he credit collapse. Tumbling markets. Bailouts and bankruptcies. Surging employment. Political debate. Today’s ancial turmoil transforms academic ory into intense real life challenges that ect every family and business sector making it one of the most teachable ments in modern history.
ngage Learning’s Global Economic Watch ps instructors bring these pivotal current nts into the classroom — through a werful, continuously updated online suite content, discussion forums, testing tools, d more.
Watch, a first of its kind resource, mulates discussion and understanding of global downturn with easy-to-integrate ching solutions:
A thorough overview and timeline of events leading up to the global economic crisis A content-rich blog of breaking news, expert analysis and commentary — updated multiple times daily — plus links to many other blogs
•
A powerful real-time database of hundreds of relevant and vetted journal, newspaper, and periodical articles, videos, and podcasts — updated four times every day
•
Discussion and testing content, PowerPoint® slides on key topics, sample syllabi, and other teaching resources
story is happening now. Bring it into your classroom. more information on how you can enrich your course with The Watch, please visit www.cengage.com/thewatch.
GLOBAL BUSINESS Second Edition
Mike W. Peng Provost’s Distinguished Professor of Global Business Strategy Executive Director, Center for Global Business University of Texas at Dallas
Australia • Brazil • Japan • Korea • Mexico • Singapore • Spain • United Kingdom • United States
Global Business, Second Edition Dr. Mike W. Peng Vice President of Editorial, Business: Jack W. Calhoun Vice President/Editor-in-Chief: Melissa Acuña Sr. Acquisitions Editor: Michele Rhoades Developmental Editor: Jennifer King
© 2011, 2009 South-Western, Cengage Learning ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. No part of this work covered by the copyright herein may be reproduced, transmitted, stored, or used in any form or by any means graphic, electronic, or mechanical, including but not limited to photocopying, recording, scanning, digitizing, taping, web distribution, information networks, or information storage and retrieval systems, except as permitted under Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without the prior written permission of the publisher.
Sr. Editorial Assistant: Ruth Belanger Marketing Manager: Clint Kernan Content Project Manager: Kelly Hillerich
For product information and technology assistance, contact us at Cengage Learning Customer & Sales Support, 1-800-354-9706
Media Editor: Rob Ellington Frontlist Buyer, Manufacturing: Miranda Klapper Sr. Marketing Communications Manager: Jim Overly Production Service: Christian Holdener, S4Carlisle Publishing Services Sr. Art Director: Tippy McIntosh Internal Designer: Mike Stratton, Stratton Design Cover Designer: Mike Stratton, Stratton Design Cover Image: Ian McKinnell, Photographers Choice/Getty Images Sr. Rights Acquisitions Specialist: Deanna Ettinger
For permission to use material from this text or product, submit all requests online at www.cengage.com/permissions Further permissions questions can be emailed to
[email protected]
ExamView® is a registered trademark of eInstruction Corp. Windows is a registered trademark of the Microsoft Corporation used herein under license. Macintosh and Power Macintosh are registered trademarks of Apple Computer, Inc. used herein under license. © 2008 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. Cengage Learning WebTutor™ is a trademark of Cengage Learning. Library of Congress Control Number: 2010925628 ISBN-13: 978-1-4390-4224-3 ISBN-10: 1-4390-4224-1 South-Western Cengage Learning 5191 Natorp Boulevard Mason, OH 45040 USA Cengage Learning products are represented in Canada by Nelson Education, Ltd. For your course and learning solutions, visit www.cengage.com Purchase any of our products at your local college store or at our preferred online store www.CengageBrain.com
Printed in the United States of America 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 14 13 12 11 10
This is an electronic version of the print textbook. Due to electronic rights restrictions, some third party content may be suppressed. Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. The publisher reserves the right to remove content from this title at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it. For valuable information on pricing, previous editions, changes to current editions, and alternate formats, please visit www.cengage.com/highered to search by ISBN#, author, title, or keyword for materials in your areas of interest.
To Agnes, Grace, and James
BRIEF CONTENTS Part 1 Laying Foundations
1
1
Globalizing Business
2
2
Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics
30
3
Emphasizing Informal Institutions: Cultures, Ethics, and Norms
60
4
Leveraging Resources and Capabilities
94
PengAtlas 1
120
Part 1 Integrative Cases
125
Part 2 Acquiring Tools
143
5
Trading Internationally
144
6
Investing Abroad Directly
178
7
Dealing with Foreign Exchange
210
8
Capitalizing on Global and Regional Integration
236
PengAtlas 2
270
Part 2 Integrative Cases
276
Part 3 Strategizing around the Globe 9
Growing and Internationalizing the Entrepreneurial Firm
297 298
10 Entering Foreign Markets
324
11 Managing Global Competitive Dynamics
352
12 Making Alliances and Acquisitions Work
380
13 Strategizing, Structuring, and Learning around the World
412
PengAtlas 3
442
Part 3 Integrative Cases
445
Part 4 Building Functional Excellence
469
14 Competing on Marketing and Supply Chain Management
470
15 Managing Human Resources Globally
498
16 Financing and Governing the Corporation Globally
530
17 Managing Corporate Social Responsibility Globally
560
PengAtlas 4
586
Part 4 Integrative Cases
590
CONTENTS Part 1 Laying Foundations
1
Cultural Differences
Chapter 1 Globalizing Business
2 3
The Context Approach 69 / The Cluster Approach 70 / The Dimension Approach 71 / Culture and Global Business 75
4
Ethics
What Is Global Business? Why Study Global Business?
11
A Unified Framework
13
One Fundamental Question 14 / First Core Perspective: An Institution-Based View 14 / Second Core Perspective: A Resource-Based View 15 / A Consistent Theme 16
What Is Globalization?
16
Three Views on Globalization 16 / The Pendulum View on Globalization 17 / Semiglobalization 19
19
A Glance at the Global Economy 20 / The Globalization Debate and You 21
Economic Development: Western Values versus Eastern Values 80 / Cultural Change: Convergence versus Divergence 82 / Opportunism versus Individualism/Collectivism 82
Chapter 4 Leveraging Resources and Capabilities
84
94 95
Resources, Capabilities, and the Value Chain: In-House versus Outsourcing
98
30
Analyzing Resources and Capabilities with a VRIO Framework
102
31 33 34
An Institution-Based View of Global Business
37
Political Systems
38
Democracy 39 / Totalitarianism 39 / Political Risk 40
Value 103 / Rarity 104 / Imitability 105 / Organization 106
Debates and Extensions
107
Domestic Resources versus International (Cross-Border) Capabilities 107 / Offshoring versus Not Offshoring 107
Management Savvy
Legal Systems
110
40
Civil Law, Common Law, and Theocratic Law 40 / Property Rights 42 / Intellectual Property Rights 44
Economic Systems
45
Debates and Extensions
46
Drivers of Economic Development: Culture, Geography, or Institutions? 46 / Private Ownership versus State Ownership 48
Part 1 PengAtlas
120
1.1 Developed Economies and Emerging Economies
120
1.2 The Group of 20 (G-20)
122
1.3 Political Freedom around the World
123
1.4 Religious Heritages of the World
124
Part 1 Integrative Cases
125
1.1 The Chinese Menu (for Development)
125
1.2 Fighting Counterfeit Motion Pictures
127
50
60 61
Where Do Informal Institutions Come From?
63
Culture
63
Definition of Culture 63 / Language 65 / Religion 67 / Social Structure 67 / Education 68
80
97
Understanding Institutions
Chapter 3 Emphasizing Informal Institutions: Cultures, Ethics, and Norms
79
Debates and Extensions
Understanding Resources and Capabilities
What Do Institutions Do?
Management Savvy
Norms and Ethical Challenges
23
Organization of the Book
Chapter 2 Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics
76
Definition and Impact of Ethics 76 / Managing Ethics Overseas 76 / Ethics and Corruption 77
Management Savvy
Global Business and Globalization at a Crossroads
69
1.3 Brazil’s Embraer: From State-Owned Enterprise to Global Leader 130 1.4 Shakti: Unilever Collaborates with Women Entrepreneurs in Rural India
134
CONTENTS
rt 2 Acquiring Tools
apter 5 ding Internationally
143 144 145
Why Do Nations Trade?
146
Theories of International Trade
149
Mercantilism 149 / Absolute Advantage 150 / Comparative Advantage 152 / Product Life Cycle 155 / Strategic Trade 156 / National Competitive Advantage of Industries 159 / Evaluating Theories of International Trade 160
Realities of International Trade
163
Tariff Barriers 163 / Nontariff Barriers (NTBs) 165 / Economic Arguments against Free Trade 166 / Political Arguments against Free Trade 167
Debates and Extensions
168
Trade Deficit versus Trade Surplus 168 / Classical Theories versus New Realities 169
The Gold Standard (1870–1914) 220 / The Bretton Woods System (1944–1973) 220 / The Post–Bretton Woods System (1973–Present) 220 / The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 221
Strategic Responses to Foreign Exchange Movements
171
178 179
Understanding the FDI Vocabulary
180
The Key Word Is Direct 180 / Horizontal and Vertical FDI 180 / FDI Flow and Stock 182 / MNE versus non-MNE 183
Why Do Firms Become MNEs by Engaging in FDI?
185
Ownership Advantages
Debates and Extensions
186
Location Advantages
Management Savvy
Chapter 8 Capitalizing on Global and Regional Integration
188
Internalization Advantages
236 237 239
Organizing World Trade
241
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: 1948–1994 242 / World Trade Organization: 1995–Present 242 / Trade Dispute Settlement 243 / The Doha Round—“The Doha Development Agenda” 245
247
The Pros and Cons of Regional Economic Integration 247 / Types of Regional Economic Integration 248
249
Origin and Evolution 249 / The EU Today 250 / The EU’s Challenges 253
Regional Economic Integration in the Americas 256 190
Market Failure 190 / Overcoming Market Failure through FDI 191
Realities of FDI
230
Political Benefits for Global Economic Integration 239 / Economic Benefits for Global Economic Integration 241
Regional Economic Integration in Europe
Location, Location, Location 188 / Acquiring and Neutralizing Location Advantages 189
227
Fixed versus Floating Exchange Rates 227 / Currency Hedging versus Not Hedging 229
Regional Economic Integration
The Benefits of Ownership 186 / FDI versus Licensing 186
224
Strategies for Financial Companies 224 / Strategies for Nonfinancial Companies 226
Global Economic Integration
Management Savvy
apter 6 esting Abroad Directly
Evolution of the International Monetary System 220
193
North America: North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 256 / South America: Andean Community, Mercosur, FTAA, USAN/UNASUR, and CAFTA 257
Regional Economic Integration in the Asia Pacific 258 Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA or CER) 258 / Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 259 / Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 259
Political Views on FDI 193 / Benefits and Costs of FDI to Host Countries 193 / Benefits and Costs of FDI to Home Countries 196
How MNEs and Host Governments Bargain
196
Regional Economic Integration in Africa
260
Debates and Extensions
197
Debates and Extensions
260
FDI versus Outsourcing 198 / Facilitating versus Confronting Inbound FDI 198 / Welcoming versus Restricting Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments 200
Management Savvy
apter 7 aling with Foreign Exchange What Determines Foreign Exchange Rates?
Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks 261 / Does the WTO Really Matter? 261
201
Management Savvy
262
210 211
Part 2 PengAtlas
270
213
2.1 Top Ten Merchandise Importers and Exporters
270
2.2 Top Ten Service Importers and Exporters
271
Basic Supply and Demand 213 / Relative Price Differences and Purchasing Power Parity 214 / Interest Rates and Money Supply 216 / Productivity and Balance of Payments 216 /
2.3 Top Ten Economies for FDI Inflows and Outflows 272
CONTENTS
2.5 Regional Integration in South America
274
2.6 Regional Integration in the Asia Pacific
275
Part 2 Integrative Cases
276
2.1 Iceland’s Financial Crisis
276
2.2 Soybeans in China
280
2.3 DP World
283
2.4 Competing in China’s Automobile Industry
288
Part 3 Strategizing around the Globe
Institutions Governing Domestic and International Competition
Chapter 9 Growing and Internationalizing the Entrepreneurial Firm
298 299
Resources and Capabilities Influencing Competitive Dynamics
Local Firms versus Multinational Enterprises
367
Debates and Extensions
368
300
Institutions, Resources, and Entrepreneurship
301
Management Savvy
305
Growth 305 / Innovation 306 / Financing 306
Internationalizing the Entrepreneurial Firm
309
Transaction Costs and Entrepreneurial Opportunities 309 / International Strategies for Entering Foreign Markets 310 / International Strategies for Staying in Domestic Markets 312
Debates and Extensions
313
Traits versus Institutions 313 / Slow Internationalizers versus Born Global Start-ups 314
364
Attack and Counterattack 364 / Cooperation and Signaling 366
Entrepreneurship and Entrepreneurial Firms
Growing the Entrepreneurial Firm
361
Value 362 / Rarity 362 / Imitability 363 / Organization 363 / Resource Similarity 363
Competition versus Antidumping 368 / Competitive Strategy versus Antitrust Policy 369
Institutions and Entrepreneurship 302 / Resources and Entrepreneurship 304
359
Formal Institutions Governing Domestic Competition: A Focus on Antitrust 359 / Formal Institutions Governing International Competition: A Focus on Antidumping 360
Attack, Counterattack, and Signaling
297
vii
Chapter 12 Making Alliances and Acquisitions Work
371
380 381
Defining Alliances and Acquisitions
383
Institutions, Resources, Alliances, and Acquisitions
384
Institutions, Alliances, and Acquisitions 384 / Resources and Alliances 386 / Resources and Acquisitions 388
Formation of Alliances
391
Evolution and Dissolution of Alliances
393
Management Savvy
315
Combating Opportunism 393 / From Corporate Marriage to Divorce 394
Chapter 10 Entering Foreign Markets
324 325
Performance of Alliances
395
Motives for Acquisitions
396
Performance of Acquisitions
397
Debates and Extensions
399
Overcoming the Liability of Foreignness
326
Where to Enter?
329
Location-Specific Advantages and Strategic Goals 329 / Cultural/Institutional Distances and Foreign Entry Locations 332
When to Enter?
332
How to Enter?
334
340
Liability versus Asset of Foreignness 341 / Global versus Regional Geographic Diversification 341 / Old-line versus Emerging Multinationals: OLI versus LLL 342
Management Savvy
Chapter 11 Managing Global Competitive Dynamics Competition, Cooperation, and Collusion
Management Savvy
Chapter 13 Strategizing, Structuring, and Learning around the World
Scale of Entry: Commitment and Experience 335 / Modes of Entry: The First Step on Equity versus Nonequity Modes 335 / Modes of Entry: The Second Step on Making Actual Selections 338
Debates and Extensions
M&As + Alliances 400 / Majority JVs as Control Mechanisms versus Minority JVs as Real Options 401
343
352 353 354
Multinational Strategies and Structures
401
412 413 414
Pressures for Cost Reductions and Local Responsiveness 415 / Four Strategic Choices 415 / Four Organizational Structures 418 / The Reciprocal Relationship between Multinational Strategy and Structure 421
How Institutions and Resources Affect Multinational Strategies, Structures, and Learning Institution-Based Considerations 422 / Resource-
422
CONTENTS
Worldwide Learning, Innovation, and Knowledge Management
425
Knowledge Management 425 / Knowledge Management in Four Types of MNEs 426 / Globalizing Research and Development 427 / Problems and Solutions in Knowledge Management 428
Staffing
429
Corporate Controls versus Subsidiary Initiatives 429 / Customer-Focused Dimensions versus Integration, Responsiveness, and Learning 431
rt 3 ngAtlas
431
Training and Development
Compensation and Performance Appraisal
442
Ease of Doing Business: Top Ten and Bottom Ten
442
Labor Relations
Top Reformers in 2008–2009
443
Rotterdam—Centrally Located in the EU
443
Managing Labor Relations at Home 511 / Managing Labor Relations Abroad 514
Top Ten and Bottom Ten Countries by Per Capita Income
444
Institutions, Resources, and Human Resource Management
445
Institutions and Human Resource Management 514 / Resources and Human Resource Management 516
Private Military Companies
445
Debates and Extensions
Huawei’s Internationalization
449
Hong Kong’s Ocean Park: Learning to Live with Disneyland
454
Best Fit versus Best Practice 517 / Expatriation versus Inpatriation 519 / Across-the-Board Pay Cut versus Reduction in Force 519
DHL Bangladesh
461
rt 4 Building Functional cellence
apter 14 mpeting on Marketing and Supply ain Management Three of the Four Marketing Ps
469
Three As of Supply Chain Management
471
Equity and Debt 533 / Reducing the Cost of Capital 533
472
Owners
478 479
Managers
508
511
514
517
520
530 531 533
535
483
488
540
Board Composition 540 / Leadership Structure 540 / The Role of Boards of Directors 540
Governance Mechanisms as a Package 486
537
Principal-Agent Conflicts 537 / Principal-Principal Conflicts 538
Board of Directors
Manufacturing versus Services 486 / Market Orientation versus Relationship Orientation 487
Management Savvy
505
Concentrated versus Diffused Ownership 535 / Family Ownership 535 / State Ownership 536
Institutions, Marketing, and Supply Chain Management 483 / Resources, Marketing, and Supply Chain Management 485
Debates and Extensions
Chapter 16 Financing and Governing the Corporation Globally Financing Decisions
Agility 479 / Adaptability 480 / Alignment 481
How Insititutions and Resources Affect Marketing and Supply Chain Management
Management Savvy
470
Product 473 / Price 475 / Promotion 477
From Distribution Channel to Supply Chain Management
501
Training for Expatriates 505 / Development for Returning Expatriates (Repatriates) 506 / Training and Development for Host Country Nationals 507
Compensation for Expatriates 508 / Compensation for Host Country Nationals 510 / Performance Appraisal 511
rt 3 egrative Cases
498 499
Ethnocentric, Polycentric, and Geocentric Approaches in Staffing 501 / The Role of Expatriates 502 / Expatriate Failure and Selection 504
Debates and Extensions
Management Savvy
Chapter 15 Managing Human Resources Globally
541
Internal (Voice-Based) Governance Mechanisms 541 / External (Exit-Based) Governance Mechanisms 542 / Internal Mechanisms + External Mechanisms = Governance Package 543
A Global Perspective on Corporate Governance
544
CONTENTS
Institutions, Resources, and Corporate Finance and Governance
545
Institutions and Corporate Finance and Governance 545 / Resources and Corporate Finance and Governance 548
Debates and Extensions
549
Opportunistic Agents versus Managerial Stewards 549 / Global Convergence versus Divergence 549
Management Savvy
Chapter 17 Managing Corporate Social Responsibility Globally A Stakeholder View of the Firm
550
560 561 563
Part 4 PengAtlas
ix
586
4.1 Major Shipping and Transportation Routes
586
4.2 Busiest Airports
586
4.3 Countries with the Largest Labor Forces
587
4.4 Countries with the Highest Unemployment Rates
588
4.5 Top 20 Countries in CO2 Emissions (in MIO Tonnes)
589
Part 4 Integrative Cases
590
4.1 Mary Kay in China
590
4.2 Baosteel Europe
593
A Big Picture Perspective 563 / Primary and Secondary Stakeholder Groups 565 / The Fundamental Debate on CSR 565
4.3 Socially Responsible to Whom? The Case of the US Ethanol Industry 599
Institutions, Resources, and Corporate Social Responsibility
Glossary
602
Name Index
612
Organization Index
620
Subject Index
624
569
Institutions and CSR 569 / Resources and CSR 573
Debates and Extensions
574
Domestic versus Overseas Social Responsibility 575 / Race to the Bottom (“Pollution Haven”) versus Race to the Top 575 / Active versus Inactive CSR Engagement Overseas 576
Management Savvy
576
PREFACE The first edition of Global Business aspired to set a new standard for international business (IB) textbooks. Based on enthusiastic support from students, professors, and instructors in Australia, Britain, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, Malaysia, Puerto Rico, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States, the first edition achieved unprecedented success. A Chinese translation is now available, an India edition specifically tailored for South Asia has been launched, and a European version with enhanced European flavor is being developed. In short, Global Business is global. The second edition aspires to do even better. It continues the market-winning framework centered on one big question and two core perspectives pioneered in the first edition, and has been thoroughly updated to capture the rapidly moving research and events of the past few years. Written for undergraduate and MBA students around the world, the second edition will continue to make IB teaching and learning (1) more engaging, (2) more comprehensive, (3) more fun, and (4) more relevant.
More Engaging As an innovation in IB textbooks, a unified framework integrates all chapters. Given the wide range of topics in IB, most textbooks present the discipline in a fashion that “Today is Tuesday, it must be Luxembourg.” Very rarely do authors address: “Why Luxembourg today?” More important, why IB? What is the big question in IB? Our unified framework suggests that the discipline can be united by one big question and two core perspectives. The big question is: What determines the success and failure of firms around the globe? To address this question, we introduce two core perspectives, (1) institution-based view and (2) resource-based view, in all chapters. It is this relentless focus on our big question and core perspectives that enables this book to engage a variety of IB topics in an integrated fashion. This provides unparalleled continuity in the learning process. Global Business further engages readers through an evidence-based approach. I have endeavored to draw on the latest research, as opposed to the latest fads. As an active researcher myself, I have developed the unified framework not because it just popped up in my head when I wrote the book, but as an extension of my own research that consistently takes on the big question and leverages the two core perspectives. This work has been published in the Journal of International Business Studies and other leading IB journals.1 Another vehicle to engage students is debates. Most textbooks present knowledge “as is” and ignore debates. However, it is debates that drive the field of practice and research forward. Obviously, our field has no shortage of debates. It is the responsibility of textbook authors to engage students by introducing cutting-edge 1
M. W. Peng, 2004, Identifying the big question in international business research, Journal of International Business Studies, 35: 99–108; M. W. Peng, D. Wang, & Y. Jiang, 2008, An institutionbased view of international business strategy: A focus on emerging economies, Journal of International Business Studies, 39: 920–936; M. W. Peng, 2001, The resource-based view and international business, Journal of Management, 27: 803–829.
PREFACE
debates. Thus, I have written a beefy “Debates and Extensions” section for every chapter (except Chapter 1, which is a big debate in itself). Finally, this book engages students by packing rigor with accessibility. There is no “dumbing down.” No other competing IB textbook exposes students to an article authored by a Nobel laureate (Douglass North—Integrative Case 1.1), a commentary by Jack Welch (former GE chairman—In Focus 15.2), and a Harvard Business Review article (authored by me—In Focus 12.2). These are not excerpts but full-blown, original articles—the first in an IB (and in fact in any management) textbook. These highly readable short pieces directly give students a flavor of the original insights.
More Comprehensive Global Business offers the most comprehensive and innovative coverage of IB topics available on the market. Unique chapters not found in other IB textbooks are: • Chapter 9 on entrepreneurship and small firms’ internationalization. • Chapter 11 on global competitive dynamics. • Chapter 16 on corporate finance and governance. • Chapter 17 on corporate social responsibility (in addition to one full-blown chapter on ethics, cultures, and norms, Chapter 3). • Half of Chapter 12 (alliances and acquisitions) deals with the undercovered topic of acquisitions. Approximately 70% of market entries based on foreign direct investment (FDI) around the world use acquisitions. Yet, none of the other IB textbooks has a chapter on acquisitions—clearly, a missing gap that my Chapter 12 will fill. The most comprehensive topical coverage is made possible by drawing on the latest and most comprehensive range of the research literature. Specifically, I have accelerated my own research, publishing a total of 30 articles between the time I finished the first edition (late 2007) and now (mid 2010).2 Some of these recent articles appear in top-tier outlets in IB, such as the Academy of Management Journal, Journal of International Business Studies, Journal of World Business, and Strategic Management Journal. Thanks to writing the first edition that forced me to look into areas where I had not done research before, I have now broadened the scope of my research, publishing recently in top-tier journals in operations (Journal of Operations Management), entrepreneurship (Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice), and human resources (International Journal of Human Resource Management). I have drawn on this latest research to inject cutting-edge thinking into the second edition. In addition, I have also endeavored to consult numerous specialty journals. For example: • The trade and finance chapters (Chapters 5–7) draw on the American Economic Review and Quarterly Journal of Economics. • The entrepreneurship chapter (Chapter 9) consults with the Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. • The marketing and supply chain chapter (Chapter 14) draws heavily from the Journal of Marketing, Journal of International Marketing, and Journal of Operations Management. • The human resource chapter (Chapter 15) heavily cites from Human Resource Management, International Journal of Human Resource Management, Journal of Applied Psychology, and Personnel Psychology. 2
All my articles are listed at www.mikepeng.com and www.utdallas.edu/~mikepeng. Go to “journal articles.”
xi
PREFACE
• The corporate finance and governance chapter (Chapter 16) is visibly guided by research published in the Journal of Finance and Journal of Financial Economics. • The corporate social responsibility chapter (Chapter 17) borrows from work that appears in the Journal of Business Ethics and Business Ethics Quarterly. The end result is the unparalleled, most comprehensive set of evidence-based insights on the IB market. While citing every article is not possible, I am confident that I have left no major streams of research untouched. Feel free to check the Name Index to verify this claim. Finally, the second edition of Global Business continues to have the most comprehensive set of cases contributed by scholars around the world—an innovation on the IB market. Virtually all other IB textbooks have cases written by book authors. In comparison, this book has been blessed by a global community of case contributors who are based in Britain, Canada, China, Germany, Hong Kong, and the United States. Many are experts who are located in or are from the countries in which the cases take place—for example, among all IB textbooks, Global Business has the very first China case written by China-based case authors (see Integrative Case 2.2 Soybeans in China). Additionally, the new set of Video Cases brings you the insights and expertise of noted business leaders from Britain, Canada, France, and the United States.
