Germany after the Grand Coalition: Governance and Politics in a Turbulent Environment (Europe in Transition: The NYU European Studies)

Germany after the Grand Coalition

EUROPE IN TR ANSITION: THE NYU EUROPEAN STUDIES SERIES The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After Edited by Martin Schain Europe at the Polls: The European Elections of 1999 Edited by Pascal Perrineau, Gérard Grunberg, and Colette Ysmal Unions, Immigration, and Internationalization: New Challenges and Changing Coalitions in the United States and France By Leah Haus Shadows Over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe Edited by Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy Edited by Joylon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy By Thomas W. Gold Germans or Foreigners?Attitudes toward Ethnic Minorities in Post-Reunification Germany Edited by Richard Alba and Peter Schmidt Germany on the Road to Normalcy? Politics and Policies of the First Red-Green Federal Government Edited by Werner Reutter The Politics of Language: Essays on Languages, State and Society Edited by Tony Judt and Denis Lacorne Realigning Interests: Crisis and Credibility in European Monetary Integration By Michele Chang The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies By Michelle Hale Williams European Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean By Federica Bicchi Sexual Equality in an Integrated Europe: Virtual Equality By R. Amy Elman Politics in France and Europe Edited by Pascal Perrineau and Luc Rouban Germany after the Grand Coalition: Governance and Politics in a Turbulent Environment Edited by Silvia Bolgherini and Florian Grotz

Germany after the Grand Coalition Governance and Politics in a Turbulent Environment

Edited by

Silvia Bolgherini and Florian Grotz

GERMANY AFTER THE GRAND COALITION

Copyright © Silvia Bolgherini and Florian Grotz, 2010. All rights reserved. First published in 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–62285–2 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Germany after the grand coalition : governance and politics in a turbulent environment / edited by Silvia Bolgherini and Florian Grotz. p. cm.—(Europe in transition : the NYU European studies series) ISBN 978–0–230–62285–2 (alk. paper) 1. Coalition governments—Germany. 2. Political parties—Germany. 3. Germany—Politics and government—1990– I. Bolgherini, Silvia. II. Grotz, Florian. JN3971.A58G468 2010 320.943—dc22

2010016441

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: December 2010 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

Contents

List of Tables

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List of Figures

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Acknowledgments

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List of Abbreviations

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Notes on Contributors

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Introduction: The Grand Coalition 2005–2009—a Single Episode or a Turning Point? Silvia Bolgherini and Florian Grotz

Part I

The Legacies of the Grand Coalition

1 New Possibilities or Permanent Gridlock? The Policies and Politics of the Grand Coalition Reimut Zohlnhöfer 2

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Toward a New German Federalism? How the 2006 Constitutional Reform Did (Not) Change the Dynamics of the Federal System Julia von Blumenthal Multilevel Party Politics during the Grand Coalition: Electoral Outcomes at Länder Level Silvia Bolgherini and Florian Grotz

4 Still the Driving Force of European Integration? The EU Policy Pursued by the Grand Coalition Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet

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Contents

Part II 5

6

7

The Federal Elections of September 27, 2009

A Post-Modern Campaign? The Sleepy Development to the 2009 Federal Election Giorgia Bulli

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The Choice for Stability: The Results of the 2009 Federal Election Mario Caciagli

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An Electorate on the Move: Explaining Vote Choice in the 2009 Federal Election Bernhard Weßels

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Part III The New Government and the Challenges Ahead 8 Coalition-Building in Germany 2009: Simulating Real Politics, Preparing Merkel III? Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer 9

10

A Fresh Start or More of the Same? The Domestic Policy Agenda of the Center-Right Coalition Roland Sturm The “Grand Coalition State” between Past and Present: Continuities and Discontinuities of a Changing Political System Gabriele D’Ottavio

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Conclusion: The Long Shadow of the Grand Coalition Florian Grotz and Silvia Bolgherini

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References

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Index

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Tables

3.1 Timing of Länder elections, 2006–2009 3.2 Results of Länder elections during the 2005–2009 term 3.3 Länder governments and Bundesrat majorities during the 2005–2009 term 5.1 Opinion polls by the major German research institutes during 2009 6.1 Bundestag elections: Distribution of votes and seats, 2002–2009 6.2 Bundestag elections: Percentages of votes and seats by political parties, 1980–2009 7.1 Change in parties and voting in Bundestag elections, 1990–2009 7.2 Bundestag election 2009: District and list mandates by party 7.3 Bundestag election 2009: Performance of parties in and out of government 7.4 Bundestag election 2009: Evaluation of the problem-solving capacity of parliamentary parties 7.5 Vote transfers from Bundestag election 2005 to 2009 7.6 An evaluation-driven model of vote choice in the 2009 Bundestag election—logistic regressions 8.1 Building federal governments in Germany, 1949–2009 8.2 Angela Merkel’s Second Cabinet (as of December 2009)

56 58 62 94 111 118 127 131 133 134 137 138 151 159

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Figures

6.1 Bundestag elections: Distribution of votes, 1949–2009 6.2 Bundestag election 2009: First and second votes by political parties 7.1 Ticket splitting among CDU/CSU voters and success of the FDP 7.2 Like-dislike scores for top candidates in the 2009 Bundestag election 7.3 Bundestag election 2009: Contribution of evaluations of problem-solving capacity, leadership, and past performance to vote shares increase 8.1 Organizational structure of the coalition negotiations 2009

110 120 132 135

140 153

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Acknowledgments

W

e would like to thank the Istituto Carlo Cattaneo in Bologna, Italy, and its Editorial Board members for launching this project and asking us to make it real; Palgrave Macmillan / New York, and Martin Schain (NYU) for including this book in their Europe in Transition series; the anonymous referees who reckoned this enterprise worth carrying out; and our editorial assistant, Robyn Curtis, for her readiness in covering all technical details. A special thanks goes to Bernardo Parrella for his final proofreading, to Leuphana University Lüneburg for its administrative support, and to Michele Scotto di Carlo for his help in editing and indexing the manuscript. We are also grateful to Friedrich Tönnies and Giulio Citroni for their generous assistance. Finally—and most of all—we would like to thank each and every contributor for promptly accepting to work on this project and for their kindness in delivering their essays “on short notice” after the September 2009 federal election. Silvia Bolgherini and Florian Grotz

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Abbreviations

CEC CEO CDU CSFP CSU DVU ESDP EU FCC FDP FRG GDR GG GNP IGC ISAF KOMBO LP MdB NPD PDS SED SMC SPD TCE

Commission of the European Communities Chief Executive Officer Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union) Common Foreign and Security Policy Christlich Soziale Union (Christian Social Union) Deutsche Volksunion (German People’s Union) European Security and Defense Policy European Union Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party) The Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland ) German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik) Grundgesetz (Basic Law) Gross National Product Intergovernmental Conference International Security Assistance Force Kommission zur Modernisierung der bundesstaatlichen Ordnung (Commission for the Modernization of the Federal Order) Left Party (Die Linke) Members of the Bundestag Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany) Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism) Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) Single-Member Constituency Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany) Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe

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TEU Uf M VAT WASG

Abbreviations

Treaty on European Union Union for the Mediterranean Value Added Tax Wahlalternative Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit (Electoral Alternative Labor and Social Justice)

Contributors

Julia von Blumenthal is Professor of Political Science at the HumboldtUniversität zu Berlin. Her research focuses on questions of governance in Germany. She has published on the role of parliaments on the national and subnational level, on federalism, and on democratic accountability. Her latest books include: Das Kopftuch in der Landesgesetzgebung. Governance im Bundesstaat zwischen Unitarisierung und Föderalisierung (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009) and Müssen Parlamentsreformen scheitern? (Wiesbaden: VS, 2009; co-edited with S. Bröchler). Silvia Bolgherini is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Naples Federico II. She has published on electoral studies, European studies, and local government. Her latest books include: Come le regioni diventano europee. Stili di governo e sfide comunitarie nell’Europa mediterranea (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006), La politica comparata. Strategie e ricerche (Firenze: Le Lettere, 2008; co-authored with M.Caciagli) and Unioni di Comuni (Bologna: Istituto Cattaneo, 2009; co-authored with G. Baldini et al.). Giorgia Bulli is Adjunct Professor of Political and Electoral Communication and Analysis of Political Language at the University of Florence. Her research interests are in the fields of political parties and political communication. Among her publications: Far Right and Regionalism: Is the Lega Nord a Far Right Party? In Mapping the Far Right in Contemporary Europe: Local, national, comparative, transnational, ed. E. Godin et al. (Oxford: Berghahn Books, forthcoming; coauthored with F. Tronconi); La comunicazione dei partiti politici: vecchi obiettivi, nuove sfide. In Partiti politici e caso italiano, ed. L. Morlino and M. Tarchi, pp. 145–171 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006). Mario Caciagli is Professor of Political Science at the University of Florence. He has been professor at the Universities of Padua and Catania and visiting professor at several European universities. He was one of

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the founders of the Italian Society for Electoral Studies (SISE) and is actually its honorary President. Editor of the half-yearly review on electoral studies Quaderni dell’Osservatorio elettorale, he has widely published on electoral history, electoral behavior and electoral systems as well as on parties, local politics and political culture in Italy, Germany and Spain. His most recent books include: Regioni d’Europa (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006) and Il clientelismo politico (Trapani: Di Girolamo, 2009). Gabriele D’Ottavio is Post-doctoral Researcher for Contemporary History at the University of Bologna. He is currently visiting fellow at the European University Institute in Florence. Among his publications: The Federal Republic of Germany and the dichotomy between Political and Economic Europe: from the Treaties of Rome to Maastricht. In Les deux Europes. The two Europes. ed. M. Affinito et al., pp. 237–250 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2009); Germania. In Sistemi politici comparati, ed. S. Vassallo, pp. 65–91 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005). Florian Grotz is Visiting Professor for Political Science at Leuphana University Lüneburg. Before, he worked at the Universities of Heidelberg, Berlin (Free University) and Würzburg. His research interests include German government and politics, political institutions in Europe and comparative electoral systems. His most recent book is: Demokratische Regierungssysteme in Mittel- und Osteuropa (Wiesbaden: VS, 2010; coedited with F. Müller-Rommel). Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet is Professor of Political Science at the University of Würzburg. She has published widely in the fields of European integration, foreign and security policy of the EU, European external relations, French European Policy, German European Policy. Her recent books include: Die Afrikapolitik der Europäischen Union (Opladen: Budrich, 2007; edited), Deutsche Europapolitik. Von Adenauer bis Merkel (Wiesbaden: VS, 2010; co-authored with U. Kessler et al.) and Javier Solana 1999–2009: A strong catalyst for the European Union’s international role? (forthcoming). Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer is Professor of Government and Policy Research at the University of Halle-Wittenberg. Since 2003 she is chief-editor of the Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen and was the President of the German Association of Political Science (DVPW) from 2006 to 2009. She has published on many aspects of parliamentarism and representation in Germany and Europe. Her recent publications include: Modewort oder Alarmsignal? Befunde und Überlegungen zur

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Entparlamentarisierung. In: Res publica semper reformanda. ed. J. Werner et al., pp. 240–253 (Wiesbaden: VS, 2008); Politische Führung im Parlament. In Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. 2010. 2–3: 15–22. Roland Sturm is Professor of Political Science at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg. He has published widely in the fields of comparative politics, comparative public policy, political economy, European integration and German politics. Among his recent books: Politik in Großbritannien (Wiesbaden: VS, 2009), Wirtschaftspolitik kompakt (Wiesbaden: VS, 2009; co-authored with M. Müller) and Bilanz der Bundestagswahl 2009 (Wiesbaden: VS, 2010; co-edited with E. Jesse). Bernhard Weßels is Senior Researcher at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) and faculty member of the Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences (BGSS) at Humboldt University Berlin. He has widely published in the field of comparative political behavior and attitudes, interest intermediation and political representation. His recent books include Wahlen and Wähler (Wiesbaden: VS, 2009; co-edited with O. Gabriel and J. W. Falter), and Die Bundestagswahl 2005 (Wiesbaden: VS, 2009; co-edited with F. Brettschneider and O. Niedermayer). Reimut Zohlnhöfer is Professor of Comparative Public Policy at OttoFriedrich-University, Bamberg. Previously, he has worked at the Center for Social Policy Research, Bremen, the University of Heidelberg and the Center for European Studies, Harvard University. His research interests include German politics, the comparative analysis of fiscal policy-making and political economy. Among his recent books: Globalisierung der Wirtschaft und finanzpolitische Anpassungsreaktionen in Westeuropa (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009) and Die Große Koalition 2005–2009 (Wiesbaden: VS, 2010; co-edited with C. Egle).

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INTRODUCTION

The Grand Coalition 2005–2009—a Single Episode or a Turning Point? Silvia Bolgherini and Florian Grotz

T

he Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has always been praised as a stable and successful democracy (Wolfrum 2006). The Basic Law (Grundgesetz), originally created as a provisionary constitution for West Germany in 1949, survived the reunification of both German states in 1990 without major changes and most recently celebrated its sixtieth anniversary (Schwarz 2009). The FRG’s governmental system produced policy outcomes that until the 1980s were quite remarkable in international comparison (Schmidt 1987; Grotz 2009a). During the last two decades, however, this overall positive picture has gradually changed after it became evident that reunification and European integration were seriously challenging the German model of governance. Since then the same system that was praised for its democratic stability and policy performance has been increasingly more and more criticized for its inability to design and implement necessary reforms (Hesse 2003; Green and Paterson 2005b). Germany’s “gathering crisis” seemed to culminate in the outcome of the 2005 federal election (Miskimmon et al. 2009). For the first time since 1949, neither of the two catch-all parties (Volksparteien)—the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU1) and the Social Democrats (SPD)— could win a parliamentary majority with their “natural allies,” the Liberals (FDP) and the Greens, respectively. As a consequence, the CDU/CSU and SPD formed a Grand Coalition government under Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU). In contrast to the first federal executive of the two Volksparteien that was in power from 1966 to 1969,

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the Grand Coalition formed in 2005 was neither the parties’ nor the citizens’ preferred choice but was rather perceived as a last option to build a stable cabinet (Egle and Zohlnhöfer 2010). Therefore, instead of being associated with any spirit of reform after its inauguration, the Merkel government was considered as doing “business as necessary” (Thaysen 2006b, 607). At the same time, many observers believed that the political standstill would last beyond 2009, since a continuation of the Grand Coalition seemed to be without alternative under the present party system (Jun 2009b, 179). Four years later these initial concerns have not materialized. In terms of policy-making, the Grand Coalition did not lead to a complete deadlock, while receiving quite respectable marks, especially for its positive handling of the repercussions of the worldwide economic and financial crisis in 2008–2009 (Zohlnhöfer and Egle 2010). In this regard, even former Chancellor Schröder validated his successor with a “f lawless crisis management” (Die Welt, June 22, 2009). And, what is more, the CDU/CSU-SPD government did not give way to a steadystate. The outcome of the September 2009 federal election allowed the Christian Democrats to form, just a few weeks later, a government with the Liberals—the same coalition that has ruled the FRG most of the time since 1949—again under Chancellor Angela Merkel. Can we assert that the 2005–2009 Grand Coalition has been just an atypical episode after which Germany returned on the “road to normalcy” (Reutter 2004)? Or has it had a lasting impact on domestic politics and policies beyond the 2009 election? The initial evaluation of the new government points to the latter: after more than 100 days in office the CDU/CSU-FDP alliance certainly does not look like the “dream team” announced by its members during the 2009 electoral campaign and the ensuing coalition negotiations. On the contrary, there has hardly been a federal government in which political discrepancies between the chancellor and the vice chancellor emerged as clearly as in the relationship of Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle (FDP) during their first months in office (Bannas 2010). Apart from the fact that Germany is still coping with the consequences of the most severe economic downturn since World War II, the serious disputes within the CDU/CSU-FDP government might also testify to the specific legacy of the Grand Coalition and the substantially changed political context that led to its formation. Against this background this book offers a differentiated survey of current developments in German politics. It provides a retrospective of the 2005–2009 Grand Coalition, an analysis of the 2009 federal election, as

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well as an account of its political consequences. This introductory chapter will give a comprehensive overview of the FRG’s institutional setting, followed by an analysis about its changed functioning and performance in the post-unification environment. We will then elaborate on the main characteristics of a Grand Coalition and its potential implications for contemporary politics and policies in Germany. A brief outline of the entire book concludes this introduction. The Federal Republic as a “Semisovereign State” According to Arend Lijphart (1999), modern democracies can be organized in two fundamentally distinct ways. The majoritarian (or Westminster) model of democracy concentrates political power in the hands of a bare majority of citizens, whereas the consensus model is based on inclusiveness, power-sharing, and compromise between different societal groups. Although neither of these models exists anywhere in its pure form, the FRG combines majoritarian and consensus- democratic elements in an idiosyncratic manner. On one hand, the Basic Law provides for a parliamentary system in which the head of government (chancellor) holds a prominent position. S/he nominates the cabinet ministers, sets the general policy guidelines (Richtlinienkompetenz) and may only be deposed by a “constructive” motion of no confidence in which a new candidate for chancellorship must receive an absolute majority in the parliament (Bundestag). Furthermore, since the 1950s West Germany saw the evolution of a bipolar party system with an extremely high concentration of votes on the two catch-all parties, leading each of them to seek power without the other party (Lehmbruch 2000, 37–44). Voters in federal elections had to choose between a Christian Democratic and a Social Democratic camp with their respective chancellor candidates. This bipolar structure of party competition, together with the power concentration in the chancellorship, provided the German system with an apparently majoritarian imprint. On the other hand, policy-making in the FRG has never been characterized by open confrontation like in Westminster democracies, but by high inclusivity and constant moderating as a result of consensusoriented institutional arrangements. Such arrangements include a mixed-member electoral system that produced extremely proportional outcomes since the early 1960s, thus forcing the winning parties (even with 45–48 percent of the votes) to form coalition governments anyway (Nohlen 2009, 331–337). Moreover, a complex structure of checks and

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balances has reinforced this governance by consensus. German chancellors and their cabinets have always been confronted with a multitude of “co-governing forces” (Schmidt 2008). For the sake of comprehensiveness, we should mention the most prominent among these “veto players” (Tsebelis 2002): the Federal Council (Bundesrat) and the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). Within the German federal order, the main share of legislative competences is concentrated at the national level (Bund), while the states (Länder) are mainly responsible for implementing federal laws. Nevertheless, the Länder retain an essential role in federal decisionmaking via the Bundesrat. This unique kind of second parliamentary chamber comprises Länder government representatives, and each Land is assigned three to six seats according to the size of its population. In the legislative process the Bundesrat has an extraordinarily strong position: its consent is constitutionally required for about half of the federal laws, including most “key policy decisions” (Beyme 1997). Therefore, the Bundesrat emerges as a powerful veto player—especially if it is dominated by the opposition parties in the Bundestag. Such constellations of “divided government” have hardly led to open party political conf licts, let alone permanent blockades of federal policy-making (Sturm 2001). In any case, they have severely restricted the federal government’s room for maneuvering because it had to anticipate the opposition’s veto potential in the Bundesrat and adjust its proposed legislation in advance (Manow and Burkhart 2004). The maneuvering room of German governments has also been confined by the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC)—one of the most powerful and active constitutional courts worldwide (Stone Sweet 2000; Hönnige 2007). The Basic Law provides citizens, opposition parties and other actors with broad opportunities to bring action before the FCC (Schmidt 2007, 229). Since its establishment in 1951, the Court has constantly pronounced path-defining judgments in nearly all key policy areas, including foreign affairs and European integration, the division of power between Bund and Länder, party finance, fiscal policy, social and family policies, etc. In so doing, the FCC has inf luenced policymaking in Germany far beyond its individual rulings, because federal governments had to consider any draft law in terms of how the FCC would react in a potential judgment. Despite the executive dominance within a bipolar party system, the political power in Germany has been “tamed” by a broad range of actors and institutions. This is the reason that inspired Peter Katzenstein (1987) to label the FRG as a “semisovereign state.” More than addressing

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West Germany’s limited role on the international stage during the Cold War, Katzenstein pointed to the fact that actually the domestic policy was determined by incremental outcomes, well apart from any incumbent federal government. However, “semisovereignty” did not necessarily mean a structural shortcoming. On the contrary, as Katzenstein convincingly argued, the FRG’s polity produced extraordinary policy outcomes— although such performance was possible only under the condition of a relative homogenous, “centralized” society, which existed in West Germany until the late 1980s. The German Model under Pressure German unification and European integration have fundamentally changed the just described environment of the semisovereign state, challenging it under several respects. In terms of policy outcomes, a unified Germany performed considerably worse than before (Green and Paterson 2005a, 9–11). Economic growth slowed while unemployment rates rose to heights never seen during the post-World War II period. Welfare expenditures increased rapidly, with a negative impact on labor costs and, consequently, on the entire Germany as a location for business within the EU Internal Market and the global economy. Moreover, the disastrous socioeconomic state of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) required huge transfer payments to the Eastern regions, which were financed by a mixture of higher taxes and public debt expansion (Wagschal 2006). In this situation, structural policy reforms were urgently needed—rather than incremental change, which the semisovereign state had traditionally produced until that moment. At the same time, the political decision-making process became increasingly complex. The addition of five Eastern Länder to the previous eleven 2 brought about a significant change in intergovernmental relations. Given the huge socioeconomic disparities between East and West, the goal of “uniform living conditions” that was enshrined in the Basic Law and formed the raison d’être of Germany’s “unitary federalism” (Hesse 1962) could hardly been maintained. Serious disputes emerged especially between richer and poorer Länder in regards to costs and benefits of social equity policies. Such environment opened the way to a new “competitive federalism” (Jeffery 2005) in which the necessary consensus among the Länder governments on major policy issues was much more difficult to achieve. Furthermore, the reunification led to structural changes within the national party system. During the 1980s a “two-bloc” party system had

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emerged, with one catch-all party and one smaller party on either side of the political spectrum: the CDU/CSU and the FDP (Black-Yellow) on the right and the SPD and the Greens (Red-Green) on the left. After 1990, however, a new force entered the stage: the post-communist Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)3, successor of the GDR state party, which held its electoral strongholds in the Eastern Länder and was regularly represented in the Bundestag. This issue not only increased the fragmentation of the party system, but also altered its dynamics, since the PDS was considered as “non-coalitionable” by all other parties. In this way, the two-bloc system subsequently transformed into a “f luid five-party system” (Niedermayer 2008) in which a parliamentary majority for either bloc could not be taken for granted anymore. In fact, the federal elections held in 1994 and 2002 reconfirmed, respectively, the Black-Yellow coalition under Kohl and the Red-Green coalition under Schröder with a tight majority—just slightly amplified by some distinct effects of the electoral system.4 Therefore, the “enforced” Grand Coalition under Angela Merkel derived not so much from the unique circumstances of the 2005 general election, but was rather a structural result that could have easily happened before. Last but not least, regional asymmetries in the German party system have considerably grown since 1990 (Detterbeck and Renzsch 2008). While the CDU/CSU and the SPD remained the strongest forces in all state parliaments, the PDS was successful only in the East where the FDP and the Greens turned out to be much weaker than in the West. The increased heterogeneity of Länder party systems also resulted in a greater variety of respective coalition governments. This situation again affected federal governance insofar as those Länder executives comprising exclusively federal government parties were the minority rather than the majority in the Bundesrat. As a result, divided government in unified Germany became more a rule than an exception.5 The radically changed environment of the semisovereign state has dramatically increased the pressure for structural policy reforms, while at the same time decreasing the decision-making capacity of the German political system. Consequently, a public demand for overcoming the “policy blockage” was accompanied by a similar demand for substantial institutional reform. 6 These latter calls aimed primarily at disentangling the “interlocked” federal order, especially by providing the Länder with more legislative autonomy and reducing the Bundesrat veto powers (Scharpf 2009, 27–67). Against this background the Schröder government embarked on major reforms during its second term (2002–2005), addressing both

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policies and institutional structures. The former efforts most notably materialized in the so-called Agenda 2010 that aimed at a reorganization of the welfare state and labor market policies, whereas the latter efforts led to the establishment of a bicameral commission including Bundestag and Bundesrat representatives (KOMBO) that should elaborate constitutional amendments aimed at “modernizing” the federal order. However, the Schröder government was unable to accomplish any of those plans. Although Agenda 2010 showed positive outcomes in economic terms (Busch 2009), it met with harsh criticism not only by the opposition but also by the SPD’s own ranks. This eventually prompted Chancellor Schröder in May 2005 to trigger early elections by deliberately losing a parliamentary vote of confidence (Zohlnhöfer and Egle 2007). On the other side, the KOMBO had disbanded in December 2004, without any agreement on the federalism reform (Benz 2005). In the aftermath, Bund and Länder still sought to renegotiate a compromise in more informal meetings but immediately stopped these efforts when early federal elections were announced (Grotz 2007, 137–138). Therefore, when the Grand Coalition government took office in fall 2005 it had at least some building blocks left by its predecessor for reforming the institutions and policies of the semisovereign state. The Grand Coalition and its Potential Consequences The close cooperation between the two Volksparteien has been a lasting feature of German politics. As mentioned above, the institutional setting of the semisovereign state requires the consent of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in key policy areas: because all Länder governments are formally involved in the legislative process via the Bundesrat and include at least one of the Volksparteien, both CDU/ CSU and SPD continuously take part in the federal decision-making process. According to Manfred G. Schmidt (2008, 90), “it is almost impossible in the Federal Republic of Germany not to be governed by a Grand Coalition of federal government and state governments and by a Grand Coalition of the major established parties—hidden or formal.” In contrast to this understanding of some kind of permanent “Grand Coalition state” (ibid.), a federal executive including both CDU/CSU and SPD has been the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, in Germany, a Grand Coalition7 has been usually regarded as a temporary arrangement because Christian Democrats and Social Democrats sought to avoid shared governments whenever possible.

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Nevertheless, a federal executive comprising the two Volksparteien has some specific implications for both party politics and policy-making within the semisovereign state (Egle and Zohlnhöfer 2010). In terms of party politics, a Grand Coalition may appear as a paradox: two parties normally competing against each other are governing together. This idiosyncratic constellation may impact the dynamics of party competition in different ways. On one hand, to maintain their programmatic profiles vis-à-vis their respective electorates, the Grand Coalition parties might seek to discriminate from each other more clearly than coalition partners usually do. This step could lead to serious intra-coalition conflicts or even early government termination especially when general elections are approaching. On the other hand, CDU/CSU and SPD could stress their commonalities hoping that the Grand Coalition’s performance would be perceived as a successful enterprise by the consensusoriented majority of German voters. This programmatic approximation runs the risk of reinforcing the diffusivity and exchangeability of the Volksparteien diagnosed by Otto Kirchheimer (1966) a long time ago. As a result, many citizens might become disappointed by the Grand Coalition’s “centrist course” and therefore choose smaller parties with more clear-cut profiles in the following elections, or even decide not to vote at all. That, in turn, might accelerate the steady decline of the catch-all parties and lead to a further de-concentration and restructuring of the German party system. The potential impact of the Grand Coalition on federal policymaking may be quite ambivalent as well. As in 2005 CDU/CSU and SPD together commanded 73 percent of the Bundestag seats and a clear majority in the Bundesrat, their government could be regarded as a unique opportunity to implement the ambitious reform projects started by the Schröder government. In this way Federal President Horst Köhler expressed himself at the inauguration ceremony of the Merkel cabinet, “the Grand Coalition with its broad majority in the Bundestag has the chance to continue the initiated reforms and to strengthen the citizens’ basic trust in the action capacity of the political elites” (Köhler 2005, 2). In the background of this presidential address looms the conventional wisdom that within the German system “big problems can only be solved by Grand Coalitions” (Egle and Zohlnhöfer 2010, 7). One might equally argue that both partners of the Grand Coalition had mutually incompatible positions in key policy areas. Given the above-mentioned need for a tactical sharpening of party profiles, the Merkel government may be expected to agree only on the lowest common denominator, or even to lead to a permanent deadlock. As a

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consequence, the Grand Coalition would probably aggravate Germany’s “gathering crisis” (Miskimmon et al. 2009). The 2005–2009 Merkel government might have had a broad variety of divergent, in part even opposite, implications for German politics and policies. This book aims at investigating the actual materialization of such potential effects both before and after the 2009 federal election. Germany after the Grand Coalition The chapters gathered here bring together different perspectives that examine the major impact deployed by the 2005–2009 Grand Coalition in the German political system, both during its term in office and in shaping the campaign, outcome, and aftermath of the 2009 elections. The overall analysis is divided into three parts. The first section provides an assessment of the main political legacies left by the CDU/ CSU-SPD government. In chapter 1, Reimut Zohlnhöfer supplies a comprehensive overview of the main policy areas the Grand Coalition dealt with (or attempted to), including an explanation of the various reform patterns and subsequent results. In chapter 2, Julia von Blumenthal covers the major topic of institutional reform (federalism reform), which started and failed under Chancellor Schröder’s term and was accomplished by the Grand Coalition. This analysis also explores the implications of federalism reform on multilevel governance and the role of the Bundesrat. In chapter 3, Silvia Bolgherini and Florian Grotz address the Grand Coalition’s impact on multilevel party politics, analyzing its consequences on voting behavior and coalition formation at the Länder level. In chapter 4, Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet provides an evaluation of the Merkel government’s European policy, including its approach, major successes, and failures—mostly through the lens of the 2007 German Presidency in the EU Council, but also focusing on other key issues, such as the climate protection policy, and the consequences of the global financial crisis. The second part is devoted to a series of analyses about the September 27, 2009 federal election. In chapter 5, Giorgia Bulli details the “sleepy” electoral campaign by taking into account its post-modern features and the most significant events that marked a turning point in public opinion, both in pre-campaign and campaign stages. In chapter 6, Mario Caciagli examines the 2009 federal election outcome addressing the expected and actual results, the five main parties’ performances, and the peculiar inf luence produced by the German electoral system on the

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final figures. In chapter 7, Bernhard Weßels covers the strategies both German voters and parties adopted in order to cope with the increasing fragmentation and uncertainty affecting the overall party system. He also provides a comprehensive explanation of voter choices in relationship to the perceived performances of each party and its leader. The third part explores the Grand Coalition’s effects on the new government and the policy issues now on the table. In chapter 8, Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer evaluates the formation of the CDU/CSU-FDP government with a detailed account of the coalition negotiations and cabinet building. In chapter 9, Roland Sturm further explores the main topics included in the 2009–2013 coalition agreement, their political meaning, and possible impacts both for parties and voters, along with a critical assessment on their implementation. In chapter 10, Gabriele D’Ottavio highlights some of the most peculiar features of the “Grand Coalition state” in historical perspective and suggests how to bridge past and present within a changing environment. Finally, the editors brief ly summarize the multifaceted insights provided by these essays. In doing so, they try to give some articulated, though yet preliminary, answers on whether the 2005–2009 Grand Coalition was just a mere episode or rather a turning point in the general development of the German political system. Notes 1. The Christian Democratic Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union—CDU) and the Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union—CSU), the CDU’s sister party in Bavaria, are two distinct party organizations, merging in one parliamentary group (CDU/CSU) within the federal parliament (Bundestag). In this book, CDU and CSU refer to the respective single party, while CDU/CSU (or “Union”) refers to the federal joint group. 2. Before 1989, West Berlin had a special status as the eleventh German Land. In 1990 it was reunited with the Eastern part of the city, the former capital of the GDR, to form today’s Land/city state of Berlin. 3. The PDS was later renamed Die Linke/PDS (Left Party—LP/PDS) and then, after its merging in 2007 with the Wahlalternative Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit (WASG), a party split from the SPD, simply Die Linke (LP). 4. Both in 1994 and 2002, the strongest party (CDU and SPD) was assigned a considerable number of surplus seats that were generated by some peculiarities of the allocation method within the mixed-member proportional system. As a result, the thin parliamentary majorities of the CDU and the SPD governments were strengthened from 50.2 and 50.5 to 50.7 percent, respectively (Grotz 2009b, 161–163).

