Global Community Global Security
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Global Community Global Security
VIBS Volume 198 Robert Ginsberg Founding Editor Leonidas Donskis Executive Editor Associate Editors G. John M. Abbarno George Allan Gerhold K. Becker Raymond Angelo Belliotti Kenneth A. Bryson C. Stephen Byrum Harvey Cormier Robert A. Delfino Rem B. Edwards Malcolm D. Evans Daniel B. Gallagher Andrew Fitz-Gibbon Francesc Forn i Argimon William Gay Dane R. Gordon J. Everet Green Heta Aleksandra Gylling Matti Häyry
Steven V. Hicks Richard T. Hull Michael Krausz Mark Letteri Vincent L. Luizzi Adrianne McEvoy Alan Milchman Peter A. Redpath Alan Rosenberg Arleen L. F. Salles John R. Shook Eddy Souffrant Tuija Takala ˇ Emil Višňovský Anne Waters John R. Welch Thomas Woods
a volume in Studies in Jurisprudence SJ Vincent L. Luizzi, Editor
Global Community Global Security
Edited by
Randall E. Osborne and Paul Kriese
Amsterdam - New York, NY 2008
Cover Design: Studio Pollmann The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of “ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for permanence”. ISBN: 978-90-420-2492-2 ©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2008 Printed in the Netherlands
Studies in Jurisprudence (SJ) Vincent L. Luizzi Editor
Formerly Natural Law Studies (NLS) Titles in NLS
Kenneth Bryson. Persons and Immortality. 1999. VIBS 77 Roger T. Simonds. Rational Individualisms. 1995. VIBS 20
Editor Emerita Virginia Black Judith Presler
I dedicate this book to Mom, for teaching me to see the human being first and all else second, and to my wife, Diane, and my son, Joseph, for helping me to love others more than I could ever love my self. Randall E. Osborne I dedicate this book to my father who with a high school education saw the good and bad of people but chose to accentuate the positive and encouraged me to do the same. Paul Kriese Together we dedicate this book to anyone who has ever suffered or fought in the name of civil rights, universal justice, human rights, or equality. May their sacrifices have not been in vain and may the world recognize their valor.
CONTENTS Editorial Foreword VINCENT LUIZZI Preface
xv
Introduction RICHARD T. HULL, RANDALL E. OSBORNE, PAUL KRIESE Part One UNIVERSAL JUSTICE AND GLOBAL SECURITY Introduction to Part One MATTHEW CROSSTON ONE
TWO
Global Security: Needed: A New Definition for a New Century LAURA MEDER Fighting Terror and Spreading Democracy: When Theory and Practice Collide MATTHEW CROSSTON
Wrap-up of Part One MATTHEW CROSSTON Part Two SELF VERSUS OTHER; “US” VERSUS “THEM” Introduction to Part Two KAREN LOMBARDI THREE
FOUR
xiii
1
5 7 9
17
45 47 49
Love and Hate as Moral Imperatives: Religious Paradox as a Challenge to Global Security RANDALL E. OSBORNE, PAUL KRIESE, STAN FRIEDMAN
51
Self versus Other; “Us” versus “Them”: The Self as Basis for Conflict ANRÉ VENTER
69
x
FIVE
SIX
SEVEN
GLOBAL COMMUNITY: GLOBAL SECURITY The Psychology of Group Membership and Alienation: Projective Identification and the Other KAREN LOMBARDI
87
The Psychology of Whiteness: Moving beyond Separation to Connection TERRI A. KARIS
97
Deterring Terror KEVIN C. M. BENSON
Wrap-up of Part Two KAREN LOMBARDI Part Three MOVING TOWARD AN INCLUSIVE WORLDVIEW Introduction to Part Three C. DOMINIK GÜSS EIGHT
NINE
TEN
109
117 121 123
A “Non-Media” Look at the Middle East: Enhancing Global Security through Exposure and Understanding SANAA MOUNIR SADEK
127
International Perspectives on Social Justice: Essentials for the Effort Toward Global Security JOHN M. DAVIS
137
A Cultural-Psychological Theory of Suicide Terrorism and What to Do about Suicide Terrorism C. DOMINIK GÜSS, TERESA TUASON, VANESSA TEIXEIRA
153
Wrap-up of Part Three C. DOMINIK GÜSS Part Four DIVERSE STRATEGIES FOR EXPANDING PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL COMMUNITY Introduction to Part Four ELIZABETH LEIGH CRALLEY, BRIAN RICHARD WETZLER
179
181 183
Contents ELEVEN
TWELVE
THIRTEEN
Proposed Strategies for Integration of Military and Civilian Agencies in the War on Terrorism within the United States and its Territories RICHARD FRIZZELL From Cooperative Intergroup Contact to Personal Motivation: A Social Psychological Perspective on Promoting a More Inclusive Worldview ELIZABETH LEIGH CRALLEY, BRIAN RICHARD WETZLER Participatory Sustainability: Building Sustainability for Complexity and Change VICENTE L. LOPES, VINCENT LUIZZI
FOURTEEN Human Sustainability: Overview of Survival Technologies and Impediments to Their Development and Deployment STEPHEN PALEY, GEORGE K. OISTER, RICHARD T. HULL FIFTEEN
Adaptation, Sustainability, and Justice JORGE M. VALADEZ
Wrap-up of Part Four ELIZABETH LEIGH CRALLEY, BRIAN RICHARD WETZLER SIXTEEN
An Exploratory Essay on Justice, Security, and Genuine Peace JOSEPH J. CALIFANO
xi
185
197
217
229 257
275 279
Epilogue ELIZABETH D. BOEPPLE
289
WORKS CITED
291
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS
317
INDEX
319
EDITORIAL FOREWORD Jurisprudence, broadly conceived, examines how the laws of peoples and their social, moral, and political institutions attain such common ends as justice, security, peace, and enlightenment. Among these, peace has a prominent legacy. In The Laws, Plato identifies training citizens for peace or preparing them for war as the primary alternatives in legislating for the greatest good. He opts for peace and good will, the alternative, which requires a courageous citizenry that is strong and steadfast in the face of pain and pleasure. Virtuous citizens, in Plato’s view, develop a rational self-control, which permeates all aspects of their lives, including their responses to temptations of pleasure, whereas citizens in warrior cultures focus narrowly on the endurance of the pain of war. Legislation is the art of calculating how best to use pleasure and pain to achieve the desired result. Prominent philosophers of the Enlightenment also point to peace as the proper aim of government and connect it with views on ethics and human nature. In Thomas Hobbes’s view, our competitive, aggressive nature is the cause of our original, warlike condition. We realize that these egoistic pursuits will forever impoverish our lives, and the only hope for attaining the benefits of social cooperation is to submit to a powerful sovereign who will compel cooperation. Pressing for perpetual peace, Kant envisions the legal order as a key factor in achieving it; the prototype of the United Nations can be traced to Kant. He saw the growing spirit of commerce in the eighteenth century, which requires international cooperation, as a powerful impetus for seeking global stability. Our “asocial sociability” prompts us in that, however much we may long to structure the world in accord with our own views, our social side counteracts that impulse and paves the way for toleration and cooperation. Peace is no newcomer to thinking about the goal of government any more than human nature is, and the kinship of them to the subject of this volume on global security and community is evident. The last century ended with a renewed interest in international law, economics, and social practices as scholars, public officials, and the general public defined and evaluated globalization. This climate of opinion was timely insofar as the new millennium ushered in major threats to global security—terrorism and a severely challenged natural environment. Thinking about global security in terms of effective responses to terrorism and to the disruption of nature as a sustainable entity is as much a dominant theme of this anthology as it is of our time. The chapters in this volume originate in papers presented at two international assemblies—a Roundtable on Global Security in Oxford, U.K. in August 2006 and a special session on Justice and Sustainability at a conference on Race, Ethnicity, and Place at Texas State University-San Marcos in No-
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GLOBAL COMMUNITY: GLOBAL SECURITY
vember 2006. Global Community and Global Security is a much needed work and a welcome addition to Studies in Jurisprudence. Vincent Luizzi Studies in Jurisprudence Special Series Editor Texas State University-San Marcos
PREFACE The main purpose of this preface is to give the reader a sense of the growth and development of the ideas outlined within the chapters of this text. Few of the contributors to this volume envisioned writing a book on global security. Most set out originally to address one small aspect of global security from a personal or disciplinary perspective. The majority of the chapters in this text grew out of a “think tank” experience in the summer of 2006 called the Oxford Roundtable. Thirty-nine individuals from around the world (predominantly the United States) came together in Oxford England for a week to discuss the issue of global security from a variety of career and disciplinary perspectives. The participants had backgrounds in numerous branches of the United States military and academic institutions located at geographic locations on both coasts of the United States and many stops between. They hailed from diverse academic disciplines such as modern languages, literature, sociology, psychology, and technological security. Most of the contributors to this volume gave presentations at the 2006 Oxford Roundtable, where all the participants discussed the issues they raised. Their primary purpose was to allow a myriad of individuals working in a variety of ways on issues related to global security to hear from others and then return to their respective places in the world to digest what they heard. Participants neither spent time trying to weave their thoughts into a coherent whole nor to propose solutions to problems they addressed. Instead, they sought to begin a ripple effect after the participants left. A second and independent conference occurred during November 2006, held at Texas State University in San Marcos. This was an International Conference on Race, Ethnicity, and Place. One of the sessions in this second conference addressed the topic of Environmental Justice and Sustainability. After listening, pondering, digesting, and discussing for months following that experience, the organizers of these two conferences began to sense common threads throughout presentations in both conferences. They sensed a need to express the culmination of commonalities to others. Regardless of disciplinary background, country of origin, career perspective (academic, military, or corporate), suggested causes for threats to global security or proposed solutions for enhancing global security, the singular theme of global community emerged from their presentations. From a career military colonel proposing a “national service project” to an Arabic language and literature teacher proposing a study abroad experience, to two scientists and a philosopher worrying about how to curb the phenomena of global warming, the theme of “seeing other as self” began to take shape. When we look at the world through provincial borders, a sense of “us versus them” usually emerges. When we “see” the world through a community lens, however, a sense of “we” can and often does emerge.
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GLOBAL COMMUNITY: GLOBAL SECURITY
The intention of this volume, then, is not to propose a solution to the crises in global security. The intention of this volume is not to pinpoint the complete set of factors that threaten global security. The intention of this volume is to explore the issue of global security from military, academic, religious, scientific, technological, and personal perspectives so that the reader can understand the factors that promote an “us versus them” mentality. This volume proposes methods for minimizing that mentality so that we can build a sense of global community. If we are to overcome the foundations of international conflict, if we are to come together to solve our common problems of environmental degradation, if we are to recognize the fundamental truth of the image of “lifeboat earth,” then we must recognize our neighbors as reflections of ourselves. The fundamental insight of many theories of ethics is the power of seeing that the demands we place on others to respect our needs for freedom and well-being entail recognition of the reciprocal duty in ourselves to respect those needs in others. We express our gratitude to the organizers of the Oxford Roundtable and the conference on Race, Ethnicity and Place for providing many of the authors (and the editors) with the intellectual environments from which this book has grown. Our thanks to Diane Osborne for her assistance with general editing of many chapters, Elizabeth D. Boepple for invaluable production assistance, and Agricultural Management Systems for their generous financial assistance in the production of the manuscript. An earlier version of Chapter Fourteen, “Human Sustainability: Overview of Survival Technologies and Impediments to Their Development and Deployment,” was published in two parts: Stephen Paley, George K. Oister, and Richard T. Hull, “Can We Survive? (Part 1): The Changes Required to Deal Effectively with Global Warming,” Free Inquiry, 28, no. 2 (February/ March 2008): 44–47; and Stephen Paley, George K. Oister, and Richard T. Hull, “Can We Survive? (Part 2): The Changes Required to Deal Effectively with Global Warming,” Free Inquiry, 28, no. 3 (April/May 2008): 37–43. We gratefully acknowledge the permission of the authors to incorporate parts into this chapter. We also gratefully acknowledge permission to reprint the first and second parts of C. D. Güss, M. T. Tuason, and V. Teixeira, “A CulturalPsychological Theory of Contemporary Islamic Martyrdom,” Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour, 37 no. 4 (2007): 415–445, which appear in Chapter Ten, “A Cultural-Psychological Theory of Suicide Terrorism,” by C. Dominik Güss, Teresa Tuason, and Vanessa Teixeira.
INTRODUCTION Richard T. Hull, Randall E. Osborne, Paul Kriese Today we are witnessing what may be the first effects of global warming on sustainability of the planet and its life forms, security, and community. We could ascribe any one of the following phenomena, taken in isolation, to normal environmental fluctuations. Together, they indicate that we may—and the emphasis is on “may”—be witnessing hints of the future. On the intrastate, interstate, and international levels, water is fast becoming a scarce resource. Chronic drought is already forcing some communities in Tennessee to import potable water because reservoirs have dried up. Large cities like Atlanta, Georgia, have less than three months of water supply left. Rivers in Georgia that provide water to other states, such as Alabama and Florida, are already being contested as the needs of wildlife and human sustainability clash. Costal and near-coastal cities and states in the United States have not significantly invested in desalination technologies, partly because those that are available are horrendously expensive to install and maintain. Yet earth’s oceans and seas remain the most likely source of water needed directly by future populations and indirectly for agriculture. The practice of draining aquifer waters already has resulted in an incredible lowering of the aquifer level in the Midwest United States’ Ogallala sandstone; Mexico City’s subsidence due to a similar practice is well known. Another water-related global warming effect threatens coastal cities. A recent issue of Catalyst: The Magazine of the Union of Concerned Scientists reports on research that indicates: sustained warming between 1.6 degrees C and 5.2 degrees C above preindustrial levels could initiate widespread destabilization of the Greenland and West Antarctica ice sheets, leading to sea level rise between 12 and 40 feet. While the full increase may take centuries to occur, even an increase of one meter . . . would threaten major cities including Mumbai, New York, and Tokyo, and inundate some small islands. Rising seas also magnify the destructive potential of coastal storms; projections show a mere 7– to 14–inch rise could produce coastal flooding in Boston and Atlantic City, New Jersey, equivalent to today’s 100-year flood almost every year on average. . . . In the continental United States, drought-prone ecosystems are projected to expand approximately 11 per cent in area for each degree Celsius of additional warming. Worldwide, 1 to 2 billion people would be at risk of increased water scarcity. (Fall 2007, p.3)
2
RICHARD T. HULL, RANDALL E. OSBORNE, PAUL KRIESE
Admittedly, the recent warming trend in Greenland has improved quality of life for its more temperate communities. Gardening has recently sprung up, with individuals now producing vegetables apart from potatoes now being produced as the growing season has increased in length. Distribution by boat will be facilitated as the Arctic ice sheet recedes and the Northwest Passage opens to near year-round traffic. Individuals who have lived in climates with severe winters should experience milder weather for longer periods of the year. Our commitments to one another implied by the ethics of community, while they enable us to rejoice at good fortunes of some, do not authorize us to shrug at the misfortunes of others. Responsibility-shifting schemes such as carbon credits tend to foist burdens on to those whose fortune is only now on the rise and to insulate those whose behaviors are causally implicated in global warming. Territorial “up-river” claims of privilege have long been contested in inter- and intrastate water law, for good reasons. The Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River will displace over a million Chinese citizens and drastically alter the area’s biosphere. For too long we have been inattentive to issues of sustainability. Population growth, increasing global trade, the demand for energy, and the unfortunate-in-the-long-term abundance of coal and oil, have all brought us to the point of serious long-term consequences. Whether we can back away from ecological disaster is debatable. Whether the projections of consequences of global temperature increase are accurate in magnitude and time projections is debatable. But justice dictates that we take steps to forestall possible negative long-term consequences of our carbon and water economy by acting to prevent what damage we can and minimize that which we cannot entirely avoid. Caution also dictates that we proceed with care, that the steps we take not themselves be causes of other intolerable climate changes. Reality dictates that we also turn our attention to willful challenges to global security via terrorism and other forms of hate-based behavior. Just as physical borders are often seen as “ours” or “theirs,” psychological boundaries also exist. We can find these boundaries in the form of religious ideologies, language, racial viewpoints, gender viewpoints, and economic levels. Any boundary that can create within a human being a sense of “us” versus “them” can, and often will, result in hate-based behavior. We must understand these boundaries without condoning them. We must explore the limits of these boundaries without creating new ones. We must create a balance between individual and community that achieves an optimal level of distinctiveness from which all can proudly proclaim membership in unique human sub-communities and the collective global community of humanity. In this rich and complex collection, melding the results of two international conferences, finding a unifying theme is a challenging task. On the one hand, the task includes assessing the impact of technology and population growth on Planet Earth. James Lovelock’s 1979 work, Gaia: A New Look at
Introduction
3
Life on Earth, and Lynn Margulis’ 1998 book, Symbiotic Planet: A New Look at Evolution, together suggest that we can regard Earth as a living organism (Lovelock) or as a huge ecosystem composed of a series of interlocking ecosystems (Margulis). Lovelock’s latest book, The Revenge of Gaia: Earth’s Climate in Crisis and the Fate of Humanity (2006), suggests that our failure to accept the Gaia hypothesis has led to a looming crisis of irreversible degradation of the super ecosystem and a consequent massive loss of habitable land. This suggests looking at human beings as a kind of planetary cancer, a reemergence of very ancient themes once explored by Reinhold Niebuhr in his 1944 work, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness. Here is one theme that can help readers see unity in the present volume’s diversity. Another approach to reading this present collection, perhaps more philosophical than the Gaia hypothesis, would be to use the concept of global or planetary ethics and the challenge of extending the work in ethical theory of recent years to apply to the set of issues that are explored in this volume. For example, John Rawls’ 1971 A Theory of Justice introduced several seminal methods of evaluating the justice of some possible arrangement of social and economic structures. Rawls posited use of what he called the veil of ignorance to test whether a social structure would be just. We are to imagine being plunged into that structure ignorant of our own position, gender, race, wealth, station, and to ask whether that structure would be acceptable to us. Recognizing that inequalities might be desirable, he argued that inequalities would be just only when they bring maximal benefit to the least well off. So part of the discussion of global ethics would be to show how these concepts are to be applied in assessing the kinds of questions that arise in the present volume’s foreign policy critiques. Whatever “filter” the reader chooses to interpret the elements of this collection, the general tenor of all the essays in the present volume is that of a multifaceted crisis coming to maturity in the near future. Regardless of the academic, individual, philosophical, or moral perspective of the authors, the theme of global community is common to them all. We cannot achieve global security while individuals, governments, factions within countries, or dominant political parties are able to create new boundaries that further separate us as human beings. Instead, we need new constructs that provide us with a universal theme of global community from which to operate. Until we come to see “ourselves” as an integral part of the “other,” we cannot achieve the symbiosis needed between global community and global security. We cannot stress enough the importance of this work at this time. This work is a manual not only for the improvement of human sustainability, but also for the actual survival of humanity.
Part One UNIVERSAL JUSTICE AND GLOBAL SECURITY
INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE Matthew Crosston Part One, Universal Justice and Global Security, presents two chapters, “Global Security Needed: A New Definition for a New Century” and “Fighting Terror and Spreading Democracy: When Theory and Practice Collide,” as the foundation of the entire volume. Taken together, these chapters epitomize the larger goals of the volume as a whole and evaluate the crucial theoretical, empirical, and philosophical questions we would like readers to consider when reading all of the contributors. This book is meant to give readers insight into several issues by giving them something unique—perspectives from academic disciplines rarely combined within one volume. With a biologist and political scientist discussing interconnected issues of justice and security, Part One constitutes a perfect example of such an interdisciplinary approach. Today the world needs alternative approaches and new theorizing about justice and security. Old paradigms that still rein supreme—especially realism and its emphasis on sovereign states, national self-interest, and low expectations for cooperation—may not offer effective or safe approaches for the global community to resolve today’s increasingly complicated dilemmas. Crises are emerging in the twenty-first century that demand new thinking and innovative ideas to prevent great potential future dangers. Part One never strays far from these pressing issues, which is why any and all theoretical discussions offered are focused through a lens of empirical relevance. We are not simply producing scholarship for scholarship’s sake, but hoping to inspire and instigate debate and discussion on the issues that face the global community today, with a warning about some of the dangerous consequences if we fail to begin these inquiries. As the contributors to Part One consider theoretical issues and empirical connections, readers should be aware of the deeper philosophical questions that both authors consider: at their heart, these chapters are asking profound questions about how we define security, what constitutes safety, and whether justice truly achievable through foreign policy. When we take all three angles together— theoretical, empirical and philosophical—the impact of Part One as a blueprint for reading the remaining parts of the volume is revealed. Laura Meder’s “Global Security” rightly calls for an expanded definition of global security, as too much of the security discussion today still falls under investigations into military intervention, peacekeeping, sanctions, and embargoes. As a biologist, Meder is uniquely aware of how much the environment has always played an integral part in the continuation and intensification of conflict. The twenty-first century will only see the increasing salience of the environment in security issues.
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MATTHEW CROSSTON
We should understand the broadness of the term “environment” to encompass issues of poverty, resource scarcity, ecosystem failure, unreliable food sources, infectious diseases, and overpopulation. Meder cogently emphasizes how these issues will likely dominate the twenty-first century and will be the source for the global community’s worst crises and conflicts. Her emphasis on creating a new definition for global security is prescient and essential. The Matthew Crosston’s “Fighting Terror and Spreading Democracy” builds on the theoretical and philosophical questions posed by Meder. He examines how the United States, the world’s only superpower, supposedly tries to ensure greater global security. As the Meder chapter asks deeply philosophical questions by considering theory, the Crosston chapter asks equally profound philosophical questions by considering empirical reality. In a groundbreaking attempt to ascertain whether the United States’ dual policy priorities—spreading democracy and fighting terrorism—coincide, Crosston finds sincere intentions riddled with practical contradictions and collisions. Ultimately he argues that we should reevaluate the standard emphasis on shortterm solutions over long-term planning, and that we should likely reorder those priorities, not because of idealized liberalism but because of the probability that current security policy, as designed by the United States, does not secure greater peace or encourage greater cooperation. If anything, it may be dangerously creating environments around the world that only foster greater animosity toward those societies that want to see greater liberty, equality, and justice. In Part One, readers can find the holistic approach the editors envision for the work. Truly the time has come to ask questions about global security in a manner that relevantly considers the global community. These two chapters ask the fundamental theoretical, philosophical, and empirical questions that will be common throughout the volume. Regardless how detailed or esoteric the contributions may be, they are all united under the framework established in this part. We hope the readers therefore focus on Part One with this in mind, as we believe they will get much more out of the remaining chapters by doing so.
