Global Community: Global Security

Global Community Global Security

VIBS Volume 198 Robert Ginsberg Founding Editor Leonidas Donskis Executive Editor Associate Editors G. John M. Abbarno George Allan Gerhold K. Becker Raymond Angelo Belliotti Kenneth A. Bryson C. Stephen Byrum Harvey Cormier Robert A. Delfino Rem B. Edwards Malcolm D. Evans Daniel B. Gallagher Andrew Fitz-Gibbon Francesc Forn i Argimon William Gay Dane R. Gordon J. Everet Green Heta Aleksandra Gylling Matti Häyry

Steven V. Hicks Richard T. Hull Michael Krausz Mark Letteri Vincent L. Luizzi Adrianne McEvoy Alan Milchman Peter A. Redpath Alan Rosenberg Arleen L. F. Salles John R. Shook Eddy Souffrant Tuija Takala ˇ Emil Višňovský Anne Waters John R. Welch Thomas Woods

a volume in Studies in Jurisprudence SJ Vincent L. Luizzi, Editor

Global Community Global Security

Edited by

Randall E. Osborne and Paul Kriese

Amsterdam - New York, NY 2008

Cover Design: Studio Pollmann The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of “ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for permanence”. ISBN: 978-90-420-2492-2 ©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2008 Printed in the Netherlands

Studies in Jurisprudence (SJ) Vincent L. Luizzi Editor

Formerly Natural Law Studies (NLS) Titles in NLS

Kenneth Bryson. Persons and Immortality. 1999. VIBS 77 Roger T. Simonds. Rational Individualisms. 1995. VIBS 20

Editor Emerita Virginia Black Judith Presler

I dedicate this book to Mom, for teaching me to see the human being first and all else second, and to my wife, Diane, and my son, Joseph, for helping me to love others more than I could ever love my self. Randall E. Osborne I dedicate this book to my father who with a high school education saw the good and bad of people but chose to accentuate the positive and encouraged me to do the same. Paul Kriese Together we dedicate this book to anyone who has ever suffered or fought in the name of civil rights, universal justice, human rights, or equality. May their sacrifices have not been in vain and may the world recognize their valor.

CONTENTS Editorial Foreword VINCENT LUIZZI Preface

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Introduction RICHARD T. HULL, RANDALL E. OSBORNE, PAUL KRIESE Part One UNIVERSAL JUSTICE AND GLOBAL SECURITY Introduction to Part One MATTHEW CROSSTON ONE

TWO

Global Security: Needed: A New Definition for a New Century LAURA MEDER Fighting Terror and Spreading Democracy: When Theory and Practice Collide MATTHEW CROSSTON

Wrap-up of Part One MATTHEW CROSSTON Part Two SELF VERSUS OTHER; “US” VERSUS “THEM” Introduction to Part Two KAREN LOMBARDI THREE

FOUR

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1

5 7 9

17

45 47 49

Love and Hate as Moral Imperatives: Religious Paradox as a Challenge to Global Security RANDALL E. OSBORNE, PAUL KRIESE, STAN FRIEDMAN

51

Self versus Other; “Us” versus “Them”: The Self as Basis for Conflict ANRÉ VENTER

69

x

FIVE

SIX

SEVEN

GLOBAL COMMUNITY: GLOBAL SECURITY The Psychology of Group Membership and Alienation: Projective Identification and the Other KAREN LOMBARDI

87

The Psychology of Whiteness: Moving beyond Separation to Connection TERRI A. KARIS

97

Deterring Terror KEVIN C. M. BENSON

Wrap-up of Part Two KAREN LOMBARDI Part Three MOVING TOWARD AN INCLUSIVE WORLDVIEW Introduction to Part Three C. DOMINIK GÜSS EIGHT

NINE

TEN

109

117 121 123

A “Non-Media” Look at the Middle East: Enhancing Global Security through Exposure and Understanding SANAA MOUNIR SADEK

127

International Perspectives on Social Justice: Essentials for the Effort Toward Global Security JOHN M. DAVIS

137

A Cultural-Psychological Theory of Suicide Terrorism and What to Do about Suicide Terrorism C. DOMINIK GÜSS, TERESA TUASON, VANESSA TEIXEIRA

153

Wrap-up of Part Three C. DOMINIK GÜSS Part Four DIVERSE STRATEGIES FOR EXPANDING PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL COMMUNITY Introduction to Part Four ELIZABETH LEIGH CRALLEY, BRIAN RICHARD WETZLER

179

181 183

Contents ELEVEN

TWELVE

THIRTEEN

Proposed Strategies for Integration of Military and Civilian Agencies in the War on Terrorism within the United States and its Territories RICHARD FRIZZELL From Cooperative Intergroup Contact to Personal Motivation: A Social Psychological Perspective on Promoting a More Inclusive Worldview ELIZABETH LEIGH CRALLEY, BRIAN RICHARD WETZLER Participatory Sustainability: Building Sustainability for Complexity and Change VICENTE L. LOPES, VINCENT LUIZZI

FOURTEEN Human Sustainability: Overview of Survival Technologies and Impediments to Their Development and Deployment STEPHEN PALEY, GEORGE K. OISTER, RICHARD T. HULL FIFTEEN

Adaptation, Sustainability, and Justice JORGE M. VALADEZ

Wrap-up of Part Four ELIZABETH LEIGH CRALLEY, BRIAN RICHARD WETZLER SIXTEEN

An Exploratory Essay on Justice, Security, and Genuine Peace JOSEPH J. CALIFANO

xi

185

197

217

229 257

275 279

Epilogue ELIZABETH D. BOEPPLE

289

WORKS CITED

291

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

317

INDEX

319

EDITORIAL FOREWORD Jurisprudence, broadly conceived, examines how the laws of peoples and their social, moral, and political institutions attain such common ends as justice, security, peace, and enlightenment. Among these, peace has a prominent legacy. In The Laws, Plato identifies training citizens for peace or preparing them for war as the primary alternatives in legislating for the greatest good. He opts for peace and good will, the alternative, which requires a courageous citizenry that is strong and steadfast in the face of pain and pleasure. Virtuous citizens, in Plato’s view, develop a rational self-control, which permeates all aspects of their lives, including their responses to temptations of pleasure, whereas citizens in warrior cultures focus narrowly on the endurance of the pain of war. Legislation is the art of calculating how best to use pleasure and pain to achieve the desired result. Prominent philosophers of the Enlightenment also point to peace as the proper aim of government and connect it with views on ethics and human nature. In Thomas Hobbes’s view, our competitive, aggressive nature is the cause of our original, warlike condition. We realize that these egoistic pursuits will forever impoverish our lives, and the only hope for attaining the benefits of social cooperation is to submit to a powerful sovereign who will compel cooperation. Pressing for perpetual peace, Kant envisions the legal order as a key factor in achieving it; the prototype of the United Nations can be traced to Kant. He saw the growing spirit of commerce in the eighteenth century, which requires international cooperation, as a powerful impetus for seeking global stability. Our “asocial sociability” prompts us in that, however much we may long to structure the world in accord with our own views, our social side counteracts that impulse and paves the way for toleration and cooperation. Peace is no newcomer to thinking about the goal of government any more than human nature is, and the kinship of them to the subject of this volume on global security and community is evident. The last century ended with a renewed interest in international law, economics, and social practices as scholars, public officials, and the general public defined and evaluated globalization. This climate of opinion was timely insofar as the new millennium ushered in major threats to global security—terrorism and a severely challenged natural environment. Thinking about global security in terms of effective responses to terrorism and to the disruption of nature as a sustainable entity is as much a dominant theme of this anthology as it is of our time. The chapters in this volume originate in papers presented at two international assemblies—a Roundtable on Global Security in Oxford, U.K. in August 2006 and a special session on Justice and Sustainability at a conference on Race, Ethnicity, and Place at Texas State University-San Marcos in No-

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GLOBAL COMMUNITY: GLOBAL SECURITY

vember 2006. Global Community and Global Security is a much needed work and a welcome addition to Studies in Jurisprudence. Vincent Luizzi Studies in Jurisprudence Special Series Editor Texas State University-San Marcos

PREFACE The main purpose of this preface is to give the reader a sense of the growth and development of the ideas outlined within the chapters of this text. Few of the contributors to this volume envisioned writing a book on global security. Most set out originally to address one small aspect of global security from a personal or disciplinary perspective. The majority of the chapters in this text grew out of a “think tank” experience in the summer of 2006 called the Oxford Roundtable. Thirty-nine individuals from around the world (predominantly the United States) came together in Oxford England for a week to discuss the issue of global security from a variety of career and disciplinary perspectives. The participants had backgrounds in numerous branches of the United States military and academic institutions located at geographic locations on both coasts of the United States and many stops between. They hailed from diverse academic disciplines such as modern languages, literature, sociology, psychology, and technological security. Most of the contributors to this volume gave presentations at the 2006 Oxford Roundtable, where all the participants discussed the issues they raised. Their primary purpose was to allow a myriad of individuals working in a variety of ways on issues related to global security to hear from others and then return to their respective places in the world to digest what they heard. Participants neither spent time trying to weave their thoughts into a coherent whole nor to propose solutions to problems they addressed. Instead, they sought to begin a ripple effect after the participants left. A second and independent conference occurred during November 2006, held at Texas State University in San Marcos. This was an International Conference on Race, Ethnicity, and Place. One of the sessions in this second conference addressed the topic of Environmental Justice and Sustainability. After listening, pondering, digesting, and discussing for months following that experience, the organizers of these two conferences began to sense common threads throughout presentations in both conferences. They sensed a need to express the culmination of commonalities to others. Regardless of disciplinary background, country of origin, career perspective (academic, military, or corporate), suggested causes for threats to global security or proposed solutions for enhancing global security, the singular theme of global community emerged from their presentations. From a career military colonel proposing a “national service project” to an Arabic language and literature teacher proposing a study abroad experience, to two scientists and a philosopher worrying about how to curb the phenomena of global warming, the theme of “seeing other as self” began to take shape. When we look at the world through provincial borders, a sense of “us versus them” usually emerges. When we “see” the world through a community lens, however, a sense of “we” can and often does emerge.

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The intention of this volume, then, is not to propose a solution to the crises in global security. The intention of this volume is not to pinpoint the complete set of factors that threaten global security. The intention of this volume is to explore the issue of global security from military, academic, religious, scientific, technological, and personal perspectives so that the reader can understand the factors that promote an “us versus them” mentality. This volume proposes methods for minimizing that mentality so that we can build a sense of global community. If we are to overcome the foundations of international conflict, if we are to come together to solve our common problems of environmental degradation, if we are to recognize the fundamental truth of the image of “lifeboat earth,” then we must recognize our neighbors as reflections of ourselves. The fundamental insight of many theories of ethics is the power of seeing that the demands we place on others to respect our needs for freedom and well-being entail recognition of the reciprocal duty in ourselves to respect those needs in others. We express our gratitude to the organizers of the Oxford Roundtable and the conference on Race, Ethnicity and Place for providing many of the authors (and the editors) with the intellectual environments from which this book has grown. Our thanks to Diane Osborne for her assistance with general editing of many chapters, Elizabeth D. Boepple for invaluable production assistance, and Agricultural Management Systems for their generous financial assistance in the production of the manuscript. An earlier version of Chapter Fourteen, “Human Sustainability: Overview of Survival Technologies and Impediments to Their Development and Deployment,” was published in two parts: Stephen Paley, George K. Oister, and Richard T. Hull, “Can We Survive? (Part 1): The Changes Required to Deal Effectively with Global Warming,” Free Inquiry, 28, no. 2 (February/ March 2008): 44–47; and Stephen Paley, George K. Oister, and Richard T. Hull, “Can We Survive? (Part 2): The Changes Required to Deal Effectively with Global Warming,” Free Inquiry, 28, no. 3 (April/May 2008): 37–43. We gratefully acknowledge the permission of the authors to incorporate parts into this chapter. We also gratefully acknowledge permission to reprint the first and second parts of C. D. Güss, M. T. Tuason, and V. Teixeira, “A CulturalPsychological Theory of Contemporary Islamic Martyrdom,” Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour, 37 no. 4 (2007): 415–445, which appear in Chapter Ten, “A Cultural-Psychological Theory of Suicide Terrorism,” by C. Dominik Güss, Teresa Tuason, and Vanessa Teixeira.

INTRODUCTION Richard T. Hull, Randall E. Osborne, Paul Kriese Today we are witnessing what may be the first effects of global warming on sustainability of the planet and its life forms, security, and community. We could ascribe any one of the following phenomena, taken in isolation, to normal environmental fluctuations. Together, they indicate that we may—and the emphasis is on “may”—be witnessing hints of the future. On the intrastate, interstate, and international levels, water is fast becoming a scarce resource. Chronic drought is already forcing some communities in Tennessee to import potable water because reservoirs have dried up. Large cities like Atlanta, Georgia, have less than three months of water supply left. Rivers in Georgia that provide water to other states, such as Alabama and Florida, are already being contested as the needs of wildlife and human sustainability clash. Costal and near-coastal cities and states in the United States have not significantly invested in desalination technologies, partly because those that are available are horrendously expensive to install and maintain. Yet earth’s oceans and seas remain the most likely source of water needed directly by future populations and indirectly for agriculture. The practice of draining aquifer waters already has resulted in an incredible lowering of the aquifer level in the Midwest United States’ Ogallala sandstone; Mexico City’s subsidence due to a similar practice is well known. Another water-related global warming effect threatens coastal cities. A recent issue of Catalyst: The Magazine of the Union of Concerned Scientists reports on research that indicates: sustained warming between 1.6 degrees C and 5.2 degrees C above preindustrial levels could initiate widespread destabilization of the Greenland and West Antarctica ice sheets, leading to sea level rise between 12 and 40 feet. While the full increase may take centuries to occur, even an increase of one meter . . . would threaten major cities including Mumbai, New York, and Tokyo, and inundate some small islands. Rising seas also magnify the destructive potential of coastal storms; projections show a mere 7– to 14–inch rise could produce coastal flooding in Boston and Atlantic City, New Jersey, equivalent to today’s 100-year flood almost every year on average. . . . In the continental United States, drought-prone ecosystems are projected to expand approximately 11 per cent in area for each degree Celsius of additional warming. Worldwide, 1 to 2 billion people would be at risk of increased water scarcity. (Fall 2007, p.3)

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Admittedly, the recent warming trend in Greenland has improved quality of life for its more temperate communities. Gardening has recently sprung up, with individuals now producing vegetables apart from potatoes now being produced as the growing season has increased in length. Distribution by boat will be facilitated as the Arctic ice sheet recedes and the Northwest Passage opens to near year-round traffic. Individuals who have lived in climates with severe winters should experience milder weather for longer periods of the year. Our commitments to one another implied by the ethics of community, while they enable us to rejoice at good fortunes of some, do not authorize us to shrug at the misfortunes of others. Responsibility-shifting schemes such as carbon credits tend to foist burdens on to those whose fortune is only now on the rise and to insulate those whose behaviors are causally implicated in global warming. Territorial “up-river” claims of privilege have long been contested in inter- and intrastate water law, for good reasons. The Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River will displace over a million Chinese citizens and drastically alter the area’s biosphere. For too long we have been inattentive to issues of sustainability. Population growth, increasing global trade, the demand for energy, and the unfortunate-in-the-long-term abundance of coal and oil, have all brought us to the point of serious long-term consequences. Whether we can back away from ecological disaster is debatable. Whether the projections of consequences of global temperature increase are accurate in magnitude and time projections is debatable. But justice dictates that we take steps to forestall possible negative long-term consequences of our carbon and water economy by acting to prevent what damage we can and minimize that which we cannot entirely avoid. Caution also dictates that we proceed with care, that the steps we take not themselves be causes of other intolerable climate changes. Reality dictates that we also turn our attention to willful challenges to global security via terrorism and other forms of hate-based behavior. Just as physical borders are often seen as “ours” or “theirs,” psychological boundaries also exist. We can find these boundaries in the form of religious ideologies, language, racial viewpoints, gender viewpoints, and economic levels. Any boundary that can create within a human being a sense of “us” versus “them” can, and often will, result in hate-based behavior. We must understand these boundaries without condoning them. We must explore the limits of these boundaries without creating new ones. We must create a balance between individual and community that achieves an optimal level of distinctiveness from which all can proudly proclaim membership in unique human sub-communities and the collective global community of humanity. In this rich and complex collection, melding the results of two international conferences, finding a unifying theme is a challenging task. On the one hand, the task includes assessing the impact of technology and population growth on Planet Earth. James Lovelock’s 1979 work, Gaia: A New Look at

Introduction

3

Life on Earth, and Lynn Margulis’ 1998 book, Symbiotic Planet: A New Look at Evolution, together suggest that we can regard Earth as a living organism (Lovelock) or as a huge ecosystem composed of a series of interlocking ecosystems (Margulis). Lovelock’s latest book, The Revenge of Gaia: Earth’s Climate in Crisis and the Fate of Humanity (2006), suggests that our failure to accept the Gaia hypothesis has led to a looming crisis of irreversible degradation of the super ecosystem and a consequent massive loss of habitable land. This suggests looking at human beings as a kind of planetary cancer, a reemergence of very ancient themes once explored by Reinhold Niebuhr in his 1944 work, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness. Here is one theme that can help readers see unity in the present volume’s diversity. Another approach to reading this present collection, perhaps more philosophical than the Gaia hypothesis, would be to use the concept of global or planetary ethics and the challenge of extending the work in ethical theory of recent years to apply to the set of issues that are explored in this volume. For example, John Rawls’ 1971 A Theory of Justice introduced several seminal methods of evaluating the justice of some possible arrangement of social and economic structures. Rawls posited use of what he called the veil of ignorance to test whether a social structure would be just. We are to imagine being plunged into that structure ignorant of our own position, gender, race, wealth, station, and to ask whether that structure would be acceptable to us. Recognizing that inequalities might be desirable, he argued that inequalities would be just only when they bring maximal benefit to the least well off. So part of the discussion of global ethics would be to show how these concepts are to be applied in assessing the kinds of questions that arise in the present volume’s foreign policy critiques. Whatever “filter” the reader chooses to interpret the elements of this collection, the general tenor of all the essays in the present volume is that of a multifaceted crisis coming to maturity in the near future. Regardless of the academic, individual, philosophical, or moral perspective of the authors, the theme of global community is common to them all. We cannot achieve global security while individuals, governments, factions within countries, or dominant political parties are able to create new boundaries that further separate us as human beings. Instead, we need new constructs that provide us with a universal theme of global community from which to operate. Until we come to see “ourselves” as an integral part of the “other,” we cannot achieve the symbiosis needed between global community and global security. We cannot stress enough the importance of this work at this time. This work is a manual not only for the improvement of human sustainability, but also for the actual survival of humanity.

Part One UNIVERSAL JUSTICE AND GLOBAL SECURITY

INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE Matthew Crosston Part One, Universal Justice and Global Security, presents two chapters, “Global Security Needed: A New Definition for a New Century” and “Fighting Terror and Spreading Democracy: When Theory and Practice Collide,” as the foundation of the entire volume. Taken together, these chapters epitomize the larger goals of the volume as a whole and evaluate the crucial theoretical, empirical, and philosophical questions we would like readers to consider when reading all of the contributors. This book is meant to give readers insight into several issues by giving them something unique—perspectives from academic disciplines rarely combined within one volume. With a biologist and political scientist discussing interconnected issues of justice and security, Part One constitutes a perfect example of such an interdisciplinary approach. Today the world needs alternative approaches and new theorizing about justice and security. Old paradigms that still rein supreme—especially realism and its emphasis on sovereign states, national self-interest, and low expectations for cooperation—may not offer effective or safe approaches for the global community to resolve today’s increasingly complicated dilemmas. Crises are emerging in the twenty-first century that demand new thinking and innovative ideas to prevent great potential future dangers. Part One never strays far from these pressing issues, which is why any and all theoretical discussions offered are focused through a lens of empirical relevance. We are not simply producing scholarship for scholarship’s sake, but hoping to inspire and instigate debate and discussion on the issues that face the global community today, with a warning about some of the dangerous consequences if we fail to begin these inquiries. As the contributors to Part One consider theoretical issues and empirical connections, readers should be aware of the deeper philosophical questions that both authors consider: at their heart, these chapters are asking profound questions about how we define security, what constitutes safety, and whether justice truly achievable through foreign policy. When we take all three angles together— theoretical, empirical and philosophical—the impact of Part One as a blueprint for reading the remaining parts of the volume is revealed. Laura Meder’s “Global Security” rightly calls for an expanded definition of global security, as too much of the security discussion today still falls under investigations into military intervention, peacekeeping, sanctions, and embargoes. As a biologist, Meder is uniquely aware of how much the environment has always played an integral part in the continuation and intensification of conflict. The twenty-first century will only see the increasing salience of the environment in security issues.

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We should understand the broadness of the term “environment” to encompass issues of poverty, resource scarcity, ecosystem failure, unreliable food sources, infectious diseases, and overpopulation. Meder cogently emphasizes how these issues will likely dominate the twenty-first century and will be the source for the global community’s worst crises and conflicts. Her emphasis on creating a new definition for global security is prescient and essential. The Matthew Crosston’s “Fighting Terror and Spreading Democracy” builds on the theoretical and philosophical questions posed by Meder. He examines how the United States, the world’s only superpower, supposedly tries to ensure greater global security. As the Meder chapter asks deeply philosophical questions by considering theory, the Crosston chapter asks equally profound philosophical questions by considering empirical reality. In a groundbreaking attempt to ascertain whether the United States’ dual policy priorities—spreading democracy and fighting terrorism—coincide, Crosston finds sincere intentions riddled with practical contradictions and collisions. Ultimately he argues that we should reevaluate the standard emphasis on shortterm solutions over long-term planning, and that we should likely reorder those priorities, not because of idealized liberalism but because of the probability that current security policy, as designed by the United States, does not secure greater peace or encourage greater cooperation. If anything, it may be dangerously creating environments around the world that only foster greater animosity toward those societies that want to see greater liberty, equality, and justice. In Part One, readers can find the holistic approach the editors envision for the work. Truly the time has come to ask questions about global security in a manner that relevantly considers the global community. These two chapters ask the fundamental theoretical, philosophical, and empirical questions that will be common throughout the volume. Regardless how detailed or esoteric the contributions may be, they are all united under the framework established in this part. We hope the readers therefore focus on Part One with this in mind, as we believe they will get much more out of the remaining chapters by doing so.

One GLOBAL SECURITY: NEEDED: A NEW DEFINITION FOR A NEW CENTURY Laura Meder “Security,” in a commonly applied definition, focuses on the possession of wellarmed military, defined and protected borders, and in some cases, the possession of weapons of mass destruction. Missing from this definition is the security role played by the environment. The environment provides the essential support system that sustains all life. Earth’s ecosystems provide the food we eat, the water we drink, and the air we breathe. Without the security of a reliable food supply, clean safe water and air, the planet and humankind are not secure. Many of the activities of human beings have affected and are affecting the ability of these ecosystems to perform their life support functions. If we neglect the environment in decision- and policy-making activities at the local, national, and international levels, we will see security threatened at each of these levels, and globally. While some people find it difficult to make the connection between the environment and security, a growing number of indicators help to make a strong argument that the lack of environmental security can lead to unrest and conflict. Examples of these indicators are resource depletion and pollution, unstable food supplies, infectious diseases, population growth, poverty, and injustice. Each of these can serve as a source of conflict and most are interconnected, providing more than one source of conflict that can affect current and future generations. While the degree of abundance varies, all natural resources are finite. As resources become increasingly scarce, conflict can increase at all levels. The world’s freshwater resource serves as an excellent example. Water conflicts have occurred throughout history over quantity, quality, and availability. Many competing claims for water resources exist: agriculture, industry, domestic users, and ecosystems. The needs of each can place differing demands on the resource. Its management is never for a single purpose; all users become stakeholders in the management process. As the number of stakeholders increases, the ability to reach agreement among all members becomes increasingly more difficult (Wolf, Kramer, Carius, and Dabelko, 2005, p. 81).Each user can drastically affect the resource for others, most commonly through overuse or pollution. Such conflicts have occurred in the Middle East, during ancient and modern times; the American West, especially during the early 1900s; and today in India, Pakistan, Hun-

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LAURA MEDER

gary, and Slovakia (Ehrlich, Gleick, and Conca, 2006). Most major river systems have river basins shared by two or more countries. The Nile is shared by ten countries, the Congo and Niger by eleven, and the Danube by seventeen (Wolf, Kramer, Carius, and Dabelko, 2005, p. 84). These river basins will become increasingly vulnerable as populations grow, resource demand increases, and resource degradation occurs. The Aral Sea, once the world’s fourth largest inland water body, has seen its surface area reduced by half, its water volume reduced by three-quarters, and its depth lowered by 19m between 1960 and 1995. It now ranks only as the eightlargest body of water. Six nations use the water from rivers that feed this sea for irrigation. The northern Syr Darya and southern Amu Darya, both supplying feed water for the sea, have been reduced to trickles and the sea’s salinity has tripled (Owen, 2001). Less water is available every year due to increasing withdrawals, and the water that does flow is degraded by fertilizers and pesticides used on cash crops such as cotton and rice. As the sea shrinks, it leaves behind a dry, saltencrusted surface. Blowing winds erode the surface and scatter salt and concentrated toxic chemicals to areas hundreds of kilometers away. This has affected the lives and livelihoods of millions and caused the severe salinization of the land growing the crops that support these millions. Cancers, respiratory diseases, infant mortality, eye diseases, and hepatitis show increased incidence rates among people living in the Aral Sea region (Miller, 2004). Increasing salinity and toxic chemicals have impacted wildlife populations, including numerous food fishes. Commercial fishing closed on the Aral Sea in 1982 (Owen, 2001, p. 2). Pesticides used in the Aral Sea region are found in penguins in Antarctica, and windblown salt crystals are helping to melt glaciers in the Himalayan Mountains. Climate change is occurring as the shrinking sea loses its temperature moderating ability, resulting in hotter, drier summers, colder winters, and shorter growing seasons. Crop yields have decreased 20–50 percent, due to salinization and climate change (Miller, 2004, p. 234). Water availability is impacting the food security of many regions. “Waterstressed” describes 27 countries of the world, an estimated 1.4 billion people, a number that could grow to five billion by 2050. These countries exhibit wateravailability rates of less than 1,700 cubic meters per person yearly (Ehrlich, Gleick, and Conca, p. 16). According to water resource expert, Sandra Postel, this scarcity of water makes domestic food self-sufficiency virtually impossible, (ibid., p. 8). Much of the food produced in many parts of the world is irrigated with water drawn from underground aquifers. The world’s largest aquifer, the Ogallala, which covers approximately 225,000 square miles in the Great Plains region of the United States, is being overdrawn at a rate that surpasses its natural rate of recharge. The Ogallala, a fossil aquifer, so named because of the extremely long periods needed for natural recharge, varies in depth in different locations, making the drawdown more problematic in some regions than in others. Three of the largest grain-producing states—Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas—using the aqui-

Global Security: Needed: A New Definition for a New Century

11

fer for irrigation, have seen water tables drop over thirty meters, causing thousands of wells to go dry (Brown, 2003). Pakistan, India, Mexico, Yemen, China, Iran, and many other nations are also withdrawing water at a rate faster than normal recharge. According to the United Nations, combined population for these regions is more than 3 billion people, over half the world’s population (United Nations Environment Programme, 2004). Excessive withdrawal can also create another problem affecting groundwater—saltwater intrusion. As the water table drops due to excessive withdrawal, saltwater can enter the remaining void. The contaminated groundwater becomes unavailable for use in agriculture, domestic, and industrial processes. India and China are experiencing one to three meter drops in water tables annually in the areas with the most intensive use of pumps (Penning de Vries, 2002). As water scarcity issues continue to grow, competition for this resource will continue to grow. Poverty affects many inhabitants of water-scarce regions. Without adequate water for growing crops, many people living on marginal lands, sub-Saharan Africa for instance, will be further marginalized. Many will be forced to leave their homes and move to other areas in search of better water resources. These environmental refugees may be forced to move into areas also facing water-related issues and could serve to further stress these regions or be a source of conflict regarding resource use. They would also join the ranks of an estimated twenty-five million environmental refugees worldwide (Conisbee and Simms, 2003). Surface waters are also under increasing resource use pressure. Dams for hydroelectric power generation have diverted many rivers; agriculture, industry, and residential use have diverted others. Many have so much water diverted from them that they are unable to flow to the sea, instead running dry. The Yellow River in China first ran dry in 1972 and has run dry for part of every year since 1985. Many other rivers also run dry, including the Colorado, Nile, Ganges, Indus, and the Rio Grande (Brown, p. 34). A significant ecological impact of rivers running dry is the loss of vital nutrients brought to the sea by free-flowing rivers. These nutrients feed the phytoplankton that serve as the basis of the coastal ecosystem food web. Other crucial functions include wetland renewal, water purification, and maintenance of biological diversity. Pollution is another source of water-related conflict. According to the World Resource Institute (2000), more than one billion people cannot obtain safe, fresh, drinking water. They report that degradation of the ecosystem is threatening the ability of the freshwater resource to sustain life. Pollutants from a myriad of sources such as pesticides, chemicals, raw sewage, disease vectors, endocrine disrupters, and radionuclides—the list is long and varied—are present in our surface and groundwater. Many of the millions of people affected by water pollution are the same as those affected by water scarcity. In the developing world, polluted water is a major source of illness. According to the United Nations, 2.4 billion people lacked access to improved sanitation. Water- borne dis-

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eases account for 3.18 million Disability-Adjusted Life Years, a measurement of lost years of healthy life (United Nations Environment Programme, 2004). The land upon which life depends is also under stress. Soil erosion and desertification are increasing in many parts of the world. According to a 2001 United Nations Economic and Social Council report, about two-thirds of the world’s agricultural lands are already degraded. Desertification is affecting 70 percent of all dry lands where more than one billion people from over 100 countries live (UN Nongovernmental Liaison Service, 2006). Soil degradation often occurs as the result of damaging agricultural practices. These are often the result of efforts intended to boost agricultural exports as countries attempt to balance external debt. In some instances, the efforts of international development organizations have facilitated these harmful practices. Deserts are spreading across increasing areas of the world, most notably in Asia and Africa. As an indication of the importance of this problem, in 2004, Wangari Maathai, the first Kenyan Woman who earned a PhD, received the Nobel Prize for Peace for her efforts to stop desertification. During 1977, she began the Green Belt Movement, with mostly women members, which has planted over thirty million trees. These have provided fuel, food, shelter, and income, but most importantly, a vegetative cover that helps to stop the loss of topsoil that causes soil erosion. The Norwegian Nobel Committee’s press release (2004) states, “Maathai has taken a holistic approach to sustainable development that embraces democracy, human rights, and women’s rights in particular.” The committee asserted that peace on earth depends on our ability to secure our living environment. A 2004 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) assessment lists the scarcity of water and fertile land as long held sources of conflict between farmers and nomads living in the Darfur region of Sudan. Farming and livestock grazing, the usual causes of desertification in this region, are now joined by the thousands of people living in refugee camps and their deleterious effect on already scarce vegetation (Herro, 2006). Soil degradation is often the result of factors such as natural climate change, which causes prolonged drought, overgrazing, deforestation, salinization, and poor irrigation practices. In other parts of the world, another important environmental impact is occurring, loss of cropland due to development and road building. According to Lester Brown, President of the Earth Policy Institute, the world’s automobile fleet increases by twelve million vehicles per year, which consume nearly one million hectares of land. Most of this land was formerly cropland that was equally suited for roads and highways— flat and well-draining (Brown, 2003, p. 49). In some developing countries, cropland conversion for road building has created conflict as already limited land availability shrinks even more. As developing countries continue to increase the number of automobiles, these conflicts will continue or increase. Increasing populations competing for dwindling resources serve to create conflict.

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According to Brown, food security is fast becoming a crucial world issue. Currently, food production is slowing, and as water shortages continue, future production may be affected. More than 100 countries are wheat importers, more than forty countries import rice. While these imports in some countries bolster grain stores, for other countries, these imports are vital to meeting food demand. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all rely on imports for more than 70 percent of their grain supply. Israel and Yemen use imports to supply more than 90 percent of their supply. Ninety percent of all grain exports come from only six countries: Canada, France, Australia, Argentina, Thailand, and the United States, where more than half of all exports are produced (ibid., p. 14). In 2004, China became the largest wheat importer in the world despite that it is also the largest wheat producer in the world (ibid.). The United Nations declared 2004 the “international year of rice” as an attempt to raise awareness of an impending crisis. Rice serves as the major food staple for more than half of the world’s population. Twenty percent of the world’s directly consumed calories come from rice, with demand exceeding production for the fourth year in a row (Halweil, 2005, p. 62). According to a calculation determined by the Worldwatch Institute, using United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) figures, current world rice stores would only last only sixty-three days after a disaster (ibid., p. 22). As demand has increased, prices have increased, making purchasing food even more difficult for the millions of people in the world living on $1 (USD equivalent) or less per day. For these people, who already spend 70 percent of their income on food, rising prices make having enough food a greater difficulty (Nierenberg and Halweil, 2005, p. 62). The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization began keeping data during the 1970s to track the number of hungry people in the world. During 2005, that number rose to 852 million people. Most of these people were too poor to buy the food they needed or too poor to afford the land that would allow them to grow food. Each year more than five million children die from starvation (Halweil, 2005, p. 22). Climate change is also contributing to food insecurity. Rising temperatures show adverse effects on plant life. Studies performed in the Philippines at the International Rice Research Institute show fertility rates for rice falling from 100 percent to near zero with temperature changes of as little as 6 degrees Celsius (Brown, 2003, p. 63). Corn also shows a strong vulnerability to rising temperatures. Leaf curling in corn plants occurs as a means of reducing surface area for evaporation; this also reduces the rate of photosynthesis. Increasing temperatures, and drier, hotter days cause more leaf curling, lowering plant productivity (ibid.). Some places reached near-record high temperatures during 2002. The North China Plain and the Great Plains of the United States suffered adverse effects. Great Plains crops, predictably subject to erosion because of the naturally occurring long-term drought, were further stressed due to misuse and overcultivation of the ordinarily arid lands. On the North China Plain, high temperatures stressed plants and placed increased demand on irrigation water (ibid., p. 65).

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Infectious diseases also contribute to a threatened global security. As the world becomes smaller and smaller due to our ability to move around the planet so quickly and easily, infectious disease can spread more quickly and easily. The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in China, occurring late during 2002, spread within six months to twenty-nine countries. Communicable diseases caused 26 percent of all deaths worldwide during 2002. HIV/AIDS has spread throughout the world, killing more than 20 million people and afflicting another 34–46 million (Pirages, 2005, p. 45). Worldwide, by 2010, HIV/AIDS is predicted to orphan more than 42 million children (Kassalow, 2001). The current Avian flu outbreaks are covering increasingly more of the globe, with the potential for a pandemic looming, while a number of infectious diseases once thought to be under control are now re-emerging. Disease outbreaks continue because poverty continues. An estimated 2.8 billion people worldwide are living on less than $2 per day (USD equivalent) (Pirages, 2005, p. 46). The gap between the rich and poor continues to grow even while the global economy continues to grow. Health spending disparities also continue to grow. While per capita spending in developed countries may be thousands of dollars—$4,887 per capita during 2001 in the United States—in developing countries it may be as little as $6 - $15 (USD equivalent) (ibid.). More than 2.3 million people, mostly from poor countries, die yearly from eight diseases: tuberculosis, diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, polio, measles, hepatitis B, and yellow fever—diseases that could easily be prevented through the use of available vaccinations (ibid., p. 47). World population reached 6 billion during October 1999. The world population increases by another 70 million people annually, with an expected population of 8 billion by 2028. An increasing population exacerbates all of the environmental problems I have discussed. The demands the current population is making on the earth’s resources are staggering. As the global economy continues to grow, the rate of consumption by developing countries will soon meet or exceed that of the currently more developed countries. A single nation, China, comprising 1.4 billion people, or about 20 percent of the world population, currently consumes 47 percent of the world’s cement and 26 percent of the world’s steel. China is also one of the fastest growing economies in the world, with a growth rate averaging 9.5 percent (Flavin and Gardner, 2005, p. 3). China and all the other developing nations of the world are striving for their people to have the lifestyle of the developed nations. Their resource demand will only continue to increase. The commonly used formula for determining impacts on the environment by population, is I = P x A x T, where I is impact, P is population, A is affluence, and T is technology. This formula, allows us to examine the impact of high population numbers combined with a technologically advanced society and high rates of consumption. Another way of looking at our impact on the planet uses the ecological footprint method. This is a measure of the amount of resources needed to support

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the lifestyle that we lead; this calculation typically yields a much higher number for persons living in developed countries. We can examine the impact of different lifestyles by comparing footprints of different nations. William Rees and Mathis Wackernagel, developers of the ecological footprint method, estimate it would take three planet Earths to support the world at the lifestyle enjoyed by people of the United States (ibid., p. 18). The technology and advancements of our developed-nation lifestyle cause us to demand increasingly more resources, produce increasing amounts of and forms of pollution, and see the number of those living in poverty increase as environmental problems disproportionately affect their lives. Jared Diamond, in his book Collapse (2005), provides us with many examples of past societies failing due to their neglect of the environment that sustained them. Environmental degradation in the Easter Islands was caused by massive deforestation. Similarly, all over Polynesia, human settlement led to habitat damage and mass extinctions of plant and animal life. Deforestation, leaving too little wood for canoes, indirectly led to reduced yields from fishing and the end of trade with Pitcairn and Henderson Islands. This eventually led to the termination of all habitation there. Science is providing us with much data today that shows trouble is here and more is on the way. Will we learn from these lessons? Will we redefine global security?

Two FIGHTING TERROR AND SPREADING DEMOCRACY: WHEN THEORY AND PRACTICE COLLIDE Matthew Crosston 1. Introduction How do we guarantee that 11 September 2001 was, and will be, a unique incident never to be repeated? The United States has adopted a dual foreign policy prioritization in the twenty-first century to answer this question. It must end terrorist groups wherever they find them. It must seed democratic regimes so that terror groups will not find fertile soil in which to reemerge. Those within the corridors of power sincerely believe that we can achieve these dual objectives simultaneously. The government stridently ignores dissidents when they suggest these two objectives might collide with one another. In this chapter, in which I discuss that collision, I argue for the essential prioritization of long-term security strategies that focus on legitimate democratic development, even if it may appear to compromise the short-term fight against terror. My analysis takes to task a disturbing trend that appears to verbally endorse long-term strategies but then consistently undermine them in real-time with short-term policies of convenience. It will reveal to the reader why the sincere effort to fight the global war against terror today often results in the United States compromising its principles on democratic development in such a way as to give cause for future terror to grow. America’s dual foreign policy priorities do collide. The aftermath of that collision makes America less safe because its “engagement” too often violates the essence of what it is to be American: democratic, stable, open, and just. Most importantly, this analysis goes beyond the standard morality versus national interest debates. I argue that the global war against terror offers the United States a unique opportunity: a situation where doing what is moral and just is the best way to serve American security. This idea, that a moral foreign policy can actually produce greater returns on national security, runs contrary to traditional wisdom in international politics. This chapter also runs contrary to most national analysts who have always considered the protection of territorial security to be a direct, immediate national interest that consistently trumps democratization, which is at best a benefit to the United States only indirectly, producing results much further down the political

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road. Even more contrary to traditional political wisdom is the supposition made in this chapter that the present fight against terror (such as in Iraq and Afghanistan) is not the greatest danger fueling radical fires to burn against the United States. Instead, the ultimate danger in the global war against terror emerges from the continued compromises made on democratic development by governments that move further away from freedom. While these foreign governments repress, the United States publicly praises its engagement with said countries, declaring its diplomatic effort successful in moving them ever closer to liberty. This subtle hypocrisy, in which local populations see no realized democratic development while listening to joint declarations of political success, radicalizes local opposition not only against the indigenous governments but also against all foreign powers, which duplicitously support such regimes. This chapter argues that such radicalization inevitably and logically leads to an emerging Islamic hatred against the United States best expressed through the ruthless and cruel methods of terror. Most scholars who have argued along similar lines are open to the criticism that they are unrealistic idealists and are unwilling to accept how governments conduct statecraft and foreign policy across the globe. This criticism always cites the overarching necessity to secure power and reduce threats, making compromises on democratic development, though perhaps hypocritical to officially declared policy goals, ultimately inevitable. This chapter tries to avoid such criticism by arguing in a hawkish language, keeping its analytical focus on effective and ineffective strategies for national security. Accepting and rationalizing a hypocritical collision between fighting terror and developing democracy increases security threats and makes American authority and power less impactful. Dismissing this collision as statecraft or realpolitik is flawed because it undermines foreign democratization and compromises American security. In short, this is a treatise in which I argue against foreign policy shortsightedness. I show how this danger emerges and what its long-term consequences are. This chapter is about stopping contradictions in American foreign policy that will only compromise American lives in the future. I hope that readers will recognize its pragmatism and avoid accusations of idealism and naiveté. Security is more important to the final conclusions here than liberal entreaties to help promulgate democracy around the globe. The resolution to this problem is argued to be self-evident though not easy: the United States should actually practice what it preaches at the State Department because its diplomatic sermons are more right and more strategically advantageous than its political acts. It is time to achieve some synergy between policy and practice.

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2. Emancipators or Enablers: The Consequences of United States’ Engagement This analysis looks at the isolated Ferghana Valley in Central Asia. It analyzes American foreign policy in three of the five Central Asian states: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. It shows how the supposed support of democratization dies in the valley, replaced by the diplomatic convenience of compromise. Unfortunately, that compromise may ultimately kill many Americans. Undoubtedly, 11 September 2001 marks the crescendo moment that changed President George W. Bush’s initial perspective on foreign policy. We can too easily forget that it was Bush, during the 2000 campaign, who openly criticized Albert A. “Al” Gore, Jr. for the likelihood that his administration might be too active abroad, forcing American commitments across too many areas. On 11 September 2001, Bush was arguably forced by circumstance to change from being a quasi-isolationist president into one firmly standing on a foundation of preemption: hit threats early and overseas so that they have limited opportunities to hit the United States. The Bush administration defined this new vision of justified military intervention as necessary: the United States should hit terror centers before they would have a chance to conduct operations on American soil. Under this vision it was obvious that Central Asia in general and the three states sharing the Ferghana Valley in specific would play a crucial strategic role. It was no coincidence that directly south of Tajikistan were the northern territories of Afghanistan, home to the largest rebel faction fighting against the Taliban and the long time archenemy of Osama bin Laden. Elizabeth Jones, Bush’s first head of the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, testified to the importance of the Central Asian region as early as December 2001, when she described the American vision for the region as “serious and for the long-term.” She hoped to see a stable, peaceful, and prosperous region where individual countries “markedly accelerated their economic reforms and democratic credentials, respected human rights, and developed vibrant civil societies” (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2004). This vision of Central Asia, she said, saw an increasing integration into the global economy “via an east-west corridor of cooperation stretching from China and Afghanistan across the Caucasus to the Mediterranean” (ibid.). Attempting to deflect the timing of this intensified interest away from purely strategic security concerns, Jones testified to Congress, “We are ready to explore new areas of assistance . . . but only in exchange for demonstrated, concrete steps toward reform” (ibid.). Two years later, Jones and the State Department had not changed their position. They emphasized continued commitment and focus of the United States on using the Central Asian states for their proximity to Afghanistan and other potential Middle East launching points and on encouraging them to engage in real democratic reform:

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MATTHEW CROSSTON When we talk with leaders of Central Asian countries, we always remind them of the need to do a better job of living up to their own promises as well as international commitments to democratic pluralism and economic openness. We emphasize the centrality of such reforms to long-term stability. Our vision is simple: namely, that these countries remain independent and become democratic, stable and prosperous partners of the United States who respect human rights, are increasingly integrated into the global economy, and avoid the poverty, isolation, and intolerance that breed terrorism and fundamentalism. (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 2004)

Ultimately, this chapter is not only about the inconsistencies of American foreign policy or only about Central Asian democracy flaws. The irregularities on the American side and systemic abuses on the Central Asian side are not merely detrimental to the development of functioning democracy in Central Asia, though truly that is so. These transgressions on both sides are sowing present-day seeds that will ultimately grow and flower into future radicalism. This radicalism, fueled by twisted Islamic interpretation and tinged with quasiMarxist and anti-globalization rhetoric, is not satisfied by the overthrow of corrupt and illiberal home regimes. The ultimate prize for such radicals will be the destruction of the “true” cause of their turmoil—the United States. Many critics see America as the initiator of Central Asian despair and destitution because they perceive it to be the purveyor of moral relativism and diplomatic convenience. This chapter asks a question that the United States government has been reluctant to seriously analyze. Quite simply, can we fight terror while simultaneously spreading democracy? Are these two objectives compatible? This work shows that the American government has been incorrectly fighting terror in the short-term while compromising its democratic principles so profoundly in the long-term as to exacerbate its future security problems. Compromising principles of democracy in areas already sensitive to Islamic revolutionary thought ultimately undermines the global war on terror in the most significant way: the United States is, in the end, making the fight against terror infinite in length and bottomless in its pool of future fighters who will try to kill Americans. The long-term answer to combating terrorism is freedom, liberty, prosperity, dignity, and justice. Terrorism will never overwhelm societies strongly imbued with these characteristics. They may be attacked but never overcome. That is the best victory for which we can hope. As long as the United States continues to compromise that long-term victory in the name of so-called shortterm strategic gain, it betrays democracy in the name of combating terror. This matters because to the United States, only genuine democracy defangs terror as the dominant method of political expression by supplying local peoples with alternative methods of protest and redress. If America continues to refuse to respect this principle while simultaneously preaching it as reality, then the United States becomes its source for a potentially fatal political sin.

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Most world hegemons throughout history were never able to foresee their downfall because they were constantly looking outward for oncoming threats, secure in the stability and superiority of their own societies. They were never prepared for downfall from within. While it may be melodramatic to draw parallels now, we would be well served to watch: America’s downfall will not come at the hands of terrorists, but it may come because of the hypocrisy and contradictions that it created while fighting them. The United States needs to act in accordance with its principles and back up the diplomatic program with real consequences when allies fail to adhere to it. In the post-9/11 world real, uncompromised, long-term democratic development as a remedy against terror must no longer be a secondary priority compared with short-term security strategy. Such a prioritization must no longer be considered a haven solely for idealists. 3. Praising Compromised Democracy The divergence between philosophy and fact forms the basis for a strange foreign policy vision, which argues that it is permissible to ignore the empirical reality of false democracy while professing continued admiration for the fantasy democracy supposedly emerging. This divergence plagues the way the United States engages Central Asia. Generally, official American foreign policy to the Central Asian region has always been three-fold: preventing the spread of terrorism, providing tools for political/economic reform, and instituting the rule of law while ensuring the development of energy reserves (The US Mission to the European Union, 2004). The United States government’s policy on the Ferghana Valley states is examined here from two analytical perspectives: how foreign policy is philosophically professed and how it gets financially implemented. Former United States Secretary of State Colin Powell declared, “freedom, prosperity, and peace are not separate principles, or separate policy goals. Each reinforces the other, so serving any one requires an integrated policy that serves all three” (ibid.). Despite these fine words, a strange disconnect happens when it comes to American foreign policy between the world the government sees and the world that actually exists on the ground. This is especially so in the three states within the Ferghana Valley. American policy appears to suffer from an apparent belief that as long as a “politically correct” favorable interpretation is repeatedly espoused across diplomatic agencies, then reality will come to reflect the fantasy. As I will show in this chapter, nothing could be further from the truth. Comparing philosophy against implementation reveals whether policy maintains a level of consistency or contradiction. This type of analysis is essential to understand the true state of national security: philosophically, policy always tends to be professed in the most grand and optimistic of terms. How that policy is ultimately financed and implemented, however, and how the recipients are ultimately impacted, is the true indication of whether policy produces results. Philosophy without empirical confirmation in policy circles quickly degrades

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into meaningless rhetoric. Regarding the war on terror, relying on rhetoric instead of results is playing a dangerous game with American security. 4. The United States Human Rights and Democracy Strategy No loftier political institution exists in the American mindset than democracy. The Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), a governmental organization committed to supporting and promoting democracy programs throughout the world, expresses this most poetically by explaining that democracy is the one national interest that helps to secure all the others. Democratically governed nations are more likely to secure the peace, deter aggression, expand open markets, promote economic development, protect American citizens, combat international terrorism and crime, uphold human rights, and avoid humanitarian crises (The Bureau of Democracy, 2007). The DRL accomplishes this through its Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF), established during the Clinton Administration in 1998. The DRL, hyperbole aside, represents the diplomatic frontline for American foreign policy with regard to spreading democracy. The Bureau concisely and boldly expresses American priorities without equivocation: (1) Assist newly formed democracies in implementing democratic principles; (2) Assist democracy advocates around the world to establish vibrant democracies in their own countries; and (3) Identify and denounce regimes that deny their citizens the right to choose their leaders in free, fair, and transparent elections. (ibid.) According to the DRL, the United States is pursuing a broad strategy of promoting respect for human rights that is both morally self-justifying and strategically beneficial for American security. The United States is “persuaded that regimes that violate the human rights of their own citizens are more likely to disrupt peace and security in their region and create a reservoir of ill will that can accrue to the detriment of the United States” (ibid.). A National Security Strategy that lists eight demands of human dignity backs up this persuasion: (1) The rule of law; (2) Limits on the absolute power of the state; (3) Freedom of speech; (4) Equal justice; (5) Respect for women; (6) Religious and ethnic tolerance; (7) Respect for private property; (8) Freedom of worship. (ibid.)

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According to the DRL, these eight demands of human dignity are not merely words on paper policy matched by action in the way the United States engages the world community. This engagement is a primary objective of American foreign policy, pushed forward by three goals that form the core of American strategy: (1) To hold governments accountable to their obligations under universal human rights norms and international human rights instruments; (2) To promote greater respect for human rights, including freedom from torture, freedom of expression, press freedom, women’s rights, children’s rights, and the protection of minorities; and (3) To promote the rule of law, seek accountability, and change cultures of impunity. Nothing is inherently wrong with the philosophy underlying American foreign policy. On the contrary, it is almost inarguable across its convictions. The problem is in the failure of implementation. Keep in mind that this is not a criticism of results or the lack thereof. Results are hard to gauge, as they may need a generation or two to truly take root and become evident. We will see in this chapter how often American diplomats emphasize the intrinsic “generational” quality of reform in the states of the Ferghana Valley. Unfortunately, this generational emphasis is a false promise: results can emerge only if we truly engage and implement policy. We will achieve no results, immediate or generational, if we do not sincerely pursue implementation. While the United States may be engaged with Central Asia it is not truly engaged in terms of productive programmatic implementation. America declares the right principles regarding law, accountability, and human dignity, but it chooses to ignore them when an ally in the war against terror makes a mockery of them. The United States has not tried to change that culture of impunity, which exists in extreme form in Central Asia, and the present work simply wishes to reveal how unwise such games are when connected to terrorism. Since 11 September 2001, the United States’ government has paid consistent lip service to the need for connecting the global war on terror with statebuilding ideals. Repeatedly across numerous governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations, this connection has been so patent that a fantastic four of American diplomacy becomes apparent: (1) Fight terror; (2) Respect democratic principles; (3) Develop civil society; and (4) Institute the rule of law. The United States says it is not interested in finding convenient partners who help it conduct the war against terror but who are not willing to produce true

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democratic change within their own societies. The United States says it is not willing to ignore transgressions in the latter three goals in exchange for assistance in the first. As former Secretary Powell said, each goal stated above reinforces the other. This symmetry or symbiosis between fighting terror internationally while encouraging democratic development within allies domestically is undoubtedly America’s most important foreign policy foundation today. Ostensibly, this foundation emerged in consequence to the harsh lesson learned after the United States disengaged from Afghanistan in the early 1990s: we must not leave countries alone to allow them to become “breeding grounds” for extremism and terrorism (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2004). To prevent these destructive forces from emerging in Central Asia, American diplomacy has supposedly intensified its efforts to help the countries of this area become “stable, prosperous, and fully integrated into the world community” (ibid.). Unfortunately, these claims that argue for a benevolent American influence increasing stability and prosperity in Central Asia appear to be hollow. While the United States did significantly increase funding to the Ferghana Valley states after 11 September 2001, very little on the ground has changed politically. While the Ferghana states have cooperated extensively in the war against terror (in some ways perhaps too enthusiastically), we have seen very little progress regarding the key state-building objectives mentioned above. In many cases, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have been backsliding with regard to democratic principles, civil society, and rule of law. American diplomatic and governmental actors have lauded so-called improvements while emphasizing the need for more “work to be done.” Does mere coincidence account for American diplomats showering praise on the “emerging democracies” sharing the Ferghana Valley, all of which happened to generously offer their assistance after 11 September 2001? Is this disparity between observation and reality at all connected with these governments quickly joining the coalition against terror, offering, “whatever was needed” to the United States? Does Tajikistan’s corrupt narco-economy or Uzbekistan’s religious inquisition government gain patience and understanding from America because of its true efforts to reform or because they were the first to offer the use of their facilities to coalition troops and play a central role as a staging area for early operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban? Does a meaningful positive correlation exist between Kyrgyzstan acting as the primary base for coalition air support and our overlooking corruption problems after its recent revolution? Was it merely fascinating coincidence that the bombing campaign in Afghanistan began on 7 October 2001, exactly one hour after Uzbekistan and the United States signed the Status of Forces Agreement, giving America the legal right to carry out search and rescue missions from Uzbek sovereign territory? (ibid.) This chapter argues that none of these realities was coincidental or accidental. By pursuing a strategy wherein the United States praises foreign governments despite actual contradictions to American foreign policy on the ground, one of two accusations against the United States is possible: the American gov-

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ernment is unaware of what is happening on the ground (unlikely) or it is being shortsighted in its positioning within Central Asia (more likely). For now, reality shows that the United States says yes to fighting terror and developing energy reserves but appears to say no to fostering real democratic institutions. The first accusation would be damaging enough to the long-term goals of the United States but again, it is unlikely that ignorance is the root of this problem. The second more likely accusation is devastating to American security interests as real democratic development offers the majority population legitimate political alternatives that could make terrorism a less attractive option. Unfortunately, as long as the first two objectives (short-term counter-terrorism and energy development) are secure, then we will apparently allow the third objective (real democratic reform) to rot on the vine. Perhaps worse, this rot will fester as the United States continues to ignore it and counter-intuitively declares political progress in Central Asia. If the United States wants to defeat Islamic terrorism it must at the very least not be seen as actively supporting such flawed democracy. America cannot be satisfied with simply stating it maintains an “intense dialogue” with backsliding governments. It must cease providing such governments with a justification for democratic deviation by emphasizing the need to wait for a “generational shift” in leadership (ibid.). How does such a shift come if American diplomacy is hopelessly empty and accommodating? That such democracy can potentially sow the seeds of new terror is fatally ironic. The Ferghana Valley is but one of those fertile fields that America itself ignorantly cultivates. 5. United States’ Assistance Programs and Funding Since the fall of the Soviet Union the American government funded assistance programs that were meant to act as a stabilizing force in the post-Soviet transition. Political and economic transformation, nuclear non-proliferation, aid in legal or judiciary reform, promotion of party development, and free media have been the formal goals for most of these United States Government (USG)-funded programs. Unfortunately, the compromised democracy supported by the United States’ State Department has also seeped into the official rationale used to explain USG financial assistance increases. Not surprisingly, such increases have achieved few if any significant results on the ground in Central Asia. Ambassador Carlos E. Pascual, named coordinator of Assistance to Europe and Eurasia in 2003 and subsequently elevated to coordinator for stabilization and reconstruction in 2004, used the weak “generational” rationalization when describing the success level of fiscal year 2003: Though the progress of this generational transition has varied tremendously among the countries of the region in fiscal year 2003, USG assistance programs continued to help promote good governance, strengthen civil society, independent media, the rule of law and human rights. . . . Yet assistance has

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MATTHEW CROSSTON been used not only to build the security and law enforcement cooperation necessary for the struggle against global terror. It has also been deployed to address the internal conditions that may lead, over time, to conflict and extremism and the emergence of new “failed states,” which can become breeding grounds for terrorism. (ibid.)

As coordinator of American assistance to Europe and Eurasia, Ambassador Pascual oversaw the development of regional and country strategies to promote market-oriented and democratic states. He ensured that American assistance reinforced American interests. He managed the allocation and implementation of approximately $1.1 billion in annual assistance. The purpose of his new position, at the Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization, was to lead American government planning, institutionalize capacity, and help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so that they could reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy. These lofty, admirable goals are eloquently expressed in powerful mission statements. In the end, however, this terminology sounds like empty rhetoric and perhaps purposefully so. While the United States is using the right language to frame its policy, it is continually increasing foreign expenditures despite a total lack of results. Considering that this occurred under a Republican administration that often spoke of the need to pinpoint foreign aid to identifiable results, I find it difficult to understand how Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have not come close to achieving any formal goals and yet received consistent increases in aid. Such difficulty dissipates after a lens of cynicism is placed over policy so that references to democracy are deleted but mentions of security and antiterrorism are left untouched. The problem with American funding since 11 September 2001 has been a decided tendency to continue funding to questionable states. Perhaps most egregious has been increased funding to the Ferghana Valley states in areas strictly aimed at promoting democracy and civil society even though in reality they are being rewarded for security cooperation. Most disturbingly, this cooperation ultimately places future American security at risk. 6. United States’ Agency for International Development The United States appears to be suffering from something akin to “African Aid” syndrome: one of the fundamental problems in African democratic and economic development was an inexplicable tendency among international lending institutions to grant huge sums of financial assistance only to fail to oversee its utilization or monitor its distribution. Inevitably, African governments quickly learned to say diplomatically right things to the international community while actively using the funds in any way they pleased. It does not appear that Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are intentionally modeling themselves after the worst offenders from the African continent. Justifying the financial increases is difficult considering these three states

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are not close to functioning democracies and they do not show any measurable progress on the ground. How do these governments account for the funds? What oversight mechanisms exist? Why are there no results timetables tied to the release of new funding? Accountability, oversight, timetables. These three things are essential if the United States is sincere in wanting the states who share the Ferghana Valley to become genuine democracies and join the global community. Using such money, meant to create stable democratic institutions, as a reward for helping to fight terror in the short-term is dangerous if the recipients use that money domestically in ways that do not respect democratic principles, do not develop civil society, and do not institute the rule of law. The United States creates a vicious circle of terror when it conducts foreign policy in this manner. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) conducted the vast majority of its USG-funded programs bilaterally, closely interacting with local actors who were inevitably connected to and often dependent upon elite structures. USAID is supposedly committed to supporting the transition of authoritarian, centrally planned societies to participatory democracies with strong market-based economies. According to USAID, promoting regional cooperation and stability is crucial across Eurasia, a region critical to American national interests and the global war on terror. Writ large, its regional programs in the Ferghana Valley meant to promote policy reform, institutional development, broad-based citizen participation, and the rule of law (ibid.). USAID spent nearly thirty million dollars during fiscal year 2002 on programs meant to directly impact the long-term democratization effort (see Table 1). These programs are not charitable donations or money meant to be misappropriated. These funds are dedicated to developing successful democratization, which is able to fight terror by making the need for terrorism appear extreme and inefficient. Subsequent funding has increased every year since 2002. Table 1. Fiscal Year 2002 Expended Funds—Non-Security Measures US AID Democratic Reform Humanitarian Assistance Social-Sector Reform Eurasia Foundation

Kyrgyzstan $5,130,000 $540,000 $6,920,000 $2,850,000

Tajikistan $2,970,000 $1,700,000 $3,530,000 $1,100,000

Uzbekistan $2,050,000 n/a $160,000 $2,050,000

Yet in all four areas—democratic reform, humanitarian assistance, social-sector reform and the Eurasia Foundation, which ran programs meant to elevate individuals and societies through democratic and market transitions—no identifiable institutionalized progress was achieved in Central Asia. Worse, to the best of my knowledge, no real oversight mechanisms to manage and monitor the distribution of these funds even existed. Once distributed, funds went into the political abyss with little or no recourse available to the United States government.

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Thomas C. Adams was the acting coordinator to Europe and Eurasia during 2003 and before the designation of Ambassador Pascual. He gave a perfect example of the flawed democracy by giving a statement to the United States House International Relations Committee on Assistance to Eurasia, Washington D.C.: The picture on democratic reform is decidedly less rosy. Noticeable backsliding has occurred in recent years in some countries. While I do not diminish these problems I believe that we have achieved tremendous accomplishments in this sphere as well over the past decade and have sown the seeds for future positive change. (2003) Despite Adams’ statements, the only definitive accomplishments made in Central Asia since 11 September 2001 have been in the security sphere, where these states have allowed American forces unfettered access to their territory. Adams refers to success under the FSA in terms of positive democratic change even though no substantive examples exist to support these claims. Adams went on to describe one of the largest assistance programs ever created in the United States: One of our best mechanisms to foster fundamental change is our program of professional and educational exchanges. Freedom Support Act exchange programs have brought slightly over 100,000 business people, journalists, students and professors to the United States to see for themselves how free people prosper and deal with challenges common to all countries. . . . FSA funds have supported the development and strengthening of civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations . . . [and has] also supported the development of political parties, helped to strengthen legislatures as a counter-weight to powerful executive branches of government, and worked to create or bolster judicial independence. (ibid.) The fact of the matter is that none of these things has happened across Central Asia or in the three countries sharing the Ferghana Valley. Political parties there are still nondescript and emasculated. Legislatures remain the de facto servants of the hyper-powerful executive branches. Currently, the mere idea of an independent judiciary in the region is inconceivable. Yet repeatedly, those at the highest American diplomatic levels speak of progress happening all over the area, largely thanks to the increasing aid and assistance of the United States (see Table 2 below). More fascinating (frustrating?) still was how Adams mentioned the three Ferghana states by name in his presentation: The largest changes in the FSA budget request are related to our country’s intensified engagement with Central Asia as a result of the September 11 attacks on our country . . . . Significant increases for Uzbekistan, Tajiki-

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stan, and the Kyrgyz Republic will support economic development in conflict-prone areas, effects to open political space by strengthening democratic institutions and grassroots organizations. (ibid.) Table 2. Freedom Support Act Funds Expended FY 2001–2003 Fiscal Year FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003

Kyrgyzstan $33,390,000 $40,000,000 $43,600,000

Tajikistan $16,800,000 $32,330,000 $35,000,000

Uzbekistan $25,840,000 $39,660,000 $42,000,000

The only significant grassroots organizations in the Ferghana Valley states that have emerged and begun to form real opposition to the ruling elites since 11 September 2001, despite FSA budget increases, have been radical Islamic fundamentalist groups. This was not the democratic opposition or grassroots activism the United States had in mind when it consistently elevated its financial engagement in this region. But we should have expected exactly this kind of opposition when the United States claims false levels of progress and gives high estimations of its own “democratic engagement.” 8. Human Rights and Democracy Fund DRL uses its HRDF to fulfill its mandate to monitor and promote human rights and democracy worldwide. According to its mission statement, the HRDF supports “innovative programming designed to uphold democratic principles, support democratic institutions, promote human rights, and build civil society in countries and regions of the world that are geo-strategically critical to the United States (Human Rights and Democracy Fund, 2005). Since 11 September 2001, it has occupied a major financial foreign policy niche, receiving enormous budget increases and gaining incredible responsibility the world over for initiating programs like the ones mentioned above. We should not be surprised that Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are a major focus of the HRDF. Every aspect of the Bureau’s vetting process to determine significant targets is satisfied by the three states of the Ferghana Valley. Undoubtedly, once the war against terror began, Central Asia would elevate in geo-strategic importance. In addition, the supposed “philosophical commitment” of the United States to democratic principles, civil, and human rights since 11 September 2001 had no better contemporary focus than the Ferghana three in that they epitomize the type of state and location the United States government would like to engage. The HRDF even singled out the Central Asian region on its Internet website, emphasizing that USG funds in Central Asia had a “renewed commitment to promoting human rights both diplomatically and programmatically” (ibid.). A casual glance at the level of USG funding to the HRDF from 2000-2005, as shown below in Table 3, indicates the increasing importance this

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fund was meant to have when it came to on-the-ground implementation across these geo-strategic regions of importance. Table 3. Fiscal Year Budget Increases for the HRDF Fiscal Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

USG Funds $8,969,985 $13,421,000 $13,000,000 $36,448,000 $43,740,000

So what kinds of “innovative programming” did we see in the three Ferghana Valley states? What sort of on-the-ground effects emerged with this nearly 400 percent increase in HRDF funding since 2000? During 2000–2001, the two largest programs involved “capacity-building for human rights advocacy [nongovernmental organizations] NGOs” in Uzbekistan and funding “get-out-thevote” (nongovernmental organization) NGO activities in Kyrgyzstan. Ironically, during this time, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan earned a reputation for government harassment and investigation into foreign-run organizations. This severely curtailed the operational environment for NGOs in these countries (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2004). During 2001–2002, the NGO increased its capacity-building budget in Uzbekistan by 500 percent, combining it with an Uzbek “rule of law” program funded for half a million dollars. Apparently, the “get-out-the-vote” NGO program in Kyrgyzstan was so successful, it earned an elevation in status, transferring into a new “capacity-building” Kyrgyz program. Over half a million dollars went into funding this program also. Another half million went to a program called “Citizens’ Rights in Ferghana Valley,” which went to creating an advocacy network throughout the area. In all three cases, funds were misused because no real follow-up was initiated to track how these funds were truly utilized. During 2002–2003, all previous programs were maintained while “political party development” emerged to take center-stage on the HRDF agenda. An additional one million dollars financed the development of political parties in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The HRDF exalted such programs’ relevance by claiming the need to “encourage constructive dialogue” between the government and opposition groups (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2005). The most vehement opposition to government across the Ferghana Valley has been the emergence of Islamic political parties and Muslim organizations that almost unequivocally stand for the forced removal of the present government. I would not consider this an example of encouraging constructive dialogue. During 2003–2004, the largest expansion of HRDF programs covered the Ferghana Valley, only confirming the supposition that Central Asia was a major

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focus of interest for its four-fold increase in overall budget. Political party development in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan increased by another half million dollars. Interestingly, new programs appeared to shift away from democracy building and toward humanitarian issues. Uzbekistan received over one million dollars to institute such programs as the Civic Coalition against Torture and Protection of Human Rights. Tajikistan also received the Human Rights Protection Program while Central Asia as a regional whole received funding for a “Civic Bridges” program meant to create a regional, interactive network of citizens, which would promote civic participation and advocacy programs (ibid.). As the funding for HRDF programs in Central Asia skyrocketed, program content gradually shifted from democratic state-building agendas to international law and human rights initiatives. This was not a coincidence but confirmation of the utter lack of success in developing opposition political parties that engaged in constructive dialogue and created civic participation networks across the region. Why, four years into this funding largess, was it necessary to begin programs aimed at stopping torture and protecting human rights? To suggest that programs aimed at civil society and democracy, if they were having any sort of impact whatsoever, would have made inroads against such barbarity as torture appears to be a logical supposition. Instead, as American government programs became more embedded in the region, regression appeared to occur on the ground. This regression flies in the face of American diplomats like Elizabeth Jones, who lauded all efforts as being “every bit as important as our security assistance in dealing with the long-term root causes of terrorism” (The United States Mission to the European Union, 2001). Closer inspection across the board of American governmental agencies finds this same illusory satisfaction, inexplicably proclaiming Central Asian policy as one that was deep, sustained, and coordinated (ibid.). 9. Diplomatic Selling Points: House of Representatives International Relations Committee If looking for a smoking gun or seminal moment in the selling of United States foreign policy on Central Asia, then ironically one of the strongest contenders came on Capitol Hill before the attacks on 11 September 2001 took place. On 6 June 2001, witnesses discussed American policy on Central Asia before the House of Representatives, specifically before its Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. I choose this as the defining moment because Central Asia’s strategic relevance only became more intense after the New York City World Trade Center Towers collapsed. Any hope at all of policy toward Central Asia being held to a high standard of introspection and oversight would had to have been in place before the security crisis known as the global war against terror had begun. This opportunity to build such a foundation did indeed emerge during summer 2001 but the House of Representatives subsequently passed it up.

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Overall, the members of the House International Relations Committee, chaired by Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois, displayed an expected mixture of facts and falsehoods when discussing Central Asia. Representative from New York, Benjamin Gilman, admitted to “serious human rights problems and extremist movements influenced by Afghanistan,” but also lauded the region for its “enormous energy export potential that could ease current American energy problems and for its governments being secular”(U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, 2001). Gilman’s statement is fascinating for its being simultaneously prescient and wrong. Central Asia’s energy reserves, though significant, face severe obstacles of climate, geography, and technology. Presently, some doubt exists as to the actual extent of the energy reserve estimates. Estimate inflation may have been done to secure more international aid. Regardless, Gilman accurately framed the debate: he showed concern at the political repression but wrapped up his analysis with praise for the economic potential. Many of his observations were lamentably ignorant with regard to the actual doings of the Central Asian governments. His calling them secular—when they manipulate Islam for their own purposes and are ruthless in the harassment of Islamic organizations—is naïve at best. At worst, such mistakes purposefully ignore the preconditions capable of creating Islamic terrorism. As we shall see below, Representative Gilman was not alone. The main figure to appear before the House subcommittee that day was Clifford Bond, a career diplomat, who at the time was the Acting Principal Deputy to the Special Advisor for the New Independent States. He appeared as the administration’s official expert witness on Central Asian policy. His opening statement was pregnant with the hidden problems brought to light in this work: The overarching and the long-term goal of United States policy in Central Asia is to see these states develop into stable, free-market democracies, which can serve as a bulwark against the spread of potential instability and conflict in the region. This broader goal serves three core strategies or interests of the United States: regional security, political and economic reform and energy development. (Ibid.) Here, before 9/11, before the global war on terror, the three core values in American policy are made explicit. Since this performance on Capitol Hill it has become clear that the first and third core interests—regional security and energy development—exploded and overwhelmed the more important long-term second interest—political and economic reform. Bond would obliviously go on to openly discuss this fundamental divergence that would come to epitomize American foreign policy: All the states of Central Asia have indicated that they welcome security cooperation with the United States. They see our engagement in the region as

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an additional element of stability as they seek to balance their relations with more powerful neighbors in the region. . . . Only by empowering their citizens through democratization and economic reform can these governments ensure lasting popular support and stability. This is an integral part of our message to the governments of Central Asia. (Ibid.) Before 11 September 2001, the United States viewed itself as the security blanket necessary for Central Asia so that governments like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan would be able to “fend off” bigger, more powerful rivals like China, Iran, and Russia. After 11 September 2001, the security relationship was inverted: the United States needed Central Asia for its own immediate national security. This flip was what most likely empowered the Ferghana Valley states to essentially ignore and dismiss Bond’s second priority of democratic and economic reform. Before 11 September 2001, the advantage was on the side of America. After, the advantage shifted decidedly to the side of the Ferghana Valley states. Apparently, America decided in favor of making its short-term security priorities supreme. To this day, we have had no public acknowledgement of how this has made it difficult to be principled on democratic development. For Representative Gilman to make incorrect statements about a Central Asian state is understandable. He was not a recognized expert and did not serve the government in such a capacity. When the official administration point man on Central Asia makes false and disturbingly vacuous statements, we have serious cause for concern. Such was the case when Bond discussed Kyrgyzstan’s perplexing backsliding when it supposedly had been the best in the region in protecting human rights: It is difficult to understand or explain President [Askar] Akaev’s motives over the past two or more years, but we have seen a turn toward repression since 1999 and the onset of a set of parliamentary and then presidential elections in the year 2000. In the lead up to those elections and as the opposition became more vociferous and more organized, we saw harassment of opposition figures . . . we saw the exclusion in the presidential elections themselves of principal opponents to President Akayaev. We saw that expand beyond activities directed against individuals to the suppression of the free media, to the harassment of NGOs. (Ibid.) Though Bond was perplexed, the Kyrgyzstan administration had no genuine interest in “constructive dialogue” or the development of such institutions as civil society and political parties as these things could ultimately be a threat to its vice-like grip on power. As Bond said, just as alternative voices became louder and more organized the central government cracked down. This would not be confusing to an objective observer. Consider that Bond was speaking before 11 September 2001, and his lack of understanding was likely explained by the general indifference of the United States toward Central Asia, seeing it only as a

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potential source down the road for non-Arab energy reserves. Unfortunately, after 9/11, when Central Asia became strategically important for immediate security concerns, American indifference apparently shifted to purposefully overlooking democratic backsliding and human rights violations. This is naked Machiavellianism. Bond commented on the “tough stance” that the United States was willing to take against this regression, saying that, “we are engaged in a dialogue with the government. We have made some progress in modest ways to get them to respect human rights, but frankly they need to do a lot more, and we need to continue to talk to them” (ibid.). Considering its record in the years to come, it appears that such “harsh language” from the United States did not greatly concern the central government of Kyrgyzstan. Even more disturbing was when Bond discussed radical Islamism within Central Asia: Let me say, first of all, that Central Asia is not fertile ground for Islamic fundamentalism. The Islamic tradition in these countries is a very tolerant one. The Taliban’s variety of Islam has little attraction to the great mass of people who accept the idea of a secular state . . . we do not see Islamic fundamentalism right now as a threat to the states of Central Asia. (Ibid.) In the most direct terms, Islamic fundamentalism was not a threat because the “secular” governments of the Ferghana Valley were willing to do anything to co-opt, undermine, and oppress Islamic political groups. But this type of reasoning was dangerously myopic, ignoring that it contradicted our policy aimed to encourage democratization and civil society opposition. It was also myopic because of what usually happens across the globe to Islamic opposition groups that are forced underground by oppressive governments. The one universal result to emerge from such maneuvers is a further radicalization of said Islamic groups. The recipe to create such a potentiality was already on the ground in the Ferghana Valley because of the repressive and violent responses of the local executive governments. Bond was conveniently and inconceivably papering over the danger by saying Central Asian society practiced a more tolerant Islamic tradition. Most Muslims in the world practice a relatively tolerant Islamic tradition. The threat in the global war against terror is not the fear of more states transforming into radical Islamic theocracies. We have no worry of “Irans” mushrooming all over the globe. What we should truly fear, because it undermines the global war against terror, are repressive “secular” governments that drive legitimate Islamic opposition underground and thus force them toward radicalization. Central Asian society as a whole does not need to be radical or practice a nontolerant version of Islam for it to be a breeding ground of radical, intolerant Islamic groups. Bond missed this point and American foreign policy continues to miss it today.

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10. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe In theory, American participation in Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) advances America’s national interest in promoting democracy and strengthening respect for human rights. The OSCE therefore has a role to play in helping to win the global war against terror. A 2004 Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs report to Congress, “Increased Attention to Central Asia,” showed that little had changed in Washington, D.C. since 11 September 2001. All of the contradictory hallmarks present three years earlier in American foreign policy had apparently become codified into catch phrases the world over. The piece was eerily reminiscent of Bond’s talking points and indicative of a policy that proclaimed much philosophically but demanded little to nothing empirically: American goals in Central Asia are to develop democratic, market-oriented states that are more fully integrated into the Eurasian community, to promote regional stability, and to strengthen a long-term coalition against terrorism that respects human rights. To advance these goals through the OSCE, the United States will support new programs in the economic and political-military dimension in Central Asia . . . the most promising programs in Central Asia in support of American goals are those focused on transnational issues, such as terrorism, trafficking, border security, police training, and judicial reform. The Central Asians have shown willingness to cooperate on these issues. (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2004) The difference between 2001 and 2004 was that the global war against terror had mutated the emphasis on democratic reform and civil society into diplomatic rhetoric that emptily prefaced policy briefings. The political dimension for accomplishing American democratic objectives in the region, once deemed most important, had now been connected directly to and usurped by military priorities: the most promising programs, with which Central Asian governments were the most cooperative, were now strictly “transnational” security programs that had very little to do with long-term democratic reform. More disturbingly, while the United States officially lauded the OSCE for “anti-torture programs and trying to strengthen the freedom of the media,” it was simultaneously creating an elaborate system of secret “black prisons.” The government kept this system secret from American media sources for two years. Apparently, the Ferghana Valley regimes noticed the hypocrisy and learned valuable political lessons from it. 11. The Moscow Mechanism In 2003, the OSCE invoked the Moscow Mechanism, a rarely used tool that gave the OSCE power to appoint a Rapporteur to investigate and ostensibly resolve serious international and interregional problems, against Turkmenistan. The initial stimulus to invoke the mechanism was the manner in which Turkmeni-

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stan’s security services conducted investigations into the attempted assassination of President Saparmurat Niyazov in fall 2002. Reports on the brutality and arbitrariness of those investigations prompted the United Nations and other international organizations to condemn the Niyazov government, pushing the OSCE to trigger the Moscow Mechanism. Once triggered, the Rapporteur’s conclusions included a well-regarded set of recommendations for both the Turkmen authorities and the international community (ibid.). Ultimately, the OSCE was unable to compel Turkmenistan to cooperate. The Turkmen government refused to even issue a visa for the Rapporteur and refused to conduct an internal investigation to honor the procedures of the Moscow Mechanism. Ultimately, Turkmen authorities rejected the Rapporteur’s final report and refused to implement its final recommendations (ibid.). This episode essentially destroyed the OSCE’s confidence that the Moscow Mechanism was an effective international tool of investigation. Even more significant was the relative silence of the United States. Turkmenistan was arguably the worst state in Central Asia from a democracy perspective, representing a cult of personality that rivaled if not surpassed North Korea. Did the United States government assume the other states of Central Asia especially the Ferghana three—would learn no lesson from this? Turkmenistan’s ability to de facto emasculate one of the OSCE’s more powerful diplomatic weapons set a frighteningly disturbing precedent. What were the chances that Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan thought they would face serious repercussions if they ignored international criticisms when Turkmenistan, which had always rebuffed American overtures to assist in the terror war, did not face sanction or punishment for failing to cooperate? The Ferghana three actively cooperated in the war against terror. The lesson they learned was unmistakable: American policy mattered little. The empirical reality said it all. Security now mattered. Democracy later did not. 12. A Strong Diplomatic Wind, Signifying Nothing The development of American foreign policy in Central Asia reveals a dangerous divergence between stated goals and empirical reality that carries potentially deadly consequences. While the American government and its diplomatic corps continually pays lip service to the ideals and power of democratic freedom, this verbal commitment is not backed up with results in diplomatic action or programmatic implementation. The careful examination I have provided in this chapter reveals a very subtle shift since 11 September 2001 in the type of programs funded in Central Asia—they focused less on democratic institutions and civil society and more on transnational security issues of dubious achievement. Worse, the United States appears to act oblivious to this compromised democracy. Repeatedly, some of the most important political figures in the United States have walked to the podium, at home and abroad, to declare a self-evident and crucial truth: democracy matters not just for freedom but for security. Secre-

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tary of State Condoleezza Rice, on a trip through Central Asia during fall 2005, addressed this issue with powerful, ringing words: We understand that the path to democracy is long and imperfect and different for every country. But make no mistake: the principles of democracy are unanimously desired and universally deserved. Here in Central Asia there is much to do but there are reasons for optimism. . . . We all live in a world in which there are security concerns. We all live in a world in which terrorism is a threat . . . [but] you have to have democracy because democracy is, in fact, the answer to terrorism and to extremism. (2005) Though powerful and moving, these words ring hollow. American political philosophy rings hollow. The implementation of American programs does not reveal a sincerity of commitment to developing real democracy abroad. At the National Endowment for Democracy, Bush passionately declared, “we know that liberty if not defended can be lost. By definition the success of freedom rests upon the choices and the courage of free peoples and upon their willingness to sacrifice” (2003). America, in its fight to preserve its liberty today, may be ignoring how “allies” in that fight are undermining the liberty of their own citizens. If that repression continues then the sacrifices made in the future by these allied citizens may be sacrifices made against American security and not for it. You reap what you sow in foreign policy. Unfortunately, at the moment, America is cultivating a bitter future harvest. 13. Missed Concerns from the Scholarly Community In addition to this diplomatic aspect, counter-analyses that emphasize the relatively small size or lack of military capability among radical groups to attack local regimes continue to overshadow the few warnings that have emerged from the scholarly community about radical Islamists. Appearing before the same subcommittee in 2003 as Jones were four leading scholars on the region. Embedded deep within their official testimony were comments that I find quite disconcerting: Dr. Ariel Cohen: While reports of increasing Hizb activity abound, the extent to which local Hizb activities are part of a coordinated global plan is still unknown, just as the question of whether every region and country has an autonomous leadership that defines programs and sets deadlines remains unanswered. Hizb is rumored to be operating on a thirteen-year grand plan, but if it exists, this program is still unknown. In fighting the war of ideas, the Bush administration must reevaluate, revive, and upgrade its public diplomacy tool box, as well as invent new specific tools for fighting aggressive, anti-Western sentiment among fundamentalist groups and regimes that support and tolerate them.