More Fun In case you think that this book must be very boring because it draws so heavily on the latest research, you are wrong. I have used a clear, engaging, conversational style to tell the “story.” Relative to chapters in rival books, my chapters are generally more lively and shorter. For example, most books use two chapters to go over topics such as trade, FDI, and foreign exchange. I cut out a lot of “fat” and use one chapter to cover each of these topics, thus enhancing the “weight-to-contribution” ratio. Throughout the text, I have woven a large number of interesting, non-traditional anecdotes, ranging from ancient Chinese military writings (Sun Tzu) to Roman empire’s import quotas, from quotes in Anna Karenina to mutually assured destruction (MAD) strategy in the Cold War. Popular movies, such as A Few Good Men, Devil’s Advocate, GI Jane, High School Musical, Star Wars, Terminator, The Hunt for Red October, and The Informant are also discussed. In addition, numerous Opening Cases, Closing Cases, and In Focus boxes spice up the book. Check out the following fun-filled features: • The McDonald’s and Dell theory of world peace (Chapter 2 In Focus 2.2). • Comparative advantage and you (Chapter 5 In Focus 5.1). • Canada and the United States fight over pigs (Chapter 5 Closing Case). • We unwind dreams (Chapter 9 In Focus 9.2). • A fox in the hen house (Chapter 11 In Focus 11.2). • Blunders in international marketing (Chapter 14 Table 14.2) and in international HRM (Chapter 15 Table 15.6). • Dallas versus Delhi (Chapter 15 In Focus 15.3). There is one Video Case to support every chapter. While virtually all competing books have some videos, none has a video package that is so integrated with the learning objectives of every chapter. Finally, as a new feature for the second edition, the PengAtlas sections allow you to conduct IB research using informative maps and other geographic tools to enhance your learning.
PREFACE
More Relevant So what? Chapters in most textbooks leave students to figure out the crucial “so what?” question for themselves. In contrast, I conclude every chapter with an action-packed section titled “Management Savvy.” Each section has at least one table (or one teachable slide) that clearly summarizes the key learning points from a practical standpoint. No other competing IB book is so savvy and so relevant. Further, ethics is a theme that cuts through the book, with at least one “Ethical Dilemma” feature and a series of Critical Discussion Questions on ethics in each chapter. Finally, many chapters offer career advice for students. For example: • Chapter 4 develops a resource-based view of the individual—that is, about you, the student. The upshot? You want to make yourself into an “untouchable,” who adds valuable, rare, and hard-to-imitate capabilities indispensable to an organization. In other words, you want to make sure your job cannot be outsourced. • Chapter 15 offers tips on how to strategically and proactively invest in your career now—as a student—for future international career opportunities.
What’s New in the Second Edition? Pedagogically, two new tools have been introduced. The all-new PengAtlas at the end of each part reinforces the geographic dimension of IB teaching and learning. PengAtlas Map 1.1 provides a comprehensive and informative map of the world, while subsequent maps feature detailed information on such relevant topics as political freedom, religious heritage, imports and exports, FDI inflows and outflows, regional agreements, labor, unemployment, and more. A new feature, “Global Action,” at the end of each chapter utilizes globalEDGE, the most current global business information portal available sponsored by Michigan State University. Between the first and second editions, there was actually a 1.5 edition labeled “2009 Update.” That was forced by the sudden and ferocious financial meltdown during 2008 and 2009. The second edition has leveraged the 1.5 edition and deepened the more timely coverage of the global economic crisis. Highlights include: • Chapter 1 Opening Case: Avon fights recession—one lipstick at a time. • Chapter 1 Closing Case: GE innovates from the base of the pyramid. • Chapter 2 Opening Case: Adam Smith versus Deng Xiaoping. • Chapter 2 debate on private ownership versus state ownership. • Chapter 4 Closing Case: Why Amazon’s Kindle cannot be made in the United States. • Chapter 6 Closing Case: The fate of Opel. • Chapter 9 Closing Case: Boom in busts: Good or bad? • Chapter 11 In Focus 11.3: From trade wars to antitrust wars. • Chapter 12 In Focus 12.3: Tata: Clawed by Jaguar and Land Rover. • Chapter 12 Closing Case: Nomura integrates Lehman Brothers in Asia and Europe. • Chapter 13 Closing Case: Moving headquarters overseas. • Chapter 15 Closing Case: Cut salaries or cut jobs? • Chapter 16 In Focus 16.3: Michael Jensen as an outside director. • Chapter 17 Closing Case: From Kyoto to Copenhagen: Cut emissions or cut jobs?
xiii
PREFACE
Again, these are merely highlights of the changes throughout the chapters. A new set of Video Cases, which are interviews of global business and academic leaders conducted by a dedicated video provider (50 Lessons), has been assembled. Leading organizations featured include: • The Coca-Cola Company • McKinsey & Company • Accenture • Shell Canada • 3M In terms of Integrative Cases, half of them are new. They are: • Fighting counterfeit motion pictures. • Brazil’s Embraer: From state-owned enterprise to global leader. • Iceland’s financial crisis. • Huawei’s internationalization. • Mary Kay in China. • Baosteel Europe. • Socially responsible to whom? The case of the US ethanol industry.
Support Materials A full set of supplements is available for students and adopting instructors, all designed to facilitate ease of learning, teaching, and testing.
Global Business CourseMate Cengage Learning’s Global Business CourseMate brings course concepts to life with interactive learning, study, and exam preparation tools that support the printed textbook. Through this website, available for an additional fee, students will have access to their own set of Powerpoint® slides, flashcards, and games, as well as the Learning Objectives and Glossary for quick reviews. A set of auto-gradable, interactive quizzes (prepared by Timothy R. Muth of Florida Institute of Technology) will allow students to instantly gauge their comprehension of the material. The quizzes are all tagged to the book’s Learning Objectives. Finally, Global Business CourseMate includes a set of four engaging, interactive maps that delve more deeply into key concepts presented in the book.
Product Support Website The flashcards, Learning Objectives, and Glossary are available for quick reference on our complimentary student product support website.
Webtutor on BlackBoard® and Webtutor on WebCT™ Available on two different platforms, Global Business Webtutor enhances students’ understanding of the material by featuring the Opening Cases and Video Cases, as well as e-lectures, the Glossary, study flashcards, and a set of four engaging, interactive maps that delve more deeply into key concepts presented in the book.
CengageNOW™ Course Management System Designed by instructors for instructors, CengageNOW™ mirrors the natural teaching workflow with an easy-to-use online suite of services and resources, all in one program. With this system, instructors can easily plan their courses, manage student assignments, automatically grade, teach with dynamic technology, and assess student progress with
PREFACE
pre- and post-tests tagged to AACSB standards. For students, study tools including e-lectures, flashcards, Powerpoint® slides, and a set of four interactive maps enhance comprehension of the material, while diagnostic tools create a personalized study plan for each student that focuses their study efforts. CengageNOW™ operates seamlessly with WebCT™, Blackboard® and other course management tools.
Global Economic Watch Cengage Learning’s Global Economic Watch helps instructors bring these pivotal current events into the classroom through a powerful, continuously updated online suite of content, discussion forums, testing tools, and more. The Watch, a first-of-its-kind resource, stimulates discussion and understanding of the global downturn with easily integrated teaching solutions: • A thorough overview and timeline of events leading up to the global economic crisis are included in the ebook module, Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on Small Business • A content-rich blog of breaking news, expert analysis and commentary— updated multiple times daily—plus links to many other blogs • A powerful real-time database of hundreds of relevant and vetted journal, newspaper, and periodical articles, videos, and podcasts—updated four times every day • Discussion and testing content, PowerPoint® slides on key topics, sample syllabi, and other teaching resources History is happening now, so bring it into the classroom with The Watch at www. cengage.com/thewatch.
Instructor’s Resource DVD-ROM Instructors will find all of the teaching resources they need to plan, teach, grade, and assess student understanding and progress at their fingertips with this all-in-one resource for Global Business. The IR-DVD-ROM contains: • Instructor’s Manual—Written by John Bowen (Ohio State University, Newark and Columbus State Community College), this valuable, time-saving Instructor’s Manual includes comprehensive resources to streamline course preparation, including teaching suggestions, lecture notes, and answers to all chapter questions. Also included are discussion guidelines and answers for the Integrative Cases found at the end of each part, as well as the 50 Lessons Video Cases. • Test Bank—Prepared by Yi Jiang (California State University East Bay), the Global Business Test Bank in ExamView® software allows instructors to create customized tests by choosing from 35 True/False, 35 Multiple Choice, and at least 8 short answer/essay questions for each of the 17 chapters. Ranging in difficulty, all questions have been tagged to the text’s Learning Objectives and AASCB standards to ensure students are meeting the course criteria. • Powerpoint® Slides—Mike Giambattista (University of Washington) has created a comprehensive set of more than 250 Powerpoint® slides that will assist instructors in the presentation of the chapter material, enabling students to synthesize key concepts. • Video Cases—Perhaps one of the most exciting and compelling bonus features of this program, these 17 short and powerful video clips, produced by 50 Lessons, provide additional guidance on international business strategies. A new set of video clips chosen expressly for this edition offers real-world business acumen and valuable learning experiences from an array of internationally known business and academic leaders.
xv
PREFACE
Instructor Product Support Website For those instructors who prefer to access supplements online, the Instructor’s Manual, Powerpoint® slides, and Test Bank are also available through the instructor’s product support website.
Acknowledgments As Global Business launches its second edition, I first thank all our customers— students, professors, and instructors—around the world who have made the book’s success possible. Most new products flop. Starting to use a new textbook entails substantial start-up cost on the part of instructors. Even worse, the first edition appeared in the worst economic times in recent memory. Given these tremendous entry barriers, the first edition’s successful penetration into some 20 countries speaks volumes about our customers’ vote of confidence. A special thank you goes to my friend and colleague, Klaus Meyer (University of Bath), who is spearheading the development of Global Business: A European View, which is tailored for European students. When working on the second edition, I sent Klaus all my “global” chapters and he sent me all his “European” chapters. We commented on each other’s work and literally practiced what we teach: “Think global, act local.” At UT Dallas, I thank my colleagues Tev Dalgic, Dave Ford, Marilyn Kaplan, Seung-Hyun Lee, Elizabeth Lim, John Lin, Livia Markoczy, Roberto Ragozzino, Orlando Richard, Jane Salk, Eric Tsang, Habte Woldu, and the leadership team— Hasan Pirkul (Dean), Varghese Jacob (Associate Dean), and Greg Dess (Area Coordinator)—for creating and nurturing a supportive intellectual environment. At South-Western Cengage Learning, I thank the “Peng team” that not only publishes Global Business, but also Global Strategy and GLOBAL: Melissa Acuña (Editor-in-Chief); Michele Rhoades (Senior Acquisitions Editor); Jennifer King (Developmental Editor); Kelly Hillerich (Content Production Manager); Clinton Kernen (Marketing Manager); Tippy McIntosh (Senior Art Director); and Terri Coats (Executive Director, International). In the academic community, I thank Ben Kedia (University of Memphis) for inviting me to conduct faculty training workshops in Memphis every year since 1999 on how to most effectively teach IB, and Michael Pustay (Texas A&M University) for co-teaching these workshops with me—known as the “M&M Show” in the IB field. Discussions with close to 150 colleagues who came to these faculty workshops over the last decade have helped shape this book into a better product. I also appreciate the meticulous and excellent commentaries prepared by reviewers for the second edition: Syed Ahmed (Cameron University) Verl Anderson (Dixie State College of Utah) George DeFeis (Monroe College, Bronx) Lianlian Lin (California State Polytechnic University, Pomona) Timothy R. Muth (Florida Institute of Technology) Attila Yaprak (Wayne State University) Continued thanks to the reviewers of the first edition: Richard Ajayi (University of Central Florida, Orlando) Basil Al-Hashimi (Mesa Community College) Peter L. Banfe (Ohio Northern University) Lawrence A. Beer (Arizona State University) Tefvik Dalgic (University of Texas at Dallas) Tim R. Davis (Cleveland State University)
PREFACE
Ping Deng (Maryville University) Norb Elbert (Eastern Kentucky University) Joe Horton (University of Central Arkansas) Samira Hussein (Johnson County Community College) Ann L. Langlois (Palm Beach Atlantic University) Ted London (University of Michigan) Martin Meznar (Arizona State University, West) Dilip Mirchandani (Rowan University) Don A. Okhomina (Fayetteville State University) William Piper (Alcorn State University) Charles A. Rarick (Barry University) Tom Roehl (Western Washington University) Bala Subramanian (Morgan State University) Gladys Torres-Baumgarten (Kean University) Susan Trussler (University of Scranton) William R. Wilkerson (University of Virginia) In addition, I thank a number of colleagues, who informally commented on the first edition: Charles Byles (Virginia Commonwealth University) Breena Coates (California State University, San Bernardino) Ping Deng (Maryville University) Juan España (National University) Sungjin Hong (University of Texas at Dallas) Ferry Jie (University of Technology, Australia) Charles Mambula (Langston University) John McIntyre (Georgia Institute of Technology) Mike Poulton (Dickinson College) Gongming Qian (Chinese University of Hong Kong, China) Pradeep Kanta Ray (University of New South Wales, Australia) Jordan Siegel (Harvard Business School) Josè G. Vargas-Hernàndez (Universidad de Guadalajara, México) George White III (University of Michigan, Flint) Habte Woldu (University of Texas at Dallas) Alan Zimmerman (City University of New York, College of Staten Island) I also appreciate the contributions made by my PhD students. PhD students Erin Pleggenkuhle-Miles, Sunny Li Sun, and Weichieh Su have worked on the second edition as my assistants and made the book significantly better. I also thank Rachel Pinkham for her extraordinary assistance. A total of 27 colleagues from Britain, Canada, China, Germany, Hong Kong, and the United States contributed cases that have significantly enhanced the global flavor of this book. They are: Masud Chand (Simon Fraser University, Canada) Peggy Chaudhry (Villanova University) Hao Chen (University of Texas at Dallas) Yuan Yi Chen (Hong Kong Baptist University, China) Juan España (National University) Steven Globerman (Western Washington University) C. Gopinath (Suffolk University) Yi Jiang (California State University, East Bay) Andreas Klossek (Technical University of Freiberg, Germany) Lianlian Lin (California State Polytechnic University, Pomona) Bernd Michael Linke (Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, Germany)
xvii
PREFACE
Yi Liu (Xi’an Jiaotong University, China) Ted London (University of Michigan) Hemant Merchant (Florida Atlantic University) Klaus Meyer (University of Bath, UK)—two cases Douglass North (Washington University at St. Louis)—Nobel laureate Kenny Oh (University of Missouri at St. Louis) Eydis Olsen (Drexel University) Brian Pinkham (University of Texas at Dallas) Erin Pleggenkuhle-Miles (University of Texas at Dallas) Sunny Li Sun (University of Texas at Dallas)—two cases Qingjiu (Tom) Tao (James Madison University) Maulin Vakil (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) Habte Woldu (University of Texas at Dallas) Wei Yang (Xi’an Jiaotong University, China) Michael N. Young (Hong Kong Baptist University, China) Alan Zimmerman (City University of New York, College of Staten Island) Last, but by no means least, I thank my wife Agnes, my daughter Grace, and my son James—to whom this book is dedicated. My eight-year old Grace is now a young writer who has recently completed her first chapter book: High School Musical 4. My six-year-old James can not only read, but also laugh at my Chapter 5 Closing Case (of course, just the title only): “Canada and the United States fight over pigs.” For now, Grace wants to be a rock star and James a race car driver. As a third-generation professor in my family, I can’t help but wonder whether one (or both) of them will become a fourth-generation professor. To all of you, my thanks and my love. July 1, 2010
ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mike W. Peng is the Provost’s Distinguished Professor of Global Business Strategy at the University of Texas at Dallas and Executive Director of its Center for Global Business, which he founded. At UT Dallas, he has been the number one contributor to the list of 40 top academic journals tracked by Financial Times, which ranked UT Dallas as a top 20 school in research worldwide and ranked its EMBA program as 16th in the United States (2009). Professor Peng holds a bachelor’s degree from Winona State University, Minnesota, and a PhD degree from the University of Washington, Seattle, where he was advised by Professor Charles Hill. Professor Peng had previously served on the faculty at the Ohio State University, Chinese University of Hong Kong, and University of Hawaii. In addition, he has held visiting or courtesy appointments in Australia (University of Sydney and Queensland University of Technology), Britain (University of Nottingham), China (Xi’an Jiaotong University, Sun Yat-sen University, Renmin University, China-Europe International Business School, and Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business), Denmark (Copenhagen Business School), Hong Kong (Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, and University of Hong Kong), the United States (University of Memphis, University of Michigan, Seattle Pacific University, and Western Washington University), and Vietnam (Foreign Trade University). Professor Peng is one of the most prolific and most influential scholars in international business (IB). During the decade 1996–2006, he was the top seven contributor to IB’s number one journal, Journal of International Business Studies. His research is also among some of the most widely cited—both the United Nations and the World Bank have cited his work in major publications. Truly global in scope, his research has covered firm strategies in countries such as China, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. He has authored approximately 80 articles in leading journals. Between the publication of Global Business’s first and second editions, Professor Peng has not only published his latest research in top journals in IB, such as the Academy of Management Journal, Journal of International Business Studies, and Strategic Management Journal, but also in leading outlets in operations (Journal of Operations Management), entrepreneurship (Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice), and human resources (International Journal of Human Resource Management). Professor Peng has previously authored Behind the Success and Failure of US Export Intermediaries (Quorum, 1998) and Business Strategies in Transition Economies (Sage, 2000). His Global Strategy text has become the world’s best-selling global strategy book and has been translated into Chinese and Portuguese. Global Business builds on and leverages the success of Global Strategy. In addition, he has also published GLOBAL, an innovative, colorful, and compact IB textbook. Professor Peng is active in leadership positions in his field. At the Academy of International Business (AIB), he co-chaired the Research Frontiers Conference in San Diego (2006) and guest edited a Journal of International Business Studies special issue on “Asia and Global Business” (2010). At the Strategic Management Society (SMS), he was the first elected Chair of the Global Strategy Interest Group (2005–2008). He also co-chaired the first SMS conference on China in Shanghai (2007). Professor Peng has served on the editorial boards of the
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Journal of International Business Studies, Journal of Management Studies, Journal of World Business, and Strategic Management Journal. He recently completed a term as Editorin-Chief of the Asia Pacific Journal of Management, during which he managed the doubling of submission numbers and the successful bid to gain entry into the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI). Professor Peng has taught students at all levels—undergraduate, MBA, PhD, EMBA, executive, and faculty training programs. Some of his former PhD students are now professors at Babson College, California State University, Georgia State University, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Northeastern University, Oregon State University, Southern Methodist University, St. John’s University, University of Colorado, University of Missouri, and University of Texas at Dallas. Professor Peng is also an active consultant, trainer, and keynote speaker. He has provided on-the-job training to over 200 professors around the world. Every year since 1999, he has conducted faculty training workshops on how to teach IB at the University of Memphis with faculty participants from around the country. He has consulted for organizations such as BankOne, Berlitz International, Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Greater Dallas Asian American Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong Research Grants Council, Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI, National Science Foundation, Nationwide Insurance, Ohio Polymer Association, SAFRAN, US-China Business Council, and The World Bank. His speaking engagements as a keynote speaker include the “China Goes Global” Conference at Harvard University Kennedy School of Government in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the Pacific Region Forum in Vancouver, Canada, and the Navy Reserve Officers Training Conference in Fort Worth, Texas. Professor Peng has received numerous awards and recognitions. His worldclass research has attracted close to $1 million in external research grants. His honors include a National Science Foundation CAREER Award, a Small Business Administration (SBA) Best Paper Award, and a Scholarly Contribution Award from the International Association for Chinese Management Research (IACMR). One of his Academy of Management Review papers has been found to be a “new hot paper” (based on citations) representing the entire field of Business and Economics by the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI). He has also been quoted in Newsweek, Smart Business Dallas, The Exporter Magazine, Business Times (Singapore), Sing Tao Daily (Vancouver), and Voice of America.
Part 1
Laying Foundations CHAPTERS 1. Globalizing Business 2. Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics 3. Emphasizing Informal Institutions: Cultures, Ethics, and Norms
ge Source
4. Leveraging Resources and Capabilities
Chapter
1
LEARNING OBJECTIVES
After studying this chapter, you should be able to: 1. explain the concepts of international business and global business. 2. give three reasons why it is important to study global business. 3. articulate one fundamental question and two core perspectives in the study of global business.
5. state the size of the global economy and its broad trends and understand your likely bias in the
Photo/Christopher Berkey
4. identify three ways of understanding globalization.
Globalizing Business O
P
E
N
I
N
Avon Fights Recession—One Lipstick at a Time When numerous mighty, masculine companies in the banking and automobile industries were falling left and right during the recent recession, Avon Products, Inc. (NYSE: AVP), a self-styled “company for women,” rose to new heights around the world. Avon is a leading global beauty products company with 42,000 employees and $10 billion in annual revenue. As the world’s largest direct seller, Avon markets “smart value” products to women in more than 100 countries through 5.8 million independent sales representatives, often affectionately known as “Avon Ladies.” Today, not all Avon representatives are women, and Avon has officially dropped the “Lady” title. Instead, they are now simply called “representatives,” because Avon has been increasingly recruiting men to hawk its products. Although numerous companies in most industries lost money in 2008, Avon’s revenue grew 5% (in local currency), to a record $10.7 billion. The growth continued in 2009: Its revenue increased 3%, 5%, and 7% (in local currency) in the first, second, and third quarters, respectively. The active number of representatives jumped 11% worldwide. In the United States alone, Avon recruited 200,000 more representatives in 2009 since its launch of an aggressive recruitment drive in March. At a time when most companies struggled for survival and forgot about dividends, Avon proudly declared regular quarterly dividends—$0.21 per share for each of the first three quarters in 2009. In an otherwise bleak environment, investors noticed Avon’s enviable performance, pushing its share price from $14.40 on March 9, 2009, to $34.52 on October 16, 2009—a 140% increase (!). Founded in 1886, Avon pioneered direct selling. In its long history, Avon has had its fair share of ups and downs. So why has its performance been so outstanding lately? Obviously, the severity of the
G
C
A
S
E
2008–2009 recession has rewritten a number of taken-for-granted rules of the game concerning job security, employment, and careers. Direct selling has always been a way (mostly for women) to earn supplemental income. It has now become all the more important for an increasingly large number of both women and men who have lost their jobs. Even currently employed individuals often join direct selling in case their jobs disappear. Burned by the recession, individuals who feel the need to “recession-proof” their income find direct selling to be a great new line of work. According to Richard Berry, director of the UK Direct Selling Association: Direct selling is almost uniquely immune to economic trends. When you have a recession and people want a low-cost way of making an extra income, direct selling is a great option. The reason our members tend not to suffer from a drop in consumer demand is that the products they sell are low-cost household and personal products, all of which are the last thing to suffer a downturn in demand. Although direct selling is attractive, competition is tough. With essentially no entry barrier, laid-off bankers and stay-at-home moms are all rushing in. Why has Avon been doing so well? Avon’s iconic brand certainly helps. Its massive army of Avon Ladies and Avon Dudes ensures unrivaled reach around the globe. Another reason is that a new generation of representatives find they do not have to go door-todoor if they do not want to. Instead, they take catalogs to church events, school functions, and sorority sister gatherings. They often operate on the “partyplan” model, pitching their wares at neighborhood potlucks and dessert parties. They are typically networked, using eBay and Twitter to creatively expand their business. Direct selling is not a get-rich-quick scheme. Representatives have to work hard. In the
PART 1 Laying Foundations
ted States, the average revenue for a party is 00, of which the representative makes 25%. So to successful, a lot of parties will be needed. Throughout its history, Avon has emphasized ial responsibility. More than 120 years ago, the very a that women could run their own entrepreneurbusinesses selling products in their communities d recruiting others to do the same was revolutionToday, this idea of empowering women continues be revolutionary in some parts of the world where men are discriminated against. Avon is the world’s gest microfinance lender for women, extending me $1 billion in credit to help women (and some n) start their new ventures. Every time a reprentative joins Avon, a small loan is provided to cover initial products up front. This is especially valuable d rare in a world where credit is drying up. In addition, direct selling can be a low-risk way experimenting with entrepreneurial ideas. Direct ing gives individuals an idea of how they like sell, how good they are at it, and how they manage ir time, inventory, and finances to maximize profit— hout necessarily having to quit current jobs, if y have jobs. For unemployed individuals, another
benefit of direct selling is that it gets them out in the community, whereas the unemployed typically have a tendency to shy away from social engagements. One expert noted: If you are out of work, you can become out of touch. Direct selling gives you another point of contact with people. You never know what’s going to land in your lap if you’re out there meeting people. Avon’s chairman and CEO, Andrea Jung, proudly noted in her message to Avon’s website visitors that Avon is “a true force for good, improving and changing the lives of others as we continue to fulfill our vision as the company for women.” As governments, companies, and individuals around the world struggle to find ways to tame recession, Avon may indeed provide a glimmer of hope—one lipstick at a time. Sources: Based on (1) BusinessWeek, 2009, Door-to-door sales revive in Britain, July 8 (www.businessweek.com); (2) BusinessWeek, 2009, The entrepreneurs born of recession, March 13 (www.businessweek.com); (3) Shanghai Daily, 2009, Avon Lady ranks boom in downturn, June 28 (www.shanghaidaily. com); (4) Telegraph, 2009, Avon Lady reborn in the USA, July 5 (www.telegraph. co.uk); (5) www.avoncompany.com (Avon reports fourth-quarter and 2008 results; Avon reports second-quarter results; CEO’s message; all accessed on October 17, 2009).