One GLOBAL SECURITY: NEEDED: A NEW DEFINITION FOR A NEW CENTURY Laura Meder “Security,” in a commonly applied definition, focuses on the possession of wellarmed military, defined and protected borders, and in some cases, the possession of weapons of mass destruction. Missing from this definition is the security role played by the environment. The environment provides the essential support system that sustains all life. Earth’s ecosystems provide the food we eat, the water we drink, and the air we breathe. Without the security of a reliable food supply, clean safe water and air, the planet and humankind are not secure. Many of the activities of human beings have affected and are affecting the ability of these ecosystems to perform their life support functions. If we neglect the environment in decision- and policy-making activities at the local, national, and international levels, we will see security threatened at each of these levels, and globally. While some people find it difficult to make the connection between the environment and security, a growing number of indicators help to make a strong argument that the lack of environmental security can lead to unrest and conflict. Examples of these indicators are resource depletion and pollution, unstable food supplies, infectious diseases, population growth, poverty, and injustice. Each of these can serve as a source of conflict and most are interconnected, providing more than one source of conflict that can affect current and future generations. While the degree of abundance varies, all natural resources are finite. As resources become increasingly scarce, conflict can increase at all levels. The world’s freshwater resource serves as an excellent example. Water conflicts have occurred throughout history over quantity, quality, and availability. Many competing claims for water resources exist: agriculture, industry, domestic users, and ecosystems. The needs of each can place differing demands on the resource. Its management is never for a single purpose; all users become stakeholders in the management process. As the number of stakeholders increases, the ability to reach agreement among all members becomes increasingly more difficult (Wolf, Kramer, Carius, and Dabelko, 2005, p. 81).Each user can drastically affect the resource for others, most commonly through overuse or pollution. Such conflicts have occurred in the Middle East, during ancient and modern times; the American West, especially during the early 1900s; and today in India, Pakistan, Hun-
10
LAURA MEDER
gary, and Slovakia (Ehrlich, Gleick, and Conca, 2006). Most major river systems have river basins shared by two or more countries. The Nile is shared by ten countries, the Congo and Niger by eleven, and the Danube by seventeen (Wolf, Kramer, Carius, and Dabelko, 2005, p. 84). These river basins will become increasingly vulnerable as populations grow, resource demand increases, and resource degradation occurs. The Aral Sea, once the world’s fourth largest inland water body, has seen its surface area reduced by half, its water volume reduced by three-quarters, and its depth lowered by 19m between 1960 and 1995. It now ranks only as the eightlargest body of water. Six nations use the water from rivers that feed this sea for irrigation. The northern Syr Darya and southern Amu Darya, both supplying feed water for the sea, have been reduced to trickles and the sea’s salinity has tripled (Owen, 2001). Less water is available every year due to increasing withdrawals, and the water that does flow is degraded by fertilizers and pesticides used on cash crops such as cotton and rice. As the sea shrinks, it leaves behind a dry, saltencrusted surface. Blowing winds erode the surface and scatter salt and concentrated toxic chemicals to areas hundreds of kilometers away. This has affected the lives and livelihoods of millions and caused the severe salinization of the land growing the crops that support these millions. Cancers, respiratory diseases, infant mortality, eye diseases, and hepatitis show increased incidence rates among people living in the Aral Sea region (Miller, 2004). Increasing salinity and toxic chemicals have impacted wildlife populations, including numerous food fishes. Commercial fishing closed on the Aral Sea in 1982 (Owen, 2001, p. 2). Pesticides used in the Aral Sea region are found in penguins in Antarctica, and windblown salt crystals are helping to melt glaciers in the Himalayan Mountains. Climate change is occurring as the shrinking sea loses its temperature moderating ability, resulting in hotter, drier summers, colder winters, and shorter growing seasons. Crop yields have decreased 20–50 percent, due to salinization and climate change (Miller, 2004, p. 234). Water availability is impacting the food security of many regions. “Waterstressed” describes 27 countries of the world, an estimated 1.4 billion people, a number that could grow to five billion by 2050. These countries exhibit wateravailability rates of less than 1,700 cubic meters per person yearly (Ehrlich, Gleick, and Conca, p. 16). According to water resource expert, Sandra Postel, this scarcity of water makes domestic food self-sufficiency virtually impossible, (ibid., p. 8). Much of the food produced in many parts of the world is irrigated with water drawn from underground aquifers. The world’s largest aquifer, the Ogallala, which covers approximately 225,000 square miles in the Great Plains region of the United States, is being overdrawn at a rate that surpasses its natural rate of recharge. The Ogallala, a fossil aquifer, so named because of the extremely long periods needed for natural recharge, varies in depth in different locations, making the drawdown more problematic in some regions than in others. Three of the largest grain-producing states—Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas—using the aqui-
Global Security: Needed: A New Definition for a New Century
11
fer for irrigation, have seen water tables drop over thirty meters, causing thousands of wells to go dry (Brown, 2003). Pakistan, India, Mexico, Yemen, China, Iran, and many other nations are also withdrawing water at a rate faster than normal recharge. According to the United Nations, combined population for these regions is more than 3 billion people, over half the world’s population (United Nations Environment Programme, 2004). Excessive withdrawal can also create another problem affecting groundwater—saltwater intrusion. As the water table drops due to excessive withdrawal, saltwater can enter the remaining void. The contaminated groundwater becomes unavailable for use in agriculture, domestic, and industrial processes. India and China are experiencing one to three meter drops in water tables annually in the areas with the most intensive use of pumps (Penning de Vries, 2002). As water scarcity issues continue to grow, competition for this resource will continue to grow. Poverty affects many inhabitants of water-scarce regions. Without adequate water for growing crops, many people living on marginal lands, sub-Saharan Africa for instance, will be further marginalized. Many will be forced to leave their homes and move to other areas in search of better water resources. These environmental refugees may be forced to move into areas also facing water-related issues and could serve to further stress these regions or be a source of conflict regarding resource use. They would also join the ranks of an estimated twenty-five million environmental refugees worldwide (Conisbee and Simms, 2003). Surface waters are also under increasing resource use pressure. Dams for hydroelectric power generation have diverted many rivers; agriculture, industry, and residential use have diverted others. Many have so much water diverted from them that they are unable to flow to the sea, instead running dry. The Yellow River in China first ran dry in 1972 and has run dry for part of every year since 1985. Many other rivers also run dry, including the Colorado, Nile, Ganges, Indus, and the Rio Grande (Brown, p. 34). A significant ecological impact of rivers running dry is the loss of vital nutrients brought to the sea by free-flowing rivers. These nutrients feed the phytoplankton that serve as the basis of the coastal ecosystem food web. Other crucial functions include wetland renewal, water purification, and maintenance of biological diversity. Pollution is another source of water-related conflict. According to the World Resource Institute (2000), more than one billion people cannot obtain safe, fresh, drinking water. They report that degradation of the ecosystem is threatening the ability of the freshwater resource to sustain life. Pollutants from a myriad of sources such as pesticides, chemicals, raw sewage, disease vectors, endocrine disrupters, and radionuclides—the list is long and varied—are present in our surface and groundwater. Many of the millions of people affected by water pollution are the same as those affected by water scarcity. In the developing world, polluted water is a major source of illness. According to the United Nations, 2.4 billion people lacked access to improved sanitation. Water- borne dis-
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eases account for 3.18 million Disability-Adjusted Life Years, a measurement of lost years of healthy life (United Nations Environment Programme, 2004). The land upon which life depends is also under stress. Soil erosion and desertification are increasing in many parts of the world. According to a 2001 United Nations Economic and Social Council report, about two-thirds of the world’s agricultural lands are already degraded. Desertification is affecting 70 percent of all dry lands where more than one billion people from over 100 countries live (UN Nongovernmental Liaison Service, 2006). Soil degradation often occurs as the result of damaging agricultural practices. These are often the result of efforts intended to boost agricultural exports as countries attempt to balance external debt. In some instances, the efforts of international development organizations have facilitated these harmful practices. Deserts are spreading across increasing areas of the world, most notably in Asia and Africa. As an indication of the importance of this problem, in 2004, Wangari Maathai, the first Kenyan Woman who earned a PhD, received the Nobel Prize for Peace for her efforts to stop desertification. During 1977, she began the Green Belt Movement, with mostly women members, which has planted over thirty million trees. These have provided fuel, food, shelter, and income, but most importantly, a vegetative cover that helps to stop the loss of topsoil that causes soil erosion. The Norwegian Nobel Committee’s press release (2004) states, “Maathai has taken a holistic approach to sustainable development that embraces democracy, human rights, and women’s rights in particular.” The committee asserted that peace on earth depends on our ability to secure our living environment. A 2004 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) assessment lists the scarcity of water and fertile land as long held sources of conflict between farmers and nomads living in the Darfur region of Sudan. Farming and livestock grazing, the usual causes of desertification in this region, are now joined by the thousands of people living in refugee camps and their deleterious effect on already scarce vegetation (Herro, 2006). Soil degradation is often the result of factors such as natural climate change, which causes prolonged drought, overgrazing, deforestation, salinization, and poor irrigation practices. In other parts of the world, another important environmental impact is occurring, loss of cropland due to development and road building. According to Lester Brown, President of the Earth Policy Institute, the world’s automobile fleet increases by twelve million vehicles per year, which consume nearly one million hectares of land. Most of this land was formerly cropland that was equally suited for roads and highways— flat and well-draining (Brown, 2003, p. 49). In some developing countries, cropland conversion for road building has created conflict as already limited land availability shrinks even more. As developing countries continue to increase the number of automobiles, these conflicts will continue or increase. Increasing populations competing for dwindling resources serve to create conflict.
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According to Brown, food security is fast becoming a crucial world issue. Currently, food production is slowing, and as water shortages continue, future production may be affected. More than 100 countries are wheat importers, more than forty countries import rice. While these imports in some countries bolster grain stores, for other countries, these imports are vital to meeting food demand. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all rely on imports for more than 70 percent of their grain supply. Israel and Yemen use imports to supply more than 90 percent of their supply. Ninety percent of all grain exports come from only six countries: Canada, France, Australia, Argentina, Thailand, and the United States, where more than half of all exports are produced (ibid., p. 14). In 2004, China became the largest wheat importer in the world despite that it is also the largest wheat producer in the world (ibid.). The United Nations declared 2004 the “international year of rice” as an attempt to raise awareness of an impending crisis. Rice serves as the major food staple for more than half of the world’s population. Twenty percent of the world’s directly consumed calories come from rice, with demand exceeding production for the fourth year in a row (Halweil, 2005, p. 62). According to a calculation determined by the Worldwatch Institute, using United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) figures, current world rice stores would only last only sixty-three days after a disaster (ibid., p. 22). As demand has increased, prices have increased, making purchasing food even more difficult for the millions of people in the world living on $1 (USD equivalent) or less per day. For these people, who already spend 70 percent of their income on food, rising prices make having enough food a greater difficulty (Nierenberg and Halweil, 2005, p. 62). The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization began keeping data during the 1970s to track the number of hungry people in the world. During 2005, that number rose to 852 million people. Most of these people were too poor to buy the food they needed or too poor to afford the land that would allow them to grow food. Each year more than five million children die from starvation (Halweil, 2005, p. 22). Climate change is also contributing to food insecurity. Rising temperatures show adverse effects on plant life. Studies performed in the Philippines at the International Rice Research Institute show fertility rates for rice falling from 100 percent to near zero with temperature changes of as little as 6 degrees Celsius (Brown, 2003, p. 63). Corn also shows a strong vulnerability to rising temperatures. Leaf curling in corn plants occurs as a means of reducing surface area for evaporation; this also reduces the rate of photosynthesis. Increasing temperatures, and drier, hotter days cause more leaf curling, lowering plant productivity (ibid.). Some places reached near-record high temperatures during 2002. The North China Plain and the Great Plains of the United States suffered adverse effects. Great Plains crops, predictably subject to erosion because of the naturally occurring long-term drought, were further stressed due to misuse and overcultivation of the ordinarily arid lands. On the North China Plain, high temperatures stressed plants and placed increased demand on irrigation water (ibid., p. 65).
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Infectious diseases also contribute to a threatened global security. As the world becomes smaller and smaller due to our ability to move around the planet so quickly and easily, infectious disease can spread more quickly and easily. The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in China, occurring late during 2002, spread within six months to twenty-nine countries. Communicable diseases caused 26 percent of all deaths worldwide during 2002. HIV/AIDS has spread throughout the world, killing more than 20 million people and afflicting another 34–46 million (Pirages, 2005, p. 45). Worldwide, by 2010, HIV/AIDS is predicted to orphan more than 42 million children (Kassalow, 2001). The current Avian flu outbreaks are covering increasingly more of the globe, with the potential for a pandemic looming, while a number of infectious diseases once thought to be under control are now re-emerging. Disease outbreaks continue because poverty continues. An estimated 2.8 billion people worldwide are living on less than $2 per day (USD equivalent) (Pirages, 2005, p. 46). The gap between the rich and poor continues to grow even while the global economy continues to grow. Health spending disparities also continue to grow. While per capita spending in developed countries may be thousands of dollars—$4,887 per capita during 2001 in the United States—in developing countries it may be as little as $6 - $15 (USD equivalent) (ibid.). More than 2.3 million people, mostly from poor countries, die yearly from eight diseases: tuberculosis, diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, polio, measles, hepatitis B, and yellow fever—diseases that could easily be prevented through the use of available vaccinations (ibid., p. 47). World population reached 6 billion during October 1999. The world population increases by another 70 million people annually, with an expected population of 8 billion by 2028. An increasing population exacerbates all of the environmental problems I have discussed. The demands the current population is making on the earth’s resources are staggering. As the global economy continues to grow, the rate of consumption by developing countries will soon meet or exceed that of the currently more developed countries. A single nation, China, comprising 1.4 billion people, or about 20 percent of the world population, currently consumes 47 percent of the world’s cement and 26 percent of the world’s steel. China is also one of the fastest growing economies in the world, with a growth rate averaging 9.5 percent (Flavin and Gardner, 2005, p. 3). China and all the other developing nations of the world are striving for their people to have the lifestyle of the developed nations. Their resource demand will only continue to increase. The commonly used formula for determining impacts on the environment by population, is I = P x A x T, where I is impact, P is population, A is affluence, and T is technology. This formula, allows us to examine the impact of high population numbers combined with a technologically advanced society and high rates of consumption. Another way of looking at our impact on the planet uses the ecological footprint method. This is a measure of the amount of resources needed to support
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the lifestyle that we lead; this calculation typically yields a much higher number for persons living in developed countries. We can examine the impact of different lifestyles by comparing footprints of different nations. William Rees and Mathis Wackernagel, developers of the ecological footprint method, estimate it would take three planet Earths to support the world at the lifestyle enjoyed by people of the United States (ibid., p. 18). The technology and advancements of our developed-nation lifestyle cause us to demand increasingly more resources, produce increasing amounts of and forms of pollution, and see the number of those living in poverty increase as environmental problems disproportionately affect their lives. Jared Diamond, in his book Collapse (2005), provides us with many examples of past societies failing due to their neglect of the environment that sustained them. Environmental degradation in the Easter Islands was caused by massive deforestation. Similarly, all over Polynesia, human settlement led to habitat damage and mass extinctions of plant and animal life. Deforestation, leaving too little wood for canoes, indirectly led to reduced yields from fishing and the end of trade with Pitcairn and Henderson Islands. This eventually led to the termination of all habitation there. Science is providing us with much data today that shows trouble is here and more is on the way. Will we learn from these lessons? Will we redefine global security?
Two FIGHTING TERROR AND SPREADING DEMOCRACY: WHEN THEORY AND PRACTICE COLLIDE Matthew Crosston 1. Introduction How do we guarantee that 11 September 2001 was, and will be, a unique incident never to be repeated? The United States has adopted a dual foreign policy prioritization in the twenty-first century to answer this question. It must end terrorist groups wherever they find them. It must seed democratic regimes so that terror groups will not find fertile soil in which to reemerge. Those within the corridors of power sincerely believe that we can achieve these dual objectives simultaneously. The government stridently ignores dissidents when they suggest these two objectives might collide with one another. In this chapter, in which I discuss that collision, I argue for the essential prioritization of long-term security strategies that focus on legitimate democratic development, even if it may appear to compromise the short-term fight against terror. My analysis takes to task a disturbing trend that appears to verbally endorse long-term strategies but then consistently undermine them in real-time with short-term policies of convenience. It will reveal to the reader why the sincere effort to fight the global war against terror today often results in the United States compromising its principles on democratic development in such a way as to give cause for future terror to grow. America’s dual foreign policy priorities do collide. The aftermath of that collision makes America less safe because its “engagement” too often violates the essence of what it is to be American: democratic, stable, open, and just. Most importantly, this analysis goes beyond the standard morality versus national interest debates. I argue that the global war against terror offers the United States a unique opportunity: a situation where doing what is moral and just is the best way to serve American security. This idea, that a moral foreign policy can actually produce greater returns on national security, runs contrary to traditional wisdom in international politics. This chapter also runs contrary to most national analysts who have always considered the protection of territorial security to be a direct, immediate national interest that consistently trumps democratization, which is at best a benefit to the United States only indirectly, producing results much further down the political
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road. Even more contrary to traditional political wisdom is the supposition made in this chapter that the present fight against terror (such as in Iraq and Afghanistan) is not the greatest danger fueling radical fires to burn against the United States. Instead, the ultimate danger in the global war against terror emerges from the continued compromises made on democratic development by governments that move further away from freedom. While these foreign governments repress, the United States publicly praises its engagement with said countries, declaring its diplomatic effort successful in moving them ever closer to liberty. This subtle hypocrisy, in which local populations see no realized democratic development while listening to joint declarations of political success, radicalizes local opposition not only against the indigenous governments but also against all foreign powers, which duplicitously support such regimes. This chapter argues that such radicalization inevitably and logically leads to an emerging Islamic hatred against the United States best expressed through the ruthless and cruel methods of terror. Most scholars who have argued along similar lines are open to the criticism that they are unrealistic idealists and are unwilling to accept how governments conduct statecraft and foreign policy across the globe. This criticism always cites the overarching necessity to secure power and reduce threats, making compromises on democratic development, though perhaps hypocritical to officially declared policy goals, ultimately inevitable. This chapter tries to avoid such criticism by arguing in a hawkish language, keeping its analytical focus on effective and ineffective strategies for national security. Accepting and rationalizing a hypocritical collision between fighting terror and developing democracy increases security threats and makes American authority and power less impactful. Dismissing this collision as statecraft or realpolitik is flawed because it undermines foreign democratization and compromises American security. In short, this is a treatise in which I argue against foreign policy shortsightedness. I show how this danger emerges and what its long-term consequences are. This chapter is about stopping contradictions in American foreign policy that will only compromise American lives in the future. I hope that readers will recognize its pragmatism and avoid accusations of idealism and naiveté. Security is more important to the final conclusions here than liberal entreaties to help promulgate democracy around the globe. The resolution to this problem is argued to be self-evident though not easy: the United States should actually practice what it preaches at the State Department because its diplomatic sermons are more right and more strategically advantageous than its political acts. It is time to achieve some synergy between policy and practice.
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2. Emancipators or Enablers: The Consequences of United States’ Engagement This analysis looks at the isolated Ferghana Valley in Central Asia. It analyzes American foreign policy in three of the five Central Asian states: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. It shows how the supposed support of democratization dies in the valley, replaced by the diplomatic convenience of compromise. Unfortunately, that compromise may ultimately kill many Americans. Undoubtedly, 11 September 2001 marks the crescendo moment that changed President George W. Bush’s initial perspective on foreign policy. We can too easily forget that it was Bush, during the 2000 campaign, who openly criticized Albert A. “Al” Gore, Jr. for the likelihood that his administration might be too active abroad, forcing American commitments across too many areas. On 11 September 2001, Bush was arguably forced by circumstance to change from being a quasi-isolationist president into one firmly standing on a foundation of preemption: hit threats early and overseas so that they have limited opportunities to hit the United States. The Bush administration defined this new vision of justified military intervention as necessary: the United States should hit terror centers before they would have a chance to conduct operations on American soil. Under this vision it was obvious that Central Asia in general and the three states sharing the Ferghana Valley in specific would play a crucial strategic role. It was no coincidence that directly south of Tajikistan were the northern territories of Afghanistan, home to the largest rebel faction fighting against the Taliban and the long time archenemy of Osama bin Laden. Elizabeth Jones, Bush’s first head of the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, testified to the importance of the Central Asian region as early as December 2001, when she described the American vision for the region as “serious and for the long-term.” She hoped to see a stable, peaceful, and prosperous region where individual countries “markedly accelerated their economic reforms and democratic credentials, respected human rights, and developed vibrant civil societies” (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2004). This vision of Central Asia, she said, saw an increasing integration into the global economy “via an east-west corridor of cooperation stretching from China and Afghanistan across the Caucasus to the Mediterranean” (ibid.). Attempting to deflect the timing of this intensified interest away from purely strategic security concerns, Jones testified to Congress, “We are ready to explore new areas of assistance . . . but only in exchange for demonstrated, concrete steps toward reform” (ibid.). Two years later, Jones and the State Department had not changed their position. They emphasized continued commitment and focus of the United States on using the Central Asian states for their proximity to Afghanistan and other potential Middle East launching points and on encouraging them to engage in real democratic reform:
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MATTHEW CROSSTON When we talk with leaders of Central Asian countries, we always remind them of the need to do a better job of living up to their own promises as well as international commitments to democratic pluralism and economic openness. We emphasize the centrality of such reforms to long-term stability. Our vision is simple: namely, that these countries remain independent and become democratic, stable and prosperous partners of the United States who respect human rights, are increasingly integrated into the global economy, and avoid the poverty, isolation, and intolerance that breed terrorism and fundamentalism. (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 2004)
Ultimately, this chapter is not only about the inconsistencies of American foreign policy or only about Central Asian democracy flaws. The irregularities on the American side and systemic abuses on the Central Asian side are not merely detrimental to the development of functioning democracy in Central Asia, though truly that is so. These transgressions on both sides are sowing present-day seeds that will ultimately grow and flower into future radicalism. This radicalism, fueled by twisted Islamic interpretation and tinged with quasiMarxist and anti-globalization rhetoric, is not satisfied by the overthrow of corrupt and illiberal home regimes. The ultimate prize for such radicals will be the destruction of the “true” cause of their turmoil—the United States. Many critics see America as the initiator of Central Asian despair and destitution because they perceive it to be the purveyor of moral relativism and diplomatic convenience. This chapter asks a question that the United States government has been reluctant to seriously analyze. Quite simply, can we fight terror while simultaneously spreading democracy? Are these two objectives compatible? This work shows that the American government has been incorrectly fighting terror in the short-term while compromising its democratic principles so profoundly in the long-term as to exacerbate its future security problems. Compromising principles of democracy in areas already sensitive to Islamic revolutionary thought ultimately undermines the global war on terror in the most significant way: the United States is, in the end, making the fight against terror infinite in length and bottomless in its pool of future fighters who will try to kill Americans. The long-term answer to combating terrorism is freedom, liberty, prosperity, dignity, and justice. Terrorism will never overwhelm societies strongly imbued with these characteristics. They may be attacked but never overcome. That is the best victory for which we can hope. As long as the United States continues to compromise that long-term victory in the name of so-called shortterm strategic gain, it betrays democracy in the name of combating terror. This matters because to the United States, only genuine democracy defangs terror as the dominant method of political expression by supplying local peoples with alternative methods of protest and redress. If America continues to refuse to respect this principle while simultaneously preaching it as reality, then the United States becomes its source for a potentially fatal political sin.
