Germany's Civilian Power Diplomacy: NATO Expansion and the Art of Communicative Action

Germany’s Civilian Power Diplomacy

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Germany’s Civilian Power Diplomacy NATO Expansion and the Art of Communicative Action

Chaya Arora

GERMANY’S CIVILIAN POWER DIPLOMACY

© Chaya Arora, 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published 2006 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–7419–8 ISBN-10: 1–4039–7419–5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Arora, Chaya. Germany’s civilian power diplomacy : NATO expansion and the art of communicative action / by Chaya Arora. p. cm. Originally presented as the author’s thesis (doctoral)—Universität Frankfurt am Main. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–7419–5 1. Germany—Foreign relations—1990– 2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Membership. 3. National security—Europe. 4. National security—Germany. 5. Germany—Military policy. 6. Civil–military relations. 7. Civil supremacy over the military. I. Title. DD290.3.A77 2006 355⬘.031091821—dc22

2006041579

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: September 2006 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

I dedicate this book to my Mother and Father, for all their love and support over the years

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C O N T E N T S

List of Abbreviations

ix

Foreword

xi

Acknowledgments Chapter 1

xiii

Introduction Part I

1

Germany’s Academic Foreign Policy Debate

Chapter 2 The Question of Germany’s Normalizing Ambitions

21

Chapter 3

37

Germany—Still Not a Civilianizing Power Part II German Diplomacy as “Communicative Action”

Chapter 4

The Habermasian Practice of “Reasoning”

57

Chapter 5

The Smyser–Habermasian “Navigational Aid”

77

Part III Germany’s Influence on the U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO: The Process from 1993 to 1997 Chapter 6 Debate on NATO Enlargement, 1993

105

viii

Contents

Chapter 7

The Holbrooke Factor, 1994

149

Chapter 8

Keeping the Process Afloat, 1995

173

Chapter 9

Winning Moscow’s Approval, 1996–97

179

Conclusion

199

Notes

233

Bibliography

267

Index

299

L I S T

AA BMVg CFE CFSP CJTF COE CSCE DGAP ECE EMU ESDP EU FOTL G7/8 IFOR IISS IMF IR ISAF MoD NAC NACC NSC OECD OSCE PFP

O F

A B B R E V I A T I O N S

Auswärtige Amt Bundesministerium der Verteidigung Conventional Forces in Europe Common Foreign and Security Policy Combined Joint Task Forces Council of Europe Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe German Council on Foreign Relations East Central Europe European Monetary Union European Security and Defence Policy European Union Follow-on-to-Lance Group of Seven/Eight Industrial Countries Implementation Force International Institute for Strategic Studies International Monetary Fund International Relations International Security Assistance Force Ministry of Defence North Atlantic Council North Atlantic Co-Operation Council National Security Council Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe Partnership for Peace

x PIN SACEUR SAIS SPD SWP UN UNSC WEU WIN WMDs

List of Abbreviations Processes of International Negotiation Supreme Allied Commander in Europe School of Advanced International Studies Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik United Nations United Nations Security Council Western European Union Washington Interest in Negotiation Weapons of Mass Destruction

F O R E W O R D

It is the purpose of this book to examine the nature of Germany’s diplomatic path of influence taken during the early 1990s to persuade the U.S. government of the benefits of the German rationale for the eastward enlargement of NATO. At the core of the analysis lies the disposition of the range of German diplomatic methods and techniques employed—during the unfolding of relevant (in)formal negotiations— assumed to have gradually enticed rather than assertively pressured American colleagues into supporting the prominently German proclaimed principle of the necessity for enlargement. Accordingly, this book consists of one substantial case study relating to a set of German–American consultations leading to Washington’s acceptance of the need for NATO’s eastward enlargement. Situated at the heart of the contemporary American-led rationalist–constructivist debate in International Relations theory and whilst focusing specifically on the German contribution to this debate, this inquiry raises the question of the extent to which the Habermasian social theory of “communicative action” can account for Germany’s diplomatic approach in this particular case and to what extent it can substantiate the notion of “civilian power” in the politico-diplomatic dimension of Germany’s foreign policy approach. After all, German foreign policy is not infrequently referred to as the practice of stille Diplomatie (low-profile diplomacy) commensurate with the concept of “civilian power” and so, if it is the case (as I assume it is) that history has placed a large degree of Gestaltungsmacht (shaping power) into German hands since unification, then it is not insignificant to examine in what form this Gestaltungsmacht finds expression within multilateral proceedings.

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A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

There have been many who have contributed to this book in a variety of ways. I would like to begin by thanking all of my former professors, lecturers, and colleagues at the Department of Politics, University of Southampton, United Kingdom. During the years of my B.Sc. and M.Sc. degree courses, I benefited greatly from the department’s vibrant and intellectually challenging atmosphere. My special thanks go to Emeritus Professor Peter Calvert, Professor Lord Raymond Plant, and Professor John Simpson, director of the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies. This book would not have been possible had it not been for the intellectual inspiration drawn from a highly international study environment well provided for by the British university system. My deepest gratitude goes to Professor Dr. Josef Esser and Professor Dr. Hans-Henning Schröder for having paved the way for my eventual return to Germany and the commencement of my doctoral degree at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University of Frankfurt, M., in the spring of 2000. In this respect, I would like to express my thanks to Professor Dr. Harald Müller, Director of the Hessische Stiftung für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung for all his help and support. Professor Dr. Lothar Brock and Professor Dr. Berthold Meyer equally deserve my gratitude for their encouragement and support over the years. Dr. Stephan Nitz, the HSFK’s senior librarian, deserves a special mention for providing me with most of the necessary research materials. At the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University’s Department of International Relations and Comparative Politics, I would like to thank all members of staff of the Internationale Promotions-Centrum

xiv

Acknowledgments

Gesellschaftswissenschaften for organizing an outstanding series of workshops in support of the research concerns of doctoral students. In this respect, I am particularly grateful to Professor Charles Kaplan from the University of Maastricht for his excellent workshop on Research Methodology held in the summer of 2003. I am equally grateful to the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik for allowing me to benefit greatly from its many controversial discussions held at conferences and public events in both Bonn and Berlin. My special thanks goes to Dr. Jackson Janes, director of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies in Washington, D.C., and Professor Jeffrey Anderson, now director of the BMW Centre for German and European Studies at Georgetown University for granting me three months in residence as a DAAD/AICGS Research Fellow in the autumn/winter period of 2001–02. The seminars and conferences organized by the institute are an indispensable source for new ideas and approaches to vital questions on the future of German–American and Euro-Atlantic relations particularly in the post9/11 international security environment. I am also grateful to Professor Angela Stent, director of the Centre for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies at Georgetown University for inviting me to participate in her study group on the theme “A New Security Agenda for U.S.–German–Russian Relations” in the company of highly distinguished and seasoned experts in international affairs. Of course, I am deeply indebted to my informants in Washington, D.C., Berlin, Brussels, and Bonn for having been extraordinarily generous with their time and for sharing their knowledge not just with respect to my specific research concern but also to my broader interest in international affairs. My special thanks go to Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, his Excellency Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, Vice Admiral Ulrich Weisser (ret.); Dr. Ronald Asmus, Professor Richard Kugler, Dr. Stephen Larrabee, Professor Anthony Lake, Dr. Jennone Walker, Professor Daniel Hamilton, Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel, Professor James Goldgeier, Dr. Robert Hunter, Dr. Karsten Voigt, Dr. Michael Rühle, Dr. Uwe Nerlich, Herrn Hans-Joachim Falenski, and Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp amongst others. Finally, I wish to thank my mother and father for their loving support and encouragement over the years. Writing this book has been a great experience and I am quite pleased to have achieved my goal not merely in terms of reaching the desired level of qualification, but more significantly in terms of “getting my ideas across.” In the same vein,

Acknowledgments

xv

therefore, I alone am responsible for the book’s remaining weaknesses and shortcomings. However, I humbly hope that this book will be of some significance in the enhancement of our understanding of where I believe the focus on Germany’s evolving foreign policy ought to lie in what is sure to be a continuously accelerating and challenging process of international change.

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C H A P T E R

1

Introduction We are all racing into the future but it is increasingly the pace of change, and not our wills, which is shaping the future. The world is rather like a plane on automatic pilot, with its speed continuously accelerating but with no defined destination.1

European international relations is in the grip of enormous change. Ever since the end of the Cold War, vast efforts have been made and innumerable books and articles have been written from the wish to discuss ways of how best to redefine and readjust Europe’s security architecture to a rapidly changing and volatile international security environment. However, to influence, (re)shape and mold the substance and course of changing structures within the very process of change is not an easy task. Nor has it been made any easier by the atrocities of 9/11 and the subsequent rather ill-conceived U.S. “war on terror.”2 It is not surprising, therefore, that the seemingly endless flood of publications on the subject of European international (in)security should reveal merely one certainty amongst many more evolving uncertainties: Europe’s path of transition appears everything but transitory, instead growing ever more challenging in speed and complexity. In the meantime, the continent has embarked upon two major structural projects—the eastward enlargement processes of The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Both of these processes—individually and combined—will have farreaching strategic as well as political–cultural consequences for all of Europe and its entire peripheral surroundings if not beyond.3 Situated at the crossroads of these developments lies a now unified German state, confronted with the threefold task of having to simultaneously cope with the country’s burdensome legacy of the past, the intricate problems of the present, and the growing challenges of the

2

Germany’s Civilian Power Diplomacy

future thus emanating in a constellation of foreign and security policy interests unique to Germany. It is this distinct constellation of foreign and security policy interests—the enduring necessity to calm pan-European fears of a dominating Germany, the necessity to meet expectations at home and abroad of a Germany able to cope with the changing domestic and international political environment, and the necessity to rise to the task of initiating dialogue within and amongst the institutions of multilateral cooperation so as to lend new impetus to the protective shield of and springboard for German foreign policy whenever these forms of cooperation threaten to drown in inertia— which places Germany in a special position to shape and influence the contemporary and future contours and content of whatever may constitute European international security in the years to come. The hopes that the peculiarity of this position raises among some if only few leading foreign observers to German politics is, perhaps, best exemplified by the respective works of Fritz Stern and Timothy Garton Ash written during the early 1990s. Writing in the course of German unification, the historian Fritz Stern observed: Germany and Europe now have a second chance to assure their true values in peace and freedom, and to do so under much more propitious conditions than in the age of crude nationalism prior to 1914.4 Stern further emphasized that Germany’s leadership were well advised to avail this “second chance” by directing its efforts toward the promotion of peace and understanding less in the manner of pledging its support for Europe in words than in a more practical sense.5 Another equally hopeful expression of a new and constructive German role in and for Europe is reflected in Timothy Garton Ash’s highly acclaimed book In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent. Here the author raises the most sensitive and yet all-pervading question regarding the future of German foreign policy—a question that many and especially Germans themselves would still prefer to ignore: To say that Germany’s problems were also Europe’s did not mean that Europe would solve them. Could Germany do it? Could it not only preserve but also help to spread the achievements that had made it a magnet and a model? In another twenty years could another Willy Brandt have the satisfaction of seeing the word Germany become the synonym not just for peace but

Introduction

3

also for freedom? Some said that Germany lacked the “internationalist élite” for the task. Yet it did not want for highly educated, well-travelled, idealistic men and women. True, what they had experienced before was little preparation for what they faced now. They were somewhat like the pilot of a barge on the Rhine who suddenly finds himself in charge of an oil-tanker on a high sea. But to some extent that had also been true of Americas’ élites in 1945. And the American half-century had not been Europe’s worst (for those in the West, that is).6 To some observers, therefore, newly unified Germany appeared as the potential unifier of a volatile and confused Großeuropa of the twenty-first century. However, that such grand visions for German leadership are still a sensitive issue both for international observers but especially for Germans themselves is most clearly reflected in the nature and course of the country’s academic foreign policy debate of the past decade. Whatever the issue of concern—be it the Gulf War of 1991; Germany’s unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991; the Bonn/Berlin Republic debate of the early to mid-1990s; the participation of the Bundeswehr in NATO’s 1999 Kosovo air war against Serbia absent a United Nations (UN) mandate; Germany’s current contribution to the UN-initiated and now NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, Afghanistan; Berlin’s defiant position toward Washington’s stance on Iraq in the course of 2002–03 or the German government’s growing insistence for a permanent seat on a reformed UN Security Council (UNSC)—at the heart of the evolving German foreign policy debate lies the persistent, although seemingly avoided question of how and by what rationale Germany ought to cope with a rapidly changing international security environment. Yet despite the centrality of this question, it seems that the “Scylla and Charybdis”7 notion of the alleged German foreign policy dilemma has left a deep imprint on the German academic consciousness and the way it chooses to discuss its country’s foreign policy. As the central features of the German academic foreign policy debate since unification reveal, foreign policy thinking in Germany over the past decade has largely been shaped by the “fears and expectations” expressed by international observers following the country’s unification.8 These fears and expectations have essentially revolved around two interrelated questions, namely whether a now reunified German state at the heart of Europe would adopt a malevolent foreign policy course or whether it

4

Germany’s Civilian Power Diplomacy

would pursue its national interests judiciously within the European balance of power. Dominated by such traditional notions of German power, the country’s foreign policy debate is thus best subsumed under the broader question of how much “regressive change” or “continuity” Germany’s evolving foreign policy has experienced since the time of unification. In other words, to what extent may Germany be turning into a “traditional power” in the realist sense of the study of International Relations (IR) as opposed to “still” being seen to conform to the Federal Republic’s foreign policy spirit of a “civilian power” amid certain necessary adjustments to changing international circumstances? Accordingly, contributors to the debate can be grouped into two main camps with “normality” observers situated at one end of the spectrum and continuity observers at the other end. Most other contributions on post-unification German foreign policy tend to coagulate around these two broader strands of argumentation.9 The persistent dominance of the normality versus continuity line of argumentation in the German academic debate on the country’s evolving foreign policy, in my opinion, attracts four key points of criticism with respect to the overall purpose of the debate. First of all, it is quite difficult to comprehend the nature of this debate in light of the all too evident fact that most leading German scholars in the respective field including even those who believe they are witnessing a normalizing trend in their country’s foreign policy behavior nevertheless agree that despite certain necessary adjustments to changing international circumstances, German foreign policy not only remains essentially characterized by continuity but that this also ought to be so. Hence, to this day there is a broad consensus across German academia, the country’s party political spectrum, and the public that “multilateral embedment” remains and ought to remain the hallmark of German foreign policy as well as its guiding principle. Second, this broad consensus is further underpinned by the meanwhile generally accepted view of the inadequacy of the (neo)realist approach to understanding Germany’s foreign policy behavior since unification. Bearing testimony to this view are the works of leading German experts in the field,10 most notably Volker Rittberger’s edited volume German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies published in 2001, the results of which are introduced in detail in chapter 2.11 The main consequence of this persistent normality versus continuity debate has been the enduring neglect of the notion of “progressive change” as encapsulated in the broader continuity line of thought on German foreign policy. The continuity school of thought essentially comprises two groups of

Introduction

5

authors both of which emphasize and agree upon the need for Germany to remain committed to its preunification foreign policy ideals and principles epitomized by the country’s continued Westbindung. However, whereas one group of authors advocate that unified Germany should remain almost unwaveringly committed to its postwar foreign policy principles in order to both alleviate lingering foreign concerns of a renewed possible German threat on the European continent and perhaps more significantly in order to respond more effectively to the challenges posed by the phenomenon of “complex interdependence,” the other group goes beyond the mere advocation of the need for foreign policy continuity insisting that Germany should—upon the foundational principles of continuity—engage in a more proactive “civilianizing” foreign policy.12 Hence, advocates of a civilianizing foreign policy take the effects of complex interdependence/globalization13 even more seriously than do the advocates of continuity thus impelling the former to make the case for the need of progressive changes in Germany’s foreign policy—changes nevertheless consistent with and built essentially upon the country’s postwar diplomatic experience in the art of multilateral cooperation. Most representative of the progressive civilianizing foreign policy strand of thought are the works of the leading German foreign policy expert Hanns W. Maull. Of particular relevance in this respect are Maull’s Vierzehn Thesen für eine neue deutsche Außenpolitik published in 1992.14 Here Maull introduced the concept of “civilian power” in both its analytical and prescriptive dimensions: the analytic dimension essentially refers to Germany’s unique postwar experiences and the evolution of West German foreign policy into one commensurate with that of a civilian power.15 The prescriptive dimension entails Maull’s vision of a unified Germany building upon its postwar diplomatic experiences in multilateral cooperation, thus evolving from a civilian to a civilianizing power. Yet, although Maull’s 1992 Thesenkomplex certainly envisions this element of progressive change, past years have seen Maull and his associates at the University of Trier concentrate their efforts more on corroborating the continued validity of the civilian power concept against the assumptions made by normality observers rather than further developing the policy options and ideas necessary to promote the concept of a civilianizing German foreign policy. This is most clearly reflected in Sebastian Harnisch’s and Hanns W. Maull’s 2001 edited volume of Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic.16 However, this is not to say that there are no growing signs of German scholarly attention beginning to swerve away from the fixation on the continuity versus normality debate

6

Germany’s Civilian Power Diplomacy

in German foreign policy and toward the recognition of an evident lack of appropriate German foreign policy concepts and ideas for rapidly changing times. Indeed, in a more recently published article entitled “Auf leisen Sohlen aus der Außenpolitik?,”17 Maull returns to the path of foreign policy prescription when he critically observes that despite some diplomatic successes in the first half of 1999, German foreign policy today suffers from conceptive unimaginativeness, a lack of strategic orientation, insufficient willingness to shape events proactively, and, more generally, from the absence of sustaining political substance.18 Ironically, the growing realization of the lack of appropriate German foreign policy concepts for changing times is also reflected in recent publications by leading normality observers,19 thus indicating a degree of convergence between so far largely opposed positions. Hence, this only serves to confirm that progressive conceptual thinking in the German academic foreign policy debate has thus far largely been neglected. The fourth point of criticism relates to a lingering inherent weakness in Maull’s two-dimensional civilian/civilianizing power argumentation. If left unexposed and unsubstantiated, this weakness will hardly allow for the progressive development of the notion of civilianizing power. To be clear, there are three definitions of the notion of civilian power: first, the notion of civilian power as a state; second, civilian power as the exercise of foreign policy by means of diplomatic and economic influence (the use of military force is seen only as a means of last resort in the service of upholding international order); and third, civilian power as a process of “civilianization.”20 Judging by the nature of the tasks enlisted in Maull’s Vierzehn Thesen and according to which Germany should strive to promote a civilianizing process in and of international relations, it is not difficult to see that the accomplishment of such tasks depends first and foremost upon the effective exercise of diplomacy. It is the diplomatic-political vein of power that usually reigns supreme in terms of the official acknowledgment of the existence of international political problems and the choice of appropriate responses thereto. Besides, the notion of a country or a group of countries civilianizing international relations would be quite a patronizing even ethnocentric one, if it were not rooted in the understanding that multilateral cooperation as an essential building-block of the civilianization process could in itself only thrive on the basis of mutual respect and dignity, at the heart of which lies the notion of the skilful exercise of diplomacy. Furthermore, Maull’s persistent critique that Germany’s leadership were not employing its “unique experience and diplomatic skill in multilateral cooperation”21 consistently and to the

Introduction

7

fullest of its capacities, even though and precisely because there have been times when Germany has proven its ability to exercise effective diplomatic leadership in certain crises situations, also bears testimony to the fact that it is the notion of the effective exercise of diplomatic influence that essentially undergirds Maull’s civilian/civilianizing power argumentation. Yet, although Maull explicitly mentions examples of German diplomatic leadership, we are left to wonder what the specifics of Germany’s unique “diplomatic skill” actually are. If it were the case that civilian diplomacy had merely to be multilaterally embedded and oriented, then other contemporary major powers could also claim the status of being civilian powers. However, as Maull explained in 1992, neither the United States nor France nor Great Britain in comparison to Germany and Japan could be seen to satisfactorily fulfill all of the key criteria pertaining to the qualified status of a civilian power.22 In other words, a foreign policy oriented toward multilateralism need not in itself be civilian. So, what then forms the essence and substance of a civilian power understanding of diplomacy? Clearly, the mere notion of the existence of a unique civilian German diplomatic skill can hardly promote our understanding of what characterizes the heart of Germany’s foreign policy. Nor can it help us to further our understanding of how best to develop Germany’s Gestaltungsfähigkeit (capacity to shape) in the civilianizing power sense, which in retrospect seems to have been the prime objective of Hanns W. Maull’s Vierzehn Thesen complex. It is against the background of the combination of these four points of criticism that we can now begin to turn our attention toward the central research purpose of this book. With German foreign policy prominently referred to as the practice of stille Diplomatie (low-profile diplomacy) traditionally associated with the broader concept of Germany’s Zivilmacht orientation, it is the purpose of this book to evaluate the diplomatic course of action taken by German decisionmakers during the early 1990s to gradually convince rather than assertively pressure their American counterparts into supporting the prominently German proclaimed principle for the necessity of NATO’s eastward enlargement. Part of this overarching research inquiry is the question of the extent to which the Habermasian social theory of “communicative action” substantiated by William Smyser’s recently released study on German negotiating behavior23 can account for Bonn’s diplomatic approach vis-à-vis Washington during the relevant negotiation period. Put differently, can the Habermasian “logic of reasoning” breathe life into the civilian power notion of German diplomacy in the context of German–American Alliance relations in the 1990s?

8

Germany’s Civilian Power Diplomacy

The relevance of this particular research inquiry and the approach taken can, perhaps, be understood best through the perspective of both a narrow and broader dimension of arguments. The narrow dimension essentially relates to the nature of the German academic foreign policy debate and the way it has been perceived over the past decade; hence, it contains a number of mutually reinforcing arguments, of which the most important ones have already paved the way to the above introduction of the central research question of this book. Still, however, some lingering weaknesses remain to be distinguished with respect to the continued rationale of the debate and its long-term neglect of the civilianizing foreign policy school of thought. The broader perspective pertains to the changing nature of contemporary international relations and is equally composed of a number of mutually reinforcing arguments, which serve to underscore the growing relevance of diplomacy in the civilianizing power vein for the future of German foreign policy, though not exclusively so. With respect to the arguments underpinning the narrow dimension of the central research question, it has already been noted that the course of the German academic foreign policy debate is considered to entail some significant flaws, making it all the more unfortunate that the debate should have evolved for so long. To begin with, there is the question of what exactly the frequently invoked notion of German “foreign policy normalcy” might mean at a time when all major Western powers are increasingly plagued by the loss of the self-evident in international affairs. To say that Germany were “again becoming as normal as its Western allies”24 is highly misleading if we consider that the world’s only remaining superpower—the United States—is itself in search of a clear foreign and security policy rationale suited to meet the challenges of a complex new era since the end of the Cold War. In other words, who would like to place a bet on where or how “normal” French, U.S., or British foreign policy might be ten years from now? Therefore, with the foreign policy rationale of the world’s major powers in flux and with no patent remedy in sight of how best to respond to international and regional policy challenges, it is difficult to see how anyone can even invoke the notion of foreign policy normalcy, let alone apply it to Germany’s already encumbered foreign policy path. Also, normality observers like to refer to Germany’s current leadership’s frequent use of the term “self-confidence” as a persuasive indicator for a growing trend toward German foreign policy normality.25 Yet the observers’ inconsistent reference to the use of the term self-confidence only serves to aggravate the issue of definitional weakness in their

Introduction

9

argumentation: as the respective literature reveals, it hardly makes sense to employ the term normality interchangeably with that of self-confidence to prove one’s argument on the one hand, whilst opening up the possibility of Germany having the choice to either become a normal nation or a self-confident civilian power on the other hand.26 Besides, if it is the case as leading normality observers have long insisted that German foreign policy were becoming increasingly normal then why should Germany now be seen to be faced with a choice? Moreover, the notion of a self-confident civilian power clearly corresponds to Maull’s notion of a civilianizing power since the evolution from a civilian power to one committed to the task of civilianizing international relations clearly requires some growth and maturation in terms of foreign policy self-confidence. Therefore, the term selfconfidence can either be used as an indicator for growing signs of German foreign policy normality (whatever that may mean) or it may be regarded as an essential element for Germany’s foreign policy evolution from that of a passive civilian to that of a more active civilianizing power. Yet it certainly cannot be reserved for both sides of the apparent divide. Furthermore, the arguments put forward by leading Euroskeptics or “proponents” for greater foreign policy normality27 that a unified Germany must begin to articulate its “national interests” vis-à-vis its Western partners, and especially the United States, more resolutely than during the days of the former Federal Republic, essentially assume that postwar West Germany had been unaware of its national interests simply because its leadership refrained from articulating the country’s foreign policy interests in such direct terms. However, such arguments are clearly oblivious to the fact that there have been many critical junctures in postwar German foreign policy—be it the intensification of the Cold War in the 1950s, the emergence of détente in the 1960s and 1970s, or the new Cold War of the 1980s—where West Germany’s leadership pursued its national interests quite confidently. In effect, and as William Smyser emphasizes, these are the very episodes and experiences of German postwar history that have given the country’s diplomacy its distinct and unique character.28 In other words, there really never was a golden age of tranquility with an automatic harmony of interest and similar conceptual outlook among Western Alliance members and especially within the U.S.–West German strategic partnership in NATO. The last in a long series of Alliance nuclear controversies with decisive German influence on U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War was, in fact, the 1989 U.S.–German “Follow-on-to-Lance”

10

Germany’s Civilian Power Diplomacy

(FOTL) dispute over the replacement of the Lance short-range ballistic missile with a more modern and technically advanced missile. Had it not been for Bonn’s persistent opposition to Washington’s modernization plans for Lance, Germany’s peaceful unification and thus the end of the Cold War might never have come to pass.29 Hence, one need only take a closer look at U.S.–German alliance relations before the end of the Cold War to find powerful examples of a “confident” pursuit by Germany’s leadership of its country’s national interests. Equally noteworthy in the argumentations presented by both normality proponents and observers alike, seems to be the intrinsic belief that the civilian power/continuity school entails some notion of foreign policy “altruism.” Why else would these scholars suggest that Germany’s leadership were behaving or should be behaving increasingly normal in its foreign policy posture? Yet on closer inspection there is no obvious reason for why the concept of civilian power should be seen as being altruistic. There is simply nothing in the corresponding literature on German foreign policy continuity that would suggest this. What the civilian power/continuity school of thought does suggest is that Germany should—in the pursuit of its own foreign policy interest—also take into consideration the national interests of its immediate neighbors and partners, and to the best of its ability strive toward balanced compromises. And it should do so not merely because of the peculiarities associated with the dark chapters of Germany’s past coupled with its central geographical location at the heart of Europe, but rather because its central political position in a pan-European institutional network and the increasingly complex nature of international affairs demand it to be so. If we can accept the fact that the civilian power school of thought contains no element of altruistic foreign policy advice, then we can logically also agree that there is no obvious contradiction between observers of, and proponents for, greater German foreign policy normality on the one hand and continuity proponents on the other hand. In fact, there is no obvious need to even juxtapose the two positions against each other, especially if there is already a broad consensus among German foreign policy experts that foreign policy continuity remains and must remain the guiding principle for Germany. It is not least for this reason that we must improve our understanding of what constitutes the essence of Germany’s civilian power diplomacy if we are to develop progressive options for German foreign policy. This brings us to the broader perspective on the relevance of and approach to our central research question. This perspective entails a number of interrelated arguments pertaining to (i) the changing nature

Introduction

11

of international relations and thus the growing relevance of the concept of civilianizing power; (ii) the differentiation between Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft power” and Maull’s concept of civilian power; and (iii) the growing relevance of moral and practical discourses over the continued validity of international norms in light of the growing crisis of multilateralism in international affairs. With respect to the growing relevance of the civilianizing power concept for contemporary international affairs, it is against the background of the phenomenon of “globalization” and thus the “poorly understood but widespread feeling that the very nature of world politics is changing”30 that Hanns W. Maull actually saw the need to develop his civilian power argumentation during the early 1990s. Since then, Maull has consistently argued that the utility of traditional notions of power politics was a fairly limited one in helping us to understand the increasingly complex nature of international relations and in assessing the evolution of post-unification German foreign policy behavior more specifically.31 As Maull explained in 1999, any serious evaluation of German power since unification would have to be less concerned with traditional notions of a possible return to the German practice of Machtpolitik than with the question of how Germany actually goes about pursuing its legitimate national interests. In other words, to what extent might Germany’s ability to influence its partners have improved since unification? After all, and as Maull emphasizes, to this day there are no obvious indications in crude realist terms to reasonably argue that Germany’s power position has actually improved.32 If anything, it has probably worsened if we take into consideration that so far the internationally expected second German Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) has evidently not materialized. Instead, Germany today faces the most serious economic crisis since its postwar defeat with a high rate of unemployment, low growth rates, and a deteriorating welfare state. Hence, as Maull argued in 1999, digging deeper into the mechanisms of Germany’s exercise of diplomatic influence in international affairs appears to be a much wiser path to evaluate the extent to which Germany’s power might have grown since unification. Turning to the necessary differentiation between the concepts of soft and civilian power, it is certainly true that Maull’s civilian power conception thrives on both Germany’s as well as Japan’s special postwar experiences whereas the civilianizing dimension is developed only with respect to Maull’s vision and hope for Germany’s future foreign policy path. Despite this specificity, it is still possible to argue that Maull’s concept does stake a universal claim and is thus not confined to Germany

12

Germany’s Civilian Power Diplomacy

and/or Japan.33 This universal applicability of the concept of civilian power is most clearly reflected in Maull’s 1990–91 argumentation that the limited effectiveness of traditional means of power politics to dealing with international politics in a “globalized” world would sooner or later compel even the United States to recognize the value of the civilian power foreign policy approach to international affairs. Hence, Maull predicted, “the United States will have to evolve into a new type of international power, of which Germany and Japan are already in a sense prototypes: it must become a ‘civilian power.’ ”34 It is perhaps ironic that the universality of the civilian power concept should at first glance be confirmed by its apparent match with the equally popular notion of soft power, originating in the U.S. genre of IR scholarship. The notion of soft power features most prominently in Joseph Nye’s enduring and increasingly more urgent appeal that if the United States wishes to maintain its superpower position in a world characterized by “complex interdependence,” its leadership will have to become more aware of the rationale of “soft(er)” dimensions of power.35 At this point, it is not difficult to recognize the parallels between Hanns Maull’s line of argumentation and that of Joseph Nye. In fact, although the notion of soft power is rooted in discussions on U.S foreign policy, it also appears in discussions on German foreign policy, where it will frequently and unquestioningly be used in exchange with the notion of civilian power. Yet, a careful glance at Nye’s conception of soft power reveals that this interchangeability does not necessarily follow and for this reason can cause significant misunderstandings in the respective areas of both German and U.S. foreign policy. Nye developed the notion of soft power with an explicit concern for the best possible U.S. foreign policy rationale in a world characterized by asymmetrically changing currencies of power. Accordingly, Nye argues that if the United States wants to maintain its status and credibility as the world’s only remaining superpower in the post-9/11 international security environment, it will have to become increasingly aware of the utility of its soft power resources in its conduct of international affairs, although it need not necessarily do so at the expense of becoming more inattentive to its “hard power” resources as defined in material economic and military terms and comprising the possibility of being applied as positive inducements (economic carrots) and/or negative sanctions (economic or military sticks). Soft power, in Nye’s view, is intended to co-opt rather than to coerce. It derives essentially though not exclusively from the power of attraction through cultural values, political ideology, and economic prosperity: in short, “the American

Introduction

13

way of life.” Soft power is said to represent more than merely the ability to persuade or move people by argument. It represents the ability to entice and attract through the spread of U.S. cultural values thus encouraging acquiescence and imitation.36 As Nye explains, if the United States represents values that other countries will gladly follow, it will cost the United States far less to lead. Yet, Nye also cautions that in a variegated world, both hard and soft powers resources must remain equally relevant even if to different degrees in different relationships. The OECD world (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) may well be experiencing changes in the quality and tangibility of its power resources and relevant indicators thereof, but the same cannot be said for other parts of the world where stalled developments pose a barrier to the transformation of power. Once again, Nye does not explicitly plead for the United States to reduce its focus on military power. He merely argues that it would be a fallacy for the United States to concentrate too narrowly on the military dimension of its power. This suggests that Nye is, in fact, pleading for an effective combination of both hard and soft power resources in U.S. foreign policy. How then does Nye’s notion of soft power differ from Maull’s notion of civilian power? The answer is they differ in three respects: first, whereas Maull’s conception of civilian/civilianizing power can claim universal applicability,37 Nye’s notion of soft power is conceived only with an eye to how the United States might best maintain its leadership status in the world. Second, when Maull first conceived of his 1992 theses, he emphasized the need for the world’s major powers to recognize that the changing nature of international relations ultimately meant that “security” was an indivisible universal good that could not be sustained in one part of the world while bereft in other parts of the world. It is for this reason that Maull called for the promotion of an international process of civilianization, in which Germany and Japan—by virtue of already fulfilling prime credentials of the civilian power model—could in a sense lead by example. Thus, the civilianization of international relations is intended to serve not only the interest of the promoters but must equally be seen to be in the interest of those to be promoted. By contrast, a closer look at Nye’s line of argumentation reveals that the notion of the wanting exercise of U.S. soft power is merely intended as a mechanism by which the United States can realize its own interests without paying much attention to the legitimate interests of other countries. This is most clearly exemplified by Nye’s parent–child analogy, which the author uses to describe the position of the United States

14

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in the world and its relationship to the rest of the world.38 Not only is this analogy highly patronizing in that the United States is seen to claim parental status whereas other sovereign nations are regarded as children, but more significantly, Nye’s assumption that the soft power projection of “American values” will secure U.S. leadership in the world clearly also shows no respect for the cultural values, beliefs, and legitimate interests of other nations in the world. Nye simply and unquestioningly assumes “the American way of life” to be in the interest of all nations. One dare say that it is precisely this assumption that forms the true “Paradox of American Power” were it not for the spread of U.S. culture that is causing so much resentment in parts of the world that are equally proud and protective of their cultural values. Hence, it is in the absence of empathy for the legitimate interests, values, and beliefs of other countries that Nye’s notion of the purpose of soft power stands in stark contrast to Maull’s notion of the purpose of civilianizing power. Finally, we must remember that Maull’s concept of civilian power is not a pacifist one. It does include the possibility of the resort to military force, but does so only as a measure of last resort for the protection of international law and order. It is to be resorted to only when all other forms of negative sanctions, notably economic ones, have been fully and unsuccessfully exhausted. Also, the use of military force in the civilian power sense must not only remain circumscribed by the collective system of international law but the degree of its application must also be seen to stand in proportion to the threat it is meant to address. On the whole, however, civilian power rests primarily on diplomatic and economic foreign policy instruments, the latter of which can be used in terms of positive incentives or negative sanctions. Now, the fact that civilian economic power can comprise the possibilities of both positive incentives (carrots) as well as negative economic sanctions (sticks) could encourage some observers to argue that this positive–negative option may also apply to the civilian power concept of diplomacy and so possibly include the option of “coercive diplomacy.”39 Yet that this is not the case can most clearly be discerned from Maull’s persistent emphasis that Germany must cultivate its postwar diplomatic skill in multilateral cooperation—a skill based essentially on diplomatic subtlety and finesse rather than coercion. This is also reflected in the example that Maull recites to make his point: hence, Berlin’s 1999 diplomatic success in persuading Russia to rejoin the Western political effort to get Slobodan Milosevic to concede defeat, thereby preventing the possibility of a NATO ground war in Kosovo, followed by Joschka Fischer’s initiation of the Balkan Stability Pact is one example in point.40 One might also

Introduction

15

add the November 2001 Königswinter UN conference on the formation of an interim government in Afghanistan, which was successfully concluded within the course of nine days. This example reflects not only Berlin’s persistent lobbying with the UN and Washington to bring the conference to Königswinter, but also unveils where the strengths of German diplomatic leadership is seen to lie, namely in the role of the “even-handed, responsible and capable peace facilitator.”41 Not only was Joschka Fischer’s role in helping to achieve the talks’ objectives praised by Lakhdar Brahimi, but the U.S. representative, James Dobbins, was also noted for praising Germany’s leadership in exercising discretion and influence on the negotiating parties when necessary, thus underlining the international acknowledgment and encouragement that Germany has won for its diplomatic efforts and possible future initiatives.42 In fact, the German-brokered Israel–Hizbollah Prisoner Swap, successfully concluded in January 2004 after more than three years of negotiation, serves as a more recent example in underlining the effectiveness of Germany’s diplomatic and mediating skills.43 From this we can conclude that the notion of civilian power diplomacy rests primarily on the value of persuasion rather than coercion. Joseph Nye’s soft power line of argumentation, in contrast, essentially departs from a variegated international perspective according to which we can roughly identify three types of countries in the world today: first, poor and weak preindustrial states; second, modernizing industrial states such as China and India; and third, postindustrial societies such as those prevalent in North America, Europe, and Japan. In Nye’s view, the use of military force is still common in the first category, still accepted in the second, but less tolerated in the third.44 As a result, Nye insists that the United States may well have to resort to its hard power resources in its relations with non-OECD countries.45 However, if it is the case that soft power is already the main currency of power in the OECD area then ought not the real foreign policy challenge for the United States be the question of how best to relate its soft power to non-OECD countries if it wants to avoid the use of more expensive hard power resources in the long term? In any case, it seems that the whole purpose of Maull’s civilian/ civilianizing power argumentation in an age of globalization is to overcome rather than perpetuate “divisionary” thinking in international security. Yet the same cannot be said for Nye’s line of soft power argumentation. It is for these three reasons that one should avoid conflating the two concepts especially with respect to discussions on German foreign policy.

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As for the growing crisis of multilateralism in international affairs, it is certainly undeniable that NATO has evolved the farthest among the world’s international organizations in adapting to the post–Cold War international security situation. No doubt, NATO remains the bedrock of German security policy, the linchpin of Euro-Atlantic security, and an indispensable forum in forging transatlantic consensus on emerging issues of common concern. Over the past decade, and not least in response to the Balkan crisis, NATO has passed through a number of impressive external reforms and corresponding internal policy adjustments: its eastern enlargement process; its NATO–Russia Council and defense cooperation partnerships with over 30 countries; its Mediterranean Dialogue; its periodically revised strategic security concepts; its persistent stabilization efforts in the Balkans; its declared support for a stronger European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within NATO; its efforts to streamline and strengthen NATO’s military command structure and capabilities in accordance with the Alliance’s declared aim to combat international terrorism more flexibly in the post-9/11 security environment; and finally NATO’s adoption of the ISAF mission in and increasingly beyond Kabul, thus representing the Alliance’s first international military mission outside the EuroAtlantic area. Although this track record may seem impressive, it is important to remind ourselves that throughout the 1990s the international security situation remained diffuse with no single threat emerging to challenge the security of advanced Western nations in a single unitary way. With the events of 9/11 this situation has completely changed. Terrorist militant Islam represents the first clear manifestation of a post–Cold War security threat confronting all nations to an equal degree: from New York across Bali to Madrid and London. Ironically, and instead of diminishing the threat, the U.S. invasion of Iraq has merely served to expose the very weaknesses of the supposedly overarching international role of the UN. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the creaking old bones of the collective system of international law are laid bare by what in hindsight appears to have been a thus far rather superficial international security debate. Hence, as astonishing as NATO’s transformation of the past decade may seem at first sight, genuine in-depth reforms of the entire collective system are still lacking. This, in turn, perpetuates the growing problem of asymmetry in the conception of and approach to international security issues among the world’s leading international organizations. The contemporary state of fluidity in international norms and the absence of a common understanding of the

Introduction

17

nature of international security in the twenty-first century, which could span the entire collective system, is most clearly reflected in the example of NATO’s bombing campaign against Serbia in the spring of 1999: although the Alliance felt compelled to carry out the mission in response to televised images of a genocidal war taking place in Europe, NATO’s air campaign against Belgrade was not supported by an appropriate UN mandate. Another example of growing uncertainty over what might be “right” or “wrong” under international law is the case of the December 1998 U.S.–British air raid on Iraq. It was carried out without an appropriate UNSC resolution and without a formal warning and declaration of war. Both the U.S. and British governments merely sought to justify their action against Iraq on alleged grounds of Iraqi attempts to acquire and store weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—grounds left unsubstantiated to this day by the equally illegal U.S.-led assault on Iraq in the spring of 2003. Thus, the Iraq episode of December 1998 already created a dangerous precedent for the growing international disrespect of international law and order. Gaping loopholes in the system of international law and the growing temptation by major powers to take advantage of these weaknesses, significantly raises the importance of the need for moral and practical discourses in international affairs.46 In the Habermasian sense, moral and practical discourses are concerned with questions pertaining to the continued appropriateness or validity of existing international norms. To figure out how best to respond to diverse international security situations, actors in international affairs must be willing to engage in collective communicative processes of “reasoning” and “deliberation.” Today, the international community has reached a stage where the need for a reasoned consensus over the continued appropriateness of existing international norms relevant to the continued viability and credibility of the collective organizational system of international relations has never been so urgent. Although the crisis of multilateralism presents a particular challenge to the continued viability of Germany’s basic foreign policy rationale, the purpose of this book is much wider. After all, are not all modern democracies sitting in the same boat of widespread international uncertainty and insecurity? Hence, to draw attention to the growing significance of reason for the purpose of effective German diplomacy in the civilianizing power sense is also to emphasize the growing necessity for the practice of reasoning in international relations more broadly. The following analysis consists of three parts. Part I introduces the dominant strands of argumentation in the German academic foreign

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policy debate, in order to establish the central argument for why it is necessary to move beyond the main tenets of this debate. Part II introduces the theoretical approach to our central research question into the nature of Germany’s influence on the U.S. decision to enlarge NATO by 1997, with detailed attention paid to the specifics of the Habermasian notion of deliberation in international negotiations and the way it may underpin our research question. The case study is presented in part III of this book. By means of detailed process-tracing based on interviews held with involved German and American policy-advisers,47 part III delineates the extent and ways by which German policymakers sought to convince their U.S. counterparts to accept the primarily Germandefined rationale for the need of NATO’s first round of eastward enlargement. In recapitulating the essential purpose of this book, the concluding chapter evaluates and presents the results of our research inquiry, whilst in the end also considering its significance for the future of German foreign policy, though not exclusively so.

P A R T

I

Germany’s Academic Foreign Policy Debate

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C H A P T E R

2

The Question of Germany’s Normalizing Ambitions As the prospect of German foreign policy normality continues to be the subject of intense international speculation, it is hard to think of a nation more obsessed with debating their country’s normalcy than the Germans.1 Ever since the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the unification of the two German states only one year later in October 1990, the realist theme of normalcy has formed a constant undercurrent to almost every significant foreign policy debate in the new Germany. The persistent continuity argument that this has invoked in response has, in turn, been increasingly challenged by the combined effects of fundamental international changes underway and the profound intensification of internal and external demands on the German state over recent years. To what extent, it is asked, can one expect the ideational foundations of Germany’s apparently deeply engrained multilateral foreign policy approach to be sustained in light of the growing complexity of the dynamics of regional and international change? In other words, to what extent might Germany’s multilateral foreign policy approach be subject to a redefinition of the “parameters of the possible” in light of growing international changes? Such is the nature of the inquiry into perceived tendencies of growing normalcy in Germany’s foreign policy stance.

Signs of Greater German Foreign Policy Normality? In recent years three important developments have taken place that have added to assumptions of greater normalcy in German foreign policy. These are, first of all, the generational change in Germany’s

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leadership with the inauguration of a new coalition government in 1998; second, the relocation of Germany’s seat of government from Bonn to Berlin in 1999; and finally, the German government’s decision to participate in NATO’s air war against Serbia absent a UN mandate in the spring of 1999. Hence, although presumptions of normality have formed a persistent undercurrent to the German foreign policy debate throughout the 1990s, it is only with the change of government in 1998 and the events since then that they have actually come to the forefront of the debate.2 With respect to the issue of generational change in Germany’s leadership, the inauguration of a new Red–Green government in September 1998 certainly raised general concerns both within Germany itself as well as abroad concerning a younger generation of leaders possibly more willing to deemphasize the historical memory of war and perhaps less inhibited to redefine the country’s multilateral foreign and security policy parameters. Also, the June 1991 decision of the German Bundestag to relocate the German capital to Berlin in the course of 1999 was—throughout the 1990s—accompanied by an intense international debate over the possible future foreign policy orientation of the new Berlin Republic to come. Hence, the actual relocation of Germany’s seat of government from Bonn to Berlin in 1999 further fuelled foreign speculations that with Berlin much closer to the dynamic transition economies of East Central Europe than Bonn, gradual political–cultural changes in Germany’s foreign policy outlook were to be expected. Third, and perhaps most significantly, the German government’s decision to participate in NATO’s air war over Kosovo in March 1999 was seen by most observers of German politics as an extraordinary break from a range of historically rooted as well as contemporary taboos regarding the question of the use of force in German foreign policy. To many observers, therefore, Germany’s military participation in the Kosovo war amounted to the most significant departure from Germany’s civilian foreign policy approach since the country’s rearmament in 1955 and its refusal to participate directly in the 1990–91 U.S.-led Gulf War. Taken together, these three developments have led some analysts to argue that Germany’s foreign and security policies might be undergoing a process of “delayed normalization.” In other words, after four decades of national division and “semi-sovereignty” under exceptional conditions,3 it appears to some analysts as though part of Germany’s political elite were finally succumbing to the temptation of “getting on

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with life at last” and of finally wanting to be treated “like other Europeans.”4 In some sense, therefore, the German normalcy debate fuses initially expressed international moderate realist concerns5 over the possibility of German policymakers increasingly willing to overcome the foreign policy limits thus far imposed by historical memory with domestic Euroskeptic realist demands that Germany ought to become increasingly assertive in defining and articulating its national interests. Hence, the contemporary debate on German foreign policy normalcy can be seen as a delayed replay of some of the realist concerns and demands expressed during the early 1990s. Yet what exactly—might one ask—are we to understand by the term normality in the evaluation of German foreign policy processes and responses? Clearly, the concept of foreign policy normality is an elusive one. For this reason, it is not hard to see why most IR experts hesitate to use such a standard to characterize in particular the politics of contemporary Germany. After all, if attempts by Germany’s leadership to take advantage of their country’s dominant position in the EU by acquiring influence over their European partners can be considered as normal European policy behavior, it would hardly be necessary to focus with anticipation on the Schröder–Fischer government for signs of detecting normal German foreign policy behavior in order to realize that the controversial decision by the Kohl–Genscher government to unilaterally recognize the Yugoslav breakaway republics of Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991 already exemplified a German foreign policy style of greater normality in that it indirectly forced its EU partners to equally recognize these countries only one month later.6 On the other hand, and by another definition, namely that of the preamble to Germany’s Grundgesetz (Basic Law), which states that it is Germany’s objective to “serve the peace of the world as an equal partner in a united Europe,”7 one could equally question whether Germany is exhibiting signs of greater normalcy when it restrains its competitive instincts in the interest of greater cooperation as in the case of the country’s renunciation of sovereignty over its own national currency for the sake of the European Monetary Union (EMU). This too could be viewed as normal German foreign policy behavior on the basis of the country’s Basic Law. In fact, only few of the analysts promulgating the term normality have deployed it with much care for conceptual underpinning be it as way of foreign policy prescription, prognoses, or caution. Therefore, it may be worth acknowledging at least Philip Gordon’s attempt to provide a definition. For Gordon the normalization of German foreign policy

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is understood to mean “that Germany is becoming more self-assured, less military-averse, more global and more assertive than in the past.”8 Gunther Hellmann appears to equate the notion of normality in German foreign policy with the return of the country’s “national interest” as a singular and routine category of thought and action including the growing preparedness to use the ultima ratio of military force as an instrument of foreign policy. In addition, Hellmann’s conception of normality also entails the view of a more instrumental German conception of what supranational institutions and alliances, notably the EU and NATO, stand for and how best they might serve Germany’s national interest.9 Hence, Hellmann’s conception and understanding of German foreign policy normality is commensurate with the Euroskeptic plea for a more normal Germany as epitomized by the writings of distinguished, conservative German political scientists and historians such as Arnulf Baring, Hans-Peter Schwarz, and Christian Hacke. Despite this we ought to remind ourselves that this particular group of authors does not seek in any way to renounce Germany’s European multilateral commitment. However, it does intend to place the reasoning behind such commitment on a more rational and nationally focused footing, indeed, much like Great Britain or France would. Therefore, the contemporary debate over whether German foreign policy might be becoming more normal, more British, or more French, as Euroskeptics think it should and Gordon and Hellmann suggest it might, subsequently begs for concrete evidence in support of such views. Judging by realist notions of normal foreign policy behavior, German foreign policy would have to be seen to be exhibiting signs of employing deliberate power geared toward the forceful articulation of its national interests combined with the use of largely material as opposed to immaterial power resources for articulating leverage.10 So, what concrete evidence is there of Germany outgrowing its multilateral instincts and of moving toward a more self-confident, instrumental articulation of its national interests as well as a more assertive use of material power resources to pursue these interests? To what extent can we observe German power being employed more deliberately and more assertively in the years since unification? Answers to these questions have typically been explored under two highly topical themes among normality proponents: the first concerning Germany’s military participation in the Alliance’s 1999 Kosovo air war and the second relating to changes in Germany’s budgetary policy stance within the EU. However, for the purpose of analytical conciseness, the

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following section focuses primarily on what leading normality proponents and observers have thus far considered to be the most vivid illustration of significant changes in Germany’s foreign and security policies namely the case of Germany’s participation in the Kosovo war.11

Kosovo and the Question of Germany’s Normalizing Ambitions In 1999 Gunther Hellmann commented that “the most remarkable feature of German foreign policy after 1990 has been the continuity in the rhetoric of continuity,”12 instrumentalized by both Helmut Kohl after his election victory in December 1990 and Gerhard Schröder after his respective election success in September 1998. Implicit in this remark is the argument that below the surface of such superficial continuity rhetoric, significant although largely concealed changes are developing in Germany’s foreign policy orientation and approach. In a rather academic argumentation to recognizing tendencies of “change” toward German foreign policy normality since unification, Hellmann thus criticizes the prevailing adherence to declarations of continuity still popular among leading German academics and policymakers.13 This, he believes, not only nurtures a false consciousness about the realities of German power but is also misleading in that it obscures important developments that may indeed be pointing to significant changes underway in both the style and substance of Germany’s foreign policy. Accordingly, Hellmann asserts that if analysts were increasingly prepared to emphasize elements of change rather than those of continuity, such an approach would naturally yield different results allowing one to paint a clearer picture of foreign policy change. But, as Hellmann informs us, the dominance of the positivist method of inquiry in the field of foreign policy analysis has also done its share of damage in constantly yielding recurring patterns of apparently similar results. In consequence, he argues, assumptions of continuity can only be proven false by cases of default. In other words, Germany’s foreign policy behavior must display something extraordinarily different or unconventional for the validity of the continuity argument to be at least put to question. Hence, given that by way of analysis the positivist approach is not geared toward the aim of generating “new” knowledge, the question of change is automatically swept away by the prevailing observations of continuity. In other words, all foreign policy decisions or processes that cannot be seen to indicate a fundamental change in

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Germany’s foreign policy orientation will, in consequence, fall victim to the dominant continuity line of argumentation.14 This dismal state of affairs, Hellmann argues further, is most clearly reflected in the country’s academic approach to the question of continuity or change in German foreign policy after unification as exemplified by three major German academic projects conducted in the course of the 1990s. The first project, led by Volker Rittberger at the University of Tübingen and published in 2001, questioned the degree to which any one of the traditional range of partially (re)constructed rationalistinspired foreign policy theories could best explain “developments” in Germany’s post-unification foreign policy. The emphasis on the term developments was intended to avoid creating the impression of the project being placed on the traditional spectrum of the continuity versus change divide and to indicate that analytical attention was indeed more objectively focused on realist assumptions of change expected to be developing in Germany’s evolving foreign policy approach. The results drawn from this particular set of highly detailed case studies on key areas of German foreign and security policies, all following one single research design, point to the overall conclusion that it is the constructivist theory as opposed to the rationalist-inspired foreign policy theories that offers the best approach to understanding how German foreign policy has developed since unification, thereby reinforcing the dominance of the conventional continuity line of argumentation so deeply ingrained in German academia and policymaking circles.15 The second major work refers to the civilian power project conducted under the auspices of Hanns W. Maull at the University of Trier also published in 2001.16 This project dealt with the question of the extent to which Germany’s foreign policy behavior across major policy areas during the 1990s could still be seen to conform to the “ideal type” model of Germany as a civilian power in the original sense of the concept.17 This project reached the conclusion that German foreign policy since 1989–90 has basically been characterized by “modified continuity” rather than “fundamental change” and that this continuity can still be explained by the concept of civilian power and corresponding notion of “role theory” despite and perhaps because of dramatic external and internal changes corroborating the alter-ego facets of the German civilian power role concept and thus lending additional credence to the constructivist approach in understanding Germany’s foreign policy evolution since unification.18 The third major piece of work is provided by Helga Haftendorn’s extensive study of the history of German foreign policy since the end

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27

of the Second World War. In addressing the question of how a divided Germany, burdened by historical legacy and constrained by the Cold War, could manage to evolve into a much respected member of the international community, and in less than half a century also succeed in achieving the country’s prime policy objective of the reunification of the two Germanys, Haftendorn focuses her inquiry on the different phases of West Germany’s postwar foreign policy whilst paying particular attention to the leadership’s political determination and tactical diplomatic skill. In fact, by emphasizing the virtues of West Germany’s diplomatic leadership style, Haftendorn intends to counter the criticisms and doubts raised by Germany’s realists and great power strategists that Bonn’s foreign policy might have been reflective of a self-confident approach. As Haftendorn argues, judging by the history of West Germany’s postwar foreign policy experiences, it would be a fallacy to believe—as realists do—that the actual foreign policy approach of the former Bonn Republic was devoid of all national interests and that the country’s leadership selflessly renounced Germany’s interests. On the contrary, and as Haftendorn tries to illustrate, the reason for Bonn’s foreign policy successes lay in the fact that the Federal Republic’s foreign policy elite clearly recognized the limits of their ability to act, accepted these, and by so doing used them to their country’s own advantage. In other words, and as Haftendorn concludes, those days the country’s political elite placed its confidence in the “method of renouncing sovereignty to gain sovereignty.”19 Based on this analysis, Haftendorn recommends that Germany best continue the policy of kluge Selbstbeschränkung (prudent self-restraint), thus abstaining from any form of foreign policy renationalization and concentrating foremost on the completion of the European integration process. As Hellmann argues, these three major works may be quite diverse in their respective approach to the question of continuity or change in German foreign policy and yet they all have one thing in common: they all focus on realist expectations of a renaissance of traditional power-political patterns of German foreign policy behavior, thereby allowing their research to be predominantly determined by the need to falsify such notions. Therefore, when just about enough evidence is gathered to falsify realist expectations, the argument is made among most German academics that German foreign policy continues to stand in the light of continuity as opposed to change in terms of realist expectations of greater normality. This is especially true for cases where the realist value reference for change taken is as exaggerated as Mearsheimer’s neorealist assumptions of a new Germany striving for

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hegemonic dominance in Europe and worse still for a military nuclear power potential.20 Hence, as Hellmann argues, against the background of such paradigmatically sharpened alternatives, between a civilian power on the one hand and a great power on the other hand, exceptionalities are being suggested that are neither plausible nor correspond to our historical experience of the realities of interstate processes and relations. If, he adds, the focus on change was less defined by realist expectations and somewhat detached from its negative connotations, one may indeed be able to identify important changes indicating the emergence of greater normality within German foreign policy. To be sure then, Hellmann criticizes the realist frame of reference, which is so dominant in the German academic debate, not so much for what it expects Germany to do as much as for the ritual oath of continuity that it encourages German analysts and policymakers to pledge. On this basis, Hellmann insists that there may indeed be important indications in the evolution of German foreign policy since the early 1990s that point to the fact that Germany’s foreign and security policies are undergoing a process of normalization thus increasingly converging with the foreign policy profiles of other European great powers, notably the United Kingdom and France. Therefore, given that the central criterion of the level of great power normality is determined by the exercise of power more generally and the willingness to use military force in particular, Hellmann insists that Germany’s military participation in the Alliance’s 1999 Kosovo war, has effectively brought to end the “ill-conceived founding myth” of Germany embodying an “avant-garde-type civilian power,”21 thereby placing the country firmly on the path of foreign policy normality. In fact, Hellmann fervently believes that the former Bonn Republic developed into a civilian power less by choice than by necessity. After all, he argues, “more than anything else, the allies wanted it to be that way.”22 Hence, in ignoring the possibility of West Germany’s gradual and willing socialization into the role of a civilian power, Hellmann implicitly and significantly also assumes that civilian power foreign policy behavior constitutes a rather abnormal phenomenon.23 Conversely then, Germany’s preparedness to resort to military force would be considered as normal foreign policy behavior. Based on this understanding of foreign policy normality, Hellmann argues that regardless of whether NATO’s war over Kosovo was morally justified or not, Germany’s military participation and involvement clearly illustrates that despite all the prevailing rhetoric of continuity, Germany—by most standards of civility—can no longer claim to

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be more or less civilian than any of its allies.24 Rather, Germany’s participation in the Kosovo war reveals that the new Berlin Republic has evolved into a “normal” ally, a country that no longer shies away from presenting itself as a self-confident nation to its partners and neighbors. Admittedly, there are five main and partially overlapping reasons for why the German decision of 24 March 1999 to contribute to NATO’s Kosovo war can be seen to represent a break with Germany’s usual foreign policy “culture of restraint”: to begin with, it was the first time since the end of the Second World War that German soldiers were dispatched on combat missions thus joining their partners and allies within NATO. Second, it was a decision that brought German soldiers to the Balkans and hence into a theatre where the burden of historical memory suggested German troops would never again be deployed. Third, not only was the Schröder–Fischer government the first German government since 1949 to decide to send German troops into combat but it was also the first German government of the Left (renown for its past entrenchment in post-1968 pacifist values) that decided to join the Alliance in its military campaign against Slobodan Milosevic. Fourth, it was a decision that created a dangerous precedent for future “peacekeeping interventions” in so far as the Alliance’s air raids were not only clearly outside of NATO’s jurisdiction, thereby overturning the Alliance’s postwar military doctrine of defensive action within NATO territory, but also lacked a clearly defined UN mandate. Fifth and finally, given that Germany joined a military operation by NATO that was offensively out of area and lacking an explicit UN mandate, it did so without clear sanction in international law and also in open contravention to the terms of the Red–Green coalition agreement of October 1998, according to which the participation of German forces in measures to preserve international peace and security is bound by the observance to international law as well as Germany’s constitutional law.25 According to Hellmann, therefore, nothing better symbolizes how much Germany’s foreign policy has changed since unification than the country’s participation in the 1999 Kosovo war. In fact, Hellmann firmly believes that the process of normalization in German foreign policy began long before the Kosovo operation of March 1999, namely with the German party political discussions surrounding the Gulf War of 1991. Hence, in his account of the shifting terrain of Germany’s leadership attitude toward the use of military force from Kuwait to Kosovo, Hellmann notes that a closer reading of the country’s political debates on Germany’s new foreign policy role during the 1990–91 Gulf War

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already foreshadowed the changes that were to come in subsequent years. As Hellmann shows in rich detail, it was during the time of the end phase of the “Two-plus-Four” negotiations on German unification in early August 199026 that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait occurred, thus prompting high-level German decisionmakers to consider the question of whether or not to support the United States in its request for German military support. As Hellmann explains, within a week of the U.S. request having been made, German Defence Ministry (MOD) circles were already hinting publicly that a deployment of the German Navy in support of military operations against Saddam could be conceivable and that such contribution could possibly be made within seven to ten days. Even Chancellor Kohl seemed willing to contribute troops to the cause, if a multilateralist cover could be provided allowing Germany to meet U.S. expectations. After all, given that Washington had been such a staunch supporter of German unification, Kohl naturally felt obliged to demonstrate solidarity with Washington and to support the United States in its military plans against Iraq. Yet, as Hellmann himself admits, a broad coalition of German politicians including leading members of Helmut Kohl’s own party strongly opposed the idea of German military participation in a possible Gulf War arguing that Germany’s Grundgesetz prohibited any deployment of the Bundeswehr outside NATO territory. Based on the established and deeply engrained political consensus among all major political parties to interpret the Constitution restrictively, it was in particular the then foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who rejected any suggestions for the deployment of German armed forces beyond NATO territory, adding that under the then actual German Constitution German soldiers were not even allowed to participate in UN peacekeeping missions unless appropriate changes to the country’s Basic Law were made. These differing views were eventually reconciled and agreement was reached that Germany would not commit any of its troops to the Persian Gulf in accordance with the conventional interpretation of the Basic Law. However, agreement was also reached upon the need to eventually amend the Constitution to allow for future military participation in the framework of the UN. Hence, in the end broader historical and political considerations prevailed. Nevertheless, the general party political controversy continued and intensified with the U.S. president’s announcement on 8 November 1990 that the American-led international coalition would begin to

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prepare for an offensive military operation against Iraq. Both the preceding and ensuing political controversy was particularly visible in the party political rhetoric of the Greens and the SPD (Social Democratic Party) both of which had charged the governing coalition with appearing intent on carving out a great power role for Germany. Even if expressed in differing terms, both parties urged the governing coalition to refrain from any form of military participation in the Gulf War, advocating instead that Germany respond to growing international expectations by gradually assuming an Internationalist foreign policy role based on its civilian power vocation. Adopting an Internationalist leadership role geared toward the civilianization of international affairs through the promotion of arms control and disarmament, for example, was heralded by these parties as the more appropriate response to the new international security environment than the rush toward changing the German Constitution in order to prepare the ground for German military involvement in future peacemaking scenarios. In fact, this opposition view was also echoed in a statement made by Willy Brandt shortly after his diplomatic success in securing the release of hostages held in Baghdad in November 1990. Brandt implored the Kohl government to continue to adhere to diplomatic means and economic sanctions “in order to reach, in every conceivable way, a political solution” to the crisis.27 Willy Brandt also reminded his country’s leadership that Germany bore a special responsibility for promoting peace since the resort to war, in his view, represented “the ultima irratio of politics.”28 Yet, as Hellmann notes, only 12 years later Willy Brandt’s words of caution were seemingly swept away as the new governing coalition of SPD and Greens led by Gerhard Schröder decided to support and join the Alliance’s air war against Belgrade. In a coincidence of timing, which hardly anyone could have predicted, the onus of responding to Washington’s expectations of a heightened German profile in American-led and primarily militarily defined international security endeavors now lay with those very parties that once so ardently criticized the former government under Helmut Kohl for seemingly caving in to U.S. demands. On closer inspection, there were three main reasons for the decision of the Schröder–Fischer government to break with Germany’s historically rooted and contemporary restrictions on an active militarily defined security role beyond NATO’s jurisdiction: the first reason for Germany’s military participation in this war lay in the governing coalition’s somewhat dubious pacifist past coupled with the fact that both parties were generally regarded as inexperienced in the conduct of foreign policy.