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5. Such divided government—that is, when the Bundesrat is dominated by federal opposition parties—is also reinforced by the voting rule in this chamber. Bundesrat votes assigned to each Land must be cast as a bloc. Thus, in case of Länder coalition governments different from the federal level, the respective parties usually agree on abstention. This however counts as a “no” against parliamentary bills waiting for mandatory approval in the Bundesrat. 6. It is most telling that “reform blockage” (Reformstau) was elected “word of the year 1997” by the Society for German Language. The following period saw a lot of labels and metaphors aimed at describing the FRG’s policy performance in a similar fashion (Green and Paterson 2005a, 10). 7. In fact, government alliances between the two largest parties have been generally rare in advanced parliamentary democracies, except for Austria. This is why the term “Grand Coalition” has primarily been applied in political debates in Germany and Austria, but is hardly found in the analytical literature on party governments (Müller 2008). For the purpose of this book, we define Grand Coalition as a government alliance comprising those parties that are the major political forces in a bipolar party system and therefore usually compete for the premiership (cf. Miller and Müller 2010). The same concept applies to the 2005–2009 Merkel government.

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PART I

The Legacies of the Grand Coalition

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CHAPTER 1

New Possibilities or Permanent Gridlock? The Policies and Politics of the Grand Coalition Reimut Zohlnhöfer

Introduction The Grand Coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD) under Christian Democratic Chancellor Angela Merkel came into power in October 2005 as an indirect result of the indecisive 2005 Bundestag election. Neither the hitherto existing coalition of Social Democrats and Greens (the so-called Red-Green coalition) nor the opposition parties of Christian Democrats and Liberals (FDP) managed to win a majority of the Bundestag seats in that election. Because neither of the large parties was able to negotiate a coalition agreement with both of the two smaller parties, FDP and Greens, and because the SPD was not willing to cooperate with the Left Party, the Grand Coalition emerged as the only viable alternative at that time. In stark contrast with the first Federal Republic’s Grand Coalition (1966–1969)—where coalition partners agreed upon several reform projects such as legislation concerning the state of emergency, reform of the federal system, economic policy instruments’ modernization, and electoral reform—this second coalition comprising CDU/CSU and SPD was not built on common policy ideas. On the contrary, during the electoral campaign both SPD and CDU/CSU had argued for very different policies in regard to health care, the labor market, and other key issues. Thus, the 2005 Grand Coalition was nothing more than an arithmetic necessity that both partners would have preferred to

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avoid. Several observers thus anticipated some sort of permanent policy gridlock as they expected the coalition partners to block one another in most policy areas. Nonetheless, both parties had been forced to cooperate with each other during the Red-Green coalition already when the Social Democrats were in power (together with the Greens), and the Christian Democrats controlled the Bundesrat, Germany’s powerful second chamber whose consent was required to pass more than half of the federal legislation. It can thus be argued that Germany was governed by an informal Grand Coalition long before the Merkel government came into power (Schmidt 2008). And this informal Grand Coalition managed to adopt rather far-reaching labor market and welfare state reforms between 2002 and 2005, under the reform package called Agenda 2010 (Zohlnhöfer 2004). Several scholars hoped that such previous cooperation could help the Grand Coalition to adopt further structural reforms addressing particularly the tax, welfare, and federal systems. Similar cooperation, they asserted, should be even easier to achieve under a formal Grand Coalition, given that now both coalition partners depended on a successful government record for future election results. Their large majority in the Bundestag and a majority in the Bundesrat could present a rare window of opportunity for these kinds of reforms. Not surprisingly, the new chancellor herself subscribed to this latter viewpoint in her first policy statement. Merkel termed the newly formed government the “coalition of new possibilities” and envisioned some ambitious goals for her government, “We intend to create the conditions for Germany to return to the ranks of the top three in Europe in ten years.” She continued, “We have a long, uphill battle to fight. We want to restructure the federal system. We want to inject new life into the labor market. We want to help our schools and universities regain their top position. We want to get our debt under control and sort out our health and pension systems as well as the long-term care” (Merkel 2005). How successful was the Grand Coalition in fighting the “uphill battle,” that is, in adopting structural reforms in different areas? In the remainder of this chapter I will address this question and provide an overview of the most important decisions achieved by the Grand Coalition. Then I will detail the mixed pattern of significant reform and gridlock that characterizes the Grand Coalition’s overall output— eventually drawing a focused conclusion. The Merkel Government’s Reform Output Following Angela Merkel’s policy statement quoted above, my analysis concentrates on the government’s most important reforms, including

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the changes to the federal system, fiscal policy, the labor market, the welfare system, and family policy.1 Some important policy decisions could not be anticipated by Mrs. Merkel when she made her policy statement in November 2005, but they are addressed within the context of this chapter. Therefore, I will also discuss the Grand Coalition’s response to the financial market crisis. The Reform of the Federal System The reform of the German federal system was put on the agenda long before the Grand Coalition came into power. The previous Schröder government had appointed a commission, consisting mostly of politicians from the Bundestag and Länder governments, aimed at laying down the proposals for reforming the German federal system. Even though the commission was able to hammer out compromises on many issues, at the end of 2004 the negotiations failed due to disagreement concerning the distribution of legislative competences between the federal level and the Länder with regard to education (Scharpf 2007). One year later, during the negotiations leading to the Grand Coalition, the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats resumed their consultations on federalism and were finally able to reach an agreement (cf. also chapter 2). The first part of the federalism reform, which was the most extensive reform of the German constitution (Basic Law) in its entire history, came into force on September 1, 2006. According to the bill memo, such reform was supposed to enable both the federal level and the Länder to act independently of each other, to better clarify federal and Länder political responsibilities, and to enhance their efficiency (Bundestag printed matter 16/813, 1). In short, the major goal of the reform was to disentangle German federalism (at least partly) by assigning several matters under the exclusive legislative competence of the Länder (e.g., store opening hours, right of assembly, education system, etc.), thus enabling them to legislate independently from the federal government on more policy areas. On the other hand, there was some hope of reducing the number of bills requiring Bundesrat approval by modifying article 84, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law (Zohlnhöfer 2008a). This change is expected to provide the federal government with more autonomy from the Bundesrat and its majority, which for the past two decades has consistently been different from the majority in the Bundestag. However, the extent to which this first part of the federalism reform has contributed to a disentanglement of joint decision making in Germany is a controversial issue (Zohlnhöfer 2008a, 2009a). On one hand, the legislative competences acquired by the Länder are

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rather limited, and most important policy matters will still be decided at the federal level. On the other hand, the reform also introduced new grounds requiring Bundesrat approval (article 104a, paragraph 4 GG), thus creating a conf lict with the original intent of the reform. Empirically, the Länder, particularly the small and financially weak ones, have been reluctant to use their new legislative competences. In a number of cases they have worked together to draft legislation in these new policy fields. On the federal level (Bund), the relative number of bills needing Bundesrat approval has decreased substantially since the reform inception. Prior to the reform, about 50–60 percent of all bills required the second chamber’s approval; this ratio declined to about 40 percent in the first four years after the reform came into force. Given the comparatively short period of observation, however, it is premature to draw a definite conclusion about the long-term effects this reform of the federal system will exert on the German policy-making procedures. The federal financial relations—with very few exceptions excluded from the reform’s first stage—were addressed in a second step with the establishment of another ad hoc commission, including members from both chambers. In May and June 2009, the proposals introduced in this new commission were approved by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The centerpiece of the reform’s second stage is a constitutional rule establishing new limits to the budget deficit for both levels of government. Accordingly, the Länder are not allowed to incur new debt from 2020 onward, and the federal government deficit is not to exceed 0.35 percent of GDP from 2016 onward. There are few exceptions to this rule, and they must meet specific conditions, such as the occurrence of natural disasters or economic recessions. In addition, from 2011–2019 five Länder (Berlin, Bremen, Saarland, Saxony-Anhalt, and Schleswig-Holstein) will receive a consolidation grant, because their excessive deficits would have prevented them from complying with the new debt rule from 2020 onward. Although the new deficit regulation deals with an important problem of inner-state financial relations, the second stage of the reform did not solve all problems of the Bund-Länder financial relations. For example, the Länder are still unable to make their own decisions about their revenues, due to the lack of any legislative competence concerning taxation at the Länder level. The reforms of the federal system have not changed this situation with the exception of the property transfer tax, which the Länder are now allowed to vary. The fiscal equalization scheme remained untouched, too. Although the two

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reform stages introduced considerable changes, most likely the federal system reform will be a leading concern in German politics for quite some time. Fiscal Policy According to the coalition agreement, budget consolidation was the top priority of the first Merkel government. And indeed, at least until 2008 the Grand Coalition was quite successful in reducing the federal budget deficit: from 31.2 billion Euros in 2005 to 11.5 in 2008. Also, overall public sector borrowing (Bund, Länder, municipalities, and social security funds taken together) shrank to almost zero in 2007 and 2008. It is likely that the federal deficit would have disappeared altogether by 2011—as planned by the finance minister, Peer Steinbrück (SPD)—had it not been for the financial markets’ global crisis. The positive development of the budget was mostly due to a favorable economic environment until mid-2008, which led to an increase in tax revenues with a simultaneous decrease in overall spending, particularly social expenditures. Government action also played a role in budget consolidation. Apart from a slight cut in expenditures, the coalition mostly focused on the revenue side. In contrast to its predecessors, however, the government could not rely to any substantial degree on privatization proceeds, because most of the state-owned enterprises had already been sold, and the remaining ones were politically difficult to privatize, or privatizations failed due to the dismal situation of the capital markets in the fall of 2008 (Herweg and Zohlnhöfer 2010). The main way to raise revenues were tax increases which were implemented right after the coalition came to power. On one hand, a number of tax expenditures were curbed (cf. SVR 2006, para. 366 for details). Examples include the halving of the tax exempt amount on savings (Sparerfreibetrag), the abrogation of the first-home owner’s allowance (Eigenheimzulage), and the curbing of the commuter tax allowance (Pendlerpauschale). The latter measure was later revoked by a Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) ruling in 2008. In addition, some tax rates were increased. The so-called tax on the rich (Reichensteuer) was mostly a symbolic operation: an additional top tax bracket of 45 percent (up from 42 percent) on annual income exceeding 250,000 Euros. More relevant, however, was the increase of both the insurance and the Value Added Tax (VAT) rates—the latter went up from 16 to 19 percent.

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It is worth noting that concern over the economic cycle played an important role when the coalition began consolidating the budget. Given the sluggish growth of the German economy in the fall of 2005, the government feared that an early VAT increase in 2006 would harm the recovery process during that period. Therefore, the government decided first to launch a program aimed at stimulating the economy, and to postpone tax hikes for one year until the recovery got on the right track—a strategy that was successful. The most important law concerning tax policy was certainly the business tax reform, which was passed in 2007. This reform aimed at improving Germany’s competitive position in regard to business taxation (cf. SVR 2007, para. 394ff., for more details). The centerpiece was the reduction of the corporate tax rate from 25 percent to 15 percent. Because German companies pay corporate taxes, local business taxes (Gewerbesteuer), as well as a surcharge on corporate taxes, the overall business tax rate is significantly higher than the corporate tax rate alone. The overall business tax rate also gained a substantial cut: from around 40 percent to 30 percent. Although this new overall nominal business tax rate is still above the average of the EU-15, it is at least no longer the highest tax rate among these countries. On January 1, 2009 the government introduced a final withholding tax on capital income at a f lat rate of 25 percent (Abgeltungsteuer). This new tax was beneficial to taxpayers with a marginal tax rate above 25 percent. Again, this change was meant to help adapt the German tax system to the challenges of globalization. As remarked in its memo, the bill was supposed to reduce the incentives for private investors to relocate their capital for tax reasons alone (Bundestag printed matter 16/4841, 1). Because the tax shortfall induced by the overall reform was supposed to be limited to 5 billion Euros, the need for broadening the tax base emerged. Such increase included some remarkable provisions designed to prevent multinational companies to relocate their profits from a (still) high-tax Germany to low-tax countries. A perfect example is the interest deduction ceiling (Zinsschranke), which limits the extent to which multinational companies can deduct interest expenses under certain conditions. Another relevant tax reform was the inheritance tax reform. The FCC had ruled the old law as unconstitutional and demanded a revised law until the end of 2008. If the Grand Coalition had failed to adopt a reform, no inheritance tax could have been raised anymore after 2009. After long negotiations, the government agreed upon such reform— although there are concerns about its possible unconstitutionality.

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The Labor Market As noted above, the Red-Green government had enacted rather farreaching reforms on the labor market (Zohlnhöfer 2004, Kemmerling, and Bruttel 2006). The Grand Coalition abstained from any further large-scale change in this area (Dümig 2010). The government succeeded in reducing social security contributions to below 40 percent of gross wages—a target that had been failed by each government since the mid-1990s. The reversal of the trend for ever-increasing social security contributions is highly relevant for the labor market because such contributions raise labor costs and have a negative effect on employment. Thus, this reduction, obtained by lowering contributions to unemployment insurance from 6.5 percent in 2005 to 2.8 percent in 2009, was an important success. The government was not responsible for this success alone, however, because the improving economic climate certainly played a role too; with a decline in unemployment, the related insurance ran surpluses, giving the government leeway for the contribution rate reduction. The Grand Coalition helped this decrease by applying part of the additional revenues generated by the 2007 VAT hike to lower unemployment insurance contribution rates. The government failed, however, to enact an even larger reduction of non-wage labor costs: health care and long-term care reforms did not produce lower contribution rates, but actually led to increased non-wage labor costs. Even within labor market policy, some Grand Coalition reforms are likely to lead to higher social security contributions, at least in the medium term. The most relevant of such changes—an extension of the period unemployed people over fifty can claim unemployment benefits—partly reversed a decision of the Schröder government’s Agenda 2010, which in 2003 had reduced this time period. Finally, an important policy change addressed the minimum wage legislation. In 2005, when the Merkel government took over, a minimum wage only existed in the construction industry. The Grand Coalition extended the minimum wage to eight more industries comprising more than two million employees. In contrast, a further liberalization of the labor market, which the CDU/CSU had argued for, did not make it to the statute books. Social Policy The Grand Coalition enacted changes in the most important branches of social security, with the health care reform in 2007 attracting

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most attention, particularly due to its new way of funding health care (Hartmann 2010). Since 2009, every citizen covered by a statutory health insurance company pays the same rate, which is determined by the federal government. The members’ contributions and additional tax money are then lumped together in the so-called health-care fund (Gesundheitsfonds). The insurance companies receive a f lat amount from this health-care fund for each person they cover. If a company has a large number of employees who have medical conditions requiring high cost care, it gets extra money from the same Gesundheitsfonds. The basic idea behind this new system is to increase competition among health insurance companies. For instance, if a health insurance company needs more money than allocated by the fund, it can levy extra contributions. In this case, however, the insured have the right to choose another company. It is hoped that insurance companies will avoid levying extra contributions and will thus work more efficiently than previously. Furthermore, insurance companies that spend less than what is allocated to them by the health-care fund can give some surplus back to the insured, while a company can also offer certain elective services. These provisions are designed to spur competition and thus curb overall spending. However, the reform failed in reducing overall contribution rates. The uniform contribution rate established by the federal government for the first time in October 2008 (15.5 percent) was 0.6 percentage points higher than the existing average contribution rate. Nevertheless, the government achieved another goal, namely its relative strengthening vis-à-vis the statutory health insurance companies; a step that might lead to the political success of future health care reforms. The most important change in pensions was the mandatory retirement age increase, from 65 to 67 years, which will be gradually phased in between 2012 and 2029 (Schmidt 2010). But the Grand Coalitions’ pension policy was not entirely about retrenchment. Rather, the government argued that pensioners should partake in the economic upswing, deciding that in 2008 and 2009 pensions (along with other welfare benefits) should receive an increase larger than the amount determined by the pension formula. This formula was also modified so that future nominal cuts to pensions are precluded. These decisions are likely to produce considerable additional costs for the German pension system. The government has argued that the “extra” increases will be clawed back at a later point, but it needs to be seen whether this step will be politically feasible. Rather, these decisions may well lead to higher contribution rates or higher subsidies from the federal budget.

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Finally, the Grand Coalition adopted the first reform of long-term care insurance since its introduction in 1995. Most provisions aimed at improving services and increasing transfers. Employees taking care of a family member were also given the right to a leave of absence for up to six months. In order to fund these improvements, the long-term care insurance’s contribution rate was increased by 0.25 percentage points. Family Policy The overhauling of the family policy is probably among the most surprising changes adopted by the Grand Coalition (Henninger and von Wahl 2010). The reform’s first step was the replacement of the child raising allowance (Erziehungsgeld ) with the parental leave benefit (Elterngeld ). While the old Erziehungsgeld was means tested and parents with higher incomes were not entitled to it, the new parental leave benefit covers all parents and is earnings-related. A parent is entitled to 67 percent of his or her average after tax annual income in the last year before the child’s birth, if he or she takes a leave of absence to raise the child. The benefit ranges from 300 to 1,800 Euros monthly and can be drawn for up to fourteen months after the child’s birth, but the same parent is entitled to the Elterngeld for only up to twelve months. Essentially, at least two months are “earmarked” for fathers, who get an incentive to take part in raising their children. The second important project related to family policy is the expansion of day care facilities for under 3-year-olds. Starting in August 1, 2013, children are entitled to enroll in a public nursery from the age of one. In order to ensure that sufficient places will be available, the federal government will provide four billion Euros (until 2013) to the Länder, which are constitutionally in charge of education policy. From 2014 onward, the federal government takes over 770 million Euros annually. The bill also includes a benefit (to be paid from 2013 onward) for parents uninterested in having a reserved place in a nursery for their children between one and three years old (Bundestag printed matter 16/9299, 3). Such benefit, however, requires new legislation in order to be implemented. This large overhaul of family policy is mostly aimed at better harmonizing family and work. The Elterngeld was supposed to ameliorate family financial situations in the first year after the birth of a child, when often one parent stays home and thus the family income may fall substantially. Also, the earnings relatedness is supposed to encourage highly qualified, well paid couples to have babies, while the extension

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of day care facilities for over one-year-old children should help parents’ return to working life. And the newly introduced tax deductibility for day care expenses is also supposed to improve the overall reconcilability of family and work. The Response to the Financial Market Crisis The financial market crisis, which hit Germany along with all other western democracies in the fall of 2008, and which soon turned into the worst recession in the Federal Republic’s history, was not discussed in the coalition agreement, but nevertheless demanded immediate action: the federal government’s response was equally unique in the post-WWII German history (for a critical overview, cf. Enderlein 2010). As long as the crisis was mainly a financial market crisis, the government primarily tried to restore public confidence in the banking system—by protecting people’s savings accounts and supporting financial institutions through a package worth up to 480 billion Euros. The Bundestag also adopted a law enabling (for a short period of time and only as a last resort), a possible expropriation of banks whose activities were crucial for the proper performance of the financial system. Even though such an option was never used, the Grand Coalition proceeded to fully or partly nationalize some banks (Herweg and Zohlnhöfer 2010). However, the bank rescue package could not prevent the financial market crisis from spilling over to the real economy where it caused a deep recession. The federal government responded in December 2008 with a 23 billion Euros package as an economic stimulus, including large investments in infrastructure, improved conditions for write-offs, and a special program supposedly able to facilitate credit access to smalland medium-sized enterprises. Two months later, a second package followed, this time worth 50 billion Euros—the largest ever economic stimulus program in the Federal Republic’s history. Investment expenditure received a further boost, the income tax was slightly reduced, a one-off payment for families with children was granted and a so-called scrapping bonus (Abwrackprämie) for old cars was temporarily introduced to help the automobile industry, hit particularly hard by the crisis. According to this provision, buyers purchasing a new car received 2,500 Euros if they scrapped their current automobile—provided it was at least nine years old. In addition, the increase in unemployment was fought by extensive active labor market measures, particularly shorttime jobs. Even though it may still be too early for a definite assessment, it seems fair to assert that such programs as a whole were able

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to mitigate the crisis in a substantial way. It is controversial, however, whether other options would have been even more effective. Explaining the Patterns of Reform Given the above picture, can we say that the Grand Coalition has proven to be a “coalition of new possibilities”? Or was it rather characterized by permanent gridlock and blockade? The answer to these questions is clearly multifaceted. A number of reforms seem far-reaching and somewhat successful. Even if it is too early to render a definitive judgment on the federalism reforms’ outcome, they nevertheless brought unprecedented change to the Basic Law. The same is true for the remarkable change in family policy. The new parental leave benefit, and particularly the extension of day care facilities for under three-year-old toddlers, certainly improved the reconcilability of family and work. Even though similar plans were pursued already by the previous Red-Green Coalition, it was the Merkel government that had the political will to enact such reforms. Similarly, increasing the statutory pension age—a very unpopular, but, according to most economists, a necessary reform— had been considered but eventually postponed by the preceding government. The business tax reform closed down a twenty-year debate on corporate taxation by bringing the statutory overall business tax rate close to the EU-15 average level. This is an important accomplishment, even if the reform was far from solving all problems related to business taxation in Germany. And the government succeeded in reducing the social security contributions to below 40 percent of gross wages, while all previous governments since 1996 had failed to achieve this symbolically important goal. At least until the outbreak of the financial market crisis, the coalition was also somewhat successful in consolidating the overall budget, even though the government had left the path of strict budget consolidation already before 2008. Finally, given the circumstances and despite a number of mistakes, the government responded reasonably adequately to the economic crisis, particularly with regard to keeping unemployment comparatively low. Nevertheless, other reform attempts cannot be assessed as successful, and some efforts contradicted one another. The major privatization projects, for example, failed completely as did the attempts to liberalize the labor market. Similarly, the 2008–2009 extra pension increases contradicted the logic of the pension age increase, and the efforts to reduce the unemployment insurance contributions were undermined by the extension of the unemployment benefit entitlement period for

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people over fifty years of age, as well as the health care and long-term care reforms that led to higher non-wage labor costs. Similarly, some aspects of the bank rescue package were also somewhat contradictory. Contrary to other countries including the United Kingdom and the United States, ailing banks were not obliged to accept capital injections (which would have implied a partial nationalization) but those banks that did were punished by a strict regulation of salaries, bonuses and dividends. Enderlein (2010) believes that this has kept banks from using the rescue package. Finally, some policy changes focused on keeping future options open: for example, health care reform has established important preconditions for both (otherwise contradictory) reform plans proposed by the coalition partners (Hartmann 2010). Hence, thanks to the Grand Coalition’s steps, the next government will find it easier to implement its pet proposal. Overall, the reform pattern seems a mixed experience. While we do find some rather far-reaching changes in certain fields, other areas have not seen much transformation or the reform attempts were inconclusive. What accounts for this varied reform pattern? The analysis of institutional veto players cannot fully explain the Grand Coalition’s reform output (Zohlnhöfer 2009b). The Bundesrat did not exert major inf luences on policies because there were fewer bills requiring Bundesrat approval due to federalism reform, and the Grand Coalition had a majority in the second chamber during its first three years in office. The FCC certainly remained a relevant player as it forced the Grand Coalition to modify the inheritance tax, ruled unconstitutional the curbing of the commuter tax allowance, and influenced the federalism reform. Apart from these cases, however, the Grand Coalition’s room to maneuver was not substantially circumscribed by the court. Even the federal president decided to intervene in the policy making process on two occasions, one of which ended with the failure of the privatization of air traffic control. In general, however, the president did not become an active veto player during the Merkel government. Coalition partners rather than institutions help to explain why there was little policy change in some areas. The leading partner of the RedGreen Coalition (SPD) remained in power and could thus veto all reform plans the Christian Democrats might have entertained, particularly with regard to taxation, privatization, the labor market, and the welfare state. On the other side, the SPD could not get all of its ideas adopted, either, due to the CDU/CSU veto. The failure to push through a general minimum wage is a case in point. The “keeping-all-options-open”

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kind of reforms, such as health care, must also be understood as a result of the coalition constellation. In this case, both partners believed that something had to be done, but at the same time they fundamentally disagreed on what that should be. Therefore, it was hard to find a shared concept to start with, and it was of paramount importance for the coalition partners to preserve as much future leeway as possible, in order to adopt the most favored idea in case the next election provided them with a Bundestag majority. Similarly, the incoherence of the bank rescue package can also be explained by the diverging programmatic positions of the coalition partners (Enderlein 2010). The SPD did not want to spend an immense amount of public money to safe banks without holding to account the managers who were responsible for the problems of their institutions. This meant that some kind of punishment had to be introduced for those banks that needed help from the state. Therefore, the salaries of managers of banks obtaining help were capped and bonuses were strictly regulated. On the other hand, the Christian Democrats refused all policy options that would imply (partial) nationalizations. This, however, meant that banks could not be obliged to make use of capital injections. In the end, these conf licting positions led to the ineffective combination of a voluntary scheme with penalties for participating banks. Given that the coalition partners blocked each other’s plans more often than not, it is important to understand why the Grand Coalition was able to adopt some rather far-reaching reforms like the federalism reform, VAT hike, business tax reform, pension age increase, family policy changes, introduction of minimum wages in some industries, unemployment benefits extension for older workers, and a prompt response to the economic crisis. It seems, however, that there are different reasons for these more far-reaching reforms—such as the reform’s perceived salience, the ministries’ leadership skills and even electoral considerations. The reform of federalism, the VAT increase, the business tax reform, and the response to the economic crisis were essential in order to preserve the political system’s capacity to act, to keep debt under control, to improve Germany’s competitive position, and to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis. Both parties agreed that it was necessary to act. With regard to the federalism reform, a ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court was of prime importance. In its 2004 ruling on the junior professorship, the FCC interpreted the conditions under which the federal government was allowed to legislate in concurrent and