How do firms such as Avon compete around the globe? How can Avon’s directselling competitors such as Mary Kay and Tupperware keep up? How can beauty products competitors that market through traditional channels, such as Procter & Gamble (P&G), Unilever, and Kao, fight back? What determines the success and failure of these firms—and numerous others—around the world during a tumultuous recession? This book will address these and other important questions on global business.
WHAT IS GLOBAL BUSINESS? 1
ain the concepts of international ness and global business.
Traditionally, international business (IB) is defined as a business (or firm) that engages in international (cross-border) economic activities. It can also refer to the action of doing business abroad. A previous generation of IB textbooks almost always takes the foreign entrant’s perspective. Consequently, these books deal with issues such as how to enter foreign markets and how to select alliance partners. The most frequently discussed foreign entrant is the multinational enterprise (MNE), defined as a firm that engages in foreign direct investment (FDI) by directly investing in, controlling, and managing value-added activities in other countries.1 MNEs and their cross-border activities are important, but they only cover one side of IB: the foreign side. Students educated by these books often come away with the impression that the other side of IB—namely, domestic firms—does
CHAPTER 1 Globalizing Business
not exist. But domestic firms do not just sit around in the face of foreign entrants such as MNEs. Domestic firms actively compete and/or collaborate with foreign entrants. In Focus 1.1 shows how domestic Chinese firms in the video game industry compete head-to-head with global giants such as Microsoft, Nintendo, and Sony. In other words, focusing on the foreign entrant side captures only one side of the coin at best.2 It seems uncontroversial to suggest that there are two key words in IB: international (I) and business (B).3 IB is most fundamentally about “B” before being “I.” To put it differently, the IB course in the undergraduate and MBA curricula at numerous business schools is probably the only course with the word “business” in the course title. All other courses you take are labeled management, marketing, finance, and so on, representing one functional area but not the overall picture of business. Does it matter? Of course! It means that your IB course is an
International business (IB) (1) A business (firm) that engages in international (cross-border) economic activities and/or (2) the action of doing business abroad. Multinational enterprise (MNE) A firm that engages in foreign direct investment (FDI). Foreign direct investment (FDI) Investment in, controlling, and managing value-added activities in other countries.
Focus 1.1 Fighting the Online Video Game Wars in China Internet connection, although rising fast, was expensive and thus rare in Chinese households. In 2001, an innovative new business model pioneered by domestic firms significantly lowered the cost of playing games. This model centered on pre-paid cards for a small fee to use a PC at an Internet café. Games were hosted on secure company servers and accessed from Internet cafés. “Killing two birds with one stone,” this new model solved two major problems: high cost to play and piracy. Since gamers only paid a few cents per hour, games now became affordable to numerous groups, ranging from school kids to retirees living on fixed incomes. Piracy was also largely eliminated because game content was maintained on secure company servers. The impact of this innovation was immediate and profound. Instead of saving a lot of money to buy expensive equipment, anyone could go to an Internet café to have a good time now. This has steered the market toward MMOGs and away from consoles. China’s explosive growth has not © Mario Tama/Getty Images
The $50-billion video game industry has two main segments. The first is personal computer (PC)- and console-based games, such as Nintendo’s Wii, Sony’s Playstation and PSP handhelds, and Microsoft’s Xbox. The second is the relatively new online video games. Players (known as “gamers”) compete in virtual worlds populated with thousands of players in large games known as massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs). With an army of close to 40 million gamers, China is emerging as a major battleground for video game wars. In the 2010s, China is likely to be the world’s largest online video game market. In the 1990s, the Chinese video game industry was growing slowly and not profitably. Rampant piracy and low income levels made it unattractive to Nintendo, Sony, and Microsoft. Further, the business model adopted in developed economies, based on sales of consoles and game cartridges to make a profit, made very slow progress in China. This was because the average Chinese found it prohibitively expensive to buy consoles or PCs. High-speed
5
PART 1 Laying Foundations
In Focus 1.1 (continued)
escaped the attention of major international game companies. However, the China market does not play to these firms’ traditional strengths in console games, thus forcing them to adapt and acquire new capabilities in MMOGs. Foreign firms eyeing China will find the market dominated by four strong domestic players: (1) Shanda, (2) NetEase, (3) The9, and (4) Changyou. Shanda was a leader in the pre-paid card movement and, as a result, was successfully listed on NASDAQ (as SNDA) in 2004. NetEase is the current market leader strong on content built on Chinese mythology. Its top-selling game Westward Journey enjoyed 1.3 million concurrent users during its peak play time. The company generating a lot of buzz is The9 Ltd., which obtained a license for World of Warcraft (WoW) from the Irvine, California–based Blizzard Entertainment. WoW is the most successful online video game in history, generating closing to $1 billion a year in worldwide income. In China, WoW smashed opening-day sale records for the industry. The fastest-growing one is Changyou, whose net income increased 20 times between 2007 and 2009. On its opening day on NASDAQ (as CYOU) in April 2009, its stock soared 25%. For foreign firms salivating for the spoils of China’s video game wars, the fundamental question is: how to play the game when industry rules are fast changing and unpredictable? Sony and Microsoft are cultivating the console market. Microsoft operates an incubation center in Chengdu to help third-party
developers create Xbox-compatible content. Sony is also working with local game developers. The Walt Disney Internet Group is partnering with Shanda to develop new games that include Disney characters. Blizzard has acquired a game development studio in Shanghai to incorporate China flavor into its nextgeneration games. Not to be left alone, the Chinese government has intervened on two dimensions. First, upset with game addiction and other health concerns (one gamer died in 2007 after playing three consecutive days in an Internet café), the government has now demanded that game companies include “fatigue controls” that will automatically halt the game after several hours. Second, the Ministry of Culture announced that it would ban games “threatening state security, damaging the nation’s glory, disturbing social order, and infringing on other’s legitimate rights.” Starting in 2004, the Ministry every year publishes a list of recommended games that were deemed “healthy” and “intelligent.” Not surprisingly, all the 35 games on these lists were domestic games. Finally, Chinese firms are not likely to sit around to see their home market invaded. Building on domestic success, they may become major game exporters to Asia and the rest of the world. Chinese firm Kingsoft’s Perfect World has already entered Japan and South Korea. In 2008, China’s CDC Games launched in North America a manga-style MMOG Lunia that is very popular in China and Japan.
Sources: Based on (1) BusinessWeek, 2009, Seeking the “next billion” gamers, July 6: 54; (2) Economist, 2009, Online gaming in China, April 4: 67; 3) R. Ewing, 2007, China’s online video game wars, China Business Review, July–August: 45–49; (4) Wall Street Journal, 2009, Changyou.com IPO jumps 25% on NASDAQ, April 3, online.wsj.com.
bal business iness around the globe.
integrative course that has the potential to provide you with an overall business perspective (as opposed to a functional view) grounded in a global environment. Consequently, it makes sense that your textbook should give you both the I and the B parts, not just the I part. This is exactly why this book, which covers both the I and the B parts, is titled Global Business—not merely “international” business. Global business, consequently, is defined in this book as business around the globe. In other words, global business includes both (1) international (cross-border) business activities covered by traditional IB books and (2) domestic business activities. Such deliberate blurring of the traditional boundaries separating international and domestic business is increasingly important today, because many previously national (domestic) markets are now globalized. Consider the competition in college textbooks, such as this Global Business book you are studying now. Not long
CHAPTER 1 Globalizing Business
7
ago, competition among college textbook publishers was primarily domestic. Before South-Western (our publisher) was acquired by Canada’s Thomson and more recently by Britain’s Apax partners and Canada’s OMERS Partners (which created a new corporate parent company named Cengage Learning), and before Prentice-Hall was acquired by Britain’s Pearson, South-Western, Prentice-Hall, and McGraw-Hill fought each other largely in the United States. A different set of publishers competed in other countries. UK publishers marketed textbooks authored by UK professors to UK students, Russian publishers marketed textbooks authored by Russian professors to Russian students, and so forth. Now South-Western Cengage Learning, Prentice-Hall Pearson, and McGrawHill have significantly globalized their competition. Thanks to rising demand for high-quality business textbooks in English, these top three publishers are now competing against each other in many markets around the globe. The first edition of Global Business not only won many customers in the United States, but also penetrated some 20 countries (noted in the Preface). It becomes difficult to tell in this competition what is “international” and what is “domestic.” Thus, “global” is a better word to capture the essence of this competition. This book also differs from other books on IB because most focus on competition in developed economies. Here, by contrast, we devote extensive space to competitive battles waged throughout emerging economies, a term that has gradually replaced the term “developing countries” since the 1990s. Another commonly used term is emerging markets. How important are emerging economies? Collectively, they now contribute approximately 45% of the global gross domestic product (GDP), as shown in Figure 1.1.4 Note that this percentage is
FIGURE 1.1 THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF EMERGING ECONOMIES RELATIVE TO DEVELOPED ECONOMIES (WORLD %) 100 90 80 70 60
Developed economies BRIC Emerging economies excluding BRIC
50 40 30 20 10 0 ow
s
s) te
fl ut
Io FD
P D
G
om (n
al in
ex
e ng
ra
n sa od
a ch
f so
d
v er
s
P
G
) ity
s
ow nfl i I
FD
g in
go
t
r po Ex
es ic
w po
er
r pa
n io
t la
pu Po
s ha rc u (p
D
Sources: Data extracted from (1) International Monetary Fund, 2009, World Economic Outlook: Sustaining the Recovery (p. 162), Washington: IMF; (2) United Nations, 2009, World Investment Report 2009 (p. 247), New York and Geneva: UN; (3) World Bank, 2009, World Development Indicators database, Washington: World Bank. All data refer to 2008.
Emerging economies A term that has gradually replaced the term “developing countries” since the 1990s. Emerging markets A term that is often used interchangeably with “emerging economies.” Gross domestic product (GDP) The sum of value added by resident firms, households, and government operating in an economy.
PART 1 Laying Foundations
chasing power parity (PPP) onversion that determines equivalent amount of goods services different currencies purchase.
C zil, Russia, India, and China.
oss national product (GNP) ss domestic product (GDP) s income from nonresident rces abroad.
oss national income (GNI) ss domestic product (GDP) s income from income from resident sources abroad. GNI is term used by the World Bank other international organizas to supersede the term GNP.
adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), which is an adjustment to reflect the differences in cost of living (see In Focus 1.2). Using official (nominal) exchange rates without adjusting for PPP, emerging economies contribute about 26% of the global GDP. Why is there such a huge difference between the two measures? Because the cost of living (such as housing and haircuts) in emerging economies tends to be lower than that in developed economies. For example, one dollar spent in Mexico can buy a lot more than one dollar spent in the United States. Some emerging economies are growing rapidly.5 During the 2008–2009 global recession, it was the strong recovery of China and India that spearheaded the global recovery.6 Table 1.1 (and PengAtlas Map 1.1) lists the 33 countries that are classified as “developed economies.” The rest of the world (more than 150 countries) can be broadly labeled as “emerging economies.” Of these emerging economies, Brazil, Russia, India, and China—commonly referred to as BRIC—command more attention. As a group, they generate 17% of world exports, absorb 16% of FDI inflows, and contribute 28% of world GDP (on a PPP basis). Commanding a lion’s share, BRIC contribute 62% of the GDP of all emerging economies (on
Focus 1.2 Setting the Terms Straight GDP, GNP, GNI, PPP—there is a bewildering variety of acronyms that are used to measure economic development. It is useful to set these terms straight before proceeding. Gross domestic product (GDP) is measured as the sum of value added by resident firms, households, and government operating in an economy. For example, the value added by foreignowned firms operating in Mexico would be counted as part of Mexico’s GDP. However, the earnings of nonresident sources that are sent back to Mexico (such as earnings of Mexicans who do not live and work in Mexico and dividends received by Mexicans who own non-Mexican stocks) are not included in Mexico’s GDP. One measure that captures this is gross national product (GNP). More recently, the World Bank and other international organizations have used a new term, gross national income (GNI), to supersede GNP. Conceptually, there is no difference between GNI and GNP. What exactly is GNI/GNP? It comprises GDP plus income from nonresident sources abroad. Although GDP, GNP, and now GNI are often used as yardsticks of economic development, differences in cost of living make such a direct comparison less meaningful. A dollar of spending in, say, Thailand can buy a lot more than in Japan. Therefore, conversion based on purchasing power
parity (PPP) is often necessary. The PPP between two countries is the rate at which the currency of one country needs to be converted into that of a second country to ensure that a given amount of the first country’s currency will purchase the same volume of goods and services in the second country (Chapter 7 has more details). The Swiss per capita GNI is $64,011 based on official (nominal) exchange rates—higher than the US per capita GNI of $46,716. However, everything is more expensive in Switzerland. A Big Mac costs $5.98 in Switzerland versus $3.57 in the United States. Thus, Switzerland’s per capita GNI based on PPP becomes $42,534—lower than the US per capita GNI based on PPP, $46,716 (the World Bank uses the United States as benchmark in PPP calculation). On a worldwide basis, measured at official exchange rates, emerging economies’ share of global GDP is approximately 26%. However, measured at PPP, it is about 43% of the global GDP. Overall, when we read statistics about GDP, GNP, and GNI, always pay attention to whether these numbers are based on official exchange rates or PPP, which can make a huge difference. Sources: Based on (1) Economist, 2009, The Big Mac index: Cheesed off, July 18; (2) Economist, 2006, Grossly distorted picture, February 11: 72; (3) World Bank, 2009, World Development Indicators database.
CHAPTER 1 Globalizing Business
TABLE 1.1
CLASSIFYING DEVELOPED ECONOMIES VERSUS EMERGING ECONOMIES 33 developed economies as classified by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece
Hong Kong Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Luxembourg Malta Netherlands New Zealand Norway
Portugal Singapore Slovak Republic Slovenia South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland Taiwan United Kingdom United States
All the other 149 countries are classified by the IMF as emerging economies (see PengAtlas Map 1.1) Source: IMF, www.imf.org (accessed October 16, 2009). The IMF recognizes 182 countries and economies. It labels developed economies “advanced economies,” and labels emerging economies “emerging and developing economies.”
a PPP basis). BRIC also generate 8% of world FDI outflows, and MNEs from BRIC are increasingly visible in making investments and acquiring firms around the world.7 Clearly, major emerging economies (especially BRIC) and their firms have become a force to be reckoned with in global business.8 The global economy can be viewed as a pyramid (Figure 1.2). The top consists of about one billion people with per capita annual income of $20,000
FIGURE 1.2 THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC PYRAMID
Top Tier Per capita GDP/GNI > $20,000 Approximately one billion people Second Tier Per capita GDP/GNI $2,000–$20,000 Approximately one billion people Base of the Pyramid Per capita GDP/GNI < $2,000 Approximately four billion people
Sources: Adapted from (1) S. Hart, 2005, Capitalism at the Crossroads (p. 111), Philadelphia: Wharton School Publishing; (2) C. K. Prahalad & S. Hart, 2002, The fortune at the bottom of the pyramid, Strategy+ Business, 26: 54–67.
9
PART 1 Laying Foundations
d th America, Western Europe, Japan.
e of the pyramid nomies where people make s than $2,000 a year.
or higher. These are mostly people who live in the developed economies in the Triad, which consists of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. Another billion people earning $2,000 to $20,000 a year make up the second tier. The vast majority of humanity—about four billion people—earn less than $2,000 a year and comprise the base of the pyramid. Most MNEs focus on the top and second tiers and end up ignoring the base of the pyramid.9 An increasing number of such lowincome countries have shown a great deal of economic opportunities as income levels have risen (In Focus 1.3). More Western MNEs, such as GE, are investing aggressively in the base of the pyramid and leveraging their investment to tackle markets in both emerging economies and developed economies (see the Closing Case). Today’s students—and tomorrow’s business leaders—will ignore these opportunities at the base of the pyramid at their own peril. This book will help ensure that you will not ignore these opportunities.
Focus 1.3 It’s the Base of the Pyramid Calling What magical device can boost entrepreneurship, provide an alternative to bad roads, widen farmers’ and fishermen’s access to markets, and allow swift and safe transfers of money? It is . . . a mobile (cell) phone! At the base of the global economic pyramid where fixed-line phones are rare or nonexistent, mobile phones are often the very first telephone networks widely deployed. In a typical country at the base of the pyramid, an increase of ten mobile phones per 100 people reportedly boosts GDP growth by 0.6%. Not surprisingly, the most explosive growth is found in the poorest region of the world: sub-Saharan Africa. Of course, such growth was based on a very low penetration level: In sub-Saharan Africa, there were three mobile phones per 100 people in 2001. Now there are eight mobile phones per 100. The world’s largest market, China now has 700 million users. In 2009, an additional 89 million signed up in China, 128 million in India, and 96 million across Africa. As demand takes off at the base of the pyramid, mobile phone makers and service providers cannot be happier. The reason is simple: At the top of the pyramid, market penetration is reaching saturation. The “race to the bottom” is challenging, since many customers demand rock
bottom prices of $50 or less per handset. For now, the only serious contenders for this segment are Nokia and Motorola, the world’s No. 1 and No. 2 makers, respectively. Their tremendous volume gives them hard-to-beat economies of scale. Samsung, LG, and Sony Ericsson have yet to sell less-than-$50 handsets. Chinese makers such as Huawei and ZTE, despite their growing reputation for higherend models, have a hard time making money from the low end. Many customers at the base may be illiterate, but they are brand conscious. At the same price, they prefer Nokia and Motorola over unknown brands. Already, both Nokia and Motorola are further consolidating their position by making models for as little as $25, while still maintaining margins at approximately 30%, which is comparable to their margin around the world. Overall, this is a win-win solution for numerous economies eager to develop and for the few far-sighted and capable mobile phone makers to do what C. K. Prahalad, a guru on the base of the pyramid, preaches—serving the world’s poor, profitably. Sources: Based on (1) Economist, 2009, Mobile marvels, September 26: 1–19; (2) Economist, 2006, Mobile phones in Africa, February 4: 94; (3) C. K. Prahalad & A. Hammond, 2002, Serving the world’s poor, profitably, Harvard Business Review, September: 48–57.
CHAPTER 1 Globalizing Business
11
WHY STUDY GLOBAL BUSINESS? Global business (or IB) is one of the most exciting, challenging, and relevant subjects offered by business schools. Why study it? There are at least three compelling reasons why you should study global business—and study hard (Table 1.2). First, mastering global business knowledge helps advance your employability and career in an increasingly competitive global economy. Take a look at the Opening Day Quiz in Table 1.3. Can you answer all the questions correctly? If not, you will definitely benefit from studying global business. The answer to Question 1 is empirical—that is, based on data. You should guess first and then look at the label of your shirt yourself or ask a friend to help you. The key here is international trade. Do you wear a shirt made in your own country or another country? Why? Students typically ask if the computer in Question 2 means the mother board or the keyboard. My answer is: “I mean the computer, all the production that went into making the machine.” Then some students would respond: “But they could be made in different countries!” My point exactly. However, desktops or laptops have labels that specify in which country the final product was made or assembled. The point here is to appreciate the complexity of a global value chain, with different countries making different components and handling different tasks. Such a value chain is typically managed by an MNE, such as Dell, HP, or Lenovo. The capabilities necessary to organize a global supply chain hints at the importance of resources and capabilities—one of the two key themes of this book.
TABLE 1.2
2 Give three reasons why it is important to study global business.
WHY STUDY GLOBAL BUSINESS?
• Enhance your employability and advance your career in the global economy • Better preparation for possible expatriate assignments abroad • Stronger competence in interacting with foreign suppliers, partners, and competitors and in working for foreign-owned employers in your own country
TABLE 1.3
OPENING DAY QUIZ
1. Which country made the shirt you are wearing?
3. How many countries does the G-20 have?
(A) China (B) Malaysia (C) Mexico (D) Romania (E) USA
(A) 20 (B) 21 (C) 22 (D) 19 (E) 18
2. Which country made your computer?
4. A 2,000-employee manufacturing plant is closing in a developed economy and production is moving to an emerging economy. How many jobs of the 2,000 will be kept by the company?
(A) China (B) Germany (C) Singapore (D) Taiwan (E) USA
(A) 0 (B) 5–10 (C) 10–20 (D) 20–30 (E) 30–50
PART 1 Laying Foundations
hat are some of the nefits you might joy as an expatriate anager?
oup of 20 (G-20) group of 19 major couns plus the European Union ) whose leaders meet on a nnual basis to solve global nomic problems.
patriate manager (expat) manager who works abroad.
ernational premium gnificant pay raise when king overseas.
Question 3 is deceptively simple. Unfortunately, 100% of my own students— ranging from undergraduates to PhDs—miss it. Surprise! The Group of 20 (G-20) only has 19 member countries. The 20th member is the European Union (EU)—a regional bloc, not a single country (see PengAtlas Map 1.2). Why the G-20 is formed in such an interesting way will hopefully make you more curious about how the rules of the game are made around the world. In this case, why are 19 countries in, but numerous others are out? What is special about the EU? Why are other regional blocs not included? A focus on the rules of the game—more technically, institutions—is another key theme of this book. Question 4 will really frighten you. Some students would typically clarify: “Do you mean the few security guards looking after the closed plant?” “Not necessarily,” I would point out. “The question is: How many jobs will be kept by the company?” Students would eventually get it: even adding a few jobs as security guards at the closed plant, the most optimistic estimates are that only 30–50 jobs may be kept. Yes, you guessed it, these jobs typically are high-level positions such as the CEO, CFO, CIO, factory director, and chief engineer. These managers will be sent by the MNE to start-up operations in an emerging economy. You need to realize that in a 2,000-employee plant, even if you may be the 51st highest-ranked employee, your fate may be the same as the 2,000th employee. You really need to work hard and work smart to position yourself as one of the top 50 (preferably one of the top 30). Doing well in this class and mastering global business knowledge may help make it happen. In addition to the first reason—to equip you with relevant knowledge—the second compelling reason why you should study global business is related to Question 4. Because many ambitious students aspire to join the top ranks of large firms, expertise in global business is often a prerequisite. Today, it is increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to find top managers at large firms without significant global competence. Of course, eventually hands-on global experience, not merely knowledge acquired from this course, will be required.10 However, mastery of the knowledge of, and demonstration of interest in, global business during your education will set you apart as a more ideal candidate to be selected as an expatriate manager (or “expat” in short)—a manager who works abroad—to gain such an experience (see Chapter 15 for details). Thanks to globalization, low-level jobs not only command lower salaries, but are also more vulnerable. However, high-level jobs, especially those held by expats, are both financially rewarding and relatively secure. Expats often command a significant international premium in compensation—a significant pay raise when working overseas. In US firms, an expat’s total compensation package is approximately $250,000 to $300,000 (including perks and benefits). When they return to the United States after a tour of duty (usually 2 to 3 years), a firm that does not provide attractive career opportunities to experienced expats often find they are lured away by competitor firms. Competitor firms also want to globalize their business, and tapping into the expertise and experience of these former expats makes such expansion more likely to succeed. And yes, to hire away these internationally experienced managers, competitor firms have to pay an even larger premium. This indeed is a virtuous cycle. Lastly, even if you do not aspire to compete for the top job at a large company and instead work at a small firm or are self-employed, you may find
CHAPTER 1 Globalizing Business
13
yourself dealing with foreign-owned suppliers and buyers, competing with foreign-invested firms in your home market, or perhaps even selling and investing overseas. Or alternatively, you may find yourself working for a foreign-owned firm your domestic employer acquired by a foreign player, or your unit ordered to shut down for global consolidation. Any of these are likely scenarios, because approximately 80 million people worldwide, including 18 million Chinese, six million Americans, and one million British, are employed by foreign-owned firms. Understanding how global business decisions are made may facilitate your own career in such firms.11 If there is a strategic rationale to downsize your unit, you want to be prepared and start polishing your resume right away. In other words, it is your career that is at stake. Don’t be the last in the know! In short, in this age of global competition, “how do you keep from being Bangalored or Shanghaied” (that is, having your job being outsourced to India or China)?12 A good place to start is to study hard and do well in your IB course. Also, don’t forget to put this course on your resume!
A UNIFIED FRAMEWORK Global business is a vast subject area. It is one of the few courses that will make you appreciate why your university requires you to take a number of seemingly unrelated courses in general education. We will draw on major social sciences such as economics, geography, history, political science, psychology, and sociology. We will also draw on a number of business disciplines such as strategy, finance, and marketing. The study of global business is thus very interdisciplinary. It is quite easy to lose sight of the forest while scrutinizing various trees or even branches. The subject is not difficult, and most students find it to be fun. The number one student complaint (based on previous student feedback) is that there is an overwhelming amount of information. Honestly, as your author this is also my number one complaint. To proactively address your possible complaint and to make your learning more manageable (and hopefully more fun), we will develop a unified framework (shown in Figure 1.3). This will provide great continuity to facilitate your learning.
FIGURE 1.3 A UNIFIED FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL BUSINESS
Institution-based view: Formal and informal rules of the game
Resource-based view: Firm-specific resources and capabilities
Fundamental question: What determines the success and failure of firms around the globe?
3 Articulate one fundamental question and two core perspectives in the study of global business.
PART 1 Laying Foundations
Specifically, we will discipline ourselves by focusing on only one most fundamental question. A fundamental question acts to define a field and to orient the attention of students, practitioners, and scholars in a certain direction. Our “big question” is: What determines the success and failure of firms around the globe?13 To answer this question, we will introduce only two core perspectives throughout this book: (1) an institution-based view and (2) a resource-based view.14 The remainder of this section outlines this framework.