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As a result, it became an overriding concern of the new government to confirm its foreign policy credibility. One important way of doing so was by demonstrating its loyalty toward the Alliance. Demonstrating such alliance loyalty was seen by Schröder as an unequivocal way of gaining the foreign policy integrity his governing coalition had thus far lacked. Of course, alliance loyalty was also a logical consequence of Germany’s postwar multilateral foreign policy inheritance. However, in Schröder’s view, this heritage obliged the country to support its partners “without any ifs and buts, [. . .] as a ‘normal’ ally—whether in the EU or in NATO.”29 The second and most significant reason for Germany’s participation in the NATO intervention was the moral imperative of putting an end to the human suffering endured by the Kosovars. From the German perspective, and as repeatedly articulated by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, military intervention in the region had a strong humanitarian justification, namely to end the atrocities and human rights abuses that were being committed against innocent Kosovar civilians. Not surprisingly, Germany’s postwar political identity and culture rooted in the deeply engrained rejection of nationalist tendencies—a rejection also continuously fanned by a decade of ethnically driven wars of genocide in the Balkans and thus on Europe’s doorstep—led many on the German Left to adjust their views on the utility of military force in international affairs. In other words, if Germany’s Left had once so fervently clung to the old refrain of “never again war,” this policy stance had now given way to the overriding need of ensuring that there would never again be another Holocaust in Europe. The third main motivation for Germany’s military participation in the Kosovo war was the concern over the possible damage to the credibility and effectiveness of NATO, the EU, and the UN if the Kosovo crisis were allowed to continue unchecked. After all Germany’s multilateral foreign policy orientation meant that it depended more than any other major European country on the effective functioning of international institutions. In fact, this was an aspect that Foreign Minister Fischer repeatedly emphasized in his justifications for Germany’s participation in the air raids.30 Two subsidiary motives for Germany’s participation in the NATO war had more pragmatic roots. First, there was considerable concern in Germany about the potential influx of refugees from Kosovo. Since the 1980s, but particularly since the collapse of communism, there has been a stark increase in the number of refugees and immigrants from Eastern and South Eastern Europe as well as the Third World seeking asylum

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in the Federal Republic. However, even more disturbing than the increase in asylum seekers to Germany has been the increase in acts of violence against foreigners culminating, for instance, in a five-day riot in August 1992 in the eastern city of Rostock, where attacks against asylum seekers were applauded by the public. For a time being, therefore, “Rostock-Lichtenhagen” became the worldwide catchword for the new xenophobic terror in Germany. At the same time, parties of the extreme Right including the Republicans who had faded during the time of unification began to revive and to make striking gains in municipal elections. In fact, it is fair to say that the problem has long gone unrecognized by authorities and public opinion, with the country still lacking a concept for a definite solution to the social problems of migration, integration, and minorities. Hence, throughout the 1990s, the policy area of Germany’s so-called Ausländerpolitik (policy toward foreigners)31 has remained highly controversial, caught up in the polemics of party politics thus feeding social tensions from which parties of the extreme Right have periodically been able to benefit from. So, whilst already burdened with a large refugee population from South Eastern Europe, German authorities were of course alarmed at the possibility of another large influx of refugees.32 Finally, abstaining from participation in NATO’s action would hardly have been a feasible option either since it would have resulted in the loss of influence over NATO policies and in selfisolation. Germany was much too exposed in terms of its socioeconomic magnetism and attraction for refugees fleeing from upheavals in South Eastern Europe and much too vulnerable, politically speaking, to abdicate its political influence on an issue of such far-reaching significance to European peace and stability. Taken together, these reasons were not only enough for Germany’s new leadership to decide to participate in the Alliance’s first ever fullscale war, but they also provided reason enough for normality proponents to conclude that Germany under the new Schröder–Fischer government was finally “coming of age.”33 Clearly, and in contrast to the country’s Gulf War debates of 1990–91, this time and only nine years later, Germany willingly joined ranks with other Western allies to militarily intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state despite the lack of a UNSC mandate and thus solely, although principally, on human rights grounds. Hence, the conclusion was drawn that Germany was finally and once again evolving into a normal great power as selfconfident as its Western partners and becoming equally assertive in its foreign policy behavior.34 As Hellmann put it: “Germany finally looked

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no more and no less ‘civilian’ than any of them, a power conducting as good or bad a ‘policy of good example’ as any of them.”35 In other words, and as ‘normality’ observers would insist, the new generation of German leadership appears less reticent in deliberately deploying material power resources for self-regarding ends, thereby apparently confirming some of the realist concerns raised in the immediate aftermath of German unification that the new Germany could once again evolve into a great power with a foreign policy vocation similar to that of France or the United Kingdom.

Normality Observers in a Cul-de-Sac: Observation versus Prescription However, as convincing as the arguments of normality observers may seem at first sight, on closer inspection they still raise certain fundamental questions relating in particular to the definitional problem of the meaning of foreign policy normality as raised earlier. First of all, to simply equate trends in Germany’s evolving foreign policy with those of other great powers notably France and the United Kingdom is highly misleading given that since the end of the Cold War these countries are as much in search of a new foreign policy rationale suited to meet the challenges of a complex new era as is the Alliance’s lead nation—the United States—itself. With the foreign policy rationale of these countries in flux, it becomes not only highly difficult to establish normality yardsticks against which to assess any country’s foreign policy, but it is also and more importantly a futile exercise since it does not help to resolve the foreign policy crisis that all Western countries are increasingly confronted with. In the area of Alliance politics, for example, the past 12 years have seen much confusion among NATO members over the appropriate relationship between operational capabilities, the political will to use them, and the political wisdom of deploying them. In fact, there is no doubt that over recent years the national security policies of each of the Alliance members have come to be characterized by elements of uncertainty and change. Indeed, in the depths of the Cold War it was relatively easy to predict the core tenets of U.S. national security policy for the next five to ten years. Nowadays, however, the untidy mosaic of international affairs hardly allows for such predictions. Viewed against this background, one cannot help but wonder whether the notion of foreign policy normalcy is an adequate description for the foreign policy of any state in the world today.

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The second point of criticism concerns the tendency among normality observers to interpret the frequent use of the term self-confidence by Germany’s current leadership as a sign of the country’s growing powerpolitical consciousness. Again, this is a highly misleading interpretation since the term self-confidence need not necessarily be equated with foreign policy normality as employed by normality observers. Seen from an Internationalist perspective, Germany’s leadership would also have to become self-confident in order to assume a civilianizing leadership role in world politics. Hence, the immediate equation of the notion of self-confidence with great power politics risks ignoring the fact that maturing into an Internationalist civilianizing leadership role naturally also presumes change toward greater self-confidence. Therefore, what may be self-confident and normal German foreign policy behavior to one person, may be self-confident, Internationalist German foreign policy behavior to another. Besides, efforts to repackage one’s normality argumentation in terms of the “power political resocialization”36 of German foreign policy, particularly in the context of more recent discussions over Berlin’s bid to acquire a permanent seat on a reformed UNSC, are equally unlikely to conceal the many inherent contradictions that persist in the normality argumentation: first, it is difficult to see how the year-long argumentative effort at observation of Germany’s apparent power political resocialization can be reconciled with the sudden foreign policy prescription that Germany’s leadership were better advised to return to the good old tradition of Bonn’s low-profile diplomacy.37 Second, to cite Germany’s performance at the November 2001 Königswinter UN/Afghanistan conference as well as Fischer’s 1999 Peace Plan as examples for low-profile German diplomatic successes,38 is to completely misconstrue Hanns Maull’s argument that it is precisely on the basis of such examples of German diplomatic performance that Berlin must become more active. In other words, these borrowed examples are not suited to make one’s case for a low-profile German diplomacy, especially if we accept that it is precisely because of these German diplomatic successes that a large part of the international community would like to see Germany assume a rightful place on a new UNSC.39 Third, the argument that Germany, due to its domestic socioeconomic difficulties, cannot afford a greater role in the UN is to contradict one’s previous argument made in the Kosovo war context that Germany was experiencing a “militarization” of its security policy. Also, if Germany were evolving toward a power political resocialization of its foreign policy, why would it be so keen to strengthen the UNSC’s international

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legitimacy? And finally, if Germany could not afford a high-profile foreign policy, why bother to warn of the increasing power political resocialization of Germany? In any case, it seems that the contemporary developments in Germany’s foreign policy are far more intricate than the interpretations of normality observers would like to have us believe. Yet, just as the theme of normalcy has occupied a prominent place in the academic debate on Germany’s foreign policy future in recent years, so too has the theme of Germany as a civilian power.

C H A P T E R

3

Germany—Still Not a Civilianizing Power As we have seen in the context of the normalization debate, it is certainly true that some of Germany’s postwar foreign and security policy assumptions have been gradually revised in the course of the 1990s in adjustment to evolving European and international security issues.1 Yet this evolution need not necessarily be seen to directly contradict Hanns Maull’s civilian power argumentation of the early to mid-1990s. Therefore, and in order to avoid carrying over possible misinterpretations of Maull’s original argumentation, it may—first of all—be worth recalling some of the central tenets of his original work to clear the ground for further analysis and discussion of where Germany’s foreign policy may be heading, if indeed we can assume that Germany’s leadership knows where it is heading. My guess is they do not.

Remembering the Original Value of the Civilian Power Thesis First developed in the early 1970s by François Duchêne and Andrew Schonfield,2 the notion of civilian power reemerged during the early to mid-1990s in a series of articles written by the German political scientist Hanns W. Maull. Writing in the immediate aftermath of German unification, Maull observed that the nature of international relations and the role of the nation-state were undergoing a profound transformation and that this was not merely a result of the end of the Cold War but more fundamentally a result of underlying longer-term trends unleashed by the international dynamics of incessant technological innovation and development—generally considered part of the ubiquitously referred to

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process of globalization.3 As Maull explained, the accelerating pace of technological innovation induces parallel, simultaneously occurring economic, social, and cultural processes of change, which, in turn, exert a high degree of pressure on domestic, regional, and international political structures to constantly adjust to these changes. The speed and course of such processes were seen by Maull to transform both the qualitative substance of international politics as well as the role of the largely perceived-to-be central actor in international affairs—the nation-state.4 In acknowledging the overall significance of these developments for the future of international politics, Maull sought to develop a new approach both for the analysis of contemporary international relations as well as for the future viability of foreign policy conduct (prescriptive approach).5 Based on this perception of the nature of contemporary international affairs, Maull also made clear his belief in the conceptual limitations of the traditional realist school of thought in IR. For Maull, realism not only failed to identify trends of ungovernable change but also failed to put them in proper perspective. As a result, realist thinking could hardly be seen to offer a way of effectively dealing with the increasingly complex realities of international relations. As Maull insisted, international politics was not only undergoing a reshuffling of power hierarchies but a deeper more fundamental change, affecting both its entire structure and substance. No longer, Maull argued, could realist notions of traditional geopolitical games, balance-of-power calculations, and the relentless struggle of nation-states for power amid the unchanging conditions of anarchy and its inherent security dilemma capture the essence of modern-day international relations. In Maull’s view, the changing nature of contemporary international affairs meant that hard coercive power and the ability to command others would have to give way to soft notions of persuasive power (here used in diplomatic terms), the latter of which Maull broadly defined as civilian power.6 Against the background of West Germany’s and Japan’s specific historical experiences of postwar defeat, Maull argued that both countries represented prototypes of the civilian power model. In the postwar period, both countries had been embraced by Washington’s “double containment” strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and were thus also firmly anchored in the U.S.-dominated alliance system by a web of security, political, and economic ties. Both countries accepted the renunciation of autonomous security policies, but they gradually also preferred to pour their national energies into the investment of economic resurgence. This, in turn, enabled them to develop into prototypes of

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the modern “trading state”7 relying primarily on soft notions of power (here used in economic terms) to realize and attain their foreign policy objectives.On this basis, Maull went on to argue that both Germany’s and Japan’s civilian power foreign policy vocation were well-suited to dealing with the contemporary forces of change and could even serve as an example to the United States, which—he predicted—would eventually be compelled to develop into a new type of international power anyway, advisably a civilian one.8 In his prominent 1992 study Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Vierzehn Thesen für eine neue deutsche Aussenpolitik, Maull went on to develop his approach to civilian power by, first of all, reiterating his initial arguments of 1990–91 that realism had lost its conceptual adequacy to account for contemporary processes of change in international affairs (1st thesis), arguing instead that contemporary international relations should more appropriately be conceived of as a single unitary sphere where both domestic and foreign policies can no longer be regarded as two separate policy areas but as circulating around similar and interrelated rather than distinct challenges. The view that foreign and domestic policies are increasingly intertwined, inspired Maull to draw upon Norbert Elias’s view of domestic civilization, which, he argued, could be translated onto the international level. In other words, understanding how interdependent members of domestic societies developed civilized ways of resolving their conflicts could lead to important insights as to how the increasingly interdependent members of international society could resolve their conflicts peacefully as well. Essentially, Norbert Elias noted that the monopolization of physical violence within nation-states had led to “pacified social spaces,” which were maintained not only by governmental authority but in the process of civilization also by the growing self-constraint of social actors. Accordingly, Maull defined the process of successful civilization of domestic politics along the following dimensions: the functional differentiation between members of society and hence the increasing interdependence between them, leading eventually to the creation of institutions for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the establishment of stable democracy based on the rule of law (Rechtsstaatlichkeit), guaranteed basic rights, participatory rights in political processes, and conditions of social justice. However, as Maull himself admitted, evidence of a process of civilianization (Zivilisierung) taking place on the international level and thus in relations between states was most marked only with respect to the Western industrialized “core group of interdependence” (2nd thesis).

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It is precisely for this reason that Maull called upon the core group of interdependence to assume more responsibility for the civilianization of the anarchic areas of world politics, lest it were willing to risk its own eventual downfall. At the same time, he warned that the difficulties encountered by such a civilianization effort could dangerously tempt Western countries to return to traditional power-political patterns of foreign policy behavior. Yet, he also warned that the growing conditions of complex interdependence did not allow for such hard power approach, since its negative repercussions would sooner or later also be felt in the industrialized world. Hence, leaving international economic, ecological, and sociopolitical problems unresolved would eventually only undermine the credibility of both the domestic and foreign policies of the Western industrialized countries. For this reason, Maull concluded, there were no realistic policy alternatives to the promotion of the Zivilisierung of international politics. Carrying forth the civilianization of international relations by civilian power means, presented both a realistic task for the future as well as an existential necessity for the West (3rd thesis). The mobilization of civilian power for the task of civilianizing international affairs would have to focus primarily on efforts to constrain the use of force in international as well as domestic politics by reforming and strengthening the power of international law. Means of civilian power would also have to be mobilized in an effort to overcome the North–South divide by a genuine development of international norms, which not only serve the international economic interests of the already privileged Western industrialized world but also offer underdeveloped countries a real opportunity to escape the poverty trap (4th thesis). With respect to the question of what constitutes civilian power in terms of foreign policy instruments, Maull explained that civilian power relies primarily on the use of nonmilitary instruments, notably diplomatic and economic ones. However, as Maull clarified, this does not mean that civilian power is entirely pacifist. Of course, as a state a civilian power must be in a position to protect and defend itself from possible external aggression and the use of force against it. More importantly, it must also be able to maintain and safeguard the principles of international law upon which the very credibility of the notion of civilian power continually depends. Thus, a civilian power may well have to resort to the threat and/or use of military force to enforce international order if internationally legitimized to do so. However, the use of military force must always be exercised with restraint and a sense of proportionality to the causes and the consequences of prevailing conflict(s), if it is to serve the “spirit” of civilianizing international affairs (5th thesis).

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Still, the use of military force is certainly not the only punitive means available to a civilian power when it comes to protecting international norms. Whereas the use of force should always be the means of last resort for a civilian power, economic sanctions constitute the other significant alternative instrument for disciplinary action. It is deplorable that the relevance of this instrument in both punitive as well as rewarding ways is often overlooked; the obvious result being that effective additional avenues based on economic sanctions and incentives have not been sufficiently explored. If effectively combined with wellplanned political strategies, economic incentives or sanctions could indeed be quite effective in the service of civilianizing international politics (6th thesis). On the other hand, and as Maull also acknowledges, it is equally necessary to recognize that the effectiveness of the instruments of economic sanctions and incentives depend decisively on the target state’s perception of how much it has to gain or lose in considering such an offer. Hence, the realm of actual maneuverability for civilian power depends to a large degree on its ability to support economic growth and provide real prospects for material prosperity and stability in the world’s poorer regions (7th thesis). The exercise of civilian power is, of course, dependent on the role of civilian powers as actors. Such actors conform to the civilian power pattern of foreign policy behavior as described in the preceding theses. This particular pattern of foreign policy behavior refers to an “ideal type” civilian power foreign policy role, which Maull argued no contemporary major power and not even Germany could proudly claim to fulfill in complete terms. In other words, at no point thus far has Maull claimed that Germany already completely fulfilled the role of a mature and full-fledged civilian power able to promote the civilianization of international affairs (8th thesis). In fact, this is an important point because it ultimately eclipses the necessity to defend Germany’s civilian power role model against the assumptions made by normality observers. Be this as it may, Maull’s enlistment of basic domestic sociopolitical preconditions necessary for any country to adopt a civilian power role in international affairs includes: (1) material prosperity (materieller Wohlstand) as a significant precondition for the stability of the domestic democratic order; (2) historical learning processes (historische Lernprozesse) that have served to establish a general consensus amongst the elite and the general public of the importance of supranational cooperation and the renunciation of absolute sovereignty in response to the risks

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and costs associated with military might and the resulting traditional security dilemma; (3) learning processes that have begun to take advantage of and incorporate postmodern ways of conducting international relations through the partial transfer of sovereignty on the basis of the international division of labor, economic interdependence, and the ability to reap benefits from it (9th thesis). In applying this ideal type conception of civilian power to the newly unified Germany, Maull went on to explain that although Germany fulfilled the basic domestic preconditions of a civilian power to a high degree, the country had yet to reach the stage of being able to claim an internationally civilianizing role. Maull insisted that precisely because of Germany’s specific historical experiences of having to diplomatically cope with the conditions and constraints of its former semi-sovereign status, the country had come to fulfill certain fundamental civilian power credentials, which gave the new Germany not only a special advantage in developing into a civilianizing force but also a special responsibility in playing a key role in the promotion of the Zivilisierung of international politics. In other words, Germany’s civilian foreign policy ethos—initially cultivated by conditions of necessity but gradually also by choice—was particularly well-suited to promoting processes of civilianization through supranational policy channels such as those offered by the EU. For Maull, therefore, Germany’s specific lessons of history coupled with its central geographical location at the heart of Europe, its economic importance for the rest of Europe, as well as its key role in the European integration process—all of these factors— bestowed a special responsibility upon the new Germany to carry forward the process of civilianizing international relations by first and foremost developing its own civilian power credentials into those commensurate with a civilianizing power (10th thesis). In detailing further the necessity for such responsibility, Maull cautioned that it was important for Germany’s leadership to realize that its own vital interests could in future only be secured through the creation of a civilian international order for three main reasons: the realities of complex interdependence had relegated notions of national security to the past. Not only were traditional realist foreign policy concepts and instruments no longer adequate for resolving increasingly complex security issues (such as the possibility of dangerous nuclear fissile material landing in the hands of international terrorist organizations), but if employed to tackle complex security dangers such policies could certainly

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make matters worse. The deteriorating situation in Iraq in the course of 2003–04 and the growing difficulties experienced by American and British coalition forces to control the country and stabilize the political situation there is an evident case in point. It underlines the continued validity if not growing currency of Maull’s 1992 argumentation. Furthermore, Maull argued, it is important to realize that military conflicts and civil strife in remote parts of the world could still have grave consequences for the security of the industrialized nations of the West, given that the consequences of civil war also hampered the chances of overall global development. Such conflicts not only destroyed important natural resources but also set in motion large-scale migratory movements, which, in turn, risked destabilizing entire regions. Besides, Maull cautioned, the perpetuation of “national” security policies only served to prevent the formulation and development of regional and global structures of cooperation desperately needed to resolve international problems. After all, international cooperation could only be fostered on the basis of mutual trust and the growing willingness to engage in compromise. Yet too strong an emphasis on national security policy would only serve to undermine such foundational elements of international cooperation. Hence, from the point of view of Germany’s own national interests, Maull insisted that promoting an international civilianizing process in structurally weaker regions of the world represented an essential precondition for German security (11th thesis). In order to accomplish the task of promoting an international civilianizing process, Germany would have to build upon its past achievements in the context of its European integration policy and the North Atlantic Alliance framework. It would have to continue to cultivate its basic civilian power foreign policy vocation through and on the basis of these two important integrative pillars—the EU and NATO—in order to become a civilianizing power with an international profile, thus enabling it to support the extension and intensification of all kinds of international forms of cooperation beyond the Euro-Atlantic hemisphere (12th thesis). However, for such international civilianizing process to succeed, chances would depend on the degree of German genuineness as well as that of other Western industrialized countries to reform the rigid structures of the international political economy and to provide financial support and political and economic incentives for the formation of a “civil society” in the underdeveloped and developing parts of the world. In other words, peace and stability constitute not only prime objectives of the international civilianizing process, but to some extent

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they are also important preconditions for the successful development of such a process (13th thesis). In recognizing that economic and political incentives cannot always suffice in the creation of an international civilian order and whilst acknowledging that the continued existence of certain traditional security threats still require the capacity of conventional military means in response, Maull explained that a civilian power could not be expected to completely renounce the possibility of resort to military instruments of power. Yet, he also made clear, that the function of military instruments would increasingly have to be defined by and adjusted to the changing nature of the threat(s) it seeks to diminish.9 The use of military power in terms of civilian power, he maintained, must essentially be geared toward “channeling” conflicts into nonmilitary forms of conflict management. The essential elements of such understanding of the effective purpose of military power would include minimal deterrence, sufficient capacity for self-defense, as well as the achievement of collective security based on collectively defined norms and decisions. As Maull insisted, for the future viability of European (security) policies, there were no alternatives to establishing a collective system of security. At the same time, he also warned of the difficulties likely to be experienced in the course of the transformation from collective defense to collective security. Although development policies and therapeutic interventions in regions torn apart by ethnic-nationalist violence might serve to (temporarily) alleviate or reduce certain security risks, Maull insisted that the development of effective collective security structures still forms the core of as well as the actual challenge for any attempt to promote the civilianization of international politics (14th thesis). This concludes the last and final thesis of Maull’s groundbreaking work of 1992. Since then, it seems that Maull’s well-intended arguments have been caught up in the persistent normality versus continuity debate10 on Germany’s post-unification foreign policy evolution. This, it seems, has had the unintended consequence of distracting civilian power adherents from concentrating on developing and refining viable options for an evolving German–European international policy of civilianization.11 Throughout the 1990s, civilian power adherents were preoccupied with discussions on whether the new Germany was becoming regressively normal and thus whether its foreign policy behavior still conformed to that of a civilian power in a limited sense.12 However, if it is the case that contemporary international developments confirm Maull’s 1992 argument that normal or traditional realist foreign policy patterns of behavior no longer represent a prudent foreign policy path for

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Germany or any other major Western power in times of unprecedented international change and interdependence, and if it is the case that German normality proponents and observers themselves can agree that supranational cooperation remains an ultimate precondition for the future viability of German foreign policy,13 then what exactly is the purpose of discussing whether Germany’s foreign policy is increasingly normal or not? I think it is unfortunate that civilian power proponents have been caught up in this rather fruitless debate, thus neglecting the progressive edges of the original civilian/civilianizing power argumentation, which persuasively maintained that Germany had in the past and over time nurtured significant foreign policy qualities—no less reflective of its national interests than any other approach—but which always took into consideration shared supranational interests that were now worth building upon by civilian power means for the wider promotion of the civilianization of international affairs.

“Die ratlose Republik”: German Foreign Policy at a Loss The fact that the progressive edge of Maull’s initial civilian power framework has largely been ignored in the dominant continuity versus normality debate on German foreign policy is most vividly reflected in Maull’s article “Germany and the Use of Force: Still a ‘Civilian Power’?” published in the summer of 2000.14 In response to assumptions of a growing normalizing trend in Germany’s security policy, Maull essentially emphasized that despite Germany’s military participation in NATO’s 1999 air war against Serbia,15 Berlin’s policies and attitudes throughout the crisis were primarily and markedly driven by humanitarian concerns. This, he argued, was apparent in all public statements as well as the large-scale humanitarian assistance that Germany provided to Albania and Macedonia almost from the beginning of the crisis. It was also reflected in Germany’s willingness to take the largest contingent of refugees from the area. Certainly, Maull acknowledged that Germany’s motivation for military participation in the war also lay in the reasons already mentioned: the need to demonstrate alliance loyalty; to avoid the loss of influence in shaping NATO’s Balkan policy; to maintain the political credibility of the EU, NATO, and the UN; as well as the need to prevent a large-scale refugee crisis. However, as Maull also emphasized, Germany’s military participation in the war

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certainly did not distract the country’s new leadership from its more instinctive commitment to finding a “politico-diplomatic way” for establishing peace and stability in the region. In this respect, it is worth remembering that during the Kosovo crisis Germany held the presidencies of both the EU and the G7/8 (Group of Seven/Eight Industrialized Nations). Clearly, this placed the new coalition government in a highly responsible and also advantageous position in that it was enabled to exert a high degree of diplomatic influence on the course of events. Whereas the EU provided the opportunity for constant liaison among the main European members of NATO and for developing ideas on the postconflict reconstruction of Kosovo as well as the wider stabilization of South Eastern Europe, the G7/8 forum provided the necessary framework within which existing disagreements between Russia and the United States could be resolved. Indeed, efforts to resolve this dissension were necessary to restore the credibility of the UN on the basis of which the eventual policing of Kosovo under international law could be resumed. Hence, it was from the context of Germany’s presidencies of the EU as well as of the G7/8 that an extraordinarily dense web of diplomatic interaction could emerge and upon which the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, in particular, managed to put together a framework of agreements and missions, which eventually made possible the cessation of the war on 3 June 1999. In fact, incessant efforts by the German foreign minister to find a political solution to the crisis essentially revolved around the offer to Belgrade that NATO would temporarily suspend its air attacks if Belgrade began pulling its military forces out of Kosovo. Once all its forces were withdrawn, NATO would fully stop its air strikes. Under the surveillance of the UN, peacekeeping forces would then be spread across the crisis area whereupon refugees would be allowed to return back home. Indeed, it was the “Fischer Peace Plan” of 13 April 1999 that helped to bring Russia back into the international diplomatic fold thus laying the foundations for the “agreed principles” on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis agreed upon by Moscow and the G7 in May 1999. Yet the war also catalyzed German diplomatic efforts in initiating an overall strategy for preventing future eruptions of violence in the Balkans by stabilizing the region economically and politically in the form of the “Stability Pact for Southeast Europe” aired at the NATO summit in April and agreed upon as an EU-led project in June 1999. Moreover, Germany was also instrumental in requesting the then president of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari to become the EU’s special

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envoy in negotiating an international peace plan for Kosovo in the early summer of 1999. Although the idea was first circulated on the initiative of the governments of the United States and Russia, it was on the personal request of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder that Mr. Ahtisaari finally decided to undertake the EU-framed mission of convincing Milosevic to surrender to the will of the international community.16 Together with Mr. Strobe Talbott, then U.S. deputy secretary of state, and the Russian special envoy Mr. Viktor Chernomyrdin, Mr. Ahtisaari became the chief architect of the Kosovo peace plan accepted by the Yugoslav Parliament in June 1999, thereby returning the case to the auspices of the UN. As the former U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright stated when questioned on Germany’s role as a “new leader of Europe” upon her return from Skopje in June 1999: I think that Germany is playing an important role. Obviously a lot depends on personalities. The Germans have taken their EU Presidency very seriously [. . .] and they thought up this Stability Pact and also their Foreign Minister. I think Joschka Fischer is a remarkable person [. . .]. He likes to shake things up. I think he is a positive shaker [. . .]. He has a sense of the things that went wrong with Germany [historically]. [. . .] He said it took the Germans a whole generation to figure out how to deal with their guilt. And that the Serbs, it will take them a long time too. He thinks in ways of making things work and to him compromise is a good word.17 On balance, therefore, it seems that the new German government while participating in NATO’s military intervention was also in the forefront of searching for political alternatives to the war. Throughout the crisis, Germany displayed the political will to promote and initiate collective policies, thus demonstrating a clear preference for political negotiations over military coercion. Certainly, against the background of repeated warnings issued to Belgrade by the “Contact Group” to halt its campaign of ethnic cleansing committed by Serbian forces against the Kosovar population and thus given the need to safeguard the basic human rights principles of international law, Germany’s military involvement in the Kosovo war and its relentless diplomatic effort to swiftly find a political solution to the crisis still allows Germany’s Kosovo policy to fall into the remit of the country’s basic civilian power foreign policy vocation.

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However, although Germany’s military participation in the Kosovo war was backed by a strong humanitarian and moral thrust and accompanied by an effective diplomatic strategy, the Kosovo crisis nonetheless revealed significant weaknesses with respect to the future direction and role of Germany’s foreign and security policies. In fact, already in 1997, Hanns Maull deplored the absence of an earnest discussion on German foreign policy when he cautioned that the country’s foreign policy had degenerated into an exercise of “minimal art.” The conduct of international affairs, Maull argued, was increasingly about avoiding the real issues and instead about safeguarding one’s own industrial interests and social stability—and all beneath the pretentious cover of the rhetoric for more cooperation. This, he said, applied not only to Germany’s foreign policy but also to that of other major industrialized countries of the Western hemisphere. Maull criticized the tendency of Western policymakers to react to prevailing circumstances by resorting to shortsighted measures rather than by trying to shape their external environment by means of constructing an international consensus around farsighted policies. Maull warned there was no time for complacency because beneath the world of governments there was a simmering world of societies subjected to changes of historically unprecedented speed and consequence—all of which meant that neither the West as a whole, nor Germany in particular, could afford the luxury of running international politics as a form of minimal art.18 Seen from the perspective of Maull’s 1992 appeal, it seems as if the country’s foreign policy—while still in conformity with its civilian power ethos—has lost its sense of direction, veering neither in the direction of normality, nor in the direction of an active internationalist “civilianizing leadership stance.” The fact that Germany’s new government had proven its diplomatic skill in helping to broker a series of international agreements on the future of Kosovo ironically only serves to strengthen Maull’s point, namely that Germany’s leadership must—in a more consistent effort—begin to cultivate an internationalist civilianizing leadership role by means of the very diplomatic skills and qualities it demonstrated during the Kosovo crisis.19 The fact that Germany does so only when situations deteriorate does not point to a persistent long-term effort in the service of crisis prevention and the civilianization of international politics.20 In other words, German foreign policy may still be civilian and far from normal but it has not yet reached the stage of being able to lay full claim on servicing the “civilianization of international politics” through a relentless promotion and effort at reforming the substance of multilateral, supranational, and international

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cooperation by means of diplomatic persuasion. Put differently, German foreign policy has yet to evolve into the confident civilianizing power that Maull envisioned in 1992 if it is not to lose its sense of foreign policy direction entirely. The argument that Germany’s security policy is far from normal and lacking in a sense of direction is evidenced by developments in three major policy areas: first, and as Maull argues, although the Kosovo war certainly spurred changes that were already underway in Germany’s security policy it is important to recognize that these changes are rather more symbolic than real. More precisely, the Kosovo experience did indeed encourage Berlin to recognize the need for restructuring the Bundeswehr into a largely professional intervention force capable of power projection. But the lack of financial resources needed to ensure that these reforms can, in fact, be carried through effectively, coupled with the lingering politico-ideological commitment to the country’s Wehrpflicht (conscription), make this apparent shift in Germany’s security policy seem rather more political than militaristic in substance.21 Second, the Kosovo experience certainly increased the political support among Europe’s major powers to strengthen ESDP, thus lending the latter a new momentum.22 Yet, as Maull insists, in the case of Germany this shift seems to have been driven more by the desire to remain bündnisfähig (capable of being an ally) and thus to prove its capacity to participate fully in Alliance action than by a clear conception of the future purpose of the ESDP. As Maull explains, Germany does not know as yet for what purpose it supports the ESDP nor is it clear about the broader political implications of the ESDP.23 In fact, this is a significant point to note because it raises—in line with Maull’s 14th thesis of 1992—the question of “diplomatic leadership” in promoting a clearer conception of the need for and purpose of greater military capabilities in the context of both the ESDP as well as NATO. In other words, what exactly would we be achieving in the strife for military parity between the United States and the EU in terms of improving international security? Admittedly, the Alliance war over Kosovo revealed the existence of a large gap in military capabilities between the United States and its European alliance partners. This state of affairs, Europeans fear, could reinforce the already evident unilateralist tendency in Washington’s foreign policy. For this reason, it is argued, greater military capabilities would not only make the EU a more militarily efficient alliance partner to the United States but also a more credible negotiating partner in the eyes of Washington. As U.S. officials never fail to point out, at present

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the Europeans are hardly able to militarily defend their own security interests if they had to. Nor is it the case—from our point of analytical interest—that the requirement of greater European military capabilities in itself contradicts the civilian power approach to international politics, because as Maull argued in 1992 international situations can arise where even a civilian power must be able to resort to the threat and/or use of force to safeguard international law and order, especially when all other forms of sanctions have failed. And so Germany and its major European partners should certainly have an interest in strengthening their overall military efficiency. However, seen in the context of evolving relations between the EU and the United States and the perceived need for Europeans to “measure up” to the strength of U.S. military capabilities, the question of what exactly such strife for military parity across the Atlantic would resolve in terms of alleviating international security concerns still remains.24 If an increase in Europe’s military capacities is geared toward strengthening the credibility of the EU’s bargaining position vis-à-vis Washington, it is unlikely to succeed because as long as the United States is able to act autonomously in military affairs, there is no obvious reason for Washington to consult its European alliance partners if it does not want to. Similarly, if it is geared toward the problem of dealing with U.S. hegemony and neoconservative foreign policy arrogance, it will fail for the same reason. Fact of the matter is that the European problem with U.S. military power will not simply be resolved by the quest for European military parity. Also, if the United States can split Europeans within NATO, as has been the case on the Iraq coalition-issue of 2003, there is nothing to stop them from trying to do the same within the ESDP context, especially against the background of a growing EU membership.25 So, again the question arises of what exactly military parity across the Atlantic would resolve in terms of tackling growing problems of international security in the twentyfirst century. No doubt, the problem seems to be a deeper, conceptual one calling for visionary diplomatic leadership in the promotion of a more thorough understanding of the nature of international security in the twenty-first century on both sides of the Atlantic. As the former president of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, once explained in relation to the international community’s experience with the Yugoslav crisis: One lesson of the international experience in the Balkans is the importance of creating a conceptual framework in which to operate and analyse all actions and policies. In the absence of an

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intellectual framework, we risk simply wasting our money. [. . .] If we compare the preparedness of the military with that of civilians for crisis-management tasks, the difference is enormous.26 Nobody denies, therefore, that military power is indeed important in these uncertain times but as the great realist thinker Hans J. Morgenthau himself remarked in 1949, even the most exceptional military potential cannot compensate for intelligent conceptual thinking.27 At this stage, it seems as if Germans and Europeans and especially their American counterparts have yet to come to terms with the question of the appropriateness of military solutions to international security problems and the nature of the contribution they wish to make not only to crisis management28 in civilian terms but also to crisis prevention in terms of the civilianization of international politics by diplomatic, political, and economic means.29 Germany’s Kosovo policy, however, also revealed an important weakness in relation to its UN policy. In fact, it is fair to say that the one significant departure from Maull’s ideal type civilian power approach was the country’s participation in a war that was clearly not legitimized by the UNSC.30 On the other hand, one could hardly have expected the Contact Group (comprising France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Russia, the United States, and Germany) to sit idly by and simply watch Milosevic’s campaign of ethnic cleansing unfold on Europe’s doorstep. Hence, in the case of genocide, international law does provide a principled justification for intervention. Yet the refusal of Russia and China to consider a UNSC resolution invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter for the use of Alliance force against Belgrade did not permit for a legally cleared intervention, thereby forcing NATO to intervene without UNSC approval.31 Nonetheless, this situation of UNSC paralysis could have been circumvented by the invocation of the seemingly long forgotten alternative of the “Uniting for Peace Resolution.”32 First initiated by the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson in November 1950, this mechanism was intended to restore the ability of the UN to act in the Korean crisis when it was being obstructed by a Soviet veto. Part of the central text of the 1950 Resolution on Korea (Res. 377 V, v.3., November 1950) reads as follows: If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the

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peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.33 In other words, in cases where the UNSC finds itself in a cul-de-sac with its room for maneuver practically reduced to nothing, the General Assembly can be called upon for a special emergency session within 24 hours to consider the problem at hand, without the UNSC being able to veto such a move. Such special session may be demanded either by nine of the UNSC members or by a majority of General Assembly members. Hence, whereas the General Assembly cannot oblige anyone to the use of force, it can pass a resolution calling upon members to resort to the necessary means to alleviate an international crisis situation. In fact, there has already been a series of precedent cases in which the “Uniting for Peace Resolution” was invoked including the crisis in Hungary in 1956, the Lebanon crisis in 1958, and the Congo crisis in 1960. The Assembly’s fifth special emergency session was convened upon the request of the Soviet Union to debate the war in the Middle East in 1967. Further special sessions followed on Bangladesh, Afghanistan, South Africa, and several times on Palestine. The most recent session, in 1997, dealt with events in East Jerusalem. During the Kosovo crisis, therefore, Germany could have tried to push for the adoption of such “Uniting for Peace Resolution” within the UN in order to gain the international legitimacy needed to participate in the Alliance’s air campaign against Serbia. However, the emphasis on the availability of such an alternative path of action within the UN does not mean that the UN is exempted from what increasingly appears to be an urgently needed comprehensive reform. To recapitulate, Maull’s civilianizing power foreign policy approach was designed to offer unified Germany a constructive way of dealing with the realities of international change based essentially upon the foundations of Germany’s postwar diplomatic experience in multilateral cooperation. In terms of the dominant normality versus civilian power debate, the thus far prevalent question of the degree to which Germany still conforms to the civilian power approach is certainly also relevant to discussing its ability to promote the civilianization of international politics. However, it would appear that over the past years Germany has merely adjusted its security policy in an ad hoc fashion to specific

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security situations especially with respect to developments in the Balkans. In other words, Germany’s security policy in crises situations has thus far been essentially reactive rather than proactive. Seen from this perspective, ongoing discussions about the appropriate role of Germany’s Bundeswehr in international crises situations, and the lack of conceptual clarity concerning the future of both German and European foreign policy coupled with the mere adjustment to the perceived need of remaining bündnisfähig—all of this suggests—that Germany’s foreign policy although still largely civilian and thus far from normal is beginning to stagnate in uncertainty over how best to move forward. German foreign policy appears to be at a loss. It is moving neither decisively forward in the sense of civilianizing international relations nor backward in the sense of encouraging the re-nationalization of foreign policies in the Euro-Atlantic hemisphere. Yet, if German foreign policy is not to be trapped in the perception of having to prove its Bündnisfähigkeit as determined by traditional U.S. notions of power and security, then the time has come for Germany to hark back to the ideas aired by Maull during the early 1990s. Besides, even normality observers as well as normality proponents agree that Germany’s foreign policy commitment to multilateralism and in particular to the EU remains a necessary condition for a successful German foreign policy. Hence, it seems that the ultimate question is not whether German foreign policy is becoming increasingly normal, but how Germany’s civilian power can best be used to effectively promote the civilianization of international politics. Given the widespread German consensus on the continued if not growing necessity for multilateralism in international affairs, one cannot help but wonder whether the energy vested in the normality debate on Germany’s evolving foreign policy is worth its while. Of course, it is arguable that such observations may serve to warn of the dangers of a possible “hollowing out”34 of Germany’s postwar “culture of restraint,” but so far it seems that the majority of Germans would still prefer to remain aloof from military adventures abroad.35 Another riddle relating to the rationale of the normality argumentation concerns the fact that normality observers such as Hellmann wish to lay claim to identifying gradual processes of change in Germany’s foreign policy by focusing on the notion of change rather than on procrastinated views of continuity and all apparently aside of exaggerated realist expectations. Ironically, however, Hellmann’s approach to corroborating realist expectations only adds to the problem of procrastination in the German normality versus continuity debate. By trying to identify changes that essentially

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depend upon one’s (over)interpretation of details drawn out of the overall context,36 this approach actually perpetuates the problem of procrastination already inherent in the normality versus continuity debate—something Hellmann himself criticizes and wishes to overcome.37 It is for this reason that Hanns Maull’s 1992 progressive civilianization approach appears to be more plausible than the approach taken by normality observers. Nevertheless, this is not to say that Maull’s civilian/civilianizing power argumentation is flawless. To repeatedly emphasize that Germany must do more in the diplomatic vein of promoting the civilianization of international politics is one thing. To clarify what exactly is meant by the practice of civilian power diplomacy is quite another. Hence, although the diplomatic dimension of civilian power reigns supreme in Maull’s recurrent advice to Germany’s foreign policy elite to undertake greater diplomatic efforts in promoting international cooperation, there is little indication of what exactly forms the essence of Germany’s apparently unique civilian diplomatic skill in multilateral cooperation. Therefore, it is only upon a reasonable substantiation of the diplomatic dimension of the civilian power approach that Germany can effectively begin to develop its foreign policy consciousness as a civilianizing power.

P A R T

II

German Diplomacy as “Communicative Action”

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C H A P T E R

4

The Habermasian Practice of “Reasoning” Suppose you toss a rock into the air. It can make only a simple response to the external physical forces that act on it. But if you throw a bird into the air, it may fly off into a tree. Even though the same physical forces act on the bird as on the rock, a massive amount of internal information processing takes place inside the bird and affects its behaviour (Waldrop, 1992: 232). Finally, take a group of people, a nation or various nations and metaphorically toss them in the air. Where they go, how, when and why, is not entirely determined by physical forces and constraints; but neither does it depend solely on individual preferences and rational choices. It is also a matter of their shared knowledge, the collective meaning they attach to their situation, their authority and legitimacy, the rules, institutions and material resources they use to find their way, and their practices, or even, sometimes their joint creativity.1

The growing prominence of social constructivist perspectives in IR theory owes much to the growing awareness in the discipline over the past decade of the limitations of both neorealist and neoinstitutionalist theories of IR and their respective convergence around neoutilitarian precepts and premises. Hence, neorealists and neoinstitutionalists depart from the assumption that states are rational actors focused on maximizing or optimizing their own calculus of expected utility defined primarily in terms of material power, national security, and economic welfare. Identities and interests of states are treated as given or as exogenously specified, meaning external to and unexplained within the terms of respective theories. Whereas simplicity appears to be the greatest strength of the neoutilitarian model, thus allowing its adherents to produce rigorous analytical results, it is at the same time also its greatest weakness because—as constructivists contend—it blinds its adherents to

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the constitutive and regulative forces of the ideational realm in international affairs. In the constructivist view, it is possible to study ideas and beliefs in terms of the properties of agents while at the same time developing an argument for the fact that these beliefs are representations and enactments of the social and intersubjective culture in which the agents find themselves.2 It is the growing recognition of the inadequate attention paid by neoutilitarians to the constitutive and regulative role of ideational factors in international relations such as norms, identities, ideologies, and culture that has led to the emergence and growing popularity of social constructivist approaches in IR over recent years.

Understanding the Habermasian Social Theory of “Communicative Action” The constructivist notion of the mutual constitution of agency and structure also has important implications for the theories of action by which human behavior is interpreted. Rational-choice and social constructivist approaches respectively emphasize different modes or logics of social (inter)action. These are characterized by different rationalities of action (Handlungsrationalität) as far as the objectives are concerned. The added emphasis on rationality is intended to underline the view that rationality need not be seen as a prerogative of the dominant understanding of (neo)utilitarian theories of action. It may well also be part and parcel of constructivist notions of social action to the extent that these also embrace goal-oriented and thus rational as opposed to irrational behavior.3 Hence, drawing upon the terms of distinction introduced by James March and Johan P. Olson, rational-choice proponents are generally regarded to adhere to the “logic of consequentiality” whereas social constructivists and especially sociological institutionalists will tend to interpret human behavior through the “logic of appropriateness.”4 According to the logic of consequentiality, goal-oriented actors whose interests and preferences are considered to be externally specified, fixed, and transitive will seek to maximize or at least optimize their own interests during the process of strategic interaction by calculating the costs and benefits of different options whilst at the same time also including into the calculus the anticipated response by the interacting partner. Abiding by the notion of instrumental rationality, actors are primarily guided by the outcome of their action rather than by virtue of the action itself. This forms the essence of rational-choice theory and as such it informs realist, liberal, and institutionalist theories of IR.

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By contrast and according to the logic of appropriateness (also referred to as norm-guided behavior), human actors are seen to abide by the very norms that have come to associate their respective identities with particular situations. Therefore, when faced with various alternative courses of action, they will try to do what is generally expected of them by assessing and matching the obligations of their identity and role perception to a specific situation. In other words, actors will try “to do the right thing” rather than attempt to maximize or optimize their own strategic objectives. What matters in this view is not so much the actor’s individual preferences but rather the intersubjectively shared, valuebased expectations of what constitutes appropriate behavior.5 Accordingly, the logic of appropriateness can most clearly be seen to apply to social situations where norms are already taken for granted, that is, thoroughly internalized and complied with by relevant actors. In such situations norm-guided behavior need not be seen as a conscious process of choice or decisionmaking. This is the realm of the sociological institutionalist approach in IR, which deals with the intersubjective quality and thus also constitutive effects of social norms and institutions.6 On closer inspection, however, it is possible to argue that the notion of the logic of appropriateness embraces more than merely one logic of social (inter)action. In social situations where the appropriateness of a norm can no longer be taken for granted, where actors may be forced to choose between conflicting norms, and where there are no easy answers to what might be the right thing to do—in such situations actors can no longer be expected to follow the logic of appropriateness since it may no longer be evident what appropriateness means in the given situation. Thus equally encapsulated in the concept of normguided or appropriate behavior is the notion of norm adjudication. Certainly, in cases of uncertainty actors may well decide to follow the logic of consequentiality preferring to optimize their own interest instead. However, the central point to note here is that when situations arise where actors must tackle the question of which norm should or should not apply, another logic of action comes into play namely that of “deliberation and reasoning.”7 The Habermasian “logic of arguing” is imagined to provide actors with a means by which they can communicate and establish the necessary knowledge needed in order to arrive at an informed decision about what the appropriate norm in an uncertain situation might be. Drawn from Habermas’s social theory of communicative action, the logic of arguing (also referred to by Thomas Risse as “argumentative rationality” or “truth-seeking”) ideally refers to a situation where human actors

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are imagined to assess and establish the validity of contextual facts in a collective communicative process in which they wish to discuss in a theoretical discourse (a) whether their assumptions about a given situation and its cause and effect relationships are correct and valid and/or in a practical and moral discourse (b) whether a given norm of appropriate behavior is justified and applicable to a given situation. Regardless of the precise nature of the subject matter, the logic of arguing implies that actors will try to reach an understanding or agreement through a process of deliberation within and by means of the medium of language.8 They will seek to establish a “reasoned consensus” by challenging the inherent validity of causal and normative claims made in relation to their respective understanding of the given situation as well as their respective justification for preferring certain norms to others. The notion of reasoning naturally also implies that participants are open to persuasion and willing to acknowledge a better argument when presented with one. In such a communicative process, it is argued, relationships of power and social hierarchies are likely to recede into the background. However, all of this is not to say that reasoning need be devoid of goaloriented behavior. On the contrary, deliberative behavior may be as goal oriented as instrumentally rational behavior, the difference being that the goal is not to attain one’s own fixed preferences but to seek a reasoned consensus. In this view, then, the interests and preferences of actors are not considered to be stable but subject to discursive challenges. In other words, where argumentative rationality prevails actors will not seek to maximize or optimize their given interests but instead they will wish to challenge and justify the inherent validity claims of each other’s arguments. They will be open to persuasion and willingly prepared to change their views or even their interests in light of the better argument. This forms the essence of the notion of the logic of arguing as introduced by the German IR community. The question of the role and effects of the logic of arguing against those of the “logic of consequences” has been the focus of a distinct German-led controversy in IR between constructivists on the one hand and rationalists on the other—a controversy that developed during the mid-1990s in the renowned Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen (ZIB) (German Journal of International Relations). Notwithstanding the details of the so-called ZIB-Debatte, the controversy had been initiated by Harald Müller in 1994, fervently opposed by Otto Keck in 1995 and 1997 as well as Gerald Schneider in 1994 and 1996, then defended by Müller’s strong replication in 1995, thereafter largely supported by Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995) and Rainer Schmalz-Bruns

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(1995), only to be finally adjourned by the mediating perspective of Bernhard Zangl and Michael Zürn in 1996.9 In laying the foundations of the ZIB debate, Harald Müller in his 1994 refinement of Jürgen Habermas’s concept of communicative action launched a strong critique of the dominant utilitarian theories of action in IR when he argued that they were largely unable to systematically account for many significant elements in the reality of international politics, such as the importance of implicit or explicit conceptions of “justice” on the part of actors, the meaning and role of “trust,” and the phenomenon of “learning through negotiation.” Although Müller acknowledges that utilitarians do recognize these phenomena, he objects to their attempts of accounting for these phenomena by the mere adoption of ad hoc assumptions. This, he argues, only serves to lay bare the limited ability of utilitarians to fully integrate these phenomena into their theories. It is this concern that animates Müller to critically analyze utilitarian theory in both its neorealist and neoinstitutionalist variants and to raise the question of how these approaches deal with the fundamental problem of the logische Lücke (logical gap), which exists between the need or motivation for interstate cooperation on the one hand and the formation of actual cooperation under the conditions of international anarchy (and the existential risks it embodies) on the other hand. In order to close this logical gap, Müller suggests that the behavioral repertoire of actors should be broadened beyond the mode of strategic action to include the Habermasian notion of verständigungsorientiertem Handeln, that is to say action geared toward reaching a reasoned if not common understanding through the medium of language. As Müller critically observes: All rational choice models have one remarkable feature in common: the players are mute. They do not speak to each other, and in three of the most important of the game theoretical models— Cherry Hunt, Prisoner’s Dilemma and Coward—this muteness is constitutive of the decision-making dilemma. This becomes particularly noticeable in the full version of Bueno de Mesquita’s ‘International Interaction Game’ which we can treat as a prototypical model of the utilitarian theory of action. The modes of communication available to the governments (“Demand— Counter-Demand—Concession—Capitulation—War”) reduce their communicative competence to the level of three-year-old children. It is indicative that the game ends when the players choose the “Negotiation” alternative.10

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As Müller insists, international relations and diplomacy consist predominantly of actions that take the form of language. Therefore, he argues, the role and influence of language—in all its different forms and variations11—deserves to be a central point of attention in its own right rather than merely an ad hoc attachment to the dominant utilitarian theories of IR. After all, even the utilitarian egoists cannot—in the act of cooperation—escape being members of a shared community of language in which communicative action is by nature as existent as the possibility for strategic behavior, and where it is only by means of argumentative practice that solutions to conflicts and problems of coordination can be found.12 Thus, even where nonlinguistic transactions take place as in the case of monetary payments, for example, this always happens in the context of action that takes the form of language. Language is, therefore, an all-pervasive feature of our everyday life. As F.D. Newmeyer once noted: We communicate primarily by means of language, we think and reason in it, and in creative expression we tailor it to our imagination. Our sleeping hours are no less free from language than our waking ones—language is even a medium in which our dreams are conveyed. Little wonder that literary critics, philosophers, and developmental psychologists have taken the analysis of language as their starting point.13 Müller acknowledges that all utilitarian theories are perfectly capable of describing discursive exchanges between governments in the course of their empirical analyses, but he deplores their failure to consider the role and effects of language sufficiently enough as to grant it a theoretical weight of its own. Rather than considering language as a shaping factor and component of international relations, Müller regrettably observes that utilitarians will quite naively consider language as a mere premise upon which international relations is seen to unfold. For Müller, emphasizing the importance of the role of language in international politics has less to do with merely adding another dimension to or adjusting utilitarian presumptions than it does with the need to allow the inherent workings of the theory of communicative action to reveal the static presuppositions of utilitarian theory to be in need of a fundamental ontological relocation. In the words of Müller: It is not simply a question of changing the utilitarian repertoire of action by adding an additional option. Rather, the assumptions of

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utilitarianism must be fundamentally corrected on the basis of the internal “logic of communicative action.” Communicative action creates and develops a social relationship between the actors. The assumption of static preferences is abandoned, as is the presumed “state of nature” in which the strategic actors first meet. The situational structure then becomes a dependent variable which changes along with the verbal exchanges between the parties. This applies not only to the mutual recognition of sincerity, but also to normative attitudes and even to the jointly undertaken construction of the “world of facts.” It is precisely in this sense that Alexander Wendt is correct when he says that anarchy is what actors make of it (Wendt, 1992).14 Hence, Müller does not refute utilitarian theories but he does refute utilitarian attempts to simply absorb and take the constructivist notion of communicative action on board their worldviews only to generously grant it a second-class seat. In his response to the criticisms raised by Otto Keck as well as Gerald Schneider, Müller contends that the notion of communicative action not only deserves preferential treatment but more importantly it may provide us with a more holistic view of international relations and thus hold superior explanatory power compared to utilitarian approaches in IR. Accordingly, utilitarian approaches can be taken over by constructivism but not the other way around.15 As Müller shows, game theorists tend to resort to two tricks when modeling actual conflicts in ongoing negotiations:16 they will either consider the factor of language as part of the “play material” of their players or describe a series of games as communication. This, however, is misleading because it implies that communication takes place between partners who do nothing more than exchange moves in the game. Accordingly, each partner makes a move, observes the opponent’s move, works out its effects on his own preferences, recalculates these, adjusts his strategy in order to make the next move, and so on. What does not take place in this context is communication in the sense of an exchange through the medium of language in our normal understanding of the term. In neither of these variants is language given any theoretical weight of its own. It remains external to the game theoretical model.17 Yet, as David Bell explains in his underlining of the importance of the role of language in international negotiations: . . . language does not merely serve as the medium for the interactions that constitute “the process of negotiation,” it underlies

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the entire phenomenon of negotiation. It encapsulates the understanding of the past, the history of previous relations between the negotiating parties. It is the container within which resides the “range of conceivable actions” that may be adopted as goals. It expresses the conceptual framework of the process of negotiation itself, and provides implicit formulas. Finally, it is the cloak surrounding and defining the outcome, its implementation and its interpretation.18 To the extent that game theory turns processes of international cooperation and negotiation into mathematical exercises, it is seen to drain away the lifeblood of language and meaning inherent in such processes. In view of the growing “linguistic turn” in political science through “speech act” theory, the philosophy of language, and the theory of knowledge, it would seem that the obvious limitations of utilitarian approaches to IR are no longer easily defendable. Therefore, what is required in IR is a theory of action that gives due weight to the significance of language. Such a theory, Müller is convinced, is available in Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action, which significantly does not remove utilitarian notions from its theoretical compound but places them in a subordinate position within a more comprehensive concept of action.19 The year-long ZIB debate, which evolved in reaction to Müller’s line of argumentation, essentially revolved around two central points of contention. The first issue raised the question of whether the notion of communicative action provided an empirically valid concept for the analysis of international negotiations given that these are generally considered to be dominated by tough bargaining behavior on the basis of the stable preferences of actors. The second issue questioned the extent to which the logic of arguing could be theoretically conceptualized and incorporated by rationalist approaches. In other words, was it really the case that the logic of arguing represented a fundamentally different theory of action compared to utilitarian theories of action?20 Although neither of these two questions were satisfactorily resolved or even answered by the participants to the debate, the controversy nevertheless propitiated a general agreement on the need for further empirical research if at least the first question were ever to be answered. Indeed, in both the national and international realms there are already a series of research projects underway aimed at promoting our empirical knowledge of the role and effect of argumentative rationality in international affairs.21 As far as the second question is concerned, analysts

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have sought to clarify what the actual controversy between the logic of arguing and the logic of consequences is all about and whether the problems discussed are to a certain extent perhaps only illusory problems. In their mediating perspective to the debate, Bernhard Zangl and Michael Zürn maintained that with respect to the conduct of theoretical discourses where actors are interested in establishing common knowledge in the sense of gathering empirical facts pertaining to the necessity of defining the actual circumstances of a given situation, even instrumentally rational actors would be interested in getting the facts right. Hence, in order to get the facts right they too would engage in argumentative rationality, and although such discursive practice may result in a change of underlying interests, this does not mean that actors must also engage in questioning each other’s preferences. Thus, in the realm of theoretical discourses relating to the establishment of basic factual knowledge in situations of uncertainty, rational-choice approaches may indeed be compatible with the logic of arguing. Even if actors decide to change and adjust their underlying interests as a result of acquiring new information through the common process of “truthseeking,” this would not be incompatible with the presumptions of the rationalist paradigm.22 However, the same cannot be said for the realm of practical or moral discourses pertaining to the righteousness of certain norms over others. Hence, in cases where the establishment of common knowledge refers to the necessity of reaching an agreement on the constitutive nature of the rules of a game and thus to the underlying principles guiding the interaction of actors, participants to the discourse must be prepared to have their interests questioned and challenged. However, under such circumstances, actors would no longer be able to adhere to the logic of consequentiality. Yet, as Risse asks, can we really assume that actors in international politics willingly engage in moral discourses?23 Generally speaking, we can probably agree that international negotiations are usually concerned with the attainment and the leveling-out of differing national interests rather than with questions of applicability of certain norms over others.24 Interestingly, however, the results of different empirical projects reveal that pure “bargaining” behavior as described by the logic of consequences hardly appears in the reality of international negotiations. This means that “deliberation” is, in fact, an ever-present and allpervasive feature of international negotiations.25 To put it differently, participants to an international negotiation are always engaged in arguing. As Risse explains, even in negotiation sequences concerning distributional conflicts over say a shrinking economic pie, it is observable

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that actors will resort to arguments of justification to strengthen their position. However, what remains unclear from this observation is whether such behavior simply represents a social ritual or whether actors assume that their own interests will be realized if they resort to argumentation rather than to the use of material incentives, threats, or other similar power resources. Given that arguing appears to be an ever-present feature of international negotiations and given the difficulties associated with discerning symbolic politics from genuine attempts at reasoning in negotiations,26 advocates of the logic of arguing have had to shift their attention away from the question of whether actors in international relations engage in deliberation to the question of whether the practice of deliberation has any significant and noticeable effects on the negotiation process itself. It is at this juncture that the notion of rhetorical action comes in. Developed by Frank Schimmelfennig, the concept of rhetorical action refers to actors imagined to resort to arguments or justifications in a strategically oriented manner in order to obtain the necessary legitimization for their interests from their negotiating partner(s) and—if present—also the interested public.27 Thus at the forefront of this mode of action lies the necessity to justify one’s egoistic interests by means of reference to universally recognized norms and principles. By presuming the need for the legitimization of one’s interests—a presumption that, in turn, rests on the underlying assumption that the actors see themselves as members of an (international) community in which a given set of principles and norms are recognized—“rhetorical action” must be seen to unfold on the basis of a normatively functioning and already established context of social structure in international politics. It is in this sense that rhetorical action attempts to draw a bridge between the logic of consequentiality and the logic of appropriateness. Yet, as Harald Müller and Thomas Risse insist, the mode of rhetorical action not only forms a subsidiary category of action to the logic of appropriateness but more importantly, they argue, it may also be subsumed by the logic of arguing. With respect to the logic of appropriateness, it is more than obvious that all the talk of the necessity to justify one’s preferences on the basis of the requirements of legitimacy ultimately also implies that instrumentally rational actors are embedded in social structural contexts and institutions. This, in turn, means that social institutions and normative structures ultimately also define who can or cannot present or justify their egoistic preferences before an (international) audience. Coupled with this insight there are two more important points to note: first of all, the very argument for the need of legitimizing one’s interests indirectly

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also presupposes at least the principled preparedness by the target audience or negotiating partner to be open to persuasion. The important feature of rhetorical action is that whereas actors engaged in this mode of action are keen to change the beliefs of others, they are not in themselves prepared to change their own views. So, the assumption is that rhetorical action can only be successful if the target audience, on its behalf, is willing to abide by the underlying principles of argumentative rationality. However, presenting universally defined justifications for one’s argumentative case presupposes at least a principled preparedness to have these arguments challenged by counterarguments unless one is willing to come across as lacking in credibility. Hence, it is always possible that members of the target audience may recognize that one is not presenting one’s arguments with the willingness of oneself being convinced by the possibility of a better argument. The audience may, therefore, put the speaker’s credibility to test by presenting counterarguments. This means that the actor engaged in rhetorical action must at least pretend to be willing to be persuaded, since failure to do so would ultimately lead to his/her loss of argumentative credibility and eventually one may not even be able to realize one’s set of egoistic interests. Ritualized argumentation will quickly be unveiled for what it really is: nothing more than argumentative action absent the willingness to reach a reasoned consensus. This means that in order to have a real chance of succeeding, rhetorical action must in its course resort to the logic of argumentative rationality as the basic mode of action in which it is embedded. This applies to both the negotiator and the negotiating partner(s). Both sides must eventually resort to the basic logic of arguing if they are to reach a sensible conclusion.28 Risse refers to the intricacies of this process as those of “argumentative self-entanglement” (argumentative Selbstverstrickung).29 This understanding of rhetorical action coupled with the notion of argumentative self-entanglement also has important implications for our theoretical and conceptual understanding of the logic of arguing in so far as we need not necessarily base our approach to the logic of arguing on the Habermasian precondition of an actor’s predisposition to reason-oriented action in order for argumentative processes to be seen to operate successfully. The above example shows that actors may well engage in argumentation for instrumental and strategic reasons. Yet, although actors may resort to rhetorical action at the beginning of a negotiation process this does not necessarily mean that they can abide by this mode of action until the end of the process. As empirical research of negotiations has shown, actors eventually become entangled

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in discursive processes whereby the logic of arguing tends to generate its own dynamics thus steering the participating actors away from their original preferences and toward a reasoned consensus. Hence, the primary question is not whether actors argue but rather under what conditions and with what consequences they do so. Any evaluation of the role of communicative action in international or multilateral negotiations must, therefore, focus on identifying the contextual conditions under which arguing influences the process of negotiation. It is with this new insight that the German debate has left the higher plains of metatheory only to delve deeper into the theoretically guided empirical research of developing a constructivist theory for negotiation capable of incorporating more than one logic of action including the logic of consequentiality.30 As Risse contends in one of his most recent publications,31 the above assessment of the implications of rhetorical action in negotiations shows that it is indeed possible to draw connections between rationalist and constructivist theories of action without, however, sacrificing the very credentials that differentiate them. Risse’s most recent case for bridge-building is animated by the wish to dissolve the existing and vastly overstated dichotomies32 between rational-choice approaches and constructivist approaches given that each mode of action as explicated above represents an ideal type of action that rarely occurs in pure form in real life. Leaving aside the issue of bridge-building, the understanding that it is not so much the question of whether arguing occurs in international negotiations but rather under what conditions and with what effect it may do so, does not relieve us from the task of as yet elucidating the conceptual underpinnings to the Habermasian theory of communicative action.

