God And Evil: An Introduction To The Issues

God and Evi

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God and Evi An introduction t o the Iss~es

Michael L. Peterson ASBURY C O L L E G E

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A Member of t l ~ ePersseus Books Group

NI rights reserveci, Pril~teciin the United States of Amefica, No Tart ofthis yublicaticjn may be rcprodueed ur ~ra~lsrnittcd in any fcxm mor by any means, electronic or mechanicai, incl~~ding p110tocop~;rec~rdjllg,or any Information starage and retrieval permission in writillg from the publisher. system, witht~~xt Copyright- 8 1998 by Wcswicw Prcss, A i2ilember of Pcrseus Books: Group Pubiished in 1998 in the United States ofAnlerica by Wesmietv Press, 5500 Central Avenue, I-lnutcter, Colorado 250303-2877, and is1 the iiilited Ecrgdom Ity KTesrciie\v Hill, Oxford OX2 9JJ Press, 12 Hici's Copse ltoad, Gu~~lr?lor I i brary of C:ongress CZatalog~lg-inPuI>tiea.tlic>~~ Data b3ererson, h4iclrael I,. 1950Grrd and cvil : an introd-ctcfict~~ to the issues / by Michael L,, b3ererson. p, cm, Ir~ctudesbi bliographicaf references and index. lSRN 0-8X 33-2848-9 (hc), - XSBN 0-8133-2849-7 (pb) 1. Good and cvit . 2. Reli@c>il-Philosog>11y. I. 'I'irfc. BJl4QX.P47 1998 2 E 4-d~2 1

98-18429 CTP

'The paper used iit this publica~onmeets the requirements o f the American Na&onal Standard for Permanence of 13agter f i r Printed 1,ibrary Materials Z39.48-198.1.

For my sons, Aar~PzaPzd Adam

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Contents

The Problem of Evil and Its Place 11 in Philosophy of Religion Evil in H u l ~ ~ aExistence, n I Evil and Rcligio~lsBelicf, 6 The Philosophical Difficulty, 8 The Classification of Evil, 10 Notes, 14 Suggested Readings, 15

The Logical Problem of Evil 2 Staten~entof the Problem, 17 The Structure and Strategy of the kgument, 19 Versions of the Logical Argument, 23 The Burden of Proof, 27 Notes, 5 X S~lggcstcdReadings, 31 3 T l ~ eFunction of Defense The Free Will Defense, 53 The Colllpatibilist Position, 35 The Incompatibilist Rejoinder, 37 The f:urrcnt State of the Debate, 41 Notes, 43 Suggested Readings, 45

The Probabilistic Problem af Evil 4 An Initial Skirmish, 47 A Modified Probabiliy Argument, 49

Three Probabilistic Argumellts fro~nEvil, 52 Reformed Epistemolog!? and Evil, 56 Notes, 61. Suggested Readings, 64

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The Problem af Gramitous Evil Can There Be an Evidential Argument from Evil? 67 Versions of the Evidential Argummt, 69 Analyzing the Evidential Argument from G r a t u i ~ u Evil, s 73 The Appearance of Evil, 74 Notes, 79 Suggested Readings, 8 1 6 The Task of Theodicy The Prospects for Thcodicy, 85 Augustine's Free Will Theodich 89 Lribniz's Best 130ssiblrWorld Theodic~~? 92 Hick's Soul-Making Theodic): 94 Whitehead's Process Theodicj: 99 Theodicy and the Assessment of Theism, 103 Notes, 105 Strggested Readings, 108

The Existential Problem of Evil 7 The Experience of Gratuitous Evil, 111 Evil and Personal Idencirp, 114 The Logic of Rcgrct, 117 Existential Authcnticiq and Evil, 119 Thc Defeat of Horren&,us Evil, 124 Notes, 127 Suggested Readings, 130 Index

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Preface

This jrolumc is an introduction to the problem of evil as it is currently discussed in professional philosophy. I have designed the book for use in an academic setting, with hopes that both student and scholar may find many points interesting and provocative. I also trust that the scrious and thoughtful person outside academia may benefit from my treatment of this perennially important subject. No project of this sort is a purely priirate undertaking. Over the years, I have benefited fro111 hclpful discussions on the problei~lof evil ~ 6 t hAvin Hantinga, Edwarcf Madden, Peter Ham, Wilfiam Idasker, David Basingrr, Bruce Reichmbach, and Jerry Walls. I have appreciated the mcouragemcnt of the Asbury College administration during my uriting. I am also thankful to Pew Charitable Trusts for fulldillg my research during the 1992-1993 acadelnic pear. I am not completely sure why I continue to be fascinated by the problem of evil in all of its permutations. In part, I am astonished by the great profusion of suffering and evil around us and am driven to ponder it on behalf of those who ask, "Why?" And, in part, I am stagt o the gered at the capaciv for evil ~vithinus and am thercbp dra~v1-1 issues concerlling God and evil. Although I am conscious of the strange mixture of good and evil in our bvorld, I am more mindful of how important it is to orient oileself properly toward these realities. I dedicate this book to my sons, Aaron and Adam, in ~vhomI take great pleasure and delight. They are certail~lptwo immeasurable goods in my life that show me just how much value there is in a ~vorld that contains evil. Their goodness even makes me a better person, My fatherly hope for them is that thcy will resist evil in all its forms and that thcy will love and seek the good in all things.

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The Prob ern of Evil and Its Place in Philosophy o f Ke

Something is dreadfully wrong with our ~vorld.An earthquake kills hulldrcds in Peru. A pancreatic cancer patient suffers prolonged, excruciadng pain and dies. A pit bull attacks a mo-year-old child, angrily ripping his flesh and killing him. Countless lnultitudes suffer the ravages of war in Somalia. A crazed cult leader pushes eighq-five people to their deaths in WBco, Texas. Millions starve and die in North Korea as famine ravages the land. Horrible things of all kinds happen in our world-and that has been the story since the dawn of civilization. Today's news media thrive on things that are wrong in the ~vorld,on bad things that h a p p n to people every day. Rlevision parades vivid images of war, ixurdcr, devastation, and suffering before our eyes. Newspapers report rape, abuse, maylncm, and disaster.

an Existence In June 199 1, Time magazine asked the question, "Why?"-"Why does evil happen?"' In the cover essay, journalist Lance Morrojv reviews the rz~ultitudeof eviils that haunt our cox~scioust~ess-from Hitler's Auschwitz to Saddanl Husscin" invasion of K~~wait, from KKK hangings of black men in prc-civil rights Mississippi t o the AIDS epidemic. Kight there in a pok3ular ixagazinc, Mr~rrowraises age-old questions in an article starkly titled "Evil." Is evil an entity! Or is evil the immoral and inhulnane actions of persons? What about bad and hurtful things that are out of our control, such as disease, floods, and mental illness? Is nature responsible? Why does evil seem

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so fascinating and alluring to the hulnan lnilld while good seems so uninterestiilg and boring! Does evil serve some purpose, or does it just happen! Why has the human race not seemed able to understand evil, to conquer it, to shut i t out! ThoughtFul people raise penetrating questions about evil and seek to nnderstand what it reveals about the hun2an condition. In a feafi~reartiTork Times Ma~azinc,Ken Koscnbaul-n seeks to probe cle in the the meaning of evil. The cover of the magazine reads "Evil's Back," and Rosenbaum's article inside carries the title "Staring into the Heart of the Heart of Darkness." Koxnbaum's piece sets the stage by recounting how Susail Smith of Buffalo, South Carolina, murdered her mro young soxls, He reheal-ses the f'acts that a whole tlation now knows aXI too well: Susan Smith drowned her two little boys by strapping them into the child safety seats in her Mazda and sending the car rolling down an embankment into Jobn D. Long Lakc. She then manufactllrcd an "ordeal" to deflect attention fro111 her crime. Playing on racial prejudice, shc claimed that an AFrican American car jackcr had kidnapped hcr two childrm, and she pled desperately on television for a search for the car jacker a i d the children. Yet, kzithin nine days, she confessed to killing three-)rear-old Michael a i d f o u r t e e n - m o - d Alex. Itosenbaurn observes that one Local tabtoid called Sxnith" action an "evil deed." What is imyressive about this pronouncemmt is that the secular rze\\rs media would make it. In a day when electronic and bxintcd media typically prefer to assume a "relativity of valuesm---avoiding difficult issues about ixoralit~thcolog>r,the ixeaning of life, and our place in the cosmos-it: was blurted out. There it was. Sol-nething was actually declared "evilv--pure, unadulterated, ullmistakable evil-by the press. No141 all the hard questioils are laid on the tabie and have to be faced: What is evil? Why d o humans have the seemingly vast capacity to harm others? If there is a good God, why does he permit innocent people to suffer!2 There is something about the Susan Smith case that evokes our harshest moral judglnents and gets us asking all of thosc hard questions. Kosenbam cannily observes that "the great tabloid stories arc the ones that raise thcologiml questions.'Yct he quiclcly aclcnowledges that we canilot talk about evil-)r about good, for that matter-~rithout solne definitions. Those definitioils lead us to larger theories about the origin and existeilce of evil in our midst, and those theories lead us to even larger conceptions of the meaning of life and the nature of ~vhateverSupreme Being might exist."

Although our age is acutely conscious of the bnidespread existence of evil in humall life, past ages have certainly been akvare of its profound significance. AImost no other theme recurs in great literature more often than that of humanity's capability for evil. I n ancient Greek tragedy? for example, the tragic hero is a person of noble status and lofty aspirations who is eventually undone bccausc of a profound character flaw, k n o w as hztbrts (pride). All of the tragic hero's other virtucs become disjointed as his flaw subtly ruins his life. Russian author Ftrodor Dostoejrsky treats scornfully the comforting llotion that humans are always rational and good. In a famous passage from 7 % ~ Broth~rsKara~~azuv, Dostoevskp protests such wild optimism about humankind: "I can't endure that a man of lofty rnind and heart begins with the ideal of the Madonna and ends with the ideal of Sodom. What" still more awful is that a man with the ideal of Sodorn in his soul does not rcnouncc the ideal of the Madonna, and his heart may be on firc with that ideal, genuinely on firc, just as in the days of youth and innocencc,"4 Our hui-nan inaibifiq to 1ivc up to our owvn high ideals is a perpetual puzzlement. The paradoxical depravity and perversity of hulnalliry are treated quite poignantly in Dr. Jebyll n ~ z dMr. Hyde. Robrrt Louis Strvmson's frightening fable records how the decent Dr. Jekyll came under the power of a transforming drug: "It severed in me those provinces of good and ill which divide and compound mall's dual nature. I \ras in no sense a hypocrite; both sides of me wcrc in dead eamest; I was no morc ixyself when I laid aside restraint and plunged in shame, than of knowledge or when I laborcd, in the eye of day, at the f~~rtherance the relief of sorro~rand sufkring."j As time %rent on, the thought of evil represented in the person of Mr. Hyde no longer filled Jekpll with terror: "I sat in the sun on a bench; the animal within me licking the chops of memory; the spiritual side a little drokmed, promising subsequent penitence, but not pet moved to begin. I began t o be aware of the telnper of my thoughts, a grcatcr boldness, a contempt of danger, a solution of the bonds of obligation."" The apelike creature had diabolically gained control of Jekyll: This was the si~ockl~lg tiling; that the slime of the pit seemed to ~tttercries and voiecs; that the amorphous dust gesricl.rlated and 811ncd; that what was dead, and had no shape, sho~xldusurp the offices of life And this again, that tile ii~surgenthorror was knit to him closer than a wife, closer

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12robigmoj'E27i1 and I2hilnsophy nfRel@Zon tl-ran an eye; lay caged in l-ris flesh, where l-re l-reard it rrittxtter and felt it struggle to be born; and at every hour oft.rreakness, and in the corlfidence of sltlmber prevailed against him, and deposed him O L Xof ~ life.7

Dr. Jekyll confesses the terrible truth that he is radically both natures: "It was the curse of mankind that . . . in the agonizcd womb of consciousness these polar wins should be continuously struggling."g Paul, tlzc early C.:hl-istian evangdist, recognizes the war ~vitbinhimself: "I do slot understand my own actions. For I do slot do what I want, but I do the very thillg I hate. . . . I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what X do."Vn a sirnlfar vein, St. Augustine recounts his unhappy predicament in his Confcssio~zs:"I was bound, not with another's irons, but by my own iron will. My will the enelny held, and thence had made a chain for me, and bound ixe."l@This personal aspect of cvil most closcly coincides with what the Judeo-Christian Scr-ipturcsdescribe as "sin. " Once we recogilize the existence of something that can reasonably be called persollal evil, we must then also recognize that it has collective as well as illdividual dimensions. Organized crime syndicates, militant emerging nations, oppressive social structures, and profit-crazed multinational corporations are, in a real sense, the social extensions of personal evil. On both individual and corporate levels, one of the saddest features of hulxan evil is its strangc adrnixtllrc with good or apparent good. Marriages are wrccked for lack of mutual understanding, educafiond col-nmtlmiticsarc m k n n i n e d by disagreement about how to pursue colnmosl ideals, political parties are throknn into disarray by excessive ambition, and nations are ripped apart by struggles for power. Although we are perplexed by humanin's capaciq for evil, even the best of us are someti~ueshurt and even crushed by the ilupersonal forces of the universe. These forces know nothing of human agendas or purposes and tend to thwart all that we hold dear. Herlnan Melville deals 144th this thcrnc in Moly Dick. <:aptain Ahab of the Peguod, forq years a whaler in thc first half of the last century, sets out from Nant~xcketon what appears to be a long ~vhafingcruise, Little does anyone b o \ v that Ahab's journey is not seamail's busiiless but a quest for the meanh~gof life. Ahab had lost a leg in an earlier ellcounter with Moby Dick, a great white bnhale, then the terror of the seas, and is nokn bent on destroying it. The captain is obsessed with the meanillg of human existence in the face of overwrhclming natural forces. Ironically, the

whale is white, a color often taken to symbolize what is sacred and holy; but the whale is fearsome and hostile to hulnall values and, in the end, triumphant. Ishmael, the ship's only survi\rol; claims that in losing his life Ahab discovered its meaning." The modem world knows all too well that this disturbing picture of life-life being ruined and finally snuffcd out by forces bcyond its control---is a realistic onc. There is no denying that persons often fall victiln to psychological and physical forces beyond their control. Rut quite apart from how these forces affect humall interests, they crrtai~llycause much pain and death ~rithinllature itself. A%AAlered Lord Tellllpson reminds us, nature is ""rd in tooth and claw." "rvival of the fittest is btiilt into the mechanism of anilllate nature. Few anir~aXsare .Free from attack by stronger animals or from suffering and death due to shifts in their environment. Although animals d o not possess the higher selfconsciousness of hulllans, they still obviously feel pain and cndurc suffering. T h o u g h t f ~ ~ people l tind it very puzzling that the world shorrld work in such a way as to maim, torture, and destrr~ylarge pmportiolls of these subhumall creatures. At the end of any catalog of ills that plague the world comes death. All thillgs ekrentually die. But death is a particularly acute probleln for the human species because we humans sense that our existence has value and worth, that our agendas have merit, that we deserve to go on living and building our lives. And yet death stands as the final enem); the last evil wc illust face; it puts an end not only to our doing and undergoing further evils but also to our pursuing our most cherished dreams. Thus, death is radically foreiw to all that is within us. Ludwig Wittge~lsteillobserves: "Death is llot an event in life: we do not live to experieilce death."" Death is the end of life. H. F. Lovell Cock5 urites that the termination of one's omrn personal existcllce is the "great human repression, the univenal 'complex.' Dying is the reality that [persons] dare not face, and to escape which [they] summon all [their] resources."lVhose who have thought long and hard about the human condition know that death is arguably thc most fearsome of all evils. After pondering evil in the ~vorld,wc may be tempted to echo thc sentiment in the chorus of T. S, Eliot's Mg~drpi"in the CTallhedg~al: Here is no continuing city, here is no nbidin~sgay. Iil $he ~~i;tzd, ill the zcz"me,g1.ztrergain the plpufit, ccrtai~zthe da~wer.

Olatg latg I&& is $he fime, mo h4 n ~ rongn d ithe jfega"; Evil $he windJ an& Itz't&;erthe .re&, .qrgy the skj5 ky,greycqreygrcy.1"

grid

Unfortunately, this profo~undand inconsolable pessimism appears to be natural and warranted when the troubles of hu~llanityarc taken scriously. All of the bad things that happen-horrors that we humall beings commit toward one another, awful evellts that occur in nature, and terrifving kvays in bnhich nature threatens human interestcfall ullder the rubric of evil. Simply put: There is evil in the world. It is in the nekvs. It is in our common experience. I'opular periodicals even grapple with it. Quite apart from any precornmitment to a specific theory of cvil and how evil fits in to a larger interpretation of lifc, thcrc is a virtual consensus that something is deeply wrong with our ~vt?rld, that things d o not always seem to go as they should, and that much too often evellts happen that are utterly dreadful. It is in this broad sense that we sap, "Evil exists."

Evil and Religious Belief As people through the centuries have reflected on the meaning of life, fhcy have had to come to grips with the pcrsisknt and pervasive prcsence of evil. It is not surprising, then, that every major religion addrcsscs cvil ~cithinits ullique kamc ofrcfcrencc.jVor Buddhism, evil is the goal. illherent in huinall existence, lnalung ilonexistence (~zirvnnn) For Hinduism, evil belollgs to the world of illusion ( m a p )and cyclical rebirth (snmsam)kom which we must seek to find release. For Zoroastrianism, e\ril is an eternal cosmic principle that opposes the good. In The Sacgped Calzopy, sociologist Peter Kerger ~vritesthat one function of eilrry religion is to provide a way of understanding life, of fitting the events of life into a meaning&[ pattern. He explains that religion imposes order and l a h l n e s s on cxperienccs that sec113 to be chaotic and destructi1.e---rnost notably? the phenomena of suffering and death. Thus, religion imposes a numos, or la~llfulexplanation, on other\\ise anolnic features of existence. Berger is worth quotillg on this point: The anomic gl-renorritena mLlst not only be lived tl-rrough, they n ~ u s also t be explained-to wit, explai~~ed in tcrms of the nornos established in the

socieq in question. AI expla~lationof these pl-re~~ome~~a in terms of retigious Xegi timatio~ls,of whatever degree of theoretical sophistication, may be called a theodicqr. It is irnporta~ltto stress I-rere particularly (alttlo~xpb tl-re sanle point has already bee11 made generally with respect to religious legitimations) tttat s~tchan. expla~ratior~ need not ex~raila complex theoretical sysrexn. The ilititerate peasant who commenB q m n the death of a child by referring to the will of God is e~lgagi~lg in tbeodicy as much as the icarxred ttteologian who writes a treatise to demtsr~stratethat the suffering of rhc innocent does not negatc the conceltGorr, of a God both ailgood and all-po\"iierf~~l, All tl-re same, it is possible to differentiate tl~eodicies in terms of their degree of rationalir~i,tttat is, the degree to ~~hiclt. ttlcy exlrtdl a theory that col~crentlyand consistently explaixrs the pbellonlella in question in ternls of a1 over-all vie\v of the unitrerse. Such a theory? of cotrrse, once it is sociall~~. established, may be refracted or1 different lcr,rels of sapt~isricatiunttlroughoc~tthe socieqf. 'Ph~s,the peasa~lt, when he speaks abo~xt:the will of God, may hill~selfintend, however inarticulatel~p,the majestic theodicy corlstructed by the tttec~tc>gial~.lb

So, what a religious system sa)Ts about evil reveals a great deal about what it takes ultimate reality and humanity's relation to it to be. Hence, the credibility of a religio~lis closely linked to its ability to give its adherents categories for thinking about the presence of evil. Although evil poses a challenge that every major religion must address, the challenge to Christianity is particularly formidable. There seems to be a scrious tcnsion bcfi4rcen what Christian theolog). affim3s about thc unrivaled power, nnlimited knodcdgc, and unrelenting Ir>w of Cod, on the one hand, and what it admia about cvil in God's cceated order, on the other. Many persolls think that the Christial Godif He really exists a ~ isd the source a ~ guaraltor d of value-\wuld not dtow the world to be as it is. This is the crux of the issue for Christian beliet:, it has traditionally been knowrn as the problem of cvil. Throughout historj: Christian theologians and philosophers have ~vrestledwith this problem. Thoughtfill and sensitive laity have also felt the need for at least a gcncral explanation of how to relate God and evil. The conundrum seems unavoidable. Aficr rc\?iewing all the evils that haunt our contenlpr>rary consciousness, Lance Morrow raises this prccisc problem at the end of his Tirne magazine article.17 Son~ethinkers believe that unless Christian believers have an acceptable solution to the problem of evil, they have 110right to hold their distinctive theological position or to ask others to adopt it.18 Philosopher T. W. Settle argues that grappling with the problem of

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evil is a "prolegomenon to intellectually honest theology."" Thor Hall proposes that the ability or illability to generate an allswer to the vexing problem of evil is the lionus test of the "reasonableness of thcology." Hall says that Christian thinkers must "he capable of handling honestly the actualities of human existence (realities which we all know) while at the same time providing a fralxework for explicating responsibly the essential affirmations of the faith (affir~nationswhich arc given \niithin the historical traditian)."zo The positioll that is put under direct pressure by the presence of evil is known as "theism." Theism ~naintainsthat there exists a Suprelne Being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. William Rowe calls this position "restricted theism."2l Theism as such is not itself living religion but forms what we might call the basic conceptual foundation for several living religions: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Thc total bclicf fraixeworks of these actual religions involve adding certain other signiticant religious beliefs t o restricted claims contheism. Restricted heism conjoined with other rcligio~~s stitutes what Kowe calls "expanded theism." The presellt study treats Inally of the i~nportalltdiscussions related to the basic theistic foundation of Chrisrian belief (i.e., restricred theism). After all, insofar as evil presents a challenge to theism, it presents a challenge to any version of expanded theism. Howriver, this study also considers some issues related to larger sets of Christian beliefs (i.c ., various <:hristian versions of expanded theism). These sets of Christian beliefs particularly come into play whm considering various responses t o the challenge posed by evil. Thcsc largcr sets of Cl-rristiail beliefs are coilstituted, of course, by restricted theism conjoined with additional propositioils about God's general purposes in the world, the role of Jesus C:hrist, life after death, the human condition, sin, and so forth. The specific propositions with which restricted theism is augmented-drawn from such sources as church creeds, biblical interpretation, and common Christian experiencedetermine the exact version of expanded theism at issue. Although we may refer to any one of these versions as "Christianit\rmor "Christian bclicf' or '"hristian thecllog!;" we will mt>rc mgularly use the rnore precise rubric ""Cl-rristiantheism.''

The Philosophical Difficulty Let US say that the essential problem here for theism (and thus for any version of Christian theism) is that of reconciling belief in an all-

po~verful,all-kilo~ving,all-good deity with the belief that there is e\il in the bnorld. But exactly what kind of a problem is this? Speaking more precisely, the difficult}! for theism lies in rebutting an argument that alleges some kind of conflict between beliefs about God and bereally, any one of several liefs about evil. An argument from e\5l---or, and conclusion. It is arguments from evil---has a structure, pre~l~ises, actually the conclusion of any given argkllnent from evil and the rcasons for that conclusion that are a "problem" for theism. In the follokning pages, I will use the term problem ofevil simply as a synonym gvil.22 h d there is not just one problem or argufor nvgz~me~ztfronz lnent from evil; there are actually Inany different arguments. Scholars have identified se\reral major types of arguments 6orn evil, noting their key strategies as well as characteristic theistic responses. These arguments have various roots. For one thing, the problem of evil expresses a kind of moral protest and so involves categories of good and evil. For another thing, the problem involves religious bclicfs about the existencc and naturc of God, giving it a distinct thcological aspect. Yet the problem of evil is best understood as a philosophical problem. In its traditional role, philosophy clarifies and ailalyzes our beliefs, exalnilles them for logical consistency and coherence, and evaluates their adequacy for explaining iluportant human phenomena. These philosophical features make the discipline of philosophy the natural home field for the problem of evil. There arc, of course, illany areas of philosophical concern, and each is determined by the exact sct of ideas and issues that arc exalxined: philosophy of science, philosophy of illind, philosophy of language, philosophy of art, and so forth. Each of these areas seeks to brillg the key insights and interests of philosophy to bear upon the relevant topics. This mealls that typical philosophical yurstiolls about reality (metaphysics), knojvledge (epistemology), and value (moral theory and axiology) are appropriate. And questions about the structure and acceptability of relevant arguments (logic) are always in order. The s~lbjectat hand, the problem of evil, falls within what is traditionally k n o w as the philosophy of religion. It is the task of philosophy of rcligion, then, to bring thcsc characteristic questions t o bear on significant religious concepts and belieE5, such as those related to God, miracle, prayer, and faith. Philosophers of religioll have always been deeply interested in the question of whether there are rational grounds for either belief in God or disbelief in God. Impressive arguments have been constructed to show that God exists-such as the ontological, cosmolog-

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ical, and teleological argumellts.23 Likeivise, a number of serious arguments have been adiranced t o show that God does slot exist. Among those arguments against God's existence, noile has been more prominent than the problem of evil. In the experience of evil and reflection upon it, humanity reaches the extreme limit-confronting the decisive question of the ixeaning of life, of the sense and nonsense of reality. Hans Kiing states that thc problem of evil is "thc rock of athcismm24 because so Exany pcoplc bclievc it t o be intractable. This accounts for the lively and ongoing discussion of the probleln in philosophy of religion. But \vhh one might ask, should this philosophical problem be relevant to faith? Faith is personal commitment, deep abiding trust, firm conviction. Faith is much more than abstract reasoning. Why should the intricate arguments and counterarguments of philosophers affect religious faith at all? A sensible answr, it would secln, runs along the following lines. Athough, granted, faith is morc than Exere intcllectual assent to a set of beliefs, it is at least intellectual assent. Athough faith is a personal trust in God, that trust is based on a slumber of important beliefs about what God is like and how persons Inay have a relationship t o him. These beliefs are subject to philosophical scrutin!: critique, and defense. Thus, there really is no responsible way to insulate religious faith from philosophical reflection. And there is certainly no jvaj. to insulate i t h m the philosophical problem of evil.

The Cllassif car-ion of Evil Recognizislg the probleln of evil as a serious challeilge to Christiail theism, it might seem advisable to begin our i~lvestigationwith a precise definition of evil. Homrever, the attempt to offer a specific defillitiosl at this point frequently ladens the meaning of evil with preconceived ideas and thus hinders objcccive discussion. Some thinkers, for example, define "evil" in theological terms as "sin" and consider the problem only in this light, reducing all evils to spiritual xbellion again^ God and its consequences. Other thinkers definc "evil" as "finialdew and thcn treat ven human pcrversiv----as the inevitable results of creatllrclp limitation. Defislitions of "evil" could be proposed and debated indefinitely. Therefore, it is advisable for present purposes to leave open the questioil of definition a ~ proceed d with a broad, cornmollsense slotion of evil evoked by the things we typically call "eiril." lxegardless of how we define it, we are all aware of the existence and profusion of evil. It is entirely possible to identify a whole spec-

trum of evellts and experiences as "evil." The set of comlnoillp recognized evils includes, at the j7eryleast, such things as extreme pain and suffering, physical deformities, psychological abnormalities, the prosperity of bad people, the demise of good people, disrupted social relations, unfulfilled potential, a host of character defects, and natural catastrophes. This list specifics the sorts of things that arc colxmonly considered evil ~vithoutprejudicing later discussions. In yhilosophial parlance, this list indicates thc c.~tensionof the term "evil" (i.e., all thillgs to which the term applies) bnithout speci@ing its exact intension (i.e., all that the term implies). The eloquent eighteenth-centur~~ skeptic David Hume follo~vedthis approach when 11e listed a sampling of the world's ills: "a hospital full of diseases, a prison crolvded with malefactors and debtors, a field of battle strewed with carcasses, a Reet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under ryrannj: faixine, [and] pestilence. Evil indeed has many faces, faces with ~vhichwe arc all too falniliar. Since the wide range of evils can be vcrp conf~~sing, most philosophers make a helpful distinction beween moral evil and natzlral evil. 111 lnarking out the difference bemeen the t\jrobroad kinds of evil, Alvin Plantinga writes that "\\re must distinguish beween mofpal evil and n&t-gg.nle~z'l.The former is evil wl-rich results f?om free hurnan activity; natural evil is any other kind of evil. "2"s Plantinga admits, the distinctioll is not very precise. Yet this salnr point is made by John Hick: "Moral evil is evil what we hulxan beings originate: crrrd, unjust, vicious, and perverse thoughts arid deeds. Natural evil is thc evil that originates independently of human actions: in discasc bacilli, earthquakes, stonns, droughts, tornadoes, etc."27 Edward Maddell and Peter Hare provide a sinlilar classification: Phj~ical!e~z'l,we shall say, Cle11~1testhe terrible pain, suffering, a ~ l duntimely death caused by evetlts like fire, Rood, la~~dslide, htirricarle, earttlquake, tidal wave, and fainine and by discases like cancer, leprosy, and tetanus-as well as the crippli~lgdefects and defor~ltibeslike bIindness, deah~ess,dtimbness, shrivefed limbs, and illsanity by which SO rnany scl~rtenrbeings are cl~eatedof the full benefits of Iife. . . . Mo~-sal evil . . . d e ~ ~ o t both e s rritoral wrong-doing such as lying, cheating, stealing, torturillg, and murderilIg and character defects like greed, deceit, cruelty, gi,wantar~ness, cowardice, and selCshx7iess.2"

Other authors do not depart far from this same general approach. Although we could debate the exact boundaries bet\\reen natural and moral evil, the basic distinction performs a helpful classificatory

it2

12robigmoj'E27i1 and I2hilnsophy nfRel@Zon

fu~lctio~l. It 110t only helps clarifp our thinking about evil but also allows us t o divide the general problem of evil into subsidiary problems related to moral and to natural evil and thus guides further stages of inquiry. In his penetrating treatment of the problem of evil, David Hulne shows he is alvare of this iznportant distinction. Hume observes that, in naturc, "the stronger prey upon the wcaker" m d ""thc wcaker, too, in their turn, oftcn prey upon the stronger, and vex and molest thcm \\;icbout relaxation." Achowlcdging that brr111aniq can organize into societies and thus avoid some of the harm zlature might do, he insists that humalls morally mistreat each other: "Oppression, injustice, contempt, . . . ~riolence,sedition, war, . . . treacherh fraudby these they mutually torment each other, and they would soon dissolve char society which they had formed were it not for the dread of still greater ills which must attend their separation."29 Quite apart from technical philosoph!~, the distinction behvecn natnral and moral evil rkzns through most great literature. "The "f"yger'" by William Blakc is a powerful poetic expression of the problcill of natural evil. The poem forcefully raises the issue of whether a certain instance of natural evil (e.g., the threat of being attacked by stronger mimals) could have been created by the Gr>dof the C:hristian faith.

Ty&er! Twer! burni~gbright 1%theforests of' the n&bt, W ~ Lim~.e.lo~$al ZL ha;l.cdor eyle G"og/d@gme [email protected]!pf-ll. ~ y r n ~ ~ e ~ ' r y ? In tvhat distant d e e p or skies Burrzed thefir6 ofthifze eyes? On 117hatwings dafpe he aspigee? Whnt the hand dar~seize thefir&?

Whar I J ~ C~ ~ P % zwhat ~ c It-hg ? ~ h a i?~ z In tvhatp6mace was thy brain? Whnt the anvil? what dreadgrasp I h v e its dead& termrs clnsp?