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Dr. Stephen Blank: Virtually every writer on Central Asia has postulated that the combination of ubiquitous misrule, corruption, poverty and repression there runs the risk of encouraging opposition groups to gravitate toward Islamic parties and movements for want of any other option. The lack of an option is therefore allegedly due to the fact that the regimes there have stifled all other opposition movements. Hence Islamic movements, which are generally and inherently underground operations, are left as the only force capable of arousing opposition to this misrule. Alternatively this repression and misrule stimulates this gravitation to Islamic parties because only they have the most coherent and resonant message that the population can assimilate in terms it understands. This conclusion emerges because we assume that all other avenues of political expression are closed off because of repression, socio-economic decline, environmental degradation, and the breakdown of social norms through crime, corruption, drugs, ethnic cleavages, or the absence of a genuine civil society. Islamic parties and movements that supposedly speak to the populace in their own language are left by default as the only alternative. Dr. Martha Brill Olcott: One of the most frustrating aspects of working in this region is how limited our levers are to influence developments in the region. Given the levels of American spending in the area, our greatest area of influence is in the area of security, and when we tackle state building issues, especially issues of political reform, it is much harder for our voice to be heard, given how limited the funds are that we are spending in this area in any of these countries. Dr. Fiona Hill: I believe that the United States should encourage more programs to expand political participation. . . . We need to bring extremist groups out of the shadows by encouraging religious education at all levels, allowing people to make their own decisions and to publicly debate social problems in mainstream settings so that these issues will be taken out of the domain of radical interpretation. (Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, “Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Regional Stability, 2003). The scholarly community can see the potential dangers but has not, for whatever reason, causally tied the exacerbation of those dangers directly to the contradictions and hypocrisy of American foreign policy. They are still focused largely on the repression initiated by local governments and somewhat ignore that such repression is violently enabled by America’s “selective engagement.” This work is hopefully the first in what will be a long line of serious investigations into the

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long-term security impact of “diplomacy for show” and the acceptance of cosmetic results when substantive progress is needed. 14. The Dangers of Divergent Diplomacy The end of the Cold War was for many in the West a confirmation of the universality and superiority of democracy and capitalism. The control of individualism and the management of human ambition were not only lesser ideologies, but also they were futile as peoples all over the globe stepped forward to become part of the cradle of democracy. From the very beginning of the post-Cold War era, therefore, the United States proclaimed to operate on two general principles: (1) Achieving balance between initiatives that address immediate threats and programs that promote lasting generational change; and (2) Pursuing selective engagement with those states truly willing to reform. (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2002) These two principles were not consistently or coherently applied even before 11 September 2001, but that day proved to be a turning point: it marked a shift elevating short-term strategic interests high above long-term “generational” reform. We had little opportunity to criticize this shift immediately following the Twin Towers disaster, as it rightfully appeared awkward and indecent to complain about security methods when the United States was so brazenly attacked. Please remember that my purpose for this chapter is not partisanship or to vent diatribes against the right, hawks, the military-industrial complex, or any group that believes security should always be the top priority for a state. The flaws I have discussed are endemic to the democratic and republican parties and in some ways reflect a flaw in the philosophical thinking with which Americans approach international relations and develop foreign policy. I wrote this piece to call attention to the way that the stalwart American pursuit of present-day terrorism (“the programs that address immediate threats”) does not produce the “lasting generational change” that the United States says is ultimately most important and in fact such pursuit enables the reemergence of transnational terrorist groups. This effort is likely to give terrorists the arguments they need to attract new legions to the cause of bringing down the West. American hypocrisy in foreign policy creates new generations of terrorists whose one true goal will not be in attacking the local regimes with which America “selectively engaged” but in looking to cause pain and suffering against Americans. They will seek retribution because the United States was not merely indifferent to their repression. It will appear to them by all objective methods of investigation to be something America tacitly endorsed and consistently supported. The Ferghana Valley is just the first and perhaps the best positioned of many other potentially similar sites around the globe.

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I argue this because the United States has blindly allowed its belief in immediate security to be embodied by a system dominated by politicians and diplomats who have been willing, since 11 September 2001, to overlook democratic regression in places like the Ferghana Valley. This democratic regression is considered a “necessary evil” to achieve progress in the present global war against terror. This is not an argument merely railing against immediate security concerns and lamenting idealized visions of freedom and liberty. This chapter has tried to reveal the manner in which the United States provided aid to a region such that compromised long-term international security. While the local regimes increased their repression, America looked duplicitous and self-serving. Until now, in conducting the war against terror, the United States government has relied mostly on its foreign military assistance programs, which are defined as a method for “friends and allies to acquire American military equipment, services, and training for . . . legitimate self-defense and for participation in multinational security efforts” (Human Rights Watch, 2002). In trying to use these programs more effectively to forge its international coalition against terror, the United States has modified its military assistance stance in three ways: (1) Changing the legal regime to push arms transfers to foreign nations; (2) Granting military assistance to several states directly involved in the war against terror; and (3) Increasing and expediting counterterrorism assistance and general military aid to other countries around the world. (Ibid.) Unfortunately, how these events have played out in real terms is an uncomfortable softening and arguably even a violation of formal American law. Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 forbids the transfer of assistance to governments that engage in a “consistent pattern of gross violations” of human rights (ibid.). Under “extraordinary circumstances,” the president has the right to waive these restrictions, which President Bush has done quite liberally since 11 September 2001. The State Department also began lifting sanctions as part of its post-9/11 foreign policy, while the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which handles foreign military sales within the Department of Defense, established a “war room” to speed up sales approvals and more quickly expedite transfers (ibid.). All of this pushes radical Islamists to one conclusion—America wants to help kill Muslims faster. Whether this is an accurate reflection of reality matters little. In such isolated places suffering from severe repression like the Ferghana Valley, perception is more important than reality. United States government press conferences and diplomatic communiqués that offer up “hope for the future” or “contentment with recent progress” all sound insincere and deadly to local groups having to live amongst the repression in Central Asia. Even when America voices concern, as Assistant Secretary of State Lorne Craner did in 2004, it sounds muted and lacking in authority:

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We know that while there is no justification for terrorism, repressive societies without economic development and that [practice] social exclusion have been breeding ground for terrorists. That is a simple fact. We don’t want to see that continue. (International War and Peace Reporting, 2004) This is well said but is received on the ground as viciously insincere as government forces in Bishkek, Tashkent and Dushanbe use weapons given by the American military at an “expedited pace” to shoot and kill Muslims. America must stop undervaluing the impact of perception on its long-term security. What becomes of all the moderate Muslims in the Ferghana Valley imprisoned and tortured? What becomes of their family and friends who suffer from such repression while listening to the United States talk of being pleased overall by the “careful progress” achieved in the region? They likely become not just the mortal enemies of the local regimes but also the enemies of the United States. Proposing such injustices can turn moderates into radicals is not necessarily revolutionary. The United States is also not the first country to engage foreign partners on security matters while having reservations about the nature of the regimes with which they are involved. The problem this chapter highlights, however, is that these regimes helping America fight terrorism today are only causing future terror problems that America will have to fight tomorrow (ibid.). Even the NGO community within the Ferghana Valley explained best by the director of the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society in Kyrgyzstan, sees the situation in a scarily compromised and pragmatic way: I regard the presence of the United States in [and assistance to] our region . . . as very positive as there will be no end to terrorism. Therefore it’s hard to say the United States will leave the region in the next 10 years. (Ibid.) This statement is ostensibly declaring that repression within the Ferghana states is horrendous and will continue to be so despite American engagement. American assistance to fight terror only breeds more terrorism locally. Grassroots organizations in the Ferghana Valley have come to approve of these dynamics because it means America will be unable to abandon them. The political environment has become so perverse that even local NGOs are finding ways to positively value terrorism. Even more disturbing, the hundreds of millions of dollars poured into the region since 11 September 2001 have produced few significant results while untold amounts have conveniently ended up in the hands of elites. Yet America persistently proclaims success and progress. This is what I have defined as compromised democracy, pervasive throughout the foreign policy of the United States government as it justifies its fight against terror. The Ferghana Valley has become a perfect nexus for harboring radicals, either in groups or as individuals: the borders between the three states are still porous and poorly guarded. The valley itself remains a largely ungoverned region where secret unfettered movement from city to city and country to country

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remains easy. The classic terrorist cell system, small and isolated from each other to prevent intelligence penetration, has only deepened in the valley since 11 September 2001, not weakened. The Ferghana Valley has long been a transnational conduit for narcotics and slave smuggling. Transforming these conduits so that they can also effectively allow for the flow of radical Islamists is not difficult. If Osama bin Laden wanted to remain forever hidden, he should have fled north from Afghanistan to the valley, where the United States does not have as much access while the local regimes use blunt but inefficient methods to antagonize Muslims. Hiding in the valley away from international eyes is easier because of the repressive hold the local regimes pretend to maintain over their sovereign territory. It may appear paradoxical, but the fact of the matter is that they may repress the valley but they do not hold it. At the moment, American diplomacy appears to live in a bubble. The United States is impervious to understanding that Uzbek, Tajik, and Kyrgyz repression against Islam does not just damn those regimes. Since 11 September 2001, a dramatic shift has occurred in public perception within the valley that sees the United States as a partner in that repression. Poor oppressed peoples never see coincidence. They see conspiracy. The American government would do well to remember that when it sends its diplomats abroad to give speeches proclaiming progress. Local populations in Central Asia see and experience nothing but degradation and worsening conditions. Talking the talk without walking the walk will ultimately be disastrous for the United States in its ability to win the war against terror. Slavish commitment to the utility of short-term strategy compromises longterm success over the same strategic interest. While I do not doubt the sincerity of polished diplomats like Craner, Jones, Karen Hughes, Rice, and Donald Rumsfeld, American security suffers dire consequences when our leaders ignore fatal contradictions in American diplomacy, when they speak of progress and advancement that does not exist. All Muslims in the Ferghana Valley carry the burden of these contradictions. 15. Conclusion: Blindly Building New Bin Ladens When the United States allows democratic principles to be undermined in areas already sensitive to radical Islamic thought and then goes on to proclaim success in establishing a foundation for democratic principles, it practices imperfect diplomacy. This inconsistency only helps fuel Muslim disgust toward American ideals and values. Such imperfect diplomacy mutates into flawed democracy when compromises are falsely trumpeted as the causes of progress. This mutation helps undermine the global war on terror not just today but generationally. Everyone knows a final end to terrorism is impossible. Terrorists will always exist. Yet the inescapable truth of these realities is not a justifiable rationale for

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tolerating policy that creates future terrorists and provides them with damning evidence that justifies acting against the United States. Conditions of poverty, repression, censorship, corruption, and injustice lead to radicalization. Unfortunately, American engagement with the Ferghana states has not lessened these qualities. In many ways, this engagement has brought about their intensification. Yet America has not acted against this heinous coincidence and has spoken out against it only weakly and lamely. It does this because it stubbornly adheres to the misplaced thinking that a short-term betrayal of true democracy abroad is sometimes necessary for making sure terror does not strike at home. This thinking is not necessary or acceptable because it is wrong. Duplicity and selfishness have long been common characteristics in foreign-policy development; one only need read Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince (1640) to know just how long such subterfuge has been implicitly if not explicitly endorsed by the international community. The problem elaborated here is that our duplicity and selfishness do not accomplish our security objectives. As Machiavelli wrote, if it were possible to be a beacon of hope and justice and have all of the people love you while maintaining power and security, then it would be best to be such a beacon. The problem for Machiavelli was his reality did not appear to provide many such opportunities to be positive and powerful. The United States needs to realize that long-term victory in the global war against terror is the opportunity that Machiavelli deemed unlikely: an opportunity where the steadfast commitment to justice and liberty, without any space for hypocrisy or contradiction, succeeds in achieving greater success and gaining greater security. We should not ignore the short-term temptations intrinsic to this war for the long-term strategies that will ultimately produce the greatest results. The United States is best served by being both positive and powerful. The American betrayal of democracy is not just a betrayal of the people of the Ferghana Valley and all those in places like it. The betrayal of democracy is a betrayal of the very essence of American hegemony. It destroys the one filament that could arguably light and justify American dominance: unilateralism would be acceptable if it was selflessly committed for the true betterment of others. Hegemony would be allowable if people employed it to sincerely expand the principles of freedom, liberty, prosperity, dignity, and justice. This type of unilateral hegemonic power would be capable of gaining world acquiescence because it would not be about American interests but about human interests. What can bring victory over terror is a belief by the world community that this truly is America’s motivation and its inspiration. That belief only comes when the world community consistently sees the United States walk the talk it so eloquently proclaims about liberal democracy. But this is not American hegemony today nor is it the end result of American unilateralism. Convenient strategic pragmatism infuses American foreign policy and allows the United States government to justify and rationalize its excesses and failures. This is a refutation of the true American ideal. It is a rejection of the

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purpose American ideology was supposed to serve in the global arena. It is not too late to correct this policy flaw. Before we can correct it, one thing is certain: both diplomatically and scholarly America must stop ignoring the signs that it is blindly building new Bin Ladens.

WRAP-UP OF PART ONE Matthew Crosston Part One opened to the reader some of the daunting problems facing the global community in the twenty-first century regarding international security. Laura Meder shows that in some ways, the global community does not help itself. The need for an expanded, broader definition of global security is essential due to the expanding and ever-broadening problems that jeopardize peace and stability. Presently, the world community recognizes these problems but has not yet formally incorporated them into an accepted definition of security. This continuing failure carries potentially radical consequences. Resolution cannot be achieved without recognition. States in the international system today are still slow to consider that water may ultimately eclipse oil as the major resource causing death and destruction. Conflict due to migration may emerge more often due to scarcity of food instead of ethnic cleansing or discriminatory practices of governments. The interdependence of the global economy can become not just a positive source for increasing prosperity but a negative source that threatens prosperity as the reckless decisions of some states cause environmental catastrophes in neighboring states. None of these potentialities are inevitable. But Meder correctly admonishes that they will be inevitable if we as a community continue to compartmentalize these as “green” issues without recognizing them as inextricably related to peace, stability, violence, and security. Perhaps more disturbing, the United States, the leading state in the global community regarding international security, is currently pursuing a policy capable of collapsing under the weight of its inconsistencies and contradictions. This is particularly disheartening because of the unique diplomatic and policy weight carried by the United States and its continued effort to have the international community see it as the guiding force for global security. Many states do not agree with the paths that the United States chooses, but they do not have the military, economic, or diplomatic independence prerequisite to act as a true counterweight or offer any credible alternative paths. The long-term answer to establishing security lies in freedom, liberty, prosperity, dignity, and justice. Societies strongly imbued with these characteristics possess the tools to help ensure security in other states and create a truly transnational network of stability. On the contrary, the United States compromises long-term victory by blindly following traditional strategies of realpolitik, fueled by self-interested realism. This steadfast adherence to outdated narrative impedes the development of new approaches and definitions and all but stymies innovation in twenty-first

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century security. If we continue such practices, we become a source for a potentially fatal political sin. The ultimate potential consequence of these failings is quite stark: the collapse of the global system as it is presently constituted. Many past societies and empires have collapsed because of a failure to recognize how they were causing irreversible damage to the environment that sustained them. The economic and technological advances made by the global community today have created wealth never before seen. The long-term damage this wealthproduction has caused to our environment and whether we have the opportunity to catch and reverse the long-term damage in time to ensure human sustainability is already in doubt. The inability to reverse the damage could very well be the most pressing security issue facing all states in the coming century. These dim prospects do not improve when we consider the world’s only superpower. Most world hegemons never consider their own downfall. They consider threats only from external sources as superpowers are confident that their systems and regimes are impervious to instability and collapse. Historically, we see that all hegemons have evinced this attitude. They were never prepared for a downfall caused by flaws and mistakes internal to their systems. While worrying about this ultimate Armageddon at the moment might appear to be premature, world conditions are worth watching: America’s downfall may not come at the hands of terrorists, but it can come because of the hypocrisy and contradictions created while fighting those terrorists. Part One aims to set up the remaining chapters of the volume while offering a glimmer of hope. It is not yet too late to correct the global community’s that threaten security. We recognize all the issues and have understood the parameters for quite awhile. What we need to do now is to begin to think in more innovative and non-traditional ways. In a post-9/11 world, real and uncompromised commitment to global security must no longer be considered a secondary priority compared with short-term strategy. Especially this area of concentration must no longer be considered a haven only for idealists.

Part Two SELF VERSUS OTHER; “US” VERSUS “THEM”

INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO Karen Lombardi The key to Section Two is the word versus. The chapters in this section all address dichotomies that create opposition or conflict between and within self and other. That dividing line may be the nation-state versus the global community, as Kevin C. M. Benson’s “Deterring Terror” addresses. Or it may be the paradox of religion, as Randall E. Osborne, Paul Kriese, and Friedman so eloquently explore in “Love and Hate as Moral Imperatives,” which simultaneously unites all mankind and divides it into smaller and smaller groups, each of which may believe it possesses a moral imperative to conquer or destroy the spirits of others. It may be the conflicts within the self that form the basis of a sense of enmity for the Other, as Anrè Venter explores through the lens of social psychology in “Self versus Other.” The individual’s unconscious psychic mechanisms of identification and disavowal may contribute to the misidentification and vilification underlying the hatred or lack of human feeling for members of groups other than our own. Karen Lombardi examines these issues in “The Psychology of Group Membership and Alienation.” Paradoxically, Terri A. Karis reveals to us that the refusal to acknowledge or lacking awareness of difference perpetuates the psychology of whiteness in a presumably post-racist society. In reading these chapters written from the perspective of different disciplines and focusing on different contents, the reader is likely to be impressed by the similarities they share. Each author struggles to understand and elucidate the mechanisms that contribute to problematic divisions among us, and to suggest possibilities for facing and overcoming those divisions. On a global political level, Benson addresses the necessity for the global community to work together in order to deter terrorism. Positive deterrence requires the cooperation of the global community, which must overcome the particular interests of nation-states. Osborne, Kriese, and Friedman explore the paradoxes of religion, which at best afford security and meaning to our lives and at worst serves as a justification for hate and torture of religious groups other than ours. By way of example, he cites the Crusades, the Inquisition, and current examples of violent struggle between Muslims and Jews, and Sunni and Shiite in the Middle East. Venter looks to our concept of the self as a basis for conflict, pointing out that the propensity for conflict is rooted in the individual level, which then transfers to the group level. The idea that the self is an enclosed instrument with the capability for control and understanding leads us to an illusion of false uniqueness that serves as a justification for atrocities inflicted on others perceived as different from ourselves— a form of acting out our internal conflicts. Lombardi points to the unconscious mechanisms of projective identification, dissociation,

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and denial, which allow us to vilify in others those feelings or attributes within ourselves that we have failed to integrate. Projecting internal psychology onto a cultural landscape, Karis points to the danger of denying differences if we are to defeat racism. She urges us to abandon the false sense of unity created by the myth that no difference exists between Black and White. Dichotomies such as “us” versus “them,” “individual” versus “collective,” “love versus hate,” “self” versus “other,” “black” versus “white,” “terror” versus “safety,” and “separation” versus “connection” are complex issues that have been with us for centuries and which do not suggest easy solutions. In contemporary society, the search for solutions becomes more urgent than ever before. As the world has changed and it has become increasingly “smaller” through advances in transportation and technology, we have become increasingly interdependent on one another. These advances, which we might view as progressive, also have a terrifying capability for destructiveness. We no longer have the space to live in small groups or insulated from each other. That we address the destructiveness of divisiveness while leaving room for the progressive and creative development of individuality has become increasingly urgent. Perhaps we need to question the concept of individuality. The uniqueness and separation that individuality implies may in itself become a dangerous prospect when the value (and the inescapable reality) of connectedness through recognition of our similarity weakens. The difficult work that this section presents us is how we can preserve the interesting aspects of our individuality and our particular group identities without falling into the toxic trap of overvaluing ourselves and undervaluing, or dehumanizing, the Other. The Other, after all, is a part of ourselves that we have failed to integrate. These failures are what make us enemies to each other as well as to ourselves.

Three LOVE AND HATE AS MORAL IMPERATIVES: RELIGIOUS PARADOX AS A CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL SECURITY Randall E. Osborne, Paul Kriese, Stan Friedman Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you. Matthew 5:43 And if a stranger stays with you in your land, you shall do him no wrong. The stranger that stays with you shall be to you as the home born among you, and you shall love him as you love yourself; for you were strangers in the land of Egypt. The Torah, Leviticus 19:33–34 Let there be no compulsion in religion. Qu’ran, Surah 2, verse 256 To the Christians of Najran and its neighbouring territories, the security of God and the pledge of Mohammed the Prophet, the Messenger of God, are extended for their lives, their religion, their land, their property, to their caravans, their messengers and their images. Prophet Mohammed, Code of Conduct issued to followers in Najran 1. Introduction As we survey the history of humanity, avoiding religious paradox is difficult. Religion provides some of the most transcendent language and symbolism, and we readily encounter lives transformed within that context. Yet, we also find territorial markers of hate: a gruesome description of torturing Jews during the Spanish Inquisition and Crusades, reports of recent violence from the HinduMoslem conflict in India, the ever-present strikes and counter-strikes in the Middle East, ethnic strife in Bosnia, Genocide in Rwanda, individuals in the United States such as David Koresh or Randy Weaver, and the “war on terror” that started with the attacks of 11 September 2001. More subtle, perhaps, would be stories of children forced to perform noxious tasks because “idle hands are the

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devil’s tools,” parents who hit children out of a fear that “to spare the rod spoils the child,” or the subordination and beating of women because “God has willed it so.” As disturbing as any act of hate-based violence and harm may be, religiously motivated hate has something even more disturbing about it. We have a hard time squaring attitudes or acts of religious hatred with the transcendent texts that define most religions. Justifying hatred and implementing cruelty in the name of religion and God creates a very puzzling paradox. This religious paradox is often apparent even in the texts themselves. In the Christian Bible, for example, we have numerous stories of the compassion and love Jesus shared with others, and contrasting examples of intolerance (even hatred) such as Jesus angrily chasing the moneychangers out of the temple! In another section of the Bible, lions devour the non-believers. For the purposes of this chapter, we define religion as “a group of relatively unified practices and beliefs related to approaching, delineating, producing or understanding what may be considered divine, sacred (literally, “set apart”) or transcendent dimensions of reality.” Please note that throughout this chapter we use the term “God” as a generic term to reference belief in a deity and not, necessarily, a Christian one. A distinction can (even needs to) be made between thinking about religion in an absolute way which provides absolute answers (such as the assumption that absolute truths, absolute right, absolute wrong exist) and thinking about religion as a series of choices that individuals must make (Mitchell, 2007; Shaw, 2005; Spencer, 2000). We can view religions’ guides for how we might make those choices (Catholic Answers, 2005; St. Thomas Aquinas, 1989; Thistlewaite, 2003). For example, according to Catholic Answers (2005), an act that might otherwise be interpreted as “evil” or “unjust” can be defined as “just” under three conditions: (1) the action itself is not intrinsically evil, (2) evil must be an unanticipated side-effect of the act not the reason for the act itself, and (3) the effect of the evil must not outweigh the effect of the good. When religion is used to promote (or justify) absolutes, individuals are not “free” to choose because “right” ways and “wrong” ways to do things are clearly defined. When religion is viewed as a series of choices, then it can be perceived as entering more freely into human thought and, therefore, human behavior. As we will explore later, religion viewed as absolute is appealing because it reduces or eliminates ambiguity. On the other hand, the greater the ambiguity, the greater the tolerance for diversity and the lower the potential for religious-based hatred. As we will also discuss later, too much ambiguity can create discomfort (even dread) that may prompt individuals to seek solace in absolutes and the cycle starts over.

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2. Religion as Narrative of Meaning Religion permeates many, if not all, facets of human existence. For believers and non-believers alike, religion is present often without our knowing it. Religion provides one of the bases for the state’s interest in marriage, and justifies tax credits for contributions to our churches. In our homes, it can infuse daily life with a sense of the sacred, and some use it to justify spousal and child abuse. It comforts many persons experiencing grief, and it provides rituals for dealing with the death of loved ones. Religious beliefs may influence whom we choose to marry and the way in which we formalize marriage (such as marriage in the Quaker tradition in which the members of a couple marries themselves with the Meeting looking on and approving of the marriage). It can influence how we structure our family, what we do with our money, and with whom we should have, or when we should refrain from sex. We may also incorporate religious belief into our self-perception, which may greatly influence our sense of personal worth. The influence of religion in our lives is almost endless, even if we do not adhere to an organized religion. Most importantly, religious beliefs (or an explicit rejection thereof) may provide a context from which we attempt to comprehend why our lives unfold as they do. As we try to understand events that appear inexplicable from the vantage point of everyday reality, we often willingly shift to a perspective that purports to give a larger perspective from which we can make sense of nonsense, a context that can provide comfort and certainty in the face of uncertainty and indeterminism. The greater the ambiguity in what we perceive in our lives (or the more insecure we feel in relationship to events happening in the world), the greater may be the pull for a system (of symbols) that provides structure and meaning to the amorphous glob we (quite glibly) label “reality.” The greater the ambiguity in our lives, the more comforting a religious view that provides absolutes might be. One implication of such a tendency is a construct called “Worldview Defense,” which we shall explore later in this chapter (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon et al., 1990). Language, the carrier of the story of our lives, is in some ways the ultimate social arbitrator (or scorekeeper). We use language to keep track of others and ourselves. Once we attach a linguistic symbol to a perception, the making of meaning is well underway—in the process of being “set” or irreversible. Merlin Donald suggests that the most elevated use of language in tribal society is what he calls “mythic invention,” the construction of (a) model(s) of the human universe. Essentially all cultures, regardless how “primitive” or unchanging, hold myths about how the world was created, why we are born, and why we die. Other stories encapsulate shared ideas and the history of the tribe (1991, pp. 213–214). In many such societies, the myths are so important and powerful that they are publicly mentioned only rarely, and often only by the initiated—and only at an appointed time. In contemporary societies, more commonly, all are initiates and anyone may talk about our myths in public space at any time.

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The move from individual narrative to larger myth entails integrating (or connecting) our personal episodes into larger stories using special (sacred) symbols. For example, we can feel blessed by God, or say that we have good Karma, as opposed to just feeling lucky. The story essentially gives shape to and embodies our experience, and connects us to a system of meaning beyond the self. This connection beyond self makes us feel part of something that is “bigger” than us, and, therefore, makes us feel less isolated, less alone. It helps us combine many apparently unrelated episodes of our lives into a coherent tapestry of meaning woven from the often frightening and apparently meaningless threads of life. “Myth is the inevitable outcome of narrative skill and is the supreme organizing principle” (ibid., p. 258). Assuming that seeking a sense of purpose and coherence and searching for answers to difficult questions, or sharing a meaningful symbol system with other human beings, are potentially noble endeavors, then where and how do toxic elements enter the search? In attempting to answer that question, we must carefully navigate the terrain of the religious quest and to distinguish the legitimate search from the path of camouflaged cruelty. Our concern is to recognize that people use religion to cover the fear that they have of the unknown. People translate their own idea of good and bad and then create a deity that agrees. But these practices must include a higher power or deity. Consider Marxism to understand this point. Marxism focused on a transcendent understanding of history but had no God. As such, we would not define it as a religion. Religion as a symbol system, as a narrative of (or providing) meaning, may offer a vision of what the world should be like, dictating how we must act to transform the world to what it could or should be. Religious beliefs and practices also dictate how to relate to God, and even more importantly perhaps, how to receive divine blessings. Religion is also a means of keeping or bringing the world back into perspective, particularly after a loss or traumatic event or after an event that does not “make sense,” often literally. In this sense, religious beliefs function as an attribution system: persons make attributions regarding the “why” of life and world events within a frame of religious beliefs. This framework provides a way to answer the question why something has happened. Where beliefs and rituals are held in common by a group, they often provide a most powerful, unifying glue to bind the group together. While our “working definition” of religion easily includes Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and other “mainline” religions, it could easily encompass non-mainstream systems of meaning as well, including those that get branded as “cults.” As an excellent example, see Let Us Now Praise Famous Men (Agee and Walker, 1941). A key criterion of religion as a cultural system is that a group of persons share a common set of symbols, embedded in story, that binds them together as a group and that they perceive as connecting them to reality—natural or supernatural (Edelman, 1964; Eliade, 1963; Ricoeur, 1967). By story or myth, we refer to the presence of a symbol system, without presuming to judge the veracity of its

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content. Seeking meaning through stories appears to be an essential component of the human condition. Literally hundreds of examples include: (1) the Jewish Midrash, (2) Christian parables, (3) Native American stories, and (4) African American “Uncle Remus” stories. People encapsulate experience in story as a way to provide coherence, order, and meaning to what they might otherwise experience as little more than random and unrelated sensory events. Through story, we can move from “mere” experience to the experience of understanding. When life events or issues are significant, but ambiguous or devoid of directly verifiable answers, then an individual may be more likely to imbue his or her story with more powerful and evocative symbols. The power of the story must rise to the level of the life domain it narrates. The stories that religions tell are inevitably complex, and the characters that inhabit the stage are necessarily larger than life (such as the Sacraments). What we are saying is that those who share religious views and those who hear them often ignore or minimize the complexity of religion (such as the reality that there could be more than one-way of viewing things) is often ignored or minimized by those sharing the religious views and those hearing them. This is, in many ways, the heart of the issue. After all, religious stories are concerned with creation, salvation, and eternal destiny, while they simultaneously draft a moral blueprint that purportedly depicts the architecture of the universe. This blueprint tells us—mere mortals—how we should live “on the ground” as well as “in heaven.” Religious story as it pertains to morality—to definitions of good and evil, right and wrong, love and hate, how to act—is most central to this inquiry. To the extent that persons rely on particular religious narratives to navigate a choppy and uncharted moral sea, we must understand how that reliance can lead us to “love or comfort” our “enemies,” or to “hate and kill in the name of God.” How can we understand when we hear paradoxical phrases such as “a Just War” or see paradoxical behavior like an Army Chaplain praying for the destruction of the enemy? The following is an example of the complexity of a behavioral blueprint. How do we decide if we should kill a person who kills someone else? We could use the “eye for an eye” text from the Talmud (the application of the “word” to the real world in which we live) to support capital punishment, but among western nations, only the United States and Israel appear to interpret the myth as answering the question in the affirmative. How do we understand and justify differences in wealth? The defining myth of capitalism is that the accumulation of capital is “good” not only for business, but also for individuals (see for example, Max Weber’s “Protestantism and the Spirit of Capitalism,” 1904; or Horatio Alger’s “Bound to Rise,” 1873). The myth renders with great specificity an answer to the question: What is an individual to do with its life? The reply of the capitalist narrative is that we should pursue the accumulation of wealth. The myth provides a loftier, more noble motive for accumulating wealth than simple greed: people use the myth to argue that the capitalist system affords the best and most efficient way to distrib-

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ute goods and services to people in need. From the Bible, we see that Abraham and Isaac have many goods; the implication is that God gave these to them as rewards or blessings. One aspect of the myth is that persons profiting from the capitalist system have accumulated wealth that they then willingly distributed to those in need, to a wide range of individual and social causes. Here, a person accumulates wealth, which, through spending, will trickle down and benefit others. Some have used the same myth to justify the abuse of migrant and sweat shop garment workers, environmental terrorism, and a general sacrifice of the many for the benefit of the few—a grossly inequitable distribution of wealth. This is not to say that capitalism justifies abuse, but it defines it differently from other systems—to pay someone as little as possible is not abuse—just “good business.” Or employers might pay more so they can have reliable workers to increase profit. As another example, consider toxic waste dumps in the United States. We doubt it is purely coincidental that many such dumps are in or near communities of color. Connecting religious myth to nation, or economic system may result in an unchallenged vision of good which may become so widespread as to give it the appearance of unanimity and more importantly, blessing from God. As such, it becomes something accepted and not to be questioned. As God’s chosen people, why should we not enjoy the lion’s share of the world’s resources? Consider American coinage. The stamping of “In God we Trust” on our currency is not coincidental. It suggests that God somehow sanctions our economic system. It suggests that our economic system is, somehow, sanctioned by God. We can find an excellent example of this type of thinking in Rudyard Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden” (1899). In this poem, Kipling calls for the United States to adopt an expansionist agenda as Britain and other European nations had done. Kipling seems to describe this expansion as a moral imperative. But when we look at economic issues from a more detached perspective, we need to face this fact: the 500 wealthiest individuals in the world now control more resources than the combined wealth of the poorest one-half—over 3 billion—of the world’s population. We must remember that a capitalist system does not consider this distribution “bad.” But other systems of meaning may interpret our system as evil. Because we view our system as right and, perhaps, Godgiven—hence it provides us with positive meaning—while others may view it as evil, great potential for conflict exists. How is it that systems of meaning that proclaim, “do unto others as you would have them do to you,” can also produce outcomes such as crusades, pogroms, witch hunts, and civil wars? How is it possible to use religion to justify the killing even of persons who reside under the same umbrella of faith, such as the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin by fellow Jews in 1995, the cycle of slaughter by Protestants and Catholics in Ireland, or the syphilis experiments on African American male inmates in the American South during the 1950s, or the ongoing conflicts between Shi’a and Sunnis? How do persons, who cognitively believe religious narratives that suggest an “equality” of all persons before the eyes of

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God, participate in narrative systems and actions that result in gross inequalities in the world? How do people instructed to “love thine enemies” support national bombing campaigns to eradicate their enemies? In short, how and why do persons who ascribe to religious systems that teach love as a moral imperative produce or participate in so many tableaus of hate? Research on (self and) identity suggests that individuals develop a “personal identity”—our sense of our own attributes and a “social identity”—our sense of which groups define who we are (Hogg, 2003). Omar may think of himself as “honest” (a personal identity) and as a “Christian” (a social identity). Social identity theory discusses the implications of social identity for our interactions with and assumptions about other people (Turner, 1985). Social identity theory suggests we: (1) categorize—we find it helpful (we might be perceived as having a need) to place people and objects into categories, (2) identify—we align ourselves with groups and gain identity and self-esteem from it, and (3) compare—we compare ourselves to others. Those groups with which we identify are called “ingroups,” while those we compare ourselves to can be considered “outgroups” (Turner 1985). John C. Turner (ibid.) suggests that we have a tendency to positively define the groups with which we identify so we can more positively evaluate ourselves. This leads to a self-serving bias: if we assign a positive value to “our” groups (ingroups), we are likely to do so by assigning negative value to the groups with which we do not identify (outgroups). If we are good, they must be bad. Our “being good” becomes the cognitive anchor and the other, therefore, must be bad. Most people rate themselves above average on most dimensions— something the social psychologists call the “better-than-most effect.” This appears to be held, for example, for fairness (Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, and Samuelson, 1985), happiness (Lykken and Tellegen, 1996), and satisfaction in personal relationships (Buunk and van den Eijnden, 1997). Jonathan D. Brown and Chihiro Kobayashi (2002) suggest that this tendency to assume that we are betterthan-most extends to members of our social self such that we believe that members of our families, our friends, and our ingroups are also “better-than-most.” The tendency to compare self to others, to judge self-qualities or self-worth, is known as “social comparison” (Festinger, 1954). Osborne (1996) suggested that individuals may sometimes compare themselves to others whom they believe to be “inferior” to feel “superior.” Herein lies the problem. Such strategies can lead to horrible outcomes for others but they make the individual feel better. As such, negative outcomes do not trouble most individuals. Human beings are highly motivated to feel positively about themselves (Sedikides, 1993). Social identity theory explains how self-concept is structured and how it functions (Brewer and Weber, 1994). An extension of social identity theory— self-categorization theory (Brewer and Gardner, 1996; Turner, Hogg, Oakes et al., 1987)—suggests that three general levels of self vary with the degree of infusion of a person’s individuality or uniqueness: (1) the superordinate level— self as a human being (“we’re all more alike than we are different”), (2) social

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identity—categorization of self based on ingroup and outgroup distinctions (“we are Americans and they are not”), and the personal identity level—categorization of self as unique even in comparison to other ingroup members (“I am more patriotic than most Americans”). Research on self-serving motives suggests at minimum three self-motives may explain under what conditions individuals are likely to boost self by denigrating others: when we are motivated by self-knowledge—we want to know who we are (Dunning, 1999); when we are motivated to verify our selfconcepts—when we are trying to confirm that we are who we think we are (Swann, Rentfrow, and Guinn, 2003); and when we are motivated to selfenhance—to put ourselves in as positive of light as possible (Sedikides, 1993). Research also shows that individuals are more likely to engage in comparisons with others that result in denigrating others (or the groups to which they belong) under two conditions: (1) when one is highly loyal to the group (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje, 2002); and (2) when the outgroup is disliked or portrayed negatively (Duck, Hogg, and Terry, 2000). When research results on social identity, self-categorization, and selfmotives is taken together, we sense a self-motive “tug-of-war” with profound implications for behavior. Research on optimal distinctiveness theory suggests, for example, two opposing affiliation motives within us all (Brewer, 1991). Like many other motives (or even physiological drives), we seek balance between the desire to “fit in” and the desire to stand out—”optimal distinctiveness.” Because these motives operate in direct opposition to each other, satisfying one sends a signal that a deficit exists in the other. We can apply this opposition to many forms of relationships or affiliations from the individual level (Brewer, 1991; Pickett, Bonner, and Coleman, 2002) to the inter-group level (Brewer and Gardner, 1995; Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis, 2002). Another example is Cynthia Carr’s Our Town (2005) that depicts how people can be married to Klan members, yet disagree with their politics and methods. Applying this theory to religious affiliations appears to be an appropriate extension. It appears to be logical that events, ideological dialogues, and stated beliefs in another religion that dialectically oppose ours would cause us to champion our different views because that would make us stand out. At the same time, we are motivated to find the commonalities—to fit in—but only until we reach some balance. This theory would predict an effort between people with opposing views to find common ground but not at the expense of “keeping our differences.” If someone tries too hard to make their religious views (assuming they are from a different religion) fit ours, the distinctiveness of our religion is threatened, and we are motivated to find and, perhaps, champion our perceived differences. An interesting example of this principle is the practice of “keeping up the hedge,” in which some sects of the modern Quaker church attempt to maintain the “purity” of the sect by only socializing with, or encouraging members to marry someone from within the sect (Cooper, 1991).

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With competition (such as competition for attention, media time, or resources), individuals show a heightened sensitivity to inter-group distinctions and an enhanced tendency to perceive an entire social category as a single entity—thus minimizing any individual differences of group members and maximizing perceived differences between one’s ingroup and relevant outgroups (Brewer and Harasty, 1996; Brewer, Weber, and Carini, 1995). When the competition ends and the threat extinguished, then individuals are motivated to again maximize their uniqueness (both individually and within the group) in line with optimal distinctiveness theory. We have no reason to believe that religious categorizations would not follow these same patterns. As such, world events that foster competition between groups with particularly strong religious ideologies are likely to result in perceptions of threat and initiate worldview defensiveness along religious lines. To the extent that religion is about morality and differences (for example, who will go to heaven), then competition will lead to the rejection and demonizing of other religions. By demonizing the “other,” we can alleviate our anxiety about our divine future and justify harmful acts perpetrated against the other. Terrorists use the perception of Americans as evil and animalistic, for example, to recruit youth in the Middle East to do things like fly planes into the New York City World Trade Center. They perceive religious hatred as just because they perceive the “other” as less than human (Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski, 2004). Obviously some identity-related issues predict where people fall on the continuum of love and hate (whether one uses religious myth to promote love or to justify hate). Threats to self and identity can prompt psychological and physical retaliatory attacks on others designed to reestablish the positive sense of personal and social identity that human beings value. Our sense that others should see things the way we do, or value the same things we value, may explain such paradoxical comments as Laura Bush’s statement that while the poor are always the main victims of natural disasters, it is just the way things are. “This is what happens when there’s a natural disaster of this scope,” the First Lady said. “The poorer people are usually in the neighborhoods that are the lowest or the most exposed or the most vulnerable. Their housing is the most vulnerable to natural disaster. And that is just always what happens” (Grieves, 2005). Although there are many examples of such paradoxes within human interaction, we want to consider those examples where the ingroup to (or with) which one is aligned is defined as a religion. 3. Love and Hate: The Crucible of Reality The arguments we are advancing should not lead a reader to conclude that we perceive religion in toto as responsible for hate and enmity. To the contrary, that so many religious narratives include the theme of love as a moral imperative leads us to juxtapose religion and the question of hate. Put another way, if persons who structure their lives according to narratives wherein love is obligatory

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still participate readily in acts of hate, must we conclude that no alternative to hate exists? Consider an example from the crucible of life. Many religious, self-proclaimed “holy” people have contributed to the culture of hatred against homosexuals. For example, during the first week of November 1999, the brutal murderer of Matthew Shepherd, a gay student, was convicted of murder in the second-degree. In another case, shortly after “apologizing” for decades of institutionalized racism, for instance, the Southern Baptists officially turned to a systematic persecution of the homosexual assemblage of society—even calling for a boycott of Disney, a company that had adopted non-discriminatory policies regarding sexual orientation. This boycott remained in place until 2005. The level of ridicule reached almost comic proportion in February of 1999, when a self-designated “moral majority” leader, Reverend Jerry Falwell, even attacked cartoon characters on the basis that they evidenced homosexual attributes! Commonly, traditionally marginalized individuals (groups), for example, decry racism on the one hand, but participate in gaybashing using the Bible as a source of “data” on the other. However, there is more to the story than just the paradoxical behavior of “religious” individuals or those who have been victims of marginalization themselves. Sometimes religion may lead people to practice what they preach—to try to end the cycle of hate, to accept fallibility in others. The father of the murdered gay student, experiencing not only the anguish inherent in the loss of his son, but also the hurt accompanying the knowledge of the grim cruelty of the murder, was allowed to address the jury during the sentencing phase of the trial. Instead of arguing for the death penalty, as do many family members of murder victims, Shepherd’s father argued against it—citing his religious beliefs as his motivation. While acknowledging that part of him wanted the murderer to die for what he had done, his religious story (and the beliefs he held based on that story)— based on biblical themes of forgiveness and reconciliation—led him to intervene on the behalf of the murderer of his son. History shows us other such examples. During World War II, Quaker individuals worked against the Nazi’s acts but at the same time called for the Nazis to be treated as human beings. During this same time period (1999), another story broke, which told of a businessman who had earned a large sum of money after making an initial public offering for his company. Unlike others in his position, he did not retain the profits solely for himself. He declared that his 550+ employees had produced the wealth and he distributed over one-hundred million dollars equally among them. In doing so, he demonstrated a most charitable orientation to life, an orientation embedded within a capitalistic story. Here, we face a paradox—a contradiction. The power of myth, especially the religious myth, can apparently activate the highest and the lowest qualities within human beings. Even the same myth, like the narrative surrounding the figure of Jesus, is used on the one hand to justify the hating of homosexuals, while on the other hand to call for forgiveness of those persons engaged in those acts of hate. Hulsey and Frost (2004) have coined the phrase, “moral cruelty”

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(Hulsey and Frost, 2004) to describe a particular vintage of hate: hate-motivated cruelty performed under or in a moral cloak. Examples include the hatred of homosexuals “because they are an abomination unto God” as well as violence against persons of other faiths “because they are infidels.” We perceive those individuals who forgive those whom engage in hate, even after they have murdered someone’s son—as actually embodying the message to which they cognitively ascribe: love as a moral imperative. As a result of mortality salience, any religious message that suggests we are “wrong” increases the need for us to defend our view of the world to reduce the anxiety associated with thinking of our existential vulnerability; this has been labeled terror management theory (for example, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon, 1999). The Middle East is, in many ways, paradoxical. Jews and Moslems have for centuries espoused, “love thy neighbor,” yet they also have exhibited many years of mutual hatred and slaughter in the name of God. Both groups have been victims of and victimized by the other. The Israeli Irgun and the Arab Palestinian Liberation Organization were founded to protect and advance their religious foundation. Each organization claims that the other is “evil,” yet both sides have been responsible for the death of innocent people. Each group has the right to survive. Both groups have claimed the right to fight against an enemy whom they see as the main reason for their insecurity. Neither side will trust the other, which is exactly what they need to create a political situation in which both groups can survive and prosper. Both sides maintain the instability of the situation. Each side is secure in its religious and moral explanation of why it cannot work with the other. Each side points to the “atrocities” of the other side as reference for the “morality” of their actions. Yet both religions, using some of the same biblical stories, preach feeding the stranger and love for their others. One allegory of the scorpion and the alligator, which comes to us from the Middle East, sums up this tragic moral reality: One day, a scorpion found itself on one side of a large river needing to cross to the other side. But scorpions hate water. As this dilemma unfolds, an alligator floats by and engages the scorpion in conversation. In the midst of this discussion, the alligator realizes that the scorpion needs to travel to the other side of the river. The alligator realizes that the scorpion is potentially deadly with its lethal stingers. So when the scorpion suggests that the alligator provide transport from one side of the river to the other side of the river, the alligator is not entirely eager to agree. The scorpion’s response to this fear is very reasonable. The scorpion suggests that for it to sting would be illogical, for to kill the alligator in the middle of the river would cause the scorpion to die also. The scorpion assures the alligator that it does not want to die in a watery grave. So the alligator agrees to transport the scorpion across the river. As the pair approaches the middle and the deepest part of the river, the scorpion stings the alligator. As the pair begins to sink into their watery grave, the alligator cries out

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in anguish. The scorpion has not only decreed a death warrant for the alligator, but has also just committed suicide. The alligator says that the scorpion’s actions make no sense for either of them. As they sink beneath the surface of the lake the scorpion’s last words are “I know, but I am a scorpion and this is what I do.” The story of the alligator and the scorpion may be the story of the Middle East. We might be able to understand the animosity between two separate groups even if they are historically biological cousins (Muslims and Israelis are ethnically come from Semitic stock). Though we might view the paradox as minor, consider a case in which two groups claiming the same religion deny the legitimacy of the other group and, at the same time, both groups obey the same general rules and obey the same definition of God. Both groups use the same biblical texts to justify their beliefs. They live side by side in the same geographical region but often ignore each other’s legitimacy. Both groups claim to be the only carrier of their faith’s legacy. No amount of political, economic, or military power has been able to create mutual space in which they can exist peacefully. Both sides claim exclusive legitimacy to the moral high ground, and both sides use religion to justify their slaughter of others whose only “sin” is being a member of the opposite religious group. The history of Islam in the Middle East is the story of the Sunni and Shi’a; both groups worship Allah and claim to be the only legitimate heirs of his major prophet, Muhammad. When each group determines how best to follow Muhammed’s teachings and how to act in public as the promoters of Islam, troubles begin. When Muhammad died, two possible successors to his leadership position emerged. The Sunni interpretation was that secular leaders who ruled the various Middle Eastern political realities inherited the mantle of authority. They looked to secular leaders to interpret Muhammad’s dictates. The clerics were significant but not omnipotent in their interpretation of Allah’s wishes for the faithful. The Shi’a interpretation could not have been more different. They argued that Muhammad was Allah’s voice on earth. Shi’a maintained that Muhammad was a religious leader who interpreted secular reality from within a religious context. They concluded that religious leaders were the only legitimate interpreters of Allah’s plans for the faithful. Secular leaders were to obey clerics’ (for example, the Mullahs and the Imams) interpretation of the Qur’an. Therefore, the religious establishment was to be the foundation for all secular activity. Sunnis and Shi’a have been locked in combat since Muhammad’s death. Both use the Qur’an as their foundation, and both justify their actions using the same holy text. The problem stems from the secular and religious leaders having fundamental disagreements about who holds the legitimate mantle of Islam. The violence in present day Iraq is a religious civil war with political, economic, and military overtones. This representation is admitedly overly simplified. We need also to consider tribal and ethnic issues. For the purposes of this chapter, however, we will keep it simple. The solutions will come only when we address the moral and religious debate between these two branches of Islam. Unfortunately, a solution may only come when so much life has been lost that

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some form of stalemate is reached. Precedent for such an outcome has already been seen elsewhere, such as that in Iran. 4. The Paradox of Certainty Karl Marx (1906) suggests that religion is the “opium of the masses” (“das Opium des Volkes”) and keeps them calm. If true, it is a palliative that functions in this manner: religion ameliorates the pain and anxiety stemming from the uncertainty of life, the certainty of death, and the ambiguous meaning of life and death. Plato’s Allegory of the Cave (1999) suggests that people are kept (or keep themselves) ignorant with an almost mystical view of “goodness.” Jeremy Bentham (1970/1789) suggests that we can empirically calculate good and evil and, hence, we can eliminate uncertainty and fear. But apparently, pain, anxiety, and uncertainty are necessary aspects of the world; without them we are unable to make true choices, or to develop character and integrity. This heightened desire to avoid existential anxiety and uncertainty, understandable though it may be, may be what most contributes to the sadistic facets of religion. Like the opiates, religion can be addictive. The addicted person is seldom aware of the effects of the addiction; it clouds the mind and tricks addicts into thinking they are coherent, into thinking everything is OK. But everything may not be OK. A school board in Central Texas, for example, recently appealed to the Supreme Court for the right to petition the “Supreme Being” prior to their high school football games. They couched this appeal in the language of “freedom of religion.” The reality may not be so simple. Any individual attending that event could, at any moment, choose to bow his or her head and pray. These Christians were actually asking for the right to force every individual attending their games to listen to the public broadcast of a Christian prayer. Were the issue truly “freedom of religion,” then presumably any person, of any faith, should also be allowed to broadcast a prayer—to Adonai, Allah, or some other deity. This is not what these individuals were arguing at all. They stated explicitly that they were arguing for the right to offer a Christian prayer (some would allow for JudeoChristian), because this is a Christian country. As another example, then United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower changed the Pledge of Allegiance during the 1950s to include the phrase “one nation, under God” because he believed that such an inclusion was self-evident. He could not conceive how anyone could believe otherwise. Apparently, most people believe that only one valid story can exist—for what I believe to be “real,” every divergent myth must have to be “false.” Divergent myths, to these people, should be eradicated. Some would argue that to eradicate the falsity—and by implication, those holding to the falsity—achieves a higher purpose. This dichotomy unveils one of the most delusional assumptions, not inherent in religion or myth making per se, but embedded in how many people choose to “hold” their narrative beliefs: the assumption that if a God

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exists, that God revealed itself to one group of individuals only. Consider the assumption that God is “male.” Many passages in the Bible suggest God could be female. For example, one passage compares God to a mother eagle taking care of her young. The Jewish Shekhinah (which means “presence of God” and references the feminine aspect of the holy trinity) is a feminine aspect of God. Many people ignore the contradiction because it does not conform to their already established assumption about what they want to see or believe. The world is divided into the ubiquitous two groups, “us” and “them,” and we begin indoctrinating children into this division early in life. The “is” can be defined as narrowly as “me” and we may allow great harm to come to others to protect ourselves. Nobel Peace Prize winner, Elie Wiesel provides an example of this proposition in his book Night (1982/1960); a father allows the Kapo to hit his son so the Kapo would not hit him. Other examples abound. In Bosnia, ethnic differences date back to the nineteenth century and are still used to fuel present-day conflict. Contemporary Tutsi/Hutu families still take revenge for long past slights and murders. Young Palestinians have to decide whether to die for Allah or whether to be a martyr. The “us versus them” mentality is usually implemented politically also, as we see in the Middle East, where people of different religions can be denied the right to vote, their having lived there throughout their entire lives. Ireland remains divided and people are still killed because they embrace variant narrative renderings of an identical source events—the fight for independence from Britain that started with the formation of the Irish Republican Army in 1916 (“Some History of conflict in Ireland,” 2002). This is another example of the complexity issue, British versus Irish political ideologies and wealth versus poverty. It appears that the tensions in Ireland have decreased as Ireland has become wealthier. Is our choice, then, one of adopting a myth of certainty, or facing life with no system of meaning at all? Not necessarily. Instead of offering a single, unambiguous answer to life itself, religion can and sometimes does offer a way to embrace life; it does not solve it in algorithmic fashion. In lived religion, people may discover a way of life instead of adopting a set of rules. Becoming part of a tradition, within which people can authentically grapple with life, can provide a significant context—a crucible for spiritual development. But if we fail to make the tradition ours, if we just accept what the ancients said—if we do not add our voice to the story—then the tension between life as we experience it and life as tradition has rendered it can easily lead to anger, to violence, to sadism. For example, how do we, in the twenty-first century, understand the idea that a disobedient child should be stoned to death, as the Torah proscribes? What does it mean to us today to turn the other cheek or to love one’s enemy? In what way shall the meek inherit the earth when faced with a neighborhood bully, or a tyrant hell-bent on genocide? Struggling with these questions and others like them requires that we keep our traditions alive and that we participate in the making of narrative—like the Talmud and its equivalent in other religions. The paradox, then, may be this: although some dimension of the human psyche may need clo-

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sure and certainty, another part of requires searching, an ongoing quest—optimal distinctiveness in terms of affiliation motives is but one, small example. 5. Resolving the Religious Paradox? What the West (particularly the United States) sees as military and political strife in much of the Arab world is a battle between two different versions of religious reality, Sunni and Shi’a interpretations of how to live out Islam’s dictates for the faithful in the world. The moral paradox is that neither side legitimates the other side’s interpretation of the same texts that both claim to be fundamental. They both use these texts to justify whatever activity in which they engage with regard to any other Muslims or any other individual. (For an excellent description of the Sunni/Shi’a discussion, see Nasr, 2007. For an excellent description of the Arab/Israeli discussion, see Hahn, 2004). In this vein, we see that a religious issue, with social, economic, and political aspects has devolved so that no one is able to talk about anything but the religious aspects. In complex times, we seek more basic explanations for crises and, if we use religion, compromising is more difficult, since the stakes are most important—our souls! The World is complex and we try to make things simpler. As such, the balance between the explained and mystery is crucial. In complex times, additional complexity from unexplained aspects of religion may be too much for us to bear. This could lead to a preference for the absolutes of religion and the clarity that this provides for how to act. Creation myths have great power. These myths develop contexts in which observant believers must live. These accepted realities pattern all daily existence and activity for the believers. We need to unravel or realize the dynamics involved in these myths to understand how to explore these realities. If people outside of these lived dynamics are unable to see the internal logic makes little difference. Only those inside the given realities must appreciate them. The difficulty is how to explain these dynamics to people in and outside these dynamics. One way to make these dynamics visible is to understand that believers think they are decreed by God or Allah and, therefore, must be accepted as reality. We can appreciate how other people live by these dynamics without ourselves being believers in their realty—just as the father of the murdered gay son forgave his son’s murderer. We do not have to believe what persons believe to accept the reality that they believe it. A crucial issue to consider here is the tendency to extend our narrative to others, in essence, to define the Other in terms of our narrative. This expands our sense of “we” by stealing the right of others to define themselves. Arabs and Israelis or Sunni and Shi’a would be better able to understand the Other if they could live in or perceive honestly that Other’s reality. If they do not accept the Other’s reality as legitimate, regardless how much they try to make a connection, it will never be strong enough to withstand the differences between them.

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Myth can communicate not only facts, but also feelings and values, often without our being explicitly aware of it. For example, a friend who knows that I am Jewish said, with no apparent sense of irony or intended cruelty, that a health problem I was having was “my cross to bear.” Although my friend may not be consciously aware of all layers of meanings of the Jesus myth (bearing the cross), it permeates her Christian culture and shapes her experience and her (Christian) actions. This tacit dimension of experience can cause difficulties when myths collide, for then we must answer the question which myth should prevail. As an example, consider the symbol of the International Red Cross, Red Crescent Organization. Most Americans would interpret the symbol as one of hope, and universal care. What many Westerners do not realize is that the red crescent is perceived as a symbol of repression by many Arab and Middle Eastern peoples. Another way of considering this is to focus on the concept of moral cruelty (perpetuation of hate within confines of moral narrative of love): a tendency to foist our myths and meanings onto others, by failing to perceive the diversity of myths through which human beings find meaning. By focusing on religious absolutes, we find ambiguity reduced, but so too is any tolerance for diversity also reduced. People often use narrative to resolve uncertainty, ambiguity, and to answer apparently unanswerable questions. The presence of competing myths “undoes” the resolution. Narrative or myth cannot resolve ambiguity when the presence of competing myths creates more ambiguity. Competing myths untie the package, which then unleash the existential dread we outlined as part of terror management theory and mortality salience. Popular American vernacular focuses on “tolerance.” Many appear to believe that tolerance is “as good as it gets” (Osborne, Baughn, and Kriese, 2007). But tolerance does not necessarily imply a positive emotion. We follow Thomas and Butler’s (2000) lead in defining tolerance as acceptance and openmindedness of different practices, attitudes, and cultures. Tolerance does not necessarily mean agreement with the differences. It implies an acknowledgement or an acceptance or respect, not necessarily an appreciation and usually consists of only surface level information. On the opposite end of the spectrum is “inclusiveness.” This can be defined as the practice of emphasizing our uniqueness in promoting the reality that each voice, when valued, respected, and expected to, will provide positive contribution to the community (ibid.). The problem is how to tolerate differences and uncertainty in the area where individuals want, need, and demand absolute certainty. Given the stakes, religious symbols are a matter of life versus death, or perhaps infinite afterlife versus nothingness. To deal with the uncertainty and the ambiguity, it becomes all too easy, psychologically, to convert a need for certainty (certainly within the ambiguity of an individual’s “myth”) into a representation of certainty. Having

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done so, however, every system of meaning that deviates from my own challenges the legitimacy of this “Truth.” Because death of my myth would mean death of my identity, now and forever, I am as likely to respond to an assault on my myth as forcefully (or more so) than an assault on my life. As I do so, I focus my attention on the rationale— preserving my system of meaning—not whether my response to “assault” is appropriate. With attention to moral justification high, emotional arousal high, and attention to what I am doing in the moment of response low, the formula for moral sadism is fully in place. I am highly energized to act (behavioral systems are activated) but those actions are not accompanied by much thought (cognitive systems are inhibited). Once we grasp fully this structure, the cruelty and sadism carried out in the name of God no longer surprises us. In like manner, losing a myth can be likened to losing identity. It can create a profound sense of loss, a confusion in what was an otherwise regulated and orderly world of meaning. The price to pay for the certainty and clarity that comes from uncritical and complete acceptance of one’s myth against all others is rigidity, a constraint on perception that causes one to potentially react with hostility or hate toward anyone whose myth threatens that certainty and clarity (Bentham, 1970/1789). To the extent this analysis is correct, then one corollary of the “certainty of my one way” assumption is an increased likelihood of moral sadism. We are very likely to harm others, feeling morally righteous, even holy, as we do so. During the eighteenth century, for example, United States’ soldiers killed young indigenous Americans because “nits breed nits” (Miller, 2001) and this would hurt the United States. The myth that the “other” is less than human justified—in the soldiers’ minds anyway—their killing the natives. The irony is that we may also be doing harm to ourselves by engaging in moral masochism. This same system of meaning, which began as a quest to unify threads of experience into a tapestry of meaning, has emerged as a straightjacket. Instead of serving in a liberating manner, wherein “the truth has set us free,” the myth has solidified the boundaries of meaning and caused us to be unable or unwilling to perceive things in any other way. Such boundaries create comfort and limit chaos. As such, persons may not perceive the constraints, limitations, and obligations that accompany such certainty. These feelings are not likely to be experiences unless something fundamentally shakes the person’s world of meaning. Religion has ended in an “escape from freedom,” to use Erich Fromm’s (1941) language. To the extent that religion has led to this condition, religion is indeed a powerful narcotic. In Elie Wiesel’s words: all ready made answers, all seemingly unalterable certainties serve only to provide a good conscience to those who like to sleep and live peaceable. To avoid spending a lifetime tracking down truth, one pretends to have found it. (1972, p. 241)

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RANDALL E. OSBORNE, PAUL KRIESE, STAN FRIEDMAN

At its best, religion can provide a framework for asking important questions, without necessarily providing the answers. Religion might help us find a way to go about trying to answer the questions. It can offer a context within which to think about the difficult decisions that we make every day and to ponder the meaning of events as they happen to us and around us. For example, what should I, as a teacher, do when a student expresses fear that I will go to hell because I do not accept Jesus as my personal savior? How should I deal with a friend who, while suffering from severe depression, forgets having asked me to visit after shock treatments caused memory impairment? Should I tell the request for me to visit if the knowledge of having forgotten might cause more fear and lead her to feel more hopeless and helpless? What is the correct thing to say when visiting a house of mourning? Should we speak in terms of the deceased going to a “better place”? This might be comforting to an individual who shares the same kind of belief system. But if mourners fail to believe so, this might make them upset with the consoler or angry with themselves about their lack of faith. It might lead them to blasphemy, condemning God for taking the person, even if to a “better place.” It might result in a loss of faith. After all is said and done, Elie Wiesel may provide the only answer that makes sense: Certain experiences may be transmitted by language, others—more profound—by silence; and then there are those that cannot be transmitted, not even by silence. Never mind. Who says that experiences are made to be shared? They must be lived. That’s all. And who says that truth is made to be revealed? It must be sought. That’s all. Assuming it is concealed in melancholy, is that any reason to seek elsewhere? (ibid., p. 240)

Four SELF VERSUS OTHER; “US” VERSUS “THEM”: THE SELF AS BASIS FOR CONFLICT Anré Venter 1. Introduction Even a cursory review of history is enough to suggest that conflict has been an ever present corollary to human interaction at all levels—ranging from the individual level through the various groups that people identify with, ending ultimately with national or religious groups. In contemplating this issue, I am reminded of the quote attributed to George Santayana: “those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.” Conflict is obviously not limited to third world countries that some may be tempted to consider backward or uneducated—so it appears that a lack of education is not a prerequisite for such conflict. Quite the contrary, as the historical landscape is marked with the bloody remains of failed conflicts perpetrated by highly advanced, educated and “civilized” groups—conflicts that did not ultimately succeed in meeting the goals of the perpetrators of that conflict. Despite this, some people instigate conflict anew, convinced that they will succeed where many others have failed. Even more startling is that such conflicts are often instigated by parties who have recently succeeded in overcoming the aggression of other parties—such as in South Africa where the Afrikaners overcame the oppression of the British only to in turn oppress the black people with the belief that they would succeed where the British had failed. What is it about human nature that such destructive, often even self-destructive behavior, continues to occur? To quote the adage usually attributed to Otto von Bismark, “What we learn from history is that no one learns

from history.”

The major thrust of this chapter is the argument that this apparent propensity for conflict in human interaction is neither a function of ignorance nor is it evidence of the existence of evil in some individuals or groups. I propose that this propensity for conflict has its roots in the concept of self and the manner in which we as human beings understand and experience our existence as selves. My argument has philosophical and psychological (to be more precise, socialpsychological) roots that respectively deal with the issues of what it means to have and experience a sense of self as well as the issue of how such a sense of self develops and functions in guiding and shaping human behavior and interactions. Philosophically, the self is a relative construct in that it can only exist and have meaning in relation to an “other” or “others.” At a fundamental level, my

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existence and my experience of myself is inextricably related to and dependent upon the presence of others in my environment. Psychologically, this is also the case in that social psychologists understand the development of the self to be a function of interactions and experiences with other people—from the parents or primary caregivers, siblings, extended family, friends, and on the influence of particular culture in which the individual is raised. Notice that the four main processes identified as forming the basis of the development of the self are: (1) other people; (2) culture; (3) reflected appraisal; and (4) self-perception. Just as the concept of the self can only have meaning in relation to the existence of an “other,” psychologically the development of the self depends on interactions with others. As I will outline later in this chapter, the self paradoxically exists as object and subject—on the one hand, my self (referred to as the “me”) is that which serves to differentiate me from others; on the other hand, my self (referred to as the “I”) is also the instrument at the center of the active process of constructing my social reality, processing information, and shaping my understanding of who I am and the nature of the world around me (referred to as the process of social cognition) . Although the self and others are quite closely linked in philosophical and psychological terms, an inherent conflict also arises between the two that comes into play in the self serving manner in which the self processes information and makes judgments and attributions about events and others in social cognition. In terms of moving from the individual to the group level, I argue that the same biases that shape and influence social cognition at the individual level operate at the group level. In the following section, I provide a brief review of the philosophical issues concerning the self, which are pertinent to the topic followed by an overview of the social psychological understanding of the self, its development, and functions showing where the roots of conflict at the individual level lie. After that, I will illustrate how this provides insight into our understanding of inter-group conflict. 2. The Philosophy of Self Who am I? Who are you? These questions pertain to our understanding of who we are—our identity. Roy Porter (2003) argues in Flesh in the Age of Reason that our present day understanding of this question directly relates to philosophical developments since the time of the Renaissance. Given the constraints of page limitations, I encourage readers interested in a more in-depth review of these developments are encouraged to read Porter’s extraordinary review. Although I run the risk of oversimplifying the issue, my goal in this section is to briefly present some of the key philosophical principles that form the basis of our modern understanding of who we are—principles active in our use of the concept of self in our daily lives and language. Porter charts the development of our thinking about what it means to have a self from the gnothi seauton or know yourself of the Delphic Oracle to our mod-

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ern individualistic understanding of the self. Porter’s comment that the developments that have led to our present day understanding of the self are referred to by some as “the death of the soul” illustrate that the history of our understanding of the self is rooted in philosophy and theology. In reading Flesh in the Age of Reason, we see how religion, faith, and philosophy have shaped the fundamental manner in which people have understood the nature of their being through time culminating in our modern secularized view of the self. Self-control and self-expression both depend upon self-understanding. The critical point in the development of the philosophical basis for our modern secularized understanding of the self was reached by René Descartes and his sense of our uniqueness in that, other than God, we alone are conscious in a manner that allows us to know ourselves and to understand the meaning of things. All of this has culminated in a modern understanding of the self that views it as a self-enclosed instrument with the capability of self-control and selfexploration. This understanding forms the basis for the manner in which we think and talk about the self, the development of which Porter beautifully illustrates through examples from the world of art, literature, and religion. Nowadays we say things about the self such as “please control yourself,” “I am going to travel to find myself,” “I need to express myself,” and be “true to yourself”—all of which presuppose the existence of some real essence of an inner self. Think about the manner in which we are apparently always intent on understanding the meaning of events and the actions of others in our lives—“what do I need to do to become successful?” “how do I get people to like me?”—as examples of the manner in which the self is an instrument we wield as we try to fulfill the goals or expectations we or others have for us. This illustrates the perspective in which other people or objects in our lives become things for us to manipulate, use, or control in meeting our needs—by which I mean the needs of myself. Paradoxically, this self is the same self that we use to fulfill its needs. Returning us to the idea of the self as “I” and “Me,” subject and object, that from which needs and desires spring and that which is used to meet those needs and desires. This concludes my intentionally brief review of the underlying philosophy of the self, which, by necessity, required some oversimplification. However brief this may be, it serves to make apparent the underlying philosophical principles and assumptions that form the basis for the way in which we think and talk about this thing called a self. 3. Social Psychology Social psychology examines the manner in which the presence of others influences our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, whether that presence is actual, implied, or imagined. Notice that this definition explicitly identifies the two critical dimensions that form the basis of understanding interpersonal behavior, namely characteristics of the person (thoughts, feelings, and behaviors—the self) and characteristics of their context or situation (their social environment, includ-

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ing the presence of others). In making judgments about and attempting to understand the behavior of others, social psychology shows that people intuitively believe behavior to be a function of the personality or disposition of the actor and accordingly base their judgments of others on this supposition. Using an algebraic notation, we can write this perspective in this way: B=P where B refers to the behavior being judged and P refers to the person whose behavior is being judged. In terms of the issue of interest to this book, we may ask what about people causes them to perform acts of terror or violence. One of the most fundamental and powerful lessons of social psychology is that human behavior is contextual and any attempt at understanding must recognize this fact. Thus we would amend the algebraic notation as follows: B=P+S where S denotes the characteristics of the context or environment. The question now becomes what the linear nature of the contribution of the two variables is— do they contribute equally to behavior? The answer here is unequivocal as research has shown consistently that intrapersonal variables (personality or dispositional attributes of the person) are quite poor predictors of behavior. Situational components are more powerful causes of behavior than intrapersonal factors, in which case we might be tempted to ignore P in the equation (the person) and focus soley on S (the situation) to understand behavior. The answer is not quite this simple. A person’s interpretation or understanding of a situation is more influential in producing behavior than the actual situation (the term objective is inappropriate as we will see). Given this interaction between the attributes of the person and those of the situation, a linear function no longer captures the complex nature of the relationship and we need to add a third variable to express the interactive nature of the relationship between the person and the situation. The following expression is a more complete description of the roots of behavior: B = P + S + P(S) where the P(S) variable captures the essence of the interaction between the individual and his or her situation. Years of research has taught us that in interpreting and understanding their world, people construct their social reality in an interactive manner (Ross & Nisbett, 1991).This explains my reluctance to use the term “objective” in the situation I described earlier, since these findings suggest that everything we experience is subjective. From a social psychological perspective, we are interested in the P(S) portion of the equation, which examines the person within their context—how their situation (the people around them) influences what they think, feel, and do. The

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nature of this interaction is captured in the process of construal by which individuals construct their social reality (broadly termed the process of social cognition). Within this approach, we therefore need to examine the person (the self) and the processes by which the self shapes the development of the person’s attitudes towards his or her social reality. If we can understand the manner in which individuals construct their social reality and the factors that shape that process, then we can understand behavior in general, which in turn will informs our understanding of negative, discriminatory, violent, or threatening interpersonal behavior. A. Basic Constructs In understanding the conflicted nature of world affairs and the relationships among individuals or groups of any kind from a social psychological perspective, we need to focus on the three basic components of human nature, namely cognitions, affect, and behavior. I argue that relationships among people, as individuals or in groups, are nothing more than an extension of the fundamental construct of the individual—the self. Together the three components form the basis of two fundamental constructs of interest to social psychologists in general, and to us particularly in terms of the topic of this chapter, namely the self and attitudes. Attitudes are defined as our evaluative reaction to or judgment of any aspect of our social reality—thoughts, ideas, objects, people, places, things. Attitudes encompass our cognitive, affective, and behavioral reactions to everything with which we come into contact as we are constantly judging, evaluating, and reacting to all things that populate our environment (or those to which we attend). We can think of attitudes as the vehicle by which we relate to our world, others, and ourselves. Although this definition and section is brief, this construct will form an integral part of the remainder of this chapter. At this point, however, we need to turn to the question of who or what is doing the judging, evaluating, and reacting. The answer to this question returns us directly to the construct of the self. The psychological study of the self, the construct that forms the core of the person, was pioneered by William James (1890). To this day, James’s typology of the self as being subject (the “I”) and object (the “Me”) is still widely accepted. James validly asserted that the “I” is not amenable to scientific observation or examination because a subject cannot remain the subject when it is the focus of examination. This assertion highlighted a thorny problem for psychology in its attempt to be recognized as a “hard” science. Psychology has long recognized that observation and measurement are not victimless crimes—these apparently objective processes influence and can change the nature of the object being examined—especially if these objects are people. Although James’s point may have had a philosophical basis, other psychologists have also addressed this problem. Jerome Bruner has noted:

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As a result of this philosophical and empirical problem, much of the research has focused on objective evaluations of the self as object, the “Me” in James’s terms, which is understood to comprise different levels ranging from the bodily self, through the inner self, social self, and societal self. One way of making sense of these different levels of self is to understand that they reflect different interactional domains of the self—with my body, my inner self-reflective identity, my interpersonal identity, and my social cultural identity (Brown, 1998). Regardless of the level of self, the conceptualization of the self as consisting of the three components of cognitions, affect, and behaviors is still valid as these components cut across the conceptual level. Self-Concept The cognitive component encompasses the self-concept, those mental representations that define who persons understand themselves to be. The self is not a single thing but a multifaceted, complex, system of semi-attached ideas lacking distinct boundaries while holding many interrelated functions. The self-concept consists of self-schemas, cognitive structures that contain the central and most salient attributes of a persons understanding (concept) of themselves. One particularly powerful aspect of the self-concept has to do with identity structure, which is based upon the roles people fulfill, the groups with which they affiliate (the ingroup), and the groups with which they choose not to affiliate (the outgroup). These role structures are cognitive schemas that contain information about what we are expected to do, with whom, and where and thus serve to guide behavior in relevant situations. In terms of group membership, people have schemas about the groups to which they belong and the outgroup. In the case of outgroups, the schemas are particularly strong—called stereotypes. Social identity theory is a well-established theory of identity, which argues that the groups to which we belong and those we choose to avoid intimately and integrally shape our sense of identity (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). The self-concept is an elaborate and complex web of ideas that manage to remain together in a coherent whole because only some aspects of the self are active at any given moment. Imagine standing in the center of a dark room with the unseen surfaces surrounding you (floor, walls, and ceiling) representing the entirety of your self-concept. Now if you were to switch on a flashlight and point it at one spot in the room, the illuminated circle represents that to which we refer as the working self concept—the currently active aspect of your self. The key point here is that the particulars of the situation in which you find yourself are the trigger that determines which aspects of the self are salient and active at any given point in time. The same is true of our identities, which are also highly complex as we can belong to a variety of groups crossing cultural, national, and religious boundaries. The particular aspect of my identity salient at any given

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point in time is determined typically by the nature of my environment—thus after 11 September 2001 in the United States, or after 7 July 2005 in Great Britain, people of all different backgrounds and nationalities within the respective countries would have primarily identified themselves as American or British. Self-Esteem The affective component—self-esteem deals with the feelings and emotions attached to self-representations and the groups to which we belong. Self-esteem consists of a state or stable dispositional component and a trait or shorter-lived component. We can also examine self-esteem in a global manner, which focuses on a person’s overarching evaluation of the self or in a more specific manner in which self evaluations focus on a person’s appraisal of characteristics. Self-Presentation The behavioral component of the self—self-presentation is the manner in which we portray our self behaviorally in daily life—what people say and do. This component of the self is interesting and significant in that typically we can observe only others’ behaviors (words and acts), yet we are always attempting to understand their internal states—their intentions, motives, thoughts, and feelings. Our cognitive processes as we extrapolate the internal unobservable intangible states from the external observable behaviors are inferential in nature. What makes the behavioral component of the self even more interesting is that we have come to understand that people actively, consciously, and purposefully manipulate their behavior to influence the judgments that others make of them—a process known as impression management. This process refers as much to what aspects of our self we reveal to others, as it does to what we choose not to reveal. Consider an educational example often reported by students who have sat in a classroom where the faculty member has been talking about a particularly complex and difficult topic. The faculty member pauses to enquire whether any students have questions. Some students in the room typically feel quite confused and lost, often to the degree that they may even struggle to articulate a question other than “help!” What usually happens though is that no one asks any questions and the depth of their confusion only dawns on the faculty member while grading papers or exams. This is an example of pluralistic ignorance as a direct result of the impression management process (Fiske, 2004). The reality is that no students ask questions in this situation because in scanning the environment to get a sense of how other students feel, they look at faces that, much like their own, adeptly hide their confusion behind well managed masks. The only inference that makes sense in this situation to the particular student looking around is that the other students understand the material and only he or she is lost. Given this conclusion, the potential consequences of being viewed as confused—when everyone else apparently understands what is going on—are such that no question gets asked despite many of the students in the room experiencing the same confusion.

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The irony of this phenomenon is that even though we are aware that we hide our internal states from others to manage what they think of us, we are still unable to apply this knowledge in judging their behavior! B. Development How does our sense of who we are develop? What are the roots of our typical ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving? Four primary sources or processes— social comparison, self-perception, reflected appraisals, and culture—have been identified as the basis for the development of our self. All four processes are social in nature, by which I mean that they require or imply the presence of other people in some manner. These processes may overlap given their social basis. This suggests additional support for the contention that self-concept is a social construct—one that depends on others for its existence. Social Comparison One of the most ubiquitous processes in which we engage in attempting to understand our world—ourselves—is social comparison, a process by which we are constantly comparing ourselves to others. We look to those around us to learn about our environment, to understand what is required from us, what our capabilities are, and to assess how well we are doing (Festinger, 1954). Typically this process is activated by motives such as selfunderstanding, self-enhancement, self-verification, and self-improvement. It can and does serve different goals depending on the motives salient to the self at any given time—a critical theme in this chapter, which I will fleshed out below. Self-Perception We learn about our world and other people and base judgments and evaluations about the character, values, beliefs, intentions, and dispositions of others by observing external behavior and then drawing inferences about internal states. Daryl Bem (1972) argues that just as we learn about others based upon their behavior, we do the same for ourselves—we observe our reactions, actions, thoughts, and feelings in various situations and draw inferences about who we are. Reflected Appraisals Symbolic interactionism (Shrauger and Schoeneman, 1979) argues that the sense of self is entirely social in nature as it depends on how other people perceive and thus behave toward us. Earlier I stated that the actor’s construal of the situation is the key to understanding behavior. In actuality, self-concept is founded on how the actor thinks others perceive it, not the actual perceptions others have of the actor (Kenny and DePaulo, 1993). The interesting yet unanswered question is whether my beliefs about how others see me shape my sense of self or whether my sense of self guides how I think others see me. Others and Culture The nature of the family, social, and cultural environment into which we are born shapes our sense of self ranging from fairly ideographic factors such as idiosyncratic family variables to more nomothetic factors such as broader cultural values and norms. I owe my sense of who I am to fairly idiosyncratic factors such as my particular relationships with my parents from

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birth (typically only shared by siblings and close family members) to broader factors pertaining to the general culture (shared among larger ethnic, cultural, or socio-economic groupings). We can find an example of the broader effects of culture in the robust finding of differences in the structure of the self crossculturally. People from a Western cultural background (most typically American and then to a lesser degree European) tend to have a more independent or individualistic sense of self characterized by dimensions or schemas more individually oriented in nature, stressing their uniqueness and individuality. By contrast, people from Eastern and African backgrounds tend to have a more interdependent or relational sense of self in which their self-schemas are relational in nature, stressing the social and related nature. The self is very much a function of the multilayered social context and culture into which people are born and then raised. In this regard, culture is a particularly interesting phenomenon as it functions and exists at the same time as an object and a process. Culture not only defines the attributes of the context is into which people are born but also is the vehicle which socializes people into becoming functioning and contributing members of the particular culture. This dual nature of culture is mirrored in the construct of the self as subject, object, and a process, a theme that runs throughout the ideas presented in this chapter. Because those with whom we choose to form relationships are significant factors in shaping our understanding of our selves, we should understand the basis of those relationships. Whom do we like? With whom do we choose to associate? Whom do we dislike? More often than not we like people similar to us (similarity), people we know and understand (familiarity), people who are attractive, and people who like us. Typically the people we like end up for the most part being people we have much in common with—politically, socially, economically, and religiously. People we do not like tend to be different from us along these dimensions. We do not often come into contact with the people we do not like; we may avoid interactions with them because that tends to be less satisfying or even quite unpleasant. C. Functions: Self as an Active and Biased Information Processor Attribution theory is widely accepted in understanding the process of social cognition (Heider, 1958). This theory suggests that the heart of the process is an explanation or attribution of events in the social world in terms of two basic categories: me or not me. When judging a person’s behavior, I attribute it either to something about the person (an internal or dispositional attribution) or to something about the person’s environment or situation (an external or situational attribution). The self has a double role in the judgment becomes quite clear—it makes the judgment and is also an object to which the cause of the event being judged (by it) can be attributed. The process of social cognition is explicitly social in nature as it involves judgments about external events, people, and ob-

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jects, and ideas with which we interact, as everything with which we come into contact comprises our social reality. The manner in which people think about themselves and others differs. This is one of the most robust and consistent findings in social psychology. The Fundamental Attribution Error (Ross, 1977) suggests that when judging the behavior of others, we tend to overestimate the influence of dispositional or personal factors—their behavior is a function of who they are, whereas when judging our own behavior, we tend to attribute it to environmental or situational factors. The Abu Ghraib atrocities during the Iraq war illustrate this principle. Our judgment of the soldiers who committed the atrocities was personal in nature—their behavior was a function of their disposition, of who they are as people. On the other hand, when asked about their behavior, the soldiers in question responded that their behavior was a function of the situation in which they found themselves— the stress, overcrowding, poor chain of command, or implied expectations. The basic issue highlighted by this effect and explicitly acknowledged by Fritz Heider’s (1958) attribution theory (see later discussion) is that judgments of events and behaviors related to people typically fall along a “me-not-me” dimension. Am I responsible or am I not? Are they responsible or are they not? In both cases, the not-me or not-they judgment attributes causality to situational factors. Judgments typically are categorical in nature, requiring an assessment of the degree of fit between a stimulus and a category object. For example, when meeting a person for the first time, we usually categorize them in terms of a variety of factors, some based upon explicit and reasonably obvious information requiring little or no inference, such as gender and ethnicity. Other judgments require an inferential process extrapolating internal states from external markers such as motives and values. The basic tools of the cognitive process are cognitive structures such as schemas, scripts, prototypes, stereotypes, category markers, and exemplars. Regardless of the term, all of these cognitive structures are standards against which we process and judge incoming information and we judge a stimulus to make sense of a situation. In their seminal work on social cognition, Susan T. Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor (1991) argue that individuals are “motivated tacticians” in processing incoming information, integrating it with their known reality and making sense of the world. Social cognition is the process by which individuals evaluate and interpret information, typically in a categorical manner. We evaluate information in terms of issues of self-relevance and importance—is this information, event, or person relevant to me? If so, how important is it to me? The central and dual role of the self becomes apparent, as does the importance of understanding the manner in which the underlying motives can influence the judgments being made. Fiske and Taylor identify three motives that influence the attribution and judgment process as following: the need: (1) to manage the self-image; (2) to conserve mental effort; and, (3) to be accurate processors of information. Motive: Managing the Self-Image In terms of managing the self-image, a pervasive tendency to see the self favorably typically influences the manner in

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which individuals process information. Although at its strongest in judgments that are subjective, private, and concerning issues of importance to the individual, this tendency to see the self favorably is pervasive. We can see examples of these biases in the observation that most people rate themselves better than average along dimensions of importance to themselves, the unrealistic optimism most people have about their chances of success along various dimensions, and the tendency of people to make attributions for events in ways that absolve themselves of any guilt or blame. When asked about why they behaved in the way they did, people tend to make attributions depending on the outcome of the specific behavior. In situations where the outcome is positive, people can make selfenhancing attributions by taking the credit for the event. Conversely, when the outcome is negative, people can make self-effacing attributions in which they see themselves as victims of the situation. To avoid appearing too obvious, people may also utilize counter-defensive strategies in which they take the blame for negative events and avoid taking the credit for positive events in an attempt to have others see them as martyrs. We can see a final example of self-serving biases in two outcomes that occur when we ask people to make comparative judgments about themselves along stated dimensions. When asked to estimate the proportion of people in the population who hold similar opinions about principles or values especially selfrelevant and significant to themselves, people typically overestimate the proportion. This phenomenon is termed false consensus (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) as people judge a greater amount of consensus in the population in terms of their beliefs, values, or principles than exists in reality. When we ask these same people to estimate the proportion of people in the population who share the same unique ability or talent as they have, they tend to underestimate the proportion. This is termed false uniqueness (Marks, 1984) as people judge themselves as more unique than they are. These two phenomena correlate with the two foundational motives discussed earlier: the need to feel liked, loved, and belong typically depends for fulfillment on acceptance by others based upon agreement along lines of opinion, belief, and values. On the other hand, the need to be unique, special, and different depends on our ability to see ourselves different from others in terms of our talents or abilities for fulfillment. In many ways, self-serving biases are an inescapable function of the self experiencing itself as the center of its world—I am looking out of my head, making sense of the world which appears to revolve and unfold all around me. One way in which this effect manifests itself is termed the spotlight effect (Gilovich and Sativsky, 1999) by which people usually tend to overestimate the degree to which other people are aware of and are monitoring, watching, and evaluating them. All that any person ever truly knows is how and what it feels like to be him or herself, although when asked to articulate what this feels like to others, people find this impossible to do in a satisfactory manner. Our sense of what it feels like to be ourself is primal and inexpressible. Parker J. Palmer captures this sense

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beautifully when he describes our sense of our self as “that familiar strangeness we take with us to the grave, elusive realities that can only be caught occasionally out of the corner of the eye” (1998, chap. 6). Motive: Conserving Effort Cognition is limited in its capability to process information; we tend to use shortcuts and strategies that simplify the process by which we make complex social judgments. These shortcuts, known as cognitive heuristics, tend to produce efficient, rapid, and adequate solutions with less effort than would be required if we were to focus on achieving accurate, detailed, and precise judgments. Research has identified a number of cognitive heuristics of which three are especially salient. These are as follows: (1) The availability heuristic, in which people asked to judge the likelihood of events occurring based upon how readily the event comes to mind: People overestimate the likelihood of events occurring when these events are easily accessible in memory. Typically we easily accessible events that tend to be highly memorable, ones that are not commonplace. People are quick to infer a general truth or principle from one especially vivid event but appear to be slower in deducing particular instances from a general principle.(2) The representative heuristic, by which people base their judgment about an event on how well it matches a cognitive prototype or stereotype. Here the use of this heuristic typically causes the individual making the judgment to be insensitive to other factors or information relevant to the judgment in question. (3) The heuristic of anchoring and adjustment, by which people, in judging other people, tend to use themselves as an anchor on which their evaluation is based. In each of these heuristics, aspects of the self form the standard against which we individuals make judgments. The ease by which the target occurs in my memory determines its availability and memory is, as I will discuss below, understood to be a reconstructive process. With regard to representativeness, the prototype or stereotype in the mind—the cognitive structure—forms the standards against which we evaluate the target. Finally, the individual is the anchor for judgments about other people and events. We may be unable to adequately correct for the self-serving biases that influence our thinking. Motive: To Accurately Process Information The need to be accurate unfortunately does not appear to be the default motive for human behavior as it appears to require a set of self-relevant conditions to be activated. The two situations under which it can become active are (1) achievement situations, in which people need to know how well they are performing; and (2) group environments, in which consensus or consistency between the self-concept and the group’s understanding of whom we are is important. At such times, the motive of selfunderstanding (or self-verification) prompts people to seek out accurate comparisons with others as this can either be an aid in assessing movement toward a goal or serve to affirm the self-concept through the affirmation of others. However, given the pervasiveness of the self-serving biases, the central role of the self in experiencing its world, and the availability of heuristics that simplify the process of perception and interpretation, we should not be surprised that only under

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somewhat limited conditions of ambiguity, high self-relevance, and potentially high costs associated with inaccuracy does accuracy become important. In general terms, attribution theory, especially Harold Kelley’s Covariation Model (1967, 1972), which identifies three types of information that people process in making attributions (distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus), attempts to identify the process by which we make judgments. Accuracy often demands effortful and time-consuming processing, luxuries typically lacking in the busy lives people lead. We rely heavily on heuristics and self serving biases until such time as accuracy becomes crucial enough that the price it demands is exceeded by the potential cost of an inaccurate or incorrect judgment. D. Examples of Motives Influencing Attitudes A number of self-related motives flow from the two fundamental needs of acceptance and uniqueness, namely the motives of self-enhancement and selfimprovement. Typically people appear to be motivated to see themselves in a favorable and positive light. The process of social comparison—especially when the comparison group is not performing as well or are not in as good a position as the person doing the comparison—facilitates achievement of this goal. When motivated by self-enhancement, people typically engage in downward comparison, selecting a comparison group less well off along the dimension in question, whether this be social, financial, health, or goal oriented. Although this motive appears to be the most prevalent, especially given its self-serving nature, we can find exceptions to downward comparison, when people may choose a comparison group or target that is better off. This usually occurs when people are motivated to improve their performance or are working towards a difficult goal where they can benefit from focusing on a model to emulate. A number of findings illustrate the effects of motives on the manner in which individuals construct their social realities. Consider for example, the issues of belief perseverance, confirmation bias, self-fulfilling prophecies, stereotype threat, and the reconstructive nature of memory. People’s initial beliefs about an event or person often persist despite their having subsequently been exposed to information that disconfirms their initial beliefs—first impressions are difficult to overcome as these carry with them formulated explanations and expectations about the future. We find the strength of belief perseverance in the explanations initially generated, used since the event, as a framework to make sense of additional information. Consciously considering alternatives is the only way we can prevent belief perseverance. Similarly, once people generate initial explanations and form impressions, they tend to focus on and look for information to confirm their initial views while glossing over or neglecting inconsistent information. In effect, people looking for information to confirm their initial views in the same way that when motivated by self-verification, they look to others for information to support their self-views. First impressions or explanations not only make sense of the event or

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person being evaluated, but also carry with them expectations about what future interactions with the targets might be like. These expectations then direct the focus of attention on consistent information while ignoring discrepant information. Remarkably, the effects of such expectations and biases are not limited only to the person of the perceiver. An especially powerful example of this is the occurrence of self-fulfilling prophecies. A self-fulfilling prophecy is a prediction in which the biases or expectation of the perceiver actually influence the behavior of the target in such a way that the target then behaves in a manner that supports the perceivers bias or expectation. For example, if teachers are told to expect excellence from randomly identified students (unbeknownst to the teacher), those students’ performance has been found to be better than predicted by objective criteria (Rosenthal, 1994). Even more interesting is a an example in which negative expectations of stereotypes about a persons performance causes the person in question to perform below their ability level as objectively measured. Stereotypes are cognitive schemas that define what members of categories are like and people typically use them in judging events, objects, or people in their environment. We may have schemas or stereotypes about types of cars (German versus American), foods (French versus English), clothes (designer clothes versus department store clothes), and even people from different ethnic and cultural groups (African American versus European, Christian versus Muslim). What differentiates stereotypes from other forms of category exemplars is that in the process of stereotyping, the perceiver typically goes beyond the initial step of determining whether the stimulus in question actually is a member of the specified category. Once the perceiver makes such a determination, it then cognitively (though not necessarily consciously) ascribes to the stimulus all the characteristics it believes to be true of that category—characteristics contained in the stereotype itself. Consider for example, the commonly (in America) held stereotype that African Americans typically do not perform as well on standardized achievement tests as do white students. Steele (1997) has shown that when members of such stigmatized groups are made aware of their group membership (not the stereotype—they are only asked to check a box on the answer sheet indicating their ethnicity), they lower their performance to meet the expectations inherent in the stereotype. These students under-perform compared with their own ability level. The theory to explain these data postulates that when members of such groups are in a situation in which stereotypes contain expectations about the performance of members of that group, and subjects become aware of their group membership, their performance is not only a reflection of their personal ability but also that of their group. This double threat causes them to under perform. In contrast, other members of the same stigmatized group performing the same test in which they do not identify their group membership perform up to their ability level as objectively measured.