The Particulars of the Habermasian Social Theory of Communicative Action In terms of what actually constitutes communicative action, Habermas first distinguishes between three types of validity claims a speaker can make, each of which demands recognition from the listener. The first of these validity claims concerns the truth of the assertions made by the speaker and thus relates to the conformity of the assertions with the factual state of affairs; the second relates to the moral rightness or validity of the normative claims being made; the third focuses on the sincerity of the speaker and whether or not the speaker genuinely means what he or she says. Hence, if the listener should have any

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doubts about any of these validity claims, the speaker must defend them with reasonable arguments, which, in turn, can be elucidated in rational discourse.33 Second, Habermas believes that our communicative practices are only able to work because we assume that we can challenge the very validity claims we make in our daily utterances by resorting to the logic of arguing. This means that communicative processes oriented toward reaching a mutual understanding counterfactually presuppose the existence of an ideal speech situation, that is, a situation proceeding from the idealized assumption of a community of communication in which nothing but the better argument counts and where actors try to persuade each other whilst equally willing to be persuaded. Clearly, in this situation interests and identities can no longer be seen as static or fixed. Instead they become subject to rational testing through argument. In fact, this clarifies the social constructivist emphasis on the mutual constitution of agency and social structure, since the theory of communicative action serves to promote our understanding of the fact that actors are not simply marionettes of social structures but that they can actively challenge the validity claims inherent in any process of communicative action. At the same time, it is understood that actors are social agents that produce and reproduce the intersubjective structures of meaning through their communicative practices. Third and in connection to the Habermasian assumption of an ideal speech situation, it is equally important that the communicating partners share what Habermas refers to as a gemeinsame Lebenswelt (a commonly shared culture or lifeworld). This common lifeworld is understood to denote the sum of shared and inherited experience, that is, a culturally inherited store of collective interpretations, which is organized through common language, history, and culture. In a sense, this lifeworld provides communicating partners with a repertoire of shared understandings to which they can refer when making their validity claims. At the same time, the common lifeworld will be reproduced and transformed by the very practice and routine of communicative action. Fourth, for the dynamics of communicative action to unfold it is also important that the communicating partners recognize each other as equals and that they have equal access to the discourse. After all, no rational discourse can evolve or even come into being between parties who are in dispute over the question of entitlement to participate.34 Besides, if the Habermasian precondition of mutual recognition and equal access remains unfulfilled, it will be the application of power

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rather than rational understanding that will determine the outcome. This also explains why William Zartman described the central objective of any prenegotiation as one characterized by “questions of mutual recognition and dignity.”35 Finally, the significant precondition for a functioning process of communicative action is the ability and preparedness by participants to empathize with each other’s viewpoints and thus to try to see things through the eyes of the respective communicating partner. However, whereas the Habermasian precondition of empathy appears to be easily acceptable, the same cannot be said for the precondition of a common lifeworld or that of equal access, both of which have attracted criticism in two essential respects: first, it is argued, international relations is anarchic. Hence, there is no common lifeworld supplying collective interpretations to communicating partners. Second, and with respect to the precondition of equality, it is argued, relationships of power are never absent in international affairs. For these reasons, it is simply naïve to assume that behavior oriented toward seeking a reasoned consensus is in fact possible in international relations. As Risse acknowledges, it is certainly true that Habermas’s theory is rather silent on the question of how much of a common lifeworld actors ought to share in order to be expected to communicate in a reasonable manner.36 It is also possible that the lifeworld and its provision of collectively shared meanings can in itself be subject to argumentative and discursive challenges. Yet the degree to which common lifeworlds exist in international affairs may differ considerably depending on the regions and issue areas concerned. Even international anarchy can be seen to constitute an albeit limited common lifeworld in international politics to the extent that it forms a shared structural background against which actors communicate in world politics. Of course, anarchy in this sense does not refer to the presocial Hobbesian “allagainst-all state of nature” but is used to denote an already established “thin” collective and social interpretation of the world. In this sense, actors must at least wish to overcome a world of sheer hostility and at least see some room for cooperation with their interacting partners in order for meaningful communication to evolve. By so doing, actors can construct a common lifeworld even from the dearth of anarchy, thereby constructing the necessary prerequisite for communicative action and stable patterns of expectation and interaction to evolve. In other words, a communicative discourse can very well begin with very little shared understanding and make progress from there. As Harald Müller explains, prenegotiations typically involve attempts by actors to

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construct a common lifeworld usually by means of referring to common experiences through narratives. The exchange of memories of the Second World War, for example, has been a regular feature of almost all East–West negotiations during the Cold War period. Although one might dismiss such rituals as sheer rhetoric, they nevertheless appear to be a necessary prerequisite for establishing the trustworthiness of the negotiating partners.37 Whereas actors must construct a common lifeworld almost entirely from scratch in the case of anarchy, this clearly is not the case within the context of highly regulated international institutions with dense patterns of interaction. Hence, both NATO and the EU—respectively and combined—not only share a collective identity but also values and norms, which when taken together constitute a common lifeworld.38 Moreover, the literature on “Democractic Peace Theory”39 reveals not only that democracies rarely fight each other, but also that they develop a collective identity based on shared liberal values and norms, which also constitute a common lifeworld. Similarly, there are certain issue areas in international affairs such as those concerning human rights or the environment, which are heavily regulated by international regimes thus providing the necessary precondition for a common lifeworld. Whether or not deliberations in these arenas are effective essentially depends on the form of organizational setting. In a nonhierarchical or informal setting characterized by high-density interaction, the structural conditions for the dynamics of argumentative processes to unfold should be present.40 This brings us to the second point of criticism concerning the Habermasian precondition of mutual recognition and equal access. This, of course, implies that in “ideal speech situations” where nothing but the better argument counts, relationships of power are absent. As Risse explains, this precondition has come across considerable criticism and has been charged with being both idealistic and utopian. Indeed, power relations do have a role to play in influencing the external dimensions of a deliberative process. For example, in the case of the UNSC, power relations determine which states have permanent legitimate access to its deliberations and which ones do not. Undoubtedly, in this case some states are more equal than others. At the same time, power relations in the UN might also affect or predetermine what counts as a good argument. It clearly makes a difference in and to the UNSC whether a certain argument is presented by the United States or a developing nation. The latter would certainly have to make a much greater argumentative effort than the former to gain the necessary

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support for its views. Hence, power asymmetries in the UNSC are likely to affect who is entitled to say what and when and by so doing they determine how arguments and thus entire policy agendas are framed in the first place.41 From this perspective, the criticism of the Habermasian notion of equality goes even deeper, namely to the possibility of power relations affecting and influencing the deliberative process from within the discourse itself. This objection goes back to Michel Foucault and the notion that power as a social structure resides in the very discourse itself.42 In this view, the very rules of the debate will prescribe which arguments can and cannot be legitimately used by the participants. Whereas Habermas’s notion of the ideal speech situation stipulates that virtually any argument can be used in either theoretical or moral discourses, Foucault’s theory has us believe that the social context of discourses establishes clear delimitations of what can and cannot be legitimately argued. Yet as Risse clarifies, this objection reflects a degree of (a) misunderstanding concerning Habermas’s theory of communicative action coupled with (b) some deep theoretical divergences. Accordingly, it is important to recognize that the ideal speech situation is not intended as a statement about the empirical world or as some utopian ideal to be attained. Rather, it constitutes a counterfactual presupposition according to which a reasoned consensus can only be achieved if the participants to the discourse assume that they can persuade each other on the basis of the power of the better argument. Although there is no denying that an alleged reasoned consensus could turn out to be rather more of a false agreement, one would however be able to recognize a false agreement only by measuring it against the notion of a reasoned consensus. And as the sociopsychological literature on persuasion appears to suggest, individuals are quite capable of distinguishing between strategic action and argumentative reasoning. Therefore, and as mentioned in connection with the notion of rhetorical action, biased or self-interested actors are likely to be far less persuasive than those who are perceived to be neutral or motivated by moral values.43 In fact, the very criticism that argumentative rationality represents nothing but another form of domination curiously presupposes argumentative rationality in the sense that the criticism itself can only be made within a reasoned discourse.44 No doubt, it is certainly true that the Habermasian condition of equal access to discourses in international politics is simply not met. Yet must the recognition of this fact necessarily also imply that actors privileged to participate in international negotiations never engage in the act of rational argumentative reasoning? Furthermore, does the objection

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raised by Foucault that the structure and social context of an argumentative process delineates the boundaries of what can and cannot be considered a legitimate and reasonable argument necessarily also imply that argumentative rationality is impossible within the structural boundaries of a discourse? In other words, can we really assume that individuals are eternally caught within the structural delimitations of their discourses and that they never challenge these boundaries? In light of these questions, Risse concludes that it would probably be best to treat Foucault’s criticisms as valid points of objection against the “anything goes” view of communicative action while at the same time relaxing some of the strict Habermasian preconditions underlying the notion of communicative action in the ideal speech situation and thereby still adhering to the belief in the possibility of reasoned dialogues in international affairs. Based on this conclusion, the real issue then is not whether power relations are present in a discourse but to what extent they can explain the deliberative outcome. On the basis of the discussion of the Habermasian theory of communicative action, we can now specify the general preconditions that may be conducive to argumentative rationality in international affairs. (1) Sharing a common lifeworld: the existence of a common lifeworld provided by a high degree of international institutionalization in the respective issue area. (2) Constructing a common lifeworld: in the absence of a common lifeworld and/or the framework of an international organization, the conscious effort by actors to construct such a common lifeworld by, for example, resorting to narratives on past common experiences in order to pave the way for a meaningful process of communication and the possible subsequent institutionalization thereof. (3) “We are all in the same boat”: uncertainty of interests coupled with the lack of knowledge about the situation among the actors is a significant condition conducive to argumentative rationality in international affairs and likely to grow in importance. (4) The role of international regimes: institutionalized forms of cooperation based on non-hierarchical relations enabling dense patterns of interaction in informal, network-type settings.45 This, in turn, leads us to the specification of criteria by which to recognize the predominance of the logic of arguing in (in)formal international negotiations.

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(1) Nonhierarchy: if the condition of equal access cannot be fully met, participants to a discourse should at least be seen to meet the conditions of nonhierarchy. This can be discerned by taking a close look at the verbal utterances of speakers (depending on the availability of relevant communiqués). Communicative situations where participants emphasize their respective power status whilst making an argument would not qualify as part of a discourse geared toward establishing a reasoned consensus. Thus the less hierarchically organized a discursive setting is, the more likely we are to witness processes of deliberation and reasoned dialogue. (2) Argumentative consistency: this point is linked to the issue of credibility. Participants who change their arguments depending on the audience they are addressing cannot be seen to be credible and engaged in a reasoned dialogue. Instead, they would be engaging in rhetorical action. (3) The power of the better argument: a situation resembling that of communicative action should at least be seen to be open to the possibility of the disproportionate empowerment of weaker, less materially powerful participants in the discourse, especially if it is, indeed, the weaker state that presents the better argument. However, this need not imply that materially more powerful states tend to produce substantially less convincing arguments. (4) Measuring the impact of persuasion: whether or not arguing has had the desired effects can be evaluated particularly well in situations where the instrumental (material or ideational) interests of actors are stacked against the arguments being made. In other words, if it is possible to observe that actors change their minds in the course of a communicative process, even though their instrumental interests would suggest otherwise, one would probably have observed a process of persuasion. (5) Acknowledging mistakes: whether actors engage in reasoned dialogues or not can also be investigated in situations where they may be seen to breach certain norms of appropriate behavior to which they previously pledged conformity. How actors react to such charges can reveal whether or not they are reasonable participants to a dialogue. Do they dismiss the charge as irrelevant or engage in some self-serving rhetoric? Or do they try to justify their behavior, provide reasons for their action, and perhaps even apologize?46 In summary, the focus on reasoning promotes our understanding of how actors develop common knowledge concerning both the definition

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of the situation in which they find themselves and an agreement on the underlying rules of the game without which they would not be able to engage in strategic bargaining if they wanted to. Hence, arguing or reasoning constitutes a necessary and precursory albeit not exclusive step to any negotiation process. In this connection, arguing is also a necessary part of problemsolving insofar as actors must reason with each other if they are to find an optimal solution to a commonly perceived problem and if they are to agree on a common normative framework. In this sense, therefore, argumentative rationality is also linked to the constitutive rather then merely regulative role and influence of norms and identities. It provides actors with a mode of interaction that enables them to mutually challenge and explore the validity claims of those norms and identities. Therefore, when actors engage in a reasoned dialogue they must be prepared to adjust their own view of the world and even their own preferences to the more reasonable arguments presented by the negotiating partner. All in all, the logic of arguing essentially intends to breathe life into the stiff and unyielding utilitarian view of the world. After all, in the real world, international relations and negotiations are conducted in verbal not mathematical language. Therefore, what is said in diplomatic parlance and how it is said is no trivial matter in international relations. On the contrary, it may have far-reaching implications for all involved.

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C H A P T E R

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The Smyser–Habermasian “Navigational Aid” This chapter lays the foundation for the conceptual underpinnings of our central research question. It aims at drawing forth the essential components of the main thesis in order to connect these with the prime objective of our central research inquiry. In this endeavor, and based on the essential elements underlying the Habermasian theory of communicative action and the extent to which these may be reflected in William Smyser’s recently released U.S.-led study on Germany’s negotiating behavior, it is hoped that a “navigational aid” can be developed with which the empirical analysis of Germany’s influence on the U.S. decision to enlarge NATO can then proceed.

What Connects Civilian Power Diplomacy to Communicative Action? First, why should the diplomatic dimension of Germany’s foreign policy be of any particular interest to us? Second, how does our central research question of Germany’s influence on the U.S. decision to enlarge NATO relate to Hanns Maull’s understanding of civilian power as a foreign policy instrument of diplomacy? The answer to this set of questions is twofold. To begin with, Germany is the linchpin of the European landmass— a geographical fact with significant politico-diplomatic repercussions for the country. Against the background of historical experiences, Germany cannot approach contentious issues within the context of the EU, NATO, or other international fora without also consulting and taking seriously the interests of its neighbors and allies. This, in turn,

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means that the function of German diplomacy is far more critical to securing the country’s peace and prosperity than say the conduct of U.S. diplomacy may be for U.S. security interests. Drawn from the country’s geographical exposure, its historical experiences, its economic status as the world’s third-largest economy, its cultural and intellectual achievements, and not least its rich distinctive philosophical outlook, German diplomacy thus reflects a unique blend of diverse influences. It is on this basis that William Smyser argues for an improved understanding of Germany’s diplomatic style and approach.1 What strikes the reader as particularly noteworthy in Smyser’s study on German negotiating behavior is the author’s observation of the evolution of a unique German diplomatic style. As Smyser observes, although postwar West Germany lacked the leverage of military force to support its diplomacy, it still succeeded in producing remarkable results for the country, reflected in the gradual integration of the Federal Republic into the international community and its leading organizations. Even after unification, Smyser contends, German diplomacy has on this very basis continued to produce good results both for itself and the wider Europe. What Smyser deplores, however, is the fact that Americans as well as other nationalities remain unaware of the nature of the “unique [diplomatic] style” that Germans have come to develop over the years—a style and pattern of successful diplomacy based largely on cultural foundations, meriting more attention than it is currently receiving. In light of Hanns Maull’s line of argumentation, Smyser is clearly not alone in raising the importance of the existence of a “distinct” German diplomatic quality. This brings us to the second important reason for why it ought to be important to unravel the diplomatic mechanisms of Germany’s foreign policy approach. The interesting point to note in Maull’s civilian power argumentation is that Maull consistently emphasizes the need to recognize the existence of a distinct and internationally useful resource of German diplomatic skill while at the same time and in various critical comments repeatedly expresses his regret that Germany’s foreign policy elite were not doing everything it could within the power of its diplomatic experience to promote the civilianization of international politics to the fullest of its capacities. And although Maull does acknowledge the country’s more recent diplomatic achievements—notably the Schröder–Fischer government’s 1999 diplomatic initiative of persuading Russia to join the Western political effort to get Milosevic to concede defeat, thus preventing a NATO ground war in Kosovo, followed by Berlin’s initiation of the Balkan Stability Pact2—Maull nevertheless

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insists that it is precisely on this basis that German diplomacy could and should be seen to do more.3 For all this, Maull’s argumentation does suffer from one inherent and not insignificant weakness. After all, it is one thing to repeatedly emphasize the existence of “a unique German experience and diplomatic skill in multilateral cooperation”4 and quite another to spell out what the specifics of such unique diplomatic skill actually are—a skill that allegedly predisposes Germany to the position of a civilian power. Yet, what in Germany’s diplomatic approach makes it so characteristically civilian? To be clear, the mere notion of the existence of a unique German diplomatic skill can hardly promote our understanding of what characterizes the “engine room” of Germany’s foreign policy. Nor can it help us to further our understanding of how best to develop Germany’s diplomatic Gestaltungsfähigkeit (shaping power) in the civilianizing power sense, which in retrospect seems to have been the prime objective of Hanns Maull’s Vierzehn Thesen.5 In this respect, it is arguable that Maull’s Thesen contain an underdeveloped kernel with respect to the notion of civilian power as an instrument of diplomacy—a kernel that deserves closer attention particularly in view of the fact that the Vierzehn Thesen form and, indeed, should continue to form the foundation of the evolving civilian/civilianizing power argumentation in the ongoing German foreign policy debate. To clarify this point it may be worth recalling a more recent comment made by Maull at the beginning of 2003, in which the author criticized the Schröder–Fischer government for having “missed [significant] opportunities” to at least try to influence the Bush administration’s views on Iraq before these fermented into a hard-line and uncompromising position. In the words of Maull: For Germany, the alternatives to diplomatic singularization were similarly obvious. Germany should have tried, from early 2002 onward, to assemble a common European position around the objective to support and moderate U.S. policies by maximising European clout in Washington. The chance to do so existed, but it was sadly squandered.6 As can be seen, Maull’s advice of assembling a common European position around the objective of moderating U.S. policies by maximizing European clout in Washington does not in itself explain how such a diplomatic task might best be carried out. Though the advice may certainly be pointing in a wise direction, it lacks the authoritative

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substance of delineating the diplomatic initiatives and activities necessary in performing such a task. To further illustrate this point and not least in order to substantiate Maull’s argument, it may be worth drawing upon the prescriptive advice issued by Harald Müller in Macht und Ohnmacht: Deutsche Außenpolitik vor dem Ende? published in 1998.7 Herein, Müller already warned of the growing neoconservative leverage on U.S. foreign policy when he observed: Over the past twenty years, the domestic political balance of power in the U.S. has shifted in ways which—from a European perspective—can only be seen as unwholesome. The average U.S. populace equipped with robust judgements of reason, but largely disinterested in their country’s foreign policy, faces a well-organised, highly motivated and often religiously founded extreme Right, [. . .], [which] on grounds of the peculiarities of the U.S. party political system have, however, gained an over-proportionate influence in the Republican Party which is also making its influence felt towards a Democratic Executive.8 In foreseeing the possibility of growing tensions in the German–American relationship, Müller recommended different ways for Germany to try to exert its share of long-term diplomatic influence on developments within the U.S. policymaking machinery, when he noted: If this tendency continues to deepen, the future of both international law and the Atlantic Alliance does not look too bright. The number of conflicts will increase—all the way to conflicts that will also affect trade relations. [. . .] These German-American controversies will have to be endured. Above all, however, it will be necessary to revive our contacts with the U.S. Congress and Washington’s foreign policy élite. [. . .] Especially the German Bundestag (lower House of Parliament) is asked to rebuild the rather strongly diminished transatlantic ties [. . .]. This will demand the courage to publicly defend the increasingly unpopular travel allowances for Parliamentarians—given that they are for a good cause. Most of all, it will be necessary to try to influence, in particular, the younger generation of Republican Congressmen and women so that more persons—such as the largely diminished Republican Centre—understand that wise leadership knows its limits and that it must also consider the opinions of allies and

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friends. Under no circumstances do I consider such effort as futile.9 Expressed as early as 1998 and thus before the inauguration of the Bush administration in 2001, Müller’s view of Germany having “missed important opportunities” to influence the course of events in Washington represents a long-term view involving both the Kohl administration as well as the Schröder government. Also, Müller suggests diplomatic-political ways of handling the changing nature of the German–American relationship, whereas Maull falls short of specifying how Germany’s diplomacy might best be further developed. From this we can conclude that although the general concept of civilian power may appear somewhat dated, as a foreign policy approach in the diplomatic sense, it still merits further exploration.10 Nonetheless, why should we specifically resort to the Habermasian theory of communicative action to substantiate the notion of civilian power diplomacy? To this question there are three sets of mutually reinforcing answers. The first answer harks back to the blueprint of Maull’s Vierzehn Thesen and attempts to draw forth the essential message it contains. Maull’s Thesenkomplex might best be conceptualized as composed of two main parts with the first part (theses 1–9) largely pertaining to the essential meaning of the notion of civilian power and its general relevance for contemporary international relations while the second part (theses 10–14) tends to be rather more prescriptive in terms of the author’s desired future course for German foreign policy coupled with the argument that although Germany certainly fulfils certain basic conditions that predispose the country to assuming an international civilianizing role, it has yet to approximate to the task of fulfilling such a role more satisfactorily.11 Thus, the second part envisions and lists significant tasks and responsibilities that lie ahead of Germany if, indeed, the country were to assume the role of a civilianizing force in international affairs. Evidently, the appropriate accomplishment of these tasks would first and foremost depend on the soft elements of civilian power of which the diplomatic-political dimension clearly reigns supreme, at least in terms of the official acknowledgment of the existence of international political problems and the choice of appropriate responses thereto.12 In other words, it is the analytic notion of civilian power as the effective and skilful practice of diplomatic influence that essentially undergirds Maull’s argumentation. If this analytic aspect of civilian power—the command of diplomatic finesse—were appropriately substantiated, it would lend the prescriptive dimension of Maull’s work

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the very strength it lacks. To sum up, then, it is the notion of diplomacy that lies at the heart of Maull’s Vierzehn Thesen. And what is diplomacy if not communication? Admittedly, the somewhat trivial awareness that diplomacy is communication does not in itself explain why we should specifically choose the theory of communicative action to substantiate the civilian power aspect of diplomacy. After all, diplomacy also comprises other forms of communication of which “bargaining,” in particular, constitutes the most dominant in the prevailing literature on international negotiations. Aside from the communicative mode of bargaining there is also the communicative mode of “rhetorical action” to which actors can resort at the start of negotiations; however, as we have seen in chapter 4, this mode of communication can only be as successful as the gradual inching toward the logic of reasoning on behalf of the speaker allows. So what makes the theory of communicative action more conducive to accounting for the notion of a civilian-style diplomacy than the rationalist theory of strategic action? Communicative action is a type of action, which assumes a holistic ontology and is geared toward reaching an agreement between actors through the process of reciprocal argumentation within the boundaries and by means of the medium of language. It therefore aims at producing consensus on the basis of the presumption that both speaker and receiver enter the communication cycle with a readiness to submit to the power of the better argument. Strategic action—equally a type of action—is embedded within the theory of rational choice and thus assumes an individualist ontology according to which actors will pursue the logic of consequences in order to make their preferences prevail, using all instruments available to achieve this objective. As types of action, both strategic and communicative action thus include the wider orientation of the speakers and comprise many speech acts. Though it has become commonplace in the course of the ongoing academic debate to associate the theory of communicative action with the logic of arguing and strategic action with the logic of bargaining, it is important to realize that arguing and bargaining represent two distinct types of speech acts that are not easily associable to the respective types of action on a one-to-one basis. Drawing upon the insights of Searle’s speech act theory, arguing and bargaining essentially differ with respect to the content and the intention they purport. Arguing is likely to entail claims to factual truth or of normative validity and as such is intended to convince the receiver of the truth and righteousness of the respective claim. Bargaining, in contrast, entails promises and threats and is

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intended to change the target’s behavior.13 In turn, both speech acts are asymmetrically related to the two types of action. Hence, whereas communicative action is indeed only compatible with arguing, strategic action is compatible not just with bargaining but also with arguing.14 The main reason for associating the theory of communicative action with the notion of civilian power diplomacy in this particular context of inquiry is best explained by reflecting on the nature of the tasks that Maull envisions for the policy of civilianization. Accordingly, the practice of civilian power diplomacy would essentially though not exclusively involve efforts geared toward constraining the use of force in international affairs not least by strengthening international law. Also, it would involve the promotion of the development of international norms and principles in an effort to overcome the continuing North–South divide in the sense of helping disadvantaged countries escape the poverty trap. Corresponding efforts would essentially involve the practice of moral or practical discourses. Such discourses— as alluded to in chapter 4—usually involve deliberations over whether or not a certain behavior, preference, rule, or norm should apply under given circumstances; and/or whether a norm should be introduced as a guidance for future action; and/or whether a norm should be applied to a present issue under consideration.15 Another broader aspect of aptness between communicative action and civilian power diplomacy concerns the fact that two of the key components of the central question—the uncertainties over the future course of German foreign policy in the 1990s and the question of NATO’s uncertain future given the demise of the Soviet Empire—coincide with three key Habermasian preconditions for the logic of arguing: the general prevalence of overall international political uncertainty coupled with the existence of an already strong institutional framework or common lifeworld in the form of NATO in dire need of a redefinition of its norms. However, all of this is not to say that actors engaged in strategic action do not also engage in reasoning even over “moral issues.”16 As explained in chapter 4, communicative and strategic action are both ideal types of action. In everyday communicative practice, they tend to occur simultaneously and so are not sharply distinguishable from one another. Clearly, if it were not for the dynamics of reasoning, even strategic actors would be unable to reach a satisfactory coordination of their interests. Conversely, communicative actors engaged in the dynamics of arguing do not for this reason lose sight of their overall strategic interests. Hence, the decisive point to note here is that both

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types of action are involved at the start of every communicative cycle.17 Be this as it may, the ontological individualist foundation upon which the utilitarian assumptions of strategic action are understood to unfold does not provide for the reality of the coexistence of arguing and bargaining. It is precisely for this reason that Müller, in 1994, insisted on the absorption of utilitarian assumptions by the more comprehensive theory of communicative action.18 Hence, the by now widespread acknowledgment among leading IR scholars that both arguing and bargaining tend to be ubiquitous in the practice of negotiations and that strategic action may well concern itself with reasoning over moral issues even if utilitarian assumptions would suggest otherwise, begs forth the question of how IR theories should best accommodate these new empirical insights. Recent attempts by rationalists and constructivists to identify the antecedent conditions that favor either arguing or bargaining have thus far cleverly avoided the issue of ontological (in)compatibility in the rationalist–constructivist debate. Yet, such avoidance, as Harald Müller argues, remains a serious handicap to the debate’s further progress, since ignoring ontological issues simply means that scholars are no longer genuinely concerned with the quality and coherence of the theories they either wish to develop or contribute to.19 It is for this reason, and against the background of recent attempts by somewhat younger IR scholars to erect bridges across the rationalist– constructivist divide, that Müller builds his most recent case on Friedrich Kratochwil’s proposition that strategic action is essentially rule-governed and as such equitable to the notion of the logic of appropriateness. As Müller explains, if we were to depart from this proposition, we would be able to dissolve the pyramid of the logic of consequentiality, the logic of appropriateness, and the logic of arguing into a simple hierarchy: beginning with the logic of appropriateness followed by the logic of consequentiality on the one side and the logic of arguing on the other side. Both, arguing and bargaining could then be seen as coexistent,20 though at this juncture it should be noted that the issue of ontological compatibility—still at an early stage of development—is not of direct concern to our subject of inquiry here. Suffice it to say—in answer to the above question—that the theory of communicative action and the act of reasoning are best suited to operationalizing the civilian power dimension of diplomacy because (a) the theory’s essential criteria (moral and normative issues) appear to be well-suited to the civilian power tasks that Maull envisioned in his Vierzehn Thesen and (b) the theory’s main preconditions (prevailing uncertainties within the context of a common lifeworld and the

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appropriate reconstruction thereof) also relate well to the key components of the central question. However, if, according to the above account, diplomacy is largely a matter of language rather than mere communication, then why not draw directly from the literature on diplomacy and international negotiations to substantiate the notion of civilian power diplomacy? The answer to this question is that the subject of diplomacy in IR suffers from a rather weak theoretical foundation, and the role of communicative action in the comparatively more dominant literature on international negotiations still remains a largely neglected area of research. As Christer Jönsson explains, the subject of international negotiation constitutes a relatively well-defined subfield of IR with a rich and variegated literature as well as a respectable amount of middle-range theorizing, yet the same cannot be said for the subject of diplomacy even though it constitutes the very institutional framework within which much of international negotiation takes place.21 Prosaically characterized by Raymond Cohen as “the engine room”22 of international relations, diplomacy is not only an essential institution for the conduct of interstate relations, but it has also proven to be quite a resilient establishment in light of the fact that only few international institutions survived the challenges of popular sovereignty and nineteenth-century nationalism.23 Given that the major classical works on diplomacy have been written by experienced practitioners rather than academics—one need only mention François de Calliére’s De la manière de négocier avec les Souverains24 or Harold Nicholson’s Diplomacy25—it comes as no surprise that the subject should suffer from a weak theoretical base, although this is not to say that there are no specialized academic studies on diplomacy at all.26 Nevertheless, the few that do exist have tended to be marginal to and somewhat disconnected from the rest of IR scholarship. Still, there are promising signs of change with a number of specialized research centers in both the United States and Europe encouraging new projects and publication series in the academic study of diplomacy. Prominent examples include the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, which publishes the annual Diplomatic Record, and the Centre for the Study of Diplomacy at the University of Leicester, which issues monthly discussion papers as well as a book series entitled Studies in Diplomacy. Hence, Jönsson opens his account of the role and meaning of diplomacy in the study of international affairs by emphasizing the fragmented nature of the field and the variety of conceptualizations of diplomacy that exist. The first area of contention concerns the

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appropriate definition of diplomacy. By citing two different definitional examples of diplomacy, Jönsson also illustrates a number of other contentious issues concerning the appropriate understanding of diplomacy in international affairs. In drawing upon the 1995 definition by Hamilton and Langhorne, which defines diplomacy as “the peaceful conduct of relations amongst political entities, their principals and accredited agents”27 and contrasting it with José Calvet de Magalhães’s definition of diplomacy as “an instrument of foreign policy for the establishment and development of peaceful contacts between the governments of different states through the use of intermediaries mutually recognized by the respective parties,”28 Jönsson identifies three main areas of contention: the first of these concerns the question of whether diplomacy by definition need necessarily be peaceful and exclude the use of force. Whereas some authors see diplomacy as an essentially peaceful institution, other scholars are reluctant to draw a clear-cut line between diplomacy and the use of force. As Raymond Cohen explains, from a historical and cross-cultural perspective the juxtaposition of diplomacy and war as polar opposites appears to be peculiarly reflective of a purely Western notion of diplomacy and as such is not necessarily found in other traditions.29 Representing the opposite view is Alexander George’s notion of “coercive diplomacy” or “forceful persuasion,” which denotes the use of threats or limited force to persuade opponents to comply with a respective demand.30 A compromising view on this issue is provided by scholar-diplomat Adam Watson who maintained, “Diplomacy is neither the simple casuistry of force, nor is it a guaranteed technique for solving by negotiation the conflicts of states without resort to it.”31 The second bone of contention, as Jönsson explains, concerns the perennial tension between the broad and narrow definitions of diplomacy. Whereas Magalhaes delimits the term diplomacy to professional diplomats, Hamilton and Langhorne include both “principals and accredited agents” thus equating diplomacy with the broader notions of statecraft and foreign policy. The broader conception appears to be common in the United States, and the narrower definition is considered to be more common in Europe. Emblematic of this comparison is Henry Kissinger’s 1994 Diplomacy,32 which covers broad themes of statecraft, and Harold Nicholson’s seminal 1939 Diplomacy,33 which reflects a narrower conception of diplomacy. Finally, Magalhaes sees diplomacy as an institution of the modern state system whereas for Hamilton and Langhorne diplomacy may exist between “political entities.” By transcending the notion of historical delimitations, the latter

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leave open the question of whether diplomacy may also exist among actors other than states. In the former time-bound analysis, the notion of diplomacy is reserved for the view most notably espoused by Harold Nicholson,34 according to whom the diplomatic system as we know it today originated in fifteenth-century Italy and was then perfected by the French during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—central features of which remain at the core of today’s diplomatic practices. However, other authors understand and interpret the concept of diplomacy in terms of human practice that precedes and transcends the experience of living in the sovereign and territorial nation-state of the past few hundred years.35 Rather than restricting the concept of diplomacy to specific practices and specific actors, these authors interpret diplomacy in terms of general concepts such as representation and communication. Clearly, that representation (in the sense of “acting on behalf of”) should be seen as a key component of diplomacy is hardly a matter of contention for any astute observer to international politics regardless of theoretical background; however, communication—as we have seen in our discussion of Habermas’s theory of communicative action—is considered as one of the logically necessary conditions for the existence of international relations. According to this view then, diplomacy can simply be understood as a “regulated process of communication”36 or even “the communication system of the international society.”37 Defined in these terms, the origins of diplomacy can be traced back further than fifteenth-century Italy all the way to a welldeveloped system of representation and communication in the ancient Near East. Hence, diplomacy in this view is not limited to state agents but it may exist wherever there are boundaries for identity and whenever those boundaries are crossed.38 Yet, despite the many different conceptualizations of diplomacy, most texts on the subject do share a common core albeit in varying proportions. Common aspects of diplomatic studies thus revolve around: (i) an account of the history and prehistory of diplomacy; (ii) typologies of diplomatic functions, modes, and techniques; (iii) the legal framework of diplomacy; and (iv) a discussion of contemporary problems and developments relating to the changing nature of diplomacy.39 Notwithstanding the details of these various aspects in the study of diplomacy—though brevity should not be interpreted as indicating insignificance—suffice it to say that the subject of diplomacy remains as yet a fragmented field of study with a weak theoretical base. Still, the centrality of the notion of negotiation in the conduct of diplomacy paralleled by the centrality of the notion of negotiation in the study of international relations, has, in some sense,

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served to revitalize the notion of diplomacy across subsidiary disciplines and scientific approaches in IR. In the international arena dominated by sovereign states, negotiation is the primary and predominant mode of reaching joint decisions. As Jönsson explains, the study of international negotiation and bargaining has developed into a vital and productive subfield of IR with substantial middle-range theorizing. Furthermore, students of international negotiation have drawn on insights from a variety of disciplinary as well as transdisciplinary perspectives ranging from diplomatic history, economics, management, sociology, social psychology to anthropology, law, and other fields. Equally noteworthy is the fact that negotiation theory tends to have both descriptive and prescriptive elements. For example, Roger Fisher’s and William Ury’s 1981 modern classic Getting to Yes40 has served as a source of inspiration to many authors who wish to provide guidance to negotiators and mediators. Also, it should be noted that the terms negotiation and bargaining are frequently used interchangeably in the literature. To the extent that a distinction is made, one will find either that the term bargaining is used to denote the broader formalized process of negotiation made up of verbal and nonverbal communication and formal and informal exchanges, whereby negotiation then forms a constituent part of the overall bargaining process; or conversely, bargaining can be understood as a subclass of negotiation denoting merely the exchange of offers and counteroffers, concessions and retractions, and bazaar-like haggling.41 As such, however, it ought to be differentiated from the Habermasian notion of “joint problem-solving.” The literature on international negotiation also reveals broad agreement that a bargaining situation must necessarily be characterized by the coincidence of both cooperative as well as conflictual elements and thus interdependent decisionmaking. As Fred Iklé aptly noted, without common interest there is nothing to negotiate for and without conflicting interest there is nothing to negotiate about.42 However, not all bargaining situations thus defined will necessarily lead to negotiations. As Schelling argued, in his 1960 seminal work Strategy of Conflict, parties may at first merely engage in the exchange of nonverbal signaling as seen in cases of limited war. They may thus exchange signals in terms of a bargain but short of the activity of bargaining—“each aware that his own actions are being interpreted and anticipated, each acting with a view to the expectations that he creates.”43 When negotiations do occur, parties might then, and in accordance with Iklé’s definition of a bargaining situation, engage in “a process in which explicit proposals

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are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching an agreement on an exchange or on the realisation of a common interest where conflicting interests are present.”44 Although treatises on international negotiations have been written by scholars and diplomats for centuries, it was not until the 1960s that systematic analysis and theory-building on the subject of international negotiation began. Hence, the year 1960 saw the publication of two pioneering works: Thomas Schelling’s aforementioned Strategy of Conflict and Anatol Rapoport’s Fights, Games and Debates.45 Even though both authors were inspired by game theory as it had at the time been applied to social phenomena by economists, neither of the two restricted himself to formal game theory, both aiming at a synthesis with other fields of knowledge. Schelling combined the game-theoretical basis of his work with psychological insights, and Rapoport contrasted games with debates and processes of developing mutual understandings, which heralded the distinction between bargaining and problemsolving in the study of negotiations.46 As Jönsson explains, since then several large-scale research projects on international negotiation have been launched. For example, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, outside Vienna, launched a project on Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) in 1986. This project has brought together scholars and practitioners of different nationalities and has resulted in a series of renowned edited volumes, such as the 2000 edition of Power and Negotiation by William Zartmann and Jeffrey Rubin. Also, the Harvard Negotiation Workshop of the 1970s has developed into a continuous, transdisciplinary programme on negotiation. Its publications include several prominent works, exemplified by Howard Raiffa’s 1982 The Art and Science of Negotiation47 and the Negotiation Journal, which covers a broad range of topics. In 1996, the Washington Interest in Negotiation (WIN) Group based at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) also launched a specialized journal entitled International Negotiation thus complementing the Journal of Conflict Resolution and the Negotiation Journal as a major outlet for research communication in the field. Although the game-theoretical heritage of negotiation studies may be less apparent today than it was in the 1950s and 1960s, given the fact that scholars have come to employ a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches by drawing on diplomatic history, legal, economic, and psychological theories, content analysis, and interviews, game theory still continues to be a source of inspiration for those wishing to refine

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their approaches to the study of international negotiations. For instance, Robert Axelrod’s innovative treatment of the prisoner’s dilemma game by employing computer tournaments has certainly served to renew interest in iterative games and “tit-for-tat” strategies.48 Other scholars have tried to eclectically synthesize game theory with other approaches, as exemplified by Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing’s 1977 effort49 to connect varieties of systems theory with decisionmaking theory. Another example includes James Sebenius’s 1991 article “Negotiation Analysis,”50 which focused on interest, alternatives to agreement, creating and claiming value, and moves to change the game itself. Terence Hopmann’s 1996 attempt at a comprehensive framework, adding layers of complexity to a game-theoretical foundation also serves as a case in point.51 In response to the fact that early game theory has long been criticized for its shortcomings in tending to (i) homogenize actors, (ii) assume symmetry in relations, (iii) emphasize instrumentality, (iv) favor bilateral encounters, (v) disregard context and institutions, and (vi) be static, more recent advances in game theory and negotiation analysis have sought to compensate for these limitations by considering also (a) the role of culture in international negotiation, which includes the study and identification of distinct national negotiating styles, but also embraces the alternative study of intercultural communication and thus the understanding of negotiation as encounters;52 (b) the role and effects of power asymmetries in negotiation, which relates to the “power of the weak” and the observation that the stronger party does not always “win” in asymmetrical negotiation encounters;53 (c) the notion of negotiating for side-effects, which implies using negotiations for other purposes other than the purpose of reaching an agreement—a view disregarded by game theory and most notably advanced by Fred Iklé54 (d) the focus on international mediation and multilateral negotiation to overcome the emphasis on bilateral encounters common to game theory;55 (e) the consideration of how contextual factors and the institutional processes may affect the negotiation outcomes;56 and (f) the analysis of negotiation dynamics entailing the exchange of proposals and patterns of concession and retractions insufficiently captured by game theory. As a result of the development of increased specialization and differentiation in the literature on negotiation, there is today no overarching theory of international negotiation processes. Instead the literature offers a variety of approaches, each of which highlights different dynamic aspects of negotiations. These approaches have either been

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used alone or in different combinations in the study of international negotiations. In fact, we can distinguish among at least seven perspectives on the essence of international negotiation processes, the first perspective of which emphasizes the establishment of contract zones. This understanding of negotiation processes applies most readily to bilateral, distributive negotiations on single, easily measurable issues.57 The second perspective focuses on strategic moves and thus the use of tactical instruments, such as commitments, threats, and promises to outwit the opponent.58 The third approach proceeds from the view of structural uncertainty experienced by negotiating parties especially but not only in multilateral negotiations. The basic element underpinning this approach is to reduce uncertainty by means of trial-and-error search, information processing, and uncertainty control.59 The fourth conceptualization of an international negotiation situation (which resonates strongly among practitioners) is that of a series of dilemmas with no invariably acceptable solution. How best to balance contradictory imperatives is the essential challenge in this view of negotiation. Contradictory imperatives are posed by questions of firmness versus flexibility, openness and honesty versus secrecy and deception, explicitness versus ambiguity, manipulating risk versus minimizing risk, and aggregating issues versus disaggregating issues.60 The fifth approach to the study of negotiation emphasizes the role and importance of timing in negotiations. Here, it is possible to distinguish between stages of the process of negotiation in terms of ripeness. Although the notion of stages (Zartmann and Berman distinguish between three stages: the diagnostic, the formula, and the detail stages) is sometimes also combined with efforts to identify turning-points within a negotiation process, the notion of ripeness has an intuitive appeal and concerns the moment when parties may be motivationally ripe and ready to engage on a particular aspect under negotiation.61 The sixth perspective concerns the nexus between internal and external processes of negotiations, with every international negotiation also having an important domestic or internal dimension.62 Finally, there is the view that without communication there could be no negotiation in the first place.63 However, as David Bell noted in 1988, “much of the existing literature [on international negotiations] derives from theoretical approaches that are particularly insensitive to language and communication.”64 As Jönsson concludes, the linguistic as well as nonlinguistic aspects of communication in international negotiations have so far received little attention. And although he acknowledges Thomas Risse’s more recent efforts to focus on the argumentative aspects of international negotiations,

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Jönsson at the same time emphasizes that this particular area certainly warrants more research attention.65 Hence, our third explanation for why the theory of communicative action should serve to substantiate the notion of civilian power diplomacy goes back to Smyser’s study of Germany’s negotiating behavior66 and the fact that it echoes Maull’s argument of Germany having developed a special diplomatic style due to its specific historical experience of postwar defeat. And although Smyser makes no specific mention of the theory of communicative action in his work, it is interesting to note that his evaluation of German diplomacy reflects many of the essential elements of the Habermasian notion of argumentative rationality. Equally noteworthy is Smyser’s observation of the transitional nature of Germany’s foreign policy and the recognition that Germany has yet to develop and settle into a stable, mature foreign policy mode.67 Again this tallies with Maull’s argumentation that although Germany fulfils certain fundamentally important credentials of a civilian power, other aspects have yet to mature in order for Germany’s leadership to meet the challenges of an increasingly complex international security environment. It is in this context that one could make the distinction between the notions of a passive and active or an adolescent and mature civilian power. In any case, this point underlines the fact that Maull never claimed that Germany was already a full-fledged civilian power. The evident interrelationship between Maull’s argumentation and Smyser’s actual study of German diplomacy plus the fact that Smyser’s evaluation appears to reflect important aspects of the theory of communicative action (even though communicative action finds no direct mention in the study) begs forth the question of how many of the essential elements of the Habermasian theory of communicative action (as enlisted in chapter 4) can be substantiated by Smyser’s study, in order for both to jointly qualify as a navigational aid for the assessment of Germany’s influence on the U.S. decision to enlarge NATO during the early to mid-1990s.

The Smyser–Habermasian Navigational Aid In drawing upon a large number of interviews with leading American and European negotiators, Smyser essentially identifies seven central features that are seen to have characterized the negotiating behavior of the former Federal Republic until 1990 as much as the negotiating behavior of the united Germany since 1990. The first three points are seen to reflect

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Germany’s strategic concerns derived especially from the wish for acceptance, security, and stability in the institutions and organizations upon which Germans have come to rely. The last four points tend to mirror the cultural origins of Germany’s negotiating behavior, thus reflecting its negotiating techniques and revealing how German diplomats function in certain consistent and predictable ways, be this in preparation for negotiation, in the process of actual negotiation, or in implementing the results. The overall objective of Smyser’s study is to illustrate how all of these points function within the broader parameters of a negotiating process. To this end, Smyser divides the negotiation process into five main phases: (i) The preparation phase; (ii) the opening phase; (iii) the middle phase; (iv) the revisionist phase; and (v) the implementation phase.

Preparing for Negotiation As Smyser explains, “Germany prepares for negotiations very carefully, perhaps more carefully than any other state. But it does so in ways that differ fundamentally from the American model and that reflect the German search for consensus as well as Germany’s federal structure.”68 Hence, in order to position itself as far as possible within a consensus, the German government will tend to look at the total context of an impending negotiation. This means that the staff of the Auswärtige Amt (AA; German Foreign Office) or whatever other government ministry is to conduct the negotiation will begin by listing and carefully studying the views other governments or relevant parties have expressed on the issue(s) to be negotiated in order to learn what they mean. This, in turn, will allow the German government to discern which of the other states may support or oppose its views in the talks. It may also allow the government to decide upon which institutional setting may be most appropriate and fitting to the negotiation issue at stake. Only after studying the views of other parties and thus only in the context of what it expects others to say and do in the negotiation will the German government begin to define its own position, the goals it wishes to achieve, and the approach by which it believes it might best be able to advance its interests. This, as Smyser points out, stands in stark contrast to the classic U.S. approach, where in preparation for negotiation the State Department or the White House will normally define the national interest of the United States first. From the perspective of a superpower with the capacity to shape the global environment, others are simply expected to adjust their positions to Washington’s views.

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German negotiators, by contrast, and for reasons related to their country’s darker historical past, recognize the need to work within the existing environment. It is for this reason that German negotiators will make an effort to try to understand the views of other parties to a negotiation and to consider these when formulating their own interests. Clearly, this observation coincides with the Habermasian criterion of the capacity to empathize and to adjust one’s own position to that of the other side. Nevertheless, it would be rather naïve to assume that Germany’s consideration for the views of others were not also geared toward the protection of Germany’s own national interests, regardless of the negative connotations this term has come to acquire for the country’s foreign policy. In other words, paying due attention to the interests of the negotiating partner also serves the German interest of devising a policy that will draw support. As Smyser notes, “the Germans do not want to be talking to themselves. Diplomacy constitutes their main route to establishing the kind of world they want. Unlike the United States, they cannot use force and cannot afford isolation. They want a diplomacy that will work with others.”69 Sensitive to their country’s need for rehabilitation and security, therefore, German negotiators will take positions that will keep them in tune with other parties to a negotiation, but that will also advance their country’s interests. This, in turn, coincides with the Habermasian understanding that communicative actors remain goal-oriented and do not necessarily abandon their own strategic goals in the process of reasoning. To this end, Smyser observes, Germans will tend to prepare their positions methodically and in minute detail. They will do so on a logical basis, justifying each element of their position intellectually. German negotiators will take into careful consideration the kind of relationship they wish to maintain or cultivate with their negotiating partner through the talks. For this purpose, they will prepare detailed arguments for presentation, upon which the German position can then be advanced and justified. Smyser describes this as a German habit, which he maintains emerges from the long-standing German devotion to logical reasoning: “As in German philosophy, the idea reigns supreme.”70 This observation clearly reveals an inherent German inclination toward a preference for the Habermasian practice of reasoning, and the careful attention paid by Germans to drawing up detailed arguments at the same time also reveals the importance of the Habermasian notion of argumentative consistency in the German diplomatic approach. As Smyser notes, nothing in the course of the German preparation for negotiation happens by accident. Germans will usually

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devote much effort in preparing a comprehensive, governing concept—a Gesamtkonzept—which expresses the fundamental objective they wish to achieve in any negotiation. This Gesamtkonzept will combine the German national interest with the perceived interests of the negotiating partner(s) and by so doing is intended to provide intellectual coherence. It is also intended to lend purpose to the overall negotiation process and to the positions of other negotiating parties. Hence, detailed proposals can then be drawn from the Gesamtkonzept and introduced to the negotiating process.

The Opening Phase: Presenting the Gesamtkonzept According to Smyser, German negotiators normally consider their opening presentation as the most important part of the negotiating process. The first item that German negotiators will usually present is the philosophical basis for their position—that is, the philosophical reasoning that undergirds the entire Gesamtkonzept. The Gesamtkonzept can be quite elaborate given that German negotiators usually want to persuade their negotiating partners that the position presented makes sense from a logical point of view. This, as mentioned earlier, reflects the importance of logic in Germany’s culture and intellectual history. The significance of the function of the Gesamtkonzept in Germany’s approach to negotiations can only be understood against the background of the fact that most internationally relevant negotiations with Germany over the past 50 years have, in fact, been about Germany itself. Respective negotiations during the Cold War inter alia always dealt with the question of Germany’s sovereignty, its alliance relationship, and/or its troop levels. From this perspective, Germany’s Gesamtkonzept approach serves the purpose of addressing the country’s search for an accepted place in the world. The Gesamtkonzept usually incorporates the essential views of the Chancellery, Foreign Office, government, and Länder (federal states). In laying the foundation for Germany’s negotiating position, it also supports the entire structure of that position. Hence, every part of the position should fit into the total concept, and the total concept should in turn highlight and justify every part of the central position. Furthermore, it is said that German negotiators will focus a great deal of their attention on gaining the acceptance of their Gesamtkonzept. As Smyser explains, “they want that concept to be understood and agreed to, for it holds their detailed positions together. And they want others

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to accept not only their proposals but also the logic behind those proposals.”71 Here, the connection to the Habermasian notion of reasoning should be more than obvious. Only after presenting their overall concept will German negotiators present their specific positions as drawn from the concept and in relation to it. At this point they may want to justify each element of their position. In this respect, it has been noted, Germans are not necessarily known for their subtlety but rather for their directness although this is not meant to imply abrasiveness or rudeness. Their detailed and coordinated presentation has been known to leave other parties to the negotiation overwhelmed. As Smyser recalls, one American negotiator commented that in 30 years of diplomatic experience, he found the German presentations to be the most thorough that he had ever encountered even to the point of being intimidating.72 In terms of presentation style, therefore, German negotiators are known to state their views openly and plainly. They do not try to keep their proposals opaque. Rather they know what they want and they want their partners to know what they want. Further, they do not try to present one position in order to present another, thus resorting to devious tactics and for instance presenting false issues as a tactical ploy while planning to drop those issues at the first opportunity. German negotiators simply outline, sometimes at staggering length, what they believe they can legitimately claim on the basis of their Gesamtkonzept.73 This, in turn, is indicative of a genuine German commitment to the Habermasian notion of reasoning, not least reflected in a commitment to argumentative consistency and credibility as opposed to rhetorical action. As Smyser explains, “The German government wants to make sure that it uses diplomacy as effectively as necessary. It sees nothing to be gained from beating around the bush.”74

The Middle Phase and the Dynamics of Arguing As negotiations proceed, the principal German objective as encapsulated by the Gesamtkonzept will become increasingly clear. German negotiators will reiterate their prime objective as and when necessary, making sure their entire strategy hangs on it, thereby allowing the Gesamtkonzept to determine the pace and direction of the talks. As Smyser observes, although German negotiators do not normally abandon their principal goal, they may be ready to negotiate secondary issues more flexibly in order to win agreement on the basic objective. In

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Habermasian terms, this means that German diplomats will attempt to persuade the other side of the inherent value of their arguments, whilst at the same time demonstrating an openness to being persuaded without, however, losing sight of their principal objective. In the course of the negotiating process, Germans will also take into consideration factors concerning the international political situation. As Smyser notes, Germans will want their talks to fit into whatever else is happening in the world. In this vein, they will try hard to ensure that talks between other negotiation partners proceed successfully since such successes are regarded as equally beneficial to Germany’s multilateral interests as a whole. This, in turn, reflects the importance that Germany’s leadership gives to both the sustenance of constructive multilateral cooperation and the projection thereof. In Habermasian terms, this inclination would be seen to reflect the importance of the sustenance of a common lifeworld and the improved (re)construction thereof as and where necessary. As for the pace of the negotiation process, this will largely depend on how the German Gesamtkonzept is advancing. Given that Germans are usually highly determined to achieve their objective, the negotiators must either agree on that objective or on modifying it in a mutually acceptable way. This process can be tedious, depending also on the importance of the subject matter at hand.75 Yet, as Smyser maintains, the record of past experiences shows that eventually Germany’s negotiating partners must deal with the German Gesamtkonzept. Although they need not necessarily accept it in its entirety and can demand or expect to receive concessions on other points, the fact of the matter is they cannot avoid the well-prepared German Gesamtkonzept. Arguably, this aspect of Germany’s approach could be read as an invitation to its negotiating partners to thoroughly think through their positions beforehand and to prepare an equally well-reasoned Gesamtkonzept upon which they can then engage in the process of more direct logical reasoning with the Germans. As far as the question of Germany’s negotiating style is concerned, Germans are seen to continue to advance their views directly on the issues before them. Hence, U.S. diplomats as well as other negotiators recall clear and tough talk on both sides in several German–American negotiations over the past decades. Helmut Schmidt even prided himself on having a sharp style in dealing with other world leaders. In other words, Germans do not necessarily spare Americans all the time. This, in Habermasian terms, implies that even in German–American negotiations, equality may prevail through the “power of the better

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argument.”76 Still, as Smyser also emphasizes, although German negotiators can be tough, “they normally speak in a reasoned manner and without bombast. They usually take care not to suggest that they are trying to force their negotiating partners into a corner.”77 They will listen carefully and will try to maintain a positive spirit throughout the process, even if they do not intend to yield quickly.78 Besides, Germans will normally hesitate to bring emotion into a negotiation. As Smyser observes, “they react with almost visible discomfort to emotional speeches.”79 Given the country’s experience with nationalism and Nazism, German negotiators prefer not to engage in sloganeering. Nor do they welcome it in negotiations, particularly if they feel others are employing it to seize the moral high ground. This indicates that German diplomacy places a great deal of emphasis on argumentative credibility rather than mere rhetoric.

The Revisionist Phase German negotiators do not seek an agreement for its own sake, but often also want to use the negotiation to establish or deepen a relationship. For this reason, they will try to avoid a breakdown of the negotiation. Given that Germans wish to strengthen their links in all directions, they will refrain from haggling or bartering and from trying to reach compromises merely for the sake of doing so. Instead they will measure each concession carefully against the totality of their concept and their basic objective. As Smyser explains, German negotiators “will listen to reason and to their partner’s arguments, but those arguments must have a logical foundation. Progress can be made. But that progress will come painstakingly and slowly as the Germans evaluate each move and weigh each argument.”80 This, in turn, confirms the German commitment to multilateralism on the basis of a preference for seeking a commonly reached reasoned consensus.

The Implementation Phase German negotiators are prepared to accept practical compromises in order to obtain an agreement. Yet it is usually only long after it appears that a deal should have been reached that German negotiators will accept an agreement. This is so because German negotiators will want the agreement to conform at least to the overall direction of their

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Gesamtkonzept, if not to all the details of their concept. As Smyser observes, virtually all agreements that Americans, Russians, French, British, and others have negotiated with Germans over the past 50 years have been made possible by practical compromises derived largely from the German quest for stability and the country’s strong commitment to multilateral cooperation. On aspects of implementation, Germans are well known for carrying out their agreement fully and meticulously, though the exact interpretation of agreements may be subject to disputes. Still, diplomats who have negotiated with Germans have commented unanimously that Germans will respect agreements and unlike Soviet leaders in their day, for example, will refrain from trying to constantly reinterpret agreements in ways that appear intended to reopen or invalidate previous negotiations. Hence, although some compromises can present genuine future complications, agreements with Germans do function normally. Once an agreement has been signed, Germans will not cast its fundamentals into doubt since they are interested in making rather than breaking relationships with other countries. Once the work is done, Germans will want to move on to other pertinent matters. As one American diplomat commented: “when you finish a negotiation with Germans, you know you have been through a real negotiation.”81 In sum, it is reasonable to conclude that Smyser’s study of Germany’s negotiating behavior reflects essential elements of Habermas’s theory of communicative action. Why should we be interested in analyzing the nature of Germany’s diplomacy in the specific context of NATO’s first round of eastward enlargement? The answer to this question is that our particular case study promises to fulfill most of the essential Habermasian preconditions as introduced in chapter 4: first, we can probably agree that in terms of the existence of a common lifeworld, both countries (Germany and the U.S.) share a strong interest in maintaining NATO for both security and political-ideological reasons. However, with Germany’s unification in 1990 and the unexpected end of the Cold War, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, there was widespread uncertainty among all Alliance members over how best to respond to these changes and over whether and how to adapt existing institutional frameworks to changing international political realities. This fulfills another precondition of Habermas’s theory in that it concerns the absence of “common knowledge” about a given situation in which the relevant actors found themselves. Given the high degree of uncertainty concerning NATO’s future in the absence of a single identifiable threat, this particular case

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also meets the Habermasian condition of relevant actors having to engage in a conscious effort to perhaps not construct an entirely new lifeworld from scratch, but to rejuvenate and reconstruct a common lifeworld for new and changing times. Finally, this particular case may also be seen to fulfill the condition of a nonhierarchical relationship given that both Germany and the United States have always enjoyed a close and central strategic partnership in the Alliance, though nobody would deny the latter its leading position. Hence, the possibility that German arguments can weigh heavily on U.S. Alliance policy is evidenced by the 1989 example of the FOTL controversy during which the Kohl–Genscher government persistently opposed Washington’s modernization plans for Lance, thus paving the way for Germany’s unification in the course of 1989–90.82 In this respect, it is also worth remembering that variations in power positions within the Alliance are invalidated once they reach the table of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), where members have an equal right to express their views and where common consent is paramount to action being unanimously agreed upon.83 This shows that our particular case study fulfills all four of the central Habermasian preconditions for reasoning. Furthermore, the course of the process leading to NATO’s enlargement decision broadly entails a diagnostic, a formula, and a detail phase.84 In addition, this case also includes specific issues of contention between Washington and Bonn, beginning specifically with the question of the actual need for NATO’s enlargement to East Central Europe (ECE), followed by the question of the appropriate timing by when to extend NATO’s membership to ECE—a question related not only to aspects of Russia’s appropriate institutional status in a panEuropean Security context, but also touching directly upon the question of how best to tackle the Yeltsin–Zhirinovsky factor in view of domestic political upheavals in Russia at the time. Equally important with respect to the way in which Smyser’s study of Germany’s negotiating behavior complements the Habermasian theory of communicative action with its notion of a “common lifeworld” in relation to our NATO case study is the specific mention by Smyser that his analysis is intended to raise especially the U.S. awareness of the unique German diplomatic approach coupled with the fact that Smyser essentially (though not exclusively) reflects on the German negotiating approach toward Americans. All in all, it seems that Smyser’s study relates well to the Habermasian theory of communicative action; together both serve to explain why the case of NATO’s first round of eastward enlargement seems well

The Smyser–Habermasian “Navigational Aid” 101 suited for attempting to delineate the German path of diplomatic influence on the U.S. decision to enlarge NATO. What remains to be seen is whether the combination of the two—as a navigational aid—can, in fact, mirror the actual German diplomatic approach in the context of this particular inquiry and whether it can serve to substantiate Hanns Maull’s understanding of Germany possessing a special diplomatic skill in multilateral cooperation that is commensurate with the notion of civilian power. Returning to the central question of our research endeavor, this study first seeks to establish the relative extent to which leading figures of the Kohl government determined and shaped the (in)formal negotiation process leading to the gradual reform of NATO’s organizational structures for the purpose of its eastward extension. Second, and more importantly, it aims at evaluating the degree to which the Kohl government’s overall diplomatic approach may have influenced the U.S. leadership to first accept the basic rationale for NATO enlargement only to gradually support the idea on largely German terms. To this end, the central question is divided into two main questions. The first part relates to the degree of influence the Kohl government had in setting and framing the agenda for the enlargement of NATO during the early to mid-1990s and thus entails (i) the identification of the most influential decisionmakers within the agenda-setting process coupled with (ii) the verification of the degree of Germany’s relative influence measured against the relative influence of other leading American players in the field. The second part seeks to identify whether the relevant set of German–American (in)formal consultations held were largely informed by the mode of reasoning as reflected in Smyser’s study of German diplomacy and as encouraged first and foremost by a German preference for argumentative rationality.