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framework legislations (article 72, section 2 Basic Law) in an extremely narrow way. As a consequence, large parts of the federal law were in danger of being unconstitutional (Scharpf 2007, 202–203). In order to safeguard such legislation (and also to prevent a policy gridlock triggered by diverging majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat), the first federalism reform was adopted. The budget situation was similar: Germany had breached the European Stability and Growth Pact’s deficit criterion for years, and the Grand Coalition would have been unable to present a budget adequate to the requirements of the Basic Law and the European Union without the 2007 tax increase. The fact that the nominal business tax rates were higher than almost anywhere else in the EU was also seen as problematic by tax experts in all parties. In March 2005, shortly after the unemployment figure had crossed the threshold of five million jobless people, the Red-Green government came to an understanding with the then-opposition of CDU/CSU to lower business taxation substantially and a cross-party bill was introduced to the Bundestag (Bundestag printed matters 15/5554; 15/5555). Even though this bill did not make it to the statute books due to the early elections, this episode shows that both coalition partners were aware of the urgency of a reduction in business taxes in order to solve the country’s pressing economic problems. Finally, it was also very hard to deny the importance of a swift and extensive response to the worst economic crisis Germany had seen in its post-war history. In sum, when a reform was undisputedly needed, the Grand Coalition promptly showed its ability and willingness to adopt broad and sometimes even unpopular acts. The urgency of structural reforms in economic and social policy decreased from 2006 onward, when the economic situation improved substantially and unemployment started to fall. Therefore, such reforms seemed less necessary and were postponed. This is particularly evident for employment policy: the revision of active labor market policy brought about little change and the introduction of certain wage subsidies that were agreed upon in the coalition agreement failed altogether (Dümig 2010). A second group of reforms was also adopted, although the related problems were not considered as extremely urgent. In such instances, the leadership skills of the responsible minister and the chancellor’s support of the respective ministers played an important role. Relevant examples include changes in family policy, the pension age increase, and budget consolidation (Schmidt 2010; Henninger and von Wahl 2010). In all of these cases, strong ministers were able to push through their pet solutions with Merkel backing them. It should be noted, however, that

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the transformation of family policy and budget consolidation benefited from the improving economic situation (as long as it did improve) and were also popular among the voters. Electoral considerations were also relevant for other policy changes, particularly those changes that explicitly or implicitly reversed parts of the Schröder government’s Agenda 2010. The emergence and relative success of the new Left Party, led by former Social Democratic party leader Oskar Lafontaine, moved the party system’s center of gravity substantially to the left (Egle 2010). This development resulted in a “re-socialdemocratization” of economic and social policy; examples include the minimum wage legislation, the extension of the period unemployed people over fifty can claim unemployment benefits, and the pension increases in 2008 and 2009. Because it suffered most from the success of the Left Party, the SPD embraced these provisions in order to make its mark as a party promoting social justice (Batt 2008). The Christian Democrats accepted those changes because they feared losing votes should they veto these reforms, and some reforms (such as extended unemployment benefits) were actually initiated by the Christian Democrats in order to attract more voters. Moreover, the coalition shied away from welfare or labor market reforms that were expected to be unpopular among voters. Conclusion The policy legacy of the Grand Coalition is characterized, on one hand, by some extensive, successful reforms, which were either responses to pressing problems or pushed through by strong ministers with the backing of the chancellor. Contrary to what some of the literature might suggest (Miskimmon et al. 2009), the Grand Coalition did not produce any permanent gridlock. On the other hand, in several policy areas the Merkel government could not seize the opportunity provided by holding the majority in both chambers of parliament. The main reason for this is that the partners of the Grand Coalition were unable to suspend the routine patterns of policy-making, particularly the fierce electoral competition among themselves. In her first policy statement, Angela Merkel (2005) pointed out with regard to the “uphill battle” the Grand Coalition would have to fight, “Nobody can stop us, unless we stand in our own way. Let us dispense with the well-rehearsed rituals, the reflex howls of protest, if we want to change anything. Surely it ought to be possible for us to leave all that behind.” In many cases, however, particularly with regard to the welfare state and the labor market, it became actually

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impossible “to leave all that behind.” The Grand Coalition lacked a common policy project, which could have been the necessary glue among its partners. Therefore, the main aim of both governing parties increasingly became to make one’s mark at the expense of the other—hoping that voters would provide them with more favorable parliamentary majorities in the next election, finally enabling them to adopt their favored policies. Even though the Merkel government succeeded in enacting several important reforms, in sum it turned out to be a sort of “inter-regnum” toward more suitable majorities. Note 1. The reforms discussed here are considered as the Grand Coalition’s key decisions. According to Klaus von Beyme (1998), key decisions are characterized by three criteria: a) the innovative character of laws, b) the public attention paid to an issue in the media and in society at large, and c) the conf licts generated by the measure. Nevertheless, it is possible that even key decisions do not imply far-reaching policy change: actors may aim at major change but may be unable to get their bills adopted. The terms “reform,” “decision,” and “policy change” are therefore used interchangeably in the following and refer to any change of the legislative status quo, irrespective of its content.

CHAPTER 2

Toward a New German Federalism? How the 2006 Constitutional Reform Did (Not) Change the Dynamics of the Federal System Julia von Blumenthal

Introduction A comprehensive reform of the German federal system requires a Grand Coalition at the federal level. The first far-reaching constitutional reform was passed in 1969 by the first Grand Coalition that had been in power since 1966. This established the constitutional foundation for Germany’s cooperative federalism, by then quite well developed.1 In 2006, the second Grand Coalition overcame the deadlock leading to the failure of the Commission for the Modernization of the Federal Order (KOMBO) in 2004 and agreed on a major constitutional reform. 2 The reform, which went into effect on September 1, 2006 was accompanied by criticism, but also by optimistic views that this could be the beginning of a “new federalism.”3 Today, one legislative term later, it is doubtful that rewriting the constitution can effectively change the historical trajectory on which a political system in a developed democratic society has embarked.4 Triggered by societal development and the dynamics of party competition, some change has already occurred and will continue. This chapter provides a detailed account and assessment of the 2006 constitutional reform. Included are the role of the second chamber (Bundesrat) in decision-making at the federal level (Bund); the disentanglement of multilevel governance involving Bund and Länder governments in certain policy fields (joint tasks) as well as within European policy-making

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procedures5; and the potential for independent policy-making at the Länder level.6 The chapter concludes by addressing the future of German federalism under the condition of the five-party system. The 2006 Constitutional Reform According to the parliamentary documents that established the KOMBO (Bundestag print matter 16/813, 1), the federal system reform had three major goals: to improve the Bund and Länder decision-making capabilities; to clarify political responsibility; and to make federal governance more efficient and effective. These goals were endorsed by constitutional amendments in three areas. The first area limited the Bundesrat veto powers, enlarging the federal government’s room for maneuver; the second group of amendments tackled the complex system of multilevel governance, aiming at a “disentanglement” and clearer distribution of competences; and finally, there were amendments designed to redistribute legislative competences in favor of the Länder. Limiting the Bundesrat Veto Powers The veto powers of the Bundesrat were to be reduced through changes to Article 84 paragraph 1 of the German constitution (Basic Law). Until 2006, the majority of legislation requiring the Bundesrat mandatory approval was due to Article 84, which included the veto power of the Bundesrat for any bill promoting the implementation by the Länder. This clause was repealed, and the Länder gained the right to deviate from regulations on administrative procedures included in the federal legislation. However, a loophole was created: the federal government could declare the uniform regulation of administrative procedures as inalienable, preventing the Länder from any deviation, triggering once again the mandatory approval of the Bundesrat. A new clause was added to Article 104a calling for mandatory Bundesrat consent for federal laws containing expenditures which have to be sustained by the Länder. Finally, Bundesrat consent is required in a new field of federal legislation: the “fight against terrorism.” The constitutional reforms removed the Bundesrat veto rights in some areas while creating new veto powers in other areas. Disentanglement of Multilevel Governance A similar mixed result occurred in the disentanglement of multilevel governance. A definitive move toward a clearcut distribution of competences

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was the abolition of “framework legislation.” 7 This category has always been disputed because federal framework laws tend to be so detailed that they leave no room for autonomous regulations by individual Länder. Reconciling federal framework laws with Land laws required the cooperation of Bund and Länder and contributed to the complexity of multilevel governance within German federalism. A major reform issue was in the field of joint tasks that are policy areas planned and realized cooperatively by Bund and Länder (Article 91a). Here, the reform showed a “mixed record”: following the Länder goal of preserving and expanding their power in the education sector. The joint task of improvement and construction of “institutions of higher learning and university clinics” (Article 91a) was removed. This was also true of the joint task covering “educational planning,” which actually had never been put into effect. On the other hand, the joint tasks regarding “improvement of regional economic structures,” “agrarian structure,” and “coastal preservation” remained untouched. In addition, a new provision called for more intergovernmental cooperation and continuous involvement of the federal government in the fields of research and education—particularly in joint programs for research facilities and projects (Article 91b), and for Bund-Länder cooperation on international comparative assessments of educational systems. A similar mixed record regarding disentanglement was reported by the changes applied to the Article 23 Basic Law, regulating the participation of Länder governments in European governance. The Länder agreed to limit their veto powers in European policy-making to those fields where they have exclusive competences (education, culture, and broadcasting). At the same time, a new clause reinforced the presence of a Länder representative nominated by the Bundesrat, acting on behalf of Germany, for such policy fields—the previous formulation shall (“soll” ) exercise Germany’s rights, was strengthened to will (“wird” ) exercise (Jeffery 2007, 17). Further amendments tackling multilevel governance were introduced with regard to international obligations, clarifying the burdensharing between Bund and Länder (Articles 104a paragraph 6 and 109 paragraph 5) and at the local level. Articles 84 and 85 were modified in order to prohibit the federal government from assigning new tasks to local government and circumventing the constitutional allocation of responsibility for that level to the Länder. Finally, to a certain extent the 2006 constitutional reform clarified the distribution of responsibilities between Bund and Länder and created an opportunity for a disentanglement of multilevel governance.

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Whether and how this chance was taken up by the political actors is discussed below. Redistribution of Legislative Powers The distribution of legislative powers has been adjusted in five different ways. First, additional competences have been ascribed to the federal level, partly from the framework legislation directory and partly from the concurrent powers list, 8 particularly in the areas where uniform legislation is preferred.9 Within the internal security sector, an additional federal power now accompanies the formerly exclusive power assigned to the Länder, as the Bund acquired the right to pass legislation addressing international terrorism. Second, the Länder gained a considerable number of exclusive competences from both areas of former framework and concurrent legislation, such as shop closing hours, salaries and benefits for public employees, imprisonment and prison management, press regulation, right of assembly, and other small areas in economic policy. Third, the remaining thirty-two concurrent legislative areas now face a complex system featuring limitations for the Bund and rights for the Länder to deviate from national legislation. The necessity clause (Erforderlichkeitsklausel)—the condition under which the Bund can make use of its concurrent power—as outlined in Article 72 Basic Law, was restricted to a set of clearly defined matters. This step was a reaction to two Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) rulings removing from the federal government discretion about the requirement of a uniform legislation in concurrent power fields.10 Limiting the application of the Erforderlichkeitsklausel to ten concurrent powers, therefore, grants the Bund more room for political maneuvering in all remaining fields of concurrent legislation. The 2006 reform introduced a fourth and completely new approach to the legislative competence distribution. Article 72 paragraph 3 lists six areas of concurrent legislation in which the Länder may deviate from existing federal legislation. In the case of coexisting Bund and Länder laws, the latter will prevail (according to the lex posterior rule). This constitutes a departure from the general principle that federal law prevails over Land law. Land legislation does not prevent the Bund from issuing new legislation in the respective field, but in order to slow down a potential legislative seesaw, any federal law comes into effect only six months after its approval.11 Finally, changes affected also those provisions aimed at returning federal legislative competences to the Länder. While such decision still

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lies with the federal government (Article 72 paragraph 4), the Länder can invoke the FCC (Article 93 paragraph 2) if the Bund refuses to pass the necessary legislation in cases where federal power is not longer rectified under the stipulations of the constitution. Judging from the legal text, the constitutional reform was far reaching: many provisions were altered and with the right of the Länder to deviate from federal legislation as far as both the implementation and the contents of federal law are concerned, a completely new way of distributing competences has been found. However, a proper evaluation of the federalism reform requires a closer look at its broad political consequences. End of Deadlock? The Role of the Bundesrat after 2006 Reducing the Bundesrat veto powers was a key issue in the goal to increase the federal government’s room for political action, and to foster clear political responsibilities. Whether the federalism reform was successful in this regard remains a disputed issue. In the few years since 2006, several published studies have analyzed the effects of rewriting Articles 84 and 104. Using different methodologies, the studies have different conclusions. According to Georgii and Borhanian’s (2006) estimation, the federal legislation quota requiring Bundesrat approval has been almost halved.12 Several other studies agree that the number of bills requiring Bundesrat consent has been reduced substantially (Risse 2007; Burkhart et al. 2008; Zohlnhöfer 2008a, 2010).13 On the other hand, Höreth (2007) sees a rather limited effect, estimating that the legislation share calling for the Bundesrat consent dropped no more than five percentage points. How can we best address the 2006 federalism reform effect on the Bundesrat role while the Grand Coalition was in office? Limited Veto Rights of the Bundesrat First, we will look at the aftermath of the modifications of Article 84 Basic Law concerning federal laws containing administrative stipulations. Georgii and Borhanian (2006) were overly optimistic in assuming that the federal government would not use its power to declare administrative provisions in federal laws mandatory, triggering the Bundesrat approval. In the first year after the reform went into effect this provision accounted for approximately one-fourth of the entire legislation requiring the Bundesrat consent. In these cases the federal government accepted mandatory Bundesrat approval in order to ensure uniform

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implementation by the Länder. This could be seen as a proof that uniform legislation and implementation are still the overarching goals of the federal government. But this would overrate the cases in question: the majority of legislation covered areas of international law where the need for uniform implementation was unquestionable and administrative discretion of individual Länder had an extremely limited leeway (Risse 2007, 711). Four bills dealt with environmental policies, an area where the struggle between Bund and Länder was and still is salient, while the deviation rights for the Länder introduced by the federalism reform took effect after December 2009. The picture changes slightly if one takes into account the Bundesrat session data not covered by Risse analysis:14 the federal government invoked Article 84 paragraph 1 clause 5 and 6 for twenty-four cases— fourteen of them related to international treaties and European law, and two pertained to environmental policy. The remaining eight covered policy areas such as workers’ migration, paternity tests, and visa information, and demonstrated that for certain, policy fields a uniform implementation is still necessary or at least preferable. Using a different approach, Höreth comes to a more skeptical evaluation of the effect of the newly phrased Article 84. He lists nineteen bills in which the new requirement could have been activated, because they contained detailed provisions for administrative implementation and were not already subject to Bundesrat consent by any other Basic Law article. In sixteen out of the nineteen cases, the federal government decided to apply Article 84, thereby accepting the Bundesrat veto right (Höreth 2007, 732). But again, these data do not necessarily imply that future federal governments will act the same way. The decision to accept a Bundesrat approval or a Länder-specific implementation is neither a simple legal issue nor purely policy-triggered, but rather a strategic choice depending on the party majorities in Bundestag and Bundesrat (Höreth 2007, 717–720). When most of the data were collected, the Grand Coalition could rely on a broad majority in the Bundesrat—thus lowering the incentive to avoid the second chamber’s compulsory approval. In sum, given the short period since the reform went into force, it is not clear whether the reformulation of Article 84 will actually lead to more discretion for the Länder in implementing federal laws, or whether federal governments will continue to determine the uniform implementation of federal legislation—effectively undermining the disentangling effect of this part of the 2006 reform.

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New Veto Rights of the Bundesrat Even less can be said about the repercussions of the Bundesrat new veto powers as laid down in Article 104a. According to a federal government official report issued in April 2008, Article 104a sparked a mandatory Bundesrat approval in seven cases, accounting for 10.7 percent of the overall legislation requiring Bundesrat consent. Again, it is too early to conclude from these figures that Fritz Scharpf was wrong when he predicted that this new stipulation would outweigh the limitations of the Bundesrat veto right caused by the Article 84 reformulation (Scharpf 2006, 7). Based on a counterfactual analysis, Burkhart et al. (2008, 529) concluded that the provision at least “erodes some of the positive effects of the new formulation of Article 84.” The future effect of Article 104a paragraph 4 will, first, depend on its interpretation. The wording of the new clause leaves room for interpretation of what constitutes a financial burden for the Länder as it not only refers to money grants to be borne by the Länder but also to “benefits” or “comparable services.” It remains to be seen which interpretation the FCC will adopt once a conf lict between Bund and Länder arises. Second, the relevance of Article 104a will depend on the political agenda of the particular federal government. The limited relevance that the new proposition of Article 104a had so far can partly be ascribed to the fact that the Grand Coalition simply did not propose many bills creating financial obligations for the Länder (Risse 2007, 711). The Bundesrat Influence on Key Decisions The studies by Zohlnhöfer (2008a) and Burkhart et al. (2008) question further the extent to which the federalism reform frees the federal government from the Bundesrat majority consent. Even assuming a 20 percent reduction for the legislation quota requiring Bundesrat approval, a different picture is emerging regarding key policies such as health care, social security, the labor market and, of course, taxes.15 Indeed, both taxes and fiscal equalization mechanisms have been excluded from the 2006 federalism reform, leaving this sector to consensual politics of the major political parties (SPD and CDU) and Bund and Länder governments. Zohlnhöfer (2008a, 463) concludes that “it is not certain that the number of important reforms that will depend on Bundesrat approval will be reduced substantially.” This result is based on a counterfactual analysis of the former Red-Green coalition’s key decisions and on the relevant data during the Grand Coalition. If the Bundesrat

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veto powers on key decisions remain largely untouched, one could argue that the political influence of the Bundesrat was not limited at all by the 2006 reform. The Bundesrat under the Grand Coalition—Not a Rubber Stamp Changes in the Bundesrat’s role cannot be confined only to the federalism reform effects. Whether the Bundesrat is best described as a veto player, often responsible for blocking legislative action, or as a carefully designed institution fostering the major political forces consensus (Lhotta 2003), depends on the constitutional rules and the political actors’ behavior within the constitutional framework. Against such background, the Grand Coalition offers interesting insights. Support for the federal government initiatives could not be taken for granted, either during the term’s first three years—when the Grand Coalition held a political majority also in the Bundesrat—and even less so after its loss in January 2009 (chapter 3). A good case in point is the health policy. The struggle of the CSU, as the ruling party in Bavaria, to preserve the Land’s advantageous position in the public health insurance system exacerbated the decisionmaking process within the federal coalition government with regard to the reform, which was finally approved in 2007. A few months before some of the reform’s key elements went into effect in January 2009, the CSU revamped the debate over the high costs facing the Bavarian region, mostly to exploit this issue for Land election purposes.16 Therefore, this case served as an evidence of the political parties’ capability to agree on reform policies, but even more it seems to confirm the relevance of specific Land interests within the overall federal policy-making scenario. The labor market policy is a different story. In October 2007, the FCC invalidated one important element of the so-called Hartz-IV reform,17 which is the creation of joint agencies involving the German Labor Office and local governments, forcing the federal government to find an alternative solution by the end of 2010.18 After intensive negotiations, a consensus was reached between the Federal Minister of Employment and his counterparts from the Länder to amend the Basic Law, thus allowing for joint federal/local agencies in this particular case (Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Arbeit e.V. 2009). However, such amendment was not supported by the CDU federal parliamentary party, and no other compromise could be reached until the end of the legislative term. Eventually, in this instance, it was not the Bundesrat that acted as a veto player but rather the governing majority at the federal level.

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Here follows another example illustrating the Bundesrat ambivalent role or the complex decision-making procedures within the German federal system—even when a Grand Coalition is in office. The federalism reform opened a window of opportunity to consolidate the numerous laws dealing with environmental policy, insofar as the Länder right to diverge from existing federal regulations did not come into force before the Bund had made use of its legislative competence setting January 1, 2010 as the final deadline (Hömig 2007, 705). However, the environmental law code draft was never introduced to the cabinet: the Federal Environment Minister decided to simply bury it after months of negotiations with his Länder counterparts. Once again, the Bavarian representatives in the Bundesrat refused to support the bill. Parts of this legislative project were later introduced into the Bundestag and finally passed with the Bundesrat consent. When these bills were discussed in the Bundesrat it became evident that the underlying conflict that had earlier led to the law code failure actually addressed the federal legislation scope and the Länder ability to deviate in accordance with their perceived distinct interests (Federal Ministry for the Environment 2009). What can be concluded is that in the Bundesrat a complex interplay between party politics and Länder interests continues to prevail. The Bundesrat still serves as the stage for political actors from the Länder, especially during election campaigns. Thus, it seems highly questionable that the 2006 federalism reform could and will result in a “reduced role” of the Bundesrat within federal politics. The Future of Multilevel Governance As detailed above, a major aim of the 2006 constitutional reform was to disentangle federal and subnational policy-making, thus addressing a longstanding and widespread accusation that policy-making in Germany quite often ends in a “joint-decision trap” (Scharpf 1988). In this section we will evaluate how multilevel governance, in its intergovernmental cooperation’s aspects, has been affected by the federalism reform. Executive cooperation is a dominant feature of German federalism, as illustrated not only by the structure and role of the Bundesrat but also by the complex system of horizontal and vertical executive intersections. Although not constitutionally mandated, the system of Länder conferences involving premiers (Ministerpräsidenten) and specific ministers, with their related administrative networks, is nevertheless well institutionalized. Efforts to reduce the complexity of the administrative

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networks and to increase political control have been undertaken by the conference of the Ministerpräsidenten and by several sectoral ministerial conferences. Although the number of committees established by the conferences has been reduced substantially, the system of permanent cooperation that triggers a great degree of uniformity in administering federal laws has remained essentially untouched (Benz 2009; Lhotta and Blumenthal 2010). The ministerial conferences still play a decisive role in the policy-making, and the so-called brotherhoods of technocrats (Fachbruderschaften) still exert their influence (Machura 2003, 399). The most striking example of the failure of disentanglement can be found in the policy field of university education. Following the rewriting of Article 91a and 91b, the Bund and Länder governments agreed to establish the Joint Science Conference (Gemeinsame Wissenschaftskonferenz), which replaces the Bund-Länder-Commission for Educational Planning. The founding document gives a clear impression of an enduring spirit of cooperation guiding intergovernmental relations. The members “whilst preserving their own competences, shall strive for close coordination on questions of common interest in the field of national, European and international science and research policy with the aim of strengthening Germany’s position as a location for science and research in the international competition” (Article 2; Federal Ministry of Education and Research 2007, 2). The related task list repeats the wording of Article 91 while paragraph 2 suggests even possible task transfers to the conference. An extensive collection of the Joint Science Conference press releases provides a clear record of its relevance for the research and university education policy fields.19 The most telling examples of joint policy-making in this sector are the Exzellenzinitiative, establishing competition between universities for additional subsidies, and the Hochschulpakt II, in which Bund and Länder agreed on additional funding for university teaching. Both initiatives demonstrate that even within the education policy field, where Länder inf luence has been traditionally strong, “joint undertakings of federal and state authorities continue to occur, reinforcing pre-existing patterns of politics” (Burkhart et al. 2008, 524). In European affairs a complete disentanglement seems as unlikely as in the national context, given the Länder struggle for the right to participate in European decision-making. But, according to Charlie Jeffery, the rewriting of the Article 23 Basic Law indicates that the Länder are on the verge of a strategy change. Rather than enlarging their influence on more policy fields, they have agreed on a stronger position in a limited number of core issues within the exclusive Länder

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competence. Autonomy rather than entanglement seems to be what the Länder are aiming at. “In most respects they [the Länder] simply do not want to have overlaps of competence with the EU and, assuming an adequate set of controls on subsidiarity . . . , are happy to leave the bulk of EU policy engagement to the federal government” (Jeffery 2007, 26). From this perspective, there is a potential for disentanglement of multilevel governance in those policy fields not strictly belonging to Länder core competences. Politics at the Länder Level For a long time, most observers have been convinced that politics at the Länder level is largely irrelevant and dominated by federal party politics. Länder parliaments were seen as losers within the development of executive federalism. However, since the German unification a different perception—which could run under the heading of “new federalism”— has been taking shape: Charlie Jeffery (1999) saw a “Sinatra doctrine” emerging, where the Länder are increasingly following their own policies (as in “do it their way”) as a reaction to the growing socioeconomic heterogeneity. The redistribution of legislative competences in the five aforementioned ways introduced by the 2006 reform could contribute to the development of more independent policy-making and greater diversity among the Länder. However, the same redistribution could also mean that a general preference for unity, as opposed to an emerging diversity, is stronger than any effort to disentangle German federalism and to strengthen Länder parliaments. Whether a “new federalism” is emerging depends on how Länder governments and parliaments will make use of their newly gained competences. In this respect, three different scenarios seem probable. In the first case, Länder governments might develop their own policies, addressing their own situations and disregarding the other Länder activities. Should this emerge as the dominant pattern for the exclusive Länder competence, the federalism reform could be seen as the starting point for a greater autonomy at the Länder level. Alternatively, Länder governments might handle the issues in the horizontal cooperation context, basically confining the Länder parliaments’ role to a rubber stamp. In this case, the new German federalism would not be characterized by a greater diversity but rather by uniform legislation and implementation, as outlined by the informal and not particularly transparent institutions of horizontal executive cooperation. Finally, the Länder governments might invoke some kind of federal participation to gain

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access to additional financial or other resources. The programs in the field of university education discussed above can be seen as evidence that Länder might not be in the position to refuse additional funding from the Bund even though it comes at the price of federal inf luence in the political process. If vertical cooperation became the dominant way of dealing with policies lying within Länder competence, this would demonstrate that any effort to disentangle the federal politics is doomed to fail. Given our limited empirical evidence on the Länder newly gained powers, it is worth considering the conditions under which Länder governments have so far developed diverging policies within their exclusive power areas. First, a comparative assessment of sixteen policy fields shows that socioeconomic and financial differences between the Länder are responsible for divergences in a number of policy areas (Wolf and Hildebrandt 2008, 363). Second, in many policy fields differences can be explained in partisan terms. Party competition gives way to a Länder-specific approach especially if the related party organization shows a distinctive profile or if the structure of party competition differs from the federal level (Blumenthal 2009, 271–272). The emergence of the five-party system pushed the establishment of different Länder coalitions with regard to the federal level. The new coalitions tried out on the Länder stage— such as the SPD-Left or the CDU-Greens partnerships—created an even larger divergence within the Bund and Länder party competition (chapter 3). The absence of a strong federal party competition in some areas facilitates a policy-making according to Länder-specific needs and priorities. Thus, party politics can be a decisive factor for arriving at more diversity. On the other hand, political parties remain the most important actors fostering uniform policies at both Bund and Länder levels. The third and last factor to consider is represented by historical and cultural legacies. Although cultural diversity may not be the most obvious feature of German federalism, diverse traditions still persist and, given the different immigration effects on the various Länder, new divergences might arise. 20 Looking at the policy record of the past, there is potential for autonomous decision-making of the Länder while unifying factors like federal party competition and the quest of the population for uniform living standards persist. 21 It can be expected, that the Länder activities for their newly gained exclusive competences will slowly evolve in

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different patterns. Analyzing the policy areas reassigned to the Länder through the 2006 federalism reform, where some legislative activities have occurred up to date, and testing the three explanatory factors (socioeconomic disparities, parties in power, cultural differences), we can distinguish three different heuristic patterns. Autonomous Policy-Making and Competition The first pattern includes policy areas where all or most of the sixteen Länder have undertaken legislative action and developed a more or less distinct profile. In this case, efforts to agree on a uniform policy have taken place within ministerial conferences but no agreement has actually been reached. While party politics cannot fully explain the observed differences, the Länder socioeconomic and financial aspects gain more explanatory relevance. The coexistence of different approaches introduced a certain degree of competition within the Länder relationships. In this context the most controversial area is the public service policy (Leunig and Pock 2010). Eleven Länder have passed separate legislation on salaries, including different pay scales for their public servants. With regard to teacher recruitment, this has already caused severe disputes: richer Länder offers to young teachers cannot be matched by poorer Länder (Goddar 2009). In the future, more diversity can be expected as a larger part of this policy field will be open for legislative and administrative activities by the Länder—due to the application of a new federal legislation on public service general standards. The second policy embracing this pattern is the no smoking regulation imposed on restaurants, bars, and other public places. Following the related European Union green paper (CEC 2007), all sixteen Länder passed a smoking ban for such venues. The laws differ to the extent that exceptions are planned for small pubs, restaurants with separate smoking rooms, and special events. Several attempts in the Ministerpräsidenten and Health Ministers conferences to reach more than a general consensus on a smoking ban failed. 22 Nevertheless, the quest for a uniform solution is still present in the discussion and was fostered by a ruling of the FCC of July 2008 that declared parts of the legislation in Baden-Württemberg and Berlin unconstitutional because the exceptions included in the legislation were ill designed and therefore violated the non-discrimination principle. 23 However, even this Constitutional Court decision, reaching out well over the two Länder explicitly mentioned in the ruling, did not result in a uniform smoking ban. The struggle for an adequate solution is still going on in many

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Länder and it remains to be seen whether the “regional competition” within the limits set by the FCC will one day lead to nationwide uniform legislation. The third case concerns the legislation on shop closing hours. The Länder have taken over this issue rather quickly, attaining more or less liberal regulations. Whether a Land has passed a more restrictive legislation on this issue cannot be traced back to party politics—it rather depends on the relative influence of the churches, which generally press for a Sunday trading ban. 24 Competition between neighboring Länder has occurred in some instances, without giving way to any further attempts to reach a uniform decision on closing hours. Coexistence of Horizontal Cooperation and Autonomous Policy-Making The second pattern shows a substantially higher degree of horizontal cooperation between some—but not all—Länder. Nine of them 25 have agreed on common standards for legislation on imprisonment. The remaining seven have passed bills that are mostly in line with the common standards but take separate paths regarding some key questions— notably, whether to deal with juvenile offenders separately, stressing education as an important goal, and whether the priority should be put on protecting society at large or on reintegrating offenders into society (Leunig and Pock 2010). Party politics plays a crucial role in these choices, but cannot fully explain them: indeed, CDU-governed Länder can be found in both groups (Leunig and Pock 2010). This aspect points to the fact that, despite the centralized organization and vertical integration of German parties, they show distinct regional profiles (Grande 2002, 196; Blumenthal 2009, 271–273). The coexistence of horizontal cooperation and independent policymaking can be considered typical of Germany’s cooperative federalism and its entrenched addiction to uniformity. It can also be seen as ref lecting the growing difficulties in reaching a consensus for all sixteen Länder resulting from the greater regional diversity in socioeconomic and financial terms. Legislative Activism versus Passiveness The third pattern is transitory but nevertheless relevant with regard to the different degree of Länder political autonomy. In some policy fields, most Länder have not taken any legislative action within the first three

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years after the 2006 reform came into force. Only some Länder more politically motivated about specific issues took advantage of their newly gained legislative competences. One interesting example is the right of assembly. Because the federal normative is still in place, most Länder simply announced that they will pass their own legislation sometime soon. The first to complete the legislative process was Bavaria, feeling the need for a more restrictive regulation of this fundamental right as it relates to the existing federal legislation (Leunig and Pock 2010). A similar pattern exists in the university education area. Despite the legislative power loss by the Bund, the general framework remains in force as long as the Länder have not adapted their current legislation to the new competence distribution. 26 The first Land to take action was Baden-Württemberg, revamping its past reform orientation, when it belonged to a group of Länder showing a distinctly liberal, marketoriented profile (Lanzendorf and Pasternack 2008, 60–63). Other Länder are now following suit, but their different pace seems a further indicator that the policy-making process at the Länder level is by no means leveled: both their priorities and orientations differ. This asymmetry explains why some Länder in some fields take quick legislative action whereas in other fields they are more hesitant to replace previous federal laws. It remains to be seen whether in the long run uniformity prevails as Länder follow the example of others taking over policies that have proven to be effective. Conclusion In conclusion, can we consider the 2006 federalism reform as a true starting point toward a “new federalism”? Although it is too early to give a final assessment, overall the first three years under the reformed constitution revealed that, notwithstanding the number of amendments applied to the constitution, the foundations of the German cooperative federalism have not been shattered. Key political decisions still require the consent of the Bundesrat. A large array of policies, lying within the Länder exclusive power, or within the Bund and Länder concurrent powers, are dealt with in the close networks of horizontal and vertical cooperation. The Länder have gained some room for autonomous policy-making but the German constitution and European law set limits to their range of action. Whether in the longrun the 2006 reform will have a substantial impact on the German federal system of joint decision-making ultimately depends on how the major political actors will employ their powers.