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A final example deals with the issue of memory and the reconstructive nature of the process. The process of recalling events from memory is not akin to only withdrawing a record of some sort (picture, photograph, or propositional description), describing an event from a storage unit as was initially surmised. Memory is a reconstructive process in which the person recalling remembered material reasons backwards from their current place in time and reconstructs the event, incorporating information that has been garnered subsequent to the event being recalled occurring. When we “remember,” we reconstruct events as we see them now, using what we know now in the process, which can result in a revision of past events to suit what we currently know. Research has also shown that individuals and social groups can create false memories, memories that persist over time, becoming part of the social history of the individuals or groups (Loftus, 1997). 4. How the Self Relates to Conflict What we have established thus far in laying out the social psychological understanding behavior and self-concept is that: (1) human behavior is typically a function of their understanding or experience of environmental factors more so than intrapersonal factors (though the intrapersonal has a role in the construction of that understanding/experience); (2) that people actively construct their understanding of themselves, others, and their world through the process of social cognition; and finally that this process is influenced by a variety of self-serving biases that are driven by basic motives. These findings are most evident in the manner in which we attribute responsibility for our actions as compared to the actions of others—the fundamental attribution error. The long list of self-serving biases illustrates that the manner in which we judge others and ourselves is typically not even-handed. We tend to selfenhance, working actively to maintain our belief systems (belief perseverance); actively seek to confirm our impressions of others even when faced with disconfirming evidence (confirmation bias); behave in ways that elicit reactions from others that serve to confirm our expectations of them (self-fulfilling prophecies); be overly optimistic about our won outcomes (unrealistic optimism); tend to be lazy processors of information relying upon shortcuts instead of detailed processing (cognitive heuristics); have our memories tend to be constructed in ways that fit with our current attitudes and beliefs; see correlations among events that allow us to gain a sense of control where we have none (illusory correlation); tend to be more confidant of our judgments than we tend to be correct (overconfidence); and judge ourselves differently than we do others. Given that the process of social cognition is operating under the influence of these kinds of biases within an organism (the self) that is driven by basic needs and motives—fundamentally the need to be loved, liked, and belong, and the need to be unique, special, and different—we need to question the degree to which our construction of reality is objective in any sense whatsoever. After all,

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every story has two sides—mine and my opponents. Which of these is the objective version of the actual events? Which of these is true? From a social psychological perspective, neither version is correct as each has been created through the process of social cognition under the influence of the biases and motives as described above. At a fundamental level, my worldview, my understanding of who I am, which groups I belong to, and which groups I oppose are all created in a self-serving and self-focused manner—to support and bolster my sense of whom I am and the feelings related to that understanding. Given this, the existence or success of individuals or groups that hold views (social, economic, political, philosophical, or religious) that differ from (and thus oppose) mine becomes threatening to me. This theme has been well developed and supported empirically in the development of terror management theory (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon, 1997, 1999; Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski, 2000). This research has shown that when people experience some form of threat against their existence, they tend to respond in a punitive manner towards someone whose worldview is different from theirs. Such a reaction tends to bolster the perpetrators’ sense of self worth and self-esteem after they commit the punitive actions. Such acts were not committed against people who shared the same worldview as the perpetrators. Amin Maalouf (2000) writes eloquently about the roots of conflict lying in the concept of identity. He argues that identity is based as much upon the identity persons as it is upon the identity of their opponents or enemies. Identity and self are intimately related—my identity is how I identify myself, who I understand my self to be. Maalouf also explicitly acknowledges that identity is determined as a function of others—from family through to the broader culture—again, echoing the understanding of the development of self as being other dependent. Maalouf’s fundamental theme is that human conflict occurs when identities are threatened and when conflicting worldviews are competing for the right to exist. Selves or identities confronted or challenged others. 5. Conclusion My intent in writing this chapter was to layout where I understand the roots of conflict to lie in human nature and to clarify that these roots are an inescapable part of our fundamental fabric. To make this point I have addressed the philosophical background of our understanding and usage of the concept self and the social psychological understanding of the self. The self per se is what I am using to try to understand the self—an interesting and often overlooked unavoidable philosophical dilemma that needs to inform our thinking in this domain. This paradox permeates the topic that we are dealing with since the self is at the same time subject and object. The self is an instrument used by itself to meet the needs and motives that flow from it. Based on this understanding, I conclude that objectivity is philosophically impossible for the self to attain—my understanding of myself, others, and my

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world constitutes my understanding, created by my self through the process of social cognition—a process influenced by self-focused motives and shaped by self-serving biases. Any “objectivity” I come to is objectivity, as I understand it to be. Yours may very well be different from mine. Finally, I have not proposed how we should deal with these issues—or even whether we can deal with these root causes of conflict to avoid future conflicts. My purpose is to admonish that any attempt to deal with these issues has to begin with the acknowledgement of these root causes.

Five THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP MEMBERSHIP AND ALIENATION: PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION AND THE OTHER Karen Lombardi 1. Introduction Irrational and destructive forms of otherness, including racism, sexism, and nationalism, are fostered not only through material conditions of wealth and poverty, plenty, and lack, but also through the privileging of difference and division that marks Western intellectual thought. The long history of psychological ideas that justifies such privileging of categorization, differentiation, and division appears to be rooted in long-standing rationalist and objectivist intellectual traditions that have come to predominate American thought. American culture honors data as objective measures of an external and neutral truth, as if data exist independent of interpretation, and as if interpretation exists independent of culture. Within psychology, however, and particularly within psychoanalysis, some strains of thought do no fall prey quite as easily to false objectification. In this chapter, I will turn to the unconscious of psychoanalytic theory, with particular attention to the theories of Melanie Klein and Ignacio Matte Blanco, with the hope of providing an alternative mode of discourse on social problems of the other within psychology. 2. Introjection and Projection as Primary Modes of Relatedness Klein (1975a; 1975b) bases the development of subjectivity and the capability for symbolization on the earliest appearing psychic mechanisms of introjection and projection. Through the mechanism of introjection, we take in or incorporate the external world and come to experience what is external as part of ourselves. For example, a child comes to experience a loving mother’s touch as belonging to the world of the good mother, and the touch comes to constitute the child’s experience of the self, a good and loving self or a good and loving baby in relation to a good mother. Good (m)other experiences come to constitute not only an external world peopled with positive experience, but also an internal world wherein a person feels its capabilities to be positive, loving, creative, and progressive. Although Klein spoke of good and bad breast experiences in terms of the

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mother’s originary body, I would extend this paradigm to all others who have the potential to constitute internal objects in one’s psychic life, without regard to gender or maternal or paternal status. Similarly, through the mechanism of projection, we expel into the outside world those affects or experiences, usually of a more negative or destructive nature, which in some way feel threatening to us. For example, we project our feelings of hunger or want, readily converted into rageful desire, into the other, who we then experience as depriving or greedy or fearsome. In this system of exchange with the world, introjective experiences tend to contain some element of love or desire from the other that the individual embraces and takes in. Meanwhile, we tend to internally generate projective experiences. We perceive them to contain some destructive element, which we then expel into the outside world. When we split good experiences from negatively tinged ones, Klein calls this the paranoid-schizoid position. In this position, an individual largely feels separated from the source of power or action and experiences things as being done to itself. When we can contain some of our destructiveness and recognize that the ones we have the potential to hurt are also the ones we love, splitting of good from bad experiences no longer predominates. Klein calls this the depressive position. The greed, envy, and persecutory anxiety characteristic of the paranoidschizoid mode no longer dominates experience, and now we can claim some power over our own actions at the same time that we come to terms with our capability for destructiveness. In the depressive position, we are able to mourn our losses and recognize our role in those losses at the same time that we can create new possibilities. For Klein, psychic health consists of a relative predominance of the depressive over the paranoid-schizoid mode of relating. However, her theory is not a linear one, with one stage supplanted by another through growth and development. Instead, the potential for both experiences remains within us in constant interplay, activated equally by external circumstances and by internal ones. We can describe social and cultural problems of difference from a Kleinian perspective, with reference to psychic issues of greed, envy, persecutory anxiety, and the dominance of the paranoid-schizoid mode of relating. Such an approach makes intuitive sense, as it provides some explanation for deep divisions among people who at another level appear to have common interests. The more deprivation is central to internal or personal experience, the more greed and envy will predominate in social relationships. When internal deprivation (the sort experienced in early relationships, at the mother’s breast, for example) is met with a situation of external deprivation, where there are fewer resources than what is needed, greed and envy will multiply exponentially, making it extremely difficult for the individual to move out of the paranoid-schizoid mode of relating. In the persecutory projective mode common to the paranoid-schizoid way of relating, identifications are disowned and similarities become alienable differences. Boundaries and divisions are instantiated. Where similarity existed, only difference remains. In the depressive mode, identification coexists with identity,

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so that an individual can experience its individuality at the same time that it deeply feels its similarities with others. Persecutory relatedness takes the social forms of racism, sexism, and fear and mistrust of other cultures. Depressive relatedness takes the social forms of similarity and identification, wherein masculinity can be incorporated into femininity, blackness into whiteness, and classes are obliterated. 3. The Logic of Symmetry and Asymmetry Building on Klein’s understanding of psychic processes, Matte Blanco (1975; 1988) reconceptualized unconscious and conscious processes along modes of experience organized by similarity and difference. He viewed psychic life as a perpetual dynamic interaction between two fundamental types of thinking and being that exist within us—that of symmetry and asymmetry. Aristotelian logic guides asymmetry. Accordingly, experience can be located according to fixed principles of time and space, leading us to a sense of where we are in relation to others and that allows us to distinguish one thing from another thing. Most closely characterized by conscious experience, asymmetry is the logic of cause and effect, allowing a sense of events preceding or succeeding each other, leading us in the direction of linear thinking and causal attribution. Asymmetry is the logic of distinction and differentiation, wherein difference and multiplicity prevail. Symmetry, on the other hand, is guided by such qualities of the unconscious as timelessness, spacelessness, a lack of mutual contradiction, and absence of negation, wherein sameness and unity prevail. This is the logic of dreams, of fantasy, and emotional life. Borrowing from mathematical set theory, symmetry treats the converse of any relation as identical to the relation itself. Whenever somebody or something stands in relation to another thing (or person), that thing (or person) stands in the equivalent relation to the first thing. According to this logic, no one thing is clearly distinguishable from another thing, nor is time, space, or causality unidirectional, as all is subject to reversibility. For example, “John is the father of Peter; Peter is not the father of John” is an instance of asymmetrical logic. Linear and nonreversible, we can attribute from this statement a fixed identity and causal directionality of the relationship of John to Peter, and Peter to John. According to symmetrical logic, however, the statement, “John is the father of Peter” would have the quality of reversibility. A symmetrical relationship would state, “John is the father of Peter; Peter is the father of John.” Principles of symmetry apply at deep levels of relatedness. For example, “My mother loves me; I love my mother” makes good psychic sense and good common sense, as a loved child is a loving one. Similarly, “My analyst is good to me; I am good to (for) her” is an essential symmetrization of the psychoanalytic relationship. We can say that symmetry is the logic of identity; asymmetry is the logic of difference. For Matte Blanco, human psychological functioning is bilogical—characterized by symmetry and asymmetry. Human beings live in a

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state of fundamental antinomy, an inability to think in a pure and incontrovertible manner, because of these two irreconcilable but simultaneous modes of thinking and being. A translating or unfolding function, which continuously transforms internal and external experience, links symmetry and asymmetry. “Symmetry is always wrapped in asymmetry” (Matte Blanco, 1975, p. 113) not only because asymmetry is necessary for conscious thought, but also because human experience always contains both symmetrical and asymmetrical functions. Because thinking requires the perception of some difference or distinction, symmetrical logic is always interpenetrated by asymmetrical logic to some degree. Matte Blanco set out five strata of human experience (though there may be an infinite number), in which the capability to recognize differences declines as the degree of symmetrization increases. The first stratum, predominated by the conscious awareness of separate objects, is abstract asymmetrical logic where differences and limits prevail. The second stratum contains a significant degree of symmetrization within asymmetrical thinking; verbal metaphors and the experience of affect characterize this level. On the third stratum, different classes are identified, but parts of a class are always taken as a whole. Identifications would apply here, as well as idealization, racism, and forms of prejudice. On the fourth level, wider classes are symmetrized, while some class differentiation remains. The deepest level tends toward mathematical indivisibility—an endless number of things tend mysteriously to become only one thing. In his development of Kleinian theory, Matte Blanco offered symmetrization to explain projective identification. He viewed Klein’s statement on the development of projective identification in the early history of the individual: “Insofar as the mother comes to contain the bad parts of the self she is not felt to be a separate individual but is felt to be the bad self” (Klein, 1975/1946, p.8) as a bi-logical structure, simultaneously symmetrical and asymmetrical. In bi-logical structures, two modes of being exist, one for which reality is divisible and one for which reality is indivisible. Two persons are one. Projective identification is such a bi-logical structure, requiring the perception of difference to then deconstruct boundaries into sameness. In Matte Blanco’s view, the concept of projective identification contains the concept of indivision and also that of distinction. The object and the self are experienced as the same and as different. In Klein’s (1946) statement above, the quality of badness and the obliteration of boundaries between mother and me comprise the symmetrical term; the distinction between mother and me, and the quality of goodness that is the negative of badness comprise the asymmetrical term. Clinically, we can see conflicts and anxieties associated with projective identification in terms of a fear of losing our (asymmetrical) identity and being sucked up into indivisibility, which we feel to be annihilative. Through the splitting of experience in the paranoid-schizoid mode, projective identification both instantiates difference and maintains identifications in a dissociative mode. The individual’s sense of badness that threatens self-destruction and the destruction

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of others is projected into the outside world. People experience this badness as belonging not to themselves, but to others, who stand poised to attack. The objectification of the other thrives through the projective identifications of the paranoid-schizoid position, where identifications are maintained in a predominantly dissociative mode. What we experience as belonging to a part of the self may be split off or splintered; we may see it as residing only in the other. Identifications become paranoid disidentifications and relationships are impoverished. For Matte Blanco, maintaining rich relationships with other people requires the simultaneous experience of the symmetry of empathic identification (in terms of what we put out and what we take in) and the asymmetry of individual, subjective experience. Likewise, in Klein, the capability simultaneously to identify with others and maintain the negativity of difference moves the individual from the predominance of splintered or part-object (what she calls paranoid-schizoid) modes of relating and into more integrative and empathic (what she calls depressive) modes. Here, loving and reparative tendencies mitigate the hatred and destructiveness born of difference and we can maintain empathic identification within a context of individuality. 4. Wholeness and the Implicate Order David Bohm, (1980; 1994) a theoretical physicist whose interest extended to larger problems of thought and culture, presents a social critique of Western culture’s emphasis on difference and a critique of the history of ideas that fits especially well with the work of Matte Blanco and Klein. He takes the focus of modern physics on the simultaneity of quantum (particle) and relativity (wave) theories in the function of the universe and extends this to a theory of being. He addresses the resistance of the scientific community to embrace their ideas, pointing out that scientists ordinarily tend to discount any sort of view giving primacy to formative activity in the undivided wholeness of flowing movement (relativity or wave theory) as features of mathematical calculus. They tend not view them as indications of the “real” nature of things. Mechanistic models predominate, even when they no longer guide scientific thought or fit the data of contemporary observation. Most physicists, he says, still think atomistically, that basic building blocks (for example, atoms or other particles) comprise the universe, from which is made everything. In biology and non-psychoanalytic psychology, this tendency to think atomistically or mechanistically is even greater. Bohm’s overall project concerns understanding the nature of reality in general and consciousness in particular as a coherent whole, which is never static or complete, but which is engaged in an unending process of movement and enfoldment. Thinking may be static (thoughts, more particularly, are static images). Experience, which always coexists with thought, is an undivided process of flow, not reducible to static bits and pieces. Bohm speaks of what I would call the pull of the paranoid, which is the tendency to slice things into smaller and smaller bits to make manageable the

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unmanageable, to create (false) identities that tend to splinter, based as they are on distinction and difference. He says this way of thinking, which he calls the fragmentary self-worldview, is at the same time a larger philosophical movement and a more narrow scientific approach that leads people to feel that fragmentation is nothing but an expression of the way things actually are, a reflection of the reality of nature, and that anything else is impossible. In Bohm’s experience as a member of the scientific and academic community, he has seen a prejudice in favor of a fragmentary self-worldview fostered and transmitted to some extent consciously and explicitly, but mainly in an implicit and unconscious manner. Such fragmentation, an extension of the analysis of the world into separate parts beyond the domain of appropriateness, effectively divides what is indivisible. Such inappropriate divisions also lead to tendencies to unite that which is incapable of being united, which can be seen as another form of fragmentation (that is, the creating of false categories). Here is a sample of Bohm’s social analysis: This [fragmentation] can be seen very clearly in terms of groupings of people in society (political, economic, religious, etc.) The very act of forming such a group tends to create a sense of division and separation of the members from the rest of the world but, because the members are really connected to the whole, this cannot work. . . . Whenever men divide themselves from the whole of society and attempt to unite by identification within a group, it is clear that the group must eventually develop internal strife, which leads to a breakdown of its unity. . . . True unity in the individual and between man and nature, as well as between man and man, can only arise only in a form of action that does not attempt to fragment the whole of reality. (1980, p. 16). My personal experience with Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in the late 1960s may serve as an example of unification leading to splintering. Originally working toward major social change in the forms of increased democracy and social justice, and then united against the Viet Nam War, SDS was effective in staging university strikes and large demonstrations, mobilizing not only students but also workers and professionals. Inclusive and tolerant of difference, SDS eagerly embraced other groups within the umbrella of their organization, including the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the Black Panther Party, campus workers’ labor unions, and the Third World Alliance, to name a few. As the group gained organizational strength and numbers, sectarianism and factionalism began to explode, even though SDS ethics explicitly condemned factionalism and continued its struggle to tolerate internal differences. Issues of personal and group power, and the greed that forms the basis of power, began to infect SDS. Women, who occupied few leadership roles, began feeling increasingly marginalized and objectified. A stunning example of this objectification was Mark Rudd’s leading a meeting on the New York University

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campus with an Asian woman student sitting on his lap. Some organized groups within SDS, such as the Worker-Student Alliance and the Revolutionary Youth Movement, began to pit themselves against one another, both ideologically and personally. One favored the unification of all people and the other lobbied for increased liberties for young people and the dominance of a new youth culture. Slogans switched from “Solidarity Forever” to “Defeat False Unity.” Both slogans spoke the truth, but remained psychically and ideologically split, leading to a splintering of the organization and an ultimate collapse. The attempt to maintain unity and difference simultaneously ultimately failed. Similarly, in addressing larger world problems as they express themselves through ecology, economics, and war, Bohm says: Everything is interdependent; and yet the more interdependent we get, the more we seem to split up into little groups that don’t like each other and are inclined to fight with each other and kill each other, or at least not to cooperate (1994, p. 1). According to Bohm (and in this way, we may view him as sharing some ideas with Jacques Lacan), our language reflects false divisions. We are taught to organize our thoughts through classifying to the point of fracturing experience. Although, like Matte Blanco, Bohm recognizes that we must make distinctions to achieve some clarity of mind, he maintains that we carry those distinctions too far without knowing that we do so. We then slip over the edge of whole experience into splintered fragmenting of experience, and lose true meaning. 5. Splitting and the Ideology of Groups The sociologist C. Fred Alford’s (1989) Kleinian analysis of the psychology of groups speaks of the tendency of groups to remain in the paranoid-schizoid position, wherein the splitting of the wholeness of things into fractured parts predominates. The more we split our experience, the more we feel ourselves to be ineluctably different from those on whom we project. The more persecutory anxiety reigns, the more we are caught in the destructiveness of our hatred. The softening of the paranoid-schizoid position is positively correlated with the degree to which reparative functions operate. Reparation allows for more depressive experiences of empathy and concern to take hold, diminishing our fears of our own destructiveness and our need to spoil with envy. A solution to the group ideology of splintering into increasingly divisive factions is what Alford calls reparative reason. Characteristic of the depressive position, reparative reason is based on the loose symbolic equation, which requires that the subject mourn the loss of identity between the thing and its symbol. The rigid symbolic equation, in contrast, fuses the symbol with the original object and is constituted through primitive projective identification, wherein the relationship to the symbol is one of omnipotent control.

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The fervor of ultraorthodox religious groups capitalizes on the rigid symbolic equation, where words and scriptures become commands and not objects for thought. The transition to the mode of loose symbolic equations requires the capability to maintain an identification with the original object at the same time that its difference is recognized and accepted. This capability to simultaneously differentiate and dedifferentiate from the other is necessary for empathic relatedness. Reparation and reconciliation, in the Kleinian tradition, is not a utopian project in which socially dichotomized groups reach the highest unity, but one in which a loving connection with objects can be sustained alongside a vigorous sense of individual identity. The country’s reaction to the events of 11 September 2001 may serve as an illustration of the failure of reparative reason. The initial reaction of this country was to feel united in this disaster, and every community, regardless how far away from New York or Washington, Boston, or Los Angeles, empathically experienced the trauma. Many of us also felt united with the rest of the world and were able to connect more deeply to those countries and communities who have experienced the threat of terrorism as a part of their daily existence. This sense of unity with the rest of the world was reciprocal, as other countries and peoples reached out with sympathy and with support. In all its horror, 11 September 2001 had the potential to begin to heal international divisions through these identifications and reparative gestures. However, we all know that instead, some government officials used this event to increase paranoia and begin a war based on false assumptions, which has left the United States even more marginalized in the international community. 6. A Note on the Other The “other” has entered into the academic vocabulary primarily through Lacan (1977) and the postmodernists. Originally, the other simply meant other people. It has come to mean that which we cannot take in through identification, either because our desire is for that which we cannot possess, or because there are barriers to our capability for identification. In my view, the other can be: (1) An alter ego, a stand-in for what we might desire but cannot claim in ourselves; (2) The not-me, an insistence on disidentification—that which is not me and never wished for; or (3) The other sex—that which is not me and unimaginable. Lacan postulates a radical other, which is beyond identification. Although philosophically we might recognize the radical other in terms of death or Lacan’s concept of the Symbolic, I postulate that in the human arena, the other always contains the possibility of identification. The other becomes radical primarily through intense and unyielding vilification. This vilification is based on the pro-

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jection into the other of a destructive part of our own psyche, necessarily dissociated and disowned as it threatens our good assessments of ourselves. Reparative reason would take as its task the deconstruction of boundaries that function not as necessary containments but as barriers to identification. Boundaries instantiate necessary differences that help us make distinctions and live ethical lives. Barriers go beyond the boundary; they are dehumanizing exclusions that foreclose identification, and also foreclose the capability to live with difference. I conclude with words to the wise from my daughter, who was eleven years old at the time that she spoke them. After 11 September 2001, she said “Mommy, did Muhammed Attah hate his mother?” Out of the mouth of babes, this unusually precocious and perceptive comment revealed my daughter’s understanding of the human element within the political—that hatred is not bred only in politics or in divisive societies, but has its beginnings in the earliest relationships. Her comment is also an attempt at reparative reason, as she struggled to see Attah not only as the vilified other, but to humanize him as a man who had problems of hatred in his intimate relationships, just as we all do to some extent or another. Hate, even political, institutional, or religious hate, is always closer to home than it seems, and so we need to address both the political and the personal to mitigate our destructiveness. After the results of the 2000 American presidential election (she would have been ten years old at the time), her commentary was “Well, that’s okay. We’re still the boss of ourselves.” I hope that she is right.

Six THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WHITENESS: MOVING BEYOND SEPARATION TO CONNECTION Terri A. Karis 1. Introduction Whiteness defines the conceptual terrain on which race is constructed and explored in the United States. It organizes personal identities, interpersonal relationships, and institutional arrangements, including the distribution of opportunities and resources. Whiteness has been constructed based on fear, exclusion, and control of non-white Others. Yet because it is constant as the dominant norm, it is invisible to those of us who are white. Seeing ourselves as racially neutral, solely as individuals, leads to a lack of racial awareness and knowledge. Individualism, colorblindness, and the widely held assumption that racial categories are biological prevent accurate understanding of racial realities. I recommend investigating whiteness by paying attention to “racial moments” as a process for disrupting white racial dominance. Our willingness to see and to know with the mind and the heart—to love—provides the ground for facing fear of the Other and fear of what we might see about ourselves. Despite our fears, we need each other’s difference calling us into new ways of being, carrying us beyond our separate selves to reclaim the interconnectedness on which our sense of security and our survival depends. In considering the question of global security and how racial dynamics impacts it, I will highlight a crucial issue—whiteness. I will discuss how the white racial practices of individuality and colorblindness support white dominance while reaffirming white innocence. Many times people avoid conversations about race because talking about it can trigger uncomfortable feelings. Frustration, anger, guilt, sadness, and fear—most of us would just as soon avoid these. Most people are much more comfortable hearing about love than about race, so before I talk about race. I will talk about love. I know that talking about love and telling personal stories are not standard practice in academic circles, but love is what sparked my interest in whiteness, and I believe that the transformative power of love is what can help us address the problems of whiteness. I began to learn about race when I fell in love with a black man. At the time, I held the belief that race did not matter, that because we both valued racial justice and equality, our personal relationship was immune from the racialized

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world around us. We loved each other and that was enough. But I was wrong. Through this relationship, I began to learn about whiteness. I noticed, for example, that others treated me differently when I went to the grocery store or the mall alone as compare with when I went with my partner. Alone, I generally felt unseen—anonymous—but with a black man I became visible and observed. Sometimes people avoided me or treated me with hostility; other times people gave me special treatment and inclusion they usually did not grant to most whites. Although I did not yet have language for it, this was the beginning of learning about the social construction of race and the privilege of whiteness. I still had the same physical appearance—I still looked white—but how others treated me shifted depending on my racial context. It was only as I lost some of my taken-forgranted white ways of being in the world that I started to become aware of them. As I lost my racial naiveté, I came to see that race is complex. Race matters and does not matter. It is possible to connect across racial lines and to love deeply, yet race shapes not only social structures and organizations, but also our interpersonal relationships and self-identities. We live in a culture that makes all loving difficult. Despite our longing to connect, one human being to another, we all are impacted by racial, gender, economic, and political structures and practices that shape our relationships and us. Sometimes these factors create a sense of belonging; at other times, they create a sense of disconnection. Stereotypical thoughts and historically conditioned images feed our fears and distort how we see others and ourselves. Fear cuts us off, separating us from access to our interconnectedness. Parker Palmer had this to say about our fears: We collaborate with the structures of separation because they promise to protect us against one of the deepest fears at the heart of being human—the fear of having a live encounter with alien “otherness” . . . We fear encounters in which the other is free to be itself, to speak its own truth, to tell us what we may not wish to hear. We want those encounters on our own terms, so that we can control their outcomes, so that they will not threaten our view of world and self. (1998, p. 37) The fear of truly encountering another human being is, according to Palmer, actually a set of interrelated fears. First, we fear the difference of the Other which challenges our illusion of being in control as sole possessor of truth. Second, we fear the inevitable conflict of divergent truths meeting. Third, we fear losing our self-identity in the encounter. Finally, Palmer states: [we] fear that a live encounter with Otherness will challenge or even compel us to change our lives. . . . Otherness, taken seriously, always invites transformation, calling us . . . to new ways of living our lives—and that is the most daunting threat of all. (Ibid., p. 38)

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I am now inviting you to consider ideas that may challenge you or trigger defensiveness. Social critic bell hooks says, “the practice of love begins with acceptance” (2006, p. 58). Acceptance does not necessarily mean to like or to agree, but means to see and to know with both the mind and the heart. Can we dare to move through our fears, to see ourselves clearly and to know each other without the annihilation of our differences? To lay the foundation for a discussion of whiteness, I will share a story about a time when my family members began to learn about whiteness. Some years ago, my extended family made plans to vacation together on Cape Cod. My brother’s family had rented the cottage next to the one that I was sharing with my husband and two sons. Our cottages were near the end of a sandy lane filled with similarly charming cottages. When my brother, David, and his family arrived late in the evening, the darkness made it impossible to see the numbers on the cottages and know which the right one was. Later, when I asked my brother how he had found his cottage, he said that he had simply walked around looking in the windows of all the cottages. My response, one that provided a moment of insight for my family members, was that my husband, Richard, never would have done such a thing, that to do so would have been risky and potentially dangerous. You may be wondering how this story is about race or about whiteness. It may help to know that my brother, his family, my mother and her husband, my sisters and their families, and I are white, while my husband was black; our two sons are biracial. The new awareness for white family members was that the ease and comfort with which my brother moved about in this world, even in an unfamiliar place a thousand miles from home, was not available to another family member, just because he was black. Still, more than our racial identities make this a story about race. Our location, a small town on Cape Cod, was a racialized space long before we arrived. But, as whitespace, it felt comfortable and natural to those of us who were white, so we did not think about it in racial terms. In this whitespace my white brother intuitively knew that he belonged and that he could move about without fear, without being subjected to a questioning gaze: “What’s he doing here?” My black husband implicitly knew he needed to move with caution, that he would be perceived as Other. While my brother David could exhale and relax, my husband Richard needed to be on his best behavior. Although the small Cape Cod village where we vacationed appeared peaceful, an underbelly to its placidity persists: its safety is created by and contingent upon separation and distance from Otherness. Throughout United States history, white people have created whiteness by excluding and policing Others, particularly blacks (Lopez, 1996). When non-whites “invade” or “pollute” whitespace, it becomes a site of fear. Non-whites fear the hostility and violence directed at those perceived to be intruders who do not belong. Whiteness, in the black imagination, is associated “with the terrible, the terrifying, the terrorizing” (hooks, 1992, p. 170).Whites fear the very presence of the un-policed Other, fear loss of control. Throughout United States history, whites have translated this fear

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into excluding, controlling, or annihilating those perceived as Other, resulting in the “common sense” customs and property laws that enslaved Africans, exterminated and confined indigenous Americans, and interned Japanese citizens. Today, we see the enduring effects of this history in ghettos, reservations, segregated housing and schools, and gated communities. My story illustrates a number of things about whiteness, some of which I will address later. For now, I will highlight two points. First, whiteness is not necessarily about personal racial prejudice or animosity. Although whiteness affects personal identities and interpersonal relationships, its influence is much broader. To describe whiteness, author Toni Morrison uses the metaphor of a fishbowl holding both fish and water (1992, p. 17). As the dominant racial ideology, whiteness is the fishbowl, which establishes a frame or a cognitive structure for how we think and talk about race. Its power goes beyond blatant discrimination and hostility to mediate perceptions, and to shape and constrain ways of processing and interpreting information. Yet how the fishbowl functions may not be apparent, especially to white people. Dominant frames hide the fact of their dominance. For the fish, the water and the fishbowl are unseen, a taken-forgranted reality. Because white racial dominance is lived in the everyday world, its practices simply become the common sense way to see things. A second point illustrated by my story is that close personal relationships across racial lines, although significant, do not eliminate the organizing influence of whiteness and its privileges. Regardless of their family bond and genuine connection, my white brother and my black husband could not change their different positions in whitespace, and therefore the behavior of looking through cottage windows after dark did not carry the same meaning or potential consequences for each of them. My goal in exploring whiteness and its privileges is not to take away the “privilege” of comfortably moving through the world with ease and replace it with fear and constraint. Instead, my vision for a secure world includes creating racially diverse communities in which all people can relax, secure in their sense of connection and belonging. What does it take to create such communities? We need to start where we are. Creating true inclusive communities begins with acceptance, with willingness to see and to know that which white racial dominance currently hides and normalizes. This willingness provides a means for working with what Charles W. Mills calls the “epistemology of ignorance.” Mills argues that “white misunderstanding, misrepresentation, evasion, and self-deception on matters related to race” are prescribed by white racial dominance (1997, p. 19). The result is that white people normally see the world based on a set of psychologically and socially useful cognitive distortions, which prevent accurate understanding of racial realities. Increased awareness is the path that can help us move beyond fear and separateness, away from ignorance as a way of knowing, towards the possibility of truly seeing and connecting with the Other. But before we can see the Other, we first need to be able to see ourselves.

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To investigate whiteness, I invite my students to notice what I call “racial moments.” A racial moment is any time that race catches their attention. In observing themselves, white students routinely see that, concerning issues of race, they often feel uncomfortable and afraid. Their stories provide many everyday examples illustrating that the security offered by whiteness is flimsy and easily disturbed. Larry, a white man, described racial moments that occurred one afternoon during a visit to the doctor. Trying to find his way through a large medical complex, he noticed a black woman walking towards him whom he asked for directions. He also noticed that he had not wanted to ask her for help, that he imagined she and all blacks might be angry at him because he was white A little later, sitting in a waiting room surrounded by people from many racial and ethnic groups, Larry became aware that he, as a white person, was in the minority. He again noticed how uncomfortable he felt. Kathy, a white woman, reflected on her experience of walking past a Latino man. She wrote: I felt uncomfortable and did not know where to set my gaze. I tend to do this with people of color . . . it becomes so important that I am not offensive . . . that I become anxious and behave unnaturally. It feels difficult to just be myself. . . . I do not feel threatened by the people I interact [with] on the street, yet something inside me feels scared that I will act in a racist way. In the process of paying attention to race, one of white students’ first realizations is how frequently they experience unwanted racial thoughts and feelings, which prior to my assignment, they would have disregarded. Kathy put it like this: At first I wanted to push the thoughts out of my mind, but I let them percolate. I realized that I wanted to pretend that I didn’t have these thoughts and feelings because I have completed quite a bit of cultural competency education, and am committed to being a part of social justice work. Similarly, Jack noticed: I guess I had these thoughts before but just dismissed them, chastising myself for having them but never really exploring them. I guess when I slow down and think a little I start to notice that these thoughts have to come from somewhere. The process of investigating whiteness involves facing fears of what we might see, risking threats to our self-identity, while remaining open to the process transforming us. Why, though, would white people want to trade in the reassuring and familiar security of whitespace for the uncomfortable, emotionally arduous exploration of whiteness? Whiteness offers a false sense of security. A security based on exclusion and separation must be continually policed. Because

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it does not reflect our interdependence as human beings, it is not sustainable in today’s world. If the presence of non-whites can so easily disrupt the perceived safety of whiteness, white people will not easily relax in a racially diverse community. But maintaining a sense of comfort is contingent not only on separation from nonwhite Others, from racial dynamics “out there”—outside of ourselves. White racial dominance requires lack of awareness and separation from our thoughts and feelings. Just as we must police and control whitespace to maintain its security, the epistemology of ignorance requires that we police our own hearts and minds to avoid knowing how racial dominance has shaped us and Others. As I invite readers into the process of noticing racial moments, I am aware that these examples of discomfort are not that enticing; given a choice, most of us prefer to be comfortable. I am trying to emphasize that underneath the comfortable thin veneer of whiteness, uneasiness is already present. Avoiding conscious discernment does not make unwanted thoughts and feelings go away; instead they hover at the periphery of awareness, not quite in focus but unconsciously shaping us nonetheless. To investigate and deconstruct whiteness requires that we open ourselves to racial realities that lay beyond the dichotomous thinking that characterizes whiteness. Whiteness sets up white/non-white as an oppositional difference, reflecting the way that white racial dominance has been constructed by actively excluding all those considered non-white. The dominant/subordinate binary is associated with a series of dichotomies: good/bad, right/wrong, innocent/guilty, pure/contaminated, civilized/barbaric, and us/them. These polarizations limit our ability to effectively engage the nuances and complexities of race. When faced with terms like “ignorance,” “evasion,” and “self-deception,” white people often get defensive and feel accused of being bad persons. Compassionate awareness can help us hold apparent contradictions, such as being a good person and feeling bad or guilty about race. For those of us who value equality, feeling barriers to connection created by our dominant racial position can be painful. Recognizing that socialization within a racially stratified culture has shaped us, we can extend loving kindness toward ourselves, and towards other white people whom we might judge as racially oblivious, creating the grounds for exploring our racial misperceptions. If we desire connection, we must face how our conditioning in a culture of white racial dominance has shaped us. 2. Individualism Three significant frames or perspectives are associated with whiteness, all of which prevent us from accurately understanding racial realities: individualism, colorblindness, and the widely held assumption that racial categories are biological. Individualism is perhaps the primary vehicle for obscuring white racial dominance. It refers to a cultural value tendency that emphasizes the importance

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of individual needs, rights, and identities over those of the group. While it is true that we all are individuals, and our individual uniqueness is a significant aspect of identity, none of us is solely an individual (powell, 1997, pp. 789–806). Thinking of people as just individuals overlooks the important ways that race, social class, gender, and other socio-historical categories shape who we are. The way that individualism functions depends upon racial group membership. This is illustrated by our use of language. When I say, “I saw a man,” and I do not name his race, current racial practices in the United States support the assumption that I saw a white man. The dominance of whiteness has resulted in dominant culture only viewing whites as raceless, as un-hypenated Americans, as individuals, while it considers non-white Others as members of racial groups (Haney-López, 2006). Whiteness does not function in the same way as other racial identities, but is the taken-for-granted yardstick used to measure all Others (Mahoney, 1995, pp. 1659–1684). White ways of being in the world set the norm as the defining universal standard. For white people, though, race typically is not a salient aspect of personal identity, resulting in the belief that race is not about us, but only about nonwhite Others. When whites see themselves as racially neutral, as simply individuals, white racial dominance is hidden. For example, my brother’s whiteness and its accompanying privilege did not become visible to him until contrasted with the lack of privilege of his black brother-in-law. Not thinking about his racial identity, his racial positioning, or even about race at all, was just my brother’s ordinary, everyday way of being in the world. This racial positioning, which appears not to be a racial position, leads to lack of racial consciousness and unawareness of racial privilege. One of the privileges of whiteness is “the ability to not-see whiteness and its privileges” (Mahoney, 1996, p. 1666), one of them being that only those in the dominant racial group have the privilege of viewing themselves as simply an individuals (Flagg, 1998). One of the ways that we participate in maintaining current racial arrangements is through lack of attention to the dynamic relationship between racial group membership and individual self-identities and behaviors. Individualism overlooks the ways that access to social rewards and opportunities is structured along the lines of race, social class, and gender. Seeing ourselves solely as individuals making personal choices, we fail to see the ways that the invisible norms associated with membership in the dominant racial group has shaped us. Returning to my story, my brother most likely would have interpreted his choice to look in windows as a reflection of his personality or his personal style of problem solving. Even though he might have been trespassing, years of experience (in whitespace) led to a sense of safety, a belief that his response was a reasonable one, and confidence that things would work out because he was, after all, a friendly good person with good intentions. Not noticing racial dynamics hides the benefits of having an advantaged relationship to privilege and cultural affirmation, and normalizes them as the universal standard. When we view ourselves and Others through this lens, we likely

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will misinterpret the behavior of non-whites or criticize those who do not measure up to our taken-for-granted standards. “They” should just do things our way or “they” should learn to speak “right.” If we do not understand how racial positioning shapes choices and a sense of self, we are likely to justify white racial practices as the norm, and blame non-whites for poor individual choices and their deviation from this standard. 3. Colorblindness A second frame that obscures white racial dominance is colorblindness—the practice of not noticing race or racial dynamics. The language of colorblindness, widely accepted by most whites, is reflected in commonly heard statements such as, “I don’t even notice race”; “We’re all human beings”; and “It doesn’t matter to me whether someone is black or brown or purple or green; race doesn’t matter.” These statements highlight similarity among humans—our common humanity—and some truth exists in the colorblind emphasis on sameness. As human beings, we all want to be happy and to avoid pain and suffering. We each deserve respect and equal opportunity. Because these values are so widely held, and because they are not explicitly about race, the problem with these statements may be difficult to see. The problem with colorblind thinking is that the focus on sameness obscures important points about difference. The statement “I don’t even notice race” implies defining non-white as different and difference as bad. Thus, simply seeing race, talking about it, or taking it into account is, minimally, impolite and often considered discriminatory. Emphasizing sameness evades the idea of white racial dominance (Frankenberg, 1993, p. 144). Colorblind statements disguise the social reality that sameness is equated with the white normative standard, and that racial dynamics still exist even when there is a no direct invocation of race (Haney-López, 2006). “It doesn’t matter to me whether someone is black or brown or purple or green” treats the colors associated with racial categories as though they are simply colors on a paint palette. Doing so detracts from the dominant/subordinate ranking of white/non-white racial groups and “camouflages socially significant differences of color in a welter of meaningless ones” (Frankenberg, 1993, p. 149). Saying “race doesn’t matter” confounds a personal value of equality with the actual circumstances of continued racial inequality. Colorblindness confuses the hoped for ideal with the means for getting there (Haney-López, 2006). Colorblindness wrongly assumes that because “race should not matter, it does not matter” (Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, and Browne, 2000, p. 60). The crucial fact that no genetically separate and distinct racial groups exist can lead to the mistaken belief that race, therefore, is unimportant. But the social practices of dominance and subordination associated with skin color and ancestry continue to function. With white racial dominance still firmly in place, not attending to

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race leaves racially stratified structures intact and colorblindness becomes a tool for preserving the racial status quo. 4. Racial Categories as Biological The commonly held assumption that racial categories are biological is a third factor that obscures white racial dominance. Although DNA analysis has firmly established that no genetically distinct racial groups exist (Templeton, 1998), a long history of scientific racism has supported the belief that distinct racial categories are a biological fact. Slavery, exploitation, and denial of the right to full citizenship have been justified by characterizing nonwhites as inherently lazy, ignorant, dangerous, criminal, irrational, over-sexed, and less than human. Conversely, Jeff Hitchcock notes how the privileges accorded to whites have been defended as the natural outcome for people who are inherently industrious, intelligent, capable, innocent, and good (2002, p. 20). At the same time, the way that whiteness functions makes it unlikely that white people will associate these characteristics with their membership in the white racial group. Because whiteness is equivalent to humanness, and white people see themselves as autonomous individuals, white people would not link these characteristics with racial group membership, but instead would see them as a reflection of their individual personalities or moral character. The assumption that racial categories are a biological given has provided a means of rationalizing racial disparities and explaining away the effects of racial stratification as simply natural occurrences. Erroneous ideas about distinct racial groups have been translated, not only into racialized self-identities, but also into racialized social arrangements taken-for-granted as ordinary and expected. The majority of white people express no objection to residential integration or to interracial marriage, yet their social interactions continue to be almost exclusively white (Bonilla-Silva, 2003). White people generally do not interpret this racial isolation and segregation from blacks in racial terms. They most often see it as the result of individual personal preferences, or assume things are just that way, without understanding how racial factors have contributed to these social arrangements, or how these responses reflect a racialized position—the colorblindness common among white people. 5. Moving from Separation to Connection To face the fear of what we might see if we begin to explore whiteness and the ways that we have been shaped by white racial dominance takes courage. Once we begin to see and to know, then what? What do we do? What, for example, should Kathy do with the awareness of how anxious and uncomfortable she feels just walking past a Latino man? Once we begin to see, those of us who are white often respond with urgency: if we can just figure out what to do we will once again feel more comfortable and in control.

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The first and most basic thing we can do is to stay with the process of beginning to see and to know. We can begin to move away from the ignorance, misunderstanding, and self-deception prescribed by white racial dominance and toward honest and open not-knowing. In her summary of the metaprivileges of whiteness, legal scholar Barbara Flagg wrote, “Whiteness not only is a set of unearned privileges, but the capacity to disguise those privileges behind structures of silence, obfuscation, and denial” (2005, p. 6). When we disrupt the evasion and silence that characterize whiteness, we are doing something. We are beginning to deconstruct the practices of whiteness, which is just what legal scholar john a. powell recommends: “For those of us with privilege, we must use those privileges we cannot reject to better understand, expose, and destabilize the structures and cultural norms that support and reinscribe whiteness” (2005, p. 44). The words of Rainer Maria Rilke in Letters to a Young Poet offer guidance on how to approach this unfolding process of destabilizing white racial dominance: Be patient toward all that is unsolved in your heart . . . try to love the questions themselves . . . Do not now seek the answers, which cannot be given you because you would not be able to live them. And the point is, to live everything. Live the questions now.” (1993, p. 34) Living the question does not mean waiting to take action in the world until we are “pure” and untainted by the influence of white racial dominance. Action that emerges from clear seeing is more effective, but the process of learning requires engagement and reflection. As powell said: it would be a serious error to see this as only an internal undertaking. This is part of the myth of the individual subject, that the self is internal and private. We must expose the social nature of the subject. This subject is not just held together by other subjects but also by our norms, practices, and institutions. (2005, p. 43). Although our fundamental human nature thrives on interrelatedness, the norms and practices of white racial dominance have shaped relationships between the United States and the rest of the world. Exploitation, colonization, boundary protection, and control have resulted in a disconnection from our global community, and fear and mistrust on the part of many around the world towards the United States. Until the United States comes to terms with the egocentric tendencies of whiteness outlined in this chapter, we will not be able to see ourselves and others clearly enough to repair the trust, and collaboratively participate in the global community, both of which are necessary for addressing issues of global security. Our willingness to begin to see whiteness, and to investigate how it shapes our ways of being in the world as individuals and as a country, lays a foundation for skillful action. Whether we focus on global economies, neighborhood in-

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volvement, or interactions with co-workers, what is most important is that we engage with the issue of whiteness, rather than perpetuate the obliviousness that supports its ongoing dominance. As activist Tim Wise suggests, “it is in the effort, the striving for equality and freedom that we become human” (Wise, 2005). Because we construct whiteness by exclusion and separation, it can never meet our needs for love and connection. I will end where I began: with love and the transformative power of love. Dare we open ourselves to our tenderhearted vulnerability? Are we willing to see and to know, even though it will require us to change our lives? Despite our fears, we need each other’s difference calling us into new ways of being, carrying us beyond our separate selves to reclaim the interconnectedness on which our sense of security and our survival depends.

Seven DETERRING TERROR Kevin C. M. Benson War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life and death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied. (Sun Tzu, 1963, p. 63) The words of Sun Tzu resonate in the twenty-first century as policy makers, historians, political scientists, and military officers study the changing conduct of war. Many well-intentioned and presumably knowledgeable observers maintain that state-on-state warfare is outdated. In their view, the clash of massed conventional armies has gone the way of the dinosaur. A corollary of this proposition is the proposition that deterrence is also a defunct concept in the twenty-first century. Nuclear-weapon nation-states have long relied on these weapons’ deterrent power Deterrence in this context can continue. But during the twenty-first century, warfare has changed from country versus country to country versus international stateless groups, many of which advocate the precept of individual or group immolation as the necessary alternative to accommodation. In this new context, our challenge is to find a workable theory of deterrence that extends into this new world. Can we deter terrorism? Terror is a method. This essay will propose a connection among preemption, demonstrated military capability, and engagement as an offensive form of positive deterrence. A theory of positive deterrence will discourage the resort to terrorism to attain political objectives. This is not a theory or strategy for one nation alone but for a community of nations. Global security requires the coordinated actions of the global community. The concepts of deterrence and compellence can be adapted to the new world of organized states, failing, and failed states. A new theory of deterrence requires that failing states be supported by the global community and failed states that either actively support terror groups or cannot control their territory be contained until they can be brought back into the community of nations. Thomas Schelling established the concept of deterrence in the nuclear age in Arms and Influence (1966). Schelling’s definitions and explanations of deterrence, compellence, and calculus of risk have informed decision makers in competing nuclear powers. Since these terms are so widely used, we will find returning to his definition of the terms helpful. We will examine whether we can extend these concepts into the twenty-first century and the global environment of terror.

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Schelling defined deterrence as, “to turn aside or discourage through fear, hence to prevent further action by fear of consequence” (ibid., p. 71). The art of deterrence involves establishing the conditions that make the deterrent credible, for example an announcement of a capability to respond to an overt act by an adversary and then waiting for the event to occur. The initiation of the counteraction is up to the adversary. Deterrence, in the nuclear state, is passive and indefinite. The adversary must understand the ability to respond to unwanted action exists and will be devastating. The counterpart of deterrence is compellence. Deterrence is passive but compellence requires action. Schelling wrote, “The threat that compels rather than deters often requires punishment be administered until the other acts, rather than if he acts” (ibid., p. 70). The art of compellence is in determining when, where, what, and how much action is required. The adversary must know the response is coming, know it is credible, and have a general idea of what it must do either to avoid the response or to make it stop. A response deemed not credible, even a response that is too harsh, will negate the value of the compellent action. Compellence and deterrence require a sophisticated understanding of the calculation of risk. Calculation of risk, the popular term being “risk calculus,” is a necessary supporting concept in the art of the application of deterrence and compellence. Both sides must have an intuitive understanding of the event that is unfolding or the long-term competition taking place. Nuclear weapons and a force of nuclear bombers, missiles, and submarines is, in Mahanian terms, a “fleet in being,” originally referring to a fleet kept in port to threaten instead of act against its enemy (Mahan, 1890). Nuclear-weapon states knew the strength of the deterrent force possessed by their adversaries. Still, diplomacy remains a large part of the art of existence in the nuclear age. The framework outlined by Schelling remains the framework of relations between rational nation-states armed with nuclear weapons. These states know that they must define and understand interests on both sides to avoid, unless intended, the confrontation that might lead to nuclear exchange. This “Great Game” of deterrence, compellence, and risk calculus went on during the twentieth century and will continue as long as nation-states have nuclear weapons. The question remains: How can we transfer these concepts to the twenty-first century and deter terrorist actions of transnational groups? The emerging state of affairs among nations, international movements, stateless groups, and others has been described as a clash of civilizations, contests between “haves” and “have nots,” or connected and unconnected states and regions (for detailed discussing of this emerging world from an American perspective, see Huntington, 1996; Robert D. Kaplan, “Old States, New Threats,” The Washington Post, 23 April 2006; Barnett, 2004; Friedman; 2005). The changing conduct of war affords tremendous strategic advantages in conducting conventional operations to the United States and its coalition partners. The conventional advantages can also translate into strategic and operational advantages in conducting counter-terror operations. Barry Posen (2003)

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offers an excellent explanation of United States’ strategic advantages. He says that America’s military technological advantages gave it “command of the commons.” This command is the starting point for the development of an extension of the concept of deterrence of terror. The commons Posen identifies are the air and sea space of the planet and aerospace over the planet. He wrote: Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the U.S. global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power, including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military, and political assistance. Command of the commons has permitted the United States to wage war on short notice even where it has had little permanent military presence. (ibid., pp. 8–9) The technological means available to American armed forces gives them unchallenged, for the foreseeable future, ability to prosecute war (ibid; The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002; Barnett, 2004). The post-Vietnam notion, which did perhaps possess some currency in the 1980s and even the 1990s, that America is a paper tiger and not willing to accept casualties or prosecute a fight with all necessary ferocity, was buried in the rubble of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, and in Fallujah, during 2005. Terrorists attacked the United States and no one on the planet should doubt America’s resolve. Yet challenges remain. Posen’s essay makes the point that command of the airspace above the surface of the planet coupled with the ability to execute precision attacks at extended ranges gives the United States a huge advantage in conventional military operations. The ability to do severe damage to the infrastructure, to command and control the armed forces of an adversary, while that adversary can do little to harm American forces, is unique in warfare. Many studies completed over the years show that while air power applied without ground support cannot determine the outcome of conventional wars, it remains a significant asset to the United States and its coalition partners (White, 1996; Pape, 1996; Press, 2001; Posen, 2003, p. 16). Just as the clash of massed conventional armies as the defining element of land warfare has diminished, so too has the titanic struggle of fleets at sea diminished as the defining element of naval warfare. Command of the sea allows the United States to project power and conduct commerce relatively unhindered by adversaries. This American strategic advantage also helps the rest of the industrial world to conduct trade. Even the re-appearance of pirates off the coast of Somalia and in the Straits of Malacca, while raising some insurance rates, has not materially affected sea-borne commerce, especially now that the United States Navy and others are fighting these pirates, reminiscent of the days of sail.

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The United States’ command of outer space also materially supports its command of the sea and air. Space-based platforms give us an advantage in the competition for the use of space-based assets to take photographs of the earth, intercept communications, monitor weather patterns, and assist in command and control of formations. Posen’s article deals mainly with how to select a grand strategic policy for United States’ diplomacy based on the selective use of American military power and selective engagement on the planet in areas that coincide with the vital national interests of the United States and its coalition partners. Commerce is crucial to all nations. International naval cooperation, supported by the United States’ command of the commons, can protect the sea-lanes for all. The world might be small in terms of the movement of information but the surface movement of ships and the number of strategic shipping points on the planet are too large for one navy to dominate for extended periods of time (Mike Mullen, “We Can’t Do It Alone,” Honolulu Advertiser, 29 October 2006). A natural starting point already exists for cooperation among a community of nations in terms of naval actions and cooperation (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Buzan, Jones, and Little, 1993). During the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, international flotillas of warships patrolled the Straits of the Bab al Mandeb in support of the United States Fifth Fleet. Nations must act together and put aside fear. In his book, The New World Strategy (1995), the late Harry Summers cited the Chinese strategist Wu Ch’i regarding the reaction of great powers to lone actors with access to powerful weapons. Wu Ch’i wrote: Now if there is a murderous villain hidden in the woods, even though one thousand men pursue him they all look around like owls and glance about like wolves. Why? They are afraid that violence will erupt and harm them personally. Thus one man oblivious to life and death can frighten one. (Ibid., p. 213) The world is akin to Wu Ch’i’s “one thousand men,” and the new and emerging threats we all face are the “murderous villains” in the form of groups that only fleetingly occupy territory. They do not possess easily detectable and vulnerable military assets. They operate in cyber-space and, in today’s changing global environment, the lone actor with access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or mass effect (WME) can indeed cause “one thousand men” to fear. The new deterrence must reduce this fear in developed nations and increase the fear within the “murderous villain.” He must understand that he risks his existence when he considers operations. The creation of this fear begins with communicating intent. In the concluding chapter of Arms and Influence, “The Dialogue of Competitive Armament,” Schelling writes, “First, don’t speak directly to him [the adversary], but speak seriously to some serious audience and let him overhear.

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Second, to get his ear, listen (1966, p. 286).” We in the developed world must listen to a number of people and agencies. The art of commitment in deterring terror and compelling behavior among those inclined to use terror will definitely require speaking to serious audiences and using means and language, the nonstate actor can receive and understand. Schelling was writing to educate the United States and the former Soviet Union in the delicate game of communicating interests between nuclear-weapon states. We must now take the same nuanced approach to communicating with nation-states and non-state actors about the advantages of engagement with the community of nation-states and the disadvantages of committing to a path of terror and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. A new theory of deterrence in the twenty-first century requires a combination of coordinated intelligence gathering, a community of nations with shared vital interests, and demonstrated capability to destroy threats to these interests and a strategy of positive engagement. The first step toward extending the benefit of deterrence is the establishment of a serious and practical means of sharing intelligence. This sharing of intelligence can build upon existing protocols from the Cold War, such as notification of troop movements and exercises, which were designed as confidence-building measures. Detection, analysis, and coordination of the range of actions, especially the lethal operations that establishes the credibility of deterrence, require a new level of intelligence sharing and analysis. Western countries currently have many intelligence sharing protocols, for example, under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) treaty. Effective worldwide deterrence of terror and WMD will require a judicious expanded sharing of “actionable intelligence”—intelligence that will support focused military action against established threats or groups on the verge of acquiring wider and more destructive weaponry. Sharing intelligence and analysis will require a confluence of interests. Some nations might never be allies and will always suspicious of one another. But some interests can be mutual, for example the prevention of the use of biological weapons, weapons of mass effect. Good, actionable intelligence collected from all means of information gathering techniques, from human intelligence to signals intelligence, must be analyzed and shared among participating nations. Sharing of intelligence and mutual interests in stability in the community of nation-states also requires the capability to conduct strike operations. Enlarging the community of functioning nation-states is in the best interests of the developed world from a number of angles from economic to general stability. In 1977, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye wrote Power and Interdependence, which is generally held to be the foundation piece of the neoliberal institutionalist school of thought. They held that international cooperation is possible because states will not want to damage their increasingly interconnected economies through war. In After Hegemony (1984), Keohane wrote to disprove the then-popular idea that stability in the international system required the presence of a hegemon, a leader state to which all others have to bow. G. John Iken-

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berry, another neoliberal, wrote After Victory (2001), focusing on what happens when wars end and order needs to be re-established. He developed the idea of what he calls “strategic restraint” to show that major powers shape the international system to benefit them, but do not do so in a way that will undermine the stability of the system in general. Long-term stability is more in their interest than short-term gains (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Keohane, 1984). The developed world must undertake multilateral positive action in the form of tangible engagement in states on the brink of failing. This requires more than mere pragmatic dealing with oppressive regimes for the sake of gaining access to natural resources. Engagement must be in the form of building political institutions that respect the broad range of human rights in the United Nations Charter along with positive economic engagement. Military engagement can also be a part of this effort in the form of incountry training to raise the standard of effectiveness of military forces to education opportunities in other countries. Exposure to the forces of the developed world, where the military is subordinate to the civilian government, will reinforce the developed world’s form of military professionalism. This positive engagement is the “carrot” of deterrence—as stable countries that can control their borders will not become havens for international groups that resort to violence. The “stick” of this policy of positive engagement is certain: if a failing country either cannot or will not accept engagement, and becomes a haven for groups using terror and seeking to acquire WMD or WME, the developed world will act. Developed nation-states will not trade with such states and they will undertake military operations within these countries if they detect groups that threaten the developed world’s vital interests. We must undertake decisive, compelling, but non-lethal actions such as trade embargoes, maritime interdiction operations, and information operations supported by focused, lethal operations. The compellence counterpart to deterrence must include preemptive actions against non-state actors that indicate the tendency to act against world wide vital interests or specific states, especially against those groups bent on acquiring WMD or WME. We can understand these preemptive actions to comprise coercion, as Robert Anthony Pape developed the concept. Robert Pape correctly defined the challenge of the post-Cold War strategist as the application of coercion. Coercion must be an element of a twenty-first century theory of deterring the use of terror. Nation-states can focus the use of air power and special operations forces, or even conventional land power, on the physical means of groups that threaten the vital interests of the community of nations. These groups threaten the global community. Taking advantage of the “commons” of the planet and the ability of the United States and other western powers to dominate these commons offers the global community a marked advantage in applying the coercive element of deterring the use of terror in a denial campaign as Pape discusses in Bombing to Win Air Power and Coercion in War (1996). Pape focuses on state warfare, but we can apply his ideas to states facing non-state actors. The denial of sanctuary

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through diplomatic and coercive means will dry up support for non-state actors that wish to threaten global vital interests. Confluence of interest and selective use of coercive force will foster increasing cooperation in establishing a stable global environment. This part of deterring terror will succeed if “the coercer can alter key components in the target state’s [international groups] decision calculus” (ibid., p. 38). This form of multilateral military cooperation will make best use of the special operations forces or conventional forces, air and ground, of a coalition of nation-states. These strike operations also take place under the protection of United States command of the commons. The United States’ ability to project power through the delivery of precision strike munitions and the ability to deliver, and more importantly sustain, troops in remote areas will complicate the existence of international groups that seek havens in unregulated areas of failing states. Demonstrated capability, strike missions into uncontrolled areas, will complicate the risk calculus of non-state actors. Strikes can be overt or covert, depending on the desired message the strike missions intend to send. Some groups are bent on destruction and are motivated by misguided zealots who pervert religion. We must realize that a hard-edged need to be able to kill in defense of vital interests will remain. Some groups exist with whom we can have no effective engagement other than engagement with fire in many forms. Any group that harbors the idea that it must acquire WMD must know that we will detect and destroy it; no alternative exists if the chosen path is violence. We must carefully think out the movement toward preemption as a part of deterrence, on policy, legal, and even moral grounds. The extension of deterrence into the realm of the community of nation-states against inter- and intranational terror groups will require a legal framework that will assist in the analysis of intelligence and taking the decision for preemptive action. In his book, Preemption (2006), Alan Dershowitz advocates the need to develop laws for preemption and prevention. The hallmark of a democracy is respect for and adherence to the law. Dershowitz is enough of a realist to understand that when people see adherence to law as the equivalent of national suicide, they will ignore the law. He proposes a pragmatic test for the decision to take preemptive action. This test is a series of questions posed to intelligence analysts, and military and political leaders prior to the decision to take preemptive action. This series of questions is amenable to modification over time based on experience with the second- and third-order effects of successful and unsuccessful preemptive strikes along a continuum from single strike missions to extended, regime-changing operations. He writes that while certain opponents are not subject to the “usual deterrent calculi of military costs and benefits,” the option of dropping the Damoclean sword could be the only realistic option. It must be a part of the arsenal, “since almost no enemy is completely oblivious to the threat of retaliation (ibid., p. 86). A community of nations acting in accord with a new theory of deterrence supported by an international system of jurisprudence for preemption and pre-

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vention will deter the use of terror by all but the most determined and fatalistic groups. Groups deterred from taking lethal action can be allowed the use of existing institutions, such as the United Nations. Institutions can facilitate talks between nation-states and non-state actors. Talks can be a means to address grievances once non-state groups realize there is no other means, especially lethal, that they could employ. Can we deter terrorist acts? If the potential terrorist can be convinced that more is lost than gained by initiation or continuation of a campaign of random violence mostly directed against civilians, then the concept of deterrence, compellence, and appreciation of risk calculus articulated by Schelling can be extended into the era of dealing with terror. The developed nations of the world must take positive steps to identify mutual vital interests, decide how to share “real-time” and actionable intelligence, propose a system of positive engagement with failing states, and a framework for the conduct of a range of strike operations all assisted by the United States command of the commons. Command of the commons allows a nuanced and new extension of the concepts of deterrence and compellence into the era of terror as an extension of nonstate actor policy. The United States and its coalition partners can extend these concepts into practical, pragmatic means that focus on results and establish conditions not only for great peace, but also for an extension of that peace into the remaining areas of the world, if not immediately, then over time. The world is a dangerous place. For the developed nations of the world and nations aspiring to that status, a level of vigilance is required to deter, and in some cases destroy, groups that threaten common vital interests and the stability that allows freedom to flourish. The cold calculus of war will always be a part of deterrence, for we will always need tough-minded professionals to carry the fight to adversaries who have little regard for their own lives or the lives of others. Deterrence can mitigate the effect of Wu Ch’i’s murderous villains. The cost is vigilance and determined action.

WRAP-UP OF PART TWO Karen Lombardi The notions of “Us” and “Them” serve as the basis for all of the chapters in this section. These categorizations, which separate people into differing sets of belonging, has splitting as its basis. Categorization, thinking of ourselves as black or white, Sunni or Shiite, Muslim or Jew, good people or bad people, is the act of dividing and then naming those divides. What we forget in this process is that, structurally, division or difference is operating simultaneously with homogeneity. As Randall E. Osborne, Paul Kriese, and Stan Friedman remind us in their chapter, that to recognize difference, we must ignore or minimize similarity. For example, to be able to recognize the categories Sunni and Shiite, we must first ignore the underlying category Muslim. The chapters ask questions such as, “how do we transform these potentially negative categorizations into positive ones?” “How do we stress our commonalities without losing our individuality and our connection to groups?” “How do we maintain the rights of the individual and the group without neglecting or destroying the common interests of all humanity?” “How do we develop a true tolerance for diversity, the sort of diversity that allows for common respect and living together in relative harmony?” Anré Venter expands the discussion of Us versus Them; he states that striving for self creates conflict because to know self requires that we categorize the “other.” The capacity to recognize difference, to categorize and name it, is the basis for linear, logical cognitive processes that assist in differentiating a sense of self. At the same time, when radical difference causes us to forget the underlying similarity, we lose the capability to connect through the recognition of shared identity. This tug-of-war between self and other is reminiscent of the quest for optimal distinctiveness described by Osborne, Kriese, and Friedman in their chapter on love and hate. Anré Ventner, from a social psychological perspective, speaks of the notion of the self as immersed in culture, developing from its dependence upon the reflections of others. He suggests that self-serving biases affect judgment. When we judge the behavior of others (the “not-me” category), we overestimate personal factors. We see others’ behavior as a function of who they are as people. For example, we tend to attribute the behavior of a person who gets into a fight as a function of being bully or a mean person. When we judge our own behavior (the “me” category), we overestimate situational or environmental factors. If we engage in a fight, we might claim to have been provoked, or that we were defending ourselves from harm. Venter gives a compelling example from the Abu Graib atrocities. When observers (the not-me category) were asked about the soldiers’ behavior, their actions were seen as a function of their per-

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sonalities. When the soldiers themselves (the me category) were asked about their behavior, they maintained it was a function of the situation—they were stressed, they were just following orders, or they were in overcrowded conditions. This is powerful experimental data for the view that we tend to vilify the Other while excusing the self. Under negative conditions, what I do, I perceive to be extenuated or justified by circumstances outside myself; what the other does I perceive to be caused by something negative in their personhood. In psychoanalytic terms, this mechanism of attribution error is termed projection. What we do not wish to accept in ourselves we project onto the Other, who serves as a receptacle for our own negativity. The greater the degree of projection, the greater is the potential for atrocity and for terrorism. Karen Lombardi discusses the formation of the group as an us and them achievement that can be a paranoid and dangerous one because some people fear that the elements excluded from belonging will come back to attack the me or the us. In this way, splitting, and the formation of individual and group identity, forms the basis for the vilified Other. On a larger societal level, power relations extend the danger of vilification. The “not-me” or the “not-us then becomes the less-than-us, in some way inferior by virtue of being dirty or dangerous or not quite human. Terri A. Karis invites us to examine the unexamined in ourselves, to notice the unnoticed, taken-for-granted structural background of our lives. Using Toni Morrison’s metaphor of the fish in the fishbowl, we, as the fish, do not see the fishbowl that instantiates our boundaries or the water that we occupy. These dominant and yet unseen structures hide their dominance by their invisibility, their taken-for-granted quality. We must become aware of those structures of dominance, which require deconstruction and renewed expansion for us to come to a truer place where community is possible. Paradoxically, the denial of boundaries, limit, and difference contributes to the ongoing status of the boundaries we deny. The false liberalism of political correctness serves as an example of such denial. Those of us who do not wish to think of ourselves as racist may deny that racism exists. We perceive that we are colorblind. We may believe that all people are individuals and that the strength and will of our individuality is what defines us (not race, class, gender, religion, or any other category). Yet a young white woman who believes so, walking down a dark street, finds herself crossing to the other side in an anxious sweat to avoid encountering a black man heading toward her, she would have come face to face with the failure of her colorblindness. Karis calls instances such as these, “racial moments,” which are opportunities for recognition and acknowledgment. In bringing our anxiety and discomfort forward, they allow us to examine the boundaries of the fishbowl and the substance of the water in which we swim. In the “racial moment,” our recognition may allow us to re-cognize—to think anew about what we thought we knew.

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Perhaps the resurgence of fundamentalist religions, with their emphasis on absolutes, is a way of dealing with the ambiguity and uncertainty that marks the post-modern era. Osborne, Kriese, and Friedman, examining the paradox of religion, stress that religion can provide coherence, order, and meaning to that which is unknowable; it tends to reduce or eliminate ambiguity that we need to tolerate to accept diversity. The religions that develop narratives of love, equality, justice, and forgiveness also support crusades, pogroms, witch-hunts, and war. Their analysis suggests that the need to avoid existential anxiety and uncertainty leads to a form of moral sadism, which allows us to feel righteous and holy while doing harm to others. This sort of straight-jacketed moralism constrains the believer and harms the “infidel,” leading to an “escape from freedom,” where living by strictures and obedience to religious “law” removes the personal necessity of judgment, compassionate concern, and the search for truth. The paradox of religion is that the greater its claims know the word of God, the less space is left for the word of an Other God. Other Gods and other words can exist only in a negative form, a demonized form. We can view radical Muslims, Catholics, Jews, and even Muslims of other sects as infidels. In this paradoxical way, religion can form the basis for hatred of difference. Kevin C. M. Benson’s chapter moves toward replacing negative deterrents to war and terror with positive deterrents based on a notion of a global community instead of nation-states. Security operations based on exclusion and separation are fragile and require constant policing. In our increasingly global community, countries, and individuals must increasingly more often acknowledge their interdependence. The recognition of mutual interests and a willingness to work together toward common goals is central to the operation of positive deterrents. What is the power of the Other? It is not simply the alien or the unfamiliar, which might provoke ordinary curiosity in us. It is the Other within ourselves, the negative aspects of ourselves that are internally feared, hated, disavowed, that is dislocated and projected onto other Others outside ourselves. We find the power of the Other in the negativity of ourselves. The psychic mechanisms of projection and radical allow us to perpetuate violence instead of peace, difference over similarity, revenge over forgiveness, war over dialogue and negotiation. This paranoid response to terror begets more terrorism.

Part Three MOVING TOWARD AN INCLUSIVE WORLDVIEW

INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE C. Dominik Güss Part Three discusses ways of moving toward an inclusive worldview—crucial steps toward a global community—from the perspectives of three authors. Sanaa Mounir Sadek highlights the role of language in cross-cultural understanding. John M. Davis focuses on the concept of social justice, offering examples from different countries. C. Dominik Güss, Teresa Tuason, and Vanessa Teixeira develop a model explaining the underlying factors influencing someone’s decision to become a suicide bomber, arguing that understanding is a first step in dealing with this phenomenon. These three chapters have in common an interdisciplinary focus addressing the need to deal with globalization’s inherent challenges from different disciplines. In her chapter, “Effect of Globalization on Teaching Arabic Literature in the United States of America,” Sadek talks about the United State’s perception of the Middle East and the Middle Eastern reaction to globalization. As a native of Egypt teaching Arabic in the United States, Sadek has had unique experiences in both worlds. She points out that American interest in the Middle East grew sharply after 11 September 2001. Such issues as domestic violence, Sharia, state power, and the role of religion in Arabic societies, human rights under Islam, the role of women, and gender equality in Islamic states present puzzling questions for American politicians and citizens alike. Sadek shows that the political form of a Western secular democracy did not work successfully in many Arab nations. In the Middle East, skepticism towards globalization is common. Globalization has economical, political, and cultural consequences; the push-pull polarization between integration and separation results in great tension. Arabs experience the dilemma of protecting their unique cultural heritage in the face of global pressure. Ultimately, Arabs view globalization and perceive foreign influence as dangerous—as a threat to their identity. In addition, Sadek highlights the United States’ different political approaches toward the Middle East, from simplistic aggressive thinking and acting after 11 September 2001 to a more cooperative approach. She discusses two examples from recent history: the United States-Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA), with the goal of increasing trade between the United States and Middle Eastern countries; and the National Security Language Initiative (NSLI), addressing the need for skilled professionals with competencies in languages critical to national security in the United States, such as Arabic. Sadek ends her chapter with suggestions for preparing for an increasingly more global community, with dialogue as her first recommendation. This dialogue will be long and difficult, but necessary. Despite its distance from the United States, many hundreds of thousands of Islamic guest workers and immi-

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grants are part of Western societies. Ways of facilitating this dialogue include learning Arabic as a foreign language and, through the language, learning about Arabic culture. She also suggests that instead of imposing Western political systems that mostly produce hostility among Arabs, collaboration through trade might be a more promising approach for the future. A liberal democracy that uses state lotteries, gambling, and alcohol sales to generate income, and that sometimes legalizes prostitution, is simply unacceptable to many Muslims believers. John Davis’s chapter, “International Perspectives on Social Justice: Essentials for the Effort toward Global Security,” is about social justice in different countries. Perceptions of social justice and just practices are key determinants for peaceful living that transcends community and national borders. Davis shows that a repressive system of social justice based on punishment is dominant in many Western countries. (The United States, for example, is the country with the highest number of prisoners in the Western world.) Other countries such as South Africa focus more on reintegration. Davis shows how difficult it is to define the term “social justice” and discusses the different levels related to it from the individual level, the community level, the state and national levels, to the international level. He also refers to theories from various disciplines explaining different forms of social justice, for example, distributive, retributional, or restorative. He illustrates nicely the complexity and difficulty of social justice in several examples, one referring to post World War II Germany. At that time, the conflict escalated between the Rote Armee Fraction and Nazis back in powerful positions, indirectly supported through the Marshal Plan. Davis draws parallels to the situation in Iraq, such as the United States’ broken promises of rebuilding the country. Illustrative examples include disbanding the Iraqi military and police forces then reinstating them later. In another example, Davis refers to the outdated composition of the United Nations Security Council. One ray of hope is that research has shown that people are willing to accept imperfect solutions if they perceive the processes and procedures that led to them as fair. Thus, even if humankind often cannot achieve just solutions, we should still attempt to engage in just procedures. Güss, Tuason, and Teixeira offer “A Cross-Cultural Theory of Terrorism and What to Do about It.” They attempt to answer the question of why someone becomes a suicide terrorist. The chapter starts with Western misconceptions still dominant in media reports and then develops a model highlighting factors (1) on the socio-political-cultural level, (2) on the individual motivational level, (3) on the level of the terrorist cell and related group processes, (4) related to rewards, and (5) related to mechanisms to eradicate guilt or doubts. They posit that these factors, together and in their interaction, can help explain the decision to become a suicide bomber. They base their explanatory model on published speeches of terrorist leaders Osama bin Laden and Abu Masab al-Zarqawi, statistics on terrorism, published interviews with Palestinian suicide bombers caught

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in Israel before they could carry out their missions, and an interview with a young man in Iraq who explained his decision to become a suicide bomber. From their findings, the authors discuss possible measures we could take to reduce the number of suicide terrorists. These measures are primarily related to the local Arab governments and their international relations. They propose outsiders should not impose peace-building processes. Instead, these processes should start in the local communities. Another possible measure could be to promise terrorists reduced sentences or amnesty to make leaving the terrorist group more attractive. Other measures have to address the wide support for suicide missions in some populations. Further measures include strengthening the position of moderate Islamic religious leaders, providing humanitarian support, and rebuilding destroyed infrastructure. Ultimately trust has to grow and hopefully then the former enemy can be seen as a human being with similar problems, needs, and desires for a better world.