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P A R T

III

Germany’s Influence on the U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO The Process from 1993 to 1997

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C H A P T E R

6

Debate on NATO Enlargement, 1993

The Incoming Clinton Administration and NATO’s Continued Inertia When Bill Clinton took office of the U.S. presidency in January 1993, he undoubtedly inherited a series of complex foreign policy issues— mostly issues involving conflicts that were taking place within rather than between nations, raising new and difficult questions pertaining to the definition of nation and nationhood. However, Clinton had won the presidency by promising to focus “like a laser beam” on issues haunting the domestic economy. In the face of widespread economic stagnation and a mounting federal deficit, there was a widespread feeling among the American public that their country needed to focus its energies on domestic rather than foreign policy problems. This meant that public support for U.S. foreign policy endeavors or peacekeeping missions increasingly declined. And as Clinton himself announced during his acceptance speech to the 1992 Democratic Convention: The end of the Cold War permits us to reduce defence spending while still maintaining the strongest defence in the world, but we must plough back every dollar of defence cuts into building American jobs right here at home. I know well that the world needs a strong America, but we have learnt that strength begins at home.1 Hence, Clinton was primarily intent on shaping a reduced U.S. military presence in Europe when considering the broader issue of NATO’s

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reform. And although Clinton ran his campaign on a centrist New Democrat ticket, he shifted to the political Left when he came into office. Many of his foreign policy and national security appointments were drawn from the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. As a result, they reacted negatively to the idea of NATO enlargement, which was a decidedly centrist and bipartisan venture. The administration’s prevailing argument was that NATO’s eastward expansion would unnecessarily antagonize Moscow; hence, initially Clinton followed the policy of his predecessor by keeping the issue under the rug. Amid emerging crises in the Balkans, Africa, and the Caribbean, Russia’s reform process was seen as a top priority in American foreign policy during the early phase of the Clinton presidency, while the subject of NATO enlargement was viewed in essentially defensive and less significant terms.2 Yet equally noteworthy is the issue of Clinton’s own apparent lack of interest in foreign policy including the subject of NATO enlargement. Whilst Clinton’s national security adviser, Anthony Lake, is said to have kept difficult foreign policy questions off the administration’s agenda, it also appears as though Clinton himself regarded foreign policy as a distraction from his domestic program, preferring to delegate its formulation to others whenever possible. As Elizabeth Drew aptly observed: The real problem was that Clinton had trouble defining policy, even in a given case, and seemed not very interested in foreign policy. He seemed uncomfortable talking about it. Unlike every President since Truman, Clinton had no regularly scheduled meetings with his foreign policy team. [Although] he did see Lake almost daily.3 Notwithstanding this observation, it is only fair to admit that the subject of UN peacekeeping did enjoy a high profile in the early months of the Clinton presidency, although not so much as a valuable subject in itself than as a means by which to share international resources to tackle the emergence of new intra-ethnic conflicts abroad, thereby deflecting from the superpower role of the United States and the apparent responsibilities this raised. Madeleine Albright, then U.S. ambassador to the UN, was particularly keen to enhance the UN’s role in international peacekeeping. Yet despite these efforts, it seemed as if Clinton’s foreign policy team, which admittedly only began to gather in the spring of 1993, had, until then, neither a policy concept for

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Bosnia nor one for the ECE demand to join NATO—a concept that would go beyond the provisions of the North Atlantic Co-Operation Council (NACC). Clearly, for an administration determined to concentrate its efforts on domestic affairs and unwilling to commit the United States to the use of force in international affairs,—the subject of NATO’s eastern enlargement was not high on the policy agenda. For the German government, however, trying to cope with the internal and external consequences of German unification whilst straddling the West’s eastern universe, the strategic imperative now was to consolidate the new democracies and market economies of Eastern Europe amidst support for joint military cooperation and arms reduction efforts as far east as possible. In this effort, Bonn sought to ensure that the shift in priorities remained firmly attached to Germany’s continued anchorage in and commitment to NATO and the EU, not least through the eventually envisioned dual eastward enlargement of these organizations. Convinced of both a historical responsibility as well as a practical need for enlargement, Bonn’s political elite understood sooner than officials in Washington, Paris, and London that the security vacuum in ECE would ultimately have to be filled. Rejecting, ignoring, or postponing East European demands for integration, it was felt, carried not only the risk of discrediting Western institutions but it could also lead to a renationalization of policy in the respective countries and a strengthening of the former communist Nomenklatura. Moreover, bereft of serious institutional affiliations, these countries might begin to construct their own security arrangements, in which case Germany would have to deal with local alliances or reach a deal with Moscow in order to keep an eye on developments in the region or else be forced to deal with the region as it saw fit—scenarios that neither East nor West Europeans would be comfortable with. Hence, from the beginning there was a tendency across party political lines in Bonn to see NATO enlargement in rather positive terms, namely in terms of the long-term contribution it could make to pan-European security as a whole rather than in negative terms of what the short-term risks or costs might be in taking such a step. Furthermore, while in 1991 common talk of the West having inherited a new security agenda seemed to be just that namely fashionable talk, by 1993 this new security agenda had evolved into a serious concern that would grow throughout and until the mid-1990s, epitomized not only by the war and genocide in the Balkans but also by a series of disturbing events in Russia, causing growing unease in the region of Central Europe. The weakening of Belarussian neutrality

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since early 1993, the growing influence of military and political hardliners following the crushing of the Duma in October 1993, and the electoral successes of ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the parliamentary elections of December 1993—all of these developments as well as the Russian assault on the Chechen capital of Grozny in the winter of 1994–95—reawakened and kept alive the fear in East European capitals of Russia’s military and strategic influence spreading westwards once again. And although these developments had not amounted to an objective threat, they did constitute a major source of perceived insecurity in the region. By the beginning of 1993, the subject of enlargement toward ECE was also being considered within NATO, albeit informally, since the majority of Alliance members had signaled clearly that they did not wish the subject to be placed on the official agenda.4 It seemed as though the subject was beyond the pale and so it was discussed among NATO ambassadors only on a rather personal and unofficial level. When asked why the subject of enlargement was treated as anathema at the time, Michael Rühle, speechwriter to the then NATO secretary general, Manfred Wörner, described the mood within the Alliance as one characterized by hesitation and a dominant concern “for establishing diplomatic relations with all the countries belonging to the former Soviet bloc and not just with the Visegrad countries.”5 Given that the Alliance was confronted with a fundamental image problem, discussing enlargement openly was felt to be rather untimely since it would complicate the task of bringing the continent together. According to Rühle’s observation: Many, not only the Americans, but the British and other members also said that they did not want to raise the issue now. They said that the last thing they needed at the time was a debate about who was going to be in or out and what would happen to Russia and the many nuclear weapons on its soil.6 Therefore, during the first months of 1993, NATO officials sought to keep the subject of enlargement under the rug, preferring to concentrate their efforts on strengthening NATO’s relations with all countries of Central and Eastern Europe instead. On 6 February 1993, on the occasion of the 30th Annual Conference on Security Policy in Munich, Chancellor Kohl gave a speech on Germany’s security interests that had the character of a broad message. For Kohl, the advantage of using broad messages was to avoid creating

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misunderstandings or apprehensions over German foreign policy and was part and parcel of Kohl’s patient and careful approach,7 evidenced also by the Chancellor’s later handling of Russia in 1996–97. Thus, rather than advertising a precooked strategy ready to be presented to others, Kohl generally preferred to appeal to a feeling of “common identity” rather than to concrete alternative decisions. In this case, Kohl took an equally cautious yet nonetheless farsighted approach in attempting to delineate the context for the further evolution of German security policy. Mindful and continuously aware of the sensitivities surrounding German unification, Kohl, in his speech, emphasized the usual parameters of German foreign policy when he said that Germany’s security interests depended on the stability of the pan-European context and Germany’s willingness as well as preparedness to contribute to such stability with the support of friends and partners upon and within a functioning European multilateral institutional foundation and context. Kohl placed Germany’s elementary interests in achieving a stable environment in the promotion and protection of human rights, freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. At the same time, however, he made sure to mention that in some parts of Europe these values were threatened and endangered by national strife and ethnic conflict, which were growing faster than the means by which they could be controlled. This led Kohl to draw three central conclusions: first, Germany as a member of the UN could not only enjoy rights but had also to adopt certain new responsibilities of which peacekeeping and peacemaking had become one central component. To this end, Kohl pledged that sections of Germany’s armed forces would have to be restructured and made more flexible in order to efficiently respond to new crisis management tasks. Finally, Kohl emphasized that NATO, next to fulfilling its main collective defense purpose, would also have to be prepared to tackle the growing challenges of crisis management. However, on the subject of NATO membership for ECE countries, Kohl decided to keep a low profile, saying there were no easy answers to this question and instead recommending a cautiously devised policy that paid respect to the legitimate security interests of all of Germany’s eastern neighbors—all, once again and presumably meaning ECE as well as Russian interests.8 Sensitive to the prevailing mood within the Alliance, Kohl cleverly avoided the issue of NATO’s eastward enlargement. However, his newly appointed Defence Minister Volker Rühe, by contrast, sought to avail rather than miss the opportunity of prevailing indecisiveness and inertia within NATO, when he began—with the

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support of his then chief of Policy Planning, Ulrich Weisser—to prepare for a deliberate attempt to place the subject of enlargement on the Alliance agenda and more importantly on the agenda of the new American administration.

Framing the Issue and Setting the Agenda: The Rühe–Weisser Initiative In the absence of an open NATO enlargement debate, the German Defence Minister Volker Rühe would become one of the most ardent supporters of NATO enlargement and in this endeavor had been publicly ahead of anyone both in Washington and Bonn. As Ronald Asmus, expert in Central European Affairs, explains: I think Rühe deserves great historical credit, because neither Kohl nor Kinkel would ever have started this debate. They were concerned about the effect this would have on the course of Russian politics. And our debate was influenced by Volker Rühe. What Rühe was trying to do was to convince Americans to go along with the idea; and soon the Americans had their own debate and we actually overtook the Germans and gradually became much more forward-leaning.9 Promoting the eastward enlargement of the Alliance met all of Rühe’s personal and political ambitions. As the former CDU foreign policy spokesman, Rühe already had long-standing contacts with leading figures in Poland’s new political elite. Rühe saw Poland as the one Central European state of strategic importance to Germany and while aware that Poland increasingly viewed Germany as a powerful tribune to represent its interests in joining the West’s premier security institution, Rühe was resolved to do all he could to ensure the country’s inclusion into Western structures.10 However, Rühe’s advocacy was not only motivated by strategic concerns but also by his personal ambitions. Before moving to the MoD in 1992, Rühe, as mentioned earlier, had been the long-time foreign policy spokesman of the CDU parliamentary party. It was always clear that Rühe considered foreign affairs his true vocation and would have preferred heading the AA instead of the Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg).11 Upon moving to Hardthöhe, Rühe tried to fill the post in ways that best suited his

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own interests and appointed Vice Admiral Ulrich Weisser, one of Germany’s most distinguished strategists, as his chief of Policy Planning. In fact, Rühe never wanted to be looked upon as the Bundeswehrminister, instead he wanted to be seen as his party’s guiding intellect in the realm of foreign and security policy. NATO enlargement was an issue that perfectly fitted these ambitions. It was a crucial foreign policy topic apt to define U.S.–EU relations as well as German–ECE and German–U.S.–Russia relations, whilst also carrying direct implications for defense and thus constituting a foreign policy subject over which the defence minister would have a legitimate voice. When Vice Admiral Ulrich Weisser became the chief of Policy Planning at the German MoD on 1 September 1992, both Rühe and Weisser, having had agreed to tie the defence minister’s name to a European project that would secure Rühe a place in history, proceeded with the initiation of the subject of NATO enlargement within the German government. To this end, Weisser had written an internal policy paper subject to Rühe’s approval in order to try to coordinate the policy with the AA and the Chancellor’s Office. By December 1992, Weisser had called for a meeting of political directors of the Chancellery, the Foreign Office, and the MoD in order to get the issue of NATO enlargement onto the agenda of the German government. However, and as alluded to earlier, it was a rather unusual move for the MoD to be taking the initiative on a subject that, in essence, affected defense-related questions but by nature was a matter of foreign policy. Not surprisingly, the MoD’s attempt to appropriate a subject of foreign policy somewhat surprised the Chancellor’s Office as well as the Foreign Office both of which reacted unenthusiastically to the idea. Both Jürgen Chrobog, the then political director of the AA and Joachim Bitterlich, Chancellor Kohl’s closest adviser on foreign policy and defense-related matters, appeared skeptical over whether such an undertaking was possible given Washington’s reluctance. Also, they considered it inadequate or improper for Germany to take the lead— so soon after unification—in a major policy area that would eventually lead to a fundamental transformation of NATO and the European strategic landscape as a whole. Hence, much in line with the German foreign policy vocation of keeping a low profile, they wondered whether it was wise for Germany to speak out on an issue before Washington had done so. At the same time, however, and given that the BMVg’s Policy Planning Staff had already seized the issue for itself, both men felt somewhat deprived of the chance of taking the lead within the government on so important a subject.12 Thus, it is arguable

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that the initial somewhat skeptical internal government reaction to the BMVg proposal was a combination of sober political judgment based on the traditional German foreign policy rationale of not being seen to upset the Americans mixed with personal feelings of political ambition and competitiveness. Despite the Foreign Office’s and the Chancellery’s apparent lack of enthusiasm for the proposal, Rühe and his chief of Policy Planning began to put together a coherent concept on which to argue the case for NATO’s eastward enlargement. To this end, they initially sought the intellectual support of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), then still located in Ebenhausen near Munich, a leading think-tank renommé for advising the government on international security affairs. The SWP had presented the MoD Planungsstab with a study assessing Germany’s future foreign policy options in extensive length. However, the study was criticized by the MoD for failing to offer any hard-core policy-relevant advice and also for being too theoretical and not innovative enough.13 Yet, in defense of the study provided by the SWP, there is good reason to believe that the assessment, apart from having been too long and theoretical, was also highly critical of the notion of the need for an early and rapid enlargement of NATO to the east and so, seen from this perspective, the study would hardly have served Rühe’s interest of selling the issue of enlargement to the Alliance as a whole and to the Americans in particular.14 At the risk of becoming highly unpopular in Ebenhausen, Weisser suggested to Rühe that they would be well advised to hire experts with the necessary experience of and understanding for the kind of practical and policy-relevant advice high-ranking policymakers required in order to deal effectively with broad and complex foreign policy issues. Weisser suggested that Rühe hire experts at the leading American think-tank RAND, where during 1990–91 Weisser himself had resided as a guest scholar. During that time and thus also during the time of the Gulf War, RAND had been conducting a study for the Bush administration “on the future commitment of the United States in and for Europe after the Cold War.”15 It had been the then president of RAND, Dr. James Thomson, who decided that it would be helpful to incorporate a German perspective in this work. Thus, while RAND experts had long and intense discussions relating to the future of European security, they also discussed the subject of NATO’s survival and raised, for the first time, the subject of the possibility of the Alliance’s eastward enlargement including the restructuring of NATO. As Weisser recalls, in this respect “we were discussing far-ranging and relatively new ideas,

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including even the possibility of creating a transatlantic free-trade zone.”16 Weisser’s part in the study was to write a chapter suggesting how NATO might adapt to new politico-strategic requirements. It was from that time onward that Weisser maintained close contact with his distinguished American colleagues at RAND.17 Hence, Volker Rühe agreed with Weisser’s suggestion of setting up a consultancy process between RAND and the BMVg whereupon Weisser—in early 1993—cabled Walter Slocombe, the then deputy undersecretary for Defence Policy at the Pentagon, to ask whether RAND could be engaged to conduct research for the German MoD. As Weisser recalls saying to Slocombe: “We will share your results, but we will pay the bill.”18 It is important to note that RAND had conducted research for foreign governments before, but never on policy pertaining to national security as exemplified by NATO.19 The initiation, organization, and planning of the RAND–BMVg consultancy process took a couple of months, but was initiated and completed in the course of 1993.20 In the meantime, Rühe’s Policy Planning Staff had tried to work out a coherent concept (Gesamtkonzept) with which to underline the basic arguments in favor of NATO enlargement. This concept adopted the following line of reasoning: (1) The notion of NATO’s “opening” to the east would have to be seen within the broader context of European political and strategic developments: the evolution of the European integration process and the transformation of the Alliance. (2) A strategy dealing with ECE would have to take into account the specific requirements of individual spheres and localities within the region, thus relying on step-by-step integration as well as intensified cooperation. That is to say, promoting the integration of some ECE countries (especially those closest to Germany’s borders) would have to be accompanied by a parallel effort of intensified cooperation with those either not yet ready or not willing to accede. Otherwise enlargement would be perceived as dangerously disturbing to the stability of the region, creating new dividing lines and competition among aspirants. The idea was to unify the space between Germany and Russia and to maintain its political homogeneity and strategic unity, whilst at the same time transforming the task of stabilizing the region into a common Western effort, bearing in mind that Germany, since unification and until spring 1993, had carried the largest financial burden in stabilizing the ECE

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region. Now, Germans sought to mobilize the efforts of all partners in order to distribute the burden more evenly. Such an approach, it was argued, would help strengthen the Western orientation of ECE countries, encouraging democracy and the development of market economies and thereby preventing recessionist developments and the rise of other related security risks in the region. In this sense, Western stability would be projected eastward. Such a strategy would have to be balanced with a sober assessment of the real possibilities for the eastward enlargement of both NATO and the EU. Furthermore, this approach would encourage NATO to reassess its functional mission in the context of a new geographical scope—a policy Zbigniew Brzezinski would eventually describe as the policy of “double enlargement,”21 meaning enlargement both in terms of geographical scope and functional mission. It was this understanding that would later also underpin the RAND troika’s argumentation on NATO enlargement.22 Change in functional mission meant moving from too strong a concentration on nuclear deterrence and the possibility of large-scale military aggression in Europe toward cooperative crisis-management and more likely risks in the pan-European context, thus reflecting new or as I would prefer to call it “evolving realities” of European security as well as the need for a more balanced relationship between America and Europe in dealing with these evolving security realities. All in all, this meant that NATO’s defense task would have to be broadened to include the notion of stability transfer, although only on condition of not threatening the cohesion and efficiency of the Alliance and thus in consideration of maintaining the value of the Alliance’s security guarantee in itself. (This also finds mention in the first RAND article on the subject.) The concept also acknowledged the correlation between developments in the EU/WEU (Western European Union) and NATO connection. After all, there was—at the time—a certain degree of institutional competition between NATO and the EU/WEU that would run concurrent with the NATO outreach debate.23 The notion of NATO’s eastern stability transfer stood in direct relation with the European integration process and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty set for 1993. Hence, the equally popular German and European notion in 1993 that the EU and its concomitant evolving defense arm WEU should enlarge first and before NATO,

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on grounds that the problems in ECE had more to do with economic instabilities than direct military threats was, however, complicated by the fact that the WEU had already offered the ECE countries Association Agreements and thus the possibility of joining the EU/WEU security dimension. Of course, these countries understood that membership in the EU/WEU would also mean membership in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Theoretically, this meant that they could resort to WEU and thus also to U.S.–Canadian military and intelligence assets, despite the fact that they were not yet members of NATO. This, in turn, raised the specter of the so-called backdoor commitment with Americans concerned that the EU might take the lead in European security affairs. On 24 June 1993, therefore, Republican Senator Richard Lugar (R.-Ind.) urged that NATO should develop its own criteria for expansion. The specter of the EU going eastward before NATO certainly worried some members of Washington’s foreign policy community, not least because it would also reduce Washington’s clout in European affairs. More significantly, however, the EU/WEU backdoor commitment meant that NATO could become embroiled in a security crisis involving a non-NATO member state. The central U.S. concern was that if Poland, for instance, were to join the EU/WEU, then its respective members would be obliged to come to Poland’s defense and in so doing might entangle NATO given the WEU’s dependency on NATO assets and primarily U.S. military resources. (8) This, in turn, carried the inherent danger of decoupling the transatlantic relationship by provoking an even lesser U.S. commitment to Europe and so from the German BMVg perspective could only be avoided by making membership of NATO a precondition for EU membership in order to achieve congruence.24 The BMVg’s line of reasoning in the spring of 1993 thus converged on the central task for Germany’s leadership to mold and promote a Euro-Atlantic consensus and accompanying policy process around the basic rationale of (i) offering ECE countries the prospect for EU membership25 and (ii) the possibility for joining NATO with NATO’s enlargement taking precedence over EU enlargement so as not to endanger the transatlantic relationship. At the same time, NATO enlargement would have to be based on a policy of integration of those countries closest to Germany’s eastern borders paralleled by intensified cooperation with countries further east, especially with Russia in the

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form of (iii) a strong strategic partnership worth its title. Although this concept seemed quite farsighted in that it already foresaw the need for a strategic partnership agreement with Russia, it is fair to say that—at this stage—it admittedly fell short of defining how the content of such an agreement might look in detail.

Rühe’s Famous IISS Speech, March 1993 In order to initiate an Alliance debate on the subject of enlargement, Rühe and his staff waited for the right opportunity. Rühe’s decision to deliver a speech on NATO enlargement at the occasion of the IISS Alistair Buchan Memorial Lecture on 26 March 1993 thus represented a strategically planned choice.26 As Weisser explains, Rühe had chosen this opportunity “for good reason” since it had been at the same forum that Helmut Schmidt, in 1977, initiated the political and strategic process that led to the Alliance’s double-track decision.27 Taking advantage of the symbolic nature of the location, Rühe thought it would be an ideal place for a German defence minister to launch yet another major Alliance project.28 Besides, Rühe’s initiative to deliver a speech on the subject, as Weisser explains, “was quite an extraordinary move, since it had not been subject to approval by a coordinated process inside the German government—a surprise move.”29 Nor had there been any outside contribution made to the speech. As Weisser emphatically noted: The development of the speech was just done on our own. There was no input from RAND or anybody else, to be precise on your question.30 Aside from the fact that it was a surprise move, Rühe drew upon two methods conducive to the theory of communicative action: one, relating to the use of a historic setting (to reinforce the feeling of the existence of a common lifeworld and common experiences) and second, using a speech in order to conceptualize and place an issue of far-ranging international political and strategic implications on the Alliance agenda to initiate a process of dialogue on what was until then considered to be a taboo subject within the Alliance. Moreover, the fact that Rühe waited for the right opportunity also indicates his awareness of the importance of appropriate timing and is also reflective of goal-oriented behavior. In presenting his “Grand Strategy for a New Era” at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London—renowned as a valuable

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forum for the hypothetical—Rühe at the beginning of his speech explicitly used the Helmut Schmidt analogy, drawing parallels to the crossroads at which NATO stood in 1977 and the crossroads at which it stood now. Praising NATO for having shown resolve and political vision on such an important issue of that time, he was quick to express his expectation that this was the place where history would likely repeat itself. Once again, NATO was likely to show the same resolve in charting a political and strategic course that would lead it safely into the harbor of the twenty-first century.31 By taking advantage of the prevailing uncertainty, therefore, Rühe was clearly no less rational than any other young and ambitious politician would be, but the means and the way by which he presented his ideas had obviously been cleverly worked out and prepared. I emphasize this point because it is important to differentiate between Rühe’s ambitions for career advancement and his actual ability to present and argue the case in favor of NATO enlargement with the desired effect of encouraging a wider debate on the subject.32 Hence, it is equally important to remember the personal qualities that Rühe brought to his job as defence minister. Like many natives of Hamburg, Rühe was at home in the English-speaking world and spoke the language with formidable, almost pedantic, fluency. He was also careful to weigh every word he used next to weighing every move he made.33 In his speech, Rühe presented quite a bold and comprehensive strategy for NATO’s future. For the purpose of analysis, the speech can be divided into two main parts, the first of which raises the main issues relating to the redefinition of the transatlantic relationship under changing circumstances. Accordingly, the first part presented arguments in favor of the EU exhibiting greater political, economic, and strategic unity in a world that was becoming increasingly multipolar; it also argued that no single country could manage to tackle new security risks on its own and that the EU would have to learn to speak with one voice when common interests were to be represented abroad. The EU, Rühe insisted, would have to evolve into a global actor. At the same time, however, Rühe emphasized that such a development would not exclude the relationship with the United States. Rather, the transatlantic relationship would have to be rebalanced in the spirit of a pluralistic security community that evidently shared the same risks and same successes. Rebalancing the relationship between the United States and the EU meant that the latter would have to learn to take on more responsibility for itself while the former would have to redefine its national interests. These two processes, it was suggested, would then

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have to be synthesized into a harmonious whole.34 To this end, NATO would need to adapt to reflect new priorities in the necessary transformation of the relationship. Thus, he argued that NATO’s redefinition was likely to affect the Alliance’s organization and task structure.35 The second most important and arousing part of the speech focused on introducing the concept with which to overcome the continuing division of Europe: this part combines emotional appeal with sober political thinking. Hence, Rühe first drew attention to the plight of the postcommunist societies faced with difficult political, industrial, financial, and social problems of transformation. Rühe then combined this with the specific plea that “we cannot disappoint them” and urged his audience that “we must overcome the division of Europe in a common effort”.36 Rühe also sought to manipulate his audience’s perception by claiming that international consensus was already growing on this subject, thus encouraging the audience to believe that there was consensus only in order to achieve consensus when, in reality, there was none.37 Then Rühe turned away from the emotional “we have to be good neighbours” appeal to a more sober reflection on the security challenges associated with the ECE transformation process, namely the rise of nationalism, ethnocentrism, the challenge of migration and economic refugees, and the costs associated with rebuilding the East—expenses that, Rühe insisted, Germany could not possibly be asked to shoulder on its own. Equally implicit in this argument was the dilemma that even if Germany continued to shoulder the economic costs of revitalizing ECE, it would do so at the risk of being charged of colonizing the region’s economies. Dealing with these security challenges thus required a common international initiative in the form of a common projection of both economic and security policies.38 As Rühe insisted, “What applies to economic policy applies to security policy as well. We must not exclude our neighbours in the east from Euro-Atlantic security structures. Eastern Europe must not become a conceptual no-man’sland.”39 To this end, Rühe called for the development of a political concept that would have to meet two requirements: “First, we must take full account of the vital security interests of our neighbours in the east and of the fact that these countries have always been members of the community of European nations. Second, we must regard the geopolitical impact of extended institutional membership on strategic stability in the whole Euro-Atlantic area. We need a balanced approach.”40 Rühe went on to explain that Russia could not be absorbed by the EU and NATO because of its large potential and geostrategic position. Rühe was quite outspoken on this. Membership of Russia in NATO or

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the EU would simply negate the European dimension of these institutions; this difficulty would have to be compensated for through intensified security cooperation via the UN, the NACC, the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE), and a network of political and economic cooperative ties. Rühe also warned: “The Atlantic Alliance must not become a ‘closed shop.’[. . .] In developing yardsticks for NATO membership, we should not apply rigid criteria.”41 Rühe went on to say that he could not “see one good reason for denying future members of the EU the prospect for membership in NATO,”42 thereby making the dual enlargement connection—then a popular term amongst academics but abandoned by the mid-1990s as it became increasingly clear that the EU would take much longer to prepare for its first round of enlargement than NATO. This particular statement was intended to clarify the point that membership of the EU would not necessarily have to precede NATO membership. Rühe concluded by saying that Alliance members were well advised to come to some preliminary conclusions preferably at a NATO summit by the end of 1993.43 This was certainly a very forceful conclusion. And while Rühe’s speech went on to enlist a number of “we should do” items on the political, the defense policy, and military levels, Rühe forcefully concluded, “We should now begin to discuss the issue of expanding the Alliance and actively conduct this debate in the appropriate Alliance fora.”44 In other words, the subject of NATO enlargement was no longer to be considered as anathema. How did the audience at Chatham House react to Rühe’s speech? Of course, the East European diplomatic corps reacted with enthusiasm whereas representatives of the British Strategic Community and most NATO ambassadors reacted with skepticism and some of them even with open rejection. The British government, in particular, seemed reluctant to accept changes that clearly would lessen London’s clout in the new European politico-strategic landscape. Its official reservations mainly revolved around the argument that enlargement would disturb the proven structure of the Alliance and its ability to act cohesively, not to mention the risks involved in relation to Moscow. In truth, however, it was the prospect of growing German influence in the region of Central Europe that concerned the British most. Thus, the subject was rarely discussed in Britain throughout the eventual debate in 1993–94, and when official statements were made they tended to be rather cautious and negative, signaling a preference for the postponement of the subject to a distant future and emphasizing that NATO membership also involved obligations and not just rights.45 The French position was more

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ambiguous. After 1989, France fervently supported the creation of European security structures in order to limit America’s role in European affairs whilst trying to strengthen its own influence. In this effort, Paris—despite its own membership in NATO’s political structures as well as its choice not to participate in NATO’s military integration at the time—consistently sought to minimize NATO’s political function whilst reducing the Alliance’s military role to that of selfdefense. Consequently, France did not participate in the NACC and was openly skeptical about the idea of NATO enlargement as a political project primarily designed to overcome the old divisions of Central Europe. At the same time, however, Paris was also concerned about its long-term influence in the Alliance, since new members from ECE would shift the Alliance’s center of gravity eastward. In other words, NATO enlargement was perceived by France as a further strengthening of Germany’s position in Europe. Yet, as soon as the enlargement policy gained momentum within NATO and the idea seemed well on track, Paris revised its position cautiously in order to be able to influence the process, largely driven by Germany and the United States.46 However, although Rühe was the first to directly address the issue of NATO enlargement publicly, this did not guarantee that anything would come to pass. There were simply too many skeptics in these early days, particularly in Washington D.C. Despite the prevailing mood of skepticism, however, Rühe’s speech did serve to create momentum. It certainly served to provoke a protracted debate on an issue that had thus far largely been avoided.47 By the early summer of 1993, the then German foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, signaled cautious agreement to the new course taken by the defence minister while Chancellor Kohl, in a speech presented to the Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in Hamburg, now also decided to go a little further on the issue of NATO enlargement than he had done in February 1993. On 24 June 1993, and in trying to echo Rühe’s appeal, Kohl openly said: At the same time, calls are multiplying to also integrate our Eastern neighbours into the Western security community. We, in NATO, face the urgent necessity to react to this appeal and by so doing to lend credit to the Alliance’s changed set of responsibilities. NATO must re-evaluate itself, it must think beyond its old structures.48 Therefore, by the spring and early summer of 1993, the leaders of the Visegrad countries felt assured that they had found a powerful tribune

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for their cause in the shape of Germany.49 Encouraged by German signals, the Visegrad leaders at the same time also availed the new momentum created by Rühe’s IISS speech to articulate their goals personally with the American president himself and his national security adviser, Anthony Lake.

The Holocaust Museum Opening in April 1993: Clinton Meets Havel and Walesa On 21 April 1993, President Clinton met one-on-one with a series of East European presidents, who had arrived in Washington for the opening of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic and Lech Walesa of Poland were the two leaders who apparently made the greatest impression on Clinton. When asked how and in what way these leaders impressed Clinton, Anthony Lake, present at the time, explained: Both men had made an impression on Clinton, although in different ways. They both brought with them a strong moral authority, in that they were both highly respected for their persistent struggle in throwing off the Soviet yoke. Havel was very convincing, given his force of intellect. Havel simply had the kind of wisdom of an East European intellectual that was very convincing. Walesa, on the other hand, tended to be extremely strident and would push hard almost over-the-top, so that there was less of a personal relationship but the arguments were so strong that he made a strong impression.50 When both leaders met Clinton in the Oval Office that afternoon, they argued that the only way to prevent future catastrophes in Europe was by admitting their countries into democratic Western institutions and especially into NATO. This, they said, would greatly lessen the likelihood of authoritarian leaders rising to power again. Both Clinton and Lake found these arguments convincing and from this day on, it is commonly argued, both of them were inclined to think positively about the idea of NATO enlargement.51 However, in the weeks and months to follow, the White House made no decisive move and gave no decisive speech on the issue of enlargement. Certainly, no deliberate attempt was made to place the enlargement issue on the official Alliance agenda. One possible reason for this apparent lack of

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initiative could be that only a few weeks before the Holocaust Museum event, Clinton had held his first summit meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Vancouver on 3–4 April 1993.52 There, Clinton had encouraged Yeltsin to win the battle in Russia’s internal struggles. For Clinton, therefore, the month of April reflected two contradictory political experiences, which could explain, at least in part, why the White House was much slower in moving forward on the issue of enlargement compared to the German defence minister’s farreaching initiative of the previous month.

The Minds Behind the Scene—The RAND Consultancy Process In 1992, Ronald Asmus, a close friend of Ulrich Weisser and expert on German and Central European affairs, as well as Stephen Larrabee, a specialist in East European and Russian Politics, had been hired by RAND, Santa Monica, to produce a report on the future of Europe, a paper that became known as “The Twin Arcs of Crisis.”53 NATO defense expert Richard Kugler, a colleague working at RAND, Washington, D.C., was asked to join the team to add to the report a strategic policy dimension for the United States and NATO. Emphasizing the potential for crises on NATO’s periphery and the Alliance’s need to adapt to new security challenges, the “The Twin Arcs of Crisis” essentially advocated that NATO enlargement be seen as part of a strategy leading to the reform of NATO’s internal structures in adaptation to new strategic realities. In other words, it coupled the notion of enlargement with a broader strategic purpose for the United States. This interpretation of enlargement was a very interesting one and was made at a time when the U.S. administration was coming under pressure to devise an attractive foreign policy catchphrase. In fact, it was this first paper that contained the seeds of the arguments the RAND troika would continue to develop in the following years, arguments that tallied with the ideas and the concept that had been developed at the German MoD. As the anonymous peer reviewer revealed, although somewhat in defense of the RAND troika’s intellectual independence: but if anybody wants to finger who led where, I was a leader of the argument for a [NATO] security foundation, Asmus was a leader of the [NATO and EU] superstructure argument, and

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Larrabee was a leader of the Russia [close dialogue] outreach argument. Did the Germans influence our thinking? Yes. But the article was mainly an original RAND creation, not something dictated by Germany.54 Had Germany’s influence been a “dictate,” it would certainly not correspond to our theoretical guiding concept of the power of reasoning. Be this as it may, the initial RAND paper did cause a stir among U.S. government officials. In fact, the prevailing mood among U.S. government circles at the time (1991–93) was very much against the notion of NATO enlargement and the majority of officials simply could not believe that anyone serious would advocate NATO enlargement as part of reforming the Alliance.55 By the spring–summer of 1993, copies of a first draft article on this subject, written by the RAND troika, had been distributed to various key policymakers both within the United States and the German policy communities. By this time, Weisser and RAND had already begun to set up a regular consultation process between RAND and the German MoD and so had regular communication with each other. Given that the ideas of the RAND troika dovetailed neatly with Rühe’s and Weisser’s ideas, a deliberate attempt was made to provoke a wider debate on the issue, particularly in Washington. The RAND troika found a receptive audience with the “fast trackers” led by Lynn Davis and Stephen Flanagan at the U.S. State Department. In fact, the distribution of the paper led to a number of RAND briefings at the State Department in the summer of 1993. By this time, the leading Republican Senator Richard Lugar (R.-Ind.), one of the most respected senators in Washington, had also become receptive to the ideas aired by RAND. Hence, the idea to introduce the paper to the U.S. administration was a deliberate attempt by the BMVg and the RAND troika, supported also by Lugar, to encourage the Clinton administration to seize the idea and begin its own internal deliberations. As Ronald Asmus recalls: Rühe, Weisser, RAND and Lugar—we all wanted to create a stir—we wanted to destroy conventional wisdom, and we—in 1993—discussed how we were going to do that, how we would try to frame the debate, because we were not happy about the debate being framed by a “Russia-first” policy, i.e. that Russia were more important than the Poles and that NATO enlargement was being described as a “crazy” idea. We wanted to argue

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that NATO enlargement and a Russia-policy were not incompatible and that the whole thing should be seen as a pro-stability move, also in Russia’s own security interests—and so as—“colleagues in crime”—we were trying to deliberately frame the debate in such a way that it was harder to attack. We sought to engineer the way people thought about this issue.56 The fact that hiring American experts at RAND was a deliberate German attempt to influence the U.S. debate is further evidenced by a comment made by Weisser himself: RAND’s work was very helpful to us because it presented a couple of additional arguments for our policy and I deliberately used RAND in order to influence Washington policymakers. Well, that has never been told to anybody. I did instrumentalise RAND, in order to achieve this kind of policy influence, because I knew that the RAND people were permanently talking to U.S. officials and presenting their ideas to the German government and that they would go back and forth, reporting to the U.S. what had been accepted at least on the ministerial level of the BMVg and about the detailed kind of debate that was going on between the RAND consultants and the German government.57 Furthermore, choosing a top U.S. think-tank to influence the American debate through the skilled writings of a small group of leading experts at RAND was also courageous in that it had been the first time in German–American relations that a high-ranking American institute received direct funding from the German MoD on a subject directly related to U.S. national security policy. This was clearly unprecedented, as emphatically confirmed by both Weisser and Asmus.58 However, when asked whether Chancellor Kohl had been aware of the BMVg’s initiative in funding RAND’s research throughout the relevant process (1993–97), Weisser quietly replied: “I don’t think so.”59 Senator Richard Lugar, considered to be one of the intellectually most respected members of Congress on foreign affairs and well acquainted with both Weisser and Rühe (Lugar would have regular meetings with Weisser and Rühe either on their joint or individual travels to Washington in 1993),60 also began to articulate a rationale for NATO enlargement in the summer of 1993. To this end, the senator borrowed much of the attractive phraseology used by the RAND troika. According to Asmus, it had been Volker Rühe who convinced

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Lugar in early 1993 of the need and rationale for NATO enlargement.61 Thus, Lugar, having asked the RAND troika to provide him with a briefing on the subject and having read Rühe’s March IISS speech in the spring of 1993, became one of the first persons in D.C. to raise the issue in a forceful speech entitled “NATO: Out-of-Area or Out-of-Business. A Call for U.S. Leadership to Revive and Redefine the Alliance,” delivered to the Overseas Writers Club in Washington, D.C., on 24 June 1993.62 In fact, as Asmus emphasizes, Lugar, by the summer of 1993, became not only the most outspoken official voice in Washington in favor of enlargement but also the first leading U.S. political figure to publicly propose NATO enlargement.63 Over time, Lugar’s support would prove important in weakening elite criticism in Washington that presenting pro-enlargement views in the Senate meant harboring anti-Russian sentiments. Unlike Senator Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.) who initially supported the idea but eventually became one of the Senate’s leading opponents to NATO enlargement on the grounds that it would have adverse effects on the Russian reform process, Lugar endeavored to work against this view, given his belief that enlargement was not inconsistent with American interests concerning Russia. In fact, Lugar’s June 1993 speech set out the problem of the “Twin Arcs of Crisis” when the senator explained that what Europe’s new security problems all had in common was the fact that they lay beyond NATO’s current borders and that if NATO failed to develop the strategy and structure to go “out of area,” the Alliance would risk going “out of business.” In other words, NATO’s mission would dissipate if it did not renew its membership, since new security risks stemmed by and large from the dissolution of the former Soviet bloc and were associated with the inherent difficulties of transformation. Therefore, Lugar concluded that the time had arrived for a new NATO mission and a new NATO membership. Only three days earlier at a U.S. Information Agency Press briefing, Lugar had been even more precise and went so far as to urge that “heavy consideration” be given “immediately” for NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.64 Interestingly, and against the background of more recent tensions in the U.S.–EU relationship, Senator Lugar, in explaining why a second round of NATO enlargement was so vital to maintaining the transatlantic partnership, restated much of what he had stated in 1993 when, at the CSIS Washington Roundtable in Capitol Hill on 13 June 2001, he said: I was among those who, at the time, was urging the U.S. and NATO to take the lead in tackling these problems with our allies.

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I urged the Alliance to transform the Transatlantic Partnership for a new era and a new set of tasks. My vision was of an expanded Alliance embracing new democracies to the East and reoriented to deal with the kinds of new threats that were emerging in the Balkans and elsewhere. Our battle cry was NATO “out of area or out of business.” In the summer of 1993, I called on the Clinton administration to expand NATO’s membership and missions as part of a new transatlantic relationship. I turned to NATO because it was—and still is—the anchor of the U.S. role in the relationship with Europe. Initially, it was not something that most people wanted to discuss, let alone support. Many said it could not be done. It was too hard, too ambitious. It was suggested that the American people were not willing to expand their commitments in Europe after the end of the Cold War. Some predicted a policy train wreck with Moscow and the derailment of Russian reform.65 This more recent statement by Lugar on the subject of NATO enlargement and the way it had been perceived by the Clinton administration in 1993 clarifies and confirms the prevailing mood of skepticism that prevailed in the Clinton administration on the subject at the time and clearly contradicts more recent attempts by former Clinton administration officials to argue that they had always been positively inclined toward the idea of NATO enlargement66 and that it had been an Alliance project initially and positively conceived of in America and primarily by Americans. I emphasize this because it makes the question of the degree and means by which the German MoD and its respective “colleagues in crime” sought to influence the U.S. administration all the more significant. The RAND troika’s draft paper “The Twin Arcs of Crisis” was eventually published in the 1993 autumn issue of the influential journal Foreign Affairs under the title “Building a New NATO.”67 Not surprisingly, its publication created an even greater stir than its previous circulation had done. Most administration officials thought the RAND troika was simply “crazy” in articulating such an idea.68 Once again, this reveals that even by September–October 1993, Washington was still not ready to consider these new ideas. The article made the case for why enlargement was to be seen as a good thing. The central thrust of the argument was that it was (i) important to initiate the process of eventual integration of ECE countries into both NATO and the EU, as and when they fulfilled certain membership criteria. The article also argued

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that (ii) nationalist forces in Central Europe could provoke security competition and wider instability, which, in turn, carried the risk of rejuvenating German–Russian competition in the region. Therefore, it was important to recognize that the security developments in ECE could not be separated from Western Europe. Further, the provisions of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) simply were not good enough for alleviating these concerns, given that by now it was largely regarded as a holding operation that provided little psychological reassurance to the region. More importantly, the authors argued that NATO should evolve from an Alliance based on collective defense against a specific threat to an Alliance committed to projecting democracy, stability, and crisis management in a broader strategic sense. At the same time, it suggested that NATO develop a partnership agreement with Russia in the form of a charter. By so doing, NATO could fulfill five key objectives: keep the United States engaged in and committed to European security affairs; prevent Germany from “goingit-alone” in addressing instabilities in ECE; stabilize ECE and develop relations with Russia and the Ukraine for the benefit of the entire continent.69 This first article served as a foundation to a series of briefings by the three co-authors, which were to become central to the administration’s deliberations throughout 1993–96.70 Therefore, in the course of 1993, the RAND troika together with the BMVg and Senator Lugar began to push the case for NATO enlargement from without the administration, thus providing ideas and encouragement to those lonely few pushing from within the State Department. Also working relentlessly in favor of the RAND–Rühe–Weisser–Lugar connection were the East Central Europeans themselves who—encouraged by Volker Rühe— would keep putting their case forward throughout the entire debate, thus maintaining political pressure on the West by persistently raising fundamental questions relating to whether the West and the United States, in particular, were caving in to Russian demands and, more provocatively, whether this would raise the prospect of the re-apparition of the ghost of Yalta.

American Reactions in the Summer of 1993: Warren Christopher’s Athens Speech At the NATO meeting of foreign ministers in Athens on 10 June 1993, the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in a speech entitled

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“U.S. Leadership after the Cold War: NATO and Transatlantic Security,” essentially emphasized his government’s preference for a strengthened NACC in the context of the growing task of “international peacekeeping.” On the question of NATO’s eastward extension, Christopher clarified the U.S. position when he said, “At an appropriate time, we may choose to enlarge NATO membership. But that is not now on the agenda.”71 However, Christopher also stated that President Clinton proposed an Alliance summit to be held six months from then, on the occasion of Clinton’s first trip to Europe since taking office. The announcement of a presidential summit, as James Goldgeier explains, was intended to focus the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy on the question of NATO’s future. In bureaucratic parlance, Christopher’s announcement was to serve as an “action-forcing event,” thus pushing the administration to formulate a position on the subject. Interestingly, however, Anthony Lake had not been very happy about Christopher’s summit announcement because he felt that the administration was not yet ready to deal with the issue of NATO enlargement. When asked why exactly he had been displeased by Christopher’s initiative, Lake somewhat defensively replied: Well, because I was pressing that we be as clear as possible about NATO enlargement and on Bosnia and I was worried about having a summit before having a clear policy. You must recall this was a new administration, and we had a lot more immediate issues to worry about: Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, et cetera, et cetera. And so, we had to work very, very hard on working out our policy on those, on the issues that mattered most before turning our attention to longer-term issues.72 Hence, in the summer of 1993 the idea of NATO enlargement was still hardly more than a passing thought for most Clinton administration officials, particularly the White House staff who, it seemed, would have preferred to stick to the president’s focus on domestic affairs in the face of increasingly demanding foreign policy issues. In fact, even while in Athens, Warren Christopher was forced to seek a last-minute approval from the White House, permitting him to make a summit announcement. Furthermore, when asked who might have carried the idea of a summit proposal into the U.S. administration, whilst not forgetting that it had been Volker Rühe who first announced the idea of the need to convene a summit by the end of 1993 in his March IISS speech, Robert

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Hunter, who had been offered the position of U.S. ambassador to NATO in March 1993, admitted that three to four weeks after his appointment he had been requested by NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner to pass on the idea of a summit proposal to the White House.73 Manfred Wörner, it should be noted, had been encouraged by Rühe’s March 1993 initiative and stood in close contact with the German defence minister, largely sharing his ideas on NATO enlargement.74 It seemed, therefore, that although the U.S. administration was not yet ready or willing to consider the issue of NATO’s eastward extension, Wörner (in securing Hunter’s support) sought to convince Christopher that the idea of scheduling the summit was to get the administration ready.75 Hence, Wörner’s objective was to ensure that the Clinton administration would now begin to engage in and encourage a wider Alliance debate on the subject. Upon Christopher’s return from Athens, an interagency working group was established to prepare a presidential statement on the subject of NATO enlargement for the January 1994 Summit. Yet it is fair to say that the results of the interagency working process largely resembled initial U.S. attempts to revitalize the NACC, suggesting ways in which the NACC could be improved by, for example, stepping up joint consultations, joint activities on peacekeeping, exchange of personnel, training in civil–military relations, and so on. In essence, the results were nothing more than a recycling of the ideas presented by Christopher in his Athens speech. And that speech was in itself nothing more than a recycling of the ideas articulated by the previous Bush administration in 1991–92.76 However, while the State Department was still holding on to the NACC, members of the Pentagon had already begun to consider an alternative direction.

Pentagon Deliberations and the Shalikashvili Initiative: Devising PFP In June 1993, General John Shalikashvili, the supreme allied commander in Europe (SACEUR) became increasingly concerned about Washington’s ability to remain in the driver’s seat as NATO adapted to new post–Cold War realities. For this reason, Shalikashvili sought to exert some influence on the development of policy in D.C.. He wanted to avoid the revitalization of the NACC, given that by now it had largely been discredited as a mere “talking shop.” Instead, Shalikashvili sought to establish actual and real military contacts with Central and

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East European countries. The general recognized the need for a compromise solution between those in favor of a rapid enlargement and those who did not want to enlarge at all; hence, he sought a solution that would allow for flexibility and patterns of cooperation permitting NATO to work with Central and East Europeans, especially those unlikely to ever become NATO members. Besides, the general’s experience of Bosnia also brought him to the realization that NATO lacked the necessary command-structure for out-of-area operations with headquarters flexible enough to absorb non-NATO members. It was this consideration that led to the creation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) program, the concept of which was developed by members of General Shalikashvili’s staff and unveiled at the January 1994 Summit in Brussels.77 In his endeavor to influence the U.S. policymaking machinery (it is unusual for a SACEUR general to try to do so), Shalikashvili was supported by Charles W. Freeman, who had been appointed assistant secretary for Defence in Regional Security Affairs in early July 1993. Previously involved in Asian, African, and Near Eastern Affairs and just returning to D.C. from his position as U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Freeman decided to go on a fact-finding trip to Europe, in order to gain a better understanding of the state of affairs in NATO and the U.S. relationship with Europe. He had previously exchanged ideas with Shalikashvili on CJTF and potential peacekeeping exercises with ECE countries. By the time Freeman returned to Washington from his trip to Europe, he was convinced that the question was not supposed to be about NATO expansion but about how to build a security architecture that could manage the problems across Europe. However, unlike his colleagues at the National Security Council (NSC) and the State Department, Freeman did not regard the Alliance’s NACC or the strengthening thereof to be the solution to the problem, since he believed that the NACC had the wrong membership list. Freeman could hardly understand how the NACC could include Tajikistan but not Sweden and Austria both of which he felt should have a closer association. Upon his return, Freeman invited his Principal Deputy Joseph Kruzel78 to his house “for a drink” to discuss his thoughts. They discussed developing a document for the Alliance to agree upon at the upcoming NATO summit. The final draft of the paper was completed in August 1993, after Kruzel had discussed it with Shalikashvili. The concept paper entitled “Charter of Association with NATO” stipulated that the question of NATO membership for East Europeans was

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dependent upon their ability to achieve NATO standards as well as their ability to “contribute” to Alliance security rather than being mere “consumers” of it. In this context, it was argued, membership would have to be considered at the end of a longer-term process of adaptation and adjustment to NATO standards and not at the start of such process. Clearly, this view was highly reflective of club theoretical thinking and cost–benefit analyses. Freeman, Shalikashvili, and Kruzel firmly believed that it only made sense to talk about NATO expansion once military-to-military relationships had been established that would enable these countries to integrate into the Alliance more effectively at a “later” stage—later implying five to ten years from then.79 As a result of these considerations, key Pentagon officials argued that a “partnership” agreement would strike a better chord with the ECE public than an updated NACC, as the State Department was proposing. Accordingly, by requiring countries to qualify for membership, the Pentagon’s partnership concept proposed a selective outreach program to the east that would go beyond the NACC, focusing on defense and military cooperation whilst not extending any NATO security commitment. In the weeks to follow, the Pentagon would strive to present its partnership concept to Alliance members.80 On 10 September 1993, key Allied officials and European defense intellectuals had gathered in Brussels for the annual meeting of the IISS. On 11 September 1993, U.S. Defence Secretary Les Aspin joined General Shalikashvili and NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner at the Residence of the U.S. ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, to discuss the ideas that had been developed at the Pentagon. At an afternoon session, attended only by U.S. officials, the “Peacekeeping Partnership” was unveiled, its genesis attributed largely to General John Shalikashvili. General Shalikashvili also introduced the CJTF concept, which his staff had been working on. The group agreed that a combination of the two programs would provide an optimal answer to the question of NATO enlargement at the forthcoming NATO summit.81 Thereupon and back in Washington, the NATO Summit Interagency Working Group had been informed by Freeman that Defence Secretary Les Aspin was opposed to the idea of enlargement for the following reasons: (i) the defence secretary did not see how enlargement whilst serving ECE interests could also serve U.S. interests (thus, once again, clearly reflecting rational cost–benefit thinking);82 (ii) enlarging NATO risked diluting the Alliance’s effectiveness; (iii) a peacekeeping partnership, by contrast, would meet and satisfy the U.S. bureaucracy’s interest in peacekeeping; (iv) peacekeeping decisions were to be made by the

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16-member NAC and not the NACC; (v) whereas the Pentagon could accept the notion of an “open-door” policy on eventual enlargement, it could not accept an announcement to begin to discuss the notion of ECE membership at the upcoming January 1994 Summit. However, in an effort to secure the administration’s support of the partnership concept, Shalikashvili, unlike Les Aspin, was inclined to support the State Department’s view that the partnership be established within the NACC framework of membership. All in all, the Pentagon opposed a quick decision on the subject in the belief that new commitments were not to be taken at a time when the defense budget and the U.S. military presence in Europe were declining. Pentagon officials were also united in the view that the time to discuss ECE membership of NATO lay five to ten years in the future. Keen to reap the economic benefits of a reduced threat from Russia, as Deputy Undersecretary of Defence Walter Slocombe had said in June 1993 during hearings before the Senate and in response to a question on the desirability of timetable or membership criteria on enlargement, the success of the Russian reform process formed the premise upon which the Pentagon could plan large reductions in its defense spending in the years ahead.83 Therefore and by September 1993, the Pentagon had developed the Peacekeeping Partnership program, which would establish military relationships with all interested countries in the Central and East European hemisphere. It would postpone the need to offer concrete NATO security guarantees and alleviate concerns over the cohesion of the Alliance, whilst at the same time avoiding the risk of confrontation with Russia. However, against the background of Clinton’s foreign policy debacle in Somalia in October 1993, which gave peacekeeping a bad name, the term Peacekeeping Partnership was changed to “Partnership for Peace” (PFP).84

The State Department and Strobe Talbott’s Dominance For the “fast-trackers” at the State Department, the debate over NATO’s enlargement was by no means settled. A small group, led by Lynn Davis, secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, which had been briefed by RAND in August 1993 and seemed quite receptive to RAND’s ideas, began to advocate a fast-track approach to NATO membership for the Visegrad countries in the very same month of August 1993. In fact, members of the group advocated

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that at the forthcoming summit, NATO should lay out a set of membership criteria (as the EU had done at its Copenhagen Summit in June 1993), and put forward a clear timetable, perhaps even float the prospect of “associate membership” for the Visegrad countries in order to put the process on a concrete path. Of course, no one in the State Department was suggesting that NATO expand in 1994, but Lynn Davis and her team were suggesting that NATO were well advised to make a firm commitment on enlargement at the January 1994 Summit. In fact, the fast-trackers and Senator Richard Lugar were of the impression that Warren Christopher was moving in their direction by mid-October 1993. Yet, as soon as Strobe Talbott heard of Lynn Davis’s efforts, he immediately presented Christopher with a nine-page memo reiterating the importance of a slow and vague approach to enlargement.85 Strobe Talbott, the then special presidential adviser on the Successor States of the Soviet Union and architect of Clinton’s Russia policy, had argued to both Christopher and Lake that any effort to put the enlargement issue on track in January 1994 risked jeopardizing the U.S. relationship with Russia. Given the domestic turmoil in Russia at that time and President Yeltsin’s recent letter of complaint86 as well as his military assault on the State Duma—Talbott argued—that expansion risked pushing Russia over the edge. Although he believed that the three most democratically developed states—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—were the only ones that deserved to be considered most, at the same time he warned that Russia and the Ukraine could not be taken into account for many years to come. Enlargement, he cautioned, would lead to a new dividing line in Europe, adding fuel to fears in Moscow that NATO wanted to contain and isolate Russia. Furthermore, membership of the Visegrad states would increase Ukrainian concerns about being “left out,” which could complicate negotiation efforts toward achieving the country’s nuclear renunciation (which was underway at that time). Thus, Talbott argued, laying down membership criteria for ECE countries at the forthcoming summit needlessly risked provoking the “Russian Bear.” Talbott’s advice was to make PFP the centerpiece of the U.S. position on NATO. He insisted that it would be best not to mention any dates or names at the upcoming summit and no membership criteria that would automatically exclude Russia and the Ukraine. And in a final piece of advice, Talbott cautioned that NATO enlargement could never be managed if Russia were not eventually offered the prospect of joining the Alliance at some future date. Warren Christopher, who had held a series of State Department lunches in September–October 1993, at which aides would present

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him with the pros and cons of NATO enlargement, at first seemed to go along with the fast-track view but eventually accepted the arguments presented by Strobe Talbott in October 1993. Warren Christopher’s change of heart was, perhaps, not so surprising: at the age of 68, Christopher undoubtedly had an aura of experience and wisdom and although he exercised discretion in his daily transgressions, he was more competitive than he had others believe. Preoccupied with his place in the administration firmament, Christopher was not an innovator, a thinker, a “doer.” In fact, according to Elizabeth Drew, some State Department officials complained that Warren Christopher failed to provide leadership to the Department.87 Unlike Christopher, Strobe Talbott, a close friend and confidant to the president (Clinton and Talbott had been roommates while at Oxford University), and thus considered to be highly influential, never wavered from his “Russiafirst” position; hence, in October 1993 Talbott had got his way and PFP became the centerpiece of the erstwhile U.S. approach to dealing with the upcoming 1994 Summit.

Yeltsin’s October 1993 Letter of Retreat During late summer 1993, in the run-up to the Polish–Russian Summit scheduled for 25 August in Warsaw, Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski informed several NATO countries that Walesa intended to discuss with Yeltsin the Polish government’s intentions of joining NATO. On 10 August 1993, Skubiszewski also met with Volker Rühe in Bonn, where they agreed on all issues under discussion during an Arbeitsfrühstück (working breakfast) at the BMVg. During this discussion, the Polish foreign minister was also strongly encouraged by Rühe to balance Polish objectives of integration into Western structures with a new “Polish Ostpolitik.”88 This is an important point because it underlines that the BMVg, unlike the U.S. administration,89 defined the notion of enlargement in positive “pro-stability” terms: the German MoD sought not to overemphasize the negative scenario of “creating new dividing lines” across Central Europe and “alienating” Moscow but instead concentrated on stressing the positive contribution new members could make to Alliance security by carrying forth and projecting further eastward the tradition of Germany’s Ostpolitik.90 In this way it was hoped that, over time, the East Central Europeans would develop enough self-confidence in their dealings with Russia, which eventually would lead to an overall improvement of stability in the entire region.91

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When President Boris N. Yeltsin visited Poland in August 1993, Walesa, as had been expected, pressed Yeltsin on the issue of Polish membership in NATO. Surprisingly, Walesa’s position was met with understanding by President Yeltsin and so, on 25 August 1993, both presidents issued a declaration that, in part, stated: The Presidents touched on the matter of Poland’s intention to join NATO. [. . .] In the long-term, such a decision taken by a sovereign Poland in the interest of overall European integration does not go against the interests of other states, including the interests of Russia.92 Of course, this joint statement prompted intensified discussion amongst NATO officials that opening-up NATO was now no longer taboo, at least as far as Russia was concerned. In fact, Yeltsin reinforced this impression when he reportedly told the press: In the new Russian-Polish relations, there is no place for hegemony and diktat, and the psychology of a “big brother” and a “little brother.”93 It was this statement by Yeltsin that prompted Polish presidential spokesman Andrzej Dryzycimski to insist: Now the West has no argument to say “No” to Poland. Until now the West has been using the argument “We don’t want to upset the Russians.” Now that is no longer a viable argument. Now we will see the true intentions of the West toward Poland.94 Not surprisingly, therefore, shortly after Yeltsin left Warsaw, the Polish government appealed to Alliance governments to open NATO’s doors to Poland’s full membership. Yet upon arrival in Moscow, Yeltsin immediately came under heavy criticism from almost all political groups. Given that Yeltsin could not afford to antagonize the Russian military circles, in particular, he withdrew from his August pledge in mid-September 1993 when he wrote a letter to key Western leaders (of Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States) opposing NATO’s admission of ECE countries. According to the text of this letter as carried in a Prague newspaper, Yeltsin indicated that the opposition and moderates in Russia would view NATO expansion as “a new kind of isolation” for Russia.95 Yeltsin also observed that the

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treaty on German unification banned the deployment of foreign troops in the eastern Länder of Germany; he expressed that the spirit of these stipulations “rules out any possibility of a NATO expansion eastwards” (an argument Russian officials would keep repeating throughout the debate). At the same time, however, Yeltsin demanded that a possible eventual membership for Russia not be excluded, stating: “From a long-term point of view, the idea of us joining NATO should not be disregarded either.” He also called for relations between NATO and Russia to be “several degrees warmer than the relations between the Alliance and Eastern Europe.”96 Although Yeltsin’s letter caused some confusion in Western capitals, it certainly rekindled fears in ECE that the West would now reinforce what they perceived to be a “Russia-first” policy, and, if anything, it certainly encouraged the Clinton administration to continue to promulgate the PFP program. In Search of a Foreign Policy: “From Containment to Enlargement?” Today Clinton administration officials as well as U.S. academics like to argue that the U.S. government was always in favor of NATO enlargement in the 1990s. This is especially the case in descriptions of President Clinton’s and Anthony Lake’s respective positions on the subject. Hence, it is generally accepted that since their experiences of meeting Walesa and Havel on the day of the Opening Ceremony of the Holocaust Museum, Clinton and Lake were inclined to think positively of the idea of NATO enlargement from that time onward. However, if this had been the case and if, indeed, both the president and his national security adviser had been so positively inclined toward the idea, one is left to wonder why the security adviser’s famous speech “From Containment to Enlargement,”97 presented to the SAIS in Washington, D.C., on 21 September 1993, and designed to articulate a new foreign policy vision with an accompanying catchphrase, devoted less than a paragraph to the subject of NATO enlargement. Although the concept of enlargement featured prominently in Lake’s speech, it appears as though its usage had more to do with the promulgation of free trade and the extension of free market economics internationally than with the specifics of an enlargement of NATO into ECE. To be precise, the seven-page speech devoted little more than a short paragraph on NATO’s general future whereas the predominant part of the

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speech referred to enlargement in general terms and to the need of ensuring an international order of a free community of market democracies in which the United States would remain the world’s largest exporter. Lake’s speech was followed by a similar presidential speech to the UN General Assembly six days later.98 Yet much to the administration’s disdain, Washington’s foreign policy community greeted both Lake’s SAIS and Clinton’s UN speeches on enlargement with indifference and even derision, complaining that this policy was merely an aspiration rather than a strategy for foreign policy. At the same time, it also reinforced European fears that the United States would increasingly withdraw from European security affairs, preferring instead to concentrate its energies on Asia’s small tiger economies. The argument that the administration had failed to develop a foreign policy strategy was also difficult to refute after 3 October 1993 when 18 U.S. Army soldiers were killed in an ill-planned operation in Mogadishu; as though that was not humiliating enough it was even more difficult to refute after 12 October 1993 when anti-American demonstrations broke out in Haiti following the president’s decision to recall a U.S. Navy ship en route to Port-au-Prince in response to the junta there.99 Thus, the point to note here is that the September 1993 speeches on enlargement presented by both Lake and Clinton had little to do with enlargement in the context of NATO, but everything to do with enlargement in the aim of developing a new U.S. foreign policy rationale, which the administration thus far clearly lacked—a foreign policy rationale aimed at securing U.S. export markets. Offering East Central Europeans a “Concrete Perspective”: Wörner Seconds Rühe On 10 September 1993, encouraged by Volker Rühe’s March 1993 initiative, NATO’s Secretary General Manfred Wörner, by now also personally and fervently committed to steering through a “transformed” Alliance, urged NATO members to offer East Central Europeans a more “concrete perspective” with regard to NATO membership. Speaking before the IISS annual meeting in Brussels on 10 September 1993, Wörner highlighted his view on enlargement when he said: In addition, I think we should now consider further steps. NATO is not a “closed shop”. [. . .] In my view, the time has

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come to open a more “concrete perspective” to those countries of Central and Eastern Europe which want to join NATO and which we may consider eligible for future membership. This should be one of the major subjects of the forthcoming NATO Summit.100 The term concrete perspective had been borrowed from a speech delivered by Volker Rühe earlier in the year. Wörner’s speechwriter, Michael Rühle, had thus far always resorted to the American language of NATO enlargement: “not being on the agenda.” However, pressed by Wörner’s request to explicitly mention the need for enlargement, Michael Rühle decided to resort to the same formula the German defence minister had used in an earlier speech. As Michael Rühle himself recalls: Until then it had been Warren Christopher’s Athens speech that appeared to be the important benchmark. When the Americans say “it is not on the agenda,” then it is simply not on the agenda. Thus, for the speech to be presented on 10 September, I used the same formula: “not on the agenda.” However, upon submission of the draft, Wörner crossed it through and said, “No. I want enlargement.” So, I used a phrase that was soft enough not to upset the Americans and since I was not sure of where the “behind-the-scenes” negotiations stood, I just took Rühe’s speech and took the phrase “to open a more concrete perspective.” So, I simply used Rühe’s formula in Wörner’s speech—as you do in a delicate political situation. You resort to language somebody else has used and follow on his coattail.101 In fact, it is fair to say that many of the phrases used by the German defence minister in early 1993 would reappear in speeches given later by NATO and U.S. officials.102

Klaus Kinkel follows Wörner’s Example on 29 September 1993 Manfred Wörner’s September 1993 initiative was shortly thereafter followed by Klaus Kinkel who, always more explicit than Rühe on taking care not to arouse Russia’s opposition, presented the German

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government’s respective expectations for the forthcoming NATO summit, when he said: Step-by-step we have to pave the way for the ECE states’ entry into the Euro-Atlantic Institutions. Next to the European Community and the European Council, this also includes the WEU and NATO. I expect the NATO Summit to deliver a clear signal in the same way the Copenhagen EC Summit has done. However, for all this, there must be no new dividing lines. Without the inclusion of Russia, a permanent European peace order is not possible.103 It should, perhaps, be noted that although Klaus Kinkel, in contrast to Rühe, steered a more careful course on NATO enlargement and repeatedly suggested a slower pace once the idea took hold, he had never been against the idea of NATO enlargement per se. His primary concern was that an over-hasty decision might endanger the security of those countries in Central and Eastern Europe that were not to be admitted to NATO, especially Russia.104 Hence, by the end of September 1993, as it became increasingly certain that the Alliance summit would take place in January 1994 and that the Alliance needed to prepare for its autumn series of Ministerial meetings while East Europeans were becoming increasingly concerned about the West’s Russia-first policy, the German government as a whole, now became determined to keep the process on track. However, when Manfred Wörner—at the end of September 1993— attempted to persuade Warren Christopher of the necessity for enlargement, Christopher signaled that the Clinton administration was still very much divided on the issue.105

Preparing for the October 1993 Travemünde Meeting: The Origins of “Not ‘Whether,’ but ‘When’ and ‘How’ ” Aware of the fact that the U.S. administration was still divided on the issue of NATO enlargement and that opinions were still being formed, Rühe recognized this situation as an opportunity by which to try to influence the administration’s deliberations whilst at the same time probing where exactly the administration stood on the issue. More

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importantly, however, Rühe did not want to be confronted with any surprises at the upcoming NATO meeting of defence ministers, intended to discuss for the first time and informally the question of NATO enlargement in Travemünde, Germany, on 20–21 October 1993. Therefore, in order to find out what the Americans were up to and what they would present at the upcoming meeting, Rühe decided to send a delegation of MoD officials led by his Chief of Staff Ulrich Weisser to Washington to discuss the subject with the officials at the NSC, the State Department, the Pentagon, the Senate, as well as leading think-tanks. The German delegation reached Washington, D.C., on 12–13 October 1993, ten days before the scheduled Travemünde meeting.106 During this fact-finding mission, the Weisser delegation quickly realized that although the administration as a whole agreed on the basic rationale that NATO needed to be adapted, the three branches of government had not yet arrived at an internal agreement. The State Department and the NSC were geared more toward the strengthening of the NACC, whereas the Pentagon preferred to stick to its PFP proposal. Pentagon officials, according to Weisser, seemed very much opposed to the notion of enlargement and were quite outspoken in this respect. In fact, during his visit to the Pentagon, Weisser also found out that General John Shalikashvili was trying, in cooperation with Defence Secretary Les Aspin, to introduce the concept of PFP as a “substitute” for enlargement. This, Weisser felt, was quite alarming because although the German delegation was not opposed to the idea of PFP in itself, they certainly did not want to see it evolve into a substitute for enlargement. In other words, although the German delegation found the PFP proposal to be an innovative and useful mechanism for cooperation with ECE countries, they were reluctant to support it as an alternative to the actual enlargement of NATO. As Weisser recalls: And we found out at the Pentagon that General Shalikashvili was trying together with the Defence Minister to introduce the Partnership for Peace as a substitute for NATO enlargement. The Pentagon was very much against NATO enlargement.107 When asked whether the Pentagon had been quite outspoken on PFP constituting a substitute for NATO enlargement, Weisser replied: Yes, the Pentagon was quite clear on that. And this was an alarming message for us. Well, we did not have anything against the

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Partnership for Peace because it was quite an interesting new mechanism to cooperate with the partners in the East, but not as a substitute for enlargement.108 Having established the Pentagon’s position, the German delegation met with the members of the NSC at the White House. The NSC, as Weisser reports, indicated its principled support and suggested that a membership formula be found that went far enough to satisfy, at least in principle, the expectations of East European aspirants while taking care not to encourage high expectations of a fast entry into NATO and maintaining good relations with Russia. However, despite its principled support, the NSC—like the Pentagon—was also not willing or ready to discuss membership criteria or timetables. In fact, it had been the senior director for European Affairs at the NSC, Jenonne Walker, who according to Weisser preferred the strengthening of the NACC.109 As far as the interrelationship between NATO enlargement and the PFP program was concerned, Walker and Weisser were very much in agreement that PFP ought not to be interpreted as an alternative to NATO enlargement. Weisser and Walker came to the conclusion that both PFP and enlargement had to be pursued, whereupon Weisser suggested that PFP best be initiated as a preparatory mechanism for membership. Jenonne Walker agreed to this.110 During this meeting, Walker and her young speechwriters also mentioned to Weisser that they were busy preparing for Clinton’s first official visit to Moscow scheduled for 12–15 January 1994 with an intermediate stop in Prague where the president would meet the four heads of state of the Visegrad countries. Walker told Weisser that they were trying to come up with some smart formulations and so the German delegation was asked whether it had any ideas on what the president’s main message to the Visegrad countries should be. Pleased to have been asked for its opinion and aware of the opportunity to influence the NSC’s deliberations, the German delegation seized its chance and offered its advice. Thus, Weisser cautioned Walker that if Clinton were not to say anything substantial to the Visegrad leaders this would cause great disappointment in the region. Weisser urged that the president were well advised to at least send a signal to these countries to indicate the direction in which Washington was most likely to lean toward. Ideas at the NSC and the White House centered on saying to the Visegrad leaders that NATO would have to consider the question of “ ‘whether,’ ‘when’ and ‘how’ ” the integration of new members would proceed. However, members of the German delegation cautioned that if the president would express himself in this

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way—especially while on his way to Russia—this would hardly be pleasing to the Visegrad leaders not least because the East Europeans generally felt that the question of “whether” had already and at least, in principle, been positively decided upon. Therefore, the Germans suggested that the president declare that the question of NATO membership was “no longer a question of ‘whether’, but ‘when’ and ‘how.’ ”111 The NSC staff gladly accepted this formula. In fact, it was from then onward that this formula would circulate around the Clinton administration, although everyone involved in the U.S. intergovernmental process would interpret it differently, thus underscoring that it could hardly have been an American brainchild.112 It is unfortunate that not one of my American informants (except for James Goldgeier) could comment on where this particular phraseology might have come from or who might have initially coined it and introduced it into the debate for the first time. What was even more surprising was the fact that every one of my American informants questioned why it was so important to know where the phrase came from. Besides, it is also unfortunate that the then senior director for European Affairs at the NSC, Jenonne Walker, could not recall having met with the German delegation ten days prior to the Travemünde NATO meeting of defence ministers.113 Nevertheless, as Goldgeier specifically mentions in his book, this formula had been used for the first time by Volker Rühe in a speech to the North Atlantic Assembly Spring Session in Berlin in May 1993 where Rühe emphatically called for bringing the Visegrad countries into NATO, when he said: “To me, therefore, accession of new partners is not so much a question of ‘if,’ as one of ‘how’ and ‘when.’ ”114 And as Solomon confirms, this phrase was repeated by Wörner throughout December 1993 at NATO meetings in Brussels and was popularized by President Clinton himself, during his January 1994 trip to Europe. Indeed, it would become a very popular phrase throughout 1994.115 Moreover, the American–German deliberations at the White House—as mentioned above—also proved important in that it was unanimously agreed upon that PFP was not to be presented to the upcoming meeting of defence ministers as an alternative or substitute to NATO enlargement. Weisser recites the precise words in his book, describing that the NSC and the Weisser delegation agreed that the PFP was “not intended as substitute for extension of NATO membership,” but that instead PFP would be seen as a stepping stone toward helping aspirants prepare for membership, thus that “active cooperation in the partnership can help lay the foundations for membership.”116 In this respect and upon his return to Bonn, Weisser received a telex from

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Walker to confirm the previously reached agreement that PFP be sold as a preparatory mechanism to enlargement and not as an alternative.117 Agreement was also reached on the need for a balanced approach vis-à-vis Russia. The German delegation was told that enlargement into ECE could only work if it were combined with a Gesamtkonzept that would give credence to Russia’s legitimate interests and help alleviate Russian concerns of isolation. As Weisser notes, the agreement reached at the White House was the result of “a very informal dialogue which served to develop formulas which by no means were American approved policy, a process of deliberation over practicalities in which the establishment of good relations with people is the key to success.”118 So, when Weisser returned to Bonn, he reported to Rühe the results of the informal dialogue that had been held at the NSC. At the same time, he informed Rühe that the U.S. position on NATO enlargement as a whole was best understood as double-minded and that it had been difficult to discern a unified government position on the status of PFP. Thus, it had been Weisser’s impression, as Rühe was told, that the U.S. administration’s deliberations were still uncoordinated.

