Global Security: A Vision for the Future - Addressing the Challenges and Opportunities for Research in the Information Age

GLOBAL SECURITY: A VISION FOR THE FUTURE

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

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Global Security: A Vision for the Future Addressing the Challenges and Opportunities for Research in the Information Age

Edited by

François Géré Founder and Executive Director of the French Institute for Strategic Analysis, Director of Research at Paris -3 Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris, France

and

Mary Sharpe Consultant to the Psychology and Religion Research Group, Faculty of Divinity and Tutor in Transferable Skills to Graduate Students, University of Cambridge, UK

Published in cooperation with NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on The Intangibles of Security Brussels, Belgium 21-23 April 2009

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Global Security: A Vision for the Future F. Géré and M. Sharpe (Eds.) IOS Press, 2011 © 2011 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Foreword From Tradition to Innovation: Considering New Perspectives for Security Research François GERE1 Director, l’Institut Français d’Analyse Stratégique (IFAS) Identifying new paths and new approaches to researching global security through the life sciences in the years to come is indeed a daunting challenge, for two major reasons. The first is a shift in the perception of security. The second is related to the recent involvement of new disciplines in this field, while, at the same time, it has also been necessary to adapt traditional security research to the new perception. Aware of the importance of that endeavor, NATO and ESF (European Science Foundation) have created a joint program aimed at identifying the various areas for research. L’Institut Français d’Analyse Stratégique (IFAS) has been commissioned to organize a number of activities for that purpose, the findings of which result in the present report. Our task is - and will continue to be - to identify all the paths for security research for the next generation. Of course, the life sciences will continue with their ordinary activities and research according to their own nature and goals, but it is the intention to create an additional security-oriented sector. Creating such a sector suggests that each discipline will contribute its own knowledge and specific methodologies, bearing in mind that a security orientation will help to create an innovative, cross-disciplinary approach. History should collaborate with geography, ethnology needs psychology, and vice-versa. Together they will interact with sociology, anthropology, philosophy and many other disciplines under the umbrella of security. Having recognized that general proposition as the fundamental principle of our activity, we need to consider several adjustment variables related to the general transformation of a post Cold War world. The Cold War was characterized by an ambiguity in the field of security and defense studies. Military studies were clearly limited to large-scale operations and tactics, sometimes they could reach strategic level, but they were all about war: conduct, preparation, planning. The nuclear dimension was a major area of study, and technology was seen as a crucial factor for more efficient, more lethal, weapons systems. In parallel, some countries, particularly in the northern part of Europe, developed specific security studies for arms control and peacekeeping operations, according to their culture and national interests. Those nations were more inclined to consider a broader if not softer concept of security, military concerns being only part of it. For example, in the former Federal Republic of Germany, the notion of Sicherheit 1

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competed with defense studies in the context of the Ostpolitk initiated by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Several institutes emerged with the sole purpose of establishing knowledge, data and analysis which differed from the bipolar sources of information. Therefore, security studies developed in the civilian academic world, but they hardly acquired full recognition as an autonomous discipline. One of the main reasons for this was the traditional existence of specific military training dedicated to the development of high-ranking officers and including training specific to their role. A second major reason is related to the desire of existing disciplines to maintain a security component: law, history, sociology, psychology and others traditionally dealt with war, peace and security and were very reluctant to allow security studies to attain full autonomy. That situation still prevails to some extent. However, there are strong incentives for structural reform. Such trends have been paralleled by the evolution of NATO as a military organization. WMD, energy security and communications security have evolved a higher profile far beyond the traditional concern about logistics and supply for military operations. Non-conventional security issues, including human security, have expanded the notion of security, creating an interaction between individual and global spheres. Many companies which traditionally were purely oriented towards military business have reoriented their activities towards security, or created new units aimed at satisfying the new security needs of counter terrorism. Many of those approaches were, locally, based upon technology as the main, if not the only, response to security concerns. A major shift in the relationship between security and defense includes two key factors: first, the individual dimension (human security), second the ‘planet dimension’ of the ‘global village’ or ‘Earth Security’, and the related perception of connections between mankind and a fragile environment. Those two topics are becoming more and more interdependent and interactive. As a result, non-traditional security studies are on the increase all over the world. These mutations, which are a combination of long-term and short-term concerns history, geopolitics, ideologies and the related mutations in the balance of power, need to be addressed through a variety of structures. Events Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has made a great leap forward which can be divided into two periods. First, the impact of the Balkan wars (1991-1999). New responsibilities arose for the EU as it addressed a new kind of security matter: peace building through civilian/military cooperation, and the step by step introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Second, 9/11/2001 and the subsequent terrorist atrocities in London (2003) and Madrid (2004), generated a major and irreversible shift. The strategic concept of the EU put forward by Mr. Solana, former Secretary General of NATO and elaborated by a team chaired by General Naumann, former Chief of Staff and head of the NATO Military Committee, addressed the new challenges, bringing together security and defense. In countries like France, new white papers addressed defense and security as deeply interwoven topics in order to create a continuum which can meet the challenges of another continuum: risk, threat and danger.

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Organizations EU, NATO, ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), etc. have modified, or are in the process of modifying, their missions according to new questions and concerns of various natures, with international terrorism, pandemics and natural disasters being on the list. Some organizations approach security from a different perspective. The background of NATO is military defense, and it is considering security in a new way, giving priority to ‘hard security’, i.e. WMD and terrorism. Other organizations, like the EU, have gradually integrated security as a new dimension to their activities because of terrorism and the need to address all forms of disaster. As a new regional body, the SCO has its own agenda, subject to many adjustments. In addition, we must take into account the significant gap between those who belong to the ‘defense and security’ community because they have made their entire career in that field, and those coming from the outside, who have a new interest in this field. They discover that things have been in motion for sometime. Generations Most, if not all, of the members of our committee must recognize that they belong to the Cold War or immediate post Cold War generation. The new generation (45 years old and younger) have a different perception, but are ignorant of some fundamentals of security and need to be educated – at the same time we must also learn from them. Countries Most of the nations belonging to NATO and the EU share the same history. Although Western Europe and Eastern Europe see their security interests differently, they share a common and sometimes painful legacy. But cultural perceptions remain strikingly different, if not divergent, when it comes to the different domains of security. Those variables have shaped our approach in terms of security research. We must take into account what has been achieved - what has become or is the state of the art - but at the same time we are obliged to consider all the variables and address them as properly as we can. Taking into account the basic principle and the variables, we should work together in order to define bold new paths and areas for research for all the institutes, thinktanks and individuals who are willing to join us and to integrate the research network we have already begun to build. Such a network should not be restricted to EU and NATO members. It should encompass other areas in the world - notably the emerging countries - and/or connect with existing networks already operating in different parts of the world, for example in South East Asia (through ASEAN).

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Acknowledgements Apart from over one hundred contributors to the workshops and conference, and the authors who submitted papers for this volume, several other people have been involved in the whole process. We would like to acknowledge and thank in particular Dr Rüdiger Klein from ESF for his cooperation, contribution and vigilance during the workshops; Elizabeth Cowan for her administrative activities at NATO and also for her help with translation even after retirement; Denis Collins for his patience and assistance in formatting the book, and Romain Foliard and Vincent Bistoquet from IFAS for their useful contributions too. Fathali Moghaddam’s chapter was reprinted with the permission of the American Psychological Association. The spellings in the various chapters of the book reflect both American and British styles according to the preference of the authors. François Géré, Paris, 2011 Mary Sharpe, Cambridge, 2011

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Contents Foreword – From Tradition to Innovation: Considering New Perspectives for Security Research François Géré Acknowledgements

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Part One: Security in a Changing World: Variables Versus Intangibles Sustainable Global Security Nayef Al-Rodhan Security Expectations Today and Tomorrow: A Tangible List of Intangibles for a Safer World Anne Bader

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A Prognosis for Security in East Asia Joseph Chinyong Liow

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Global Trends in Organized Violence and Coups d’État Andrew Mack, Zoe Nielsen, Tara Cooper and Mila Shah

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Part Two: Modeling Security Modeling Security: 18-20 June 2007, Sarajevo François Géré, Denis Hadjovic, David Rodin and J.L. Samaan

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Imperial Security, National Security and Global Security: The Chinese Point of View and Proof of the Construction of Modernisation Zhang Lun

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Sex, Drugs and Education: A Model of Education for Security in a Changed Environment Mary Sharpe

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What Does Security Mean for the Balkans? Bisera Turkovic

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Part Three: Identity, Loyalty and Security Identity, Loyalty and Security: 19-21 October 2007, Casablanca Mary Sharpe and Mokhtar Benabdallaoui

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Being Muslim Being British: Preventing Extremist Violence Through Raising Integrative Complexity Sara Savage, Jose Liht and Ryan Williams The Islamic Movement in Algeria: A Socio-Historical Approach Arous Zoubir The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration Fathali M. Moghaddam

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Part Four: Security and Norms: Law, Ethics and Justice Security and Norms: Law, Ethics and Justice:10-11 March 2008, Oslo Peter Burgess and David Rodin

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The Intangibles of Security: Topics for Research Mervyn Frost

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Providing Security for the Human Brain Nina Slanevskaya

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Part Five: Management of Security: Successes and Failures The Management of Security: Successes and Failures: 22-23 May 2008, Istanbul Bruce Seely, Rachel Hollander and Tayseer Ahmad

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Human Security: Population Well-Being as a Path to Global Security Zaryab Iqbal

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Frontiers in Research on Human-Centered Dimensions of Disasters David Mendonça

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Widespread Disastrous Events: The Case of the August 2003 Blackout and Other Electric Power Blackouts Rae Zimmerman

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Conclusion Conclusions: Conference Intangibles of Security Lars Wedin

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Subject Index

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Author Index

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Part One Security in a Changing World: Variables Versus Intangibles

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Sustainable Global Security Nayef AL-RODHAN1 Programme Director Geneva Centre for Security Policy Abstract. There are five inter-related dimensions to global security. Unless all of them are attended to security will not ensue. Human nature is moulded by three factors, only one of which- ‘amorality’- can realistically be shaped for the better. Ten non-traditional areas of further research are adduced. Keywords. human security; environmental security: national security: transnational security; transcultural security: Multi-Sum Security Principle: human nature; emotional amoral egoism; neurophilosophy: symbiotic realism

Introduction I need to start by congratulating Professor François Géré and his institute (The French Institute for Strategic Analysis, IFAS) as well as his co-partners, the European Science Foundation and NATO for this conference. This is clearly the way to go because security issues are multi-faceted and will require combined efforts like this to gain the necessary insights. I am both a neuroscientist and a geostrategist and therefore my talk on global security will reflect both of these specialties and I will address three themes: 1. What is global security and how can it be sustained? 2. I will mention a few words about human nature, its neurobiological foundations and its relevance to security and conflict, and 3. I will end with new ideas for political research in response to François' request. What is global security and how do we sustain it? In a previous book of mine called ‘The Five Dimensions of Global Security: Proposal for a Multi-Sum Security Principle’ (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2007), I suggested that global security has five essential and inter-related dimensions that have to be addressed with equal importance if we are to be collectively secure. Central to this multi-dimensional nature of global security is what I have previously called the multi-sum security principle. This is a security principle that I think is more applicable to our connected and interdependent world because I believe that the days of the security dilemma and zero-sum paradigms are dangerous and obsolete. The multi-sum security paradigm states that “In a globalised world, security can no longer be thought of as a zero-sum game involving states alone. Global security instead has five dimensions that include human, environmental, national, transnational, 1

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and transcultural security, and, therefore, global security and the security of any state or culture cannot be achieved without good governance at all levels that guarantees security through justice for all individuals, states, and cultures.” Now let me touch upon these five dimensions quickly. a. Human security The guarantee of human dignity is a central pre-requisite for global security, because humiliation, inequality and double standards are the most certain way to persistent insecurities. b. Environmental security I do not have time to go into this, but this clearly impacts all of the above and must be taken seriously through burden-sharing and global efforts, while balancing economic needs for progress with true environmental concerns and to take into account the concerns of developing and rising powers in this regard. It is important here, not to conceal geopolitical aspirations under this environmental umbrella to avoid the development of lack of trust and goodwill which may have the potential for the unraveling of global cooperation in this regard. c. National security In a globalised world of instant connectivity and interdependence, the national security of any nation is no longer just national, and therefore cannot be achieved through national capabilities alone regardless of how powerful a state may be. Global justice is a pre-requisite of national, regional and global security. Typical excuses as to why this cannot be adhered to include things like: whose justice is it, who defines justice, and according to what value system? My answer to this is, if there is a will, there is a way, and that it will not be hard for well intentioned and reasonable people to figure out what needs to happen for each particular situation, but this needs a different mindset of escaping narrow geopolitical interests realising that global justice is above all a national interest. The problem is that these are medium- to long-term results which are beyond the electoral cycles that politicians are interested in. Therefore I believe in this case the responsibility lies with career diplomats and security experts who are entrusted with doing what is in the long-term interests of their states rather than their short-term gains. d. Transnational security Because of the nature of new security threats, multilateral and transnational cooperation is critical for global security both from natural disasters as well as from man-made ones. e. Transcultural security Large collective identities, whether sub-national or supra-national, must have jobs, respect and understanding to avoid the 'us-versus-them' concept that breeds mistrust,

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division, alienation, exclusion and exceptionalism, all of which are counter-productive. These cultural groups must not be asked to choose between their cultures and their new homes, because they can have both. However, in return, their loyalty must be first and foremost to their new homes and their grievances must be voiced through democratic and civil society institutions which must themselves be open and welcoming. If they feel welcome and included, they will automatically assimilate slowly and enrich their new cultures. Avoiding stereotyping and humiliation through educational materials, media, and the entertainment industry is essential not only because it is the right thing to do, but because it is the only way to ensure the loyalty of these groups and to achieve sustainable security. Apparent differences in norms, ideals, value systems, etc.. should be moulded to achieve an acceptable minimum common standard. I am not worried about these differences in the long-term because these things have a way of resolving themselves. My concern is in the short term, where maximum wisdom and sensitivity is required in avoiding populist and divisive electoral political statements. Clearly, things are not that simple, but patience, empowerment, equality, opportunity and inclusiveness will win in the end rather than quick, critical and judgemental approaches that will result in the development of defensive postures on all sides of a conflict. Now a few words about human nature because of its importance in understanding global security. My own philosophy of human nature, which I have termed emotional amoral egoism and published in a book of the same name last year, is a neurophilosophical theory based on neurochemistry and its neuropsychological manifestations. I am neither Machiavellian nor Hobbesian and I have the benefit of collective scholarly insights of a few hundred years since Machiavelli's insights in 1506 and those of Hobbs in 1651. Although the nature of man has not changed since those days, our interpretations of certain behaviours have improved because we know more about molecular genetics, neurochemistry, have better behavioural methodologies and more sophisticated functional neuroimaging techniques than in the past. My theory applies to the vast majority of humanity, and accepts that there are some people who will always act morally in spite of their own miseries, but these are rare and cannot be thought of as the norm. The theory proposes that humankind can be defined by three attributes: 1. Emotionality 2. Amorality 3. Egoism We cannot do much about the first attribute, namely emotionality because that is how we are wired due to evolutionary selection pressures that were necessary for survival over millions of years. We should not stifle the third attribute, namely egoism because that is essential for progress. But we can and should do a great deal about the second attribute, i.e. our “amorality” which affects the other two attributes. This is done through normative governance mechanisms, checks and balances, reward and punishment, transparency, accountability, and liability, and therein lies the promise of sustainable harmony, security and progress. This theory is supported by the realisation that the enduring assumption that human behaviour is governed by innate morality and reason is at odds with the

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persistence of human deprivation, injustice, brutality, inequality and conflict. In my book proposing this theory, ‘emotional amoral egoism’ I advocated a general theory of human nature and a specific theory of human motivation drawing on a wide range of philosophical, psychological, evolutionary and neuroscientific approaches. This theory argues that human behaviour is governed primarily by emotional self-interest and that the human mind is what I have called a pre-disposed tabula rasa (in response to John Locke's clean slate approach). In other words, our emotional and cognitive repertoire has been programmed for survival through evolutionary selection pressures over millions of years. In my opinion, human beings are neither innately moral nor immoral but rather amoral and circumstances will determine the survival value of humankind's moral compass. This realisation has profound implications for the re-ordering of governance mechanisms at all levels with a strong emphasis on the role of society and the global system in setting the standard of ethical, fair, just and dignity-based self-interest rather than short-sighted and narrow political and policy agendas that will not work in the long run, especially in today's world. Fear, alienation, injustices, inequalities and humiliation will never be acceptable to the neurobiological foundations of the human mind even if it cannot do anything about them. I do not have time to go into more details, but for example I have suggested in the book (amongst other suggestions) what I have called fear-induced pre-emptive aggression which stresses that anarchy, constant humiliation and inequality will precipitate anger, frustration, and possible aggression primarily because of fear and dignified survival needs. So doing the right thing in keeping with global standards and international norms is the way to go, not simply for altruistic reasons, but because it is in our collective self-interest to do so, especially in our connected and interdependent world. And finally, I will end by proposing a few non-traditional new research areas that are worth considering: 1. Help develop endogenous culture-specific, accountable governance paradigms, i.e. help but do not dictate, because for these to be workable, they have to be specific to histories and cultures and be appropriate, acceptable and affordable, and that all of these must meet common and minimal global standards to ensure maximum political and moral cooperation. 2. Tie global justice and human dignity needs as a pre-requisite to extensions of national and regional security paradigms, i.e. global justice that guarantees human dignity should be thought of as national and regional security issues rather than purely altruistic acts. 3. Legitimise public diplomacy to reflect specific gains, real changes, actions and results that guarantee respect, inclusiveness, and awareness of historical baggage, pains and vulnerabilities, rather than some cosmetic way of covering up geopolitical ambitions, because in today's informed world this will not work for long. Explanations of state policies, their motivations and potential results must be clarified to avoid mis-representations, mis-perceptions and conspiracy theories that can cause defensive postures that are unhelpful and counterproductive. 4. Develop minimum common global values and norms and focus on commonalities rather than differences. State ambitions can only be sustainable if they conform to international norms in spirit and substance. 5. Develop interstate relations that are governed by what I have previously called ‘Symbiotic Realism’ where absolute rather than relative gains are allowed and

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that non-conflictual cooperative competition is the only sustainable way forward, and to enlarge the spectrum of unitary actors beyond the state and non-state actors as I have done in my new theory of international relations which I have called ‘Symbiotic Realism’. 6. Reconcile power with interests and justice through what I have previously proposed as ‘just power’ that uses hard, soft and smart power paradigms as conduits of global justice through which itself is thought of as a national security tool. 7. Reconcile the eight global interests which I have proposed recently (individual, group, national, regional, cultural, global, planetary and moral interests). 8. The importance of education, a responsible media and entertainment industry and inclusive political statements. 9. Develop inclusive and fair policies for cultural groups in new situations - here the comparative experiences of various cultural groups in the United States and Europe is worth studying. These groups clearly do better in the United States than in Europe and there are many reasons for this, which are worthy of analysis. 10. More awareness of human motivations, namely emotionality, amorality and egoism and the urgent development of global ethical norms in response to the rapid convergence developments in various emerging technologies (like bio-, nano-, info-, material, etc.) which are essential for security as well as human dignity as we approach our inevitable trans-human and even post-human existence.

References Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan, The Five Dimensions of Global Security: Proposal for a Multi-sum Security Principle (Berlin: LIT, 2007), p. 15-16. Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan, “emotional amoral egoism”: A Neurophilosophical Theory of Human Nature and its Universal Security Implications (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2008). Ibid. Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan, Symbiotic Realism: A Theory of International Relations in an Instant and an Interdependent World (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2007). Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan, Neo-statecraft and Meta-geopolitics: Reconciliation of Power, Interests and Justice in the 21st Century (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2009). Ibid. Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan, The Role of Education in Global Security (Genéve: Slatkine, 2007). Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan and Lisa Watanabe, A Proposal for Inclusive Peace and Security (Genéve: Slatkine, 2007). Al-Rodhan, op. cit., note 2.

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Security Expectations Today and Tomorrow: A Tangible List of Intangibles for a Safer World Anne BADER1 The Atlantic Council Abstract. In today’s ever more complex and interdependent world some ‘intangibles’ of security are actually quite ‘tangible’. Understanding a wide range of relevant factors is essential if security is to be achieved and maintained. Whereas NATO’s role is sometimes stated to be responding to conflicts it would surely be helpful if it also had a role in foreseeing and preventing conflicts. A good example of this would be an effort to curtail the selling (on the part of under paid soldiers) of surplus small arms in former Soviet states, which the author has herself witnessed. Networks of various parties- governmental, military, NGOs, etc.- can aid in this, and are indeed required for these efforts to be successful. Keywords. Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST); Partnership for Peace Trust: ‘just do it!’ (JDI); NATO; 21st Century Programme for Innovation and Security; European Science Foundation; ‘Resilience to Crises’

Introduction Today we face the reality of increased interdependence, enhanced information, expanded risk and greater uncertainty coupled with declining human capacity to respond. We live in a world that is consolidating itself based upon variables that we cannot balance sufficiently or even describe clearly.

What Do We Want To Accomplish? What Are the Shared Benefits and Compromises That We Need To Make? Dr. Mahbub ul Haq identified seven security threats: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political in his groundbreaking 1994 Human Development Report for the United Nations Development Programme. In spite of the increased understanding of the need for interaction, dynamic networks, information sharing and voluntary mandates for cooperation and governance, the priorities must begin with our intangibles that are quite tangible.

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What Are the Minimum Requirements Necessary To Achieve the Objective? In 1994 I was working with the Special Advisor, Secretary General, NATO to build the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Nongovernmental Network across the former Soviet Union. My task was to help set up infrastructures, educate the leadership, find funding and outreach connections on a local, regional, national and international level to record progress and to expand the educational aspects of the programme. The intangible aspects were the most important: • understand the culture; • understand the needs of the people you are trying to help; • understand the power structure (but don’t get captured by it); • meet the needs of the people you are helping and use them to achieve your objectives; • don’t become the solution or the solution leaves when you do; • and, most importantly, understand the needs of the funders and how they intersect with the needs of those you are helping. The programme was successful. In summary, it was successful because the programme was based upon creating a community to accomplish the task that was based upon trust, respect, transparency, accountability; flexibility shared benefits and increased capacity.

What Is Our Shared Understanding of Requirements, Tasks and Outcomes? In 2003 I presented a Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) to a NATO expert group at the headquarters. It was created by my then NGO, the Fund for Peace, to provide a broad-based assessment tool in order to prevent the occurrence of conflict. It was based upon the premise that understanding the causes of conflict and preventing them was critical in mitigating their occurrence. After the presentation my host reassured his audience that NATO’s mandate was to respond to crisis and thus this tool would not be possible for NATO to consider. The intangibles here are making the right assumptions and understanding political will. We can create the perfect system but it will go nowhere unless we test its relevance in solving the problem.

Whose Security Are We Talking About? In 2002-2003, I was part of a NATO Expert team comprised of a US and Ukrainian NGO, NATO and NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) experts. Our task was to do a feasibility assessment of Ukraine’s small arms and munitions. Our purpose was to develop a proposal for the Partnership for Peace Trust Fund that would begin destruction of small arms, land mines and munitions. In addition to highly dangerous storage conditions and an unknown quantity of small arms, our primary effort was to stop the growing illicit sale of weapons from these sites. In early March 2003 we visited a salt mine in Artemosk, the Donetsk region that housed three million small arms. After an overnight train trip from Kiev, we were hosted at a T34 tank base for breakfast. The pipes were frozen and the deputy base commander held a pitcher of warm water as we each washed our hands before the

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meal. It became clear that the people were selling arms on the black market to light and heat their homes and to feed their families in this region.

It Was Critical To Understand and Share the Benefits In the final report, we proposed a defence conversion facility with help from other nations' funding, which included exchange programmes with local government, business and nongovernmental organisations with similar experiences in the United States. Among other things, it would provide local investment and jobs. In the same report, the NGOs created the brand TRUST for the PfP Trust Fund and a communications strategy that NATO has used to promote this programme. We checked the translations/connotations of TRUST in each of the NATO languages before settling on the term. The programme was successful. A follow-on NATO programme to convert surplus ammunition into saleable components modeled on the Ukrainian programme was also successful.

How Do We Start and Who Takes the Lead? In my experience, 'need takes the lead'. It is important to look beyond and behind the local, sponsoring government and NATO rhetoric and determine what is the shared need. We start by using existing assets and combining them for better leverage. Those who will make a difference will move forward. Within this room, we agree that there is an urgent need to improve our collective approach to security. The tangible intangible is leadership and trust in the shared values. Secondly, you can’t build the perfect programme. At some point, you move forward. I call it ‘just do it!’ (JDI). Two years ago, I began a project called ‘Resilience to Crises’ with government, business, nongovernmental, media and academic leaders, practitioners from 17 NATO, PfP and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, with funding from NATO and the UK Defence Academy. We gathered in a former monastery outside Prague for three days to talk about the growing reaction of government, business and the military in the face of mounting and converging threats worldwide. We spoke under the Chatham House Rule to allow openness and discussed the case studies that grace the front pages of our news. We determined that we needed to continue and have since met in formal sessions in Belgrade and Paris with several working group sessions in between. The effort is based on an informal ‘network of networks’ of leaders, risk and crisis managers and educators and trainers. We test informally through these networks. Our 'Resilience to Crises' initiative will take the project into its next phase.

What Do We Want To Accomplish? What Are the Shared Benefits and Compromises That We Need To Make? A community based upon trust, respect, transparency, accountability, flexibility, reliability, shared benefits and increased capacity.

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What Is Our Shared Understanding of Requirements, Tasks and Outcomes? Make the right assumptions and understand political will. We can create the perfect system but it will go nowhere unless we test its relevance in solving the problem.

Whose Security Are We Talking About? Understand and share the benefits. Know culture and language.

How Do We Start and Who Takes the Lead? Need takes the Lead. Leadership and trust in the shared values. I call it ‘just do it!’ (JDI).

How Do We Engage the Multiple Sectors and Interests? In my experience, NGOs, carefully vetted and screened, and engaged from the beginning are essential interlocutors with the multiple entities required to make security-related programmes work.

Finally, Some Suggestions For Outcomes From This Conference In the long-term: • Establish a network of networks. • Identify a representative group of private and public organisations (P.E.: The Twenty-First Century Security Consortium) that can alternate in hosting this new community. They should include government, policy organisations and universities, international and regional organisations, business, hard and soft science, innovators, outliers, nongovernmental, development, organisational behaviour, anthropology, law, governance, communications and strategy. • Develop a shared scope of exploration from this conference mandate. Link them through yearly meetings and a dedicated social network. • Develop the science of knowledge management for information sharing, network alliances and cross-sectoral interrelationships. In the mid-term: • Develop a shared 21st Century Programme for Innovation and Security between NATO and the European Science Foundation with a term of five years. The programme will fund pilot projects that will beta-test various objectives that we identify in this conference. It will be the first Multi Stakeholder Incubator towards developing the working community that we need to mount our challenge to global and local security. If the projects funded yield positive results, the programme could be expanded to other organisations and be continued.

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Global Security: A Vision for the Future F. Géré and M. Sharpe (Eds.) IOS Press, 2011 © 2011 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-760-4-12

A Prognosis for Security in East Asia Joseph CHINYONG LIOW 1 S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU) Abstract. The financial problems in the region in the late 1990s caused political turmoil but that is now resolved. China’s continuing rapid economic growth will have major consequences, including a massive rearmament programme- for what ultimate purpose? Though no two democracies have ever gone to war with each other, the transition to democracy is a very dangerous process (e.g. Iraq), which most of the states in this region have yet to experience. What will the results beespecially considering that two of them (China and North Korea) have nuclear capabilities? Keywords. human and societal dynamics; China; Indonesia; North Korea; Japan: nuclear weapons and waste; natural disasters

1. The Global Financial Crisis Is the Number One Issue Previously, the mantra was “only capitalism can save China”, now it is “only China can save capitalism”. But it remains to be seen. In 1997-8 the region recovered from a financial crisis which brought down governments, especially that of Indonesia. Terrorism has now taken a back seat as human and societal dynamics has improved and non-traditional security receives greater attention and commitment. As a result of the last decade, Chinese growth was previously expected to reach 9 10% per annum, but is now at 5-6%. That decline could trigger unpredictable consequences for Asia and the rest of the world as well. 2. What Happens in the US Remains Critically Important Barack Obama grew up in Indonesia- but there is not much to expect from that. Far more important is the free trade issue which weighs heavily on the region. There is concern that Obama will look again at that issue to protect the economic interests of the US. 3. Broad Rubric of Non-Traditional Security Issues As a result of an earthquake and a cyclone in China that cost half a million lives, numbers that terrorists and suicide bombers could not achieve, it became evident that policy makers had become too focused on terrorism. Natural disasters, especially the 1

E-mail: [email protected]

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Tsunami, sparked rethinking on institutions. In sharp contrast, in Burma the authorities took three weeks before letting a very small foreign team in, whereas in China they allowed foreign rescue teams and the media in at an earlier stage of the disaster. Nonetheless, the same question stands: “Security for whom?” Many governments continue to see these new challenges through a traditional lens. They think first about their own political security. The question is how to inform governments so they can deal with these issues without becoming overly securitised. Recent problems in the region include the avian flu pandemic, SARS and environmental issues in the Mekong Delta (the Chinese are nonchalant about the environmental effects of manufacturing processes). Asia is still lagging behind in its readiness to compromise its integrity- it is still robust about sovereignty and integrity.

4. Political Transition, Democratisation Obsessive regimes include North Korea, China, Burma, etc.. Nepal, Bhutan and Indonesia have gone through a transition. Indonesia had 32 years under Suhuarto, but within a few years it has now become dynamic. Democracies do not make war with each other but, depending on how the transition takes place, the process of becoming a democracy can be one of the most violent there is. The case of Iraq has raised alarm in the region. Most countries cannot afford the sort of overnight democracy that the Bush administration wanted. In addition it raises cross-border issues. Most of the current problems are to be blamed on Europe in the nineteenth century. Because of cartography and diplomatic bargaining, South East Asia is still trying to deal with the outcomes of these decisions. a. Persistence of Traditional Security South Ossetia reminds us not to take our eye off the ball regarding traditional security issues. In East and South East Asia, there are a slew of political conflicts that have been swept under the carpet for the sake of economic growth. The trend has been to not deal with them but instead to focus on cooperation, but they are still there. China is involved in a lot of these; in the case of Taiwan, as a nation it responds more emotionally than rationally. Over the past year or year and a half, though, the relationship with Taiwan has improved. b. China and the Rest of the Region China remains a long-term security question. The modernisation of its armed forces is a matter of concern. What is the ultimate goal? These questions have sparked a mini revival in International Relations theory; they have not shown their hand- this is good for the theorists as we can all speculate. The key question is about retraining the modern military machine, moving for blue water naval capability. The most logical expansion would be south (if it goes east it gets to Japan and the US). China has claims persisting in the South China Sea. At the

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present time no one desires any destabilization. It is important to keep a dialogue between Europe and Asia open and a partnership between China and the EU. The critical issue will be to mediate between short-term and long-term issues as well as between traditional and new security challenges in Asia.

Questions for Researchers Question 1. 2.

Role of piracy, the ability to cooperate on that issue especially relating to the shipping of goods, energy and so on. North Korea, which allegedly performed a nuclear test in 1998. This may pose a real security challenge to the whole area.

Answer The Malacca Straits is an important region in regard to piracy, even though it is not the size of the Gulf of Aden. Concern has been reduced in the past 2-3 years due to improved cooperation among the littoral states. Indonesia is very sensitive about its waterways, because it has previously been used by others to undermine other countries. The US has resumed bilateral ties with Indonesia because of its improvements in Human Rights. Japan and India are waiting in the wings to help with policing the waters, but they are not yet allowed an active role. In Japan you will find very hawkish positions on North Korea's pretensions. Japan could go nuclear if it wanted to, China too, and not just with WMD but with environment issues too. There are 17,000 islands making up Indonesia- where nuclear waste could be dumped. This needs some kind of mechanism to deal with it, currently there is not any in place. Question Why is there a relatively low incidence of homicide in the crime rate in this region yet high levels of corruption? Answer a.

b. c.

Bureaucrats from the lowest ranks right to the top are poorly paid. It is a matter of survival. Civil servants in Singapore are some of the best paid in the world so there is no need to be corrupt. It is also the nature of local politics; there is a major security issue around deforestation, so environmental rules are not applied because of it. Cheap labour from Indonesia to Malaysia, businessmen pay politicians to overturn or delay legislation related to illegal immigration.

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Knowledge communities- bottom-up think tanks- deal with security in very traditional ways. Are think tanks and universities natural avenues for further collaboration?

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Global Security: A Vision for the Future F. Géré and M. Sharpe (Eds.) IOS Press, 2011 © 2011 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-760-4-16

Global Trends in Organized Violence and Coups d’État1 Andrew MACK2, Zoe NIELSEN3, Tara COOPER4 and Mila SHAH a

Simon Fraser University

Abstract. Global trends in violence over recent decades vary greatly by region and conflict-type. Coups have become less frequent, as have wars between states. Intrastate conflicts have become more common, particularly since the end of the Cold War, but fortunately they tend to be less deadly. Another trend is an increase in the proportion of wars which end in negotiated settlements rather than military victory for one side. There is a strong negative correlation between the level of democracy in a region and the number of conflicts it experiences (and vice versa). Keywords. state-based conflicts; non-state conflicts; one-sided violence; coups d’état; terrorism; genocide; conflict fatality statistics

Introduction This chapter reviews the global and regional trends in two types of armed conflict: ‘state-based’ conflicts, those in which a state is (at least) one of the warring parties, and ‘non-state’ conflicts, those between non-state groups, such as rebel organizations, warlords or community groups. The new data from the Uppsala Conflicts Data Program (UCDP) reveal that there has been no change in the aggregate number of state-based conflicts between 2005 and 2006, although there have been significant changes at the regional level between 2002 and 2006.5 By contrast, the number of non-state conflicts has continued to fall since 2003, though here, too, there are notable differences between the world’s six regions. In addition to tracking conflicts trends, we also report on the death tolls from both state-based and non-state conflicts. The chapter also examines UCDP’s data on one-sided violence- or organized political violence against civilians. Globally, the number of campaigns of one-sided violence grew unevenly throughout the 1990s, lending support to the view that targeting civilians had become an increasingly prevalent element of the post-Cold War security landscape. However, after 2004, the number of campaigns of one-sided violence began to decrease. The chapter ends with a review of global and regional trends in coups d’état. It finds that the average number of coups per decade has halved since the 1980s. 1

Source: Adapted from Human Security Brief 2007 (www.humansecuritybrief.info). Copyright © 2008 by the Human Security Report Project (www.hsrgroup.org). Reprinted with permission. 2 E-mail: [email protected] 3 E-mail: [email protected] 4 E-mail: [email protected] 5 This five-year period has been chosen because the data on non-state conflicts only go back to 2002.

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State-based armed conflict In 2006 the dramatic decline in state-based armed conflicts that started in 1993 appears to have stalled. The number of state-based conflicts around the world has remained unchanged at 32 for the past three years.6 Early indications from UCDP suggest that there was little change in 2007. All of today’s conflicts are fought within states- as Figure 1 reveals, there has not been an interstate conflict since 2003. Iraq and Afghanistan, which many people might think of as interstate conflicts, are what UCDP calls “internationalized intrastate conflicts”—i.e. conflicts that take place within a country but which involve foreign military forces. Iraq and Afghanistan would only be interstate conflicts if the US and its allies were fighting against, rather than in support of, the governments of these countries. With a few exceptions- notably Iraq- conflicts in the post-Cold War period, sometimes called ‘new wars’, have mostly been fought in low-income countries by small, poorly trained, and poorly equipped armies that tend to avoid major military engagements.

After more than a decade of uneven decline, the number of state-based conflicts being fought around the world has levelled off.

6 Note that the UCDP/Human Security Report Project dataset is subject to an annual review and that estimates may change as more information becomes available. The Human Security Brief 2006 reported that there were 31 state-based armed conflicts in 2005. This number has since been revised upwards to 32.

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Recent changes at the regional level The leveling off of the global state-based conflicts count over the past few years obscures some significant changes at the regional level. The number of state-based conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa declined by 46 per cent between 2002 and 2006. In 2002 the region accounted for 40 percent of the world’s state-based conflicts; by 2006 it accounted for just 22 percent. For four years out of the five between 2002 and 2006, Central and South Asia was the most conflict-prone region in the world. It has experienced a net increase in conflicts- going from seven in 2002, to 10 in 2006. The number of conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa also increased, rising from four in 2002, to seven in 2006. There has been just one state-based conflict in Europe since 2002- that of Russia’s in Chechnya. Meanwhile, in both the Americas, and in East and Southeast Asia and Oceania there were the same number of conflicts in 2006 as in 2002: two in the case of the Americas, and five in the case of East and Southeast Asia and Oceania. However, in both regions the numbers fluctuated slightly in the intervening years. Deaths from state-based conflicts Figure 2 shows the number of reported battle-deaths from state-based armed conflicts between 1946 and 2006. The overall trend reveals a striking, but very uneven, decline in the death toll from the peak caused by the Korean War in 1950 to the present day. The most telling indicator of the changing deadliness of warfare over time is the average number of battle-deaths incurred per conflict per year. Using this metric, we find that in 1950 the average state-based conflict killed some 38,000 people, but by 2006 the toll had shrunk to just over 500, a decline of 99 percent. Intrastate conflicts have been the most common form of conflict over the past 60 years; they have also been the least deadly. Between 1946 and 2006: • The average interstate conflict killed 34,677 people per year. • The average internationalized intrastate conflict killed 8,609 people per year. • The average intrastate conflict killed 2,430 people per year. In 2006 just five of the conflicts being waged around the world qualified as ‘wars’i.e. they resulted in 1,000 or more battle-deaths. Two of these were internationalized intrastate conflicts (Afghanistan and Iraq), while three were intrastate conflicts (Chad, Sri Lanka, and Sudan). In the Americas, 2006 saw a sharp reduction in the death toll in Colombia’s longrunning civil war. Indeed, 2006 is only the second year since 1990 in which the fighting in that country resulted in fewer than 1,000 battle-deaths.7 Colombia’s lower death toll was responsible for the 54 percent drop in battle-deaths across the region from 2005 to 2006. Battle-deaths in Central and South Asia increased significantly between 2002 and 2006. The 36 percent increase during this period was mostly due to increased fighting in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. The death toll in the Middle East and North Africa (primarily in Iraq) rose even more sharply (by 93 percent). Together, these two regions accounted for over three-quarters of the world’s reported battle-deaths from state-based conflict in 2006. 7

The other year in which the battle-death toll in Colombia dipped below the 1,000 mark was 2003.

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Interstate wars, though relatively few in number, have been by far the deadliest form of armed conflict since the end of World War II.

Europe’s sole conflict, that in Chechnya, has been active for 10 of the 12 years between 1994 and 2006, and has resulted in the deaths of almost 100,000 people. However, the number of fatalities has declined sharply since 2004- in 2006 the estimated death toll was less than 300. In sub-Saharan Africa, the decrease in the number of state-based conflicts between 2002 and 2006 is reflected in the battle-death toll that declined by more than half over this period. In 2002 the region accounted for some 30 percent of global fatalities: by 2006 its share was just 13 percent. However, the trend has not been consistently downwards- increased fighting in Chad and Somalia pushed the region’s battle-death toll for 2006 above that for 2005. The decline in battle-deaths in East and Southeast Asia and Oceania has been uneven, though there has been a small net decline between 2002 and 2006. State-based conflict onsets and terminations The 1990s was an extraordinary decade. On average there were more than twice as many state-based conflict onsets each year as in the 1980s. However, the average number of conflicts ending each year increased even more dramatically. The 1990s was the first decade since the 1950s in which there were more terminations than onsets, which explains the net decline in state-based conflict numbers over the decade.8

8 Strictly speaking, the UCDP/Human Security Report Project terminations dataset deals with the onset and termination of ‘conflict episodes’. A given conflict can consist of a number of conflict episodes.

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In the new millennium, as Figure 3 shows, the average number of conflict onsets per year dropped by 47 percent, although the rate of conflict onsets is still higher than in the 1950s, 1970s, and 1980s. Similarly, while the rate of conflict terminations per year in the new millennium is lower than in the 1990s, it is still higher than every previous decade back to the 1950s.

Following the end of the Cold War, the average number of conflict onsets per year more than doubled. There was an even greater increase in the number of terminations.

How wars end Figure 3 tells us about the average number of state-based conflicts terminating per year by decade, but it does not tell us how those conflicts were terminating- whether by victories, negotiated settlements, or a third catch-all residual category known as ‘Other’. Nor does it tell us anything about the stability of the terminations- i.e. the probability that the conflicts that had stopped would restart. In every decade from the 1950s to the 1980s there were many more victories than negotiated settlements. But as Figure 4 demonstrates, there was a striking change in this pattern in the 1990s. For the first time there were greater numbers of negotiated settlements than there were victories. The numbers of negotiated settlements in the 1990s also increased in absolute terms- indeed, there were more than three times as many negotiated settlements in the 1990s as in any previous decade. This pattern appears to have continued into the new millennium, and has become even more pronounced. From 2000 to 2005, there were more than three times as many

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negotiated settlements as victories.9 And even though we have data for only six years, there have already been more negotiated settlements in the new millennium than in any previous decade, bar the anomalous 1990s.

In the new millennium, the number of conflicts ending in victory has declined, while the number ending in negotiated settlements has increased.

Both the reduction in the number of victories and the increase in the number of negotiated settlements reflect the sharp increase in peacemaking- the practice of seeking to end wars via negotiation rather than on the battlefield. In the 1990s negotiated settlements were far more likely to restart within five years than conflicts that ended in victories: during this decade, 44 percent of negotiated settlements broke down within five years. In the new millennium negotiated settlements seem to be far more stable than was the case previously. Seventeen conflicts were ended by negotiation between 2000 and 2005, and thus far just two of them- 12 percent- have broken down. Over the equivalent period in the previous decade (1990 to 1995), 48 percent of the negotiated settlements had failed. The increased stability of these settlements is very likely the result of the international community’s increased support for post-conflict peacebuilding in recent years. While negotiated settlements have become more common and more stable, the reverse appears to be the case with victories, which have become less common and somewhat less stable. The least stable type of conflict termination is that labelled “Other” in Figure 4. This category includes conflicts that terminate because the fighting peters out completely, or because the death toll drops below the 25-battle-deaths-peryear threshold. There were 21 conflict terminations in this category between 2000 and 2005. Fourteen of them- 67 percent- have already broken down. “Other” terminations are generally not supported by the international community. Given this, given that neither of the warring parties has been defeated, and that there are rarely any negotiations to resolve the disputes that drove the conflict in the first place, it is not surprising that they are so unstable.

9

Attentive readers may expect that, since the Human Security Brief 2006 published conflict terminations data to 2005, the Human Security Brief 2007 would update these data to 2006. The data here, however, still end at 2005; this is a result of an adjustment made to coding practices for the conflict terminations data.

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Because we only have data on terminations for the first six years of the new millennium, it is impossible to draw any firm conclusions about the stability of the terminations at this point. However, the increase in negotiated settlements and decline in the number breaking down are grounds for modest optimism. The findings of the terminations’ dataset contain important messages for policymakers- particularly with respect to conflict prevention. Since the point of conflict prevention is to reduce the number of new conflicts breaking out, the huge increase in conflict onsets in the 1990s tells us that if conflict prevention initiatives were being attempted during this period, they were decidedly unsuccessful. Given the huge amount of attention paid to conflict prevention at the UN and elsewhere, this finding is sobering. In the new millennium, the reduction in the number of conflict onsets could mean that preventive diplomacy activities were having a positive effect, but it could also mean that whatever forces were driving the onset of conflicts in the 1990s have attenuated. The one area in which conflict prevention has clearly had a positive recent impact is in helping to prevent conflicts that have stopped from restarting. There is no doubt that the major increase in post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives has had an important preventive effect. The sharp increase in the number of conflicts ending in negotiated settlements provides further grounds for cautious optimism. It suggests that what the UN calls “peacemaking”- using third party mediation to help bring conflicts to an end- has been increasingly effective. Given the extremely limited resources that the international community devotes to peacemaking and to conflict resolution more generally, this finding is encouraging.

Non-state armed conflict Until 2002 armed conflicts that did not involve a government were almost completely ignored by the conflict research community, an omission that created a misleading picture of the incidence of conflicts around the world.10 Five years ago the Human Security Report Project commissioned the UCDP to collect data on a range of non-state conflicts- intercommunal conflicts and conflicts between rebels groups and warlords. The Human Security Report published the initial findings of this dataset in 2005. It revealed that in both 2002 and 2003 there were more of these hitherto uncounted ‘nonstate conflicts’ than state-based conflicts. The majority of non-state conflicts have occurred in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, in each of the five years for which there are data, the number of non-state conflicts in subSaharan Africa has been equal to, or greater than, the number of non-state conflicts in all of the other regions of the world combined. However, sub-Saharan Africa experienced a 54 percent decline in non-state conflicts between 2002 and 2006. This decline helped drive the global non-state conflict total down from 36 conflicts in 2002, to 24 in 2006. The Middle East and North Africa is the second most conflict-prone region and has experienced the greatest increase in the number of non-state conflicts- with numbers more than doubling during the same period. 10

One exception is the dataset compiled by Monty G. Marshall at the Center for Systemic Peace in Virginia.

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As Figure 5 reveals, while the trend in non-state conflicts in Central and South Asia has been uneven, the region experienced a modest increase in the number of these conflicts during the period under review. The trends in non-state conflicts in the Americas, and East and Southeast Asia and Oceania have been similarly uneven. However, both regions experienced a net decline in the number of conflicts between 2002 and 2006. Europe is the only region that has been free of non-state conflict between 2002 and 2006.

The majority of non-state conflicts have occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, but even here the numbers have been declining since 2003.

Deaths from non-state conflicts Although non-state conflicts have, on average, been as numerous as state-based conflicts over the past five years, they are not nearly as deadly. Between 2002 and 2006, state-based conflicts killed an average of some 17,000 people per year. Non-state conflicts killed less than a quarter of that number.11 Figure 6 reveals the 62 percent decline in the number of reported non-state battle-deaths around the world between 2002 and 2006- notwithstanding the slight increase in the global death toll between 2005 and 2006. This decline is quite remarkable over such a short period of time. The Middle East and North Africa is the only region to have experienced a net increase in the number of battle-deaths from non-state conflict between 2002 and 2006. Most of the increase was accounted for by fighting in two countries: Iraq and Sudan.

11 This figure was arrived at by using ‘best estimates’ from the UCDP/Human Security Report Project dataset and rounding to the nearest 1,000.

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The overall decline in deaths from non-state conflicts has been driven by lower death tolls in sub-Saharan Africa, Central and South Asia, and the Americas.