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Most world hegemons throughout history were never able to foresee their downfall because they were constantly looking outward for oncoming threats, secure in the stability and superiority of their own societies. They were never prepared for downfall from within. While it may be melodramatic to draw parallels now, we would be well served to watch: America’s downfall will not come at the hands of terrorists, but it may come because of the hypocrisy and contradictions that it created while fighting them. The United States needs to act in accordance with its principles and back up the diplomatic program with real consequences when allies fail to adhere to it. In the post-9/11 world real, uncompromised, long-term democratic development as a remedy against terror must no longer be a secondary priority compared with short-term security strategy. Such a prioritization must no longer be considered a haven solely for idealists. 3. Praising Compromised Democracy The divergence between philosophy and fact forms the basis for a strange foreign policy vision, which argues that it is permissible to ignore the empirical reality of false democracy while professing continued admiration for the fantasy democracy supposedly emerging. This divergence plagues the way the United States engages Central Asia. Generally, official American foreign policy to the Central Asian region has always been three-fold: preventing the spread of terrorism, providing tools for political/economic reform, and instituting the rule of law while ensuring the development of energy reserves (The US Mission to the European Union, 2004). The United States government’s policy on the Ferghana Valley states is examined here from two analytical perspectives: how foreign policy is philosophically professed and how it gets financially implemented. Former United States Secretary of State Colin Powell declared, “freedom, prosperity, and peace are not separate principles, or separate policy goals. Each reinforces the other, so serving any one requires an integrated policy that serves all three” (ibid.). Despite these fine words, a strange disconnect happens when it comes to American foreign policy between the world the government sees and the world that actually exists on the ground. This is especially so in the three states within the Ferghana Valley. American policy appears to suffer from an apparent belief that as long as a “politically correct” favorable interpretation is repeatedly espoused across diplomatic agencies, then reality will come to reflect the fantasy. As I will show in this chapter, nothing could be further from the truth. Comparing philosophy against implementation reveals whether policy maintains a level of consistency or contradiction. This type of analysis is essential to understand the true state of national security: philosophically, policy always tends to be professed in the most grand and optimistic of terms. How that policy is ultimately financed and implemented, however, and how the recipients are ultimately impacted, is the true indication of whether policy produces results. Philosophy without empirical confirmation in policy circles quickly degrades
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into meaningless rhetoric. Regarding the war on terror, relying on rhetoric instead of results is playing a dangerous game with American security. 4. The United States Human Rights and Democracy Strategy No loftier political institution exists in the American mindset than democracy. The Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), a governmental organization committed to supporting and promoting democracy programs throughout the world, expresses this most poetically by explaining that democracy is the one national interest that helps to secure all the others. Democratically governed nations are more likely to secure the peace, deter aggression, expand open markets, promote economic development, protect American citizens, combat international terrorism and crime, uphold human rights, and avoid humanitarian crises (The Bureau of Democracy, 2007). The DRL accomplishes this through its Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF), established during the Clinton Administration in 1998. The DRL, hyperbole aside, represents the diplomatic frontline for American foreign policy with regard to spreading democracy. The Bureau concisely and boldly expresses American priorities without equivocation: (1) Assist newly formed democracies in implementing democratic principles; (2) Assist democracy advocates around the world to establish vibrant democracies in their own countries; and (3) Identify and denounce regimes that deny their citizens the right to choose their leaders in free, fair, and transparent elections. (ibid.) According to the DRL, the United States is pursuing a broad strategy of promoting respect for human rights that is both morally self-justifying and strategically beneficial for American security. The United States is “persuaded that regimes that violate the human rights of their own citizens are more likely to disrupt peace and security in their region and create a reservoir of ill will that can accrue to the detriment of the United States” (ibid.). A National Security Strategy that lists eight demands of human dignity backs up this persuasion: (1) The rule of law; (2) Limits on the absolute power of the state; (3) Freedom of speech; (4) Equal justice; (5) Respect for women; (6) Religious and ethnic tolerance; (7) Respect for private property; (8) Freedom of worship. (ibid.)
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According to the DRL, these eight demands of human dignity are not merely words on paper policy matched by action in the way the United States engages the world community. This engagement is a primary objective of American foreign policy, pushed forward by three goals that form the core of American strategy: (1) To hold governments accountable to their obligations under universal human rights norms and international human rights instruments; (2) To promote greater respect for human rights, including freedom from torture, freedom of expression, press freedom, women’s rights, children’s rights, and the protection of minorities; and (3) To promote the rule of law, seek accountability, and change cultures of impunity. Nothing is inherently wrong with the philosophy underlying American foreign policy. On the contrary, it is almost inarguable across its convictions. The problem is in the failure of implementation. Keep in mind that this is not a criticism of results or the lack thereof. Results are hard to gauge, as they may need a generation or two to truly take root and become evident. We will see in this chapter how often American diplomats emphasize the intrinsic “generational” quality of reform in the states of the Ferghana Valley. Unfortunately, this generational emphasis is a false promise: results can emerge only if we truly engage and implement policy. We will achieve no results, immediate or generational, if we do not sincerely pursue implementation. While the United States may be engaged with Central Asia it is not truly engaged in terms of productive programmatic implementation. America declares the right principles regarding law, accountability, and human dignity, but it chooses to ignore them when an ally in the war against terror makes a mockery of them. The United States has not tried to change that culture of impunity, which exists in extreme form in Central Asia, and the present work simply wishes to reveal how unwise such games are when connected to terrorism. Since 11 September 2001, the United States’ government has paid consistent lip service to the need for connecting the global war on terror with statebuilding ideals. Repeatedly across numerous governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations, this connection has been so patent that a fantastic four of American diplomacy becomes apparent: (1) Fight terror; (2) Respect democratic principles; (3) Develop civil society; and (4) Institute the rule of law. The United States says it is not interested in finding convenient partners who help it conduct the war against terror but who are not willing to produce true
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democratic change within their own societies. The United States says it is not willing to ignore transgressions in the latter three goals in exchange for assistance in the first. As former Secretary Powell said, each goal stated above reinforces the other. This symmetry or symbiosis between fighting terror internationally while encouraging democratic development within allies domestically is undoubtedly America’s most important foreign policy foundation today. Ostensibly, this foundation emerged in consequence to the harsh lesson learned after the United States disengaged from Afghanistan in the early 1990s: we must not leave countries alone to allow them to become “breeding grounds” for extremism and terrorism (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2004). To prevent these destructive forces from emerging in Central Asia, American diplomacy has supposedly intensified its efforts to help the countries of this area become “stable, prosperous, and fully integrated into the world community” (ibid.). Unfortunately, these claims that argue for a benevolent American influence increasing stability and prosperity in Central Asia appear to be hollow. While the United States did significantly increase funding to the Ferghana Valley states after 11 September 2001, very little on the ground has changed politically. While the Ferghana states have cooperated extensively in the war against terror (in some ways perhaps too enthusiastically), we have seen very little progress regarding the key state-building objectives mentioned above. In many cases, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have been backsliding with regard to democratic principles, civil society, and rule of law. American diplomatic and governmental actors have lauded so-called improvements while emphasizing the need for more “work to be done.” Does mere coincidence account for American diplomats showering praise on the “emerging democracies” sharing the Ferghana Valley, all of which happened to generously offer their assistance after 11 September 2001? Is this disparity between observation and reality at all connected with these governments quickly joining the coalition against terror, offering, “whatever was needed” to the United States? Does Tajikistan’s corrupt narco-economy or Uzbekistan’s religious inquisition government gain patience and understanding from America because of its true efforts to reform or because they were the first to offer the use of their facilities to coalition troops and play a central role as a staging area for early operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban? Does a meaningful positive correlation exist between Kyrgyzstan acting as the primary base for coalition air support and our overlooking corruption problems after its recent revolution? Was it merely fascinating coincidence that the bombing campaign in Afghanistan began on 7 October 2001, exactly one hour after Uzbekistan and the United States signed the Status of Forces Agreement, giving America the legal right to carry out search and rescue missions from Uzbek sovereign territory? (ibid.) This chapter argues that none of these realities was coincidental or accidental. By pursuing a strategy wherein the United States praises foreign governments despite actual contradictions to American foreign policy on the ground, one of two accusations against the United States is possible: the American gov-
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ernment is unaware of what is happening on the ground (unlikely) or it is being shortsighted in its positioning within Central Asia (more likely). For now, reality shows that the United States says yes to fighting terror and developing energy reserves but appears to say no to fostering real democratic institutions. The first accusation would be damaging enough to the long-term goals of the United States but again, it is unlikely that ignorance is the root of this problem. The second more likely accusation is devastating to American security interests as real democratic development offers the majority population legitimate political alternatives that could make terrorism a less attractive option. Unfortunately, as long as the first two objectives (short-term counter-terrorism and energy development) are secure, then we will apparently allow the third objective (real democratic reform) to rot on the vine. Perhaps worse, this rot will fester as the United States continues to ignore it and counter-intuitively declares political progress in Central Asia. If the United States wants to defeat Islamic terrorism it must at the very least not be seen as actively supporting such flawed democracy. America cannot be satisfied with simply stating it maintains an “intense dialogue” with backsliding governments. It must cease providing such governments with a justification for democratic deviation by emphasizing the need to wait for a “generational shift” in leadership (ibid.). How does such a shift come if American diplomacy is hopelessly empty and accommodating? That such democracy can potentially sow the seeds of new terror is fatally ironic. The Ferghana Valley is but one of those fertile fields that America itself ignorantly cultivates. 5. United States’ Assistance Programs and Funding Since the fall of the Soviet Union the American government funded assistance programs that were meant to act as a stabilizing force in the post-Soviet transition. Political and economic transformation, nuclear non-proliferation, aid in legal or judiciary reform, promotion of party development, and free media have been the formal goals for most of these United States Government (USG)-funded programs. Unfortunately, the compromised democracy supported by the United States’ State Department has also seeped into the official rationale used to explain USG financial assistance increases. Not surprisingly, such increases have achieved few if any significant results on the ground in Central Asia. Ambassador Carlos E. Pascual, named coordinator of Assistance to Europe and Eurasia in 2003 and subsequently elevated to coordinator for stabilization and reconstruction in 2004, used the weak “generational” rationalization when describing the success level of fiscal year 2003: Though the progress of this generational transition has varied tremendously among the countries of the region in fiscal year 2003, USG assistance programs continued to help promote good governance, strengthen civil society, independent media, the rule of law and human rights. . . . Yet assistance has
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MATTHEW CROSSTON been used not only to build the security and law enforcement cooperation necessary for the struggle against global terror. It has also been deployed to address the internal conditions that may lead, over time, to conflict and extremism and the emergence of new “failed states,” which can become breeding grounds for terrorism. (ibid.)
As coordinator of American assistance to Europe and Eurasia, Ambassador Pascual oversaw the development of regional and country strategies to promote market-oriented and democratic states. He ensured that American assistance reinforced American interests. He managed the allocation and implementation of approximately $1.1 billion in annual assistance. The purpose of his new position, at the Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization, was to lead American government planning, institutionalize capacity, and help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so that they could reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy. These lofty, admirable goals are eloquently expressed in powerful mission statements. In the end, however, this terminology sounds like empty rhetoric and perhaps purposefully so. While the United States is using the right language to frame its policy, it is continually increasing foreign expenditures despite a total lack of results. Considering that this occurred under a Republican administration that often spoke of the need to pinpoint foreign aid to identifiable results, I find it difficult to understand how Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have not come close to achieving any formal goals and yet received consistent increases in aid. Such difficulty dissipates after a lens of cynicism is placed over policy so that references to democracy are deleted but mentions of security and antiterrorism are left untouched. The problem with American funding since 11 September 2001 has been a decided tendency to continue funding to questionable states. Perhaps most egregious has been increased funding to the Ferghana Valley states in areas strictly aimed at promoting democracy and civil society even though in reality they are being rewarded for security cooperation. Most disturbingly, this cooperation ultimately places future American security at risk. 6. United States’ Agency for International Development The United States appears to be suffering from something akin to “African Aid” syndrome: one of the fundamental problems in African democratic and economic development was an inexplicable tendency among international lending institutions to grant huge sums of financial assistance only to fail to oversee its utilization or monitor its distribution. Inevitably, African governments quickly learned to say diplomatically right things to the international community while actively using the funds in any way they pleased. It does not appear that Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are intentionally modeling themselves after the worst offenders from the African continent. Justifying the financial increases is difficult considering these three states
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are not close to functioning democracies and they do not show any measurable progress on the ground. How do these governments account for the funds? What oversight mechanisms exist? Why are there no results timetables tied to the release of new funding? Accountability, oversight, timetables. These three things are essential if the United States is sincere in wanting the states who share the Ferghana Valley to become genuine democracies and join the global community. Using such money, meant to create stable democratic institutions, as a reward for helping to fight terror in the short-term is dangerous if the recipients use that money domestically in ways that do not respect democratic principles, do not develop civil society, and do not institute the rule of law. The United States creates a vicious circle of terror when it conducts foreign policy in this manner. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) conducted the vast majority of its USG-funded programs bilaterally, closely interacting with local actors who were inevitably connected to and often dependent upon elite structures. USAID is supposedly committed to supporting the transition of authoritarian, centrally planned societies to participatory democracies with strong market-based economies. According to USAID, promoting regional cooperation and stability is crucial across Eurasia, a region critical to American national interests and the global war on terror. Writ large, its regional programs in the Ferghana Valley meant to promote policy reform, institutional development, broad-based citizen participation, and the rule of law (ibid.). USAID spent nearly thirty million dollars during fiscal year 2002 on programs meant to directly impact the long-term democratization effort (see Table 1). These programs are not charitable donations or money meant to be misappropriated. These funds are dedicated to developing successful democratization, which is able to fight terror by making the need for terrorism appear extreme and inefficient. Subsequent funding has increased every year since 2002. Table 1. Fiscal Year 2002 Expended Funds—Non-Security Measures US AID Democratic Reform Humanitarian Assistance Social-Sector Reform Eurasia Foundation
Kyrgyzstan $5,130,000 $540,000 $6,920,000 $2,850,000
Tajikistan $2,970,000 $1,700,000 $3,530,000 $1,100,000
Uzbekistan $2,050,000 n/a $160,000 $2,050,000
Yet in all four areas—democratic reform, humanitarian assistance, social-sector reform and the Eurasia Foundation, which ran programs meant to elevate individuals and societies through democratic and market transitions—no identifiable institutionalized progress was achieved in Central Asia. Worse, to the best of my knowledge, no real oversight mechanisms to manage and monitor the distribution of these funds even existed. Once distributed, funds went into the political abyss with little or no recourse available to the United States government.
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Thomas C. Adams was the acting coordinator to Europe and Eurasia during 2003 and before the designation of Ambassador Pascual. He gave a perfect example of the flawed democracy by giving a statement to the United States House International Relations Committee on Assistance to Eurasia, Washington D.C.: The picture on democratic reform is decidedly less rosy. Noticeable backsliding has occurred in recent years in some countries. While I do not diminish these problems I believe that we have achieved tremendous accomplishments in this sphere as well over the past decade and have sown the seeds for future positive change. (2003) Despite Adams’ statements, the only definitive accomplishments made in Central Asia since 11 September 2001 have been in the security sphere, where these states have allowed American forces unfettered access to their territory. Adams refers to success under the FSA in terms of positive democratic change even though no substantive examples exist to support these claims. Adams went on to describe one of the largest assistance programs ever created in the United States: One of our best mechanisms to foster fundamental change is our program of professional and educational exchanges. Freedom Support Act exchange programs have brought slightly over 100,000 business people, journalists, students and professors to the United States to see for themselves how free people prosper and deal with challenges common to all countries. . . . FSA funds have supported the development and strengthening of civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations . . . [and has] also supported the development of political parties, helped to strengthen legislatures as a counter-weight to powerful executive branches of government, and worked to create or bolster judicial independence. (ibid.) The fact of the matter is that none of these things has happened across Central Asia or in the three countries sharing the Ferghana Valley. Political parties there are still nondescript and emasculated. Legislatures remain the de facto servants of the hyper-powerful executive branches. Currently, the mere idea of an independent judiciary in the region is inconceivable. Yet repeatedly, those at the highest American diplomatic levels speak of progress happening all over the area, largely thanks to the increasing aid and assistance of the United States (see Table 2 below). More fascinating (frustrating?) still was how Adams mentioned the three Ferghana states by name in his presentation: The largest changes in the FSA budget request are related to our country’s intensified engagement with Central Asia as a result of the September 11 attacks on our country . . . . Significant increases for Uzbekistan, Tajiki-
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stan, and the Kyrgyz Republic will support economic development in conflict-prone areas, effects to open political space by strengthening democratic institutions and grassroots organizations. (ibid.) Table 2. Freedom Support Act Funds Expended FY 2001–2003 Fiscal Year FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003
Kyrgyzstan $33,390,000 $40,000,000 $43,600,000
Tajikistan $16,800,000 $32,330,000 $35,000,000
Uzbekistan $25,840,000 $39,660,000 $42,000,000
The only significant grassroots organizations in the Ferghana Valley states that have emerged and begun to form real opposition to the ruling elites since 11 September 2001, despite FSA budget increases, have been radical Islamic fundamentalist groups. This was not the democratic opposition or grassroots activism the United States had in mind when it consistently elevated its financial engagement in this region. But we should have expected exactly this kind of opposition when the United States claims false levels of progress and gives high estimations of its own “democratic engagement.” 8. Human Rights and Democracy Fund DRL uses its HRDF to fulfill its mandate to monitor and promote human rights and democracy worldwide. According to its mission statement, the HRDF supports “innovative programming designed to uphold democratic principles, support democratic institutions, promote human rights, and build civil society in countries and regions of the world that are geo-strategically critical to the United States (Human Rights and Democracy Fund, 2005). Since 11 September 2001, it has occupied a major financial foreign policy niche, receiving enormous budget increases and gaining incredible responsibility the world over for initiating programs like the ones mentioned above. We should not be surprised that Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are a major focus of the HRDF. Every aspect of the Bureau’s vetting process to determine significant targets is satisfied by the three states of the Ferghana Valley. Undoubtedly, once the war against terror began, Central Asia would elevate in geo-strategic importance. In addition, the supposed “philosophical commitment” of the United States to democratic principles, civil, and human rights since 11 September 2001 had no better contemporary focus than the Ferghana three in that they epitomize the type of state and location the United States government would like to engage. The HRDF even singled out the Central Asian region on its Internet website, emphasizing that USG funds in Central Asia had a “renewed commitment to promoting human rights both diplomatically and programmatically” (ibid.). A casual glance at the level of USG funding to the HRDF from 2000-2005, as shown below in Table 3, indicates the increasing importance this
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fund was meant to have when it came to on-the-ground implementation across these geo-strategic regions of importance. Table 3. Fiscal Year Budget Increases for the HRDF Fiscal Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
USG Funds $8,969,985 $13,421,000 $13,000,000 $36,448,000 $43,740,000
So what kinds of “innovative programming” did we see in the three Ferghana Valley states? What sort of on-the-ground effects emerged with this nearly 400 percent increase in HRDF funding since 2000? During 2000–2001, the two largest programs involved “capacity-building for human rights advocacy [nongovernmental organizations] NGOs” in Uzbekistan and funding “get-out-thevote” (nongovernmental organization) NGO activities in Kyrgyzstan. Ironically, during this time, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan earned a reputation for government harassment and investigation into foreign-run organizations. This severely curtailed the operational environment for NGOs in these countries (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2004). During 2001–2002, the NGO increased its capacity-building budget in Uzbekistan by 500 percent, combining it with an Uzbek “rule of law” program funded for half a million dollars. Apparently, the “get-out-the-vote” NGO program in Kyrgyzstan was so successful, it earned an elevation in status, transferring into a new “capacity-building” Kyrgyz program. Over half a million dollars went into funding this program also. Another half million went to a program called “Citizens’ Rights in Ferghana Valley,” which went to creating an advocacy network throughout the area. In all three cases, funds were misused because no real follow-up was initiated to track how these funds were truly utilized. During 2002–2003, all previous programs were maintained while “political party development” emerged to take center-stage on the HRDF agenda. An additional one million dollars financed the development of political parties in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The HRDF exalted such programs’ relevance by claiming the need to “encourage constructive dialogue” between the government and opposition groups (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2005). The most vehement opposition to government across the Ferghana Valley has been the emergence of Islamic political parties and Muslim organizations that almost unequivocally stand for the forced removal of the present government. I would not consider this an example of encouraging constructive dialogue. During 2003–2004, the largest expansion of HRDF programs covered the Ferghana Valley, only confirming the supposition that Central Asia was a major
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focus of interest for its four-fold increase in overall budget. Political party development in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan increased by another half million dollars. Interestingly, new programs appeared to shift away from democracy building and toward humanitarian issues. Uzbekistan received over one million dollars to institute such programs as the Civic Coalition against Torture and Protection of Human Rights. Tajikistan also received the Human Rights Protection Program while Central Asia as a regional whole received funding for a “Civic Bridges” program meant to create a regional, interactive network of citizens, which would promote civic participation and advocacy programs (ibid.). As the funding for HRDF programs in Central Asia skyrocketed, program content gradually shifted from democratic state-building agendas to international law and human rights initiatives. This was not a coincidence but confirmation of the utter lack of success in developing opposition political parties that engaged in constructive dialogue and created civic participation networks across the region. Why, four years into this funding largess, was it necessary to begin programs aimed at stopping torture and protecting human rights? To suggest that programs aimed at civil society and democracy, if they were having any sort of impact whatsoever, would have made inroads against such barbarity as torture appears to be a logical supposition. Instead, as American government programs became more embedded in the region, regression appeared to occur on the ground. This regression flies in the face of American diplomats like Elizabeth Jones, who lauded all efforts as being “every bit as important as our security assistance in dealing with the long-term root causes of terrorism” (The United States Mission to the European Union, 2001). Closer inspection across the board of American governmental agencies finds this same illusory satisfaction, inexplicably proclaiming Central Asian policy as one that was deep, sustained, and coordinated (ibid.). 9. Diplomatic Selling Points: House of Representatives International Relations Committee If looking for a smoking gun or seminal moment in the selling of United States foreign policy on Central Asia, then ironically one of the strongest contenders came on Capitol Hill before the attacks on 11 September 2001 took place. On 6 June 2001, witnesses discussed American policy on Central Asia before the House of Representatives, specifically before its Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. I choose this as the defining moment because Central Asia’s strategic relevance only became more intense after the New York City World Trade Center Towers collapsed. Any hope at all of policy toward Central Asia being held to a high standard of introspection and oversight would had to have been in place before the security crisis known as the global war against terror had begun. This opportunity to build such a foundation did indeed emerge during summer 2001 but the House of Representatives subsequently passed it up.