The Travemünde Turmoil: Wörner Rescues Enlargement Aware of the constellation of interests in the U.S. government, Rühe decided to make effective use of his role as the host of the upcoming NATO meeting of defence ministers by steering the media into his preferred direction of gaining overall Allied support for NATO’s eastward extension and selling the PFP concept as a preparatory step for full membership. Fully assured by the fact that he enjoyed the support of Manfred Wörner as well as the Dutch, Danish, and Norwegian defence ministers, Rühe informed the German and foreign press that he and his NATO colleagues would join the Conference with the unanimous intention of sending out a clear signal to East Europeans that membership was “no longer a question of ‘whether,’ but ‘when’ and ‘how.’ ” At the Travemünde meeting, however, U.S. Defence Secretary Les Aspin presented the official view of the Pentagon, thus introducing PFP not as a preparatory mechanism for enlargement but rather as an alternative to it, at least for the foreseeable future. Aspin explained that the question of membership for ECE could only be considered when insecurities in the region were diminished and their progress toward democracy secured. Decisions regarding the eastward enlargement of

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NATO would have to be made at the end of such a process of adaptation and not at the beginning. Aspin’s presentation of PFP came as a surprise to the Germans in that it held out much less encouragement to the East Europeans than had been expected.119 Of course, the U.S. defence secretary’s remarks also made it appear as though German and American conceptions and interpretations of PFP were adrift and the Germans were unsure whether his remarks were geared toward provoking the appearance of a misunderstanding or even a disagreement between the German and American positions. To diffuse the tension that had been created, Rühe spoke up and quickly added that he thought well of the idea of enlargement and that PFP—through active military cooperation—would help prepare the new democracies of ECE for NATO membership. In so doing, Rühe, in order to reassure himself that his American colleagues at the White House would not contradict his remarks, resorted to the language that Weisser’s delegation and the White House had agreed upon and that he expected Clinton would use at the upcoming summit in January. Furthermore, Rühe asked Weisser to inform Manfred Wörner of the conversations he (Weisser) had had at the White House and of the formula the NSC staff intended to use at the January 1994 Summit. Weisser swiftly informed Wörner that the NSC staff had given its agreement to sell PFP as a preparatory mechanism and not as an alternative to enlargement and that the White House had also agreed to the “not ‘whether,’ but ‘when’ and ‘how’ ” formula. In awareness of this, Manfred Wörner, at the end of the meeting and in his role as acting chairman, decided to paint over the deviating path taken by Les Aspin. As Weisser recalls: When it came to the end of the discussion, Manfred Wörner said: “Well, gentlemen, you all know this is an informal meeting—we have no record—but you will allow me to summarise the results of this meeting. If I understand this discussion correctly we can all agree that PFP is a wonderful thing, which can also serve as a mechanism to prepare new members for membership in NATO.” Full stop! Meeting is adjourned.120 Wörner confirmed his position taken at Travemünde when he repeated to the Washington Post that NATO ministers had offered preliminary support for the U.S. partnership plan, but then added: “this proposal is not meant to sidetrack the issue of enlargement of NATO.”121 Given that no official communiqué of the meeting was released, individually held press conferences on respective national positions to the

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question of PFP and enlargement that followed resulted in differing interpretations of PFP. The American delegation refused to take up the comments made by Manfred Wörner, while the British stated that it was too early to discuss the notion of enlargement. Still others praised the Germans for creating a new atmosphere of cooperation with the east, declaring that enlargement was now well underway. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Travemünde meeting resulted in all kinds of contradictory signals, reflected in the ensuing press coverage. Also, differing interpretations of the PFP program in the media as well as inexplicable British and American press reports that the German defence minister was apparently withdrawing from his original position to support East European demands for NATO membership caused some degree of nervousness across East European capitals that their countries were being consigned to some alternative tier of cooperation.122 However, the consequence of the confusion resulting from Travemünde and from the misinterpretations of the meeting—of which some were clearly intended—ironically only served to encourage the German government to send out even more concrete signals to both NATO and East European governments that NATO enlargement was still on track.123

Preparing for the Brussels Summit In the run-up to the January 1994 summit, NATO Alliance members had begun to formulate their national positions on PFP and enlargement, eagerly working and sorting out remaining questions, ranging from first-order issues such as the precise military and political objectives of PFP to contractual and financial issues and whether PFP was a ticket to or substitute for membership. As the winter meetings of NATO foreign and defence ministers approached, the German government found itself inundated with position papers and conceptual elements pertaining to a possible summit declaration from Alliance partners, without itself having formulated a common, single government position on the subject. The German MoD saw this as an inherent weakness in the German intra-governmental process and therefore took the initiative to establish a common German position for the upcoming summit. By the end of October 1993, the German government as a whole reached a principled agreement on the conceptual line of argumentation and the results they wanted to achieve at the forthcoming summit, mirrored

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largely by the concept that had been developed at the BMVg in the spring of 1993. To this end, both Rühe and Klaus Kinkel would comment publicly on the German position on NATO enlargement and air their views throughout November and December 1993, emphasizing the reasons why NATO enlargement was so vital to European security, the arguments being much the same as they were throughout the spring–summer of 1993. Thus they indicated that despite certain personal and political differences there was a basic consensus in the German government on the need for NATO enlargement. The aim was to demonstrate where Germany would stand on the issue at the January 1994 summit.124 Meanwhile, in Washington, and as the year 1993 drew to a close, most of the bureaucracy had taken for granted that PFP would be offered in exchange for membership. As the January 1994 summit approached, U.S. officials adhered to PFP and did nothing more to clarify the Clinton administration’s position on enlargement. Although Warren Christopher had tried to place his emphasis on PFP slightly differently125 than had Les Aspin and although Anthony Lake was moving in favor of making more concrete statements on enlargement, the U.S. position remained highly ambiguous. What appeared to many observers within and outside of the U.S. administration as a continuing preference for a Russia-first policy (especially in light of the strong showing of the ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the December 1993 parliamentary elections) would come under growing criticism from powerful senior American figures of Central European descent, amongst them Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, both of whom still wield considerable influence in the making of U.S. foreign policy. Both men viewed the PFP as inadequate, with Brzezinski in particular making sure that the American–Polish Congress would organize a massive letterwriting campaign to the White House calling for Poland’s admission to NATO.126 Also, in December 1993, Senator Richard Lugar would apply rhetorical pressure against the administration’s leaning toward Russia when he said that PFP epitomized the administration’s ad hoc approach to the problems of European security and called PFP “a bandaid offered in place of corrective surgery.”127 Volker Rühe also criticized the administration’s Russia-first stance when he, during the NATO meeting of defence ministers in December 1993, made clear that Russia could not be granted a right of veto over Alliance decisions.128 All of this pressure did increase concerns at the White House that the president would have trouble projecting leadership at the forthcoming summit. Amid growing criticism, reigning confusion, and uncertainty within the

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administration only one thing did seem certain: as former Bush administration senior official Robert Zoellick pointed out in January 1994, the Clinton administration was suffering from an inherent imbalance. With Strobe Talbott, Clinton’s “Russia Hand,” the administration clearly had a strong policy position on Russia. However, it lacked an equally strong policy on Europe.129

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C H A P T E R

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The Holbrooke Factor, 1994

The January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels: Clinton Unveils the PFP and CJTF President Clinton left Washington for Brussels on 8 January 1994 where he delivered several speeches on NATO’s continued centrality, its future role, and the relationship between the PFP and enlargement. On 9 January 1994, Clinton made sure to emphasize the continued relevance of the Alliance when he stated that only NATO had the legitimacy, the military assets, and the habits of cooperation to respond to Europe’s new security challenges and the security concerns of new participants. However, Clinton then went on to indirectly reiterate the prime concerns of his administration when he said that the PFP would not change or undermine NATO’s fundamental mission of defending Alliance territory from attack because essentially the PFP would “advance a process of evolution for NATO’s formal enlargement . . . .”1 After all, Clinton concluded, NATO could not afford to risk drawing new dividing lines across the European continent.2 With these remarks, Clinton satisfied the prevailing concerns of his administration, which essentially revolved around the questions of whether the United States was, in fact, prepared to defend ECE and whether doing so really was in America’s national interest and also whether NATO enlargement was worth risking renewed confrontation with Russia. At the same time, the words “process of evolution” were clearly intended to satisfy the Pentagon’s objective of ensuring that an eastward extension of NATO membership would be a sequential, long-term endeavor. The following day, in his speech to the actual NATO summit, Clinton

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spoke more forcefully when he acknowledged the difficulties of the eastern transformation process and the dangers they posed to European security. In this context, Clinton repeated that the PFP program would set in motion a process that would eventually lead to the enlargement of NATO. The president reassured his audience that the PFP was the right thing to do at this moment in time, because it left open the best possible future for Europe. By this he meant the possibility of a democratic Russia and Ukraine.3 At a subsequent news conference, Clinton was asked whether he could tell whether Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic were on the fast-track toward NATO membership. The president abided by his previous statements when he replied that the PFP was designed to provide for the cooperation and practical integration of these diverse military forces, thereby supporting Western efforts to integrate Europe whilst opening up the possibility for NATO enlargement.4 The president had not veered from the script and the statements prepared for him by his administration. Hence, the results of the Brussels Summit more or less resembled the Pentagon’s ideas. As had been expected, Clinton unveiled the PFP program as well as the CJTF concept, both important programs in their own right and Pentagon officials would concentrate their attention after the summit on trying to implement these initiatives.5 Thus, the U.S. administration continued to steer the middle course making no significant, far-reaching comments on the subject of enlargement—much to the continuing disappointment of East European leaders. For this reason, many observers interpreted the PFP as a “quick fix,”6 enabling NATO to postpone the hard question of enlargement while others, and the German government in particular, made sure to interpret it as a significant step toward enlargement. Yet from the East European perspective, the actual relevance of the PFP could only be judged in relation to a clear-cut U.S. commitment to NATO enlargement. At this point, however, it was still difficult to discern whether NATO’s priority was to extend cooperation or to move toward enlargement.7

Clinton’s Speech in Prague: “Not ‘Whether’ But ‘When’ and ‘How’ ” On 12 January 1994, the Clinton team arrived in Prague for a news conference with Visegrad leaders. In a statement prepared by Anthony Lake and speechwriter Jeremy Rosner, Clinton sought to reassure ECE

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leaders when he said: Let me be absolutely clear: The security of your states is important to the security of the United States. [. . .] While the Partnership is not NATO membership, neither is it a permanent holding room. It changes the entire NATO dialogue, so that now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how.8 Evidently, in preparing the presidential statement Lake had drawn upon the phraseology Walker and Weisser had discussed at the October 1993 NSC and White House meeting with the German delegation of the BMVg. Besides, by this time Anthony Lake himself seemed concerned that the president’s Brussels statements had not gone far enough in signalling that the administration was seriously moving forward on enlargement. Hence, for Lake the president’s Prague statement was a serious one because it laid the basis for moving the process along. Of course, it may well be the case that Lake was unaware of the origins of the phraseology but the fact that he placed the formula, which had been floating around the government in different interpretations since the fall of 1993, into the president’s Prague speech, eventually proved to be an important step in pushing administration deliberations forward. In fact, precisely because of these three words Clinton’s Prague speech was considered one of the most important U.S. presidential speeches on NATO enlargement since the U.S. administration had begun the debate in the autumn of 1993. On the importance of the formula and Lake’s role in injecting it into the presidential speech, Ronald Asmus explains: You know, I often say, in the olden days we fought wars with swords, today we fight wars with words. And the way to adjudicate battles and disagreements within the U.S. government is through a speech. When your President has to go out there and say something, everyone fights over how he will say it. So, Clinton’s Prague speech was a key speech. Walesa, Havel, they all were there. So, this is the place where the President has to face up to them and tell them what he is going to do with their aspirations. And this is the reason why this speech was so desperately fought over politically. Now, Lake being a smart bureaucratic operator, takes this phrase—“not whether, but when and how”— that Shalikashvili had also used earlier although in a different sense, so that the Pentagon could not object to these words.9

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In other words, although this formula had been floating around the Clinton administration since the autumn of 1993, it meant different things to different people thus reflecting that the administration really had not made any decision on the question of NATO enlargement but rather that it had postponed making a decision.10 To most administration officials, the phraseology was simply a “throwaway line,” conceding that NATO enlargement was theoretically possible but that no actual effort would be undertaken to extend the Alliance at this point in time. As mentioned by Asmus, General Shalikashvili had used the same phrase a couple of weeks before the Prague speech but later argued that when he had used the formula, it was meant to denote where the U.S. debate stood and not as a policy statement. However, Lake cleverly repackaged the formula and used it as precisely a policy statement. To sum up, therefore, German influence in the form of a formula that had first been coined and used by the German defence minister in May 1993 had been introduced to the White House and NSC staff in October 1993 by the Weisser delegation and had come to fruition— just as had been intended by Walker and Weisser—at the president’s Prague meeting with the Visegrad leaders in January 1994. In other words, if a U.S. president in a major U.S. foreign policy statement uses a phrase first used by a German defence minister, then what does this say about the power of German influence on U.S. foreign policy? Today, American officials tend to argue that a U.S. decision on NATO enlargement had effectively been taken with Clinton’s Prague speech and that the administration’s enlargement policy was on track from that day on. However, this is an overstatement since it was not until this formula had been used in Prague that the administration was actually forced to begin to seriously consider the question of whether or not NATO enlargement served U.S. security interests. In other words, although Clinton had proclaimed that enlargement was no longer a question of whether, the U.S. government was still unsure whether enlargement was, indeed, a good idea. Accordingly, Charles Kupchan who himself had been involved in designing the PFP program explains that the adoption of the PFP simply “allowed NATO to put off difficult decisions about if, when and where the alliance will expand and about what endpoint the PFP is building toward.”11 In fact, even Clinton himself seemed unsure on where his policy on NATO stood when, during his return flight to Washington after further trips to Kiev, Minsk, and Moscow, he told reporters—almost as if to reassure himself: “It [meaning PFP] is not something, as you all know, that just knocks you off your feet once you hear about it; we all know that. But the more I thought about it, the stronger I felt about it.”12

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Indeed, the PFP certainly did not knock President Walesa off his feet. In Prague, Walesa expressed his disappointment over the Brussels Summit and over the PFP when he reprimanded both the U.S. leadership and the Alliance, as a whole, saying: It is difficult for me to hide my doubts and reservations [. . .]. The idea of a divided Europe has revived. There is Russia, who, perceiving NATO as an enemy, fears an increase in its membership, and is resorting to blackmail. There is the West, which is vacillating. We are reproached with distrust, distrust in the face of agreements and treaties. Poland’s historical experience, and not only historical, in this respect has not been good. [. . .] Is it surprising that we are distrustful? We have learned to believe only in facts, for it is facts, which create guarantees.13

Critics in Washington Step Up the Pressure Meanwhile, back in Washington and throughout the spring of 1994, members of the foreign policy elite would continue to criticize the administration for dragging its feet on NATO enlargement. Amongst the critics were most notably Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Senator Richard Lugar, Robert Zoellick, and James Baker. In February 1994, Senator Lugar continued to complain about the administration’s Russia-first policy and stressed that personally he was not averse to line-drawing since it was important that the Alliance abided by its own priorities and was not dictated to by Russia. In this respect, Lugar seemed very much in line with Volker Rühe’s position that Russia be treated as a partner but not as a possible future member. Henry Kissinger, for his part, also criticized the PFP, concerned that it would dilute what was left of NATO into a vague form of multilateralism. Brzezinski urged that NATO sign a formal treaty of alliance with Russia and that a more explicit path to full membership of NATO for Central European countries be developed. James Baker also made the case for a clear road map and benchmarks for prospective members. Robert Zoellick continued to argue that the administration needed a strong counterbalancing force to make the case for a European policy separate from the dominance of Strobe Talbott’s Russia policy.14 In February 1994, Strobe Talbott was appointed as deputy secretary of state, in charge of overseeing the administration’s European policy, having previously been the ambassador at large for the Newly Independent

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States. For various reasons, Talbott’s occupancy of this office would prove critical in the evolution of his views on enlargement in the months ahead. Talbott’s main objective in the autumn of 1993 had been to keep concrete steps toward enlargement off the table and in this he had largely succeeded. However, over time and for a whole series of interrelated reasons, Talbott would ensure that his Russia policy was coordinated and balanced with a European policy. In fact, by the end of 1994, Talbott would emerge not only as one of the most articulate Clinton administration spokespersons on NATO enlargement but also as the principal overseer of the German–American effort to keep the enlargement train and the Russia train running on parallel tracks in the period 1996–97.15 Therefore, whilst faced with a barrage of criticism over the PFP and whilst realizing that President Clinton in his Prague statement had actually gone “beyond his mandate,” the administration realized that it would now seriously have to consider the pros and cons of whether or not NATO enlargement was in the interest of the United States. However, until the late summer of 1994, this evolution in U.S. policy would proceed in fits and starts, reflecting the continuing lack of an agreed interagency position.16

The German Government’s Position in the Aftermath of the Brussels Summit The German government naturally took advantage of Clinton’s Prague statement and interpreted it positively. After all, with the formula “not whether, but when and how” the U.S. president had opened a “window of opportunity” for the issue to be presented as though an Alliance consensus had already been established, at least in principle. Hence, the Germans continued to steer the course toward both EU and NATO enlargement. On 13 January 1994, only one day after Clinton’s Prague speech, Kohl presented his Regierungserklärung (Statement of Government Policy) summarizing the results of the Brussels Summit, appraising and commending the adoption of the PFP and declaring in clear words: NATO is open for new members. We would like to, gradually, bring the former communist states of ECE closer to NATO, all the way to membership—of course, only if these countries so wish.17 Chancellor Kohl also made sure to interpret the introduction of the American CJTF concept not only as an important step in the

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strengthening of the transatlantic relationship but, more importantly, as a way by which to emphasize the reciprocal relationship between the processes of EU and NATO enlargement. In this respect, it is important to remember that the Brussels Summit took place against the background of disquieting developments in Russia and President Yeltsin’s attempt to restructure his government and cabinet. Concerned especially about whether Moscow would abide by the October 1990 agreement of Russian troop withdrawal from the eastern Länder, Kohl, in January 1994, would try everything to ease the domestic political pressure on Yeltsin. Kohl hoped that emphasizing the enlargement of the EU in connection with NATO enlargement would help alleviate Russian concerns somewhat, since it was known that Moscow was less opposed to the idea of EU enlargement than to the idea of NATO enlargement.18 Thus, Chancellor Kohl had no quarrels with the summit results and even the SPD praised the summit results as “largely positive.”19 Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel also took a positive stance, despite his concerns over alienating Russia and his initial preference for EU enlargement, declaring that the door toward NATO membership for the former Warsaw Pact countries had now been opened.20 Volker Rühe, two days after the summit, repeated what he had been saying throughout the autumn of 1993, namely that the PFP was not to be seen as a “substitute” for NATO enlargement but as a preparatory mechanism, stressing also that it had taken months of effort to get to this stage and indicating that it was now important to concentrate on putting the PFP into practice.21

Internal Differences in the German Government However, soon after the Brussels Summit, the German MoD realized that there was still widespread resistance in Washington to the idea of NATO enlargement and also lingering concerns over how best to proceed in Bonn itself. From the point of view of the BMVg, it was important to maintain the momentum of the Brussels Summit by concentrating on preparing and developing criteria for candidacy, timetabling, and membership. It is certainly true, as U.S. officials are quick in pointing out, that the German government rarely spoke with one voice on the question of NATO enlargement. Although it is generally accepted that Volker Rühe, representing a younger generation of Christian Democratic leaders, was one of the first to advocate NATO enlargement publicly thereby

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creating quite a stir in the Alliance, it is also argued that unlike Kohl and Kinkel, Rühe paid more attention to his personal ambitions and Germany’s more immediate strategic security requirements than to Germany’s long-term pan-European foreign policy interests. This is clearly reflected in Rühe’s less sensitive reactions to Moscow’s objections to NATO enlargement.22 Although Rühe had been the first to propose that Russia be offered a strategic partnership with NATO in 1993, he, at the same time, insisted that NATO be extended as soon as possible, before the turn of the century and irrespective of any Russian opposition. In Rühe’s view, Russian objections were not justified since he believed that Western efforts to stabilize ECE were also in Russia’s security interests. He did not want to see any wrangling among NATO partners due to Russian objections. Rühe would continuously insist that NATO not concede to Russian pressure since doing so would only encourage and “whet the appetite” of reactionary forces in Moscow. The defence minister thus recommended an uncompromising NATO line. Kohl, on the other hand, whilst always trying to alleviate European concerns about a dominant Germany, pursued a highly reflective approach on the subject of NATO enlargement, never losing sight of the larger “strategic vision” and always patiently waiting for the appropriate time to make the appropriate statement. Depending on whom he would speak to, he would either support the idea or regard it as “premature.” However, throughout the entire process, from 1993 to 1997, Kohl regarded himself as Yeltsin’s chief partner in the West. In this role, Kohl also regarded himself as the chief mediator between the United States and Russia—between a Russian president under extreme pressure and a young American president fairly inexperienced in foreign policy. As Ronald Asmus reveals: Having looked at transcripts of telephone conversations between Kohl and Clinton—and they talked for hours—numerous times—it’s all about Russia, it is all about Yeltsin.23 When asked whether he thought the perceived lack of a united and strong German high-profile strategy on NATO enlargement to have been of advantage to Germany’s role in the enlargement process, Asmus replied: Well, I think the Germans enjoyed a very high profile. I mean in private, not in public. Helmut Kohl is the key player in the NATO enlargement debate in Europe. Amongst all European

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leaders, Kohl is the person that Bill Clinton listens to the most. He is the person, which Bill Clinton would call in the middle of the night and ask “what should we do?” They were buddies, political buddies.24 With Helmut Kohl showing great sensitivity to Russian complaints, not least because he had a fundamental interest in seeing the Russian troops withdraw from the eastern part of Germany and because he wanted the democratic reforms in Russia to succeed, the German chancellor would repeatedly warn against any attempts to isolate Russia and would always take care to “massage the Russian ego” by emphasizing the country’s continued great power status. Indeed, Kohl strove hard to minimize the Kremlin’s objections throughout the entire process leading to NATO’s enlargement decision in 1997. In this respect, Kohl would urge President Clinton in the course of 1995 and 1996 not to make any public statements on Poland’s prospect for NATO membership so as not to annoy the Kremlin.25 In his effort to win Moscow’s approval, Kohl was also actively supported by his foreign minister. In fact, Kinkel would emphasize that NATO enlargement was not so much to be seen as a military process but rather in connection with the enlargement of the EU and thus in the perspective of a broader sociocultural process from which the entire region had only to benefit.26 Yet, while Kohl and Kinkel were concerned not to alienate Russia over the NATO enlargement debate, they were equally concerned about neoisolationist tendencies in Washington’s foreign policy position coupled with the growing disillusionment among U.S. officials over the EU’s ability to act on its own in the Balkans. Thus, during the course of 1993, Kinkel and Kohl grew more disposed to help sustain America’s interest in NATO even if this meant giving in to Washington’s preferences on internal reform. Besides, they were concerned that if the Alliance continued to oppose the offer of membership for ECE countries in the face of growing pressure from the Visegrad countries, this would eventually undermine the credibility of NATO as a community of shared values.27 Hence, despite these intra-governmental differences, a common German position on the basic necessity for the internal and external adaptation of NATO was nevertheless discernable by the end of 1993 and in the run-up to the Brussels Summit.28 It is certainly true that the German government had its internal differences as German political analysts themselves admit. However, a closer look at the nature of these differences reveals that these had less to do

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with the basic rationale of the necessity for NATO enlargement than with differences over certain inherent aspects of the overall policy of enlargement. Hence, there was never any major disagreement about the actual need for NATO enlargement, even though there were differences in emphasis on certain policy aspects (pertaining especially to Russia), which, in turn, had more to do with personal ambitions, competitiveness, and the question of who would reap the overall credit and appraisal for the “Grand Project.” In confirming the nature of personal competitiveness in the German policy process, Ronald Asmus describes Kohl’s Geheimdiplomatie at the start of the debate in 1993, when he recalled: Kohl would say to the Americans “don’t listen to these guys,” meaning Rühe and Kinkel. I am in charge. This is Chefsache. And you can see all of this when the archives are opened. And Americans found that Kinkel and Rühe did not always know what was going on and that Kohl is not telling them what he is telling the President.29 Therefore, it is arguable that internal political wranglings in Bonn did not make things easier for the Clinton administration. As Weisser admits: Clinton officials knew what the German Defence Minister wanted, but they were having some doubts about whether this would become the German view. You see, they did not know what the German government as a whole wanted to do and whether Rühe’s views carried real weight in the cabinet and in the internal deliberations of the German government as a whole.30 Yet, despite the competitive nature of the German policymaking process, I do not believe that these internal government differences ought to be overemphasized. Certainly, Chancellor Kohl’s position during the process does appear somewhat ambiguous. However, although Kohl did not initially provide strong public support for Rühe’s ideas on NATO enlargement, he equally made sure never to denounce his defence minister’s ideas publicly—a point emphatically confirmed by Weisser as “correct.”31 However, when asked whether Kohl might have done so behind-the-scenes, Weisser replied: No. Not really. The thing was that Kohl waited for chances and avoided risks. And he knew that something was going to happen

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with regard to the Eastern countries. He did not want to be a frontrunner in the whole process and he did not know how the other European partners would react. So, he kept himself bedeckt (kept a low profile). But he was fully aware that his Defence Minister was very much respected in Washington for his views and that the Visegrad governments in Warsaw, Hungary, the Czech Republic were very enthusiastic about the outspoken support from the German Defence Minister as were most of his [Kohl’s] rank and file in the CDU.32 Thus, the American argument that the Germans never had a Grand Strategy on enlargement because of these initial differences and simply because they never had a public debate similar to that in the United States in 1995–96 does not seem convincing.33 As Angela Stent points out, by 1993 there was already a broad-based consensus on the necessity for NATO enlargement in Germany. With Germany directly affected by the events in ECE, all major political parties supported the idea of NATO enlargement; without it, it was clear, Germany’s Ostpolitik would become bilateralized thus risking tensions in both east and west.34 Furthermore, one might want to argue that, perhaps, it was not to Germany’s disadvantage that it appeared as a “Doubtful Mover” to its American counterparts since, as Solomon argues, throughout the summer and autumn of 1993, there was a widespread sense among Clinton administration officials that the initiative on NATO enlargement was to come from the Europeans themselves.35 Hence, from the view of the German government and given its interest not to be seen as overbearing, appearing divided would force the U.S. administration to eventually take matters into its own hands. As Karsten Voigt, the then president to the North Atlantic Assembly points outs, for the German government having a “strategy of no strategy” proved to be a very effective strategy in the end.36 To sum up, it is fair to say that the German government, despite its internal competitive quarrels and differences in emphasis on certain policy aspects of enlargement pertaining in particular to developments in Russia, nevertheless supported the principle of NATO enlargement by agreeing to give preference to the Visegrad countries and—by summer–autumn of 1994—reaching consensus on extending the possibility of NATO membership prior to EU membership as it became increasingly clear that the EU would require more time given that it had more policy areas to cover than NATO.37

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By the summer of 1994, the German government’s largely cautious approach to NATO enlargement was suddenly overtaken by Washington as the Clinton administration began to adjust its policy in the face of growing criticism from Washington’s foreign policy community. In the summer of 1994, Senator Richard Lugar had slung another arrow at the administration’s PFP policy when he demanded that a “clear timetable for the enlargement of the Alliance to include the Visegrad countries” be established.38 Branding the PFP program as a “policy for postponement,” Senator Lugar urged that “The West must make plain to Russia that we are now discussing how to expand NATO, not whether to expand it.”39 Thus, during his trip to Warsaw in July 1994, President Clinton moved the ball forward with his remarks during a televised interview in Poland on 1 July 1994. When asked whether he “could make that step forward and say when and how?” Clinton replied: Well, first of all, I have to make sure there is an agreement among the NATO members about what exactly the standards should be and the timetable. And they haven’t all agreed. But I do want to make clear that, in my view, NATO will be expanded, that it should be expanded, and that it should be expanded as a way of strengthening security and not conditioned on events in any other country or some new threat arising to NATO.40 Then, on 7 July 1994, in an anxiously awaited speech before the Polish Sejm, Clinton decided to bury the “no new lines” rhetoric of January 1994, pledging instead that NATO would not allow the Iron Curtain to be replaced with a veil of indifference.41 To be clear, shortly before his trip to Warsaw, Clinton had visited Bonn where he indicated to the Germans that NATO should consider the inclusion of Poland and perhaps the other Visegrad countries by the years 1996–97. And even before Clinton’s trip to Germany and Poland in July 1994, the State Department had informed German diplomats that Vice President Al Gore would present a far-reaching programmatic speech on NATO enlargement on the occasion of the Allied troop withdrawal from Berlin on 8 September 1994.42 Of course, critics of the U.S. administration as well as the German Foreign Office wondered about the possible reasons for the sudden shift

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in Washington’s policy, speculating that President Clinton supported NATO enlargement purely for the political purpose of securing the “Polish vote” in the run-up to the November 1994 congressional elections. It is a well-known fact that Americans of East Central European descent are important constituencies in key midwestern and northeastern states such as Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and New York. Had Clinton decided against NATO enlargement, he would have alienated these important constituencies, driving them instead into the Republican camp, which would have gained a further issue to capitalize on in both the congressional November 1994 elections as well as the presidential campaign in 1996.43 Another reason for the sudden shift in U.S. policy had been Clinton’s thus far dismal foreign policy performance. The administration’s Bosnia policy had not been doing very well in 1993–94 and the crisis in Bosnia had overshadowed every other foreign policy issue at the time, making it appear as though the United States was doing very little to alleviate the plight of the Bosnian Muslims. Hence, it was important that the president find an issue that would allow him to demonstrate U.S. leadership without taking any serious foreign policy risks. Moreover, both Talbott and Clinton were also growing increasingly concerned that the United States would lose its strong status in European affairs and that NATO would atrophy, if developments in the EU/WEU context would continue as speedily as they were. On 9 May 1994, the now defunct WEU Council of Ministers issued the Kirchberg declaration, establishing “Associate Status” for the countries of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, thereby opening the doors to direct participation in WEU Council discussions for engagement in joint exercises and operations in arrangement with the WEU Planning Cell. Although officially the U.S. welcomed the Kirchberg WEU decision in June 1994, Washington also recommended that NATO and the WEU coordinate their eastern outreach programs. Besides, Talbott who had thus far always opposed a quick decision on NATO enlargement and basically favored a gradual approach— given his views on Russia—was now facing strong criticisms from leading Republican congressmen, who argued that Talbott was willing to sell out NATO’s effectiveness to appease Russia.44 Thus, having become the new deputy secretary for European affairs, Talbott realized that he would now have to consider the needs of the Central Europeans more earnestly than he had done when he was in charge of the Newly Independent States and the U.S.–Russia relationship.

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However, to harmonize the administration’s Russia policy with a European policy, Talbott would require the support of both Richard Holbrooke and Ronald Asmus.

Returning from Bonn to Washington: The Holbrooke–RAND–BMVg Dynamics Richard Holbrooke had returned to Washington from his post as U.S. ambassador to Bonn by mid-summer 1994 and was sworn in as assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian Affairs on 13 September 1994. In 1993, Richard Holbrooke had been hoping to be appointed U.S. ambassador to Japan given his past involvement in U.S. policy on Asia (Holbrooke had been assistant secretary for Asia under President Jimmy Carter). Thus, Holbrooke had not given much thought to NATO and German foreign policy when he was confirmed as U.S. ambassador to Bonn, the tenure of which began in September 1993. Hence, during his time as ambassador to Bonn, the acclaimed German historian Fritz Stern and German foreign policy expert Daniel Hamilton would become Holbrooke’s closest advisers.45 Throughout his year in Bonn (1993–94), Holbrooke would become quite exposed to the German argument that Washington and Bonn needed to co-manage the volatile area of ECE and that once this region stabilized, it could serve as an important bridge in relations with Moscow.46 As Ronald Asmus recalls: It was the US–German–Poland–Russia equation that we (Rühe, Weisser, RAND) were all focusing on. We engineered the way people would think about this. We were always trying to find ways to talk about NATO enlargement that would not scare people. We sought to wrap it up in positive language. We often discussed whether NATO enlargement was a subject of geopolitics or anti-geopolitics, since we were trying to phrase it in terms of pro-integrationist and not anti-Russian neo-containment language. Rühe, Weisser, Lugar, and the RAND troika—none of us were anti-Russian. What is interesting is that at the time when RAND and the German Defence Ministry begin to work together, Holbrooke becomes Ambassador to Bonn in September 1993. Now, he does not know much about Germany and NATO and has two top advisers, Dan and Fritz.47

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Given that Holbrooke had initially been in favor of EU enlargement,48 a series of meetings were held between American, German, and Russian officials in Bonn to convince Holbrooke of the rationale for NATO enlargement. In fact, these meetings must have been so positively spirited that at one memorable dinner the distinguished historian Fritz Stern declared, in the course of proposing a toast to the assembled officials, that if such a meeting had taken place in 1914 the First World War might never have broken out.49 At around the same time, and thus in the autumn of 1993, RAND conducted its first big briefing at Hardthöhe in Bonn on the question of how to enlarge NATO. This second RAND study raised important aspects of how best to deal with Russia. Pleased with the contents of the paper, Rühe requested Ronald Asmus to publish the paper. Rühe also requested Asmus to brief it across European capitals and thereafter to the White House and NSC staff, but to make sure not to associate him with it. As Asmus confirms: [. . .] and what Rühe says is “you guys go out and be my missionaries—using my money but don’t put my political fingerprints on it.” [. . .] I must have taken that briefing and briefed it a 150 times across Europe, in every European capital—all paid for by the German Ministry of Defence.50 Asked whether he could remember how many RAND papers were written for the BMVg, Asmus replied: There were many papers done. We worked for the BMVg for 4–5 years. So, I must have written a whole set of papers, not all of which were published, not all of which had as much impact. But this briefing (on how NATO should enlarge) had the most impact of anything we did. This briefing eventually becomes the second big RAND study published in Survival in the spring of 1995.51 However, in the spring of 1994, while Ronald Asmus is busy presenting his study on how to enlarge NATO across European capitals, he receives a telephone call from Ambassador Holbrooke requesting him to come over for breakfast. During this informal meeting, Holbrooke explained that he was acting on instructions from the U.S. government in cautioning Asmus that the U.S. government was not at all pleased about the fact that RAND was producing “intellectual ammunition” for the German MoD on a policy the United States did not support. Holbrooke stressed that the U.S. government still had not

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made up its mind on NATO enlargement and that it now regretted having allowed RAND to work for the German MoD, since RAND’s work was allowing Rühe to “get his hands around articulating a problem.” As Asmus recalls Holbrooke saying: Ron, you think you are working for the Crown Prince of the CDU—who might be the next Chancellor of Germany, but you are way ahead of the U.S. government and you have to be careful [. . .]. You are providing intellectual support to somebody who is advocating a policy the U.S. government does not agree with, so be careful.52 Interestingly, however, by August 1994, Holbrooke himself had been positively convinced about the German case for NATO enlargement. As Asmus confirms: I am convinced that Rühe and Weisser had a tremendous impact on Richard Holbrooke’s thinking, who initially had been for EU enlargement. But his time in Germany makes him shift towards NATO. He was also influenced by Kohl, because he talked a lot to Kohl. He returns from Bonn a “true believer” in NATO enlargement.53 When asked how often Rühe would meet with Holbrooke to discuss the subject of NATO enlargement during Holbrooke’s time as U.S. ambassador to Germany and to what extent Holbrooke had been open to persuasion to the German rationale for NATO enlargement, Weisser noted: Holbrooke and Rühe met on a regular basis—at least twice a month and I had a couple of private meetings with Holbrooke in his study and talked to him as well. [. . .] Holbrooke, for example, was actually turned around from a sceptic to a strong supporter whilst he was Ambassador to Germany.54 In response to the question of what substance or logic of reasoning actually stood behind the German argument that allegedly served to turn Holbrooke from a skeptic into a strong supporter of the need for NATO enlargement, Weisser replied: Well, Holbrooke understood—since he is very intelligent—very quickly that NATO extension could not be avoided. I told him

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once what the Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski told us during a breakfeast meeting on 13 August 1993 in Bonn. Skubiszewski said, it is the priority and number-one-goal of the Polish state strategy to become once and for all an integrated member of the Western family of democratic nations, especially in light of the Polish past of being pushed around and divided time and again between Germany and Russia. I mentioned that to Dick Holbrooke and said that if Germany decides that it is in the vital interest of Germany to integrate Poland into the Western structures in order to be encircled by Allies and friends and to make sure that the eastern border of Germany is not the border of stability and instability and given that it also serves our basic strategic needs, since if ever it comes to a confrontation with somebody else, it is much easier to defend Germany at the eastern borders of Poland than on our eastern border—if two countries at the centre of Europe, for ideological, historical, political and strategic reasons decide that it is in their best and vital interest to enlarge NATO in order to serve all of these purposes—it is going to happen. And Holbrooke said: “You are dead right and it is also in the American interest.” And so he reflected upon the whole intraEuropean debate, its goals and objectives with immediate regard to American interests, with regard to the future of NATO and the relationship with Russia and said: “It has to be done.”55 As can be discerned from these remarks, Holbrooke’s time in Bonn and the many meetings he had held with German, American, and Russian officials had a lot to do with the fact that Holbrooke returned to Washington as a firm supporter of NATO enlargement, convinced that the only way to manage the ECE region was by anchoring German–Russian cooperation in a U.S.-led Alliance framework.56 When Holbrooke returned to Washington he asked Ronald Asmus whether he could “use the work you are doing for the Germans in the U.S. government?”57 and so the RAND troika agreed to furnish Holbrooke with the necessary intellectual ammunition on NATO enlargement. In fact, it was Strobe Talbott who sought Holbrooke’s return to Washington. Holbrooke and Talbott had been close friends and the two spoke practically everyday while Holbrooke was in Bonn. Because Warren Christopher had grown increasingly disillusioned with the work the European Bureau was producing on both NATO and Bosnia, Talbott—convinced that Holbrooke was the right man for the job—had chosen Holbrooke in the hope that he would revitalize the

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European Bureau, shaping a coherent policy on NATO enlargement and Bosnia. Besides, upon the advice of Holbrooke, Talbott also hired Ronald Asmus as his adviser on NATO enlargement in December 1993. When asked by Asmus why he decided to hire him given their differing views on the subject, Talbott explained that he had never been against the idea of NATO enlargement, in principle, but that he was in favor of it being carried out gradually, not against but with Russia.58 Also, Talbott made clear that the reason he had hired Asmus was that the administration, whereas having a policy on Russia lacked a policy on Europe and thus needed “a Europe-Russia Policy that fit together.”59 Talbott also explained that he believed in hiring people who had strong but different views to his own, because this was the only way the government would come up with the best policy. Therefore, Holbrooke’s return to D.C. had a lot to do with Talbott’s own evolution; hence, by the end of the summer of 1994, the U.S. administration’s position was beginning to evolve into one that was more favorable to NATO enlargement than it had been in October 1993. Once in Washington, Holbrooke was determined to resolve two major issues: first, he endeavored to end the bloodshed in Bosnia and second, he wanted to ensure that NATO was enlarged. In fact, it is important to realize that Holbrooke saw an important connection between the developments in Bosnia and the rationale for NATO’s eastward extension. If the Alliance failed to prevent the ongoing slaughter in Bosnia, of what value would an extension of NATO security guarantees be to East Central Europeans?60 In other words, if NATO could not guarantee the security of Bosnia, how could it guarantee the security of Warsaw, Budapest, or Prague? To demonstrate that he was now in charge, Holbrooke held his first interagency meeting on NATO enlargement at the State Department at the end of September 1994, almost immediately after taking office.61 Incidentally, it is also worth noting that it had been Holbrooke who upon his arrival in Washington had provided much of the language for Al Gore’s 8 September 1994 speech in Berlin, where the vice president reinforced Clinton’s Warsaw remarks when he stated that the time had come for the Alliance to go beyond the PFP and the NACC; that ECE membership demands would have to be met and that to this end discussions would have to begin by the autumn of 1994.62 Ambitious as he is, Holbrooke—without having confirmed his plans with Lake or with the president—told the interagency group that there was a presidential policy on NATO enlargement that needed implementation.

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Holbrooke also made clear that he had been asked by Warren Christopher to set up and run the mechanism to extend NATO. However, the remaining skeptics could not believe that Holbrooke was resting his case for NATO enlargement on a few “simple remarks” Clinton had made in Brussels, Prague, and Warsaw. Pentagon officials wondered how these speeches could have been so important and began to dispute the history of the policy that Holbrooke was describing by waving a few sentences around. According to the new defence secretary, William Perry, a highly respected and thoughtful individual who replaced Les Aspin shortly after Clinton’s January 1994 trip to Europe (Les Aspin resigned because he never really recovered from the Somalia debacle; Perry had been his deputy; Aspin died a year later from heartrelated disease), Holbrooke was merely presuming that Clinton had made a decision on NATO enlargement, but—as Perry insisted—no formal decision to this effect had actually been made. In an attempt to co-opt his skeptics at the Pentagon, Holbrooke asked General Wesley Clark to set up a meeting to brief the interagency group on what they would need to do to implement the policy. By taking this approach, Holbrooke enabled Pentagon representatives to voice their concerns but at the same time he co-opted them into acting on the issue. Holbrooke cleverly insisted that the arguments presented by the Pentagon were exactly what were needed to make the policy work.63 At the same time, and given his reputation for abrasiveness,64 Holbrooke had to reassure the Germans that the process would be a “smooth” one. Chancellor Kohl, in the course of 1994, was growing particularly concerned about developments in Russia and urged Holbrooke to go about things slowly. Holbrooke, in turn, explained that he was keen to keep the momentum going by giving the right signals. He also asked Kohl for support and whether Kohl could make some public statements in acknowledgment of the American course to keep enlargement on track while supporting an agreement with Russia. Hence, although the German government was pleased to see that Holbrooke had returned to Washington to steer the U.S. policy in favor of NATO enlargement, there was also some concern that Holbrooke might go about it too eagerly.65 Nevertheless, the Germans were pleased to see that the U.S. administration had now taken the lead in the matter. As Weisser describes in his book: In Washington it was now Richard Holbrooke who set the tone in the enlargement debate and he would certainly demonstrate his engagement also towards visitors: “If anybody in this administration

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is in charge of NATO expansion, it is me!” In the few months that Holbrooke spent as U.S. Ambassador to Bonn in 1994, he adopted the core rationale of NATO enlargement and made it his own.66 The Holbrooke interagency meetings would eventually serve as a basis for a briefing to Allies before the NATO meeting of foreign ministers in the autumn of 1994 and would lay the foundation for launching the NATO enlargement study in December 1994, completed less than a year later in September 1995.67

The German Government’s Position by the Autumn–Winter of 1994 Given the U.S. government’s policy shift in the summer of 1994, the German Foreign Office urged the Bundesregierung to develop a common position on the questions of “who,” “when,” and “how,” so that the German government would be well prepared for the forthcoming Alliance discussion. However, the AA did not want the debate over membership criteria and possible timeframes to be discussed publicly, although its preference was already leaning toward accepting the Visegrad countries as first members. Also, whilst moving away from its previous emphasis on EU enlargement and the necessity for dual enlargement of the EU and NATO, the AA was now leaning toward the idea that NATO could enlarge before the EU.68 However, at the same time, the Foreign Office remained steadfast in its position that relations with Russia would have to be intensified through a series of face-saving agreements that would allow Yeltsin to sell NATO enlargement to the Russian public. Thus, the AA insisted that any mechanisms designed to grant Russia member status in the political realm of the G7, an EU partnership agreement, and a strategic partnership with NATO (as had been promulgated by the BMVg throughout 1993)—all of these cooperation agreements with Russia— would have to contain enough inherent substance to withstand a first round of NATO’s eastward extension. In light of the Russian hardening of position on NATO enlargement in the autumn of 1994, it was of utmost importance that the German government was not seen by Moscow to be pushing too hard for NATO enlargement into ECE. However, at the same time, Bonn could not afford to lose the momentum of a policy it clearly supported.69

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Prompted by the AA and the changes that were taking place in Washington, Chancellor Kohl, on 6 September 1994, decided to set up an “Interministerial Working Group” (Interministerielle Arbeitsgruppe IMAG) to develop a common government position on how to proceed with the subject of NATO enlargement. In an intensive intra-governmental dialogue, the German government gradually reached a common position. To Kohl, it was of utmost importance that sensitive questions pertaining to candidate nominations, new dividing lines, and Russian and Ukrainian concerns would not be carried into an open NATO debate until dealt with through a process of (bilateral) intergovernmental Alliance consultations. As far as changes in the U.S. position were concerned, Kohl explained that there were two schools of thought discernible in Washington, one suggesting that NATO enlarge by 1997–98, the other that the Alliance enlarge by 2000–02. However, Kohl clarified that the U.S. government had been informed that Bonn was unwilling to support Washington’s fast-track rhetoric and that it preferred to be seen to be taking a gradual approach to enlargement. The chancellor also stated clearly that the U.S. government could rest assured that the incorporation of Russia into the European process would have to be based on a fundamental common German–American understanding.70 By 19 November 1994, the German government finally reached a common consensus on how to proceed with NATO enlargement—a consensus largely based on the conceptual propositions previously prepared for and developed at the BMVg upon Rühe’s request. The results were that the Visegrad countries would be the preferred candidates and that a partnership with Russia would have to be made concrete. However, no dates or timeframes were to be specified at this point and contemplations over timing, it was argued, would best be coupled with and cushioned by the EU enlargement debate and the upcoming EU 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Although the November agreement did not specify any particular dates, it did define a basic list of membership criteria not dissimilar to the EU’s Copenhagen criteria of June 1993.71 The November agreement was also reflected in the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition agreement, later dispatched to respective German embassies, which had thus far remained aloof from the broader international debate. Although the Germans had arrived at a common internal agreement on how best to proceed with NATO enlargement, Moscow’s hardening of position, the need to keep Yeltsin in power, and the need to secure

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Russian help in pressing the Bosnian Serbs to accept a peace settlement— all of these considerations—prompted Bonn in the autumn–winter of 1994 to avoid making hard choices publicly and to temporize instead— much to Washington’s disdain and incomprehension.72 Thus, on 28 November 1994, President Clinton decided to make a public announcement that the United States would make sure that a decision on “who,” “when,” and “how” would soon be made—even before the EU Intergovernmental Conference—thereby making it appear as though German and American objectives on NATO enlargement were out of line. In fact, Clinton’s statement had made it seem as though the German government had sought to delay the entire process. Yet, the enlargement process received a significant boost by the initiative of the German president to the North Atlantic Assembly, Karsten Voigt, who, on 23 November 1994, urged the NAC to take a far-reaching step in adopting a resolution that would prepare NATO for further steps toward enlargement.73 Nevertheless, rumors by American and British officials that the Germans were now getting “cold feet” over the enlargement issue were spreading throughout the Alliance, whereupon both Rühe and Kinkel set out to clarify the German position that enlargement remained on track. However, given the growing popularity of ultranationalist forces in Russia and Moscow’s openly declared opposition to NATO enlargement, the German government was not too pleased about the fact that the U.S. administration was creating political facts by making far-reaching public statements on enlargement.74 In fact, by the end of November 1994, German NATO Ambassador Hermann von Richthofen, in a leaked cable sent to the German government, complained that the United States had suddenly and unilaterally changed its position on enlargement and that the uncoordinated approach of the United States would strain the cohesion of the Alliance.75 The German ambassador also argued that America’s overzealous stance carried the risk of discrediting NATO’s enlargement policy. In addition, critics within the Alliance worried that the United States was not at all well prepared and that its position was not yet clear on important details.76 Still, in the run-up to the NATO meeting of foreign and defence ministers in December 1994, Clinton and Christopher tried hard to push the Germans into accepting a fast-track approach, but to no avail. The German preference not to specify particular candidates and timeframes prevailed in the end. Although the results of the NATO meeting of foreign ministers of 1 December 1994 were sold as a compromise solution, it clearly adopted the German formula.77 Thus, the

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Alliance explicitly stated that it would not examine the “who” and “when” questions: “We agreed that it would be premature to discuss the timeframe for enlargement or which particular countries would be invited to join the Alliance.”78 Hence, nothing remotely specific was decided and Germany’s gradual approach to enlargement prevailed. At the same time, however, rather than specifying concrete timeframes the Alliance had agreed to embark upon an extensive study on the question of how the Alliance should be enlarged. It was decided that the study be finalized and presented to NATO by the end of 1995. The idea of conducting a study on NATO enlargement could be traced back to an American initiative (most probably to Richard Holbrooke). The U.S. administration in a proposal to NATO had initially suggested that it would study the questions of how and why in order to then examine the questions of who and when. Interestingly, however, critics of a fast-track argument claimed that this approach revealed that the Americans lacked the necessary clarity of thought, reflected in the wrong sequencing of the questions to be asked. Thus, they argued, it made more sense to first examine the question of why in order to be able to assess the question of when.79 Be this as it may, the East Europeans were naturally disappointed, claiming their security concerns had once again been pushed aside. The Russians, too, claimed to be quite surprised about NATO’s intention to “study” enlargement (although they had been informed of the text in advance). For this reason, NATO officials interpreted Russia’s anti-enlargement rhetoric as well as President Yeltsin’s angry outburst at the CSCE Summit in Budapest on 1 December 1994 as largely designed for domestic appeasement.80 At the CSCE Summit, Yeltsin accused the West for not yet having discarded the legacy of the Cold War. Yeltsin charged NATO with sowing the seeds of mistrust and with an intimidating voice charged President Clinton with plunging the West into a Cold Peace.81 For a young, sensitive president who tended to choreograph every encounter on his overseas trips, it could hardly have been easy to tolerate Yeltsin’s behavior. And even if Yeltsin’s hard-line statements had been designed merely for domestic consumption and public support, given the growing popularity of communists and ultranationalists in Russia, such statements were still a cause for concern among Western leaders. After all, if Russian leaders were known to support NATO enlargement privately but not publicly, what did this say about the nature and success of the transformation process in Russia?82

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In any case, if the months and weeks before NATO’s December meetings had been characterized by the United States pushing for NATO enlargement, the weeks and months after the Budapest meeting were characterized by the United States reducing the pressure, claiming—much in accordance with the German government’s position—that so far no concrete timeframes and membership listings had been developed for NATO membership.83

C H A P T E R

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Keeping the Process Afloat, 1995

Transforming NATO’s Enlargement Debate into a Scientific Exercise The year 1995 was a year of leisurely approach to NATO enlargement. Throughout 1995, the Russian attitude would remain problematic although the Russian Foreign Ministry by the end of 1994 had signaled that it would be prepared to accept NATO membership for the Visegrad countries in exchange for territorial guarantees with respect to the Kaliningrad oblast and a prohibition on the stationing of nuclear weapons and foreign forces there. As for the East Central Europeans, there were growing concerns that the prospects for NATO membership were growing dimmer given that NATO had agreed to “freeze” the discussion on enlargement until after the December 1995 Russian parliamentary elections and the country’s June 1996 presidential elections. East Central Europeans were also concerned that Russia would exploit the written pledge, reportedly made in March 1995 by Clinton to Yeltsin, that Russia would not be automatically excluded from NATO membership, something the U.S. president had apparently also stated at the CSCE Budapest Summit. The last thing East Central Europeans wanted was to become hostage to the NATO–Russia dialogue. However, Russian officials were smart enough to routinely cite the forthcoming Russian elections and public opinion as reasons for NATO not to wave its flag. Yet apart from Russian obstructionism, European Allies themselves encouraged a slowing down of the enlargement process. Italy’s Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli in April 1995 urged that NATO enlargement be approached gradually, thus allowing

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enough time for reflection. Others even suggested prolonging NATO’s study on enlargement into 1996.1 However, in an endeavor to keep the German–American approach from drifting apart, especially over Russia, and in order to ensure that the British and the French were also thinking along the same lines—in other words, to ensure Alliance cohesion and conceptual clarity in a united Alliance approach to enlargement during 1995—German Defence Minister Volker Rühe decided to visit the United States in the period from 24 February to 4 March 1995, during which he held political talks with President Clinton, high-ranking senior administration officials, leading U.S. senators, and members of the U.S. strategic community. During this time, Rühe also presented three major speeches in San Francisco, New York, and Washington, all of which echoed the basic message he had delivered in his March 1993 IISS speech. By the end of Rühe’s trip, on 3 March 1995, U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry convened a “Group of Four” meeting attended also by the British and French defence ministers in Key West, Florida. At this meeting, the Four defence ministers reached an agreement that apart from having to redefine the transatlantic relationship by placing it upon a qualitatively new footing, the Alliance would also have to harmonize the development of a strategic partnership with Russia with a first wave of enlargement into ECE. However, it was also agreed that because of the upcoming presidential elections in both Russia and the United States in 1996, decisions on setting the course would not be made until 1996. Hence, Rühe—having established a good working relationship with William Perry by this time—succeeded in synchronizing Bonn’s “slow-motion” approach to enlargement based on “integration combined with intensified cooperation plus a Russia–NATO strategic partnership agreement” with French, British, and particularly American conceptions of enlargement.2 In the meantime, NATO’s internal study on the why and how of enlargement also acted as a catalyst in producing Alliance consensus, as more and more Alliance members began to accept the rationale for NATO’s eastward enlargement. On 30 May 1995, the NAC convened in Noordwijk, Netherlands, to review the first results of the study. During this occasion, the ministers repeated the “openness” formula in that the objective of NATO’s extension was to enhance the security of all countries in Europe without drawing new dividing lines. It was also noted that the study had made measured progress in dealing with the list of relevant questions. In essence, however, the 28-page “Study on

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NATO Enlargement,”3 as it was entitled on its endorsement on 20 September 1995, was kept deliberately cautious and vague. It received attention primarily because it left open the option of stationing nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. Throughout the summer of 1995, NATO heads of state would use summit diplomacy to alleviate and balance Russian fears of isolation against ECE concerns of being neglected.4 Hence, in order to tackle Russian concerns on the one hand and strengthen ECE confidence on the other, Clinton and Kohl would resort to summit diplomacy as an important tool with which to “massage the Russian ego,” especially since the issue of NATO enlargement had provoked friction between the United States and Russia at the CSCE Budapest Summit in December 1994.5 In an attempt to smooth over the row with Russia, a small breakthrough was achieved at the Clinton–Yeltsin Summit in Moscow on 10 May 1995, as both presidents reaffirmed their commitments to strategic arms reductions, nuclear nonproliferation, and economic reform. Although Yeltsin did make sure to emphasize that no solution had been found to the NATO problem, both presidents agreed that all states had the right to freely choose or change their security arrangements, including treaties of Alliances as they evolve.6 German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel also calmed Russian concerns over NATO enlargement when, on 10 May 1995, he emphasized that a strategic partnership between NATO and Russia could go beyond the PFP program (which Russia had joined on 24 June 1994, although not without some political wrangling with NATO). Kinkel also mentioned that he believed that Russia had an opportunity to boost its cooperation with the Council of Europe, the World Bank, the IMF, and the G7. Kinkel added that the EU was also ready to open its markets for Russia, stressing that it had been the German government which had intensively lobbied for Russia’s rapprochement with European and Atlantic structures.7 Given the German government’s internal agreement that until mid-1996 no timetable or membership criteria should be mentioned publicly, Bonn, at the same time, sought to assure that the period until summer 1996 would not amount to a year of Tatenlosigkeit (idleness). The Germans endeavored to continue with the necessary preparatory conceptual work on enlargement, whilst also trying to send encouraging signals to the East Central Europeans. Hence, on 6 July 1995, Chancellor Kohl gave a far-reaching speech before the Polish Sejm, in which he explained that NATO had offered Russia a strategic partnership and that he was convinced that this arrangement would create the