Despite an increase in the death toll in 2006, sub-Saharan Africa actually experienced a 71 percent decline in the number of deaths from non-state conflict between 2002 and 2006. A reduction in the fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was largely responsible for the long-term decline, while increases in fighting in Somalia, Chad, and Senegal drove the modest increase in fatalities in 2006. Although Central and South Asia experienced a net increase in the number of nonstate conflicts between 2002 and 2006, the region experienced an 87 percent decline in the number of battle-deaths over the same period. This was due mainly to a decline in violence in India, and to a lesser degree, Afghanistan.12 The trends in the death tolls in the Americas, and East and Southeast Asia and Oceania reflect the uneven decline in the number of non-state conflicts in these two regions. Targeting civilians ‘Terrorism’ and ‘genocide’ are both terms used to describe the organized killing of civilians, but each is controversial. At the UN, where the General Assembly has repeatedly failed to agree on a definition of terrorism, there are two main sources of controversy. First, while some believe killing civilians may be acceptable when a people is ‘resisting occupation’, others totally reject the idea. Second, there is no consensus on whether the label ‘terrorist’ should be applied to governments as well as to non-state groups. Were such a comprehensive definition to be accepted, it would 12

Although the final data are not yet available, it appears that the death toll in Afghanistan increased in 2007.

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Campaigns of one-sided violence increased in the 1990s then dropped sharply from 2004 to 2006.

have embarrassing consequences for a number of liberal democracies whose governments pursued policies that deliberately targeted civilians in mass bombing raids in World War II. ‘Genocide’ can also be an intensely contested term, as Turkey’s decades-long efforts to reject any attempt to use the term to describe the mass killing of Armenians between 1915 and 1917 attest. More recently there has been a fractious debate over whether the intentional killing of civilians in Darfur constitutes genocide. Uppsala University’s Conflict Data Program (UCDP) avoids both the controversy and politicization associated with the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘genocide’ by adopting a less emotive term- ‘one-sided violence’. UCDP describes one-sided violence as the intentional use of armed force against civilians by a government or formally organized group that results in at least 25 deaths within a calendar year. Civilians killed in bombing raids against military targets, or the crossfire of combat are counted in the battle-death tolls, not as victims of one-sided violence. The 25 deaths that must be perpetrated for a campaign of one-sided violence to be recorded by UCDP can occur at anytime within the calendar year. So both a mass killing of 25 or more civilians in a single day, and a series of 25 individual killings spread over the course of a year, constitute a campaign of one-sided violence. A single country can experience more than one campaign of one-sided violence in a calendar year, just as it can experience more than one conflict.13 In 2006, for 13 In a given country, in a given year there can only ever be a single campaign of one-sided violence perpetrated by a particular actor- i.e. a government or non-state armed group. However, because there can be more than one non-state armed group in a particular country, it is possible to have two or more campaigns of one-sided violence in any one year.

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example, India and Iraq each experienced four campaigns of one-sided violence; Sudan had three; and Sri Lanka and Nepal each had two. Before UCDP created the one-sided violence dataset at the request of the Human Security Report Project, no government, international organization, or research institution had collected data on intentional violence against civilians by both non-state armed groups and governments.14 What the trend data reveal Although not necessarily associated with warfare, one-sided violence most commonly occurs in countries experiencing conflict. In fact, in 2006 only three out of the 16 countries that experienced one-sided violence were not also embroiled in conflict. Given this association, we might expect that as armed conflicts declined from the early 1990s, campaigns of one-sided violence would have declined as well. This did not happen. Throughout most of the 1990s, the number of campaigns of one-sided violence trended upwards. It is not clear why this should have been the case, but the data clearly lend support to the widely held view that the targeting of civilians has become increasingly prevalent. The number of campaigns of one-sided violence around the world rose from 19 in 1989, to a high of 38 in 2004. In fact, in 2004 there were more campaigns of one-sided violence than there were state-based armed conflicts. However, as Figure 7 shows, after 2004 things changed- the number of campaigns of one-sided violence began to decrease and by 2006 had dropped to 26- a 32 percent decline. The regional picture Figure 8 illustrates the extent of the changes in the incidence of campaigns of one-sided violence within the world’s regions from 2002 to 2006. Four of the six regions have seen net declines since 2002, one has seen an increase, and one experienced no change.15 Sub-Saharan Africa has seen by far the most dramatic reduction in the number of campaigns of one-sided violence. In 2002 some 40 percent of all campaigns of onesided violence were in sub-Saharan Africa. By 2006 the region’s share had shrunk to just 19 percent. In Central and South Asia the reverse was true. While the number of campaigns fluctuated over the period, there were nearly twice as many campaigns in 2006 as in 2002. The biggest increase was between 2005 and 2006 when the number of campaigns in the region went from four to nine. Most of this increase was accounted for by new campaigns in India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. As Figure 8 shows, there was no net change in the number of campaigns of onesided violence in the Middle East and North Africa between 2002 and 2006. However, in the intervening years, the number had increased by 50 percent (from 8 to 12) before declining sharply again in 2006. In 2006 Europe was free of one-sided violence for the second year in a row. Although this region has experienced relatively few campaigns of one-sided violence

14 The genocide and politicide dataset created by Barbara Harff focuses primarily on the killing of civilians but includes deaths of combatants (Harff 2003). 15 We focus on the 2002-2006 period here for two reasons. First, UCDP’s data are more reliable for this period than for the 1989-2001 period. Second, we want to be able to make comparisons with the non-state conflict trend data and these only extend back to 2002.

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There was a threefold decline in campaigns of one-sided violence in sub-Saharan Africa between 2002 and 2006; in Central and South Asia the numbers increased by 44 percent over the same period.

since 1989, some of them have been particularly deadly. The slaughter of 7,500 Muslim civilians by Serb forces in Srebrenica in 1995, for example, killed almost as many people as all of the campaigns of one-sided violence in the Americas during 1989 to 2006 (Eck and Hultman 2007). Deaths from one-sided violence While we can be reasonably confident about the data on the number of campaigns of one-sided violence, the fatality data are more problematic. Those who kill civilians rarely publicize their actions, so many deaths go unreported, and determining the identity of the perpetrators can be very difficult. Knowing who the killers are is important because UCDP will not record a fatality unless it can identify the perpetrators. Without information about the identity of the perpetrators, it is impossible, for example, to distinguish between deaths from political violence and those from criminal violence, or to determine whether the deaths were caused by government or non-state groups. These coding challenges are compounded by the fact that governments and rebels can- and do- intimidate, and sometimes kill, those who seek to report the truth about the killings of civilians. The uncertainties that complicate the coding process are evident in the often much wider variation between UCDP’s low and high death toll estimates for one-sided violence than for deaths from armed conflict. For these reasons, and because the challenges of simply counting the civilian deaths in Darfur, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are so great, the one-sided violence fatality counts need to be treated with considerable caution. They can indicate broad trends but not much more. Keeping these reservations in mind, the data suggest that while the number of campaigns of one-sided violence increased unevenly into the new millennium, their death toll has been trending downwards since the catastrophic slaughter in Rwanda in 1994. There was, however, a very slight increase in the reported global fatality toll between 2005 and 2006, though there were no large-scale campaigns- those that kill 1,000 or more people- during this period. The last such campaign was perpetrated by the Sudanese government in 2004.16 16 Most of the 200,000 people estimated to have died in Darfur have perished as a result of conflictexacerbated disease and malnutrition. These deaths are not counted in the one-sided violence nor indeed in any other- dataset.

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It is also instructive to look at the regional trends in death tolls. In three regions of the world- Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa- there was little or no change in the death toll from one-sided violence between 2005 and 2006, while in the other three regions- the Americas, Central and South Asia, and East and Southeast Asia and Oceania- the changes were quite marked. Europe, as mentioned earlier, was free of one-sided violence in 2005 and 2006, while in both sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa, there was a slight decline in the number of reported deaths over the same period. In the Americas, deaths from one-sided violence dropped by 71 percent between 2005 and 2006, driven by a sharp decline in deaths in Colombia. By contrast, the death toll in Central and South Asia almost doubled, increasing by 91 percent. Much of the change in this latter region can be accounted for by increased death tolls in India and Sri Lanka. East and Southeast Asia and Oceania suffered a 48 percent increase in the civilian death toll from one-sided violence due primarily to escalating violence in Myanmar and Laos. However, it should be borne in mind that these fatality tolls are relatively small and that the estimates have a wide margin of error. The decline in the number of campaigns of one-sided violence over the past two years, and the longer-term- though uneven- decline in fatality numbers are encouraging. But until we have a much better understanding of what causes violence against civilians to start, as well as to stop, it would be imprudent to assume that the downward trend will necessarily be sustained.

Coups d’État Conflicts and campaigns of one-sided violence are not the only indicators of state instability. Coups d’état are characterized by the swift illegal seizure of state power by part of the state apparatus- almost always the military. They are localized eventsusually taking place in the capital. While governments can defend themselves against rebels by increasing the size, firepower, and efficiency of their armed forces, this strategy is quite irrelevant when it comes to protecting against coups. Here, what matters is the loyalty of the armed forces, not their size or effectiveness. Although coups are premised on the potential threat of violence, as the phrase ‘bloodless coup’ suggests, they do not necessarily have to involve the actual use of force (McGowan 2003). The University of Heidelberg’s Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) publishes data that record not only successful coups- those in which there is a change of leadership at the top- but also coup attempts that fail.17 HIIK researchers stress the difficulties involved in obtaining reliable data, particularly for the early years of the dataset (HIIK, personal communication). Information is not always available, reports may be contradictory, and the veracity of claims questionable- governments, for example, sometimes use the discovery of an alleged coup plot as a pretext for detaining- and in some cases executing- political enemies. These caveats aside, the overall trends are not in dispute. 17 See Conflict Barometer (Heidelberg, Germany: HIIK, various dates). The data for this review were supplied by researchers at HIIK. Although the HIIK data go back to 1945, we have chosen our starting year as 1946. For ease of reference, we refer only to ‘coups’ here, but readers should note that the data are for coups and attempted coups.

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As Figure 9 indicates, from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, the number of coups around the world increased rapidly. In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, coup numbers fluctuated unevenly, but averaged about 12 per year. In the 1990s the global average dropped to between eight and nine coups per year, while in the new millennium the annual average has dropped still further- to six.

Coup numbers rose from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s and remained high until the end of the Cold War.

As Figure 10 illustrates, all of the coups between 1946 and 1959 occurred in just three of the world’s six regions. In fact, all but one of the 36 coups during this period were in the Americas, and the Middle East and North Africa. The one coup that took place outside of the Americas, and the Middle East and North Africa was unsuccessful and was led by three renegade French generals in 1958. Although this coup actually took place in Algeria, because Algeria was still a department of metropolitan France at that time, the coup attempt is coded as having taken place in France.18 By 1969 all six regions of the world had experienced coups, with sub-Saharan Africa experiencing by far the greatest increase in number. The continent had been coup-free during the colonial period, but following independence, coups became a common feature of the intense struggles for control over the post-colonial state. During the 1960s, sub-Saharan Africa established itself as the world’s most coup-prone region, a dubious distinction that remains true today. According to one recent study, only three countries in the region- Botswana, Cape Verde, and Mauritius- have been independent for more than 25 years and have remained completely coup-free to 2001 (McGowan 2003: 345-346). The number of coups in the Middle East and North Africa peaked in the 1960s, when there were 36 coups in the region, and then started to decline. In the Americas there were, on average, some three coups per year between 1960 and 1989, but in the 18

Any coup or attempted coup in a colony is coded as having taken place in the colonial capital.

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Sub-Saharan Africa is the world’s most coup-prone region.

1990s the number dropped significantly, and in the new millennium the region has averaged fewer than one coup per year. Coup numbers peaked in Central and South Asia in the 1970s- reflecting the political instability in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Coups in these three countries, as well as in the former Soviet republics of Georgia, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, pushed the regional total up again in the 1990s. There is no consistent trend in East and Southeast Asia and Oceania, although it is the only region to have experienced more coups between 2000 and 2006 than in the previous decade. The five coups in the new millennium took place in Fiji (2000 and 2006), the Solomon Islands (2000), the Philippines (2006), and Thailand (2006). Europe, the region that has been home to the greatest number of consistently democratic states for the longest period of time, is also the region that has experienced the fewest coups. Just eight countries account for Europe’s 18 coups (Greece had seven, Albania two, France two, Portugal two, Russia/USSR two, Bulgaria one, Cyprus one, and Spain one). The region’s three coups in the 1990s took place in the newly independent Russian Republic (1991), the Russian Federation (1993), and Albania (1998). There have been no coups in Europe in the new millennium. A history of armed conflict increases the risk of future conflicts. The evidence indicates that the same relationship is true for coups. Seventy-eight percent of countries that experienced a coup between 1946 and 2006 experienced more than one. SubSaharan Africa not only accounted for the majority (44 percent) of the world’s coups between 1946 and 2006, but was also home to four of the world’s eight most coupprone countries (Nigeria with 15 coups, Comoros with 13, Mauritania with 12, and Benin with 12). The Americas experienced 24 percent of the world’s coups, and was

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home to the world’s most coup-prone country- Bolivia- which experienced 22 coups during the period 1946 to 2006. The Middle East and North Africa accounted for 17 percent of the world’s coups between 1946 and 2006, and was home to three of the world’s eight most coup-prone countries (Syria with 20 coups, Sudan with 18, and Iraq with 15). Figure 11 provides information on each region’s share of the global coup total between 1946 and 2006, but it does not take into account the fact that the number of countries per region varies greatly. While sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 44 percent of the world’s coups over the time period in question, it also contains many more states than most other regions. It should be remembered, however, that the number of states in the world increased considerably over the last 60 years as a consequence of the end of colonialism.19 The decline in the average number of coups per decade since the 1970s is not only encouraging but is also not accidental. The decline is strongly associated with a range of economic and political changes, including rising incomes; an increasingly entrenched norm against the usurpation of government by the military; and a greater willingness on behalf of the international community and regional organizations to seek to prevent or reverse coups, and to sanction coup leaders. Whether this positive changeand the factors that have driven it- can be sustained remains to be seen.

Almost half of the world’s coups have taken place in sub-Saharan Africa.

19 The HIIK dataset includes a number of countries that have populations of less than 500,000 and are therefore not included in the UCDP/PRIO, UCDP/Human Security Report Project, and Lacina/Gleditsch datasets.

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References Eck, K., and Hultman, L. (2007), ‘One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data’, Journal of Peace Research 44(2): 233-246. Harff, B. (2003), ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955’, American Political Science Review 97 (1): 57-73. Lacina, B., and Gleditsch, N. (2005), ‘Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths’, European Journal of Population 21 (2-3): 145-166. McGowan, P.J. (2003), ‘African Military Coups d’État, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution’, Journal of Modern African Studies 41(3): 339-370. UCDP and Human Security Report Project Dataset (2007). UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (2007). University of Heidelberg’s Institute for International Conflict Research (2007), unpub.data.

Part Two Modeling Security

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Global Security: A Vision for the Future F. Géré and M. Sharpe (Eds.) IOS Press, 2011 © 2011 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-760-4-35

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Modeling Security 18-20 June 2007, Sarajevo Chair François GEREa1, co-chair Denis HADJOVICb2, Rapporteur David RODINc3, Secretary JL SAMAANa4 a l’Institut Français d’Analyse Stratégique (IFAS) b ISS, Bosnia-Herzegovinia (non-NATO country) c Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, University of Oxford

Abstract. Because security is central to humankind, societies and other organized groups, the notion has different meanings, depending on history, geography, culture and the nature of governments. Therefore it would be presumptuous and vain to pretend to lock the notion of security into a single dogmatic definition which would be immediately challenged by many others. A universal definition could be provided only by hard science which in that realm seems to be irrelevant or by a universal agreement among all the parties involved, still in limbo. Therefore, we will consider security from two empirical points of view linked by the notion of contract: political and economic. Security is not a scholarly discipline in itself with full recognition and a systematic presence in the traditional academic community. As a domain, security needs to be expanded far beyond the military and law enforcement domains, not just in order to counter current international terrorist activities in-depth but also to meet all the other requirements. Here we need historians, anthropologists, and others to do research and offer usable conclusions for a better understanding of security. If indeed we may assume that the demand for security has always existed, it is clear that it has dramatically expanded along with the evolution of human societies and the globalization of human activities. Modeling, elaboration of new models and the combining of models are needed. The initial exploratory workshop was dedicated to those matters. As a first step for further inquiry, we have limited ourselves to a general descriptive statement, not a normative definition. Security appears as “the ability to live, work and prosper on a daily basis. It is the main duty of the State to provide security both internal and external to each member of the collectivity/community of citizens”. Conversely, individuals who have agreed to enter into a society should assume their responsibility in order to contribute to their own security, the organization of which is provided by the State. Keywords. Human Biometrics Security; conceptual clarification; components and determinants of security: terrorism, environment, economy: ‘technè’: identity’: thematic continuities: transdisciplinary research






























































E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]  E-mail: [email protected]  E-mail: [email protected] 





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Goals of the Workshop




That workshop was conceived as an essential first step to clarify the concept of security and to assess the relative importance of different threats to security. • Conceptual clarification • Different contexts, components and determinants of security: terrorism, environment, economy, finance, heath and food, impact of terrorism on all these components of ordinary life and human activity • No war-no peace environment • Latent conflict could be considered a model of protracted stability • Diversity of cultural perceptions of security: What does it means for a rural community in Afghanistan? In Mali, in Haïti? By nature that first workshop is comprehensive. It has been permanently reviewed and discussed throughout the duration of the program in order to elaborate a more accurate concept of security for advanced research.

Scientific Content All the participants agreed with the idea that security studies are dependent on a wide variety of other disciplines. Security is a practice related to and connecting with many areas of knowledge. Security studies, just like the notion of strategy, cannot be considered a science, but rather an art, a know-how (Geré). Indeed the Ancient Greeks had an excellent word for that: ‘technè’. Even if a wide range of scientific disciplines such as mathematics, physics, or psychology, are required for security studies, it remains important to understand that the field of security per se cannot improve the scientific advancement in those disciplines. Consequently, any effort for a security research agenda should be a security-based approach, not a science-based approach. Thereby there is a real need to define the boundaries of security studies in a way everyone will approve of. It was suggested (Dubucs) that any research program in security should include three different academic profiles: an historian, an expert on complex systems, and a scientist. The historian would assess relevant empirical data, the expert on complex systems would integrate them into a broad political framework including all the actors that matter, and the scientist would be able to create simulation patterns and perform them in order to discover trends and patterns. The role of history has been strongly underscored since it provides crucial pieces of information about what happened in the past (security failures), and provide crucial data which explains the present security/insecurity context. The neglect of history results in major losses of memory and neglect of the past by studies who take into account only the immediate present. It is clear that close study of history and geography would help strengthen a definition of security research perimeter (O’Loughlin, Urbanczik).

































































As initially formulated by ESF





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Security Must Be Understood Within a Broad Scope But Cannot Cover All the Aspects of Life on Earth During the workshop, scholars several times highlighted the fact that since the end of the Cold War and in the aftermath of 9/11, there has been an increasing debate about the nature of security and about the fact that it could not be conceived in a militarycentric way anymore. Security is now a humanitarian, social, and financial issue. It is argued that “Human security”, a concept typical of the post-Cold War era, provides a better understanding of the so-called “failed states” phenomenon than the traditional security definition (Dijkema). Human security shifts the object of the analysis from the State to individuals and allows us to reassess the political structures of vulnerable states. Nevertheless, Dr David Rodin pointed to the obstacle between too narrow and too broad conceptions of security: if everything is a matter of security, then nothing is. This is directly linked to the issues of defining the boundaries of security studies. In order to avoid such a deadlock, Professor François Géré suggested that scholars should focus on the goals of security research, which basically amount to preventing, containing and controlling insecurity in its multiple domains and its complex interactions. Dr Rodin also pointed out another definition issue asking if any model should be descriptive or normative. Depending on the answer the methodologies will be different. In addition the descriptive approach seems to be more related to current politics and relationship with end users who are also the financial sponsors (see below). Professor Géré considered that in any case an efficient research policy should be proactive rather than reactive. Initiatives should help policy makers to be aware of possible treats, and to be engaged in prevention and prepared to respond in kind, should the event occur. Security Is First a Perception, Very Different All Around the World Security is still a concept relying upon specific cultural contexts within which individuals assess the threats they are facing. For instance, Dr Denis Hadjovic explained how Bosnians think essentially about internal security before being able to conceive an institutional framework for international security because of the challenges they are currently facing. Therefore, they support the concept of “security sector reform”. An historical and sociological survey of the evolution of the notion of security in China shows how, in 1949, imperial security was replaced by the idea of national security in a context of communist dominant ideology, which itself has been subject to many changes ever since (Zhang Lun). Thus, security research needs to keep aware of specific trajectories, different cultures and distinct histories which influence the way decision-makers as well as researchers consider security. Sometimes the society itself creates security problems (Burgess). Indeed everyone agreed with the fact that security is first and foremost a cognitive phenomenon. At the same time security is a ‘physical state’, close to the familiar notion of ‘safety’ which applies more to objects and facilities rather than human beings: a situation for an individual as well as any organized group which allows them to conduct and develop their activities in a free manner: ordinary and innovative. Today, the continuous threat of international terrorism has generated important turbulences





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which affect the ordinary life of peaceful average citizens traveling for business or leisure purposes. The diversity, complexity and magnitude of security measures indicate a ‘state’ of rampant insecurity which by any case should become a normal way of living and behavior. 1. The new logic of insecurity y 2. The inflation of insecurit 3. The new non -military security challenges 4. From insecurity to uncertainty: The rise of risk 5. Risk and responsibility 6. The precautionary principle

7. Unknown unknowns 8. Risk and values

7. Unknown unknowns

empirical known s

unknown s

known

hazard

threat

unknow n

ignorance

disa ster

method ological

Source: Peter Burgess presentation

Security and the ‘Risk Factor’ As a result, it is difficult to evaluate human perceptions and human behavior confronted with a ‘risk’ factor. A well-intended approach will consist in thinking that

4
 






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all the actors want to reduce that factor because it is related to instability. But instability can mean change of situation from a not too good to a better situation depending on the perception of the situation by each actor. Let’s put aside those people who enjoy calculated risk, even if they are more numerous than it is sometimes imagined. They are not only gamblers. Financial organizations take risks, Governments take risks because according to their calculations they hope there will be a reward: it is profit expectancy. Wars are often triggered by that kind of calculation. Therefore the relation between risk and security is two-fold. First, there is a general agreement about the necessity to prevent, control and reduce natural risks. In addition all States recognize, at least in principle, the necessity to reduce those human activities generating risks, such as contamination, major pollutions or pandemics. Major differences appear when it comes to the definition of priorities implementation strategies to reduce those risks. Accordingly, the ‘momentum factor’ becomes crucial. At which time and pace should the appropriate measures and reforms be implemented? Not all Nations and States are born equal. Emerging Great Powers have their own agenda even if they agree to sharing the same ultimate goals. Second, when it comes to conflicting human actions collectively organized, the picture becomes much more murky. Terrorist activities and the risk they pose are condemned by the international community. But the UN is still waiting for a universal definition of terrorism because of the reluctance of many States to change their political posture on specific issues related to their national interests. Clearly, the leading/driving notion of ‘national interest’ generates a different approach between risk and security. One of the best examples is the fact that most of the international treaties still include a clause of withdrawal in the name of threat to supreme national interests. As a complement, it was emphasized that irrationality is also a factor to be taken into account when dealing with security. Excessive emphasis on technology can be

destabilizing instead of bringing appropriate solutions. Security Is also an Objective Situation Which Results from the Combination of Measures Supported by Relevant Organization Under the Responsibility of the State The first duty of any government is to build a protracted, sustainable and reliable environment which create the foundations of a situation (physical state) allowing average people to feel secure (perception) in their ordinary life and related activities. Interestingly, when a State fails to provide such a ‘service’ its relevance becomes questionable. This is not just a fashionable matter. The whole tradition of western political thinking since the end of the 17th century attests that it has been a permanent requirement.






























































Amazingly that point was made by Dr Joseph Henrotin editor of the journal Defense et Stratégie International which focus on armament technology.





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Advancing a Blueprint for Security Research Policy Those main points about security research in general pave the way for a more segmented approach (bottom-down), elaborating categories which will be subdivided through the following workshops. Discussions considered prevention, crisis management, and outcome management. It examined a number of themes deserving further research and identifying policy considerations. These included Communication, Resilience, Governance, Institutional Learning, Risk, Vulnerability, and Security for Whom, noting the tendency of bureaucratic actors to focus on ‘threats to’ rather than careful analysis of ‘threats from’. That kind of approach is similar to several traditional scientific approaches like the methodology elaborated by Cuvier in order to study ‘animal species’. As a result, three main tasks should be carried out: • To build up a common language: because of the different academic profiles of the participants in Sarajevo, there has been a real need for clear and common definitions about basic but crucial concepts used in security research: insecurity, uncertainty, risk, stability, culture. • To elaborate a ‘complex system’ we must devise multiple approaches to security that will include different actors and organizations in order to avoid the traditional state-centered conception of security (Professor Seely). • To explain, develop clarify the notion of ‘identity’: as mentioned before, security remains a cognitive phenomenon and therefore we must use theoretical tools which would help us to better understand the way people all around the world shape their intrinsic identities in regard to their conception of security. That is the reason why the role of education has been emphasized (Sharpe). That is also why the European Commission is now launching several broad-scale research projects about the process of radicalization in the United Kingdom, Germany and France (Rizzo). Those projects aim to analyze the way self-constructed identity can lead to violent action. Nevertheless, elaborating and transferring models from a specific context to another is no easy task.

Discussion and Following Wrap-up The Tensions (Rodin) 1. 2.

3. 4. 5. 6.

A narrow conception which focus on state nuclear security is opposed by a comprehensive, maybe too broad, understanding of human security Normative versus descriptive: if prescriptive objective (qualitative versus quantitative) or subjective (psychology); if normative collective (aggregative, utilitarian) or individualistic (human rights, deontolology) Interdisciplinary approach. A model should reach such a validity that it could be shared and practiced by the different social and humanistic sciences. International issues, cross-cultural dimension: geographical, historical, cultural (anthropology, ethnography) Universality of the concept of security Assessing the models of security through appropriate criteria. Conceptual coherence versus pragmatic utility





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7.

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Definition of the concept: prior to enquiry (through ‘raison pure’, Kant, Rawles) or through the development of enquiry

Is a Definition Possible? (Géré) Let’s start with a general descriptive statement, not a normative definition. Security appears as “the ability to live, work and prosper on a daily basis. It is the main duty of the State to provide security both internal and external to each member of the collectivity/community of citizens”. Because security is central to humankind, societies and other organized groups, the notion has different meanings, depending on history, geography, culture and the nature of governments. Therefore it would be presumptuous and vain to pretend to lock the notion of security into a single universal definition which would be immediately challenged by many others. A universal definition could be provided only by hard science which in that realm seems to be irrelevant or by a universal agreement among all the parties involved, still in limbo.

Thematic Continuities 1.

2.

3.

4.

Closing the gap between security research policy and policy research for security studies: on the one hand, scientific research aims to increase knowledge per se so as to enhance human powers; on the other, security research wants to translate knowledge into strategy in order to achieve desired goals. In accordance with the two components of security, perception and the physical, security research should increase the quality of perceptions (more rational, better informed) while at the same time strengthening and deepening the physical situation. Security is a legitimate human aspiration to live and prosper in all social and economic activities in a facilitative environment; the extent to which this is possible is a function of the relationship between a government and its citizens. Conversely, insecurity can be considered a perception of existential threats which require emergency answers, putting in temporary jeopardy the normal quality of social activities. Thus security research studies will remain influenced and partly directed by four defensive tasks that are related to its multi-faceted adversary- insecurity: detect/alert; prevent/deter; reduce/ control; suppress A major question is: who is in control of security and research into it? Traditionally it has been police and armed forces, but these have not been able to mount longitudinal studies on their own initiative due to constraints imposed by their other duties, and so they prefer to turn to academic institutions for such work. But when looking at the broader view of security things prove more complex, therefore security should be implemented by all those who are responsible for normal and stable operations in their own particular domain. The nature and identity of ‘end users’ of security research needs to be questioned. It requires support from bureaucrats and politicians who may no longer be in office by the time the research bears fruit. It thus needs to make a strong case that resources should be devoted to it.





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5.

The role of the advertising media in respect of excess consumerism promoting inter alia financial insecurity, and the need for education to help balance its influence.

Key Findings and Recommendations for Research Security: An Expanding Concern in Need of Boundaries Security is not a scholarly discipline in itself. Still, security stands as a specific domain of studies and research which should be expanded far beyond the military field and the present need to counter international terrorist activities, using a variety of tools provided by many disciplines converging in order to develop a robust protracted security research. From the many points of views expressed by the participants it appeared that security research will be shaped by two combining factors: the definition of the goals related to the nature of the danger and the related timeframe for action. Action is divided into short term and long term effects. In the case of immediate response to a threat, a coming danger and a developing disaster (note that in that perspective we need a definition of what is a threat, what is a disaster?) it becomes necessary to define the categories and levels of emergency: • Prevention level • Response (‘resilience’) i.e. reparation after the failure of prevention or the failure to detect the presence of a major threat. • Immediate threat response needs generate narrow goals limited to segments of security. It requires quick answers, shortening in kind the time-length/frame required for research. • Long-term goals allow research to expand over time. However, the division is not that simply clear-cut. On the contrary, short-term concerns for an immediate threat which can expand through a generation require the support of long-term strategies in order to reduce and suppress the threat. Long-term goals may ask for quick answers when a major catastrophic event requires prompt initiatives (let’s keep in mind that all this remains highly political and therefore under pressure of immediate demands coming from the authorities!). But it also requires immediate decisions in order to produce long-term effects at the right moment in order to stop and counter negative damaging processes. Security research should develop according to several basic methodological principles: • Facing reality, i.e avoiding subjectivity by taking into account the importance of perceptions which have to be scrutinized by adequate polling tools and related devices. • Thinking in time and through time, beyond the circumstances. Using experience from the past to anticipate the future. • Avoiding short-sighted reactivity to new events, for instance to Somalia piracy.





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Therefore it is necessary to establish a clear scale of priorities combining the magnitude of the problem with the degree of emergency (although reaction has become necessary because of the speed and spread of information). Security and Insecurity in Time, a Sequence/Scale: Risk-Threat-Danger These notions have to be considered as a possible chain reaction and/or a dynamic process, not disconnected, or opposed (as it appears so often in the current literature). • Risk (probable, loose, unidentified or vaguely identified) • Threat (potential identified) • Danger (actual, clear and present). An example, Tchernobyl, 1986 situation: 1. Risk: poor condition of an aging nuclear reactor, poor level of safety measures 2. Threat: an accident which could affect the facility and spread in an unpredictable manner 3. Danger: first indications of disfunctioning, absence of analysis, absence of quick measures Those levels are important since they parallel with the notions of prevention, preemption and protection. Some Areas for Transdisciplinary Research on Security: Mobilizing the Potential from Humanities and Related Disciplines Based upon dedicated workshops oriented to identify further research areas, the following papers have been elaborated in the perspective of a combination of the disciplines mentioned above. Of course we cannot pretend that all human sciences should cooperate on a single topic. Nonetheless, we have identified a number of sectors where several of them can join their efforts. Furthermore, they may also get together, on an equal footing, with hard sciences and technologies when it appears that on specific issues only their combination can bring solutions. Human Biometrics Security stands as a remarkable example. It combines hard science, technology, psychology, demography and sociology: • History: case studies of lessons learned • Anthropology, Ethnology, Geography: ethnic boundaries and related tensions • Sociology: social unrest: riots from South West Los Angeles (summer 1993) to French Suburbs (November 2005). • Law, Philosophy: reviewing and creating • Psychology: perceptions of (in)security • Educational sciences: ‘deradicalization’, reinsertion of irregular warriors, treatment of ‘child soldiers’. • Economy: economic security and could also include the economic dimension of prevention, management and reparation • Financial security: avoiding major financial ‘krachs’, countering ‘black economies’ (potential for terrorism). • Information security: protection, secrecy and freedom of privacy, through secure communication procedures, including encryption. Of course we cannot pretend that all human sciences should cooperate on a single topic. Nonetheless we have been able to identify a number of sectors where several of them can join their efforts. Furthermore they may also get together, on an equal





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footing, with hard sciences and technologies when it appears that on specific issues only their combination can bring solutions. Human Biometrics Security is a remarkable example.

Global Security: A Vision for the Future F. Géré and M. Sharpe (Eds.) IOS Press, 2011 © 2011 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-760-4-45

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Imperial Security, National Security and Global Security: The Chinese Point of View and Proof of the Construction of Modernisation Zhang LUN1 Former pro-democracy movement leader, Tien An Men Square protest Abstract. China provides a useful case-study for the changing face of security. The governments of Imperial China, Nationalist China and Communist China all had very different views of and approaches to security. As the country has moved towards a form of capitalism in recent times its approach has changed once more; whereas before there were six principal challenges in this area there are today six entirely different principal challenges. While today the Chinese military is extremely strong, no doubt primarily to dissuade foreign aggression, Chinese participation in international peace-keeping is also now an important factor. Keywords. modernisation; imperial security; national security; global security; Taiwan; traditional/non-traditional security

Introduction From all the evidence, security is always the security of someone, of a given subject situated within a historical context, endowed with a worldview and a sense of self. If the feeling of security is not a condition of being human, the formation of the concept of security is intrinsically linked to the birth of civilisation in a number of places in the world. To exist as a human being, security is a fundamental and historical, technical and cultural, objective and psychological matter. In modern times, for various reasons, the question of security takes on a whole new dimension: the previously unheard-of dynamic of modernisation; the enormous capacity of constantly renewable technology; a freedom without precedent in which one can revel: the acceleration of social differentials and the multiple contacts between different populations. Modernisation requires a permanent response to the question of security, and the more modernisation advances, the more the question becomes sharper and more complex. The destiny of a collective in modern times depends on the way the members of that collective view, manage and respond to this question. Under this heading, the course of Chinese modernisation gives us a good example.






























































E-mail: [email protected]

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Imperial Security and National Security In former times the feeling of cultural superiority over frontier tribes and minorities within the empire incited the Chinese to forge an image of a civilised world in which their country found itself at the centre. The geographical configuration of the empire encircled as it was by seas, mountain ranges, deserts and wild plains, reinforced this feeling. Very soon, the notion of security was formed around three fundamental challenges, the threats posed by frontier tribes, the revolts of peasants provoked by implacable politics applied by corrupt officials and, finally, the risk of desegregation of an empire ruled by the personal ambitions of military chiefs or high officials in local or central government. The question of security concerned the security of the empire, an imperial security of which the subject was the emperor or the dynasty. These problems had direct repercussions for the wellbeing of all and had a strict link to the question of order, the order of authority and of peace, an important part of classic Chinese political thinking which developed around these problems. Keeping great state strength capable of dissuading invaders and potential revolts, and maintaining unification of the empire, was a primary task for each dynasty. But for some, the task for the country, unified by culture, could not be accomplished without the high morality of the leader, the officials and the subjects of the empire. Even if the high-stake matter of national security has changed during the course of history, the preoccupation of the ancient Chinese with the security of the whole world turned around these three problems. This situation radically changed in modern times. At first sight, the problems of security would appear similar to those of former times- the massive invasions of foreigners, the huge peasant revolts. This mistaken similarity perhaps explains in part the intellectual and political inertia of the Chinese ruling classes when faced with a completely new situation. The awareness by the ruling classes of the fundamental difference in these new challenges with the problems encountered in cycles in history was finally made after a series of setbacks which had serious consequences for modern China. From then on, after this awareness, the cultural superiority of China ceased to exist and the empire progressively disintegrated under the pressure of colonial empires which were endowed with modern military equipment as well as with more attractive ideologies. From empire to nation, China began its painful metamorphosis towards modernisation and its inevitable participation in an accord with world nations. The question of security changed its very nature. From then on, it became for the Chinese nation a question of building a security which had to survive and develop. If we look at Chinese documents from the end of the 19th century, we are struck at what point the terms of crisis and danger were ever present. The construction of the Chinese nation was accompanied permanently by a feeling of crisis, by a realisation of a struggle for national safety. The fear of the disappearance of the Chinese zhong (race), the zhu (community) then minzhu (nation) from Western threat shapes all discussion from the end of the 19th century until recent times. Military setbacks and illegal treaties left deep wounds and produced real collective psychological symptoms among the Chinese. It is in this historical context that China adopted its modern name, Zhongguo (in Western meaning this remains ‘China’) in the first diplomatic treaties with the powerful West. A decisive stage which would transform imperial China into a modern nation was achieved with the war of resistance against the Japanese invaders during the 1930’s. A modern nationalism progressively saw the light and substituted the old traditional universalism: ‘how to guarantee national security’ as a primary question which concerned not only security, but which also played a role as a catalyst

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for the construction of a nation. To develop the economy and modernise education, to change politics and culture- all the propositions merged in one line towards the response to this question of national security in order to attain the objective ‘a country Fuaiqng (rich and strong)’. Building an army capable of assuring national security was an over-riding priority among the ruling classes, the most urgent task of modernisation. To never again allow the humiliations that China experienced during the period of modernisation was the wish of everyone, which one can find in the slogan “Luohou jiuyao aida” (to be under-developed means to be beaten and maltreated). According to the American researcher Roads Murphey, “the great success of China since 1949 is not modernisation but the resistance to colonisation”. Nevertheless, the resistance has only partially succeeded. For example, at the economic level, we see that the important sectors are largely controlled by foreigners. The communist model, to a certain extent, can be seen as a pathological reaction to the overall feeling of insecurity, both internally and (particularly) externally. Without taking account of the serious experiences of the past, we cannot understand the view, the feeling and the reaction of the Chinese in matters of security today. It is for this reason that I have briefly evoked the past before tackling the subject which is preoccupying us here– the Chinese view of security today.

National Security and Global Security It can seem difficult to speak in a global way of the Chinese view of security, because of the social and state differentiation involved in rapid modernisation. The views of the ruling classes and of the population are very different on a number of subjects. It is evident that the question of national security is often a subject which concerns the ruling classes, but with the process of post-communist transition which is presently at work in China, public opinion weighs more and more in political decisions on foreign affairs, even if China is not democratic. On the question of security, the divergence is certainly less important, but it exists nevertheless even between the State and the population, amongst the intellectual and political classes. Let us take two examples. Firstly, the increase in social discontent because of social inequality is one of the principal worries of the State in matters of security. This is especially the case in the post-Tiananmen era where the legitimate state control has been strongly affected because of the repression of the democracy movement in 1989, and because of general corruption. In the eyes of certain leaders, this question is inseparable from the attempts of Western countries to upset the regime. Official discussion on the question of security since the 1990’s always guards this ideological dimension of the Cold War type, even if its importance has been diminished; this dimension always occupies a place. Another example is that the liberal and democratic intellectuals often ignore the potential threat of globalisation to Chinese security; on the contrary, they see this as an opportunity to enthuse triumphantly about the modernisation of China. Amongst some of them it is on the whole the authoritarian China that represents a potential danger for global security. On the other hand, certain nationalists and statesmen keep insisting on the harm which it can bring to independence and the integrity of national Chinese sovereignty. This divergence is not without importance. But for many reasons, our interest here is limited to analysing the view of the State and that of specialists in matters of security.

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Three Phases and Three Views First Phase- The Military View After the foundation of the regime in 1949, the leaders put national security, or more exactly the survival of the regime, as the priority. Under the threats from Western countries and nationalists in Taiwan, the authorities thus adopted a security policy which was based essentially on military security. This was reinforced elsewhere by the rift at the beginning of the 1960’s between communist China and the then USSR. The China of Mao found itself in an environment of total insecurity which reminds us of certain modern eras where the threats came from all sides– North, South, East and West. To differentiate amongst these eras, the China of Mao possessed a centralised and totalitarian power which can explain the different results in defence planning. Communist China very early on proposed certain rules– ‘peaceful co-existence’ and ‘non-interference in internal affairs’ as the principles in international relations. But in fact, in order to break isolation and also for an ideological reason, Maoist China multiplied its support to revolutionaries worldwide, in particular to Third World countries. For Mao, the world found itself on the eve of a global revolution that would precede an inevitable world war. In order to rival the USSR, which he saw as being governed by revisionists, he claimed leadership in this total revolution. According to Mao’s strategy, the more the world descended into disorder, the more revolution approached and communist China would be secure; China would have more of a chance to vie with the US and the USSR. Therefore the view of Chinese security in the period was an amalgam of a radical universal ideology and national pride, a mixture of doctrinaire vision and practical pragmatic realism. It paid heavy tribute to China at the level of modernisation and, to a certain extent, accelerated the setback to the Maoist model. Second Phase- An Artificial View (zonghe anquanguan) The end of the Cultural Revolution and the setting up of the policies of Reform and Opening since the end of the 1970’s completely changed the picture. We have now entered the second phase where China practices a realistic and pragmatic policy in matters of international relations. National interest was primary. The official interpretation of global trends also changed; from now on a world war was not inevitable and revolution was not necessary to make a better world. The wish for peace and development replaced the impulse for war and revolution and became the principal trend for global evolution. Chinese modernisation was thus set by the authorities as an objective. Maintaining a peaceful environment favourable to the development of China and taking precautions against the possible independence of Taiwan became the driving force of Chinese diplomacy. A relationship of semi-alliance between China and the Western world, in particular with the United States, was established against the common enemy– the then USSR. The modernisation of the army was necessary but secondary to the priority of economic development. For according to Deng, only economic development would bring the necessary resources which the modernisation of the army needed. Defence policy was defined as the prevention of regional conflicts and the upgrading of out-of-date military technology in certain sectors by using available resources. The military dimension was not the sole consideration in the

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question of security. National security now depended on multiple factors among which the economy occupied a predominant place. Third Phase- The Neovision of Security The upheavals which took place in China (and elsewhere in the world) at the end of the 1980’s again modified the view leaders took of security. The anti-Western ideological discussion surfaced again during this period. But very quickly the authorities adopted another view of security in the mid-1990’s in which the global dimension took on an important place for the first time. Security was no longer just a national question but also an international one. The point of view had changed. In 1996, the original form of the Shanghai Cooperative Organisation (OCS) showed certain signs of having supporters for this view. In April 1997, in a discussion before the Duma in Moscow, Jiang Zeming presented the first formulas of this view of security, revised thereafter by the Chinese authorities and specialists as xin anquanguan (neovision of security). It took the definitive form of a debate which Jiang presented in March 1999 in Geneva during an international meeting on disarmament. The principal points can be summed up in four areas: huxin (reciprocal confidence), huli (reciprocal advantages), pingdeng (equality) and xiezuo (cooperation). According to him, “the old view of security, the basis of which was military alliance and therefore the means of constantly perfecting armaments, could no longer guarantee international security nor maintain peace in the world.” The neovision of security set out by Jiang insisted on the compatibility and complementarity of national security and international security. In this view, peace and development were the two principal aims of our times; international political structure was evolving towards multi-polarisation, conflicts were reduced but new threats were appearing at the level of international security. It was in the efforts to maintain global security that the maintenance of national security could be secured. National security was no longer separate from global security. Given that under-developed countries could not attain their security objectives, the world could not be stable. A single country could not itself assume global security. This view formed the basis of the strategies which the Chinese state applied in the diplomatic area; favouring a new economic and more just world political order, searching for new cooperative mechanisms and new interlocutors in maintaining international security, strongly resisting international conflicts, reinforcing economic cooperation and guaranteeing security in this area, persuading regional organisations to play a more positive role in the maintenance of regional and global security. For a number of specialists, the neovision of security became a view that touched all aspects of modern life: economic, political, technological, environmental, cultural and investigative. The military aspect remained important in the maintenance of security but it was not the only means or the only part of the question. The military forces and traditional alliances had to give up their dominant role in the maintenance of the dialogue on international security; only reciprocal confidence and permanent cooperation could achieve this objective.

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The Challenges for National Security and the Question of Global Security Six Principal Challenges for National Security In parallel with the very modern and international debate, there always existed a national debate concerning the question of security which was expressed in constant discussions about the threats and challenges which China met in its development. Amongst others, six principal challenges threatened national security and undermined the success of the policy of ‘growing in strength in a peaceful way’. These were: the challenge of the integration and sovereignty of the territory of China; the challenge of military security; the challenge of political security; cultural security; the challenge of energy security; and the challenge of economic security. Without doubt the question of Taiwan was at the heart of the first challenge. It is difficult to develop an advantage here in the complexity surrounding this question, but that is not to deny that the danger of a huge global conflict is always present. The Strait of Taiwan has always been one of the most unpredictable places in the world. For historical reasons which we have not addressed before, this question is a very sensitive and explosive one for the Chinese population. The integration of China into the external world, in the form of the entrance of China into a number of international organisations and the signature of China to international treaties, has constrained China to cede certain traditional areas controlled by the State. Regarding the military challenge, over the last few years, the Chinese strategies have been underlined as ‘hands tied’ in that the belief of being surrounded by the United States was perceived by China in a manifestation of American troops stationed in the adjacent countries of Japan, South Korea and in central Asia. In addition, the rapid evolution of military technology brought another important aspect to this challenge- how to guard political stability and preserve the present political system? This question could well resume the issue of political challenge in the minds of the country’s leaders. The impact of Western values on China via communication technologies is more and more felt in the country. The official ideology feels threatened by the various lines of thinking coming from the external world. Six challenges to non-traditional security: the question of financial security: environmental problems; information security; the threat of epidemics; demographic security; and the question of minority separatism. This last challenge is not new, but it is new in the terrorist aspect of the struggle of certain minorities for the independence of their regions, which is mixed with certain religious phenomena and world politics, as is the case of Xinjiang.

Conclusion- Rupture and Continuity Between the national and the global, China is in the process of recovering a certain confidence lost in world eras in the matter of the defence of its security, but the psychological complexity and suspicion remain; evolution depends on an internal evolution in China and also the way that the external world, notably the West, treats this emergence of China. The principal line of China in regard to this question of security is more or less outlined but the real strategies have not been established. Reinforcing the military capability before dissuading the interventions of the external world in certain of its affairs (the case of Taiwan is a resolutely decided policy) is one

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way, but the active way of intervening in world affairs is peace-keeping. This presents a favourable environment for the development of China and as such is an agreed policy as it corresponds to the interests of China.

References Xin Jian-Fei, Shijie de whongguoguan, jin erqiannianlai shijie dui zhongguo de renshishigang, (World's concept of China- a historical sketc.h about the word's knowledge of China in 2,000 years), Shanghai, Xueling Publishing House, 1991, 92, pp. 3-5. Lucian Bianco, Les origines de la Révolution chinoise, 1915-1949, coll. ‘folio/histoire ’, Paris, Gallimard, 1967, p. 234. Roads Murphey, The Outsiders, The Western Experience in India and China, Ann Arbor, Michigan University, 1977. p. 152. ‘Jusqu'à 1936, les capitaux étrangers contrôlent 95% de la production nationale de fer, 83% de celle de l'acier, 66% de l'extraction mécanique du charbon, 55% de la production d'électivité ’. p. 58, mon livre, La vie intellectuelle en Chine depuis la mort de Mao, Paris, Fayard, 2003. WU Zhong-gang, Jianguohou guojia Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping zenxuan (Recueil de Deng Xiaoping), Vol. 3, Beijing, Reminchubanshe, 1993, p. 129. Jiang Zeming, ‘tuijin chaijun jinchen, zeihu guofang anquan ’, (Avancer le processus du désarmement, maintenir la défense nationale ’, le 23 mars 1999, in Jiang Zeming lun you zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi (Les discours de Jiang Zeming sur le socialisme avec la spécificité chinoise), Beijing, Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi wenxian bianjishi, 2002. Yan Jin, ‘Qianxi whongguo xin anquanguan de xingcheng beijing jiqi neihan ’, (Sur le contexte et le sens de la nouvelle vision de la sécurité chinoise), in Sixiang lilun jiaoyu daokan, 2002, No. 1, No. Total 37.

