power. Instead, they see p r e s e n t experience as in the process of a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , s o m e t i m e s a painful transformation, in which all goodness (including God's) will be vindicated. T h e here and now, according to the N e w T e s t a m e n t and Early Christian writings, is n o t the final bar by which h u m a n experience should be judged. Christian faith in creation is m o r e eschatological than anything else; it is c o n c e r n e d w i t h w h a t will h a p p e n at the end (the eschaton in Greek) of all things. Because Christianity is c o m m i t t e d to eschatology as the single perspective that m a k e s sense of h u m a n experience, it has b e e n obliged to spell o u t for itself w h a t its eschatology means, h o w the anticipated t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the world is to be w o r k e d out. T h r e e types of eschatological perspective—temporal, transcendent, a n d juridical—have c h a r a c t e r i z e d Christianity over t i m e , a n d they are closely related to o n e another. Christians have advanced all three of t h e m , often at the same time, although given periods usually represent a c o m m i t m e n t to one of the three m o r e t h a n the others. W h i c h of the types is e m p h a s i z e d has a p r o f o u n d impact on h o w a person and a c o m m u n i t y deal with suffering, and with h o w they actually perceive pain. For that reason, the distinctions a m o n g the t h r e e — a n d their relationship to one a n o t h e r — a r e quite i m p o r t a n t to understand.

I P R I M I T I V E A N D EARLY C H R I S T I A N I T Y

Temporal

Eschatology

By its very nature, eschatology must involve the end of time as we know and conceive of time. But there is n o actual necessity that eschatological expectation should develop into what is defined as an apocalyptic expectation. After all, Jesus instructed his disciples to pray, "Your kingdom will come," 2 without giving a precise indication of w h e n that m o m e n t was to come. Apocalyptic thought involves the claim to understand the sequence and timing of the ultimate events in h u m a n affairs, u p until and including the end. Jesus does not appear to have taught any single apocalyptic scheme, and it is even said that, after his resurrection, he explicitly told his followers that "It is not yours to know the times and periods which the Father has set by his own authority" (Acts 1:7). But the fact is that, even w i t h o u t Jesus's e n c o u r a g e m e n t , apocalyptic calendars thrived in primitive Christianity, as evidenced in books in the New Testament such as the Revelation of John, 2 Thessalonians, 2 Peter, and Jude, all of which were produced near the end of the first century. There is n o single such calendar, so it seems obvious that Jesus did n o t endorse any single apocalyptic scheme. But then, the variety of the calendars themselves shows how vibrant and diverse apocalyptic expectation was. Although other forms of eschatology have tended to dominate over temporal eschatology in the s u b s e q u e n t history of the church, there have been notable examples of renewed apocalyptic fervor, especially during times of extreme social change. Examples include s o m e radical Anabaptists during the Reformation in Europe, and g r o u p s such as the Shakers in the United States d u r i n g the nineteenth century. Transcendent

Eschatology

Because t h o u g h t in the m o d e r n (and the so-called p o s t m o d e r n ) world is, on the whole, n o t eschatological, it is easy to dismiss eschatology as a primitive and outdated view of the world. T h e scientific t h o u g h t of ancient Greece, which has deeply influenced our own view of science, often conceived of physical reality as static and unchanging, and that has inclined m a n y c o n t e m p o r a r y philosophers to prefer views of the world that are also static. Now, however, science itself shows us just h o w conditional h u m a n existence is. Physically, not even the universe appears p e r m a n e n t ; solid m a t t e r seems to be a myth; the very survival of h u m a n beings is called into question by the rapid extinction of many other animal and plant species. Just as our own world has started to seem less stable and unchanging to us, the world of ancient eschatology has proven to be m u c h less simplistic and "primitive" than was once t h o u g h t to be the case. It was fashionable a century ago to depict eschatology as a strictly t e m p o r a l teaching, as if time were its only concern. We have just seen that s o m e eschatology is indeed temporal in its empha-

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43

50IBruce D. Chilton | sis. But to see G o d as final in h u m a n affairs also involves seeing God's Kingdom as w o r k i n g now, t r a n s f o r m i n g t h e very e n v i r o n m e n t in which w e live. As Jesus p u t it, the K i n g d o m of G o d "is like yeast, w h i c h a w o m a n takes, hides in three m e a s u r e s of d o u g h , until t h e w h o l e is y e a s t e d " (Luke 13:21; M a t t h e w 13:33). Because space, as well as time, is a d i m e n s i o n of God's activity, eschatology also involves seeing G o d at w o r k n o w in his final revelation, and it involves the possibility of j o i n i n g G o d in His Kingdom. T h e point of the revelation of the Kingdom within o u r world is that it points beyond o u r world. T h e Kingdom is transcendent: It c o m e s from outside us, transf o r m s us, a n d directs us o u t s i d e o u r selves. N o t h e o l o g i a n m o r e forcefully o r influentially e m p h a s i z e d this aspect of eschatology t h a n the third-century Christian apologist, theologian, and priest Origen. To explain the value of the p r o m ises that are o u r s in Christ, Origen cites J o h n 17:14, w h e r e Jesus asserts that neit h e r h e n o r his disciples are of the world. Origen goes o n to explain: But there is n o doubt that the Savior refers to something more glorious and splendid than this present world, and invites and incites all w h o believe in him to direct their course towards it. But whether that world, which he wishes us to know of, is one that stands apart and separate from this world in space and quality and glory, or whether, as seems more likely to me, it excels in quality and glory but is nevertheless contained within the limits of this world, is uncertain, and in my opinion an unsuitable subject for the mind and thoughts of h u m a n beings. (On First Principles 2.3.6)

Origen h e r e expresses a characteristic feature of Christian teaching concerning t r a n s c e n d e n c e . T h e p o i n t is n o t to speak of s o m e t h i n g so different that w e have n o inkling w h a t G o d w o u l d do w i t h us. Rather, G o d may be perceived to be i m m a n e n t in the world, and in His i m m a n e n c e to direct o u r course t o w a r d that w h i c h H e w o u l d have us be. ( " I m m a n e n c e " is the usual category used to refer to t h e divine as existing w i t h i n t h e universe as p e o p l e m a y perceive it.) Because Christian t e a c h i n g of divine t r a n s c e n d e n c e is eschatological, it links this w o r l d w i t h the w o r l d t o c o m e in the expectation and the experience of the believer. Juridical

Eschatology

Jesus's well-known parable of a feast to which the host m a k e s surprising, insist e n t invitations-—and equally categorical exclusions—voices a n o t h e r e m p h a t i c d i m e n s i o n of his o w n eschatology (see M a t t h e w 22:1-14; Luke 14:16-24). G o d is p o r t r a y e d as celebrating in His k i n g d o m w i t h those w h o w o u l d join H i m , and as refusing to include those w h o have rejected the appointed way of entering His k i n g d o m . Because J e s u s w a s a n d is rightly k n o w n as t h e s u p r e m e t e a c h e r of divine love, this aspect of his t e a c h i n g is f r e q u e n t l y (and all t o o conveniently) i g n o r e d . But t h e r e is finally n o c o m p r o m i s e in love; it s u p e r s e d e s w h a t w o u l d

I P R I M I T I V E A N D EARLY C H R I S T I A N I T Y

resist it. As the book of Psalms puts it, God's being king puts an end to everything wicked and those w h o represent wickedness, w h e t h e r individuals or nations (see Psalm 10:15-16). In the realm of Early Christianity's politics, this juxtaposition between divine love's all-embracing inclusiveness, and its uncompromising exclusion of those w h o reject God's love, parallels the paradox between Christians suffering at the hands of the same government they endorse. Disciples of Jesus view their earthly rulers as being subordinate to God, willingly or unwillingly, for they themselves have chosen to subordinate their lives to God by n a m i n g j e s u s as their sovereign Lord and personal savior. W i t h o u t doubt, this acute sense of the j u d g m e n t which is involved in God's final disclosure is a typical, sometimes even dominant, feature of Christianity. In this, Augustine of Hippo delineates the sort of personal preparation for the judgm e n t which would emerge during the Middle Ages. Speaking during the season of Lent, w h e n the congregation makes ready for the celebration of Easter and Christ's temptation in the wilderness is recalled, Augustine preached as follows: Life in this world is certainly the time of o u r humiliation. These days show—by the recurrence of this holy season—how the sufferings of the Lord Christ, w h o once suffered for us by death, are renewed each year. For what was done once and for all time so that o u r life might be renewed is solemnized each year so that the m e m o r y may be kept fresh. If, therefore, we ought to be humble of heart with sentiments of most sincere reverence t h r o u g h o u t the entire period of o u r earthly sojourn when we live in the midst of temptations, h o w m u c h m o r e necessary is humility during these days, w h e n we not only pass the time of o u r humiliation by living, but call attention to it by special devotion! T h e humility of Christ has taught us to be h u m ble because he yielded to the wicked in his death; the exaltation of Christ lifts us u p because by rising again he cleared the way for his devoted followers. Because, "if we have died with him, we shall also live with him; if we endure, we shall also reign with h i m " (2 T i m o t h y 2:11-12). O n e of these conditions we n o w celebrate with due observance in view of his approaching passion; the other we shall celebrate after Easter w h e n his resurrection is, in like manner, accomplished again. (Sermon 206.1)

W h a t Augustine is here signaling to us, in the clearest of terms, is the link b e t w e e n devotion to Christ and eschatology. Devotion to him, the imitation of Christ, is not merely encouraged because of Jesus' goodness, but because his life, death, and resurrection m a p the path into God's Kingdom. Jesus's example charts the single course for passing through the divine j u d g m e n t that is necessarily a part of the coming of the Kingdom.

The Medium

of Expressing

Politics

in Primitive

and Early

Christianity

These three types of eschatology are particularly m e n t i o n e d here because they correspond to m a j o r movements in the formative centuries of Christianity. Tem-

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52IBruce D. Chilton | poral eschatology typified the first t w o centuries (ca. 30-200 C.E.); t r a n s c e n d e n t eschatology characterized the e m e r g e n c e of Christianity's philosophical dominance b e t w e e n the third and seventh centuries (ca. 200-700 C.E.); juridical eschatology, of w h i c h Augustine is an early example, b e c a m e the h a l l m a r k of Christianity f r o m t h e Middle Ages o n w a r d (ca. 7 0 0 + C.E.). A l t h o u g h it m a y s e e m c o n f u s i n g to t h i n k of e s c h a t o l o g y in these different ways, they are all a p a r t of conceiving G o d as truly final. God's finality is such that he will definitively change time, b u t space and the n a t u r e of justice in h u m a n relations also will be transf o r m e d . T i m e and space and ethics are n o t totally different categories; rather, they are essential d i m e n s i o n s of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e , so t h a t e s c h a t o l o g y rightly involves t h e m all. 3 E s c h a t o l o g y in all of its rich n u a n c e s c o n s t i t u t e s the f u n d a m e n t a l perspective f r o m which Christianity b o t h addresses the p r o b l e m of suffering and urges a positive e n g a g e m e n t w i t h t h e w o r l d . T h e G o d w h o m a k e s t h e w o r l d also r e d e e m s the world, and he r e d e e m s the w o r l d that w e know, as it is. T h a t m a y involve w a i t i n g over t i m e ( t e m p o r a l e s c h a t o l o g y ) , t r a n s f o r m i n g t h e place w h e r e w e stand ( t r a n s c e n d e n t eschatology), a n d / o r e n t e r i n g i n t o a j u d g m e n t which will change us (juridical eschatology). But in any and all cases, a l t h o u g h f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of this w o r l d a n d its political a u t h o r i t i e s , s u f f e r i n g is a m e a n s of control, f o r Christians, it is certainly n o t t h e last w o r d , b u t merely a transitional w o r d b e f o r e glory. T h e t y p e of e s c h a t o l o g y e m b r a c e d by Christianity has d e t e r m i n e d its portrayal of h o w w e e n c o u n t e r o u r w o r l d (and its politics) and h o w a holy life m a y be led. T h a t portrayal, in t u r n , relates to the anticipation of h o w G o d in Christ is t o t r a n s f o r m t h e w o r l d and i n f l u e n c e its p r e s e n t s t r u c t u r e s of authority. T h e virtue which arises f r o m each eschatology is u n d e r s t o o d as "power:" virtus in the Latin sense of the w o r d . O n c e t i m e is p e r c e i v e d as t h e principal d i m e n s i o n w i t h i n w h i c h G o d acts definitively, t h e o b v i o u s q u e s t i o n b e c o m e s : J u s t w h e n will t h a t be? W e have already seen (above) that the b o o k of 1 Peter urges its readers to treat their current p e r s e c u t i o n as a "fiery ordeal," a test w h o s e e n d w o u l d be glory for those w h o w e r e proven (1 Peter 4:12-13). But h o w l o n g w a s t h e ordeal to last? D o e s faith involve t h e simple a s s u r a n c e t h a t in t h e e n d G o d will t r i u m p h , w i t h o u t k n o w l e d g e of his p l a n for his p e o p l e ? O r d o e s faith a p p r o p r i a t e l y i n c l u d e a m o r e precise insight i n t o o n e ' s o w n r e d e m p t i o n a n d the r e d e m p t i o n of o n e ' s sisters and b r o t h e r s in Christ? It is n o coincidence that the letter called 2 Peter addresses just these questions. T h e letter called 2 Peter is a second-century w o r k attributed to Peter, w h o (as w e have seen) probably died u n d e r N e r o in R o m e in 64 C.E. It takes u p the trait of apocalyptic literature of b e i n g a t t r i b u t e d to a g r e a t visionary f r o m t h e past.

I P R I M I T I V E A N D EARLY CHRISTIANITY

( T h a t t r a i t is also r e p r e s e n t e d in t h e O l d T e s t a m e n t b o o k o f D a n i e l a n d in t h e a p o c r y p h a l b o o k o f 2 Esdras.) H e r e , 2 P e t e r b e a u t i f u l l y a n d classically sets o u t a n a c c o u n t o f h o w t h e p a i n o f e s c h a t o l o g i c a l d e l a y is e x p e r i e n c e d w i t h i n a p o c a l y p tic Christianity, a n d h o w it m i g h t b e a d d r e s s e d : This is already, beloved, a second letter I write to you; in t h e m 1 arouse by reminder your sincere intent, to r e m e m b e r the sayings told in advance by the holy prophets and the c o m m a n d m e n t of your apostles of the Lord and Savior. First, know this: There will come at the last days scoffers with scoffing, going according to their own desires, and saying, W h e r e is the promise of his coming? Because although the patriarchs perished, everything remains the same f r o m the beginning of creation! This escapes those w h o like to think this way: Heavens existed f r o m of old and earth f r o m water and through water subsisted by the word of God. T h r o u g h t h e m the world then was destroyed, deluged with water. But the present heavens and the earth by the same word are stored for fire, kept for the day of j u d g m e n t and the destruction of the godless. Do not let this one thing escape you, beloved: one day with the Lord is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day (Psalm 90:4). T h e Lord does not delay His promise, as some people suppose delay, but He is generous to you, not wishing you to be destroyed, but that all might attain to repentance. (2 Peter 3:1-10) T h e p a i n o f t i m e , t h a t it r e m a i n s u n f u l f i l l e d b y t h e p r e s e n c e o f G o d , is d e a l t w i t h t h r o u g h t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t it p r o v i d e s a n i n t e r i m f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f r e p e n tance, t h r o u g h the eschatological lens of faith that pain b e c o m e s an opportunity, t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t it is u s e d as a p r e p a r a t i o n . P a t i e n t p e n i t e n c e is p a r t o f t h e power that transforms the world. J u s t as O r i g e n b e l i e v e d t h a t G o d t h r o u g h C h r i s t h a d p r e p a r e d " s o m e t h i n g m o r e g l o r i o u s a n d s p l e n d i d t h a n this p r e s e n t w o r l d , " as w e h a v e s e e n , s o h e p o n d e r e d w h a t it m e a n s t o c o n c e i v e of G o d a n d o f divine r e w a r d as b e y o n d o u r ordin a r y t e r m s o f r e f e r e n c e . H i s d i s c u s s i o n a p p e a r s w i t h i n his u s e o f t h e i m a g e r y o f light t o u n d e r s t a n d G o d : Having then refuted, to the best of our ability, every interpretation which suggests that we should attribute to God any material characteristics, we assert that He is in truth incomprehensible and immeasurable. For whatever may be the knowledge which we have been able to obtain about God, whether by perception or reflection, we must of necessity believe that He is far and away better than our thoughts about Him. For if we see a m a n w h o can scarcely look at a g l i m m e r of the light of the smallest lamp, and if we wish to teach such a one, w h o s e eyesight is not strong enough to receive more light than we have said, about the brightness and splendor of the sun, shall we not have to tell him that the splendor of the sun is unspeakably and immeasurably better and more glorious than all this light he can see? (On First Principles 1.1.5)4

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54IBruce D. Chilton | H e r e the imagery of pain is m o r e t h a n a m a t t e r of the discomfort o n e might feel in the ordinary course of living. T h e point is rather that o u r lives at their best do n o t prepare us to c o m e in contact w i t h God, and the little we k n o w already is itself n o t s o m e t h i n g we can sustain. As in the m y t h of the cave in Plato's Republic, a person living in the dark will n o t readily be a c c u s t o m e d to light. T h e difference b e t w e e n Origen and Plato is that, whereas in the m y t h of the cave, the p e r s o n can c o m e into the sun's light, for Origen in this life w e c a n n o t truly k n o w G o d as G o d . ' For that reason, pain is experienced in t w o directions at once. First, w e are n o t naturally prepared to discover as m u c h of God's light as we do, and that is a painful condition, as in Plato's m y t h . But second, we are also intrinsically unable t o p r o c e e d f r o m the intimations of G o d to the reality they point to, so that w e c a n n o t be completely fulfilled even after w e have prepared ourselves for the light. So the pain of this life is b o t h that it offers t o o m u c h of the reality of God, and too little of it. T h e dilemma can only be resolved w h e n we are in a different place, w h e n the transcendence of God, which presently impinges on o u r lives, b e c o m e s t h e w h o l e of life as w e k n o w it. And b e c a u s e t h a t can only o c c u r b e y o n d o u r world, present experience is n o t merely painful b u t is itself a kind of pain. T h a t is the reason why Origen emphasizes the irreducible i m p o r t a n c e for every Christian of the vision of G o d . Only t h a t vision b o t h enables us t o u n d e r s t a n d and to e n d u r e o u r present p r e d i c a m e n t , because it anticipates the full reality that is to c o m e — m u c h as t h e life and teachings of Jesus gave a foretaste of w h a t G o d is like. In Sermon 205.1, preceding the s e r m o n in which he explains the eschatological link b e t w e e n humility and exaltation, Augustine portrays the Christian life as inherently painful, and yet as inherently h o p e f u l for that reason. W h a t he says at the start of the season of Lent is a classic exposition, w h i c h charts a course for the development of spirituality during the Middle Ages: Today we commence the observance of Lent, the season now encountering us in the course of the liturgical year. You are owed an appropriately solemn sermon, so that the word of God, brought to you through my ministry, may sustain you in spirit while you fast in body, and so that the inner man, thus refreshed by suitable food, may be able to accomplish and to persevere bravely in the disciplining of the outer man. For to my spirit of devotion it seems right that we, who are going to revere the Passion of our crucified Lord in the very near future, should construct for ourselves a cross of the bodily pleasures in need of restraint, as the Apostle says, "And they who belong to Christ have crucified their flesh with its passions and desires." (Galatians 5:24)

Pain here is actually a gate to the promise of transformation. T h e fact of o u r selfish desires, which we experience in o u r flesh, is w h a t keeps us f r o m appreciating

I PRIMITIVE A N D EARLY CHRISTIANITY

|

and joining ourselves to the love of God in Augustine's thought (see especially his magisterial work, The City of God). So the willing experience of pain actually p e r m i t s us to k n o w o u r true selves, to f o r m a cross of w h a t alienates us f r o m God, and so t h r o u g h the death of selfishness to understand w h o we truly are before God. Juridical eschatology is the source of Christianity's profound skepticism about the value of h u m a n life in the flesh. The problem is not so m u c h the material of which we are made, as what has b e c o m e of it by means of h u m a n selfishness. Flesh is where we try to make gods of ourselves, and in so doing dishonor each other as m u c h as we dishonor God in our abuse of passion. For Augustine, war, crime, exploitation, and the violent results of all three are not happenstances. His is n o t a sudden realization that life as he knows it (in the flesh) is beset by evil. Rather, it is a recognition that these evils must be overcome by a realization of our truer selves, selves not subservient to that selfishness. That became the most predominant virtue in Christianity f r o m the time of the Middle Ages onward.

The Message

of Early Christianity's

Politics

Obviously, not all w h o became Christians in the Church's first three centuries of growth had their faith tested to the same degree. Nor did all believers consciously conceive of their world in terms of a particular brand of eschatology. However, politically speaking, each follower of " T h e Way"—as Christians w e r e at first known—and each believing m e m b e r of the c o m m u n i t y (the local church), had to walk his or her own path on the c o n t i n u u m between the here-and-now and the Kingdom to come. Individually and collectively, they had to figure out what it m e a n t to imitate the life of Christ in their world. This entailed living with the paradoxes of allegiance to God and to Caesar, the h u m a n paradox of accepting life as it is while believing passionately in the transformative power of God, and the spiritual paradox of being able to take in only so much of God. By the fourth century C.E., changes in the R o m a n empire's political landscape dramatically altered h o w Christians related to the "powers that be," and their balance of the paradoxes inherited f r o m centuries of being the outsiders. Adapting

to the Forms of This

World

Gregory of Nyssa inhabited a very different world f r o m Paul's. By his time (the fourth century C . E . ) , Christianity was in fashion within the Roman Empire. H e was the brother of Basil of Caesarea in the Cappodocian region of Asia Minor, and Gregory himself was bishop of Nyssa (between 371 and 394). Together with their friend Gregory, son of the bishop of Nazianzus, they are known as the "Cappodocian Fathers." Champions of the emerging Trinitarian doctrine of their day, Gregory especially represents the interpénétration of the Hellenistic literary tra-

56 I Bruce D. Chilton | dition with the orientation of Christianity. Deeply influenced by Origen, he also remained married long into his episcopate, and only t o o k monastic vows after his wife's death. More eloquently t h a n any o t h e r Christian teacher, he identified the p r o b l e m of the sincerity of believers, which obviously n e e d e d to be questioned as soon as the Christian faith b e c a m e fashionable. Gregory c o n f r o n t e d this issue directly in " O n W h a t Is M e a n t by the Profession 'Christian'": Let us, then, consider, first of all, from the term itself what Christianity means. From those who are wiser it is, of course, possible for us to discover a significance more profound and more noble in every way, more in keeping with the dignity of the word. However, what we begin with is this: the word "Christ," exchanged for a clearer and more familiar word, means "the king," and Holy Scripture, in accordance with proper usage, indicates royal dignity with such a word. But since, as Scripture says, the divine is inexpressible, incomprehensible, exceeding all comprehensible thought, the Holy Spirit must inspire prophets and apostles, and they contribute with many words and insights to our understanding of the incorruptible nature, one setting us right about one divine idea and another about another. His dominion over all is suggested by the name of Kingdom, and his purity and freedom from every passion and every evil is indicated by the names of the virtues, each being understood as referring to higher signification. Such expressions are used as "justice itself" and "wisdom and power" and "truth" and "goodness" and "life" and "salvation" and "incorruptibility" and "permanence" and "lack of change" and whatever elevated concept there is, and Christ is and is said to be all of them. If, therefore, the comprehension of every lofty idea is conceived of in the name of Christ (for the other qualities mentioned are included under the higher designation, each of them being implied in the notion of kingdom), perhaps some understanding of the interpretation of Christianity will follow. If we, who are joined to him by faith in him, are called by his name whose incorruptible nature is beyond verbal interpretation, it is altogether necessary for us to become what is contemplated in connection with that incorruptible nature and to achieve an identity which follows along with it. For just as by participating in Christ we are given the title "Christian," so also are we drawn into a share in the lofty ideas which it implies. Just as in a chain, what draws the loop at the top also draws the next loops, in like manner, since the rest of the words interpreting his ineffable and multiform blessedness are joined to the word "Christ," it is necessary for the person drawn along with him to share these qualities with him. T h e p o w e r of G r e g o r y ' s analysis is that he identifies precisely the p r i m a r y e n g i n e of Christian ethics: the i m i t a t i o n of Christ. T h e prosperity of a Christ i a n i z e d R o m a n E m p i r e p u t f o l l o w e r s of Jesus in t h e o d d p o s i t i o n of b e i n g p r o m i n e n t and acceptable. In an unexpected way, the non-Christians of Gregory's day w e r e in the position of the s e c o n d - c e n t u r y c.E. Scillitan Martyrs, having the option to declare their allegiance to the church or not. Since Christianity h a d b e c o m e t h e official religion of the e m p i r e , it h a d b e c o m e conceivable

I P R I M I T I V E A N D EARLY CHRISTIANITY

and practicable to b e c o m e a Christian out of convenience. Gregory reflects the response of exchanging the inquisition which once came f r o m outside, f r o m R o m a n magistrates, for a searching inquiry within, to test one's own motivations and sincerity. Engagement with the world, always a duty within Christianity, brings with it suffering in distinct ways. There is the suffering of time, the suffering of place, the suffering of self. Temporal eschatology longs for a different time, transcendent eschatology for a difference place, juridical eschatology for a different self. W h a t is striking is that these anxieties—of time, place, and self—are precisely the m o s t persistent troubles of modernity, while in Gregory's teaching they are actively embraced as a discipline of life. Yet just where one might expect that these distinct kinds of suffering would develop into distinct responses, Christianity in fact teaches a single, unambiguous strategy, g r o u n d e d in the teaching of Jesus, best expressed in the f a m o u s advice: You have heard that it was said, "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." But I say to you not to resist the evil one. But to s o m e o n e w h o strikes you on the right cheek, turn also the other. And to one w h o wants to enter j u d g m e n t with you to take your shirt, give your cloak, too! And with someone w h o compels a mile's journey f r o m you, travel with him two. Give to the one w h o asks of you, and do not turn away from one w h o wants to b o r r o w f r o m you. (Matthew 5:38-42)

Of all the teachings of Jesus, none is more straightforward, and none m o r e challenging. Evil is to be overcome by means of what is usually called nonresistance. W h a t follows in Matthew states the principle of Jesus's teaching, that we are to love in the way that God does (Matthew 5:43-48; and see Luke 6:36). The fund a m e n t a l quality of that teaching within Christianity is u n q u e s t i o n a b l e (see Matthew 22:34-40; Mark 12:28-34; Luke 10:25-28; Romans 13:8-10). But in the teaching about turning the other cheek, giving the cloak, going the extra mile, offering the money, everything comes d o w n to particular conditions that prevailed during the Roman occupation of the Near East. The fact that this formulation only appears in Matthew (written around 80 C.E.) has given rise to the legitimate question whether it should be attributed to Jesus in its present f o r m . T h e i m a g e r y c o r r e s p o n d s to the conditions of the Roman occupation in an urban area, where a soldier of the empire might well demand provisions and service and money, and all with the threat of force. But even if we acknowledge (as seems only reasonable) that Matthew's Gospel has pitched Jesus's policy in the idiom of its own experience, the policy itself should be attributed to Jesus. W h y should what is usually called nonresistance to evil be recommended? It needs to be stressed that nonresistance is n o t the same as acquiescence. T h e

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52 I Bruce D. Chilton | injustice that is d o n e is never accepted as if it w e r e just. T h e acts of t u r n i n g the o t h e r cheek, giving the cloak, going the additional mile, offering the money, are all are d e s i g n e d t o be excessive, so t h a t t h e fact of t h e injustice of w h a t is d e m a n d e d is u n d e r l i n e d . Indeed, it is n o t really a c c u r a t e to call t h e b e h a v i o r "nonresistance," for it is anything b u t passive. T h e p o i n t is for the p e r s o n w h o m a k e s d e m a n d s that are u n j u s t to realize they are unjust. Precisely that policy served Christians and their faith well during the centuries of persecution u n d e r t h e R o m a n E m p i r e . It w a s effective b e c a u s e it b r o u g h t a b o u t an a w a r e n e s s w i t h i n the empire, even a m o n g the e n e m i e s of Christianity, that the policy of violent persecution was u n j u s t (and, for that matter, ineffective). Rather t h a n a t e a c h i n g of n o n r e s i s t a n c e , this is a version of t h e advice of h o w to retaliate. Instead of an eye for an eye, it suggests a cheek after a cheek. This is n o t nonresistance; it is an exemplary response. T h a t is, it is a f o r m of retaliation: n o t to h a r m , b u t to s h o w a n o t h e r way. T h e h o p e that the o t h e r w a y — G o d ' s way—will be seen by m e a n s of an exemplary response, and that once it has been seen it will be followed, is basic to Jesus's policy of reflecting G o d ' s love. T h a t h o p e is a r t i c u l a t e d by the t h r e e types of eschatology we have seen, in each of which God's ultimate vindication is w h a t awaits the believer at the end, in the eschaton. But in every case, the same basic policy of an exemplary response is urged as the only authentically Christian way to deal w i t h suffering in the present. A Hope of

Justice

Because the principal political f o r m s that Christianity confronted during its formative period w e r e n o t of its o w n making, n o n e of t h e m emerges as actually sanctioned with the force of revelation. Instead, w h a t e m e r g e s is a p a t t e r n of u r g i n g justice o u t of a variety of circumstances—some of t h e m manifestly u n j u s t — b y m e a n s of the imitation of Christ. Believers' willingness to e m b r a c e the p a t t e r n of Christ m a k e s t h e m a part of that global t r a n s f o r m a t i o n that is the sign of the Kingdom of G o d w o r k i n g itself o u t in the world. A l t h o u g h A u g u s t i n e is chiefly an e x p o n e n t of juridical eschatology, as explained above, h e also provided Christianity w i t h an e n d u r i n g m o d e l of h o w this world interacts w i t h the will of God. In his City of God, Augustine b r o u g h t his Christian t h e o l o g y of history t h r o u g h its baptism by fire. In 410 C.E., Alaric sacked the city of R o m e itself. T h a t event was a stunning blow to the empire generally, b u t it was a double b l o w to Latin Christianity. First, the pillage occurred while the empire was Christian; t w o centuries before, Tertullian had argued that idolatry b r o u g h t about disaster (see Apologeticus 41.1), and n o w Christianity could be said to have d o n e so. Second, Latin Christianity—especially in N o r t h Africa— had b e e n particularly attracted to an apocalyptic, millenarian eschatology. H o w

I P R I M I T I V E A N D EARLY C H R I S T I A N I T Y

could one explain that the triumphant end of history, announced by Eusebius and his followers, seemed to be reversed by the Goths? T h e explanation of that d i l e m m a occupied Augustine in his City of God, a tremendous work of twenty-three books, written between 413 and 426. From the outset, he sounds his theme, that the city of God is an eternal city which exists in the midst of the collective city of m e n through the ages; those two cities are both mixed and at odds in this world, but they are to be separated by the final judgm e n t (City of God 1.1). T h a t essentially simple thesis is sustained t h r o u g h an account of Roman religion and Hellenistic philosophy, including Augustine's critical appreciation of Plato (books 1-10). In the central section of his work, Augustine sets out his case within a discussion of truly global history, starting f r o m the story of the creation in Genesis. From the fall of the angels, which Augustine associates with the separation of light and darkness in Genesis 1:4, he speaks of the striving between good and evil. But the distinction between those t w o is involved with the will of certain angels, not with any intrinsic wickedness (City of God 11.33). People also are disordered in their desire, rather than in their creation by God (City of God 12.8). The difference between the will God intends for his creatures and the will they actually evince attests to the freedom involved in divine creation. But the effect of p e r v e r t e d will, w h e t h e r angelic o r h u m a n , is to establish t w o antithetical regimes: So t w o loves have constituted t w o cities—the earthly is f o r m e d by love of self even to c o n t e m p t of God, the heavenly by love of God even to c o n t e m p t of self. For the one glories in herself, the other in the Lord. T h e one seeks glory from man; for the other God, the witness of the conscience, is the greatest glory. . . . In the one the lust for p o w e r prevails, b o t h in her o w n rulers and in the nations she subdues; in the other all serve each other in charity, governors by taking thought for all and subjects by obeying. (City of God 14.28)

By b o o k 18, Augustine arrives at his o w n time, and repeats that the t w o cities "alike enjoy temporal goods or suffer temporal ills, but differ in faith, in hope, in love, until they be separated by the final j u d g m e n t and each receive its end, of which there is n o end" (City of God 18.54). That commits Augustine to speak of eschatological issues, which he does until the end of the work as a whole. It is in his discussion of eschatology that Augustine frames classic and orthodox responses to some of the most persistent questions of the Christian theology of his time. H e adheres to the expectation of the resurrection of the flesh, not simply of the body (as had been the m a n n e r of Origen). In so doing, he refutes the Manichaean philosophy that he had accepted before his conversion to Christianity. In Manichaeanism, n a m e d after a Persian

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53

54 I Bruce D. Chilton | teacher of the third c e n t u r y n a m e d Mani, light and darkness are t w o eternal substances t h a t struggle against o n e a n o t h e r , and t h e y w a r over t h e creation they have b o t h participated in m a k i n g . As in the case of Gnosticism, o n which it was d e p e n d e n t , Manichaeanism counseled a denial of the flesh. By his insistence on the resurrection of the flesh, Augustine revives the s t r o n g assertion of the extent of God's e m b r a c e of His o w n creation in the tradition of Irenaeus. At the same time, Augustine sets a limit on the extent to which o n e might have recourse to Plato. Augustine had insisted with Plato against the Manichaeans that G o d w a s n o t a material substance b u t transcendent. Similarly, evil b e c a m e in his m i n d t h e denial of w h a t p r o c e e d s f r o m G o d (see Confessions 5.10.20). W h e n it c a m e t o t h e c r e a t i o n of p e o p l e , h o w e v e r , A u g u s t i n e insisted against P l a t o n i c t h o u g h t that n o division b e t w e e n soul a n d flesh could b e m a d e (so City of God 22.12). H u m a n i t y in flesh and b l o o d was the only g e n u i n e humanity, and G o d in C h r i s t w a s e n g a g e d t o raised t h o s e w h o w e r e of t h e city of G o d . M o r e o v e r , A u g u s t i n e specifically r e f u t e d t h e c o n t e n t i o n of P o r p h y r y (and O r i g e n ) t h a t cycles of creation could be included within the entire s c h e m e of salvation. For Augustine, the p o w e r of the resurrection within the world was already c o n f i r m e d by the miracles w r o u g h t by Christ and his martyrs. H e gives the example of the healings c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e relics of Saint S t e p h e n , w h i c h h a d b e e n recently transferred to H i p p o (City of God 22.8). Even now, in the p o w e r of the Catholic C h u r c h , G o d is represented o n earth, and the present, Christian e p o c h (Christiana tempora) c o r r e s p o n d s to the millenn i u m p r o m i s e d in Revelation 20 (City of God 20.9). This age of d a w n i n g power, released in flesh by Jesus and conveyed by the church, simply awaits the full transition into the city of God, c o m p l e t e w i t h flesh itself. It is interesting that, w h e r e Origen could allude to a saying of Jesus to c o n f i r m his view of the resurrection (On First Principles 2.10-11; see M a t t h e w 22:30; Mark 12:25; Luke 20:36), Augustine has to qualify the s a m e saying: They will be equal to angels in immortality and happiness, not in flesh, nor indeed in resurrection, which the angels had no need of, since they could not die. So the Lord said that there would be no marriage in the resurrection, not that there would be no women. (City of God 22.18) In all of this, Augustine is straining, a l t h o u g h he is usually a m o r e straightforward i n t e r p r e t e r of Scripture. But h e is w e d d e d to w h a t the Latin confession of "the resurrection of the flesh" implies, and therefore he c a n n o t follow Origen's exegesis. T h e r e is a double irony here. First, Origen, the sophisticated allegorist, s e e m s m u c h simpler to follow t h a n Augustine, the i n c o m p a r a b l e preacher. Second, Augustine's discussion of such issues as the fate of fetuses in the resurrection s o u n d s remarkably like the Sadducees' hypothesis that Jesus argues against in the relevant passage f r o m the Synoptic Gospels.

I P R I M I T I V E A N D EARLY C H R I S T I A N I T Y

Augustine is well aware, as was Origen before him, that Paul speaks of a "spiritual body," and acknowledges that "I suspect that all utterance published concerning it is rash." And yet he can be quite categorical that flesh must be involved somehow: "The spiritual flesh will be subject to spirit, but it will still be flesh, not spirit; just as the carnal spirit was subject to the flesh, but was still spirit, not flesh" (City of God 22.21). Such is Augustine's conviction that flesh has become the mediu m of salvation now and hereafter. As in the case of Irenaeus, the denial of a thoroughly abstract teaching leads to the assertion of greater literalism than may have been warranted. In his adherence to a kind of millenarianism and to the resurrection of the flesh in the Latin creed, Augustine is very m u c h a product of N o r t h Africa and Italy, where he was active (chiefly as a teacher of rhetoric) before his conversion and his return to N o r t h Africa. But his City of God creates the greater frame, primordial and eschatological, within which history b e c o m e s a theological discipline. Here, he argues, is more than a lesson in h o w to avoid war and create order. And here there is certainly m o r e than the superficial enthusiasm that comes of histories written by the winners. Rather, history for Augustine—and f r o m Augustine—is the interplay of those two forces, which determine the existence of every society, every person. Augustine died in Hippo while the city was actually under siege by the Vandals. His passing, and the passing of his church and his city, was a curious witness to his Christiana tempora. But his conception that his history and every history reflected the struggle between the t w o cities prepared him and the global church for that, and for m u c h worse. H e had t u r n e d back to the Eusebian model of history as apocalypse, and he took it even m o r e seriously than had Eusebius himself. N o apocalyptic seer ever promised an easy transition to the consuming reign of Christ, and on to that m o m e n t w h e n God would be all in all (so 1 Corinthians 15:28, which Augustine quotes). Smooth, u n h a m p e r e d progress is a model of history that only c o m m e n d s itself to those in the line of Eusebius and historians since the nineteenth century. If history is apocalyptic, because the times of the church are millennial, then h u m a n flesh has indeed been blessed, but h u m a n history is equally dedicated to struggle. The struggle, however, is not ultimately between good and evil, but between the love of God and the love of self. T h a t is the key to Augustine's ceaseless, pastoral ministry, as well as to his remarkably broad intellectual horizon. In every t i m e and in every place, there is the possibility t h a t the city of G o d will be revealed and embraced; now, in the Christiana tempora, we at last know its n a m e , and can see the face of that love that would t r a n s f o r m us all. History after Augustine could be painted on canvasses of indeterminate size, because he established the quest to integrate the historical task with philosophical reflection. At the same time, in his Confessions, he established the genre of

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62 I Bruce D. Chilton | a u t o b i o g r a p h y as an investigation of t h e dynamics of universal salvation within the life of the individual he k n e w best, himself. W r i t t e n large in nations and written small in persons, history attested to the o u t w a r d - w o r k i n g and inward-working p o w e r of God, if only one's eyes could see w i t h the love of God, and be cured of the blindness of self-love.

Early Christianity outside

the

and Nonbelievers:

Politics

and

People

Tradition

Only f r o m the second c e n t u r y C.E. d o w e find a literature that engages in a spirited, intellectual defense of Christianity across the range of o t h e r G r e c o - R o m a n religious and philosophical options. T h a t defense was principally c o n d u c t e d in the midst of the religious and philosophical pluralism of the second century. In that e n v i r o n m e n t , in which adherents of various g r o u p s w e r e attracted to Christianity, it w a s i m p e r a t i v e t o develop an a c c o u n t of t h e intellectual integrity of faith—an "apology" in the philosophical sense—a justification that m a d e sense t o nonbelievers. Such literature developed t h e p a r a d i g m a t i c a t t i t u d e of Christianity t o w a r d faiths o t h e r t h a n J u d a i s m . Christianity's apologists crafted a distinctive view of t h e divine " W o r d " (logos), w h i c h conveys t h e t r u t h of G o d t o humanity. T h a t logos w a s Jesus Christ, u n d e r s t o o d as the h u m a n teacher w h o at last fully incarnated w h a t philosophers and p r o p h e t s h a d b e e n searching for and had partially seen. A second-century d e f e n d e r of the Christian faith, Justin Martyr, was the theo l o g i a n w h o articulated t h a t d o c t r i n e m o s t clearly, o n t h e basis of the Gospel according to J o h n . In 151 C.E., he addressed his Apology to the e m p e r o r himself, A n t o n i u s Pius. Such was his c o n f i d e n c e that the " t r u e philosophy" represented by Christ, attested in the H e b r e w Scriptures, w o u l d t r i u m p h a m o n g the o t h e r o p t i o n s available at t h e t i m e . J u s t i n h i m s e l f h a d b e e n t r a i n e d w i t h i n s o m e of t h o s e traditions, a n d by his S a m a r i t a n b i r t h he could claim t o r e p r e s e n t s o m e t h i n g of t h e w i s d o m of t h e East. S o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n 162 a n d 168, h o w e v e r , Justin was m a r t y r e d in R o m e , a victim of the increasing hostility against Christianity u n d e r the reign of Marcus Aurelius. 6 Justin argued that the light of reason in people is p u t there by G o d and is to be e q u a t e d w i t h the W o r d of G o d incarnate in Jesus. T h e type of Christianity that Justin d e f e n d e d was as m u c h a philosophy as it w a s a religion. His claim was that the light of reason in humanity, which had already b e e n indirectly available, actually b e c a m e fully manifest in the case of Jesus Christ. Jesus, therefore, was the perfect sage, and Socrates as m u c h as Isaiah w a s his p r o p h e t . In that sense, Christianity was as old as h u m a n i t y ; it was only its o p e n manifestation that was recent. To m a k e his case, Justin u s e d a r g u m e n t s t h a t h a d b e e n e m p l o y e d b e f o r e by Philo of Alexandria (Jesus's older contemporary), b u t on behalf of Judaism. Philo

I PRIMITIVE AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY

had also identified the logos, the prophetic word articulated in Scripture, as the reason by which God created the world and animates humanity. Philo even makes out the historical case that Moses influenced the Greek philosophers directly, 7 so that the extent to which Greek philosophy illuminates God's wisdom is derivative. Justin is bolder in his Platonism, in that his argument does not rely on such an historical argument but rather on the contention that in Jesus the primordial archetype of humanity and of the world itself, the logos, became accessible and knowable in a way it had not been before. In his Dialogue with Trypho, A Jew, Justin describes his own development f r o m Platonism to Christianity as a result of a conversation with an old man. The sage convinced him that the highest good that Platonism can attain, the h u m a n soul, should not be confused with God himself, because the soul depends u p o n God for life (chapter 6). Knowledge of God depends r a t h e r u p o n the revelation of God's spirit (chapter 7): L o n g ago, he replied, there lived m e n m o r e ancient t h a n all the so-called philosophers, m e n righteous and beloved of G o d , w h o spoke by the divine spirit and foretold t h i n g s t o c o m e , t h a t even n o w are t a k i n g place. T h e s e m e n w e r e called prophets. T h e y alone b o t h saw the t r u t h and p r o c l a i m e d it to m e n , w i t h o u t awe or fear of anyone, moved by n o desire for glory, b u t speaking only those things which they saw a n d h e a r d w h e n filled w i t h the H o l y Spirit. T h e i r writings are still w i t h us, and w h o e v e r will m a y read t h e m and, if he believes t h e m , gain m u c h knowledge of the b e g i n n i n g and end of things, and all else a philosopher o u g h t to know. For they did n o t e m p l o y logic to prove their statements, seeing they w e r e witnesses t o the t r u t h . . . .They glorified the creator of all things, as G o d and Father, and p r o c l a i m e d the Christ sent by him as his Son. . . . But pray that, before all else, the gates of light m a y be o p e n e d t o you. For n o t everyone can see or u n d e r s t a n d these things, b u t only he to w h o m G o d and His Christ have g r a n t e d w i s d o m .

Here is a self-conscious Christianity, which distinguishes itself f r o m Judaism and proclaims itself the true and only adequate philosophy. Justin's account of the t r u t h of the logos depends u p o n t w o sources of revelation, resonant with one another: the prophetic Scriptures, which attest to the Spirit; and the wise reader, w h o has been inspired by the Spirit. Implicitly (and later, with the conversion of Constantine, explicitly), this apologetic theology explained a refusal of Christ in terms of either a rejection of Spirit itself or a lack of insight.

Conclusion The injustice of h u m a n institutions comes as no surprise to Christianity, because the anthropology inherited f r o m Saint Paul has prepared theologians and believers at large for that breach between God and humanity that is called sin. At the same time, each Christian is called to a path of justice, through the transform-

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64 I Bruce D. Chilton | ing p o w e r of the Son of God, disclosed within every believer by God's Spirit in baptism. Paradoxically, therefore, an experience of injustice in this world can be a badge of honor, the seal of one's loyalty to the world to c o m e at the price of one's status in this world. For that reason, o n e can accept the legitimacy of institutions that are nonetheless unjust, because they b e l o n g to the structure of a w o r l d that is passing away T h e c o m i n g of the supernatural world that is to supersede all others, the Kingdom of G o d in its fullness, extends to the witness of martyrs, w h o participate in an eschatological t r a n s f o r m a t i o n over time, t h r o u g h space, and in the revelation of t r u e justice. T h e s e distinct kinds of e s c h a t o l o g y — t e m p o r a l , transcendent, and juridical—have resulted in different views of h o w g o v e r n m e n t should be organized w h e n it reflects the message of the Gospels. Christian theologians over time have portrayed g o v e r n m e n t as an o p p o r t u n i t y for individuals to repent, as an educational i n s t r u m e n t w h o s e apogee is the vision of God, and as a place to adjudicate h u m a n i t y ' s struggle w i t h the flesh. Because n o g o v e r n m e n t can be identified with God's Kingdom, Christian politics has always varied. Yet within that variation, Jesus's teaching of an exemplary response is a constant principle. In specific instances, the believer is called u p o n to reply to injustice in this world with the justice G o d provides from the world to c o m e . T h e conviction that the k i n g d o m that is c o m i n g will constantly complem e n t and correct the evils of this w o r l d is the f o u n d a t i o n of Christian h o p e in history as a locus of revelation.

Notes 1. See Eusebius, The History of the Church from Christ to Constantine, trans. G. A. Williamson (Baltimore: Penguin, 1967), 2.25. 2. For the emphatic wording of the prayer of Jesus, and its Aramaic original, see Bruce

Chilton, Jesus' Prayer and Jesus' Eucharist: His Personal Practice of Spirituality (Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1997). 3. In fact, Jesus's own eschatology included two further dimensions. His definition of the Kingdom of God provided for a distinctive view of what made for the purity acceptable to God and for an emphasis on the outward, inclusive range of the Kingdom. See Bruce Chilton, Pure Kingdom: Jesus' Vision of God, Studying the Historical Jesus 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996). Those dimensions are not included here because they did not a m o u n t to distinctive types of eschatology within the formative periods of Christianity. Still, emphases upon the purity and upon the outward extension of God's kingdom are characteristic of Christianity in most periods. 4. For the examples and their elucidation, I am indebted to John Dillon, "Looking on the Light: Some Remarks on the Imagery of Light in the First C h a p t e r of the Peri

Archon," The Golden Chain: Studies in the Development of Platonism and Christianity (Aldershot, U.K.: Variorum, 1990), 215-30 (essay 22).

I

PRIMITIVE AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY|65 5. This is Dillon's m a i n p o i n t (see " L o o k i n g o n the Light," 225), and his citation of On

First Principles 1.1.6 demonstrates it admirably. 6. See H e n r y Chadwick, The Early Church ( L o n d o n : Penguin, 1993), 29, 74-79. 7. For a discussion of this m o t i f (in Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesin iv. 152, for exam-

ple), see Harry Austryn Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam ( C a m b r i d g e , Mass.: H a r v a r d University Press, 1947), 141-43, 160-63.

Suggested

Readings

B e t t e n s o n , Henry, ed. Documents of the Christian Church. O x f o r d and N e w York: O x f o r d University Press, 1999. Boff, L e o n a r d o . Holy Trinity, Perfect Community.

Trans. P. B e r r y m a n . N e w York: Orbis,

2000.

Brown, Peter. Authority and the Sacred: Aspects of the Christianisation of the Roman World. C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1995. Brown, R a y m o n d E. An Introduction to the New Testament. N e w York: Doubleday, 1997. Chadwick, Henry. The Early Church. N e w York: Penguin Books, 1993. Chilton, Bruce. Pure Kingdom: Jesus' Vision of God. G r a n d Rapids: E e r d m a n s , 1996.

Grant, Robert M. Augustus to Constantine. The Rise and Triumph of Christianity in the Roman World. San Francisco: H a r p e r & Row, 1990.

Daniélou, Jean, and Henri Marrou. The Christian Centuries, 1: The First Six Hundred Years. Trans. V C r o n i n . N e w York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. Frei, Hans. Types of Christian Theology. Ed. G. H u n s i n g e r and W. C. Placher. N e w Haven, C o n n . : Yale University Press, 1992.

Gunton, Colin E., ed. The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. M o l t m a n n , J ü r g e n . The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology. Trans. M. Kohl. L o n d o n : SCM, 1996. Niebuhr, Reinhold. The Nature and Destiny of Man. N e w York: Scribner's, 1964.

Norris, Richard A. God and World in Early Christian Theology: A Study in Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian and Origen. London: A. & C. Black, 1967. Pelikan, Jaroslav. The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971-89.

Torrance, Thomas F. The Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church. Edinburgh: Τ & Τ Clark, 1994.

Three I Roman Catholic Christianity I Charles E. Curran

GIVEN THE MULTIPLICITY OF USES FOR THE TERM " C A T H O L I C , " IT IS IMPORTANT AT THE

outset to clarify h o w it and its p e r m u t a t i o n s are used in this chapter. T h e very word "catholic" (with a lowercase "c") means universal or all-embracing, f r o m the Greek katholikos, used generally in Greek classics to m e a n " t h r o u g h o u t the w h o l e , universal, general." Eventually, Christians a p p r o p r i a t e d the t e r m to describe the "universal church" (it was originally used by Saint Ignatius, ca. 110 c.E.).

As is noted by Petros Vassiliadis in his treatment of Orthodox Christianity

in chapter 4 and by Martin Marty in his discussion of Reformation Christianity in chapter 5, this sense of "catholic" is embraced by a large percentage of Christians w h e n referring to the church. In fact, m e m b e r s of m o r e than one Christian denomination routinely reaffirm their identity with the "catholic" church, in an inclusive rather than exclusive way, every time they recite the ancient creeds (e.g., Anglicans, called Episcopalians in the United States; the Greek Orthodox; Lutherans; Presbyterians; and Roman Catholics). In its capitalized f o r m , the w o r d "Catholic" has, over time and in c o m m o n usage, c o m e to refer b o t h to the ancient Christian C h u r c h b e f o r e significant schisms, and m o r e specifically to the church whose supreme bishop is the pope in Rome, f r o m which the Protestants broke away in the sixteenth century C.E.— the Roman Catholic Church. In this chapter, unless otherwise defined, "Catholic" and "Catholicism" refer to Roman Catholic Christianity, and "catholic" to the universal church. While emphasizing the gift and goal of eternal life, Catholicism has consistently had a concern for this world and h o w life is lived in this world. Catholic faith touches all aspects of h u m a n existence. T h e ultimate basis for such a concern for life in this world comes from the doctrine of creation, according to which God made all that exists and saw that it was very good. Some Christians stress the doctrine of sin as radically affecting the t e m p o r a l world and m a k i n g it evil; but the Catholic tradition has insisted that, although sin does affect the goodness of creation, sin clearly does not destroy the basic goodness of humanity and all that God has made. C o n t e m p o r a r y Catholic t h o u g h t also sees the redemptive love of Jesus and God's grace affecting and t r a n s f o r m i n g the t e m p o r a l realm, while recognizing that the fullness of justice and peace will never be present in this world. Critics b o t h inside and outside Catholicism have pointed o u t the danger that Catholicism might be too optimistic a b o u t the t e m p o r a l realm and the political order 6i

68 I Charles Ε. Curran | and n o t give e n o u g h i m p o r t a n c e to the negative effects of sin. Catholicism today, in c o n t i n u i t y w i t h its past, insists t h a t C a t h o l i c C h r i s t i a n s are called t o w o r k t o g e t h e r with all people of goodwill for a b e t t e r or m o r e j u s t t e m p o r a l o r d e r in general and political o r d e r in particular. In this chapter's consideration of the Catholic u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the political order, I first discuss the classical sources, texts, m e t h o d , and audience of Catholic social a n d political teaching. I t h e n develop the substance of this u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the political o r d e r and the role of Catholics and o t h e r s in the political realm.

Classical

Sources

of Roman

Catholicism

on

Politics

W h a t are the generic sources that Catholicism uses to develop its u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e political order? W h e r e d o e s t h e C a t h o l i c a p p r o a c h f i n d w i s d o m a n d k n o w l e d g e for its u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h o w the political o r d e r should function? Sources in

General

C a t h o l i c i s m , in k e e p i n g w i t h t h e J u d e o - C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n , believes t h a t G o d reveals God's self to us and that this revelation provides w i s d o m and knowledge. Revelation includes b o t h Scripture and tradition, b u t these are n o t u n d e r s t o o d today in a dualistic way as t w o distinctly different realities. T h e Scriptures, or the W o r d of God, include the H e b r e w Bible (often called the Old Testament) and the N e w T e s t a m e n t . T h e Scriptures are the inspired W o r d of God, a l t h o u g h diverse i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of inspiration exist. Tradition refers to b o t h the process and the c o n t e n t of w h a t has b e e n h a n d e d over in the church from g e n e r a t i o n to generation. Catholicism believes that the Holy Spirit is given to the church so that d o w n t h r o u g h the centuries the church will be able to u n d e r s t a n d , live, and appropriate the w o r d and w o r k of Jesus in the light of c h a n g i n g historical circumstances. T h e Scriptures themselves are historically and culturally conditioned, so tradition helps us to u n d e r s t a n d the call of faith in light of the different historical and cultural c i r c u m s t a n c e s in w h i c h w e n o w live. Perhaps the best e x a m p l e of tradition in early Catholicism c o n c e r n s the creeds of the Early C h u r c h , w h i c h spelled o u t Catholic Christian belief in such basic areas as the Trinitarian nature of G o d and the divine a n d h u m a n n a t u r e s in Jesus. T h e Trinitarian d o c t r i n e of three divine Persons in o n e G o d is n o t f o u n d explicitly as such in the Scriptures, b u t the church p r o p o s e d this teaching in its early councils and creeds. Most Christian churches recognize Scripture and tradition as sources of m o r a l w i s d o m for believers. But Catholicism also acknowledges a distinctive source of m o r a l w i s d o m and knowledge: T h e gift of the Holy Spirit has b e e n given to the p o p e and bishops in the church to assist t h e m in t e a c h i n g authoritatively a b o u t faith and m o r a l s for the m e m b e r s of the church. This teaching office, exercised especially by the bishop of R o m e or pope, has in recent times p r o p o s e d authori-

I ROMAN CATHOLIC CHRISTIANITY

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tative t e a c h i n g in m a n y m o r a l areas, i n c l u d i n g t h e political order. In addition, Catholicism accepts h u m a n sources of m o r a l w i s d o m — r e a s o n and experience. Because Catholicism recognizes the g o o d n e s s of all that G o d has m a d e , h u m a n reason and h u m a n experience can be sources of m o r a l w i s d o m and k n o w l e d g e . Catholicism relies heavily on h u m a n reason for its u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the political order. Again, the d a n g e r in Catholicism is t o forget that limitation a n d sinfulness also affect b u t do n o t totally distort h u m a n reason and experience. Texts In relation to these sources, various authoritative texts exist in Catholicism. T h e Bible itself w i t h all its parts is the m o s t significant text, b u t for the area of politics t h e Bible d o e s n o t p r o v i d e t h a t m u c h g u i d a n c e a n d d i r e c t i o n . C o n s e q u e n t l y , Christians o f t e n refer to the saying in M a t t h e w to give to G o d w h a t is God's and to Caesar w h a t is Caesar's (22:15-22). T h e y also recognize the teaching in the letter of Paul to the R o m a n s a b o u t the obedience that is d u e to civil rulers (13:1-7). However, there are also passages in the N e w T e s t a m e n t that cause p r o b l e m s for m a n y Christians today, such as the apparent acceptance of slavery. Christians have tried to explain in different ways h o w this c a m e about. T h e p r i m a r y p u r p o s e of revelation in g e n e r a l and the Bible in particular is n o t to give details a b o u t t h e political order, although they do provide guidelines and even c o m m a n d m e n t s for life in this world. However, the dramatic difference b e t w e e n political life then and political life today m e a n s that any specific biblical teachings m i g h t n o t be applicable to o u r very different situation. T h e Early C h u r c h ' s councils and creeds usually did n o t address issues of politics, b u t the writings of the leaders of the Early C h u r c h (often called the Patristic Age, e m b r a c i n g the first six or m o r e centuries) frequently did discuss aspects of life in the t e m p o r a l and political spheres. For example, the question of Christian participation in the a r m y was frequently discussed. Many other issues of daily life, as well as t h e b r o a d e r q u e s t i o n of w h a t t o d a y w e call t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of church and state, w e r e discussed by these church leaders and thinkers. Augustine of H i p p o (d. 430 c.E.), the m o s t f a m o u s of these "fathers of the church," w r o t e o n m a n y subjects dealing w i t h life in the t e m p o r a l and political realms. T h e writings of this period f r o m these leaders t e n d e d to be ad h o c and dealt w i t h particular issues primarily f r o m a pastoral perspective. A m o r e systematic study c a m e t o the fore in the second m i l l e n n i u m with the rise of universities u n d e r church auspices. H e r e again, notice the Catholic acceptance of the g o o d n e s s and p o w e r of h u m a n reason to arrive at t r u t h . Systematic t h e o l o g y b e g a n at this time as an a t t e m p t to explain Catholic faith and m o r a l s in a systematic way, putting all the parts together into a whole. In the thirteenth century, religious orders such as the D o m i n i c a n s and the Franciscans c a m e into existence and b e g a n to engage in the systematic study of theology.

70 I Charles Ε. Curran | T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t figure in the t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y was T h o m a s Aquinas (d. 1274), an Italian D o m i n i c a n friar w h o s e Summa theologiae b e c a m e the m o s t significant b o o k in Catholic theological tradition. By definition, the Summa is a synthesis of all theology. But the second of its three parts deals w i t h the m o r a l life, w h i c h Aquinas explains on the basis of the three theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity) and the f o u r cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, and t e m p e r a n c e ) — w i t h justice, dealing w i t h life in the world, receiving the m o s t coverage. 1 Aquinas uses all the five sources m e n t i o n e d above, b u t in a distinctive m a n n e r h e e m p l o y s A r i s t o t e l i a n t h o u g h t in t r y i n g t o explain C h r i s t i a n faith a n d morals. His discussion of justice relies heavily o n Aristotle. At t h e s a m e time, the Franciscan School, represented by Alexander of Hales (d. 1245), J o h n D u n s Scotus (d. 1308), and Saint Bonaventure (d. 1274), m a d e sign i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o s y s t e m a t i c theology. D u r i n g t h e next f e w c e n t u r i e s , T h o m i s m c o m p e t e d w i t h b o t h Scotism and n o m i n a l i s m , an approach associated w i t h William of O c k h a m (d. 1347). However, in the sixteenth c e n t u r y a revival of T h o m i s m t h r o u g h o u t Europe, b e g i n n i n g in G e r m a n y and m o v i n g to Italy and especially Spain, m a d e T h o m i s m the p r i m a r y approach to Catholic theology and u n d e r s t a n d i n g . At this time, the Summa b e c a m e the t e x t b o o k of t h e o l o g y in all universities. Spain b e c a m e the principal c e n t e r of the T h o m i s t i c renewal, w i t h such leading figures as Francis de Vitoria (d. 1546), w h o has b e e n called the father of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, a n d D o m i n i c Soto (d. 1560), w h o like m a n y o t h e r s w r o t e long c o m m e n t a r i e s on the Summa, especially the section o n justice. In t h e e i g h t e e n t h century, h o w e v e r , T h o m i s m lacked vitality a n d b e g a n t o w a n e . In the n i n e t e e n t h century, Italian Jesuits started a successful campaign to r e n e w T h o m i s m (or Scholasticism, as it w a s s o m e t i m e s called). O n e of their students later b e c a m e Pope Leo XIII, w h o in 1879 issued an encyclical (an authoritative letter to the bishops of the world) titled Aeterni Patris. This encyclical called for t h e renewal and teaching of Aquinas in Catholic universities and seminaries "for the defense and b e a u t y of the Catholic faith, for the g o o d of society, and for the advantages of all the sciences" (η. 31). 2 Later church d o c u m e n t s maintained that philosophy and theology in Catholic institutions should be t a u g h t according to the m e t h o d , outline, and a p p r o a c h of T h o m a s Aquinas. N o t e here the i m p o r t a n c e of Aquinas n o t only for teaching the faith b u t also for the Catholic u n d e r s t a n d i n g of society as a whole. From the ninet e e n t h c e n t u r y o n w a r d , T h o m i s m (or neo-scholasticism) reigned as the Catholic t h e o l o g y a n d philosophy, w i t h v a r y i n g e m p h a s e s , u n d e r t h e o n e T h o m i s t i c u m b r e l l a u n t i l t h e S e c o n d Vatican C o u n c i l (or Vatican II), w h e n C a t h o l i c i s m o p e n e d itself to o t h e r possible approaches. Many have viewed Pope Leo's imposition of T h o m i s m in the late n i n e t e e n t h century, w h i c h w a s c o n t i n u e d by his successors, as a very f o r c e f u l w a y f o r t h e c h u r c h t o s p e a k convincingly to t h e m o d e r n w o r l d and its p r o b l e m s . But o t h e r s criticized this as i m p o s i n g an older

I ROMAN CATHOLIC CHRISTIANITY

approach and showing an unwillingness to open up a dialogue with contemporary thought. Leo XIII played an even m o r e significant role in developing the Catholic approach to the social and political orders. In 1891, he issued the encyclical Rerum novarum (official church d o c u m e n t s take their n a m e f r o m the first t w o or three Latin words of the document), dealing with problems for workers brought about by the Industrial Revolution. The encyclical recognizes the right of workers to a living wage, the need for t h e m to organize into unions, and the p r o p e r role of government to intervene to protect the rights of workers and others w h o are in need. T h e encyclical inspired other encyclicals and letters by subsequent popes dealing with social, e c o n o m i c , and political questions. Such d o c u m e n t s were o f t e n issued on anniversaries of Rerum novarum, and t o g e t h e r they constitute what Pope John Paul II has called the social teaching of the church. These documents, including those f r o m Vatican II (1962-65), have addressed a broad range of issues pertaining to national and international society in the social, political, and economic realms. In the U.S. context, t w o pastoral letters by the U.S. bishops on peace (1983) and on the e c o n o m y (1986) are generally included in the g r o u p of d o c u m e n t s on Catholic social teaching. 3 Thus, these d o c u m e n t s f o r m an authoritative source of official teaching on the social and political order. T h e d o c u m e n t s themselves employ all the sources mentioned above but tend to highlight official church teachings. The documents have spawned many commentaries t h r o u g h o u t the world. Before Vatican II, m o s t such c o m m e n t a r i e s were quite uncritical, but later ones employ m o r e sophisticated hermeneutical principles. Catholic social teaching, because it authoritatively proposes teaching for all Catholics, tends to be somewhat broad and general, involving principles for reflection, criteria for m a k i n g j u d g m e n t s , and basic directives for action. On the U.S. scene, the t w o pastoral letters by the bishops have proposed m o r e specific guidelines (e.g., no first use of counterforce nuclear weapons), but the bishops recognize that on these m o r e specific issues there is r o o m for disagreement a m o n g Catholics. The somewhat general nature of the papal documents means that various c o m m e n t a t o r s can and will interpret t h e m differently. T h e basic thrust of Catholic social teaching, as will be illustrated below, tends to the m o r e progressive side, emphasizing the needs of the p o o r and workers. However, a g r o u p of Catholic neoconservative scholars in the United States have disagreed with the approach taken by the U.S. bishops for being too negative on U.S. policy and capitalism and have interpreted the papal d o c u m e n t s f r o m their perspective. 4

Roman Catholicism's

Theory of

Politics

On the one hand, Roman Catholicism has a well-articulated theory of politics, in its use of natural law. Fundamentally, this m e t h o d o l o g y has theological, as well

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72 I Charles Ε. Curran

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as ethical and social, dimensions. N a t u r a l law, f r o m a theological perspective, is the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature. Because Catholic theology believes in m e d i a t i o n — t h e divine is mediated in and t h r o u g h the h u m a n — it posits that G o d ' s o w n reason can be discerned t h r o u g h the w o r l d H e created and the faculty of reason that H e has given us. W i t h i n the ethical d o m a i n , this t h e o l o g y relates t o issues a b o u t the degree t o w h i c h h u m a n s can and should be held responsible and accountable for their actions. So also in the social d o m a i n , n a t u r a l law points to issues of social justice and h u m a n rights. O n the o t h e r h a n d , because n a t u r a l law as t h e o r y has so often b e e n discussed and d e b a t e d in t h e c o n t e x t of its m e t h o d of expression, t h e t w o s e e m t o have b e c o m e inextricably b o u n d t o g e t h e r . Moreover, this m e t h o d o l o g y t o u c h e s o n such a wide array of issues, and has stimulated so m a n y debates, that it w o u l d be c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e h e r e t o t r y t o s e p a r a t e t h e t h e o r y f r o m t h e m e d i u m of its expression. T h e r e f o r e , r a t h e r t h a n a t t e m p t i n g t o deal s e p a r a t e l y b e l o w w i t h Catholic political t h e o r y and its m e t h o d of expression, I will take u p b o t h together, w i t h o u t a t t e m p t i n g to disentangle the discussion of o n e f r o m the other.

The Medium

of Expressing

Politics

in Roman

Catholicism

T h o m i s m , Catholic social ethics (the a c a d e m i c discipline), a n d Catholic social teaching are obviously interrelated and e m p l o y in general a n a t u r a l law m e t h o d ology based o n that f o u n d in Aquinas. N a t u r a l law, f r o m a theological perspective, is t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h e e t e r n a l law in t h e r a t i o n a l c r e a t u r e . As w a s explained above, f r o m a t h e o l o g i c a l v a n t a g e p o i n t , n a t u r a l law is t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t divine e t e r n a l law exists i n d e p e n d e n t of h u m a n o p i n i o n o r construction, b u t rational beings participate in it. T h e eternal law is the plan that G o d has for the world. H o w d o w e discover G o d ' s plan? D o w e go directly and i m m e diately to G o d to find o u t w h a t to do? T h e Catholic answer t o this question is No. O n e of the distinctive characteristics of Catholic t h e o l o g y is the idea of mediation, w h i c h w a s explained above. G o d has created the w o r l d and has given us o u r reason that m e d i a t e s God's o w n reason. H u m a n reason, reflecting o n the creation that G o d has m a d e , including of course h u m a n beings, can discover h o w G o d wants us to act and use w h a t G o d created. T h u s n a t u r a l law is t h e participation of t h e e t e r n a l law in t h e rational c r e a t u r e . Such a n a t u r a l law a p p r o a c h m e a n s that Catholics a n d all o t h e r s are called to d o t h e s a m e t h i n g in w o r k i n g for a b e t t e r or m o r e j u s t t e m p o r a l and political realm. T h e later papal encyclicals explicitly address n o t only Catholics b u t all people of goodwill. F r o m an ethical and philosophical perspective, n a t u r a l law is h u m a n reason directing us to o u r end in accord w i t h o u r h u m a n n a t u r e . O f course, there are disputed q u e s t i o n s a b o u t w h a t is m e a n t by h u m a n r e a s o n and h u m a n n a t u r e .

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By examining h u m a n beings, h u m a n reason c o m e s to the conclusion we are not isolated monads but are social by nature and m e a n t to live in many different communities, f r o m the family on up to the broader political community. To fulfill ourselves as h u m a n beings, we need to exist in these many different relationships. A n o t h e r example: Reason discovers that t h r o u g h w o r k h u m a n beings earn what is necessary to provide for themselves so that they might have at least a minimally decent h u m a n existence. T h e just wage, therefore, is n o t simply what the employer and the employee agree on but rather what is necessary to provide the worker with a minimally decent h u m a n existence. C o m m e n t a t o r s have raised various questions and criticisms about natural law, b o t h f r o m within and f r o m outside the Catholic tradition. More recent documents of Catholic social teaching and commentaries on these have responded to these criticisms and thus modified to some extent the neo-scholastic natural law approach as found in Leo XIII. A first criticism concerns the fact that the natural law approach does not give e n o u g h importance to the central faith aspects of Jesus Christ, revelation, and redeeming grace. Vatican II, which renewed Roman Catholicism, in Gaudium et spes (translated as The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World), lamented that the split between faith and daily life is a major error of our times (n. 41). Neo-scholasticism, perhaps not totally faithful to Aquinas, had seen the temporal as the realm of the natural distinguished from the supernatural aspects of grace, redemption, and Jesus Christ. Subsequent to Vatican II, the documents of Catholic social teaching have tried to understand life in the world also in the light of Catholic faith and all that it entails. One advantage of the newer Christological or faith approach is the centrality of working for a better h u m a n society or, as it is called, the social mission of the church. Previously, the church's mission was seen as twofold—divinization and humanization, with the latter carried out by lay people in their daily life in the temporal, social, and political orders. Divinization occurred on the supernatural level in the life of the church, and humanization occurred on the natural level in the life of the world. Justitia in mundo (1971), the d o c u m e n t of Catholic social teaching coming f r o m the international Synod of Bishops, maintained: "Action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the world fully appear to us as a constitutive dimension of the preaching of the Gospel, or in other words, of the church's mission for the redemption of the h u m a n race and its liberation from every oppressive situation." Working for a better h u m a n society in this world was always a consequence of Catholic faith, but before Vatican II it tended to be secondary to the more spiritual and supernatural elements. Now it is a constitutive part of the preaching of the Gospel, which means that without a social mission there is n o true preaching of the Gospel or redemptive mission of the church.

68 I Charles Ε. Curran | A second criticism of natural law c o n c e r n s its failure to give e n o u g h importance to history, change, and development. Natural law is a participation in eternal law, which is u n d e r s t o o d as absolute, universal, and u n c h a n g i n g . T h e nature of things is s o m e t h i n g already given and does n o t recognize m u c h change and development. T h e r e have b e e n s o m e rejoinders to this criticism w i t h i n the d o c u m e n t s of c o n t e m p o r a r y Catholic social teaching. First, the teaching itself has developed over time, as this chapter will explain below. For example, Catholic social teaching in the twentieth c e n t u r y c a m e to a greater appreciation of f r e e d o m , equality, and participation in public life and even changed its teaching on religious freed o m . In o t h e r areas (e.g., sexuality and medical ethics), c o n t e m p o r a r y Catholic teaching has n o t b e e n that o p e n to change or development. S e c o n d , m a n y m o r e r e c e n t d o c u m e n t s have e m p l o y e d a m o r e inductive methodology. T h o m i s m , at least as it was i n t e r p r e t e d in nineteenth- and earlytwentieth-century neo-scholasticism, was deductive in its m e t h o d . Conclusions were deduced f r o m their premises. Pope Paul VI clearly employed a m u c h m o r e inductive m e t h o d . Induction by definition begins, as does Gaudium et spes, w i t h "the signs of the times," c o n t e m p o r a r y realities. Third, Paul VI in Octogesima adveniens (1971) explicitly moves away f r o m the backward glance of natural law to eternal law and appeals rather to forward looking Utopias as "criticism of existing society [which] often provokes the forwardl o o k i n g i m a g i n a t i o n b o t h to perceive in the present the disregarded possibility hidden within it and to direct itself toward a fresh f u t u r e " (n. 37). J o h n Paul II, the successor of Paul VI, has moved away from the historical consciousness and m o r e inductive approach f o u n d in Octogesima

adveniens.

A third criticism refers to natural law's p e n c h a n t for insisting o n universality, a b s o l u t e principles, a n d u n i t y at t h e e x p e n s e of particularity, flexibility, a n d greater diversity. H e r e again, s o m e effort has b e e n m a d e to m e e t this criticism, b u t t h e d o c u m e n t s still p r o p o s e principles f o r reflection, criteria f o r m a k i n g j u d g m e n t s , and directives for action for the whole world, in all its cultural diversity. At a very m i n i m u m , any a p p r o a c h that tries to speak for the w h o l e w o r l d m u s t be conscious of its diversity and be self-critical e n o u g h to recognize that n o perspective is w i t h o u t its limitations and prejudices. In the global reality of the m o d e r n world, however, universal ethical c o n c e r n s t o u c h i n g all h u m a n beings s e e m to be m o s t necessary. A f o u r t h criticism points to the tension involved in a teaching claiming to be authoritative for Catholics b u t also claiming to be based on h u m a n reason. T h e criticism has b e e n phrased as seeing the teaching m o r e as law and less as rational. This is obviously a tension within the Catholic c o m m u n i t y itself in t e r m s of t h e l e g i t i m a c y of d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h i n t h e c h u r c h a b o u t hierarchical c h u r c h teaching o n social and political m a t t e r s . W i t h i n R o m a n Catholicism, there has

I

ROMAN CATHOLIC CHRISTIANITY

been considerably less discussion about disagreement and dissent in the realm of Catholic social teaching than in the areas of hierarchical sexual teaching such as contraception and divorce. Perhaps the very general nature of the social teaching, which by definition allows for different interpretations, makes the issue of dissent or disagreement less likely.