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Whether cooperative federalism ends up in the “joint-decision trap” (Scharpf 1988), largely depends on the capability of the party system to mediate conflicts of interest among the various Länder and between different ideological standpoints. The role the CSU played in the last months of the Grand Coalition confirms the observation of Arthur Benz (2003) that the major political parties have lost some of their capacity to mediate federal-regional conf licts. It remains to be seen whether under the conditions of the five-party system new modes of compromising will develop or whether the greater complexity of the party system will lead to more conf lict. Whether German federalism will embark on a development path toward greater diversity and less unity eventually depends on choices political actors make and on public expectations. As long as the Scharpf statement that Germans accept federalism as long as it does not make a difference (Scharpf 2006, 10) is true, a federal structure based on disentanglement and competition will not emerge. Notes 1. For a detailed account of the 1969 reform, see Renzsch (1991, 209–260). 2. For a detailed account of the KOMBO commission, established by the Bundestag and Bundesrat in October 2003, its proceedings and an explanation of its failure in December 2004, cf. Benz (2005) and Lhotta et al. (2005). 3. Positive assessments were given by the main political actors (cf. Schmidt 2007, 217), whereas political scientists remained skeptical (Benz 2005, Scharpf 2006). 4. On the historical legacies that shaped the development of German federalism cf. Lehmbruch (2002). 5. Here multilevel governance is understood in a rather narrow sense, referring to the cooperation of Bund and Länder governments outside the (national) legislative procedure and the Länder involvement in European policymaking. 6. The chapter will not discuss the Föderalismusreform II passed in August 2009. On this topic cf. chapter 1. 7. In the limited number of policy fields listed in Article 75 Basic Law, such as public service, general principles of university education, the press regulation, and nature protection, the Bund had the right to pass legislation setting some general rules (the framework). The Länder maintained the right to approve their own legislation containing more specific regulations. 8. In the numerous fields of concurrent powers (Art. 74 Basic Law), the Bund can legislate insofar as a nationwide regulation is regarded necessary, according to the Erforderlichkeitsklausel (necessity clause) of Art. 72 Basic Law.

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9. Federal exclusive powers comprise weapons, nuclear energy, residency registration and identity cards, safeguarding German cultural assets against their removal from the country (former framework legislation), benefits for disabled war veterans, dependents of deceased war victims, and assistance to former prisoners of war (former concurrent power). 10. The conditions of Article 72 applied to both concurrent and framework legislation. Cf. Scharpf (2006, 9) who refers to the first ruling on the 5th amendment to the federal framework legislation on universities (FCC, 2 BvF 2/02 July 27, 2004), dealing with Juniorprofessuren (junior professors) and issued during the KOMBO operational term. The second ruling on the 6th amendment (FCC, 2 BvF 1/03 January 1, 2005), addressing tuition fees, was issued shortly after the KOMBO expiration. 11. Here, again, a loophole is created: with the Bundesrat consent, the sixmonth delay can be overcome. 12. Georgii and Borhanian (2006) used a counterfactual analysis assessing which bills would have required the consent by the Bundesrat if the federalism reform had been in force since 1998. 13. For example, taking into account data from September 2006 until July 2009, Zohlnhöfer (2010) comes to the conclusion that the share of bills requiring Bundesrat approval has dropped by 10–20 percent depending on the chosen reference point. 14. Bundesrat, Session No. 837–861, November 30, 2007 until September 18, 2009. 15. For a definition of key decisions, cf. Zohlnhöfer (2008a, 462) and chapter 1. 16. See Tagesspiegel, December 17, 2008, Bohsem et al. (2008) and Seils (2008). For more details on health reform, cf. chapter 1. 17. For a detailed analysis of the “Hartz” reform, cf. Konle-Seidl (2008). 18. FCC, 2 BvR 2433/04 December 20, 2007. 19. See the Joint Science Conference website at: http://www.gwk-bonn.de/. 20. The cultural tradition relevance has turned out to be the most important explaining factor for the German Länder decisions about religious symbols in schools (Blumenthal 2009). 21. In a survey conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation between 30 and 59 percent of the recipients pointed to the federal level as the reference for equal standards of living (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2008, 18). 22. In March 2007, the conference of Ministerpräsidenten came to a general agreement accompanied by several Länder statements, that they would spell out the details according to their own preferences (Hamburger Abendblatt, March 23, 2007). In September 2008, the Health Ministers conference failed to reach a shared standpoint due to the CDU-governed Länder opposition (Frankfurter Rundschau, September 7, 2008). 23. FCC, 1 BvR 3262/07 July 30, 2008. 24. Berlin, governed by an SPD and Left Party coalition, went further in liberalizing shop closing hours than most Länder managed by the CDU or by coalitions including the Liberals (FDP).

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25. Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia. Initially Saxony was also part of this initiative (Leunig and Pock 2010). 26. A Grand Coalition project to abolish the federal framework legislation by October 2009 failed to be approved before the 2009 federal election. The CDU/CDU-FDP coalition, formed in October 2009, agreed to cancel the existing federal framework legislation (CDU, CSU, FDP 2009, 62).

CHAPTER 3

Multilevel Party Politics during the Grand Coalition Electoral Outcomes at Länder Level Silvia Bolgherini and Florian Grotz

Introduction As in all federal countries, party politics in Germany occurs in a multilevel setting. Parliamentary elections take place at the national level (Bund) every four years and in each of the sixteen states (Länder) every four to five years.1 As these elections are not necessarily held on the same date, German parties and voters are exposed to an almost permanent political dispute (Schmidt 2007, 212). At the same time, the electoral arenas at national and regional levels have been more closely intertwined than in most federal democracies. There are two main reasons for this fact. First, the party systems deployed in both Bund and Länder have long displayed a very high degree of congruence (Hough and Jeffery 2004, 60–65). In the 1960s and 1970s nearly all parliamentary seats at both levels were won by three statewide parties: the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The Greens joined them during the 1980s, while other parties remained insignificant until 1990. Second, the idiosyncratic structure of German federalism has reinforced multilevel connections within the same party system. Compared to other federal countries, the Länder have a relatively low autonomy in legislative matters, but may significantly influence the national policy-making via the Bundesrat (chapter 2). Because Bundesrat seats are filled by the respective Länder governments, they become a “major prize” for the parties winning a Land election (Hough and Jeffery 2006, 119).

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Such structural interconnectedness of Bund and Länder has long produced some characteristic effects on the multilevel party politics. On one hand, Länder elections have not been seen as distinct political events determined by regional issues. Quite similarly to European elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980), they became “second order” contests in which voters pronounce their verdict on the incumbent federal government parties (Dinkel 1977, 348). On the other hand, changes in the Länder governments may alter the party composition in the Bundesrat. Such changes can considerably affect the overall federal governance, when the opposition parties gain the majority in the Bundesrat and therefore can blockade the legislation process (Lehmbruch 2000). In other words, election outcomes at the Länder level have been the main cause for “divided government” in Germany (Elgie 2001). After unification, however, the German party system underwent significant changes. Since then the post-communist Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), renamed Left Party (LP) in 2007, managed to always gain some seats in the Bundestag. This outcome not only increased the parliamentary fragmentation, but also made the building of politically congruent governments more difficult, as the post-communists were regarded as non-coalitionable by all other parties. The Grand Coalition formed in autumn 2005 was an unintended consequence of this party system change: the impossibility to form a majority coalition including one of the catch-all parties (CDU/CSU or SPD) and one of the smaller parties (FDP or Greens) gave way to a government with the two major parties as the last possible option. As a consequence of the increased fragmentation and territorial incongruence within the unified Germany’s party system, the regional political contexts have become more diverse. Whether such transformation has also changed the traditional multilevel linkages remains a disputed issue: some authors argue that federal inf luence on Länder elections has been weakened (Jeffery and Hough 2001), while others suggest it grew even stronger (Burkhart 2005). In any case, there is good reason to assume that a Grand Coalition government at the federal level provides a specific landscape and peculiar conditions which are likely to affect multilevel party politics. The present chapter explores whether the 2005–2009 Grand Coalition produced some characteristic impact on the Länder elections. For this purpose, we begin by outlining the theoretical effects on electoral behavior and government formation at Länder level caused by a federal government comprising the two largest parties. The second part provides a comprehensive survey of the “regional contexts,” that is, the

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party systems in individual Länder. We then analyze the political outcomes of the sixteen Länder elections held between 2006 and 2009, addressing both the top-down inf luence at the federal level and the regional contexts’ relevant factors. A short conclusion summarizes our findings. Federal Grand Coalition and Länder Elections According to the relevant literature, federal party politics can affect the Länder election outcomes in two major respects: it may influence both voting behavior and the formation of post-electoral governments. Multilevel effects on voting behavior have been primarily set out by the theory of second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Jeffery and Hough 2001). According to such theory, Länder parliament elections have “less at stake” than federal elections and thus are considered less important. Consequently, electoral turnout at Länder level is generally lower than at national level, while smaller and non-established parties are supposed to do much better. Last but not least, Länder elections provide an opportunity for citizens to “punish” the federal government. Indeed, government parties’ losses were quite common in the elections taking place in the middle of the federal electoral cycle (Dinkel 1977). Although this midterm effect has somewhat vanished within unified Germany, the popularity of federal government parties continues to have a strong effect on their Länder election results (Burkhart 2005). The second kind of multilevel effects is related to the government formation process. In Germany, coalition-building at the regional level has largely followed the given patterns at the federal level (Debus 2008). Beside the fact that a certain “political symmetry” between Bund and Länder is generally considered appropriate, there is also a major institutional incentive to build consistent coalitions across both levels (Pappi et al. 2005, 434–435). As mentioned before, federal government parties have a vital interest in relying on a Bundesrat majority in order to avoid political deadlock by federal opposition parties. However, such consistent majorities are all but easily achieved. If a Land government is composed of federal governmental as well as opposition parties, the coalition treaty usually stipulates abstention in controversial Bundesrat decisions. Therefore, federal government parties can only secure a solid Bundesrat majority if they actually form Länder governments without any of the federal opposition parties. Under this perspective, another aspect is worth analyzing: the political (in)consistence between Bundestag and Bundesrat. When federal

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government parties lost contests at the Länder level, they may not be able to form any corresponding governments. As a consequence, the Bundesrat is likely to be dominated by the federal opposition. This structural tendency toward divided government is also mirrored empirically: Germany has seen long periods of politically divergent majorities in both the Bundestag and Bundesrat during the 1970s and early 1980s, and also later on in the 1990s and 2000s (Wagschal and Grasl 2004, 734–737). Let us address now the possible changes of such multilevel effects with a Grand Coalition in power at the federal level. Given the structural weakness of the parliamentary opposition, any Grand Coalition’s term reveals a low degree of political dispute. Moreover, decision-making is mainly characterized by centrist compromises, thus making the policy positions of CDU/CSU and SPD almost indistinguishable from each other. This landscape gives citizens a further incentive to support smaller right- or left-wing parties featuring more clear-cut profiles. Therefore, a federal Grand Coalition should reinforce the second-order effects emerging in Länder elections: the turnout may decrease even more, while smaller— and possibly extremist—parties should significantly gain in voter support at the expense of the “punished” major parties. 2 Regarding the government formation process, a Grand Coalition may change the usual multilevel consequences in a different way. Although both Volksparteien are expected to lose considerably at the polls, together they should remain strong enough to secure a majority of parliamentary seats in any Land and thus could move on to build shared governments. If this logic of governmental symmetry is consistently applied by CDU/CSU and SPD, the political congruence between Bundestag and Bundesrat should not decrease—as it has mostly been the case so far—but should rather remain quite stable during the entire electoral term. These assumptions about the Grand Coalition’s impact only hold under the condition that the “top-down” logic of multilevel party politics is (still) more relevant for Länder election outcomes than idiosyncratic conditions of the regional contexts. Hence we will first take a closer look at the party systems at the Länder level in order to frame their relevant characteristics, before analyzing the Länder elections during the Grand Coalition’s term. Party Systems at the Länder Level As mentioned earlier, before unification the electoral behavior in Germany was very stable and the consistency between the party systems

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at the Bund and Länder levels was impressively high (chapters 6 and 7). Since then, a growing asymmetry of Länder party systems emerged (Sturm 1999; Haas et al. 2008, 21–24). To better highlight these changes we subdivide the sixteen Länder into four groups: the citystates (Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg); the Eastern states (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia); the large Southern states (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria); and the other West German states (Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein).3 In the “old” federal republic, the city-states used to be Social Democratic strongholds. In Bremen and Hamburg, the SPD was the predominant party and uninterruptedly in power from the 1960s to the 1980s, either alone or with the Liberals. In West Berlin, the Social Democrats saw a gradual erosion of their political support during the 1970s and were replaced in power by a CDU-FDP coalition in 1981. After the unification, in each of these three cases, the two catch-all parties lost significantly in the elections while minor parties— including populists and extremists—could set foot in the parliament. As a consequence, SPD-CDU governments were formed in Bremen and Berlin that remained in power for several consecutive terms; only the Berlin Grand Coalition was replaced by left-wing cabinets since 2001 (SPD with Greens first, and then PDS). In Hamburg, CDU and SPD governed alternatively with different small parties until the Christian Democrats won an absolute majority in the 2004 elections and built the first CDU single-party cabinet in that city-state’s history. The party systems in the five Eastern states, reestablished on the territory of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1990, featured remarkable differences in respect to the federal party system. Their most obvious trait has been the strong presence of the PDS, the political heirs of the communist state party (SED). Since the mid-1990s, the post-communists have regularly gained around 20–25 percent of the votes. The Liberals and Greens won only 3 to 5 percent each and could hardly enter parliament, whereas right-wing extremists—such as the National Democratic Party (NPD) or the German People’s Union (DVU)—gained a considerable number of seats from time to time. CDU and SPD turned out to be the strongest parties but managed to get over the 40 percent “catch-all-threshold” only in some cases (CDU in Thuringia and Saxony, SPD in Brandenburg). Given these party system features, the government formation in the Eastern Länder has significantly diverged from the federal level: apart from some singleparty cabinets and CDU-FDP coalitions, a broad range of alliances

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has been tried out, for example, SPD-Green minority in SaxonyAnhalt (1994–1998), SPD-PDS in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (1998–) and, of course, Grand Coalitions in Brandenburg (1999–), Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (1994–1998), Saxony (2004–) and Thuringia (1994–1999).4 In the large Southern states, political continuity prevailed after 1990. In Baden-Württemberg the CDU remained the strongest party at about 45 percent, therefore holding power since the 1950s, both in singleparty cabinets and in alliances with FDP or SPD. In Bavaria, the CSU, CDU’s sister party, has been even stronger: from the 1960s on, it earned large absolute majorities—in 2003 over 60 percent of the votes—thus being able to govern by itself. The last group includes the remaining six Western Länder. At the electoral level, their party systems continued to resemble the federal party system after the unification: a relatively high vote concentration on the two major parties and an almost constant presence of Liberals and Greens in the regional parliaments. At the government level, cyclical sequences of right-wing (CDU-FDP) and left-wing (SPD-Green) cabinets could be observed since the 1980s, though with some contextspecific differences. In Lower Saxony, after a twenty-five-year long CDU prevalence, the SPD came to power with the Greens in 1990 and was even able to form a single-party cabinet in 1994 that lasted until 2003, when a CDU-FDP government was formed. A similar evolution took place in Saarland, where the CDU was the strongest party and permanently in government until the mid-1980s, but was then replaced by a series of SPD single-party cabinets. After the 1999 elections, the Christian Democrats returned to power, this time alone. In Schleswig-Holstein as well, a decades-long CDU predominance came to an end in the late 1980s and was followed by an era of SPD single-party and SPD-Green cabinets. In April 2005, parliamentary elections resulted in a political gridlock then leading to the first ever Grand Coalition in this Land. Rhineland-Palatinate was as well a traditional CDU fortress, but in 1991 neatly moved toward the Social Democrats, which formed a coalition with the FDP. This left-liberal government—the first and only one after the reunification—survived several consecutive terms. In contrast to the aforementioned cases, Hesse saw an almost uninterrupted series of left-wing governments, although SPD and CDU came very close to each other in terms of votes since the 1970s. However, the 1999 elections led to a major political change: the Christian Democrats

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went to power and have been ruling the Land since then, initially with the Liberals and after 2003 alone. North Rhine-Westphalia, finally, used to be the “SPD home country,” that is, the predominant party at both the electoral and the government levels since the 1960s. However, the 2005 elections marked a historic defeat for the Social Democrats, so that eventually a CDU-FDP coalition raised to power. In the 1990–2005 period, party politics at Länder level has grown more diversified. Structural asymmetries between the regional and the federal party systems turned out to be strongest in the city-states and in the East, while the traditional congruence prevailed in the South and in the West. At the same time, in the two former Länder groups the electoral volatility increased, whereas in the latter it remained quite low until 2003, when the Christian Democrats gained massive electoral support due to the negative image attained by the federal Red-Green coalition (Zohlnhöfer 2008b). The increased diversity at the electoral level also translated into a broad variety of party governments, which also included a series of new alliances never tried out before on either level. Therefore, when the Merkel cabinet took office in autumn 2005, it had to face a heterogeneous spectrum of Länder governments standing for reelection. Länder Elections During the Grand Coalition During the Grand Coalition’s term, parliamentary elections took place in each Land except for North Rhine-Westphalia; Hesse voted even twice (in 2008 and 2009). In order to analyze these sixteen Länder elections in a systematic way we will group them according to their timing within the federal electoral cycle (see table 3.1). Five Länder held elections until autumn 2006, when the Grand Coalition was in office for just one year. Following electoral cycle theories (Dinkel 1977; Anderson and Ward 1996), its popularity should not have declined in a substantial way within this “honeymoon” timeframe. The second group encompasses six Länder elections that took place in the middle of the Grand Coalition’s term, when federal governments usually tend to lose most of their electoral support. Therefore, second order effects are most likely to occur during this period. The remaining five elections were scheduled at the very end of the Grand Coalition’s term. In these votes, which immediately preceded or were held simultaneously with the 2009 Bundestag elections, federal party politics should have had a particularly strong effect.

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Timing of Länder elections, 2006–2009

Timing

Land

Date

Honeymoon time

Baden-Württemberg Rhineland-Palatinate Saxony-Anhalt Berlin Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania Bremen Hesse (I) Lower Saxony Hamburg Bavaria Hesse (II) Saarland Saxony Thuringia Brandenburg Schleswig-Holstein

03/26/2006 03/26/2006 03/26/2006 09/17/2006 09/17/2006 05/13/2007 01/27/2008 01/27/2008 02/23/2008 09/28/2008 01/18/2009 08/30/2009 08/30/2009 08/30/2009 09/27/2009 09/27/2009

Midterm time

End-term time

Source: Adaptation from the Bundesrat’s official website (http://www.bundesrat.de/ cln_090/nn_9550/DE/struktur/laender/wahltermine/wahltermine-node.html?__ nnn=true, accessed on January 31, 2009).

Honeymoon Time: The Grand Coalition’s Consolidation On March 26, 2006, toward the end of the Grand Coalition’s first “100-day honeymoon” (Tenscher and Batt 2008), elections were held in Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saxony-Anhalt. This electoral test turned out to be positive for the federal Grand Coalition, although the individual balances of CDU and SPD varied considerably between the three Länder. In Baden-Württemberg the CDU-FDP government was confirmed, with minimal losses for the Christian Democrats and some gains for the Liberals. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, saw a significant decline (–8.1 percentage points), one of their worst results since 1952. However, this outcome was not caused by federal issues but rather expressed an overall preference for the political status quo in the Land (Gabriel 2006). Accordingly, the electoral campaign lacked any polarization, and the overall turnout was 53.4 percent, the lowest level ever recorded. The Rhineland-Palatinate elections were characterized by similar features, though under different political auspices (Gothe 2007). Due to their top candidate popularity, Kurt Beck, the Social Democrats were confirmed as the strongest party, with almost the same vote share as

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in the previous election. Since the Greens failed to cross the 5-percentthreshold, the SPD won an absolute majority of seats and could form a single-party cabinet. The Christian Democrats, in contrast, had their worst-ever result, and turnout also fell to an all-time low of 58.2 percent. Slightly more significant changes were observed in Saxony-Anhalt, although the federal influence was also limited in this case (Holtmann 2007, 51). The most relevant electoral results were, along with the lowest turnout since 1990 (44.4 percent), the different performances featured by the small parties. The FDP, which governed with the Christian Democrats, suffered a heavy loss, while the LP/PDS received almost four percentage points more than in 2002, surpassing the SPD and achieving one of its best results ever in a Land election (table 3.2). The CDU and SPD instead experienced only minor changes in their respective vote share and eventually formed a government together. However, this first ever Grand Coalition in Saxony-Anhalt was not established for reasons of a multilevel consistency but rather turned out to be the only option available to achieve a majority government, given that the LP/PDS was considered non-coalitionable by the Social Democrats (Detterbeck 2008). Six months later, on September 17, 2006, it was time for Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, both ruled by Red-Red coalitions (SPD-PDS), to go to the polls. In Berlin, the SPD under its popular leader Klaus Wowereit was confirmed as the strongest party, while its government ally suffered heavy losses. The CDU and FDP also experienced a decline in their respective vote share. Again, the turnout reached an all-time low of 58.0 percent. Although the Social Democrats could have formed a coalition with the strengthened Greens, eventually they decided to continue their government with the LP/PDS (McKay 2007). In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, instead, the SPD saw a serious decline (–10.4 percentage points) while the LP/PDS vote share remained almost stable. Whereas the CDU obtained its worst performance since 1990 (28.8 percent), the real winners were the Liberals (9.6 percent) and the right-wing extremist NPD (7.3 percent)—thus transforming the former three-party into a five-party system (Heinrich and Schoon 2007). Since the Red-Red government would have had the narrowest possible margin in the new parliament, the SPD opted for the only remaining political alternative: a Grand Coalition. Summoning up, the 2006 Länder elections were marked by a lack of politicization and scarce public interest (Tenscher 2008). These features went along with a mild but encouraging support for the recentlyappointed federal Grand Coalition, a pattern consistent with the electoral cycle theories, expecting favorable results for the governmental

Table 3.2 Land

Results of Länder elections during the 2005–2009 term Turnouta

CDU/CSU

FDP

25.2 [–8.1] 45.6 [+0.9] 21.4 [+1.4] 30.8 [+1.1] 30.2 [–10.4]

10.7 [+2.6] 8.0 [+0.2] 6.7 [–6.6] 7.6 [–2.3] 9.6 [+4.9]

30.6 [–3.0]

8.5 7.3 [–0.2] [+2.0]

Midterm time elections (2007–2008) Bremen 57.6 25.6 [–3.7/–8.0] [–4.3] Lower Saxony 57.1 42.5 [–9.9/–15.2] [–5.8] Hesse (I) 64.3 36.8 [–0.3/–2.7] [–12.0] Hamburg 63.3 42.6 [–5.1/–5.5] [–4.6] Bavaria 58.1 43.4 [+1.0/–7.1] [–17.3] Hesse (II) 61.0 37.2 [–3.3/–5.5] [+0.4] Average End63.4 31.4 term time [+5.1/–2.4] [–6.8]

36.7 [–5.6] 30.3 [–3.1] 36.7 [+7.6] 34.1 [+3.6] 18.6 [–1.0] 23.7 [–13.0] 22.4 [–2.8]

6.0 [+1.8] 8.2 [+0.1] 9.4 [+1.5] 4.8 [+2.0] 8.0 [+5.4] 16.2 [+6.8] 9.8 [+4.8]

End-term time elections (2009) Average 60.2 Midterm time [–3.6/–7.3] Saarland 67.6 [+12.1/–5.1] Saxony 52.2 [–7.2/–10.8] Thuringia 56.2 [+2.4/–8.8] Brandenburg 67.5 [+11.1/+9.0] Schleswig73.5 Holstein [+7.0/+3.6]

30.0 [–1.9] 24.5 [–6.3] 10.4 [+0.6] 18.5 [+4.0] 33.0 [+1.1] 25.4 [–13.3]

8.8 10.8 6.1 6.4 [+2.9] [+1.1] [+4.9] [+0.2] 9.2 5.9 21.3 4.6 [+4.0] [+0.3] [+19.0] [–4.0] 10.0 6.4 20.6 12.4f [+4.1] [+1.3] [–3.0] [–2.0] 7.6 6.2 27.4 9.1 [+4.0] [+1.7] [+1.3] [+0.6] 7.2 5.6 27.2 7.2 [+3.9] [+2.0] [–0.8] [–6.7] 14.9 12.4 6.0 9.8 [+8.3] [+6.2] [+5.2] [+2.3]

Honeymoon time elections (2006) Baden53.4 44.2 Württemberg [–9.2/–13.3] [–0.6] Rhineland58.2 32.8 Palatinate [–3.9/–10.7] [–2.5] Saxony-Anhalt 44.4 36.2 [–12.1/–17.6] [–1.1] Berlin 58.0 21.3 [–10.1/–12.8] [–2.5] Mecklenburg59.1 28.8 Western [–11.5/–12.8] [–1.6] Pomerania Average 54.6 32.7 Honeymoon time [–9.4/–13.4] [–1.7]

38.0 [–7.3] 34.5 [–13.0] 40.2 [–0.9] 31.2 [–11.8] 19.8 [+0.4] 31.5 [–8.7]