One Fundamental Question What is it that we do in global business? Why is it so important that practically all students in business schools around the world are either required or recommended to take this course? Although there are certainly a lot of questions to raise, a relentless interest in what determines the success and failure of firms around the globe serves to focus the energy of our field. Global business is fundamentally about not limiting yourself to your home country. It is about treating the entire global economy as your potential playground (or battlefield). Some firms may be successful domestically but fail miserably when they venture abroad. Other firms successfully translate their strengths from their home market to other countries. If you were expected to lead your firm’s efforts to enter a particular foreign market, wouldn’t you want to find out what drives the success and failure of other firms in that market? Overall, the focus on firm performance around the globe defines the field of global business more than anything else. Numerous other questions and topics all relate in one way or another to this most fundamental question. Therefore, all chapters in this book will be centered on this consistent theme: What determines the success and failure of firms around the globe?
First Core Perspective: An Institution-Based View15 An institution-based view suggests that the success and failure of firms are enabled and constrained by institutions. By institutions, we mean the rules of the game. Doing business around the globe requires intimate knowledge about both formal rules (such as laws) and informal rules (such as values) that govern competition in various countries. If you establish a firm in a given country, you will work within that country’s institutional framework, which is the formal and informal institutions that govern individual and firm behavior. Firms that do not do their homework and thus remain ignorant of the rules of the game in a certain country are not likely to emerge as winners. Formal institutions include regulations and laws. For example, Hong Kong’s laws are well-known for treating all comers—whether from neighboring mainland China (whose firms are still technically regarded as “nondomestic”) or far-away Chile—the same as they treat indigenous Hong Kong firms. Such equal treatment enhances the potential odds for foreign firms’ success. It is thus not surprising that Hong Kong attracts a lot of outside firms. Other rules of the game discriminate against foreign firms and undermine their chances for success. India’s recent attraction as a site for FDI was only possible after it changed its FDI regulations from confrontational to accommodating. Prior to 1991, India’s rules severely discriminated against foreign firms. As a result, few foreign firms bothered to
CHAPTER 1
Globalizing Business
15
show up, and the few that did had a hard time. For example, in the 1970s, the Indian government demanded that Coca-Cola either hand over the recipe for its secret syrup, which it does not even share with the US government, or get out of India. Painfully, Coca-Cola chose to leave India. Its return to India since the 1990s speaks volumes about how much the rules of the game have changed in India. Informal institutions include cultures, ethics, and norms. They also play an important part in shaping the success and failure of firms around the globe. For example, individualistic societies, particularly the English-speaking countries such as Australia, Britain, and the United States, tend to have a relatively higher level of entrepreneurship as reflected in the number of business start-ups. Why? Because the act of founding a new firm is a widely accepted practice in individualistic societies. Conversely, collectivistic societies such as Japan often have a hard time fostering entrepreneurship. Most people there refuse to stick their necks out to found new businesses because it is contrary to the norm.16 This explains why direct-selling companies such as Avon (see the Opening Case) have a hard time recruiting representatives in Japan. Overall, an institution-based view suggests that institutions shed a great deal of light on what drives firm performance around the globe.17 Next, we turn to our second core perspective.
Second Core Perspective: A Resource-Based View18 The institution-based view suggests that the success and failure of firms around the globe are largely determined by their environments. This is certainly correct. Indeed, India failed to attract much FDI prior to 1991 and Japan does not nurture a lot of internationally competitive start-ups because of their institutions. However, insightful as this perspective is, there is a major drawback. If we push this view to its logical extreme, then firm performance around the globe would be entirely determined by environments. The validity of this extreme version is certainly questionable. The resource-based view has emerged to overcome this drawback. Although the institution-based view primarily deals with the external environment, the resource-based view focuses on a firm’s internal resources and capabilities. It starts with a simple observation: In harsh, unattractive environments, most firms either suffer or exit. However, against all odds, a few superstars thrive in these environments. For example, despite the former Soviet Union’s obvious hostility toward the United States during the Cold War, PepsiCo began successfully operating in the former Soviet Union in the 1970s (!). Most of the major airlines have been losing money since September 11, 2001. But a small number of players, such as Southwest in the United States and Ryanair in Ireland, have been raking in profits year after year (although, thanks to the recession, their profits are smaller than before). Most unusually, in the fiercely competitive beauty products industry, Avon has been able to grow its revenue during the devastating 2008–2009 recession (see the Opening Case). How can these firms succeed in such challenging environments? A short answer is that PepsiCo, Southwest, Ryanair, and Avon must have certain valuable and unique firm-specific resources and capabilities that are not shared by competitors in the same environments. Doing business outside one’s home country is challenging. Foreign firms have to overcome a liability of foreignness, which is the inherent disadvantage that foreign firms experience in host countries because of their non-native status.19 Just
Liability of foreignness The inherent disadvantage that foreign firms experience in host countries because of their nonnative status.
PART 1 Laying Foundations
think about all the differences in regulations, languages, cultures, and norms. Against such significant odds, the primary weapon foreign firms employ is overwhelming resources and capabilities that not only offset the liability of foreignness, but also pose a significant competitive advantage. Today, many of us take it for granted that the Honda Civic is the best-selling car in the United States, CocaCola is the best-selling soft drink in Mexico, and Microsoft Word is the world’s number one word-processing software. We really shouldn’t. Why? Because it is not natural for these foreign firms to dominate non-native markets. These firms must possess some very rare and powerful firm-specific resources and capabilities that drive these remarkable success stories and are the envy of their rivals around the globe. This is a key theme of the resource-based view, which focuses on how winning firms acquire and develop such unique and enviable resources and capabilities and how competitor firms imitate and then innovate in an effort to outcompete the winning firms.
A Consistent Theme Given our focus on the fundamental question of what determines the success and failure of firms around the globe, we will develop a unified framework by organizing the material in every chapter according to the two core perspectives, namely, the institution-based and resource-based views. With our unified framework—an innovation in IB books—we will not only explore the global business “trees,” but also see the global business “forest.”
WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION? 4
ntify three ways of erstanding globalization.
balization close integration of couns and peoples of the world.
Globalization, generally speaking, is the close integration of countries and peoples of the world. This abstract five-syllable word is now frequently heard and debated. Those who approve of globalization count its contributions to include greater economic growth and standards of living, increased technology sharing, and more extensive cultural integration. Critics argue that globalization undermines wages in rich countries, exploits workers in poor countries, grants MNEs too much power, and triggered the devastating economic recession that has engulfed the world since 2008. So what exactly is globalization? This section outlines three views on globalization, recommends the pendulum view, and introduces the idea of semiglobalization.
Three Views on Globalization Depending on what sources you read, globalization could be • a new force sweeping through the world in recent times • a long-run historical evolution since the dawn of human history • a pendulum that swings from one extreme to another from time to time An understanding of these views helps put the debate about globalization in perspective. First, opponents of globalization suggest that it is a new phenomenon beginning in the late 20th century, driven by recent technological
CHAPTER 1 Globalizing Business
innovations and a Western ideology focused on exploiting and dominating the world through MNEs. The arguments against globalization focus on environmental stress, social injustice, and sweatshop labor, but present few clearly workedout alternatives to the present economic order. Nevertheless, antiglobalization advocates and protesters often argue that globalization needs to be slowed down, if not stopped.20 A second view contends that globalization has always been part and parcel of human history. Historians are debating whether globalization started 2,000 or 8,000 years ago. The earliest traces of MNEs have been discovered in Assyrian, Phoenician, and Roman times.21 International competition from low-cost countries is nothing new. In the first century a.d., the Roman emperor Tiberius was so concerned about the massive quantity of low-cost Chinese silk imports that he imposed the world’s first known import quota of textiles.22 Today’s most successful MNEs do not come close to wielding the historical clout of some MNEs, such as Britain’s East India Company during colonial times. In a nutshell, globalization is nothing new and will probably always exist. A third view suggests that globalization is the “closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of the costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders.”23 Globalization is neither recent nor onedirectional. It is, more accurately, a process similar to the swing of a pendulum.
The Pendulum View on Globalization The pendulum view probably makes the most sense because it can help us understand the ups and downs of globalization. The current era of globalization originated in the aftermath of World War II, when major Western countries committed to global trade and investment. However, between the 1950s and the 1970s, this view was not widely shared. Communist countries, such as China and the former Soviet Union, sought to develop self-sufficiency. Many noncommunist developing countries, such as Brazil, India, and Mexico, focused on fostering and protecting domestic industries. But refusing to participate in global trade and investment ended up breeding uncompetitive industries. In contrast, four developing economies in Asia—namely, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan—earned their stripes as the “Four Tigers” by participating in the global economy. They became the only economies once recognized as less developed (low-income) by the World Bank to have subsequently achieved developed (high-income) status (see Table 1.1). Inspired by the Four Tigers, more and more countries and regions—such as China in the late 1970s, Latin America in the mid-1980s, Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, and India in the 1990s—realized that joining the world economy was a must. As these countries started to emerge as new players in the world economy, they became collectively known as “emerging economies.” As a result, globalization rapidly accelerated. For example, between 1990 and 2000, while world output grew by 23%, global trade expanded by 80%, and the total flow of FDI increased fivefold.24 The pendulum view suggests, however, that globalization is unable to keep going in one direction. Rapid globalization in the 1990s and the 2000s saw some significant backlash. First, the rapid growth of globalization led to the historically inaccurate view that globalization is new. Second, it created fear among many
17
PART 1 Laying Foundations
people in developed economies that they would lose jobs. Emerging economies not only seem to attract many low-end manufacturing jobs away from developed economies, but they also increasingly appear to threaten some high-end jobs. Finally, some factions in emerging economies complained against the onslaught of MNEs, alleging that they destroy local companies as well as local cultures, values, and environments. During the 2008–2009 crisis, many citizens in emerging European countries, such as Hungary, Latvia, and Romania, were bitter.25 Prior to 2008, these countries were infected with an irrational exuberance brought about by their integration with the EU. Many consumers in these countries thought they could afford to duplicate the rich living standards of the rest of Europe by excessive borrowing, which was often denominated in the euro even though the euro was not (and still is not) the legal currency in those countries. When emerging Europe collapsed in 2008, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) came to the rescue, but not without belt tightening, credit squeezing, and spending cuts. Not surprisingly, many citizens in emerging Europe further resented the IMF’s “rescue” policies that some have accused of exacerbating the downturn (see Chapter 7). Although small-scale acts of vandalizing McDonald’s restaurants are reported in a variety of countries, the December 1999 antiglobalization protests in Seattle and the September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington are undoubtedly the most visible and most extreme acts of antiglobalization forces at work. As a result, international travel was curtailed, and global trade and investment flows slowed in the early 2000s. In the middle of the 2000s, however, worldwide economic growth was again humming along. World GDP, cross-border trade, and per capita GDP all soared to historically high levels. Unfortunately, the party suddenly ended in 2008. Outlined in Table 1.4, the 2008–2009 global economic crisis was unlike anything the world had seen since the Great Depression (1929–1933). The year 2008 showed, for better or worse, how interconnected the global economy has become. Deteriorating housing markets in the United States, fueled by unsustainable subprime lending practices, led to massive government bailouts of financial services firms starting in September 2008. Initially most of the world probably shared the sentiment expressed by Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva that the crisis would be “Bush’s crisis” (referring to President George W. Bush) and would have nothing to do with “us.” Unfortunately, the crisis quickly spread around the world, forcing numerous governments to bail out their own troubled banks. Global output, trade, and investment plummeted, while unemployment skyrocketed.
TABLE 1.4
SYMPTOMS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS, 2008–2009
• The bursting of a real estate bubble • The liquidity and solvency problems for major banks • The refusal by consumers and companies to spend on consumption or investment • Plummeting global output, trade, and investment • Skyrocketing unemployment • Rapid contagion around the world due to the closely interconnected nature of the global economy
CHAPTER 1 Globalizing Business
19
After unprecedented intervention in developed economies where governments ended up being many banks’ largest shareholders, confidence is growing that the global economy has turned the corner and that the recession is ending. However, economic recovery is likely to be slow in developed economies, whereas emerging economies are likely to rebound faster. The recession reminds all firms and managers of the importance of risk management—the identification and assessment of risks and the preparation to minimize the impact of high-risk, unfortunate events.26 As a technique to prepare and plan for multiple scenarios (either high risk or low risk), scenario planning is now extensively used by firms around the world.27 As far as the direction of economic globalization is concerned, the recovery may see more protectionist measures, since the stimulus packages and job creation schemes of various governments emphasize “buy national” (such as “buy American”) and “hire locals.” In short, the pendulum is swinging back. Like the proverbial elephant, globalization is seen by everyone yet rarely comprehended. The sudden ferocity of the recent economic crisis surprised everybody—ranging from central bankers to academic experts. Remember all of us felt sorry when we read the story of a bunch of blind men trying to figure out the shape and form of the elephant. We really shouldn’t. Although we are not blind, our task is more challenging than the blind men who study a standing animal. Our beast—globalization—does not stand still and often rapidly moves, back and forth (!). Yet, we try to live with it, avoid being crushed by it, and even attempt to profit from it. Overall, seeing globalization as a pendulum provides perhaps the most balanced and realistic perspective.
Semiglobalization Despite the debate over the far-reaching impact of globalization, globalization is not complete. Most measures of market integration (such as trade and FDI) have recently scaled new heights but still fall far short of a single, globally integrated market. In other words, what we have may be labeled semiglobalization, which is more complex than extremes of total isolation and total globalization. Semiglobalization suggests that barriers to market integration at borders are high, but not high enough to completely insulate countries from each other.28 Semiglobalization calls for more than one way for doing business around the globe. Total isolation on a nation-state basis would suggest localization—a strategy of treating each country as a unique market. Total globalization, on the other hand, would lead to standardization—a strategy of treating the entire world as one market. But semiglobalization has no single right strategy, resulting in a wide variety of experimentations. Overall, (semi)globalization is neither to be opposed as a menace nor to be celebrated as a panacea; it is to be engaged.29
Risk management The identification and assessment of risks and the preparation to minimize the impact of high-risk, unfortunate events. Scenario planning A technique to prepare and plan for multiple scenarios (either high or low risk). Semiglobalization A perspective that suggests that barriers to market integration at borders are high, but not high enough to completely insulate countries from each other.
GLOBAL BUSINESS AND GLOBALIZATION AT A CROSSROADS Twenty-first-century business leaders are facing an enormous challenge. This book provides a basic guide to meeting that challenge. As a backdrop for the remainder of this book, this section makes two points. First, a basic understanding of the global economy is necessary. Second, it is important to critically examine your own personal views and biases regarding globalization.
5 State the size of the global economy and its broad trends and understand your likely bias in the globalization debate.
PART 1 Laying Foundations
A Glance at the Global Economy At present, the global economy is approximately $60 trillion (total global GDP calculated at official, nominal exchange rates). Although there is no need to memorize a lot of statistics, it is useful to remember this $60-trillion figure to keep things in perspective. A frequent observation in the globalization debate is the enormous size of MNEs.30 This can be illustrated by comparing the sales of some of the largest MNEs with the GDP of countries. The world’s largest MNE, ranked by sales, is Royal Dutch Shell headquartered in the Netherlands. If it were an independent country, it would be the 24th largest economy—its sales are smaller than Saudi Arabia’s GDP but larger than Norway’s. Exxon Mobil and Wal-Mart are the top two US firms, and also the top two and three global firms, respectively. Their respective sales equal the GDP of Austria and Iran, the 25th and 26th largest economies in the world measured by GDP. The sales of the largest Asia Pacific-based MNE, Sinopec of China, globally ranked number nine, are larger than the combined GDP of Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and New Zealand, all of which are sizeable Asia Pacific economies. Today, approximately 82,000 MNEs control an estimated 810,000 subsidiaries overseas.31 Figure 1.4 and Table 1.5 track the changes in the makeup of the 500 largest MNEs between 1990 and 2008. Broadly speaking, a country’s economic strength is reflected by its number of firms on the Fortune Global 500 list. In general,
GURE 1.4 FORTUNE GLOBAL 500 (1990–2008) 500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Others
Australia
Switzerland
Canada
European Union
Brazil
China
South Korea
Japan
United States
Sources: Based on data from various issues of Fortune Global 500.
CHAPTER 1 Globalizing Business
TABLE 1.5
21
CHANGES IN THE FORTUNE GLOBAL 500 (1990–2008)
Country/bloc
1990
1995
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
United States European Union Japan Canada South Korea Switzerland China Australia Brazil Others Total
164
153
185
178
192
189
176
170
162
153
140
129
148
136
139
150
147
161
165
165
170
163
111 12 11 11 0 9 3 50 500
141 6 12 16 2 4 4 14 500
95 13 8 10 10 7 3 33 500
88 5 12 9 10 6 4 49 500
88 14 13 11 11 6 4 11 500
100 12 9 12 14 7 3 7 500
81 13 11 11 16 9 3 19 500
70 14 12 12 20 8 4 25 500
67 16 14 13 24 8 5 26 500
64 14 15 14 29 8 5 28 500
68 14 14 15 37 9 6 34 500
Sources: Based on data from various issues of Fortune Global 500.
approximately 80% of the 500 largest MNEs come from the Triad. However, in 2008, thanks to the recession that originated from the Triad (in particular, from the United States), Triad-based MNEs only represented 74% of Fortune Global 500. Since 1990, the United States has contributed about one-third of these firms. In 2008, only 140 US MNEs made the Fortune Global 500, the lowest number for the United States since 1990. The EU has maintained a reasonably steady increase. With only 68 firms showing up on the Fortune Global 500 list in 2008, Japan has experienced the most dramatic variation (roughly corresponding to its economic boom and bust with several years of delay). Among MNEs from emerging economies, those from South Korea and Brazil have largely maintained their presence in the Fortune Global 500. MNEs from China have come on strong—from zero in 1990 to 37 in 2008. Beijing is now headquarters to 26 Fortune Global 500 firms, eight more than New York. In some industries, these MNEs, often regarded as “Third World multinationals” or “dragon multinationals,” have joined the top ranks.32 Clearly, Western rivals cannot afford to ignore them, and students reading this book need to pay attention to these emerging multinationals.
The Globalization Debate and You At the dawn of the 21st century, the seemingly one-directional march of globalization started to show its true color as a pendulum, which has direct ramifications for you as a future business leader, a consumer, and a citizen. Because the globalization debate directly affects your future, it is imperative that you participate in the debate instead of letting other people make decisions on globalization that will significantly affect your career, your consumption, and your country.33 It is important to know your own biases when joining the debate. By the very act of taking an IB course and reading this book, you probably already have some pro-globalization biases compared to nonbusiness majors elsewhere on campus and the general public in your country. You are not alone. In the last several decades, most executives, policymakers, and scholars in both developed and emerging economies, who are generally held to be the elite in these societies, are biased toward acknowledging the benefits of globalization.34 Although it is
PART 1 Laying Foundations
hy do protestors object globalization?
ngovernmental organizans (NGOs) ganizations that are not iated with governments.
BLE 1.6
long known that globalization carries both benefits and costs, many of the elite have failed to take into sufficient account the social, political, and environmental costs associated with globalization. However, that these elites share certain perspectives on globalization does not mean that most other members of the society share the same views. Unfortunately, many of the elite fail to understand the limits of their beliefs and mistakenly assume that the rest of the world thinks like them. To the extent that powerful economic and political institutions are largely controlled by the elite in almost every country, it is not surprising that some antiglobalization groups, feeling powerless, end up resorting to unconventional tactics (such as mass protests) to make their point. Many opponents of globalization are nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as environmentalists, human rights activists, and consumer groups. Ignoring them will be a grave failure when doing business around the globe.35 Instead of viewing NGOs as opponents, many firms view them as partners. NGOs do raise a valid point when they insist that firms, especially MNEs, should have a broader concern for the various stakeholders affected by the MNEs’ actions around the world.36 At present, this view is increasingly moving from the peripheral to the mainstream. It is certainly interesting and perhaps alarming to note that current business school students already exhibit values and beliefs in favor of globalization, which are similar to those held by executives, policymakers, and scholars, and are different from those held by the general public. Shown in Table 1.6, relative to the general public, US business students have significantly more positive (almost one-sided) views toward globalization than the general public. Although these data are based on US business students, my teaching and lectures around the world suggest that most business students—regardless of their nationality—seem to share such positive views on globalization. This is not surprising. Both self-selection to study business and socialization within the curriculum, in which free trade is widely regarded as positive, may lead to certain attitudes in favor of globalization. Consequently, business students may focus more on the economic gains of globalization and be less concerned with its darker sides. Current and would-be business leaders need to be aware of their own bias embodied in such one-sided views toward globalization. Since business schools aspire to train future business leaders by indoctrinating students with the dominant values managers should hold, these results suggest that business schools may have largely succeeded in this mission. However, to the extent that current
VIEWS ON GLOBALIZATION: AMERICAN GENERAL PUBLIC VERSUS BUSINESS STUDENTS
Percentage answering “good” for the question: Overall, do you think globalization is good or bad for • US consumers like you • US companies • The US economy • Strengthening poor countries’ economies
General public1 (N ⫽ 1,024) 68% 63% 64% 75%
Business students2 (N ⫽ 494) 96% 77% 88% 82%
rces: Based on (1) A. Bernstein, 2000, Backlash against globalization, BusinessWeek, April 24: 43; (2) M. W. Peng & H. Shin, 2008, How do future business ers view globalization? (p. 179), Thunderbird International Business Review, 50(3): 175–182. All differences are statistically significant.
CHAPTER 1 Globalizing Business
managers (and professors) have strategic blind spots, these findings are potentially alarming. They reveal that business students already share these blind spots. Despite possible self-selection in choosing to major in business, there is no denying that student values are shaped, at least in part, by the educational experience business schools provide. Knowing such limitations, business school professors and students need to work especially hard to break out of this mental straitjacket. In order to combat the widespread tendency to have one-sided, rosy views, a significant portion of this book is devoted to the numerous debates that surround globalization. Beyond this chapter, which illustrates a big debate in itself, debates are systematically introduced in every chapter to provoke more critical thinking and discussion. Our field has no shortage of debates. No doubt, debates drive practice and research forward. Therefore, it is imperative that students be exposed to cutting-edge debates and encouraged to form their own views when engaging in these debates.37 In addition, ethics is emphasized throughout the book. A featured Ethical Dilemma and a series of Critical Discussion Questions on ethics can be found in every chapter. In addition, two whole chapters are devoted to ethics, norms, and cultures (Chapter 3) and corporate social responsibility (Chapter 17).
ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK This book has four parts. Part 1 is foundations. Following this chapter, Chapters 2, 3, and 4 deal with the two leading perspectives—institution-based and resourcebased views. Part 2 covers tools, focusing on trade (Chapter 5), foreign investment (Chapter 6), foreign exchange (Chapter 7), and global and regional integration (Chapter 8). Part 3 sheds light on strategy. We start with the internationalization of small, entrepreneurial firms (Chapter 9), followed by ways to enter foreign markets (Chapter 10), to manage competitive dynamics (Chapter 11), to make alliances and acquisitions work (Chapter 12), and to strategize, structure, and learn (Chapter 13). Finally, Part 4 builds excellence in different functional areas: marketing and supply chain (Chapter 14), human resource management (Chapter 15), finance and corporate governance (Chapter 16), and corporate social responsibility (Chapter 17).
CH A P T ER SUM M A RY 1. Explain the concepts of international business and global business. • IB is typically defined as (1) a business (firm) that engages in international (cross-border) economic activities and (2) the action of doing business abroad. • Global business is defined in this book as business around the globe. • This book has gone beyond competition in developed economies by devoting extensive space to competitive battles waged in emerging economies and the base of the global economic pyramid. 2. Give three reasons why it is important to study global business. • Enhance your employability and advance your career in the global economy by equipping yourself with global business knowledge. • Better preparation for possible expatriate assignments abroad. • Stronger competence in interacting with foreign suppliers, partners, and competitors and in working for foreign-owned employers in your own country.
23
PART 1 Laying Foundations
3. Articulate one fundamental question and two core perspectives in the study of global business. • Our most fundamental question is: What determines the success and failure of firms around the globe? • The two core perspectives are (1) the institution-based view and (2) the resource-based view. • We develop a unified framework by organizing materials in every chapter according to the two perspectives guided by the fundamental question. 4. Identify three ways of understanding globalization. • Some view globalization as a recent phenomenon, and others believe that it is a one-directional evolution since the dawn of human history. • We suggest that globalization is best viewed as a process similar to the swing of a pendulum. 5. State the size of the global economy and its broad trends and understand your likely bias in the globalization debate. • MNEs, especially large ones from developed economies, are sizeable economic entities in a global economy of $60 trillion (global GDP). • Current and would-be business leaders need to be aware of their own hidden pro-globalization bias.