The Message

of Roman Catholicism's

Politics

In the Catholic understanding, the temporal realm embraces all that occurs in h u m a n existence in this world. T h e temporal realm includes the broad area of the social as well as the cultural and the political. Thus, for o u r purposes, the political order is n a r r o w e r than the t e m p o r a l order and is differentiated f r o m the cultural realm. The political realm refers to the ordered political life of the community. Anthropology constitutes the g r o u n d i n g for the Catholic understanding of the political order. The Catholic tradition usually addresses the political order in terms of the state. "State" is the word that is usually used to refer to all aspects of g o v e r n m e n t , be it local, state (in the U.S. understanding), or federal. Catholic anthropology insists that the h u m a n person (personal language is m u c h m o r e recent; the older t e r m was h u m a n being) has an inherent, God-given dignity and sacredness but is also social and political by nature. Genesis, the first book of the Bible, tells us that God created h u m a n beings in God's own image and likeness. The h u m a n person has an inherent, God-given sacredness and dignity and is thus different f r o m all other parts of the creation. However, as h u m a n beings, we are n o t isolated m o n a d s b u t are called by the nature God has given us to live together in various structures, such as the natural structure of the family and the natural institution of the state or the political order. This twofold aspect of anthropology grounds the Catholic understanding of the state as natural, necessary, and good but also limited. The State as Natural,

Necessary, and Good

Aquinas, in harmony with the biblical emphasis, accepted the Aristotelian understanding of the h u m a n being as social and political by nature. H u m a n beings by their very nature (notice the natural law approach) are made by God and called to live t o g e t h e r in political society. Only in and t h r o u g h political society can h u m a n beings achieve some of their fulfillment. Again, n o h u m a n being is an island or an isolated monad. Such an understanding of the state differs from two other c o m m o n approaches. Some Christian traditions (especially the Lutheran) see the state as fulfilling the promise made to Noah that God will never again destroy the world. Sin by its very nature leads to death, and sinful h u m a n beings cannot live peacefully

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76 I Charles Ε. Curran | together. G o d thus uses the state as an o r d e r of preservation, which t h r o u g h the p o w e r of coercion tries to k e e p sinful h u m a n beings in check and f r o m killing one another or creating chaos. T h e state thus has the s o m e w h a t minimal and negative f u n c t i o n of restraining evil and maintaining order. In the thirteenth century Aquinas raised w h a t m i g h t seem today to be a totally irrelevant question: W o u l d the state or political o r d e r exist if A d a m and Eve had n o t sinned (Summa I, q. 96, a. 4)? But the question is very relevant. Are the nature and existence of the state due primarily to h u m a n sinfulness or to h u m a n n a t u r e as created by God? Aquinas responded that the state w o u l d have existed w i t h o u t sin, because wherever there are a multitude of h u m a n beings, they need s o m e o n e to direct t h e m to the c o m m o n g o o d . T h e different o r d e r s of angels remind us that even angels need a political authority. In this conception, the state has a very positive role to play in bringing a b o u t the c o m m o n g o o d of society. In the Catholic understanding, the state is primarily directive and not coercive. If citizens feel that their g o v e r n m e n t is primarily coercive, such a g o v e r n m e n t will be very insecure. N o t e again that the perennial d a n g e r in Catholic u n d e r s t a n d i n g involves an overly o p t i m i s t i c v i e w of h u m a n n a t u r e a n d t h e state p r i m a r i l y because n o t e n o u g h i m p o r t a n c e is given to the role of sin. F r o m a philosophical perspective, t h e C a t h o l i c a p p r o a c h differs f r o m the m o r e individualistic a p p r o a c h t h a t prevails t o d a y a m o n g m a n y p e o p l e in the United States. Individualism sees different individuals c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e m selves w a n t i n g to p r o t e c t their o w n interests in t h e light of t h e existence of o t h e r people and their interests. T h e s e individuals t h e n c o m e together to w o r k o u t a contract for a society that can best protect their individual interests, with the realization that s o m e c o m p r o m i s e s will be necessary to a c c o m m o d a t e others. This is o f t e n called the c o n t r a c t t h e o r y of the state, w h e r e b y individuals e n t e r into a c o n t r a c t with each o t h e r as the best way of trying to p r o t e c t their o w n individual interests. T h e Catholic a p p r o a c h does n o t b e g i n w i t h isolated individuals b u t r a t h e r w i t h a p e r s o n w h o is social and political by n a t u r e and thus destined to live in political community. The Role of

Government

Anthropology also governs the role of the state. An anthropology that recognizes b o t h the inherent dignity or sacredness of the h u m a n person and the social and political n a t u r e of the person avoids the opposite dangers of individualism and collectivism. Individualism sees only individuals and downplays the role of the c o m m u n i t y itself. Conversely, collectivism so stresses collective interests that it fails to give e n o u g h i m p o r t a n c e to the individual. This complex a n t h r o p o l o g y governs t w o i m p o r t a n t roles of the state: its purpose and its relationship with individual persons and o t h e r g r o u p s in society. In the Catholic tradition, the p u r p o s e of the state has been to w o r k for the c o m m o n

I ROMAN CATHOLIC CHRISTIANITY

good, which differs in theory from both individual goods and the collective good. An individualistic approach acknowledges only individual goods which each one tries to protect and p r o m o t e as much as possible. T h e collective good so stresses the collectivity that it denies individual goods and is even willing to sacrifice the individual for the good of the collectivity. T h e Catholic tradition insists that the purpose of the state is to work for the c o m m o n good. In theory the c o m m o n good by definition flows back to the good of individuals and does n o t contradict or limit the proper good of individuals. T h e state, for example, pursues the g o o d of clean air, which benefits all. T h e encyclical of Leo XIII, Rerum novarum (1891), m a d e explicit, however, that the c o m m o n good also still requires the good of parts of society. The state can and should intervene to help a particular g r o u p such as workers, but this also ultimately contributes to the c o m m o n good and the good of other m e m b e r s of society (nn. 28-29). The description of the concrete c o m m o n good tends to be somewhat general. In Mater et magistra (1961), Pope John XXIII describes the c o m m o n good as "the s u m total of these conditions of social living whereby h u m a n beings are enabled more fully and readily to achieve their own perfection" (n. 65). The criterion of the c o m m o n good as the purpose of society thus clearly differentiates the Catholic approach f r o m both individualism and collectivism. In keeping with that same basic anthropology, the state in the Catholic understanding is natural, necessary, and good—but its role is limited. The proper role of the state is g o v e r n e d by t w o principles: subsidiarity and socialization. In Quadragesimo anno (1931), Pope Pius XI developed the principle of subsidiarity (n. 79), but the basis of this principle is clearly found in Aquinas. The primary limit on the role of the state comes from the dignity and sacredness of the h u m a n individual w h o is prior to the state. Likewise, the Catholic tradition sees the family as a natural society that is prior to the state. In addition to the individual person and the family, public society also includes given structures and institutions, such as extended families and neighborhoods. Then there exist voluntary groups or institutions of all types that are necessary for the total good of society—educational, cultural, social, and professional groups. Think of the media, colleges and universities, labor unions, management groups, and also religious groups such as churches, synagogues, mosques, and temples, all of which exist in society and contribute to the good of public society as a whole. Only then do we come to the levels of government, beginning with the local, then the state, and finally the federal (as these are understood in the United States). Subsidiarity c o m e s f r o m the Latin w o r d subsidium, m e a n i n g "help." T h e description of society in the preceding paragraph begins with the most fundamental level of the h u m a n person, moving upward to given institutions and structures, then to voluntary associations, and finally to government with its different

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72 I Charles Ε. Curran | levels. According to the principle of subsidiarity, the higher level should do everything possible to help the lower level achieve its o w n p u r p o s e s and should only intervene w h e n the lower and m o r e basic level cannot do s o m e t h i n g o n its own. T h e way higher e d u c a t i o n is f u n d e d in the United States illustrates well the principle of subsidiarity at w o r k . Individuals and families b e a r t h e p r i m a r y responsibility of providing for higher education. Originally, m a n y colleges and universities were religious in origin; t h e n private institutions also came into existence. However, these alone could n o t m e e t the d e m a n d , so state g o v e r n m e n t s f o u n d e d universities—land g r a n t institutions, teachers' colleges, and c o m m u n i ty colleges. T h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t n o w helps all types of h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n t h r o u g h g r a n t s and low-interest loans. T h e state g o v e r n m e n t had to start its o w n institutions to provide higher education for all, b u t individuals and families m u s t still pay s o m e t h i n g . Likewise, state g o v e r n m e n t s d o n o t d e m a n d the extinction of private institutions. In fact, m a n y if n o t m o s t private colleges could n o t survive if it were n o t for various f o r m s of g o v e r n m e n t help. T h u s the g o v e r n m e n t does n o t u s u r p the role of t h e family or m o r e basic g r o u p s b u t helps t h e m t o achieve t h e i r purposes while providing for others w h o otherwise w o u l d n o t have access to higher education. C o n t e m p o r a r y political scientists o f t e n speak of the need for mediating structures and institutions b e t w e e n the individual and g o v e r n m e n t . T h e principle of socialization exists in s o m e tension with the principle of subsidiarity. Pope John XXIII developed this principle in Mater et magistra (1961): "One of t h e principal characteristics of o u r t i m e is t h e multiplication of social relationships, that is a daily m o r e complex i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e of citizens" (n. 59). In this light, to a greater extent t h a n heretofore, public authorities have to intervene in a m o r e organized and extensive way to adapt institutions, tasks, and m e a n s to t h e c o m m o n g o o d . However, this does n o t do away w i t h the principle of subsidiarity. T h u s t h e complexity of the m o d e r n w o r l d — w i t h its m a n y interrelationships, including globalization itself—calls for greater g o v e r n m e n t intervention, b e c a u s e t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l o n e can direct t h e s e c o m p l e x forces t o the c o m m o n good. Development

in the Values of the Common

Good

As has b e e n m e n t i o n e d above, the c o m m o n g o o d in Catholic social teaching is described in b r o a d and s o m e w h a t v a g u e t e r m s . T h e values that constitute the c o m m o n g o o d have c h a n g e d over t i m e , a n d t h e a u t h o r i t a t i v e d o c u m e n t s of Catholic social teaching s h o w a very significant development—even t h o u g h the d o c u m e n t s themselves do n o t explicitly call attention to this change. O n e m u s t also see the values that constitute the c o m m o n g o o d in the light of the Catholic self-understanding of the state as in a middle position b e t w e e n the t w o extremes of individualism and collectivism. In the eighteenth and nineteenth

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centuries, the Catholic Church saw the individualism of liberalism as its primary foe. Liberalism extolled the reason and f r e e d o m of the individual cut off f r o m any relationship with God and God's law according to the Catholic self-understanding. The Catholic Church was the implacable enemy of all forms of liberalism. (The t e r m is used here as it is used in philosophical thought, not in cont e m p o r a r y political t h o u g h t . ) Religious liberalism, according to a generally understood Catholic approach, started with Luther, w h o exalted the conscience of the individual believer over the authority of the church. Philosophical liberalism emphasized h u m a n reason cut off f r o m God and God's law. Political liberalism supported democracy and the rights of the majority over the rights of truth. Economic liberalism in the f o r m of capitalism affirmed the freedom of owners and entrepreneurs to make as much money as possible and forgot a b o u t the rights of w o r k e r s and the poor. Leo XIII's Rerum novarum (1891) emphasized the role of g o v e r n m e n t to intervene and protect the workers and the poor. In a very triumphalistic way, in Quadragesimo anno (1931) Pope Pius XI maintained that "Rerum novarum completely overthrew those tattering tenets of liberalism which had long hampered effective intervention by the gove r n m e n t " (n. 27). Pope Leo XIII's authoritative writings clearly illustrate the opposition to liberalism with its emphasis on h u m a n freedom. Leo strongly attacked the m o d e r n freedoms, including f r e e d o m of religion, which violates the "highest duty" of worshiping the one true God in the one true faith; f r e e d o m of speech and the press means that truth will not remain sacred. In addition Leo did not see h u m a n equality as a value because in his concept of the organic society each individual has a different role to play for the good of the whole. Civil society is based on an analogy with the h u m a n body, which has many distinct and unequal parts that have to work together for the good of the whole. If all the parts were the same and equal, there would be n o unified h u m a n body. Equality erodes the glue that keeps society together. Also, Leo did not advocate the participation of people in government. His favorite word for the leaders of society was rulers (principes), and he saw the people as the illiterate multitude that had to be led. As the twentieth century unfolded, however, the Catholic Church began to see totalitarianism, especially in the f o r m of c o m m u n i s m , as the biggest problem. In the 1930s, Pius XI issued encyclical letters condemning totalitarianism on the right (Nazism and Fascism) and especially totalitarianism on the left in the f o r m of communism. C o m m u n i s m trampled on the dignity, freedom, and rights of the individual. In this context, Pius XI was happy and proud to wage the good fight for the liberty of consciences, which he was quick to point out did not mean the absolute independence of conscience f r o m God's law. In the t w o encyclicals issued by John XXIII in the early 1960s, one can observe a fascinating development. Mater et magistra (1961) develops a vision that the val-

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80 I Charles Ε. Curran | ues of truth, justice, and love constitute the g o o d society (nn. 212-65). But Pacem in terris (1963) adds a f o u r t h value to this triumvirate: f r e e d o m (nn. 86-129). T h e d o c u m e n t s themselves d o n o t call attention to this very significant change, b u t the g r o w i n g i m p o r t a n c e of f r e e d o m c o m e s to the fore here. Vatican II moves even f u r t h e r in its p r o m o t i o n of h u m a n f r e e d o m in general and f r e e d o m in political life, as is illustrated in its changed teaching on religious f r e e d o m , which will be analyzed below. In Octogesima adveniens (1971), Pope Paul VI develops t w o aspirations that have c o m e to the fore in the light of recent develo p m e n t s : "the a s p i r a t i o n t o e q u a l i t y a n d t h e a s p i r a t i o n to p a r t i c i p a t i o n , t w o f o r m s of h u m a n dignity and f r e e d o m " (n. 22). At the e n d of the n i n e t e e n t h century, the Catholic C h u r c h strongly o p p o s e d f r e e d o m , equality, and participation. But in the t w e n t i e t h century, the same Catholic C h u r c h b e c a m e a strong proponent of h u m a n dignity and f r e e d o m . Pope John Paul II has m a d e h u m a n f r e e d o m and dignity an essential part of his m a n y teachings o n the political order. T h e shift to a greater emphasis on f r e e d o m , equality, and participation in political society helps to explain the Catholic m o v e m e n t t o w a r d acceptance of and s u p p o r t for d e m o c r a t i c f o r m s of g o v e r n m e n t . T h e Catholic C h u r c h strongly opposed the French Revolution and even supported the monarchy and the ancien régime. Liberal d e m o c r a c y s e e m e d to involve all the negative aspects of liberalism in general. Catholic teaching did n o t give that m u c h emphasis to the f o r m of g o v e r n m e n t b u t simply insisted that, in whatever f o r m it existed, it should strive for the c o m m o n g o o d of society. As the t w e n t i e t h century progressed, however, the developments m e n t i o n e d above called for an a c c e p t a n c e of democracy. In his 1944 C h r i s t m a s message, Pope Pius XII stated that a democratic f o r m of g o v e r n m e n t appears to m a n y people as a n a t u r a l p o s t u l a t e i m p o s e d by r e a s o n itself. C a t h o l i c t h i n k e r s such as J a c q u e s Maritain a n d C a t h o l i c C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c p a r t i e s in E u r o p e a f t e r World W a r II e s p o u s e d the cause of democracy. Vatican II firmly accepted the d e m o c r a t i c f o r m of g o v e r n m e n t . J o h n Paul II has b e e n a s t r o n g advocate of d e m o c r a c y , b o t h in t h e c o u n t r i e s b e h i n d t h e f o r m e r Iron C u r t a i n a n d in t h e developing countries of the world. 5 Church and

State

Historically, R o m a n Catholicism has b e e n associated w i t h the u n i o n of church and state. In fact, it was only at Vatican II that the Catholic C h u r c h accepted religious f r e e d o m and the so-called separation of church and state. T h e Gospel of M a t t h e w recognizes the duality b e t w e e n church and state with t h e w a r n i n g to give t o G o d w h a t is G o d ' s a n d to C a e s a r w h a t is Caesar's (22:21-22). T h e Catholic tradition has recognized t w o different orders—the spiritual and the t e m p o r a l — w i t h different authorities ruling each order. In the course

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of history, however, the Catholic Church has accepted significantly different relations between church and state. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

At the time of the Roman Empire, the conversion of E m p e r o r Constantine brought about a very close relationship between church and state. Constantine and his successors saw themselves as defenders of the faith w h o could and did intervene directly in the spiritual affairs of the church, as was illustrated by their calling ecumenical councils. The Middle Ages witnessed an attempt by popes in the Catholic Church to establish a Christian commonwealth with all people and princes bound together under obedience to the pope. The confessional state arose after the Reformation in accord with the f a m o u s principle—cuius regio eius religio—that the religion of the place (and the people) follows the religion of the prince. T h e Peace of Augsburg (1555) established the confessional state, which was based on the understanding that religious unity was necessary to achieve civic unity. T h u s there came into existence Protestant and Catholic states. Note how the founding of the United States in the eighteenth century introduced a new reality: the possibility of political unity in the midst of religious diversity. Catholic theology in general fought against control of the church by the state, and it developed various theories for understanding the relationship. In the Middle Ages, many Catholic theologians espoused the direct power of the papacy and the church over the state and thus supported the Christian commonwealth of the Middle Ages. This hierocratic theory, however, still recognized the existence of two different powers or societies but maintained that Christ—who was b o t h priest and king—delegated to Peter and his successors, the popes, direct jurisdiction over t e m p o r a l affairs as well as spiritual ones. According to the metaphor, the pope has the two swords but delegates the temporal sword to the princes. If the prince is delinquent, the pope can take the temporal sword away. Such was the justification of Christendom. During the Reformation, Robert Bellarmine (d. 1621) supported a theory of the indirect power of the pope over the temporal realm. For spiritual reasons, the pope can depose the ruler. By the nineteenth century, official Catholic teaching still called for the state to publicly support the Catholic religion. Individuals could privately practice different faiths, but the state should prohibit the public expression of all faiths except the Catholic faith. A distinction, however, was made between thesis and hypothesis. The thesis, which should prevail, called for the institution of legal establishm e n t of the Catholic Church and legal intolerance for all others. In certain circumstances in which a greater good could be achieved or a greater evil avoided, however, the hypothesis involving the legal toleration of all religions could be accepted. W h a t happened in practice was that where Catholics were a vast major-

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82 I Charles Ε. Curran | icy, the thesis existed; w h e r e Catholics w e r e a minority, as in the United States, the hypothesis could be tolerated. This remained the official teaching until Vatican II. It is helpful—especially in o u r o w n age, which is so different—to give the reasons b e h i n d the denial of religious f r e e d o m . First, the primacy of the spiritual order called for the t e m p o r a l to be in service of the spiritual. T h e y were t w o different realities, b u t they had to w o r k together. Second, the m o s t i m p o r t a n t reality involved was objective t r u t h . T h e t r u t h — which, according to the Catholic understanding, m e a n t that the Catholic C h u r c h w a s t h e o n e " t r u e religion"—is p r i m a r y . But w h a t a b o u t t h e c o n s c i e n c e s of p e o p l e w h o disagreed? T h e r e s p o n s e w a s that e r r o r has n o rights. Just as o n e is n o t free to sell p o i s o n s that can cause d e a t h to o u r physical life, o n e c a n n o t p e r m i t religious errors that can cause spiritual death. Objective t r u t h is the prim a r y consideration. Third, the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the state bolstered this denial of religious liberty. T h e state is a creature of God, and like all creatures of G o d it also m u s t acknowledge the one true G o d and the one true religion. T h e state has an ethical and even religious f u n c t i o n of directing the illiterate m u l t i t u d e to their spiritual and ethical good. Such a state is authoritarian or paternalistic at best. F o u r t h , the Catholic C h u r c h strongly o p p o s e d the E u r o p e a n a r g u m e n t s in favor of religious f r e e d o m as p r o p o s e d in the n a m e of continental liberalism. According to this theory, there was n o dyarchy (no t w o societies—the t e m p o r a l and the spiritual) b u t only a t h o r o u g h g o i n g political a n d juridical m o n i s m — o n e sovereign, o n e society, one law, o n e secular faith. This complete secularism w o u l d r e m o v e the c h u r c h entirely f r o m the public r e a l m and leave it existing only in the private sphere. Such a c h u r c h could have n o influence w h a t s o e v e r o n public life. C H A N G E AT VATICAN II

At Vatican II in 1965, however, R o m a n Catholicism accepted the principle of religious liberty, m e a n i n g t h a t n o o n e is t o be forced to act against o n e ' s conscience in religious m a t t e r s or p r o h i b i t e d f r o m acting in accord w i t h religious conscience. W h a t b r o u g h t a b o u t this significant change? T h e p r i m a r y reality in this c h a n g e w a s the g r e a t e r appreciation and accept a n c e of t h e dignity, rights, a n d f r e e d o m of t h e h u m a n p e r s o n t h a t had b e e n developed earlier. Its implications for religious liberty are decisive. First, the emphasis moved f r o m the primacy of the objective reality of t r u t h to the primacy of the subjective reality of the h u m a n person and her or his conscience. T h e f r e e d o m of the h u m a n person calls for a free response, and n o secular authority can take away the basic f r e e d o m of the individual person in one's response to God.

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Second, the growing emphasis on the freedom and dignity of the h u m a n person dramatically changed the understanding of government and its role. For Leo XIII, the state was authoritarian, or at best paternalistic, in directing the illiterate multitude to their own good. N o w the freedom of the individual limits the role of the state. The Declaration on Religious Freedom of Vatican II insists that "the usages of society are to be the usages of freedom in their full range. These require that the freedom of h u m a n beings be respected as far as possible and curtailed only when and insofar as necessary" (n. 7).6 Here the Catholic Church accepts the principle of the free society and of limited constitutional government. Third, the contemporary understanding of religious freedom as enshrined in limited constitutional g o v e r n m e n t does not call for the removal of the church from the public realm and its relegation only to the private sphere. The church is free to carry on its own mission in the world, including the mission of working for a m o r e just h u m a n society. The church has a right to influence the temporal society in and through the conscience and works of church members, w h o are both m e m b e r s of the church and citizens of the nation. The g o v e r n m e n t thus recognizes the freedom of the church to carry out its mission, and in this way the primacy of the spiritual is safeguarded. The recognition of religious freedom also means the acceptance of a limited constitutional government and the rejection of the authoritarian, paternalistic, and ethical state that Leo XIII had proposed in the late nineteenth century. O n the basis of the teaching f o u n d in the Declaration on Religious Freedom, Catholic teaching insists on the important distinction between the broader public society and the narrower concept of the public order where the coercive power of government is employed. The broader public society includes all individuals, natural groups, and voluntary associations that influence and affect public society. T h e end of public society and all those w h o participate in it is the c o m m o n good. The political order or the state with its power of coercion has the limited purpose of protecting and p r o m o t i n g the public order. The basic principle of a free society is as much freedom as possible with government intervening for the sake of public order. The question then naturally arises: W h a t is public order? According to the Declaration, public order involves the three goods of justice, public morality, and public peace (n. 7). Government can and should intervene and p r o m o t e these three values. In keeping with the anthropology and understanding of the state developed above, I add social justice to the generic concept of justice because of the danger that people often do not give enough importance to social justice in our society. Public order with its threefold goods or values also puts legitimate limits on religious freedom. In the United States, despite the prevailing rhetoric, we recognize restrictions on religious freedom that are basically governed by the three-

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78 I Charles Ε. Curran | fold values of public order. If a religion calls for child sacrifice, public authorities can and should stop this because of justice—the n e e d to protect the right to life of all citizens. If y o u r religion calls for you to m a r c h t h r o u g h a residential neighb o r h o o d at 3 A.M. with a hundred-piece band, the need to keep the peace justifies the g o v e r n m e n t in preventing such a march. In the n i n e t e e n t h century (in a disputed move), the S u p r e m e C o u r t ruled that polygamy for M o r m o n s was illegal despite the directives of their religion to practice polygamy. N o t e that the criterion of public morality by definition differs f r o m private morality, b u t there exists m u c h discussion a b o u t w h a t constitutes public morality. T h e Declaration on Religious Freedom thus sets forth the c o n t e m p o r a r y Catholic acceptance of limited constitutional g o v e r n m e n t . But in a surprising move, subsequent papal d o c u m e n t s of Catholic social teaching issued by Paul VI and J o h n Paul II fail to m e n t i o n public order as the end of the state b u t still regularly invoke the c o m m o n g o o d . T h e possible reasons for this s o m e w h a t astonishing silence lie beyond the scope of this chapter. Because Catholic social teaching deals primarily with justice issues, however, b o t h the criterion of public order and the criterion of the c o m m o n g o o d w o u l d c o m e to the same conclusions a b o u t the role of t h e state w i t h regard to justice. T h e f o l l o w i n g section deals w i t h justice in Catholic social teaching. Justice In this section, I discuss material goods, private p r o p e r t y and the poor, the different types of justice, h u m a n rights, and the economic systems of capitalism and Marxism. MATERIAL G O O D S , PRIVATE PROPERTY, A N D P O O R P E O P L E

T h e Catholic tradition based o n t h e Scripture a n d influenced by T h o m i s t i c Aristotelianism has maintained that material g o o d s are n o t the m o s t i m p o r t a n t h u m a n g o o d s b u t are always subordinate to m o r e spiritual goods. H u m a n dignity, however, requires a sufficiency of the material goods of this world. In any society or g o v e r n m e n t , the primary issue c o n c e r n s the just distribution of material goods. Catholic social teaching emphasizes the universal destiny of the goods of creation to serve the needs of all people. In Sollicitudo rei socialis (1987), Pope J o h n Paul II succinctly summarizes the teaching: "It is necessary to state once m o r e the characteristic principle of Christian social doctrine: the g o o d s of this world are originally meant for all. T h e right to private property is valid and necessary, b u t it does n o t nullify the nature of this principle. Private property, in fact, is u n d e r a "social m o r t g a g e , " which m e a n s that it has an intrinsically social f u n c t i o n , based u p o n

I ROMAN CATHOLIC CHRISTIANITY

and justified precisely by the principle of the universal destiny of goods" (n. 42). Since the beginning of the church, Catholic teaching has recognized both a social and an individual dimension to material goods, in keeping with its basic anthropology, but there has been some development over time about the exact relationship between the t w o aspects. The social aspect of the goods of creation rests on the intention of the Creator that the goods of creation exist to serve the needs of all people. On this basis, the criterion of distributive justice that will be developed below insists that all h u m a n beings have a right to the material goods necessary to live a minimally decent existence. T h e social dimension also limits the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of private p r o p e r t y as s o m e t h i n g that one owns as one's own. T h o m a s Aquinas accepts the general teaching of the Early Church that private property is justified not on the basis of natural law but on the basis of h u m a n sinfulness. He acknowledges there would be no need for private property if it were not for sin. However, granted the need to possess things as one's own in this imperfect and sinful world, the use of private property insists on its function to serve the needs of all (Summa la, q. 98, a.l, ad. 3). In the question of the distribution of material goods, the Catholic tradition has insisted on a special care and c o n c e r n for p o o r people. According to the Hebrew Scriptures, God is the special protector of poor people, and God will hear their cry and take care of them. The N e w Testament also shows this special concern of God and Jesus for poor people, as is illustrated in the so-called last judgment scene in Matthew, where eternal reward is based on what one does for poor people and the least of our brothers and sisters (chap. 25). In the very beginning of Rerum novarum (n. 2), Leo XIII insists that "some remedy must be found and quickly found, for the misery and wretchedness which press so heavily at this m o m e n t on the large majority of the very poor." John Paul II insists on the preferential option for poor people. The economic pastoral of the U.S. bishops spells out the priorities involved in the preferential option for poor people (nn. 87-95). A preferential option is not an exclusive option. God loves all people but has a special concern for poor people. On the basis of the preferential option for poor people, three priorities emerge. First, the fulfillment of the basic needs of poor people is the highest priority. Second, increasing active participation in economic life by those presently excluded or vulnerable is a high social priority. Third, the investment of wealth, energy, and h u m a n talent should be specifically directed to benefit poor people. THREE TYPES OF JUSTICE

In keeping with an a n t h r o p o l o g y that stresses b o t h the dignity and social nature of the h u m a n person, the Catholic tradition insists on three types of jus-

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86 I Charles Ε. Curran | tice: c o m m u t a t i v e justice (coming f r o m the Latin commutare, m e a n i n g exchange) governs one-to-one relationships such as contracts; distributive justice governs h o w society distributes its g o o d s a n d b u r d e n s a m o n g its m e m b e r s ; a n d legal, social, or contributive justice governs the obligation of individuals to society and the state. Scholastic theologians, especially T h o m a s Aquinas and c o m m e n t a t o r s o n his w o r k , developed a similar u n d e r s t a n d i n g of justice and applied it to the p r o b l e m s of their o w n day. T h e e c o n o m i c p a s t o r a l of t h e U.S. b i s h o p s (1987) describes these three types of justice and indicates their application to c o n t e m p o r a r y p r o b l e m s (nn. 68-76). C o m m u t a t i v e justice involves arithmetic equality, is blind, and is n o respecter of persons. If I b o r r o w ten dollars f r o m you and ten dollars f r o m the wealthiest person in the world, I owe each of you ten dollars. T h e characteristics of the individual p e r s o n do n o t e n t e r into the consideration. T h o s e w h o p r o p o s e a m o r e individualistic a n t h r o p o l o g y see c o m m u t a t i v e j u s t i c e as t h e p r i m a r y or only aspect of justice. Distributive justice governs the relationship b e t w e e n society or the state and the individual. As was pointed o u t above, society is b r o a d e r than the state. In the light of space constraints, this subsection discusses h o w the state should distribute its goods and burdens. A just distribution rests on a recognition that the political c o m m u n i t y includes m e m b e r s w h o have an equal h u m a n dignity. Take first the distribution of material goods. W h a t is a fair and just distribution of material g o o d s in society? An individualistic a p p r o a c h asserts the right of individuals t o acquire as m u c h as possible f o r o n e ' s self, p r o v i d e d e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y is a f f o r d e d to all. O f t e n t h e m e t a p h o r of t h e race is invoked. E x t r e m e collectivism a r g u e s f o r total equality in t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of m a t e r i a l goods. T h e Catholic tradition, o n c e again, finds a m i d d l e way b e t w e e n these t w o approaches. A f u n d a m e n t a l criterion for the just distribution of material goods is h u m a n need. As was m e n t i o n e d above, in the Catholic u n d e r s t a n d i n g all h u m a n beings have a right to a minimally decent existence. Above and beyond this criterion of need, o t h e r criteria such as creativity, hard work, risk, and reward all c o m e into play. N o t everyone should have the s a m e a m o u n t of goods, b u t all should have that basic m i n i m u m necessary for a minimally decent existence. In addition, the equality of m e m b e r s of society is j e o p a r d i z e d if there exists a h u g e gap b e t w e e n the highest and lowest e c o n o m i c strata in the possession of material goods. Take n o w the distribution of burdens. T h e p r i m a r y societal b u r d e n involves taxation. W h a t is a j u s t tax s y s t e m , according to t h e principles of distributive justice? T h o s e w h o e a r n or have m o r e m o n e y should contribute m o r e . Distributive j u s t i c e m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h o s e w h o have m o r e s h o u l d pay n o t only arithmetically m o r e b u t also should pay a higher percentage. A progressive tax syst e m is called for.

I ROMAN CATHOLIC CHRISTIANITY

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Legal justice, or what is today sometimes called contributive justice, involves the relationship of the individual person or citizen with society and the state. In an older understanding, the primary obligation was to obey the just laws of the state; hence the n a m e legal. Now, however, the emphasis falls on the responsibility of individuals to participate actively in the total life of the state and their c o m m u n i t y and on the c o r r e s p o n d i n g obligation of society to recognize and encourage such participation. Especially today, when many people feel they have n o say or control over o u r political and e c o n o m i c institutions, we desperately need institutions that are open to participation by all. HUMAN RIGHTS

Until comparatively recently, Roman Catholicism has shied away f r o m talk of rights. Aquinas does not treat subjective rights. Rights language in the nineteenth century was associated with liberalism, the Enlightenment, and individualism. However, in keeping with the development in the twentieth century traced above, Catholic social thought began to appreciate more the freedom, dignity, and rights of the h u m a n person. Only in Pacem in terris in 1963 did Pope John XXIII, for the first time, develop a theoretical understanding of h u m a n rights in the context of Catholic social teaching. Today John Paul II has made h u m a n rights and solidarity the cornerstone of his social teaching. Catholic social teaching arrived on the h u m a n rights bandwagon somewhat late and out of breath. To its credit, however, Catholic teaching insists on both political and civil rights, as well as e c o n o m i c or social rights. Political rights such as freedom of religion, speech, press, and association are cornerstones of liberalism. Conversely, socialist countries have stressed the social and economic rights of individuals to food, clothing, shelter, and health care. By insisting on b o t h political and economic rights and by insisting on duties as well as rights, Catholic social teaching today tries to avoid the one-sided extremes of individualism and collectivism. As might be expected, the Catholic social tradition with its basic anthropology has historically criticized both capitalism and communism. Because this chapter deals primarily with the political order and its responsibilities, it does n o t include a detailed discussion of these t w o economic systems.

Roman Catholicism

and Nonbelievers:

People outside

Tradition

the

Politics

and

Is the message or teaching of Roman Catholicism about politics intended just for Catholics and Christians or for all h u m a n k i n d as well? The d o c u m e n t s coming f r o m the hierarchical teaching office in the Roman Catholic Church insist that the teaching is for all humankind. From a methodological perspective, the teach-

7I

88 I Charles Ε. Curran | ing has traditionally b e e n based on the natural law approach, which by definition is o p e n to all h u m a n beings and has n o religious presuppositions w i t h regard to its c o n t e n t . F r o m a c o n t e n t perspective, Catholic social teaching insists o n o n e c o m m o n g o o d f o r political societies, to w h i c h all m e m b e r s of t h e society, w h e t h e r they are believers or not, m u s t contribute. Since the 1960s, the papal docu m e n t s t h e m s e l v e s have explicitly b e e n a d d r e s s e d t o all p e o p l e of g o o d w i l l . N o w h e r e do these official teachings p r o p o s e s o m e t h i n g different that Catholics are asked to do in the political order. F r o m a practical perspective, the Catholic approach recognizes that its teaching for a m o r e just social order will be effective only if m a n y people w o r k t o g e t h e r to try to p u t this teaching into practice. Although, in theory, Catholic social teaching is addressed n o t only to R o m a n Catholics b u t to all people of goodwill, in practice, t w o p r o b l e m s arise. First, as was m e n t i o n e d above, ever since Vatican II, official church teaching d o c u m e n t s have m a d e m o r e explicit r e f e r e n c e s to Scripture, Jesus Christ, revelation, and grace. But, as was also n o t e d above, these d o c u m e n t s still address all people of goodwill. At t h e very least, this n e w a p p r o a c h creates s o m e tension because it addresses t w o different readerships. T h e U.S. bishops in their pastoral letters have recognized this tension, and they claim that they appeal to u n i q u e Catholic and Christian sources in addressing fellow Catholics and appeal to others o n the basis of c o m m o n h u m a n reason and experience. However, it is impossible to m a k e this clear differentiation all the time. Second, recall the tension m e n t i o n e d above b e t w e e n natural law as based on h u m a n reason and experience and natural law as authoritatively proposed by the R o m a n Catholic C h u r c h . W i t h regard to non-Catholics, the fact that the teaching is p r o p o s e d as being in accord w i t h reason and experience m e a n s that all people can e n t e r i n t o t h e discussion. Such an a p p r o a c h facilitates a civil dialogue a m o n g all people in a society. However, because the teaching is also p r o p o s e d as authoritative church teaching, the Catholic C h u r c h and Catholic individuals at times have used their political muscle or p o w e r to m a k e these authoritative teachings into law. T h u s , at times, t h e p a r a d i g m of culture wars s e e m s m o r e fitting t h a n the p a r a d i g m of deliberative rational discourse and civil discussion a b o u t w h a t is g o o d for society.

Conclusion This chapter has discussed the R o m a n Catholic approach to politics in the light of its sources, its t h e o r y of politics, the m e d i u m or m e t h o d o l o g y used, its message and content, and finally its relevance for nonbelievers. T h e very n a t u r e of Catholicism, w i t h its authoritative teaching office, m e a n s that the official docum e n t s have developed in s o m e d e p t h the Catholic u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the political order. More t h a n half of this chapter thus has dealt w i t h the message or c o n t e n t

I ROMAN CATHOLIC CHRISTIANITY|7I o f t h i s t e a c h i n g as f o u n d in t h e o f f i c i a l d o c u m e n t s o f t h e C a t h o l i c C h u r c h . T h e C a t h o l i c a p p r o a c h , h o w e v e r , is a l s o i n t e n d e d f o r all p e o p l e o f g o o d w i l l a n d t h u s is t r u l y c a t h o l i c o r u n i v e r s a l .

Notes 1. For a Latin and English version of the Summa, see Summa theologiae:' Latin Text and English Translation, Introductions, Notes, Appendixes, and Glossaries, 61 vols., ed. Dominicans f r o m English-Speaking Provinces of the O r d e r ( N e w York: McGraw-Hill, 1964-). T h e treatise on justice is f o u n d in the second part of the second p a r t of the Summa and is generally referred to as II-II, q. 57-122. 2. For an English translation of Pope Leo XIII's encyclicals, see The Papal Encyclicals, 1878-1903, ed. Claudia Carlen ( W i l m i n g t o n , N.C.: M c G r a t h , 1981). Encyclicals and o t h e r church d o c u m e n t s take their official title f r o m the first t w o o r three Latin w o r d s of the document. 3. T h e r e is n o official c a n o n o r list of these d o c u m e n t s . For a readily available collection of these d o c u m e n t s in English, see Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary

Heritage,

ed. DavidJ. O'Brien and T h o m a s A. S h a n n o n (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1992). T h e text will give the p a r a g r a p h n u m b e r s from the d o c u m e n t s cited, which can t h e n b e f o u n d in this v o l u m e o r any o t h e r source. 4. Michael Novak, "Neoconservatives," in The New Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought, ed. Judith A. D w y e r (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1994), 678-82. 5. Paul E. Sigmund, "Catholicism and Liberal Democracy," in Catholidsm

and Liberal-

ism: Contributions to American Public Philosophy, ed. R. Bruce Douglass and David Hollenbach (Cambridge: C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1994), 217-41. 6. For an English translation of the Vatican II d o c u m e n t s , see Walter M. Abbott, ed., The Documents of Vatican II ( N e w York: Guild, 1966).

Suggested

Readings

Bokenkotter, T h o m a s S. Church and Revolution: Catholics in the Struggle for Democracy and Social Justice. N e w York: D o u b l e d a y Image, 1998. C u r r a n , Charles E. Catholic Social Teaching 1891-Present: A Historical, Theological, and Ethical Analysis. W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: G e o r g e t o w n University Press, 2002. C u r r a n , Charles E., and Leslie Griffin, eds. The Catholic Church, Morality, and Politics. Readings in Moral Theology No. 12. N e w York: Paulist Press, 2001. Dorr, Donal. Option for the Poor: A Hundred Years of Catholic Social Teaching. Rev. ed. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1992. Froehle, Bryan T., and Mary L. Gautier. The Catholic Church Today. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 2000. Gillis, Chester. Roman Catholicism in America. N e w York: C o l u m b i a University Press, 1999. Hellwig, Monika Κ. Understanding Catholicism. 2d ed. N e w York: Paulist Press, 2002. Kohmescher, M a t t h e w F. Catholicism Today: A Survey of Catholic Belief and Practice. 3d ed. N e w York: Paulist Press, 1999.

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I Charles Ε. Curran

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Krier Mich, Marvin L. Catholic Social Teaching and Movements. Mystic, Conn.: TwentyThird Publications, 1998. McBrien, Richard P. Catholicism. San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1994. McBrien, Richard P. Responses to 101 Questions on the Church. New York: Paulist Press, 1996. McCarthy, Timothy. The Catholic Tradition: The Church in the Twentieth Century. Rev. 2d ed. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1998.

Four

Orthodox Christianity I Petros

Vassiliadis

IN THE MIND OF THE GENERAL POPULACE, CHRISTIANITY MAY BROADLY BE UNDERSTOOD

as the religious tradition devoted to Jesus Christ, which today is most readily identified with a variety of churches and denominations. Furthermore, followers of Christ would logically be k n o w n as Christians. Beyond that, however, it would be difficult for most people to keep track of the distinctions within the Christian tradition, even on the denominational level. Particularly with reference to the Orthodox branch of Christianity, a clear, concise definition is in order. Defining " O r t h o d o x Christianity" is indeed a very difficult task. At a time when the very attribute ("orthodox") is widely understood as having more or less negative connotations, w h a t can we identify as the defining attributes of the " O r t h o d o x Church"? In Western theological and academic circles, O r t h o d o x Christianity has become known through ecumenical discussions, especially within the World Council of Churches, involving Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox Christians. Some scholars used to identify Orthodoxy either as a kind of Roman Catholicism without the pope, or as a kind of Protestantism with an episcopacy (hierarchy of governance through bishops). Certainly to most Protestants f r o m the "evangelical" stream of the Christian tradition, but s o m e t i m e s also those f r o m the "ecumenical" one, the "Orthodox Church" has a negative Old World connotation. For them, Orthodox Christianity has come to signify stagnation in church life, strict dogmatic confessionalism, and an inflexibility and unreadiness to adapt to m o d e r n situations or to deal with politics in a comprehensible way. At best, Orthodoxy is an "Eastern p h e n o m e n o n " vis-à-vis the " m o d e r n Western mentality" and perhaps theological and academic process. Orthodox Christianity is normally defined in confessional or denominational terms, that is, as the Eastern branch of Christianity, which was separated f r o m the West around the beginning of the second millennium c.e. In the Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, the Orthodox Church is described as "a family of Churches, situated mainly in Eastern E u r o p e : each m e m b e r C h u r c h is independent in its internal administration, but all share the same faith and are in communion with one another, acknowledging the honorary primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople." In general, most textbooks of church history with a Western perspective make little or no reference to Eastern Orthodoxy after the Great Schism between the Eastern and Western churches in 1054 C . E . — o r at least after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 C.E. With regard to our subject of politics, the general impression 85

iooIPetros Vassiliadis | of most scholars f r o m all church traditions that u n d e r w e n t m o d e r n i s m is that for a very long period of time w h a t actually characterized Eastern O r t h o d o x y was an intolerable subservience of the church to the state. A n o t h e r way of l o o k i n g at is that the church adapted to the existing world order, resulting in church and society p e n e t r a t i n g and p e r m e a t i n g each other. At the same time, however, others insist that the Eastern O r t h o d o x C h u r c h established itself in the world as an institution focused almost exclusively o n otherworldly salvation. Reinforced by recent developments, b o t h these contradictory assessments of O r t h o d o x Christianity hold s o m e t r u t h . But neither o n e is completely accurate. T h e f o r m e r view was reinforced by the political attitude of almost all the so-called O r t h o d o x nations in the near past (e.g., Greece, Russia), which actually gave the impression of a nationalistic inclination of the O r t h o d o x Church. T h e latter view, f o u n d in the writings of s o m e O r t h o d o x theologians, lays disproportionate stress o n the mystical aspect of Orthodoxy. It should be n o t e d that these w r i t e r s are mostly immigrants f r o m prerevolutionary Russia (before 1917), w h o came in contact with the West after a long period of separation. In a desperate attempt to preserve their ancient O r t h o d o x identity s u r r o u n d e d by a m o d e r n world quite alien to t h e m , they underline the mystical aspect of O r t h o d o x Christianity to Western Christians. H o w e v e r , t o d a y b o t h t h e s e one-sided p r e s e n t a t i o n s of O r t h o d o x Christianity (i.e., nationalistic and mystical) are seriously questioned. To give an accurate description of O r t h o d o x Christianity, we need to redefine the actual u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the t e r m to a radical (in the sense of getting back to the root meaning) degree, because current usage is so misleading. According to m o s t serious interpreters of this ancient tradition, if we examine the derivation of the t e r m O r t h o d o x Christianity it refers to the wholeness of the people of G o d w h o share the right conviction (orthe + doxa — right o p i n i o n ) c o n c e r n i n g t h e event of God's salvation in Christ and his Church. In addition, this label encompasses the notion of right expression, or right practice (orthopraxia) of the Christian faith. Orthodoxia leads to the m a x i m u m possible application in orthopraxia of charismatic life in the f r e e d o m of the Holy Spirit, the spirit of God, in all aspects of daily social and cosmic life. Thus, everybody is invited by O r t h o d o x y to transcend confessions and inflexible institutions w i t h o u t necessarily denying t h e m . Some O r t h o d o x theologians even insist that O r t h o d o x y is n o t to be identified only w i t h those b e l o n g i n g to the canonical O r t h o d o x churches in the historical sense and w i t h all their limitations and shortcomings. After all, initially this t e r m was n o t given to any historical b r a n c h of Christianity, b u t to the O n e , Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic C h u r c h as a whole over against the heretics who, of their o w n choice, split f r o m the main b o d y of the c h u r c h . T h e t e r m is exclusive for all those w h o willingly fall away f r o m the historical stream of life of the O n e Church, b u t it is inclusive for those w h o profess their spiritual b e l o n g i n g to that stream.

I ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY

The t e r m Orthodoxy, therefore, has more or less ecclesial (having to do with the essence of what it means to be a church) rather than confessional connotations. And for this reason, one can argue that the fundamental principles of Christian spirituality, of social and political theory, are the same in the East and in the West. Nevertheless, that ecclesial charismatic community has had a certain historical manifestation, and it has developed concrete political viewpoints, which need to be extracted from a certain background, f r o m certain texts, and from certain sources. A t t e m p t i n g to accomplish this, however, we e n c o u n t e r s o m e m a j o r difficulties.

Classical

Sources of Orthodox

Christianity

on

Politics

On what g r o u n d and f r o m what sources can one accurately establish an Orthodox viewpoint? Roman Catholics have the decisions produced by the relatively recent council known as Vatican II (1962-65 C.E.) to guide them, but the Orthodox do not have an equivalent collection of authoritative statements. The Lutherans have the Augsburg Confession; the Orthodox do not have a confession, and O r t h o d o x Christianity also lacks the equivalent of a Luther or Calvin, to mention just t w o leaders of the Protestant Reformation w h o help give Protestant Christians their theological identity. With regard specifically to politics and social life in general, the Catholic tradition has certain encyclicals and declarations, such as Rerum novarum (1891), Gaudium et spes (1965), and m o r e recently Justitia in mundo (1971). Similarly, Protestant denominations in the wider sense have their confessions and from time to time certain decisions made by their respective collective ecclesial bodies. This has never been the case with the Orthodox, until a very recent exceptional case with regard to the Russian Orthodox Church, to which we will return below. In contrast, the only authoritative sources that O r t h o d o x Christianity possesses are in fact c o m m o n to all Christians: the Bible and the Tradition, although they have never been considered by Orthodox Christians as "sources" in the strict sense, at least in the way they are thought of in the West. H o w can one establish a distinctly O r t h o d o x view on a basis which in fact is c o m m o n to the non-Orthodox as well? Some Orthodox insist that defining Orthodox Christianity is not a matter of drawing f r o m special sources but rather of interpreting the sources that Orthodoxy shares with the rest of Christianity and partly with Judaism. In other words, it is a matter of theological presuppositions, which suggests a certain problematic and method not always familiar to the non-Orthodox. Naturally then, all their social, ethical, and theological viewpoints, and politics in particular, c o m e only as the logical consequence of these presuppositions. However, even the essence

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iooIPetros Vassiliadis | of O r t h o d o x Christianity, vis-à-vis W e s t e r n Christianity in its entirety—that is, Catholic and Protestant—is even beyond such theological presuppositions. After all, the m a i n theological difference, which resulted in the eventual split b e t w e e n Eastern and W e s t e r n Christianity, w a s a different u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t r u t h . Eastern Christianity—especially in later Byzantine antiquity—presupposes a concept of revelation substantially different f r o m that held in the West u n d e r the influence of Aristotle. In particular, u n d e r the guidance of the Holy Spirit, O r t h o d o x y believes that in the church every Christian, and the saint in particular, possesses the privilege and the o p p o r t u n i t y of seeing (theorein) and experiencing the truth. Because the concept of theologia (i.e., theology) in Cappadocian and Antiochean thinking was inseparable f r o m theoria (i.e., contemplation), theology could n o t be—as it was at least in W e s t e r n high Scholasticism—a rational d e d u c t i o n f r o m "revealed" premises, that is, f r o m Scripture or f r o m the statements of an ecclesiastical magisterium. Instead, it was a vision experienced by the faithful, w h o s e authenticity was of course to be checked against the witness of Scripture and Tradition. A t r u e theologian as u n d e r s t o o d in later Byzantine t h o u g h t was for the m o s t p a r t t h e o n e w h o saw a n d e x p e r i e n c e d t h e c o n t e n t of theology. T h e o l o g i c a l inquiry and insight were considered to b e l o n g n o t to the intellect alone, t h o u g h rigorous thinking of course is n o t excluded f r o m the process, b u t to the "eyes of the Spirit," which place the w h o l e h u m a n being—intellect, emotions, and even senses—in contact with the divine existence. In O r t h o d o x Christianity, " t r u t h " is inseparable f r o m " c o m m u n i o n . " T h e r e f o r e , it w o u l d be m o r e accurate to say that O r t h o d o x Christianity is a way of life; h e n c e the i m p o r t a n c e of its liturgical tradition. It is exactly for this reason that the Liturgy plays such a p r o m i n e n t role in the theology of almost all O r t h o d o x Christians in m o d e r n times. It is widely held by the O r t h o d o x that the liturgical dimension is perhaps the only safe criterion for ascertaining w h a t might be considered u n i q u e or peculiar to O r t h o d o x theology. Given the centrality of the Liturgy, I w o u l d suggest that the O r t h o d o x Church is first of all a worshiping community. Worship c o m e s first, doctrine and discipline second. As an old Latin saying goes, lexorandi lex credendi, "The rule of prayer dictates the rule of belief" or 'As we pray, so we believe." T h e lex orandi (the law or rule of prayer) has a privileged priority in the life of the Christian C h u r c h . T h e lex credendi (the law or rule of belief) depends on the devotional experience and vision of the church, or m o r e precisely on the authentic (i.e., liturgical) identity of the church. T h e question, therefore, about the principal sources on which one can d r a w to describe the O r t h o d o x religious system's views a b o u t politics is m u c h m o r e complex than for the rest of Christianity. T h e heart of O r t h o d o x liturgy, as in all or almost all Christian traditions, is the E u c h a r i s t , w h i c h is called by t h e O r t h o d o x "Divine Liturgy." T h e O r t h o d o x

I ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY

Church has consistently accepted the priority of the eucharistic experience over all theological views and convictions, the priority of communion overfaith or belief and as a matter of fact the priority of ecclesiology over theology in its regular meaning. One of the most distinguishing features of Orthodox Christianity is that, contrary to many Western religious systems that have adapted to modernism, Orthodoxy has a t t e m p t e d to distance itself as m u c h as possible f r o m the d o m i n a n t postEnlightenment and post-Reformation paradigm that m o s t theologians tacitly accept. T h e o l o g i a n s w h o have a m o d e r n i s t bent believe that the essence of Christianity is to be found in the articulation of theological statements, based on Scripture, Tradition, or other authoritative pronouncements, and that these truths are upheld by church institutions and promoted by the authority of clergy and scholars. But for the Orthodox, w h o by the way have not yet undergone the process of modernization, what constitutes the core of Christian faith cannot be extracted f r o m expressed theological views, f r o m a certain depositum fidei (depository of faith), be it the Bible or the Tradition (or both), the writings of the Fathers, or the canons and even the decisions of the Ecumenical Councils. W h e r e a s the modernist outlook inevitably led the Western church to adopt some kind of magisterium, be it hierarchical or scholarly, Orthodox Christianity took a different tack. It is mainly for this reason that the criterion most widely held a m o n g the O r t h o d o x of o u r t i m e in d e f i n i n g the O r t h o d o x C h u r c h ' s response to all ethical, m o r a l , social, and political issues is u n d o u b t e d l y the eucharistic approach. Only in the Eucharist does the church b e c o m e God's people, the One Church in its fullest sense. Even with Orthodoxy's emphasis on the Eucharist, I will start my discussion of politics with Jesus Christ, the anointed Messiah. All social ethical issues, and the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics in particular, are based on and d e t e r m i n e d in Orthodox Christianity—as in all Christian traditions—by the teaching, life, and w o r k of Jesus of Nazareth. His teaching, however, and especially his life and work, cannot properly be u n d e r s t o o d w i t h o u t reference to the eschatological expectations of Judaism. W i t h o u t getting sidetracked by the complexities of Jewish eschatology, one can very briefly say that this eschatology was interwoven with the idea of the c o m i n g of a messiah, w h o in the "last days" of history ("the eschaton") would establish his kingdom by calling the dispersed and afflicted people of God into one place to b e c o m e one body united a r o u n d him. As it was expressed in the prophetic tradition of the Hebrew Bible (e.g., Joel 3:1; Isaiah 2:2, 59:21; Ezekiel 36:24), the start of the eschatological period will be marked by the gathering of all the nations and the descent of God's Spirit to the sons and the daughters of God. O n e particular statement in the Gospel of John about the messiah's role is extremely important. In chapter 11, the writer interprets the words of the Jew-

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ioo I Petros Vassiliadis | ish high priest by affirming that "he prophesied that Jesus should die . . . n o t for the nation only b u t to gather into one [emphasis added] the children of G o d w h o are scattered abroad" (John 11:51-52). T h r o u g h o u t the Gospels, Jesus Christ identifies himself w i t h this eschatological messiah. We see this in the various messianic titles he chose for himself, at least as witnessed by the m o s t primitive sources of the Christian tradition ("Son of Man," "Son of G o d , " m o s t of w h i c h h a d a collective m e a n i n g , w h e n c e the Christology of " c o r p o r a t e personality"). We see it as well in the parables of the Kingdom of G o d (e.g., M a t t h e w 13, Mark 4, and Luke 8), which s u m m a r i z e his teaching, the point of which is to proclaim that his coming initiates the new world of God's rule. In the Lord's Prayer, b u t also in his conscious overt acts (e.g., the selection of twelve disciples, symbolizing Israel's Twelve Tribes), Jesus introduces the eschatological agenda. In short, Christ identified himself with the messiah of the eschaton, w h o w o u l d be the center of the g a t h e r i n g of the dispersed people of God. It is on this radical eschatological teaching of the historical Jesus about God's rule that the Early Christian c o m m u n i t y has developed its ecclesiology and determ i n e d its "political" t h e o r y (in the w i d e r sense). M o d e r n biblical research has shown that Jesus's expectation about the rule of G o d moves dialectically between the "already" and the "not yet"; in o t h e r words, it has already b e g u n in the present b u t will be c o m p l e t e d in its final authentic f o r m in the eschaton. In the first t w o decades after the crucifixion of Jesus, the Christian c o m m u n i ty u n d e r s t o o d its existence as the perfect and g e n u i n e expression of the people of God. With a series of t e r m s taken f r o m the H e b r e w Scriptures, the Early Christian c o m m u n i t y expressed its belief t h a t it w a s the "Israel of G o d " (Galatians 6:16), the "saints" (Acts 9:32, 41; 26:10; R o m a n s 1:7; 8:27; 12:13; 15:25), "the elect" (Romans 8:33; Colossians 3:12, etc.), and "the chosen race" and "the royal priesth o o d " (1 Peter 2:9), namely, the holy people of G o d (laos tou theou), for w h o m all the promises of the Bible w e r e to be fulfilled at the eschata. D u r i n g this constructive period, the concept w i t h which the Early Christian c o m m u n i t y u n d e r s t o o d its identity was that of a people and n o t an organization or even a religious system. An examination of b o t h the First (Old) and the Second (New) Testament t e r m i n o l o g y makes this quite clear. T h e chosen people of G o d w e r e an 'am (in H e b r e w , especially in t h e p r o p h e t s ) or a laos (in Greek), w h e r e a s the people of the outside w o r l d w e r e designated by the H e b r e w t e r m goyim and the Greek ethne, m e a n i n g Gentile (cf. Acts 15:14). T h e second generation after Pentecost is certainly characterized by the theological contribution of Saint Paul. H e takes over the above charismatic notion of the church, b u t he gives it in addition a universal and ecumenical character. To the church b e l o n g all h u m a n beings, Jews and Gentiles; for the latter have b e e n j o i n e d to the same tree of the people of G o d ( R o m a n s 1 l:13ff). T h e church, as

I ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY

the new Israel, is thus no longer constituted according to the external criteria of Judaism (e.g., circumcision, sacrifices), but rather on its faith in Jesus Christ (cf. Romans 9:6). The phrase, however, that characterizes Pauline ecclesiology is Body of Christ. With this metaphorical expression, Saint Paul was able to express the charismatic nature of the church by means of the Semitic concept of corporate personality. H e emphasized that a variety of gifts exist in the church, exercised by the individual m e m b e r s of the community, and necessary for the building up and the nurturing of this body, Christ alone being its only head and authority. The understanding of politics, and the church's social responsibility in general, stems exactly f r o m this conception of the church. T h e people of God is an eschatological, dynamic, radical, and corporate reality that struggled to witness authentically to the Kingdom of God, that is, to manifest God's rule, "on earth as it is in heaven" (Matthew 6:10, parallel). T h e Apostles, Jesus of Nazareth's disciples, were commissioned to proclaim neither a specific political theory nor a set of given religious convictions, doctrines, or moral commands. Instead, they were to announce the coming Kingdom, the Gospel, that is, the Good News of a new eschatological reality, with the crucified and resurrected Christ as its center. H e is the incarnate Logos (or Word) of God, w h o nevertheless through the presence of the Holy Spirit continues to dwell a m o n g h u m a n beings, guiding t h e m to transform the present—"fallen" and unjust—world order, and pave the way toward the ideal and otherworldly Kingdom of God. On the basis of this Kingdom reality, therefore, all faithful Christians were called—not so much as isolated individuals, but as a corporate ecclesial entity— to behave in this world "politically." 1 Because they understood themselves to be carrying on the line of Israel, the Early Christians took on the political responsibilities required of the chosen race of the people of God. They were considered a "royal priesthood" by reason of the fact that all of t h e m , w i t h o u t exception, have priestly and spiritual authority to practice in the diaspora (or the dispersed c o m m u n i t y of faith) the w o r k of the priestly class. The fact that not just some special cast, such as the priests or Levites (i.e., people with certain political and religious authority), were responsible for this "eschatological holy nation" at the same time r e m i n d e d Christians to be w o r t h y of their election t h r o u g h their exemplary life and works. That is why they were called to walk toward unity ("50 that they may become perfectly one" [John 17:23]), to abandon all deeds of darkness and to do justice to the society at large. We note that the church was able within a few generations of the first century C.E., largely on the basis of the important contribution of the Greek Fathers of the golden age (second-fourth centuries C.E.), to develop the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, and much later to further develop the important distinction between substance and energies of the three Persons of the Trinity. According to some historians, this was only possible because of the eschatological experience of koinon-

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iooIPetros Vassiliadis | ia (fellowship, c o m m u n i t y ) in the Eucharist (both vertical w i t h its head, and horizontal a m o n g the people of God, and by extension with all of h u m a n i t y through the church's mission), an experience that ever since has continued to constitute the only expression of the church's self-consciousness, its Mystery par excellence. N o one, of course, can deny that early e n o u g h in the history of the Christian community, even from the t i m e of Saint Paul, there b e g a n a "paradigm shift" in the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of this act (Eucharist) of self-consciousness of c o m m u n i t y as a koinonia of the eschata, i.e., in the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the the Eucharist as a manifestation of the c o m i n g Kingdom of G o d in anticipation of the actual eschatological event. Regardless of the reasons, over the centuries there has b e e n a shift of the theological center of gravity of Christianity from the (eucharistic) experience to the (Christian) message, f r o m eschatology to Christology (and f u r t h e r and consequently to soteriology), f r o m the event (the Kingdom of God), to the w o r d s and story a b o u t the bearer and center of this event (Christ, and m o r e precisely his sacrifice o n the cross). H o w e v e r , t h e Eucharist (the theia koinonia,

or divine fellowship w i t h G o d

a n d a m o n g p e o p l e ) has always r e m a i n e d t h e sole expression of t h e c h u r c h ' s identity. T h i s koinonia

d i m e n s i o n of t h e E u c h a r i s t recently has b e e n q u i t e

strongly r e a f f i r m e d in ecumenical circles w i t h its indications that n o t only the identity of the church, b u t all its expressions (e.g., structure, authority, and mission) and actions (e.g., ethics, social and m o r a l , and consequently politics) are in fact relational. To s u m up: if o n e w a n t s to a p p r o a c h , and reflect on, any specific issue, like politics, f r o m a distinctly O r t h o d o x perspective, it is eucharistic t h e o l o g y in its b r o a d sense t h a t s h o u l d g u i d e his or h e r e f f o r t . O f c o u r s e , o n e w o u l d expect O r t h o d o x Christianity, like all o t h e r religious systems, to offer final solutions to c o m m o n problems, and inevitably to exercise s o m e kind of legitimate p o w e r and n o t only present affirmations of conscience. But the caution to keep in mind with O r t h o d o x y is that the entire ethical issue, that is, the p r o b l e m of overcoming the evil in the w o r l d , is basically u n d e r s t o o d n e i t h e r as a m o r a l n o r as a doctrinal issue; it is primarily (and for s o m e even exclusively) u n d e r s t o o d as an ecclesial o n e . T h e m o r a l and social responsibilities of the church (both as an institution and also as its individual m e m b e r s ) , as its p r i m a r y witnessing acts, are the logical consequence of its ecclesial self-consciousness.

Orthodox

Christianity's

Theory

of

Politics

Given h o w differently the O r t h o d o x tradition views the relationship b e t w e e n the religious and the ethical, it w o u l d be p r u d e n t for us to begin o u r discussion of its t h e o r y of politics with a couple of basic questions. First of all, "Does O r t h o d o x

I ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY

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Christianity have a theory of politics and the social order?" Second, "Is politics a tangential and unimportant subject?" These questions cannot be answered by a simple "yes" or "no." O r t h o d o x Christianity in dealing with the problem of politics in the past has come to a solution, according to which religion and polity were never to be divorced or even separated f r o m each other, despite the lack of any visible spectacular victory of the church over the empire, and the detrimental impact of the imperial forces on ecclesiastical affairs (dethronements and exiles of bishops and patriarchs). 2 Most Orthodox churches nowadays still have this model of "in-and-out-of-politics," the model of symphonia or synallelia—which was fully developed and elaborated in premodernity—as their ideal, and they try to impose it as far as they can on m o d e r n constitutions of m o d e r n democratic states. 3 Only in the O r t h o d o x diaspora have there been serious attempts to adapt Orthodox ecclesiology to the m o d e r n context. 4 For an explanation of this close relation between religion and polity in Orthodox Christianity, one has to go back to ancient Greece, where religion was understood as the cultic life of the polis and never conceivable outside it. Having been ideologically shaped (more than any other branch of Christianity) by Greek culture, the O r t h o d o x religious system n o t only b o r r o w e d the word ecclesia, the assembly of citizens, f r o m Greek political life to denominate itself but also developed its identity very much embedded in the whole society. Religion as a separate sphere has never f o u n d a solid footing in the theological thinking of the Orthodox Church. It would have been impossible to relegate the church, holistic in conception—and relational rather than confessional in character—to a private sphere in civil society. This idea of the privatization of the church, together with individualism— which for historical reasons was adopted in the historical Protestant churches— was developed in modernity. There the cardinal idea, which still shapes our modern Western culture, is that religion should be altogether separate f r o m the state, being a m a t t e r of individual conscience, in an attempt to provide the basis for social peace and stability. In part, this was a reaction to the religious wars in Europe between Protestants and Catholics in the early seventeenth century c.e. At the same time, however, the eschatological inclination of Orthodoxy gives the impression that politics may be a tangential and unimportant issue. In recent years, and despite the fact that the eucharistic approach to all aspects of Orthodox Church life has been reaffirmed again and again, the Orthodox have drafted a n u m b e r of official documents to be presented for final approval to the forthcoming Holy and Great Synod of the Orthodox Church. One of these documents or decisions, titled "The Contribution of the Orthodox Church in Establishment of Peace, Justice, Freedom, Fellowship and Love a m o n g the Peoples,

ioo I Petros Vassiliadis | a n d t h e Lifting of Racial a n d O t h e r D i s c r i m i n a t i o n s , " deals indirectly w i t h sociopolitical problems. This d o c u m e n t , which was finally officially approved by the third Pan-Orthodox Pre-Conciliar C o n s u l t a t i o n by all O r t h o d o x Autocephalous Churches, 5 is a first a t t e m p t at a theological response f r o m an O r t h o d o x perspective t o social issues pertinent to m o d e r n challenges. More precisely focused on o u r subject is an even m o r e recent d o c u m e n t , issued by the Russian O r t h o d o x C h u r c h , titled The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church.6 This d o c u m e n t may n o t have a P a n - O r t h o d o x canonical status, 7 b u t it accurately describes the present status of the c h u r c h - s t a t e relations in the O r t h o d o x world: Today the Orthodox Church performs her service of God and people in various countries. In some of t h e m she represents the nation-wide confession (Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria), while in others, which are multinational, the religion of the ethnic majority (Russia). In still other countries, those w h o belong to the Orthodox Church comprise a religious minority surrounded by either heterodox Christians (Finland, Poland, USA) or people of other religions (Japan, Syria, Turkey). In some small countries the O r t h o d o x Church has the status of the state religion (Cyprus, Greece, Finland), while in other countries it is separated from the state. There are also differences in the concrete legal and political contexts in which the Local Orthodox Churches live. They all, however, build both their internal order and relations with the government on the c o m m a n d m e n t s of Christ, teaching of the apostles, holy canons and two-thousand-year-long historical experience and in many situations find an opportunity to pursue their God-commanded goals, thus revealing their other-worldly nature, their heavenly, divine, origin. 8

Having said all this, it is i m p o r t a n t to underline that s o m e of the theological differences b e t w e e n the O r t h o d o x East and the Christian West were, and in s o m e cases still are, related to the way the church—as the image of the expected Kingd o m of G o d — w a s and is directly e n g a g e d w i t h t e m p o r a l and secular m a t t e r s , that is, with politics. It has been argued time and again that toward the end of the first millennium the church in the West adopted, or was forced to accept, a kind of c h u r c h - s t a t e relationship on a legal basis, namely, as a relationship b e t w e e n t w o distinct institutions, t w o distinct and i n d e p e n d e n t " t e m p o r a l " authorities. T h u s , t h e c h u r c h m o v e d away f r o m the m o d e l of symphonia,

or synallelia,

and

a d o p t e d t h e t h e o r y of t h e " t w o swords." In c e r t a i n critical m o m e n t s , it even a r g u e d that, w h e r e a s priestly a u t h o r i t y is directly derived f r o m G o d , secular authority can only be assumed t h r o u g h priestly authority. Even if such political v i e w s are n o l o n g e r officially s u p p o r t e d in C a t h o l i c Christianity, o n e can safely argue that d u r i n g the second m i l l e n n i u m — t h e mill e n n i u m of t h e tragic schism b e t w e e n W e s t e r n and Eastern Christianity—the e m p h a s i s of W e s t e r n t h e o l o g y w a s m o r e o n t h e historical d i m e n s i o n of the

I ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY

Christian ecclesial identity, thus being m o r e sensitive to ethics and constantly reminding the church of its responsibility for the world. At the other end of the political spectrum, the Orthodox Church has developed a clear awareness of the eschatological dimension of Christianity, being in fact the only ecclesiastical institution that always emphasizes the eschatological identity of the church, sometimes even disincarnating its historical manifestation f r o m history. It is mainly for this reason that m a n y of us 9 are in search of a synthesis b e t w e e n Eastern and Western spirituality, believing that a dynamic e n c o u n t e r will enrich both traditions. After all, the authentic catholicity of the Church (in terms not so much of ecclesiology, but of spirituality, of ethics, and in particular of politics) must include both East and West. Only through such a synthesis can the perennial p r o b l e m of the tension b e t w e e n history and eschaton in Christianity—and by extension in politics—find a p r o p e r and p e r m a n e n t solution. Quite simply, therefore, this is the message of O r t h o d o x Christianity's politics, n o matter how strange or vague this may sound!

The Medium

of Expressing

Politics

in Orthodox

Christianity

Turning next to the question "through what m e d i u m does Orthodox Christianity make its point," the answer is certainly through the eucharistic Liturgy, understood as a glimpse and a foretaste of the eschatological Kingdom of God. In its liturgy, however, the Orthodox Church clearly and in a very stylish and sophisticated way reenacts a story: the story of God's creation, of h u m a n destiny and condition, of God's abundant love for His creation (and, therefore, His intervention in history), His continuous care for His people, by giving t h e m the Law and by m a k i n g a covenant with t h e m , and finally by sending t h e m His only-begotten Son, w h o inaugurated his Kingdom on earth, experienced in history by hosts of saints in his church, but expected in its fullness at the eschaton. In Orthodox Christianity, this story is not told as a past event but as a present reality, as personal narrative with far-reaching consequences for the social order of corporate community. It is for this reason that the political role of its m e m bers starts after the Liturgy, in the meta-Liturgy, the Liturgy after the Liturgy, in which the Orthodox are sent forth "in peace" to give witness to this ideal by any means, including politics. Those "means," nevertheless, have never been clearly defined (except in a very vague way; i.e., that they should not deviate f r o m the Gospel, as proclaimed by Jesus of Nazareth, his disciples, and the hosts of saints thereafter). This is partly because almost all the geographical areas where Orthodoxy has historically flourished have never faced the process of modernity. As I will assert m o r e fully below, the relationship b e t w e e n religion and politics became an issue only after the Enlightenment.

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ioo I Petros Vassiliadis | The Message

of Orthodox

Christianity's

Politics

W e have stated above that, a l t h o u g h the principal sources of O r t h o d o x Christianity are the same as those of the rest of Christianity (Bible and Tradition), the special n u a n c e is its liturgical (i.e., eucharistic) dimension. To p u t it a different way, c o m p a r e d with the West, the O r t h o d o x tradition underlines m o r e sharply t h e eschatological d i m e n s i o n of t h e Christian faith. In that respect, O r t h o d o x Christianity claims to have followed the Early Church, which entered history n o t so m u c h as a "doctrine" b u t as a new, otherworldly "social order," a n e w "community." T i m e and again, early Christians insisted that their true citizenship (politeuma) was n o t of this world: O u r citizenship is in heaven, and it is f r o m there that we are expecting a Savior. (Philippians 3:20) Here we have no lasting city (polin), but we are looking for the city that is to come. (Hebrews 13:14)

A n d n o t only this; t h e m e m b e r s of t h e Early C h u r c h w e r e a l m o s t always addressed as strangers and traveling t h r o u g h (paroikoi and parepoidemoi

1 Peter

2:11) this world. Although the m a i n issue in politics is w h o does w h a t to w h o m , these tasks were consciously, although in certain cases reluctantly, transmitted to the lay m e m b e r s of the church, and in time to the secular authorities. This migration of political responsibility results f r o m the incompatibility of using even legitimate force w i t h b e i n g and reflecting that glorious and ideal Kingdom of God, which the church (and especially its priestly m e m b e r s ) strives to do. Only in special situations, such as w h e n the people of an organized nation request the head of their local O r t h o d o x C h u r c h to assume for a while leadership in secular matters, does one find an O r t h o d o x ecclesiastical figure engaged in the politics of this world. T h e guiding principle for these tasks, b o t h for those b e l o n g i n g to the laity (which by the way is c o n s i d e r e d in O r t h o d o x y an ecclesiastical priestly order, w i t h o u t w h i c h n o liturgical service is possible) and for those c o m i n g f r o m the ordained priesthood, is Jesus Christ's a d m o n i t i o n to his disciples: The rulers of the Gentiles exercise lordship over their subjects; and those in authority over t h e m are called benefactors. But not so with you; rather let the greatest a m o n g you b e c o m e as the youngest, and the leader as one w h o serves. (Luke 22:25-26, parallel)

Recall that the O r t h o d o x C h u r c h considers as its m a i n task to m a k e manifest proleptically (or in anticipation of the p r o m i s e d f u t u r e reality) in the Eucharist this new, ideal order of the c o m i n g Kingdom. To this end, the faithful literally are sent at the end of the service to "go f o r t h in peace" to t r a n s m i t the experience g a i n e d in t h e L i t u r g y — e v e n as a g l i m p s e a n d as a f o r e t a s t e — o f t h a t g l o r i o u s expected m o m e n t . In this respect, the O r t h o d o x faith in fact e m b r a c e s all aspects

I ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY

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of h u m a n life. T h e ultimate basis for such a concern for life and for all that has been created in this world comes f r o m the f u n d a m e n t a l doctrine of creation, according to which God—ex nihilo—made all that exists and "saw that it was good" (Genesis 1:4, 10, 13, 18). Because God's creation was corrupted by sin, however, it became necessary for all of creation to be transformed ("that the creation itself will be set free f r o m its bondage to decay and will obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God"; Romans 8: 21), to be renewed, to b e c o m e a "new creation" (2 Corinthians 5:17; Galatians 6:15), a process that started with the incarnation of God Himself in Jesus Christ. The Kingdom of God that Jesus proclaimed did not have an eschatological character alone, but also an earthly one. And his people, the church, the "true" Israel (Galatians 6:16), was in fact "a city," a polis, a new and peculiar "polity." It was more than "a church," just as ancient Israel was at once a "church" and a "nation." It was for that reason that in the early stages of their existence, Christians were suspected of civic indifference, even of "misanthropy," odium generis humani (literally, the "hatred of the h u m a n race," probably contrasted with the alleged "philanthropy of the Roman empire"). Origen, responding to a similar accusation by Celsus, insisted that Christians "have another system of allegiance" (alio systema tes patridos).10 And Tertullian even went to the extreme of declaring that for Christians "nothing is more alien than public affairs" (nec ulla magis res aliéna quam publica).11 We find a more balanced position, however, in an a n o n y m o u s letter f r o m the early years of the second century C.E. In the famous Letter to Diognetus, Christians are presented as living in the world but not being of the world: W h i l e they dwell in the cities of Greeks and Barbarians, as the lot of each is cast, the s t r u c t u r e of their polity is peculiar and paradoxical. . . . Every f a t h e r l a n d is a foreign l a n d . . . . T h e i r conversation is on earth, b u t their citizenship is in heaven. 1 2

All these are a c o m m o n heritage of b o t h Eastern and Western Christianity. W h e r e Orthodox Christianity seems to differ f r o m both the Roman Catholic and the Protestant points of view with regard to politics is the famous "Byzantine synthesis," a unique experiment in political matters, which most Orthodox churches and Orthodox societies (some even use the awkward term "Orthodox nations") unfortunately dream to revive, even in the age of modernity and postmodernity. This e x p e r i m e n t was the first O r t h o d o x adventure in Christian politics. According to the renowned Orthodox historian and theologian George Florovsky, "It was an unsuccessful and probably an u n f o r t u n a t e experiment. Yet it should be j u d g e d on its o w n terms." 1 3 It was w r o n g l y labeled as a " C a e s a r o p a p i s m " (alluding to the combination of the two roles of Caesar and pope) on the assumption that in Byzantium the church ceased to exist as an independent "political" institution, because the e m p e r o r became with the agreement of the church its

ioo I Petros Vassiliadis |

actual ruler. T h e e m p e r o r s w e r e indeed rulers in Christian society, and also in religious matters, b u t never rulers over the church. 1 4 In fact, this solution to the p e r e n n i a l p r o b l e m of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n c h u r c h a n d state, initiated by the overall policy of Constantine the Great, 1 5 had its origin in Pauline theology and his u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the role of all secular ruling authorities. T h e ruling secular authorities are u n d e r s t o o d as being instituted by God, and therefore are of divine origin: Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for there is no authority except f r o m God, and those authorities that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore whoever resists authority resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment. For rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad. Do you wish to have no fear of the authority? Then do what is good, and you will receive its approval; for it is God's servant for your good. But if you do what is wrong, you should be afraid, for the authority does not bear the sword in vain! It is the servant of God to execute wrath on the wrongdoer. Therefore one must be subject, not only because of wrath but also because of conscience. For the same reason you also pay taxes, for the authorities are God's servants, busy with this very thing. Pay to all what is due them—taxes to w h o m taxes are due, revenue to w h o m revenue is due, respect to w h o m respect is due, h o n o r to w h o m h o n o r is due. (Romans 13:1-7)

It was exactly for that reason that in the so-called Pastoral Epistles the faithful are urged even to pray for governing authorities: I urge that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for everyone, for kings and all w h o are in high positions, so that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and dignity. (1 Timothy 2:1-2)

This c o m p r o m i s e d solution to all the p r o b l e m s dealing w i t h p o w e r and the authorities of this world is in effect in a g r e e m e n t w i t h Jesus of Nazareth's clever answer to the religious authorities of his day: Give to the emperor the things that are the emperor's, and to God the things that are God's. (Mark 12:17, parallel) 16

T h e response of Early Christians to this dilemma, i.e., h o w to a c c o m m o d a t e their simultaneously b e l o n g i n g to secular and to eschatological worlds, was n o t u n a n i m o u s . Paul's a c c o m m o d a t i n g views in dealing w i t h t h e secular authorities are seemingly in s h a r p c o n t r a s t w i t h the m o r e radical views expressed by t h e a u t h o r of t h e b o o k of Revelation (chap. 13). T h e r e , t h e secular R o m a n authorities are c o m p a r e d with the beast, in contrast to the eschatological identity of the church as the " N e w Jerusalem," m a k i n g any dealing and connection of t h e p e o p l e of G o d w i t h the hostile secular a u t h o r i t i e s impossible. 1 7 1 have a r g u e d in o t h e r related studies t h a t t h e s o l u t i o n t o o u r p r o b l e m , o f f e r e d by

I ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY

Paul—and in fact to all o t h e r social issues—might n o t have been as idealistic or radical as in the rest of the N e w Testament. It was, nevertheless, a realistic solution of the social integration G o d into society at large.

of t h e charismatic (and eschatological) p e o p l e of

18

This solution reached its climax in t h e sixth c e n t u r y C.E. It is expressed in a m o r e detailed way in the preface to Justinian's f a m o u s Sixth Novel, which is a summ a r y of t h e basic principles of t h e Byzantine political system, a n d w h i c h has greatly influenced the political views of O r t h o d o x Christianity, even to this day: T h e r e are t w o m a j o r gifts which G o d has given u n t o m e n of His supernal clemen-

cy, the priesthood and the imperial authority—hierosyne and basileia; sacerdotium and imperium.

Of these, the f o r m e r is c o n c e r n e d with things divine; the latter pre-

sides over t h e h u m a n affairs and takes care of t h e m . P r o c e e d i n g f r o m the s a m e source, b o t h a d o r n h u m a n life. N o t h i n g is of g r e a t e r concern for the e m p e r o r s as the dignity of the priesthood, so that priests may in their t u r n pray to G o d for t h e m . Now, if o n e is in every respect blameless a n d filled w i t h c o n f i d e n c e t o w a r d G o d , and the o t h e r does rightly and properly maintain in order the c o m m o n w e a l t h to it, there will be a certain fair h a r m o n y established to it, there will be a certain fair harm o n y established, which will furnish whatsoever may be n e e d f u l for m a n k i n d . We therefore are highly c o n c e r n e d for the t r u e doctrines inspired by G o d for the dignity of priests. W e are c o n v i n c e d t h a t , if t h e y m a i n t a i n t h e i r dignity, G o d will bestow great benefits on us, and w e shall firmly hold whatever w e n o w possess, and in addition shall acquire those things that w e have n o t yet secured. A happy e n d i n g always c r o w n s those things, w h i c h w e r e u n d e r t a k e n in a p r o p e r m a n n e r , acceptable to God. This is the case, w h e n sacred canons are carefully observed, which the glorious Apostles, the venerable eyewitnesses and ministers of the Divine World, have h a n d e d d o w n to us, and the holy Fathers have kept and explained. 1 9

T h e Sixth Novel, of course, does n o t speak of church and state, b u t of t w o ministries. And in addition, it was a secular (legal) n o t a religious (Christian) docum e n t . T h e r e the imperium is at once an authority and a service. This model, very o f t e n called " s y m p h o n y , " o r synallelia,

w a s f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d in t h e f a m o u s

Epanagoge, a constitutional d o c u m e n t of the ninth c e n t u r y C.E., m o s t probably prepared by Photius, the f a m o u s Patriarch of Constantinople: 2 0 T h e t e m p o r a l p o w e r and the priesthood relate t o each other as body and soul; they are necessary for state order just as b o d y and soul are necessary in a living m a n . It is in their linkage and h a r m o n y that the well-being of a state lies. 21

In the Epanagoge, however, w e notice a slight centralization of power. In the place of the imperium and sacerdotium, we n o w have the e m p e r o r and the patriarch, 2 2 n o t as rivals b u t as allies, b o t h parts of a single organism, b o t h essential for the prosperity of the people. This m o d e l has helped the church in the East to resist the temptation to acquire temporal secular authority and to avoid the temp-

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I Petros Vassiliadis | tation to be "clericalized." In addition, O r t h o d o x Christianity did not feel the need to develop the t h e o r y of the "two swords," which held such appeal in the West. This may be due to a m o r e classical Greek philosophical b a c k g r o u n d in its ontological t h i n k i n g , in c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e m o r e R o m a n (i.e., legal) h e r i t a g e of W e s t e r n Christianity. It is to be n o t e d that the f a m o u s p r o g r a m m a t i c m o d e l and vision of De civitate Dei, by Augustine of H i p p o (d.

4 3 0 C.E.),

which was so influ-

ential in Western Christianity, did n o t play a decisive role in the development of O r t h o d o x Christianity's political theory. Conversely, this e n m e s h m e n t b e t w e e n c h u r c h and state, very tight indeed, w h i c h has c a u s e d so m a n y t e n s i o n s a n d even clashes (e.g., in t h e

iconoclastic

controversy and later in the imperial unionist policy), was n o t w i t h o u t opposit i o n . For instance, t h e e m e r g e n c e of m o n a s t i c i s m h e l p e d E a s t e r n O r t h o d o x C h r i s t i a n i t y — n o t w i t h o u t p r o b l e m s of c o u r s e — t o k e e p the balance b e t w e e n t h e e s c h a t o l o g i c a l vision a n d t h e historical m i s s i o n a r y e n g a g e m e n t of t h e church. This is especially t r u e in monasticism's later d e v e l o p m e n t n o t as an a r m of t h e institutional c h u r c h (cf. s o m e medieval o r d e r s of R o m a n Catholicism) b u t r a t h e r as a s t r o n g reaction to it, as a constant r e m i n d e r of the eschatological character of the church, and the eschatological d i m e n s i o n of the Christian faith in general. 2 3

Orthodox outside

Christianity the

and Nonbelievers:

Politics

and

People

Tradition

H i s t o r y has s h o w n that O r t h o d o x c h u r c h e s have traditionally taken a t o l e r a n t attitude t o w a r d nonbelievers by and large. O n e case in p o i n t is t h e Crusaders, w h o f o u n d the O r t h o d o x in Constantinople unexpectedly and unacceptably tole r a n t t o w a r d the Muslims. Similarly, m o r e o p e n n e s s and hospitality have b e e n g r a n t e d by the O r t h o d o x to non-Christian "religious cousins" (e.g., in the case of the expelled Jews f r o m the Iberian Peninsula in the sixteenth century). These were not accidental occurrences. Instead, they were the result of Orthodoxy's Trinitarian u n d e r s t a n d i n g of mission, w h i c h goes b e y o n d the "Christocentric Christian universalism" developed in the past by W e s t e r n Christianity. Underlying its response to nonbelievers is O r t h o d o x Christianity's twofold fundamental missiological (having to do with evangelism and outreach) assumption a b o u t G o d : (1) the divine self, G o d ' s i n n e r life, is a life of c o m m u n i o n ; and (2) God's involvement in history aims to draw h u m a n i t y and creation in general into this c o m m u n i o n with the very life of the divine being. Perhaps for this reason, O r t h o d o x Christianity has never developed a universal proselytizing mission. 2 4 W i t h o u t relegating their mission to an optional task and neglecting the imperative of bringing n e w converts to Christ, the O r t h o d o x normally direct their efforts

I ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY

toward the transmission of the life of c o m m u n i o n that exists in God, and n o t toward the propagation of certain doctrines or moral and social norms. If one carries this understanding of mission a little further, one can even argue that the church's involvement in this present fallen and sinful situation, i.e., its worldly politics, does n o t actually allow the use of p o w e r and coercion that inevitably includes legitimate violence. Rather, the Orthodox understand their task to be that of witnessing in a tolerant, loving, and reconciling way to the proleptic experience of God's rule (i.e., the Kingdom of God), gained in their liturgical and eucharistic c o m m u n a l life. According to Orthodox theology, the mission of the church does not focus on the conversion of "others" by the spreading of the Gospel of the a b u n d a n t love of G o d to the end of the world (which inevitably leads to a "confessional and religious exclusiveness"). Its mission is to serve in this multicultural and pluralistic world as the witness of the church's eschatological (and certainly not institutional) identity (this can be labeled "ecclesial inclusiveness"). That understanding of mission has by and large prevented Orthodoxy f r o m all kinds of aggressive proselytism. For the Orthodox Church, the real aim of evangelism has never been so much bringing nations and people of other faiths to its own religious "enclosure"; its real aim has always been to "let" the Spirit of God use both evangelizers and those to w h o m they bear witness to bring about God's rule. According to this understanding, everything belongs to God, and to His Kingdom. In simpler terms, everything belongs to the new eschatological reality, inaugurated of course in Jesus's messianic work but expected to reach its final stage at the end of history. T h e church in its historical manifestation does not administer all reality, as was believed for centuries in the West; it only prepares the way to that reality, being an icon of it.