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Global Security: A Vision for the Future F. Géré and M. Sharpe (Eds.) IOS Press, 2011 © 2011 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-760-4-52

Sex, Drugs and Education: A Model of Education for Security in a Changed Environment Mary SHARPE1 Advocate Tutor in transferable skills to post graduate students at the University of Cambridge Abstract. The human mind has evolved over millions of years to survive in conditions of scarcity. In recent decades however, as a result of technological developments, the environment, political and social, has changed significantly. We are inundated with information, with access to material goods and to hyperstimulation. The effect has been to overwhelm the delicate balances in the brain’s decision-making areas as we struggle to make sense of everything. Resilience to cope with the changes is low. There is an increase in the perception of, or ‘feelings’ of, insecurity and fear. This is manifesting at the personal level with chronic stress and addictions, at societal level with a breakdown of hierarchies and institutions and at an international level with more sophisticated serious organised crime and the growth of religious extremism. A model of education based on an understanding of the human being as a whole person, physical, mental, moral and relational is required to help us adapt to the changes. The model would include lessons on how we actually learn; how the reward circuitry (temptation centre) of the brain operates and how imbalances reflect moral choice; conflict management skills based on integrative complexity; applied psychological skills that are compatible with spiritual practices and which strengthen mental resilience, ethical behaviour, promote creativity and social engagement. With such a model of education, peace, cooperation and security at both the individual and community levels could be enhanced. Research into these proven techniques for wider scale application is required. Keywords. Education; neuroscience; psychology; philosophy; conflict management; integrative complexity; stress; feelings of insecurity; reward circuitry; morality; spiritual practice; meditation; hedonic pleasures; eudaimonic happiness; ‘golden mean’; positivity ratio; tipping points; mental and physical resilience; dopamine; oxytocin

“Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.” Chinese Proverb 1. Aim The purpose of this collaboration between the NATO Science for Peace and Security group and the European Science Foundation has been to seek new avenues of research in the social sciences and humanities that can help policy makers understand the ‘intangible’ aspects of peace and security. This must be linked, however, to research in 1

E-mail: [email protected]

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the life sciences. Together they can help to explain how people make decisions that affect their behaviour (and other people) and with appropriate education, make better and fairer decisions that promote peace and security. In this paper, we shall look at key elements of decision-making and as a result, what type of education is required to lead to peaceful and secure outcomes. 1.1 Background In building a model of education for today’s world I shall consider three areas of scholarship and practice: neurobiology, philosophy and psychology. Together they shed some light on the human being as a whole: body, mind and spirit/relational. The profound changes of the past thirty years have put human beings under considerable stress as we attempt to make sense of and adapt to a world of constant communication, unprecedented access to material wealth and instant gratification. Security as a concept, like happiness or positivity, is difficult to define and measure as it is largely subjective in nature and subject to frequent fluctuation depending on external conditions, personal state of mind and the sector of one’s life involved[1]. It exists on a continuum from feeling ‘out of control’ and insecure (anxious or depressed) to feeling ‘in control’ and secure (resilient), and these feelings can alter throughout any day. Today the changes in all sectors of life have overloaded our minds with potential meaning leaving us stressed as we seek to understand and control our environment. In other words we are feeling insecure. This has led at the very least to impaired decision-making, reduced learning ability and increased levels of anxiety, fear and depression. At worst, it has provoked violence, conflict and an escalation in addiction-related behaviours that support serious organised crime through sex trafficking, drug trafficking and money laundering. What is clear however is that a build up of actual ‘hard’ security does not, of itself, alleviate the intangible ‘feelings’ of insecurity in individuals and groups. It is impossible to remove all sources of insecurity in life. We have to focus instead on reinforcing mental and physical resilience, the ability to bounce back and stay on course in the face of adversity, rather than focusing on external, physical measures alone. To do that we need to understand more about how our minds and decisionmaking processes operate. Human beings have not evolved to deal with the level of change and stimulation that we have experienced in recent decades. In order to survive in times of scarcity human beings, as pair bonding, tribal mammals, evolved programmes to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Food and sex, our primitive brain’s top priorities for survival of the genes, were scarce compared to today’s abundant opportunities to enjoy both. As we shall see, over-stimulation of the delicate reward circuitry of the primitive brain has an effect on impulsive and compulsive behaviour. We thrive best when we feel connected ‘directly’ to others in loving, trusted, sustainable relationships and feel part of a group. This builds mental and physical resilience. Much of today’s over-stimulation via the internet leads to feelings of social isolation and actual isolation as people, especially the young, spend more and more time using computer technology, and less time developing social skills and emotional connection with others.

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1.2 Change How does so much change in such a short time affect us? All change, good or bad, real or imagined, produces an emotional and physiological response in humans as we seek to adapt to the change by mobilising the necessary resources. The main stress neurochemicals that activate a changed response are adrenaline (epinephrine), noradrenaline (norepinephrine) and cortisol. Cortisol is a marker for stress and depression. These neurochemicals facilitate the fright, flight, fight or freeze responses particularly in men, and in women, oxytocin more readily promotes the ‘tend and befriend’ stress response appropriate for protecting offspring[2].We have evolved programmes that allow us to adapt to cope with ‘acute’ stress, and to recover when the stress is over. What we have not adapted to is ‘chronic’ stress. When change is multiplied, magnified and too prolonged, without a period of respite in which to adapt or recover, we experience ‘chronic’ stress. This often leads to coping mechanisms (alcohol, smoking, high calorie foods, shopping, gambling, pornography etc.) to help us feel better, ease the pain. Many lead however to long-term addictions that affect our physical and mental wellbeing and as a result impair our ability to think rationally and ethically. It also causes faster wear and tear on the physical body leading to a reduced immune response and higher levels of coronary heart disease and other stress related illnesses. The primitive and impulsive areas of our brain, which operate in a basic survival ‘us-versus-them’ mode take over the controls from our slower, deliberative moral faculties and executive decision-making forebrains which down-regulate (become less active in response to an external variable) in times of chronic stress or when we have dependencies or addictions. What we see today is an over-stimulated, chronically stressed and sick society at all levels, one that is becoming more socially fragmented, with more individual isolation, and vulnerable to quick fix solutions. Under the effects of chronic stress and addiction, we are emotionally volatile and more vulnerable to impulsive behaviour as well as to suggestions from charismatic leaders. What we need to learn are new habits to help restore metal and physical balance and build resilience. After a period of chronic stress and burnout, with rest and a change of habits, regeneration is possible. How is this to be done? Through education.

2. Education “The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn and relearn.” Alvin Toffler, futurologist[3] The proposed model of education therefore seeks to provide a means to restore order to the mental and physical chaos that is being experienced as part of our global existential crisis of being. Education has to teach us how to ‘know’ ourselves better, so that we can learn to think more rationally even in times of stress and crisis. This involves the ‘spiritual’ or relational aspect of our lives, an ability to cooperate with others as we do not thrive in isolation. It requires us to learn: x how our minds and bodies function at their best x how to choose better which relationships to trust as well as conflict management skills for the inevitable disagreements

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x x x x

how to relate in a trusting and trustworthy way to others to be aware of our sources of inspiration and judge their influence on us how to practice critical thinking ‘how to learn’ new skills, and how long it takes to integrate new habits into our lives, and undo old ones x to have meaningful, ‘realistic’ goals in life and how to achieve them x how to manage our financial resources and generate new ones x how to manage our levels of personal resources x how to temper our moods and emotions towards positivity x how to be creative and stay interested and engaged in life x how to be organised and discerning about the vast influx of information today A good education gives control back to people so that they can choose to have better mental and physical health, greater resilience and more sense of meaning and purpose in their lives. They can also choose to have less dependency on unrealistic role models, short-term thrills and addictive stimuli. 2.1 Multi-Disciplinary Research The increased specialization within academia has made finding suitable research more challenging for policymakers. This results not only from difficulty in understanding arcane language but also, and as a consequence, from difficulty in extracting useful research outcomes from across disciplines that could inform policy. An important area of education therefore, specifically for academic teams, is in communication skills so they can learn how to explain their research findings in culturally relevant ways that help others reap the benefits of their knowledge. Before the seventeenth-century division that separated the study of the mind from that of the body, the human being was studied as a unity, as mind, body and soul and part of the natural living universe. The division came about when René Descartes, natural philosopher and a key figure in the scientific revolution, agreed with the Pope to focus on the study of the body only and leave matters of the mind or soul to the Church. That division still largely exists today. For example, medicine and psychology are separate from theology and philosophy. However, more scholarship is focusing again on how the human being as a whole perceives, interprets, interacts with and is influenced by the environment in a two-way dynamic. This trend arises from concepts such as integrative complexity and emergence, and non-linear dynamic systems spreading from mathematics into other disciplines such as genetics (epigenetics), neuroscience (social neurobiology, neuroethics) and psychology (positive psychology). This integrative approach must be part of any successful model of education. How do we decide which subjects will best stimulate the interest of learners today and encourage further study with outcomes for wellbeing and peace? We can ask. One particularly important group is young Muslims vulnerable to radicalisation. In a research programme[4] carried out in the UK in 2010 by the Psychology and Religion Research Group at the University of Cambridge (see relevant chapter in Part Three of this volume) seven key issues were identified that are of concern to young people and relate to their vulnerability to radicalisation. These are: how should young Muslims live in Britain, how to ‘do’ relationships, science versus religion, equality (gender, race, class, religion), justice and money, democracy and security, purity and pleasure. In

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other words, ethical or moral choices related to power relationships at all levels, how to improve, and sources of knowledge. These are the foundation stones of education.

3. The Role f Ethics and Morality Many security issues today could be described as ‘moral issues’- sex trafficking, child pornography, drug trafficking, cyber crime, domestic violence, injustices, and widespread corruption, to name a few. We shall look deeper at the source of ethics and morality as part of human decision-making. 3.1 Morality and Neuroscience Moral decisions (including sexual ones) do not invoke a specific psychological or philosophical ‘moral sense’ in the brain. Moral decisions rely on a primitive brain mechanism that influences all choices: our reward circuitry (the brain’s appetitive mechanism, which is behind all drives and emotions). "Scientists at Harvard University have found that humans can make difficult moral decisions using the same brain circuits as those used in more mundane choices related to money and food. These circuits, also found in other animals, put together two critical pieces of information: How good or bad are the things that might happen? What are the odds that they will happen, depending on one's choice? The authors found that a brain region called the ventromedial prefrontal cortex tracked the ‘expected moral value’ of the uncertain option, integrating information about the number of lives to be saved and the probability of saving them. Other brain regions separately tracked outcome magnitude and outcome probability. The work advances understanding of how people make decisions affecting the lives of others. Many of the most consequential such decisions are made by policymakers: in some cases, a single choice can change thousands of lives.”[5] So what are these influential structures in the brain? All are components of the brain’s reward circuitry: ventral striatum, insula and vmPFC (ventromedial pre-frontal cortex). Most operate beneath the level of the conscious mind. In neuroscience, the reward system is a collection of brain structures that attempt to regulate and control behaviour by inducing pleasurable effects. Our reward circuitry existed before humans were human. Its job is to shout a loud “Yes!” to things that furthered the survival of our ancestors. It was moulded for survival under conditions of scarcity. This means that its priorities no longer reflect the conditions of today. For example, it will push us toward high-calorie foods even when we are overweight, and to reckless mating behaviour even when close, trusted companionship serves us better in the longer term. It could reasonably be called the root of ‘temptation’. This mechanism, which urges us not to overlook golden opportunities, leaves us vulnerable in the face of today’s superabundance of tempting junk food, hypersexual stimulation (including Internet porn), and chemical stimulants. Skilful marketing targets those appetites with disquieting effectiveness, and we are easily misled about where our genuine wellbeing lies. Worse yet, too much stimulation can actually numb this part of the brain[6]. As our sensitivity to pleasure decreases, our gut-level dissatisfaction increases. Such feelings can tarnish our perception of our circumstances

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and others’ motives, speed habituation between mates, and even drive binges as we seek to satiate artificially exaggerated cravings. (See ‘Cupid’s Poisoned Arrow’[7]).

3.1.i Effect n Relationships A recent survey[8] revealed that young Japanese men are growing indifferent or even averse to sex, while married couples are starting to have it even less, and the trend is escalating rapidly. More than 36% of men aged 16 to 19 had no interest in sex, more than double the 17.5% from 2008. Men between 20 and 24 showed a similar trend, jumping from 11.8% to 21.5%, while men between 45 and 49 leaped from 8.7% to 22.1%. And this isn’t happening just in Japan. In France a 2008 survey found that 20 percent of younger French men had no interest in sex[9]. Kunio Kitamura, director of the Clinic of the Japan Family Planning Association and the man who directed the survey, said: "Those in the younger generation seem to nd it especially cumbersome dealing with others face-to-face… Basically, there is this general lack of communication taking place between men and women," he said, adding that he believed the proliferation of cell phones and the impact of the struggling economy are also negatively impacting young people's sex lives. There is growing concern too that addiction to Internet pornography may be a factor in the decline of interest in sexual relations for adolescents and adults[10]. Another study[11] in humans showed that teens release more dopamine for rewards. Dopamine is the neurochemical that produces the subconscious craving, the ‘I must have it’ experience. When it comes to teens and porn use the implications are clear. First of all they get a bigger blast of dopamine, so the addiction process can manifest itself more rapidly. The extra dopamine also functions to rewire synapses to the addiction and associated memories more strongly and quickly. The teen brain is less organized and more vulnerable to such neuroplastic changes. Addictions can be seen as ‘excessive learning’ or pathological over-learning[12] as the brain narrows its focus of attention in an attempt to satisfy subconscious cravings. The teen brain then has reduced powers of concentration and is less able to learn. 3.1.ii Current Education As regards substance abuse, many schools now educate students about the risks of addiction. While a keen awareness of the negative long-term repercussions of substance use protects some people from developing addictions, others remain vulnerable. One reason that education about the risks alone cannot prevent substance abuse is that people who are vulnerable to developing substance abuse disorders tend to exhibit a trait called ‘delay discounting’, which is the tendency to devalue rewards and punishments that occur in the future. Delay discounting may be paralleled by ‘reward myopia’, a tendency to opt for immediately rewarding stimuli, like drugs. Thus, people vulnerable to addiction who know that drugs are harmful in the long run tend to devalue this information and tend instead to be drawn to the immediately rewarding effects of drugs.

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Delay discounting is a cognitive function that involves circuits including the frontal cortex[13]. It builds upon working memory, the brain's ‘scratchpad’, i.e. a system for temporarily storing and managing information reasoning to guide behaviour. "The legal punishments and medical damages associated with the consumption of drugs of abuse may be meaningless to the addict in the moment when they have to choose whether or not to take their drug. Their mind is filled with the imagination of the pleasure to follow," commented Dr. John Krystal, editor of ‘Biological Psychiatry’. "We now see evidence that this myopic view of immediate pleasures and delayed punishments is not a fixed feature of addiction. Perhaps cognitive training is one tool that clinicians may employ to end the hijacking of imagination by drugs of abuse." Dr. Bickel agrees, adding "although this research will need to be replicated and extended, we hope that it will provide a new target for treatment and a new method to intervene on the problem of addiction." In short, our primitive reward circuitry spurs us with powerful, subconscious signals to say "yes" even under circumstances when we know better. Yet we are so accustomed to relying on our reward circuitry- especially when it signals the presence of ‘high-value’ activities- that we react without thinking, impulsively. We are particularly vulnerable to ‘high value’ activities when we are bored, lonely, angry, hungry, stressed or tired. If we would help people find balance for themselves, we must teach them about their reward circuitry’s genetic agenda. Today’s synthetic abundance can throw this appetite mechanism out of balance. Issues related to addiction are as relevant in the UK, US and Japan as they are in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Could this imbalance and numbing of the pleasure centres (but hyper-focus on sex, especially the violent sex found in so much pornography) be related too to the dramatic rise in the systematic violence and rape of women and children in areas of conflict and mass poverty? Our tastes are changing leading to insatiable cravings for more. Enough is never enough- of hedonic pursuits- be it of money, sex, clothes, alcohol, power, or whatever, as the search to satisfy our insatiable desires continues. However, inner balance is possible through the adoption of healthier habits and skills that can manage our desires, improve wellbeing, relationships and security. As Stanford University biologist Robert Sapolsky observed[14], there is a price to pay for blasting our brain’s delicate appetite mechanism too enthusiastically in our efforts to counter the blues. "Unnaturally strong explosions of synthetic experience and sensation and pleasure evoke unnaturally strong degrees of habituation... Our tragedy is that we just become hungrier." The condition is aptly summed up in the classic song by the rock band The Rolling Stones ‘(I Can’t Get No) Satisfaction’. 3.2 Morality and Evolutionary Psychology Moral behaviour has been fundamental in the advancement of human societies. According to Jonathan Haidt of the University of Virginia, morality ‘binds and builds’ society[15]. Morality and gossip were crucial for the evolution of ultra-sociality, which allows humans, but no other primates, to live in large and highly cooperative groups. Haidt suggests that the motivation for ‘moral behaviour’ has to do with evolutionary, neurological and social-psychological insights. What one considers right and wrong behaviour depends on one’s view of human nature. Is it inherently ‘bad’ and in need of constraint by external rules? Or is it

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essentially ‘good’ and in need of education and guidance about boundaries so that we can exercise free choice mindfully in order to be balanced and happy? The answer to these questions affects one’s political viewpoint. Conservatives tend to care more about issues of hierarchy and respect. (These may relate to levels of testosterone which is a marker for perceptions of hierarchy and social positioning[16].) Liberals on the other hand concentrate on caring and fairness. (Such affiliative and trusting behaviours, by contrast, are more associated with higher levels of the neurochemical oxytocin that is a marker for trust and bonding[17].) Haidt argues that human morality is a cultural construct built on top of, and constrained by, a small set of evolved psychological systems. He presents evidence that political liberals rely primarily on two of these systems involving emotional sensitivities to harm and fairness. Conservatives, however, construct their moral understandings on those two systems plus three others, which involve emotional sensitivities to in-group boundaries, authority and spiritual purity. This model is important in dealing with fundamentalists of any persuasion who place great emphasis on ‘sexual purity’, especially as regards women. They tend to punish women for perceived breaches of honour rather than men, in cases of adultery or dress code. Haidt says that we all start off with the same evolved moral capacities but then we each learn only a subset of the available human virtues and values. Here is where formal education about how the brain affects moral decisions would be valuable. It should not be left to religious authorities alone. Too often we demonise people with different political ideologies (even within our own religion) because of our inability to appreciate the moral motives operating on the other side of a conflict. We are surrounded by such moral conflicts, or the conflict of value systems, on the personal level, the national level and the international level, as people take stands at different points along the spectrum in defence of their ethnic or social identity and perceived threats to its survival. 3.2.i. Conflict Management Based n Integrative Complexity Happily it is possible to teach people in conflict over value systems and worldviews how to understand the other’s point of view without their compromising their own position. This permits a satisfactory outcome for both. An example of this type of ‘integrative complexity’ is set out in the chapter ‘Being British, Being Muslim’ in part three of this volume. Ideally every educational model will include lessons, suitably adapted to the culture, on developing integrative complexity as a critical life skill for managing conflict and clashes of value systems. 3.3 Morality and Philosophy Many scholars, especially in the relatively new field of positive psychology, are looking back to ancient times to the concept of happiness. For Plato, and his pupil Aristotle, in the latter’s work entitled the ‘Nichomachean Ethics’[18] in the mid 300s BCE, virtue was a constituent of ‘eudaimonia’, the happiness found developing and being guided by one’s own personal ‘daimon’ or spirit in a (‘eu’) good way. It was achieved through the constant pursuit of excellence and ‘moral virtue’. However one of the best known positive psychologists today, Martin Seligman, has said that his discipline does not deal with morality[19]. If this is the case, there is even more need for interdisciplinary education and practice.

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Aristotle advised that happiness was to be found (as a by-product of) leading the good life based on justice and harmony/beauty. It advocated a life that steered a middle ground between the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain. The basis of this was the belief in classical Greek philosophy that desires, emotions or the passions (path) cannot be suppressed or eliminated, only educated and managed; finding the ‘right balance’ is the key to a healthy mind and body. Mens sana in corpore sano. He distinguished between the short-term happiness of hedonic pleasure and the long-term happiness of eudaimonic wellbeing or flourishing, though one influences the other. Moral virtue is to be tempered by the ‘golden mean’, a dynamic that varies with circumstances; too much gratitude or too little prudence in a given situation leads to unhappiness. It was not a fixed and rigid system of rules, but rather a dynamic state requiring conscious choice in decision-making. Moral virtue called for the adoption of good habits often in emulation of a good role model or under the guidance of a teacher. It recognised justified anger, which should be expressed at the right time, to the right person, in the right way and to the right degree. Aristotle distinguished eudaimonic happiness from the purely subjective form of ‘hedonic’ happiness- momentary pleasures related to satisfying basic appetites such as for food and sex etc., or the pursuit of money, honours, celebrity and so forth. Is our changed environment responsible for the rise in the pursuit of hedonic happiness today and the decline in the eudaimonic variety? What are we to do when we have gone, often imperceptibly, too far in the pursuit of hedonic pleasure and are out of control?

4. Role f Spiritual Practice n Shaping Morality Despite its rejection by secularists, a relationship with God through faith still has the power to galvanise individuals in society. It provides many with a sense of meaning and purpose as well as of community. Brain imaging experiments by Andrew Newberg at the University of Pennsylvania reveal that people in spiritual or meditative states show a decrease in brain activity in regions representing our map of the body and our sense of self[20]. Devotional feelings do seem to be selfless, which may be one of the attractions of spiritual practice. Many human activities, from music festivals to military service, tap into our powerful urge for group bonding and our need to belong. 4.1 Devotional Practices The value of devotional practices has been recognised and they are being used more and more in secular environments. One of the most effective and ancient practices which has been tested extensively by Western scientists, is meditation or deep relaxation. Herbert Benson (Harvard Medical School) has worked on this area since the 1970’s[21]. After studying many different types of meditative practice, he isolated the variables that contribute to reduced blood pressure, lower heart rate, reduced blood lactate levels and so on, all factors in coronary heart disease and strokes. These are among the major causes of infirmity and premature death in both men and women today. In her book ‘Positivity’[22], which we shall examine further in a moment, Barbara Fredrickson expands on mindfulness meditation. Jon Kabbat-Zinn has also researched and promoted mindfulness meditation derived from Buddhist practices[23].

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Mindfulness means paying attention in a particular way especially to our thoughts and feelings: on purpose, in the present moment and in a non-judgmental way. With practice we learn to observe the content of our mind calmly and in a non-reactive way. We learn to accept a thought as just a thought. In a state of ‘mindfulness’, it becomes possible to accept one’s thoughts, even negative ones, without acting on them impulsively or reacting to them emotionally. The power of mindfulness is that it can literally sever the link between negative thoughts and negative emotions. When we come to accept a negative thought as just a thought that will soon pass, it ceases to have power over us and stops feeding our negativity. Mindfulness meditation has been shown to improve cognition (thinking)[24]. Mindfulness is a skill requiring concentration. Like most skills, as in learning a sport or a musical instrument, it does not come naturally, but requires instruction and, above all, practice. 4.2 Effect n Stress Deep relaxation elicits the body’s natural healing and growth response by switching on the parasympathetic processes of the nervous system and switching off the stress hormones. It counteracts the effects of chronic stress on the mind and body, restoring neurochemical equilibrium. Deep relaxation triggers the release of a neurochemical called oxytocin (amongst others), which makes us feel calmer, more safe and secure within ourselves and more connected to others. Amongst other things, oxytocin has the added benefits of being non-addictive and free. Billions of pounds and dollars are being spent on drug-based solutions while little money has been devoted to research on behavioural measureseven those which have shown promise in counteracting addictions and reducing stress, aggression, addictive cravings and depression. Research demonstrates that oxytocin counteracts the effects of dopamine (cravings) and cortisol (stress and depression)[25]. Relaxation practices, like conflict-management skills based on integrative complexity, are a part of any sound education. An experiment using meditation was carried out at Lancaster prison in the UK to good effect[26]. The technique, known as Vipassana Meditation, has been offered in several prisons in India, the US and New Zealand. Dr Kishore Chandiramani, a lecturer in psychiatry based at the Queen Elizabeth Psychiatric Hospital in Birmingham, found it helped improve inmates' discipline and their willingness to co-operate with prison authorities. They were less likely to smoke too. His work showed that inmates who studied the technique were less prone to depression, feelings of hostility and helplessness and a sense of hopelessness. The prisoners themselves readily accepted the technique, said Dr Chandiramani, and the cost of running training courses was minimal. Deep relaxation helps generate positive emotions, which in turn build resilience.

5. Resilience One of the areas of education that has been identified as necessary to help deal with feelings of insecurity and stress is resilience or the ability to bounce back after a crisis or setback.

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5.1 Positive Psychology In recent years a new area of psychology has developed that focuses on ‘flourishing’, or the good life, rather than on depression, anxiety and dysfunctional behaviour. The idea is that to enjoy a good life, it is not enough to just remove the negative responses, we have to seek the positive ‘actively’ and consciously. This area of scholarship is called ‘positive psychology’ and was referred to above in section 3.3. 5.1.i Positive Emotions In her book ‘Positivity’[22] Barbara Fredrickson explains that positive emotions have the ability to ‘broaden and build’ our outlook for future benefit. Positive emotions tell us not just what the body needs but also what is needed mentally and emotionally and what our future selves might need. They help us broaden our minds and outlook, and build resources down the road. This leads to the ‘broaden and build effect.’ She views happiness as the overall outcome of many positive moments. Positive emotions shift us out of a state of negativity, narrow focus and languishing towards one of positivity, big picture view, growth and flourishing. With an increase in positive emotions, we feel a growing sense of oneness and connectedness to the people and world around us. “While positive emotions are more fleeting than negative ones, and their effect subtle, they do accumulate over time… Repeated experiences of positivity build up multiple resources: at least one physical resource (we sleep better); at least one mental resource (we are more mindful of our current circumstances); at least two psychological resources (we are more resilient and optimistic) and several social resources (we have better connections to family and colleagues.)” (p.10). She identifies ten core forms of positivity: awe; joy; gratitude; serenity; interest; hope; pride; amusement; inspiration; and love, the most frequently experienced form of positivity of all. In the application of these values, she says we must evoke genuine emotion, or sincerity. For example, gratitude has “an evil twin: indebtedness. If you feel you have to pay someone back you are not feeling grateful… Indebtedness pays back begrudgingly, as part of an economy of favors.” (p.41). Being able to be genuine however it is suggested, is dependent on the state of neurochemical balance in our reward circuitry. 5.1.i.(a) Mathematical Model and Tipping Points Positive emotion is not a prescription for some naïve, Polyanna-type approach to life but one based on solid evidence of changed attitude. These attitudes can be learned like other habits. Fredrickson collaborated with mathematician Marcial Losada who had been working on high performing business teams using a mathematical model that reflected a complex system- more specifically a nonlinear dynamic system- that highlights certain ratios of positivity to negativity in their relationships and communication with one another. “Mathematicians and physicists talk in terms of a ‘control parameter’. This is the key that determines the fate of the system. Just as ambient temperature holds the key to whether H2O is stuck in ice or flowing as water, Losada’s control parameter determined the fate of his business teams. It determined whether they’d be stuck in a rut or enjoying flourishing success… Losada’s control parameter was the connectivity he’d observed among team members- their degree of attunement to one another.” (p.128, emphasis added).

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Through this mathematical model, Fredrickson tracked the ideal ratio of positive emotions experienced to negative ones to achieve a state of flourishing in various situations. Positivity, and its relative frequency, she discovered, is subject to a ‘tipping point’. “For most people their positivity outnumbers their negativity by about two to one. At this ratio, life is rather ordinary. We get by but we are hardly growing. This is languishing. As we raise the ratio above three to one we start to feel more alive, creative, resilient. We have a palpable sense of growth and of making a difference. This is flourishing. It feels and is totally different from languishing. You’ve stepped up to a whole new level of life.” (p.227). But more is not always better. At the other end of the spectrum, there is a point when the positivity ratio tips into stagnation and languishing, away from growth. That ratio is around eleven to one. This spectrum in many ways appears to support the ‘golden mean’ theory of Aristotle in the exercise of virtues, or expressions of positivity, as they are described by Frederickson. She highlights the fact that people who flourish are relatively rare. Only about one in five people meet the criteria (p.130). Again the need for interdisciplinary research is called for here. Perhaps knowledge of positivity combined with an understanding of the workings of the reward circuitry (and how its over-stimulation can lower positive emotion), and conflict management skills could together improve this relatively low percentage of people who are able to flourish. 5.2. Interventions or Improving Resilience The true benefits come not from focusing on one area of change alone, but on integrating a number of positive changes at once, through more activities that engage us with others, more self-development and interests to broaden our minds, and with healthier distractions for times when we are bored, lonely or tired. The intensity of one’s positivity matters less than frequency. Little and often, in several activities, is the key. 5.2.i Positive Psychology Interventions In her book Fredrickson sets out twelve tools from a range of studies by other positive psychologists to increase our positivity ratio, including: making good quality connections with others; spending time in nature; making a mission statement for the future; cultivating kindness; gratitude and meditation. In keeping with the three-month period that it takes for the cells in our bodies to renew themselves[27], she postulates that it takes about three months to really integrate a new habit or lifestyle change. Positivity also works to stimulate new cell growth. This is true for both the body and the brain[28]. 5.2.ii Physical Exercise Psychiatrist John Ratey, Associate Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard University, sets out extensive research in his book ‘Spark: The Revolutionary New Science of Exercise and the Brain’[29] that points to the importance of regular physical exercise. Not only does it stimulate the growth of new brain cells, even in the elderly, but it strengthens resilience and is an antidote to depression as well. We are born to move and too much inactivity leads to physical as well as emotional problems.

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5.2.iii Organisational Skills and Time Management David Allen, an executive coach, has a worldwide following for the direct benefits to stress reduction that his book ‘Getting Things Done’[30] has produced through promoting better organisational skills and time management. These are key skills in a world of information overload and high expectation. It helps put order into everyday chaos and frees our minds for more creative work.

6. Conclusion 6.1 Learning How o Learn A feature of human beings that sets us apart from other mammals is our ability to learn. Other species are stronger or have better eyesight but humans are the best learners. It is part of our evolutionary inheritance. However learning happens in chunks, in the gaps between conscious effort, thus relaxation is key to learning. An over-stimulated and stressed mind cannot learn. Perpetual dissatisfaction is good for our genes’ agenda, but bad for our long-term wellbeing and security, both personally and as a society. Any model of education must teach people the basics of what leads to resilience and flourishing. It means knowing how we learn, what boosts this capability (positivity and trusted relationships) and what hinders it (chronic stress and an over-stimulated reward circuit that can lead to narrowed excessive or ‘hyper’ learning, impaired connectivity with others). If we teach people how to learn we may find that most will want to choose healthier options that lead to creativity, more promising relationships and successful joint enterprises, leading to a state of personal and social flourishing. In other words we build the conditions for eudaimonic happiness, peace and security. The root of the current social disorder may be exacerbated by ignorance about how to build resilience to the stressful overabundance of stimulation in this digital new world. Ignorance can be remedied by a system of education that focuses on the basics of what motivates and drives us and leads to flourishing. It need not be incompatible with religious or spiritual teaching. In Islam, the greater jihad is the inner struggle to maintain faith, just as in Christianity sin is a state of ego-mindedness and separation from the Divine. In practice, an over-stimulated reward circuitry, or ‘temptation’ centre, can lead to the imbalanced state of mind and ego-perception that devotional practices seek to remedy. 6.2 Contents f the Model f Education Accordingly the most fruitful areas for researchers to investigate in a model of education that could improve both actual security and the feeling of security are the following: 1. Knowledge of how the brain actually learns and makes decisions to help people become more self directed and motivated in their learning and less distracted by harmful attractions through boredom, loneliness, anger, hunger, stress or tiredness 2. Knowledge of how over-stimulation of our brain’s primitive appetite mechanism affects relationships and rational decision-making, and how best to keep it in balance

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3.

Conflict management skills such as those developed through integrative complexity 4. Meditation- how it improves one’s ability to learn, think clearly, quiet emotions and ease addiction cravings 5. Positivity- how raising our ratio of positive emotions to negative ones can influence decision-making in everyone, but especially in corporate, political and military leaders coping with conflict and high levels of stress 6. How successful would a model of education be for resilience and flourishing based on a combination of: i. the goal of eudaimonic happiness (the Aristotelian version, thus including the learning of moral virtues based on excellence and aimed at harmony and justice) ii. knowledge of the workings of the reward circuitry (especially as it relates to sex and nutrition) iii. devotional practices such as meditation and or prayer iv. conflict resolution skills based on integrative complexity v. physical exercise vi. organisational skills 6.3 Multi-Disciplinary Research Academia has been highly specialised in recent years, some would say overspecialised. If we are to reap the fruits of the research from different fields, however, there will have to be more people capable of communicating across those disciplines. While this may be anathema to many, especially scientists who fear a ‘dumbing down’ of the quality of research in favour of quantity, and replacing depth with breadth, this need not be the case. Howard Gardner, educational psychologist at Harvard University, in the book ‘Five Minds For The Future’[31] states the following: “In the study of cognition it is generally thought that it takes ten years to master a discipline. This trek does not leave much time to master multiple forms of mastery. I am now persuaded that thanks to excellent computer pedagogy, forms of expertise can be attained more rapidly, perhaps in half the time. Also, because of shrewd scaffolding for those of us who have not yet fully attained mastery [or who have], there is hope that we will nonetheless be able to participate in a number of disciplines and to synthesize knowledge obtained there from.” This hope may alleviate the fears of academics who are sceptical about the merits of interdisciplinary research. There is no reason why both approaches to study cannot offer opportunities to scholars across academia and at the same time enrich our knowledge of integrative systems in a practical way. With all the knowledge systems available to us in the twenty-first century we have the means to educate ourselves to tip the balance away from one of over-stimulation, languishing and insecurity, towards hope, growth, resilience, flourishing and security. Knowledge is power. Knowledge of peace and security are within our grasp. We just require the will and wisdom to make it happen.

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Fredrickson B.L., and D. Kahneman (1993) “Duration neglect in retrospective evaluations of affective

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M. Sharpe / Sex, Drugs and Education: A Model of Education for Security episodes,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65:45-55. Cannon, W B. (1932). The wisdom of the body. New York: Norton; Taylor, S.E., Klein, L.C., Lewis, B. P., Gruenewald, T.L., Gurung, R.A.R, & Updegraff, J.A. (2000). Biobehavioral responses to stress in females Toffler A. 1970 Future Shock, Random House PRRG research, Being Muslim, Being British, contact [email protected] https://mcl.wjh.harvard.edu/mcl/pubs/Greene-CogNeurosciences-Chapter-Consolidated.pdf Weight Gain Is Associated with Reduced Striatal Response to Palatable Food. Eric Stice, Sonja Yokum, Kenneth Blum, and Cara Bohon. The Journal of Neuroscience 2010; 30(39): 13105-13109. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2105-10.2010] Robinson M. Cupid’s Poisoned Arrow, From Habit to Harmony, in sexual relationships (2009) North Atlantic Books http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20110114a3.html http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1581043/French-women-are-the-sexual-predators-now. html http://www.psychologies.co.uk/news/put-porn-in-its-place-2/See also http://www.yourbrainonporn.com http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-01-teen-brains-over-process-rewards-root.html Steven E. Hyman,1 Robert C. Malenka,2 and Eric J. Nestler3 NEURAL MECHANISMS OF ADDICTION: The Role of Reward-Related Learning and Memory Annual Review of Neuroscience, Vol. 29: 565-598 (July 2006) Warren K. Bickel, Richard Yi, Reid D. Landes, Paul F. Hill, and Carole Baxter. Remember the Future: Working Memory Training Decreases Delay Discounting Among Stimulant Addicts. The article appeared in Biological Psychiatry, Volume 69, Number 3 (February 1, 2011).”Training the brain to think ahead in addiction." January 27th, 2011. Sapolsky, R. 2004 Why Zebras Don't Get Ulcers: Owl Books p351-2 Haidt, J., Journal of Science 18 May 2007. Mazur and Booth 1998; Mazur and Lamb 1980; Booth et al. 1989; Archer 1991, 17–18; Geen 1998, 321; Blum 1997, 167; Turner 1994, 246; Baron and Richardson 1994, 257; Klama 1988, 77; fans: Bernhardt et al. 1998; lawyers: Dabbs, in Science, April 26, 1991: 513. http://www.pnas.org/content/106/50/21437.full Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics Book I, chapter 7 1098a Seligman, M. Stated in a lecture at the University of Cambridge, 29 January 2010 Newberg AB, Alavi A, Baime M, Pourdehnad M, Santanna J, d'Aquili EG. The measurement of regional cerebral blood flow during the complex cognitive task of meditation: A preliminary SPECT study. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging 106: 113-122, 2001. Benson H. MD Relaxation Response by, Quill (2000), Benson Henry Institute: http://www.mbmi.org/home/ Fredrickson B. Positivity 2009 Oneworld Publications Kabbat Zin, J. Coming to Our Senses: Healing Ourselves and the World Through Mindfulness (2005) (New York: Hyperion) "Mindfulness Meditation Improves Cognition: Evidence of Brief Mental Training" http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20363650 (Legros, 2003) Oxytocin counteracts the effects of cortisol, the stress hormone; (Kovacs, 1998). Oxytocin reduces cravings; (Agren, 2002) Oxytocin calms. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/1430311.stm Loehr,J., and T. Schwarz (2003) The Power of Full Engagement: Managing Energy not time, Is the key to High performance and Personal Renewal (New York: Free Press). Cotman, C.W., N.C. Bechtold, and L. Christie (2007) Exercise builds brain health: Key roles of growth factor cascades and inflammation. Trends in Neurosciences 30:464-72. Ratey J. Spark: The Revolutionary New Science of Exercise and the Brain 2008 Little, Brown & Co. Allen D. Getting Things Done 2001 Piatkus Gardner H. Five Minds for the Future: 2008 Harvard Business Press (p. xviii) paperback edition

Global Security: A Vision for the Future F. Géré and M. Sharpe (Eds.) IOS Press, 2011 © 2011 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-760-4-67

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What Does Security Mean for the Balkans? Bisera TURKOVIC1 Ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the United States of America and Director of the Centre for Security Studies Abstract. Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) is a good example of a state which has successfully pulled itself away from a state of total insecurity to relative security. After the brutal wars of the 1990s the region has managed, with international help, to maintain a peaceful and increasingly secure and prosperous future. Militias have been disarmed, the armed forces have been depoliticised and some regional states (including BiH) have been allowed to join international security groups like NATO. This is a long process that is far from completely fulfilled, but the increase in national security in BiH has allowed individual human security to flourish, and vice versa- the security of nations and the individuals who live in them are inextricably linked. Keywords. Bosnia-Herzegovina; a security policy: Partnership for Peace: NATO; cooperative security: ethnic tensions: human security

In my capacity as Ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the United States of America and as Director of the CSS (Centre for Security Studies), I would like to welcome you this June 2007 and to invite you to come more frequently to this historic city of Sarajevo where World War I started, and where the tragic recent war, only 15 years ago, claimed 200,000 lives in Europe at the end of the twentieth century. It is a country: • only one hour's flight from Vienna or two hours' flight from Paris, a country where perpetrators of horrible crimes are still free • a country where mines contaminate 4% of the territory and, in accordance with some estimates, will need at least 50 years to be cleaned up • where small arms and light weapons represent a huge problem • where trafficking in human beings is still a problem • where people believe that their health is being affected by depleted uranium • where political insecurity is high on the agenda • where economic insecurity is evident • in simple words, it is the right place to start our discussion about security issues. Currently I wear two hats, one representing Bosnia-Herzegovina as ambassador to the USA, but covering also Brazil and Mexico and the other as director of the CSS. CSS was established seven years ago, after completing my tenure as Minister for European Integration, as a consequence of the need to establish a forum to debate security matters. At that stage we did not have a security policy and the country had two defence ministries with two, or three separate armies, a large number of personnel, large budgets, and armies financed by neighbouring states. Hence these armies were 1

E-mail: [email protected]

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maintained to defend each of the three constituent peoples from each other and not from aggressors outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The same model applied for the police force and intelligence services. Now, seven years later there is a small professional army, one budget, membership of the Partnership for Peace, and, hopefully, in the near future membership of NATO. With the change in the international environment, the concept of security has been broadened to what has been and continues to be a challenge for this region, as the result of weak controls and border services. At least 25% of the heroin consumed in Western Europe now passes through the borders of Eastern Europe. With the new threats and risks, emphasis is placed on cooperative security which creates a favourable environment conducive to the pursuit of human security. While national security creates opportunities that can improve the lives and conditions of the people, national security can lead to human security and human security, in turn, provides a strong foundation for national stability. Traditionally, national security describes the measures taken by a state to ensure its survival and security. The protection of the state, its boundaries, people, institutions and values from external attacks was the responsibility and main objective of the state. Thus, States built powerful military structures to defend themselves. People were presumably assured of their security by the shield of the state. Human security takes the safety of people as its point of reference, it is concerned with safeguarding and expanding people's vital freedoms. For humans to be secure, their lives must be free from pervasive threats, violent or otherwise, to their rights and safety. Human security is no longer defined exclusively within the realm of states or as a consequence of state security. The reasons for the insecurities of today are diverse. The UN has identified seven key elements that constitute the concept of human security. These include, amongst other things, economic, social and political factors. Today security is not seen only in military terms. It represents an absence of conflict, social justice, respect for human rights and the rule of law. Security in the Western Balkans If we take it that 'human security' takes the security of people as its point of reference then we may say that human security in the Western Balkans has seen improvements in recent years but the situation remains challenging. Everyday cases of torture, the threat of war and street violence in the region are nowadays things of the past. However, other threats to personal security persist and in some cases, are on the rise. Cross-border crime in the Western Balkans, especially trafficking, has been and continues to be a challenge for this region. It is, inter alia, the result of weak controls and weak border services. (As already noted, at least 25 % of heroin consumed in Western Europe now passes through the borders of Eastern Europe.) Small arms and light weapons are another serious threat to human security in the region. Mine contamination continues to hinder refugee returns, infrastructure recovery programmes and economic development. It is estimated that, at the going rate, the destruction of the Bosnian Armed Forces' surplus ammunition stockpiles alone will take 137 years! The existence of ethnic tensions in the region have a major impact on the sense of

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security of its citizens. Their feelings of endangerment from other ethnic groups makes them more vulnerable to nationalistic tendencies. These tendencies can create a threat to the very existence of a state itself; it is thus the responsibility of the state to work towards reducing the sense of insecurity among its citizens. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the inability of the state mechanism to guarantee security to its citizens resulted in more than 300,000 people killed in a period of three and a half years from 1992-1995, and more than a million refugees, displaced internationally and internally in one of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia's regions alone, namely in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order to bring matters under control, military forces were downsized. Hence in 1998 there were 46,000 soldiers but by 2000, this number was reduced to 31,000. With additional reductions, by 2002 the overall number of solders was 18,600. These reductions took place in conformity with the Defence Policy of BIH (Bosnia and Herzegovina), adopted in May 2001. By the end of 2004 the target to be achieved was 12,000. Democratic control over the armed forces is increasing, as parliamentary committees on the democratic control of the armed forces have been established. On 30 May 2003, for the first time after the war, all parties in the armed forces in BIH agreed upon a common doctrine. Also, a security policy for BIH has been adopted by the members of the presidency and sent to the parliament. On 8 May 2003, the High Representative established a Defence Reform Commission (DRC). The Commission was mandated to reach an agreement on the legal requirements to reform the defence structures of BIH and propose legislation and other legal instruments in accordance with basic principles conforming to modern European practice. Consequently state law on defence has been adopted by the parliament of BIH on 1 December 2003, and according to the schedule, the minister of defence at state level was nominated in March 2004. This process is a prerequisite to achieving the stated desire of BIH to join EURO Atlantic structures, and in particular NATO's Partnership for Peace programme. So far, a number of important steps have been taken in the process of democratisation of the armed forces. Some of these include the following: • Political parties have been eliminated from both armies • Officers cannot be elected to political positions, they can only vote • Party control over the armies has been abolished • Civilian ministers of defence were appointed in both entities • A committee for security is in the process of being formed in the state parliament • A defence policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina has been adopted and • Defence planning and budgeting have become more transparent Although the reform process has not yet been completed, the chances for stability in the country were given a major boost by the reforms made in the security sector. The establishment of a unified body of command and control over the armed forces of BIH is being established. The establishment of a unified command and control structure would allow for greater democratic control over the armed forces, as well as providing the conditions and capacity for Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate in European security and defence structures, as well as improving security within the region. The transformation of the politics of security within the region is headed by the

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need for certain levels of conformity, interoperability, compatibility and co-operation. In recognition of this and to improve stability and cooperation in eastern and outheastern Europe, NATO developed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. The realisation of defence reform, the enhancement of democratic control over the armed forces and increased inter-regional and regional co-operation are paramount to the creation of security and stability and are an integral part and focus of the programme. Fortunately, the situation in south-eastern Europe has been steadily improving since then. It is a long but not impossible process to build confidence amongst countries or peoples who have had the type of history that the Balkans have had. The main challenge that remains is how to facilitate democracy and economic growth and development. Solutions to these problems will provide the background to the political and security environment for the next decade. Effective human security can only be assured when economic growth occurs in a way that avoids growing disparities as the latter would only exacerbate crime, social problems and political tensions. With economic development and growth, citizens feel more confident and secure, this is a key asset in political transitions and demonstrates the fact that the economic component of human security is a crucial one. The UNDP's Early Warning System indicates that all Bosnian citizens, regardless of ethnicity, have the economy and job prospects as their primary concerns. Thus with the strengthening of the economy in BIH it is likely that nationalistic influences will continue to wane with inter-ethnic relations improving and thus human security increasing. It is therefore clear that as the economic situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to improve - as is foreseen following the conclusion of the countries privatisation process - it is likely that stability and security throughout the country will be further enhanced. Security within BIH is likely to improve and be reinforced as the ability of the countries' institutions take ownership of their responsibilities.

Part Three Identity, Loyalty and Security

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Identity, Loyalty and Security 19-21 October 2007, Casablanca Chair Mary SHARPEa, Co Chair, Dr. Mokhtarb BENABDALLAOUI a

Advocate, Adviser to Psychology and Religion Research Group, University of Cambridge b Center for Humanities Studies and Research, Hassan II University, Casablanca

Introduction The purpose of this workshop was to approach the topic of identity, loyalty and security in a multi-disciplinary way through presentations from both academics in the social sciences and practioners such as the military and civil servants involved directly with security. We had presentations giving an overview of the situation in specific regions followed by case studies. On the basis of this general and particular introduction, we split up into break-out groups to brainstorm research and policy outcomes relevant to the different regions.