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Overall, the members of the House International Relations Committee, chaired by Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois, displayed an expected mixture of facts and falsehoods when discussing Central Asia. Representative from New York, Benjamin Gilman, admitted to “serious human rights problems and extremist movements influenced by Afghanistan,” but also lauded the region for its “enormous energy export potential that could ease current American energy problems and for its governments being secular”(U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, 2001). Gilman’s statement is fascinating for its being simultaneously prescient and wrong. Central Asia’s energy reserves, though significant, face severe obstacles of climate, geography, and technology. Presently, some doubt exists as to the actual extent of the energy reserve estimates. Estimate inflation may have been done to secure more international aid. Regardless, Gilman accurately framed the debate: he showed concern at the political repression but wrapped up his analysis with praise for the economic potential. Many of his observations were lamentably ignorant with regard to the actual doings of the Central Asian governments. His calling them secular—when they manipulate Islam for their own purposes and are ruthless in the harassment of Islamic organizations—is naïve at best. At worst, such mistakes purposefully ignore the preconditions capable of creating Islamic terrorism. As we shall see below, Representative Gilman was not alone. The main figure to appear before the House subcommittee that day was Clifford Bond, a career diplomat, who at the time was the Acting Principal Deputy to the Special Advisor for the New Independent States. He appeared as the administration’s official expert witness on Central Asian policy. His opening statement was pregnant with the hidden problems brought to light in this work: The overarching and the long-term goal of United States policy in Central Asia is to see these states develop into stable, free-market democracies, which can serve as a bulwark against the spread of potential instability and conflict in the region. This broader goal serves three core strategies or interests of the United States: regional security, political and economic reform and energy development. (Ibid.) Here, before 9/11, before the global war on terror, the three core values in American policy are made explicit. Since this performance on Capitol Hill it has become clear that the first and third core interests—regional security and energy development—exploded and overwhelmed the more important long-term second interest—political and economic reform. Bond would obliviously go on to openly discuss this fundamental divergence that would come to epitomize American foreign policy: All the states of Central Asia have indicated that they welcome security cooperation with the United States. They see our engagement in the region as
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an additional element of stability as they seek to balance their relations with more powerful neighbors in the region. . . . Only by empowering their citizens through democratization and economic reform can these governments ensure lasting popular support and stability. This is an integral part of our message to the governments of Central Asia. (Ibid.) Before 11 September 2001, the United States viewed itself as the security blanket necessary for Central Asia so that governments like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan would be able to “fend off” bigger, more powerful rivals like China, Iran, and Russia. After 11 September 2001, the security relationship was inverted: the United States needed Central Asia for its own immediate national security. This flip was what most likely empowered the Ferghana Valley states to essentially ignore and dismiss Bond’s second priority of democratic and economic reform. Before 11 September 2001, the advantage was on the side of America. After, the advantage shifted decidedly to the side of the Ferghana Valley states. Apparently, America decided in favor of making its short-term security priorities supreme. To this day, we have had no public acknowledgement of how this has made it difficult to be principled on democratic development. For Representative Gilman to make incorrect statements about a Central Asian state is understandable. He was not a recognized expert and did not serve the government in such a capacity. When the official administration point man on Central Asia makes false and disturbingly vacuous statements, we have serious cause for concern. Such was the case when Bond discussed Kyrgyzstan’s perplexing backsliding when it supposedly had been the best in the region in protecting human rights: It is difficult to understand or explain President [Askar] Akaev’s motives over the past two or more years, but we have seen a turn toward repression since 1999 and the onset of a set of parliamentary and then presidential elections in the year 2000. In the lead up to those elections and as the opposition became more vociferous and more organized, we saw harassment of opposition figures . . . we saw the exclusion in the presidential elections themselves of principal opponents to President Akayaev. We saw that expand beyond activities directed against individuals to the suppression of the free media, to the harassment of NGOs. (Ibid.) Though Bond was perplexed, the Kyrgyzstan administration had no genuine interest in “constructive dialogue” or the development of such institutions as civil society and political parties as these things could ultimately be a threat to its vice-like grip on power. As Bond said, just as alternative voices became louder and more organized the central government cracked down. This would not be confusing to an objective observer. Consider that Bond was speaking before 11 September 2001, and his lack of understanding was likely explained by the general indifference of the United States toward Central Asia, seeing it only as a
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potential source down the road for non-Arab energy reserves. Unfortunately, after 9/11, when Central Asia became strategically important for immediate security concerns, American indifference apparently shifted to purposefully overlooking democratic backsliding and human rights violations. This is naked Machiavellianism. Bond commented on the “tough stance” that the United States was willing to take against this regression, saying that, “we are engaged in a dialogue with the government. We have made some progress in modest ways to get them to respect human rights, but frankly they need to do a lot more, and we need to continue to talk to them” (ibid.). Considering its record in the years to come, it appears that such “harsh language” from the United States did not greatly concern the central government of Kyrgyzstan. Even more disturbing was when Bond discussed radical Islamism within Central Asia: Let me say, first of all, that Central Asia is not fertile ground for Islamic fundamentalism. The Islamic tradition in these countries is a very tolerant one. The Taliban’s variety of Islam has little attraction to the great mass of people who accept the idea of a secular state . . . we do not see Islamic fundamentalism right now as a threat to the states of Central Asia. (Ibid.) In the most direct terms, Islamic fundamentalism was not a threat because the “secular” governments of the Ferghana Valley were willing to do anything to co-opt, undermine, and oppress Islamic political groups. But this type of reasoning was dangerously myopic, ignoring that it contradicted our policy aimed to encourage democratization and civil society opposition. It was also myopic because of what usually happens across the globe to Islamic opposition groups that are forced underground by oppressive governments. The one universal result to emerge from such maneuvers is a further radicalization of said Islamic groups. The recipe to create such a potentiality was already on the ground in the Ferghana Valley because of the repressive and violent responses of the local executive governments. Bond was conveniently and inconceivably papering over the danger by saying Central Asian society practiced a more tolerant Islamic tradition. Most Muslims in the world practice a relatively tolerant Islamic tradition. The threat in the global war against terror is not the fear of more states transforming into radical Islamic theocracies. We have no worry of “Irans” mushrooming all over the globe. What we should truly fear, because it undermines the global war against terror, are repressive “secular” governments that drive legitimate Islamic opposition underground and thus force them toward radicalization. Central Asian society as a whole does not need to be radical or practice a nontolerant version of Islam for it to be a breeding ground of radical, intolerant Islamic groups. Bond missed this point and American foreign policy continues to miss it today.
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10. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe In theory, American participation in Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) advances America’s national interest in promoting democracy and strengthening respect for human rights. The OSCE therefore has a role to play in helping to win the global war against terror. A 2004 Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs report to Congress, “Increased Attention to Central Asia,” showed that little had changed in Washington, D.C. since 11 September 2001. All of the contradictory hallmarks present three years earlier in American foreign policy had apparently become codified into catch phrases the world over. The piece was eerily reminiscent of Bond’s talking points and indicative of a policy that proclaimed much philosophically but demanded little to nothing empirically: American goals in Central Asia are to develop democratic, market-oriented states that are more fully integrated into the Eurasian community, to promote regional stability, and to strengthen a long-term coalition against terrorism that respects human rights. To advance these goals through the OSCE, the United States will support new programs in the economic and political-military dimension in Central Asia . . . the most promising programs in Central Asia in support of American goals are those focused on transnational issues, such as terrorism, trafficking, border security, police training, and judicial reform. The Central Asians have shown willingness to cooperate on these issues. (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2004) The difference between 2001 and 2004 was that the global war against terror had mutated the emphasis on democratic reform and civil society into diplomatic rhetoric that emptily prefaced policy briefings. The political dimension for accomplishing American democratic objectives in the region, once deemed most important, had now been connected directly to and usurped by military priorities: the most promising programs, with which Central Asian governments were the most cooperative, were now strictly “transnational” security programs that had very little to do with long-term democratic reform. More disturbingly, while the United States officially lauded the OSCE for “anti-torture programs and trying to strengthen the freedom of the media,” it was simultaneously creating an elaborate system of secret “black prisons.” The government kept this system secret from American media sources for two years. Apparently, the Ferghana Valley regimes noticed the hypocrisy and learned valuable political lessons from it. 11. The Moscow Mechanism In 2003, the OSCE invoked the Moscow Mechanism, a rarely used tool that gave the OSCE power to appoint a Rapporteur to investigate and ostensibly resolve serious international and interregional problems, against Turkmenistan. The initial stimulus to invoke the mechanism was the manner in which Turkmeni-
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stan’s security services conducted investigations into the attempted assassination of President Saparmurat Niyazov in fall 2002. Reports on the brutality and arbitrariness of those investigations prompted the United Nations and other international organizations to condemn the Niyazov government, pushing the OSCE to trigger the Moscow Mechanism. Once triggered, the Rapporteur’s conclusions included a well-regarded set of recommendations for both the Turkmen authorities and the international community (ibid.). Ultimately, the OSCE was unable to compel Turkmenistan to cooperate. The Turkmen government refused to even issue a visa for the Rapporteur and refused to conduct an internal investigation to honor the procedures of the Moscow Mechanism. Ultimately, Turkmen authorities rejected the Rapporteur’s final report and refused to implement its final recommendations (ibid.). This episode essentially destroyed the OSCE’s confidence that the Moscow Mechanism was an effective international tool of investigation. Even more significant was the relative silence of the United States. Turkmenistan was arguably the worst state in Central Asia from a democracy perspective, representing a cult of personality that rivaled if not surpassed North Korea. Did the United States government assume the other states of Central Asia especially the Ferghana three—would learn no lesson from this? Turkmenistan’s ability to de facto emasculate one of the OSCE’s more powerful diplomatic weapons set a frighteningly disturbing precedent. What were the chances that Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan thought they would face serious repercussions if they ignored international criticisms when Turkmenistan, which had always rebuffed American overtures to assist in the terror war, did not face sanction or punishment for failing to cooperate? The Ferghana three actively cooperated in the war against terror. The lesson they learned was unmistakable: American policy mattered little. The empirical reality said it all. Security now mattered. Democracy later did not. 12. A Strong Diplomatic Wind, Signifying Nothing The development of American foreign policy in Central Asia reveals a dangerous divergence between stated goals and empirical reality that carries potentially deadly consequences. While the American government and its diplomatic corps continually pays lip service to the ideals and power of democratic freedom, this verbal commitment is not backed up with results in diplomatic action or programmatic implementation. The careful examination I have provided in this chapter reveals a very subtle shift since 11 September 2001 in the type of programs funded in Central Asia—they focused less on democratic institutions and civil society and more on transnational security issues of dubious achievement. Worse, the United States appears to act oblivious to this compromised democracy. Repeatedly, some of the most important political figures in the United States have walked to the podium, at home and abroad, to declare a self-evident and crucial truth: democracy matters not just for freedom but for security. Secre-
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tary of State Condoleezza Rice, on a trip through Central Asia during fall 2005, addressed this issue with powerful, ringing words: We understand that the path to democracy is long and imperfect and different for every country. But make no mistake: the principles of democracy are unanimously desired and universally deserved. Here in Central Asia there is much to do but there are reasons for optimism. . . . We all live in a world in which there are security concerns. We all live in a world in which terrorism is a threat . . . [but] you have to have democracy because democracy is, in fact, the answer to terrorism and to extremism. (2005) Though powerful and moving, these words ring hollow. American political philosophy rings hollow. The implementation of American programs does not reveal a sincerity of commitment to developing real democracy abroad. At the National Endowment for Democracy, Bush passionately declared, “we know that liberty if not defended can be lost. By definition the success of freedom rests upon the choices and the courage of free peoples and upon their willingness to sacrifice” (2003). America, in its fight to preserve its liberty today, may be ignoring how “allies” in that fight are undermining the liberty of their own citizens. If that repression continues then the sacrifices made in the future by these allied citizens may be sacrifices made against American security and not for it. You reap what you sow in foreign policy. Unfortunately, at the moment, America is cultivating a bitter future harvest. 13. Missed Concerns from the Scholarly Community In addition to this diplomatic aspect, counter-analyses that emphasize the relatively small size or lack of military capability among radical groups to attack local regimes continue to overshadow the few warnings that have emerged from the scholarly community about radical Islamists. Appearing before the same subcommittee in 2003 as Jones were four leading scholars on the region. Embedded deep within their official testimony were comments that I find quite disconcerting: Dr. Ariel Cohen: While reports of increasing Hizb activity abound, the extent to which local Hizb activities are part of a coordinated global plan is still unknown, just as the question of whether every region and country has an autonomous leadership that defines programs and sets deadlines remains unanswered. Hizb is rumored to be operating on a thirteen-year grand plan, but if it exists, this program is still unknown. In fighting the war of ideas, the Bush administration must reevaluate, revive, and upgrade its public diplomacy tool box, as well as invent new specific tools for fighting aggressive, anti-Western sentiment among fundamentalist groups and regimes that support and tolerate them.
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Dr. Stephen Blank: Virtually every writer on Central Asia has postulated that the combination of ubiquitous misrule, corruption, poverty and repression there runs the risk of encouraging opposition groups to gravitate toward Islamic parties and movements for want of any other option. The lack of an option is therefore allegedly due to the fact that the regimes there have stifled all other opposition movements. Hence Islamic movements, which are generally and inherently underground operations, are left as the only force capable of arousing opposition to this misrule. Alternatively this repression and misrule stimulates this gravitation to Islamic parties because only they have the most coherent and resonant message that the population can assimilate in terms it understands. This conclusion emerges because we assume that all other avenues of political expression are closed off because of repression, socio-economic decline, environmental degradation, and the breakdown of social norms through crime, corruption, drugs, ethnic cleavages, or the absence of a genuine civil society. Islamic parties and movements that supposedly speak to the populace in their own language are left by default as the only alternative. Dr. Martha Brill Olcott: One of the most frustrating aspects of working in this region is how limited our levers are to influence developments in the region. Given the levels of American spending in the area, our greatest area of influence is in the area of security, and when we tackle state building issues, especially issues of political reform, it is much harder for our voice to be heard, given how limited the funds are that we are spending in this area in any of these countries. Dr. Fiona Hill: I believe that the United States should encourage more programs to expand political participation. . . . We need to bring extremist groups out of the shadows by encouraging religious education at all levels, allowing people to make their own decisions and to publicly debate social problems in mainstream settings so that these issues will be taken out of the domain of radical interpretation. (Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, “Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Regional Stability, 2003). The scholarly community can see the potential dangers but has not, for whatever reason, causally tied the exacerbation of those dangers directly to the contradictions and hypocrisy of American foreign policy. They are still focused largely on the repression initiated by local governments and somewhat ignore that such repression is violently enabled by America’s “selective engagement.” This work is hopefully the first in what will be a long line of serious investigations into the
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long-term security impact of “diplomacy for show” and the acceptance of cosmetic results when substantive progress is needed. 14. The Dangers of Divergent Diplomacy The end of the Cold War was for many in the West a confirmation of the universality and superiority of democracy and capitalism. The control of individualism and the management of human ambition were not only lesser ideologies, but also they were futile as peoples all over the globe stepped forward to become part of the cradle of democracy. From the very beginning of the post-Cold War era, therefore, the United States proclaimed to operate on two general principles: (1) Achieving balance between initiatives that address immediate threats and programs that promote lasting generational change; and (2) Pursuing selective engagement with those states truly willing to reform. (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2002) These two principles were not consistently or coherently applied even before 11 September 2001, but that day proved to be a turning point: it marked a shift elevating short-term strategic interests high above long-term “generational” reform. We had little opportunity to criticize this shift immediately following the Twin Towers disaster, as it rightfully appeared awkward and indecent to complain about security methods when the United States was so brazenly attacked. Please remember that my purpose for this chapter is not partisanship or to vent diatribes against the right, hawks, the military-industrial complex, or any group that believes security should always be the top priority for a state. The flaws I have discussed are endemic to the democratic and republican parties and in some ways reflect a flaw in the philosophical thinking with which Americans approach international relations and develop foreign policy. I wrote this piece to call attention to the way that the stalwart American pursuit of present-day terrorism (“the programs that address immediate threats”) does not produce the “lasting generational change” that the United States says is ultimately most important and in fact such pursuit enables the reemergence of transnational terrorist groups. This effort is likely to give terrorists the arguments they need to attract new legions to the cause of bringing down the West. American hypocrisy in foreign policy creates new generations of terrorists whose one true goal will not be in attacking the local regimes with which America “selectively engaged” but in looking to cause pain and suffering against Americans. They will seek retribution because the United States was not merely indifferent to their repression. It will appear to them by all objective methods of investigation to be something America tacitly endorsed and consistently supported. The Ferghana Valley is just the first and perhaps the best positioned of many other potentially similar sites around the globe.
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I argue this because the United States has blindly allowed its belief in immediate security to be embodied by a system dominated by politicians and diplomats who have been willing, since 11 September 2001, to overlook democratic regression in places like the Ferghana Valley. This democratic regression is considered a “necessary evil” to achieve progress in the present global war against terror. This is not an argument merely railing against immediate security concerns and lamenting idealized visions of freedom and liberty. This chapter has tried to reveal the manner in which the United States provided aid to a region such that compromised long-term international security. While the local regimes increased their repression, America looked duplicitous and self-serving. Until now, in conducting the war against terror, the United States government has relied mostly on its foreign military assistance programs, which are defined as a method for “friends and allies to acquire American military equipment, services, and training for . . . legitimate self-defense and for participation in multinational security efforts” (Human Rights Watch, 2002). In trying to use these programs more effectively to forge its international coalition against terror, the United States has modified its military assistance stance in three ways: (1) Changing the legal regime to push arms transfers to foreign nations; (2) Granting military assistance to several states directly involved in the war against terror; and (3) Increasing and expediting counterterrorism assistance and general military aid to other countries around the world. (Ibid.) Unfortunately, how these events have played out in real terms is an uncomfortable softening and arguably even a violation of formal American law. Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 forbids the transfer of assistance to governments that engage in a “consistent pattern of gross violations” of human rights (ibid.). Under “extraordinary circumstances,” the president has the right to waive these restrictions, which President Bush has done quite liberally since 11 September 2001. The State Department also began lifting sanctions as part of its post-9/11 foreign policy, while the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which handles foreign military sales within the Department of Defense, established a “war room” to speed up sales approvals and more quickly expedite transfers (ibid.). All of this pushes radical Islamists to one conclusion—America wants to help kill Muslims faster. Whether this is an accurate reflection of reality matters little. In such isolated places suffering from severe repression like the Ferghana Valley, perception is more important than reality. United States government press conferences and diplomatic communiqués that offer up “hope for the future” or “contentment with recent progress” all sound insincere and deadly to local groups having to live amongst the repression in Central Asia. Even when America voices concern, as Assistant Secretary of State Lorne Craner did in 2004, it sounds muted and lacking in authority:
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We know that while there is no justification for terrorism, repressive societies without economic development and that [practice] social exclusion have been breeding ground for terrorists. That is a simple fact. We don’t want to see that continue. (International War and Peace Reporting, 2004) This is well said but is received on the ground as viciously insincere as government forces in Bishkek, Tashkent and Dushanbe use weapons given by the American military at an “expedited pace” to shoot and kill Muslims. America must stop undervaluing the impact of perception on its long-term security. What becomes of all the moderate Muslims in the Ferghana Valley imprisoned and tortured? What becomes of their family and friends who suffer from such repression while listening to the United States talk of being pleased overall by the “careful progress” achieved in the region? They likely become not just the mortal enemies of the local regimes but also the enemies of the United States. Proposing such injustices can turn moderates into radicals is not necessarily revolutionary. The United States is also not the first country to engage foreign partners on security matters while having reservations about the nature of the regimes with which they are involved. The problem this chapter highlights, however, is that these regimes helping America fight terrorism today are only causing future terror problems that America will have to fight tomorrow (ibid.). Even the NGO community within the Ferghana Valley explained best by the director of the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society in Kyrgyzstan, sees the situation in a scarily compromised and pragmatic way: I regard the presence of the United States in [and assistance to] our region . . . as very positive as there will be no end to terrorism. Therefore it’s hard to say the United States will leave the region in the next 10 years. (Ibid.) This statement is ostensibly declaring that repression within the Ferghana states is horrendous and will continue to be so despite American engagement. American assistance to fight terror only breeds more terrorism locally. Grassroots organizations in the Ferghana Valley have come to approve of these dynamics because it means America will be unable to abandon them. The political environment has become so perverse that even local NGOs are finding ways to positively value terrorism. Even more disturbing, the hundreds of millions of dollars poured into the region since 11 September 2001 have produced few significant results while untold amounts have conveniently ended up in the hands of elites. Yet America persistently proclaims success and progress. This is what I have defined as compromised democracy, pervasive throughout the foreign policy of the United States government as it justifies its fight against terror. The Ferghana Valley has become a perfect nexus for harboring radicals, either in groups or as individuals: the borders between the three states are still porous and poorly guarded. The valley itself remains a largely ungoverned region where secret unfettered movement from city to city and country to country
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remains easy. The classic terrorist cell system, small and isolated from each other to prevent intelligence penetration, has only deepened in the valley since 11 September 2001, not weakened. The Ferghana Valley has long been a transnational conduit for narcotics and slave smuggling. Transforming these conduits so that they can also effectively allow for the flow of radical Islamists is not difficult. If Osama bin Laden wanted to remain forever hidden, he should have fled north from Afghanistan to the valley, where the United States does not have as much access while the local regimes use blunt but inefficient methods to antagonize Muslims. Hiding in the valley away from international eyes is easier because of the repressive hold the local regimes pretend to maintain over their sovereign territory. It may appear paradoxical, but the fact of the matter is that they may repress the valley but they do not hold it. At the moment, American diplomacy appears to live in a bubble. The United States is impervious to understanding that Uzbek, Tajik, and Kyrgyz repression against Islam does not just damn those regimes. Since 11 September 2001, a dramatic shift has occurred in public perception within the valley that sees the United States as a partner in that repression. Poor oppressed peoples never see coincidence. They see conspiracy. The American government would do well to remember that when it sends its diplomats abroad to give speeches proclaiming progress. Local populations in Central Asia see and experience nothing but degradation and worsening conditions. Talking the talk without walking the walk will ultimately be disastrous for the United States in its ability to win the war against terror. Slavish commitment to the utility of short-term strategy compromises longterm success over the same strategic interest. While I do not doubt the sincerity of polished diplomats like Craner, Jones, Karen Hughes, Rice, and Donald Rumsfeld, American security suffers dire consequences when our leaders ignore fatal contradictions in American diplomacy, when they speak of progress and advancement that does not exist. All Muslims in the Ferghana Valley carry the burden of these contradictions. 15. Conclusion: Blindly Building New Bin Ladens When the United States allows democratic principles to be undermined in areas already sensitive to radical Islamic thought and then goes on to proclaim success in establishing a foundation for democratic principles, it practices imperfect diplomacy. This inconsistency only helps fuel Muslim disgust toward American ideals and values. Such imperfect diplomacy mutates into flawed democracy when compromises are falsely trumpeted as the causes of progress. This mutation helps undermine the global war on terror not just today but generationally. Everyone knows a final end to terrorism is impossible. Terrorists will always exist. Yet the inescapable truth of these realities is not a justifiable rationale for
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tolerating policy that creates future terrorists and provides them with damning evidence that justifies acting against the United States. Conditions of poverty, repression, censorship, corruption, and injustice lead to radicalization. Unfortunately, American engagement with the Ferghana states has not lessened these qualities. In many ways, this engagement has brought about their intensification. Yet America has not acted against this heinous coincidence and has spoken out against it only weakly and lamely. It does this because it stubbornly adheres to the misplaced thinking that a short-term betrayal of true democracy abroad is sometimes necessary for making sure terror does not strike at home. This thinking is not necessary or acceptable because it is wrong. Duplicity and selfishness have long been common characteristics in foreign-policy development; one only need read Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince (1640) to know just how long such subterfuge has been implicitly if not explicitly endorsed by the international community. The problem elaborated here is that our duplicity and selfishness do not accomplish our security objectives. As Machiavelli wrote, if it were possible to be a beacon of hope and justice and have all of the people love you while maintaining power and security, then it would be best to be such a beacon. The problem for Machiavelli was his reality did not appear to provide many such opportunities to be positive and powerful. The United States needs to realize that long-term victory in the global war against terror is the opportunity that Machiavelli deemed unlikely: an opportunity where the steadfast commitment to justice and liberty, without any space for hypocrisy or contradiction, succeeds in achieving greater success and gaining greater security. We should not ignore the short-term temptations intrinsic to this war for the long-term strategies that will ultimately produce the greatest results. The United States is best served by being both positive and powerful. The American betrayal of democracy is not just a betrayal of the people of the Ferghana Valley and all those in places like it. The betrayal of democracy is a betrayal of the very essence of American hegemony. It destroys the one filament that could arguably light and justify American dominance: unilateralism would be acceptable if it was selflessly committed for the true betterment of others. Hegemony would be allowable if people employed it to sincerely expand the principles of freedom, liberty, prosperity, dignity, and justice. This type of unilateral hegemonic power would be capable of gaining world acquiescence because it would not be about American interests but about human interests. What can bring victory over terror is a belief by the world community that this truly is America’s motivation and its inspiration. That belief only comes when the world community consistently sees the United States walk the talk it so eloquently proclaims about liberal democracy. But this is not American hegemony today nor is it the end result of American unilateralism. Convenient strategic pragmatism infuses American foreign policy and allows the United States government to justify and rationalize its excesses and failures. This is a refutation of the true American ideal. It is a rejection of the
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purpose American ideology was supposed to serve in the global arena. It is not too late to correct this policy flaw. Before we can correct it, one thing is certain: both diplomatically and scholarly America must stop ignoring the signs that it is blindly building new Bin Ladens.