Conclusion In recent years, as a result of the effect of postmodernism and of the resurgence of religion worldwide, some Orthodox societies (at least those with a powerful institutional church, like the Greek and the Russian ones) have shown signs of willingness to allow their churches to reassert their influence on both politics and public life. This deprivatization of religion means that the ideal of modernity—to keep church and state (or religion and society) separate, relegating the f o r m e r to the private or personal realm and declaring the public realm secular and free of all religious influence—is losing ground. This deprivatization is, of course, a universal p h e n o m e n o n , mainly due to the shortcomings of modernism. The post-Enlightenment modern critical paradigm, which has u n d o u b t e d l y shaped o u r d e m o c r a t i c political process, has overra-

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I Petros Vassiliadis | tionalized everything f r o m social and public life to scholarship, from e m o t i o n to i m a g i n a t i o n , seeking to overcontrol and overlimit the irrational, the aesthetic, and even the sacred. In its search to rationalize and historicize all, m o d e r n i s m has t r a n s f o r m e d n o t only w h a t w e k n o w a n d h o w w e k n o w it, b u t also h o w w e u n d e r s t a n d ourselves within that k n o w n world. H e n c e the desire in a wide circle of intellectuals (not limited to scholars or even to theologians) for wholeness, for community, for w h a t in G e r m a n is called Gemeinschaft, for an antidote to the fragm e n t a t i o n and sterility of an overly technocratic society, and in the end for postmodernism. To be honest, religion is far t o o i m p o r t a n t for h u m a n existence to be excluded from politics; and this is u n d o u b t e d l y b o t h a threat and a hope. It is a threat if f u n d a m e n t a l i s t s assume uncontrolled power, as was the case o n S e p t e m b e r 11, 2001. However, it is a h o p e if religion can exercise its t r e m e n d o u s potential and p o w e r to b r i n g b a c k m o r a l values a n d t o r e c r e a t e or o r i g i n a t e n e w i m a g e s of w h a t it m e a n s to be h u m a n in a just, peaceful, and sustainable universe. Nowadays, this last option is b e i n g seriously considered by the O r t h o d o x , if n o t for anything else, at least because the basic ecclesiological principles of their religious system are incompatible with individualism, one of the pillars of modernity. T h e r e is a lot of discussion that the old "Byzantine s y m p h o n y " can again b e c o m e a m o d e l of O r t h o d o x political theory, b u t this time n o t as a s y m p h o n y of the church with the state b u t instead directly with citizens. In addition, any such s y m p h o n y could n o t be i m p l e m e n t e d in isolation from the rest of Christianity but rather in cooperation with it, as an example of a "comm o n Christian witness." Even people of o t h e r faiths are considered as p a r t n e r s on certain political issues, as has been s h o w n by the m o s t recent initiatives of the primus inter pares O r t h o d o x Patriarchal See of Constantinople and also of o t h e r a u t o c e p h a l o u s O r t h o d o x churches. In o u r small global village, that mysterious universe, the values of God's K i n g d o m are c o m m o n to all people of goodwill, religious or not! Only wicked people could object to their political implementation, provided of course that the basic democratic rules are observed. 2 5

Notes 1. In classical Greek philosophy and language (which was the overall language adopted by Christianity to elaborate its doctrine), "political" behavior, i.e., care for the polis (the city, the society) was contrasted to a selfish, egocentric lifestyle, i.e., the behavior of the "idiot" (Greek idiotes), a t e r m that universally acquired negative connotations. Cf. 1 Corinthians 14:24, where the term idiotes is equated with that of the unbeliever. 2. G. Florovsky was right that "Byzantium collapsed as a Christian Kingdom, under the burden of (this) t r e m e n d o u s claim." G. Florovsky, "Antinomies of Christian History:

Empire and Desert," in Christianity and Culture, vol. 2 of The Collected Works of Georges

I ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY|109 Florovsky (Belmont, Mass.: Nordland Publishing Company, 1974), 67-100; the quotation is found on p. 83). 3. The majority of the Orthodox positions with regard to a system of church-state relationship take this Byzantine model as the only acceptable one in the Orthodox world, despite the above-mentioned remarks of Florovsky. 4. Cf. Saint Harakas, "Church and State in Orthodox Thought," Greek Orthodox Theological Review 27 (1982): 5-21; E. Clapsis, Orthodoxy in Conversation: Orthodox Ecumenical Engagements (Geneva and Brookline, Mass.: World Council of Churches Publications and Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2000); Th. Hopko, "Orthodoxy in Post-Modern Pluralistic Societies," Ecumenical Review 51 (1999): 364-71. 5. The final documents were originally published in the journal Episkepsis (December 15, 1986), and they have since received wide circulation, being translated into many languages. According to a decision of the consultation, they all have a binding canonical status for the Orthodox, even before their final synodical (ecumenical?) approval (p. 9 n). 6. The final d o c u m e n t (now available at w w w . i n c o m m u n i o n . o r g / m i s c ) deals with "those aspects of the life of the state and society, which were and are equally relevant for the whole Church at the end of the 20th century and in the near future." It is a document of a local Autocephalous Orthodox Church, primarily aimed at providing her members "the basic provisions of her teaching on church-state relations and a number of problems socially significant today" (preamble). 7. This may be because some of the positions taken reflect rather conservative views, not shared by all Orthodox. In addition, the wide range of themes tackled (anthropological, ecological, bioethical, educational) may need further theological examination. But mainly because of the principles underlined above in the first section. After all, the Russian Orthodox, being aware of all these, does not claim for the document anything more than that it "reflects the official position of Moscow Patriarchate on relations with the state and secular society" (Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church). Despite all these limitations, the d o c u m e n t is a courageous first attempt by an official Orthodox institution to deal with social problems, in the way Western Christians have been responding to modern everyday challenges in the last centuries, and for this reason it must be judged accordingly. 8. Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church, III 4. 9. P. Vassiliadis, "Orthodoxy and Ecumenism," Eucharist and Witness. Orthodox Perspectives on the Unity and Mission of the Church (Geneva and Brookline, Mass.: World Council of Churches Publications and Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1998), pp. 7-27, especially 15. 10. Origen, Contra Celsum VIII, 75. 11. Tertullian, Apologeticum 38,3. Cf. also his statement in De Pallio: "I have withdrawn myself from the society (seces5i de populo)" (5). 12. Ad Diognetum 5,6. 13. Florovsky, "Antinomies," 77. 14. Florovsky, "Antinomies." Dvornik was certainly right that "in most ways the Byzantine emperors followed the example of their 'predecessors' David and Solomon when organizing religious life" (Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy. Origins and Background, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C., no publisher given, 1966), p. 301.

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I Petros Vassiliadis

|

15. The importance of Constantine's religious policy rests not so much on the implementation of the religious freedom of his subjects, not even on his conversion to Christianity. It rests, instead, on the fact that he introduced a major shift in politics, by replacing the cosmocentric theories of Greco-Roman antiquity with the theocentric worldview of Christianity, a process which was dramatically ended in post-Enlightenment modernity. In the person of Constantine, the church recognized the possibility of implementing its catholicity, but also the founder of its visible ecumenicity, and for that reason it canonized him with the honorable title of isapostolos (equal to the apostles). 16. The other biblical reference, which usually enters in the discussion, i.e., Peter and the rest of the Apostles' statement, "We must obey God rather than any h u m a n authority" (Acts 5:29), has more general connotations. 17. Theologically interpreted, the b o o k of Revelation expresses the victory of the oppressed over the impersonal and oppressing secular institutions, the victory of the "politics of theology" over the (pseudo-) "theology of politics." 18. P. Vassiliadis, "The Church and State Relationship in the N.T. (With Special Reference to the Pauline Theology)," Biblical Hermeneutical Studies (2000): 435-44 (in Greek); cf. also my "Your Will Be Done. Reflections from St. Paul," in Eucharist and Witness, 77-84. 19. R. Schoel and W. Kroll, Corpus Juris Civilis, vol. 3 (Berlin, no publisher given, 1928), 35ff. 20. The Epanagoge was in fact a draft that has never been officially promulgated. However, substantial portions of it were incorporated in later legislation, but most important, it received wide circulation and appreciation throughout the Orthodox world. 21. J. Zepos and P. Zepos, eds., Jus Graecoromanum, vol. 2 (Athens: no publisher given, 1931), 240ff. 22. "The Patriarch is a living and animate image of Christ, characterizing the truth in deeds and words." The role of the patriarch (in rank after the emperor) was threefold: (1) to preserve the faith of the Orthodox believers, (2) to make any possible effort that the heretics be reunited to the church, and (3) "finally to behave in such a brilliant, most glorious, and admirable way so that those outside the faith be attracted and imitate the faith" (Epanagoge, in Jus Graecoromanum, 242). 23. More in Florovsky, "Antinomies," 83ff. 24. Cf. I. Bria, ed., Go Forth in Peace. Orthodox Perspectives on Mission (Geneva: World Council of Churches Press, 1986), 3.

25. More in Vassiliadis, Postmodernity and the Church (Athens: Akritas Publications, 2002).

Suggested

Readings

"The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian O r t h o d o x Church." Available at www.incommunion.org/misc. Clapsis, Emmanuel. Orthodoxy in Conversation: Orthodox Ecumenical Engagements. Geneva and Brookline, Mass.: World Council of Churches Publications and H C O Press, 2000. Dvornik, Fr. Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy: Origins and Background, vol. 1. Washington, D.C. (no publisher given), 1966. Fitzgerald, Thomas. The Orthodox Church. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995.

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| 111

Florovsky, Georges. "Antinomies of Christian History: Empire and Desert." In Christian-

ity and Culture, vol. 2 of The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky. Belmont, Mass.: Nordland Publishing Company, 1974.

. Bible, Church, Tradition: An Eastern Orthodox View. Belmont, Mass.: Nordland Publishing Co., 1972.

Harakas, Stanley S. Wholeness of Faith and Life: Orthodox Christian Ethics. Brookline, Mass.: H C O Press, 1999.

Lossky, Vladimir. The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church. London: Clarke, 1957. Pelikan, Jaroslav. The Christian Tradition 2: The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600-1700). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.

Meyendorff, John. Byzantine Theology. Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes. Crestwood, N.Y.: SVS Press, 1987. S c h m e m a n n , Alexander. Church, World, Mission. C r e s t w o o d , N.Y.: SVS Press, 1979. Staniloae, D u m i t r u . The Experience of God. Brookline, Mass.: H C O Press, 1994.

Vassiliadis, Petros. Eucharist and Witness: Orthodox Perspectives on the Unity and Witness of the Church. Geneva and Brookline, Mass.: World Council of C h u r c h e s Publications and H C O Press, 1998. W a r e , Kallistos ( T i m o t h y ) . The Orthodox Church. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964 (and n u m e r o u s s u b s e q u e n t editions). Zepos,J., and P. Zepos, eds .Jus Graecoromanum,

vol. 2. Athens (no publisher given), 1931.

Zizioulas, John. Being as Communion. Studies in Personhood and the Church. Crestwood, N.Y.: SVS Press, 1985.

Five I Reformation Christianity I Martin E.

Marty

NEARLY FIVE CENTURIES AGO, W E S T E R N CHRISTIANITY W E N T T H R O U G H A PERIOD OF

dramatic upheaval, which changed not only the religious landscape but also the political landscape of Christendom. As with most periods of dramatic transition, no one knew early on exactly what was emerging or what the o u t c o m e would be. However, astute observers of the time would have perceived numerous forces coming together all at once, challenging the relatively homogeneous realm of the Roman Catholic Church to reform itself, or else face the breakup of its domain. "Reformation Christianity" is the broad label we apply to the diverse Christian movements that emerged in Europe and the West during the sixteenth century C.E., and the religious and political dimensions of this variegated movement are the subject of this chapter.

Clarifying

Theses

In an effort to make things clear and, I hope, memorable, let m e propose some theses, in advance of my discussion of the politics of Reformation Christianity. Reformation Christianity left as its legacy at least seven elements of political theory. First, God the Creator is the agent behind politics. God is sovereign, gracious, and mysterious. H u m a n s are to be responsible, but they cannot rightfully claim to be sure that their acts are c o n g r u e n t with God's will. Negatively stated: The political order is never "merely" a h u m a n creation. Second, discernment of the will of G o d finds its source or reference in the sacred Scriptures of the faith, though such efforts at discernment will not bring r e s p o n d e n t s to absolute assurance that they have rightly acted. T h e r e is n o supreme ecclesial authority, such as the papacy—from which Protestants separ a t e d — t o d e t e r m i n e resolutions. Protestants in the tradition of R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity are divided over scriptural interpretation, and also over politics. Third, this tradition is ordinarily dualistic; the sovereign God acts in one order through divine law and promotes justice. The same God, as a gracious deity, acts in the o t h e r order t h r o u g h the Gospel and p r o m o t e s salvation. T h e f o r m e r is essential in the political ordering. Fourth, believers are called to obedience to God even as they act at the side of nonbelievers. Some in this tradition hold in t h e o r y to the belief that they m u s t w o r k to see the development of political orders in which believers have

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I Martin Ε. Marty | privilege or monopoly. O t h e r s see G o d w o r k i n g equally t h r o u g h believer and nonbeliever. Fifth, in this tradition, there is a s t r o n g accent on the vocation or calling of lay people to civic responsibility. "The priesthood of all believers" is supposed to minimize deference to hierarchical authority, at least within the church. T h e political agent is, in God's eyes, equal to the religious professional as he or she w o r k s o u t this vocation. Sixth, such an o u t l o o k predisposes R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity t o w a r d d e m o cratic thinking. This does n o t m e a n that this tradition immediately w o r k e d for democratic politics or could have realized it w h e r e it exists w i t h o u t partnerships. But w h e n the o p p o r t u n i t y c a m e for its development, those of this heritage came to e m b r a c e and f u r t h e r it. Seventh, R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity in t h e o r y proclaims w h a t has b e e n called "the Protestant principle of prophetic protest." T h a t m e a n s that the j u d g m e n t of G o d a n d critical t h i n k i n g and activity are to be directed as m u c h to one's o w n people, believing community, cause, nation, or m o v e m e n t as it is to that of "the other." But this is theory; in practice, this motif (like s o m e of the others) is often neglected or m u t e d .

Defining

Reformation

Christianity

as Religion:

Protestantism

Plus

Heirs of the tradition here called R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity seldom think of their " R e f o r m a t i o n " b a c k g r o u n d and realization as a "religion." If they use the w o r d religion, as they m u s t in encyclopedias, textbooks, and curricula, they restrict it to the n o u n : they are Christian. T h e y see their movement(s) as the w o r k i n g o u t of t h e Christian faith, c h u r c h , a n d culture t h r o u g h t h e t w e n t y centuries a f t e r Christ. So o n t h e large scale of b e i n g an a l t o g e t h e r s e p a r a t e religion, n e i t h e r R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity, n o r Eastern Orthodoxy, is c o m p a r a b l e to J u d a i s m or Islam. Yet the adjective " R e f o r m a t i o n " tells m u c h a b o u t the distinctions of this b r a n c h of "the Christian religion," adhered to by several h u n d r e d million people a r o u n d the world. To m o s t readers in o u r time w h o are at all aware of religious history, "Reform a t i o n Christianity" equals "Protestantism." All Protestantism is a descendant of E u r o p e a n m o v e m e n t s of r e f o r m in the sixteenth century. We shall treat the t w o t e r m s as r o u g h equivalents, after having introduced several cautions about the limits of such an approach. There are four ways to do that. First, the R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity t h a t b e c a m e P r o t e s t a n t i s m did n o t have a p a t e n t on r e f o r m of the Christian C h u r c h in W e s t e r n E u r o p e . (We are talking only of the West; Eastern or O r t h o d o x Christianity m a y have experienced "reformations" f r o m time to time, b u t its leaders rather serenely ignored the tensions that led to the b r e a k u p in the sixteenth c e n t u r y of unified Western Christianity,

I REFORMATION CHRISTIANITY

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which before that time m e a n t exclusively R o m a n Catholicism.) T h a t is to say, there were many m o v e m e n t s of r e f o r m that remained in the R o m a n Catholic Church. Leaders of some of these may have displayed similarities to the accents and trends that became Protestant, but they did not forsake papal obedience, nor were they excommunicated. O n e must take great care to r e m e m b e r and to remind others that there was also a "Roman Catholic Reformation" in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. So it is that some Roman Catholics could say and would say, if it were not confusing to hearers, "We represent Reformation Christianity." A second reservation to keep in mind w h e n roughly equating Reformation Christianity with Protestantism is this: Many reform movements that inspired the causes that became Protestant were cut short and had no chance to develop into a full-blown movement. Thus in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, leaders such as John Wycliffe in England and Jan Hus in Bohemia anticipated many of the accents later developed by those historians regard as the originators of the Protestant Reformation. Most such leaders had to challenge both the papacy and their temporal rulers, be they kings or emperors. And that challenge led to their death. Think of their contributions as being "Pre-Reformation Christianity." A third reason for being a bit cautious about terms has to do with later Protestant movements that do not like to think of themselves as being heirs of Reformation Christianity. This is the case a m o n g American-born church bodies such as the Christian C h u r c h (Disciples of Christ) and the various bodies that call themselves the Churches of Christ or the Church of Christ. Nevertheless, in the eyes of sociologists of religion or opinion poll-takers, they do not succeed in disentangling themselves from Reformation Christianity. They clearly are neither Orthodox nor Roman Catholic, and they tend to focus on teachings that others associate with the Protestant Reformation. However, their leaders saw themselves as n o t deriving f r o m the Christian agencies associated with names of people in the sixteenth century, names such as Henry VIII in England, John Knox in Scotland, John Calvin in the Netherlands and Switzerland—and Huldreich Zwingli also needs to be m e n t i o n e d , in that case—and parts of Germany, or Martin Luther in G e r m a n y and Scandinavia. These nineteenth-century innovators instead believed that they were reclaiming a primitive, pure, original, innocent, apostolic Christian world that had been obscured in Roman Catholicism as well as in what looked to them like a too-complicated set of Reformation churches. Their leaders, Alexander Campbell and Barton Stone a m o n g others, taught t h e m to say something like "Where the Bible speaks, we speak; where the Bible is silent, we are silent." For them, most of what happened between the first and the eighteenth centuries was not only beside the point but seriously obscured the true faith of the Apostles. Despite the respect we must show such "primitive" movements for their efforts at self-definition, it

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is obvious to those w h o study t h e m that in politics, o u r present c o n c e r n , they m a t c h Protestant R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity in m o s t respects. A f o u r t h reason to be a bit w a r y a b o u t the t e r m s w e m u s t necessarily use is that to anyone w h o w a n t s to be patient and accurate, there is n o such t h i n g as Reformation Christianity. T h e r e are only Reformation Christianities. In the United States and Canada alone, there are m o r e than t w o h u n d r e d bodies listed in the censuslike c h u r c h y e a r b o o k s , b o d i e s t h a t are n e i t h e r O r t h o d o x n o r R o m a n Catholic and w o u l d be considered Protestant. T h e O r t h o d o x C h u r c h claims to be "one," even if it has several jurisdictions, based in part on g e o g r a p h y and ethnicity. R o m a n Catholicism, for all its internal variety, claims to be and is " o n e " because in the e n d it yields to the papacy in m a t t e r s of authority and organization. N o t so with Protestantism, w h i c h f r o m day one—if, indeed, we can isolate such a day—was divided and p r o d u c e d diverse expressions.

What

Reformation-Tradition

Christians

Hold and

Reject

Having set o u t so m a n y qualifications, the reader m a y w o n d e r w h a t is left. H e r e c o m e w o r d s of cheer to those w h o w o u l d seek a plot, a way of m a k i n g sense of the realities a r o u n d t h e m . Alert to the differences a m o n g the Protestant churches and w i t h fingers figuratively crossed, we shall find s o m e c o m m o n features in m o s t of R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity, even if s o m e of t h e m are negative—meaning defined by w h a t they are not. W i t h these in mind, we shall be free to deal responsibly with those differences. To get to the positive point as quickly as possible, we n o t e w h a t Reformation Christians unanimously are not. Unlike the vast majority of Christians in the West until soon after 1500 c.e., and unlike all Christians at that time w h o were officially established and had privileges, they w e r e n o t u n d e r papal obedience. T h a t does n o t m e a n t h a t m a n y of t h e m did n o t a n d d o n o t c o n s i d e r t h e m s e l v e s t o be "catholic." Notice that until the previous sentence, the eight times the w o r d "Catholic" appeared it c a m e w i t h an adjective, " R o m a n . " T h a t was the case because again, as a m a t t e r of historical accuracy a n d in the interests of sensitivity, w e c a n n o t restrict the w o r d "Catholic" to R o m a n Catholicism. Many m e m b e r s of the largest n o n - R o m a n Catholic expressions, the Anglican C o m m u n i o n , will correct you every time you even call t h e m Protestant, or at least if you forget to say that they are also Catholic. (Many of t h e m will settle for "catholic" with a lowercase "c," w h i c h literally m e a n s "universal.") L u t h e r a n s , Presbyterians, and m a n y o t h e r s w h o get categorized as Protestant also recite the ancient creeds and w i t h t h e m confess "I believe in one holy, catholic, and apostolic church." For n o n - R o m a n Catholic Christians, this m e a n s that they are in continuity with the universal church that dates back to Jesus Christ and has existed through-

I REFORMATION CHRISTIANITY

out the centuries. But if they are "Catholic," they are emphatically not "Roman" Catholic, for the reason m e n t i o n e d above: T h e y reject the p o p e as Christ's uniquely legitimate representative on earth. The pope is, of course, a bishop, one of many bishops, at the Vatican and governing Rome. That situation does not offend n o n - R o m a n Catholic bodies that themselves have bishops, again and especially, Anglicans and Lutherans. The fact that there is one "presiding" bishop for Roman Catholics, in this case at Rome, is also not offensive as such to almost any Protestant body. Most of t h e m elect a president, a moderator, a presiding bishop. They may recognize a wide range of powers in such a person. W h a t offended Protestants—who acquired that n a m e when some of t h e m were involved in a protest in G e r m a n territories in 1529—was the set of claims that came with the papacy. These, of course, had a bearing on their political resolutions. Protestants rejected the notion that the pope was Christ's vicar. They vehemently refused to believe with Roman Catholics that outside his church, and thus apart f r o m papal leadership, according to official sixteenth-century Catholic doctrine (less stressed today) there is n o salvation. This Roman claim left churches in the Reformation tradition incapable of being the bearers of salvation-work. They rejected the notion reinforced and made official only in the late nineteenth century that the pope is infallible with respect to faith and morals. Because he often governed in earthly affairs, at times in congruence with and sometimes in rivalry with emperors and kings, they challenged the role of the pope and broke ties to him, dismissing his authority over them. Some years ago, I was assigned the task of writing a book called simply Protestantism. Having read the doctrines and observed the practices of the Protestant bodies in search of what they held in c o m m o n and that no one else, in Catholicism or Orthodoxy, held, I could find nothing beside nonpapacy to be a universal Protestant position. Most Protestants, it is true, liked to say that they were gathered around t h e m e s such as "grace" and "Scripture," but Catholics would n o t let t h e m get away with claiming a m o n o p o l y o n these. Of course, s o m e Catholic teachings were abhorrent to most Protestants. These included prayer to the saints, the elevation of Mary the m o t h e r of Jesus to quasi-divine status, "gaining salvation in part by works," and the like. But one can always find Protestants, at least toward the Anglo-Catholic end of the spectrum, w h o keep some practices that many other Protestants would regard as Roman Catholic. Here we have made so m u c h of the rejection of the papacy because observation of that theological position opens the door to the many kinds of adjustments the W e s t e r n Christians w h o are identified with the R e f o r m a t i o n and Protestantism made in governance, in relation to authority, and thus, following the guiding t h e m e of this book, in politics. If the pope was not to govern, not to mediate the spiritual concerns in the temporal world of politics, w h o would? If the papa-

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io2 I Martin Ε. Marty | cy was n o t to be the authority, but Scripture was, w h o would decide h o w to determ i n e w h a t Scripture has to say? T h a t is an i m p o r t a n t question, because various scripturally based R e f o r m a t i o n m o v e m e n t s disagreed w i t h each o t h e r significantly while each claimed that it derived its a p p r o a c h f r o m Scripture. This fact b e c a m e the basis for m a n y taunts directed at Reformation Christianity by R o m a n Catholic and Eastern O r t h o d o x Christians. Because the Bible is held in such high e s t e e m within R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity, w e need t o investigate w h a t it and the o t h e r ancient (authoritative) Christian sources say a b o u t politics.

Classical

Sources of Reformation

Christianity

on

Politics

"This religion," internally divided Protestantism already in the R e f o r m a t i o n era of the sixteenth century, was also divided as to which are the classical sources and which have authority. But that there are classical sources is obvious in every case, and we m u s t discern s o m e of the key ones. The Hebrew

Scriptures

Because all of R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity claimed itself to be c o n g r u e n t with and faithful to "original" Christianity, as even the "primitive" bodies that were b o r n in the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y w o u l d also c o n t e n d , it m e a n s that they all inherited s o m e of their political views f r o m the H e b r e w Scriptures, their Old Testament, and from the N e w Testament. To m e n t i o n this may m e a n that there will be s o m e overlapping of t h e m e s in this survey w i t h w h a t o t h e r s write about Judaism first and then, m o r e closely, about Early Christianity, R o m a n Catholicism, and O r t h o dox Christianity. Of course, each interpreted these classical texts in different ways. T h e Old T e s t a m e n t was indeed a d o m i n a n t classical source for political thinking. N o Protestants saw themselves as being simply "the children of Israel," which w o u l d have m e a n t their b e i n g g o v e r n e d by Yahweh t h r o u g h a p r i e s t h o o d and o t h e r authorities, t h o u g h m a n y saw t h e m s e l v e s complicatedly so. R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity i n h e r i t e d a n d i n t e r p r e t e d t h e T e n C o m m a n d m e n t s , a n d m a n y stretched teachings c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e m into the political order. T h u s promin e n t R e f o r m a t i o n leaders like M a r t i n L u t h e r e x p o u n d e d the D e c a l o g u e in his Small Catechism and t o o k the c o m m a n d to h o n o r p a r e n t s i n t o o t h e r realms of o b e d i e n c e , including g o v e r n m e n t . Elders in h o m e as well as c h u r c h a n d state d e m a n d e d and deserved respect and obedience. Many Protestant r e f o r m e r s (after this, w e will capitalize that w o r d to suggest a definite b o d y of people at a particular time in history) derived m o r e political and g o v e r n m e n t a l t h o u g h t f r o m the Old T e s t a m e n t t h a n f r o m the N e w Testament, from the H e b r e w Scriptures than from the earliest decisively Christian docu m e n t s such as the Gospels and Epistles. W h o e v e r has read the writings of the American Puritans w h o settled N e w England, and h a d m u c h influence on later

I REFORMATION CHRISTIANITY

American politics, will have found t h e m citing "the laws of Moses" and telling stories based on the H e b r e w Scriptures w h e n d e t e r m i n i n g w h a t positive laws should say. If, for instance, those laws condemned bestiality, the laws of the land had to forbid it as well and to stipulate penalties for offenders, penalties sometimes also stipulated in the Pentateuch, which to those Puritans was "the five books of Moses" in the beginning of their canon, their Bible. Only a few wilder-eyed and dreaming sectarians—I am momentarily adopting the view of "establishment" Protestants here by using their stigmatizing terms— ever tried to work out simple equations linking governors in their time and governing leaders as recorded in the Hebrew Scriptures. Thus the governor of Massachusetts Bay or Connecticut was not an exact match for figures like Moses and Aaron or the judges and kings of Israel. Sometimes the Protestant movements did aspire to f o r m theocracies f o u n d e d directly on the H e b r e w Scriptures, as many observers saw John Calvin's Geneva or John W i n t h r o p s Massachusetts Bay to be. But most of t h e m were realistic about the differences between the situation of ancient Israel's chosen people and their o w n circumstances. Still, wherever they could, they w a n t e d to c o n n e c t earthly rule with divine sanction, w h e t h e r that m e a n t the sanction of a monarch, a prince, a ruling assembly, or, m u c h later, democratically elected rulers. The New Testament

Gospels

Because N e w Testament authors, especially the Apostle Paul in his letters, out of their way to say that the saving work of Jesus Christ freed believers the bonds of "the law," only the Decalogue served as a universal religious or tural guide to governance. H u m a n - m a d e law, in Reformation Christians' dared not violate those Ten C o m m a n d m e n t s . But citizens were free f r o m of the hundreds of ritual laws that governed Judaism.

went from scripeyes, most

One example of this pertains to a central issue in both Judaism and Christianity, namely, observing the Sabbath. Reformation Christianity inherited and kept the O r t h o d o x and Catholic practice of moving the Sabbath f r o m Saturday—as specified in the creation accounts of Genesis and observed in Judaism—to Sunday, which in early times, for most Christians, came to be observed as the festival of the resurrection of Jesus on that day. (In the nineteenth century, and in smaller ways in other times and places, "Seventh-Day" Adventists or Baptists went back to Saturday observance. But w h e n most Protestants, especially the already-mentioned Puritans, wanted to legislate Sabbath observance, they chose Sunday.) Reformation Christianity prioritized responsible interpretation of the whole Bible, both "Testaments," though ordinarily Protestants did not include the Deuterocanonical b o o k s of the Apocrypha, which w e r e equally authoritative for Catholics. They were specially cautious to avoid the perception that their exposition might in fact be rejecting the authority of the Old Testament, even if they

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114 I Martin E. Marty \ did see the N e w Testament's witness as a rejection of the legalism that they found in the Old Testament. T h e y were m o s t c o n c e r n e d a b o u t eternal salvation, about h o w one b e c a m e right w i t h God, or "justified." For that, the law was n o t of positive use. It applied to the earthly realm, including politics. So the Protestants w e r e selective a b o u t w h a t they carried over f r o m the Old Testament. Most R e f o r m a t i o n Christian m o v e m e n t s , however, m a d e u p as they w e r e of believers in salvation t h r o u g h Jesus Christ, w e r e less a m b i g u o u s l y devoted to the N e w Testament as a classical source for their politics t h a n to the H e b r e w Bible. H e r e is w h e r e trouble c a m e in, trouble that suggests why Puritans and m a n y b e f o r e t h e m c o m m e n t e d m o r e o n Old T e s t a m e n t t h a n o n N e w T e s t a m e n t descriptions and prescriptions of t h e God-pleasing life w i t h respect to the temporal and the political. T h e r e is a clear reason for that. T h o u g h they m a y n o t all have used the t e r m "eschatological," which m e a n s "dealing w i t h the eschaton," the end of the world as they k n e w it, they could read that the writers of the N e w Testament did picture the world e n d i n g soon. Of course, fifteen centuries later, believers had to have laws and to govern and be g o v e r n e d socially in the m e a n t i m e . T h e y w e r e t o " o c c u p y " t h e lands a n d t h e t i m e s until Jesus w o u l d c o m e again. But the w o r d s of Jesus as set forth in the Gospels are seldom e n c o u r a g i n g to anyone w h o w a n t s to establish a political order based on t h e m . T h a t e s c h a t o l o g i c a l vision p o r t r a y s Jesus as always in a hurry, d e m a n d i n g i m m e d i a t e obedience to the reign of G o d and freeing disciples f r o m m a n y legal and religious b o n d s and bounds. In the S e r m o n on the M o u n t ( M a t t h e w 5-7) he was cited as taking o n e or a n o t h e r of the Ten C o m m a n d m e n t s and t h e n raising the bar to h u m a n l y impossible levels. T h e law said, " D o n o t kill." Jesus claimed this also meant, "Do n o t hate." T h e law said, " D o not c o m m i t adultery." H e m a d e this difficult if not, again, impossible to follow: Any m a n w h o h a d even looked w i t h desire on a w o m a n had already c o m m i t t e d adultery in his heart. Jesus was q u o t e d as being e m p h a t i c that his k i n g d o m was n o t "of this world," a fact that logically rendered it nonpolitical. Gospel stories s h o w Jesus having to instruct disciples and would-be followers that he was not an earthly Messiah w h o would occupy the t h r o n e of David, t h r o w off the yoke of the R o m a n Empire and o t h e r oppressors, and rule the day-to-day affairs of Israel, including w h a t his supp o r t e r s saw themselves to be, a N e w Israel, a chosen people. While e n g a g i n g in such i n t e n d e d corrective w o r k , the Jesus of the Gospels, that central classical Christian source, was even portrayed as disdainful of gove r n m e n t , earthly authority, as R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity, eager to be faithful to the scriptural word, could n o t help b u t see in the Gospels. H e r o d , on any organizational or political flowchart, had to be the i m m e d i a t e t e m p o r a l authority to w h o m Jesus m u s t defer; b u t Jesus s n e e r e d at R o m e ' s political p u p p e t as "that fox." T h a t is hardly t h e kind of t e r m o n e uses w h e n b o w i n g low in deference

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and reverence. O u t of such an attitude, one could hardly hope to teach and live with "the divine right of kings," which is what most in Reformation Christianity continued for a time to recognize, even w h e n they chafed u n d e r unjust or anti-Protestant kings. A second illustration has to do with a Gospel scene in which s o m e Jews, eager to trap Jesus, asked w h e t h e r they should pay taxes to Caesar or not. Any direct answer w o u l d get him in trouble, with Jews as pictured in such stories and with Rome, whose Caesar was embossed on the coins used to pay imperial taxes. Jesus's indirect answer was a question or two: Do you have a coin to show me? S o m e o n e in the crowd m u s t have reached into the coin bag and offered one to him. A second question: W h o s e image is on it? Naturally, the m o d e r n non-Jewish reader thinks: Caesar's. Let it go at that. Not at all. In the first century c.e., Jews w e r e n o t s u p p o s e d to be carrying a r o u n d images of g o d s — w h i c h Caesar Augustus and other Roman Emperors claimed to be—because that would challenge the uniqueness and authority of Yahweh. In effect, the second question was: W h a t are you righteous people doing practicing idolatry by the very act of cherishing coins with that idol on them? O n e can almost hear an "Ugh!" f r o m Jesus: a coin with an image is dirty. Give it back to the figure whose image is on it, Caesar. And meanwhile, render to God the things that are God's, including your ultimate allegiance. Such a text is often put to use positively in patriotic sermons in republics where church and state are somehow separated but mutually to be recognized. It is used to suggest not only separation but also balance. For Jesus, that could not be further f r o m the point; this t h e m e is a valuing of the divine kingdom and a devaluing of the coin of the realm. It would be hard to pursue a political order in which there is n o pattern of financing operations. And here is Jesus having little interest in politics and so much interest in a kingdom above, apart from, and beyond politics, giving no charter for Reformation Christianity in its faithfulness to Scripture as it replaces papal rule with a political order of its own. The New Testament

Epistles

R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity's N e w Testament classical source, however, did not d r a w only o n the gospels, which center o n the life and teachings of Jesus of Nazareth. Its leaders deduced some political notions from the Epistles, which also center on Jesus Christ, but more specifically on the meaning of his life and teachings for the life of the early church, as interpreted by Paul the Apostle and by others w h o s e Epistles c o m e attached to n a m e s such as "Peter" and "James" and "John." Although the letters of Paul were probably written before the Gospels were produced in the f o r m we can read today, Paul never knew Jesus the rabbi of Nazareth, Jesus "after the flesh." Paul's Jesus Christ was the subject of a revela-

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tion, an experience m a t c h e d by all o t h e r believers w h o believed in Jesus b u t were n o t eyewitnesses. Paul, as revered a "classical source" as anyone in Reformation Christianity, was friendlier t h a n the Jesus of the Gospels to the political order. Again, there w e r e ambiguities. Paul the rabbi and R o m a n citizen could speak of that political order as the locale for "principalities and p o w e r s " that could w a r and did w a r against Jesus Christ and his believing people. Paul, also eschatologically m i n d e d , cont e n d e d that the time for such authorities to rule w a s short. T h e i r p o w e r s w e r e limited, as was to be evident as the n e w o r d e r that c a m e w i t h belief in Jesus was e m e r g i n g . Still, there was an i n d e t e r m i n a t e " m e a n t i m e , " and in that m e a n t i m e , Rabbi Paul, w h o m a d e radical breaches w i t h Jewish law, read his H e b r e w Bible w i t h an interest in a n c h o r i n g everything in nonlegal free grace effected by and e m b o d i e d in Jesus. In t h a t m e a n t i m e , Paul t h e R o m a n citizen—in s o m e biblical narratives, glimpsed as a p r o u d m a n w h o k n e w h o w to use his citizenship to survive and m a k e his w a y — s p o k e well of t h e a u t h o r i t y t h a t h a p p e n e d at t h a t t i m e to be R o m a n . In a f a m o u s passage in his letter to the church in R o m e (Romans 13), he provided a charter taken over wholesale into political i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by Martin Luther and fated to be central to the political theory in force in m a n y mainstream versions of R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity. Paul c o m m a n d e d every soul to be subject to the higher a u t h o r i t y — h e w a s s p e a k i n g of t h e very R o m a n e m p i r e that was harassing Christians!—considering it to be ordained of God. Thus, he insisted, it was worthy, even w h e n it acted unworthily; it merited obedience, and because it was a p p o i n t e d by G o d was n o t to be resisted. Expressed radically: To resist the authority was to go against the ordinance of God. O t h e r epistolary advice told believers to " h o n o r the king" and to be supportive of earthly g o v e r n m e n t , s o m e t h i n g that m a n y f o u n d hard to do in early Christian times. T h e y t h o u g h t it did n o t pay to offer allegiance because the world was ending and the rule was h a r s h — a f t e r all, the g o v e r n m e n t was persecuting t h e m . Many in the Reformation era of the sixteenth century also f o u n d such obedience h a r d to offer to their r u l i n g authorities, b o t h civil and religious. T h a t "higher authority" was for most of t h e m t h e n a mix of the papacy, which in their eyes had t o o m u c h of a hold o n t e m p o r a l affairs, a n d the holy R o m a n e m p e r o r , w h o s e interests did n o t m a t c h theirs and w h o tried to stem R e f o r m a t i o n impulses. Of course, the N e w T e s t a m e n t also in the Epistles was c o n c e r n e d that Christians get their priorities right, to give obeisance first to G o d and to relativize all political orders to God's directives. Such references inspired the politics of s o m e o n w h a t is o f t e n called the "left w i n g of the R e f o r m a t i o n , " the "radical Reform a t i o n . " T h e s e set themselves n o t only in opposition to the holy R o m a n emperor and the papacy b u t also against Protestant orders as these c a m e to prevail in m a n y territories and e m e r g e n t nations in n o r t h e r n and n o r t h w e s t e r n Europe. So

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there is no such thing as an unambiguous Protestant response to the charter docu m e n t s in their only determinative classical source, the Bible as interpreted by contending and differing Reformers. Early Christian

Thought,

Especially

Augustinian

Although most Protestant movements adopted the ancient creeds of the church, the Apostolic, Nicene, and Athanasian, these offer n o direct word about politics. Most found the ancient creedal formulas about the divine Trinity and the nature of Christ congenial, but these also did not include anything of a political nature. (Historians will note, however, that the way doctrinal formulas t u r n e d out was often influenced by politics.) Thus, emperors in the officially established Christian church in the fourth century c.e. took sides on doctrines, and some statements of church councils were influenced by the fact that an e m p e r o r was present at, or absent from, a council where these matters were to be decided. If these classical sources are generally silent on our subject, it was because they dealt with other than political questions. In turn, some unofficial writings f r o m the fourth century, when Christianity officially became the religion of the West, and f r o m the sixteenth century, when Western unity began to break up, did have influence, if not full authority. Most notable a m o n g these for the Reformers was the work of Saint Augustine of Hippo (d. 430), w h o in Civitas Dei (The City of God) wrote what certainly has to be called a classic Christian exposition of religion and politics in the Roman Empire. This was a b o o k that some called a "Charter for Christendom." That suffix "-dom" suggests dominion or rule, and Christendom really m e a n t that part of the world ruled by Christian authority. Papal Catholics may have read Augustine in one way, b u t m o s t Protestant Reformers read him in quite another. His classic The City of God differentiated between the concerns of the "earthly" and the "heavenly" city. It thus provided perspective as to what was really important—the heavenly city—and relativized the t e m p o r a l order. Still, Augustine gave that second r e g i m e n considerable weight. S o m e o n e has said that you do not write a 1,000-page b o o k explaining why Rome "fell" and take pains not to overassign blame to Christians for that fall, unless you have s o m e kind of regard for the t e m p o r a l city, in that case Rome. Augustine, in the eyes of the Reformers, did not give very hearty assent to the grandeur of political authority. At one time, he legitimated it as being necessary for h u m a n order, using the rather shady analogy (to political leaders) of thieves. Even bands of thieves, he noted, had t o select s o m e o n e a m o n g t h e m to lead them. Those Reformers w h o wanted to undercut the absolute authority of the rulers that they inherited, and even those w h o sometimes would limit those governances that they themselves had, often indirectly, helped set up, could use such a passage for perspective.

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W h a t Protestants mainly t o o k f r o m Augustine and propelled into later history was a f o r m u l a t i o n of dualism. It was n o t an approach that left G o d o u t of half the picture, b u t it described different ways G o d was active in the world and in the "Kingdom of God," t h e n o f t e n identified w i t h the church catholic. ( O n e could p u t a m a r k e r here that says: "Watch this. It will show u p in Protestant theory.") S o m e P r o t e s t a n t s , L u t h e r p r e e m i n e n t l y , liked to talk a b o u t " t w o k i n g d o m s , " w i t h o u t letting G o d o u t of the picture in either o n e of t h e m . Caution: D o n o t equate the t w o cities w i t h "church" and "state," b u t realize that the church signifies, it points to, the fuller heavenly city. T h e R e f o r m e r s in general f o u n d themselves a t t a c k i n g m o s t of the classical sources of the R o m a n Catholicism of their day. They w o r k e d in t a n d e m with a b a n d of scholars called Humanists, w h o were developing critical historical tools and using t h e m on inherited d o c u m e n t s . S o m e such as the " D o n a t i o n of Cons t a n t i n e " t h e y s h o w e d to be a p u r e forgery, t h o u g h it h a d b e e n claimed as an instrument that gave authority also to the papacy and the R o m a n Catholic church to rule on earth. Such exposure of forgeries or such revisionist history concerning the contexts in which inherited d o c u m e n t s had appeared served to help m a k e possible the setting u p of an alternative authority to that of R o m e , t h o u g h it did n o t provide classical sources for the positive teaching and practice of Reformation Christianity. T o g e t h e r w i t h R o m a n Catholicism and O r t h o d o x Christianity, R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity subscribed to the authority of the Bible and the ancient creeds. However, because they viewed themselves as b o t h t r u e bearers of the Christian faith and renewers of the existing church, the R e f o r m e r s devoted m u c h effort to generating d o c u m e n t s reflecting their n e w understandings of Christianity. T h e classical sources of R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity, then, c a m e to include the d o c u m e n t s p r o d u c e d by R e f o r m a t i o n m o v e m e n t s and R e f o r m e r s . To t h e m we t u r n next, a l o n g w i t h an explanation of the t h e o r y (or theories) of politics advocated by R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity.

Reformation

Christianity's

Theory of

Politics

Given the centrality of Scripture to Reformation Christianity, it is n o surprise that translating the Bible i n t o m o d e r n E u r o p e a n l a n g u a g e s — t h e l a n g u a g e s of the p e o p l e — b e c a m e a m a j o r t h r u s t of the Reformers. Equally i m p o r t a n t was their effort to explain and debate the theology, as well as the political theory, they were proposing. T h e s e explanations and debates w e r e aimed at swaying the ecclesial powers that controlled the religious realm, and also the e m p e r o r s and kings w h o g o v e r n e d their respective d o m a i n s . For this reason, R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity's t h e o r y of politics was n o t identical t h r o u g h o u t C h r i s t e n d o m , b u t t o o k different f o r m s in different geographical locations. O u r survey of these R e f o r m a t i o n era

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classical sources corresponds to the places where they were created, the languages in which they were articulated, and the respective Protestant groups for which they became authoritative. The Church of England and

Anglicanism

Almost no Reformation movement came into being for the purpose of stating a theory of politics and the social order. At the same time, in almost no such movem e n t can one describe politics as being tangential—or certainly as unimportant. The nearest one comes to an exception as an agent of a political order, and it is an i m p o r t a n t exception indeed, is the C h u r c h of England, which b e c a m e the m o t h e r church for the worldwide Anglican C o m m u n i o n . This is the body that first severed itself f r o m the papacy during the reign of Henry VIII, w h o had fallen out with Roman Catholicism thanks largely to its disapproval of his personal marital vagaries. Of course, H e n r y ' s experience was n o t all that the Anglican Reformation was about. Decades before he came to power, John Wycliffe and the Wycliffites, the Lollards, and o t h e r m o v e m e n t s were restless with Rome. They set out on the dangerous task of providing Bible translations in English, the language of the c o m m o n people, which was a threat to the monarch regardless of w h e t h e r he or she was R o m a n Catholic or Protestant. They advocated much more authority by lay people than Rome was willing to tolerate. Some of t h e m w a n t e d to r e f o r m practices c o n n e c t e d with the sacraments, to accent grace instead of law in the path of salvation, or to attack the immorality of the clergy. But it was Henry's move that occasioned the original and central political adjustment. W h e n H e n r y broke with Rome, he appropriated all of the Roman Catholic church's property (e.g., churches, monasteries, and land) and functionaries (e.g., priests and bishops), which were renamed the Church of England, m u c h like a m o d e r n hostile corporate takeover. That move m e a n t that the Church of England claimed that it was the direct and proper successor to the Apostles. Its bishops, n o longer obedient to the pope, they contended, were in unbroken succession to the Apostles in the "historic episcopate" and possessed special authority for that reason. In a move consolidating the power of the secular and sacred into one office, the English monarch in 1534 officially became the head of the Church of England and, equally officially, the Defender of the Faith. This m e a n t royal supremacy over the church. Of course, this change did not go unchallenged. Briefly, after 1553, the ardent Roman Catholic Q u e e n Mary Tudor reverted to Catholic monarchical ways. But still much of Henry's approach remained, and it was restored when n o n - R o m a n Catholic monarchs again acceded. And there were challenges f r o m those w h o favored Presbyterian ways—ruling through "elders"—or separatist and "congregational" modes (these related, for example, to the Puritan tradition). But Henry's

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I Martin Ε. Marty \ basic a p p r o a c h d o m i n a t e d . T h r o u g h o u t the centuries, the C h u r c h of England domestically has devoted m u c h of its energy to c a n o n law, to retaining a church established by law, to being the would-be official expression of the faith of the English people, and to issues of authority. All the while, it identified ever m o r e w i t h doctrines, e m b o d i e d in its "Thirty-Nine Articles," that w e r e expressive of Protestant views of divine grace. T h e r e are, indeed, s o m e classical sources for Anglican politics. But in m o s t cases they manifest theologically s o m e t h i n g of a hit-and-miss character, an adjustm e n t to circumstances, active as these w e r e in the church's necessary political a d j u s t m e n t s and inventions. T h e s e w e r e u r g e n t because in almost all cases religious r e f o r m was connected to impulses of popular dissent. In all those cases, it was necessary to f o r m u l a t e n e w ways to rule. Scandinavian

Lutheranism

S o m e t i m e s t h e t r a n s i t i o n w a s easy. W h e n R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity c a m e to Scandinavia—to Sweden and D e n m a r k and w h a t was to b e c o m e N o r w a y — t h e Catholic bishops b e c a m e Lutheran, and the civil rulers, having d e t e r m i n e d to follow a L u t h e r a n path and to break w i t h R o m e , ruled m u c h as they had previously. Of course, they n o longer inhibited the L u t h e r a n s w h o represented Reformation Christianity. Instead, they gave t h e m support, and the o n c e - R o m a n Catholic establishment n o w b e c a m e the L u t h e r a n establishment. Even there, however, o n e w o u l d have to say that the t h e o r y of politics and the social o r d e r was tangential and did n o t issue in n e w classical sources. N o S o u t h e r n E u r o p e a n or M e d i t e r r a n e a n jurisdiction b e c a m e part of Reform a t i o n Christianity. O n e looks in vain in Italy and Spain, for example, to discern Protestant theories. T h a t leaves central Western Europe, w h a t b e c a m e or already was Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and f r o m t i m e to time France, to p r o b e theories of politics in R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity. T h e r e o n e m u s t m a k e a distinction b e t w e e n t w o general families of Protestantism: w h a t may be called the "magisterial" Reformation, and the radical Reformation. The Magisterial

Reformation

First, t h o u g h there is n o g o o d and agreed-upon n a m e for it—but observers recognize it w h e n they see i t — w e t u r n to the m o r e "established" f o r m of Protest a n t i s m . S o m e call it "magisterial," b e c a u s e it b e c a m e expressive of a t y p e of authority that was coexistent w i t h t e m p o r a l rule. Today, o n e m i g h t call it "mainstream" Protestantism, which in almost all cases had once been the state faith during s o m e regime or in s o m e territory. O v e r against this, there is a dissenting version of Protestantism, w h i c h w a s sometimes, as has b e e n noted, called the "left-wing," the "radical Reformation," t h e n o n e s t a b l i s h e d version. Except f o r brief periods in isolated circumstances

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when a charismatic and theocratic ruler declared divine authority for his leadership of a movement, this wing of the Reformation did not set up political authority. On the contrary: It often was inhibited and persecuted not only by Catholic but also by newly established Protestant leaders. Both camps of Reformation Christianity produced d o c u m e n t s that, if they often do lack authority, provide perspective and historical reference points. This is the case even where later developments, such as the rise of democracy, both forced and lured such leaders into situations of drastic change. W h a t I am leading up to here is a fundamental fact about mainstream Protestant Reformation Christianity, a fact that flies in the face of many popular perceptions of P r o t e s t a n t politics and polity. So heartily did m o s t Protestants embrace the separation of church and state w h e n it came, for example, to the y o u n g United States, that their heirs like to think that Reformation Christianity invented such separation, such differentiation of authorities. Not at all—or at least not entirely. Ironically, in the face of such thought, Reformation Christianity in central Europe at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 found mainstream Protestant leaders accepting the idea that, in Latin form, contended cuius regio, eins religio: Whoever rules a region determines its religion. We have already seen this idea operating in realms such as Sweden. The d o c u m e n t sealing the Peace of Augsburg may be read by few later Protestants, but it has to be seen as a classical source, even if it serves as an example of what later Protestants repudiate. Alongside the "magisterial Reformation," and contributing significantly to its formulation of a politics, were several leading Reformers. If one wishes to speak of "classical Reformers," it is natural to turn to Martin Luther and John Calvin. Martin

Lutherand

Lutheranism

Most influential was Martin Luther, the German Catholic m o n k turned Reformer, w h o m many regarded as the prime embodiment of the Reformation. Historians today are less ready than often before to let any of the early-sixteenth-century figures be seen as heroic initiators. They will observe instead that scores of restless people and m o v e m e n t s had b e g u n to question R o m a n authority and politics. Then, as is so often the case, one figure comes forward as a charismatic, beguilingly attractive (and at the same time, to others alienating) personification. It has been said that this Luther-led (and later, Lutheran) part of the Reformation started as a revolt of the junior faculty at a new backwater university in Wittenberg. From the start, Luther's reform was definitely not about politics. It had to do centrally with the question of how the sinful person found a gracious God and came to proper terms with God. Luther's familiar formula was that the people were "justified by grace through faith" and not by obedience to the law or good works. But o n e could n o t use such a teaching as a direct assault on R o m a n

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Catholicism and the Holy R o m a n Empire, especially if that teaching successfully attracted many, w i t h o u t c o m i n g t h r o u g h with theories about w h a t was w r o n g w i t h the old order and h o w to address the new. T h e official and thus classical L u t h e r a n source for doctrine and for providing coherence was a set of "confessions," such as the Augsburg Confession of 1530 and the collection that included it, the Book of Concord, fifty years later. Anyone w h o c o m p a r e s these t o the official writings of the C h u r c h of England will see that there is in t h e m very little of positive political construction or c o m m e n t . T h e sources here instead are unofficial, chiefly the writings of L u t h e r himself. At t h e h e a r t of Luther's political t h e o r y and practice is t h e o c e n t r i s m — G o d r u l e s — a t h e m e t h a t similarly p e r v a d e d t h e politics of J o h n Calvin a n d o t h e r b r a n c h e s of R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity. For these Reformers, G o d was the center of it all. Of course, R o m a n Catholics also w o u l d have agreed to that, b u t they w o u l d have applied the affirmation quite differently. Papal Catholicism set o u t to keep together, if in s o m e tension, Augustine's "two cities"—what L u t h e r called " t w o r e g i m e n t s . " Such R e f o r m a t i o n Christians saw little tension b e t w e e n the two, even w h e n relations w e r e in fact practically tense. For L u t h e r and Lutherans, G o d ruled the church, representing the heavenly city, t h r o u g h the Gospel, the g o o d n e w s of G o d ' s g r a c e in Christ. T h a t r e a l m s h o u l d n o t be ruled by law. G o d ruled the o t h e r r e g i m e n t , the earthly city (or k i n g d o m , or reality), t h r o u g h the l a w — b o t h divine and h u m a n . It dare n o t be governed by the Gospel. Such governance w o u l d cheapen h u m a n affairs and sentimentalize t h e m to the point that chaos w o u l d result. Sinners cannot live witho u t the Gospel; they cannot be saved apart from it—just as they cannot be saved by the law. Societies c a n n o t live w i t h o u t g o v e r n m e n t ; anarchy m e a n t death. So G o d initiated b o t h r e g i m e n t s and is served in b o t h . W h a t this has to do with politics in particular is the following. T h e civil ruler, w h o m a y or may n o t be a Christian, w h o as Christian w o u l d be governed by the Gospel, and w h o may n o t recognize G o d at all, can still serve G o d t h r o u g h w h a t L u t h e r called "civil r i g h t e o u s n e s s . " In slang t e r m s , y o u d o n o t get to h e a v e n through civil righteousness, but you serve G o d through it. Luther was m o r e ready to live u n d e r a just and intelligent non-Christian ruler than he w o u l d be u n d e r a fellow Christian w h o was unjust and unwise. T h e other regiment meanwhile lives by "the righteousness that avails before God." This m e a n s Christian faith in the g o o d n e w s of w h a t the same G o d has d o n e in Christ. In s o m e respects, the L u t h e r a n classic approach gives great space to w h a t we can call the secular realm. In its n a m e o n e does n o t have to baptize the secular o r d e r t h r o u g h t e r m i n o l o g y (e.g., by calling it a Christian n a t i o n , b e c a u s e t h e majority of people in it identify as Christians). O n e moves freely in it, seeking justice along w i t h secular people and those of o t h e r religions, believers and unbelievers alike. (John Calvin, we shall see, has a s o m e w h a t different take on this.)

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The upside of the Lutheran approach for participation in the political order is seen in that people w h o have a sense of vocation, a calling, serve God. This vocation liberates t h e m for all kinds of "secular," "worldly," and ordinary activity that is ecclesiastically on a par with the calling of clergy and monastics in Catholicism. T h e r e is a downside, which is the abdication of responsibility for the secular realm. The Lutheran tradition in Europe turned over m u c h church governance to electors, princes, and temporal rulers, w h o were to be obeyed (after the manner of Paul in Romans 13) more than resisted. Luther did allow for resistance for the sake of the church, but those circumstances were rare. By the way, he himself resisted, when in 1521 at the Diet of Worms he stood before the secular ruler, the e m p e r o r and not the pope, and defied him—an act which helped lead to the breakup of unified Western Christendom. In that legacy, nations with L u t h e r a n majorities a m o n g Protestants, m o s t notably Germany, often saw the development of obedient, acquiescent, supine, uncritical Christians in the face of evil r e g i m e s — m o s t notably Nazism. T h e c o m m a n d to be obedient often even led Lutherans into explicit support of "the powers that be" (Paul's t e r m in Romans 13), evil though they be. The Lutheran f o r m of polity works best w h e n the civil order is ruled benignly, where people in ordinary lives can freely live out their vocation in service to God. It works least well when there should well be religious resistance to evil under authority. Luther was capable of seeing the church as an instrument of criticism in the state, and he w r o t e a treatise q u e s t i o n i n g unlimited submission to "secular authority." But his approach had granted so m u c h to civil authority that it was always hard for Lutherans to rise up in criticism and counteraction. The general tendency was for Lutherans to be acquiescent in and supportive of the policies of governing authorities, often at the expense of the prophetic voice they claimed. Although Luther, m o r e than anyone else, s h o o k up the p o w e r bloc of the Holy R o m a n Empire, the R o m a n Catholic Church, and the pope, and t h o u g h o t h e r Protestants learned f r o m him, his polity was very m u c h attuned to the changing times, to his m o m e n t . It continued to have influence in Germany and Scandinavia. But very little of it ever was w e l c o m e d in England or reached America in large e n o u g h m e a s u r e to have a shaping role. T h a t role belongs much m o r e to the heritage of John Calvin, author of other classical sources for Reformation politics. John Calvin and the Calvinist-Reformed

Tradition

J o h n Calvin was a French lawyer w h o chose to participate in and t h e n lead reforms in Geneva and, through it, in m u c h of Switzerland. In the mix of European boundaries and influences in his time, Calvin also helped shape what came to be called Reformed Protestantism in the Netherlands and in John Knox's Scotland (e.g., Puritanism, Presbyterianism, and Congregationalism). The Reformed

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124 I Martin Ε. Marty \ tradition also c a m e to have m o r e influence on the C h u r c h of England's theology than did Lutheranism. As a lawyer, Calvin w a s b e t t e r trained and m o r e capable of envisioning the implications of a political order than was his G e r m a n c o u n t e r p a r t Luther, w h o was a professor of Scripture. Calvin's Geneva b e c a m e the m o d e l for a R e f o r m e d polity, just as Massachusetts Bay, u n d e r the Calvin-influenced Puritans, w a s later to b e c o m e . Formal Calvinism did anything b u t "separate church and state" or, in J a m e s Madison's t e r m , it only d r e w a thin, blurred, and i n t e r r u p t e d "line of distinction b e t w e e n religion and the civil authority." Geneva, Switzerland's u r b a n center, had n o r o o m for outsiders or dissenters. Under Calvin's leadership, its laws w e r e to be divine laws. T h e confessions of the Calvin-influenced churches, docu m e n t s such as the Westminster Confession, reflected m o r e concern than did the L u t h e r a n confessions for political order. Halfway t h r o u g h the twentieth century, theologian H. Richard Niebuhr w r o t e a seminal b o o k called Christ and Culture, which offered a useful typology of h o w Christians related to their social and political e n v i r o n m e n t . T w o of the five types m a t t e r here. Luther's approach, says Niebuhr, saw Christ and culture "in paradox." Such a t h e o r y could n e g a t e and it could a f f i r m the political order, seeing church and culture always in tension. In contrast, according to Niebuhr, Calvin was devoted to "Christ t r a n s f o r m i n g culture." T h a t is, t h r o u g h responsible citiz e n s h i p and activities o n e w o r k e d t o see t h e "secular" o r d e r t r a n s f o r m e d into ever m o r e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h w h a t t h e e t e r n a l city, t h e r e g i m e n t of G o d , w o u l d effect. Calvin w a s as t h e o c e n t r i c as L u t h e r . I n d e e d , s o m e see L u t h e r as b e i n g so Christ centered and Gospel centered that he slighted the sovereignty, the majesty, and the governing will of God. Calvin started with that sovereignty, and in a way "fit grace in" as the second t h e m e . Calvin, like Luther, drew distinctions b e t w e e n c h u r c h a n d state, b e t w e e n t h e t w o r e g i m e n t s t h a t t h e y r e p r e s e n t e d . But in Calvin's view, the state should be Christian, p r o m o t e Christianity, live by Christian n o r m s , and develop laws c o n g r u e n t w i t h Christian calls to justice as defined in the Bible. In s o m e respects, Calvin's approach was a kind of reversion to w h a t medieval Catholicism had represented. Calvinism was m o r e ready and able to confront evil in the governmental realm t h a n Lutheranism because for it the church h a d the mission of p u r g i n g the political order of evil and even of r u n n i n g that political order w h e r e possible. Churchly officials held s o m e f o r m s of state power. T h e classic source of Calvinism is Calvin's m o n u m e n t a l The Institutes

of the Christian Religion, w h i c h w a s q u i t e

explicit about theories of politics and governance. T h e civil order was to p r o m o t e religious life. It was n o t to be neutral. Calvin's also was m o r e of a r e w o r k i n g of Old Testament motifs, because he was less afraid of elders and rulers being active

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on the lines of Mosaic rule. The language of American Puritans showed that they wanted to be seen as a city set upon a hill, a colony that ruled out outsiders, an authority that legislated on the basis of divine law. In qualified ways, this approach entered the American mainstream. It is seen most regularly almost half a millennium after Calvin when, even in a pluralist society, there are impulses by some to create a kind of "evangelicaldom." In this case, the "dominion" would be a church-informed government that p r o m o t e s piety and religiously based morality. John Knox in Scotland, by the way, in the style of Calvinism, resisted m o n a r c h s w h e n they, in his terms, " c o m m a n d [ e d ] impiety." Knox was also more ready than Luther to authorize insurrection against ungodly rulers. The Radical

Reformation

From all these magisterial figures and movements, we turn to the radical Reformation—left-wing, radical, dissenting, outsider f o r m s of R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity. O f t e n in their day they were called Anabaptist (literally "rebaptizer"), because most of t h e m did not believe in infant baptism, which they associated with Rome and magic or superstition. Because they strongly advocated that theology be rooted in the Bible, and they concluded that the N e w Testament called for adult baptism, they insisted on "believers' baptism," involving adults w h o could make their own profession of faith. So they rebaptized; hence, the name. Under the umbrella of Anabaptism are subsumed highly diverse movements in which theories of politics and social order, largely negations of the Catholic and magisterial Reformation resolutions, were central. For their radical beliefs and practices these Anabaptists, n o n e of w h o s e leaders had n a m e s to m a t c h Henry VIII, Luther, or Calvin for recognition, suffered under both Catholic and Protestant regimens. Menno Simons, after w h o m Mennonites are named; Conrad Grebel; Sebastian Franck; and the truly radical T h o m a s Muentzer—all led smaller movements against the dominant theological stream. These often downplayed the sacraments (Baptism and the Lord's Supper), to which they felt mainstream Protestants gave too much stress. Their t h e m e was discipleship, or following after Christ, which d e m a n d e d high standards of personal appropriation of faith and a willingness to criticize officials of both church and state. They were leaders in p r o m o t i n g w h a t b e c a m e a m a j o r Protestant theme: separation of church and state. Their heirs in late colonial America, some Baptist and s o m e Quaker, t e a m e d up with leaders like T h o m a s Jefferson, n o friend of orthodox Christianity, to help topple establishments in religion. Many Anabaptists, t h o u g h they regarded g o v e r n m e n t or magistracy as ordained by God, were not free to hold office. It was too compromising. In H. Richard Niebuhr's terms, they represented "Christ against culture." T h e main-

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stream R e f o r m a t i o n culture's t h e o c e n t r i s m r e m a i n e d b u t c a m e n o w with a different twist. In the radicals' a r g u m e n t , g o v e r n m e n t held the sword, and the fact of that possession left it a priori outside the realm of Christ. G o o d g o v e r n m e n t in that respect was as bad as bad g o v e r n m e n t . O u t of this view c a m e s o m e of the pacifist m o v e m e n t s . T h e s e "peace c h u r c h e s " t h o u g h t that t h e discipleship of believers, n o t citizen-in-government activities, was the i n s t r u m e n t by which G o d would w o r k justice in the world. In the respect that a Christian's relationship with G o d is viewed as p a r a m o u n t , the Anabaptist stress o n discipleship m o r e closely echoes the O r t h o d o x emphasis on the Eucharist than it does the variety of Protestant political theories. Because Anabaptists did n o t recognize Anglican ( " H e n r i c i a n , " if y o u will), L u t h e r a n , or Calvinist a u t h o r i t y any m o r e t h a n they w o u l d a R o m a n Catholic regimen, they were harassed or persecuted, s o m e t i m e s even executed by Protestant and Catholic alike. In America, their heirs also often suffered, m o s t notably w h e n Q u a k e r s of their lineage kept this pacifist and dissenting h e r i t a g e alive. Mary Dyer, a Quaker, was the only person hanged for religious reasons by Massachusetts Bay colonists (in 1662). Quakers, Mennonites, and o t h e r dissenters living in Pennsylvania during the Revolutionary War after 1776 m e t stigma and suffered harassment. At the s a m e time, m a n y of t h e m gained admiration for their personal ethics and their voluntary contributions to h u m a n good. T h u s they present still a n o t h e r m o d e l of R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity and (anti-)political theory.

The Medium

of Expressing

Politics

in Reformation

Christianity

Reformation Christianity, being so internally diverse, issued m a n y f o r m s of relation t o t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d . T h e C h u r c h of E n g l a n d and, i n s o f a r as they w e r e established by law, o t h e r P r o t e s t a n t churches, h a d to be p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h law, t h o u g h L u t h e r a n s generally t o o k pains t o n o t e that t h e laws w e r e n o t as such "Christian." They were merely laws—congruent, one hoped, with what one k n e w of God's c o m m a n d m e n t s and justice. Calvinism, however, was m o r e ready to use the m e d i u m of law. T h e o l o g y was strong in the R e f o r m a t i o n s of Knox, Luther, and Calvin. Most of their political t h o u g h t came in preaching and theological proclamation. Each of t h e m w o u l d have described his w o r k and vocation as being wholly centered in theology. Unlike Anglicans, they w o u l d have had to say that political t h e o r y and action, however urgent and G o d pleasing, were secondary. Liturgy played a part in the established Protestantisms, m o s t notably in the C h u r c h of England. In lands w h e r e the ruler and thus the realm t u r n e d Protestant, the leaders t o o k over the great Catholic cathedrals f r o m medieval times. In those surroundings, they enacted coronations, blessed military forces, m o u r n e d those killed in battle, and sanctioned the acts of lawmakers. T h e s e milieus con-

i reformation christianity

j u r e d u p a sense of i m p o r t a n c e , of divine authority standing b e h i n d h u m a n action. Even in a highly pluralist society like the United States, Catholic and Protestant alike keep something of this sense alive. In September 2001, after terrorist attacks on N e w York and Washington and thus on the whole nation, it was natural that memorial observances be held in the awesome arched nave of Washington National Cathedral, an Episcopal sanctuary. The solemn event signaled to all the gravity of the occasion, and the blessing and care of God over the civil order, celebrated on religious soil. It was not a direct "sectarian" expression of Episcopalianism, which by now in the United States represents an out-of-power religious minority. As for institutions, these varied. In some cases, there were efforts to replicate all the supportive institutions inherited f r o m medieval Catholicism. The universities with their law faculties in G e r m a n y and Scandinavia turned Lutheran and enhanced the claims of Reformation Christianity. In Geneva, Calvin invented "the academy" to sustain and reinforce the t h e m e s of his politics u n d e r God. But most institutions were tangential to the understanding of churchly political theory and action. Narrative played its part in developing political t h e o r y and action a m o n g Reformation Christianity's founders and heirs. Protestantism is more often a storied faith than a chiefly sacramental one. Lutherans and Calvinists could h o n o r theologians and p r o m o t e their tomes a m o n g specialists. But by telling their stories, they also made it possible for the laity to grasp what was going on. Many of these stories appeared in sermons, which took narratives f r o m the Gospels and applied t h e m to daily contemporary life. Often these and other stories developed against the background of the narrative of developing freedom apart from the medieval Catholic political order. John Foxe's Book of Martyrs, a bestseller in England and the American colonies, was one of the better known of the accounts of what dire things happened as a result of Catholic monopolies and oppression. Over against these, authors told stories of freedom, deliverance, and covenant making a m o n g the heirs of the Reformation.

The Message

of Reformation

Christianity's

Politics

Despite all the diversity, the seven theses mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, which have been developed above in detail, are constant and appear across m u c h of the scope of Reformation Christianity. Therefore, in s u m m i n g up the message of the Reformers' politics, we return to the theses. First, God is in control. God is at the center of life and all that happens. Politics that is not God-centered may be effective, but Christians have to bring Godcentered interpretations to any polity. Thus they might live under "the Turk," the Muslim authority, a constant threat that they would not welcome. But they would

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n o t say G o d h a d a b a n d o n e d t h e w o r l d , creation, or t h e political o r d e r simply because the T u r k c a m e to rule in the s o u t h e a s t e r n part of the W e s t e r n Catholicturning-Protestant territory. Second, the Scriptures tend to be normative. Although h u m a n s may use their intellect and i m a g i n a t i o n to set u p institutions of c h u r c h and state, in the e n d m o s t leaders in R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity w a n t e d to m a k e their case by referring to the Bible, however m u c h adapting they m u s t do because they were n o t ancient Israel and m u c h had h a p p e n e d since the period of Scripture f o r m a t i o n . Third, G o d w o r k s in t w o different ways t h r o u g h t w o different cities, realms, or regiments. In one, clearly, the Gospel rules, t h o u g h there m a y be church laws to s u p p o r t it. Its p u r p o s e is the salvation of sinners and the developing of comm u n i t y a m o n g m e m b e r s , b e f o r e they go o u t into the w o r l d to d o g o o d . In the other, the law of God, the effort is to establish and s u p p o r t a sphere in which G o d is active for the sake of h u m a n good, t h r o u g h agencies of justice and protection. For R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity, these can be related in a variety of ways. But it is rare to picture any responsible leader or follower w h o would advocate doing away with the civil sphere, and it w o u l d be unthinkable to see h i m or her let the instrum e n t of salvation slip. Fourth, Christians are called to obedience in the civil and political realms, b u t rarely is their response seen as absolute obedience. Most of R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity could picture the legitimation of dissent and, w h e n the Gospel is at stake, even of insurrection. Christians are called to live u n d e r the Gospel in the churchly realm. T h e r e m a y be m a n y degrees of intermingling b e t w e e n the t w o cities, realms, or regiments, b u t Reformation Christians do n o t picture a complete blurring of the lines or m e r g e r of one into the other. Fifth, Reformation Christianity was a move away f r o m the secluded monastery and convent, f r o m the hierarchical church into a world that celebrated and authorized the vocation of lay people. This was called the "priesthood of all believers" and was easily rendered by analogy from the churchly to the civil realm. Sixth, d e m o c r a c y t h u s was b e i n g prefigured b u t never fully realized in early R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity. Protestants w h o claimed that they invented democracy were well advised to send a card of thanks to leaders in the Enlightenment and forces of modernity. But as democratic thinking and republican realization developed, Protestants could find m a n y anticipations of it and authorizations for it. Seventh, in the twentieth century Paul Tillich discerned better than most w h a t he called "the Protestant protest" in the n a m e of "prophetic Christianity." (One did n o t have to be a Protestant to exemplify it.) In the political realm, the heirs of R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity—responsive to the language of the H e b r e w prophets, w h o criticized Israel and n o t only its enemies, and to Jesus, w h o attacked the relig i o u s and civil forces o n w h i c h people a r o u n d h i m r e l i e d — m u s t criticize their o w n polis, their city, nation, church, and cause.

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Reformation Christianity and Nonbelievers: People outside the Tradition

Politics

and

H o w does Reformation Christianity's politics deal with nonbelievers? To this final question, no single answer suffices, partly because the definition of "nonbeliever" varies to such a great extent from age to age. Predominantly, given the nature of the times, the different subgroups of sixteenth-century Reformation Christianity tended to label anyone not of their particular stripe a nonbeliever, regardless of whether they were from a different Christian denomination or simply nonChristian. In the twenty-first century, a greater degree of tolerance prevails. Inevitably, those forms of Reformation Christianity that are established hand in glove with government will be more ready to demean and inhibit or even exile or execute radical and open dissenters w h o are m e m b e r s of other faiths. Almost inevitably, clashes developed between the various expressions of Reformation Christianity and Catholicism, even to the point that each saw the other as "nonbeliever," or "anti-Christ." Terrible experience such as the Thirty Years' War (1618-48) showed that the "other" could be demonized and subjected to death. At the same time, almost from the beginning, there were theologies, theories, and patterns of action that worked for some measure of tolerance. Some on the left wing of the Reformation in England, the Puritan sects, first openly promoted tolerance of the other. With the infusion of Enlightenment thought and the politics of tolerance in England and in n o r t h w e s t e r n Europe, very gradually more "live-and-let-live" policies developed. Some Reformers, like Luther, voiced a theology that provided great space for the nonbeliever. However, in action it was o f t e n obscured, and Luther himself spoke obscenely of e x i l i n g j e w s and b u r n i n g synagogues, and of m a k i n g war against "the Turks." Yet m o s t of the dealing with the "other" occurred between Protestants and Catholics. Centuries later, most versions of Reformation Christianity promote tolerance, dialogue, and constructive engagement with Muslims, Jews, Catholics, and others, though some in reaction have withdrawn into "fundamentalism" or sought purity t h r o u g h isolationist sectarianism. As they c o n f r o n t o t h e r religions and o t h e r polities, the heirs of R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity are free to develop subthemes f r o m their spiritual heritage, which in a pluralist and interactive world can b e c o m e major themes.

Conclusion In the many parts of the world w h e r e Protestants are n o t well represented— places where Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, or others dominate—the Protestant role in politics is negligible. At the same time, nations that interact with Western European, North American, and n o w Sub-Saharan African and other nations where Protestantism has a presence will find good reason to study Protes-

136 I Martin Ε. Marty

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t a n t a p p r o a c h e s t o politics. S u c h s t u d y will h e l p explain s o m e of t h e a c t i o n s of t h e s e n a t i o n s a n d t h e i r residents. At t h e s a m e t i m e , citizens o f n a t i o n s s u c h as t h e U n i t e d States have a special r e a s o n f o r t r a c k i n g P r o t e s t a n t w a y s in t h e p o l i t i c a l o r d e r . W e l l o v e r h a l f t h e A m e r i c a n p e o p l e identify t h e m s e l v e s as m e m b e r s of religious b o d i e s t h a t are classified as P r o t e s t a n t , a n d t h e m o r e i n t e n s e a m o n g t h e m t r y t o p u t s o m e aspects o f this P r o t e s t a n t f a i t h t o w o r k in t h e political a n d g o v e r n m e n t a l o r d e r s . T h u s , in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s — w h e r e p e o p l e s p e a k of " t h e n e w C h r i s t i a n right," w h i c h is a l m o s t w h o l l y P r o t e s t a n t , o r of " m a i n l i n e P r o t e s t a n t activists"—Protest a n t s a n d n o n - P r o t e s t a n t s alike n e e d t o m a k e s e n s e of t h e d e p o s i t of R e f o r m a t i o n C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d t h e P r o t e s t a n t p r e s e n c e in society. T h e y will r a r e l y m e e t s o m e o n e w h o exactly replicates o r p u t s t o w o r k t h e politics t h a t s u c h R e f o r m e r s as L u t h e r , Calvin, o r t h e N e w E n g l a n d P u r i t a n s w a n t e d t o establish. But t h e aftere f f e c t s o f t h e i r m o v e m e n t s r e m a i n in t h e n e w c e n t u r y a n d s h o w f e w s i g n s o f dissipating.

Suggested

Readings

Bouyer, Louis. The Spirit and Forms of Protestantism. Cleveland: World, 1964. Brown, Robert McAfee. The Spirit of Protestantism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Dillenberger, John, and Claude Welch. Protestant Christianity Interpreted through Its Development. New York: Scribner's, 1954. Forell, George. The Protestant Faith. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1960. Martin, Martin E. Protestantism: Its Churches and Cultures, Rituals and Doctrines, Yesterday and Today. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1972; New York: Doubleday, 1974. Mehl, Roger. The Sociology of Protestantism. London: SCM, 1970. Pauck, Wilhelm. The Heritage of the Reformation. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1961. Sanders, T h o m a s G. Protestant Concepts of Church and State: Historical Backgrounds and Approaches for the Future. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964. Schmidt, Jean Miller. Souls or the Social Order: The Two-Party System in American Protestantism. New York: Carlson, 1991. Tillich, Paul. The Protestant Era. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. Tinder, Glenn. The Political Meaning of Christianity. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989. Wald, Kenneth D. Religion and Politics in the United States. New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1987. William, George H. The Radical Reformation. Philadelphia: John Knox, 1962. Wolf, Donald J., S.J. Toward Consensus: Catholic-Protestant Interpretations of Church and State. New York: Doubleday, 1968. Yoder, John Howard. The Politics of Jesus. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972.

Six I Classical Islam I John L. Esposito

w i t h Natana J. De

Long-Bas

ISLAM IS OFTEN DESCRIBED AS A "TOTAL WAY OF LIFE,"ENCOMPASSING BOTH THE PRIVATE

and the public spheres. Islam's holistic worldview does n o t recognize a division b e t w e e n public and private life, asserting instead that one's private beliefs should serve as the guiding force in all decision m a k i n g . In Islam, faith is n o t simply a m a t t e r of w h a t one believes (orthodoxy) b u t also includes w h a t o n e does (orthopraxy). Thus, in the Muslim u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the m e a n i n g and p u r p o s e of faith, religion cannot be separated f r o m social and political life because religion informs every action that a person undertakes. "Islam" is an Arabic w o r d m e a n i n g "submission." A Muslim is o n e w h o submits to the will of God, seeking to follow and actualize God's will in history at b o t h the individual and c o m m u n a l levels. A d h e r e n c e to Islam m e a n s m e m b e r ship in the worldwide c o m m u n i t y of believers, giving the Muslim b o t h an individual and a corporate religious identity and placing u p o n the Muslim the responsibility n o t only to obey God's will b u t also to i m p l e m e n t it on earth in b o t h the private and public spheres. T h e responsibility of the believer to Islam and t h e Muslim c o m m u n i t y overrides all o t h e r social ties and responsibilities, w h e t h e r to family, tribe, ethnicity, or nation. Politics is therefore central to the Muslim faith because it represents the m e a n s by which Islam is to be carried o u t in the public sphere.

Classical

Sources of Islam on

Politics

T h e principal sources of Islam, to which Muslims look for guidance and inspiration, are the Q u r a n (the Word of God) and the Sunnah (example) of M u h a m m a d . Muslims believe that the Q u r a n is the eternal, literal, uncreated, and final Word of God, revealed to the p r o p h e t M u h a m m a d o n e final time over a period of 22 years

( 6 1 0 - 3 2 C.E.)

to serve as a guide for h u m a n k i n d (Q

2:185).

Rather than being

a n e w revelation, the Q u r a n claims to be the corrective to the one eternal message of G o d initially revealed to b u t c o r r u p t e d by Jews and Christians (Q

5:19).

It

contains 114 chapters (surahs) with a total of 6,000 verses (ayat) that are arranged according to length, rather than chronology. As G o d ' s W o r d , the Q u r a n is essentially a religious d o c u m e n t p r o c l a i m i n g God's existence, sovereignty, and will for h u m a n k i n d . It contains examples and lessons of G o d ' s i n t e r v e n t i o n and sovereignty in h u m a n history (Q

131

30:2-9)

in

132 I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | o r d e r to m a k e His will for h u m a n k i n d k n o w n . It is neither a law b o o k n o r a collection of legal prescriptions per se. Rather, it presents an ethical guide for m o r a l b e h a v i o r (doing g o o d and avoiding w h a t is w r o n g ) and building a j u s t society according to God's will. T h e s e guidelines for behavior necessarily have b o t h private and public dimensions. M u h a m m a d ' s role is that of an intermediary w h o received God's message and c o m m u n i c a t e d it. H e is a p u r e l y h u m a n p r o p h e t , r a t h e r t h a n a divine f i g u r e . M u h a m m a d enjoys special status a m o n g Muslims b o t h because of the message he received and because he is believed to have b e e n a perfect living m o d e l (sometimes popularly referred to as the living Q u r a n ) and interpretation of that message. T h u s , t h e S u n n a h of M u h a m m a d in b o t h his w o r d s a n d d e e d s e n j o y s authoritative scriptural status a m o n g Muslims. T h e Sunnah are recorded largely in the hadith (tradition) literature. T h e hadith, or prophetic traditions, are narrative reports that record the sayings and deeds of M u h a m m a d , d e m o n s t r a t i n g the living o u t of the Q u r a n ' s precepts and teachings. T h e y are used in c o n j u n c t i o n with the Q u r a n to d e t e r m i n e appropriate behavior and values. M u h a m m a d and the Q u r a n have thus b e e n pivotal to the f o r m u l a t i o n and d e v e l o p m e n t of Islamic law, traditions, rituals, and social practices. Central to Islam is the doctrine of tawhid, or absolute m o n o t h e i s m , in which G o d is the creator, sustainer, judge, and sovereign of the universe. God's will, as expressed in Islamic law, and rule are therefore comprehensive and applicable to all c r e a t u r e s a n d aspects of life. Unlike a secular a p p r o a c h , w h i c h c o n s i d e r s h u m a n reason to be the f u n d a m e n t a l point of reference, Islam, like m a n y o t h e r religions, looks to G o d as the u l t i m a t e source of authority and as the center of the universe. All p o w e r and authority c o m e f r o m G o d and should reflect Q u r a n ic values. In cases w h e r e h u m a n reason and God's W o r d are in conflict, Muslims believe that God's Word should take precedence. T h e Q u r a n ' s overarching message a b o u t G o d is that G o d is a G o d of m e r c y (36:5, 21:107, a n d 29:51) and j u s t i c e (21:47). As j u d g e , G o d is the source of all r e w a r d s and p u n i s h m e n t s . T h e p u r p o s e of h u m a n beings is to serve as G o d ' s vicegerents or representatives, caring for all of creation and carrying o u t His Will. Islamic ethics are derived f r o m Q u r a n i c values and the special status and responsibility of h u m a n beings. T h e social o r d e r prescribed by the Q u r a n and Sunnah emphasizes the t h e m e s of social justice, the responsibility of all Muslims, particularly the wealthy, to care for the less f o r t u n a t e and oppressed, and the right and responsibility of the Muslim c o m m u n i t y to defend itself from aggression. W o m e n and o r p h a n s enjoy special protection in the Q u r a n . Redistribution of wealth is prescribed t h r o u g h the r e q u i r e m e n t that Muslims pay zakat, or an alms tax, of 2.5 percent of their total w e a l t h . Usury, or t h e collection of interest, is f o r b i d d e n b e c a u s e it serves as a m e a n s of exploiting the poor. False contracts are also d e n o u n c e d .