Greens

LPb

SPD

Others

11.7 3.1 5.1 [+4.0] [+3.1] [–1.0] 4.6 2.6 6.4 [–0.6] [+2.6] [–0.6] 3.6 24.1 8.0 [+1.6] [+3.7] [+1.0] 13.1 16.3 10.9 [+4.0] [–6.3] [+6.0] 3.4 16.8 11.2c [+0.8] [+0.4] [+6.9] 12.6 8.3 [+0.7] [+6.8]

16.5 8.4 6.8d [+3.7] [+6.7] [–2.6] 8.0 7.1 3.9 [+0.4] [+6.6] [+1.9] 7.5 5.1 4.5 [–2.6] [+4.9] [–0.6] 19.6 6.4 3.3 [–2.7] [+6.4] [–3.9] 9.4 4.4 16.2e [+1.7] [+4.4] [+6.9] 13.7 5.4 3.8 [+6.2] [+0.3] [–0.6] 7.3 20.5 8.6 [+2.3] [+4.3] [–2.0]

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Remarks: a The table documents electoral turnout and the number of votes by party (in percentages). Figures in brackets indicate the respective differences to previous elections [for turnout also /from 1990–2005 average] (in percentage points). b The Left Party—LP (Die Linke) was officially born in June 2007 from the fusion between Linkspartei/PDS and the Wahlalternative Arbeit and Soziale Gerechtigkeit (WASG). In the elections held before this date, the provided results refer to the WASG in Baden-Württemberg and in Rhineland-Palatinate and to the LP/PDS (Linkspartei.PDS) in Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. In Berlin, instead, both parties were present. Variations, if any, refer to the PDS. c The right-wing extremist German National Democratic Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands—NPD) conquered six seats with 7.3 percent of votes. Other minor parties obtained together 3.9 percent of the votes and no seats. d In Bremen the right-wing extremist German Popular Union (Deutsche Volksunion—DVU ) won 2.7 percent of the votes and one seat. e With 10.2 percent of votes the grassroots movement Freie Wähler (FW), which is present in many Länder at the municipal and also regional level, conquered 21 seats. Other minor parties obtained together six percent of the votes and no seats. f The NPD won eight seats with 5.6 percent of votes. Other minor parties obtained together 6.8 percent and no seats. Source: Authors’ compilation from data provided by the respective Länder Election Commissioners.

parties in their initial months in power. Although the CDU and SPD suffered some losses compared to previous elections, the smaller parties’ advancements remained quite limited. Furthermore, and also in line with our theoretical considerations, the general electoral turnout experienced a dramatic fall: it was 9.4 points less than in the preceding elections and 13.4 points below the Länder average recorded during the last 15 years (table 3.2). Finally, the political lineage between the Bund and Länder governments increased, as three “small” coalitions were replaced by CDU-SPD (Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania) and SPD-single party cabinets (Rhineland-Palatinate). This outcome eventually provided the Merkel government with a two-thirds majority in the Bundesrat—the strongest support achieved by a federal cabinet in decades. However, the expanded consistency at the government level was not achieved by a deliberate “top-down” strategy, but rather emerged out of idiosyncratic electoral results that were mainly determined by regional issues (Holtmann 2007, 66–67). Midterm Time: Increasing Troubles for the Merkel Government Between 2007 and 2008, the two years encompassing the “midterm time” five Länder renewed their parliaments. During its second year, the Grand Coalition had progressively lost terrain. The main causes are to be detected in the slow policy-making process and the long negotiations between the governing parties upon most of the reform issues (chapters 1 and 2). Furthermore, in approaching the second half of the

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term, the CDU/CSU and the SPD felt the consequent need to differentiate more clearly from each other. The city-state of Bremen was the only Land to hold elections in 2007. Its results were awaited as a sign of the Grand Coalition’s health condition, even more so considering that an SPD-CDU government had been ruling the city-state for over ten years. The outcome showed the main features expected from an election hold under a Grand Coalition (table 3.2): the lowest turnout in the Land electoral history (57.6 percent), heavy losses for both catch-all parties and significant gains for smaller parties (Greens, FDP, LP), thus turning the traditional three-party into a five-party system. Furthermore, the LP set foot in a Western Land parliament for the first time and even with a remarkable vote share (8.4 percent). Although the SPD could have continued to rule with the CDU, it opted for an alliance with the Greens, ending the Grand Coalition era in Bremen. In the first months of 2008 three other states went to the polls: Lower Saxony, Hesse, and Hamburg, all ruled by CDU governments (in Lower Saxony together with the FDP). In the first two Länder, despite similar political conditions and simultaneous elections, the polls led to very different results. In the Lower Saxony, where a confirmation of the ruling coalition (CDU-FDP) was generally expected, the electoral temperature was low and the voter turnout even lower (Broughton 2008). The CDU, despite considerable losses, held in fact the power with the Liberals, while the LP again succeeded in gaining entree in the parliament (Saretzki and Tils 2008). In Hesse, instead, after a heated campaign, the CDU and SPD earned almost identical vote shares, with the Christian Democrats suffering a bad loss and the Social Democrats performing unexpectedly well. This trend—more than the relative party strengths (table 3.2)—gave the SPD leader, Andrea Ypsilanti, the chance to form a government, whose composition remained however quite uncertain. The alliance with the Greens was not enough to reach the majority, but a coalition with the LP, which had again performed well, had been excluded by the SPD during the campaign. The year 2008 went by while Ypsilanti attempted to form a SPD-Greens minority government supported by the LP or, later, a SPD-LP-Greens coalition, while the CDU outgoing Prime Minister Roland Koch remained in charge for an ad-interim government. A month later in Hamburg, the CDU lost its parliamentary majority but remained the predominant party, as the SPD vote share was only moderately above its all-time low recorded in 2004 (Horst 2008). Because the Liberals—CDU’s “natural ally”—missed the 5-percent-threshold while

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the Greens and LP set foot in the parliament, the government formation proved to be quite tricky. Given the situation, rather than pursuing a Grand Coalition, the CDU opted for an alliance with the Greens, thus forming the first Black-Green government in German history. However, the biggest surprise came from the Bavarian election in September 2008. The Christian Democrats suffered a dramatic defeat in their oldest and biggest stronghold, losing 17.3 percentage points compared to 2003. This unexpected—at least in quantitative terms— debacle forced the CSU to form a coalition government with the FDP, after more than forty years of single-party rule. Apart from this most relevant result, other data are worth noticing as well. First, the SPD achieved its worst result ever in this Land (18.6 percent), confirming the declining trend involving both federal government parties. Second, the Liberals returned to the Landtag after having missed for fourteen years in a row the 5-percent-threshold. And third, the Freie Wähler grassroots movement became the third party, gaining 10.2 percent of the vote share while the LP could not enter the Bavarian parliament. In November 2008, the SPD’s attempts to form a government in Hesse ultimately failed and new elections were scheduled for January 2009, nine months before the federal ones. Along with the lowest turnout ever registered in this Land, the final outcome revealed the collapse of the SPD (13 percentage points less than in 2008), punished by the electorate for the previous year’s long-lasting crisis. On the other side, the CDU performed better than in 2008 (table 3.2) but still far below the 2003 result enabling it to run a “solo” cabinet. Thus the Christian Democrats and the FDP, which clearly benefited from the SPD decline, agreed to form a right-wing coalition. The Greens gained six percentage points and the LP was again able to gain access to the Hesse Landtag. Summoning up, the midterm time Länder elections displayed some notable features. Political difficulties began to concern federal government parties in the second half of their term, as foreseen by the electoral cycle theories. Both the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats lost ground in nearly all six elections. These losses were counterbalanced by improved performances by the Greens and the Liberals, while the LP set foot in four out of the five parliaments renewed in these months. In addition, the overall turnout significantly decreased in all Länder (except for Bavaria), giving further support to the hypothesis that the federal Grand Coalition had discouraged voter participation. Finally, and contrary to our theoretical assumption, the political consistency between federal and Länder governments considerably weakened during this period. As shown in table 3.3, no Grand Coalition was

Table 3.3

Länder governments and Bundesrat majorities during the 2005–2009 term September 2005a

2006

2007

Newly Newly Party elected elected governments N votesb governments N votes governments Honeymoon time BadenWürttemberg RhinelandPalatinate Saxony-Anhalt Berlin MecklenburgWestern Pomerania Midterm time Bremen Lower Saxony Hamburg Bavaria Hesse

2008 Newly elected N votes governments

2009 Newly elected N votes governments

September 2009

Party N votes governments

N votes

CDU-FDP

0

CDU-FDP

0

0

0

0

CDU-FDP

0

SPD-FDP

0

SPD

4

4

4

4

SPD

4

CDU-FDP SPD-PDS

0 0

4 0

4 0

4 0

4 0

CDU-SPD SPD-LP

4 0

SPD-PDS

0

CDU-SPD SPD-LP/ PDS SPD-CDU

3

3

3

3

SPD-CDU

3

SPD-CDU CDU-FDP CDU CSU CDU

3 0 3 6 5

0 0 0 0 5

0 0 0 0 0

SPD-Greens CDU-FDP CDU-Greens CSU-FDP CDU-FDP

0 0 0 0 0

3 0 3 6 5

SPD-Greens

0 0 3 6 5

CDU-FDP CDU-Greens CSU-FDP CDU (ad interim)

CDU-FDP

End-term time Saarland Saxony Thuringia Brandenburg SchleswigHolstein

CDU CDU-SPD CDU CDU-SPD CDU SPD

3 4 4 4 4

3 4 4 4 4

3 4 4 4 4

3 4 4 4 4

Later Elections North RhineWestphalia

CDU-FDP

0

0

0

36

47

44

Total a

3 0 4 4 4

CDUc CDU-FDP CDUc SPD-CDUc CDU-SPDc

3 0 4 4 4

0

0

CDU-FDP

0

35

26

CDU-FDP

26

Remarks: The first and last columns refer to the beginning (“September 2005”) and end (“September 2009”) of the 2005–2009 federal electoral term. The data in the other columns refer to the end of the indicated year/period. b The pillars “N votes” give the respective number of Bundesrat votes in favor of the federal Grand Coalition. c After the 2009 federal elections the following coalition governments were formed: “Jamaica” (CDU-FDP-Greens) in Saarland, CDU-SPD in Thuringia, SPD-LP in Brandenburg, and CDU-FDP in Schleswig-Holstein. Source: Authors’ compilation.

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formed at the regional level. This finding is particularly interesting for Hesse and Hamburg where the elections failed to produce either a rightwing or a left-wing majority in the Parliament. In both cases, CDU and SPD did not opt for a shared government as the usual last resort, trying instead to launch new courses, leading to the very first CDU-Green government (Hamburg) and to the failed experiment of a Red-Red-Green coalition (Hesse). This picture again supports the assumption that regional contexts have become more important for Länder party politics than any consideration about the multilevel “compliance.” As a consequence, the midterm Länder elections also led to a successive decrease of the Grand Coalition’s two-thirds majority in the Bundesrat (table 3.3): it shrank from forty-seven seats in 2006 to thirtyfive in 2008 and to only thirty in early 2009. After the CDU-FDP coalition establishment in Hesse, the Merkel government, though still commanding two thirds of the Bundestag seats, had even lost the absolute majority in the second chamber. End-term Time: The Missing Upturn for the Volksparteien With the term approaching its conclusion, year 2009 was marked by three Länder polls immediately preceding the Bundestag elections (in Saarland, Thuringia and Saxony), with the Brandenburg election to be held simultaneously with the federal one. Furthermore, when in July 2009 the Grand Coalition fell apart in Schleswig-Holstein, the early elections called in this Land were also set for September 27. Not surprisingly, the representatives of the federal political parties sought to interpret the three Länder votes held on August 30 as clear-cut signals for the upcoming Bundestag race. Especially the SPD Chancellor candidate, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, hoped for a reversal of his party’s negative surveys (chapter 5)—if only the Social Democrats would prove their “leadership qualities” in the new cabinets formed in Saarland, Thuringia, and Saxony (Spiegel online, August 24, 2009). The three Länder elections neither provided a consistent indication for the federal race nor were the results too encouraging for both Volksparteien (Neu 2009). In Saxony, the CDU declined but could maintain its position as the strongest political force (table 3.2). Because the Liberals performed extremely well, the Christian Democrats were able to put an end to the Grand Coalition and to form a government with the FDP. Beside the Social Democrats’ stillness at about 10 percent, again the LP, the Greens and the right-wing extremist NPD set foot in the parliament.

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The outcomes in Saarland and Thuringia expressed quite different indications. In both cases, the CDU single-party governments had continuously lost their popularity and the party itself experienced a heavy electoral decline (over 10 percentage points). However, the Social Democrats were not able to profit from such decrease: while experiencing considerable losses in Saarland, they increased their vote share in Thuringia (+4.0 percentage points), but the overall 18.5 percent achieved left them far away from the catch-all threshold. The real winners were again the smaller parties: Liberals, Greens and especially the LP, which gained its best result in both states. In Saarland, the LP conquered a historical, for a Western Land, 21.3 percent (plus 19 percentage points), due to its popular leader Oskar Lafontaine. On September 27 the last two Land elections occurred in Brandenburg and Schleswig-Holstein. Their outcomes differed insofar from the previous ones, as the concurrent federal elections led to a remarkably higher turnout both in short and long time comparison (table 3.2). The parties’ performances, however, confirmed the already consolidated trends: the CDU and SPD continued to lose votes, whilst the smaller parties— particularly the FDP—grew. In Schleswig-Holstein the electoral support for both CDU and SPD fell to an all-time low (only in 1950 the CDU performed worse), counterbalanced by a twofold gain for the Greens and the Liberals, which instead achieved their best result ever. Like in most other Länder, also the LP made it in the parliament. Finally, the Brandenburg outcome revealed little difference in regards to previous elections—both the Liberals and the Greens gained seats, thus confirming the main trend emerged during the Grand Coalition term. Summoning up, the end-term time votes do not properly support the electoral cycle theories, where good scores for the governing parties are expected due to “last minute” policies mostly aimed at conquering public support. In the Merkel government case, however, its last months were devoted by CDU/CSU and SPD to campaign in different directions, rather than trying to gain consensus based on their shared governance. As a consequence, the two Volksparteien continued to lose electoral support, while Liberals, Greens and the LP gained some power. By diverging from electoral cycle theories, this picture seems to reinforce our general hypothesis about the Grand Coalition’s negative impact on the subsequent performances of its own parties, along with the successes of non-centrist smaller parties. Furthermore, and in contrast to most Länder votes held in the 2005– 2009 term, these five last elections—except in Saxony—displayed higher turnouts than previous ones (although mostly lower than the

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long time average). This outcome can be explained by the electoral timing, that is, the federal elections approaching and the electoral expectations raising. Finally, as for the government formation, the last weeks in the term have been overshadowed by the probable post-electoral prospects at the federal level. In fact, no Grand Coalition was formed before the Bundestag elections. The Saxon CDU-FDP coalition, on the other hand, was established only two weeks after the respective vote, as a sort of symbolic forerunner for a similar outcome at the federal level. In Thuringia and Saarland, instead, the polls had strongly mitigated Merkel’s hopes regarding a Black-Yellow coalition, whereas the SPD in neither case succeeded to form a left-wing alliance. Consequently, the new governments in Thuringia and Saarland were established only after the federal elections. Again, their party composition was mainly determined by regional issues: while in Thuringia an SPD-LP alliance failed giving way to a Grand Coalition government, in Saarland the first “Jamaica” (CDU-FDP-Greens) coalition in the German history took office. An expected CDU-FDP coalition was established in SchleswigHolstein, while in Brandenburg an SPD-LP alliance was formed. Conclusion Has the 2005–2009 Grand Coalition affected multilevel party politics in a particular way? Following the above analysis, this question requires a differentiated answer. As for the voting behavior, the federal CDU/ CSU-SPD government has indeed exerted some specific influence on the Länder elections held during its term, working toward a reinforcement of some typical second-order effects, as claimed by our hypotheses. In fact, because the political polarization between the two catch-all parties was almost completely lacking, in most 2006–2009 Länder elections the turnout reached an all-time low, except for the last elections that took place immediately before or concurrent with the 2009 federal election. Furthermore, both the CDU and SPD recorded almost permanent and often unprecedented large losses in their vote shares since the midterm time. In contrast to electoral cycle theories, this trend also continued during the end-term time, which might be ascribed to the additional (negative) effect of a federal Grand Coalition on the decline of the Volksparteien. On the contrary—and confirming this claim the other way round—smaller non-centrist parties, especially Liberals and the LP, have performed much better than before, in many cases better than ever.

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Nevertheless, the 2005–2009 Grand Coalition did not completely determine the Länder election outcomes. This aspect emerges especially when looking at the respective government formation processes. Somewhat contrary to our expectation, although political consistency between the federal and regional executives increased during the honeymoon time, then it decreased constantly so that the Merkel government—quite similar to its Red-Green predecessor—lost its Bundesrat majority and could not regain it until its term end. Therefore a question arises: why did the federal Grand Coalition not affect the coalitionbuilding at the Länder level? Our tentative answer, below, is based on two major grounds. First, the formation of the Grand Coalition in 2005 was widely perceived as a temporary solution and not as a permanent option, let alone a “normal” configuration. Although federal parliamentary majorities of either CDU/CSU-FDP or SPD-Greens have become all but certain within the “f luid five-party system” (Niedermayer 2008), both the main political elites and the general public are stuck to the traditional bipolar structure of German party politics. Therefore, the CDU-SPD coalitions formed in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania in 2006 were not pushed by either of the federal parties, but were rather seen as a last resort under the given political circumstances. Vice versa, the aftermath of those six Länder elections that produced a Black-Yellow majority (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein) paved the way to relevant coalitions without any discussion. The second reason supporting the scarcity of Grand Coalitions at the Länder level in 2005–2009 lies in the fact that ideological distances between the main political parties diverge considerably across and within the government levels (Debus 2008). For example, while an SPD-LP alliance at the federal level has been excluded by both sides, in most Eastern Länder the same configuration has not only been a general option but also turned into a reality. Similarly, a federal government comprising CDU and Greens has hardly been imaginable for the time being, but the two parties actually became partners in Hamburg (2008) and Saarland (2009). In a nutshell, since party elites in several Länder dispose of quite more coalition options than their federal colleagues, Grand Coalitions are not necessarily the last resort when none of the traditional “small” alliances is numerically feasible. Given the increased electoral volatility and the variety of coalition configurations at the Länder level, even a federal government of the two major parties cannot secure a consistent majority in either the Bundestag

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or the Bundesrat. In this perspective, if a need to form a federal Grand Coalition should emerge again, sooner or later such alliance will have to face a divided government—like its 2005–2009 predecessor and any other federal executive in unified Germany. Notes 1. The regular electoral term is five years in 14 Länder; only the Bremen and Hamburg parliaments have a four-year term. 2. The latter effect could also be observed under the first federal Grand Coalition (1966–69), when both the CDU/CSU and SPD experienced heavy losses in Länder elections, while the right-wing extremist Nationaldemocratic Party (NPD) set foot in nearly all Länder parliaments (Hilmer 2008, 93–94). 3. For a quantitiative account of the Länder party systems reaching a slightly different classification, see Schniewind (2008). Empirical data on individual cases are based on Jun et al. (2008). 4. Most of these alliances were due to changes implemented during the Grand Coalition’s term, as discussed later on.

CHAPTER 4

Still the Driving Force of European Integration? The EU Policy Pursued by the Grand Coalition Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet

Introduction The Federal Republic of Germany has always been very much committed and very reliable in supporting European integration, acting as an important driving force toward this achievement. During the past decades, the further enhancement of the European unification process has become Germany’s reason of state, based on a broad consensus among the political elite and the public as well (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2006, 466–488). Even the 1990 German reunification did not change this EU-friendly attitude. In the more recent past, however, some observers have noticed a certain “pragmatization” of Germany’s EU policy (Schmalz 2001, 62–68). This hypothesis suggests that Berlin is now pursuing its own national interests more clearly and that Germany’s efforts for a further deepening of the integration are declining. In this context, it should also be noted the German government’s evident refusal to still act as “Europe’s paymaster.” Indeed, time seems to be running out for a position where the “necessary compromises were possible because Germany paid for them,” as the former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder put it (as quoted in Der Spiegel No. 1/1999). However, supporters of the pragmatization thesis must take into consideration the huge amount of money the unified Germany has needed—and still needs—for overcoming its former division. Furthermore, it must be recognized that the enormously increased disparities of the enlarged EU made it much more difficult to

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strive for “an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe” (Art. 1 (2) TEU Lisbon) than before. In other words, “for the time being, the ‘great narration’ of integration—ever bigger, ever closer—has come to its end” (Knelangen 2005, 29). Given these premises, the question arises whether the Grand Coalition has also somehow pursued or even deepened the pragmatization of Germany’s EU policy. What has been this Coalition’s commitment in pushing the EU forward? Has the first Merkel government been able to take up the traditional German role (in most cases, along with France) of promoting new goals and visions within the integration community? Shortly, has the European policy been also the Grand Coalition’s reason of state? Aiming at providing well-founded answers to such questions, this chapter analyzes the Merkel government’s most important contributions to the European policy—focusing on the programmatic aspects of such policy as well as on the German EU presidency in the first half of 2007. Furthermore, Germany’s contributions to the EU’s climate protection policy and initiatives to master the current financial and economic crisis will also be discussed.1 After a close look to the German-French relations, we will draw some overall conclusions. The Grand Coalition’s EU Agenda: Much Continuity and a Few New Targets It is not surprising that the Merkel government’s European policy agenda, laid down in the coalition agreement of November 11, 2005, shows outspoken continuity with its predecessor’s. This was achieved by appointing Frank-Walter Steinmeier, former Chancellor Schröder’s close intimate for long years, as foreign minister. The inner-cabinet distribution of competences in the EU affairs saw only moderate changes. Within the chancellery, Angela Merkel kept the European department previously established by Schröder, while the foreign office powers remained untouched as well. Only the finance minister had to give away its EU coordination competences to the economic affairs ministry, which already managed this position before 1998. As a consequence, the “old triangle” of German EU coordination—between the foreign office, the ministry of economic affairs and the chancellery—was fully restored (Janning 2007, 321). Continuity was also the overall feature of the Grand Coalition’s European policy agenda (Marhold 2006, 6). According to the coalition agreement, 2 the Merkel government promised to support the Constitutional Treaty that was supposed to make “the European Union

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more democratic, capable of acting, efficient and transparent.” For the upcoming German EU presidency, the Grand Coalition announced that in regard to financial issues “Germany should not contribute more than 1 percent of gross national income to the EU”—while at the same time promising to comply by 2007 with the budgetary requirements of the European Stability and Growth Pact. The explicit references to the reduction of “unnecessary bureaucracy” and the fulfillment of the Lisbon strategy, whose supposed goal was to make EU the world’s most competitive region by 2010, showed a slightly new connotation, due to the CDU/CSU influence. The call for a “fair cooperation between larger and smaller states” signaled a departure from the previous Schröder cabinet, whose support for the EU’s “big boys” had been sharply and repeatedly criticized by Merkel and the Christian Democrats. Instead, the Grand Coalition wanted to instill new quality and intensity to its cooperation with neighbors and new member states. In regard to Turkey’s request to join the EU, a continuity approach was prevailing as well. Despite the recent CDU/CSU opposition to Turkey’s full EU membership, preferring rather a “privileged partnership,” the coalition agreement supported the current negotiation procedure— emphasizing though that such “open-ended process is not giving reason to any automatism.” In her government statement of November 30, 2005, Merkel explained on this topic: “ ‘Pacta sunt servanda’ must be the principle of trust in Europe.” Angela Merkel—Europe’s New Superstar When Angela Merkel took office as chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, the EU was in deep crisis due to the failure of the Spring 2005 referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands. For different reasons, some of Merkel’s colleagues were under severe political pressure—such as French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. This helped Merkel to become very quickly Europe’s new hope, some kind of superstar. This image was enhanced by her modest, friendly, and moderating presence, clearly different from Schröder’s jovial but sometimes arrogant political style. Furthermore, Merkel gained much approval and appreciation by being complaisant during the negotiations on the EU financial framework 2007–2013, closured by the Brussels EU Council in December 2005. Luxembourg proposed 1.06 percent of the EU Gross National Product (GNP) as the new financial framework, while the UK recommended just 1.03 percent. After tough and turbulent negotiations, during which

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Great Britain’s EU presidency almost failed as a neutral broker (mainly because it wanted to save the so called British rebate), the final compromise was 1.045 percent of the EU GNP. As Marhold (2006, 19) pointed out, “according to all observers, . . . Angela Merkel’s commitment during the summit . . . was the decisive factor. . . . Her readiness to tirelessly support a compromise in the most different constellations [is said to have been] of particular significance, just as her trustworthiness that . . . was acknowledged by all sides.” Finally, another important reason for the summit success was Merkel’s willingness to leave to Poland 100 million Euros from regional funds foreseen for East Germany, in order to support Polish eastern regions. This generous gesture was met with enthusiasm by (then) Poland Prime Minister, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, and the German press celebrated Merkel as a “shooting star with the ability to achieve diplomatic compromise” (Rüger and Wolf 2007, 22). The chancellor justified her 100 million Euros gift with a sober statement, “I believe that this is a reasonable investment between two neighboring states” (press conference on December 17, 2005). However, it seems wrong to call Merkel’s financial concession “a reprise of Kohlesque leadership” (Heisenberg 2006, 117). On one hand, the new financial framework meant an additional burden of about 2 billion Euros for Germany, which gave away 0.43 percent of its GNP to the EU. On the other hand, the improved financial contributions agreement reached at the December EU Council must be acknowledged, as in the future all old EU member states would contribute to the EU budget with a share ranging between 0.32 and 0.37 percent of their GNP (MüllerBrandeck-Bocquet et al. 2010, 266–269). Apart from this successful “journeyman’s piece” (Janning 2007, 321), the chancellor achieved another success on the Brussels stage, when in December 2006 the European Commission decided to again suspend the year-long deficit procedure against Germany. In 2006 Peer Steinbrück (SPD), the Grand Coalition’s finance minister, was able to draft a budget including the Maastricht criterion of 3.0 percent for new indebtedness. In short, Angela Merkel’s debut on the European stage was perceived as a great success. Germany’s EU Presidency 2007: The Breakthrough to New Treaty Foundations The Premises of the German EU Presidency Angela Merkel definitely needed her high standing when on January 1, 2007 Germany took over the EU presidency: it was necessary to help

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the EU overcome a severe crisis and move along the treaty reform process. Indeed, in June 2006 the European Council instructed Germany to outline, after extensive consultations with the other member states, an assessment report on the state of discussion with regard to the Constitutional Treaty and its future developments (particularly about appropriate steps for the 2008 second semester). Furthermore, the European Council called for a political declaration planned “in Berlin on 25 March 2007 for the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaties” (Doc. 10633/1/06, 17). The German presidency’s successful efforts to revitalize the constitutional reform process are mostly due to two elements. First, at its June 2006 summit the EU was determined to firmly revamp such reform process, after the “ref lection period” following the French and Dutch referenda. And second, the EU left in the hands of the “big two.” Germany and France, to prompt the decisions over its constitutional future. Berlin tried to play down the exaggerated hopes placed on Germany (Göler and Jopp 2007), also echoed by the EU Commission President, José Manuel Barroso: “There are great expectations, but it is not fair to place the whole burden on Germany” (Süddeutsche Zeitung, October 12, 2007). In any case, the combination of German traditionally EU-friendly profile and Merkel’s successful debut on the European stage was an excellent premise, enabling the German EU presidency to achieve much more than a simple “roadmap.” 3

Diverging Future Scenarios for the Constitutional Treaty Finding a way out of the constitutional crisis was complicated mostly due to the issue of the “Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe” (TCE) itself. While politicians from Great Britain, Poland and the Czech Republic declared the TCE “dead,” others such as Belgium’s Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, called it “deep-frozen” (Rüger 2007, 116). Regarding the future of the TCE, different “camps” emerged. The first one included the 18 member states that had ratified the treaty, representing 55.9 percent of the EU population.4 These “friends of the constitution” wanted to stick to the TCE as far and long as possible. The second camp was formed by France and the Netherlands, whose citizens had rejected the TCE, but whose governments strongly favored a constitutional process revival. Finally, there was the camp involving those seven member states that had not even started the Constitutional Treaty ratification process and which—with the exception of Portugal and Ireland—did not intend to do so (Rüger 2007, 116). Each camp