WRAP-UP OF PART ONE Matthew Crosston Part One opened to the reader some of the daunting problems facing the global community in the twenty-first century regarding international security. Laura Meder shows that in some ways, the global community does not help itself. The need for an expanded, broader definition of global security is essential due to the expanding and ever-broadening problems that jeopardize peace and stability. Presently, the world community recognizes these problems but has not yet formally incorporated them into an accepted definition of security. This continuing failure carries potentially radical consequences. Resolution cannot be achieved without recognition. States in the international system today are still slow to consider that water may ultimately eclipse oil as the major resource causing death and destruction. Conflict due to migration may emerge more often due to scarcity of food instead of ethnic cleansing or discriminatory practices of governments. The interdependence of the global economy can become not just a positive source for increasing prosperity but a negative source that threatens prosperity as the reckless decisions of some states cause environmental catastrophes in neighboring states. None of these potentialities are inevitable. But Meder correctly admonishes that they will be inevitable if we as a community continue to compartmentalize these as “green” issues without recognizing them as inextricably related to peace, stability, violence, and security. Perhaps more disturbing, the United States, the leading state in the global community regarding international security, is currently pursuing a policy capable of collapsing under the weight of its inconsistencies and contradictions. This is particularly disheartening because of the unique diplomatic and policy weight carried by the United States and its continued effort to have the international community see it as the guiding force for global security. Many states do not agree with the paths that the United States chooses, but they do not have the military, economic, or diplomatic independence prerequisite to act as a true counterweight or offer any credible alternative paths. The long-term answer to establishing security lies in freedom, liberty, prosperity, dignity, and justice. Societies strongly imbued with these characteristics possess the tools to help ensure security in other states and create a truly transnational network of stability. On the contrary, the United States compromises long-term victory by blindly following traditional strategies of realpolitik, fueled by self-interested realism. This steadfast adherence to outdated narrative impedes the development of new approaches and definitions and all but stymies innovation in twenty-first
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century security. If we continue such practices, we become a source for a potentially fatal political sin. The ultimate potential consequence of these failings is quite stark: the collapse of the global system as it is presently constituted. Many past societies and empires have collapsed because of a failure to recognize how they were causing irreversible damage to the environment that sustained them. The economic and technological advances made by the global community today have created wealth never before seen. The long-term damage this wealthproduction has caused to our environment and whether we have the opportunity to catch and reverse the long-term damage in time to ensure human sustainability is already in doubt. The inability to reverse the damage could very well be the most pressing security issue facing all states in the coming century. These dim prospects do not improve when we consider the world’s only superpower. Most world hegemons never consider their own downfall. They consider threats only from external sources as superpowers are confident that their systems and regimes are impervious to instability and collapse. Historically, we see that all hegemons have evinced this attitude. They were never prepared for a downfall caused by flaws and mistakes internal to their systems. While worrying about this ultimate Armageddon at the moment might appear to be premature, world conditions are worth watching: America’s downfall may not come at the hands of terrorists, but it can come because of the hypocrisy and contradictions created while fighting those terrorists. Part One aims to set up the remaining chapters of the volume while offering a glimmer of hope. It is not yet too late to correct the global community’s that threaten security. We recognize all the issues and have understood the parameters for quite awhile. What we need to do now is to begin to think in more innovative and non-traditional ways. In a post-9/11 world, real and uncompromised commitment to global security must no longer be considered a secondary priority compared with short-term strategy. Especially this area of concentration must no longer be considered a haven only for idealists.
Part Two SELF VERSUS OTHER; “US” VERSUS “THEM”
INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO Karen Lombardi The key to Section Two is the word versus. The chapters in this section all address dichotomies that create opposition or conflict between and within self and other. That dividing line may be the nation-state versus the global community, as Kevin C. M. Benson’s “Deterring Terror” addresses. Or it may be the paradox of religion, as Randall E. Osborne, Paul Kriese, and Friedman so eloquently explore in “Love and Hate as Moral Imperatives,” which simultaneously unites all mankind and divides it into smaller and smaller groups, each of which may believe it possesses a moral imperative to conquer or destroy the spirits of others. It may be the conflicts within the self that form the basis of a sense of enmity for the Other, as Anrè Venter explores through the lens of social psychology in “Self versus Other.” The individual’s unconscious psychic mechanisms of identification and disavowal may contribute to the misidentification and vilification underlying the hatred or lack of human feeling for members of groups other than our own. Karen Lombardi examines these issues in “The Psychology of Group Membership and Alienation.” Paradoxically, Terri A. Karis reveals to us that the refusal to acknowledge or lacking awareness of difference perpetuates the psychology of whiteness in a presumably post-racist society. In reading these chapters written from the perspective of different disciplines and focusing on different contents, the reader is likely to be impressed by the similarities they share. Each author struggles to understand and elucidate the mechanisms that contribute to problematic divisions among us, and to suggest possibilities for facing and overcoming those divisions. On a global political level, Benson addresses the necessity for the global community to work together in order to deter terrorism. Positive deterrence requires the cooperation of the global community, which must overcome the particular interests of nation-states. Osborne, Kriese, and Friedman explore the paradoxes of religion, which at best afford security and meaning to our lives and at worst serves as a justification for hate and torture of religious groups other than ours. By way of example, he cites the Crusades, the Inquisition, and current examples of violent struggle between Muslims and Jews, and Sunni and Shiite in the Middle East. Venter looks to our concept of the self as a basis for conflict, pointing out that the propensity for conflict is rooted in the individual level, which then transfers to the group level. The idea that the self is an enclosed instrument with the capability for control and understanding leads us to an illusion of false uniqueness that serves as a justification for atrocities inflicted on others perceived as different from ourselves— a form of acting out our internal conflicts. Lombardi points to the unconscious mechanisms of projective identification, dissociation,
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and denial, which allow us to vilify in others those feelings or attributes within ourselves that we have failed to integrate. Projecting internal psychology onto a cultural landscape, Karis points to the danger of denying differences if we are to defeat racism. She urges us to abandon the false sense of unity created by the myth that no difference exists between Black and White. Dichotomies such as “us” versus “them,” “individual” versus “collective,” “love versus hate,” “self” versus “other,” “black” versus “white,” “terror” versus “safety,” and “separation” versus “connection” are complex issues that have been with us for centuries and which do not suggest easy solutions. In contemporary society, the search for solutions becomes more urgent than ever before. As the world has changed and it has become increasingly “smaller” through advances in transportation and technology, we have become increasingly interdependent on one another. These advances, which we might view as progressive, also have a terrifying capability for destructiveness. We no longer have the space to live in small groups or insulated from each other. That we address the destructiveness of divisiveness while leaving room for the progressive and creative development of individuality has become increasingly urgent. Perhaps we need to question the concept of individuality. The uniqueness and separation that individuality implies may in itself become a dangerous prospect when the value (and the inescapable reality) of connectedness through recognition of our similarity weakens. The difficult work that this section presents us is how we can preserve the interesting aspects of our individuality and our particular group identities without falling into the toxic trap of overvaluing ourselves and undervaluing, or dehumanizing, the Other. The Other, after all, is a part of ourselves that we have failed to integrate. These failures are what make us enemies to each other as well as to ourselves.
Three LOVE AND HATE AS MORAL IMPERATIVES: RELIGIOUS PARADOX AS A CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL SECURITY Randall E. Osborne, Paul Kriese, Stan Friedman Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you. Matthew 5:43 And if a stranger stays with you in your land, you shall do him no wrong. The stranger that stays with you shall be to you as the home born among you, and you shall love him as you love yourself; for you were strangers in the land of Egypt. The Torah, Leviticus 19:33–34 Let there be no compulsion in religion. Qu’ran, Surah 2, verse 256 To the Christians of Najran and its neighbouring territories, the security of God and the pledge of Mohammed the Prophet, the Messenger of God, are extended for their lives, their religion, their land, their property, to their caravans, their messengers and their images. Prophet Mohammed, Code of Conduct issued to followers in Najran 1. Introduction As we survey the history of humanity, avoiding religious paradox is difficult. Religion provides some of the most transcendent language and symbolism, and we readily encounter lives transformed within that context. Yet, we also find territorial markers of hate: a gruesome description of torturing Jews during the Spanish Inquisition and Crusades, reports of recent violence from the HinduMoslem conflict in India, the ever-present strikes and counter-strikes in the Middle East, ethnic strife in Bosnia, Genocide in Rwanda, individuals in the United States such as David Koresh or Randy Weaver, and the “war on terror” that started with the attacks of 11 September 2001. More subtle, perhaps, would be stories of children forced to perform noxious tasks because “idle hands are the
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devil’s tools,” parents who hit children out of a fear that “to spare the rod spoils the child,” or the subordination and beating of women because “God has willed it so.” As disturbing as any act of hate-based violence and harm may be, religiously motivated hate has something even more disturbing about it. We have a hard time squaring attitudes or acts of religious hatred with the transcendent texts that define most religions. Justifying hatred and implementing cruelty in the name of religion and God creates a very puzzling paradox. This religious paradox is often apparent even in the texts themselves. In the Christian Bible, for example, we have numerous stories of the compassion and love Jesus shared with others, and contrasting examples of intolerance (even hatred) such as Jesus angrily chasing the moneychangers out of the temple! In another section of the Bible, lions devour the non-believers. For the purposes of this chapter, we define religion as “a group of relatively unified practices and beliefs related to approaching, delineating, producing or understanding what may be considered divine, sacred (literally, “set apart”) or transcendent dimensions of reality.” Please note that throughout this chapter we use the term “God” as a generic term to reference belief in a deity and not, necessarily, a Christian one. A distinction can (even needs to) be made between thinking about religion in an absolute way which provides absolute answers (such as the assumption that absolute truths, absolute right, absolute wrong exist) and thinking about religion as a series of choices that individuals must make (Mitchell, 2007; Shaw, 2005; Spencer, 2000). We can view religions’ guides for how we might make those choices (Catholic Answers, 2005; St. Thomas Aquinas, 1989; Thistlewaite, 2003). For example, according to Catholic Answers (2005), an act that might otherwise be interpreted as “evil” or “unjust” can be defined as “just” under three conditions: (1) the action itself is not intrinsically evil, (2) evil must be an unanticipated side-effect of the act not the reason for the act itself, and (3) the effect of the evil must not outweigh the effect of the good. When religion is used to promote (or justify) absolutes, individuals are not “free” to choose because “right” ways and “wrong” ways to do things are clearly defined. When religion is viewed as a series of choices, then it can be perceived as entering more freely into human thought and, therefore, human behavior. As we will explore later, religion viewed as absolute is appealing because it reduces or eliminates ambiguity. On the other hand, the greater the ambiguity, the greater the tolerance for diversity and the lower the potential for religious-based hatred. As we will also discuss later, too much ambiguity can create discomfort (even dread) that may prompt individuals to seek solace in absolutes and the cycle starts over.
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2. Religion as Narrative of Meaning Religion permeates many, if not all, facets of human existence. For believers and non-believers alike, religion is present often without our knowing it. Religion provides one of the bases for the state’s interest in marriage, and justifies tax credits for contributions to our churches. In our homes, it can infuse daily life with a sense of the sacred, and some use it to justify spousal and child abuse. It comforts many persons experiencing grief, and it provides rituals for dealing with the death of loved ones. Religious beliefs may influence whom we choose to marry and the way in which we formalize marriage (such as marriage in the Quaker tradition in which the members of a couple marries themselves with the Meeting looking on and approving of the marriage). It can influence how we structure our family, what we do with our money, and with whom we should have, or when we should refrain from sex. We may also incorporate religious belief into our self-perception, which may greatly influence our sense of personal worth. The influence of religion in our lives is almost endless, even if we do not adhere to an organized religion. Most importantly, religious beliefs (or an explicit rejection thereof) may provide a context from which we attempt to comprehend why our lives unfold as they do. As we try to understand events that appear inexplicable from the vantage point of everyday reality, we often willingly shift to a perspective that purports to give a larger perspective from which we can make sense of nonsense, a context that can provide comfort and certainty in the face of uncertainty and indeterminism. The greater the ambiguity in what we perceive in our lives (or the more insecure we feel in relationship to events happening in the world), the greater may be the pull for a system (of symbols) that provides structure and meaning to the amorphous glob we (quite glibly) label “reality.” The greater the ambiguity in our lives, the more comforting a religious view that provides absolutes might be. One implication of such a tendency is a construct called “Worldview Defense,” which we shall explore later in this chapter (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon et al., 1990). Language, the carrier of the story of our lives, is in some ways the ultimate social arbitrator (or scorekeeper). We use language to keep track of others and ourselves. Once we attach a linguistic symbol to a perception, the making of meaning is well underway—in the process of being “set” or irreversible. Merlin Donald suggests that the most elevated use of language in tribal society is what he calls “mythic invention,” the construction of (a) model(s) of the human universe. Essentially all cultures, regardless how “primitive” or unchanging, hold myths about how the world was created, why we are born, and why we die. Other stories encapsulate shared ideas and the history of the tribe (1991, pp. 213–214). In many such societies, the myths are so important and powerful that they are publicly mentioned only rarely, and often only by the initiated—and only at an appointed time. In contemporary societies, more commonly, all are initiates and anyone may talk about our myths in public space at any time.
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The move from individual narrative to larger myth entails integrating (or connecting) our personal episodes into larger stories using special (sacred) symbols. For example, we can feel blessed by God, or say that we have good Karma, as opposed to just feeling lucky. The story essentially gives shape to and embodies our experience, and connects us to a system of meaning beyond the self. This connection beyond self makes us feel part of something that is “bigger” than us, and, therefore, makes us feel less isolated, less alone. It helps us combine many apparently unrelated episodes of our lives into a coherent tapestry of meaning woven from the often frightening and apparently meaningless threads of life. “Myth is the inevitable outcome of narrative skill and is the supreme organizing principle” (ibid., p. 258). Assuming that seeking a sense of purpose and coherence and searching for answers to difficult questions, or sharing a meaningful symbol system with other human beings, are potentially noble endeavors, then where and how do toxic elements enter the search? In attempting to answer that question, we must carefully navigate the terrain of the religious quest and to distinguish the legitimate search from the path of camouflaged cruelty. Our concern is to recognize that people use religion to cover the fear that they have of the unknown. People translate their own idea of good and bad and then create a deity that agrees. But these practices must include a higher power or deity. Consider Marxism to understand this point. Marxism focused on a transcendent understanding of history but had no God. As such, we would not define it as a religion. Religion as a symbol system, as a narrative of (or providing) meaning, may offer a vision of what the world should be like, dictating how we must act to transform the world to what it could or should be. Religious beliefs and practices also dictate how to relate to God, and even more importantly perhaps, how to receive divine blessings. Religion is also a means of keeping or bringing the world back into perspective, particularly after a loss or traumatic event or after an event that does not “make sense,” often literally. In this sense, religious beliefs function as an attribution system: persons make attributions regarding the “why” of life and world events within a frame of religious beliefs. This framework provides a way to answer the question why something has happened. Where beliefs and rituals are held in common by a group, they often provide a most powerful, unifying glue to bind the group together. While our “working definition” of religion easily includes Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and other “mainline” religions, it could easily encompass non-mainstream systems of meaning as well, including those that get branded as “cults.” As an excellent example, see Let Us Now Praise Famous Men (Agee and Walker, 1941). A key criterion of religion as a cultural system is that a group of persons share a common set of symbols, embedded in story, that binds them together as a group and that they perceive as connecting them to reality—natural or supernatural (Edelman, 1964; Eliade, 1963; Ricoeur, 1967). By story or myth, we refer to the presence of a symbol system, without presuming to judge the veracity of its
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content. Seeking meaning through stories appears to be an essential component of the human condition. Literally hundreds of examples include: (1) the Jewish Midrash, (2) Christian parables, (3) Native American stories, and (4) African American “Uncle Remus” stories. People encapsulate experience in story as a way to provide coherence, order, and meaning to what they might otherwise experience as little more than random and unrelated sensory events. Through story, we can move from “mere” experience to the experience of understanding. When life events or issues are significant, but ambiguous or devoid of directly verifiable answers, then an individual may be more likely to imbue his or her story with more powerful and evocative symbols. The power of the story must rise to the level of the life domain it narrates. The stories that religions tell are inevitably complex, and the characters that inhabit the stage are necessarily larger than life (such as the Sacraments). What we are saying is that those who share religious views and those who hear them often ignore or minimize the complexity of religion (such as the reality that there could be more than one-way of viewing things) is often ignored or minimized by those sharing the religious views and those hearing them. This is, in many ways, the heart of the issue. After all, religious stories are concerned with creation, salvation, and eternal destiny, while they simultaneously draft a moral blueprint that purportedly depicts the architecture of the universe. This blueprint tells us—mere mortals—how we should live “on the ground” as well as “in heaven.” Religious story as it pertains to morality—to definitions of good and evil, right and wrong, love and hate, how to act—is most central to this inquiry. To the extent that persons rely on particular religious narratives to navigate a choppy and uncharted moral sea, we must understand how that reliance can lead us to “love or comfort” our “enemies,” or to “hate and kill in the name of God.” How can we understand when we hear paradoxical phrases such as “a Just War” or see paradoxical behavior like an Army Chaplain praying for the destruction of the enemy? The following is an example of the complexity of a behavioral blueprint. How do we decide if we should kill a person who kills someone else? We could use the “eye for an eye” text from the Talmud (the application of the “word” to the real world in which we live) to support capital punishment, but among western nations, only the United States and Israel appear to interpret the myth as answering the question in the affirmative. How do we understand and justify differences in wealth? The defining myth of capitalism is that the accumulation of capital is “good” not only for business, but also for individuals (see for example, Max Weber’s “Protestantism and the Spirit of Capitalism,” 1904; or Horatio Alger’s “Bound to Rise,” 1873). The myth renders with great specificity an answer to the question: What is an individual to do with its life? The reply of the capitalist narrative is that we should pursue the accumulation of wealth. The myth provides a loftier, more noble motive for accumulating wealth than simple greed: people use the myth to argue that the capitalist system affords the best and most efficient way to distrib-
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ute goods and services to people in need. From the Bible, we see that Abraham and Isaac have many goods; the implication is that God gave these to them as rewards or blessings. One aspect of the myth is that persons profiting from the capitalist system have accumulated wealth that they then willingly distributed to those in need, to a wide range of individual and social causes. Here, a person accumulates wealth, which, through spending, will trickle down and benefit others. Some have used the same myth to justify the abuse of migrant and sweat shop garment workers, environmental terrorism, and a general sacrifice of the many for the benefit of the few—a grossly inequitable distribution of wealth. This is not to say that capitalism justifies abuse, but it defines it differently from other systems—to pay someone as little as possible is not abuse—just “good business.” Or employers might pay more so they can have reliable workers to increase profit. As another example, consider toxic waste dumps in the United States. We doubt it is purely coincidental that many such dumps are in or near communities of color. Connecting religious myth to nation, or economic system may result in an unchallenged vision of good which may become so widespread as to give it the appearance of unanimity and more importantly, blessing from God. As such, it becomes something accepted and not to be questioned. As God’s chosen people, why should we not enjoy the lion’s share of the world’s resources? Consider American coinage. The stamping of “In God we Trust” on our currency is not coincidental. It suggests that God somehow sanctions our economic system. It suggests that our economic system is, somehow, sanctioned by God. We can find an excellent example of this type of thinking in Rudyard Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden” (1899). In this poem, Kipling calls for the United States to adopt an expansionist agenda as Britain and other European nations had done. Kipling seems to describe this expansion as a moral imperative. But when we look at economic issues from a more detached perspective, we need to face this fact: the 500 wealthiest individuals in the world now control more resources than the combined wealth of the poorest one-half—over 3 billion—of the world’s population. We must remember that a capitalist system does not consider this distribution “bad.” But other systems of meaning may interpret our system as evil. Because we view our system as right and, perhaps, Godgiven—hence it provides us with positive meaning—while others may view it as evil, great potential for conflict exists. How is it that systems of meaning that proclaim, “do unto others as you would have them do to you,” can also produce outcomes such as crusades, pogroms, witch hunts, and civil wars? How is it possible to use religion to justify the killing even of persons who reside under the same umbrella of faith, such as the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin by fellow Jews in 1995, the cycle of slaughter by Protestants and Catholics in Ireland, or the syphilis experiments on African American male inmates in the American South during the 1950s, or the ongoing conflicts between Shi’a and Sunnis? How do persons, who cognitively believe religious narratives that suggest an “equality” of all persons before the eyes of
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God, participate in narrative systems and actions that result in gross inequalities in the world? How do people instructed to “love thine enemies” support national bombing campaigns to eradicate their enemies? In short, how and why do persons who ascribe to religious systems that teach love as a moral imperative produce or participate in so many tableaus of hate? Research on (self and) identity suggests that individuals develop a “personal identity”—our sense of our own attributes and a “social identity”—our sense of which groups define who we are (Hogg, 2003). Omar may think of himself as “honest” (a personal identity) and as a “Christian” (a social identity). Social identity theory discusses the implications of social identity for our interactions with and assumptions about other people (Turner, 1985). Social identity theory suggests we: (1) categorize—we find it helpful (we might be perceived as having a need) to place people and objects into categories, (2) identify—we align ourselves with groups and gain identity and self-esteem from it, and (3) compare—we compare ourselves to others. Those groups with which we identify are called “ingroups,” while those we compare ourselves to can be considered “outgroups” (Turner 1985). John C. Turner (ibid.) suggests that we have a tendency to positively define the groups with which we identify so we can more positively evaluate ourselves. This leads to a self-serving bias: if we assign a positive value to “our” groups (ingroups), we are likely to do so by assigning negative value to the groups with which we do not identify (outgroups). If we are good, they must be bad. Our “being good” becomes the cognitive anchor and the other, therefore, must be bad. Most people rate themselves above average on most dimensions— something the social psychologists call the “better-than-most effect.” This appears to be held, for example, for fairness (Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, and Samuelson, 1985), happiness (Lykken and Tellegen, 1996), and satisfaction in personal relationships (Buunk and van den Eijnden, 1997). Jonathan D. Brown and Chihiro Kobayashi (2002) suggest that this tendency to assume that we are betterthan-most extends to members of our social self such that we believe that members of our families, our friends, and our ingroups are also “better-than-most.” The tendency to compare self to others, to judge self-qualities or self-worth, is known as “social comparison” (Festinger, 1954). Osborne (1996) suggested that individuals may sometimes compare themselves to others whom they believe to be “inferior” to feel “superior.” Herein lies the problem. Such strategies can lead to horrible outcomes for others but they make the individual feel better. As such, negative outcomes do not trouble most individuals. Human beings are highly motivated to feel positively about themselves (Sedikides, 1993). Social identity theory explains how self-concept is structured and how it functions (Brewer and Weber, 1994). An extension of social identity theory— self-categorization theory (Brewer and Gardner, 1996; Turner, Hogg, Oakes et al., 1987)—suggests that three general levels of self vary with the degree of infusion of a person’s individuality or uniqueness: (1) the superordinate level— self as a human being (“we’re all more alike than we are different”), (2) social
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identity—categorization of self based on ingroup and outgroup distinctions (“we are Americans and they are not”), and the personal identity level—categorization of self as unique even in comparison to other ingroup members (“I am more patriotic than most Americans”). Research on self-serving motives suggests at minimum three self-motives may explain under what conditions individuals are likely to boost self by denigrating others: when we are motivated by self-knowledge—we want to know who we are (Dunning, 1999); when we are motivated to verify our selfconcepts—when we are trying to confirm that we are who we think we are (Swann, Rentfrow, and Guinn, 2003); and when we are motivated to selfenhance—to put ourselves in as positive of light as possible (Sedikides, 1993). Research also shows that individuals are more likely to engage in comparisons with others that result in denigrating others (or the groups to which they belong) under two conditions: (1) when one is highly loyal to the group (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje, 2002); and (2) when the outgroup is disliked or portrayed negatively (Duck, Hogg, and Terry, 2000). When research results on social identity, self-categorization, and selfmotives is taken together, we sense a self-motive “tug-of-war” with profound implications for behavior. Research on optimal distinctiveness theory suggests, for example, two opposing affiliation motives within us all (Brewer, 1991). Like many other motives (or even physiological drives), we seek balance between the desire to “fit in” and the desire to stand out—”optimal distinctiveness.” Because these motives operate in direct opposition to each other, satisfying one sends a signal that a deficit exists in the other. We can apply this opposition to many forms of relationships or affiliations from the individual level (Brewer, 1991; Pickett, Bonner, and Coleman, 2002) to the inter-group level (Brewer and Gardner, 1995; Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis, 2002). Another example is Cynthia Carr’s Our Town (2005) that depicts how people can be married to Klan members, yet disagree with their politics and methods. Applying this theory to religious affiliations appears to be an appropriate extension. It appears to be logical that events, ideological dialogues, and stated beliefs in another religion that dialectically oppose ours would cause us to champion our different views because that would make us stand out. At the same time, we are motivated to find the commonalities—to fit in—but only until we reach some balance. This theory would predict an effort between people with opposing views to find common ground but not at the expense of “keeping our differences.” If someone tries too hard to make their religious views (assuming they are from a different religion) fit ours, the distinctiveness of our religion is threatened, and we are motivated to find and, perhaps, champion our perceived differences. An interesting example of this principle is the practice of “keeping up the hedge,” in which some sects of the modern Quaker church attempt to maintain the “purity” of the sect by only socializing with, or encouraging members to marry someone from within the sect (Cooper, 1991).