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T h r o u g h all of these declarations, the Q u r a n emphasizes the responsibility of the rich toward the p o o r and dispossessed. T h e previous guiding principles of tribal vengeance and retaliation are subordinated to a belief in God's justice and mercy, so that h u m a n - m a d e laws, bonds, justice, and customs are replaced by divinely prescribed laws. This new social order f u r t h e r proclaims that the purpose of all actions is the fulfillment of God's will, rather than serving the desires of tribes or self. By asserting the notion that all believers belong to a single universal community (ummah), M u h a m m a d sought to break the bonds of tribalism and place Muslims under a single prophetic leader and authority. The Quranic basis for consideration of the Muslim community as a political entity c o m e s f r o m Q u r a n 49:13, which proclaims that God " m a d e you into nations and tribes." The Q u r a n proclaims that, like Jews and Christians before them, Muslims have been called into a covenant relationship with God, making t h e m a community of believers w h o are to serve as an example to other nations (Q 2:143) by creating a moral social order. The Q u r a n states, "You are the best community evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong" (Q 3:110). This prescription has served as the Muslim rationale for political and moral activism throughout the centuries.

Islam's

Theory of

Politics

The Quranic prescription to enjoin what is right and forbid what is w r o n g serves as the springboard for an activist approach to politics in Islam. Muslims look to the Q u r a n and Sunnah not only for specific examples of M u h a m m a d ' s actions as a political head of state but also for values upon which to base the defense of the Muslim community and Islam (jihad) and a theory of the Islamic state. Muhammad

and the State

For Muslims, M u h a m m a d was not only the final prophet and the living embodiment of the Q u r a n through his words and deeds but also served as the religiopolitical leader of the first Muslim community. M u h a m m a d ' s first ten years of preaching in Mecca were marked more by resistance and oppression than by mass conversions. His claim to p r o p h e t h o o d gave him and his message a legitimacy and authority that undermined the wealthy and powerful in Mecca. He called for allegiance to the b r o a d e r Muslim community, t r a n s c e n d i n g tribal b o n d s and authority and breaking away f r o m the power structure based upon leadership by the tribe of Quraysh. T h e threat of M u h a m m a d ' s message to the wealthy and powerful in Mecca led to persecution of and attacks against M u h a m m a d and his followers. After ten years of p e r s e c u t i o n and violence at the h a n d s of the Meccans, M u h a m m a d and the early Muslims migrated to Medina, where M u h a m m a d was

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134 I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | invited to serve as an arbiter and judge b e t w e e n Muslims and non-Muslims. Eventually, M u h a m m a d was r e c o g n i z e d as the religious and political leader of the entire community, m a r k i n g a n e w phase in the Muslim experience. Rather than being rejected by society and being outside of the p o w e r structure, M u h a m m a d and the Muslims n o w f o u n d themselves in the position of leadership and power. In M e d i n a , t h e M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y p r o s p e r e d a n d grew. F r o m its b e g i n n i n g , therefore, Islam has contained a political dimension, with M u h a m m a d serving as the political leader of an a u t o n o m o u s community. Muslims look t o the e m i g r a t i o n (hijra) f r o m Mecca to Medina in 622 C.E. as b o t h a t u r n i n g point in M u h a m m a d ' s life and a m a j o r milestone and paradigm in Muslim history. For M u h a m m a d , it m a r k e d the beginning of his political and military leadership, in addition to his continuing role as prophet. D u r i n g the next ten years, M u h a m m a d forged the identity and religious practices of the Muslim community, consolidated its political base, t u r n e d it into a s t r o n g military force, and established its legal s y s t e m o n t h e basis of Islamic religious law. 622 C.E. also m a r k s the first year in the Muslim calendar (1 A.H., or "After the Hijra"). This dating m e t h o d is significant because it focuses attention on the birth of the Muslim community, rather t h a n o n the birth of M u h a m m a d (c. 570 C.E.) or the sending of the first revelation (610 C.E.). Rather t h a n e m p h a s i z i n g the central role of its prophet, selection of the first year after the hijra emphasizes the central role of the b r o a d e r Muslim community, reinforcing the public and thisworldly m e a n i n g of Islam as t h e realization of G o d ' s will o n e a r t h as carried o u t by t h e Muslim c o m m u n i t y . It is a s t a t e m e n t of b o t h the message and the mission of Islam. As political and military leader of the Muslim c o m m u n i t y in Medina, Muhamm a d used b o t h force and diplomacy in his e n g a g e m e n t s with the Meccans and in order to unite the tribes of Arabia u n d e r the b a n n e r of Islam. These engagements w e r e initially defensive in nature, serving to protect the fledgling Muslim comm u n i t y f r o m aggression. Several pivotal battles occurred b e t w e e n the early Muslims and the Meccans, providing symbols and p a r a d i g m s for Muslims of every time and place. T h e first m a j o r battle b e t w e e n the Muslims and the Meccans occurred at Badr in 624 C.E. In this military encounter, M u h a m m a d and his followers were greatly o u t n u m b e r e d by the Meccans. Nevertheless, the Muslims w e r e victorious. Muslims look to this battle as evidence of the righteousness of the Muslim cause and of God's favor u p o n the Muslims because the forces of G o d (monotheism) miraculously defeated the forces of unbelief (polytheism). T h e Q u r a n

(8:42

and

3:123)

records God's sanction and assistance to the Muslims, providing t h e m with victory. T h e Battle of Badr has therefore b e c o m e a sacred symbol for Muslims and has b e e n r e m e m b e r e d , c o m m e m o r a t e d , a n d r e f e r r e d to t h r o u g h o u t h i s t o r y w h e n e v e r Muslims have b e e n facing seemingly o v e r w h e l m i n g odds. For exam-

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pie, Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat used the code name "Operation Badr" for the 1973 Egyptian-Israeli war, believing that the use of Islamic symbols and slogans would both inspire and motivate his forces. The Muslims fought additional battles against the powerful Meccans (Uhud in 625 C.E. and the "Battle of the Ditch" or "Battle of the Trench" in 627 C.E.), after which the t w o parties agreed to a truce. However, by 630 C.E., M u h a m m a d charged the Meccans with breaking the truce. In response, he led an army of ten thousand against them. The Meccans surrendered without a fight. Although he could have demanded vengeance and plunder according to the n o r m s of the day, M u h a m m a d chose instead to grant his f o r m e r enemies amnesty. As a result, the majority of the Meccans converted to Islam and became part of the Muslim community, recognizing M u h a m m a d as both prophet and political leader. By 630 C.E., the Muslims controlled most of Arabia. As the n u m b e r and strength of this initial Muslim c o m m u n i t y grew, rulers engaged in offensive, as well as defensive, activities. Although defensive activities w e r e legitimated in the n a m e of self-defense and preservation of the ummah (community), offensive activities were launched by rulers and legitimated in the n a m e of Islam, although primarily driven by a desire for political expansion and economic gain. Jihad Like many other world religions, Islam is a religion that emphasizes peace and nonviolence. Islam and the Arabic word for peace, salaam, from which the comm o n Muslim greeting "Peace be u p o n you" comes, share the same root. Both convey a sense of order and social harmony, rooted in obedience to God's will. It is only through submission to the will of God and participation in the order that God has ordained that one can be at peace not only with God, but also with other h u m a n beings. However, like other world religions, Islam recognizes that there are also legitimate uses for violence. Jihad is mentioned in both the Q u r a n and the hadith and is often referred to as the "sixth pillar of Islam," although it has n o such official status. T h o u g h it is often mistranslated as "holy war," jihad actually means to "struggle" or "strive" and refers to the Quranic c o m m a n d to Muslims to exert themselves to realize God's will on earth, to live a v i r t u o u s life, to spread the Islamic c o m m u n i t y throughout the entire earth by preaching and teaching, and to fulfill the universal mission of Islam. Muslims are generally responsible for carrying out jihad both individually and communally. Jihad is often described as having two levels: internal and external. At the internal level, jtíiíiíi—or greater jihad—is a personal struggle within oneself to carry out God's will by leading a virtuous life and by spreading Islam through personal example, teaching, or preaching. The external level of jihad—or lesser jihad—

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136 I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | refers to the struggle to d e f e n d Islam and the Muslim c o m m u n i t y , w h e t h e r by w o r d s or by t a k i n g u p arms. G o d p r o m i s e s blessings u p o n those w h o strive to achieve His will. Q u r a n 9:20-22 states, "Those w h o have believed, emigrated and f o u g h t in the path of G o d with their lives are higher in rank in God's sight; and those are the winners. T h e i r Lord a n n o u n c e s to t h e m the g o o d n e w s of m e r c y f r o m H i m , g o o d pleasure and gardens wherein they have everlasting bliss; abiding therein forever. W i t h G o d is a great reward." T h a t is, one should n o t fear the loss even of one's o w n life in such striving because G o d will reward those w h o struggle in His cause. As the obligation to strive or struggle to realize God's will, jihad has, at times, b e e n interpreted to justify e n g a g e m e n t in holy w a r to struggle against injustice and evil and to spread and defend Islam. It was in this way that jihad b e c a m e part of Islam's doctrine of w a r and peace. However, jihad is n o t intended to be a military activity designed to spread the faith or w i n converts. T h e Q u r a n (2:156) proclaims, "There is n o compulsion in religion." Rather, conversions should be carried o u t t h r o u g h p e r s u a s i o n , e m p h a s i z i n g t h e i m p o r t a n c e of p r e a c h i n g and teaching. Violence is permissible only '"if we are aggressed against, if o u r land is u s u r p e d , we m u s t call for hitting the attacker and the aggressor to p u t an end to the aggression.'" 1 Jihad has s o m e t i m e s t a k e n o n aggressive f o r m s , as e x e m p l i f i e d by early extremist g r o u p s like the Kharijites. T h e Kharijites i n t e r p r e t e d t h e Q u r a n and Sunnah literally and believed that the Q u r a n i c injunction to " c o m m a n d the good and prohibit evil" was a religious m a n d a t e that was to be i m p l e m e n t e d absolutely and w i t h o u t c o m p r o m i s e at the political level. All h u m a n actions w e r e divided into t w o classifications: good and permissible or bad and forbidden. There was n o in-between category. T h e Kharijite worldview f u r t h e r divided the world into t w o clear, mutually exclusive spheres: the realm of believers (dar al-Islam), that is, Kharijites, and the realm of unbelievers or infidels (dar al-kufr), that is, those w h o did n o t share Kharijite beliefs, w h o w e r e necessarily the enemies of God. This division was particularly striking because it declared anyone w h o claimed to be a Muslim b u t did n o t share extremist Kharijite beliefs to be a non-Muslim and therefore outside of the t r u e Muslim community. Non-Kharijites w e r e considered apostates guilty of treason against the Islamic community, rendering t h e m liable to p u n i s h m e n t . Although they were to be called to repentance and acceptance of the Kharijite interpretation of Islam, refusal to b e c o m e Kharijites rendered t h e m enemies liable to being fought against and killed, even if such people were pious Muslims and regardless of h o w m i n o r such sins or differences were. T h e Kharijites' literal interpretation of the Q u r a n and S u n n a h affected their i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t w o concepts that b e c a m e the hallmarks of their m o v e m e n t : hijra and jihad. T h e first Muslim hijra occurred w h e n the Muslims left Mecca for Medina. T h e Kharijites interpreted this to m e a n that all Muslims m u s t engage in

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a hijra, or withdrawal, f r o m their society of origin to live in a Kharijite c o m m u nity. Jihad was u n d e r s t o o d as the literal, physical struggle against unbelief, which t h e Kharijites i n t e r p r e t e d t o b e n e c e s s a r y against any a n d all n o n - K h a r i j i t e s because all non-Kharijites were classified as enemies of God. T h e Kharijites characterized themselves as the soldiers of G o d fighting against the people of evil. Because they believed that they were instruments of God's justice and God's o w n righteous a r m y fighting against those w h o had usurped God's rule, they declared all m e t h o d s of warfare legal, legitimate, and obligatory for themselves, including violence, revolution, and guerrilla warfare. T h e y continu e d to lead rebellions against b o t h Umayyad and Abbasid rulers. C o n t e m p o r a r y ideologues like Egypt's Sayyid Q u t b and extremist g r o u p s today like the A r m e d Islamic G r o u p in Algeria and the international al-Qaida organization, share similar beliefs, a l t h o u g h this clearly is n o t the Q u r a n i c vision of h o w jihad is to be carried o u t because the Q u r a n clearly and expressly forbids aggressive violence. T h e proscription against aggressive violence in Islam is based u p o n Q u r a n 17:33: " D o n o t kill the life/soul that G o d has m a d e sacred except for just cause. W h o e v e r is killed unjustly, We have given his heir the p o w e r [to d e m a n d satisfaction]." T h e Q u r a n also clearly prohibits aggressive actions (Q 2:190): "And fight for the cause of G o d those w h o fight you, b u t do n o t be aggressive. Surely G o d does n o t like the aggressors." However, the Q u r a n g r a n t s permission to fight to people w h o have suffered aggression. Q u r a n 22:39-40 states: "Permission is given t o t h o s e w h o fight because they are w r o n g e d . Surely G o d is capable of giving t h e m victory. T h o s e w h o w e r e driven o u t of their h o m e s unjustly, m e r e l y f o r their saying: O u r Lord is G o d . ' H a d G o d n o t repelled s o m e people by others, surely m o n a s t e r i e s , churches, s y n a g o g u e s and m o s q u e s , w h e r e i n the n a m e of G o d is m e n t i o n e d frequently, would have been demolished. Indeed, G o d will supp o r t whoever supports H i m . G o d is surely Strong and Mighty." T h e Q u r a n also gives p e r m i s s i o n t o M u s l i m s to f i g h t f o r j u s t i c e f o r t h e oppressed. Q u r a n 4:74-76 states, " W h o e v e r fights in the way of G o d and is killed or conquers, We shall accord h i m a great reward. And why don't you fight for the cause of G o d and for the d o w n - t r o d d e n , m e n , w o m e n and children, w h o say: 'Lord, bring us o u t of this city w h o s e inhabitants are u n j u s t and g r a n t us, from You, a protector, and g r a n t us, f r o m You, a supporter.' T h o s e w h o believe fight for the cause of G o d , and t h o s e w h o disbelieve fight on behalf of Satan. Fight then the followers of Satan. Surely the guile of Satan is weak." Thus, the Q u r a n m a k e s it clear that fighting in God's cause m e a n s seeking to reassert God's order o n earth, particularly with respect to social justice. Fighting for the sake of justice for the oppressed is permissible. Fighting to maintain an u n j u s t order is not. Classical Islamic law provides very strict and highly detailed regulations about the carrying o u t of jihad as a physical struggle or fight. Jihad is never to be an arbitrary action or to be used for the acquisition of personal power,

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138 I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | wealth, or p r o p e r t y or to forcibly convert anyone to Islam. T h e only "valid" conversions according to b o t h the Q u r a n and Islamic law are those which occur from the heart due to personal conviction. The Islamic

State

Historically, Islam has served as t h e religious ideology for the f o u n d a t i o n of a variety of Muslim states, including g r e a t Islamic e m p i r e s ( U m a y y a d (661-750 C.E.),

Abbasid (750-1258 C.E.), O t t o m a n (1281-1924

C.E.),

Safavid (1501-1722

C.E.),

and Mughal (1526-1857 C.E.). In each of these empires and other sultanate states, Islam i n f o r m e d the state's legal, political, educational, and social institutions. T h e Muslim vision of political and social o r d e r is based u p o n the p u r p o s e for which Muslims believe G o d created h u m a n beings. T h e Q u r a n teaches that G o d has given the e a r t h as a trust to h u m a n k i n d (Q 2:30, 6:165). Muslims therefore see themselves as God's representatives w i t h a divine m a n d a t e to establish God's rule on earth in order to institutionalize an Islamic Order that is expected to result in the creation of a just society. "You are the best c o m m u n i t y ever b r o u g h t forth for m a n k i n d , enjoining w h a t is g o o d and forbidding evil" (Q 3:110). W h e r e a s the Christian West has interpreted Jesus' message as s u p p o r t i n g the division of the world into secular and sacred spheres, rendering u n t o Caesar w h a t belongs to Caesar and to G o d w h a t belongs to God, Muslims believe that all of creation belongs to G o d as the Creator and Sustainer of the universe. Indeed, the p r i m a r y act of faith is to seek to i m p l e m e n t G o d ' s will in b o t h the private and public spheres, calling all to w o r s h i p G o d as well as p r o m o t i n g g o o d and prohibiting evil. Therefore, t h r o u g h o u t history, being a Muslim has b e e n n o t just a m a t t e r of b e l o n g i n g to a c o m m u n i t y of fellow believers, b u t also to live in an Islamic c o m m u n i t y or state governed by Islamic law (in t h e o r y if n o t always in practice). In this Utopian vision of the Islamic state, political authority is u n d e r s t o o d to be the i n s t r u m e n t for carrying o u t the divine message. Sovereignty, therefore, is the e m b o d i m e n t of the W o r d of G o d in the Shariah (Islamic law), rather than a p o w e r that b e l o n g s t o the r u l e r o r the clergy. T h u s , the ideal Islamic state is a n o m o c r a c y (a c o m m u n i t y g o v e r n e d by G o d ' s law), r a t h e r t h a n a t h e o c r a c y or autocracy. T h e p u r p o s e of the state is to provide security and order so that Muslims can carry o u t their religious duties, particularly the doing of g o o d and the prevention of evil. Legislation is n o t a f u n c t i o n of the state because divine law, the Shariah, is n o t a p r o d u c t of the state b u t precedes it. According to the literature, the legal process of a truly Islamic state is a m a t t e r of detailing rules and j u d g m e n t s f r o m the b r o a d e r tenets of the Shariah, rather than creating n e w legislation. A sense of balance s h o u l d exist a m o n g three g r o u p s : t h e caliph, w h o serves as the guardian of b o t h the faith and the c o m m u n i t y ; the ulama (religious scholars), w h o are responsible f o r providing religio-legal advice; and the qadis

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(judges), w h o resolve disputes in accordance w i t h Islamic law. Over time, Muslims c a m e to believe that this ideal blueprint and state had actually existed and m u s t be reinstated. C o n t e m p o r a r y militant m o v e m e n t s particularly l o o k b a c k to this Utopia as an example to be e m u l a t e d today. T h e Q u r a n and hadith do not provide any specific f o r m a t for an "Islamic state" or even prescribe o n e as necessary. Instead, they contain general indications of the f u n c t i o n of the state as well as ethical considerations. Early Islamic empires a n d sultanates developed systems that c o m b i n e d e l e m e n t s a d o p t e d f r o m conq u e r e d societies w i t h religious prescriptions and institutions. D u r i n g this time period, m o s t states, non-Muslim as well as Muslim, used or controlled religion as a source of legitimacy or to mobilize popular support. A l t h o u g h n o specific f o r m of g o v e r n m e n t is exclusively "Islamic" or "Muslim," t h e r e are c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n s t h a t t h e state is t o fulfill in Islam. E x a m p l e s include caring for the poor, o r p h a n s , and widows; the provision of justice; and the p u n i s h m e n t of crimes. T h e Islamic c o n c e p t of the state e m p h a s i z e d three m a j o r t h e m e s : jamaa or ummah (the g r o u p or c o m m u n i t y ) , adl or adalah (justice or fairness), and qiyadah or imamah (leadership). T h e r e f o r e , politics in Islamic t h o u g h t focuses m o r e on p r o b l e m s of g o v e r n m e n t , m e t h o d s of statesmanship, and the c o n d u c t of the ruler than o n types of states.

The Medium

of Expressing

Politics

in

Islam

Fewer t h a n thirty years after M u h a m m a d ' s death, serious divisions arose within the Muslim community. During M u h a m m a d ' s lifetime, the c o m m u n i t y was united by M u h a m m a d ' s prophetic and political leadership. W h e n situations or questions caused divisions a m o n g believers, M u h a m m a d a n d his c o n t i n u e d divine revelations provided i m m e d i a t e and authoritative answers. M u h a m m a d ' s death m a r k e d n o t only the end of direct, personal contact with him, but also the end of direct revelation f r o m God. Disputes over various issues led to crises, dissent, and even civil wars after M u h a m m a d ' s d e a t h . I m m e d i a t e l y following M u h a m m a d ' s death, his senior C o m p a n i o n s sought to reassure the c o m m u n i t y that Islam had n o t died w i t h its P r o p h e t . Abu Bakr, a close C o m p a n i o n , t r u s t e d adviser, and father-in-law of M u h a m m a d , a n n o u n c e d to the Muslim c o m m u n i t y : "Muslims! If any of you has w o r s h i p p e d M u h a m m a d , let m e tell you that M u h a m m a d is dead. But if you worship God, then k n o w that G o d is living and will never die." Abu Bakr was selected by the C o m p a n i o n s as caliph, or successor, to M u h a m m a d as political and military leader of the Muslim community. H e did n o t serve in the capacity of a p r o p h e t because the Q u r a n declared M u h a m m a d to be the last of the prophets. Abu Bakr's reign as caliph lasted only t w o years (632-34 C.E.). Yet it reflected s o m e of the critical issues facing the early Muslim c o m m u n i t y that remain rele-

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140 I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | vant to c o n t e m p o r a r y Muslim debates a b o u t the nature of b o t h political leadership in Islam and the m e a n i n g of m e m b e r s h i p in the Muslim ummah. Shortly after Abu Bakr was declared caliph, Muslim tradition maintains, several Arab tribes tried to leave the Muslim community, arguing that they had maintained their political independence despite their conversion to Islam as a religion. According to tribal c u s t o m , political pacts and alliances b e t w e e n leaders e n d e d u p o n the d e a t h of o n e of the parties to the pact. Consequently, f r o m their perspective, t h e d e a t h of M u h a m m a d r e p r e s e n t e d t h e e n d of their political alleg i a n c e to t h e b r o a d e r Muslim c o m m u n i t y . H o w e v e r , Abu Bakr r e m i n d e d t h e Arab tribes of the overarching message of Islam—that m e m b e r s h i p in and loyalty to the Muslim c o m m u n i t y transcended all tribal bonds, customs, and traditions. H e asserted as b o t h political and religious t r u t h that all Muslims b e l o n g to a single c o m m u n i t y w h o s e unity is based u p o n the interconnection of religion and the state in which faith and politics are inseparable. T h e i m m e d i a t e result of this conflict in perception was the Wars of Apostasy, in which Abu Bakr prevailed, crushing the tribal revolt, consolidating Muslim rule over the Arabian Peninsula, and definitively preserving and reasserting the unity and solidarity of t h e Islamic c o m m u n i t y - s t a t e o n the basis of shared religious beliefs. Abu Bakr m a d e it clear that religion was n o t simply a m a t t e r of personal, private belief, b u t that those beliefs w e r e intended to be lived o u t publicly and h a d political consequences. Abu Bakr did n o t accept the a r g u m e n t of the Arab tribes that religion and politics were t w o separate and unrelated entities. Rather, in Abu Bakr's view, religion was intended to guide political decisions and to provide legitimacy to a political system. Abu Bakr's successor, U m a r ibn al-Khattab

( 6 3 4 - 4 4 C.E.),

continued the policy

of the indivisibility of religion and politics. H e e m p h a s i z e d the c o m b i n a t i o n of religious a n d political-military l e a d e r s h i p d u r i n g his reign by a d d i n g t h e title " c o m m a n d e r of the faithful" (Amir al-Muminin) to that of caliph, d e m o n s t r a t ing the religious basis for political unity a m o n g Muslims. Extensive expansion and conquest occurred u n d e r Umar's capable military leadership. By the rule of the third caliph, U t h m a n ibn Affan

( 6 4 4 - 5 6 C.E.),

the Muslim

c o m m u n i t y w a s again e x p e r i e n c i n g serious divisions. Tribal factionalism and rebellion resurfaced as the Umayyad clan, the clan of U t h m a n , sought preferential status and p o w e r within U t h m a n ' s administration on the basis of tribal ties. U t h m a n was assassinated by a g r o u p of m u t i n e e r s f r o m Egypt in 656 in the first of a series of rebellions that t h e r e a f t e r plagued the Islamic c o m m u n i t y ' s develo p m e n t and unity. Ali ibn Abi Talib, M u h a m m a d ' s cousin, son-in-law, and close C o m p a n i o n , was selected as the f o u r t h caliph following U t h m a n ' s assassination. A m a j o r civil w a r followed, resulting in a p e r m a n e n t division b e t w e e n Sunnis and Shiis over t h e questions of leadership, authority, and responsibility. Divisions over the question

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of leadership had existed since the a p p o i n t m e n t of Abu Bakr as leader of the Muslim c o m m u n i t y following M u h a m m a d ' s death. T h e majority of Muslims supported the appointment of Abu Bakr as being consistent with the teachings of the Q u r a n that all Muslims are equal in God's eyes, with n o special status accorded to anyone on the basis of wealth or family. That is, the best Muslim is not the wealthiest or the most powerful, but the one w h o is the most pious and learned in matters of faith. This majority, known as the Sunnis (those w h o follow the Sunnah [example] of M u h a m m a d ) , believed that leadership should pass to the most qualified person, not in hereditary succession. Thus, they supported the appointment of Abu Bakr. However, a minority believed t h a t succession should be hereditary. Since M u h a m m a d had no sons w h o survived infancy, this minority, known as the Shiis (the "partisans" or "sect"), believed that succession should pass through Muhammad's daughter, Fatima, and her husband, Ali, who, as Muhammad's first cousin, was M u h a m m a d ' s closest living male relative. T h e Shiis believed that the first three caliphs recognized by the Sunnis were, in fact, illegitimate. This political infighting c a m e to a h e a d w h e n Ali finally succeeded to the caliphate. Ali faced t w o i m m e d i a t e crises u p o n his accession to the caliphate. First, a g r o u p of Muslims led by Aisha, Abu Bakr's daughter and M u h a m m a d ' s favorite wife, launched a military challenge to Ali's authority. The ensuing "Battle of the Camel" (so n a m e d because Aisha directed her troops f r o m her palanquin on the back of a camel) ended in Aisha's defeat. The more important and lasting effect of this battle was its marking the first military engagement between Muslims, resulting in the p e r m a n e n t split between Sunnis and Shiis. The second major crisis with which Ali had to contend was to find and punish U t h m a n ' s murderer. W h e n he failed to d o so, he was c o n f r o n t e d by t w o groups. One g r o u p was led by Muawiyyah, the governor of Syria and a relative of Uthman. Disgusted with Ali's failure to provide justice, Muawiyyah sent his soldiers against the Muslim army. W h e n it looked as if the army of Muawiyyah w o u l d suffer defeat, Muawiyyah's soldiers raised Q u r a n s on the tips of their spears and declared that they would let the Quran decide the outcome of the conflict. T h e arbitration process that followed was inconclusive, and b o t h armies returned h o m e . The second g r o u p to challenge Ali's leadership, the Kharijites (those w h o "go out" or secede), then emerged. Claiming that Ali's failure to find and punish Uthman's m u r d e r e r and to subdue his o p p o n e n t s rendered him n o better a leader than Muawiyyah, the Kharijites permanently broke away f r o m the broader Muslim community. T h e Kharijites proclaimed that b o t h Ali and Muawiyyah had sinned against God, rendering t h e m unbelievers w h o deserved to be punished by death. The Kharijites b r o u g h t their extremist proclamation to political reality w h e n one of their n u m b e r assassinated Ali in 661 C.E. Muawiyyah subsequently

142 I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | seized p o w e r a n d established an a b s o l u t e m o n a r c h y , c r e a t i n g t h e U m a y y a d Dynasty

( 6 6 1 - 7 5 0 C.E.).

Following these events, b o t h the Sunni and Shii traditions established a b o d y of literature addressing the n a t u r e of political authority and political legitimacy in an Islamic state and detailed the qualifications of the appropriate leader for the Muslim c o m m u n i t y — t h e caliph for Sunnis and the i m a m for Shiis. The Sunni

Caliphate

Sunnis believe t h a t t h e m o s t qualified p e r s o n s h o u l d b e c o m e t h e h e a d of t h e Muslim community. T h e y u n d e r s t a n d political leadership in Islam to be strictly political in n a t u r e because the caliph succeeded M u h a m m a d as political leader, n o t as p r o p h e t . Because M u h a m m a d w a s the last of the prophets, leadership of t h e Muslim c o m m u n i t y f o l l o w i n g M u h a m m a d ' s d e a t h ceased t o be a religiopolitical p o s i t i o n a n d b e c a m e strictly political. Sunnis believe t h a t t h e l e a d e r (caliph) of the Muslim c o m m u n i t y possesses h u m a n a n d worldly, r a t h e r t h a n divine, authority. Sunnis look to the lifetime of M u h a m m a d Four Rightly Guided Caliphs

( 6 3 2 - 6 1 C.E.)

( 6 1 0 - 3 2 C.E.)

and the rule of the

as a special normative period in which

God's favor was clearly u p o n the Muslims. During this time, the conquest of Arabia w a s c o m p l e t e d and Islam spread t h r o u g h o u t m o s t of t h e Middle East and N o r t h Africa. This physical expansion of Islam was the p u t t i n g into social and political action of the religious principles preached by M u h a m m a d . T h e t w o successive Sunni dynasties, the Umayyad ( 7 4 9 - 1 2 5 8 C.E.)

( 6 6 1 - 7 5 0 C.E.)

in Damascus and the Abbasid

in Baghdad, consolidated Muslim p o w e r by expanding the Islam-

ic empire as a world political force covering a geographical space that was greater than that of the ancient R o m a n Empire and encouraged the flourishing of Islamic civilization. Sunni Muslims considered this expansion and civilizational develo p m e n t to be a sign of God's guidance and favor, as well as validation of Islam as a faith. T h e S u n n i juridical t h e o r y of t h e state f o c u s e s o n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e caliphate, b e g i n n i n g w i t h the question of the legitimacy of the institution. T h e caliphate w a s l e g i t i m a t e d by t h e first t w o of the Rightly G u i d e d Caliphs, Abu Bakr a n d Umar, by tying it to tribal principles of g o v e r n m e n t : shura (consultation), aqd (the contract b e t w e e n the ruler and the ruled), and bayah (oath of allegiance). Although these principles w e r e used in the selection of the third caliph, U t h m a n , by the time the U m a y y a d Dynasty was established following the death of the f o u r t h caliph, Ali, these principles had fallen into disuse and were replaced by a hereditary, semiaristocratic monarchy. T h e rise of t h e Abbasid caliphate raised t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e l e g i t i m a c y of t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e u n i t y of t h e c o m m u n i t y . A h m a d ibn Hanbal (d. 855 C.E.), the f o u n d e r of the Hanbali school of Islamic law,

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declared the primacy of the unity of the community over the legitimacy of the government in cases where the t w o were in conflict. After this, juridical theory emphasized the authority of the caliph as a political symbol, whereas the unity of the c o m m u n i t y was a h u m a n base. In the Sunni political literature, the concept of rights is divided between those of the caliph and those of the community (ummah). Civil individual rights exist only with respect to one's life and personal property. N o m e n t i o n of public or political individual rights is m a d e . Instead, emphasis is placed upon the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. The ruler is responsible for persuading or coercing the population into obeying him. The state is intended to be the expression of a religio-cultural mission that is universalistic in its orientation. N o physical or ethnic boundaries are recognized. The state is defined by its moral content and does not recognize any distinction between the public and private spheres. The Sunni literature addressing the caliphate tends to focus on the person of the caliph, particularly the qualifications and traits he should possess. As the ruler of an Islamic polity, the caliph or sultan as a head of state was seen as the political successor of M u h a m m a d whose responsibility was to protect the faith, lead the faithful, implement Islamic law as the official legal system, and spread Islamic rule. The Sunni practice of at times merging spiritual leadership with political leadership in the institution of the caliphate made it difficult to religiously justify disobedience against an unjust or usurping ruler. Resistance to the government was possible only via open militancy or spiritual disdain. O n e of the most contentious questions faced by religious scholars througho u t Muslim history has been w h e t h e r the character of the ruler was a decisive factor in determining whether the state was truly Islamic. That is, if the ruler is known to be immoral, did this necessarily render the state un-Islamic so that its citizens were obligated to overthrow the ruler? The majority of religious scholars (ulama) determined that maintaining social order was more important than the character of the ruler and therefore determined that the decisive factor rendering a state or society "Islamic" is its governance by Islamic law. However, a minority of ulama, most notably the thirteenth-century Hanbali scholar Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah, determined that the character of the ruler was, in fact, decisive. In a case w h e r e the ruler was perceived to be u n j u s t , i m m o r a l , or otherwise a "bad" Muslim, this minority declared that rising up against him and overthrowing him was not only permissible but in fact required. Although this minority opinion never enjoyed broad acceptance or support, it is significant in that it has c o n t i n u e d to influence radical extremist m o v e m e n t s t h r o u g h o u t Muslim history up t h r o u g h today, especially and including Osama bin Laden. Ibn Taymiyyah asserted that a legitimate Islamic government was one that not only was governed by the Shariah as law but also had to be capable of defending

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144 I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | Muslim lands militarily against invaders. Ibn Taymiyyah's influence is also seen in d o c t r i n e s such as "din wa-dawlah,"

w h i c h assert t h e n e c e s s a r y synthesis

b e t w e e n religion and the state in Islam, and in his j u d g m e n t that the use of Islamic discourse does n o t render a ruler, or anyone else for that matter, a Muslim. In Ibn Taymiyyah's t h o u g h t , w o r d s and actions m u s t be consistent. S o m e o n e w h o claims to be a Muslim b u t does n o t act like o n e cannot be considered a t r u e Muslim. Ibn Taymiyyah also viewed the w o r l d in a bipolar manner, in which the only t w o choices were Muslim and non-Muslim. 2 Ibn Taymiyyah's influence on c o n t e m p o r a r y Islamic m o v e m e n t s is significant. Particularly relevant w i t h respect t o political c o n c e r n s is the t e n d e n c y of cont e m p o r a r y e x t r e m i s t m o v e m e n t s t o l o o k t o Ibn T a y m i y y a h ' s division of t h e w o r l d into t w o spheres and p r o c l a m a t i o n that actions m u s t be consistent w i t h w o r d s for a person to truly be a Muslim. T h o s e n o t in a g r e e m e n t with the movem e n t s ' interpretation of Islam are labeled as kafirs, or unbelievers. This is particularly i m p o r t a n t in cases w h e r e rulers and religious authorities are targeted as unbelievers w h o must forcibly be removed f r o m power, as was the case, for example, with A n w a r al-Sadat of Egypt, w h o was assassinated by al-Jihad in 1981. The Shii

Imamate

Shiis believe that succession to leadership of the Muslim c o m m u n i t y should be hereditary and passed d o w n to M u h a m m a d ' s male descendants, b e g i n n i n g with Ali, his cousin and son-in-law. Ali's caliphate b e g a n only after three o t h e r caliphs had b e e n appointed by the c o m m u n i t y and had ruled, and it ended with m a j o r p o w e r struggles. Ali was assassinated by opponents, and the caliphate was seized by his e n e m y Muawiyyah. Shiis believe that Muawiyyah was an impostor and that the rightful next caliph was Ali's son Hussein. W h e n Muawiyyah's son Yazid came to power, H u s s e i n was p e r s u a d e d by s o m e of Ali's followers living in Kufa (in m o d e r n Iraq) to lead a rebellion against Yazid in 680 C.E. T h e s u p p o r t p r o m i s e d by the Kufans never materialized, however, and Hussein a n d his a r m y w e r e s l a u g h t e r e d by t h e U m a y y a d a r m y at Karbala (also in m o d e r n Iraq). T h e m a r t y r d o m of Hussein and his followers, c o m m e m o r a t e d by Shiis every year during Ashura, shaped the Shii worldview and p a r a d i g m of the suffering and oppression of the righteous, the n e e d to protest against injustice, and the r e q u i r e m e n t that Muslims be willing to sacrifice everything, including their lives, in the struggle to restore God's rule. T h e struggles b e t w e e n Ali and Muawiyyah and Hussein and Yazid are u n d e r s t o o d to represent the struggle of God's righteous rule against the o v e r w h e l m i n g forces of evil (Satan). Over the centuries, this paradigm and reading of history has b e e n reinforced by the fact that Shiis have r e m a i n e d in the m i n o r i t y in the global Islamic c o m m u n i t y (constituting a total of a b o u t 15 p e r c e n t of all Muslims) and that they have experienced discrimination because of their minority status and their theo-

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logical disagreements with Sunnis, w h o have constituted the majority at about 85 percent of all Muslims. Politically, Shiis were therefore not concerned with legitimizing the authority of an inherently illegitimate government, but, rather, with legitimizing Shii participation in and obedience to Sunni governments and public life in Sunni majority territories. Their p u r p o s e was to cooperate with those in power while refusing to accept responsibility for the existence of an illegitimate government. In other words, Shiis granted de facto recognition of Sunni government and complied with it while avoiding legitimating it. Historically, Sunnis have almost always ruled over Shiis. Because Shiis existed as an oppressed and disinherited minority a m o n g the Sunnis, they understood history to be a test of the righteous community's perseverance in the struggle to restore God's rule on earth. Realization of a just social order led by the i m a m b e c a m e the dream of Shiis t h r o u g h o u t the centuries. W h e r e a s Sunni history looked to the glorious and victorious history of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs and then the development of imperial Islam under the Umayyads, Abbasids, and Ottomans, Shii history traced the often tragic history of the descendants of Ali and Fatima. Thus, whereas Sunnis can claim a golden age when they were a great world power and civilization, which they believe is evidence of God's favor upon t h e m and a historic validation of Muslim beliefs, Shiis see in these same developments the illegitimate usurpation of power by Sunni rulers at the expense of a just society. Shiis view history more as a paradigm of the suffering, disinheritance, and oppression of a righteous minority community that must constantly struggle to restore God's rule on earth under His divinely appointed Imam. In the twentieth century, this history was reinterpreted as a paradigm providing inspiration and mobilization to actively fight against injustice, rather than passively accept it. This reinterpretation has had the most significant impact a m o n g the Shiis of Lebanon, w h o struggled to achieve greater social, educational, and economic opportunities during the 1970s and 1980s, and a m o n g those of Iran, where the Shah was equated with Yazid and Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers with Hussein during the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 so that the victory of the Islamic Revolution was declared the victory of the righteous against illegitimate usurpers of power. In contrast to the Sunni caliphate, Shiis believe that leadership of the Muslim community should follow an imamate structure in which the leader, or imam, is a direct descendant of M u h a m m a d and serves in a religious, as well as politicalmilitary, capacity. Although the imam is not considered to be a prophet because the Q u r a n states that M u h a m m a d was the last of the prophets (defined as one receiving direct revelation from God), the imam is nevertheless considered to be divinely inspired, infallible, and sinless, and to be the final and authoritative interpreter of God's will as formulated in Islamic law. Shiis therefore consider the say-

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146 I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas

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ings, deeds, and writings of the i m a m s to be a source of scripture, in addition to the Q u r a n and Sunnah. There are three m a j o r subdivisions of Shiis which reflect the n u m b e r of imams t h e y believe s u c c e e d e d M u h a m m a d : t h e Zaydis (also called the Fivers), t h e Ismailis (Seveners), and the Ithna Ashari (Twelvers). T h e Zaydis split w i t h the o t h e r Shiis by recognizing Hussein's g r a n d s o n , Zayd, as the fifth i m a m . T h e y believed that any d e s c e n d a n t of Ali w h o was willing to assert his claim to the i m a m a t e publicly and fight for it could b e c o m e I m a m . T h e Zaydis were the first Shii g r o u p to achieve independence. They founded a dynasty in Tabaristan on the Caspian Sea in 864 C.E. A n o t h e r Zaydi i m a m a t e state was f o u n d e d in Yemen in 893 and lasted until 1963. T h e split between the Ismailis (Seveners) and Ithna Ashari (Twelvers) occurred in the eighth century over the question of w h o succeeded the seventh Imam, Jafar al-Sadiq (d. 765 C.E.). T h e Ismailis (Seveners) recognize seven Imams, ending with Jafar al-Sadiq's son, Ismail, w h o was designated as the seventh i m a m but w h o predeceased his father and left n o son. This g r o u p f o r m e d a political revolutionary m o v e m e n t against the Sunnis and established their o w n Fatimid Dynasty, which stretched f r o m Egypt and N o r t h Africa to the Sind province of India between the tenth and twelfth centuries. An offshoot of this group, the Nizari Ismailis, was particularly opposed to the Sunni Abbasid rulers and engaged in a policy of striking at t h e m , earning t h e m the epithet of the Assassins. O n e of their descendants fled to India and established the line of I m a m s k n o w n by the h o n o r i f i c title of Agha Khan, which has ruled over prosperous c o m m u n i t i e s in Canada, East Africa, South Asia, and the United Kingdom. T h e current Agha Khan functions as a living I m a m and oversees the cultural and spiritual lives of his followers, in addition to looking after the educational, social, and commercial institutions of the community. T h e third and most p o p u l o u s g r o u p of Shiis, the Ithna Ashari (Twelvers), are a majority in Bahrain, Iran, and Iraq. This g r o u p recognized twelve legitimate successors to M u h a m m a d . T h e twelfth, M u h a m m a d al-Muntazar ( M u h a m m a d the Awaited One), "disappeared" in 874 C.E. as a child w i t h n o sons, creating a m a j o r d i l e m m a for the line of n o t only political and military b u t also religious succession. Shii theology resolved this dilemma with the doctrine of the Hidden I m a m , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h t h e t w e l f t h I m a m h a d n o t died b u t r a t h e r "disappeared" or g o n e into hiding for an unspecified period of time. H e is a messianic figure w h o is expected to r e t u r n as the divinely guided Mahdi at the end of time to vindicate his followers, restore his faithful community, and usher in a perfect Islamic society of justice and truth. In the interim, there is n o i m a m in the physical realm to lead the community. Instead, the role of guiding the c o m m u n i t y is to be filled by religio-legal experts,

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or mujtahids (those capable of independently interpreting Islamic law). The role assigned to the religio-legal experts led, over time, to the development of a clerical hierarchy, at the top of which were religious leaders who were acknowledged by their followers as ayatollahs (signs of God) because of their reputations for knowledge and piety.

The Message

of Islam's

Politics

The main political message of Islam is that Muslims are required to establish a just society on earth that recognizes God as the source of all authority, law, and order. H o w this society is to be established and under what format and institutions has been open to interpretation by various groups across time and space. Historically, Islam's role in the state reinforced a sense of c o m m o n identity for Muslims, as well as a sense of continuity in Muslim rule, success, and power from the time of M u h a m m a d to the dawn of the European colonial era. The existence of an Islamic ideology and system, however imperfectly implemented, both validated and reinforced a sense of a divinely mandated and guided community with a unifying purpose and mission, giving the Islamic state a divine raison d'être. It was this belief in the divine mandate of the Muslim community that gave Muslims the impetus to spread their rule and empire over the entire Middle East and major portions of Africa, South Asia, and Southeast and Central Asia, as well as into Spain and southern Italy on the European continent. Since Islam was revealed, Muslims have been involved in an ongoing process of understanding, interpreting, defining, redefining, and applying Islam to all aspects of their lives. It is a process in which the Word of God as revealed in the Quran has been interpreted and applied through the teachings and preachings of h u m a n beings. Because not all texts have a single clear meaning, it has been necessary in every time and place to reflect u p o n and interpret texts in accordance with political and social contexts, typically reflecting the power structures and privileges of the time and place. The result has been the development of Islamic law, theology, and mysticism in response to the political and social questions particular to the societies in which they were developed. Although there is only one Islam, revealed in the Q u r a n and Sunnah, m a n y interpretations of Islam have existed over time and space. Islamic

Law

The detailing of Islamic law over the centuries has been one major way in which Islam has been given a prominent public role in the life of the Muslim community. The elaboration of Islamic law and the implementation of a system of Islamic courts and judges were a m o n g the most important activities of the Muslim

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148 I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | c o m m u n i t y in the first centuries following M u h a m m a d ' s death. T h e delineation of Islamic law p r o v i d e d the believer w i t h specific duties and responsibilities, reflecting Islam's emphasis on o r t h o p r a x y (correctness of behavior), rather than simply on orthodoxy (correctness of belief), so that obedience to God's law and religious observance are key duties in Islam. Thus, Islamic law, rather than theology, has occupied the primary stage in the development of the Muslim comm u n i t y historically. Islam's worldview is a vision of individual and c o m m u n a l m o r a l responsibility and accountability in which Muslims are to strive or struggle (jihad) in the path (shariah) of G o d in order to i m p l e m e n t God's will on earth, expand and defend the Muslim community, and establish a just society. T h e p u r p o s e of Islamic law in such a vision is to provide the guidelines and r e q u i r e m e n t s for t w o types of interactions: those b e t w e e n h u m a n beings and God, or matters of worship (ibadat); and those b e t w e e n h u m a n beings, or social transactions (muamalat).

Both

types have private and public dimensions. Islamic law is comprehensive in its coverage, r a n g i n g f r o m r e g u l a t i o n s for c a r r y i n g o u t religious rituals, m a r r i a g e , divorce, and inheritance to setting standards for penal and international law. Historically, the m a j o r elaboration of Islamic law occurred b e t w e e n the seve n t h and t e n t h centuries C.E., largely d u r i n g the rule of the U m a y y a d Dynasty. Rather than being a purely intellectual exercise, the elaboration of Islamic law was motivated by the real religious and political concerns and issues of Muslims of that time. Many Muslims felt that the Umayyads were illegitimate usurpers of power, particularly as dissatisfaction arose over time due to increasing social and e c o n o m i c stratification within the empire, the rise in c o r r u p t i o n and the abuse of power, and the incorporation of "foreign" ways into Islamic civilization and religious practice. Islamic law was developed largely in response to these conditions as a m e a n s of placing limitations on the p o w e r and a u t o n o m y of the ruler and placing it instead in the hands of religious scholars. T h e development of Islamic law continued to flourish during the tenth century u n d e r the patronage of the Abbasid Dynasty. T h e Abbasid caliphs had led a rebellion that ultimately overthrew the Umayyads, placing t h e m in a position of needing religious legitimation and justification for their rule. By officially sponsoring the study of Islamic sources and the elaboration of the law, the Abbasids gained religious legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects. It is i m p o r t a n t to note, however, that the elaboration of the law was the w o r k of scholars (ulama), rather than judges, the practice of the courts, or g o v e r n m e n t decrees. Theology

Because of the primacy of orthopraxy over orthodoxy, theology does n o t play as central a role in Islam as Islamic law. T h e o l o g y is u n d e r s t o o d to be the d o m a i n

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of the ulama (religious scholars) because there is n o ordained clergy in Islam. Historically, although they did n o t necessarily serve in official posts, the ulama (religious scholars) w e r e considered the guardians and interpreters of Islam. As such, t h e y o f t e n served in an advisory capacity t o M u s l i m rulers. T h e ulama w h o advised the rulers were n o t part of a clerical hierarchy; n o r were they necessarily associated w i t h any organized h o u s e of worship. Rather, they constituted an unofficial intellectual and social class in society, serving in a variety of capacities. Their authority was due to popular acclaim and their role as the collective voice of society's conscience, rather than to official licensing. T h e ulama as a class played a p r i m a r y role in the state's religious, legal, educational, and social service institutions. T h e y w o r k e d as theologians, legal scholars (fiiqaha), and legal advisers (muftis) w h o w e r e responsible for the administration and application of the law and the Shariah courts. They ran the schools and universities, educating those w h o aspired to b o t h religious and public offices. T h e y oversaw and a d m i n i s t e r e d f u n d s f r o m religious e n d o w m e n t s (waqf) and royal grants, which were used for a variety of social benefits, such as the construction and maintenance of hospitals, roads, bridges, mosques, schools, and student hostels. Over time, the ulama b e c a m e a religious establishment that o p e r a t e d alongside and was often d e p e n d e n t u p o n the political establishment. In m a n y empires, the ruler appointed a senior religious leader to serve as Shaykh al-Islam (head of religious affairs), a position that still exists in m a n y Muslim countries. Islamic t h e o l o g y did n o t g r o w o u t of any theological or d o g m a t i c necessity. Rather, it developed due to particular sociopolitical contexts that led to a need for a religious resolution to specific p r o b l e m s . Examples of theological p r o b l e m s addressed are the Kharijite split f r o m Ali, early Muslim-Christian polemics, and the penetration of Greek t h o u g h t into the Islamic world during the early Abbasid period (750-1258

C.E.).

T h e first m a j o r theological issue faced by Muslims was t h e Kharijite withdrawal f r o m the Muslim c o m m u n i t y over their declaration that Ali h a d aband o n e d his right to the caliphate by failing to s u b d u e Muawiyyah's rebellion and find and punish U t h m a n ' s assassin. T h e theological issues that arose f r o m this incident w e r e the question of the religious implications of grave sin, its effect on m e m b e r s h i p in the Islamic community, and the religious legitimacy of a political ruler. T h e Kharijites believed that only t w o categories existed in the world: believers and nonbelievers, or Muslims and non-Muslims. In their opinion, anyo n e w h o failed to adhere to their extreme interpretation of Islam was to be considered outside of the Muslim c o m m u n i t y because they w o u l d thereby hold the status of non-Muslims. T h e y believed that they had the right to d e t e r m i n e the status of o t h e r s a n d t h e r e b y expel t h e m f r o m t h e Muslim c o m m u n i t y if they were classified as non-Muslims.

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150 I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | T h e majority of the Muslim c o m m u n i t y rejected the Kharijite position, believing t h a t only G o d o n J u d g m e n t Day is capable of d e t e r m i n i n g w h o is to b e excluded f r o m the Muslim c o m m u n i t y and, therefore, Paradise. T h e majority of Muslims did n o t believe it was appropriate for h u m a n beings to declare others as apostates and expel t h e m from the Muslim community, except in cases of obvio u s acts of apostasy, such as denial of the existence of God. T h e majority maintained that an individual's faith, rather than specific actions, should d e t e r m i n e his or her m e m b e r s h i p in the Islamic community. T h e y f u r t h e r believed that the prim a r y w o r k of Muslims should be calling others (dawah) to the worship and service of G o d , r a t h e r t h a n j u d g i n g a n d c o n d e m n i n g t h e m , b e c a u s e only G o d is capable of j u d g i n g . Historically, one of the m o s t i m p o r t a n t g r o u p s carrying o u t missionary w o r k was the Sufis. Sufism Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, like the development of Islamic law, began as a seventh-century r e f o r m m o v e m e n t . T h e expansion of the Islamic Empire, its growing contact with o t h e r civilizations w h e t h e r t h r o u g h diplomacy or conquest, and the tendency of the Umayyad caliphs to establish elaborate courts and c o u r t rituals, as well as imperial lifestyles and material luxuries, led s o m e pious Muslims to be c o n c e r n e d that dynastic rulers and their royal courts w e r e m o r e interested in p o w e r and wealth than they were in s u b m i t t i n g to the will of God. Although s o m e t u r n e d to Islamic law as the solution to the excesses of the Umayyad court, believing that stricter adherence to the Q u r a n and S u n n a h was in order, Sufis felt that simply k n o w i n g God's will and following G o d o n the external path t h r o u g h Islamic law was insufficient. T h e y desired a deeper, internal spiritual experience of the presence and reality of God. T h e p a t h to this internal experience b e c a m e k n o w n as Sufism. S u f i s m b e g a n as an ascetic m o v e m e n t t h a t r e n o u n c e d d e p e n d e n c y o n t h e things of this world and e n c o u r a g e d d e t a c h m e n t f r o m t h e m . Sufis believed that dependency on worldly things was a seduction and distraction away from the central reality of God. They desired instead to r e t u r n to the purity and simplicity of the early Muslim community. Disdaining the materialism of imperial Islam, the early Sufis e m p h a s i z e d the n e e d to devote themselves completely and selflessly to the fulfillment of God's will, study the Q u r a n and Sunnah, p e r f o r m their religious duties, focus on the centrality of G o d and the Last J u d g m e n t , deny their o w n material desires, repent from sin, and carry o u t g o o d works. Although this approach w o u l d appear to be apolitical by its nature, the historical reality is that Sufi orders have played an i m p o r t a n t role in the political life of Muslims, particularly during the period of E u r o p e a n colonialism. T h e Sufi orders played an i m p o r t a n t role in the spread of Islam t h r o u g h missionary work. T h e Sufi tendency t o w a r d eclecticism, signified by their adoption

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and adaptation of local non-Islamic customs and practices, and the strong devotional and emotional content of their practices enabled it to b e c o m e a popular mass movement. Although this opened the Sufi orders up to charges by the more orthodox ulama that they were unfaithful to the tenets of Islam, as well as a threat to the established religious order, this spirit of openness and willingness to incorporate local traditions into their practices allowed the Sufis to expand rapidly and to wield great power over their adherents. Sufism became integral to popular religious practices and spirituality. Over time, Sufism's strengths which allowed it to b e c o m e a popular mass m o v e m e n t also became its weaknesses. P r e m o d e r n reformers and modernists, b o t h secular and Islamic, targeted Sufism as the culprit in the decline and corruption of Muslim faith and societies. They believed that Sufism's flexibility and openness to local practices and beliefs, however superstitious, over time had led to the corruption of Islamic practices and beliefs. Furthermore, critics charged that the tendency of Sufis to focus on purely spiritual experiences and the afterlife had resulted in the passive withdrawal of Sufi adherents f r o m engagement in the affairs and problems of this world. Thus, many reformers believed that the r e f o r m of Sufism was a necessary prerequisite for the revival of Islam and for Muslim societies to successfully recover the power and prestige of past Islamic empires. However, the reform of Sufism was not restricted to impositions f r o m without. Many Sufi orders chose to reform themselves from within. In fact, the vast majority of African jihad movements in the nineteenth century were led by heads of reformist, politically oriented Sufi orders w h o sought to reform Sufism f r o m within by realigning the orders in accordance with the Shariah. These leaders redefined Sufism, reinterpreting the orders to stress a this-worldly, activist Islam, as opposed to the earlier otherworldly, passive Islam. Consequently, Sufi orders have played an important role in politics, particularly in the struggle against European colonialism and, most important, in South Asia and the African continent. For example, in Algeria, the Emir Abd al-Qadir, head of the Algerian Qadiriyah Sufi order, as well as a m e m b e r of the Naqshbandiyah and Akhbariyah orders, led the resistance against the French for more than thirty years. As the head of the order and a recognized Sufi leader, Abd alQadir was officially recognized as " c o m m a n d e r of the faithful" (amir almuminin), extending his religious and political legitimacy across Algeria. T h e popularity of Sufism as a mass movement greatly aided Abd al-Qadir's quest for uniting Algerians in resistance to the French occupation. Although he ultimately surrendered to the French in 1847 after seventeen years of military opposition to French rule, Abd al-Qadir remained a powerful symbol of resistance to Western colonialism.

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Historically, in m a n y countries t h r o u g h o u t the world, the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of a state religion has encouraged intolerance, oppression of, a n d / or second class status for o t h e r faiths because the d o m i n a n t faith has b e e n able to m a k e use of the coercive p o w e r of the state to achieve its o w n interests and influence, m u c h as the state has been able to use religion to legitimate its policies in the eyes of the people. 3 Intolerance is not necessarily limited to o t h e r religions, for oppression also o f t e n extends to m e m b e r s of the same confession w h o do n o t share or supp o r t the state's interpretation of religion. Of f u r t h e r concern is the reality that a small fringe of extremists may take the law into their o w n hands w h e n they feel that a n o t h e r individual or g r o u p is n o t adhering to religion according to their o w n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of it. Examination of the texts of Islam and the historical experience of Muslims ruling over non-Muslims provide s o m e useful guidelines for consideration of the issue of religious minorities u n d e r Muslim rule today. T h e Q u r a n t e a c h e s t h a t G o d deliberately c r e a t e d a w o r l d of diversity (Q 49:13): " O h u m a n k i n d , We have c r e a t e d y o u m a l e a n d f e m a l e a n d m a d e y o u nations and tribes, so that you m i g h t c o m e to k n o w o n e another." Muslims, like Christians and Jews before t h e m , believe that they have b e e n called to a special covenant relationship with God, constituting a c o m m u n i t y of believers intended to serve as an example to o t h e r nations (Q 2:143) in establishing a m o r a l social order (Q 3:110). T h e special status of b o t h Jews and Christians within Islam is due to Muslim recognition that G o d revealed His will t h r o u g h His prophets, including A b r a h a m , Moses, and Jesus. Indeed, Q u r a n 2:62 states: "Those w h o believe— the Jews, the Christians, and the S a b a e a n s — w h o s o e v e r believe in G o d and the Last Day and do g o o d works, they shall have their reward f r o m their Lord and shall have n o t h i n g to fear, n o r shall they c o m e to grief." T h e r e are t w o categories of non-Muslims in Islam: dhimmis and kuffar. Dhimmis are those w h o are n o t Muslims b u t w h o are entitled to a special contractual relationship with Muslims on the basis of their o w n religious beliefs. Historically, this special status was m o s t frequently g r a n t e d to the Ahl al-Kitab, or People of the Book, defined as those possessing a sacred scripture b u t w h o did not accept M u h a m m a d ' s p r o p h e t h o o d . In practice, this m e a n t Jews, Christians, Magis, Sabaeans, Samaritans, and Zoroastrians. U n d e r the protective dhimmi relationships, adult male dhimmis of s o u n d m i n d paid a poll tax (jizyah) on their incomes in exchange for protection by Muslims. Dhimmis did n o t enjoy a legal or social status equal to that of Muslims, however. In m a n y instances, dhimmis w e r e required to wear special clothing, barred f r o m certain occupations, and restricted as to w h e r e they were allowed to live. In public, they w e r e required to c o n d u c t themselves quietly and inoffensively and

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were forbidden from proselytizing or publicizing their religion or religious activities. In exchange for this, dhimmis were provided with protection of their lives and property; defense against enemies; freedom of religious practice, including the right to live under the authority of their own religious leaders and laws; and the right to govern themselves. These rights and regulations were applied in different ways and to varying degrees over time and space. Generally speaking, u n d e r the Islamic Empires, dhimmis enjoyed far greater tolerance than their minority counterparts in Europe. 4 However, over time and space, the right to privately practice one's religion came to mean that dhimmis could not build or repair structures for worship without permission from the government, testify against a Muslim in court, or marry a Muslim w o m a n . In his early years, M u h a m m a d had expected Jews and Christians, as People of the Book, to be his natural allies. T h e Q u r a n itself c o n f i r m s the sending of prophets and revelation to Jews and Christians and recognizes t h e m as part of Muslim history (Q 5 : 4 4 - 4 6 , 3 2 : 2 3 , 4 0 : 5 3 ) . M u h a m m a d initially presented himself as a prophetic reformer reestablishing the religion of Abraham. For example, like the Jews, the Muslims initially faced Jerusalem during prayer and fasted on the tenth day of the lunar month. M u h a m m a d made a special point of reaching out to the Jewish tribes of Medina. The Jews of Medina, however, had political ties to the Quraysh tribe of Mecca, so they resisted Muhammad's overtures. Shortly afterward, M u h a m m a d received a revelation changing the direction of prayer from Jerusalem to Mecca, marking Islam as a distinct alternative to Judaism. W h e n M u h a m m a d consolidated his political and military control over Medina, he recognized the reality of religious pluralism in the Constitution of Medina (c. 6 2 2 - 2 4 C.E.). The Constitution states that believers, includingjews, constitute a single community, or ummah, which is responsible for collectively enforcing social order and security and for confronting enemies in times of war and peace. Tribes remained responsible for the conduct of their individual members, but a clear precedent was set for the inclusion of other religions as part of the broader community led by Muslims. The Jewish population was granted the right to internal religious and cultural autonomy, including the right to observe Jewish religious law, in exchange for their political loyalty and allegiance to the Muslims. Muslims point to the Constitution of Medina as evidence of Islam's inherent message of peaceful coexistence, the permissibility of religious pluralism in areas under Muslim rule, and the right of non-Muslims to be members of and participants in the broader Muslim community. This state of affairs could have continued to exist had not the Jews of Medina maintained their ties with the Meccans, despite their relationship with M u h a m m a d and the Muslims. These ties became a source of conflict over time. Furthermore, after each major battle between the Muslims and the Meccans, one of the Jewish tribes was accused of breaking their treaty with Muhammad, establishing a relationship of distrust between Muslims

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and Jews. As a result, s o m e Jews were exiled and the Muslims ultimately engaged in a w a r to crush the r e m a i n i n g j e w s of Medina, w h o were regarded as a political threat to Muslim rule in and consolidation of Arabia. T h e primary issue here was one of politics, rather than religion. T h e foundation and expansion of the Islamic Empire b r o u g h t the issue of relig i o u s m i n o r i t i e s u n d e r Muslim r u l e t o the f o r e f r o n t of Muslim politics. T h e inhabitants of c o n q u e r e d territories w e r e offered three choices: (1) convert to Islam, which enabled t h e m to enter into the c o m m u n i t y of believers, g r a n t i n g t h e m full citizenship or m e m b e r s h i p in the n e w empire; (2) pay a special poll tax (jizyah), which enabled t h e m to enter into the dhimmi relationship in which they were allowed to practice their o w n faith and be ruled in their private lives by their o w n religious laws and leaders, a l t h o u g h this m e a n t accepting a m o r e limited f o r m of citizenship; and (3) fight or b e killed for resisting or rejecting Muslim rule. T h e fact that conquered peoples were given the right to maintain their o w n religious affiliation and a u t o n o m y was unusual for the time, reflecting a spirit of openness and pluralism which was n o t apparent in other empires. This spirit was f u r t h e r reflected in the tendency of the Islamic Empires to incorporate the m o s t advanced elements f r o m s u r r o u n d i n g civilizations, including Byzantine and Sassanid imperial and administrative practices and Hellenic science, architecture, art, medicine, and philosophy. C h r i s t e n d o m , particularly the Eastern O r t h o d o x Byzantine Empire, experienced the early conquests and expansion of Islam as a political, cultural, and theological threat to its o w n hegemony. However, the reality was that Byzantium and Persia shared cultural and ethnic ties to the Muslim conquerors. In fact, for the non-Muslim populations of Byzantium and Persia, Islamic rule m e a n t simply a change in rulers rather than a loss of independence. Christian and Jewish subjects, as dhimmis, assisted their Muslim rulers with the collection and translation of the great books of science, medicine, and philosophy f r o m b o t h East and West. Despite initial fears, the Muslim conquerors thus proved to be far m o r e tolerant than imperial Christianity had been, g r a n t i n g religious f r e e d o m to indigen o u s Christian churches and Jews, most of which had been persecuted as schismatics and heretics by the O r t h o d o x Church. As Francis Peters has observed: By an exquisite irony, Islam reduced the status of Christians to that which the Christians had earlier thrust upon the Jews, with one différence. The reduction in Christian status was merely judicial; it was unaccompanied by either systematic persecution or blood lust, and generally, t h o u g h not everywhere and at all times, unmarred by vexatious behavior.'

O t h e r positive historical e x a m p l e s of religious t o l e r a n c e u n d e r Muslim rule include Sultan al-Nasir of Bejaya's request to Pope Gregory VII in 1076 C.E. for t h e o r d i n a t i o n of a local priest t o care for t h e Christian p o p u l a t i o n and the

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a r r a n g e m e n t s m a d e by the Christian e m p e r o r C h a r l e m a g n e and the Abbasid Caliph H a r u n al-Rashid for Christian travel to the Holy Land through the establishment of a hostel in Jerusalem for Christian pilgrims and hostels constructed and r u n by the Christian Cluniac order along the way. T h e m o s t frequently cited example of interreligious tolerance in h i s t o r y t h o u g h , is that of Muslim rule in Spain (al-Andalus) f r o m 756 to a b o u t 1000, which is usually idealized as a period of interfaith h a r m o n y or convivencia, living together. Muslim rule of Spain offered the Christian and Jewish populations seeking refuge f r o m the old ruling class system of Europe the opportunity to become prosperous small landholders. 6 Christians and Jews f u r t h e r occupied prominent positions in the court of the caliph in the tenth century, serving as translators, engineers, physicians, and architects. Bishops were even sent by the Umayyads on important diplomatic missions. 7 The archbishop of Seville had the Bible translated and annotated into Arabic for the Arabic-speaking Christian community. Islamic history also contains positive examples of interfaith debate and dialogue, beginning in the time of M u h a m m a d . M u h a m m a d himself had engaged in dialogue with the Christians of Najran, resulting in a mutually agreeable relationship whereby the Najranis were permitted to pray in the Prophet's mosque. The fifth Sunni caliph, Muawiyyah (661-69 C.E.), regularly sent invitations to the contendingjacobite and Maronite Christians to come to the royal court to work out their debates with each other. T h e Syrian Christian John of Damascus was also invited to appear in the court of the caliph to debate the divinity of Jesus and the concept of free will. Debates involving both Muslims and Jews occurred in Spanish Muslim courts, and a sixteenth-century interreligious theological discussion between Catholic priests and Muslim clerics was presided over by the Mughal e m p e r o r Akbar. Although these debates were n o t always conducted between "equals" (indeed, many were held to "prove" that the other religion was "wrong," as was also the case for dialogues initiated by Christians), the fact that the debate was permitted and encouraged indicates some degree of open exchange between faiths, one of the highest stages of educational and cultural achievement in the Muslim world. 8 Furthermore, Muslims maintained an open-door policy to Jews escaping from persecution in Christian Europe during the Inquisition. Even during the Crusades, Muslims practiced a tolerance of the practice of Christianity—an example that was not followed by the other side. For example, some treaties concluded in the thirteenth century between Christians and Muslims granted Christians free access to sacred places then reoccupied by Islam. The great Christian saint Francis of Assisi met Muslim leader Salah al-Din's nephew Sultan al-Malik al-Kamil in 1219, leading the Sultan to g r a n t f r e e d o m of worship to his m o r e than 30,000 Christian prisoners w h e n hostilities were suspended, as well as the choice of returning to their own countries or fighting in his armies. 9

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T h e O t t o m a n Empire has long served as o n e of the p r i m e examples of positive t r e a t m e n t of religious m i n o r i t i e s in a M u s l i m m a j o r i t y e m p i r e . T h e O t t o m a n s officially recognized f o u r religiously based c o m m u n i t i e s , k n o w n as millets: Greek O r t h o d o x , A r m e n i a n Gregorian, Muslim, and Jewish. U n d e r the millet system, Islam assumed the prime position, b u t each other millet was placed u n d e r the authority of its religious leaders and p e r m i t t e d to follow its o w n relig i o u s laws. T h e millet s y s t e m e n a b l e d t h e e m p i r e to a c c o m m o d a t e religious diversity, placing non-Muslims in a subordinate position to Muslims and offering t h e m protected status. Minority religions f u r t h e r had the right to hold governm e n t p o s i t i o n s in s o m e cases. T h u s , religious p l u r a l i s m and t o l e r a n c e w e r e i m p o r t a n t c o m p o n e n t s of O t t o m a n statecraft.

Conclusion Islam has a s t r o n g history of faith as a guiding force in b o t h the private and public spheres. This history has provided a series of symbols, slogans, and precedents, which have b e e n called u p o n in the m o d e r n era to provide legitimacy to rulers, g o v e r n m e n t s , and political systems, as well as t o r e s p o n d t o m a n y of the challenges of the m o d e r n era. T h e next chapter addresses the m o d e r n interpretations and adaptations of Islam in politics.

Notes 1. Cited in Markjuergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 79. 2. For a more detailed discussion of Ibn Taymiyyah, see Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam (Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996), 43-54. 3. Hugh Goddard, Christians and Muslims: From Double Standards to Mutual Understanding (Surrey, England: Curzon Press, 1995), 133. 4. Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History, rev. ed. (New York: Harper 8C Row, 1966), 93-94. 5. F. E. Peters, "The Early Muslim Empires: Umayyads, Abbasids, Fatimids," in Islam: The Religious and Political Life of a World Community, ed. Marjorie Kelly (New York: Praeger, 1984), 79. 6. Lewis, Arabs in History, 121. 7. Ibid., 124. 8. Tamara Sonn, "The Dialogue between Islam and the Judeo-Christian Tradition," in Religious Issues and Interreligious Dialogues: An Analysis and Sourcebook of Developments Since 1945, ed. Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Gerhard E. Spiegler (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 437.

9. Recognize the Spiritual Bonds Which Unite Us: 16 Years of Christian-Muslim Dialogue, Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, Nostra Aetate (Vatican City: Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, 1994), 4.

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Suggested

Readings

Esposito, John L. Islam and Politics. 4th ed. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1998. . Islam: The Straight Path. 3d ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. , ed. The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. , ed. The Oxford History of Islam. N e w York: Oxford University Press, 1999. . What Everyone Needs to Know about Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Goddard, H u g h . Christians and Muslims: From Double Standards to Mutual

Understanding.

Richmond, England: Curzon Press, 1995. Haddad, Yvonne Y., and John L. Esposito, eds. Islam, Gender and Social Change. N e w York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Peters, Rudolph. Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam. Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996.

Seven I Modern Islam I John L. Esposito w i t h Natana J. De Long-Bas

I N CHAPTER 6 , WE ADDRESSED THE FIVE QUESTIONS BEING ASKED IN THIS VOLUME OF

every religious tradition with respect to the formative period of Islam. Because the answers to the first two of those questions (dealing with the classical sources and theory of politics) are the same for m o d e r n Islam as they were for classical Islam, we do not reiterate our findings here, but rather refer the reader to the first t w o sections of chapter six. Across the globe, f r o m N o r t h Africa to Southeast Asia, f r o m New York City to London and Paris, Muslims, like many believers of other faiths in the m o d e r n age, struggle with the question of h o w to live out and apply their faith in a global world. T h o u g h some believe that religion should be restricted to private life, others, believing that Islam is a comprehensive way of life that should serve as the guiding ethical force for all actions, struggle to implement Islam in public life. Many twenty-first-century Muslims, like their ancestors, point to the Quran, the lives and times of M u h a m m a d and the Companions, and Islamic law as embodied in the Shariah (Islamic law) as a blueprint for an Islamically guided and socially just and m o r a l state and society. But with the d e m a n d s of the m o d e r n era, these same people question how to interpret and reinterpret their history to allow Islam to speak to their life situations. In Muslim-majority countries, Muslim activists disillusioned with Western secular ideologies have pressed for the implementation of Islam in the public sphere of politics with slogans like "Islam is the solution" and "The Q u r a n is our constitution." Muslims living in non-Muslim-majority countries struggle with the question of their appropriate assimilation into and participation in these societies, w h e t h e r economically, socially, or politically, while maintaining their Muslim identity. One of the greatest challenges for Muslims today is understanding why a religion that enjoyed great prestige and prosperity in the past has failed to maintain such glories in the present. Sunni Muslims, in particular, look to the vast conquests and great empires of the past as evidence of God's favor upon Muslims w h e n they fulfilled their divine m a n d a t e to spread God's Word, guidance, and governance. Viewed in this light, the increasing decline and powerlessness of the Muslim world f r o m the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h r o u g h the present can only be understood as a reflection of their failure to adhere to God's will. It is this worldview that has, in part, given rise to the Islamic revival that began in the eighteenth century and experienced a m a j o r resurgence and reformulation in the twentieth 159

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I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | century. This revival has in t u r n sparked debates and theories a b o u t the relationship b e t w e e n Islam and politics resulting in a multiplicity of interpretations over space and time.

Modern

Islam's

Theory of

Politics

As has been explained above, Islam's theory of politics applies equally in the mode r n era as it did in t h e classical period. Because w e have already discussed this aspect of Islam's politics in c h a p t e r six, w e refer t h e r e a d e r t h e r e for f u r t h e r insight into the issue of Islam's t h e o r y of politics. T h e eighteenth t h r o u g h the t w e n t i e t h centuries were a period of remarkable upheaval and renewal in the Muslim world. T h e internal failures and declines of the previously p o w e r f u l and wealthy Islamic empires gave way to European colonial power, resulting in an increasing sense of p o w e r l e s s n e s s a n d f r u s t r a t i o n . However, rather than passively accepting their colonial overlords and their accompanying Christian faith and secular political ideology, m a n y Muslims t u r n e d to their o w n faith in search of answers n o t only as to w h y their o w n societies h a d failed in the face of W e s t e r n power, b u t also as to h o w they could recover their past p o w e r and prestige. T h e c o m m o n response was a revival of interest in Islam as a faith and religio-political ideology. Although the f o r m s of the religious, social, and political revivalist m o v e m e n t s varied, as did the political and socioeconomic circumstances of the countries in which they occurred, all of t h e m shared a comm o n concern a b o u t the deterioration of the religious, social, and political practice of Islam and a conviction that the revival and renewal of Islam as the center of life b o t h individually and c o m m u n a l l y was therefore the cure.