K E Y T ERM S Base of the pyramid 10 BRIC 8 Emerging economies 7 Emerging markets 7 Expatriate manager (expat) 12 Foreign direct investment (FDI) 5 Global business 6 Globalization 16 Gross domestic product (GDP) 7
Gross national income (GNI) 8 Gross national product (GNP) 8 Group of 20 (G-20) 12 International business (IB) 5 International premium 12 Liability of foreignness 15 Multinational enterprise (MNE) 5
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 22 Purchasing power parity (PPP) 8 Risk management 19 Scenario planning 19 Semiglobalization 19 Triad 10
RE V IE W QUES T IO N S 1. What is the traditional definition of IB? How is global business defined in this book? 2. Discuss the importance of emerging economies in the global economy. Use current news. 3. What is your interest in studying global business? How do you think it may apply to your future? 4. If you were to work as an expatriate manager, where would you like to go and
CHAPTER 1 Globalizing Business
5. How would you describe an institution-based view of global business? 6. How would you describe a resource-based view of global business? 7. After comparing the three views of globalization, which seems the most sensible to you and why? 8. What is semiglobalization and what factors contribute to it? 9. Why do some people protest against globalization? Do they make any point(s) that all people, whether for or against globalization, should consider? 10. You may view yourself as objective and neutral regarding globalization, but do you sense any bias that you may have one way or the other? What bias most likely exists on the part of other students taking this course? 11. Look at PengAtlas Maps 2.1 and 2.2. Compare the global position of the United States in merchandise trade versus service trade. Imagine that you were asked to give reasons why you think it is good from the US perspective that it is the world’s largest importer in both merchandise and services. What reasons would you mention? 12. Some readers may be studying this book in one or more of the emerging economies shown on PengAtlas Map 1.2. Others may be descended from immigrants from these countries. If this is the case with you, pick one of the countries and do some research into current changes in that country. Indicate the reasons why you think that over the long run there may be a shift from an emerging status to a developed status.
CRITIC A L DIS CUS S IO N QUES TIONS 1. A classmate says: “Global business is relevant for top executives such as CEOs in large companies. I am just a lowly student who will struggle to gain an entry-level job, probably in a small domestic company. Why should I care about it?” How do you convince your classmate that global business is something to care about? 2. Thomas Friedman in his book The World is Flat (2005) suggests that the world is flattening—meaning it is increasingly interconnected by new technology such as the Internet. This can raise the poor from poverty, nurture a worldwide middle class, and even spread democracy. On the other hand, this presents significant challenges for developed economies, whose employees may feel threatened by competition from low-cost countries. How does this flattening world affect you? 3. ON ETHICS: What are some of the darker sides (in other words, costs) associated with globalization? How can business leaders make sure that the benefits of their various actions (such as outsourcing) outweigh their drawbacks (such as job losses in developed economies)?
25
PART 1 Laying Foundations
4. ON ETHICS: Some argue that aggressively investing in emerging economies is not only economically beneficial but also highly ethical, because it may potentially lift many people out of poverty (see the Closing Case). However, others caution that in the absence of reasonable hopes of decent profits, rushing to emerging economies is reckless. How would you participate in this debate?
GLOBA L AC T ION 1. Chemical companies are among the largest firms worldwide. Two approaches to evaluating operations of chemical companies are by capital spending and research and development (R&D) spending. Through the globalEDGE website, access a resource that provides this information about top global chemical producers. Then compare the top five capital-spending and R&D-spending chemical companies. Are any companies found on both lists? What insights does this information provide? 2. An important aspect of globalization is the fundamental stability of the global economic order currently in place. Thus, FDI intentions can be influenced by the perceived sustainability of the global economic order. Using the globalEDGE website, identify the three most important issues related to global economic stability over the next 20 years. Be sure to discuss the sample surveyed to provide the appropriate frame of reference for discussion.
V IDEO C A SES Watch “Integrating Global Business at a Local Level” by E. Neville Isdell of the Coca-Cola Company. 1. What is meant by the title of the video “Integrating Global Business at a Local Level”? What is being “integrated”? 2. In referring to past practices of global firms, Isdell referred to simply “parachuting in.” What did he mean by that and how does it relate to his concern about economic nationalism? 3. How must global firms in the future be different regarding identifying with society as a whole? 4. How does a franchise system with its use of local entrepreneurs contribute to the integration desired by Isdell? 5. Isdell warned against simply extracting and not putting something back. What challenge did Coca-Cola have in that regard? Think of an example of another firm or industry that may heed Isdell’s warning and explain the reason for your selection.
CHAPTER 1 Globalizing Business
Closing Case GE Innovates from the Base of the Pyramid facilities. Patients thus have to travel to urban hospitals to access ultrasound. However, transportation to urban hospitals, especially for the sick, is challenging. Since most Chinese patients could not come to the ultrasound machines, the machines need to go to the patients. Scaling down its existing bulky, expensive, and complex ultrasound machines was not going to serve that demand. GE realized that it needed a revolutionary product— a compact, portable ultrasound machine. In 2002, GE in China launched its first compact ultrasound, which combined a regular laptop computer with sophisticated software. The machine sold for only $30,000. In 2008, GE introduced a new model that sold for $15,000, less than 15% of the price tag of its high-end conventional ultrasound models. While portable ultrasounds have naturally become a hit in China, especially in rural clinics, they have also generated dramatic growth throughout the world, including developed economies. These machines combine a new dimension previously unavailable to ultrasound machines—portability—with an unbeatable price in developed economies where containing health care cost is increasingly paramount. Before the global recession, portable ultrasounds by 2008 were a $278 million global product line for GE, growing at 50% to 60% annually. Even in the midst of a severe global recession, this product line is expected to grow 25% annually in China. GE’s experience in developing portable ultrasound machines in China is not alone. For rural India, it has pioneered a $1,000 handheld electrocardiogram (ECG) device that brings down the cost by a margin of 60% to 80%. In the Czech Republic, GE developed an aircraft engine for small planes that slashes its cost by half. This allows GE to challenge © Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images
Although the 130-yearold General Electric (GE) is usually regarded as a model of management excellence, the recent recession has been brutal. An Economist article in March 2009 on GE used the following unflattering title: “Losing Its Magic Touch”—for a good reason. Since 2008, GE has slashed its dividends by twothirds, lost a prized AAA credit rating, and seen $269 billion wiped off its stock market value due to concerns about the quality of some loans made by its financial services unit, GE Capital. One glimmer of hope out of GE’s recent mess is a new initiative called “reverse innovation,” which has attracted GE chairman and CEO Jeff Immelt’s personal attention. MNEs such as GE historically innovate new products in developed economies, and then localize these products by tweaking them for customers in emerging economies. Unfortunately, a lot of these expensive products, with well-off customers in developed economies in mind, flop in emerging economies not only because of their price tag, but also because of their lack of consideration for the specific needs and wants of local customers. Being the exact opposite, reverse innovation turns innovative products created for emerging economies into low-cost offerings for developed economies. Take a look at GE’s conventional ultrasound machines, originally developed in the United States and Japan and sold for $100,000 and up (up to $350,000). In China, these expensive, bulky devices sold poorly because not every sophisticated, urban hospital-based imaging center could afford to have them. GE’s team in China realized that more than 80% of China’s population relies on rural hospitals or clinics that are poorly funded. Conventional ultrasound machines are simply out of reach for these
27
PART 1 Laying Foundations
TABLE 1.7
GE’S MENTAL MAP OF THE WORLD 2000
2010
• United States
• People-rich regions, such as China and India
• Europe
• Resource-rich regions, such as the Middle East, Australia, Brazil, Canada, and Russia
• Japan • Rest of the world
• Rest of the world, such as the United States, Europe, and Japan
Source: Extracted from text in J. Immelt, V. Govindarajan, & C. Trimble, 2009, How GE is disrupting itself (p. 59), Harvard Business Review, October: 56–65. Jeff Immelt is chairman and CEO of GE.
Pratt & Whitney’s dominance of the small turboprop market in developed economies. Such outstanding performance in and out of emerging economies, in combination with GE’s dismal recent experience in developed economies, has rapidly transformed GE’s mental map of the world (see Table 1.7). Ten years ago, it focused on the Triad and paid relatively minor attention to the “rest of the world.” Now strategic attention is on emerging economies and other resource-rich regions, and the Triad becomes the “rest of the world.” In an October 2009 Harvard Business Review article, Immelt wrote:
Siemens, Philips, and Rolls-Royce. But it knows how to compete with them; they will never destroy GE. By introducing products that create a new price-performance paradigm, however, the emerging giants very well could. Reverse innovation isn’t optional; it is oxygen.
Case Discussion Questions: 1. What are the similarities and differences between GE’s traditional innovation and reverse innovation? 2. Why is GE so interested in reverse innovation? 3. What are the main concerns that prevent Western MNEs from aggressively investing in emerging economies? What are the costs if they choose not to focus on emerging economies? 4. Why is a leading US MNE such as GE afraid of emerging multinationals from emerging economies?
To be honest, the company is also embracing reverse innovation for defensive reasons. If GE doesn’t come up with innovations in poor countries and take them global, new competitors from the developing world—like Mindray, Suzlon, Goldwind, and Haier—will . . . GE has tremendous respect for traditional rivals like
Sources: Based on (1) BusinessWeek, 2009, The joys and perils of “reverse innovation,” October 5: 12; (2) Economist, 2009, GE: Losing its magic touch, March 21: 73–75; (3) GE Report, 2009, www.gereports.com; (4) J. Immelt, V. Govindarajan, & C. Trimble, 2009, How GE is disrupting itself, Harvard Business Review, October: 56–65.
N OT ES
urnal acronyms] AMP—Academy of Management Perspectives; R—Academy of Management Review; APJM—Asia Pacific Jourof Management; BW—BusinessWeek; HBR—Harvard Business iew; JIBS—Journal of International Business Studies; JIM— nal of International Management; JM—Journal of Management; S—Journal of Management Studies; JWB—Journal of World ness; MIR—Management International Review; SMJ—Strategic nagement Journal
his definition of the MNE can be found in R. Caves, 1996,
New York: Cambridge University Press; J. Dunning, 1993, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy (p. 30), Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Other terms are multinational corporation (MNC) and transnational corporation (TNC), which are often used interchangeably with MNE. To avoid confusion, in this book, we will use MNE. 2
O. Shenkar, 2004, One more time: International business in a global economy (p. 165), JIBS, 35: 161–171.
3
C. Pitellis, 2009, IB at 50, AIB Insights, 9 (1): 2–8.
CHAPTER 1 Globalizing Business
5
T. Hasfi & M. Farashahi, 2005, Applicability of management theories to developing countries, MIR, 45: 483–513; R. Ramamurti, 2004, Developing countries and MNEs, JIBS, 35: 277–283; M. Wright, I. Filatotchev, R. Hoskisson, & M. W. Peng, 2005, Strategy research in emerging economies, JMS, 42: 1–33. 6
M. W. Peng, R. Bhagat, & S. Chang, 2010, Asia and global business, JIBS (in press).
7
29
414–425; I. Mahmood & C. Rufin, 2005, Government’s dilemma, AMR, 30: 338–360; P. Ring, G. Bigley, T. D’Aunno, & T. Khanna, 2005, Perspectives on how governments matter, AMR, 30: 308–320. 18
M. W. Peng, 2001, The resource-based view and international business, JM, 27: 803–829.
19
B. Elango, 2009, Minimizing effects of liability of foreignness, JWB, 44: 51–62.
A. Bhattacharya & D. Michael, 2008, How local companies keep multinationals at bay, HBR, March: 85–95; A. Cuervo-Cazurra, 2007, Sequence of value-added activities in the multinationalization of developing country firms, JIM, 13: 258–277; I. Filatotchev, R. Strange, J. Piesse, & Y. Lien, 2007, FDI by firms from newly industrialized economies in emerging markets, JIBS, 38: 556–572; M. Garg & A. Delios, 2007, Survival of the foreign subsidiaries of TMNCs, JIM, 13: 278–295; S. Klein & A. Worcke, 2007, Emerging global contenders, JIM, 13: 319–337; N. Kumar, 2009, How emerging giants are rewriting the rules of M&A, HBR, May: 115–121; J. Lee & J. Slater, 2007, Dynamic capabilities, entrepreneurial rent-seeking, and the investment development path, JIM, 13: 241–257; P. Li, 2007, Toward an integrated theory of multinational evolution, JIM, 13: 296–318; Y. Luo & R. Tung, 2007, International expansion of emerging market enterprises, JIBS, 38: 481–498; D. Yiu, C. Lau, & G. Bruton, 2007, International venturing by emerging economy firms, JIBS, 38: 519–540.
20 A. Giddens, 1999, Runaway World, London: Profile; S. Strange, 1996, The Retreat of the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8
27
G. Gao, J. Murray, M. Kotabe, & J. Lu, 2010, A “strategy tripod” perspective on export behaviors, JIBS (in press); S. Gubbi, P. Aulakh, S. Ray, M. Sarkar, & R. Chittoor, 2010, Do international acquisitions by emerging-economy firms create shareholder value? JIBS (in press).
9
T. London, 2009, Making better investments at the base of the pyramid, HBR, May: 106–113; T. London & S. Hart, 2004, Reinventing strategies for emerging markets, JIBS, 35: 350–370; C. K. Prahalad, 2005, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, Philadelphia: Wharton School Publishing.
10 A. Yan, G. Zhu, & D. Hall, 2002, International assignments for career building, AMR, 27: 373–391. 11
W. Newburry, 2001, MNC interdependence and local embeddedness influences on perceptions of career benefits from global integration, JIBS, 32: 497–508. 12
BW, 2007, The changing talent game (p. 68), August 20: 68–71.
21
K. Moore & D. Lewis, 1999, Birth of the Multinational, Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press.
22
D. Yergin & J. Stanislaw, 2002, The Commanding Heights (p. 385), New York: Simon & Schuster.
23
J. Stiglitz, 2002, Globalization and Its Discontents (p. 9), New York: Norton.
24
United Nations, 2000, World Investment Report 2000, New York and Geneva: United Nations.
25
S. Leong et al., 2008, Understanding consumer animosity in an international crisis, JIBS, 39: 996–1009.
26
L. Purda, 2008, Risk perception and the financial system, JIBS, 39: 1178–1196; N. Taleb, D. Goldstein, & M. Spitznagel, 2009, The six mistakes executives make in risk management, HBR, October: 78–81.
S. Lee & M. Makhija, 2009, Flexibility in internationalization, SMJ, 30: 537–555.
28
P. Ghemawat, 2003, Semiglobalization and international business strategy, JIBS, 34: 138–152.
29
M. Guillen, 2001, The Limits of Convergence (p. 232), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
30
All data described in this section refer to 2008. GDP data are from the World Bank, and Global 500 data are from Fortune.
31
United Nations, 2009, World Investment Report 2009 (p. xxi), New York and Geneva: UN.
32
J. Mathews, 2006, Dragon multinationals as new features of globalization in the 21st century, APJM, 23: 5–27; R. Ramamurti & J. Singh (eds.), 2009, Emerging Multinationals from Emerging Markets, New York: Cambridge University Press. See also P. Aulakh, 2007, Emerging multinationals from developing economies, JIM, 13: 235–240.
13
M. W. Peng, 2004, Identifying the big question in international business research, JIBS, 35: 99–108.
33
14
K. Meyer, S. Estrin, S. Bhaumik, & M. W. Peng, 2009, Institutions, resources, and entry strategies in emerging economies, SMJ, 30: 61–80.
34
15
35
M. W. Peng, S. L. Sun, B. Pinkham, & H. Chen, 2009, The institution-based view as a third leg for a strategy tripod, AMP, 23: 63–81; M. W. Peng, D. Wang, & Y. Jiang, 2008, An institutionbased view of international business strategy: A focus on emerging economies, JIBS, 39: 920–936. 16 S. Lee, M. W. Peng, & J. Barney, 2007, Bankruptcy laws and entrepreneurship development, AMR, 32: 257–272. 17
B. Kim & J. Prescott, 2005, Deregulatory forms, variations in the speed of governance adaptation, and firm performance, AMR, 30:
T. Friedman, 2005, The World is Flat, New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux. A. Bird & M. Stevens, 2003, Toward an emergent global culture and the effects of globalization on obsolescing national cultures, JIM, 9: 395–407. H. Teegen, J. Doh, & S. Vachani, 2004, The importance of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in global governance and value creation, JIBS, 35: 463–483.
36
A. Peredo & J. Chrisman, 2006, Toward a theory of communitybased enterprise, AMR, 31: 309–328; C. Robertson & W. Crittenden, 2003, Mapping moral philosophies, SMJ, 24: 385–392.
37
B. Kedia & A. Mukherji, 1999, Global managers, JWB, 34: 230–251; D. Ricks, 2003, Globalization and the role of the global corporation, JIM, 9: 355–359.
Chapter
2
LEARNING OBJECTIVES
After studying this chapter, you should be able to: 1. identify two types of institutions—formal and informal. 2. explain how institutions reduce uncertainty. 3. identify the two core propositions underpinning an institution-based view of global business. 4. understand the differences between democracy and totalitarianism. 5. list the differences among civil law, common law, and theocratic law. 6. articulate the importance of property rights and intellectual property rights.
8. participate in two leading debates on politics, laws, and economics.
Photo/Landov
7. outline the differences among market economy, command economy, and mixed economy.
Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics O
P
E
N
I
N
Adam Smith versus Deng Xiaoping Adam Smith would probably turn in his grave if he heard that in 2008, the fundamental principle of his theory first published in The Wealth of Nations in 1776, laissez faire (the idea that governments should be hands-off when managing the economy), would be severely challenged. The challenge came neither from the remaining practitioners of socialism such as Cuba, nor from countries traditionally strong on government intervention such as Russia. Instead, these challenges came from the United States and United Kingdom—the two countries so deeply in love with Adam Smith that they had often preached “free market principles” around the world until recently. To be sure, the times were tough: Financial markets were melting down, banks were failing left and right, and consumer and investor confidence were reaching all-time lows since the Great Depression. However, the solutions turned the unthinkable into a new orthodoxy. Labeled “radical intervention” or even “financial socialism,” the solutions centered on nationalization of failing banks and financial
G
C
A
S
E
services firms. Yet, for over three decades (since the 1980s), privatization—the complete opposite of nationalization—was largely in the air. On October 3, 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, commonly known as the $700-billion bank bailout plan or the Paulson plan (named after then US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson in the George W. Bush administration), was passed and signed into law. The congressional debate prior to its passage was ferocious because critics argued that this would clearly violate the enshrined free market principle of nonintervention. On October 15, Paulson announced the first step of implementation, by injecting $125 billion into nine banks: Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo each obtained $25 billion; Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley $10 billion each; and Bank of New York and State Street between $2 billion and $3 billion each. In return, the US government, having turned these banks into (partially) state-owned enterprises (SOEs), would take nonvoting preference shares paying 5% interest. This action was so at odds
PART 1 Laying Foundations
h the free market tradition in the United States t its principal architect Paulson admitted that it was jectionable.” In Paulson’s own words at a press nference:
Government owning a stake in any private US company is objectionable to most Americans, me ncluded. Yet the alternative of leaving businesses and consumers without access to financing is otally unacceptable.
Similarly, on October 8, 2008, the UK government nounced a £400 billion ($692 billion) rescue package nject cash into UK banks. The justification was that he government had not acted, UK banks faced the l risk of collapse. So used to being lectured by the ish about “free markets,” other EU governments re reluctant to believe this initially. But they quickly owed UK actions by bailing out their own troubled nks. By the end of 2008, governments in most deoped economies became the largest shareholders heir financial industries, reversing three decades of egulation and privatization. Although these are certainly extreme measures for reme times, their long-term significance in terms of nging economic ideology has been noted by numers experts. No doubt, these actions will be recorded as mportant turning point in economic history, triggering ndamental rethink regarding the merits of private ownhip and state ownership. The once-cherished assumpns about the superiority of the US economic model, ntered on more market forces and less government
titutions mal and informal rules of game.
titutional transitions damental and comprehene changes introduced to the mal and informal rules of game that affect firms as yers.
titution-based view ading perspective in global iness that suggests that success and failure of firms enabled and constrained by itutions.
intervention, are now in doubt. Recently, French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that such “laissez faire capitalism is over.” The irony was that he had been elected in 2007 on a campaign platform promising to practice more “Anglo-Saxon capitalism” in France. “Forget Adam Smith. Whatever Works.” This is the title of a BusinessWeek article in October 2008. On October 11, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Richard Fisher gave a speech at the Group of Seven (G-7) finance ministers meeting in Washington, and borrowed a line from the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping: “Regardless of whether it is a white cat or a black cat, as long as it can catch mice, it is a good cat.” Of course, Deng in the early 1980s popularized his pragmatic “cat theory” in an effort to transform China from a command economy to a market economy. Interestingly, nearly three decades later, the “cat theory” was being invoked in a totally opposite direction. The upshot is that to the same extent that a pure command economy does not exist, a pure free market economy does not exist either. No doubt the post-bailout United States and United Kingdom can still be labeled “market economies,” but it is prudent to drop the “F” word. In other words, let us drop the “free” from the term “free market economies.” Sources: Based on (1) BusinessWeek, 2008, Forget Adam Smith. Whatever works. October 27: 22–24; (2) Economist, 2009, Business in America, May 30-June 5: special report; (3) Economist, 2008, Is Sarkozy a closet socialist? November 15: 61–62; (4) Financial Times, 2008, US injection lifts confidence, October 15: 1; (5) Financial Times, 2008, Whatever it took, October 15: 11; (6) R. Reich, 2009, Government in your business, Harvard Business Review, July–August: 94–99.
What are the benefits and costs of free markets and private ownership? What are the pros and cons of government intervention and state ownership? What are the political ideologies behind such ownership arrangements? Why are the stakes so high behind these decisions? As the Opening Case illustrates, these decisions are affected by institutions, commonly known as the “rules of the game.” As economic players, firms play by these rules. However, institutions are not static and they may change, resulting in institutional transitions—”fundamental and comprehensive changes introduced to the formal and informal rules of the game that affect firms as players.”1 Overall, the success and failure of firms around the globe are to a large extent determined by firms’ ability to understand and take advantage of the different rules of the game. In other words, how firms play the game and win (or lose), at least in part, depends on how the rules are made, enforced, and changed. This calls for firms to constantly monitor, decode, and adapt to the changing rules of the game in order to survive and prosper. As a result, such an institution-based view has emerged as a leading perspective in global business.2 This chapter first
CHAPTER 2
Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics
33
introduces the institution-based view. Then, we focus on formal institutions (such as political systems, legal systems, and economic systems). Informal institutions (such as cultures, ethics, and norms) will be discussed in Chapter 3.
UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONS Building on the “rules of the game” metaphor, Douglass North, a Nobel laureate in economics, more formally defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction.”3 An institutional framework is made up of both the formal and informal institutions governing individual and firm behavior. Richard Scott, a leading sociologist, identifies three pillars that support these institutions: regulatory, normative, and cognitive pillars.4 Formal institutions include laws, regulations, and rules, as shown in Table 2.1. In global business, formal institutions may be imposed by home countries and host countries. Their primary supportive pillar, the regulatory pillar, is the coercive power of governments. For example, although many individuals may pay taxes out of a sense of patriotic duty, many others pay taxes out of fear—if they did not pay and got caught, they would go to jail. In other words, it is the coercive power of governments’ tax laws that forms the regulatory pillar to compel many individuals to pay taxes. On the other hand, informal institutions include norms, cultures, and ethics. Informal institutions are supported by two pillars: normative and cognitive. The normative pillar refers to how the values, beliefs, and actions of the relevant players—collectively known as norms—influence the behavior of focal individuals and firms. For example, a recent norm is the rush to invest in China and India. This norm prompted many Western firms to imitate each other without a clear understanding of how to make such moves work.5 Cautious managers who resist such herding are often confronted by board members, investors, and reporters with the question: “Why don’t you invest in China and India?” In other words, “Why don’t you follow the norm?” The cognitive pillar is the second support for informal institutions. It refers to the internalized (or taken-for-granted) values and beliefs that guide individual and firm behavior. For example, a few whistleblowers reported Enron’s wrongdoing out of a belief in what was right and wrong. Although many Enron employees might not feel comfortable with organizational wrongdoing that they were aware of, the social norm in the firm was to not rock the boat. Essentially, whistleblowers chose to follow their internalized personal beliefs on what was right by overcoming the social norms that encouraged silence. How do these three forms of supportive pillars combine to shape individual and firm behavior? Let us use two examples—one at the individual level and another at
TABLE 2.1
DIMENSIONS OF INSTITUTIONS
Degree of formality Formal institutions
Informal institutions
Examples
Supportive pillars
• Laws • Regulations • Rules
• Regulatory (coercive)
• Norms • Cultures • Ethics
• Normative • Cognitive
1 Identify two types of institutions— formal and informal.
Institutional framework Formal and informal institutions governing individual and firm behavior. Formal institutions Institutions represented by laws, regulations, and rules. Regulatory pillar The coercive power of governments. Normative pillar The mechanism through which norms influence individual and firm behavior. Cognitive pillar The internalized (or taken-forgranted) values and beliefs that guide individual and firm behavior.
PART 1 Laying Foundations
the firm level. First, speed limits formally define how fast drivers can go. However, many drivers adjust their speed in relation to the speed of other vehicles—a form of the normative pillar. When police ticket some motorists for driving at speeds above the legal limit, they protest: “We are barely keeping up with traffic!” This statement indicates that the drivers do not have a clear cognitive pillar regarding what is the right speed. Never mind the posted speed limit signs, they have followed the norm and let other drivers define what is the right speed. Second, in 2008, while Wall Street had to be bailed out by trillions of taxpayer dollars, Wall Street executives paid themselves $18 billion in bonuses. The resulting public outcry was understandable. However, by paying themselves so handsomely, these executives did not commit any crime or engage in any wrongdoing. Therefore, the regulatory pillar had little teeth. Rather, this is a case of major clashes between the normative pillar and cognitive pillar held by these executives. In the minds of these executives, supported by their own cognitive pillar, they deserved such bonuses. What they failed to read was the normative pressure coming from an angry public.