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With competition (such as competition for attention, media time, or resources), individuals show a heightened sensitivity to inter-group distinctions and an enhanced tendency to perceive an entire social category as a single entity—thus minimizing any individual differences of group members and maximizing perceived differences between one’s ingroup and relevant outgroups (Brewer and Harasty, 1996; Brewer, Weber, and Carini, 1995). When the competition ends and the threat extinguished, then individuals are motivated to again maximize their uniqueness (both individually and within the group) in line with optimal distinctiveness theory. We have no reason to believe that religious categorizations would not follow these same patterns. As such, world events that foster competition between groups with particularly strong religious ideologies are likely to result in perceptions of threat and initiate worldview defensiveness along religious lines. To the extent that religion is about morality and differences (for example, who will go to heaven), then competition will lead to the rejection and demonizing of other religions. By demonizing the “other,” we can alleviate our anxiety about our divine future and justify harmful acts perpetrated against the other. Terrorists use the perception of Americans as evil and animalistic, for example, to recruit youth in the Middle East to do things like fly planes into the New York City World Trade Center. They perceive religious hatred as just because they perceive the “other” as less than human (Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski, 2004). Obviously some identity-related issues predict where people fall on the continuum of love and hate (whether one uses religious myth to promote love or to justify hate). Threats to self and identity can prompt psychological and physical retaliatory attacks on others designed to reestablish the positive sense of personal and social identity that human beings value. Our sense that others should see things the way we do, or value the same things we value, may explain such paradoxical comments as Laura Bush’s statement that while the poor are always the main victims of natural disasters, it is just the way things are. “This is what happens when there’s a natural disaster of this scope,” the First Lady said. “The poorer people are usually in the neighborhoods that are the lowest or the most exposed or the most vulnerable. Their housing is the most vulnerable to natural disaster. And that is just always what happens” (Grieves, 2005). Although there are many examples of such paradoxes within human interaction, we want to consider those examples where the ingroup to (or with) which one is aligned is defined as a religion. 3. Love and Hate: The Crucible of Reality The arguments we are advancing should not lead a reader to conclude that we perceive religion in toto as responsible for hate and enmity. To the contrary, that so many religious narratives include the theme of love as a moral imperative leads us to juxtapose religion and the question of hate. Put another way, if persons who structure their lives according to narratives wherein love is obligatory
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still participate readily in acts of hate, must we conclude that no alternative to hate exists? Consider an example from the crucible of life. Many religious, self-proclaimed “holy” people have contributed to the culture of hatred against homosexuals. For example, during the first week of November 1999, the brutal murderer of Matthew Shepherd, a gay student, was convicted of murder in the second-degree. In another case, shortly after “apologizing” for decades of institutionalized racism, for instance, the Southern Baptists officially turned to a systematic persecution of the homosexual assemblage of society—even calling for a boycott of Disney, a company that had adopted non-discriminatory policies regarding sexual orientation. This boycott remained in place until 2005. The level of ridicule reached almost comic proportion in February of 1999, when a self-designated “moral majority” leader, Reverend Jerry Falwell, even attacked cartoon characters on the basis that they evidenced homosexual attributes! Commonly, traditionally marginalized individuals (groups), for example, decry racism on the one hand, but participate in gaybashing using the Bible as a source of “data” on the other. However, there is more to the story than just the paradoxical behavior of “religious” individuals or those who have been victims of marginalization themselves. Sometimes religion may lead people to practice what they preach—to try to end the cycle of hate, to accept fallibility in others. The father of the murdered gay student, experiencing not only the anguish inherent in the loss of his son, but also the hurt accompanying the knowledge of the grim cruelty of the murder, was allowed to address the jury during the sentencing phase of the trial. Instead of arguing for the death penalty, as do many family members of murder victims, Shepherd’s father argued against it—citing his religious beliefs as his motivation. While acknowledging that part of him wanted the murderer to die for what he had done, his religious story (and the beliefs he held based on that story)— based on biblical themes of forgiveness and reconciliation—led him to intervene on the behalf of the murderer of his son. History shows us other such examples. During World War II, Quaker individuals worked against the Nazi’s acts but at the same time called for the Nazis to be treated as human beings. During this same time period (1999), another story broke, which told of a businessman who had earned a large sum of money after making an initial public offering for his company. Unlike others in his position, he did not retain the profits solely for himself. He declared that his 550+ employees had produced the wealth and he distributed over one-hundred million dollars equally among them. In doing so, he demonstrated a most charitable orientation to life, an orientation embedded within a capitalistic story. Here, we face a paradox—a contradiction. The power of myth, especially the religious myth, can apparently activate the highest and the lowest qualities within human beings. Even the same myth, like the narrative surrounding the figure of Jesus, is used on the one hand to justify the hating of homosexuals, while on the other hand to call for forgiveness of those persons engaged in those acts of hate. Hulsey and Frost (2004) have coined the phrase, “moral cruelty”
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(Hulsey and Frost, 2004) to describe a particular vintage of hate: hate-motivated cruelty performed under or in a moral cloak. Examples include the hatred of homosexuals “because they are an abomination unto God” as well as violence against persons of other faiths “because they are infidels.” We perceive those individuals who forgive those whom engage in hate, even after they have murdered someone’s son—as actually embodying the message to which they cognitively ascribe: love as a moral imperative. As a result of mortality salience, any religious message that suggests we are “wrong” increases the need for us to defend our view of the world to reduce the anxiety associated with thinking of our existential vulnerability; this has been labeled terror management theory (for example, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon, 1999). The Middle East is, in many ways, paradoxical. Jews and Moslems have for centuries espoused, “love thy neighbor,” yet they also have exhibited many years of mutual hatred and slaughter in the name of God. Both groups have been victims of and victimized by the other. The Israeli Irgun and the Arab Palestinian Liberation Organization were founded to protect and advance their religious foundation. Each organization claims that the other is “evil,” yet both sides have been responsible for the death of innocent people. Each group has the right to survive. Both groups have claimed the right to fight against an enemy whom they see as the main reason for their insecurity. Neither side will trust the other, which is exactly what they need to create a political situation in which both groups can survive and prosper. Both sides maintain the instability of the situation. Each side is secure in its religious and moral explanation of why it cannot work with the other. Each side points to the “atrocities” of the other side as reference for the “morality” of their actions. Yet both religions, using some of the same biblical stories, preach feeding the stranger and love for their others. One allegory of the scorpion and the alligator, which comes to us from the Middle East, sums up this tragic moral reality: One day, a scorpion found itself on one side of a large river needing to cross to the other side. But scorpions hate water. As this dilemma unfolds, an alligator floats by and engages the scorpion in conversation. In the midst of this discussion, the alligator realizes that the scorpion needs to travel to the other side of the river. The alligator realizes that the scorpion is potentially deadly with its lethal stingers. So when the scorpion suggests that the alligator provide transport from one side of the river to the other side of the river, the alligator is not entirely eager to agree. The scorpion’s response to this fear is very reasonable. The scorpion suggests that for it to sting would be illogical, for to kill the alligator in the middle of the river would cause the scorpion to die also. The scorpion assures the alligator that it does not want to die in a watery grave. So the alligator agrees to transport the scorpion across the river. As the pair approaches the middle and the deepest part of the river, the scorpion stings the alligator. As the pair begins to sink into their watery grave, the alligator cries out
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in anguish. The scorpion has not only decreed a death warrant for the alligator, but has also just committed suicide. The alligator says that the scorpion’s actions make no sense for either of them. As they sink beneath the surface of the lake the scorpion’s last words are “I know, but I am a scorpion and this is what I do.” The story of the alligator and the scorpion may be the story of the Middle East. We might be able to understand the animosity between two separate groups even if they are historically biological cousins (Muslims and Israelis are ethnically come from Semitic stock). Though we might view the paradox as minor, consider a case in which two groups claiming the same religion deny the legitimacy of the other group and, at the same time, both groups obey the same general rules and obey the same definition of God. Both groups use the same biblical texts to justify their beliefs. They live side by side in the same geographical region but often ignore each other’s legitimacy. Both groups claim to be the only carrier of their faith’s legacy. No amount of political, economic, or military power has been able to create mutual space in which they can exist peacefully. Both sides claim exclusive legitimacy to the moral high ground, and both sides use religion to justify their slaughter of others whose only “sin” is being a member of the opposite religious group. The history of Islam in the Middle East is the story of the Sunni and Shi’a; both groups worship Allah and claim to be the only legitimate heirs of his major prophet, Muhammad. When each group determines how best to follow Muhammed’s teachings and how to act in public as the promoters of Islam, troubles begin. When Muhammad died, two possible successors to his leadership position emerged. The Sunni interpretation was that secular leaders who ruled the various Middle Eastern political realities inherited the mantle of authority. They looked to secular leaders to interpret Muhammad’s dictates. The clerics were significant but not omnipotent in their interpretation of Allah’s wishes for the faithful. The Shi’a interpretation could not have been more different. They argued that Muhammad was Allah’s voice on earth. Shi’a maintained that Muhammad was a religious leader who interpreted secular reality from within a religious context. They concluded that religious leaders were the only legitimate interpreters of Allah’s plans for the faithful. Secular leaders were to obey clerics’ (for example, the Mullahs and the Imams) interpretation of the Qur’an. Therefore, the religious establishment was to be the foundation for all secular activity. Sunnis and Shi’a have been locked in combat since Muhammad’s death. Both use the Qur’an as their foundation, and both justify their actions using the same holy text. The problem stems from the secular and religious leaders having fundamental disagreements about who holds the legitimate mantle of Islam. The violence in present day Iraq is a religious civil war with political, economic, and military overtones. This representation is admitedly overly simplified. We need also to consider tribal and ethnic issues. For the purposes of this chapter, however, we will keep it simple. The solutions will come only when we address the moral and religious debate between these two branches of Islam. Unfortunately, a solution may only come when so much life has been lost that
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some form of stalemate is reached. Precedent for such an outcome has already been seen elsewhere, such as that in Iran. 4. The Paradox of Certainty Karl Marx (1906) suggests that religion is the “opium of the masses” (“das Opium des Volkes”) and keeps them calm. If true, it is a palliative that functions in this manner: religion ameliorates the pain and anxiety stemming from the uncertainty of life, the certainty of death, and the ambiguous meaning of life and death. Plato’s Allegory of the Cave (1999) suggests that people are kept (or keep themselves) ignorant with an almost mystical view of “goodness.” Jeremy Bentham (1970/1789) suggests that we can empirically calculate good and evil and, hence, we can eliminate uncertainty and fear. But apparently, pain, anxiety, and uncertainty are necessary aspects of the world; without them we are unable to make true choices, or to develop character and integrity. This heightened desire to avoid existential anxiety and uncertainty, understandable though it may be, may be what most contributes to the sadistic facets of religion. Like the opiates, religion can be addictive. The addicted person is seldom aware of the effects of the addiction; it clouds the mind and tricks addicts into thinking they are coherent, into thinking everything is OK. But everything may not be OK. A school board in Central Texas, for example, recently appealed to the Supreme Court for the right to petition the “Supreme Being” prior to their high school football games. They couched this appeal in the language of “freedom of religion.” The reality may not be so simple. Any individual attending that event could, at any moment, choose to bow his or her head and pray. These Christians were actually asking for the right to force every individual attending their games to listen to the public broadcast of a Christian prayer. Were the issue truly “freedom of religion,” then presumably any person, of any faith, should also be allowed to broadcast a prayer—to Adonai, Allah, or some other deity. This is not what these individuals were arguing at all. They stated explicitly that they were arguing for the right to offer a Christian prayer (some would allow for JudeoChristian), because this is a Christian country. As another example, then United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower changed the Pledge of Allegiance during the 1950s to include the phrase “one nation, under God” because he believed that such an inclusion was self-evident. He could not conceive how anyone could believe otherwise. Apparently, most people believe that only one valid story can exist—for what I believe to be “real,” every divergent myth must have to be “false.” Divergent myths, to these people, should be eradicated. Some would argue that to eradicate the falsity—and by implication, those holding to the falsity—achieves a higher purpose. This dichotomy unveils one of the most delusional assumptions, not inherent in religion or myth making per se, but embedded in how many people choose to “hold” their narrative beliefs: the assumption that if a God
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exists, that God revealed itself to one group of individuals only. Consider the assumption that God is “male.” Many passages in the Bible suggest God could be female. For example, one passage compares God to a mother eagle taking care of her young. The Jewish Shekhinah (which means “presence of God” and references the feminine aspect of the holy trinity) is a feminine aspect of God. Many people ignore the contradiction because it does not conform to their already established assumption about what they want to see or believe. The world is divided into the ubiquitous two groups, “us” and “them,” and we begin indoctrinating children into this division early in life. The “is” can be defined as narrowly as “me” and we may allow great harm to come to others to protect ourselves. Nobel Peace Prize winner, Elie Wiesel provides an example of this proposition in his book Night (1982/1960); a father allows the Kapo to hit his son so the Kapo would not hit him. Other examples abound. In Bosnia, ethnic differences date back to the nineteenth century and are still used to fuel present-day conflict. Contemporary Tutsi/Hutu families still take revenge for long past slights and murders. Young Palestinians have to decide whether to die for Allah or whether to be a martyr. The “us versus them” mentality is usually implemented politically also, as we see in the Middle East, where people of different religions can be denied the right to vote, their having lived there throughout their entire lives. Ireland remains divided and people are still killed because they embrace variant narrative renderings of an identical source events—the fight for independence from Britain that started with the formation of the Irish Republican Army in 1916 (“Some History of conflict in Ireland,” 2002). This is another example of the complexity issue, British versus Irish political ideologies and wealth versus poverty. It appears that the tensions in Ireland have decreased as Ireland has become wealthier. Is our choice, then, one of adopting a myth of certainty, or facing life with no system of meaning at all? Not necessarily. Instead of offering a single, unambiguous answer to life itself, religion can and sometimes does offer a way to embrace life; it does not solve it in algorithmic fashion. In lived religion, people may discover a way of life instead of adopting a set of rules. Becoming part of a tradition, within which people can authentically grapple with life, can provide a significant context—a crucible for spiritual development. But if we fail to make the tradition ours, if we just accept what the ancients said—if we do not add our voice to the story—then the tension between life as we experience it and life as tradition has rendered it can easily lead to anger, to violence, to sadism. For example, how do we, in the twenty-first century, understand the idea that a disobedient child should be stoned to death, as the Torah proscribes? What does it mean to us today to turn the other cheek or to love one’s enemy? In what way shall the meek inherit the earth when faced with a neighborhood bully, or a tyrant hell-bent on genocide? Struggling with these questions and others like them requires that we keep our traditions alive and that we participate in the making of narrative—like the Talmud and its equivalent in other religions. The paradox, then, may be this: although some dimension of the human psyche may need clo-
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sure and certainty, another part of requires searching, an ongoing quest—optimal distinctiveness in terms of affiliation motives is but one, small example. 5. Resolving the Religious Paradox? What the West (particularly the United States) sees as military and political strife in much of the Arab world is a battle between two different versions of religious reality, Sunni and Shi’a interpretations of how to live out Islam’s dictates for the faithful in the world. The moral paradox is that neither side legitimates the other side’s interpretation of the same texts that both claim to be fundamental. They both use these texts to justify whatever activity in which they engage with regard to any other Muslims or any other individual. (For an excellent description of the Sunni/Shi’a discussion, see Nasr, 2007. For an excellent description of the Arab/Israeli discussion, see Hahn, 2004). In this vein, we see that a religious issue, with social, economic, and political aspects has devolved so that no one is able to talk about anything but the religious aspects. In complex times, we seek more basic explanations for crises and, if we use religion, compromising is more difficult, since the stakes are most important—our souls! The World is complex and we try to make things simpler. As such, the balance between the explained and mystery is crucial. In complex times, additional complexity from unexplained aspects of religion may be too much for us to bear. This could lead to a preference for the absolutes of religion and the clarity that this provides for how to act. Creation myths have great power. These myths develop contexts in which observant believers must live. These accepted realities pattern all daily existence and activity for the believers. We need to unravel or realize the dynamics involved in these myths to understand how to explore these realities. If people outside of these lived dynamics are unable to see the internal logic makes little difference. Only those inside the given realities must appreciate them. The difficulty is how to explain these dynamics to people in and outside these dynamics. One way to make these dynamics visible is to understand that believers think they are decreed by God or Allah and, therefore, must be accepted as reality. We can appreciate how other people live by these dynamics without ourselves being believers in their realty—just as the father of the murdered gay son forgave his son’s murderer. We do not have to believe what persons believe to accept the reality that they believe it. A crucial issue to consider here is the tendency to extend our narrative to others, in essence, to define the Other in terms of our narrative. This expands our sense of “we” by stealing the right of others to define themselves. Arabs and Israelis or Sunni and Shi’a would be better able to understand the Other if they could live in or perceive honestly that Other’s reality. If they do not accept the Other’s reality as legitimate, regardless how much they try to make a connection, it will never be strong enough to withstand the differences between them.
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Myth can communicate not only facts, but also feelings and values, often without our being explicitly aware of it. For example, a friend who knows that I am Jewish said, with no apparent sense of irony or intended cruelty, that a health problem I was having was “my cross to bear.” Although my friend may not be consciously aware of all layers of meanings of the Jesus myth (bearing the cross), it permeates her Christian culture and shapes her experience and her (Christian) actions. This tacit dimension of experience can cause difficulties when myths collide, for then we must answer the question which myth should prevail. As an example, consider the symbol of the International Red Cross, Red Crescent Organization. Most Americans would interpret the symbol as one of hope, and universal care. What many Westerners do not realize is that the red crescent is perceived as a symbol of repression by many Arab and Middle Eastern peoples. Another way of considering this is to focus on the concept of moral cruelty (perpetuation of hate within confines of moral narrative of love): a tendency to foist our myths and meanings onto others, by failing to perceive the diversity of myths through which human beings find meaning. By focusing on religious absolutes, we find ambiguity reduced, but so too is any tolerance for diversity also reduced. People often use narrative to resolve uncertainty, ambiguity, and to answer apparently unanswerable questions. The presence of competing myths “undoes” the resolution. Narrative or myth cannot resolve ambiguity when the presence of competing myths creates more ambiguity. Competing myths untie the package, which then unleash the existential dread we outlined as part of terror management theory and mortality salience. Popular American vernacular focuses on “tolerance.” Many appear to believe that tolerance is “as good as it gets” (Osborne, Baughn, and Kriese, 2007). But tolerance does not necessarily imply a positive emotion. We follow Thomas and Butler’s (2000) lead in defining tolerance as acceptance and openmindedness of different practices, attitudes, and cultures. Tolerance does not necessarily mean agreement with the differences. It implies an acknowledgement or an acceptance or respect, not necessarily an appreciation and usually consists of only surface level information. On the opposite end of the spectrum is “inclusiveness.” This can be defined as the practice of emphasizing our uniqueness in promoting the reality that each voice, when valued, respected, and expected to, will provide positive contribution to the community (ibid.). The problem is how to tolerate differences and uncertainty in the area where individuals want, need, and demand absolute certainty. Given the stakes, religious symbols are a matter of life versus death, or perhaps infinite afterlife versus nothingness. To deal with the uncertainty and the ambiguity, it becomes all too easy, psychologically, to convert a need for certainty (certainly within the ambiguity of an individual’s “myth”) into a representation of certainty. Having
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done so, however, every system of meaning that deviates from my own challenges the legitimacy of this “Truth.” Because death of my myth would mean death of my identity, now and forever, I am as likely to respond to an assault on my myth as forcefully (or more so) than an assault on my life. As I do so, I focus my attention on the rationale— preserving my system of meaning—not whether my response to “assault” is appropriate. With attention to moral justification high, emotional arousal high, and attention to what I am doing in the moment of response low, the formula for moral sadism is fully in place. I am highly energized to act (behavioral systems are activated) but those actions are not accompanied by much thought (cognitive systems are inhibited). Once we grasp fully this structure, the cruelty and sadism carried out in the name of God no longer surprises us. In like manner, losing a myth can be likened to losing identity. It can create a profound sense of loss, a confusion in what was an otherwise regulated and orderly world of meaning. The price to pay for the certainty and clarity that comes from uncritical and complete acceptance of one’s myth against all others is rigidity, a constraint on perception that causes one to potentially react with hostility or hate toward anyone whose myth threatens that certainty and clarity (Bentham, 1970/1789). To the extent this analysis is correct, then one corollary of the “certainty of my one way” assumption is an increased likelihood of moral sadism. We are very likely to harm others, feeling morally righteous, even holy, as we do so. During the eighteenth century, for example, United States’ soldiers killed young indigenous Americans because “nits breed nits” (Miller, 2001) and this would hurt the United States. The myth that the “other” is less than human justified—in the soldiers’ minds anyway—their killing the natives. The irony is that we may also be doing harm to ourselves by engaging in moral masochism. This same system of meaning, which began as a quest to unify threads of experience into a tapestry of meaning, has emerged as a straightjacket. Instead of serving in a liberating manner, wherein “the truth has set us free,” the myth has solidified the boundaries of meaning and caused us to be unable or unwilling to perceive things in any other way. Such boundaries create comfort and limit chaos. As such, persons may not perceive the constraints, limitations, and obligations that accompany such certainty. These feelings are not likely to be experiences unless something fundamentally shakes the person’s world of meaning. Religion has ended in an “escape from freedom,” to use Erich Fromm’s (1941) language. To the extent that religion has led to this condition, religion is indeed a powerful narcotic. In Elie Wiesel’s words: all ready made answers, all seemingly unalterable certainties serve only to provide a good conscience to those who like to sleep and live peaceable. To avoid spending a lifetime tracking down truth, one pretends to have found it. (1972, p. 241)
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RANDALL E. OSBORNE, PAUL KRIESE, STAN FRIEDMAN
At its best, religion can provide a framework for asking important questions, without necessarily providing the answers. Religion might help us find a way to go about trying to answer the questions. It can offer a context within which to think about the difficult decisions that we make every day and to ponder the meaning of events as they happen to us and around us. For example, what should I, as a teacher, do when a student expresses fear that I will go to hell because I do not accept Jesus as my personal savior? How should I deal with a friend who, while suffering from severe depression, forgets having asked me to visit after shock treatments caused memory impairment? Should I tell the request for me to visit if the knowledge of having forgotten might cause more fear and lead her to feel more hopeless and helpless? What is the correct thing to say when visiting a house of mourning? Should we speak in terms of the deceased going to a “better place”? This might be comforting to an individual who shares the same kind of belief system. But if mourners fail to believe so, this might make them upset with the consoler or angry with themselves about their lack of faith. It might lead them to blasphemy, condemning God for taking the person, even if to a “better place.” It might result in a loss of faith. After all is said and done, Elie Wiesel may provide the only answer that makes sense: Certain experiences may be transmitted by language, others—more profound—by silence; and then there are those that cannot be transmitted, not even by silence. Never mind. Who says that experiences are made to be shared? They must be lived. That’s all. And who says that truth is made to be revealed? It must be sought. That’s all. Assuming it is concealed in melancholy, is that any reason to seek elsewhere? (ibid., p. 240)
Four SELF VERSUS OTHER; “US” VERSUS “THEM”: THE SELF AS BASIS FOR CONFLICT Anré Venter 1. Introduction Even a cursory review of history is enough to suggest that conflict has been an ever present corollary to human interaction at all levels—ranging from the individual level through the various groups that people identify with, ending ultimately with national or religious groups. In contemplating this issue, I am reminded of the quote attributed to George Santayana: “those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.” Conflict is obviously not limited to third world countries that some may be tempted to consider backward or uneducated—so it appears that a lack of education is not a prerequisite for such conflict. Quite the contrary, as the historical landscape is marked with the bloody remains of failed conflicts perpetrated by highly advanced, educated and “civilized” groups—conflicts that did not ultimately succeed in meeting the goals of the perpetrators of that conflict. Despite this, some people instigate conflict anew, convinced that they will succeed where many others have failed. Even more startling is that such conflicts are often instigated by parties who have recently succeeded in overcoming the aggression of other parties—such as in South Africa where the Afrikaners overcame the oppression of the British only to in turn oppress the black people with the belief that they would succeed where the British had failed. What is it about human nature that such destructive, often even self-destructive behavior, continues to occur? To quote the adage usually attributed to Otto von Bismark, “What we learn from history is that no one learns
from history.”