The Medium

of Expressing

Politics

in Modern

Islam

A l t h o u g h t h e m o v e m e n t s of t h e e i g h t e e n t h t h r o u g h t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s shared a belief in the n e e d for the revival and rejuvenation of Islam as the solution to the s o c i o e c o n o m i c and political circumstances in w h i c h they arose, the f o r m s of expressing this goal politically varied across time and space. W h a t follows is an analysis of s o m e of the m o s t c o m m o n political expressions of Islam according to time period, b e g i n n i n g w i t h the eighteenth c e n t u r y Eighteenth-Century

Islamic Revival

and

Reform

E i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y r e f o r m e r s g e n e r a l l y s o u g h t to r e e n a c t t h e p a r a d i g m a t i c d r a m a of early Islam by either restoring or recreating the ideal, early c o m m u n i ty-state as it existed in M u h a m m a d ' s time. T h e y believed that they were thereby reestablishing G o d ' s r u l e o n e a r t h in t h e s a m e way as M u h a m m a d h a d d o n e . Revivalist m o v e m e n t s combined religious practice with political action and estab-

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lished Islamic states based u p o n Islamic law (the Shariah). Their jihad was not so m u c h a b o u t holy w a r against o u t s i d e o p p r e s s o r s as it was a b o u t purifying, defending, and restoring the internal integrity and orthodoxy of their c o m m u nity f r o m the inside first w i t h the f u r t h e r goal b e i n g t o build u p its earthly strength and eventually expand. To achieve these goals, the r e f o r m e r s first established s o c i o m o r a l r e f o r m m o v e m e n t s designed to create a religious community-state that would spearhead an a t t e m p t to r e t u r n society to a m o r e pristine practice of Islam. They taught a direct return to the Q u r a n and Sunnah and reinstated the practice of ijtihad (independent reasoning). Their purpose in doing so was not so m u c h to find new solutions or to resolve n e w problems as it was to rediscover the m e a n i n g of the original message in its original time and place. They believed that i m p l e m e n t i n g this vision w o u l d resolve the problems of c o r r u p t i o n and powerlessness facing Muslim societies of their o w n time and place. T h o s e w h o disagreed with or resisted this r e f o r m - m i n d e d interpretation of Islam were to b e c o m e subject to jihad as holy war. Consequently, a l t h o u g h r e f o r m i s m initially appeared to be simply a m a t t e r of r e f o r m i n g and reviving religious practice, it clearly took on political dimensions, particularly as the m o v e m e n t s gained increasing n u m b e r s of adherents. Indeed, one of the integral c o m p o n e n t s of the revivalist worldview was the assertion that the righteous c o m m u n i t y established by M u h a m m a d at Medina s h o u l d serve as the timeless and e t e r n a l m o d e l that all Muslim c o m m u n i t i e s should emulate. Revivalist m o v e m e n t s looked to the rich history and tradition of revival (tajdid) and reform (islah) to address the internal failures and external threats to their societies. T h e concepts of tajdid and islah are contained within the f u n d a m e n t a l scriptural sources of Islam, the Q u r a n and Sunnah. Both call for a direct return to the Q u r a n and Sunnah as the basis for the revival and renewal of Muslim faith and society. Both also call for a reassertion of ijtihad to reinterpret and revitalize Islam t h r o u g h these sources. T h e Q u r a n uses the t e r m islah to refer to the work carried out by the prophets (Q 7:170, 11:117, 28:19). Also called "messengers" and "warners," the prophets in the Q u r a n , w h o include the biblical prophets, were essentially reformers w h o called sinful individuals and c o m m u n i t i e s back to God's path. Muslim r e f o r m e r s t h r o u g h o u t history have followed this same pattern, calling individuals and communities to realign themselves with the n o r m s and ethics of the Shariah by doing and enforcing w h a t is g o o d and avoiding and prohibiting what is evil. This w o r k takes on political dimensions w h e n carried o u t at the c o m m u n i t y level because it provides a c o m m o n bond and rationale for c o m m u n i t y life and direction. O n e of the most i m p o r t a n t and influential m o v e m e n t s dedicated to islah historically was the eighteenth century "Wahhabi" m o v e m e n t , which began in Arabia. This m o v e m e n t was the result of an alliance between a reform-minded jurist

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I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | and theologian, M u h a m m a d Ihn Abd al-Wahhab ( 1702-92 C.E.), and a tribal chief, M u h a m m a d Ibn Saud (d. 1765 C.E.), in 1744 C.E. T h e m o v e m e n t had i m p o r t a n t political implications because it s o u g h t to politically unite the tribes of Arabia u n d e r the religious b a n n e r of Islam. Religious purification was c o m b i n e d with military action to enforce religious precepts and principles f r o m the t o p d o w n , r a t h e r than relegating religion to the purely private, individual sphere. O n e of the m a j o r p u r p o s e s of this m o v e m e n t w a s to purify the practice of Islam f r o m s u p e r s t i t i o n s a n d p o p u l a r practices t h a t w e r e n o t based u p o n the teachings of the Q u r a n and S u n n a h . In particular, t h e m o v e m e n t ' s ideologue, M u h a m m a d Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, s o u g h t to eradicate t h e p o p u l a r practices of v e n e r a t i o n of saints and the use of a m u l e t s , activities w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e d shirk (idolatry) because they asserted that people or objects o t h e r than G o d possessed the p o w e r to g r a n t requests. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab asserted the absolute equality of all believers in t h e eyes of G o d , so t h a t n o o n e e n j o y e d special status or a favored position except t h r o u g h piety. O n e of the most controversial ways in which Ibn Abd al-Wahhab tried to eradicate these practices was t h r o u g h the destruction of shrines and t o m b s that were popularly venerated, including those of holy m e n and even M u h a m m a d himself and his Companions. In the process, Shii, as well as Sunni, shrines were destroyed, setting t h e stage for Wahhabi-Shii t e n s i o n s w h i c h c o n t i n u e t o this day, as evidenced by o n g o i n g tensions b e t w e e n Saudi Arabia and Iran. M u h a m m a d Ibn Abd al-Wahhab also t a u g h t the radical rejection of taqlid, or adherence to past tradition, in favor of ijtihad, or the use of i n d e p e n d e n t reasoning in direct interpretation of the Q u r a n and Sunnah. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not s u p p o r t a literal interpretation of scripture. Rather, he e m p h a s i z e d the need to contextualize the Q u r a n and S u n n a h so as to k n o w the exact situation facing the Muslim c o m m u n i t y at the time. This enabled h i m to distinguish, for example, which Q u r a n i c prescriptions were intended to apply to every time and place versus those which w e r e situation specific. Likewise, this approach allowed h i m to d e t e r m i n e the same for M u h a m m a d ' s Sunnah so that attributes or responsibilities specific to M u h a m m a d could be separated f r o m those applicable to a political or religious leader of another time and place. This b e c a m e particularly important as Ibn Abd al-Wahhab o u t l i n e d the responsibilities of an i m a m (religious leader) versus t h o s e of an a m i r (political leader), particularly w i t h respect to jihad.1 Preaching a message of absolute m o n o t h e i s m (tawhid), Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought to reassert the absolute uniqueness and sovereignty of G o d in every aspect of life at b o t h t h e individual and c o m m u n a l levels. H e e m p h a s i z e d the importance of "conviction of the h e a r t " and the n e e d to gain converts. Although the W a h h a b i m o v e m e n t has often b e e n accused of "conversion by the sword," that is, a militant f o r m of jihad, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself d e n o u n c e d this m e t h o d

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as being incapable of p r o d u c i n g "conviction of the heart." Instead, w h a t he proposed was a policy of missionary w o r k (dawah), in which adherents w o u l d carry on dialogues and study with non-Wahhabis to e n c o u r a g e t h e m to r e t u r n to the straight path of Islam. Historically, this missionary w o r k was carried o u t t h r o u g h letter writing and traveling for direct dialogue and debate, the p u r p o s e being expansion of the Wahhabi c o m m u n i t y t h r o u g h conversion to Wahhabi religious beliefs. T h e historical record also includes instances in which c o m m u n i t i e s targeted for debate and dialogue disagreed with and resisted the W a h h a b i interpretation of Islam. In these cases, the inhabitants w e r e declared to be unbelievers and thus b e c a m e subject to military activity to place the territory u n d e r Wahhabi control. This policy was in k e e p i n g w i t h the classical historical practice of providing the inhabitants of areas u n d e r conquest with the choice of conversion, entering into an alliance relationship, or b e c o m i n g subject to the sword. Thus, rather than remaining a strictly religious m o v e m e n t , the Wahhabi m o v e m e n t was one in which religious ideology i n f o r m e d and guided political activity. This alliance of religion and politics remains intact today in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. T h e concept of tajdid has its origins in a saying of M u h a m m a d : "God will send to this ummah (Muslim c o m m u n i t y ) at the head of each century those w h o will r e n e w its faith for it." 2 Muslims believe that a r e n e w e r (mujaddid) will be sent at the beginning of each century to purify and restore Islamic practice to the straight path (shariah), thereby regenerating and revitalizing the Muslim community. Over time, the belief in the mujaddid took on popular religious forms, the most import a n t of w h i c h w a s belief in t h e M a h d i ("divinely g u i d e d o n e " ) . T h e M a h d i claimed to be God's appointed and inspired representative on earth, although he did n o t hold prophetic status. O n e of the m o s t p r o m i n e n t revivalist m o v e m e n t s w i t h a proclaimed Mahdi was that which arose in the Sudan in the eighteenth century. In this case, a charismatic Sufi leader, M u h a m m a d A h m a d , p r o c l a i m e d himself the awaited Mahdi w h o had c o m e to r e f o r m his degraded society. Like M u h a m m a d Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the Sudanese Mahdi perceived his society to be c o r r u p t and in decline. H e b l a m e d the existence of popular, foreign, and un-Islamic practices—such as the v e n e r a t i o n of saints, p r o s t i t u t i o n , g a m b l i n g , w i d e s p r e a d i m m o r a l i t y and corr u p t i o n at all levels of society, i n c l u d i n g political a n d religious, and t h e use of a l c o h o l — f o r the state of his society. H e particularly singled o u t t h e fact of E g y p t i a n - O t t o m a n rule as having led to the c u r r e n t state of degradation in the Sudan. H e accused the Egyptians of disobedience to G o d and M u h a m m a d , alteration of and deviation from the Shariah, and blasphemy, thereby justifying a jihad against these unbelievers. T h e Mahdi's p r o p o s e d solution was to be the eradication of these practices in favor of a r e t u r n to the "pure" interpretation of Islam that was practiced by the

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I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | early Muslim c o m m u n i t y during the time of M u h a m m a d and the Rightly Guided Caliphs. Unlike t h e e g a l i t a r i a n i s m of t h e W a h h a b i m o v e m e n t , t h e M a h d i claimed special status for b o t h himself and his followers, w h o m he called Ansar, after the C o m p a n i o n s of M u h a m m a d . T h e Mahdi set as a p r i m a r y goal of the m o v e m e n t independence f r o m foreign rule so that an Islamic state could be established with himself as s u p r e m e ruler and the Shariah as the law of the land. This return to past examples was taken so literally that the Mahdi actually reinstituted the caliphate, believing that even the political structure of the early Muslims m u s t be replicated in o r d e r t o r e t u r n to t h e " s t r a i g h t p a t h " of Islam. Although the Mahdist state ultimately was overthrown, its influence lives on in t h e collective m e m o r y of Sudanese Muslims and t h r o u g h the Mahdi's descendants, w h o r e m a i n active in Sudanese politics today. For example, the Mahdi's great, g r e a t - g r a n d s o n , Sadiq al-Mahdi, r e m a i n s the h e a d of the Mahdiyah Sufi order and served as p r i m e minister f r o m 1986 until 1989. Nineteenth-Century

Islamic

Modernism

By the n i n e t e e n t h century, m o s t Muslim countries w e r e in a sufficient state of internal decline that they b e c a m e vulnerable to E u r o p e a n imperialism. Muslims experienced the defeats of their societies at the h a n d s of Christian E u r o p e as a religious, as well as political and cultural, crisis. This w a s particularly the case because E u r o p e a n armies were typically accompanied by Christian missionaries, w h o attributed their conquests n o t only to superior military technology and economic power b u t also to the superiority of Western Christian civilization and religion. Because religion t o o k on such political overtones on the part of the West, it is n o t surprising that s o m e Muslims looked to the c o m b i n a t i o n of religion and politics to provide a solution. Muslim responses to E u r o p e a n colonialism ranged f r o m resistance or struggle, justified as jihad in the defense of Islam in the face of the Christian onslaught, to a c c o m m o d a t i o n a n d / o r assimilation with the West. T h o s e Muslims w h o advocated resistance to the West t u r n e d to the example of M u h a m m a d , w h o , having faced rejection and p e r s e c u t i o n by the Meccans, chose to e m i g r a t e (hijra) f r o m Mecca to Medina, f r o m w h e r e he built his p o w e r base. Ultimately, he engaged the Meccans in battle and w o n . Some Muslims chose to follow this example, b u t such efforts w e r e generally ineffective in the face of m o d e r n w e a p o n r y and technology and numerically superior European forces. In the end, n o t only did military e n g a g e m e n t prove to b e fruitless b u t e m i g r a t i o n to a "safe" Muslim territory i n d e p e n d e n t of E u r o p e a n colonial control proved logistically and physically impossible for most. O t h e r Muslims, discouraged by the failure of Muslim societies to successfully oppose E u r o p e a n colonial armies, believed that simple imitation of past Muslim practices or the r e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the early Muslim c o m m u n i t y ' s practices w a s insufficient, given m o d e r n t e c h n o l o g y and m e t h o d s . Instead, t h e y

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believed that Western technology w a s compatible w i t h Islam so that w h a t was really needed was a m o d e r n reinterpretation or reformulation of Islam. T h e s e Islamic m o d e r n i s t s t a u g h t that religious doctrines and practices needed to be reinterpreted (ijtihad) in light of m o d e r n needs so as to provide religious, educational, and social r e f o r m . For example, they reinterpreted Q u r a n verses to introduce r e f o r m s e n h a n c i n g the status of w o m e n by restricting polygamy and the husband's unilateral right to divorce, enhancing the w o m a n ' s right to divorce, and providing g r e a t e r regulation of m a i n t e n a n c e p a y m e n t s and child custody. O t h e r s believed that the best long-term plan was to harness religion to political and social activism, a t e n d e n c y o f t e n referred to as "Islamic f u n d a m e n t a l i s m . " T h e s e a p p r o a c h e s r e m a i n in existence in t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y M u s l i m w o r l d , a l t h o u g h their relative p o w e r and influence have varied over time. Islamic m o d e r n i s t s provided an Islamic rationale for the r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Islamic law and doctrine and the adoption a n d / o r adaptation of m o d e r n ideas, technology, science, and institutions by asserting the compatibility of Islam and reason. T h e y looked to the glories of past Islamic empires and their significant contributions in m a t h e m a t i c s and science to argue that Islam was a religion of science, progress, and reason. T h e y called u p o n Muslims to reclaim the beliefs, values, and attitudes that had m a d e the Islamic c o m m u n i t y successful and h a d contributed to the creation of Islamic empires and civilization in the past. They claimed that the decline of the Muslim c o m m u n i t y was n o t d u e to any flaw in Islam per se, b u t rather lay in Muslims' d e p a r t u r e f r o m the dynamic of Islam as practiced by M u h a m m a d and the early Muslims. To r e m e d y this, Islamic m o d ernists like M u h a m m a d A b d u h (1849-1905 C.E.) in E g y p t and Sayyid A h m a d Khan (1817-98 C.E.) and M u h a m m a d Iqbal (1876-1938 C.E.) in India called for a process of purification and reconstruction, or renewal and reform, to replace the prevailing static medieval religious worldview with a m o r e dynamic interpretation of Islam that was capable of adapting to and i n c o r p o r a t i n g modernity. Islamic m o d e r n i s m t o o k on political f o r m to the extent that it was c o n c e r n e d with the overall r e f o r m of society. T h e raison d'etre for Islamic m o d e r n i s m was the c o n f r o n t a t i o n b e t w e e n the Muslim world and the West in the f o r m of European colonialism and the global debate a b o u t the relationship b e t w e e n religion and science. In the process, Islamic m o d e r n i s t s and conservative traditionalists came into conflict, because conservative traditionalists (represented by the ulama) accused Islamic modernists of selling o u t to the West. Islamic modernists defended their position by asserting the n e e d to break with strict adherence (taqlid) to the past in order to reinterpret Islam (ijtihad) so as to move into the f u t u r e . Modernists insisted u p o n the n e e d to u n d e r s t a n d the past historical and social contexts in which Islamic law had originally b e e n interpreted in order to d e t e r m i n e its applicability to m o d e r n society. T h e y also e m p h a s i z e d the n e e d to place the Q u r a n and hadith in context to u n d e r s t a n d their m e a n i n g in their o w n time. A

166 I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | distinction was m a d e b e t w e e n the u n c h a n g i n g laws of G o d (Shariah) and h u m a n interpretations (fiqh), which w e r e subject to r e f o r m u l a t i o n and change. Modernists i m p l e m e n t e d their r e f o r m s in a variety of forms—political action a n d legal, e d u c a t i o n a l , a n d social r e f o r m s . For e x a m p l e , M u h a m m a d A b d u h introduced changes in Egypt's Shariah courts w h e n he was appointed mufti (head of the religious c o u r t system) of Egypt. H e used his position as a j u d g e to reint e r p r e t and apply Islam to m o d e r n conditions, c o m b i n i n g a r e t u r n to the fundam e n t a l sources of Islam (the Q u r a n and Sunnah) with m o d e r n rational t h o u g h t . H e f u r t h e r called for training n e w religious leaders capable of i m p l e m e n t i n g this n e w m e t h o d o l o g y to achieve social reforms, such as i m p r o v i n g and p r o t e c t i n g the status of w o m e n . Likewise, Sir A h m a d Khan and M u h a m m a d Iqbal rejected the classical f o r m u l a t i o n s of Islam in favor of r e t u r n i n g to the Q u r a n and Sunnah. T h e y also p r o m o t e d educational r e f o r m s to c o m b i n e the best of W e s t e r n education with a m o d e r n i s t interpretation of Islam so as to prepare a n e w gene r a t i o n of Muslim leaders capable of leading the Indian s u b c o n t i n e n t into the m o d e r n era. M u h a m m a d Iqbal in Pakistan provides a p r o m i n e n t example of the Islamic m o d e r n i s t critique of the West. Although he admired the d y n a m i c spirit, intellectual tradition, and technology of the West, he nevertheless criticized their use in s u p p o r t i n g E u r o p e a n colonialism, the m o r a l b a n k r u p t c y of secularism, the materialism and exploitation of capitalism, and the atheism of Marxism, t h e m e s that remain a part of c o n t e m p o r a r y Islamist discourse. Iqbal posited the vitality and d y n a m i s m of early Islamic t h o u g h t and practice as a r e m e d y and called for the reinterpretation of Islam and Islamic law in o r d e r to develop Islamic m o d e l s that could serve as alternatives to societies built u p o n Western ideologies. Most i m p o r t a n t f r o m a political point of view, Iqbal identified precedents in Islamic belief and traditions that could be reinterpreted to yield Islamic equivalents of Western d e m o c r a c y and parliamentary government. H e claimed that the m o s t i m p o r t a n t political ideal in Islam was its assertion of the b r o t h e r h o o d and equality of believers, beliefs that he believed represented democracy. In fact, he a s s e r t e d that, r a t h e r t h a n his b o r r o w i n g t h e c o n c e p t of d e m o c r a c y f r o m the West, t h e reverse w a s t r u e . D e m o c r a c y w a s actually an Islamic i d e o l o g y : " D e m o c r a c y has b e e n the great mission of England in m o d e r n times . . . it is one aspect of o u r political ideal that is being w o r k e d o u t in it. I t . . . makes it the greatest M u h a m m a d a n Empire in the world." 3 Iqbal also used his belief in the unity and b r o t h e r h o o d of all believers to reject the secular W e s t e r n ideology of territorial nationalism because he believed that this threatened the overarching unity of the Muslim community. T h a t is, in Islam, territorial borders should n o t be considered the m o s t relevant criterion for determ i n i n g loyalty relationships. However, despite this theoretical objection, Iqbal,

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like many other Islamic modernists, tempered his religious idealism with a political realism that led him to recognize the need for Muslims to achieve national independence f r o m their European colonial overlords. It was this political realism that permitted him to b e c o m e the "father" and ideologue of m o d e r n Pakistan because he was increasingly convinced that c o m m u n a l h a r m o n y would not be possible for a Muslim minority living in a Hindu-dominated state. His call for a separate homeland for Muslims was geared toward allowing Muslims to preserve their distinctive Islamic identity, way of life, and solidarity. Despite its important contributions to the revitalization and reinterpretation of Islam, Islamic modernism attracted only a small intellectual elite of followers. It never developed into a p o p u l a r or mass p h e n o m e n o n . Islamic m o d e r n i s m served as the theoretical springboard for legitimating and Islamizing m o d e r n ideas and institutions, such as the nation-state, democracy, parliamentary gove r n m e n t , and the n o t i o n that legal experts were qualified to i n t e r p r e t Islam. However, the systematic reinterpretation of Islam and the development of effective and popular organizations to preserve, propagate, and implement its message did not occur until the emergence of twentieth-century organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Jamaat-i Islami in South Asia. Twentieth-Century

Islamic Political

Activism

T h e Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i Islami serve as models for many of the c o n t e m p o r a r y Islamic m o v e m e n t s and organizations active in the Muslim world today. The springboard for the development of these movements was the continued presence and power of Europe in the Muslim world and the apparent failure of Islamic reformers to block the spread of Western political and cultural penetration of the Muslim world. Like the revivalist and modernist movements that preceded them, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i Islami sought to recapture the strength and vitality of the early Islamic period and to harness religion to political and social activism. But their methods, agendas, and popularity have differed. The most important and influential thinkers of the contemporary m o v e m e n t s are the f o u n d e r of the Muslim B r o t h e r h o o d in Egypt, Hasan alBanna (1906-49 C.E.), the f o u n d e r of the Jamaat-i Islami in Pakistan, Mawlana Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-79 C.E.), and the Egyptian Muslim Brother w h o radicalized Islamic revivalism, Sayyid Q u t b (1906-66 C.E.). Hasan al-Banna and Mawlana Mawdudi b o t h were influenced by and built upon the eighteenth-century models for revival and reform, particularly the Wahhabi and Mahdi m o v e m e n t s . Like the Wahhabis and the Mahdi, al-Banna and Mawdudi insisted upon returning directly to the Q u r a n and Sunnah for reinterpretation. However, unlike the Wahhabis and the Mahdi, both al-Banna and Mawdudi were modern, although not necessarily Western oriented, in their activities,

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I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | organization, and ideological agendas. T h e y s o u g h t to engage and control the m o d e r n w o r l d , r a t h e r t h a n to escape f r o m or avoid it. Both e m e r g e d at a t i m e w h e n the Muslim world was weak, in decline, and mostly occupied and ruled by foreign powers. Both the Muslim B r o t h e r h o o d and the J a m a a t declared Islam to be a self-sufficient, all-encompassing way of life and an ideological alternative to Marxism and Western capitalism. As such, they claimed that Islam was the ideological and organizational solution to the m a j o r issues facing the twentieth-century Muslim world, namely, E u r o p e a n colonialism and the revitalization and development of Muslim societies and their fortunes. Because the religio-cultural p e n e t r a t i o n of the West t h r o u g h education, customs, laws, and values was blamed for the downfall and subservience of Muslim societies to the West, they believed that the solution was necessarily a religio-cultural reassertion of Islam in these fields, rather than a simple adoption of Western institutions and ideas. T u r n i n g back to the f u n d a m e n t a l sources of Islam, the Q u r a n and S u n n a h , the B r o t h e r h o o d and the J a m a a t looked for Islamic equivalents of Western ideas and institutions, thus reinterpreting and Islamizing matters such as legal and educational r e f o r m s , g o v e r n m e n t accountability, and p o p u l a r participation in the political process. Religious ideology thus informed, motivated, and inspired b o t h political and social activism and b e c a m e a m e a n s of protecting Muslim identity and culture. In contrast to Islamic m o d e r n i s t s w h o sought to render Islam compatible with Western culture, the B r o t h e r h o o d and the J a m a a t sought to create a m o r e indigenously r o o t e d Islamic state and society t h r o u g h a process of renewal and Islamization. Although the B r o t h e r h o o d and J a m a a t rejected Westernization, they did n o t reject modernization. In fact, they incorporated m o d e r n m e t h o d s and means into their institution building, provision of services, and even proselytizing, m a k i n g use of the mass media, m o d e r n technology, and organizational skills. Although their message was based u p o n the Q u r a n and Sunnah, it was clearly w r i t t e n for a twentieth-century audience because it addressed the challenges of m o d e r n i t y and analyzed t h e relationship of Islam to m o d e r n issues, such as d e m o c r a c y ; nationalism; Zionism; Marxism; capitalism; m o d e r n banking; law and education; the status, education, and right to w o r k of w o m e n ; and international relations. W h i l e they differed on s o m e issues, the B r o t h e r h o o d and the J a m a a t shared an ideological worldview based u p o n the Islamic historical tradition. This worldview, which has guided m a n y c o n t e m p o r a r y r e f o r m movements, includes the following c o m m o n beliefs: 1. In Islam as a c o m p r e h e n s i v e way of life in b o t h state and society, private and public spheres; 2. In the Q u r a n and S u n n a h as the f u n d a m e n t a l scriptural sources of Islam;

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3. In Shariah (Islamic law), as derived f r o m the Q u r a n and Sunnah, as the sacred blueprint for all aspects of Muslim life, both personal and communal; 4. That Muslims have a divine vocation to reestablish God's sovereignty and rule over the earth through the implementation of the Shariah and that fulfillment of this vocation will result in success, wealth, and power for the Islamic community in this life as well as the next; 5. That the current state of decline and subservience of Muslim societies is due to the fact that they have not fulfilled their divine vocation and have not adhered to the Shariah; 6. That the restoration of Muslim identity, pride, power, and rule can occur only through a return to Islam, reimplementation of the Shariah, and following of God's guidance for both state and society; 7. That m o d e r n science and technology must be harnessed and used within an Islamically guided and oriented context to prevent the Westernization and secularization of Muslim society; and 8. That a social revolution must be undertaken to set the stage for the establishment of an Islamic state and society The Brotherhood and the Jamaat looked to the example of M u h a m m a d and the early Muslim community in Mecca for their organizational example. They found a paradigm in the early Muslim community for righteous living within a broader society. That righteous c o m m u n i t y was to serve as a dynamic nucleus f r o m which a true Islamic reformation or revolution was to be launched. The Brotherhood and the Jamaat determined that the most effective means of building such a dynamic nucleus in the contemporary era was to produce a new generation of Islamically oriented but m o d e r n educated leaders to lead a dynamic social, rather than violent political revolution with the ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic state and society. Consequently, both movements recruited followers from different educational institutions, including schools, universities, and mosques, and from a variety of professions, ranging from professionals to students and laborers, largely from the lower-middle and middle classes. T h e m a j o r difference b e t w e e n the t w o organizations was its power base—the Muslim Brotherhood worked to develop a broadly based mass populist movement, whereas the Jamaat was m o r e elitist and hierarchical in membership. The Jamaat's primary goal was to train leaders w h o were intended to c o m e to power, whereas the Brotherhood sought to achieve change through popular demand across society. As was m e n t i o n e d above, both the Brotherhood and the Jamaat sought to establish an Islamic state through the gradual Islamization of society through a process of social change, rather than through violent political revolution. Rather than rapidly overthrowing the current order, both organizations taught that Mus-

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John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | lims needed first to reclaim and reappropriate their Islamic identity and practice, b e g i n n i n g at the grassroots level and gradually w o r k i n g their way u p t h r o u g h society and institutions to achieve Islamization. T h e r e f o r e , b o t h organizations disseminated their interpretation of Islam, which c o m b i n e d personal religious c o m m i t m e n t with m o d e r n learning, technology, and social and political activism, t h r o u g h the provision of social services, as well as publications and preaching. In addition, to e n c o u r a g e Muslims to seek to revive and strengthen Muslim societies t h r o u g h Islam as the divinely revealed foundation for state and society alone, they discouraged adherence to self-generated Western ideologies like capitalism and c o m m u n i s m , which they accused of p r o m o t i n g values a n a t h e m a to Islam, n a m e l y a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m , c o r r u p t i o n , social injustice, and e c o n o m i c exploitation. T h e y p r e a c h e d t h a t W e s t e r n secularism, w i t h its s e p a r a t i o n of church and state, was morally b a n k r u p t and inherently fallible and w o u l d ultimately lead to the m o r a l decline and downfall of E u r o p e and N o r t h America. T h e revitalization and r e f o r m a t i o n of Islam therefore, in their view, should be in a r e t u r n to revelation, rather than dependence u p o n h u m a n reason. A g r o u p within the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt b e c a m e radicalized during t h e late 1950s and 1960s w h e n it was e n g a g e d in c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h and suppressed by the Egyptian state, u n d e r the presidency of Gamal Abd al-Nasser. As the g r o u p was targeted for state persecution and, ultimately, eradication, its chief architect, Sayyid Qutb, transformed the ideological beliefs of Hasan al-Banna and Mawlana Mawdudi f r o m a social into a violent political revolution with the ultim a t e goal of physically o v e r t h r o w i n g the Egyptian state. T h a t is, w h e r e a s alBanna and Mawdudi had focused m o r e on a vision of social change, Qutb's prog r a m was blatantly political and radical in focus. A l t h o u g h he r e p r e s e n t s an extremist minority within Islamic activists, Q u t b is i m p o r t a n t for study because of his influence on c o n t e m p o r a r y militant extremist movements. His approach has b e c o m e s y n o n y m o u s with Western understandings of jihad as holy war. Q u t b ' s rejection of the West w a s based u p o n his o w n personal e n c o u n t e r s with it. Although b o r n and raised in Egypt, like m a n y o t h e r y o u n g intellectuals of the time, he studied Western literature and admired the West as a y o u n g man. In 1948, he published a m a j o r work, Social Justice in Islam, in which he argued that, unlike Christianity and C o m m u n i s m , Islam possessed its o w n distinctive social teachings. In his view, only Islamic socialism, as rooted in Islam's comprehensive vision of life, avoided the c o r r u p t i o n and failures of atheism and secularism. In 1949, he traveled to the United States t o study e d u c a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . Although he set o u t on his j o u r n e y in admiration of the United States, he quickly experienced a s t r o n g dose of culture shock that drove h i m to b e c o m e m o r e religiously observant and severely critical of the West, which he experienced as sexually permissive, morally decadent, and anti-Arab (due t o U.S. g o v e r n m e n t and media s u p p o r t for Israel).

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Q u t b r e t u r n e d to Egypt in 1951. Shortly thereafter, he j o i n e d the Muslim B r o t h e r h o o d and quickly e m e r g e d as the organization's most influential ideologue, particularly a m o n g the younger, more militant members. He directly experienced the Egyptian g o v e r n m e n t ' s harassment of the Brotherhood during his i m p r i s o n m e n t and t o r t u r e in 1954 for alleged involvement in an assassination attempt against then-president Nasser. Q u t b was imprisoned for ten years, during which time he w r o t e prolifically. His most important and influential Islamic ideological tract, Signp05t5 or Milestones, was written during this time. In it, he t o o k the ideas of al-Banna and Mawdudi to their literalist, radical, and revolutionary conclusions. Qutb's prison experience radicalized him, pushing him into an increasingly c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l worldview in which the world was absolutely divided into t w o strict categories: the party of G o d and the party of Satan, or those c o m m i t t e d to the rule of God and those opposed to it. In this worldview, which was reminiscent of the seventh-century Kharijite movement, there was n o middle g r o u n d between the forces of good and evil. Q u t b ' s vision of a bipolar world included b o t h the c o n f r o n t a t i o n b e t w e e n Islam and the secular West and the confrontation b e t w e e n Islamic activists and repressive, anti-Islamic governments and societies. Q u t b included Nasser's regime in this latter category. Q u t b advocated the formation of a g r o u p (jamaa) of true Muslims within the broader faithless and c o r r u p t society in order to oppose it. Like M u h a m m a d and the early Muslims, Q u t b viewed his Islamic m o v e m e n t as a righteous minority s u r r o u n d e d by unbelief ( k u f r ) and ignorance

(jahiliyyah).

Here Q u t b reinterpreted the concept of jahiliyyah as ignorance f r o m its classical meaning of pre-Islamic to a m o r e m o d e r n m e a n i n g of "anti-Islamic." In Qutb's worldview, jahiliyyah was the result of the displacement of Islam's God-centered universe, where the responsibilities of the c o m m u n i t y are the primary concern, by the Western-minded and -oriented, human-centered universe, w h e r e the rights of the individual have taken priority. T h e driving p u r p o s e of Q u t b ' s worldview was political—the i m m e d i a t e , revolutionary creation of an Islamic system of g o v e r n m e n t . H e u n d e r s t o o d this to be a divine imperative, r a t h e r than simply an alternative ideology to capitalism and c o m m u n i s m . H e encouraged a r m e d , rather than passive, struggle as the only way to i m p l e m e n t the new Islamic order because of the violence his m o v e m e n t experienced at the hands of the authoritarian, un-Islamic Egyptian government. Q u t b was executed by the Egyptian government in 1966. Qutb's radical declarations against governments in both East and West, defining t h e m as "enemies of G o d " against w h o m t r u e believers were obligated to wage holy war, represented a significant departure from the teachings of al-Banna and Mawdudi, as well as most classical scholarship. Classical scholars tended to emphasize the importance of maintaining social order even in the case where the ruler was unjust, and al-Banna and Mawdudi focused on evolution from the grass-

172 I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | roots level upward. Qutb, however, preached the revolutionary overthrow of any g o v e r n m e n t d e e m e d to be "un-Islamic" or "anti-Islamic" according to his interpretation, so as to implement an Islamic state and society from the top down. His formulation has inspired m a n y o t h e r radical, extremist m o v e m e n t s since then. O n e of the ways in which Qutb's influence is most apparent is the interpretation of jihad ("to strive" or "to struggle") as a call for the violent overthrow of an u n j u s t order, as e x e m p l i f i e d by t w e n t i e t h - and t w e n t y - f i r s t - c e n t u r y militant extremist m o v e m e n t s . T h e s e m o v e m e n t s have reinterpreted Q u r a n i c prescriptions about just wars versus unjust wars in ways differing greatly f r o m classical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . At issue are d e f i n i t i o n s of concepts, such as aggression a n d defense, as well as the questions of w h e n the c o m m a n d to sacrifice life and property to defend Islam is appropriate, and h o w to define the "enemies" of Islam. For example, the Q u r a n speaks again and again of the "enemies of G o d " and the "enemies of Islam," often defining t h e m as "unbelievers." Although other Quranic verses a p p e a r to m a k e it clear that such people should be physically f o u g h t against only if they behave aggressively t o w a r d Muslims, s o m e Muslims have interpreted the call to "struggle" or "strive" against such enemies to be a permanent e n g a g e m e n t required of all Muslims of every time and place until the entire world is converted to Islam. A m a j o r example of this kind of thinking is f o u n d a m o n g those responsible for the attacks on the World Trade C e n t e r and Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Such extremists claim that they have a divine m a n d a t e to kill and m a i m "the enemies of G o d " (Muslims and non-Muslims alike). O s a m a bin Laden justified his declaration of w a r against the United States because of his perception of US. crimes against Muslims—specifically the presence of non-Muslim U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, the h o m e l a n d of Islam; U.S. e c o n o m i c sanctions imposed against Iraq, which have resulted in the deaths of t h o u s a n d s of civilians; and unconditional U.S. support for the state of Israel, which is held responsible for the suffering of the Palestinian people—which placed the United States in the position of the aggressor. Thus, in bin Laden's mind, there is a call for "self-defense" in the face of U.S. military and e c o n o m i c aggression. Definitions of "attacks" or "offensive" actions against Muslims have changed in the t w e n t i e t h and twenty-first centuries, reflecting c u r r e n t social t h o u g h t . Rather than restricting "attacks" and "offensive" actions to purely military activities, current definitions of aggression include economic, cultural, and environmental aggressions, such as disparities between wealthy and p o o r nations and the globalization of Western culture. For example, w h e n Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called the United States the "Great Satan," he was referring to the perceived cultural aggression against Iran by t h e U n i t e d States t h r o u g h the m e d i a and advertising, as well as through U.S. support for the shah. It was in response to this perceived aggression that Khomeini declared that the most binding c o m m a n d in

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Islam is that which instructs the Muslim to sacrifice life and property to defend and bolster Islam. 4 O t h e r twentieth- and twenty-first-century interpretations of jihad are focused on the Muslim vision of order and social h a r m o n y . Recognizing that Muslims have a responsibility to strive for a just society, Muslims in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have considered the struggles for educational and social reform, the fight against d r u g use and addiction, the fight to clean up neighborhoods and slums, and the efforts to establish good schools and to provide education for all children to be ways in which communities engage in jihad. Personal endeavors in jihad include the individual discipline required to keep the fast of Ramadan, to do w h a t is good and avoid w h a t is evil, and to fulfill family responsibilities. Clearly, c o n t e m p o r a r y Islamic m o v e m e n t s a n d societies, t h o u g h all in a g r e e m e n t about the ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic state and society, continue to debate about w h e t h e r evolution or revolution is the appropriate m e t h o d for its a c c o m p l i s h m e n t and the n a t u r e of the state, f r o m caliphate to m o d e r n parliam e n t a r y governments.

The Message

of Islam's

Politics

Classical definitions of the role of Islam and the state have undergone revision in m o d e r n times. Up until the n i n e t e e n t h century, Muslims generally t h o u g h t of politics in t e r m s of the Muslim ummah (understood as the universal Islamic comm u n i t y ) and either a universal caliphate (in w h i c h its religious c h a r a c t e r was emphasized) or diverse sultanates (in which its political character was e m p h a sized). T h e d o m i n a n t vision was that of the unity of the universal Muslim community, or ummah, which recognizes n o geographic, linguistic, ethnic, or national b o u n d a r i e s , and the responsibility of the ummah to obey the j u s t ruler. T h e m o d e r n nation-state, in the European sense, did not exist before the nineteenth century. Politics was m o r e a matter of dynasties and rulers (referred to as dawlah) than a m a t t e r of c o m m u n a l participation in a system. T h e first m e n t i o n of the territorial state was m a d e in the nineteenth century by the Egyptian scholar Rifaah Rafi al-Tahtawi (1801-73 C.E.), w h o emphasized the concept of watan (fatherland), as o p p o s e d to dawlah. T h e use of dawlah to refer to a territorial state dates to the nineteenth-century O t t o m a n Empire, w h e n the "state"' b e c a m e distinct f r o m "dynasty" or "government." Nineteenth-century Islamic scholars also distinguished b e t w e e n the politics and administration of religion (al-din) versus the politics and administration of the "kingdom" (al-mulk), positing that the t w o had b e e n united only during the eras of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs (632-61 C.E.) and Caliph U m a r ibn Abd al-Aziz (r. 717-20

C.E.).

T h e proclamation of Islam as being b o t h a religion and a state (din wa-dawlah) dates to the early twentieth century, w h e n Muslims were confronted with b o t h

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the abolition of the Turkish caliphate and the territorial division of Muslim communities u n d e r the impact of European colonialism. Under such circumstances, the vision of the caliphate that should be reinstated provided an alternative to f r a g m e n t a t i o n by insisting u p o n the unity of the Muslim ummah. It also provided an alternative vision to the territorial nationalism of Europe. Those w h o supp o r t e d the c o n t i n u e d existence of the caliphate defined it as a c o m b i n a t i o n of spiritual and political authority in its ideal f o r m , so that an Arab caliphate, for example, should serve as a state for b o t h Arab Muslims and Arab non-Muslims. Although the caliphate had c o m e to a forcible end with the fall of the Abbasid dynasty to the Mongols in 1258 C.E., it remained a p o w e r f u l religious symbol of political legitimacy. T h e O t t o m a n sultans adopted the title of caliph to lend religious legitimacy to their rule. T h e O t t o m a n claim to the caliphate was abolished in 1924. Since then, there have been occasional calls a m o n g Islamic revivalists for a revival of the caliphate as a m e a n s of maintaining unity of the broader Muslim c o m m u n i t y , b u t such calls have n o t g a r n e r e d p o p u l a r s u p p o r t . Instead, o t h e r organizations, such as the O r g a n i z a t i o n of the Islamic C o n f e r e n c e , have b e e n f o r m e d to try to unify policies b e t w e e n Muslim countries. Twentieth-century visions of the ideal state have varied. W h e r e a s some have spoken of the necessity of a Muslim state, defined as a state f o u n d e d as a h o m e land for Muslims (i.e., the creation of the state of Pakistan), others, like Mawlana Abu al-Ala Mawdudi (1903-79), the f o u n d e r of the Jamaat-i Islami, called for the f o u n d a t i o n of a specifically Islamic state, a God-centered one r u n only by t r u e believers with the Q u r a n and Sunnah as guides. Mawdudi was, as a result, vehemently opposed to b o t h nationalism and d e m o c r a c y because he perceived both to be secular ideologies in which sovereignty belonged to the territory or the people rather than to God. Stated belief in Islam as a faith was insufficient in Mawdudi's political vision. A c c o r d i n g t o M a w d u d i , that faith m u s t be placed i n t o action in all spheres of the state—political, economic, and legislative, as well as moral. Likewise, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood proclaimed Islam as a religion and a state, a spirituality as well as an action. Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i Islami sought the Islamization of b o t h society and state, b u t this was to be done f r o m the grassroots level on up, rather than by a revolutionary overthrow of the current political system. An alternative, and m o r e radical, vision of the relationship b e t w e e n Islam and politics w a s p r e s e n t e d by Sayyid Q u t b (1906-66), w h o s e w o r k was discussed above. In Qutb's vision, the foundation of an Islamic state is i n c u m b e n t u p o n all Muslims and is to be achieved by force, if necessary. Establishment of the Islamic state is to precede Islamization of society, because Q u t b posits that the Islamic state is necessarily in a p o s i t i o n t o i m p o s e Islamization f r o m above. In his vision, h u m a n rulership in all of its f o r m s is to be rejected so that the k i n g d o m of G o d can be established on earth. All non-Islamic influences, such as patriot-

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ism and nationalism, are to be rejected so that Islamic culture cannot be polluted. According to Qutb, God's kingdom on earth is to be established via physical jihad (struggle), not just t h r o u g h teaching or preaching. Only w h e n the n e w Islamic order has been established should followers turn to the detailing of laws and systems of government. Many militant Islamic groups today have pursued Qutb's ideology, seeking to confront and overthrow secular states. The Islamic revival that began in the late 1960s was accompanied by a revived interest in the subject of the appropriate relationship between Islam and politics. The mainstream position recognizes that Islam, although in part a devotional religion, also has a public dimension. Mainstream Muslims believe that Islam should serve as a moral guide in developing new forms and systems of both state and government in accordance with modern circumstances. Political Islamists, in particular, believe that a distinct Islamic model of the state and government are clear, making their immediate establishment mandatory. However, to date, Islamists have failed to present a blueprint for such a state or government, focusing instead on the need to first create an Islamic order. The most conclusive evidence that the Quran and hadith do not specify a form for Islamic government or an Islamic state is the fact that contemporary Islamic movements do not all seek the same type of polity. Nor do the states that consider themselves "Islamic" necessarily share the same f o r m of g o v e r n m e n t . Countries may share certain principles, such as the application of the Quranically prescribed hudud punishments or the prohibition of usury, but the actual forms of government vary widely. Some Islamic states, like Saudi Arabia, are hereditary monarchies, whereas others are military dictatorships (Sudan) or are republics with elected parliaments (Iran and Pakistan). Many of them do not even mutually recognize each other as Islamic states. Clearly, a variety of political forms of Islamic government are possible, although c o m m o n social and moral features may exist. The theory of the Islamic state that has had the most direct impact upon actual government due to its implementation is that of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-89) in Iran. Khomeini taught that Shiis did not necessarily have to wait for the return of the Hidden Imam to have a pious government, but that such a government could exist currently, provided that it had an appropriate leader. The hallmark of Khomeini's vision of the Islamic state was his declaration of the doctrine of vilayat-ifaqih, or the rule of the jurist. This doctrine was based upon a reinterpretation of the Shii doctrine of the Hidden Imam, in which the ulama (religious scholars) serve as the Hidden I m a m ' s representatives during his absence. According to this system, the ulama are responsible for the interpretation of Islamic law and the most learned in Islamic law is to serve as the leader of the country. This doctrine was i m p l e m e n t e d in the Islamic Republic of Iran in

176 I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | 1979, with Khomeini as the Faqih, or s u p r e m e jurist. Within a short time after the revolution, b o t h Iran's g o v e r n m e n t institutions and parliament were dominated by the ulama. Although an elected parliament is responsible for enacting legislation, t h e ulama retain c o n t r o l over legislation t h r o u g h the C o u n c i l of Guardians, a g r o u p of appointed ulama w h o must verify that any and all legislation passed by the parliament is in accord w i t h Islamic law. By granting the gove r n m e n t primacy in Islam, the Islamic g o v e r n m e n t therefore held the right to b r e a k any c o n t r a c t or stop any activity d e e m e d c o n t r a r y to the Shariah or to the interest of the country. T h e role of the ulama in politics is an increasingly contested issue in Iran today as Iranians grapple with the realities of the c o n t e m p o r a r y global and increasingly technical and scientific world of today, the a r g u m e n t being that the ulama, as m o r e t r a d i t i o n a l scholars, simply do n o t possess t h e scientific and technical expertise to deal effectively with contemporary realities. Instead, it is believed that religious experts need input f r o m experts of o t h e r professions. This is particularly true with respect to the need to reinterpret, expand, and r e f o r m Islamic law.

Islamic

Law

W i t h respect to Islamic law, the c o n t e m p o r a r y Muslim c o m m u n i t y faces t w o m a j o r interrelated issues. T h e first is t h e necessity of distinguishing b e t w e e n the eternal principles and values of the Q u r a n , which are to be applied consistently and w i t h o u t c h a n g e to all sociopolitical contexts, a n d t h o s e t h a t w e r e revealed as specific responses to specific historical situations. T h e o t h e r m a j o r challenge is the need to separate o u t divine prescriptions from h u m a n interpretations. Many of t h e ulama, r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e traditional a n d conservative strains in Islam, c o n t i n u e to e q u a t e t h e Shariah, G o d ' s divinely revealed law, with its interpretation as f o u n d in the legal manuals developed by the early law schools. O t h e r m o r e r e f o r m i s t trends, like t h o s e r e p r e s e n t e d by M u h a m m a d A b d u h and M u h a m m a d Iqbal, have insisted o n t h e distinction b e t w e e n the divinely revealed law (Shariah) contained in the Q u r a n and Sunnah and h u m a n interpretation (fìqh) and application of those laws which is the product of social c u s t o m and reason. T h o s e that are considered to be u n c h a n g i n g relate to the Muslim's duties and obligations to G o d (ibadat, or worship), whereas those that are subject to change relate m o r e to interpersonal relations (muamalat, or social obligations), because these are c o n t i n g e n t u p o n social and historical circumstances. Consequently, c o n t e m p o r a r y leaders of Islamic activist m o v e m e n t s have r e c l a i m e d the right to ijtihad for t h e express p u r p o s e of r e i n t e r p r e t i n g Islam to address today's issues and needs. Legal r e f o r m s remain a contested issue in m a n y c o n t e m p o r a r y Muslim countries. Most Muslim states have Western-inspired legal codes addressing everything

i m o d e r n islam

but family law. As the heart of the Shariah and the basis for a strong, Islamically oriented family structure and society, Islamic family law has remained intact in most Muslim countries. However, significant reforms in Islamic law occurred during the twentieth century, most notably with respect to the protection and expansion of women's rights.' However, these legal reforms have been the subject of considerable conflict and debate. Since the 1980s, the Islamic resurgence has often been accompanied by attempts to reimplement classical family law and to reverse m o d e r n reforms. Furthermore, since the 1960s, there has been increasing pressure for the reimplementation of Islamic law in the public sphere, as well, in countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan. Islamization of the law has occurred most notoriously through the reimplementation of the hudud punishments for alcohol consumption, adultery, theft, fornication, and false witnessing. Other, less controversial Islamization measures guided by Islamic law include the prohibition of interest and the development of an Islamic banking and financial sector. Although in some cases, such as Afghanistan under the Taliban, reimplementation of Islamic law has meant restrictions on the rights of w o m e n , this has not necessarily been the case in other countries, like Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan, where w o m e n vote, work, and hold political office. Contemporary Islamic reforms tend to focus on political issues: the relationship between Islam and the state, the reform of Islamic law, the promotion of religious and political pluralism, the push for popular political participation or democratization, and the rights of w o m e n . The question of the compatibility of Islam and democracy has taken center stage during the past few decades. 6 Some Muslims, such as the ruling family of Saudi Arabia, reject any discussion of the issue at all, claiming that Islam has its own system of government. Others claim that Islam and democracy are incompatible because Islam is a divinely revealed system, whereas democracy is based u p o n un-Islamic, Western, h u m a n - m a d e principles and values. However, there are those w h o point to traditional Islamic concepts like consultation (shura) and consensus (ijma) as providing the basis for the reinterpretation of the Islamic understanding of politics in support for adopting m o d e r n forms of political participation and democratization, such as voting in parliamentary elections, which involves the consultation and consensus of the masses, and the appointment of a parliamentary body as a legislative branch, because passing bills into laws would require consultation and consensus on the part of the lawmakers. Muslims supporting these concepts point to the past example of M u h a m m a d ' s senior C o m p a n i o n s f o r m i n g a consultative assembly (majlis alshura) to advise M u h a m m a d and to the selection and election of Muhammad's successor (the caliph) through a process of consultation and consensus. Muslims reinterpret and extend this notion to the creation of m o d e r n forms of political

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178 I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | participation and g o v e r n m e n t , such as the election of heads of state and m e m bers of parliament. T h e close relationship a m o n g t h e state, religion, a n d society t h r o u g h o u t Islamic history has m a d e the relationship of Islam to the state and the place and role of the Shariah in the c o n t e m p o r a r y Muslim world one of the greatest questions and challenges facing c o n t e m p o r a r y Muslims. For most, the question is not w h e t h e r change should occur, b u t r a t h e r h o w m u c h change and w h a t kinds of change are possible, permissible, and even necessary. T h e question of change is vital to b o t h private and public life for Muslims. Tied to the question of change are the questions of w h o should determine those changes by reinterpreting Islam and according to w h a t standards. Although the ulama (religious scholars) have traditionally regarded themselves as the appropriate guardians of religion on the basis of their extensive knowledge of the Q u r a n , hadith, and Islamic law, the reality is that m a n y contemporary Muslims believe that the traditionally educated and oriented ulama do n o t have the necessary expertise to address c o n t e m p o r a r y issues, such as technology, medicine, and science. F u r t h e r m o r e , m a n y of the ulama are seen to be t o o closely linked to the authoritarian regimes u n d e r which they serve, approving and religiously legitimating the u n p o p u l a r policies of the state. Because governments in m a n y countries control and distribute the f u n d s used to build mosques, appoint and pay the salaries of religious leaders and judges, and approve the topics or outline t h e Friday m o s q u e s e r m o n s , t r a d i t i o n a l religious leaders have b e c o m e increasingly accused of preaching the g o v e r n m e n t interpretation of Islam. Consequently, it is not surprising that the majority of c o n t e m p o r a r y reformist leaders are n o t religious scholars b u t lay people w h o are Islamically oriented and politically and socially activist. These leaders argue that they have the appropriate expertise (technical, medical, economic, social, and legal) to address contemp o r a r y issues and therefore should be c o u n t e d as qualified "experts" in the reinterpretation of Islam for the c o n t e m p o r a r y world. These changes in religious leadership have led to m o r e serious questioning of the nature of authority, the state, and society. H o w are their Islamic character to be determined and defined? And by w h o m ? Should the traditionally trained ulama retain their prerogative in i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Islam? O r should the n e w class of laypeople with a m o d e r n education take over? Or should there be s o m e combination of the two, w h e r e the ulama remain the interpreters of Islam and Islamic law but with the advisory assistance of laypeople with m o r e m o d e r n expertise?

Islam and Nonbelievers:

Politics

and People outside

the

Tradition

O n e other m a j o r issue facing Muslim and Islamic states today is the status of nonMuslim minorities. C o n c e r n has arisen in recent years a b o u t the status of reli-

i m o d e r n islam

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gious minorities under Muslim rule, because Islam has been reasserted as the state religion in many countries. In the contemporary era, many of those seeking to establish Islamic states in the Muslim world look to history to determine the status of non-Muslims. Although many call for a strict reinstatement of the gradations of citizenship that accompanied dhimmi status in the past, others recognize that this approach is not compatible with the pluralistic realities of the contemporary world and international h u m a n rights standards. Those w h o advocate gradation of citizenship according to religious affiliation believe that an Islamic state, defined as one in which Islamic law is the law of the land, must necessarily be run by Muslims because only Muslims are capable of interpreting Islamic law. This position has been advocated by Islamization prog r a m s in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan that have legislated that only Muslims have the right to hold senior government positions. However, this status is not satisfactory to non-Muslims w h o wish to enjoy full and equal rights of citizenship. Islamists have been on the forefront of the debate over religious pluralism, affirming that pluralism is the essence of Islam as revealed in the Quran and practiced by M u h a m m a d and the early caliphs, rather than a purely Western invention or ideology. They point to the Islamic empires that permitted freedom of religion and worship and protected the dhimmis as evidence of the permissibility and legality of pluralism. T h o u g h many militants and mainstream conservative or traditionalist Muslims advocate classical Islam's dhimmi or the millet system, r e f o r m e r s call for a r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of pluralism. By the mid-1980s, recognizing the need to open the one-party and authoritarian political systems ruling the Muslim world, many Islamists began using the word "pluralism" for the political process, as well, so that, by 1990, they were using the term to explore conflict and differences in Muslim society, as well as the legitimacy of a multiparty system. 7 Particularly problematic for the Muslim world today is the lack of accountability of current regimes. Increasingly, many Muslims promote the use of ijtihad (interpretation) and shura (consultation) as the function of the whole people and the recognition of the equality of all men and women. The universal implementation of ijtihad in the Muslim world is intended to rejuvenate political and social systems within the parameters of Islamic history, fulfilling the needs of m o d e r n society. The system could also result in the answerability of Muslim governments to the people combined with each individual Muslim's responsibility to God for his or her actions, demonstrating the positive fusion of Islam and democracy. 8 Mainstream m o d e r a t e Muslims and Islamic activists today are w o r k i n g to reexamine their faith in the light of m o d e r n society and to develop a new body of literature on diversity and pluralism. Its premise is that pluralism is a foundational principle of nature revealed by the Quran, which promotes the equality of

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I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | all h u m a n i t y in stating that G o d created the world to be c o m p o s e d of different nations, ethnicities, tribes, and languages (Q 30:22, 48:13). Thus, pluralism in systems, civilizations, and laws was intended to be p e r m a n e n t (Q 5:48, 69). Islamists believe that the p u r p o s e of these differences was not the p r o m o t i o n of war and discord b u t rather to serve as a sign f r o m G o d that all people should strive to better understand each other. 9 As a result, Islam should n o t seek the eradication or negation of the " o t h e r " b u t should favor m u t u a l acceptance and appreciation, b e c a u s e differences are i n t e n d e d to e n c o u r a g e c o m p e t i t i o n in v i r t u e a m o n g nations and g u a r a n t e e progress (Q 2:251). Islamists point to the Quranic phrase used for the Muslim c o m m u n i t y — u m m a t a n wasat (middle community)—as one that avoids extremes. This b o d y of literature also addresses the so-called universal values of pluralism, democracy, h u m a n rights, and the rights of minorities and w o m e n , debating the following c o n t e m p o r a r y concerns: 1. Can an Islamic state maintain normal relations with non-Islamic governments? 2. Can the Islamic polity tolerate political differences within its ranks without disobeying God's c o m m a n d m e n t s ? 3. Can the Islamic majority (Sunnis) tolerate the differences in religious interpretation of Islamic sectarian groups? 4. C a n a Muslim n a t i o n g r a n t equal status and o p p o r t u n i t i e s to religious minorities in a reconstituted Islamic state, allowing t h e m to continue the role g r a n t e d to t h e m by nationalist governments? 5. Can w o m e n have a public role in an Islamic state? Debates about religious pluralism occupy an i m p o r t a n t space in Islamic literature. For example, s o m e suggest that the early Muslim c o m m u n i t y practiced pluralism, highlighting the P r o p h e t ' s debates with and g r a n t i n g of f r e e d o m of religious t h o u g h t a n d practice to J e w s a n d Christians, in particular, setting a precedent for peaceful and cooperative interreligious relations. Furthermore, the fact that the ulama t h r o u g h o u t history have exercised ijtihad (independent reasoning in interpreting Islamic law) indicates that the quest for t r u t h may be considered to be de facto and valid pluralism. T h e y n e g a t e the claims of various Islamic g r o u p s to have "the" one and only t r u t h because M u h a m m a d recognized the infallibility only of the c o m m u n i t y as a whole, n o t of the individual. ("My people will never agree in error.") 1 0 T h e Tunisian scholar and leader of the Renaissance Party, Rashid al-Ghannoushi, advocates the parliamentary system as a legitimate m e a n s for universal p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e political process and an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the r o t a t i o n of authority t h r o u g h honest election as a m e a n s of avoiding dictatorship and fulfilling the role of the Islamic institution majlis al-shura (consultative council). H e cites shura, ijtihad, and ijma as principles for m a n a g i n g state institutions, the econ-

i m o d e r n islam

omy, and social affairs, because "Divine law, therefore, manifests itself as the will of the people who, by expressing support or opposition, ratify the law and their approach to Islam and, consequently, their approach to modernity." 11 Democracy also provides the f r a m e w o r k for dialogue and a remedy for the "ills of radicalism." 12 He discusses pluralism as part of the "Islamic heritage," as evidenced by peaceful existence of Jews in Muslim countries during the Middle Ages. Jews then were free to excel in their field of choice on the basis of skill, rather than religious affiliation. He cites the Quranic principle "There is no compulsion in religion" as the basis for religious, cultural, political, and ideological pluralism in Muslim society. 11 Clearly, the questions of religious and political pluralism have been interconnected in the contemporary Islamic debates on the topic of nonMuslim status in countries ranging from Egypt to Indonesia. The question of the appropriateness of non-Muslims serving in official capacities in Muslim majority countries or in self-proclaimed Islamic states remains a problematic issue in many countries. These difficulties are reflected in debates such as the Egyptian dispute over whether Copts, members of an ancient Christian church, should be allowed to serve in the army and whether they should have to pay a special tax, so that the classical dhimmi relationship can exist. Similar debates have occurred and continue to exist in Indonesia, Malaysia, Lebanon, and Pakistan. F u r t h e r m o r e , theoretical acceptance of nonbelievers has not always been observed in the c o n t e m p o r a r y Islamic world. O n e has only to consider the records of discrimination—against Bahais in Iran; Ahmadis in Pakistan; Christians in Egypt, Nigeria, and Sudan; and Arab Jews in Syria—to recognize the failures of many modern states to accommodate differences at an institutional level. One state that has successfully established interfaith cooperation and coexistence is Indonesia, although in recent years it also has experienced problems of religious intolerance and intercommunal violence. Ironically, in recent years the debate about minority status has taken on new meaning for Muslims as many Muslims have emigrated to Europe and the United States where they themselves constitute the minority. Islamic jurisprudence has been challenged to address the issue of minority rights and duties within a majority community f r o m a new perspective. Is it possible for Muslims who live in Muslim-minority communities to be full citizens and to participate politically and socially in non-Muslim-majority communities not governed by Islamic law? W h a t should be the relationship between Islamic law and civil law? Which is to prevail? H o w is Islamic law to be practiced in a non-Muslim-majority country? And what should be the relationship between Muslims and the non-Muslim state? These questions have been faced in the past, although in different circumstances. In classical exegesis, written during the days of the expansion of the Islamic empires, Muslims living in non-Muslim territories were encouraged to

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I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas | m i g r a t e f r o m t h e m so that they w o u l d n o t be c o n t r i b u t i n g to the s t r e n g t h or prosperity of non-Muslims. Although it was preferable for Muslims to live in Muslim territories, nevertheless, the reality was that this was not always possible. Consequently, classical jurists did allow Muslims to live outside of Muslim territories (dar al-Islam) if they were free to practice their religion there. Muslim jurists today offer a variety of opinions. In the c o n t e m p o r a r y era, there remain s o m e jurists w h o continue to counsel e m i g r a t i o n f r o m non-Muslim territories. However, o t h e r s have p e r m i t t e d and even encouraged Muslims to live permanently as loyal citizens in their n e w homelands while preserving their Muslim identity and faith. Rather than focusing on differences and legalistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , they recognize that Muslims share a c o m m o n ethical and m o r a l code w i t h o t h e r religions, w h i c h could be used to build a m o r e just society in which economic injustice, materialism, excessive individualism, consumerism, sexual promiscuity, and violence would be condemned. Such r e c o g n i t i o n of c o m m o n goals offers unity in t h e m i d s t of diversity and points toward the possibility of pluralism t h r o u g h m u t u a l recognition of comm o n values based u p o n authentic revelation. 1 4 In this order, anyone w h o w o r k s toward the establishment of a just society would be considered as submitting to God's will. 15

Conclusion Islamic history continues to provide symbols and slogans for c o n t e m p o r a r y political and religious movements. W h e n M u h a m m a d b r o u g h t his reformist message to Arabia, he was rejected and persecuted by the Meccans, creating a paradigm for "Islam in danger." Just as the early caliphs and Islamic revivalists and reformers t h r o u g h o u t history issued the call of "Islam in danger" as a m e a n s of rallying the Muslim c o m m u n i t y to defend their faith, so twentieth-century independence struggles in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Palestine have used this paradigm to g a r n e r popular support for their causes. This is not to say that Muslims are always united. Monotheistic does not m e a n monolithic. In fact, there c o n t i n u e to be a variety of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Islam. Although the one most talked about in the West tends to be the explosive, radical, extremist strain, the b r o a d e r and m o r e representative "revolution" in the Muslim world is a quiet one taking place through Islamic discourse and social and political activism. In all cases, the question is n o t w h e t h e r Islam has a role to play in the political lives of Muslims but, rather, w h a t role Islam should play.

I M O D E R N ISLAM

|

Notes 1. T h e s e options are outlined in M u h a m m a d Ihn Abd al-Wahhab, Kitab al-jihad. A detailed discussion of this treatise can be found in Natana J. De Long-Bas, " M u h a m m a d Ibn Abd al-Wahhab: An Intellectual Biography," Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 2002. 2. John O. Voll, "Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah," Voices of Resurgent Islam, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 33. 3. M u h a m m a d Iqbal, "Islam as a Political and Moral Ideal," in Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal, ed. S. A. Vahid (Lahore: M u h a m m a d Ashraf, 1964), 52. 4. Cited in Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 79. 5. For a more detailed analysis of Muslim family law and contemporary reforms, see John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas, Women in Muslim Family Law, 2d ed. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2001). 6. For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between Islam and democracy, see John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 7. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, "Islamists and the Challenge of Pluralism," Occasional Paper (Washington, D.C.: Center for C o n t e m p o r a r y Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1995), 3. 8. Brian Beedham, Muslims and Westerners: The Reformation of Cultures (London: Eleni Nakou Foundation, 1997) 13. 9. Haddad, "Islamists and the Challenge of Pluralism," 6. 10. Ibid., 7-8. 11. Rachid Gannouchi, "The Battle against Islam," Middle East Affairs Journal 1, no. 2 (1992): 5. 12. Gannouchi, "Battle against Islam," 8. 13. Gannouchi, "Battle against Islam," 7. 14. Terence L. Nichols, "Social and Religious Pluralism and the Catholicity of the Church," in Religions of the Book: The Annual Publication of the College Theology Society, 1992, vol. 38, ed. Gerard S. Sloyan (Lanham, Md.: College Theology Society, 1996), 76. 15. Tamara Sonn, "The Dialogue Between Islam and the judeo-Christian Tradition," in Religious Issues and Interreligious Dialogues: An Analysis and Sourcebook of Developments Since 1945, ed. Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Gerhard E. Spiegler (New York: G r e e n w o o d Press, 1989), 446.

Suggested

Readings

Abdo, Geneive. No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Esposito, John L. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality'! 3d ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. . Unholy War: Terrorism in the Name of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

190 I John L. Esposito with Natana J. De Long-Bas

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Esposito, John L., with Natana J. De Long-Bas. Women in Muslim Family Law. 2d ed. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2001. Esposito, John L., and John O. Voll. Makers of Contemporary Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Sachedina, Abdulaziz. The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Tamimi, Azzam S. Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Eight I Hinduism I Brian K.

Smith

T H E M A N Y A N D VARIEGATED TRADITIONS THAT H A V E BEEN SYNTHESIZED U N D E R T H E

umbrella t e r m "Hinduism" are often characterized in the Western imagination as "otherworldly" or "world-negating." The stereotypical image most commonly associated with Hinduism is the ascetic, the world-renouncer, the homeless wanderer, the cave-dwelling meditator, the holy m a n or sadhu w h o has transcended the concerns of this world and pursues liberation f r o m the bonds of karma and rebirth. Although most strands of Hinduism do indeed include such renunciatory ideals and practices, Hinduism has always been mostly oriented toward the this-worldly concerns of the laity or the "householder." This-worldly H i n d u i s m is the religion of caste identity and obligation, of knowing and doing one's proper and inborn religious "duty" or dharma, of properly fulfilling oneself in each of the stages of life (the four ashramas of religious student, householder, forest-dweller, and world-renouncer) before moving on to the next, of maintaining and preserving a cosmic order by integrating one's own life and society as a whole to its dictates. Visions of a well-ordered society have been an integral part of the canonical tradition of Hinduism, complementing and contextualizing the mysticism and renunciation of otherworldly H i n d u i s m . Although the many sects and branches of Hinduism vary in their theology, metaphysics, doctrines, and beliefs, they have traditionally all tended to adhere to the system of varnasharma dharma, religious duty calibrated to one's class or caste and one's stage of life. Hinduism has usually been oriented around questions of religion in society; the renunciation of the social world, and the obligations it demands of individuals, is usually envisioned as the culmination of one's prior perfection of religiously ordained social duties. This-worldly Hinduism is thus a religion of dharma wherein everything has a place and, ideally, everything is in its place. D h a r m a is the principle of cosmic order, the condition of possibility for ordered cosmos rather than anarchic chaos. It is the foundation of all things, the force that preserves order and ensures morality, and as such is the "highest good": " D h a r m a is the foundation of the whole universe. In this world people go unto a person w h o is best versed in dharma for guidance. By means of the d h a r m a one drives away evil. Upon dharma everything is f o u n d e d . Therefore, d h a r m a is called the highest g o o d " (Taittiriya Aranyaka 10.79).1 Within this social and cosmic ordering of things, each individual has his or her special role to play. Every individual has their "own dharma"

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i86 I Brian Κ. Smith | (svadharma), and fulfilling it to the best of one's ability contributes to the macrocosmic order. T w o figures stand o u t in this-worldly H i n d u i s m as c o u n t e r b a l a n c e s to the world-renouncer, figures w h o are pivotal for the maintenance of social, and therefore cosmic, order. T h e r e is first of all the m a r r i e d householder, w h o supports n o t only himself and his family t h r o u g h proper w o r k and religious rites b u t also t h r o u g h the giving of alms and o t h e r gifts is t h e very source of sustenance of m e m b e r s of the o t h e r stages of life. This stage of life, deeply implicated in the social world of w o r k and relationships and in the this-worldly religious sphere of preservation and maintenance of the cosmos, is said to be the best stage of life: "Just as all living creatures depend on air in order to live, so do m e m b e r s of the o t h e r stages of life subsist by d e p e n d i n g on h o u s e h o l d e r s . Since people in the o t h e r three stages of life are supported every day by the knowledge and the food of the householder, therefore the h o u s e h o l d e r stage of life is the best. It must be carried out with zeal by the m a n w h o wants to win an incorruptible heaven (after death) and endless happiness here o n earth" (Manu Smriti 3.77-79). 2 T h e s e c o n d p e r s o n a g e critical t o t h e p r o m o t i o n and stability of t h e social order, and of d h a r m a m o r e generally, is the traditional H i n d u king, the ultimate householder and patriarch ruling over his "household," society at large. Since the times of the ancient Vedas, Hinduism has had a theory of sacred kingship wherein the ruler is n o t merely a great m a n or primus inter pares b u t also the creation of the gods and himself the very e m b o d i m e n t of a deity, charged w i t h the alli m p o r t a n t task of overseeing the social and political order. T h e proper administration of the polity by the righteous and strong king results b o t h in the stability necessary for individuals and g r o u p s to fulfill their proper duties and in the harmonization of social order with the cosmic order as a whole. Conversely, a weak, inept, or i m m o r a l king w h o does n o t align himself and his subjects with the dictates of d h a r m a is d o o m e d to failure and b e c o m e s the cause of chaos a m o n g his people—a chaos that is said to have disastrous cosmic ramifications. Within this vision of kingship, the god-king can, according to the texts, wield virtually absolute power. We shall see that m a n y scriptural passages describe the king's powers in stark, even cruel terms. For it is " p u n i s h m e n t " in the symbolic f o r m of the scepter (danda)—the "big stick" or rod of p u n i s h m e n t and coercive p o w e r — t h a t o f t e n is said to u n d e r l i e and c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e king's rule: " T h e scepter conduces to the acquisition of w h a t is n o t acquired, the preservation of w h a t has b e e n acquired, the g r o w t h of w h a t has been preserved, and the distribution a m o n g w o r t h y people of w h a t has g r o w n . It is on it that the p r o p e r functioning of society d e p e n d s . . . . T h e r e is n o such m e a n s for subjugation of beings as the scepter, say the ancient teachers. . . . T h e king, severe w i t h the scepter, becomes a source of terror to beings. T h e king, mild with the scepter, is despised" (Artha Shastra 1.4).3

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Hinduism, in other words, condones and legitimates political power verging on the dictatorial (and this, perhaps, is one of the sources of another and opposite Western stereotype concerning Hinduism, that of the "Oriental despot"). But Hinduism also tempers these absolutist powers by insisting that the king himself be both self-disciplined and under the rule of another. The ideal ruler is one who, like the ideal world-renouncer, has attained mastery over his desires and his senses; the paragon of this-worldly activity mirrors the model of other-worldliness. The ruler, then, should be a kind of this-worldly yogin whose rule over others is predicated on his rule over himself. Moreover, it is crucial, according to many texts of the tradition, that the king closely align himself with those most closely associated with religion: the Brahmins or priestly class. It is ultimately only in consort with, or rather in subordination to, the Brahmins and the principles of religion they represent and embody that the king can rule effectively and legitimately—at least according to the sacred texts c o m p o s e d and preserved by these very Brahmins. Such an ideal alliance between the principles of temporal power and spiritual authority carries with it a certain ambivalence, however, that highlights the sometimes unresolved tensions between the this-worldly and otherworldly aspects of Hinduism. Kingship and the religious roots of political power have thus received great attention in the sacred literature of Hinduism. These texts raise and scrutinize the following questions, a m o n g others: W h y is a king necessary, and what is his function? W h o is a proper king? W h a t are his rights and powers, but also what are his limitations and obligations? W h a t is the king's particular duty or svadharma and h o w does it relate to the preservation of dharma m o r e generally? And what kind of associations is he to forge with the Brahmins and the Hinduism they represent, preserve, and broker? In sum, what is the role of the king in establishing and maintaining a religiously legitimate and beneficial political and social order, and what should that order look like?

Classical

Sources of Hinduism

on

Politics

The classical—one might even say "orthodox"—traditions of Hinduism all trace their lineage back to the canonical texts known as the Vedas. The Vedas, which were composed beginning in the middle centuries of the second millennium B.C.E., and supplemented for at least a millennium after that, are a heterogeneous collection of different types of treatises compiled by different ritually based schools of thought and practice. All of these texts, in one way or another, pertain to the central preoccupation of Vedic religion: the performance and philosophy of ritual sacrifice. The later traditions that were founded upon and drew their authority from them regarded the Vedas as "revealed," that is, as existing eternally and not composed by h u m a n beings but rather "seen" or "heard" by the ancient sages.

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I Brian Κ. Smith | It is in the Vedas that we first e n c o u n t e r an ancient Indian political philosophy set in a religious context. T h e idea and religious roots of kingship are found in the earliest strata of these texts, o f t e n nestled within c o s m o g o n i c accounts or within discourses concerning the m e a n i n g and performance of sacrifice. In these works, the k i n g is o f t e n identified w i t h o n e or a n o t h e r of the Vedic gods, b u t especially w i t h Indra, the apotheosis of the warrior-king. H e r e also we see form u l a t e d the extremely influential and e n d u r i n g idea that different classes have various f u n c t i o n s in the social order; w h e r e a s Kshatriyas or warriors are given the exclusive prerogative to rule, Brahmins or priests are said to hold a m o n o p oly on spiritual authority. Kings are advised to place themselves u n d e r the guidance of Brahmins for their rule to be efficacious. Rituals designed to confer spiritual authority as well as t e m p o r a l p o w e r on the king also date f r o m this period. Of especial importance were the royal consecration rite (Rajasuya) and the "horse sacrifice" (Ashvamedha), both of which rituals continued to be p e r f o r m e d in later Hindu states long after the Vedic period came to an end. During the Vedic age, the rights and obligations of the various orders or classes of society were increasingly concretized and formalized. This process came to a h e a d in t h e post-Vedic texts called t h e D h a r m a Sutras (a.k.a. "Shastras" or "Smritis"). Although, like most ancient Indian texts, the D h a r m a Sutras are very hard to date, a recent estimate puts t h e m at a r o u n d the middle of the third century

B.C.E.

at the earliest. 4 It is in these w o r k s that we get detailed instructions on

t h e religiously g r o u n d e d duties of each of the social classes, and, specifically, s o m e of the first codifications of the duties of the righteous king. Indeed, s o m e of these treatises go into great detail, instructing the king in his rights and obligations and h o w he is to c o n f o r m all behavior to the dictates of dharma—"religious law" or "righteousness." But at about this same time a different kind of text was also produced that was designed to guide the H i n d u m o n a r c h . This was the Artha Shastra, supposedly c o m p o s e d by Kautiliya, an adviser to the e m p e r o r C h a n d r a g u p t a Maurya. This b o o k was n o t about d h a r m a or religion b u t rather concerned artha, the pursuit of economic and political self-interest. T h e H i n d u tradition had by this time formulated the notion that, in addition to d h a r m a , there were t w o other religiously valid "goals of h u m a n life"—pleasure (kama) and artha—and

that a well-bal-

5

anced life would consist in the regulated pursuit of all three. While the king was himself ruled by religious law or d h a r m a , he was also very m u c h encouraged to look after and p r o m o t e his o w n (and his subjects') self-interest. T h e Artha Shastra, a classic of political science in world literature often compared with Machiavelli's The Prince, p u r p o r t s to instruct the H i n d u king in h o w to safeguard and maximize that self-interest. Topics covered range f r o m the proper subjects in which a king should be educated and the i m p o r t a n c e of intellectual and m o r a l discipline to the nuts and bolts of statecraft: the organization of the

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polity, how to guard against treachery in the court, the most effective use of spies, policing the populace and administering justice, how to conduct foreign affairs and war to one's best advantage, and so forth. Although Kautiliya's Artha Shastra is the classic work of this genre, other and lesser known texts centering on political advantage, the rules of government, and the "science of the use of force" (.danda niti) were also later produced. It is also necessary in this context to mention the two great epics of the Hindu tradition, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, both of which revolve around the topic of kingship and rule. The Mahabharata is a massive, sprawling work that centers on the tale of a war fought by two sides of the same family for rule over "Bharata" or India. Among the many topics covered in this epic is that of political theory and rajadharma, the duty of kings. The Ramayana, the legendary story of Rama, who represents the Hindu ideal of warrior nobility and righteous rule, often discusses the need for proper government and the chaos that results in its absence. In its portrait of Rama himself, the Ramayana offers Hindus an image of the perfect ruler. Finally, the encyclopedic texts known as the Puranas (written beginning in the first millennium C.E.) contain, inter alia, religiously based advice and guidance for the Hindu king.

Hinduism's

Theory of

Politics

As was mentioned above, the religious grounding for the Hindu vision of an ideal social and political order can be traced back to the earliest texts of the Hindu tradition, the Vedas. Already in the Rig Veda (ca. 1200 B.C.E. or earlier) the four principal social classes are depicted as issuing forth from the time of creation as parts of the dismembered primordial Cosmic Man: " W h e n they divided the Cosmic Man, how many parts did they apportion him? What do they call his mouth, his two arms and thighs and feet? His m o u t h became the Brahmin (priest); his arms were made into the Kshatriya (warrior and ruler); his thighs the Vaishya (comm o n e r ) ; and f r o m his feet the Shudras (servants) were b o r n " (Rig Veda 10.90.11-12). Each class is associated with its distinctive quality: the Brahmin with the m o u t h , by which he recites the sacred texts in his liturgical functions; the Kshatriya with the arms representing physical and coercive power; the Vaishya with the thighs (or loins) symbolizing fecundity and productivity; and the Shudra with the lowly (and polluted) feet, indicating the "base" nature of the lowest class but also that the Shudra is the "basis" upon which society stands. This myth of origins is elaborated in a later text in which the duties or dharmas of each of these classes are enumerated: But to protect this whole creation, the lustrous one made separate innate activities for those b o r n of his m o u t h , arms, thighs, and feet. For Brahmins, he ordained

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190 I Βήαη Κ. Smith | teaching and learning (the Veda), sacrificing for themselves and sacrificing for others, giving and receiving. Protecting his subjects, giving (to the Brahmins), having sacrifices performed (by the Brahmins), studying (the Veda), and remaining unaddicted to the sensory objects are, in summary, for a Kshatriya. Protecting his livestock, giving, having sacrifices performed, studying, trading, lending money, and farming the land are for a Vaishya. The Lord assigned only one activity to a Shudra: serving these (other) classes without resentment. (Manu Smriti 1.87-91)

In this way, the particular duties of the four classes—here is, in nuce, the m u c h m o r e complicated system of caste—are g r o u n d e d in religious ideology, with the Brahmin at the top followed by the warrior-ruler, together m a k i n g up the ruling classes. Below these two are the masses or c o m m o n e r s , the Vaishyas and Shudras. These classes, their duties and their relative rank in the hierarchy, are portrayed as aboriginal and "natural," and thus indisputable and eternal. Within this scheme, it is the Kshatriya alone w h o is given the right to rule and the duty to protect others. In the Vedas, the Kshatriyas are said to be infused with certain innate powers that explain their unique capabilities to wield p o w e r over others. They are consistently associated with "virility," "power," "force," "might," "physical s t r e n g t h , " "vigor," " f a m e " and "glory," "distinction," and t h u s w i t h "rule" (raj). T h e tools of physical and military power, the w e a p o n s of war and violence, are clustered in the hands of the Kshatriya. T h e ideal m e m b e r of this class is described as "an archer, a hero, and a great charioteer" and as "one w h o kills his enemies and contests with rivals" (Shatapatha Brahmana 2.1.2.17). Strong in a r m s and legs and fitted with armor, he p e r f o r m s his manly and heroic deeds (Taittiriya Brahmana 3.8.23.3). T h e o t h e r three classes (including the Brahmins) are sometimes said to be "subordinate to him" (Taittiriya Samhita 2.5.10.1), or to "approach the Kshatriya respectfully" and be "subject to h i m " (Jaiminiya Brahm a n a 1.285). In the ancient Vedas and subsequent sacred texts, the king's p o w e r over those he rules is described in absolute terms, although not without recognition that this p o w e r is also derived, at least in part, f r o m his subjects. He is the "lord of all" or the "lord of the people" (Atharva Veda 3.4.1), and the notion that the king is "lord of the earth" and the "father" of his people (the "children") is frequently encountered in H i n d u texts. 6 But it is also only " t h r o u g h the people that the p o w e r of rule b e c o m e s strong" and it is "by m e a n s of his people that the Kshatriya wins what he desires to win" (Shathapatha Brahmana 4.3.3.6; 5.4.3.8). T h e ruler should be "surrounded" and "guarded" on all sides by his subjects (Shatapatha Brahmana 3.6.1.24), for they are his "protection" (Atharva Veda 3.3.5). Conversely, m a n y Vedic texts depict the ruler's subjects as existing mainly for his o w n exploitation. T h e king is said to have a "share in the people" so "whatever there is a m o n g the people, in that the ruler also has a share" (Shatapatha B r a h m a n a 9.1.1.18). T h e king's subjects are t o be " r e s t r a i n e d , " " b r o u g h t to

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order," and made "steady and faithful" by the ruler through the implementation of coercive force (Taittiriya Brahmana 3.3.6.10; Aitareya Brahmana 1.9; Shatapatha Brahmana 5.3.4.15), and in all events the hierarchical distinction between ruler and ruled must be established and maintained: "The ruler (is) higher than the people, and therefore the people here serve, from a lower position, the Kshatriya who is placed above them" (Shatapatha Brahmana 2.5.2.6). There should, in sum, never be what one text calls a "categorical confusion" between the inferior and the superior, and one must take care never to "make the people equal and resistant to the ruler" (Shatapatha Brahmana 10.4.3.22); one must, as is proper, make them "compliant and obedient" (Shatapatha Brahmana 2.5.2.34).' T h e stark e m b r a c e of political exploitation in the Vedas is n o w h e r e m o r e explicit than in the discourse of "food" and "eaters": "The Kshatriya is the eater, and the people are food. W h e r e there is abundant food for the eater, that kingd o m is prosperous and grows" (Shatapatha Brahmana 6.1.2.25). In one text, the ruler is equated with a deer and his subjects with grain: "He thus makes the people to be food for the ruler, which is why the ruler feeds on the people" (Shatapatha B r a h m a n a 13.2.9.8). T h e c o m m o n e r is s u m m a r i z e d as a "tributary to another, to be eaten by another, and one w h o may be dispossessed at will" (Aitareya Brahmana 7.29). Such a portrait of the king's absolute powers in relation to his subjects continues in some later texts, most notoriously in the Artha Shastra (where, e.g., the king's dictates are said to overrule law and custom and dharma itself, 3.1.39), in the many texts that extol the necessity of the "rod of punishment" or danda as the king's proper tool (see below), and especially in the Narada Dharma Shastra, where the king is to be obeyed and even worshiped, no matter what: Whatever a king does is right, that is a settled rule; because the protection of the world is entrusted to him, and on account of his majesty and benignity towards living beings. As a husband though feeble must be constantly worshiped by his wives, in the same way a ruler though worthless must be constantly worshiped by his subjects. (18.21 fF.)