Session Synopses Session 1 • •

Overview of identity issues in globalised world Case studies 1 & 2: Sub-Continent Asians in Britain; the Moroccan experience

Session 2 • •

Post-Regime Change/Occupation cont.

Case Studies 5 & 6: Post- colonial Algeria; Arab/Islamic style democracy

Session 4 •

Post-Regime Change/Occupation

Overview of situation in Middle East and North Africa Case studies 3 & 4: Challenges of building a police force in Iraq; Psychological ID in Iraq

Session 3 •

Post-Colonial Situation

Post-Soviet Space

Overview of situation in former Soviet Union

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•

Case studies 7 & 8: Serbia and Afghanistan

Session 5 • •

Sociological dimensions- engineers of Jihad Psychological factors: theology and modernity

Session 6 • • •

Factors Shaping Identity and Loyalty

Break-Out Groups

European North Africa and Middle East Post Soviet Space

Identity, Security and Fractured Globalization The overview of this subject of identity and the psychological citizen in the context of fractured globalization was set out by Professor Fathali Moghaddam; his full paper is given in Part Three of this volume. To promote interobjectivity and justice, dialogue and negotiations are needed. Research: • How do Muslims conceive of procedural justice? • Does their understanding differ from Western perceptions? • What are the perceptions in different countries? • What understanding is necessary to enable mutual understanding/negotiations? Other debates covered: Transition to Democracy All the examples of democratic forms of transition based on essentialist identifications have failed or are in perpetual crisis (e.g. Lebanon, Iraq) because they do not accept compromise. (Conflict management training based on integrative complexity is required.) • Identity should not be essentialized (be too confined or defined). It is something dynamic across time and space and researchers must avoid making it too fixed. Multiple identities are possible. • Research: how Muslims living in the West (and elsewhere) construct their national identities. Mapping their composite identities, and finding out what kinds of decisions and loyalties flow from which identities, and under what contexts/conditions. This would be a complex, in-depth study involving ethnographic fieldwork. • Media research: what cultural/media products are out there to enable, for example, British Muslims to mix identities? To enable integrated identities? What kinds of media products do young Muslims turn to? • We must distinguish between identity and immigration. Terrorism is more than an identity issue alone. • Research on the role of civil society organizations in the Arab world and how successful they are. Action research- sponsoring citizenship clubs.

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In the transition to democracy in the Arab world we are now split between two options for building a democratic model of citizenship- a multicultural one or a communitarian one (i.e. quotas). We need to build our democracy not on communitarian lines as in Lebanon and Iraq, but on a citizenship basis. We need a minimum of separation between religion and government. The Educational Factor Invite Al Azar (the University of Cairo) to build a joint project with their counterpart in the Maghreb and/or hold a joint workshop to look at the content of education in the major Islamic universities. The education of women is a very sensitive subject but worth exploring. How could more education in management, organisational systems and science be developed? • Research Muslim cultural and psychological factors in the interface between first/second generation Muslims and Western bureaucratic institutions. • How are identities managed? • What does it mean to be an Arab or Muslim? • Systematic study of the splits and boundaries that radical movements draw and the characteristics of the sub-movements. We need to study not only how splits arise but how those structures work, what are their mechanisms and communication systems and how do they generate their leadership? • We should have comparative research on mixed identities or the clash thereof from elsewhere not just the Middle East, such as Ireland, the Basque country etc..

Post-Soviet Space The impact of recent economic and social changes (economic growth, migrations, political developments) have caused transformations of identities in Russia and, in particular, in the North Caucasus. This is a multi-ethnic region which was studied to test the hypothesis that the evolution of identities and ethnic tensions varies depending on the geographical location of an area or a settlement (especially on its distance from Chechnya), its economic situation, the ethnic structure of its population, the pattern of migrations and other territorial factors. Mixed marriages produce mixed identities. How does one select between a mother’s and a father’s identity? What reasons push people to select one among several possible identities? Research: Why in certain critical situations do people have to select between regional identity and family heritage or select other identities? Do decisions fit with rational choice models, or are decisions linked more closely with issues like social identity or religious worldview? Serbia is one of a group of states with a “schizophrenic foreign policy” which has one foot in Moscow and the other in Brussels. This may seem like the fallout from contemporary tensions between the West and Russia over the Kosovo issue but a deeper look into history and the strategic culture of Serbia displays a longer record. The complexity of identity means that in order for a state to be stable it is crucial that a national identity emerge. In post-conflict Afghanistan, for instance, how is it possible to articulate the different levels of identity in order to produce the feeling of

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‘belonging to a nation’? Which political system enables the recognition of particular identities without simultaneously obstructing the emergence of a national consciousness? How flexible is identity? Are there any universals that are not flexible? How much does national identity set a limit to this flexibility? A meta-analysis of national survey databases could shed some light on this question. Jihad Identity It was proposed that the high number of engineers incarcerated for terrorist activities in recent years may be a result of the combination of psychological factors common to engineers and certain sociological conditions which have led to fewer employment opportunities for them on graduation in most Islamic countries (with the important exception of Saudi Arabia). This is a ‘profile’ type explanation (i.e. the notion that there is something of an ‘engineer mindset’ with the desire for clear-cut answers and definitive and straightforward ‘solutions’ to problems) with a variant of the ‘frustration-aggression’ hypothesis. It is quite likely that individuals with a propensity to clear-cut solutions may be particularly drawn to engineering (a ‘selection bias’, in other words). Research: Is this selection bias a result of the ‘rationalist-sounding’ discourse of Islamism (with which engineers identify), or is there a deeper sympathy? It was noted that the key ingredients of Islamist radical religious speech and the identity needs to which it appeals are distinguished by a three-part simplifying narrative. This narrative echoes primitive and dualist worldviews resulting in low levels of complexity that utilizes rhetorical strategies, a ‘closed’ belief system and a ‘rationalistic’ tone. This is particularly appealing to second- and third-generation young Muslims living in Europe. This kind of extreme speech appeals to those experiencing a valuesclash between Western and Muslim cultures. It also fills the ‘identity gap’ and is wellbuffered from societal pressure from without. It was noted that the perceptions of ingroup and out-group are heightened by such forms of Islamist teaching. The importance of educational intervention programmes to try to deradicalise Islamised individuals was emphasised. Research: How do young people who have gone through a de-radicalisation course respond to Islamist discourse when they are re-exposed to it? Do they see it in a more complex, critical, nuanced way? What short-, medium- and long-term behaviours flow from involvement in such courses? (This kind of research is needed to help determine what are the key markers of de-radicalisation that we should be aiming for.) Where are the tipping points, the trigger points, the push factors that move people into sympathy with violent movements? And the reverse: what are the push factors and tipping points that move people to endorse democratic principles? One has to consider that the processes are never stable, and when we address the problem of loyalty, we must also consider the problem of disloyalty. This is, of course, relative to which side one is on. Presently forces in Afghanistan which are striving to rebuild the nation and create security forces are facing the problem of widespread disloyalty. How can we organise a political power there free from sub-national identities?

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Suggestions for Research Proposals from the Break-Out Groups European Break-Out Group: •

• • • •

How far have radicalisers become modernists themselves? They may have a thin religious veneer, but underneath they have all the hallmarks of modernity. Perhaps look at how the Qu’ran and Bible have been misinterpreted to make certain positions legitimate. What is the non-inclusion of Turkey going to do to Muslim identity in France? How will this then affect Muslim identity and loyalty in the rest of Europe? How far have the faith schools been instruments of segregated identity building: Jewish, Muslim, Christian etc.? Are faith schools positive or divisive in terms of identity? Why are young Muslims failing in state schools? Does early Madrassa education make it harder for Muslim children to do well in secular schools?

Middle Eastern Break-Out Group • •

• • •

• • •

• • • •

What is an Islamic democracy? Issues of secular and religious compatibility. Ijtihad (Islamic wisdom and practice) and the renewing of Islamic texts in the 21st century; we need a new interpretation of the texts to make a comparison between the content and terminology used by Islamists now and the origin of these terms in the holy texts. Research question: What is the process by which itjihad would be accepted as legitimate within the Muslim community? Who needs to be involved? Which scholars/groups? Can we build a link between Islamism and democracy? What kind of Islamists can benefit from democratic principles and what kind will corrupt or block it? Is there a connection between the communal emphasis within traditional Muslim upbringings (that gear the individual towards maintaining the harmony of the group while disallowing critical thinking and individualism) and distance from democratic participation? Or are the anti-democratic attitudes inculcated by the Islamist discourse? What does it mean to be an Arab? Muslim identities: Is the sense of belonging based on ethnic, tribal, cultural or faith considerations? To study the concept of loyalty in Arab and Muslim culture; what are the terms of identity and loyalty in the groups and how do these differ by region? Examine the media, e.g. how are cartoons and other media used by extremist groups to strengthen the idea that the West is against Islam and there is a western conspiracy against the Muslim world? Speech in the media is unbalanced and focuses on the reaction to the cartoons (in the case of the Danish newspaper debacle) and not to the original insult made. How we perceive neighbours, allies and enemies is important in foreign policy. It is important to have surveys of values and attitudes in the Middle East. An examination of the role of civil society organizations in the Arab world and how successful they are is required. The effect of the media and Internet on the transformation of values in the Arab world also needs to be studied. It is important to talk about immigration and security with regard to identity and loyalty.

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•

When and how did Muslim society lose its attraction to scientific knowledge?

Post-Soviet Space Break-out Group • • • • • • • • •

What are the reasons for the crises of identities? What are the effects of migration and fragmented globalization? Why does polarization and fragmentation of identity occur? Post-modern management of multiple political identities; how people perceive their neighbours, allies and enemies is very important for foreign policy. Psycho-social studies of radicalization. The group could not agree about how to strengthen the dialogue between young decision-makers in conflict, to push them to stimulate discussion on political perspectives. What are the historical and cultural sources/antecedents to the development of extreme behaviours in contemporary cultures? Does conflict of identities and roles (including the fear of losing one’s identity) in multi-layered contemporary cultures lead to extremism and terrorism? What determines the tipping point that leads individuals to shift from acceptable dissent to extreme behaviour? What mechanisms for recruitment and persuasion in contemporary society lead to identity creation and loyalty-spreading?

Thematic Continuities Identity Identities are complex and deeply emotional. Individuals may base their identities (which are often plural) on a number of factors- religious, national, ethnic, family, political, tribal, etc.. These identities can and do change over time and with changing personal and external circumstances. The question is when there is a conflict of duty, to which identity is one loyal? How is a new identity or sense of belonging along with its concomitant duties, formed? Islamic Democracies There is a danger of imposing a Western-tinted view of Muslim/Arab identities. For instance, even if Islamic countries democratise we should not expect them to be (at least in the short term) Western-style ‘liberal’ democracies. The election of Hamas in Palestine is a case in point. The suggestion is to study the ability of Islamic societies to adopt democratic norms; under this there are many sub themes: What would democracy look like in the Middle-east and North Africa (MENA) region?; Islamic ideals; secular and religious compatibility, etc.. Loyalty Individuals feel loyalty to many institutions- their state, family, tribe, religious and/or political leaders. The flip side is disloyalty, where one or more loyalties inevitably clash. This arises in cases where individuals support religious or political leaders who

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are hostile to their national government, for example. This is the very real problem faced by those attempting to organise governmental and security institutions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Religious Values and Interpretation of Texts The interpretation of religious texts and its basis for knowledge of how to live ethically in a modern globalised world is important. The introduction of the Internet is fast transforming values in the Arab world. This change of values needs to be studied. Education To improve communication between secular and religion-based societies more education on the different value systems is required. Ethics and moral values and their application in practice have to be studied. Individualist and collectivist societies prioritise different values. Both suffer from deficiencies in ethical practice at all levels, each pointing to the weaknesses in the other’s society. Both religious and secular authorities have failed to control this effectively. Many Muslim and Arab societies suffer from underdeveloped organisational and management skills that hinder participation in and the development of modern techniques for administration and business that would improve social and economic development. Further, the non-participation in the development of modernity has led to a sense of inferiority in some regards vis-à-vis the West impacting on ethnic and group identity and economic status, the oil rich nations apart. An enhanced sense of ‘moral’ superiority, by contrast, fuels much of the new global Islamic and Islamist identity.

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Being Muslim Being British: Preventing Extremist Violence Through Raising Integrative Complexity Dr Sara SAVAGE1, Dr Jose LIHT2 and Ryan WILLIAMS3 Psychology and Religion Research Group, Faculty of Divinity, University of Cambridge4

Abstract. Being Muslim Being British is a primary prevention initiative that raises participants’ levels of integrative complexity (IC) as a means of preventing violent extremism and promoting social cohesion. The approach is based on changing ‘usvs.-them’ perceptions of social reality by improving the quality of people’s information processesing – achieving high Integrative Complexity (Suedfeld 2003), particularly in the domain of values, and is reputedly one of the first prevention programmes with empirically measurable outcomes benchmarked against extremist violence. Assessment research based on seven pilot courses around the UK (each course comprising eight modules) shows that IC rises significantly by the end of the course, in comparison with IC levels before the course, and that high IC significantly correlates with participants’ choosing of prosocial activism rather than violent mobilisation. This chapter discusses the theoretical background for the intervention, and describes how the eight module course works, with illustrations from participant’s verbalisations. Finally, the chapter positions this intervention with other forms of prevention in use around the world and details next steps in this work. Keywords. preventing violent extremism; Integrative Complexity; multiple perspectives; pro-social activism; value complexity; identity uncertainty; life skills; primary prevention

1. Introduction In summer 2010 we completed a project to develop and test teaching materials that address Islamist, al-Queda-related radicalisation. Being Muslim Being British is an eight module course (using DVD films and group activities) for young Muslims in the UK that seeks to raise participants’ levels of integrative complexity (IC) as a means of preventing violent extremism, promoting social cohesion and inter-group conflict resolution. BMBB is reputedly one of the first prevention programmes with empirically measurable outcomes benchmarked against extremist violence. Our approach is based



























































E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]  E-mail: [email protected]  www.prrg.org 




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on changing ‘us-vs.-them’ perceptions of social reality by improving the quality of people’s information processesing – achieving high Integrative Complexity (Suedfeld, Guttieri & Tetlock 2003), particularly in the domain of values. After participating in Being Muslim Being British (BMBB), our assessment research based on seven pilot courses around the UK (each course comprising eight modules) shows that IC rises significantly by the end of the course, in comparison with IC levels before the course- particularly concerning public values such as civic participation and inter-group relations. These findings are based on coding participants’ verbalisations in group discussions and end of course creative projects. It is clear from participant feedback that BMBB enables participants to retain their own deeply held value commitments while broadening their thinking to understand other viewpoints, and to find common values between them, maximizing a greater array of values applied to complex social and moral issues. Further, the scores of high IC participants (measured through analyzing participants’ written moral dilemmas) are highly correlated with participants’ choosing peaceful, pro-social activism items in a questionnaire at the end of the course, even when they continue to view the structure of the social world as unjust towards their own ingroup. IC seems to be playing an important role in moderating between extremist perceptions of social reality and the kind of mobilization participants choose, whether pro-social or violent mobilisation. Two separate studies covering a total of seven assessed BMBB courses around the UK show these same data patterns. (A peer reviewed journal article on Being Muslim Being British with full assessment data by the authors is in preparation.) We are planning further controlled studies so that we can isolate and try to understand more deeply the precise psychological processes involved in the strong correlation between high IC and pro-social activism (and the eschewing of violent mobilization). We also observed through Social Networks Analysis that social processes within the groups are playing a positive role rather than the negative, subverting role that group processes sometimes play in well-intentioned interventions. This data shows that the groups favour high IC individuals and high IC social norms. The vast majority of our participants are young Muslims (aged 16-30), and are people who take their faith seriously. The data suggests that, through their experience of the course, high IC becomes a desirable mode of being religious for these young Muslims. Findings also showed that the younger participants (18 and under) showed slightly higher IC gains compared with people in their mid 20s and 30s. Also, participants who strongly identified with their own chosen ‘ingroup’ (such as ‘Pakistani British’, or ‘Muslim’, or ‘Somali Muslim’) showed higher IC gains. In other words, affirming a commitment to one’s own social identity seems to provide the rootedness needed to engage with opposing viewpoints. A BMBB course leader in Bury St Edmunds described his BMBB group: “These are high end, very articulate, very intelligent young people. They join the Bury Muslim forum to enhance their CV; most of them will go to University. But they are very vulnerable to being radicalised there. The Bury BMBB experience showed that for the whole group at the beginning their views were aligned with the Hizb ut Tahrir. But at the end of the course all of them had significantly changed their position.” This chapter will discuss the theoretical background for the intervention, and describe how the eight module course works, with illustrations from participant’s verbalisations. Finally, the chapter will position this intervention with other forms of prevention in use around the world and describe next steps in this work.

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2. Theoretical Background: Integrative Complexity and Value Complexity Defining Integrative Complexity Integrative complexity refers to how complexly the social world is perceived. It involves two steps. The first is to be able to differentiate different perspectives on an issue, or to perceive a multiplicity of problem dimensions, and to see that there is some validity in these different views or dimensions. The next step is to integrate the differentiated array together in some kind of overarching framework. This could involve, for example, finding trade-offs between different perspectives in tension, perhaps being able to identify shared values between conflicting viewpoints, being able to find win/win solutions to opposing groups’ goals, or to find some context that makes sense of why reasonable people can maintain opposite views (Suedfeld et al 2003). In short, low IC means only one perspective is considered valid: the world is cast in black or white, groups are good or bad, right or wrong, seen from one single evaluative viewpoint. Moderate levels of IC mean that a multiplicity of viewpoints can be considered, and some validity is seen in them, yet without the ability to see any overarching framework. High levels of IC mean that thinkers are able to find integrating frameworks for differing perspectives (Baker-Brown, Ballard, Bluck, de Vries, Suedfeld, & Tetlock 1992). In the field of political psychology, the study of integrative complexity enjoys a robust empirical literature over decades. Studies show that when political actors’ level of integrative complexity drops (measured by coding speeches, parliamentary proceedings, press releases, letters, and so forth) from that actor’s normal baseline, that sudden drop predicts intergroup conflict, and even military action (Suedfeld et al 2003). It is prolonged stress and threat to important values that precedes the drop in the complexity. IC concerns the structure of thinking, not its content. Thus a political message may seek to dissimulate, saying in effect, ‘peace, peace’, but if the structure underlying the message shows a significant drop from normal levels of complexity, this augurs conflict. IC coding thus has the advantage of being largely unfakeable, because structure of thinking is held at a less than conscious level (although some impression management may need to be taken into account). Our BMBB assessment research has shown that not only is IC an effective and measurable means of addressing violent extremism, it has the added advantage of being attractive as a life skill to young people. Thus, it avoids labeling young Muslims as somehow pathological, as IC processes, whether low or high, are entirely normal cognitive states. All human beings can benefit from becoming aware of how IC affects their thinking. Complexity of information processing has a long gestation in psychology. It was first observed as a personality trait - that individuals differ in terms of the complexity of their thinking, their openness to new experience, and to new ways of organizing how they perceive the world. Psychological traits are generally thought to be fairly durable, long-term individual differences. Later on, complexity was observed to change in response to different states: if an individual is stressed or threatened, their thinking constricts, and shows lower complexity in comparison to their normal baseline of IC (Suedfeld, Leighton, & Conway, 2005). Some research shows that complexity can also be domain specific. For example, Christian fundamentalists show low IC in regard to moral and existential issues, but show no differences in other domains in comparison to non-fundamentalists, suggesting the impact of fundamentalist discourse (Hunsberger, Alisat, Pancer & Pratt, 1996). Due to expected domain specificity, we felt it was

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necessary to cover a wide range of ‘hot’ issues in the BMBB course. Our experience suggests that IC needs to be worked on issue by issue, and that IC doesn’t transfer easily to other domains, at least in the early stages. A wide literature in psychology also suggests that overall normal human development follows a general trajectory towards greater complexity (Slugoski, Marcia, & Koopman, 1984). However, we argue, that trajectory towards complexity can be stunted by trauma, by totalist group membership, or by extremist ideology. We developed our intervention in the hope that the normal movement towards complexity can be recovered through appropriate intervention, and we argue that this is what the BMBB course brings about- a recovery of that person’s normal growth towards complexity. Prior to this work, there has been no attempt to engineer deliberate changes in people’s integrative complexity. We are the first psychologists to pioneer an intervention that teaches IC as a skill that enables people to become aware of, and move beyond, the knee-jerk reaction of low IC elicited by a sense of threat to oneself, one’s community, or to important values. We discovered that the first task for our participants is to identify their own deep commitments and values, to ‘see’ them and own them. The widespread norm of fairness encourages people to offer this same courtesy to others, and the next step is to branch out to listen to others, even to opposing viewpoints. Participants are encouraged to maintain their own value commitments while they listen to others. A further step is to find an overarching framework that makes sense of the differences without smoothing over the irreducible tensions. When these skills are in place, the ultimate task is to be able to choose which level of IC best suits the context of the problem a person is currently in. It would be untrue to say that low IC is never adaptive. Winston Churchill’s low IC style, in comparison to Neville Chamberlain’s higher IC style, is generally considered historically to have been the more adaptive IC level for responding to Hitler’s arming of Nazi Germany. Thus, IC dynamism is the ultimate goal of our intervention. Key to the success of this intervention is that IC enables people to firmly hold their own value commitments, while engaging with others. In 2008, we first attempted to raise IC in a project designed to help senior religious leaders enmeshed in religious or theological conflict (Boyd-MacMillan & Savage 2008, Savage and Boyd-MacMillan 2010). This project drew in religious leaders from across the mainline denominations in the UK. The participants in this action research came to us because they felt they had a problem and wanted to find a solution to transform the conflicts they were facing. They generally possessed theological worldviews already high in IC (not surprising given their level of expertise as bishops, archbishop, archdeacons, moderators and superintendents of the various denominations). However, they showed low IC, and even black and white thinking, when it came to engaging with the views of the ‘disputed other’, an example of domain specific nature of IC. Our task was to help them see how they could retain their own deep values, while increasing their ability to differentiate at least some validity in opposing views in order to work towards win/win solutions concerning issues of deep theological dispute. In short, these participants wanted help with their thinking and were open to seeking it. In contrast, the BMBB course is designed for young people who are not seeking to change their thinking; they perceive the problem residing with the oppressive outgroup (such as Westerners or bad Muslims). Direct attempts to change these participants’ thinking would be met with defensive reactance. Our challenge was to develop an

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ethical, transparent means of raising IC, while getting around this understandable embargo. The utility of IC is that it is about structure, rather than content. Our starting place is that the young people have a right to their viewpoint, but that they can grow to increase their awareness of the complexity of the social field. Value Complexity- Addressing Violent Extremisms We argue that radicalized religious discourses usually emphasise one moral value (such as communalism or justice) to the exclusion of other values (such as individualism or liberty). They are value monists. Extremist ideologies, whether right or left, secular or religious, are similarly value monist, and reduce the complexity of the social world in order to mobilize action to maximize the ingroup’s aims. In contrast, all mainstream religious traditions are value plural. In responding to different challenges over history, mainstream religious traditions, such as Judaism, Christianity or Islam, evolve to maximise, within historically imposed limits, the multiple competing values of their constituencies (Jinkins, 2004). By this we mean that religious traditions take into account the several priorities of their communities. For example when judging the appropriateness of the use of alcohol for pharmaceutical reasons, Islamic jurisprudence usually rules that alcohol is allowed to sterilize instruments or skin even when it is normally proscribed. In this way the precept of prohibiting alcohol is balanced against the modern benefit of its pharmaceutical use exemplifying how the underlying value of purity (from contamination through contact with something considered haram or off limits) is not an absolute when positioned relative to the value of health. In contrast, fundamentalist splinter groups are much less inclined to work out value tradeoffs. In an effort to offer simple solutions to a complex world, those overwhelmed by modernity, including most Islamists, become highly selective within their own traditions; emphasising certain texts and interpretations while suppressing others (Marty, Appleby, & American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995). In this process, they radically alter traditional underlying value hierarchies by increasing some values’ importance while dramatically decreasing that of others. This lack of complexity in the domain of values can be seen, for example, in the absolute prohibition of the use and transportation of alcohol or the hardening of the demand for conducting business free from Riba (interest), without consideration for the benefits lost to the community when halal (prescribed) loans are not available to finance businesses. And in the most extreme of cases, that of the suicide bomber, the glorification of Islam or the achievement of a political concession which furthers the group’s objectives is given priority over the life of the perpetrator, those who love him and all his victims. Consequently, these extreme versions of the tradition become less value plural to the point of absolute value simplification (value monism). This is what we posit constitutes the ‘radical’ element in extremist Islamic groups and ideology. We also posit that the appeal of these groups can be countered by developing value complexity, or in other words, developing people’s developmental path towards complexity in the domain of moral values. Considering the increasing importance of religion for Muslims as a source of identity (Choudhury, 2007), we posit that, in order to achieve a successful integration of Muslim and British identities and their underlying values, individuals require more cognitive resources to successfully resolve the dissonance between religious and

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secular-rational value systems. This is what BMBB provides. If not engaged with this dissonance constitutes a risk for further radicalisation via the attractiveness of extremist groups, especially for people who are experiencing identity uncertainty or group status threat. By acknowledging that most Islamic positions espouse legitimate values, even the radical ones, as long as other value commitments are given equal importance, we aim to facilitate a non-dogmatic approach to the exploration of the full diversity of groups and ideologies. Therefore, we hold that promoting value complexity can be an effective intervention to prevent radicalization. To summarize, developing high integrative complexity thinking in the domain of moral values can serve as a preventative inoculation against uncertainty states that can be potentially exploited for violence and disruption, and in our assessment research IC seems to moderate between the kinds of mobilization that participants choose. High IC participants choose pro-social, peaceful mobilization to solve problems. Why Does IC Drop in Response to Threat? The integrative complexity literature provides a reliable method for measuring the complexity of thought, through coding seven levels of IC, deploying blind coding and inter-coder reliability. It does not seek to offer an explanation of why IC levels drop in response to threat or stress. We turn to new fields of study to understand what processes may be at work in this. New research concerning social identity complexity may contribute. It may be that if people can embrace a wider range of multiple social identities (such as Muslim, store manager, football fan, family member) in the face of a moral dilemma, this wider array of social identities may enable a greater range of values to be accessible to the thinker in the face of threat. Another direction to explore is the stress literature and recent imaging studies in cognitive neuroscience. There may be something in the ‘hardwiring’ of the brain that is involved in sudden drops in IC. Studies on stress in the abnormal psychology literature is extensive. One recurring finding is that stress or fear states produce cognitive constriction, and that people are less able to think complexly in fear or stressed states. FMRI studies now reveal that the ‘old brain’ (the brain stem and the limbic brain, the seat of emotions) are particularly active in fear states. The old, ‘emotional’ brain has evolved to respond quickly and powerfully to perceived threats (Haidt 2006). The ‘fight/flight/freeze’ response has enabled humans to react immediately if threatened. Scientists who examine how the limbic system functions tell us this part of the ‘old brain’ is not directly related to our five senses or the outside world. Only the neo-cortex is connected to the real, external world through the senses. The old brain is connected to the real world in a hazy sort of way, through the images, symbols and thoughts produced by the new brain, the neo-cortex. The old brain works on very basic categories such as predator, mate, offspring, food. It cannot make fine distinctions like the thinking neo-cortex can, nor does it have the capacity to distinguish past and present. The old brain is fast and powerful, but not nuanced. A critical part of this emotional, limbic brain is the small almond-shaped amygdala. The amygdala is the home of anxiety and fear. Fear is saying that something is wrong. The amygdala shouts loud with neuronal messages that are faster and stronger than messages from the ‘thinking brain’. Its job is to save our life, not provide nuanced accuracy. The job of the thinking brain is to accurately assess the danger and to intelligently decide how to respond to it. But research by neuroscientist Le Doux (1996) shows that the thinking brain’s neuronal messages are weaker and slower that

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the messages of the amygdala. So, anger and fear can easily overrule thinking- they really do shout louder. It is extremely difficult to will away these powerful emotions. Our cognition has become simpler as a result of feeling threatened. And then we act on our perceptions, causing others to react to us in kind. Conflict spirals upward in a series of mutually threatening reactions. Hormones and other long-acting chemicals released into the body during fear or anger can then return to the brain and lock it into that state. Extremist ideology, we argue, is both low IC itself (being value monist) and affects a drop in IC (or maintenance of an already low IC) in its adherents. Extremist discourse engages with young people’s genuine sense of identity threat arising from living with dual cultures (Muslim and Western), the encroachment of globalization, and the anger arising from international military incursions into Muslim lands. It then introduces its binary narrative (Muslims are good, Westerners are bad), along with a selective interpretation of history culminating in the victorious return of the Caliphate to overthrow the illegitimate dominance of the outgroup. The leader of extremist groups (usually male) will be an exemplar, a prototype of the group’s norms; he models what kind of thinking is acceptable. Acceptance by this leader is crucial for members’ sense of belonging in the extremist group. This assuages some of the young person’s identity conflict, and this acceptance is thus highly valuable to the group member. Extremist groups insist on loyalty to the leader and the ideology without deviation, accepting no alternate viewpoints. Dissenters live with the threat of excommunication. All these factors contribute to the maintenance of low IC. Thus, social processes, cognitive processes, and brain processes probably all interact in a subtle interplay between both the ‘software’ of the mind, and its ‘hardwiring’ to produce changes in IC. Extensive laboratory studies will be required to disentangle these. For now, we are pleased to know that the BMBB course is achieving the desired aim of raising IC (correlated with pro social activism). The next section provides a description of the how the course works in such a way as to ‘engineer’ the desired changes in IC.

3. How the Course Works Getting the multimedia materials right was crucial to the intervention working. DVDs are created in the voice of the target audience, young Muslims in Britain - not in the voice of an outside ‘authority’. In BMBB, we use a home video genre, presented by a range of young Muslim narrators (of different ethnicities and gender) along with film clips spanning the demographic variety of the target audience. It is vital that participants recognize themselves and their social world in the DVDs and materials. With advice from expert Muslim consultants, we selected seven key issues that are of concern to young people and relate to their vulnerability to radicalisation: how should young Muslims live in Britain, how to ‘do’ relationships, science versus religion, equality (gender, race, class, religion), justice and money, democracy and security, purity and pleasure. These issues are presented using culturally and age-appropriate film clips, music, art, photos. To encourage differentiation, we make use of the internal diversity within the wider Muslim discourses available on the internet. The film clips provide experience of the multiplicity of Muslim voices on the issues. In the first weeks of the course, it often comes a surprise to young Muslims that there is such a multiplicity ‘out there’, each different Muslim voice claiming to be the voice of true Islam on the issue.

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Each session involves working with this material using creative group activities such as debate, role-play, and physical games. By week 5, we explicitly teach IC skills. Our pedagogy is thus: experience differentiation first through a wide array of input, work these through with social interactions, bodily involvement and role play, then reflect and make conscious the steps that have already experienced in the course. By week 8 participants create their own IC project on an issue, showing their own original creations: poems, raps, photographs, diagrams, films, along with their verbal explanations of their projects. A key factor is that participants develop their IC based on their own personally identified deep values, and this contributes to the sense of empowerment that participants get from the course: • “I realized how strong my actual beliefs and values are in all the situations we were put through. It’s also helped me… to break away from a kind of tunnelvision thinking, that everything is kinda straight-forward, all or nothing. And there’s been times when I would not have ventured into this and I would have just dismissed things very quickly. This course has helped me say, ‘Okay, let me just take a look at that thing and settle my mind a bit.’ It has helped me understand how different people think; it helps you understand how much a person’s religion plays a part in their actual perception of life.” -Participant • “I liked how we had to think laterally about conflict resolution and not act upon our first instincts.” -Participant • “I thought [the course] was intriguing and highlighted the fact that everybody deserves the right to be listened to – whether you agree or not – and that sometimes there is merit in what they have said.” -Participant • “Both sides need to look beyond the stereotypes and see the bigger picture and build bridges.” -Participant • “The role-plays we have done are fantastic… This course has made me proud of myself as a Muslim and proud of myself to live in this country. And I can say, in an authoritative way, I can be a Muslim and I can be British as well and contribute to this society.” -Participant • “This course has reminded us of the very basic points the Prophet has taught us: that Islam is the middle way. We shouldn’t be extreme in any way, we should come half way to understand whoever is opposite to us…the Prophet lived with the Jewish people, the Christians; he made so many treaties with them. We are not the only people to live on this earth, we have to always find common ground, to come together with other communities where we live.” -Participant • “As a practicing Muslim I think IC [Integrative Complexity] is in Islam anyway – that’s my personal view.” -Participant • “In Islam before you speak you are to listen carefully, digest what is heard, hear the full story, hear both sides…before you go for it or make a judgement. I am trying to incorporate that into my life and yeah, I’ve really enjoyed the course. I’ve listened to everyone’s comments which has given me a different

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•

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way to look. Even though for me my views haven’t changed, I can see where other people are coming from.” -Participant “What BMBB taught me is you should always look at other people’s perspectives instead of judging them straight away. Whereas before I would probably be quite harsh on them now I look at the bigger picture. What I also enjoyed is you learn something new and you do something. You go home feeling good about something and you research, like science and religion. It helps you gain more knowledge; it helps you to look at other people’s perspectives.” -Participant “It was a very terminal point for me to see that people really took their religion very, very seriously…you open to understanding other people…I found it very interesting, thought-provoking…I found it fantastic!” -Participant “This course made me realize that there are a lot of misunderstandings about Islam that confuse culture with religion. And this course made me realize they are two different things.” -Participant “Being Muslim Being British…has done so much for my understanding where people come from: their values, their beliefs… It’s helped me to put my own values and views into perspective…to refine them and strengthen them... And that can’t be taken away. If every course was designed to do that we would all be greater people.” -Participant

Philosophy and Educational Pedagogy Behind BMBB Thus, our aim is to empower participants, believing that the capacity to make free choices is fundamental to being fully human. In our approach to de-radicalisation we reject authoritarian imposition of concepts of ‘what is good’. Consequently, people and communities are entrusted with working out their individual and collective value commitments in the knowledge that the limitations imposed by limited life and resources forces us to make choices. Implicit in this is the recognition that in the impossible task of maximising all values at all times and that most values being incommensurable (i.e. they do not exist in a clear reducible hierarchy), one person’s choices will be as valid as those of others choosing to prioritise different values. For example, an interpersonal offence in a close relationship can evoke conflicting values of justice and mercy. Justice demands punishment of the offender and redress. Mercy compels us to understand the offender, and to find a way for the offender to be forgiven. The deep personal struggle of forgiveness is an effort to realise both values, justice and mercy, and prompts people to transcend their current level of complexity by achieving a solution where both justice and mercy are integrated. Nevertheless, appreciating that although one might desire to maximise both justice and mercy, this will be impossible and thus the final formula adopted will differ across individual and community lines especially if communities have different historical experiences. These assertions are in line with the Islamic principles of huq-uqul-ibad (which places duty to people before duty to God - it is the meeting of human needs that pleases God), the art of courteous disagreement (within Islamic Jurisprudence) and shura (consultation).

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Basing our philosophical approach upon these core Islamic principles - principles that are equally enshrined within Western democratic values - we think is part of the reason why the BMBB course has found enthusiastic acceptance among the Muslim community, both with young people and clerics. By promoting the absence of fear, the search for truth, and the freedom to exercise choice, and through the development of targeted skills, we believe that this course empowers young Muslims to find ways of integrating into the host cultures of Britain and the EU.

4. How BMBB Fits with Current Prevention Primary Prevention BMBB is reputedly the first prevention programmes with empirically measurable outcomes benchmarked against extremist violence. We developed BMBB firstly as a primary prevention initiative. Primary prevention decreases prevalence by addressing causal factors. It operates among the broadest population in order to cover the widest range of causal factors. In the attempt to cover as broad a base as possible to address root causes the natural consequence is that individuals who are not at risk are subject to the same treatment as those who are vulnerable, but whose symptoms are undetectable by the available diagnostic tools, or who may be vulnerable but do not exhibit any indicators. Priority in primary prevention is to increase individual strengths and decrease individual weaknesses, increase social supports and decrease social stress, and to increase physical resources while decreasing physical pressures (Bloom, 1996). Such a paradigm as described in Bloom’s configural equation of primary prevention has two complementary objectives of supporting promotive factors while decreasing risk factors (Bloom 1996). In primary prevention the promotion of protective factors identified with individuals and within communities is as important as decreasing risk factors. There are several types of initiatives specific to the primary prevention of violent Islamist extremism that fall under the following categories: counter-ideology or alternative narratives, including the use of positive role models; identity strategies; addressing grievances and empowerment; and general education. Counter-Ideology and Counter-Ideologue Strategies It is not uncommon for rebuttals specific to ideological treatises to deconstruct the argumentation of authors espousing variants of Islamism that sanction the use of violence (e.g. JI and Singapore). This is more common in South East Asia, Egypt (where radical have even offered rebuttals against their own writings – see Ashour), and Saudi Arabia, where official interpretations of Islam can readily be juxtaposed with deviant interpretations. In Britain counter-ideology is often embedded in Muslim youth culture involving youth magazines and forms of democratic activism (e.g. Hear My Voice, described further below) or in well-marketed initiatives that aim to flood the Muslim identity market and religious seeker with alternative narratives. For example the Radical Middle Way (RMW) involves a series of influential speakers on various topics in Islam that holds talks across Britain. Speakers, who have included Shaykh Abdal Hakim Murad and the Grand Mufti of Egypt Shaykh Ali Gomaa, provide alternatives to radical discourse. Through these figures RMW not only provides

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alternative narratives, but provides alternative charismatic leadership to counter radicalisers such as the infamous Abu Hamza. Other positive role models or counterideologues include ex-radicals, which, not unlike the ‘scared straight’ programs in the United States, utilize figures like Ed Husain, author of ‘The Islamist’ and founder of the Quillium Foundation, to inform broad audiences of the perils of radicalisers and of becoming radicalised. Identity Strategies Caplan’s model of prevention was informed by an Eriksonian notion of development, where a disorder, or in this case a social issue, arises because of maladaption and maladjustment, and by altering the balance of forces, healthy adaptation and adjustment is possible. What guides primary prevention is equipping communities with resilience to crisis – a triggering point in the onset of many social issues. In research on radicalisation, crisis of identity is considered a risk factor. Where there are unresolved tensions in one’s identity, the likelihood of a ‘cognitive opening’ to activism and vulnerability to radical discourses is increased (Wiktorowicz, 2005). One example in primary prevention is the emphasis on citizenship training which aims to offer to immigrants a form of anticipatory instruction to safeguard or build resilience against potentially irreconcilable identity conflicts and stresses associated with immigration and displacement (e.g. refugees). (Lynn Davies highlights the role of identity in extremism [Davies, 2008].) Addressing Grievances and Empowerment A third group of primary prevention initiatives are those which broadly address grievances. The UK Government Home Office has set up a division aimed to forestall misinterpretation of counter-terrorism policy, called RICU. More concretely, ombudsman initiatives involving representation of young Muslims to directly communicate with the government were established across Britain, serving as a primary prevention effort to safeguard against unaddressed grievances and perceptions of disempowerment. Organizations like Hear My Voice offer alternative forms of activism through participation in the democratic process. General Education Strategies Lynn Davies provides a systematic examination of extremism and a primary prevention platform through education. In her analysis, the prevention of violent extremism begins with root questions. ‘How do we prevent people from becoming intolerant and absolutist?’ ‘How do we prevent people from joining extremist or violent movements?’ ‘How do we enable people to challenge extremism?’ These are the questions and challenges posed for primary prevention. Salient here is the ‘process base’ of her educational model which underscores the role of critical thinking, openness towards and presentation of alternative perspectives- features central in BMBB. Davies argues that such a strategy aligns with the tradition of ijtihad, promoted by the Washington think-tank, the Centre for the Study of Islam and Democracy, as well as by Tariq Ramadan, articulator of a European Islam (Davies, 2008).

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Being Muslim Being British Course as Primary Prevention Being Muslim Being British (BMBB) belongs to primary prevention interventions. However, while its effect might be that of reducing a person’s vulnerability to being recruited for terrorist actions, we designed the material as a life-skills development course that has value for the user in and of itself independent of its preventative potential, and this ‘lure’ towards high functioning beyond the norm (not just stamping out a problem) we think is part of the course’s draw for young people. Throughout the BMBB sessions, Theatre of the Oppressed (Boal 1998)-inspired group activities enable participants to work through the steps of raising integrative complexity, supported by trained facilitators. Group activities are vital: we use debate, role play and Theatre of the Oppressed methods of making an ‘image’, a bridge, or a whole group drama to describe a social reality, so that it can be viewed objectively, and learned from in a context of fun and playfulness. We used activities that were pioneered in the Boyd-MacMillan and Savage (2010) conflict work: deep breathing, active listening through three stages, laddering down to deep values, negotiating for win/win solutions, using critical thinking, and the use of diagrams and terminology that are user-friendly, such as IC = I See, branching out (to describe differentiation) and weaving together (to describe integration). BMBB thus fits into the primary prevention category, but is not first and foremost about prevention, but rather about ‘overshooting’ the problem, and empowering young people with a high level, cognitive life skill. As well, there now appear to be surprising secondary and even tertiary applications for BMBB. Secondary Prevention Secondary prevention is aimed at a smaller subset of the population, among those where a disorder (or social issue) has progressed far enough that it is detectable through early diagnosis and where treatment can begin. Secondary prevention aims to decrease prevalence of a disorder by shortening the duration of the malaise through early diagnosis and effective treatment. This is accomplished through early diagnosis, achieved by effective diagnostic tools, an early referral system which identifies warning signs, as well as screening programs used within populations at special risk (Caplan 1964). Secondary prevention programs must cope with issues of stigma and ‘at risk’ labels, and thus must be built on trust between the body administering the initiative and the community, without which social issues may be exacerbated. One of the few examples of secondary prevention in preventing violent extremism is the UK Government’s Home Office Channel program. The Channel program is a referral-based program that coordinates with local authorities and organizations to identify and address risk factors in individuals. These include, but are not limited to or necessarily determined by: expressed opinions including support for violence and terrorism; possession of violent extremist literature or imagery, membership or contribution to violent extremist websites and/or chat rooms, or literature on weapons or bomb-making; behaviour or behavioural changes including withdrawal from family/peers, hostility, association with extremist organisations; and, finally, aspects of personal history including involvement in organisations espousing the use of violence or overseas military/terrorist training (HO Government, March 2010). Those who are referred to the Channel program are screened, assessed for needs, and have an action plan for support developed according to these needs (10). Records detailing

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interactions with individuals are recorded in a database and retained up to seven years (personal conversation, Channel practitioner, 13 May 2010). Channel, police and Prevent practioners have told us that BMBB should play a role in secondary prevention, at least in terms of enabling Channel practitioners to understand their own and other’s positions, to enable their interactions in the community to become more positive with the help of IC. Tertiary Prevention Tertiary prevention is directed at the smallest subset of a population: those for whom the issue has progressed to the point where there are deleterious consequences for the functioning of an individual and their capacity to contribute to society. In the tertiary prevention of violence for example, efforts are directed towards those who are violent or threaten to use violence. Tertiary prevention in this sense is interchangeable with rehabilitation. Examples of tertiary prevention in terrorism mainly take place in prison rehabilitation programs among non-violent and violent individuals alike. We have had interest from several prison chaplains and prison psychologists. Now several BMBB pilots are planned for trial in some UK prisons. The assessment research following these pilots will show whether it is effective in that context, and what adaptations are needed. Please see contact details at end for further information.

5. New Directions for BMBB Research shows that both right-wing and left-wing ideologies are low in IC (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003), and we think that the IC model can be adapted to fit a range of ideologically-driven extremisms. We now propose to add to the tools already developed in Being Muslim Being British to create IC for Young People – with eight new sessions to tackle violence arising from right-wing extremism and gang culture, in addition to Al-Qaeda or Islamist-related radicalisation. The new course, IC for Young People, will comprise a set of sixteen modules, including the eight sessions from Being Muslim Being British, to be flexibly selected by front line professionals who work with vulnerable young people at risk of a range of extremisms, such as teachers, social workers, nurses, police, youth leaders and religious leaders with the aim of promoting social cohesion, civic participation, and preventing violent extremism. Course leaders will choose 6-8 sessions relevant to their group. The new teaching materials (also using DVD and group activities) will be based on the theoretic IC model that has been tried and tested in Being Muslim Being British. New IC content for gangs and right-wing extremisms will be developed and pre- and post-tested in 2011, and will address issues of inter-group conflict and hatred (such as homophobia). Skills for emotional regulation and improved relationship skills will be likely to feature more strongly in the new sessions. Proposed IC Training Course for Front Line Professionals Our experience shows that course facilitators for BMBB need to be already skilled youth work leaders. In addition, they need approximately two days intensive IC Training to enable them to experience their own IC being raised, so that they can

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mentor and facilitate this process for others. They also need the skills and materials to assess the effectiveness of their intervention, and the Advanced IC Training Course will impart this measurement tool kit based on our assessment research paradigm. We are concentrating on training four key networks of professionals dealing with young people vulnerable to extremisms: chaplains (all faiths) to prisons; Channel teams; specialists- youth workers, probation officers, social workers, teachers, nurses, MAPPA (Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements); and Muslim chaplains to colleges and universities. We are planning two courses, each of two days duration, in Basic and Advanced IC Training. We are in dialogue concerning getting the IC Training courses accredited at a prestigious university’s external teaching programme. This we hope to snowball in Europe through universities there. The accredited IC Training course is thus the gateway to the free-of-charge IC educational materials, at the same time providing a quality assurance for IC delivery and a degree of ongoing supervision. As well, the IC Training for course facilitators will provide an ongoing research agenda into IC and prevention, so that theory, training and practice can be refined and improved over time, and adapted to the needs of many groups. For information on IC Training, IC courses, and free introductory BMBB course materials e-mail: beingmuslimbeingbritish@gmail

Acknowledgements We thank the European Commission and the UK Home Office for their generous support of this project from Dec 2007-June 2010 and to Dr Fraser Watts for his direction of the Psychology and Religion Research Group. Thanks also to Mary Sharpe for inviting us to NATO workshops and conferences, and for her help in kick-starting this project.

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The Islamic Movement in Algeria: A SocioHistorical Approach Professor Arous ZOUBIR1 Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Algiers Abstract. Algeria is a state where Islamism has been culturally dominant for several decades. It began as a feature of the nationalist movement that grew up to resist French colonialism. (It is not, as is sometimes claimed, due to foreign influences.) From 1989 onwards Islamism has been politically dominant too, and this has resulted in both legal and extra-legal attempts to stymie research into the sociological aspects of religion in the country since the government sees such work as ‘un-Islamic’. Such a climate does, of course, make academic study in this area very difficult. Keywords. Algeria; Islamism; Salafism; Muslim Brotherhood; Algerianism; Donatism; Ideological obstacles; Conceptual abuse

Introduction An adequate analysis of the Islamic movement that encompasses its various trends, that includes the forms of its political and associative organisation, and the theological sources of its discourse requires due emphasis upon the socio-historical context that made it what it is now. Needless to say that this requires, from a methodological standpoint, a focus upon its main preoccupations, the use of different methods and different levels of analysis necessary to disclose the anthropological and sociological dimensions of the movement. Obviously this approach implies the repudiation of the prevailing views that regard the Islamic movement as a foreign and imported phenomenon arbitrarily imposed upon Algeria, its history and cultural heritage. In accordance with this line, we hold that the recent Islamic phenomenon came into being as a part of the large nationalist movement but has gradually developed its own ideological apparatus and subsequently transformed itself into a political force capable of threatening the very existence of the state and challenging its actions in the economic, cultural and legislative fields. To establish this principal thesis we need to face first the issue regarding the looseness of concepts recurrent in studies related to this theme. Second, since we believe that this movement derives what is specific to it from the social history of Algeria, we build our claim upon two main arguments, namely, the functional continuity in history of the religious factor and the recognition of local circumstances which contributed, following periods of imposed dormancy, to the awakening of this element.