The major thrust of this chapter is the argument that this apparent propensity for conflict in human interaction is neither a function of ignorance nor is it evidence of the existence of evil in some individuals or groups. I propose that this propensity for conflict has its roots in the concept of self and the manner in which we as human beings understand and experience our existence as selves. My argument has philosophical and psychological (to be more precise, socialpsychological) roots that respectively deal with the issues of what it means to have and experience a sense of self as well as the issue of how such a sense of self develops and functions in guiding and shaping human behavior and interactions. Philosophically, the self is a relative construct in that it can only exist and have meaning in relation to an “other” or “others.” At a fundamental level, my
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existence and my experience of myself is inextricably related to and dependent upon the presence of others in my environment. Psychologically, this is also the case in that social psychologists understand the development of the self to be a function of interactions and experiences with other people—from the parents or primary caregivers, siblings, extended family, friends, and on the influence of particular culture in which the individual is raised. Notice that the four main processes identified as forming the basis of the development of the self are: (1) other people; (2) culture; (3) reflected appraisal; and (4) self-perception. Just as the concept of the self can only have meaning in relation to the existence of an “other,” psychologically the development of the self depends on interactions with others. As I will outline later in this chapter, the self paradoxically exists as object and subject—on the one hand, my self (referred to as the “me”) is that which serves to differentiate me from others; on the other hand, my self (referred to as the “I”) is also the instrument at the center of the active process of constructing my social reality, processing information, and shaping my understanding of who I am and the nature of the world around me (referred to as the process of social cognition) . Although the self and others are quite closely linked in philosophical and psychological terms, an inherent conflict also arises between the two that comes into play in the self serving manner in which the self processes information and makes judgments and attributions about events and others in social cognition. In terms of moving from the individual to the group level, I argue that the same biases that shape and influence social cognition at the individual level operate at the group level. In the following section, I provide a brief review of the philosophical issues concerning the self, which are pertinent to the topic followed by an overview of the social psychological understanding of the self, its development, and functions showing where the roots of conflict at the individual level lie. After that, I will illustrate how this provides insight into our understanding of inter-group conflict. 2. The Philosophy of Self Who am I? Who are you? These questions pertain to our understanding of who we are—our identity. Roy Porter (2003) argues in Flesh in the Age of Reason that our present day understanding of this question directly relates to philosophical developments since the time of the Renaissance. Given the constraints of page limitations, I encourage readers interested in a more in-depth review of these developments are encouraged to read Porter’s extraordinary review. Although I run the risk of oversimplifying the issue, my goal in this section is to briefly present some of the key philosophical principles that form the basis of our modern understanding of who we are—principles active in our use of the concept of self in our daily lives and language. Porter charts the development of our thinking about what it means to have a self from the gnothi seauton or know yourself of the Delphic Oracle to our mod-
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ern individualistic understanding of the self. Porter’s comment that the developments that have led to our present day understanding of the self are referred to by some as “the death of the soul” illustrate that the history of our understanding of the self is rooted in philosophy and theology. In reading Flesh in the Age of Reason, we see how religion, faith, and philosophy have shaped the fundamental manner in which people have understood the nature of their being through time culminating in our modern secularized view of the self. Self-control and self-expression both depend upon self-understanding. The critical point in the development of the philosophical basis for our modern secularized understanding of the self was reached by René Descartes and his sense of our uniqueness in that, other than God, we alone are conscious in a manner that allows us to know ourselves and to understand the meaning of things. All of this has culminated in a modern understanding of the self that views it as a self-enclosed instrument with the capability of self-control and selfexploration. This understanding forms the basis for the manner in which we think and talk about the self, the development of which Porter beautifully illustrates through examples from the world of art, literature, and religion. Nowadays we say things about the self such as “please control yourself,” “I am going to travel to find myself,” “I need to express myself,” and be “true to yourself”—all of which presuppose the existence of some real essence of an inner self. Think about the manner in which we are apparently always intent on understanding the meaning of events and the actions of others in our lives—“what do I need to do to become successful?” “how do I get people to like me?”—as examples of the manner in which the self is an instrument we wield as we try to fulfill the goals or expectations we or others have for us. This illustrates the perspective in which other people or objects in our lives become things for us to manipulate, use, or control in meeting our needs—by which I mean the needs of myself. Paradoxically, this self is the same self that we use to fulfill its needs. Returning us to the idea of the self as “I” and “Me,” subject and object, that from which needs and desires spring and that which is used to meet those needs and desires. This concludes my intentionally brief review of the underlying philosophy of the self, which, by necessity, required some oversimplification. However brief this may be, it serves to make apparent the underlying philosophical principles and assumptions that form the basis for the way in which we think and talk about this thing called a self. 3. Social Psychology Social psychology examines the manner in which the presence of others influences our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, whether that presence is actual, implied, or imagined. Notice that this definition explicitly identifies the two critical dimensions that form the basis of understanding interpersonal behavior, namely characteristics of the person (thoughts, feelings, and behaviors—the self) and characteristics of their context or situation (their social environment, includ-
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ing the presence of others). In making judgments about and attempting to understand the behavior of others, social psychology shows that people intuitively believe behavior to be a function of the personality or disposition of the actor and accordingly base their judgments of others on this supposition. Using an algebraic notation, we can write this perspective in this way: B=P where B refers to the behavior being judged and P refers to the person whose behavior is being judged. In terms of the issue of interest to this book, we may ask what about people causes them to perform acts of terror or violence. One of the most fundamental and powerful lessons of social psychology is that human behavior is contextual and any attempt at understanding must recognize this fact. Thus we would amend the algebraic notation as follows: B=P+S where S denotes the characteristics of the context or environment. The question now becomes what the linear nature of the contribution of the two variables is— do they contribute equally to behavior? The answer here is unequivocal as research has shown consistently that intrapersonal variables (personality or dispositional attributes of the person) are quite poor predictors of behavior. Situational components are more powerful causes of behavior than intrapersonal factors, in which case we might be tempted to ignore P in the equation (the person) and focus soley on S (the situation) to understand behavior. The answer is not quite this simple. A person’s interpretation or understanding of a situation is more influential in producing behavior than the actual situation (the term objective is inappropriate as we will see). Given this interaction between the attributes of the person and those of the situation, a linear function no longer captures the complex nature of the relationship and we need to add a third variable to express the interactive nature of the relationship between the person and the situation. The following expression is a more complete description of the roots of behavior: B = P + S + P(S) where the P(S) variable captures the essence of the interaction between the individual and his or her situation. Years of research has taught us that in interpreting and understanding their world, people construct their social reality in an interactive manner (Ross & Nisbett, 1991).This explains my reluctance to use the term “objective” in the situation I described earlier, since these findings suggest that everything we experience is subjective. From a social psychological perspective, we are interested in the P(S) portion of the equation, which examines the person within their context—how their situation (the people around them) influences what they think, feel, and do. The
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nature of this interaction is captured in the process of construal by which individuals construct their social reality (broadly termed the process of social cognition). Within this approach, we therefore need to examine the person (the self) and the processes by which the self shapes the development of the person’s attitudes towards his or her social reality. If we can understand the manner in which individuals construct their social reality and the factors that shape that process, then we can understand behavior in general, which in turn will informs our understanding of negative, discriminatory, violent, or threatening interpersonal behavior. A. Basic Constructs In understanding the conflicted nature of world affairs and the relationships among individuals or groups of any kind from a social psychological perspective, we need to focus on the three basic components of human nature, namely cognitions, affect, and behavior. I argue that relationships among people, as individuals or in groups, are nothing more than an extension of the fundamental construct of the individual—the self. Together the three components form the basis of two fundamental constructs of interest to social psychologists in general, and to us particularly in terms of the topic of this chapter, namely the self and attitudes. Attitudes are defined as our evaluative reaction to or judgment of any aspect of our social reality—thoughts, ideas, objects, people, places, things. Attitudes encompass our cognitive, affective, and behavioral reactions to everything with which we come into contact as we are constantly judging, evaluating, and reacting to all things that populate our environment (or those to which we attend). We can think of attitudes as the vehicle by which we relate to our world, others, and ourselves. Although this definition and section is brief, this construct will form an integral part of the remainder of this chapter. At this point, however, we need to turn to the question of who or what is doing the judging, evaluating, and reacting. The answer to this question returns us directly to the construct of the self. The psychological study of the self, the construct that forms the core of the person, was pioneered by William James (1890). To this day, James’s typology of the self as being subject (the “I”) and object (the “Me”) is still widely accepted. James validly asserted that the “I” is not amenable to scientific observation or examination because a subject cannot remain the subject when it is the focus of examination. This assertion highlighted a thorny problem for psychology in its attempt to be recognized as a “hard” science. Psychology has long recognized that observation and measurement are not victimless crimes—these apparently objective processes influence and can change the nature of the object being examined—especially if these objects are people. Although James’s point may have had a philosophical basis, other psychologists have also addressed this problem. Jerome Bruner has noted:
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As a result of this philosophical and empirical problem, much of the research has focused on objective evaluations of the self as object, the “Me” in James’s terms, which is understood to comprise different levels ranging from the bodily self, through the inner self, social self, and societal self. One way of making sense of these different levels of self is to understand that they reflect different interactional domains of the self—with my body, my inner self-reflective identity, my interpersonal identity, and my social cultural identity (Brown, 1998). Regardless of the level of self, the conceptualization of the self as consisting of the three components of cognitions, affect, and behaviors is still valid as these components cut across the conceptual level. Self-Concept The cognitive component encompasses the self-concept, those mental representations that define who persons understand themselves to be. The self is not a single thing but a multifaceted, complex, system of semi-attached ideas lacking distinct boundaries while holding many interrelated functions. The self-concept consists of self-schemas, cognitive structures that contain the central and most salient attributes of a persons understanding (concept) of themselves. One particularly powerful aspect of the self-concept has to do with identity structure, which is based upon the roles people fulfill, the groups with which they affiliate (the ingroup), and the groups with which they choose not to affiliate (the outgroup). These role structures are cognitive schemas that contain information about what we are expected to do, with whom, and where and thus serve to guide behavior in relevant situations. In terms of group membership, people have schemas about the groups to which they belong and the outgroup. In the case of outgroups, the schemas are particularly strong—called stereotypes. Social identity theory is a well-established theory of identity, which argues that the groups to which we belong and those we choose to avoid intimately and integrally shape our sense of identity (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). The self-concept is an elaborate and complex web of ideas that manage to remain together in a coherent whole because only some aspects of the self are active at any given moment. Imagine standing in the center of a dark room with the unseen surfaces surrounding you (floor, walls, and ceiling) representing the entirety of your self-concept. Now if you were to switch on a flashlight and point it at one spot in the room, the illuminated circle represents that to which we refer as the working self concept—the currently active aspect of your self. The key point here is that the particulars of the situation in which you find yourself are the trigger that determines which aspects of the self are salient and active at any given point in time. The same is true of our identities, which are also highly complex as we can belong to a variety of groups crossing cultural, national, and religious boundaries. The particular aspect of my identity salient at any given
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point in time is determined typically by the nature of my environment—thus after 11 September 2001 in the United States, or after 7 July 2005 in Great Britain, people of all different backgrounds and nationalities within the respective countries would have primarily identified themselves as American or British. Self-Esteem The affective component—self-esteem deals with the feelings and emotions attached to self-representations and the groups to which we belong. Self-esteem consists of a state or stable dispositional component and a trait or shorter-lived component. We can also examine self-esteem in a global manner, which focuses on a person’s overarching evaluation of the self or in a more specific manner in which self evaluations focus on a person’s appraisal of characteristics. Self-Presentation The behavioral component of the self—self-presentation is the manner in which we portray our self behaviorally in daily life—what people say and do. This component of the self is interesting and significant in that typically we can observe only others’ behaviors (words and acts), yet we are always attempting to understand their internal states—their intentions, motives, thoughts, and feelings. Our cognitive processes as we extrapolate the internal unobservable intangible states from the external observable behaviors are inferential in nature. What makes the behavioral component of the self even more interesting is that we have come to understand that people actively, consciously, and purposefully manipulate their behavior to influence the judgments that others make of them—a process known as impression management. This process refers as much to what aspects of our self we reveal to others, as it does to what we choose not to reveal. Consider an educational example often reported by students who have sat in a classroom where the faculty member has been talking about a particularly complex and difficult topic. The faculty member pauses to enquire whether any students have questions. Some students in the room typically feel quite confused and lost, often to the degree that they may even struggle to articulate a question other than “help!” What usually happens though is that no one asks any questions and the depth of their confusion only dawns on the faculty member while grading papers or exams. This is an example of pluralistic ignorance as a direct result of the impression management process (Fiske, 2004). The reality is that no students ask questions in this situation because in scanning the environment to get a sense of how other students feel, they look at faces that, much like their own, adeptly hide their confusion behind well managed masks. The only inference that makes sense in this situation to the particular student looking around is that the other students understand the material and only he or she is lost. Given this conclusion, the potential consequences of being viewed as confused—when everyone else apparently understands what is going on—are such that no question gets asked despite many of the students in the room experiencing the same confusion.
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The irony of this phenomenon is that even though we are aware that we hide our internal states from others to manage what they think of us, we are still unable to apply this knowledge in judging their behavior! B. Development How does our sense of who we are develop? What are the roots of our typical ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving? Four primary sources or processes— social comparison, self-perception, reflected appraisals, and culture—have been identified as the basis for the development of our self. All four processes are social in nature, by which I mean that they require or imply the presence of other people in some manner. These processes may overlap given their social basis. This suggests additional support for the contention that self-concept is a social construct—one that depends on others for its existence. Social Comparison One of the most ubiquitous processes in which we engage in attempting to understand our world—ourselves—is social comparison, a process by which we are constantly comparing ourselves to others. We look to those around us to learn about our environment, to understand what is required from us, what our capabilities are, and to assess how well we are doing (Festinger, 1954). Typically this process is activated by motives such as selfunderstanding, self-enhancement, self-verification, and self-improvement. It can and does serve different goals depending on the motives salient to the self at any given time—a critical theme in this chapter, which I will fleshed out below. Self-Perception We learn about our world and other people and base judgments and evaluations about the character, values, beliefs, intentions, and dispositions of others by observing external behavior and then drawing inferences about internal states. Daryl Bem (1972) argues that just as we learn about others based upon their behavior, we do the same for ourselves—we observe our reactions, actions, thoughts, and feelings in various situations and draw inferences about who we are. Reflected Appraisals Symbolic interactionism (Shrauger and Schoeneman, 1979) argues that the sense of self is entirely social in nature as it depends on how other people perceive and thus behave toward us. Earlier I stated that the actor’s construal of the situation is the key to understanding behavior. In actuality, self-concept is founded on how the actor thinks others perceive it, not the actual perceptions others have of the actor (Kenny and DePaulo, 1993). The interesting yet unanswered question is whether my beliefs about how others see me shape my sense of self or whether my sense of self guides how I think others see me. Others and Culture The nature of the family, social, and cultural environment into which we are born shapes our sense of self ranging from fairly ideographic factors such as idiosyncratic family variables to more nomothetic factors such as broader cultural values and norms. I owe my sense of who I am to fairly idiosyncratic factors such as my particular relationships with my parents from
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birth (typically only shared by siblings and close family members) to broader factors pertaining to the general culture (shared among larger ethnic, cultural, or socio-economic groupings). We can find an example of the broader effects of culture in the robust finding of differences in the structure of the self crossculturally. People from a Western cultural background (most typically American and then to a lesser degree European) tend to have a more independent or individualistic sense of self characterized by dimensions or schemas more individually oriented in nature, stressing their uniqueness and individuality. By contrast, people from Eastern and African backgrounds tend to have a more interdependent or relational sense of self in which their self-schemas are relational in nature, stressing the social and related nature. The self is very much a function of the multilayered social context and culture into which people are born and then raised. In this regard, culture is a particularly interesting phenomenon as it functions and exists at the same time as an object and a process. Culture not only defines the attributes of the context is into which people are born but also is the vehicle which socializes people into becoming functioning and contributing members of the particular culture. This dual nature of culture is mirrored in the construct of the self as subject, object, and a process, a theme that runs throughout the ideas presented in this chapter. Because those with whom we choose to form relationships are significant factors in shaping our understanding of our selves, we should understand the basis of those relationships. Whom do we like? With whom do we choose to associate? Whom do we dislike? More often than not we like people similar to us (similarity), people we know and understand (familiarity), people who are attractive, and people who like us. Typically the people we like end up for the most part being people we have much in common with—politically, socially, economically, and religiously. People we do not like tend to be different from us along these dimensions. We do not often come into contact with the people we do not like; we may avoid interactions with them because that tends to be less satisfying or even quite unpleasant. C. Functions: Self as an Active and Biased Information Processor Attribution theory is widely accepted in understanding the process of social cognition (Heider, 1958). This theory suggests that the heart of the process is an explanation or attribution of events in the social world in terms of two basic categories: me or not me. When judging a person’s behavior, I attribute it either to something about the person (an internal or dispositional attribution) or to something about the person’s environment or situation (an external or situational attribution). The self has a double role in the judgment becomes quite clear—it makes the judgment and is also an object to which the cause of the event being judged (by it) can be attributed. The process of social cognition is explicitly social in nature as it involves judgments about external events, people, and ob-
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jects, and ideas with which we interact, as everything with which we come into contact comprises our social reality. The manner in which people think about themselves and others differs. This is one of the most robust and consistent findings in social psychology. The Fundamental Attribution Error (Ross, 1977) suggests that when judging the behavior of others, we tend to overestimate the influence of dispositional or personal factors—their behavior is a function of who they are, whereas when judging our own behavior, we tend to attribute it to environmental or situational factors. The Abu Ghraib atrocities during the Iraq war illustrate this principle. Our judgment of the soldiers who committed the atrocities was personal in nature—their behavior was a function of their disposition, of who they are as people. On the other hand, when asked about their behavior, the soldiers in question responded that their behavior was a function of the situation in which they found themselves— the stress, overcrowding, poor chain of command, or implied expectations. The basic issue highlighted by this effect and explicitly acknowledged by Fritz Heider’s (1958) attribution theory (see later discussion) is that judgments of events and behaviors related to people typically fall along a “me-not-me” dimension. Am I responsible or am I not? Are they responsible or are they not? In both cases, the not-me or not-they judgment attributes causality to situational factors. Judgments typically are categorical in nature, requiring an assessment of the degree of fit between a stimulus and a category object. For example, when meeting a person for the first time, we usually categorize them in terms of a variety of factors, some based upon explicit and reasonably obvious information requiring little or no inference, such as gender and ethnicity. Other judgments require an inferential process extrapolating internal states from external markers such as motives and values. The basic tools of the cognitive process are cognitive structures such as schemas, scripts, prototypes, stereotypes, category markers, and exemplars. Regardless of the term, all of these cognitive structures are standards against which we process and judge incoming information and we judge a stimulus to make sense of a situation. In their seminal work on social cognition, Susan T. Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor (1991) argue that individuals are “motivated tacticians” in processing incoming information, integrating it with their known reality and making sense of the world. Social cognition is the process by which individuals evaluate and interpret information, typically in a categorical manner. We evaluate information in terms of issues of self-relevance and importance—is this information, event, or person relevant to me? If so, how important is it to me? The central and dual role of the self becomes apparent, as does the importance of understanding the manner in which the underlying motives can influence the judgments being made. Fiske and Taylor identify three motives that influence the attribution and judgment process as following: the need: (1) to manage the self-image; (2) to conserve mental effort; and, (3) to be accurate processors of information. Motive: Managing the Self-Image In terms of managing the self-image, a pervasive tendency to see the self favorably typically influences the manner in
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which individuals process information. Although at its strongest in judgments that are subjective, private, and concerning issues of importance to the individual, this tendency to see the self favorably is pervasive. We can see examples of these biases in the observation that most people rate themselves better than average along dimensions of importance to themselves, the unrealistic optimism most people have about their chances of success along various dimensions, and the tendency of people to make attributions for events in ways that absolve themselves of any guilt or blame. When asked about why they behaved in the way they did, people tend to make attributions depending on the outcome of the specific behavior. In situations where the outcome is positive, people can make selfenhancing attributions by taking the credit for the event. Conversely, when the outcome is negative, people can make self-effacing attributions in which they see themselves as victims of the situation. To avoid appearing too obvious, people may also utilize counter-defensive strategies in which they take the blame for negative events and avoid taking the credit for positive events in an attempt to have others see them as martyrs. We can see a final example of self-serving biases in two outcomes that occur when we ask people to make comparative judgments about themselves along stated dimensions. When asked to estimate the proportion of people in the population who hold similar opinions about principles or values especially selfrelevant and significant to themselves, people typically overestimate the proportion. This phenomenon is termed false consensus (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) as people judge a greater amount of consensus in the population in terms of their beliefs, values, or principles than exists in reality. When we ask these same people to estimate the proportion of people in the population who share the same unique ability or talent as they have, they tend to underestimate the proportion. This is termed false uniqueness (Marks, 1984) as people judge themselves as more unique than they are. These two phenomena correlate with the two foundational motives discussed earlier: the need to feel liked, loved, and belong typically depends for fulfillment on acceptance by others based upon agreement along lines of opinion, belief, and values. On the other hand, the need to be unique, special, and different depends on our ability to see ourselves different from others in terms of our talents or abilities for fulfillment. In many ways, self-serving biases are an inescapable function of the self experiencing itself as the center of its world—I am looking out of my head, making sense of the world which appears to revolve and unfold all around me. One way in which this effect manifests itself is termed the spotlight effect (Gilovich and Sativsky, 1999) by which people usually tend to overestimate the degree to which other people are aware of and are monitoring, watching, and evaluating them. All that any person ever truly knows is how and what it feels like to be him or herself, although when asked to articulate what this feels like to others, people find this impossible to do in a satisfactory manner. Our sense of what it feels like to be ourself is primal and inexpressible. Parker J. Palmer captures this sense
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beautifully when he describes our sense of our self as “that familiar strangeness we take with us to the grave, elusive realities that can only be caught occasionally out of the corner of the eye” (1998, chap. 6). Motive: Conserving Effort Cognition is limited in its capability to process information; we tend to use shortcuts and strategies that simplify the process by which we make complex social judgments. These shortcuts, known as cognitive heuristics, tend to produce efficient, rapid, and adequate solutions with less effort than would be required if we were to focus on achieving accurate, detailed, and precise judgments. Research has identified a number of cognitive heuristics of which three are especially salient. These are as follows: (1) The availability heuristic, in which people asked to judge the likelihood of events occurring based upon how readily the event comes to mind: People overestimate the likelihood of events occurring when these events are easily accessible in memory. Typically we easily accessible events that tend to be highly memorable, ones that are not commonplace. People are quick to infer a general truth or principle from one especially vivid event but appear to be slower in deducing particular instances from a general principle.(2) The representative heuristic, by which people base their judgment about an event on how well it matches a cognitive prototype or stereotype. Here the use of this heuristic typically causes the individual making the judgment to be insensitive to other factors or information relevant to the judgment in question. (3) The heuristic of anchoring and adjustment, by which people, in judging other people, tend to use themselves as an anchor on which their evaluation is based. In each of these heuristics, aspects of the self form the standard against which we individuals make judgments. The ease by which the target occurs in my memory determines its availability and memory is, as I will discuss below, understood to be a reconstructive process. With regard to representativeness, the prototype or stereotype in the mind—the cognitive structure—forms the standards against which we evaluate the target. Finally, the individual is the anchor for judgments about other people and events. We may be unable to adequately correct for the self-serving biases that influence our thinking. Motive: To Accurately Process Information The need to be accurate unfortunately does not appear to be the default motive for human behavior as it appears to require a set of self-relevant conditions to be activated. The two situations under which it can become active are (1) achievement situations, in which people need to know how well they are performing; and (2) group environments, in which consensus or consistency between the self-concept and the group’s understanding of whom we are is important. At such times, the motive of selfunderstanding (or self-verification) prompts people to seek out accurate comparisons with others as this can either be an aid in assessing movement toward a goal or serve to affirm the self-concept through the affirmation of others. However, given the pervasiveness of the self-serving biases, the central role of the self in experiencing its world, and the availability of heuristics that simplify the process of perception and interpretation, we should not be surprised that only under
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somewhat limited conditions of ambiguity, high self-relevance, and potentially high costs associated with inaccuracy does accuracy become important. In general terms, attribution theory, especially Harold Kelley’s Covariation Model (1967, 1972), which identifies three types of information that people process in making attributions (distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus), attempts to identify the process by which we make judgments. Accuracy often demands effortful and time-consuming processing, luxuries typically lacking in the busy lives people lead. We rely heavily on heuristics and self serving biases until such time as accuracy becomes crucial enough that the price it demands is exceeded by the potential cost of an inaccurate or incorrect judgment. D. Examples of Motives Influencing Attitudes A number of self-related motives flow from the two fundamental needs of acceptance and uniqueness, namely the motives of self-enhancement and selfimprovement. Typically people appear to be motivated to see themselves in a favorable and positive light. The process of social comparison—especially when the comparison group is not performing as well or are not in as good a position as the person doing the comparison—facilitates achievement of this goal. When motivated by self-enhancement, people typically engage in downward comparison, selecting a comparison group less well off along the dimension in question, whether this be social, financial, health, or goal oriented. Although this motive appears to be the most prevalent, especially given its self-serving nature, we can find exceptions to downward comparison, when people may choose a comparison group or target that is better off. This usually occurs when people are motivated to improve their performance or are working towards a difficult goal where they can benefit from focusing on a model to emulate. A number of findings illustrate the effects of motives on the manner in which individuals construct their social realities. Consider for example, the issues of belief perseverance, confirmation bias, self-fulfilling prophecies, stereotype threat, and the reconstructive nature of memory. People’s initial beliefs about an event or person often persist despite their having subsequently been exposed to information that disconfirms their initial beliefs—first impressions are difficult to overcome as these carry with them formulated explanations and expectations about the future. We find the strength of belief perseverance in the explanations initially generated, used since the event, as a framework to make sense of additional information. Consciously considering alternatives is the only way we can prevent belief perseverance. Similarly, once people generate initial explanations and form impressions, they tend to focus on and look for information to confirm their initial views while glossing over or neglecting inconsistent information. In effect, people looking for information to confirm their initial views in the same way that when motivated by self-verification, they look to others for information to support their self-views. First impressions or explanations not only make sense of the event or
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person being evaluated, but also carry with them expectations about what future interactions with the targets might be like. These expectations then direct the focus of attention on consistent information while ignoring discrepant information. Remarkably, the effects of such expectations and biases are not limited only to the person of the perceiver. An especially powerful example of this is the occurrence of self-fulfilling prophecies. A self-fulfilling prophecy is a prediction in which the biases or expectation of the perceiver actually influence the behavior of the target in such a way that the target then behaves in a manner that supports the perceivers bias or expectation. For example, if teachers are told to expect excellence from randomly identified students (unbeknownst to the teacher), those students’ performance has been found to be better than predicted by objective criteria (Rosenthal, 1994). Even more interesting is a an example in which negative expectations of stereotypes about a persons performance causes the person in question to perform below their ability level as objectively measured. Stereotypes are cognitive schemas that define what members of categories are like and people typically use them in judging events, objects, or people in their environment. We may have schemas or stereotypes about types of cars (German versus American), foods (French versus English), clothes (designer clothes versus department store clothes), and even people from different ethnic and cultural groups (African American versus European, Christian versus Muslim). What differentiates stereotypes from other forms of category exemplars is that in the process of stereotyping, the perceiver typically goes beyond the initial step of determining whether the stimulus in question actually is a member of the specified category. Once the perceiver makes such a determination, it then cognitively (though not necessarily consciously) ascribes to the stimulus all the characteristics it believes to be true of that category—characteristics contained in the stereotype itself. Consider for example, the commonly (in America) held stereotype that African Americans typically do not perform as well on standardized achievement tests as do white students. Steele (1997) has shown that when members of such stigmatized groups are made aware of their group membership (not the stereotype—they are only asked to check a box on the answer sheet indicating their ethnicity), they lower their performance to meet the expectations inherent in the stereotype. These students under-perform compared with their own ability level. The theory to explain these data postulates that when members of such groups are in a situation in which stereotypes contain expectations about the performance of members of that group, and subjects become aware of their group membership, their performance is not only a reflection of their personal ability but also that of their group. This double threat causes them to under perform. In contrast, other members of the same stigmatized group performing the same test in which they do not identify their group membership perform up to their ability level as objectively measured.