Whg~zt h stars ~ threa~dolv~ztheir spears, And 137~~.tergd h e l ; t ~~7Ztb e ~ ~ th~iartggrs, ])id he smz'lg his wofpk t o .re&? ])id he $@ad& the Lg$.%zb $.%zake Bee?

q g e ~ !T~ger!Itgrvtia8 b~$&ht: IB the for^gs~'s of the %&h$, W ~ &immor~al G h a ~ dor eyle Darg @me thy fearful syrn metry l.3"

We also find the problem of moral evil in great noirels. Dostoevsky's classic The Rruthcr.r I
Notes X . Lance Morro\;c; "Evil," Time, June X 0, X 991, pp. 48-53. 2. 'l'he use of the masctxline gcnder pronocln here docs not imply that God is rritale, Historical Judeo-Chnstiar~views of God have affirmed that sexuatiq is a creattrrely reality not reflected in God. My use ofmascrrline gcnder proxlotrns wbex~referring to God tbraughot~tthis book, then, ;followsthe tradition tliat requires us to use i~~lperfect earthly terms and i~~lages to talk about God, I a ~ x ~using i d any new?revised God-language here, which wotrld raise some very interesting but also very sophisticated contro~rcrsies.X retain traditional usage simply for the sake of econclmy and getting on with the issl-~es at hand. 3, Roil XXosexlba-itm, "&faring into the Heart of the Heart of l>arkl~ess?" New T0a.k ?Z'YM.~S'M ~ ~ ~ S( f Zt ~Fn 4, eZ 1995): ~ 36-44, 50-58,61, 72. 4, Fjmodor Dc~stoelirskj?~ ?he B~.ot;t-Jers Kararnazo~~ trans. Collsta~lceGari~ett (New York: Norton, X 9761, p. 97. 5. Itobert Lauiis Srevcnsan, Y79e Stra~tqeCnse of 131.: JgkyII and HjtcZe (LR~ndon:Folio Societ!r, 19481, p, 124, 6, Ibid., p. 127. 7. Ibid., p. 146. S, Ibid., pp, 1 2 4 1 2 5 , 9. Rt~rn,7:15 , 18 b-li 9 New Xteviscd Standard Versiotl. Paul7$lfamerltatior~ should be read in context: See Ram, 7:15--20, 10. Arlgt~stine,Confessions, 8.5.11). X X . Herman hlelvtl'le, fJz"ck, eds. H, Hayford and H. Parker (New York: W, W. Nortor-1, 1'367). For a. cfisctxssio~lof this vision of life, see Henry A, Myers, Tg*g~~dy: A View ~f-'Lfc(Itl~aca:C:ori~eil University Press, l BSd), pp. 57-77, and Echard Sewall, The Visiun of T$#g~edy (New Haven: Yale IZniversiq3 X959), pp. 92-1 05. 12. li~Ct~rig Wittgenstein, ?kactnt$is Lo~z'cn-l-"hz'lmopk~z'c~s, trails. D, F. Pears and R. F, McGrtix~ness(London: Rcjudecige 8. Kegaxl PauX, X97X), prol1oskion 6.43lX, p. 147'. 13. H. F, Lovelf C:ocks, By Egi&ljAhlalze ( h n d o n : Tame? CCkarke, 1943), p. 55. X 4, T. S . Eliot-, ,Wu$edepcZ'Y~ Ca$bedfp~l: "Oc Chf%plet:~ Poems (New Yc~rk: Harco~rrr,Brace, 19521, p. 180. 15. Such rritatters are disc~~ssed in John Itoliiker, Probie~~s of SzgJir~i~2.~ ;P% RlirIi~Zons(~-8hcWofeld(Cambridge: Cambridge U~~iversiry Press, X 970). 16. Peter Berger, lfhe Snc~vdCanopy (New liorlc: Doublcda); X967), pp, 53-54. X 7 . hiorrow, ""Evil," p 551. 18, In response, same Christians hold that believers may instead argtle of approaches are possible here, that they do lot need a theobicy. A ~~t~t-rlber For examplle, a believer may argue that S~IICC the problem of evil does not co~~clusivcly disprove her position, she need nor answer it. Or a believer may argue that she has c ~ n v i ~ l c iproc~f l ~ g of Gc)Cf7sexistence on other grounds

and l-rence that she knows the problem of evil must have some answer. She may even say that t ~ e rbelief in God is so basic that it supersedes efforts to prove or disprove it. Tlzls line of tho~xghtis discussed in Chapter 4. However, it is fair to say that there are differing opinions about whether any way of avoiding the problem of evil can be cornhrtabfy accepted. After all, Christian theis111 p ~ ~ r p o rto t s explain relevant feattlrcs of huxnall existence, brrt evil does slot seem to fit well into the expfanation. Therefore, there is at feast a prima facie case that the Christian theist must make good her clairn by addressing the prablcrn of evil. 19, T. W, Settle, ""A Prc~lcgomenonto Intellectudly Honest ~ ~ l ~ e c ~ ~ c ~ Phz'lnsr,phical Fo~*zrlm1 ( 1978): X 36-1 40. 20. Tf'hor Hall, """Theadicyas a Test of the XZeasonablc17tess of rrhealog3'? R~iz8icrf.l. i;rzL f e 4 3 (1974): 204. 21. FViltiam Rowe, ""Evil and the 'Theistic Hypothesis: *AL R ~ S P O I It oS ~ ~ a 12bilnsophy t nfRel@Zon it 6 ( 1984): 95. kvjrksrra," h8gf*natiuv2atJ ~ ~ u a pJbr 22. Da~lielHoward-Snyder distinguishes bet't.\reen the ""poblem of evil" and the ""argurnexlt: from evil" hi1.1his edited vofrrme T%aE~idertt.z"alrl~ume~t.8 j?om Epil (Ufooxnington: Indiana. Ux-rivcrsiy Xzrcss, X 996), pp. XI-XIX. 23, For a disc~-rssionof most of the major issues related to jiihether there are rational grounds fbr beiievixlg in God, see Michaet Petersoxl, FViIliam EIasker, Uruce Reict~cx~bach, and David Basingcr, IZeaso~i!a n d ReIigioz6s BeZiefi Ia~rod%ctiu~t ;t-o ithe Pi?z'lusnpk3y c?f"Relvicrfz,2nd ed, ( N e w York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 24. Hans KGng, 61*tB P ~ aBCjhri~tz'g~z, ~ trans. Edward Qrrinn (Garden City>N.Y.: Doublednj?, 1974), p, 432. 25. David Hurne, Dialr~ailicsC u n c e r n i ~ iNg~ural ~ Reli~z'ort,cited in Michael L. Xzetcrson, ed., 279~12g#oblemof Evil: Selected Readin:&$(Notrc Darrite, Ind,: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992),p. 42. 26. Afvin Planti~lga,G d , Fffig~dom~ alzd E ~ i (Grand l k~pids,Mich,: Eerdmans, 1977)),p. SO. 27, J o h ~ lHick, E ~ z ' and l $he Chd @'Love, re\: ed. (Xew k r k : Harper & Rtxv, 1975), p. 12, 28. Edward Maddell and 13cerer Hare, Evil nlizd ithe C o ~ c e puf'CT"od t (SpringGeld, Ilt.: Charles C, Tltomas, 1968), p. 6. 29. Hrrrne quoted in peters or^, ed., " I e Paeoktbm of Evil, p, 4 1. 30. Willam Blakcc, ""'l'lze Tyger," lfhe firtable B l ~ k e ,ed. AIkcd k z i n (New York: Viki11g Press, 19681, p, 109, 3l . IDostoevsky, B~~oghefps IC&3fiamk7t2~)27, pp, 224-225,

Suggested Readings

16

Yl2e 12robigm oj'Evbl and 12hilnsophy ofRel@Zon

Davis, Stepbeill 'I". "Why Did This Happen to h%eZ-The Patieilt as a P I I ~ ~ O S O ~ ~Patz"~~~e$o~%)n C T , ' ' Scrnip.~na.j) B Z . E ~ ~ 65 ~ L I( 1972): : $ ~ 61-67. FIiek, lot11-t. "The 1%roblemof E-\7il." "1x7. Y%e E~zcyclopediaoj'12hilosop13j~.Edited by Paul Edivards, New York: Maen~illanand Free Press, 1967, pp. X 36-1 41. Hume, L3avid. L>z'ala~$~es (Iloncer~zk~z~ Ngt.zza.nl Reli8ion. Parts 10 and l l . Edited by H. IT,Aiken. New York: Hafner P~xblisbing,1955. Lcwis, 6, S, "E58Patoktleutz c$'P~ain, New Vc>rk:Macmittan, X 962. Macktsh, Arct~ibald.1.B. Boston: FIougbton Miffliin, 1986. h%elville,Hermarr, ~W~by-Dich, Edited by H, Hayford and Hershet Parker, New York: W, W, Norton, 1967. 13cctersan, Michael L,, eb. If79e 13~coblemof Evil: Selecgcd R e a d i ? ; ~ ~Notrc , Dai~le,Ind,: University of Notre Dat-rite Press, 1992. Pike, Nelson, ed. CTIOd ~ a l ~ EPZI: n! R~ndZplt~s OIEt^h& 29;JeolrgicalP~~oblem of-E~zlt, E n g j c ~ ~ o oClttffs, d N .l.: X%rei?tlce-Hall, 1964. Wiesel, Elie. N@b$.rlI"rarrslatedby Stella Rodi+?a~r. New Uork: Bailtarn Books, X 960. . Y79e 2 k i d of God. Trmnslatcd by Marian Wicsel . Ncw York: Schoclccl~ Books, 1979,

The Logical Problem o f Evi

The problem of evil has both theoretical and existential dimensions. The theoretical problerns deal with logical and epistcmic reladonships bcmeen propositions about God and evil. The existential dimension of thc problcm pertains t o one's deeply personal response to evil and overall sellse of the \north of human existence. Leavillg discussioil of the existential probleln until Chapter 7, I devote the interveiling chapters t o three important statelnents of the theoretical problem. philosophers ~ calnr to make a distincDuring the 1970s and 1 9 8 0 ~ tion between two broad b~ersionsof the theoretical problem. The logical problem revolves around the question of consistency alnong key theistic propositions. The evidential problcm involves evaluating propositions about God in terms of the facts of evil. I discuss two ways of advancing the evidential proble~llin Chapters 4 and 5. Here I focus on the classic logical probleln of evil.

Statement of the Problem The logical problem of evil (also called the a priori problem and the deductive problem) arises on the basis of an alleged inconsistencjr bemeen certain clai~xsabout God and certain clailns about evil.1 Historically, thc discussion of this problem has developed as critics attempt to expose an inconsistenc)~among theistic beliefs and theistic philosophers attempt to show j4rh.hy there is n o inconsistency. Oxford philosopher J. L. Mackie sums up the atheistic challmge: "Here it can be shobnn, not that religious beliefs lack ratioilal support, but that they are positively irrational, that several parts of the essential

theological doctrine are illconsistent with one allother."2 Si~lcebeillg logically consistent is necessary for a set of beliefs t o be rational, Mackie's charge is very serious. Mackie clearly and forcefully states the logical problem: "In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is ~vhollygood; and yet evil exists. There serlns to be some contradiction bemecn thesc thrcc propositions, so that if any hvo of them wcrc true the third would be false. But at thc salllc time all thrcc arc essential parts of ixost theological positions; thc thcolo@an, it seems, at once 1 ~ ~ ladhere s t and calznot cufzsirtently adhere to all three."3 If Mackie and other critics are right, then the dilemma facing the theist is whether to retain his theistic position and the propositions that constitute it (and thus be saddled with a contradiction) or m relincluish one or more of the relevallt yroyositions (and thereby escape the contradiction). To el-nbracc a contradiction is irrational, but to surrender any kcy theistic bclicf is to abandon standard thcism. Two centuries ago, David H t m c (following Epicurus) poscd the difficulty with stark clarity: "Is [God] \villiilg to prevellt evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not uilling! Then he is malevolmt. Is he both able and willing? Whellce then is evil?"")r consider H. J. McCloskry's succinct statement: "The problem of evil is a very simple one to state. There is evil in the ~vorld;pet the ~vorld is said to be the creation of a good and omnipotent God. How is this possible? Surely a good omnipotent God would have made a world &cc of evil of any kind."Vilnilar expressions of the logical problem arc abtxndant in the philosophical literature. If we isolate for closer inspection the propositions that critics commonly have in mind, we get the following list of propositions: ( 1 ) God exis&; (2) God is all-powerful; (3) God is all-good; (4) God is all-knoiving; (5) Evil exists.

The set of beliefs ( 1)-(4) is what Kowe calls "restricted theism," a positioil that the theist, by jrirtue of being a theist, lnust accept. However, the ypical theist also accepts (5) as an element in his overall position. The critic, then, maintains that the set (1)-(5) is logically ir1consistetlt.

The Structure and Strategy of the

ent

Before embarking on a complete discussion of the logical argument from evil, it is helpful to review the general concept of inconsistency or contvadictiun.6 Actually, there are seveml types of contradiction to consider. One type is a certain kind of proposition---a conjunctive proposition in ~vhichone conjunct is the denial or negation of the other conjunct. Consider the following proposition: ( 6 ) Socrates is mortal, and i t is false that Socrates is mortal.

The first conjunct (Socrates is mortal) and the second conjunct (it is false that Socrates is mt~rtal)car111ot both be true. WI-tat we have here is an explicit contmdiction. Thc bwoblclll, of course, is that one who asserts a contradiction cannot be advancing a position that is cornblletcly truce By mctl~ods found in any elesnentary text on logic, wc can know that a contradiction is a proposition that is necessarily false. Interestingly, k~lo\ving the actual truth or falsity of the conjuncts in a contradictory proposition is not required in order to know that it suffers from inconsistencjc Presumably>few people commit such flagrant errors in thinking, Mackit: speaks of a set of theistic propositions being inconsistent or containing a contradiction. Rut what does it illcan for a set t o be inconsistent or contradictory? WC may say that a set of propositions is explicitly contradictory if one of the mcillbers is the denial or ncgation of allother member. For example, consider the follo~ingset:

(7) Socrates is mortal ( 8 ) it is false that Socrates is mortal.

By conjoining these two propositions, we get: the familiar contradiction (6). A sct from which such a contradiction can bc gcncratcd is explicitly contradictory in the scnsc in. qtrestion, In Illany cases, howc\rcr, a sct of propositions is contradictory but the colltradiction is not obvious, not explicit. In these more difficult instances, the charge of inconsistency can still be made to stick if ordinary rules of formal logic can be used to deduce a contradictioll.7 Let us develop an example to show how this works. Call the follo\\~ing set: A:

(9) If ali snen are mortal, then Socrates is mortal ( 10) All men are mortal (8) Tt is hlse that Socrates is mortal. Using the logical rule morlgs punens (if p, then q; p; therefore g), we can deduce (7) Socrates is mortal

from (9) and (10). Proposition ( 7 )is logically inconsistent with (8). Since it is not possible for propositions (7) and (8) both t o be true at the salnr time; the set from which they are drawn is contradictory. We shall say that set A is fbrmally contmdictory because we can deduce an explicit contradiction from its member propositions by the laws of formal logic. Admittedly, this cxamplc of an inconsistent set of propositions is a simplified one; seldom do such easy cascs occur in ordinary lifc. In fact, the propositions that form an inconsistency in an opponent's position are sometimes not stated at a l , So, the critic is faced witl-1 the double task of first producing all of the rrlrvallt unstated propositions and then drawi~jgout the contradiction from the fully articulated position. In such cases, the sets of propositions in question are implicit4 contradictory. For a third cxamplc, let us reflect on the following propositions as forming an implicitly contradictory set: ( 1 1) Socrates is older than Plato ( 12) 131atois older than Aristotle ( 15) Socrates is not older than Aristotle.

s not explicitly contradictory; it This set-jvhich I will designate is also not forlnallp contradictory. We cannot use the laws of logic to deducc thc denial of any of these propositions fro~xthe others. Yet there is an important sensc in which set B is inconsisrcnt or contradictory. That is, it is not possiltle that its three members arc all true. Now, it is ~ e c e s s ~ ~ r$rpzte i [ y that ( 14) If Socrates is older than Plato, and Pfato is older than Aristotle, then Socrates is older than Aristotle.

If we add (14) to B, \W get a set that is formally coimadictory Employing the laws of formal logic, (1I), (12), and (14)yield the denial of (13). Now we have succeeded in lnaking the i~nplicitcontradiction explicit. WC were able to deduce the cotltradiction in this set because we employed an additional proposition that is necessari!y truc. There are actually different varieties of necessary truth. The truth of solxe bwopositions----such as (15) below----can be established by the laws of logic alone. ( 15) If all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal.

This expresses a truth of logic. Yet the truths of arithmetic and mathematics generally are also necessarily true, such as

Furthermore, there are Inany propositiolls that are neither truths of logic nor truths of lnathematics but are noiletheless llecessarily true, such as (14). A few more examples of this type of necessary truth would be (17) Bachelors arc unmarf-lcd males ( 1X ) Blue is a color ( 19) No numbers are horses. Let us call the type of necessity with which we are dealing here bt~oadlylogical necessity. There is a correlative kisld of possibility as well: A proposition p is possibly true (in the broadly logical sense) just in case its negation or denial is not necessarily true (in that same broadly logical sense). Necessity and possibility in the broadly logical sense lnust be distinguished from another scnse of necessity and possibility. That other necessiq?and possibiliq. Fur instance, sense is cngml!or ~agggffial (20) Michael Jordan has lcapt over the Sears Tower.

is a propositiosl that is possibly true in our sense of broadly logical possibility. Yet in the sense of causal or natural possibility, it is not

possible at all. Human beings-ejren great athletesjust d o not have the physical endo\\rments required for such a feat. There are a number of propositions, furthermore, about which it is difficult t o say whether they are or are not possible in the broadly logical sense, thus giving rise to philosophical controversy. For example, is it possible for a person to exist in a disembodied state? Without attempting to S C M ~thc more subtle philosophical yroblcins lurking in this area, we now arc in a good position t o define what it mealls for a set of propositio~lsto be ivnplicitly cuntlpadictory: A set S of propositions is implicitly contradictory if there is a necessary proposition p such that the conjunction of p with S is a formally contradictory set. Alternatively, we might say: S is implicitly contradictory if there is some necessarily true proposition p such that by using just the laws of logic, we can deduce an explicit contradiction froix p together with the mcmbcrs of S. Now that wc have defined thc concept of implicit contradiction, we arc in a position to understand how Mackic frames up the logical argumellt from evil. His atheistic challenge is esselltiallp that theism is a system of inconsistent beliet5-hat is, that a coiltradiction can be derived from central theistic propositions about God and evil. Hobnever, the contradiction is not an explicit one. In addition, it does not appear that a formal contradiction can be deduced from basic theistic propositions. So, Mackir and other critics who make this argument arc faccd with the task of supplementing the basic propositions of theism with one or more necessary truths in order to deduce thc fjtal contradiction. In fact, Mackie's strategy is t o speci5 additional propositions that relate to the meanings of key terlns used in the original set of theistic propositions: The contradiction does not arise immediately; to S ~ O L Vit we 12eed some additional premises, or perhaps some quasi-logical rules ctzrlnecting the terms ""gad," "evil," and ""oxnnipotel~t.""l'lze additional principles arc that good is opposed to evil, in ssrch a way that a good thing always etimir~at-esevil as far as it can, and that there arc no fixnits to \%?hat:an olnlliyatcnt thing can do, Froxn these it follows that a goad olnlliyatcnt thing elimi~latesevil completely>and then the propositions that a good omnipotent- ttting exists, and that evil exists, are ir~compatibte,"

Here we have Mackie's %.ay of generating the contradiction. In the vigorous debate that surrounded the logical problem, critics tppically used supplemental propositions from the following list:

(1') God is a real being independent from the world (2') An omnipotent being can bring about any logically possible state. of affairs (3') A wholly good being is opposed to evil and tries to eliminate it as far as it can. (4') An omniscient being knows everything that it is logically possible to know (5') The existence of evil is not logically necessary. One can readily see how each proposition here defines or extends the meanings of cemal theistic claims. The atheistic critic maintains that propositions such as these, together with the original set of theistic propositions, generate a conaadiction. Other supplemental propositions become relevmt as we consider the se-verd dilslfinct versions of the logical problem.

Versions of the Logical ent The atheistic critic's basic suategy is to demonsuate how the essenrial theistic claims are implicitly conuadictory. And these critics have not differed significantly over the set of theistic claims that contains the conuadiction. As we saw above, the following set is gequently cited: (1) (2) (3) (4)

God exists; God is omnipotent; God is omniscient; God is wholly good. (5) Evil exists. For brevity and clarity, let us abbreviate the theistic position expressed by propositions ( 1)-(4)in one complex proposition:

(G) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists. Any question about (G) is equivalent, then, to a question about one or more of the propositions that are incotporated into it. Our subse-

quent analysis will focus on the issue between those atheists who advance the charge of inconsistency and those theists who refuse to give up (G) or any of its constituent propositions in order to escape the charge. Such defenders qualify as true the is^, whereas those who re-

linquish or modiQ (G) are actually quasi-theists' whom we shall discuss in Chapter 6. Actualllr, there are three distinct versions of the logical problem of evil, with each version being determined bp exactly which proposition about evil i t employs. As we have srm, man!, critics (Hume, Mackie, McCloskcy, and others) takc the belief in the existence of evil---expressed in proposition (5) above---to form an inconsistent set when conjoincd with set (1 )-(4). And clearly, this formulation of the problem has been the most ~ridelydiscussed. Hobnever, other critics do not believe that the incoilsistency arises \vhen some proposition about the sheer existence of evil is added to the set of propositions (1)-(4). Instead, they hold that the Inore ilnportant logical problem of evil is formed by adding to (1)-(4) some proposition about the great extent and prohsion of evil. Plantinga recognizes that this second formulation of the problem is open to the critic who ~vouldsay that "God's existence is not consistmt with thc vast naguz-zRt and an.ie$y of moral evil the universe actually contains."'Q A tllird version of the logical problem, a version that does not focus either on the sheer existence of evil or on its profusion, has been raised by a few critics. Terence Penelhum, for example, insists that "it is logically i~lconsiste~lt for a theist to adrnit the existence of a pointless evil."" The critic raising this version of the logical argument assumes that the theist believes both that God exists and that pointless evil exists. WC may now distinguish threc versions of the logical argument fro111 cvil, depending on ~vhichproblelnatic belief about evil the critic attributes to theism. The critic can fommulate an argument t o the effect that (G) is inconsistent with any one of the three propositioils below:

(EI) Evil exists;

(Ez)Largc amounts, cxtrcmc kinds, and perplexing distfihrxtions of evil exist; (E3) Gratuitrstrs or pointless evil exists. When conjoined with (G), each of the prcccding propositions detcrlnilles a different forsnulatioil or jrersion of the logical problem. Let us develop a helpful taroilolnp of the logical problem, as presented in Figure 2.1. All three versions of this argtlsnrnt here are exactly the same in having a purely deductive structure and a strategy of deriving an implicit contradiction.

FIGIJW 2.1 Versions of the Logical Argtlmel-tt koxn Evil I

I1

111

Since Versioll I is clearly the most influential a ~ most d btidely discussed formulation, we shall treat it as the paradiglnatic jrersion of the logical problem of evil and give it close attention. Besides, most of the analysis of Version I applies mutatis rnutandis to Versions II and III. The esserlce of Version X is that the theist believes in the existex~ce and relevant perfections of God, on the one hand, and that therc is this set of beliefs to evil, on the other. Tbc atheistic critic ~~ndcntands be implicitly contradictory. Casting the diffic~~lty in tcrllls of the prccise propositions in\rol\red, we have the follobving logical situation. The theist is officially committed to

(G) h omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists as well as to

(E, ) Evil exists. Ho~lrever,it appears to the atheistic critic that propositioll ( G ) ,when supplemented by the appropriate necessary propositions, entails

(-EL) Evil does not exist. Now i f (G) does entail (-EL), then the theist is unwittingly committed to both (El) and (-El). This means that his beliefs arc inconsistent because both (El) and (-El) figurc into his theological position. In order t o vindicate himself rationally>the theist must clarify and rccollcilr the propositio~lsthat supposedly generate the contradiction. It is comlnonlp ageed that the alleged contradiction is not immcdiately forthcolning from propositions (G) and (E,). So, the critic must invoke the strategy previously explained for exposing ilnplicit contradictions-that is, she must add certain propositions to (G) and

26

The Logical Problem of Evil

(El). Let us review a representative selection of auxiliary propositions often cited by the atheistic critic: ( 1.1) God is a real being transcendent from the world (2.1) God can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, including the elimination of evil (3.1) God kno\vs everything that it is possible to know, including how to eliminate evil (4.1) God always seeks to promote good and eliminate evil (5.1) The existence of evil is not a logically necessary state of affairs.

Now, from (G), together with (1.1)-(5.1),

it follows that

(-El) Evil does not exist, a conclusion that clearly contradicts (El). At this point, the atheist seems t o have made good her charge of inconsistency by deriving fiom the theist's position two logically incompatible propositions: (El) and (-El). Obviously, by the law of noncontradiction, these nvo propositions cannot both be true at the same time and in the same sense. Hence, anyone holding both propositions is irrational. The reasoning behind this indictment is not hard to grasp and resembles the third example above, in which unstated belief (14) had t o be supplied in order t o set up the contradiction. Theists say that God exists and has a definite character. It is natural to presume that God's character can be used as a basis for explaining (and perhaps predicting) his actions, even actions related to evil in the world. For present purposes, this means that the terms in proposition (G) have specifiable meanings that can be delineated in additional propositions such as (1.l)-(4.1). Furthermore, there is no logical necessity that evil exist, as indicated by (5.1). From (G) together with (1.1 )-(5. l), it is a fairly elementary exercise in deductive logic t o derive (-El) Evil does not exist. Yet evil does exist, and its existence is recognized by the typical theist: (El)

Evil exists.

The classical logical problem as rrpresellted by Version I is thus forged. This is the kind of case that Macke and many other atheistic critics articulate. Other propositions would have to be stated in order to forge Versions II and III. For instance, a proposition much like the folloiving ~vouldbe needed in Version 11:

(4.2) God" ggodness wodd scck to prcvent or eliminate large amounts, extrelne kinds, and perplexing distributions of evil. Something like

(4.3) God's goodness would not allow gratuitous or pointless evil to exist. would be needed to articulate f ~ ~ lVcrsion ly III. But wc need not pursue discussion of these versions here. The strategy is the same for all jrersions of the logical problem of evil. The atheistic critic derives a contradiction from a set of propositions that the theist allegedly accepts. How shall the theist respond?

The Burden of Proof In assessing the state of thc debate bemecn the theist and the atheistic critic, it is helpful t o rcvicw how the logical problem of evil develops. The theist holds a set of beliefs, and the critic claims that they are inconsistent. This places the initial burden on the critic t o state the inconsistency, to drakv it out, to make it obirious. The critic's stratem then, is to attempt to generate a contradiction h m a designated set of the theist's own beliefs. Otherwise, i t ~vouldnot be possible to make the accusation that the theist" belie& are incot~sisterltstick, Once the critic has made the opening fora): thc theist illust respond by showing what is wrong with thc critic's case. Consider Version I of the logical problem of evil, which we have chosen as a no del. Here the critic maintains that the theist holds contradictory beliefs, (G) and (E,). In order t o bring this contradiction to light, the critic lnust show that (G) ultimately entails (-E,). If the critic can do this, she will thereby show that the theist's position in-

volves both ( E l ) and (--h), the belief that e ~ iexists l as well as the belief that evil does not exist. This is a plaill contradiction. For Version II, the critic's strategy would be similar. She ~vouldneed to deduce two propositions from theistic commitments: one stating that there are amountc, kinds, and clistributions of ez5l that God \;vould not allow and onc indicating that those amounts, kinds, and distt-ib~ltions exist. This ~vouldconstitutc a contradiction, For Version 111, thc required atheistic strategy is now quite familiar. It must be proved that the theist is commitred to the belief that God bvould not a11014 rratuo itous e ~ i and l to the belief that gratuitous evil exists-again, n ~ contradictory beliefq. The significance of the charge of logical inconsistency is not difficult to comprehend. Two propositions that are inconsistent cannot both be true at the sarne tixl~eand in the sarne sense, such as

(2f ) &nt is a grcat philosopher and

(22) It is not the case that Kant is a great philosopher.

Any position involving such a contradiction, then, cannot be ~vhollp true, In the issue over God and evil, the critic decZares that it is not possible for both (G) and some (E)-like proposition t o bc true and yet that, on sorne grounds or other, the theist is committed to both. Although the burden of deducing a contradiction from thcistic beliefs rests squarely on the shoulders of the atheistic critic, Alvin Plantinga has correctly stated the coilditions that any critic lnust meet: "To lnake good his claim the atheologian must proiride some proposition which is either necessarily true, or essential to theism, or a logical consequences of such propositions."'z Clearly, there is no logical problem for the theist if he is not committed to each proposition in the set or if the set does not rrrally entail a contradiczion. If the critic uses an additional proposition. that is necessarily true, then the theist must accept it because it ixust be accepted by all rational people. If the additional propositioll is esse~ltialto any theistic position, then the theist must accept it by virtue of beillg a theist. And of course, the theist lnust accept any logical callsequence of his propositions as well. The critic's aim is to show that it is not possible that both (G) and (El ) be true. If she can come up with an additional proposition

set of propositioilsthat the theist must accept and derij~ea contradiction froin it together with the other relevant theistic propositions, the theist is in serious trouble. Theistic defenders, such as Plantinga, maintain that i t is enormously difficult to come up with a proposition that meets the conditions of being necessarily true, essential to theism, or a logical consequence of such propositions. On these grounds alone, theists illay argklc that it is far from clcar that it is not possible for both ( G )and (EI) to be truc. Exteilding the theistic respoilse further, Plailtinga pioileered a method for showing that it is possible for both (G) and (E,) to be true-a method that can presumably be used against the charge of inconsistency aimed at (G) and any (E)-like proposition. Succeeding at this task is equivalent to denpil~gthe claim made by Mackie and others that i t is not possible for both (G) and (El) to be true. According to Plantinga, the theist need not show that both propositions are in fact true in order to rebut the critic's charge. Rebutting the charge of inconsistency relies on making some fine distinctions in the meanings of key theistic terlns (e.g., omnipotence) and then on supplying addiof a theistic tioilal propositions that reflect a possible ullderstal~dil~g worldview. These maneuvers directly challenge the critic's auxiliary definitions and thus block her ability to deduce a contradiction from theistic beliefs. In Chapter 3, I elnbark on a hll-scale discussioll of what l'lantinga and other theists have done to defend against Version I of the logical problem of cvil. I particularly focus on a conteinporary theistic rcspan" "own as thc Frce Will Dcfense, which has already become classic, Ho~ve\ier,1 will first bliefly rehearse some of the basic mows that theists can make to defend against Versions 11 and 111, although these versions, ulllike Versioll I, have not attracted widespread interest. In addressing the challenge posed bp Version II, theists have lnaintained that critics have not successfully shown belief in God to imply that he would limit the evil in the world to manageable amounts, kinds, and distributions. Theists can construe divine goodness, power, and knowrlcdgc. as ablc to allow very large ai-nounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing distributions of evil. God ~xightdo this for a number of different reasons: for example, to preserj7ea wide range of free humall choices or to allow the regular operation of impersoilal natural objects. Theists taking this line in effect argue that they need not accept some of the additional propositions that critics use to deduce a contradiction from key theistic beliefs. So, i t is not clear that

critics can establish that theists hold beliefs that imply both that God limits the amounts, kinds, and distributions of evil and that those limits have bee11exceeded. Theists who respond to Version III grapple with the charge that they are committed to the yroposition that God would not allow gratuitous evil, as ~ve11as the proposition that gratuitous evil exists. The working assumption of the atheistic critic here is that theism recognizes the existence of very sc\lerc evils as long as they havc some point or meaning. Ho~vejrer,certain stock responses suffice to refute the critic's formulation for Versioil 111. Thc theist can take a wry traditioilal approach and argue that he is not really com~nittedto (E,)that is, that he does not belieire that gratuitous or pointless evils exist. He can argue that his position necessitates that all evils, no matter how severe, must be meaningful or justified. Many theists understand their position in prcciseIy this wily The theist who has this orientation ~llightevm venture some explanation or range of explanations dcsigned to cover paidctxlarly troublesome evils. Some theists, however, coilstrue their position differently and actually accept (E3).These theists must take a different tack, then, in defellding agaillst Version III of the logical problem. They can seek to point out that the additional assumptiolls that the critic emplojrs to derive the contradiction-such as (4.3)-are neither essential to theism nor necessariljr true. Since this line of discussion is very rare in the philosophical literature on the logical problem of evil, I will wait to analyze it fully ulltil Chapter 5, where it surfaces in relation to the evidential problem. We can now see that tbc issrzc before us turlls on the abiIiq of critics, on the one hand, to show that theists lnust accept all of the propositions they use to drd~lcra contradiction and on the ability of theists, on the other hand, to show that they need not accept all of them. The only appropriate grounds for insisting that theists must accept the propositions are that they are either necessarily true, essential to theism, o r a consequence of such propositions. Habring framed the debate in this manner, I must note that an impressive number of critics have been convinced that serious logical difficulties exist for thcism, and thcy havc labrlrcd vigorously to bring them to light. Likewise, there are a ll~zmberof theists who have taken seriously the lnatter of logical inconsistency and have kvorked diligently to defelld against such attacks. At present, there is a large consensus that theistic maneuklers have been very effective and that the burden still rests on the shoulders of the critic to produce the contradiction. In the next

chapter, I \\.ill turn t o the line of debate in the philosophical literature that is \%idelpthought to support this sentiment. Notes X . 'The following works employ tttese differctlt labels for the problem: Wlllialn XXmve, PhZ'10~0phyof R e l i ~ i o n :An Ipztf*p.odzaction(Encino and BeImont, Caiif.: nickenson, 1978), pp. 80-86; Micl-rael L. Peterson, ""Christian Theism a11d rite Problem of I:xri.il,'"fozjs~nnl @'$beE ~ n ~ g e f i c 'gf bl c o l f ~ i c gSl~ c k rtli~cds:A St$641!of eo! 21 (1978): 3 5 4 6 ; and Nvin Plantia-tga, God and OtIi"ef# ithe Ratzonnl J%sr~ific~c.zlon of' Belzef in C7'0d (Ithaca: Gi~rnellU~liversirjrPress, X 967), p* 128. 2.1. L. Markie, ""Eil ilalld Oxnnipotexlrce," Mind64 (1955): 200. 3, Ibid. 4. David Hurne, Dialoggggs Cr~nce~~i.tz'~g8 Natzgral Rel&Z'on, ed. Henry ID. Aike1-t (New York: Hafner, l04S>,p. 66. 5, H. J. McGloskey, "The Probient. of Evil," fizitr~~znl of Bible n~zdR e l z ~ b l r ~ ~ 30 (1962): 187, 6. I will follow Xzlantinga3 discussion throughout this exposition. See his <$od, F~*eadn~z$, and Evil (Grand bpids, Mich.: Eerdma~ls,1877), pp. 12-24. 7 . Ir~~ing, M, Copi and Car1 Cohen, I ~ ~ t ' ~ ~ o n ! ~ ~$0l .IJ[@ic) i c r n IOgh Editiol-2 ( El-tgje~~aod GM&, N. J .: 13rrcl-ttice-EIatl,1998), pp. 342-301 . 8.Mackie, LCE\ril and C31ltniipotence~"p. 2209, 9. This terminolou is borrot.crcd fiorn Edward hiladclell and Peter Hare, Evil and the Concept. of Chd (Springfield, 111.: Charles G, 'rboxnas, 19681, chap, 6, pp. 104-136. 10, Pla~~tinga, a d , Freedom, alzn! E ~ i l p, , 55, ,4ls0 see remarks in his 2 % ~ Natzlz~eeof Nece~ssir;y(Oxford: Clasendon Press, 19741, pp. 190-191 . 1l . Tere~~ce Penell~sznl,""Divir~eGoodness and the Problcnt. of Evil," ~ I I Rrndz~tgsin thr: Philosophy oj' Re1biol.t: A n Artalyzic Approlach, ed. Kaructt. d N.J. : Xzrea-ttlce-Hall,19741, p. 226. Brody ( E n g j c ~ ~ a oCliffs, 12. Pla~~tinga, God n~zdOther Minds, p. 117.

Suggested Readings Adarns, Marityn M,, and Rt1bet.t: M. Adams, The P$eoktlg~gof E ~ i l New . Vc3t.k: Oxf-isrd Univtrrsiq 13rrcs, 1990. New York: Sel-rockenBooks, 1971. fi-rern, N. B, 7be Problem ofE~z"l, Feihet-g, John S. 'f bc M ~ PF- ~E X~oj-Evil: S ?!leulo~icnlS;liic~cm$ a ~ z d$be PaeobEe~la of Evil. 2nd ed. Grand Ibpids, Mict~.:Zondertran, 1994. Fletv? h ~ t o n y"Divir~eCjmnipotence and Human Freedom," Hibbert Joszr% @ l 5 3(January t 955): X 35-144,

Gale, fichard, f h ithe Ngtz~.rg&and Ekis$~~zce (?f1<;od, Gat-rtbkdge: Cambridge University Press, X 99 f . Mackie, 1. I,. ""Eil and Omniporexlrce." Mind 64 (1955): 200. . ""The Problem of Evil," h Inbe Mia~acbc?f' Thezfm. Oxford: CXarendon Press, 1982, McClosltejr, H. J. CJod and E ~ i l Thc . Hagtlc: Martinus Nijhoff> 1974. Peterst~n,Michaet . ""Evil and Inconsistency. " Lci~phin(A gst~*alia)18 (July X 979):20-27. 13ectrsan, Michael L,, eb. 279e I3~@ob7lem of Evil: Selecgcd R e a d i ? ; ~Notrc ~, Dai~le,Ind,: University of Notre Dat-rte Press, 1992. Petersoil, Michael, Wiltiarn Hasker, Brrrce Keichenbach, and Davtcl Basinger, IZeaso~i!and Reltgiozi Beliej An I7il?t~~odi?.l,cirz'01:~ to the 13hZ'Io~-ophj~ ofl<eIz"~ion, 2nd ed. N e w York: Clxford U~liversityPress, 1998, chap, 6, pp, 116-1455. Plantinga, A h n . Chd grid mhefpMinds: A Stud31o f ~ h eR~k.$io'~nnlJz#s~z$~at:I:on ofB~lz'cfirtGod. Itfiaca: Corncll Univtrrsiq Prcss, 1967. . <;od, F~~~ednm, and E ~ i k Grand . h p i d s , Micb .: Eerdma~ts,1977. . "Irie Na1:2.trc~ f ' N e ~ e s sOxford: i~, Glarelilrdorl Press, 1974, . "Which Worlds Could God Have Created?" Jour~wlof1>kilosophy70 (1973): 539-552, Keichenbaclt, Kruce. "The Dcducti\re Argtrment from Evil," '$clphi&( 2 ~ s tralz'n)20 (April 198l): 2 5 4 2 . . E ~ it%nd l n Chad C;od, N e w York: Fordhat-rt University Press, 1982.

The Function o f Defense

Just as we have classified the two major versions of the problem of evil into the logical and cvidentini formulations, wc Exay also classi@ thc WO illain responses to the problcill as dgf~.fenseand theodicy. The aim of defense is to show that antithcistic arguments from evil----either logical or evidential-are not successful on their own terms. The gelleral aim of theodicb by contrast, is to give positive, plausible reasons for the cxiste~lceof evil in a theistic universe. Defensc has come to be tbc theistic strategy most closely associated with discussions of the logical formulation of the problem of evil, ~vhereastheodicp has come to be associated with the evidential formulation. Much controversy has arisen over the rclativc nced for defensc and thcodicp, and wc shall latcr scc how thcsc differences play out in the litcraturc on God and evii.