1

E-mail: [email protected]

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Algerian Islamism To achieve our purpose, it is therefore imperative to deal with the cluster of concepts used by the Islamic movement in ways that would make them more suitable and harmonious to the threefold division of this movement, i.e. the Salafist trend, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Algerianist faction. Understandably, this entails a need for a close examination of the presence of the religious element in the formative process of the militant nationalist consciousness. This allows us to see how Islam was actually used by the state to give cultural legitimacy to its economic and social policies. It also helps us to see how other forces, with different social origins, used it as a lethal weapon to undermine both ideology and the socio-economic programmes of the state. Now, it is worthwhile to recall that Algeria in 1989 enjoyed remarkable growth in political parties with the noticeable spread of a large Islamic movement throughout the country. With the rise of this phenomenon the fusion of the religious with the political realm became a reality, and with it political violence became an important ingredient of daily life too. It goes without saying that the political use of Islam manifests itself in the appearance of political parties and associations sharing the same discourse yet differing in tactics and ways to bring about the desired social change. In any case, the astonishing growth in ranks of an Islamic movement advocating a radical change to the existing social order is a result of history and a society in a state of flux. As expected this position not only differs from but runs contrary to what some observers of the Algerian scene hold to be true. They see the matter differently. For them not only was the event astonishing but also it falls outside the range of the scientific method and its explanatory power. In the words of Hassan Kateb, the rapid spread of the Islamic movement nowadays is the work of Allah's invisible hand. Others went as far as to deny the socio-historic dimension of the phenomenon and when accepting it with reluctance, they restrict it in space and time. Redwane Al Sayyed, for instance holds that the Islamic movement is an exclusive product of rural areas in the nineteen eighties. Obviously this implies the exclusion of historical continuity and the denial of its urban origin and consequently restricts the scope of its activity to rural areas. Clearly, these interpretations are in complete contradiction to the logic of history and rules governing social change. They are indeed entirely opposed to what is generally admitted in the social sciences, namely nations derive what is specific to them from their history. History is however nothing more than what a people has experienced and lived through in the fields of civilisation, culture, politics and so on. Aside from this, we should keep in mind that we are actually dealing with issues related to projects for social reconstruction presenting itself as a real substitute for the existing state of affairs. To put it directly, the crux of the matter is about poetically organised social forces wrapped up with Islam but seeking in the end to overthrow the existing social order, and the most striking fact about their discourse is that it has been raised to the level of religious faith and thus most of the literature produced by this movement was robbed of its human qualities and transformed into an absolute dogma completely opposed to the needs of society. Consequently it has been unable to capture the contradictions resulting from the process of superficial modernisation which fail to take into account the rigidity of local culture and traditions that work in ways opposed to it. This does not mean that we adhere to the secular thesis which states that the

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solution to the crisis and the contradictions facing Algeria lie in the evacuation of religion from the political field. The practice of politics, so it is held, in the name of religion or vice versa, is conducive to endless conflicts. In spite of its seeming logical consistency this thesis remains flawed for it neglects two important facts, namely the presence of religion and its capacity to permeate actions and institutions throughout Arab and Muslim countries in general and Algeria in particular. Yet the recent resurgence of the Islamic movement must be viewed as a symptom of a crisis resulting from failures in the economic, cultural and social arenas. The preceding facts stimulate a search for certainty and salvation which most people find in religion. The return to religion that we witness nowadays in Algeria is quite understandable in view of the fact that religion has always constituted the bulk of popular culture and institutions and social conduct. It was used through history by Algerians to impose or resist hegemony and also to press social demands and express grievances. This was the case with Donatism in ancient history and with the nationalist movement in its struggle with French colonial power. Most of the factions constituting the nationalist movement derived their ideological creed from Islam and used it to stress national identity and independence. It is no wonder therefore that religion is used by other social forces in the period subsequent to independence to undermine the existing social order. The significance of Islam lies precisely in its powerful influence upon the whole culture and the overwhelming majority of Algerian citizens as well as in its capacity to serve as an invaluable source of legitimacy for social and political programmes. If we take this element seriously we understand why most leaders of the nationalist movement relied on Islam and used it during the French occupations as a principal component in their political creed and programmes in spite of their divergence and links to western schools of political thought. These facts confirm the suitability of the historical approach for it is extremely helpful in understanding conflicts among political parties in and after the era of independence. Their periodic hostilities were most of the time motivated by the attempt to possess, so to speak, Islam in order to deprive political adversaries from a vital source of legitimacy. The approach adopted in this study teaches us that discourses on movements of an Islamic persuasion represent, from a sociological standpoint, an attempt to comprehend the dynamics of Algerian society with views that try to expose the causes underlying the general movement of this society in total. Talking about the Islamic movement is an enquiry into a complex social reality brought into existence by changing social and political circumstances. Basic to our approach is the recognition of the specification of each movement arising from a distinctive historical experience and cultural environment. Accordingly, we believe it is legitimate to consider the Islamic movement an integral part of the formative social process rather than something standing over and above it. Needless to say, the factions constituting the Islamic movement share as a matter of fact the same cultural heritage. Nevertheless they differ from each other as a result of what they experienced in their respective social history which in turn contributed in one way or another to the language with which they have articulated historical tasks. At this stage in the analysis when dealing with the Algerian Islamic movement we need to make a distinction between associations linked to political parties, and associations labeled by public authorities as charity or culture associations dedicated to carrying out useful social work according to autonomously developed plans often

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presented to public opinion as a typical example of the working out of the good old national values of solidarity. On the other hand, it would be extremely useful for practical purposes to show how this type of association moved to overt political activism. To carry out this task we need again to go back to history in order to examine closely its contributions to Islamic political action and the social environment into which it came into being. Last but not least, we must admit that the approach used in any study does in no way preclude other methods capable of yielding results and conclusions free from prejudices and the distortion of facts. Moreover we have also to admit that our approach is paved with a number of difficulties and obstacles some of which have to do with ideology, while still others arise from difficulties related to the mastery of epistemological and sociological fields. Ideological Obstacles Obstacles related to methods and concepts used in the sociological study of the Islamic movement pertain to the kind of difficulties with which scholars are well acquainted and overcome them by taking precautionary measures that guarantee a reasonable measure of truth to their findings. However the matter is altogether different when confronted with the threat of death or being declared an apostate and heretic. This is precisely what actually happened with the Islamic Front for Salvation (I.F.S) when it warned scholars in the field of the social sciences against inquiring into ‘introductions to the devil‘ which aimed at undermining national unity and religion. It even went as far as to call to the nation for resistance to prevent them (scholars) from achieving their ‘destructive design’. The threatening message appeared in a warning from fellow Muslims, “dangerous questionnaire covers the skies of Algeria”. What actually triggered this hostility was a study conducted by the National Institute for Research and Analysis to collect data on the conditions of Algerian youth. The study was judged by the I.F.S leaders as devious and dangerous to divine law for the following reasons: • • •

it included questions that undermine divine law and national cultural identity it attempted to draw a line separating politics from divine law it asked questions about the reasons for wearing the Islamic veil and if girls were willing to marry Christians and Jews

In short, the study amounts, in the eyes of the I.F.S. leadership, to a sin, which is reason enough to prohibit research seeking to understand the functions of religion in the political and social fields. Conceptual Abuse It has been fashionable in studies on the Islamic movements to use terminology that does not square with the general spirit of their ideologies. Sometimes we come across concepts that express wishful thinking and are more akin to slogans used for propaganda purposes. Such abuse in no way helps getting near the truth about the ideology, nor the organisation of, this movement.

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Difficulties Arising from Epistemological and Sociological Fields The Islamic movement as a subject matter for social research is plural in its trends and factions. It has experienced protracted periods of secrecy and relied on a single ideological source i.e. the Islamic faith. This resulted in lumping together all groups and factions as though they constituted a unified whole called ‘the Islamic movement’ yet the components of this movement diverge on a number of issues, most of them relating to ways of bringing about the expected social reconstruction. The difference of opinion on these practical matters ended in armed combat. Unity of Speech If taken at face value, the speech articulating objectives and ideology leads to conclusions that tend to obliterate differences, as though the Islamic movement were in effect a coherent and unified whole. Effect of Secrecy The secretive nature of the Islamic movement, which is a result of political persecution and official banishment, constitutes an additional impediment. Secrecy and extreme caution, for security reasons, seriously affect the availability of research materials.

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The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration Fathali M. MOGHADDAM1 Georgetown University

Abstract. To foster a more in-depth understanding of the psychological processes leading to terrorism, the author conceptualizes the terrorist act as the final step on a narrowing staircase. Although the vast majority of people, even when feeling deprived and unfairly treated, remain on the ground floor, some individuals climb up and are eventually recruited into terrorist organizations. These individuals believe they have no effective voice in society, are encouraged by leaders to displace aggression onto out-groups, and become socialized to see terrorist organizations as legitimate and out-group members as evil. The current policy of focusing on individuals already at the top of the staircase brings only short-term gains. The best long-term policy against terrorism is prevention, which is made possible by nourishing contextualized democracy on the ground floor. Keywords. terrorism; ‘Staircase to the Terrorist Act’; psychology; ‘us-versusthem’; ingroups/outgroups; perceptions of injustice; spread of democratization; contextualized democracy; participation in decision-making; ‘moral engagement’; perceived legitimacy; inhibitory mechanisms; policy implications; procedural justice

Introduction Despite disagreements about the definition of terrorism (Cooper, 2001) and claims that “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter,” there is general agreement that terrorism has become a monstrous problem in many parts of the world and that all efforts must be made to end it. For the purpose of this discussion, terrorism is defined as politically motivated violence, perpetrated by individuals, groups, or state-sponsored agents, intended to instill feelings of terror and helplessness in a population in order to influence decision-making and to change behavior. Psychologists have a vitally important responsibility to combat terrorism because (a) subjectively interpreted values and beliefs often serve as the most important basis for terrorist action (Bernholz, 2004) (b) the actions of terrorists are intended to bring about specific psychological experiences- that is, terror and helplessness (Moghaddam & Marsella, 2004); and (c) terrorism often has extremely harmful psychological consequences (Schlenger et al., 2002). Psychologists are contributing in important ways to a better understanding of terrorism and are providing more effective approaches to coping with its individual and 1 Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Fathali M. Moghaddam, Department of Psychology, White Gravenor Building, 3rd floor, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057. E-mail: [email protected]

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communal health consequences (Danieli, Brom & Waizer, in press; Horgan & Taylor, 2003; Moghaddam & Marsella, 2004; North & Pfefferbaum, 2002; Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003; Silke, 2003; Silver, Holman, McIntosh, Poulin, & GilRivas, 2002; Stout, 2002). However, there is an urgent need for greater attention to the social and psychological processes that lead to terrorist acts. A better understanding of terrorism is essential to the development of more effective policies to combat this global problem. Critical assessment of the available evidence suggests that there is little validity in explanations of terrorism that assume a high level of psychopathology among terrorists (Crenshaw, 1981; Ruby, 2002) or that terrorists come from economically deprived backgrounds or have little education (Atran, 2003). Attempts to profile terrorists (e.g., Fields, Elbedour, & Hein, 2002) and to identify demographic and socioeconomic factors associated with terrorism (e.g., Ehrlich & Liu, 2002) can yield greater benefits when incorporated within a broader conceptual account of processes leading to terrorist acts. The present discussion is intended as a contribution to a more dynamic, comprehensive account of the social and psychological processes leading to terrorism. A central proposition is that terrorism can best be understood through a focus on the psychological interpretation of material conditions and the options seen to be available to overcome perceived injustices, particularly those in the procedures through which decisions are made (Tyler & Huo, 2002).

The Staircase to the Terrorist Act To provide a more in-depth understanding of terrorism, I have used the metaphor of a narrowing staircase leading to the terrorist act at the top of a building. The staircase leads to higher and higher floors, and whether someone remains on a particular floor depends on the doors and spaces that person imagines to be open to her or him on that floor. The fundamentally important feature of the situation is not only the actual number of floors, stairs, rooms, and so on, but how people perceive the building and the doors they think are open to them. As individuals climb the staircase, they see fewer and fewer choices, until the only possible outcome is the destruction of others, or oneself, or both. This kind of ‘decision tree’ conceptualization of behavior has proved to be a powerful tool in psychology. For example, Latane and Darley (1970) conceptualized helping behavior as the outcome of five choices that lead an individual either to help or not help others in an emergency. The staircase to terrorism is conceived as having a ground floor and five higher floors, with behavior on each floor characterized by particular psychological processes. On the ground floor, perceptions of fairness and feelings of relative deprivation dominate. In conditions in which the millions of people who occupy the ground floor perceive injustice and feel relatively deprived, some individuals from among the disgruntled population will climb to the first floor in search of solutions. Those who reach the first floor seek ways in which to improve their situation and achieve greater justice. But if they do not see possibilities for individual mobility and do not feel that they can adequately influence the procedures through which decisions are made, they are more likely to keep climbing. Individuals who reach the second floor but still perceive grave injustices experience anger and frustration, and in some circumstances they are influenced by leaders to displace their aggression onto an ‘enemy’. Individuals who are more prone to physically displace aggression onto enemies climb further up the staircase.

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The most important transformation that takes place among those who reach the third floor is a gradual engagement with the morality of terrorist organizations; these individuals now begin to see terrorism as a justified strategy. Those who become more fully engaged with the morality of terrorist organizations and keep climbing up the staircase are ready for recruitment as active terrorists. Recruitment to terrorist organizations takes place on the fourth floor, where potential terrorists learn to categorize the world more rigidly into ‘us-versus-them’ and to see the terrorist organization as legitimate. On the last floor- the fifth- specific individuals are selected and trained to sidestep inhibitory mechanisms that could prevent them from injuring and killing both others and themselves, and those selected are equipped and sent to carry out terrorist acts. The wider context of the staircase metaphor is the internationalization of trade and mass communications, with the consequent vast movement of people and information around the globe. The rapidly increasing flow of people and information across national borders has greatly extended the global influence of the West generally and the United States specifically (including in the realm of psychology; Moghaddam, 1987). The spread of American and Western values and lifestyles has had two broad and in some ways contradictory consequences. On the one hand, major segments of societies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are strongly attracted to the affluent lifestyle and political and social freedoms associated with the United States and the West. On the other hand, there is growing frustration and anger in many non-Western societies that their higher expectations for improved economic conditions and greater political freedom are not being met. In addition, there is deep anxiety in many societies that local cultural and linguistic systems are being swept away and that traditional identities and allegiances are threatened by the massive sweep and reach of ‘Americanization’. Authoritarian forces have attempted, sometimes with considerable success, to harness this widespread discontent and to use it opportunistically to bolster both dictatorial rule and anti-American sentiments, particularly in a number of Islamic societies. Two points need to be clarified at the outset about the staircase metaphor. First, the metaphor is intended to provide a general framework within which to organize current psychological knowledge and to help direct future research and policy; it is not intended as a formal model to be tested against alternatives. Metaphors have proved highly useful in psychological science (see discussions in Leary, 1990) and can serve a constructive role in helping to better explain the roots of terrorism. Second, the staircase metaphor is intended to apply only to behavior encompassed by terrorism as defined earlier in this discussion; it is not intended to apply to other types of minority influence tactics. I briefly discuss the policy implications of the staircase metaphor at the end of this article. Ground Floor: Psychological Interpretation of Material Conditions The vast majority of people occupy the ‘foundational’ ground floor, where what matters most are perceptions of fairness and just treatment. To understand those who climb to the top of the staircase to terrorism, one must first comprehend the level of perceived injustice and the feelings of frustration and shame among hundreds of millions of people down at the ground floor. The central role of psychological factors is underlined by evidence that material factors such as poverty and lack of education are problematic as explanations for terrorist acts. In the West Bank and Gaza, support for

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armed attacks against Israeli targets tends to be greater among Palestinian individuals with more years of education (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002). A British army document discussing the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PRIA) in 1978, at a time when armed attacks by the PIRA had reached a peak, stated that “There is a stratum of intelligent, astute and experienced terrorists who provide the backbone of the organization… Our evidence of the calibre of rank and file terrorists does not support the view that they are mindless hooligans drawn from the unemployed and unemployable” (Coogan, 2002, p. 468). Similarly, low levels of education and impoverished backgrounds were not found to be characteristic of captured terrorists associated with al Qaeda in Southeast Asia (Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003) nor of Bin Laden or the al Qaeda members who perpetrated the tragedy of September 11, 2001 (Bodansky, 2001). Clearly, absolute material conditions do not account for terrorism; otherwise, acts of terrorism would be committed more by the poorest individuals living in the poorest regions, and this is not the case. Half a century of psychological research underlines the important role of subjective perceptions on feelings of deprivation (Collins, 1996). Particularly relevant to terrorism is Runciman’s (1966) distinction between egoistical deprivation, where an individual feels deprived because of his or her position within a group, and fraternal deprivation, involving feelings of deprivation that arise because of the position of an individual’s group relative to that of other groups. Research evidence suggests that fraternal deprivation is, under certain conditions, a better predictor of feelings of discontent among minorities than is egoistical deprivation (Guimond & Dube-Simard, 1983), and in some cases such feelings translate into collective action (Martin, Brickman, & Murray, 1984). Gurr’s (1970) theoretical formulation and subsequent research (e.g. Crosby, 1982) suggest that fraternal deprivation is more likely to arise when group members feel their path has been blocked to a desired goal that their group deserves and that others possess. For example, in the case of terrorism, especially important could be a perceived right to independence and the retention of indigenous cultures for a society, a perception that other societies have achieved this goal, and a feeling that under present conditions, the path to this goal has been blocked (e.g. by Americans). Of course, such perceptions may be influenced by deep prejudices (see Moghaddam, 1998, chap. 10). The literature on collective mobilization also emphasizes the importance of subjective perceptions (D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). From the French revolution to the Iranian revolution and other collective uprisings in modern times (Moghaddam, 2002), it is perceived injustices and relative rather than absolute deprivation that coincide with collective non-normative action (Miller, 2000). Perceptions of injustice may arise for a variety of reasons including economic and political conditions and threats to personal or collective identity (D. M. Taylor, 2003). Perceived threat to identity is of central importance in the case of religious fundamentalists because of the unique ability of religion to serve identity needs (Seul, 1999) and the feeling that increasing globalization, secularization, and Westernization are undermining traditional non-Western ways of life. Identity threat is also of deep concern to broader segments of non-Western populations, particularly the youth, who often grapple with the ‘good-copy problem’ (Moghaddam & Solliday, 1991), that is, the feeling that the very best they can achieve is to become a good copy of the Western model of women and men propagated as ‘ideal’ by the international media- a good copy that can never be as good as, or better than, the original.

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Among the vast populations who occupy the ground floor, then, perceptions of fairness are what matter most. An individual may be living in extremely poor, crowded conditions in Bombay and not feel unjustly treated despite the opulent living conditions of others around him or her in the city; however, another individual may be living in relatively comfortable conditions in Riyadh but feel very unjustly treated. In recent decades, rapidly rising expectations, nourished by images of affluence and democratic lifestyles spread by the international mass media, have fueled feelings of deprivation among vast populations, particularly in Asia, Africa, and parts of Eastern Europe. This groundswell of frustration and anger has given rise to greater sympathy for extremist ‘antiestablishment’ tactics among the vast populations on the ground floor. Every year, a number of those who feel unjustly treated are motivated to march along alternative paths, even desperate and radical ones, to address their grievances. First Floor: Perceived Options to Fight Unfair Treatment Individuals climb to the first floor and try different doors in search of solutions to what they perceive to be unjust treatment. Two psychological factors shape their behavior on the first floor in major ways: individuals’ perceived possibilities for personal mobility to improve their situation (D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994) and their perceptions of procedural justice (Tyler, 1994). A key question is whether there are doors that could be opened by talented persons motivated to make progress up the societal hierarchy. In ‘The Republic’ (D. Lee, Trans., 1987) Plato warned of the inevitable collapse of a society that does not allow for the rise of talented individuals in the social hierarchy and, correspondingly, the downward mobility of those who lack talent but are the offspring of those in power. The idea of ‘free circulation’ of individuals is also central to modern psychological theories of intergroup relations (D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). A variety of research evidence suggests that when paths to individual mobility are seen to be open, there is far less tendency to attempt non-normative actions (e.g., Tyler, 1990), probably because of a strong human tendency to want to believe that the world is just and that one’s personal efforts will be fairly rewarded (Lerner, 1980). Research on equity theory endorses the view that people strive for justice and feel distressed when they experience injustice (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994, chap. 5). But the equity tradition also underlines the vital role of psychological interpretations of justice and the need for policymakers to understand local cultural practices and ideas- ‘the native’s point of view’- in justice. When local cultural interpretations lead to a view that the in-group is being treated fairly, there is greater likelihood of support for central authorities. The availability of options for participating in decision-making is a key factor in perceived justice and support for authorities (Tyler, 1994). Tyler and Huo (2002) demonstrated that independent of distributive justice- the outcomes of justice processes- and interactional justice- the explanations that authorities provide for their decisions and the considerations they show to the recipients of decisions- the key factor in perceived legitimacy and willingness to abide by government regulations is procedural justice- how fair people see the decision-making process to be. Although much of the research on procedural justice has been conducted in Western societies, there is solid evidence in support of a few basic universals in perceived rights and duties (Moghaddam & Riley, 2004) and strong reasons to believe that procedural

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justice also plays a central role in many, perhaps all, major non-Western societies. A key influence on procedural justice is participation in decision-making (Tyler & Huo, 2002). Opportunities for voicing opinions and participating in decision-making are lacking in many parts of the world, as evidenced by recent United Nations Human Development reports: the spread of democratization appears to have stalled, with many countries failing to consolidate and deepen the first steps toward democracy and several slipping back into authoritarianism. Some 73 countries- with 42% of the world’s people- still do not hold free and fair elections, and 106 governments still restrict civil and political freedoms. (United Nations Development Programme, 2002, p. 13) It is clear that low income is no obstacle to democracy and that regions with an enormous deficit in democracy are the Middle East and North Africa. The democratic movements that have improved the lives of hundreds of millions of people in Latin America and in some parts of Africa and Asia have yet to have a serious impact on Islamic societies of the Middle East and North Africa. There is general agreement that options for voice, mobility, and participatory democracy are particularly lacking in Saudi Arabia, the country of origin for many of the most influential terrorist networks currently active on the world stage (Schwartz, 2002). This is not, of course, a justification for attempting a transplantation of Westernstyle democracy to non-Western societies. But there is a need to support contextualized democracy- that is, sociopolitical order that allows participation in decision-making and social mobility through the utilization of local, culturally appropriate symbols and strategies. Contextualized democracy needs to proceed with attention to the details of the cultural context in non-Western societies (see Moghaddam, 2002, particularly chaps. 2 and 3), such as that of Shi’a Islam (Moghaddam, 2004). A challenge is to avoid violent and highly disruptive political revolutions, such as the 1978-1979 revolution in Iran, that tend to perpetuate dictatorships under different guises rather than lead to genuinely open societies. Violent revolutions can best be avoided through measured and tangible progression toward contextualized democracy. The implementation of contextualized democracy should be given the highest priority in countries such as Saudi Arabia, where a combination of repression and corruption (see, e.g., Aburish, 1995) leaves minimal options available for any kind of public expression of dissatisfaction and participation in meaningful decision-making. Some psychological theories (see, e.g., D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994) suggest that a range of possible interpretations will arise among people in this situation, including displacement of aggression: Those who vehemently blame ‘others’ (e.g. ‘America- the Great Satan’) for their perceived problems climb the stairs to the second floor. Second Floor: Displacement of Aggression The idea that at least some acts of terrorism involve displaced aggression (as the concept is discussed by Freud (1921/1955, 1930/1961, and contemporary researchers, e.g., Miller, Pederson, Earlywine & Pollock, 2003) is well known. What remains less understood is the complex relationship between some movements and leaders in Asia and Africa who are supported by the United States and other Western powers and who at the same time directly and indirectly use anti-Americanism to bolster their own positions. As Rushdie (2002) and others (e.g. Atran, 2003, p. 1538) have noted, antiAmericanism is serving to deflect criticism from governments in the Middle East, even

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though without U.S. support a number of such governments would probably collapse. The displacement of aggression onto out-groups, particularly the United States, has been channeled through direct and indirect support for institutions and organizations that nurture authoritarian attitudes (see Altemeyer, 1988, for a discussion) and extremist behavior. This includes educational systems that encourage rigid, us-versusthem thinking, and fanatical movements, including violent Salafis, whose fundamentalist movement originates in and still receives support from Saudi Arabia. In this context, individuals who develop a readiness to physically displace aggression and who actively seek out opportunities to do so eventually leave the second floor and climb more steps to try to take action against perceived enemies. As they move up the staircase, these individuals become more deeply engaged in a morality that condones terrorism. Third Floor: ‘Moral Engagement’ Terrorist organizations arise as a parallel or shadow world, with a parallel morality that justifies ‘the struggle’ to achieve the ‘ideal’ society by any means possible. From the perspective of the mainstream, terrorists are ‘morally disengaged’, particularly because of their willingness to commit acts of violence against civilians. However, from the perspective of the morality that exists within terrorist organizations, terrorists are ‘morally engaged’, and it is ‘enemy’ governments and their agents who are morally disengaged. The terrorist organization becomes effective by mobilizing sufficient resources to persuade recruits to become disengaged from morality as it is defined by government authorities (and often by the majority in society) and morally engaged in the way morality is constructed by the terrorist organization (for a related discussion, see Bandura, 2004). In the context of the Islamic world, terrorist organizations have fed on interpretations of Islam that laud what outsiders see as acts of terrorism but that terrorists depict as martyrdom toward a just goal (Davis, 2003). Although the struggle for control of the ‘correct’ interpretation of Islam is for the most part public, the terrorist organizations that have incorporated an ideology of martyrdom are secretive. Recruits are persuaded to become committed to the morality of the terrorist organization through a number of tactics, the most important of which are isolation, affiliation, secrecy, and fear. Studies of terrorist organizations and their networks (e.g. Alexander, 2002; Alexander & Swetman, 2002; Rapoport, 2002; Sageman, 2004) reveal that even when terrorists continue to live their ‘normal’ lives as members of communities, their goal is to develop their parallel lives in complete isolation and secrecy. Recruits are trained to keep their parallel lives a secret even from their wives, parents, and closest friends. The illegal nature of their organization, perceived harsh governmental measures against them, and perceived lack of openness in society all contribute to their continued isolation and the sense of absolute affiliation with other in-group members. In essence, terrorist organizations become effective by positioning themselves at two levels: (a) the macro level, as the only option open toward reforming society, and they point to (alleged) government repression and dictatorship as proof of their assertion; and (b) the micro level, as a ‘home’ for disaffected individuals (mostly young, single males), some of whom are recruited to carry out the most dangerous missions through programs that often have very fast turnaround. Having started from the ground floor, where they share feelings of frustration, injustice and shame with vast populations, potential terrorists now find themselves

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engaged in the extremist morality of isolated, secretive organizations dedicated to changing the world by any means available to them. Fourth Floor: Solidification of Categorical Thinking and the Perceived Legitimacy of the Terrorist Organization After a person has climbed to the fourth floor and entered the secret world of the terrorist organization, there is little or no opportunity to exit alive. In most cases, the first category of new recruits consists of those who will be relatively long-term members and who become part of small cells, each typically numbering four or five persons, with access to information only about the other members in their own cells. In the case of the second category of recruits- the ‘foot soldiers’ who are recruited to carry out violent attacks and to become suicide bombers- the entire operation of recruitment, training, and implementation of the terrorist act in some operations may take no more than 24 hours. Within those 24 hours, the recruited individual is typically given a great deal of positive attention and treated as a kind of celebrity, particularly by the recruiter (who stays by his or her side constantly) and by a charismatic cell leader. The cell structure of terrorist organizations may have first been widely adopted among guerilla forces fighting dictatorships in Latin America in the mid-20th century, and is designed to limit infiltration and discovery by antiterrorist agents. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the cell structure was being copied by most terrorist organizations, including those operating in Western societies (e.g. the Irish Republican Army [IRA]; Coogan, 2002, p. 466). Often, it is informal friendship networks and a need to belong that binds individuals to such cells (Sageman, 2004). Immersion in secret, small-group activities leads to changes in perceptions among recruits: a legitimization of the terrorist organization and its goals, a belief that the ends justify the means, and a strengthening of a categorical us-versus-them view of the world. Social categorization is a powerful psychological process (McGarty, 1999), which can lead to in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination even when the basis of categorization is trivial in a real-world context (D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994, chapter 4). A categorical us-versus-them view of the world is one of the hallmarks of terrorist organizations and the individuals attracted to them (Pearlstein, 1991; M. Taylor, 1988). The Western psychological literature has identified right-wing authoritarians as having a categorical viewpoint (Altemeyer, 1988), but in the global context, religious fundamentalism may be more directly related to an us-versus-them viewpoint among both Easterners (Alexander, 2002) and Westerners (Booth & Dunne, 2002). Just as Islamic fundamentalists have labeled the United States the ‘Great Satan’, leading evangelical Christians in the United States have backed the view that “Islam was founded by… a demon-possessed pedophile” (Cooperman, 2002). This us-versusthem thinking from the West has played into the hands of fundamentalists abroad, particularly some strands within Saudi Wahhabism (Gold, 2003) and the radical form of Shi’a Islam, as represented by Hizballah in Iran and Lebanon, for example (Shapira, 2000). Of course, a categorical us-versus-them viewpoint is not sufficient to lead to terrorism; another important element is a belief in the terrorist organization as a just means to an ideal end. Commitment to the terrorist cause strengthens as the new recruit is socialized into the traditions, methods, and goals of the organization. Over a century of research on social influence (see Moghaddam, 1998, chaps. 6 and 7) suggests that conformity and obedience will be very high in the cells of the terrorist organization, where the cell

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leader represents a strong authority figure and where nonconformity, disobedience, and disloyalty receive the harshest punishments. The recruits at this stage face two uncompromising forces: from within the terrorist organization, they are pressured to conform and to obey in ways that will lead to violent acts against civilians (and often against themselves); from outside the terrorist organization, especially in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa, they face governments that do not allow even minimal voice and democratic participation in addressing perceived injustices. These dictatorial governments are seen as puppets of world powers, primarily the United States- a perception endorsed by a variety of international critics (Scranton, 2002). During their stay on the fourth floor, then, individuals find that their options have narrowed considerably. They are now part of a tightly controlled group from which they cannot exit alive. Fifth Floor: The Terrorist Act and Sidestepping Inhibitory Mechanisms Terrorism involves acts of violence against civilians, often resulting in multiple deaths. The experience of professional military units demonstrates the intensive programs required to train soldiers to kill enemy soldiers (Grossman, 1995) and raises the question as to how terrorist organizations train their members to carry out the terrorist acts that kill innocent civilians. The answer is to be found in two psychological processes that are central to intergroup dynamics (Brown & Gaertner, 2001): the first involves social categorization (of civilians as part of the out-group), and the second involves psychological distance (through exaggerating differences between the ingroup and the out-group). The categorization of civilians as part of the out-group matches the pattern of secrecy practiced by terrorist organizations; recruits to terrorist organizations are trained to treat everyone, including civilians, outside their tightly knit group as the enemy (Sageman, 2004). Newspaper headlines announcing that a terrorist blast has killed innocent bystanders have little meaning to terrorist organizations because of the particular way in which they have categorized the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’ and their perception that anyone who is not actively resisting the government is a legitimate target of violence. Thus, from the point of view of the members of terrorist organizations, acts of violence against civilians are justified because civilians are part of the enemy, and only when civilians actively oppose the targeted ‘evil forces’ will they not be the enemy. The perception of civilians as part of the enemy helps explain how terrorists sidestep what Lorenz (1966) termed “inhibitory mechanisms”. Lorenz argued that inhibitory mechanisms serve to limit intra-species killing. For example, when two wolves fight, it usually becomes clear fairly soon that one of them is stronger, with the result that the weaker wolf signals defeat by moving back and showing signs of submission. The aggression of the winner is inhibited by the signals of submission, so that the winner does not continue to attack and attempt to seriously injure or kill the loser. Inhibitory mechanisms also evolved to limit the aggression of humans against one another and can be triggered through eye contact, pleading, crying, and other means when an attacker is in close proximity to a victim. Crime statistics (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2002) show that humans often kill other humans by means of guns and other weapons that allow killing from a distance and enable inhibitory mechanisms to be sidestepped. This is in line with Lorenz’s argument that among humans, inhibitory mechanisms have been sidestepped through the use of

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modern weapons, which allow an attacker to destroy a target from a distance. Because terrorists, particularly suicide bombers, often operate in very close physical proximity to at least some of their human targets, they could potentially be influenced by the kinds of pleading and other signals that typically trigger inhibitory mechanisms. But two key factors enable inhibitory mechanisms to be sidestepped during terrorist attacks: 1. By categorizing the target, including civilians, as the enemy and exaggerating differences between the in-group and the out-group, terrorists psychologically distance themselves from the other humans they intend to destroy. Psychological distancing is achieved in part through the adoption of terrorist myths, such as the idea that by attacking civilian targets, social order will be disrupted and the terrorist act can serve as a ‘spark’ to get people to ‘recognize truth’ and revolt against authorities (such a terrorist myth was even shared by the Oklahoma City bombers; see Linenthal, 2001). This is perhaps similar to the distancing that takes place between a rapist and the victim, particularly through the rapist’s adoption of cultural myths about rape (see readings in Searles & Berger, 1995). 2. The victims seldom become aware of the impending danger before the attack actually occurs, so they do not have an opportunity to behave in ways that might trigger inhibitory mechanisms. Thus, individuals who reach the fifth floor become psychologically prepared and motivated to commit acts of terrorism, sometimes resulting in multiple civilian deaths. But in order to understand the actions of the few who climb to the top of the staircase to terrorism and plunge into terrorist acts, one must begin by considering the conditions of life and the perceptions of justice among the millions on the ground floor. A solid body of psychological research (see Moghaddam, 1998, chap. 7) demonstrates that under certain conditions, some individuals will probably climb from the ground floor and wind their way up the staircase to terrorism. Of course, certain individuals are more likely than others to become terrorists, but it would be short-sighted to base policy entirely or mainly on identifying profiles of likely terrorists. It is conditions on the ground floor that lead to terrorism, and removing one set of individuals will only make room for another set to step forward and climb to the top. Only by reforming conditions on the ground floor can societies end terrorism.

Some Policy Implications In this final section I highlight four important policy recommendations arising from the staircase metaphor. 1. Prevention Must Come First The staircase metaphor has an overarching policy implication that is familiar to psychologists researching and practicing in mental health: Prevention is the long-term solution to terrorism. This is in line with a model of mental health that is integral to a larger public health care system and that provides broad-based services. But why should policymakers be expected to ‘go preventive’ in the terrorism domain when they have not shown much enthusiasm to do so in other domains? And

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what role is there for psychologists? In response to the first question, policymakers have no choice but to adopt a preventive approach to terrorism because the survival of the United States as a democratic superpower is at stake. This is not an exaggeration. The psychological, social, political, and economic costs of the tragedy of September 11 are too high to be repeated, and the continued risk of repeated attacks of the same or even greater magnitude is too high for the United States and its allies not to adopt preventive policies. Some measures have already been taken toward at least initiating preventive policies through tentative steps in support of contextualized democracy in parts of the Middle East (e.g., in Bahrain), but in some Islamic countries (e.g. Pakistan, Egypt), democracy has been taking significant steps backward, and dissatisfaction among millions on the ground floor is increasing. The message of psychological science should be expounded clearly: under certain conditions some individuals will more likely be influenced to harm both others and themselves. As long as conditions are perceived to be unjust and hopeless by vast populations on the ground floor, some individuals will very likely be influenced to climb the staircase to terrorism. The conditions on the ground floor must be improved if terrorism is to diminish. Second, psychologists should articulate the limited effectiveness of short-term strategies that have dominated policy in this area for decades: secretive ‘counterterrorist’ units and measures, a total concern to hunt for the so-called bad apples or needles in a haystack, and a naive reliance on improved technology and superior military might as the solution to defeating terrorism. The strategy of identifying and eliminating individual terrorists is extremely costly and counterproductive, because as long as conditions on the ground floor remain the same, every terrorist who is eliminated is quickly replaced by others. Obviously, long-term and short-term policies can be implemented hand-in-hand, but psychologists have an important role in helping to turn policies toward foundational long-term solutions. 2. Support Contextualized Democracy Through Procedural Justice Psychological research clearly highlights the important role procedural justice can play in bringing about contextualized democracy. Local cultural practices and symbolic systems need to be incorporated and used to enable greater legal opportunities for voice and mobility, as well as to influence perceptions of available opportunities. Such policies must include women and other minorities in the decision-making process. The experiences of numerous countries demonstrate that the full and equal participation of women in all domains of life, including social, economic, and political spheres, is a prerequisite for healthy national development. Strong support is needed for democratic processes even when they contradict local traditions, such as a tradition of allowing only a very limited role for women in the public sphere (as is still the case in much of the Middle East and North Africa). In this regard, special attention must be given to equal opportunities for voice and mobility in educational as well as professional and political domains. As is clear from the case of Iran, where the women are now the majority of undergraduate students in major universities, women can gain access to higher educational opportunities by successfully competing in open academic examinations but still be prevented from fulfilling their potential role in national development because of state-sponsored barriers against women at work and in politics.

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3. Educate Against Categorical Us-Versus-Them Thinking In order to influence greater voice and mobility in societies such as those in the Middle East and North Africa, an important step concerns the framing of the fight against terrorism, particularly in how the social world is categorized. As individuals climb the staircase, their categorization of the world into us-versus-them, the forces of good versus the forces of evil, and so on, becomes more prominent and rigid. The challenge is to prevent such a rigid style of categorization from becoming the norm at the foundational level, where most of the people are situated. A starting point for implementing this policy is to avoid, and indeed to combat, a categorization of the world into us- versus-them, good versus evil, and so forth. Such categorization only endorses the views of fundamentalists and increases the probability that more individuals will climb the staircase to commit terrorist acts. 4. Promote Interobjectivity and Justice In addition to providing treatment for the victims of terrorism (Moghaddam & Marsella, 2004), psychologists must help to mentally and emotionally prepare the U.S. population and other ‘victim societies’ to enter into dialogue with and achieve better understanding of those who have climbed the stairway to terrorism. Dialogue with extremist groups intent on attacking the United States is presently unthinkable for perhaps most Americans, but it must be kept in mind that there are numerous historical examples of former terrorist groups being brought into mainstream political processes (a recent example is the IRA in Northern Ireland, whose political wing now participates in mainstream politics). Greater international dialogue and improved intercultural understanding must come about as part of a long-term solution. Psychologists have a unique role to play in formulating and implementing international policies to influence interobjectivity- the understandings shared within and between cultures (Moghaddam, 2003)- to strengthen a shared worldview on justice, rights, and duties. Such policies can build on a foundation of probable psychological universals in justice but must also take into consideration the perceptions among many non-Western people that their indigenous identities are threatened as a result of increasing globalization and Western, particularly American, influence.

Conclusion The staircase metaphor directs us to build a solid foundation of contextualized democracy so that there will be minimal incentive for individuals to climb to higher floors in order to join terrorist organizations. Ultimately, terrorism is a moral problem with psychological underpinnings; the challenge is to prevent disaffected youth and others from becoming engaged in the morality of terrorist organizations. A lesson from the history of terrorism is that this moral problem does not have a technological solution; this lesson is at odds with the contemporary tendency to try to find technological solutions to moral dilemmas (Moghaddam, 1997). More sophisticated technology and increased military force will not end terrorism in the long-term. Over at least the last few decades, policies for ending terrorism have tended to be short-term, often driven by immediate political demands rather than by scientific understanding. The necessity of shifting to long-term policies is underscored by psychological research on populations most directly affected by the fight against terrorism, such as

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those in Afghanistan and Iraq (e.g. Wessells, 2004). The focus of policies for the most part has been on individuals who have climbed all the way up the staircase and are already committed to carrying out terrorist acts. Policies must be revised to address foundational problems at the bottom of the staircase and to encourage the development of contextualized democracies.

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Part Four Security and Norms: Law, Ethics and Justice

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Global Security: A Vision for the Future F. Géré and M. Sharpe (Eds.) IOS Press, 2011 © 2011 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-760-4-117

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Security and Norms: Law, Ethics and Justice 10-11 March 2008, Oslo Chair Peter BURGESSa1 and David RODINb2 a PRIO, Norway b Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, University of Oxford

Goals of the Workshop • • • • • •

International law and security Justice and fairness: global justice as a possible determinant of security Formal versus informal norms Constraints of security policy Ethics and the development of technology Geographical differences

First Part: Scientific Content According to the goals the workshop was divided into four sessions: • Globalisation • Norms of armed conflicts • Technology relevance • Risk The primary premise of that workshop was that law, ethics, and justice structure, guide and give meaning to human action. These elements should play a role in the determination of future security research. The workshop thus sought both to chart the relationship between law, ethics, justice and security research and to contribute to the identification and critique of relevant norms of conduct in security practices. This double agenda produced two broad perspectives on security research. One approach is essentially descriptive, and concerned the ways in which norms are produced, structured and sustained as social and political phenomena, subject to social, political and philosophical investigation. The other approach is explicitly normative in nature. It seeks to subject norms to critical attention and analysis, often with the explicit aim of developing and strengthening systems of legal and ethical norms. This approach is prominent in, though not limited to, the disciplines of philosophy, law, international relations theory and political theory.




























































 

E-mail: [email protected]


E-mail: [email protected]


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The workshop produced a rich set of recommendations for future research priority. Many of these research questions have a descriptive and normative component, and several (particularly in the area of research design and methodology) cut across the descriptive/normative divide). Recommendations can be seen to coalesce around four themes: the need to clarify the concept of security relative to the concepts of law ethics and justice, the content of legal and ethical norms, normative issues in security practices, and methodological issues in the development of this research agenda. The individual research issues identified below are connected on many levels. The division into four themes represents nodes in a network of interconnected  ideas, rather than conceptually independent programs of work. 1. Conceptual Issues Effective research is premised on an appropriate analysis of underlying terms and conceptions. Such analysis can be understood in differing ways. The normative approach seeks to clarify and critique basic concepts that may be confused, ambiguous, or inappropriate to the conceptual role they are intended to play and to amend or replace them with conceptions better suited to this task. The descriptive approach seeks to uncover and study the implicit structures, dynamics, underlying power
relations, and interests that organize conceptions. Security is itself a normative concept; it identifies a desirable state and objective of individual and social action. However it contains a number of important ambiguities and contested elements. Security may be conceived in individual or societal and collective terms. But what is the precise relationship between aspects of security? Are there different conceptions of security relevant to these two areas? How do these conceptions shape normative tensions, such as those between liberal and communitarian conceptions of norms discussed below? The notion of ‘absolute security’ from all possible risks and dangers causes significant conceptual problems. First, is absolute security possible given the social and biological constraints on humans? Second, if it were possible, would it be desirable? There is some evidence that the search for absolute security has socially counterproductive and even self
destructive consequences, and may be likened to a kind of hubris. If, on the other hand, absolute security is not possible, what level of security should societies aim for? How are researchers and policymakers to conceptualise, a ‘sufficient’ or ‘optimal’ level of security objectives? How is the concomitant notion of ‘acceptable insecurity’ to be conceived and justified? The notion of risk is fundamental to the norms and practice of security. Risk is intimately connected to the management of future uncertainties through various forms of governance including law, and tacit norms. The concept of risk is related to the concept of security (though the precise relationship remains open to debate). A number of fundamental issues arise in the context of risk. First, to what extent is it possible to manage risk, and what are the appropriate norms and mechanisms for governing the management of risk?





























































Throughout this document the term “security norms” has been used to refer to ethical and legal aspects of security practices.




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Risk management processes encompass a number of different instruments including: i) technological instruments such as mathematical risk models and algorithms ii) financial instruments such as insurance, financial securities, and markets iii) managerial, governance and institutional structures for managing risk. Each of these practices and instruments raise complex and difficult ethical and legal issues. Practices of risk management engage with and are supported by a number of adjacent concepts and principles, many of which raise deep and problematic questions of their own. One of the areas in which concepts of risk, and strategies of risk management, have been most highly developed is in financial markets. But further work is needed on the extent to which financial concepts such as volatility, and statistical concepts such as probability, can be generalised into a broader account of risk applicable to other areas of security practice. A further issue concerns how we are to conceptualise catastrophic risks the occurrence of which may be highly unlikely. The ‘precautionary principle’ is one way to deal with this problem, but is in tension with principles of cost
benefit rationality. The idea of risk management is often connected, in practice, with strategies of pre
emptive intervention. These practices can be more or less intrusive and more or less coercive, but the principle of pre-emption and its application demand careful normative examination. Subjective assessments of risk often seem divergent with what might be suggested by a purely rational response to underlying facts and conditions. Often risk assessment is conditioned by political conditions and a ‘cover your ass’ mentality among officials. To what extent is it possible to achieve objective assessment of risk, and what contribution can social scientists and humanists make to this? Related to this is the observation that the representation of danger as risk may create a more present reality than the underlying dangers themselves, with security policy more directed to the representation and perception of risk than any underlying ‘objective’ danger. The concept of globalisation has had a profound impact on research on the norms of security. But how useful is the conception of globalisation as a meta
theme for structuring this research? The idea of Globalisation began as a challenge to traditional dichotomies (for example the division between internal/external, market/state, public/private). Yet it may also obscure many issues, by over-emphasising the novelty of current phenomena, and reifying precisely the dichotomies it seeks to supersede. To what extent should we make use of concepts such as structural violence, symbolic violence in studying security practices? 2. The Content of Norms: Principles, Rules and Virtues Legal, moral and philosophical norms of security are experiencing significant strain from familiar yet complex sources including technology, trends of globalisation, social, political and demographic change. Core aspects of legal and ethical values remain essentially contested. A number of research agendas were identified. Some of these are descriptive, seeking to understand how such norms are produced and sustained. Others are more normative in focus, seeking to clarify, extend and in some cases overturn the content of established norms.