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A final example deals with the issue of memory and the reconstructive nature of the process. The process of recalling events from memory is not akin to only withdrawing a record of some sort (picture, photograph, or propositional description), describing an event from a storage unit as was initially surmised. Memory is a reconstructive process in which the person recalling remembered material reasons backwards from their current place in time and reconstructs the event, incorporating information that has been garnered subsequent to the event being recalled occurring. When we “remember,” we reconstruct events as we see them now, using what we know now in the process, which can result in a revision of past events to suit what we currently know. Research has also shown that individuals and social groups can create false memories, memories that persist over time, becoming part of the social history of the individuals or groups (Loftus, 1997). 4. How the Self Relates to Conflict What we have established thus far in laying out the social psychological understanding behavior and self-concept is that: (1) human behavior is typically a function of their understanding or experience of environmental factors more so than intrapersonal factors (though the intrapersonal has a role in the construction of that understanding/experience); (2) that people actively construct their understanding of themselves, others, and their world through the process of social cognition; and finally that this process is influenced by a variety of self-serving biases that are driven by basic motives. These findings are most evident in the manner in which we attribute responsibility for our actions as compared to the actions of others—the fundamental attribution error. The long list of self-serving biases illustrates that the manner in which we judge others and ourselves is typically not even-handed. We tend to selfenhance, working actively to maintain our belief systems (belief perseverance); actively seek to confirm our impressions of others even when faced with disconfirming evidence (confirmation bias); behave in ways that elicit reactions from others that serve to confirm our expectations of them (self-fulfilling prophecies); be overly optimistic about our won outcomes (unrealistic optimism); tend to be lazy processors of information relying upon shortcuts instead of detailed processing (cognitive heuristics); have our memories tend to be constructed in ways that fit with our current attitudes and beliefs; see correlations among events that allow us to gain a sense of control where we have none (illusory correlation); tend to be more confidant of our judgments than we tend to be correct (overconfidence); and judge ourselves differently than we do others. Given that the process of social cognition is operating under the influence of these kinds of biases within an organism (the self) that is driven by basic needs and motives—fundamentally the need to be loved, liked, and belong, and the need to be unique, special, and different—we need to question the degree to which our construction of reality is objective in any sense whatsoever. After all,
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every story has two sides—mine and my opponents. Which of these is the objective version of the actual events? Which of these is true? From a social psychological perspective, neither version is correct as each has been created through the process of social cognition under the influence of the biases and motives as described above. At a fundamental level, my worldview, my understanding of who I am, which groups I belong to, and which groups I oppose are all created in a self-serving and self-focused manner—to support and bolster my sense of whom I am and the feelings related to that understanding. Given this, the existence or success of individuals or groups that hold views (social, economic, political, philosophical, or religious) that differ from (and thus oppose) mine becomes threatening to me. This theme has been well developed and supported empirically in the development of terror management theory (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon, 1997, 1999; Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski, 2000). This research has shown that when people experience some form of threat against their existence, they tend to respond in a punitive manner towards someone whose worldview is different from theirs. Such a reaction tends to bolster the perpetrators’ sense of self worth and self-esteem after they commit the punitive actions. Such acts were not committed against people who shared the same worldview as the perpetrators. Amin Maalouf (2000) writes eloquently about the roots of conflict lying in the concept of identity. He argues that identity is based as much upon the identity persons as it is upon the identity of their opponents or enemies. Identity and self are intimately related—my identity is how I identify myself, who I understand my self to be. Maalouf also explicitly acknowledges that identity is determined as a function of others—from family through to the broader culture—again, echoing the understanding of the development of self as being other dependent. Maalouf’s fundamental theme is that human conflict occurs when identities are threatened and when conflicting worldviews are competing for the right to exist. Selves or identities confronted or challenged others. 5. Conclusion My intent in writing this chapter was to layout where I understand the roots of conflict to lie in human nature and to clarify that these roots are an inescapable part of our fundamental fabric. To make this point I have addressed the philosophical background of our understanding and usage of the concept self and the social psychological understanding of the self. The self per se is what I am using to try to understand the self—an interesting and often overlooked unavoidable philosophical dilemma that needs to inform our thinking in this domain. This paradox permeates the topic that we are dealing with since the self is at the same time subject and object. The self is an instrument used by itself to meet the needs and motives that flow from it. Based on this understanding, I conclude that objectivity is philosophically impossible for the self to attain—my understanding of myself, others, and my
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world constitutes my understanding, created by my self through the process of social cognition—a process influenced by self-focused motives and shaped by self-serving biases. Any “objectivity” I come to is objectivity, as I understand it to be. Yours may very well be different from mine. Finally, I have not proposed how we should deal with these issues—or even whether we can deal with these root causes of conflict to avoid future conflicts. My purpose is to admonish that any attempt to deal with these issues has to begin with the acknowledgement of these root causes.
Five THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP MEMBERSHIP AND ALIENATION: PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION AND THE OTHER Karen Lombardi 1. Introduction Irrational and destructive forms of otherness, including racism, sexism, and nationalism, are fostered not only through material conditions of wealth and poverty, plenty, and lack, but also through the privileging of difference and division that marks Western intellectual thought. The long history of psychological ideas that justifies such privileging of categorization, differentiation, and division appears to be rooted in long-standing rationalist and objectivist intellectual traditions that have come to predominate American thought. American culture honors data as objective measures of an external and neutral truth, as if data exist independent of interpretation, and as if interpretation exists independent of culture. Within psychology, however, and particularly within psychoanalysis, some strains of thought do no fall prey quite as easily to false objectification. In this chapter, I will turn to the unconscious of psychoanalytic theory, with particular attention to the theories of Melanie Klein and Ignacio Matte Blanco, with the hope of providing an alternative mode of discourse on social problems of the other within psychology. 2. Introjection and Projection as Primary Modes of Relatedness Klein (1975a; 1975b) bases the development of subjectivity and the capability for symbolization on the earliest appearing psychic mechanisms of introjection and projection. Through the mechanism of introjection, we take in or incorporate the external world and come to experience what is external as part of ourselves. For example, a child comes to experience a loving mother’s touch as belonging to the world of the good mother, and the touch comes to constitute the child’s experience of the self, a good and loving self or a good and loving baby in relation to a good mother. Good (m)other experiences come to constitute not only an external world peopled with positive experience, but also an internal world wherein a person feels its capabilities to be positive, loving, creative, and progressive. Although Klein spoke of good and bad breast experiences in terms of the
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mother’s originary body, I would extend this paradigm to all others who have the potential to constitute internal objects in one’s psychic life, without regard to gender or maternal or paternal status. Similarly, through the mechanism of projection, we expel into the outside world those affects or experiences, usually of a more negative or destructive nature, which in some way feel threatening to us. For example, we project our feelings of hunger or want, readily converted into rageful desire, into the other, who we then experience as depriving or greedy or fearsome. In this system of exchange with the world, introjective experiences tend to contain some element of love or desire from the other that the individual embraces and takes in. Meanwhile, we tend to internally generate projective experiences. We perceive them to contain some destructive element, which we then expel into the outside world. When we split good experiences from negatively tinged ones, Klein calls this the paranoid-schizoid position. In this position, an individual largely feels separated from the source of power or action and experiences things as being done to itself. When we can contain some of our destructiveness and recognize that the ones we have the potential to hurt are also the ones we love, splitting of good from bad experiences no longer predominates. Klein calls this the depressive position. The greed, envy, and persecutory anxiety characteristic of the paranoidschizoid mode no longer dominates experience, and now we can claim some power over our own actions at the same time that we come to terms with our capability for destructiveness. In the depressive position, we are able to mourn our losses and recognize our role in those losses at the same time that we can create new possibilities. For Klein, psychic health consists of a relative predominance of the depressive over the paranoid-schizoid mode of relating. However, her theory is not a linear one, with one stage supplanted by another through growth and development. Instead, the potential for both experiences remains within us in constant interplay, activated equally by external circumstances and by internal ones. We can describe social and cultural problems of difference from a Kleinian perspective, with reference to psychic issues of greed, envy, persecutory anxiety, and the dominance of the paranoid-schizoid mode of relating. Such an approach makes intuitive sense, as it provides some explanation for deep divisions among people who at another level appear to have common interests. The more deprivation is central to internal or personal experience, the more greed and envy will predominate in social relationships. When internal deprivation (the sort experienced in early relationships, at the mother’s breast, for example) is met with a situation of external deprivation, where there are fewer resources than what is needed, greed and envy will multiply exponentially, making it extremely difficult for the individual to move out of the paranoid-schizoid mode of relating. In the persecutory projective mode common to the paranoid-schizoid way of relating, identifications are disowned and similarities become alienable differences. Boundaries and divisions are instantiated. Where similarity existed, only difference remains. In the depressive mode, identification coexists with identity,
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so that an individual can experience its individuality at the same time that it deeply feels its similarities with others. Persecutory relatedness takes the social forms of racism, sexism, and fear and mistrust of other cultures. Depressive relatedness takes the social forms of similarity and identification, wherein masculinity can be incorporated into femininity, blackness into whiteness, and classes are obliterated. 3. The Logic of Symmetry and Asymmetry Building on Klein’s understanding of psychic processes, Matte Blanco (1975; 1988) reconceptualized unconscious and conscious processes along modes of experience organized by similarity and difference. He viewed psychic life as a perpetual dynamic interaction between two fundamental types of thinking and being that exist within us—that of symmetry and asymmetry. Aristotelian logic guides asymmetry. Accordingly, experience can be located according to fixed principles of time and space, leading us to a sense of where we are in relation to others and that allows us to distinguish one thing from another thing. Most closely characterized by conscious experience, asymmetry is the logic of cause and effect, allowing a sense of events preceding or succeeding each other, leading us in the direction of linear thinking and causal attribution. Asymmetry is the logic of distinction and differentiation, wherein difference and multiplicity prevail. Symmetry, on the other hand, is guided by such qualities of the unconscious as timelessness, spacelessness, a lack of mutual contradiction, and absence of negation, wherein sameness and unity prevail. This is the logic of dreams, of fantasy, and emotional life. Borrowing from mathematical set theory, symmetry treats the converse of any relation as identical to the relation itself. Whenever somebody or something stands in relation to another thing (or person), that thing (or person) stands in the equivalent relation to the first thing. According to this logic, no one thing is clearly distinguishable from another thing, nor is time, space, or causality unidirectional, as all is subject to reversibility. For example, “John is the father of Peter; Peter is not the father of John” is an instance of asymmetrical logic. Linear and nonreversible, we can attribute from this statement a fixed identity and causal directionality of the relationship of John to Peter, and Peter to John. According to symmetrical logic, however, the statement, “John is the father of Peter” would have the quality of reversibility. A symmetrical relationship would state, “John is the father of Peter; Peter is the father of John.” Principles of symmetry apply at deep levels of relatedness. For example, “My mother loves me; I love my mother” makes good psychic sense and good common sense, as a loved child is a loving one. Similarly, “My analyst is good to me; I am good to (for) her” is an essential symmetrization of the psychoanalytic relationship. We can say that symmetry is the logic of identity; asymmetry is the logic of difference. For Matte Blanco, human psychological functioning is bilogical—characterized by symmetry and asymmetry. Human beings live in a
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state of fundamental antinomy, an inability to think in a pure and incontrovertible manner, because of these two irreconcilable but simultaneous modes of thinking and being. A translating or unfolding function, which continuously transforms internal and external experience, links symmetry and asymmetry. “Symmetry is always wrapped in asymmetry” (Matte Blanco, 1975, p. 113) not only because asymmetry is necessary for conscious thought, but also because human experience always contains both symmetrical and asymmetrical functions. Because thinking requires the perception of some difference or distinction, symmetrical logic is always interpenetrated by asymmetrical logic to some degree. Matte Blanco set out five strata of human experience (though there may be an infinite number), in which the capability to recognize differences declines as the degree of symmetrization increases. The first stratum, predominated by the conscious awareness of separate objects, is abstract asymmetrical logic where differences and limits prevail. The second stratum contains a significant degree of symmetrization within asymmetrical thinking; verbal metaphors and the experience of affect characterize this level. On the third stratum, different classes are identified, but parts of a class are always taken as a whole. Identifications would apply here, as well as idealization, racism, and forms of prejudice. On the fourth level, wider classes are symmetrized, while some class differentiation remains. The deepest level tends toward mathematical indivisibility—an endless number of things tend mysteriously to become only one thing. In his development of Kleinian theory, Matte Blanco offered symmetrization to explain projective identification. He viewed Klein’s statement on the development of projective identification in the early history of the individual: “Insofar as the mother comes to contain the bad parts of the self she is not felt to be a separate individual but is felt to be the bad self” (Klein, 1975/1946, p.8) as a bi-logical structure, simultaneously symmetrical and asymmetrical. In bi-logical structures, two modes of being exist, one for which reality is divisible and one for which reality is indivisible. Two persons are one. Projective identification is such a bi-logical structure, requiring the perception of difference to then deconstruct boundaries into sameness. In Matte Blanco’s view, the concept of projective identification contains the concept of indivision and also that of distinction. The object and the self are experienced as the same and as different. In Klein’s (1946) statement above, the quality of badness and the obliteration of boundaries between mother and me comprise the symmetrical term; the distinction between mother and me, and the quality of goodness that is the negative of badness comprise the asymmetrical term. Clinically, we can see conflicts and anxieties associated with projective identification in terms of a fear of losing our (asymmetrical) identity and being sucked up into indivisibility, which we feel to be annihilative. Through the splitting of experience in the paranoid-schizoid mode, projective identification both instantiates difference and maintains identifications in a dissociative mode. The individual’s sense of badness that threatens self-destruction and the destruction
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of others is projected into the outside world. People experience this badness as belonging not to themselves, but to others, who stand poised to attack. The objectification of the other thrives through the projective identifications of the paranoid-schizoid position, where identifications are maintained in a predominantly dissociative mode. What we experience as belonging to a part of the self may be split off or splintered; we may see it as residing only in the other. Identifications become paranoid disidentifications and relationships are impoverished. For Matte Blanco, maintaining rich relationships with other people requires the simultaneous experience of the symmetry of empathic identification (in terms of what we put out and what we take in) and the asymmetry of individual, subjective experience. Likewise, in Klein, the capability simultaneously to identify with others and maintain the negativity of difference moves the individual from the predominance of splintered or part-object (what she calls paranoid-schizoid) modes of relating and into more integrative and empathic (what she calls depressive) modes. Here, loving and reparative tendencies mitigate the hatred and destructiveness born of difference and we can maintain empathic identification within a context of individuality. 4. Wholeness and the Implicate Order David Bohm, (1980; 1994) a theoretical physicist whose interest extended to larger problems of thought and culture, presents a social critique of Western culture’s emphasis on difference and a critique of the history of ideas that fits especially well with the work of Matte Blanco and Klein. He takes the focus of modern physics on the simultaneity of quantum (particle) and relativity (wave) theories in the function of the universe and extends this to a theory of being. He addresses the resistance of the scientific community to embrace their ideas, pointing out that scientists ordinarily tend to discount any sort of view giving primacy to formative activity in the undivided wholeness of flowing movement (relativity or wave theory) as features of mathematical calculus. They tend not view them as indications of the “real” nature of things. Mechanistic models predominate, even when they no longer guide scientific thought or fit the data of contemporary observation. Most physicists, he says, still think atomistically, that basic building blocks (for example, atoms or other particles) comprise the universe, from which is made everything. In biology and non-psychoanalytic psychology, this tendency to think atomistically or mechanistically is even greater. Bohm’s overall project concerns understanding the nature of reality in general and consciousness in particular as a coherent whole, which is never static or complete, but which is engaged in an unending process of movement and enfoldment. Thinking may be static (thoughts, more particularly, are static images). Experience, which always coexists with thought, is an undivided process of flow, not reducible to static bits and pieces. Bohm speaks of what I would call the pull of the paranoid, which is the tendency to slice things into smaller and smaller bits to make manageable the
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unmanageable, to create (false) identities that tend to splinter, based as they are on distinction and difference. He says this way of thinking, which he calls the fragmentary self-worldview, is at the same time a larger philosophical movement and a more narrow scientific approach that leads people to feel that fragmentation is nothing but an expression of the way things actually are, a reflection of the reality of nature, and that anything else is impossible. In Bohm’s experience as a member of the scientific and academic community, he has seen a prejudice in favor of a fragmentary self-worldview fostered and transmitted to some extent consciously and explicitly, but mainly in an implicit and unconscious manner. Such fragmentation, an extension of the analysis of the world into separate parts beyond the domain of appropriateness, effectively divides what is indivisible. Such inappropriate divisions also lead to tendencies to unite that which is incapable of being united, which can be seen as another form of fragmentation (that is, the creating of false categories). Here is a sample of Bohm’s social analysis: This [fragmentation] can be seen very clearly in terms of groupings of people in society (political, economic, religious, etc.) The very act of forming such a group tends to create a sense of division and separation of the members from the rest of the world but, because the members are really connected to the whole, this cannot work. . . . Whenever men divide themselves from the whole of society and attempt to unite by identification within a group, it is clear that the group must eventually develop internal strife, which leads to a breakdown of its unity. . . . True unity in the individual and between man and nature, as well as between man and man, can only arise only in a form of action that does not attempt to fragment the whole of reality. (1980, p. 16). My personal experience with Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in the late 1960s may serve as an example of unification leading to splintering. Originally working toward major social change in the forms of increased democracy and social justice, and then united against the Viet Nam War, SDS was effective in staging university strikes and large demonstrations, mobilizing not only students but also workers and professionals. Inclusive and tolerant of difference, SDS eagerly embraced other groups within the umbrella of their organization, including the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the Black Panther Party, campus workers’ labor unions, and the Third World Alliance, to name a few. As the group gained organizational strength and numbers, sectarianism and factionalism began to explode, even though SDS ethics explicitly condemned factionalism and continued its struggle to tolerate internal differences. Issues of personal and group power, and the greed that forms the basis of power, began to infect SDS. Women, who occupied few leadership roles, began feeling increasingly marginalized and objectified. A stunning example of this objectification was Mark Rudd’s leading a meeting on the New York University
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campus with an Asian woman student sitting on his lap. Some organized groups within SDS, such as the Worker-Student Alliance and the Revolutionary Youth Movement, began to pit themselves against one another, both ideologically and personally. One favored the unification of all people and the other lobbied for increased liberties for young people and the dominance of a new youth culture. Slogans switched from “Solidarity Forever” to “Defeat False Unity.” Both slogans spoke the truth, but remained psychically and ideologically split, leading to a splintering of the organization and an ultimate colla