The Free Will Defense The present task is to review and e~~aluate a very fascinating and instructii~epart of the debate over the logical problem. Taking Version I of the logical problem of evil as a point of departure, Akin Plantinga developed a response that has now come to be known as the Frec Will Dcfensc. Plantinga's famous Frcc Will Dcfense was produced in both 1967 and 1974 rcnditions.Wincc the latcr rendition exploits the most curreilt and sophisticated ideas in forlnal logic, I uill use it as the basis for the present discussion. As we have seen, philosophers such as J. L. Macke have charged that it is logically inconsistent for a theist to believe that

(G) h omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists and that

(E$)

Evil exists.

This accusation is tantamount to claiming that it is not possible for both propositions to be true together----that thc conjunction of (G) and (E,) is necessarily false. The critics' strateg is to try to produce a proposition that is at least plausibly thought to be llecessarily true and whose conjunction wit11 our original two propositions formally yields a contradiction. Defenders insist that critics have never produced a plausible candidate for this role. In fact, many theists through the centuries-perhaps inspired most notably bp Augustine---have thought that thc theme of free will provides a basis for rejecting the critics' charge that God and evil arc incompatible. Although full discussion of St. Augustine's view of evil appears in Chapter 6, 1 lnust note here his emphasis on di~rinelycreated ti-ee \till: "If man is a good, and cannot act rightly uilless he wills to do so, then he must have free will, j4rithout which he can not act rightly. We must not believe that God gave us free will so that we might sin, just because sin is committed through free \vil1."2 The point is that our humanity is of great value and that free will is necesbccausc sary to our humanity. Hulxan beings have moral sig~~ificance \VC have the ability to make choices that arc. morally right or Fvrong. Yct God cannot give us the power t o make morally right choisxs uithout givillg us the power to make morally wrong olles as well. So, in order to have the good of humanity itself as well as the good choices that humanity might make, God lnust perlnit evil. Many theists through the centuries have found St. Augustine's reasoning on this lnatter very compelling. Alvin 131ar>tingais well known for applying this line of reasoning in a very specific manner to the precise way in which the charge of inconsistency was formulated. Against the logical problem, he crafls a defense. Unlike Augustine's discussion, ~vhichaffirms the reality of creaturelp free will, Plantinga's discussion turns on the pure logical possibiliv of such. As Plantinga recognizes, the success of the defense hinges on a certain understandillg of what is meant by a persolz's bei~zg f k e with respect to alz acgion. For the Free Will Defender, if a person is free with respect to an action, then he is free either to perform or to

refrain ~ o the m action. No causal laws and alltecedent conditions determine that he -will perform or not perform the action. In other words, at the time in question, it is ~vithinthe person's power to perform the action and within his power to refrain from performing the action. What it means for a person t o g o ,uroncQ ,pith respcct t o a morally rignz$cant action is for it to be wrong for him to perform it and he does or Fvrong for him not to and he does not. According to Plantinga, a preliminary stateincnt of thc Frcc Will Defeilse bvould go as follo~vs:A bvorld contailling significailtlp free creatures (\\rho can freely choose benveen good a ~ evil) d is more Iraluable, all other things being equal, than a world containing no free creatures whatsoever, God, of course, can create free creatures, but then he cannot caase or dctermilze that they only pelfor~uright actions. Doing this would preempt their significant freedom. Hence, there is no way for God to creatc creatures capable of moral good without thereby crcating crcaturcs capable of moral evil. Conversely, God cannot eliminate thc possibility of moral evil without eliminating the possibiliw of moral good. The fact, then, that some creatures have gone kzrong in the exercise of their freedom since the dawn of creation does not count against God's oln~lipotenceor goodness. Having gained a sellse of this perspcccive, we may now state the central claim of the Free Will Defensc: I t is possible that God could not have created a universe containing moral good (or a5 much moral good as this one contains) without creal-ing onc containing moral cvil.

The Compatibilist Position Critics, of course, are not ullfalniliar with the recurrillg theme of free uill in ~nuchtheistic thought. h t o n y Flew and J. L. Mackie raised a very important objection to the Free Will Dcfense that had to be met before the defrnse could be totally effective. The objection rests on the claim that it is logically possible that there could be a world containing significantly frcc beings who always do what is right. Sincc there is no contradiction or inconsistency in this claim, it lneans that there arc possible worlds containing moral good but no moral evil. Since God is omnipotent-and thus can briilg about any logically possible state of affairsGod lnust be able to create a bvorld containing moral good but no lnoral evil. 111 other kvords, God lnight have made people so that they always freely do the right thing. As Flew expresses it, "If there is no contradiction here then Omnipotence might

have made a bnorld inhabited by bnhollp ~rirtuouspcople."3 If this is sr], then, as Flew says, ""the Free Will Defense is brokell-backed," and "\re are back again with the original intractable al~tinomy."" Flew is not alone in voicing this line of reasoning. Mackie puts it forthrightly: If God has made men such that in their kee choices they sometii-rites prefer wlitat. is good and sometimes \%?hatis evil, why could he 110t have rnade rnen such that they always freely choose the goad? If tliere is n o logical i~npossibilityitit a mail's seely choosing the good on one, or on scverat occasions, there catlIlot be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing the good on every occasion. God was not, then, hced with a choice between nitakiilg innocent autoi-ritata and making beings who, in actirlg freejy, \%rouIci sometimes go wro~lg:there \%?asopen t o ltirn the obviously bctrcr possibiliy of making bei~lgswho would act k e l y b t ~ t always g o right. Clearly, his failure t o avail l~imsetfof this possibility is inconsistent- with his beillg both omnipotent and ~7hoXlygood."

The positio~lchalnpioncd here is known as compntibilism. It is the view that keedonl and determinisnl-even divine detern~inism-are compatible. Put another Ivaj; the compatibilists' point is that the propositioll

( 2 3 ) God brings it about that human beings always choose what is right is logicaly consistent with the proposition (24) humall beillgs have free choice. This position directly opposes the Free Will Defense, which, as Ivr have already seen, relies on an i~zcvnzpatibilistpositioll: the view that ( 2 3 )and (24) are logically inconsistent. As wc would expect, the controversy behvccn Frce Will Defenders and critics historically rcvolved aro~undthe issuc of how key concepts such as omnipotence and free will should be understood. Although the Free Will Defellder may agree with critics that a world in which all persoils freely choose to do what is right is indeed a possible bnorld, he seeks to qualifp our understandings of free will and omnipotence in a Ivap that avoids the dilelnma presented bp the critic. Obviousll: the critic here believes that an omnipotmt deity can create just any

logically possible ~rorldhe selects. A ~rhollygood deity kvould select the bvorld that is best on the whole, a j4rc1rld that we bvould surely deem to be one in which everyone freely does what is right. At this point, we have come to the hotly contested claim that God could have created any possible world he pleased.6 The defender counters that God, though omnipotent, could not bme created just any possible world. At this point, WC must pause to consider how Frcc Will Defenders have co~llcto frame the issue of free will and omnipotcncc in terms of contemporarjl ideas about possible \vorlds.

The Incompatibilist Rejoinder Since Plantinga is credited with first putting the Free Will Defense in t c m s of thc logic of possible worlds, WC will consider his vindication of incompatibilism.7 We may say that a possible world is a way things could have been, a total possible state of affairs. Among states of affairs, some are actual, and some are not. For example, the iCentz$clzy Wildcats' bctei~wthe c c ~ a i n z z i nbasketball ~" teal@in NC:AA history is a state of affairs, as is Abtpaham Li~zculn'sbctei~zgthe firrt presidcfzt of the U ~ h Stntcs. d However, the former is actual, whereas the latter is not. Although the latter is not actual, it is still a possible state of affairs. Possible states of affairs must be distinguished kom impossible ones, and impossible ones ixust be further distinguished. Both Reth's hnving climbed Mt. E~crcstin five minutesfigt and John ir hnving squa~qd thg circle arc impossible states of affdirs. The foriller is causally or naturally impossible; the latter is impossible in the broadly logical sense. A possible world, then, is a possible state of affairs in the sense that it is possible in the broadly logical sense. Although a possible world is a state of affairs, not every state of aftBirs is a possible world. To have the status of a possible world, a state of affairs must be cvmplctc or maximdl. Socgpatcs' having been executed by dnilzkilzg hemlock is a possible state of affairs, but it is not complete or inclusive enough to be a possible world. Cornplctcness must now bc defined. A statc of affairs S includes state of affairs S' if is not possible that S obtain and S' fail to obtain. Like\yiselsc, the colljunctive state of affairs S bat not S' is not possible. A state of afr of affairs S' if it is not possible that both obfairs Sprecl~desa ~ o t h estate tain. 111other words, S precl~4desS' if the colljul~ctivestate of affairs S and S' is impossible. Now, a complete or maximal state of affairs-that is, a possible ~vorld-is one that either includes or precludes every other

state of affairs. It should be obvious that exactly one possible world is actual alld that at ~nostone possible world is actual. Corresponding to each possible world W" there is a set of propositions that we may call the ltvob on W. A propositioll is in the boob on W just in case that state of affairs to which it corresponds is included in W. Wc ~xightexprcss this idea alternatively as follo~rs:A proposition P is trup in a ~vorldW if and only if P a?o%ldh n v ~been trup if W had been actzlal---if and only if it is not possible that W is actual and P is false. The book on W, then, is the set of propositions true in W: Books, like bnorlds, are ~naximalor complete. A book on a world is a maximal consistent set of propositions. The additioll of just one propositio~lt o it al\\raps yields an explicitly inconsistellt set. There is exactly one book for each possible world. Possible worlds possess some interesting features. For example, a bwoposition p is possible if it is true in at lcast one world and impossible if truc in none. A proposition p is necessary if it is truc in all possiblc worlds. Another feature of possible tvorlds is that persons as wcll as other thillgs exist in them. Clearls each of us exists in the actual ~rorld,but we also exist in a great man)! ~rorldsdistillct froln the actual twrld. These other twrlds are simply possible but unactual.8 To say that something exists in a possible world means that it ~vouldhave existed had that world been actuail, As we begin to turn our thoughts back toward God's relation to possible ~vodds,tvc must notc that it \i\?orsldnot be technically propcr to say that God clpenter any possible tvorlds or states of afiairs. What God crcatcs are the heavens, the earth, and so forth. In performing such actions as creati~igthe heavens a ~ the d earth and all that they contain, God brings about a multitude of states of affairs. For example, God created Socrates, but he did not create the state of affairs colxisting in Socrates' existence. Strictly speaking, we must say that God nctgnlizps a state of affairs, such a5 the state of affairs consisting in Socrates' existence. Accuracy, then, demands that we speak of God as actgallzi~ga possible tvorld, which is of coursc a total state of affairs." After this brief explanation of key ideas rclatcd to the logic of possibfc worlds, wc can now rcturn to our original q~lcscion:C;otrld Cud have actualized just any possible ~rorldhe chose? The se~renteenthcentury Gerlnan philosopher Gottfried Leibniz believed that it is uithin the scope of olnnipotence to bring about any possible t.orld.lO Flew and Mackie, moreover, have already argued that there are possible worlds containing moral good but no moral evil. We know that

the books 011 such ~rorldsform eiltirely coilsistent sets of propositions. Furthermore, as Flew and Mackie insist, if divine omnipotence can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, even a complete possible world, then God must be able to bring about a world containing lnoral good but n o moral evil. Thus, God can make people so that they always freely do what is morally right. The Free Will Dcfender rcsponds that it is not objrious that God, though omnipotent, can bring about j ~ ~ any s t possible world he pleases. Eve13 grailting that God is a ilecessary being (i.e., one that exists in every possible bnorld), not every possible world is such that God can actualize it." In worlds in which the omnipotent God chooses to create free persons, we must remember that the free actions of those persons cannot be determined by causal laws and antecedent conditions. More broadly, if a person is free with respect to t cgggse it ; ~ be u the an accion A, then God does not Itvi?g& it n l ~ u gor that shc does A or refrains fro111 doing A. For if God byin&$ it ahoztt or cags-rs it $0 be casrr in any manner ~vl~atsoever that thc pcrson eithcr does A or does not d o A, then that persol1 is not really free. Plantinga dubs Flew and Mackic's contelltion "Lribniz's Lapse." It is the contention that

(25) God, if omnipotent, could have actualized just any possible world he pleased. The Free Will Defender claims to the contrary that the following is possible :

(26) God is omnipotent, and it was not uithin his power to bring about a world containing moral good but no inoral evil. Plantinga takes for granted that God cannot actualize a state of affairs including the existence of creatures who fi.eely take some action or ~cg He then considers lveak acother; this wotald be ~ ~ ' r oactualization, tualization, which is all the critic really needs for his casc. What is at issue, then, is whether there is solncfhing God cotald have done, some series of actions he could have takm, such that if he had, a given possible world W jvould have been actual. Lct is say that W contains inoral good but no inoral evil. To develop his case, Plantinga provides an argument based on the peculiar behavior of counterfactual condidonals. Rehearsing Plan-

tinga's o~z.11 example, we may imagille Curley Smith, sometime ma)Tor of Boston, who was offered a $35,000 bribe to allow a disputed freeway to be constructed. Suppose he accepted. Now, ponder:

(27)

If Curley had been offered $20,000, he would have acccptcd the bribe

and (27.1) If Curley had been offered $20,000, he bvould have rejected the bribe.

Next, think of the possibk worlds that include the antecedent state of affairs consisting in Cgulqy's bein8 offelfled $2620,000.Then think of two possible ~vorlds,W and W", which arc exac~balike up to thc point in time when Curley responds to the bribe offer. Lct us say that in U: Crrrley acccps the bribc, and in kP, Curley does not. Le.t us call tfic states of affairs shared by W and W* an initial world segment a1d even suppose that God could actualize this initial world segment. If Curley accepts the bribe, then God could ilot have actualized W*; if Curley rejects the bribe, then God could not have actualized W" So, there is a possible world W* in which Curley does not go Ivrong with respect to the bribe offer, but whether W* is actual was partly up to Curlep and not completely up to God. Therefore, we have an instance of a possible world- W*,in h i s casc-that God cotrld not have brought about. Plantinga diagnoses Curley as suffering from what he calls trannvorld depfpa~lity,a terrible malady. M e r defini~lgthe concept of an ilzdividg4al nat8sre or esselzce as the set of all properties a person or thing possesses in every possible world where he or it exists, Plantinga clainls that it is possible that Curley's essence sufkrs from transworld depravity. He states: "If an essence E suffers From trans~rorlddepravity, then it was not within God's pokver to actualize a possible world W such that E contains tile propertics i s f & ~ i ~ c afree n t ~in W and al~j~gys does g?Itla$ is r&bt in W."12 He then ventllres the further observation: It is possible that every crcaturely ess~ncc-e\~ery esscncc, including the propert). of being created by God ufkrs from trmsprorld depravity. From this, it follo~rsthat it is possible that God could not have created a bvorld containing moral good but 110 moral evil. Now the Free Will Defender has made his case against the critics. He has argued that, although there are possible worlds containillg

moral good but n o lnoral evil, it is not within God's power to bring them about. Although W* is possible, it is nut possible for God to bring it about. This establishes that the Free Will Defender's claim that

(26) God is onnnipr~tent,and it was not ~vithinhis power to bfing abo-bat a world containing moral good but no moral evil is possible. Hence, Leibniz's L a p s e t h e claim that God, if omnipotent, can create any possible kvorld-is false. The critic's case fails. Theism has been defended. Fundamental to the Free Will Defender" scase, of course, is a certain understanding of the metaphysics of eeedom and its relation to divine omnipotmce.l3 Theists who have an incomyatibilist ul~derstanding of this matter can then defend theisin bp arguing that bringing about a ~vorlcfeontaini~lgmoral good but no moral evil is a cooperatijre venture. It rcquircs thc uncocrccd concurrence of significantly free creatures; it is not up to God alone. The power of an olnilipote~lt God is limited by the frredoln he confers upon his creatures, given that he chooses to create free creatures at all.

The Cwrent State of the Debate It is now widely acknokvlcdgcd that the Frcc Will Defcnse adequately rebuts the logical problem of evil. As it has turned out, athcistic critics made their best case that the theistic belief3

(G) h omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists and

(E$)

Evil exists

arc inconsistent. Theistic defenders----i\lvin Plantinga, Keith Yandell, Stephen T. Davis, and othersarticulated and amplified the Free Will Dek~lseto shmv that these belief5 are ilot inconsistent. 'Thus, Version I of the logical problem has been laid t o rest. Version II in our taxonomy of the problem is based on the charge that the proposition

(G) h omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists is inconsistent with the proposition

(Ez) Large amounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing distributions of evil exist. According to Plantinga, the salne type of dcfcnsive xnaneuver used against Version I applies t o Version 11. Focusing simply on the alnount of moral evil, Plantinga recommends that the theistic defender argue that somethillg like the follo\\ring claim is possible:

(28) God is omnipotent, and it was not within his power to bring about a world containing as much moral good and less xnoral evil than this one, Again, thc theistic defender here would need to e~nploythe same basic assertiolls previously made in arguing against Versioll I-that God, though omnipotent, calnot actualize a state of affairs consisting in an agellt freely doing what is right, that all crraturely essellces might suffer eom transworld depravity, and so forth. h successhl defensc against Version II shows, in effect, that God's existence is compatible with the existence of as much evil as the real world does, in fact, contain.14 In any event, the theistic defcndcr's strategy against all versions of the logical problcrx is t o show that the two kcy theistic bclicfs in question arc not inconsistent, that thcy arc logicall]? compatible. This is not to say that he must show that they are both true. This \%~ould be too strong a requirement for the defender and illappropriate to the nature of the issue. A kind of minimalist response is all that the purely logical problem of evil really requires: Accusations that theism is inconsistent can be met with vindicatiolls showing that i t is not. As theists have solidified their defensive position, they have exposed one of two hllacics bp critics who adb~anccany version of the logical problem of evil. It appears that critics either beg the guestition by selcctin6 propositions to whiril the theist is not comrnittcd or Iif~ozzl: of cofztext propositio~lsto which the theists are colnmitted and impute new meanings to them that are not fully coililected with the theists' own theological background beliefs. So, the critic might find a set of propositions that invo1j.e a logical contradiction, but doing so is irreleFrant unless the propositions genuinely represent theistic belief.

In the final analysis, the logical problem of evil does not seem to be a promising avellue of attack against Christiall theism. Ironically, the atheistic challenger begins by accusing the theist of committing a logical mistake and ends up embroiled in logical fallacies herself. Although Version I is by far the most popular formulation of the problem, it appears no ixorc effective than the other two fonnulations. All of the fonnulations of thc argurxent arc now thought to exhibit ccrtain sy~~dromatic errors. Adlnittillg that the Free Will Defellse is successful but relnaining convinced that a viable argulnent from evil can still be mounted, srlmc critics have shieed the attentioil to what we may call the ejiidential yrobleln of evil. They agree that defense against the logical problem establishes that no claim about evil, conjoined with other key theistic beliefs, sets up an automatic contradiction. These critics lnalntain that, although evil does not: reveal theism to be inconsistentt the facts of evil constitute evidence against thcism. Using the language of possible ~vorldsthinking, they admit that thc Frcc Will Dcfense shows that there is at least one possible bnorld in kvhich the propositions "God exists" and "evil exists" are both true, but they n~aintainthat this does not shcw that it is reasonable to think that God exists despite the evil in our world, the actual world. Interestingl)r, theists seeking further understanding of the intellectual commitments of their faith have also considered whether the logical problem expresses the only rational concern rciatcd to God and evil. Thus, they also express strong interest in solxe kind of evidential problem of evil. The next chapters are de\?otedto analyzing the exact structure as well as the proper strategy for such a response.

l . A v i r ~Pta~~dnga, God n~zdOther Minds: A 'Cj~aitdy@'$ha Rac.innn;lJ25s88ficn $ion of Rdz'g'ilaz G d (Tthaca: Cornell i1712iversircy Press, 1967), pp, X 31-1 55; ~l 1974), Xzlantinga, Y7fe N ~ g u r eof Necg~xiql( O x f o r d : G l a r e ~ ~ d o13rrcss, pp. 164-195. 2. Augustine, 0r.t Free Choicg of'ghe Will, trans, *411na Rex~jaminand L, H. EIackstaff (New h r k : Babbs-Merrili, li964), bk. 2, chap. l , p. 36. 3, Antony Flew, "Divir~eOmnipotence a ~ H ~ udn ~ a nF;reeCf~)m,"in Ncw E;says in Philosopd3z"cd 2'hcolo8yl, ecis. ,411t01ly Flew and Alasdair MacTrztyre (New York: Macn-tillan, 1955), p, 149. 4, Ibid. 5 . J, L, Mackie, ""Ei(.iland Omnipotence," Mind64 (1955): 209.

6, See Robert M, Adat-rits, LCMustGod Create the Itcst?" in 726 PfpobIe~f$ of' E P ~ /Se/gc$~-ed ; Re@d;En&sfed. Michael Peters011 (Notrc I>ame, h-id.: Ut1iversir-y of Notre Dame 13ress, 1992),pp. 275-288; in tlie same volume, also see Philip I,. Quinn, "God, Mord Perfection, and Possible Worlds," pp. 289-3132, 7 , 'The classical locatiotl of ,ALfvix~Plantinga" ideas on the logic of possiMe worlds and inodal logic is his Nat5et.r: oj"N~cessz'q~~, cited in Notc l . S, Ptantinga, C;od, Fffleedam, and E ~ i (Grand l Kqpids, Mich.: Eerdmarrs, X977), p* 39. 9. 'I3here are a multitude of things that exist but that Gad did nor create. In addition to the fact that God has not created states of affairs, he has not created himself or nurn bers, propoktt ems, properties, and so forth. These havc no begini2ings. God" activity results in sorne states of affairs being or becoming act~xaf,See Plantinga, 7 b e Natuf*gof'Nc~essz'q~~ p. 169, 10. Gottfiied Wilhelm von LJeibiliz, "Xeudiicy: ESSGE~S 0% the Cgorrdng~sof God, the Fr#r:edomoj'Man, a n d $he &k&in of Evil, ed. Austt n Farrer, trails. E, h%,Huggard ( k ~ n d o nRouttcdge : 8r Kegan Pa~xt,1952), p. 127-129. X X . From this point: forbvard, \vc assume that God is a necessary and not a cantingat being, that God exists in all passible worlds. l'lze question before us, tl-ren, is whetl~erGod can actualize just any possible world that i~~cludes his existence. iYe foflow~Planbnga" discussion of \~~hictit wc~rldsGod cotrid havc created, kom his N&CZ.L~*C @OJgccssz"[y,pp. 169-174. 12. Pla~itti~lga, Chd, Freedurn, a ~ z dE ~ i kp. , 53, X 3, A complete statement of the Free FViH Dcfense ~~o-itlci need to take into accoullt a11 of the eleinel~tsthat 131tandnga b~tildsinto it, such as a concept of essences, a hller treatnlelitt of cor~~iterfactr~aIs of freedollit, aiitd so forth. See his Natzgrc of'Ngc~rssz'ty,ppp,X 72ff. 14. Many thinkers, both theists and tl~eircridcs, havc Xong accelttcd the limits to what an o~~iti~ip~)telitt being can pril~cipletl-rat there are no ~zop2Io~Tiicnl do. In other wc~rds,God has the ability to bring about any z'~zt:~*i~zsicrsk.I[~pc~~s bl~rstate of affairs (i.e., a state of affairs the description of which is not logicatty inco~itsistent).God could bring about, for example, white polar bears and tI-iangfes because they are intrix~sicallypossible, but he could not bring about rnarried bachelors and square cirdes bccause ttiey are intrinsically impossible. Howcver, Planti~lgarevises the cotlcept of omnipotcxlce to aIlo\v for the (Le., intrinsihct ttiat there are states ofafcatrs that are passible z'7.z tbe~$gclve~catiy) b ~ r that t are not possible for Chd to bring about. Tllis poiritt depel-rds on a proper ~11lderstandi1.1g of the logic of free witl. If a persoil is free with respect to an action, then whether she perforrns or rekair-ts &am performing that action is up to her, ~ z o God. t A l t h o ~ ~ ga fworld ~ in which all persons a1\%raysfreety d o what is right is cereainly possible, it is not a state of affairs that was within God's pawer to create; all of the kee crcattires in that world would have to l-relp bring it about by their olirn choices. The Free Wi11 De-

fe~lderit~siststhat God cann<)t detc-ermi~zethe actiosls of fkee persons. See Plantinga, The Natzgre of Nec~ssigf,pp, 190-X 9 1. For a. i~elpfrrldiscussion of this matter, see Williarn kvainwrtght, "fircedam and Cjmnipotence," Nosis 2 (1968):239-301,

Suggested Readings Adams, 1Zc)bert M. "Middle ktowlcdge and the XZrobleinof Evil." Aifef*ic~n Philosophical Qtggrgeriy 14 ( 1677)):109-1 17. . ""Pat-rtinga 011 the Problem of :Evil."ln Alpin PlgFzri~wa,cdited by James Tamberiiit and Ikter van Inwagen. Dordrcch t: IZeidel, 1985, pp, 225-255. Basinger, David. ""Christian Theism and the Free Will Defense," "phi@ 19 (July 1980):20-33. (A$~stralin;) . "Determii~isnland Evil: So111e C:larifications."" Agstr;t~-lasian Pzitr~~zal of PbiIt~sc~phy 60 ( IX 982): X 63-1 64. . ""Il)i\iine Omniscricnce and the Best of ,411 130assibleWorlds." figrl.znl of Valge I~zgwigty16 (1982): 143-148. . "Hr~manFreedom and Divine Orutnipotence: Some New Thorrghts on an Old XZrablem." R~eIz&z"o%s St$$diwl 5 (1979): 491-510. . ""IWhat Se~lseM L I SG~ c )DC) ~ His Best? A Response to Hasker.?' I%zg:e~.~i.tn$iortal Jozg~~ialf"ar Philosophy ofRlirl@Zon X 8 ( X 985): X 6 X -1 64. . "Must God Create the Best Possible World? A XZespoitse." htef*nntiofzt%l PhiIosophiical Qtggr$gr[y20 ( 1680):339-342. Co-itgltlan, Michaei L, ""'Fhe Free FVill Defensc and Natttral Evif," I%zg:ep.~ivtntionat Jourrrat J b 12bilnsophyofReli~ion:20 ( 1986):93-1 08. Gale, %chard, "fireedom and the Free Wilt Defense." 'Social 7beot#y and Pfpgc$icli:(Fall X 990): 397423. . OF$$he Na$zz~ee.end E x I ~ e ~ cofeC;od. Cambridge: Cambridge Unirrcrsity Press, 1991. Hasker, WiXliam, "hifust God Do His Rest.>" hz$gf*:mal.z'unnI Juzgr~ialfbrPhilosopj~yofRelz&t"opi!16 (t984):213-224. Hoi tenga, Dewcy. ""Logic and the Pro ble1-11 of Evil." A kfze~#ican Pi?z'lusopk3ical 4 (1967): X 14-1 26, QgarzerI,~ b n e , G. Staniley. """l'hcFrce-kviitl Defcnse l3efcnded." " c Mc~aSchol@~$icism 50 (1976):435446, Mavrodes, George. "The Problem of Evil ." "1 Bgli!jeSi~itG d : A &$$z&djf in the E p i a ~ ~ ~ oofRglg&io~i!. Io~y New York: Ibndoxn EIouse, 1970, chap. 4, C)akes, Robert A, ""Actualities, Possibilities, and Free-will "fheodicy." '?he Ne~vSeholns~icZsm46 ( X 972): X 9 1-20 1. 13ike, Nelson. ""Iflantinga on Free Will and Evil." R~eli~ioz~s S$z$diw l 5 (1979):449473,

PLarrtinga, B v i n . "Existence, Necessit~and God," The N;em ,5'cholastz'cisliaz 50 (1976): 61-72. . ""Tl~eFrce bVill Defense." h In2hilnsopI3j~in: r(t~$er.ic&, edited by Max Black, London: George AIlen and Unwin, 1965. . Chd nrtd Qti$g~* Minds: A Stgdjf ofthe Rgtional Jzgstg$cation ~fRalz"@' ~ P ZGod. Ithaca: Cornell Ux-riversiv Press, 1967. . <$od, Ff~cgdnm,and E~pil.Grand h p i d s , Micb.: Eerdma~ls,1977. . "Irie M&I:~.~PC of'N~~essz"~, Oxford: Glarelldorl Press, 1974, . "Which Worlds Could God Have Created?" Jour~wlof1>hz"losophy70 (1973): 539-552, Quinn, Phitip L, "God, Moral Perfectiotl, and Possible Worlds." h Chd: Gm~~tcn'~pot.arj~ Disczzaion, edited by Frederick Sontag and M. Darrol Bryant, New York: Kc~seof Sharon Press, 1982, pp. 197-21 3, Kc?\vc, Wilfiam L, "Rlantinga on PossiMe iVorfds and Evi1," fi~uuz?.~i.tnl oj'philosophy 70 (1973): 554-555. Sennett, Janles F. ""The Free Will ITefc-nse a ~ l dDeter~ltillisnl.'' Fgkgh and Philosophy 8 (1981 ): 340-353. Smart, Ninian. ""C)mniyatence, Evil and Superinel-E." Philosophy 36 (1961): 188-195. Stcw~ar t , Melville, 2 ge G~~eatct.er-C;ood ~ I ~ ~ TAJnSEss@*y P : on the R~.k.ziofzalz-'q of' F~z'lrh.Ncw York: St. Martin", 1993. Wainwkght, William. "C:ii.iristian Theism and the Free Will Defense." hgtc~#P/$ilosophyof'flelgion 6 ( X 975): 243-2 50. national Jogsen~aIjb.~* Walls, Jerry. '"I'hc Free Wilt Dcfcl-Ese, Calvinism, bVcsiey7 and tbc Goodness of God," CC;'hr.af$ian c5'chalgr"s~evz'ew1 3 (January 1983): 19-33,

The Probabilistic Problem of Evi From the atheistic critics' point of view, the beautp of the logical argurxent from evil is that, if it could be made t o work, it would be a tour de force for atheis~x.Critics could then ignore any allegedly favorable evidence for God's existence and declare theism patently irrational. Hobnever, with what appears to be the decisive defeat of the logical argulnent from evil by the Free Will Defense,] some critics have developed a different kind of argumeilt from evil. This other type of argument seeks to establish that the existence of God is still somehow rationally unacceptable given the facts of evil. Philosophers ~vieldingthis kind of argument say that evil so~uehowcounts against the existcncc of God, although it is not inconsistent with the existcncc of God. Since the mid- 1970s, the number of these argkllnents in the philosophical literature has grown significantly. Such argulnents have been ~rariouslylabeled evidential, inductiire, or a posteriori? but one of the more prominellt formulations is now called the probabilistic argumeilt from evil. It is to this argumeilt that I 12014~ turn, leab~ingconsideration of a more broadly conceived evidential argument until the next chapter.

h Initial SKrmish Proponents of the probabilistic argument maintain that evil ixakcs the existellce of God imp~pobableor unlikeb. Let us consider an early exchange ben4reen noiltheistic and theistic philosophers along these lines. Consider how J. W. Cornman and Keith Lehrer preseilt the problem in the guise of a provocative thought experiment:

If you were all-good, all-k~lowing,and all-powerfut and you were going tt were scxltient beixlgs-beings that t o create a universe in ~ ~ h i cthere are happy and sad; enjoy pleasure, feel pain; express love, anger, pity, l-ratred-what kind of world would you create? . . . Try t o i~ltaginewltnt such a \voriA WCIUIBbe like. FVould it bc like the one wl~ichactually does exist, this world wc live in? bVould you crcatc a world such as this or-zc if you had tl-re power and know-how t o create any logically possible \%rorld?If yorrr anst;Grcris ""no," as it scerns t o be, then yorr sftorrlct begin t o undersra~~d why the evil of suffering and pain i1-t this world is such a problcnl for allyone who tl-rinks God created this world. . . . Girrcn this \%rorld,then, it seems, we should cotlcltrde that it is z'mpgeoktaktk: that it was created or sustained by anytfiing wc would call God. Thus, 81~~11 this particular world, it s e e ~ ~that t s we should c o n c l ~ ~ dthat e it is impmba6k that: God-who, if he exists, crcated the \%rorfd-exists, Consequexlrtl!?, the belief that God does not exist, rather tfian the belief that he exists, W O L I / ~seen1 to be jz&s"r~z$edby $he eviide~zeewe find in tl-ris world."

Herc wc find the language of probability. <:omman and Lchrcr arc sapi~lgthat evil in the ~rorldmakes the existence of God impfpobatable. But let us try to extract the esselltial argtllnent from their comments. Before proceeding, we shall discount at the outset the rhetorical suggestion that the reader's answer "seems" to be a negative one. This phraseology imposes a bias on the reader and too hastily dismisses a number of very important perspectives about why the world contains evil. I shall cover solxe of thcsc perspectives later but hcrc must clari@ the structure of the argument at hand. One premise in Cornman and Lehrcr" argument seems to be (29) If God is omnipotent and omniscient, then he could have created any logically possiblc world.

Another prelnise seems to be (30) If God is all-good, he would choose to crcatc the best \vorid he corxld. From (29) and (30), they conclude (31) If God is omniscient, omnipotmt, and all-good, he would have created the best of all possible worlds.

Then they add

( 3 2 ) It is unlikely or improbable that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds. And from (31) and ( 3 2 ) ,it follows that (33) It: is unlikeb or imprObablc that thcrc is an omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good God.

If this is a reasonably accurate sketch of the basic moves of the argllmmt,"ow might theists respond? Alvin Plantinga thinks that the argument contains at least two major errors. For one, Cornman and Lehrer incorporate into their arguIllent Lcibniz's Lapse----the claim that God, if omnipotent, can create any logically possible world. WC have already seen the error of Lcibniz's Lapse in our discussion of the Frcc Will Dcfensc for the logical proble~n.Thus, Plantinga mailltaills that the argument as stated is not S O U I ~because ~ it i~lcorporatesthis falsehood. We now h o w that it is simply not true that God, if he exists, could have actualized any possible world. Another error in the argulllent is that it seems to presuppose that there is "a best of all possible worlds," a concept that is incoherent. Consider what we all know: that for any prilne number you designate, thcrc is always one that is greater. In like manner, Plantinga reasons that, for any world you mention (kvith howc\rcr many dancing girls and dclirio~~sly happy sentient creatures), thcrc is always one that is better (with even more dancing girls and deliriously happy sentiellt creatures). So, Plantinga pronounces the arguineilt of Cornmall and Lehrrr incapable of sho~lingthat the existence of evil in the world rnakes it uniilicly that God exists.

A Modified Probability

ent

We might, however, try t o modify and strengthen Comman and Lrhrer's argumellt in order to make the best of their case against theism. One %.ay to revise it is to elimiilate the claim that God can create just any logically possible Ivorld. The substitute claim can be made that, alnong the logically possible worlds that were within God's

power to create, he could have created one containing a more fairorable balance of good and evil. hlother alteratioil would be t o cast this claim in terms of natugpal evil rather than moral evil, since many thinkers now grant that God could not do anything about the amount of moral evil brought about by free human beings. Nevertheless, they still insist that God can control the amount of natural evil. With these two adjustments, does thc argument farc any better? Plantiilga thinks that the modified argument still fails. He rcbuts this strollger renditioil of the argtllnent by extending the Free Will Defense-the claim that it is possible that God caililot actualize any possible world that includes free agency. His point is that the evil in the world does not render the existence of God improbable. He asks us to consider the following proposition: (34) ALl thc evil in this world is broadly illoral evil; and of all the worlds God co-rrld have created, none contains a bctter balancc of broadly moral good with rcspcct to broadly moral evil.