Eight

A “NON-MEDIA” LOOK AT THE MIDDLE EAST: ENHANCING GLOBAL SECURITY THROUGH EXPOSURE AND UNDERSTANDING Sanaa Mounir Sadek 1. Background As the pursuit of al Qaeda and America’s confrontation with Iraq intensifies, Arabic-speaking educators, Islamic organizations, and universities and schools across the United States, are straining to respond to requests by students and the public for information and instruction about the language and culture of Islam. (Examples include Harvard, University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), and Columbia.) An educated Egyptian and professor specialized in teaching Arabic language and literature, I feel as if I am standing in the middle of different thoughts, clashing and struggling against each other. On the one hand, I come from Egypt (Middle Eastern, Arabic, and under-developed). I feel that changes happening in the world, economically, politically, and culturally, threaten my nationality. As professor of Arabic language and literature in the United States, I know surely that I am personally profiting from these changes because I am a native speaker of the Arabic Language and living in the United States of America. Globalization has economic roots and political consequences, but it has also brought into focus the power of culture in this global environment—the power to bind and to divide at a time when the tensions between integration and separation tug at every issue relevant to international relations. The impact of globalization on culture and the impact of culture on globalization merit discussion. Unfortunately, many Arabic institutions are not responding to public demands. Instead of achieving a deeper understanding of the Arab World, most Arabic teaching institutions focus on materials that lead students to look at the Arab World as an incubator for terrorism. Students do not learn the deeper nuances of the culture that would lead to an enlightened understanding of the Arab world, instead they gain a limited understanding of the region based on limited political goals. (For a brief history of these issues see Hahn, 2004.) In this chapter, I am aiming to show that studying Arabic, with cultural and literature materials that highlight the richness of Arab culture, will lead to im-

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proved future relations between the West and the Arab world. I am not trying to avoid political issues or disregard them, but my concern is about dealing with the literature and cultural aspects apart from politics to understand the people and their needs. Language, literature, and culture are representative of the mindset of people everywhere. Arabic language, Arabic literature, and studying Arabic culture are key to understanding why Gamal Abdel Nasser was a great hero in the mind of Arabs but a dictator in the minds of the West. Similarly, it can help us understand why now Islam represents a new identity, with some Arabs dealing with this identity through modesty while others, such as the militant Islamic groups, use this identity as a weapon against the West and against America. Historically, most Americans have been only dimly aware of Islam and its liturgical language, Arabic, but this is not the first time that national interest has built to a fever. The 1979 hostage crisis in Iran led to a burst of the study of Muslim world, and the federal government made more money available to train teachers of Middle Eastern languages and for study abroad. By the mid-1980s, American government and public interest had waned, at the time of the Persian Gulf War (Sam Dillon “Suddenly, a Seller’s Market for Arabic Studies,” The New York Times Metro, 19 March 2003). Later, during 2002, the measurements of improvements toward globalization in the Middle East showed that most of the countries of the area clustered towards the bottom. The most globalized country in the area of the Middle East was Israel, and Tunisia was the only other Middle Eastern country in the top forty (White House Press Secretary, 2004). On 9 May 2003, President George W. Bush set out his vision of establishing a United States-Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by 2013. The main focus of MEFTA is working with countries in the region of the Middle East in graduated steps to increase their trade and investments with the United States in particular, and the world economy in general. A critical component of this program is the assistance provided to these countries to implement domestic reforms, institute the rule of law, protect private property rights, and crate a foundation for openness, economic growth, and prosperity. President Bush said of MEFTA: Across the globe, free markets and trade have helped defeat poverty, and taught men and women the habits of liberty. So I propose the establishment of a USA-Middle East Free Trade Area within a decade, to bring the Middle East into an expanding circle of opportunity, to provide hope for the people who live in that region. (Ibid.) Obviously, President Bush here began to take a different direction in his policy toward the Middle Eastern countries than before and contrary to many of his declarations he made at the beginning of his presidency. Following are some of his previous declarations on different occasions and places. He said on 16 August 2001, just one month before the attack of 11 September 2001:

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The true threats facing the United States are threats from terrorist nations, nations that they call rogue nations, nations that are developing weapons of mass destruction that may be pointed at us, may be pointed at our friends, the Israelis, or other allies we have, to hold us hostage, conduct international blackmail. (2001) At that time, as a direct result of what Bush stated, most Arabs understood that Israelis were the only friends of America in the Middle East. I was in Egypt then and personally experienced the reaction of the Arabic media and the people in the street. We must examine what Bush said even more carefully, terrorist “nations” not terrorist “groups,” which illustrates his vision of the Middle East at the beginning of his presidency. On 8 March 2002, Bush said: Look, here’s the thing. We’re fighting leaders of the murderers that sent people to commit suicide missions. They’re real brave. They say, you go ahead and commit suicide, I’m going to find a cave . . . we’ll send youngsters to their death; in the meantime I’m going to try to find a deep cave somewhere. And so when you fight people like that, you never know. (2002b) Bush mentioned on 18 November 2002, “The threats we face are global terrorist attacks. That’s the threat. And the more you love freedom, the more likely it is you’ll be attacked” (2002a). On 9 February 2003, he said: Prior to September the 11th, there was apparently no connection between a place like Iraq and terror. Oh, sure, he had run some terrorist networks out of his country, and that was of concern to us. But it was very difficult to link a terrorist network and Saddam Hussein to the American soil. As a matter of fact, it was very difficult to link any attack on the American soil, because prior September the 11th, we were confident that two oceans could protect us from harm. In 2006, President Bush announced a National Security Language Initiative (NSLI) for which he requested $114 million for the fiscal year 2007, to address the need for skilled professionals with competency in languages critical to United States national security (2006). In it, under the direction of the President, the Departments of Education, Defense, and State and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence would undertake a comprehensive national plan to expand foreign language education beginning in early childhood and continuing throughout formal schooling and into the workforce. The NSLI was to have three broard goals to address weaknesses in American teaching and learning of foreign languages, especially critical need languages, such as Arabic, Chinese, Russian, Hindi, and Farsi:

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SANAA MOUNIR SADEK (1) Expand the number of Americans mastering critical need languages and start at a younger age. (2) Increase the number of advanced-level speakers of foreign languages, with an emphasis on critical need languages. (3) Increase the number of critical need language teachers and resources available to them.

Meanwhile, observers see that the countries in the region of the Middle East are currently ill prepared to thrive in the world system, and they focus on some important issues such as: (1) Massive population increases; (2) A youth explosion especially between ages twenty to twenty-four; (3) A failure to achieve global competitiveness; (4) A steady decline in non-petroleum exports; (5) A decline in agricultural production; (6) Broad problems in integrating women effectively into the work force; (7) A lack of the opportunities of work and the tensions created because of loosing hope to have any future; (8) Little regional trade; (9) Increasing water scarcity, due to which many Arabic countries have become permanent importers of food; and (10) Problems of housing and education are also included in the main problems facing people in the Middle East. (Looney, 2004) Considering the policy of the United States toward the Middle East, and what observers of the region see, we must ask, should the Middle Eastern countries focus on economic reforms or improved governance? Are both types of reforms of relatively equal importance?” Are some reforms more effective in the economic area while are others best for improving the technological aspect of globalization? Will the MEFTA effectively work on improving the relationship between America and the Middle East? Does any relation exist between MEFTA and expanding the teaching of the Arabic Language and Literature in the United States? Finally, did the expansion of teaching the Arabic language come mainly as the result of the threat of terrorism? In the economic realm, the highly globalized countries have the biggest lead in eliminating the informal black markets, developing sound banking and finance sectors, and in implementing good trade policy. The questions raised in this regard are, what can we expect from desperate countries that belong to the group that are not highly globalized? What can Middle East export to the world and to the United States in particular? Do you think that the policy of the United States toward the Middle East is based on a solid foundation of understanding the history and the cultural aspects that created the area, or do Americans clearly understand the mentality of the Arabs?

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2. The Middle East and Its History For the average Westerner, the Middle East conjures up exotic images reinforced by popular media (van der Veer and Munsh, 2004): Men with long beards waving guns and shouting “Death to America” or “God is great!” or faceless women covered in long black robes walking aimlessly in dirty streets. The Middle East is often associated with such clichés and catch phrases that include terrorism, suicide bombers, nuclear proliferation, corrupt regimes, dictators, unfair elections, and human rights violations. These images and perceptions often equate the unfamiliar with oppression and violence. Problems exist, but understanding those problems requires more than a snapshot view of the Modern Middle East. Constant bombardment in the media by images and discourses that fail to accurately convey some key, relevant issues in the region make the reality of the Arab world difficult for us to understand. Admittedly, conditions within the Middle East are not encouraging—poverty, weak democracy, human rights often violated, lack of popular reaction—but many historical factors lay behind these bad conditions, not only one. The annual “Freedom around the World” report by Freedom House reveals much about the deficiencies of democracy and freedom in the Middle East. During 2005, of forty-seven Muslim countries in the world, only ten qualify as Muslim democracies, and none of those democracies are in the core Arabic-speaking countries. Most analysts focus on Islam and its inability to relate to the modern world. The central inquiry for us is about the policy makers and the media that affecting the decision of many Americans who remain transfixed to their television sets and daily newspapers, watching the drama unfold in distant desert lands. Many individuals watch these events unfold (as portrayed by the media) and wonder, “What is the problem within the Middle East?” The confusion is created from supposing all Arabs are Muslims have the same ideas and belong to one culture, the culture of Islam. Clarifying this confusion is quite easy and lies in understanding and accepting that while Islam is one religion, Muslims are different, belonging to different states, facing different issues and challenges. By centralizing Islam as the main reason for the backwardness of the Middle East, thinkers are drawing attention away from the real causes and historical roots of the problems in this region, and creating more enemies. R. Stephen Humphrey, in Between Memory and Desire (1999), makes a valuable contribution to the way that we can understand the modern Middle East. Middle Easterners are trapped between deeply felt and ardently sought aspirations for freedom, prosperity, dignity, and cultural authenticity on the one side, and bitter memories that suffocate these aspirations on the other. Humphrey draws a key distinction between Islam and politics in the Middle East. He makes the point that the present day Middle East is a very recent political development heavily influenced by the politics of European imperialism between the two World Wars. Islam is more detached from current political governance than some often claim.

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During the twentieth century, many political leaders in the Middle East openly proclaimed secular policies as the best way for the revitalization of culture and society so that the people of the Middle East could again take their rightful place in the forefront of world civilizations. Dating to the earlier part of the twentieth century, we can see this rise of secularism in the politics of many countries of the Middle East. In Egypt for example, Nasser and Anwar El Sadat encouraged newer approaches to Egyptian and Arab identity. They even jailed members of outwardly expressive Muslim groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. In Saudi Arabia, a strict Wahhabi belief runs contrary to the common belief in the other Arabic countries of North Africa. Islam often gained popular support as an alternative to the moral ambiguities and oppressive regime of the region. Pan-Arabism and socialism failed to make good on its promise to the Arabic world. As policies failed within this framework, and with poor economic conditions and suppressing social dissatisfaction with oppression, Islamic reformers gained momentum. In Egypt, Islamic activists have promised good things; their platform has attracted many adherents and sympathizers. Despite rapid secularization in Egypt during the early part of the twentieth century, the population remained committed to Islamic roots. Most Arab leaders come from poor sectors of their countries. Nasser and Sadat were sons of peasants and laborers. Hafez al-Assad, President of Syria for three decades, from 1970 until his death in 2000, was also from a poor family. Each of these leaders appealed to the masses by appearing to be the authentic voices of the population. Despite autocratic rule, the people of the Middle East continue to look for new ways of developing stronger institutions and governments that have more accountability. We should see developments in the Middle East, such as constitutional reforms during the earlier part of the twentieth century, in a positive light. In many ways, these reforms demonstrate the resilience of the Arabic peoples. The Middle East has survived foreign invasion, internal revolt, and innumerable economic crises: so in what sense can we think of the Middle East countries as weak? Instead of viewing the Middle East in terms of its strength and resilience in the face of adversity, many, especially Westerners, view it as a weak, failed region. For example, the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Nasser in 1956 affected politics not only in Egypt but also in the entire Middle East for a long time. Nasser was a great hero in the eyes of the Arab leaders and the people greatly respected him. He had a spiritual influence on the people in the whole area of the Middle East. But in the West and to the Americans, according to the modern political measurements, he was a great dictator. I mentioned the nationalization Suez Canal by Nasser as only one example, but many differences exist between West and East in how they understand the meaning of identity and dignity.

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3. United States of America and the Culture of the Middle East in the Shadow of Globalization Countries in the Middle East wish to improve their integration into the world system; currently, improvements in the various areas of governance have the greatest pay-off. In this sense, the United States’ approach developed in its recently proposed broader Middle East initiative, focusing on democracy and governance issues, appears to be on the right track. The task is enormous; it faces considerable resistance throughout the region. Some of this resistance may stem from the sizeable imbalance in the way the region has advanced liberalization. These countries have made much more progress in the economic freedom area relative to the various dimensions of governance. Undoubtedly, this has resulted in many of the key countries’ exposure to some of the rigors of international competition. Meanwhile, these same countries do not have the domestic institutions capable of enabling them to take advantage of the opportunities opened up by increased integration into the world system. This has resulted in a negative perception of globalization throughout most of the region of the Middle East. Several years ago, and before 11 September 2001, the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) view of globalization in the Middle East presented in a bleak picture. This bleak picture, especially after 11 September 2001, created the need in America to understand some of Arabic cultural factors: (1) The relationship between domestic violence and Sharia (Shari’a), the body of Islamic religious law, in the Middle East, which is now one of the most important topics relating to Arabic Literature, and of interest to American students. Sharia provides the legal framework for administering family relations and a religious-cultural framework for social norms and values in Muslim societies and between the people of the Arabic countries. (2) State power deployed to regulate gender and family relations, as well as the role of religion in society. (3) Islamization and human rights: Since the 1970s, Islamist movements have mobilized in many countries across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia to demand a turn to Islam by the establishment of a system of government that adheres to and enforces Sharia. In some countries, Islamists represent an opposition movement; in others, they represent an influential constituency; in a few, they have assumed control of the state. Regardless of the relationship between Islamist movements and regimes, a generally shared commitment to the preservation of patriarchal family relations exists. Even in contexts where Islamists constitute a hostile opposition, states often are willing to accommodate their demands on matters of gender and family relations as a means of placating them. (4) State formation and how it affects the position of women in society: The state mediates gender relations through the law and attempts to

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SANAA MOUNIR SADEK foster or inhibit social changes, to maintain existing arrangements, or to promote greater equality for women in the family and the society. (5) Debates over the legitimacy of gender equality have been especially vigorous in Muslim societies and display some common patterns related to Sharia. The Qur’an, which believers accept as the literal word of God and eternally applicable, contains many verses that would appear to be inescapably discriminatory toward women. So, too, do many of the Hadith (sayings by and stories about the Prophet Muhammad). Yet there are also many Quranic and Hadith passages that establish the equality of men and women. These apparent contradictions lend themselves to multiple readings, claims, and counter-claims about what Islam prescribes for women. (Looney, 2004; Hajjar in Halper, 2006)

The use of Sharia to administer family relations contributes to some commonalities in gender relations across Muslim societies, notably the privileging and empowerment of men over women within the context of the family. Despite these commonalities, significant variations also exist. The state is the most important variable for understanding variations across societies, since, during the modern era, the state is the primary arbiter of law. Despite having the Arabic language offered for study in some American universities since the 1950s, the number of students were taking Arabic classes had always been relatively small until the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington during 2001. Then the attacks of 11 September 2001 sparked the curiosity of the American youth about Arabic as a language to understand the Arabic culture. Some American universities, which had been offering Arabic since 1987, experienced a 100 percent increase in enrollment after 11 September 2001. At the same time, many universities and smaller colleges began offering Arabic for the first time. Mahmoud M. Al-Batal, who teaches Arabic at Emory University in Atlanta, says that currently about 12,000 American students are studying Arabic as opposed to about 5,000 students across the country just before 11 September 2001. Many Americans are also traveling to the Middle East to enrich their understanding. To meet the demands, schools that already offer Arabic are expanding old programs, scrambling, sometimes in vain, to find qualified teachers. For example, Vermont’s Middlebury College recruits from Syria and Egypt to staff its summer language program. Teaching Arabic in America is now a challenge for schools to meet. Many American students realize that they have to study Arabic for a number of years to become fluent. Among the many students studying Arabic to enhance careers in business or government, approximately 20 percent are heritage speakers with a purely cultural or personal interest. In the meantime, the Muslim students in America mostly study Arabic for religious reasons, not economic or political quest. They see themselves as a bridge to connect people and

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cultures of the Islamic world with the American public, and they see the language as critical to achieve this goal (MacDonald, 2005). We have to admit that, like the rest of the world, globalization has deeply affected Muslim societies and Muslims everywhere. The lives of their people have been changed, as have their thought patterns and sense of creative expression. I am speaking here of the intellectual and moderate Muslims who believe that the Qur’an is against violence (Akyol and Baran, 2006). Some of these Muslims have welcomed the changes of globalization, while others still worry about the nature of the transformations taking place and the capacity of those affected to respond appropriately. One of the underlying causes of such anxiety has been a multifaceted cultural concern about how to protect a unique heritage in the face of global pressure; to uphold religious traditions; to preserve linguistic purity; to defend social institutions; and ultimately, to maintain a viable identity in the midst of a rapidly changing global environment. Undoubtedly, the horrific image of 11 September 2001 triggered an enormous wave of solidarity with the United States, within and outside its borders. In foreign policy terms, the world became energized to make progress in addressing terrorism. For a while, the Bush administration said that the military option was just one among many. We began to hear, “we have to seek dialogue, we have to seek agreement.” We knew that Western countries could no longer be separated from Muslim societies because they had Muslims living within them. They were themselves internally globalized; therefore, seeking dialogue became an urgent need in this networked world. Global terrorism created a kind of global community sharing a common fate, something we had previously considered impossible. But this represented a moment of decision, an occasion to take decisions that could be applied in quite diverse ways. Incidentally, I regret that the European position, which can be summed up in the maxim, “make law, not war,” was not more clearly expressed in geopolitical terms. We have also experienced how difficult it can be to achieve understanding between cultures as a plain fact; it needs a lot of effort from all sides to understand each other or minimally to be aware of each other’s needs. For example, East Asia, dominated by Japan and China, and which now comprises about 50 percent of the global economy, involves many competing interests within broad political and economic traditions radically different from those of Western societies. The recently expanding teaching of the Japanese and Chinese languages in the United States reflects the need to integrate with these two big countries and to understand the power behind their superiority in the free trade field. On the contrary, the expanding of Arabic language teaching came because of terrorism and a different kind of dangerous power exported from the Muslim countries and the Middle Eastern Area. The Middle Eastern problem now is not solely a conflict between Arabs and Israelis. It has become more complicated; to clarify it, we need to understand the

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mentality of the people and how Islamists gained momentum. Such understanding will not be easy without learning the language and the literature. 4. Conclusion Globalization for the people in the Third World in general and in the Middle East in particular is still a scary word. It means “foreign” which has become a synonym for “danger.” For the first time in history, virtually every individual at every level of society can sense the impact of international changes.

Nine INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL JUSTICE: ESSENTIALS FOR THE EFFORT TOWARD GLOBAL SECURITY John M. Davis 1. Introduction Can we achieve global security without greater progress toward social justice? Today, injustice anywhere in the world should concern people everywhere. In “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” Martin Luther King, Jr. (1963) wrote, “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.” Because perceptions of social injustice and violent social movements have strong psychological links, perceptions of injustice result in threats to global security. An understanding of social justice and a deep concern for it are essential aspects of our effort to promote global safety. While some philosophers may assume that social justice can become a single globally recognized, universally desired concept, the current reality is that different cultures vary in their beliefs, assumptions, and traditional practices concerning social justice. Because this is so, as technological and economic forces increase the confrontation of the world’s cultures, the potential for conflict between differing cultural views of social justice escalates and poses threats to global security. The challenge is to better understand and respect these differing views and to seek avenues for cooperation, consensus, and possible synthesis. This chapter deals with the psychological link between social justice and the effort toward global security. First, I give a brief history of the age-old quest for justice and describe modern efforts toward a universal system of social justice. Then, I review the way social psychology has examined the connection between social justice and social movements, and the relationship of these to global security. I use the example of pre-and post-World War II Germany to illustrate the connection between perceptions of injustice and support for violent ideologies. Next, I provide case studies of attempts to achieve justice in three different cultures. Finally, I note some promising developments from around the world. 2. The Age-Old Quest for Justice The desire for social justice is not new. Injustice has been a problem since the beginning of recorded history. For thousands of years, philosophers, religious

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thinkers, and others have been concerned with issues of justice. Plato’s Republic deals with the appropriate relationship between the individual and the state. The Old Testament makes many references to the importance of justice. For example: You shall appoint for yourselves judges and officers . . . and they shall dispense true justice to the people. You shall not pervert the course of justice or show favor, nor shall you accept a bribe; for bribery makes the wise man blind, and the just man give a crooked answer. Justice, and justice alone, you shall pursue, so that you may live and occupy the land which the Lord your God has given you. (Deut. 16:18–20, New English Bible). Islam also addresses the subject of justice. When, in response to the 11 September 2001 attacks, the United States labeled its counter-terror mission “Operation Infinite Justice,” Muslim-Americans took issue with the label, stating that only Allah could determine justice. Respectful of the Muslim point of view, the government relabeled the mission, “Operation Enduring Freedom” (Hegtvedt, 2005). We find wisdom in the old African saying that the same law for the lamb and the lion is not justice. Though understood in different ways in different cultures, social justice is crucial to everyone. Injustice—including perceptions of injustice—often leads to efforts to restore justice. Issues of social justice are critical for harmony and well-being, and key to the larger domain of global security. Why have many efforts to achieve social justice been less than successful? Competing human motives help explain this. Normal self-interest, concern for justice, and possession of unjust advantage can be difficult to reconcile. Today, because of its close relationship to global security, the attainment of social justice has become essential—not only in individual countries but on an international scale. We must find ways to bring together the varying concepts and find a course acceptable to all. 3. A Modern International System of Justice: The Challenges First, an examination of the tension between the political science philosophies that seek to articulate a universal system of social justice and the present-day reality noted above will be useful. According to H. Richard Friman (2007), three major theoretical approaches share the assumption of the universality of the concept of justice. These approaches used by political scientists have greatly influenced modern scholarship on global justice: John Rawls theory of justice, Cosmopolitanism, and the English School approach. Rawls argues for an ideal social contract in a well-ordered domestic society. He recognizes, however, that, if such a system is ever to exist at the global level, the path to it must begin from the variety of existing local practices. Cosmopolitanism focuses on the individual, as a global citizen, with little regard to any one specific society. The English School is primarily concerned with justice at the level of nations (international relations) (Davis, 2008a). These three ap-

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proaches illustrate the challenge of reconciling the many different levels of conceptualizing social justice. In addition to this challenge, we should recognize that the different levels are interconnected. Should justice be based at the village (community), state or provincial, national or federal level, or the international level? Is justice to be restorative or retributive (Lundy, 2007)? Is justice to be communal or individual? Should the systems and traditions of each country or nation be dominant within that country or should an international (global/universal) system be overriding? If based on the international level, then what is the model for this international system of justice? Is the United Nations (UN) or the UN Security Council the answer? Like the League of Nations before it, the UN was established by victors following a war and is increasingly recognized as not truly representative of the world’s people or its nations. Therefore, this is not a particularly satisfactory model if measured against the yardstick of social justice. For example, why should the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (those with veto power), be the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China? (The remaining ten positions rotate and have no veto power). The answer is that these five countries were the victorious allies during World War II. In today’s very different world, should that remain the deciding factor? Why should France, with a population of 50 million, have a permanent seat while India, with a population of 1.2 billion, has not? Both Japan and Germany have greater roles in the global economy, and both Indonesia and India have much larger populations. 4. Varieties of the Justice Experience The concept of justice has nebulous boundaries. Disciplines other than political science also contribute to the literature on global justice. Religion, philosophy, political science, psychology, and popular culture all influence the meaning of justice. Many perspectives contribute terms used to discuss the complex issue of justice. To take examples from the discipline of psychology, only recently have terms relating to justice been introduced as formal indexing and search terms in the Thesaurus of the American Psychological Association indexing system, PsycINFO, which introduced “justice” as a formal search term in 1973. PsycINFO defined the term as “the impartial and fair settlement of conflict and differences, or the designation of rewards or punishment.” (Gallagher Tulaya, 2007). The term “procedural justice,” introduced in 2003, is defined as “The perceived fairness of the process by which decisions are made and outcomes are determined” (ibid.). We may perceive the procedures used to determine outcomes and to decide upon the allocation of costs and benefits as fair or unfair. When an individual perceives them as fair and objective, that person is likely to accept the outcome even if that outcome is less desirable than hoped for. When perceived as unfair, the person may feel victimized by the procedure and is likely to experience anger and frustration along with a desire to change the procedure or to seek retribution against the individuals responsible for the unfair procedures.

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PsycINFO also introduced the term “distributive justice” in 2003, which describes how benefits are allocated, and is defined as “The fairness of resource allocation, responsibility distribution, and other decision outcomes” (ibid.). These terms are precursors to the term “social justice,” which was not introduced until 2006. This term refers to “a society based on fairness and equality for its members regardless of social status” (ibid.). Two key types of social justice have yet to be included in PsycINFO as indexing terms: “restorative” and “retributive.” Restorative justice is an important element of some traditional cultures and seeks to reintegrate the offender into the community. Retributive justice, the method of punishing someone who harms another, is exemplified by the American criminal justice system. 5. Social Justice, Social Movements, and Global Security According to Tom R. Tyler and Heather J. Smith (1998), a strong link exists between perceptions of social justice and social movements. When people feel a decision to be just, they are happy to cooperate with each other, support the group, and accept decisions of figures of authority. When people perceive injustice, their response may be sabotage, protest, or rebellion. Tyler and Smith introduce five questions relevant to judgments of justice and injustice. The first question concerns how strongly conditions of justice and injustice influence people’s feelings and attitudes. Research shows that people’s feelings and attitudes regarding injustice are based more on subjective than on objective factors. Often those who are objectively less well off do not report feeling deprived and therefore do not describe their situation as unjust. An individual’s feelings are determined in part by the persons with whom they compare themselves. A further complication is that individuals may focus on their personal position relative to others or on the position of their group in relations to other groups in deciding whether their circumstances are just or unjust. The second question has to do with criteria people use to decide whether something is just or unjust. Three criteria appear to be used: the first is “equity,” which means that outcomes may be matched to input. The second is “equality,” treating everyone the same, and the third is “need,” which means providing the most benefits to those that need them the most. The third question addresses how people respond to perceived injustice. Individuals respond very differently depending on whether they are in the position of advantage and are receiving more than they deserve or in the position of disadvantage and receiving less than they deserve. Self-interest often motivates those in an advantaged position to deny that they are receiving more than they deserve. They may seek to justify their advantaged position and may denigrate those in disadvantaged positions in an attempt to rationalize the injustice. The individual in a disadvantaged position, on the other hand, faces a more complex situation: while self-interest can explain a desire to take action to achieve a more just situation, the unfairly disadvantaged often do not act to cor-

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rect injustices. This inaction may be the result of feelings of powerlessness; it also may be a rational choice based on concerns about the cost and risk of seeking justice and the low probability of achieving success. The disadvantaged may also reject the idea that they are victims of injustice because such as admission would damage their self-image. Sometimes the disadvantaged do take action though, either as individuals or collectively, and in some cases, their actions reach the level of civil disturbance and violence. The fourth question has to do with why people are concerned about justice. The answer combines the value placed on relationships with feelings of selfworth. People interpret the way others treat them as indicative of the quality of their social status within the group. If they receive unfair treatment, they feel they undervalued by the group. On the other hand, if others treat them with respect, they feel valued. People are not always concerned about justice. Tyler and Smith’s fifth question asks when and under what circumstances people do become concerned about it. Most of the research and theorizing has been done within Western cultures and the research literature summarized above describes patterns within American culture. This final question, “When do people care?” addresses most directly the question of international justice; it acknowledges that people’s concerns in applying the principles of justice are often not universal. Even within the United States, subgroups may not have the benefit of just treatment. For example, during World War II, the United States forced Japanese Americans into internment camps, a clear violation of their rights as American citizens. Many justified this by categorizing them as “Japanese” instead of “American” despite their citizenship status. Americans sometimes fail to apply principles of justice valued within American culture when dealing with people of other cultures. Even individuals who think of justice principles as universal sometimes apply them selectively. Strong psychological links between perceptions of social injustice and violent social movements lead to threats to global security and make an understanding of and a concern for social justice essential in efforts to promote global security. A limitation of the current literature in social psychology is that most of the research has studied homogenous groups, composed of individuals who share common beliefs about procedures. To apply the findings of this research to the international arena, we must recognize that the contending individuals and groups often do not share common beliefs about procedures, retribution, or other facets of social justice. Instead, they often have very different traditions and beliefs. For example, European countries and the Middle East differ greatly in many of their views. Political science and international relations, most often characterize the interaction and relations among nations as anarchy because no commonly held or agreed upon structure or hierarchy exists. Since this is true also of beliefs about social justice, we must find better ways to address the situation psychological research and theory can help.

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6. When Social Movements Become Violent Threats to Global Security A. Psychological Research on Aggression While many areas of psychological research help explain behaviors that threaten international security, research and theory on human aggression have an obvious and direct relationship. The psychological literature offers various definitions of aggression, most of which are similar to that of Robert A. Baron and Deborah S. Richardson: “any form of behavior directed toward the goal of harming or injuring another living being who is motivated to avoid such treatment” (1994, p.5). A perennial controversy within psychology concerns the degree to which human aggression is due to innate factors versus influences in the social environment. Early psychologists favored a biological view. William James (1902/1936) described human violence as a powerful instinct that supports the struggle for survival. William McDougall (1908) also described aggression as a basic human instinct. For Sigmund Freud, aggression was basic to human motivation and hate emanated from aggression. The discovery by Walter B. Cannon (1925), of a brain mechanism associated with aggression, further strengthened the biological view. Modern research into the biological aspects of human aggression continues to offer new insights. Many psychologists—particularly social psychologists—describe the causes of aggression as multi-determined. These determinants include biological processes, aversive environmental stimuli, cognitive interpretations, and social/group influences and interactions. Conflict with others is seen as a particularly potent stimulus for aggression. Social psychologists have focused on the cultural/environmental conditions and the psychological processes combining all these factors. They see the causes of aggression as more complex than previously thought, and believe these causes include the individual’s genetic endowment, past learning and experiences, and assessment of aspects of the situation that punish (inhibit) or reward (promote) aggression. They have also shown that frustration, poor impulse control, the cultural and individual construal of negative emotions, and social and group norms can contribute to violence. Russell G. Geen (1998) has organized the extensive social psychological research on aggression and anti-social behavior according to five psychological processes: (1) instigation, usually in the context of interpersonal conflict, involving cognitive processes; (2) social and learning history of the individual that determines the likelihood of aggression being enacted in situations of conflict; (3) skills in processing interpersonal information and tendencies to attribute hostile intent to others; (4) social and cultural variables (norms, beliefs, expectations) regarding the appropriateness of aggression in conflict situations; and (5) personality variables that moderate aggressive behavior patterns. These processes are directly related to threats to global security (Davis, 2004).

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B. Psychological Theory on Aggression Social learning theory provides a framework for understanding these processes and explains how they contribute to the development of enduring patterns of individual aggression. Social learning theory makes a distinction between learning and performance. Observation and imitation result in learning a repertoire of responses and behavior patterns. However, much that is learned may never be performed. Reinforcement and punishment are primary influences on performance and maintenance of behaviors. Children in many societies have frequent opportunities to observe aggressive behaviors in real-life situations at school, in the community, at home, and in the fantasy world provided by the media. They learn from an early age about many aggressive behaviors. Fortunately, the vast majority of children and adults never perform the aggressive acts demonstrated to them countless times. Most people never fire a gun at another person, or use a knife or explosives to harm another, even though these aggressive acts have been modeled repeatedly in the media (Davis, 2004). Albert Bandura (1986) reviewed studies that show the influence of aggressive models on learning and studies that show the effects of expected rewards and punishments on aggressive performance. Only a few individuals, because of real or imagined patterns of reinforcement for past aggressive behavior, carry out aggressive acts. An individual that has successfully used aggression to achieve valuable goals expects that future aggression will be similarly rewarded. Social learning theory, well supported by evidence, explains a crucial distinction between the learning of aggression (acquired through observation) and the performance of aggression (influenced by reinforcement and punishment). Research has shown that most people learn how to perform many aggressive acts but only a few perceive the reinforcement contingencies to make it worth their effort to perform these acts (Davis, 2004). Other research has further verified the validity of this analysis (Perry, Perry, and Rasmussen, 1986; Boldizar, Perry, and Perry, 1989). According to cognitive social learning theory, individuals also develop and refine mental frameworks (scripts/schemas) that serve as internal standards to guide their behaviors. If cultural norms teach that aggression is an appropriate response to interpersonal conflict, individuals may learn the schemas of responding to conflict with aggression. L. Rowell Huesmann (1988) has shown that people who persistently show aggressive behavior are those who have used aggression successfully in the past, have participated in many aggressive situations, and continue to add to and perpetuate their aggressive behavior patterns (Davis, 2004). C. Group Dynamics and Responses to Injustice Much research in psychology has established that groups exert strong and subtle powers on the behaviors, thoughts, and emotions of individual group members. At the most basic level, groups provide categories of “ingroup” versus “out-

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group,” “us” versus “them,” “friend” versus “foe.” Group pressure can exert a powerful influence on an individual’s behavior, decision making, and even on perceptions of reality. For example, a series of classic studies by Solomon E. Asch (1951; 1955) found that people would erroneously perceive a simple visual diagram when subjected to subtle group pressure. A substantial minority of those individuals even denied that the group had influenced them and they denied that their objectively incorrect answers were wrong. Michael Harris Bond and Peter Bevington Smith (1996) provided a review of the cross-cultural results of the type of group conformity research pioneered by Asch. Because beliefs about injustice are more subjective than the perceptual tasks used in Asch’s studies, these beliefs are even more subject to group pressure Can group pressure also channel beliefs about injustice into violent group action? 7. Perceptions of Injustice and Threats to Security A. How the Melding of Aggression and Political Ideology Threatens Security Wherever people perceive injustice, the potential for violent action intended to bring about redress of this perceived injustice arises. Cultures and social groups have different norms regarding the appropriate use of aggression in inter-group conflict and hostility. Appropriate and inappropriate aggression are regulated by cultural norms for many types of interpersonal and inter-group aggression. Often, when a member of one group transgresses against a member of another group, the aggrieved individual or group engages in a process of attribution regarding the cause. The victim makes an attribution about whether the offending action was accidental or intentionally hostile. The injured person or group also wants to know whether the action was an indication of evil and malicious intent. Whether overt aggression follows this process depends on multiple factors: the nature of the original transgression, the outcome of the attribution process, and the degree of preexisting negative attitudes toward the out-group (Davis, 2004; DeRidder, Schruijer & Tripathi, 1992; Schruijer, 1992). We can apply lessons learned from the research on aggression to aspects of injustice and global security. Many cross-cultural studies examine ways in which levels of violence and aggression are embedded in the social norms of diverse cultures and subcultures. Dane Archer and Rosemary Gartner (1984) reviewed literature of the period from 1960 to 1970 and compiled statistics from 110 nations to create a comparative Crime Data File. Their data indicate that post-war levels of violence exceed those of pre-war levels, suggesting that violence leads to more violence. At the level of the individual, the most reliable causes of aggression are attack or the perceived threat of attack (Buss, 1961). Extremist aggression such as a terrorist attack is no exception. Social psychological research on aggression has shown that attack, threat, and even perceived threat of attack all serve as reliable

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instigators of aggression. However, when individuals respond to an attack of another person by harming the attacker, they label their behavior as justified action instead of as aggression (Harvey and Enzle, 1978). B. The Individual as the Primary Source of Violent Threat Traditional cross-sectional descriptions of individuals are of little value in explaining or predicting the actions of an individual who may be a potential threat. Hans J. Eysenck (1997) has noted that descriptive and correlational approaches lack information about the causal nexus of behavior. More useful are longitudinal studies of hostile, aggressive, anti-social patterns of behavior such as those reviewed by Gian Vitoro Caprara (1996) and Michael J. Rutter (1997). Even longitudinal approaches to the study of the aggressive personality may be less useful than the recognition that schemas of the enemy, evil, revenge, or hate probably predict aggressive behavior best. Such schemas were easily aroused in Germany during the 1930s and 1940s. Adolf Hitler’s personality along with the entire German society explained the German behavior leading up to and during World War II: Ever since 1933, I have listened to all of Hitler’s broadcast speeches, as well as those of Goering, Goebbels, and other leading Nazi, and— especially since the outbreak of war—to the German broadcasts for German listeners, because they throw important light on the special psychological problem of German mentality. It is the duty of anyone who is trained in psychology to study these revelations as fully as possible, with a view to the future. The problem is really a medico-psychological one. Germany is a sick nation, and we need to understand how she has reached the state in which she now is if we are to form a reliable opinion as to the best way of treating her later on. If we treat her in the wrong way later on it will be more that an international calamity, it will be a world crime. (Brown, 1944, pp. 49–50) This analysis of the cultural milieu that led to World War II is timely even today, but leaders did not understand or act upon it during the 1940s. Political violence occurs only when people see a theoretical justification as legitimizing the destructive activities (Groebel, 1989). Germany after World War II is again a good example. A study of the literature of the German revolutionaries of the 1960s and 1970s is relevant to the ideology of revolutionary movements and other threats to global security. Several authors (Kellen, 1998; Markovits, 2001) have discussed the philosophical tenets of that period that provided foundations for terrorist thinking and revolutionary action. The radicals of the 1960s considered the Western powers (mostly the United States) to be fundamentally evil because the Western powers supported many of the individuals who had been or were perceived to have been in collusion with the Nazis.

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A study of the writings of revolutionaries such as Rudi Dutschke, Michael “Bommi” Baumann, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Petra Kelly, and others (Kellen, 1998; Markovits, 2001) reveals that these idealists focused their anger on the government and the business establishment of Germany, and on those of the United States. They contended that after World War II, the Western nations under the Marshall Plan made supporters of Hitler—prominent Nazi political leaders and judges during the war—the country’s new leaders. They claimed, with considerable justification, that the establishment in Germany and its Western supporters were corrupt. Many other revolutionary and terrorist movements have used similar arguments; we can see a striking resemblance in the line of reasoning used in modernday Iraq, for example. Although they originate from somewhat different ideological bases, the current revolutionary conceptualizations from the Middle East are quite similar to those of the German revolutionaries. Terrorists there point to the government of Saudi Arabia, arguing that it is corrupt and that only the support of the Western governments allows it to remain in power. They further believe that Israel occupies land unfairly and continually oppresses the Palestinians primarily because of Western—especially United States—support (Davis, 2004). The American support of post- World War II rebuilding in Germany also has many parallels in present-day Iraq. In Iraq, the United States is once more attempting to rebuild a war-torn society. In doing so, it again faces the dilemma of supporting (or not supporting) factions of the society that other segments perceive as corrupt. When, early in the conflict, the United States disbanded the military and police forces that had operated under Saddam Hussein, reasoning that they were corrupt, it left a political vacuum not easily filled. No other segment of Iraqi society had the training, knowledge, and skill to provide police and military security. The United States is now trying to reintegrate into positions of leadership elite members of the former Baathist party. Many of these individuals possess skills and experience needed to fill responsible positions. However, this clearly poses problems similar to those faced in the rebuilding of West Germany. More than sixty years have passed since defeated Germany began rebuilding with the help of the United States. Though today a united Germany is a great success, the rebuilding there is by no means complete and the United States remains a strong presence in Germany. Though still too early to know the full extent of the parallels between Germany and Iraq, we should hope to achieve similar success.

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8. Case Studies in Seeking Social Justice and Security In the eyes of the American public, the global conflicts most directly tied to issues of global security are undoubtedly those involving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war against terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, other conflicts, such as those in East Timor, Kosovo, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone all involve security and social justice. South Africa: Perhaps the most informative and hopeful development in a conflict over social justice has occurred in South Africa: the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that came into being following the end of apartheid has achieved dramatic compromise and resolution after decades of injustice and has allowed the country to heal. After South Africa established democracy in 1994, it created the TRC under the provisions of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34, and enacted it by legislation in 1995. The purpose of the TRC was to determine: how the government and the South African people should deal with systematic violations of internationally recognized human rights that occurred over an extended period before the eventual transition to democracy in 1994. (Anthonissen, 2007, p.2) The test the TRC faced was how to appropriately compensate for the evils committed in the past and at the same time to ensure that neither the new democracy nor its future prospects were harmed (Crocker, 2000). After considering the establishment of judicial procedures accompanied by trials in courts of law, the TRC members decided instead to establish a truth commission. The commission would act as an investigative body which would “attend to ‘transitional justice’ [and] which would strive to afford compensatory, distributive and restorative justice as opposed to mere ‘penal justice’ offered by trials and punishment” (Anthonissen, 2007, p.2). They hoped to achieve national unity and a spirit of understanding, which would rise above the divisiveness and discord of the past. The goals of the TRC included: (1) Discerning and making public ‘the truth (the issue of ‘one truth or many’, ‘forensic truth’, ‘hard facts’ as well as ‘emotional truth’); (2) Providing a public platform for victims; (3) Holding perpetrators accountable and meting out appropriate sanctions; (4) Strengthening the rule of law; (5) Securing compensation for victims; (6) Providing for reforms of the law and of basic institutions to reduce the possibility of former violations being repeated; (7) Reconciling former enemies and reintegrating them into society; (8) Extending the practice of public deliberation even where it is unlikely that full agreement will be achieved (Anthonissen, 2007, p. 2).

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The truth and reconciliation approach greatly contributed to the reduction of tensions and conflict after the official end of apartheid, leading to the creation of a more integrated, peaceful, and just society in South Africa. East Timor: Probably less familiar to many readers than the South African situation, but also informative, is the effort toward achieving social justice in East Timor (now the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste). The scenario unfolding in this small Southeast Asian country, which experienced more than four hundred years of colonial rule by Portugal, is quite different from that of South Africa but may achieve similarly positive results. During 1974 and 1975, rapid change came to East Timor. For more than 450 years, the country had been a Portuguese colony. When the Carnation Revolution was taking place in Lisbon during the 1970s the East Timorese saw a realistic hope of gaining independence and creating their own sovereign government. They began to organize and form political parties, most of which favored independence and sovereignty. Within a year, though, it became apparent that powerful Indonesia, already in control of West Timor, intended to replace Portugal in dominating the territory of East Timor. Indonesia infiltrated the nascent political parties and made other efforts to destabilize the moves toward independence. In spite of this, on 28 November 1975, the majority party in East Timor declared independence. Then, on 7 December 1975, Indonesia invaded and the resulting conflict brought death to an estimated 60,000 Timorese. During the five years that followed, many more were killed. The total number of deaths is disputed but some independent estimates are as high as 200,000, constituting approximately one-third of the East Timorese population (Lundy, 2007). Between 1975, when independence was declared, and 2002, when the international community recognized the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste as an independent state, Indonesia continued to dominate the territory through a brutal military occupation. Throughout this entire twenty-seven-year period, East Timorese underground resistance was strong. During this period, major political and economic changes altered global dynamics: the Berlin Wall fell, the Soviet Union collapsed, and an economic crisis swept over parts of Asia. In addition, the government of Indonesia changed. In 1997, following the East Asian economic crisis, Indonesia’s dictator, Suharto, was forced out of power and the people of Indonesia increasingly called for democracy and justice. Suharto’s successor, Bacharuddin Jusuf (B. J.) Habibie, under pressure from the international community, agreed to an August 1999 referendum for East Timor, held under the supervision of the United Nations (Lundy, 2007). The purpose of the referendum was to allow voters to choose between independence and “Special Autonomy” within Indonesia. Regardless, elements within Indonesia still determined to dominate East Timor and sought to influence the coming vote. In doing so, the Indonesian military and pro-Indonesia militias recruited—often forcibly—young men from East Timorese villages (ibid.).

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In the referendum, 78.5 percent of the voters chose independence but, immediately after the vote was counted, the Indonesian military and their proIndonesia militias began a well-planned “scorched earth” campaign to destroy East Timor. Troops targeted pro-independence leaders for public killings, destroyed houses, and threatened international monitors and members of the media. Within days, most of the unarmed UN Assistance Mission in East Timor evacuated the territory, leaving the people defenseless. Within three weeks, the Indonesian military and Timorese militias forcibly displaced more than half of the population, committed widespread killings and rape, destroyed between 70 and 80 percent of all buildings, and left the infrastructure in ruins. They forced more than 200,000 people at gunpoint into Indonesian territory (primarily into West Timor) and held them as bargaining chips. Many remain there today in deplorable conditions (ibid.; Nevins, 2005). Within the three weeks, the United Nations needed to organize and obtain approval to send in an armed intervention force, East Timor was in ruins. When the UN forces arrived, little remained to protect. Currently, efforts to seek justice are occurring. East Timor is striving to rebuild its war-devastated country and to reintegrate the East Timorese militia members forced by Indonesia to wreak devastation on its people. Complicating this effort, relations between the UN staff and the local communities and leaders are strained concerning the system of justice that should apply to East Timorese militia members who are returning home. East Timor consists mainly of tightly knit, rural communities. The local elites of these communities believe that they are best prepared to determine the culpability and fate of returning militia members using Lisan, their 500-year-old traditional system of justice. Lisan is a restorative form of justice. In this system, the complainant and the accused are summoned to a community meeting that begins with a meal and other rituals. After these are completed, both complainant and accused present their perspectives, followed by comments from other members of the village. The complainant then specifies desired compensation: sometimes this is only an apology, sometimes a request for something of value such as a pig or other animal, or the rebuilding of a destroyed home. Village elders preside and determine the final resolution. The focus of this procedure is to restore harmony between the opposing individuals, between the accused and other members of the village, and to draw the accused back into the community. (Lundy, 2007). In contrast to this traditional Lisan system of restorative justice are the retributive Western approaches. Portugal imposed the first of these, Indonesia imposed another, and, most recently, the UN commissions imposed a third. Under this system, former militia members are tried in criminal courts, often far from their villages. The victims are unable to participate in the proceedings and receive neither compensation nor restoration. The tension between these two forms of justice is easy to understand, but some resolution has recently occurred: the UN has acknowledged the Lisan method to be more successful in many situations.

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The situation in East Timor, with two opposing systems of social justice, illustrates how no one system is perfect. Village elders using the Lisan system often directed returning militia members to rebuild houses they had earlier destroyed and to make other forms of restitution. The United Nations criticized this form of restitution as a violation of the International Declaration of Human Rights, which forbids coerced labor. Nevertheless, the UN has increasingly recognized the value of the traditional system and finally acquiesced to it. On the other hand, the Lisan system also has limitations and drawbacks. A particularly unsatisfactory aspect of Lisan is the compensation provided to rape victims; the recompense deemed appropriate by the village might be payment of money or livestock, but this usually goes to the victim’s family instead of the victim. Often the rapist is forced to marry the victim, though the victim must agree. Critics consider this to be an inadequate and unsatisfactory form of justice. East Timor’s dilemma furnishes compelling evidence that achieving true social justice is a complex matter. Afghanistan: The final example of cultural conflict comes from presentday Afghanistan where humanitarian aid workers are facing the challenges of remaining and being perceived as neutral while they struggle to provide services to the people of this war-torn country. The dilemma is that warring factions within Afghanistan pressure aid workers to choose sides. The United States-led coalition forces, after their initial military victory against the Taliban/Al Quaeda, have increasingly engaged in providing aid and in nation building, which aligns their interests with those of the civilian humanitarian aid organizations. Groups that support the hostile forces in Afghanistan now perceive the aid workers as allied with the military coalition and target them for violence (Mojadidi, 2007). These examples from different cultures have in common a concern for the significance of perceptions and beliefs regarding social justice (Anthonissen, 2007; Verdoolaege, 2007). Each illustrates a conflict between two or more cultural systems of social justice. As gloabalization increases and different cultures increasingly encounter one another, the number of situations in which conflicting systems of social justice compete will undoubtedly increase. How these conflicts will be reconciled has enormous implications for global security. They are of concern to social and international psychologists (Davis, 2004, 2008b; Fry & Björkqvist, 1997) and should be of concern to us all. 9. Promising Developments from around the World For countries to engage in meaningful dialogue about social justice, they must recognize the subjective nature of the concept of justice and its different traditional roots. A key theme running throughout this chapter is that views of justice are constructed within cultural traditions. The recognition that the same events can be understood in vastly different ways is a crucial step toward reconciling conflicting cultural views. As the experience of living in more than one culture

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can teach, many different perspectives have validity. The following examples illustrate this kind of understanding. A unique book entitled History Lessons: How Textbooks from around the World Portray U.S. History (Lindaman and Ward, 2004) offers a valuable exercise in seeing United States history through the eyes of others. It illustrates how people in other countries teach and learn about familiar events of United States history from standpoints dissimilar to that of Americans. For example, school children in France, Vietnam, and Canada learn about the events of the Vietnam War in a way very different from that of their counterparts in the United States. Similarly, textbooks of Saudi Arabia, Great Britain, France, Israel, Syria, and the United States portray the current conflicts in the Middle East very differently. Another example is the German-French common history project currently underway. France and Germany have recently completed the first volume of a joint French-German history textbook. Five history teachers from France and five history teachers from Germany developed the outline. Then, one French and one German teacher co-authored each chapter. The book highlights common interpretations and differences in viewing the history of the two countries. This collaboration is remarkable considering that Germany and France have periodically been enemies for two centuries (“A Franco-German Textbook: History Lessons,” 2006). German reunification is also a promising achievement in social justice. When East and West Germany reunited in 1990, after more than a generation of separation, enormous tasks lay ahead in settling property claims justly. Countless families and business had had their property confiscated when East Germany became communist. When Germany was reunited, Helmut Kohl’s government exchanged East German marks for West German marks at a very generous exchange rate in an effort to establish economic reunification and achieve social justice. Business properties confiscated by the communist state were auctioned to private bidders, with the proceeds used to recompense the historical owners whenever possible. Families that had fled the East during the 1950s and lost their homes also received financial compensation. While Germany was undergoing reunification, another remarkable event was unfolding in Europe: the two parts of Czechoslovakia were contemplating a “velvet divorce.” Three years after German reunification, Czechoslovakia peacefully separated into the Czech Republic and Slovakia as the result of an organized, democratic process. That it succeeded so well was in large part due to the wise leadership of Czechoslovakia’s first post-communist President, the statesman and playwright, Vaclav Havel. Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on 4 February 1992, Havel gave eloquent voice to the need for recognizing and respecting multiple perspectives: Man’s attitude to the world must be radically changed. We have to abandon the arrogant belief that the world is merely a puzzle to be solved, a machine with instructions for use waiting to be discovered, a body of information to

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JOHN M. DAVIS be fed into a computer in the hope that, sooner or later, it will spit out a universal solution. It is my profound conviction that we have to release from the sphere of private whim such forces as a natural, unique and unrepeatable experience of the world, an elementary sense of justice, the ability to see things as others do, a sense of transcendental responsibility, archetypal wisdom, good taste, courage, compassion and faith in the importance of particular measures that do not aspire to be a universal key to salvation. Such forces must be rehabilitated. Things must once more be given a chance to present themselves as they are, to be perceived in their individuality. We must see the pluralism of the world, and not bind it by seeking common denominators or reducing everything to a single common equation. We must try harder to understand than to explain. (“The End of the Modern Era,” The New York Times, 1 March 1992) 10. Conclusion

We can apply Havel’s eloquent words to the pursuit of social justice. The preceding research and examples lead to the conclusion that the concept of social justice is a human construction. It cannot simply be “discovered” in nature. Different cultures with differing traditions have constructed their ideas of social justice along somewhat different lines. Within each culture, the normative concepts of justice often appear self-evident. Cultural systems generally serve the specific circumstances and needs of that culture and members of that culture recognize them as such. A familiarity with, and understanding, of the justice systems of different cultures helps us grasp the relative nature of the concept of social justice. Reconciling different cultural systems of social justice will require the attainment of a deep understanding of and respect for the traditions of different cultures. It will also require doing the necessary work of finding common ground and demonstrating a willingness to reconsider age-old beliefs previously accepted without question. We find many different views of social justice embedded in the traditions of different cultures. Diligent and willing examination of these views will yield a much broader repertoire of possible solutions in cases of injustice. Meaningful discussion and exploration will result from acknowledging and attempting to understand the traditions. In turn, these efforts will lead to discovery of novel solutions and ultimately to reconciliation. With greater understanding of various traditions, with greater respect for their value, and with new ways of achieving social justice, we will gain a rich laboratory for testing better solutions for cases of injustice. Equally important, with these new attitudes and skills, we will greatly reduce the threat that injustice poses to global security.

Ten A CULTURAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF SUICIDE TERRORISM AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT SUICIDE TERRORISM C. Dominik Güss, Teresa Tuason, Vanessa Teixeira 1. Introduction Terrorism affects the well-being of citizens in many countries around the world. Since the 11 September 2001 attacks on The World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the train bombings in Madrid, and the subway bombings in London, terrorism has become one of the most widely discussed topics in the media. Although many Islamic terrorist acts—not linked to al Qaeda–had occurred earlier, for example, in North America, on the World Trade Center, Paris, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt, terrorism became a topic that preoccupies not only the media but also administrations and governments after the 11 September 2001 attacks. This paper focuses on one specific form of terrorism, “suicide terrorism.” We use the term suicide terrorism only because it is widely used in the Western literature. We are aware though that those volunteering for such a mission mostly reject the terms “suicide bombers” or “suicide terrorists” and consider themselves to be warriors of Allah, or as shuhada (martyrs). Moreover, the Western world might term a suicide attack of a Muslim on American soldiers as a terrorist act, many people in Islamic countries might consider it an act of courage and honor in defense of their country against foreign invaders. Why does someone become a suicide terrorist? What political, economic, religious, and emotional causes make a person decide to kill civilians, military personnel, and even commit suicide? What are the motivations, and convictions, and philosophy behind such dramatic acts? The authors perceive terrorist acts as brutal and unacceptable. However, understanding how it has come to be an acceptable and revered way of death in certain cultures is the necessary first step to comprehend and initiate prevention and respectful intervention. The first part of this paper will discuss and analyze common explanations, such as hate, found in Western media, and the second part will present a process model developed to investigate cultural and psychological causes of suicide terrorism. The third part will then discuss possible interventions to prevent suicide terrorism.

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Suicide terrorism is becoming a preferred strategy of violence by many terrorist groups for the reason that it is quite effective, relatively easy to carry out, inexpensive, hard to detect, and the suicide bomber is not privileged to strategic information of their leaders. Most importantly, the act has a huge psychological impact on the enemy. This paper focuses on suicide bombers in Iraq and Palestine. Although the two countries differ in their political and cultural history, both countries have several characteristics in common, which may justify a discussion of suicide bombers in both countries in one paper. Iraq and Palestine are similar in that they share the highest number of suicide bombers worldwide (Schweitzer and Goldstein Ferber, 2005, p. 10). The suicide bombers in both countries are of Islamic background, and they share the viewpoint that their country is under foreign control, Israel controlling Palestine and the United States controlling Iraq. In Iraq, from March 2003 until September 2005, no fewer than 350 suicide bombings occurred. These numbers show a trend that we can expect such events to increase in the future (ibid., p. 80). From May until July 2005, suicide bombers carried out 129 attacks in Iraq (Ghosh, 2005, p. 24). Many of the suicide bombers in Iraq have connections with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi, born in 1966, in Jordan, became the mastermind behind many terrorist acts and suicide bombings in Iraq. He was the reputed al Qaeda network leader in Iraq. Osama bin Laden and al-Zarqawi differed in that al-Zarqawi propagated not only the death of Westerners, but also the death of the Shi’a in Iraq. Bin Laden’s strategy, in contrast, was to attack only Westerners in Middle Eastern countries; he did not advocate attacking fellow Muslims. The origins of al Qaeda go back to the time when Soviets invaded Afghanistan during 1979 and when bin Laden and thousands of other non-Afghan Muslims joined the war. During that time, the United States provided them with financial support (Brisard and Dasquié, 2002). In Palestine, suicide bombings have become a popular tactic since 1993. Between 1993 and 2004, 139 suicide attacks were out against Israelis, not including failed attacks, for example, those attackers caught by the Israeli security forces (Yom and Saleh, 2004). Four thousand, six hundred and ten people died in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza between 1993 and 2005 due to suicide bombings (Brym and Araj, 2006). Palestinian groups such as Hamas, Fatah, and Islamic jihad recruit male and female volunteers, who often use explosive belts strapped to their bodies, and who detonate them in highly frequented public places. Hamas is the most influential Palestinian militant movement also sponsoring many social service activities in the country, such as schools, health clinics, and orphanages. Hamas recently won the elections in 2006. According to the Western stereotype often portrayed in media, an Islamic suicide bomber is a religious fanatic or a psychopath (Martens, 2004), who does not appreciate life, has no education, lives in poverty, and is irrational. More recent research suggests these terrorists have no major psychopathology among

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them; they have a huge variation among their demographic characteristics (Hudson, 1999; Pape, 2005; Post, 2005; Reuter, 2004; Soibelman, 2004). Most suicide bombers are quite well educated (for example, the terrorists who attacked the United States on 11 September 2001; see Holmes, 2005, for a detailed analysis), are from middle-class families, and do not suffer serious psychological disorders (Atran, 2003; Pape, 2005). Poverty and low education are not correlated with additional terrorist activity (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003). Intuitively, we might think that most suicide bombers are male, but 15 percent are female, and that proportion is rising (Merari, 1990; see Cook, 2005, for more details on female terrorists). We may consider suicide bombers as irrational in the sense that their acts are quite difficult for the Western world to understand. But if the term means that no logic is being followed, then we cannot judge their acts to be irrational. If rational means acting to achieve a goal, then the acts of suicide bombers are highly rational (Barkan and Snowden, 2001). Christoph Reuter noted, “Most suicide bombers are normal, fearless people with strong convictions” (2004, p. 204). Although researchers have collected some demographic data on suicide terrorists, ethnographic research on suicide terrorists is rare (Ricolfi, 2005). To compensate for this lack of data, we can better understand the worldview of suicide bombers and their way of thinking, by listening to the words of terrorist and reading the speeches of their leaders before we decide to condemn them. This chapter will investigate the terrorism phenomenon, especially suicide terrorism, by analyzing interviews with potential suicide bombers and the speeches of their radical terrorist leaders that we found in secondary sources. 2. What Does a Cultural-Psychological Theory of Terrorism Need to Accomplish? Psychological theories focus mostly on the individuals’ motivations, needs, emotions, decisions, thoughts, and behaviors, and are governed by perspectives of individuals mainly from Western industrialized countries. On the other hand, a cultural-psychological perspective does not view the individual as isolated, but as a part of a society with a particular context. A cultural-psychological theory explains phenomena at the microlevel, the individual level, yet also considers the macrolevel, society, culture, and history. Such an approach yields considerable information in the study of terrorism (Atran, 2003; Davis, 2003; Hafez, 2006a; Marsella, 2005; Moghaddam, 2006; Moghaddam and Marsella, 2004; Post, 2005). Culture refers to the “human made part of the environment” (Herskovits, 1948) and to internalized knowledge, norms, values, beliefs, and problem-solving strategies shared by a group (Güss, 2000; Hofstede, 2001; Smith and Bond, 1998), which are transmitted from generation to generation. Culture sets boundaries and expectations, and determines what individuals are allowed to do in a society. Mostly implicit, many of these cultural norms, values, and thoughts only become

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explicit during interactions with members of different cultures. These cultural differences may often be a source of misunderstanding and conflict. In this chapter, we will address the following questions, applying the cultural-psychological theory on suicide terrorism: What is the socio-historiccultural frame in which the individual operates? What motivates someone to become a suicide bomber and what needs are satisfied? What roles do individuals’ ideological attitudes, religious convictions, and group advocacy play? What influence does the terrorist cell have on the individual volunteer? What characterizes the thinking of terrorists? 3. Method One inherent predicament with research on suicide terrorism is the lack of empirical data (Brannan et al., 2001; Victoroff, 2005) and the impossibility to conduct controlled experimental studies. Similar to research on suicidality, study those who have completed the suicide act is impossible; we can only speculate on the intent and reasons these terrorist held before their fatal acts. Ronald F. Levant, Laura Barbanel, and Patrick H. De Leon pointout, “The psychological literature on terrorism, ethnopolitical warfare . . . is sparse” (2002, p. 276). Despite original data being preferable to that found in secondary sources for data analysis and theory development, this study will attempt to understand suicide terrorism with the data available: (1) published speeches of terrorist leaders, bin Laden and al-Zarqawi, given that many suicide volunteers regard them as great heroes (Thousands of young Arabs who joined the training camps in Afghanistan during the 1990s and who are joining al Qaeda cells today identify with bin Laden and al-Zarqawi.); (2) statistics on terrorism; (3) published interviews with Palestinian suicide bombers caught in Israel before they could carry out their mission (not much data are available from suicide terrorists in Iraq); and (4) an interview with a young man (pseudonym Marwan Abu Ubeida) in Iraq, who explained his decision to become a suicide bomber to a journalist of Time magazine (Ghosh, 2005). We extracted from the interviews the underlying cultural and psychological mechanisms and characteristics of terrorism following a phenomenological paradigm (Dilthey, 1894), which holds that the construction of self and reality is a social process in which culture and community play a central role (Gergen, 1994). For example, the individual who kills might view the killing as a victory, but the people who have lost loved ones might see the same act as outrageous, unjust, and incomprehensible. We drew inferences from the data about how psychology and culture affect the decisions, thoughts, emotions, and behaviors of terrorists. Based on these data, we analyzed the meaningful variables and integrated the relations among these variables into a model following the ideas of theory development and systems theory (Dörner, 1994). The model describes how the cultural context, group

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processes, rewards, and mechanisms to eradicate possible doubts and guilt influence the individuals’ psyche and the decision to become a suicide bomber. 4. Results A. The Macro-Socio-Historical-Political Context Individuals live at a given time in history, in societies with their unique cultural worldview, values, norms, and traditions. An analysis of an individual’s decision to become a suicide bomber needs to consider the socio-historical-political context of the individual. Research shows that a large pool of possible volunteers for suicide missions can be found in many Middle Eastern countries. Amal Shahda reported that 25 percent of Palestinian boys between twelve and seventeen years of age want to become suicide bombers (cited in Madsen, 2005). Elaine Sciolino reported that approximately 95 percent of young educated Saudis are supportive of al Qaeda (“Don’t Weaken Arafat, Saudi Warns Bush,” The New York Times, 27 January 2002). Along the same lines, Bruce Hoffman talks about “inverted sense of normality” to describe the high approval of suicide bombings within the population (2006, p. 153). In what follows, we will demonstrate that this enormous potential pool of suicide bombers is a result of three macro variables: the United Stats occupation of Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and dissatisfaction with current local governments. The United States Occupation of Iraq: During March 2003, the United States started its military intervention in Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The main reason given by the Bush administration was the potential danger of Hussein having weapons of mass destruction. Ultimately, we found no weapons of mass destruction. Iraqis’ initial happiness about the removal of Hussein was quickly replaced by disappointment, sadness, and anger that the American troops were staying and occupying their country. When asked, “whether Iraq is better or worse off than it was before the invasion,” 32 percent of Iraqis answered “somewhat worse,” and 15 percent indicated “much worse” (Clawson, 2003). Many Iraqis now view the military intervention for freedom as a military presence of oppression. They experience the American presence as an imperialist military and cultural invasion (Abi-Hashem, 2004). Many participants in one study, involving 2,950 Iraqis, supported resistance against American occupation forces (Harb, Hafedh, and Fischer, 2006). The findings also suggested that support for resistance is related to socio-cultural factors, not religious fundamentalism or psychopathology, so often used as explanations in the Western media. Even United States’ spy agencies indicate that the war in Iraq was actually creating more terrorism than preventing it (Mazzetti, 2006). Abu Ubeida also expresses disappointment about the United States staying in Iraq. He volunteered to become a suicide bomber and his commander sent him

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to participate in an interview with Time magazine (Ghosh, 2005). He does not know when his suicide mission will be, but he is preparing for it as a member of the terrorist network al Qaeda in Iraq. Ubeida comes from a privileged family, which lived quite well under the regime of Hussein, although he did not like Saddam’s Sunni-led regime. He is disappointed about the United States’ invasion: “We expected them to bring Saddam down and then leave. . . But they stayed and stayed” (Ghosh, 2005, p. 26). Among Iraqis and citizens of Arab countries, mistrust in the motives of the United States and perceived injustice are widespread. As the following text passages show, some believe that the United States is motivated by its national interests and agenda. These include motives such as the exploitation of oil and other natural resources in Iraq. They believe the United States does not genuinely care about democracy. Prior to his death, Al-Zarqawi (2006), the terrorist mastermind killed by the American military on 7 June 2006, mentioned several reasons he believed were the foundation for the United States’ invasion. In his speech, “Ibn AbuWaqqas” (to the nation of Islam), he named, to exploit Iraqi resources, to change the map of the Middle East according to its own interest, to dismember the big Arab states or to weaken them, and to impose Western moral values. Indicating his belief in American duplicity, he continued: America came to spread obscenity and vice and establish its decadence and ribald culture in the name of freedom and democracy. It hopes to remold the region and change its political, religious, and cultural map according to its personal interests. He believed that the United States could not be trusted because it applies law as it serves their best interest. He elaborated on the exploitation of Iraqi resources as one of the reasons for the United States’ invasion: [T]he resources and treasures of this rich land that have whetted the appetite of the bloodsuckers, the big capitalists, whose lust for wealth has driven them to commit every dirty and mean act, without any regard for big or small, man or woman. To them, the aim justifies the means. They are applying the jungle law by incriminating and killing indiscriminately. In his analysis of over 450 suicide terrorists, Robert Anthony Pape (2005) identified three principle reasons for suicide terrorism: (1) fighting foreign troops in land suicide volunteers regard as their homeland; (2) foreign troops having different religious backgrounds; and (3) insurgents interpreting the occupation as oppression of their faith. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The frustration toward foreign oppressors and the anger against them are motives for young people to become terrorists. This is true not only in Iraq but also in Palestine (Soibelman, 2004).We dedicate

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some space here to the Israeli-Palestine conflict because it is related to the Iraq war and to other conflicts in the Middle East (Morris, 1999). Suicide bombers appear to view Israel and the United States as partners in their international endeavors. They believe that the two states also cooperate in the war on Iraq. It was in Israel’s foremost interest that the United States should take the lead in the war against Iraq. Even before Vice President Richard Bruce “Dick” Cheney started his campaign for war, the Washington Post reported, “Israel is urging United States’ officials not to delay a military strike against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein” (J. Kayer, “Israel Urges U.S. to Attack,” The Washington Post, 16 August 2002). Israeli intelligence provided Washington with alarming reports about Iraq’s alleged program to develop weapons of mass destruction (WME) (Gideon Alon, “Sharon Panel: Iraq Is Our Biggest Danger,” Ha’artezt, 13 August 2002). Al-Zarqawi (2006) also mentions the link between the war in Iraq and the Israeli- United States relationship in his speech to “the nation of Islam”: “America came to guarantee security for its Israeli protégé and eliminate any threat against it.” Bin Laden also links the Israeli-Palestinian conflict directly to the terrorism against the United States In a message addressed to America and its citizens on October 2001, he said: As for the United States, I tell it and its people these few words: I swear by Almighty God who raised the heavens without pillars that neither the United States nor he who lives in the United States will enjoy security before we can see it as a reality in Palestine. Right or wrong, Rasan Stiti, a young Palestinian, also expressed this perception of injustice and foreign oppression in Palestine. The Israeli Defense Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer interviewed Stiti, who had planned to blow himself up in Tel Aviv, but was caught when he was about to carry out his mission. When Ben-Eliezer asked Stiti if he hated the Jews, he answered: No, not at all. I don’t hate Jews. That’s not it. I just wanted to take part in my people’s war of national liberation. It’s a holy war for the liberation of occupied Palestine. That’s what I was thinking all the time. (Levy-Barzalai, 2002) According to Stiti’s view, Israel is oppressing Palestine and he sees it as his duty to liberate his country. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not just a local conflict but affects the entire Middle East. Many Islamic political leaders are dissatisfied and horrified with Israel’s military actions in Palestine (and lately with Israel’s war against Lebanon in 2006). “Puppets”: Disappointment in Current Local Governments: Many Iraqis are not only dissatisfied with the United States military presence but also with their current government, with slow economic progress, low order, and high criminality (Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2006). Many terrorists

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see their current government as an extension of the United States government. To them, current governments are a disappointment compared to what AlZarqawi would otherwise refer to as their glorious past, when Islam was strongest and threatening the Western world, for example, under the Ottoman Empire. The dissatisfaction with the current government might be more relevant for Iraq than Palestine. The recent Hamas government in Palestine, after all, finds strong support among the Palestinian population. The Western media often attributes terrorism to poverty. But three quarters of the world’s population live in chronic poverty. Therefore, if poverty were the cause of terrorism, we should expect to see terrorism occurring in three quarters of the world. Not so much the mere fact of poverty sows seeds for terrorism, as do how the poor attribute the causes of their poverty. If, for example, people in the Middle East believe that the cause of their poverty is related to imperialism and exploitation by the West,—the United States, Britain, even Israel and other puppet local governments—then they may attribute their dissatisfaction and anger about the local, current, economic situation and the absence of any form of progress to the United States and Israel. To what degree these attributions are factual is immaterial. Essential is that their beliefs and attributions are true for them. For some of the suicide bombers, every American—whether soldier or civilian—is an enemy since he or she is paying taxes and directly or indirectly supporting the governance of the United States. During October 2004, Bin Laden expressed the link between local governments and the United States government, especially the disinterest and neglect for its citizens: We had no difficulty in dealing with Bush and his administration because they resemble the regimes in our countries, half of which are ruled by the military and the other half by the sons of kings . . . . They have a lot of pride, arrogance, greed, and thievery. So far, we have discussed three socio-political-historical-macro-factors related to suicide terrorism (see Bjørgo, 2005 for a more detailed account of preconditions of terrorism). Many Muslims experience this reality as unjust and react with strong negative emotions of anger, hate, and powerlessness. B. Individual Psyche: Cumulative Experience of Injustice and Death The beliefs and experiences of injustice on the political level become a concrete and miserable reality in the lives of many young people in Iraq and Palestine who later decide to become suicide bombers. Since they do not see an opportunity to participate in politics (Crenshaw, 1990), they often become angry, and see revenge as the only moral acceptable way to perpetrate justice. Often they describe experiences where the foreign military has killed one of their close friends

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or family members. As Leon Trotsky stated in 1909, “The most important psychological source of terrorism is always the feeling of revenge in search of an outlet” (Jenkins, 2003, p. 70). Experience of Cruelties and Death of Loved Ones: Abu Ubeida, who volunteered to become a suicide bomber, experienced what he referred to as injustice and cruelty from the United States’ military. He decided to become a suicide bomber after United States’ soldiers fired on a crowd of demonstrators at a school, killing twelve and wounding many more (Ghosh, 2005, p. 26). According to him, that event formed his motivation to start participating in countless assaults toward United States troops. Hussam Abdo, a fifteen-year-old Palestinian boy, witnessed American soldiers kill one of his friends. Hussam planned to carry out a suicide attack close to a checkpoint during March 2004. He had explosives strapped to his chest, but was caught before he could execute his plan. Hussam wanted to use revenge for the death of his friend. He said: Just like they came and caused our parents sadness and suffering they too should feel this. Just like we feel this—they should also feel it. (Reynolds, 2004) Other forms of violence that some perceive as the reason for their decision to participate in terrorism include cruelties inflicted by American soldiers on civilians. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reports “a fairly consistent pattern with respect to times and places of brutality by members of the CF [Coalition Forces] arresting them.” The report continues: Arresting authorities entered houses usually after dark, breaking down doors, waking up residents roughly, yelling orders, forcing family members into one room under military guard while searching the rest of the house and further breaking doors, cabinets and other property. They arrested suspects, tying their hands in the back with flexi-cuffs, hooding them, and taking them away. Sometimes they arrested all adult males present in a house, including elderly, handicapped, or sick people. Treatment often included pushing people around, insulting, taking aim with rifles, punching and kicking and striking with rifles. (2004, p. 6) The ICRC estimates that 70–90 percent of Iraqis are wrongfully arrested. Such a high number can lead Iraqis to believe that arrests are arbitrary and unjust, especially since in most cases arresting authorities did not provide families information about where they took their family and the reason for their arrest. Revenge: Unfortunately, many people around the world are suffering from military conflict and wars. Although they are living under oppression and extreme injustice, neither all who experience these conditions nor those who have experi-

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enced unimaginable cruelties or death of loved ones become suicide bombers. For others, there seems to be no alternative solutions, but violence. They are motivated to seek revenge (Ricolfi, 2005) that is justified and even demanded by Islam. From al-Zarqawi’s perspective, the holy war in Iraq is seen as a reaction to the aggressions of the Americans and as an act of revenge, which will later be rewarded: God be praised, we are invading them, as they are invading us, attacking them as they are attacking us, and inflicting losses on them as they are inflicting losses on us. Yet, we are not the same. Our dead go to paradise and theirs go to hell. . . . “If we are suffering hardships, they are suffering similar hardships: but you hope from Allah, what they have not” (Qur’anic verse). (2006) Bin Laden describes the attack on 11 September 2001 as an act of revenge for the acts committed by the United States in Lebanon: As I watched the destroyed towers of Lebanon, it occurred to me to punish the unjust the same way [and] to destroy towers in America so it could taste some of what we are tasting and stop killing our children and women. (2004) The interviews and speeches by bin Laden and al-Zarqawi show the hurt they experience due to the actions of the United States. In their eyes, they are justified to use revenge to deal with this injustice. C. Group Processes: Joining the Terrorist Cell and Isolation If an individual already perceives the socio-political situation as unjust, and then witnesses the killing of loved ones by foreign troops, the resulting outrage and helplessness may push the individual to do something as extreme such as joining a terrorist cell. The motivation behind “wanting-to-do-something” is the basic need for self-determination, the ability to make decisions about one’s life (Wagner and Long, 2004). Similarly, Dietrich Dörner (1999) speaks of a motivation to enlarge competence, to be able to satisfy needs through one’s knowledge and abilities, which results in enjoyment or pleasure. Suicide bombers satisfy this need by volunteering and preparing for their mission. One way to prepare is to look for a terrorist group. In the terrorist cell, members are among others who think the same way and pursue the same goals as they do. The terrorist cell reinforces “not the motivation as such, but rather the commitment to act” (Gambetta, 2005). To dismiss further doubts and possible confrontation with contradictory thoughts, the volunteers are often isolated from their families and friends. The volunteer’s need for affiliation is met by belong-

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ing to a group of people who think similarly, and who are most likely to have had experienced the same oppression, outrage, and helplessness. Abu Ubeida, who became a member of a terrorist cell, has cut the connections with his family. He now contemplates, prays, and reads about great martyrs to strengthen his “will” (Ghosh, 2005, p. 26). His family does not approve of his decision: “My family are not happy with my choice. . . . But they know they can’t change my path. . . .You give up your previous life . . . and start a new one” (ibid., pp. 26, 29). Being part of a group that isolates its members from friends and family leads to an increase ingroup cohesion and a change in identity (Post, 2005). These terrorists appear not to consider or discuss conflicting or contradictory information (Silberman et al., 2005). Individuals join the group with preconceived convictions, and these convictions and beliefs, shared by the group, become reinforced core aspects of their identity (Pastor, 2004; Post, 2005). D. The Enduring Influence of the Training Some people–of Islamic and Christian belief—around the world have radical religious convictions, but they do not become suicide bombers. For most believers, killing another human being is not only contradictory to religious beliefs, but is also forbidden. What is often a part of the training of suicide bombers is the reduction of this cognitive dissonance (Maikovich, 2005) and the justification of the use of violence, by describing the suicide mission as an act of service to the supernatural being, Allah or God. Reducing this dissonance becomes relatively easy when strong radical religious or ideological beliefs are paired with the death of a loved one, with experienced injustice, with resulting emotions of rage, frustration, sadness, a sense of helplessness, and with the belief that the United States or Israeli occupation is responsible for the suffering of the country. With all these combined, it is more likely that a young man or woman makes the decision to become a suicide bomber. This decision, however, may not yet be the final decision. Doubts, fears, and qualms arise about whether this is the right thing to do, whether they should leave their families behind, and whether they could conquer their anxiety and fear of dying. To strengthen the volunteers in their decision to make a suicide mission, they often undergo a rigorous training under a spiritual mentor who interprets the Qur’an and with a group that offers support. In this training, volunteers become also familiar with the teachings of bin Laden, al-Zarqawi, and radical Islamic scholars. The document, “Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants” (anonymous, 2000) found in the home of an alleged al Qaeda member in England, gives insight into al Qaeda’s detailed operations. The manual starts with “In the name of Allah, the merciful and compassionate.” It identifies their main mission to be “The overthrow of the godless regimes and their replacement with an Islamic regime.” It outlines fourteen nec-

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essary qualifications for members of al Qaeda: These are “Islam, commitment to the organization’s ideology, maturity, sacrifice, listening and obedience, free of illness, patience, tranquility and ‘unflappability,’ intelligence and insight, caution and prudence, truthfulness, and counsel, ability to observe and analyze, and the ability to act, change positions and conceal oneself.” The suicide act is then described as martyrdom and dying in the name of Allah. Abu Ubeida said, for example, after being exposed, “I read about the history of jihad, about great martyrs who have gone before me. These things strengthen my will” (Ghosh, 2005, p. 26). Thus, the training is a key factor for the formation of a suicide bomber. Post (2005) was able to interview one of the Tanzanian Embassy bombers in 2001. The bomber went to Pakistan to train in one of bin Laden’s training camps. There, he learned about weapons and explosives and had four hours of ideological training every day. After this training, he returned to his home and lived a normal life for three years (a sleeper) until he received a phone call asking if he would volunteer “to do a jihad job” (Post, 2005, p. 625) and he agreed. During the three years before he received that fateful phone call, this person lived a normal life where his mind and his goals did not change. This is a testament to how life changing his training must have been. Religious Convictions as Motivation: This section highlights the role religion plays, especially radical Islam, in motivating young men and women to become suicide bombers in Iraq and Palestine. We found that religion can play a central role for a terrorist, but not for every terrorist. Stiti stated that his deep motivation to become a suicide bomber lies in his Islamic beliefs (Levy-Barzilai, 2002). Although many Islamic scholars disagree about when jihad against the United States is justified and by whom it can be declared (Murphy, 2002), some radical leaders like bin Laden believe jihad against “nonbelievers” or “unbelievers” is justified now. A discussion of the official teachings of Islam is beyond the purview of this chapter. The focus of this discussion encompasses only the individual terrorist’s religious convictions, which, admittedly, may not be consistent with Islam’s official teachings. Regardless of the official “correct” version regarding holy war and who can declare it, for individuals training for suicide missions, belief in holy war is the binding subjective reality. Abu Ubeida is a Sunni Muslim and deeply religious. “I am a terrorist. [The Qur’an] says it is the duty of Muslims to bring terror to the enemy, so being a terrorist makes me a good Muslim.” (Ghosh, 2005, p. 29). For Abu Ubeida, first comes the fight for Islam, second to become a “martyr,” and “only third for control of his country” (ibid., p. 26). Stiti and Abu Ubeida state that paradise will be the reward for their suicide attacks. In his final prayer before he carries out his mission, Abu Ubeida intends to say the following:

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First I will ask Allah to bless my mission with a high rate of casualties among the Americans… Then I will ask him to purify my soul so I am fit to see him, and I will ask to see my mujahedin brothers who are already with him. (ibid., p. 23–24) Abu Ubeida perceives the jihadis as more religious and credible than the average population: You ask them anything—anything—and they can instantly quote a relevant section from the Qur’an. Their lifestyle is faithful to the Qur’an and they live the ideal of an Islamic state with no alcohol, no music, and no Western influences. (ibid., p. 26) Central during training of terrorists is the conviction that Allah desires the planned attacks. In an audiotape made by bin Laden during October 2001, he explicitly connected the attacks of 11 September 2001 to the will of Allah: “When Almighty God rendered successful a convoy of Muslims, the vanguards of Islam, He allowed them to destroy the United States.” He continues: “God Almighty hit the Unites States at its most vulnerable spot.” According to bin Laden’s beliefs (or statements meant to influence potential terrorists’ beliefs), the Muslims had the blessing of Allah and Allah was guiding their mission. It was the will of Allah and not of individuals. For bin Laden, fighting for Allah means fighting against the “unbelievers,” and alZarqawi cited the Qur’an in a speech on 6 April 2006, “They are the enemies; so beware of them. The curse of Allah be on them!” (2006). The strong link between Islamic religious convictions and al Qaeda is evident in an al Qaeda document that the FBI found, left by one of the 9/11 hijackers in his car parked at Dulles International Airport. They found a copy of the same document in Muhammad Atta’s luggage. The document used religious terminology, described the terrorist plan as a reward of God, and as a “sacrificial rite” promising eternal life (Neria et al., 2005, p. 8). E. Anticipated and Immediate Rewards The decision to give up one’s life for a cause is probably one of the most difficult decisions a person can make. Behaviorism postulates that rewarded behavior is likely to be repeated. What would be the reward for killing oneself? At first glance and particularly from a Western perspective, such an act would have no reward. Life ends. The suicide bomber expects many rewards for a successful mission. Abu Ubeida states, “It doesn’t matter whether people know what I did,” he says. “The only person who matters is Allah—and the only question he will ask me is ‘How many infidels did you kill’?” (Ghosh, 2005, p. 29) The suicide, but more so the killing of enemies, guarantees direct access to paradise, not only for the suicide bomber, but also for the seventy people he or she wishes to save.