WHAT DO INSTITUTIONS DO? 2
lain how institutions reduce ertainty.
nsaction costs costs associated with nomic transactions or, more adly, the costs of doing iness.
portunism act of seeking self-interest h guile.
Although institutions do many things, their key role is to reduce uncertainty. Specifically, institutions influence the decision-making process of both individuals and firms by signaling what conduct is legitimate and acceptable and what is not. Basically, institutions constrain the range of acceptable actions. Why is it so important to reduce uncertainty? Because uncertainty can be potentially devastating.6 Political uncertainty such as a coup may render long-range planning obsolete. Economic uncertainty such as failure to carry out transactions as spelled out in contracts may result in economic losses. An extreme case of economic uncertainty is the 2008–2009 recession, during which consumption by individuals and investment by firms around the world plummeted. Uncertain about how long the recession would last, even consumers with jobs and firms with profits felt compelled to preserve cash, collectively driving global economic growth to a new record low. Uncertainty surrounding economic transactions can lead to transaction costs, which are the costs associated with economic transactions or, more broadly, the costs of doing business. A leading theorist and winner of the 2009 Nobel Prize in economics, Oliver Williamson, makes the comparison to frictions in mechanical systems: “Do the gears mesh, are the parts lubricated, is there needless slippage or other loss of energy?” He goes on to suggest that transaction costs can be viewed as “the economic counterpart of frictions: Do the parties to exchange operate harmoniously, or are there frequent misunderstandings and conflicts?”7 An important source of transaction costs is opportunism, defined as selfinterest seeking with guile. Examples include misleading, cheating, and confusing other parties in transactions that will increase transaction costs. Attempting to reduce such transaction costs, institutional frameworks increase certainty by spelling out the rules of the game so that violations (such as failure to fulfill a contract) can be mitigated with relative ease (such as through formal arbitration and courts). Without stable institutional frameworks, transaction costs may become prohibitively high, to the extent that certain transactions simply would not take place. For example, in the absence of credible institutional frameworks that protect investors, domestic investors may choose to put their money abroad. Although Africa is starving for capital, rich people in Africa put a striking 39% of their assets outside of Africa.8 Similarly, rich Russians often prefer to purchase a soccer club in London or a seaside villa in Cyprus, rather than investing in Russia.
CHAPTER 2 Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics
Institutions are not static. Institutional transitions are widespread in the world (see the Opening Case). Institutional transitions in some emerging economies, particularly those moving from central planning to market competition (such as China, Poland, Russia, and Vietnam), are so pervasive that these countries are simply called “transition economies” (a subset of “emerging economies”). Institutional transitions in these countries as well as in India and South Africa (see the Closing Case) create both huge challenges and tremendous opportunities for domestic and international firms. For example, IKEA, a leading Swedish furniture retailer, aggressively entered Russia beginning in 2000. Over the next decade, IKEA invested $4 billion, and Russian yuppies became known as the “IKEA Generation.” However, even as one of the largest foreign investors in Russia, IKEA has been frustrated by the difficulties, especially those associated with corruption at the local level. In 2009, it put on hold all new investment in Russia (see In Focus 2.1). Having outlined the definitions of various institutions and their supportive pillars as well as the key role of institutions in uncertainty reduction, next we will introduce the first core perspective on global business: an institution-based view.
Focus 2.1 The Russia Puzzle Russia is not the Soviet Union. But what is it? Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has undergone a series of extraordinary institutional transitions. Russia changed from a communist totalitarian state into a democracy with regular elections. Its centrally planned economy was transformed into a capitalist economy of mostly private firms. Yet, Russia has remained a huge puzzle to policy makers, scholars, and business practitioners both in Russia and abroad, thus provoking a constant debate. The debate centers on political, economic, and legal dimensions. Politically, does Russia really have a democracy? Some critics labeled Russia’s democracy to be “phony.” In 2004, Russia was downgraded from “Partly Free” to “Not Free”—on a 1 to 3 scale of “Free,” “Partly Free,” and “Not Free”— by Freedom House, a leading nongovernmental organization (NGO) promoting political freedom (see PengAtlas Map 1.3). This was driven by Russia’s recent steady drift toward more authoritarian rule under then-president Vladmir Putin. Yet, Russia under Putin between 2000 and 2008 grew 7% annually, whereas Russia under Boris Yeltsin during the 1990s, when it was “Partly Free,” experienced a catastrophic economic decline. Most Russians, who were economically better off in the 2000s, do not
seem to mind living in a “less democratic” country (relative to what Russia was in the 1990s). Economically, just how bad was the decline? Official statistics indicated that GDP fell approximately 40% in the 1990s. One side of the debate argues that the actual decline might have been far worse. However, the other side suggests that Russia’s economic performance was actually far better, because some decline in output, by reducing military goods and shoddy consumer products for which there was no demand, was actually good for the economy. For example, there was no reason why the former Soviet Union should produce 80% more steel than the United States. Also, the level of output at the outset of reforms was exaggerated because the central planning system rewarded managers who overreported their output. However, managers now underreport output in order to reduce their tax bill. Thus, the real decline was probably smaller than officially reported. In addition, Russia’s unofficial economy blossomed since the early 1990s, significantly compensating for the decline of the official sector. Thus, Russia’s decline might not have been as bad as commonly thought. Legally, establishing the rule of law that respects private property is one of the main goals of Russia’s institutional transitions. In a society where nobody
35
PART 1 Laying Foundations
In Focus 2.1 (continued) had any significant private property until recently, how a small number of individuals became super-rich oligarchs (tycoons) almost overnight is intriguing. By 2003, the top 10 families or groups owned 60% of Russia’s total market capitalization. Should the government protect private property if it is acquired through illegitimate or “gray” means? Most oligarchs obtained their wealth during the chaotic 1990s. Once these oligarchs have acquired assets, they demand that the government respect and protect these private assets. The government thus faces a dilemma: Redistributing wealth by confiscating assets from the oligarchs creates more uncertainty, whereas respecting and protecting the property rights of the oligarchs results in more resentment among the population. Thus far, except when a few oligarchs, notably Mikhail Khodorkovsky, threatened to politically challenge the government, the Russian government sided with the oligarchs. Not surprisingly, oligarchs have emerged as a strong force in favor of property rights protection. In Russia, oligarchs run their firms more efficiently than other types of business owners (except foreign owners). Although the emergence of oligarchs no doubt has increased income inequality and caused mass resentment, on balance, oligarchs are often argued to have contributed to Russia’s more recent boom. Where exactly is Russia heading? Key to solving this puzzle is to understand Putin (who has been the prime minister since 2008) and his chosen successor, President Dmitry Medvedev. While Russia becomes economically richer and stronger (thanks to high oil prices), the government is bolder and more assertive in foreign affairs by being willing to challenge the United States and to dominate neighbors. In August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia. At home, the government is also sliding back to more authoritarian ways. But, one argument goes, if the government delivers economic growth or at least survives the recent downturn, so what? Finally, another group of writers point out that despite its former superpower status, Russia has become a “normal,” middle-income country. With GDP per capita around $8,000, Russia in 2010 is at a level similar to that of Argentina in 1991 and Mexico in 1999. Democracies in this income range are rough around the edges. They tend to have corrupt governments, high income equality, concentrated corporate ownership, and turbulent economic performance. In all these aspects,
Russia may be quite “normal.” However, these flaws are not necessarily incompatible with further political, economic, and legal progress down the road. For example, consumers in normal, middleincome countries naturally demand bank loans, credit cards, and mortgages, which have only appeared in Russia for the first time and created lucrative opportunities for Russian and foreign firms. Because Russia is so large and complex, news from Russia is often simultaneously good and bad. For example, IKEA, a leading Swedish furniture retailer, aggressively entered Russia in 2000, investing $4 billion over a decade during which Russia’s yuppies became known as the “IKEA Generation.” However, even as one of the largest foreign investors in Russia, IKEA has been frustrated by the difficulties, especially those associated with corruption at the local level. In 2009, IKEA put on hold all new investment in Russia. At the same time, despite such bad news, big political risks overall, which might deter foreign investors, seem reasonably remote. More foreign firms are now rushing into Russia, which is the R in BRIC. Russia is simply too big and too rich to ignore. Disposable household income in Russia is onethird higher than Brazil’s, four times China’s, and 10 times India’s. However, the Russian economy seems overly dependent on raw materials exports (such as oil and minerals). The global collapse of demand, due to reduced production, is hurting Russia. Among BRIC, Russia’s economy is likely to shrink 8.5% in 2009, whereas Brazil’s would shrink slightly (by 1%), and China’s and India’s would grow by 7% and 5%, respectively. Overall, solving the Russia puzzle has more than academic importance; it has a direct bearing on firms’ assessment of the risks of operating in Russia relative to the risks of operating in other countries such as Brazil, India, and China.
Sources: Based on (1) BusinessWeek, 2009, IKEA in Russia: Enough is enough, July 13 & 20: 33; (2) BusinessWeek, 2009, The peril and promise of investing in Russia, October 5: 48–51; (3) Economist, 2007, Dancing with the bear, February 3: 63–64; (4) Economist, 2007, Russia and America, February 17: 60–61; (5) Economist, 2008, Enigma variations, November 29: 3–18; (6) S. Guriev & A. Rachinsky, 2005, The role of oligarchs in Russian capitalism, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19: 131–150; (7) S. Puffer & D. McCarthy, 2007, Can Russia’s state-managed, network capitalism be competitive? Journal of World Business, 42: 1–13; (8) A. Shleifer & D. Treisman, 2005, A normal country: Russia after communism, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19: 151–174; (9) www.freedomhouse.org.
CHAPTER 2 Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics
AN INSTITUTION-BASED VIEW OF GLOBAL BUSINESS
3
An institution-based view of global business, as shown in Figure 2.1, focuses on the dynamic interaction between institutions and firms and considers firm behavior as the outcome of such an interaction.9 Specifically, firm behavior is often a reflection of the formal and informal constraints of a particular institutional framework.10 In short, institutions matter. How do institutions matter? The institution-based view suggests two core propositions, shown in Table 2.2. First, managers and firms rationally pursue their interests and make choices within institutional constraints. In Brazil, government tax revenues at all levels reach 35% of GDP, much higher than the average for emerging economies (for example, Mexico’s is 18% and China’s is 16%). Not surprisingly, the World Bank estimates the gray market in Brazil to be a much higher percentage of the economy than in Mexico or China.11 Likewise, in the United States, the Obama Administration’s 2009 proposal to tax the overseas earnings of US-based multinationals, which are currently exempt from US taxes, has met
FIGURE 2.1 INSTITUTIONS, FIRMS, AND FIRM BEHAVIOR
Dynamic Institutions
Firms Interaction
Formal and informal constraints
Industry conditions and firm-specific resources and capabilities
Firm Behavior
TABLE 2.2
37
TWO CORE PROPOSITIONS OF THE INSTITUTIONBASED VIEW
Proposition 1
Managers and firms pursue their interests and make choices rationally within the formal and informal constraints in a given institutional framework.
Proposition 2
Although formal and informal institutions combine to govern firm behavior, in situations where formal constraints are unclear or fail, informal constraints will play a larger role in reducing uncertainty and providing constancy to managers and firms.
Identify the two core propositions underpinning an institution-based view of global business.
PART 1 Laying Foundations
tical system rules of the game on how a ntry is governed politically.
fierce resistance from the business community. Having already paid overseas taxes, US-based multinationals naturally resent having to pay $190 billion extra in US taxes, when their global competitors pay lower taxes. “Doesn’t the Obama Administration recognize that most big US companies are multinationals that happen to be headquartered in the United States?” asked Duncan Niederauer, CEO of NYSE Euronext in a BusinessWeek interview.12 A case in point is Seagate Technology. Formerly based in Silicon Valley, the disk-drive maker incorporated in the Cayman Islands a few years ago.13 One of the reasons behind Seagate’s move was to avoid such a financial hit, and more US-based multinationals are likely to follow if the Obama tax proposal goes through. The upshot? Fewer good jobs in the United States because high-end executive, R&D, and finance jobs are likely to be located wherever the headquarters are.14 Further, high-quality service providers, such as lawyers, bankers, and accountants, are likely to follow their clients. Both Brazilian firms’ migration to the gray market and US firms’ interest in migrating overseas are rational responses to formal institutional constraints within their respective countries. Second, while formal and informal institutions combine to govern firm behavior, informal constraints play a larger role in reducing uncertainty and providing constancy for managers and firms in situations where formal constraints are unclear or fail. For example, when the former Soviet Union collapsed and with it the formal regime, the growth of many entrepreneurial firms was facilitated by informal constraints based on personal relationships and connections (called blat in Russian) among managers and officials.15 Many observers have the impression that relying on informal connections is relevant only to firms in emerging economies and that firms in developed economies pursue only market-based strategies. This is far from the truth. Even in developed economies, formal rules only make up a small (although important) part of institutional constraints, and informal constraints are pervasive. Just as firms compete in product markets, firms also fiercely compete in the political marketplace characterized by informal relationships.16 Basically, if a firm cannot be a market leader, it may still beat the competition on other grounds—namely, the nonmarket, political environment.17 In September 2008, a rapidly failing Merrill Lynch was able to sell itself to Bank of America for a hefty $50 billion. Supported by US government officials, this mega deal was arranged over 48 hours (less time than most people take to decide which car to buy) and the negotiations took place inside the Federal Reserve building in New York. In contrast, Lehman Brothers failed to secure government support and had to file for bankruptcy. Overall, the skillful use of a country’s institutional frameworks to acquire advantage is at the heart of the institution-based view. Although there are numerous formal and informal institutions, in this chapter we focus on formal institutions. (Informal institutions will be covered in Chapter 3.) Chief among formal institutions are political systems, legal systems, and economic systems. We will now briefly introduce each in turn.
POLITICAL SYSTEMS 4
erstand the differences between ocracy and totalitarianism.
A political system refers to the rules of the game on how a country is governed politically. At the broadest level, there are two primary political systems: democracy and totalitarianism. This section first outlines these two systems and then discusses their ramifications for political risk.
CHAPTER 2 Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics
39
Democracy is a political system in which citizens elect representatives to govern the country on their behalf. Usually the political party with the majority of votes, such as the ANC in the post-apartheid South Africa (see the Closing Case), wins and forms a government. Democracy was pioneered by Athens in ancient Greece. In today’s world, Great Britain has the longest experience of running a democracy (its Parliament was founded in the 1200s), and India has the largest democracy (by population). A fundamental aspect of democracy that is relevant to global business is an individual’s right to freedom of expression and organization. For example, starting up a firm is an act of economic expression, essentially telling the rest of the world: “I want to be my own boss! And I want to make some money!” In most modern democracies, the right to organize economically has been extended not only to domestic individuals and firms, but also to foreign individuals and firms that come to do business. While those of us fortunate enough to have been brought up in a democracy take the right to establish a firm for granted, we should be reminded that this may not necessarily be the case under other political systems. Before the 1980s, if someone dared to formally establish a private firm in the former Soviet Union, he or she would be arrested and shot by the authorities.
© AP Photo/Damian Dovarganes
Democracy
What fundamental aspect of democracy is relevant to the conduct of global business?
Totalitarianism On the opposite end of the political spectrum from democracy is totalitarianism (also known as dictatorship), which is defined as a political system in which one person or party exercises absolute political control over the population. There are four major types of totalitarianism: • Communist totalitarianism centers on a communist party. This system had been embraced throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union until the late 1980s. It is still practiced in China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam. • Right-wing totalitarianism is characterized by its intense hatred of communism. One party, typically backed by the military, restricts political freedom because its members believe that such freedom would lead to communism. In the decades following World War II, the Philippines, South Africa (see the Closing Case), South Korea, Taiwan, and most Latin American countries practiced right-wing totalitarianism. Most of these countries have recently become democracies. • Theocratic totalitarianism refers to the monopolization of political power in the hands of one religious party or group. Iran and Saudi Arabia are leading examples. Another example is Afghanistan, which had been ruled by the Taliban until 2001 when US forces removed that group from formal power. • Tribal totalitarianism refers to one tribe or ethnic group (which may or may not be the majority of the population) monopolizing political power and oppressing other tribes or ethnic groups. Rwanda’s bloodbath in the 1990s was due to some of the most brutal practices of tribal totalitarianism.
Democracy A political system in which citizens elect representatives to govern the country on their behalf. Totalitarianism (dictatorship) A political system in which one person or party exercises absolute political control over the population.
PART 1 Laying Foundations
Political Risk Although the degree of hostility toward business varies among different types of totalitarianism (some can be more pro-business than others), totalitarianism in general is not as good for business as democracy. Totalitarian countries often experience wars, riots, protests, chaos, and breakdowns, which result in higher political risk—risk associated with political changes that may negatively impact domestic and foreign firms. The most extreme political risk may lead to the nationalization (expropriation) of foreign assets.18 This happened in many totalitarian countries from the 1950s until the 1970s. Consider the oil industry in Argentina. In 1955, the government canceled international contracts signed by a previous president, Peron, in 1952. The next president signed new contracts in 1958, which were nullified in 1963 by a different president. Foreign oil companies were invited to return in 1966, expelled in 1973, and again encouraged to enter after 1976.19 It is hardly surprising that foreign oil companies are reluctant to repeat the cycle yet again, and would rather go to “greener pastures” elsewhere. Firms operating in democracies also confront political risk. However, such risk is qualitatively lower than that in totalitarian states. For example, Quebec’s possible independence from the rest of Canada creates some political risk. Although firms highly exposed to Quebec experience some drop in their stock price, there is no general collapse of stock price in Canada or flight of capital out of Canada.20 Investors are confident that, should Quebec become independent, the Canadian democracy is mature enough to manage the break-up process in a relatively nondisruptive way. No two democracies have reportedly gone to war with each other (see In Focus 2.2 for an interesting extension of this point). Obviously, when two countries are at each other’s throats, we can forget about doing business between them (perhaps other than smuggling). In this regard, the recent advance of democracy and retreat of totalitarianism is highly beneficial for global business. It is not a coincidence that globalization took off in the 1990s, a period during which both communist and right-wing totalitarianism significantly lost its power and democracy expanded around the world (see Chapter 1).
5
the differences among civil law, mon law, and theocratic law.
tical risk k associated with political nges that may negatively act domestic and foreign ms.
al system rules of the game on how a ntry’s laws are enacted and orced.
il law gal tradition that uses comhensive statutes and codes a primary means to form legal gments.
LEGAL SYSTEMS A legal system refers to the rules of the game on how a country’s laws are enacted and enforced. By specifying the do’s and don’ts, a legal system reduces transaction costs by minimizing uncertainty and combating opportunism. This section first introduces three different legal traditions and then discusses crucial issues associated with property rights and intellectual property.
Civil Law, Common Law, and Theocratic Law Laws in different countries typically are not enacted from scratch but are often transplanted—voluntarily or otherwise—from three legal traditions (or legal families): civil law, common law, and theocratic law (Table 2.3). Each is briefly introduced here. Civil law was derived from Roman law and strengthened by Napoleon’s France. It is “the oldest, the most influential, and the most widely distributed around the world.” 21 It uses comprehensive statutes and codes as a primary means to form legal judgments. Over 80 countries practice civil law.
CHAPTER 2
Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics
41
Focus 2.2 The McDonald’s and Dell Theory of World Peace Thomas Friedman, a New York Times columnist and author of the 1999 book The Lexus and the Olive Tree, reported that no two countries that both had McDonald’s had ever fought a war against each other since they got their McDonald’s. He theorized that the country does not necessarily have to operate a democracy, but if its political system can foster a middle class whose population is large enough to support a chain of McDonald’s, people don’t like to fight wars anymore. They prefer to wait in line for burgers. Although this “theory” was offered slightly tongue in cheek, the serious point was that as countries are woven into the fabric of global trade and rising standards of living, which are symbolized by McDonald’s, the cost of war becomes too prohibitive. More recently, in a 2005 bestseller, The World is Flat, Friedman upgraded his McDonald’s theory and suggested a new Dell theory: No two countries that are both part of a major global supply chain, like Dell’s, will ever fight a war against each other as long as they are both part of the same global supply
TABLE 2.3
1 2
chain. Countries involved in major global supply chains focus on just-in-time deliveries of goods and services, which raise standards of living. In the case of Dell, the following countries are involved: China, Costa Rica, Germany, Israel, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States. The biggest test of the Dell theory is whether China will go to war with Taiwan, which is regarded as a renegade province by Beijing. With the recent détente between China and Taiwan (including the inauguration of direct flights), the Dell theory has been supported 100% so far. However, the McDonalds’ theory has been violated by Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008. Both countries have a chain of McDonalds’ and the joke is that Russian and Georgian soldiers went to war with each other while wolfing down their Big Macs. Sources: Based on (1) T. Friedman, 1999, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux; (2) T. Friedman, 2005, The World is Flat, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
THREE LEGAL TRADITIONS1
Civil law countries
Common law countries
Theocratic law countries
Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan
Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, United Kingdom, United States, Zimbabwe
Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE)2
The countries are examples, and do not exhaustively represent all countries practicing a particular legal system. Certain parts of Dubai (an emirate within the UAE) practice common law (see In Focus 2.3).
Common law, which is English in origin, is shaped by precedents and traditions from previous judicial decisions. Common law has spread to all English-speaking countries, most of which were at one time colonies of the British empire. Relative to civil law, common law has more flexibility because judges have to resolve specific disputes based on their interpretation of the law, and such
Common law A legal tradition that is shaped by precedents and traditions from previous judicial decisions.
PART 1 Laying Foundations
eocratic law gal system based on gious teachings.
perty rights legal rights to use an nomic property (resource) to derive income and efits from it.
interpretation may give new meaning to the law, which will in turn shape future cases. Civil law has less flexibility because judges only have the power to apply the law. Thus, civil law is less confrontational because comprehensive statutes and codes serve to guide judges. Common law, on the other hand, is more confrontational because plaintiffs and defendants, through their lawyers, must argue and help judges to favorably interpret the law largely based on precedents. This confrontation is great material for movies. Hollywood movies such as A Few Good Men and Devil’s Advocate dramatically illustrate common law in action. In contrast, movies rarely show a civil law court in action because civil law lacks the drama and its proceedings tend to be boring.22 In addition, contracts in common law countries tend to be long and detailed to cover all possible contingencies, because common law tends to be relatively under-defined. In contrast, contracts in civil law countries are usually shorter and less specific, because many issues typically articulated in common law contracts are already covered in comprehensive civil law codes. The third legal family is theocratic law, a legal system based on religious teachings. Examples include Jewish and Islamic laws. Although Jewish law is followed by some elements of the Israeli population, it is not formally embraced by the Israeli government. Islamic law is the only surviving example of a theocratic legal system that is formally practiced by some governments, including those in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Despite the popular characterization of Islam as anti-business, it is important to note that Mohammed was a merchant trader and the tenets of Islam are pro-business in general. The holy book of Islam, the Koran, does, however, advise against certain business practices. In Saudi Arabia, McDonald’s operates “ladies only” restaurants in order to comply with the Koran’s ban on direct, face-to-face contact between unrelated men and women (who often wear a veil) in public. Moreover, banks in Saudi Arabia have to maintain two retail branches: One for male customers staffed by men and another for female customers staffed by women. This requirement obviously increases property, overhead, and personnel costs. To reduce costs, some foreign banks such as HSBC staff their back-office operations with both male and female employees who work side by side.23 Overall, legal systems are a crucial component of the institutional framework because they form the first, regulatory pillar that supports institutions. They directly impose the do’s and don’ts on businesses around the globe. Legal reforms (such as importing common law–based frameworks into civil law or theocratic law countries) are difficult, but not impossible. In Focus 2.3 introduces how Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which uses theocratic law as the country’s legal system, is able to create a common law oasis within Dubai. A legal system is complex, and there are numerous components under its broad umbrella. Two of these, property rights and intellectual property, are discussed next.
Property Rights 6
culate the importance of proprights and intellectual property ts.
One fundamental economic function that a legal system serves is to protect property rights—the legal rights to use an economic property (resource) and to derive income and benefits from it. Examples of property include homes, offices, and factories. Intellectual property will be discussed in the next section. What difference do property rights supported by a functioning legal system make? A lot. Why did developed economies become developed (remember, for example, the United States was a “developing” or “emerging” economy 100 years ago)?
CHAPTER 2 Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics
Focus 2.3
As one of the seven emirates that consist of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Dubai is known for its aggressive drive for modernization in the Arab world. Both UAE federal laws and Dubai laws are based on the Islamic legal framework known as sharia. This framework imposes a number of Islamic finance principles on the do’s and don’ts of business, such as banning interest payment. Within Dubai, 15 free zones enjoy a relatively autonomous legal status with more business-friendly regulations. The most extreme example is the Dubai International Finance Centre (DIFC), a 110-acre free zone that has a most unusual legal
© Mosab Omar/Reuters/Landov
Dubai International Finance Centre: A Common Law Oasis framework. In its ambitious bid to become a world-class financial center, DIFC has totally embraced English common law and operates an independent, common law–based, parallel legal framework, which is backed by a judicial system that is independent from UAE and Dubai laws. Since DIFC’s opening in September 2004, it has attracted high-caliber financial services firms from around the globe. NASDAQ Dubai opened in DIFC in September 2005.
Sources: Based on (1) A. Carballo, 2007, The law of the Dubai International Financial Centre, Arab Law Quarterly, 21: 91–104; (2) Dubai International Finance Centre, 2009, www. difc.ae; (3) R. Nasra & M. T. Dacin, 2010, Institutional arrangements and international entrepreneurship, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice (in press).