The king, the very embodiment, protector, and instigator of one of the principal "ends of life" in Hinduism—"profit," "material advantage," or political and economic self-interest (artha)—is given wide latitude to pursue this end with whatever means are necessary: (The king) should try hard to get what he has not got and to guard what he has got; he should make what he guards grow, and he should deposit in worthy receptacles of charity what he has made to grow. He should realize that these are the four ways of accomplishing the h u m a n goals; never tiring, he should strive to employ them properly. By m e a n s of his a r m y he should seek what he has not got; by careful attention he should guard what he has got; he should make what he guards grow

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I Brian Κ. Smith | by means of the pursuit of self-interest (artha); and he should deposit in worthy receptacles of charity what he has made to g r o w (Manu Smriti 7.99-101)

At the same time, the king's p o w e r to rule is t e m p e r e d and restrained by several factors, including simple practical considerations. As the Artha Shastra notes, a king w h o is hated by his subjects cannot expect to easily succeed in his goals (8.3.16) and a ruler w h o is overly severe in wielding the coercive "rod of punishm e n t " "becomes a source of terror to beings," whereas the just use of such power confers h o n o r u p o n h i m (1.4.8, 10). "Use of the royal prerogative to advance the ruler's o w n ends," notes Drekmeir, "was considered to be theft of the people's wealth—and was as grave an offense as failure to provide s e c u r i t y . . . . In m e e t i n g t h e responsibilities of his office, h e m u s t g u a r d against p r o v o k i n g the people unnecessarily, and he m u s t always take public opinion into account." 8 It is ultimately in the king's best interests to curb his o w n excesses and to attend to the welfare of those he rules, for "in the happiness of the subjects lies the happiness of the king and in w h a t is beneficial to the subjects his o w n benefit" (Artha Shastra 1.19.34). But aside f r o m the restraints that derive f r o m sheer self-interest or practicality are those of religion. Already in the ancient Vedas and continuing into the period of classical Hinduism, the king's rule is limited and constrained by the claim of the Brahmin, the representative of religion, to a hierarchically superior place. T h e Brahmins, it will be r e m e m b e r e d , are created first and f r o m the highest part of the creator god's body; they are, therefore, "the m o s t excellent; there is nothing m o r e excellent than this. H e w h o knows this, being himself the most excellent, b e c o m e s t h e highest a m o n g his o w n p e o p l e . T h e B r a h m i n has n o t h i n g before it and n o t h i n g after it" (Shatapatha Brahmana 10.3.5.10). Although the Kshatriya has indeed been afforded an exclusive right to the exercise of physical and political power, it is the Brahmin w h o wields the supposedly superior powers of religion, especially embodied in their m o n o p o l y over the sacrificial rituals, knowledge of the Vedas, and expertise in dharma. Even in the early texts, the Brahmins did n o t hesitate to assert their superiority over the Kshatriyas (see, e.g., Aitareya Brahmana 7.15). And in the later texts on religious law or dharm a , the Brahmins p r o m o t e their o w n status to the u t m o s t , on the basis of the superiority of their birth and their connection to religion. "The Brahmin is the lord of the (other) classes because he is p r e e m i n e n t , because he is the best by nature, because he maintains the (ascetic) restraints, and because of the preeminence of his transformative rituals" (Manu Smriti 10.3). Or again: The Brahmin is the Lord of this whole creation, according to the law, because he was born of the highest part of the body, because he is the eldest, and because he

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maintains the V e d a . . . . The very birth of a priest is the eternal physical form of religion (dharma); for he is born for the sake of religion and is fit to become one with ultimate reality. For when a priest is b o r n he is born at the top of the earth, as the lord of all living beings, to guard the treasure of religion. All of this belongs to the priest, whatever there is in the universe; the priest deserves all of this because of his excellence and his high birth." (Manu Smriti 1.94, 98-101)

Even a young Brahmin boy is to be thought of as superior to even the most wizened of Kshatriyas: "A ten-year-old Brahmin and a hundred-year-old Kshatriya should be regarded as father and son, and of the two of them the Brahmin is the father" (Manu Smriti 2.135). Complementing and often superseding the notion that the king was a divine figure was the Brahmins' claim to be themselves "human gods.'' The Brahmins, it is said in the Veda, are the "divine class" (Taittiriya Brahmana 1.2.6.6), born out of the " w o m b of the gods" (Aitareya Brahmana 3.19), and, like the "other gods," equally deserving of sacrifices: There are two kinds of gods, for the gods are gods, and those Brahmins w h o have studied and teach the Vedas are h u m a n gods. . . . Oblations into the fire are (sacrifices) to the gods, and sacrificial fees (paid to the Brahmin priests are sacrifices) to the h u m a n gods, the Brahmins w h o have studied and teach the Veda. With oblations into the fire one pleases the gods, with sacrificial fees o n e pleases the h u m a n gods, the Brahmins w h o have studied and teach the Veda. Both these gods, when gratified, place him in a condition of well-being. (Shatapatha Brahmana 2.2.2.6)

As " h u m a n gods," the Brahmins f r o m earliest times claimed exemption— while nevertheless d e m a n d i n g p r o t e c t i o n — f r o m the rule of the Kshatriyas. Already in the Vedas, the Brahmins were insisting on both security against oppression and exclusion f r o m capital punishment (Shatapatha Brahmana 11.5.7.1)— exemptions they further codified in law by the time of the Dharma Sutras: "(The king) should never kill a priest, even one w h o persists in every sort of evil. . . . There is no greater (act o f ) irreligion on earth than priest-killing; therefore the king should not even conceive in his mind of killing that (kind of) man" (Manu Smriti 8.380-81). Another text on dharma declares that "The king should exempt such a man (i.e., a Brahmin) f r o m six things: He should not be subjected to corporal punishment, imprisonment, fines, banishment, upbraiding, and abandonment" (Gautama Dharma Sutra 8.12), and yet others prohibit the king from confiscating p r o p e r t y f r o m the Brahmins (e.g., Baudhayana D h a r m a Sutra 1.11.15-16). The Brahmins, at least in the sacred texts they composed and preserved, refuse to admit that they are under the sovereignty of the king. The Vedic ritual for con-

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I Brian Κ. Smith | secration of a king includes rites whereby the Brahmins are m a d e "higher" and the king "lower" (e.g., Shatapatha Brahmana 5.1.1.12), for, as it is said

frequent-

ly, the Brahmins are ruled by a different king—"King Soma," the divine ruler of the sacrifice (e.g., Aitareya Brahmana 7.29ff). Even the king's p o w e r of punishm e n t and e n f o r c e m e n t of the law is, according to s o m e texts, n o t to be applied to the Brahmins, w h o are represented as self-sufficient agents wielding their o w n legitimate power: "A Brahmin w h o k n o w s the law need n o t report anything to t h e king. By m e a n s of his o w n power, h e m a y chastise t h o s e m e n w h o have w r o n g e d him. Between his own power and the power of the king, his o w n power is stronger; therefore a Brahmin may suppress his enemies by m e a n s of his o w n p o w e r alone" (Manu Smriti 11.31-32). And should the warrior class be so rash as to be "overbearing" in any way to the Brahmins, the latter claim the right to "subd u e " t h e m since Kshatriyas o w e their very existence to the Brahmins: "If the Kshatriyas b e c o m e o v e r b e a r i n g t o w a r d the B r a h m i n s in any way, t h e priests themselves should s u b d u e t h e m , for the Kshatriyas w e r e b o r n f r o m the Brahmins" (Manu Smriti 9.320). Thus, in sum, it is declared that "The king rules over all except the Brahmins" ( G a u t a m a D h a r m a Sutra 11.1). But while the priestly authors of the sacred texts maintain that Brahmins can, if necessary, live in independence apart from the Kshatriyas, they also insist that the reverse is n o t true. A Brahmin will, u n d e r the p r o p e r circumstances, find it advantageous to "obtain a king," that is, to find himself in the employ and u n d e r the protection of a pliant ruler. But a king w h o wishes to rule successfully—let alone righteously—must ally himself with and place himself u n d e r the control of the priests. If he does so, his rule will prosper: "It is perfectly in order for a Brahmin to be w i t h o u t a Kshatriya, b u t were he to obtain a king that would be advantageous. It is, however, quite improper for a Kshatriya to be without a Brahm i n . . . . T h e r e f o r e a B r a h m i n is indeed to be a p p r o a c h e d by a Kshatriya w h o intends to take any action, for his success depends on the act having been impelled by a Brahmin" (Shatapatha Brahmana 4.1.4.6). It is, then, by placing himself u n d e r the guidance and authority of the Brahm i n that the king's inclination to tyranny is restrained and his connection to the spiritual principle of d h a r m a is established and preserved. T h e legitimacy and success of the king's rule depend on forging a b o n d with a Brahmin priest, with a purohita (literally "one w h o is put ahead") w h o is said to b e c o m e one half of the very self of the king he serves. It is in this relationship that the t w o ruling classes are c o n j o i n e d into a mutually a d v a n t a g e o u s c o n s o r t i u m , a c o m p l e m e n t a r y union b e t w e e n political and t e m p o r a l p o w e r and spiritual authority. "Therefore a B r a h m i n w h o has a Kshatriya ( p a t r o n ) is s u p e r i o r to a n o t h e r B r a h m i n ; and therefore a Kshatriya (king) w h o has a Brahmin (as his personal priest) is superior to a n o t h e r Kshatriya" (Taittiriya Samhita 5.1.10.3). T h e Manu Smriti explains it thus, "Kshatriyas do not prosper w i t h o u t Brahmins, and Brahmins do n o t pros-

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per without Kshatriyas; Brahmins and Kshatriyas closely united thrive here on earth and in the world beyond" (Manu Smriti 9.322). This, then, is one of the principal ways in which political power is made subservient to spiritual authority in the Hindu tradition. The king's rule, seemingly absolute and often apparently tyrannical, is (at least in the texts of Hinduism) severely constrained and morally channeled through his necessary connection to the Brahmin priest. "He should appoint as his personal priest a Brahmin w h o is learned, born in a good family, eloquent, handsome, mature, and virtuous; who lives according to the rules; and w h o is austere. He should undertake rites only with his support, 'for a Kshatriya, when he is supported by a Brahmin,' it is said, 'prospers and never falters'" ( G a u t a m a D h a r m a Sutra 11.12-14). W h e n the monarch is in this way harnessed, disciplined, restrained and under the supervision of his priest, his kingdom prospers and "does not come to an early end, life does not leave him before his time, he lives to a ripe old age, he lives life to the fullest, and he does not die again" (Aitareya Brahmana 8.25). Such an important and intimate relationship holds its own dangers, however, and one of the interesting tensions inherent in Hindu thinking about religion and politics turns on this very union between king and priest. Because the alliance requires the two to join together so closely, the texts warn against Brahmins and Kshatriyas entering into this kind of bond with just anybody: "A Brahmin should not desire to become the purohita of just any Kshatriya, for thereby that which is well made and that which is poorly made unite. Nor should a Kshatriya make just any Brahmin his purohita, for thereby that which is well made and that which is poorly made unite" (Shatapatha Brahmana 4.1.4.5). The problem is particularly acute for the Brahmin. For he is the principle of spiritual purity, and by the very establishment of such a personal relationship with the king (so necessary for the king's legitimacy), his purity is thereby compromised. The Brahmin purohita is said to take on the traits of the Kshatriya he serves (Aitareya Brahmana 8.24; Manu Smriti 12.46; Mahabharata 12.76); as "half of the self" of the king he serves, the priest also takes on the sins and bad karmic deeds of that king (see, e.g., Pancavimsha Brahmana 13.3.12). T h e food of a king ingested by a Brahmin takes away the latter's "brilliant energy" (tejas), as do his gifts (Manu Smriti 4.218; M a h a b h a r a t a 13.35.23). T h u s s o m e texts even r e c o m m e n d that the Brahmin avoid "service to a king" (e.g., Manu Smriti 3.64) and others depict the royal priest as a contemptible figure (Mahabharta 13.93.130). All in all, the relationship is often regarded with ambivalence on the part of the Brahmin authors of various scriptures. As H e e s t e r m a n writes, "The purohita cannot be a proper b r a h m i n because he is stuck in the sphere of antithetical relations w h e r e he has to exchange his purity for the impurity of his patron." 9 Such a dilemma did not, however, prevent Hindu texts from insisting upon this relationship as a means of mitigating the king's power and legitimating his rule.

i86IBrian Κ. Smith | A n o t h e r m e t h o d for t e m p e r i n g the otherwise absolutist powers of the Hindu king was to subject t h e m to the strictures of d h a r m a or religious duty. This was, of course, the principal duty of the king's personal priest: to instruct and guide the k i n g in his "particular duty" or svadharma. Because d h a r m a has a superhum a n origin, it was binding o n all and could be avoided by none; "since law (or d h a r m a ) was theoretically beyond the reach of m e n , the king was confined on pain of supernatural reprisal to administrative decrees c o n s o n a n t with the relig i o u s and social c o d e t h a t g o v e r n e d the c o m m u n i t y . " 1 0 O t h e r w i s e p u t , "Restraints on the king were n o t formal; they were the restrictions imposed by the obligation to uphold custom and sacred law and to fulfill the requirements of r a j a d h a r m a [the " d h a r m a of kings"]." 1 1 Rajadharma, according to the various law b o o k s on the subject, can be encapsulated as protection of his subjects f r o m internal and external threats to their stability and well-being, f r o m chaos within and w i t h o u t . "To take care of creatures is the special duty of a king, and he attains success by fulfilling it," according to o n e text (Vasishtha D h a r m a Sutra 19.1); according to another, the king's particular duty is to "destroy enemies and protect his o w n people" (Artha Shastra 14.3.88). Protection f r o m external threats means primarily defending the kingdom from its enemies, and virtually all the law books and other treatises on kingship require martial strength of the H i n d u king. "The king should n o t t u r n back in battle," says o n e such text, b u t t h e n goes o n to n o t e t h a t a r i g h t e o u s k i n g will f i g h t according to the rules: H e should n o t "strike with barbed or poisoned weapons. H e should n o t engage in battle people w h o are afraid, intoxicated, mad, or delirious, or w h o have lost their a r m o r ; as also w o m e n , children, old people and Brahmins, unless they are trying to kill h i m " (Baudhayana D h a r m a Sutra 1.17.9-12). Conversely, texts based on political realism like the Artha Shastra are far less scrupulous in their advice to the king for carrying out foreign policy, b o t h in times of peace and those of war. T h e king should unhesitatingly and ruthlessly pursue his advantage; he should "march w h e n by marching he w o u l d be able to weaken or e x t e r m i n a t e the e n e m y " (Artha Shastra 9.1.44). P r o t e c t i o n f r o m external threats also is said to include protection from natural and supernatural disasters, or as one list would have it, protection from the "eight great calamities" of fire, floods, disease, famine, rats, wild animals, serpents, and evil spirits (Artha Shastra 4.3.1-2). Diplomacy and foreign relations w e r e included in this aspect of rajadharma; they w e r e m e t h o d s for insuring the p r o t e c t i o n of t h e k i n g d o m f r o m external threats and sometimes were constituted as war by other means. T h e f a m o u s theory of the "circle of states" p u t forward by Kautilya in the Artha Shastra, whereby one's immediate neighbor was one's natural enemy, and the neighbor's neigh-

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bor one's natural ally, also called for an elaborate system of undercover agents and spies—all designed to f u r t h e r the king's own interests by secretly "striking again and again" at his enemies and undermining their strength and stability: In this way, the conqueror should establish in the rear and in the front a circle (of kings) in his own interest, with the excellences of the constituent, called the ally. And in the entire circle he should ever station envoys and secret agents, becoming a friend of the rivals, maintaining secrecy when striking again and again. The affairs of one w h o c a n n o t maintain secrecy, even if achieved with particular success, undoubtedly perish, like a broken boat in the ocean. (Artha Shastra 7.13.42-44)

In sum, a king who fails to protect his subjects, in all the ways at his disposal, from external threats to their security is compared with a barren wife, a dried-up milk cow, or a bull that bears no burden. 1 2 Protection from internal threats to stability entails the king's administration of law and order. The king is to be both the chief of police and the chief magistrate, and both functions are summarized and symbolized in the form of the "rod of punishment" or danda. The proper use by the king of coercive force allows for "the orderly maintenance of worldly life" (Atharva Veda 1.4.4), for w i t h o u t it internal chaos would surely follow. The Hindu view of h u m a n nature is, as we shall see below, rather pessimistic, and as such the king's duty to enforce morality or dharma becomes all the more important. "The only way that a man might be kept pure and righteous was by the fear of danda," writes Spellman. "In the absence of a king or when people do not fear danda, the inevitable result is anarchy and strife." 13 The administration of justice was another element of the king's obligations to ensure internal order. The law books and the treatises on kingship go into great detail on this subject. The Manu Smriti, for example, dedicates a whole chapter to the topic, instructing the king to hold legal hearings every day and decide cases "in accordance with arguments taken f r o m local practices and from authoritative teachings" (8.3), but also allowing him to rely u p o n his own powers of intuition to determine guilt or innocence: [The king] should take his place on the throne of justice, with his body covered and his mind concentrated, b o w low to the Guardians of the World, and begin to hear the case. Recognizing both what is profitable and what is not profitable, and what is intrinsically just and unjust, he should hear all the cases of the parties in the order of their classes. He should discover the inner emotion of m e n from the outward signs, by their voice, color, involuntary movements, and facial expressions, by their gaze and their gestures. The inner mind-and-heart is grasped by facial expressions, involuntary movements, gait, gesture, speech, and changes in the eyes and m o u t h . (Manu Smriti 8.23-26)

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i86IBrian Κ. Smith | It is especially the king's duty to uphold the religious law or d h a r m a of the various classes a n d castes to e n s u r e t h e p r o p e r o r d e r and f u n c t i o n i n g of society: " W h e n all laws are perishing the king here is the p r o m u l g a t o r of laws, by virtue of his guarding the right conduct of the world consisting of the four social classes and the four stages of life" (Artha Shastra 3.1.38). Keeping order in caste India m e a n t m a k i n g certain that everyone kept in their proper place. This required the king to oversee the p e r f o r m a n c e of the individual duties of the constituents of his k i n g d o m , b u t also to g u a r d against m i s c e g e n a t i o n . T h e " i n t e r m i x t u r e of castes" was abhorred and feared as the ultimate sign of internal chaos. It was the king's duty to protect the lives of the "fourfold h u m a n race," to ensure and prom o t e their "increase" and "protection" and, especially, their " n o n i n t e r m i x t u r e and adherence to the d h a r m a " ( G a u t a m a D h a r m a Sutra 8.2-3). As part of the king's duty or rajadharma, and as yet a n o t h e r m e a n s for keeping the p o w e r s of the k i n g in check and assuring that his activities c o n f o r m to religious principles, it is often declared that the king must himself be a model of personal conduct and ascetic restraint. H e should, as we have seen above, "remain unaddicted to the sensory objects" (Manu Smriti 1.89); elsewhere it said that the king should be "correct in his actions and speech and trained in the three Vedas and logic. Let h i m be upright, keep his senses u n d e r control, s u r r o u n d himself with m e n of quality, and adopt sound policies. He should be impartial toward his subjects and w o r k for their welfare" (Gautama D h a r m a Sutra 11.2-6). T h e king w h o p r o p e r l y and legitimately wields the " r o d of p u n i s h m e n t " is o n e w h o "speaks the truth, acts after due consideration, is wise, and is conversant with religion. . .." Conversely, one w h o is "lustful, partial and m e a n " is himself destroyed by that very rod. "For the rod of p u n i s h m e n t has great brilliant energy, and for those w h o are undisciplined it is hard to maintain; if a king swerves f r o m justice it strikes him down, together with his relatives, and then his fort, his territory, and the whole world, with all that moves and does n o t move" (Manu Smriti 7.26-29). O n e reading of the m o s t f a m o u s text o n H i n d u political science, the Artha Shastra, sees that w o r k as p r o m o t i n g a legitimating rationale for kingship based n o t on the sacrality of the office b u t rather on the world-renouncing principle of the ascetic restraint of the senses. T h e king's authority, in other words, is to replicate the authority of the world-renouncer or the otherworldly Brahmin, w h o s e purity derives f r o m his d e t a c h m e n t f r o m the things and interests of worldly life: The ideal Kautalayan king has an authority and a legitimation not derived from the community but all his own. For here the king's basic qualification is not his sacrality or divinity, but the indriyajaya, the victory over the senses, which sets him free from being at the mercy of worldly interests. In this way he becomes the worthy counterpart of the ideal Brahmin, who is equally detached from worldly concerns. 1 4

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Thus it is that in the Artha Shastra itself the "whole of this science" of politics and statecraft is said to rest on the king's mastery over himself. The ideal king mirrors the ideal ascetic who has attained control over his senses, his desires, and his emotions: Control over the senses, which is motivated by training in the sciences, should be secured by giving u p lust, anger, greed, pride, arrogance and fool-hardiness. Absence of improper indulgence in (the pleasures o f ) sound, touch, color, taste and smell by the senses of hearing, touch and sight, the tongue and the sense of smell, means control over the senses; or, the practice of (this) science (gives such control). For the whole of this science means control over the senses. A king, behaving in a manner contrary to that, (and hence) having no control over his senses, quickly perishes. (Artha Shastra 1.6.1-4)

It is, the text declares, especially important for a king to overcome lust and anger, for "lust means the favoring of evil persons" and anger entails "the suppression of g o o d persons. Because of the m u l t i t u d e of evils (resulting f r o m them), both are held to be a calamity without end" (Artha Shastra 8.3.65). Controlling these two vices has very practical ramifications for the king's rule. Kings "under the influence of anger are known to have been killed by uprisings a m o n g the subjects"; anger can lead the king to oppression of his people which, in turn, can result in rebellion (Artha Shastra 8.3.5-7, 14-22). Elsewhere also, the king is advised to "make a great effort to avoid the ten vices that arise f r o m desire and the eight that are born of anger, which (all) end badly": For a king w h o is addicted to the vices born of desire and pleasure loses his religion and profit, but (if he is addicted to the vices) b o r n of anger (he loses) his very self. Hunting, gambling, sleeping by day, malicious gossip, women, drunkenness, music, singing, dancing, and aimless wandering are the group of ten (vices) born of desire. Slander, physical violence, malice, envy, resentment, destruction of property, verbal abuse, and assault are the g r o u p of eight (vices) b o r n of anger. (Manu Smriti 7.45-48)

Most important, the king should be morally restrained because the king is the model for his subjects; his behavior influences them, and, according to Hindu political philosophy, in a very direct way. The king's adherence to the guidelines of d h a r m a and the rules of ascetic self-discipline ineluctably molds the moral quality of his people: " W h a t character (the king) has, that character the constituents come to have. . . . For the king is in the place of their head" (Artha Shastra 8.1.17-18); or, again, "A king endowed with personal qualities endows with excellences the constituent elements not so endowed. One not endowed with personal qualities destroys the constituent elements that are prosperous and devoted (to him)" (Artha Shastra 6.1.16).

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So it is t h a t t h e king's self-control o r "self-rule" (svaraj) is t h e c o n d i t i o n of possibility f o r his effective r u l e over o t h e r s : " D a y a n d n i g h t h e s h o u l d m a k e a g r e a t e f f o r t t o c o n q u e r his s e n s o r y p o w e r s , f o r t h e m a n w h o h a s c o n q u e r e d his sensor y p o w e r s is able t o k e e p his s u b j e c t s u n d e r c o n t r o l " ( M a n u S m r i t i 7.44). T h e k i n g ' s b e h a v i o r is even said t o have c o s m i c r a m i f i c a t i o n s : "Welfare, g o o d rains, sickness, calamities, a n d d e a t h a m o n g t h e p e o p l e o w e t h e i r o r i g i n t o t h e king," 1 5 a n d it is o f t e n said t h a t t h e k i n g ' s relative r i g h t e o u s n e s s d e t e r m i n e s t h e k i n d of c o s m i c era ( r a n g i n g f r o m t h e G o l d e n Age t o t h e d e g e n e r a c y of t h e "Kali Yuga" o r D a r k Age) his s u b j e c t s inhabit: "Let n o t this d o u b t b e t h i n e , w h e t h e r t h e era is t h e c a u s e of t h e k i n g o r t h e k i n g t h e cause of t h e era, f o r k n o w it t o b e certain t h a t t h e k i n g is t h e cause of t h e era." 1 6

This almost mystical notion of the interconnection b e t w e e n the individual's self-rule and t h e r i g h t e o u s rule of t h e political order, the postulation that o n e should be able to rule oneself before a t t e m p t i n g to rule others, is thus a fundam e n t a l principle of Indian political philosophy. It perseveres in the H i n d u tradition all the way up to the twentieth century, w h e n it was adopted by n o less of a figure than Mohandas Gandhi, w h o m a d e it the centerpiece of b o t h his m e t h o d on n o n v i o l e n t resistance and his vision of an i n d e p e n d e n t India. Svaraj in the sense of self-control was for Gandhi the p r o p e r m e a n s for attaining the correlative end of svaraj in the sense of political independence.

The Medium

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We have seen h o w even in the earliest strata of H i n d u literature texts extolling the divine right of kings to rule are e n c o u n t e r e d within accounts of the creation of the world as a whole. O t h e r sacred w o r k s of the tradition provide m y t h s of origins specific to kingship per se, and argue for his divinity. 17 T h e king, such m y t h s of origin and legitimation insist, is n o t to be regarded as an ordinary being b u t as a god on earth, created to p u t an end to anarchy and fear. In the following text, the king is portrayed as comprising the various essences of the gods so as to establish order in a world that, w i t h o u t a king, was in u t t e r chaos: For when this world was without a king and people ran about in all directions out of fear, the Lord emitted a king in order to guard this entire (realm), taking lasting elements from Indra (warrior king of the gods), the Wind (Vayu), Yama (god of death), the Sun (Surya), Fire (Agni), Varuna (god of the waters), the Moon (Candra), and (Kubera) the Lord of Wealth. Because a king is made from particles of the lords of the gods, therefore he surpasses all living beings in brilliant energy, and like the Sun, he burns eyes and hearts, and no one on earth is able even to look at him. Through his special power he becomes Fire and Wind; he is the Sun and the Moon, and he is (Yama) the King of Justice, he is Kubera and he is Varuna, and he

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is Indra. Even a boy king should not be treated with disrespect, with the thought, "He is just a h u m a n being"; for this is a deity standing there in the form of a man. (Manu Smriti 7.3-8) A n o t h e r text e x p l a i n s h o w h a v i n g t h e e s s e n c e s o f e i g h t g r e a t deities c o n f e r s u p o n t h e k i n g his distinctive p o w e r s a n d abilities: Like Indra, the sovereign is able to protect the wealth and possessions. As Vayu or Air is the spreader (and diffuser) of scents, so the prince is the generator (and cause) of good and evil actions. As the sun is the dispeller of darkness (and the creator of light) so the king is the founder of religion and destroyer of irreligion. As Yama is the god w h o punishes (human beings after death) so also the monarch is the punisher of offenses (in this world). Like Agni (fire), the prince is the purifier and the enjoyer of all gifts. As Varuna, the god of water, sustains everything by supplying moisture, so also the king maintains everybody by his virtues and activities. As the god of wealth protects the jewels of the universe, so the king protects the treasure and possessions of the state. 1 8 A similar set of c o r r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e deities a n d t h e k i n g ' s p o w e r s is form u l a t e d as p a r t o f t h e m y t h o f o r i g i n s f o u n d in t h e V i s h n u d h a r m o t t a r a P u r a n a : The king was emitted by the Self-generated One w h o had drawn together portions of the gods for the purpose of wielding the rod of coercive power in order to protect all living beings. Since no one is even able to gaze at him on account of his radiant energy, the king is, a m o n g the people, a lord like the Sun (Surya). W h e n a person comes to participate in divine favor by looking on him, then because he is the source of delight for the eye, he becomes the Moon (Candra). W h e n he spontaneously pervades the entire world by means of his mobile agents, the king becomes the Wind (Vayu) a m o n g the people. Whenever the king makes wrong-doers shrivel up, the king turns into Death (Yama), born of the sun, a m o n g men. Whenever the king, on account of his majesty burns angered and aroused m e n even though he might not desire to, he turns into Fire (Agni) a m o n g men. Whenever the king makes gifts of wealth on all sides for the sake of giving itself then he b e c o m e s Kubera (god of riches). Whenever he floods the world by showering down streams of wealth, the king is said to b e c o m e Varuna (god of waters) by m e n learned in right conduct. Sustaining all of the people without distinctions by means of a heart strong in compassion, the king becomes lord of the earth. W h e n he fully protects the entire populace with overlordship then he turns into Indra (warrior king of the gods), compassionate toward all living beings. 1 " T h e k i n g is e v e n given p o w e r s of m e t a m o r p h o s i s d u e t o his divine n a t u r e : "In o r d e r t o m a k e j u s t i c e s u c c e e d , h e t a k e s all f o r m s again a n d again, t a k i n g i n t o cons i d e r a t i o n realistically w h a t is t o b e d o n e , (his) p o w e r , a n d t h e t i m e a n d place. T h e l o t u s g o d d e s s o f G o o d F o r t u n e resides in his favor, v i c t o r y in his a g g r e s s i o n , a n d

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d e a t h in his a n g e r ; f o r h e is m a d e of t h e brilliant e n e r g y of all (the g o d s ) " ( M a n u Smriti 7.10-11). S o m e stories l e g i t i m a t e t h e k i n g ' s sacred n a t u r e a n d right t o r u l e b y i m a g i n i n g a p r i m o r d i a l s t a t e o f n a t u r e w i t h o u t law, stability, a n d security. O t h e r s u c h m y t h s start b y p o s i t i n g a g o l d e n age in w h i c h t h e r e w a s n o n e e d f o r a king. Society w a s self-regulating as all p e o p l e n a t u r a l l y c o n f o r m e d t h e i r b e h a v i o r t o dharm a o r r i g h t e o u s c o n d u c t . But t h e n c o m e s a "fall." M o r a l i t y d e g e n e r a t e s , a n d t h e typical H i n d u vices of d e l u s i o n , i g n o r a n c e , desire, a t t a c h m e n t t o sense objects, a n d g r e e d arise. D h a r m a is n o l o n g e r o b s e r v e d , i m m o r a l i t y is g i v e n f r e e reign, a n d t h e p r o p e r d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n t h i n g s b r e a k s d o w n . It is as a corrective t o such c h a o s t h a t k i n g s h i p is established b y t h e gods: Neither kingship nor king was there in the beginning, neither scepter (or rod of punishment, danda) nor the bearer of the scepter. All people protected one another by means of righteous conduct. Thus, while protecting one another by means of righteous c o n d u c t . . . men eventually fell into a state of spiritual lassitude. Then delusion overcame them. Men were thus overpowered by infatuation . . . on account of the delusion of understanding; their sense of righteous conduct was lost. W h e n understanding was lost, all m e n . . . overpowered by infatuation, became victims of greed. Then they sought to acquire what should not be acquired. Thereby, i n d e e d . . . another vice, namely desire, overcame them. Attachment then attacked them, who had become victims of desire. Attached to objects of sense, they did not discriminate between right and w r o n g action. . . . They did not avoid . . . pursuing what was not worth pursuing, nor, similarly, did they discriminate between what should be said and what should not be said, between the edible and inedible, and between right and wrong. . . . Then the gods approached Vishnu, the lord of creatures, and said, "Indicate to us that one person among mortals who alone is worthy of the highest eminence." Then the blessed lord god Narayana reflected, and brought forth an illustrious mind-born son, called Virajas (who became the first king). 20 K i n g s h i p h e r e a n d in m a n y o t h e r t e x t s is r e p r e s e n t e d as c o m i n g i n t o exist e n c e in t h e m y t h i c a l t i m e of b e g i n n i n g s t o c o u n t e r a c t t h e effects of a n a t u r a l s t a t e of affairs (or t h e r e v e r s i o n t o it) o f c h a o s , anarchy, a n d i m m o r a l i t y . T h i s s t a t e of n a t u r e , d e v o i d of t h e coercive r u l e of a k i n g , is o f t e n d e p i c t e d as o n e g o v e r n e d by t h e "law of t h e fishes" (an a n c i e n t Indian c o n c e p t n o t dissimilar t o t h e "law of t h e j u n g l e " ) . "If t h e r e w e r e n o k i n g o n e a r t h f o r h o l d i n g t h e r o d of p u n i s h m e n t , t h e s t r o n g w o u l d t h e n have o p p r e s s e d t h e w e a k a f t e r t h e m a n n e r of fishes in t h e w a t e r . W e have h e a r d t h a t m e n , in days of yore, in c o n s e q u e n c e of anarchy, w e r e r u i n e d , d e v o u r i n g o n e a n o t h e r like s t r o n g e r fishes d e v o u r i n g t h e w e a k e r o n e s in t h e w a t e r . " 2 1 As S p e l l m a n n o t e s , "In a n c i e n t India, t h e f e a r of a n a r c h y w a s a l m o s t p a t h o l o g i c a l . U n d e r l y i n g every c o n c e p t of k i n g s h i p w a s t h e d o c t r i n e o f matsyanyaya—the

a n a l o g y o f t h e b i g f i s h e a t i n g u p t h e little

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fish. . . . W i t h o u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g this idea, there can be no u n d e r s t a n d i n g of kingship in ancient India." 22 It is, indeed, out of fear of the unruly alternative of a world w i t h o u t law in which the unrestrained "survival of the fittest" prevails that the gods fashioned the first king and ordained him the restorer of order, the legitimate ruler, and the enforcer of righteousness—and, as such, the h u m a n "worthy of the highest eminence." "The coronation of king is the first duty of kingdom," according to the great Hindu epic, the Mahabharata, for without a king anarchy prevails: A kingdom in which anarchy prevails becomes weak and is soon afflicted by robbers. In kingdoms torn by anarchy, righteousness cannot dwell. The inhabitants devour one another. An anarchy is the worst possible of states. T h e sacred texts declare that in crowning a king, it is Indra (the king of the gods) that is crowned (in the person of the king). A person w h o is desirous of prosperity should worship the king as he should worship Indra himself. No one should dwell in kingdoms torn by anarchy. Agni (the god of fire) does not convey (to the gods) the libations that are poured upon him in kingdoms where anarchy prevails. 23

The consequences of a king w h o is t o o weak or overly scrupulous w h e n it comes to enforcing order are similar to a world in which there is no king at all. Lawlessness and disorder overwhelm stability, and society falls into the ultimate sign of corruption and chaos—the intermixture of castes: If the king did not tirelessly inflict punishment on those w h o should be punished, the stronger would roast the weaker like fish on a spit. The crow would eat the sacrificial cake and the dog would lick the oblations; there would be n o ownership in anyone, and (everything) would be upside down. The whole world is mastered by punishment, for an unpolluted m a n is hard to find. T h r o u g h fear of punishment everything that moves allows itself to be used. The gods, the titans, the centaurs, the ogres, the birds and the snakes, even they allow themselves to be used, but only under pressure from punishment. All the classes would be corrupted, and all barriers broken, all people would erupt in fury as a result of a serious error in punishment. (Manu Smriti 7.20-24)

The king's right to enforce the law, dispense justice, and administer punishment is summarized in the concept of danda, the scepter or "rod of punishment." The danda—and all it represents—is itself given its own myth of origins in which the Creator "emits" it as his own son and as the "protector of all living beings." This rod of punishment is also identified with the king ("the rod is the king"), who wields it in order to uphold dharma: For (the king's sake) the Lord in ancient times emitted the rod of punishment, his own son, (the incarnation o f ) Justice, to be the protector of all living beings, made of the brilliant energy of ultimate reality. Through fear of him all living beings, sta-

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tionary and moving, allow themselves to be used and do not swerve from their own d u t y . . . . The rod is the king and the man, he is the inflicter and he is the chastiser, traditionally regarded as the guarantor for the duty of the four stages of life. The rod alone chastises all the subjects, the rod protects them, the rod stays awake while they sleep; wise men know that justice is the rod. Properly wielded, with due consideration, it makes all the subjects happy; but inflicted without due consideration, it destroys everything. (Manu Smriti 7.14-15, 17-19)

The Message of Hinduism's

Politics

In t h e face of t h e always t h r e a t e n i n g d a n g e r s of anarchy, a n d especially t h e fear of t h e socially d i s a s t r o u s " m i x i n g of castes," t h e f i g u r e of t h e k i n g played a crucial role in H i n d u social a n d political t h o u g h t . T h e w i d e latitude t h e k i n g is given t o exercise coercive p o w e r s e e m s t o have d e v e l o p e d in direct c o r r e l a t i o n t o t h e d e g r e e of anxiety r e g a r d i n g life w i t h o u t s u c h restraints. B u t t h e k i n g h i m s e l f m u s t also b e r e s t r a i n e d , lest t h e p o w e r s h e h a s b e e n g i v e n are m i s u s e d . H e is always t o b e g u i d e d b y rajadharma,

t h e religious d u t y

a s s i g n e d specifically t o t h e m o n a r c h , t h a t i n c l u d e s t h e d u t y of m a i n t a i n i n g a k i n d of y o g i c s e l f - c o n t r o l o n e u s u a l l y e x p e c t s t o f i n d as a n a t t r i b u t e of t h e k i n g ' s social a n d religious o p p o s i t e : t h e w o r l d - r e n o u n c e r . A n d as w e have s e e n a b o v e , t h e k i n g ' s r e l i g i o u s l e g i t i m a c y , as w e l l as his t e m p o r a l s u c c e s s , a l s o d e p e n d s o n his p r o p e r alliance w i t h a B r a h m i n p r i e s t o r purohita.

The bond

f o r m e d b e t w e e n the these t w o figures ensured not only that the king, the e m b o d i m e n t of t h e p r i n c i p l e of p o w e r , w o u l d b e r e s t r a i n e d b y t h e B r a h m i n , t h e e m b o d i m e n t of t h e principle of religion; it also acted as a p o t e n t s y m b o l of religiously l e g i t i m a t e d political leadership. Such a u n i o n b e t w e e n k i n g a n d p e r s o n a l priest is given a divine p e d i g r e e a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l o r i g i n in stories r e v o l v i n g a r o u n d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e d i v i n e p r i e s t M i t r a a n d t h e royal g o d V a r u n a . T h e t w o a r e r e p r e s e n t e d as t h e a p o t h e o s e s of t w o c o m p l e m e n t a r y principles. T h e B r a h m i n deity is "intelligence" o r " i n s p i r a t i o n , " w h e r e a s t h e Kshatriya g o d e m b o d i e s " c a p a c i t y f o r a c t i o n " o r "skillfulness." T h e B r a h m i n priest t h u s "at o n c e inspirits a n d inspires t h e King," as o n e scholar p u t s it. 24 O n e p a r a d i g m a t i c text o n t h e divine c o u p l e p o r t r a y s t h e t w o as originally s e p a r a t e . But w h e r e a s "Mitra, t h e B r a h m i n , c o u l d s t a n d w i t h o u t V a r u n a , t h e Kshatriya," things w e r e o t h e r w i s e f o r V a r u n a : " W h a t e v e r action V a r u n a did u n i n s p i r e d by Mitra, t h e B r a h m i n , did n o t s u c c e e d . " O n l y w h e n t h e deities—and the powers they represent—were united, and the Brahmin was m a d e " f o r e m o s t " in t h e relationship, c o u l d t h e divine k i n g rule effectively: " W h a t ever action, inspired by Mitra, t h e B r a h m i n , V a r u n a s u b s e q u e n t l y did s u c c e e d e d " ( S h a t a p a t h a B r a h m a n a 4.1.4.iff.).

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T h e H i n d u epics, t h e M a h a b h a r a t a a n d R a m a y a n a , are ( a m o n g m a n y o t h e r t h i n g s ) also l e g i t i m a t i n g n a r r a t i v e s o f ideal H i n d u k i n g s h i p . T h e r u l e o f Yudh i s h t h i r a in t h e M a h a b h a r a t a is r e p r e s e n t e d as o n e in w h i c h t h e v i r t u e of t h e k i n g f a n s o u t b e n e f i c i a l l y t o all t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e polity: T h e kingdom became free f r o m disputes and fear of every kind. And all the people became attentive to their respective occupations. The rain became so abundant as to leave n o r o o m for desire and the kingdom grew in prosperity. Indeed, during the realm of Yudhishthira, w h o was ever devoted to truth, there was n o extortion, n o stringent realization of rent debts, n o fear of disease, of fire, or of death by poisoning and incantations, in the kingdom. . . . and accordingly, during the reign of Yudhishthira, w h o was ever devoted to virtue, his dominions grew in prosperity. 2 ' In like m a n n e r , R a m a , t h e h e r o - k i n g o f t h e R a m a y a n a , is d e p i c t e d in i d e a l t e r m s as " m a j e s t i c , " "illustrious," " l o r d o f t h e t h r e e w o r l d s , " t h e " g r e a t e s t r u l e r in t h e t h r e e w o r l d s , " a n d so f o r t h . H e is t h e g r e a t e x e m p l a r a n d p r o t e c t o r of d h a r m a : " R a m a ' s o w n p e r s o n a l d h a r m a a n d his d h a r m a as p o t e n t i a l k i n g are l i n k e d t o g e t h e r . T h e i d e a l o f k i n g s h i p s e e n in R a m a is b a s e d u p o n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n R a m a ' s o w n d h a r m a and that of the k i n g d o m . . . . T h e p r o m o t i o n of d h a r m a is s e c u r e d n o t j u s t b y s t a t e c r a f t b u t also b y e x a m p l e . " 2 6 Also in t h e R a m a y a n a , w e are g i v e n a d e p i c t i o n of t h e ideal H i n d u k i n g d o m , a s t a t e r u l e d b y t h e r i g h t e o u s g o d - k i n g R a m a a n d t h u s t e r m e d " R a m r a j y a . " In this m i l l e n a r i a n t i m e , " t h e w o r l d w o u l d b e happy, satisfied a n d d e l i g h t e d , a n d f r e e f r o m sickness, affliction, f a m i n e a n d fear. M e n w o u l d n o t see t h e d e a t h o f t h e i r sons, w o m e n w o u l d n o t b e c o m e w i d o w s a n d w o u l d r e m a i n d e v o t e d t o t h e i r husb a n d s . T h e r e w o u l d b e n o d a n g e r of t e m p e s t , n o r w o u l d p e o p l e p e r i s h t h r o u g h d r o w n i n g , n o r w o u l d t h e r e b e d a n g e r f r o m f i r e , j u s t as in t h e G o l d e n A g e " ( R a m a y a n a 1.1.71-73).

Hinduism

and Nonbelievers:

Politics

and People outside

the

Tradition

T h i s H i n d u political a n d r e l i g i o u s ideal o f a " k i n g d o m of h e a v e n o n e a r t h " r u l e d by a r i g h t e o u s g o d - k i n g (or t h e equivalent) has persisted t h r o u g h o u t history. T h e r e have, h o w e v e r , b e e n s o m e w h a t d i f f e r e n t visions o f w h a t s u c h a n ideal kingd o m w o u l d l o o k like, especially w i t h r e g a r d t o its social a n d r e l i g i o u s c o m p o s i t i o n . For w h i l e H i n d u t h e o r y h a s always n o t o n l y a c c o u n t e d f o r b u t a s s u m e d t h e d i v e r s e n a t u r e o f t h e r e l i g i o u s a n d social c o m p o n e n t s of t h e polity, it h a s o n l y b e e n relatively r e c e n t l y t h a t t h e m o d e r n idea ( a n d p r o b l e m ) of r e l i g i o u s diversity h a s c o m e t o t h e f o r e . In t h e classical t e x t s o f t h e t r a d i t i o n , s o c i a l — a n d a l s o t o s o m e e x t e n t relig i o u s — p l u r a l i s m is e m b r a c e d as n o t o n l y a f a c t o f political life b u t as n e c e s s a r y

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t o t h e p r o p e r o r d e r of things. " U n i t y in diversity" describes t h e H i n d u s y s t e m of varnashrama

dharma,

w h e r e b y r e l i g i o u s a n d social d u t y is c a l i b r a t e d t o o n e ' s

i n b o r n class a n d p a r t i c u l a r stage of life. T h e n o t i o n t h a t t h e r e are, a n d s h o u l d be, differences in t h e b o d y politic is t h e r e f o r e n o p r o b l e m f o r t r a d i t i o n a l H i n d u i s m ; i n d e e d , it is a feature

of t r a d i t i o n a l H i n d u political a n d r e l i g i o u s t h o u g h t . T h e

k i n g ' s j o b is t o s t a n d a p a r t f r o m t h e s o m e t i m e s c o m p e t i n g interests of t h e vario u s classes a n d castes, t o n e g o t i a t e a n d m e d i a t e t h e m , b u t in every case t o d o so a c c o r d i n g t o t h e religiously fixed g u i d e l i n e s of d h a r m a . As w e have seen, o n e of t h e principal d u t i e s of t h e k i n g is t o e n s u r e i n t e r n a l o r d e r b y e n f o r c i n g t h e dictates of t h e p a r t i c u l a r d h a r m a assigned t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r individuals a n d g r o u p s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e his k i n g d o m . T h i s a s s u m e s , h o w e v e r , t h a t all w i t h i n t h e k i n g d o m a c c e p t a n d u n d e r s t a n d t h e s e dictates, t h a t all, in o t h e r w o r d s , are in s o m e s e n s e o r a n o t h e r " H i n d u . " T h e e x t r e m e elasticity of t h e t e r m h a s h e l p e d ( m a n y a p p a r e n t l y u n o r t h o d o x t r a d i t i o n s like B u d d h i s m , J a i n i s m , a n d l a t e r S i k h i s m c o u l d b e a n d h a v e b e e n i n c o r p o r a t e d u n d e r t h e c o n c e p t at v a r i o u s times), as h a s t h e n o t i o n t h a t social d u t y overrides sectarian affiliation (a B u d d h i s t o r Sikh m e r c h a n t is still, a f t e r all, a m e r c h a n t w i t h all of t h e a t t e n d a n t social duties). F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e hierarchical n a t u r e of H i n d u t h o u g h t a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n has allowed c e r t a i n H i n d u texts a g r e a t f r e e d o m t o e n c o m p a s s all s o r t s of b e l i e f s a n d p r a c t i c e s u n d e r o n e o r a n o t h e r sectarian h e a d i n g . T a k e , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e classic s y n c r e t i s t i c text o f t h e B h a g a v a d Gita, w h i c h r e o r i e n t s H i n d u i s m u p u n t i l its t i m e a r o u n d a n e w c e n t e r , t h e d e v o t i o n t o a n d w o r s h i p of t h e deity Krishna. It is Krishna, t h e text declares, w h o is recipient of w o r s h i p regardless of w h o t h e w o r s h i p p e r s t h i n k t h e y are w o r s h i p p i n g : " W h e n d e v o t e d m e n sacrifice t o o t h e r deities w i t h f a i t h , t h e y sacrifice t o m e , A r j u n a , h o w e v e r a b e r r a n t t h e rites" (Bhagavad Gita 9.23). In this way, religious diversity can b e easily t o l e r a t e d , albeit w i t h i n a hierarchical s c h e m e of things. But H i n d u i s m also has a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e possibility of heresy, of t h e existence of t h o s e w h o c a n n o t b e included even w i t h i n t h e r a t h e r w i d e e m b r a c e of the relig i o n . "Atheists" (usually r e f e r r i n g t o B u d d h i s t s a n d / o r materialists) have s o m e t i m e s b e e n s o d e s i g n a t e d , b u t especially t h o s e w h o d e n y t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e Vedas a n d t h e B r a h m i n s (and t h u s t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e H i n d u c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of d h a r m a ) are cast b e y o n d t h e pale. A l t h o u g h in p r a c t i c e H i n d u kings since t h e rise of t h e h e t e r o d o x religions of B u d d h i s m a n d Jainism in t h e f i f t h c e n t u r y B.C.E. have n o t only t o l e r a t e d b u t o f t e n e n o u g h p a t r o n i z e d t h e m , H i n d u law b o o k s are n o t w i t h o u t passages t h a t advise t h e k i n g t o b a n i s h t h o s e t h e B r a h m i n s r e g a r d as d a n g e r o u s c o m p e t i t o r s : " ( T h e k i n g ) s h o u l d q u i c k l y expel f r o m t h e t o w n g a m blers, t r a v e l i n g b a r d s , p l a y b o y s , m e n w h o persist in h e r e s y o r b a d actions, a n d b o o t l e g g e r s " ( M a n u Smriti 9.225). Such advice ( a s s u m i n g t h e heretics in q u e s t i o n w e r e B u d d h i s t s a n d Jains) w a s a practical impossibility f r o m early t i m e s a n d w a s i g n o r e d b y H i n d u kings in all periods.

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The institution of Muslim rule over much of north India in the second millennium C.E. put much of Hindu political thinking and policy into eclipse. Hindus could and did, however, accommodate themselves to Islamic rule, perhaps in large part because, as one scholar has noted, "The ideal activities of the king, in the Hindu and Muslim traditions, appear to have certain c o m m o n characteristics": The king presides over a social order to be maintained rather than over an enterprise to be managed: he must mete out punishment in order to uphold justice; he should not interfere with the property of his subjects except to levy lawful taxes; he should take care to restore good customs, namely those in consonance with sacred law; he should protect and help widows and orphans. In order to perform his proper functions effectively, he must cultivate traits of character which, in the t w o traditions, prove to be very similar. He must develop and exercise self control; he must avoid intoxicating drink; even though his sexual impulses need not be kept u n d e r severe restraint, he must remain suspicious of the influence of women.27

The Muslims were succeeded by the British, w h o colonized and ruled India in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Resistance to their rule and movements organized to achieve independence often involved the resuscitation of ancient Hindu religio-political ideas and images. T h e vision of an independent India based on and guided by the "rule of God" or Ramrajya was particularly embraced by two very different and competing factions of the independence movement. On the one hand, Mohandas Gandhi envisioned an inclusivistic and ecumenical ideal of Ramraj, which was nevertheless self-consciously conceived as a spiritual alternative to Western secular notions of nationalism and statecraft. On the other hand, a very different conceptualization of the concept of Ramrajya was formulated and propagated by the rather more exclusive and intolerant m e m b e r s of the Hindu nationalist or "Hindutva" m o v e m e n t . This latter understanding was one of a Hindu theocracy in which non-Hindus (primarily Muslims and Christians) would be relegated to the status of "guests." Both versions of Ramrajya were in direct opposition to the constitutionally secular nationalism that won the day in 1947. But the Hindutva movement has received large support over recent decades in India and, at least in some of its more radical factions, has not given up its ideal of a Hindu theocracy—the reconciliation of political power and spiritual authority.

Conclusion Gandhi once famously remarked that those w h o believe religion is separable from politics understand neither one. The Hindu tradition, stretching over the course of m o r e than three millennia, has, in this regard, tried to have its cake and eat it too. On the one hand, religion and politics are separable and separat-

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I Brian Κ. Smith | ed in classical H i n d u thinking. T h e f u n c t i o n s of political p o w e r and spiritual authority are, f r o m this point of view, distinct and held apart. Each is m o n o p o lized by a different class: the warrior-king's temporal p o w e r belongs to him and him alone, whereas only the Brahmin embodies spiritual authority. As such, the k i n g r e p r e s e n t s (and is o f t e n said to wield) a b s o l u t e p o w e r over t h e secular realm, w h e r e a s t h e B r a h m i n holds himself aloof f r o m t h e c o m p r o m i s e s and impurity of the world and thus safeguards his o w n spiritual purity. This-worldly and o t h e r w o r l d l y H i n d u i s m , c o n d e n s e d and symbolized in the figures of the king and the world-renouncing Brahmin, are in this way juxtaposed while isolated one f r o m the other. But this Hindu version of the "separation of church and state" cannot and did n o t stand unmitigated. T h e state's legitimacy depended on its connection to religion, just as "the church" depended on the state for protection and support. Thisworldly H i n d u i s m could only be religiously validated with recourse to the transcendent values and prestigious practices of otherworldly Hinduism. Conversely, otherworldly H i n d u i s m was only possible t h r o u g h the support, order, and stability provided by those p u r s u i n g this-worldly activities. T h e king n e e d e d the Brahmin (or w h a t the Brahmin stood for), and the Brahmin needed the king (or what the king stood for). This tension played itself out in various ways, as we have seen. T h e king is represented as an autocrat w h o s e pursuit of his political self-interest is his highest duty, b u t also as a divinity, the earthly e m b o d i m e n t of transcendent deities. T h e king's duty involves him deeply in the affairs of politics, protection, warfare, policing, and law—and mostly "by any m e a n s necessary"—while at the same time requiring h i m to subordinate himself to the Brahmin priest and the restraints of religion. T h e k i n g m u c k s a b o u t in the w o r l d of realpolitik—of the p u r s u i t of one's o w n goals and desires—while simultaneously restraining himself through ascetic practices designed to t u r n him into a kind of disinterested yogin. T h e r e is, argues H e e s t e r m a n , an "insoluble dilemma" inherent in the Hindu view of political rule. This c o n u n d r u m finds its focused expression in the problematic alliance b e t w e e n the king and his B r a h m i n priest. T h e king needs the transcendent legitimation that only such a relationship with the Brahmin can give him. "But once the king has succeed in establishing this relationship the Brahmin by the same token has lost the transcendent status that f o r m e d his literally priceless value." 2 8 By virtue of the very fact that the Brahmin has f o r m e d such a relation w i t h the king, his p o w e r to legitimate the king's rule is thereby c o m p r o mised. Otherwise put, the c o n u n d r u m of the power and authority consists in the fact that the king " w h o has successfully enticed the Brahmin to serve him only obtains an empty husk, for the Brahmin then loses his special quality that was the reason to engage him." 2 9

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Nor is this dilemma really solved by insisting that the king combine in himself this-worldly and otherworldly features in the form of the active, politically powerful king w h o is also epitome of the yogic ideal of self-restraint. For while "the king has to win his independence of action at the price of renouncing worldly interests," it is not clear what then could "motivate the king, whose hard-won conquest of the senses has placed him above worldly interests, still to acquire and increase his worldly power. " 30 In Hindu religious texts, "Kingship remains, even theoretically, suspended between sacrality and secularity, divinity and mortal humanity, legitimate authority and arbitrary power, dharma and adharma." 3 1 And perhaps such a conundrum is not really unique to Hinduism, but a feature of all religions. The harmonization of such opposing principles is never easy, and is perhaps ultimately impossible. It is not easy to connect the transcendent and imminent, the religious and the political, without compromising both.

Notes 1. Unless otherwise noted, translations from the Sanskrit texts are my own. 2. All translations from the Manu Smriti come from The Laws of Manu, trans, by Wendy Doniger with Brian K. Smith (London: Penguin Books, 1991).

3. Translations from the Artha Shastra are taken from The Kautiliya Arthasastra, Pt. II: An English Translation with Critical and Explanatory Notes, 2d ed., trans, by R. P. Kangle (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972). 4. See the introduction of Dharmasutras: The Law Codes of Ancient India, trans, by Patrick Olivelle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). I have drawn on this work for translations of the D h a r m a Sutras found below. 5. Another "goal" or "end" of life is also sometimes included: moksha or "liberation" from suffering and rebirth.

6. For references, see Jan Gonda's Ancient Indian Kingship from the Religious Point of View (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966). 7. For f u r t h e r citations and a discussion, see Brian K. Smith, Classifying the Universe:

The Ancient Indian Varna System and the Origins of Caste (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 42-46. 8. Charles Drekmeir, Kingship and Community in Early India (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), 255-56. 9. J. C. Heesterman, "Brahmin, Ritual, and Renouncer," Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde

Sud- und Ostasiens 8 (1964), 21. 10. Drekmeir, Kingship and Community, 21-22. 11. Drekmeir, Kingship and Community, 256. 12. Mahabharata (Shantiparva 15; 78.14), cited in Drekmeir, Kingshipand Community, 138. 13. John W. Spellman, Political Theory of Ancient India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), 108.

i86 I Brian Κ. Smith

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14. J. C. Heesterman, "Kautalya and the Ancient Indian State," Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens 15 (1971): 9. 15. Mahabharata (Shantiparva 139.9), cited in Spellman, Political Theory of Ancient India, 211.

16. Mahabharata (Udyogaparva), cited in Spellman, Political Theory of Ancient India, 212. 17. Drekmeir contends throughout his important work on ancient Indian kingship that the "divinity" of the king lies primarily not in his person but in the office. See, e.g., Kingship and Community, 252: "In summary we may say that usually the concept of divinity was used metaphorically in ancient India to describe the functions of the royal o f f i c e . . . . In India (as in the European Middle Ages) divine right, at least in the period before the decline of Mauryan rule, must be located in the institution of kingship and not in the king himself." 18. Shukranitisara 1.141-52. Cited in Drekmeir, Kingship and Community, 223. 19. Vishnudharmottara Purana 2.71; adapted from the translation in Ronald Indens "Ritual, Authority, and Cyclical Time in Hindu Kingship," i n j . Ε Richards, ed., Kingship and Authority in South Asia (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 48-49. 20. Mahabharata 12.59.5ff. Cited in Ainslie T. Embree, ed., Sources of Indian Tradition, Vol. 1, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 238-39. 21. Mahabharata (Shantiparvan 67.16ff.), cited in Drekmeir, Kingship and Community, 138. 22. Spellman, Political Theory of Ancient India, 4-5. 23. Mahabharata 12.67, cited in Ainslie T. Embree, ed., The Hindu Tradition: Readings in Oriental Thought (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 107. 24. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power in the Indian Theory of Government (New Haven, Conn.: American Oriental Society, 1942), 12. 25. Mahabharata (Sabhaparva), cited in Spellman, Political Theory of Ancient India, 213. 26. Frank Whaling, The Rise of the Religious Significance of Rama (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), 64-65. 27. Peter Hardy, "Growth of Authority over a Conquered Political Elite: Early Delhi Sultanate as a Possible Case Study," in Richards, Kingship and Authority in South Asia, 223. 28. J. C. Heesterman, "Priesthood and the Brahmin," Contributions to Indian Sociology (new series) 5 (1971): 46. 29. J. C. Heesterman, The Inner Conflict of Tradition: Essays in Indian Ritual, Kingship, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 155. 30. Heesterman, "Kautalya and the Ancient Indian State," 9-10. 31. Heesterman, Inner Conflict of Tradition, 111.

Suggested

Readings

Biardeau, Madeleine. Hinduism, The Anthropology of a Civilization. Trans. Richard Nice. New York : Oxford University Press, 1989. Coomaraswamy, Ananda K. Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power in the Indian Theory of Government. New Haven, Conn.: American Oriental Society, 1942. Drekmeir, Charles. Kingship and Community in Early India. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962.

i hinduism

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211

Flood, Gavin D. An Introduction to Hinduism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Gonda, Jan. Ancient Indian Kingship from the Religious Point of View. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966.

Herman, A. L. A Brief Introduction to Hinduism: Religion, Philosophy, and Ways of Liberation. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991. Hopkins, T h o m a s J. The Hindu Religious Tradition. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing. Co., 1971. Klostermaier, Klaus K. A Short Introduction to Hinduism. Oxford: Oneworld, 1998. . A Survey of Hinduism. 2d ed. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. Knipe, David M. Hinduism: Experiments in the Sacred. San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1991. Larson, Gerald James. India's Agony over Religion. Albany: State University of N e w York Press, 1995. Richards, J. F., ed. Kingship and Authority in South Asia. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998. Spellman,John W. Political Theory of Ancient India. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964.

Veer, Peter van der. Religious Nationalism : Hindus and Muslims in India. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

Nine I Confucianism I Mark

Csikszentmihalyi

W H E N J E S U I T MISSIONARIES FIRST S E N T A C C O U N T S OF C H I N E S E R E L I G I O N B A C K TO

Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, some attempted to draw a distinction between "idolatrous" religions, such as Buddhism and Taoism, and the more enlightened tradition of the sage Confucius that preserved some traces of natural theology. In the intervening centuries, elements of this essential distinction have been recast in several ways: the prevailing academic tendency to classify C o n f u c i a n i s m as a "philosophy" and o t h e r traditions as "religions," Max Weber's idea that Confucianism served as the official ideology of an imperial bureaucracy that retarded the development of capitalism, and even contemporary attempts to adopt elements of Confucianism as a secular value system by s o m e Asian governments. W h e t h e r as a r e m n a n t of an inspired theology, a humanistic ethical system, or a bureaucratic ideology perceived as unthreatening to m o d e r n states, each of these portrayals of Confucianism paints it as a unitary and coherent tradition. Yet the very diversity of these portrayals demonstrates that the t e r m actually has a n u m b e r of distinct referents, and suggests that the notion that Confucianism is a single discrete tradition is an oversimplification. Historically, Confucianism refers to a n u m b e r of separate but related traditions that in some way invoke the authority of Kong Qiu, the fifth-century B.C.E. figure on w h o m the Jesuits bestowed the latinized sobriquet "Confucius." Most important for the purposes of this essay is the transmission of the Confucian canon, at different times in Chinese history comprising the "Five Classics" (wujing), the "Four Books" (sishu), and the "Thirteen Classics" (shisanjing) and their accumulated commentaries. Owing to Confucius's putative authorship, editorship, and teaching of many of the canonical texts, the transmission and valorization of these texts by scholars is called Confucianism. By extension, the emphasis on these texts in the traditional educational system has often been labeled as Confucian. Another Confucianism is the bureaucratic structure that depended on the canon for the curriculum of its examination system, and on relevant aspects of Confucius's teachings as a code of professional ethics for its members. On a personal level, family life in East Asia has been structured by a set of normative behaviors, such as the familial piety (xiao) advocated by Confucius, that are indexed to roles defined by the "five relationships" (wulun). Also, the veneration of Confucius by his family and disciples spawned a cult that became institutionalized through the establishment of an official network of Confucian tem213

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pies in the Tang Dynasty

( 6 1 8 - 9 0 7 C.E.).

Both p r o p e r family behavior and animal

sacrifice at Confucian temples also are routinely labeled Confucian. Each of these strands of C o n f u c i a n i s m has had its o w n distinct influence on Chinese politics, and the political significance of b o t h Confucian family roles and Confucian liturgy each merit attention in its o w n right. Here, however, the focus will be on the politics reflected in the core texts of the C o n f u c i a n tradition. Because the Confucian canon played a central role in the educational system and defined the ethos of the g o v e r n m e n t official, its interpretation has historically been at the center of disputes over politics in the public sphere.

Classical

Sources of Confucianism

on

Politics

Of the classical sources that b e c a m e part of the C o n f u c i a n canon, t w o are particularly influential in the f o r m a t i o n of the religious justification of political authority. T h e earlier of the t w o is the record of the sage kings of antiquity, collected in the Shangshu, or the Classic of Documents (Shujing, hereafter Documents). T h e o t h e r is the teachings of Confucius, primarily as transmitted in the Analects (Lunyu), b u t also as expressed in the cryptic chronicle of the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu) and various other works such as those incorporated by the Qing Dynasty scholar Sun Xingyan (1753-1818 C.E.) into the Collected Sayings of Confucius (Kongzijiyu).

These t w o sources treat politics t h r o u g h a dual focus on the

m e t h o d s and character of exemplary rulers of the past, and on the description of a process of the cultivation of a set of virtues capable of imparting moral authority. Both sources distinguish between the ruler's virtue as the justification for their authority, and the sanction conferred by tian (usually translated as "Heaven") as the actual source of the authority. These canonical texts argue that political success or failure is a function of the virtue of the ruler, and in this way combine a religious view of m o r a l perfection with a political system that imagined n o alternative to imperial sovereignty. Yet the emperor's sovereignty was always predicated on the proper performance of a set of religious duties that were especially stringent. In keeping with its limited institutional existence outside the social and political structures of the state, the objects of writing on spiritual perfection in Confucianism were often the very rulers and officials that constituted the g o v e r n m e n t . T h e political and the religious spheres overlapped to the extent that the e m p e r o r himself, as "Son of Heaven" (tianzi), conducted the imperial rituals that provided partial proof of his m o r a l fitness and so legitimated his authority. Lacking an a u t o n o m o u s base, the guardians of the Documents and the Analects, collectively k n o w n as the Ru, could lobby the e m p e r o r t h r o u g h memorials to the t h r o n e or indirectly criticize h i m by c o m m e n t i n g on history, but had little purchase to call into question the structural features of the political system.

i confucianism

It is in this context that the contrast between the Documents, as case studies of the practices of past sage rulers, and the Analects, as a guide to behavior for princes and ritual experts, may best be understood. The Documents is a collection of orations attributed to the sage rulers of the past and their ministers. The dominant tone of its fifty-eight chapters is persuasive, and the dominant argument is the justification of the political authority of the speakers. As such, its first-person testimony is seen to contain b o t h a guide for behavior for the sage ruler and methods that have been empirically proven successful by those rulers. By contrast, the Analects is a collection of dialogues highlighting the teachings of the "uncrowned king" (suwang) Confucius, and is less concerned with the regulation of the state as it is with self-regulation as a means to becoming a sage. Its application to politics is for the most part implicit, but is no less influential than the Documents because of the perceived connection between the governance of the self and of the state. The Chinese term for this connection is "inside a sage and outside a king" (neisheng waiwang), which illustrates how the orations of the sage kings and the dialogues of Confucius have traditionally been perceived to prom o t e the same political message. The Documents is widely regarded as a combination of authentic Z h o u period texts and forgeries created centuries later. The core chapters thought to be genuine include: "Great Announcement" (Dagao), "Announcement of Kang" (Kanggao), "Announcement of Shao" (Shaogao), "Many Officials" (Duoshi), and "Lord Shi" (Junshi). These texts have traditionally been dated to the reign of King Cheng of Z h o u (d. 1006 B.c.E.). By contrast, the thirty or so "new text" chapters, traditionally said to have been found in the wall of Confucius's h o m e in the first century B.c.E., are generally believed actually to have been forged around the fourth century C.E. Nevertheless, for much of Chinese history the text as a whole was regarded as the record of the sage rulers of the Zhou, and the weight of its examples has exerted a strong pull on both policies and political organization, as well as on the expectations for the personal behavior of the ruler. The chapter "Announcement of Kang" in the Documents exemplifies the larger work's mixture of information on the proper conduct of the ruler and models for the successful administration of the state. Addressed to Feng, one of the sons of King Wen, on the occasion when he was put in charge of his own domain or fiefdom, the text is variously attributed to King Cheng or to Cheng's uncle the D u k e of Z h o u , speaking on the king's behalf while he served as regent. T h e "Announcement of Kang" is itself internally divided into ten parts: 1. A description of the virtues of King Wen. Wen is described in the following terms: "He made bright his virtue and was attentive in punishments, he did not mistreat those who had lost their spouses." His achievements were so extraordinary that Heaven (tian, see below) provided him with the man-

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date (ming, see below) t o o v e r t h r o w t h e Yin (i.e., Shang, t h e p r e v i o u s dynasty). 2. A charge t o Feng to pacify and i n t e g r a t e the w o r t h y m e n of the f o r m e r dynasty into the current government. Part of this charge is to "seek to learn the w i s d o m of the f o r m e r kings as a m e a n s to protect the people." 3. A charge to attend to the circumstances of his subjects. Although it is n o t always possible to u n d e r s t a n d the favor of Heaven (tian), the "feelings of the people are visible." 4. A plea to j u d g e c r i m e s n o t by their gravity, b u t by t h e i n t e n t of the perpetrator. 5. An a r g u m e n t that judicial fairness on the part of the ruler will lead to similar circumspection on the part of his subjects. 6. T h e maxim that once an attitude of justice is created in the people, virtuous behavior will b e c o m e universally appreciated. Particular goals are the attitudes of familial piety and the b o n d s of friendship (you), "revealed by Heaven (tian)," so as to develop in a fair and just environment. 7. T h e imperative that a ruler needs to guide the people to good f o r t u n e and success. 8. T h e assurance that the ruler's j u d g m e n t s are really an expression of the j u d g m e n t of Heaven (tian). 9. T h e statement that in order to render just j u d g m e n t s , the ruler must perfect his mind. 10.The observation that the m a n d a t e (ming) given h i m by Heaven (tian) is n o t unchanging, and so the ruler must always keep it in mind. T h e "Announcement of Kang" ends with the statement that if Feng regularly heeds the a n n o u n c e m e n t , his fiefdom will be passed d o w n to his heirs across the generations. Characteristic of the Documents, the p r o p e r effect of the "Announcement of Kang" on the intended audience was to inculcate an attitude of reverence (jing) in the ruler. Although it is possible to be corrupted by rulership and its privileges, the attitude of u n c e r t a i n t y in light of the possibility of the w i t h d r a w a l of the Mandate of Heaven (tianming) outlined in the piece motivates the ruler to remain attentive to his own m o r a l development and maintain judicial fairness. Attention to such motivations is also characteristic of the Analects, w h e r e m o r a l self-cultivation is abstracted f r o m the context of rulership and translated into contexts such as the conduct of lesser officials and the navigation of everyday life. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of an ethical s y s t e m t h a t could be applied to c o n t e x t s besides rulership is one of the primary aims of the Analects. Because the sayings and dialogues that conveyed Confucius's teachings were c o m p o s e d and edited in the period b e g i n n i n g f r o m the lifetime of C o n f u c i u s (trad. 551-479 B.C.E.) and

i confucianism

ending with its collation in the late second and early first centuries B.C.E., the Analects is properly attributed to both Confucius and his disciple tradition over the centuries following his death. Judging by the offices held by those who used and commented on the Analects in the first century B.C.E., the collection was used by Grand Tutors to the HeirApparent and other officials in charge of ritual and the education of the crown prince. 1 In its twenty chapters, the Analects depicts Confucius interacting with others, either the rulers he meets in his travels or the disciples of his later career as teacher. A concern with attaining the ideal of the gentleman (junzi) is the unifying element in the Analects, and this ideal was certainly taken as normative by those w h o later read the text as a guide to proper ritual behavior for princes and officials charged with maintaining court etiquette. The Analects outlines the develo p m e n t of the character traits of benevolence (ren, a sensitivity to others), righteousness (yi, an obligation to act fairly), wisdom (zhi, an ability to assess circumstances), and t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s (xin, being true to one's word). O n e m u s t also locate oneself correctly with respect to one's family through familial piety (xiao, caring for other family m e m b e r s as befits one's role) and with respect to one's community through ritual propriety (li, regulating speech and demeanor as befits one's status). The cultivation of these virtues is the proper goal of the gentleman, and it is these characteristics of the gentleman that qualify him for public service. As Hsu Cho-yun has observed, in the Warring States period, the term gentleman changed from denoting members of the ruling clan, to "an admirable person whose virtue entitles him to a high moral position no matter what his social status was." 2 In the Analects, attaining the moral ideal of the gentleman is the ideal qualification for public service. In the context of the view that moral perfection was the primary qualification for rulership, both the Analects and the Documents may be read as political texts. That view is explicit at times in the texts themselves, especially with respect to the social virtues of familial piety and ritual propriety. The importance of the cultivation of virtues like familial piety in early life and its connection with fitness for governing is made clear in Analects 1.2: "It is rare for a person who is pious to his parents and older brothers to be inclined to rebel against his superior.. . . Piety to parents and elder brothers may be considered the root of a person." Possession of this quality led the sage king Shun (trad. r. 2256-2205 B.C.E.), despite his h u m b l e origins, to be recognized as a suitable successor to the sage king Yao (trad. r. 2357-2256 B.C.E.), according to a narrative found in the Documents. Yet while the sage was at times recognized and promoted in this way, the counterexample of Confucius implied that there were also times when the sage was not promoted. By the second century, the legend that Confucius had developed a perfect plan for governing, but had not been given the opportunity by tian, had become part

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of the standard lore of Confucius. In chapter 80 of his Balanced Discussions, the H a n critic W a n g C h o n g (ca.

2 7 - 9 7 C.E.)

explains the idea: "Confucius did n o t rule

as king, b u t his w o r k as u n c r o w n e d king may be seen in the Spring and Autumn Annals." T h e m y t h that t h r o u g h his writings C o n f u c i u s could prepare China for the g o v e r n m e n t of a f u t u r e sage king b e c a m e part of the cult of Confucius and has colored the reception of his writings ever since. T h e story of Confucius reinforced the cosmological assumption that merit did n o t always guarantee authority, but that authority always had to be g r a n t e d t h r o u g h

Confucianism's

Theory of

tianming.

Politics

T h e n o t i o n t h a t traditional C h i n a ' s social s t r u c t u r e w a s inert a n d its political order u n c h a n g i n g is at once the p r o d u c t of official imperial narratives of historical continuity developed to provide the ruling dynasty with a useful version of the past a n d a relic of t h e e n t h u s i a s t i c E u r o p e a n r e c e p t i o n of t h e "timeless" aspects of Chinese civilization. It is t r u e that myriad religious and cultural continuities lasted u p to and even b e y o n d the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, b u t their deployment to mask the developments and dislocations of Chinese history is a project that is being increasingly discredited. T h a t China's hist o r y is full of revolutions is n o t simply a f i g m e n t of Maoist historiography; it reflects a useful antithesis to the c o m m o n vision of a static Chinese past. Yet within the d y n a m i c processes of Chinese history, ethical n o r m s and political structures preserved in the Confucian canon and in sanctioned approaches to its interpretation are a m o n g the m o r e conservative elements of traditional culture. O n e of the core mistakes of m a n y revisionist accounts, however, is the inference that the conventional aspects of C o n f u c i a n traditions were allied exclusively with the interests of the state or of the ruling class. T h e r e is n o mistaking the ability of Confucian traditions to transmit core texts and concepts relatively intact across g e n e r a t i o n s , b u t that does n o t imply that their influence has b e e n uniformly conservative on the political level. T h o u g h o n e of the primary concerns of the texts of the C o n f u c i a n canon is the theoretical task of defining legitimate authority, contesting that definition was a preoccupation of entrenched political powers, as well as r e f o r m e r s and peasant revolutionaries. Far f r o m being solely reactionary or progressive, C o n f u c i a n texts were read as providing a vision of a normative social order, one that was invoked both in defense of and as a challenge to the status quo. Although n o single concept fully encompasses this complex social vision, few are as central to C o n f u c i a n political discourse as the doctrine of tianming (often translated as "Heaven's Mandate"). Briefly, tianming is the political authorization that the v i r t u o u s ruler receives f r o m the n o n h u m a n realm, and the bad o m e n s the c o r r u p t ruler receives f r o m the same source. T h e t w o w o r d s that m a k e up

i confucianism

this concept, tian (often translated as "Heaven") and ming ("command," "decree," "fate" or most often "mandate"), are key to understanding the formulation of claims to legitimate authority by emperors and revolutionaries alike throughout Chinese history. T h e fact that the word used in b o t h 1949 and in the 1960s to translate "revolution" is geming (literally, "changing the mandate") demonstrates the degree to which Confucian theories of legitimation are still implicit in contemporary political discourse. At the core of the doctrine of tianming is the agency of tian, one of the cardinal elements of Chinese cosmology. Tian literally means "sky," and is at the same time the m e c h a n i s m — a t times intentional and at o t h e r times naturalistic— behind the movement of the cosmos, conveyed to h u m a n beings through supernatural omens or seasonal cycles. Combining aspects of the notions of "God," "Heaven," and "Nature," tian shares at least one fundamental similarity with all of these concepts: it often is used as the category that complements that of the "human." An example of the contrast between tian and the h u m a n is in chapter six of the Taoist classic Zhuangzi (also know as Chuang Tzu), which compares knowledge of "what humans have created" with that of "what tian has created." In this context, the eminent sinologist Herbert A. Giles (1845-1935) identified tian as an allusion to God, albeit "of course as seen through Taoist glasses." 3 Giles is correct to the extent that in the earliest texts, tian has some of the anthropomorphic characteristics of a "spirit" (shen) or deity. Yet the glasses are somewhat askew—the perfect Taoist ruler is not acting at the behest of an intentional tian; instead, such a ruler is simply best able to understand and internalize the patterns of tian through dispassionate and reactive governance (wuwei). In early Confucian texts, a similar approach is sometimes advocated. The sage king Shun, as portrayed in Analects 15.5, is said to have governed in the same reactive way (wuwei) and simply "be reverent himself and face due south." A focus of the ruler's relationship to tian in the Confucian texts has to do with one particular aspect of tian's influence on the world. Analects 16.8 says that one difference between the gentleman and the petty person is that the former is in awe of the ming (mandate) of tian, whereas the latter is ignorant of it. Tian's direct influence on the ruler is most often associated with ming, literally "command" or "mandate" but more accurately a limited notion of "fate." Ming is w h a t d e t e r m i n e s the avenues of o p p o r t u n i t y available to a person, and so whereas some capacities and potential outcomes such as wealth and life span are a matter of ming, personal thoughts, associations, and actions are primarily a matter of individual choice—comparable to what some might call "free will." This view is seen most clearly in the words quoted by Confucius's disciple Zi Xia in Analects 12.5: "Life and death are a matter of ming, wealth and honor depend on tian." Similarly, in the " A n n o u n c e m e n t of Shao" f r o m the Documents, "Tian

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b e s t o w s its ming in w i s d o m , in g o o d and bad f o r t u n e , and in a set n u m b e r of years." W h e n placed together, these t e r m s c o n n o t e the e n d o r s e m e n t that the cosm o s gives to a virtuous ruler in the f o r m of b o u n t y and favorable omens, and t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n it provides a despot in t h e f o r m of blight and unfavorable o m e n s . This m e c h a n i s m underlies t h e traditional c o n c e p t i o n of the dynastic cycle, a G i b b o n e s q u e m o d e l w h e r e i n each dynasty b e g i n s w i t h a v i r t u o u s f o u n d e r claiming a c h a n g e in tianming

and finally ends w i t h a d e b a u c h e d

descendent forfeiting it amid waste and immorality. In this way, the continuity of t h e dynasty and m a i n t e n a n c e of social o r d e r d e p e n d on the effect of the character of the ruler on tianming. T h e concept of tianming has a long tradition in China, and its evolution begins w i t h the key historical event of the twelfth c e n t u r y B.C.E.: the Z h o u conquest. T h e earliest m e n t i o n s of tianming occur in texts associated with the end of the Shang (or Yin) clan's rule of the central plain by the Z h o u clan. These texts were primarily attributed to Kings W e n and W u , and D a n the d u k e of Z h o u . T h e s e Z h o u f o u n d e r s talk a b o u t the original authorization of the Shang by tian, and also about h o w the Shang lost tian's support, thereby justifying their o w n usurpation of the Shang. T h e Documents has long been interpreted to imply that tian was a deity of the Shang that was adopted by the Z h o u as an alternative to the Shang high deity, Shangdi ("Highest Ancestor"). As Creel pointed o u t in 1965, the idea that tian was a factor in the founding of the Shang was a projection back in time by the Z h o u , and there is little evidence that tian was a significant e l e m e n t of Shang religion. 4 By contrast, ming appears m o r e frequently in Shang materials, b u t as Liu Z e h u a has argued, the f u n d a m e n t a l m e a n i n g of the t e r m was t r a n s f o r m e d f r o m Shang to Z h o u : Just as in the Shang, the Duke of Z h o u did not speak or act himself, but rather it was said that everything was the intent or command of tian. This concentration of power is seen in the "Announcements of Shao" in the Documents: "Tian bestows its ming in wisdom, in good and bad fortune, and in a set number of years." Here ming means to "give an order to an inferior." The basic sense of this phrase is that Heaven sends down its orders by endowments of sagely wisdom, dispatches good and bad fortune, and makes determinations of how long one's time will last. The Duke of Z h o u continued the Shang belief in the Highest Ancestor, but also made changes. The most important was that, in the words of the A n n o u n c e m e n t of Kang in the Documents: "the mandate is not among those things that are constant." The meaning of this is that the great mandate bestowed by the Highest Ancestor is not unchanging. 5

T h e c o n c e p t of ming u n d e r w e n t a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n f r o m p e r m a n e n t in the Shang to conditional in the Z h o u . This change is reflected in the different nature

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of divination practices between the Shang and Z h o u , something recent archaeological discoveries have demonstrated. The classical method of reading milfoil stalks of the Yijing (Classic of Change) associated with the Z h o u period is advisory in the sense that the cast hexagram determines a potential outcome at a particular m o m e n t but assumes that later actions might negate the predictive value of the divination. The long-lost Guizang (Storehouse to Which Things Return), classically described as the Shang m e t h o d of reading milfoil stalks, was discovered at Wangjiatai in Hubei Province in 1993. This method associated an invariant reading of either good or bad fortune with each hexagram, predicated on a relatively fixed notion of contingency Therefore, the hexagram deciphered in the milfoil stalks was always based on a fairly rigid set of rules about how the symbols related to reality. In the same way, the eternal support of the Highest Ancestor of the ruling clan of the Shang was replaced by the concept that tian gave and revoked its favor based on the qualities of the ruler. The Documents in particular again and again narrates the intervention of tian in h u m a n affairs through the change in ming that affects changes of dynasty. In the "Many Officers" chapter of the Documents, for example, the duke of Z h o u addresses the officers of the declining Shang Dynasty and invokes the example of their own ancestor's receipt of the ming from tian. He tells them of their founder, the sage king C h e n g Tang, w h o defeated Jie, the last ruler of the previous Xia Dynasty (trad. 1750 B.C.E.). The duke of Z h o u ' s narrative is almost exclusively driven by the agency of tian: "[Jie] was immoral and dissolute and others accused him of this, but tian did not care or listen to him. It relieved him of his original ming, and sent down extreme punishment. Thereupon it commanded (ming) your ancestor Cheng Tang to replace the Xia, and use the best people to regulate the empire." This is one of many examples in which the rise of the Z h o u is justified by locating it in the theory of dynastic cycles tied to the notion of tianming. Just as the virtuous founders of the Shang had replaced the debauched last ruler of the Xia, so also the Z h o u founders were replacing the last ruler of the Shang. For the ruling clan of the Zhou, the notion of tianming authorized their own conquest of the Shang, but at the same time raised the possibility of their eventual loss of legitimacy. Of course, what tian was looking for in a ruler was specifically indexed to the ethos of the ruling clan of the Zhou. As Poo Mu-chou has written, "Yet if we examine the nature of the texts in which the t e r m 'mandate of Heaven' was employed, it can be seen mainly as encompassing political doctrines propagated by the Z h o u court or its ruling apparatus." 6 The acceptance of the doctrine of tianming for centuries after the waning of Z h o u political authority meant that the Z h o u polity became the model according to which the legitimacy of future governors or aspirants to governing was determined. In Analects 17.5, the recreation of the Z h o u was the explicit political ideal of Confucius, who seeks to "make a Z h o u in the east," and in 3.14 avers "I follow the Zhou." In this

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way, particulars of the Z h o u image of the perfect ruler b e c a m e fixed as requirem e n t s for securing the authorization of tian. A m o n g the central political doctrines of the Z h o u was the notion that proper family behavior was a m o d e l for the operation of the state. This doctrine, that there is a direct relationship b e t w e e n the familial piety of the ruler and the loyalty of his subjects, is one of the central reciprocal relationships that i n f o r m e d the description of the ruler that the Z h o u held w o u l d receive tianming. A celebrated passage in the "Daxue" (Great Learning)—a chapter of the Record of Ritual (Liji) that b e c a m e part of the "Four Books" elevated to canonical status by Z h u Xi (also k n o w n as C h u Hsi, 1 1 3 0 - 1 2 0 0 c.e.)—explains that "the g e n t l e m a n does n o t leave h o m e , yet brings his teachings to t h e entire n a t i o n . His p i o u s behavior to his parents is the m e a n s to serve the state's ruler, his filial t r e a t m e n t of his older brothers is the means to serve the state's elders, and his parental kindness is the m e a n s to employ the multitude.'' This passage is based on an association b e t w e e n the natural feelings cultivated in the setting of the family and the behaviors required for g o o d government. T h e first section of the "Discourses of Jin" f r o m the Warring States period Discourses of the States (Guoyu) a d u m b r a t e s this idea: "Serve one's lord with reverence, serve one's father with piety." T h e relationship is m o r e than metaphorical, because there is an assumption that p r o p e r familial behavior leads directly to a well-ordered state. This is s h o w n in Analects 2.21, w h e n C o n f u c i u s justifies his lack of participation in g o v e r n m e n t by q u o t i n g f r o m the Documents: "simply by treating with piety those w h o one should, and by being friendly to one's elder and younger brothers, one is putting governance into practice." T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y C o n f u c i a n scholar Tu Wei-ming p a r a p h r a s e s this s t a t e m e n t as "taking care of family affairs is itself active participation in politics." 7 Indeed, the essence of the association b e t w e e n familial piety and g o o d g o v e r n m e n t is that a state of properly functioning families is in fact a well-ordered society, that politics is the set of conventional relationships that m a y be projected f r o m the natural connections f o u n d in the family. Familial piety is n o t t h e only parallel s t r u c t u r e t h a t c o n n e c t s t h e p e r s o n a l behavior of the ruler with the m e c h a n i s m s for g o o d g o v e r n m e n t . T h e individual's constellations of responsibilities outside the family are the subject of a set of behaviors s u m m a r i z e d as "ritual propriety" (if). Later writers portray Z h o u ritual as formally complex, and they stress b o t h the adherence to rules and the expression of the proper attitudes of reverence (in the case of sacrifice) or grief (in the case of m o u r n i n g ) . T h e later aspect is so i m p o r t a n t that on several occasions the Analects condemns formalism without the proper attitude. Analects 17.11 makes it clear that ritual propriety is n o t simply a m a t t e r of ritual: "Saying 'Rites,' 'Rites,'—does it refer only to jade and silk? Saying 'Music,' 'Music,'—does it refer to bells and drums?"

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CONFUCIANISM

Instead, for the ruler, the performance of the rites with the proper attitude is an important stage in the development of the proper virtues. For the society as a whole, participation in the rituals of Z h o u assured the orderly interaction of its m e m b e r s . As Ivanhoe has written, the rites were intended by C o n f u c i u s to remind people that "harmonious relationships between people is the ultimate aim of and justification for moral self cultivation. If one loses sight of this aspect of the rites, one can mistake the task of moral self cultivation as primarily or exclusively a private, perfectionist concern, and this can lead one to run roughshod over the needs, interests, and feelings of others." 8 In the case of the ruler, consciousness of the intended end of ritual participation entailed attention to the good of others and of the society as a whole. Excellence in the practice of the rites was then a means to ensuring social harmony. Yet harmony was not the sole end of ritual. In Analects 1.12, it is clear that ritual is m o r e than just a means of establishing h a r m o n y in the society: "Harm o n y is the most valuable of the applications of ritual propriety. It is the most beautiful of the ways of the former kings, and both minor and great were done in this way. Yet some things did not work out. To understand h a r m o n y and so pursue it, without the ritual to regulate it, will leave some things that do not work out." This illustrates the degree to which ritual was theorized as the only means to harmony on the level of the society. Even pursuing the ostensible goal of social harmony will not reach that goal as successfully as pursuing it via the proper performance of ritual. The proper familial and ritual behavior of the ruler was the key to the Confucian understanding of the Z h o u model of good government. Arguments for the legitimacy or illegitimacy of later g o v e r n m e n t s often focused m o r e on whether the emperor was in accordance with the standards for personal behavior of the past than on specific elements of policy. Because of the perceived linkage between the ruler's familial piety and his subjects' loyalty to the state, and between the ruler's ritual deportment and social harmony, the focus on the characteristics of the ruler's personal behavior was not only a matter of morality but also implicitly one of politics. The connection between the t w o is best understood through the mediating concept of tianming, whereby personal behavior resulted in concrete political change. Judging concrete behaviors against abstract standards could, however, prove problematic. For this reason, much of the normative political discourse of Confucianism has been transmitted through stories of exemplary sage kings of the past.