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According to Islam, a “martyr” can guarantee a place in paradise for those seventy people. From such a perspective, deciding to volunteer as a suicide bomber brings the ultimate reward beyond this temporal world’s treasures. When Abu Ubeida’s commander finally agreed to put his name on the list of volunteers, he said, “It was the happiest day of my life . . . I can’t wait . . . I am ready to die now” (ibid., p. 24). Offering one’s life for a higher cause is puzzling for Western psychology, since it violates the assumption of an individual’s motivation for selfpreservation. Apparently, suicide bombers are able to act against this motivation. If this life is perceived only as a beginning of an eternal life, if the current sociopolitical situation is perceived as unjust, if this life is not according to God’s or Allah’s will, and if the expected rewards are so powerful and desirable, then the suicide bombers’ decisions appear justifiable to themselves. Stiti expresses the relation of this life and the other life: Because they explained to me that life here is just a pathway to life in the next world. The loss of life here is not such a big thing. Here it’s just preparation. The next world is the true life, for the holy ones who are worthy of reaching there. (Levy-Barzilai, 2002) The main reward for many volunteers is their religious belief that Allah will reward them in their life after the death of their earthly body. Related to this belief is the belief that they are regarded as martyrs. They often hear others celebrate their dead loved ones, who committed suicide bombings. As Arin Ahmed proclaimed, her commanders told her, “You’ll gain a very special status among the women suicide bombers. You’ll be a real heroine” (ibid., 2002). Suicide bombers are heroes in Palestine. Videos of suicide bombers’ last words are available for purchase and on many occasions, parents dress their babies and children as suicide bombers and photograph them (Oliver and Steinberg, 2005). Suicide bombers can expect community appreciation and admiration. Suicide bombers also believe that they will be united in heaven with the loved ones who were killed by foreign troops. Another reward is monetary and social support for the families left behind. Oftentimes, the terrorist network financially supports the families left behind and, as it was the case of Abdo, the network promised to rebuild his family’s house (Reynolds, 2004). The rewards mentioned so far are anticipated rewards, those that await them after they die in their suicide attack. Preparing for the act also provides for immediate rewards. Joining the terrorist group and preparing for their missions is rewarded by their feeling of “doing something.” There is a continual sense of achievement— they are not only to remain passive and powerless. Abu Ubeida was part of several attacks on United States soldiers and always escaped unharmed. He said, “They shot back but couldn’t hit any of us. . . . It was my first taste of victory against the Americans” (Ghosh, 2005, p. 26). He experienced this victory and it motivated him to continue. What appeals to sui-

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cide mission volunteers is their belief that what they are about to do is the most valuable act someone can ever do—to die for the Islamic faith and for one’s country. Suicide terrorism is the most valued technique of jihad (see also Post et al., 2003). Volunteering creates a feeling of moral superiority, since the volunteer is “doing the right thing” and has the courage to do it compared to many who lack the courage or faith to do it. F. Mechanisms to Eradicate Guilt or Doubt Although the convictions might be strong, doubts about the mission might arise in the waiting time before the actual attack. These final hours appear to be exceptionally difficult. Often, young men and women only receive notice about carrying out an attack several hours before the actual attack. In some cases, they are isolated during the last days, most times together only with another suicide bomber volunteer to prepare spiritually. During the waiting period before carrying out an attack is when possible doubts can arise. These questions preoccupy their minds: What does my family think? Is it a hero’s act to kill people? Guilt develops when the volunteers think of their family and of the families who will suffer the loss of people killed in the suicide mission. To strengthen the volunteers’ resolve, they often make a final videotape or write farewell letters. By doing this, volunteers anticipate their death and take it as a given. Making a video or writing farewell letters and watching the video and reading the letter constitute a commitment to the decision, and making withdrawal from the mission more difficult for the volunteer (Gambetta, 2005). To minimize guilt, three main mechanisms are utilized: first, the enemy is dehumanized; second, an individual’s responsibility for the act is minimized; and third, thinking about consequences of the act to possible victims is forbidden. Dehumanize the Enemy and Instill Hatred: Dehumanization is a powerful mechanism to distance a person from another person or group. Dehumanization is typically accomplished by describing the other as an animal, or as “evil,” instead of as a human being (Baumeister, 1996). For example, on a Palestinian wall, people draw pictures of pigs and monkeys and write “Sons of monkeys and pigs” comparing Jews with these animals (Oliver and Steinberg, 2005). Islamic culture considers pigs to be unclean, thus the suggestion is made that Jews are unclean. One consequence of dehumanizing the enemy is hatred. Al-Zarqawi accuses Americans of lies and charlatanry: “The dust of lies and smoke of charlatanry released by the enemies of God are only intended to dope and weaken you so that you will not rise as heroes and men do (2006).” He denounces not only the United States but also the Shi’a in Iraq as collaborators with the United States government:

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Bin Laden expressed his hatred toward the Americans in an interview during 1998, in which he criticizes Americans as thieves and terrorists: We believe that the worst thieves in the world today and the worst terrorists are the Americans. . . . It is far better to kill a single American soldier than to squander his efforts on other activities. (Miller, 1998) Consequences of dehumanization are outgroup homogeneity and strong prejudices. Outgroup homogeneity means that all Americans or all Jews are regarded as equal and as a homogenous group (Tajfel, 1982). No differences among Americans or among Israelis are recognized. Prejudices refer to strong convictions and pre-judgments about the other group. Defer Individual’s Responsibility: A number of factors reduce the responsibility of the individual suicide bomber for the cruel act. First, the act is desired by Allah. Allah will give the strength and courage to carry out the mission; the individual alone cannot make the decision to carry out the act. Second, the act is supported and ordered by the commanders of the terrorist cell (Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants, 2000). In this way responsibility is diffused, and the individual can morally disengage from the act (Bandura, 2004; Maikovich, 2005). According to Jerrold M. Post (2005), Muslims already learn at a young age to respect authority and to show unquestioning obedience to Allah. Forbidden to Feel Empathy or to Think: Other factors that strengthen suicide volunteers to make their decision are (1) not thinking about the enemy as a person (the result of dehumanization); (2) not thinking about the consequences of the suicide mission to the enemy and their families; (3) not thinking about the consequences of their death to their family; and (4) non-questioning obedience to superiors and their orders. Asked if he thought about the possible victims, Stiti responded: I wouldn’t have seen that. We don’t see them at all. What’s before my eyes is [becoming] a shaheed [(martyr)]. Everything is for the sake of the commandment. That’s what I was told. The shaheed is on a very high level and everyone respects him. I wanted to participate in the liberation of my people, to fulfill the sacred commandment, to be a source of pride to my people and my friends. (Levy-Barzilai, 2002)

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As Stiti’s thoughts show, the suicide bomber must not think of people’s suffering, must not even see the enemy as human. The suicide bomber thinks about the act itself and the anticipated reward, which is after all the ultimate one from Allah. Arin Ahmed allowed herself to have empathy and it changed her life. Arin was about to blow herself up after her co-bomber did when she suddenly decided not to do it. She had planned to wait for the panicked people to run in her direction and then detonate her bomb. However, she never went through with her mission. She revealed the reason why she changed her mind: I remembered an Israeli girl my age whom I used to be in touch with. I suddenly understood what I was about to do and I said to myself: How can I do such a thing? I changed my mind. (Ibid.) In this moment, it was not just a dehumanized, strange enemy she would kill, but a person she knew. The mechanisms to eradicate guilt or doubts no longer had an impact. She empathized with the potential victims and she could not imagine killing the person she knew. Most of the volunteers try not to think about anything. They experience psychological denial or intentionally block out of their consciousness the possible consequences for victims or their own families. They dismiss possible problems that might occur, such as the potential of being captured before completing the mission. One of the Palestinian suicide bombers who was caught claimed: When I sit with you and want to drink water, I think of how I will get the water and get it and drink. But if I want to blow myself up, I don’t think about anything. (Berko and Erez, 2005, p. 615) We might wonder how a family would react if one of its members decided to become a suicide bomber. If the family does not approve of the decision, will this disapproval cause doubts and guilt in the volunteer? Often, families do not know about the decision or the plan and only receive a phone call shortly before the act is carried out. In the event that the families know about the mission and try to convince the suicide volunteers not to carry out their mission, the volunteers’ radical Islamic beliefs and the anticipated rewards are more important than the families’ concerns. Besides, during the training, the volunteers often sever connections with their families. About what his parents thought, Stiti responded: Yes. My parents begged me not to do it. My father told me that I’d be very sorry if I dared to go ahead, but it didn’t convince me. What they told me at the mosque was more powerful. They told me to just think about the commandment and the reward, up above, in Paradise, with the virgins that would be waiting for me and all the honor I would receive. (Levy-Barzilai, 2002)

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Commanders in the higher ranks of the terrorist networks make the larger decisions about politics and strategies. The young suicide volunteers seldom meet those superiors and they have no voice in any aspects of their final mission. They are also unaware of other concerns that affect the politics of their mission. As Abu Ubeida said, “The first step is to remove the Americans from Iraq. . . . After we have achieved that, we can work out the other details” (Ghosh, 2005, p. 26). The acceptance of orders from leaders and the unquestioning obedience to the mission might also be related to the high priority many Middle Eastern cultures place on hierarchical, authoritative relationships (Dwairy et al., 2006a). Adolescents from seven Arab countries (Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Palestine, Palestine/Israel, Egypt, Jordan) showed higher emotional, financial, and functional connectedness than American adolescents (Dwairy et al., 2006b). Obedience and deference towards authority as shown by the volunteer in the terrorist cell toward the commander is a part of the Islamic cultures. The possible causes of suicide terrorism discussed so far are integrated in the following model (see Figure 1). The central column represents the individual’s attitudes, beliefs, and decision to become a suicide bomber, which is influenced by four sets of causes: the macro socio-historico-political context, group processes, immediate and anticipated rewards for the individual, and mechanisms to eradicate possible guilt or doubts. Arrows indicate positive or negative influences among variables. This decision process may take years. A Cultural-Psychological Theory of Suicide Terrorism Group

Context Suicide Bomber

The Glorious Past: Ottoman Empire

Experience of Injustice

U.S. Occupation of Iraq

Cause of Injustice: U.S. and Israel

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Hatred Anger Helplessness

Deterioration of Living Conditions

Joining Terrorist Group

Group Cohesion: Solidifying Convic-

Ideological Training: Us v. Them

Commitment to Decision

Local Puppet Governments

Violence and Revenge as Moral Duty

Mechanisms to Eradicate Guilt or Doubt Dehumanize the Enemy

Defer Responsibility

Culture: Hierarchical and Collectivist Values

Guilt or Doubts

Suicide/ Martyrdom as Altruistic Act

Rewards

Anticipated Rewards

Immediate Rewards

.

Figure 1. Model showing Causes of Suicide Terrorism in the Middle East

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The model allows for individual differences. For a Palestinian volunteer, for example, the perceived Israeli oppression and injustice and the personal revenge and retaliation could be a major factor (Brym and Bader, 2006). For a member of Al Qaeda, on the contrary, the Muslim values and readings, which are part of the ideological training, may be the core of his or her decision to become a suicide bomber (Neria et al., 2005; Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants, 2000). 5. What Can be Done? Some Preliminary Thoughts on How to Decrease Suicide Terrorism The development of terrorism, especially suicide terrorism, is a complex phenomenon and difficult to counter or to end. How to prevent suicide terrorism is a very difficult question; no one exhaustive answer exists, because there are many different motivations of suicide terrorists and their leaders, because there are various goals related to suicide missions, and because the historical-culturalpolitical situation in which suicide terrorists operate is always different. The solutions we offer focus on suicide terrorism in Palestine/Israel and Iraq, the countries we focus on in this paper. Our theoretical model of suicide terrorism allows us to give tentative recommendations about how to possibly reduce suicide terrorism. We do this by enumerating actions that influence the variables and that interrupt the chain of causes. Following the model, we will discuss psychological, social, and cultural aspects of prevention. A. Actions Targeting the Socio-Cltural Context of Suicide Missions Motivations of many young Palestinians to become suicide bombers are related to the macro socio-cultural-historical context. Ahmed (2006) mentions the frustration about the Israeli occupation, the tough Israeli military measures to deal with Palestinian resistance, the inhuman conditions within their country, and the disappointment with their government. Imposition of military power has only led to an increase in suicide bombings and the spiral of violence and counterviolence continues. History has shown, for example, that during Hosni Mubarak’s oppression of Egypt and Ariel Sharon’s oppression of Palestine, military actions have not successfully provided any solution suicide bombings (ibid.). Hamas, for example, was about to declare a suspension of suicide missions in 2002, when Sharon bombed the home of Sheikh Salah Shehada, leader of the Izzidene al Qassam Brigade (Davis, 2003). Shehada, his family, and many innocent Palestinians and their children died. This caused Hamas to vow retaliation. They then renewed their suicide missions. As Joyce Davis put it, “bombing alone will not end the threat of terrorism” (2003, p. 178). As Mahatma Gandhi once said, “An eye for an eye will leave the whole world blind” (1957). Terrorism research often compares military aggres-

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sion against suicide bombers with the Hydra of the Greek mythodology, the monster with several heads (Wilkinson, 1986). When one of the Hydra’s heads severed, two or more heads grew again. Thus, the Hydra being hurt, it became stronger and stronger. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict needs to be resolved on a political level to decrease the possible number of suicide terrorist volunteers in the end. Many Iraqis perceive their current situation as being similar to the one occurring in Palestine. They are disappointd with American occupation; they feel exploited and unjustly treated. Other sources of discontent include disappointment with different ethnic groups, slow political progress, and the experience of cruelties. Mia Bloom cites an Iraqi who said, “I see no difference between us and the Palestinians” (2005, p. 175). Increasingly more Muslims are seeing the United States as a colonial power who occupies together with their partner Israel three of the holiest places in Islam—Arabian Peninsula, Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, and Jerusalem (Scheuer cited in Bloom, 2005, p. 173). The long-term propaganda of bin Laden, that the United States would come and occupy an Islamic country and exploit its oil resources, came true. The United States’ occupation of Iraq, instead of reducing violence, led to a multitude of new volunteers for al Qaeda (Reuter, 2002). According to the New York Times, the National Intelligence Estimate of April 2006, which draws from the United States Intelligence Community, all sixteen United States’ intelligence agencies, contradicts the George W. Bush administration, and indicates that the war in Iraq was actually creating more terrorism (M. Mazzetti, “Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terrorism Threat,” The New York Times, 24 September 2006). Other democratic countries in the global community, for example the European Union, can show that they are determined not to tolerate unjust violence, even if committed by its allies, such as Israel killing civilians while fighting terrorism in Lebanon during 2006. They are still willing to support other states in crises, such as Lebanon. They could speak out against injustices. The local governments in Iraq and Palestine also play an important role in preventing suicide terrorism. They have to demonstrate that people can trust them. They need to guarantee safety for their citizens, fight corruption, and defend the interests of their citizens. Local governments have to show a life worth living in a moderate Islamic state, since a crucial mass of young men in many Middle Eastern countries is supportive of al Qaeda (Atram, 2003; Sciolino, 2002; Soibelman, 2004) and the goal is to prevent those young men and women from joining the terrorist cells. Societal motives to become a suicide terrorist were “victimization by external enemies” (Hafez, 2006b, p. 53) and authorities promoting or tolerating extreme violence. The task for the local governments is to tackle the real problems on the societal or global levels, the poverty, the powerful control of developed countries, the unjust relations between countries, and the continued ignorance of other people’s cultures.

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B. Actions Targeting the Individual Suicide Volunteer and the Surrounding Population Intervention targeting the individual suicide terrorist volunteer is quite difficult. Volunteers are people who made up their mind often long before they join a terrorist cell (Bloom, 2005). We discussed some of the motivations leading young men and women to become volunteers for suicide missions such as loss of a loved one in armed conflict, revenge, lack of believe in current political leaders, deterioration of living conditions, and religious rewards. As Tom H. Hastings said, “terrorism… is in the minds of the terrorized” (2004, p. 204). Due to the complex reasons for their decisions, many of the volunteers are likely to carry out their missions, especially when their resolve strengthens once they join the terrorist group. In the short-term, a society can only try to minimize the likelihood that the suicide missions will be carried out successfully. Security actions already being taken are scanning people in airports, government buildings, and big shopping malls. Short-term actions can also address the problems faced by volunteers who would like to leave the terrorist groups. Many of them might have doubts or develop doubts about their missions. Often involved in illegal activities earlier, volunteers can only expect imprisonment. Governments could promise reduced sentences or amnesty to offer a way out and to make leaving the terrorist group more attractive. This procedure worked well in Italy when many members of the Mafia turned themselves in. Long-term actions have to target the population and the big group of possible volunteers within this population who have not yet made up their minds (Bloom, 2005). The population plays the key role in the prevention of suicide terrorism. Research indicates that 25 percent of Palestinian boys between twelve and seventeen years of age want to become suicide bombers. About 95 percent of young educated Saudis are supportive of al Qaeda (Shahda, as cited in Madsen, 2005; Sciolino, 2002). Other reports have shown strong resistance against American occupation forces in Iraq (Abi-Hashem, 2004; Harb, Hafedh, and Fischer, 2006). A change in attitudes in the population regarding the support of suicide missions would withdraw the moral basis and the support for the terrorist organizations that use suicide missions as their strategy. The battle has to occur in the minds and hearts of the people (Burke, 2003). How can those attitudes change? The attitudes of the populations could slowly change, if the perceived oppressors were to engage in honest peace talks or start actively supporting the population that is suffering. Frustration and anger as experienced by many Iraqis and Palestinians could slowly evolve into forgiveness and hope. With such resolution of conflict, the population could perceive slight improvements in the economic situation and experience new avenues for political engagement. Only when the vast majority of the population does not support suicide and other ter-

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rorist attacks, will the terrorist organizations lack the necessary support from the population and their strategy to employ suicide missions will change. One promising example for the declining support of the terrorist organization within the population can be found in Iraq. There, three major fractions have the goal to collapse the regime: Mujahideen Consultative Council (al Qaeda in Iraq), Ansar al-Sunna Army; and the Ba’athists (Hafez, 2007). Currently, Iraqis do not feel protected by the United States forces or by their current government. If Iraqis would start criticizing suicide missions, especially those targeted against Iraqi civilians, the terrorist groups might change their strategy. Internal Iraqi pressures, for example, lead al Qaeda to change their strategy and to turn over their leadership to Iraqis—the Mujahideen Consultative Council (ibid.). To win the population, the Western world needs to support peace building in Palestine and Iraq. Peace building in Islam can be based on strong Islamic values such as “patience (sabr), solidarity, sacrifice, and universal human dignity” (Abu-Nimer, 2003, p. 184). Peace building needs to involve the local communities, which may already be skeptical against outsiders. Imposed solutions from the West might fail in the long run if they do not consider the local cultural traditions (ibid.). C. Actions Targeting the Terrorist Leaders and the Terrorist Cells One current strategy followed by the United States and Israel is to kill the top leaders of terrorist organizations. But this is arguably an ineffective strategy. In Palestine, killings of top leaders did not lead to a decrease of terrorism. Killing of al Qaeda leaders may weaken the centralized structure of al Qaeda and may lead to an increasingly decentralized structure. This decentralization has its advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that planned and coordinated attacks of a magnitude like the attacks of 11 September 2001 will become less likely. The disadvantage is that intelligence will have a harder time to monitor the many small, decentralized, local terrorist organizations. Another disadvantage is that those small terrorist organizations might have to demonstrate their power and distinguish themselves from other small terrorist organizations by some spectacular attacks. For example, fights among terrorist organizations in Palestine are quite common. Adhering to democratic principles, capturing terrorist leaders and following legal actions instead of killing them, would increase the credibility of democratic states. Another strategy could be to point out some of the inconsistencies in motivations and attitudes of terrorist leaders, perhaps using the media to communicate these ideas. Thauriya Hamamreh, a young twenty-five-year-old Muslim from Palestine, with nine brothers and sisters, was caught by Israelis before she could carry out her suicide mission (Rudge, 2002). She had changed her mind and did not want to carry out her mission. Initially she trained to put on an explosive belt packed with nails and other metal objects and learned how to detonate it

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two days before the planned attack. But she had doubts and was disillusioned with her handlers and their motives. Hamamreh realized that her commanders did not genuinely care about her, only about their goals. She came to realize that she was just a means for them to achieve their goals. What she did to come to a change of viewpoint was to ask questions, think critically, and not accept commands blindly. She changed her mind because she no longer believe in the integrity of her commanders. We can identify three reasons for this change. First, she was asked to detonate the belt if she believed that Iraelis recognized her—even if she were not surrounded by many Israelis. Based on that order, she decided that the goal of her commanders was not so much to kill the enemy, but to make sure that she did not get caught and questioned. Second, they asked her to wear make-up and dress like a modern Israeli girl in tight jeans with her hair loose: “I didn’t want to do this because it was against my religious beliefs” (ibid.). The third reason for changing her mind was that she had developed empathy with her possible victims, as did Arin Ahmed: I also began to imagine the people I would be killing, whether they would be women and children, families sitting down at a cafe. I became a bit disillusioned, because I had been told to blow myself up in any event. (Ibid.) Many researchers point out that the use of suicide attacks can be regarded as a strategic choice of a terrorist organization to reach their goals. Fear, anxiety, and mistrust in the state’s ability to guarantee public safety are consequences of suicide attacks. As long as the intended effects of suicide missions occur, the terrorist organization will most likely continue to use this method. Support in the population and the media also play a key role. Often, media reporters show and dramatize suicide attacks. More critical reporting about suicide attacks in the media might slowly change the attitudes in the population. Terrorist organizations might cease to use suicide missions as their strategy if they no longer have the support from the population or the media. In Islamic societies, religious leaders could play a crucial role in the prevention of suicide terrorism. No Islamic system had the power to close mosques and silence religious leaders; perhaps silencing some leaders, but not all of them. Even though some of those leaders publicly support suicide missions (Hoffman and McCormick, 2004) most of them do not support those missions. In Iraq, those leaders have always played a crucial role in opposing Hussein’s dictatorship. They have a high reputation and moral authority in the population. Their voice is heard and they can contribute immensely to the democratization process of Iraq. Clerics could argue against bin Laden’s declaration of jihad; they could emphasize that he does not represent Islam and that he is damaging to moderate Islam. They could marginalize bin Laden and al Qaeda. Perhaps they could proclaim a contextualized democracy for their country, democracies adapted to the

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local socio-cultural history, yet showing basic rights of every democracy such as equal treatment before the law—Democracies, that give the citizens the right to participate in the democratic process (Moghaddam, 2006, p. 129). Moderate Islamic leaders could also play an important role in a different form of education. In several Middle Eastern countries, some schools teach children the literal interpretation of Qur’an, Wahhabism. This form of Islam is taught by Wahhabi clerics in Saudi Arabia or in Pakistan. Learning and reciting the Qur’an is not a bad thing. However, if teachers also foster anti-Western ideas and intolerance, anger rises and the West will be viewed as the scapegoat for all problems. PBS Frontline (2007) cites one part of the Hadif (statements of Prophet Muhammad) for ninth graders published by the Saudi government Ministry of Education: The last hour won’t come before the Muslims would fight the Jews and the Muslims will kill them so Jews would hide behind rocks and trees. Then the rocks and tree would call: oh Muslim, oh servant of God! Fostering anti-Western ideas and fundamentalist Islamic beliefs, as described in the 9/11 report (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004), is populating a breeding ground for many new terrorists and suicide terrorists. A long-term goal for those who wish to reduce the number of suicide bombing attacks should be the support of schools that adapt to the Islamic culture and community, one that support their schoolchildren and offer a different sort of education. President Bush made an initial attempt toward this new sort of education when he promised millions of dollars to support the Indonesian school system as an alternative to the growing fundamentalist schools in Indonesia. D. Actions Targeting the Decrease of Immediate and Anticipated Rewards Promises of financial rewards, hope of admiration and spiritual rewards in the afterlife are strong incentives for suicide volunteers Suicide terrorists are perceived as martyrs, heroes who stand up against injustice. One way to decrease these rewards would be to change the supporting attitudes of the population by changing the macro-political situation. To counter the financial rewards offered to suicide volunteers, the global community needs to offer humanitarian support for the Palestinian populations, but divorce support from Hamas and limit the funds flowing to Hamas. Opening the Palestinian market for export and import to boost the economy as indicated by the World Bank Report 2003 is critical. But today roads are blocked and free movement is restricted by Israelis to prevent further suicide attacks. Financial help in Iraq could repair destroyed infrastructure, expand new infrastructure, and support the healthcare and educational system. Initial actions

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would slowly lead to trust. A powerful example of how Americans were able to build such trust, albeit from a different cultural and historical context, is the extraordinary help they offered Germans after the Second World War. E. Actions Targeting the Increase of Feelings of Guilt or Doubt when Thinking of Killing Others One last group of variables influencing the decision to become a suicide bomber as outlined in the theoretical model are mechanisms to eradicate guilt or doubt about committing suicide for a cause. Guilt or doubt would arise, for instance, if potential volunteers came to perceive enemies as human beings. To decrease these feelings of guilt or doubt, indoctrinators exaggerate ingroup and outgroup differences (Moghaddam, 2006).They dehumanize the enemy, often comparing them to unclean or disgusting animals. Trainees can then more easily attribute responsibility for the act of suicide to kill them to the leaders of the mission and to Allah, who desires, controls, and leads the mission. They come to view the enemies as dispensable, without feeling as if they have taken the life of undeserving human beings. A long-term goal could be education of the public, perhaps through the media and in schools, that enemies are also human beings with similar worries and concerns. This experience of seeing the enemy as a human being made Arin Ahmed decide not to detonate her bomb. Arin Ahmed was about to blow herself up after her co-bomber blew himself up, when she suddenly decided not to do it. In this moment, it was not just a dehumanized, strange enemy she would kill, but another human beings. The mechanisms to eradicate guilt or doubts did not work any more. She showed empathy with the possible suffering and she could not imagine killing those people. One of the many steps in eradicating terrorism would be to see the enemy as persons. The probable and most efficient way to do this is to get to know them personally. 6. Conclusion and Discussion Suicide terrorism in the Middle East has increased during the last century and is a method that terrorist organizations employ to fight a militarily stronger enemy. The goal of this chapter was to investigate the question of how someone can become a suicide bomber. Although “the discussion of factors leading an individual to commit the suicidal act is still in its early stages” (Pedhazur, 2005, p. 38), we outlined a theoretical model that tries to explain suicide terrorism in Palestine/Israel and Iraq. The model indicates that the problem of suicide terrorism is a complex problem involving individuals, groups, the population, and the global community. The major factors influencing an individual’s decision to become a suicide bomber were macro-socio-cultural and political context, the processes in the terrorist cell, the rewards related to becoming a suicide terrorist and the mechanisms to eradicate guilt or doubt.

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We could have discussed every aspect of the model in more detail, but our main goal was to present the overall picture instead of focusing in depth on only one or two aspects. Investigating some aspects of the model in depth could be done in future studies. From that model, we derived possible actions that states could take to decrease the number of suicide missions, being aware that those recommendations are tentative. Change will not happen overnight, but if we take appropriate actions, change could happen in the near future. A major difficulty related to the psychological study of suicide terrorism is the quality of self-report data gathered. If suicide bombers carried out their mission successfully, they could not be interviewed. If they did not carry out their mission and were imprisoned, we must question how reliable and trustworthy their statements are. Did the interviewer truly capture the key information in the interview? Interviewing families of suicide bombers or analyzing videos left behind can also be criticized as methods, because they are also secondary sources of data. Is it possible to get more reliable data through other methods, e.g. participatory observation? Joining a terrorist group for a specific amount of time is extremely dangerous, not to mention its feasibility. Terrorist organizations are built on trust and do not advertise and it would be exceedingly difficult for a citizen from a Western country to enter in contact with such an organization. Even if difficulties with the research methodologies in this field exist and no experimental laboratory studies can be carried out, we believe that these difficulties should not hinder further exploration of this phenomenon. If we cannot truly understand suicide terrorism or if we refuse to understand it, then how can we claim that we want to end terrorism?

WRAP-UP OF PART THREE C. Dominik Güss The three chapters in this part focused on inclusive worldviews—how cultural differences can be the cause of conflict, or be an opportunity to achieve peace. Sanaa Mounir Sadek’s chapter focused on the effects of globalization on the Middle East, and the role that knowledge of the Arabic language and culture can play in improving intercultural interactions. John M. Davis focused on the concept of social justice, offering examples across different countries. He described the West’s tendency to use retaliation and punishment versus other cultures’ concentration on reintegration. He suggests that the West can learn from other countries in the world community. C. Dominik Güss, Teresa Tuason, and Vanessa Teixeira discussed suicide terrorism in Iraq and Palestine. Addressing what we can do to ameliorate the problem, the authors argued that a first necessary step is to try to understand how suicide terrorists think. Although the three chapters had different themes and content, they shared implications for global security. All three chapters talked about Western misperceptions of Islam and the Middle East. Sadek referred to an impression of the Arab world and Islam in general as incubators for terrorism—men with beards shouting, “Death to America.” Davis and Güss, et al. described the distorted images portrayed in Western media about suicide terrorism. Such misperceptions are the root of stereotypes; to achieve better understanding, Western media must present a more accurate and truthful picture of other countries. All three chapters argued that learning about the other country is a first step for global security. Sadek recommended learning the Arab language, literature, and culture. Davis showed that lack of knowledge about the other can lead to social injustice and inappropriate actions, for example, dissolving the Iraqi military and later reinstating it. Güss, et al. demonstrated that learning about the socio-cultural context of suicide bombers, about their motives, and the influences of terrorist cells can lead to better understanding, allowing people to move beyond black and white thinking. Following the advice in these three chapters, the key to better understanding and improved relations, especially between the West and the Arab world, lies in knowledge. Also discussed by all the authors were the socio-economic conditions in many Middle Eastern countries, for example, the decline in agricultural production and non-petroleum export, and the overall lack of opportunities and loss of hope for the future. Considering Middle Eastern countries’ bitter memories of European imperialism and the biased favoritism of Western countries toward Israel, no wonder we find many people in these countries might be skeptical of the West. All the authors described Middle Easterners’ dissatisfaction with governments and frustration with the status quo.

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The authors of these chapters agree that problems in the Middle East stem from more than one cause. Despite the often too simplistic causes proclaimed in Western media, no one factor—not only poverty, not only Islam, not only oppression of women, not only the historical experience, and not only a specific form of education—can account for the hostility and unrest. Moving toward an inclusive worldview is possible—if partners let go of black and white thinking, then partners try to understand instead of exploit, become less egocentric and more humble. Through understanding, we will realize that all too often the problems of “other” countries can become the problem of “our” country.

Part Four DIVERSE STRATEGIES FOR EXPANDING PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL COMMUNITY

INTRODUCTION TO PART FOUR Elizabeth Leigh Cralley, Brian Richard Wetzler As the title of Part Four suggests, strategies for promoting global community and global security vary widely. This part includes theoretical approaches and suggestions for practical applications. The authors offer us military, civilian, scientific, and philosophical perspectives. They are not only consumers, but also producer of resources and technology. In “Proposed Strategies for Integration of Military and Civilian Agencies,” Richard Frizzell suggests strategies for reconsidering traditional divisions among the United States’ active duty, reserve, and National Guard groups. He encourages greater sharing of communication of technological advances in the war on terrorism. As such, the military could be share its communications with the state and local levels of government and law enforcement. He also proposes a National Service Program, a compelling and rewarding dedication to national identity and citizenship. Elizabeth Cralley and Brian Wetzler discuss theoretical origins of prejudice and intergroup hostility from a social psychological perspective in “From Cooperative Inter-Group Contact to Personal Motivation.” We review group and individual factors involved in the origins and discuss these factors in terms of current and historical geopolitical conflict. We present strategies for reducing prejudice and promoting a more inclusive worldview, based on scientific evidence supporting their effectiveness. Moving the focus from the war on terror, and interactions among people and groups, to the relationship between humanity and Earth’s natural resources, Vincent Lopes and Vincent Luizzi discuss “Participatory Sustainability.” Focusing on the interdependent person-environment relationship, they suggest how we can transition to a state of participatory sustainability, wherein the current population can effectively meet its needs for resources without hindering future generations’ ability to do the same. Asking “Can We Survive?” Stephen Paley, George K. Oister, and Richard T. Hull address the need for immediate implementation of technological survival strategies to prevent irreversible environmental destruction and to decrease humanity’s contribution to destructive climate change. They discuss how intergroup conflict and competing goals hamper the development and delivery of survival strategies, highlighting the interdependence of human beings with the environment. Jorge M. Valadez, in “Adaptation, Sustainability, and Justice,” maintains that we can achieve sustainability and social justice by promoting the capability of individuals and collectivities to adapt to their social and natural environments. Adaptation is understood as self-determination broadly conceived, while for the natural world it is understood in terms of evolutionary capacity. Valadez

184 ELIZABETH LEIGH CRALLEY AND BRIAN RICHARD WETZLER contends that self-determination, when conceived as a form of adaptation, facilitates the implementation of sustainable environmental policies. Throughout this part, we encourage readers to consider these recurring themes: interdependence among groups of people and between groups of people and their environment; the powerful motivation of shared and superordinate goals; the importance of more effective communication and shared knowledge; and the need to conceptualize our place in the world as individuals and as essential partners in a global community. These diverse perspectives offer insight into the complexities of enhancing global security by changing our ideas of what constitutes the global community. Disclaimer The views expressed in this document do not represent any implicit or explicit endorsement by any office or division of the United States Coast Guard or by any office or division of the United States Government.

Eleven PROPOSED STRATEGIES FOR INTEGRATION OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AGENCIES IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM WITHIN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS TERRITORIES Richard Frizzell 1. Introduction The United States federal government and its various agencies are responsible for preserving peace and security within its borders. Currently, it is responding to new threats posed by the “War on Terrorism,” focusing on ways to combat unconventional warfare and fend off catastrophic attacks. It keeps the most modern antiterrorism technology out of the hands of civilian police forces because of its fear that the devices may be compromised by theft and misuse. Available antiterrorism technology is not available because the military controls it. Therefore, we must seek ways to meld military, intelligence, and police agencies into one compact and tailored organization capable of using all technology at the country’s disposal. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has directed the military, intelligence, and police services to work together to improve their capabilities to detect breakthrough adversarial technology that enemies could use to usurp United States’ military power. The Strategic Planning Guidance 2006, formerly known as the Defense Planning Guidance, was the first step in an elaborate process of building a defense budget (United States, 2006). It drafted objectives for uniting United States’ antiterrorism agencies, reflecting new Pentagon thinking that it must complement traditional warfare capabilities with a more comprehensive set of antiterrorism skills. Army Times Magazine staff writer, Jason Sherman, in “Pentagon Plans for combating the ‘Tactics of the Weak,’” pointed out that the military is opening to new methods of dealing with security challenges presented by the War on Terror (17 May 2004). The Strategic Planning Guidance is the first step in an elaborate process of building a defense budget meant to guide the services as they planned their 2006 budgets and six-year spending plans. The strategy for the unified cooperation among military, intelligence and civilian forces shakes up Pentagon priorities for weapons-system modernization, many of which are designed to deal with conventional military threats. The strategy has also challenged proposed changes in the development and deployment of United States forces and capabilities. Loren Thompson, an analyst with the Lex-

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ington Institute, a defense-consulting firm, opines that regardless of military transformation being a substantial shift away from traditional ways of organization, the transformation is necessary and worthwhile (2004). The thinking at the end of the Cold War, during the “Peace Dividend” (a time when the United States no longer had a Cold War adversary in the now defunct Soviet Union, when we could expect smaller defense budgets), the Clinton Administration thought that the United States would never again need to face a large formidable enemy. Therefore, it used all speed and purpose to downsize and modernize the force into a lean, mean, technologically superior fighting force, reinforced by space-based radar, intelligence gathering capabilities that could intercept international calls, and high visual satellite support of ground operations. However, we will execute much of the antiterrorism activities not on the soil of far-off countries but within our borders. The Afghanistan and Iraq Wars on terrorism have narrowed that window of time when Clinton’s “Modernization of the Force” was to be completed. It forced the Pentagon to reconsider how to implement the transformation. To fortify United States’ defenses, the Pentagon is setting goals to strengthen its intelligence operations and irregular-warfare proficiency. What part does the Office of Homeland Security play in this move for the use of military technology? How much does the government consider the actual security of soft targets, such as civilians, utilities, communication infrastructure, non-governmental industries, and institutions within the United States borders? These facts govern the present War on Terror: (1) The United States’ military is the smallest it has been since the end of World War I. (2) The military is presently a “volunteer force” that does not include a larger base of all males and females of eligible military age. (3) No move is currently planned reinstitute the “draft” which would bring a larger base of support for prosecuting the War on Terror. (4) United States military policy uses Reserve and National Guard Forces to “plug in the holes” of a thinly stretched out military. (5) The United States military is getting older at the upper ranks and younger at the lower ranks with few forces in the middle age range. (6) War fighting and homeland security are two different and separate actions in plans and operations. (7) Presently, the United States military uses high-tech war fighting support mostly outside the United States. (8) No plans are in the works to use military personnel or expertise at the municipal police level, even though integrating some types of military personnel could improve the civilian police departments’ ability to cope with the changing environment of terrorist activity within the United States.

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The United States has a long history of improvisation and adaptation to changing environments during national crisis. We have had the luxury of time and a vast ocean, in addition to a large country in which to fall back, lick our wounds, and then revise our strategy to meet new challenges. This is no longer the case as we have large cities, with interdependent infrastructures, and an evergrowing population. Transportation within and outside of the country is efficient and simple. An enemy or potential terrorist can leave anywhere in the Middle East and be in any major American city within twenty-four hours. We must therefore be ready to counter any 9/11-type threat with speed and a unified use of technology. Antiterrorism technology is available to our active military units but is not accessible by local level police agencies. For local access to antiterrorism technology to happen quickly and efficiently, local police must acquire military technology for local use. The United States’ Government and military must make changes to laws and policies to give the local and statewide police forces access to technology. We must also make changes in the everyday lives of citizens. The United States Government and the many state governments, in support of the war effort, should give this list of proposed changes strong consideration: (1) The United States should immediately develop and implement a “National Service Program,” similar to the draft, which was used to gain labor during past wars. This program would give individuals the right to choose where they would serve. This is similar to the present European National Service Programs that are so successful today. (2) The United States should increase its military strength by 300,000 men and women in arms to fill the ranks of combat units now deployed. The increased military ranks would produce standing combat units that will be in constant readiness training at home bases in the United States when not in the theatre of war. (3) The Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1385), which forbid the use of federal troops as police within the borders of the country, should be repealed as soon as possible. This will enable various state and local governments the flexibility to work with military forces unhindered by antiquated notions of the use of military units in police work. (4) The National Guard, Army, Naval, and Air Force Reserve units should not be used in out-of-the-country combat, but in-service to local and state police forces. The Guard units should be equipped with modern “state-of-the-art” intelligence and surveillance equipment and weaponry, to be used in police actions against terrorist cells in the United States. (5) The federal government should issue National Identity Cards every five years to citizens in the same way as states issue driver’s license or voter registration cards. (6) The federal government should suspend immigrations to the United States and its territories for six-month to one-year, with exceptions granted only as determined sound by the federal government.

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RICHARD FRIZZELL (7) We should use United States Armed Forces Reserve units on the borders of the United States to seal the border. Reserve troops of the Federal Armed Forces should be eligible to be deployed at any part of the border without regard to state borders. We should not use reserve troops for combat outside the United States except on a volunteer basis. (8) We should use the Reserve Forces, Army, and Marine, to run detention camps for perpetrators of border violations. The authorities should punish illegal entrances to this country by incarceration and fines to pay for travel expenses back to the violator’s home country of record. These persons should not be allowed legal entrance into the country after their illegal action. (9) Once we have secured the borders and the immigration and visa program is on track, the country should again allow migration with visas and green cards. Migrant farm and other labor workers should be given eight-month workers cards along with a special social card to be able to pay taxes for benefits legally after retirement age in this country or their country through normal government channels. (10) We should test all Green Card holders in this country to ensure that they speak English as their second language. Persons making application to the country for citizenship should have command of the English language equal to that of a native citizen. Voting ballots should not be printed in any language other then English.

These changes, though somewhat radical to our American way of life, reflect common sense and should be presented to the American people as the official national policy regarding security in the present War on Terror. The United States now needs to demonstrate the same flexibility within its borders and with the states and the local municipalities as it exercises in the military with regard to enemies on foreign soil with the objective to get all police organizations to train and work with the National Guard and Reserve forces on Inter-State and Intra-State security. In this chapter, I will discuss current strategies under consideration by our government, examining how easily they could be adapted to the proposals listed above. We should review International Treaties, Protocols, and Associations that have enabled the United States the flexibility of working cooperatively with other friendly nations with these questions in mind: (1) Are these associations still in our best interest? (2) Will our continued membership in these organizations strengthen our defensive posture? (3) Does sincere two-way cooperation exist among all members of these organizations, which can facilitate increased security for the United States and other members?

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The United States is presently a member of the following organizations: (1) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a collective organization defensive in nature established to protect Western Europe and all its members. (An attack on one will be considered an attack on all). This treaty has endured for over sixty years since the end of the World War II and the beginning of the Cold War to present time; (2) The Organization of American States (OAS), which loosely binds North, Central, and South America for defensive and economic stability; (3) The United States-Japan Bilateral Alliance; (4) Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States-ASEAN Business Council. These are but a small example of cooperative defensive and economic defense efforts we have taken against outside threats. America has learned to share the burden of security for the group. 2. Understanding What the Reserves Are and How They Work Let us review what constitutes a Reservist/National Guard Citizen member of the Armed Forces of the United States. The Armed Forces Reserves and the National Guard Forces are different organizations. The Armed Forces Reserves (Army, Air Force, Marines, Navy, and Coast Guard) are federal forces governed by the various branches or components of the United States Armed Forces. These Reserve Armed Forces are assigned units and areas of training and support responsibilities in support of active duty, full time Armed Forces units with missions from training to combat service support. The National Guard Units are state-governed reserve forces ruled by National Guard Bureau Regulations (NGB). Each state then has regulations by which the units train and operate. Each state has an official called The Adjutant General of the Force (TAG), who reports directly to the governor of that state. Governors can activate National Guard forces for state emergencies, for example, floods, hurricanes, forest fires, and civil disorder incidents, such as riots. The President of the United States can also “nationalize” National Guard Forces, which are federally constituted forces, for service in the active military. In both reserve forces, the federal government pays for either all or most of the training conducted by these forces. I will provide a brief history of both organizations to better clarify the roles and missions of these organizations. The National Guard has a long history that dates almost a century before the Independence of the original thirteen British Colonies in North America. Each colony had a “Colonial Militia” which provided for the local defense of the frontier. Their training came from “elected officers” with varied degrees of military experience, which at times was barely sufficient to load a musket. However, as the War for Independence proceeded, so did the improved training of the

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various militia units that fought alongside the Colonial Regulars. Still, the government never relied on the militia for anything but rear guard, a ruse, or guard duty. It was not a question of loyalty, but to split duties: one for the home, one for the war. We needed this militia at home for planting, harvesting, and family needs. At best, they always remained part-time citizen soldiers. These men had the desire to serve, a key quality, but they never quite had the time to train when they needed it. During our history as a nation, we called on various militia units to serve. This was evident during the Civil War, the Spanish American War, World Wars I and II, and the Korean War. Viet Nam was an exception; only a few units of the National Guard ever served then. We called upon Guard Units for two major reasons: because of their structure, composed mostly of combat units with a military chain of command, and because the men and women who served in these units had civilian occupations that gave them experience in overcoming shortfalls. They were innovative during training at home stations and in the field. Today, these men and women must also go through regular military boot camp and combat training for sixteen weeks to six months, depending on the individual’s military occupational specialty (MOS). Unit members, in many cases, have been working with each other for several years. Some of these members have jobs in the public service sector such as police officers, firefighters, public works employees, and public administrators. This has been a “plus” for getting things done despite “military regulations.” National Guard units have a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE). Units can be anywhere from 50 percent to 90 percent in personnel strength and equipment readiness, compared to active duty (full time federal military unit) component strength and equipment organization. These guard units train at local armory buildings and usually must beg for “Local Training sites” from citizens who may own expanses of land large enough to be used for training by the whole unit. Units trains either on a selected weekday evening every week, or on one weekend a month. For the weekday evening training of four hours, the unit member will receive the equivalent of one day’s pay of an active duty, full time military counterpart of the same rank. Weekend duty usually involves sixteen hours of training and the individual receives the equivalent of four days’ pay of an active duty counterpart. Most training conducted by these units is with “older equipment,” a generation or older than the latest model of the same equipment. A Guardsman incurring injury during training is not a good thing for either the unit or the commanders. No one wants to admit to having someone injured during supervised training. This can be a career ender for the commander and a long drawn out process of getting compensation and continued wages for the incapacitated individual. As the active component units change structure, so the National Guard Units structure also changes. However, this generally is done on paper long before the actual equipment and training come along to modernize the

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unit. Despite all of these shortcomings, many outstanding National Guard Units with good people serve their state and their country. Federal Reserve units were formed after World War I and have the same problems as the National Guard units. But their mission is one of a ready work force source with little reliance on “Unit Structure” for combat. Both Guard and Reserve train for two-week periods each year as a requirement for certification and one weekend per month at the home station for the remainder of the year. The “resident expert” assigned to the training classes for the day or weekend guides most home station training. Training is assigned to subordinate units on quarterly training schedule (QTS).Units follow a training program set by higher command to ensure that members of the unit maintain an acceptable level of military expertise. Some training is excellent and some is barely adequate, with most of the training falling somewhere in between. However, many Guard members and Reservists have higher civilian educational levels than their regular forces counterparts typically have, with the exception of the Officer Corps. The drawbacks of using National Guard and Reserve units in battle in operations outside the United States is that the average ages of these “part-time soldiers” are seven to ten years older than their regular forces counterparts. They are also engaged within the civilian workforce in jobs that require skill and time. They have families and are involved in the day-to-day life of being parents. Some Guard units have done two tours in the combat zone in Iraq and Afghanistan and may be faced with yet a third or fourth tour in either the combat zone or on military installations as relief forces to free up regular combat units before enlistments of Guard members and Reservist time is up in the National Guard and Reserves (twenty years if they are a “Lifer”). These facts can, and often do, create hardship, mental and physical, on the entire family structure. Reservists and Guard members serving in the Middle East suffer as many as 35 percent more non-combat injuries, illnesses, combat wounds, and deaths as their Regular Army and Marine Counterparts (Bannerman, 2006, p. 179). It is very difficult getting casualty figures on one segment of the force because units combine all combat zone figures and commands without identification of the soldiers’ original status as a Guardsman or Reservist. Many good noncommissioned and commissioned officers are leaving the Guard and Reserve forces because of the stress created by having to be absent for long periods of time because of duty in the Middle East or some other place outside the United States. They also risk being passed over for promotion in their civilian occupation because of their uncertain availability should their unit be called up again. This situation also increases stress on employers. 3. The Disadvantage of Using Reserve Forces in Frontline Combat at the Present Time The Reserve Forces are categorized in two broad fields: training units under the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); and Forces Command (FOR-

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SCOM), that are combat and combat support units. In theory, FORSCOM units are ready to be activated and used to round out active duty units in simulated combat training and for war fighting. Most FORSCOM units are organized under the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) or MTOE. TRADOC units are mostly Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) units, which must be reauthorized every year for these units to stay in the system. TDA units are usually light in equipment and can be easily reorganized or deactivated. However, some units are MTOE or TOE units within the TRADOC side of the house. To better understand the two forces, remember that National Guard units are organized to serve the state and the federal governments alike. They have equipment, a continuous training cycle, and a wartime mission and a State mission, which are quite different in nature. The citizen/soldier must maintain some level of proficiency in both areas using two weeks annual training (80 to 100 hours) and Individual Drill Training (IDT), training at home station of four hours per week or sixteen to twenty hours per month, but not both. If we do the math, we see that these citizen soldiers get about 280 to 290 hours of military training per year in a best-case scenario. In a national emergency, these whole units would be called up, and in most cases, kept intact. Are these units ready, physically and militarily, to go into war? We could ask the same question of the federal Reserve Forces, either units or individuals called up because of the need for their type of military units or for an individual’s MOS. A good example of individuals needed for their skills are doctors, nurses, computer repair technicians, language specialist, and MOS instructors just to name a few. The need for full units such as Civil Affairs Units, Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH), basic training drill cadre units, base operations units, and engineering units also become more critical as regular units rotate into the combat zone or are drawn down by the need for more troops in other combat units. 4. How We Can Best Use Our Nation’s Reserve Armed Forces in the Prosecution of the War on Terror Many occupations presently found in civilian life have counterparts in the Reserve Forces of the United States. The list is extensive and includes but is not limited to intelligence interceptors, foreign language experts, military police, construction engineers, health service providers, veterinary services, pilots, mechanics of both light and heavy equipment, transportation drivers, communicators, computers operators, power plant workers, fuel dump operators, firefighters, and emergency medical technicians. With proper management, individuals in these military occupational specialties and specialty units can be used in support roles to bolster agencies of the government directly involved in the War on Terror and border patrol. During 2005 and early 2006, there appeared to be a paralysis within the George W. Bush Administration concerning controlling the United States’ bor-

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der. To handle the crisis, it took an organization called the Minute Men, composed of 7,500 United States citizens, to show the way for our government to get back on track and do the job of securing the borders. The Minute Men began securing the border along the Texas border between the United States and Mexico by constructing or repairing border barriers. They used simple farm tools such as post-hole diggers, farm tractors, and backhoes to build fences and earthen embankments. They cleared areas for observation posts and conducted motor patrols. They operated improvised observation posts to maintain security on the border and performed this mission without payment or any funds or assistance from the government. They also received very little praise from federal agencies starting from the top down. The Minute Men got the agencies back on task and for that, we should recognize them for their service to the country. Many of these Minute Men are prior service veterans or members of the Armed Reserve Forces who have expertise and determination. These people are available right now, if the government were to adopt my proposals. 5. How the Minutemen Organization Succeeded in Getting the Government to Realize that the Border Control Job Can Be Done The proper use of available human resources and the knowledge of how to get at those resources is the key to success. Thanks to modern computers, resource availability is within any government agency’s reach, so long as there is a revised plan for the use of this nation’s Reserve Armed Forces. A. Identifying Needed Military Skills for Federal and State Agencies All Reservists have personnel records showing their MOS, their highest military and civilian education level and fitness to serve. Units also have a similar record called the Unit Readiness Report. If a mission has an unambiguously outlined priority and need, such as border reinforcement, then needed personnel and units could be scheduled to assist other agencies. Presently, United States Army Reserve (USAR) training units provide Drill Sergeants for basic combat training and combat engineer training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Reserve units schedule drill Sergeants year round as fill-ins and as whole company trainers. The program is successful because of continuous coordination. Some Drill Sergeants go on active duty for several months while others for only two weeks per year. If law enforcement agencies have a need for additional work force for a long period of time, a Presidential Executive Order can activate the needed personnel for up to two years, in the same way that such orders have provided major assistance in the past. President Ronald Reagan did just that during his first term when the Federal Air Controllers went on an illegal strike. Military Air Control-

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lers filled in for absent government employees while new employees trained for positions in air traffic control. When the Nation institutes a National Service Program, we can replenish the work force to these units by offering membership in the unit as a way of filling the required national service and making benefits available to the ones who do so by providing benefits as reward for service. The idea of National Service to the country is not new and has been done to some degree piecemeal during times of crisis. This proposal of using federal and state reserve forces calls for a totally new approach to the present War on Terror crisis and emphasizes the whole idea of what citizenship of this country is and means to our young people. Citizenship is not free and freedom is not cheap. As President John F. Kennedy so eloquently put it, “ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country.” We must make changes to our present approach to the use of the Reserve Forces to prevent a great exodus of quality people from the system and to show gratitude for service to this country. B. What Can We Do to Save Valuable United States’ Human Resources and Military Units, to Use Them to the Best Advantage in the Protection of, and Service to, America? We can save the unit and the individuals by redefining the mission of the Reserve Military Forces of the United States. Reserve units should benefit from the National Service program by offering service in these Reserve Forces as a way to clearly fill the obligation to the country. Local police and state law enforcement agencies that need the military expertise of the individuals within the unit should use most Reserve Units only in the United States. In this way, we can accomplish two things: (1) Individuals will serve the country, and (2) Using the latest technology, the individual or unit will be used effectively to counter terrorism on the home front. A National Service Program would also make service in the Guard and Reserve forces more attractive by allowing for service in a hometown unit. Service can be for two years with a stand-by requirement of another four years. By offering the GI Bill for enlistees for any time after the two years of initial service, local Guard and Reserve units’ recruitment would improve. We should also make group hospitalization benefits available to Guards members and Reservists to offset the possibility of having lost this benefit from their ordinary civilian jobs when the unit goes on active service. Medical health insurance should be a benefit in both of these reserve units throughout the entire enlistment. Cost to the Reservist for this benefit should be minimal. There are many MTOE Medical units in the Guard and Reserve forces. Part of the benefit program should be the availability of Medical School Slots set aside for the Reserve Forces so that eligible members can receive Physician and Registered Nurse training paid for by the Government for additional years of

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service in the units. Medical School slots are very valuable and can be allocated from the foreign student allocations presently reserved for Middle East Countries that are not fully supporting the War on Terrorism. Veterans’ organizations should open membership to all the Reserve and Guard units’ members once they have finished two years of service either on full tours or on part-time training. This would instill pride and esprit de corps to citizen/soldier unit members and bring the community together. Veterans’ organizations also have a way of promoting patriotism and appreciation for past and present service member’s contributions to our country. Once the national service persons enter into a military unit, the probability is good that they might opt to enter the regular forces. This was the case during the late 1950s and early 1960s. There should also be mobility within and into the active duty units of the regular Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard for Reservists to be able to transfer for a career changes as they desire. Presently, the Federal Reserves have this ability to some extent, but not within the National Guards of the states. Reserve forces have more of a combat service support role and would do well in national service in support of organizations such as the Border Patrol, immigrations, Coast Guard, homeland security, and civilian police forces. These civilian police agencies and regulatory organizations will be able to put most of their work force in the field because they will be relieved of many administrative duties. It would also serve as a recruiting tool for getting some Reservists into the ranks of these civilian agencies. Finally, if effected, these proposals would result in a greater sense of accomplishment for Guard members and Reservists. Every young person who chooses to serve in the reserves forces will be doing something crucial for their country and community. As highly trained citizen soldiers, they will be doing constructive work toward making our borders safe and secure, and assisting in the battle against terrorist activity through the operation and maintenance of the latest equipment and technology used in the War on Terrorism. 6. Conclusion The challenge of fighting a war against terrorism faces America, a war which has no front lines or frontiers. We are engaged in “Asymmetric Warfare,” which no front lines, rear areas, or safe zones. The battlefield is here in the United States, in the Middle East, and in Europe. In most cases, the “battlefield” does not resemble our traditional conception of a combat zone or potential target. The events of 11 September 2001 changed all of our preconceived notions when New York City and Washington, D.C. became a battlefield to an unsuspecting population of civilians. Different counter terrorist operations call for different and specialized organizations. Highly trained, young, physically fit, and aggressive soldiers should carry out hot lethal combat. Those fully trained and fit for special operations

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action should carry out unconventional warfare. Federal, state and local police agencies, with the full assistance of our Reserve Forces, can and should defend our population against terrorist organizations. Reservists and National Guard members bring to these agencies the combat experience of members who have served in combat; they also bring organizational expertise, civilian and military skills, and a true willingness to serve. A sense of community exists in these units along with a pride that they can “make a difference.” To let these opportunities slip by because of antiquated ideas based on historical warfare would be a mistake. The time is now to change the way we protect our citizens while we fight the “Global War on Terrorism.”

Twelve FROM COOPERATIVE INTERGROUP CONTACT TO PERSONAL MOTIVATION: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PROMOTING A MORE INCLUSIVE WORLDVIEW Elizabeth Leigh Cralley and Brian Richard Wetzler 1. Introduction In the geopolitical climate of the twenty-first century, promoting a more inclusive worldview appears vital to promoting a greater sense of global security. Given the psychological complexities of intergroup attitudes and relations, this may be one of the more challenging objectives facing us. To understand the factors that might promote inclusive attitudes and improve intergroup relations, we first must consider what factors promote divisiveness. Social psychological research can help us understand how to promote more inclusiveness by explaining the theoretical roots of prejudice, and suggesting specific strategies to help reduce it. Although not exhaustive in its coverage, this chapter reviews six theoretical origins of prejudice and many approaches to prejudice reduction. We discuss selected classic and contemporary research examples and illustrate their concepts in terms of recent and historic geopolitical issues and conflicts. We do not claim that the simple application of the below concepts would be, or could be, sufficient to explain the manifold intricacies of international diplomacy. We hope to provide some useful insight to people who seek to promote a global community and a more inclusive worldview. Although lay people may use the terms “stereotyping,” “prejudice,” and “discrimination” interchangeably, social psychologists distinguish among these concepts to better understand how people think about, feel about, and act towards others in social situations. In general, a stereotype is a mental construct, or a collection of ideas and beliefs that are associated in memory with members of a particular social group. Although stereotypes may contain some accurate information, inaccurate or incomplete information may form their foundation. Using stereotypes to guide judgments is potentially problematic. The stereotype of a terrorist, for example, may include attributes such as being Muslim, young, and male. Using this stereotype to decide who might be a terrorist would lead the perceiver to overlook those who do not fit the stereotype, such as immediate

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exclusion of half the world’s population. For example, female suicide bombers have successfully perpetrated terrorist crimes over the last twenty years (Zedalis, 2004). The female stereotype being typically nonviolent may even provide a strategic advantage. On the other hand, as problematic as stereotypes may be, they also allow people to process complex social information efficiently and therefore may be considered to have functional value (Fiske and Neuberg, 1990). On a typical day, individuals are bombarded with so much social information that if organized mental structures such as stereotypes did not exist, or were not readily accessible in memory, perceivers might easily be overwhelmed in their efforts to process a multitude of social cues. As a related concept, we can also consider prejudice to be an attitude comprised of feelings and evaluative reactions linked to beliefs about members of a stereotyped group. Prejudiced attitudes may be either positive or negative in nature. Just as one person may have negative feelings aroused by bias against a specific ethnic group, another person (or even the same individual) may have positive feelings towards or bias in favor of a specific religious group. Typically, people are more concerned with negative prejudiced attitudes. Any prejudiced attitude may bias one individual’s perceptions of another. Even positive prejudiced attitudes can be detrimental to others. Discrimination differs from prejudice in that it involves negative actions directed toward members of stereotyped groups, or members of groups for whom another person holds prejudiced attitudes. For example, an employer’s discrimination against a specific ethnic group has a direct negative impact on job applicants who belong to that group. At this point, readers may wonder whether simply knowing the content of a stereotype is indicative of prejudice. The answer is “no.” However, we would consider individuals who have knowledge of the stereotype and endorse these stereotypic beliefs to hold a prejudiced attitude. These individuals would then be at risk for allowing the prejudiced attitude to guide their judgments and/or behavior, which ultimately could result in discrimination. Sometimes prejudiced individuals avoid discriminating against others, even though doing so may require considerable effort. Thus, knowledge of stereotypes may lead to prejudiced attitudes (but may not), and prejudiced attitudes may be associated with discrimination (although not always). Finally, any person can harbor bias in favor of or against any group; no one person or group is immune from holding prejudiced attitudes or from being the target of prejudiced attitudes held by others. 2. Origins of Prejudice We can analyze the theoretical origins of prejudice at three different levels: group-to-group interactions, group-to-individual interactions, and individual cognitive processes. At each of these levels, we first will explain the basic tenets of relevant theoretical perspectives, along with illustrative research findings. Second, we will attempt to apply elements of these perspectives to current and/or historical events.

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A. Group Level Processes Prejudice that stems from group level processes may result from factors such as intergroup competition or group-to-group comparisons of resources. Not surprisingly, competition over resources, or realistic group conflict, tends to promote intergroup hostility (Campbell, 1965). In addition, when group members compare themselves and their levels of resources to other groups, they may experience perceptions of relative deprivation or gratification. These perceptions are also positively correlated with higher levels of prejudice (Davis, 1959). Often, two or more groups compete over scarce or valued resources. The situation may involve resource supplies limited in quantity or availability; adequate resources are not available for equitable distribution among all interested parties. Or, a zero-sum conflict may exist in which, by default, when one group wins the competition or secures the desired resource the other group loses out. As would be expected, these sorts of competitions often yield negative or hostile intergroup attitudes. People tend to want to secure valued resources for their group’s use and may perceive competitive groups as threatening their ability to do so. Indeed, realistic conflict theory (Campbell, 1965) addresses this situation, succinctly stating that competition over scarce resources among interdependent groups tends to lead to hostility. A series of experiments conducted by Muzafar Sherif (1961) illustrated just how powerful realistic group conflict can be in generating intergroup hostility. In one of these studies, conducted at an Oklahoma state park called Robber’s Cave, Sherif randomly divided twenty-two eleven- and twelve-year-old boys into two groups for their summer camp experiences, setting each group up at a separate campsite. Researchers allowed each of the two groups one week to get to know their group members, but members of one group had no contact with members of the other group. During this initial phase of the study, group identities emerged and the groups even named themselves the Rattlers and the Eagles. Subsequently, Sherif set up a competition between the two groups to test the hypothesis that competition would result in intergroup hostility. Sherif devised realistic conflict between the two groups by creating a series of tournament style competitions (for example, tug-of-war, baseball, and football) and providing the groups with incentives to win, including a trophy and coveted prizes. The researchers found that prejudice and intergroup hostility developed quickly; both groups derogated members of the opposing group and engaged in negative actions directed towards each other, such as raiding each other’s campsites. In these classic studies, Sherif and his colleagues demonstrated that, even among children, prejudice could easily develop when two groups compete over the same desired outcome. Also at the group level, we might consider how intergroup comparisons contribute to prejudice. Relative deprivation theory (Davis, 1959) suggests that people compare their group’s resources with those of other groups, which may result in perceptions of deprivation when it appears that another group has more.

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In these situations, feeling somehow deprived contributes to intergroup hostility. The deprivation that group members perceive can be actual deprivation or it can involve perceptions that an individual’s group is deprived relative to another group. The resources themselves may involve either tangible assets, such as food or material goods, or less tangible factors, such as power or status. For example, Group A may compare their level of wealth with that of Group B. Even though Group A might have experienced significant gains in wealth relative to their status of ten years prior, they may feel deprived compared with what they believe to be more impressive gains in wealth achieved by Group B. From this perspective, both higher and lower status groups may experience feelings of relative deprivation, even when both groups are empirically better off compared with their prior status. Subsequently, they may blame the other group for their apparent deprivation and/or victimization. Classic research on relative deprivation (Vanneman and Pettigrew, 1972) surveyed White respondents from four American cities who were economically wealthier than their Black counterparts were as measured by objective standards. More than half of the White respondents surveyed who perceived their economic gains over a five-year period to be less than the economic gains of their Black counterparts during the same period also expressed prejudice toward Black people. In addition, Black respondents who perceived more relative deprivation in terms of job discrimination were more likely to endorse the use of violence for obtaining civil rights than were Black respondents who perceived less deprivation (Dibble, 1981). Interestingly, the group that expressed the most hostility was the group that perceived high levels of relative deprivation for their group and who also had personally experienced job discrimination. When people make group comparisons and realize that they are better off than another group, they experience the opposite of relative deprivation: relative gratification (Guimond and Dambrun, 2002). Ironically, experiencing relative gratification does not appear to reduce prejudice, but to increase it. This may happen in part because when people become aware of their group’s relatively advantaged status, they engage in thought processes that help them justify the inequality between groups (ibid.). Thus feelings of and perceptions of either relative deprivation or gratification may contribute to intergroup hostility. To apply these concepts to the current geo-political climate, competition over land, natural resources, food, or even a way of life may feed into feelings of intergroup hostility. For example, the Israelis and Palestinians remain in violent and ongoing conflict over, among other things, land that both groups consider rightfully theirs. Both groups have long and complicated historical claims to the disputed territory. Although realistic conflict is by no means the only factor that may contribute to hostile feelings between these groups, it likely plays a significant part. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces during August 1990 also contained elements of realistic conflict theory, as Iraq openly accused Kuwait of stealing oil by using sophisticated, horizontal drilling technology to siphon oil from inside Iraqi sovereign borders. Backed by United Nations (UN) sanctions, a

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large coalition of armed forces from around the world succeeded in expelling the Iraqis from Kuwait. In situations that involve competition over food, nations that are struggling to feed their people often receive aid packages that include food (and medical supplies) from groups such as the UN and a host of nongovernmental agencies. Often this aid does not flow directly to those who most need it. Instead, it is, albeit sometimes wittingly, fed into a system rife with internal conflict, as rival groups within the nation state compete for access to and control of the vital resources. These competitions have resulted in armed clashes, and deliberate campaigns of intimidation and terror, as parties vie for the power and influence that will guarantee their access to life-giving supplies. The War on Terror and the ongoing tensions between Israel and Iran are two of many examples of modern day conflicts that involve potential zero-sum problems. As President George W. Bush said after the July 2005 terrorist attacks in London, the nations that are the intended targets of terrorists need to be 100 percent successful in preventing acts of terror, while terrorists only need to be successful once (Quigley, 2005). Every time a terrorist attack is successful, by default, we lose. This sort of conflict pushes potential victims toward “rooting out” and eliminating terrorists, as there appears to be no viable path for peaceful resolution when the stated goal of one group is the destruction of another. Similarly, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has repeatedly stated that a prevailing Iranian goal is to wipe Israel off the map, putting Middle East conflict to rest (Yoong, 2006). Instead of encouraging groups to work together to solve their differences, drawing a line in the sand for a zero-sum conflict can do little else than exacerbate feelings of hostility and fear of the enemy. Relative deprivation and gratification also may play a part in some modern day conflicts. For example, when making group level comparisons regarding power in government and access to coveted resources, the Shi’a and Sunni Iraqis have both expressed dissatisfaction with the new Iraqi government and power structure. Under Saddam Hussein, the Shi’a in Iraq were, along with the rest of the population, effectively suppressed. With the emergence of representative government, and the concept of shared political power, the Sunni minority may now feel relative deprivation when compared to the Shi’a majority, even though both groups had effectively been released from a despotic dictatorship. This perceived deprivation may exacerbate the historical conflicts already evident between the groups, and serve to increase prejudice. Within the United States, the ongoing debates and controversies over outsourcing American jobs to countries such as China and India suggest that some Americans feel that the United States is losing out relative to these groups of foreign workers. Even with a robust American economy, strong positive economic indicators and a United States standard of living well above those of the nations perceived to be “stealing” American jobs, the sense of relative deprivation remains palpable.

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Prejudice may stem from interactions between groups and individuals. This level of analysis includes considerations of how individuals think about and are affected by the groups to which they belong. Social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) considers group level influences on individuals and their attitudes as they relate to the cognitive tendency we have to categorize people into groups. Integrated threat theory (Stephan and Stephan, 2000) links the group level processes associated with realistic conflict and relative deprivation with social identity theory to help explain how these factors together may lead to prejudice. Social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) posits that people tend to categorize other people into groups. People often draw these group categories along the lines of whether they perceive the others to be members of the perceiver’s group—making the other an “ingroup” member—or members of other groups—making them “outgroup” members. These divisions result in “us”“them” categories. The theory also suggests that part of an individual’s sense of self, the social identity, stems from identification with the ingroup. In general we tend to favor other ingroup members over outgroup members, and often we distribute more rewards to members of groups to which we belong. In addition, social identity theory proposes that the tendency people have to make intergroup comparisons and evaluate how well their group compares against others affects how people feel. Sometimes our groups compare favorably, which tends to lead to a boost in esteem and good feelings. Sometimes our groups do not fare well by comparison, which leads to a loss of esteem and negative feelings. Assuming that most people generally want to feel good about themselves and the groups to which they belong, they then may be motivated to engage in strategies to repair or boost any damage to their self-esteem that resulted from unfavorable comparisons. Although not always the case, one way that we may repair a loss in esteem is to derogate the other group. Thus, threats to social identity ultimately may lead to prejudice and intergroup hostility. Classic research, utilizing the minimal groups paradigm, illustrates how the simple categorization of individuals into groups, even groups based on insignificant factors, affects people’s attitudes and behaviors (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament, 1971). Researchers first created groups based on trivial, or minimal, standards: participants’ alleged tendencies to over or underestimate the number of dots on a page. Participants then distributed rewards to members of their group, the ingroup, as well as to outgroup members. The researchers found evidence of ingroup favoritism among the minimal groups. Imagine, then, how the tendency to favor the ingroup may be much stronger for groups in which membership is not based on trivial standards but instead on characteristics or differences that the group members perceive as meaningful and essential. Integrated threat theory (Stephan and Stephan, 2000) combines group level influences with personal feelings and experiences. From this perspective, the

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more strongly a person identifies with the ingroup, the more likely the person is to perceive real or symbolic threats to the ingroup and experience intergroup anxiety (being nervous in the company of outgroup members or being afraid of saying the wrong thing). Negative stereotypes also feed into expectations that social interactions with outgroup members will be negative. As the levels of perceived threat increase, prejudice increases. For example, consider an individual who identifies strongly with a particular political party in a two-party democratic society. Regardless of whether the person identifies with a liberal or conservative party, the stronger the ingroup identification becomes, the more likely the person is to perceive realistic or symbolic threats, such as the fear that if the opposing political party gained power, they would destroy or undermine the values and way of life espoused by the ingroup. Integrated threat theory would predict that this situation would be more likely to lead to expressions of prejudice than one in which the individual does not identify strongly with either political party. A recent meta-analytic review including ninety-five samples found support for the relationship among perceptions of intergroup threat and negative attitudes toward outgroups (Riek, Mania, and Gaertner, 2006). Applications to global security in the twenty-first century, and to the current geo-political climate, would suggest that to the extent that some group memberships are significant to us, we suffer when that social identity is threatened or harmed. For example, after the attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., on 11 September 2001, many American citizens felt an incredible and understandable blow to their social identity and sense of security as Americans. Intense pressure to make sense of the attack and to repair self-esteem likely led to derogating the outgroup members who seemed responsible for the attacks, even leading some individuals to engage in acts of violence. Indeed, FBI crime statistics reported that the number of anti-Islamic crimes in the United States increased over ten times between 2000 and 2001. Experimental research demonstrated that the stronger participants’ sense of American identity, the less likely they were to provide monetary aid to an outgroup even loosely associated with the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, such as the Afghan Widows and Children Fund (Reed and Aquino, 2003). Participants were more likely to provide aid to an ingroup (New York City Police and Firefighters Widows and Children Fund) even though we could consider both groups to be victims and that the monetary aid being divided among groups was donated from an outside source. Importantly, individuals need not be “extremists” to perceive the presence of symbolic threats to their ingroups. For example, recently publicized cartoons of the prophet Muhammad inflamed many Muslims and led to violent protests in many places around the world. Integrated threat theory can help explain how this symbolic threat to the Muslim way of life was linked with increased perceptions that outgroup members were trying to undermine and destroy Muslim values and culture. For example, the theory would suggest that individuals who identify strongly with the Muslim ingroup based on religion would be more likely to feel threatened than individuals who identify only weakly with their Muslim heritage.

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Given estimates that more than one billion Muslim people exist worldwide, we should not be surprised that the appearance of the cartoons upset many Muslims; negative reactions were not limited to the perceptions of religious extremists. C. Individual-Level Processes At the level of the individual, we can consider how people process social information, along with how they may adopt stereotypic beliefs or prejudiced attitudes through socialization. For example, Patricia Devine (1989) and Margo Monteith (1993) proposed a dual process model of stereotype activation and application that addresses how cognitive processes interact with dispositional levels of prejudice to affect the likelihood that an individual might use or try to avoid using their stereotypes. Also, Gordon Allport (1954) described how children might acquire prejudiced attitudes from their parents and families. More generally, social learning theory (Bandura, 1977; 1986) helps explain how individuals might adopt and internalize prejudiced attitudes through common socialization practices. Devine (1989) proposed a two-step model for processing social information. Essentially, stereotypes spring to mind automatically when we come into actual or symbolic contact with members of stereotyped groups. This stereotype activation is very difficult for a person to control. Given that most people are aware of the content of cultural stereotypes for categories such as race and gender, most perceivers would have the content of these stereotypes readily available in memory following stereotype activation, regardless whether the individuals actually endorse the stereotypic beliefs. Subsequent application of the activated stereotype is a secondary step that appears to depend partially, if not in whole, on an individual’s dispositional level of prejudice. For example, people who are high in dispositional prejudice towards members of a particular social group might freely use their activated stereotypes to judge a member of that group, while low prejudiced people typically would not. Monteith’s (1993) research indicates that people who are relatively low in prejudice experience discomfort with the activation of their stereotypes because thinking in stereotypic terms is inconsistent with their self-perceptions of being nonprejudiced. They engage in self-regulation strategies to “suppress” the stereotype or otherwise avoid using it to judge members of that group. People who endorse egalitarian values generally try to avoid using their stereotypes to guide their judgments and behavior, while people who hold prejudiced views are usually more likely to let their biased attitudes guide their judgments and behavior. Both groups may be at risk for having stereotypes activated outside of their conscious control. Given that dispositional levels of prejudice appear to affect how people respond to and try to control their thought processes, we must consider how people acquire these biased attitudes. Any sort of direct experience with outgroup members may contribute to developing stereotypes or prejudiced attitudes. Even in the absence of direct experience with outgroup members, people still learn about

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stereotypes and still may acquire or develop prejudiced attitudes. Allport (1954) argued that although only a small number of parents might explicitly teach prejudiced attitudes to their children, children can “catch” prejudiced attitudes indirectly, by observing negative attitudes and behaviors expressed by parents. Similarly, social learning theory (Bandura, 1977; 1986) would suggest that people learn about stereotypes and prejudice much like they learn anything else: via teaching, modeling and imitation, and/or vicarious learning. Role models, such as parents, teachers, friends, and family members, along with dominant cultural media sources, provide information about the alleged traits and characteristics of groups, as well as information about acceptable or unacceptable attitudes and behaviors relative to those groups. Although most parents probably try to teach their children egalitarian instead of prejudiced attitudes, Kathleen M. Blee (2002) found that women who were members of organized racist groups not only expressed their prejudiced views freely in front of their children, but they also used direct instruction in an effort to teach their children to adopt their racist attitudes. Even in more tolerant and egalitarian households, children may pick up on subtle cues regarding their parents’ attitudes toward some outgroups, such as noticing low levels of close contact among their family members and members of those social outgroups. As for the media, news and film industries, along with entertainment television and advertising, tend to portray racial and gender groups in stereotyped ways. Research has found that news broadcasts disproportionately depict Black men as the perpetrators of crime, and White citizens as the victims (Romer, Jamieson, and de Coteau, 1998). Beyond the influences of parents and the media, the immediate social climate experienced at any given moment might also effect expressions of prejudice. Jeff Greenberg and Tom Pyszczynski (1985) found that overhearing an ethnic slur had a detrimental effect on students’ perceptions of a Black person who lost a debate (although not when the Black person won), and another study (Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, and Vaughn, 1994) found that when college students overheard another student condone racism it weakened their anti-racist attitudes. The social environment that individuals experience in their homes, schools, and communities can affect their attitudes. In applications to the current geopolitical climate, not all people have internalized egalitarian values. Therefore, not everyone is personally motivated to avoid using some stereotypes. Recall, too, that these stereotypes allow for efficient processing of social information, so the idea that anyone would be motivated to avoid all stereotypic thinking is unlikely. People in today’s society may not consider bias against some groups to be reprehensible, including, for example, child abusers, neo-Nazis, and terrorists; both low and high prejudiced people might let their stereotypes freely guide their judgments about people who appear to fit into these categories. For instance, after 11 September 2001, many Americans endorsed the use of profiling in the hunt for terrorists. Although such a strategy, when used in conjunction with other proven law enforcement techniques, may indeed help identify terrorists, disproportionate reliance on profiling

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would present a significant security weakness, as well informed terrorist groups would simply seek to defy the profile during their operations (see Zedalis, 2004). As for media sources contributing to hostile intergroup relations, Jack G. Shaheen’s (2003) recent research found that the portrayals of Arabs in over 900 films were consistently negative, depicting them as brutal, heartless, powerhungry fanatics. Shaheen found that almost all Arabs were portrayed as Muslim and almost all Muslims were Arab. This negativity bias in the film industry likely contributes to anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States in much the same way as stereotyped depictions of Black Americans in media also undermine progress in improving race relations. Importantly, even from within terrorist groups, socialization practices are at work, helping to shape prejudiced attitudes in people. For example, groups that revere suicide bombings, and bombers, provide an atmosphere in which their children are more than likely to adopt and internalize prejudice. Glorifying terrorists and suicide bombers either at home or in the media encourages others to see these people as positive role models, reinforces extremist beliefs, and condones violence and brutality against civilians as an acceptable means of obtaining desired goals. D. Summary of Theoretical Origins of Prejudice The origins of prejudice stem from many sources, including (1) competition and comparisons among groups, (2) perceptions of threats related to an individual’s social identity, and (3) cognitive habits, internalized attitudes, and situational factors. Although the examples provided in the first part of this chapter are ones that we felt could be partially explained through the lens of these relevant theories, we understand that these situations are highly complex. Our goal in discussing these examples was not to oversimplify any of these issues. Instead, we hoped to increase readers’ understanding of how we can explain and apply these different social psychological theories to modern and historical intergroup issues.

3. Reducing Prejudice Given the overview of the multiple levels and sources from which prejudice may originate, we can move on to discuss strategies to improve intergroup attitudes and relations. The goals of these strategies include reducing stereotypic beliefs and breaking down negative attitudes and promoting new, inclusive beliefs and positive intergroup attitudes. Programs designed to reduce prejudice and/or promote better intergroup relations are widespread in the United States, and an extensive report on Promising Practices for Racial Reconciliation (President’s Initiative on Race, 1999) reviews more than one hundred such programs it deems to be excellent. Even though these programs exemplified criteria relevant to the goals of promoting dialogue, education, community building, or problem solving

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for racial reconciliation in the United States, less than one third of the fifty-nine programs that listed prejudice reduction as a specific goal reported any sort of evaluation of the program’s effectiveness (Oskamp and Jones, 2000). After reviewing all of the programs identified in the report, Stuart Oskamp and James M. Jones suggested that social scientists and community and national program organizers could derive mutual benefits by working closer together in designing and evaluating the effectiveness of these programs. For the purposes of this chapter, our discussion of strategies designed to promote positive intergroup relations and attitudes will focus primarily on programs for which substantial empirical evidence supports their efficacy. The discussion is organized by the same levels as the previous section. A. Group Level Strategies Although successfully eradicating group-level conflict may be impossible or highly unlikely, strategies that promote intergroup contact may partially reduce intergroup hostility. Cooperative intergroup contact may also successfully promote inclusive views by facilitating the development of cross-group friendships. The idea that increased contact between groups can improve intergroup relations by helping people learn more about each other as individuals is the foundation of many effective intergroup contact strategies. Although simply bringing groups into contact might sometimes afford such educational opportunities, increased contact between groups in and of itself is not sufficient to decrease intergroup hostility. In fact, in some circumstances, increasing contact between groups that already dislike each other may promote more hostility. Instead, Allport (1954) suggested that to break down intergroup hostility effectively, intergroup contact must occur under specific conditions. For example, the contact opportunity between groups must involve group members of equal status who share common goals and who have the opportunity to discover common interests. The contact should occur in situations where the group leaders undoubtedly support the goals of the interaction. Other researchers have added more parameters, suggesting that the social climate be supportive, that the contact be meaningful instead of superficial (Amir, 1969), and that the contact offer the potential for developing new friendships (Pettigrew, 1998). All of these criteria are met in the ideal situation. Returning to a previously cited example, when Sherif and his colleagues (1961) provided the boys in the Robber’s Cave study with opportunities for increased intergroup contact, they found evidence consistent with these predictions. First, when researchers brought the boys together for increased contact that did not meet the parameters described above, it exacerbated intergroup tensions. They engaged in a food fight during a joint dining event and antagonized each other when they all gathered to watch a film. These situations did increase intergroup contact, but they did not involve key factors such as cooperative effort or common goals. Subsequently, Sherif coordinated a series of events that required

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the boys from both camps to become interdependent while working to achieve superordinate goals. This approach was much more successful in breaking down feelings of intergroup hostility. The events Sherif staged included having the boys work together to move a supply truck out of a ditch and to figure out how to fix an interrupted water supply source. Boys from both groups cared about the outcomes in these events and they needed to rely on each other to solve the problems they collectively faced. Although Sherif found it necessary to stage several of these incidents to start breaking down the barriers between groups, these findings underscore the importance of cooperative intergroup contact and superordinate goals in reducing prejudice. In this case, the previously competitive groups became interdependent, facilitating the desire to get to know each other more as individuals. Conducted nearly a half century ago, the Robber’s Cave studies represent only a few of the hundreds of empirical studies that have evaluated the effectiveness of intergroup contact in reducing prejudice and promoting positive intergroup relations. Indeed, in their meta-analytic reviews of over 500 studies on the effectiveness of cooperative intergroup contact, Thomas F. Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp (2000; 2006) found the positive effect to be robust and to generalize across groups and settings. Evidence also shows that the power of cooperative intergroup contact helps break down intergroup barriers in educational settings. Historically, the educational climate in the United States has been highly competitive, and, during and since school desegregation, the need to promote positive intergroup attitudes has been especially salient. Applications of cooperative intergroup contact strategies have been adapted for school use. One such application, the jigsaw classroom, brings children from different backgrounds together to work on educational material in interdependent groups. Studies have shown that the jigsaw classroom decreases negative ethnic stereotypes and promotes intergroup friendships, increases liking for school, and positively affects the self-esteem and academic performance of minority group children (Aronson, Blaney, Stephan, Sikes, and Snapp, 1978; Aronson and Bridgeman, 1979). In the jigsaw classroom, researchers divide children into small groups with a relatively even distribution of ability levels, gender, and ethnic backgrounds among groups. They then assign each child a unique task to master, with all tasks centering on a common theme. After mastering their parts, each child plays the role of teacher and educates the group members about what he or she learned. Ultimately, the group members learn all of the material in a cooperative setting. The jigsaw classroom affords opportunities for children to play teachers and learners in an interdependent process, which is just one example of many effective cooperative educational interventions. In their review and discussion of dozens of studies evaluating the success of cooperative learning communities, David W. Johnson and Roger T. Johnson (2000) concluded that well designed and implemented educational interventions effectively promote academic performance and help enhance intergroup relations in diverse student bodies.

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Although challenging, opportunities for cooperative intergroup contact at the geo-political and the personal, educational level exist. For example, the initial “space race” between the United State and the Soviet Union was fiercely competitive. As geo-political dynamics changed, nations eventually channeled the technology that made the space race possible into the superordinate goal of building the first International Space Station. What began as heated competition morphed into an opportunity for formerly competitive groups to work cooperatively on a superordinate goal. Other examples of large-scale operations that necessitate cooperative interdependence among nations include coming together to support causes such as the reduction of AIDS, or the effective management and preservation of the world’s oceans. Natural disasters also tend to bring people together, such as the massive relief efforts that followed the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. In another excellent example, the potential threat of an avian flu pandemic has governments and scientists from all over the world working together, in groups such as the World Health Organization, to create effective prevention and response strategies. The popularity and success of cooperative educational programs also is not restricted to the formal classroom setting. For instance, carefully planned and monitored service learning programs may yield positive results when considering intergroup relations. Research by Sam Marullo (1998) found that students in a Race and Ethnic Relations class, who were also involved in service learning projects in Washington, D.C.’s Latino community, showed many positive outcomes, including increased levels of diversity awareness. The service learning advantages were above and beyond the advantages experienced by students enrolled in a different section of the same course that merely used experiential learning techniques. Following the parameters of the revised contact hypothesis, Cynthia Berryman-Fink (2006) offers many suggestions for increasing intergroup contact and decreasing prejudice on campuses, including the use of service learning programs. Although students who leave the United States for studyabroad programs typically attend schools in western European nations, a growing number of American college students are interested in study-abroad programs in China, India, Argentina, and Brazil (McMurtrie, 2006). Interest in programs in developing countries has increased markedly since 11 September 2001. However, other research (Goldstein and Kim, 2005) found that higher levels of prejudice predicted lower levels of participation in study abroad programs. Only students already inclined to feel a sense of global community may experience an increase in that sense after participating in a study abroad experience. But even for others no so inclined, these programs are likely to dispel myths and stereotypes about regional and global differences among groups. Consequently, students will become more open-minded to the inclusive perspective of a global community.