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presented several proposals to overcome the constitutional impasse, along with the emergence of a Europe-wide, passionate debate on the different possibilities to save the TCE. Suggestions reached from strictly following or even improving the TCE (TCE plus) to “cherry picking” its best provisions and to the proposal of new negotiations while others recommended to stick to the Treaty of Nice with slight corrections (Nice plus) (Rüger and Wolf 2007, 12–16; Maurer 2007). At first, the TCE supporters insisted on saving altogether the treaty, warning not to untie the constitutional draft again and risking to open a “Pandora’s box,” and Germany strongly opposed a cherry picking approach. But in the course of 2006 an open and flexible strategy was finally pushed through: in the case of further negotiations, the TCE substance had to be preserved. However, there was never a clear definition of that “substance” and how much of it should be preserved. Nevertheless, Berlin followed suit: in her December 14, 2006 statement, Chancellor Merkel spelled out the safeguard of the TCE’s substance as the foundation of her EU presidency roadmap. France gave another important contribution toward the implementation of a new strategy. Nicolas Sarkozy, presidential candidate in the May 2007 election, considered the French “no” a serious burden for his ambitions in the European political arena. Therefore, he repeatedly suggested to lay down a “simplified treaty” which would take over those regulations of the TCE that “are necessary to make Europe capable of acting again and which were not an issue during the referendum campaign” (Sarkozy quoted in: Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2007, 15). His trick, however, was that such a simplified treaty could be ratified by the French Parliament without endangering the need for another referendum— thus attracting also those governments being confronted with domestic demands for a popular vote on the treaty. Furthermore, he joined the “friends of the constitution” camp while only slowly explaining that he wanted to completely take over the TCE substance. When on May 6, 2007 Sarkozy was elected President of France this plan could finally be launched and the TCE supporters had moved a good deal toward a solution of the constitutional crisis. Germany’s Contribution to Saving the Constitutional Treaty Like most of its predecessors, the German EU presidency introduced an extensive agenda, under the well-thought title of “Europe—succeeding together.” The program intended to spur new dynamics in numerous policy fields, even if the constitutional process development was by far

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the most important task at hand. However, the presidency itself rarely mentioned this topic, promising only a final report that was supposed to “show possible future developments and serve as a basis of further decisions on how the EU’s reform process shall be continued” (German EU presidency program 2007, 1). Initially it was necessary to build up a certain time pressure, in order to spur the decision-making willingness among the 27 EU members. For this purpose, the chancellor used the Berlin Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome in March 2007. As a former GDR citizen who ironically calls herself a “rather young EU citizen” (speech at the European Parliament, January 17, 2007), Angela Merkel actually succeeded in somewhat re-founding the “integration community” with the help of that anniversary declaration. Reminding that in present days the EU’s historic legitimacy and success story is no longer sufficient to gain the citizens’ support, Merkel urged the EU politicians to show their commitment and to advocate “why the idea of European integration is still indispensible” (Merkel quoted in: Goosmann 2007, 252). The Berlin Declaration, which was ceremoniously signed by Merkel, Barroso and the European Parliament President, Hans-Gert Pöttering, is written in an appealing, clear language. After acknowledging the previous integration achievements that included countries from Eastern Europe, the introduction ends with a remarkable sentence: “We, the citizens of the European Union, have united for the better.” After the listing of values and common challenges, the final paragraph sets concrete guidelines: “Today . . . we are united in our aim of placing the European Union on a renewed common basis before the European Parliament elections in 2009. For we know, Europe is our common future.”5 However, the chancellor was subject to sharp criticism since Berlin included neither the public nor the EU institutions during the declaration preparation. Merkel’s rebuttal was that an agreement among the 27 member states had only been possible by not “always discussing [everything] on the market place” (Merkel quoted in: Goosmann 2007, 255–256). Also for the roadmap design Merkel chose a confidential style, discussing it exclusively with and addressing a questionnaire only to the heads of state and government; by help of which in April 2007 the presidency tried to record proposed alterations of the TCE; every member state was allowed to state two proposals (Maurer 2007, 6–7). Although Merkel tried to justify this confidentiality by functional reasons, the impression grew that the chancellor preferred working in small and discrete circles, whereas she tried to avoid public determinations and

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clear guidelines. This “Merkel method,” also well-known as her domestic policy style, brought the chancellor’s undeniable qualities as a mediator at best to bear. On June 14, 2007, the German presidency introduced its roadmap with the expected TCE changes: giving up on state-like names and symbols; determining the status of the fundamental rights charter; finalizing the details of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/ European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP); clarifying the competences of EU and member states as well as the role of national parliaments in the overall European policy-making. Furthermore, Chancellor Merkel suggested that the upcoming European Council should provide the following Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) with a precise and comprehensive mandate that would elaborate a new treaty until the end of 2007. However, some key issues, such as the distribution of votes in the Council of Ministers, remained to be solved by the European Council. Summoning up, Angela Merkel and her government, during the German presidency, had tirelessly undertaken all necessary efforts to enable the June EU summit to finalize the treaty reform—thus exceeding the high flying expectations toward Berlin. The European Council of June 2007: Merkel’s Great Success for Europe Indeed, the European Council of June 21–23, 2007 proved that the German presidency had the ability and the teamwork skills to effectively moderate and inf luence the general outcome. Accordingly, several times Angela Merkel asked for and received help from her French, Luxemburg, Spanish, and even British colleagues in order to reach the needed compromises. When Poland’s Vice Prime Minister, Roman Giertych, accused her of promoting “Nazi methods” and a “hands-up policy” (Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 25, 2007), after Merkel threatened to convene the IGC by a simple majority decision, her “circle of helpers” promptly intervened to calm down the situation (Rüger 2007, 120). This way the European Council itself was finally able to achieve complex compromises, leaving just a few minor decisions to the IGC. While listing in detail the agreed TCE changes (Annex 1, Doc. 11177/07, 15–30), timing was also kept tight by establishing the ultimate closing of IGC activities by the end of 2007. However, such compromise came with its own price: the symbolic and substantial cuts imposed to the TCE document. Symbolic losses such as the abandonment of

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a hymn, a f lag and the wording “European Foreign Minister” for the future High Representative for CFSP meant more than just “cosmetic modifications” (Seeger 2007, 2), as they addressed the common identity of EU states and citizens. On a substantial level, more worrisome were the cuts about the “double majority”—the simplified decision making rule in the Council being based on member states and population majority. Such rule will be fully implemented only after 2017, and even then the so-called Ioannina Clause may be applied to protect “significant” minorities in the Council against the majority decision. This concession to Poland is probably the most severe change in the TCE substance, as it might affect in a crucial and lasting way the intended gain concerning the EU’s decision-making efficiency. However, these few but painful losses must be compared to the major achievements accomplished by the European Council decisions: the preservation of most TCE substantial provisions, particularly those related to its institutional part such as the double majority, the empowerment of the European Parliament and the important strengthening of the High Representative (CEPS, EGMONT, EPC 2007; Lieb et al. 2008; Höreth and Sonnicksen 2008; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet et al. 2010, 286–289), while in some aspects its mandate reaches even beyond the TCE clauses, for example, the upgraded impact of national parliaments with regard to subsidiarity control or the commitment of the EU to fight climate change (Rüger 2007, 120). Merkel and the Grand Coalition government spurred these valuable achievements with the excellent conduct of the German presidency and the intense consultations of all the member states. The Grand Coalition and the Lisbon Treaty The IGC was inaugurated by the Portuguese presidency on July 23, 2007, and succeeded in producing a new draft treaty on time. After reaching an agreement on some minor changes—for example, the increase of the Italian seat quota in the European Parliament (adding one more seat, for a total of 72) and a further tightening of the Ioannina Clause—the reform treaty could be ceremoniously signed by the European Council on December 12, 2007. Since then the document has been known as the Lisbon Treaty—and Chancellor Merkel was publicly praised for her preparatory work by the then EU Council President, José Socrates. In those days, nobody could yet know that the Irish “no” of the referendum on the Lisbon Treaty of June 12, 2008, would not only make the schedule of the reform process invalid again, but would also considerably

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reduce the successful balance of the Grand Coalition’s European policy. But even after this new European disaster the first Merkel government actively and reliably supported the Lisbon Treaty, particularly when in December 2008 under French presidency it was about making the Irish have a second referendum on the new treaty.6 After its approval, the Treaty of Lisbon went into force on December 1, 2009—only several weeks after the term of the Grand Coalition had expired. Summoning up, the German EU presidency and the Grand Coalition on the whole showed an extraordinary commitment in the EU’s constitutionalization. Tirelessly and with distinctive pertinacity the Merkel government supported this goal. Thus, it did not only stick to its motto “Europe—succeeding together” but also convincingly continued Germany’s traditional commitment to Europe’s further integration. The “Chancellor of Europe” German people very much appreciated Merkel’s frequent and successful appearances on the European and international stage. Just ten weeks after her nomination, Angela Merkel was as popular as no chancellor before: she got an 80 percent approval rating from German citizens (Focus, February 3, 2006). When the EU presidency was running out, a 73 percent of Germans taking part in a survey gave her good or very good marks (Allensbach survey, July 20, 2008). This approval rating continued well beyond the EU German presidency terms: in mid-2008, Angela Merkel received an 85 percent positive feedback in representing Germany across the world (Forsa survey, July 9, 2008). And according to a later survey covering five European countries and the United States, 38 percent of French and 29 percent of German citizens considered Angela Merkel as Europe’s most important politician.7 The German press called her the “foreign policy chancellor” (Außenkanzlerin) (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 11, 2007) and “chancellor of Europe” (Kanzlerin von Europa) (Süddeutsche Zeitung, October 12, 2006). However, often such references did not only mean praise but also reproach. Some reporters interpreted Merkel’s preferences for foreign policy as an escape from the tight maneuvering room at home (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 11, 2007) as well as a lack of domestic leadership power (Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 9/10, 2007). In other words, the above-mentioned “triangle” of EU policy coordination, involving the foreign office, the economic affairs ministry

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and the chancellery, was definitively dominated by the latter during the Grand Coalition’s term. Whereas former chancellors tended to discover EU policy as a fabulous stage only after some years in office, thus giving room to their foreign ministers, Angela Merkel immediately and extensively occupied that policy field, with the EU presidency procuring her further justification. The German people’s large approval ratings confirmed Merkel’s great instinct for political power and ability. The Grand Coalition and the EU’s Climate Protection Policy Apart from reviving the treaty reform, climate and energy policy was also a priority for Germany’s EU presidency agenda—as well as a major EU concern since many years, particularly promoting the Kyoto protocol statement and application. The German EU presidency gave fresh impetus to such commitment and prepared to face new challenges, a context where the 2007 Germany presidency of the G8 summit proved to be very helpful. Chancellor Merkel, former federal environment minister, could thus reach back to an extensive stock and take up the energy supply security issue, which the 2005 British EU presidency had placed on the EU agenda during the first Russian-Ukrainian gas struggle. Germany proposed an overall goal combining supply security, economy and sustainability—that is, it pursued an integrated approach to climate protection and energy policy. This topic was center stage at the March 2007 European Council, where the so-called “20–20–20-until 2020” formula raised a remarkable public attention. Compared to 1990, the EU intended to save 20 percent of greenhouse gases by year 2020; should other big emitters join, the reduction quota could be increased even to 30 percent. The plan called also for a 20 percent less energy consumption, thus reducing the import dependence and increasing supply security. Finally, 20 percent of EU total energy consumption should come from renewable sources. These ambitious goals were then detailed in the European Council’s action plan called “Energy Policy for Europe,” summoned up and relaunched in the Presidency conclusions (Annex 1, Doc. 7224/1/07). The German government, and particularly Angela Merkel, were very much praised for these achievements—somewhat forgetting that it was the EU Commission who had intensively prepared this agenda in advance (see the action plan “Energy Policy for Europe” COM (2006) 545 and COM (2007) 5282). Nevertheless, Merkel took the credit for enforcing the “20–20–20 formula” despite some resistance, particularly

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against the 20-quota for renewable energies, where some countries proposed the nuclear energy inclusion in the renewable sources list. While firmly opposing such position, Merkel had to make some concessions: for example, the 20 percent goal on renewable energies referred only to the EU at large, not to each member state, and the final document explicitly stated that it is left “to member states to decide on national targets for each specific sector of renewable energies (electricity, heating and cooling, biofuels)” (Annex 1, Doc. 7224/1/07). As a follow-up to the 20–20–20 formula, at the G8 summit held at Heiligendamm on June 7, 2007, the European countries, headed by Angela Merkel, succeeded in making US President Bush promise to join the post-Kyoto process. The United States and also Russia declared to “seriously consider” a substantial reduction of their greenhouse gas emissions: for the first time, the only world power left, the United States, gave in to the EU coalition pressure. But when in December 2008 the European Council passed under French EU presidency an extensive climate pack, the former ambitions could not be met entirely. Interestingly enough, Merkel not only agreed with such cuts in the climate protection goals she had essentially defined before, but also decided actually to push for them. Furthermore, she massively supported the protection of particularly energy-intensive industries in the context of emission trading. The chancellor defended herself by stating that the EU self-obligation to reduce greenhouse gases by 20 percent until 2020 was not endangered by these industry concessions. Therefore, this case can be seen as a perfect example for the “pragmatization” of the German EU policy, i.e. the pursuing of national interests at European level, an approach already launched under the Schröder government. The German and international press criticized the turnaround of the chancellor from being a “new hope on the horizon of the environment protection movement” to becoming a “climate dinosaur” (Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 9, 2008). For some, she was “the disappointment of the year” (Le Monde, December 19, 2008). Such criticism, however, was overstated, because Merkel emphasized her climate-political commitment by making financial concessions to the Eastern European member states, particularly Poland, in order to overcome their resistance toward the 20–20–20 formula. Despite these cut backs, the EU continued to be the only entity in the world to set strict and binding goals in its climate protection policy. The Grand Coalition was crucial in enabling the EU to play temporarily a leadership role in world climate protection policy. 8

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The Grand Coalition During the Economic and Financial Crisis “Madame No”: The Chancellor as “Discouraged Angela” When the 2008 mortgage and bank crisis, initially concerning mostly the United States, grew to become a worldwide financial and economic emergency, the EU seemed unable to find any common answers and counter-measures. The member states, particularly Germany, confined themselves to national emergency programs, and despite the frequency of “special summits,” the EU as a whole could not provide a strong, joint answer to such crisis. Particularly Chancellor Merkel got under heavy pressure, as she blocked for several months a joint crisis management at EU level. In November 2008 the chancellor had vetoed a 130 billion Euros reflationary program, and this additional pragmatization step within Germany’s European policy was sharply criticized by parts of the German press. On the contrary, French President Sarkozy was depicted as a positive example. “At the international level and partly in Germany, Sarkozy is seen as a hero and Merkel as Mother Discourage (Mutter mutlos),” the Süddeutsche Zeitung wrote on December 6, 2008. France bemoaned “Angela Merkel’s hesitating,” stating that the chancellor and her finance minister had failed to recognize the crisis extent and timing (Le Monde, December 11, 2008). The Grand Coalition was even accused of promoting a “parasite policy”: Europe’s largest national economy was accused of shirking its responsibility (Der Spiegel No. 49/2008). The chancellor reached a low point in early December 2008, when the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown invited Nicolas Sarkozy and José Manuel Barroso—but not Angela Merkel—to help in the G20 summit preparation. “Madame No is not welcome anymore,” commented the Zeit Online (November 27, 2008). But Merkel insisted that her reflationary programs were already a sufficient measure, thus rejecting a competition for spending additional billions of public money. In a government statement of March 19, 2009, she self-confidently pointed out to Germany’s achievements, whose 3.3 percent of the GNP dedicated to spur the economy was “among the foremost” within all member states. European Successes in Crisis Management After months of disagreement in the spring of 2009, the EU surprisingly achieved a renewed unity and ability to act. While the special

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summit on the economic and financial crisis, held on March 1, 2009 and promoted by the German-French partnership, outlined some common positions, the regular March 2009 European Council turned out to relaunch the EU decision capability on this topic. This achievement has to be interpreted in a differentiated manner. On the one hand, the final document speaks of “considerable financial stimulations . . . which are now created for economy in the EU (more than 400 billion Euros)” (Doc. 7880/1/09). But this amount simply added together the individual member states’ ref lationary programs, thus totaling about 3.3 percent of EU GNP. Rather, the joint EU ref lationary program itself was quite modest: 30 billion Euros instead of the intended 130 billion Euros. More convincing were the European Council’s steps to regulate the financial markets, at that point completely out of control. While announcing the control and supervision improvement on the EU financial sector, the European Council also defined the EU’s position in respect to the G20 summit, including several detailed suggestions for strengthening the EU’s ability to manage and prevent crises, along with better regulation for global financial markets (Appendix 1 Doc. 7880/1/09). Addressing the international financial system, the G20 London summit in April 2009 passed various framework decisions aimed at putting an end to the previously predominant irresponsibility. Its final declaration, titled “The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform” highlighted the strengthening of international financial institutions, a tighter control of financial markets and rating agencies, the imposition of sanctions against “tax paradises” and the repeal of protectionist measures.9 Thus, the European countries were successful in placing their regulation proposals on the G20 agenda, while also giving evidence to their considerable assertiveness. Chancellor Merkel, along with President Sarkozy, contributed substantially to such European success and to a renewed common action—the “discouraged Angela” had become again an inf luential and widely respected head of government. German-French Relations: An Emerging Merkel-Sarkozy Tandem? Since the 1950s, the German-French relationship has been of outstanding significance for the European integration process: they are often addressed as the driving force of integration. Against this historical background the question arises which importance the Merkel government assigned to France within its EU policy.

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After 2002, Chancellor Schröder and President Chirac had closed the ranks with a renewed intensity, due to their common resistance against the Iraq war, which also sped up the treaty reform process through the European Convention (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2004, 253–259). Therefore, due to the CDU/CSU’s opposition toward the ChiracSchröder intimacy, the Grand Coalition’s taking office let suppose a certain readjustment in its relationship with France. A relevant paragraph in the coalition agreement stated that “German-French cooperation and the important momentum it creates remain vital and will serve the interests of our partners within the European Union” (Coalition Agreement 2005, 121). At the same time, however, the Merkel government intended to develop “a new quality and intensity of cooperation with our neighbors and the new member states.” In a speech setting out the basic principles of her European policy at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP) on November 8, 2006, Chancellor Merkel did not say a word about France. Although Merkel achieved some important agreements with President Chirac, she did not invest much in this relationship since his European standing had enormously declined after France said “no” in the treaty referendum. Consequently, such German-French relation as the driving force of integration must focus on the period after Sarkozy took office. Initially, the mutual relationship between Merkel and Sarkozy was characterized by evident problems. Particularly obvious were the distinctive differences between the two politicians about their character and style: on one hand, the extremely fast-acting French president always aiming at media attention and show effects, and on the other hand the extremely sober, highly rational and deliberately acting German chancellor. But of course their initial clashes were mostly due to some crucial issues at stake: whereas Sarkozy’s suggestion of a “simplified treaty” contributed much to the success of Merkel’s EU presidency in 2007, in the fields of economic, financial and industrial policy, the contradictions became clear as Berlin reacted to the new French patriotisme économique with a harsh defense of national interests. Here, too, the pragmatization of German EU policy kept on going. But most of all Sarkozy’s project of establishing a Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was received with profound displeasure in Berlin. Originally, on the European side Sarkozy planned only the involvement of Mediterranean states, while all other EU members, including Germany, were not supposed to participate, or only to some financing respect. Although a strong German pressure forced Sarkozy to propose an integration-compatible Uf M project and to “re-declare” it a “second

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edition” of the Barcelona process (Schwarzer and Werenfels 2008), Berlin was shocked by this obvious strategy of exclusion (Demesmay 2008, 381).10 Sarkozy’s extensive style during his EU presidency in 2008 went a step further, and some observers spoke of the “greatest distrust and misunderstanding between Germany and France since two decades” (Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 6–7, 2008). But in spring 2009 something changed: the willingness to make a fresh start and enhancing bilateral cooperation was confirmed at the German-French Council of Ministers meeting in Berlin on March 12, 2009, where both leaders underlined a more relaxed atmosphere. There are several reasons for this German-French recommencement (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet et al. 2010, 320–330). Probably the most important one was the insight that, facing the financial and economic crisis, the EU urgently needed a strong driving force for common action. Indeed, as mentioned above, it was a joint German-French initiative that left strong marks on the March 2009 European Council as well as on the April G20 meeting, in particular the shared proposals on the financial markets control and the “tax paradises” restriction. Also at the Pittsburgh G20 meeting on September 24/25, 2009, Merkel and Sarkozy submitted various joint proposals, which gave substantial shape to the summit final decisions. By the end of the Grand Coalition term the German-French relation has got back into routine. Probably this step came as a surprise to all those who, as a result of the Eastern enlargement, predicted the end of the German-French special role in and for Europe. Thus, what the Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker once said simply seems to be a European political reality: “Every time when Germany and France are cooperating closely, this immediately creates distrust among the smaller member states, but if they don’t, it is even much worse” (Le Monde, November 25, 2008). Currently it seems that there is no alternative to the German-French driving force of integration, working together as a powerhouse and a pacemaker within the EU, thus providing new ideas and dynamics. Conclusion The analysis of the Merkel government’s EU policy could lead to differentiated assessments. On the one hand, the great and continuous commitment to create new treaty foundations stands out. The temporary failure of the Constitutional Treaty, however, made clear that Merkel’s strategy of continuously including all 27 member states and getting

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them all on board has not been more successful than her predecessor’s. On the other hand therefore, Angela Merkel could be reproached for not having imposed her leadership will. Was this due to her political style, the “Merkel method,” based on listening and moderating, waiting and compromising, refraining from imposing clear guidelines but nevertheless successful due to skillful activities in small circles behind the curtain? In any case, it is still an open question whether the “Merkel method” was mostly due to the chancellor’s personal character or whether it was a consequence of the Grand Coalition’s political constellation—where she could not prove her leadership qualities like in a small coalition, given the strength balance between the parties. It is also undeniable that the energy and climate policy, along with the financial crisis management, showed that Merkel openly tried to push through national interests. Former Foreign Minister Fischer accuses the Grand Coalition: “The German view at the EU is . . . more and more like the French and British one—increasingly the EU is only considered a framework and a condition for enforcing one’s own interests but no longer an independent purpose of Germany’s European policy” (Süddeutsche Zeitung, May 28, 2009). Even if still under a moderate approach, the German EU policy combines in a previously unknown way a reliable integration-friendly attitude with enforcing national interests. In other words, pragmatization goes on. In conclusion, the Merkel government has shown a result-oriented and sober political style, able to achieve much at the European and international level. Despite the Grand Coalition’s solid and reliable work, however, it has not succeeded in sufficiently communicating the EU added value to a population increasingly uninterested in Europe’s integration. A preliminary account of the Grand Coalition’s European policy should therefore underline a clear lack of vision. Neither the chancellor nor the foreign minister were actually able to open up new prospects for the EU, to outline attracting perspectives toward an accomplished integration. Their European policy lacked any kind of glamour, any pathos. After her second term nomination on September 27, 2009, Angela Merkel and her new liberal coalition partner and Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle now have the opportunity to breathe more life into their European policy and—one more time and with renewed persuasive power—to make the fulfillment of Europe’s integration Germany’s reason of state. They will have to work for this goal under new conditions: after the Federal Constitutional Court verdict on the Lisbon Treaty of June 30, 2009, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat now dispose of deepened and enlarged competences for monitoring and controlling

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the government European policy.11 Merkel and Westerwelle will have to effectively integrate the parliament to their work; this hopefully will ease their responsibility to revive the German support for strengthening Europe’s unity. Notes 1. For more details on the Grand Coalition’s contribution to the Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defense Policy, as well as to the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, see MüllerBrandeck-Bocquet et al. (2010, 307–325). 2. The following quotations refer to Coalition Agreement (2005, 121–123). 3. Soon the term “roadmap,” issued by the European Council in June 2006, became common for the German EU presidency mandate. 4. Germany was counted among the ratifiers because in summer 2005 the Bundestag and Bundesrat had passed the Constitutional Treaty with a clear majority. However, Federal President Köhler did not sign the appropriate law because of an impending proceeding at the Federal Constitutional Court. 5. The text of the Berlin Declaration is available at http://eu2007.de/de/News/ download_docs/Maerz/0324-R AA/English.pdf (accessed on December 6, 2009). 6. The most important concession to the Irish in this context was that the Commission shall continue to include one national of each member state. As a consequence, the second Irish referendum was set on October 2, 2009 and won. 7. Available at http//:www.welt.de/politik/article1871195 (accessed on December 6, 2009). 8. In December 2009 at the Copenhagen climate summit, however, the EU failed to set the pace thus allowing others, mainly the United States and China, to forestall any serious agreements in the post-Kyoto process. 9. Further declarations were added to the “Global Plan,” see http://www.g20. org/Documents/final-communique.pdf (accessed on December 6, 2009). 10. In 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also called Barcelona process, between the EU and all Mediterranean abutter states was initiated. 11. The Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) judged the Lisbon Treaty to conform to the German Constitution but condemned the laws regulating the Bundestag and Bundesrat participation in the EU decision-making process. In mid-September 2009 new laws were passed that met the conditions set out by the FCC (see Hölscheidt et al. 2009).

PART II

The Federal Elections of September 27, 2009

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CHAPTER 5

A Post-Modern Campaign? The Sleepy Development to the 2009 Federal Election Giorgia Bulli

Introduction The 2009 elections in Germany could have been an ideal time for a lively electoral and media confrontation. The repeated ballots—several municipal and many Länder elections—could have been viewed as an evaluation of the Grand Coalition guided by Angela Merkel (CDU), and also as a preview for the upcoming federal election. In this situation, a “permanent campaign” climate could have occurred, along with sharp contrapositions and adversary tones aimed at underlying the differences among political parties (Blumenthal 1980). However, the 2009 elections have been universally described as one of the less exciting in the history of the Federal Republic. Was this because the campaign went on too long? Or was it because of the institutional peculiarity of the Grand Coalition, or to an innovative “presidentialization” of the campaign by Chancellor Merkel? In this chapter we describe the different parties’ situation preceding the electoral campaign, and analyze campaign events in chronological order. These events are divided into three major periods following some important turning points: (1) the election of the Federal president and the European elections, whose outcome inf luenced public opinion; (2) the conventions of the five main parties, where the emphasis is on their platforms and on their coalition strategies; and (3) the electoral campaign itself. Finally, the campaign strategies carried on by the major parties are evaluated, particularly whether such strategies matched the “third stage” features of post-modern political communication based

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on professionalization, personalization, and spectacularization (Norris 2000; Farrell and Webb 2000). The Grand Coalition’s Legacy and Coalition Strategies The face-off between Chancellor Merkel (CDU) and Vice Chancellor Steinmeier (SPD) can be interpreted as a personal confrontation of the two governing parties in the Grand Coalition: the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. Research on the radical right-wing parties’ electoral success (Kitschelt 1995) reveals Grand Coalition governments generally damage the parties in office and open up political opportunities for other parties. During the 2005–2009 term, the parties that could benefit from this situation were the Left Party (LP) and the Greens, on the left side, and the Liberals (FDP) on the right. The extreme right-wing parties—National Democratic Party (NPD) and German People’s Union (DVU)—were unable to take advantage of this situation, other than some limited success in regional elections.1 In the approaching phase to the 2009 federal election, the CDU/ CSU and the SPD faced different consequences for their participation in the Grand Coalition. In the Länder elections Christian Democrats had shown signs of crisis (chapter 3). This situation was advantageous to the Liberals who again and again declared themselves as the CDU/CSU “natural ally.” However, the statements of FDP Chairman Westerwelle about his party’s fierce willingness to form a Black-Yellow government after the elections were not followed by similar remarks by the Christian Democratic leadership. As a consequence, the FDP clearly feared a renewal of the Grand Coalition. The situation was different on the left side. The SPD was suffering from its minority partner position in the Grand Coalition. Actually, while the gap between the SPD and CDU/CSU after the 2005 election was not as wide in terms of votes (Zolleis 2009, 30), the chancellor was still a Christian Democrat. The SPD also suffered from a deep identity crisis due to the conclusion of the “Schröder era” and the difficulty in finding a new course of action after the unpopular Agenda 2010 issued by the Red-Green government. Aimed at reforming the German welfare state, the Agenda 2010 implementation resulted in broad dissatisfaction, promptly exploited by the LP. Such competition with a party that sometimes the Social Democrat leadership did not hesitate to define as “populist,” reduced the political action space for the SPD. In fact, the creation of the Grand Coalition originated from the SPD’s refusal to accept any form of cooperation with the LP at the federal level. The