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Research on the ethics of security practices is framed by a number of underlying and well-established philosophical debates. One is the debate between liberal and communitarian conceptions of value. Another is between deontological, consequentialist and virtue
centred theoretical approaches to ethics. These debates need further development in the context of security practice. Attention must be paid to the development of synthetic and integrative approaches that go beyond a sterile opposition of theoretical positions. Accepted security norms frequently reflect a Western viewpoint and are often historically derived from a Western theory and practice. This engages a number of ethical challenges in terms of formulating general or global norms for security practices. Is it possible to build a culturally diverse overlapping consensus on the substance of security norms? Is it possible to articulate a vision of security as a good which stake
holders from all societies can view as beneficial? Principles of responsibility and liability require significant development in both their ethical and legal context. We must develop a greater understanding of the basis of individual and group (specifically state) liability, and of how they are related to one another. Notions of responsibility based on recklessness and negligence engage the debates on risk highlighted above. Further challenges for the notions of responsibility and liability concern the need to embed ethical norms in the design of products, systems and networks. A number of specific issues in international law and ethics demand further work. Many of the most notable gaps and problems lie in the Laws of Armed Conflict. In the context of jus ad bellum a pressing concern is developing our understanding of the crime of aggression. Logically connected to this project are the issues of pre
emptive and preventive action, (in particular preventive military action and war) and humanitarian intervention. There is a great need to clarify and develop the jus in bello norms of proportionality and collateral damage (with related issues of double effect), targeted killing, and the content and basis of the combatant/non combatant discussion. Driving many of these issues are developments in the practice of war and conflict, including new kinds of participants such as insurgents, terrorists, private contractors and special forces personnel who do not easily fit the traditional categories. A significant set of issues concerns the relationship between ad bellum and in bello components of the laws of war. Traditionally these two bodies of norms have been viewed as conceptually and normatively independent, but this conceptual separation has been challenged by a recent body of philosophical and legal work, with potentially far
reaching consequences for many aspects of the laws of war. This topic will require significant further work. The relationship between war and security is itself highly problematic. Just War Theory assumes that war can sometimes be an appropriate means to attain security, but this assumption is not self
evident and has been historically challenged by pacifism. The more recent body of work on global governance seeks to develop new models of international authority that would implicitly remove or restrict the rights of individual states to have unilateral recourse to war. This authority
centric model of international security is a significant departure from traditional Just War Theory and requires significant further work and development. Are there any absolute moral and legal norms? Norms against torture, genocide, cruel and unusual punishment, which have the legal status of jus cogens suggest that

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there are. But how are we to make sense of these norms? How do such absolute prohibitions relate to the well-established notions of excuse and justifications? How are absolute norms to be understood in a cross
cultural context? Does the terminology of absolute norms for example ‘evil’, ‘monster’. etc. facilitate or impede human security? 3. Implementing Legal and Ethical Issues in Security Practices Continuous with the question of the substance of security norms is a set of issues around how such norms are and ought to be implemented and enforced. Indeed, the content of norms and their implementation have a reflexive relationship, challenging, developing and shaping one another. The challenges of new security practices raise many paradoxical implications for the stable establishment of norms. First, in many contexts security for one group may create risk and insecurity for another (for example security from crime for some presupposes the imprisonment of others). This raises a fundamental ethical question about whose security is to be optimized. Second, norms and practices that are intended to be security enhancing may be self
defeating, even for the intended beneficiaries. Norms may create perverse incentives, and if they are unjust, or appear unjust, they may provoke additional security threats. Difficult trade
offs are implicit in the implementation of security norms. But what are the principles that should govern such trade
offs? Are there some absolute values that ought not to be traded off? Technology contributes significantly to the way in which ethical norms can be formulated and implemented in security practices, both as a context for, enabler of, and challenge to those norms. There is a great temptation to view technology as in itself providing a solution to security problems– the ‘technical fix’. This is a mistake. Technology has an irreducible societal and human aspect that profoundly affects its uses and effects. Moreover, technology and its design are imbued with human intentionality and normative assumptions. Often these normative commitments are obscure and unexamined, and there are significant questions as to whether these can be made explicit and managed in a rational ethically informed way. Technological solutions such as biometric techniques, data mining, risk analysis, and profiling may appear to offer ways to enhance security while avoiding problematic aspects of traditional military security practices. However, many of these practices conceal profound normative issues of their own, which must be critically examined. Material and virtual technologies raise somewhat different issues, and material technologies in particular deserve more attention from legal and ethical scholars. The role of networks in security practices deserves particular attention. Networks, both human and computational, are sometimes seen as more robust, because they are distributed and have built-in redundancy. However, networks also tend to develop where regulation is minimal or even absent. This has a number of important implications. First, networks may be used to circumvent traditional state controls to deliver striking new security threats (as we have seen with the use of the internet by ‘radical’ terrorists). Second, networks themselves, as critical infrastructure, may contain hidden vulnerabilities to cascading failure.

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Third, networks may provide new models of how normative functions such as authority and legitimacy can arise in a more or less self-organizing and distributive setting (for example Wikipedia, Wikileaks). This may prove a fruitful model for considering the development of ethical consensus in a plural world. Fourth, networks can also enable the evasion of responsibility, if action is determined by the system: if all have responsibility then no one is responsible. How can we encourage attention to the ethical dimensions of security practices? Conceptions of virtue can play a role in generating compliance with existing laws and norms, but aberrant virtue systems are also capable of developing. This suggests a prominent role for ethical and legal teaching and training, for which systems and methodology require further development. Others suggest that only clear guidelines, backed by sanctions, can ensure compliance. Design ethics seeks to design ethical action into human and technical systems. The relationship of security to punishment raises several questions. Punishment is one form of expressing and maintaining normative commitments, and can play an important part in the development of norms, as for example in the recent attempts to bring perpetrators of war crimes to justice in the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and the nascent International Criminal Court. Yet the desire to punish may be linked to revenge and the confusing of war with punishment may undermine restraint in the prosecution of war. Two domains of interaction are crucial in shaping security practices and the norms that govern them: politics and the market. One fundamental question concerns the relationship between the two and how domestic and global society draws the boundary between these domains. Oversight and governance of markets remains a challenge and an important debate concerns the possibility of democratic oversight of market processes. A significant new research agenda focuses on the way that ethical norms can be embedded in the design of products, systems, networks, and institutions. ‘Design ethics’ explores the way that such ethical design can constrain and guide action. Attention to the design process may provide opportunities to enhance desirable goals such as security in ways that are less intrusive or coercive than traditional security practices. A related trend in international ethics is to focus on the procedures and institutions required to achieve justice and the protection of rights. However, challenges and risks remain for this research agenda. New methodologies for integrating ethical and normative norms into the design process must be developed. Institutional governance processes and conceptions of responsibility and liability must be developed. Critical design theory explores the unintended consequences and problematic applications of technology and design. There are also questions as to whether it would be desirable, given conceptions of human autonomy, even if possible, to constrain human action through design in such a way that wrongful action is impossible. Much work will be required to develop new, shared ways of working between designers, engineers, legal, humanists and social scientists. The clear result of the workshop is that there are significant tensions and discontinuities between these differing approaches to the study of norms. Both approaches will require attention in the development of any security research agenda and neither approach should monopolize the premises for an ethics of security practice. Moreover, while the tensions should not be underestimated, there are also areas of continuity and overlap between the two approaches, suggesting opportunities for mutual engagement. One obvious area of continuity is the way in which normative

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approaches can be informed by the understanding of norms provided by descriptive research.

Second Part: Findings and Agenda for Research Two key observations informed the deliberations of the Ethics, Law and Justice working group. The first relates to the fundamental importance of ethics in the security domain. Within the field of security studies, as well as actual security practice, the inclination to disregard the significance of ethical issues remains strong. The extent to which ethics pervades all aspects of this field makes it incumbent on researchers to draw out these ethical dimensions more explicitly in their research. To that end, the working group has adopted the term ‘security norms’ in order to denote the ethical and legal dimensions of security practices. A related issue for researchers to consider concerns the relationship between ethical analysis and policy. As was observed among members of the working group, the greatest threat to our core values stems from a failure to understand, which in turn, significantly hampers the effectiveness of decision-making. In devising and pursuing an agenda for future research, it was noted that researchers must bear in mind the potentially devastating policy implications that arise from faulty ethical analysis. The research agenda that follows was framed with these issues in mind. Second, it is critical to explore these issues in a historically informed way. History is often absent or poor in normative debates, leading to an exaggerated sense of the ‘newness’ of current trends and a failure to capitalise on historical bodies of thought. The ongoing development and understanding of normative frameworks for security practices will require social scientists and humanists to work with governmental, non
governmental and security organisations. There are, however, particular methodological risks associated with this. Care must be taken to ensure that accepting research funding does not introduce research bias. More problematically, we must face the question of whether researching the ethics of security phenomena presupposes accepting and validating the underlying assumptions of this practice. This difficulty is particularly acute in the case of war, where the underlying practice contains such a potential for the destruction of security. Similarly engaging with security practitioners can entail difficult trade
offs. For example there may be a temptation to ‘tone down’ a normative position in order to gain access to security actors and the possibility of influence. Research Agenda: Security Norms and International Authority, a Framework for Mutual Reinforcement The extent to which ethical questions pervade contemporary security issues can no longer be disputed. From the advent of new weapons technology and the concomitant difficulties associated with counter-proliferation to the challenges posed by global terrorism, the response to contemporary insecurity in all its incarnations will undoubtedly raise ethical questions and many aspects of security policy will be guided, shaped and constrained by ethical considerations. While there is widespread recognition that security practices must be informed by normative considerations, existing ethical and legal structures can be ill-equipped for meeting this task.

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This proposal sets out an ambitious programme of research that seeks to elaborate a more robust normative framework for managing and regulating contemporary security challenges. While a number of research efforts have begun to address the ethical dimensions of security, this agenda will endeavour to integrate and move beyond these efforts through the pursuit of collaborative, interdisciplinary, and impactoriented research. The aim of this investigation will be to determine the extent to which existing approaches will need to be strengthened, modified or replaced. Underlying this programme of study are three key assumptions. First, the effective management of contemporary security challenges requires a critical re-examination of existing security norms. Second, a robust normative framework can only be realised in the context of sound authority structures. Third, further attention must be devoted to the reflexive relationship between norms and international authority. Just as normative frameworks rely on instruments of authority to interpret, apply, and implement such norms, the legitimacy of authority structures will be enhanced by facilitating and upholding particular norms. In this respect, security norms and authority structures should ideally be mutually reinforcing. The overarching concern of this research programme is to develop the means for enhancing practices of mutual reinforcement. The proposed research agenda will incorporate three strands of inquiry into a unified programme of research. (1) Security Norms: The intention of this first strand will be to signal instances in which conventional norms are inappropriate or inadequate, often subject to challenge or contestation. This will require an identification of areas where certain norms are in conflict, and an assessment of whether such norms should be modified, abandoned or replaced. (2) Authority Structures: In many respects, the presence of weak and contested norms reflects an underlying strain in contemporary authority structures. This area recognises the important role of authority as a vehicle for interpreting, implementing and enforcing norms. The emphasis of this research strand will be to examine how international authority can be strengthened. (3) Interaction: A final research strand will explore the crucial interactions between security norms and authority structures. While security norms depend on strengthened structures of authority, authority structures also derive legitimacy through propagating particular norms. This area of research recognizes the reflexive relationship between the two, and their potential for mutual reinforcement. The areas of inquiry identified will require contributions from (though not be limited to) the following disciplines: philosophy, law, history, international relations, political theory, sociology, linguistics, politics and psychology. The remainder of this section will provide a detailed description of the proposed program of study, including its key themes and the avenues for future research within each of these broad categories. As will be evident from the program of study, many of the themes identified cut across the three categories, thereby resulting in elements of overlap within the agenda. Nevertheless, given the overriding interest of this project in strengthening practices of mutual reinforcement between security norms and international authority, such instances of overlap serve to strengthen, rather than detract from, the central objectives of the research program.

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Programme of Study (1) Security Norms The first strand of the research agenda is concerned with defining, exploring and assessing the substance of security norms. Research in this area will focus on how norms are produced and sustained in different contexts, and the extent to which particular norms are contested. Key questions that will be addressed include: How can traditional norms be adapted to suit changing circumstances? Should security norms be considered absolute or provisional? How can legal and ethical norms respond to technological change and how can the development of security technology be informed by appropriate norms? Is it possible to build a culturally diverse overlapping consensus on the substance of security norms? A number of research themes have been identified with these specific questions in mind. The Law of Armed Conflict Today’s security norms were elucidated in circumstances historically removed from our own. Nowhere is this more evident than in the traditional law of armed conflict, which was first elaborated in the 19th Century on the basis of a body of thought that dates back to the Middle Ages. Contemporary security challenges have cast doubt on the relevance of this framework for guiding future security practice. This ultimately raises the question as to whether these traditional norms can be adapted to suit an altered security landscape. In the context of jus ad bellum, research will focus on defining aggression, particularly in relation to the concepts of pre-emption, humanitarian intervention, and the issue of self-defence. The norms relating to jus in bello will also need to be clarified in light of new practices of war and the introduction of new actors that tend to escape traditional categories. Issues for further study include: principles of proportionality and discrimination (including the issue of intended and unintended action with respect to double effect), collateral damage, and the content and basis of the non-combatant/combatant distinction. A third focal point for research concerns the conceptual distinction between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Although a bedrock principle of the law of armed conflict, this distinction has increasingly been called into question. A final component of this research will consider the issue of war termination and responsibilities after the cessation of formal hostilities, often called jus post bellum. Just Terror, Resistance and Exceptional Measures While the first research stream will focus on the appropriateness of norms in the face of altered security situations, the second research stream will examine the character of security norms in cases of unconventional war. Of particular interest will be the emergence of non-state actors in the field of armed conflict, and the specific ethical issues these actors raise. One central objective of this field of inquiry is to ascertain whether there are any absolute moral and legal norms, in the sense of allowing no justifiable exceptions. Norms against torture, genocide, cruel and unusual punishment, which have the legal status of jus cogens suggest that there are. But how are we to make sense of these norms? Are there exceptional circumstances of extreme danger in which such practices may be necessary or even justified? Is there such a thing as morally justified terrorism, and if so in what circumstances? Researchers will focus on how absolute prohibitions relate to notions of excuse and justification. The topics, which will be addressed include: terrorism as an ethical problem, the use of torture, the

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relationship between security and liberty, and ethical restraints on resistance movements. New Technologies Technological innovations present both opportunities and challenges for the elaboration of a more robust normative framework. On the one hand, technological solutions such as biometric techniques, data mining, risk analysis, and profiling may appear to offer ways to enhance security while avoiding problematic aspects of traditional military practices. However, many of these practices conceal profound normative issues of their own, which must be critically examined. Technology and its design are infused with normative assumptions. An important question is whether these can be managed, and made explicit in a rational and ethically informed, manner. Researchers will pursue three interrelated fields of inquiry. The first area of research will focus on broader questions relating to the ethics of the design. This will include an assessment of the prospects and challenges of incorporating ethical constraints in technology. In conjunction with this, researchers will analyse the ethical dimensions of weapons development, such as: the ethical implications of a missile defence system, the use of drones, and the notion of so-called ‘risk-less’ war. A final strand of research will assess the impact of new technologies at the individual level. Of particular interest will be the consequences for soldiers in light of technological developments, the ethical issues surrounding the use of performance-enhancing drugs on the battlefield, and the impact of technology on decision-making. Universalism and Cultural Relativism A final stream of research will explore the extent to which it is possible to build a culturally diverse overlapping consensus on the substance of security norms. This area of research is based on the common critique that security norms tend to emanate from Western theory and practice, and therein, reflect a Western perspective. Researchers will engage in a comparative, cross-cultural assessment of norms, with an emphasis on the determinants of norm implementation and civilisational drivers. This area concerns competing conceptions of security, and potential conflicts over individual security and group security. The theory and practice of human rights will be particularly important in this regard. This area will also consider the notion that Western security norms have been globalised; a point reflected by the ardent defence of sovereignty in non-Western security practices. (2) International Authority The second strand of research will explore the issue of international authority. The elaboration of a more robust normative framework cannot be achieved in isolation, but will depend on authority structures to interpret, implement, and enforce such norms. In many respects, the tensions within our ethical and legal frameworks examined above tend to reflect the strains within existing instruments of authority. This strand of research will focus on four specific themes: the nature of authority, the rise of non-state actors, the genesis of law, and authorising the use of force. Nature of Authority Despite the overriding importance of the issue of authority this subject has received insufficient scholarly attention. Accordingly, the first theme within this strand of research will explore the nature of authority with a view to providing an account of its normative basis. Researchers will begin by examining different models of authority throughout history and across different cultural traditions. A second avenue of research

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will examine the issue of authority within contemporary political structures at the global and regional levels, including: the UN Security Council, African Union, ASEAN and NATO. This will be done in conjunction with a third component of research, which will seek to explore alternative models of authority, such as networkcentric approaches. New Challenges for Sovereignty: The Rise of Non-State Actors Although sovereign states continue to assume the focal point of international authority within contemporary international affairs, non-state actors are increasingly challenging the privileged position of states. On the one hand transnational and international organs such as the UN Security Council and NATO have emerged as competing loci of authority to sovereign states. Much work is needed to determine how the authority of such international actors can be established, assessed and strengthened. On the other hand mercenaries, terrorist groups, insurgents, and private military companies poses significant problems from the perspective of both state and international authority. These non-state actors do not fit comfortably within the traditional categories of international law, and therein, exert pressure on the conventional distinctions between combatants and non-combatants. Efforts to incorporate these actors within existing normative frameworks risk legitimating certain practices, which some may be reluctant to legitimise; yet, the increasing presence of non-state actors requires a response. Research in this area will examine the various mechanisms for controlling non-state actors on both the domestic and international levels. Genesis of Law In recent years there has been a proliferation of legal bodies engaged in the enforcement of international criminal law. Such bodies include: the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). The appearance of these bodies highlights significant challenges with respect to the issue of international authority. For one, the authority of these bodies remains rather contested. Related to this is the matter of overlapping jurisdiction between domestic and international courts. Researchers will examine the relationship between domestic and international jurisdiction, with a view to determining in what respect law creation can be improved. Issues of accountability, criminal liability, and notions of responsibility will also be addressed. Authorising the Use of Force A final steam of research will focus on the issue of authority with respect to the use of force. Who decides when force is justified? What criteria should be used? And subject to what kind of review? Within traditional just war theory the prevailing assumption is that war may sometimes be an appropriate means to attain security; however, in recent state practice there has been a growing tendency to severely restrict the unilateral recourse to war. Researchers will focus on the prospective conflicts between just war theory and emerging state practice on this issue. A related area of research will assess the changing justifications for the resort to force, such as humanitarian intervention and pre-emptive war. The possibility that these justifications may be more in line with traditional just war theory will be explored. A final area will explore the development of punitive uses of force, and the complex relationship between punishment and security. While punishment can play an important role in the development of norms by expressing and maintaining normative commitments, the desire to punish may be linked to revenge and could potentially lead to abandoning norms of restraint.

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(3) Interaction A final strand of research will focus on the interaction between security norms and authority structures. This research stems from the recognition that the development of norms and international authority must be achieved in concert. Since the effectiveness of norms will depend on structures of authority to interpret, implement and enforce them, the elaboration of a more robust normative framework can only be done in the context of strengthened structures of authority. Likewise, the legitimacy of authority structures is often judged by their capacity to uphold and reflect particular norms. The underlying objective of this research strand is to strengthen possibilities for mutual reinforcement. Accordingly, research will explore three central questions: What is the relationship between norms and authority structures? How are the content of norms shaped and constrained by authority structures and institutions? How does the concept of legitimacy relate to the study of norms and authority structures? Implicit in this strand of research is a dynamic view of morality, which views ethical ideas as malleable and potentially subject to change and development. In this context the idea of normative progress is significant. How are we to judge when and in what context norms ought to be revised and developed, compared with those contexts when we want norms to restrain and hold fast? How can the moral and legal norms of security which in many ways are nascent and under-developed be bought to a greater state of maturity. Challenging the technology solution: the key security threats that we face in the modern world are not technical ones, but are those things that threaten the ethical components of our global practices. These practices constitute us as the kind of actors that we value ourselves to be. Where these are threatened our very selves are at risk. Our major research efforts ought to be directed towards understanding these practices that constitute us as valued people in one another’s eyes. We need research to understand what kinds of things can threaten them. Good research in this direction would then open the way for us to consider how best effectively to deal with these threats. Thematic Continuities Risk Risk is an integral part of all human activity, and security is no exception to this. Absolute security is neither attainable nor, in all likelihood, desirable (since it would inevitably bring unacceptable compromises to individual freedom). The question of how much risk is acceptable is a fraught one; it will differ between countries and between individuals. There are various processes for managing risk, none of which is perfect. Norms Norms differ from society to society. As well as having different legal codes, nations differ in what is considered moral and/or acceptable. It is important not simply to assume that Muslim countries will accept Western norms of security. There may be some universal norms in this area- such as the prohibition of torture- but even this should not be assumed. Ethics This is a critical area for future research and raises a fundamental question about whose security is to be optimized. The increased use and influence of the internet in particular (the boundary of human interface with cyberspace) along with the increased number of

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countries who hold nuclear weapons (seven) makes this a serious target for research. Applied ethics- only a small group of social scientists deal with ethics, and an even smaller group of those with applied ethics. Interdisciplinary Study Technological and scientific approaches need to be supplemented with expertise from fields such as political science, sociology, psychology and theology. Only an approach that takes into consideration the religious and political beliefs of individuals is likely to be successful in negating their potential attraction towards extreme groups and behavior.

Third Part: Methodology Issues and Research Design Significant methodological challenges face security-related normative research in the humanities and social sciences. Many of these challenges are shared by both descriptive and normative research agendas. There is general recognition that research on security norms must be interdisciplinary, both within the humanities and social sciences and beyond to science and technology disciplines; but interdisciplinary research continues to pose numerous challenges, both conceptual and institutional. A research approach must be reflected in the concrete institutional mechanisms by which researchers are managed, promoted, funded and remunerated. We may also ask whether we need more research in this area, or whether the focus should on fewer research outputs of higher quality. It was agreed that a strong grounding in a particular discipline is highly desirable as a basis for interdisciplinary research. The research agenda on the norms of security must be expanded in a number of ways. Geographically, more must be done to include and engage with normative conceptions from non
western and non-northern hemispheric normative conceptions. This process inevitably raises questions of objectivity and relativism. A significant new research agenda focuses on the way that ethical norms can be embedded in the design of products, systems, networks, and institutions. ‘Design ethics’ explores the way that such ethical design can constrain and guide action. Attention to the design process may provide opportunities to enhance desirable goals such as security in ways that are less intrusive or coercive than traditional security practices. A related trend in international ethics is to focus on the procedures and institutions required to achieve justice and the protection of rights. However, challenges and risks remain for this research agenda. New methodologies for integrating ethical and normative norms into the design process must be developed. Institutional governance processes and conceptions of responsibility and liability must be developed. Critical design theory explores the unintended consequences and problematic applications of technology and design. There are also questions as to whether it would be desirable, given conceptions of human autonomy, even if possible, to constrain human action through design in such a way that wrongful action is impossible. Much work will be required to develop new, shared ways of working between designers, engineers, legal, humanists and social scientists. The initial workshop produced a rich set of recommendations for future research priority. Many of these research questions have a descriptive and normative component, and several (particularly in the area of research design and methodology)

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cut across the descriptive/normative divide). Recommendations can be seen to coalesce around four themes: the need to clarify the concept of security relative to the concepts of law ethics and justice, the content of legal and ethical norms, normative issues in security practices, and methodological issues in the development of this research agenda. The individual research issues identified below are connected on many levels.

Global Security: A Vision for the Future F. Géré and M. Sharpe (Eds.) IOS Press, 2011 © 2011 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-760-4-131

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The Intangibles of Security: Topics for Research Mervyn FROST1 Head of Department of War Studies, King’s College, London

Abstract. It has become fashionable to seek technical solutions to terrorist threats, but this is only part of the answer. More important are seeking security for the intangible human practices that make us all what we are: citizens, tax-payers, workers, church-goers, etc.- i.e. members of civil society. If this is lost then we lose something more important than mere material goods or infrastructure (as is typical in terrorist attacks)- we lose our very selves. History shows that if populations feel they are well governed and have a just common cause they will cheerfully put up with even great hardships (e.g. the ‘Blitz Spirit’), but will not do so if they distrust what their government is doing in response to a threat (e.g. the US after 9/11). Five suggestions for further research in this area are offered.

Keywords. terrorism; inadequacy of technical solutions alone; failed states; civil society; importance of security of selfhood

My central argument today is that there is always a great temptation to think that security threats both old and new present us with technical problems. How to prevent the spread of certain kinds of weapons? How to prevent terrorist attacks on aeroplanes? How to secure our buildings? How to find the terrorists in our midst? How to identify people who might become terrorists before they have done this? How to prevent the radicalisation of young people? And so on. The temptation of course is fuelled by the fortunes to be made and the careers to be made in pursuing technical solutions. Many students in the War Studies Department at King’s College, London (which I currently head) are banking on this kind of career. They hope to find careers in the military apparatus, in intelligence services, in the private military companies, in foreign offices and so on. If we think of security threats in this way then a very specific research agenda presents itself. If we understand threats in this way then our research ought to be focussed on finding technical solutions to these technical problems. We ought to focus on exploring the myriad techniques of surveillance that can help us track wrongdoers before any crime is committed. We ought to find more sophisticated ways of making our buildings, airports, harbours, industries, and so on, safe from physical attack. We ought to focus on finding ways of tracking the physical movement of people who might be considered to be potential terrorists in the future. I need not continue with further examples, for the picture is clear.
































































E-mail: [email protected]

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I wish to suggest that this line of technical thought is thoroughly misleading. Although there are many serious technical issues to be considered when attempting to maintain security, a pre-occupation with these may lead us to ignore or downplay a set of issues that is far more important than these. For humans the most important things that need to be secured are not material objects, but the intangible human practices within which we are constituted as the free individuals we value ourselves to be. These practices make possible the creation and use of material resources. These social practices are intersubjective realities that exist only through the recognition that we give to one another. When we say that we wish to secure our families, our nations, our religions, or the states within which we live, although we might regard the material assets that these institutions require and use as important, these are not as fundamental to us as the practices of family life, the life of the nation, religious life or our sovereign states themselves. These social practices consist of sets of intersubjective relationships governed by elaborate social rules which themselves are underpinned by key familial, national, religious and state values. When these are threatened our statuses as actors of a certain kind are threatened. Our core social identities are threatened. Defending these is not a narrowly technical matter. It is when our relationships with others go wrong that we are most insecure. Consider, first, breakdowns at the micro-level of interpersonal relationships. Here our security can be threatened by emotional betrayals, adultery, divorce, and family breakdowns of many different kinds. Second, consider how security might be threatened at the meso-level, within firms, partnerships, corporations, universities, churches and states. Consider for example the security that is lost by the participants in a failed state. Here it might well be the case that the physical plant of a particular sovereign state is still intact (that is, not overrun by some aggressive enemy), the buildings may still be intact, much of the infrastructure might still be in place, but the persistence of these in no way compensates for the loss of that set of relationships between citizens (and between citizens and their government) that exists in successful states. As an illustration of this kind of failure consider what has come about in Zimbabwe (or any other failed state). What precisely goes wrong in such cases where security is threatened by the collapse of social practices? There are different things that can happen here. First, the social arrangements may no longer function in a way that they were originally designed to do. A company that was designed to make profits and to increase the wealth of its shareholders may find that it no longer does so. This leads to action which destroys the relationships of trust between the workers in the company and the management. As an illustration of this consider the circumstances that pertain in the wake of the credit crunch. Here many people’s economic security has been severely damaged by the breakdown of trust between workers, management and shareholder owners. The reasons for the breakdown of this set of intersubjective relationships might stem from causes internal to the practice or external to it. If we turn to failed states, we find that such states no longer perform the function of protecting their citizens in the way that they were designed to do. Often citizens and taxpayers come to feel that they have been let down. This is happening in many places including South Africa where taxpayers find that the national police force for which they are paying their taxes is no longer providing the protection for which it was originally set up. The same is happening in Zimbabwe, but on a much more intense scale. Second, the value that is created by certain forms of mutual recognition within social arrangements may no longer be achieved. In a marriage, for example, where there is a divorce the husband and wife no

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longer feel secure in these roles. The children might consider that their parents have let them down in some profound ethical way. Similarly where a state breaks down citizens may no longer experience themselves to be cherished by their fellow citizens and by those citizens who form the government and the civil service. Instead of enjoying the ethical status of being a citizen, people find themselves living in a completely changed relationship with the very same people with whom they lived in harmony as citizens before the breakdown. Here it might happen that people fall into a mode of interaction in which everyone is simply out to seek for his or her own interests. It might become a veritable Hobbesian state of nature and not at all like our normal state within which we feel ourselves ethically at home. In successful states we feel ourselves to be valued as citizens and in some real way we recognize the government as our government. In a Hobbesian world, by contrast, people would treat one another as things rather than ends. Something like this happened in the former Yugoslavia when it fell apart in the wake of the Cold War. To repeat, it is this kind of collapse of the ethical structure that brings about the greatest and most radical insecurity for people. The greatest threats we face are those which threaten our very social standing as ethical beings within families, firms, churches, states and so on. Where these relationships hold up in the face of adversity- where they do not crumble or decaypeople can cope with the utmost material hardships. We know that this happened, for example, in Britain during the Blitz in World War II. Here, in spite of the extreme material hardships that people experienced, there is ample testimony that people still valued one another most profoundly in the ethical senses outlined above. Families, churches, nations and states remained intact in the face of extreme material destruction. Indeed the damage done to material property, the insecurity at this level, ironically, had the effect of bringing out and making secure the deeper ethical commitments embodied in the practices described above. Adversity brought with it ethical strength and solidarity. So, if the trains in London were disrupted by bombs, if the fuel supplies were interrupted by terrorist activity, if the hijacking of an airliner were to cause chaos in the timetabling of departures and arrivals at a major airport, these would all be threats to our material security and it would be important that we understood them as such. Such threats might not threaten us at the deeper ethical level at all. Indeed, if our interpersonal ethical relationships were to hold within families, churches, companies and within the state in the face of such threats, then we would be able to manage the material damage quite easily. To repeat myself, the difficulties we experienced in the face of such attacks might strengthen the bonds of our ethical relationships. But, if the ethical relationships themselves collapsed, then we would be in the direst of straits. Because then we would have ceased to be the people we value ourselves to be. It seems to me that in some measure this is what happened during the previous administration in the USA following its reactions to the events of 9/11. Many US citizens felt that they had ceased to be the kind of people that they valued themselves to be. The government policies and actions undermined the ethical standing of all US citizens. Before we can find out how to secure such intangible, but vital, intersubjective relationships, we need to know which things or activities threaten them. We need to undertake the appropriate kinds of research. Here is my incomplete list of threats to the intangible relationships that make up the core social practices within which we are established as the ethical beings we value ourselves to be.

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a.

b. c.

The threat posed by weak theory. The greatest threat to our core values in international relations stems from a failure properly to understand our global practices. For example, if we think we live in a world of sovereign states engaged in a zero-sum competition for scarce resources, we are likely to make policies that threaten us at the most fundamental level. To understand the world in this way is a mistake. We live in an interdependent world and we do not react towards one another in zero-sum ways. Consider the complexities that have given rise to the credit crunch on a global scale. This crunch has produced a major threat. But the solution will have to be cooperative across states. It will have to rely on new regulative practices that infringe traditional ideas of sovereignty. The zero sum realist theory fails to explain the existing practices or to predict our likely behaviour in future. In general we do not use weak or mistaken theory. In the day-to-day affairs of international relations for the most part individuals, corporations, multinational companies, churches, sports clubs, universities, and all kinds of social practices interact with one another in stable and conflict-free ways. This does not just happen by chance. The participants understand certain rules of interaction. The theories they use to understand the practices within which they are operating are good ones. They enable the participants to understand who they are and what they are entitled to do. They enable them to understand what would count as an offence. They enable them to know how to make claims on one another, praising good conduct and criticising bad conduct. The theory enables them to understand what the underlying values served by these practices are. Were we to get these wrong we would be in no position to judge what would count as a threat to our core constitutive practices. As indicated above, a major threat to any social practices derives from a failure to understand it properly. The threat is realized when we use a faulty theory about how the practice works. We can see a manifestation of this kind of threat materializing in the origins of the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is not simply that Bush and Blair got faulty intelligence, it is not just that the information they received was incorrect. The core failure had to do with the fact that they misunderstood certain key aspects of contemporary international practices. One of the things they misunderstood was the role of the sovereignty norm in interstate relations. This rule of international practice is foundational. All participants understand this. So, when the invasions took place the people who lived in those territories, referring to the sovereignty rule, understood that their sovereignty had been threatened. They understood that resisting such an invasion would be a legitimate thing to do in terms of standard just war theory. This understanding was one of the elements which launched the insurgency which continues to the present. In the name of protecting our security the coalition had, in fact, created new threats to it. Migration on a global scale. Domestic injustices in one country pose security threats on an international scale. Consider Saudi Arabia and Israel, states that do this. There are many others. There are many key areas calling for research here. I suspect that most issues that fall under the heading of “global terrorism” are of this kind that require detailed research from us. We need to understand the roots of global terrorism. These are often domestic. The difficulty is to find out what the

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international community can do to solve domestic injustices. Criminality in some localised geographical space poses security threats globally. What would count as an appropriate response that would not undermine the basic ethical structure? For example unilateral action by a superpower to curb the problem of piracy would open that superpower to charges of imperialism. Careful research is needed here. There are environmental problems that have arisen as a result of human action which are affecting human beings everywhere. Clearly technical research needs to be done, but much more important is research into how concerted action might be organised to remedy the problem, but without at the same time damaging our core international practices such as the system of sovereign states and global civil society. We also need research into how environmental problems might pose direct threats to the ethical social fabric of our international practices. A major threat to international security is posed by a lack of adequate systems of global governance. Within states we have well-established systems for doing politics by means of which we arrive at compromise decisions. The most successful of these are our systems of democratic government. We do not have these at the global level. How should we reform international institutions to give them greater democratic legitimacy as decision-making bodies capable of dealing with these difficult political problems?

Conclusion In this short article I have argued that the key security threats that we face in the modern world are not technical ones, but are those things that threaten the ethical components of our global practices. These practices constitute us as the kind of actors that we value ourselves to be. Where these are threatened our very selves are at risk. Our major research efforts ought to be directed towards understanding these practices that constitute us as valued people in one another’s eyes. We need research to understand what kinds of things can threaten them. Good research in this direction would then open the way for us to consider how best effectively to deal with these threats.

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Providing Security for the Human Brain Dr Nina SLANEVSKAYA1 St Petersburg University Abstract. The findings of neuroscience in respect of organization of social life need to be more widely known and acted upon. The use of neuroactive drugs, even those medically prescribed, can be harmful as well as beneficial in a number of ways. A systems approach to the human brain/mind and behaviour (i.e. taking into account all genetic, physical, mental and external factors) is more useful in making the mentally unwell better and in improving their behaviour. Removing violent factors from the environment of children is particularly important in this regard. ‘Intangible security’ will be greatly aided by researching what the optimal environment for healthy human minds might be; by finding non-damaging substitutes for dangerous psychoactive drugs; and by stopping the distortion of neuromorality (i.e. the in-built basic ethical ‘module’ shared by all normal humans) by political and other powerful social interests. Keywords. neuroethics; neuroeconomics; neurotheology; neuromarketing; neurosociology; `Harmful' Neuroscience; mood-altering drugs; oxytocin; serotonin; systems approach; `Helpful' Neuroscience; CREB; DNA; RNA; personal morality

The scientific community, government bodies, international organizations and the public seem to pay little attention to the correlation of neuroscientific findings with the organization of society. Many researchers admit the influence of sociocultural factors upon the neurobiology of the brain. However neuroscience can be used not only to treat a damaged and sick brain but also to protect a healthy one. Hardly any neuroscientist, nowadays, will deny the influence of the brain upon the state of mind and the mind upon the brain state and both the mind and brain upon the state of the body. However the argument between the materialist and the nonmaterialist neuroscientists is about which one has causal priority- mind or brain, and whether the explanation of the mind can be reduced to material substance - the neurons of the brain. New areas of social neuroscience have recently sprung up such as neuroethics, neuroeconomics, neurotheology, neuromarketing, neurosociology, etc., mainly due to government subsidies in the USA in the 1990s and the breakthrough in brain scanning technologies. However, there has been no attempt to summarize the accumulated knowledge and to build up a coherent theory to find out what is necessary for the organisation of human society so that the brain and mind of a human might not be damaged by an unsuitable social, political or economic environment. Neuroscience can serve global society by supplying it with knowledge necessary for the creation of the best social environment for a human. By this I mean the political, economic, social, aesthetic, ethical and other indispensable aspects of human life. This is the benevolent side of neuroscience. However, the destructive side of neuroscience exists as well. Neuroscience can be 1

E-mail: [email protected]

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used against mankind in pursuit of harmful policies just for the satisfaction of personal or national political and economic aims. I consider the situation to be even worse when the wrong social atmosphere with distorted social values pushes an individual to harm himself by trying to improve his mental abilities and swallow medicine for ‘enhanced performance’, as though IQ were the main criterion of human worth. To pride themselves on having extremely bright offspring with the strongest memory, parents allow medication to be given to their normal children who are a bit more active and emotional than others but do not have the same good marks as quiet and unemotional children. However, it is the emotions that are the locomotive of human society and moral life, not IQ or good marks. Meanwhile high-ranking military officials commission neuroscientists to develop drugs blocking the memory of soldiers (perhaps, those former schoolchildren whose memory was enhanced by parents) so that killing might become a mechanical and routine exercise not involving feelings and the torture of strong memories. Like any science, neuroscience is affected by a dual-use problem. Neuroscience must be open to public discussion and deliberation over the potential use of inventions and findings because science by its nature is a social domain. The human brain and mind are the most important items on the agenda of security. People can make a decision to use weapons consciously under certain circumstances but if the brain is manipulated and a human cannot exercise conscious control over himself then all other security measures are not worth discussing.

1. `Harmful' Neuroscience Neuroethics has appeared recently, following medical ethics and bioethics, to promote the beneficial use of technological advances and the evolving techniques of brain study. It reflects the worries of society about the potential application of neuroscientific research. Research in all areas of science is a `dual-use' dilemma, i.e. it can be for either the benefit of people or to their detriment. However there is a third possibility which might be called a `postponed disadvantage'. For example, the drug `amphetamine' created mainly for patients suffering from traumatic brain injury and the daytime drowsiness symptoms of narcolepsy (falling asleep at inappropriate times), is now used as a performance enhancer by normal people (students, businessmen, etc..). This could be considered as a `postponed disadvantage'. There is a well-known case of two American pilots coming down from amphetamine use `prescribed' by the U.S. military, who killed four Canadian troops in Afghanistan by friendly fire in 2002. That is not the only case as Russel Forster, professor of Circadian Neuroscience at Oxford University, remarked at the Transatlantic video conference between Dana Centers (Mind Wars, 2007). After one comes off amphetamines one has a whole range of problems. The attempt to override the need for sleep has negative consequences, and withdrawal from long term use of amphetamines can include anxiety, depression, psychosis, suicidal thoughts, excessive sleeping and so on. An interesting question was asked by Martha J. Farah, director of the Center for Cognitive Neuroscience at the University of Pennsylvania, while discussing modern mood-altering medications: if we fall in love with someone who is on Prozac and then find that she is difficult or temperamental without the drug, who was it that we loved? Personality is dissolved by mood-altering drugs. I believe the increasing use of

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enhancement drugs is due to the influence of the ideology which denies human uniqueness and the social worth of man. This ideology shuns those who are `slow thinking', with less capacity to make profit for society and which considers man as a material commodity where unique human spirituality is depreciated to the level of a commodity. Thomas E. Fitzpatrick's question “Ought we to do if we know how to?” is, indeed, very relevant for the application of neuroscientific achievements to a human brain (Fitzpatrick, 2008). Speaking about the development of neuroscience, Thomas E. Fitzpatrick summarises questions and worries about society under such rubrics in his article as: Prediction vs. Privacy, Personhood, Science vs. Spirit, Performance Enhancement. • Prediction vs. Privacy: Brain scanning techniques appear to have the potential to identify mental health vulnerabilities, predisposition to violent crime, racial attitudes, risk aversion, pessimism etc.. How will this knowledge be used? How accurate will the prediction be? Should we act on the prediction or on action? • Personhood: What is the distinction between the brain, a physical organ of the body, and the human mind exercising free will? Should the `disease model' of substance addiction and compulsive behaviour be applied to criminals in court? • Science vs. Spirit: Could it be that there is a nonphysical feature that resides in us and functions in conjunction with a healthy human brain system? • Performance Enhancement: Isn't the distinction between things and persons eroding? Is an enhancer cheating? The medications, designed to help individuals with a cognitive disorder, are being used for cognitive enhancement by healthy students who claim that they study better and longer and earn higher scores on exams if they take drugs. Should we treat them like professional athletes who are disciplined and disqualified if they use drugs? Jonathan Marino, a professor of ethics at the University of Pennsylvania, a fellow of the Hastings Center and of the New York Academy of Medicine, who participated in the Dana conference `Mind Wars', draws attention to the potential military and national intelligence use of neuroscience (Mind Wars, 2007). He speaks about the use of beta blockers that inhibit the consolidation of long term memory with emotions like fear and regret; about `Modafinil', which was developed to treat narcolepsy, and is also used to keep normal people awake (possible up to 60-80 hours) and that there is evidence that the Air Force is already using it. Indeed, there can be a great temptation for the military to create a `metabolically dominant soldier' who never needs to sleep, whose memory of fearful events can be blocked, who can ‘read’ the mind of the enemy and can be manipulated at a distance by his military boss. However, former soldiers come back to their own countries eventually and that country becomes another battlefield for the former soldiers whose neurobiology has been damaged and new systemogenesis (the formation of systems of neuronal networks) has taken place. Referring to DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), which is a science agency supporting some important cutting edge research in neuroscience, and which, in particular, sponsors work on enabling people who have lost their limbs to move their prosthetic arms through connections to their brain centres, Jonathan Marino

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remarks “if you can make a prosthetic arm move when it's on your body, or in the next room, through wireless transmission of brain signals, you might also be able to control a robot thousand of miles away on a battlefield, perhaps for reconnaissance purposes, perhaps for mine clearing” (Mind Wars, 2007). Marino also draws attention to the possible use of `oxytocin' which is a neurochemical produced when we trust. `Pitocin' a version of `oxytocin' is sometimes given to a woman in labour to reassure her and facilitate delivery. Some studies suggest that a version of oxytocin can be given nasally to somebody and it will stimulate the production of oxytocin. As a result, a person, for example, a terrorist with hostages, will treat anyone who comes along as his friend and will trust him. So here is a doubleuse dilemma: if allowed to be used by the police such use seems to be beneficial for people. On the other hand, if considering such permission (to use a drug for a forced alteration of the mind) in a broader picture there will be a temptation to use it under other social circumstances, for example, at protest demonstrations. It may eventually do away with democracy within the state. Possible use of advances in neuroscience have very big social, ethical and legal implications. However there is not enough attention to both the beneficial and the hostile applications of these advances of neuroscience in society.

2. A Systems Approach The human brain is the centre of the human nervous system. It contains roughly 100 billion neurons, each linked potentially to 100,000 synaptic connections. Neurons communicate with one another via synapses. A typical neuron consists of a cell body called the soma, a long thin axon which is covered by the myelin sheath and a branching dendritic tree that receives electrochemical signals from the axons of other neurons. The end of the axon (axon terminal) releases neurotransmitters (chemical substance) into a gap called the synaptic cleft between the axon terminals and the dendrites of the next neuron. Neurons exist in a number of different shapes and sizes and can be classified by their morphology and function. In a chemical synapse, the process of synaptic transmission is as follows: when an action potential or impulse reaches the axon terminal, it opens voltage-gated calcium channels, allowing calcium ions to enter the axon terminal. Calcium causes the synaptic vesicles of the axon, filled with neurotransmitter molecules, to release their contents into the synaptic cleft. The neurotransmitters diffuse across the synaptic cleft and activate receptors on the postsynaptic neuron. To understand the correlation between sociocultural factors and the neurobiology of the brain, I will describe in short some neurobiological phenomena, such as neuromodulation, neuroplasticity, mirror neurons, protein building and a systems approach. In neuroscience, neuromodulation is the process in which several classes of neurotransmitter in the nervous system regulate diverse populations of neurons (one neuron uses different neurotransmitters to connect to several neurons). As opposed to direct synaptic transmission, in which one presynaptic neuron directly influences a postsynaptic partner (one neuron reaching one other neuron), neuromodulatory transmitters secreted by a small group of neurons diffuse through large areas of the nervous system, having an effect on multiple neurons. Dopamine, serotonin, acetylcholine, histamine are examples of neuromodulators. A neuromodulator can be

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conceptualized as a neurotransmitter that is not reabsorbed by the pre-synaptic neuron or broken down into a metabolite. Such neuromodulators end up spending a significant amount of time in the cerebrospinal fluid, influencing the overall activity level of the brain. Neuromodulators may alter the output of a physiological system by acting on the associated inputs. Drugs targeting the neurotransmitter of such systems affect the whole system, which explains the mode of action of many drugs. According to the theory of neuroplasticity, thinking, learning, and acting actually change both the brain's physical structure (anatomy) and functional organization (physiology) from top to bottom. Neuroplasticity is the changing of neurons and the organization of their networks and their function by experience. Learning happens through the changing strength of the connections between neurons by adding or removing connections or by adding new cells. All areas of the brain are plastic even after childhood. Environmental changes can alter behaviour and cognition by modifying connections between existing neurons and via neurogenesis in the brain. A mirror neuron is a neuron that fires both when we act and when we observe the action performed by another person. The mirror neurons `mirror' the behaviour of another human being, as though the observer were acting himself. These mirror neurons were found in the premotor, the inferior frontal and parietal cortices. However, some researchers think that a much wider network of brain areas shows mirror properties. The discovery of the mirror neuron system dates back to studies in the 1980s and 1990s, when Giacomo Rizzolatti, Giuseppe Di Pellegrino, Luciano Fadiga, Leonardo Fogassi, and Vittorio Gallese at the University of Parma, Italy, made experiments with macaque monkeys and discovered mirror neurons. More recently Christian Keysers and V.S. Ramachandran have contributed to the study of mirror neurons. V.S. Ramachandran thinks that mirror neurons are important for imitation and language acquisition (Ramachandran, 2000). Christian Keysers and colleagues have come to the conclusion that the mirror neuron system also responds to the sound of actions (Kohler et al., 2002). Some researchers believe that empathy (the capacity to share and understand another's emotions and feelings) can be explained with the help of mirror neurons. Mirror neurons also contribute to the theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states - beliefs, desires, intentions, pretending, knowledge, to others and to understand that others can have different beliefs, desires and intentions from one's own. Apart from neuroplasticity and the mirror neuron system, the process of the consolidation of a long-term memory must be described before we consider the system and the social questions explained on the basis of these processes. Electrical impulses from the axon of a neuron together with a neurotransmitter released from vesicles on the presynaptic membrane of an axon are transmitted to the receptors of a postsynaptic membrane on the dendrites of another neuron across a synaptic cleft. A short-term reinforcement of a synaptic connection means a short-term memory. A critical requirement for the conversion of the short-term memory into the consolidated long-term memory is new gene expression with the help of new mRNAs and protein synthesis (Costa-Mattioli, Sonenberg, 2008). New proteins help to build new receptors for cooperation with neurotransmitters and can change the chemical environment in the synapse. They also help to reinforce synaptic activity and consolidate memory. It was shown that long-term memory can be distinguished from short-term memory by its susceptibility to protein synthesis inhibitors. It was also found that long-lasting synaptic changes are also dependent on new protein synthesis. The production of new proteins devoted to synapse reinforcement is triggered after the

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release of certain signaling substances (such as calcium) into the cell. To produce proteins it is necessary to copy the part of the DNA which is in the nucleus of a neuron cell, upon a molecule which is called mRNA and which goes into the cytoplasm of this neuron cell where special cell organelles read the encoded instruction in mRNA and synthesize molecules of protein. The blocking of the transcription of DNA into mRNA or mRNA into protein, prevents the formation of a long-term memory, meanwhile a short-term memory is not disrupted. (Fields, 2005) The transcription factor CREB (transcription factors are proteins in the nucleus of a cell) finds the sequences of DNA needed and interacts with them. So the activation of CREB leads to the activation of genes, and then to new proteins, and then, to a longterm memory. The information in the nervous system is encoded by means of the pattern of impulses between neurons and activates certain chemical processes in a cell which have their own specific realisation in time. So the activation of special kinds of genes is time dependent, dependent on the pattern of impulses, and calcium. Some signaling pathways are activated quickly but stop functioning quickly also. Other signaling pathways operate slowly in the biochemical encoding of signals, but they are also slow to switch off. It means they have the chance to preserve activity between waves of impulses, interrupted by long spells of rest. This is how genes are activated and consolidated as long-term memory if the process is repeated regularly. Thus a short-term memory does not depend on the nucleus of a cell but a long-term memory does. Pyotr K. Anokhin (1898-1974), a prominent Russian biologist and physiologist, elaborated the theory of functional systems which became a methodological `bridge' between psychology and physiology. He formulated a new approach to the function of the whole organism. Instead of the classical physiology of organs based on the anatomical principle, his theory of functional systems is based on the systemic organisation of the functions of a human being starting at a molecular level up to a social one (Anokhin, 1975). The whole is organized into systems. A system must have a 'system formation factor' and the architectonics consisting of key physiological mechanisms, with the analysis going from the whole to its molecular level. Without finding a 'system formation factor' it is not possible to study the system or use it in a constructive way. It is also important to understand the function and role of its components. Anokhin illustrates his systems approach with an example of blood circulation. In the organism blood circulation cannot be treated as a separate system because it is part of the system of relations within the whole organism. Blood circulation is necessary for achieving some adaptive result (the level of blood pressure, speed of blood flow, etc.). However, none of these effects can be reached with the help of blood circulation alone. The nervous system and the endocrine system are involved in achieving the aim too. All these parts work on the principle of cooperation. Functional systems are dynamic and are characterized by the quick mobilisation of their structural elements aimed at getting the required result. Anokhin criticized the conception of neuronal response activity and suggested instead the system-based conception of integrative neuronal activity. It means that a neuron aims at achieving a result, i.e. in acquiring the necessary elements for the cell metabolites from its microenvironment by using the electrical impulses under some external/internal conditions. The electrical activity is treated as the means for getting metabolites but not as the aim for a neuron to respond and transmit electrical impulse further. The neuron cell obtains chemical substances using synaptic activity.