Although there are many answers, Hernando de Soto, a Peruvian economist, forcefully put forward an answer centered on the role played by formal institutions, in particular the protection of property rights afforded by a functioning legal system.24 In Africa, only approximately 1% of land is formally registered. 25 In developed economies, every parcel of land, every building, and every trademark is represented in a property document that entitles the owner to derive income and benefits from it. That property document is also important when violators are prosecuted through legal means. When a legal system is stable and predictable, tangible property also makes other, less tangible economic activities possible. For example, property can be used as collateral for credit. The single most important source of funds for new start-ups in the United States is the mortgage of entrepreneurs’ houses. But this cannot be done without documented right to the property. If you live in a house but cannot produce a title document specifying that you are the legal owner of the house (which is a very common situation throughout the developing world, especially in “shanty towns”), no bank in the world will allow you to use your house as collateral for credit. To start up a new firm, you end up borrowing funds from family members, friends, and other acquaintances through informal means. But funds through informal means are almost certainly more limited than funds that could have been provided formally by banks. Because of such under-funding, in
43
PART 1 Laying Foundations
ellectual property ngible property that is the ult of intellectual activity.
ellectual property rights R) hts associated with the ownhip of intellectual property.
ents lusive legal rights of invenof new products or proses to derive income from h inventions.
pyrights lusive legal rights of authors publishers to publish and seminate their work.
demarks lusive legal rights of firms se specific names, brands, designs to differentiate their ducts from others.
the aggregate, the average firm size in the developing world is smaller than that in the developed world. Insecure property rights also result in using technologies that employ little fixed capital and do not entail long-term investment (such as R&D). These characteristics of developing countries do not bode well in global competition where leading firms reap benefits from economies of scale, capitalintensive technologies, and sustained investment in R&D. What the developing world lacks and desperately needs is formal protection of property rights in order to facilitate economic growth.
Intellectual Property Rights Although the term “property” traditionally refers to tangible pieces of property, such as land, intellectual property specifically refers to intangible property that is the result of intellectual activity (such as books, videos, and websites). Intellectual property rights (IPR) are rights associated with the ownership of intellectual property, such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks. • Patents are legal rights awarded by government authorities to inventors of new products or processes. The inventors are given exclusive (monopoly) rights to derive income from such inventions through activities such as manufacturing, licensing, or selling. • Copyrights are the exclusive legal rights of authors and publishers to publish and disseminate their work. This book, for example, is protected by copyright laws. • Trademarks are the exclusive legal rights of firms to use specific names, brands, and designs to differentiate their products from others. Because IPR are usually protected on a country-by-country basis, a pressing issue arises internationally: how to protect IPR, when countries have uneven levels of IPR enforcement? The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property is the “gold standard” for a higher level of IPR protection. Adopting the Paris Convention is required in order to become a signatory country to the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Given the global differences in the formal rules, much stricter IPR protection is provided by TRIPS. Once countries join TRIPS, firms are often forced to pay more attention to innovation. IPR need to be asserted and enforced through a formal system, which is designed to punish violators and to provide an incentive for people and firms to innovate. However, the intangible nature of IPR makes their protection difficult.26 Around the world, piracy—unauthorized use of IPR—is widespread, ranging from unauthorized sharing of music files to deliberate counterfeiting of branded products. Different countries have developed “distinctive competencies.” For example, China is known for fake DVDs and Rolexes. Russia is emerging as a powerhouse for counterfeit software. Ukraine is famous for bootlegged optical discs. Paraguay is well known for imitation cigarettes. Italy is a leading producer of counterfeit luxury goods. Florida has developed a strong reputation for fake aircraft parts.27 Overall, an institution-based view suggests that the key to understanding IPR violation is realizing that IPR violators are not amoral monsters, but ordinary people and firms. Given an institutional environment of weak IPR protection, IPR violators make a rational decision by investing in skills and knowledge in this business (Proposition 1 in Table 2.2). When filling out a survey on “What is your dream career?” no high school graduate anywhere in the world will answer,
CHAPTER 2
Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics
45
“Counterfeiting.” Nevertheless, thousands of individuals and firms voluntarily choose to be involved in this business worldwide. Stronger IPR protection may reduce their incentive to do so. For example, counterfeiters in China will be criminally prosecuted only if their profits exceed approximately $10,000. No counterfeiters are dumb enough to keep records to show that they make that much money. If they are caught and are found to make less than $10,000, they are usually fined $1,000, which is widely regarded as a (small) cost of doing business. However, IPR reforms to criminalize all counterfeiting activities regardless of the amount of profits, currently being discussed in China, may significantly reduce counterfeiters’ incentive.28
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS An economic system refers to the rules of the game on how a country is governed economically. At the two ends of a spectrum, we can find a market economy and a command economy. In between, there is a mixed economy. A pure market economy is characterized by the “invisible hand” of market forces first noted in 1776 by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations. The government takes a hands-off approach known as laissez faire. All factors of production should thus be privately owned. The government performs only those functions the private sector cannot perform, such as providing roads and defense. A pure command economy is defined by a government taking, in the words of Lenin, the “commanding height” in the economy. All factors of production should be owned and controlled by the government. During the heydays of communism, the former Soviet Union and China approached such an ideal. A mixed economy, by definition, has elements of both a market economy and a command economy. It boils down to the relative distribution of market forces versus command forces. In practice, no country has ever completely embraced Adam Smith’s ideal laissez faire approach. Question: Which economy has the highest degree of economic freedom (the lowest degree of government intervention)? Hint: Given extensive government intervention since 2008, it is obviously not the United States (see the Opening Case). Answer: A series of surveys report that it is Hong Kong (the post-1997 handover to Chinese sovereignty does not make a difference).29 The crucial point here is that there is still some noticeable government intervention in the economy, even in Hong Kong. During the aftermath of the 1997 economic crisis when the share price of all Hong Kong–listed firms took a nose dive, the Hong Kong government took a highly controversial action. It used government funds to purchase 10% of the shares of all the blue chip firms listed in the Hang Seng index. This action slowed down the sliding of share prices and stabilized the economy, but it turned all the blue chip firms into state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—at least 10% owned by the state. At present, most governments in developed economies have bailed out their banks, which have become SOEs. Likewise, no country has ever had a complete command economy, despite the efforts of communist zealots throughout the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War. Poland never nationalized its agriculture. Hungarians were known to have second (and private!) jobs while all of them theoretically worked only for the state. Black markets hawking agricultural produce and small merchandise existed in practically all former communist countries. Although the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern European countries have recently thrown away communism, even ongoing practitioners of communism such as China and Vietnam have
7 Outline the differences among market economy, command economy, and mixed economy.
Economic system Rules of the game on how a country is governed economically. Market economy An economy that is characterized by the “invisible hand” of market forces. Command economy An economy that is characterized by government ownership and control of factors of production. Mixed economy An economy that has elements of both a market economy and a command economy.
PART 1 Laying Foundations
embraced market reforms. Cuba has a lot of foreign-invested hotels. Even North Korea is now interested in attracting foreign investment. Overall, the economic system of most countries is a mixed economy. In practice, when we say a country has a market economy, it is really a short-hand version for a country that organizes its economy mostly (but not completely) by market forces and that still has certain elements of a command economy. China, France, Russia, Sweden, and the United States all claim to have a market economy now, but the meaning is different in each country. In other words, free markets are not totally “free.” It boils down to a matter of degree. The point is that we probably need to consider dropping the “F” word (“free”) when discussing “free market economy.”
DEBATES AND EXTENSIONS 8
ticipate in two leading debates politics, laws, and economics.
Formal institutions such as political, legal, and economic systems represent some of the broadest and most comprehensive forces affecting global business. They provoke some significant debates. In this section, we focus on two major debates: (1) drivers of economic development and (2) private ownership versus state ownership.
Drivers of Economic Development: Culture, Geography, or Institutions? The differences in economic development around the globe are striking (see PengAtlas Map 3.4). Table 2.4 shows the highest and lowest per capita income countries to be Norway ($76,450) and Burundi ($110), respectively. Why are countries such as Norway so developed (rich), and countries such as Burundi so underdeveloped (poor)? More generally, what drives economic development in different countries? Scholars and policymakers have debated this very important question since Adam Smith’s time. Various debate points boil down to three explanations: culture,
BLE 2.4
TOP TEN AND BOTTOM TEN COUNTRIES BY PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL INCOME (GNI)
Richest ten
US$
Poorest ten
US$
Norway
$76,450
Mozambique
$320
Switzerland
$59,880
Rwanda
$320
Denmark
$54,910
Niger
$280
Ireland
$48,140
Sierra Leone
$260
Sweden
$46,060
Malawi
$250
United States
$46,040
Eritrea
$230
Netherlands
$45,820
Ethiopia
$220
Finland
$44,400
Liberia
$150
United Kingdom
$42,740
Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)
$140
Austria
$42,700
Burundi
$110
rce: Adapted from The World Bank, 2009, World Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic Geography, Washington: The World Bank. GNI is gross domesoduct (GDP) plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from nonresident sources.
CHAPTER 2 Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics
geography, and institutions. The culture side argues that rich countries tend to have a smarter and harder working population driven by a stronger motivation for economic success (such as the Protestant work ethic identified by Max Weber— see Chapter 3). However, it is difficult to imagine that an average Norwegian is nearly 700 times smarter and harder at work than an average Burundian. This line of thinking, bordering on racism, is no longer acceptable in the 21st century. The geography school of thought in this debate suggests that rich countries (such as the United States) tend to be well endowed with natural resources. However, one can easily point out that some poor countries (such as the Democratic Republic of Congo [Zaire]) also possess rich natural resources, and that some rich countries (such as Denmark and Japan) are very poor in natural resources. In addition, some countries are believed to be cursed by their poor geographic locations, which may be land-locked (such as Malawi) and/or located near the hot equator zone infested with tropical diseases (such as Burundi). This argument is not convincing either, because some land-locked countries are phenomenally well developed (such as Switzerland) and some countries near the equator have accomplished enviable growth (such as Singapore). Geography is important, but not destiny. Finally, institutional scholars argue that institutions are “the basic determinants of the performance of an economy.”30 Because institutions provide the incentive structure of a society, formal political, legal, and economic systems have a significant impact on economic development by affecting the incentives and the costs of doing business. In short, rich countries are rich because they have developed better market-supporting institutional frameworks. Specifically, several points can be made: • It is economically advantageous for individuals and firms to grow and specialize in order to capture the gains from trade. This is the “division of labor” thesis first advanced by Adam Smith (see Chapter 5). • A lack of strong, formal, market-supporting institutions forces individuals to trade on an informal basis with a small neighboring group and forces firms to remain small, thus foregoing the gains from a sharper division of labor by trading on a large scale with distant partners. For example, most of the transactions in Africa are local in nature and most firms are small. Over 40% of Africa’s economy is reportedly informal, the highest proportion in the world.31 • Emergence of formal, market-supporting institutions encourages individuals to specialize and firms to grow in size to capture the gains from complicated longdistance trade (such as transactions with distant, foreign countries). As China’s market institutions progress, many Chinese firms have grown in size. • When formal, market-supporting institutions protect property rights, they fuel more innovation, entrepreneurship, and thus economic growth. Even though spontaneous innovation existed throughout history, why has its pace accelerated significantly since the Industrial Revolution, which started in the 1700s? In no small measure, this was because of the Statute of Monopolies enacted in Great Britain in 1624, which was the world’s first patent law to formally protect the IPR of inventors and make innovation financially lucrative.32 This law has been imitated around the world. Its impact is still felt today, as we now expect continuous innovation to be the norm. This would not have happened had there not been a system of IPR protection. Why do we now routinely expect IT products to double their computing power roughly every ten years? The answer is certainly not because humans (or even IT geniuses) are two times smarter every decade—the key is institutions affording better and stronger IPR protection that fuels such relentless (and effectively routine!) innovation.33
47
PART 1 Laying Foundations
BLE 2.5
These arguments, of course, are the backbone of the institution-based view of global business. Championed by Douglass North, the Nobel laureate quoted earlier, this side has clearly won the debate on the drivers of economic development.34 However, the debate does not end, because it is still unclear exactly what kind of political system facilitates economic development. Is a democracy conducive for economic growth? Although champions of democracy shout “Yes,” the fastest-growing major economy in the last three decades, China, remains totalitarian. The growth rate of India, the world’s largest democracy, in the same period is only about half of China’s. On the other hand, no one in his or her right mind can seriously argue for a case for totalitarianism in order to facilitate economic development. The few examples of “benign” totalitarian regimes that protected property rights and delivered strong growth, such as South Korea and Taiwan, have become democracies in the last two decades. Overall, there is no doubt that democracy has spread around the world (from 69 countries in the 1980s to 117 in the 2000s). However, whether democracy necessarily leads to strong economic development is still subject to debate (see In Focus 2.1 and Integrative Case 1.1).
Private Ownership versus State Ownership35 Private ownership is good. State ownership is bad. Although crude, these two statements fairly accurately summarize the intellectual and political reasoning behind three decades of privatization around the world since the Thatcher Revolution in Britain in the early 1980s. Table 2.5 summarizes the key differences between private ownership and state ownership. As providers of capital, private owners
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP VERSUS STATE OWNERSHIP Private ownership
State ownership
Maximize profits for private owners who are capitalists (and maximize shareholder value for shareholders if the firm is publicly listed).
Optimal balance for a “fair” deal for all stakeholders. Maximizing profits is not the sole objective of the firm. Protecting jobs and minimizing social unrest are legitimate goals.
stablishment of he firm
Entry is determined by entrepreneurs, owners, and investors.
Entry is determined by government officials and bureaucrats.
inancing of the firm
Financing is from private sources (and public shareholders if the firm is publicly traded).
Financing is from state sources (such as direct subsidiaries or banks owned or controlled by governments).
iquidation of the firm
Exit is forced by competition. A firm has to declare bankruptcy or be acquired if it becomes financially insolvent.
Exit is determined by government officials and bureaucrats. Firms deemed “too big to fail” may be supported by taxpayer dollars indefinitely.
ppointment and dismissal of management
Management appointments are made by owners and investors largely based on merit.
Management appointments are made by government officials and bureaucrats who may also use noneconomic criteria.
ompensation of management
Managers’ compensation is determined by competitive market forces. Managers tend to be paid more under private ownership.
Managers’ compensation is determined politically with some consideration given to a sense of fairness and legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Managers tend to be paid less under state ownership.
Objective of the firm
rce: Extracted from text in M. W. Peng, 2000, Business Strategies in Transition Economies (p. 19), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
are known as “capitalists,” and their central role in the economic system gave birth to the term “capitalism.” State ownership emphasizes the social and public nature of economic ownership, and leads to the coinage of the term “socialism.” Both forms of ownership have their own pros and cons. The debate is which form of ownership is better—whether the pros outweigh the cons. The debate on private versus state ownership underpins much of the global economic evolution since the early 20th century. The Great Depression (1929– 1933) was seen as a failure of capitalism, and led numerous elites in developing countries and a nontrivial number of scholars in developed economies to favor the Soviet-style socialism centered on state ownership. As a result, the postwar decades saw an increase in state ownership and a decline in private ownership. State ownership was not only extensive throughout the former Eastern Bloc (the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, China, and Vietnam), but was also widely embraced throughout developed economies in Western Europe. By the early 1980s, close to half of the GDP in major Western European countries such as Britain, France, and Italy was contributed by SOEs. Experience throughout the former Eastern Bloc and Western Europe indicated that SOEs typically suffer from a lack of accountability and a lack of concern for economic efficiency. SOEs were known to feature relatively equal pay between the executives and the rank and file. Since extra work did not translate into extra pay, employees had little incentive to improve the quality and efficiency of their work. Given the generally low pay and the nondemanding work environment, former Soviet SOE employees summed it up well: “They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work.” 36 As Britain’s prime minister, Margaret Thatcher privatized a majority of British SOEs in the 1980s. Very soon, SOEs throughout Central and Eastern Europe followed suit. After the former Soviet Union collapsed, the new Russian government unleashed some most aggressive privatization schemes in the 1990s. Eventually, the privatization movement became global, reaching Brazil, India, China, Vietnam, and most countries in Africa. In no small part, such a global movement was championed by the Washington Consensus, spearheaded by two Washington-based international organizations: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. A core value of the Washington Consensus is the unquestioned belief in the superiority of private ownership over state ownership. The widespread privatization movement suggested that the Washington Consensus had clearly won the day—or so it seemed. But in 2008, the pendulum suddenly swung back (see the Opening Case). During the unprecedented recession, major governments in developed economies, led by the US government, bailed out numerous failing private firms using public funds, effectively turning them into SOEs. As a result, all the arguments in favor of private ownership and “free market” capitalism collapsed. Since SOEs had such a dreadful reputation (essentially a “dirty word”), the US government has refused to acknowledge that it has SOEs. Instead, the US government refers to them as “governmentsponsored enterprises” (GSEs). GSEs include the bankrupt General Motors (GM), whose equity is held by the US government (61%) and the Canadian government (8%). GM is now popularly known as Government Motors, and Citigroup, which is 30% owned by the US government, is now nicknamed Citigovernment. Conceptually, what are the differences between SOEs and GSEs? Hardly any! The right column in Table 2.5 is based on my own research on the “classical” SOEs
49
© Elizabeth Dalziel
CHAPTER 2 Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics
Are the income and jobs of these automobile manufacturing workers in China affected by the move toward privatization in that country?
Washington Consensus A view centered on the unquestioned belief in the superiority of private ownership over state ownership in economic policy making, which is often spearheaded by two Washington-based international organizations: the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
PART 1 Laying Foundations
in pre-reform China and Russia published more than a decade ago. This column also accurately summarizes what is happening in developed economies featuring GSEs now. For example, protecting jobs is one of the stated goals behind bailouts. Entry and exit are determined by government officials, and some firms that have been clearly run to the ground, such as AIG and GM, are deemed “too big to fail” and are bailed out with taxpayer dollars. The US government forced the exit of GM’s former chairman and CEO and is now directly involved in the appointment of executives at GM and other GSEs. Not surprisingly, the US government is now drafting rules to regulate executive compensation. Scholars who have studied “classical” SOEs in emerging economies and gurus who are worried about the pendulum swinging toward more state ownership in developed economies agree on one thing: Despite noble goals to rescue the economy, protect jobs, and fight recession, government bailouts serve to heighten moral hazard—recklessness when people and organizations (including firms and governments) do not have to face the full consequences of their actions.37 In other words, capitalism without the risk of failure becomes socialism. It is long known that executives in SOEs face a “soft budget constraint” in that they can always dip into state coffers to cover their losses.38 When executives in private firms make risky decisions that turn sour, but their firms do not go under—thanks to generous bailouts—they are likely to embrace more risk in the future. In other words, bailouts foster a “heads I win, tails you lose” kind of thinking among executives regarding state coffers and taxpayer dollars. Per Proposition 1 (Table 2.2), these executives are being perfectly rational: Taking on risks, if successful, will enrich their private firms, their owners (shareholders), and themselves; if unsuccessful, Uncle Sam will come to the rescue. Having bailed out failing private firms once, governments that not long ago were the strongest champions of “free markets” now increasingly find it hard to draw the line. Although the worst fear about the recession is now over, debate continues to rage. Although the Obama administration is clearly interested in having the government play a larger and more active role in the economy, it is also becoming a stronger and more powerful regulator as well as a shareholder and manager in banks and automobile companies. As a core institution behind the Washington Consensus, the IMF still believes that state ownership is not healthy and needs to be eventually withdrawn. But it is pragmatic enough to acknowledge the realities of bailouts and stimulus packages. In October 2009, the IMF advised great care in disengaging from state ownership. Specifically, the IMF opined in its World Economic Outlook:
ral hazard klessness when people and anizations (including firms governments) do not have ace the full consequences of r actions.
The key policy priorities remain to restore the health of the financial sector and to maintain supportive macroeconomic policies until the recovery is on a firm footing, even though policymakers must also begin preparing for an eventual unwinding of extraordinary levels of public intervention. . . . The challenge is to map a middle course between unwinding public interventions too early, which would jeopardize the progress made in securing financial stability and recovery, and leaving these measures in place too long, which carries the risk of distorting incentives and damaging public balance sheet. 39
MANAGEMENT SAVVY 9
w implications for action.
Focusing on formal institutions, this chapter has sketched the contours of an institution-based view of global business, which is one of the two core perspectives we introduce throughout this book. (Chapter 3 will flesh out the institution-based view with a focus on informal institutions.) How does the institution-based view
CHAPTER 2
Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics
help us answer our fundamental question of utmost concern to managers around the globe: What determines the success and failure of firms around the globe? In a nutshell, this chapter suggests that firm performance is determined, at least in part, by the institutional frameworks governing firm behavior. It is the growth of the firm that, in the aggregate, leads to the growth of the economy. Not surprisingly, most developed economies are supported by strong, effective, and marketsupporting formal institutions, and most underdeveloped economies are pulled back by weak, ineffective, and market-depressing formal institutions. In other words, when markets work smoothly in developed economies, formal marketsupporting institutions are almost invisible and taken for granted. However, when markets work poorly, the absence of strong formal institutions may be conspicuous. For managers doing business around the globe, this chapter suggests two broad implications for action, shown in Table 2.6. First, managerial choices are made rationally within the constraints of a given institutional framework. Therefore, managers aiming to enter a new country need to do their homework by having a thorough understanding of the formal institutions affecting their business. The rules for doing business in a democratic market economy are certainly different from the rules in a totalitarian command economy. In short, “when in Rome, do as the Romans do.” Although this is a good start, managers also need to understand why “Romans” do things in a certain way by studying the formal institutions governing “Roman” behavior. Of course, merely mastering the rules of the game will not be enough. The firm will also need to develop firm-specific resources and capabilities to take advantage of the rules of the game. In the midst of a horrific recession, Merrill Lynch’s skillful maneuvers to save itself and Lehman Brothers’ failed attempt to garner political support serve as two contrasting cases in point. Second, although this chapter has focused on the role of formal institutions, managers should follow the advice of the second proposition of the institutionbased view: In situations where formal constraints are unclear or fail, informal constraints such as relationship norms will play a larger role in reducing uncertainty. If, for example, you are doing business in a country with a strong propensity for informal, relational exchanges, it may not be a good idea to insist on formalizing the contract right away. Such a plan could backfire.40 In a country with relatively weak legal systems, personal relationship building is often used to substitute for the lack of strong legal protection.41 Attitudes such as “business first, relationship afterwards” (have a drink after the negotiation) may clash with the norm that puts things the other way around (lavish entertainment first, talk about business later). We often hear that, because of their culture, the Chinese prefer to cultivate personal relationships (guanxi) first. This is not entirely true. Investing in personal relationships up front may simply be the initial cost one has to pay if interested in eventually doing business together, given the absence of a strong and credible legal and regulatory regime in China. In other words, the value on personal relationships has as much to do with the absence of institutional constraints as it does with cultural norms. In fact, personal relationships are key to business in a
TABLE 2.6
IMPLICATIONS FOR ACTION
• When entering a new country, do your homework by having a thorough understanding of the formal institutions governing firm behavior. • When doing business in countries with a strong propensity for informal relational exchanges, insisting on formalizing the contract right away may backfire.
51
PART 1 Laying Foundations
broad range of countries from Argentina to Zimbabwe, each with different cultural traditions. So the interest in cultivating what the Chinese call guanxi, the Russians call blat, or the Vietnamese call guan he is not likely to be driven by culture alone, but also by the fact that these countries have in common a lack of formal marketsupporting institutions.
CH A P T ER SUM M A RY 1. Identify two types of institutions—formal and informal. • Institutions are commonly defined as the rules of the game. • Formal institutions include laws, regulations, and rules, which are underpinned by the regulatory pillar. • Informal institutions include norms, cultures, and ethics, which are supported by the normative and cognitive pillars. 2. Explain how institutions reduce uncertainty. • The key function of institutions is to reduce uncertainty, curtail transaction costs, and combat opportunism. 3. Identify the two core propositions underpinning an institution-based view of global business. • Proposition 1: Managers and firms rationally pursue their interests and make choices within formal and informal institutional constraints in a given institutional framework. • Proposition 2: When formal constraints are unclear or fail, informal constraints will play a larger role. 4. Understand the differences between democracy and totalitarianism. • Democracy is a political system in which citizens elect representatives to govern the country. • Totalitarianism is a political system in which one person or party exercises absolute political control. 5. List the differences among civil law, common law, and theocratic law. • Civil law uses comprehensive statutes and codes as a primary means to form legal judgments. • Common law is shaped by precedents and traditions from previous judicial decisions. • Theocratic law is a legal system based on religious teachings. 6. Articulate the importance of property rights and intellectual property rights. • Property rights are legal rights to use an economic resource and to derive income and benefits from it. • Intellectual property refers to intangible property that is the result from intellectual activity. 7. Outline the differences among market economy, command economy, and mixed economy. • A pure market economy is characterized by laissez faire and total control by market forces.
CHAPTER 2 Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics
• A pure command economy is defined by government ownership and control of all means of production. • Most countries operate mixed economies, with a different emphasis on market versus command forces. 8. Participate in two leading debates on politics, laws, and economics. • What drives economic development: culture, geography, or institutions? • Private ownership versus state ownership. 9. Draw implications for action. • Have a thorough understanding of the formal institutions before entering a country. • Insisting on formalizing the contract in initial negotiations may backfire in some countries.