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SPD always remained faithful to this strategy, though Red-Red coalitions were implemented in regional government and were not formally excluded in the federal environment until the eve of the regional elections in Thuringia, Saxony, and Saarland at the end of August 2009 (chapter 3). This limited space for political action strongly weakened the Social Democratic possibility of an electoral success. This position was reinforced by the party’s bad results in Länder elections and its declining rates in opinion polls. The electorate’s disaffection with the Grand Coalition advantaged the FDP on the right, while on the left it strengthened the Greens and the LP. The Social Democrats could not benefit from this situation because the Greens excluded the possibility of a coalition with the SPD, and the LP was barred from any coalition strategy by the SPD. Against this background, the main issue of the 2009 election campaign turned out to be the coalition-strategy explanation as envisioned by each party. Long before the opening of the electoral campaign, the public debate was oriented to the following alliance options: a Black-Yellow coalition (CDU/CSU-FDP); a revival of a Grand Coalition; a “Jamaica” partnership (CDU/CSU-FDP-Greens); and a “traffic light” alliance (SPDFDP-Greens). Other possible outcomes (SPD-LP or SPD-LP-Greens) had little chance of success and received scarce media coverage. Despite a limited number of coalition options—about the same figure found in the 2005 post-electoral debate (Jun 2009a)—the electoral campaign was essentially focused on coalition-building. Pushed by the parties and the mass media, the overall debate centered more on hypothetical alliances than on the economic and financial crisis, or on the proposals addressing the welfare state reform. Pre-Campaigning Phase (I): Shaping the Climate of Opinion In contrast to the 2005 federal election, characterized by a real commencement date of the campaign activities, 2 the 2009 drive did not present such a starting point. In fact, the various elections held in this period comprised a series of intermediate steps slowly leading to the official campaign. One of the most important elections, in Hesse in January 2009, marked a crucial point for the public perception about the Social Democrats’ chances of success and their internal organization. The Social Democratic top candidate in Hesse was Andrea Ypsilanti. In the January 2008 elections the SPD had obtained a good electoral result, but after a one-year negotiation to establish a Red-Green minority coalition (tolerated by the LP), following an SPD-LP-Greens alliance, Ypsilanti’s

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attempt eventually failed (chapter 3). This failure was essentially due to the opposing votes by some Social Democratic representatives (SchmittBeck and Faas 2009b). The early elections held in January 2009 not only led to a bitter defeat for the SPD, but also represented an image debacle for the party (Schmitt-Beck and Faas 2009a). From these elections onward, the general climate was characterized by two elements: the crisis of the SPD, and the likelihood of a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition capable of substituting the Grand Coalition government.3 These two features grew even larger in the following phases. The “super-election year” continued with the Federal President ballot on May 23, 2009. Although the Federal President is actually elected by the Bundestag and delegates of the Länder parliaments in joint session, the contest between the incumbent Horst Köhler (CDU) and his challenger Gesine Schwan (SPD) had a relevant effect on the public perception of the current strength of the two Volksparteien. The left faction of the SPD pressured for Schwan’s candicacy. Even if Schwan had been able to gain some votes from the Union and FDP representatives in the 2004 election, her election would have been mathematically impossible lacking the LP’s support (Egle 2009, 20). This controversy created some uncertainty in the Social Democratic electorate: on one hand, the SPD always stressed its resolute “no” to a coalition with the LP at the federal level. On the other hand, the SPD’s decision not to support President Köhler’s candidacy appeared even more confusing—a step that could have been easily “sold” to the public and would also have been in line with the cooperative logic of the Grand Coalition.4 The subsequent European Parliament election, held on June 7, did not significantly change the mood developed after the Hesse election. First of all, the extremely low turnout (43.3 percent) concerned the major parties in view of the federal election. The SPD had good reasons to be worried: the 20.8 percent (–0.7 points compared to the 2004 European elections) suggested no sign of recovery whatsoever. The results of the Christian Democrats were also less than brilliant: the CDU reached 30.7 percent (–5.8 percent) and the CSU 7.2 percent (–0.8 points). The FDP, on the other hand, obtained its best-ever outcome (11.0 percent, +4.9 points). The LP also performed well (7.5 percent, +1.4 points), while the Greens gained almost the same share as in 2004 (12.1 percent compared to 11.9 percent). Despite the CDU’s larger loss, if compared to the SPD’s, the Social Democrats’ performance at the European elections was generally perceived as a debacle (see, e.g., FAZ.net, June 8, 2009). In fact, 20.8 percent was the lowest figure ever reached by the party in European

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elections. The large vote gap between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, combined with an excellent result for the FDP, highlighted the deep crisis of the Social Democrats and their unlikely recovery in the upcoming federal election. The SPD chairman, Franz Müntefering, contributed to attracting media attention to the SPD crisis. He did not hide his profound disappointment with the low electoral performance, while firmly announcing the willingness to come back. He repeated that the SPD would not form any coalition with the LP at the federal level, without excluding though such possibility in the upcoming Länder elections. He also indicated the lack of personalization in European elections as a major cause of the Social Democrats’ poor results (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 8, 2009). In an attempt to hide the poor vote share of the Christian Democrats, Chancellor Merkel painted the CDU as the most voted party. The European elections marked the political debate shifting toward the parties’ coalition strategies—a central feature in the 2009 campaign. The FDP leader pointed out his party’s positive result and insisted on the cooperation project with the Christian Democrats. He underlined the end of the Grand Coalition era, the “strengthening of the center,” and made continuous reference to the political danger represented by the Left (ZEITonline, June 7, 2009). As a result, the presidential and European elections deepened the negative climate toward the SPD, as shown by the opinion polls (table 5.1). Consequently, a Black-Yellow alliance began to be perceived as a likely option. Pre-Campaigning Phase (II): The Parties’ Conventions After the European vote and feedback on their respective performance, the parties held their conventions and introduced their electoral platforms. Similar to the previous phase, this time period was also predominated by the parties’ focus on their coalition strategies, rather than on their programs. The Greens were the first to hold their convention in May 2009: its chairwoman stated that her party did not intend to participate in a Black-Yellow government. She added that “we are not minor partners of anybody, and we are not voted to flirt with other parties and competitors, which are our challengers in the electoral campaign” (FAZ. net, May 10, 2009). After declaring that they would take part in the 2009 election without a predefined coalition strategy, the Greens proposed their platform, mostly combining the traditional environmental issues with a sharp criticism of the Grand Coalition’s economic reform

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Institute

Giorgia Bulli Opinion polls by the major German research institutes during 2009

Allensbach

Emnid

Forsa

Forschungsgruppe Wahlen

Infratest

Date 27/01/2009 27/01/2009 28/01/2009 30/01/2009 23/01/2009 CDU/CSU 36 34 35 37 35 SPD 27 23 22 26 25 Greens 9.5 12 10 9 11 FDP 12 15 16 14 14 LP 11.5 12 12 9 11 Others 4 4 5 5 4 Date 16/6/2009 CDU/CSU 36 SPD 24.5 Greens 11.5 FDP 14.5 LP 9.5 Others 4

General elections results 27/09/2009 33.8 23.0 10.7 14.6 11.9 6.0

17/06/2009 17/06/2009 12/06/2009 11/06/2009 27/09/2009 35 35 37 36 33.8 26 21 25 25 23.0 12 13 11 13 10.7 14 15 13 14 14.6 10 11 8 9 11.9 3 5 6 3 6.0

Date 21/07/2009 15/07/2009 CDU/CSU 36.5 36 SPD 24 23 Greens 12 12 FDP 13.5 13 LP 10 11 Others 4 5

15/07/2009 36 23 12 14 10 5

24/07/2009 17/07/2009 27/09/2009 36 36 33.8 24 23 23.0 11 13 10.7 14 14 14.6 9 10 11.9 6 4 6.0

Date 01/09/2009 02/09/2009 02/09/2009 04/09/2009 03/09/2009 27/09/2009 CDU/CSU 35.5 35 36 37 35 33.8 SPD 23 24 22 23 23 23.0 Greens 13.5 11 12 11 13 10.7 FDP 14 14 14 15 14 14.6 LP 9.5 11 10 10 11 11.9 Others 4.5 5 6 4 4 6.0 Source: Author’s compilation from opinion polls available on: http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/index. htm (accessed on February 28, 2010). Figures indicate percentages of votes.

policies— which had actually been introduced by the Red-Green government under Gerhard Schröder. In doing so, the party tried to free itself from the legacy of its former government participation and its former influential Chairman Joschka Fischer, with the establishment of a new political course under a renewed leadership (Blühdorn 2009, 46). The Liberals also introduced their platform at their party convention in May. Their leader, Guido Westerwelle, did not openly exclude a coalition with the SPD and the Greens, and stated that he would not conduct a “polarized left-right campaign” (Lagerwahlkampf ) (Frankfurter

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Allgemeine Zeitung, May 16, 2009). However, eventually Westerwelle removed any doubts concerning the party’s coalition strategy, by outlining the FDP’s intention to build an alliance with the Christian Democrats. The SPD and the LP held their conventions in June, while the CDU simply convened its party cadres at the Berlin Congress-Center performing a sort of acclamation of its platform. At the SPD convention, the chancellor candidate Steinmeier strongly expressed the party’s willingness to lead a “fulminating campaign,” characterized by a clear-cut division with the CDU/CSU and the FDP. In his words, the SPD “fights for the shop assistant, as well as for the mason, but at the same time we are and we remain the new center party” (FAZ.net, June 14, 2009). At the same time, the party did not abjure the labor market reforms introduced by the Red-Green cabinet. The approved platform confirmed the party intention to form a government with the Greens or otherwise a “traffic light” coalition with the Greens and the Liberals—while explicitly ruling out both an alliance with the Left and a SPD minority government. A new edition of the Grand Coalition was described as a “last resort.” The other parties reactions to the news coming from the SPD convention varied from the positive evaluation of Steinmeier’s speech, expressed by the Greens, to the accusation of “left-leaning,” as stated by the CDU. The LP expressed strong criticism toward the SPD: according to Chairman Oskar Lafontaine, “the neo-liberal block composed by the Union, the SPD, the FDP and the Greens has unrolled the red carpet to the finance-sharks.” After reiterating the major platform points, Lafontaine stated the LP goal of reaching “10 percent + x of the votes” (FAZ.net, June 20, 2009). Finally, the CDU revamped a slogan by Konrad Adenauer,5 when its Secretary General Pofalla stated that “this is no time to try new experiments” (FAZ.net, June 29, 2009). The party platform for the 2009 general elections carried the slogan “We have the strength. Together for our nation” (Wir haben die Kraft. Gemeinsam für unser Land ). It was approved by 700 CDU and CSU cadres of various levels, who participated in an event that resembled a talk show rather than a party convention. What emerged from the pre-campaigning phase was a very difficult situation for the SPD. Its chancellor candidate Steinmeier tried to offer an image of strength and determination by promising a “fulminating campaign.” But besides the approval of the Greens, the other parties emphasized the isolation of the Social Democrats—thus contributing to strengthening a positive opinion toward the CDU/CSU already confirmed by the opinion polls.

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The Electoral Campaign Heats Up After this long preparation, the federal election campaign heated up at the end of August when the regional elections in Thuringia, Saarland, and Saxony got the voters’ attention. However, the negative attitude toward the SPD was reinforced by two elements: the doubts on FrankWalter Steinmeier’s ability to embrace the chancellor’s role and, the very high approval rate gained by Angela Merkel, as revealed by the opinion polls. Steinmeier’s figure was shadowed even within his own party. According to Henning Scherf, former SPD Mayor of Bremen, “Steinmeier is a great administrator, but not an experienced campaigner” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, July 26, 2009). The SPD campaign manager, Kajo Wasserhövel, stated instead that “the abstract popularity of Mrs. Merkel is no real chancellor bonus. People express great confidence and curiosity toward Frank-Walter Steinmeier” (ibid.). Despite the SPD attempt to gain support in the population, opinion polls confirmed that only 23–25 percent of the voters favored the Social Democrats (table 5.1). The SPD responded to this negative result by designing a professional electoral campaign. This strategy was launched with a public event (Wahlkampfkonferenz) held in Hannover at the end of July and was aimed at explaining the SPD’s campaign strategy to about 400 electoral candidates. The SPD Secretary General, Hubertus Heil, stated that this was precisely the right moment to begin a “real” electoral campaign, while adding that the negative opinion polls did not take into account the large number of undecided voters (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 28, 2009). In Heil’s opinion, nothing was definitive, and the situation was not so different from 2005, when the electoral debacle of the SPD had been foreseen for months (Hohlfeld 2006), but eventually the gap between the two major parties was quite small in terms of actual votes. The SPD’s unwillingness to lead a remissive campaign was confirmed by the introduction of the so-called Team Steinmeier two days after the Hannover meeting. The group comprised eight men and ten women close to Steinmeier, including the SPD ministers who served in the Grand Coalition and experts in different policy areas. The team denomination as a “professional group” (Profi-Gruppe) was intended to point out the professional feature of the entire SPD electoral campaign. Health Minister Ulla Schmidt was not included in the team: she was heavily criticized for using her official car during her holiday in Spain

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and even the SPD leadership failed to accept her explanation.6 With the German press and television providing large coverage, this controversy further deteriorated the party image. Moreover, the “Schmidt affair” highlighted the main characteristic features of the 2009 electoral campaign: an overall lack of concrete policy issues. This absence was mostly ascribed to the two “catch-all” parties. Actually, in some occasions the SPD seemed to compensate the lack of policy proposals by resorting to a certain spectacularization.7 On the contrary, Chancellor Merkel maintained a sober tone by stating that “in my electoral appearances I try not to shout. In any case, shouting to people does not sound good” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 21, 2009). Merkel asserted her determination not to attract media attention for assuming a contrasting position or making specific promises, thus running the risk of damaging her image. This latter aspect is very important in order to better understand the second element mentioned above—Chancellor Merkel’s broad popularity—within the positive opinion for a Black-Yellow coalition that characterized the starting phase of the electoral campaign. Merkel’s refusal to impose adversarial tones, combined with a sober style and a refusal of open conflict expressed during the Grand Coalition’s term, prompted to the under-representation of the CDU as a party and the over-representation of Angela Merkel (Mielke 2009, 11). Her popularity reached its highest peak in mid-August, when she was described as the “most powerful woman in the world” (Forbes, August 18, 2009). Furthermore, an opinion poll showed that 62 percent of German people would have approved the re-election of Angela Merkel (Süddeutsche Zeitung online, July 9, 2009). The combination of the chancellor’s positive image and the large gap between her and her competitor prevented the campaign from becoming a polarized confrontation between the two top candidates, which is a typical trait within the German “chancellor democracy” (Niclauß 2004). Despite the SPD’s attempt to heat up the campaign discourse and to call media attention on its own campaign, Steinmeier’s institutional role—vice chancellor and minister of foreign affairs—impeded him from acting as Angela Merkel’s challenger and attacking the political performance expressed by the Grand Coalition. 8 Given her big advantage, Merkel decided also to continue her “presidential” campaign strategy. In fact, in all opinion polls the SPD failed to show any sign of electoral recovery: a polarized confrontation with Steinmeier would have represented a useless risk for the chancellor.

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The Final Phase: Quietness and Lack of Spectacularization According to some case studies based on opinion polls, the campaign polarization would not have helped the CDU but rather the FDP since the electorate did not appreciate a potential renewal of the Grand Coalition (Faas 2009a). Furthermore, the chancellor’s willingness to keep quiet the campaign tone aimed also at avoiding the communication mistakes that characterized the 2005 CDU electoral campaign (Spreng 2006). Last but not least, the four years of the Grand Coalition featured broad cooperation and sober confrontation between the two Volksparteien. This political style was transferred in the electoral campaign, and resisted until the end of August, when the regional elections in Thuringia, Saxony, and Saarland seemed to finally wake up the general atmosphere. The results of these elections indicated an unexpectedly bad performance for the CDU (along with the SPD) as well as a general increase for the FDP and the Left, with a slight growth for the Greens (chapter 3). Within a few days, the whispered accusations to Angela Merkel for her soft campaign became openly known. Actually, a few days earlier the campaign had gained a more highspirited tone when the Liberals demanded “the end of constant Union attacks” against them and the beginning of a new climate. The FDP should not be considered as a “strategic enemy,” but rather as a “strategic ally” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, August 21, 2009): these words by FDP Chairman Westerwelle were directed to Chancellor Merkel. And on August 22, she had declared on the ZDF channel that she considered the FDP as a “likely ally.” Nevertheless, she did not want to conduct a Lagerwahlkampf, an electoral campaign where the Union and the FDP would oppose the SPD, the Greens, and the LP. For all these reasons, Westerwelle’s statement represented a difficult moment for Merkel. The so-called Ackermann affair created even more tension. The chancellor was blamed for having organized an official dinner in August with Deutsche Bank CEO, Joseph Ackermann, for his sixtieth birthday. Merkel defended herself by stating that the official dinner had in fact taken place, but not to celebrate the banker’s birthday. On the contrary, the aim was to “connect groups of people that do not usually have such opportunities to get together” (FAZ.net, August 26, 2009). This was Merkel’s reaction to the accusation of an illegitimate combination of politics and economy and tried to reinforce her indisputable networking abilities. Despite the strain deriving from such episodes and the following bad performance of the CDU in the regional elections, the chancellor firmly

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refused to change her electoral strategy (FAZ.net, August 31, 2009). The CSU’s insistence for a more aggressive campaign failed. In Merkel’s opinion, the Christian Democrats should focus on issues such as social justice, labor market, and economic development rather than on a new electoral strategy that citizens most likely would not understand. A few days later, however, the electoral campaign took another turn. During a radio program, for the first time Merkel openly criticized Steinmeier. According to her argument, the fact that the SPD indicated a potential coalition with the LP for the 2013 elections could be interpreted as its willingness for a similar strategy for the September elections as well (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 2, 2009). Steinmeier replied even more directly, “It is impossible to hear anything real coming from Angela Merkel. In the long run, only walking on red carpets is way too little” (FAZ.net, September 3, 2009). Such rudeness may be interpreted as a consequence of the poor electoral results achieved by the two major parties in the regional elections—along with some pressure by the CSU and partly the FDP for a more aggressive campaign. The general perception of a quiet run remained untouched: in an early September (three weeks before election day) opinion poll by the Allensbach Institute, 49 percent of the population found the electoral campaign “boring and without any contents” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 9, 2009). The television “duel” between Merkel and Steinmeier on September 13—less than two weeks before the elections—was considered the last occasion to revitalize the campaign. The debate was the only direct confrontation with the two chancellor candidates. Controversies arose before the long prepared and long awaited television event; the show was denied radio broadcasting permission (FAZ.net, August 31, 2009). Despite some high expectations, the debate was unable to stir up emotions and to indicate a real winner. The ninety minute contest was broadcast live and heard by 14.2 million people (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 21, 2009). In 2005, twenty-one million people watched the debate between the then candidates Schröder and Merkel. In the 2009 event, Merkel and Steinmeier mostly discussed issues and questions proposed by the anchormen. Both candidates agreed on a positive evaluation of the Grand Coalition’s performance and on the exit strategies from evident crisis situations, like Germany’s involvement in the Afghanistan ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) mission and the envisaged ownership passage of Opel from General Motors to Magna. A general agreement on the Grand Coalition’s conduct in the previous four years was somewhat expected, because the two participants

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were chancellor and vice chancellor respectively in that alliance. Overall the event reached its peak in terms of interest and discussion about such issues as economy, finance, and social justice (Faas 2009b). As already mentioned, the debate revealed no clear winner. In a subsequent opinion poll by the ZDF channel, a 31 percent share indicated a positive evaluation of Steinmeier’s performance, compared to 28 percent favoring Merkel’s. Another opinion poll by the ARD channel indicated 43 percent for Steinmeier and 42 percent for Merkel. And according to the RTL channel, Merkel prevailed on Steinmeier, with 37 percent over 35 percent. In 2002 and 2005, similar TV confrontations were able to stir up emotions and attract participation, with an unambiguous indication about its winner and also some inf luence on the actual voting decisions (Maurer et al. 2007). On the contrary, the September 13, 2009 debate was generally perceived not as meaningful and even the anchormen were criticized, mainly by the press. The journalists were blamed for focusing only on the sensationalistic tones, to the detriment of the policy issues to be discussed. The Liberals, the Greens, and the LP also criticized the debate format that excluded the opposition parties thus providing an advantage to the SPD and the CDU/CSU. Nevertheless, the debate was able to ignite the political comments. Müntefering (SPD) did not exclude a coalition with the FDP, whereas the Liberals excluded it because—according to the opinion of its Secretary General, Dirk Niebel—no real dialogue was possible between the two parties. Müntefering also ruled out any rebirth of a Grand Coalition. The Greens stated their wish of an open dialogue with all parties after the elections, but Cem Özdemir (Green party Co-Chairman) underlined the party’s reluctance to become a possible minor partner of a Black-Yellow coalition (FAZ.net, September 14, 2009). In conclusion, this phase was characterized by little discussion about policy issues while statements about coalition-building strategies abounded—something that added very little to electoral campaign environment. The long awaited television duel was unable to influence in any way the previous gap dividing the two chancellor candidates. In sharp contrast to 2005, the opinion climate remained stable until September 27. The electoral campaign ended in the same sleepy atmosphere with which it had begun. The 2009 Campaign in Comparative Perspective Campaigning at German federal elections has been the subject of scientific attention only since 1998. In that year, for the first time the

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campaign was carried out according to the major features of postmodern political communication: personalization, spectacularization, and professionalization. Personalization indicates both media and public focus on one or more personalities within the parties (Brettschneider 2002; Mazzoleni 2004); spectacularization deals with the amplification of some theatrical and parading aspects in current politics; and professionalization refers to an efficient and specialized usage of communication resources and competences within the parties, and their respective staffs (Negrine 2007). The 1998 election represented a turning point in this perspective (Kuhn 2007, 8), when particularly the “horse race” involving Kohl and Schröder emphasized the affirmation of such political personalization. This aspect surfaced took not only in the confrontation between the two chancellor candidates, but also in the selection process for the Social Democratic candidate.9 Four years later, similar personalization traits characterized the challenge between Edmund Stoiber (CSU) and Angela Merkel (CDU) when selecting the Christian Democratic candidate as well. Eventually, the former won the selection process, but Merkel’s political image of the “girl from the East” started to be more and more appreciated. The real innovation of the 1998 campaign was the establishment of the first German “war room,” the so-called Kampa. In that occasion, for the first time the campaign organization took place outside the Willy-Brandt-Haus, the party headquarters, while communication strategies were decided by external professionals (Bergmann 2002). For the first time it made sense to talk about an “Americanization” of the German political communication (Oberreuter 2002). Mainstream media—mostly the press, but television channels as well—began to pay attention to the parties’ internal dynamics about potential chancellor candidates and to the professionalization of electoral campaigns. Let’s turn now to the role played by these same elements— personalization, spectacularization, and professionalization—in shaping the 2009 campaign. The first feature was interpreted under a different light by the two top candidates and their parties. Angela Merkel conducted an almost presidential campaign, exploiting the clear advantages of being the incumbent chancellor and often present in the international spotlight. As a consequence, her visibility continued to grew steadily. The national and international press mostly celebrated her talent in mediating conflicts, while sometimes criticizing some unclear positions (chapter 4). On the contrary, the coverage of Steinmeier’s candidacy was less benevolent. The answer to the question “Kann er Kanzler?” (“Does Steinmeier have the necessary qualities to become chancellor?”) was

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often negative, at least from the viewpoint of his campaigning abilities (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July, 31, 2009). The leadership image of the Social Democratic candidate suffered from his previous career. He was well-known as a talented administrative figure, particularly as the administrative head of the chancellor’s office, becoming a sort of “shadow man” for Schröder and as his trustworthy advisor in the years of his chancellorship. But he could neither compare with Schröder’s communication abilities nor with his charisma. By presenting its campaign as aggressive and fast-paced, the SPD tried to limit the bad coverage of Steinmeier’s image and the negative opinion polls surfaced in the previous months. The National TV aired two special reports on both candidates that further contributed to a wider gap between the chancellor and her challenger. The documentary on Steinmeier—“Candidate Steinmeier”—aired at the beginning of August by the ZDF10 was a failure in terms of audience. On the contrary, the Angela Merkel footage—“Chancellor Merkel”—received broader attention and support.11 On the other hand, the live TV debate that should have represented the personalization peak was unable to actually catch people’s attention. Another typical campaign tool, electoral posters, exploited the personalization feature, well beyond the two main candidates—while also further illustrating the clear differences in the strategies of each party. The CDU strongly focused on the chancellor’s face immediately after the results of the August regional elections. Completed with immediate and easy slogans, they tried to capture the general attention particularly with the sentence “We have the strength.” The FDP, and partly the LP, made equal usage of their leaders’ images, while the Greens opted for the traditional environment-based images evoking their ecological campaigns and actions. The SPD, understanding the communication deficit of its candidate, preferred to focus on images of common people with slogans related to general issues such as education, economy, and labor market. In terms of spectacularization, apart from the sharp comments mentioned above on the Schmidt and Ackermann cases, the 2009 campaign did not differ much from previous ones. A peculiar use of electoral posters was made by some constituency candidates, especially by a CDU candidate, Vera Lensfeld, who was sharply criticized for a poster showing her image next to a picture of the chancellor. The common element shared by the two women portraits was a generous cleavage. The poster was accompanied by the slogan “We have more to offer” (Wir haben mehr zu bieten). Similarly, the poster used by a LP candidate showed a woman’s back and bottom with a tattoo carrying the word

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“socialist” and the slogan Mit dem Arsch in der Hose in den Bundestag. This word play, centered on the term “bottom,” implied something like “entering with courage in the Parliament.” Eventually none of these two candidates was elected in the Berlin constituency of Kreuzberg, but widespread rumors on national and international media confirmed the ongoing tendency toward spectacularization elements in electoral campaigning (Voß 2007; Kuhn 2007)—or at least a growing media attention on such features. The use of the so-called electoral tours also represents an example of political spectacularization. The emphasis here focuses not so much on electoral tours, but rather on related publicity stunts. In this context, the turning point was represented by Westerwelle’s usage of a blue and yellow van (the so-called Guidomobil, from Westerwelle first name, Guido) in the 2002 electoral campaign. The touring van body was painted with the campaign website address, thus attracting the media’s and people’s attention on the FDP itself. The Liberals hoped that such an innovative communication style would help in shaking away their long-standing identity crisis. In the 2009 campaign, however, most candidates featured less bizarre electoral tours that were met with considerably less media attention.12 The professionalization of the 2009 electoral campaign was less evident than in the past, especially when compared to the 1998 elections. In that year, the SPD organized their “Kampa” and hired professional consultants. Following Gibson and Römmele’s (2009) analysis criteria related to the 2005 electoral campaign,13 it becomes clear that the major parties employed many typical elements of a professionalized campaign, while others were less identifiable. All parties took advantage of various Internet tools. However, it is still unclear if and how social networks and online multimedia channels affected the election outcome and which of the competing parties made better use of social networks (Albers 2009). Some professionalization elements featured in previous electoral campaigns—external organization of the war room, use of opposition research (professional investigation to collect information on the candidate’s public and private life), and hiring of external consultants—failed to emerge during the 2009 race. Does this mean that the last election tried to promote a renewed role for parties in general? After all, postmodern professional campaigns employ large numbers of advisers and campaign managers. Obviously each campaign strategy was inf luenced by the different chances of success in the competing parties, together with the continuous evolution of the opinion climate favoring the CDU/CSU and

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the FDP, but discouraging the SPD. Such influence was evident in the Christian Democrats’ refusal to change their strategy, as well as in the Social Democratic choice to embrace a professional outlook, despite most data gathered by research institutes showing an unlikely recovery. As a consequence, the major communication resources—strategy definition, campaign managers, etc.—were eventually located within the same parties. Moreover, the growing costs of professionalized electoral campaigning are likely to have played a role in such party-centered campaign implementations. It is nevertheless daring to affirm that the 2009 federal election represented a step back in the evolution of German campaigning. Despite the low level of “externalization,” all other analyzed factors indicate a “post-modern” (Norris 2000) campaign interpretation by all major parties. All things considered, this last campaign’s main feature was the lack of adversarial tones and the widespread recourse to a sober style. This attitude can be interpreted in part as a consequence of the CDU/CSUSPD peaceful cohabitation during the Grand Coalition’s term and the often trusty relationship between Merkel and Steinmeier. The growing competitive advantage gained by the chancellor against her competitor certainly played a major role in determining Merkel’s decision to avoid adversarial and spectacular tones, which would have created a much more lively confrontation. Other factors may be responsible for the sleepy atmosphere prevalent during the 2009 electoral campaign. These factors include a limited number of probable government coalitions deriving from opinion poll data; the Liberals’ preoccupation not to irritate their likely coalition partner; and the Greens’ worries of being associated with the SPD’s losing image. As a consequence, it is not surprising that personalization, spectacularization, and professionalization—though obviously present—did not play a major role in the 2009 electoral campaign. On the contrary, the overall lack of interest in addressing actual policy issues—finance and economic crisis, party stands on specific matters, etc.—was evident on the side of parties’ and media’s outlets alike. The prevalence of personal and secondary issues was not enough to create a thrilling and exciting competition. The scarce media coverage about issues other than coalitionbuilding and the personalization domains was also partly due to the parties’ reluctance to assume clear positions on solutions of the economic crisis, apart from some specific instances. Eventually, though, such dormant campaign environment was the combination of different

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factors: the particular institutional situation characterized by the Grand Coalition’s conclusion, the unwillingness of most voters to support a renewed CDU/CSU-SPD alliance, the continuous CDU advantage over the SPD and Chancellor Merkel’s supremacy over Steinmeier, and the unlikely possibility of an SPD-led coalition. In conclusion, during the 2009 electoral campaign the Grand Coalition’s “long shadow” and the parties’ opportunity structures prevailed on the typical adversarial logic of post-modern campaigning. Notes 1. In the 2006 Mecklenburg-Western Pomeranian elections the NPD obtained 7.3 percent and the DVU obtained 2.7 percent in Bremen in 2007. 2. This start happened on May 22, 2005 when the SPD Chairman, Franz Müntefering, announced on television his and Chancellor Schröder’s decision of calling early federal elections (Schmitt-Beck and Faas 2006, 393). 3. In the 2009 Hesse elections, the FDP reached a very good electoral result (+6.8 percentage points) and thus was able to form a government with the CDU. 4. In fact, as indicated by Infratest dimap opinion polls, at the time of the candidature announcement in May 2008, Köhler’s presidency was appreciated by both the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. Data show that, in the case of a direct election, two thirds of the SPD electorate would have voted for Köhler, and only 30 percent for Schwan (Süddeutsche.de, May 27, 2008). 5. “No to experiments” (Keine Experimente) was the slogan used by the CDU for the 1957 elections. With this expression the party underlined its wish to keep unchanged the political direction pursued under the Adenauer governments. In 1957 the Christian Democrats reached for the first and only time the absolute majority of votes (50.2 percent) and seats (54.3 percent) in the Bundestag. 6. On August 10, after bitter controversies and explanation attempts, the Minister was re-included in the “Profi-Team.” 7. This was the case of Steinmeier’s statement about the possibility of creating four million new jobs within 2020, as proposed in his economic governance program (Deutschland-Plan) introduced in early August. 8. Two weeks before the elections, in a Bundestag declaration, Steinmeier and Merkel praised the Grand Coalition’s achievements (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 9, 2009). 9. Schröder and Lafontaine run for the candidature in a highly personalized competition that attracted large media attention (Voß 2007, 94). After the 1998 elections in Lower Saxony, where Schröder was re-elected Land Ministerpräsident for his third time, there was no doubt left about his Chancellor candidature.