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The experiment with animals and the self-administering of cocaine by animals themselves shows that the activity of a neuron rises when the concentration of cocaine reduces. In becoming active to acquire metabolites, the neuron changes not only the microenvironment, but itself too and gets ready for the future metabolic flow. It is interesting that Anokhin emphasizes the idea of the 'future' demand of a neuron instead of an unavoidable post-reaction. From the psychological point of view it leads to the assertion of the free will of a human being (a neuron wants cocaine and becomes active; a human wants to do something and starts doing). Learning for an adult is a return to the period of childhood when systemogenesis took place as a reaction to repeated external and internal pressure. The consolidation of memory includes such changes to a neuron as size and number of synapses. A neuron can satisfy its demand for metabolites by cooperating with other elements of the organism and forming a functional system. When it is not possible to solve the problem within the framework of the previous experience, the process of systemogenesis takes place and new systems appear. It is true for both learning and pathological states, e.g. after strokes or other brain injuries. It is called neuroplasticity. If the process of systemogenesis carries on successfully, new systems are formed and new interneural relations are created supported by the activation of genetic availability. So the neuron's need in metabolites is satisfied and the neuron cell survives. However, if the process lasts too long, the neuron is too active and its needs are not satisfied, the neuron cell dies. In cases of pathology, death is more frequent. When the individual is placed in an unavoidable situation (which can trigger depression) or in a situation of learning where he cannot solve a complicated task for a long time, the death of neurons increases. Antonio Damasio, professor of neuroscience at the University of California where he directs the Brain and Creativity Institute (he is the author of the somatic-marker theory, which also uses the methodology of a systems approach), claims that it is not right to separate the brain from the body while analysing the process of thinking or decision-making because “mind derives from the entire organism as an ensemble” (Damasio, 2006: 225). The body also thinks and remembers its past experience on the basis of its chemical memory when a person was in a certain emotional state due to some event and there is a certain projection of this memory upon a new but similar situation. We sometimes say that we decided not to do something because we had a gut feeling that it would go wrong. 'Soma' means body and 'marker' means emotional images acquired by the body on the basis of which we act as decision-makers. Emotions and feelings are central to Damasio's theory. According to his theory the process of emotion and feeling are part of the neural machinery for biological regulation whose core is composed of homeostatic controls, drives and instincts. Nearly every part of the body (muscles, joints, internal organs etc.) can send signals to the brain via the peripheral nerves. Those body signals enter at the level of a spinal cord or brain stem and then they are carried inside the brain from one `neural station' to another `neural station' and to the somatosensory cortices in the parietal lobe and insular regions. Chemical substances from the body are carried by the bloodstream to the brain either directly or by activating special brain sites such as the subfornical organ. In the opposite direction the brain also acts through nerves in all parts of the body. Signals for the autonomic nervous system arise in the emotional part of the brain (evolutionarily older regions), such as the amygdala, the cingulate, the hypothalamus, and the brain stem while the signals for the musculoskeletal system arise in several motor cortices and subcortical motor nuclei. The brain also acts on the body by producing or ordering the production of chemical substances released into the

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bloodstream (hormones, neurotransmitters, and neuromodulators). The system approach allows Damasio to analyze the body-mind-brain correlations from the molecular level up to the social activities level where social factors interact with neurochemical factors. In the next part of the paper I am going to describe how these neurobiological events are related to social events.

3. `Helpful' Neuroscience Antonio Damasio states that our decision-making depends on: 1. the experience under the control of an internal body's preference system (survival mechanism); 2. the influence of an external set of circumstances which include not only entities and events with which the organism must interact but also social conventions and ethical rules (Damasio, 2006: 122-125). The hypothesis is that the neural representations of the wisdom of conventions and ethical rules are linked to the neural representation of innate regulatory biological processes and it is possible to make a meaningful link to simpler goals and then to drives and instincts. Such conventions and ethical rules contribute (or are perceived as contributing) to survival and to the quality of that survival. However, as Damasio admits, there can be `sick cultures' which are directed against human beings such as Cambodia's Pol Pot regime, Germany during the Second World War, etc.. Thus, though Damasio refers to the biological origin of ethical rules worked out by society in the process of evolution, he seems to distinguish social ethical culture from individual moral intuition when speaking about `sick cultures'. So my conclusion is that social culture should be critically examined so that it does not violate individual innate moral intuition and brain functioning. Damasio, as a materialist neuroscientist, emphasizes that it is important to understand the degree to which social factors interact with biological factors (1) to aggravate the condition, or (2) increase its frequency and (3) even explain the aggravated condition largely determined by sociocultural factors. Using a system approach, Damasio considers the case of low levels of serotonin (chemical substance) in some individuals, which is considered to be the cause of their violence. Serotonin is part of a very complicated mechanism, as Damasio reminds us, which “operates at the level of molecules, synapses, local circuits, and systems, and in which sociocultural factors, past and present, also intervene powerfully. A satisfactory explanation can arise only from a more comprehensive view of the entire process, in which the relevant variables of a specific problem, such as depression or social adaptability, are analysed in detail. On a practical note: The solution to the problem of social violence will not come from addressing only social factors and ignoring neurochemical correlates, nor will it come from blaming one neurochemical correlate alone. Consideration of both social and neurochemical factors is required in appropriate measure.” (Damasio, 2006: 78). Nowadays the prevailing opinion among neuroscientists is that mind-body interaction exists and some diseases are caused by mental stress. The mental state of chronic depression influences brain systems at the level of the neocortex, limbic system, and hypothalamus, and leads to the overproduction of a chemical, calcitonin gene-related peptide, or CGRP, in nerve terminals within the skin. Damasio explains

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that if completely coated by CGRP, the Langerhans cells (“an immune-related cell whose job it is to capture infectious agents and deliver them to lymphocytes so that the immune system can counteract their presence”) are disabled and “can no longer perform their guardian function” (Damasio, 2006: 120). The result of it is that the body is more vulnerable to infection. The reverse influence of chemical substances from the body on the brain is also well known. Tobacco, alcohol, and drugs (medical and non-medical) enter the brain and modify its function and thus alter the mind. Damasio also believes that children's overexposure to violence in real life or through audiovisual fiction downgrades “the value of emotions and feelings in the acquisition and deployment of adaptive social behaviour” (Damasio, 2006: 247). In light of the mirror neuron system and neuroplasticity studies it is quite possible to suppose that children can develop abnormal neuronal networks and reactions which will prevent them from developing the adaptive social behaviour within a moral framework. According to studies on empathy, almost the same neuron structures are activated when an individual watches the other one doing something. “In addition to the ability to understand the mental states (propositional attitudes) of others, humans can also empathize with others, that is, share their feelings and emotions in the absence of any direct emotional stimulation to themselves” (Singer, 2006: 857). So watching violence directly or vicariously, a child is trained to be cruel and violent in the future. The mirror-neuron system is responsible for imitating the behaviour of others in the vicinity (criminal surrounding, social violence, family abuses, etc..), and if it lasts for a long time, neuroplasticity can make such imitation permanent. New proteins help to reinforce synaptic activity and consolidate a long-term memory. Many speak about a genetic predisposition to violence. However, genetic predisposition must be somehow activated by the environment in order to become a permanent character trait. Laurence Tancredi, a noted physician and Professor of Psychiatry at New York University School of Medicine, as well as the author of several books on law, ethics, and psychiatry claims that psychopaths have a malfunctioning brain, perhaps due to defective wiring (neuralpathways), which leads to undesirable moral behaviour and so cannot exhibit what we consider `free will'. However, describing the case of a psychopath, Green concludes that this biologically-driven murderer resulted from exposure to a prolonged stressful environment which most likely altered the neurobiology of his brain because each person has a threshold, the limit of his ability to withstand stress and provocation (Tancredi, 2005). Through the whole book, Tancredi uses the medical case of a criminal in order to illustrate the distorted moral judgment due to the distorted functioning of the brain. “The story is about Ricky Green, 29 years old, who was charged with the serial killing of two women and two men. He had sexually mutilated his victims after drinking with them and having sex. The pre-history is as follows: he started drinking at 9, and at the age of 14 he was a heavy drinker and smoked marijuana. His elder brother and father went to prison, and his mother died at 45. His father was very demanding of the boys, he abused his wife when she was alive and slept with his daughter. Ricky Green had an intense fear of his father, had no friends, had protracted bed-wetting until 16, and as a child he liked killing animals and starting fires. He ran away from home twice at the age of 11 and 16. His attempt to escape at 16 ended up in a casino where he was picked up by a homosexual old man. At the age of 18 he had met with a woman who liked to hurt him during sex. He found a new girlfriend who was a drug-abuser and married her. After killing a victim Ricky felt so guilty and had such a strong impulse to confess to

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someone that he used his wife for this against his own best interests.” (Slanevskaya, 2008: 44). His desire to confess shows that Green still had moral feelings and knew that he had done something wrong. After reading this story in Tancredi's book `Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals about Morality' two questions come to mind: 1. How can we speak at all about genetic predisposition in such a case? Could any normal child with the best genetic inheritance stay normal in such circumstances? Could any adult with a perfect character and bright mind if forced to live in such an environment for several years, helpless and constantly abused, stay normal? 2. What is the social organisation of such a society and what is the basis of its morality? This case described by Tancredi indicates a much deeper level of the problem - a `social disease' due to inappropriate social organisation and social values. Social conflicts or the appearance of such psychopaths as Green, or the members of his family, are symptoms of the fact that social organisation fails to provide people with a healthy environment necessary for the normal mental and physical state of the brain. A global scientific project based upon neuroscience is necessary in order to study what are the best conditions of social organization for a human. Traditions, religions and specific social institutions within different nation-states are not an obstacle for such a project because a human is characterized by some universal traits. A human being has a set of innate qualities from birth: the ability to learn languages with categories of things and actions and with attributes/qualifiers to both of them; abstract thinking and moral thinking that reflects the human attitude to other people in society. If these abilities did not exist, man could hardly learn all that. It is impossible, for example, to make a dog or a monkey use abstract thinking however long you may teach it. Hardly anyone would deny that people use moral principles in solving social problems. However, people live under the pressure of their social surroundings. The morality of society can have little in common with innate human moral intuition which is based on such eternal principles as “do not kill, do not steal, do not tell lies”, etc.. Any organised society, organised religion, organised science, or organised business represents the struggle for power within that organisation and with competing organisations. So those who have the power define the morality of the organisation, can manipulate others' innate moral feelings and choose the element for moral discourse within that society. Hence we have the morality of a slave-owning society, or Christian religion with wars by crusading knights, materialist Academies of Sciences rejecting scientists studying parapsychological phenomena, and so on. The violence to inner moral criteria leads to nervous and psychological diseases, the alteration of brain chemistry and changes in personality. Neuroscientists agree with the existence of inherent moral thinking and certain inherent moral principles, but explain them in different ways. Materialist neuroscientists find their basis in our genetic coding due to the evolution of a human being as a social being and the fact that a group survives more easily with certain moral rules. Non-materialist neuroscientists on the other hand, explain it either as given by God or via the connection with one's rational nature and the Universe. For example, fairness is one of the innate moral principles which has been discussed since ancient times but which has been constantly presented in a distorted way by powerful elites. The greater the number of people participating in the governance of an organization, the more difficult it is for individuals in power to choose a specific segment for public discourse and manipulation out of the whole range of questions on ‘what is fair?’. Speaking about the `Golden Rule' (“I do unto you as I would have you do unto

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me” or “Each person should do only what she or he would allow others to do” (Pfaff, 2007: 7, 12)) the materialist neuroscientist (naturalist) Donald W. Pfaff admits, “But once I had found abundant evidence for a universal ethical principle, I was convinced there must be a biological reason for it.” (Pfaff, 2007: 3). His whole book `The Neuroscience of Fair Play' is dedicated to the hypothesis that “some rules of behaviour are universally embedded in the human brain - that is we are `wired for good behaviour'”(Pfaff, 2007:2). So if we are wired biologically for good behaviour and do not behave in a proper way, it must be the social environment which prevents us from behaving properly as in the case of Ricky Green. Pyotr Anokhin insisted upon the need to find a 'system formation factor' in order to understand the system’s functioning and to be able to explain and study the system in a constructive way. Thus, I argue that the system formation factor which can be used for the constructive explanation of social systems is neuromorality which is to be found through all human activities in all societies at all times.

Conclusion No one can deny that there are, indeed, certain difficulties in the registering and explanation of brain events in neuroscience and, as in any science, it is also subject to the personal predisposition of a researcher in picking out the neuroscientific data or theoretical explanations in neuroscience and social disciplines which he/she prefers. However, such a broad range of explanations should be welcomed because it widens the field of knowledge allowing one to compare and choose the one that is perceived to most match one's life experience. The neuroscientific field is already full of the discovery of empirical data contradicting existing political, economic and social theories. So a wide discussion could be started in society on how to use these data and how to create a suitable social environment for a human mind and brain on a scientific basis. In other words, what can be done to improve the `social ecology' for a human brain in order to avoid conflict, terrorism, wars, etc.? The human brain, if damaged, makes a person take wrong decisions and inflict unnecessary disturbance on society. This damage can be a direct physical injury to the skull and brain or an indirect one as a result of the changed neurochemistry and neuronal networks in response. So the primary task of the `intangibles of security' project is to find out the optimal societal organisation for a healthy human brain and mind. The second one is to find out, by carrying out neuroscientific experiments, what constitutes harmless substitutes for narcotics for the brain. Would it be meditation, religion, creative activities or other spiritual activities, to name a few? The effect of drugs has been studied thoroughly and the analogous studies must be dedicated to the alternatives. Nonmaterialist neuroscientists seem to be on the right track in their study of the spiritual life. The third element, which I believe is the most basic one, is inherent neuromorality, the violation of which brings about all social conflicts. Neuromorality is a system formation factor for all social systems and the individual neurobiological system. Many neuroscientists confirm the existence of inherent moral categories and moral thinking. However, the moral principles created by a society can violate or distort such inherent moral intuition. To base international policy on the diversity of national traditions and

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religions, means to base it on those who are in power and who use organised social institutions to preserve this power. Such international policy will mean a reduced political basis of support in the future. Brain scans show the consistently similar emotional reactions of different people to certain moral events (fairness/unfairness, keeping one's word/deception, positive and negative reciprocity, appreciation of trust, disgust at killing, moral anger and so on). Further studies need to be carried out to fully understand the correlations between social systems and the healthy state of the human brain and mind.

References Anokhin, P.K. (1975) Essays on the Physiology of Functional Systems, Moscow: 17-62 (the translation of the title from Russian) Damasio, A. (2006) Descartes' Error. Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, London, Vintage Books. Fields, D. (2005) “Making Memories Stick” in ScientificAmerican.com http://www.scientificamerican.com/ article.cfm?id=making-memories-stick. Retrieved 10.08.09. Fitzpatrick, T.E. (2008) “Are We in Need of a Neuromorality?” in Vision, Spring 2008 Issue. http://www. vision.org/; http://www.vision.org/visionmedia/article.aspx?id=1655. Retrieved 10.09.2009. Mind Wars (2007) the edited transcript of the conference `Mind Wars', October 2007, the website of Dana Foundation, http://www.dana.org/. Retrieved 02.01.2009. Pfaff, D.W. (2007) The Neuroscience of Fair Play, New York, Dana Press. Ramachandran, V.S. (2000) "Mirror Neurons and Imitation Learning as the Driving Force Behind `the Great Leap Forward' in Human Evolution”, Edge Foundation, http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/ramachandran /ramachandran_p1.html. Retrieved 3.09.2009. Singer, T. (2006) “The Neuronal Basis and Ontogeny of Empathy and Mind Reading: Review of Literature and Implications for Future Research” in Neuroscience and Biobehavioural Reviews 30, 2006: 855863. www.sciencedirect.com Slanevskaya, N. (2008) “Moral Agency under Globalization” in Systems, Structures and Agents Under Globalization: European and Russian Tendencies, ed. N. Slanevskaya, St.Petersburg, Asterion, 2008: 37-58, http://www.neurosciencerus.org ; http://www.slanevskaya.narod.ru Tancredi, L. (2005) Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals about Morality, Cambridge University Press. See the edited transcript of the conference `Mind Wars', October 2007, the website of Dana Foundation, http://www.dana.org/. Retrieved 02.01.2009. Thomas E. Fitzpatrick (2008) “Are We in Need of a Neuromorality?” in Vision, Spring 2008 Issue. http://www.vision.org/; http://www.vision.org/visionmedia/article.aspx?id=1655. Retrieved 10.09.2009 Ibid. The edited transcript of the conference `Mind Wars', October 2007, Dana Foundation, http://www.dana.org/, Retrieved 02.01.2009. Ibid. V.S. Ramachandran (2000) "Mirror Neurons and Imitation Learning as the Driving Force Behind `the Great Leap Forward' in Human Evolution” in Edge 69, May 29, 2000, Edge Foundation, http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/ramachandran/ramachandran_p1.html. Retrieved 3.09.2009. Kohler et al., (2002) “Hearing Sounds, Understanding Actions: Action Representation in Mirror Neurons” in Science, 2002, Vol. 297, http://www.bcn-nic.nl/txt/people/publications/hearingsoundsunderstanding actions.pdf. Retrieved 3.09.09. M.Costa-Mattioli, N.Sonenberg (2008) General RNA-binding Proteins Have a Function in Poly(A)-binding protein-dependent Translation, Department of Biochemistry and McGill Cancer Center, McGill University, Montréal, Canada. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18394469. Retrieved 04.09.09. R. Duglas Fields (2005) “Making Memories Stick” in ScientificAmerican.com http://www.scientificamerican .com/article.cfm?id=making-memories-stick. Retrieved 10.08.09. P.K.Anokhin (1975) Essays on the Physiology of Functional Systems, Moscow, 1975: 17-62) (the translation of the title from Russian) Antonio Damasio (2006) Descartes' Error. Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, London, Vintage Books: 225. Ibid.: 122-125. Antonio Damasio (2006) Descartes' Error. Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, London, Vintage Books:

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78. Ibid.: 120. Ibid.: 247. Tanya Singer (2006) “The Neuronal Basis and Ontogeny of Empathy and Mind Reading: Review of Literature and Implications for Future Research” in Neuroscience and Biobehavioural Reviews 30, 2006, pp.855-863 : 857. www.sciencedirect.com L. Tancredi (2005) Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals about Morality, Cambridge University Press. The description from Nina Slanevskaya's "Moral Agency under Globalization" in Systems, Structures and Agents under Globalization: European and Russian Tendencies, ed. N. Slanevskaya, St.Petersburg, Asterion, 2008: 37-58, http://www.neurosciencerus.org ; http://www.slanevskaya.narod.ru Donald W. Pfaff (2007) The Neuroscience of Fair Play, New York, Dana Press: 7, 12. Ibid.: 3. Ibid.: 2.

Part Five Management of Security: Successes and Failures

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Global Security: A Vision for the Future F. Géré and M. Sharpe (Eds.) IOS Press, 2011 © 2011 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-760-4-151

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The Management of Security: Successes and Failures 22-23 May 2008, Istanbul Chair Bruce SEELYa1 and Rachel HOLLANDERb2, co-chair Tayseer AHMADc3 a Department of Social Sciences, Michigan Technological University b National Academy of Engineering c Royal Medical Services, Jordan (non-NATO country) Abstract. Proposed types of responses to various kinds of disaster, both natural and man-made. The importance of listening to groups who are generally ignored, particularly women. A number of areas for future study are identfied which should lead to better preparation for disasters on the part of both experts and (the widest possible number of) stakeholders. Keywords. disaster planning and management; political and bureaucratic response to terrorism, natural and public health disasters; ‘riskmindedness’; communications issues; uses and hazards of technology; preventative strategies; stakeholder awareness



Initial Goals

How and why do communities, nations, states, choose between relative and absolute security? Through case-studies the workshop is tasked to study the responses to extreme events actual or potential, natural or human, deliberate or accidental. Examples are terrorist operations, pandemia, and large natural disasters (tsunamis, hurricanes, earthquakes). The workshop should define criteria for determining successes and failures. Participants are encouraged to consider, in a political context, the bureaucratic responses to extreme events. For example: coordination and communication, planning and priorities, adoption of risk assessment and perception of modern threats in evolving societies; local, national, international, global levels; the irrational in policy and bureaucracy, the balance of security and civil liberties or individual rights; the quality of the relations of experts to decision- makers: trust, credibility. The workshop will present the lessons learned: • Reaction versus anticipation






























































E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]  E-mail: [email protected]
 as suggested by ESF 







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• •

The limits of planning, particularly in the case of natural disasters Spin and hype: information available to the public about extreme events (resilience).

Scientific Content This part first provides a brief synopsis of each session, identifying key points raised by the presenters and the discussants. Next, the document reviews the main common threads for research that emerged during the discussions, as well as many of the specific suggestions for research activities which the individual participants made. The results provide a first set of important possibilities for research focused on managing events related to security and insecurity in our contemporary world. The organizers grouped the representations topically as follows: • Large and Natural Disasters • Public Health • Terrorism • Technological Systems Failures • The Management of Uncertain Science • Technology, and Management and Communication

Large and Natural Disasters Two topics were introduced: first, gender in disaster studies and, second, the mutually interconnected roles of culture and technology in dealing with security/insecurity. One aspect discussed was the need to ensure that attention is given to all of the relevant stakeholders, including many groups (women, young children, elderly, the poor, the sick, those on the bottom rungs of the socio-economic ladder) not often visible in current discussions of security (Enarson). It was noted that it is important to avoid the seductive but problematic appeal of technological “fixes”, because technology may not directly reflect or address cultural differences (Bijker’s). The importance of words, language, and communication has been quickly and strongly underscored. ‘Risk’ and ‘resilience’, for example, emerged as significant terms. Attempts to employ categories of analysis systematically such as culture, technology, and gender become enormously difficult in the absence of common languages and agreed-upon assumptions about cultural and social values. Two more complicating factors were mentioned: the multi-cultural structure of modern global society and the spatial or geographic ‘resolution’ problem. It means that the scale at which one views a circumstance can lead to identification of different challenges. Security issues must be framed differently when one moves from examining the individual to consideration of a family, community, nation and so forth.

Public Health 1) The role of citizens and communities in responding to a disaster (Hopmeier). Among the proposed topics for investigation was the need to determine the




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skill sets required. 2) Family violence in Jordan brought issues of gender into view again (Reem Ahu Hassan). 3) How technological solutions (e.g. telemedicine) are being implemented in the Georgian health system in order to limit the spread of disease (Kldiashvili). 4) The de-radicalization and education of detainees while detained as a measure of the success or failure of management of security in Iraq (Sharpe). In the discussion on how to engage and involve the public in responding to disasters it was said that the aim ought not be getting the public to do the ‘right’ thing, but getting them to do something ‘predictable’. Additionally there is the challenge of ensuring public acceptance of statements and direction from the voices of ‘authority’. Winning trust by achieving moral authority was considered vital. Lurking in the background of the discussion of radicalization was the issue of religion, theology and belief. However, basic uncertainty concerning the place of religion in these discussions suggests another topic for further research.

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Presentations adopted a cultural approach to researching success or failure in dealing with terrorism. They demonstrated the problematic nature of the terms “success” and “failure” in this regard. First the patterns of riots and civil unrest in India were addressed, underscoring the relativity of the perceptions of security (Visvanathan). Another element of relativity is how each side might define success in a case of terrorism, and the third explored the challenges involved in bureaucratic planning and responses to terrorist acts. A common enduring concern is related to the severe challenges of maintaining democratic ideals and values while responding to the threat of terrorism. Differences in the pattern of response to security threats between nations (even democracies) were noted. For example state officials in India took action in the interest of security during and following riots that seemed threatening to some citizens. By the same token, officials concerned with security in agencies at various governmental levels in Canada seemed to focus much more on ‘threats to’ rather than ‘threats from’ – a subtle change that merits more attention (Farson). Terrorist groups may see success or failure differently to those trying to counter them- any terrorist incident, even those that fail in tactical terms, can become a strategic success for a terrorist group (Géré). Major terrorist acts in modern societies can be termed “complex crises”, requiring complex responses. A question arising from this is, can institutions learn? This is a testable hypothesis to which might be added the question of exploring repetitive failures to learn. How and why do governmental institutions and others sometimes learn the wrong lessons? This can take the form of misalignments of resources and personnel, for instance. There may also be confusion about official responses, caused by asking about threats to, rather than threats from. This mindset leads agencies to focus on vulnerabilities, thereby devoting their attention to apparent gaps- which can prevent planning and preparation for real threats. Understanding the functioning of a bureaucracy in situations involving security, disasters and suchlike seems an important realm of study and one which will require good contacts and communication between practitioners and scholars.




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Managing Uncertain Science and Technology The idea of ‘riskmindedness’ as it emerged historically was discussed. The importance of environmental sustainability as a security concern and the challenges of managing security within the political process were presented, along with the difficulty for institutions in solving these challenges. Key points were: 1) It is not easy for academics to talk to managers, politicians, leaders, or the public (and vice versa). Academic advice can never be guaranteed and science and technology products designed to provide security offer something less than perfect certainty. Indeed, technology can itself become the cause of disaster (e.g. infrastructure or digital network failures). 2) Security and insecurity may not be symmetric- we may know what makes us feel insecure but not what makes us secure. 3) The concept of ‘emergency management’ perhaps betrays a misconception about our ability to control situations. 4) Time is another variable that adds uncertainty into security thinking; some challenges only appear when outcomes are observed on a longer timeframe, while others diminish in significance on such a scale. The concepts of communication and resolution were re-emphasized throughout the workshop. The resolution problem prompted the identification of several categories that seem to exist as a continuum: Temporal: immediate  long-term past  present  future: the role of a historical awareness sudden  incremental Spatial: micro  macro Orientation: tactical  strategic philosophic/theoretical  public possible risk  concrete mishap academic  lay public This roster of perspectives demonstrates the complex challenge involved in scholarship and policy choices regarding (in)security. There are many ways to approach this large topic.

Technological System Failures Failures of technological infrastructure were examined, and responses to them (Khripunov). A scientific approach which sought to quantify hazards to infrastructure was proposed (Zimmerman), which recognized that certain hazards are harder to prepare for because the human element is more complicated than simply considering technological elements in the abstract. In those cases, once again, rises the issue of communication. A key point made was that in any technological system, maintenance is paramount. Because most technologies have relatively short life expectancies, it is not enough to just build them.




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Management and Communications There is a strong necessity for a horizontal structure for management and integration of multiple groups of stakeholders in communication processes (Atkins). Neither communication nor management is a science thanks to the way events never unfold exactly as planned (Przelj). New groups and new factors will emerge that cannot be fully accounted for during planning exercises, a situation that places a high premium on flexibility (Shalamanov). (Train for certainty, educate for uncertainty.) Another issue to emerge was the question of when an event is actually over, suggesting an important area for study. Several recent cases show that the rebuilding and recovery periods are not only long but can be more difficult to negotiate than the initial highly publicized response (e.g. The Thaï tsunami, Katrina and donor fatigue). Other suggestions for research were: • Is crisis management different from risk management? What is the significance of the difference? • The atrophy of vigilance. How long can a society stay on alert? • In responding to threats and risks the idea of a ‘trade-off’ pertains to the process a society makes to define responses to (in)security and set policy. • Understanding the benefits and the costs of managing security challenges and determining the balance between immediate threats and risks and those that have much longer time horizons. • Economic, social, cultural, moral and ethical choices are inevitably always involved in determining how to respond to (in)security challenges. Understanding how these choices get framed and made is an imperative research topic. • What if we adopted the idea of who needs to share instead of who needs to know? It was agreed that secrecy is a serious problem in both the research and analysis of governance related to security. • Historical case studies of events to study what is unique and what is not • Methodological opportunities such as agent-based modelling might offer insights into the behaviour of different actors in the midst of a crisis. Security for Whom? A need was identified to devote more research and planning to women, young people, and the elderly – groups rarely examined and often left out of the planning for and analysis of disasters and other security events. The question of “the value of human life" is a major variable for assessing the meaning of security in a variety of contexts including national/strategic culture. Gender was seen as an important topic. There is a need to study the link between domestic violence toward women and terrorism, such as in the way that rape is a purposive tool used to achieve social control of women. In addition, political leaders tend to adopt styles based on machismo, paying more attention to leadership than justice and rights. Also worthy of study is the connection between masculinity and the desire of national leaders to achieve superpower status. The importance of not looking for simple technological fixes was stressed. So was the emerging issues of natural resources and the environment as regards security research. Practically all security problems in all dimensions of human




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development- environmental, social or technological- are human-induced, requiring a change in values. Recognition of the importance of value judgments in all choices dealing with insecurity opens numerous research approaches in the humanities. The assumption that emergencies can be managed at all may be a male mindset predicated upon control. Yet control is often hard to achieve in a disaster situation, so perhaps we should explore uncertainty and design for resilience and flexibility and the ability to survive the unanticipated consequences. Finally, a divide appeared in which some people felt that a scientific approach could solve problems. Quantify the problem and then a solution can be made. The humanists, on the other hand, suggested we must understand the knowledge of the groups involved and communicate amongst different groups.

Additional Issues and Recommendations Management-Communication Combination as a Recipe for Efficiency 1. Bounding of inquiry. One of the most contentious issues for participants concerned what boundaries should be used to frame the management research questions. Two major sides emerged on the question of whether this security research should encompass the sorts of problems posed by phenomena such as global warming and pandemics, or even technological disasters such as Chernobyl or Three Mile Island, or whether it should be limited to phenomena of social conflicts such as war, terrorism, and civil strife. This might be called the policy interest as boundary. There are also organizational involvements as boundaries; for instance, certain organizations at the national and international level focus on civil conflicts and others on environmental and public health issues. Private sector organizations also exhibit these differences. Civil conflicts often take state-centric rather than human security perspectives, although they shouldn’t be limited in this way if human suffering is the measure. These differences are reflected in the boundaries between academic specialties and subspecialties that focus on the phenomena. This is itself a research problem: how can or should these boundaries be overcome in establishing an appropriate research program? Much previous research that focuses on questions of human security is not visible to research communities that study international relations and social conflicts. So a major challenge is to organize and take lessons from related research areas that would be useful in addressing concerns for research for policy. This issue will become more an item for study as ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘security communities’ displace ‘defense alliances’. In this area research should focus on: looking for ways to diminish time in situations of uncertainty or ignorance (facing the unknown) and the need to diminish strategic surprise. What management models (for individuals, organizations, and governments) assist in moving out of these zones? What are the possibilities for ‘early warnings or early warning systems’? Case studies and modeling and simulation exercises may be useful approaches for these issues and those below. How should priorities for attention be established? How can new threats be identified? Better relationships between researchers and policy/decision makers may be needed in order to answer these questions. State actors and non-state actors are involved and issues of information security complicate the ability to get needed




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answers to appropriate parties. How can trustworthy communication and understanding develop? What is the advantage to ‘management’ of putting famine, climate change, etc.. in this basket? Given limited resources, what should the research agenda be, if the research community is to make a contribution to security sector(s) in managing? Perhaps we should focus on conditions that are essential to orderly well-functioning society and susceptible to manipulation by policy means? These may be a minimally good government and functioning economy, which provides a starting point. If human security is to work as a research focus or policy agenda for defense organizations, often negative historical associations and fears of remilitarization will need to be dealt with, requiring attention to public opinion and social movements. Security is a collective good, but it may pose threats to individual safety and civil society. Special representatives or other innovative social responses have been found; these should be studied as management tools. Also relevant here are examinations of goals and relationships between defense and other organizations in societies or between societies. Of merit would be comparative studies of NATO and other security sector organizations, inclusive of private security organizations. Identifying the factors leading to successful cooperation in pursuit of human security goals would be significant. Key management issues concerns leadership, partnerships and strategic planning; relevance; new metrics; and new applications. More program agility and less bureaucracy, more transparency and coordination are needed. One question for management research here is what factors would lead to these positive outcomes. The study pointed to the importance of personal relationships and professional networks, which are critical but difficult to measure; these ideas need both examination and operationalization. New models are being promoted, but research on these new attempts at cooperation and coordination is needed. What are the different priorities that different countries give to various threats? The Middle East, Africa, and Asia may want to partner with others on disaster preparedness, port security, and disease surveillance. What problems remain intractable? Why? What management approaches succeed? Why? It was recommended that a more rapid response to opportunities for cooperative threat reduction is needed and that new funding mechanisms would be a positive innovation. Of current and long-standing importance stands the big issue of arms control and disarmament. Even though some can argue that it is old military stuff, it retains a considerable impact in peacetime, and, needless to say, in war periods. When and how is disarmament possible? What security guarantees are necessary? How would the process of disarmament be managed and results verified? These questions led some participants to suggest that the concept of security in a world without the threat of nuclear weapons returns us to the challenges faced by nation states in the years before World War I and between the world wars. Thus attention to history matters in sorting out the best strategies for managing these more ‘traditional’ issues of security between and among states. That the failure of security in such regimes twice led to major wars in the first half of the twentieth century is a sobering reminder of the importance of understanding the dynamics of security. Therefore, a major area in which to build ongoing research concerns how to enhance the management of nuclear security on a regional or worldwide basis. Is zero nukes the best solution? Would international control of a small stock be better? Issues of energy and national security are also of ongoing research concern. What regime might control supply augmentation in cases of security threat?




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Why has an expanded notion of security come to attention now? People have local or partial approaches to the issue depending on their particular focuses. In this session, people spoke about nuclear weapons, Afghanistan, good governance and corruption, climate change, international terrorism and piracy, drugs and money laundering, AIDS, displacement of human populations, unmanned weapons and the challenges from the distancing that ‘cyborg’ and information technology approaches pose to human biological responses to suffering. Participants suggested that ‘envisioning exercises’ might be useful in improving relations between the developed and under-developed worlds. Different regions and different groups within them have different visions about desired futures and legitimate authority, and these visions need to be understood and respected if fears of outside control are to be mitigated and cooperative approaches are to evolve. The issue of piracy and failed states is hot right now, requiring immediate answers. Nonetheless, research on post-colonial states is needed to understand the history of locality of authority within a country. There are many different types of economies and we need new ideas for governing given complex realities. Regional studies provide some useful research results that should be mined to examine the complexities of ideas of government and governance, and issues of security for human life – food, water, and shelter. Security of livelihood jumps to the political realm, but before that perceptions of security and threats need to be understood if responses to failures of governance are to be well-informed. Another area for research concerns relationships between private and public sector organizations. Unglamorous issues such as governmental and private (financial) responsibilities for critical infrastructure need to be addressed. Ownership rights and responsibility differ in different societies, but government is held ultimately responsible for infrastructure security and survival. 2. Security as a management problem raises the question of who owns which aspects of the problem. Who manages what and for whom? What are priorities for research from the perspectives of managers, researchers, and affected parties? How can management research improve security practices and policies? Overall, participants agreed that security is essential for well-ordered societies; thus, management of security and security sectors is a central concern. Given the security problems facing all societies, all need to consider how to develop or reform bureaucratic organizations to handle the problems. Participants agreed that management problems for security are monumental and wide-ranging, as the list under ‘boundary problems’ above makes clear. They include problems posed by religion, gender, local context (time and place). They include such problems as stabilization (for instance, Afghanistan). There are problems of crime and corruption and exit or extrication from active conflicts. Is management of security an issue that can be studied independently of particular problems? Discussions identified the issue of force as a major research topic. Besides issues of legitimacy or legality, there are questions about the organization of the production of force and different types of force. How is control, civilian control, of force instituted and maintained? How does international cooperation develop and end? What is the capacity for change management in force organization(s)? There have been descriptive studies, but these issues of the governance of security research need comprehensive answers that can be used by decision makers in structuring and evaluating programs. Getting such answers requires analytical, comparative studies that might use previous work to capture important variables.




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An issue that participants identified as related to defense and security involves management of energy and the roles of government and corporate support for protecting supplies. This is an area fraught with historical and current tension, and research doesn’t seem to have focused on how to improve management so that local needs and interests are taken into account and corruption is lessened.

International CommunityNATO; EU; etc..

National Governments Militaries,
Police Forces

Individual Security: Human Life, Food, Water, Shelter

Local Governments Private Sector

Circles of Security Research Reference: Bruce Seely, Rachel Hollander, Brussels, April 2009

3. Communications issues may underlie management problems. These difficulties exist between different states and between governments and their citizens. They exist between security organizations and managers and other parties (stakeholders). Communications need to be resolved in developing partnerships and managing cooperation and conflicts between organizations. Several issues merit attention in developing partnerships. One concerns the need to share information perceived as sensitive or confidential or ‘secret.’ Legal requirements may exacerbate the difficulties. The situation makes it even difficult to examine what can be shared and how. The problem is seen when an intelligence agency may be able to share information with a counterpart in another country but not with fire and police departments at home. The ramifications of these policies need study. A somewhat more basic question concerns communications in hierarchies. This has been studied, and more study is needed if improvements in receiving timely and useful communications are to be made. The problem of paying attention, not just receipt, needs examination. Is there a difference between information and message that is important? Information sharing also requires development of conceptual understandings that are needed for international and regional cooperation. This issue raises that of trust and

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the problems of management when trust is lacking. What are the prerequisites for enhancing trust? Finally, the more general question concerns how popular culture shapes perceptions of security. There is considerable research about popular culture, but not so much in relationship to perceptions of security and to ways in which popular actions can increase security or affect the actions of organizations so as to increase security. The relationship between popular media and expertise and authority in the context of security has not been carefully examined. A related question concerns potential or negative consequences of ‘good intentions’. Sometimes, setting aside concerns about hidden agendas, problems are created by elite actors, e.g., religious leaders, intellectual, scientific, technological and political leaders, for various reasons that may involve self-interest, or group- think, or sunk costs, among other factors. What social controls of elites lead to better or worse outcomes? How is this managed? When do elite and common interests coincide, for better or worse? 4. Methodologies and social and historical perspectives: this research uses qualitative and quantitative methods including historical studies and case studies. Theoretical orientations arise from most of the social and behavioral sciences, including science and technology studies. Most techniques involve document analysis. Historical examinations often require archival work. Case studies can involve interviews and surveys or questionnaires. There has been little longitudinal work, but there are some efforts on which to build. In the area of social and historical perspectives on security and their implications for management, the need is to acknowledge private and public sector involvements and examine their roles with an eye to improving interactions. One area for research takes historical perspectives and uses the approaches of political science and international relations to examine the network of actors at trans-national levels. Comparative approaches can study historical and contemporary patterns examining the circulation of information, actors, and innovations. There are numerous possible cases involving numerous organizations and assistance from numerous countries. A recent example is the Italian earthquake. Here research is examining networks at the transnational level. In future studies, research can simulate potential catastrophes and transnational responses. Force- its legitimacy, legality, effects, is an important research topic. Research would examine the organization of the production of force (and different types), with issues ranging from how it is controlled and civilian control to international cooperation, and the capacity for change management in force organizations. Individual researchers have studied these topics. What is needed is organization and governance of security research to answer these questions comprehensively and bring answers to decision makers. As noted in the previous categories, identification and assessment are needed of values that compose security- economic, social, military, cognitive, emotional. These values encompass material and non-material factors. Audiences for these studies include policy makers. The answers should indicate the nature and degree of social trust and the assignment of responsibility. They should provide information about the quality of management of security- in various organizations, national and international, via indications of perceptions of accountability, competence and legitimacy. Other areas for research include the relationships between technology and security (including issues of disruptive innovations, normalization of deviance, and hidden hazards),

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evaluation of process and capabilities (conjoining national and international goals), and expenditures analysis. Methodological issues for these kinds of research involve difficulties in selecting groups of respondents and institutionalizing longitudinal studies. Can protocols from one country be used for another? There are various sociological perspectives on issues of threats to and from powerful and less powerful states, and the studies require not just traditional functional analysis, but also complex systems theory using a multidimensional approach. The goal is a preventive, diagnostic approach that can develop practical solutions to improving the role of experts and stakeholder awareness. In the end, the study and evaluation of good practices as well as management successes and failures should lead to uptake of results about human behavior in crisis, to use for better management and program development.

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Human Security: Population Well-Being as a Path to Global Security Zaryab IQBAL1 Pennsylvania State University Abstract. The traditional notion of national and international security as basically avoiding war between and preventing invasion of/by other states has, perforce, been superseded in recent years. In the post-Cold War period ‘human security’ has become extremely important, particularly since 9/11, and in light of subsequent Islamist attacks on the West. To provide all human beings with such personal ‘securities’ as a secure food supply, human and civil rights, a clean and safe environment, etc.. has become recognised both by researchers in the field and by international bodies such as the UN as of paramount importance. A more integrated approach to studying this area is required to achieve the desired results of integrated security- i.e. from the human to the international level. Keywords. national and international security; post-Cold War era; human security; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); human and civil rights

For more than a century the idea of national and international security has been synonymous with protecting the territory and national interests of sovereign states from external aggression or unwelcome interference. Traditional approaches to the study of national and international security reflect this conception, and focus attention primarily on the state-level impacts of violent conflict; once a state is able to safeguard its military, territorial, and political interests from outside threats, it is perceived to have attained national security. Particularly during the Cold War era, realist notions of security dictated that foreign policy and state leaders remain unrelentingly occupied with the pursuit of military superiority. The emphasis of neo-realist theory on states as the single most important entities in the international system led to the deprecation of the interests of groups and people within states. Entities without sovereignty did not warrant attention at the international level, and what occurred within the borders of a sovereign state was to be addressed at the domestic level. Only threats to the security and existence of states were considered detrimental to global security and thus worthy of international attention and action. In stark contrast to this conventional perspective, the emerging notion of human security considers first and foremost the security of state populations, and asserts that the factors that engender insecurity among the people living within states are not limited to perpetuation of the state. In this view, the security of people is inextricably bound up with their quality of life and, therefore, threats to their security include a range of social and economic issues beyond the territorial integrity of their states. Thus, while the occurrence of violent international conflict can adversely affect any or all of 1

E-mail: [email protected]

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the factors associated with the security of ordinary people, the absence or cessation of militarized conflict does not guarantee the elimination of threats to human security. Problems like environmental degradation and disease proliferation threaten not only the security of people in a single state, but can easily attain global magnitude. The idea of human security, then, offers a more accurate reflection of global security than the security of states in the post-Cold War era. Clearly, state security is necessary for the security of people; however, state security alone does not ensure human security. For instance, the events of September 11th 2001 and subsequent waves of terrorism have compelled governments and international institutions to focus on societies' vulnerabilities beyond national border security and conventional military strength. Studying human security allows us to better understand sources of societal vulnerabilities and effective ways to mitigate them. Moreover, findings from a research agenda focused on determinants of human security can illuminate the real costs and benefits of national and international policies (such as involvement or intervention in international armed conflict, development assistance, economic liberalisation, and environmental regulations) by estimating their direct effects on populations. Human security as a framework for evaluating population and global security was first introduced in the 1994 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which called for a "profound transition in thinking... from nuclear security to human security" (22). During the Cold War, the concept of security had been limited to protecting territory, safeguarding national interests, and preventing a global nuclear war; as a result, the notion of global security was closely associated with the territorial and political security of nation-states. The world was caught up in the tensions between the superpowers, with the developed states striving to perpetuate their ideologies and the newly independent developing countries guarding themselves against threats to their sovereignty. In the fray for military superiority the plight of ordinary people who populated sovereign states rarely made it on to the international relations agenda. Both politics and scholarship were dominated by the realist paradigm and its emphasis on states as the key actors in the global system; what happened within the borders of states was granted little attention or concern. Consequently, conflicts within states as well as the quality of life of individuals were matters relegated to domestic governance and did not merit the same concern from the international community as did interstate conflict. In 1994, the UNDP described human security in negative terms: "For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event... human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons, it is a concern with human life and dignity." (22). Seen in this light, human security is comprised of two main elements. The first is safety from constant threats (such as repression and poverty) that prevent people from achieving an acceptable standard of living. Second, human security is the absence of sudden catastrophic events that disrupt the lives of people, including natural disasters and war. The people-centric concept of human security is universal; the effects of threats such as environmental degradation, crime, drug tracking, terrorism, and disease proliferation are not contained within any single state. In this view, the global nature of human security reflects the interdependence of the international community, and hence the threats to human security are best addressed at the global level (UNDP 1994). The UNDP listed seven components of human security: personal security,

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economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, political security, and community security. According to the UNDP's definition, a population could only be considered secure if it enjoyed all these seven elements of security. Personal security involves the ability of individuals to live their lives without fear of physical harm. Economic security, narrowly defined, refers to secure means for a basic income through productive work, hence employment. Food security entails access to food at all times for every member of a society. This means that there is food available to be purchased at a reasonable price and that people have the economic means to buy food that meets their nourishment needs. Health security involves access to both preventive and curative healthcare, as well as protection from health threats, such as epidemics. Environmental security entails safety from threats to the local as well as global ecosystems. Political security exists if the human and civil rights of people are respected by their states, and people do not suffer political repression. Community security refers to the safety of groups, ranging from families to ethnic communities (UNDP 1994). This early discussion of human security provided a framework for assessing the security needs of nations and the international communities in the post-Cold War era. Proponents of the broader view of human security are concerned with security in the lives of individuals, while traditional studies of international security focus on the security of states and consider war or invasion as the main security threat. The report of the Commission on Human Security (2003), ‘Human Security Now’, argues that human security complements state security by including threats that may not necessarily affect state security, including issues of human rights and healthcare. The report calls for a holistic approach to human security that broadens the perceptions of security from state borders to people who live within the states. According to this report, threats to human security include environmental pollution, illiteracy, and ill health (Commission on Human Security 2003). The emphasis in the human security debate on quality of life and threats such as poverty, disease, hunger, and illiteracy reflect the importance of development. Ul Haq (1999) advocates looking at security through development instead of arms, and predicts a universal and indivisible perception of human security. He argues that is it "easier, more humane, and less costly to deal with the new issues of human security upstream rather than face their tragic consequences downstream." Similarly, Thakur (1997) emphasizes the importance of the quality of life of people as a core component of human security and views any challenge to their quality of life as a threat to the security of people. Sen (2000) states that threats to human security include any menaces to the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings, while McRae (2002) calls for a focus on the lives of individuals in evaluating the socio-political state of nations. Human security, however, cannot be viewed merely as a consequence of or companion to development. According to the report of the Commission on Human Security (2003), the response of states and institutions to issues of human security "cannot be effective if it comes fragmented (from those dealing with rights, those with security, those with humanitarian concerns and those with development.) With human security as the objective, there must be a stronger and more integrated response from communities and states around the globe" (2). The breadth of human security as described by these ideas changes the focus of security from states to people as the object in need of security. It also shifts the burden of providing security from sovereign states alone to a number of actors, including governmental and nongovernmental institutions as well as national and local

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communities. Human security thus suggests an integrative approach to the study of global security, one that better accounts for security threats in the current international environment than extant frameworks. Although the idea that human security encompasses a number of threats to the lives of people is relatively new, the various components of human security are issues that have long been studied by various disciplines. Neither the academic world nor policymakers and practitioners are unfamiliar with problems such as poverty, environmental degradation, and disease. The human security framework merely presents an integrative approach to the welfare of people by emphasizing the interconnectedness of these various issues. The shift in perception of security from purely state-centric considerations to factors that influence populations of states is apparent in academic as well as policy circles. However, in order for human security to be systematically and scientifically assessed, there is a need for better conceptualisation, measurement, and analysis of issues and factors related to human security; and to better incorporate issues of human security into the security agenda of states and international institutions.