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proper conditions for Poland’s inclusion into NATO. Kohl added that no country had the right to prevent another country from acquiring Alliance membership and no country had the right to treat another country as a security glacis.8 By making this statement, Kohl had eradicated whatever doubts remained in Poland as well as in other Visegrad countries. Until then, no Western statesman had been as clear as Kohl had been, nor had anyone made as far-reaching a speech on NATO enlargement as Kohl had done on that particular day, so that the Poles were now sure that they were, in fact, heading for NATO membership.9 Seemingly always a step ahead of Alliance deliberations, the German government for the rest of 1995 and the first half of 1996 would concentrate on cultivating the level of Alliance consensus already achieved thus building upon the enlargement study and developing further the Alliance’s political strategy in preparing for potential future candidates and respective accession negotiations. By October 1995, in bilateral consultations with the United States, the German government sought to enlist American support for its ideas and concepts on how to proceed in terms of priorities, timeframes, and content of agreements to be reached. The German objective was to establish a strategic partnership with Russia at least by the summer of 1997. During these consultations, the Americans were quite surprised to see that both the German MoD and the German Foreign Office had reached a common position and that even during separate visits abroad, the political directors of both ministries represented a common government position. However, the fact that both ministries were now working more closely together than before had its reasons in the year-long friendship between the Ministerial Director Wolfgang Ischinger at the Foreign Office and Rühe’s chief of planning at the MoD. In recognizing the value of this friendship and whilst also holding in high esteem the many personal qualities Wolfgang Ischinger brought to his job, Rühe saw this connection as a valuable contribution to presenting a more cohesive German foreign policy position. At the same time, Ischinger, on his behalf, also recognized that Rühe’s energetic efforts in leading Germany’s European reform process were something the AA should participate in more actively, so that both the BMVg and the AA could build a strong counterweight to the Bundeskanzleramt, given that the latter was becoming increasingly dominant and conducting its own secret diplomacy—a state of affairs that Ischinger and Weisser knew tended to confuse the American side and thus something Ischinger was not at all pleased about.10

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In any case, the fact that both Ischinger and Weisser were now working together in joint negotiations with Washington had the effect of Washington accepting German proposals on how best to continue for the year 1996. The Americans agreed to the German proposal of following a three-tier strategy for 1996 that would (i) concentrate on deepening the results of the 1995 study by making concrete the necessary requirements to be fulfilled for membership; (ii) intensify the dialogue with candidate countries in order to prepare them for possible future membership; (iii) reach a substantial agreement with Russia on the extension of relations toward establishing a strategic partnership.11 Besides, the German delegation also pleaded convincingly with its American colleagues that such a strategy be adopted at the next NATO meeting of defence ministers in the autumn of 1995 and that it was of utmost importance that the Alliance plucked the courage to arrive at innovative and substantial solutions in its dealings with Russia. The Germans also made sure to caution the United States that Russia’s participation in the Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in BosniaHerzegovina was an important test case for how serious the West was about a partnership with Russia.12 At the next informal defence ministers meeting of NATO in Williamsburg, Virginia, in the United States, Rühe was asked to give the opening speech on the subject of “NATO and the East.” Confident that he enjoyed American support for German conceptual thinking on how best to continue with the process of enlarging NATO, Rühe was able to secure Alliance agreement on German conceptions for 1996 in pursuing a “twin-track policy” of preparing East Central Europeans for NATO membership on the one hand, whilst at the same time developing a strategic partnership with Russia on the other hand—a partnership agreement that would deserve its title.13

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C H A P T E R

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Winning Moscow’s Approval, 1996–97

German Efforts in Securing a Strategic Partnership with Russia Bonn’s strategic priority and highest political task for the year 1996 was to secure Russian approval for NATO enlargement, whilst at the same time attempting to bring Russia into the Western institutional fold without, however, risking the integrity and cohesion of the Western Alliance. Given the German government’s special interest in ensuring the withdrawal of Russian troops from its eastern Länder, Bonn’s initiatives in the process of improving relations with Russia had already been set in motion long before 1996. As patient long-term frontrunners in the Western effort to ameliorate and reshape relations with Moscow, both Chancellor Kohl and his Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel would, in the course of 1996, and with the active support of German diplomats working from below, work relentlessly to secure the Kremlin’s approval for NATO’s eastward extension—an agreement that was finally reached in the early summer of 1997. Back in June 1995, the German government, in order to be able to influence and steer the Brussels’s Alliance debate in its own preferred direction, agreed to develop a detailed internal policy position on how best to shape Alliance relations with Russia in both political as well as strategic terms. From the German point of view it was clear that the right balance would have to be struck between inviting Russia as a participant to Euro-Atlantic procedures on the one hand, whilst making sure not to compromise the Alliance’s political integrity and freedom

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of choice to enlarge on the other hand. In defining a new relationship with Russia, it was of utmost importance to strike, as the then British defence minister, Malcolm Rifkind, cautioned, the right balance between “membership” and “partnership”—a process that would require much in the way of great diplomatic skill, patience, and political vision. The conceptual work concluded by the German government in the summer of 1995 led to a position that was easily communicated to both the bilateral and multilateral levels, since it took care to include whatever concrete and plausible Alliance ideas were floating around at the time on the possible contents of a partnership agreement with Russia. At the same time, the Germans were working out an Alliance agreement for the Ukraine, as it became increasingly clear that this would be less complicated than designing an agreement with Moscow. By September 1995, the Ukraine had indicated that it would agree to a security partnership with NATO as compensation for renouncing its quest for NATO membership, given Moscow’s continued opposition. However, unlike the Ukraine, Russia was not adapting so fast to evolving realities. When Yevgeny Primakov became Russia’s new foreign minister at the beginning of 1996, the whole process received a new impulse. Given that Primakov’s predecessor Andrei Kozyrev had stepped down in early January 1996, after having been accused of an overly proWestern concessionary bent, Primakov a few days later would take a negative attitude toward NATO enlargement, accentuating all the different aspects of NATO policy that Russia was not going to concede to, and continuously deploring the emergence of a hierarchical system of European security where some institutions were preferred to others. Clearly humiliated by NATO’s enlargement plans and by its country’s own economic and military decline, the Kremlin continued to favor a pan-European security system based on the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) rather than on NATO.1 On 16 January 1996, on the occasion of German–Russian consultations in Bonn, the German government tried to rectify Russian impressions of isolation and exclusion. The German delegation argued that NATO enlargement was not intended to redesign the geopolitical contours of Europe at the expense of Russia’s security interests, but that the aim of opening NATO to ECE lay in stabilizing the region—a process that should also be in the interest of Russia. Furthermore, it was argued that given the many security problems Russia faced on its southern flank, the Kremlin had every reason to be relieved about the existence of a functioning Western zone of stability that was willing to cooperate

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with Russia on common security issues. In addition, the German delegation made sure to clarify that the terminology used in the enlargement debate had less to do with an inherent Alliance drive to expand (Expansionsdrang) than with ECE pressure to “return to Europe” and to belong to the Western family of nations. Nevertheless, despite these attempts, the Kremlin continued with its strong anti-NATO enlargement rhetoric, whereupon Kinkel in previous agreement with Kohl continued the German effort to secure Russian support. In offering Moscow a series of face-saving spoils, such as the membership in the European Council, the foreign minister repeatedly pledged at the beginning of 1996 that Russia was part of the European family of nations and that this was an important point to be considered in any plan for enlargement, both with respect to NATO and the EU. On 22 January 1996, speaking before the International Bertelsmann Forum at Petersberg, Kinkel reemphasized the German government’s position when he said that the enlargement of NATO was intended to unify and not to split the continent. He also urged that Russia be convinced that the reason for opening NATO had nothing to do with power projection but with the need to overcome continuing divisions. As the Frankfurter Allgemeine reported: According to the German Foreign Minister, an enlargement of the Alliance is to serve the purpose of unification and not that of a new division. “We have to convince Russia that the reason for opening NATO to new members is to overcome division and not to extend power.” It was necessary to deliver Moscow from its sense of isolation.2 Despite continued German attempts to calm Russian fears of isolation, President Yeltsin, by the end of January 1996, issued a warning to both Clinton and Kohl that Russia clearly opposed the eastward enlargement of NATO. However, given the triumph of communists and ultranationalists in the Russian elections of 17 December 1995, Yeltsin’s hard-line statements were largely dismissed by the West as designed for public consumption and support. The Frankfurter Allgemeine wrote: In a serious message delivered to the American President, Russian President Yeltsin has expressed himself sharper than ever against the eastward enlargement of NATO and ensured that Chancellor Kohl also received a copy of this written message. Russia’s objections were also made plain to the German Foreign Minister at the

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weekend, during his visit to Moscow where he was received by Yeltsin and where he also met with the new Foreign Minister Primakov. [. . .] At the same time, however, the Russian President’s harsh tone might well be considered part of his electoral effort in taking the wind out of the sails of his communist and nationalist rivals on issues concerning the country’s foreign policy.3 Against the background of some American critics, notably Republicans who had expressed their skepticism at the argument that the fate of Russian reforms depended on whether or not NATO enlarged, thus arguing that it would be a mistake if the Alliance were to fine-tune its policies to suit Russia’s internal debates, Chancellor Kohl—in reflecting a not-so-tacit Western agreement to “tone down” NATO’s enlargement rhetoric based on the theory that this would help Yeltsin in the forthcoming presidential elections given Yeltsin’s deteriorating state of health due to his heart condition—would throughout the first half of 1996 act as a relentless apologizer for and explainer of a restless Russia, cautioning Western leaders to remain sensitive to Russian concerns, at least until after the Russian elections in June 1996. In fact, in preparing for his negotiations with Yeltsin in Moscow beginning on 18 February 1996, Chancellor Kohl would slip into his role as “chief bridge builder” between Russia and the West when in an address to the Annual Wehrkunde Defence Conference in Munich at the beginning of February 1996, he spoke of the need to understand the psychological vulnerability of the Russians and once again hinted that the West should tread lightly with its plans to enroll ECE states in NATO. Then, whilst meeting with Yeltsin in Moscow during late February 1996, Kohl clearly emphasized that enlargement “is not a topic which should be discussed precisely at this moment in time.”4 In fact, during his meeting with Yeltsin, Kohl urged both Russians and Americans not to misuse the subject of NATO enlargement as an election campaign issue. The German chancellor also stressed that he was confident that a solution could be found that would meet the security interests of all involved, but that finding a solution was not of immediate concern. This could be done at another point in time, when matters could be discussed in a cool and calm manner. Kohl said that the German government did not want to do anything that would risk or endanger the good relations it had thus far established with Russia. The Frankfurter Allgemeine reported: On Monday, after a two-and-a-half-hour conversation with Chancellor Kohl, Russian President Yeltsin—in an angry

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outburst—expressed himself against plans to enlarge NATO. Kohl smiled with restraint, [. . .]. Kohl replied that it was not about opposing Russia. The enlargement of NATO was not a subject suitable for election campaigns, including also the Presidential election campaign in America. He was quite confident that there were possibilities to include Russian security concerns in the conceptions, however, the right for other states to choose to join an Alliance also needed to be preserved. [. . .] “I am sure that we will find a solution, but certainly not now.” [. . .] He [Kohl] would urgently advise to do all that were necessary at a time “when matters could be discussed calmly.” This was the policy of the German government. [. . .] Kohl’s warning not to misuse the subject of NATO enlargement for election purposes was also a hidden message to U.S. Republicans, who in the hope for securing U.S.–Polish votes were at the same time wounding the Russian pride.5 Furthermore, Kohl also seemed to be in agreement with both Clinton and Jacques Chirac that in order to keep the Russian reform process on track, Yeltsin’s reelection was of utmost importance to the West. The Frankfurter Allgemeine observed: In his assessment, Kohl clearly seems to be in agreement with Clinton. On Saturday, Kohl had spoken to President Clinton and French President Chirac on the phone. It seems more than obvious that the three leaders came to the mutual agreement that Yeltsin’s re-election in June was better for the West and for Russia’s reform efforts than the advent of another candidate, given that the reform politician Yavlinsky did not enjoy a strong anchorage in the Russian populace.6 The German chancellor was supported by his foreign minister who, throughout the months of January and February, made clear to Moscow that although the Alliance could not offer Russia a right of veto on Alliance affairs, Germany and the West could strengthen its relations with Russia in the context of the PFP and IFOR in Bosnia whilst also ensuring Russian membership in the Council of Europe (COE) and Russian participation at the forthcoming G7 Summit to be G8 Club of Industrial Nations. Hence, throughout the first half of 1996, while offering Russia a series of compensatory face-saving spoils in exchange for accepting

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NATO’s eventual enlargement plans, and whilst at the same time ensuring that the Alliance would press on with its plans, both Kohl and Kinkel would continually stress that they did not wish to see the idea of NATO enlargement become a major campaign issue during the Russian elections. Both U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry and Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott also largely supported the German government’s careful approach. During the February 1996 Munich Conference, Perry stressed that he had been encouraged by recent cooperation efforts between Russia and NATO in Bosnia; Strobe Talbott, on 13 February 1996, reiterated the concerns of Chancellor Kohl when he said that NATO had to resist the temptation to accelerate the enlargement process for certain countries and that if the United States was to do so unilaterally it could well jeopardize Washington’s ability to maintain the necessary Alliance consensus.7 After the elections in June 1996, the Russian government itself now seemed more willing and able to engage in talks with the West on its future role and status in the European security architecture. In his first encounter with a Western head of state since being reelected on 3 July 1996, Boris Yeltsin, having suffered an unreported heart attack in late June 1996, met with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in an informal setting where Yeltsin was said to be resting and preparing for heart surgery in November 1996.8 The informal setting in which both leaders in burgundy sweaters would stroll in amiable fashion through the grounds of a picturesque hunting lodge spoke volumes of the relationship that had developed between Yeltsin and Kohl over the years. Speaking of each other as personal friends, Kohl said he stood solidly behind the Russian president amid speculations of a possible power vacuum and leadership void due to Yeltsin’s illness. Amid peace talks in Chechnya, both men also discussed NATO’s enlargement plans. Kohl said it had been agreed that all questions on NATO’s eastward extension would be resolved in time for a NATO summit scheduled for 1997.9 Kohl’s visit to Moscow was followed by U.S. Vice President Al Gore’s visit on 15 July 1996, where Gore and Yeltsin met at a government rest home in the suburbs of Moscow in the presence of a doctor. In the weeks ahead, Yeltsin’s health would continue to deteriorate causing much concern in the West that the President’s frail health could make the Russian reaction to NATO’s enlargement plans less predictable than ever. In August 1996, the Kremlin announced that the Russian president suffered from “colossal weariness” after his election campaign and that he would need two months of peace and quiet. By September 1996, and amid

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growing speculation over his state of health, Yeltsin himself decided to break with Kremlin tradition announcing on 5 September 1996 that he would have heart surgery, although the date for surgery was mentioned only shortly before the actual operation in November 1996. Throughout the late summer of 1996, while Yeltsin was grappling with his health, it was Primakov who emerged with a clear mandate to secure the best possible deal for Russia in his talks with leading Western statesmen over NATO’s enlargement. In July 1996, Primakov suggested, as he had done in previous meetings, that “a way out of the prevailing situation might be found through compromise and reciprocal consideration of interests,” which must include a “guarantee that the enlargement of NATO will not lead to the installation of military infrastructures” near Russia’s borders and that a NATO–Russia treaty will not be reduced to a mere declaration, as he suggested some in the Alliance were seeking, but rather that it should contain guarantees that would alleviate Russian security concerns.10 In separate talks with the German foreign minister, on 29 July 1996, Primakov emphasized the Russian preference for a pan-European security system based on the OSCE rather than on NATO, an idea he already discussed with Warren Christopher and Malcolm Rifkind. He also urged that relations between Russia and a new, more European NATO geared toward tackling contemporary regional security issues be placed upon a legal footing amid further steps in arms control measures in the context of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and that such steps be taken before NATO decided to enlarge into ECE. Primakow also made sure to repeat the Kremlin’s “two red lines” conditions, one pertaining to the requirement that NATO does not move its military “infrastructure” close to the borders of Russia, and second, that former Soviet Republics, in particular, the Ukraine, not be considered for NATO membership. Kinkel, on his behalf, introduced to Primakov Germany’s objectives for a NATO–Russia charter, explaining that Bonn was especially interested in ensuring that Russia were incorporated into the Alliance 16 ⫹ 1 framework set up in September 1995 and that—within the framework of a NATO–Russia charter—Bonn was also interested in establishing a NATO–Russia council. Besides, and in any case, both Germany and France were keen to conclude a NATO–Russia agreement before any decision on enlargement was made.11 By the end of August 1996, the Russian Foreign Ministry submitted a number of detailed proposals on the possible contents of a NATO–Russia agreement, thus indicating that it was willing to resume

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the process of dialogue in negotiations with NATO—a process that had been interrupted in the summer of 1995. Not surprisingly, however, the Russian position contained a number of nonstarters or maximum demands the West simply could not accept.12 At the same time, the Russian position did contain some constructive elements, permitting the West to present its concept of cooperation, thus allowing the negotiation dynamics to unfold. Therefore, the German government, keen to resume negotiations with the Russians as soon as possible and in preparation for the forthcoming meetings between Primakov and Kinkel, decided to underline its position with three main arguments: the first argument was that Bonn sought to reach an agreement with Moscow on a charter—a framework document for a partnership between NATO and Russia; the second argument was that Bonn sought to open a process of dialogue not negotiations to explain to Russia the internal reforms and adaptations of NATO and thus to convey to Russia the nature and characteristics of a new NATO; finally, the German government would aim to open talks with Russia to convince Moscow of NATO’s intention to stabilize ECE, whilst at the same time clarifying that extension of its membership remained an internal matter for the Alliance and thus could not be a direct subject of NATO–Russia negotiations—a point the Americans would more often than not phrase in less sensitive terms, arguing that Moscow had no right to “dictate” its terms to NATO.13 Keeping all three Alliance processes on track—that is, the enlargement process or “external adaptation” of NATO as well as NATO’s “internal adaptation” and the development of a strategic partnership with Russia—demanded political and diplomatic experience, skill and statesmanship of the highest order. Judging by the news reports of the time, it is fair to say that it was Chancellor Kohl who, in September 1996, would throw his personal weight, experience, and reputation behind the project, which required a show of political courage in both Washington and Moscow as well as in every other major capital in Europe. Thus, in September 1996, Kohl would arrange further procedures in talks with the American president, the French president, the British prime minister, and the Russian president and managed to reach agreement on a summit to be held by the early summer of 1997 with a preceding special summit to sign the NATO–Russia agreement beforehand. The German chancellor also succeeded in persuading his Alliance counterparts to agree to a postponement of official NATO negotiations with Russia, given Yeltsin’s frail state of health and upcoming heart bypass surgery in November 1996. Hence, Kohl suggested

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that official negotiations on a NATO charter with Russia be resumed in January 1997 and that in the meantime discrete negotiations through special representatives were to proceed. Given that Kohl’s suggestion had been accepted across Alliance capitals, NATO at its ministerial meeting in December 1996 proposed that Russia and the Alliance begin an in-depth dialogue, with NATO to be represented by its Secretary General Javier Solana and Russia by its Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov.14 In September 1996, the Bundekanzleramt, the AA, and the BMVg agreed on a common position for further procedure based on the following four points: first, Bonn acknowledged Moscow’s active contribution in reshaping its relations with NATO and would therefore continue to support and encourage an active dialogue in this direction; second, Bonn would endeavor to carry these talks into NATO at the appropriate time, to ensure that NATO’s secretary general acquired the mandate for further Alliance negotiations with Russia; third, Bonn would aim for a decision on NATO enlargement to be made after and not before agreement was reached with Russia and would thus agree to make an enlargement decision at the 1997 NATO summit; finally, the 1997 Summit would have to issue membership invitations to new members, and introduce the previously agreed-upon Charter with Russia as well as the results of its internal adaptation. By the beginning of October 1996, the German government was able to proceed in its consultations with leading Alliance partners in a consensus-oriented manner, not least because Washington and Bonn had arrived at a common position through regular consultations. In the meantime, Strobe Talbott had achieved important successes in talks with his Russian colleague Mamedov—results that were also encouraging for Bonn. By this time, the Russians had agreed to drop some of their maximum demands, concentrating their attention now on the adaptations to Europe’s arms control regimes. To compare the results of the bilateral talks that had taken place with the Russians and to discuss preparations for the summit meeting in 1997, an informal gathering of defence and political directors of the United States, British, German, and French foreign and defence ministries convened at Ditchley Park outside London under British chairmanship on 11 October 1996.15 Strobe Talbott led the American delegation while Wolfgang Ischinger led the German delegation. During this meeting, the German delegation introduced a detailed paper on the possible structure and content of a NATO–Russia charter, which also included some ideas of Alliance members. Primarily, however, it

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was based on the preparatory conceptual work conducted in the German government in the period from autumn 1995 to autumn 1996. It was Ischinger who presented the German proposal, outlining the principles of a NATO–Russia partnership agreement: introducing the idea of a mechanism for regular consultation to include Russia in processes of common relevance without, however, giving Russia a right of say in internal Alliance affairs; and suggesting areas of cooperation on the basis of reciprocity. The overriding objective of the agreement was to establish closer cooperative relations in the area of European crisis management and regional stabilization efforts. Following an extensive discussion of the German proposal, the concept was unanimously agreed on.16 Respective participants also agreed that after further prenegotiation efforts with Russia, the negotiation mandate would be passed on to Solana. More interestingly, however, Strobe Talbott, somewhat concerned that the German proposal was too ambitious, decided to entrust the German delegation with the responsibility of carrying forth further consultations with the Russians in order to win Moscow’s approval for the concept. As Weisser recalls Talbott saying: Strobe Talbott said—although he was Clinton’s personal responsible man for U.S.–Russian affairs: “Why don’t you Germans fly to Moscow and feel the Russian pulse?”17 And so by early November 1996, the German government resumed its consultations with the Russians and dispatched a delegation led by Wolfgang Ischinger to Moscow to do just that—“to feel the Russian pulse.” In Moscow, Ischinger had a ten-hour meeting with highranking officials at the Russian Foreign Ministry. The German delegation presented its rationale for a NATO–Russia agreement including a NATO–Russia council.18 The German side argued that both the Western Alliance and Russia were well advised to work together given that emerging security challenges were common to the Euro-Atlantic hemisphere, as a whole. The Germans also argued that NATO enlargement served Russian interests since East European countries could eventually act as an important bridge to the West, and their integration and stabilization through NATO19 could also release military resources for Russia to concentrate and deal with trouble spots on its southern flank. This argumentation, the Russians said, sounded very convincing. However, they insisted that the political atmosphere in Russia had not yet matured to the level of accepting such arguments. At the same time, the Russians emphasized that there could be a chance of success

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in the long run. So, the German delegation left Moscow with a feeling of assurance. They had every reason to believe that sooner or later they would succeed in reaching an agreement with the Russians. The results of this meeting were reported to leading Alliance partners and eventually marked the beginning of the Solana–Primakov negotiations, built on substantial preparatory efforts on the part of the German government.20 As the Russian Information Agency ITAR-TASS reported on 8 December 1996 in an article entitled “German Minister proposes NATO–Russian Consultative Body”: Security in Europe will be possible only with Russia, not without it or against it, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel told the Welt am Sonntag newspaper, today. He stressed that Germany insists on taking into account the Russian security interests. Russia still mistrusts and feels alarmed with the NATO expansion plans, said the Minister. That is why, the North Atlantic Alliance and Germany are striving to prevent new gaps in security. [. . .] this goal is cherished by the Charter on NATO–Russia Strategic Partnership, which is being drafted with an active assistance of German diplomats. On the other hand, NATO should propose to Russia a permanent consultative body on all aspects of security in which Russia would have a fully–fledged status. [. . .] In the opinion of the German Minister, Moscow is ready for negotiations with NATO on these proposals.21 Hence, German–Russian consultations paved the way for a resultoriented NATO–Russia dialogue. Certainly, the friendly atmosphere in which the German–Russian dialogue took place was also influenced by the special friendship that had developed between Yeltsin and Kohl as well as between Kinkel and Primakov. The talks were characterized by a high degree of mutual trustworthiness, allowing both sides to speak quite openly about deviations of interests and opinions. At the same time, both Germans and Russians were keen to arrive at a common understanding on which to continue the process of reaching an agreement.22 As the Frankfurter Allgemeine reported in an article entitled “Die Bundesregierung hat für die Gespräche mit Rußland ein Konzept entwickelt: westlichen Bemühungen vorausgedacht”: Bonn wishes to place emphasis on the fact that from the beginning, Germany “with its suggestions thought ahead of Western efforts.” This is said to be exemplified by the frequent meetings of

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Chancellor Kohl with President Yeltsin and the suggestions made by Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in the European Union (EU) and the Western Alliance. [. . .] Two weeks ago, Kohl is said to have assured Yeltsin that there were no intention of extending the Western military machine. “The opening of NATO is a political process geared towards the inclusion of certain partners, not primarily a military procedure intent on building a potential against Russia.” NATO’s decision not to station nuclear weapons on the territory of new members could be traced back to a suggestion made by Germany. [. . .] Bonn assumes that Germany—in accompanying, for example, the talks between NATO’s Secretary General Solana with Russia (Solana will be meeting with Cabinet members in Bonn this Friday)—will play no less significant a role than the more dominant America. It is hoped that by February, Yeltsin will be in a position to reassume his appointments. Obviously, the German government is still counting on Yeltsin despite his sickness. In fact, it seems as if the German government is intent on making good use of the coming period given that Yeltsin seems positively inclined toward the arguments presented by those he trusts—such as those of the Chancellor.23 By the end of 1996 and despite its continuing objections to NATO’s eastward enlargement plans, Russia accepted the Alliance’s offer to negotiate a separate formal security arrangement, drafted with the active assistance of German diplomats. The following weeks witnessed an unprecedented highly intense diplomatic process both within NATO itself and respective Alliance capitals. The efforts of NATO Secretary General Solana, now the Allies’ principal negotiator, were embedded within and accompanied by this wider diplomatic process. This intensive and demanding period of negotiations began in January 1997 and was led by the British, French, American, and German foreign ministries but, in particular, by Strobe Talbott and Wolfgang Ischinger. This network of consultations was further supplemented with talks taking place between the respective heads of state and their national security advisers. All in all, Solana and Primakov would go through six rounds of negotiation starting from 20 January up to 14 May 1997.24 The first round of negotiations dealt with questions relating to the title and legal status of a document between NATO and Russia coupled with the appropriate definition for a consultation mechanism; the identification of various areas of cooperation; certain adaptations in arms control

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agreements; and the question of NATO’s military infrastructure on the territory of new members. At the end of this first round, both sides agreed that these questions would have to be dealt with further during a second round of negotiations. Thus, Solana and Primakov would meet again for a second round of talks on 23 February 1997. Klaus Kinkel had visited Moscow shortly before, on 18–19 February, to make sure that Primakov would be more flexible in reaching an agreement with Solana on the issue of the document’s appropriate legal status and title. When the then newly appointed secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, went to visit Moscow on 21 February 1997, she confirmed Kinkel’s positive impression that the Russian negotiation position was becoming more flexible. Therefore, during the second round of Solana–Primakov talks, attention was devoted to more difficult and sensitive questions. Primakov suggested that a summit meeting of “17” rather than “16 ⫹ 1” be held in May 1997. Primakov also suggested that the talks be speeded up, so that preliminary results were achieved ahead of the upcoming Yeltsin–Clinton Summit in Helsinki on 20 March 1997.25 By March 1997, NATO’s biggest concern was to convince Moscow of the significance of far-reaching confidence-building measures in the context of improvements to the CFE treaty coupled with the internal adaptation of NATO as well as the extent to which Russia’s security interests had been respected on the one hand whilst, on the other hand, seeking clarification over what exactly was meant by Russian demands that NATO’s military infrastructure was not to be deployed on the territory of new members. In other words, by March 1997, the main question for NATO was whether and if so, how it should respond to Russian demands that the Alliance’s infrastructure not be deployed close to Russia’s borders. Clearly, a reasonable balance had to be struck between the legitimate security interests of new members and the need for a nonconfrontational approach vis-à-vis Russia. However, at the same time, NATO was in the midst of adjusting its main rationale to a new security environment and to a new strategic concept, exemplified by its crisis management tasks in the Balkans. Furthermore, it was important that the Alliance would not become hostage to the demands of third parties, but that it maintained its credibility and sovereignty. Yet again, at the same time NATO could not do anything that would undermine those standards of cooperation already achieved under the PFP program. All of these concerns had to be balanced and checked against each other. To deal with these sets of concerns, German–American consultations took place in Washington on 10 March 1997, where both sides

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agreed to push ahead with both processes, the NATO–Russia agreement as well as the enlargement process. Agreement was also reached that the above-mentioned concerns could only be kept in balance if the Alliance stuck to the following “five nos”: no delay in enlargement; no veto; no exclusion of candidates; no second-class membership; no interference in NATO decisionmaking.26 Hence, with the third round of Solana–Primakov negotiations taking place on 9 March 1997, and the German–American agreement of 10 March 1997, Solana was able to present the Russians with a complete NATO–Russia document, which opened the way for further negotiations as Primakov agreed to enter into discussions of the text. As The European observed: Javier Solana, the Secretary General of NATO flies to Moscow for a third round of negotiations amid signs that the former Cold War enemies may be nearing a breakthrough on establishing a strategic partnership. But the two sides are in a race against time if they are to have all the elements of a complex accord in place before a crucial summit between Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin at Helsinki on 20–21 March. [. . .] The thinking in NATO capitals is that there has been a change of approach in Moscow in recent weeks associated with the return of Yeltsin to active duty. [. . .] While NATO and Russia remain at odds over the amount of “infrastructure” such as military communications, air defences and fuel pipelines that NATO will establish in the new territory, the main area of contention is the status of the document itself. NATO has dropped its objection to a “binding” document, while still refusing to accept Russian demands for a legally binding treaty. NATO argues that a treaty would restrict its future activities [. . .]. The Alliance is proposing a document to be signed at the Madrid summit in July that would be similar to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act on human rights, which was not a treaty but was regarded as binding on all signatories.27 At the U.S.–Russia Helsinki Summit held on 20–21 March 1997, both presidents, after eight hours of talks, agreed to work on a new consultative status for Russia with NATO.28 Although President Yeltsin continued to insist that NATO enlargement was a serious mistake, he dropped his earlier bluster that NATO membership for former East European satellites was absolutely unacceptable. In return for this acquiescence and amid agreements to move toward even greater cuts

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in strategic nuclear arsenals, Yeltsin received a promise that Russia’s economic standing would be upgraded by deepening its presence at the G7 and thus soon to be G8. Karl Kaiser, former director of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) was reported saying to the German magazine Focus in May 1997: Nobody pushed harder for this solution [G8 solution] than the Germans. It took some effort to convince the United States.29 Thus, Clinton promised Russia broad consultations on NATO affairs but made clear that there was no hope for a Kremlin veto on Alliance activities. It was reported that although Clinton had made the case for enlargement with a great deal of passion and conviction, Yeltsin continued to explain why Russia was so firmly opposed. Although the Helsinki Summit was described by Kissinger as a “fiasco,”30 largely because of Clinton’s remarks at the following press conference that NATO had been a “mirror image” of the former Warsaw Pact—a choice of words indicating precisely the opposite of all impressions NATO was trying to convey to Moscow31—and although Clinton himself told the subsequent joint press conference that the two presidents agreed to disagree on NATO enlargement, the Alliance still managed to achieve everything it wanted. The two presidents formally authorized the NATO–Russia charter, the final details of which were still to be negotiated by Solana and Primakov. It was agreed that the charter would give Russia a special relationship with NATO including some rights to be consulted. Although the charter was not to be a legally binding document, it was agreed that it would involve an enduring commitment at the highest political level. It was also agreed that the NATO–Russia charter would be signed by all 16 NATO members at a ceremony still to be arranged. Despite some remaining ambiguities, such as the continuous Russian claim that verbal promises were given to Moscow by Western leaders that the unification of Germany within NATO would not lead to an eastward extension of NATO, and the Western counterargument that at the time no one could foresee the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and therefore it had never crossed anyone’s mind that NATO could take in new states to the East (we ought, perhaps, to remember that the Warsaw Pact was kept alive by East Europeans themselves until July 1991, making it difficult for NATO to figure out how best to deal with their respective security concerns), the way was now clear for NATO to announce the names of those countries it wished to invite for membership applications at its special summit in Madrid in July 1997.

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Interestingly, German efforts to keep the momentum toward an agreement going did not end with the achievements of the Helsinki Summit. In fact, Kinkel would meet Primakov on 29 March 1997 as part of an ongoing German–Russian dialogue and not least in order to support the next and fourth round of Solana–Primakov negotiations. The results of this fourth round of negotiations were reported to NATO on 15 April 1997. Solana and Primakov had reached agreement on five chapters of the document. However, there were still differences remaining over the chapter on military aspects. Because Solana sounded very skeptical that agreement could be reached on these points, since giving in to Russian demands would clearly undermine the Alliance’s defense integrity, Yeltsin’s visit to Baden-Baden in Germany on 17 April would prove to be an important step in making further progress. During this meeting, Kohl sought to convince Yeltsin by explaining to him that NATO had come a long way in meeting Russian demands and that there were certain rights NATO needed to reserve. Kohl pleaded with Yeltsin not to risk losing the unique chance of reordering the European security system. In response to Kohl’s plea, Yeltsin promised Kohl to personally see to it that an agreement would be reached and finalized by the end of May 1997. Certainly, while the Clinton–Kohl/Kohl–Yeltsin/Clinton–Yeltsin dynamics were in full swing throughout the entire process and especially in the first weeks of 1997 and while positive developments were taking place on the level of the heads of state, striking a deal on the lower echelons of diplomatic practice would prove more difficult. With the Russians trying to win as many concessions as possible and pushing NATO to its limits, German diplomats—already experienced with the Russian negotiation style and tendency to strike last-minute agreements—informed Solana that he best be prepared for a last-minute agreement with the Russians. By the end of April 1997, internal government discussions were taking place in Bonn, supplemented by a number of bilateral talks and significant preparations by the NATO assistant secretary general, Gebhardt von Moltke, to see where the limits of the Alliance position were in negotiations with Russia and what new impulses might be necessary and possible in order to see the agreement through. On 2 May 1997, the political director at the AA, Wolfgang Ischinger, met with Solana to discuss the question of how best to proceed with the Russians. Both reached the conclusion that the next two weeks would be crucial in reaching a final agreement with Russia. However, at the same time, it was difficult to determine how many more rounds of talks would still be necessary and whether the next round of

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Solana–Primakov negotiations scheduled for 6 May 1997 was going to be the last before the document could be formally adopted. Besides, the main question was how could NATO retain its five nos condition and still get Russia to agree. The only way out was to repeat NATO’s unilateral three nos pledge from December 1996 (no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or policy) and retain the five nos condition by repeating and generally confirming both pledges in the document, whilst not placing them under the actual bilateral agreement. Ischinger presented this proposal to Paris, London, and Washington on 6 May 1997, whereupon he received the agreement of all three major partners. From 6 to 13 May, in intense diplomatic efforts on all levels, Solana was provided with as much room for maneuverability as possible. The boundaries of Solana’s negotiation position were clarified and the Russians were accordingly informed in time for the next round of negotiations. Thus, the final round of Solana–Primakov negotiations took place in Moscow on 13–14 May, during which the remaining questions were resolved.32 On 14 May, Solana returned to Brussels and was welcomed with standing ovations in the NAC. As the Frankfurter Allgemeine reported on 15 May 1997: Up until the final stages, Moscow tried everything to get a binding guarantee from the Alliance that it would not station any nuclear weapons, military infrastructure or troops on the territory of newly chosen member countries. NATO was certainly prepared to issue a declaration of intent, but not a binding pledge. [. . .] Solana seems confident that the way is open for the signing of the document in Paris on 27 May.33 On 27 May 1997, Russia and the Alliance signed the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations”34 at the Elysée Palace in Paris. With the signing of the Act, NATO had now won Russian acceptance of its right to enlarge.35 Yet, at the NATO meeting of foreign ministers in Sintra, Portugal, on 29 May 1997 one of the remaining hurdles that was still being discussed even at this late stage was the question as to which of the East European countries should be invited into the first round of enlargement. Although a general consensus had developed that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were going to be among the first to be invited, proposals for Romania and Slovenia were also circulating. Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Luxembourg, Portugal

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and Spain supported this five-member proposal. The United States and the United Kingdom as well as Iceland supported only the first three candidates. The German government kept a low profile on the issue, while the Italians and the French were pressing ahead with their case for the inclusion of Romania and Slovenia. On 12 June 1997, Clinton—having discussed the matter with Kohl—told the press that Washington preferred to adhere to a small group of three candidates. The American preference clearly did not go down well with the French, who decided to carry their complaints to the Germans on the occasion of the annual Franco-German Summit meeting held in Poitiers on 13 June 1997, where the French explained that NATO enlargement affected European security interests even before American security interests and that therefore France was not happy about being dictated to by Washington. The Franco-German Summit revealed that an agreement would hardly be reached before the July Madrid Summit, whereupon Kohl decided to prepare for his role as mediator without undermining Washington’s position. On 17 June 1997, Clinton met with Kohl in Bonn and asked Kohl to support the U.S. position. On 20 June 1997, at the G7/8 Summit in Denver, the American delegation insisted that it was prepared to accept only three members into NATO, whilst still asking Germany to support its stance publicly. However, although Kohl had reached an agreement with Clinton on the three Central European countries, the German government avoided taking any position openly on the subject in the run-up to the Madrid Summit. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Madrid Summit on 8–9 July 1997 opened on a note of genuine discord.36 Nine mainly southern NATO countries, led by France and Italy, pressed the case for Romania and Slovenia to be invited immediately. With the firm support of only the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland, the United States insisted on a first wave of only three. Kohl, on his part, carefully straddled both positions stating that he was ready to embrace five new members but adding almost in the same breath that he would be quite content just with the early inclusion of the three Central European countries. However, Kohl, taking advantage of the tension-laden summit atmosphere, quickly slipped into his role as mediator when he suggested that a passage be included in the Alliance communiqué making special mention of remaining concerns and alluding to “priority treatment” for those countries left out—a passage that would meet everyone’s special request (i.e., the Scandinavian preference for the Baltic states as well as the French–Italian preference for Romania and Slovenia) without,

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however, undermining the American and underlying German preference for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. These proposed passages led to a compromise decision in which the Alliance declared its preparedness to review the opening process at its next summit in April 1999. Accordingly, NATO would recognize positive developments toward membership criteria in Southeastern European countries especially Romania and Slovenia as well as the Baltic countries. However, NATO steered clear from specific commitments and so the inclusion of these passages certainly did not mean that a second round of enlargement would automatically follow the first; however, it did mean that the countries mentioned stood a good chance of becoming members if, indeed, NATO were to decide to enlarge for a second time.37 On 8 July 1997, after five years of continuous strife and three years of dealing with vehement Russian opposition, NATO finally invited Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to join the Alliance.

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Conclusion We embarked upon this research endeavor with three key purposes in mind: first, to establish the extent of Germany’s relative influence on Washington’s leadership to accept the basic rationale for NATO’s eastward enlargement, only to then gradually support the idea on largely German terms; second, we sought to assess whether and to what extent Germany’s diplomatic approach in exercising this influence coincides with William Smyser’s 2003 study of the German negotiating style. Finally and upon this basis we aspired to evaluate whether this particular case corresponds in substance to the Habermasian notion of communicative action. Hence, the structure of the following evaluation is in accordance with these three aims. Each of the three sections consists of a set of illustrative examples, taking care to ensure that the choice of these examples is evenly spread out across the relevant period (1993–97) and not least in order to be able to verify whether it is possible to account for the criterion of consistency in the three categories of influence, approach and substance. Before approaching this task, however, it may be worth calling to mind the two main reasons for choosing this particular case study given that the two reasons taken together form a comprehensive background against which the relevance of our central research concern becomes clearer. The first and so far unmentioned reason for choosing this particular case study concerns the fact that most of the prominent studies on the policymaking process leading to NATO’s 1997 enlargement decision tend to be written from a U.S. perspective. And although Germany’s role as well as that of other leading Alliance members does find mention in these studies, it is interesting to note that Germany’s particular role in the process is most often relegated to that of an “outsider’s voice.”1 Not surprisingly, therefore, the impression is conveyed that NATO’s eastward enlargement process was primarily a U.S.-driven one. As Michael Rühle emphasizes in his review of Ronald D. Asmus’s most recently published book Opening NATO’s Doors:2

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For the European reader, however, one observation remains striking: the virtual absence of the European Allies in the NATO enlargement process. Although some inflated egos in Berlin may still claim that they invented NATO enlargement, the whole process was US-driven. As Asmus shows, even the German government remained in two minds as to the benefits of no longer being on the frontline and the drawbacks of alienating Russia. Other European Allies also get short shrift. Some bickered, some wavered, and, in the end, then Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke steamrolled them into submission. Considering the benign outcome of the process, this may not necessarily have been a bad thing. Yet it remains puzzling that more than half a century after the Second World War Europeans quietly accept that the United States should re-order their continent for them—and to do so through the expansion of a military alliance.3 In my view, it is more than an overstatement to say that NATO’s eastward enlargement process was primarily a U.S.-driven one. Of course, there is no denying that NATO could and would not have decided to open its doors to ECE had Washington not endorsed such a far-reaching decision of historic proportions and strategic significance. Yet it is equally necessary to note the strategically significant role a united Germany in a wider Europe played in Washington’s evolving post–Cold War Alliance considerations. As Stephen Szabo observed in his article entitled “A Project ‘Made In Germany’ ” published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine in July 1997: Gradually Holbrooke understood the strategic logic of the German position. [. . .] Holbrooke was of the opinion that Germany would reorient itself, if NATO were no longer regarded as relevant to the security interests of America’s most important European ally. In this respect, it was necessary to take both Russian and German interests into considerations. And the conclusions were the same George Bush had reached in 1989/90 when he made his choice for the primacy of the German–American relationship in Europe. Without Germany’s support and cooperation, the United States could no longer remain a “European power” with the end of the Cold War. For different reasons, neither Great Britain, nor France nor Russia could be the very partner America wished for. Germany was that central power. The fact that this motive is still valid today, is

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evidenced by the strong U.S. support for NATO membership of those three countries that are so crucial to Germany’s strategy: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.4 Thus, there are good reasons for paying just as much if not more attention to Germany’s role and influence in the process leading to NATO’s 1997 enlargement decision as there are for paying attention to the role of the Alliance’s lead nation, the United States. This brings us to the second reason for why our central research question is worth exploring: although it may well be arguable that both countries played an equally significant role in the respective process and may have shared a degree of common interests in transforming NATO to a novel and changing international security situation, it is equally arguable that both countries displayed divergent security interests with respect to (i) the broader question of whether it were, in fact, necessary to respond to the emergence of thus far unfamiliar security problems as well as (ii) the issue of how best to respond to and effectively handle these new and more intricate security concerns. To be precise, both countries approached the question of NATO’s internal and external transformation from different strategic positions and thus also from differing security perspectives. Only one area of interest clearly revealed some degree of overlap: the necessity to anchor and assimilate a newly unified Germany into a stable European balance of power held in check by the U.S. military presence in Europe through NATO. With the exception of its leading role in the Gulf War of 1990–91, the Bush administration essentially took a hands off approach with respect to any other international security concern that would emerge in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and for the remaining period during which it held the reigns of U.S. power. Against the background of the growing international phenomenon of complex intrastate ethnic conflicts most vividly expressed by the rapidly deteriorating developments in Yugoslavia in 1990, the Bush administration stated clearly that it had “no dog” in the Balkan fight, thus avoiding the question of whether it was wise for the United States to become militarily embroiled in such intricate conflicts and therefore also whether or not NATO’s defense structures were to be trimmed for “out-of-area” peace-enforcement missions. And although developments in the Balkans fuelled East European security aspirations for NATO membership, the Bush administration steered clear from the subject of NATO enlargement because it did not want to endanger the volatile Russian reform process, which was underway: in the then prevailing U.S. foreign policy perspective, NATO enlargement

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was simply not on the cards because it signified an extension of a clearcut U.S. security commitment for a region still largely in disarray and to a certain degree still under the watchful eye of a transforming, disoriented, and unpredictable Russia. This was a responsibility the U.S. government was unwilling to shoulder, especially at a time when the American public mood was swinging against an increased U.S. engagement in international security affairs and in favor of greater attention being paid to domestic sociopolitical issues, such as healthcare, education, race equality, and unemployment—the very electoral platform upon which the Clinton administration made its venue into the White House in January 1993. The Clinton administration, in so far as it could be seen to have a post–Cold War U.S. foreign policy rationale and to the extent that it inherited a rapidly growing and complex international security agenda from the previous administration, essentially followed the same cautious hands off foreign policy approach, particularly with respect to the issue of NATO enlargement and the need to avoid any alienation of Russia. Hence, both U.S. administrations essentially sought to maintain NATO but not necessarily to substantially adapt NATO to changing circumstances. Also, both administrations tended to define the idea of NATO membership for ECE countries as one that involved significant security risks not only in terms of provoking Russian opposition but also in terms of becoming militarily involved in long drawn-out and costly regional minority conflicts as well as entailing the risk of creating new dividing lines in Central Europe between possible members and remnant nonmembers of NATO. Hence, the then prevailing U.S. definition of the idea of NATO expansion was overly negative and risk-averse. Yet, could the German government also afford to take a hands off foreign policy approach to emerging European international security issues at the time? For the German government, which had to cope with the internal and external ramifications of unification whilst straddling the West’s eastern universe, the strategic imperative during the early 1990s was to consolidate the democratizing states and market economies in ECE. However, for Bonn this extension of foreign policy priorities had to remain firmly attached to Germany’s continued embedment and commitment to NATO and the EU as well as to an eventually concomitant dual eastward enlargement of these organizations. Convinced of both, a historic responsibility as well as a practical need for enlargement, Bonn’s political leadership in comparison to that of other West European capitals quickly realized that the ECE “security

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vacuum” needed to be filled. From the beginning, therefore, there was a tendency across party political lines in Bonn to view the notion of NATO enlargement in rather positive terms, namely in terms of a far-reaching pan-European “pro-stability” move from which everyone, including Russia, had only to benefit. Hence, whereas the American foreign policy establishment appeared rather like an Eagle Adrift5 during the early 1990s, Germany’s foreign policy establishment, by contrast, sought to come up with innovative and quite ambitious pan-European institutional security designs initially intended to embrace the CSCE/OSCE, NATO, and the EU/WEU as a whole. It is against the background of this understanding of German and American security interests—the differing significance both governments attached to the question of the necessity for NATO’s internal and external transformation as well as the immediacy thereof—that we can now turn our attention to the actual assessment of the case study.

Tracing Germany’s Influence on the U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO, 1993–97 Are we right in assuming that the Kohl government had influenced U.S. policy thinking on NATO enlargement during the period 1993–97 and if so, to what extent might this have been the case? Several key episodes taken as examples from the overall process may provide answers.

The Impact of Rühe’s March 1993 Call for a NATO Summit Against the background of the U.S. avoidance behavior and thus also the Alliance’s own initial hesitancy to embark upon an open and official debate over the possibility of extending formal NATO membership to the countries of ECE throughout the period 1990–92, the delivery of Rühe’s groundbreaking speech on NATO enlargement at the annual occasion of the IISS Alistair Buchan Memorial Lecture on 26 March 1993 represented, in hindsight, a clear-cut attempt by the BMVg to finally “break the ice” and launch a formal Alliance debate on the subject of enlargement. As we have seen, Rühe’s arguments essentially revolved around Germany’s search for pan-European stability in an increasingly volatile international context. The Euro-Atlantic community, according to

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Rühe, could no longer avoid making appropriate organizational adjustments to changing international circumstances. To this end, the German defence minister pressed Alliance members to convene a summit in order to arrive at some preliminary conclusions on these issues by the end of 1993. Although the immediate American and British reaction to Rühe’s initiative could at best be described as lukewarm if not outright cool, Rühe’s specific appeal for a forthcoming NATO summit did have an indirect impact on the Clinton administration’s alliance policy, even if it was apparent only in the medium term. As evidenced by the administration’s reaction (or rather absence thereof) to the enlargement plea made by both Havel and Walesa at the occasion of the opening of the Holocaust Museum in Washington in April 1993 and less than a month after Rühe’s IISS speech, the White House, for its part, certainly gave no decisive speech and made no decisive move on the subject of NATO enlargement in the weeks and months to follow. Although the prevailing U.S. interpretation of this particular meeting has us believe that both Clinton and Lake were impressed by the arguments put forward by Havel and Walesa and that they were positively inclined toward the idea of NATO enlargement from then onward, the fact of the matter is that no deliberate, immediate attempt was made by the Clinton administration to place the issue on the official Alliance agenda. Given that the Visegrad leadership’s argument for NATO enlargement was no different to that of the German BMVg argument and given also that Rühe’s outspoken position had clearly encouraged Havel and Walesa to present their case to Clinton, it is fair to say that at this stage the extent of Germany’s influence on the U.S. position to seriously consider the issue of NATO enlargement was dismal. The Clinton administration’s defiant stance on enlargement continued until the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Athens, where on 10 June 1993 the then U.S. secretary of state, Warren Christopher, made clear that the issue of an enlarged NATO membership was “not now on the agenda.” According to Christopher, the security concerns of the postcommunist hemisphere were best provided for by a strengthened NACC mechanism given that NATO needed to sustain its military strength in light of growing international challenges. At the same time, however, Christopher also stated that President Clinton wished for a NATO summit to be held by the end of the year to discuss NATO’s future, thus clearly echoing Rühe’s March 1993 appeal for a NATO summit. This evidently reveals some measure of German influence on U.S. political thinking, at least in so far as the Clinton administration

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now appeared to have accepted that an earnest Alliance debate over NATO’s future was no longer avoidable. In fact, it had been Manfred Wörner, who with the help of the then newly appointed U.S. ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, and also by way of his own unilateral efforts, succeeded in persuading Warren Christopher of the need to make such an announcement. What makes the power of Germany’s influence all the more significant is the fact that the announcement was not well received within the Clinton administration and particularly by Anthony Lake, who held the belief that the administration was not yet ready to discuss the issue. This is further underlined by the fact that even while in Athens, Christopher was forced to seek a last minute approval from the White House, permitting him to make the announcement. Hence, although it was plain to see that the Clinton administration was not yet prepared to discuss the issue of NATO enlargement in the summer of 1993, Wörner succeeded in convincing Christopher that the purpose of scheduling a summit was to get the administration ready. In this respect, it is also worth noting that Manfred Wörner had himself been encouraged by Rühe’s March 1993 initiative and was in close contact with the German defence minister largely sharing Rühe’s enlargement ideas. Hence, by the summer of 1993, the German argument had successfully made its way into the U.S. policymaking machinery, propelling the Clinton administration to at least begin to seriously consider the subject of NATO enlargement.

Words Do Matter—the Origins and Impact of “Not ‘Whether’ but ‘When’ and ‘How’ ” When, in the run-up to the October 1993 NATO defence ministers’ meeting in Travemünde, Rühe decided to send the Weisser-led delegation of defence ministry officials to Washington, he did so in order to determine where exactly the Clinton administration stood on the issue of NATO enlargement. At the same time, Rühe also recognized that if opinions within the U.S. administration were still being formed, this could present the BMVg delegation with the opportunity to influence U.S. deliberations in some way. And, indeed, at its meeting with the NSC and White House staff, the BMVg delegation was asked whether it had any ideas on smart formulations, which could be used by the White House in preparation for the president’s forthcoming trip to Prague in January 1994. Although the NSC staff suggested that it would prefer the president to issue a statement in Prague that went

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along the lines of NATO enlargement being a question of “whether, when and how,” the Weisser delegation cautioned that such a statement would lead to widespread disappointment in the region of ECE and that it would be much wiser for the president to state that NATO enlargement was “no longer a question of ‘whether,’ but ‘when’ and ‘how.’ ” The NSC staff thought well of this formula. It was from this time onward that the German formula would circulate in the Clinton administration, though everyone involved in the U.S. policymaking machinery would interpret it differently, thereby revealing that it could hardly have been an American invention. Besides, not one of my American informants (except for James Goldgeier) knew or gave much importance to the question of where this particular phraseology might have come from and who might have introduced it into the debate for the first time. Yet, in terms of determining Germany’s influence on U.S. Alliance policy at the time, this episode clearly depicts how a policy formula—first coined and used by Volker Rühe in a speech to the North Atlantic Assembly Spring Session on NATO enlargement in Berlin in May 1993—was infused into the White House by the BMVg delegation upon the NSC staff’s explicit request for advice—a formula that, as Weisser noted, “was by no means American approved policy.”6 However, the longer-term impact of this influence on Washington’s enlargement policy was not manifested until much later in the process during Clinton’s visit to Prague. When Clinton arrived in Prague for the news conference with the Visegrad leadership, he sought to reassure ECE leaders that the offer of the PFP was not to be understood as a permanent holding room and so the question was “no longer ‘whether’ NATO would absorb new members but ‘when’ and ‘how’ ” it would do so. This presidential statement was widely considered to be the most far-reaching on NATO enlargement since the debate began in 1993. By resorting to this formula, President Clinton effectively committed his country to the process of NATO enlargement. Against the background of mounting criticism from within Washington’s foreign policy community that the administration lacked a strong European policy, it had been Anthony Lake who inserted the formula into the president’s statement, given his concern that Clinton’s summit announcements in Brussels had not gone far enough in signaling the administration’s seriousness in moving forward on enlargement. In so doing, Lake had evidently drawn on the phraseology agreed to by the NSC staff–BMVg delegation meeting at the White House in October 1993, although he might well have been unaware of the

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precise origins of the formula. Also, the fact that the formula had been circulating in the administration throughout the autumn–winter period of 1993–94 but was used in ways that meant different things to different people within the U.S. bureaucracy is evidenced by General Shalikashvili’s later comment that when he had used the formula in the run-up to Brussels he did so to denote where the U.S. debate on enlargement stood, not as a policy statement. Yet, Anthony Lake used the phrase in precisely the opposite sense and in the same sense in which the Germans had always used it, namely as a policy statement on NATO enlargement. Hence, until the implications of the presidential Prague statement became increasingly apparent in that it forced the administration to assume a clearer stance on enlargement in the months to follow, large parts of the U.S. bureaucracy had, for the most part, underestimated the formula as a mere “throwaway line” only to indefinitely postpone the process. This episode undoubtedly reveals a high degree of ultimate German influence on Washington’s enlargement policy—influence exerted by means of a linguistic device infused into the U.S. policymaking machinery on the White House’s own request—a phrase that thereafter most U.S. officials tended to employ without serious consideration to its effects on the course of the continuing enlargement debate, thus illustrating that carefully chosen words in the business of international affairs do matter. In fact, this observation touches directly upon the concept of frames. As Snow and Benford have argued in their 1992 account of variations in social mobilization, they “do not view social movements merely as carriers of extant ideas and meanings that stand in isomorphic relationship to structural arrangements or unanticipated events.”7 Rather, they see them “as actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers.”8 It is this productive work—the transformation of old meanings and the generation of new meanings—which the authors refer to as “the politics of signification.”9 This signifying work is referred to as the act of “framing.” The products of this framing activity are, in turn, referred to as collective action frames. The concept of a frame is essentially defined as “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment.”10 Frames help individuals to “ ‘locate, perceive, identify, and label’ events.”11 Yet, aside from these broader definitional aspects, the authors are also quick to emphasize that the novelty of a collective action frame is determined not so much by its innovative

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ideational elements as by the manner in which activists articulate or tie them together.12 This argument takes us away from the broader discussions on framing to the more specific linguistic aspects of framing. As George Lakoff, professor of linguistics and cognitive science at the University of California Berkeley explains, the framing of a policy issue through the skilful use of language has the effect of not only defining the terms of an entire policy debate but may also determine its course, unless the target audience(s) is/are willing and effectively able to reframe the original message.13 In the words of Lakoff: “Once the issue is framed, if you accept the framing, if you accept the language, it’s all over.”14 In focusing on the current U.S. presidential election campaign as an example by which to illustrate his point, Lakoff insists that the Democrats should never have unquestioningly employed the Republican-coined formula “war on terror” for two main reasons: first, it is important to understand that the word terror denotes a general state that is internal to a person. The word terror has nothing to do with the actual target of attention, that is, the terrorist as an individual. The word terror activates fear and fear, in turn, activates the notion of a strict father model—the very image the radical conservative wing of the Republican party wishes to thrive on. According to Lakoff, therefore, the slogan “war on terror” is not intended to calm the fears of U.S. citizens but rather to make them afraid. Second, there is the problematical use of the term “war”. War in the classical sense is a nationstate problem. Terrorists—the active hundreds or thousands—are a relatively small number of individuals and considering the size of the United States as a country they do not as such constitute a nation-state problem. It is logical to fight a war against another country but not against widely dispersed terrorists. Yet, in the “war on terror,” the United States is doing just that, namely launching assaults on countries. In other words, Lakoff sees the Bush administration as acting on the wrong level. Also, the use of this particular frame lends the “war president” extraordinary powers in the “war on terror”; since the prospects of ever reaching a peace treaty with terrorists are dismal, it is a prescription for keeping conservatives in power indefinitely. Hence, as Lakoff argues, just three simple words—“war on terror”—have enacted vast not to say detrimental international political changes. Lakoff’s keen interest in how politicians employ language to wield policy influence brings us back to our original point of departure, namely how the NSC and White House staff unquestioningly accepted the German-coined formula that NATO enlargement was “no longer a question of ‘whether’, but ‘when’ and ‘how,’ “ thereby allowing the

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Kohl government to frame the entire NATO enlargement process from 1994 onward. Also, that German policymakers appeared to be more aware of or sensitive to the effects of successful linguistic framing compared to their American counterparts in the enlargement debate is further evidenced by three examples: first, whereas U.S. officials and academics have tended to refer to the process of NATO enlargement as one of expansion, German officials and scholars have consistently preferred to use the term opening instead. Needless to say, the notion of NATO’s eastward opening carries less aggressive connotations than the notion of NATO’s eastward expansion. Second, rather than launching official negotiations with the Russians in 1997, German government officials emphasized that they wished to initiate a dialogue with Moscow on the relevant modalities concerning NATO’s eastward enlargement. Similarly, rather than abiding by the “16 ⫹1” formula adopted by NATO in September 1995 as part of a political framework agreed on with Russia, the German Foreign Ministry preferred to employ the more inclusive “17” formula so as not to encourage Moscow’s growing concern of being isolated or even encircled by NATO’s plans. All of this goes to show that the Kohl government paid far greater attention to framing the policy process in language terms appropriate to its pan-European pro-stability ideal than its American counterparts were inclined to do.

The BMVg–RAND Consultancy Process: Convincing Lugar and Winning Holbrooke’s Support Weisser’s initiation of the BMVg–RAND consultancy process in early 1993 as well as the fact that the BMVg financed RAND’s research work on NATO enlargement clearly reveals this effort to have been a deliberate attempt by the German MoD to influence the U.S. policymaking machinery on NATO enlargement. The instrumentalization of a leading U.S. think-tank whose intellectual work on the future of Europe (“The Twin Arcs of Crisis”) tallied with the BMVg’s enlargement concept, also underscores that both Rühe and Weisser sought essentially to initiate an intellectual U.S. debate on NATO enlargement. In other words, rather than attempting to influence the Clinton administration’s NATO policy directly, the BMVg preferred to resort to intellectual means from within the Washington policy community itself in order to encourage the U.S. government to begin with an internal process of

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deliberation on an issue it thus far clearly sought to avoid. This is not to say, however, that Rühe and Weisser refrained from more direct (bilateral) attempts to make use of their ties with Washington’s strategic community. As Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel, former deputy chief of mission to Bonn, recalls (particularly with respect to Weisser’s role): He [Weisser] was always around [in D.C.].15 Nothing was done without some kind of conversation with Ulrich. [. . .] He is intellectual, always supplying ideas, forceful and determined. I like him.16 As for the effectiveness of the BMVg approach, it seems that Senator Richard Lugar’s exposure to RAND’s arguments as well as his close connections to both Rühe and Weisser, certainly encouraged him to deliver his subsequent June 1993 “NATO: Out-of-Area or Out-ofBusiness” speech, heralded as the first decisive speech on NATO enlargement in D.C.. Lugar’s June 1993 speech essentially reflected the core argument presented in the RAND troika’s first draft paper “The Twin Arcs of Crisis,” which had been circulating in Washington’s predominantly skeptical policy community in various forms throughout the spring–summer of 1993 and which largely coincided with the BMVg’s “change of geographical scope equals change of functional mission” argument for NATO enlargement. In the autumn of 1993, “The Twin Arcs of Crisis” was published in the influential journal Foreign Affairs under the title “Building a New NATO.” By this time the BMVg–RAND consultancy process was in full swing. Hardly surprising, therefore, that “Building a New NATO”—the RAND troika’s first official publication on NATO enlargement as financed by the BMVg—reflected almost in full the arguments encapsulated by the BMVg’s Gesamtkonzept and Rühe’s March 1993 IISS speech. Indeed, the RAND–BMVg rationale for NATO enlargement also seemed to have had a measurable impact on Richard Holbrooke’s stance toward the idea—something quite remarkable considering that Holbrooke initially and upon his appointment as U.S. ambassador to Bonn in September 1993 favored the idea of a first round of EU enlargement instead. Yet the episode of Ronald Asmus having been “summoned” to meet Holbrooke in the spring of 1994 to be warned that the U.S. government was not at all pleased about the fact that RAND was producing intellectual ammunition17 for the German MoD on a policy the United States did not support (or at least had not made up its mind on) and that it now regretted having allowed RAND

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to work for the German MoD because RAND’s work was allowing Rühe “to get his hands around articulating a problem,”18 clearly confirms the growing effectiveness of the BMVg’s intended effort to use RAND’s intellectual work as a means by which to stir and initiate an earnest U.S. debate on enlargement. Had RAND’s work not shown some effect on the nature of deliberations within the U.S. government and had the U.S. government truly always been favorably inclined to support NATO’s eastward extension, as some U.S. officials like to claim nowadays,19 there would hardly have been any need for Holbrooke to issue a clear-cut warning to Asmus that in working for the “Crown Prince of the CDU,”20 Asmus risked losing his career. Interestingly, however, by August 1994, Holbrooke himself had been positively convinced by the German case for NATO enlargement. Indeed, it may well have been Holbrooke’s lack of detailed knowledge in German and European security affairs that left him open to persuasion. In any case, it was Holbrooke who advised Talbott to hire Asmus as a policy adviser on NATO enlargement in December 1993. Upon his return to Washington in the autumn of 1994, Holbrooke himself asked Asmus whether he could use the work the RAND troika was producing “for the Germans” in the U.S. government. Obviously the RAND troika agreed to furnish Holbrooke with the intellectual ammunition he required. Hence, not only did the German side succeed in using RAND for its own purpose to influence the U.S. debate, but it also succeeded in convincing Holbrooke of the German enlargement rationale to the point that Holbrooke himself ended up resorting to RAND’s intellectual work to promote the subject within the U.S. policymaking machinery. This clearly indicates a “double success” for Germany’s influence on Washington’s NATO policy, although nobody would go so far as to suggest that Holbrooke himself ended up working for “the Crown Prince of the CDU.”