In keeping with the earlier strategy of defense, Plantillga asks us to consider that (34) is logically possible. The reference to "broadly moral evil" recluircs comment. Plantinga claims i t is possible that what we normally call natural evil is really broadly ixoral evil causcd bp nonhuman free agcnts.Traditional rcligion, for cxample, attributes much evil to Satan or to Satan and his cohorts. These dc~nonicspirits arc fallen angels ivho seek t o spoil God's creation. In this light, 131antinga states that, of all the jwrlds God could have created, it is possible that none contains a better balance of broadly ~noralgood and broadly ~noralevil than this one. Although we Inay have no evidence to confirln (34), Plantinga that ~voulddispoints out that we do not appear to have any e~~idence confirnl it either, But how shall we think about this wl~olebusiness of confirmation anyway? Let us say that a proposition p confirms a proposition q if q is ixorc probablc than nor on p alone: if, that is, q would be more probable that not-q with respect to what we know, if p were the only thing we knew that was relevant to q. hid let us say that p discvnfirws q if p co~lfirmsthe denial of q. Although there is really no \vay to measure the quantiv of evil in the ~vorld,PIantinga takes Cornman and Lehrer's argument to be about the anzu5fintand variety of evil. He then advances this proposition:

( 3 5 ) There are 1013 turps of evil. Plantinga here coins the term "turp" as a basic unit of evil in order to facilitate discussion. Here the expression "1 013CUWS" nallles the past, present, and future evil in the actual ~vorld. Claiming that ( 3 5 ) does not disconfirm (349, Plantinga goes on to sap that neither does it disconfirm the following:

( 3 6 ) God is omniscient, omnipotmt, and morally perfect; God has created the world; all the evil in the ~rorldis broadly Inoral evil; and there is no possible ~rorldGod could have created that contains a better balance of broadly moral good and broadly moral evil. No\\; if a proposition p confirms a proposition q, then it confirms every proposition q entails; and if p disconfirms g, p disconfirllls every bwoposition that entails g. It seems clcar that ( 3 5 ) does not disconfir121 (36); but (36) entails

( 3 7 ) God is omniscient, omnipotent, and Inorally perfect.

So, the existence of the great amount and variety of evil does not render improbable the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good God. Of coursc, therc may bc other things we know such that the existence of God is improbable with respect t o them. Nonetheless, the amount and variety of evil in this wodd does not disconfirm God" existence. Here we can sec how the Free Will Drfense works agaillst the probabilistic problem of evil. Against the logical problem, of course, Plantinga established that

(G) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists and

(E, ) Evil exists are not loaically incompatible. He accomplished this by shokning that the consistent conjunction of a certain proposition about free will and a proposition asserting God's existence entails that there is evil. Now,

against the probabilistic problem, Plantinga employs a similar defensive strategy to show that

(G) h omnipotent, omniscient, \\.holly good God exists and

( 3 5 ) There are 10'Qturps of evil are not probabilistically incompatible.6 He does this by showing that proposition (G) and a certain propositioil about all evil being broadly moral evil entail that God could not control the evil in the world. Some critics as well as some theists have misunderstod Pfantinga's suggestion that possibly there are nonhuinan free agents-wri~at traditional religion calls "delxons" or "fallen angelsm---\\.ha arc responsible for \\.hat wc call natural evil. This ~vould,in effect, make all cvil broadly inoral c\-it. Several tbinkcrs rightly pointed out that neither classical theisln nor the livillg religions that embrace it (Christianit): Judaism, or Islam) hold that demonic activiy is the best explanation of evil. Yet there is a misul~dersta~ding here that provides an opportuniq to clarifp the nature of 131antinga's defensive strategy against the charge that God could reduce the amount of evil. Plantinga does not postglg~gthat there are tlonfiumm free creatures w i ~ ocreatc: evil in our wortd; hc is not offering this notion as a hypothesis in order to gxplain an\%hing. Plantinga's defensive stratcm does not rcquirc that the claim that all natural evil could bc viclvcd as broadly moral evil bc h % eor even probabl?, trgge. And he certclinly does not have t o be committed to its truth or even its probable truth. In light of a sophisticated theistic world~rie\v,it could even be factually @lsg that demolls create what we call natural evil; or, in light of many other things we know, it could be h&h& inzp~.obable. Rut Plantinga's strategy requires only that i t be posgible and consistent with (G) in order to accomplish its defensive purpose.?

Three Prababilisr-ic

ents from Evil

Discussion of the prospects for a viable probabilistic argumellt from evil did not end with Plantinga's critique of Corlllnail and Lehrer. Several atheistic critics have developed their oMrn statements of the argument. The general strategy they follolv is to argue that a proposition such as

(E) A great amoullt and variet): of evil exists is evidence against the proposition (G) h omnipotent, omniscient, ~vhollygood God exists. Philosophers have still thought it worthwhile to contil~rscto probc the issue of exactly how it is that (E) renders (G) improbable. In fact, the probabilistic argumellt f r o ~ nevil could be framed and subseque~ltlyanalyzed in terms of any of the three (E)-propositions discussed in Chapter 2. But we will pursue the argument that iilcorporates (E;) as stated here. After all, what is the relationship that the critic says holds between (E) and (G) when he says the fonner is evidmce against the latter or that (-G), which is the denial of (G), is probable with respect to (E)? In probabilitj~studies generally>the probabilit). of any proposition B on the basis of the e\ridencc A is depicted as P(B/A). Thc question, then, is h0141 to ullderstand precisely h0141 all of this works in the matter of God and evil-that is, how to interpret the critic's claim that P((G)/(E)) is lob\ less than .5. To comprehend this, of course, we must have some idea of what the relationship is between any propositions K and A when A is evidcnce for R or when K is prohgble %pithrespect to A. Yet this ~vholearea of scholarship is notoriously unsettled, with no clcar consensus on how to define thc evidential relationship between propositions or on how t o think about the probability of one proposition given another proposition. Plantinga suggcsts that a good starting place would be to view the relatio~lshipbet\i.een propositions B and A as coilforlning to the calculus of probabilities. He then collsiders the three main interpretatio~lsof probabiliyprrsonalist, logical, and frequency-to determine if there is any basis for a good probabilistic argument from evil.Vdet us briefly revieiv his remarks about the first two interpretation~and then focus on how he treats t l ~ ethird. According to a personalist interplflctntion,the probabilit)? of (G) on (E) reflects a person's crcdcnccf2tnction, which is the dcgrcc of bclicf that she assigns to a given proposition, P(A), or that she assigns to the . Plalltinga proproposition niven another proposition, P nounces a personalist argument for the low probability of theism based on evil to be nothing more than mere biographical infom~ation. Predictably? an atheist will assign a low subjecti~reprobability,

perhaps close to zero, t o the hypothesis that God exists own terms or in view of the e~ridenceas he sees it. So, it is not surprising that the atheistic critic maintains that 13s((G)/(E)) = c .5. A theist, on the other hand, will assign a high subjective probability to ((;)-%ither on its own terms or in view of the evidmce as she sees it. But then it appears that a personalistic probability argument from evil tells only about the belief dispositions of the atheistic critic and nothing abo~atwhether God exists or ~vhethcrit is rational per sc to believe that God exists given the e~ridenceof evil? Plantinga lnailltains that an evidelltial argtllnent based on the in&cal theory of probability fares no better than the perso~lalisticargtlment. Here probability is a "quasi-logical relation of which entaillnent is a special casr."jo Trying to protect probability judgments from the taint of subjectivity, those promoting this theory think of probability as a kind of "partial entailment" of onc proposition by ano t h c r J In other words, one proposition (A) has an a priori probability in view of another proposition (B). The ideally rational pcrson, thm, should believe (A) to the exact degree it is entailed by (B). For example, the probability of the proposition

(38) Friedrich cannot swirn

(39) Nine out often Prtrssians cannot skvim and Friedrich is a Prussian/Geman appears to be .9-i.e., P((38)/(39)) = .9. So, the rational persol2 who k1lo~z.snothillg else relevant will believe (38) t o the degree .9. However, if we consider

(40) Friedrich is a lifeguard, then the probability of (38) changcs drail~atically! Likewise, the critic ofkring an argument from evil roorcd in the logical theory of probability lnight claim that the probabilit). of

(G) h omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists is low given, saj;

(E, ) _t;,\-ilexists. But the theist might retort that the probability of (G) changes significantljr when we consider

(R) God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil to exist. It is extremely difficult to see, therefore, how a given propositioll can just have a certain probabiliq on the basis of ailother proposition-a lnatter long debated alnoilg scholars of inductiire logic.12 Since there is no reason to think that contingent propositions have a priori probabilities, Plantinga concludes that there is no reason to think that a proposition such as (E1) disconfirms (G). Although the pcrsonalist and logical theories of probabilit). do not seem to lend themscl\rcs to ixaking a decent atheistic argulxcnt kolx evil, a number of thinkers have considered whethcrfreguencjf thcory (or statistical probability) offers a more interestillg and more prolnising way of framiilg the argument. According t o the frequency theory, with probabiliw is a vgtio: It is a measure of the relative freq~~ellcy which the members of a specified class of objects or eirenrs exhibit a certain propcrty.13 An insurance actklary, fir example, might compute the number of thiry-year-old males in a sample of 10,000 who survive to their fortieth birthdays and get a result of 9,450. The probabilit). value, then, is .945. This value, in turn, bccomcs a predictive factor for . arc literally thnusmds the undcrwl-itcr in setting insurance m ~ s Thcre of situations in science, mathematics, and practical life in ~rhichthis kind of statistical reasoning is entirely appropriate and helpful. Weslep Salnlon suggests that the frequellcjr theory can also be used to collclude that evil makes God's existence improbable-that is, how are we to undentand this yrobabilistic 13(CG)J(E)) = .= .5.'"ut claim in frequency terms? Salmon must surely mean something like the following: Among possible worlds that contain as much evil as this one does (lvhich is lO'qturps), there arc relatively few-less than half-that arc divillely crcated.l5 Thus, poposition (G) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists has a low probability value, i.e., below .5.But how would one arrive at such a judgment? Should we start bp imagining hypothetical uni-

verses (or what we have called "possible jwrlds") and simply estimating how mallp co1ltai1li13g as much evil as this one were created by a being who has the relevant theistic attributes? Salmon ~vouldinsist that the number here would be relatively low. Plantinga poina out a number of serious difficulties in the frequentist ixcthods Salmon uses for arriving at the conclusion that P((G)/(E)) = .5. For one thing, how can the frequentist critic count the possible ~vorlds,which arc theoretically infinite in nulxber, so that he map perform his calculations! For another thing, what about the differences in how the theist and atheist ~nakea number of initial assesslnellts before arrij~ingat a final value for P((G)/(E))! After all, the nontheist would typically assess the probability that there would be less evil in our ~vorldif God did exist to be high, ~vhereas the theist would most certainly disagree. Herc Plantinga rccognizcs the fact that such initial assesslllcnts arc nltimately rciativc to thc do;dnJ hseIiefsg$ that each party brings to thc bwobabilitp judgment at hand and that the belicf sets of the theist and the critic differ in some irreconcilable w a y s . l V e would expect the theist and the atheistic critic to disagree, for instance, on the success of various independent argulnents for God's existence, such as the ontological and cosmological arguments. But surely, their assessments of such matters will form part of their respective total belief sets, or, as Plantinga calls them, their respective "noetic frameworks." These as well as othcr problems undercut any effort to mount a viable frcqucncy argument from evil.18

Reformed Epistemology and Evil 111 the contemporarjl debates over God and evil, a certaill pattern of response has emerged in regard to both the logical and the probabilisric arguments: challenge from the critic followed by defensive maneuvers by the theist. In discussions of the logical argument, the critic charges that bclief in God and belief in evil arc inconristent. The theist shields his bclicf sjrstcm frolx the charge by demonstrating that theism is not inconsistpnt. In discussions of the probabilistic argument, the critic claims that God's existellce is impfpobablein light of the evil in the world. The theist answers by s h o ~ i n gthat God's existence is not improbable given evil. These defellsive responses are trchnically correct and instructive in many ways. We should note that such responses are not geared to show that theism is plausible, proba-

ble, or true. They are also not ailned at shouillg either that theism makes good sense on its o\lrn terms or that it makes better sellse than competing \vorldvie\vs. The general defensij~estrategy is simply that of protecting theistic beliefs while deflecting all challenges-a strategy that has becolne well recognized and widely employed. Intercstingl!: theists who have constructed dcfcnses against various challcngcs detcctcd a recurring flaw in critics' attacks. In defending against the logical probleill of evil, theists took exception to auxiliary assumptiolls einployed by their atheistic critics who sought to deduce a coiltradiction within theism. As we have seen, these critics constructed their arguments using propositions defining such theistic concepts as omnipotence and perfect goodness-definitions that tilted the controversjl in their favor from the outset. This, of course, was an early indication of how different thinkers inevitably appeal to their own background infornation in evaluating philosophical positions. Then, in defending against the probabilistic problern of evil, theistic defenders pointed out that the atheistic critic could not avoid assessing a number of probabilities based on things he already accepts, byhereas the theist \vould clearly differ 011 such things. So, predictably, (G) -will be improbable with respect t o things that the atheist accepts but probable with respect to things that the theist accepts. Continuing reflection on the construction of both logical and probabilistic arguments has brought to light an important fact-that

(G) h omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists must be probabilisticallp assessed on the basis of all the propositions one knows or beliel2-es,T"13is is what W mean when we talk of the requirement of "total evidence." Discussioils of this lnatter have become couched in tenns of one's "epistemic framework" or "noetic structure." Rut then, i t is difficult to see how so many of the arguments from evil-both logical and probabilistic-are really objections against thcism when they arc based on thc atheistic critic's total set of beliefs. How might we tllink of the objection from evil now? Clcarlj~,the discussion shifts away fro111 its original focus on ~rhether(E,) or (E) or any other (E)-like proposition per se probabilistically discollfirms the proposition that God exists. Instead, the coiltroversy revolves around a byhole coiltext of other beliefs kvithin which such a probabilistic judg~nentcould ever be made. We map call this context of total evidence one's evidence ret. So, if there is going to

be any kind of effective probabilistic argllinent f r o ~ nevil, it will have to run along these lines: For any theist T, there is a set of propositions Ts that constitute his totnl evidence .re6 for any proposition A that the theist accepts, he is rational in accepting A only if A is not improbable with respect to Ts. The critic's case, then, is that the existence of God is improbable with respect to 'f's, Many philosophers---including David Hume, W. K. Clifford, Bertrand R~lsscll,h m n y Flew, Michatll Scrivcn, and others-make this kind of case.19 Flew maintains that it is rational t o presume that atheisln is true (i.e., that theism is false) ullless convincing argulnents for theism are advanced.20 This places the burden of proof on the theist, since there are propositions that all rational persons believe or ought to believe that- either offer no support for (G) or make i t improbable. According to most critics, then, the theist is irrational (and pehaps unethical) in believing in God because them is little or no etridcncc for the bclief (e.g., the hilure of traditional theistic proofs) and bccause there is impressive etridencc (e.g., evil) against the belief. At this juncture, a ilumber of importailt questioils surface, questions about what beliefs are properly included in a \yell-formed noetic structure: byhat it meails to be rationally entitled to hold a belief, and what our epistemic obligations are. In addressing such questions, Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, William Alston, and George Mavrodes have developed a position known as Reformed episte111olo~21Reformed epistemology is relevant, first, to the critic's procedure of formulating rcasons for not believing (G) and, second, to the critic's protest that defense against these reasons is an unsatis@ing minimalist approach. Plantinga and other Reformed epistemologists explain that the critic operates on the evidentialist assu~nptionthat a person is rationally kvarranted in holding a belief only if he holds other beliefs that give it good evidential support. Conversely, one is not rationally warranted in holding a brlief if there is good evidence against it. Of course, "evidmce" here must be expanded to include one's total evidence. set, This is a very natural way of thinking about i.ntionaiit?i. Of coursc, the critic here takes the probabilistic argulllcnt from evil to supply good evidence against (G). When the theist provides a defense sho~ringthat evil does not count n~ginstit, the critic points out that the theist is not entitled to hold (G) ullless he can supply good e~~idence for it. It is this ~vholeevidentialist Ivay of looking at the matter that Reformed epistemology calls into question. Refor~nedepiste-

mologists point out that those evidentialists who raise serious challenges to theism also accept strongfoz~ndatio~zali~~~. Strong foundationalislu is a jvajl of looking at human knojvlrdge as built or erected upon "foundations." The general foundationalist position, then, is that our beliefs may be dik~idedinto tjvo kinds: those that are supported by or rcccivc e\ridcntial support from other beliefs and thosc that arc accepted without bcing supported by still other belicfs. This second kind of bclief forxns thc "basis" on which t>rrrentire structure of belief and kno~rledgeultimately rests. Foundatio~lalbeliefs are "basic" and not "&eritred" &om other beliefs.22 The "strong" foundationalist wants to place very strict rrquirrments on what sorts of beliefs car1 be in the foundations. Wanting to allow only belie& about jvhich i t is ilupossible or nearly impossible to go wrong? the foundationalist asserts that the only beliefs that can be properly basic are thosc that are either r e v - c ~ i d g n or t incorr&ible. Selfevident belicfs arc seen to be true by anyone who understands them (e.g., the simple trklths of arithmetic, such as 2 + 2 = 4). Incorrigible beliefs are those that deal with one's immediate experience and thus are thought to be immune from serious doubt (e.g., reports of consciousness, such as "I am feeling pain" and "I seem to be seeillg something green"). h strong foundationalist, then, maintains that

(SF) A person is rational in accepting a givcn belief only if that bclief is self-evident or incorrigible or is derived form sclfevident or incorrigible belie& using acceptable lnrthods of logical inference. The "ekridentialist challenge" t o religious belief, then, is for religious belief to satis@ these requirements of ejridence. Many nontheists (e.g., W. K. C;lifford, Antony Flew, and others) embrace evidentialism and strong foundationalism, but a number of jvellknown theists do as well (e.g., l)escartes, Lockr, and 1,eibniz). Historicallj~,the twin assumptions of e\ridentialism and strong foundationalisrn have created a certain way of thinking about how rcligious bclief ixust be justified. The theistic e\ridcntialist is obliged to give positive evide~lcefor belief in the existe~lceof God, kvhereas the evide~ltialistcritic either must provide evidence for rejectillg belief in God or must point out that the theist's evidellce is insufficient. Plantinga has identified tjvo serious difficulties with strong hundationalism. For one thing, strong foundationalisrn is self-rrferrntially

incoherent. It simply does not meet its o~z.11standards of evidence, for it is not self-evident, incorrigible, or logically derij~ablefrom beliefs that are. For another thing, strong fou~~dationalism is overlp restrictive in regard to what kinds of beliefs can count as properly basic. Strong foundationalisrn rnistakenlp rules out various kinds of beliefs that arc properly basic but that arc neither sclf-evident nor incorrigible. In fact, a careful analysis of our native noetic powers (such as perception and memory) shows that they produce iflgrnedinte or d i ~ p g c t beliefs in us. Such beliefs as "I see a tree in the quad now" and "I had breakfast three hours ago" are "properly basic" for me although they are not held on the basis of other belief5 in my ejridential set. When one is in normal circumstances and one's cognitive powers are functioning properly, one is entitled to accept the beliefs formed by these native cogniti~epowers, such as perception and memory. Now we arc ready t o understand the Reformed cpistelnologists' contention that belief in God call be a properly basic belief. Plantinga sklggests that all rational persons have cognitive faculties that, under appapriate conditions, can forln such a belief in them. Thus, I might accept the belief that

(41) There is such a person as God without appeal to my other beliefs. That is, it can be part of the foundations of my noetic structure without being derived by argkllnents koix bundational belie&, Thc rclcvancc of Reformed epistemology to the discussion of God and evil is that it changes how we think about the rationality of the parties involved. Alld it is a llatural colnpollent in defensive maneuvers by theists. For one thing, Reformed epistemolog!? explains how the theist may be rational ~vithoutmounting, say, a pprbbailistic argulnent for divine existence that is aimed at overturning the yrobabilistic argument from evil. The theist may siinply hold belief in God as basic (\\?ithour:argmentj. Then, when a critic adtrances soi-ne version of the problem of evil and thc theist feels its probative force, the theist must deal with the oL7jcction. The objection is a potential defeatgr of the basic belief in God; it threatens the theist's s~loeticstructure. But the only action rationally required of the theist, according to Reforlned epistemology, is to depat the defeater, so to speak. This may be done by defgnse, showing that the critic's case against theism does not succeed, whatever that case map be (e.g., logical or probabilistic

probleln of evil). Of course, it is eiltirely possible for the antitheistic critic to respond bp trying t o defeat the defeater defeater and so on. Thus, although one may be rational in believing in God without discursive reasoning and argument, this would be a situation in which reasoning and argkxment is needed. However, the point of theistic argurxentation in this casc has changed frolx thc positive enterprise of showing that bclicf in God is rational because it is derived from basic beliefs to the project of showing that antithcistic attacks do not rcveal it to be rationally substandard.

I . h-rtong ~lontheisticgl-rilosophers who recognize that the logical probCOP$lem is not: cffecti~reare: Edward Maddex? and Peter Hare, Evil nrtd 17epctof ir;Ud (Sprii~gfield,Ill .: Cirarles C. Tlroxnas, 19681, and Williarn XXowc, (Enci~itoand Itetl-ritont,Calif.: Dickenson, 1978). Pj~z'losaphyof-'Reli~ion 2. For the i11ductive argument, see Rruce Reichenbach, "The Ilrductive 1 7 (1980): Argumellt from Et't1," Amwz'c~n12bilosophz'cal Qfbartc~~I,y 221-227; for the a posteriori argument, see Atvin Pla~ittinga,God and Other LWinds:A Agzbdy c~-$he fCnti:z'ortnlJ~~stz~ckal-z'un of' B e l z " ~ -E& ( kehaca: Cornef l Universiq, I967), p. 128. 3, Tames W, Cornt-ritan and ICeith Lebrer, Philosophiical Prohle~~s n~zdAy@%mgg8.s:An lr:zt$*oduction(New York: Macmillan, X 970), pp, 340-341 (italics rnine) . 4, Here we follow PLantinga" strayof oudining the argunitent, See PLantinga, G d , Fr6gdomI n~.tdE d (Grand bpids, Mich.: Eerdrna~~s, 1977), pp. 59-64. 5, XZlantingafirst introduced the notion of all evil beix~gbroadly rnoral evil in dealing with the argut-ritent that the existellce of God is i~~consistent with the existe~lceof i2atrrraX evil. This notion is then a~rallablcto be imported into his discr~ssionof tlic probabllisric problem. 6, Plantinga, Ct'od, Frgada~~~ and L?:t?il, p. 64. 7 . Of co~rrsc,classicai tt~eismas \%.ellas the major moxlrstlteistic religions that espoclse it acknobviedge that God's kuitful and creative power can create many orders of ration&? kee beings other than hul-ritan beings. Wllnt is repugllailt both to commox? sexlse and to a sophisticated ttledogical uxlderstanding is the llotlon that reference t a nontluman creatures who are rational and kce plays a rritajor part i r ~tl-re explanation of the evil we experience, Clne can add to tl-ris the assessmellt titat it is extremely unlikely that \%.hat~~ecall natrrral evil in our wodd is really broadly moral evil. First, natural law themes can be drawn kern biblicd sources as well as rritajor theologies of the Ckristia~itfaith. Such themes ellvisage the natural world as cor~stitcrtedby imgersoxlal objects operating and

interactirlg according to their own inherent natures, Seco~~d, deniat of or at least de-emphais 0x1 the role ofdemorls or devils in our w r i d can be adduced kom such sotrrces by fair and ir-ttelligel-ttintcryretattan. S, Avin Planringa, """l"1e Probabilistic Argtrt-rte~~t fr.ol-rtEvil," Pi3ilusopk3ical Sgudz'lrs35 ( X 979): 1-53, For tttose \%rishingto fblfow the subsequent discussiol-ts of PIax~tinga"work in this area, see Kcith CIirzan, "Plantinga on AtheProbabilistic Induc~on,"&phi& 27 (1988): 10, a ~ l dPlaliti~lga,LCEpi~temic ity and Evil," Arlrshi~z'od i fzko~ofi~k56 (I988), reprinted in IDaniel Evil (Bloorningtan: InFIobvard-Snyder, ed,, 2he Evbdgngial A~gz~~~.aze~ztJkon2 diana Ulliversity Press, 1996), pp, 69-96. 9. Planti~lga,""-X)robabilisticArgrrmexlt," pppp, X 5-1 8. IO. Ibid., p. 15. 11, Ibid.>p. 18. 12, Planting3 thczrotrghly discusses this and other diffictrlties in ibid., pp. 21-30, 13, Cjf course, the classical or LaPlacean theory of probability also assumes it is a ratio brit one cseablished a priori based 0x1 equiprobable outccsxnes. 14, Wesley Sailnon, "Religion and Science: .A New I,r>ok at Hume" DiaI ~ ~ ~ e sPl~z'lir~~ophic~li ," Scz#dies 33 (I9";j"): 143-1 76, ,4ctually, Safmorl proposes that wc evaluate the dcsigi-t argumcx~tclairn that it is highly probable that this world was created by a benelirolcnt, intelligelit Supreme Being, In evaluati~lgthe argument from the perspective of eequel~cytheor~i,he concludes that it i s ii-nyrobable that this world was deslgr-ted by an all-knowing, all-pokverfkrl, and all-good being, particularly give11 the evil that it co~ltains. 15. Planrnnga, "Probabitistic Argument," p, 33. In the same articte (pp. 32-30), Plal-ttiilga also col-tsldersthe possibility that the kcquency clairn here i~~volves the frequency with jiil-tich one class of propositions are true relative to ar~otherclass ofpr~positiorls. 16. Pial-ttir-tgaalso calls tt~csebelief sets "~loertcsrrucrurcs" aal-td makes ixnknoliitcdge, See l-ris portallt observations on frolii they ft~nctionin h~xma~i ""Pobabitistic *4rgument," pp. 44,628, and 51. I 7. See Michael 13ctcrson,Wit liam Haskcr, Bruce 12cicbel-tbach, and David Bas, nger , R~nsonand Relg&iozss Bciie$ AB Iatrod2.tctz'on $0 the Phikosophy oj' Itgl&a;)n, 2nd ed. (NewYork: C)xhrd University Press, I998), pp. 87-91 and 81-100. 1S, For more criticism of the frequentist argu~~itent ahanced by Sdr-rton,see Nancy Cartiv15ght, ""Commex~tson WesIey Salmon's '"Sclex~ceand Keligiol~:A New Look at Hurnc" 12i~lo~aze;r;"Y~l~ilosuplha"cal Stztdz'es 33 ( 1978): 1.77-5.85. Mthough freqrxentist metllods may not be feasible for arritfing at cr~rcial the initial asessments or estimates that can, in turn, be L I S C ~in cafculati~~g probabiliy of (C), Bruce 1teichei-tbacb7a theist, still thinks it worth\%rhilc:to consider Sati-rton"~proposal that Itayes's Theorem be used for calculation

purposes, Where P(B/A) mealls the probability of E; on A, Reichenbacl-rformulates Kayes? Theorem in this fashion:

The parts of the theorern have the foliowing meanings:

P(K/CA) = P(B/A)

=

13((C/A&B) =

P(c/A&B)

=

P(B/"A&C:) =

the prior p~obgbilz'ythat the origi~ialhypothesis is true, givcn the backgrorxnd evidence the prior prvbnbility that the original hypothesis is false, gi~renthe background cvide~lce the probabiliv that the effcct will be observed, give11 tl-rat the hypothesis is true the probability that the effcct will be obscrvcd, given that the hypothesis is htse the probability tl-rat the hypo the"^ is true, given the background evidence and the fact titat the effect is obser\red,

Now the way is prepared fir construixig a probabilistic argrrmexlt from evil along Uaycsial-t lines. Reichenbach sets up the frame~iorkfor the Bayesian-ppe argu~tenth111 evil:

Then, casting the cridc? argtlmcl-tt in terlns of tfic alnoul-rr ofnat~rralevil in our world, Iteichenbach interprets the parts of tl-re theoren~as follo\vs: 13((G)/(N)) =

P((G)/(?.J)) = P((E)/(N)&(G))

=

the prababititry that a. persorlal, Zo~ring,omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God exists, gillell the f~trnittirearid strticrtire of the w r l d (iliclrxdix~gsentier~tcreatures, insexltient creatures, physical objects, any morally suffia i d taws of nature but exclgdi~~q cient reasorl, defense or tt-xeodiqfix evil, any construed evidence ;for God" eexistcnce, or evil) the probability that a God as described above does not exist, given the furiiittire and structrrre of the world the probability of there being the an~ountof eli.21 that exists in orir world, givejl that the world described above obtair-ts arid the God described above exists

P((E)/(N)&(G))

=

P((G)/(N)&(E)) =

the probability of there being the amouilt of evil that exists in our wc~rld,given tltauhe \%rorfddescribed atrove obtains and the God described above does nclt exist the probabifiy tha"i:od as described above exists, give11 that the world described above obtains and there exists the amount of natural evil that our

Of course, the critic advanci~lgthis kind of Itayesian argunlent claims, in the end, that P((G)/(N)&(E)r = .S. Relchenbact~rightly observes that P((G)/(N)&(E)) cannot be computed by the atl-reistic critic wt thout dcternli~li~lgthe prior probabilities, P((G)/(N)) and P((G)/(N)). For ~ L I L Z C ~context, see Uruce XXcicbe~~bacEx, Evil n~gdn CJood CJod (New York: Fordhanl rjni\iersitjr Press, 19821, pp, 26-27. 19. W. K. Clifford, ""'Fhe Ethics of Belie<" in his f J ~ c t z ~ ralzd c s E S S ~(Lon~& and Bglief'(br-1don: Mactniltan, 1979), pp. 3456 Brand Blanct~ard,IZg~so~i! don: Mien 8r Urzwin, 1974), pp. 40116 Bertra~ldRussell, "Why I Am Not a Gl~ristian,"in his Why 1 A m Not a. Christz'alz (New York: Sirnon & Schrtster, X957), pp. 3ff; Micbael Scrivcn, 13i.ai~%aznf*y I2bklo~-op/3j~ (New York: McGrawHill, 19662, pp. 87fe Antony Fie\!; 7be P~eszkmp~inp2 c?f'Athez'sliaz(London: Pernbcrto1.1, 197.6),pp, 22ff. W. K Clifford insists that ""l is wrong always, evcrj5vherc, and ;for anjiox~e to believe anythi~lgupon insufficie~ltevide~lce,"See his ""Ethics," p 186. 20, Flew, Prgszgmp~iofz,pp, 1 4-1 5 21. See, far example, their respecti~reessays in Alvtn 131antinga and l i ~ ~ : and Blief' if$it$od Nicholas FVcd terstor ff3eds,, Faith n~zdR a t i n ~ ~ t %Rmson (Notre IDarne, Ind.: Uxli\rersiq of Notre I>ame Press, 1983). See also A1Gn Xzlantinga, """I'heXXeformcd Objecrior-1to Natural ' ~ f ~ e a l aChriaZn~ ~ ~ " Schola n R ~ ~ i a1l lv (1882): 187-198. 22. Sec the fuller discussiorl of evtclel~tialismand fou~~datioxlalism in Petersar-1et al., R e a s o ~pp. , 146-165.

Suggested Readings

Adams, Robert M, "Hlantinga on the Problcnl of Evil." h Inlvzlaz P l a ~ z t z ' ~ % ~ a ~ edited by Jarnes Tornberlin and Peter 17anXn~ragen.Dordrecht: Reidcl, 1985, pp. 225-255. Basinger, David. "Evil as E\rider~ceAgainst the Existerlce of God: A Response," Philosopy Rcsn-a.ch Archivcs 4 ( f 978): article no. X 275.

Carti#irigl--tt,Na~lcy.""Comments on Wesley Salmon's '"Sience and ReliStzbdies 33 (Fall 1978): 177-1 83. gion .'" Pjjz'los~pk3ic~l C;brza~),Keith. ccPlantii~ga on Atheistic Induction. " Lcj~phia(A gstralin) 27 (July 1988): 10-14. Draper, Xzaul. ""E.\iI and the XZroper Basicalier of UeXief in God." Fail-h a n d Izhitosoph~y8 ( 1991): it 35-1 47. . ""Pain and Pleasure: An E.\ride~-ttialProbXsrn ;for l'heists." Nags 23 (1989): 331-350. . ""Prababilistic Arguxnents kern E.\iI." Raelgaiogs S$z%rrl!ies28 ( 1993): 303-3 X 7 . Ho~%rard-Snjlder, Daniel. 2 ge Evidg..zlt.ti:z'alA ~ g ~ g ~ ~ c n t f k Eo r~pi zl .Bloomingtor1: lrldialta Univcrsity Press, X 996, Ihufman, Gordon D, ""E\ridexlrnalism: A 'Theologian" Xtcspoilsc," Fgigh alzd Phikosc~phy6 (1989): 3 5 - 4 6 . Martin, Micftael. rl~hl;risg%: A PhiZ~sophZ~alJ~~sl:i$c~ti:~'~~~, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990. . ""God, Satm alld Natural Evil," "Tiaiphia (Agstrnlia) 22 (flctober 1983):4 3 4 5 , . ""I Evil Evidence Agait~stthe Existence of Gc>d?"~Wklzd87 (1978): 429432, . Theistic I ~ l d ~ ~ c tArgul-tle~~t ive from Evil?" I~~ite:ernt%tio~~t%Z Jozzr~zaI jbr 12bilnsophy nfReli~iun:22 (1987):81-87. Qakes, lXabert A, ""Cod, Suffering, and Cox~clusivcE.\ride~-tce."&pi$ia (Az$stralia) it4 (July 1975): 16-20. 13cterson, Michael. "ltceent Work on the 13rablcm of Evil." Aifmefeic~n12bilnsopI3icnI QztartcrCv 20 (1983): 521-339. 13ectrsan, Michael L., ed. 279e I3~@ob7lem of Evil: Selecgcd R e a d i ~ m s ,Notrc Dame, Ind.: Univcrsity of Notre Dame Press, 1992, Petersoil, Michael, Wilfiarn Hasker, Brrrce Xteichen bach, and Davtcl Basinger, Rcgsc~rtalzd R el@iuus Retiq: A $2 I ~ t ~ ~ o d ~I;O~ &l;rz i oPhilosopb n of Rcird Plniversi~Press, 1998, chap, 6. Plantinga, Alvin. ""X=,pisternicProbability and Evil ," A~rchiviod i fi"lofoji"a (Italy) 56 ( X 988): 557-588 . <$od, F ~ ~ ~ e d nand m , E~z'l,Grand h p i d s , Micb.: Eerdma~ls,1977. . 7be N a t ~ ~ oftf'Nccessi9. *g Clxford: C:larendon Press, 1974. . T h e Probabilistic Arg~lntentfi-om Evil." Philnsopk~icaI Stz4dies 35 (1979): 1-53, Reiche~~baeh, Itruce, E ~ i n~zd l n Ct'ood Ct'od. New York: Fordbnt-tit University Press, 1982. . ""The l~lductiveArgumetlt from Evil." Az~erickavt Phz'lusf?phicgl 17 ( l980): 22 1-227. Q~fartea*(y

P

Satl-riton,Wesicy. "Religion and Science: A N e w Look at Hunite's Dialn~ugs.?' Philosophical Stztdigs 33 3 19978): X 43-1 76. Wainwright, Williarn, "The XZrescl~ce of Evil and ttlc Falsificarisn of Theistic A;sertic~ns." R~eli~iagfs Stz4dies 4 (196";2:21 3-216,

The Prob Gratuitous Evil

In thc prc\rious chapter, we saw that assessment of probabilitics for theisln depended not sinlply on bcliefs about evil but also on a larger collection of background beliefs and, ultimately, on one's total evidence set. Since the atheist's ttotal set of beliefi will surely differ from the theist's in important \naps, their assign~ne~lts of probabilities t o (G) h omnipotent, omniscient, ~vhollygood God exists

will differ greatly. For the theist, the probability of ( G ) is high, ~vhercasfor the atheist, it is low. But thcn it is difficult to sec how evil constitutes a probabilistic probleln for thc theist. Additionally, Reforlned epistemology's critique of evidentialism, coupled with its perspective on j4rhethrr evidence is even necessary for one to be rationally entitled to beliekre (G), b r a s a recoilsideration of the role of atheistic as well as theistic arguments over God's existence.' Yet Inany philosoyhersatheists and theists alike-still think that evil yrovides a basis for some kind of nondeductive or broadly indtxctive argument against thcism. The trick is to arrive at a formulation of an e\ridential argument fro111 evil that significantly advances the discussion.