The Medium

of Expressing

Politics

in

Confucianism

Early Confucianism has been described as a form of virtue ethics, and indeed the exemplars of the virtuous sage kings of antiquity were central to the develop-

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m e n t of the imperial state. At the same time, the emphasis on merit and virtue was always at least implicitly in tension w i t h the actual criteria of kingship by which the imperial succession was usually d e t e r m i n e d . To rule, a c o n t e n d e r to the t h r o n e needed to be viewed as the legitimate successor of the previous ruler. Generally speaking, legitimation is based on hereditary, religious, legal, political, military, or o t h e r criteria. In China, legitimation was often m o r e concerned with t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n of m e r i t by h e r e d i t a r y r u l e r s t h r o u g h p e r s o n a l piety a n d t h r o u g h reliance o n officials and advisers w h o s e m e r i t was a f u n c t i o n of their i m m e r s i o n in the culture and canon associated w i t h the f o r m e r sage kings and with the " u n c r o w n e d king" Confucius. T w o central narratives spoke to these dual m o d e s of political legitimation. T h e first, the cardinal political narrative of C o n f u c i a n i s m , was the decision by the predynastic e m p e r o r Yao to pass on political authority to Shun, bypassing the n o r m s of the hereditary transfer of power. Shun was d e e m e d w o r t h y to rule on the basis of his m o r a l perfection, as exemplified by his pious behavior in relation to his family. This narrates the standard of legitimation during a period of good g o v e r n m e n t : the peaceful transfer of p o w e r based on merit, accomplished witho u t the intercession of outside authority. T h e o t h e r narrative was that of King W e n and his son King W u , the f o r m e r credited with overthrowing the last corr u p t ruler of the Shang Dynasty in the twelfth century B.C.E., and the latter credited with founding the succeeding Z h o u Dynasty with the help of his uncle the duke of Z h o u . T h e founding of the Z h o u Dynasty complements the story of Yao and Shun in that it narrates the intercession by tian, t h r o u g h the military actions of a virtuous person, to end a period of misrule. T h e story of Yao and Shun is o n e of the central narratives of sagehood and politics in early China. In t h e " C a n o n of Yao" (Yaodian) c h a p t e r of the Documents, t h e basic s t o r y of Yao's anxiety at t h e i n c o m p e t e n c e of his sons is followed by the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Shun by Yao's minister Si Yue: "Although his f a t h e r w a s stupid, his s t e p m o t h e r deceitful, and (his y o u n g e r b r o t h e r ) Xiang w a s a r r o g a n t , he himself w a s able t o have amicable relations w i t h t h e m t h r o u g h his familial piety, raising t h e m up t h r o u g h his benign influence so they did n o t r e t u r n to wickedness." More detail about Shun's family's t r e a t m e n t of h i m are given in an extended dialogue about Shun in b o o k five of the Mencius (Mengzi), the e p o n y m o u s w o r k associated with the second m a j o r Confucian theorist (trad. 3 8 5 - 3 0 4 b.c.e.) of early times. There, the story is recounted that Shun's parents sent him to repair a grain storehouse. Once Shun had climbed up the ladder to the top, his father removed the ladder and set fire to the storehouse. Failing to dispose of him, they had Shun dig a well, which, n o t realizing he had m o m e n t a r i l y left it, they filled in. O t h e r sources provide the story of Shun finding o u t that his family planned to poison

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liquor they were planning to serve him, and preparing himself by bathing in a bath of that time's anti-intoxicant, dog excrement. In such a context, his "amicable relations" with them are perhaps even more surprising. Yet it is exactly this quality that distinguished Shun in the eyes of Yao and, by implication, in the eyes of tian. As recounted in Analects 20.1, Yao proclaims: "It is you, Shun. Tian's succession has fallen on your person. . . If the area within the seas (i.e., China) sinks into difficulties, then tian's benefits will be forever ended." Despite the usual association of tianming with the changing of dynasties, its application in the case of the succession of Yao by Shun indicates that it should properly be seen as a facet of all successions. For reasons outlined in the previous section, it was the pious behavior of Shun in the familial realm that identified him as the rightful successor to Yao. The application of the theory of tianming to the case of Yao's ceding the throne to Shun illustrates the way in which Confucian ethics and its implicit theory of contingency challenge the principle of hereditary succession. It is Yao's realization that he should select a virtuous successor that leads him to select Shun. If he had not chosen such a successor, then his descendants might have faced the fate that was meted out to the corrupt rulers of the Shang by King Wen and King Wu. Yet the corrective actions of tian are not automatic, as is illustrated by an early Confucian text that was discovered at Guodian in Hubei province in 1993 called Frustration and Success Are a Function of the Age (Qiongda yi shi). The text (dating to about 300 B.C.E.) argues that Shun would still be plowing his field if he had not met Yao. It argues that "meeting or not is a matter of tian." Indeed, the role of tian in the succession is central to the understanding of the Shun narrative in b o o k five of the Mencius: "Shun served as Chancellor for Yao for twenty-eight years, s o m e t h i n g that was n o t a result of h u m a n agency, but a m a t t e r of tian. After the death of Yao, once the prescribed three years of m o u r n i n g were completed, Shun retreated from Yao's son to the area south of the Nan River. W h e n those a m o n g the feudal lords of the world went to court, they did not go to Yao's son, but to Shun. W h e n they had cases to be adjudicated, they did not go to Yao's son, but to Shun. Singers did not sing of Yao's son, but of Shun. This is why I say that it was a matter of tian. Only after these things did Shun return to the central states and take the position of 'Son of tian.' Had he continued to live in Yao's palace and expelled Yao's son, it would have been a usurpation and not something given by tian." As the early translator James Legge implies by his note "voxpopuli, voxdei" this notion of the action of the tian through the actions of the people is also an important political doctrine and will be examined at greater length below. Early Confucian interpretations of the narrative of Yao and Shun take pains to implicate tian in the transfer of authority f r o m Yao to Shun, making explicit the idea that

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tian does n o t recognize heredity as a sufficient justification for granting political authority. At the same time, these narratives d e m o n s t r a t e h o w tianming does n o t completely u n d e r m i n e the hereditary transfer of power. Despite his exceptional service as regent, there was little question that the d u k e of Z h o u w o u l d cede his authority w h e n King C h e n g had attained majority. W h e n King Wen t o o k power, he distributed his f i e f d o m s to his close relatives. T h e Z u o c o m m e n t a r y to the Spring and Autumn Annals for 514 B.C.E. reads: "In the past, w h e n King W u conquered the Shang and controlled a b r o a d area of the world, he had fifteen principalities governed by his brothers, and forty governed by the clans of his concubines." Likewise, in chapter 1 of the Historian's Records (Shiji), written around 100 B.C.E., it is asserted that Yao's family continued to participate in the administration of Shun: "Yao gave his t w o daughters in marriage to Shun so that he could observe h o w he dealt with people f r o m his t r e a t m e n t of t h e m . " It also notes that Yao's nine sons attended to Shun's affairs. T h e third-century B.C.E. writer Xunzi (Hsün Tzu) explicitly attacks the notion that Yao "abdicated" the t h r o n e to Shun, arguing in chapter 18 of the Xunzi that the proper principle of succession is continuity of the policies of the previous ruler, "If a Yao succeeds a Yao, can we say a change has even occurred?" T h e t w o narratives of nonhereditary succession play a central role in C o n f u cian political writing because they reinforce the f u n d a m e n t a l political principles of that writing. Specifically, the successful rebellion of t h e Z h o u clan and the peaceful succession of Shun b o t h illustrate the way in which tian can act to elevate a v i r t u o u s person to authority. Although the C o n f u c i a n notion of contingency allows for the possibility that good people may not be recognized, at the same time it guarantees that dynasties at the end of their cycle will eventually be replaced.

The Message

of Confucianism's

Politics

An important debate in the interpretation of the C o n f u c i a n canon was about the proper m e a n s of identifying the intercession of tian. By the f o u r t h century B.C.E., references to o m e n s interpreted as signs of Heaven's pleasure or displeasure with the c h a r a c t e r of t h e r u l e r or o t h e r p a r t s of the g o v e r n m e n t w e r e b e c o m i n g increasingly c o m m o n . In the first century, the p h e n o m e n o n b e c a m e so important to the political discourse that records of these o m e n s began to be integrated into the standard histories, as in Ban Gu's (32-92 C.E.) Standard History of the Han (Hanshu).

T h o u g h the esoteric i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of o m e n s as signs t h a t

required special knowledge to decipher only g r e w stronger in the so-called apocryphal Confucian texts of the first centuries C.E., these m e t h o d s developed alongside an exoteric tradition that read negative social conditions as signs of intercession of tian. This t r a d i t i o n , h o l d i n g t h a t tianming

m a y be o b s e r v e d in t h e

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material wealth and satisfaction of the populace, has existed in China from the time of the Documents. That the will of tian is evident in the material well-being of the people of a state is a lesson that Confucians have often read as a central message of the Documents. We have already seen how the "Announcement of Kang" specifies that whereas it is not always possible to understand tian, the feelings of the people are visible to the ruler. Other early Confucian texts also cite the Documents when they want to make similar arguments. For example, the "Black Robes" (Ziyi), another d o c u m e n t discovered at Guodian in Hubei province in 1993 and dating to 300 B.C.E. at the latest, quotes the following passage from the "Lord Shi" chapter of the Documents: "In the past it was the Highest Ancestor in Geshen w h o looked down on the virtue of King Wen, and the great ming was concentrated in his person." It uses this quotation to c o m p l e m e n t a statement about the reception of the ruler's words by his people. Many scholars attribute this c o m p l e m e n t a r y statement to Confucius: "If one acts immediately following one's words, then the actions cannot be exaggerated. Therefore, if the gentleman first pays attention to his words and then acts, thereby bringing his trustworthiness full circle, then the people will be able to neither exaggerate his excellences nor diminish his faults." The implication is that the tianming being spoken of in the Documents is expressed through the approval or criticism of the people. The Z u o c o m m e n t a r y to the Spring and Autumn Annals, in an entry dated to 542 B.C.E., quotes similar ideas from the "Great Vow" (Taishi) chapter of the Documents: "Whatever the people desire, tian is sure to follow it." This is the same chapter quoted several times in chapter 5 of the Mencius. One quotation caps the explanation of how tianming was evidenced when Yao presented Shun to the people, and they approved of him. There the Documents is quoted as saying: "Tian does not speak, it simply indicates ming through actions and affairs." A second quotation of the Documents is even more explicit: "Tian sees through what my people see, tian listens through what my people hear." In one sense, this understanding of tianming signals the naturalization of the concept of tian, because the cause-and-effect character of the relationship between bad rulership and negative social conditions is portrayed as self-evident. At the same time, the idea that tian still sees and hears, albeit through the eyes and ears of the people, is also consistent with an anthropomorphic divinity that is an embodiment of the society itself. This interpretation of tianming allows for the retrospective legitimation of any succession, and it is the primary way the concept is applied in Chinese historiography. In chapter 12 of the Xunzi, the succession of Shun is explained in terms of the basic model that the people will follow an heir if he is worth but will turn to a sage if the heir is not. In The Heir and the Sage: Dynastic Legends in Early China, Allan examined the contrasting criteria of virtue and heredity for succession and

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explains this development in these terms: "This transformation removes the onus for breaking the rule of heredity from the ceding kings of the predynastic era and the rebel kings of the dynastic era by regarding all transfers of rule, b o t h hereditary and non-hereditary, as equally valid manifestations of Heaven's will or as d e t e r m i n e d by the allegiance of the people." 9 T h u s the notion of tianming was m a d e c o n g r u e n t to the test of popular support. This reading of the Documents was very influential in s o m e later C o n f u c i a n writing, and it is one of the central ways in which tianming was employed to criticize authority. In addition to the claims about the ruler's lack of familial piety or ritual propriety, concrete e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s in the state could also be used as the g r o u n d s for claiming a change in tianming. T h e latter type of claim was n o t u n c o m m o n t h r o u g h o u t Chinese history, and was amplified by later imperial writers such as Z h a n g j u z h e n g (1525-82) and W a n g Fuzhi (1619-92). In response to China's encounters with the West, Liang Qichao (1873-1929) and o t h e r writers sought to replace Confucian political theory with the w o r k of writers that he considered to be m o r e realist political theorists such as Guanzi. Liang w r o t e that "The reason that Europeans and Americans are strong a m o n g the peoples of the world are a m a t t e r of m e t h o d s of governing, and the reasons that Chinese are weak a m o n g the peoples of the world, are also only a matter of these methods." 1 0 As a result he advocated t u r n i n g away f r o m the C o n f u c i a n classics to other writings he saw as m o r e similar to the w o r k of Machiavelli and Hobbes. Nevertheless, claims to m o r a l virtuosity m a d e for figures like Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Z e d o n g in the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y attest to the continuity of m a n y of the ideas that find their roots in the Documents and the Analects.

Confucianism outside

the

and Nonbelievers:

Politics

and

People

Tradition

T h e r e are f u n d a m e n t a l l y t w o ways to address t h e issue of nonbelievers w i t h respect to Confucian traditions: to examine historical systems of governance and self-cultivation that t o o k issue with central Confucian claims, and to make problematic the rubric "belief" with respect to Confucian traditions. An examination of the m a j o r streams of t h o u g h t that developed in c o u n t e r p o i n t to the various Confucian traditions—such as Mohism, Legalism, Daoism, and Buddhism—will inevitably reveal s o m e of the key differences in the way that religion operated in p r e m o d e r n China in c o m p a r i s o n w i t h the p r e m o d e r n West. These differences highlight the way in which "outside the tradition" carries a different m e a n i n g in China than it might in o t h e r parts of the world. In early China, w h e n t h e Documents

and Analects w e r e still f o r m i n g , their

approaches w e r e criticized f r o m perspectives r o o t e d in the traditional governm e n t a l establishment, which f o u n d fault with the C o n f u c i a n emphasis on alle-

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giance to family and on individual self-cultivation. T h e earliest tradition that defined itself in opposition to the figure of Confucius was Mohism, which was founded by Mozi (a.k.a. Mo Tzu) in the fifth century B.C.E.. Mohist texts—centered on universalizing the altruistic impulse of "impartial caring" (jian'ai)—criticize the partiality inculcated by concepts such as familial piety. Instead, they prom o t e a consequentialist scheme in which actions, especially those of the ruler, are deemed good if and only if they maximize the wealth, population, and social order of the state. Although tian had a major role in Mozi's system, it was an automatic one in which "good actions" were rewarded and partial actions were punished. In this way, the theory of government resembled the one outlined above for early Confucians: it rewarded the ruler whose actions benefited the society; however, the definition of benefit was drastically different. In the third century B.C.E., Han Feizi (a.k.a. Han Fei Tzu) adopted from Mozi the notion that a well-ordered state was the goal of the ruler and designed a system of rulership based on the application of rewards and punishments in support of a universal legal code. Han Feizi s ideal ruler was intent on maintaining power at all costs and eschewed the niceties of Confucian moral self-cultivation. Both these texts are critical of the priorities of Confucian morality, and their alternative priorities to some extent influenced later Confucian writings. These approaches, with vested interests in a strong centralized state, were explicitly critical of the early followers of Confucius but shared f u n d a m e n t a l assumptions about the organization of the state. Both Mozi and Han Feizi accept the sovereign authority of a monarch and argue that the actions of the ruler are the primary determinant of the success or failure of the state. Neither of the systems accepts a strong version of the Confucian doctrine of ming, which introduces both a degree of uncertainty about the effectiveness of even the best potential ruler and a position f r o m which to question the authority of the monarch. The systems of Mozi and Han Feizi offered an alternative to the theory of governance of the early Confucians. But because their audience was the ruler, they did not offer a comprehensive set of novel alternative values and beliefs outside that narrow focus. This contrast underlines an important distinction between the early Confucian worldview and some of its counterparts further west during the same period. T h o u g h tian is often opposed to the h u m a n realm, faith or belief in tian was not contested across the different traditions. As such, issues of orthodoxy and heresy were focused on the area that the traditions contested: the conduct of the ruler. Consequently, early Confucian traditions lacked a confessional aspect. In this sense, the category of "nonbelievers" was fundamentally different in early China than elsewhere. This category was reserved for those opposed to the authority of the monarch and the state bureaucracy that supported him.

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By the late sixth century C.E., however, Confucians had begun to define themselves in opposition to the followers of t w o o t h e r alternative systems, and they had begun to develop a rich vocabulary to engage issues of nonbelief. These t w o s y s t e m s w e r e T a o i s m a n d B u d d h i s m , a n d c o m b i n e d w i t h C o n f u c i a n i s m are k n o w n as the "three teachings" (sanjiao) of China. Taoism is often misunderstood to refer primarily to a textual tradition in early China that includes the Daodejing (a.k.a. Tao-te Ching) and

Zhuangzi.

Although these texts exerted an influence on later Taoism, they were just one of several i m p o r t a n t influences that included shamanism and medical and mantic practices. It was the arrival of Buddhism f r o m South and Central Asia in the first century C.E. that sparked the formation of this hybrid religion and influenced its f o r m s of organization. For the first few centuries after its arrival, Buddhism was received as f u n d a m e n t a l l y similar to Taoism and n o t essentially in conflict with indigenous systems. By the sixth century C.E., a recognition of s o m e of the strong differences between Buddhism and China's indigenous religions led to officially sponsored debates b e t w e e n representatives of the "three teachings." T h e s e court debates m a r k e d the beginning of Confucianism's move toward self-consciously defining itself as a tradition against—in competition with—Taoism and Buddhism. Particular areas of contention were the conflict between Confucian notions of familial piety and g o v e r n m e n t participation and the Buddhist monastic ideals of renunciation and asceticism. Only rarely did this contention result in explicit conflict; mostly these differences were mediated t h r o u g h imperial proscriptions. More often, the result was a c c o m m o d a t i o n s through the integration of familial piety into notions of rebirth and integration of monastic with state and private institutions on one hand, and of spiritual exercises and institutions that existed independently of the social structure into C o n f u c i a n i s m and Taoism on the other. A similar m o m e n t occurred in the sixteenth century C.E., w h e n the arrival of Jesuit missionaries b r o u g h t into focus differences b e t w e e n Christian views (which had actually b e e n present in China for centuries) and the "three teachings." Because of the alliance b e t w e e n Christianity and E u r o p e a n and American imperial interests, the attitude to these foreign religions e r u p t e d into open hostility in the nineteenth century. For almost the first millennium of its existence, then, C o n f u c i a n i s m did n o t identify itself as a "religion." Alternative political m o d e l s did exist during that period. But because they w e r e n o t r o o t e d in a robust and distinctive religious worldview, p r o p o n e n t s of the alternatives w e r e n o t perceived of as being nonbelievers. As the arrival of Buddhism and then Christianity altered the identity of C o n f u c i a n traditions, the resulting religious self-consciousness supported a distinction b e t w e e n insiders and outsiders, although again, confessed "belief" was n o t the d e t e r m i n i n g criterion. T h o u g h the c o m p e t i n g traditions did c o m e into conflict, s o m e f o r m of m u t u a l accommodation was the most c o m m o n outcome.

i confucianism

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Conclusion Of the many Confucianisms that have existed throughout Chinese history, the narratives of the ancient sage kings as related in the classic texts—Documents and Analects—have exerted the cardinal influence on the construction of political authority in China. The notion of tian as the arbiter of moral claims through its bestowal of ming upon moral rulers and its rescinding it from corrupt rulers has meant that the justification of political authority was to some degree contingent on the moral self-cultivation of the ruler. The classical texts provided two narrative models of imperial succession, one in which h u m a n beings recognize the need to base political authority on moral authority and tian does not need to intercede, and one in which tian replaces an immoral ruler. The application of this conception of tianming is inherently ambiguous, and whereas the need to interpret changes in ming spawned a n u m b e r of technical disciplines, it also led to an influential model that material wealth and satisfaction of the populace were a sign of the approval of tian. This model has been the source of religious claims to authority by emperors and revolutionaries alike throughout Chinese history, even to the present. As the discussion of nonbelievers above made clear, the very definition of separate spheres of "religion" and "politics" is problematic in pre-modern China (whether this distinction is clear elsewhere in the premodern world is another question). Despite the reception of Confucianism as a unitary and primarily "philosophical" entity, the complementary strands of Confucianism represented by the Documents and Analects represent a comprehensive theory of religion and politics that has influenced every subsequent claim to authority in China. For this reason, the strands of Confucianism that they represent may best be seen as a binary entity that is inherently both political and religious.

Acknowledgment T h e a u t h o r thanks Z h a n g Z h e n j u n and G u o Jue for their c o m m e n t s on this chapter.

Notes 1. Mark Csikszentmihalyi, "Confucius and the Analects in the Han," in Essays on Confucius and the Analects, ed. Bryan W. Van Norden (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 134-62. 2. Hsu Cho-yun, Ancient China in Transition; An Analysis of Social Mobility, 122-222 B.C. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1965), 159. 3. H. A. Giles, Religions of Ancient China (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1905), 44. 4. Herrlee G. Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 493.

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5. Liu Zehua, Zhongguo zhengzhi sixiangshi [A history of Chinese political thought], vol. 1 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Renmin, 1996), 18. 6. Poo Mu-chou, In Search of Personal Welfare (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 30. 7. Tu Wei-ming, Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Confucian Religiousness (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 115. 8. P. J. Ivanhoe, Confurían Moral Self Cultivation. 2d ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 5. 9. Sarah Allan, The Heir and the Sage: Dynastic Legend in Early China (San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1981), 31. 10. Liang Qichao et al., Zhongguo liu da zhengzhi jia [Six great Chinese political thinkers] (Taibei: Zhongzheng Shuju, 1964), 1.

Suggested

Readings

Creel, Herrlee G. The Origins of Statecraft in China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. Csikszentmihalyi, Mark. "Confucius." In The Rivers of Paradise, ed. David Noel Freedman and Michael McClymond. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2001. Ivanhoe, Philip J. Confucian Moral Self Cultivation. 2d ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000. Jensen, Lionel. Manufacturing Confucianism: Chinese Traditions and Universal Civilization. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997. Karlgren, Berhard. The Book of Documents. Stockholm: Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, 1950. Lau, D. C. The Analects. Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1979. Liu Zehua. Zhongguo zhengzhi sixiangshi [A history of Chinese political thought], 2 vols. Zhejiang: Xinhua, 1996. Xu Fuguan. Rujia zhengzhi sixiangyu minzhu ziyou renquan [Confucian political thought and democracy, freedom, and human rights]. Taibei: Baishi Niandai, 1991.

Ten I Buddhism: The Politics of Compassionate Rule I Todd

Lewis

"But what, Lord Buddha, is it that must rule the king?" "It is the Dharma, monk!" replied the Buddha.

— Anguttara Nikaya III, cxxxii

T H E S I X T H C E N T U R Y B.C.E. IN N O R T H E R N I N D I A WAS A T I M E O F S P I R I T U A L S E E K I N G

unparalleled in the history of religions. Among the many individual teachers then regarded as having attained nirvana, an exalted state of salvation, was one w h o called himself a "Buddha," one "awakened" by having seen reality clearly and fearlessly. 1 Feeling compassion for beings w h o suffered on the wheel of life and death, he founded the world's first missionary religion, created a community of monks and nuns (the sangha) w h o adopted his ascetic norms and meditative practices, and shared his teachings with all interested in hearing them, inspiring many and leading a few to enlightenment. The Buddha, born a prince, had renounced his own line to a royal throne; his early sangha, too, was taught to cultivate detachment from the householder's lifestyle, and so entanglements in worldly politics. So for the student of world religions—and even for many scholars of Buddhism—a discussion of this religious tradition's relationship to politics might seem to be a strange, even barren, concern. Given the typical focus in the West on Buddhist texts dealing with philosophical beliefs and soteriological practices of the exemplary sangha, one might be t e m p t e d to view politics f r o m the perspective of the spiritual elite and conclude that Buddhism counsels aloofness and that Buddhists should remain unconcerned with both worldly power and politics. Such an interpretation, however, would be lacking in the most rudimentary sociohistorical awareness and ignore a large corpus of canonical and popular texts. As it gained ever wider popularity beyond the ascetics and spread out of its region of origin, the Buddhist tradition developed in breadth and scope so that soon after the Buddha's death, most Buddhists were householders (more than 95 percent in most societies) and few—even a m o n g the monastic elite (as we will see)—were aloof from political concerns. In fact, we know that rulers across Asia were drawn to support Buddhism because of its positive contributions to political life: its emphasis on individual morality promoting social stability, its rituals designed to secure prosperity for the state as well as officials in power, and its authority through its respected monastics to bestow legitimization on rulers.

2 3 3

234 I Todd Lewis | B u d d h i s m has f o u n d acceptance in m a n y kinds of societies, f r o m n o m a d i c c o m m u n i t i e s to u r b a n i z e d polities, f r o m t h e tropics to the vast grasslands of n o r t h e r n Asia, f r o m the Arabian Sea to the Pacific Ocean. O n e reason for this religion's successful trans-Asian pilgrimage has b e e n n o t only an inspiring vision of the cosmos and salvation, b u t also its promise of householders securing worldly prosperity, participating in a m o r a l civilization, and achieving a heavenly rebirth. From its inception, Buddhism achieved broad support due to its flexibility, both doctrinal and institutional. This distinctive characteristic is based in part on the essential Buddhist belief that b o t h individuals and societies are different as a result of possessing different karmic backgrounds—that is, persons have different past lives and so inherit unique and widely varying personalities, m o r a l natures, and habits. Over time, even the same societies are subject to great changes as well. Buddhist acceptance of pluralism in social life is also due to the tradition's vast library of sacred literature b u t with n o one text, canon, or institution ever gaining universal acceptance. Like all world religions, then, Buddhism is multivocalic; with few exceptions, 2 religious authority has been decentralized wherever the tradition has taken root. Before constructing a composite "Buddhist view of politics," then, it is important to note that in fact Buddhist political thought and practice w e r e always region-specific and that this portrait necessarily entails b r o a d generalizations.

The Classical

Sources of Buddhism

on

Politics

T h e canons assembled by the m a j o r Indie schools that arose during the first 1,000 years after Shākyamuni Buddha (d. 480 or 380 B.C.E.) contain the most i m p o r t a n t sources for this study. T h e s e texts w e r e redacted by m o n k s , and m o s t sections contain the Buddha's discourses on doctrine, monastic issues, and religious matters of prime interest to only m o n k s and nuns. T h e religious concerns of householders, and any p r o n o u n c e m e n t s regarding political philosophy, quite naturally found little place a m o n g long treatises discussing meditation methods, detailed philosophical analyses, or monastic discipline. It is instead in the canonical (and postcanonical) "popular texts" addressed to the householder c o m m u n i t y w h e r e political p o w e r and n o r m s of rule find greater iteration. Jātakas and avadānas, story narratives concerned with the previous lives of the Buddha, contain m a n y sources of guidance in this d o m a i n (Brown 1955). Well over 800 of these story traditions exist, m a n y in multiple recensions, and these w e r e collected by all the canonical schools and woven into c o m m e n t a r i e s as well (e.g., Jones 1949-56; Khoroche 1990). Many relate teachings on the issue of political power. In these tales, the f u t u r e Buddha Shākyamuni (properly t e r m e d a bodhisattva, "future Buddha") is often b o r n in a ruling family; in m a n y o t h e r narratives, he has dealings with political figures.

i b u d d h i s m : t h e p o l i t i c s of c o m p a s s i o n a t e r u l e

It is important to recognize that these "popular" stories were the most circulated sources for imparting Buddhist norms and doctrine across the broad sweep of Asian communities. Evidence for the centrality of these rebirth narratives comes from their early collection and the vast accumulation of story collections, indicating popular interest in these parables and the universal need for monkscholars to redact them for use in teaching student-monks and householders. The ubiquitous place of these stories in Buddhist societies is made clear f r o m the plethora of sculptures and paintings at stupas and monasteries that illustrate key scenes from the most popular stories. This wealth of cultural evidence implies that from the earliest days onward it was the story narratives that shaped the spiritual imaginations and fixed the moral landmarks in the minds of most Buddhists, including the great majority of m o n k s and nuns. That these "popular" stories were taken seriously and read carefully by the literati is confirmed by their translation into various vernacular languages and their use in the legal systems of Southeast Asia. Another important source for our treatment of Buddhism and politics is a text that began as a letter from the famous philosopher Nāgārjuna that he addressed to a north Indian king, Gautamipūtra Shatakarni (80-104 C.E.). This work devotes several chapters to the norms of just kingship and the practices of political rule, in certain areas down to specific policy recommendations; its circulation and importance went far beyond this ruler, because the text was eventually translated into Chinese and Tibetan (Hopkins 1998). The life of Buddha constitutes another key source. Buddhists, like Muslims, have looked to the small and large details of their founder's life to inspire their own actions. Building on the scattered sources from the canons, and from oral sources now lost, monastic authors composed sacred biographies that recount the final life of the boy named Siddhārtha: a prince who is born in the modest Shākya kingdom located in the foothills of the Himalayas; who finds the householder life unsatisfying, leaves palace, wife, and child behind to pursue spiritual practices; and who achieves enlightenment, founding a community of celibate renunciants and householder supporters w h o m he leads for more than forty years until his death. These biographies draw upon the canonical sources that record pronouncements on a vast variety of subjects. For more than the past twenty-five centuries, Buddhists have carefully examined and interpreted these sources on almost every conceivable issue, both transcendental and pragmatic, including those pertaining to political power.

Buddhism's

Theory of

Politics

T h e very scattered passages in the monastic texts concerned with political thought and power relations might suggest that this area was only of tangential

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concern to the Buddha and his monastic followers, the m o n k s and nuns of the sangha. T h e consistent concern in the canons for insuring good sangha-state

rela-

tions, however, suggests that the Buddha and his early c o m m u n i t y t o o k these matters very seriously (Thapar 1980). In the Mahāparinibbāna

Sutta, a popular text recounting the last m o n t h s of his

life, the Buddha lavishes praise on the Vajjian people, whose small ethnic state is ruled by a f o r m of republican democracy and an ideology of social equality. H e lauds their strength, justice, and social solidarity as a model to inspire the Buddhist sangha—his community of monks, nuns, and dedicated householders—after his o w n demise. (Modern Buddhist politicians have utilized this text to support their advocacy of republican democracy.) But the world in which the Buddha lived, and in which early Buddhism flourished, was that in which kingship was the n o r m . (The Vajjian state was in fact eventually annexed by the k i n g d o m of Magadha.) Political t h o u g h t in the Buddhist sources very p r e d o m i n a n t l y assumes the reality of kingship. In fact, o n e canonical passage explaining the origins of the world asserts that the evolution of the institution of kingship was a natural stage in the world's development, one in response to the world's d e g e n e r a t i o n f r o m earlier eras w h e n virtue was so strong that n o rules or rulers were even needed. Kingship comes into existence and is n e e d e d to continue society's resistance against anarchy. Buddhaghosa's s u m m a r y of the Pali Canon's creation account f r o m the Aggana Sutta recounts the origin of kingship: Then they instituted boundary lines [on the land] and one steals another's share. A f t e r . . . the third time . . . they beat the offender with fists, earth clods, with sticks, etc. When thus stealing, reproof, lying, and violence had sprung up among them, they come together and said, "What if we elect some one of us, who shall get angry with him who merits anger, reproof, and banish him who merits b a n i s h m e n t . . . . He was called the 'Great Elected One,' 'Lord of Fields,' . . . [and] 'King.'" 3

And w h o becomes the world's first king? T h e c o m m e n t a r y asserts that it was the f u t u r e Buddha. This canonical text thus contains t w o original theories of political authority introduced by Buddhism into Indian political thought: a social compact theory that included a justification of social class and property rights; and a governmental contract theory for kingship (Gard 1962, 44). T h e "natural law" of kingship in Buddhist t h o u g h t is extended in the narratives imagining the animal and oceanic realms as well, with single species ruling ecological regions, and individuals within species assuming the role as king 4 (and, at times, queen). Because there is near-universal agreement a m o n g Buddhists that since the Buddha's demise the world has been on a downward spiritual and ethical course (Nattier 1991), subsequent writers w h e n treating political rule assume that kingship is the n o r m .

i b u d d h i s m : t h e p o l i t i c s of c o m p a s s i o n a t e r u l e

Buddhist texts provide religious support for the place of kingship in society. Following the example of the Buddha in his last lifetime (and many births before this), which began when he was born as a crown prince, Buddhist doctrine sees an individual who becomes king doing so as the result of extremely good karma, a reward for almost immeasurable spiritual development in past lifetimes. Like the future Buddha in many incarnations, just kings can do great spiritual good; kingship's power can also be the cause of rapid descent into hells or lower births if the wealth and power over the multitudes is used selfishly or for evil.5 Due to their potential for evildoing, Buddhist texts of all schools describe kings as a potential "danger" (along with bandits, snakes, poisons, fire, shipwreck) and commonly counsel great care in dealing with them. What the tradition offers kings is to substitute a greater legitimacy based on Dharma (Pali, Dhamma; righteousness, justice, spiritual power) and the charisma of adhering to it for the legitimacy of rule based on power or mere inheritance (Gokhale 1969, 735). If this path is taken, a state can become a moral institution. Even with his praise of the Vajjian republic, the Buddha's own rules in the Vinaya (the canonical books of monastic discipline) clearly advocate adapting to the laws and social practices of the region's monarchies. For example, no one could become a m o n k who was a deserter from a royal army or an escaped criminal; state law must also not be broken in other domains, because debtors could not join the order nor could slaves escape their masters; likewise, civil customs had to be respected, such as children having parental permission to b e c o m e novice monks or nuns and spouses having to secure their partner's consent to receive ordination. Contrary to an oft-repeated stereotype about Buddhism in its early north Indian context, in no way can Buddhism be seen as a "social reform" movement. Throughout its first 1,700 years in India, there was no attempt to end the caste system or institute gender equality. Even within the sangha, the Buddha conformed to the patriarchal norms of his times and required all nuns to submit to the authority of monks. Political power in Buddhist polities is founded on the Buddha's view that society should be organized with a spiritual exchange connecting householders with the monastic community in a symbiotic relationship. Buddhist institutions have always depended upon the laity making donations to them to earn merit and to garner worldly blessings for themselves, their families, and their communities. The sangha, in turn, was expected to maintain the rules of communal life and be spiritually virtuous, guaranteeing that the laity would earn good karma. Through their material support, monks and nuns could garner the resources for living simply, engage in spiritual practices, study, and preserve the tradition. As the faith developed and grew, the sangha also acquired lands and buildings that were donated, and it drew children from families to join the sangha wherever it took root. It also offered the Dharma to the householders through its monastics' public and

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private teaching. This central set of exchanges maintained Buddhism in ancient Indian society, and across Asia, and it was the political ruler who had to oversee its functioning (figure 10.1).

Ruler Leading devotee and oversight of the system

/

r

V

Progeny

Λ

Material Support Sangha

Householders Merit

J

Dharma

J

Figure 10.1. Ideal Religio-Political Exchanges in Buddhist Society

One distinctive weakness of Buddhism t h r o u g h o u t its history was that it depended upon the state to protect this exchange and to maintain civil laws and civic order. Thus, Buddhist institutions relied on secular political to prosper. 6 Another dependency on outsiders concerned the maintenance of monastic discipline; although highly specific canonical guidelines set forth the rules by which monastic discipline was to be maintained, including the expulsion of those who broke the norms, the sangha still depended on the state to enforce such orders, because kings were invited to "purify the sangha" when conditions warranted (Rahula 1956, 67). Again, this essential juridical role indicates the importance of political relations in the maintenance of Buddhist institutions. But this service was not a one-sided relationship. Leading monks in the sangha could offer those wielding political power the very highest terms of religious legitimation in the eyes of the Buddhist citizenry The good king (governor, local official et al.) could be called a dharmiko dharmarājā ("just and righteous king"), dharmarāja ("just king"), priyadarshι ("one who sees the good [of others]"), or mahāsattva ("great being"). The terms bodhisattvarāja ("king who is a being [to be] enlightened") or bodhisattvāvatāra ("incarnation of a bodhisattva") were used across the Buddhist world, 7 usually implying that the ruler was considered the current incarnation of the future Buddha Maitreya (Sarkisyanz 1965). The highest level of praise is reserved for the most extraordinary Buddhist king. He was the cakravartin ("wheel-turning just ruler and zealous devotee"), a

i buddhism: t h e politics of compassionate r u l e

spiritual ruler who sets the wheel of the Dharma in motion and establishes a just state, possesses miraculous possessions and assistance, and whose rule is marked by various supernatural signs. This figure, who is also recognized as a Hindu saint in Brahmanical political theory, in Buddhist reckoning is second in cosmic importance only to the Buddha. 8 Despite the respect that the sangha may extend to those in political power, it is noteworthy that the Vinaya nonetheless contained a strict monastic rule that no m o n k or nun must ever bow to any secular authority, rulers included. This norm, to be observed regardless of a monk or nun's approval for a particular king, asserts symbolically that receiving ordination means moving into a form of existence that has transcended the householder's. The rule also seems intended to have the sangha act in unison, and not be divided by personal attachments of individual monks or nuns to political figures. It is also important to note that a bad king could be boycotted by the sangha, with monks and nuns uniting to "invert their bowls" and thereby refuse to accept meritorious alms and so proclaim that the individual is not worthy of his office. 9 Because individuals likewise hold power legitimately due to their righteousness, those who fail to maintain this standard can also be removed. From antiquity to the present, there have been individual monks noted for their service to specific kings, none more significant than the m o n k who converted the ruler Ashoka, the monarch w h o first spread Buddhism throughout South Asia and beyond, and whose rule set the most important precedent for 5ímgha-po1itica1 relations thereafter. We now need to turn to this pivotal and paradigmatic political figure.

The Medium of Expressing

Politics

in

Buddhism

W h e n the world conquest campaign of Alexander the Great (355-323 B.C.E.) faltered in northwestern India, the small states on the Indus River weakened by his incursions were subdued and integrated into India's first great empire, that of the Chandragupta Maurya. W h e n his grandson Ashoka (274-236 B.C.E.) assumed the throne, he followed Hindu n o r m s of rulership, later set forth in the Arthashastra,10 consolidated his frontier regions with brute force, directing an assault at Kalinga, a coastal region encompassing modern Orissa. The widespread destruction and bloodshed that his army caused in securing his victory, however, greatly dismayed Ashoka. At just this time, the emperor encountered a charismatic Buddhist monk and became a staunch devotee. Now that he had extended the Mauryan empire across most of the Indian subcontinent, Ashoka sent ambassadors and scribes throughout his realm to explain "the D h a r m a " that the emperor embraced, and these reached the borders of his state, and beyond.

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Ashoka's edicts—inscribed on rocks and tall pillars—were b o t h general and specific in their explanation of D h a r m a , a principle he held as key to creating a good society. In Pillar Edict I, he writes, " D h a r m a is good. But w h a t does Dharma consist of? It consists of few sins and m a n y good deeds, of kindness, liberality, truthfulness, and purity." 11 Although several inscriptions allude to the value of meditation, Ashoka's chief concern was for Buddhism to be a moral force in society: " O n e should obey o n e ' s f a t h e r and m o t h e r . O n e should respect the s u p r e m e value and sacredness of life. O n e should speak the t r u t h . O n e should practice these virtues of Dharma." 1 2 Having stated these principles and had t h e m placed in prominent public places, Ashoka also sought to have his bureaucracy administer the empire with reference to t h e m : "My officials of all ranks—high, low, and intermediate—act in accordance with the precepts of my instruction. . . . For these are the rules: to govern according to D h a r m a , to administer justice according to D h a r m a , to advance the people's happiness according to D h a r m a , and to protect t h e m according to Dharma." 1 3 In the capital, Ashoka had trees and wells planted to aid travelers, declared certain days w h e n animal slaughter was prohibited, and worked to limit religious conflict (Filliozat 1967). His inscriptions also indicate that Ashoka w e n t on a pilgrimage to the places where the Buddha had lived; texts recount that he unearthed the Buddha's relics in order to distribute t h e m across his realm, building thousands of n e w sacred m o n u m e n t s called stūpas to enshrine t h e m . Ashoka t h r o u g h his imperial edicts, official policies, and his p a t r o n a g e of notable m o n k s and m o n a s t e r i e s helped spread Buddhism f r o m the Bay of Bengal to Afghanistan, f r o m the Himalayan midhills to the island of Sri Lanka. Inscriptions indicate that he had sent emissaries to all the states of the known world, including the Greeks, the Chinese, and some (still unidentified) venues in Southeast Asia. T h e fate of the distant missions remains uncertain, but in South Asia the definite traces of the first Buddhist monu m e n t s (monasteries and stūpa shrines) can be dated to this era, as can the first systematic oral collections of the teachings. Ashoka immeasurably abetted Buddhism's emergence as a broadly based religion that reached beyond the ascetics, one that did—given his s t r o n g political leadership—unify a civilization. Buddhist institutions soon dotted the major trade routes going n o r t h and south, east and west. Although Buddhists in India eventually lost awareness of his inscriptions, they preserved m e m o r i e s of Ashoka's actions (with m a n y embellishments) in postcanonical narratives such as the Sanskrit Ashokāvadāna,14

the Mahāvamsa,

and

o t h e r chronicles of Sri Lanka (Geiger 1958), and the Thai text Trai Phum Phra Ruang (Reynolds and Reynolds 1982, 172-88). Strong summarizes the popularity of the Ashokan paradigm conveyed in the n u m e r o u s narrative retellings:

i buddhism: t h e p o l i t i c s o f compassionate r u l e Much of the appeal of the figure of Ashoka in the Ashokāvadāna lies precisely in t h e fact t h a t he is b o t h g r e a t k i n g and simple l a y m a n . O n a p e r s o n a l level, this involves him . . . with charismatic Buddhist saints w h o represent the Buddha and c o n f i r m for him his royal status; and, on the other, with abbots and ordinary m e m bers of the sangha with w h o m he enjoys a routinized relationship. At the same time, however, as a legendary model for Buddhists everywhere, this duality of roles represents a p o w e r f u l combination; for as cakravartin and greatest d o n o r of all time, Ashoka clearly was an ideal to inspire, while as a giver of ordinary gifts and routine s u p p o r t e r of the community, he was an example to actually be f o l l o w e d . " B u d d h i s t e x p o n e n t s in s u b s e q u e n t c e n t u r i e s i n v o k e d A s h o k a as a m o d e l h o u s e h o l d e r a n d ruler, o n e w h o s e e x a m p l e c h a l l e n g e d l a t e r B u d d h i s t k i n g s t o see t h e i r v o c a t i o n as a s p i r i t u a l o n e . T h i s i d e a o f B u d d h i s t k i n g s h i p is e x p r e s s e d d i r e c t l y in t h i s t e x t ' s r e c o u n t i n g o f a d i a l o g u e b e t w e e n A s h o k a a n d his t e a c h e r , the m o n k Upagupta:

[Upagupta:] You have established your sovereignty, Ο Lord, Keep on ruling conscientiously, And always h o n o r the precious Triple G e m .

T h e completely enlightened Buddha, that m o s t excellent charioteer of beings, has entrusted us—you and m e — w i t h the safe keeping of his teachings which we are to maintain diligently amidst his flock.

[Ashoka:] I distributed his reliquaries And beautified the earth everywhere W i t h mountain-like stūpas of m a n y colors, W i t h lofty b a n n e r s and bejeweled parasols. My son, myself, m y house, m y wives T h e whole earth, even the royal treasure— T h e r e is n o t h i n g whatsoever that 1 have n o t given u p For the Teaching of the D h a r m a King. 1 6

T h e t r a d i t i o n ' s m e m o r y o f A s h o k a , t h e n , e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t charity, j u s t i c e , c o n c e r n w i t h t h e c o m m o n g o o d , a n d g e n e r o s i t y t o w a r d t h e sangha

became the

n o r m s b y w h i c h a " g o o d B u d d h i s t r u l e r " w a s m e a s u r e d . Since this t i m e , t o o , B u d d h i s t s s a w it as n a t u r a l t h a t c o m m u n i t i e s h a d t o d e p e n d o n t h e a s s i s t a n c e o f u p r i g h t r u l e r s t o r e a l i z e t h e i r ideal o f a m o r a l a n d s p i r i t u a l civilization. O n l y w i t h p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t c a n t h e sangha's

integrity be assured, the Buddha's m o n u m e n t s

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|

be maintained, and the teachings be passed down. In this pattern, Buddhist doctrines, monastic officials, and patrons entered into the secular and political hist o r y of t h e societies w h e r e it t o o k r o o t . At times, as w i t h Ashoka, Buddhist m o n k s and institutions were supportive of expansive states providing b o t h political and m o r a l legitimation for their integrating tribal peoples on their

frontiers

(Falk 1973), a process still ongoing in the m o u n t a i n o u s regions of Southeast Asia (Lewis 1994; Tambiah 1984).

The Message

of Buddhism's

Politics

Just as c o m p a s s i o n w a s the B u d d h a ' s c e n t r a l t r a i t — w i t n e s s e d t h r o u g h his choosing to teach tirelessly for forty years after his e n l i g h t e n m e n t — s o did this ideal b e c o m e central to Buddhist ethics. In m a n y of the s t o r y narratives describing the d i l e m m a s of rule, the recurring message is that political p o w e r should be wielded as a m e a n s of creating a society w h e r e compassion

flourish-

es. Holding political p o w e r is n o t just an end, the coronation of one's past good k a r m a , b u t the m e a n s to an end: shaping the world w i t h justice and kindness. As Gokhale has observed, "The state was n o t merely a punitive i n s t r u m e n t b u t primarily an agency for the m o r a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of m a n as a political animal. [The Buddhists] f o u n d in morality of a higher order the solution to the dilemm a of power" (1966, 20). In m a n y jātaka narratives, a g o o d king's duty is likened to a parent caring for children, or as a son caring for an aged parent. 1 7 Like the Buddha, a j u s t ruler should u n d e r s t a n d that in a w o r l d m a r k e d by suffering, attention to collective welfare is needed; and that being in a position of wielding power, one must bear the burden of m o r a l cultivation and d e t a c h m e n t so as to dispatch one's political responsibilities fully. As the great Buddhist m o n k Buddhaghosa observes in his Visuddhimagga (IX, 124): For the Great Beings' minds retain their balance by giving preference to beings' welfare, by dislike of beings suffering, by the desire for the various successes achieved by beings to last, and by imparting impartiality toward all beings. And to all beings they give gifts, which are a source of pleasure, without discriminating. . .. And in order to avoid doing harm to beings they undertake the precepts of virtue. They practice renunciation for the purpose of perfecting their virtue. They cleanse their understanding for the purpose of non-confusion about what is good and bad for beings. They constantly arouse energy, having beings' welfare and happiness at heart. W h e n they have acquired heroic fortitude through supreme energy, they become patient with beings' many kinds of fault. 18

In the Buddhacarita, one of the influential biographies of the Buddha written by the Mahāyāna m o n k Ashvaghosa (active in the second century C.E.), the ideal

i buddhism: t h e p o l i t i c s o f compassionate r u l e k i n g a n d t h e n o r m s o f p o l i t i c a l r u l e a r e d e s c r i b e d in t h e c a s e o f K i n g S u d d h o dana, the Buddha's father, and the Shākya state he governed. T h e king "ceased f r o m all evil, p r a c t i c e d all s e l f - r e s t r a i n t , a n d r e w a r d e d t h e g o o d ; " " h e s u r p a s s e d his k i n d r e d a n d c i t i z e n s b y his v i r t u e s ; " h e w o r s h i p p e d t h e g o d s a n d s u p p o r t e d b r a h m i n s ; h e c o m m u t e d the s e n t e n c e s of criminals c o n d e m n e d to death, supp r e s s e d a n g e r t o w a r d t h e m , a n d s o u g h t t o " r e f o r m t h e i r c h a r a c t e r s . " All his c o u n t r y h e v i e w e d "like a f a t h e r . " T h e e f f e c t o n t h e s t a t e w a s p r o f o u n d : " H i s s e r v a n t s a n d c i t i z e n s f o l l o w e d his e x a m p l e , like t h e s e n s e s o f o n e a b s o r b e d in c o n t e m p l a t i o n w h o s e m i n d is a b s t r a c t e d in p r o f o u n d p e a c e . " 1 9 W e e n c o u n t e r t h e i d e a o f virtue's contagiousness again below. M a n y popular narratives focusing on kings and the principles that should g u i d e p o l i t i c a l r u l e c o n v e y a c o n s i s t e n t s e t o f v i r t u e s , a l t h o u g h t h e r e a r e variat i o n s in e m p h a s i s . In Pali J ā t a k a # 3 7 6 , a s a g e advises, " O g r e a t k i n g , a k i n g s h o u l d r u l e his k i n g d o m w i t h r i g h t e o u s n e s s , e s c h e w i n g t h e f o u r evil c o u r s e s , b e i n g zealo u s a n d full of patience a n d kindness a n d c o m p a s s i o n . " 2 0 H e r e , an e x h o r t a t i o n to the king draws focus to an a d m o n i t i o n against anger:

In the village, in the forest, on the sea or on the shore, N e ' e r be angry, prince of warriors 'tis my counsel evermore. 2 1 A n o t h e r Pali s t o r y ( # 3 8 7 ) s u m m a r i z e s t h e v i r t u e s t h a t s h o u l d b e c u l t i v a t e d b y c o m p a s s i o n a t e r u l e r s , e n d i n g w i t h a s a g e listing t e n political v i r t u e s : " G r e a t k i n g , it is g o o d f o r a k i n g t o r u l e his k i n g d o m b y f o r s a k i n g t h e w a y s o f w r o n g d o i n g , not offending against the ten kingly virtues and acting with just righteousness: Alms, morals, charity, justice and penitence, Peace, mildness, mercy, meekness, patience. 2 2 A s i m i l a r p a s s a g e f r o m a n o t h e r Pali s t o r y p r o v i d e s a n o v e r v i e w o f t h e v i r t u e s t h a t a r e c o n s i s t e n t l y h i g h l i g h t e d in i n d i v i d u a l n a r r a t i v e s . It m e n t i o n s K i n g J a n a s a n d h a ' s e x e m p l a r y p r a c t i c e s , especially t h o s e t h a t led t o his k i n g d o m e n j o y ing prosperity and spirituality: T h e good King inspired all India with his almsgiving; the prison doors he opened for good and all the places of execution he destroyed, all the world he protected with the four sorts of beneficence [liberality, affability, impartiality, good rule], he kept the five precepts, observed the holy fasting days, and ruled in righteousness. F r o m time to time, he w o u l d g a t h e r his subjects and declare the D h a r m a to them.23 W e n o w t u r n t o s e v e r a l o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f political p o w e r t h a t a r e e m p h a s i z e d a g a i n a n d a g a i n in p o p u l a r B u d d h i s t l i t e r a t u r e .

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244 I Todd Lewis Forgiveness and Foregoing

| Revenge

In a story found in the Theravādin Vinaya (X, 2, 20), emphasis on forgiveness as a royal virtue is highlighted, as Prince Dighavu realizes a central ethical lesson: After King B r a h m a d a t t a m u r d e r s his p a r e n t s and destroys their k i n g d o m , he patiently and diligently plots revenge. O n the brink of accomplishing it, he recognizes the alternative causalities that would unfold if he u n d e r t o o k immoral or m o r a l action, and sees his only course as forgiveness. W i t h revenge merely a sword thrust away, he relents: If I should deprive you of life, Ο king, then your partisans would deprive me of life; my partisans again will deprive those of life. Thus by hatred that hatred would not be appeased. 24

T h e futility of a king or g o v e r n m e n t inflicting capital punishment in karmic t e r m s comes up again and again in the royal narratives, with individual and collective retribution eventually b o o m e r a n g i n g back in immediate a n d / or next lifetime effects. In Pali Jātaka #528, for example, w h e n the king captures plotters of a coup against him, the future Buddha convinces him to forgo the ministers' suggestions of the guilty receiving execution or dismemberment, but instead be content with a m o r e h u m a n e course: "depriving t h e m of property and after having fettered t h e m and sprinkled t h e m w i t h cow-dung, banishing t h e m into exile." Similar in approach is the widely popular Simhalasārthabāhu

Avadāna. It tells the

story of a caravan trader w h o is shipwrecked and has his companions trapped and eaten by cannibalistic demonesses; w h e n he later becomes king, he leads an army to attack these m u r d e r o u s spirits, b u t accepts their s u r r e n d e r in the following terms: "O Demonesses! After seeing all of your crimes, you deserve to be killed immediately." But after hearing their entreaties for mercy, he continued, "And in this land, you should live no more. You must never come back here so go and live in a dense forest in a far-off land. If you ever return to this town, I will certainly kill you all." 25

In a few stories, we find the view expressed that kings should not even resist violent invaders w h o threaten their domains. In one instance, a king throws open the city gates and admits a m a r a u d i n g gang. After he himself is c a p t u r e d and t h r o w n into a d u n g e o n , the king's only defense is to extend t h o u g h t s of maitrx (Pali, metta; loving-kindness) to his chief tormenter. This causes his captor to feel "great t o r m e n t in his body," b u r n as though "with a two-fold flame," and be smitten with great pain." 2 6 A similar story plot is found in Pali Jātaka #351, and the result is the same: Both kings regain their thrones without war or bloodshed. This s a m e spiritual m e t h o d of n o n v i o l e n t defense is evident in o t h e r Mahāyāna narratives as well. In one of the stories that is part of the Pancarakshā,

i buddhism: t h e politics of compassionate r u l e

o n e o f t h e m o s t p o p u l a r B u d d h i s t texts t r a n s l a t e d across n o r t h e r n a n d e a s t e r n Asia, t h e k i n g r e s p o n d s t o invasion b y telling t h e citizens n o t t o fight, as h e a l o n e r e s o r t s t o ritual: He proclaimed, "My dear subjects! It is my duty to safeguard the country and countrymen. You need not be afraid of anything. I will do all that is needed." After saying this, King Brahmadatta bathed and cleansed himself with many kinds of sweetsmelling waters. Purified in body, speech, and mind, the king appended the amulets of the Pratisarā dhāranī to his crown and armor, then went alone to meet the enemy. The men in the army of the enemy kings retreated and ran away in a panic. 2 ' In a n o t h e r M a h ā y ā n a story, w e f i n d t h e s a m e t h r e a t again, b u t a f t e r t h e citiz e n s express f r a n k skepticism, 2 8 t h e k i n g assures t h e m t h a t t h e y can relax b e c a u s e h e a l o n e will r e p e l t h e m a r a u d i n g a r m y r e l y i n g o n his " m e r i t o r i o u s a c t i o n s " : " K i n g B r a h m a d a t t a w e n t t o t h e h o l y river a n d b a t h e d . T h e n h e w e n t t o t h e . . . t e m p l e t h a t night, fasted, a n d w o r s h i p e d Mahākā1a. 2 9 H e m e d i t a t e d o n Mahākā1a c o n s t a n t l y . . . . As a r e s u l t , t h e d e i t y M a h ā k ā 1 a in his t e r r i f y i n g f o r m a p p e a r e d b e f o r e the king."30 T h e k i n g praised Mahākā1a a n d received the b o o n of the "eight s u p e r n o r m a l p o w e r s , " i n c l u d i n g b e i n g invisible, capability t o b e invulnerable t o e n e m i e s , a n d g a i n i n g t h e p o w e r t o v a n q u i s h e n e m i e s . T h e result? "Armed w i t h s u c h p r e c i o u s p o w e r s , w h e n King B r a h m a d a t t a w e n t like a lion t o t h e battlefield w i t h his h a n d raised high, his e n e m i e s w e r e panic-stricken a n d r a n t o h i m for refuge."31 T h u s , a n o b s e r v a n t B u d d h i s t k i n g n e e d n o t p e r p e t u a t e t h e e n d l e s s cycle o f r e v e n g e , e v e n o n t h o s e m i n d l e s s l y a s s a u l t i n g civil o r d e r ; instead, h e c a n rely o n t h e p o w e r s o f t r a d i t i o n t h e m s e l v e s : t h e f o r c e o f l o v i n g - k i n d n e s s , t h e causality of k a r m i c r e t r i b u t i o n , a n d t h e p o w e r of rituals and c h a n t s b e s t o w e d by the Buddhas.32 Support

of Buddhism

and Spiritual

Teachers

T h e g o o d political ruler, as w e have s e e n , can rely o n t h e f o r c e of m e r i t f o r b e n e f i t i n g his s u b j e c t s . So it f o l l o w s t h a t p e r f o r m i n g m e r i t o r i o u s d e e d s is a c e n t r a l a t t r i b u t e o f B u d d h i s t kingship. In t h e B u d d h i s t r e c k o n i n g o f m e r i t m a k i n g , n o a c t i o n is m o r e p r o d u c t i v e o f g e n e r a t i n g g o o d k a r m a t h a n m a k i n g d o n a t i o n s t o spiritual seekers, w i t h B u d d h i s t saints t h e m o s t p r o d u c t i v e "field o f m e r i t . " W e k n o w f r o m t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e C h i n e s e p i l g r i m H s u a n T s a n g t h a t s o m e Indian k i n g s f o l l o w e d t h e e x a m p l e o f A s h o k a a n d w e r e g e n e r o u s t o t h e ascetics in t h e i r r e a l m (Beal 1983, 63), i n c l u d i n g t h e i r s p o n s o r i n g t h e pancavārsika

("Five-Year

A s s e m b l y " ) t h a t A s h o k a r e p u t e d l y i n a u g u r a t e d , w h e r e b y every m o n k a n d n u n in t h e sangha w a s fed a n d g i v e n r o b e c l o t h o n a lavish scale ( S t r o n g 1983, 91-96). As m a n y of t h e s t o r y narratives also reveal, royal d o n a t i o n s t o m o n a s t e r i e s a n d sages

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252 I Todd Lewis | were often repaid by their being sources of service to citizens 33 and purveyors of good advice. As one virtuous king notes: Because, Ο Prince, I never grudge great sages what is meet: Ready to pay them honor due, I fall before their feet. Me envying none, and apt to learn all conduct meet and right, Wise sages each good precept teach in which they take delight. I listen to the bidding of these sages great and wise: My heart is bent to good intent, no counsel I despise. 34

If respected, the sangha can thus serve as a "repository of the conscience of the state" (Gokhale 1966, 22). Fostering political as well as social stability, m e m b e r s of the sangha often served in governmental administration in education, welfare, and in diplomatic relations (Gard 1962, 47). 35 Some stories provide a negative lesson on this theme, showing the results of kings failing to heed the advice of wise m o n k s and virtuous counselors. In the case of the Sringabheri Avadāna, it is the q u e e n w h o offers her husband the king some good advice, to cease his daily hunting; ignoring her, he dies young and falls victim to great suffering in his subsequent lifetime. 3 6 The Measure of Wielding

Power: Seeking and Promoting

Justice

A Buddhist in power must pursue justice in his realm and be just in his ruling practices. T h e popular texts counsel kings to choose their ministers wisely and monitor their agents carefully. Paying those in their e m p l o y regularly and fairly is important. 3 7 Rulers should also respect prisoners and appoint their punishments with compassion; invest in schools, resthouses, w a t e r systems, and medicines; exact taxes sensitive to the plight of farmers; and m a k e certain that the police truly protect the citizens. T h e reckoning of Buddhist justice extends to nonhumans, including animals and suffering spirits. 38 Kings in ancient India were often preoccupied with dispute resolution, deciding cases in their courts that arose b e t w e e n individuals. Being fair, n o t accepting bribes, and implementing a just solution are often cited as moral markers in the jātaka narratives. 3 9 In a f r a m e story to one, for example, the Buddha addresses a king from the early state of Kosala: "'My lord king,' replied the Master, 'To judge a cause with justice and impartiality is the right thing; that is the way to heaven."' H e t h e n n o t e s that a k i n g closely following the Buddha's precepts and acting rightly is n o t surprising. 4 0 Justice must be sought in every part of the k i n g d o m and extended to every kind of individual, regardless of class, caste, or occupation. As the poetic verses in Pa1iJātaka #501 eloquently convey:

i buddhism: t h e politics of compassionate r u l e

To friends and courtiers, warrior king, do righteously; and so By following a righteous life to heaven the king shall go. In war and travel, warrior king, do righteously; and so . . . In town and village, warrior king, do righteously;. . . In every land and realm, warrior king, do

righteously;...

To brahmins and ascetics, warrior king, do righteously;. . . To friends and courtiers, warrior king, do righteously;.. . To birds and beasts, warrior king, do righteously;. . . Do righteously, warrior king, from this all blessings flow By following a righteous life to heaven the king shall go.'"

The Politics of Collective Karma: Buddhist Polity as

Commonwealth

It is commonly thought that the karma doctrine of Buddhism (and Hinduism) embraces a strict nexus of individualistic retribution: that is, what one person sows by intended action, one reaps oneself, whether in the present lifetime or in a future rebirth. But in fact this is not the full reality of h u m a n connection and karmic causality. Jātaka stories told by the Buddha about his previous lives clearly portray how a person's worldly and spiritual destiny can also be profoundly affected by simple proximity to significant others, especially spouses, shipmates, monks, and kings. 42 But the potential for those wielding political power to affect their subjects is a relationship of the greatest magnitude. This truth is memorably and dramatically conveyed in Pa1iJātaka #276 (a plot line also found in #483 and #494), when the deity Indra seeks to find out why heaven 43 is suddenly becoming so crowded. He investigates and discovers that the spiritual rule of a virtuous king is the reason; not only does the king's virtue lead citizens to reach the heavens, it also leads to the land's prosperity: 44 Then their king practiced the Kuru precepts and the Five Virtues. And then in the realm . . . the rain fell; the three fears were allayed; the land became prosperous and fertile . . . and then with his subjects went to fill the heavens. 4 '

Many stories about rulers make this point, utilizing the same simile: Beneath the mild sway of a righteous king, Like shade from sun-stroke sheltering, His subjects may all dwell in peace, Rejoicing in their wealth's increase. . . . If the bull a course direct shall steer, The herd of cows straight follow in his rear.

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Todd Lewis | So should their chief to righteous ways be true, The common folk injustice will eschew, And through the realm shall holy peace ensue. 46

A g o o d king's virtue is highly influential t h r o u g h his example as leader. As another jātaka concludes: Should their chief to righteous ways be true, The common folk injustice will eschew, And through the realm shall holy peace ensue. 47

Another idea found in these stories is that the natural world itself responds to a king's m o r a l actions, 4 8 affecting all the citizens as a result. 4 9 Pali Jātaka # 3 3 4 provides a g o o d example of this view of connectivity: "In the time of u n j u s t kings, oil, honey, molasses and the like, as well as wild roots and fruits, lose their sweetness and flavor; n o t only these b u t the whole realm b e c o m e s bad and flavorless; b u t w h e n the rulers are just, these things b e c o m e sweet and full of flavor, and the whole realm recovers its tone and flavor." 50 A king's actions also affect t h e s u p e r n a t u r a l beings that share o u r world, a causal nexus that also can affect an entire nation. This is m a d e clear in Pali Jātaka #213, where the result is not collective blessing but collective disaster: All the spirits that dwelt in the realm of Bharu with one mind were angry with the king, and they brought up the sea, and for the space of three hundred leagues they made the kingdom of Bharu as though it were not. And so for the sake of the king of Bharu alone, all the inhabitants of the kingdom perished t h u s . "

O n e final aspect of the king's collective influence is in his role as ritual leader. Ritual acts, in traditional Buddhist assessment, are choreographed moral actions garnering merit, drawing on the canonically sanctioned power inherent in repeating the Buddha's words and venerating his relics or images. Ritual texts for this purpose were translated into all Asian languages and utilized extensively, although few have been translated into Western languages (Lewis 2002). Many of the stories appended to t h e m state that kings are especially enjoined to p e r f o r m rituals to aid their countries. T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t ritual a king can do for his realm is enshrine or worship the Buddha's relics, or venerate a special Buddha image. Another example of the linkage b e t w e e n political power and ritual power is the previously cited Pancarakshâ,

a text that contains special chants

(parittas,

mantras, dhāranīs) that were revealed by the Buddha to help kings protect their cities, f a r m animals, elicit supernatural assistance, and free the realm of diseases, including epidemics. 52 T h e king as p r o m o t e r of rituals directed to solicit the compassionate intervention of the celestial bodhisattvas was pivotal in the Mahāyāna

i b u d d h i s m : t h e p o l i t i c s of c o m p a s s i o n a t e r u l e

Buddhist polities of highland and east Asia, and is featured in many texts, such as in the aforementioned Simhalasārthabāhu Avadāna. Going f u r t h e r is the Manjusrimūlakalpa, an early and widely disseminated Mahāyāna text, that attests that a just king must be on the Buddhist path and one who has produced the thought of enlightenment. In the text's description of the royal consecration, the ritual encodes many of the ideas already mentioned; the king also is asked to identify with Manjushrf, the celestial bodhisattva who symbolically wields a sword that cuts through delusion; and he must strive to be a cakravartin ruler w h o will serve all beings, h u m a n and n o n h u m a n (Snellgrove 1959, 205-7).

Buddhism and Nonbelievers: outside the Tradition

Politics

and

People

W h e t h e r or not people convert to Buddhist tradition—taking refuge in the Buddha, his teachings, and in the sangha of monks and nuns—believers aver that the destiny of all beings in this world is shaped by karma. So whether individuals follow the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path, Buddhists believe that its general moral framework is universal, because all humans must proceed on the same progressive religious path: Starting with morality, one advances through many births to be capable of meditation; and as this is slowly mastered, there is the arising of salvific insight (prajnā); when this is complete, there is enlightenment and escape from future rebirth, that is, nirvana. This cosmic law operates regardless of whether individuals adhere to views of the world at variance with the Buddha's. So from the Buddhist perspective, those who adhere to monotheistic or polytheistic theologies, or who propitiate spirits, or those who are atheists or irreligious . . . are simply immature in their spiritual development, but eventually—in this or future lifetimes—will find the Buddhist path. Therefore, non-Buddhists must certainly be shown compassion because they are simply underdeveloped, like children, in their spiritual capacity. Toleration of non-Buddhists in Buddhist polities follows from this outlook. W h a t is also striking in the stories we have examined is that kings are urged to support all true spiritual seekers and teachers in their realms, including Brahmins; in many instances, and somewhat surprisingly to non-Buddhists, many texts lack any special call for favoring Buddhist monks or nuns to the neglect of others. So all beings and all spiritual seekers in a polity must be protected by the Buddhist ruler, even foreigners. As one story's praised king reflects on the success of his rule: Thus merchants prosper, and from many a realm they come and go, And I protect them. Now the truth, Uposatha, you know. 53

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250 I Todd Lewis | So t h e g e n e r a l B u d d h i s t v i e w o f political r u l e r e g a r d i n g n o n b e l i e v e r s is t o a c c e p t p l u r a l i s m , t o p r o t e c t a n d s u p p o r t all b e i n g s regardless of t h e i r religious affiliation, and to use p o w e r to s u p p o r t morality and m o l d a compassionate w o r l d . T h e m e a s u r e of a political r e g i m e ' s success is its citizens' w o r l d l y prosperity, justice i m p l e m e n t e d in t h e state's w o r k i n g s , t h e p r e s e n c e of a vital sangha, a n d m e r i t - m a k i n g practices b y citizens t h a t w o u l d h o l d t h e p r o m i s e of their heavenly rebirth.

Conclusion T h e Buddhist approach to political p o w e r and rule builds u p o n the faith's core philosophy that sees as a universal t r u t h the fact that all beings suffer and that compassion is the ethos to guide h u m a n action in the world. Beyond the basic principles articulated in the early texts surveyed, it is important to note that later Buddhist theorists did n o t develop m a n y finely n u a n c e d policies for wielding political power. In ancient India, however, the detailed articulation of statecraft m e t h o d s received great attention by H i n d u writers. We do k n o w that statecraft in South Asian polities did follow the principles of the Dharmashastras

and the

Arthashastra, and not m a n y of those in the Ashokan Buddhist model. In fact, across the Himalayan, Sri Lankan, and Southeast Asian frontiers of India, where Buddhism spread and established its n e t w o r k of institutions, it was accompanied by H i n d u and Brahmanical traditions at the ruling courts. Thus, Hindu theories of divine kingship, rule by force, and royal court ritualism at times influenced these otherwise predominantly Buddhist polities. T h e history of these frontier countries—up to the present—therefore cannot be viewed as being influenced solely by the Buddhist theories of political rule b u t by the confluence of these t w o Indie traditions (Reynolds 1972; Tambiah 1976, 102-31; Pathak 1974; Lewis 1994). Having surveyed the features of Buddhist political philosophy, its acceptance of religious pluralism, and the universal exhortation n o t to resist evil or capital retribution, one might finally w o n d e r h o w the tradition has even survived to the m o d e r n era or u p to the present. T h e past 500 years have b r o u g h t a multilayered and interlinked series of crises to Buddhist Asia: the decline and fall of kingship t h r o u g h o u t the Buddhist world (in all countries b u t Thailand and Bhutan), the forceful imposition of colonial law by foreigners, the imperial quest for wealth, and c o n f r o n t a t i o n with world religions that m o r e readily sanction violence to defend or extend themselves. Because m o s t of the discourses and prescriptions for political action in Buddhist societies are based u p o n the presence and necessary intervention of a king, Buddhist societies have faced the unprecedented challenges of colonialism—and now independence—lacking the guidance of primary resources from their canon-

i b u d d h i s m : t h e p o l i t i c s o f c o m p a s s i o n a t e r u l ei257

ical tradition. Across Asia, there has been an urgently felt need to redefine the political foundations of Buddhism in a kingless world. 54 The rise of lay organizations across Asia and the general decline of monastics and monastic influences have dramatically changed the classical balances imagined in the early texts. Is the history of Buddhism's decline and near disappearance from medieval South Asia (the Gangetic plain; ancient Gandhara and Sind, which correspond to m o d e r n Pakistan and Afghanistan), f r o m Central Asia, and f r o m Indonesia a product of its distinctively passive approach to political power and rule? Or did the tradition decline in these places centuries ago because there were no longer Buddhist kings to protect the faith? Does the exile of the Dalai Lama-led Gelugpa State in Tibet after 1959, the failure of Buddhists in Burma to resist military authoritarianism since 1960, or the inability of Buddhists to m u s t e r effective resistance to communist regimes in Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) reflect the inapplicability of the traditional political views to the postcolonial and posttraditional era (Gard 1962; Sarisyanz 1965; Lewis 1997)? We conclude this essay with the sort of question commonly posed today in Buddhist societies: H o w can a Buddhist society following its classical political ideals hope to survive in the m o d e r n world where nations' "civil religions" require universal loyalty, violent retribution is often regarded as virtuous, and where showing compassion is regarded as political weakness? Modern Buddhist reformers now face many questions from citizens and rulers concerning the relevance and applicability of the traditional Buddhist norms of political rule.

Notes 1. Buddhist terms in this chapter will be rendered in the more familiar Sanskrit form, with the Pali term indicated in parenthesis at first usage. For citations of Pali texts, the original will be preserved, with the Sanskrit term indicated in brackets. 2. In this chapter, due to space limitations, I cannot include more than passing references to the unique and complex case of Tibet. In this vast high-mountain region, schools f o r m e d that allowed monastic officials to assume political power in a m a n n e r unseen elsewhere in the Buddhist world. See Dargyay 1988; Goldstein 1989, 1997; Richardson 1962; Stein 1972; Shakabpa 1967. 3. Translated in Warren 1995, 326. 4. E.g., see Palijatakas #407 and #270 (Cowell 1957, vol. 2, 242-43) where all land animals have the lion and among fish there is the "Ananda" (of uncertain identity, perhaps a dolphin); the story details birds seeking a king, as they reject the owl and decide on the golden goose. In more than half of the jātakas, the future Buddha is born as king of his group or species. 5. In one jātaka, the bodhisattva remembers his previous life as a king and how he had to be born in purgatory to "work off" the bad karma of royal acts. Accordingly, he feigns mental illness and physical disabilities to avoid becoming king.

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6. Pali texts recommend that Buddhist kings establish officers to advise the king on policies relating to justice and religious support (Gokhale 1966, 18). 7. The Dalai Lamas of Tibet were identified as incarnations of the most popular Mahāyāna celestial bodhisattva, Avalokiteshvara. 8. Textual prescriptions indicate this king's extraordinary standing and state that the cakravartin's relics must be enshrined in a stūpa, and whose worship is considered meritorious. 9. The Ceylon Chronicles mention that this punishment was once set in place by the sangha for the seventh-century king Dathopatissa II (Wijayaratna 1990, 136). 10. This work details the Hindu theory of royal rule. 11. Nikam and McKeon 1978, 41. 12. Nikam and McKeon 1978, 43. 13. Nikam and McKeon 1978, 42. 14. The Ashokāvadāna is a Hinayānist work, but one that foreshadows Mahāyāna developments. It is translated in Strong 1983. 15. Strong 1983, 100. 16. Strong 1983, 242. 17. "Just as an aged father . . . ought to be cared for by an able-bodied son, so too ought all the people be protected by the king." Pali Jātaka #432; Cowell 1957, vol. 9, 305. 18. Nyanamoli 1976, vol. 1, 353. 19. Cowell 1969,24. 20. Pali Jātaka #276 highlights the influence of a just king who upholds the "Kuru Precepts" of kingship: slay not the living; take not what is not given; walk not evilly in lust; speak no lies; drink no strong drink." Cowell 1957, vol. 3, 276. These are none other than five precepts for all Buddhist householders. 21. Cowell 1957, vol. 6, 151-52. 22. Cowell 1957, vol. 6, 173-74. 23. Jātaka #468, in Cowell 1957, vol. 4, 110. 24. Rhys-Davids and Oldenberg 1982, vol. 2, 305. This passage quotes the famous section at the beginning of the Pali Dhammapada. 25. Translated in Lewis 2000, 79. 26. Jātaka #282, in Cowell 1957, vol. 3, 274. 27. Translated in Lewis 2000, 135. 28. That this nonviolent and spiritual policy toward murderous lawbreakers was met with skepticism in ancient times finds expression where a spokesman is quoted replying in panic to the king's bold but seemingly foolhardy assurances, "We have no knowledge of what powers you have by virtue of your meritorious actions. We want you to demonstrate this power by resisting and destroying the present enemy. It will be pointless to repent after our country has fallen into the hands of its enemies!" Lewis 2000,111-12. 29. Mahākā1a is an Indie deity shared by both Hindu and Buddhist traditions. Related to Shiva, and associated with kings in later South Asian history, Mahākā1a is thought to be a guardian of Buddhist monasteries, and utilized in Vajrayāna meditation traditions. See Lewis 2000, chap. 5. 30. Lewis 2000, 112. 31. Lewis 2000, 113.

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32. That some Buddhist kings ignored these nonviolent precepts, and did not follow the Ashokan example entirely, should not be surprising. One famous example comes from Sri Lanka, where the fanatical early king Duttagamani ( 1 0 1 - 7 7 B.C.E.) does make an armed crusade to repel invaders. In the national chronicle, the Mahāvamsa, he is said to have attached a Buddha relic to his spear and marched into battle with 500 m o n k s in attendance. This is clearly perceived as a deviation from the Buddhist n o r m in the text, which describes the efforts of 8 enlightened monks (Arhats) w h o were called upon to assuage his guilt at the killing he had caused. Their words of comfort are also in striking contrast to the n o r m s of the early canon and popular narratives: "From this deed arises no hindrance in thy way to heaven. Only one and a half h u m a n beings have been slain here by thee, Ο Lord of m e n . . . unbelievers and m e n of evil life were the rest, not more to be esteemed than beasts . . . therefore cast away care from thy heart." Quoted in Smith (1972, 43), w h o notes that this passage may reveal that the sangha preserved it to underline the need for vigilance against such compromises in the future. 33. According to the Chinese Tripitaka [Taisho 16, #683], Buddhists should missionize by engaging in the follow services for local communities: "1. Build monastic halls and temples; 2. Plant Fruit trees, shade trees and then excavate bathing pools; 3. Freely supplying medicines to heal the sick; 4. Construction of sturdy boats; 5. Safe placement of bridges suitable for the weak or ill; 6. Digging wells near roads for the thirsty and weary; 7. Enclosing sanitary toilets." The value of these activities to local and state rulers was doubtless, in places, considerable. 34. Palijataka #462 from Cowell 1957, vol. 4, 85. 35. The exceptions to this practice were classical India (300-1200 C.E.) where brahmanical texts argue against any ascetics serving the state, and in China where a Confucian civil service often disdained the social benefits of the Buddhist sangha. 36. Translated in Lewis 2000, chap. 2. 37. One king in Palijataka #462 proudly proclaims: "Elephant troops and charioteers, guard royal, infantry— / I took no daily toll of daily dole, but paid t h e m all their fee." Cowell 1957, vol. 4, 85. 38. Mentioned in Nâgârjuna's Precious Garland (Hopkins 1998, 74-83). 39. Palijataka #527 has the future Buddha offering the following advice: Ά king delighting in the law is blest, / And of all m e n a learned one is best, / Ne'er to betray a friend is good, / But evil to eschew is perfect bliss." Cowell 1957, vol. 5, 114. 40. Palijataka # 1 5 1 . Cowell 1957, vol. 2, p. 1. See also Palijataka #247. 41. In Cowell 1957, vol. 4, 263. 42. I discuss stories in these areas in Lewis 2000. 43. According to Buddhist doctrine, heaven is a highly desirable rebirth venue, and praised as a goal of householder Buddhists; but it is impermanent and one must eventually be reborn in other spheres. Significantly, one cannot escape the world of rebirth (samsara) from heaven. 44. Despite the universally declared individual hope for nirvana in a distant time, worldly prosperity and heavenly rebirth were the two primary goals that have motivated Buddhist householders from antiquity to the present. The royal stories underline that these were the central concerns in the imagination of typical Buddhists in Asian societies. 45. #276 in Cowell 1957, vol. 3, 260.

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46. Cowell 1957, vol. 4, 114-15. 47. Cowell 1957, vol. 4, 74. 48. This idea that the earth or nature will respond to the actions of a notable spiritual person—who declares his or her truthfulness and goodness—is actually found often in the canonical literature. There are numerous examples: the earth quakes after the enlightenment of a Buddha, and to affirm his imminent attainment of nirvana. Trees blossom in response to a Buddha's deeds. The recitation of the Buddha's words can alter a region's environment, pacify serpents, and cause rain to fall. Early Buddhists also believed in a ritual practice called "An Act of Truth" that calls upon the unseen forces of the world to change worldly reality when a morally advanced person speaks the truth about his spiritual practice. 49. Many ritual traditions practiced in Buddhist polities—the king plowing the first furrow in planting, welcoming the rains, etc.—were based upon this belief (Gard 1962, 45). 50. Cowell 1957, vol. 4, 72. 51. Cowell 1957, vol. 2, 120. 52. The Karunikarâja-prajnāparimitâ Sütra is another Mahāyāna ritual text designed for "protecting the country" (Gard 1962, 56). 53. Pali Jātaka #462, in Cowell 1957, vol. 4, 85. 54. The title of the recent book by H. L. Seneviratne (1999), The Work of Kings: The New Buddhism in Sri Lanka, captures just this reality: Buddhist reformers having to reinvent their Buddhist polity in the one country that has in many respects led the revival of Theravada tradition during the colonial and postcolonial eras. The initial results of these efforts—the rise of intolerant Buddhist nationalism, ethnic fratricide, civil war—have exposed the failure to invent modern Buddhist politics there and have led to the tragic failure to achieve the canonical ideals of tolerant and compassionate rule. The same pattern of Buddhist institutions and Buddhists succumbing to nationalism can be discerned in early modern Japan, where the Buddhist establishment likewise fueled nationalism and fomented imperialistic wars (Victoria 1997; Ketelar 1990).

References Beal, Samuel, tr. 1983. Si-Yu-Ki: Buddhist Records of the Western World. 2 vols. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal. Brown, D. Mackenzie. 1955. "Didactic T h e m e s of Buddhist Political T h o u g h t in the

Jatakas."Journal of Oriental Literature 1(2): 3-7. Cowell, E. B., trans. 1957. TheJātaka, 6 vols. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. . 1969. Buddhist Mahayana Texts. New York: Dover. Dargyay, Eva K. 1988. "Srong-Btsan Sgampo of Tibet: Bodhisattva and King." In Monks and Magicians, ed. Phyllis Granoff and Koichi Shinohara. Oakville, Canada: Mosaic Press. Falk, Nancy Auer. 1973. "Wilderness and Kingship in Ancient South Asia." History of Religions 13(1): 1-15. Filliozat,J. 1967. Studies in theAsokan Inscriptions. Calcutta: R.D. Press. Gard, Richard A. 1962. "Buddhism and Political Authority." In The Ethic of Power: The Inter-

i buddhism: t h e p o l i t i c s o f compassionate

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play of Religion, Philosophy and Politics, ed. Harold W. Lasswell and Harlan F. Cleveland. N e w York: H a r p e r & Row. Geiger, Wilhelm, ed. 1958. The Mahavamsa. London: Luzak and Company,. Gokhale, B. G. 1966. "Early Buddhist Kingship ."Journal of Asian Studies 26: 15-22. . 1969. "The Early Buddhist T h e o r y of the State." Journal of the American Oriental Society 84(4): 731-38. Goldstein, Melvyn C. 1989. A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951. Berkeley: University of California Press. . 1997. The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hopkins, Jeffrey. 1998. Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nagarjuna's Precious Garland. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion,. Jones, J. J. 1949-56. The Mahāvastu, 3 vols. London: Luzac and Co. Ketelar, James Edward. 1990. Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan: Buddhism and Its Persecution. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Khoroche, Peter. 1990. Once the Buddha Was a Monkey: Arya Sura'sJātakamālā.