Giving in to Kohl’s Preference for a Wait-and-See Approach There is no denying that the German government was pleased to see that Holbrooke had taken charge of the process of NATO enlargement within the U.S. government by the autumn of 1994; nevertheless, there was some concern in Bonn and particularly in the Bundeskanzleramt that Holbrooke might push the process ahead too eagerly and without due regard to increasingly unfavorable political developments in Moscow. Indeed, by the summer of 1994, the German government’s essentially

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balanced approach to the process of NATO enlargement was suddenly overtaken by Washington as the Clinton administration began to adjust its policy to growing criticism from within its foreign policy community. To be clear, Bonn’s approach to NATO enlargement had thus far been balanced in so far as the Kohl government tended to pay close and constant attention to political developments in Moscow whilst never losing sight of its central objective of NATO enlargement. As the political situation in Russia became increasingly difficult for Yeltsin to handle in the course of 1994 and as it became increasingly clear that the EU would require more time than NATO to prepare for an enlarged membership, there was thus an even greater need for such a balanced approach. Ironically, however, and just when a politically more sensitive approach vis-à-vis Moscow would have been needed, Clinton and Vice President Al Gore decided instead to make far-reaching statements on NATO enlargement in the summer and autumn of 1994. Interestingly, it had been Holbrooke who, upon his return to Washington, had provided much of the language for Al Gore’s forwardleaning Berlin September 1994 speech, wherein the vice president reinforced Clinton’s July 1994 remarks to Warsaw that the time had arrived for NATO to go beyond the PFP and the NACC and that discussions regarding ECE membership demands in NATO would have to begin by the autumn of 1994. Of course, critics within the U.S. government but also the AA wondered about the possible reasons for this sudden shift in U.S.–policy, speculating that President Clinton supported NATO enlargement purely for the political purpose of securing the U.S.–Polish vote in the run-up to the November 1994 congressional elections. Another possible reason for the sudden shift might have been the administration’s thus far dismal foreign policy performance and so it was paramount that the president find an issue that would allow him to demonstrate leadership, without taking any serious security risks in U.S. foreign policy. Furthermore, both Clinton and Talbott were concerned that the United States would lose its strong status in European affairs and that NATO would atrophy if developments in the EU/WEU context would continue as speedily as they were at that time. Finally, Talbott himself was coming under growing pressure from leading Republican congressmen, who claimed that he was willing to sell out NATO’s credibility to appease Russia—hence the origins of the U.S. “no dictate by Russia” rhetoric. Therefore, by the summer of 1994 there was a series of strong U.S. internal motives rather than German-inspired motives for the United States to support the idea of NATO enlargement.

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However, by November 1994 and in light of the Russian hardening of position on enlargement, the German government reached an internal interministerial agreement that no dates or timeframes for ECE membership to NATO were to be publicly specified at this stage of the process. Helmut Kohl also stated that he had informed the U.S. government of his disquietude with Washington’s largely insensitive fast-track rhetoric and that he preferred the United States to take a more gradual approach. Although the Clinton administration tried to push the Germans into accepting its preference for a fast-track approach in the run-up to the Alliance’s December 1994 ministerial meetings, its efforts failed. In the end, Washington was left with no choice but to concede to the German preference of playing for time until the political situation in Moscow had become more stable. It was Washington’s resignation to Bonn’s policy stance that then resulted in a U.S. proposal to the Alliance to embark upon an extensive study on the details of enlargement for the year 1995. Hence, this episode clearly shows that the United States—as the most powerful member of the Alliance—resigned itself to Germany’s policy preference on NATO enlargement in the winter of 1994, although the Clinton administration’s own instrumental interests, such as securing the Polish vote, would have made it do otherwise.

The Ischinger Proposal: Winning Moscow’s Final Approval By March 1997, the central question for NATO was whether, and if so to what extent, it should respond to Russian demands that the Alliance’s military infrastructure not be deployed close to Russia’s borders. Clearly, a reasonable balance had to be struck between the legitimate security interests of ECE membership aspirants and the need for a non-confrontational approach toward Russia. Yet in adjusting to its new security environment as outlined in its new strategic concept and as exemplified by its mission in Bosnia, NATO and particularly Washington insisted that the Alliance could not become hostage to the demands of third parties if it were to maintain its credibility. Nor could NATO do anything that would undermine the standards of cooperation already achieved under the PFP. To solve this conundrum, both the Germans and Americans agreed in March 1997 that they would push ahead with both the appropriate formulation of a NATO–Russia agreement as well as the process of enlargement. More specifically, both sides agreed that NATO’s above mentioned concerns could only

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be kept in balance if it abided by its five nos pledge, according to which there was to be: no delay in enlargement; no Russian right of veto; no exclusion of candidates; no second-class membership; and no interference in internal Alliance matters or decisionmaking procedures. By May 1997, the central question for NATO was how to retain its five nos pledge and still get Russia to agree to enlargement. The only way out—according to Wolfgang Ischinger—was to repeat NATO’s December 1996 three nos pledge (which stated that there was no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members) and to retain the five nos pledge by repeating and generally confirming both pledges in the document, whilst not placing them under the actual bilateral agreement. Ischinger’s proposal received unanimous agreement from Washington, Paris, and London. It paved the way for Solana’s final round of talks with Primakov in Moscow in May 1997 where the settlement finally received a Russian stamp of approval. It had been on the basis of a German government proposal, therefore, that NATO’s agreement with Russia could finally be sealed, indicating a high degree of German diplomatic influence on the course of the enlargement process as a whole.

Keeping the Best for Last: Kohl’s Mediating Role at Madrid However, in the run-up to the July 1997 NATO summit in Madrid, the question of which of the ECE countries should be included in the first round of enlargement still remained unresolved and became a contentious issue between on the one hand the United States, the United Kingdom, and Iceland, who supported the three-member entry proposal for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and on the other France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Canada, and Belgium, who supported the five-member proposal to include Romania and Slovenia. Although Clinton had urged Kohl to openly support the U.S. preference for the three-member proposal that the Germans and Americans had in fact agreed on, Kohl kept his silence and made sure not to upset the French before the NATO summit, given the Elysée’s preference for a five-member invitation. As expected, the Madrid Summit did open on a note of genuine discord among Alliance members. Kohl carefully straddled the two divergent three-member versus five-member proposals when he stated that he was quite ready to see NATO embrace five new members, but that he would be equally content with an early inclusion of just the three

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Central European candidates. Taking advantage of the tension-laden situation, Kohl slipped into the role of the mediator when he suggested that it was best for the Alliance communiqué to make special mention of remaining Alliance concerns whilst alluding to priority treatment for those countries excluded from the first round of invitations. This suggestion met everyone’s special interests—the Scandinavian preference for the Baltic Republics, the French–Italian preference for Romania and Slovenia—without undermining Germany’s own and U.S. supported preference for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Hence, Kohl’s silent defiance of Clinton’s request to make a public announcement of the U.S. and German preference for the three-member proposal ahead of the Madrid Summit clearly underscores the dominance of Germany’s shaping role in the entire enlargement process. In fact, it also underscores Kohl’s very own diplomatic skills. As Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel remembers: Kohl never took positions. I have worked with Mr. Kohl for sixteen years. He is a very smart politician. And his ability to make a decision at the right point was one of the reasons he made good decisions along the way.21 While the above examples show that Germany played a significant if not architectural role throughout the entire process of NATO enlargement and exerted a high degree of shaping influence on Washington’s mindset over the rationale and modalities of enlargement, we have yet to determine whether and to what extent the exercise of this influence coincides with Smyser’s assessment of how German policymakers typically approach a negotiation process.

Assessing Germany’s Diplomatic Approach to NATO Enlargement: Validating Smyser? Turning our attention to the actual assessment of Germany’s negotiating approach, we have first of all to identify in what way the key negotiation phases of the actual process correspond to the abstract negotiation phases we introduced in our navigational aid. Broadly speaking, the entire process entails a diagnostic, formula, and detail phase. The diagnostic phase broadly embraces Smyser’s classification of the preparation, the opening as well as part of the middle phase of a negotiation situation. This, in turn, corresponds to the actual process of

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negotiation in so far as it relates to the question of the actual need for NATO’s eastward enlargement as discussed during key events in the period 1993–94. The formula phase includes and overlaps with certain aspects of Smyser’s middle phase and key events in the final months of 1994 pertaining to the question of appropriate timing and the wider political implications of a hasty enlargement decision. In effect, this question is then carried into the year 1995. The relevant question here of appropriate timing of an Alliance decision on enlargement in the actual process under analysis is, in turn, connected to the Russia factor in two of three significant respects: (i) Russia’s unstable domestic political situation and Germany’s predominant concern that President Yeltsin be reelected in 1996 coupled with (ii) the issue of Russia’s appropriate institutional status in the West European and international institutional context. The detail phase corresponds to Smyser’s classification of the revisionist as well as the implementation phase and fundamentally involves the third dimension of the Russia factor namely (iii) the question of how best to attach Russia via some sort of agreement to an Alliance decision on NATO enlargement without, however, sacrificing NATO’s credibility in the process. Hence, the Russia factor in all three dimensions constitutes a constant theme running throughout the process. Following this revisionist phase in late 1996 and early 1997, the final phase concerning the implementation of the decision crucially and until the final moments of the July 1997 Madrid Summit focuses on the question of who among the aspiring East European countries would be among the first chosen for NATO’s membership candidacy. In the following assessment, we shall try to identify at least one example for each of the central criteria characterizing Germany’s negotiating behavior in the above-mentioned phases.

The BMVg’s Gesamtkonzept: Preparing the Ground for an Alliance Debate on NATO Enlargement As Smyser explains, German policymakers tend to prepare their negotiation position very carefully, paying much attention to the views and concerns of other governments in the process in order to position themselves, as far as possible, within a consensus. Doing so, serves the German interest of devising a policy that will draw support. Indeed, Smyser’s observation clearly corresponds to the BMVg’s efforts of late 1992 and early 1993 to prepare a Gesamtkonzept that took into consideration all possible interests and concerns of Germany’s key negotiating

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partners in both the East and West. It was upon the basis of this Gesamtkonzept that the BMVg then initiated and steered the Alliance debate on NATO enlargement into the German preferred direction.

The Opening Phase: Rühe’s March 1993 Alistair Buchan Memorial Speech As Smyser informs us, German negotiators consider their opening presentation to be the most important part of the negotiating process. This observation corresponds to our case study, in so far as Rühe did not present the BMVg’s Gesamtkonzept at any randomly chosen occasion, but instead waited for the right opportunity to deliver his “Grand Strategy” speech on NATO enlargement. Hence, in order to launch an official enlargement debate among NATO members, it had certainly been Rühe’s intention to present his speech at the annual occasion of the IISS Alistair Buchan Memorial Lecture on 26 March 1993, not least because it had been at this forum that the former German chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, had launched his idea for NATO’s far-reaching double-track decision of 1977. In paying close attention to the appropriate timing and the location’s symbolic significance, therefore, Rühe and his staff considered London’s IISS forum to be an ideal place for a German defence minister to launch yet another major Alliance project. Also, it is said that the first item German policymakers will usually present is the philosophical basis for their position. For this reason, the presentation can be quite elaborate, not least because German policymakers would like their partners not only to accept the German argument but more importantly to understand the rationale behind it. This inclination is said to have its roots in Germany’s culture and intellectual history, coupled with the fact that most internationally relevant negotiations with Germany over the past 50 years have tended to be about Germany itself. Indeed, Rühe’s presentation begins with and essentially revolves around the subject of Germany’s post–Cold War search for pan-European stability. To the extent that Rühe’s speech made no secret of Germany’s particular security concerns and its rationale for advocating the transformation of NATO, it certainly also tallies with Smyser’s observation that German policymakers wish the philosophical reasoning behind the German position to be thoroughly understood. In spelling out that “the economic revitalisation of parts of Central and Eastern Europe could no longer be expected to remain a predominantly German exercise”22 and that Germany could not be expected to function “as a

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cordon sanitaire for the rest of Europe,”23 Rühe’s speech certainly also reflects a high degree of openness. However, as Smyser also mentions, this German openness can at times be perceived by others as overwhelming or even intimidating. Judging by the British reaction to Rühe’s speech and London’s subsequent attempts to delay any serious discussion on the subject of NATO enlargement, the feeling of intimidation among some Alliance members may certainly have been one of the unforeseen consequences of the BMVg’s surprise move. In the Process of Negotiation: Demonstrating Leadership, Flexibility, and Circumspection As Smyser observes, German negotiators may certainly be ready to negotiate secondary issues more flexibly, but they will not for this reason abandon their principal goal. Indeed, our case study shows that when— during its October 1993 fact-finding mission in Washington—the Weisser delegation realized that the Pentagon had every intention to present its PFP program to the Alliance as a long-term substitute for enlargement, it did not react negatively to the concept of PFP in itself, praising it instead as an “interesting and innovative preparatory mechanism for ECE membership to NATO,”24 but it was certainly less willing to support the program as a substitute for NATO enlargement. Smyser also informs us that in the course of the negotiating process, German policymakers will take into consideration factors concerning the international political situation, for they will want their talks to fit into whatever else is happening in the world. In this vein, they will try hard to ensure that talks between other negotiation partners proceed successfully, since such successes are regarded as beneficial to Germany’s multilateral interests. Developments in the latter half of 1994 reveal that it was the increasingly unstable political situation in Russia—the rise of ultranationalist forces threatening to unseat President Yeltsin and Bonn’s predominant concern that Yeltsin be reelected in 1996—which prompted the German government to urge Washington to take a more gradual and circumspect approach toward the process of enlargement, although by this time the Clinton administration would have preferred to press ahead with the process. This episode clearly underscores Smyser’s finding that German policymakers tend to remain circumspect to international political developments in order to ensure that the central objective under negotiation does not cause damage to Germany’s other multilateral interests. Germany’s central objective, in this case, was

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to promote the process of NATO’s opening up towards the East in agreement with Russia and not against it. Smyser’s further observation that German policymakers will strive hard to ensure that talks between their negotiating partners proceed without hindrance given that the success of such effort is seen to generally strengthen Germany’s multilateral foreign policy orientation, seems most clearly exemplified by the Kohl government’s persistent effort to “keep all sides happy” throughout the period 1995–96, not least in order to safeguard its own interests in ensuring that (i) NATO remained united throughout the primarily German recommended “wait-and-see” period of 1995 whilst at the same time working toward greater conceptual clarity in NATO’s approach to enlargement and that (ii) Russian fears of isolation were alleviated and balanced against (iii) growing ECE concerns of being neglected. To this end, Volker Rühe, as a result of his two-week trip to the United States and the “Group of Four” meeting in Florida during the early spring of 1995, succeeded in synchronizing Bonn’s slow-motion preference to enlargement with American as well as French and British conceptions of enlargement by the beginning of March 1995. Besides, in a generally acknowledged and relentless personal effort at mediation between Clinton and Yeltsin, Helmut Kohl, for his part, not only resorted to the use of summit diplomacy to “massage the Russian ego” but also encouraged Clinton to engage in similar efforts, especially after the subject of NATO enlargement had provoked friction between Clinton and Yeltsin at the CSCE Budapest Summit in December 1994. By the early summer of 1995, Klaus Kinkel, on his behalf, even went beyond the offer of a strategic partnership agreement with Russia, offering the Kremlin a number of face-saving spoils in the form of cooperation agreements with the Council of Europe, the World Bank, the IMF, and the G7, while Rühe—in a, perhaps, unintentionally complementary stand to Kinkel—admittedly took a much firmer stance toward Moscow so as not “to whet the Russian negotiating appetite.” As for the need to send encouraging signals to the East Europeans that their concerns were not being neglected, Chancellor Kohl in his farranging speech to the Polish Sejm in July 1995 explained that NATO had offered Russia a strategic partnership and that he was convinced that this arrangement would create the proper conditions for Poland’s inclusion into NATO. Moreover, the incessant effort by leading German diplomats to mediate between Washington and Moscow throughout 1996 and early 1997, given the U.S. Republican opposition to see NATO yield to a “Russian dictate” as well as Strobe Talbott’s own

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request for Wolfgang Ischinger to “feel the Russian pulse” regarding Bonn’s October 1996 proposal for a NATO–Russia partnership agreement, not only bears testimony to Smyser’s view of German diplomats having a tendency to slip into the role of the “honest broker” in international negotiations, but it also underscores the confidence that U.S. policymakers themselves seem to have in Germany’s diplomatic skills. The pace of a negotiation process with German diplomats, according to Smyser, usually depends on how the German Gesamtkonzept is advancing. As the negotiation proceeds, Germany’s negotiating partners will themselves be forced to think their positions through if they are to engage in effective discussions with the German side. This is exactly what happened by the end of 1994 when the Clinton administration realized that it could not impose its enlargement preferences on the German government and decided to launch an Alliance study on NATO enlargement instead. Yet the fact that the U.S. administration placed the relevant questions in an illogical sequencing (for which it was heavily criticized by German NATO officials) only serves to confirm that the time had arrived for the Clinton administration to actually begin to “get to grips” with the German Gesamtkonzept on NATO enlargement, while other Alliance members and particularly Germany sought to maintain the momentum toward NATO enlargement in the hope for an improvement of the political climate in Russia. Finally, and as far as Germany’s negotiating style during the process is concerned, Germans are said to continue to advance their views clearly and directly on the issues before them. This observation tallies with our case study in so far as Helmut Kohl, for example, made it plain to the U.S. government in the winter of 1994 that he was not at all impressed with Washington’s fast-track rhetoric on enlargement and that the incorporation of Russia into the European process would have to proceed upon the basis of a common German-American understanding and approach.

Establishing Cooperative Relations with Russia: The Revisionist Phase During the revisionist phase of a negotiation process, German policymakers will usually not seek an agreement for its own sake but will rather use the negotiation to establish or deepen a relationship. This inclination confirms Germany’s commitment to multilateralism and is exemplified by the fact that in February 1996, Helmut Kohl urged both Clinton and

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Yeltsin not to (mis)use the subject of NATO enlargement as an election campaign issue. In fact, throughout the first half of 1996, Helmut Kohl relentlessly cautioned Western leaders to remain sensitive to Moscow’s concerns at least until after the June 1996 parliamentary elections given that the Kremlin’s hard-line statements against enlargement were largely dismissed by the West as designed for Russian public appeasement. More significantly, Kohl also made clear that he did not want to do anything that would endanger the good relations Germany had come to develop with Russia. Indeed, in the autumn of 1996, after having succeeded in persuading his Alliance counterparts to agree to a postponement of official Alliance negotiations with Moscow until after Yeltsin’s heart bypass surgery in November 1996, both Kohl and Clinton—as if in mutual agreement—even made sure to send top American and German cardiologists to Moscow to oversee Yeltsin’s heart surgery. Also, Smyser’s observation that German negotiators will measure each concession against the totality of their Gesamtkonzept and its basic objective is reflected in Ischinger’s May 1997 proposal to NATO that in order to win Moscow’s approval for enlargement, the NATO–Russia agreement needed to generally confirm both NATO’s unilateral three nos pledge and the five nos condition in the document, whilst not placing them under the actual bilateral accord. This proposal, which received unanimous agreement from Washington, Paris, and London not only paved the way for Moscow’s final acceptance of NATO’s right to enlarge into ECE, but at the same time met all of the essentials of the German government’s initial proposal for a NATO–Russia partnership arrangement as presented to and unanimously agreed upon by leading Alliance members at Ditchley Park, London, in October 1996. Managing Madrid: Kohl’s Last-Minute Proposal for a Compromise Solution As Smyser explains, German negotiators are prepared to accept practical compromises in order to obtain an agreement. However, it is usually only long after an agreement should have been reached that German negotiators will yield to the necessity of reaching practical compromises. Also, German negotiators will want the compromise decision to conform at least to the overall direction of their Gesamtkonzept, if not to all the details of the concept. So, how does this observation relate to our case study? It seems that Kohl’s cautious approach to the Madrid Summit of July 1997—his careful straddling of the two divergent

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three-member versus five-member proposals by Alliance partners—and Kohl’s carefully worded statement that he was quite ready to see NATO embrace five new members but that he would be equally content just with an early inclusion of the three Central European candidates coupled with his suggestion that it was best for the Alliance communiqué to make special mention of remaining Alliance concerns whilst alluding to priority treatment for those excluded from the first round of invitations, clearly shows these proposed passages to have led to a compromise decision on NATO enlargement at Madrid; however, it should be noted that NATO steered clear from making any specific commitment to a second round of enlargement. Hence, Kohl’s handling of the Madrid Summit reveals that in the implementation phase to a negotiation process, Germans will show that they are prepared to accept practical compromises to obtain an agreement. At the same time, it is worth noting that in terms of the overall German objective for enlargement, the results achieved in Madrid reflected almost point for point the arguments presented in the German 1993 BMVg Gesamtkonzept. As can be discerned from the above assessment, the distinct features that Smyser identifies as characteristic for Germany’s negotiating style during the respective negotiation phases are, indeed, consistent with the actual diplomatic approach taken by Germany’s policymakers during the relevant stages leading to NATO’s enlargement decision of 1997. Despite this, however, we have yet to determine the degree to which Germany’s negotiating approach also corresponds in substance to the Habermasian theory of communicative action and its deliberative act of reasoning.

Germany’s Approach to NATO Enlargement: In the Practice of Reasoning? The point of departure for the following evaluation is the peculiarities associated with the negotiation situation in which the Alliance found itself in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War. As explained in the final section of chapter 5, this particular case fulfils all of the essential Habermasian preconditions conducive to the process of reasoning: (1) The prevalence of widespread uncertainty over how best to respond to international political changes as a result of the unexpected end

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of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union only a year after German unification. (2) A general absence of common knowledge with no ready-made answers available to help Alliance members work out how best to embark upon the uncharted waters of a new era of international relations. (3) The need for Alliance members to reconsider NATO’s future role and viability in the absence of a single identifiable threat and thus to reconstruct their common lifeworld for changing times. (4) The precondition of equality given that German policymakers are known not to spare their American counterparts in every negotiation situation, as most clearly exemplified by the 1989 FOTL controversy and the fact that variations in power positions within the Alliance are invalidated once they reach the table of the NAC, where members have an equal right to express their views and where common consent is paramount to action being unanimously agreed upon. As concerns the evaluation of the substance of the negotiation approach taken by the Kohl government in this case and the extent to which it corresponds to the Habermasian notion of reasoning, briefly summarized here are the six central criteria by which processes of reasoning might best be identified in any negotiation situation: (1) By the prevalence of equality and thus by the absence of rank and file issues in a discourse. (2) By the presence of empathy and thus the ability of participants to genuinely take into consideration the concerns of the parties to the negotiations. (3) By the prevalence of argumentative consistency, which is linked to the issue of credibility and thus opposed to the notion of rhetorical action. (4) By the prevalence of the power of the better argument, whereby even the arguments of materially weaker parties to a discourse should be seen to prevail. (5) By the observation that actors change their minds in the course of a communicative discourse, even though their instrumental interests would suggest otherwise. (6) By the acknowledgments of mistakes and the willingness to apologize or make concessions, even reach practical compromises through reasoned dialogue rather than by engagement in self-serving or self-righteous rhetoric.

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For the purpose of the following evaluation, we shall identify at least one significant example for each of the above-mentioned criteria. However, some examples may by virtue of illustration entail subsidiary reference to the other defining characteristics of reasoning.

The Prevalence of Equality: Kohl Determines the Question of Timing in 1994 and 1996 As our case study reveals, by the late summer of 1994 the Clinton administration appeared to have taken charge of the process of NATO enlargement, favoring a fast-track approach and publicly declaring that discussions regarding ECE membership to NATO would have to begin by the autumn of 1994. However, although the German government was pleased to see that the Clinton administration finally agreed to support the German and ECE rationale for an eastward opening of NATO, it was less enthralled by Washington’s sudden lack of concern for the growing political difficulties confronting Yeltsin’s Russia. After all, one significant component of the German 1993 Gesamtkonzept for NATO enlargement was that the process would have to be managed in agreement with Russia and not in provocation of it. Besides, all other parts of the Gesamtkonzept rested on the notion that the enlargement of both NATO and the EU were to be understood by the Euro-Atlantic community as an inclusive pro-stability move for all involved—be they members of or partners to that community. To protect the credibility of Germany’s rationale for the enlargement of both NATO and the EU, Helmut Kohl—in convening the inter-ministerial meeting of November 1994—sought to ensure that his government’s policy on NATO enlargement was not hijacked by Washington’s now precipitous approach. The German ministers agreed that contrary to Washington’s public statements at the time, no specific candidate names or membership timeframes were to be publicly specified at this stage of the process. Of course, when the German chancellor made clear his preference for a gradual, joint German–American approach to enlargement to the White House, Washington did not immediately surrender to Bonn’s preferred course of action, attempting instead to persuade the Kohl government to support its policy preference for a fast-track approach in the run-up to NATO’s December 1994 meeting of foreign and defence ministers. In the end, however, it was the German preference that prevailed. Germany’s policy preference on aspects of timing proved equally potent in the course of 1996: it had been Helmut Kohl who, by the

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autumn of 1996 and in talks with the American, French, British, and Russian presidents, managed to reach an agreement that a NATO summit be held in the summer of 1997 with a preceding special summit for a possible NATO–Russia accord. Thereafter, the German chancellor also succeeded in persuading his Alliance counterparts to agree to a postponement of official Alliance negotiations with Moscow until after Yeltsin’s heart bypass operation in November 1996. Hence, Bonn’s preferences for appropriate timing throughout the relevant stages in the process were certainly taken seriously and thus regarded as equally valid in the debate on enlargement, irrespective of the existing power constellation among Alliance members, particularly Washington’s superior status. Besides, the fact that the Germans assessed and determined the pace of the enlargement process in relation to the overall rationale underpinning their 1993 Gesamtkonzept also underlines the significance of the role that argumentative consistency and thus credibility as opposed to rhetorical action played in Germany’s diplomatic approach.

The Capacity to Empathize: Advocating the East European Cause, Winning Washington’s Support, and Alleviating Russian Concerns The Kohl government’s capacity to empathize with the concerns of its negotiating partners and its ability to influence the Clinton administration to eventually approve of the ECE wish for NATO membership in that very capacity is, perhaps, best exemplified by Richard Holbrooke’s exposure to the German government’s regular advocacy of the German and ECE rationale for enlargement during the time in which he served as U.S. ambassador to Bonn. As we have seen, the German argument presented to Holbrooke was as clear-cut as it was obvious when seen from the security perspectives of both Germany and, in particular, Poland: with two countries at the center of Europe in agreement that it were in their mutual interest to fill the security vacuum in ECE for ideological, historical, political, and strategic reasons, there would be little choice left for the United States but to support these countries unless it was willing to lose its position as a “European Power.”25 Not only is this a strong example of Germany empathizing with the ECE and Polish cause, but at the same time the German government left no doubt about its own security interests involved. In this combination, the German argumentative rationale reflected a genuine concern for

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Holbrooke and the Clinton administration to actually understand the logic behind the German and Polish strife for enlargement, so that Washington would support the cause for precisely those and no other reasons. Nevertheless, there is an interesting twist to this example: as developments in Washington during the latter half of 1994 reveal, Holbrooke, upon his return to Washington certainly did show signs of having grasped the German and ECE rationale for why NATO enlargement had to proceed, yet he failed to grasp the equally important segment of the German Gesamtkonzept that Russia, too, would “somehow” have to be brought into the Western institutional fold. If the early period of the Clinton administration’s leadership was characterized by great sensitivity for Russian security concerns, the final months of 1994 were suddenly marked by a complete lack of concern for Moscow’s growing threat perceptions, even though this was precisely the time when a more cautious approach toward Russia would have been needed. Hence, Washington’s approach toward Russia during this period (1993–94) was deeply contradictory, prompting Chancellor Kohl to throw his own personal weight into the U.S.–Russia equation, given his understanding for Yeltsin’s domestic political struggles and his own interest in ensuring that Russia remained on the path of democratic reforms. In this effort, the Kohl government (from the winter of 1994 onward) determined the pace of the entire enlargement process, which was made dependent by Bonn on the nature of the more informal than formal negotiation process with the Russians. In other words, it is not an overstatement to claim that Holbrooke’s faux pas of acting too eagerly on enlargement in the autumn of 1994 gave Bonn the upper hand (although Bonn had intended it to be the other way around when it placed its hopes in Holbrooke’s return to Washington) in determining the pace of the entire enlargement process. In fact, even Strobe Talbott—Clinton’s responsible man for Russia—appeared to place greater confidence in the German diplomatic skill to feel the Russian pulse and so to empathize with Russian concerns than in the ability of his own diplomatic corps to do so. The Prevalence of Argumentative Consistency: Bonn’s Mediating Efforts in 1995 The German government’s decision in the winter of 1994 and NATO’s subsequent agreement to “freeze” the discussion on enlargement until after both the December 1995 Russian parliamentary elections and the

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country’s June 1996 presidential elections, reveals that the German government acted in accordance with the line of argumentation presented in its Gesamtkonzept, according to which the enlargement of NATO—although certainly remaining a primary objective of German security policy—could only be advanced if it were to be perceived by all sides as a pro-stability move and especially so by Russia. However, as long as the political situation in Russia remained volatile and the possibility of reaching an agreement with Moscow appeared untenable, it seemed wise to delay the process until political conditions in Russia became more favorable to the German cause. Yet, the Germans also remained loyal to the other segments of their Gesamtkonzept when throughout the course of 1995 they sought to ensure that their enlargement policy was kept afloat. In this effort, Rühe succeeded in synchronizing Bonn’s slow-motion approach to enlargement with the American, French, and British conceptions of enlargement as a result of the “Group of Four” meeting in Florida in March 1995, while Helmut Kohl with the support of Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel sought to alleviate Russian fears of isolation by resorting to the use of summit diplomacy as well as the offer of cooperation arrangements with the Council of Europe, the World Bank, G7, and the IMF. At the same time, Kohl in a far-reaching speech to the Polish Parliament in July 1995 assured Warsaw that a strategic partnership agreement between NATO and Russia would pave the way for Poland’s entry into NATO, adding that no country had the right to treat another country as a security glacis or to prevent it from joining an Alliance, thus reassuring all of the Visegrad countries that their concerns had not been forgotten.

The Power of the Better Argument: Bonn’s Slow-Motion Preference Prevails over Washington’s Fast-Track Rhetoric As noted above, by the winter of 1994 Chancellor Kohl had made his policy preference on enlargement quite clear to Washington when he adamantly insisted that with regard to growing political unrest in Russia, the Alliance needed to adopt a gradual, more circumspect approach to enlargement rather than a fast-track approach as the Clinton administration would have preferred. Finally, the German chancellor cautioned Washington not to risk carrying both Russian and Ukrainian concerns into an open Alliance debate, since doing so risked

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derailing the entire enlargement process. Instead, Kohl suggested that these concerns were best dealt with through a process of bilateral intergovernmental consultations. After some initial resistance and attempts to sway the German government, the Clinton administration eventually gave up its fast-track rhetoric and accepted Kohl’s arguments for adopting a slow-motion approach. Hence, it was the power of the better argument by the materially weaker party in the equation that clearly prevailed in this situation. The Clinton administration changed its mind even though its instrumental interests would have demanded that it press ahead with the process. After all, the White House’s key interests in initiating a fast-track approach to enlargement in the late summer of 1994 essentially revolved around the need to secure the Polish vote in the run-up to the November 1994 congressional elections and to alleviate growing Republican concerns that Clinton and Talbott were selling out NATO’s credibility only to appease Russia. Moreover, Washington’s change of heart in the winter of 1994 also had a bit of a concessionary aspect to it, in that the administration decided to propose an Alliance study on the central aspects of enlargement instead of deciding to charge ahead with the process on its own terms. Hence, of the six central criteria by which to recognize the Habermasian dynamics of reasoning, this final example contains all three of the final criteria in that it reveals (i) the better argument by the materially weaker party to have prevailed in the negotiation situation; (ii) the materially stronger party to have changed its mind although its instrumental interests would have demanded it to abide by its own policy preferences; and (iii) the materially stronger party to have demonstrated its willingness to concede to the better argument by way of launching an Alliance study on enlargement rather than insisting on self-serving or self-righteous rhetoric.

Concluding Remarks We embarked upon this research endeavor for two main reasons: (i) the regret felt over the procrastinated nature of the German academic debate over the country’s foreign policy since reunification, owing to the seemingly long-term inability by the German academic community to move beyond the continuity versus normality divide, although recent attempts to rectify this state of affairs have been acknowledged, coupled with (ii) the consequential negligence of the most prescriptive

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element of the most progressive Internationalist foreign policy school of thought in the German academic debate, which is most commensurate with Maull’s civilian–civilianizing power concept. The most prescriptive element of this approach focuses in essence on the diplomatic vein of civilianizing power and thus recommends that Germany built upon and cultivate its civilian power diplomatic skills to promote a wider international process of civilianization. While this implicitly corresponds to Beate Kohler-Koch’s notion of German diplomacy inducing international political changes by redefining the substance of multilateral procedures whilst pursuing its own political objectives not by means of the “powerful or even violent realisation of one’s fixed interests, but as a communication process which aims at the furthest possible adjustment or at least complementarity of interests,”26 we are still left to wonder what exactly civilian power diplomacy in terms of communication consists of. If we are to follow Maull’s foreign policy advice that Germany must do more in terms of its civilian power diplomatic skills acquired by historical experience, then it is first of all necessary to find out what exactly constitutes the essence of Germany’s civilian power diplomatic approach. Only then can we be expected to push the country’s foreign policy debate beyond the continuity versus normality divide and toward the edge of a new27 period of engenderment for innovative foreign policy concepts and ideas—similar to the one we witnessed in the watershed years of 1989–91. In this case, we decided to assess Germany’s diplomatic course of action against the background of the Habermasian theory of communicative action, because—as Kohler-Koch suggests—the notion of civilian power diplomacy is connected to the notion of effective communication. More specifically, however, the communicative action approach was chosen because (i) civilian power diplomacy and communicative action appeared to connect well to the civilianization power tasks envisaged by Maull’s Vierzehn Thesen of 1992, which essentially involve the promotion of moral and practical discourses over the continued validity and appropriate (re)definition of international norms; (ii) diplomacy is generally understood to be about communication and although there are other forms of communication aside from reasoning, such as “bargaining” and “rhetorical action,” the fact of the matter is that the literature on diplomacy suffers from a weak theoretical base while the literature on international negotiations despite its respectable base of middle-range theory still warrants greater attention with respect to the specific intricacies of diplomatic communication and argumentative processes; (iv) Maull claims that Germany’s diplomatic

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approach is unique because of Germany’s postwar experiences as a divided country, although as I have explained in the introductory chapter, to this book, Maull’s civilian–civilianising power model can certainly stake a universal claim to foreign policy prescription while Joseph Nye’s soft power concept is firmly rooted within the U.S. context of perceived foreign policy requirements. Maull’s uniqueness argument has also been echoed by Smyser’s study of German diplomacy and although Smyser’s study makes no mention of the Habermasian notion of communicative action, it is interesting to note that his assessment reflects central connections to the theory of communicative action, as depicted in our Smyser–Habermasian navigational aid. On the basis of the preceding assessment, we may conclude that against the background of the Clinton administration’s initial resistance to NATO enlargement, the Kohl government from the beginning of the debate exerted a relatively high degree of consistent and persistent policy-shaping influence on U.S. political thinking regarding the German–ECE rationale for NATO’s eastward enlargement. The diplomatic approach taken by Germany’s leadership to exert this influence corresponds fully with the central features identified by Smyser’s study, whilst furnishing ample evidence to maintain that in substance Germany’s approach was markedly characterized by all of the essential criteria underpinning the theory of communicative action. At least in this case, therefore, it is fair to conclude that the Habermasian notion of advancing one’s interests by way of reasoning does serve to breathe life into Maull’s notion of Germany’s civilian power diplomacy. Undoubtedly, the results acquired here cannot compensate for the lack of contemporary sound foreign policy concepts and ideas affecting not only Germany. However, they do provide an understanding of how foreign policy interests might best be advanced in the respective fora of international politics and specifically in the vein of a civilianizing effort. If we can agree that the central foreign policy question confronting Germany today is not one of whether it is becoming increasingly “normal”, but rather one of having to adjust itself to international changes whilst remaining loyal to its civilian power foreign policy ethos (an ethos that—in its progressive dimension of a civilianizing power effort—appears to be among the most suitable to tackling the complexities of contemporary international affairs), then the notion of communicative action becomes a very useful one to be explored. The challenge of adjustment to haphazardly changing international norms is, perhaps, most forcibly portrayed by a comparison of two international developments confronting Germany’s leadership in recent

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times: one, was the 1999 Kosovo crisis where Berlin decided to support NATO’s air war against Serbia despite the absence of a UN mandate but largely because of the escalating humanitarian crisis in the region; the other was the Iraq crisis of 2002/2003 where—in defiance of the U.S. and U.K. instrumentalization of past UN resolutions on Iraq—Berlin refused to support the Bush administration’s largely unsubstantiated stance on Iraq. Clearly, what this juxtaposition of examples reveals is the growing significance of the need for moral and practical discourses over the continued validity and suitability of existing international norms in the context of the increasingly apparent inadequacies of our collective system of international law. This is the real issue at stake when assessing the future of Germany’s foreign policy and that of other major powers in the world today.

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Notes

1

Introduction

1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1993, p. 14. 2. See Paul Rieckhoff and Dafna Hochmann, “Policies that Hurt: How the Pentagon Has Failed U.S. Troops,” International Herald Tribune, 31 August 2004; Richard W. Stevenson, “Even some Republicans Question Bush Strategy,” New York Times, 28 June 2005. 3. On the basis of its “open-door policy” on enlargement (Article 10 of the Washington Treaty), NATO on 29 March 2004 and in its second and largest round of eastward enlargement, formally acknowledged the Alliance membership of seven new countries from Central and Eastern Europe, these being the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as the East European countries of Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania, and one successor state from the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia. In this respect, it may be worth pointing out that the Alliance’s second round of eastward enlargement into the still Russian perceived glacis protecteur appears to have been a far less spectacular event than the Alliance’s first round of eastern enlargement accomplished and celebrated at the NATO Washington Summit in April 1999. NATO’s second round of enlargement more or less coincided with the EU’s first round of enlargement, which took place on 1 May 2004 and absorbed ten additional countries. These include: Cyprus and Malta; Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. The origins of the eastern dimension of the EU enlargement process can be traced back to the Copenhagen European Council of June 1993, which legitimized Central and Eastern European applications for EU membership on the basis of the conditional fulfillment of the three main “Copenhagen Criteria”: the political criterion, covering the stability of institutions guaranteeing the democracy and the rule of law; the economic criterion, relating to the existence of a functioning market economy; and the criterion concerning the ability of “acceding countries” to adopt the existing body of EU legislation—the acquis communautaire. Thus, the dual enlargement of both NATO and the EU—with NATO now comprising 26 members and

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Notes

4. 5. 6. 7.

8.

9.

the EU 25 member countries—represents the largest round of institutional enlargement the continent has ever experienced. It remains to be seen what this means—in terms of political practice–for the future of European International Relations and thus also for the future of Russia, which now shares a common border with the NATO and EU hemisphere. See Fritz Stern, “Die zweite Chance: Die Wege der Deutschen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 July 1990. Ibid. Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent, London: Vintage 1994, p. 409. Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich have characterized the dilemma confronting German foreign policy since (re)unification along the following lines: “Germany is caught between the Scylla of collective memory which will not permit it to exercise power in a normal manner, and the Charybdis of contemporary exigencies, which demand German acceptance of its responsibilities in Europe and maybe even the world.” For details, see Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997, here p. 7. There is, of course, a vast amount of literature available on the historical dimension of the German “problem” and the possibility of a revival of German dominance in Europe after 1990. For a good overview comprising both international and German leading contributions see Thomas Banchoff, The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945–1995, University of Michigan Press, 1999. On the “normality/normalization” side of the German foreign policy debate see Philip H. Gordon, “The Normalisation of German Foreign Policy,” Orbis, vol. 38, no. 2, 1994, pp. 225–243; see especially Gunther Hellmann, “Nationale Normalität als Zukunft. Zur Außenpolitik der Berliner Republik,” Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, vol. 44, 1999; Hellmann, “Sag beim Abschied leise Servus. Die Zivilmacht Deutschland beginnt ein neues Selbst zu behaupten,” Politische Vierteljahresschrift, vol. 43, no. 3, 2002, pp. 498–507; Hellmann, “Der ‘deutsche Weg.’ Eine außenpolitische Gratwanderung,” Internationale Politik, vol. 9, 2002, pp. 1–8.; Hellmann, “Wider die machtpolitische Resozialisierung in der deutschen Außenpolitik. Ein Plädoyer für offensiven Idealismus,” WeltTrends, vol. 42, Spring 2004, pp. 79–88; Hellmann, “Von Gipfelstürmern und Gratwanderern. Deutsche Wege in der Außenpolitik,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. B11, March 2004, pp. 32–39. See also, Egon Bahr, “Normalisierung der deutschen Außenpolitik,” Internationale Politik, vol. 1, 1999, pp. 41–52; Karl-Rudolf Korte, “Über die Unbefangenheit der Berliner Republik,” Internationale Politik, vol. 53, no. 12, December 1998, pp. 3–12; Robert Zoellick, “Abschied von der Selbstbeschränkung,” Internationale Politik, vol. 53, no. 12, December 1998, pp. 21–26. As for the “continuity” line of argumentation see Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W. Maull (eds.), Germany as a Civilian Power: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001; Hanns W. Maull, “Großmacht Deutschland? Anmerkungen und

Notes

10.

11. 12.

13.

14.

15. 16. 17.

18.

19.

20. 21.

22.

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Thesen,” in Karl Kaiser and Hanns W. Maull (eds), Die Zukunft der deutschen Außenpolitik, Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik, 72, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1993b, pp. 53–72. Volker Rittberger and Frank Schimmelfennig, “Deutsche Außenpolitik nach der Vereinigung. Realistische Prognosen auf dem Prüfstand,” Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung, no. 28, 1997; Rainer Baumann, Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang Wagner, “Power and Power Politics: Neorealist Foreign Policy Theory and Expectations about German Foreign Policy since Unification,” Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung, no. 30a, 1998. Volker Rittberger (ed.), German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001. For details, see Dirk Peters, “The Debate about a New German Foreign Policy after Unification,” in Rittberger, German Foreign Policy since Unification, chapter 2. On differences between the two concepts, see Michael Zürn, “From Interdependence to Globalisation,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage Publications, 2002, chapter 12. Hanns W. Maull, “Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Vierzehn Thesen für eine neue deutsche Außenpolitik,” Europa Archiv, vol. 47, no. 10, 1992, pp. 269–278; see also Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” Foreign Affairs, 69: 5, 1990, pp. 91–106; Another equally prominent German advocate for a civilianizing foreign policy is Dieter Senghaas, Wohin driftet die Welt? Über die Zukunft friedlicher Koexistenz, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1994. Maull’s “civilian power” concept may also serve to describe the foreign policy behavior of countries such as Sweden, Ireland, and Canada. Harnisch and Maull, Germany as a Civilian Power. Hanns W. Maull, “Auf leisen Sohlen aus der Außenpolitik,” Internationale Politik, vol. 9, 2003, pp. 19–30; Maull, “Internationaler Terrorismus. Die deutsche Außenpolitik auf dem Prüfstand,” Internationale Politik, vol. 12, 2001, pp. 1–10. Maull, “Auf leisen Sohlen aus der Außenpolitik,” here p. 27; and Hanns W. Maull, Sebastian Harnisch, and Constantin Grund, Deutschland im Abseits? Rot-grüne Außenpolitik 1998–2003, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003. Gunther Hellmann, “Agenda 2020. Krise und Perspektive deutscher Außenpolitik,” Internationale Politik, vol. 58, no. 9, September 2003, pp. 39–50. Henning Tewes, “The Emergence of a Civilian Power: Germany and Central Europe,” German Politics, vol. 6, no. 2, August 1997, pp. 95–116. Hanns W. Maull, “Germany, Iraq, and the Crisis of the Transatlantic Alliance System,” http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/digest/op-ed_ inhalt_02.php. On this point see Maull, “Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” here p. 275.

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Notes 23. William R. Smyser, How Germans Negotiate: Logical Goals, Practical Solutions, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2003. 24. Gunther Hellmann, “Beyond Weltpolitik: Self-Containment and Civilian Power: United Germany’s Normalising Ambitions,” IGS Discussion Papers Series Number 99/10, Institute for German Studies, The University of Birmingham, 1999, p. 43. 25. Gunther Hellmann frequently uses the terms “self-confidence” and “normality” interchangeably. See especially, Hellmann, “Beyond Weltpolitik.” 26. As is the case in Hellmann, “Agenda 2020.” 27. See Christian Hacke, “Die nationalen Interessen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert,” Außenpolitik, vol. 49, 1998, pp. 5–17; and Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Zentralmacht Europas. Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne, Berlin: Siedler 1994. 28. Smyser, How Germans Negotiate, pp. 72–73. 29. See Thomas E. Halverson, The Last Great Nuclear Debate, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1995. See also, Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Deutschland, Europa, Amerika: Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1994, Volume 2, Auflage, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1995. 30. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Globalisation: What’s New? What’s Not? (And so What?),” Foreign Policy, vol. 118, 2000, pp. 104–109. 31. Hanns W. Maull, “Geopolitik im 21. Jahrhundert: Keine Zukunft für den Nationalstaat?” Deutschland, vol. 6, December–January 1999/2000, pp. 26–30; Maull, “Die deutsche Außenpolitik am Ende der Ära Kohl,” in Erich Reiter (ed.), Jahrbuch für Internationale Sicherheitspolitik 1999, Hamburg: Mittler Verlag, 1998, pp. 274–295, here p. 280. 32. Obviously the disintegration of the former Soviet Union has opened up the possibility for Germany to exercise greater economic and thus political influence in the region of East Central Europe, but as the Czechs are fond of saying, “the only thing worse than being dominated by the German economy is not being dominated by it.” Quoted by Robert Gerald Livingston, “United Germany: Bigger and Better,” Foreign Policy, no. 87, Summer 1992, p. 168. 33. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers.” 34. Ibid., p. 92. 35. Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York: Basic Books, 1990; Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002; Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs, 2004. 36. Nye, The Paradox of American Power, here p. 9. 37. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” here in particular, pp. 93–97. 38. Nye, The Paradox of American Power, p. 9. 39. As coined by Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991.

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40. Maull, “Internationaler Terrorismus,” pp. 1–10. 41. John Vinocur, “Peace in Kabul or Not, Berlin Wins on Global Stage,” International Herald Tribune, 7 December 2001. 42. Ibid. 43. Inge Günther, “Israel einigt sich mit Hisbollah,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 26 January 2004. 44. Nye, The Paradox of American Power, p. 6. 45. Ibid., p. 12. 46. Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue: Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization, vol. 54, no. 1, 2000, pp. 1–39. 47. Fritz Schütze, Die Technik des narrativen Interviews in Interaktionsfeld-Studien dargestellt an einem Projekt zur Erforschung von kommunalen Machtstrukturen, Arbeitsberichte und Forschungsmaterialien, Universität Bielefeld, Fakultät für Soziologie, August 1977, 2nd edition, January 1978.

2

The Question of Germany’s Normalizing Ambitions 1. See, for example, Helmut Hubel and Bernhard May, “Ein ‘normales’ Deutschland? Die souveräne Bundesrepublik in der ausländischen Wahrnehmung,” Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik der DGAP, Band 92, Bonn 1995. 2. See Hellmann, “Beyond Weltpolitik”; see also, Hellmann, “Jenseits von Normalisierung und Militarisierung: Zur Standortdebatte über die neue deutsche Außenpolitik,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. B1–2, 3 January 1997, pp. 24–33. 3. The term “semi-sovereignty” was coined by Peter J. Katzenstein, The Growth of a Semi-Sovereign State: Policy and Politics in West Germany, Philadelphia: Temple, 1987. 4. See Charlie Jeffery and William E. Paterson, Germany’s Power in Europe, IGC and ESRC Paper, Institute for German Studies, University of Birmingham, available at http://www.bham.ac.uk/IGC/pattjeff.pdf. 5. For this somewhat “soft” realist expectation, see Timothy Garton Ash, “Germany’s Choice,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, 1994, pp. 66–68. For a “harder” neorealist expectation concerning the international security policy implications of a united Germany, see Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Relations,” International Security, vol. 18, no. 2, Fall 1993, pp. 44–79, here p. 66. 6. See Heinz-Jürgen Axt, “Hat Genscher Jugoslawien entzweit? Mythen und Fakten zur Außenpolitik des vereinten Deutschlands,” in EuropaArchiv, vol. 12, 1993, pp. 351–360, here p. 351. For more details, see Roland Schönfeld, “Balkankrieg und internationale Gemeinschaft,” Südosteuropa Mitteilungen, vol. 34, no. 4, 1994, pp. 257–278, here p. 266. 7. Official documents covering Germany’s Basic Law are available at http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/-,4246.429716/PureHtml/ dokument.htm.

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Notes 8. Gordon, “The Normalization of German Foreign Policy,” here p. 225. 9. Hellmann, “Nationale Normalität als Zukunft,” here p. 847. 10. Simon Bulmer, “Shaping the Rules. The Constitutive Politics of the European Union and German Power,” in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), Tamed Power. Germany in Europe, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 47–79. 11. Hellmann, “Beyond Weltpolitik.” 12. Hellmann, “Nationale Normalität als Zukunft.” 13. Hellmann, “Sag beim Abschied leise Servus.” 14. Ibid. 15. Rittberger (ed), German Foreign Policy since Unification. 16. Harnisch and Maull, Germany as a Civilian Power? 17. Henning Tewes, “Das Zivilmachtskonzept in der Theorie der Internationalen Beziehungen. Anmerkungen zu Knut Kirste und Hanns Maull,” Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, vol. 4, no. 2, 1997, pp. 347–359. 18. For details, see Harnisch and Maull, Germany as a Civilian Power? p. 3. 19. Helga Haftendorn, Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung 1945–2000, Stuttgart, München: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 2001, here p. 436. 20. For John Mearsheimer’s 1990 argument that Germany may possibly choose to go nuclear so as to protect itself from blackmail by other nuclear powers as a result of shifting alliances in a wider Europe free from Cold War constraints, see Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security, vol. 15, no. 1, Summer 1990, pp. 5–56, here, p. 36. 21. Hellmann, “Beyond Weltpolitik,” here pp. 2–3. 22. Ibid., p. 2. 23. Hellmann, “Jenseits von Normalisierung,” p. 24. 24. Hellmann, “Beyond Weltpolitik,” p. 3. 25. For details, see Aufbruch und Erneuerung—Deutschlands Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert,” Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und Bündnis90/Die Grünen, Bonn, 20. Oktober 1998 at http://archiv.spd.de/koalition/uebersicht.html. 26. See, for example, Philip Zelikow and Condolezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed—A Study in Statecraft, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995; Karl Kaiser, Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationalen Aspekte, Bergisch Gladbach: Basteil Lübbe, 1991; Richard Kiessler and Frank Elbe, Ein runder Tisch mit scharfen Ecken: Der diplomatische Weg zur deutschen Einheit, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993. 27. Hellmann, “Beyond Weltpolitk,” p. 16. 28. Ibid. 29. Hellmann, “Nationale Normalität,” p. 841. 30. Joschka Fischer, “Grundsatzfragen deutscher Außenpolitik,” Foreign Minister Fischer’s speech to the DGAP General Assembly in Berlin on 24 November 1999 in Internationale Politik, vol. 55, no. 2, February 2000, pp. 58–64. 31. For more information on this subject see Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische

Notes

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39.

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Bildung, Schriftenreihe Band 410, 2003; see also Simon Green, The Politics of Exclusion: Institutions and Immigration Policy in Contemporary Germany, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004. Rudolf Scharping, “Der Stein auf unserer Seele. Deutschland und der gerechte Krieg,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 May 1999. Hellmann, “Beyond Weltpolitik,” p. 43. Ibid. Ibid., p. 25. Hellmann, “Wider die machtpolitische Resozialisierung in der deutschen Außenpolitik.” Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, “Der überforderte Patient,” Handelsblatt, 18 May 2004 Hellmann and Wolf, “Neuer Spielplan auf der Weltbühne. Deutschlands Auftritt muß abgesagt werden,” Internationale Politik, vol. 59, no. 8, 2004, pp. 73–80. Karl Kaiser, “Ein deutscher Sitz im UN Sicherheitsrat. Ein richtiges Ziel deutscher Außenpolitik,” Internationale Politik, vol. 59, no. 8, 2004, pp. 61–72.

3

Germany—Still Not a Civilianizing Power

1. See Harnisch and Maull, Germany as a Civilian Power? 2. See Christopher Hill, The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, London: Routledge, 1995; Hedley Bull, “Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” in Loukas Tsoukalis (ed.), The European Community: Past, Present and Future, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983. 3. See Michael Zürn, Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates. Denationalisierung und Globalisierung als Chance, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998. 4. Maull, “Die deutsche Außenpolitik am Ende der Ära Kohl.” 5. Maull, “Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” 6. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” here p. 93. As has been explained in the introduction to this book, there are compelling reasons for keeping the two concepts of “soft” and “civilian” powers separate and although Maull himself has a tendency to use the term “soft” power interchangeably with that of “civilian” power as shown here, it is all the more important to bear the differences in mind. 7. As coined by Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, New York: Basic Books, 1986. 8. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” pp. 92–96. 9. On the growing currency of this subject especially with respect to the role of the UN, see all of the various contributions in Dieter S. Lutz and Hans J. Gießmann (eds.), Die Stärke des Rechts gegen das Recht des Stärkeren: Politische und rechtliche Einwände gegen eine Rückkehr des Faustrechts in die internationalen Beziehungen, 1st edition, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003.

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Notes 10. As for the persistence of the “normality versus change” dichotomy in the German foreign policy debate see Thomas Risse’s more recent article, “Kontinuität durch Wandel: Eine neue deutsche Außenpolitik?” available at http://www.bpb.de/popup_druckversion.html?guid⫽3XLEXF. 11. However, “continuity” proponents are gradually moving away from their preoccupation with the “normality thesis” toward policy criticism and prescription. See, for example, Maull, “Auf leisen Sohlen aus der Außenpolitik”; Maull et al., Deutschland im Abseits? 1998–2003. 12. Harnisch and Maull, Germany as a Civilian Power? 13. As can be discerned from Hellmann’s writings. 14. Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?” Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 56–80. 15. For a comprehensive overview of the 1999 Kosovo War, see Jens Reuter and Conrad Clewing (eds.), Der Kosovo Konflikt. Ursachen, Verlauf, Perspektiven, Klagenfurt: Wieser Verlag, 2000. Joachim Krause (ed.), Kosovo—Humanitäre Intervention und kooperative Sicherheit in Europa, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2000, pp. 103–119. 16. Having had the opportunity to personally ask Mr. Ahtisaari the question of who had been the key person to actually request him to assume the role of international mediator in the Kosovo conflict, Mr. Ahtisaari emphasized that this was, indeed, an important question because contrary to prevailing assumptions it had been Chancellor Gerhard Schröder who finally telephoned him and asked him to become the EU mediator to the crisis. Mr. Ahtisaari said he gladly agreed to Chancellor Schröder’s request because the offer of acting as a special envoy for the EU delivered him from becoming embroiled in the conflicting positions that had thus far existed between the United States and Russia. The question was asked during the June 2000 Press Conference held at the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, a.M., on the occasion of Mr. Ahtisaari receiving the Hessische Friedenspreis 2000. 17. Cited in Lily Gardner Feldman, “Cooperative Differences in U.S. and EU Balkans Policies: An American Perspective on the Political Dimension,” AICGS German Issues, vol. 26, 2001, pp. 1–29, here p. 19. 18. For more details see Hanns W. Maull, “Quo vadis, Germania? Außenpolitik in einer Welt des Wandels,” Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, vol. 10, 1997, pp. 1245–1255. 19. See Maull, “Internationaler Terrorismus,” here p. 7. 20. See Maull’s criticism in “Quo vadis, Germania?” 21. In Maull, “Germany and the Use of Force,” p. 57; see also Michael J. Inacker, “Deutschland nur noch beschränkt bündnisfähig,” Die Welt, 24 March 2000. 22. See, for example, Gunther Hellmann and Wolfgang Wagner, “Getrennt marschieren oder zusammen? Die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik und die NATO,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 June 2000. 23. Maull, “Germany and the Use of Force.”

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24. See Peter Schmidt’s comments on the question of “Was soll und kann im Kontext der NATO-Krise aus der ESVP werden?” presented at the SWP’s Jour Fixe on 19 March 2003, available at http://www.swp-berlin.org. 25. Ibid. 26. In “Martti Ahtisaari: International Mediator,” NATO Review, vol. 49, Autumn 2001, pp. 24–25, here p. 25. 27. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations—The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1949, here pp. 90–91. 28. On this subject, visit also the website of “Crisis Management Initiative— The Office of President Ahtisaari,” available at http://www.cmi.fi. 29. In this respect, see also Reinhardt Rummel, “Wie zivil ist die ESVP?” SWP-Aktuell, 10 March 2003. 30. Maull, “Germany and the Use of Force,” p. 72. 31. See article by former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Wesley K. Clark, “When Force Is Necessary: NATO’s Military Response to the Kosovo Crisis,” available at http://www.nato.int/ docu/review/1999/ 9902–03.htm. 32. Norman Paech, “Ein letzter Mechanismus der Rettung,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 February 2003; see also Norman Paech and Gerhard Stuby, Völkerrecht und Machtpolitik in den internationalen Beziehungen, Hamburg: VSA-Verlag, 2001. 33. In Paech, “Ein letzter Mechanismus.” 34. Maull, “Germany and the Use of Force,” p. 77. 35. Survey figures from the Transatlantic Trends 2003 study, commissioned and conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia Di San Paolo in the month of June 2003, reveals 80 percent of Germans to be in favor of the strengthening of international organizations especially the UN, in response to the growing intricacies resulting from (asymmetrical) “globalization” and the need to deal with shared problems; the survey also reveals that 81 percent of Germans do not believe the war in Iraq to have been worth the loss of life as well as the material costs incurred; as for the experiment question of North Korea acquiring WMDs and NATO deciding to attack North Korea to force it to give up these weapons, 64 percent of Germans said they would not support their government’s decision to participate in such military action (hence, and as the answer to the first question reveals, the majority of Germans would like to see a strengthening of multilateralism but evidently not for the purpose of greater military action in international affairs); that this is so is also reflected in the response to another hypothetical question concerning the possibility of a country harboring international terrorists and the United States proposing to impose economic sanctions to counter this country, whereas the EU would favor the use of military force. In this case, 84 percent of Germans said they would prefer to support the U.S. proposal for economic sanctions. The study also reveals the majority of Germans to agree strongly that economic power is becoming more important in world affairs. Against the background of

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Notes 82 percent of Germans supporting the argument that it would be best for Germany’s future if it were to take an active part in world affairs rather than remaining aloof, the overall result of the study clearly indicates a strong German preference for “civilian” rather than “military” solutions to international security problems, thus supporting Maull’s 1992 vision of Germany playing a greater role in international affairs by trying to strengthen patterns of multilateral cooperation rather than by “slipping” into a traditional realist and power political foreign policy practice. For a more detailed view of the survey, see Transatlantic Trends 2003, Topline Data, July 2003, available at www.worldviews.org. 36. That the notion of “change” in German foreign policy is largely a matter of (over)interpretation of contextual events can be discerned from Sebastian Harnisch’s strong reply to Gunther Hellmann’s provocative argumentation on the occasion of the 21st DVPW Congress in Halle, Saale, 1–5 October 2000. See Gunther Hellmann, “Rekonstruktion der Hegemonie des Machtstaates Deutschland unter modernen Bedingungen? Zwischenbilanzen nach zehn Jahren neuer deutscher Außenpolitik,” Beitrag zum 21. Kongress der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft in Halle, Saale, 1–5 Oktober 2000. For Harnisch’s reply, see “Truth Is What Works oder was nicht überzeugen kann, das wird sich auch nicht bewahrheiten,” Eine Replik auf Gunther Hellmann’s “Rekonstruktion der Hegemonie des Machtstaates Deutschland unter modernen Bedingungen?” Fassung vom 18 October 2000. 37. Hellmann, “Sag beim Abschied leise Servus.”

4

The Habermasian Practice of “Reasoning”

1. Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” European Journal of International Relations, vol. 3, no. 3, 1997, pp. 319–363, here pp. 320–321. 2. Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue,” pp. 1–39, here pp. 4–5. 3. Ibid., here p. 3. 4. James March and Johan Olson, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organisational Basis of Politics, New York: Free Press, 1989. 5. On the notion of “role theory” in relation to German foreign policy, see also Knut Kirste and Hanns W. Maull, “Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie,” Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, vol. 3, no. 2, 1996, pp. 283–312. 6. “Sociological Institutionalism” is sometimes also referred to as “Constructivist Institutionalism.” For details, see Thomas Risse, “Konstruktivismus, Rationalismus und Theorien Internationaler Beziehungen—warum empirisch nichts so heiß gegessen wird, wie es theoretisch gekocht wurde” in Gunther Hellmann, Klaus-Dieter Wolf, and Michael Zürn (eds.), Die neuen Internationalen Beziehungen: Forschungsstand und Perspektiven in Deutschland, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003, pp. 99–132, here, p. 108. For specific works

Notes

7. 8.

9.

10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15.

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written from the “sociological institutionalist” perspective, see Frank Schimmelfennig’s, “Liberal Norms and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: A Case for Sociological Institutionalism,” ÖZP, vol. 27, no. 4, 1998, pp. 459–483; see also Karin Fierke and Antje Wiener, “Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO Enlargement, Robert Schuman Centre, EU Working Papers, no.99/14. Risse, “Let’s Argue.” Harald Müller, “International Relations as Communicative Action,” in Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jørgensen (eds.), Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation, London: M.E. Sharpe, 2001, pp. 160–178, here p. 161. For the “ZIB-debate,” see Harald Müller, “Internationale Beziehungen als kommunikatives Handeln: Zur Kritik der utilitaristischen Handlungstheorien,” Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, vol. 1, no. 1, 1994, pp. 15–44; Gerald Schneider, “Rational Choice und kommunikatives Handeln: Eine Replik auf Harald Müller,” ZIB, vol. 1, no. 2, 1994, pp. 357–366; Otto Keck, “Rationales kommunikatives Handeln in den Internationalen Beziehungen: Ist eine Verbindung von Rational-ChoiceTheorie und Habermas’s Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns möglich?” ZIB, vol. 2, no. 1, 1995, pp. 5–48; Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Reden ist nicht billig: Zur Debatte um Kommunikation und Rationalität,” ZIB, vol. 2, no. 1, 1995, pp. 171–184; Rainer SchmalzBruns, “Die Theorie kommunikativen Handelns—eine Flaschenpost? Anmerkungen zur jüngsten Theoriedebatte in den Internationalen Beziehungen,” ZIB, vol. 2, no. 2, 1995, pp. 347–370; Harald Müller, “Spielen hilft nicht immer: Die Grenzen des Rational-Choice-Ansatzes und der Platz der Theorie kommunikativen Handelns in der Analyse internationaler Beziehungen,” ZIB, vol. 2, no. 2, 1995, pp. 371–391; Bernhard Zangl und Michael Zürn, “Argumentatives Handeln bei internationalen Verhandlungen: Moderate Anmerkungen zur post-realistischen Debatte,” ZIB, vol. 3, no. 2, 1996, pp. 341–366. Müller, “Internationale Beziehungen als kommunikatives Handeln,” here p. 15. On this aspect, see Volker von Prittwitz, Verhandeln und Argumentieren. Dialog, Interessen und Macht in der Umweltpolitik, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996a; see also Thomas Saretzki, “Arguing oder Bargaining: Selbstbindung der Politik durch öffentliche Diskurse,” in Gerhard Göhler (ed.), Macht der Öffentlichkeit—Öffentlichkeit der Macht, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995, pp. 277–307. Müller, “Internationale Beziehungen als kommunikatives Handeln,” here p. 27. F.D. Newmeyer, The Politics of Linguistics, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986, pp. 3–4. Müller, “International Relations as Communicative Action,” here p. 164. Müller, “Spielen hilft nicht immer: Die Grenzen des Rational-ChoiceAnsatzes.”