Can. There Be an Evidential

ent from Evil?

In seeki~lgto determi~le%.hether there is some kind of evidential argument that ai~oidsthe defeca of the logical and probabilistic argumenu:

from evil and still gives solne rational basis for not believing in God, we n~ustfirst renlember -what defenders have and batre not sho~v11.131altinga has shown that theism is nut improbabir: given evil; he has not proved that evil cannot be cvidelzcc apinst theistic belief. For example, the testilnony of the defendant's husband that she was at home at the time of the murder is e\ridcnce against the hypothesis that she is guilty. But the testimony ixay not show that the hjrpothesis is improbable if there is enough other e\ridencc of her guilt. Likewise, evils may gcnuillely be ekidence against theism a ~ still d not show that the probabilit)~ of theisln is low, if theisln is sufficie~ltlyprobable on other grounds. Furthermore, Reformed epistemologists poiilt out that the theist may be entirely rational in taking belief in God as basic, that he need not justif\. i t by arguments constructed from other beliefs. However, Reformed epistemology does not entail that evil cannot count as evidencc against belief in God. It does undermine unfair efforts to evaluate bclicf in God probabilistically according to the atheist's own evidential sct. More generally, Reformed epistemology calls into question the idea that one is rationally elltitled to believe in God only if one has adequate evidence for this belief. None of this, hobnever, shows that evil cannot count against belief in God-evm when that belief is construed as basic. The probabilistic problem of evil reRects one (albeit flawed) strategy for showing how evil can be conceived as e~~idence. It is, then, a potential defeater for theistic belief that itself can be defeated by appropriate defensive illaneuvers. Rut this leaves open the possibilitp that a illorc formidable defeater can bc fashioned in terms of another type of evidential argument. Plantinga has clearly shown that the atheistic critic is misguided if he thinks he can produce an argument of coercive force that will compel all reasonable people to agree that theism is improbable with respect to evil and thus that one ~vouldnot be rational in embracing it. However, it does not hllow kom this either that aheists have no argument at their disposal regarding the evidential ilnpact of evil on theistic belief or that theists should show no concern for any such argurxent. Thc atheistic critic, for instance, ixap not intend to "coercc" but rathcr to "persuade" the minds of theists and agnostics. The theist and atheist can reason together about the bearing of evil 011 the existeilce of G o d a s well as the bearillg of a great Inany other things, for that matter-~rithout accusing each other of beillg irrational or being in violation of some inteIlectual duties.

Much reasoning in philosophy generally has this persuasive, II~IICOercive character. Eve11 if it canilot be shobnn that one position on some controversial issue is more probable than another, it is still legitimate for the position's proponent to make a case for why it is prrferable to the other. And it is liltewise legitimate for his interlocutor to ~llakea case for his own position, point out wcakncsscs on the other side, ansjtrcr objections, and so firth. This all takes on the character of clnssicnl philosophicaj diajectic----giving reasons for and against a controversial position. Since such reasolling does sometimes lead t o changes of opinion, we map ellgage in it with a sincere hope of persuading others or of comillg to a more adequately justified position ourselves. In the process, we may rely on assessments of plausibility or credibility that are not obvious and not universally accepted. Neither Plantinga's defense against the probabilistic problem nor his presentation of Reformed episteil~olomhas shown that it is useless to offer an evidential probleln of evil in this vein. The key is to arrive at some understanding of thc kind of nondemonstrative argument that supplies rational grounds for the rejection of theism.

Versions of the Evidential

ent

This kind of nondemonstrative or broadly inductive argument csscntially asks the theist to make scnsc of evil in light of his belief in God. Thc critic cites soille alleged fact about evil as the ewidence that supports the conclusioll that it is more rational, given the evidmce, t o believe that God does not exist. Three forn~ulatiansof this kind of argumellt Inay be detected in the grokning literature on the ejridential argument. As with the logical and probabilistic arguments, we Inay classify these formulations according to which of the followring propositions about evil they use:

(E$) Evil exists (Ez) Large amounts, cxtrcme kinds, and perplexing distfihrxtioils of evil exist (E3) Gratuitous evil exists. Thus, we get the taxonomy of arguments shown in Figure 5.1:

FIGIJW 5-1 Versions of the Evidential Argtlmel-tt koxn Evil

(E,) is evidence agair~st

(6)

(E21 is evidence against (6)

(E3) is evidence against (G)

For each jrersion of the argument, thm, a specific (E)-proposition is said to count as ejridence agaillst (G). The first formulation of the evidential argument-Version IV-is not now widely discussed. George Schlesinger, a theist, recognized this version in very early discussions of the evidmtial argument: "While the question of the amount of evil the world contains most vitally affccts our lives, in the context of our problcm this is an entirely irrcle\rant questione9'2According to this version of the argument, any instancc of cvil at all tends to disconfirm God's eexistencc. Howrever, the critic's hope of lnaking Version IV successful depends on his shokning that there is no lnorallp sufficient reason for an omnipotent, omniscient, kvholly good God to allow any evil whatsoejrer. This is a claim that seems well beyond the critic's reach, since a number of thoughtful nontheists admit that some evil szrFTesgood ends that could not otherwise be achieved. Therefore, the theist can respond that God, if he exists, could have a illorally sufficient rcason for allowing som~evil. Thc thcist might even suggest solxe general kinds of evils that arc connected to soillc goods (e.g., hardship is connected to character development, danger to heroism, and so forth). Many critics, ho~vever,see Versioil V as a more promising argu~ ofa Hefpetic, Walter Kaufnlann states: ment. In 7 %Faith The problenl arises when rritoncltl-reismis e~lrichedwit1-r-or impo~ferished by-two assumptions: that God is omnipotexlt: and titat God is just, 1x1 het, popular tfieism goes beyond rnerely asserting that God is just and clAms that God is ""good," that he is moraiIly perfect, that he l-raressuffering, that he loves mall, and titat he is infitlitely mercifirl, far trax~scending all human mercy, love, and perfection. Ql~cethese assuxnytior-zs are granted, tile prchblenl arises: w1-;ty9then, is there all the suffering we kilo~v? And as long as these assurngtioxls arc grar~ted,titis questioxl callnot be answcrcd, For if these assumptions were true, it would follow that tticrc couid not be at1 this suffering. Con\rersely: since it is a fact that tl-rere is aU

this suffering, it is plain that at least one of these asstxnlptions nlust be false, Popular theism is refilted by the existence of so gg~chs~tffering.The tt~eisrnpreactled kom rbac~sandsof p~llpltsand credited by iniltions of believers is disprocrcd by Auschwitz and a billion lesser evils.3

Many theists also acknowledge that this argument is quite formidable. Harvard theologian Gordon Kaufman discusses its force: A tl~ajc~r stut-ritbling block for contemporary faith it1 God remait~s:If there is a God, and if he is lo\ri~~g, why is there such horrendorts evil in t t ~ cworld? Do not the facts of terror, pain, and ulljustifiable suffentlg t of demonstrate either that Gob is not good-and therefc~ret ~ o jiiorthy our adoration and worship-or that there is l10 God at all? . . . ExpXoration of thc ~?nri..te$i-zs, sgbtteties, and e~zormitiesof cviI in huxnan life has becr>rriteperhaps the principal theme of Iiterature, art, and dranla since FVorid War 11.4

Thus 1ECarrfinan adn~itsthat (E2) Large amounts, extrelne kinds, and perplexing distributions of evil exist can be construed to count against

( G ) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists. Again, it is not the sheer existence of evil per se that counts against the existence of God but the fact that thcrc arc so many evils that arc very severe and presellt in patterns de@ing comprehension.5 Formulating a reply to this ~rersionof the problem is dimcult but not impossible for theists. Sorne theists have poilited out that this argumellt rests on an assulnption that the theistic deity would allowv only certain amounts, kinds, and distributions of evil. Yet i t is hard to kxlo\%rhow to establish how rz~uchevil is too mgcb for God to allow. How, in principle, could we establish this? The logic of theism itsclf does not scc131 to gcncratc any clear limit on the amount, type, and bxoportions of evil in thc world. It also does not appear that thc teachings of Christian theology, which expand upon restricted theism, contain some limit. We could obviously apply one theistic response to Versioll V here, sayillg that God could allow quite a lot of evil, even very extreme evil, as long as it serves good purposes that

God could not otherwise achieve. A secolld question that theists often raise regards how any finite person could ascertain that the present amount of evil in the world far exceeds the divinely set limit. These and other perplexing questions make it difficult to imagine how the atheist could ever establish such claims.6 What arc we to sal: then, about formulation V? In spite of its difficultics, wc should not dislniss V too quickl~r.After all, it is an attetnpt to articulate one of the deepest and most profound objections to rcligious disbelief. Expressions of this argument that describe concrete instances of suffering, for example, strike a responsive chord in man)! thoughtful people, believers and unbelievers alike. The critic can certainly argue strongly that theism fails to explain the large amounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing distributions of evil in the ~vorldand that this is a prima facie good reason to reject theism. Further, critics can argue that ~vhatcvcrdivine purposes thc horrible evils of our world allegedly serve must be shown to be illorally worthwhile if God is to be exonerated for permitting them. The debate over Version V is vigorous and important. Theists typically argue that even quite considerable evil can be allokved bp a morally perfect deity as long as it is necessary to either bringillg about a greater good or preventing a greater evil. They employ either defenses or theodicies that involve suggestions for what morally sufficient reasons God has or rnight have along these lines? Atheistic critics find fault in attempts to arguc that all evils have a point. But this rcally brings us to the consideration of the next version of the eridential problcim. Version VI has become a major focus of both atl-reists and theists alike. We map refer to this ~rersionhere as the evidefztial alzament f i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r e~?il. a t ~Many i t u critics ~ s who advance Version V1 of the evidential argument are willing to admit that the theistic deity might allow vast amounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing distributions of evil to exist. But they insist that God is justified in allowing the magnitude and profusion of evil only if it serves some purpose. Cornman and Lehrcr speak of "unnecessary evil," Madden and Harc speak of "gratuitous evil," and Danicl Howard-Snyder speaks of "poititless evil."8 So, it is gratuitous or pointless evil, if it exists, that proirides crucial e~ridenceagaillst the existence of a supremely pobverful, wise, and good God. WC must now take a look at how the philosophical cornmunitp has handled this argument from evil.

ProbZ~mof Gratuitous E ~ i l

Andping the Evidential fioxn. G r a t ~ t a u sEvil William Rowe has provided the most widely discussed version of the evidential argument from gratuitous evil. In 1979, Rowe wrote: (R1) There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. ( M ) An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitdng some evil equally bad or worse. (R3) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.9 Rowe actually offers a concrete version of this argument by citing a specific instance of intense suffering that could have been prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. Largely to avoid the Free Will Defense, he describes an instance of natural evil: A helpless fawn is uapped in a forest fire and suffers horribly for days before dying. Now, assuming that premise ( U )is held in common by most theists and atheists, the bulk of the controversy revolves around the first premise. In providing rational support for premise (Rl), Rowe states that the fawn's suffering is "apparently pointless" for "there does not appear to be any ourneighing good such that the prevention of the fawn's suffering would require either the loss of that good or the occurrence of an evil equally bad or worse." In later revisions of the argument, Rowe also borrows a case of suffen'ng from Bruce Russell as an instance of moral evil: A five-year-old girl is raped, severely beaten, and strangled to death by her mother's drunken boyfriend. Rowe's WO examples are now referred to as "the cases of Bambi and Sue" and employed as two reasons to believe that gratuitous evil exists. Rowe argues, moreover, that even if we could discover that God could not have eliminated these specific cases of seemingly pointless evil without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse, it would still be unreasonable to believe

that all the illstances of seelnillgly pointless human and allinlal suffering that occur have such a point.'Q Thus, Rowe beliekres he has provided inductive support for premise (R1 ). Iiowr's argument has brirtually been the paradigrn for the evidential argument from evil since the late 1970s. For present purposes, let us trin~it dow1-1as bllows:

(Kf ' ) Gratuitous evil exists (R2')If God exists, then gratuitous evil does not exist ( M ' ) Therehre, God does not exist. The argument structure here is obviously deductive. The support for premise (1x1' ) is inductive, making this version of the argulnent from evil "e\~idrntial~"l~ evil (in b w c % svords) as an evil We must understand ~ra~git.of&s that an omnipotent, omniscient bcing could have prevented without thercby tosing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. A gratuitous evil, in this smse, is a state of affairs that is not necessary (either logically or causally) to the attainment of a greater good or to the prevention of an evil equally bad or kvorse. According to this line of thinking, the only muraJly ~ztfficielzt1.ea~ulz God can have for permitting any evil is that i t must be necessary either to the attainment of a greater good or to the prevention of an evil equally bad or s\rorsc,

The Appearance Mally theists have joined the fray to rebut or lnitigate the force of Rowr's first premise and thus stop the argulnent from ~vorking.Some of them argue that the instances of apparently pointless evil that Rowe cites are not generated by following proper inductive techniques, that is, that they arc not part of a rcprescntativc sample. These theists argue that wc arc rationally justified in belic\ring that therc arc no goods that justi@ an evil only if we think the goods wc kno~vof are part of a represeiltative sample. <)bviously, in making many ordillarp illductive judgments, the rallge of relejrant items in the sample falls kvithin our range of knokvledge (e.g., lookixlg all around the world and seeing many storlts with red legs and then concluding that it is reasonable to believe that all storks have red legs).

But Stephrn Wykstra argues that the atheistic critic has no reasoll to believe that finite human beings can have a representatiire sample of goods for the sake of which an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being would allow evil. To begi12 to understand the exact point of this objection to Kowe, we 131ust understand Wybtra's analysis of appears-locutions. He assumes Rowc uses the term "appears'? hil-t what Kodcrick C:hisholm calls the "epistcrnic'? sense of the tcnn. That is, it pertains to what \VC arc inclined to belieire when we contemplate a situation. Then, Wykstra makes a careful distinction in the different jwys that the word "not" fullctions in such locutions. He argues that Ko\ve's statelnent that "there does not appear to be any ounveighing good" should not be intelpreted as the initial premise in an argument h m ignorance, ~vhichis a blatant fallacy. Rowre's statement, a5 Wykstra correctly poi~ltsout, is bener i n w r p ~ t e das meaning that "it aayycars that tl~crcis no ourneighing good ."l2 Rowe's inference, then, may be understood as moving from a proposition such as (42) It appears that some evils are co~lllectedto no ounvrighing goods

to the proposition (43) It is masonable to believe that some c\-ils arc not connected to o t r ~ c i g h i n ggoods.

This reasoning has this gelleral form: (A) It appears that p; therefore, (B) it is reasollablc to believe that p. Such an inference seems warranted by the Principle of Crcdkxliry expounded by Kichard Swinburne: lf something appears to be the case (in the epistemic sense of "appears"), then this prima facie justifies one in bclicving it is the case.lVhis pr;\nciylc is rooted in a widespread philosophical opinion that \VC have generally rcliablc bcliefforming powers (e.g., perception, memory) that incline us toward certain belie& in certaill situations.l%ccordi~lg to Wykstra, hobvever, the Principle of Credulity does not quite provide the criterion we need. He argues that the epistelnic relatioil that the principle posits bet\\reen (A) and (B) tnust meet the Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access (COIWEA):

CCILWEA: On the basis of cognized situation s, l-rut-ritanH is entirled to claim "It appears that g" only if it i s reasonable for H to believc that, give11 her c~gtlftivcfactzIties and the use she has rnade of them, if p wcrc 12ot the ease, s would likely be different than it is in sot-rite way discernible by her,'"

In ~-nakingan appears-claim, one assrrmes there is an evidential connection bcween what she is inclined to belie\re (i.e., that p) and the cog~lizedsituation that illclines her to believe it. However, if it is not reasonable for her t o believe that this e~ridentialconnection obtains, then she is not entitled to sap, "It appears that p," Wykstra argues that applying COWEA is fatal to liowe's case, for by COlWEA, one is entitled to claim "this suffering does nor appear (i.e., appears not) to serve any Divinely purposed ounvrighing good" only if it is reasonable t o believc that if such a Divinely purposed good exists, it would be within our ken. But it is not reasonable to believe this, according to Wykstra, sincc an infinitely wise deity ~vould crrtaillly know of ounveighing goods that escape our finite undrrstanding. We hulnalls could not expect to know all the goods in jrirtue of bnhich God permits suffering. They are beyond our ken. Thus, Kowr's clailx~that there appear to be no ounvrighing goods for much suffering does not meet the Condition of lieasonable Episternic Access. If such goods did exist, Wykstra claims that we have no reason to think WC would have cognitive access to thel-n. Wj~kstra.contends that Rowc would have to show that if thcism is true, then there is reason to think that \VC \\rouid have access to the all the goods that ellter into God's reasons for permitting suffering. Wykstra beliejrrs that the prospects for doing this are very bleak. Since he lnaintains that belief in God's illfillite kno~rledgethat exceeds our own is logically implied bp theism, the theist should gxpect that we would fail to see outweighing goods for many e\rils.lb According to Wykstra, the theist has reason indeed to believe that in many cases of sufkring, C O m E A is not rmt. But then he ~vondcrsho\v Rowe's claim that thcrc appear to be no justifiiing goods connccted to many evils is supposed to be rational support for the key prcmisc that

(K1 ) There exist illstances of intense suffering that an omnipotellt, omniscient being could have prevented ~vithout thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse,

If this premise does not have adequate rational support, that is, if one is not bnithin her epistemic rights to believe it, then it is difficult to see how it can serve as evidence n&ginst theism. In replying to Wkstra, Rowe reinforces his position that the fact that various evils "appear" not to have out\veighing goods is acceptable rational justification f i r his prclnise (RI). He clarifies that his original in&eis%az, ~vhichis the view that the= is tcntion was to discrrss sta%d~~!gfid an omnipotent, omniscient?~vhollygood bcing who crcrtted the world. Within standard theism, Kowe distinguishes rertricted theism and 6%panded theism. Restricted theism is strictly the view that the being described bp standard theism exists. Expanded theism, hobnever, is the view that this being exists, conjoined with certain other significant religious claims (about sin, redemption, afterlife, and so forth). The essence of Rowe's response to Wkstra, then, is that Wyhtra mistakenly defends his o w prcferrcd version of expanded thcisln, whereas Rowc"s original attacli was mounted against rcsat-icted thcism. Wjrkstra's defensc, then, inisses the point. It might work for his particular versioil of expailded theism, but it does not help restricted theism at all. Rowe describes Wykstra's gelleral strategy as an attelnpt to block his abiliy to affirm a proyositioil such as

(44) It appears that the fawn's suffering is pointless-that is, i t appears that the fawn's suffering does not serve an outweighing good otherwise unobtainable by an omnipotent, omniscient beixilg. Ro~ve,of course, cites as justificatioil for (44)the fact that k2.e are unable to think of any good that exists or might come into existeilce that both ounveighs the fmrll's suffering a ~ could d not be obtained by God without permitting that suffering. If this is acceptable support for (44), then the eilidential argument fioln gratuitous evil works. Ho~vever,Wykstra counters that Rowe is not entitled to affirm (44) ulllcss the following proposition is true: (45) WC have no reason to think that wcrc God to exist things would strike us in pretty much the same %.ay concernillg the fawn's suffering. Wykstra's objection focuses, then, on shojving (45) to be false by supplying a reason to think that were the fawn's suffering actually to

serve an ourneighing good, otherwise unobtainable bp God, things would still strike us in pretty much the same way-that is, we jwuld be unable to think of any outweighing good for it. Rowe characterizes Wykstra7sreasoning in this \\lap. Wykstra starts with the claim (46) God" smind grasps goods bcyond our ken,

(47) It is likely that the goods for the sake of which God permits suffering are, to a large extent, beyond our ken, and condudes with (48) It is likely that illany of the s~lfkringsin our world do not appear to have a point----WCcannot see what goods justi@ God in permitting them. For Wykstra, then, proposition (48) is a "logical erteilsioil of theism," "implicit" in theism, and not simply an "additional yostutate.'"y Armed with a version of theisrn that includes (48), Wjrkstra claims that the appearance that many instances of suffering do not have a point is exactly what WC would expect if God exists. In other ~vords,(45) is not true, Rowc agrccs that standard theism implics (46) and that it also implies a proposition something like

(49) God allo~rsthe sufferillgs that occur in this world in order goods he could otherwise not achieve. to achie~~e Rut l b w e vigorously disagrees that restricted standard theism ilxplies that these goods, once: they occur, rei~~ain beyond our ken," That is an implication of some versions of expanded thcislll, such as Wykstra"? but not of rcstrieted tbeism itself. R o w maintains, then, that Wykstra" move kern (46) to (47) is the heart of the difficulty. This move presupposes that the goods in question have not occurred or, if they hiwe occurred, remain unknown to us (in themselves or in their connections to actual sufkrings). Rut restricted standard theism, says Rokve, supplies no reason to think that

either of these alternatives is true. Perhaps, prior to their being realized, God's inind grasps goods that we cannot imagine. This much seems deducible flt.om standard theisr~~. But this is no reason to thinlr either that the greater goods in virtue of which God permits most suffering~come into existence in the distant future o r that once they do come into existence, we rclllain ignorant of them and their relation to the sufkrings. 1" Athough restricted standard theism implies that God can appreheild noilactual goods prior t o their occurring that lie beyond our ken, this is iilsufficie~ltto justifi Wj~kstra'sclaim that, if God were t o exist, the sufferillgs in our ~rorld~rouldappear to us as they do. Kowe concludes, therefore, that Wykstra has not supplied a convincing reaso11 to reject his evidential claim:

(R1) Thcrc exist instances of intcnsc suffering that an o~llnipotent, omniscient being co~aldhave pre\rcnted ~virhout thereby losing some grearcr good or pcrlnitting some evil equally bad or bvorse. Thus, for Rowe, a crucial pre~nisein the evidential argumellt can be shown reasonable to believe, and the argument from gratuitous evil stands. Notes X . Sec AIVIIIPlalltil~ga,"The Kefc>rmedObjection to Natrrral T h e ~ I o m ~ " Ci!$ristian Scjgokgr S- Revieav l I (1982): it 87-198. See also Nicholas WoLterstorff; "The Migration of the Tl~eisticArguments: From Natural Theology to Ellidtentialist Apologetics," bin Rationnlit-y; Relz'~z'clz$sBeliq; sad bAo18~al Ciovkz~~itment~ eds. Roberr Audi and Williarn J. bVainwrigl~t:(Xthaca: Cornell University Press, 1986),pp. 38-81. 2. Gcorge Schlcsinger, Reltqz'clrt alzd Sez'e~t.tg3c6g190d ( F-Xi~~gIlam, Mass.: IXcidcl, l977), p. 13, 3, Waiter &ufn-lan~~,?he Failch @"a Hgretic (Garden City, N.Y.: ITo~xbleday, X 961), p, 139 (italics rnirle), 4. Gorcfan D, bufman, God: 2he IZroblem (Cambndgc, Mass.: EIarvard University, 1972), pp. 171-1 72 (italics rritine), 5 . Pauf X3raper has offered the rnczst sopl-liseicatcd recent relldirion of argumcx~rV in ""Pin and Ncasure: An E~ridentiaiIZrobleinfor 'l'lzeisa," "1 Y79e E ~ ~ i d e ~ z tA
the tailguage of "*ai~~ount," akind,'7 and ""distribution" iinto the discrission of l tha Christi~anG d ( G r a ~ ~bdp i d s , the evidential argrrmexlt in my E ~ i nrtd Mich,: Baker Book House, 1982), p. 67. Peter van fslwagcl~has more recelntly used these collcepts as the basis for an artictc on the problem of evil. See his "The Magnitrtde, Drtration, and I>iseribr~tionof Evil: A Tl~eodicy," I2hil~sophicai1>er~pectives 5 ( 1991): X 35-1 65. Brtlce XXusscfull acknowledges Ar~g~s$ent fkom this kind of problem in "Defensetess," bin 7be E~~identz.zlal E ~ i l ,ed. IDaniel Howard-Sr1-t7del.de ( Ifloomi ngton : Indiana University Prcss, lY96), pp. 194, l99ff. 6, Peter van Inwagell discrisses the difficufties surroundi~lgthe argut-ritent over the arnorrnt and kinds of evil in his ""The Probiern ofEvi1, the Probtern 5 (199 1): of Air, and the Problem of Silence," Philosophical 13g~slfiect-zz7es 135-165, especially pp, 140-1 52. 7 . St~chan. appraisai of the situation seems more intellectrrafly hoxlest and rnore philosoptlically proxnising than del-tj'inp that there reafly is as mueh evil or tl-tnt rrituftitrzdes of people are really as ul-thappy as is iinibdiy supposed, It is better fir the theist simply to admit that there are a great maxly severe evils in the world and the11 t a argtle that the existel-tce of God is llelthcr precluded nor n~adeunlikely thereby. The argllnlent can be constructed either fro111 the logic of essc~~tiaf ttteistic coxlcepts ur from the additiotla! cotlcepts ir~cluded in sarne e x p a ~ ~ d;form ~ d of tftelsm that is represented in a Xivii-tg faith tradition, ssrch as C;l~ristianity, Althczugh strclt theistic maxleu\rers seem reasonable, pertlaps there is at least one sense in which the evidel-ztial argtlmel-tt kom the amounts, kinds, and disrril;liutior~of evil is ii~lmediateiydestrt~ctiveto religious belief. The argrrmexlt clearly discredits belief in a delry who places a felicitorrs limitation 01-1the evils that lrulnall beings can experience and about wham sixnplisttc answers for evil may be given. Th~xs,the god of popu1~"fotk religion peddled in the name of historical, ortltodox Christianiq-really is dead, The burden, then, falls upon the shoulders of thoughtfufulChristian theists to articulate a concept of God that is 111ore sopllisticated a i d profo~xndthan popufar theism envisioxls. 8. 7 . W Cornrnan and Keirfi Lefirer, 1>hilosophical1>roblgmsa d A ~ ~ E . c aazents: An I~trodaectio~$ (New York: h%acmiIlan,1970), p. 347; Edkirard Maddell and Peter Hare, Evil grid the Concep~of C;c.d (Springijeld, Ill.: Charles C;. Thomas, 19681, p. 3; Dalliel Howard-Si~yder,""l'be Argtlmel-tt fi-om Inserurablc Evil," in his Evidential A ~ q u ~ s $ e n t fEvil i o ~(Bloomington: ~ Indiana Universiry Press, X 996), pp, 29 1-292, 9. WiIliam Itowe, ""Tfie Problem of Evil and Soine Vaneties of Atheism," Amtsrica~zPhilosophical Qzir%rter1",~ 16 ( 1879): 336. I have changed nsxnlbers and added parentheses to Ro\%rc?argrrment in keeping with the convcntioll ;for lluxnbering used thro~tphoutthis book, 10. Ibid., p. 337.

1l , In terms we used earlier, (E3) Grat~zitclusevil exists counts as negative er~idenceagai~lst

( G ) AI omnipotent, omnisciet~t,jiiholly good God exists,

~legatiifeer~identiairelationship to (G) in jiihich But what is the sig~~ificant (E3) sta~lds?Rrrrce Russell explains that ttterc are really m70ways ofcor~ceiving of this evidential relationship, one z'~tdi?.l.ct.zve and the other nbdacctive. AIthough we callnot psrrstxe this distincdon here, the reader is encouraged to read R~tsself'S 'Wefenseless,"" pp, X 93-2 X 8, 121. Stephen Wyksrra, ""'l'he I3trmean Obstacle to Evldel-zdal hguments fi-om S~~ffering: O n AvoiQi~lgtl-re Evils of "ppearance,"' I~$er~~zac.innn;lJo~~~ nlili.l$%trPj~iltrscphjf~'Rel@z"on X 6 ( 1.984):80-8 l . 12%. lZichard Srvinburne, 2be E~igg~-zce of Chd (Oxford: Clarel-Edan lzress, 1970), pp. 245,254. 14, For example, Swirtbr~rnecircs an example o f a betiefformed 0x1 the basis of scl~soryexperience: ""If say 'ttil~cship appears to be mokring" am saying that I am i~~clined to beliecre that the ship is movii~g,and that it is my present sensory experience which leads me to have this ir1ciina6ol1 to belief." See his Existence of'God, p. 246. For a fuller discussion of these cognitive and Pf*operFgncgolirers and their function, see Afiin Pia~ltinga,Wa~.r#gnt tiun (New York: Oxhrd U111versit.y Press, 1993). it 5. Wykstra, "Humcan Obstacle," p. 85. 16, Ibid., p. 89. X 7 . Ibid., pp* 89,9l. 18. WiXliarn Rowc, and the '~bcisricEIyyothcsis: A lXcsponsc t o J1;1~a#nt%lf-;3~ PhiIusopby of"Relg3ion16 ( 1984):99. Wykstra," hic~:ep-pzatin~~t%I X 9. Xi,owe observes that ~ 7 ecould, of cottrse, imagine a ~rersiotlof expanded theism that conjoins a praposidan such as ""E7il

The goods for the sake of which God rnLlst perinit suffering wilt. be realized only at the e ~ l dof the wortd with standard theisnl. This version of expanded theism is not rendered unlikely by ttte items that render restl-icted theism ~tnXikeXy-See ibid.

Suggested Radings Aston, William, "The Inductive Argut~le~lt from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition." Phz'kos~~phz'cnl Pe~~spccgi~cs 5 ( 1991): 2947. Bear)?, MichaeI D. ""'l'lze Problein of Evil: l'lze Ux-rans\vered Questions Argu" kSuzdt.htvenPifilo~~phy R e v i e l ~4 ( 1988): 57-44, rrite~lt,

82

'Ihe l3faoble~$ of C;r&ggit~gs Evil

Chrzan, Keith, "Necessary Grat~ritousEvil: An Cjxymoron Revisited," Fgitlj alzd P/$z'losophyX 1 ( 1994): 134-1 37. . "W~CXI 1s a Graruirac~sEvil Xtcally Grattlitaus?" fizt.gr.l.znt-z'o~nI]otc~~nt%lf-irrPhz"losopk3~1 n_f"Religi;on 24 ( 1988): 87-9 l. Dore, Cternexlt. "Does Strffcring Serve Valuable Ends!" 111 Thehm, Dordrcchr: D. IZcidel, 1984. Faca of Evil: Theolo~z'cal ,I?tfte:msand the P~~olibm Feinberg, Joh11S, ?he LW~PZJI of7Evil,2nd ed. Grand bpids, Mich,: %iondervan,1994. Gcach, Petcr. Piw~kdanceand Evil. Gambndgc: Cambndgc Ux-rivcrsiy Press, 1977. Hasker, iVilliam, ""Chrzan on Necessary Grattritous Evil," Faith and Phiinsopby l 2 (1995):4 2 3 4 2 5 . . "The Necessity of Grattiitous Evil." Fgigh and Phiilosopk3~1 9 (1992): 2344' . ""Pravidcncc and Evil: Three l'heorics." Raeti8iaws S~udkes28 (1992): 91-105, Hick, John. Evil and tik G d of'IJc~~e. 2nd ed. New York: Harper 13r: I
. ""Evil a ~ l dTheadicy." Pi2z'los~phicalTopics 16 (Fall 1988): 119-1 32. . "Evil and the Theistic Hypothesis: A Respotlse to S, J. Wykstra." hteaerrationat Jotca~aatJbr I2hilnsophjt ofReli8ion: it 6 ( 1984): 95-1 00. . "The Prc->ble~-rit of Evil ." h1 Pi$z/osaphy of Reltqion: AFZI ~ z t ~ 0 d ~ . ~ c t i r n , Etldno and Belmont, Calif.: IDickensor-r, 1978, pp, 79-95, . ""TIC ProbXem of Evil and Soxne Varieties of Atheism," Aifmeaeic~n PhiIttsophical Qts@rtgr[y16 ( 19792: 335-34 1. . "R~~rni natiolls about khil, " PhiIosc~phicdPerspecti~~es 5 ( X 99X ) : 69-8 8, 12ussel1, Bruce. "Thc 13eersistel-ttXzroblenl of Evil," a ~ z dIZhilosophy 6 (1989): 121-139. Kusscll, Bruce, and Stephell Wykstra, "The "~xlducti\reWrgrrmex-rtfrom Evil: A Dialogue." P!~ilosophicak Ybpiw 16 (Fall 1988): 133-1 60. Sennett, Jan~esE", ""The Inscrutable Evil Defense," Fgith n~zdPhilosophy 10 (X 993): 220-229. Stc~par t, Mclville. 7ke CJ~~eatea*-Good Dgkasme: An: Essgy on: the Rn;t-z'o~nlip of Faith. New k r k : St. Martin'ss, 1993, Trau, Jane hilary, "hltacies in the ,ALrg~rne~lt from Grattritous S~rfferil-rg." 2be M ~ u 7S c h o i g ~ % i c i60 ~ - ~(1986):58'5-588, Iran Inwagen, Peter, ""Tlte Magnitude, Duratioil, a ~ l dDistribution of Evil: A Tkcodicy." Philosophicnl Topics X 6 (Fall X 988): 16 1-X 87. . ""'l'llc 131taceof Gballce in a bVorid Sustained by God," h Inlivi~zea n d Hgagn~zAcrt:Z082, edited by Thornas V. Morris. Itltnca: Ci~rilellUniversity Press, X988, pp, 21 1-235. . "The 13rrablem of EliI, the Problem of Air, and the 13rrablcm of Silence," Phi/osopk~icaIPc?~spectz'~e~ 5 ( 1991): l 35-1 65.

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The evidential argulllent from gratuitous evil is now widely considered the most forlnidable objection to theistic belief. Glearlj: de@nse against this as well as other objections fro111 evil is an important type of theistic response. Yet Exany classical and contemporary theists have responded in an altogether different mode. Thcse theists engage in what has traditionally been called theodicy. The term derives froin the Greek theus (god) and dike (justice) and is, as John Milton saps, an attempt t o "justify the ways of God t o man." Rather than propose merelj!pusslblc reasons God inight have for permitting evil, a theodicy seeks to articulate plausible or crcdiblc explanations that rest on theistic truths and insights. Just as contemporary analytic philosophers of religion have sharply distinguished the logical and evidential problems of evil, they also have carefully defi~lcdthc strategic tilnctions of defense and theodicy. Although debate about the viabiliq?of theodicy continues, snany illtrresti~lgand influelltial theodicies have been ad12-al2cet;f. in the discussion of God 2nd evil. I review here discussions of the feasibility of theodicy. Then, 1 will take a close look at four famous theodicies, &om Augustine, Gottfried Leibniz, John Hick, and AXei-etl North Whitehead.