References The Commission on Human Security. 2003. Human Security Now. New York: Commission on Human Security. McRae, Rob and Don Hubert eds. 2002. Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. Sen, Amartya. 2000. ‘Why Human Security?’ Presentation at the International Symposium on Human Security, Tokyo, July 28. Thakur, Ramesh. 1997. ‘From National to Human Security’ in Harris, Stewart and Andrew Mack, eds. AsiaPacic Security: The Economics-Politics Nexus. Sydney: Allen and Unwin. Ul Haq, Mahbub. 1999. ‘Global Governance for Human Security’ in Tehranian, Mayid, Ed. Worlds Apart: Human Security and Global Governance. New York: IB Tauris. United Nations Development Program. 1994. Human Development Report. New York: UNDP.

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Frontiers in Research on Human-Centered Dimensions of Disasters David MENDONÇA1 New Jersey Institute of Technology Abstract. Multi-disciplinary research is needed on the human aspects of disaster management. Sociological research has been prominent in this field in recent decades Furthermore the tools available to do it have multiplied and improved in that time. There is a problem, however, with data access. Much of the data from these studies has yet to be digitized. Better organization and integration of researchers and technology is needed so as to maximize the outcomes of disaster research and minimize duplication of work. Keywords. human-centered dimensions of disaster; Disaster Research Center; European Science Foundation Forward Looks; en-route sense-making; organization building; instrument development; process-level modeling

1. Outline This brief paper suggests some opportunities (and pressing needs) for multidisciplinary research on human-centered dimensions of disaster2. Sources for the paper are longer-term trends, recent advances and of course the author’s own speculation. Following some prefatory remarks, comments are divided into two broad areas: research infrastructure (including the development of new human resources, as well as research tools and instrumentation) and specific topics (such as cognitive bases of decision-making). 2. Prefatory Comments Large-scale disasters- sometimes called extreme events- offer unique and captivating situations in which to investigate how humans deal with high stakes decisions that must be made across time and organizational levels, frequently enough under conditions of tight time constraint. Research on human response to disaster has a long history, drawing on disciplines that range from social sciences (Kreps 1984; Quarantelli and Dynes 1977a; Tierney 2007), to business (Webb et al. 2000), to science and engineering (DeBalogh and Wallace 1985). The scope of this work is similarly large, including study of individuals, groups, organizations and even nations. Perhaps the most recent sustained burst of scholarship is that associated with field studies 1

E-mail: [email protected] I adapt this phrase from Thomas Drabek’s excellent introduction- given in the form of a college courseentitled Social Dimensions of Disaster: Drabek, T. E. (1996). 'Social Dimensions of Disaster: A FEMA Higher Education Course (Instructor guide).' PB97-115372, National Emergency Training Center, Emmitsburg, MD.. 2

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conducted from the 1960s through the 1980s in the United States by sociologists at the Disaster Research Center, or DRC, located originally at Ohio State University, then at the University of Delaware (Quarantelli 1997). These highly labor-intensive (and sometimes harrowing) investigations eventually became mainstream methods for studying extreme events: the US National Science Foundation (and through it, the University of Colorado at Boulder and the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, or EERI) has continued to fund fieldwork in the area. A parallel development has been the improvement in the accessibility and quality of tools for collecting, analyzing and managing data from the field. The technologies now available for recording what happens on the ground during disaster response are worlds away from what they were during the halcyon days of the DRC, and include sensors for biological agents (such as humans) and mechanical ones (such as public infrastructure), digital still and video cameras, personal computers that allow for quick analysis in the field, and communications technologies that allow for real-time observation and rapid data gathering, storage, analysis, and dissemination of findings even during the acute phase of a disaster. Our capacity for sustained and detailed observation, measurement and recall is therefore vastly superior to what it was when the last major thrust to build disaster theory was undertaken. For example, we now view as routine the methods for analyzing speech and text via algorithmic methods, and for associating events (such as interpersonal communications) with specific places and times. The result is data of compelling richness and objectivity. Not surprisingly, challenges associated with data access have continued, and perhaps even intensified, to the point where only very few researchers can boast of programs that involve sustained periods of field work. Fewer still are those who can say that they have been able to intervene in everyday operations of emergency response organizations, and to publish the results of these interventions. While the DRC studies continue, the center simply has not been able to collect the volume and breadth of data that it once collected- and no other organization has attempted to fill this gap, either in the US or elsewhere. Without focused and sustained support for a core group of researchers concerned with social dimensions of disaster (Drabek 1996), development in the field will be piecemeal, loosely federated, and likely to be lost. Section 3 considers how European Science Foundation Forward Looks might stimulate work on the design of organizations to conduct this work. For a number of reasons, resurrecting the DRC- or something identical to it- would not address all of the issues noted above. First, technology and circumstances on the ground (e.g. access to the right data) have changed. Second, the field of disaster research has expanded, proving stubbornly resistant to attempts to create a single academic field out of ‘disaster studies’. Prior to the DRC’s founding there was very little that could be written to summarize research in the field (see comments on this matter by Quarantelli and Dynes (1977b). While at DRC sociology was the core discipline3 in the last twenty or so years since the center’s move to the University of Delaware, it is perhaps fair to say that there has been significant research done in the human dimensions of disaster by researchers in public policy, human factors, and information technology. As a result, a broader perspective is now needed, one which attempts to bring multidisciplinary perspectives to bear in articulating and investigating 3 I should note that this work has had far-reaching implications. Even a cursory analysis of patterns of citations for papers by R. Dynes, E.L. Quarantelli, G. Kreps, K. Tierney, W. Anderson, D. Wenger and others will show that their work has influenced researchers far beyond the traditional bounds of Sociology.

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human-centered dimensions of disaster. Section 4 takes up this theme by sketching out promising frontiers on some specific research topics.

3. Infrastructure Infrastructure refers here to the personnel and material necessary to provide some service: in this case, the development of research that makes lasting contributions to science and engineering. The raw materials for scholarship in disaster research have always been (and will continue to be) observations collected in field, archival and laboratory settings on humans and human organizations as they plan for, respond to, or learn from extreme events. Extracting defensible measures of these activities requires a sufficiently large set of skilled and available researchers willing to dispatch themselves to the disaster scene at a moment’s notice. Part of this skill is in learning how to swiftly gain access and trust among decision makers on the scene. The task is made somewhat easier by the availability of new technologies, such as devices for sensing the environment, and routines for logging communications and decisions within organizations. But these technologies cannot be expected to be in all places at all times. Humans will continue to be needed to place the sensors, initiate the logging, and of course to collect the data they never thought they would need. We may consider, then, how to structure, sustain and manage an organization of researchers that is capable of making a fundamental contribution to our understanding of human-centered dimensions of disaster.4 A similar point may be made about the methods that guide inquiry once the phenomena have been measured. The uniqueness, severity, spontaneity, complexity, and possible sensitivity of disasters pose considerable challenges for conducting methodologically rigorous investigations into crisis decision-making, communication and supporting technologies (Drabek 1970; Stallings 2002; Weick 1985). The approach to addressing this challenge has been varied, ranging from field to laboratory studies, to archival research and the statistical analysis of data, to less conventional techniques such as computer simulation. In many cases, there has been a strong reliance on one-shot case studies, leading to questions about the generalizability or transferability of results; this is one aspect of the history of field research that needs to be addressed. Substantial challenges therefore remain for developing sound theory about human decision-making and the role of supporting tools in emergency management. Aside from the DRC archive (which contains a wealth of interviews and supporting materials), there are no common databases that may be approached from a range of disciplinary perspectives. Indeed, the raw data from the DRC archives are not in a form that can be distributed digitally, despite their considerable historical importance. The main impediment to digital distribution is the sheer volume of studies and the costs associated with digitizing this much information. Consequently, we are severely limited in the extent that we can conduct comparative studies, either within units (e.g. patterns in community resilience over time), across units (e.g. relative 4 The first two iterations of the US National Science Foundation’s ENABLING project (‘Enabling the Next Generation of Hazards Researchers’) offers a smaller scale model for how this might be done. A third iteration has recently begun, led by Tom Birkland of North Carolina State University. Given international interest in this program, a similar program would be very fruitful in Europe.

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resilience of comparable communities to common disaster events). Social scientistswho are frequently called upon to construct instruments for measuring human-centered phenomena- are in an excellent position to contribute to the development of such data sets. Indeed, there are a number of examples of instruments developed outside the field of disaster research that have been successfully employed in disaster field studies (e.g. (Andersson and Nilsson 1964; Goodhue 1998)). The need for discussions of instrument development is particularly great when the phenomena are not clearly understood. Yet with a few prominent exceptions such as survey instruments, the path to instrument development is seldom discussed, and the instruments themselves- such as those measuring actual or perceived user performance or satisfaction-are woefully under-discussed. Without adequate detail on instrument development and validation the resulting theory may become too narrow (or too diffuse) too quickly, leading either to an unnecessarily narrow view or to a hopelessly broad one. We might discuss the design of a single instrument (not necessarily a questionnaire) that provides insightful data, requires less than one person-hour of labor to apply, and can be administered with only a minimum of training.

4. Specific Topics As noted previously, the scope of disciplinary perspectives on human-centered dimensions of disaster continues to grow. There are recent fine contributions from researchers in disciplines such as public policy, computing sciences, human factors and civil engineering (National Research Council 2006). The scope is appropriate and natural considering the life-cycle of an emergency: monitoring operations during normal conditions, selecting an appropriate procedure when planned-for contingencies arise, and revisiting the appropriateness of these procedures as other potentially disruptive events occur (Beroggi and Wallace 1994; Beroggi and Wallace 2000). Dealing with these events requires both monitoring capability (i.e. noticing that the event has occurred) and responding capability (i.e. developing and deploying new procedures once the need for them has been recognized). Disaster research in the mid-20th century focused on structural aspects of emergency management, including the role of policy in shaping response, and the behaviors exhibited by organizations and their members before, during and after a disaster. A more recent trend is the investigation of the processes that underlie behavior and that- inevitably- help shape structure. Examples in the field of human-computer interaction include Jonas Landgren’s work on en-route sense-making by firefighters (Landgren 2005) and Leysia Palen’s work on community informatics. My own work has been concerned with how individuals and organizations detect and respond to highly non-routine events (Mendonça 2007; Mendonça and Wallace 2004; Mendonça and Wallace 2007). I describe these two tasks briefly in order to illustrate the salience of cognitive-level theory to an understanding of human response to disaster, then suggest future work that would build upon it. In the first stage, the responding organization recognizes either that no planned-for procedure applies to the current situation or that an appropriate planned-for procedure cannot be executed. In the process, "There can be errors of rigidly adhering to someone else’s plan as well as inappropriately departing from the plan" (Klein 1993). An incorrect choice may therefore be defined as either (i) improvising when a planned-for

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procedure applies and is executable or (ii) failing to improvise when an appropriate planned-for procedure either cannot be found or cannot be executed. The other two possible choices (improvising when no planned-for procedure applies or can be executed; not improvising when a planned-for procedure does apply and can be executed) are correct choices, though of course no improvisation or planned-for procedure is guaranteed to have a desirable outcome. At a cognitive level, the question of when to improvise may be conceptualized as a categorization problem that may be influenced by a number of factors. Time pressure (Marsden et al. 2002; Moorman and Miner 1998) and risk, for example, may influence how the choice is made (Smart and Vertinsky 1977), in part by reducing the inclination to improvise given that the need exists to do so (Weick 1993). Prior training may lead decision-makers to enact strategies based on recognizing characteristics of past problems in the current one (Klein 1993). Indeed, a sobering conclusion of Weick’s (1993) study of the response to the Mann Gulch forest fire is that groups under such conditions may force their conception of the emergency to fit one they know how to address- rather than to the one they need to address. Once the need to improvise has been recognized, the second stage is the real-time development and deployment of new procedures. The improvised action may range from substitution (e.g. using a school bus to transport injured persons) to the construction of new procedures (e.g. using fire trucks to provide mobile showers following a chemical exposure). In addition to actions, roles of response personnel may also be improvised (Kreps and Bosworth 1993). For example, as discussed by Webb (1998), a material role improvisation involves “changes in the tools or equipment used in the performance of disaster roles or in the physical location where those roles are enacted”; a non-material improvisation involves “changes in the things that people do or how those things are done.” At a cognitive level, then, the question of how to improvise may therefore be conceptualized as a search and assembly problem (Newell et al. 1962), which may be influenced by factors such as time available for development and deployment of new procedures, risk in the environment and the results of prior decisions. It therefore involves problem finding (Gallupe and DeSanctis 1988) and creative thinking (Boden 1998; Newell et al. 1962). Building better theory about when and how humans respond to unplanned-for contingencies provides a window into human ingenuity and creativity, particularly as exercised in high stakes situations. My own work has been concerned with modeling cognition at both stages of this process. I have employed a range of techniques, including case study methods, statistical data modeling, and computational (i.e. rulebased) modeling, using both field and laboratory data. A similarly varied breadth may be seen in Landgren’s and Palen’s work. Multiple methods applied at individual through organizational levels may yield insights not obtainable via single method/single unit of analysis studies. In all of this work may be seen a continuation of the themes of adaptation, innovation and improvisation in the response phasediscussed eloquently by Dynes (1970) in various research projects conducted at the Disaster Research Center.

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5. Concluding Comments This brief note has identified organization building, instrument development and process-level modeling as three areas of possible investment by national and international research sponsors. Some of the barriers to development in these areas have also been identified, with some suggestions for overcoming them. I thank you for provoking these thoughts, and look forward to our future discussions.

References Andersson, B., and Nilsson, S. (1964). ‘Studies of the Reliability and Validity of the Critical Incident Technique.’ Journal of Applied Psychology, 48(6), 398-403. Beroggi, G. E. G., and Wallace, W. A. (1994). ‘Operational Risk Management: A New Paradigm for Decision Making.’ IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 24(10), 1450-1457. Beroggi, G. E. G., and Wallace, W. A. (2000). ‘Multi-Expert Operational Risk Management.’ IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics Part C, 30(1), 32-44. Boden, M. A. (1998). ‘Creativity and Artificial Intelligence.’ Artificial Intelligence, 103, 347-356. DeBalogh, F., and Wallace, W. A. (1985). ‘Decision Support Systems for Disaster Management.’ Public Administration Review, 45, 134-146. Drabek, T. E. (1970). ‘Methodology of Studying Disasters: Past Patterns and Future Possibilities.’ American Behavioral Scientist, 13(3), 331-343. Drabek, T. E. (1996). ‘Social Dimensions of Disaster: A FEMA Higher Education Course (Instructor guide).’ PB97-115372, National Emergency Training Center, Emmitsburg, MD. Dynes, R. R. (1970). Organized Behavior in Disaster, Heath, Lexington, MA. Gallupe, R. B., and DeSanctis, G. (1988). ‘Computer-Based Support for Group Problem-Finding: An Experimental Investigation.’ MIS Quarterly, 12(2), 277-296. Goodhue, D. L. (1998). ‘Development and Measurement Validity of a Task-Technology Fit Instrument for User Evaluations of Information Systems.’ Decision Sciences, 29(Winter), 105-138. Klein, G. A. (1993). ‘A Recognition-primed Decision (RPD) Model of Rapid Decision Making.’ Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods, G. A. Klein, J. Orasanu, R. Calderwood, and C. E. Zsambok, eds., Ablex Publishing Corp., Norwood, NJ, 138-147. Kreps, G. A. (1984). ‘Sociological Inquiry and Disaster Research.’ Annual Review of Sociology, 10, 309330. Kreps, G. A., and Bosworth, S. L. (1993). ‘Disaster, Organizing and Role Enactment: A Structural Approach.’ American Journal of Sociology, 99(2), 428-463. Landgren, J. (2005). ‘Supporting fire crew sensemaking enroute to incidents.’ International Journal of Emergency Management, 2(3), 176-188. Marsden, J. R., Pakath, R., and Wibowo, K. (2002). ‘Decision Making Under Time Pressure with Different Information Sources and Performance-based Financial Incentives—Part 1.’ Decision Support Systems, 34(1), 75– 97. Mendonça, D. (2007). ‘Decision Support for Improvisation in Response to Extreme Events.’ Decision Support Systems, 43(3), 952–967. Mendonça, D., and Wallace, W. A. (2004). ‘Studying Organizationally-situated Improvisation in Response to Extreme Events.’ International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 22(2), 5-29. Mendonça, D., and Wallace, W. A. (2007). ‘A Cognitive Model of Improvisation in Emergency Management.’ IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Part A, 37(4), 547–561. Moorman, C., and Miner, A. S. (1998). ‘The Convergence of Planning and Execution: Improvisation in New Product Development.’ Journal of Marketing, 62(3), 1-20. National Research Council. (2006). ‘Facing Hazards and Disasters: Understanding Human Dimensions.’ National Academies Press, Washington, DC. Newell, A., Shaw, J. C., and Simon, H. A. (1962). ‘The Processes of Creative Thinking.’ Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking, H. E. Gruber, G. Terrel, and M. Wertheimer, eds., Atherton Press, New York, 63-119. Quarantelli, E. L. (1997). ‘The Disaster Research Center Field Studies of Organizational Behavior in the Crisis Time Period of Disasters.’ International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 15(1), 4769.

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Quarantelli, E. L., and Dynes, R. R. (1977a). ‘Response to Social Crisis and Disaster.’ Annual Review of Sociology, 3, 23-49. Quarantelli, E. L., and Dynes, R. R. (1977b). ‘Response to Social Crisis and Disaster.’ Annual Reviews in Sociology, 3(1), 23-49. Smart, C., and Vertinsky, I. (1977). ‘Designs for Crisis Decision Units.’ Administrative Science Quarterly, 22, 640-657. Stallings, R. A. (2002). ‘Methods of Disaster Research.’ Xlibris Corporation, Philadelphia, PA. Tierney, K. J. (2007). ‘From the Margins to the Mainstream? Disaster Research at the Crossroads.’ Annual Review of Sociology, 33(1), 503-525. Webb, G. R., Beverly, M., McMichael, M., Noon, J., and Patterson, T. (1998). ‘Role Improvising Under Conditions of Uncertainty: A Classification of Types.’ 289, University of Delaware, Newark, DE. Webb, G. R., Tierney, K. J., and Dahlhamer, J. M. (2000). ‘Business and Disasters: Empirical Patterns and Unanswered Questions.’ Natural Hazards Review, May, 83-90. Weick, K. E. (1985). ‘Systemic observational methods.’ Handbook of Social Psychology, G. Lindzey and E. Aronson, eds. Random House, New York, 567-634. Weick, K. E. (1993). ‘The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster.’ Administrative Science Quarterly(Dec.), 628-652.

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Widespread Disastrous Events: The Case of the August 2003 Blackout and Other Electric Power Blackouts Rae ZIMMERMAN1 Professor of Planning and Public Administration; Director, Institute for Civil Infrastructure Systems2, Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York University Abstract. Disasters that strike over a large area- such as large power blackoutsare especially hard to tackle since they preclude simply utilizing the resources of nearby unaffected areas. The number of such outages has been steadily rising in the US for decades, due to accidents and natural causes, but the possibility of relevant terrorist attacks must be considered too. Such events have cascading effects in a modern, technologically inter-connected state- transport, telecoms, water, and other infrastructure networks are soon affected by loss of power. These problems, and their solutions are multi-faceted and involve a number of agencies and institutions. Not only must electrical infrastructure be made more resilient so as to reduce the likelihood of large-scale failure, but procedures must be developed to make affected systems run again as soon as possible. Keywords. civil infrastructure; power grids; outages; blackouts; natural disasters; accidents; terrorism; multi-agency disaster response; climate change threat

One of the most devastating types of disasters by virtue of our ability to manage recovery is one that is very widespread. Such a disaster precludes common means of recovery that allow us to adopt management strategies such as moving to other nonimpacted areas for safety or drawing on non-impacted or ‘slack’ resources. One such disaster was the August 2003 blackout that affected an estimated 50 million people covering numerous states and provinces in the U.S. and Canada respectively. The vast extent of the outage restricted drawing upon other resources to restore electric power quickly as well as providing places to which people could evacuate, since adjacent areas were impacted equally for hundreds of miles. This is akin to a pandemic that would tend to be geographically widespread and affecting many areas at once, though the fatalities in a pandemic are likely to be greater depending on the nature of the disease vector. Based on historic evidence we can expect numerous initiating causes to continue to produce electric power outages and their consequences from natural hazards, accidents, and at least outside of the U.S., acts of terrorism. Natural hazards (defined as federally declared disasters) have been increasing in the U.S. at an average annual rate of 2.7% per year since the 1950s (Simonoff, Restrepo, Zimmerman and Napthali 2007: 382). Acts of terrorism have also been occurring outside of the U.S. targeting electric power 1 2

E-mail: [email protected] www.nyu.edu/icis

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systems. Accidents and weather together have been the primary contributors to increases in the number of outages in the U.S. at least since 1990 through 2004 regardless of season (Simonoff, Restrepo and Zimmerman 2007: 551), as well as being contributors to a generally increasing duration of outages which between 2002-2005 increased at the rate of 30-40% per year (Simonoff, Restrepo and Zimmerman 2007: 561). Another outage during August 2006 in Long Island City, Queens was in a more restricted area, but the duration was one of the longest outages occurring within the past 15 years, estimated at being in the top 10% of outages in terms of duration of the outage (Zimmerman and Restrepo 2006a). When electric power is cut off, it cascades to other infrastructures due to the dependencies of these other systems on electricity. Dependencies and interdependencies appear in many different forms (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly 2001; Zimmerman 2004, 2006, 2008 forthcoming), and knowledge of them is fundamental to understanding how to manage infrastructure security. Transportation, water and communications all are extremely dependent upon electric power to function. In many cases, these dependent systems take longer than the electric power system to recover, as was the case in the August 2003 blackout (Zimmerman and Restrepo 2006b). The August 2003 blackout began in the Mid-west as a consequence of apparently multiple but very specific causes, including the failure of computer software and a tree falling on a transmission line in the Mid-west, and due to the interconnections among the electric power providers, the outage quickly spread (US-Canada Task Force 2004). It is notable that some regions were able to avert the outage in their territories due to management actions taken. No loss of life was known to have occurred, at least directly attributed to the outage. The duration was substantial, taking on average an estimated 29 hours to be restored in New York City, but it took mass transit (subways) 38 hours to be restored and traffic signals 75 hours to be restored (Zimmerman and Restrepo 2006b: 252; DeBlasio 2004). The security issues that surfaced in connection with the blackout were multifaceted. Although the initiating factor was an accident and possibly human error, the consequences that ensued have ramifications for those that could occur due to a natural hazard (and in fact the Quebec ice storm had similar and perhaps even greater effects) as well as an intentional attack on the system. Measures of success and failure are critical to understanding this case, other electric power outages, and analogous cases. These measures need to be based on a number of factors. First is the ability to recover, such as how fast basic services can be restored and how equitably. Recovery can be very rapid where destruction is localized even in the most catastrophic of events as in the case of restoring electric power by relocating distribution lines to connect to substations in adjacent non-impacted areas after the attacks on the World Trade Center (Zimmerman 2003b), however, in more widespread outages the solution can be more complicated. Second is the ability to reduce impacts during the post-disaster period before recovery or restoration is able to occur. In the 2003 blackout as in others, energy production facilities were designed to shutdown when electric power surges occurred to protect the machinery. While backup energy generation was relied on to reduce postblackout impacts in the short term and restore electricity at least temporarily, many of those facilities were not operative for a variety of reasons. One of the most devastating impacts of the 2003 blackout in NYC resulted from the failure of diesel generators to run the pumps for the Manhattan interceptors to the Newtown Creek sewage treatment plant, resulting in a massive discharge of raw sewage, which necessitated closing swimming and shell-fishing areas. Thus, many management options have to be

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orchestrated carefully not only to avoid a blackout from occurring in the first place, but also to support recovery and reduce impacts when it does happen. The institutional issues are obviously also multi-faceted, having to do with those that manage and control such systems, assess the risks, and reduce the impacts. In the 2006 New York City blackout, relationships between oversight agencies and the utility were critical to the institutional strength needed to avoid or at least reduce the impacts of future blackouts (Bockstein et al. 2007). Another area in which institutional issues surface relevant to electric power is global climate change, and the impacts on electric power and other infrastructure systems are likely to be similar to, though more gradual than, in the case of weather-related natural hazards. Zimmerman and Cusker (2001) summarized research indicating which facilities would be most impacted by global climate change-initiated sea level rise in the Metro East Coast area, and some of these facilities were electric power facilities; institutions were presented that were responsible for managing infrastructure that would have to play a key part in the adaptation of such services should flooding and related impacts occur (Rosenzweig and Solecki 2001). In the context of electric power, many of the institutional frameworks relevant to global climate change are also relevant to blackouts. Another consideration is the emphasis placed on making infrastructure less vulnerable, i.e. more resilient and secure in the face of threats. One aspect of this is to improve the condition and performance of infrastructure services. The ASCE (2005) has rated the nation’s energy infrastructure as D, which is the average across all infrastructure categories they rated (only water sectors are lower than that). Improving condition and performance of infrastructure services not only means adhering to traditional performance criteria that ASCE measured, but also introducing social goals and needs for security and sustainability into new socially determined measures of infrastructure performance. Technological innovations are playing a key role and are likely to continue to play a key role in defining the security of electric power and other infrastructure services. Dramatic changes are occurring in the way that energy is produced and provided to consumers that is responsive to social goals related to pollution reduction, health and the reduction of greenhouse gases. Institutional changes will no doubt accompany these technological changes. How these are connected to the reduction in the risk of blackouts and their consequences is yet to be seen. Thus, the reliability of energy production and consumption and the case of electricity outages such as the massive one that occurred in 2003, is an important platform for many dimensions of security and the research directions needed to address the problems and derive solutions.

Note Portions of this work pertaining to some of the conceptual aspects of electricity and infrastructure vulnerability were presented in summary form at various conferences, for example, Zimmerman, R. with Restrepo, C.E. and Simonoff, J.S. (2007) “Analyzing Infrastructure Vulnerabilities to Multiple Hazards,” Presentation at the MCEER Emerging Developments in Multi-Disciplinary Multi-Hazard Engineering, September 18.

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References ASCE (2005) ‘2005 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure’, Online. Available at: http://www.asce.org/reportcard/2005/index.cfm Bockstein, M.A. Elfner, D.W., Walters, J.M., Collar, G. (2007) State of New York Public Service Commission Prima Facie Statement of the New York State Consumer Protection Board, Albany, NY, July 10. Online. Available at: (accessed October 25, 2007). DeBlasio, A.J. (2004) Effects Of Catastrophic Events On Transportation System Management and Operations, U.S. Department of Transportation, John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, MA. Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K. (2001) ‘Identifying, Understanding and Analyzing Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies’, IEEE Control Systems magazine, pp. 11-25. Rosenzweig, C. and Solecki, W. D., ed. (2001) Climate Change and a Global City: The Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change. Metro East Coast. New York, NY: Columbia Earth Institute and Goddard Institute of Space Studies. Simonoff, J.S., Restrepo, C.E., and Zimmerman, R. (2007) ‘Risk Management and Risk Analysis-Based Decision Tools for Attacks on Electric Power’, Risk Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 547-570. Simonoff, J.S., Restrepo, C.E., Zimmerman, R., and Naphtali, Z.S. (2007) ‘Analysis of Electrical Power and Oil and Gas Pipeline Failures’, Chapter 27 in Critical Infrastructure Protection, edited by E.D. Goetz and S. Shenoi. New York, NY: Springer, pp. 381-394. US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force (2004) Final Report on the August 14th 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations, The Task Force, April. Zimmerman, R. (2006) ‘Critical Infrastructure and Interdependency’, Chapter 35 in The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, D. G. Kamien, ed. NY, NY: McGraw-Hill, pp. 523-545. Zimmerman, R. (2004) ‘Decision-making and the Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructure’, Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, edited by W. Thissen, P. Wieringa, M. Pantic, and M. Ludema. The Hague, The Netherlands: Delft University of Technology. Zimmerman, R. (2003a) ‘Global Climate Change and Transportation Infrastructure: Lessons from the New York Area’, in The Potential Impacts of Climate Change on Transportation: Workshop Summary and Proceedings, Washington, DC: U.S. DOT (Center for Climate Change and Environmental Forecasting) in cooperation with the U.S. EPA, U.S. DOE, U.S.GCRP, pp. 91-101. Zimmerman, R. (1996) ‘Global Warming, Infrastructure, and Land Use in the Metropolitan New York Area: Prevention and Response’, in The Baked Apple? Metropolitan New York in the Greenhouse, edited by Douglas Hill. New York: New York Academy of Sciences, pp. 57-83. Zimmerman, R. (2008 forthcoming) ‘Managing Infrastructure Resiliency, Safety and Security’, Encyclopedia of Quantitative Risk Assessment, eds. B. Everitt, E. Melnick. NY, NY: John Wiley. Zimmerman, R. (2003b) ‘Public Infrastructure Service Flexibility for Response and Recovery in the September 11th, 2001 Attacks at the World Trade Center’, in NHRAIA, PERI, and ICIS, Beyond September 11th: An Account of Post-Disaster Research. Boulder, CO: U. CO, Nat. Hazards Ctr. Zimmerman, R. and Cusker, M. (2001) ‘Institutional Decision-making’, Chapter 9 and Appendix 10 in Climate Change and a Global City: The Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change. Metro East Coast, edited by C. Rosenzweig and W. D. Solecki. New York, NY: Columbia Earth Institute and Goddard Institute of Space Studies, pp. 9-1 to 9-25 and A11-A17. Zimmerman, R. and Restrepo, C. (2006a) ‘Fact Sheet on National Electric Power Outages and Duration of Outages’, Unpublished, August 4. Zimmerman, R. and Restrepo, C. (2006b) ‘The Next Step: Quantifying Infrastructure Interdependencies to Improve Security’, International Journal of Critical Infrastructures, Vol. 2, Nos. 2/3, 2006, pp. 215-230.

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Conclusions: Conference Intangibles of Security Captain (Navy) (Retd) Lars WEDIN1 Swedish National Defence College Abstract. Summation of the conference; security is a broad concept involving a number of facets. National security and personal security will always involve certain compromises and trade-offs. Yet the various levels of security- personal, societal, national, international- are indivisible, that is they cannot be treated in isolation as each is dependent on the others. Policy makers and (especially) military planners need to be aware, or made aware, of the many ethical issues raised by their actions: such awareness should serve to reduce conflict. Academic security research can help in this aim and this conference has contributed towards that aim. Keywords. security, ethics, military planning

Introduction This has been an extremely rich conference; rich in the themes addressed and the thoughts given to them. Although I have added observations from a colleague2 visiting other sessions of the conference, many nuances could still have gone unnoticed. As a consequence, these conclusions can only be personal; we will all go away with our personal perceptions of the deliberations. A Contested Concept Security is indeed a broad concept. The actual span of objects and situations covered by the term these days is breathtaking. No wonder then that many questions were raised about the concept and its applications and that the discussions yielded many examples and paradoxes from recent events and experiences. Some of these interventions gave profiles to various intangibles and will be discussed below. But, what then is security? There is not one single definition even if a number of essential properties and dimensions can be identified. Moreover, the significance of at least two thresholds of understanding was evident. The first is related to the difference between security and fear experienced in relation to another man, other or opponent vs. in relation to nature and natural hazards. Secondly warnings were raised against too broad a concept of security, which risks losing its meaning. It is also important to make a difference between security and safety. Both are important issues, indeed, but in this context we are more interested in the first aspect. 1 2

E-mail: [email protected] The author wishes to thank Mr Carl-Einar Stålvant of the Swedish National Defence College.

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Despite these gate-keeping suggestions, most interventions accepted a broad and comprehensive understanding of security. The issue is related to whether there are universal standards of security and, if so, to what extent; or are such standards merely embedded and contextually dependent? The bottom line is that each individual should have the possibility to feed himself and his/her family while living in relative peace, in a secure environment and with freedom. This is a main responsibility of the state. However, the individual also has a responsibility in this regard. These two levels are not easily connected and very often not in harmony. Security cannot be a zero-sum game. National security must also include transnational aspects. This leads to the concept of indivisibility of security: the link between personal security and that of the society, the state and, finally, international security. This is one reason why factors that affect individuals such as identities, loyalties, ethics, and justice needed to be addressed in this conference. That is also why oppression of, for instance, religious minorities is an issue with ramifications larger than the state and the society where it takes place. Any discussion on security inevitably implies a discussion of threats to security. There are many possible qualifications: real or perceived, potential or actual, urgent or long-term and so on. As these qualifications can be applied to all parts of the indivisible spectrum of security- personal, societal, state or international- the result becomes a kind of a matrix of security issues. A careful analysis of such a matrix may result in new combinations of security issues. The exercise may result in new combinations of security concerns and of the way in which they are managed. One interesting example given stems from the earthquake in China in 2008. The magnitude of the problems changed something in the relationship between the people and its leaders when the leaders accepted the legitimacy of the needs of people. Rather than turning a blind eye to the event, leaders showed compassion and gave domestic and international publicity to the catastrophe and efforts to mitigate the consequences. A Fresh Record Importantly, we learned in the opening session from the Human Security Report Project that the world is going forward. Today, fewer people die in conflicts, there are fewer wars and coups d’états have become less frequent. This development goes handin-hand with an increase in peace agreements as well as ceasefires, which are more stable thanks to more experienced mediators. The reason seems to be that peacebuilding efforts succeed more often than before as there are more Peace Support Operations, more UN Special Representatives and new techniques like Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). This favorable development should, however, not lead to complacency- there are lots of tensions and risks, and the number of old, recalcitrant (of more than 20 years’ standing) conflicts are increasing. In Search of Intangibles When locating intangibles, dynamics within various domains of life were identified. The sources varied from individual perception to structural factors. However, words of caution concerning the boundaries of security were also heard.

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The Role of Force To my mind, the conference should also have paid more attention to military issues proper and to those regarding military, police and other security forces. While, mostly, these are seen as rather “tangible”, they also have important intangible roles. The fact that after the Cold War we usually say that “security no longer is just military” does not mean that these forces do not have important roles also in the contemporary situation. In fact, the intangibles of military and police operations should constitute an important area of research. Perceiving Reality Security is about perceptions and, hence, has different meanings for different persons depending, among other things, on the position and the context of the situation. It was noted that people living in situations that, seen from the outside, seemed to be extremely insecure actually felt more secure than other people living in “objectively” less insecure environments. It is therefore relevant to ask if the idea of a “social contract” is equally relevant all over the globe. There is no simple relation between the magnitude of a threat or hazard and the nature and salience of the response. Perceptions are of utmost importance not the least in situations of negative interactions where they feed into expectations of fear. In fact, fear is a very important feeling as we are prepared to do anything in order to survive. Importantly, fear can be manipulated – for good or for bad. Fear may make people do dangerous things. In general it seems that man has always been afraid of the Other, especially when the Other has habits that are deemed unusual. As a consequence there is a great risk for self-fulfilling prophecies here – pushing the Other into violence. When an Al-Quaïda chief is interviewed by Al-Jazeera TV standing in the desert with his Kalashnikov, he portrays pride and becomes an ideal to follow for some and a source of fear for others. What Is at Stake? The Merits of Differentiation In this context, a large number of issues arise that link strategic changes in the environment to perceptions and assessments. The difficulty of early warning in order to avoid strategic surprise is one of these. Important aspects are the possibility of noting weak signals, the possibility of wild cards and disruptive events. It was noted that slow changes – like climate change – are particularly difficult to handle. However, just because an issue has security ramifications, it should not necessarily become securitized. To take an obvious example, even though persons with a difficult childhood may become dangerous to their societies, childcare should not be seen as an area of security. Misuse of security may also hide the real issues. The issue of securitization is particularly pertinent when it comes to issues like identity and loyalty. Obviously, terrorist attacks are a security threat. And many terrorist attacks are made in pursuit of a religious cause. Terrorism by extreme Muslims is the danger most often discussed.

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Misreading Symbols Radical religious views and violence, however, do not necessarily go hand in hand. When does personal religious behavior become a security problem? This constitutes an issue that is important but not quite understood. An important aspect is the fact that Muslims tend to see themselves primarily as a part of the Muslim community, the Umma. Such tendencies are increased by a feeling of rejection as a consequence of slogans like “Europe is a Christian community”. However, to be a Muslim is not only a religious statement but also – perhaps foremost – a lifestyle. However, while Muslims often are treated as belonging to a unified movement, the Muslim community is in fact extremely fragmented – except regarding Palestine. Translating Information and Cognitions Into Action It is one thing to say “comprehensive security”; it is another thing to do it. How do decision-makers become aware of research? Academic research on security may be of the highest quality but will serve little purpose if the results will not reach those who actually manage security. Important issues in this regard are packaging and relevance. However, there is also a risk that academic quarrels about definitions and concepts impede action. In acute situations time does not allow for timeless fact-finding. Then it may be enough to basically agree on what needs to be done: JDI = Just Do It! Conversely, mistakes in intelligence reports and politically motivated lack of interest in political realities are costly. A corollary to this problem is information to the citizen. Well-informed citizens probably meet difficult situations in a better way than those who are uninformed. However, for a government to inform its citizens is not necessarily easy despite, or because of, the “information society”. No one believes the spokesman in this day of Facebook and YouTube, when people tend to choose information according to personal interest and discard information that is deemed as unpleasant or boring. And who, in the jungle of information, can they trust? One important lesson learnt concerning the relation between information-bases, public opinion and the calibration of an action is that governance must be adapted to history and culture. In this context, intangibles of security like trust, respect and transparency are core issues. As a consequence, the international system must take “the intangibles” into account when furthering good governance – the idea “one size fits all” is too simplistic. There are, however, basic values that must be respected. Securing Whom, What, How? An Intangible Ethical Imperative? Ethics is another intangible security aspect. Strategies and policies need to be scrutinized with a view to possible ethical dilemmas. A prerequisite, however, is that ethical issues can be formulated in order to be understandable from a practical standpoint. It was noted that each person, generally, has two basic ethical bases: as a citizen and as a member of the global community. In fact, ethical dilemmas need to be taken into account very early in a decisionmaking process. It was questioned whether the operation in Iraq would have been launched if leaders had thought through the possible ethical dilemmas in advance. Moreover, there are a number of difficult ethical issues in the security field like the balance between surveillance of public places and the need for privacy.

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This problem is especially pertinent when it comes to the use of new technologies in the military field. Technical solutions that have not taken ethical questions into account are nearly always wrong. The ethical problems must be studied very early on, otherwise, there is a risk that the one who has to operate the system, only has nonethical options to choose from. Ethics must be made understandable and relevant to decision-makers. This constitutes an important field of research. In fact, politicians and diplomats have a responsibility towards those who are to put their policies into practice ‘in the field’: military, police, aid-workers and so on. They must have directives that help them to take the right decisions in situations which more often than not will be fuzzy and unforeseen. In fact, one could make a case for the ethical issues to be inserted early on in the military planning process like Nato’s Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP).

Conclusions More generally, strategic and operational planning procedures need to be adapted in order to handle the broad issues of security and to link it to the great variety of subtle indirect components discussed during this conference. This will not be easy; as such an undertaking will need to wrestle with different cultures and perceptions among the various professions – military and non-military – involved. To conclude, the conference – and its predecessors – has clearly shown the importance of “intangibles of security”. There are vast fields of research that need to be addressed. The practical problem will be to identify and formulate workable research projects. Finally, to paraphrase Field Marshal Maurice of Saxony (1696-1750): “Security is a science kept in the dark where you do not walk a sure path.” Hopefully, the research stemming from this conference – for the conference is not the end but the start – will make the science of security less dark and make possible an assured path.

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Global Security: A Vision for the Future F. Géré and M. Sharpe (Eds.) IOS Press, 2011 © 2011 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Subject Index accidents Algeria Algerianism a security policy blackouts Bosnia-Herzegovina 21st Century Programme for Innovation and Security China civil infrastructure civil society climate change threat communications issues components and determinants of security conceptual abuse conceptual clarification Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) conflict fatality statistics conflict management contextualized democracy cooperative security coups d’État CREB disaster planning and management Disaster Research Center DNA Donatism dopamine economy education emotional amoral egoism en-route sense-making environment environmental security ethics ethnic tensions eudaimonic happiness European Science Foundation

173 95 95 67 173 67 8 12 173 131 173 151 35 95 35 8 16 52 100 67 16 136 151 166 136 95 52 35 52 3 166 35 3 179 67 52 8

European Science Foundation Forward Looks 166 failed states 131 feelings of insecurity 52 genocide 16 global security 45 ‘golden mean’ 52 `harmful' neuroscience 136 hedonic pleasures 52 `helpful' neuroscience 136 human and civil rights 162 human and societal dynamics 12 human biometrics security 35 human nature 3 human security 3, 67, 162 human-centered dimensions of disaster 166 identity 35 identity uncertainty 80 ideological obstacles 95 imperial security 45 importance of security of selfhood 131 inadequacy of technical solutions alone 131 Indonesia 12 ingroups/outgroups 100 inhibitory mechanisms 100 instrument development 166 integrative complexity 52, 80 Islamism 95 Japan 12 ‘just do it!’ (JDI) 8 life skills 80 meditation 52 mental and physical resilience 52 military planning 179 modernisation 45 mood-altering drugs 136 morality 52 ‘moral engagement’ 100

186

multi-agency disaster response 173 multiple perspectives 80 multi-sum security principle 3 Muslim Brotherhood 95 national and international security 162 national security 3, 45 NATO 8, 67 natural and public health disasters 151 natural disasters 12, 173 neuroeconomics 136 neuroethics 136 neuromarketing 136 neurophilosophy 3 neuroscience 52 neurosociology 136 neurotheology 136 non-state conflicts 16 North Korea 12 nuclear weapons and waste 12 one-sided violence 16 organization building 166 outages 173 oxytocin 52, 136 participation in decision-making 100 Partnership for Peace 67 Partnership for Peace Trust 8 perceived legitimacy 100 perceptions of injustice 100 personal morality 136 philosophy 52 policy implications 100 political and bureaucratic response to terrorism 151 positivity ratio 52 post-Cold War era 162 power grids 173

preventative strategies 151 preventing violent extremism 80 primary prevention 80 procedural justice 100 process-level modeling 166 pro-social activism 80 psychology 52, 100 resilience to crises 8 reward circuitry 52 ‘riskmindedness’ 151 RNA 136 Salafism 95 security 179 serotonin 136 spiritual practice 52 spread of democratization 100 ‘Staircase to the Terrorist Act’ 100 stakeholder awareness 151 state-based conflicts 16 stress 52 symbiotic realism 3 systems approach 136 Taiwan 45 terrorism 16, 35, 100, 131, 173 ‘technè’ 35 thematic continuities 35 tipping points 52 traditional/non-traditional security 45 transcultural security 3 transdisciplinary research 35 transnational security 3 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 162 uses and hazards of technology 151 ‘us-versusthem’ 100 value complexity 80

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Global Security: A Vision for the Future F. Géré and M. Sharpe (Eds.) IOS Press, 2011 © 2011 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Author Index Ahmad, T. Al-Rodhan, N. Bader, A. Benabdallaoui, M. Burgess, P. Cooper, T. Frost, M. Géré, F. Hadjovic, D. Hollander, R. Iqbal, Z. Liht, J. Liow, J.C. Lun, Z. Mack, A.

153 3 8 73 117 16 131 v, 35 35 151 162 80 12 45 16

Mendonça, D. Moghaddam, F.M. Nielsen, Z. Rodin, D. Samaan, J.L. Savage, S. Seely, B. Shah, M. Sharpe, M. Slanevskaya, N. Turkovic, B. Wedin, L. Williams, R. Zimmerman, R. Zoubir, A.

166 100 16 35, 117 35 80 151 16 52, 73 136 67 179 80 173 95