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Notes 16. See Otto Keck, Information, Macht und gesellschaftliche Rationalität. Das Dilemma rationalen kommunikativen Handelns, dargestellt am Beispiel eines internationalen Vergleichs der Kernenergiepolitik, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993. 17. Müller, “International Relations as Communicative Action,” here p. 161. 18. See David Bell, “Political Linguistics and International Negotiation,” Negotiation Journal, July 1988, pp. 233–246, here p. 244. 19. This argument is made most explicit in Harald Müller, “Spielen hilft nicht immer: Die Grenzen des Rational-Choice-Ansatzes.” 20. Risse, “Konstruktivismus, Rationalismus und Theorien Internationaler Beziehungen,” here p. 111. 21. See Katharina Holzinger, “Verhandeln statt Argumentieren oder Verhandeln durch Argumentieren? Eine empirische Analyse auf der Basis der Sprechakttheorie,” Politische Viertelsjahreszeitschrift, vol. 42, no. 3, 2001, pp. 414–446; Robert O. Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World,” American Political Science Review, vol. 20, no. 1, 2001, pp. 1–14; Thomas Risse, “International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behaviour in the Human Rights Area,” Politics and Society, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 526–556. 22. Zangl und Zürn, “Argumentatives Handeln bei internationalen Verhandlungen.” 23. Risse, “Konstruktivismus, Rationalismus und Theorien Internationaler Beziehungen,” here p. 112. 24. See Harald Müller’s and Thomas Risse’s project, Arguing and Persuasion in Multilateral Negotiations, unpublished manuscript, 2001. 25. Katharina Holzinger, “Kommunkationsmodi und Handlungstypen in den Internationalen Beziehungen,” Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, vol. 8, no. 2, 2001, pp. 243–286. 26. Risse, “Konstruktivismus, Rationalismus und Theorien Internationaler Beziehungen,” here p. 113. 27. Frank Schimmelfennig, “Rhetorisches Handeln in der Internationalen Politik,” ZIB, vol. 4, no. 2, 1997, pp. 219–254. 28. Risse, “Konstruktivismus, Rationalismus und Theorien Internationaler Beziehungen,” here pp. 113–114. 29. Ibid., p. 114; as well as Thomas Risse, Anja Jetschke, and Hans-Peter Schmitz, Die Macht der Menschenrechte. Internationale Normen, kommunikatives Handeln und politischer Wandel in den Ländern des Südens, BadenBaden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002. 30. As exemplified by Jeffrey Checkel’s, “Why Comply? Constructivism, Social Norms, and the Study of International Institutions,” International Organization, vol. 55, no. 3, 2001, pp. 553–588; Alistair Ian Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 45, no. 5, 2001, pp. 487–515. 31. Risse, “Konstruktivismus, Rationalismus und Theorien Internationaler Beziehungen.” 32. As Colin Wight convincingly argues, not only is dichotomized thinking in IR Theory vastly overstated but it is founded on the misinterpretation of

Notes

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42.

43.

44.

45. 46.

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“positivism” as meaning “science” when, in fact, “positivism” ought to be understood as one of many “epistemologies” initially formed in accordance with the criteria of the “philosophy of science.” However, over time it was falsely interpreted to denote the “philosophy of science” itself. It is this misunderstanding that has led to the perpetuation of the science–anti- science divide in IR Theory, appearing under many different labels over the years to denote the nature of inter-paradigmatic debates in IR, the most recent one being the rationalist–constructivist debate. For details see, Colin Wight, “Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations,” in Carlsnaes et al., Handbook of International Relations, pp. 23–51. Müller, “International Relations as Communicative Action,” here p. 162. Ibid. Ibid., p. 166. Risse, “Let’s Argue,” here p. 14. Ibid., p. 15. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Harald Müller, “Antinomien des demokratischen Friedens,” Politische Vierteljahreszeitschrift, vol. 43, no. 1, 2001, pp. 46–81; Andreas Hasenclever, “The Democratic Peace Meets International Institutions. Überlegungen zur internationalen Organisation des demokratischen Friedens,” ZIB, vol. 9, no. 1, 2002, pp. 75–112. Tanja Börzel, “Organizing Babylon—On the Different Conceptions of Policy Networks,” Public Administration, vol. 76, no. 2, pp. 253–273. Ibid., p. 16. Michel Foucault, “Politics and the Study of Discourse,” in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, pp. 53–72. See Shelly Chaiken, Wendy Wood, and Alice H. Eagly, “Principles of Persuasion,” in E.T. Higgins and A.W. Kruglanski (eds.), Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles, New York: Guilford Press, pp. 702–742. Risse, “Let’s Argue,” here p. 17; also Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996, pp. 137–138. Ibid., p. 19. Risse, “Let’s Argue,” here p. 18.

5

The Smyser–Habermasian “Navigational Aid”

1. Smyser, How Germans Negotiate. 2. See Maull’s remarks in “Germany and the Use of Force,” here p. 72. 3. See Maull, “Forderungen an die deutsche Außenpolitik,” Internationale Politik, vol. 58, no. 12, December 2001, pp. 1–10, p. 7. 4. Maull, “Germany, Iraq, and the Crisis of the Transatlantic Alliance System.”

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Notes 5. Maull, “Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” 6. Maull, “Why Germany Needs to Choose Europe over America,” available at http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/digest/op-ed_inhalt_ o4.php. 7. See Harald Müller, Macht und Ohnmacht: Deutsche Außenpolitik vor dem Ende? Alfred Herrhausen Gesellschaft für internationalen Dialog, Frankfurt/M.: Deutsche Bank 1998 (my translation). 8. Ibid., p. 55 9. Ibid., pp. 62–63. 10. See Henning Tewes, Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002. 11. A complete interpretation of Maull’s Vierzehn Thesen is presented in chapter 3 of this book. 12. Wolf Mendl, “Strategic Thinking in Diplomacy: A Legacy of the Cold War,” in Michael Clarke (ed.), New Perspectives on Security, The Centre for Defence Studies, London: Brassey’s, 1993, pp. 1–16, here p. 16. 13. See Harald Müller, “Arguing, Bargaining and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness,” European Journal of International Relations, vol. 10, no. 03, September 2004, pp. 395–435. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. See Müller, “International Relations as Communicative Action,” here p. 163. 18. Ibid., pp. 164–165. 19. Ibid. 20. Müller, “Arguing, Bargaining and All That.” 21. See Christer Jönsson, “Diplomacy, Bargaining and Negotiation,” in Carlsnaes et al., Handbook of International Relations, pp. 212–234. 22. Raymond Cohen, “Putting Diplomatic Studies on the Map,” Diplomatic Studies Programme Newsletter, Leicester University, 4 May 1998. 23. Paul Sharp, “For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations,” International Studies Review, vol. 1, no. 1, 1999, pp. 33–57, here, p. 56. 24. François de Callières, On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes, Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1919. 25. Harold Nicholson, Diplomacy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939; and Harold Nicholson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method, London: Constable, 1954. 26. James Der Derian, “Mediating Estrangement: A Theory for Diplomacy,” Review of International Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, 1987, pp. 91–110, p. 91. 27. Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, p. 1. 28. Jose Calvet De Magalhaes, The Pure Concept of Diplomacy, New York: Greenwood Press, 1988, p. 59.

Notes

247

29. Raymond Cohen, “Reflections on the New Global Diplomacy: Statecraft 2500 BC to 2000 AD,” in Jan Melissen (ed.), Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999, p. 4. 30. See George, Forceful Persuasion. See also, Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, Washington, D.C.: The United States Institute of Peace, 2003. The notion of “coercive diplomacy” is sometimes also referred to as “coercive compellence.” 31. Adam Watson, Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States, London: Eyre Methuen, 1982, p. 60. 32. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. 33. Nicholson, Diplomacy. 34. Ibid. 35. Sharp, “For Diplomacy,” here, p. 51. 36. M. Costas Constantinou, On the Way to Diplomacy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 25. 37. Alan James, “Diplomacy and International Society,” International Relations, vol. 6, no. 6, 1980, pp. 931–948, p. 942. 38. Constantinou, On the Way to Diplomacy, p. 113. 39. For further details see Jönsson, “Diplomacy, Bargaining and Negotiation,” here pp. 214–217. 40. Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981. 41. Jönsson, “Diplomacy, Bargaining and Negotiation,” here p. 218. 42. Fred Charles Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Praeger, 1964, p. 2. 43. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 21. 44. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, pp. 3–4. 45. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict; and Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960. 46. Terrence P. Hopmann, “Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem-Solving,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 542, 1995, pp. 24–27. 47. Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982. 48. Robert Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. 49. Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflicts among Nations: Bargaining, Decisionmaking, and System Structure in International Crises, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977. 50. James Sebenius, “Negotiation Analysis,” in Victor Kremenyuk (ed.), International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues, San Francisco: JosseyBass, 1991. 51. Terrence Hopmann, The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflict, Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1996. 52. See especially the projects on national negotiating styles in progress at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., as well as the

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Notes

53.

54. 55. 56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83.

84.

Institute’s Cross-Cultural Negotiation Project aimed at comparisons of national negotiating styles. Thomas Risse, Cooperation among Democracies. The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997; William Zartman and Jeffrey Rubin, Power and Negotiation, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate. See, for example, Jacob Bercovitsch, Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation, Boulder: Lynne Riener, 1996. See Beate Kohler-Koch, “Catching Up with Change: The Transformation of Governance in the European Union,” Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 3, no. 3, 1996, pp. 359–380. Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966. William Zartmann and Maureen Berman, The Practical Negotiator, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982, pp. 93–95. Dean G. Pruitt, “Flexibility in Conflict Episodes,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 542, 1995, 100–115. Zartmann and Berman, The Practical Negotiator. Ibid., p. 207; but also Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, vol. 42, no. 3, 1988, pp. 428–460. Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes, here p. 33. Ibid. Jönsson, “Diplomacy, Bargaining and Negotiation,” p. 227. Smyser, How Germans Negotiate. Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 58. Ibid., p. 59. Ibid. Ibid., p. 72. Ibid., p. 73. Ibid., p. 74. Ibid., p. 78. Ibid., p. 80. Ibid., p. 83. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 86. Ibid. p. 97. See Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen, 1. Auflage, Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1995. and Halverson, The Last Great Nuclear Debate. See Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, p. 19; see also NATO Handbook, NATO Office of Information and Press, Belgium: Brussels, 2001, pp. 149–151. Zartmann and Berman, The Practical Negotiator.

Notes 6

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Debate on NATO Enlargement, 1993

This chapter represents a first draft, written and completed in the course of May–June 2002. I would like to thank Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp for his strong words of approval. In its original version, this case study included a preliminary chapter on the “Historical Background: Germany’s Unification within NATO.” However, for publication purposes and brevity, it is not included in this book. Suffice it to say here that the preliminary chapter is relevant to recognizing (i) that the nature of the agreement permitting Germany’s unification within NATO reveals the Bush administration to have entrusted the German leadership with the right to interpret the agreement responsibly; (ii) Germany’s unification as a sovereign nation within NATO, in a sense, already represented a first tranche of NATO extension into former Soviet territory; (iii) the respective process relates directly to Russian complaints throughout the ensuing negotiation period that NATO enlargement into ECE was in violation of the “spirit” of agreement reached in 1990, permitting German unification within NATO; (iv) it illustrates the nature of ECE security concerns against the background of disquieting events in the Balkans and the Baltic, their reasons for initially holding on to the Warsaw Pact but then supporting a CSCE/OSCE-based system for pan-European Security, only to end up appealing for NATO membership; and (v) NATO’s initially hesitant but various ad hoc responses to this persistent wooing. 1. Bill Clinton’s acceptance speech to the 1992 Democratic Convention is available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/billclinton 1992duc.htm. 2. See Peter Rudolf, “The USA and NATO Enlargement,” Aussenpolitik, vol. 47, no. 4, 1996, pp. 339–347, here pp. 339–340. 3. See Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, here p. 144. On Clinton’s indecisive leadership style, see also Douglas Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine,” Foreign Policy, vol. 106, Spring 1997, pp. 111–127; and Thomas Preston, The President and His Inner Circle, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, pp. 222–235. 4. Karl-Heinz Kamp, Die Frage einer “Osterweiterung” der NATO, Interne Studien, No. 57, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Sankt Augustin, 1993. 5. Dr. Michael Rühle, Head of the Policy Planning and Speechwriting Section of the Political Affairs Division, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, in interview with the author on 22 May 2002, tape recorded. 6. Ibid. 7. On Kohl’s leadership style, see Karl-Rudolf Korte, Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohl’s Kanzlerschaft. Regierungsstil und Entscheidungen 1982–1989, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998, here pp. 257 and 482. 8. In Bulletin des Presse-und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung, no. 13, 1993, pp. 101–105. 9. Dr. Ronald Asmus in interview with the author at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., on 8 January 2002, tape recorded.

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Notes 10. Reinhard Wolf, “The Doubtful Mover: Germany and NATO Expansion,” in David Haglund (ed.), Will NATO Go East? The Debate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance, Kingston, Ont.: Queen’s University, Centre for International Relations, 1996, pp. 197–224. 11. Angela Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 216–217. 12. Vice Admiral (ret.) Ulrich Weisser in interview with the author in Sankt Augustin, Bonn on 2 April 2002, tape recorded. 13. Ibid.; also mentioned by Dr. Stephen Larrabee in interview with the author at RAND, Washington, D.C., on 15 January 2002, tape recorded. 14. The SWP study (originally commissioned by General Klaus Wiesmann, FüS III) was supervised and written in large part by the then SWP research director Dr. Uwe Nerlich, now director of the European Security and Defence Analysis Group of the IABG in Ottobrunn. In a telephone conversation with the author on 26 April 2005, Nerlich revealed that in his former capacity as close adviser to NATO SecretaryGeneral Manfred Wörner, he had initially and successfully advanced the view that NATO as a military alliance had first to be consolidated around an in-depth redefinition of its future purpose and tasks, before considering the idea of extending its military membership to ECE. Also, Nerlich had long sought to convince Rühe of the righteousness of a “politische Bindungserklärung” for the “Oder-Neiße Linie” in lieu of the offer of NATO membership for Poland. Both these points underscore that Nerlich’s view probably did not suit the BMVg’s growing ambitions of putting NATO enlargement firmly on the international agenda by the winter of 1992–93. And indeed, as Heinrich Rentmeister, Rühe’s personal assistant in 1993 and Head of Office from 1994 to 1997, confirmed in a telephone conversation with the author on 1 June 2004: the SWP study, apart from having been too extensive and theoretical, was seen by the BMVg to confuse the two issues of NATO enlargement and consolidation. The prevailing belief in the BMVg at the time was that the two issues had to be dealt with separately. For a reprint of Nerlich’s ideas as presented in the then SWP study, see Wolfgang Heydrich, Joachim Krause, Uwe Nerlich, Jürgen Nötzold, and Reinhardt Rummel (eds.), Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands: Neue Konstellationen, Risiken und Instrumente, Baden-Baden (Reihe Internationale Politik und Sicherheit): Nomos Verlag, 1992. 15. Weisser, interview. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid.; confirmed also by Asmus, interview. Of course, there is good reason to believe that the Americans debated the issue of NATO enlargement long before the Germans did. This is exemplified by Dr. Jeffrey Simon’s various writings published during the early 1990s. However, it seems that neither the Bush administration nor the Clinton administration paid much attention to these early writings nor were there any major public speeches held in Washington in early 1993 on the question of

Notes

18. 19.

20.

21. 22.

23.

24.

25. 26. 27.

28.

29.

30. 31. 32.

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NATO enlargement. See Jeffrey Simon, European Security Policy after the Revolutions of 1989, Government Printing Office, June 1991 edition; and Jeffrey Simon, “Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO?” Orbis, vol. 37, Winter 1993, pp. 29–31. Weisser, interview. Asmus, interview; confirmed also by Larrabee, interview; and also by Professor Richard Kugler in interview with the author at the National Defence University, Washington, D.C., on 14 January 2002, tape recorded. Weisser, interview. In Weisser’s own words: “This was relatively early in 1993. The initiation and planning of the consultancy process took couple of months but this was all in 1993.” Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Plan for Europe,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 1, 1995, pp. 26–42. See Ronald D. Asmus, “Double Enlargement: Redefining the Atlantic Partnership after the Cold War,” in David C. Gompert and Stephen Larrabee (eds.), America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. For a good overview concerning these intra-institutional dynamics, see Trine Flockhart, “The Dynamics of Expansion: NATO, WEU and EU,” European Security, vol. 5, no. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 196–218. For the BMVg’s Gesamtkonzept, see Ulrich Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa: Die Atlantische Allianz in der Bewährung, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999, pp. 25–30; related details were also confirmed during my interview with Weisser. The EU-membership criteria had already been defined by the European Council at the Copenhagen Summit of June 1993. Rentmeister, telephone conversation. Weisser, interview; it is equally relevant to note that it had been Ulrich Weisser who, as a young officer, formerly helped to draft Helmut Schmidt’s 1977 Alistair Buchan Memorial Lecture, which served to initiate the debate on INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces). The 1977 Helmut Schmidt analogy was also raised by Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel in interview with the author at AICGS, Washington, D.C., on 9 January 2002, tape recorded. Weisser, interview; also confirmed by Bindenagel, interview. Bindenagel stated that Rühe’s speech certainly came as a surprise to the U.S. State Department. Weisser, interview; and confirmed by Bindenagel, interview. See Volker Rühe, “Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era,” Survival, vol. 35, no. 2, Summer 1993, pp. 129–137. It was Michael Rühle, who, by not differentiating between Rühe’s ambitions and Rühe’s ability during the interview, unintentionally helped to draw my attention to this point. I think, it is one thing to be overly ambitious and quite another to be able to pursue these ambitions in the appropriate way and with the desired results. Since I am interested in the question of how Germany’s leadership pursued its interests in NATO

252

Notes

33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

46.

47.

48.

enlargement, I am naturally more concerned with the ability and personal qualities of key actors involved in the process of winning support for German conceptions than with their ambitions of “personal aggrandissement.” Of course, if a leading political figure is mesmerized by the ambition of “personal aggrandissement” this may, indeed, have an adverse effect on the authenticity of his/her speeches and his/her ability to influence the audience as previously discussed in relation to the notion of “rhetorical action” (chapter 4, in this book). On the other hand, if the arguments of the speech carry more weight than the personal weaknesses of the orator and if the arguments are made consistently and convincingly for a long period of time (which seems to have been the case with Rühe and his Policy Planning Staff), then the audience is likely to be influenced by the power of the “better argument” rather than by being overly concerned with the underlying weaknesses in the character of the speaker. Besides, working in the area of politics does require “ambition.” In other words, “ambition” need not be a “bad thing,” but it is certainly necessary if one wants to survive in the field of politics. Hans-Joachim Falenski, Volker Rühe’s current Head of Office, speaking about Rühe’s personal qualitities, strengths, and weaknesses in interview with the author in Berlin on 2 May 2002, tape recorded. Rühe, “Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies,” here p. 133. It is interesting to observe how some of these arguments still carry weight in the context of today’s transatlantic debate. Rühe, “Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies,” pp. 133–135. Ibid., p. 131. Ibid., p. 134. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 135. Ibid. Ibid., p. 135. Ibid., p. 137. See Max Otte, A Rising Middle Power? German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 1989–1999, New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 2000; see also the comments made by the then British foreign minister, Douglas Hurd, in “Hurd: keine baldige Ausdehnung der NATO,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24 September 1993. See Karl-Heinz Kamp, “NATO Entrapped: Debating the Next Enlargement Round,” Survival, vol. 40, no. 3, Autumn 1998, pp. 170–186, here p. 176. On the function of speeches in foreign policy, see Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, pp. 7–11. For Kohl’s speech, see “Bündnis- und Einsatzfähigkeit der Bundeswehr bleiben gewährleistet,” Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, 2 July 1993, p. 45 (my translation).

Notes

253

49. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Rühe offen für neue NATO-Mitglieder: Plädoyer für eine Strategie des euroatlantischen Raumes,” 21 May 1993. 50. Professor Anthony Lake, former national security adviser to Bill Clinton, in interview with the author at Georgetown University on 14 January 2002, tape recorded. The point made about Walesa confirms the point I made earlier about alleged weaknesses in character not taking precedence over the power of the “better argument.” See note 32, in this chapter. 51. See James Goldgeier, Not Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999, p. 20; also confirmed by Lake, interview. 52. Interestingly, the “Vancouver Declaration” makes no mention at all of NATO’s role in bringing security to a new Europe. Instead, both presidents emphasize the role of the UN and the CSCE in providing security and stability across the continent including Central and Eastern Europe. For details see, 1st Clinton–Yeltsin Summit, 3–4 April 1993 (Vancouver, Canada), Vancouver Declaration, available at http://www.ceip.org/ programs/npp/summits1.htm. 53. As the anonymous peer reviewer revealed, the “Twin Arcs” study had been sponsored by the U.S. Army where—upon completion—it was largely ignored. Report by peer reviewer, 23 June 2005. 54. As mentioned in the peer review report. 55. The fact that the subject of NATO enlargement was highly unpopular among Washington’s policy circles at the time was confirmed by Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp, in interview with the author at JWG University of Frankfurt, March 2002. It was also mentioned by Asmus, interview; Larrabee, interview; Kugler, interview; and Weisser, interview. 56. Asmus, interview. 57. Weisser, interview. The fact that the BMVg chose RAND and its experts on grounds that (i) their work suited Volker Rühe’s own ideas on NATO enlargement and (ii) served as a medium to influence, shape, and direct the U.S. policymaking machinery and its debate, by virtue of the fact that RAND had an input to the U.S. policymaking process, was also confirmed by Rentmeister, telephone conversation. 58. Asmus, interview; confirmed by Weisser, interview. 59. Weisser, interview. The BMVg sponsored all three of the leading RAND publications on the subject of NATO enlargement: Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, “Building a New NATO,” Foreign Affairs, September–October 1993, pp. 28–40; Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, “NATO Expansion: The Next Steps,” Survival, vol. 37, no. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 7–33; Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, “What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?” Survival, vol. 38, no. 3, Autumn 1996, pp. 5–26. Of these three major RAND studies, the second one is considered to be the most important, according to Asmus, interview. 60. Confirmed by Falenski, interview; Weisser, interview; Asmus, interview. 61. Asmus, interview.

254

Notes 62. See Richard Lugar, “NATO: Out-of-Area or Out-of- Business,” Foreign Policy Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 2, September–October 1993, pp. 25–29. It should be noted that the slogan “Out-of-Area or Out-of- Business” was purely a RAND creation, according to the peer reviewer. 63. Asmus, interview. 64. On Lugar’s role, see also Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, p. 35. 65. This speech is entitled, “Why Europe Still Matters and Why NATO Should Enlarge, Again,” Address by Senator Richard G. Lugar to the CSIS Washington Roundtable on Capitol Hill, 13 June 2001, available at http://www.expand.nato.org/lugarcsis.html. 66. Ambassador Jenonne Walker, former special assistant to President Clinton and senior director for European Affairs at the National Security Council, in interview with the author in Washington, D.C., on 20 December 2001, tape recorded. 67. Asmus et al., “Building a New NATO.” 68. Confirmed by Larrabee, interview. Stephen Larrabee explained that many U.S. policymakers at the time thought that Asmus was simply “crazy” to be advertising the issue of NATO enlargement in D.C. 69. Asmus et al., “Building a New NATO,” here specifically pp. 31–32 and 37. 70. In his book, Warren Christopher, mentions that his thinking had been influenced by the first RAND article on NATO enlargement published in the autumn of 1994. See Christopher, In The Stream of History, p. 129, footnote 2. 71. Warren Christopher, “U.S. Leadership after the Cold War: NATO and Transatlantic Security,” Intervention at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in Athens, Greece, 10 June 1993, in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 21 June 1993, vol. 4, no. 25, p. 450. 72. Lake, interview; also confirmed by Walker, interview. 73. Ambassador Robert Hunter, in interview with the author at RAND, Washington, D.C., on 11 February 2002, tape recorded. Robert Hunter also mentioned that Thomas Donilon, then Warren Christopher’s Chief of Staff, was able to confirm that it had been Hunter who managed to get the idea of the summit proposal across to the White House upon Wörner’s request. Ulrich Weisser, during the interview, also emphasized that Manfred Wörner had a great deal of influence on American deliberations and especially on placing the idea of a NATO Summit on the U.S agenda in the course of 1993 for 1994. Dr. Karsten Voigt, former president of the North Atlantic Assembly, in interview with the author in Berlin on 28 May 2002, equally confirmed that Wörner together with Rühe, Weisser, RAND, and others joined forces to see this project through. 74. Rühle, interview. As Michael Rühle clarified, Manfred Wörner had been waiting for an Alliance member to take the initiative to start the debate on NATO enlargement. 75. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, p. 22. 76. For details on the Interagency Working Group see ibid., pp. 23–24. 77. Ibid., p. 26.

Notes

255

78. Joseph Kruzel sadly lost his life in a car accident outside Sarajevo during Richard Holbrooke’s Mission in Bosnia in 1995. Consult Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, New York: The Modern Library, 1998. 79. It is a well-known fact within NATO, although only seldom openly pronounced, that new member countries are hardly able to contribute to Alliance security to the extent Pentagon officials envisioned in 1993–94. Hence, the Alliance’s 1997 decision to invite new members from ECE indicates that, in the end, other considerations—other than rational cost–benefit analyses—must have dominated the decisionmaking process within NATO. On the (in)ability of new members to contribute effectively to Alliance security, see Ronald D. Asmus and Charles Grant, “Can NATO Remain an Effective Military and Political Alliance if it Keeps Growing?” available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/ issue1/debate_pr.html. 80. See Rudolf, “The USA and NATO Enlargement,” p. 340. 81. See Gerald B. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990–1997— Blessings of Liberty, Westport: Praeger Press with Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998, pp. 27–28. Also confirmed by Hunter, interview. 82. See my point under note 80, in this chapter. 83. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, pp. 27–28; see also Michael Mihalka, “Squaring the Circle: NATO’s Offer to the East,” RFE/Rl Research Report, 25 March 1994, p. 1. 84. See Drew, On the Edge, p. 404. 85. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, p. 34. 86. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Bedenken Jelzins gegen eine Ausweitung der NATO nach Osten,” 2 October 1993; New York Times, “Yeltsin Opposes Expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe,” 2 October 1993. 87. Drew, On the Edge, p. 140. 88. In Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, p. 41. 89. On Washington’s overly negative definition of NATO enlargement, see Brzezinski, “A Plan for Europe,” pp. 26–42, at p. 42. 90. Confirmed by Rentmeister, telephone conversation. 91. That this was the German government’s main rationale for and definition of NATO enlargement was also confirmed by Voigt, interview. 92. James M. Morrison, “NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments,” available at http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/ macnair/m040ch2a.html, p. 1; and Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 23. 93. Morrison, “NATO Expansion,” p. 1. 94. Ibid. 95. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Jelzin-Brief in Prag kritisiert,” 4 October 1993. 96. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Bedenken Jelzins gegen eine Ausweitung der NATO nach Osten,” 2 October 1993; see also Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 24.

256

Notes 97. Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 4, no. 39, 27 September 1993, pp. 658–664. 98. Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement.” 99. Ibid., here pp. 111–118. 100. Manfred Wörner, IISS speech, Brussels, 10 September 1993, available at http://www.nato.int./docu/speech/1993/s930910a.htm. It is worth remembering that at the time Wörner gave this speech, Yeltsin’s letter had not yet been written. 101. Rühle, interview. 102. On this point, see also Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, p. 34. Besides, Professor James Goldgeier agreed with me in a tape-recorded interview at George Washington University, on 18 December 2001, that he should have paid more attention to the role and influence of the Kohl government on the U.S. decision to enlarge NATO than he had done in his 1999 book. 103. See Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, p. 44 (my translation). 104. See Kamp’s remarks in “NATO Entrapped,” here p. 177. 105. Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, p. 45. 106. Weisser, interview. 107. Weisser, interview. 108. Weisser, interview. 109. Ambassador Jenonne Walker’s preference for the NACC was also confirmed by Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski in interview with the author at John Hopkins University on 8 January 2002, tape recorded. 110. Weisser, interview. 111. See Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, pp. 47–48; and Weisser, interview. 112. On differing interpretations of this formula and the general state of confusion within the Clinton administration on NATO enlargement, see Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, p. 42. 113. Walker, interview. 114. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, p. 35. 115. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 30. 116. Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, p. 48. 117. Weisser, interview; permission to see a copy of the telex addressed to Ulrich Weisser and signed by Jenonne Walker in confirmation that PFP were not to be interpreted by the Clinton administration as an alternative to NATO enlargement at the then forthcoming NATO defence ministers meeting in Travemünde in October 1993. 118. Weisser, interview. 119. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 33. 120. Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, p. 52; and Weisser, interview. See also, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Die NATO bietet eine Partnerschaft für den Frieden an,” 22 October 1993. 121. In Thomas W. Lippmann, “Christopher Talks Partnership in East,” Washington Post, 22 October 1993, p. A28. 122. Welt am Sonntag, “Polen beklagt Absage der NATO an Erweiterung,” 24 October 1993.

Notes

257

123. Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, p. 53. 124. Martin Winter, “Kinkel will osteuropäischen Staaten Zugang zur NATO öffnen,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 11 September 1993. 125. Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, p. 57. 126. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, p. 47. 127. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 29. 128. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Rühe warnt die NATO vor “Vetorecht” für Rußland,” 9 December 1993. 129. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, p. 54.

7

The Holbrooke Factor, 1994

1. William Jefferson Clinton, “Remarks to Future Leaders of Europe in Brussels,” 9 January 1994, Public Papers, Book I, p. 11. 2. Ibid. 3. William Jefferson Clinton, “Partnership for Peace: Building New Security for the 21st Century,” US Department of State Dispatch Supplement, January 1994, vol. 5, pp. 3–4; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Vereinigte Staaten: Langsamere Gangart Rußlands wegen,” 7 January 1994. 4. William Jefferson Clinton, “The President’s News Conference in Brussels,” 11 January 1994, Public Papers, 1994, Book I, p. 29. 5. For more information on PFP and CJTF in this context, see Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, pp. 56–57. 6. Charles Kupchan, “Strategic Visions,” World Policy Journal, vol. 11, Fall 1994, pp. 112–122, here p. 113. 7. See “Erklärung der Staats-und Regierungschefs des Nordatlantikpaktes, abgegeben zum Abschluß ihrer Tagung am 10–11 January 1994 in Brüssel,” Europa-Archiv, vol. 49, no. 2,1994, pp. 132–134; see also KarlHeinz Kamp, Zwischen Friedenspartnerschaft und Vollmitgliedschaft: Die Frage einer Osterweiterung der NATO? Interne Studien, no. 102, June 1995, Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung. 8. William Jefferson Clinton, “The President’s News Conference with Visegrad Leaders in Prague,” 12 January 1994, Public Papers, 1994, Book I, p. 40; for ECE concerns, see also Jiri Dienstbier, “Die NATOPartnerschaft darf kein Ersatzzuckerl sein,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 6 January 1994; and Andrzej Olechowski, “Polen und die Nordatlantische Allianz,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 03.01.1994. 9. Asmus, interview. 10. Goldgeier, interview. 11. Kupchan, “Strategic Visions,” p. 113. 12. William Jefferson Clinton, “Interview with Reporters Aboard Air Force One,” 16 January 1994, Public Papers, 1994, Book I, p. 90. 13. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 46. 14. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, pp. 47–48.

258

Notes 15. Ibid., p. 65. Keeping the Russia and NATO trains on parallel tracks in 1996–97 was a joint German–American effort led by both Strobe Talbott and the then political director of the German Foreign Ministry, Wolfgang Ischinger, on the diplomatic level. 16. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 64. 17. In Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, no. 3, 1994, p. 17 (my translation). 18. Claus Gennrich “Das Bild der Moskauer Vorgänge beunruhigt die Bonner Politik: Die Lava ist in Bewegung,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 February 1994. 19. See Das Parlament, “Das Tor nach Osten geöffnet,” 21 January 1994, no. 3. 20. Ibid. 21. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 43. 22. Frankfurter Rundschau, “Rücksicht tut Not,” 9 December 1993. 23. Asmus, interview. 24. Asmus, interview. That Clinton and Kohl were in regular contact was also confirmed by Anthony Lake, interview. 25. Martin S. Lambeck, “Kohl bei Clinton: Abstand zu Polen,” Die Welt, 10 February 1995; also George Brock, “Kohl Cautions NATO against Rush to Expand Eastwards,” Times (London), 4 July 1995; Atlantic News, “NATO Enlargement/Kohl: Developing a Concept in Close Contact with Russia,” 22 December 1994. 26. “Junktim mit EU-Mitgliedschaft,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 July 1995. 27. Details in Wolf, The Doubtful Mover, pp. 197–219, here p. 208. 28. That intra-governmental differences did not prevent Germany from playing a leading role in the international Alliance debate can be discerned from Claus Gennrich, “In einer Zeit ohne Patentrezepte gewinnt die deutsche Außenpolitik an Gewicht: der wichtigste Partner Amerikas—enge Verbindung zu Jelzin,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 January 1994. 29. Asmus, interview. 30. Weisser, interview. Confirmed also by Asmus, interview; and Walker, interview. 31. Weisser, interview. 32. Weisser, interview. 33. In Germany, the 1995–96 American–British debate on NATO enlargement was largely perceived as a delayed debate over the pros and cons of enlargement, shaped primarily by U.S. strategic interests and cost–benefit calculations rather than “pro-stability” arguments as in the case of Germany. See, Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, “Zwischen Moral und Staatsinteresse,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 June 1995. See, especially, Michael E. Brown, “The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion,” Survival, vol. 37, no. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 34–52; Dana H. Allin, “Can Containment Work Again?” Survival, vol. 37, no. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 53–65; Philip Zelikow, “The Masque of Institutions,” Survival, vol. 38, no. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 6–18; Philip H. Gordon, “Recasting the Atlantic Alliance,” Survival, vol. 38, no. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 32–57; Nick

Notes

34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

259

Williams, “Partnership for Peace: Permanent Fixture or Declining Asset?” Survival, vol. 38, no. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 98–110. Voigt, interview. See Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 28; and Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, “Amerika setzt auf Deutschland,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 March 1994. Voigt, interview. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 32. Ibid., p. 49. Ibid. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, p. 69. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 64. Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, p. 62; supported by Bindenagel, interview. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, p. 61. Ibid., p. 65. Dr. Daniel Hamilton, former senior advisor to Richard Holbrooke and currently director of the Centre for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., in interview with the author on 17 February 2002, tape recorded. Voigt, interview. Asmus, interview. Hamilton, interview. See Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn, p. 219. Asmus, interview; also confirmed by Weisser, interview. Asmus, interview. Asmus, interview. Asmus interview; also confirmed by Weisser, interview, as well as Bindenagel, interview. Ambassador Bindenagel added that Joachim Bitterlich (Chancellor Kohl’s adviser) also managed to positively influence Holbrooke’s thinking on the German rationale for NATO enlargement. See also, Richard Holbrooke, “America, a European Power,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 2, March–April 1995, pp. 38–51. Weisser, interview; confirmed by Bindenagel, interview. Weisser, interview. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, p. 69; confirmed by Asmus, interview; Bindenagel, interview; and Hamilton, interview. Asmus, interview. Asmus, interview. Also, Anthony Lake confirmed in his interview that Strobe Talbott was not as anti–NATO enlargement as is often portrayed. Asmus, interview. Hamilton, interview. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, p. 73. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 67. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, p. 74. Richard Holbrooke has been characterized by some Washington officials as: “A master negotiator, even though he does not fit Harold Nicholson’s

260

Notes

65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

70. 71. 72.

73. 74. 75.

76.

77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82.

83.

description of a “good” diplomat. Holbrooke stands in a category of his own. He is a “tough cookie” and an interesting case study of “communicative action” in himself because he can conduct several telephone conversations at once. Holbrooke is someone you would love to have on your football team, but not someone you would like to see courting your sister. He can be ruthless, constantly thinking about every scrap of leverage he can get over you—to get what he wants. He may start to talk about your mother, your sister, the weather—it is all part of the tactics. He is a genius. You can either love or hate him.” I guess it is not surprising that the respective informants would like to remain anonymous. Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, p. 72. Ibid (my translation). See Kamp, “Zwischen Friedenspartnerschaft und Vollmitgliedschaft,” p. 19. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Im Grundsatz nach Osten offen,” 5 May 1994. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Kinkel und Rühe uneins über NATOErweiterung,” 7 October 1994; see also, dpa Pressebrief, “Kohl will sich zum Streit um Ost-Erweiterung nicht äußern,” 7 October 1994. Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, p. 66. Ibid., pp. 66–67. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Washington will Osterweiterung der NATO voranbringen,” 9 November 1994. In a World-Net Interview in November 1994, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke announced that the U.S administration intended to take “far-ranging steps” on the subject of NATO enlargement: see U.S. Policy and Texts, 21 November 1994, p. 7. Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, p. 68. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 70. dpa Pressebrief, “Süddeutsche Zeitung: NATO Botschafter kritisiert USA,” 30 November 1994. Excerpts of Richthofen’s letter to the German government are reprinted in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1 December 1994. Confirmed during an interview with a high-ranking AA official who had been commissioned to NATO at the time to help work out an agreement with Russia and who would like to remain anonymous. According to this official, it had not been easy for the German delegation in NATO to consult with the American NATO delegation on matters at hand, since the latter appeared to be “very disorganized.” Interview conducted in Berlin, AA, on 28 May 2002. See Kamp, “Zwischen Friedenspartnerschaft und Vollmitgliedschaft,” p. 18. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 71. Kamp, “Zwischen Friedenspartnerschaft und Vollmitgliedschaft,” p. 19, footnote 27. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 71. Die Welt, “Schlagabtausch Clinton-Jelzin,” 6 December 1994. Stanley Kober, “NATO Expansion and the Danger of a Second Cold War,” available at http://cato.org/pubs7fpbriefs/fpb-038.html, pp. 1–14, here pp. 4–5. Kamp, “Zwischen Friedenspartnerschaft und Vollmitgliedschaft,” p. 20; see also, Craig Whitney, “Why Europe Is Careful Not to Scold the Bear,”

Notes

261

New York Times, 2 January 1995; see also, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Kohl rät in Washington zur Geduld bei NATO-Erweiterung,” 11 February 1995.

8

Keeping the Process Afloat, 1995

1. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Wie weiter zwischen dem Westen und Russland? Amerika, Europa, Bonn denken nach,” 12 May 1995. 2. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Vier Minister sollen erreichen, was die NATO als Ganzes nicht kann: Rühe reist nach Amerika—Treffen mit Perry, Rifkind, Leotard,” 27 February 1995. 3. United States Information Service Wireless File, “NATO Issues Study on Enlargement of Alliance,” 29 September 1995. See also John Barrett, “NATO’s Year of Study: Results and Policy Implications,” in Haglund, Will NATO Go East? pp. 99–102. 4. Steven Greenhouse, “Clinton to Tell Yeltsin that NATO Is Not AntiRussian,” The New York Times, 14 March 1995. 5. Steven Greenhouse, “U.S.–Russian Intersection: The Romance Is Gone,” The New York Times, 27 March 1995. 6. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 80. 7. Argumenty I Fakty, “Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel: We Bear No Grudge against Russians for Germany’s Defeat in World War Two,” 10 May 1995, no. 18–19, p. 8. 8. For Kohl’s speech, see “Offizieller Besuch des Bundeskanzlers in der Republik Polen,” Bulletin des Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, no. 58, 14 July 1995, pp. 569–572. 9. Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, p. 80. 10. Ibid., p. 83; confirmed by Asmus, interview. 11. For further details, see Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, pp. 82–83. 12. On the role and significance of Russian soldiers serving in Bosnia under the American-led NATO command for the first time in history, see Gerhard Gnauck, “Jetzt sind wir Waffenbrüder,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 March 1997. 13. See Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, p. 84.

9

Winning Moscow’s Approval, 1996–97

1. See Tatiana Parkhalina, “Of Myths and Illusions: Russians Perceptions of NATO Enlargement,” NATO Review, no. 3, May–June 1997, pp. 11–15. 2. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Kinkel macht sich für die Aufnahme Rußlands in den Europarat stark,” 22 January 1996 (my translation). 3. Quoted in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Jelzin warnt Washington und Bonn vor der Ost-Erweiterung der NATO,” 29 January 1996 (my translation).

262

Notes 4. On Kohl’s cautionary remarks see Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 92; see also Claus Gennrich, “Die Europäer sollen in einem Block leben und nicht in zweien,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 February 1996. 5. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Kohl in Moskau—Wutausbruch Jelzins gegen die Ost-Erweiterung der NATO,” 20 February 1996 (my translation); see also Roger Boyes, “Germany’s Wooing of Uneasy Russia Unsettles Nerves in Central Europe,” The Times, 7 February 1996. 6. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Kohl in Moskau,” 20 February 1996 (my translation). 7. See Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 93. 8. According to news reports, Yeltsin had suffered a heart attack shortly before the second round of elections; however the Kremlin tried to withhold the information of the heart attack for political reasons. On Kohl’s relaxed meeting with Yeltsin, see http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/ 9609/07/kohl.yeltsin/. 9. For details of Yeltsin’s health record amid domestic political crises, see http://www.cnn.com/world/9609/20/yeltsin.button/. 10. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 97. 11. Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, pp. 94–97. 12. On the Russian negotiating style, see Hiroshi Kimura, “The Russian Way of Negotiation,” in Peter Berton, Hiroshi Kimura, and William Zartmann, International Negotiation: Actors, Structure/Process, Values, Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999, chapter 3. 13. In 1997, for example, Madeleine Albright the new U.S. secretary of state would repeatedly and in various comments emphasize that NATO was not going to be “dictated” to by Russia. 14. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Kohl und Jelzin wollen 1997 Frage der NATO-Erweiterung klären,” 9 September 1996; see also, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Jelzin: Erst Vertrag zwischen der NATO und Rußland,” 30 September 1996; and Keesings Archiv der Gegenwart, “NATO: Herbsttagung der Außenminister,” 10 December 1996, 41641. 15. Weisser, interview and Weisser’s book, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, pp. 97–100. 16. Ibid. 17. Weisser, interview. 18. The fact that Wolfgang Ischinger played a key role in preparing the ground for the 1997 Solana–Primakov negotiations on the NATO–Russia Founding Act, was also confirmed by Heinrich Rentmeister, telephone conversation. 19. On this line of argumentation, see also, Karsten Voigt, “Die Osterweiterung der NATO,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, vol. 46, no. B5, 1996, p. 22. 20. Weisser, interview. 21. See Gennady Temnenkkov, “German Minister Proposes NATO–Russian Consultative Body,” The Russian Information Agency ITAR-TASS, 8 December 1996; See also, Alexei Korinenko, “Germany:

Notes

22. 23.

24.

25.

26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31. 32. 33.

34.

35. 36. 37.

263

NATO to Take Decision on Expansion in the First Six Months of 1997,” Russian Information Agency ITAR-TASS, 22 September 1996. For more details, see Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, pp. 101–109. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Die Bundesregierung hat für die Gespräche mit Rußland ein Konzept entwickelt: westlichen Bemühungen vorausgedacht,” 17 January 1997 (my translation). As the article confirms, it had been Germany that had secured the Alliance’s unilateral “three no’s” pledge issued in December 1996. On the pledge, see Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 104. See Bruce Clark, “How the East Was Won,” Financial Times, 5–6 July 1997; see also, Keesings Archiv der Gegenwart, “Russische Diskussionen über die NATO-Osterweiterung: Solana in Moskau,” 20 January 1997, 41734. It is worth noting that Kinkel himself preferred the “17” to the “16⫹1” formula adopted by NATO in September 1995 as part of a political framework agreed with Russia. For this, see Gennady Temnenkov, “German Minister Proposes NATO–Russia Consultative Body,” The Russian Information Agency ITAR-TASS, 8 December 1996. See Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, p. 112. See Ian Mather and Miranda Anichkina, “Solana to Seek Deal in Russia,” The European, 6–12 March 1997. Keesings Archiv der Gegenwart, “Gipfeltreffen in Helsinki,” 20 March 1997, 41898–41900. For details, see Focus, “Schach dem Bündnis: Russland setzt bei der NATOOsterweiterung ein lukratives Tauschgeschäft durch, und die Deutschen helfen dabei,” 17 May 1997, pp. 60–62, here p. 60; see also, Süddeutsche Zeitung, “Kohl: Moskau wird politisch aufgewertet,” 18 April 1997. Henry Kissinger, “Helsinki Fiasco,” Washington Post, 30 March 1997. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, p. 112. Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, pp. 109–116. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Die NATO und Rußland einig—Der Weg zur Unterzeichnung in Paris ist frei: Solana und Primakov nach zähen Verhandlungen erfolgreich,” 15 May 1997 (my translation). Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Germ of a More Secure Europe,” Financial Times, 27 May 1997; see also, Javier Solana, “NATO’s Quantum Leap,” Wall Street Journal Europe, 27 May 1997. For details, see Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa, pp. 117–118. Keesings Archiv der Gegenwart, “NATO-Gipfelkonferenz in Madrid,” 9 July 1997, 42175; see also Focus, “Drei dürfen mit,” 7 July 1997, pp. 208–212. Financial Times, “NATO invited old enemies into fold,” 9 July 1997; David Buchan, Bruce Clark and David White, “NATO Expansion Deal Covers Divide,” Financial Times, 9 July 1997.

Conclusion 1. See most notably, Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, pp. 32–33; Stanley Sloan, NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The

264

Notes

2. 3.

4.

5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered, Boulder, Colo.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002. Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Doors, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. In Michael Rühle, “Re-Examining the Transatlantic Bargain and the Enlargement Conundrum,” available at http://www.nato.int/docu/ review/2002/issue4/english/book_pr.html; see also Stefan Wolff, “Coincidence or Commonality of Interests? German and American Views on NATO Enlargement,” International Studies Association, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001. Stephen Szabo, “Ein Projekt ‘Made in Germany’—Was Rühe’s strategischer Logik entsprang, hat die Unterstützung der Regierung Clinton gefunden,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 July 1997 (my translation). Robert J. Lieber (ed.), Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century, New York: Longman, 1997. Weisser, interview. David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest,” in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (eds.), Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992, pp. 133–155, here p. 136. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 137. Ibid. Ibid., p. 138. On this, see Bonnie Azab Powell, “Linguistics Professor George Lakoff Dissects the “War on Terror” and other conservative catchphrases,” UC Berkeley Web Feature, News Center, 26 August 2004, available at http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/08/25_lakoff.shtml. See “The Republicans Know How to Frame Issues and Keep the Democrats on the Defensive,” a BuzzFlash Interview with “Framing” Expert UC Berkeley Professor George Lakoff, available at http://www.opednews.com/buzzflash0104_lakoff_interview.htm. Also confirmed by Brzezinski, interview. Bindenagel, interview. Asmus, interview. Asmus, interview. Walker, interview. Asmus, interview. Bindenagel, interview. Rühe, “Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies,” here p. 134. Ibid. Weisser, interview. Holbrooke, “America, a European Power,” here pp. 38–51. Beate Kohler-Koch, “Deutsche Einigung im Spannungsfeld internationaler Umbrüche,” Politische Vierteljahresschrift, vol. 32, December 1991, pp. 605–620, here p. 616.

Notes

265

27. I place the word “new” in inverted commas, because I believe there are many foreign policy concepts of the early 1990s that remain ill defined and thus deserve to be closely reexamined in relation to their potential usefulness to current international affairs. Still, I do not believe that any effort to recharge older concepts should distract our attention from producing new foreign policy concepts similar to the period of engenderment we experienced during the early 1990s.

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I N D E X

Afghanistan, 3, 15–16, 35, 237 Ahtisaari, Martti, 46–7, 50, 240–1 Argumentative rationality, see Logic of arguing Asmus, Ronald, 122–5, 151–2, 156, 158, 162–6, 199–200, 210–11, 249–51, 253–5, 258–9, 264 Aspin, Les, 131–2, 140, 143–4, 146, 167 Balkans, 14, 16, 29, 32, 45–6, 53, 78, 107, 126, 157, 191, 197, 201, 240 bargaining, 82–4, 88–9, 229, 246–8 Bosnia, 128, 130, 161, 165–6, 170, 177, 183, 213, 255 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 146, 153, 251, 263 Christopher, Warren, 127–9, 133–4, 138–9, 146, 165, 167, 170, 185, 204–5, 252, 254 Civilian/Civilianizing Civilianization, 13, 31, 39–40, 42, 48, 54, 83, 229 definition of, 37–45 diplomacy, 54, 77–9, 81–5, 92, 229–30 power, ix, 4–17, 26, 28–9, 31, 33–54, 77–9, 81–5, 92, 101, 229–30, 235, 238–42, 245

Clinton, William Jefferson, see United States, Clinton administration Cohen, Raymond, 85–6, 246 Cold War, 1, 8–10, 16, 27, 34, 37, 71, 95, 99, 105, 112, 126, 129, 192, 200–2, 217, 222–3, 238, 251, 254 Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), 130–1, 150, 154, 257 Communicative action, ix, 7, 17, 58–75, 77, 81–5, 87–8, 92, 94, 97, 99–100, 116, 199, 222, 229–30, 237, 243–6 common lifeworld, 69–71, 73, 83–4, 88, 97, 99–100, 116, 223 equality, 69–74, 97, 223 Communism, 32, 107, 154, 171, 182 complex interdependence, 5, 12, 39–40, 42, 44 Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE), 119, 173, 175, 203, 253 continuity, 4–5, 10, 21, 25–8, 44, 45, 53–4, 228–9, 240 democracy, 17, 39, 71, 107, 109, 114, 127, 137, 143, 150, 157, 165, 233, 247, 249

300

Index

diplomacy, ix, 5–11, 14–15, 27, 35, 40, 46, 48–9, 52, 54, 62, 77–88, 92–101, 175–6, 179–80, 186, 190, 194, 199, 214–15, 219–20, 225–7, 229–30, 236, 246–8, 252 and civilian/civilianizing power, 7, 8, 10, 14, 17, 40, 48, 54, 83, 92 coercive, 86, 236, 247 German, 5, 7, 9, 11, 15, 17, 27, 46, 48–9, 52, 54, 77–81, 92–101, 179–80, 190, 194, 199, 214–15, 219–20, 225–7, 229–30, 252 low-profile, ix, 7, 35 Economic policy, 6, 12, 14, 31, 38–40, 41, 44, 241 Fischer, Joschka, 14–15, 32, 35, 46–7, 238 Foreign policy change, 25–8, 34, 39, 53, 242 continuity, see continuity German, ix, xiii, 2–15, 17–18, 21–45, 48–9, 53, 77–83, 92, 94, 100, 109, 111–12, 135, 145, 155–7, 162–3, 174–6, 179, 185, 188, 202–3, 219, 229–31, 234–5, 237–8, 240–2, 264–5, see Civilian/Civilianizing power national interests, 10, 24, 27, 42–3, 45: normality, See Normality; self-confident, 8–10, 24, 27, 29, 33, 35, 49, 236 United States, 8–10, 12–15, 34, 49, 79–80, 92, 94, 105–7, 111, 122–3, 125–6, 128–34, 136–7, 146, 149–54, 159–72, 174, 176–7, 186, 188, 190–7, 199–215, 218–21, 224–8, 230–1 FOTL (Lance short-range ballistic missile) dispute, 9–10, 223

game theory, 61, 63–5, 89–90 genocide, 17, 32, 47, 51, 107 Germany diplomatic influence, 6–7, 11, 15, 27, 49, 77–9, 81, 93, 188, 230–1 foreign policy of, see Foreign policy, German historical legacy, 10, 22, 27, 29, 78, 92, 94, 98, 217 humanitarianism, 32–3, 39, 45, 48, 231 location of, 10, 22, 42, 77–8 military force (use of), see Military force, German national interest, 9–11, 23–4, 42–3, 45, 94–5, 98, 216, 225 negotiating behavior, see negotiation, German behavior postwar experiences/culture, 5, 11, 32, 38, 52–3, 78, 92, 230 security policy, see Security policy, Germany as “threat,” 2–3, 5, 28, 156, 234 unification, see Unification West Germany, 5, 9, 27–8, 38, 78, 237 Gesamtkonzept, 95–7, 99, 113, 143, 210, 217, 220–2, 224–7, 251 Globalization, 5, 11–12, 15, 37–8, 235–6 Goldgeier, James, 206, 253–7, 259, 263 Group of Seven/Eight Industrialized Nations (G7/8), 46, 168, 175, 183, 193, 196, 219, 227 Gulf War, 3, 22, 29–31, 33, 112, 201 Habermas, Jürgen, 61, 64, 72, 96 Social theory of Communicative Action, see Communicative Action Hard power, 12–13, 15, 38, 40

Index Havel, Vaclav, 121, 136, 151, 204 Hellman, Gunther, 24–31, 33, 53–4, 235–40, 242 Helsinki Summit, 191–4, 263 Holbrooke, Richard, 162–8, 171, 200, 210–12, 225–6, 255, 259–60 Human rights, 32–3, 39, 47, 71, 109, 192, 244 Hunter, Robert, 131, 205, 254 IISS, 116, 121, 125, 128, 131, 137, 203–4, 210, 217 International change, xiii, 1, 6, 8, 16–17, 21, 38, 44, 52, 222 International law, 14, 16–17, 29, 40, 47, 50–1, 80, 83, 109, 231 International norms, 16–17, 40–1, 83, 229–31, 244 International Relations (IR), ix, 4, 12, 23, 26–8, 34, 38–9, 42, 44–5, 51, 53, 57–64, 84–5, 237, 242, 244–6 Germany’s contribution to, ix, 6, 10–11, 39, 60 Theory, 25, 31, 35, 48, 57–9, 61–4, 75, 84, 229, 242–5: Constructivism, 26, 57–60, 63, 68–9, 84, 242, 244; Prescription, 6, 38, 228–9, 240; Rationalism/Rational-choice, 26, 57–75, 82, 84, 98, 246; rationalist–constructivist debate, ix, 26, 84, 245; Realism, 4, 23, 26–8, 34, 38–9, 42, 44–5, 51, 53, 57–8, 61, 237, 242 Iraq, 3, 16–17, 29–31, 42, 50, 79, 231, 235 Ischinger, Wolfgang, 176–7, 187–8,190, 194–5, 214, 220–1, 258, 262 Jönsson, Christer, 85–6, 89, 91–2, 246–8

301

Kinkel, Klaus, 110, 120, 138–9, 146, 155–8, 170, 175, 179, 181, 184–6, 189–91, 194, 219, 227, 260–1, 263 Kissinger, Henry, 146, 153, 193, 247, 263 Kohl, Helmut, 23, 25, 30–1, 108–11, 120, 124, 154–9, 164, 167, 169, 175–6, 179, 181–4, 186–7, 189–90, 194, 196, 208–9, 212–15, 220–8, 230, 249, 252, 258–9, 262 Kohl–Genscher government, 23, 31, 81, 100–101, 203, 208–9, 212, 223, 226, 230 Kosovo war, 3, 14, 22, 24–5, 28–9, 32, 35, 46–9, 51–2, 78, 231, 240–1 Lake, Anthony, 121, 128, 133, 136–7, 146, 150–2, 166, 204–7, 253–4, 258 Language, 60–4, 75, 85, 91, 138, 151, 207–9, 244, 264 Logic of appropriateness, 58–9, 66, 84, 246 Logic of arguing, 59–75, 82–4, 92, 101, 223, 225, 242–6 Logic of consequentiality, 58–60, 65–6, 68, 82, 84 Lugar, (Senator) Richard, 123–7, 133, 146, 153, 160, 162, 210, 254 Maull, Hanns W., 5–7, 9, 11–15, 26, 35, 37–45, 48–54, 77–84, 92, 101, 229, 235–7, 238–42, 245–6, see Civilian power Military force (use of), 6, 14–15, 22, 24, 28–9, 44–7, 49–51, 79, 131, 188 German, 3, 22, 24, 28–32, 40–1, 45, 48–51, 53, 78,109 United States, 13, 49–50, 53, 105, 115, 132, 200–1 Milosevic, Slobodan, 14, 29, 47, 51, 78 Müller, Harald, 60–4, 66, 70, 80–1, 84, 243–5, 246

302

Index

Multilateral cooperation, ix, 2, 4–6, 7, 14, 52, 54, 79, 97, 99, 101 Multilateralism, 7, 11, 16–17, 21–2, 24, 30, 32, 53, 79, 90–1, 97–8, 101, 109, 153, 218–19, 220, 229, 241–2, 244 National Security Council (NSC), 130, 140–4, 151–2, 163, 205–6, 208, 254 Nationalism, 2–3, 32, 85, 98, 118, 127, 170–1, 182 Negotiation, ix, 15, 49, 61, 63–8, 70–1, 74–5, 77–8, 86–101, 176, 182, 188–94, 196, 199, 209, 215–25, 228, 246–9, 262 German behavior, 77–8, 92–101, 176, 182, 188–94, 196, 199, 209, 215–25, 228, 236, 245 International, 63–4, 68, 73, 82, 85, 88–91, 244 United States, 93–4 Normality, 4–6, 8–10, 21–5, 27–9, 33–7, 41, 44–5, 48, 52–4, 66, 228–30, 234, 236–7, 240 and “self-confidence,” 8–10, 29, 33, 35 Normality versus continuity debate, 4–6, 8–10, 21–2, 44, 45, 53–4, 228–9, 234, 240 North Atlantic Co-Operation Council (NACC), 107, 119, 120, 127–32, 140–1, 166, 204, 212 North Atlantic Council (NAC), 100, 132, 170, 174, 195, 223 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Brussels Summit, 149–50, 155, 157 NATO–Russia negotiations, 16, 173–4, 185–97, 213–14, 220–1, 225, 227–8 Travemünde, 139–40, 142–5, 205, 256 Nye, Joseph, 11–15, 230, 236–7

Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), 180, 185, 203, 249 Partnership for Peace (PFP), 132–4, 136, 140–6, 149–50, 152–5, 160, 166, 175, 183, 191, 206, 212–13, 218, 256–7 Persuasion, 60, 67, 69, 74, 86, 164, 186, 210, 244–5, 247 Primakov, Yevgeny, 180–1, 185–7, 189–95, 214 RAND, 112–14, 116, 122–7, 132, 162–5, 209–11, 250, 253–4 “The Twin Arcs of Crisis,” 122, 125–6, 209–10, 253 Reasoning, 7, 17, 24, 59–75, 83–4, 94–5, 98, 101, 113, 123, 164, 217, 222–4, 228, 230 German, 94, 98, 113, 123, 217 Rhetorical action, 66–8, 82, 96, 223, 225, 229 Risse, Thomas, 59–60, 65–8, 72–3, 91, 237, 240, 242–5, 248 Rühe, Volker, 109–13, 116–21, 123–5, 127–9, 134, 137–40, 142–4 146, 153, 155–6, 158, 162–4, 169–70, 174, 176–7, 199, 203–6, 209–10, 217–19, 227, 249–54, 256, 260, 264 Rühle, Michael, 108, 138, 199, 249, 251, 254, 264 Russia, see NATO–Russia negotiations Schmidt, Helmut, 97, 117, 217, 251 Schröder, Gerhard, 25, 31–2, 47, 240 Schröder–Fischer government, 23, 29, 31–3, 78–9, 81 Security, 13, 16, 25, 38, 42, 44, 50, 57, 115, 118, 180, 189, 194, 196, 203, 225, 236, 240 European, 1–2, 37, 44, 49–51, 107, 112, 118, 125, 127, 137, 146, 149–51, 156, 171, 180, 194, 196, 201

Index German, 2–3, 8, 16, 22, 25–6, 28–9, 31, 37–8, 42, 45, 48–3, 108–9, 118, 203, 225, 227 International, 1–3, 8, 12–13, 15–17, 31, 37, 49–52, 92, 107, 118, 174, 201–4, 237 Russian, 156, 180, 183, 185, 189–91, 226 United States., 8, 12, 34, 49–51, 53, 106, 124, 151–2, 202–4 Self-confidence, 8–10, 24, 27, 29, 33, 35, 49, 236 Serbia, 17, 22, 45, 47, 52, 231 Shalikashvili, General John, 129–32, 140, 151–2, 206 Smyser, William, 77–8, 92–101, 199, 215–22, 230, 236, 245, 248 Soft power, 11–13, 15, 38–9, 81, 230, 239 Soviet Union, 38, 51, 83, 99, 121, 125, 133, 223, 236, 250 Talbott, Strobe, 133–4, 147, 153–4, 161–2, 165–6, 184, 187–8, 190, 211–12, 219–20, 226, 228, 258 Ukraine, 127, 133, 150, 169, 180, 185, 227 Unification, ix, 1–5, 9, 11, 21, 24–7, 29–30, 52, 92, 99, 107, 109, 111, 113, 136, 181, 193, 202, 223, 228, 249–50 post-unification, 24–7, 29, 34, 37, 42, 52, 78, 92, 107, 111, 113, 223, 238 United Nations (UN), 3, 15–17, 22, 29–30, 32–3, 35, 45–7, 51–2, 71, 106, 109, 119, 137, 231, 239, 253: mandate (or lack thereof), 17, 22, 29, 33, 51, 231; peacekeeping missions, 29–30, 46, 105–6, 109, 128–9 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 3, 17, 33, 35–6, 51–2, 71–2

303

United States (U.S) Bush administration, 79–81, 112, 129, 147, 200–1, 231, 250 Clinton administration, 105–6, 121–4, 126, 128–37, 139, 141–2, 144, 146–7, 149–75, 176–7, 181, 183, 186, 188, 190–7, 200, 202, 204–6, 209–10, 212–15, 218–21, 224–8, 230, 249–50, 256–8, 261 foreign policy, see Foreign policy, United States German influence on, 9–10, 18, 77, 81, 92, 101, 112, 121–6, 137–45, 152, 156, 158–72, 174, 176–7, 183–4, 186, 188, 190–7, 199–216, 218–21, 224–8, 230 Iraq, see Iraq Military force, see Military force, United States national interest, 93, 117, 131, 149, 154, 165, 196, 202 and NATO enlargement, 77, 92, 101, 120–7, 156–72, 174, 176–7, 183–4, 186, 188, 190–7, 199–216, 218–21, 224–8, 230, 252 “War on Terror,” 1, 208, 264 Walesa, Lech, 121, 134–6, 151, 153, 204, 253 Weisser, Ulrich, 110–13, 116, 122–4, 127, 140–4, 151–2, 158, 162, 164, 167–8, 177, 188, 205, 209–10, 218, 250–1, 253–64 Wörner, NATO Secretary General Manfred, 129, 131, 137–9, 142–5, 205, 250, 254, 256 Yeltsin, Boris, 122, 133–6, 155–6, 168–9, 171, 173, 175, 181–6, 189–92, 194, 212, 216, 218–19, 221, 224–6, 256, 261–2