The Prospects for Theodiq Most theistic responses to the argument from gratuitous evil rcvolve around its factual premise, which is the claim that there is (or probably is) gratuitous evil. William Rowe writes: "If we are to fault this argument, . . . we must find some fault with its [factual] premise."' Madden and Hare state that "the really interesting problem of evil is

whether the apparellt gratuity can be explained a\lray . . . or whether the gratuity [of evil] is real and hence detrimental t o religious belief."2 Keith Yandell, a theist, insists that "the crucial question is whether it is certain, or at least more yrobable than not, that there is unjustified evil, ~vhethernatural or moral."3 Almost all defenses as \veil. as thc~dicicsbased on standard theis111 react t o the factual premise of the argument. Theistic defenses against the factual claim that therc is gratuitous e\ril-sucI~ as Wykstra's, Aston's, and van In\vagen7s4-tppicaIly cite the severe cognitive limitations of human beings in relation to divine wisdom. According to these theists, such limitations bar the critic from claiming that i t is reasonable to believe that therc are no offsetting goods conllected to many evils in the world. The goods that jusGod in allowing evil are, they contend, beyond our ken, known to the divine mind but not to our minds. Because of thcsc salxc cognitive limitations, many theists who offer a defense declarc thcodicy to be impossible or klnneccssary or inappropriate. Some sec fheodicy as impossible because it requires knokning the rewons for evil that only the divine kvisdom can kno\n. Even if it kvere not strictly impossible to blow God's reasons for evil, others kvould argue that theodicy bnould still be unnecessary because i t exceeds what pure defense coupled with Reforlned episteluology requires of the theist in the debate with the critic. Some even say that theodicy is inapyropriate because it displays the presumption and arrogance of mere hulxans trying to probe into divine ixysterics. Let us look at cach of thcse objections in turn. A grcat many C:hristian theists, past and prcscnt, have not considered theodicy impossible. Most of them have not thought that formulating a theodicy requires kilowing God's reasolls for evil as though finite humail beillgs could completely fathom the infiilite divine ~visdom.liather, they conceive of the project of theodicy as drawing out the implications of one's theological position for evil. After all, religious believers commonly accept that the doctrines and teachings of their faith have implications for all sorts of illlportant il~attcrs----moraland spiritual virtues, the meaning of rcdeil~ption,the purpose of htlman life, and so forth. So, it would bc odd indeed to think that religious beliefs have no implicatioils kvhatsoever for understanding something so important as evil in the bnorld. In a sense, then, Christiall theisln already contains implicit theodical insights that may be made explicit and systematic. In fact, some Christian traditions forthrightly claim that it is God's good pleasure to give us at

tie

least dim and partial glimpses of his general purposes, including his purposes for evil. (Here we simply have t o recognize difkre~lces among Christian traditions or what we are calling versions of expanded theism, and some are more positive toward theodicy.) Whatever degree of understanding of evil that believers achieve, then, provides a lneasklrc of theodicy. Thus, theodicy is not impossible. Not all theists agrcc with what we ~xightcall the Reformed objcction to theodic): which designates defcnse as the theist's only rcsponsibility in the debate with the critic and offers a theory of how belief in God can be episte~nicallybasic. Yet developillg a theodicy seems completely justified to theists who coilstrue the dialectical context of rational debate in a certain fashion. The theist might see himself not as asserting the isolated claim that "God exists" but rather as asserting a whole set of logically interrelated clairns regarding the divine nature and purposes. He ~xighteven understand the single claim ""God cxists" to toe investcd with this largcr interpretive scheme and thercforc entailing all sorts of other claims about God's ways with thc bvc~rld.He could maintain that the j4rhsle system of tselieE5 that constitute his understanding of theism offers an iilterpretatioil of human life and the kvorld at large. The dialectic develops, then, when the critic alleges that this theological interpretation has difficulty accounting for evil. The theist responds by trying to elucidate and explain how his theological beliefs make sense of evil. Here the critic is not being eccentric or unfair to request that the thcist make sensc of his own belief in God, particularly by tracing out its ramifications for the issue of evil. So, when the contest of dialoguc is conceived differcntlj~, theodicy is not unilecessav. Even if we grmt that the ixliever may be entitled to accept belief in I ~ Sto, think that lik's eexGad as basic Litider certai~lC O I ~ ~ ~it~isOnaive perirnces \\.illnever invite deeper reflection upon that belief, reflection that includes questioning as well a5 reaffirgning one's faith. When engaging in this kind of honest reflection, thoughtful believers explore the implications of their uniqur particular <:hristian and theistic pcrspectivc for a large number of illlportant issues----moral crises, the worth of ccrtain humanitarian projects, the hope of life after death, and the prcscncc of evil. Thus, it is quite legitimate for theists to try to formulate some underreasonable understaildi~lgof evil for themselves, and ~rhate~rer stailding they obtain moves them in the direction of theodicy. This activity need not be characterized as exhibiting the haught)' presumption that a finite hurnan being can know the dibrine mind. Instead, i t may be

seen as the process of "faith seeking u~~dersta~ding" Cfides qthaefpelzs i ~ z tellect&snz).Hence, theodicp is not inappropriate. If theodicy is not impossible or unnecessary or inappropriate, then the way is open to discuss a variety of issues at the 1e-d of metatheon'icy. For example, how lnuch conceptual work can or ought theodicy accomplish? That is, can theodicy specify God's reason for allowing partic~alarevilsmr sho~aIdit aim at explainir~gwhy God allows the broad kinds of evils that exist? Must a thcodicy ~ sont just one theme (e.g., punishlnent or character building)! Or can it kveave together several themes and illsights into an oirerall picture of the sort of 14rorld God created and sustains? And what role does our particular ~noral theory play in the creation of theodicp! What difference does it make, saj: ~vhetherwe adopt a co~lsequentialistor a deontological moral theory! Where are appropriate building blocks for theodicy to be found---in restricted theislx or in solxe version of expanded theism? Ho\v these and many Exore related questions are settled determines the direetion theodicy will cake. Without attempting t o discuss these questioils in detail, let us say that all of the theodicies considered here try to give some highly general explailatioils for the evils we find in our world. Furthermore, since restricted theism prok~idrsvery little material for theodicl~,each of the following theodicies relies on some for~nof expanded theism adopted by the theodicist. In developing their theodicies, Christian theists extract themes frolx the Bible and historical church teachings as wcll as insights prc\ralcnt in the communiq of belic\rers, thus tapping into a rich vein of ideas. Of course, various <:hristian traditions \n.ill yield difkrellt forms of expanded theism. The theodicist then reflects upon the various ideas ajrailable bnithin his tradition and coilstrues them in a \nap that accounts for evil in the ~rorld. The motivation for theodicy, of course, is that we do not readily see the purpose of much evil. Without at least a general account of evil from a theistic perspective, then, evil appears pointless. Hence, we have the force of Rowc's first premise:

(RI) Thcrc exist instances of intcnsc suffering that an o~llnipotent, omniscient being could have prevellted ~rithout thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or bnorse. Most theodicies therefore follojv the strategy of specifying either greater goods that are gained or worse evils that are averted by God's

permitting evil? We map call this gelleral approach "Greater-Good Theodic~7."Greater-Good Throdicy is, so to speak, the "parmt," and man!. particular theodicies are its "offspring."b The b~ariousoffspring theodicies may specift different offsetting goods for the evils of the world, but they all agree in assuming that the justification of God consists in specieing some grcatcr good.7 The difference bcmecn a Greater-Good Dcfcnsc and a Create~GoodThesdic~;of course, is that thc former claims it is possible that some proposed grcatcr good justifies evil kvhereas the latter claims that the proposed good ifzfact justifies evil.

Augustine's Free Will Theodicy The first fully formed theodicy in the Western world was offered by St. Augustine, an early C:hristian philosopher and theologian. 111 part, A-rxgustine was rebutting Manichacan Dualism, ~vj~ich, holds that equal cosmic powers, one Good and the other Evil, arc at war in thc unikrerse. For Manichaeism, the Good pokner, ~rhichpeople ~rorshiy, is therefore not absolute. For Augustine, ho~rever,the Christian worldview elltails that God is absolutely sovereign over all things and that no evil comes from hirn. So, Augustine undertook the task of shojving how the disturbing and undeniable presence of evil in no way detracts from God's total sovereignty. Augustine ofkrs a comprchensivc vision of reality that brings together several strands of thought. One of Augustine's central idcas is that God is suprcme in rcaliq and goodness. He also bclic\res that the universe-that is, the whole of God's creation-is good. Only God has the pokner to bestow beillg upon finite creatures, and God only creates good things. All of the creatures in God's creation, then, are good in their essence. Augustine elnbraces a recurring theme in Western philosophy: the linkage of being and goodness. Here we must understand "being" not as bare "existence" (~vhichdoes not admit of degccs) but as having more or less ""intensiq" (in the sense, say, that j ? a simpleton). Intcnsiq ada poetic genius lives more i t ~ ~ n s c lthan 131its of degrees. I11 Augustine's terminology, everything has some dcgree of "measure, form, and order,"8 ~rhichis its proportion of being. Just as God's being is illfinite and absolute, so his goodlless is infillire and unsurpassable. God's creation is rich and variegated, filled with all levels of being, and the goodness of all things is correlated to the degree of measure, form, and order he has given them. On the scale of created things, an artichoke is more valuable than a rock, a gorilla

is more valuable than an artichoke, and a human being is more valuable than a gorilla-all because of their relative degrees of being.' Evil, then, from Augustine's perspective, is not a thing, not a being. Although evil in human experience can be very powerful and profound, evil does not, at least metaphysically speaking, represent the positive existencc of anything. Evil silnplp does not exist in its own right; it is not one of the constituents of the universe. Rathcr, it is thc lack of realit)?and thus the lack of goodness. Put another way, evil enters creation when created beings cease to function as they \yere created to function by nature. Evil is thus metaphysical deprivation, privation, or degradation. Augustine's term for evil is prlvatio boni (privation of good). For Augustine, evil enters creation through the misuse of finite &ee will. He attributes all evils, both natural and moral, to the wrong choices of frcc rational beings. This evil choice is "sin" in theological language. Augustine's intcrprctation of Christian teachings leads him to assert that, first, a company of angels (none~nbodiedrational frcc beings) rebelled agaillst God and that this rebellioll was then replicated in humallkind (embodied ratioilal free beings). In order to explain how free rational creatures-~rhich represent a very valuable kind of being-
Of course, the classic Cbristiall belief in God's
universe seen as a kvhole. So, the uniqueness of each grade or kind of finite creature is somehokn complementarjl in an overall scheme that is harmonious, beautiful, and balanced in the sight of God. The determinate characteristics of each kind of creature, then, betoken its place in the great chain of being (e.g., the skbriftness of the cheetah, the beauty of a giant sequoia), as do its limitations (e.g., the pig is not as beautihl as the peacock, the dog does not live as long as the elephant). It may seem that the aesthetic emphasis here explaills natural evil better than it does lnoral evil. Yet Augustine obviously extellds it to cover lnoral evil bp reference to justly deserved, properly proportioned punishment that settles accounts for Ivrongs that were done. Augustine sees even the fall of the human race and the darnnation of sinners as subsumed under the "perfection" and "beautp" of the universe.lWe states: "For as the beauty of a picture is increased by wellmanaged shadows, so, to the eyc that: has skill to discern it, che universe is beautified even by sinners, though, considered by themselves, their deformity is a sad blemish."lb The result of pressing the aesthetic theme to the fullest is that everythi~lgin God's creation contributes to the beauq and appropriateness of the %.hole-even ilatural and moral evil.17 "If it were not good that evil things exist, they would certainly not be allowed to exist by the Olnnipotent Good."lR Clearly, the upshot of Augustinian throdicy is the dellial of the factual prcmise of the argument frolx gratuitous evil. Everything in the ulliverse sertres the highcr harmony of God's sovereign design. There is no state of affairs ltrithout which the rxnivcrsc ~voutdhave been better: "God judged it better to good out of evil than not to permit any evil to exist."lWAll evil serves a greater good.

Leibniz's Best Possible World Theodicy Gotrfried Wilhelm von l,eibniz (1646-1716) is the only thinker included in the present study who has ~vrittena book explicitly entitled fieodicy.2"eibnizian thcodicy seeks to demonstrate that God cannot be blamed for the existence of evil in the ~vodd,since this wodd is the best of all possible worlds. Leibniz's argllmcnt utilizes the concept of a "possible world" that was introduced in Chapter 3. Technically speaking, a p~ssibleworld is a total possible state of affairs, a complete universe with past, present, and future. Possibility here, as defined in Chapter 2, is broadly logical possibility. For lmibniz, God's

omnipotence ellsures that God has the pokner to actualize any possible world he chooses from among an infillite llumber of eternally fixed possibilities. God's perfect goodness, which always and unerringly acts for the best, ensures that he will choose to create the most valuable possible world. And God's omniscience ensures that he understands all possible worlds that he could create, accurately calculates their wtr>rth,and identifies the very best one. So, the theistic concept of God entails the conclusion that ~vhateverworld exists is indeed the best of all possible ones. Of course, no creaturely reality can be totally perfect, and at lcast in that sense, reality \nil1 contain some evil (i.e., "metaphysical evi17').21 According to Leibniz, God's goodness and power guarantee that he will select that possible ~vorldfrom among all other alternatives that contains the optilnum balance of good and evil. Some interpreters of Leibniz mistakenly think he maintains that God brotrght about that world containing the least amount of evil colllmensurate with thcrc being a world at all. Howc\rer, a more correct interpretation of Lcibniz is that he enirisions God actualizing that possible ~rorldthat contains the amount of evil ilecessary to make the byodd the best one on the kvholc. And frankly, this map not meail actualizing the \norid that has the least amount of evil. It may mean bringing about a world that has a great many evils in i t but evils of such kinds and arranged in such Ivaps that they contribute to the world being the very best one possible, As Lcibniz says, the actual 'ivorld contains those possible states of affairs "which, bcing united, produce most reality, ixost perfection, most significancc."z2 Sometimes he e~nploysan aesthetic motif, relniiliscent of Augustine, illdicating that mere quantitative maximalization is dull and uninteresting, that God seelts to produce richiless and quality in the world. In the process of comparing and evaluating all possible worlds, God foresees the natural and moral evil they contain. He chooses to actualize that world whose various cox~stituents-eve its evil ~0x1stitucnts-make it the best on the ~vhole:"Not only does [God] derive from [c\rils] greater goods, but he finds them connected with the greatest goods of all those that arc possible: so that it would bc a fault put, all the evils of the world connot t o permit them."2"impl!~ tribute to its character as the best of all possible ~rorlds:"If the slnallest evil that comes t o pass in the world were missing in it, it bnould no longer be this ~vorld;~vhich,with nothing omitted and all allowallce made, was found the best by the Creator who chose it?"'"

There are many poi~ltsof serious philosophical interest in Leibniz's theodicy-for example, its conceptio~lof the relation benveen dil~ine omnipotence and human fiee will'2bhe standard of b~alueaccording to which this possible world is the "best," and the prospect that it impugns God's power that he cannot make a better world than this one. Yet the point of central interest for us is this theodicy's bearing on the factual premise of the argument from gratuito~lsevil. Lcibnizian thcodicp is tantalxount to a denial of the factual prcmisc. The evil that exists is illdispensable to the jralue of the ulliverse coilsidered as a whole. Leibniz's argumellt is not an elnpirical one that starts with the evils that actually exist in the world and argues that they coiltribute to the best b~alueof the whole. Instead, the argulnent starts with several crucial assumptions about God's attributes and purposes, ~vhichare taken as axiomatic and which yield a demonstratian that this world must bc the best one possible. It is a cwrld that contains no gratuitous evil.

Hick's Soul-Making Theodicy Although St. h ~ s e l m St. , Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz, and other traditional thinkers may be seen as following in the broad Augustinian tradition in theodicj: there is allother major approach to theodicy that also has roots in Christian antiquity. This type of theodicy can be traced to Bishop Irenaeus (c. 130-c. 202). The most articulate contemporary proponent of lrenaean theodicy is John Hick, and it is his prcscntation that wc will exallline. The main difference bemecn the n\.o traditions map be plainly put: Augustiniail theodicy looks back to the fall of a good creation through the inisuse of humall freedom; Irellaeail theodicy looks to the future in terms of God's plail for the development of humanity. However, the ostensible airn of lrenaean theodicy is the same as that of Augustinian theodicy: to relieve God of responsibility for evil. According to Hick, Adam, the first human, and the rest of the original creation werc innocent and immature, possessing thc privilege of becoming good by loving God and fellow creatures. But it would bc an error t o hold, as Augustinian theodicp does, that original innocellce can be equated with original perfection. Indeed, it is not at all clear that God can illstantaneouslp create morally mature persons, since lnoral maturity allnost certainly requires struggling, grappling with telnytation over time, and probably participating in evil. But

even if God could create by fiat a morally mature humall person, Hick saps, "one \\rho has attained to goodness by lneeting and ejrentuallp mastering temptations, and thus bp rightly making responsible choices in concrete situatiolls, is good in a richer and more valuable sense than would be one created ab ilzitiu in a state either of innocvil as wc know it is explained not as a cence or of virtuc."2"ence, decline from a state of pristine purity and goodness but rather as an inevitable stage in the gradual growth and struggle of the human race. Hick also states: "I suggest . . . that it is an ethically reasonable judgement, even though in the nature of the case not one that is capable of demoilstrative proof, that human goodness slo~vlybuilt up through personal histories of moral effort has a value in the eyes of the Creator which justifies even the long travail of the soul-making process."27 Thus, humanity was not created perfect but is in the process of being perfected. z~ beHick tabcls his Irenaean-type apprclactl s o g l - ~ g a k i ~gheodicy cause it paints a picture of God's grand scheillc of hclping relatively immature humail beings become morally and spiritually mature. The ~rorldwe inhabit is an eni~ironmentdesigned to promote God's plan of soul-making. h enirironmmt collducive to personal gro\l.th lnust be one in which there are real challenges, real opportunities for the display of moral virtue, and real possibilities for expressing faith in God. A major component of this environment is a community of moral agents who interact in a variet). of special ways----deciding on the kinds of relationships thcy will haw, what projects they will pursue, and how thcy will live togcthcr, h o t h c r component is a physical order of impersonal objects that operate indepelldellt of our wills: atolns and molecules, fields of energ): oceail currents, biological cells, and illnumerable other physical things. <)bviously, in this lund of environment, there are opportunities to develop moral character as well as distinctively spiritual qualities. Equally obviousll: in such conditions there is the genuine risk of evil f failure and ruin, suffering and injustice. 1rztercstIni;ly Hick even deems it important that chc ~vorldappear as if thcrc is no God, and cvil certainly plays an important role in fomming this appearance. For Hick, the potentially atheistic appearailce of the world creates "epistemic distance" benveen creature and Creator.28 He thillks that, if the preseilce of God \=re impressed too forcefully upon human consciousness, people ~vouldreadily ackno\rledge that God esists and authentic faith would not be possible. So, God has to conceal

his presence from us, having an importailt dual effect. On the one hand, epistemic distailce has the effect of making it virtually inekritable that huinan beings will organize their lives apart from God and in selfcentered competition with their fellow human beings. Thus, our state of fallenness represents the Ivay we humans were made, not a descent from a prior statc of holiness. On thc othcr hand, epistcmic distance has thc result of making room f i r sincere, uncoixpcllcd acceptance of God's gracious invitation to a life of faith and trust.2" Within the general frame~rorkof an lrenaeail vision of soulmaking, Hick faces the realities of evil and sufkriilg in hulnall life. In regard to moral evil, Hick saps that the possibility of \vr01lg choice and action is necessary to the kind of world that is conducive to pcrsonal growth. He is ~villingto agree with Mackie, Flew, and others that i t is lvgicallypoJsible that God could have created free finite beings who always do what is morally right. But then he e~l~phasizes that the spiritual dimension requires the frcedoix either to rcject God or to come to him: "According to Christianiq?the divine purpose for m m is not only that they shall freely act rightly towards one allother but that they shall also freely elltrr into a filial persollal relatio~lship uith God Himself. There is, in other jwrds, a religious as !.ell as an ethical dimension to this purpose."" i t is relationship with God, then, that makes it logically inzpo~siblefor God to have so constituted humans that they freely respond to him, manifesting love and trust and faith. So, Hick's argument is that God created the world with the possibility of moral evil (or sin, from a theological perspectijre) as the kind of cn\rironil~cntin ~vl~ich hun2ans corxld exercise arxthentic faith in him as well as 112aitifest love and virtue toward their fello~vs. In regard to pain and suffering, Hick argtles that it is rational to recognize the value of a ~rorldof physical objects operatillg by stable natural laws. In such a ~vorld,both pleasure and pain are possible for the sentient creatures inhabiting it. Rut he turns this feature of the world into fodder for his soul-building thesis, explaining that a painfrcc, soh, unchallenging world would be inhabited by a soft, unchallenged race of frcc beings. Hick then distinguishes "sufkring" (as a qualitatively ulliquc psychic state) from "pain" (as a physical state). Though pain may sometimes be the source of suffering, it is not always or even usually so. Suffering is a distillct and very profoulld human phmomenon. Hick defines suffering as "that state of mind in which we wish violently or obsessively that our situation were otherwise." This state of

mind can be as co~nplexand high-lekrel as the husnan mind i t s e l f related t o regret and remorse, to anxiety and despair, to guilt and shame, or to the loss of a loved one. Even what makes, saj: a terminal illness produce suffering is not only the physical pain involved but the anticipation of loss. Now, suffering or anguish is usually self-regarding in focus but is solxetimcs other-regarding. Hick attributes suffering to sin and its consequences for our improper attitt~destoward our own finitude, ~veakness,and mortalit).. Sin keeps us from bcing filllp conscious of God and humbly and joyfully accepting his ulliversal purposes for good. Again, just as physical pain is an ingredient of a kwrld in bnhich the soul-building purposes of God can be carried out, so suffering is also a feature of such a world. It prompts human beings to search for the deeper meanings of their existence, helping prepare them for mutual service to each other arnid suffering and for turning to God. Much of Hick's argurxent rc\rolves aro~undthc instrumental (teleological) value of the evils of this world: Both natural and moral evils cosltribute to the soul-making process. Hick assulnes that he has won the point that a hedonistic paradiseor at least a bnorld kzithout significant challenge and opportunity-does not contribute t o solid moral character or authentic religious faith. It seems that a considerable amormt of many kinds of evils would be necessary to any world amounts that could be an environment for soul- making. Whate~~er and kinds arc necessary, then, arc not gratuitous but j~lstificdin the sense we have bcen discussing. At this point, it appears that Hick is rcady to deny the factual premise of the argument from gratuitous evil, since he has obviously idelltified much evil that serves a good pul-yose. But then Hick asks the hauntill8 question regarding why God allows "dysteleological evil," that is, those evils that are excessij~eand go beyond anything rationally required of a soul-making process: Need the ~vorfdcontain the more extreme and crrxshing evils ~~hicft. it in fact contains? h e nor life3 challenges often so severe as to be selfdefeating whe11considered as soul-making i~lftuences?Man rnlxst (let us of his suppose) cultivate tile soil so as to \%.inhis bread by tile s\%?eatbrow; but need there be the gigantic famines, ;for exaxnyls in China, fi-0111which millions have so rritiserablj~perished?5"

Hick states that it would have been better if such events had never happened," an adjnission that seems to embrace the fact of gratu-

itous evil. Then he moves 011 to ask how, from the staildpoint of Christian theodicy, we can address the utterly destructi1.e evils in our world. Why does this world seem less like an environment for soulbuilding and more like a cold and indifferent, if not outright hostile and malevolent, place?33 Hick ultimately says that the exccss and random character of much evil is mysterious to us. We sec no constructive purposc for it. Rut then he begins to bring even dysteleological or excessic.e evil ~vithin the ambit of soul-making theodicy, saying that even the lnpstery of dysteleological evil has soul-making value. He argues that the human misery in this jwrld calls forth deep perso~lalsylnpathy and energetic efforts to help.31 He contends that unless the suffering is really undeserved and actually bad for the sufkrer, we would not have such desirable and valuable passionate reactions. He also argues that, in a world where sufferillg and prosperity were exactly proportioned to ~ the moral environment in which persons do desert, we W O U ~lose what is right simply for the sake of what is right. Instead, persons would act prude~ltiallyso as to bring about the most fakrorablr consequences for themselves. So, bp the end of his treatment of dysteleological evil, it is not clear that the evil relnains dysteleolo@cal. In the end, there is no gratuitous evil for Hick because all evil serves a purpose. He says that God permits evil to "bring out of it an even greater good than ~vouldhave been possible if evil had never existed."3" A study of Hick's Ircnaean version of thcodicp would nor be cornpletc without analpzing his view of life akcr death as the continuation of God's plan of soul-lxaking. Hick argues that God's plan is the universal salvation of all persons, a process that extends beyond earthly existence and into the afrerlife. For those people who, for whate~rer reasons, depart mortal life bnithout hajring achieved the proper degree of moral and spiritual maturity (or soul-hood, one might say), God pursues his same objective for them in the life to come. After all, some of these persons would have been among those ~ v h osuffered terribIy and whosc lives were snufkd out ~vithorzta fair chance to mature along moral and spiritual lines. So, God continkles his efforts in the aftcrlifc, providing occasions for exercising love and trust, ulltil all persons are brought into the heavenly kingdom. He notes that the universal sal~rationof humaniy is not a logical necessiy ~rithinirenaean theology but is a "practical certailly."36 This affirmatioil of divine persistence completes the progressive, developmental, and eschatological orientation of lrmaean theodicy.

In the final analysis, then, Hick is not able to admit the existence of gratuitous evil. On this point, ironically3Irenaean theodicjr falls back into agreement with Augustinian theodicy. Hick says that "the Kingdom of God will be an infinite, because eternal, good, outbveighing all temporal and therefore finite evils."37 Interestingl~: whereas Augustinian theodicy argues for the possibilit). of evil in a theistic universe, Hick uses Ircnaean theodicy t o argue for its actuality being necessary to the kind of theistic univene he describes. So, Irenaean theodicy places the responsibilitp for evil on God in at least as strong a sense as Augustiniall theodicy does. Yet in relatioll to the fulfilllnent of God's purpose, "nothing will finally have been sheerly and irredeemably evil. For everything will receive a new meaning in the light of the end to which it 1eadse7'3a Hick's contributioll to the ongoing discussioll of God and evil is an important one. He must be colxmcnded for not denying the reality of the evil in the world by saying that it only seems evil fro111 our finite perspective. Although he tries to facc even the most horrible and excessikre evils, his theodicy cannot ultimately recognize really gratuitous evils. Even though, for Hick, it %.as ~rithinGod's power to make a world significantly like this one but uithout dysteleological evils, such a ~vorldwould not have been as conducive to soul-making as is this world. Thus, colltrarg to other relnarks he makes along the way?" h the end Hick comes very close to arguing that our world, even with its most extreme evils, is the best possible one for achieving God's purposc of soul-making. For those whose intuitions run counter to this conclusion, perhaps WC lxust say that it col-nes down to difkrillg conceptions of goodness and what goodlless ~ r o u l dd o regardill8 things that are kzithin its power.

itehead's Process Theodicy Each of the theodicies I have surveyed so far has ended up rejecting the factual premise of the argument frolx gratuitous evil. Yet some thinkers d o not bclic\re that denying gratuitous evil is a satisfactory xsponse to the problem, although they see such a denial as a logical coilsequence of classical theistic commitments. They seek t o develop a viable theodicy based on an alternative conception of deity. One important alterllative to classical theism is found in the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. Process philosophy assumes a difkrent metaphysical picture of reality than does much traditional

philosophical thought upon bnhich classical theism rests. Process tl-tinkers-such as Charles fiartshorne, John Cobb, and Dinrid Ray Griffin-have employed process concepts to articulate what is cornmonly k n o ~ mas pgpoccsstheism and its implicatiolls for throdicy. They claim that process theism retains the strengths of classical theism while avoiding its ~veakncsscsand that thcrc are clcar benefits t o theodicy Process thought is based on a view of reality as becoming rather than hci~zg,which is a direct re~rersalof the traditiollal approach. It is not surprising, then, that the central theme in process theodicy is the concept of change, development, evolutioll-both in the creaturely world and in God. Creatures are conscious, ever-changing centers of activity and experience rather than relatively enduring substal1ces.4Q God, for process thought, has two natures: l'rimordial Nature and Conscqtxent Nature. God's Prirnt~rdialNature contains all etcrnal possibilities for how the crcaturcly world can adk~ance;God's Conscquent Nature contains the experiences and rcsponses of crcaturcs as they choose to actualize some of these possibilities in their lives. A% God's Consequent Nature changes in respol-tse to eIrents in the creaturely ~rorld,God also map be said t o change or to be in p r o c e s s not something that classical theists would say of God. Although process thinkers deny that they hold a pantheistic ~vorldvieiv~ the intimate and reciprocal ontological relationship betjjreen God and the ~vorfdis ob~rious.Process thinkers have labeled their position ""pancntheisin," ~vhichaffirms that the cxpericnccs of the world arc included in God.41 One key point in process theodicy is the rejection of the classical concept of divine omnipotence, kvhich process thinkers find inadequate and ladell with fallacies. Process theists deny that God has a monopoly on power or is "infinite in power," as traditional theology affirms. Since finite creatures are also centers of power (or "freedom" or "self-determination"), they can bring about new states of affairs that God cannot control. Althotrgh traditional thcisms qpically entrision God choosing t o bestow some degrcc of significant freedom on crcaturcs, the process version of freedom is rooted in the vcrp structure of reality, with each creature having the illherent power of selfdetermination. This power enables creatures to choose good or evil possibilities for their lives. God's pokner, then, can meet real resistance from creatures. Thus, we may say that God has all of the power that it is possible for a being to have but not all of the power that there is.

This Inarks a clear parting of the ways with the classical col-rcept of omnipotence, ~rhichprocess theists criticize as lnonopolistic and totalitarian .42 According to yrocess thinkers, God's chief goal for the universe is the realization and rnaxi~nizationof value in the experience of creaturely rcalities. Important valucs here include novelv, c r c a t i v i ~ad~ venture, intensiq, c c o i ~ p l e xand i ~ ~so ~ forth. Rut God's powcr must be viewed as pcrszggsive rather than coercive. God tries to "persuade" or "lure" creatures toward the good and atyap from evil, but he cannot force them to choose the good. Process thil-rker David Rap Griffin states that God cannot elin~il-rateevil because ""God cai-rnot unilaterally effect any state of affairs."4"1nstead, God offers persons possi bilities for the realization of good in their experience. When negative ("evil") experiences occur, threatening to thwart the divine aim, God simply offers new ideal possibilities that arc adjusted to what has already happened. Again, creatures freely respond, and again, God offers new possibilities. So goes the evolution of the world as God continually creates increased order and significai-rce out of aboriginal chaos and triviality. Since finite creatures are always perishing, process theodicy affirms that God is co~ltinuallystoring up their experiences in his Consequent Nature. All positive and negative experiences are ultimately corzser~ledand harmonized in God's own conscious life, Thus, all things can be said to work out all right insofar as God "include[s] in hirnsclf a synthesis of the total miverse.""" "1 his f~mctionas ""the Kingdom of Heaven," God brings about a kind of synthesis of all earthly experiences but does not unilaterally rectiq all evils. Typically, process thinkers have not conceived of "personal immortality" or "life after death" as cel-rtral to the defense of God's goodness agail-rst the problem of evil, as traditional Christian thinkers sornetiznes do .45 There i s also no final, definitive, eschatological culmination of all things. Thus, for process thinkers, the continual, ongoing sjlnthesis of all experiences in God's own conscious life is the basic hope for the triu~xphof good and the redemption of the world. Process theisn2 has forced classical theists to rethink and rcfine their fundalnel-rtal col-rcepts.4b But classical theists as -well as some i-ro~~theists have also raised a i-rumber of serious objections to process thought. For example, the process attack on the classical concept of divine power has been said to rest on pure caricature that sets up an oversimplified "either/orW distinction between coercive and persua-

sive power. It is probably wiser to adnlit that there map be a range of modes of divine power, such as "productive power" or "sustaining power" or "enabling power," many of which are compatible with moral persuasion." Another topic about which there is vigorous discussion is divine goodness. Some classical theistic thinkers declare that the proccss concept of God's goodness is fundamentally aesthetic rather than moral. If the aims of the proccss deity arc to makc crcaturcly experience richer and inore complex, even at the cost of pain and discord, then there is the risk of violating many ordinary ~noral principles. Most classical theists uilderstand that their 014~11position denies that God could be morally perfect if he caused or allo~vedsuffering in order to attain merely aesthetic aims. l'rocess theists have replied that their conception of aesthetic value is a larger, more inclusive category than moral \Talue. Hanging on the outcome of this dispute, of course, is the question of whether God is worthy of \jrorship. Putting thesc and other questions aside for the moment, lct us focus on how proccss thought rclatcs to the e\ridential argument from gratuitous evil. It ~ r o u l dbe difficult to think of another tradition in theodicy that tries to come to grips more squarely with what appear to be gratuitous evils in the world. In its analysis of the concept of power, process metaphysics makes roorn for really gratuitous evils. These are evils that God does not ordain, canrzot control, and cannot necessarily make right. Now, in order to admit the existence of such evils, at the very least, proccss theists have radically overhauled the traditional theistic concept of divinc power. Thcy maintain that the classical concept of omnipotence lcads logically to the denial of gratuitous evil and that their alter~lativecoilcept of divine power allows us its existence. to ack~>o\vledge In our brief survey of theodicies, it may seem that process thought has pushed us to a dilemma: Either we can retain classical categories and deny the existence of gratuitous evil or we can adopt process categories and accept gratuitous evil. In a sense, process theodicy defends theism against the argument from gratuitous evil by inodi$ing theisln---by opting for "cluasi-theisln," as it has bccn called. Thus, in terms of the historical discussion, the critic asks llow classical theisrn deals with what appears to be gratuitous evil in the world. The process theist responds bp coilceding that classical theism cannot handle gratuitous evil and thus must be modified along process lines. Of course, for those theists who agree that there is something to the claim about gratuitous evil but who Ivant to retain classical theistic

commitments, the only visible option is to try to break the dilemlna to which we have come. It map be that an i~lterpretatioilof divine goodness and other diviile attributes can be developed that allows for the possibility of genuinely gratuitous evil. But that is a project that lies beyond the scope of the present volume.48