K E Y T ERM S Civil law 40 Cognitive pillar 33 Command economy 45 Common law 41 Copyrights 44 Democracy 39 Economic system 45 Formal institutions 33 Institutional framework 33 Institutional transitions 32
Institution-based view 32 Institutions 32 Intellectual property 44 Intellectual property rights (IPR) 44 Legal system 40 Market economy 45 Mixed economy 45 Moral hazard 50 Normative pillar 33 Opportunism 34 Patents 44
Political risk 40 Political system 38 Property rights 42 Regulatory pillar 33 Theocratic law 42 Totalitarianism (dictatorship) 39 Trademarks 44 Transaction costs 34 Washington Consensus 49
RE V IE W QUES T IO N S 1. In what ways do institutions influence individual and firm behaviors? Explain your answer. 2. Define institutional transitions and give three examples of where they can be found. 3. Explain the two core propositions behind the institution-based view of global business. 4. Which are generally more significant: formal or informal constraints? Explain your answer. 5. Suppose your firm has an opportunity to expand into a totalitarian state. What are some of the issues that you may consider (other than profitability) before taking advantage of the opportunity?
53
PART 1 Laying Foundations
6. To what extent should your firm become involved in politics within another country? 7. Compare PengAtlas Maps 1.1 and 1.2 with PengAtlas Maps 1.3. To what extent does there appear to be a relationship between political freedom and a country’s economic development and power as reflected in its G-20 status? Are there any exceptions to the rule? What is your explanation? 8. Describe the differences among the three types of legal systems. 9. Give an example of how theocratic law may affect daily business operations. 10. Describe intellectual property and explain its importance. 11. Is intellectual property easier or more difficult to protect than other types of property? Why? 12. Name and describe the three economic systems. 13. Which economic system is the most common and why? 14. Generally speaking, what is the result of strong, effective, market-supporting formal institutions? 15. Why should managers guard against a herd mentality? 16. If formal constraints are unclear or ineffective, what else can managers use to reduce uncertainty?
CRI TI C A L DISCUS SION QUES TION S 1. How do you explain your country’s economic success (or failure)? 2. What is your view on the debate between private ownership and state ownership? 3. ON ETHICS: As manager, you discover that your firm’s products are counterfeited by small family firms that employ child labor in rural Bangladesh. You are aware of the corporate plan to phase out the products soon. You also realize that once you report the counterfeiting to the authorities, these firms will be shut down, employees will be out of work, and families and children will starve. How do you proceed? 4. ON ETHICS: Your multinational is the largest foreign investor and enjoys good profits in Sudan, where government forces are reportedly cracking down on rebels and killing civilians, and also in Vietnam, where religious leaders are reportedly being persecuted. As country manager, you understand that your firm is pressured by activists to exit these countries. The alleged government actions, which you personally find distasteful, are not directly related to your operations. How would you proceed?
CHAPTER 2 Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics
GLOBA L AC T ION 1. Evaluating political risk is an important element of country risk analysis. In fact, your personal interest relates to countries in the Middle East and North Africa region that have a high political risk. After searching the globalEDGE website, provide a brief overview of the region and the reasoning behind assessing these countries that have been assessed with high political risk. From this list, which country has the highest overall country risk? 2. Since you work for a diversified multinational corporation, economic risk across different sectors of the world economy is an integral part of analysis as it indicates the future business prospects for specific industries. Using the globalEDGE website, evaluate the risk assessment of three industry sectors that are available to analyze. Prepare a report and provide a recommendation concerning which industry and region would be most beneficial to your company.
V IDEO C A SES Watch “Entering the Chinese Market” by Eric Tarchoune of Dragonfly Group, Ltd. 1. In what ways did Tarchoune’s knowledge of the Chinese language contribute to his success? Why was it particularly important given the areas of China he visited? 2. Western businesses depend on documents and written contracts. What challenge did Tarchoune encounter and how did he cope? 3. What did Tarchoune mean when he said that the rules were “not written on the wall”? What does that suggest when doing business in other countries and cultures? 4. In many parts of Asia, respect is gained with age but Tarchoune was quite young when he went to China. If a young foreign manager were to be sent to China, what could he or she do to improve his or her managerial effectiveness in that country? 5. Tarchoune indicated that there would be some differences in doing business in the larger modern cities of China as compared to where he went. To what extent do you think that such might be the case in other parts of the world? Do you think that Western businesspeople may have a preference for cities that may cause them to ignore opportunities in rural areas? Why?
55
PART 1 Laying Foundations
Closing Case Managing Risks in the New South Africa In principle, few South Africans disagree with BEE. In practice, there has been much grumbling over the way BEE has been implemented. This is because BEE is clearly intrusive, setting quotas and timetables in terms of black ownership, executive position, employment, and affirmative action procurement. South African firms, which are predominantly owned and managed by whites, are compelled to sell a substantial percentage (25% to 50%) of their equity to black-owned businesses and investors often at discounted prices. A number of leading South African firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange, such as AngloGold, SAPPI, SASOL, and Telkom, have disclosed BEE as a risk to shareholders, because these firms cannot guarantee that BEE transactions would take place at fair market price. BEE also affects foreign firms. Foreign firms interested in securing government contracts in excess of $10 million are required to invest at least 30% of the sales in local black-owned firms. In the case of defense contracts, the percentage increases to 50%. Firms such as SASOL complain that in a country whose official unemployment rate is stubbornly high at 25% (which may really be as high as 40%), BEE scares away investment and deters foreign firms. Further, although BEE has rapidly created a new black business elite (who often have connections with the ANC), it has not created jobs for the millions of poor and unemployed blacks. In other words, BEE has sliced up the economic cake differently, but has done little to expand it. Then-president Thabo Mbeki labeled firms such as SASOL “bigoted,” and accused them of badmouthing South Africa’s attempt to address the legacy of racism. © Mike Hutchings/Reuters/Landov
With a population of 49 million, South Africa represents 10% of Africa’s population and 45% of the continent’s gross domestic product (GDP). Its GDP is almost as big as the rest of sub-Saharan Africa’s 47 countries combined. As the engine of growth for Africa, South Africa had been growing at 5% annually until 2008. As Africa’s sole member of the G-20 group, South Africa has the 20th-largest GDP in the world and is among the top ten emerging economies. Before 1994, South Africa had been ruled by a white minority government that earned notoriety for its apartheid (racial segregation) policy. In 1994, South Africa accomplished a peaceful transition of power, with the black majority party, African National Congress (ANC), taking over power. ANC’s leader, Nelson Mandela, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, served as its first post-apartheid president. Since then, South Africa has embarked on a new journey toward political reconciliation and economic liberalization. Yet, doing business in South Africa has always been risky. Although the risks associated with apartheid are well known, managing risks in the postapartheid era is no less challenging. Since 1994, South Africa has introduced fundamental and comprehensive changes to its rules of the game, unleashing both uncertainties and opportunities. The democratically elected ANC government has adopted a Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy aiming to increase blacks’ share in the economy. While the neighboring Zimbabwe has violently expropriated land from white farmers and redistributed it to blacks, the South African government is committed to protecting property rights. BEE aims to accomplish its goals through peaceful means.
CHAPTER 2 Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics
In addition to BEE, heavy-handed labor regulations are another area attracting business complaint. Unions are given broad power to block layoffs and limit the outsourcing of contracts, making a lot of firms reluctant to hire in the first place. The HIV/ AIDS epidemic has reached epic proportions, affecting 5.5 million individuals, one-ninth of the population. Since laid-off HIV-positive employees will be on government support, the government has more incentive to make it harder to fire employees. The upshot? Skyrocketing absenteeism and heath care costs. Crime is another problem. Security expenditures and crime-related losses cost South African firms approximately 1% of sales, higher than in Russia or Brazil. Despite the risks, many firms—both domestic and foreign—are charging ahead. For large domestic firms, noncompliance with BEE may not be an option in the long run. Thus, they adopt two strategies. The first is “fronting”: relying on businesses controlled by blacks to acquire procurement contracts. Second, lobbying to renegotiate the BEE terms becomes a frequent coping strategy. The Chamber of Mines, an industry association for the important mining sector, successfully reduced the targeted ten-year equity quota for black ownership from 51% to 26%. Many foreign firms find it attractive to form joint ventures (JVs) or merge with black-owned firms. For instance, Tsavliris Salvage Group of Greece formed a JV with Cape Diving & Salvage of South Africa that has a 66% black equity stake. This JV thus is well positioned to go after government contracts in the offshore oil industry. PricewaterhouseCoopers’s South African subsidiary merged with MSGM Masuku Jeena, the largest
black-owned accounting firm in the country. The merger opened doors for more lucrative contracts. In May 2009, Jacob Zuma became the third post-apartheid president of South Africa. After the heroic, aristocratic Mandela and the aloof, technocratic Mbeki, the charismatic and relaxed Zuma is a highly popular president among the public. However, his lack of formal education and his promise to trade unions have made the business community nervous. There are concerns that Zuma may reduce judicial independence, foster corruption and patronage, and undermine democracy. None of these concerns is substantiated as of this writing. In the meantime, the global crisis has hit South Africa, which is experiencing its first recession since 1994. Business confidence is at a ten-year low, and the economy is shrinking. To numerous South African businesses and foreign firms interested in the country, how to survive the economic downturn and the new presidential regime is a multimillion dollar (or rand) question.
Case Discussion Questions: 1. How do firms in South Africa play the game when the rules are uncertain? 2. There is a proposition that democracy usually goes hand in hand with a functioning market economy. Does the government’s insistence on BEE, often involving nonmarket-based quotas and below-market prices for equity sales to black firms and investors, support or refute this proposition? 3. Should foreign firms be interested in entering South Africa? Why or why not?
Sources: I thank Professor Steve Burgess (University of Cape Town) for his assistance. This case is based on (1) S. Burgess, 2003, Within-country diversity: Is it key to South Africa’s prosperity in a changing world? International Journal of Advertising, 22: 157–182; (2) Economist, 2006, Chasing the rainbow, April 8: 1–12; (3) Economist, 2006, The way to BEE, December 23: 99; (4) Economist, 2007, The long journey of a young democracy, March 3: 32–34; (5) Economist, 2009, Africa’s new Big Man, April 18: 11; (6) Economist, 2009, Still on a roll, September 26: 60–61; (7) Economist, 2009, Voting for the people’s man, April 18: 23–25; (8) J. van Wyk, W. Dahmer, & M. Custy, 2004, Risk management and the business environment in South Africa, Long Range Planning, 37: 259–276.
57
PART 1 Laying Foundations
N OT ES
urnal acronyms] AER—American Economic Review; AME— demy of Management Executive; AMJ—Academy of Management nal; AMP—Academy of Management Perspectives; AMR— demy of Management Review; APJM—Asia Pacific Journal of nagement; B&P—Business & Politics; BW—BusinessWeek; R—China Business Review; HBR—Harvard Business Review; —Journal of Economic Literature; JIBS—Journal of International iness Studies; JIM—Journal of International Management; JMS— nal of Management Studies; JPE—Journal of Political Economy; B—Journal of World Business; SMJ—Strategic Management nal; WSJ—Wall Street Journal
M. W. Peng, 2003, Institutional transitions and strategic choices 275), AMR, 28: 275–296.
M. W. Peng, S. Sun, B. Pinkham, & H. Chen, 2009, The institun-based view as a third leg for a strategy tripod, AMP, 23: 63–81; W. Peng, D. Wang, & Y. Jiang, 2008, An institution-based view nternational business strategy, JIBS, 39: 920–936.
. North, 1990, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic ormance (p. 3), New York: Norton.
W. R. Scott, 1995, Institutions and Organizations, Thousand ks, CA: Sage.
M. Guillen, 2003, Experience, imitation, and the sequence of eign entry, JIBS, 34: 185–198; J. Lu, 2002, Intra- and interanizational imitative behavior, JIBS, 33: 19–37.
Elbanna & J. Child, 2007, Influences on strategic decin making, SMJ, 28: 431–453; V. Hoffmann, T. Trautmann, & emprecht, 2009, Regulatory uncertainty, JMS, 46: 1227–1253.
. Williamson, 1985, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism . 1–2), New York: Free Press.
Collier & J. Gunning, 1999, Explaining African economic formance, JEL, 37: 64–111.
M. W. Peng, 2002, Towards an institution-based view of busis strategy, APJM, 19: 251–267; C. Stevens & J. Cooper, 2010, A avioral theory of governments’ ability to make credible comments to firms, APJM (in press).
N. Biggart & R. Delbridge, 2004, Systems of exchange, AMR, 28–49; R. Greenwood & R. Suddaby, 2006, Institutional repreneurship in mature fields, AMR, 49: 27–46; R. Mudambi & Paul, 2003, Domestic drug prohibition as a source of foreign itutional instability, JIM, 9: 335–349; A. Parkhe, 2003, Instional environments, institutional change, and international ances, JIM, 9: 305–216.
conomist, 2007, Heavy going (p. 5), April 14: 5–7.
W, 2009, NYSE chief Duncan Niederauer on Obama and iness (p. 15), June 8: 15–16.
W, 2009, The overseas tax squeeze, May 18: 18–20.
W, 2010, Taxes: Ready to rumble, February 1: 38–41.
M. W. Peng, 2001, How entrepreneurs create wealth in transin economies, AME, 15: 95–108; S. Puffer & D. McCarthy, 2007, n Russia’s state-managed, network capitalism be competi? JWB, 42: 1–13.
16 A. Hillman & W. Wan, 2005, The determinants of MNE subsidiaries’ political strategies, JIBS, 36: 322–340; A. McWilliams, D. van Fleet, & K. Cory, 2002, Raising rivals’ costs through political strategy, JMS, 39: 707–723; M. Ozer & S. Lee, 2009, When do firms prefer individual action to collective action in the pursuit of corporate political strategy? B&P, 11: 1–21; D. Schuler, K. Rehbein, & R. Cramer, 2002, Pursuing strategic advantage through political means, AMJ, 45: 659–672. 17 J. Bonardi, G. Holburn, & R. Bergh, 2006, Nonmarket strategy performance, AMJ, 49: 1209–1228. 18 R. Click, 2005, Financial and political risks in US direct foreign investment, JIBS, 36: 559–575. 19
M. Guillen, 2001, The Limits of Convergence (p. 135), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 20 M. Beaulieu, J. Cosset, & N. Essaddam, 2005, The impact of political risk on the volatility of stock returns, JIBS, 36: 701–718. 21 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, & R. Vishny, 1998, Law and finance (p. 1118), JPE, 106: 1113–1155. 22 M. W. Peng & K. Meyer, 2011, Global Business: A European View, London: Cengage Learning (in press). 23
The author’s interview, Middle East Women’s Delegation visiting the University of Texas at Dallas, January 23, 2006. 24
H. de Soto, 2000, The Mystery of Capital, New York: Basic Books.
25
W. Easterly, 2008, Institutions: Top down or bottom up? AER, 98: 95–99. 26
P. Chaudhry & A. Zimmerman, 2009, The Economics of Counterfeit Trade, Berlin: Springer; C. Hill, 2007, Digital piracy, APJM, 24: 9–25. 27
M. W. Peng, 2006, Dealing with counterfeiting, in M. W. Peng, Global Strategy (pp. 137–138), Cincinnati: South-Western Cengage Learning. 28
J. Simone, 2006, Silk market fakes, CBR, January–February: 16–17. 29
Heritage Foundation, www.heritage.org.
30
D. North, 2005, Understanding the Process of Economic Change (p. 48), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 31
Economist, 2005, Doing business in Africa, July 2: 61.
32
D. North, 1981, Structure and Change in Economic History (p. 164), New York: Norton. 33 Y. Lu, E. Tsang, & M. W. Peng, 2008, Knowledge management and innovation in the Asia Pacific (p. 359), APJM, 25: 361–374. 34
D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, & J. Robinson, 2001, The colonial origins of comparative development, AER, 91: 1369–1401; R. Barro & X. Sala-i-Martin, 2003, Economic Growth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; G. Roland, 2000, Transition and Economics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 35 State ownership is also often referred to as “public ownership.“ However, since a lot of privately owned firms are publicly listed and traded, this can cause confusion. I have decided to use “state ownership” here to minimize confusion.
CHAPTER 2 Understanding Formal Institutions: Politics, Laws, and Economics
36
M. W. Peng, 2000, Business Strategies in Transition Economies (p. 24), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
39
37 P. Bernstein, 2009, The moral hazard economy, HBR, July– August: 101–102; S. Harrington, 2009, Moral hazard and the meltdown, WSJ, May 23, online.wsj.com.
40
38 J. Kornai, 1992, The Socialist System, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
59
International Monetary Fund, 2009, World Economic Outlook: Sustaining the Recovery (p. xvi), Washington: IMF.
41
D. Malhotra, 2009, When contracts destroy trust, HBR, May: 25.
C. Su, Z. Yang, G. Zhuang, N. Zhou, & W. Dou, 2009, Interpersonal influence as an alternative channel behavior in emerging markets, JIBS, 40: 668–689.
Chapter
3
LEARNING OBJECTIVES
After studying this chapter, you should be able to: 1. explain where informal institutions come from. 2. define culture and articulate its four main manifestations: language, religion, social structure, and education. 3. discuss how cultures systematically differ from each other. 4. explain why ethics is important and identify ways to combat corruption.
6. participate in three leading debates on cultures, ethics, and norms. 7. draw implications for
Photo/Nasser Shiyoukhi
5. identify norms associated with strategic responses when firms deal with ethical challenges.
Emphasizing Informal Institutions: Cultures, Ethics, and Norms O
P
E
N
I
N
Cartoons that Exploded In September 2005, Danish newspaper JyllandsPosten (Jutland Post ) published a dozen cartoons of the Muslim prophet Muhammad. These cartoons not only violated the Muslim norm against picturing prophets, but also portrayed Muhammad in a highly negative, insulting light, especially those that pictured him as a terrorist. Jyllands-Posten knew that it was testing the limits of free speech and good taste. But it had no idea about the ferociousness of the explosion its cartoons would ignite. For Denmark itself, this incident became the biggest political crisis since the Nazi occupation during World War II. Beyond Denmark, publishers in a total of 22 countries, such as Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway, reprinted these cartoons to make a point about their right to do so in the name of freedom of expression. Muslims around the world were outraged, protests were organized, Danish flags were burned, and Western embassies in Indonesia, Iran, Lebanon, and Syria were attacked. In Khartoum, Sudan, a crowd of 50,000 chanted “Strike, strike, bin Laden!” At least ten people were killed in protests against the cartoons, as police in Afghanistan shot into crowds besieging Western installations.
G
C
A
S
E
In addition to mob reactions in the street, Muslim governments also took action. In protest of the cartoons, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria withdrew their ambassadors from Denmark. The Justice Minister of the United Arab Emirates argued: “This is cultural terrorism, not freedom of expression.” However, Anders Rasmussen, the Danish Prime Minister, when meeting ambassadors from ten Muslim countries, indicated that however distasteful the cartoons were, the government could not apologize on behalf of the newspaper. This was because in principle freedom of speech was enshrined in Denmark (and the West), and in practice even if the Danish government preferred to take action against the newspaper, there were no laws empowering it to do so. While acknowledging the importance of freedom of speech, Western governments expressed sympathy to Muslims. French President Jacques Chirac issued a plea for “respect and moderation” in exercising freedom of expression. British Foreign Minister Jack Straw called the cartoons “insensitive.” US President George W. Bush called on world governments to stop the violence and be “respectful.” Carsten Juste, editor of Jyllands-Posten, who received death threats, said that the drawings “were not in violation of Danish law
PART 1 Laying Foundations
offended many Muslims, for which we would like apologize.” Although Muslim feelings were hurt, Danish firms ve in Muslim countries were devastated. Arla Foods, e of Denmark’s (and Europe’s) largest dairy firms, had en selling to the Middle East for 40 years, had had duction in Saudi Arabia for 20 years, and normally d sold approximately $465 million a year to the region, uding the best-selling butter in the Middle East. Arla’s es to the region plummeted to zero in a matter of days er the protests began. Arla lost $1.8 million every day, d was forced to lay off 170 employees. Other affected ms included Carlsberg (a brewer), Lego (a toy maker), d Novo Nordisk (an insulin maker). In addition, Carrer, a French supermarket chain active in the region, untarily pulled Danish products from shelves in the ddle East, and boasted about it to customers. In response, Arla took out full-page advertisements Saudi newspapers, reprinting the news release from
the Danish Embassy in Riyadh saying that Denmark respected all religions. That failed to stop the boycott. Other Danish firms kept a low profile. Some switched “Made in Denmark” labels to “Made in European Union.” Others used foreign subsidiaries to camouflage their origin. Danish shipping companies, such as Maersk, took down the Danish flag when docking in ports in Muslim countries. Overall, although Muslim countries represented only approximately 3% of all Danish exports, a worst-case scenario would lead to 10,000 job losses, which would be a significant blow to a small country with a population of only 5.4 million. Sources: Based on (1) A. Browne, 2006, Denmark faces international boycott over Muslim cartoons, Times Online, January 31 (www.timesonline.co.uk); (2) Economist, 2006, Mutual incomprehension, mutual outrage, February 11: 29–31; (3) Economist, 2006, When markets melted away, February 11: 56; (4) J. Lausen, 2009, The Cartoons that Shook the World, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; (5) E. Pfanner, 2006, Danish companies endure snub by Muslim consumers, New York Times, February 27: 2; (6) P. Reynolds, 2006, A clash of rights and responsibilities, BBC News Website, February 6 (news.bbc.co.uk).
Although publishing the offending cartoons is legal in Denmark, is it ethical? Should the editor of Jyllands-Posten, the Danish prime minister, and managers at Arla have reacted differently? Why should many Danish firms, which have nothing to do with the cartoons, suffer major economic losses in Muslim countries? Why do non-Danish and non-Muslim firms such as Carrefour withdraw Danish products from their shelves in the Middle East? More fundamentally, what informal institutions govern individual and firm behavior in different countries? This chapter continues our coverage on the institution-based view, which began with formal institutions in Chapter 2. Now we will focus on informal institutions represented by cultures, ethics, and norms. Remember that the institution-based view involves two propositions. First, managers and firms rationally pursue their interests within a given institutional framework. Second, in situations where formal institutions are unclear or fail, informal institutions play a larger role in reducing uncertainty. The first proposition deals with both formal and informal institutions. The second proposition hinges on the informal institutions we are about to discuss. As the Opening Case shows, informal institutions are about more than just basic customs such as how to present business cards correctly and how to wine and dine properly. Informal institutions can make or break firms, which is why they deserve a great deal of our attention.1
CHAPTER 3 Emphasizing Informal Institutions: Cultures, Ethics, and Norms
WHERE DO INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS COME FROM? Recall that any institutional framework consists of formal and informal institutions. Although formal institutions such as politics, laws, and economics (see Chapter 2) are important, they make up a small (although important) part of the rules of the game that govern individual and firm behavior. As pervasive features of every economy, informal institutions can be found almost everywhere.2 Where do informal institutions come from? They come from socially transmitted information and are a part of the heritage that we call cultures, ethics, and norms. Those within a society tend to perceive their own culture, ethics, and norms as “natural, rational, and morally right.”3 This self-centered mentality is known as ethnocentrism. For example, many Americans believe in “American exceptionalism,” a view that holds that the United States is exceptionally well endowed to lead the world. The Chinese call China zhong guo, which literally means “the country in the middle” or “middle kingdom.” Ancient Scandinavians called their country by a similar name (midgaard). Some modern Scandinavians, such as some Danes, believe in their freedom to publish whatever they please. Unfortunately, as shown in the Opening Case, those from other societies may beg to differ. In other words, common sense in one society may be uncommon elsewhere.4 Recall from Chapter 2 that informal institutions are underpinned by the normative and cognitive pillars, whereas formal institutions are supported by the regulatory pillar. Although the regulatory pillar clearly specifies the do’s and don’ts, informal institutions, by definition, are more elusive. Yet they are no less important.5 Thus, it is imperative that we pay attention to three different informal institutions: culture, ethics, and norms.
63
1 Explain where informal institutions come from.
CULTURE Out of many informal institutions, culture is probably the most frequently discussed. This section first defines culture, and then highlights its four major components.
Definition of Culture Although hundreds of definitions of culture have appeared, we will use the definition proposed by the world’s foremost cross-cultural expert, Geert Hofstede, a Dutch professor. He defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another.”6 Before proceeding, it is important to make two points to minimize confusion. First, although it is customary to talk about American culture or Brazilian culture, no strict one-to-one correspondence between cultures and nationstates exists. Many subnational cultures exist within multiethnic countries such as Belgium, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United States.7 In Focus 3.1 shows the importance of the Hispanic culture within the United States. Second, culture has many layers, such as regional, ethnic, and religious. Even firms may have a specific organizational culture. Companies such as IKEA are well-known for their distinctive corporate cultures. Acknowledging the validity of these two points, we will, however, follow Hofstede by using the term “culture” to
2 Define culture and articulate its four main manifestations: language, religion, social structure, and education.
Ethnocentrism A self-centered mentality held by a group of people who perceive their own culture, ethics, and norms as natural, rational, and morally right. Culture The collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another.
PART 1 Laying Foundations
discuss national culture unless otherwise noted. Although this is a matter of expediency, it is also a reflection of the institutional realities of the world with about 200 nation-states. Each one of us is a walking encyclopedia of our own culture. Although culture is too complex to dissect in the space we have here, we will highlight four major components of culture that impact global business: language, religion, social structure, and education.
Focus 3.1 Marketing to Hispanics in the United States According to the US Census Bureau definition, “Hispanic” refers to individuals of Latin American descent living in the United States who may be of any race or ethnic group (such as white or black). With approximately 45 million people (15% of the US population), Hispanics represent the largest minority group in the United States. To put things in perspective, the US Hispanic population is larger than the population of Australia, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden combined. The print media advertising revenues for the US Hispanic market, $1.5 billion, have now sur