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Knowing that social categorization processes are naturally occurring, we can build strategies to reduce prejudice based on group interactions and individuallevel processes aimed at restructuring how people think about groups and category memberships. For example, although Protestant and Catholic groups in Ireland may perceive each other as outgroups at one level, category boundaries are somewhat fluid. Encouraging these groups to focus on their similarities instead of their differences may result in a more inclusive perception that both groups belong to a superordinate category: in this case, either Irish or Christian, or even Irish Christians. The Common Ingroup Identity Model (Dovidio, Kawakami, and Gaertner, 2000; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, et al., 1993) considers several strategies for how people might alter their perceptions of groups. The model suggests that, on the one hand, people might be encouraged to decategorize, where instead of focusing on outgroup members as belonging to a separate group, the focus is on understanding each other as individuals. This strategy helps reduce prejudice by reducing ingroup favoritism. Alternatively, people might be encouraged to recategorize groups to achieve a more inclusive, or common, ingroup identity (e.g. Irish Christians). According to the model, recategorization can take the form of promoting one common identity, or it could take the form of promoting a more inclusive group that is made up of separate groups that are both “playing on the same team.” Either way, recategorization should decrease prejudice by extending ingroup favoritism and privilege to include more people, including former outgroup members. Research supports the idea that recategorization decreases prejudice. However, the two types of recategorization may not be similarly effective in all situations (Dovidio, Kawakami, and Gaertner, 2000). For instance, promoting one common ingroup identity may be associated more with the concept of assimilation, and therefore may be preferred by group members who are in the majority. On the other hand, recategorization that permits groups to maintain their unique group status while also adopting a common identity, or the dual identity approach, is more similar to a multicultural approach, and may be preferred by minority groups. Marilynn Brewer (2000) suggests that the concept of dual identity recategorization is not comprehensive enough to account for the fact that most people have multiple, not just dual, social identities. Accordingly, as perceptions of the ingroup become more inclusive and complex (which may happen in several different ways), prejudice tends to decrease. In either case, researchers and community organizers should keep in mind the potential complexities of encouraging recategorization, as pressures to accommodate outgroup members in a common ingroup identity may inadvertently be threatening to the social identity of some groups. In considering prejudice reduction programs in the classroom context, some research (Molina and Wittig, 2006) suggests that program organ-

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izers may want to emphasize slightly different approaches depending on the intended goals of the program. For example, they suggest that if the goal of a program is to reduce prejudice, then focusing on friendship potential in intergroup contact is crucial. If the goal is to promote a common ingroup identity, such as dual identity recategorization, they suggest emphasizing interdependence among groups. While recategorization may work at some levels and for some conflicts, this strategy is less likely to be effective for ongoing and tense conflicts, such as that between Jewish and Palestinian groups in Israel. In this case, providing an opportunity for groups to work together on a superordinate goal might provide more opportunity for learning about group similarities and seeing the potential for higher-level categories to apply to otherwise disparate groups. At times, a common enemy may unite warring groups in a superordinate effort to confront the shared threat; this may occur even among groups with significant political and ideological differences. During World War II, the Soviet Union allied with the United States and Britain only after being invaded by its former ally, Nazi Germany. The political and ideological chasm between Soviet and Western governments could not have been wider. Yet, President Franklin D. Roosevelt personally urged Congress and the American people to support the American alliance with the Soviets despite knowing that Joseph Stalin was already a despotic, mass murderer. The superordinate goals at hand were the mutual survival of the Soviet and British nation-states, and the defeat of Adolf Hitler’s designs for a new world order. These concerns were powerful enough to overshadow the dramatic group differences in evidence. In less extreme conflicts, individuals may be prompted to evaluate their similarities and differences with both groups, usually siding with the group that has a belief system most resembling theirs. On the other hand, people may, under some circumstances, side with the group that appears more threatening, in an attempt to prevent negative outcomes from coming to fruition. C. Individual/Cognitive Level Strategies Several approaches might be helpful to reduce prejudice at the individual level. Increasing our knowledge of how people low in dispositional prejudice think about outgroup members can help us consider how to encourage highly prejudiced individuals to alter their attitudes and behaviors. From the perspective of social learning, increasing exposure to positive role models while decreasing exposure to negative role models also may be helpful. Finally, studies of various empathy training and confrontation techniques show promising results. Studies of the strategies that low prejudiced individuals use to self-regulate their thought processes have been informative. Monteith (1993) proposed that when people who are low in dispositional prejudice experience a prejudicerelated discrepancy it leads to feelings of compunction. These feelings then lead them to focus on the self, and engage in efforts to prevent future prejudiced re-

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sponses. In testing this model, Monteith found that low prejudiced participants led to believe that they had responded in a prejudiced manner regarding homosexual individuals (in the first phase of a study) successfully inhibited prejudiced responses during the second phase. High prejudiced participants did not. Inhibiting prejudiced responses appeared to require personal motivation and cognitive effort. The data are consistent with the model, suggesting that people who have internalized egalitarian values experience discomfort when they believe they have violated their personal standards, which leads them to be more careful with their future judgments. With practice, such self-regulation should become more automatic and require less effort. Research also suggests that given enough practice and motivation, people can successfully negate the activation of a stereotype (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, and Russin, 2000), and even eliminate some relatively automatic racial biases (Plant, Peruche, and Butz, 2005). In the short term (and regardless of dispositional levels of prejudice), gentle reminders to try to see other people as individuals can undercut stereotyping. Making people accountable for their views may also be successful (Fiske and Neuberg, 1990). Changing people’s attitudes over the long term, however, may be significantly more challenging. Although we might encourage people who have higher levels of dispositional prejudice to internalize more egalitarian values, Patricia G. Devine, E. Ashby Plant, and Brenda N. Buswell (2000) caution that imposing overt pressure on high prejudiced people “to change” may result in a negative backlash that undermines the success of the intervention. Indeed, research indicates that people who score high on measures of subtle forms of prejudice, such as the McConahay Scale for Modern Racism, do not actually believe themselves to be prejudiced in the first place (McConahay, 1986). Indirect influences on the attitudes of highly prejudiced people, such as educational interventions like the jigsaw classroom, might yield more success. From the social learning perspective, formal programs designed to teach and reinforce inclusive attitudes are becoming common in the United States (President’s Initiative, 1999). Numerous informal ways exist to approach this, including increasing exposure to those who model such behavior. If we can teach and learn prejudice, then we can teach and learn egalitarian beliefs. Ensuring that we expose children to models that exhibit desired behavior increases the chances that the observers will adopt and internalize these values. In addition, we might try to limit or decrease exposure to role models that promote, encourage, or glorify hatred, violence, and intolerance of others. In their research on the effects of exposure to female role models, Nilanjana Dasgupta and Shaki Asgari (2004) found that exposing women to counterstereotypic exemplars of women leaders (for example, famous women leaders or female university faculty) helped undercut automatic gender stereotyping. In reviewing the effects of the media intervention programs Sesame Street and Different and the Same, Sherryl B. Graves (1999) concluded that these programs effectively alter children’s racial beliefs, attitudes, and preferences for cross-group friendships. Both studies suggest that attitudes and beliefs can be altered in a positive way via social learning processes.

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Factors in the immediate social climate of a given situation also might affect attitudes. For example, although the previously described research by Fletcher A. Blanchard, Christian S. Crandall, John C. Brigham, and Leigh A. Vaughn (1994) found that when college students hearing another student condone racism weakened their anti-racist attitudes. The researchers also found that participants hearing another student condemn racism strengthened their antiracist attitudes. Charles Stangor, Gretchen B. Sechrist, and John T. Jost (2001) found that when college students learned that other students on their campus held stronger positive beliefs about Black Americans than they did, their racial beliefs changed to become more positive. Therefore, providing consensus information might also be an effective way to alter attitudes. These examples represent only a few of the many studies that illustrate how we might use social influences to produce positive effects. Another encouraging approach to reducing prejudice at the individual level involves training in empathy. Empathy training involves helping children (and adults) learn to adopt a perspective different from theirs, often that of a person who is the target of prejudice. Subsequently they are encouraged to try to imagine (or actually experience) what it would feel like to be in that person’s place. One classic approach to increasing empathy is the Blue Eyes Brown Eyes roleplay exercise developed during the 1960s by elementary school teacher Jane Elliott. Elliott first divided her rural Iowa third grade class into two groups based on the color of their eyes. Each group had a chance to experience being the privileged group and the disadvantaged group. Although extensive scientific data was not collected on her exercise, vivid and moving footage of the exercise was broadcast in the 1970 ABC News documentary, The Eye of the Storm, and Elliott still offers a variety of training classes and materials for adolescents and adults based on the original exercise (www.janeelliott.com). More recently, research has shown empirical support for empathy training as an effective way to promote more positive outgroup evaluations and decrease stereotyping (Galinsky and Ku, 2004; Galinsky and Moscowitz, 2000; Vescio, Sechrist, and Paolucci, 2003). Research also indicates support for an approach that involves confronting people with discrepancies related to their values (Rokeach, 1973). Other studies indicate that thinking about or experiencing interpersonal confrontation can be effective in decreasing stereotypic responses and reducing prejudice. Those studies found that when individuals were confronted about their prejudice, despite the ingroup/outgroup status of the confronter, they showed higher levels of selfdirected negative affect and fewer stereotypical responses (Czopp and Monteith, 2003; Czopp, Monteith, and Mark, 2006). Confrontation effectively promoted change. Scott Plous (2000) also presents a helpful role-play exercise that offers constructive suggestions and practice for how to confront others on their prejudiced responses, while Bernard E. Whitley and Mary E. Kite (2006) offer other tips for influencing our attitudes and the attitudes of others. Taken together, these studies and strategies support the idea that we can influence stereotypical responses and prejudiced attitudes in a positive way at the individual level.

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Strategies for reducing prejudice at the individual level can be applied to almost any geo-political situation. Controversial issues themselves may afford unique opportunities for reflecting on and altering attitudes and behaviors at the individual level. For example, during 2006, an amateur video recording of a United States Marine performing a song called “Hadji Girl” rapidly made its way through the Internet. The song tells the fictional story of a Marine who falls in love with a young Iraqi girl, but subsequently ambushed when she takes him home to meet her family. In the ensuing gunfight, the Marine ends up killing several members of the girl’s family. In the wake of considerable media coverage, the Marine publicly apologized for performing the song, and assured an incensed media that the song was intended to be funny (“Marine Says Song He Wrote about Killing an Iraqi Was a ‘Joke,’” USA Today, 14 June 2006). Although the situation was regrettable, a constructive dialogue regarding the issue, potentially directed by parents or teachers, could help individuals to better understand how even comedic depictions of negative stereotypes can have serious negative consequences. Similarly, in April of 2007, CBS Radio fired talk show host, Don Imus, after he made degrading remarks about the Rutger’s University women’s basketball team (P. Farhi, “Don Imus Is Fired by CBS Radio: Racial Slur Doomed Shock Jock’s Broadcast,” The Washington Post, 13 April 2007). The media frenzy that followed the original comments and the termination of Imus’s affiliation with CBS underscores the strong role that media can play in rebuking individuals for using terminology considered to be prejudiced. In both situations, these individuals, along with outside observers, might benefit from adopting an empathetic perspective while they contemplate the evident responses to their words and actions. In a concerted effort to try to change children’s attitudes and promote better intergroup relations, the producers of Sesame Street recently announced that, after years of absence on the airwaves in the Middle East due to lack of funding, the program will return to television in Israel and the Palestinian territories (Winograd, 2007). Producers have created Israeli and Palestinian versions of new episodes that specifically target audiences in the Middle East. For example, the new Israeli version introduces Mahboub, a bilingual Muppet of Arab origin who is fluent in Hebrew and Arabic. In addition, the Israeli program features new human actors playing the roles of Jewish immigrants from various countries. The Palestinian version introduces positive role models for empowering young boys, including Salim, a new male role model in his early 20s who runs a “Fix-It” shop (Sesame Workshop, 2006). The reintroduction of Sesame Street at this point in history, with the stated goals of trying to interrupt the intergenerational cycle of passing down prejudice, provides an excellent example of how groups from all over the world are taking specific positive actions, and making strides toward promoting a more inclusive worldview for future generations.

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D. Summary of Prejudice Reduction Strategies Effective programs that help undercut prejudice and promote intergroup relations are many and varied in structure. Strong support exists for cooperative intergroup contact and educational interventions based on cooperative interdependence. Promoting a common ingroup identity and focusing on individual-level efforts are promising strategies. Multifaceted interventions that are delivered from a variety of sources, including the ingroup, can alter how people think about and act towards outgroup members. In applying the research to current geo-political issues, we do not wish to suggest that any “one size fits all” approach exists to eradicate prejudice and erase geopolitical conflict. Instead, we hope that we have succeeded in helping readers gain an appreciation of how we might use strategies supported by empirical evidence to reduce prejudice and promote a greater sense of global community. 4. Conclusions Prejudice stems from many different sources, and no one person or group is immune. The theories and strategies reviewed in this chapter represent only a snapshot of the historic and ongoing research social psychologists around the world are conducting. They are developing new strategies to reduce prejudice and promote positive intergroup attitudes every day. Ultimately, understanding more about how people think, feel, and behave in intergroup activities has potential benefits for improving intergroup relations at all levels of society and government, all over the world. Disclaimer The views expressed in this document do not represent any implicit or explicit endorsement by any office or division of the United States Coast Guard or by any office or division of the United States Government.

Thirteen PARTICIPATORY SUSTAINABILITY: BUILDING SUSTAINABILITY FOR COMPLEXITY AND CHANGE Vicente L. Lopes, Vincent Luizzi 1. Introduction Perhaps the most basic and important sense of providing global security is one of ensuring that we have a globe to protect and keep secure, that nature endures as a sustainable entity. A misguided view of people’s relationship to nature has nurtured practices that undermine sustainability. Global security requires a new view that promotes and insures sustainability. Different agencies and organizations have connected global security with sustainability. The Worldwatch Institute, for example, holds itself out as working toward: the evolution of an environmentally sustainable and socially just society, in which the needs of all people are met without threatening the health of the natural environment or the well-being of future generations. (2007) The Foundation for Environmental Security and Sustainability observes: Policymakers often overlook the extent to which environmental stresses can undermine social and political stability, impede economic development, and generate conflict. Yet, the effective governance, sound management, and sustainable use of natural resources are vital to human security, political stability, and conflict prevention. (2004) We concur with connecting global security with sustainability but urge the approach of participatory sustainability. In what follows, we outline the problematic and destructive relationship human beings have developed with nature. We depict a vision of a better worldview that restores the natural balance, which we have upset, and that re-directs our thinking about how we should be in the world. We pay special attention to how we can best make the transition. Further, as we locate participatory sustainability within the context of traditional social and political theorizing, we are able to demonstrate how this practice allows us to break from the traditional and linear model of moving from the problematic social condition to the better world order. We bring out how participatory sus-

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tainability is the vehicle for making the transition but merges with the ongoing functioning of the new society. 2. Observations about Methodology Most political theorists advocating social change rely on an argument of this sort: (1) If undesirable conditions exist in society, we should create a better world order in which these conditions do not exist. (2) These undesirable conditions do exist. (3) Therefore, we should create a better world order in which these conditions do not exist. The argument continues: (1) If we want to move from an undesirable social order to a better one, we should undertake an explicit course of action. (2) We do want to make the transition. (3) Therefore, we should undertake an explicit course of action. In the language of problem and solution, the political philosopher diagnoses a significant social malady, creates a vision of a healthy society, and prescribes how to make a transition. Take Thomas Hobbes as an example. He sizes people up as competitive, self-interested, and aggressive. Left to their devices, people would create a world of conflict and live without the benefits of social cooperation and production. He envisions a better future, a peaceful society in which people cooperate to secure what no one individual could attain to any significant degree whether it be in the area of knowledge, trade, construction, or the arts. Hobbes recommends the intervention of a powerful ruler to compel people to cooperate, a ruler to whom the people agree to submit in the name of peace and the fruits of social cooperation. In like fashion, we can characterize our current plight—an increasing less sustainable environment—along with a first approximation of the sustainable world we strive to create. Richard T. Hull (2006) recently observed how our last best hope may be to suspend the democratic process and agree to rule for a time by a Hobbesian sovereign, given the environmental crisis, the soon approaching point of no return, and the necessity for quick, decisive action, which is not in the offing in the United States today. He likened the move to that of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s programs he initiated to cope with the Great Depression. 3. The Sustainability Crisis During the last quarter of the twentieth century, our planet has entered a period of unprecedented crisis—social, economic, moral, ecological. In ecological

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terms, this crisis is probably more catastrophic than any Earth has experienced for thousands of years (Trainer, 1997). One manifestation is the speed at which the globe is losing biological diversity as human beings appropriate a growing share of nature’s primary productivity. Data from a 2004 World Conservation Union (IUNC) assessment, for example, indicate that approximately 70 percent of the species assessed and 3 percent of all plant species are threatened with extinction with almost 45 percent of the threatened plants either listed as endangered or critically endangered (Baillie et al., 2004). In 2005, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) determined that the health of the world’s ecosystems was in significant decline. Ecosystems provide essential services to people. Yet of the twenty-four ecosystem services examined by the MA, fifteen (62.5 percent) are being degraded or used unsustainably, a trend that “could grow significantly worse during the first half of this century” (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). According to Ecological Footprint analysis, humanity has been living beyond its means since 1987 and thus drawing down the ecological capital that is the basis for the continued health of the planet. Global forested area contracted by some 36.6 million hectares, or just under 1 percent, between 2000 and 2005, a continuation of the decades-long trend of forest loss in much of the world, according to the Global Forest Resource Assessment 2005 by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2006). The question we need to ask is, in spite of widespread policy instruments, environmental impact assessment, and environmental taxes and regulations, why do these trends continue today? The answer has to lie in rethinking the solutions we are currently applying, these solutions being part of the problem itself. 4. Challenges to Sustainability Humanity has reached a crossroads in its relationship with the natural world. As our technology and productivity continually grow, human beings have caused unprecedented change in the functioning of natural systems to meet growing demands for food, fresh water, fiber, and energy. Over-exploitation of resources, global climate change, species extinctions, and loss of biodiversity have all drawn attention to the need to better understand, protect, and manage the natural and modified environment around us. New management systems require integration of social and ecological systems within an interdisciplinary planning and policy framework and a capability to handle complexity, uncertainty, and the application of different methods of analysis and different approaches to governance and community engagement. The concept of sustainability has grown in popularity in recent decades as a new way of thinking about human beings’ relationship to the planet and to each other. By sustainability, we mean meeting current needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs. Sustainability has been widely discussed in the fields of ecology, economics, and conservation, yet the

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challenge of sustainability goes beyond how we use natural resources to questions of social justice and human health. The challenge of sustainability encompasses all aspects of human life, yet it is primarily a social issue. Major social/cultural challenges facing sustainability include: (1) lack of public engagement (people are only dimly aware that we share a destiny with all inhabitants of the Earth); (2) lack of political support; and (3) the scientific rationalism of modern Western civilization. Western scientific rationalism of the past several centuries has influenced a large part of our present understanding of the world and our selves. It has made extraordinary contributions to human affairs in the flourishing of Western culture, scientific endeavor, and material well-being. But it has also caused human alienation, ecological devastation, social injustice, and spiritual impoverishment. This worldview, which takes as fundamental the distinctions between mind and body, culture and nature, human and nonhuman, subject and object, channels our thinking and perception in fundamental ways: (1) The world is made of separate “things.” (2) Each thing has its own independent and generally fixed essence. (3) Human (mind) and physical reality (nature) are treated independently. This split between humanity and nature was what the German political economist and sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) meant by the “disenchantment of the world (1946, p. 155). As British action researcher Peter Reason notes: The disenchantment of the world is also the disenchantment of the human person, which the modern worldview of Western civilization sees as an autonomous individual, separate not only from the natural world but from her fellow humans. (2003, pp. 7–29) The underpinning and major consequences of this worldview include: (1) An epistemology rooted in a utilitarian and exploitative perspective— human domination over Nature; (2) The treatment of resource systems as discrete entities in isolation from rest of natural and social systems; (3) Management practices geared for efficient utilization of resources as if they were limitless; (4) The assumption that management strategies are universal and independent of socio-cultural context; and (5) A widespread belief that technology can solve all our problems (science has the answer).

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5. The New Vision: Part One We argue in this chapter that if we are to resolve the sustainability crisis, we need to replace the modern Western worldview with a more holistic, relational, and integrally informed understanding of human and natural systems. The shift we seek is “from control to participation” as a way of being in the world—a relational worldview. In setting out the tenets of this view, we acknowledge such cognate approaches ranging from Native American notions of our interconnectedness to the land ethic of Aldo Leopold. Each of these equates nature with the moral community and demands an ethic of respect and care for the whole community of life of which we are a part. A relational worldview gives us a very different understanding of the world we live in, the wider cosmos, and how we come to know it. It tells us: (1) The Universe is not an assembly of physical objects located in space and changing position over time but a multiplicity of self-ordering patterns of activity in various relationships to each other. (2) Everything in the Universe is intertwined and interdependent; nothing has a selfhood of its own; everything is in a continuous state of change and transformation. In this view, we cannot understand the property of any part without understanding how this part is related to the others and how the others influence it. The practical relevance of this worldview is the recognition that unless we learn to experience ourselves as part of the biosphere and understand that we human beings are participants in a wider community of beings, the damage we will do to our planet will continue to be devastating. The great challenge ahead of us, therefore, is to be able to realize: (1) We human beings are participants with one another and with all beings on the planet. (2) Cooperation and adaptability, not competition, are the essence of human survival. Only a shift in worldview will prove to be adequate for building a socially just, peaceful and ecologically sustainable future. 6. Making the Transition How do we make the transition? The primary alternatives for change from one social order to another are rational and irrational approaches, and these alternatives mirror the debate about the rationality of the change from one scientific paradigm to another. French philosopher Georges Sorel, in his depiction of the elements of a social movement, emphasizes its irrationality. In a word, irrational

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because people are acting upon what they believe to be an unquestionably correct portrait of the social reality; they are disposed to act to insure that the social reality be true to their conception of what is good and bad. Says Sorel: [M]en who are participating in a great social movement always picture their coming action as a battle in which their cause is certain to triumph. These constructions, knowledge of which is so important for historians, I propose to call myths; the syndicalist “general strike” and [Karl] Marx’s catastrophic revolution are such myths. (1950, p. 48) Sorel brings out that these social myths do not serve primarily to portray a better social order; “the myths are not descriptions of things, but expressions of a determination to act” (ibid., p. 57) Sorel’s immediate concern is a labor movement in France, but the power of the myth for social change has general applicability. Adolf Hitler appealed to the myth of the Aryan race, its history and superiority, along with the Jewish threat, to stir his followers to action. The myth can quite evidently be used for good or ill, but its elements seem to embrace an account of a threat, the hope of overcoming it, and the readiness to act. Sorel indicates that, like a religion, it cannot be refuted, as it does not purport to be a description: People who are living in this world of “myths,” are secure from all refutation; this has led many to assert that Socialism is a kind of religion. For a long time people have been struck by the fact that religious convictions are unaffected by criticism, and from that they have concluded that everything which claims to be beyond science must be a religion. It has been observed also that Christianity tends at the present day to be less a system of dogmas than a Christian life, i.e. a moral reform penetrating to the roots of one’s being; consequently, a new analogy has been discovered between religion and the revolutionary Socialism which aims at the apprenticeship, preparation, and even reconstruction of the individual—a gigantic task. (Ibid, pp. 59–60) If we were to draw on an approach like this to assist with making a transition to a sustainable world, we would begin with a depiction of the desolation and destruction, the result of our exploitation of nature. We would continue the narrative by acknowledging that a failure to modify our actions is as much a continuing threat as the damage and ever-worsening conditions we have already caused. We create antagonists, or negative role models of people, who continue to exploit nature, and build conceptions of heroes and positive role models as their counterpart. Albert Arnold “Al” Gore’s film and book by the same name, An Inconvenient Truth (2006) is a good example of a construction of a social myth. It depicts Earth as having a fever and our having to do something about it. Some viewers report its having a transforming effect on their views and behavior. Some com-

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mentators see it more of a success in convincing people that a problem exists. In her well-researched and influential work, Silent Spring (1962), Rachel Carson sets out the extensive damage pesticides have done to the environment. Even the title—inspired by a John Keats poem (1820) from which she quotes—“The sedge has withered from the lake, and no birds sing”—stirs the imagination to conjure images of desolation and a nature that has died, and fixes a belief in our need to head off an imminent and dreadful future. Even with this more modest measure of a myth’s success, believing in the existence of a problem is part of the transition. Charles Sanders Peirce (1877) and William James (1896) break down the divide some thinkers create between knowledge or belief and action as they speak of belief as that upon which a person is prepared to act. John Dewey’s thinking on social change is a good example of a rational approach in that he draws on the scientific model of identifying problems and formulating and testing hypotheses. In his view, we cannot identify genuine social problems if we insist on using the abstractions of individuals and society: Just as “individual” is not one thing, but is a blanket term for the immense variety of specific relations, habits, dispositions and powers of human nature that are evoked, and confirmed under the influences of associated life, so with the term, “social.” (1957, pp. 199–200) He tells how: society . . . covers all the ways . . . men share their common experiences, and build up common interests and aims; street gangs, schools for burglary, clans, social cliques . . ., villages and international alliances. (Ibid.) We need a detailed look at the actual living conditions of people to ascertain what we need to address and to identify genuine problems: The new method takes effect in substituting inquiry into these specific, changing, and relative facts . . . and identifies “the region of concrete difficulties” as the domain where “experimentation is urgently needed. (Ibid., p. 192) Formulating and testing hypotheses amounts to considering what approaches government agencies can take to remedy the matter and seeing which works best. Implementation of that agency’s approach renders social change in the form of a solution to the problem. “[O]rganization . . . is a means of promoting association, of multiplying effective points of contact between persons, directing their intercourse into the modes of greatest fruitfulness” (pp. 206–207). Dewey’s thinking suggests that reflection on the right relationship between individual and society in the abstract will not lead to the detection of problems associated with the degradation of the environment. As we gather information about ways in which practices affect people and entities, we are on our way to

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detecting a genuine problem. At each point along the way in this process public dialogue is essential: The increasing acknowledgment that goods exist and endure only through being communicated and that association is the means of conjoint sharing lies back of the modern sense of humanity and democracy. (Ibid., p. 206) This insight shows Dewey’s view of participatory democracy as a pre-cursor or foundation of participatory sustainability. A recent project in Peru is a good example of a collaborative endeavor, which bears some of the significant features of participatory sustainability. Scientific studies on the migration of fish in the Madre de Dios River in Peru indicated that the proposed construction of a dam in Brazil would cause much damage to the migrating fish. The work prompted the Brazilian government to halt construction and investigate ways of constructing the dam that would lessen the overall damage to the environment. Among the parties involved were scientists from the University of Florida, the John D. and Katherine T. MacArthur Foundation (2005–2007), which funded the research, the Brazilian President, and the staff of the local project. As we develop our discussion of transitioning to a sustainable environment through participatory sustainability, we see how this practice becomes a permanent part of the new and sustainable world order. 7. Participatory Sustainability: The Transition and the New Vision, Part Two Participatory sustainability is an innovative, integrative approach to sustainability that combines collaborative learning and adaptive management. It is a form of bottom-up management that builds upon the collective knowledge and participation of stakeholders, managers, scientists, and policymakers. Collaborative learning is a process of knowledge generation through the interactions of people with many different viewpoints, experiences, and belief systems. This process has a philosophical foundation called constructivism. Constructivism holds that “realities” are constructions of the human minds that represent the outside world. People with different experiences may very well construct different visions of reality. Collaborative learning takes advantage of this attitude towards knowledge, using a dialectic approach among community members, stakeholders, and regulators to construct a collective base of common knowledge from which to approach the issues of sustainability and the future of the community. Integrating activities for conservation and development through community participation and collaboration among different institutional and social actors is increasingly recognized as one of the more promising approaches towards achieving sustainable communities and ecosystems (Thompson, Pretty, Guijt,

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and Shah, 1999). This recognition is leading to the development of more collaborative—often referred to as community-based or participatory—approaches towards environmental monitoring and natural resource management (Armitage, 2005; Berkes and Folke, 1998). Community participation and collaboration among different institutional and social actors is a complex process. No single approach or methodology has universal acceptance. Participation is not an on-off event; it is a continuously ongoing process. It takes time, resources, understanding, and perseverance; but the result should be a developmental process that involves local people—their ideas, skills, and knowledge. Participation of this kind can contribute towards achieving sustainability and making environmental activities more effective while simultaneously building the capacity of the involved communities to continue and perhaps expand the initiative. Participatory sustainability demands that current management policies be continually re-evaluated in the light of new data, observations, a changing environment, or changing economic conditions. It assumes that no universal “best management practice” exists, but that best management is site-specific and will change with time. This assumption is based on complex adaptive systems theory, which says that socio-ecologic systems, because they are non-linear and selforganizing, will be unpredictable and will generate surprise (Gunderson and Holling, 2002). Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect that one fixed management strategy will always be successful. A participatory sustainability program comprises three interrelated phases: (1) integrated assessment, (2) participatory reflection, (3) and participatory action. The main objective of the integrated assessment is to enable and support community members in identifying the most important and urgent goals to be pursued through participatory sustainability. Most of the information to be collected during this phase is generated through interactions among small groups of community members and the researchers. Task sharing is often based on the participants’ individual interests, competence, and personal preferences. Following the integrated assessment, researchers conduct workshops with stakeholders with the purpose of identifying priority problems and establishing a common vision. They select the overall management approach and assessment frameworks they will adopt, and determine the research needs and disciplinary focus by means of participatory action research and dialectic decision-making processes. Experts play an active role in this process by working with stakeholders and using their technical and analytical skills to help them understand ecosystem dynamics and the effects of human activities on the natural environment. A comprehensive understanding of the underlying social-ecological issues and general agreement on the desired outcome are critical to any decisionmaking process that attempts to choose a common path for developers and resource management. The stakeholders, with their different perspectives, define the problem, arrive at a common vision about the desired outcome, and identify

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the appropriate management approaches and the set of management criteria that they will use to choose from among options and/or management strategies. Major activities carried out during this phase include identification, analysis and prioritization of problems; identification of possible solutions; and drafting of a tentative action plan. Ideas for action developed during the workshops are reviewed through a participatory feasibility analysis, aimed at assessing the extent to which these ideas are technically, economically, and socially viable and scientifically sound. This assessment often includes priority-setting exercises, technical studies, on-site investigations, and conflict management initiatives. Following the feasibility study, detailed terms of reference for joint implementation are negotiated among local property owners and appointed or elected officials with the purpose of defining a collaborative implementation agreement. Participatory sustainability deals with management strategies as a series of management policy experiments. This emphasizes the element of surprise in the search for sustainable development (Holling, Berkes, and Folke, 1998; Kai, 1999; Janssen and Goldsworthy, 1996). The management strategies negotiated and eventually agreed upon in the reflection phase are implemented and monitored in an iterative manner. The results of these experiments will indicate the extent to which these problems are manageable, and which strategies are useful. Regardless of how the results are interpreted, this phase becomes one of adaptive (or experimental) learning. This learning process is central to participatory sustainability. Stakeholders learn by observing the results of their actions and analyzing cause-effect relationships based on their newly acquired knowledge; they then feed their findings back into the decision-making process. Formal involvement in the linked processes of implementation, monitoring, evaluation, and re-planning develops greater technical expertise in the community building on collective local knowledge and an associated scientific awareness of the environment in which the community resides. Such a cooperative venture offers a variety of knowledge-based tools and possible courses of action to enable the community to make better-informed decisions. As communication among different sectors of the community expands and improves, the level of conflict surrounding land use and management issues should be minimized. 8. Concluding Remarks Participatory sustainability, as a mechanism to deal with future resource-related conflicts focused more on personal or social biases than scientific facts, can provide the foundation for a globally secure community. Consider that, at some point in time, we have built a nearly ideal global community, a cohesive entity, and a secure one in every sense. It is secure because its economy is strong; its legal institutions, just; and its citizenry, educated and spiritually fulfilled. It is secure because people are free from racial, religious, and ideological conflict and because people are troubled no longer by acts of aggression in local and international arenas. However trite, what is good for nature is good for civilization. This

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close to ideal civilization declines and falls when it becomes increasingly unlikely for nature to endure as a sustainable entity. If participatory sustainability is the best approach for creating a sustainable nature, as we have argued, it thereby becomes the foundation for a globally secure community.

Fourteen Human Sustainability: Overview of Survival Technologies and Impediments to Their Development and Deployment Stephen Paley, George K. Oister, and Richard T. Hull 1. Introduction Four significant and interconnected physical problems are likely to reach critical stages over the next two decades: (1) Global warming and environmental degradation; (2) Depletion of key resources including oil, gas, and potable water; (3) Pollution caused by use of fossil fuels with current technologies; (4) A world population beyond Earth’s carrying capacity—exacerbating the first three problems—that continues to increase. Keeping these problems within tolerable limits will require defining the actions that we must take and the sequence in which we must take them, followed by rapid deployment of the largest set of integrated, knowledge-based changes the world has ever seen. Included in these changes is the deployment of “survival” technologies. In this chapter, we will discuss fundamental impediments to the creation, adoption, deployment, and proper use of those technologies. The compartmentalization of knowledge, along with various cultural, economic, and business realities, has created a severely limited understanding of the changes necessary for our survival, and has delayed implementation of those changes. These realities are: (1) Economic self-interest; (2) Profit motive as the sole determinant of action; (3) Lack of appropriate institutions to promote and manage required changes; (4) Limitations on the range of practical solutions that experts are able to create because they possess only a narrow range of specialized knowledge in a particular field; (5) Limitations associated with non-expert decision makers attempting to formulate decisions that require expert knowledge.

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We suggest that we create an institution designed to orchestrate solutions to the first three of these four problems. Regarding the fourth, overpopulation, this institution would promote understanding of the need for population reduction as necessary for human survival and help create improved, long-term birth-control technology to facilitate population reduction. 2. The Nature of Survival Technologies Because the physical problems listed above are interrelated, developing effective survival technologies is exceedingly difficult and not always achievable by those possessing only a narrow range of specialized knowledge. By “survival technologies,” we mean those that are sustainable and which provide to a significant extent for: (1) Human needs for energy, fresh water, food, and population reduction; (2) Reduced human impact upon the environment; (3) Restricting global warming to within tolerable limits; and (4) Adjustment to negative environmental changes due to global warming. Survival technologies must be sparing in their use of nonrenewable resources, must avoid producing much pollution, and avoid, as much as possible, harming the environment. The wish list of survival technology characteristics calls for them to be robust, relatively low-cost, rapidly deployable, and compatible with existing infrastructure. We will refer to a survival technology that exhibits these criteria as “practical.” But even this formidable list is incomplete when discussion turns to energy technologies. Practical energy technologies must also have a high “energy gain.” Energy gain of a fuel is the ratio of energy produced by burning the fuel to the energy expended to manufacture it. For example, we can compare the energy obtained by burning a gallon of gasoline to the energy expended to obtain that gallon of gasoline. “Energy expended,” in this case, includes but is not limited to that required to drill, produce, transport, and refine the oil and the energy (prorated) required for making pipes, erecting oil-drilling platforms, and constructing refineries. For other forms of energy, such as electricity generated by wind power, we similarly need to compare the total energy generated by a wind turbine over its lifetime with the energy needed to mine and refine the metals, forge the blades, build the generator and the support structure of the turbine, and other factors requiring the expenditure of energy. Unless all of these parameters are favorable, the technologies upon which we depend for our survival will eventually fail us. Finally, we must guarantee that in regions where climate change is most evident, the resources required by proposed survival technologies must be impervious to climate change. As a case in point, during 2006, high temperatures and a summer drought in Western Europe increased the temperature of water supplies needed to cool nu-

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clear reactors and reduced its volume. Consequently, reactor power levels (and the electricity they generate) had to be reduced, In one case, a reactor shut down; water used to cool reactors had to be discharged to rivers and lakes at higher temperatures than normally permitted, which, in turn, resulted in substantial damage to the environment (Goday, 2008). By our criteria, therefore, we must not consider water-cooled nuclear reactors as a future survival technology in any region susceptible to either higher temperatures or permanent freshwater shortages. In addition, existing reactors may have limited future use in areas that will become hotter or drier because of climate change. Currently, freshwater shortages are occurring all over the world. Australia is presently suffering the worst drought in its history; a significant portion of its crops have failed. Commentators speculate that the drought is due to global warming and may represent a permanent climate change. Such a change may result in the need to relocate up to six million people, but no one has suggested where such a relocation could successfully occur (Tim Johnson, “Parched in Australia: Drought Changes Views on Warming,” International Herald Tribune, Asia Pacific, 7 November, 2006; Marks, 2007). Some analysts have predicted that agricultural areas, which grow much of the world’s food, will become hotter and drier due to global warming and potentially reduced precipitation (Michael McCarthy, “The Century of Drought,” The Independent/UK, 4 October 2006; Steve Corner, “A Global Catastrophe of Our Own Making,” Independent/UK, 31 October 2006). In North America, these areas include the American Midwest, Southwest, and far West. In the future, these regions may no longer be able to support high-yield agriculture because of a lack of water. In addition to less precipitation, is the approaching depletion of the Ogallala Aquifer threatens agriculture in the Midwest and South Central region of the United States. Parts of the Southwest, including parts of California, gets 80 percent of its water from mountain snowmelt runoff, which is already in sharp decline, possibly because of global warming or very long-term (hundred-year) drought, which, historically, is common in this part of the country. Residential development also competes with agriculture for water resources. For example, California’s Imperial Valley, naturally a desert, has long been employed for production of fruits and vegetables. The success this industry depends on irrigation from diverted Colorado River water. In recent years, much of the water used to irrigate crops in the Imperial Valley has been transferred to cities in Southern California. This has resulted in reduction of agricultural production (“Building Bonanza: Growth and the Ag Industry,” 2004). Whatever the cause for reduced water supplies, we need to replace the water lost by drought and diversion to residential purposes if we are to maintain food production. The survival technology that could enable human beings to have adequate supplies of water to maintain food production would be a practical, extremely low-cost, energy-conserving method of desalinating vast quantities of ocean water. As we shall see, this, and other innovative solutions face serious impediments to their development and deployment. Before discussing

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those in more detail, let us turn our attention to reasons why timely adoption of new technologies is crucial. 3. Why Global Warming Requires Immediate Deployment of Survival Technologies Normally, rational people desire solid proof of potential outcomes before acting on major issues. But some aspects of global warming require us to compromise this principle. Global warming is so critical that, if it becomes pronounced enough, it could jeopardize humankind’s future on the planet. Given such a severe threat, we must address some aspects of global warming before we establish cause and effect with 100 percent certainty. For example, major threats we need to address now without waiting to be “sure” global warming is occurring or to what degree it might advance include the quantity of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, their rate of increase, and the potential for global warming to become self-sustaining. In simplest terms, global warming occurs when greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, water vapor, nitrous oxide, and methane) trap heat in the earth’s atmosphere. Light from the sun enters the atmosphere freely and gets absorbed within the atmosphere and at the earth’s surface and changed into heat. The heat remains trapped by the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, which act like a blanket. The greenhouse gases do not let the heat go back out into space as easily as light enters the atmosphere, which causes an increase in the earth’s temperature. The greater the concentration of greenhouse gases, the greater will be the rate at which the earth’s temperature increases. Carbon dioxide is a relatively long-lived molecule and is emitted into the atmosphere as a byproduct of respiration or by burning organic fuels. While molecule for molecule, methane is a more effective greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, its concentration is much smaller so that its total effect in trapping heat is only about a fourth of that of carbon dioxide. Data for the years 2000 through 2006 reveal that carbon dioxide emissions during that time were the highest recorded since the beginning of continuous monitoring in 1959 and a significant increase over growth recorded in earlier decades. Global atmospheric carbon dioxide rose from 280 parts per million (ppm) at the start of the industrial revolution (taken to be approximately 1750 CE) to 381 ppm in 2006. The rate of annual rise during 2000–2006 has increased to over three times the rate of annual increase over the previous 250 years. The present concentration is the highest during the last 650,000 years and probably during the last 20 million years (Canadell, Le Que´ re´, Raupacha, et al., 2007). The rate at which carbon dioxide is being released into the atmosphere since 2006 continues to accelerate (“Increase in Carbon Dioxide Emissions Accelerating, Australian Research Shows,” 2006). Reports such as this one have caused many to form the opinion that the advance of global warming is already out of control (Connor, 2006; Lean, 2007).

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The time during which humankind can attempt to hold global warming to tolerable limits may be short: a commonly held view among three thousand climate researchers, who participated in a recent five-year international study of global warming, is that the time left for us to attempt effective action is shorter than ten years. This is not to say that global warming will be full-blown within a decade, but that within this ten-year timeframe, progressive and irreversible effects could exacerbate beyond the ability of human beings to sufficiently moderate them (Mary Millkin, “World Has 10 Year Window to Act on Climate Warming—NASA Expert,” Reuters, 14 September 2006). If rapid increase of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and irreversible environmental damage are not threatening enough, even more disturbing is the prospect that global warming might become self-sustaining because of a feedback effect. As Earth’s average temperatures rise, the rate at which some natural sources inject greenhouse gases into the atmosphere also increases. Globally, crop soils alone currently supply about 25 percent of the total amount of carbon dioxide that enters the atmosphere from manmade sources (Soil Science Society of America, 2007). As temperatures rise, the amount of carbon dioxide released in to the atmosphere from soil increases (Trumbore, 1999). This, in turn, increases the Earth’s temperature even further, further accelerating the rate at which natural sources of greenhouse gases enter the atmosphere. Such self-perpetuating processes, well known to physicists, are said to have “undamped positive feedback upon the input.” Although they are not yet the largest contributors to global warming, such processes, quite varied and common in nature, represent potential sources that pushed too far, could continue to spontaneously drive environmental changes beyond the limits human beings can tolerate. If natural sources of greenhouse gases continue to increase and become self-sustaining, then the biggest contributor to additional global warming will ultimately be global warming itself. Consider the following examples of positive feedback of greenhouse gases. In the same time as the industrial revolution has transpired, permafrost, a layer of earth frozen since the last ice age, has been melting to an alarming degree (NASA, 2003; Borenstein, 2006; Deborah Zabarenko, “Thawing Permafrost Could Unleash Tons of Carbon,” Reuters, 15 June 2006). Currently, one continuous area of permafrost in Asia is larger than the areas of France and Germany combined. Permafrost contains large quantities of the greenhouse gases methane and carbon dioxide, released into the atmosphere when the permafrost thaws (Borenstein, 2006; Zabarenko, 2006). This contributes to further global warming, which, in turn, contributes to more rapid melting of permafrost, and so on. A second serious example of positive feedback in the environment is the melting of the ice covering the Arctic Ocean. Ice reflects 90 percent of the light falling upon it, but ocean water absorbs 80 percent of that light and changes it into heat. As the area of the ice cover deceases and is replaced by water, more

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light is absorbed and changed into heat, which causes the remaining ice to melt even faster (NASA, 2003). Melting ice absorbs heat without causing a rise in ambient temperature, which may currently be retarding any temperature increase in the Arctic Ocean area. But after the ice is gone, we can expect the ocean’s temperature to rise more quickly. The melting of the Arctic ice is already in an advanced stage: climatologists predict the summer ice covering the Arctic Ocean will disappear by 2013 enough to open up the Northwest Passage during summer months (Revkin, 2007). Contrary to the prima facie benefits for commerce of an open sea-lane through the Northwest Passage, a significant downside looms: the warming of the Arctic Ocean is expected to result in significant climate changes elsewhere on the planet. This, in turn, suggests that we must immediately prepare for climate change by, among other actions, deploying survival technologies needed to support fundamental human needs that enable adjustment to the negative environmental changes caused by global warming. We will look at low-cost, low energy desalination as an example of a practical solution to this sort of problem later in the chapter. The above example of positive feedback of greenhouse gases and the numerous negative effects caused by their increase suggest that we must immediately address both manmade and natural sources of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere. Furthermore, the percentage of carbon dioxide entering the atmosphere from manmade versus natural sources is irrelevant; we know enough about the carbon cycle to know that uninterrupted at its present rate of increase, atmospheric carbon dioxide can ultimately cause human extinction along with that of much of the biosphere. In principle, two approaches to ameliorate the problem are available to us. One would be the use of techniques to reduce the output of some natural and manmade sources—difficult in the case of natural sources because most of them extend over large areas. The other approach would be to employ a practical survival technology that would remove and sequester greenhouse gases after they enter the atmosphere, irrespective of whether they came from manmade or natural sources. In our opinion, a practical technology that enables the capture and longterm sequestration of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere is the most important survival technology we can presently deploy. But let us examine this intervention more closely: Although the build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is currently increasing global warming and a good place to intervene or compensate on a temporary emergency basis, the capture and long-term sequestration of atmospheric greenhouse gases is analogous to placing a human patient on life support. It may be necessary to keep the patient alive, but if you stop there without fixing the underlying causes, the patient will eventually die. Some of the direct and indirect sources of increased atmospheric carbon dioxide are environmental destruction, population increase, conventional methods of energy generation and use, the increased rate of greenhouse gases released by

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natural sources into the atmosphere due to warming that has already occurred, and, replacement of planted areas by concrete and asphalt. 4. “First Round” Survival Technologies: An Initial Step toward Humankind’s Survival Creating and deploying most long-term survival technologies, and making many of the more or less permanent changes necessary for human sustainability, will require considerably more time than we have left to contain climate change. No time is left for further research and development of survival technologies. A solution to this apparently hopeless situation is to immediately deploy certain “first round” survival technologies that can buy us more time. To meet this criterion of rapid deployment, these first round technologies must: (1) be those that already exist (or slight modifications of them); or (2) be optimized systems synthesized from such existing, rapidly deployable technologies. A low cost, low energy method for (net) large-scale capture of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, using an existing technology, to produce carbon-negative ethanol followed by a simple method of long-term sequestration, is an example of such optimization of pre-existing technology for a new, originally unintended purpose. Another first round survival technology is use of 100-year-old physics and a slight modification of existing technology to achieve low energy, large scale desalination. We will discuss the production of carbon-negative cellulosic ethanol later in this chapter. Humanity could use the additional time bought through rapid deployment of first round survival technologies to develop and deploy more long-term technologies and changes that, we cannot, by virtue of their nature, accomplish quickly. As crucial as we see this approach to be, though, some major impediments to the creation and deployment of such technologies exist. A primary goal of this chapter is to discuss some of these impediments. Some of these impediments will come as no surprise: Some large companies may have purchased rights to innovative technologies and then suppressed their further development to protect their profit interests. For example, some evidence exists to suggest that Enron-AMOCO-British Petroleum may have suppressed photovoltaic’s deployment after its possibly fraudulent takeover of Solarex Corporation during the 1980s (Berger, 1998). Multinational corporations have been able to earn sizable profits for decades without their products conforming to the many requirements of a practical survival technology—a major reason for our current environmental crisis. The nature of our economic system is that corporations distribute the economic benefits of some technologies among different groups and subsidiaries so the full benefits may not appear on the balance sheet of any one company or institution that purchases them. For example, solar cells, which generate energy without atmospheric pollution, may have appeared far more economically attractive decades ago if an accurate accounting of

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the economic benefits appeared on the balance sheets of the companies that purchased them. Other significant impediments may be less familiar: As we will discuss, skills different from those of basic research and germane to creating first-round survival technologies are almost extinct. Changes have occurred in multinational corporations, defense contractors, and government labs, which make alternative development and utilization of the skills necessary to create survival technologies nearly impossible. The culture of freedom and flexibility prevalent in many smaller, high technology companies has enabled some of them to create such technologies. But, as we will also discuss, such companies—some with solutions pivotal in the battle to contain global warming—have little or no access to sufficient capital with which to deploy these technologies. As we will show, not every survival technology will yield immediate financial gains, and production costs may be more than that required to produce “dirty” fuels. Companies motivated only by profit will not be interested. Instead, some crucial technologies will result in additional expenses to their manufacturers without the opportunity for additional profit. If we are to deploy such technologies, government intervention to mandate or pay for them will be necessary. Finally, as we will discuss, a fundamental obstacle exists that we authors have labeled the “knowledge barrier.” It often accompanies the above-listed impediments and arises when economic, financial, industrial or political decision makers, who have little or no firsthand knowledge of technology, attempt to make decisions concerning technology. Fundamental limitations arise when such decision makers attempt to utilize, in a “secondhand” fashion, the knowledge of science and technology experts. These limitations result in decisions that are usually far from optimal. If this flawed decision-making process continues, based on past performance, it will significantly reduce the likelihood of creating, recognizing, and deploying the optimal technologies required for humanity’s survival at the very time we may have only one last chance to achieve and deploy them. 5. The Potential Effectiveness of Survival Technologies Versus Currently Proposed Solutions So far, United States congressional legislators appear to have treated climate change as merely another political problem. They have tended to choose politically acceptable remedies, often with exaggerated claims implied about their predicted degree of successful solution. They move such remedies’ adoption date so far into the future as to effectively suspend or fatally weaken them. HR 6, Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 displays both shortcomings. Increasing average auto fuel economy to thirty-five miles per gallon, mandated by HR 6, would save approximately one million barrels of oil per day. We currently use twenty million gallons per day to fuel vehicles. Similarly, lighting utilizes 4 percent of United States’ energy consumption; phasing out incandescent bulbs in favor of a more efficient alternative, as also mandated by the bill,

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would save only a fraction of that. If we replace incandescent bulbs with fluorescent bulbs, the toxic mercury they contain will multiply disposal problems to save a relatively small percentage of the energy we use. By contrast, consider the much greater and shorter-term benefits of a genuine first round survival technology capable of rapid deployment: the manufacture of a $0.70 per gallon, biofuel replacement for most energy applications of petroleum: a particular (microorganism-mediated) process for making “cellulosic” ethanol. While many processes for making cellulosic ethanol exist, using this process, enough of the required kind of biomass to replace all United States’ oil imports could be grown on less than 10 percent of the acreage currently used by United States agriculture, and would be sustainable if grown correctly. This process also offers an astonishing energy gain of 11 units of energy contained in the biofuel per unit of energy expended to grow proper biomass and change it into the biofuel. By contrast, corn ethanol, at best, has an energy gain of only about 10 percent that of cellulosic ethanol. Some argue that of corn is lower due to the energy intensive nature of growing corn. In addition, manufacture of ethanol using this process generates almost no pollution, produces few particulates when burned, is neither capital-intensive nor very demanding of nonrenewable resources, and is produced by a non-critical low-tech process easily established in developing nations. Even more beneficial, by adding an extra step—one that uses existing technology—during manufacture, the process can be rendered carbon-negative—growing proper biomass and changing it into biofuel will pull more carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere than is released when the biofuel is burned. (Even without rendering the ethanol carbon negative, the high-energy gain and the very small amount of energy required to make a unit of ethanol using this process, means that the ethanol will be only slightly carbon positive—must less carbon positive than other fuels or ethanol made by other processes.) Finally, a reasonable extension of this system may enable sustainable production of sufficient biomass to replace, with ethanol made by this process, energy applications of oil worldwide without requiring any agricultural land, forest or grassland, to grow it. Science fiction? The stuff of wish lists? Not at all. This carbon-negative process already exists and has ready for rapid deployment for years, but due to some of the impediments mentioned and others we will discuss, its inventors have been unable to deploy the technology. Imagine the initial impact of just this one first-round survival technology in helping to combat global warming, reducing fuel costs and pollution, and alleviating the politico-military consequences of the United States’ current dependence on foreign oil in favor of a carbon negative (or low carbon positive) replacement. Given the status quo, which we will subsequently describe in detail, and given that a small high-tech company invented this technology, chances are remote that it—as with most developed by small companies today—will ever be recognized for its potential benefits, commercialized, or deployed.

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HR 6 also encourages expansion of ethanol manufactured from corn, a technology (along with other biofuels) the United Nations has declared a “crime against humanity” (Lederer, 2007) based on the following premises: (1) The world now needs all of its agricultural land to grow food, and this need will only be aggravated as population increases and global warming reduces yields; (2) Corn ethanol and other current biofuels demand too much land per unit of ethanol produced; (3) Making enough ethanol for one SUV car tank fill-up consumes enough corn to feed a person for a year; (4) More energy is consumed in making and transporting corn ethanol than we get back by burning it; and (5) Diverting corn to ethanol production also drives up the cost of foods for which corn is an ingredient or feedstock. It has already doubled the price of tortillas in Mexico and substantially increased the price of eggs and milk; soon prices of hogs and corn-fed cattle will follow. Expanding the manufacture of corn ethanol and other conventional biofuels will only aggravate these problems. Did legislators write corn ethanol expansion into the energy bill as a political earmark for agricultural states? Did they act out of technological or environmental ignorance? Perhaps, but regardless of their motivations, such promotion of “non-survival” energy technologies reduces the likelihood of containing global warming and related problems, and of achieving survival. 6. Significant Innovation: A Game Just One Can Play The four crises previously discussed call, in part for breakthrough research that has not yet emerged from conventional, established sources. One surprising reason for this is that large research organizations, public and private, fail to recognize that significant innovation is a one-person game. Major breakthroughs occur in the mind of a single individual (Bower, 2008). Group research becomes relevant only after planners define the innovation and frame the approach for implementing it. Organizational climates were once much friendlier toward breakthrough research. Until the mid 1960s, innovative engineers and researchers at large organizations could frequently act on their own ideas. A classic example is the complete freedom management gave to the two physicists, John Bardeen and Walther Brattain, who were tasked with developing what was later to be known as the transistor, a feat that ultimately won them and the manager of the project, William Shockley (who took no active role in development), the 1956 Nobel Physics Prize (Augenbraum and Hammer, 1999). After its inventor demonstrated the first transistor, others eventually made the device more practical by virtue of

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many years of team development. Brattain, the theoretician, even spent much of his productive time working at home, an action today’s company management is not likely to sanction. Having been in industry and defense research and development since just after World War II, one of us authors has first-hand experience that researchers and engineers today enjoy far less freedom to demonstrate new concepts or suggest how to implement a project goal. By the time technical people become involved in most projects today, the project goal and the approach by which that goal is to be achieved have already been decided by managers who usually have little scientific or technical knowledge. Obviously, this is not conducive to creation of survival technologies, which must satisfy many diverse criteria. Innovation being a one-person enterprise has other consequences, too. Although some individuals have generated significant innovations more than once, and in more than one specialty, innovation is inherently unpredictable. One can never be sure from whom—or from where—a significant innovation will come. A corollary is that significant innovation cannot be planned with any certainty which means, in turn, that it may or may not come from any one university or government laboratory funded and designated as a center for applied research in some crucial area. Reasons for this unpredictability relate to the backgrounds of the technologists who develop innovative solutions. Often, someone trained in one special field may invent a technology traditionally considered to be part of a different discipline. Aside from what we might consider the disadvantages of not having trained in the target field, “outsiders” possess two significant advantages regarding their ability to provide an innovative solution to problems in the new field. Coming from a different technical or scientific background, they may possess different knowledge, or be aware of a different approach relevant to solving the problem at hand: they can “think outside the box.” This is consistent with the most recent research on the process of innovation (Bower, 2008). In addition, they will not suffer from “the conventional way of thinking” of people trained in that particular field because they never went through the same training. One of the most notable examples of this sort of innovation is Paul A. M. Dirac, who put quantum theory, one of the most significant advances in modern physics, on a sound theoretical and axiomatic basis. When he entered the field, Dirac was a mathematician much more than a physicist. In a somewhat similar, if not as grandiose a vein, one of us authors, who had no academic credentials or training in biofuels or any allied field, developed the concepts for carbon negative biofuels described above. Based on his background and training in a different field, he would never have been hired for work in biofuels research or development. His insight, in this case, had more to do with his knowledge of systems from technical areas quite different from biofuels than with his knowledge of chemistry, biology, or biochemistry. Another well-known example of individuals who, based on their backgrounds and formal training, would never have been hired to work, in this case

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on aircraft development, were the Wright brothers. By contrast, the foremost “expert” in the developing field of aviation at that time was Samuel Langley, whose calculations for flight turned out to be incorrect. Survival requires that we change the system so that significant innovations from any source can be safely revealed and verified, while aspects of the innovation with commercial potential are fully protected against their unauthorized disclosure to, or misappropriation by, others. Existing government-sponsored or university labs are unlikely to cooperate in this process without new incentives. 7. Finding the Skills and Organizations to Create First Round Survival Technologies Iconic innovators like Alexander Graham Bell, Thomas Edison, Marchese Guglielmo Marconi, and George Eastman were successful one-man enterprises because during their time, few national markets and few large national corporations existed. Edison actually had the best of both worlds. A talented innovator in his own right, he had many assistants to carry out various aspects of his development programs under his close direction. He is credited with inventing the modern development team, and his operation at Menlo Park is an excellent example of the many innovations that can be generated when a highly innovative individual is in charge and able to closely guide the development effort. (The converse is often true today: administrative people with little knowledge of science and technology are in charge of, and frame research and development.) During World War II, we saw a huge increase in applications of science and technology. Because the survival of Western democracies was at stake, engineers and scientists had significant freedom to develop the technologies that won the war. Some of the companies for which they worked, or their offshoots, would ultimately become major defense contracting firms. During the postwar transition to civilian technologies and products, large numbers of innovators learned their skills within large United States’ corporations. For example, one of us authors worked at Radio Corporation of America (RCA) at their Morristown, New Jersey, location, where color television was refined after CBS had introduced it on a limited basis in 1940. At that location, as much as 10 percent of the technical and scientific workforce developed general technological skills. They became “technologists,” an under-recognized multidisciplinary specialty. These tech-savvy generalists initially learned their skills by bootstrap trial and error. By the early 1950s, enough technologists worked throughout industry that workers learned technologist’s skills by apprenticeship. Whether learned by trial and error or under the tutelage of established experts, characteristics of the work environment, long gone from today’s organizations, enabled technologists to learn and pass on their skills. Principal among these were high quality development programs, a relatively small number of engineers and scientists doing the entire project, and working in an atmosphere that encouraged interaction among

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scientists and engineers so that each could extend their knowledge and understanding into the disciplines of others. This atmosphere enabled them to learn, among other skills, how to make practical (system) compromises among different elements of technology involved in the products, processes, or systems they were developing. By the mid 1960s, this culture of technologist training was in decline because industries had instituted a new system of technology development requiring compartmentalization of knowledge—first begun in the defense industry as a protection against espionage. As compartmentalization became the norm in large corporations and government programs, the number of places where technologists could teach and learn their skills dwindled. In recent years, the number of defense contractors has decreased by a factor greater than ten; at the same time, companies have outsourced much commercial research and development to groups in foreign countries. America has lost the critical mass of scientists, engineers, and program architectures within which technologists’ skills could be preserved. Because we could train fewer new technologists, the relevant skill set has become nearly extinct over time. The capacity to function as a technologist remains mostly in a small number of aging individuals, most of whom are now beyond retirement age. Fortunately, some of them have joined small high-tech companies in which some have developed survival technologies; we authors are part of this small group. This disappearance of technologists greatly complicates the development and implementation of survival technologies. Such scientific and technical expertise as America retains is organized almost exclusively according to the principle of specialization in which scientists and engineers know a single area of science or engineering in great depth or detail but have much less knowledge in other areas. This leaves us nuclear physicists, solid-state physicists, and structural engineers, with relatively narrow specialties. Specialization is simultaneously powerful and limiting in terms of the range of solutions that an expert in a any discipline is able to generate. When experts receive assignments of particular problems, the solutions at which they arrive usually fall within their area of expertise. If an optimum solution does not exist within that area of expertise, we end up with a less than optimum technology— not acceptable for survival technologies that must satisfy many diverse criteria. Another disadvantage of specialization is that technologies based upon the specialization inherent in basic research can often take decades before they can be made practical—as far as survival technologies are concerned, we cannot wait that long. Specialization of knowledge, which originally gave civilization a jump-start, may now be one of the key factors that limits its advance or even brings it to a close, if it prevents the timely creation and adoption of survival and first-round survival technologies. Creation of first-round survival technologies ideally calls for technologists who are generalists versed in many different areas of science and technology but who need not know any particular area to the same degree as an expert who

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specializes in that area would. Given today’s dearth of technologists, the nextbest solution might be a development program within which technical specialists can collaborate easily, informally, and often. Unfortunately, to the contrary, the culture and structure of most large, complex, multi-tiered organizations today make regular intercommunications among different work groups quite difficult if not practically impossible. Today’s organizations are missing three essential elements for creation of survival technologies: (1) Technologists and members of management who possess the knowledge and skills needed to create survival technologies and policies that allow them to be created; (2) Internal development programs organized in a manner that encourages the creation of survival technologies; and (3) Institutional goals, mandates, and self-interests that promote creation of survival technologies. Sometimes goals, publicly stated or implied (for example, in television commercials), are the opposite of the hidden agendas of large organizations. Some oil companies, for example, claim to be environmentally responsible while they cause significant environmental damage brought about by careless operation or extraction of oil and improper waste disposal in developing nations (Environmental News Service, 2005; Epstein, 2003). Until recently, some corporations claimed in commercials that they were attempting to develop alternate energy sources. Their claims created an illusion of commitment to progress and falsely suggested that, if large corporations with their vast resources cannot accomplish the goal, no one can. This façade was recently shattered when Shell Oil Company sold its solar energy division during 2007 and positioned itself, along with virtually all other multinational oil companies, to extract oil from Canadian tar sands—a project shaping up to be one of the biggest environmental disasters that the planet has seen so far (Baker, 2007; Terry Macalister, “Big Oil Lets Sun Set on Renewables: Shell Has Quietly Shed Most of its Solar Power, while BP Is Buying into Dirty Tar Sands,” The Guardian/UK, 11 December 2007; Cahal Milmo, “The Biggest Environmental Crime in History,” The Independent/UK, 10 December 2007). If large organizations are hostile to the creation of survival technologies, we might hope for better among small high-tech companies. Such companies are often set up to develop a technology after its invention, precluding the barriers erected by large organizations to creation of survival technologies. This is especially true if the small company retains the innovative technologists who invented the technology as influential members of the organization. Unfortunately, small companies are almost invariably unable to access capital sufficient to commercialize and successfully deploy their technologies. So long as the status

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quo persists, few places will remain in which survival technologies can be created and then deployed. We will return to this point. 8. Cases Studies To illustrate the sort of survival technologies we have been discussing, let us examine a cluster of survival technologies developed and perfected in selected small, high-technology companies. We will discuss two technologies that we authors have developed and a third in which we have no financial stake but to which we have added an important feature—the ability to render some biofuels carbon-negative. We have chosen technologies with which we have first-hand experience to be able to accurately discuss the issues with regard to particular examples. The three survival technologies are as follows: A particular process of microorganism-mediated production of cellulosic ethanol is the “new biofuel process” to which we alluded earlier in the chapter. Infinitely Renewable Energy, Inc., near Mac Allen, Texas, developed this process. It uniquely eliminates several fatal drawbacks of corn ethanol as a replacement for oil-based fuels and eases and potentially eliminates competition between using agricultural land for growing food crops versus biomass for making ethanol in addition to other objections to biofuels raised by the United Nations and other organizations. In producing corn ethanol, the sugars and starches within corn kernels are fermented, but most of the rest of the corn plant remains unused. In cellulosicethanol production, the cellulose of the entire plant—most of the plant’s mass—is broken down into sugars. These, along with the naturally occurring sugars, are fermented into ethanol. Fewer plants are needed to make a given quantity of cellulosic ethanol; fewer plants means less acreage required to grow them. Several known processes produce cellulosic ethanol. Some break cellulose into sugars by using enzymes. But enzymes are expensive and different enzymes are needed for different kinds of plant material. Microorganism-mediated production does not use enzymes. This particular process of microorganism mediated cellulosic ethanol is also a low pressure and low temperature process able to use input of extremely small amounts of energy and a different microorganism for each step: to break biomass up into small pieces, to change cellulose into sugars, and, to ferment the sugars into ethanol. This process produces ethanol at a very low cost, approximately $.70 USD per gallon compared to well over $2.20 USD per gallon for enzyme (and other) cellulosic ethanol processes. This process generates almost no pollution and, unlike other cellulosic ethanol processes, can make ethanol from mixtures of different sources of cellulose—crops grown as biomass, leftover straw, or stubble from food or fiber crops, wood or sawdust, switch grass, prairie grasses, even old newspapers. This process of ethanol production, because of the very low energy input required, has

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an unprecedented high energy gain of 11. Corn ethanol, at best, has an energy gain of 1.3 and it may be closer to breakeven since growing corn is energy intensive. The additional step during the manufacturing process, which can produce ethanol that is “carbon negative” uses an existing “bubbler” device, consisting of transparent tubes exposed to sunlight and containing algae, can capture the large quantities of carbon dioxide that are produced during this (and other) biofuel manufacturing processes. The carbon dioxide is turned into solid carbon compounds within the tubes—within the algae—as the algae feed and multiply using photosynthesis to consume the carbon dioxide that is fed into the tubes. This algae technology is now being tested on a full-sized power plant to capture carbon dioxide emissions (Sheehy, 2005; MSNBC Staff and News Service, 2006; Paley and Oister, 2006; Bielli, 2007). The carbon dioxide captured and turned into solid forms of carbon within the algae can be sequestered for millennia through deep ocean disposal of the algae from the bubbler after they die. Provided this sequestering is done, then a life cycle analysis of the growing biomass and changing it into ethanol shows that more carbon dioxide will be pulled out of the atmosphere by biomass photosynthesis than is put back by burning the ethanol. The steps are as follows: Photosynthesis pulls carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere. Cultivating the biomass—to the extent that it requires the use of fuel and energy intensive material—puts some carbon dioxide back into the atmosphere. We thus grow biomass that requires little fuel or energy intensive material to cultivate. Fortunately, we can accomplish this in a practical sense while satisfying all other requirements. The carbon dioxide from the fuel required to run the ethanol production process, along with the carbon dioxide produced by the process itself, is captured by the algae in the bubbler and permanently disposed in deep ocean. Finally, some carbon dioxide is returned into the atmosphere when the ethanol is burned. Examining the inputs and outputs of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere, and permanent deep ocean disposal of much of it, more carbon dioxide is pulled from the atmosphere by biomass photosynthesis than is put back by burning the ethanol. The ethanol has been rendered “carbon negative.” A problem does exist in getting slow-falling algae to drop below the initial three thousand feet of ocean. Within this zone, up to half the algae are consumed and recycled, short-term, back into the atmosphere as carbon dioxide. To compensate, we propose to compress the dead algae (with a small amount of binder) and increase its aggregate density to a point greater than that of ocean water. (We can do this, if necessary, by simply adding stones to the compressed algae bundle.) Once the density of the bundle is greater than that of ocean water it will fall rapidly though the initial 3,000 feet of ocean with little consumption and recycling of the carbon in the dead algae back into the atmosphere. We understand that we must also do studies of the environmental impact of this sort of carbon sequestration in the ocean so that we can make the improvements without dire unexpected consequences. But to ignore even the possibility of using this innovative approach is short-sighted foolhardiness.

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The reduction of atmospheric carbon dioxide that accompanies manufacture and use of carbon negative biofuels has two sources. One is direct: The production and use of the carbon negative biofuels themselves. To the extent that carbon negative biofuels replace fossil fuels, we can also rid ourselves of the largest manmade carbon positive enterprise on earth, burning fossil fuels and their support technologies and industries (drilling, transporting, and refining oil; building pipelines and oil-drilling platforms and mining and refining that amount of metals that go into building them). Because of the quantities of biomass required in the cellulosic ethanol production process, optimal manufacturing must take place within twenty miles of the biomass source, which minimizes transportation costs and the amount of energy required to transport it. The inherently local nature of the production process thereby minimizes the energy-input requirements and resulting amounts of carbon dioxide returned to the atmosphere. Furthermore if suitable biomass crops can be locally grown, then both production and use of the ethanol can become local or nearly so, thereby further reducing the amount of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere. Forage sorghum may be a suitable crop for cellulosic ethanol production throughout much of the United States, but if the preferred process of ethanol production is used, the crops can vary locally because of the ability of the preferred process to utilize a variety of biomass or even mixtures thereof. The logistical significance of developing carbon negative biofuels cannot be overstated. An 80 percent reduction in manmade sources of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will be required to keep global warming within limits humankind can tolerate. To accomplish that degree of reduction with continued use of fossil fuels would require capturing carbon dioxide at most of the places where fossil fuels are burned, a logistical nightmare. After capture, a practical, low-cost, energy-efficient technique must be available to sequester the carbon dioxide for millennia, either on-site or byf transporting it elsewhere for long-term disposal and sequestration. That would be energy intensive and constitute another logistical nightmare. With carbon negative ethanol, the only place where carbon dioxide needs to be captured is at the manufacturing plants where the ethanol is produced. After that, this biofuel can be burned anywhere without capturing the carbon dioxide produced by burning it, yet a net overall carbon dioxide reduction in the atmosphere is effected. A process of large scale, low-energy desalination produces fresh water at a cost of about 0.01 cents, USD per gallon, low enough so that it can be used economically for irrigated agriculture. The current technology used for large-scale desalination, mostly in desert regions, is based on reverse osmosis through plastic ion exchange membranes. That process is energy-intensive and the water it produces is thirty times as expensive as the process we have been exploring. Airborne remote sensing of plant health can be accomplished due to a set of breakthroughs in the field of remote sensing from low-flying aircraft (flying at 3,000 feet), which could significantly reduce energy-intensive inputs to agricul-

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ture such as fertilizer, protective chemicals, and water, while at the same time enabling increased yields in some crops. Our advances in airborne sensors consistently detect, in their early and even pre-visible stages, problems such as nutrient deficiencies, crop diseases, insects and many other adverse conditions that degrade crop yield. The resolution of our detection equipment enables us to detect problem areas in the field as small as six feet in diameter. In response to weekly data gathering, field inputs can then be applied exactly where needed, only when needed, and often in far smaller quantities than the traditional wholefield application often done “blindly,” today, according to a pre-established schedule. We had commercialized this technology for a time but could continue operation long enough to develop a sustainable market because the company was thinly capitalized. These examples are typical of survival technologies developed by small companies that all suffer poor prospects for successful deployment related to lack of adequate capital to commercialize and deploy these innovations. 9. Why Small Companies Cannot Secure Funding: The Difficulties Non-Technically Trained Decision Makers Have Dealing with Technology In the United States, unlike most of the rest of the world, newly formed small high technology companies, historically played a major role in bringing economically major innovative technologies to the marketplace—technologies such as air conditioning, the automatic transmission, stereoscopic sound, instant photography, and the photocopier. According to the United States Department of Commerce, two-thirds of the pioneering inventions made in the United States during the first half of the twentieth century came from individuals and small, high tech companies (Harvey, 1977). Because non-technical, financial leadership lacks the knowledge to judge technological innovations developed by small companies , such companies command little inherent credibility among venture capitalists and other external decision makers—with the possible exception of companies one or more of whose principals is a researcher at a prestigious university. Consequently, the decision to fund a survival technology created by most small companies today usually hinges on non-technical decision makers attempting to evaluate a technology that they have no competence to evaluate. There is usually no way around this lack of credibility. Most technologies do not function as simply or with an easily demonstrated result (such as a light bulb being switched on and off). For example, the technologist who created the microorganism-mediated ethanol process demonstrated it, with appropriate measurements, to non-technical potential investors on many occasions. Invariably they were either unsure of what it was they were viewing or they suspected deception. The company’s business plan could not persuade them because it had

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meaning only if the technology was real and unflawed, precisely what they could not judge. Readers may ask why potential investors do not hire someone with the proper technical knowledge to evaluate the technology for them. Over several decades, we have seen a person with the correct knowledge and experience to make a reliable judgment chosen only once. For an investor group to choose a person with the correct knowledge, its members must already know something about the subject to make a wise selection of a candidate. But prospective investors usually fear collusion when offered a list of individuals alleged to be capable of making a proper evaluation. If investors cannot be persuaded based on knowledge presented to them because they cannot understand it, and absent trust, then no way exists to assure potential investors that the conclusions drawn are valid. Neither venture capital nor initial public offerings (IPOs) can fund small companies at the point that capital is required to move their technology toward initial commercialization. Using the microorganism-mediated ethanol technology as an example, current investment criteria would require the firm to first build a commercial-scale plant using its new process (demonstrating that its technology was sound) and then sell its product successfully for about a year (demonstrating a sound business model). What small company can afford to invest the many millions of dollars required to do all that, simply to reach the point where it might be considered for venture capital? As a practical matter, IPO’S are available only to technology companies with established technologies, which exclude new survival technologies. Brokerages will not provide an IPO for a new technology that they cannot judge because these institutions are legally required to act as fiduciaries. Other problems arise when decision makers try to deal with knowledge in which they are not well versed in the science they are evaluating: Technology solutions proposed by non-technical decision makers are often improperly framed for creating survival technologies. As an example, Richard Branson, the billionaire Englishman behind Virgin Airlines, offered a prize to anyone who could come up with a machine to capture and sequester large amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Those with the prerequisite knowledge realized that a more practical approach to this goal might instead be the exploitation of an appropriate natural process (such as the carbon-negative process we have described here). Knowledgeable critics found it impossible to communicate to Branson that although his goal was valid, he had framed the problem of atmospheric carbon dioxide capture and sequestration in a manner that rendered a practical technology to accomplish this goal unlikely. (One objection to machines on the scale required is that they would require input of significant amounts of energy thus producing unacceptable amounts of carbon dioxide when operated.) At one juncture, a lower echelon employee told us that, “It was Branson’s money and he could spend it any way he wanted.” The current state of affairs in American industry is unlikely to result in survival and first round survival technologies because it has too many criteria that

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must be satisfied. But continuing to develop, manufacture, and deploy nonoptimum commercial technologies and products uses up nonrenewable resources and contributes to pollution—one of the reasons we find ourselves in the present environmental crisis. As another example of these difficulties, contrast the early commercialization of reverse osmosis membranes for water desalination by DuPont (Oklejas, Moch, and Nielsen, 1995), an excellent job of product development for its time, with our recent development of an alternative, very low cost, energy-conserving method of water desalination. Someone at DuPont, probably in marketing, realized that if reverse osmosis films could be perfected, they could be used for large-scale desalination of seawater. DuPont would then have a new ongoing product to sell—membranes that periodically needed replacement that could not immediately be manufactured by competitors, because of DuPont’s proprietary technology and the patents that it was likely to acquire. This development required professionals with state-of-the-art knowledge of reverse osmosis films and backgrounds in inorganic, polymer, and physical chemistry, and other specified areas of expertise that were either hired or transferred internally to the project. Large companies usually operate with no one presented the goal of largescale desalination to engineers and scientists and asked them how they would achieve it. Management framed the desired solution, reverse osmosis films, before scientists and engineers got involved with the project. By contrast, one of the technologists in our company proposed a process to achieve large-scale desalination in a simpler, much lower cost, and much more energy conserving way than DuPont’s process. Unlike the way desired solutions are assigned with preconceived parameters to technical workers in large companies, our technologist asked himself the question “What is the best (sustainable, energy-conserving, low cost, and, having the least environmental impact) way to achieve large scale desalination?” By virtue of the creative process, this technologist’s practical experience, and way of thinking, he developed in areas completely different from desalination and reverse osmosis, he devised a simple method based on quite old science that was practically feasible with only a slight modification to existing technology. This alternate desalination technology meets our criteria for a survival technology because it requires input of very small amounts of energy per unit of water produced, at a cost low enough to use the water for irrigated farming. Unfortunately, our method may not be patentable and would not have established a marketing advantage based on proprietary expertise and patents for DuPont. It is also sufficiently simple that others can readily copy it. We will discuss patent issues later. We cannot fault DuPont, fueled by the profit motive, as are all large companies, for discarding our method—had it been aware of it—when it chose to pursue the reverse osmosis solution.