Theodicy and the Assessment of Theism The complete list of comprehensive theodicies as well as the various themes that they incorporate is too long to treat in this chapter. Ho~rever,this samplillg of approaches begills to acquai~ltus with the wide scope of moves available to theists and a number of countermoves open to critics. We can detect one common thread running through virtually all theistic solutions, ~vhctherglobal theodicics or more specific the~nes: God j~vhoir omnipotgnt, onz~ircient~ and ?~?holly&oord) jvould design the l.~pZilters~" SUC~ e~dlis Becessary $0 ~ o r m t r ? ~ o o oTllcists d. have typid as iiltegral to their search for a cally taken a ~ r e a t e r ~ q o oapproach morally sufficieilt reasoll fix why God allows evil. For maily who think about the problem, it seelns to be a deeply held intuition that for an evil to be justified-and for God to be justified in permitting it-the evil must be necessary to a greater good. If i t Ivere not strictly "necessary," then a God \\rho is all-powerful, all-knowing, and allgood could achieve the specified good through other mcans. With this stratebT in the background, theistic thinkers havc proposcd a variety of types of goods and a range of suggestions for how they arc connected with evils. The various responses to evil in the immediately preceding pages only hint at the ~videspectruln of possibilities. Actually, the greater-good schelna is also the common root of man)! defenses to the problem of evil. Using a great-er-good approach defensively?man!. theists have long endorsed a greater-good strategy to undermine all versions of the logical problem of evil, for example. In constructing a defense around the t h m c of free will, theists havc stated that the greater good of free will is a possiblfi rcason for why a powerful and perfectly good allows evil. Howdeity who is s~~prcmclp ever, the greater-good strateg). stands behind Inany attempts to de\relop a positive theodicy as well. The free will theme is one that theists have used in the context of theodicy, not as a merely possible reason for God's permission of evil but as a purportedly true and plausible reason. Whether i t is free will or some other proposed

greater good, let us focus here on the gelleral stratew of specifpi~lga greater good as the basis for theodicy. Many theists and their critics believe that a moralljr sufficient reason for why God a1low.s evil must relate evil to a good that outweighs it. These theists usually take for granted that no explanation of evil can be acccptrtblc unless it credibty argues that the evil in qtrcstion is necessarily connected t o a greater good. A large numbcr of thcodicics, then, simply ofkr difkrcnt ways of construing what that good is. In effect, they conclude that no existing evils are pointless or gratuitous and thus that they d o not coullt as evidence against the existence of God. Here ~ r g t a i t o g sevil is understood as an evil that is not llecessary to the existence of a greater good. The most potent atheistic rebuttals to theistic specifications of greater goods revolve around the claim that at least sorzle evils or sorzle broad kinds of evil do not seem necessary to any greater good. It makes more sense to believe either that they scrve no good purpose ~vhatrsocveror that the purpose they s~lpposedlyserve is not worth thc pricc. In the history of the debate over theodic)~?several important points lre perhaps critics could have been made by both sides. 111 f ~ ~ t ~debates, probe more deeply into the yurstioil of ~rhethera greater-good justificatory scheme is viable. After all, attempting to justify evil by reference to some good essentially makes the moral weight of the evil depend on an extrinsic factor. It may we11 be, however, that a more bwomising line for thc critic is to say that soillc actual evils arc intrinsically so negative and dcstruaive that no external good could outweigh them. This certainly is the tone of Ivan Karamazov's rcmarks to his brother Myosha with which I opened this book. And the writings of Madden and Hare lnake a forceful case along these lines. Theists, by contrast, could more fully explore a distinction betjjreen two sorts of greater-good theodicy: One type claims that the nrtztnlit;y of evil is necessary to a greater good, and another type claims that the possibility of evil is necessary to a greater good. Clearljf, Inany of the unacceptable greater-good thcodicics arc of the first type. Follo\\.ing this first type of approach, thcodicists embracing classical theism have to justify each actual cvil or kind of evil by lillking it to some actual good or class of goods-ail effort that is extremely difficult and probably doomed. Solne classical theists ajroid mailp seIrere difficulties bp dellyillg that God is morally obligated to make each specific installce of cvil turn out for the best, arguing instead that- God is morally obligated to create or pursue a certain kind of jvorld in which we have the

potesltial for certain goods. A good kind of ~rorldkvould be structured according to certaill overall policies. Such policies bnould include the granting of significant freedom to human beings, the estabIishment of a stable tlatural order, and so forth. These structural features of God's created order would then make many particular evils possible, evils that may or may not always bc connected to particular goods within the world system, either now or in the future. kcording to this approach, the greater good would bc the overall structure of the kvorld order and the values that are generally able to emerge from it. Thus, as long as the theist describes a very jraluable kind of world (structured so that free creatures can make significailt choices, have the opportunity to develop lnoral character, and so on), the existence of such a world might well be seen as worth it? Ultimately, the dispute over evil is one of several considerations relevant to the rational acceptance or rejection of theistic belief. A rcasoned judglnent about the acceptability of theisln, thcrcforc, must be ~lladein light of all of the rclcvant argulllcnts for and against the existellcc of God. What is more, a final judgment bnould have to consider ho14r well the overall theistic positiosl fares in comparison to other worldviews, both religious and secular. Notes it. Wilitiam Itowe, 13hz'lo~-ophy oj'Relz&z'o~:An [email protected]~ct.z'on:o ( Encino and Belmont, Chlif.: nickenson, 1978), p. 88. 2. Edward Maddell and Peter Hare, E ~ i arid l Conccp~ofC&n! (Sprixlgfield, Ill,: Charles G, 'lVhomas,19681, p. 3. 3, Keith Yandel, Basic Isstbcs 6 ~ z$he f'hilosophy of Relzhion (Boston: Mlyn and Bacon, 1971), pp. 62-63. 4, In the previous cilaptcr, we considered Stcphen Wj~kstra"ddefense, which turns on the cognitive limitations of humall beings. S i ~ ~ ~ defe~lses ilar are used by iVittiarn Alstor~,""The Indtrctivc Arg~rrnelltkorn Evil and the Humail Cogni tive Condidon," in 2 he &pidentigl Alyg~gentfro~gEvil, d. D a ~ ~ iEIowardel Snqrdder (Bloomington: It~diallaUrliversixy Press, 19961, pp. 97-1 25, a i d by Peter van Inwagexl, """fieProblem of k:viI, the Problem of Air, arid the Problem of Silence," in Howard-Snyder, pp. Isit-l 74, 131anrtngaalso alludes to the cogi~itivelis~litatimthenle: ""ferhaps God has a good reason, but that reason is too complicated for us to undersrand"~esecAtvirr Piax~tinga,God2Ffpegdom, and Evil (Grand bpids, Mich. : Ecrdmans, 19772, p. 10. E;, In otl-rer jiiords, these theodicies offer a moratly ssrfficient reasoil for God permitting evil

6, This imagery is bornowed from Melville Stewart, The <$re~t~rfi-C~ood Defgnse (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), p. fX. 7. And whether for purposes of defense or thcodicj?, both agrcc that a Greater-Good "fhe~lteis ~teeded,Sir~cethe theme is assut-rted to be ileeessary t o theism, authors developing both defel~sesancl theodicies c m p l q it. 8. Augustine, Y'he Natgre uf'the Good, cd. and trans. J.H.S. Burlcigh, in Ag&~stine:Earlier W ~ i t i (LC)II~CJI~: ~g~ SrC.M, Press, 1953), p. vt. 9. Interestingly, Neoplatonism heavily influenced Augustine's view7 of evil. For a discussion of Plotinian Ncoylatonism, see W. R. Ingc, ?'hel3hilo~-opi$j~ of Pknginzes, 3rd ed, j h ~ r t d o i Longntans, ~: Green, 1929). Plotinus's view of evil as lack occurs in Augustine, as explained in this chapter. t 0. Friedricb Schlcicrmacher, " f k e Chrz'stknn Fgz'lih (Edinb~~rgh: 1'. cyi 'I3, CLark, 19282, p, 161. 1 1. Augusti~~e, Cily oS"ll;od,trarrs, Marcus Dods, George Wilson, and I. 1. Smith (New York: lbx~damHouse, t950), pp. 13, 14. 12. A~~gustine, C:olzt-ra Jglia~ztpaP~la&inawm,bk. 5, chap, M, 13. To see hc>wthis principle is wok7enthroitgh much of Western intellecCbnir.a qf N e i ~ g(Camt>ridgc, ~ tual history, sec A r t h ~ ~Lov~u); ll&e r Mass,: Harvard Unikrersity Press, 1936)14. John Hick, Evil arid the God of-Love, 2nd ecd. (San Frarrcisco: Harper Sr IXORT,19781, pp. 82ff. 15. Augustine, On Free Wiill,trans. J.H.S. Burleigh, in A ~ ~ z ~Ea~*Lier ~ z ~ e : W~*i$ip.t&$, 3. 9. 26, 16. Augtlstinc, Cz'g~ofC;od, I. 1. 23. 17. Augustine, f='~tci~i~*idio~, trans. J, E;. Shay in Baszc W~*i;t.i~as of'Sc. A~8z"tsZ r i n ~(2 vols.), ed., FVhitney J. Oates (New b r k : Random House, 19481, .27 1.8. Ibid., 24.96. 19, Ibid., 8. 27. 20. Gottfii-iediVilhelm van I,eib~riz, "X;heudicjf:ESSGE~S 0% the Cgotrdng~sof (;uA tht~eFz~gedu~6 ~J'LMcz-n, m d $he O$~inuf'Evil, trans. E. M . H uggard fi-om C:. J. Cerhardfs edition of the CoIlectcd Philosopbicnl Wnt#ks( 1875-1 890) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952.). 2 1. Gotrfrictd Wif helm vor-1 Lei bniz, Ygeodic~trans. E, M . Huggard ( b r - 1 don: Rc~uticdge& ICegan Paul, 1952), paras, 30-33. 22. Ibid., para. 2.01. 23. Ibid., para. 127. 24. Ibid., para. 9. 25. The reader remember Plantingaysremarks 011 Leibniz's Lapsc that was discussed ii-1 Chaptcr 3. 26, Hick, E~lil,p. 255, 22. Ibid., p*256, 28. Ibid., p. 281. 29, Ibid., p. 287. ~iiillll

30. Ibid., p. 272. 31. Ibid., pp* 329-330, 32, Hiclr speaks of "evil. wfilch is utterly grattlitous" (ibid., p. 324); of ""evil in so far as it is p~lrelyand unambiguously eli.21" (ibid., p. 325); and "horrors ~vhichwill disfigure the universe to the end of time" (ibid., p*361 ). 33. Hick (ibid., p. 330) even quotes ShAcspeare ( I < i g Lcgr): ~ ''h Rics to wailtoll boys, are Itre to the gods, They kill us for their sport.?' 34, Ibid., p+ 334. 35. Ibid., p, 176. 36. Ibid., p. 344. 37, Ibid., p+ 350. 38. Ibid., p. 363. 39, Many of Hick" statements about the Ilature of evil indicate that sin and sufferit~gare to be regarded as ""gexluinefy spit! and utterly inimical to God's wifI and p~~rpose" "(ibid., pp. 15-16); he also says: ""For it is an inecritable deliverance of our moral conscio~xsness,of jtrhich nothilsg must be allowed to rob LIS, that evil in all its forms is to be abhorred and resisted and feared" "bid,, p. 363). 40. Aift.ed North Whitehead, Pr~ee,cfa n d i"Et7nlz'tyf(New York: Macmill~n, 1929), p* 343, 41. Michael Petcrson, "God and Evil in l)rocess 'rfrzeodiqr,,"YinlZrocess7%gol0g3f3 ed. Rondd Nash ( G r a ~ dbpids, h%ich,:Baker Book House, 19871, p. 123, 42, See, for example, Charles Hart-shorne, "Omxlipotence,"' in Afz Eacyclopedia oJJIZet!z"gZo~ eb. V. Fenn (New Yorkz: 13hhllosophical Librar): 1945), pp, 545f. See also C:harles Hartshorne, (Jl.rzn$atencc a~zdOther ~ ' ~ " J ~ O ~ D & Z C LW2'~akcs (Alba~~y: State Uni\rersiry ofNew7 York Press, 1984), pp. 1If: 43. l3avid Iby Griffin, God, 130wer, and Epil (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976), p. 280, 44. ,4lltred North Wttircltcad, R~k&ioni f z the IM;nkz'~z&(New York: MacmilZan, 19261, p. 98; also sce his I3'i.aceaand Reality, pp. 524-525. 45, Sonte prcxcess philosophers 1-rac.e atte~~tpted to prcnride a prcxcss aecount of persotlal irnmczrtality, that is, life after death. See the discussiotl of ' o ~- s thls in DaGd Ihy Griffirl, Ep61 Revisited: Rgspourscs and R e c o ~ s i d c ~ ~ n t z(AI (iba~ly : State Universiq of N e w York Press, 1991), pp. 34-40, 46. See the f~zll-scalediscussiot~of process thcodicy in Petersorl, "God and Evil in 13rocess'I'k~eodicjr,"pp. it 2 1-1 39. 47, Naney Frarrkenberr~""Some Problet-rts in Process "fheodi~y~" Ri"~elz~ i o a ~ S t ~X7 d i(1981): ~s 181-184, 48. I supgcsted that Christiall theists could take thls kind of approach in 11ty wcr~rkEvZI a d $he C;h~ez'st.z'gnCt'od (Grand Rapids, h%ich.:Baker Book House, 1982), particularly cltag, 5 , pp. 101-1 33. X: also recommended it in the book I wrote with WiiZla~nHasker, Ur~rccI<eict~enbach,and David Basinger, Reason and Relli_qiufbsBelz'eJ1:AFZI~trod~.tctz'on $0 the PhiIos~phyof-'

Rer!z~icrfz,2nd ed. (New k r k : Oxford Universirjr Press, 1998),pp, 123-1 27. iViIXiarn Haskcr makes a case fbr the possibifiy of gratrrito~rsevil from the

persyectivc of Christial~rheis1-n in his """l'hcNecessiy of Gratuitous Evil," Fgilch n~zdPhiIttsophy 6 ( 1992):23-44, 49. See Hasker, "Xecessity"flr~ruce Reichenbach, Evil ;land ;l G o d Cgod (Ncw York: Forciiliam Ux-tiversiqr Press, 1982); David Basir~gcr,lfhe Cas6jbr Frpca Will Thczffaz(Dolvners Grove, Ill.: Interh7arstrjr Press, 1996), chap. 4, pp. 83-1 04; and Petersoxl, Evil alzd $he Chrz"st:igna d ,

Suggested Radings Adarns, Marityn M, "Theodicjr FVithout RIame," PPhil~s~)phic&l Topics X6 (Fall 1988):215-245, Adanls, Marityll M,, advisory ed, Theological C:tr>ntributions to Theodicy, special iss~reof Faz'gh nrtd Philosophy f 3 ( X 996). Basingcr, David. ""Uivil~eOxnnipotcnce: Ptantiinga vs, Griffirl." Procgss Studhas 11 (1981): 11-24, Daris, Stephell T., ed. Evzcognl-erz"~-g E ~ i l L: i ~ Options c ip.~"Irgeodz'cy.Atf anta, Ga.: b o x Press, it98 X . Fdcs, Evarr. "Antedilurrian "fheodicy: Str~nlpon the Fall." Faith n~zdPhilosophy 6 ( l989): 320-329. . ""Shauld Gad Nor Have Created Adam? Fait/? a d 13/2ilosophy 6 (1992):192-218, Ferrb, Nets, E ~ i l;lnd the CJ3rG~ianFai~h.New York: Harper, 1947. 12cllrintcd by Books for Libraries Press, Ncw York, 1972. Griffin, David Rny E ~ i Revisited: l Responses n~zdReeunsiderations. Af bany : Seate University of New Vc>rkPress, X 99 I . . CGod, Po1i57eq annd Evil: 14 12rocgss ?%ea&cjf. Philadelphia: bVcsrminstcr Press, 1976. Hare, Peter, "Review of David Xby Griffin, a d , P P P E ;l~zd ~ E~il." P$eocess S~z.~dz'gs 'S' ( 1977):44-5 1. Hartshorile, C:harles. "A S,e\-\lr Look at the Problct-rit of Evil," "I ci,'~rr*g~zt Philosophical Issgfes: Essgjrs Hoptor of'[email protected] Ducasse, edited by F. C. l3ommcyer. Sprtrlgficld, f 11.: Charles C . 'l'homas, 1966, pp. 20 1-212. Hasker, Wiuiam. ""Sffering, Soul-hlaking, and Sal~fation,"h z t e r ~ z a t i o ~ a l Phikos~~phical Q@arge;.l;~28 ( X 988): 3-1 9. Hick, ]ofin, Eviln;yrd the God @love. 2nd cd. New York: EIarper 8r lXowJ 1978. . ""God, E\i1 and Mystery*"Rel&io~s,5'tzdies 3 ( 1668):5 39-546. . "The Problem of Evil in the First and I,ast 2"hings." fig$r.utnl c~'"Ir3eolr~z'calS t u d z ' ~19 ( f. 968): 591-602. Ibne, G. Stanley, "The Concept of ITiville Goodness a~itdthe Problem of Evil ." Rek&z"uus '$tz&digsf l ( (1975): 49-72 .

m -

. "Evil and Privation." hter~zalti;onnlJournt%l jbr Pi3ilosophy c?f" Reli~ i o r lt X (1980): 43-58. . ""TIC Failcrre of Soul-Making 'rfieodicy.'Y~rzt.errraziournl Jotb~erratjbr PhiIttsophy of'R~I&io~z 6 6 1975): l -22. . ""So-ttl-Maliing 'Theadicy and Escttatology," %Suphi& (Az&s$rglza)X 4 (July 1975): 24-31. I,e.c\liis, C . S , The P~pobLc;lazc?f'Pgin. New York: h%aclltillan,1962. Maddexl, Ed\\~arcS,and Petcr Hare, E ~ i arid l $he Concgpt: ofC;ud, Springfield, 111.: Charles 6, l'lzoxnas, 1968. Jacques, Ct'od a ~ $he d Perfimissicjn oJ-'E~?il.Milwaukee: Brrrce Pubh%aritair~, lishixlg, X 966, 13cterson, ~Vichael.""God and Evil in 13rocess Thcologr." h~n12rocess Y79ealo&jt7 edited by Rondd Nash. Grand Rapids, h%icl--t,: Baker Book Hosxse, 1987, pp. X X 7-1 39. . "lXcce~-EtbVork 017. the Probleln of Evil." A ~ ~ e j e i c a12bilosaphz'cal n Qzfartt:r1",y20 (1683): 321-339. Petersoil, hiiichael, ed. Y'hg P~oblemof &P$/:Salcczgd R c g d i ~ g s .Notre Dame, Ind. : Ux~ivcrsiyof Norrc Dame f3ress, 1992, Peterson, Michaei, Williant Hasker, Bruee Reichenbacb, and David Basinger. Rcgsort alzd Relgious Reli$ An In ~~poduction t o the Philosophjf of Rcli&z"on, 2nd ed, New York: Oxford Universi~Prcss, 1998, chap. 6, pp. 1X6-145. l n Ct'ood God. New York: Fordbnt-rt University Reiche~~bach, Bruce, E ~ i n~zd Press, 1982. . ""Natural Evils and Natural Law: A 'rheodicy ;for Natural Evils." h;t-ernt%$infzt%l Philosophical Qsfartt:r1",~ l 6 ( 1676): l 76-1 66. Joztmal Swinburnc, &chard. "Does ?'X~cismNeed a 'Theodicy?'T~nnadz"g;~z of12bilosophy t 8 (1988): 287-31 X. . "Kno\vledge from Experience, and the Problem of Evil." In 7be R n tzl"oaali2-yoj' Rt:r!&kozits Belig; Essajfs i.1.2 Hornor of Basil Migchell, edited by bVilliam Abrafialn and Stcve1-1Holtzcr. Oxford: Czlarendon Press, 1987, pp, 141-167. . ""Natriral Evil." A~merz'cgnPljilosophickal Qggnrterly X5 (1978): 295-301. . "The Problei~t-ritofEvil." In The &ZZstgnce crlf'C;od. Oxford: Clare~~don Press, 1979, pp. 200-224. . "A l'lzeodicy of I-Ieavcmi and Heill." h~n Y72e E~is$g;elzceand Nat:z$re of C$od, edited by &fi-ed Freddoso. Natre Dame, Ind.: Notre Da~~t-rite U-~liversity Press, 1983, pp. 37-54. bVhitncy, Barry L. Evil and the Izrocess Chd. Ncw York: MelXc1-113rcss, 1985.

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The Existentia Problem o f Evil

As noted earlier, the problem of evil may be divided into theoretical and existential dinnensions. We are far~jiliarwith the various versions of the theoretical problem: the logical, probabilistic, and evidential formulations. Yet writers 011 the theoretical problem frequently d u d e to another kind of problem lying beyond the scope of the logical, probabilistic, and epistemic concerns that give shape t o the ~rarious theoretical expressions. This other dimension of the probleln of evil is more dimcult to characterize. At the very least, i t is rooted in the actual experience of evil and how that experience supports disbelief in God. It has been called a practical problem, a psychological problem, and a moral problc111.1 Mvin Plantinga has catled it the "religious bxoblcm of evil,"2 and Marilyn A d a ~ l ~has s called it the "pastoral problcm of evil."WWhat is clear is that, For some people, the existcntial feel for evil somehow leads to the rejectioll of religious belief.4 Although there is no definitive study ofthe existential problem of evil, I shall explore major aspects of it here and tie together sejreral important ideas about it ~ o r n the current Literature.

The Experience of Gratuitous Evil What one ~llightcall the "phenomenology of e\ri19'----thatis, the study of the awareness of evil in human consciousness and how we assign mealli~lgto it-is a rich field of investigation. Jeffrey Burton R~lssell insists that evil is "perceived immediately, directly and existe~~tiallp."" Many other authors also believe that there is something forceful and primal about the way evil is experienced." John Bowker ~vritesthat

"the sheer bloody agonies of existence" are something of which "all m m are atvare and have direct experiencr.''7 Actually, it is not the experience of evil per se that has such intensiry but the experience of evil as meaningless, pointless, gratuitous. It is this aspect of experience that is expressed in the bitter lament of the ordinary person as well as in the sophisticated reasoning of thc antitheistic philosopher.Wrcat literature also provides extremely effective rcprcsentations of this exbxricnce: Consider the writings of Dostoevsky,%Albert Camus,'o and Migtlel dr Unamuno. H There is something about the experience of evil as gratuitous that can and often does render faith in God untenable. Man)! persoils say that they find themselves gripped at the core of their being by the horror of evil and that this awareness is profoundly transforming. Those who have this kind of perception of evil often report that they cannot experience the universe as theistic-tha they could never ~llanifestattitudes of praise, adoration, gratitude, and worship toward God. AFtcr reflecting on thc horrible and absurd evils in the world that the divine being is supposed to allow, John Stuart Mill says, "When I am told that . . . 1 must . . . call this being bp the nalnes which express and affirln the highest hulnall moralit5 I say in plain terlns that I will not. Whatever power such a being map have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do: he shall not compel me to worship him."l2 h long as theism is understood to entail that there are no gratuimus evils and as long as human beings expcrience much evil as gratuitous, then therc will be a continuing tension b c w c n theistic belief and common experience. Somc defensive lnalleuvrrs by theists such as Plantinga seek to show that the facts of evil do not rellder theism improbable. Other theists, such as Stephen Wykstra, argue defensivel!~ that we are in no position cognitivelp to affirm the existence (or likely existence) of gratuitous evil. In a sense, Plantinga sums up the net result of all such defensive strategies when he writes: The theist nlay find a ?*eLz~z'u~s probble~~it in evil; in the presence of his own suffering or that of sorneolle near to him hc may find it difficuft to maintair-t what he takes to be the proper attitude towards God. Faced with great persollnf s~~ffering or misfc~rtune,he may be tempted to rebel agair~stGod, to shake his fist: in God's face, ,or cvcn to give up belief in God altogether. But this is a probXsm of a different dime~-tsion.Such a grobfem calls IIQX for philosophical enligl~tennlent,but for pastoral care.13

So, presumably? at the strictly philosophical level-the level of logically reconciling jrarious claims, coilfirming and disconfir~niilg them-the critic's argumena can be staved off, and the intellectual doubts of believers can be assuaged. If there is any remaining objection to religious faith, then it must be emotional or attitudinal or practical in nature. Plantinga correctly intimates that therc is more to the problcill of evil than abstract exercises in juggling propositions. But how we conceive of this other dimellsioll in relation to the theoretical dimension is of major importance. To suggest that further philosophical enlightenment is slot relejrant to the attitudinal or experiential dimension bifirrcatcs reason and experience. When defense against the problem of evil is coupled with Reformed epistemologh which affirms the theist's intellectual right to believe in God basically, man!. theists believe that virtually everything rclatcd to the issue of God and evil that is philosoyhically important has been addrcsscd. Frorn another ycrspcctivc, Mal.llyl-x Adams indicates that the pastoral or religious problem of evil "has a philosophical dilnension in that it lnight be partially alleviated by some sort of explanations of how God is being good to created persons, even byhen he permits and/or causes evils such as theseeWl4 For Adams, to deny the bifurcation between theoretical considerations and the actual experience of evil is to move in a more appropriate direction. After all, there are many convincing philosophical and psychological studies, quite unrclatcd to the issuc of God and evil, that argue for the intimate link bcmecn "logic and e~notion"or "bclicf and cxpericnce." These studies show that what a person believes coilditions the railge and qualiy of his experience. 15 It is not surprising that, in discussing the problcln of evil, critic Sidney Hook observed that "no monotheistic religioll ~vhichconceives of God as both omnipotent and benevolent, no metaphysic which asserts that the world is rational, necessary, and good has any rooln for genuine traged~r."lbh e r e we may assume that Hook's term ""gc.nuinc tragedy" rcfers to gratuitous evil. The point, then, is that what onc believes about theism and its implications affects his experience of thc world. Mit: can see why theistic believers who ullderstalld the existence of God to exclude gratuitous evil would ellcounter significant dissollance in the face of intense experiences of evil as being gratuitous. John Hick captures something of this dissonance when he argues that a theology cannot be repugnant t o the moral sense on

which it is based.17 In this same vein, we can comprehelld why nontheists who ponder the credibility of theistic belief3 have great difficulty seeing how they fit with the experience of real life. Adams is correct in suggesting that the religious probleln can be somewhat alleviated by relevant explanations. In other words, a person's beliefs about God and their logical implications map necd to bc clarified, amplified, or modified. Or she map necd to bc encouragcd, in an emotionally supportive context, to sec that thc beliefs shc holds about God really call for attitudinal change or for a different personal response. Recognizing the seriousness of the religious problem, theoloaian Thomas Oden has articulated a "theodicji for pastoral practice." The pastoral approach Oden outlines clearly discouna false and hannful answers for evil, offers some general explanations for why evil exists, suggests how some good may still be brought out of unnecessary evil, and presents some general themes about God" love and care for persons in spite of the contingcncics of hurxan existencc.l8 One does not have to follow this sort of pastoral process very long to see that it cannot go far simply on the conceptual resources of restricted theisn~.Standard theistic belief3 about the divine attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness inlply only the broadest outlines of ho\\r to thinlr about the relation of God and evil. Although sheer defense may be efkctivel~rbased on restricted theism, any sufficient explanation of evil, which obviously takes us into the area of theodic): rcquircs additional rcsourccs, drawn from various doctrines and teachings of a faith tradition.

Evil and Personal Identity We are now in a position t o see how the experiellce of gratuitous evil supports the factual premise of the argument. For the person offering the argument from gratuitous evil, the factual clairn-such as Ro\ve7s (RI)-has strong experiential ~veight.Though the argument itselfits constituent propositions and their logieal and epistemic rcladonsf o m s the thcorctical dilllension of the problem, it is intimately rclatcd to what \ve arc calling the existential dilllension. Afier all, thc argtllnent must be advanced by somcolle who thinks it is sound, that is, a person who believes the premises to be true and that they lead to the stated conclusion. We geilerally assume that the critic who believes there is gratuitous evil is expressing lnoral protest, indignatioll, and outrage. We typically see him as wishing violently that things

were not the way they are and insisting that God, if he exists, is blameworthy for allo~lingthem t o be the way they are. That is a large part of the existential dimension of the problem. Rut once a person experiences the ~vorldas containing gratuitous evils and is morally repulsed bp their horrors, an interesting and subde considcratian arises. It is a deeply existential consideration pcrtaining to the person's value prcfercnces toward himself and toward the world in general. According to a certain way of thiilking about such things, a persoil can be girtentially azlthelztic or existentially honest in raising a theoretical statement of the problem of evil only if he genuinely regrets his own existence. This consideratio12provides the basis for an intriguing theistic response to the problem of gratuitous evil, a response that does not advance an explanatory theory of why God justifiably allojvs the evils of the world. Although i t would be interesting to explorc other nuances of the attitude of rcgrct in rclation to other statements of the problelll of evil, I will focus here on thc most formidable of all statements: the argurxent from gratuitous evil. The particular theistic strategy here rests on certaill value preferellcrs or attitudes. The first step in developillg this respollse is to call upon each indi~ridualwho thillks about it--in this case, the atheist advancing the problem of gratuitous evil-to declare his attitude toward his own existence. Williarn Hasker straightforwardly poses a question to each person who rnight advance the problem of evil as a reason for 1: exist?He explains the exact meanrajecting theism: A m PoIgd ing of the question as follows: The question is imt whether my life is all that it ougl-rt t o be o r all that it cor~ccivablycoufd be. It is not whetfier tile pleasure-pain batajlce in my life ta date has bccx-1, on the whole, ;fa~.orableor unhvorabls. Ir is not wl-rether my life is, in general, a benefit t o tl~osewho are affected by it, It is not- even the questiorl whether my fife, all tilings considered, ctzriarc deeply interesting, tains more good than evil. Ai of these q~~estions and the allsMiers to them, if knoliin, n~igl-rtaffect my arlsMier t o the qlxestion which I am asking. But the questiorl is simplj~,am I glad that I am alivc? Or is my existence, on thc whole, sainerbing which X regret? Is my life s o n ~ e t h i ~which ~ g I affirmit,or do I wish, like Job, that I had rlcvcr been?

Ob~riously,this casts the lnatter in a persoll-relative way. Each person must answer for himself ~vhetherhe is glad for his own existence or would rather i t be replaced by nonexistence. And the question can

obviously be extended to ask byhether one is glad for the existence of loved ones: AIMI ~ l a doftheir wistelzce? The second step in laying out the theistic existential response is to clarifv what is necessary for human beings to exist as the unique individuals that they are. Hasker yroposes a thesis that is not uncontroversial but is widely accepted by thinkers who hold a varicq of philosoyhical perspectives. The thcsis is

(50) A lleccssary colldition of my coming-into-existence is the coming-into-existencr of my body.zo

In one way or another, then, my unique personal identity depends somehow on having this particular body. Materialists, identit)' theorist, epiphenomenalists, brhaviorists, and even Thomists accept this thesis. Cartesian dt~alistsand the likc, who do not hold that the body is a necessary condition of personal existence, will not fccl thc force of the following reasoning. The third step in progressively unfolding this existential response is is lleccssary for my body3 existence is to show that, logically' ~rhate~rer necessary for my existence. That is, if my body is necessarjl for me to have indikridual personal existence, then ~vhateveris necessary for my body's existence is also necessary for my personal existence. This principle, of course, holds for any person. When one honestly and thoroughly exalllines all of the necessary conditions for one's bodily existcncc, the results arc impressive. In order for my body to co111c into existence, my parents w u l d have had to have had a child, Had my noth her married sonleone else, nolle of their children could have been mc?,sincc notle of their bodies could have been $hisbody. Moreover, not just any child of my parents ~ r o u l dhave been me, with my identical genetic heritage donated by a specific pair of male and female reproductive cells at a specific time. All of this means that the corning into existence of any particular individual is, antccedently, an extremely improbable event. In fact, antecedently, it is quite improbable that any given individual would come into cxistcnce in view of his or her dependence on a illultitude of other highly improbable events, such as the fortuitous circulnstances surrounding how one's parents met and got married, which could include events as routine as a school prom or as dralnatic as a world war. And behind one's parents stand a whole series of their progenitors, persons ~vhoseco~xing-into-beingmust have depended

on pet other contingent events. All of this leads Hasker to conclude that

(51) Had major or sig~lificantevents in the world's past history been different than they were, then in all probabiliry neither I nor the persons ~vhoxnI love would even have existed. This securcs the connection bernc.cn one" attitude toward one's existeilce and the j4rc1rld" trotal history. The meeting and mating of our ancestors was influenced by the events of their rir~es-many of j4rhich were undoubtedk calamitous, such as wars, epidemics, crimes, accidents, and so forth. And we already know that no person has any reason whatever to suppose that he would have existed had the course of the world's history been substantially diffcrcnt. WC arc now in a position to grasp thc link bewecn one's individual existence and thc existence of all the evils of the world leading up to his coming-into-isei13g.ASRobcrl: Mams observes, "The farther back we go into history, the larger the proportion of evils to which we owe our being; for the causal nexus relc~rant to our individual genesis widms as we go back in time. We almost certainly ~vouldneFrer have existed had there not been just about the same evils as actually occurred in a large part of human history."21 Let us now explore the bearing of this link on the original question, A m I &Ifid t h a ~ I ~~isli?

The Logic of Regret At this point, we need to specify some principles governing the logical relationships beween certain attitudes. The relevant attitudes are expressed by the phrases "bring glad that" and "being sorry that." Such a ~ i t u d e cannot s be true or false, as beliefs are. Hasker contends that they share with beliefs, moral judgment, and imperati\res the property of bcing ~pationnlbconsistent or inconsistent. Thc scnse of '"lad" and ""srry'\tl..th ~vl~ich we are concerned is not essentially a mattcr of fcelin~gladness or sorrow, although it might involve thcsc z c e . my feelings. These attitudes are largely defi~ledby p ~ p e f e ~ ~ g ~ Thus, beillg glad that P entails m y p ~ g f ~ r rthat i ~ zP~ be the case rather than not-F. Conversely if I am s o n y or reBret that P, this means that I ~uuuldprefer that not-Pbe the case rather than I? (Here P stands for the sentmce that expresses the proposition that P, and P is the name

of the state of affairs such that P.) By virtue of these preferences, the attitudes in questioil are ratiollallp consistent or inconsistent. At this point, we can begin to discern important logical priilciples that apply to the attitudes in question. Surely, we can say that

(52) If I am glad that P, I rationally cannot be sorry that P. Of course, a person may fcel both gladncss and sorrow about soillething. This is what we mean j4rhen we sap that an eIrent in life is "bittersweet" (e.g., a parent j4rhose child is grttillg married may be described as "being sad" that a family lnember is leaving home but "being glad" that she is finding committed companionship). Rut "being glad" in the relevant sense here involves an attitude of preference to which principle (52) applies. Let us now specifp some key definitions that will enable us to scc the significance of some other important principles. Haskcr first suggests this: 'A i s ~ z " ~ . ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ $ a ~that t z " X>'= a I & cif ~ I 'A a t 1zs glad rbat 13, and there i s some state-of-affairs Qsuch that .A k~le>wsthat if Qdid 1l0t obtain neither wc~ufdP, and A regrets that Q.'

One mah for example, be circumstantially glad that the University of Kentucky defeated the University of Utah to win the 1998 NCAA basketball challlpionship but not prefer Kentucky's victory gnder all possible ~igficztnzstnnces(i.e., on the whole). For example, one may have placed a largc bet on Utah or bclic\rc that the N C M ? existencc is a bad thing because its championships, telc~risioncontracts, and the like foster corruption and an ulldue emphasis on athletics in our societ)'. So, @iven the civc~mstalzces,one may be glad for Kentucky's ~rictory. Rut this does not mean that one is glad on the ~vhole.We are now ready for the second definition we need: "A i s 8 I a B on the r??hokr:that I"'= df "A is glad that P, atld fbr any state-ofaffairs Qsuctl rbar A k~lowsrbar if &did not obtain neltlicr would P, A is glad t l ~ a Q." t

Modi@ing our example, we map say that one may be glad on the whole whm, recognizillg that the NCAA involves some ulldrsirable consequences, he still definitely prefers Kentucky's cha~npionshipvictory. Finally, we may say that a person ve&lpe~son the ivholc that P ~vheneverhe is clearly nut glad on the ~vholethat P or is only circumstantially glad that P.

In light of these definitions, we can now see the significance of the follo\ning principle: (53)

If I am glad on the whole that 1:and I know that Pentails Q then I rationally must be glad on the whole that Q.