Chicago:

University of Chicago Press. Lewis, Todd T. 1989. "Mahāyāna Vratas in N e w a r Buddhism." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 12 (1): 109-38. . 1994. " T h e H i m a l a y a n F r o n t i e r in C o m p a r a t i v e Perspective: C o n s i d e r a t i o n s Regarding Buddhism and Hinduism in Diaspora." Himalayan Research Bulletin 14(1-2): 25-46. .1997. "The Anthropological Study of Buddhist C o m m u n i t i e s : Historical Precedents and Ethnographic Paradigms." In Shamanism, Altered States, Healing: Essays in the Anthropology of Religion, ed. Steven Glazier. Westport, Conn.: G r e e n w o o d Press. . 2000. Popular Buddhist Texts from Nepal: Narratives and Rituals of Newar

Buddhism.

Albany: State University of N e w York Press. -. 2002. "Representations of Buddhism in U n d e r g r a d u a t e Teaching: T h e Centrality of Ritual and Story Narratives." In Teaching Buddhism in the West: From the Wheel to the Web, ed. Victor Hori and Richard P. Hayes. Surrey, U.K.: C u r z o n . Nattier, Jan. 1991. Once Upon a Future Time: Studies in a Buddhist Philosophy of Decline. Berkeley, Calif.: Asian Humanities Press. N i k a m , N. A. and Richard McKeon, eds. and trans. 1959. The Edicts of Ashoka. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. N y a n a m o l i , Bhikkhu, trans. 1976. The Path of Purification

(Visuddhimagga)

by Bhadan-

tacariya Buddhaghosa. Berkeley, Calif.: Shambhala. Pathak, Suniti Kumar. 1974. The Indian Nitishastras in Tibet. Delhi: Motilal Barnarsidass. Rahula, Walpola. 1956. History of Buddhism in Ceylon. C o l o m b o : Gunasena. Reynolds, Frank. 1972. "The T w o W h e e l s of D h a m m a : A Study of Early Buddhism." In The Two Wheels of Dhamma, ed. Bardwell Smith. Chambersburg, Pa.: American Acade m y of Religion. Reynolds, Frank E., and Mani B. Reynolds. 1982. Three Worlds According to King Ruang. Berkeley, Calif.: Asian Humanities Press.

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Rhys-Davids, T. W., and Hermann, Oldenberg, trans. 1982. Vinaya Texts. 3 vols. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Richardson, Hugh E. 1962. Tibet and Its History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sarkisyanz, E. 1965. Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution. The Hague: M. Nijhoff. Seneviratne, H. L. 1999. The Work of Kings: The New Buddhism in Sri Lanka. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Shakabpa, Tsepon W. D. 1967. Tibet: A Political History. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Smith, Bardwell L. 1972. "The Ideal Social Order as Portrayed in the Chronicles of Ceylon." In The Two Wheels of Dhamma, ed. Bardwell Smith. Chambersburg, Pa.: American Academy of Religion. Snellgrove, David L. 1959. "The Notion of Divine Kingship in Tantric Buddhism." Studies in the History of Religions 4: 204-18. Stein, R. A. 1972. Tibetan Civilization. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Strong, John S. 1983. The Legend of KingAsoka. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Tambiah, Stanley J. 1976. World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. . 1984. Buddhist Saints of the Forest and the Cult of Amulets. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thapar, Romila. 1980. "State Formation in Early India." International Social ScienceJournal 32(4): 1-28. Victoria, Brian. 1997. Zen at War. New York: Weatherhill. Warren, Henry Clarke. 1995. Buddhism in Translations. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Wijayaratna, Mohan. 1990. Buddhist Monastic Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Conclusion I Retrospective on Religion and Politics I JacobNeusner

D E S P I T E T H E DIVERSITY OF T H E W O R L D ' S M A J O R RELIGIONS, AS W E H A V E O B S E R V E D

t h r o u g h o u t this volume, politics p e r m e a t e s each religious tradition. A politics theorizes an ongoing exercise of power, of coercion that includes legitimized violence. Here we have shown for world religions that politics addresses a religious issue a n d — m o r e to the p o i n t — m a k e s a religious s t a t e m e n t , as m u c h as, n o t uncommonly, religions take up political ones and engage in political action. People expect f r o m religion n o t only private solace b u t also ultimate solutions to shared problems; that means they anticipate from religion acts of power, not only affirmations of conscience. T h o u g h these acts of power may f r o m the religious perspective originate in the sacred realm—in G o d — t h e y very m u c h affect the h u m a n , and social, d o m a i n . Therefore, religion integrates the private and the public. In the public sphere, religion produces political consequences, shaping attitudes and ideas that make an impact on issues of public policy. W h y so? Religion comprises what people do together, not just what they believe in the privacy of their hearts. In other words, religion functions socially. And because it operates within society, religion may function politically, sometimes t h r o u g h legitimate violence and coercion. Before the seventeenth century in the West, and througho u t m u c h of the world even today, religion integrated politics, economics, and philosophy, imparting its character and p u r p o s e to t h e m all, expressing its statem e n t of self-evident truth t h r o u g h t h e m all. Of course, all religions speak of power, and thus to some extent of legitimate violence. In their view, power is exercised by or in behalf of God and his divine agencies. But religions also talk politics in another manner. A religion's intellectuals claim to explain the w o r k i n g s of power. T h a t is, they try to explain why things are the way they are. And in accounting for why legitimate power works, why things are as they are, they c o m m o n l y p r o p o u n d a causative theory of h o w things began. Further, the assertion of h o w things began serves as justification for the religion's legitimate violence, for w h e n we say h o w things originated, we implicitly claim that that is h o w things were w h e n they were right, and therefore h o w they should be even now. T h e chapters in this volume are drawn together around the politics of religions. In our t r e a t m e n t of this critical subject, however, we have not limited our analysis to data that directly concern coercion and violence, legitimate or otherwise. Quite to the contrary, we have extended our interest to the consideration of all aspects of the social order that the religion u n d e r

2

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258 I Jacob Neusner | study m e a n s to describe. It would have b e e n impossible to treat politics as dise m b e d d e d from m y t h and philosophy and from economics and theology. In the end, the comparative study of religion offered here supplies insight n o t simply into politics b u t also into the n a t u r e of religious systems of the social order. Each account here reveals h o w that system that is u n d e r study delivers its message through the topics it selects for detailed analysis, what its message is, and why it chooses (in this case) politics as the appropriate m e d i u m for stating its message. Politics is well captured for religions in the laconic, searing j u d g m e n t of the social order of Babel: "Brick served t h e m as stone, and m u d served t h e m as mortar" (Gen. 11:3); religions have n o t h i n g b e t t e r w i t h w h i c h to w o r k t h a n the h u m a n materials at hand. At stake in the issues raised here is u n d e r s t a n d i n g the world we face at the advent of the twenty-first century, a world in which in m a n y parts of the world religion and politics f o r m a tight alliance. As William Green suggests in the introduction, the United States is the exception to the rule of the union of religious belief and political behavior. As a m a t t e r of fact, we in the West have long ago formulated a theory of the social order that distinguishes religion from politics, church or synagogue or mosque or temple from institutions of state. We in the United States define politics in an acutely secular way as the theory of the legitim a t e exercise of violence, and reserve for the state the power of physical force, assigning to religion the moral force of persuasion. This is expressed clearly by Mitchell's penetrating observation that: In the West, the rightful employment of coercion is generally reserved for political powers, the civil and military authorities at their various levels. Persuasion, on the other hand, is generally left to the social powers, consisting of the many voluntary associations that influence individual behavior (church, family, community, etc.). Primitive tribes . . . recognize no distinction between the social and the political. The tribe functions as an extended family, organized in a strictly hierarchical fashion. . . . Everyone has his place in the pyramid, and every social subgroup is a subordinate part of the whole. Some societies have maintained a unified, hierarchical, and essentially tribal structure. . . . Most Western nations are still political societies, with a political system easily distinguishable from the rest of society, and a political hierarchy representing just one way in which the society is organized. 1

Here Mitchell rightly underscores that in the West, political power is limited, and the social powers stand on their own: "Christianity . . . c o n f i r m e d the distinction between political rule and social life, providing Western civilization with b o t h a cosmological basis for the distinction and a powerful n e w social order to counterbalance the political order." 2 O n e may speculate that the first three centuries of Christian history, with the Church confronting a hostile state, introduced the distinction b e t w e e n the C h u r c h as an a u t o n o m o u s social entity and the

i conclusion

empire: "It claimed for itself the right to function free of government interference and made itself responsible for many matters of public welfare and moral, at the same time leaving the use of coercion to civil authorities alone." 3 The systemic message of earliest Christianity appropriated a politics of division, perhaps turning necessity into the occasion for a restatement of the systemic perspective on the coming of God's Kingdom under Christ. So it is easy for us to miss the extreme and radical character of that theory of distinction between church and state, religion and politics, for that distinction is not only familiar in the politics of our own country but also a given of the Christian civilization that defines Western civilization. As a result, we in this country find exceedingly difficult the task of understanding a different utilization of politics from the Christian and Western, secular one, with its critical distinctions, as Mitchell has expressed them in most current form. But that is exactly the task facing both individuals and religions from around the globe. We must all wrestle with the fundamental differences between two disparate worldviews. One is a religiously sanctioned political order wherein the spheres of politics and religion are, at least theoretically, neatly distinguished one from the other. The other is a religiously sanctioned political order incorporating the divine realm and its power, and whose purpose is to achieve the goals set forth and sanctioned by God. The upshot of the character of Western Christian and secular politics, with its critical distinction between and a m o n g power in various modes—political from prophetic, for instance—is simple: We find exceedingly difficult the task of making sense of a politics that serves for systemic purposes in religious systems. We have no theory that encompasses a politics embedded in the religious theory of the social order, shaped by that theory, given legitimacy and purpose through that theory. Hence we cannot hear the religious messages that politics, when embedded in an encompassing, religious theory of the social order, wishes to set forth. We are unable to make sense not only of those e n o r m o u s portions of the world in which politics and religion cohere and deliver a single, uniform, and cogent statement. We also cannot formulate in our own context a theory that will explain to us the political aspirations of religious societies, with the result that important components of the political order in this country, on both right (viz., the former Christian Coalition) and left (viz., the National Council of Churches) come to the public square with pronouncements on public policy that invoke theological principles and express them. Consequently, religious groups appear to speak a kind of gibberish, intelligible only to themselves, when in fact they mean to make a statement not only to, but about, the social order that encompasses us all. They address the definition of what it means to be a human being, what God wants of us, how we are to relate to one another and assume public responsibilities—deeply religious categories of thought. But the rest of us hear, and fear, yet another pressure group, but an illegitimate one.

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I Jacob Neusner In the p a g e s of this b o o k , w e have surveyed the o t h e r ways, besides t h e A m e r ican o n e , in w h i c h G o d r u l e s — o r n e g o t i a t e s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e b o o k has b o t h d e s c r i b e d h o w e a c h m a j o r w o r l d religion f o r m u l a t e s its politics a n d h o w t h e y have laid t h e g r o u n d w o r k f o r potentially f r u i t f u l dialogue b e t w e e n m a n y differe n t g r o u p s . T h e t r a j e c t o r i e s of t h o s e dialogues will d e f i n e t h e f u t u r e of o u r relig i o n s a n d o u r politics.

Notes 1. Brian Mitchell, "The Distinction of Powers: How Church and State Divide Us," Reli-

gion and Public Life 2 (1995): 2. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid.

Glossary |

Aggadah: T h e rules of c o r r e c t conviction, exegesis, and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Apostles',

Nicene, and Athanasian

Creeds: T h e c r e e d s of t h e Early C h u r c h t h a t

s p e l l e d o u t C a t h o l i c C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f in s u c h b a s i c a r e a s as t h e T r i n i t a r i a n n a t u r e of G o d and t h e divine and h u m a n n a t u r e s in Jesus. arhat: E n l i g h t e n e d m o n k , o r a p e r f e c t e d saint, w h o has r e a c h e d nirvana and will b e released f r o m samsara at d e a t h . ashram: A stage of life in H i n d u i s m ; also refers t o a h e r m i t a g e o r secluded place for m e d i t a t i o n . Bavli: T a l m u d of Babylonia (ca. 600 C.E.), a Rabbinic c o m m e n t a r y o n the Mishnah. bodhisattva:

" F u t u r e B u d d h a , " o r p e r s o n w h o is t o b e c o m e fully e n l i g h t e n e d ; in

Mahayana Buddhism, one w h o reaches enlightenment but vows to continue rebirths in samsara t o assist o t h e r s . Brahmins: T h e priestly ("divine") class in H i n d u society, t h e highest r a n k of society b a s e d o n their ritual purity.

Buddha: "Enlightened O n e " ; Siddhartha S h a k y a m u n i G a u t a m a (ca. 563-483

B.C.E.)

b e c a m e t h e B u d d h a , w i t h w h o m t h e religion of B u d d h i s m is associated. Catholic: W i t h a lowercase "c," the w o r d m e a n s "universal o r all-embracing"; capitalized, t h e w o r d refers t o t h e R o m a n C a t h o l i c tradition. Christology: T h e s t u d y of t h e w o r d s a n d s t o r y of Christ, and m o r e precisely his sacrifice o n t h e cross. danda: T h e scepter, "big stick," o r r o d of p u n i s h m e n t a n d coercive p o w e r . Dead Sea Library: T h e collection of w r i t t e n d o c u m e n t s (e.g., scrolls) of t h e Jewish s e c t a r i a n r e l i g i o u s c o m m u n i t y living in caves l o c a t e d in t h e m o u n t a i n s o v e r l o o k i n g t h e D e a d Sea; see also

Qumran.

dharma: A t e r m central to H i n d u i s m w i t h m u l t i p l e m e a n i n g s , i n c l u d i n g (1) personal d u t y o r responsibility, social obligation; (2) religious law o r r i g h t e o u s ness; (3) the principle of c o s m i c order, t h e c o n d i t i o n of possibility for o r d e r e d cosmos. ecclesiology: T h e s t u d y of t h e theological u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c h u r c h . episcopacy: T h e s y s t e m of c h u r c h g o v e r n m e n t by b i s h o p s ( f r o m t h e G r e e k episcopoi), for example, in the Anglican, L u t h e r a n , O r t h o d o x , and R o m a n Catholic traditions. Epistles: Books of the N e w T e s t a m e n t that focus o n t h e m e a n i n g of Jesus Christ's life a n d teachings for t h e life of t h e Early C h u r c h , as i n t e r p r e t e d b y Paul t h e Apostle, Peter, J a m e s , a n d J o h n . eschatology, eschatological: F r o m t h e G r e e k eschaton, m e a n i n g " t h e e n d " o r " e n d times." 261

262

I Glossary | Eucharist: T h e Christian s a c r a m e n t of H o l y C o m m u n i o n , t h e theia koinonia,

or

fellowship w i t h G o d ; called t h e "Divine L i t u r g y " by t h e O r t h o d o x . evangelical:

T h e s e g m e n t of Protestant Christianity that stresses certain core

beliefs r o o t e d in t h e Bible, s u c h as p e r s o n a l conversion and salvation by faith in t h e a t o n i n g d e a t h a n d r e s u r r e c t i o n of Jesus Christ, and t h e Bible as t h e sole a u t h o r i t y in m a t t e r s of faith a n d life. familial piety (xiao): O n e of t h e t w o core social v i r t u e s of early C h i n a , e m p h a s i z ing t h e respect and care t h a t s h o u l d b e exhibited by children t o w a r d their pare n t s , w h i c h t h e y t h e n will receive f r o m t h e i r o w n c h i l d r e n . In t h e

Analects

(Lunyu), C o n f u c i u s n o t e s t h a t familial piety (xiao) and b r o t h e r l y d e v o t i o n (di) are t h e r o o t s of acting w i t h b e n e v o l e n c e . Five Classics (wujing): Five classic w o r k s associated w i t h C o n f u c i u s , m a d e c a n o n ical b y t h e 651 c o m p i l a t i o n of t h e c o r r e c t e d m e a n i n g s o f t h e Five Classics (Wujing zhengyi). T h e s e w o r k s are t h e Classic of C h a n g e s (Yijing), t h e Classic of P o e t r y (Shijing), t h e Classic of D o c u m e n t s (Shujing), the Spring and Annals (Chunqiu),

Autumn

and t h e Records of Ritual (Liji).

five relationships (wulun): T h e five p a r a d i g m a t i c family relationships are r u l e r and subject, father and son, elder and y o u n g e r brother, h u s b a n d and wife, and friend a n d friend. Four Books (sishu): T h e f o u r core classic philosophical w o r k s m a d e canonical duri n g t h e S o n g D y n a s t y C o n f u c i a n revival by Z h u Xi (1130-1200). T h e s e w o r k s are t h e Analects (Lunyu), Mencius (Mengzi), and "Inward H a r m o n y " (Zhongyong)

a n d t h e " G r e a t L e a r n i n g " (Daxue)

c h a p t e r s of t h e Records of Ritual

(Liji).

Gospels: T h e first f o u r b o o k s of t h e N e w T e s t a m e n t — M a t t h e w , Mark, Luke, and J o h n — w h i c h f o c u s o n t h e life a n d teachings of Jesus of N a z a r e t h a n d are t h e central classical Christian s o u r c e f o r i n f o r m a t i o n o n the life of Jesus Christ. hadith: T h e p r o p h e t i c traditions of Islam, w h i c h are narrative r e p o r t s that record t h e sayings a n d d e e d s of M u h a m m a d . Halakhah: T h e n o r m s of c o r r e c t c o n d u c t . Hebrew Scriptures:

J e w i s h c a n o n i c a l s a c r e d texts, r o u g h l y c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o

C h r i s t i a n i t y ' s " O l d T e s t a m e n t , " also k n o w n as t h e W r i t t e n T o r a h , w h i c h is divided i n t o t h r e e sections: T o r a h , P r o p h e t s , and Writings. Also k n o w n as the First T e s t a m e n t . hijra: T h e e m i g r a t i o n of M u h a m m a d from Mecca t o M e d i n a , w h i c h eventually d e v e l o p e d i n t o a practice of m a k i n g p i l g r i m a g e t o Mecca at least o n c e in t h e life of a Muslim. immanence: T h e usual c a t e g o r y u s e d t o refer t o t h e divine as existing w i t h i n the universe as p e o p l e m a y perceive it; t h e o p p o s i t e of t r a n s c e n d e n c e . Islam: A n A r a b i c w o r d m e a n i n g s u b m i s s i o n , r e l a t e d t o t h e A r a b i c w o r d f o r p e a c e , salaam, Muhammad.

b u t also t h e n a m e of t h e r e l i g i o n m e d i a t e d b y t h e p r o p h e t

269

I Glossary

|

Israel: (1) T h e a l t e r n a t i v e p e r s o n a l n a m e of t h e p a t r i a r c h J a c o b , s o n o f Isaac. (2) T h e collective n a m e of t h e H e b r e w p e o p l e w h o are d e s c e n d e d f r o m Jacob. jihad: O f t e n m i s t r a n s l a t e d as "holy w a r , " t h e w o r d actually m e a n s t o " s t r u g g l e " o r "strive" and refers to the Q u r a n i c c o m m a n d t o Muslims t o exert themselves t o realize G o d ' s will o n e a r t h , t o live a v i r t u o u s life, t o spread the Islamic c o m m u n i t y t h r o u g h o u t t h e entire e a r t h b y p r e a c h i n g a n d teaching, a n d t o fulfill t h e universal mission of Islam. karma: Literally, " a c t i o n , " " d e e d , " o r " w o r k " ; in H i n d u i s m , it m e a n s t h e law of c o n s e q u e n c e s w i t h regard t o o n e ' s actions, w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s t h e f u t u r e cycle of rebirth. Kharijites: A M u s l i m g r o u p that i n t e r p r e t e d t h e Q u r a n and S u n n a h literally a n d believed that the Q u r a n i c i n j u n c t i o n to " c o m m a n d t h e g o o d and prohibit evil" w a s a religious m a n d a t e t h a t w a s t o b e i m p l e m e n t e d absolutely and w i t h o u t c o m p r o m i s e at t h e political level. Kshatriyas: T h e classical "noble," warrior, o r r u l i n g class in H i n d u society, the seco n d social s t r a t u m . Liturgy: A rite o r b o d y of rites prescribed f o r public w o r s h i p ; it plays an especially p r o m i n e n t role in the t h e o l o g y of a l m o s t all O r t h o d o x Christians in m o d e r n times; also a s y n o n y m f o r t h e Eucharist. ming: Literally, " c o m m a n d " o r " m a n d a t e , " "fate."

Mishnah: A Rabbinic philosophical law c o d e (ca. 200

C.E.).

New Testament: A collection of b o o k s (Gospels, Acts of the Apostles, Letters, a n d t h e Apocalypse) c o n s i t u t i n g t h e p a r t of t h e Bible exclusive t o Christianity; also k n o w n as t h e Christian o r S e c o n d T e s t a m e n t . nirvana: " B l o w i n g o u t " of t h e fires of life, liberation f r o m suffering and rebirth, t h e spiritual goal of Buddhist practice; p o p u l a r l y conceived as p e r f e c t bliss o r even paradise.

Old Testament: See Hebrew Scriptures. Oral Torah: T h e c o r p u s of Rabbinic w r i t i n g s f r o m t h e M i s h n a h t o t h e Yerushalm i t h r o u g h t h e Bavli, a l o n g w i t h c e r t a i n c o m p i l a t i o n s of biblical i n t e r p r e t a tion k n o w n as M i d r a s h b o o k s of t h e s a m e p e r i o d . Pali Canon: Earliest collection of B u d d h i s t sacred texts, i n c l u d i n g t h e Tripatika, o r " T h r e e B a s k e t s " (Vinaya, S u t t a , a n d A b h i d h a m m a ) , w r i t t e n in a n c i e n t Sanskrit. Pentateuch: T h e G r e e k t e r m f o r t h e first five b o o k s of t h e H e b r e w S c r i p t u r e s — Genesis t h r o u g h D e u t e r o n o m y — a l s o k n o w n as t h e T o r a h . Qumran: A site a d j a c e n t t o t h e D e a d Sea w h e r e t h e D e a d Sea library w a s f o u n d , a n d w h e r e a Jewish sectarian c o m m u n a l g r o u p lived. Quran: In Islam, t h e e t e r n a l , literal, u n c r e a t e d , a n d final W o r d of G o d , revealed t o t h e p r o p h e t M u h a m m a d o n e final t i m e over a p e r i o d of t w e n t y - t w o years (610-32 C.E.) t o serve as a g u i d e f o r h u m a n k i n d ( Q 2:185); c l a i m e d t o b e t h e

264

I Glossary | c o r r e c t i v e t o t h e o n e e t e r n a l m e s s a g e of G o d initially r e v e a l e d t o b u t corr u p t e d b y J e w s and Christians ( Q 5:19).

raj: Rule. rajadharma: T h e duty (dharma) of kings Reformation:

R e f o r m a t i o n C h r i s t i a n i t y is t h e b r o a d label a p p l i e d t o t h e diverse

C h r i s t i a n m o v e m e n t s t h a t e m e r g e d in E u r o p e a n d t h e W e s t d u r i n g t h e sixt e e n t h c e n t u r y C.E. Sadhu: H o l y m a n , in H i n d u i s m . samsara: T h e cycle of rebirth. sangha: O n e of B u d d h i s m ' s t h r e e j e w e l s : t h e c o m m u n i t y of m o n k s , n u n s , a n d h o u s e h o l d e r s (laity). Second Vatican Council: R o m a n Catholic c h u r c h council c o n v e n e d in 1962 by Pope J o h n XXIII, w h i c h c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h 1965 u n d e r his successor P o p e Paul VI, t o deal w i t h issues of m o d e r n i t y in t h e C a t h o l i c c h u r c h ; also called Vatican II. Shii: T h e m i n o r i t y t r a d i t i o n of t h e M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y , w h i c h h o l d s t h a t succession of political a n d M u s l i m l e a d e r s h i p a n d a u t h o r i t y s h o u l d b e hereditary, passing t h r o u g h M u h a m m a d ' s d a u g h t e r , Fatima, a n d h e r h u s b a n d , Ali, w h o , as M u h a m m a d ' s first cousin, w a s M u h a m m a d ' s closest living m a l e relative.

Shirk: Idolatry. Shudras: Classical s e r v a n t class in H i n d u society, t h e f o u r t h - (lowest) level social stratum.

soteriology: T h e study of salvation as effected by Jesus Christ. stūpa: M e m o r i a l Buddhist shrine o r reliquary, o f t e n built in a m o u n d . Sufism: A n Islamic m y s t i c i s m t h a t b e g a n as a n ascetic m o v e m e n t , r e n o u n c i n g m a t e r i a l things a n d e n c o u r a g i n g a d e t a c h m e n t f r o m t h e m a n d a r e t u r n t o t h e p u r i t y a n d simplicity of t h e early M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y ; it played an i m p o r t a n t r o l e in t h e political life of M u s l i m s a n d in t h e s p r e a d of Islam t h r o u g h missionary w o r k . Sunnah: T h e e x a m p l e of M u h a m m a d in b o t h his w o r d s a n d deeds, r e c o r d e d in t h e hadith

literature, which enjoys authoritative scriptural status a m o n g

Muslims. Sunni: T h e m a j o r i t y t r a d i t i o n of t h e M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y , w h i c h h o l d s t h a t Muslim a u t h o r i t y s h o u l d pass t o t h e m o s t q u a l i f i e d p e r s o n ( t h e m o s t p i o u s a n d l e a r n e d in m a t t e r s of faith) r a t h e r t h a n in h e r e d i t a r y succession, b e c a u s e it h o l d s t h a t all M u s l i m s are equal in G o d ' s eyes, w i t h n o special status a c c o r d e d t o a n y o n e o n t h e basis of w e a l t h o r family. svadharma:

Personal, individual d h a r m a .

Svaraj: Self-control o r "self-rule." Talmud: A Rabbinic c o m m e n t a r y o n t h e M i s h n a h . tawhid: M u s l i m d o c t r i n e of a b s o l u t e m o n o t h e i s m .

I Glossary Thirteen Classics (shisanjing):

T h e t h i r t e e n classics d e f i n e d in t h e S o n g Dynasty.

T h e s e w o r k s include t h e Five Classics (see "Five Classics") w i t h t h e a d d i t i o n of t h e ritual texts Ceremony and Ritual (Yili) a n d Rituals of Zhou (Zhouli); t h r e e c o m m e n t a r i e s t o t h e Spring and Autumn

Annals (Chunqiu)

Z u o , G o n g y a n g , and G u l i a n g ( t o g e t h e r t a k i n g t h e place of t h e Chunqiu); Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing); the dictionary Approach to Refinement Analects (Lunyu); a n d t h e Mencius

the

n a m e d after the

(Erya); t h e

(Mengzi).

tian: Usually t r a n s l a t e d as " H e a v e n . " tianming:

Literally, " H e a v e n ' s M a n d a t e " ; t h e political a u t h o r i z a t i o n t h a t the vir-

t u o u s r u l e r receives f r o m t h e n o n h u m a n r e a l m , a n d t h e b a d o m e n s t h e corr u p t r u l e r receives f r o m t h e s a m e s o u r c e . T h e t w o w o r d s t h a t m a k e u p this c o n c e p t , tian ( o f t e n t r a n s l a t e d as " H e a v e n " ) a n d ming ( " c o m m a n d , " "decree," "fate," o r m o s t o f t e n " m a n d a t e " ) , are key t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f c l a i m s t o l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y b y e m p e r o r s a n d r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s alike t h r o u g h o u t C h i n e s e history. tianzi: "Son of H e a v e n , " a special n a m e f o r t h e e m p e r o r . Torah: Literally, "Instruction." W h e n referred t o as "the Torah," it can m e a n either (1) t h e first five b o o k s of H e b r e w Scriptures, also called t h e P e n t a t e u c h , o r (2) the collection of the entire " W r i t t e n Scriptures." Trinity: T h e Christian d o c t r i n e of t h r e e Divine P e r s o n s in o n e G o d : t h e Father, t h e Son, and t h e H o l y Spirit. ummah: T h e single, universal c o m m u n i t y of Islam. Vaishyas: T h e m e r c h a n t , business class in H i n d u society, third social s t r a t u m . varnasharma

dharma: Religious d u t y calibrated t o o n e ' s class o r caste a n d o n e ' s

stage of life. Vedas: A v a r i e d c o l l e c t i o n of H i n d u s c r i p t u r e s , all of w h i c h f o c u s o n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e a n d p h i l o s o p h y of ritual sacrifice. Vinaya: T h e c a n o n i c a l b o o k s c o n t a i n i n g r u l e s a n d r e g u l a t i o n s f o r B u d d h i s t m o n a s t i c life a n d discipline; o n e of t h e t h r e e "baskets" (tripitaka) of the Buddhist c a n o n . Written Torah: W r i t t e n Scriptures, t h e sacred texts of the H e b r e w Bible. wuwei: In B u d d h i s m , literally, " n o n a c t i o n , " o r action w i t h o u t a t t a c h m e n t to t h e o u t c o m e , b u t also m e a n i n g dispassionate a n d reactive g o v e r n a n c e . Yerushalmi: T a l m u d of t h e L a n d of Israel (ca. 400 C.E.), a Rabbinic c o m m e n t a r y on the Mishnah. yogin: An individual w h o practices yoga, t e c h n i q u e s of spiritual discipline for overc o m i n g b o n d a g e t o samsara (the cycle of rebirth), o f t e n e m p h a s i z i n g b r e a t h i n g a n d m e d i t a t i o n exercises. T h r e e y o g i c p a t h s are k a r m a ( a c t i o n ) , j n a n a ( m e d i t a t i o n / i n s i g h t ) , a n d b h a k t i (devotion). zakat: An alms tax of 2.5 p e r c e n t of the total w e a l t h of each Muslim.

Contributors |

B r u c e D. C h i l t o n is t h e B e r n a r d I d d i n g s Bell P r o f e s s o r o f R e l i g i o n at Bard C o l l e g e . H e is a n E p i s c o p a l p r i e s t as w e l l as a s c h o l a r of early C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d J u d a i s m . H e h a s w r i t t e n several a c a d e m i c s t u d i e s t h a t p u t J e s u s in his J e w i s h context, i n c l u d i n g m o s t r e c e n t l y Rabbi Jesus: An Intimate

Biography (2000), t o g e t h e r

w i t h c o m p a r a t i v e s t u d i e s o f C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d J u d a i s m , s u c h as Redeeming

Time:

The Wisdom of Ancient Jewish and Christian Festal Calendars (2002). Mark C s i k s z e n t m i h a l y i is a n assistant p r o f e s s o r in t h e D e p a r t m e n t of East Asian L a n g u a g e s a n d L i t e r a t u r e a n d t h e Religious Studies P r o g r a m at t h e University of W i s c o n s i n , M a d i s o n . H e c o e d i t e d ( w i t h P h i l i p J. I v a n h o e ) Religious

and

Philo-

sophical Aspects of the Laozi (1999) a n d is c o m p l e t i n g a m a n u s c r i p t titled Material Virtue: Ethics and the Body in Early

China.

C h a r l e s E. Curran, is E l i z a b e t h S c u r l o c k University P r o f e s s o r of H u m a n Values at S o u t h e r n M e t h o d i s t University. His extensive w o r k in t h e field of m o r a l theo l o g y i n c l u d e s Catholic Social Teaching, 1891-Present: Ethical Analysis

A Historical,

(2002) a n d The Catholic Moral Tradition

Theological,

Today: A Synthesis

and

(1999),

w h i c h w a s a w a r d e d first p r i z e in its field of m o r a l t h e o l o g y b y t h e C a t h o l i c Press A s s o c i a t i o n of A m e r i c a . N a t a n a J. D e L o n g - B a s is a s e n i o r r e s e a r c h assistant at t h e C e n t e r f o r M u s l i m C h r i s t i a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g at G e o r g e t o w n University, w h e r e s h e c o m p l e t e d h e r P h . D . in history. She is a n e d i t o r of a n d a c o n t r i b u t o r t o t h e Oxford Dictionary

of

Islam (2002) a n d is c o a u t h o r of Women in Muslim Family Law ( w i t h J o h n . L. Esposito, 2001). J o h n L. E s p o s i t o is u n i v e r s i t y p r o f e s s o r a n d p r o f e s s o r of r e l i g i o n a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l affairs at G e o r g e t o w n U n i v e r s i t y ' s W a l s h S c h o o l o f F o r e i g n Service. H e w a s f o u n d i n g d i r e c t o r of t h e C e n t e r f o r M u s l i m - C h r i s t i a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d is editor-in-chief o f The Oxford Encyclopedia

of the Modern Islamic World (1995) a n d

The Oxford History of Islam (1999). His o t h e r p u b l i c a t i o n s i n c l u d e Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (2002), The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (3d ed., 1999), a n d What Everyone Needs to Know about Islam (2002). W i l l i a m S c o t t G r e e n is d e a n of t h e C o l l e g e , p r o f e s s o r of religion, a n d Philip S. B e r n s t e i n P r o f e s s o r of J u d a i c S t u d i e s at t h e U n i v e r s i t y of R o c h e s t e r , w h e r e h e

267

268

I Contributors

|

f o u n d e d t h e D e p a r t m e n t of Religion and Classics. H e has w r i t t e n extensively o n t h e h i s t o r y of J u d a i s m a n d is associate e d i t o r of t h e HarperCollins Religion (1995) a n d c o e d i t o r of The Encyclopedia of Judaism

Dictionary

of

(2000).

T o d d L e w i s is associate p r o f e s s o r of w o r l d religions at the College of t h e H o l y Cross. H e w a s f o u n d i n g cochair of t h e T i b e t a n a n d H i m a l a y a n religious g r o u p in t h e A m e r i c a n A c a d e m y of Religion, a n d h e has w r i t t e n m o r e t h a n thirty j o u r nal articles a n d several b o o k s , i n c l u d i n g Popular Buddhist Texts from Nepal: Narratives and Rituals of Newar Buddhism

(2000) a n d World Religions Today (with J o h n

Esposito a n d Darrell Fasching) (2002). Martin E. Marty is t h e Fairfax M. C o n e Distinguished Service P r o f e s s o r Emerit u s at t h e University of Chicago. H e has b e e n p r e s i d e n t of t h e A m e r i c a n Academ y of R e l i g i o n , t h e A m e r i c a n S o c i e t y of C h u r c h H i s t o r y , a n d t h e A m e r i c a n Catholic Historical Association. H e is t h e a u t h o r of m o r e t h a n fifty b o o k s , including t h e t h r e e - v o l u m e Modern American Religion (1984, 1990, 1996) a n d

Righteous

Empire (1970), w h i c h w o n t h e N a t i o n a l B o o k Award. Jacob N e u s n e r is a research p r o f e s s o r of religion and t h e o l o g y a n d a senior fell o w at t h e Institute of A d v a n c e d T h e o l o g y at Bard College in N e w York. H e has w r i t t e n o r e d i t e d m o r e t h a n 900 b o o k s o n J u d a i s m a n d religious studies a n d is e d i t o r of t h e m u l t i v o l u m e Pilgrim Library of World Religions (1996-98) a n d World Religions in America (2000). Brian K. S m i t h is a p r o f e s s o r of religious studies at t h e University of California, Riverside. H e has w r i t t e n several b o o k s o n the history of religion, including Classifying the Universe: The Ancient Indian Varna System and the Origins of Caste (1994). Petros Vassiliadis is p r o f e s s o r of N e w T e s t a m e n t in t h e D e p a r t m e n t of T h e o l o g y at Aristotle University in T h e s s a l o n i k i , Greece. H e is c u r r e n t l y p r e s i d e n t of t h e W o r l d C o n f e r e n c e of Associations of T h e o l o g i c a l Institutes ( W O C A T I ) , vice p r e s i d e n t of t h e Society f o r E c u m e n i c a l Studies a n d I n t e r - O r t h o d o x Relations, a n d h e is t h e a u t h o r of n u m e r o u s j o u r n a l articles a n d several b o o k s , i n c l u d i n g Eucharist

and Witness:

Orthodox

Perspectives on Unity and Mission of the Church

(1998) a n d ΛΟΓΟΙ ΙΗΣΟΥ: Studies in Q (1999).

Index |

A b b a s i d Dynasty, 137, 138, 142-43,

A s h o k a ( B u d d h i s t ruler), 2 3 9 - 4 2 Ashvaghosa (Buddhist monk),

1 4 8 , 1 4 9 , 174

242-43

A b d al-Qadir a n d Algerian resis-

A u g s b u r g C o n f e s s i o n , 87, 122

t a n c e , 151

A u g u s t i n e of H i p p o , 45, 4 8 - 4 9 , 63;

A b d u h , M u h a m m a d , 165, 166, 176

o n d i l e m m a of e s c h a t o l o g y a n d

A b u Bakr (first caliph), 139-40, 141,

g l o b a l history, 52-55; O r t h o d o x

142

political t h e o r y a n d , 100; Refor-

" T h e Acts o f t h e Scillitan M a r t y r s , "

m a t i o n C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d , 117-18

41-42 Aeterni Patris ( L e o XIII), 64 A g g a d a h (rules o f c o r r e c t convic-

Ban G u , 226

tion), 20, 22, 28, 29

al-Banna, H a s a n , 167-68, 170,

Aggana Sutta ( B u d d h i s t text), 236

171-72

A g h a K h a n , 146

Baptists, 113

A h m a d , M u h a m m a d (Sudanese

Basil of C a e s a r e a , 49

The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church, 94,

M a h d i ) , 163-64 A h m a d ibn H a n b a l , 142-43

103nn6, 7

A k b a r ( M u g h a l e m p e r o r ) , 155 A l e x a n d e r of H a l e s , 64

Battle of Badr, 134-35

A l e x a n d e r t h e G r e a t , 239

Bavli ( T a l m u d of Babylonia), 12

Ali ibn Abi Talib ( f o u r t h caliph),

B e l l a r m i n e , R o b e r t , 75 Ben G u r i o n , David, 11

140-42, 144

B h a g a v a d Gita, 206

Allan, S a r a h , 2 2 7 - 2 8

b i n L a d e n , O s a m a , 143, 172

A n a b a p t i s t s , 125-26 Analects of Confiicins (Lunyu),

"Black R o b e s " (Ziyi), 227

214-15,

bodhisattvas,

2 1 6 - 1 7 , 219, 2 2 1 - 2 3 , 225, 231

238, 252n7

B o n a v e n t u r e , Saint, 64

A n g l i c a n i s m ( C h u r c h of E n g l a n d ) ,

Book of Martyrs (Foxe), 127

1 1 0 , 1 1 1 , 1 1 9 - 2 0 , 126-27

B r a h m i n s , 187, 188, 189-90, 192-95,

Apology (Justin M a r t y r ) , 56

204,208

A p o s t l e s ' C r e e d , 42

B u d d h a g h o s a ( B u d d h i s t m o n k ) , 236,

A q u i n a s , T h o m a s , 64, 6 9 - 7 0 , 79, 80,

242

81

Buddhism, 7-8, 233-56; Ashoka and,

Aristotle, 14-15, 64, 88 A r m e d Islamic G r o u p (Algeria), 137

239-42; the Buddha and f o u n d i n g

A r t h a S h a s t r a (Arthashastra):

of, 233; B u d d h a ' s life in s a c r e d

Ashoka

a n d , 239, 250; H i n d u k i n g a n d ,

b i o g r a p h i e s , 235, 2 4 2 - 4 3 ; Bud-

188-89, 191-92, 196-97, 198-200

dhist i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d s e c u l a r 269

270

I Index \ Christianity and, 93, 97-100, 102,

B u d d h i s m (continued) p o w e r s , 238-39, 252n6; classical

103n3

s o u r c e s o n politics, 234-37, 242-43; c o m p a s s i o n a n d ethics of, 242, 250; C o n f u c i a n i s m and, 230;

Calvin, J o h n , 87, 109, 113, 122, 123-25, 127

c o n t e m p o r a r y t r a d i t i o n in post-

Calvinism, 126, 127

colonial Asia, 250-51;

C a m p b e l l , Alexander, 109

flexibility,

multivocality, a n d a c c e p t a n c e of pluralism, 234; forgiveness a n d

"catholic" (universal, all-embracing), 3 7 , 6 1 , 110-11

f o r e g o i n g of revenge, 244-45,

C h a n d r a g u p t a M a u r y a , 239

252n28, 253n32; g o o d sangha-

C h e n g T a n g (sage king), 221

state relations, 236; h e a v e n a n d

C h i l t o n , B r u c e D., 5. See also primi-

Buddhist d o c t r i n e , 247, 253nn43,

tive and early Christianity

44; H i n d u political p h i l o s o p h y

Christ and Culture (Niebuhr), 124

and, 250; h o u s e h o l d e r s and,

Christianity. See O r t h o d o x Christian-

237-38, 252n20, 253n44; jātaka

ity; primitive a n d early Christiani-

narratives, 234-35, 242, 246-48,

ty; R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity;

251nn4, 5, 252nn17, 20, 253nn37,

R o m a n C a t h o l i c Christianity

39; justice, s e e k i n g a n d p r o m o t -

Christian right, 130

ing of, 246-47, 253nn37, 39;

c h u r c h and state. See religion and

k a r m a d o c t r i n e and Buddhist polity, 247-49; kings a n d sangha, 238-39, 245-46, 252nn7, 9, 253nn33, 35; k i n g s h i p in Buddhist t h o u g h t , 7, 234-39, 242-49, 251nn4, 5; king's political p o w e r

politics C h u r c h of E n g l a n d (Anglicanism), 110,111, 119-20, 126-27 City of God (Augustine), 49, 52-54, 100, 117

Classic of Documents (Shangshu)

a n d ethical duties, 234-35,

( C o n f u c i a n canon), 214, 222,

242-49, 252n20, 253nn32, 37, 39;

227-28, 231; ' A n n o u n c e m e n t of

king's role as ritual leader,

Kang," 215-16, 227; "Announce-

248-49; M a h ā y ā n a narratives,

m e n t of Shao," 219-20; " C a n o n

244-45, 248-49; m e d i u m of

of Yao," 224; " G r e a t V o w "

expressing politics in, 239-42;

(Taishi), 227; " L o r d Shi," 227;

m e s s a g e of politics, 242-49; t h e

" M a n y Officers," 221

n a t u r a l w o r l d a n d king's m o r a l actions, 248, 254nn48, 49; n o n b e -

Collected Sayings of Confiicius (Sun Xingyan) ( C o n f u c i a n text), 214

lievers and t o l e r a n c e , 249-50;

Confessions (Augustine), 55-56

sangha and, 233, 236-39, 241-42,

C o n f u c i a n i s m , 6 - 7 , 213-32; Bud-

245-46, 2 5 2 n n 7 - 9 ; t h e o r y of poli-

d h i s m and, 230; Christianity's

tics, 235-39

arrival a n d , 230; classical s o u r c e s

"Byzantine synthesis": early Chris-

o n politics, 213, 214-18; C o n f u -

tianity and, 98-99; O r t h o d o x

cian vision a n d s t a t u s q u o , 218;

I Index d e f i n i n g t r a d i t i o n s of, 213-14;

Creel, H e r r l e e G., 220

early t r a d i t i o n s d e f i n e d in o p p o -

C r u s a d e s , 155

sition to, 228-30; familial piety

Csikszentmihalyi, Mark, 7. See also

(xiao) and, 213, 217, 222, 229, 230; a n d "five relationships" (wulun),

213; i d e n t i f y i n g interces-

Confucianism C u r r a n , Charles E., 6. See also R o m a n Catholic Christianity

sion of tian, 226-28; j u s t i f i c a t i o n of political authority, 215; t h e m e d i u m of expressing politics, 223-26; t h e m e s s a g e of politics, 226-28; ming ("fate") and, 219-21, 229, 231; M o h i s m and, 229; n o n b e l i e v e r s and, 228-30; as

danda ( H i n d u "rod of p u n i s h m e n t " ) , 191, 197, 198, 2 0 3 - 4 Declaration on Religious Freedom (Vatican II), 77-78 D e Long-Bas, N a t a n a J., 7. See also Islam, classical; Islam, m o d e r n

p h i l o s o p h y / i d e o l o g y , 213, 231;

D h a r m a (Buddhist), 237, 239-40

o n political l e g i t i m a t i o n a n d

d h a r m a ( H i n d u ) , 185-86, 196-200

i m p e r i a l succession, 224-26,

D h a r m a Sutras, 188, 193

227-28, 231; o n ritual propriety,

dhimmis (People of t h e Book),

217, 222-23; r u l e r ' s relationship t o tian, 214, 216, 219-20; r u l e r ' s sovereignty a n d religious duties, 214, 215-16; s t o r y of Yao and S h u n , 224-25; T a o i s m a n d , 230; t h e o r y of politics, 218-23; tian

152-53, 154, 179

Dialogue with Trypho, A Jew (Justin Martyr), 57 D u t t a g a m a n i (Buddhist king), 253n32 Dyer, Mary, 126

( " h e a v e n " ) a n d , 2 1 4 , 226-28, 229, 231; tian and ming, 219-21, 227;

Epanagoge (Photius), 99, 104n20

tian a n d social conditions,

Episcopalianism, 127

226-28; tianming a n d criticism of

eschatology: A u g u s t i n e and, 45,

political authority, 228;

tianming

52-55; global history and, 52-56;

doctrine ("Heaven's Mandate"),

juridical, 42, 44-45, 46, 49; justice

7, 215, 216, 218-28, 231; v e n e r a -

and, 57-58; O r t h o d o x Christiani-

t i o n of C o n f u c i u s a n d t e m p l e s

ty a n d , 9 0 - 9 1 , 94-95, 100; of

of, 213-14; Z h o u d y n a s t y and,

primitive and early Christianity,

2 1 5 , 2 2 0 - 2 2 , 224

38, 45-49, 57-58, 90; R e f o r m a t i o n

C o n s t a n t i n e , 75, 98, 104n15

Christianity and, 114; t e m p o r a l ,

" T h e C o n t r i b u t i o n of the O r t h o d o x

42, 43, 45-46; t r a n s c e n d e n t , 42,

C h u r c h in E s t a b l i s h m e n t of Peace, Justice, F r e e d o m , Fellowship a n d Love a m o n g the Peoples, and t h e Lifting of Racial a n d O t h e r Discriminations," 93-94, 103n5

43—44,46 Esposito, J o h n L., 7. See also Islam, classical; Islam, m o d e r n Eucharist and O r t h o d o x Christianity, 88-89, 91-92, 95 Eusebius, 53, 55

272

I Index \ "Five Classics" (wujing) ( C o n f u c i a n canon), 213 Florovsky, G e o r g e , 97, 102n2 " F o u r Books" (sishu) ( C o n f u c i a n canon), 213, 222

H e n r y VIII, King, 109, 119-20 hijra a n d b i r t h of M u s l i m c o m m u n i ty, 133-34, 136-37, 164 H i n d u i s m , 6, 7, 185-211; t h e A r t h a Shastra and, 188-89, 191-92,

Foxe, J o h n , 127

196-97, 198-200; t h e Bhagavad

Franciscan School, 64

Gita and, 206; B r a h m i n s , 187,

Francis of Assisi, 155

188,189-90, 192-95, 204, 208;

Franck, Sebastian, 125

British r u l e a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e

Frustration and Success Are a Function

m o v e m e n t s , 207; B u d d h i s m and,

of the Age (Qiongda yi shi) ( C o n f u -

206; classes and their f u n c t i o n s in

cian text), 225

social order, 188, 189-90; classical s o u r c e s o n politics, 187-89,

G a n d h i , M o h a n d a s , 2, 200, 207

190-95; " d h a r m a " d e f i n e d ,

Gaudium etspes (Vatican II), 67, 68,

185-86; t h e D h a r m a Sutras and,

87

188, 193; a n d d i l e m m a i n h e r e n t

a l - G h a n n o u s h i , Rashid, 180-81

in political rule, 207-9; H i n d u

Giles, H e r b e r t Α., 219

nationalists and, 207; ideal king-

Gnosticism, 42, 54

d o m of " R a m r a j y a , " 205, 207;

G o k h a l e , B. G „ 242

Jainism and, 206; k i n g a n d stric-

Grebel, C o n r a d , 125

t u r e s of d h a r m a , 196-200; king-

G r e e n , William Scott, 11, 258

ship, divine, 186-204; kingship in

G r e g o r y of Nazianzus, 49

origin m y t h s , 200-203, 21 On 17;

G r e g o r y of Nyssa, 49-51

king's p o w e r s , 186-87, 190-200;

G r e g o r y VII, P o p e , 154-55

king's p u r s u i t of self-interest, 188-89, 191-92; king's relation-

hadith literature, 132, 135, 139 H a l a k h a h ( n o r m s of c o r r e c t con-

ship w i t h B r a h m i n s , 187, 188, 192-95, 204, 208; king's relations

duct), 20-29; conflicts b e t w e e n

w i t h his subjects, 190-91, 192,

g o v e r n a n c e and, 35-36; m o t i f s

196-97; king's self-discipline/self-

and design f o r social order, 23-28;

rule, 187,198-200, 204; Ksha-

on negotiations between

triyas (warriors), 188, 189-90,

Israelites a n d gentiles, 31-35;

191, 192-95; t h e M a h a b h a r a t a

nonbelievers and idolatry, 29-35;

and, 189, 203, 205; m a r r i e d

of O r a l T o r a h , 32-34; t h e m e of

h o u s e h o l d e r s and, 186; m e d i u m

God's encounter with humanity,

of expressing politics in, 200-204;

20-28; t h e m e of r e e m b o d i m e n t

m e s s a g e of politics, 204-5; a n d

of Israel, 28-29; of W r i t t e n

M u s l i m r u l e of n o r t h India, 207;

T o r a h , 21, 3 1 - 3 2

nonbelievers and, 205-7; plural-

H a n Feizi ( H a n Fei Tzu), 229

ism a n d diversity in, 205-6; t h e

H e e s t e r m a n , J. C., 195, 208

P u r a n a s and, 189, 201; rajadhar-

IIndex ma and, 189, 196-200, 204; t h e

p e a n c o l o n i a l i s m / imperialism

R a m a y a n a and, 189, 205; t h e Rig

and, 150-51; expansion of Islamic

Veda and, 189; a n d "rod of p u n -

E m p i r e , 150-51, 154; first hijra

i s h m e n t " (danda), 191, 197, 198,

a n d b i r t h of M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y ,

203-4; S h u d r a s (servants),

133-34, 136-37, 164; H u s s e i n ' s

189-90; Sikhism and, 206; t h e o r y

rebellion and m a r t y r d o m , 144;

of politics, 189-200; this-worldly,

Ibn T a y m i y y a h and extremists,

185-87, 208; Vaishyas ( c o m m o n -

143-44; Islamic law (Shariah),

ers), 189-90, 191;

138-39, 147-48; Islamic sover-

varnasharma

dharma and, 185, 206; t h e Vedas

eignty and, 138-39, 173; and Jew-

a n d Vedic p e r i o d , 187-91, 192-95

ish p o p u l a t i o n of M e d i n a ,

"Hindutva" movement (Hindu nationalists), 207

Historian's Records (Shiji) (Confucian text), 226

1 5 3 - 5 4 J i h a d in, 135-38, 148; a n d Kharijite extremists, 136-37, 141-42, 149-50; m e d i u m of expressing politics, 139-47; mes-

H s u a n T s a n g (Chinese pilgrim), 245

sage of Islam's politics, 147-51;

H s u C h o - y u n , 217

m i s s i o n a r y w o r k and, 150-51;

H u m a n i s t s , 118

M u a w i y y a h (fifth S u n n i caliph),

H u s , J a n , 109

141-42, 144, 149, 155; M u h a m m a d a n d t h e state, 133-35; multi-

Ibn A b d al-Wahhab, M u h a m m a d , 162

ple i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s over t i m e a n d space, 147; nonbelievers and,

Ibn Saud, M u h a m m a d , 162

152-56; a n d O r t h o d o x Byzantine

Ibn T a y m i y y a h , Taqi al-Din, 143-44

E m p i r e , 154-55; p u b l i c / p r i v a t e

The Institutes of the Christian Religion

s p h e r e s undivided, 131, 138;

(Calvin), 124

Q u r a n and, 131-33, 135, 136, 137,

Iqbal, M u h a m m a d , 165, 166-67, 176

138, 139; t h e Shii i m a m a t e , 141,

Iranian Islamic R e v o l u t i o n

144-47; Shii m i n o r i t y status,

(1978-79), 145, 175-76

144-45; Shii subdivisions and,

Irenaeus, Bishop, 37, 54, 55

146-47; Shii view of h i s t o r y and

"Islam" (submission), 131

suffering, 145; social o r d e r a n d

Islam, classical, 7, 131-57; Abbasid

social justice t h e m e s , 132-33;

Dynasty, 137, 138, 142-43, 148,

Spanish rule and, 155; Sufi mysti-

149, 174; caliphs of, 139-44; clas-

cism, 150-51; t h e S u n n a h of

sical s o u r c e s o n politics, 131-33;

M u h a m m a d , 131, 132-33; t h e

dhimmis (People of t h e Book),

S u n n i caliphate and views of

152-53, 154, 179; divine m a n d a t e

leadership, 141, 142-44; tawhid

of, 147; divisions over l e a d e r s h i p

d o c t r i n e of m o n o t h e i s m , 132;

a n d succession, 140-42, 144; early

t h e o l o g y and, 148-50; t h e o r y

battles of c o m m u n i t y , 134-35;

of politics, 133-39; t o l e r a n c e

early factionalism, 139-41; Euro-

and, 155, 156; ulama (religious

274

I Index \ and, 167-70, 171; n i n e t e e n t h - c e n -

Islam, classical (continued ) scholars), 138-39, 148-49;

t u r y Islamic m o d e r n i s m , 164-67;

U m a y y a d Dynasty, 137, 138, 140,

n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y territorial

141-42, 148, 150; ummah

states, 173; nonbelievers and, 144,

(com-

m u n i t y ) , 1 3 3 , 1 3 9 , 1 4 0 , 147-48,

163, 171-72, 175, 178-82; Q u r a n

149-50, 173; ummah and Islamic

a n d Islamic revival, 161, 167, 168,

law, 147-48. See also Islam, m o d -

169; Q u r a n a n d m o d e r n i s m , 165;

ern; M u h a m m a d ; Q u r a n

Q u t b a n d Islamic e x t r e m i s m ,

Islam, m o d e r n , 7, 159-84; caliphate

170-72; a n d religious minorities,

and, 143-44, 174; c h a n g i n g defi-

179-82; r e t u r n t o islah ( r e f o r m ) ,

nitions of Islam a n d t h e state,

161-62; r e t u r n t o Q u r a n and Sun-

173-76; conflicts w i t h conserva-

n a h , 159, 161, 1 6 7 , 1 6 8 , 1 6 9 ;

tive traditionalists, 165-66; cri-

r e t u r n t o tajdid (revival), 161, 163;

tiques of t h e West, 166-67; a n d

as s h a r e d w o r l d v i e w w i t h c o m -

d e b a t e over religious

m o n beliefs, 168-69; t h e o r y of

pluralism /diversity, 179-82; eigh-

politics, 160 (see also Islam, classi-

t e e n t h - c e n t u r y revival and

cal); t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y political

r e f o r m i s m , 160-64; e x a m p l e s of

activism, 145, 167-73; ulama

M u h a m m a d , 164, 169; Iranian

(scholars) and, 175-76, 178; W a h -

Revolution, 145, 175-76; Islamic

habi m o v e m e n t and, 161-63. See

extremists, 137, 139, 143-44, 145,

also Islam, classical

170-73, 175; Islamic law and cont e m p o r a r y c o m m u n i t y , 176-78; Islamic revival and c o n c e r n a b o u t M u s l i m decline, 159-60; Islamic

Israel, c o n t e m p o r a r y state of, 11, 12, 35-36 itjihad ( i n d e p e n d e n t reasoning), 161, 162

revival a n d m e d i u m of expressing politics, 160-73; Islamic revival

I v a n h o e , P. J., 223

and relationship b e t w e e n Islam and politics, 159-73; Islamic state,

Jainism, 206

139, 173-76, 179-82; Islamization

Jamaat-i Islami (Islamic m o v e m e n t ) ,

of society, 169-70, 173-76; a n d

167-71, 174

itjihad ( i n d e p e n d e n t reasoning),

J a n a s a n d h a , King, 243

161, 162; t h e J a m a a t - i Islami and,

jātaka Buddhist narratives, 234-35,

167-70; jihad and, 137, 162-63, 172-73, 175; jihad a n d militancy,

242, 246-48, 251nn4, 5, 252nn17, 20, 253nn37, 39

172-73, 175; jihad a n d m i s s i o n a r y

Jefferson, T h o m a s , 125

w o r k , 162-63; and t h e M a h d i

jihad (to " s t r u g g l e " o r "strive"),

("divinely g u i d e d one"), 163-64,

135-38; defining, 135-36; Khari-

167; m e s s a g e of politics, 173-76;

jite extremists and, 136-37; m o d -

m o d e r n i t y a n d r e f o r m s , 165-66,

e r n Islam and, 137, 162-63,

168, 169; M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d

172-73, 175; Q u t b and, 172, 175; Shariah guidelines for, 148; vio-

I Index lence a n d militancy, 136-38,

lievers and idolatry, 29-35; "Oral

172-73, 175

T o r a h , " 12, 32-34; politics of t h e

J o h n of D a m a s c u s , 155

M i s h n a h in historical context,

J o h n Paul II, Pope, 65, 68, 81

14-15; politics of t h e P e n t a t e u c h

J o h n XXIII, Pope, 71, 72, 73-74, 78,

as charismatic and p r o p h e t i c ,

81 J u d a i s m , 4 - 6 , 11-36; A g g a d a h and,

14-15; R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity and, 113; sanctions, 5, 13-14,

20, 22, 28, 29; classical Islam and,

15-20; state of Israel and, 11,12,

152, 153-54; classical s o u r c e s o n

35-36; stories of disobedience,

politics, 11-14; conflicts b e t w e e n

18-20; and s t o r y of E d e n , 18-20,

H a l a k h a h s y s t e m a n d gover-

21-24; t h e m e of G o d ' s self-real-

n a n c e , 35-36; earthly c o u r t and,

ization, 28; t h e o r y of politics a n d

13, 16-17, 19-20; gentiles and, 25,

G o d ' s i n v o l v e m e n t in h u m a n

29-30, 31, 32-35; G o d ' s

realm, 14-15; u n c l e a n n e s s and,

e n c o u n t e r w i t h h u m a n i t y , 20-28;

25-27, 29-30, 31; " W r i t t e n

G o d ' s role in politics and use of

T o r a h " / P e n t a t e u c h / Scripture,

l e g i t i m a t e violence, 13-14; G o d ' s

4 - 5 , 12, 14-15, 21, 31-32

will a n d h u m a n will, 17-19;

Justinian, 99

H a l a k h a h and, 20-29, 31-36;

Justin Martyr, 56-57

H a l a k h a h m o t i f s a n d design for

Justitia in mundo (Synod of Bishops),

social order, 23-28; Halakhic sys-

67, 87

t e m a n d nonbelievers, 29-35; H e a v e n l y c o u r t and, 13-14,

"Kali Yuga," 200

16-17, 19-20; a n d h i e r a r c h i z a t i o n

Khan, Sayyid A h m a d , 165, 166

of i n f r a c t i o n and sanction, 17;

Kharijites (Muslim extremist g r o u p ) ,

h u m a n will and intentionality, 17-20, 25, 34; idolatry and, 29-35; J u d a i c political m y t h , 13-20;

136-37, 141-42, 149-50 K h o m e i n i , Ayatollah Ruhollah, 145, 172-73, 175-76

m e d i u m of expressing politics,

K n o x , J o h n , 109, 123, 125, 126

15-20; m e s s a g e of politics, 20-29;

Kshatriyas (warriors), 188, 189-90,

Midrash, 12; M i s h n a h , 5, 12-20;

191,192-95

m o t i f of c o n t e s t b e t w e e n d e a t h and life, 26, 31; m o t i f of e n e m i e s

Legge, J a m e s , 225

of E d e n , 25, 29-31; m o t i f of

L e o XIII, Pope, 64-65, 67, 71, 73, 77,

intentionality a n d t h e civil order,

79

25; m o t i f of k i n g d o m of G o d , 27;

Letter to Diognetus, 97

m o t i f of land and possession,

Lewis, T o d d , 7. See also B u d d h i s m

23-24; m o t i f of o v e r c o m i n g

Liang Q i c h a o , 228

d e a t h , 26-27; m o t i f of sin and

Liu Z e h u a , 220

a t o n e m e n t , 24-25; and t h e m y t h

Luther, Martin: "magisterial" Re-

of G o d ' s authority, 17-19; n o n b e -

f o r m a t i o n and, 87, 109, 121-23;

I 275

I Index

I 282

Luther, M a r t i n (continued )

e m i g r a t i o n to M e d i n a a n d b i r t h

nonbelievers and, 129; and Paul's

of M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y , 133-34,

letter t o t h e R o m a n c h u r c h , 116;

164, 169; m o d e r n Islam and, 164,

religious liberalism and, 73; Ten

169; n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y Islamic

C o m m a n d m e n t s and, 112

m o d e r n i s m and, 164; as political

L u t h e r a n i s m , 111, 120, 126, 127

h e a d of state, 133-35; relationship w i t h J e w s a n d Christians,

M a h a b h a r a t a , 189, 203, 205

153, 155; S u n n a h of, 131, 132-33;

Mahākā1a (Indie deity), 245, 252n29

t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y Islamic revival

Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, 236

and,169

M a h d i ("divinely g u i d e d one"),

M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d (Islamic m o v e m e n t ) , 167-71, 174

163-64, 167 al-Malik al-Kamil, Sultan, 155 M a n i c h a e a n i s m , 53-54

al-Nasser, G a m a l Abd, 170, 171

Manjusrīmūlakalpa

N e u s n e r , Jacob, 5. See also J u d a i s m

(Buddhist n a r r a -

tive), 249 Maritain, Jacques, 74 Marty, M a r t i n E., 6, 61. See also R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity

N i e b u h r , H . Richard, 124, 125 nonbelievers: B u d d h i s m and, 249-50; classical Islam and, 152-56; C o n f u c i a n i s m and,

M a r y T u d o r , Q u e e n , 119

228-30; early Christianity and,

Mater et magistra ( J o h n XXIII), 71, 72,

56-57; H i n d u i s m and, 205-7;

73-74 M a w d u d i , M a w l a n a Abul Ala, 167-68, 170, 171-72, 174 Mencius (Mengzi) ( C o n f u c i a n text), 224-25, 227

J u d a i s m and, 29-35; m o d e r n Islam and, 144, 163, 171-72, 175, 178-82; O r t h o d o x Christianity and, 100-101; R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity and, 107-8, 128, 129;

M e n n o n i t e s , 125, 126

R o m a n C a t h o l i c i s m and, 75-78,

Midrash, 12

81-82

ming ("fate"), 219-21, 229, 231 M i s h n a h , 5, 12-20

Octogesima adveniens (Paul VI), 68, 74

Mitchell, Brian, 258, 259

" O n W h a t Is M e a n t by t h e Profes-

M o h i s m , 229

sion 'Christian'" ( G r e g o r y of

Moses, 12, 18-19, 57

Nyssa), 50

M o z i ( M o Tzu), 229

O r i g e n , 37, 44, 47-48, 50, 54, 97

M u a w i y y a h (fifth S u n n i caliph),

O r t h o d o x Christianity, 6, 85-105;

141-42, 144, 149, 155

t h e Bible a n d Tradition in, 87;

M u e n t z e r , T h o m a s , 125

"Byzantine synthesis" and, 93,

M u g h a l e m p i r e , 138

97-100, 102, 103n3; church-state

M u h a m m a d : divisions f o l l o w i n g

relations, 86, 92-95, 97-100,

d e a t h of, 139-41; a n d early battles

101-2, 103nn3, 5 - 7 ; citizenship in

of Muslim c o m m u n i t y , 134-35;

h e a v e n instead of this w o r l d ,

I Index i 277 96-97; classical Islam and,

Peter, 41, 46-47

154-55; classical s o u r c e s o n poli-

Peters, Francis, 154

tics, 87-92; defining, 85-87;

Philo of Alexandria, 56-57

eschatological / nonhistorical

Photius, 99

d i m e n s i o n of politics, 90-91,

Pius XI, Pope, 71, 73

94-95, 100; ethics as ecclesial

Pius XII, Pope, 74

issue, 92; Eucharist and, 88-89,

Plato, 14-15, 48, 53, 54

91-92, 95; Jewish e s c h a t o l o g y

P l a t o n i s m , 57

and, 89-91; K i n g d o m of G o d and

Pollitt, Katha, 1

Christ as Logos, 91 ; koinonia in

P o o M u - c h o u , 221

Eucharist, 91-92; t h e Liturgy

Porphyry, 54

and, 88-89, 95-97; m e d i u m of

primitive a n d early Christianity, 4,

expressing politics, 95; m e s s a g e of

5 - 6 , 37-59; a n d a d a p t a t i o n t o

politics, 95, 96-100; and m o d e r n

political f o r m s of this w o r l d , 5-6,

sociopolitical c o n c e r n s , 93-95,

37, 38, 41-42, 49-52; A u g u s t i n e

101-2, 103nn5, 6, 7; m o n a s t i c i s m

and, 52-55; "Byzantine synthesis"

and, 100; nonbelievers and toler-

and, 98-99; Christian e p o c h a n d

ance, 100-101; patriarch's role in,

h i s t o r y as apocalypse, 38, 54, 55;

104n22; R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity

classical sources o n politics,

and, 85, 93, 110, 112, 118; teach-

38-41; distinction b e t w e e n

ings a n d life of Jesus Christ for,

"primitive" and "early," 37; dual

89-91; theological presupposi-

loyalties t o G o d and earthly mas-

tions r e g a r d i n g t r u t h / r e v e l a t i o n ,

ters, 37; eschatologies, k i n d s of,

87-88; t h e o r y of politics, 92-95;

38, 46, 58; e s c h a t o l o g y a n d global

Trinity d o c t r i n e and, 91-92

history, 52-56; e s c h a t o l o g y a n d

O t t o m a n e m p i r e , 138, 156, 174

m e d i u m of expressing politics,

Oxford Dictionary of the Christian

45-49; e s c h a t o l o g y a n d t h e o r y of

Church, 85

politics, 41-45, 90; G o d ' s will a n d h u m a n will, 53; G r e g o r y of

Pacem in terris ( J o h n XXIII), 74, 81

Nyssa and Christianized E m p i r e ,

Pancaraksha (Buddhist narrative),

49-51; H e b r e w Scriptures and, 4,

244-45, 248-49 papal letters and encyclicals, 64-65, 73-74, 79, 8 0 , 8 2 , 8 7 Paul: early Christianity and, 38-41,

6, 37, 39; history and philosophical reflection in, 55-56; a n d h o p e of justice, 52-56; juridical eschatology, 42, 44-45, 46, 49; justice,

90-91, 98-99; R e f o r m a t i o n Chris-

eschatological, 57-58; justice

tianity a n d epistles of, 113,

and t h e imitation of Christ, 52;

115-17

m e s s a g e of politics, 49-56; N e w

Paul VI, Pope, 68, 74, 78

T e s t a m e n t and, 37, 51; nonbeliev-

Pentateuch ("Written Torah"), 4-5,

ers a n d apologistic literature,

12, 14-15, 21, 3 1 - 3 2

56-57; n o n r e s i s t a n c e t o evil and

I Index primitive a n d early Christianity

(continued )

Q u t b , Sayyid, 137, 167, 170-72, 174-75

e x e m p l a r y response, 51-52, 58; Paul o n G o d ' s relationship t o h u m a n i t y , 38-40; politics of divi-

rajadharma

( d u t y of H i n d u kings),

189, 196-200, 204

sion b e t w e e n social o r d e r and

R a m a y a n a , 189, 205

religion, 259; r e s u r r e c t i o n of t h e

R a m r a j y a (ideal H i n d u k i n g d o m ) ,

flesh in, 53-55; struggle b e t w e e n love of G o d a n d love of self, 55;

205,207 R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity, 6, 107-30;

suffering and e n g a g e m e n t w i t h

and A m e r i c a n "Christian

right,"

the w o r l d , 51; t e m p o r a l eschatol-

130; A u g u s t i n i a n t h o u g h t and,

ogy, 42, 43, 45-46; t r a n s c e n d e n t

117-18; Calvin and t h e Calvinist-

eschatology, 42, 43-44, 46

R e f o r m e d tradition, 123-25;

The Prince (Machiavelli), 188 P r o t e s t a n t Christianity: O r t h o d o x

c h u r c h a n d state issues, 122-23, 124-26; C h u r c h of

Christianity and, 85, 93; r e f o r m a -

E n g l a n d / A n g l i c a n i s m , 110, 111,

t i o n t r a d i t i o n and, 108-10. See

119-20, 126-27; classical sources

also R e f o r m a t i o n Christianity

o n politics, 112-18; d e f i n i n g as

P u r a n a s , 189, 201

equivalent w i t h P r o t e s t a n t i s m ,

Puritans, A m e r i c a n , 112-13, 125

108-10; d e m o c r a t i c t h i n k i n g and, 108, 128; dualism and, 107, 118,

al-Qaida, 137

128; G o d as a g e n t b e h i n d politics,

Quadragesimo anno (Pius XI), 71, 73

107, 127-28; H e b r e w scriptures

Q u a k e r s , 125, 126

and, 112-14; institutions and, 127;

Q u r a n , 131-33; classical Islam and,

law and, 126; liturgy and, 126-27;

131-33, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139;

L u t h e r a n d L u t h e r a n i s m , 121-23;

c o n c e p t of tajdid (revival) a n d

t h e "magisterial" ( m a i n s t r e a m )

islah ( r e f o r m ) , 161; Islamic ethics

R e f o r m a t i o n , 87, 109, 120-25;

derived f r o m , 132; o n Islamic

m e d i u m of expressing politics,

state, 138, 139; jihad in, 135, 136,

126-27; narrative, role of, 127;

137; m o d e r n Islam and, 159, 161,

N e w T e s t a m e n t Epistles and, 113,

165, 167, 168, 169; a n d M u h a m -

115-17; N e w T e s t a m e n t Gospels

m a d ' s actions of political h e a d of

and, 113-15; nonbelievers and,

state, 133, 134; n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u -

107-8, 128, 129; O r t h o d o x Chris-

ry m o d e r n i s t s ' r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s

tianity and, 85, 93, 110, 112, 118;

of, 165; o n nonbelievers, 152, 153;

a n d " p r i e s t h o o d of all believers,"

religious pluralism and, 179-80;

108, 128; a n d p r o b l e m of eschato-

social o r d e r and t h e m e s of social

logical vision, 114; p r o p h e t i c

justice in, 132-33; and ummah as

p r o t e s t in, 108, 128; t h e radical

political entity, 133; W a h h a b i

R e f o r m a t i o n , 116-17, 120-21,

m o v e m e n t a n d itjihad, 162

125-26; r e j e c t i o n of p a p a c y by,

Index 110-12; R o m a n C a t h o l i c i s m and,

m o n g o o d and, 72-74, 82; con-

75, 109, 110-12, 118, 119-20, 129;

temporary thought on temporal

S a b b a t h o b s e r v a n c e in, 113; Scan-

r e a l m a n d political order, 61-62,

dinavian L u t h e r a n i s m , 120; Scrip-

69; dissent o n hierarchical social

t u r e s as n o r m a t i v e for, 107, 128;

teachings, 68-69, 82; and d o c t r i n e

seven theses a n d m e s s a g e of poli-

of creation, 61; h u m a n dignity

tics, 127-28; Ten C o m m a n d -

and, 79-81; h u m a n r e a s o n a n d

m e n t s and, 112, 113; t e r m

n a t u r a l law, 63, 66-67, 68-69, 82;

"catholic" and, 110-11; t h e o c e n -

h u m a n rights and, 78-81; individ-

t r i s m and, 122, 124; t h e o r y of

ualism a n d t h e state, 70-71,

politics, 118-26

72-73, 80; justice a n d social

religion a n d politics, 1-9; B u d d h i s m ,

teachings, 78-81; m e d i u m of

7 - 8 , 238-39; c o m p a r a t i v e grid of

expressing politics, 66-69; mes-

piety and p o w e r , 4-8; C o n f u c i a n -

sage of politics, 69-81; m o r a l wis-

ism, 7-8; d e f i n i n g "politics," 2;

d o m a n d k n o w l e d g e in a u t h o r i t a -

d e f i n i n g "religion," 2; early

tive teachings, 62-63; n a t u r a l law

Christianity and, 5 - 6 , 37, 38,

m e t h o d o l o g y and, 65-69, 82;

41-42, 49-52; H i n d u i s m , 7, 8;

n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y distinctions

interconnection/inseparability

r e g a r d i n g t o l e r a n c e , 75-76; n o n -

of, 2 - 4 ; Islam, 7, 8, 133-35,

believers and, 75-78, 81-82; papal

138-39, 173-76, 179-82; J u d a i s m ,

letters/encyclicals as social teach-

4 - 5 , 11, 12, 35-36; necessity of

ings, 64-65, 73-74, 79, 80, 82, 87;

W e s t e r n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of, 1 - 2 ,

papal o b e d i e n c e and, 111; philo-

258-59; O r t h o d o x Christianity

sophical liberalism and, 72-73,

and, 86, 92-95, 97-100, 101-2,

74; preferential o p t i o n f o r t h e

103nn3, 5 - 7 ; R e f o r m a t i o n Chris-

p o o r , 79; public o r d e r a n d public

tianity, 122-23, 124-26; a n d reli-

society, 77-78; R e f o r m a t i o n

g i o n s t h a t are o u t of p o w e r , 3;

Christianity and, 75, 109, 110-12,

R o m a n Catholic Christianity,

118, 119-20, 122, 123, 129; refor-

69-72, 74-78, 94-95. See also

m a t i o n t r a d i t i o n in, 109; religious

entries for individual religions

f r e e d o m issues in, 68, 73-74,

Rerum novarum (Leo XIII), 65, 71, 73, 79, 87 Rig Veda, 189 R o m a n C a t h o l i c Christianity, 6,

75-78; revelation as b o t h Script u r e a n d tradition, 62; social mission of c h u r c h , 67; state a n d c o m m o n g o o d , 70-71; state a n d

61-84; Catholic a n t h r o p o l o g y , 69,

socialization, 72; state and sub-

70-71, 79-81; c h u r c h a n d state

sidiarity, 71-72; state's role and,

issues, 74-78, 94-95; c h u r c h ' s his-

69-72, 77; s y s t e m a t i c theology,

torical d i m e n s i o n a n d worldly

63-65, 67, 68; t h e o r y of politics,

responsibilities, 94-95; classical

65-66; t r a d i t i o n and Trinitarian

s o u r c e s o n politics, 62-65; c o m -

doctrine, 62. See also Vatican II

| 279

28ο

I Index \ Spring and Autumn Annals

Russian O r t h o d o x C h u r c h , 94,

(Chunqiu)

( C o n f u c i a n text), 214, 218, 226,

103n7

227 Sringabheri Avadāna (Buddhist narra-

al-Sadat, Anwar, 135, 144

tive), 246

Safavid e m p i r e , 138 sangha (Buddhist c o m m u n i t y ) , 233,

S t a c k h o u s e , Max, 2 - 4 Standard History of the Han

236-39, 241-42, 245-46,

(Hanshu)

( C o n f u c i a n text), 226

252nn7-9 Scandinavian L u t h e r a n i s m , 120

Stone, B a r t o n , 109

Scotus, J o h n D u n s , 64

Stone, R o b e r t , 8

"Seventh-Day" Adventists, 113

Strong, J o h n S . , 240-41

S h a n g Dynasty, 220-21

S u d a n e s e Mahdi, 163-64

Shariah (Islamic law): classical Islam

S u d d h o d a n a , King, 243

and, 138-39, 147-48; a n d c o n t e m -

S u f i s m , 150-51

porary Muslim community,

Summa theologiae ( T h o m a s Aquinas),

176-78; guidelines f o r jihad,

148;

a n d ideal Islamic sovereignty, 138-39

64 S u n n a h of M u h a m m a d : classical Islam and, 131, 132-33; m o d e r n

Shii Islam, 141-42, 144-47; t h e Ismailis (Seveners), 146; t h e Ithna Ashari (Twelvers), 146-47; t h e

Islam a n d r e t u r n to, 161, 167, 168, 169 S u n n i Islam, 141-44, 145, 159

Nizari Ismailis (Assassins), 146; S u n n i g o v e r n m e n t s and, 145; t h e

al-Tahtawi, Rifaah Rafi, 173

Zaydis (Fivers), 146

Taliban, 1, 177

S h u d r a s (servants), 189-90

T a n g Dynasty, 214

S h u n (sage king), 217, 219

T a o i s m , 230

Signposts (Milestones) ( Q u t b ) , 171

tawhid (absolute m o n o t h e i s m ) , 132

Sikhism, 206

Tertullian, 52, 97

Simhalasārthabāhu

Avadāna (Bud-

dhist narrative), 244, 249 Simons, M e n n o , 125

T h e r a v a d a B u d d h i s m , 244, 254n54 " T h i r t e e n Classics" (shisanjing) ( C o n f u c i a n canon), 213

Sixth Novel (Justinian), 99

T h o m i s m , 64-65, 67, 68, 69-70

Smith, Brian K., 2, 7. See also

tianming d o c t r i n e ( " H e a v e n ' s Man-

Hinduism

date"), 7 , 2 1 5 , 2 1 8 - 2 8 , 2 3 1

Social Justice in Islam ( Q u t b ) , 170

T i b e t a n B u d d h i s m , 251n2

Sollicitudo rei socialis ( J o h n Paul II),

Tillich, Paul, 128

78 Soto, D o m i n i c , 64

T i m o t h y , 40 T o r a h : " O r a l T o r a h , " 12, 32-34; Pen-

Spain, M u s l i m r u l e of, 155

tateuch ("Written Torah"), 4-5,

Spellman, J o h n W., 197, 202

12, 14-15, 21, 3 1 - 3 2

Spiro, Melford, 2

Trinity doctrine, 62, 9 1 - 9 2

I Index T u W e i - m i n g , 222

Vitoria, Francis de, 64

ulama (religious scholars): classical

W a h h a b i m o v e m e n t , 161-63, 167

Islam and, 138-39, 148-49; m o d -

W a n g C h o n g , 218

e r n Islam and, 175-76, 178

Weber, Max, 213

U m a r ibn al-Khattab, 140, 142

W e n g Fuzhi, 228

U m a y y a d Dynasty, 137, 138, 140,

W i l l i a m of O c k h a m , 64

141-42, 148, 150 ummah (universal c o m m u n i t y of Islam), 133, 139, 140, 147-48,

W i n t h r o p , J o h n , 113 W o r l d C o u n c i l of C h u r c h e s , 85 Wycliffe, J o h n , 109, 119

149-50, 173 U p a g u p t a (Buddhist m o n k ) , 241

Xia Dynasty, 221

U t h m a n ibn Affan (third caliph),

Xunzi (Hsiin Tzu) ( C o n f u c i a n text),

140

226,111

Vaishyas ( c o m m o n e r s ) , 189-90,

Yerushalmi ( T a l m u d of t h e Land of

191 varnasharma

Yao (sage king), 217

dharma ( H i n d u s y s t e m

of religious duty), 185, 206

Israel), 12 Yijing (Classic of C h a n g e ) , 221

Vassiliadis, Petros, 6, 61. See also O r t h o d o x Christianity Vatican II, 64, 65, 67, 74, 76-78, 81, 82, 87 Vedas a n d H i n d u Vedic p e r i o d , 187-91, 192-95 Vinaya (Buddhist narrative), 244

Z h a n g j u z h e n g , 228 Z h o u dynasty, 215, 220-22, 224

Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu), 219 Z h u Z i ( C h u Hsi), 222 Z i Xia, 219-20 Z w i n g l i , H u l d r e i c h , 109