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The requirement for companies to earn a profit, in some cases, conflicts with the world’s present need for survival technologies. In such cases, we have no institutions capable of carrying out their deployment. The example we have offered is not an isolated cases. When small high tech companies are able to create survival technologies, they usually do so in a simple but innovative manner because they lack the resources to do it in any other way. Another factor, that postpones deployment of survival technologies, is decision makers, who often view strong statements in areas that they do not understand, as being exaggerated. Most of us are suspicious of extreme descriptions and strong conclusions because we usually believe them to be wrong or exaggerated; in most situations, the real world does not work that way. But what of the rare situations in which an accurate description of an important problem requires a forcefully stated description or conclusion? If true, for example, that we have fewer than ten years to do the things necessary to hold global warming within tolerable limits, then forceful statements are necessary to express the crisis and present its solutions. On the other hand, we can make such robust arguments with maximum impact only to those with the knowledge and background to understand the arguments. To others, including most of our technologically unknowledgeable leadership, forceful conclusions and strong recommendations in the areas of science or the environment may sound exaggerated. This, in turn, may limit understanding of the need for urgent, timely responses, such as deployment of first-round survival technologies. Inability to understand technical data concerning environmental problems, together with short-term economic self-interest, may explain the behavior of those industrial and financial leaders who deny or downplay the consequences of global warming or continue to espouse the use of fossil fuels without requiring carbon dioxide capture and its long-term sequestration. Non-technical management, and most United States leadership tends to allow and can effectively manage only those functions that it understands and with which it feels comfortable. One of us authors christened this phenomenon the “knowledge barrier” during the 1970s, when its apparent primary effect was economic. It was an important but a little recognized contributing factor to the loss of many American industries to foreign competition. Consider, for example, the American auto industry. At the end of World War II, it was the world’s only intact auto industry. Yet it threw away its primacy by focusing almost exclusively on marketing, finance, and sales— functions its postwar management understood and with which it felt comfortable. By contrast, executives whose initial backgrounds were in engineering and manufacturing headed foreign competitors like Toyota. The CEO of Toyota for many years, for example, was a world-class engine designer. In these foreign companies, practical innovation relevant to market share continued, such as mileage-enhancing hybrids. The knowledge barrier regarding technology is ubiquitous. One of us authors sent a published paper on the practical consequences of microorganism-

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mediated cellulosic ethanol, that also contained a description of how to render this and some other biofuels carbon negative, to Albert “Al” Gore, Jr.’s office in Tennessee. The paper described the process as a carbon-negative, low-cost, practical replacement for all imported oil, compatible with existing infrastructure, and with no significant negative tradeoffs. The paper included a simplified version of the paper written for nonprofessionals that avoided jargon used in the field of biofuels. The author called one of Gore’s assistants to flag the importance of the paper and request that it not be lost in the large volume of mail that they receive. After receiving a form letter acknowledging receipt of the material but subsequently failing to hear back for several months, the author called again. He learned that they had already processed all mail beyond the date that they had received his paper. The author learned that his paper had been “thrown away” because they “had no one capable of evaluating it.” (Gore, who also has no ability to judge these technologies, is now a venture capitalist making decisions about which environmental technologies to commercialize.) We do not mean, by recalling this anecdote, to diminish Al Gore’s commitment to sounding the alarm about the seriousness of global warming—for which he won the Noble Prize—but he, as most of our other political leaders, is unqualified to understand and choose correct solutions from those that are presented to him. It is but another illustration of our belief that not possessing technical knowledge also means that our political leaders cannot choose the right expert to explain the problems to them or recommend the proper actions. This is one of the reasons that American science policy is generally ineffective. Many of the proposed so-called solutions for global warming we hear being touted to Congress nowadays are simplistic, improperly framed, incomplete, impractical, and would be only be marginally effective if adopted—occasionally (as described above) some may be destructive to the environment. The grant and patent traps: Government grants were once useful for a small high-tech company seeking to develop proprietary knowledge or a new technology. Because of recent changes to the laws that govern them, federal grants now have two significant drawbacks for small companies. All details of the research must be disclosed to the granting agency, which takes no responsibility for protecting it except on a “best efforts” basis—legally almost meaningless. In addition, any federal agency, even one not involved in the grant, has the right to “co-use” the fruits of supported research without compensation. This has resulted in government departments handing over small companies’ research results to multinational corporations “to apply on the Government’s behalf.” For these reasons, government grants are no longer useful to small companies as vehicles for generating and retaining proprietary knowledge or technology. Patents are also effectively denied to small companies that have developed survival technologies. Even though the patent office does not judge the validity of the science or technology involved in the patent application, patents are nevertheless a significant source of credibility to prospective investors. Unfortunately,

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recent changes in patent law make the process of applying for a patent extremely risky for any small company whose technology might threaten the markets of a large corporation or multinational corporation—including markets for survival technologies. Under the current process, review of patent applications by an examiner takes between six and eighteen months after the patent application is made. During that time, the application is posted publicly on the Internet where the stated date of invention is displayed. Any large corporation has the resources to create a false history of invention (predating the displayed date of invention) and jump the claim by applying for a patent that predates the first. To avoid misappropriation, small companies whose technologies might be detrimental to the markets of a large company or a multinational corporation are obliged to hold them as trade secrets and forgo pursuing patents that would make their technology more credible to investors. Not being able to safely apply for a patent, in turn, prevents the small, high tech company from having its innovation published in a peer-reviewed journal, another source of credibility to investors. To publish in a peer-reviewed journal, the author needs to provide enough detail for experimental results to be replicated, thereby revealing the innovation. One final factor can suppress technologies of small companies that threaten a multinational if they appear able to succeed in the marketplace; the multinational can sometimes purchase the small company. We know of one small biotech firm that recently developed an artificial version of high-density cholesterol. In early tests, it showed promise of being able to sweep clogged arteries free of plaque after a small number of treatments, thereby reversing, or even curing cardiovascular disease. This posed a threat to manufacturers of cholesterollowering statin drugs, which are much more profitable than the new technique would have been, since patients must take statin drugs indefinitely. A manufacturer of one of the primary statin drugs purchased the smaller biotech company for twice its then-current value and never developed the new technique. For these and other reasons beyond the scope of this chapter, few institutions now exist that can develop and deploy survival and first-round survival technologies. We have explored some of the reasons why impediments to creation and deployment of survival technologies exist, but we must not lose sight of the forest through the trees. The absence of a mechanism to objectively evaluate claims about survival technologies should serve as a warning that our present system of research, development, and deployment is dysfunctional and unlikely to fulfill our needs for survival. 10. Significant Barriers to the Deployment and Proper Use of Survival Technologies Despite the importance of atmospheric greenhouse gas capture and sequestration, no profit motive is associated with technologies to accomplish it. Rendering biofuels carbon negative, for example, and then sequestering the carbon on a

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long-term basis, would add expense to biofuel production without providing additional profit. Therefore, we suspect that we will not see these innovations adopted unless the federal government finances or mandates them. Even if we were to deploy survival technologies, we have no guarantee that they will be used in the intended way to promote survival without regard to profit motive. In general, when any technology is commercially successful, it is at risk for dissemination without limits and without regard to the effect it may have on the environment. In some parts of South America, for example, the cheapest initial source of biomass for cellulosic ethanol production would be what remains of the Amazon rainforest. Similarly, forests and grasslands are currently and indiscriminately being cleared and turned into fields to grow biomass for conventional biofuel production, or to grow natural oils to blend with petroleum-based fuels to lessen air pollution when the fuels are burned. A recent study has shown that the net result of these activities is to increase the amount of greenhouse gases entering the atmosphere to a greater extent than if the acreage had never been cleared to grow biomass; use of gasoline was expanded instead (Juliet Eilperin “Biofuels a Bigger Climate Risk than other Fuels, Studies Say,” Washington Post, 8 February 2008). No institutions currently exist that can prevent indiscriminate clearing of acreage for growing biomass and expansion of biofuel production to the point where it is environmentally destructive. As another example, currently, a hole in the ozone layer exists around the South Pole, possibly due to the bootleg manufacture of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in Mainland China for use in South America. We propose that international negotiators must address such problems as soon as possible if we are to survive, yet no institutions currently exist to address the problem. Without a systems approach, piecemeal adoption of technologies and other solutions is unlikely to assure survival. Consider, for example, the recent development and likely dissemination of a battery /gasoline-powered hybrid, which require battery charging from a traditional electric power source. Half of all electric power generated in the United States, and more than half in China, comes from burning coal (“Industry Statistics,” 2008). Only about one-third of the energy produced by burning coal is left by the time the electricity reaches the home or office to charge an automobile battery (Andrew C. Revenkin, “A Shift in the Debate over Global Warming,” The New York Times, 6 April 2008). If the battery is 85 percent efficient—another 15 percent of the energy is lost at the socket in charging the battery—then 72 percent of the energy from burning coal is lost by the time that the car’s batteries are charged. Put another way, each unit of energy used to charge the car’s battery requires the generation of 3.6 units of energy by burning coal. If the car’s batteries are only 75 percent efficient—a more realistic number—then each unit of energy used to charge the car’s batteries require of 4.0 units of energy by burning coal. If plug-in/gasoline hybrids become common, we would have to dramatically increase our use of coal to generate enough electricity to charge their bat-

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teries and build more electric infrastructure to deliver the additional electricity. This increased use of coal would dramatically increase our (and China’s) output of carbon dioxide, which promotes global warming, increases airborne mercury, and increases sulfur dioxide that produces acid rain if high sulfur coal is burned. To determine which technology is better for the environment and for our survival we would have to compare the total efficiency of each system starting with the mining of coal or oil, its transportation, refining] and its direct use in a conventional auto in the case of gasoline versus the conversion of the energy of burning of coal into electricity and its use to charge the batteries of the plug-in hybrid. The building of fixed infrastructure such as oil pipelines or tankers or extra infrastructure to carry more electricity complicates the calculation. But these calculations are necessary before deploying any technology. Noting that the utilization of oil and coal cause pollution, and neither is a sustainable technology, we simply cannot afford to replace one with another that may be better but still not good enough with respect to environmental requirements and our survival. “Relatively better” is no longer good enough. The awful possibility exists that if we replace the use of much of our oil with coal (via the plug-in hybrid for example) that oil producers may sell the amount we save in this country for use elsewhere. Then, on a worldwide basis, we will not have reduced carbon dioxide emissions at all. Most people appear to be unaware of these complexities. Several reporters and spokespersons for a national auto show, as well as NPR (National Public Radio) have reported this development as a way for the United States to become less dependent on foreign oil—which it is—and/or as also good for the environment (Abuelsamid, 2007; Kahn, 2008). Adding to the possibility of unjustified enthusiasm, California air quality regulators have ordered six major car companies to have 60,000 of these hybrids operating in California by the year 2014 (Kahn, 2008; “Plug-in Hybrid Cars Ready to Roll in California,” 2008). All of these institutions ignored, or perhaps were unaware, of how much the widespread use of plug-in hybrids would cost in our attempt to keep global warming within tolerable limits. This is a typical but crucial example of the technologically-illiterate-blind leading the blind. It illustrates why humankind’s attempt to survive global warming must be a coordinated effort by those with appropriate knowledge who, additionally, represent no special economic or political interests. Instead of a knowledgeable systems approach, we currently we have technology (and other recommendations) determined piecemeal by those with a particular economic or political agenda who often possess neither the knowledge to advance humankind’s’ attempt to survive climate change nor the assignment to do so. 11. A Proposal for Creating, Recognizing, and Deploying Survival Technologies and Enabling Other Necessary Changes It is our opinion that impediments to creating and deploying survival technologies are so complex, extensive, and infused with self-interest that fully correcting

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them before human sustainability is irreparably damaged is unlikely. As an alternative, we believe that, a most practical approach, given the time constraints, is to try to work around these impediments to buy precious time to develop more long-term solutions and funding sources to deploy them. We therefore propose formation of a not-for-profit institute staffed by selected academic scientists, engineers, and technologists with the following mandates: (1) Verify and actively promote deployment and dissemination of existing first-round survival technologies, and new ones, created internally or in cooperation with other organizations. The mandate would extend to funding the initial commercialization of these technologies if no other sources of capital were available. The technology would be kept proprietary (“owned” by the innovator), with resulting technologies offered for use to all who can deploy them on the condition that they agree to observe control parameters approved by the institute regarding environmental requirements and constraints. (2) Study the four major physical problems set forth in this article to specify practical, integrated ways of dealing with them—develop a systematic plan for humankind’s survival. (3) Communicate with legislators and other political leaders regarding actions necessary to enable some survival technologies to be deployed and, once deployed, to ensure that all are utilized in the manner intended. This proposed function would constitute “Humanity’s Survival Lobby.” (4) Assist legislators and other leaders to hire technology aides to keep them abreast of new developments and to interface effectively with institute personnel. (5) Serve a teaching role to make science and technology professionals and other interested parties aware of the criteria required for survival. (6) Survival will require system changes. A single company, however, is usually unable to introduce all of the changes that are necessary. Thus, the institute would work with other involved groups to educate them concerning the changes requested of them, and, where applicable, show how the changes would enhance their profit margin. How might we secure funding for such an institute? After Niels Bohr first described nuclear fission in 1939, immigrant scientiest like Leo Szilard and Eugene Wigner attempted to persuade the American government that this might provide the answer for a weapon that could defeat Nazi Germany. The government ignored their supplications until Szilard convinced Albert Einstein to sign a letter to Franklin Delano Roosevelt outlining the theoretical possibility of building the first atom bomb. At that time, the government was not in the practice of funding research, but Roosevelt released six thousands dollars to investigate the

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possibilities. This research became the Manhattan project, and the rest, as the saying goes, is history (Goldberg, 1995). This precedent might furnish a template for obtaining seed capital. The apparent reason Einstein was successful where others had failed was his previously established credibility and renown. The institute would employ one or more credible academics from prestigious institutions to approach philanthropists to obtain initial funding for the institute. Another route might be for a philanthropist to underwrite a demonstration project to commercialize one first-round survival technology. The long-range goal would be to have the institute become self-sustaining, perhaps through agreements obligating companies whose technologies it helps disseminate to make later contributions to the institute’s financial support. 12. Summary and Conclusions Whatever time we have left to keep global warming within tolerable limits, our response must take into account that human existence and much of the biosphere is at stake. Global warming is highly interrelated with three other major problems, any one of which, by itself, poses a significant threat to humankind. Therefore, if we are to err, prudence dictates that it be on side of caution regarding actions with the potential to keep global warming and associated problems within tolerable limits. Part of the solution is to create and deploy what we have called first round survival technologies. But our current systems discourage this; the entire category of skills required to create such multidisciplinary, first round innovations is on the verge of extinction. As we have learned more about global warming in recent years, our understanding of the severity of the threat has increased. Some known effects have dramatically accelerated. Other effects, not expected for many decades, have already arrived, as have still others never anticipated. One reason for these unpleasant surprises is the highly coupled nature of elements within the environment (and between the environment and the other three physical problems.) When one significant element of the environment becomes perturbed, it invariably affects others. Because of this significant interrelatedness of these issues, the likelihood that adequate solutions will emerge in piecemeal fashion is slim. This is the most powerful argument than can be made to argue for an institute that can take a systematic approach to charting the integrated changes necessary for survival. The other argument is the need for an organization that can find a way around the impediments to creating or deploying survival, and in particular, first round technologies, in a manner that will promote survival. The time for urgency—and action—is now. If estimates of only a short time remaining to contain global warming are accurate, then a systematic program for survival would be starting with precious little time left to achieve its goals.

Fifteen ADAPTATION, SUSTAINABILITY AND JUSTICE Jorge M. Valadez 1. Introduction Social justice is crucial for the preservation of peace and security, for we can trace many historical and current conflicts to injustices. These injustices often generate tensions, resentments, or armed conflicts between nation-states or substate groups. On the other hand, societies that have achieved sustainability are likely to experience less inter-state conflict because they will have proportionately less pressure to coercively appropriate others’ natural resources. They will also experience less domestic strife caused by environmental deterioration and worsening quality of life. Accordingly, understanding how best to achieve social justice and sustainability is crucial to peace and security. One of the principal contentions in this chapter is that safeguarding the capacity for adaptation, understood as self-determination in the case of human societies and evolutionary capacity in the case of the natural world, can serve as an overarching normative principle for a synoptic justice theory that systematically incorporates social and environmental justice. Self-determination is understood as the capacity of present and future generations to adapt successfully to changing circumstances in social and natural environments. Evolutionary capacity is the potential of the natural world to adapt through the mechanisms of natural selection. I contend that self-determination not only sustains human flourishing over a temporal continuum, but also promotes sustainability and the flourishing of the natural world, since sustainability and flourishing are more readily achievable when people have the capabilities and resources to determine their future. In this coevolutionary approach, mutually reinforcing pragmatic and normative relationships exist between promoting human flourishing and preserving the evolutionary capacity of the natural world. The capacity for adaptation turns out to be of central importance for social justice and sustainability. Central to conventional theories of justice is the search for criteria or principles for assigning goods to individuals, groups, institutions, and so forth. These goods may involve material resources, opportunities, protections, services, social positions, and even affective attitudes. The most prominent theories of justice at present are those that derive from the tradition of distributive justice elaborated by John Rawls. In this tradition, justice is understood as fairness and principles of justice are identified that determine the distribution of basic goods among

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members of a society. Rawls believed that we should apply the theory he developed in his seminal work, A Theory of Justice (1971), only at the national level. Later philosophers have sought to apply his theory at the global level to identify our moral obligations to individuals beyond our national borders. Rawlsian theories of justice have a prominent place in domestic and global theories of justice. A pertinent fact about these theories of justice is that they usually neglect issues of environmental justice. Even when theories within the Rawlsian tradition attempt to incorporate environmental justice issues, these issues are regarded as supplementary considerations and are not seen as being of central importance for shaping the fundamental principles of the theory itself. However, an adequate theory of justice should articulate our moral responsibilities to all entities to which we owe moral consideration. The theory I sketch here, a more comprehensive and theoretically cohesive theory of justice, which falls outside the Rawlsian tradition, identifies a principle of justice that can adequately articulate our moral responsibilities not only to human beings but also to the natural world. 2. The Coevolutionary Perspective One of the most prominent approaches in contemporary environmental ethics is the coevolutionary perspective (Merchant, 1994; 1995; Bortz, 1998). The primary objective of this perspective is for human societies to achieve a shared flourishing existence with the natural world by integrating themselves into the fabric of natural systems. Coevolutionary theory expands the scope of our moral responsibilities in three dimensions. In the temporal dimension, it recognizes that future generations will depend on the same biosphere we inhabit to satisfy their material needs and to live flourishing lives. It is therefore incumbent on us to take the needs of these future generations into account in determining the way we deal with the natural world. In the spatial dimension, coevolutionary theory acknowledges that since ecological problems usually transcend national boundaries, our environmental practices can affect the welfare of communities spatially distant from us. In formulating morally responsible environmental policies, we should be mindful of their likely effects on other communities. In the interspecies dimension, coevolutionary theory advocates that we have a moral obligation to extend our consideration to nonhuman life forms. Investigating the fundamental reasons to grant moral status to entities in the natural world is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, I concentrate on explaining the particular approach taken by coevolutionary theorists to identify our responsibilities to nature. For basic accounts of why we should grant nature moral status, see Paul W. Taylor’s Respect for Nature (1986) and Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals (1975). Unlike most other theories of justice, which are anthropocentric, coevolutionary theory recognizes that other beings besides people are deserving of moral respect. It expresses this respect by safeguarding their evolutionary capacity.

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Instead of focusing on the preservation of isolated species or maintaining ecological systems in a continual steady state, the coevolutionary approach focuses on preserving nature’s fecundity and biodiversity when responding to the factors that induce ecological change. The Western philosophical tradition has generally disregarded the ethical concerns emphasized by the coevolutionary perspective, which involve moral responsibilities to future generations, other political communities, and the natural world. Theories of justice in the Western tradition, though often couched in universalistic language, have for the most part focused on our moral obligations to fellow members of our political communities. But globalization and the rise of the environmental movement, among other developments, have compelled philosophers to broaden the scope of their justice concerns. In recent decades, they have paid more attention, for example, to our obligations to individuals per se and to the world of nature. At present, no theory of justice exists that articulates in a theoretically cohesive manner our justice obligations in the different levels of justice we have thus far identified, namely, our justice obligations to individuals per se, to members of our own political community, to other political bodies, to future generations, and to the world of nature. A problem arises when articulating an adequate synoptic theory of justice: when philosophers set out to develop a theory of justice, they usually take one of these levels as primary or foundational and derive basic principles of justice that are appropriate for this level. They then encounter difficulties in extending these principles to other levels of justice in which the principles may not be applicable. In contrast, a synoptic theory of justice is able to incorporate systematically the ethical concerns in the five levels of justice. It demonstrates how our normative commitments and practices in each of the levels of justice can sometimes complement and reinforce one another. I believe that the notion of adaptation, construed in a suitably expansive manner, could play a central theoretical role in developing a synoptic theory of justice. In what follows, I briefly demonstrate how the notion of adaptation can illuminate the nature of our justice commitments in each of the above-mentioned levels of justice and how it can help us understand the interconnections between these levels. Given limitations of space, here I can only outline the nature of these commitments, but I hope this will suffice to show that this is a feasible and important project. After this preliminary exposition, we shall see the relevance of attaining social justice at multiple levels for achieving sustainable societies. 3. Individual Adaptation and Capabilities Theory The synoptic theory of justice outlined here emphasizes interconnections within and between social and natural systems. By emphasizing social and natural ecologies, its conception of the individual is fundamentally different from traditional theories in which individuals are understood, inter alia, as autonomous, selfsufficient, and not embedded in social and physical environments. Recognizing

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the holistic orientation of the theory of justice I outline is key because conceptions of human flourishing in this theory are shaped by the empirical factors related to the social and natural environments in which individuals are embedded. In this section, I demonstrate, by modifying capabilities justice theory, how the capacity for individual adaptation goes beyond capabilities theory in articulating what is crucial for human flourishing. Besides Rawlsian theories of justice, one of the most prominent contemporary theories of justice is the capabilities theory proposed by Amartya Sen (1999) and Martha Nussbaum (2006). Here I discuss Nussbaum’s version of the theory, because she has explicitly proposed her capabilities theory as a theory of social justice. Taking a cue from Aristotle, Nussbaum defines a capability as an ability to function in a way typical or specific to one’s species. She claims that for human beings to attain a dignified life, they must have the provisions required to realize basic capabilities: for physical survival, bodily health, bodily integrity, the exercise of the imagination, emotional response and exploration, practical reason, love and friendship, connection with nature and other species, play, and control over one’s environment, including political control. Nussbaum argues that everyone has a right to the resources necessary for attaining a threshold level of these basic capabilities. National governments should implement policies of redistribution to ensure that everyone attains the threshold level of basic capabilities. The international community should help poor nations unable to provide resources needed for their inhabitants to reach this threshold level. People are equally entitled to the provisions needed to attain the threshold level of basic capabilities because they have equal moral status. This universal moral status inheres in them because they are human beings, not because of their political membership or group affiliation. An advantage of the capabilities approach is that it recognizes that equal access to resources is not a reliable way to ensure equal welfare because the recipients of these resources may be unequally capable of employing them effectively. For instance, even if a school in a rural district of a developing country received computers connected to the Internet, this would not ensure that they had equal access to global information unless they had the capability to use the computers and the Internet effectively. Likewise, a person with a gastrointestinal illness that prevents efficient absorption of food, who receives the same amount of food as a healthy individual, may not enjoy equal nutritional status as the healthy counterpart. By focusing on capabilities instead of resources, Nussbaum provides an accurate account of what is required for people to have a basic level of welfare and achieve a dignified life. Resources are also necessary but not sufficient to attain a dignified life. Nussbaum must resolve several problems with her capabilities theory of justice. First, societies may believe some capabilities necessary for a dignified life are not on her list. For instance, in some societies, males must engage in some form of competitive, even aggressive, practices to have the community regard them as adult members in good standing. These societies regard partici-

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pating and succeeding in these endeavors as crucial for their sense of dignity and self-validation. Likewise, in some communities, for individuals to attain autonomy and self-reliance is crucial, but these capabilities are not on her list. Second, some communities may not believe attaining some capabilities on the list to be of importance, such as the capability of having a connection with nature and other species. In these communities, attaining some of the capabilities on the list is not crucial to live a dignified life. Nussbaum regards her list of basic capabilities as provisional and suggests a global dialogue to reach consensus regarding which capabilities we should consider as fundamental. For any society to alter or abandon its conception of dignity to reach a consensus on this matter is unlikely. Because conceptions of dignity are generally quite central to a culture, societies would not easily transform their conceptions of dignity merely by engaging in global dialogue. If we define dignity in an abstract way (as Nussbaum would evidently do) as involving the intrinsic worth and sanctity of human beings, we might achieve general agreement. But when we attempt a more concrete definition that would yield a specific set of basic capabilities to achieve dignity, we are likely to encounter fundamental cultural differences between societies. For Nussbaum to argue that different societies could simply accept different conceptions of basic capabilities would not help either, because one of the goals of capabilities theory is to identify a basic set of capabilities essential for human welfare. Cultural variation would likely hinder the identification of such a universal set of fundamental capabilities. Even if we could reach consensus regarding the set of basic capabilities, using the idea of dignity still may not be the most appropriate way to conceptualize what is required to promote human welfare, broadly conceived. As Nussbaum concedes, capabilities theory intends to identify a minimal threshold for justice and as presently developed does not articulate a full conception of our justice responsibilities. The notion of capabilities goes beyond the mere possession of resources in elucidating what we need to empower people to prosper and attain a dignified life. I believe that the concept of adaptation goes even further in clarifying the underlying reasons why capabilities are important for human welfare in the first place. Their attainment enables people to deal successfully with the numerous and diverse problems and changing circumstances they must constantly face individually and collectively. After all, why are the capabilities for bodily health, bodily integrity, practical reason, and emotional response and exploration important, for example, if not to be able to adapt successfully to one’s social and physical environment? Being able to employ practical reason effectively, for instance, or enjoying the benefits of bodily health involve many more aspects of human welfare besides achieving a dignified life. Living a life of dignity is no doubt significant, but the broader notion of adaptation captures more fully what aspects of welfare we should be concerned with in a theory of justice. In any case, we can readily integrate dignity as a component of adaptation.

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Adaptation is a contextual and dynamic concept recognizing that people live in social and natural environments in which they pursue their objectives and resolve ever-changing dilemmas that arise from their embeddedness in these environments. Adaptation is what human beings have been doing throughout history, what they are doing now, and what they will continue to do in the future. A theory of justice is well grounded if it focuses on the fundamental process through which people seek their welfare. Even though dignity is a significant aspect of a flourishing life, the concept of adaptation encompasses, if appropriately understood, more aspects of individual and collective empowerment not only of existing individuals but also of future beings with which we share the environment to which we must adapt. Adaptation is well suited for drawing key connections between the different levels of the social and natural environments in which people need to attain self-determination to flourish. The notion of adaptation requires three crucial qualifications. First, this concept is different from genetic adaptation in the natural world. Unlike some other species, human beings at this point in history are not undergoing significant genetic evolution, so we are not adapting in a genetic sense. We are constantly, however, changing or evolving culturally. Our cultural evolution occurs primarily through the creation, selection, and maintenance or elimination of sociocultural forms in social and physical environments. The notion of socio-cultural forms includes ideas, values, practices, symbols, and other means by which information is transmitted and maintained. Second, the conception of adaptation as cultural evolution I have in mind does not necessarily imply a movement towards some perfect ideal, but merely refers to change in which socio-cultural forms—as a result of selection pressures of various kinds—are created, selected, and maintained or discarded. Third, and most important, the concept of adaptation when understood in a purely naturalistic way is not a process with moral constraints. Interpreted in this way, someone who hoards a community’s resources or who has a materially extravagant lifestyle could claim to have adapted quite well. If the concept of adaptation is to have a central role in a theory of justice, we must cast it in a normative mode. We can do this in a straightforward way by incorporating into our concept of adaptation the essential element characteristic of a moral perspective, namely, the consideration of the needs and interests of others. No perspective can claim to be a moral perspective unless it incorporates in some way or other this essential normative component. We should now say that, at the individual level, our universal justice obligations include safeguarding the capacity of individuals to successfully adapt in social and natural environments. This adaptation should be subject to the empirical and moral constraints imposed by those environments, including the right of others to achieve a similar level of adaptation. The relevant conception of adaptation and the nature of the empirical and moral constraints imposed by social and natural environments will become clearer as we proceed through the different levels of adaptation.

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4. Self-Governance as Collective Adaptation In trying to adapt successfully by realizing their ends and resolving the dilemmas they face in their social and natural environments, human beings form stable unions of various kinds. These unions allow them to clarify their ends, formulate collective strategies, and coordinate their actions to achieve their objectives. Perhaps the most prominent and encompassing of these unions are political bodies, because in this arena people claim and exercise their rights, attain social recognition and respect, exercise self-governance, and achieve economic objectives. Political communities are the site of the institutional matrixes in which people manage their social, political, economic, and cultural affairs. Even though in the contemporary world supranational, regional, and “third space” organizations are playing an increasingly relevant role in governance, the territorially based political community, and the nation-state in particular, remain the primary encompassing form of political organization. But in a political community we do not just exercise self-governance; we engage in the crucial process of justifying to one another the use of its coercive power to ensure compliance with collectively binding laws and policies. In this section, I show how we can understand the satisfaction of some of the criteria of normatively justified and effective selfgovernance as a form of collective adaptation. One of the most widely discussed contemporary perspectives in political philosophy and political science is deliberative democracy. According to this perspective, we cannot always reach normatively legitimate, collectively binding decisions by aggregating the pre-existing preferences of the citizenry though such rudimentary mechanisms as voting. Generally, such procedures are not always normatively legitimate because existing preferences may be based on parochial interests, illogical reasoning, prejudiced attitudes, selective or distorted information, fear, and so forth. Advocates of deliberative democracy maintain that normatively legitimate collective decisions are those based on normative criteria, such as the commitment to the common good, respecting the force of the best available argument, and justifying decisions based on reasons deemed acceptable by all deliberators. Though supporters of deliberative democracy use other criteria in justifying collective decisions (Valadez, 2001, pp. 31–34), here I will examine these three criteria to demonstrate how we can understand the normatively legitimate justification of decisions in a self-governing political community as a form of collective adaptation. In deliberative democracy, subjecting collective decisions to a process of reasoned public deliberation yields not only morally justified political decisions, but also decisions that conform more closely to the goals and purposes of participating in a self-governing political community. Just political decisions that satisfy the normative criteria set forth by deliberative democracy promote collective adaptability, since collective adaptability involves the achievement of ends and the effective resolution of dilemmas of common concern within the context of a stable and viable political community.

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To see how this is so, consider the first criterion, the requirement to make a commitment to the common good and not sectarian interests. The purpose of participating in the process of self-governance is to achieve ends and solve problems of common concern that cannot be resolved through individual action. Requiring that morally justified collective decisions be subjected to a process of public deliberation that considers all interests and focuses on the common good promotes the solidarity, stability, and viability of the political community as a whole. After all, if the political community is to function effectively as an institutional matrix in which differences of interests are mediated properly and problems of common concern are resolved effectively, the political community’s members must express a commitment and sense of investment to that community. People must have a basis for believing that the good of all, including theirs, takes precedence over narrowly defined particular interests. The commitment to the common good advocated by deliberative democracy indicates that the political sphere is not an arena merely to further parochial interests, but one in which the needs and interests of all the members of that political body are considered in making collectively binding decisions. This commitment, in turn, helps maintain the political community as an adaptable and sustainable form of social organization in which its members can achieve their ends and resolve successfully the problems they encounter living together as a political community. Consider next the second criterion, the commitment to base political decisions on the best available argument or rationale. We should not base collective decisions that are just and reasonable on epistemically distorting factors such as power, coercion, partial or distorted information, or faulty reasoning. Instead, we should based these decisions on the rationale most generally persuasive and grounded on the best available information. In political negotiations, power commonly plays a significant role in determining which policies and decisions people will select from available alternatives. Power can take many forms in the political process, including advantages in wealth and resources, control or inordinate influence over the dissemination of information, misuse of existing political institutions, and the use or threat of violence. In these forms of power, a particular sector of the political community exercises its power to the detriment of the rest of the polity. By insisting that we should not make decisions based on the unequal advantages possessed by powerful sectors of the political community, deliberative democracy explicitly rules out forms of political negotiation in which power plays a dominant role. The major problem with letting power determine political decisions is that these decisions may not reflect the most reasoned judgments of the community. In these cases, decisions will not be based on the most rational, informed, and justifiable basis, compromising the capability of the political community to adapt successfully to problems of common concern. The third criterion, basing decisions on reasons deemed acceptable by all deliberators, also promotes collective adaptability. Deliberative democracy ad-

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vocates that deliberators provide reasons for preferred policies, justifiable from the perspective of the other members of the political community. This principle, called by some writers the principle of reciprocity (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, chap. 2), aims to produce a shared and common understanding among the members of the polity. Agreement will be based on a rationale shared by all. According to the reciprocity principle, deliberators should try to provide justifications that are reasonable and persuasive not only by their own standards, but by the standards of other deliberators as well. Through this process, deliberators will engage in a mutual process of adapting and modifying their positions in response to the positions of others until they reach equilibrium based on a common understanding. By cultivating the civic skills of communication, compromise, and understanding the perspectives of others, they will learn to govern themselves better and improve their capacity for collective adaptation. As individuals develop their basic capabilities, this makes possible the development of their capabilities to function effectively as members of a political community. These political capabilities are hardly possible without the prior development of basic species-specific capacities. In this section, I provided a rudimentary account of how effective and normatively legitimate self-governance, which we can understand as a form of collective adaptation. I employed some of the criteria for effective and legitimate governance proposed by the theory of deliberative democracy, though these are not the only plausible criteria that could be considered. My modest purpose was to show one prominent theory of standards of good democratic governance. We can understand these standards as forms of adaptation in a collective context. 5. Global Justice and International Adaptation In this section, I examine the justice obligations that arise between nation-states. The territorially based nation-state is the primary form of political organization in the world today and will likely continue to be for the near future. Claims about the “demise” of the nation-state are greatly exaggerated. Currently, no viable movements are underway to replace or supplant the nation-state as the primary mode of political organization. Moreover, various developments likely to entrench the territorial nation-state, such as terrorist threats and diminishing natural resources, compel nation-states to strengthen the security and ownership claims of their territories. Given their prominence as political bodies, for us to consider what justice obligations arise between nation-states is appropriate. The contemporary world consists of nation-states with territorial powers to use and control the land and natural resources within their jurisdiction, to regulate entrance into their territory, and to control air space above their territory. Because nation-states find themselves competing against one another in an increasingly globalized economy, natural resources at their disposal greatly affect their economic welfare. Though richness of natural resources does not necessarily translate into wealth, countries that have valuable resources such as oil depos-

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its, fertile land, or abundant water supplies are at a great advantage over countries not similarly endowed. Given the importance of territorial powers for national welfare, these considerations raise the crucial question of what justifies these territorial powers. Nation-states cannot claim to have a morally unconditional claim on their territories, for they generally acquired them through violent conquest, invasive settlement, broken treaties, and other morally illegitimate means. Even a nationstate founded without the displacement of pre-existing communities does not have an unconditional claim on its territories, since it did not obtain the consent of the world community to have exclusive control over those parts of nature. Given the morally illegitimate mode of acquisition of their territorial powers, what justice conditions should we place on nation-states? We could maintain that justice requires a global redistribution of land and natural resources to achieve a more equitable resource distribution among nationstates. This might involve a massive relocation of populations or a global redrawing of national boundaries. These alternatives are utopian in the extreme and cannot presently be executed. The citizens of nation-states have deep attachments to their national territories and their agreeing to such radical proposals is highly unlikely. Another possibility is to provide a conditional basis for recognizing the territorial powers of nation-states. We could maintain that even though nation-states do not have morally unqualified claims to their national territories, a conditional justification of their territorial powers could be provided. This conditional justification would recognize that we cannot start from scratch in distributing the earth’s natural resources and, more important, that a pragmatically feasible way must be found to develop and employ those resources. With most political philosophers, I am deeply skeptical of the wisdom of establishing a global government. Such a government, should it become despotic, would be too difficult to overthrow. Also, centralized control by global institutions would jeopardize cultural diversity. Accordingly, given the absence and undesirability of a global government, self-governing political communities with territorial powers appears to be a plausible alternative. We could view nation-states as self-governing administrative units to develop and employ the portion of the earth’s resources under their control. Territorial powers enable nation-states to exercise effective administrative control over their resources, for short- and long-term strategies for economic development require the control and stability of expectation that territorial powers provide. Economic development generally occurs within complex national institutional frameworks that specify laws governing the ownership and use of property, the terms of business contracts, the provision of credit, the regulations for establishing new firms, and many of the other features that constitute a society’s economic sector. The form that these economic regulations take is largely determined by the political community through the process of self-governance. More generally, to practice effective self-governance, a political community must have

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the capacity to determine the scope of its jurisdictional reach, who has the right to participate in decision-making procedures, and to whom its leaders are democratically accountable. Territorial powers, which include the power to regulate admission and membership in the political community, make these political capacities possible. But nation-states’ ability to function as administrative units to develop the earth’s natural resources and exercise self-governance does not provide a morally unconditional justification of their territorial powers because the often exploitative historical processes that created the existing configuration of nation-states lead to great resource inequalities. For example, the forced displacement of peoples from fertile lands, the appropriation of valuable material and human resources through colonial exploitation, and the exploitative use of the natural resources of economically weaker nations have resulted in great material inequalities between nation-states. Even when historical developments have not been intentionally exploitative, the unequal distribution of valuable resources in nature has resulted in some nation-states having less arable land and fewer valuable resources than others have. If the justification of the territorial powers of nation-states is to be legitimate, we must address these inequalities in natural resources between nationstates. We need to recognize that nation-states owe a profound moral debt to the world community by its recognition of their territorial powers, despite their moral illegitimacy. Because of this moral debt, a non-discretionary relation of moral reciprocity that gives rise to transnational justice obligations binds nationstates to one another. The notion of adaptation, by calling attention to the factors necessary for the flourishing of nation-states within an increasingly interdependent global environment, can help us articulate the nature of these justice obligations. Three provisions in the area of global justice are especially crucial to safeguard the capability of nation-states and other political communities to adapt successfully in a global context: nondomination, compensation, and ecological integrity. The nondomination provision requires nation-states to support fair conditions of participation in the global economy for all and to refrain from using their greater economic, political, or military power to dominate other nation-states. Countries should be able to participate in the global economy without, for instance, unjust terms of finance, trade, or intellectual property ownership. If recognizing the territorial powers of nation-states is justifiable because they make possible the development of the earth’s natural resources, then to require that all nation-states support fair conditions under which such development can take place is just. Likewise, if another rationale for territorial powers is that they enable nation-states to function as self-governing political communities, then to demand that nation-states refrain from using their political or military power to undermine the capacity for self-determination of other, particularly weaker, nation-states by coercing them into doing their bidding is fair.

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The compensation provision requires that nation-states have a collective responsibility to rectify resource inequalities that afflict resource-poor or colonially exploited nation-states that prevent them from functioning effectively in the global economy. The world community has a collective responsibility to provide material and technological aid to resource-poor countries that fared badly in the historically unjust and contingent processes through which land acquisition was implemented. Since these countries are participating in a generally beneficial global division of labor to develop the earth’s resources, despite that they fared poorly in resource acquisition, they deserve to be compensated for their impoverished resource base. The ecological integrity provision requires nation-states to refrain from following practices that ecologically degrade the global resource base on which we all depend for survival. Since nation-states do not have a morally unconditional claim over their territories, we are justified in maintaining that they have the obligation to protect the environmental integrity of those territories with which the world community has entrusted them. Because territorial powers in effect provide nation-states with proprietary but conditional control of a portion of a common global resource base, we can see these territorial powers as a form of ecological stewardship. Nation-states should also abstain from environmentally harmful practices that have a negative effect on territories outside of theirs. Since many environmental problems transcend national boundaries, all countries should do their part in safeguarding the ecological integrity of our common global resource base. The nondomination, compensation, and ecological integrity provisions jointly promote the capacity for nation-states to adapt successfully at an economic and political level within a global environment. We can thus see the moral obligations comprising global justice as measures to safeguard the capacity for adaptation of political collectivities. These moral obligations between nationstates are a sui generis kind of moral relationship distinctively different from obligations between individuals and are not reducible to them. This insight is one that contemporary cosmopolitan theorists of global justice have a difficult time recognizing, since their conceptions of global justice are based on moral relations between individuals. 6. Sustainability and the Adaptation of Future Generations The next level at which we need to consider justice obligations concerns our responsibilities to future generations. Existing theories of global justice and traditional ethical theories have little to say about these responsibilities. Environmental ethicists have taken the lead in raising this as a significant ethical issue. Since we live in the same biosphere which future generations will inhabit and since our environmental practices have a direct impact on this shared biosphere, justice considerations arise regarding our behavior in relation to it. I believe that the concept of adaptation is crucial for understanding the nature of

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our justice obligations. The focus should be on what they will need to adapt successfully to their social and natural environments. Because the conception of adaptation encompasses adaptation at social and naturalistic levels, we are able to expand and deepen our understanding of our moral obligations to future generations beyond those articulated by environmental ethicists. Environmental philosophers have often employed the concept of sustainability in discussing our moral obligations to future generations. Sustainability refers to “the capacity of a practice, relation, or process to be carried on indefinitely without undermining the environmental conditions of its viability” (Thiele, 1999, p. 75). Many of our economic practices, such as our rate of water use from aquifers, extent of marine fishing, and use of agricultural land exceed their rate of natural recovery. Environmental philosophers have claimed that the present generation is morally obligated to engage in sustainable practices so that opportunities for future generations to live well are not diminished. Even though we cannot fathom what all of the specific needs of future generations for living well will be, we can reasonably assume that they will need access to such things as clean water, arable land, unpolluted air, and uncontaminated soil. Even taking into account technological innovations that we may not be able to envision at present, their ability to adapt successfully to their environment and live flourishing lives without these basic resources is doubtful. If we recognize future generations as human beings worthy of the same moral dignity and consideration as presently existing people, we should avoid environmental practices that will seriously compromise their capacity for adaptation. For efforts to achieve sustainability to be effective, they must be institutionalized. Even though individual efforts to achieve a sustainable society are significant, they need to take place within a context of institutionalized, coordinated changes in the society’s environmental practices. Sometimes a society’s economic, social, and political structures undermine individual initiatives, so we must emphasize structural changes. Especially important is the transformation of economic systems of production and consumption to reflect a fundamental shift in ecological practices. Measures such as full-cost accounting, in which the full social and ecological costs of goods and services are reflected in their price, would be an effective way for society to institutionalize its commitment to sound environmental policies. Under full-cost accounting, the cost of such factors as the depletion of natural resources, public health maintenance, pollution, and waste disposal would be incorporated into the price of products and services so that consumers become aware of the true cost of using them. A straightforward way of implementing full-cost accounting would be through the use of “green taxes” which would be used to pay for programs designed to offset the negative effects of using these products and services and which would serve as disincentives for their use. Considering the possibly negative effects of some of our environmental practices calls attention to the fact that achieving sustainability involves a modification of the concept of adaptation itself. Thus far, we have understood adaptation

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as the capability of people to further their individual and collective welfare— subject to empirical and moral constraints imposed by their environments—within the social and physical contexts in which they are situated. Now we must expand adaptation to incorporate the needs and interests of future generations. Considering future generations emerges as an additional constraint for existing individuals and societies. One of the most important constraints imposed by the moral responsibility to promote sustainability is what some environmentalists call the precautionary principle. A fundamental principle of ecology is that nature exemplifies extensive webs of interconnection and interdependence among animal species, plants, bodies of water, soils, and other components of ecological systems. When we alter one component, our actions reverberate throughout the ecological system. Using pesticides on crops to control insects or weeds, for example, does not just affect the intended targets, but may also lead to the contamination of watersheds, diminishing of bird populations, and harming of the health of farm workers and consumers of those crops. The reality and pervasiveness of the interdependencies found in nature should alert us to the fact that our ecological practices can have consequences that reach far beyond our original estimations. Complicating the matter is that the webs of life in nature are so complex that determining what the long-term consequences of our actions will be is often not possible. This is particularly true when we employ chemicals that remain in the environment for a long time and have lasting consequences of the health not only of existing animals and plants but of also of present and future human communities. Given these considerations, precaution should be of primary concern. According to the precautionary principle, we should take precautionary measures with practices that threaten or harm the environment or human health even if cause-effect relationships have not been fully established scientifically (Thiele, 1999, p. 84). This precautionary principle serves as a correction to the tendency of many contemporary societies to underestimate the impact of their environmentally harmful practices and their failure to take responsibility for them. In implementing this principle, we should focus on carefully investigating the potentially negative effects of our environmental policies and practicing caution in practices that may threaten the well-being of future generations. Sustainability is crucial not only for the physical welfare of future generations, but also for their capacity for social adaptation. For instance, by enabling future generations to minimize social conflict, sustainability can enhance their capacity for social adaptation. As more of the world’s resources are depleted and degraded, competition for them increases, thus increasing the likelihood for conflict and violence as nation-states and political communities within nationstates compete for scarce valuable resources. Countries throughout the world must therefore develop national and international policies and institutions to protect existing resources so that rates of use do not exceed natures’ capacity for renewing them.

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Further, social justice promotes sustainability insofar as economically and politically empowered people will be better able to make environmentally sound decisions. People who suffer from poverty, particularly extreme poverty, are so concerned about their daily survival that they are not likely to alter their environmental practices—such as contributing to deforestation by using firewood for cooking and heating or depleting soil fertility by over-farming—for the sake of attaining environmental sustainability. Social justice and sustainability are thus mutually reinforcing and countries would be well advised to work on both of these fronts for the benefit of existing and future generations. 7. Adaptation and Justice Obligations towards the Natural World The final level at which justice obligations arise involve our relations toward the natural world. Given the extensive literature on environmental ethics, in this section, I confine myself to introducing the coevolutionary approach to the moral treatment of nature. I maintain that an essential component of our moral responsibilities towards nature involves preserving nature’s capacity for adaptation through the implementation of sustainable practices. Before presenting the coevolutionary perspective, I describe briefly an approach commonly taken in accounting for our moral responsibilities to nature. Theories of environmental justice usually begin by identifying some characteristic(s) based on to which nonhuman animals we should granted moral status. Environmental ethicists often argue that nonhuman animals are sentient and can feel pain, that they have interests that we can frustrate through our actions, or that it matters to them how we treat them. They argue that since we can reasonably assume that nonhuman animals have these characteristics, we should grant them moral consideration and not treat them merely as objects to satisfy our interests. These characteristics that nonhuman animals share with people are morally relevant, for among the major reasons why we do not treat human beings as objects is that they are conscious beings capable of feeling pain, have interests, and care about how they are treated. Thus, we should refrain from treating animals as objects when doing so is not necessary to protect fundamental human interests, such as survival. Granting nonhuman animals moral consideration involves, for example, not killing them merely to obtain their fur, not harming them when testing for the safety of cosmetics, and not subjecting them to pain for human entertainment. But problems immediately arise if we take this approach to granting moral consideration to the natural world. First, given that the world of nature actually consists of millions of species of animals with widely different sentient capacities, what are our moral obligations to particular species? Do we owe equal moral consideration to all species or just those species with sufficient consciousness to feel suffering and pain and that have interests? What of plants and other living organisms that do not exhibit these human-like characteristics?

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I believe that providing a systematic or even coherent answer to these questions is extremely difficult. Theorizing about our moral obligations to other people is a manageable, though difficult, enterprise because of the relative uniformity of morally relevant characteristics that human beings exhibit. The enormous variety in the degrees and ways in which nonhuman animals can exemplify these characteristics makes such theorizing about our obligations to them practically impossible. For the “sentientist” approach, our moral obligations are presumably stronger for those nonhuman animals that exhibit the kind of awareness similar to that human beings have. Aside from the easy cases like chimpanzees and dogs, how do we determine and rank, for instance, the degree and kind of sentience exhibited by a bat, an angelfish, a butterfly, a muskrat, a chameleon, a toad, a roach, a snail, a mockingbird, a shrimp, or a snake? We could take the position of biocentrists such as Arne Naess (1989, p. 167) and David Ehrenfeld (1978, p. 208), who maintain that all forms of life have an equal right to life and preservation. We would then not have to make distinctions between organisms more deserving of moral concern than others are, since they all have equal moral status. This position, however, contravenes our moral intuitions regarding our responsibilities towards nonhuman animals. Most people believe that killing a dog or a beaver, for example, requires far greater justification than killing an ant or a cockroach, and this reveals a great difference in our moral regard for these animals. Granting equal moral regard for all organisms also makes it difficult to justify the use and killing of animals to satisfy human basic needs, such as providing food when no alternatives are available. This clearly violates our moral intuitions regarding the prioritizing of moral status between people and animals. The coevolutionary approach takes an interesting position regarding moral consideration towards nonhuman animals and the natural world. It recognizes that we owe moral consideration to them, but does not try to articulate that consideration in terms of our moral obligations to particular animals, species, or other natural entities. Instead, the coevolutionary perspective takes a holistic approach and maintains that we have the obligation to safeguard nature’s capacity for adaptation. Instead of trying to preserve particular species, according to the coevolutionary approach, we should safeguard the requirements necessary for organisms to adapt, such as biodiversity, undeveloped habitats, and the integrity of ecosystems. Increases in human populations and the accompanying land development and greater consumption of resources are destroying countless species. Instead of adapting slowly to environmental changes, species are quickly disappearing due to human encroachment and pollution of their habitats. People are, in some cases, actually halting the process of evolution. Even though some species, such as insects, can evolve under these circumstances, more complex organisms such as large herbivores and carnivores cannot (Thiele, 1999, pp. 48–49). The coevolutionary perspective advocates that socioeconomic structures should integrate themselves into natural systems to permit a mutual flourishing

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of human beings and the natural world. This goal involves a conception of sustainability in which the capacity for adaptation is maintained for both humans and nature by developing a social order cognizant of the interdependence of social and ecological life systems. Just as human societies cannot flourish without healthy and enduring ecological systems, so the natural world cannot flourish without societies in which people cannot determine the course of their future. As we observed in our discussion of the first three levels of justice, selfdetermination at the individual, national, and international levels promotes human beings’ capability for adaptation. In turn, when conditions for justice at these levels are attained, adaptation for organisms in nature is more readily achieved, since people will have the resources and capacities necessary for formulating and implementing ecologically sustainable policies. In summary, the theory of justice I outlined considers safeguarding the capacity for adaptation as the fundamental principle of justice. This principle manages to show how the capability for adaptation can foster the flourishing of the human and natural world. I identified five normative levels at which justice obligations arise established that the principle of justice as adaptation articulated fundamental (though by no means all) features of these obligations. I also showed that sustainability plays an important role in adaptation, particularly with regard to the third, fourth, and fifth levels of justice. My exposition was of a very preliminary nature and many aspects of my account need to be further developed. My primary objective in this essay was to establish that the notion of adaptation has great potential for understanding crucial aspects of social justice and sustainability.

WRAP-UP OF PART FOUR Elizabeth Leigh Cralley, Brian Richard Wetzler The chapters in Part Four illustrate strategies for expanding our sense of global community and increasing global security that consider myriad factors. Despite apparently dramatic differences in these perspectives, they share significant commonalities. Richard Frizzell’s chapter on integrating military and civilian agencies in the war on terrorism emphasizes how dynamics within a group can affect the group’s ability to accomplish its goals. Within an existing ingroup (for example, the United States), group divisions can and do serve positive and negative functions. Dividing the military services into active duty, reserve, and National Guard reflects the different but related missions of these subgroups. Still, all three remain within the larger group that serves the nation: the armed forces of the United States. Recategorizing group boundaries and restructuring the groups, as suggested by Frizzell, could make the entire armed forces more effective in sharing key knowledge and technology, and in accomplishing their individual and common missions. In addition, Frizzell’s call for the establishment of a National Service Program in the United States asks us to consider the potential impact of another large diverse group unified in common service to a greater cause or, in this case, a nation state. A commitment to a national identity, augmented by other longdocumented positive benefits associated with group membership, would appear to be an extremely powerful incentive for genuine and effective cooperation. Cralley and Wetzler highlight how factors apparently within and outside of an individual’s control interact to shape intergroup relations. For example, intergroup conflict over resources may depend on real competition for scarce materials and on perceived differences in the distribution of those resources. Factors such as cultural norms and complex cognitive processes shape how individuals perceive others. Awareness of these factors can aid individuals and groups to combat intergroup hostility and to promote more positive intergroup relations. Perhaps one of the most important points is that we have sound scientific evidence to support the strategies for promoting more positive attitudes highlighted in this chapter. Vincent Lopes and Vincent Luizzi, Stephen Paley, George K. Oister, and Richard T. Hull all highlight the interface between humanity and the environment. Lopes and Luizzi propose a theoretical road map for how Western cultures can transition to participatory sustainability, in part by recognizing the interdependence between the planet and all of its inhabitants. They call for scientists and stakeholders to work together to achieve this critical transition to participatory sustainability. In a three-phase design that involves (1) an integrated socioecological system assessment, (2) a period of participatory reflection, and (3)

276 ELIZABETH LEIGH CRALLEY AND BRIAN RICHARD WETZLER continued participatory action, they propose a self-regulating model, which is fluid and dynamic, and may occur independently or simultaneously. Paley, Oister, and Hull propose the creation of an institute, which would involve academicians, engineers, and technologists, to aid in the evaluation and implementation of survival strategies. Such an institute would allow teams of subject matter experts who do not represent any competing element of the global corporate structure to evaluate and deploy the ideas and strategies developed within small technological firms. This institute would be the critical link between innovative researchers and the actual deployment, monitoring, and long-term supervision of survival technology. While recognizing that large scale cooperation in the arena of global survival is extremely challenging, they also recognize the potential power of superordinate goals. They urge us to consider that in this case, the stakes for all subgroups (participating and non-participating) could not be higher. Immediate development and implementation of effective survival strategies is crucial. Valadez states that an emphasis on adaptation and change can, and will, enhance global security. But in the context of global security, what does adaptation mean? According to Valadez, it focuses on self-determination and recognizes that taking away, impinging upon, or threatening an individual’s (or group’s) right to self-determination results in self-defense responses that run counter to the goal of global security. Indeed, by assisting individuals and groups in adapting to the environment, social justice is more likely to be achieved and actions that run counter to global security (such as terrorism and war) are significantly less likely to be initiated. As a primary emphasis, Valadez wants the reader to recognize that self-determination must be recognized as a form of individual and collective adaptation. Once this is recognized, sound (fair, just) environmental policies are more likely to be developed and implemented, a true sense of global community will be established, and all of this will result in a more secure globe. In sum, this part offers promising ideas for expanding our conceptualization of a global community and, therefore, increasing global security. Common themes that emerge include concepts of interdependence, superordinate goals, shared knowledge, effective communication, and the need for people to reconsider group boundaries and recognize commonalities. All the chapters emphasize interdependence in different ways, underscoring the importance of recognizing its existence across a wide range of circumstances. The authors illustrate how interdependence can be prominent within homogeneous groups, among and between diverse subgroups, and between human groups across the planet. Each chapter challenges readers to consider how the functioning of one unit is dependent on others. This simple act of recognition has the potential to produce magnificent positive returns, as awareness of interdependent relationships can open vast, often overlooked solution sets, and can most assuredly help promote a greater sense of global community and, in turn, increased global security.

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The utility of recognizing shared or common goals, especially superordinate goals, is also emphasized in all the chapters in this part. Such goals require cooperative contact and effort among groups to achieve goals that no single group alone could accomplish alone. The authors provide many examples of superordinate goals, including military operations, theoretical and applied examples of cooperative intergroup contact, the participatory sustainability theme, and the development and implementation of immediate survival strategies for the world’s entire population. The third common theme in this part is the call for more effective communication and dissemination of knowledge for the greater good. Frizzell provides examples of how the United States military does not currently share technological advances with other areas of law enforcement on the state and local levels. Cralley and Wetzler explain how and why groups may protect information as a resource, and why groups may be reluctant to it share with others. Lopes and Luizzi call for stakeholders and scientists to work together to share valuable information in order to promote participatory sustainability. Valadez contends that self-determination is a form of adaptation, and encouraged to flourish, will contribute to a sustainable—social and natural—environment. Paley, Oister, and Hull challenge industry and government to find a way to better communicate and disseminate critical information regarding nascent survival technologies. Each of these chapters considers communication and shared knowledge to be paramount in increasing our sense of global community and security. The fourth theme that emerges in this part is the need for individuals and groups to reconceptualize boundaries and traditional group memberships. Frizzell calls for a reorganization of subgroup structures to more effectively meet demands in the war on terrorism. Cralley and Wetzler discuss recategorization at the theoretical and applied level, offering suggestions for how to encourage it without alienating groups in the process. Lopes and Luizzi advocate that stakeholders and scientists reconsider boundaries and conflicts in conducting the proposed integrated socio-ecological system assessment. Sustainable environmental policies discussed by Valadez transcend individual or national boundaries. Paley, Oister, and Hull encourage reconceptualization by forming an institute designed to merge and effectively channel diverse contributions from academics, engineers, and technologists alike; these groups, in some ways, have traditionally observed a system of artificial professional boundaries. In conclusion, the importance of developing, maintaining, and improving global security is, we believe, self-evident. The equations that drive international policies, global economics, and worldwide environmental management are incredibly complex and resistant to dramatic change in the absence of compelling, and equally dramatic, stimuli. Despite this high level of static friction, the concepts discussed in these chapters remain relevant within the context of our complex society. The basic tenants for improving cooperation among diverse groups remain, in essence, quite consistent and universal. With these tenants squarely in

278 ELIZABETH LEIGH CRALLEY AND BRIAN RICHARD WETZLER mind, engaged citizens and their governments may be better prepared to effectively promote, create, and sustain a more cooperative and secure global community. Disclaimer The views expressed in this document do not represent any implicit or explicit endorsement by any office or division of the United States Coast Guard or by any office or division of the United States Government.

Sixteen AN EXPLORATORY ESSAY ON JUSTICE, SECURITY, AND GENUINE PEACE Joseph J. Califano 1. Introduction In this essay, my intention is to motivate the reader to entertain the issue of sustainability of the human heart or soul as it relates to issues of justice, security, and genuine peace. Whether the reader agrees with the positions I take, my hope is to stimulate discussion and thought about how a personal quest for “goodness” can and should translate to a genuine concern for others. 2. Justice, Security, and Peace versus Imbalance All men and women of good will seek justice, security, and a genuine peace for themselves, their loved ones, and others. Conversely, history teaches us that not every individual is of good will and many are confused about what constitutes genuine justice and peace or how to achieve it. Genuine peace is not simply the absence of war or a state of affairs where a real or imagined balance of power prevents open conflict. Those inclined to go to war are always trying to create an imbalance of power in their favor that would allow them to “win” a war. Some people understand and engage politics as a means of obtaining, increasing, or maintaining power. This separates them from any effort to understand the common good and creates a state of affairs in which people seek to increase their power by any—even evil—means. Seeking power becomes an end in itself. People who seek power in this way become blind to a genuine understanding of justice or the raison d’etre of authority. We cannot achieve genuine peace without achieving genuine justice. Otherwise, people can never achieve security of person, property, or rights. A telling example of this is the situation in Myanmar, formally known as Burma, after the devastating cyclone of 2008, wherein the military dictatorship led by Senior General Than Shwe refuses to have other nations offer disaster relief to maintain an iron clad control over the indigenous population regardless of their desperate need of outside help. Our unwillingness to learn from history has condemned us to go in and out of wars constantly despite our hope to wage the “war to end all wars. We should study history not only to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past but also to repeat the good and just actions of the past to increase the common good.

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This labyrinth of intersecting and conflicting notions of how people are supposed to behave and live together casts into doubt whether people can work together to move in the direction of achieving genuine peace and security. Unfortunately, many people today are pessimistic. They believe justice and peace are unattainable and that wars and insecurity will always be insurmountable problems. The basis of this essay is the assumption that a positive commitment to human rights and the civilization of human life is the only way out of the violence and misery so deeply ingrained in the world today. 3. De jure versus De facto Understanding of the Issues of Peace, Justice and Security Determining whether our conceptualizations and perception of reality conform to actual reality is challenging. We make judgments in our attempts to evaluate how we think, conceptualize, and discover principles operating in our world by means of which we reason about the objects we are trying to understand. A de jure judgment determines whether an action or an event is in accordance with a law. Some court might be asked to make a ruling whether a named person is the rightful heir to a throne. A de facto judgment characterizes an officer, government, past action, or a state of affairs that we must accept for all practical purposes, but is illegal or illegitimate. In this, it is the contrary of de jure, which means rightful, legitimate, just, or constitutional. So, a de facto officer, king, or government is one in actual possession of the office or power, but by usurpation, or without lawful title. An officer, king, or governor de jure is one who has just claim and rightful title to the office or power, but has never had plenary possession of it, or is not in actual possession. Our thinking can become enslaved to rigid deterministic deductive patterns of thought rooted in an over rationalization of the world and human behavior. Human beings are only sometimes rational animals, though. Many times the public de jure rationale for an action appears to be quite reasonable while the de facto reasons for an action, with its hidden agendas, is quite a different matter. The de facto reasons for an action, not the de jure reasons or framework by means of which we conceptualized the action, reveal what actually is intended and determine what actually will result from the action. The conflict between the de jure and the de facto realities of the contemporary world manifests itself in the prevailing economic ideologies of modernization that identify modernization with free market capitalization or collectivizing socialism. Both systems share the common de jure myths that engendered a whole system of values and policies that would rob men of their creative moral vocation. De facto they assume deterministically that men and women exist for the sake of economic activity instead of holding the view that economic activity exists for the sake of men and women. Their view of progress is such that they either advocate that the invisible hand of competition or the invisible hand of

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dialectical economic forces will lead us to the civilized life—the good life irrespective of whether those in authority are virtuous or vicious individuals. Free market capitalism advocates that private (personal) vices such as greed are public virtues concretizing the public good. With collectivizing socialism, however, the evils of public vices vanish because people have no private (personal) choice. Historically, both economic methods have been unqualified failures in producing sustained progress toward the common good. Both are intellectually bankrupt and morally devoid of vision—where no vision exists, people will perish and justice ceases to be an attainable goal. The predictions and promises of both ideologies have failed to materialize; their explanatory value on reflection is limited and dysfunctional. Their advocates are simple people suffering from blindness because of self-inflicted wounds. The myth of nation building suffers from the belief that “democratic” institutions can be developed in nations where the indigenous people have no historic or cultural inclination toward democracy. A just, worthwhile policy requires a long-term commitment—economic, and often military—from the nation striving to impose democracy (for example, Japan after World War II). Meanwhile, the contemporary mindset of many self-centered Americans with a “quick-fix” mentality is that they want instant problem resolution. Quick-fix mentality applied to foreign policy results in reacting to one crisis after another, giving control to those who would create another unintended crisis because of their unwillingness to take the time to insure a good result. Effective foreign policy must have a set of intelligible long-, mid-, and short-term goals. Only in this way can we become proactive instead of reactive in striving for peace, justice, and security. Most importantly, the people of a democracy must have the patience to see the policy come to fruition. We must be open to the possibility that ways exist to peace, justice, and security that are better than the ones we have tried in the past. 4. An Historic Lesson from the Cold War and Its Ideologies as Played Out in So-Called Developing Nations When we confront ideologues with historical facts that do not support their ideology, they often respond either that we are paying too much attention to facts or that we are paying attention to the wrong facts. They dismiss the disparity between fact and theory because the pure system, devoid of any interference from reality, has never been permitted to operate. They reject any reality that does not fit into their theory and try to make any reality fit their theory. Marxists and free market advocates alike hold that by allowing events to take their natural or necessary course, progress will automatically occur. If we only let modernization, defined as industrialization measured by gross national product (GNP), take place, then the future improvement of our lives would be guaranteed. All the evil of repressive governments and social injustices would

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disappear if only man would not interfere with the predetermined natural forces at work in human history. This view is a pure example of tunnel vision. Debate about Marxist praxis or free market analysis is interminable and fruitless. Not only are these model wrought with a falsification of how things actually work but also they are impediments to finding genuine means for the realization of our aspirations for progress. I believe that poor people in Russia are going to be sorely disappointed if they hope that by changing the ideology of their system to a so-called free market economy that this will bring about genuine development. Commitment to these ideologies is why earlier optimism based on the belief in necessary progress de jure and de facto has now led many into a debilitating pessimism. Locked into such models, they cannot recognize de facto causes of what is and how to bring about what ought to be. Consequently, they make plans to change or improve situations, which are not likely to succeed because they suffer from defects rooted in the inadequacy of the concepts that produced them. In this way, we are more likely to become self-fulfilling prophets of doom than authentic generators of progress. These de facto realities create the impression that the road to upward mobility is to obtain a government position through which we can reap a portion of the spoils of the conflict between the de jure and de facto realities. The public administrator discovers a vertical system in which decisions flow from the top down; those who know the least about the concrete situation have the most influence. Public administrators quickly learn that to preserve their jobs and portion of the spoils, their function is not to solve problems but to protect themselves and the interests of those above them in the vertical pipeline. The public administrator prevents any problem that would endanger the security of those in control from rising through the system to the top. The public administrator’s job is to keep a lid on things. They also quickly learn quickly that the best means to this end is to hide knowledge of the de facto situation in the system from those outside the system, except for a designated few. In this manner, government operates on a need to know basis: those most in need of help from the system are judged by those operating the system as the people who least need to know how the system works. Public administrations become, in this circumstance, the perfect union of technical proficiency and social dysfunction in terms of a de facto development of people and their common good. Citizens do not judge such a governmental system to be de facto an evil because people accept the status quo as is, without evaluating what ought to be. Many people believe that the de facto state of affairs is the natural state of affairs, and that some people are destined by nature to be knowledgeable, wealthy, and wise, while others are destined to be ignorant, poor, beasts of burden, and the de facto property of the first. Evil conditions in which they suffer are believed to be a natural part of their lot; abandoning the luckless is acceptable. The “haves” in administrations fail to identify with the poor and the suffering. The poor, knowing this, become millions of nameless people who can find

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no reason to identify with a government or public administration that seeks their support or their life to defend the system. Citizens never identify with those who rule—even if they elected the rulers. The conflict between the de jure and de facto realities of the developing nations should cause us to abandon our traditional intellectual allegiance to models of human realities that turn us away from de facto living situations and inhibit finding creative solutions to human problems. We should rethink our empirical experience to define genuine progress in human affairs and genuine means of accomplishing good. At first, this may appear to be an impossible task because requires us to disengage from long standing habits of thinking about common realities deeply ingrained in our consciousness. These habits are so strong that we convince ourselves that we have a genuine understanding of economics, politics, and social institutions, even when we do not. Genuine comprehension of how to achieve justice requires that we extricate actual reality from its ambiguous meaning acquired through our rational models of it. Social institutions loaded with the prejudices of historical, culture, and social attitudes become loaded with emotional judgments that a priori determine how we view economics, politics, and what is possible. A truthful definition of these realities may be something no one may be willing to accept because of the revolution this would require in our thought and our actions. If the development of people is what we seek, then we should rethink what a public administrator ought to be. The public administrator should be committed to disseminating knowledge of how the system works to those who are most in need of the knowledge, irrespective of what system we de jure have in mind. For this to occur, we must make public administrators secure from fear of reprisal for redefining their role in the system. The greatest impediment to a de facto improvement of public administration in the world today is corruption as the modus operandi of many government systems. Corruption puts the de facto survival of the public administrator, who wants to achieve the de jure goal of the system, at odds with the de facto realities of the system. Only with the elimination of corruption, can the public administrator come to be problem solvers instead of system protectors. Only in eliminating corruption can we establish a viable system of accountability, in which we could use objective criteria to evaluate the work of public administrators. What is good for the public is also good for public administrators, since this would free them from arbitrariness on the part of their superiors. This is only the first step toward effective public administration for professional bureaucracies. To release creative capabilities of people for their development, we must overcome the fallacy that the evil conditions in which some people live are unavoidable—we must understand that all can and should be able to live in positive conditions conducive to their development. For governments in the contemporary world to survive, citizens must want to follow what those governments do because they truly believe in what those governments are doing not out of fear of reprisals. Connecting to a government in such a way requires that people have a

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concrete de facto experience of a government’s commitment to the improvement of their lives. They must see that the government is creating the conditions under which they are able to develop their talents and civilize their lives. Until governments commit to the people’s lives in the manner just outlined, this author fears that bloody revolutions, which will not change anything, will endlessly occur as people strive to “find” the right government. We should give indigenous people, who know the land and the de facto situation better than foreign experts do, effective direct input into defining their needs and how to organize their neighbors to meet those needs. When given a chance for such input, these people are best equipped to discover and carry out local solutions to developmental issues. Their solutions may not fit any of the models familiar to us. Through their creativity, they may discover successful means where familiar models have failed. If we genuinely want to further human development and civilize human life, we must unite the national policies within the developing world and foreign aid policies of countries like the United States to social justice in a positive sense. We cannot let this quest to unite national policies with social justice be deflected by the claim that the national or foreign policy interests are threatened by such a commitment. Apparently, the lack of such a commitment has been the cause of the failure of our foreign policy in respect to the developing countries. We cannot rely on the recent work of private voluntary organizations, or on simply “writing off” or “forgiving” foreign debt, to solve these problems. Creative new patterns of economic, social, and political institutions must occur in the developing world. Forgiving debt without making other changes would simply result in a similar debt situation a few years later. Only by dealing creatively with the causes of debt will we make lasting progress. Governments throughout the world should be willing to designate a small percentage of foreign aid to go necessarily to the immunization of children. We need to assure that we meet their basic physiological needs so that countless potentially productive lives will be saved. A positive commitment to human rights and the civilization of human life may be the only way out of the violence and misery so deeply ingrained in the world today. 5. Reflections on Poverty and Our Responsibility to and for the Poor Poverty, and whether we have any responsibility to the poor, is one of the most pressing justice issues in our contemporary world. We live in an age of downward mobility in the United States. No longer can the younger generation expect to live at an equal or better standard of living than their parents. Not all who seek work can find jobs that pay a living wage. We are witnessing a class of “working poor.” Many work at more than one job and are still not able to make ends meet. Some families are living in their cars. People are not able to provide themselves and their children with what they need to become productive members of their

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communities, living decent lives, contributing to the common good. The absence of a living wage and access to quality health care, education, and decent living conditions condemns many people who are working to be in a deteriorating situation from which they have no hope of extricating themselves. Many employers exacerbate the situation by replacing full time employees with several part time employees to avoid having to provide healthcare or retirement benefits. According to the 2005 United States census, family income has slightly improved over the previous reporting period. These statistics do not account for the number of jobs and hours that people must work to achieve the gain. If parents work more hours to secure increased income, they have less time to devote to child rearing and, for many, an increase in the cost of day care. Therefore, the nominal increase in part time employment and in minimum wage jobs may not be moving people any closer to earning a living wage when all aspects of the actual situation are considered. Consequently, childcare and the development of a proper relationship between parents and children has become a significant crisis in our country. An unjust profit is a profit is one obtained by denying a just wage to those whose labor was used to produce the profit. A contradiction in our society today is that many people in politics and in the corporate world appear to be advocating family values but are unwilling to support paying a just wage. Consequently, people have become aware that many of our large corporations have no longer any sense of responsibility to their employees or to the nations in which they operate. They realize corporations are only driven by greed expressed in an inordinate desire for profit for those heading the corporations. Almost daily, we read in the newspapers that corporations are closing their operations in developed countries like the United States in favor of the exploitation of third-world labor. Thus, justice in our contemporary world has lost its integrity. In the meantime, some claim that the wealthy have no responsibility to help people in desperate need, despite the number of people slipping into poverty increasing daily. There are those who would deny that an employer has any responsibility to pay a living wage; they rationalize that the desperate people freely agree to work at the wage offered and had the choice to decline. This is an abstract, distracted view of the dynamics of the situation. In truth, the freedom to consent under such circumstances is seriously impaired. Greed as a legitimate expression of self-interest is not based on any genuine moral principle and it requires the denial of the humanity of the desperate person, reducing the desperate person to a thing— a mere means to an end, no different from an inanimate machine. Greed and unbridled self-interest could never become intelligible moral principles because actions rooted in such notions can and will only result in evils in the concrete order, destroying justice. Such notions are operating to an alarming degree in our world today. The confusion of liberty with greed and freedom with the greatest greed compatible with the greed of others is a view that destroys the very intelligibility of how liberty, freedom, and justice are interrelated and should be interactive in the real world, if we are to bring about actual or de

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facto justice in our society. In such a context, people fail to properly distinguish between freedom, liberty and licentiousness. In the poorest of countries, such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, large foreign corporations employ children to sew soccer balls, clothing, or sneakers for a pittance, all in the name of minimizing cost and maximizing profits. A similar misuse of people as migrant farm labors or those who work in the flourishing sweat shops in the dress manufacturing industry occurs in California and along the Mexico border, where women are likely to be swindled out of most of their wages if they are paid at all. Evidence of such practices can be found in all the large cities of America, and in some cases, like in El Monte California, allegations of enslavement have been lodged. America has gained the distinction of having the greatest gap between the share of the new wealth accruing to the few wealthiest members of our society and those who are laboring to produce the wealth, than any other industrialized nation. Enough wealth is being produced so that a living wage could be paid to employees and investment in research and development could be accomplished by redistributing profits away from corporate executives. This would reduce the dependency of the poor on the powerful and wealthy and reduce the number of people slipping into desperation, a goal unacceptable to those who lust for unlimited power and unlimited material wealth gained by any means. Any attempt to frame the definition of justice in terms of a false individualism or false egalitarianism is bound to distort our notion of justice. Individualism tries to interpret classical liberalism in a way that denies the reality that we are, by nature, social beings. They claim that we have no real natural relationships to one another as human beings. They claim is that all human relationships are artificial and that relationships are only possible on a voluntarily basis. This view is ultimately rooted in the nihilistic, voluntaristic assumption that we, through free will, determine what we are. Therefore, we cannot achieve objective discovery of what we are. Consequently, the notion of justice and our relationship to other human beings is devoid of any positive meaning. Justice becomes a negative, empty notion, without any meaning at all. Justice is reduced to some kind of maximization of the greed of all human beings. In such a world, freedom is falsely identified with greed and human beings are viewed as something akin to denatured individuals having no real relationship to one another, where the greatest compossible greed is associated with justice and the common good. Collective socialism denies other obvious realities of the human person and seeks liberation by exchanging one set of evils for another. Individualism and collectivism rationalize a form of enslavement of men and women. Both are rooted in materialism and the myths of atheism with their view of what it is to be a human being and they remain blind to what makes human beings what they are. Individualism tries to ground itself in the myth that we will find justice in the absolute autonomy of the individual will, while collec-

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tivism tries to ground itself in the myth that justice is to be found in absolute obliteration of the human will. 6. Some Concluding Remarks on Foundational Principles Much of the confusion and interminable paralyzing debate on the nature of wealth, power, poverty, and peace is rooted in a willed blindness to the existential natural order to the universe. No materialistic view of human beings can give us a genuine notion of the person, justice, or a genuine notion of what it is to be a moral human being. For matter cannot be just or unjust and to speak in a way that would make such a claim is to render matter an equivocal unintelligible term—a kind of thinking that, even though fashionable today, is absurd. No mechanistic, materialistic view of the world can enable us to comprehend adequately what it is to be a human being and what it is to understand human nature and real relationships to other human beings. Material realism is not realism at all and an equivocation of the term realism. At best, skeptics reside in a no man’s land where we can find nothing of value regarding life’s real issues. This no man’s land contains purely speculative views of distracted arrogant minds disconnected from the real world. They are views of the world invented by people who prefer to live in a world of their own making, a world that is nothing more than a product of their imagination. They are views of people who find comfort in living in an ivory tower made according to their own pleasures. What we are witnessing today is the blind leading the blind. Many have deceived themselves in matters of justice by rationalizing their passions and greed, seeking to deceive others about the nature of justice, and justifying their lifestyle. People confuse liberty with licentiousness and rationalize evil as good. The rationalization of passions we find in these flawed views of reality also tend to have a distorted view of religion akin to that of David Hume, who reduced religious experience to mere passions. He missed the point that genuine religion is rooted in intelligence, truth, goodness, beauty, grace, transformation, transcendence, the discovery and experience of God’s love, and the surrender to God’s love. Whatever subjective phenomena Hume was describing, it had nothing to do with real genuine religion. A genuine knowledge of history is a prerequisite for developing the virtues of the docility and practical memory required to understand and actualize justice. For a genuine knowledge of history furnishes us with concrete examples of what actually happens to human beings when they lose sight of whom and what they are and their real natural relationships to other human beings, especially when they lose understanding of their relationship to the living personal God who Is. History demonstrates that when men and women lose sight of these most fundamental truths, they become morally blind. Losing sight of the first principle

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of moral life—to care for others—creates an unwillingness to learn the hard lessons of the past from those wise people of the past. Such blindness pushes many off a cliff into the oblivion of nihilistic amoralism. The worse lies are the lies we tell ourselves to justify evil we do or to rationalize the denial of our responsibility to others. Such lies are the way in which we attempt to give evil acts the appearance of being good acts. Sadly, we learn from history that people can, if they so desire, rationalize any evil action or lack of responsible behavior. Human beings always have a reason for what they do or fail to do. In this sense, an evil act can appear to be reasonable. However, whether an action is authentically in accordance with the truth, or what is genuinely good, is another question. All evil actions or omissions of just actions, which one can and should perform, always involve a rationalization of such behavior through an act of selfdeception devoid of what is genuinely true and good. Jean-Paul Sartre, Friedrich Nietzsche, and many others have demonstrated that without the discovery of a personal God, a notion of justice, the common good or even ethics is untenable except in a subjective sense.

EPILOGUE Elizabeth D. Boepple Globalism and security are hot button topics since the attacks on the United States by terrorists on 11 September 2001. Did the compiling editors of this volume choose the title, Global Community: Global Security, because each of the contributors had something compelling to tell readers on this particular topic, or did they choose the title only to grab readers’ attention? Was their intention to tell you something of crucial relevance to all of humanity or did some have something perhaps only tangentially relevant to say, and see this collection as an opportunity to get their message published? Ask how those motives influenced what the authors did not say as well as what they did say. Regardless their motives, we ask you to consider how what the authors have said is relevant to you as an individual and how they impact your goals. As an editor of academic scholarship, I regularly ask authors to add references to support their positions. Now you should ask questions about the citations and quotations you find in the work. Did the authors correctly convey the facts in the original sources? Did they selectively choose only brief passages, perhaps take them out of context, to appear as if the references support their positions but ignore many credible sources that oppose their positions? What are the credentials of the reference works’ authors? Should we consider the opinion of a newspaper journalist to be as worthwhile as the opinion of a scientist, politician, or philosopher? Not submitted to accepted academic institutions for peer review at best and easily attributed wrongly to experts at worst, Internet postings pose a special challenge to the discerning reader. We attempted to use only active URLs, which you can read for yourself. Question whether you agree with the conclusions drawn by the authors who chose to cite those sources. Do many people agreeing with a position make it any more credible than if only one person holds it? The full force of the Roman Catholic Church and many scientists opposed the conclusion of Galileo Galilei, yet that one man was right in the face of the many “authorities” who stood together but wrong. Have we presented some ideas quite unpopular now that might become crucial in a future context? If you find yourself feeling a visceral opposition to some position, we ask you to thoughtfully consider what factors fuel that emotion. Is your reason clouded by narrative born in a different time? If you read any of these contributions and found yourself experiencing a conversion moment, an “aha!” experience that caused you to immediately change your mind or to draw some firm opinion about what we should do to sustain our species, then perhaps you read too quickly or accepted what you read without holding the ideas to the harsh light of scrutiny that we recommend. We intend these contributions to raise questions more than answer any.

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The deceptively simple-sounding title stands at the front of astoundingly complex issues that require serious contemplation. The answers will require a great deal of cooperation among many entities at all levels, development of new technologies, raising enormous sums of money, changing attitudes, and garnering public will. Answers will hinge on personal beliefs and cultural context, and juggling these with other priorities, some more immediate, and many more crucial. Surely, a sudden decision made after reading this, or any, one work is a decision based on emotion instead of rational thought. What you come to believe we ought to do must be balanced against what we know is possible, fiscally feasible, and consistent with larger exigencies. Even if many individuals believe that we should strive for some solution, how many of those individuals will be willing to give their personal resources—private land, efforts, financing—to the cause? Have the authors suggested technically feasible but politically hopeless solutions? At what point does imposing what we believe to be wise on others become justifiable? If the premises are wrong—perhaps global warming is not caused by human activities, or the United States is not covertly attempting to annihilate the pursuit of happiness for people of color—might the recommendations based on those premises still make sense, result in increased security? When you begin to ask these questions, then you arrive at the reason this collection rightly belongs in the Value Inquiry Book Series (VIBS). Answers will depend on values. Americans might find themselves contemplating a paradox: the foundation of the United States rests on individual freedoms and pursuit of happiness. Yet if you freely decide to believe that we should impose solutions suggested in this collection on others, then you must face the prospect of imposing solutions you believe are necessary for the collective good at the expense of personal freedom and pursuit of happiness. Ask what the authors have assumed to be true, right, wise, or moral. Even if finding the technology to reverse climate change or sustain the human race is feasible, should we do so? Is this line of thinking self-centered or narrow minded? Does it ignore the larger, natural course of the universe? Humanity first evolved because of global warming. Before we expend great resources to control climate change, should we ask whether doing so is consistent with the natural course of our planet? Considering the juxtaposition of the technology or politics with these sorts of questions is what places this volume squarely in the field of philosophy. Finally, once you have decided what questions capture your passion and you have critically considered what our authors have said, then ask what you can do to extend the discourse and strive for practical solutions. Most importantly, ask what questions we have not answered and what others need to be asked. If you do, then we will have reason to celebrate, since we will have achieved our goal in preparing this volume.

WORKS CITED Introduction Richard T. Hull, Randall E. Osborne, and Paul Kriese Lovelock, James. (1979) Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Margulis, Lynn. (1998) Symbiotic Planet: A New Look at Evolution. New York: Basic Books. Niebuhr, Reinhold. (1944) The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of its Traditional Defence. New York: C. Scribner’s Sons.

Chapter One Laura Meder Brown, Lester R. (2003) Plan B: Rescuing a Planet Under Stress and a Civilization in Trouble. New York: W. W. Norton. Conisbee, Molly, and Andrew Simms. (2003) Environmental Refugees: The Case for Recognition. London: Nef Pocketbooks. Diamond, Jared. (2005) Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. New York: Viking. Ehrlich, Anne H., Peter Gleick, and Ken Conca. (2000) “Resources and Environmental Degradation as Sources of Conflict,” presented at 50th Pugwash Conference On Science and World Affairs: Eliminating the Causes of War, Queens’ College, Cambridge, UK (3–8 August). Pugwash Online Conferences on Science and World Affairs http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG5draft.htm (accessed 18 February 2008). Flavin, Christopher, and Gary Gardner. (2006) “China, India, and the New World Order.” In State of the World 2006: A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress toward a Sustainable Society. New York: W. W. Norton, p. 3. Halweil, Brian. (2005) “Grain Harvest and Hunger Both Grow.” In Lisa Mastny, ed. Vital Signs2005: The Trends that are Shaping Our Future. New York: W. W. Norton, p. 62. Herro, Alana. (2006) “Desertification is Important Factor in Darfur Crisis,” Worldwatch Institute http://www.worldwatch.org/node/4087 (accessed18 February 2008). Kassalow, Jordan S. (2001) “Why Health is Important to U.S. Foreign Policy,” Milbank Memorial Fund Council on Foreign Relations http://www.milbank.org/reports/Foreignpolicy.html (accessed 18 February 2008). Owen, Jerry. (2001) “Aral Sea,” The Water Page http://www.africanwater.org/aral.htm (accessed 18 February 2008). Miller, G. Tyler. (2004) Living in the Environment. Pacific Grove, Calif.: Brooks/Cole. Nierenberg, Danielle, and Brian Halweil. (2006) “Cultivating Food Security.” In Michael Renner, ed. State of the World 2006: A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress toward a Sustainable Society. New York: W. W. Norton, p. 62. Norwegian Nobel Committee. (2004) “The Nobel Peace Prize 2004” http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2004/ (accessed 18 February 2008).

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Penning de Vries, F. W. T. (2002) Integrated Land and Water Management for Food and Environmental Security. Colombo, Sri Lanka: Comprehensive Assessment Secretariat. Pirages, Dennis. (2005) “Containing Infectious Disease.” In Renner, State of the World 2005, p. 45. Renner, Michael, ed. (2005) State of the World 2005: A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress toward a Sustainable Society. New York: W. W. Norton. United Nations Environment Programme. (2003) GEO Year Book. Nairobi: Kenya. UN Nongovernmental Liaison Service. (2006) “Implementing Agenda 21” http://www.un-ngls.org/site/article.php3?id_article=59 (accessed 18 February 2008). Wolf, Aaron T., Annika Kramer, Alexander Carius, and Geoffrey Dabelko. (2005) “Managing Water Conflict and Cooperation.” In Renner, State of the World 2005, p. 81. World Resources Institute. (2000) World Resources, 2000–2001: People and Ecosystems, the Fraying Web of Life. Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute.

Chapter Two Matthew Crosston Adams, Thomas C. (2003) “U.S. Assistance Programs in Europe: An Assessment,” U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/19203.htm (accessed 17 February 2008). The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL). (2007) “Democracy” http://www.state.gov/g/drl/democ/ (accessed 17 February 2008). Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. (2002) “Frequently Asked Questions about US Policy in Central Asia” http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/15562.htm (accessed 17 February 2008). ———. (2004) “U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia,” pt. 1 http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/37645.htm (accessed 17 February 2008). ———. (2004) “U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia,” pt. 2 http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/37677.htm, (accessed 17 February 2008). ———. (2004) “U.S. Policy and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe” http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/2004/31935.htm (accessed 17 February 2008). Bush, George W. (2003) Speech on the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy. White House Press Secretary: Washington D.C. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html (accessed 17 February 2008). Hill, Fiona. (2003) “Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Regional Stability,” Testimony before House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, 108th Congress (29 October) http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa90361.000/hfa90361_0.HTM (accessed 17 February 2008). Human Rights and Democracy Fund, “Mission Statement” (n.d.) http://web.archive.org/web/20060108224009/www.state.gov/g/drl/c7607.htm (accessed 20 March 2008). Human Rights Watch. (2002) “Dangerous Dealings: Changes to U.S. Military Assistance after September 11,” 14:1(G) http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/usmil/ (accessed 17 February 2008).

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Chapter Three Randall E. Osborne, Paul Kriese, and Stan Friedman Agee, James and Walker Evans. (1941) Let Us Now Praise Famous Men: Three Tenant Families. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co. Alger, Horatio. (1873) Bound to Rise, or Up the Ladder. New York: Loring. Bentham, Jeremy. (1970/1789) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Edited by James Henderson Burns and Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart. London: The Athlone Press. Brewer, Marilynn B. (1991) “The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 17, pp. 475–482. ———, and B. Carini. (1995) “Person Memory in Intergroup Contexts: Categorization versus Individuation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69, pp. 29–40. ———, and W. Gardner. (1996) “Who Is This ‘We’? Levels of Collective Identity and Self-Representations,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71, 83–93. ———, and Amy S. Harasty. (1996) “Seeing Groups as Entities: The Role of Perceiver Motivation.” In Richard M. Sorrentino and E. Tory Higgins, eds., Handbook of Motivation and Cognition: 3. The Interpersonal Context. New York: Guilford Press, pp. 347–370. ———, and J. G. Weber. (1994) “Self-Evaluation Effects of Interpersonal versus Intergroup Social Comparison,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 66, pp. 268–275. Brown, J. D. and C. Kabayashi. (2002) “Self-Enhancement in Japan and America,” Asian Journal of Social Psychology 5, pp. 145–167. Bunk, B. P. and R. J. J. M. van den Eijnden. (1997) “Perceived Prevalence, Perceived Superiority, and Relationship Satisfaction: Most Relationships are Good, but Ours Is Best,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23, pp. 219–228. Carr, Cynthia. (2005) Our Town. New York: Random House. Catholic Answers. (1979–2008) “Answer Guide: Just War Doctrine” http://www.catholic.com/library/Just_war_Doctrine_1.asp (accessed 18 February 2008). Cooper, Wilmer A. (1991) Growing Up Plain among Conservative Wilburite Quakers: The Journey of a Public Friend. Richmond, Ind.: Friends United Press.