(54) If I am glad on the j4rhole that P, and I know that if Qdid not obtain neither bnould P, then I rationally must be glad that Q. These principles seem quite clearly correct. But when principle (54) is combined with ( 5l ) from the previous section regarding self-identity, \VC get an astotmding conclusion:

(55) If I am glad on the whole about my own existcncc and that of those whom I love, the13 I must be glad that the history of the world, in its major aspects, has beell as it has. Of course, this conclusion does not follow dedtlctively from (54) and ( 5 1) as they have been stated. Principle (54) speaks of my klzo~vllzn that if Qdid not obtain neither would I< whereas (51) saps only that in all pffiobgbili~ there is such a connection. This should makc little difference in our attitude toward (55).32 Perhaps, then, the rcason why (55) has been largely ignorcd is the fact that (50) and (51) arc not obvious. The ideas expressed in (54) and (55) have been discussed in philosophical literature. Benedict de Spinoza, for example, saps that our ordinar!. judglnellts of good and evil are irratioilal precisely because in lnaking them, we overlook the necessary connections bet~reenevents.2"

Existential Authenticity and Evil If what we have said so far is souild and if the truth of (55) has been established, what bearing does all this have for the problein of evil? Put more precisely, what effect can it have on one who advances or considers advancing the argument from gratuitous evil? For a person who is glad on the ~vholethat he exists or even that someone he loves exists, then it follo\\rs-due to (55) above-that he must be glad also

about the world's existence and about the gelleral course its history has taken. But then it is very difficult for him to be exigenti~lhnathentic or wistentiall~honest in advancing the argument from gratuitous evil. Let us see why this is so. The argument from gratuitous evil involves affirming a factual premise about: thcrc being evil in the world that sertrcs no good purpose. To have the experiential grounds for affirming this crucial premise is to have certain moral convictions, to consult one's cxpcrience of the goods and evils of life, and to be lnorallp repulsed by !vl=~t one finds. To assert the factual premise is, in effect, to issue a complaint that there is something drastically wrong with the world as a whole. And we nowr are keenly aware of the intricate causal intcrconncctions between all the events in the world (including evil events) and our own existence. Thus, the critic who is glad on the ~vholefor his own existence or that of those ~vl1on2he loves cannot bc existcntially authentic in advancing the factual prelllise. Robcrt Adams writes: "Thc fact that \vc owe our existence to evils gives rise t o a probleln of evil, not only for theists but for allyone who loves an actual human individual-himself or anyone else. How is our Love for actual hulnan selves to be recoilciled with moral repudiation of the e\rils that crowd the pages of history? Are we to wish that neither we nor the evils had existed?"z4 Based on this line of reasoning, the followring existential stance simply becomes ludicrr~rzs:

(56) The world as we know it is morally so objectionable that a God who tolcratrd it could in no meaningful sense be y Existence called good-nevertheless, I arnflladfior ~ z own alzd tbggpefore I am almglgd that the wofpld exists and ghat the main events andfeatugpes [ f i t s history have been a$ they have, We may say that s ~ ~ ac posture h is ~.Z~~L'~.PZGZ"I%IIJI .fe~-stt~~~z:fyz"n& or exisBPZ tia[{ysey-dgfg&L'i?$&. It shorrld now bc intuitively evident that

(57) If I am glad on the whole about my owrn existence and that of persons close to me, then I cannot reproach God for the general character or the major events of the world's past history.

Since reproach is attitudinal, preferential, and existential in nature, the critic is hereby blocked from reproachillg God by citing the general character and major events of the past, many of which Ivere tragic for the persons involved. It will also not do for the critic to base his argument from gratuitous evil just on events in his own lifetime, events, therefore, on which his own existence does not depend in the way in which it depends on those tragic events of the past. Af'tcr all, the tragedies of our lifetime arc simply the same kinds of events as those that have occurred countless times in the past. For a critic to lnount his moral complaint solely 011the basis of evil evellts that occur only in his lifetime is for him to express a position too egocelltric to deserve serious attention. Thus, the critic who is positively glad about (i.e., does not positively regret) his own existence cannot advance the general problem of gratuitous evil in an existentially authentic way. One interesting aspect of this approach to the exi~entialproblem is that, without trj
to rebuttal in other %laps.As sho~z.11 in Chapter 5, the argulnellt from gratuitous evil is the ~ n o s tdifficult for the theist to rebut anymrap. Chapter 6 reviewed several theodicies that could be interpreted as attempts to answer the argument from gratuity by offering theoretical explanations. But now we see a different way for the theist to respond to the antitheistic critic who ahanecs the argument. This still leavcs us with the one very formidable typc of critic-the persc1r.r who is willing to say that he positikrely j#cBre&his own existencc on the whole. This is the persoll-presulnably a very rare individual indeed-who is able hollestly to say that he would truly uish and would prefer that some other world, in j4rhich no one now living has a share, or perhaps no world at all should exist in place of this present evil ~vorld of which he is unhappily a part. Out of the depths of his own pointless suffering, the ancient patriarch Job cursed the day of his birth: "Let the day perish in wl-ricb I was born, alld the night that said, 'A mall-child is cotlceived." "Let that &ay be darkt~ess!May Gad abovc not seek it, or light sfiine on it. "Let gloom and deep darkness claim it. Let clorrds settle upoxl it; letthe blackl~cssof the day tern@ it. "That light-let thick darkness seize it! tct it not rejoice among the days ofthe year; let it not come into tile number of the moxlths. "Yes, 1st that night be barrel-t; let no jo~rfix)cry be heard in it. "Let those curse it who curse the Sea, those who are skilled to rouse up I~viathan. "Let the stars of its dawn be dark; let it hope ;for light, b ~ have ~ t none; may it not see the eyelids of the morning""because it did not shut the doors of my mczther? s%romb,and hide trouble fi-on1my eyes. "Why did I not die at birth, come forth from the wo111b and expire," "liVhy were there knees to receive me, or breasts far me to suck? ""Now I wo~tIdbc Xying dawn and quiet; I wo~tldbe asleep; then I w ~ t ~ be l dat rest "with ki~lgsand counsclors of the earth \%rhorebuild ruins f i r themselves, ""or with princes whc) have gold, who fit1 their houses with silver. "Or why was I not: br~riediikc a stillborn child, like an ir1h:;lxlt:that never sees the Iight?"25

This is the deep existential regret char is recluired for one meaningfirlly to raise the argument from gratuitous evil. To be able to assert

the factual prelnise that there is gratuitous evil, the critic must positively regret on the %.hole that he, his famill: his friends, all his loved otles, and all the rest of us have ever lived. Perhaps lvan Karamazov is the paradigmatic figure here. Ivan resists his brother" declaration that all events I11 the world contribute to a dkinck designed ""frtigher harmony" that will bc rcvealed at the end of time: You see, Alyosl-ra, perhaps it really may happen that if X jive to that moment, or rise agaix~to see it, I, too, perhaps may cry aloud with the rest, looliing at the mother en~bracirlgthe child's torturer, "Thou art just, 0 Lord!" "but I don" r7ant to cry aloud then. W~ilcsthere is still time, X hasten to protect rnyself and so I renounce the higher harmor-zy altogetl~er.It's slot worth the tears of that one tortured child who beat itself on the breast ~virtti t s little fist and prajxed in its stinkixlg outhouse, 1vit1-r its unexpiated tears t o ""dear, kind God"! It's s a t worth it, because those tears are unatoned for.26

Summarizing his existential posture, Ivan declares, "In the final result, I don't accept this world of God's, and, although I kno~vit exists, I don't accept it at all."27 Here we have a person who is willing to say that the existellce and history of the world has not been worth it. For Ivan, man!. of the world's evils are gratuitous because whatever purpose they serve is not worth thc price, A rebellious existcntiali hero, Ivan clearly seems ready to embracc the implication that he must be willing for his own t does, then, is to existence to be replaced by nonexistence.. W ~ a Ivan answer the penetrating question with which we have been workingAm Iglnd that I mist?-and to ansNrer it negatiirely. This ansNrer allows him to be existentially honest or authentic in rejectillg the evils of the world.28 It is these kinds of persons-the Ivan Karamazovs of this world-jvho are unaffected by the theistic response to the problem of evil that has been sketched here. Ivan is the person who can honestly say that he regrets his own existence and the cxistcncc of all whom he loves, since too great a price in terms of illiser): and suffering has been paid for thcir existencc.z" In fact, for such a person, framillg his objectioll in terlns of the general problem of gratuitous evil is somekvhat unnecessary because he can consider the evils occurrillg in his o\vn life as the only factual instance of gratuity he needs to cite. On that basis alone, he might object that the God of theism does not exist. Or he might cite as a case

in point any single life that does not seem to be good on the whole, not a great good to the person living it. A12 implicit assumption here would be that a morally good deity would not allow even one individual to have a life that is not a great good to hirn on the whole, regardless of what broad reasons there are for thinking that our ~vorldis good on balance. This line of thought, of course, pursues the attack in an Ivan-like direction. h d it ccrtaillly makes the attel-npt to apply general explanations for evils to individual cascs impertinent, at least, and damaging, at most.30

The Defeat of Horrendous Evil It is not clear whether restricted theism offers enough rich ideas to fashion an effective response to the person who says that he regrets his own existence or that of the whole world. Thc critic's charge here is essentially that it would have been better if God---if he exists at ail---had not created this world, For one thil~g,the theist might query, "Better tvhom!" since if God had not created this \norid and the critic had not come into existence, it could hardly be better for the critic. For ailother thing, the theist who accepts the fact of gratuitous evil in a thristic unikrrrse may stress the ok~erallvalue of the moral enterprise--even if there are no guarantees that all evils will always be compensated with greater goods. Rut all such tactics map still but \\;hat about all the horbe met with the Ivan-like rcsponsc, "h, rendous suffcrillg! It is just not worth it. Nothing can make it worth it." b a n even admits that all people map indccd be resurrected at the end of time and that victims map forgive their torturers. But that will all be too ulljust, he insists, since some of the sufferings are too awful to be compensated.31 For Ivan, there are too Inany people whose lives are not a great good to them and may, on balance, not have positive value. Thus, no just and loving deity could have created a world that contains them. Put another way, the magnitude of the horrific evils that sornc tragic human lives irlcludc cannot: be ctrcn approximately estimated without recognizing that they are incommensurate with any collection of goods. Although we are enteri~lga territory of fundamental disagreelnellt benvern the theist and critic, a territory that is largely uncharted, Marilyn Adams has offered a response that is disti~lctivelyChristian as well as theistic. She observes that most responses to the problem of evil are generic (specifl~inga general reason for evil) and global (fo-

cusillg on some feature of the bnorld that makes evil possible). Yet she points out the insufficiencj~of geileric and global solutions for the problem raised bp horrmdous evils. "Horrelldous evils" are evils the doing or suffering of which gives one pri~nafacie reason to doubt whether one's life could (givm the inclusion of such evils in it) be a great good to one on the wholc. Adams argues that the attribute of divine goodness must bc analpzed to show not only that God cvould create a world that is good on the whole but also that he ~votxldnot allow any individual lives to be lived that are ellgt~lfedand ole~- -c o n ~ e by evil. The difficulty that the Christian theist faces here is not only that do we not know God's nctzlnl reason for permittillg horrelldous evils but also that we cannot even conceive of any plausible reasons.32 Employing what she calls the "resources of religious value theory," Adams develops an argument that horrendous evils can be defeated in the context of the lives of individuals who expericncc them. Let us simply say that evil is "defeated" \vhen it is part of a life that is good on the wholc, when it is related appropriatdy to relevant and great goods. Adams agrees with rebels like Ivan Karamazov and John Stuart Mill in insisti~lgthat there is no set of temporal and firlite goods that can guarantee that a person kvhose life includes horrendous evils will be a great good to him or her on the whole. According to Adams, i t is the intimate relationship with God that has value incommensurable with anything else: F

Fro111 a Clhri-istianpoint of view; God is a bei~lga greater than jiihich cannot- be coilceived, a good i~~commex~sttrat-e with both created goods and tcxnyoral evils. Liketvisc, the good of beatific, face-to-face intimacy with God is simply incommensurate ji4tl-r any n~erefyn<)n-transcendent goods or ills a perso-il might experience. Thus, the good of beatific faceto-face intimacy with God would e~z825CI('. . . even the horrendous evils l-run~a~~s expekence in this present fife here beto\\; and overcame ally had to do-itbt ~ ~ h e t h chis/her r life prima-facie reasoils the iji~divid~lal woc~lbor co~tldbe worth li17ing.33

Thc ccntraf logic at work here is that the cwrst evils dernand to be dtfeated bp the best goods.34 Christian theists such as Marilpn Adams argue, then, that horrendous evils can be overcolne only by the infinite goodness of God. Adams claims that it is not ilecessary to firxi reasorls (eiien merely logically possible reasons) ivhy God lnight permit horrendous evils. Thus, theoretical theodicy is not essential. It is enough for the Chris-

tian theist to show bus, God can be good ellough to created persons despite their participation in such horrors. For Christiall theists to show this, according to Adalns, they must work out the implications of divine goodlless conceived not just as aiming at the excellent production of global goods but also as not allowing any individtlal life to s~lstainevils that would ultimately engulf it. Her conclusion, then, is that, for a person who experiences horrendous evil, God can ensure that his life is a great good to him only by integrating participation in those evils into a perso~lalrelationship with God himself. This is, in effect, to offer a practical or existential theodicy. How shall we think about what it means for God to integrate horrendous evil into a relationship with himselfi Adams argues that God's loving identification with the sufferer, vividly displayed in his own self-sacrifice in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, is a helpful Christian rl~odelin this contcxt."Vhe asserts that Christian theism tcachcs that God through Christ participated in horrendous evil, experiencing hulxan horrors. Thus, the sufferer can idcntie (either sympathetically or mystically) with Christ and thereby have access to the illner life of God. According to Adams, this experience of God preelnpts the need to kno\\r why horrendous evils erist.36 At the end of his long ordeal with anguish and loss, the biblical character Job was not privileged to know the reasons why he suffered so terribly. But he was given an intimate brision of God that seemed to satisfv hiin and let him sec that his life was indecd a great good. Job answcrcd the h r d : "I know that you can d o all things, and that no purposc of yours can be thwarted. I have uttcrcd what I did not udcrstand, things too wonderful for me, which I did not know. I had heard of you by the hearillg of the ear, but 11ow my eye sees pou."37 In the final analysis, the issue comes down to whether Adams's case is acceptable to the one to whom it is addressed. Adams can maintain that her own distinctively Christian approach is internally consistent, although the Christian theist and the critic will predictably differ on the truth and plausibility of its claims. Thc antitheistic critic, bp contrast, could agrcc that God, if he exists, is a good incom~xensurable with all other goods. But he might object chat some means by which people can be collilected to God (e.g., horrendous suffering) are so iiltrinsically awful that they still violate other moral principles we hold. The critic inight also complain that Adalns has shifted ground in answering the theoretical problem by giving a practical solution. The critic might even press the point that i t is extremely difficult to

understand what it is for one person to experience another's pain or for suffering to be an avellue of interpersoilal identificatioil and thus that the acceptability of Adarns's answer hangs, in part, on fuller analysis of such concepts. Adams and other Christian theists may eventually offer complete accounts of these concepts so that this strand of cxistcntial theodicy may adi~ancc.It is hard to sap exactly wherc thc kxturc discussion of thc cxistcntial problem of evil will icad, but it is surc to be both fascinating and important.

Notes it. Kennetb Surin dlsrtngtlishes theoretical &am practical problems of cvil in his ? h c o l ~ ~and y the Pr~bLep#% oc?f'E~~ik (Clxford: Black~vetl,1986), p, l 12, Robert ,4dams calls it a psycltdogical problem in his "Irge Virgge of'Fgic'gJ3 alzd Other Essays in lZhz"los~phical 2 heolo~y(New Yorlcr: Oxford Ux-rivcrsit>rPress, l987), p. 75. Williaix Hasker alludes to the problenl beiilg a form of moral protest in ""011 Regretting the Evils of this World," "~ultghernJuz#~~i.tnl ofphilosophy 19 (19811: 425. 2. M v i n Plantinga, ($04 fi-eedom, and E ~ i (Gmnd l hpids, Micb.: Eerdmans, 1977), p. 63, 3. Marily1.r Adams, "lXedcmprive Suffering: A Christian Solution to the ofE11i1: iS"eIee$cdR s g d i ~ z ed, ~ s ~Michael I,. PeProblem of Evil," in The Pffioble~n terser1 (Notre Dame, Xnd, : Universi~of Notre IDarnc Press, 19921, p. 171 . 4, Ed-vzrard Madden and Peter Hare, Evil and t.hConcept of' God (SyringGeld, Ilt.: Charles C. Ihomas, 1968),p. 25. 5. Jeffrey Burt-on Itussell, "The Experiex~ceof Evil," Lz's2:g1~ifv 9 ( X 974): 72, 6. X%ut lGco~xer, is;ymbolisfnof'Epz'l, rrans. Exnersor-1Buchallan (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967));see, for instance, pp. 3-5. 7 . John Bol%rli;er,Pffi~higitpzs c ~ ~ S ~ in. J ~R~l&z'ons ~ Z ' Pof ~the~ W ( I P I( ~ Lotldox~: Carnbrldge Universiq 13rrcss, 1970), p. 2. 8. A contenlporary classic, written for the layperson, that expresses grief refigio-its faith i s C. S. I R ~ v ~ s ' s ,A and bitterness in a strrrggle to mair~tair~ G r i q Observed (?clew York: Macinillan, 19611. Ar~athcrbook in the same spirit is Nicholas Wc~lterstorff,Lt%f$$e~$t fbf* a Son (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmax~s,1987). 9. Fyodor Dostoevsky, Y79e NrotI~ef~s [email protected], trans. Constance Garnert (Xew York: Norton, 1976),pnrticrrlarty pp. 217-227. X Q. ,4lmczse all of AI bert Camus" writings can be seen as dealing with the problem of gratuitous evil and the senseless destruction of things of value. But see particufarly his "The Mytl-r of Slsyphus,'Yin ?he Myth of-'i";<~pphgsm2d . Og/ge~* Essaj~s~ trans, Justirl O'Br-ien (New York: AI&ed A, bopl.; 1955), pp,

1-1 38, Alst~see C:at-ritus, 7be Pla~ug,trails, Stuart Gifbert (New York: Alfred A. h o p 6 1948). it it. Miguel &c Unamuno, Y2e ??&&;C Sense of' Lge, trans. 1. Grawford Flitch (New York: Dover, 1954;). 12, From John Stuart Mill, ""The Philosophy of the Col~ditiot~ed as Applied by Mr. Manscl to the 1,imits of ktigious TI-iought," i - t A B k i z ~ ~ g i n n $ion@",SirWilliam H&rnil$~n'~. PhiIos~ph, repri~~ted in Nelson Pike, ed,, <$od a d Evil: Re&diaz&.f 0% Th@oZo~z"~nl I,gpoblem~f'lz.:~il(Engle~roodCliffs, N.J.:13rcnttce-EIatl,1964), p. 43. 13, Plnntinga, CI-Tod,F ~ ~ ~ en~zd d o E~ik, ~ ~ ~pp. , 63-44, X 4, M, Adaxns, "Redemptive Srtfferi~-tg,"p. 171. . it 5. Edward Waiter, """L"hcLogic of Emotions," "agthcr~ Jourrrat of'l3hz'l'osophy 10 (1972): 71-78, 16, Sidtley Hook, "Pragmatism and the 'l'ragic Sense of Life," Paeoc~.edi;~&s and Adds~esswof' the A ~aze.l.zcan15,hilosophicalAssocia$ion ( October 19601, VZ'JJ~OP;~ n~zdFor~rn(San Francisco: reprinted in Robert Gorrigan, ed,, 7'3"~1.~~47: Clrandter, 1965), p*68. it?. 1olil-t Hick, E ~ i and l the God oflove, 2nd ed, (San Francisco: Harper & Ro~li;1978), p. 82, 18. 'Thornas OAen, ""A Theodicy for Pastoral Practice," in his Pgsto~e~aZ 2 heol08y (Sax1 Francisco: Harper & i$ro\\rl, 1983), pp. 223-248. 19. Hasker, "Regretting," pp, 4 2 5 4 2 6 . 20, Ibid., p. 427. Here X have renrtmbered Hasker? prix~ciptesfor the sake of continui~rin the context of this book. ALI rc~naintngprinciplss cited here rritay be k ~ u n din the context of Hasker" articles and will. lot carry hrtber referel-tces. 21. llobert M, Adams, ""Eistcnce, Self-Interest, and the XZrablem of Evil," kin his VZ'rt~e of"Fai$b,p, 66, 22. Hasker, "Regretting," p. 4431. Hasker writes: "Note first of all that, ghcn the truth of (A), it is cert-&;B,and not just probable, that scrbsequel-tt to any major c&anlit.fr,such as a war, maily of the persolls whc) come into existence are differexlt ir~di\iidttalsfrom those \%rhowczufd have existed had the calamiq not occurrcd, Many persons who wo~tldotherlvisc have become parents die without l-rairing children, Those who would have been their mates have cltildren wit11 other partners, and so on. FVithi1.1a few generations, it is likely that hardly anyone Iivil~gin the affected area is idel-ttical with any indijlidual who would have existed, had the calamity not occurred, What is mczre difficrtft is to show that this is true in the case of a given individual. But even in the indlvld~ralcase, the probabilities mount up very rapidly. Suppose, for exat-ritpic, tl-rat had the First World War not occt-rrred tl-tere is one cf~ax~ce in ten that my parents ~ ~ o - i thave l d met each other. (X am sure that this is too high. But at this point I can afford to be conservative.) Stlppose, occasic~i~s the meetitrg and mating of ft~rther~ltore, that on just ~ L V Oprevio~~s

some of my earlier ancestors has been influenced in similar walrs by ealamitotts evellts of their own times. Then neglecti~igall other factors (all of which, if considered, would further strel-tgthen my argtlmel-tt),the likelihood of my existing, if just these three major calamities had not occsrrred, is 110 better than oxie in a thousaxid! The truth is, that I have no reasoil h hat ever to suppose that I would have existed, had the coktrsc ofthe world" history been ssrbstarrtially different,. But what I have 110reason to suppose true mlxst for practical purposes be disregarded. So (55) must be acceptedm7' 23. Benedict: cie Spinoza, EtIfiq ed. Hcnry Frowde, trans. W. EIale White. Revised by Amelia Hutchinson Stirtiilg ( k ~ n d o nClxfc~rd : University Press, X 910), pp* 80-8 l . 24. R, Adams, ""Existence," p. 75. 25. Job 33-7 New Revised Standard Version, ICgf*&mazu~, p. 22 5, 2.6. Ivaxi K~ramazo\rin IDostoevsky, 2 ge B~*o$hew 27. Ibid., p. 216. 28. We nclte here b~xtcannclt pursue tl-re jirell-knokvn ease of Leo -rolstoy s and was ~ i owrtel-1 t living \?rho came to the conclusiol~that lik had ~ i r meax-xirzg and thus cajne to the brink of suicide. If the critic raising the problem of gratuitous evil is jirilling to say that he regrets his ow11 existence, tltat his own existence is not a positive good to him ox3 the ~ ~ h o tthen e , the theist might ask why he does not colnrnit suicide. What we might call tlie suicide argumel-tt seerns especidly strong for the one jirho is iviltitlg t c ~say he regets Iris existence. See trans. Leo FViener ( I ~ n d o nJ,: M. Dent, X 905). Leo 'Tolstoy, Mjj CJII~gkssiu~gs, 29, Although wc canllot explore the inatrer here, the reality of suffering and the search for the proper response to the aivareness of s~rfferinglies at the heart of Ruddl-xism,Xirvana (no~~existence) is recommex~ded.See John in: Rclg&iol.zsof $he Wo~eld(Cambridge: GarnBowkcr, l Z ~ o b b ~of'$ sStgjFcri~~ bridge University Press, 19";""0), pp. 237-258. 30. The tendency of certain theodicaf ans\%rcrsto do damage to persoxis is discussed in .rerrencc W. Tilfey, Y79e Evils of Ifheodicjt (kVashir-xgton, D.C.: Georgetolirn University Press, l99 L1 ). 3X . I-\laxikramazo~rin Dostoe\~sb,Kbe Rr~~thers ICar~~azov, pp. 22+226, 32. M. Adams, "Horrel-tdous Evils and the Goodness of God," Praceedb ~ i l of'tha p A ri$otgZI;apz ,"incz'e[?t3 supplcmentar y vol. 63 ( 1989): 297-3 10, The presel2r quote is from the reprix-xted piece in Rt~bertMerrihew Adarns arid ~$ (New York: Oxford UniMarilyn McCord Adams, eds., 77% l Z ~ o b l eofE~il rrersity Press, 1990), p. 2 1E;, 33, M. *ALdams, "Horrelld~~ts Evils," p, 2.18. The reader should coxis~rlt the coinpletc article for techxiical distinctians between bgknnciqg ofx de,l(bgtb ~ i l 8and ~ F P ~ B Z I . &evil, ~J~ 34. Tofstoy (mentioxied in Note 28) came to accept this kind of logic: that only the inf illre call give meaning ta the f i-xite. 'l'hus, he averted suicide and claii-xited to find i-xitearringin his life,

35. M, Adams, "Redemptive Stiffering," pp, 169-187. 36. M, Adarns, "Horrendo~rsEvils," p. 222. 57. Job 42-2, Sb, 5 Ncw IXevised Standard Version.

Suggested Readings Adarrits, Marilyn h%."Horrendo~isEvils a i d the Goodness of God," The A f8i@otelz'~lz Society: S g p p l 8 r n e ~ t . tVoluf%.sz~ 63 ( X 989): 297-3 l 0, . ""Problcxns of Evil: More Advice to Christim XzhiXosotttbers," Faith and Phiilosapby S (1988):f 21-143, . "Redemptive Suffering: A Christian Solutiotl to the Problem of Evil ." In lrk:Macmittan, X 962. Xzcterson, Michael. "Recent Work 01-1the Problem of Evil." A merkcan 12bilnsopjjical Qgdnr$~-e~.& 20 (1983): 321-339, Petersoil, hifichael, ed. ""JiiePi..oblcrfm of &P$/: Salccted Rcgdi~gs.Notre Dame, of Narrc Dame Press, 1992, Ind. : Ux~ivcrsi~

Index

Abducti\re argument from evil, 81(n11) Adam (biblical character), 9 1,94 Adarns, Marilyn, 111, 1 13-3 14, 124-227 Adams, IXobcrt, 1 17, 2 20 Aestlrctic thcmc, 9 1-92,93 aesthetic ain-rs (God's), 102 See alm Bil~cipleaf plel~titude Akerlifc, 98, Z 01, 107(n45>,124 AIDS, 1 Ml-good, God as, 7,9, 18,23, 36--3q 448+9,55,70--"7, 102-103 Mston, Wiltiarn, 58, 86 hiunal pain, 5, '74. See a l s ~Evil, natuml h ~ s e l mSr., , 94 h~tecedentNat~tref Go~l'ss),100-1 0 3 Appears-iiocurions, 75, Sec also Evil, gratuitous Aquinds, St. "l"homas, 94 Augizstil~c,St., 4, 34, 85, 89-93 Aushwitz, 1 Axiologj??9 Basinger, 13avic1, 107(n48), Z Q8jn49) Bayes thcorcm, 62-64(r1 18) Beliefs basic, 59-61 irzcorrigible, 59-60, See a l s ~ Foirndatiol~aiis~~, strong self-evident, 5 9 4 0 , Sce also Fsundationaiism, strong rhetsbc, 8-9, 18,41,57,6"7

Berger, 13etcr,6 Bible (as source of ideas for Icheodicy), 88 Blake, FVifliam, 12 Bowkcr, John, Z 1X BTOE~CP.~. Kat#gmaso~, 3, 13 Buddhism, 6, 129(rr29) (l:an~us,Albert, 112, 127-128(r110) (l:h%iractcr-t)uild;ingtheme, 88 C:l~isholm,Roderick, 75 C:lifEord, bT. IC., 58-59 Czobb, John, 100 C:ocks, EI. F. Lovell, 5 C:ognitive limitations, 75-78, 86, 105(114), X12 Cognitive (epistcmic) powers, GO, 75 Compat">itism, 35-36. See also hibxziiz's Lapse Coxzditioxz of llcasonabte Epistcmic Access ((I:OXWEA), 75-76 Coxzseqilent Nature (God"), 100-101 (l:onsistenc.gp of rfreisnl. See Frcc Wilt Deknsc (l:ontrol, (divine ), See Con~patilisn~; 111compattbiIisn1; Sovereignty Czornman, f ohn, 47-50,72 C:osmof~gicalargtiment, 9-1 0, 56 C:rrarion, 50,89--91. See alm God, as creator C:rrdence function, 75 Davis, Stephen 'I.,41 Death, 5-6

Defeater (of belief-),60-6 l , 68 Defense, as a theistic strategy?33, 69, 85,239 1leIated to Ixehrnted epistemolom, 60-6 1 Sec also Free Will L3efense L>escartes, Ixene, 512 L3esign argumellt, G2.Cn 141, Sec aim 'Itleolctgical argument Dostoevskh FyocSor, 3, 13, 112 Eliot, 'I". S., 6 Eyicur~is,2 8 Eyistemic distance, 95-96 Eyistemic ~amcwork(beliefs), 57 Ej>istemolag>r,9 Escharalogicat motif, 98, 101 Evidentialism, 58-60, 64(n22), 67 Evi 1 dassification af, 10-1 3 definition of, 2, 10-1 1 ci>rstcleoiogical,98-99 as an eternal cosrmtic e~lttqr,G, 39 gratuitous (poinrless, rmteanitrgless), 30,72-79,92,94,97-99> 102-103,111-115, 119-126 in the media, 1-2,6, 7 metai3hysicaf, 93, $86 also Privatit~n (of good) moral, 11-12?, ,24,35, 3 8 4 2 , 5 0 natural, 4-5, 22-1 3, SO Existcntiai artitudes toward evil, X 25-124 Faith, relatioll of to rational. pmcess, 10 Fallen angels, 50, 52, 61-62(n7), 90 Fler?i, h t o r ~ y35-36, ~ 38-39, 58-59, 96 Foundationalisnt, strong, 59-60, 64(n22) Free will, 34-35,89-90,94-96,103 as self-~Ietcrmil~atic>n, 100 Sec also Compatibiiism; Xncompatibilisrn

Free Will Defense, 29, 33-43, 44(n13), 73 applied to natirral evil, 50-52

God as conceivc~lby classical theism, 7-8 as creator, 18,88,91,93,95, 125 as identteing with the sufferer, 125-127 as necessary being, 44(1111) See also Process theisrrr Greater-Gooct s t r a t c g ~89, ~ ~2 03-1 04, 206(n7) Griffin?David 100-1 0 X Hait, Thor, 8 Hare, Peter, 1 1,72, 85-86, 104 Harrshome, C:ilarles, 100 Hasker, kVilLiarn, 1 1 1, 107-1 08(n48), 108(n49), 115-119 Hick, John, 11,85,91,94-99, 113-1 14 Higher harmorly solution, 123. S66 also Aesthetic theme Hinduisrmt, 6 Hook, Sidney, 1 13 Howarcli-Snydcr, Danicl, 9,72 H,fi~*i;~ (y-rcte) Hume, David, 12 , 12, 2 8 , 2 4 , 5 8 Xncompatibilisn~,37-41, Secr also hibniz" 1,aysc I~tconsistellcyin theism, 17-23, 33 Iltcorrigibhie beliefs. See i~lcorrigi ble Iltductive argument from ~ i l47-52. , Sce also Prnbabiliy (as a inerhod of irlduction) Irenaeus, 94 Islam, 8, 52 Jes~ts,8, 126 Job (biblical chamcrer), 115, 122, 126 J~idaisn~, 8, 52

Index Ihramazo\i, Ivan, 13,104,123-125 Ihufn~an,Cordon, 71 Ihufmann, kValter, 70, 7 1 7 1 ICGng, Hans, 10 Lehre2; ICeirf-r, 47-50, 72 Leibniz, Gottfxned FVifhelm von, 38, 59,85,91-94 I,eibrziz% I,apse, 3 8 4 l , 49,94 I,ewis, C. S., 127(n8) I,ocke, John, 551 I,ovejoy, Arthur, 9 X hrackie, J. I,. , 17- X 9,22,24,27,29, 33,35,36,38,39,96 Madden, Edurard, 11,72,85-86, 104 Madonna, the, 3 Manichaealism (Cosmic Dualism), 89 Mavrodes, George, 58 M a p (illusion), 6 McC:loske.4; H. J,, 18,24Meaning of life (itr relation to evil), 2, +G, 10, 123, X25Cn28) Metaphysics, 9 Metarheodic!i, 88. Sec aim 'rheodicy Mill, Toll11 Stuarr, 112, 125 &jilton, Jahn, 85 MO[??Dick, 4-5 hrorrobv, Lance, 1,7 Natural law tlrerne, 29, 6142(117), 1OS Neoplato~~ism, 2 OS(n9) Nirpapza, 6, 129(n29) Noeric ponrcrs (episemic), 6 0 4 1 Oden, Thornas, 114 Omnipotence (having ail pokrzrcr), 7-9 in relation m humall freeciom, 4445(n14), Scc also Compa"bi1isnt; Xncompadbilism process critique of, 100-1 0 1 Omniscience f having ail-knowledge), 7-9,76 Ontological argument, 9 , 5 6

Pantheism, 100 Pastoral theodicy, 1 14, 126 Pastoral prnblern of evil, 1 12 Paul (the al~ostfe),4 Peneff-rum,"Yerence,24 Peterson, Mtchael, 17, 107-108(n48), 108(n49) Philosophical dialectic, 69, 87 Pfax~dnga,Avin, 1 1,28-29,33-35, 37, 39-42,44(nr.r9,X X), 4445(nX4), 49-56,58-50, 62(11rt14,15,XS),68,75, ZQ5(n4), I. X 1-1 X2 Plato, 91 Possiblc worf ds hest of all possible warlds, 48-49, 92-94 logic of, 37-38 God's relation to, 38-41, 56 Pourer, God's coercive, 101-1 02 persuasive, 10 1-1 02 Sec alm Ontnipotence Predestination, 9 1 Presrtmption of att~eism,58 Princi12le of plerltitude, 9 1 . Stz alm Aesthetic .tizcrnc Principle af CrcduXiry, 75 Privation (of gooct), 90. Slscr also iuetaphysical evil Probability (as a mctlrad af induction) f'reycrency theory at; 55-56, 62(1114), 62-64(n 18) logical theory af, 54-55 personalist theory ol; 53-54 Process theism, 99-103 P~~nisfiment theme, 88,Y 1-92 Qr~asi-theism,2, Sec also Process theism 1btionalizrq;of religious belief (faith), 9-1 0, Sce also Evidentialism; Foundatioxlalismt, strong; Rchrmed epistemoiogy

1Xel"ormecf ei~istcmoIoa~, 56-60, 68-69,8687, X 13 fXegrct, See Existential attituctes tomrard evil fXeicl-rc~~bach, Eeichc~~bacl-r, 62-64(n I 8), 108t11.19) fXoscn ba~rxl~, fb11, 2 Ro~re,William, 8, 17, 18,4"7 73-79, 85 Russeil, Bertrand, 58 Russeil, Bri~ce,73, 81(nl 1) Russeil, f efeey Burton, l 11 Salmon, FVesle)i, 55-56 Sgrnsnm f cycle of birth-deattlrebirtf-r), 6 Sapan, S66 Fallen angels. Schleiermacher, Friecirich, 90 Schlesinger, George, 70 Scriven, Mici-raeX, 58 Self-cl~identbeliefs, Secr Bclich, sefC evident Self-rcfcrcl~tidi~~cohcrcl~cc, 59-60 Settfc, 'I". W., 7 SIII, 4, 34, 77,90-91,97. See also Evil, moral Smith, Srisan, 2 Soveseignv (God"), 8 9 , 9 1. Sge also Omnipotence Spinoza, Beneclict de, 119 Stevenson, Robert Louis, 3 S~ticide,f 21-3Cn28)and (n34) Swlnf7~1"11e, &chard, 75, X f(xtl4)

'I"eleo1ogical. argument, 10, G2fn 14) 'I"c11nysol1, At ftred Lord, S 'I"heisn3 jstartctarcl), 18 Ghristial~,7-8, 43, 86, 124 expa~~ded, 8 , 7 l , 77-79,80(117), 8X(11X9), 87-88, 114, 224 monotheism, 52,70, 113 restricted, 8, 18,71,77--"7,88, 114,124 Theodicy, 13,33,39, 105(n5) as related to csedibiliw of religious belief, 6-8, 14-1 5(n18) viabilif)iof, 85-88 S66 alm Metattleo~licy 'I"olstoy, Leo, f 29f 11281, (n34) 'I"otaJt etridence, 56-58, 62(nf 6), 6 7 4 8 . %c alm E\ridentialisn~ 'I"ransworld depravity, 4 0 4 2

Value theory, rrcftgious, 125 van tn\vagen, Peter, 79-80(n5), 86 Whitehead, Alfred North, 85,99-101 Witrgenstein, Lud~srig,5 Wolcersmrff, Nicholas, 58 W>rkstra,Stephen, 8,75-79, 112, 12Pn8)