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Duck, Julie M., Michael A. Hogg, and D. J. Terry. (2000) “Perceived Impact of Persuasive Messages on “Us” and “Them.” In Terry and Hogg, eds. Attitudes, Behavior, and Social Context: The Role of Norms and Group Membership. Applied Social Research. Mahwah, N.J.: Erlbaum, pp. 157–170. Dunning, D. 1999. “A Newer Look: Motivated Social Cognition and the Schematic Representation of Social Concepts,” Psychological Inquiry 10, pp. 1–11. Edelman, Jacob Murray. (1964) The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. Eliade, Mircea. (1963) Myth and Reality. Translated by W. Trask. New York: Harper and Row; orig. (1963) Aspects du mythe. Paris: Gallimard. Ellemers, N., R. Spears, and B. Doosje. (2002) “Self and Social Identity,” Annual Review of Psychology 53, pp. 161–186. Festinger, L. (1954) “A Theory of Social Comparison Processes,” Human Relations 7, pp. 117–140. Fromm, Erich. (1941) Escape from freedom. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Greenberg, Jeff, Tom Pyszczynski, Sheldon Solomon, Abram Rosenblatt, M. Veeder, S. Kirkland, and D. Lyon. (1990) “Evidence for Terror Management Theory II: The Effects of Mortality Salience on Reactions to Those Who Threaten or Bolster the Cultural Worldview,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58, pp. 308–318. Grieve, Tim. (2005) “The first lady: That’s just the way it is.” Salon.com War Room (2 September) http://www.salon.com (accessed 20 February 2008). Hahn, Peter L. (2004) Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945–1961. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Hewstone, M., M. Rubin, and H. Willis. (2002) “Intergroup Bias,” Annual Review of Psychology 53, pp. 576–604. Hogg, Michael A. (2003) “Social Identity.” In Leary and Tangney, Handbook of Self and Identity, pp. 462–479. Kipling, Rudyard. (1899) White Man’s Burden: A Poem. New York: Doubleday and McClure. Leary, Mark R., and June Price Tangney, eds. (2003) Handbook of Self and Identity. New York: Guilford Press. Lykken, D. T. and A. Tellegen. (1996) “Happiness Is a Stochastic Phenomenon,” Psychological Science 7, pp. 186–189. Marx, Karl. (1906) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling. Chicago, Ill.: Charles H. Kerr and Co. Messick, D. M., S. Bloom, J. P. Boldizar, and C. D. Samuelson. (1985) “Why We Are Fairer than Others,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 21, pp. 480–500. Miller, Dawn. (2001) Letters to Callie: Jack Wade’s story. New York: Simon and Schuster. Mitchell, Joshua. (2007) “Religion Is Not a Preference,” The Journal of Politics 69:2 (May), pp. 351–362. Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. (2007) The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future. New York: W.W. Norton. Osborne, Randall E. (1996) Self: An Eclectic Approach. Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn & Bacon. ———, Nancy Baughn, and Paul Kriese. (2006) “Bridging the gap between the Humanities and the Social Sciences: A crisis resolved,” The International Journal of the Humanities 5:1, pp. 61–66.

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Bruner, Jerome. (1990) Acts of Meaning: Four Lectures on Mind and Culture. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Brown, Jonathon D. (1998). The Self. McGraw Hill. Festinger, L. (1954) “A Theory of Social Comparison Processes.,” Human Relations 7, pp. 117–140. Fiske, Susan T. (2004). Social Beings: A Core Motives Approach to Social Psychology. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley. ———, and Shelley E. Taylor. (1991) Social Cognition, 2nd ed. New York: McGraw Hill. Gilovich, T., and K. Sativsky. (1999) “The Spotlight Effect and the Illusion of Transparency: Egocentric Assessments of How We Are Seen by Others,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 8, pp. 165–168. Heider, Fritz (1958). The Psychology of Interpersonal Relationships. New York: Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley. James, William (1890). The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1. New York: Holt. Kelley, Harold H. (1967) “Attribution Theory in Social Psychology.” In David Levine and Daniel Ellis Berlyne, eds., Nebraska Symposium on Motivation vol. 15. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, pp. 192–238. ———. (1972) “Attribution in Social Interaction.” In Edward Ellsworth Jones, ed., Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior. Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, pp. 1–26. Kenny, D. A., and B. M. DePaulo. (1993) “Do People Know How Others View Them? An Empirical and Theoretical Account,” Psychological Bulletin 114, pp. 145–161. Loftus, E. (1997) “Creating False Memories,” Scientific American 277:3, pp. 70–75. Maalouf, Amin (2000) In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong. New York: Penguin Books. Marks, G. (1984) “Thinking One’s Abilities Are Unique and One’s Opinions Are Common,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 110, pp. 203–208. Palmer, Parker J. (1998). The Courage to Teach. San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass. Porter, Roy (2003) Flesh in the Age of Reason. New York: W. W. Norton. Pyszczynski, Tom, Jeff. Greenberg, and Sheldon Solomon. (1997) “Why Do We Need What We Need? A Terror Management Perspective on the Roots of Human Social Motivation,” Psychological Inquiry 8, pp. 1–20. ———. (1999) “A Dual-Process Model of Defense against Conscious and Unconscious Death-Related Thoughts: An Extension of Terror Management Theory,” Psychological Review 106, pp. 835–845. Rosenthal, R. (1994) “Interpersonal Expectancy Effects: A 30-Year Perspective,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 3, pp. 176–179. Ross, Lee. (1977) “The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings.” In Leonard Berkowitz, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 10. New York: Academic Press. Ross, Lee, D. Greene, and P. House. (1977) “The False Consensus Effect: An Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 12, pp. 279–301. ———, and Richard E. Nisbett. (1991) The Person and the Situation. Boston, Mass.: McGraw Hill. Steele, C. M. (1997) “A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance,” American Psychologist 52, pp. 613–629.

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Chapter Five Karen Lombardi Alford, C. Fred. (1989) Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory: An Account of Politics, Art, and Reason Based on Her Psychoanalytic Theory. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Bohm, David. (1980) Wholeness and the Implicate Order. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ———. (1994) Thought as a System. London and New York: Routledge. Klein, Melanie. (1975a) Envy and Gratitude & Other Works, 1946–1963. London: Hogarth Press. ———. (1975b) Love, Guilt, and Reparation. London: Hogarth Press. ———. (1975/1946) “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms.” In Klein, Envy and Gratitude. Lacan, Jacques. (1977) Écrits: A Selection. London: Tavistock/Routledge. Matte Blanco, Ignacio. (1975) The Unconscious as Infinite Sets: An Essay in Bi-Logic. London: Duckworth. ———. (1988) Thinking, Feeling, and Being. London and New York: Routledge.

Chapter Six Terri A. Karis Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. (2003) Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Flagg, Barbara J. (1998) Was Blind But Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the Law. New York: New York University Press. ———. (2005) “Foreword: Whiteness as Metaprivileges,” Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 18, p. 6. Frankenberg, Ruth. (1993) White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Haney-López, Ian F. (2006) White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race. New York: New York University Press. ———. (2006) “Colorblind White Dominance.” In White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race, rev. ed. New York: New York University Press. Hitchcock, Jeff. (2002) Lifting the White Veil. Roselle, N. J.: Crandall, Dostie & Douglass. Hooks, Bell. (1992) Black Looks: Race and Representation. Boston: South End Press.

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Chapter Seven Kevin C. M. Benson Axelrod, Robert, and Robert Keohane. (1985) “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics 38:1 (October). Barnett, Thomas P. M. (2004) The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the TwentyFirst Century. New York: Putnam’s Sons. Buzan, Barry, Charles Jones, and Richard Little. (1993) The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism. New York: Columbia University Press. Dershowitz, Alan M. (2006) Preemption: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways. New York: W. W. Norton. Friedman, Thomas L. (2005) The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux). Huntington, Samuel P. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Shuster. Ikenberry, G. John. (2001) After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Keohane, Robert O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Dicsord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. ———, and Joseph S. Nye (1977) Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. (1890) The Influence of Seapower upon History. London: Sampson Low, Marston, pp. 1660–1783. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (2002, 17 September) http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (accessed 4 February 2008). Pape, Robert A. (1996) Bombing to Win Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

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Chapter Eight Sanaa Mounir Sadek Akyol, Mustafa and Baran Zeyno. (2006) “A Muslim Manifesto: Rejecting the Bad,” National Review Online (3 March) http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/akyol_baran200603010816.asp (accessed 19 February 2008). Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 2007, The Budget Documents, sec. 2.E. Higher Education programs. (2007) Office of Budget and Management http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/ (accessed 19 February 2008). Bush, George W. (2001) “Remarks by president at ‘People for Pete’ Dinner in Honor of Senator Pete Dominici,” Sheraton Old Town Hotel, Albuquerque, New Mexico. Office of the White House Press Secretary (16 August) http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010816.html (accessed 19 February 2008). Bush, George W. (2002a) “Interview of the President by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,” The Library. (18 November) http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021118-7.html (accessed 19 February 2008). Bush, George W. (2002b) “President Discusses War & Economy in Florida. America II Electronics Management,” St. Petersburg, Florida. Office of the White House Press Secretary (8 March) http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020308-3.html (accessed 19 February 2008). Bush, George W. (2003) “President Says ‘It is a Moment of Truth’ for UN,” Remarks by the President at the 2003 “Congress of Tomorrow” Republican Retreat Reception. The Greenbriar, White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. Office of the White House Press Secretary (9 February) http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020308-3.html (accessed 19 February 2008). Hahn, Peter. (2004) Caught in the Middle East. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

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Chapter Nine John M. Davis Anthonissen, Christine (2007) “The Language of Remembering and Forgetting.” In C. Anthonissen and J. Blommaert, eds. Discourse and Human Rights Violations. Philadelphia, Pa.: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Archer, Dane, and Rosemary Gardner. (1984) Violence and Crime in Cross-National Perspective. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Asch, Solomon E. (1951) “Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgment.” In H. Guetzkow, ed. Groups, Leadership, and Men. Pittsburgh, Pa.: Carnegie. ———. (1955) “Opinions and Social Pressure,” Scientific American, 193:5, pp. 31–35. Bandura, Albert. (1986) Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory. Inglewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Baron, Robert A., and D. S. Richardson. (1994) Human Aggression. New York: Plenum. Boldizar, Janet P., David G. Perry, and Louise C. Perry. (1989) “Outcome, Values and Aggression,” Child Development, 60, pp. 571–579. Bond, Michael Harris, and Peter Bevington Smith. (1996) “Culture and Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of Studies Using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) Line Judgment Task,” Psychological Bulletin, 119, pp. 111–137. Brown, William. (1944) “The Psychology of Modern Germany,” British Journal of Psychology, 34, pp. 43–59. Buss, Arnold H. (1961) The Psychology of Aggression. New York: Wiley. Cannon, Walter B. (1925) Bodily Changes in Pain, Fear, Hunger, and Rage: An Account of Recent Researches into the Function of Emotional Excitement. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Caprara, Gian Vitoro. (1996) “Structures and Processes in Personality Psychology,” European Psychologist, 1, pp. 14–26.

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Chapter Fifteen Jorge M. Valadez Bortz, E. B. (1998) “Ecology and Consciousness,” Synthesis/Regeneration, Inter, p. 20. Ehrenfeld, David. (1978) The Arrogance of Humanism. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 208. Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson. (1996) Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press. Merchant, Carolyn. (1994) “Introduction.” In Ecology: Key Concepts in Critical Theory. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, p. 20. ———. (1995) Earthcare. New York: Routledge. Naess, Arne. (1989) Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, p. 167. Nussbaum, Martha. (2006) Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap. Rawls, John. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Sen, Amartya. (1999) Development as Freedom. New York: Knopf. Singer, Peter. (2002) Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals. New York: Harper Collins. Taylor, Paul W. (1986) Respect for Nature. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Thiele, Leslie Paul. (1999) Environmentalism for a New Millennium. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 75. Valadez, Jorge M. (2001) Deliberative Democracy, Political Legitimacy, and SelfDetermination in Multicultural Societies. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, pp. 31–34.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS KEVIN C. M. BENSON, Colonel, United States Army (ret), University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, Fort Leavensworth. ELIZABETH D. BOEPPLE, Clinical Psychologist, New York (ret.); currently freelance editor and book producer. JOSEPH J. CALIFANO, Professor of Philosophy, St. John’s University. ELIZABETH LEIGH CRALLEY, Assistant Professor of Psychology, American University. MATTHEW CROSSTON, Assistant Professor at the Virginia Military Institute with the Department of International Studies and Political Science. JOHN M. DAVIS, Professor of Psychology, Texas State University-San Marcos. STAN FRIEDMAN, Lecturer in Psychology, Texas State University–San Marcos. RICHARD FRIZZELL, Instructor of Political Science, Coastal Georgia Community College. C. DOMINIK GÜSS, Associate Professor of Psychology, University of North Florida. RICHARD T. HULL, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, State University of New York-Buffalo. TERRI A. KARIS, Associate Professor of Psychology, University of Wisconsin-Stout. PAUL KRIESE, Associate Professor of Political Science, Indiana University East. KAREN LOMBARDI, Professor, Derner Institute of Advanced Psychological Studies, Adelphi University. VICENTE L. LOPES, Professor of Biology, Texas State University-San Marcos. VINCENT LUIZZI, Professor of Philosophy, Texas State University-San Marcos. LAURA MEDER, Associate Professor of Biology, Averett University.

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GEORGE K. OISTER (1927–2007) MS in Electronics Engineering; Chief Engineer at Agricultural Management Systems at the time of his death. RANDALL E. OSBORNE, Professor of Psychology, Texas State University-San Marcos. STEPHEN PALEY, PhD in physics, Principal Scientist at Agricultural Management Systems. SANAA MOUNIR SADEK, Assistant Professor of Arabaic Language and Literature, United States Naval Academy. VANESSA TEIXEIRA is currently pursuing the MA in Mental Health Counseling at University of North Florida. TERESA TUASON, Associate Professor of Psychology, University of North Florida. JORGE M. VALADEZ, Associate Professor and Department Chair of Philosophy, Our Lady of the Lake University. ANRÉ VENTER, Director of Undergraduate Studies, University of Notre Dame. BRIAN R. WETZLER, Commander, United States Coast Guard.

INDEX Abdo, Hussam, 161, 166 Abraham, 56 Abu Ubeida, Marwan, 156, 157, 161, 163–166, 170 accountability, 23, 27, 132, 283 acid rain, 253 Adams, Thomas C., 28 adaptation, 183, 184, 187, 257, 259–261, 269, 271, 273 collective a., 263, 265, 276 genetic a., 262 international a., 265, 267, 268 self-determination as form of a., 277 social a., 270 Adjutant General of the Force (TAG), 189 Admiration, 166, 176 Adonai, 63 affiliation, 58, 65, 162, 260 Afghanistan, 18, 19, 24, 32, 42, 147, 150, 154, 156, 186, 191 After Hegemony (Keohane), 113 Agencies, 113, 217 antiterrorism a., 185 diplomatic a., 21 governmental/federal a., 23, 31, 192, 193, 194, 201, 223 intelligence/spy a., 157, 172 military/civilian a., 185, 275 police/law enforcement a., 185, 187, 195, 196 aggression, 22, 69, 226 military a. against suicide bombers, 172 political idealogy and a., 144, 145 psychological research/theory on a., 142, 143 agriculture, 1, 9, 11, high-yield a., 231 irrigated a., 245 United States a., 237 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 201 Ahmed, Arin, 166, 169, 171, 175, 177 Air Controllers, federal, 193 Akaev, Askar, 33

al Qaeda, 24, 127, 153, 154, 156–158, 163–165, 171–173, 175 al Q. in Iraq, 174 al-Assad, Hafez, 132 Al-Batal, Mahmoud M., 134 Alford, C. Fred, 93 algae, 244 Alger, Horatio, 55 “Bound to Rise,” 55 alienation, 49, 87, 220 Allah, 62–65, 138, 153, 162–166, 168, 169, 177 allies, 113 United States’ a., 21, 24, 37, 40, 111, 129 European Union’s a., 172 victorious a. in WWII, 139 alternative energy sources, 248 al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab, 124, 154, 156, 158–160, 162, 163, 165, 167 Amazon rainforest, 252 American way of life, 188 amoralism, 288 An Inconvenient Truth (Gore), 222 anger, 64, 97, 139, 146, 157, 158, 160, 170(fig.). 173, 176 animal(s), 15, 149, 270, 271, 272 enemies described as a., 167, 177 rational a., 272 Animal Liberation (Singer), 258 Ansar al-Sunna Army, 174 Arabian Peninsula, 172 Arabic, 123, 124, 127–135, 179, 214 Aral Sea, 10 Arctic Ocean, 233, 234 Aristotle, 260 Armed Forces of the United States Armed Forces Reserves Arms and Influence (Schelling) arm(ies)(y) a. chaplain, 55 United States A., 187–189, 191, 195 Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH), 192 arrests of Iraqis by coalition forces, 161

320

INDEX

Aryan race, 222 assaults on U.S. troops, 161 assistance programs, 25, 28, 40 association(s), 188, 223, 224 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 189 asymmetry. See symmetry Attah, Muhammed, 95 attribution, 54, 70, 79, 144, 160 causal a., 89 a. error, 78, 83, 118 a. theory, 77, 78, 81 authority, 40, 62, 140, 168, 170, 279, 281 American a., 18 moral a., 175 auto fuel economy, 236 autonomy, 261 a. of individual, 105, 220, 259, 286 a. leadership, 37 Special A. within Indonesia, 148 Ba’athists, 146, 174 Bab al Mandeb, Straits of, 112 ballots, 188 Bangladesh, 286 Barbanel, Laura, 156 Bardeen, John, 238 barriers border b., 193 b. to capacity for identification, 94, 95 b. to connection, 102 b. between groups, 208 knowledge b., 236, 249 organizations, b. erected by survival technologies, b. to, 251 beliefs, 76, 79, 81, 83, 137, 141, 142, 152, 155, 160, 170, 290 egalitarian b., 212 extremist b., 206 Islamic b., 164, 176 b. about justice, 144, 150 racial b., 212, 213 religious b., 52–54, 58, 60, 62, 63, 163, 175 Bell, Alexander Graham, 240 Ben-Eliezer, Benjamin, 159

Benson, Kevin C. M., 49, 109, 119 Between Memory and Desire (Humphrey), 131 bias(es), 57, 70, 77, 79–85, 117, 179, 198, 204–206, 212, 226 bin Laden, Osama, 19, 42, 44, 124, 154, 156, 159, 160, 162–165, 168, 172, 175 biomass, 237, 243–245, 252 Bishkek, 41 Black Panther Party, 92 Blanchard, Fletcher A., 213 Blank, Stephen, 38 Bloom, Mia, 172 Boepple, Elizabeth D., 290 Bohm, David, 91–93 Bombing to Win Air Power and Coercion in War (Pape), 114 Bond, Clifford, 32–34 Border Patrol, 195 border(s), 2, 9, 114, 124, 200, 258. See also boundaries: national b. security, 35 United States’ b., 135, 185–187 U.S.-Mexico b., 193, 286 U.S. b. security, 188, 192, 193, 195 “Bound to Rise” (Alger), 55 boundaries, 3, 275, 277. See also border(s) cultural b., 155 justice, b. around concept of, 139 b. of meaning, 67 national b., 258, 266, 268, 277 professional b., 277 psychological b., 2 religious b., 74 self, b. among aspects of, 74, 88, 90, 95, 118 Branson, Richard, 247 Brattain, Walther, 238, 239 Brigham, John C., 213 Brown, Jonathan D., 57 Brown, Lester, 12, 13 brutality, 36, 161, 206 Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), 22, 23, 29

Index Bush, George W., 19, 37, 40, 128, 129, 135, 176, 201 B. administration, 157, 160, 172, 192 Bush, Laura, 59 Califano, Joseph J., 279 capabilities, 76, 87, 257, 261, 265 intelligence gathering c., 186 c. justice theor(ies)(y), 259, 260 political c., 265 capitalism, 39, 55, 56, 281 carbon dioxide, 232–235, 237, 244, 245, 247, 249, 253 Carr, Cynthia, 58 Our Town, 58 Carson, Rachel, 223 Catalyst, 1 categor(ies)(y)(zation), 57–59, 77, 78, 82, 87, 92, 97, 102–105, 117, 118, 141, 143, 191, 202, 204, 205, 210, 211, 255, 275, 277 cellulosic ethanol, 235, 237, 243, 245, 250, 252. See also ethanol Central Asia, 19–21, 23–25, 27–28, 40, 42 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 133 change, 28, 98, 107, 118, 178, 196, 212, 213, 217, 221, 225, 240, 276, 277, 282, 284 attitudinal c., 173, 175, 176, 214 climate c., 10, 12, 13, 183, 219, 230, 231, 234–236, 253, 290 democratic c., 24, 28 ecological c., 259 generational c., 39 scientific paradigm c., 221 social c., 92, 218, 134, 218, 221–223, 262 charlatanry, 167 Cheney, Richard Bruce “Dick,” 159 The Children of Light, 3 China, 11, 14 19, 33 135, 139, 201, 209, 252, 253 C. citizens, 2 C. language, 129, 135 North C. Plain, 13 chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), 252

321

Christian(ity), 51, 57, 222 C. Bible/Parables, 52, 55 C. belief, 163 C. countries, 210 C. culture, 66 Irish C., 210 C. v. Muslim, 82 C. of Najran, 51 C. prayer, 63 citizenship, 105, 141, 183, 188, 194 Civic Bridges, 31 Civic Coalition against Torture and Protection of Human Rights, 31 civic skills, 265 Civil Affairs Units, 192 civil war, 56 American C. W., 190 religious c. w., 62 civilized life, 281 climate change, 2, 10, 12, 13, 183, 219, 230, 231, 234–236, 253, 290 Coast Guard, United States, 184, 189, 195, 215, 278 coercion, 114, 264 coevolutionary theory, 258 cognitive dissonance, 163 Cohen, Ariel, 37 Cold War, 39, 113, 114, 186, 189, 281 Collapse (Diamond), 15 collectivism, 286, 287 colonial exploitation, 267, 268 Colonial Militia, 189 colonial powers, 148, 172 Colonial Regulars, 190 colorblind(ness), 97, 102, 105, 118 combat, 191 Afghanistan/Iraq c. zones, 191 c. and non-c. injuries, 191 c. training, 193 c. units, 187–189, 190–192, 195, 196 commerce, 111, 112, 234, 246 Common Ingroup Identity Model, 210 commons, 111, 112, 114–116 communication(s), 183, 184, 186, 226, 242, 265, 276, 277 intercepting c., 112

322

INDEX

communit(ies)(y), 1, 66, 118, 124, 125, 139, 140, 143, 156, 195–197, 205, 206 academic/scholarly c., 37, 38, 92 c. appreciation, 166 c. of color, 56 cooperative learning c., 208 diverse/inclusive c., 100, 102 Eurasian c., 35 global/internationa/world, 2, 3, 7, 8, 23, 24, 26, 27, 36, 43, 45, 46, 49, 94, 106, 109, 112–115, 119, 123, 135, 148, 172, 176, 177, 179, 181, 183, 184 Latino c., 209 local c., 149, 174 NGO c., 41 c. program organizers, 207 rural c., 149 scientific c., 91 temperate c., 2 comparison (social), 57, 58, 76, 80 downward c., 81 group c., 199–202, 206 compellence, 109, 110, 114, 116, 259 compensation, 267, 268 c. for research products, 250 c. for victims, 147, 149–151 c. for wounded military, 190 competence, 162, 225, 246 competition, 59, 110, 221, 280 apartheid, c. after end of, 148 information, c. over, 163 intergroup c., 206 international/foreign c., 133, 199, 249 c. for space-based advantage, 112, 209 conflict, 7–9, 26, 85, 139, 142, 144, 156, 161, 173, 179, 201, 211, 218, 257, 270, 277, 279 Central Asian c., 32 c. prone areas, 29 ethnic c., 64 geopolitical c., 183, 197, 215 global c., 147 group-level c., 207 ideological c., 226

interpersonal c., 142, 143 justice, c. over systems of social, 137, 147, 150 c. management initiatives, 226 Middle Eastern/Muslim c., 51, 56, 146, 151, 159, 201 Nazi c., 124 Palestinean-Israeli c., 135, 147, 157– 159, 170, 172 c. prevention, 217 realistic c., 199, 200, 202 realistic c. theory, 199, 200 resources, c. for, 9, 11, 12, 45, 199– 201, 226, 275 self as basis of c., 49, 69, 70, 73, 83, 84, 90, 117 truths, c. over divergent, 98 zero-sum c., 201 Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), 92 connectedness, 50, 97, 98, 107, 170, 221 conscious processes, 89 conservation, 219, 224 contradiction(s), 8, 18, 21, 24, 38, 42, 45, 46, 60, 64, 89, 102, 134, 285 control, 49, 71, 83, 93, 102, 106, 177, 281, 286 centralized c. by global institution, 266 climate c., 290 environment, c. of, 260 fear loss of c., 99 impulse c., 142 indigenous population, c. of, 279 information, c. of., 264 non-white others, c. of, 97 political c., 260 resources, c. of, 201, 265, 266, 268 state , c. of, 133 cooperation, 7, 8, 19, 137, 197, 207–209, 215, 218, 221, 226, 254, 275–278 Europe, c. in, 35 global community, c. in, 49 interagency c., 185, 188 international c., 112, 113 law enforcement c., 26 military c., 115 regional c., 27

Index cooperation, con’t. security c., 26, 32 corporations, 240–242, 285 foreign c., 286 multinational c., 235, 236, 250 corruption, 24, 38, 43, 172, 283 Cralley, Elizabeth Leigh, 183, 197, 275, 277 Crandall, Christian S., 213 Craner, Lorne, 40, 42 creation, 55 c. myths, 65 cris(es)(is), 7, 8, 65, 187, 281 childcare c., 285 economic c., 132, 148 environmental c., 3, 218, 219, 221, 235, 238, 248, 249 hostage c., 128 humanitarian c., 13, 22 security c., 31, 193, 194 terrorism c., 172 critical thinking, 175 crop soils, 233 Crosston, Matthew, 7, 8, 17, 45 cruelt(ies)(y), 52, 54, 60, 61, 66, 67, 161, 162, 172 Crusades, Christian, 49, 51, 56, 119 cultural variation, 261 culture(s), 53, 70, 76, 77, 84, 89, 91, 117, 137–140, 144, 150, 152, 153, 155, 156, 158, 172, 261, 283 American c., 87, 141 Arabic c., 124, 128, 134, 179 Christian c., 66 corporate c., 236, 241, 242 homosexual, c. of hate against, 60 c. of impunity, 23 Islamic c., 127, 131, 135, 167, 170, 170 (fig.), 176 Middle Eastern c., 132, 133 Muslim c., 205 Westerm c., 141, 220, 275 youth c., 93 Darfur region, 12 Davis, John M., 123, 124, 137, 179 Davis, Joyce, 171 debt, 12

323

foreign d., 284 moral d., 267 decision makers, 109, 229, 236, 246, 247, 249 defense contractors, 236, 241 Defense Planning Guidance. See Strategic Planning Guidance Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 40 deism, 287 De Leon, Patrick H., 156 democrac(ies)(y), 7, 8, 12, 17, 18, 26, 27, 29, 31, 35, 37, 43, 92, 115, 124, 224, 281 Central Asian d., 20 compromised d., 21, 36, 41 contextualized Islamic d., 175, 176 deliberative d., 263–265 emerging d. \in Ferghana Valley, 24 flawed d., 25, 28, 42 Kyrgyzstan, d. in, 41 market d., 32 Middle Eastern d., 133 secular d., 123 United States d. strategy, 22, 158 weak d., 131 Western d., 240 democratization, 17–19, 27, 33, 34, 175 Department of Agriculture, 13 Department of Defense, 40, 129 Department of Education, 129 Department of State, 129 deprivation, 88 perceived d., 201 relative d., 199–202 relative d. theory, 199 Dershowitz, Alan Preemption, 115 desalination, 1, 234, 235, 245, 248 desertification, 12 destiny, 55, 220 detention camps, 188 deterren(ce)(t power), 110–116 negative/positive d., 49, 109, 119 nuclear weapons, d. power of, 109 developed world, 113, 114 development team, 240

324

INDEX

Dewey, John, 223, 224 dialogue, 25, 30, 31, 33, 34, 58, 119, 123, 124, 135, 150, 206, 214, 224, 261 “The Dialogue of Competitive Armament” (Shelling), 112 Diamond, Jared, 15 Collapse, 15 dichotomies, 49, 50, 63, 94, 102 black/white, 50, 89 good/bad, 88, 102, 117, 222 individual/collective, 50 masculine/feminine, 89 plenty/lack, 87 self/other, 49, 50, 57, 69, 77, 79 separation/connection, 50, 92, 97–99, 101, 105, 107 Different and the Same, 212 dignity (dignified life), 20, 22, 23, 43, 45, 131, 132, 174, 260–262, 269 diplomacy, 37, 110 American/United States d., 23–25, 42, 112 divergent d., 39 international d., 197 Dirac, Paul A. M., 239 Disability-Adjusted Life Years, 12 discrimination, 100, 197, 198, 200 disidentifications, 91, 94 distinctiveness, 2, 65, 81 Optimal D. Theory, 58, 59, 117 domestic violence, 123, 133 dominance, racial, 97, 100, 102–107, 118 Donald, Merlin, 53 Dörner, Dietrich, 162 doubt, 167, 170 (fig.), 177 drought, 1, 12, 13, 230, 231 DuPont, 248 Dushanbe, 41 Eastman, George, 240 ecology, 2, 11, 93, 218, 220, 221, 258, 267–270, 273 ecological footprint analysis, 14, 15, 219 ecological integrity, 267, 268

econom(ics)(y), 3, 35, 56, 62, 65, 77, 84, 92, 93, 98, 111, 123, 133, 134, 137, 173, 176, 219, 225, 226, 229, 271, 272, 280, 281, 283, 284 American e. system, 200, 201, 235, 236 e. crisis, 148, 218 e. decline, 38 e. development, 22, 29, 41, 217, 266 global e., 14, 19, 20, 45, 46, 106, 127, 128, 135, 139, 148, 265, 267, 268, 277 market e., 26, 27, 282 Middle East e., 179 narco-e., 24 poor e., 132, 159, 267 e. reform, 19, 21, 32, 33, 130 e. reunification, 151 e. self-interest, 249, 253, 263, 269 e. stability, 113, 114, 189 e. transformation, 25 water e., 2 Economic and Social Council report, United Nations, 12 ecosystem(s), 1, 3, 8, 9, 11, 224, 225, 272 Millenium E. Assessment (MA), 219 Edison, Thomas, 240 educat(ion)(ors), 28, 69, 114, 206–209, 212, 215, 226, 254, 285 Arabic-speaking e., 127 competency e., 101 language e., 129 Middle East, e. in, 130, 176, 177, 180 Reservist, and Guards’ members e. levels, 191, 193 terrorists’ e. levels, 154, 155 egalitarian attitudes/values, 204, 205, 212 false egalitarianism, 286 Egypt, 51, 123, 127, 129, 134, 153, 170, 171 E. identity, 132 Ehrenfeld, David, 272 11 September 2001, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31–36, 39–42, 46, 51, 75, 94, 95, 111, 123, 128, 133–135, 138, 153, 155, 162, 165, 174, 155, 203, 205, 209, 289 9/11 report, 176 9/11-type threat, 187

Index empathy, 93, 168, 169, 175, 177, 211, 213 enem(ies)(y), 41, 50, 51, 55, 61, 64, 84, 110, 115, 125, 131, 145, 147, 151, 154, 160, 164, 165, 167– 170, 175, 172, 177, 185–188, 201, 211 energy gain, 230, 237, 244 energy reserves, 21, 25, 32, 34 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (HR 6), 236 engagement, 106, 109, 113, 115 American e., 17–19, 21, 23, 24, 28, 29, 32, 38, 39 community e., 219 economic/financial e., 29, 114 military e., 112, 114 political e., 173 positive e., 114, 116 public e., 220, 278 engineers, 192, 238–241, 248, 254, 276, 277 Enron-AMOCO-British Petroleum, 235 environment, 8, 12, 14, 46, 70, 72, 73, 75, 77, 82, 155, 226, 230, 254, 255, 260–263, 270, 277 aversive e. stimuli, 142 e. catastrophes/crises, 45, 187, 235, 242, 248 e. changes, 272 cultural e., 76, 142 e. degradation/destruction, 15, 38, 183, 223, 224, 229–231, 233, 234, 242, 250, 252, 257, 268 e. factors, 78, 83, 117 fluctuations, normal e., 1 global e., 112, 115, 127, 135, 267, 268 group e., 80 e. harmful practices, 12, 268, 270 e. ignorance, 238 e. impact assessment, 219, 244, 248, 249 e. justice, 257, 258, 271, 276 e. monitoring, 225 person-e. relationship, 183, 275 political e., 41 positive feedback on e., 233 poverty, rel. of e. to, 15 e. refugees, 11

325

e. responsibility, 242 security issues, e. role in, 7, 9 social e., 71, 142, 205 sustainable e. policies, 184, 217, 218, 224, 258, 271, 276, 277 e. taxes, 219 e. technologies, 250, 253 e. terrorism, 56, 109, 186 work e., 240 equilibrium, 265 erosion, 12, 13 ethanol cellulosic e., 235, 237, 243, 245, 250, 252 corn e., 237, 238, 243, 244 local production of e., 245 microorganism-mediated e. process, 246, 247 ethnic strife, 51 European nations, 56, 209 evil, 52, 55, 56, 61, 63, 69, 144, 145 casting enemies as e., 167 de facto e., 282 e. living conditions, 282, 283 justification of e., 288 necessary e., 40 perception of Americans as e., 59 perception of Western powers as e., 145 power seeking by e. means, 279 rationalize e. as good, 287, 288 e. of repressive governments, 281 Shiites’ e. toward Muslims, 168 evolutionary capacity, 183, 257, 258 existence, human, 53, 110, 255, 258 exploitation, 105, 106, 111, 158, 160, 172, 180, 267 colonial e., 267, 268 e. perspective, 220 resources, e. of, 158, 219, 222, 267 third-world labor, e. of, 285 exports, 12, 13, 130 extremists, 203, 204 fairness, 57, 139, 140, 257 family relations, 133, 134 fanatic(s), 154, 206 Fatah, 154

326

INDEX

Federal Air Controllers, 193 Federal Armed Forces, 188 Ferghana Valley, 19, 21, 23–30, 33–35, 39–43 Flagg, Barbara, 106 flourishing, 257, 258, 260, 262, 269, 272, 273, 277 freedom, f. of, 116 nation-states, f. of, 267 Western culture, f. of, 220 food, 8–13, 45, 82, 130, 200, 201, 207, 219, 230, 231, 238, 243, 260, 272 Forces Command (FORSCOM), 192 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 40 Fort Leonard Wood, 193 Foundation for Environmental Security and Sustainability, 217 “Freedom around the World” (Freedom House), 131 free market analysis, 282 free will, 286 freedom, 18, 20, 21, 37, 40, 43, 45, 67, 107, 116, 129, 131, 157, 158, 194, 236, 290 consent, f. to, 285 democratic f., 36, 131 economic f., 133 escape from f., 67, 119 innovate, f. to, 238, 239, 240 licentiousness, f. versus, 286 religion/worship, f. of, 22, 63 speech, f. of, 22, 23, 35 Freedom Support Act (FSA), 28, 29 Friedman, Stan, 49, 51, 117, 119 Frizzell, Richard, 183, 185, 275, 277 frustration, 97, 139, 142, 158, 163, 171, 173, 180 full-cost accounting, 269 fundamentalism (fundamentalist), 20, 29, 34, 37, 119, 157, 176 funding, 254, 255 airwaves in Middle East, f. for, 214 Civic Bridges, f. for, 31 get-out-the-vote f. in Uzbekistan, 30 small companies, f. for, 246

United States (USG) f. to foreign states, 25, 26, 27, 29–31 Ferghana Valley, United States f. to, 24, 26 Gandhi, Mahatma, 171 gender, 2, 3, 78, 88, 98, 103, 118, 123, 133, 134, 204, 205, 208, 212 generations, future, 9, 183, 214, 217, 219, 257, 259, 268–271 genocide, 51, 64 geopolitical issues, 197 GI Bill, 194 Gilman, Benjamin, 32, 33 global community, 2, 3, 7, 8, 27, 45, 46, 49, 106, 109, 114, 119, 123, 135, 172, 176, 177, 181, 183, 184, 197, 209, 215, 226, 275–278, 289 Global Forest Resource Assessment 2005 (FAO), 219 global warming, 1, 2, 229–234, 236–238, 245, 249, 250, 253, 255, 290 globalization, 123, 127, 128, 130, 133, 135, 136, 179, 259 anti-g. rhetoric, 20 God, 51, 52, 54–57, 61–65, 67, 68, 71, 119, 131, 134, 138, 159, 162, 163, 165–167, 176, 287, 288 good(ness), 52, 55–57, 63, 90, 105, 226, 263, 264, 277, 279, 281–283, 285–288, 290 g.-bad dichotomy, 88, 102, 117, 222 g. intentions, 103 goods, 56, 200, 224, 257, 269 Gore, Albert A. “Al”, Jr., 19, 222, 250 An Inconvenient Truth, 222 government labs, 236 governments, 3, 23–25, 27, 173, 180, 209, 278, 283, 284 African g., 26 Asian g., 32, 33, 35 discriminatory g., 45 local g., 38, 157, 159, 160, 172, 187 local puppet g., 170 (fig.) Middle East g., 132 national g., 260

Index governments, con’t. oppressive/repressive g., 18, 34, 40, 281 secular g., 32, 34 United States state g., 187, 192 Western g., 146, 211 grants, government, 250 gratification, 199–201 Graves, Sheryl B.,212 Great Depression, 218 greed, 55, 88, 92, 141, 160, 281, 285–287 Green Belt Movement, 12 Green Card holder(s), 188 Greenberg, Jeff, 205 greenhouse gas(es), 232–234, 251, 252 Greenland, 1, 2 gross national product (GNP), 281 group affiliation/membership, 49, 74, 82, 87, 203, 260, 275, 277 intergroup activities, 215 intergroup contact, cooperative, 197, 207–209, 211, 215, 277 racial g. m., 103, 105 Güss, C. Dominik, 123, 153, 179 guilt, 79, 97, 102, 124, 157, 167, 169, 170, 170 (fig.), 177 Hadif, 134, 176 “Hadji Girl” (anonymous), 214 Hamamreh, Thauriya, 174, 175 Hamas, 154, 160, 171, 176 happiness, 57, 157, 290 hat(e)(red), 49, 61,66, 67, 93, 95, 142, 145, 153, 160, 167, 170 (fig.), 212 h.-based acts, 2, 52, 60, 61 Bin Laden’s h. of America, 168 homosexuals, h. of, 60, 61 indifference, h. born of, 91 Islamic h. against United States, 18 love/h. relations, 50, 51, 55, 59, 117 religious h., 52, 59, 95 haves/have nots, 110, 282 hegemony, 43 hidden agendas, 242, 280 Hill, Fiona, 38 Hitler, Adolf, 145, 146, 211, 222 Hobbes, Thomas, 218

327

H.’s sovereign, 218 Hoffman, Bruce, 157 holy (place, people) (holiest) homeland security, 195. See also security Office of H. S., 186 homosexuals, 60, 61, 212 hooks, bell, 99 hospitalization benefits, 194 hostility, 67, 98–100, 124, 144, 180 intergroup h., 183, 199–202, 207, 208, 275 HR 6. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 Hughes, Karen, 42 Hull, Richard T., 1, 183, 218, 229, 275, 276, 277 human beings, 2, 3, 9, 54, 57, 59, 60, 66, 69, 89, 102, 104, 106, 177, 183, 217, 219, 221, 231, 233, 258, 260–263, 269, 271–273, 280, 286–288 h. relationship with nature, 217, 219 h. sub-communities, 2 human rights, 12, 19, 20, 23, 25, 29–35, 40, 114, 123, 147, 150, 280, 284 Islamization and h. r., 133 United States strategy for h. r., 22 h. r. violations, 131 Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF), 22, 29–31 humanity, 2, 3, 51, 104, 117, 183, 219, 224, 235, 236, 238, 275, 285, 290 h.-nature split, 220 H.’s survival lobby, 254 Hume, David, 287 Humphrey, R. Stephen, 131 Between Memory and Desire, 131 Hussein, Saddam, 129, 146, 157–159, 175, 201 hybrid automobiles, 249, 252 Hyde, Henry, 32 hydroelectric power generation, 11 hypocrisy, 18, 21, 35, 38, 39, 43, 46 ice age, 233 idealism, 18

328

INDEX

ideas, 73, 74, 78, 225 antiquated i., 196 defensiveness, i. that trigger, 99 erroneous i. about racial groups, 105 history of i., 91 innovative i., 7 psychological i., 87 shared i., 53, 197 war of i., 37 Western i., 176 identification, projective, 49, 87–95 disi., p., 91, 94 identit(ies)(y), 57–59, 67, 70, 84, 88, 89, 93, 94, 97, 100, 123, 128, 135, 163, 203, 206 American i., 203 Arab i., 132 asymmetrical i., 90 cultural i., 74 false i., 92 group i., 50, 118, 199, 210, 211, 215 national i., 183, 275 National I. Cards, 187 racial i., 99, 103 self-i., 98, 101, 103, 105 shared i., 117 i. theory, social, 57, 74, 202 illness, 11, 164, 191, 260 immigration, 188, 195 impediments to technology development, 229, 231, 235–237, 251, 253–255 Imperial Valley, 231 imperialism, 131, 160, 179 improvisation, 187 Imus, Don, 214 An Inconvenient Truth (Gore), 222 India, 9, 11, 51, 139, 201, 209 indigenous people, 100, 279, 281, 284 individual(s), 222, 223, 238 i. action, 264, 269 autonomous i., 220 i. boundaries, 277 i. differences, 171 group-i. factors, 183, 198, 202, 203, 210, 211, 218, 262, 270 i. happiness, 290

innovative i., 240 i.-level processes, 204, 211, 213–215, 262, 273 i. will, 286 Individual Adaptation and Capabilities Theory, 259, 260, 276 Individual Drill Training (IDT) individualism, 39, 97, 102, 103, 286 indivision, 90 industrialized countries, 155, 286 infidels, 61, 119, 165 infrastructure, 111, 125, 149, 176, 186, 187, 230, 250, 253 ingroup(s), 57–59, 74, 163, 177, 201– 203, 210, 211, 213, 215, 275. See also outgroup(s) initial public offerings (IPOs), 247 injustice(s), 9, 41, 43, 137, 138, 140, 141, 143, 144, 147, 152, 158– 163, 170 (fig.), 171, 172, 176, 179, 220, 257, 281 innovation, 7, 29, 30, 45, 46, 190, 224, 231, 235, 238–240, 242, 244, 246, 249, 251, 252, 254, 255, 269, 276 Integrated Threat Theory, 202, 203. See also threat intelligence (spy reports), 42, 113, 115, 116, 129, 159, 164, 172, 174, 185–187, 192, 287 interaction strategies, 210 interdependence, 45, 102, 113, 119, 183, 184, 209, 211, 215, 270, 273, 275, 276 international community, 26, 36, 43, 45, 94, 148, 260 International Relations Committee, House of Representatives, 28, 31, 32 International Rice Research Institute, 13 international year of rice, 13 introjection, 87, 88 investors, 246, 247, 250, 251 Iran, 11, 33, 63, 128, 201 Iraq(is), 18, 129, 146, 147, 160, 171, 172, 177, 179

Index al Queda in I., 154, 158 American occupation in I., 157, 170, 170 (fig.), 173 financial help for I., 176 Kuwait, I. invasion of, 200, 201 I. military, 124 Operation I. Freedom, 112 religious civil war in I., 62, 162 Shi’a and Sunnis in I., 167, 201 terrorism in I., 154, 156, 164, 174, 175 I. War, 78, 127, 159, 186, 191 wrongful arrest of I., 161 Irgun, 61 Irish Protestant/Catholic conflict, 56, 210 irrationality, 221 Isaac, 56 Islami(ization)(sm)(sts), 32, 54, 62, 65, 123, 127, 131, 133, 135, 136, 138, 154, 158–160, 162, 169, 170, 174, 175, 179, 180 al Queda, I. relationship to, 164–167 anti-I. crime in United States, 203 fundamentalist I., 29, 34, 176 I. guest workers, 123 I. jihad, 154 I. liturgical language, 128 moderate/tolerant I., 34, 125, 172, 176 I. political groups, 30, 34, 38 radical I., 18, 20, 34, 37, 40, 42, 128, 163 I. reformers, 132 I. revolutionary thought, 20 I. states, 123 I. terrorism, 25, 32, 153 women, I. rules for, 134 Israel(is), 13, 55, 61, 125, 128, 129, 135, 151, 160, 163, 168, 174, 175, 179 Arab-I. conflict, 65, 146, 147, 154, 156–159, 170–172, 176, 177, 200, 201, 211, 214 Irish Republican Army, 64 Izzidene al Qassam Brigade, 171 James, William, 73, 74, 142, 223 Jerusalem, 172 Jesus, 52, 60, 66, 68 Jews, 49, 51, 56, 61, 119, 159, 167, 168, 176 jigsaw classroom experiments, 208, 212

329

jihad, 154, 163–165, 167, 168, 171, 175 Jones, Elizabeth, 19, 31, 37, 42 Jones, James M., 207 Judaism, 54 judgment(s), 70, 72, 73, 75–81, 83, 119, 140, 197, 198, 204, 205, 212, 247, 264, 280, 283 incorrect j., 81 pre-j., 168 justice, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 20, 22, 43, 45, 92, 97, 101, 119, 123, 124, 137–141, 147–152, 179, 183, 220, 257, 258, 171, 172, 176, 179, 220, 257, 259–262, 265–269, 271, 273, 276, 279–281, 283–288 communal v. individual j., 139 criminal/penal j., 140, 147 distributive j., 140 environmental j., 257, 258 injustice, 9, 41, 43, 137, 138, 140, 141, 143, 144, 147, 152, 158– 163, 170 (fig.) international j. system, 139, 141 procedural j., 139 restorative v. retributive j., 139, 140, 147, 149 synoptic j., 257 transitional j., 147 Karbala, Iraq, 172 Karis, Terri A., 49, 50, 97, 118 Keats, John, 223 Kennedy, John F., 194 Keohane, Robert O., 113 After Hegemony, 113 Power and Independence (with Nye), 113 Kipling, Rudyard, 56 White Man’s Burden (Kipling), 56 Klein, Melanie, 87–91, 93, 94 Kleinian theory, 90 knowledge (knowledge barrier) k. barrier, 236, 249 Koran. See Qur’an Korean War, 190 Koresh, David, 51

330

INDEX

Kriese, Paul, 1, 49, 51, 117, 119 Kuwait, 200, 201 Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz Republic), 19, 24, 26, 27 (table), 29–31, 29 (table), 33, 34, 36, 41, 42 labor, 187, 188, 285 coerced l., 150 division of l., 268 l. movement in France, 222 third-world l., 285 l. unions, 92 land acquisition, 268 Langley, Samuel, 240 language, 2, 53, 68, 70, 03, 113 Arabic l., 127 l. competencies, 123 cross-cultural understanding, role of l. in, 123 false divisions reflected by l., 93 foreign l., 124 harsh l., 34 hawkish l., 18 National Security L. Institute (NSLI), 123, 129 transcendental l., 51 law, 128, 133, 135, 38, 187, 263, 266, 280 adherence to l. viewed as national suicide, 115 courts of l., 147 l. enforcement, 183, 193, 194, 205, 277 equal treatment before l., 176 government grants, l. regulating, 250 jungle l., 158 patent l, 251 religious l., 119, 134 learning theory, social, 143, 203 Let Us Now Praise Famous Men (Agee and Walker), 54 Letters to a Young Poet (Rilke), 106 Levant, Ronald F., 156 liberty, 8, 18, 20, 37, 40 ,43, 45, 128, 285–287 logic, 65, 155 Aristotelian l., 89 asymmetrical/symetrical l., 89, 90

l. of identity, 89 Lombardi, Karen, 49, 87, 117, 118 Lopes, Vincente L., 183, 217, 275, 277 love, 63–66, 88, 89, 97–99, 106, 107, 117, 119, 168, 260, 287 Lovelock, James, 2, 3 Gaia, 2, 3 The Revenge of Gaia (Lovelock), 3 Luizzi, Vincent, 183, 217, 275, 277 Maathai, Wangari, 12 MacArthur Foundation, John D. and Katherine T., 224 Machiavelli, Niccolò, 43 The Prince, 43 Machiavellianism, 34 macro-socio-historical-political context, 157 Madre de Dios River, 224 management practices, 220 Marconi, Marchese Guglielmo, 240 Margulis, Lynn, 3 Symbiotic Planet, 3 market(ing)(s), 22, 248, 249, 251 black m., 130 m. economy, 26, 27, 282 free m., 128, 280 f. m. analysis, 282 f. m. capitalism, 281 f. m. democracies, 32 national m., 240 m.-oriented states, 26 Palestinean m., 176 survival technologies, m. for, 251 sustainable m., 246 Marxis(m)(ts), 20, 54, 281, 282 martyr(dom)(s), 64, 79, 153, 163, 164, 166, 168, 170, 176 materialism, 286 Matte Blanco, Ignacio, 87, 89–91, 93 McConahay’s Scale for Modern Racism, 212 me/not me dimension, 78 Meder, Laura, 7–9, 45 media, 59, 124, 131, 143, 149, 174, 175, 177, 205, 206, 212, 214 American m., 35

Index media, con’t. Arabic m., 129 free m., 25, 33, 35 Western m., 153, 154, 157, 160, 179, 180 melting of permafrost/ice caps, 233, 234 Menlo Park, 240 metaprivileges, 106 Middle East, 9, 19, 31, 32, 38, 49, 51, 59, 61, 62, 64, 66, 123, 127–136, 141, 146, 151, 154, 157–160, 170, 172, 176, 177, 179, 180, 187, 191, 195, 201, 214 Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA), 123, 128, 130 Middlebury College, 134 Midrash, Jewish, 55 migrant workers, 56, 188, 286 migration, 45, 187, 188, 195, 224. See also immigration Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), 190, 192, 193 “Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants” (anonymous), 163 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA), 219 Mills, Charles W., 100 Minute Men, 193 misery, 280, 284 misperceptions, 102, 179 misunderstanding, 100, 106, 156 Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH), 192 modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE), 190, 192, 194 morality (moral, moral consideration), 55, 59, 61, 262, 285, 290 m. ambiguities, 132 m. authority, 175 m. blueprint, 55 m. character, 105 claim, m. unconditional, 266, 268 m. community, 221 m. consideration, 258, 271, 272 m. constraints, 262, 270, 271 m. crises, 218 m. cruelty, 60, 66

331

m. debt, 267 m. dignity, 263 m. disengagement from action, 168 m. duty, 170 (fig.) m. human being, 287, 288 m. illigitimate means, 266, 267 m. imperatives, 49, 51, 56, 57, 59, 61 Islam, m. debate between different factions of, 62 justice, m. acceptable way to perpetrate, 160 m. justification, 67, 263, 264, 267 love, m. narrative of, 66 m. majority, 60 m. masochism/sadism, 67, 119 m. v. national interest debates, 17 nihilistic amoralism, 288 m. paradox, 65 m. reciprocity, 267 m. reform, 222 m. relativism, 20 m. responsibility, 258, 259, 268–272 suicide terrorism, m. basis for, 173 m. superiority, 167 vision, m. devoid of, 281 vocation, creative m., 280 Western m. values, 158 Morrison, Toni, 100, 118 mortality, 10, 61, 66 Moscow Mechanism, 35, 36 (m)other experiences, 87 motiv(ation)(es), 75, 78–80, 83–85, 138, 142, 153, 289 affiliation m., 58, 65 attitude-influencing m., 81 individual/personal/self-serving m., 58, 76, 81, 124, 155, 166, 183, 184, 197, 202, 205, 212 non-survival technologies, m. to promote, 238 profit m., 229, 236, 248, 252, 252 religoius conviction as m., 164 terrorist, m. to become, 156, 161, 162, 171–175, 179 United States’ m., 43, 158 Mubarak, Hosni, 171

332

INDEX

Muhammad, 62, 134, 165, 176, 203 Mujahideen Consultative Council, 174 Mullen, Mike, 112 “We Can’t Do It Alone” (Mullen), 112 multinational companies (multinationals), 235, 236, 242, 250, 251 Muslim Brotherhood, 132 Muslim(s) /M. World/organizations, 30, 34, 40, 41, 42, 49, 62, 65, 117, 160, 165, 171, 172, 174, 176, 197, 203, 204, 206 Afghan M., 154 M.-Americans, 134, 138 anti-M. sentiment, 206 Arab M., 206 Christian v. M., 82 M. democracies, 131 M. in Ferghana Valley, 42 radical M., 119 respect learned by M. at early age, 168 Shiite rancor against M., 168 M. suicide attacks, 153 Sunni M., 164 Myanmar (Burma), 279 myth(s) (mythic invention), 53, 54, 64, 66, 209, 222, 223 atheism, m. of, 286 capitalism m., 55, 56 competing m., 66 creation m., 53, 65 de jure m., 280 divergent m., 63 Greek m., 172 identity, relation of m. to, 67 individual subject, m. of, 106 Jesus m., 66 nation building m., 281 religious m., 56, 59, 60 Naess, Arne, 272 naiveté, 18, 98 Najaf, 172 narrative, 45, 53, 54, 57, 119, 222 capitalist n., 55 moral n., 66 religious n., 55, 56, 59, 60 ,63–65 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 128, 132

National Guard Bureau Regulations (NGB), 189 National Guard Forces, 183, 186, 188, 189–192, 195, 196, 275 National Identity Cards, 187 National Intelligence Estimate, 172 National Security, Office of the Director of, 129 National Security Language Initiative (NSLI), 123, 129 National Security Strategy, 22, 111 National Service Program, 183, 187, 194, 275 nationalism, 87 nation-states, 49, 113–116, 119, 265, 266 armed conflict between n.s., 257, 270 justice obligations of n.s., 265 material inequalities between n.s., 267, 268 nuclear weapons n.s., 109, 110 Soviet and British n.s., survival of, 211 Native American Stories, 55 natural resources, 9, 114, 158, 183, 200, 217, 220, 257, 265–267, 269 Nazis, 60, 124, 145, 146, 211, 254 neo-N., 205 negotiation(s), 119, 264 The New World Strategy (Summers), 112 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 3 The Children of Light, 3 Niyazov, Saparmurat, 36 nonbelievers/unbelievers, 164 nondomination, 267, 268 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 23, 30, 33, 41 non-state actors, 113–116 normality, 157 norms, 23, 38, 76, 103, 106, 133, 142– 144, 155, 157, 275 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 113, 189 nuclear fission, 254 nuclear (weapons) state(s), 109, 110, 113 nuclear (non-)proliferation, 25, 131 Nussbaum, Martha, 260, 261

Index Nye, Joseph, 113 Power and Independence (with Keohane), 113 objectification, 91, 92 false o., 87 objects, 71, 73, 82, 90, 94, 221, 280 categorization of o., 57 internal o. in psychic life, 88 occupation of Iraq, United States, 157, 170, 170 (fig.), 173 occupational specialty (MOS), 190, 192, 193 Officer Corps, 191 Ogallala Aquifer/Sandstone, 1, 10, 231 oil, 2, 45, 158, 172, 200, 229, 230, 236, 237, 242, 245, 250, 253, 265 fuels, o.-based, 243 multinational o. companies, 242 Oister, George K., 183, 229, 275–277 Olcott, Martha Brill, 38 Operation Enduring Freedom, 112, 138 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 112 oppressors, 158, 173 order, 55, 114, 119 evils in o., 285 implicate o., 91 natural o., 287 world o., 211, 217, 218, 224 organic fuels, 232 organizations, 98, 217, 240, 242, 243, 254 o. climate, 238 development o., 12 foreign-run o., 30 grassroots o., 29, 41 governmental o., 23, 28 humanitarian aid o., 150 international o., 36 Islamic o., 32, 127 Muslim o., 30 NGOs, 28, 30 police o., 188 private voluntary o., 284 research o., 238 United States is a member, o. of which, 189

333

terrorist o., 173–175, 177, 178, 196 third space o., 263 veterans’ o., 195 Organization of American States (OAS), 35, 36 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 35, 36 Osborne, Randall E., 1, 49, 51, 57, 117, 119 otherness, 87, 98, 99 self v. o., 50 Our Town (Carr), 58 outgroup(s), 57–59, 74, 168, 177, 202– 205, 210, 211, 213, 215 ozone layer, 252 Pakistan, 9, 11, 164, 176, 286 Palestine, 154, 158, 160, 164, 166, 170– 172, 174, 177, 179 Israel-P. conflict, 159 Palestinian Liberation Organization, 61 Paley, Stephen, 183, 229, 275–277 Pan-Arabism, 132 Pape, Robert Anthony, 114, 158 Bombing to Win Air Power, 114 parables, Christian, 55 paradox, 84, 118, 119 certainty, p. of, 63 moral p., 65 religion, p. of, 49, 51, 52, 55, 59–62, 64 self, p. of, 70, 71 paranoid disidentifications, 91 paranoid response to terror(ism), 118, 119 paranoid-schizoid position, 88, 90, 91, 93 parochial interests, 263, 264 participation, citizen/civic, 27, 31, 225 stakeholders, p. of, 224 Pascual, Carlos E., 25, 26, 28 patent(s), 248, 250, 251 patience (sabr), 24, 164, 174, 281 patriotism, 195 peace, 7, 8, 12, 19, 21, 22, 26, 45, 62, 67, 99, 116, 119, 124, 125, 148, 185, 218, 221, 257, 279–281, 287 p. building, 173, 174 p. resolutions, 201 Peace Dividend, 189

334

INDEX

Peirce, Charles Sanders, 223 Pentagon, 111, 153, 185, 186 “Pentagon Plans for combating the ‘Tactics of the Weak’” (Sherman), 185 permafrost, 233 Persian Gulf War, 128 philosophy, 21, 23, 37, 70, 71, 139, 263 photosynthesis, 13, 244 physicists, 91, 233, 238, 241 police actions, 187 police training, 35 policy, American foreign, 3, 7, 17–24, 27, 29, 31, 34–41, 43, 135, 281, 284 politics, 17, 58, 95, 128, 131, 132, 160, 170, 279, 283, 285 p. community, 259, 263–267 p. decisions, 263, 264 p. leaders, 115, 132, 173, 254 American p. l., 250 Islamic p. l., 159 Nazi p. l., 146 pollut(ants)(ion), 9, 11, 15, 99, 229, 230, 235, 237, 243, 248, 252, 253, 269, 272 poor, the, 13, 42, 56, 59, 132, 160, 260, 282, 284 rich-poor dichotomy, 14, 286 population, 79, 177, 183, 272, 277 Aral Sea, p. in vicinity of, 10 bird p., diminishing, 270 civilian p., 195, 196 formula to determine effect of p. on environment, 14 p. of France v. India, 139 future p., 1 p. growth/increase, 2, 9, 10, 12, 14, 130, 187, 234, 238 indigenous p., 279 Iraqi p., 201 Islamic p., 132 jihadis v. general p., 165 local p., 18, 42 overp. 8, 230 Palestinean p., 160, 176 p. reduction, 230 p. relocation, 266

Timorese p., 148, 149 world p., 11, 13, 14, 56, 198, 229 poor p. of w., 160 suicide terrorits, p. that support, 125, 157, 173–175 Posen, Barry, 110–112 Posse Comitatus Act, 187 Postel, Sandra, 10 poverty, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 20, 38, 43, 64, 87, 128, 131, 154, 155, 160, 172, 180, 271, 284, 285, 287 Powell, Colin, 21, 24 powell, john a., 106 power, 18, 33, 43, 92, 200, 201, 286, 287 air/land p., 114 balance of p., 279 colonial p., 172 culture, p. of, 127 coercive p., 263, 264 dangerous p. exported from Middle East, 135 de facto p., 280 democratic freedom, p. of, 36 deterrent p., 109 electric p., 11, 252 group p., 92, 208 hegemonic p., 43 higher p. (deity), 57 individual p. over action, 88 love, p. of, 97, 107 military p., 62, 112, 171, 185, 267 myth, p. of, 60, 65, 222 Other, p. of, 119 political p., 201, 203, 264 powerlessness, 141, 160 racial dominance, p. of, 100 p. relations, 118 solar p., 242 state p., 22, 123, 133 superordinate goals, p. of, 276 territorial p., 267 terrorist p., 174 United States’ p. position in world, 111, 115 veto p. in UN Security Council, 139 wind p., 230

Index Power and Independence (Keohane and Nye), 113 precautionary principle, 270 precipitation, 231 preempti(on)(ve action), 19, 109, 114, 115 Preemption (Dershowitz), 115 prejudice, 90, 92, 100, 168, 183, 197– 215, 263, 283 The Prince (Machiavelli), 43 priorities, 8, 17, 22, 33, 185, 290 privilege, 2, 98, 100, 103, 105, 106, 154, 158, 210, 213 problem solving, 103, 155, 206 profit(s), 56, 60, 127, 229, 235, 236, 248, 249, 251, 252, 254, 285, 286 projection, 87, 88, 118, 119 projective identification, 49, 87, 88, 90,, 91, 93 prosperity, 20, 21, 24, 43, 45, 128, 131 “Protestantism and the Spirit of Capitalism” (Weber), 55 protocols, 113, 188 psychic life, 88, 89 psychology, 73, 139, 142, 156 group membership, p. of, 87, 93, 143 social p., 49, 71, 72, 78, 137, 141 Western p., 166 whiteness, p. of, 49, 50, 97 psychopath(ology)(s), 154, 155, 157 puppets, 159 purpose, 9, 54, 63 American ideology in global arena, p. of, 43, 44 unintended p., 235 Pyszczynski, Tom, 61, 205 Quakers, 53, 58, 60 quantum theory, 239 quarterly training schedule (QTS), 191 quick-fix mentality, 281 Qur’an (Koran, Quranic verses, passages), 62, 134, 162–165, 176. See also Wahhabism Rabin, Yitzhik, 56

335

rac(e)(ial issues)(ism), 2, 3, 50, 60, 87, 89, 90, 97–106, 118, 204–207, 209, 212, 213, 226 racialized world, 97, 98, 99, 105 Radio Corporation of America (RCA), 240 rationalism, scientific, 220 rationality, 141, 155, 221, 223, 232, 264 Rawls, John, 3, 138, 257, 258, 270 A Theory of Justice, 3, 258 Reagan, Ronald, 193 reality, 2, 20, 24, 40, 50, 53-55, 92, 220, 280, 281, 283 r. of Arab world, 131 different versions of r., 224 divisible/indivisible r., 90 empirical r., 8, 21, 36 flawed views of r., 287 moral r., 61 objective construction of r., 83 r. in Palestine, 159, 160 perception of r., 144, 280 religious v. secular r., 62 subjective r., 164 taken-for-granted r., 100 realpolitik, 18, 45 reason, 260, 261, 280 reparative r., 93–95 reciprocity principle, 265 Red Crescent Organization, 66 Red Cross, International, 66 International Committee of R. C., 161 Rees, William, 15 reform, 20, 23, 24, 39, 130, 147 democratic r., 19, 27, 27 (table), 28, 35 domestic r., 128 economic r., 19, 21, 32, 33, 130 generational r., 39 Islamic r., 132 judicial r., 35 moral r., 222 political r., 38 regulations, 189, 190, 219, 266 relatedness, 87 depressive r., 89 empathetic r., 94 interr., 106, 255

336

INDEX

relatedness, con’t. persecutory r., 89 relationships, 58, 77, 88, 141, 221, 276 cause-effect r., 226, 270 early r., 88, 95 family r., 76 (inter)personal r., 57, 73, 97, 98, 100, 286, 287 intimate r., 95 race influences r. of United States and rest of world, 106 religion, 49, 51–56, 58–65, 67, 68, 71, 115, 118, 119, 123, 131, 133, 139, 164, 203, 222, 287 r. convictions, 156, 163-165, 222 r. paradox, 51, 52, 65 ultraorthodox r. groups, 94 reparation, 93, 94, 166, 222 research, 286 aggression, r. on, 141–144 behavioral r., 72 cognitive heuristics, r. on, 80 conflict reduction r., 207, 208, 215 conformity, r. on, 144 environmental r., 224 deprivation, r. on relative, 200 fairness, r. on perception of, 124 global warming, r. on, 233 government grants, r. funded by, 250, 251, 254, 255 identity r., 57, 58, 203, 210 inclusiveness, r. on, 197 (in)justice, r. on, 140, 141, 152 innovative r., 276 memory r., 83 minimal groups paradigm r., 202 Optimal Distinctiveness Theory, r. on, 58 racial prejudice, r. on, 198, 199, 204, 205, 209–211, 213 self, r. on, 74 stereotypes, r. on, 212 survival technologies r., 235, 236, 238–241, 246 sustainability, r. on participatory, 225 terror management r., 84

Reserve forces (reservists), 186–189, 191–196 residential development, 231 Respect for Nature (Taylor), 258 responsibility, 2, 29, 177, 250 attribution of r., 83 collective r., 268 corporate r. to employees, 285 deferred r., 170 (fig.) diffused r., 168 distribution of r., 140 individual r. for terrorism, 167, 168 moral r., 270 poor, r. to and for the, 284 transcendental r., 152 Reuter, Christoph, 155 The Revenge of Gaia (Lovelock), 3 reverse osmosis, 245, 248 reward(s), 26, 27, 56, 103, 124, 139, 142, 143, 157, 162, 164–166, 169, 170, 170 (fig.), 173, 176, 177, 183, 194, 202 rice, 10, 13 Rice, Condoleezza, 37, 42 Rilke, Rainer Maria, 106 Letters to a Young Poet, 106 risk, 1, 26, 38, 70, 109, 141, 191, 198, 204, 252 r. calculus, 110, 115, 116 ritual(s), 53, 54, 149 Robber’s Cave experiments, 199, 207, 208 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 211, 218, 254 Rudd, Mark, 92 rule of law, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 30, 128, 147 Rumsfeld, Donald, 42, 185 sacraments, 55 sacrifice, 37, 56, 164, 174 Sadat, Anwar El, 123, 127, 179 Sadek, Sanaa Mounir, 123, 127, 179 salinization, 10, 12. See also desalination salvation, 55, 152 Saudi Arabia, 132, 146, 151, 153, 170, 176 Saudi Ministry of Education, 176 scarcity/shortage of fresh water, 1, 8, 10– 13, 45, 130, 231

Index Schelling, Thomas, 109, 110, 112, 113, 116 “The Dialogue of Competitive Armament,” 112 Sciolino, Elaine, 157 scorpion-alligator allegory, 61, 62 security, 1, 9, 19, 20, 49, 119, 147, 257, 265, 280, 281, 289, 290 American national s., 17, 18, 21, 22, 25, 26, 31, 32, 36, 37, 40, 42, 43, 123, 129, 185, 188, 189, 203 A. border s., 193 democratic freedom, s. at expense of, 36, 39 increased s. measures, 173 A. Homeland s., 186, 195 Central Asia, s. in, 28, 32–34, 37, 38 “diplomacy for show,” s. impact of, 38, 39 environmental s., 9 food s., 10, 13 global/international s., 2, 3, 5–8, 14, 15, 25, 26, 31, 40, 45, 46, 51, 97, 109, 127, 137, 138, 140–142, 144, 145, 147, 150, 152, 179, 183, 184, 197, 217, 275–277, 279, 282 Israeli s., 154, 159 Middle East, s. in, 61 miltary s., 146 profiling presents weakness to s., 205, 206 strategies, long-term s., 17, 21, 41 transnational s. programs, 35, 36 Turkmenistan’s s. services, 35, 36 whiteness, s. offered by, 101, 102, 106, 107 self, 54, 57, 59, 69–71, 73–75, 84, 85, 90, 104, 118, 156, 202 attribution, s.-effacing, 79 bias, s.-serving, 79–81, 83, 85, 117 s.-categorization, 57, 58 child’s experience of s., 87 s.-concept, 74, 76, 80, 83 s.-c. across cultures, 77 conflict within/caused by s., 49, 83, 117 s.-deception, 100, 102, 106, 288

337

s.-defense, 276 s.-destruction, 69, 90 s.-determination, 162, 183, 184, 257, 262, 267, 276, 277 s.-esteem, 57, 75, 84, 202, 203, 208 fragmented/split s., 91, 98 s.-fulfilling prophesy, 81–83, 282 s.-identity, 7, 45, 98, 101, 103 racialized s.-i., 105 s.-importance, 78 s.-governance, 263–267 s.-interest, 138, 140, 218, 229, 242, 249, 253, 285 s.-knowledge, 58 s.-motives, 58, 81, 85 s. v. other, 49, 50, 57, 69, 77, 79 s. perception, 70, 76, 79, 141, 204 s.-regulation, 204, 211, 212, 276 s.-relevance, 78, 80, 81 s.-reliance, 261 s.-representations, 75 s.-validation, 261 s.-verification, 76, 80, 81 s.-worldview, 92 s.-worth, 57, 84 Sen, Amartya, 260 separation, 119, 123, 127, 151 s. v. connection, 50, 92, 97–99, 101, 105, 107 Sesame Street, 212, 214 sexism, 87, 89 Shahda, Amal, 157 shaheed/shuhada (martyr[s]), 153, 168 Sharia (Shari’a), 123, 133, 134 Sharon, Ariel, 171 Shehada, Salah, 171 Shell Oil Company, 242 Shepherd, Matthew, 60 Sherif, Muzafar, 199, 207, 208 Sherman, Jason, 185 “Pentagon Plans for combating the ‘Tactics of the Weak,’” 185 Shi’a, 56, 62, 65, 154, 201 Shockley, William, 238 Shwe, Than, 279

338

INDEX

Singer, Peter, 258 Animal Liberation, 258 skeptics, 287 social change. See change: social social comparison. See comparison: social social condition, 217 socialism, 132, 222, 280, 281, 286 societ(ies)(y), 50, 92, 132, 136, 155, 157, 173, 205, 215, 223, 270, 273, 277, 285 advanced s., 14 Arabic s., 123 Asian s., 34 civil s., 19, 23–29, 31, 33–36, 38 conflict, transition of s. from, 26 democratic s., 203 devisive s., 95 dignity, concept of in s., 261 economic sector of s., 266 enemies, reintegrate into s., 147 German s., 145 hegemonic s., 21 homosexuals within s., 60 Iraqi s., 146 Islamic/Muslim s., 133–135, 175 just s., 138, 140, 148, 217, 258, 260, 286 myth, role of in s., 53 peaceful s., 218 racist s., 49 religion, role of in s., 133 repressive s., 41 sustainable s., 46, 257–259, 269 terrorism within s., 20, 23, 24 tribal s., 53 war-torn s., 146 Western s., 124, 135 women, role of in s., 133, 134 sociocultural forms, 262 socio-ecologic systems, 225, 277 socio-historical categories/context, 103, 157 soft targets, 186 soil degradation, 12 solar energy, 242 Solarex Corporation, 235 solidarity, 93, 135, 174, 264 Sorel, Georges, 221, 222

soul, 65, 71, 165, 279 South Pole, 252 Soviet Union, 25, 113, 148, 186, 209, 211 space, outer, 112 spacelessness, 89 Spanish American War, 190 Spanish Inquisition, 51 stakeholders, 9, 224–226, 275, 277 Stalin, Joseph, 211 statecraft, 18 statin drugs, 251 stereotyp(es)(ing), 74, 78, 80–82, 98, 154, 179, 197, 198, 203–206, 208, 209, 212–214 Stiti, Rasan, 159, 164, 166, 168, 169 strategic gain, 20 Strategic Planning Guidance, 185 Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), 92, 93 Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, 31, 32, 38 subjectivity, 72, 79, 87, 91, 140, 144, 150, 164, 287 substate groups, 257 Suez Canal, 132 Sunni, 49, 56, 62, 65, 117, 158, 164, 201 suicidality, 156 suicide bomb(ers)(ings), 123–125, 129, 131, 153–179, 198, 206 Summers, Harry, 112 The New World Strategy, 112 Sun Tzu, 109 superordinate goals/efforts, 57, 184, 208–211, 276, 277 survival, 3, 97, 107, 109, 142, 221, 260, 268, 271 democracy, s. of Western, 240 mutual s. of Soviet Union and Great Britain, 211 s. strategies, 183, 229, 230–232, 234, 235, 243, 246–255, 276, 277 sustainability, 1–3, 46, 183, 217–221, 224–227, 229, 235, 254, 255, 257, 268–271, 273, 275, 277, 279 Symbiotic Planet (Margulis), 3

Index symbol(ism)(ization)(s), 51, 55, 87, 93, 94, 203, 204, 262 s. interactionism, 76 linquistic s., 53 religious/sacred s., 54, 66 symmetry/asymmetry, 24, 89–91 syphilis experiments, 56 Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), 192 Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), 192 Tajikistan, 19, 24, 26, 27, 29, 31, 33, 36, 42 Tanzanian Embassy bombers, 164 tar sands, Canadian, 242 Tashkent, 41 taxes, 160, 188, 219, 269 Taylor, Paul W., 258 Respect for Nature, 258 Taylor, Shelley E., 78 technolog(ies)(ists)(y), 14, 15, 32, 46, 50, 268, 275, 276, 290 agricultural sensing t., 246 algae t., 244 anti-terrorism t., 183, 185, 187, 195 belief t. can solve all problems, 220 birth-control t., 230 civilian t., post-war transition to, 240 commercial t., non-optimum, 248 desalination t., 1, 245, 248 dwindling number of technologists, 242 earth, impact of t. on, 2, 219 energy t., 230, 238 environmental t., 250, 253 fossil fuel support t., 245 globalization, t. aspect of, 130 innovative t., 235, 242, 246, 248, 251, 269 military t., 111, 186, 187, 194, 277 oil-drilling t., 200 space t., 209 survival t., 183, 229–232, 234–243, 246–255, 276 t. training, 241 Teixeira, Vanessa, 123, 124, 153, 179 television, 131, 205, 214, 240, 242

339

territorial powers, 265–268 territories, 265, 266, 268 Afghanistan’s t., 19 Palestinian t., 214 United States t., 185, 187 terror management theory, 61, 66, 84 terror(ists)(ism), 2, 8, 24–26, 31, 37–41, 49, 56, 94, 118, 119, 124, 127, 130, 131, 135, 153, 157, 159, 160, 172–174, 178 anti-t./counter t., 26, 35, 40, 41, 185– 187, 194 cultural-psychological theory of s. t., 153–178, 170 (fig.) deterring t., 109 suicide t., 124, 125, 153–158, 160, 167,170 (fig.), 170–173, 175–179 war on t., 20, 22, 23, 27, 32, 42, 51, 183, 185, 186, 195, 196, 275–277 A Theory of Justice (Rawls), 3, 258 theory, 82 aggression, psychological t. on, 143 attribution t., 77, 78, 81 being, t. of, 91 capabilities t., 259–261 categorization t., 57 coevolutionary t., 258 conflict t., 199, 200 democracy, t. of deliberative, 265 deprivation t., relative, 199 deterrence, t. of, 109, 113, 114, 115 ethical t., 3 fact and t., disparity between, 281 identity t., social, 57, 74, 202 justice, t. of, 3, 138, 258–262, 273 synoptic j. t., 257, 259, 260 Kleinian t., 90 learning t., 143, 204, 205 mathematical set t., 89 Optimal Distinctiveness T., 58, 59 t.-practice collision, 7, 8, 17 psychoanalytic t., 87, 88 systems t., 156 adaptive s. t., 225 quantum t., 239

340

INDEX

theory, con’t. terror, t. about, 124, 141, 142, 153, 155, 156, 170 (fig.) t. management t., 61, 66, 84 threat t., 202, 203 wave t., 91 timelessness, 89 thinking, 76, 80, 84, 90, 220 aggressive t., 123 asymmetric t., 90 atomistic t., 91 black and white t., 179, 180 colorblind t., 104 conventional t., 239, 283 dichotomous t., 102 linear t., 89 new t., 7 philosophical t., 39 rigid t., 280 self-centered t., 290 static t., 91 stereotypical t., 204, 205, 213 terrorist t., 145, 155, 156, 168 Third World Alliance, 92 Thompson, Loren, 185 thought. See thinking threat, 39, 59, 110, 211, 255, 284 t. behavior, 73 Central Asia, t. in, 34 deterrent t., 110 environment, t. to, 11, 214, 219, 222, 231, 233, 270 existence, t. to, 84 external/outside t., 46, 189 individual as source of t., 145 injustice, t. posed by, 152 Integrated T, Theory, 202, 203 Islamic t., posed by, 34, 160 Israel, t. to, 159 myth, t. created by, 222 perceived t., 88, 144, 203 retaliation, t. of, 115 security t., 9, 14, 18, 19, 21, 46, 112– 116, 137, 141, 142, 144, 145 9/11-type t., 187 self-determination, t. to, 276

self/identity, t. to, 59, 90, 95, 98, 101, 123, 202, 206 technology t. to markets, 251 tendency to side with more t., 211 violence, t. of, 264 war on terrorism, t. created by, 185 timelessness, 89 toxic waste dumps, 56 Toyota, 249 tradition(s), 64 Islamic t., 34 Kleinian t., 94 Quaker t., 53 Rawlsian t., 258 Western philosophical t., 259 trafficking, 35 Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 191, 192 transistor, 238 transnational security programs, 35 treaties, broken, 266 Trotsky, Leon, 161 truth, 52, 67, 68, 287, 288 t. commission, 147 divergent t., 98 forensic v. emotional t., 147 infer general t. from single event, 80 search for t., 119 truthfulness, 164 tsunami of 2004, 209 Tuason, Teresa, 123, 124, 153, 179 Turkmenistan, 35, 36 Uncle Remus stories, 55 unclean animals, 167, 177 unconscious, the, 49, 87, 92, 102 undamped positive feedback upon the input, 233 Unit Readiness Report, 193 Unit Structure, 191 United Nations (UN), 139, 201 UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 13, 219 UN Environment Protection Programme (UNEP), 12 UN sanctions against Iraq, 200

Index United Nations (UN), con’t. UN Security Council, 139, 149, 150 United States, 8, 10, 13–15, 25, 26, 28, 33, 38, 39, 45, 55, 56, 63, 65, 67, 75, 94, 97, 99, 103, 106, 110– 116, 123, 124, 127–130, 133, 138, 139, 141, 145, 146, 150, 151, 172, 174, 184, 189, 191, 203, 206–209, 211, 212, 214, 215, 218, 231, 236, 237, 240, 245, 246, 249, 252, 253, 289 U.S. border security, 35, 135, 185– 188, 192, 193, 195, 282 U.S. foreign policy, 17–24, 27, 29, 31, 32, 34–41, 43, 135, 284 U.S. war on terror, 20, 22, 23, 27, 32, 42, 51, 183, 185–188, 192, 194– 196, 201, 275, 277 United States Army Reserve (USAR), 193 universe, 55, 91, 221, 287, 290 U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, 189 U.S.-Japan Bilateral Alliance, 189 “us”-”them,” 2, 50, 64, 69–85, 102, 117, 118, 202 Uzbekistan (Uzbek), 19, 24, 26–33, 36, 42 Valadez, Jorge M., 183, 257, 276, 277 values, 78, 79, 104, 174, 213, 262, 290 American v., 32, 42 collective v., 170 (fig.) cultural v., 76, 155, 157, 170 egalitarian v., 204, 205, 212 family v., 285 moral v., 158 Muslim v., 133, 171, 203 myth, v. communicated by, 66, 280 Vaughn, Leigh A., 213 Venter, Anré, 49, 69, 117 veterans’ organizations, 195 victim(ization)(s), 59, 60, 79, 139, 141, 167, 200, 201, 203, 205 attibutions made by v., 144 compensation for v., 147, 149, 150 crimes, v.less, 73 empathy with v., 169, 175 marginalization, v. of, 60

341

terrorist, v. as motive to become, 61, 172 Vietnam War, 151 vilification, 49, 94, 118 violence, 45, 51, 52, 61, 64, 72, 114–116, 119, 131, 135, 141, 142, 150, 154, 161–163, 170 (fig.), 171, 172, 200, 203, 206, 212, 270, 280, 284 domestic v., 123, 133 Iraq, v. in, 62 political v., 145 pre- v. post-war v. levels, 144 threat of v., 264 Virgin Airlines, 247 vision, 19–21, 54, 56, 100, 128, 129, 217, 218, 221, 224, 225, 281, 282 volunteers for terrorism missions, 153, 154, 156–158, 161–164, 166– 173, 176, 177, 186 vulnerability, 13, 61, 107 Wackernagel, Mathis, 15 Wahhabism, 132, 176. See also Qur’an war(fare), 93, 94, 109–111, 113, 114, 116, 135, 139, 145, 156, 185, 186, 190, 192, 276. See also Cold War, Iraq: I. War, Korean War, Persian Gulf War, Vietnam War, War for Independence, American, World Wars asymmetric w., 195 holy w., 159, 162, 164 ideas, w. of, 37 just w., 55 peace not absence of w., 279 terror, w. on, 17, 18, 20, 22–24, 27, 29, 31, 32, 34–36, 40, 42, 43, 51, 119, 147, 183, 185–188, 192, 194–196, 201, 273, 275, 277 unconventional w., 196 violence, pre/post w. levels of, 144 w.-torn countries, 146, 149, 150 War for Independence, American, 189 water, 246, 266, 269, 270 aquifers, rate of w. use from, 269 w.-borne disease, 11, 12

342

INDEX

water, con’t. conflict, w.-related, 11 drought, w. lost by, 231 fresh/potable w., 1, 2, 9, 12, 45, 61, 100, 118, 169, 219, 229–230, 245 ground-saltw. intrusion, 11 interrupted w. supply, 208 irrigation w., 13, 231, 248 nuclear-reactors, w.-cooled, 231 polluted w., 11 w. purification, 11 salt/ocean/desalinated w., 231, 233, 244, 245, 248 w.sheds, 270 w. shortage/scarcity, 1, 13, 130, 231 w. vapor, 232 w.-availability rates, 10 wealth, 3, 55, 56, 60, 87, 158, 200, 264, 282, 285–287 w. v. poverty, 14, 64 w. production, 46 weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 112–115 weapons of mass effect (WME), 112, 114, 159 weapons-system modernization, 185 Weaver, Randy, 51 Weber, Max, 55, 220 “Protestantism and the Spirit of Capitalism,” 55 “We Can’t Do It Alone” (Mullen), 112 well-being, 138, 153, 217, 220, 270 West, the, 39, 65, 128, 132, 160, 174, 176, 179, 180 West Bank, 154 Wetzler, Brian Richard, 183, 197, 275, 277 White Man’s Burden (Kipling), 56

white(ness)(s), 49, 50, 82, 89, 97–107, 117, 118, 179, 180, 200, 205 whitespace, 99–103 wholeness, 91, 93 World Conservation Union (IUNC), 219 World Economic Forum, 151 world order, 211, 217, 218, 224 World Trade Center, 31, 59, 111, 153 World Wars (I, II), 60, 124, 131, 190 auto industry at end of WWII, 249 defense research since WWII, 239, 240 Federal Reserve Unites formed after WWI, 191 German behavior leading to WWII, 145 Japan after WWII Japanese internment during WWII, 141 NATO treaty since WWII, 189 post-WWII Germany, 137, 145, 146, 177 United States allies in WWII, 211 United States military since WWI, 186 victorious allies from WWII, 139 worldview defens(e)(iveness), 53, 59 worldview(s), 157, 217, 220 conflicting w., 84 inclusive w., 121, 123, 179, 180, 183, 197, 214 relational w., 221 self-w., 92 suicide bombers, w. of, 155 Western civilization, w. of modern, 220, 221 Worldwatch Institute, 13, 217 Wright brothers, 240 Wu Ch’I, 112, 116 Yemen, 11, 13, 153

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