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10. The documentary film was aired on August 4, 2009 at 8.15 p.m. on ZDF channel (see http://w w w.zdf.de/ZDFmediathek/beitrag/video/810832/ K a nd idat-Steinmeier#/beitra g /video/810832/K a nd idat-Steinmeier, accessed on February 28, 2010). 11. The documentary film was aired on August 11, 2009 at 8.15 p.m. on ZDF channel (see http://www.zdf.de/ZDFmediathek/beitrag/video/813900/ Kanzlerin-Merkel#/beitrag/video/813900/Kanzlerin-Merkel, accessed on February 28, 2010). 12. Merkel chose the train, a “low profile” mean of transportation whose characteristics seemed to be coherent with her campaign tones. Westerwelle abandoned the “Guidomobil,” but did not renounce to use a website illustrating his electoral activities with pictures, reports, etc. 13. The research made use of the following indicators: (1) Use of telemarketing for contacting party members and outside target groups; (2) Use of direct mail to party members and outside target groups; (3) Presence of an internal Internet communication system; (4) E-mail sign-up or subscription list for regular news updates; (5) Outside headquarters; (6) Continuous campaigning; (7) Use of outside public relations/media consultants; (8) Use of computerized databases; (9) Use of opinion polling; (10) Conducting opposition research.

CHAPTER 6

The Choice for Stability The Results of the 2009 Federal Election Mario Caciagli

Introduction Many Germans refer to 2009 as a Superwahljahr, a “super election year”: four Land elections, municipal elections in eight different Länder, the European Parliament elections, and—we might also include—the head of state (Bundespräsident) election by the Federal Convention. The peak of this voting bonanza for German citizens was the September 27 Bundestag election. In spite of all these events, or possibly because of them, the campaign leading up to the Bundestag election was rather dull and boring. That very boredom, however, seen from outside, may reveal its positive respect as an expression of civil calm and peacefulness. This chapter assesses the 2009 federal election outcome. We discuss several possible scenarios and opinion polls before election day, and analyze certain aspects of voter behavior along with the five main parties’ performances. Another section specifically addresses the inf luence of the electoral system on the new coalition government; the conclusion covers the current development within the German party system. The Uncertainties Ahead of Election Day: What Coalition Will Emerge after September 27? Never before had there been so much uncertainty concerning the ultimate outcome of a Bundestag election, that is, the actual composition of government. Traditionally German federal governments have been multi-party coalitions, with the only short exception of Adenauer’s third cabinet.1 Since 1965, German voters at each Bundestag election

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have been faced with a clear-cut alternative typical of a bipolar party system. For a long time, particularly since the German reunification, the possible choice comprised the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition and the SPD-Green coalition, which alternated in power. Only in 2005 did the election lead to a somewhat indecisive result allowing the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats to form the Grand Coalition. The number of parties represented in the Bundestag has risen from three, in the 1961–1983 period, to five, in the last two decades—an increase that made the functioning of the “coalition democracy” (Jesse 2002) all the more complex. According to some observers, the German party system has absorbed some contemporary Western European characteristics, namely fragmentation and polarization, thus multiplying the various coalition alternatives (Korte 2009). This was also influenced by the electorate itself, which is increasingly unstable and, like elsewhere in Europe, less and less influenced by social institutions previously determining citizen voting behavior: that is, the catch-all parties (Volksparteien), the Catholic Church, family and trade unions. Today German voters seem more volatile, more sensitive to contingent issues, and quite easily influenced by the media— with a growing trend toward a lower turnout at polling booths. Overall these factors produced quite a difference in the most recent federal elections. In addition to such structural factors, several rounds of regional and municipal elections in spring and summer 2009 contributed to some turbulence in the electorate and to tension among the political parties concerning their respective strategies. This picture further increased the great uncertainty about the new cabinet formation. The heavy losses suffered by both major parties on those occasions in favor of the smaller parties (chapter 3) paved the way for the most disparate speculations on the future coalition, widely reported in the German media before the vote: a Christian Democratic and Green coalition had been already governing in the city-state of Hamburg; an alliance between the Social Democrats, the Greens, and the Left Party (LP) was not unimaginable, in spite of the former two parties’ hesitations, while at the same time a renewal of the Grand Coalition was deemed likely by many observers. The main uncertainty concerned the Liberals outcome, because their alliance with the Christian Democrats was the most expected by both potential partners and the public as well. Chancellor Merkel had repeatedly stated that her party, confident to win most votes, intended to set up a government with the FDP.2 This same alliance had already been successfully experimented with in the reelection of the Federal President, Horst Köhler (CDU), at the end of May.3

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Most opinion polls appeared to confirm the success of the CDU/ CSU-FDP alliance. Contrary to the 2005 situation, this time the polling data were quite accurate in predicting the final election outcome. If we look at the opinion polls produced by several institutes 4 in the months preceding the election, the data consistency is striking. However, the actual results show that such polling data slightly overestimated the success of both the CDU/CSU (which several sources predicted at no less than 36–37 percent) and the SPD (which most institutes forecast at 23 percent, but some as high as 25 percent). All polling agencies predicted the Greens at 11 percent, which they came very close to. On the other hand, the FDP did reach the percentage predicted since months earlier—between 13 and 14 percent. Finally, the LP beat the polling estimate, which consistently underestimated its success at 9–10 percent. The pollsters were right on the most important figure, the Liberals’ achievement. Whereas in 2005 the FDP did not gain enough seats to become again the Christian Democrats’ minor partner, in 2009 they did hit their target. By proving pollsters right, the Liberals won this election, thus returning to government after eleven years. One explanation for this victory (and possibly the best-founded one) is that German voters opted for stability, sensing the uncertainties that might have derived from post-electoral negotiations and extraparliamentary agreements.5 The Christian Democratic and Liberal coalition government will last the whole four-year term of the new Bundestag: in the following section we will try to substantiate this prognosis with appropriate data. What mattered most so far, and will matter most in future years, is the yearning for government stability— something that, as politicians know very well, is so dear to German voters. Voting Behavior Figure 6.1 shows the second vote shares gained by the CDU/CSU, the SPD, and the FDP between 1949 and 2009, along with those earned by the Greens since 1980 and the PDS (LP, as of 2007) since 1990—that is, because these two parties first participated in Bundestag elections. In 1990 the Greens gained no seats, since they did not reach the 5 percent threshold; in 2002 the PDS failed to reach the 5 percent hurdle, but still gained two seats thanks to the first votes obtained in two singlemember constituencies in Berlin Eastern districts. 6

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60 50 40 30 20 10

19 49 19 53 19 57 19 61 19 65 19 69 19 72 19 76 19 80 19 83 19 87 19 90 19 94 19 98 20 02 20 05 20 09

0

CDU/CSU

SPD

FDP

Bündnis 90/Greens

PDS/LP Figure 6.1 Bundestag elections: Distribution of votes, 1949–2009 Note: Until 1987 only West Germany; since 1990 unified Germany. Graphs refer to second votes cast for party lists (in percentages). Source: Federal Statistical Office.

CDU/CSU almost always had the most votes. Only in 1972 and 1998 did the SPD manage to pass it. The SPD again became the strongest party in 2002, by a margin of just 8,000 votes, in one of the hardest head-to-head races in the Federal Republic’s history (Caciagli 2002). In 2005 and 2009 the CDU/CSU came in first place again, with a margin of no less than 10 percent over the SPD in 2009—a gap never experienced since the 1950s. A comparison between the 2002 and 2005 election results, both in terms of votes and parliamentary seats (table 6.1), reveals the most relevant changes brought about by the 2009 elections. Although the CDU/ CSU won by a wide margin, and proportionally lost less than the SPD, it still wasted many votes. Its overall 33.8 percent was the lowest level ever reached in its history.7 The increased seat amount, 13 more seats than in 2005, was due to the allocation of surplus seats (Überhangmandate) resulting from the technical specificities in the German electoral system (see below). Of the two Christian Democratic partners, however,

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Table 6.1 Bundestag elections: Distribution of votes and seats, 2002–2009 9/27/2009

9/18/2005

9/22/2002

2009

2005

2002

N of votesa

%

N of seats

N of votes

%

N of seats

N of votes

Voters 62,132,442 61,870,711 61,432,868 Votes cast 43,997,633 70.8 48,044,134 77.7 48,582,761 Valid votes 43,357,542 47,287,988 47,996,480 CDU/CSU 14,655,004 33.8 239 16,631,049 35.2 226 18,482,641 CDU 11,828,277 27.3 194 13,136,740 27.8 180 14,167,561 CSU 2,830,238 6.5 45 3,494,309 7.4 46 4,315,080 SPD 9,988,843 23.0 146 16,194,665 34.2 222 18,488,668 FDP 6,313,023 14.6 93 4,648,144 9.8 61 3,538,815 5,153,884 11.9 76 4,118,194 8.7 54 1,916,702 LPb Greens 4,641,197 10.7 68 3,838,326 8.1 51 4,110,355 Others 2,605,591 6.0 – 1,857,610 3.9 – 1,459,299 a b

%

N of seats

79.1 38.5 248 29.5 190 9.0 58 38.5 251 7.4 47 4.0 2 8.6 55 3.0 –

Number of second votes cast for party lists. In 2002: PDS, in 2005: LP.PDS, in 2009: LP.

Source: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Federal Statistical Office.

it was the Bavarian CSU that lost most votes, from 7.4 percent in 2005 to 6.5 percent in 2009: a 0.9 percentage point loss that actually hides a drop by 7.3 percentage points in Bavaria, where the CSU is now as low as 42.6 percent, also due to an even greater loss experienced in 2005 (from 9 percent to 7.4 percent). In the face of recent defeats in Bavarian elections, where the CSU lost the absolute majority maintained for forty-five years, we may hypothesize a certain decline for the only stable territorial subculture in Germany, the Bavarian Catholics, which have consistently supported the CSU. Although a vote shift estimation requires a cautious approach, some reliable and comparable data were indeed produced by several German opinion poll sources, which the following analysis is based on. 8 The CDU/CSU appears to have lost votes in favor of all other parties, gaining in turn no less than 420,000 votes (0.7 percent) from the SPD. Indeed, the most relevant aspect of the 2009 election was the SPD’s downfall, ending up at 23 percent and losing over seven million votes if compared to 2005, and almost nine million votes in contrast to 2002: this represents a drop by –11.2 and –15.5 percentage points respectively. The number of Social Democratic representatives in the Bundestag has dropped by well over one-third across two elections, from 251 in 2002 to 146 in 2009.

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This was not only the worst result obtained by the SPD in federal elections since 1949. It was in fact the worst downfall any party ever experienced in the Federal Republic’s history, and ranks among the worst declines ever witnessed throughout Western democracies. The SPD lost everywhere: in the North, South, East, West, and in major cities, where it was traditionally strong. In the East, it is now the third largest party after the CDU/CSU and the LP. It has lost votes to the left and the center; the above-mentioned opinion poll sources state that, considering the 6.4 million votes lost by the SPD, 400,000 went to the CDU/CSU, while 1,600,000 (2.6 percent) went to the Greens, 960,000 (1.5 percent) to the LP, and 560,000 (0.9 percent) to the FDP. Even greater damage was caused by the estimated over two million former SPD voters (6.7 percent) who decided to stay away from the polling booths. After eleven years in government—seven with the Greens under Gerhard Schröder, then four with the Christian Democrats under Angela Merkel—the Social Democrats are now back in the opposition. Under the pressure of this heavy defeat, the party now is even risking an implosion after over a century of life. The real winner of this election was the FDP, which gained around two million votes and reached six million in total, thus moving from 9.8 percent in 2005 to 14.6 percent in 2009. In other words, it rose by 50 percent, like no other competing party, and reached its highest peak in the sixty years of federal elections. The FDP grew everywhere, including the districts in East Germany where it has always been weaker. In 2002 and 2005 the FDP widely missed a declared target of 14 percent, only to reach it in 2009 after a series of successful municipal and Land elections. While sometimes deluded by opinion polls in previous federal elections, this time the same opinion polls proved the FDP—and themselves—right. It gained votes from both major parties, especially from the CDU/CSU (1,050,000 ballots, that is 1.7 percent), and only lost a few dozen thousand votes to the other two minor parties. Probably due to opinion polls largely underestimating its power, the LP produced the most unexpected result. It was an utter success: over five million ballots, representing 11.9 percent, and a 3.2 percent increase against the 2005 elections, embodied a result that went beyond the party leaders’ most optimistic expectations. Even more important, the party managed to break through in the West, confirming some previous successes in municipal and Land elections. In all Western Länder the LP hit the decisive 5 percent target, while exceeding 10 percent in the citystates of Hamburg and Bremen; even in Bavaria, it reached 6.5 percent,

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surging to 21.2 percent in Saarland, home to its leader Oskar Lafontaine. In the former German Democratic Republic its progress was almost a triumphal march: the LP is now the second largest party there (28.5 percent), running up close to the CDU (29.8 percent) and leaving the SPD well behind at 17.9 percent. In Brandenburg it even managed to become the largest party, with 28.5 percent. And even if losing some ground toward abstentionism, the LP conquered votes from all other parties: mainly from the SPD (the 960,000 ballots mentioned earlier), but also from the CDU/CSU (240,000 votes) and a few dozen thousand from the Greens, the Liberals, and even far-right groups—something that, up to a certain level, seems to confirm the hypothesis of a protest motivation underlying some of the LP vote. With a result of 10.7 percent (+2.6 percentage points as to 2005), the Greens achieved their best result ever. However, they did not make it back into government as they would have liked, and some Green leaders regarded the victory of a center-right coalition as their own defeat. The Greens are estimated to have gained about 1.6 million former SPD voters (2.6 percent), as well as 320,000 (0.5 percent) former Christian Democratic voters. In spite of these substantial vote transfers from one party to another, the overall geographic map of German voters still holds its major structural features (Niedermayer 2009a). The LP’s entrenchment in the East—a well-established phenomenon over the past twenty years—is the most evident of these features, and represents the deepest political cleavage in contemporary Germany. In the West, the LP only reached a two-digit percentage in the Saarland and in the Ruhr area. Despite its broad growth, the FDP remains frail in the East, while its strongholds lie in those regions characterized by an old liberal tradition, Baden above all, but also Hesse and Schleswig-Holstein. Even weaker are the Greens in the East, with the exception of some areas in Berlin, where they regained a single-member constituency in 2009; at the same time, they maintain their undisputed supremacy in Western university cities. The CDU/CSU is still strong in the Catholic South and Rhineland, while the SPD still holds its wide support in the protestant North as well as in the Ruhr, Oberhessen, and Lower Saxony. In the East, the CDU holds a majority only in Saxony. The SPD, on the contrary, still maintains a wide, albeit weakened, basis of support especially in Brandenburg. Concerning the voting behavior according to age, gender, occupation, and religion, the following can be said regarding the 2009 election (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2009). Support for the CDU/CSU and SPD increased with age, with lower percentage points in the young population: among voters under age thirty, the CDU/CSU only reached 27 percent

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and the SPD as low as 17 percent. For the SPD, the age group gap has grown much wider: whereas in 2005 the difference between the best and the worst result for each age group was 2 percent, in 2009 it stretched to 12 percent. The Liberals increased their reach in all age groups, performing best among the younger voters—who perceived them, so it seems, as innovators—while the Greens confirmed their influence on youngsters and overall performed well across all age groups. The LP reached its peak among forty-five to fifty-nine-year-old voters. Compared to 2005, the gap between men’s and women’s preferences increased. More than ever, the CDU/CSU attracted the women’s vote: 36 percent, as opposed to 31 percent among men (the overall score of the Union was 33.8 percent). According to some pre-electoral surveys, candidate Angela Merkel may also have attracted a considerable number of women’s votes. While the Greens performed equally well among women (13 percent, as opposed to 9 percent among men), the Liberals did just the opposite (17 percent men versus 13 percent women), as did the LP (13 percent versus 11 percent). On the contrary, there was no gender difference in the SPD’s voting spectrum. Finally, a cross-comparison of age and gender groups revealed that older women’s preferences went to the two major parties. Regarding employment, the CDU/CSU is still the strongest party among all four main job categories,9 attracting most ballots among high civil servants (35 percent) and especially in the self-employed sector (36 percent). In comparison to its overall percentage (23 percent), the SPD performed slightly better among blue-collar workers (25 percent), which is nevertheless quite a low percentage considering its glorious past, and because the CDU/CSU gained 31 percent and the LP another 16 percent within the same employment group. The FDP also benefited from blue-collar votes, with 13 percent, while performing well in the public and private white collar sector (15 percent) and even better among the self-employed (24 percent). Finally, the Greens got consistent results in three main job categories, but performed poorly among blue-collar workers (7 percent). Level of education has its own influence on voting behavior in Germany. The higher the education level, the lower the preferences for the two major parties, with Liberals and the LP climbing to the top. It should not come as a surprise then that no less than 18 percent of Green voters have a college degree—the highest percentage about this variable. Finally, religion—intended as a regular involvement in a particular church or denomination—remains probably one of the most helpful variables to explain voting choice in Germany. In 2009 the CDU/CSU

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reached 44 percent of votes among Catholics, despite its four percentage point decrease, while the SPD, the LP, and the Greens performed better among Protestants. Overall the Liberals scored evenly across the two religious groups. Among those voters who do not belong to any church or denomination, the SPD gained 21 percent and the LP a remarkable 22 percent. A final note about people attending religious ceremonies on a regular basis: they played a major role in favor of the CDU/CSU, with the Christian Democrats gaining no less than 67 percent among Catholics attending mass every week, and 47 percent of Protestants attending their services. The Decline of the Volksparteien Between 1961 and 1983, when the German Bundestag included only three parties (the two major ones, with the FDP holding the balance), the CDU/CSU and the SPD together used to make up about 90 percent of votes. In the 1976 election, CDU/CSU and SPD support reached a 91.2 percent high. In 2002 the two major parties still obtained 77 percent, but in 2005 their total score had already decreased to 69.4 percent. In 2009, the slow but steady CDU/CSU decline, along with the SPD downfall, made their votes collapse to a mere 56.8 percent—an unimaginable performance only ten years ago. In the East, the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats together hardly reached 50 percent. The Volksparteien, as the Germans call the “whole people parties,” echoing Otto Kirchheimer’s (1966) definition of a catch-all party, had long been declining. In their own way, they suffered from the ideological and structural crisis that hit most European political parties, particularly those of mass integration, toward the end of last century. Long before their large downturn in this last election, the CDU/CSU and the SPD had already lost hundreds of thousands of members and people renewing their membership belonged mostly to older generations (Niedermayer 2009b), as did most of their voters. While the political integration capacity of both parties receded drastically, their role as mediators between society and state institutions has also been challenged. The formal affiliation and the informal liaison between Catholic associations and the CDU/CSU, on one hand, and between trade unions and the SPD on the other, has virtually come to an end— with the steady erosion of the supporting subcultures (Catholics and the working class). Some observers are even talking about the “autumn of the Volksparteien” (Walter 2009). The main causes of their decline could be detected in new social processes of individualization and secularization,

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an increasing lifestyle differentiation, a decrease in industrial employment, and an employment expansion in the service sector, with the subsequent loosening of organizational ties, and weakening of shared values (Jun 2009a). Indeed, they never quite matched the definition of mass integration parties, with the possible exception of the SPD during the early post-WWII years, when it still embodied the working class party. Yet, they remained definitely membership-based bureaucratic parties with permanent cadres, local branches, and strong ties to local powers. Both the SPD and the CSU embraced such characteristics since the late 1950s, while the CDU followed suit in the mid-1970s when Kohl became its leader. Today they have left behind those features, at least partly, thus dismissing their traditional major function: that of building and channeling consensus. German elections have always scored a high turnout—an outcome undoubtedly due to the political parties’ will and ability to mobilize voters. After the 78.5 percent turnout reached in 1949, the first general election following the Nazi dictatorship also marking the post-war reconstruction and the Federal Republic’s delayed establishment, the electoral participation remained consistently steep in Western Germany. The peak was reached in 1972 in the Brandt government’s struggled confirmation (91.1 percent). In 1990, the drop to 77.8 percent could be explained with the inclusion of the East Germans, which did (and still do) make quite a difference due to their traditionally lower turnout. The 70.8 percent turnout in 2009 set a negative record that was unexpected: in the West, 72.2 percent of voters cast their ballots, while in the East they were as few as 64.7 percent. Some sources estimate the number of people who did not vote at over 4.5 million (Süddeutsche Zeitung, September 29, 2009). All five parties suffered from some vote drain. The analyses of such vote shifting, made public right after the election and still awaiting further investigation, are based on estimated figures. The SPD suffered the largest loss toward abstention. As mentioned earlier, it is estimated that over two million former SPD supporters decided not to vote. The CDU/CSU appeared to have missed about 1,170,000 votes, while the three smaller parties obviously experienced more limited losses. Mirroring the two major parties’ decline, the electoral growth of the smaller ones is transforming the German party system, and is likely to continue doing so in the future. The new party system’s possible format and mechanics are still uncertain. Already in 2005, right after the Bundestag election, the definition of a “fluid five-party system” was emerging (Niedermayer 2008) and

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the Grand Coalition itself was a reaction to that challenge. Instead of relinquishing, the fragmentation at the electoral level clearly increased with the 2009 federal election. It is important to acknowledge here not only the votes and seats gained by the three minor parties and the number of new abstentions: we also must take into account that 6 percent of the voters (about 2.5 million people) were left with no representation in the Bundestag. It is true that they only comprise a small bunch of lists, most of which hardly reached 1 percent, and none of which made the 5 percent threshold. For example, the much-dreaded, Nazi-nostalgic Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), albeit represented in some East Länder parliaments, received only 1.5 percent of the overall votes (little more than 600,000); and the Piraten list, created in 2006 to represent Internet surfers and to promote individual rights in the information society, gained only little more than 800,000 votes (2 percent). However, the overall 6 percent of voters left with no representation signals both a certain malaise in the German electorate and its ever evolving social fragmentation. The Effects of the Electoral System The German electoral system has been defined as a “personalized proportional representation” system. And in fact, it is a very proportional system. Assuming that the best criterion to measure the proportionality is the ratio between the percentage of votes and the percentage of seats obtained by each party or candidate list, the German electoral system always performed quite well in respect to this ratio. Actually, according to the outcomes produced, it may be considered one of the most proportional systems still active. Table 6.2 describes the performance in the past thirty years: most often, and for most parties, the two scores are virtually equal. In 1994 the figures are identical for Liberals, Greens, and PDS (6.9, 7.3, and 4.4 percent, respectively). In 2009 the percent of votes and seats were still extremely close.10 This time, in fact, all five parties had a net gain in seats, due to the above-mentioned loss of about 6 percent of the votes. In addition, some parties took advantage of the surplus seats assigned to them—namely, the CDU and CSU—as we will further explain below. According to the current electoral system—which has been in force since 1956, after some modifications in view of the 1953 elections—onehalf in the Bundestag seat is filled according to plurality rule (first-pastthe-post) in single-member constituencies (SMCs), while the other half is filled by proportional representation. Voters can cast two votes: with

Table 6.2

Bundestag elections: Percentages of votes and seats by political parties, 1980–2009 1980

CDU/CSU SPD FDP Greens LP b a b

1983 seats

1987

votes

seats

votes

votes

44.5 42.9 10.6 1.5 –

45.5 43.9 10.7 0.0 –

48.8 49.0 44.3 38.2 38.7 37.0 7.0 6.8 9.1 5.6 5.4 8.7 – – –

seats

1990

1994

1998

2002

2005

2009

votes

seats

votes

seats

votes

seats

votes

seats

votes

seats

votes seats

44.9 43.8 37.4 33.5 9.2 11.0 8.5 3.8a – 2.4

48.1 36.1 11.9 0.0a 2.7

41.4 36.4 6.9 7.3 4.4

43.7 37.5 6.9 7.3 4.4

35.1 40.9 6.2 6.7 5.1

36.6 44.5 6.4 7.0 5.4

38.5 38.5 7.4 8.6 4.0

41.1 41.6 7.8 9.1 0.3

35.2 34.3 9.8 8.1 8.7

36.8 36.1 9.9 8.3 8.8

33.8 23.0 14.6 10.7 11.9

In 1990, the alliance Bündnis 90 that merged with the Greens in 1994, won 1.2% votes and 0.0% seats respectively. From 1990 until 2002: PDS, in 2005: LP.PDS, in 2009: LP.

Source: Author’s compilation of data from the Federal Statistical Office.

38.4 23.4 14.9 10.9 12.2

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the first vote they select a constituency representative (which is why the system is called “personalized”), with the second they choose a regional party list. This list is closed and blocked, i.e. no preferential vote can be assigned (ranking, transferable vote, etc.). The key feature of this electoral system, for the purpose of our argument, is that the voting calculation determining seats allocation is carried on at the federal level, and takes into consideration the total amount of second votes obtained by each party list: in practice, the whole national territory is considered one constituency. As shown in table 6.2, this single national constituency yields the highest degree of proportionality. Finally, the seats allocation only considers those parties able to attain the 5 percent threshold—which in itself constitutes the strongest element of disproportionality.11 In the competition for SMC seats (so-called direct mandates), minor parties usually stand little chance of winning, so their potential voters tend to choose any major party they feel closest to (“ticket splitting”). Again, as in previous elections, the Greens only managed to win one direct mandate (in a constituency comprising mostly downtown Berlin districts), while the LP won sixteen mandates in Berlin and the Eastern Länder. The FDP gained no direct mandate. Figure 6.2 shows the first vote percentages gained by the five parties in the SMCs, alongside the second vote percentages obtained in their regional lists. The two major parties, and especially the CDU/CSU, got much better percentages in the first votes, while it was the FDP who suffered from the widest gap among the smaller parties. According to the strategic voting dictate, many potential Liberal voters opted for the Christian Democratic candidate in their local constituency, while a proportionately smaller number of potential Green and LP voters opted for a Social Democratic candidate. The choice cast by minor parties’ voters may indicate their preference for alternative future coalitions. In the 1970s Liberal voters chose—with their first votes—Social Democratic candidates, in the 1980s instead selected Christian Democratic candidates, thus pointing to the government coalition they would have preferred—an option that was announced in advance and in more or less clear terms, by the same party leaders. When a party wins more SMC seats in a Land than those granted by the proportional representation calculation, it keeps the surplus seats— the aforementioned Überhangmandate. Hence the varying number of Bundestag members, normally higher than the 598 resulting from the sum of the 299 seats allotted respectively through SMCs and the nationwide constituency. In the past those surplus seats were not so numerous,

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45 40 35

39.4 33.8

30

27.9

25

23.0

first votes second votes

20 14.6

15 9.4

10

11.1 11.9

9.2

10.7

5 0 CDU/CSU

SPD

FDP

LP

Greens

Figure 6.2 Bundestag election 2009: First and second votes by political parties Note: Figures indicate percentages of first and second votes. Source: Federal Statistical Office.

actually there were almost none before 1990. The reunification generated asymmetries in the regional distribution of party votes, which were mainly responsible for the higher number of surplus mandates (Grotz 2000; Behnke 2007). Only in 2009 did their number reach twentyfour, all gained by the two Christian Democratic parties. The SPD’s downfall in 2009 was so dramatic that it lost many singlemember constituencies to the CDU, so that the latter received twentyone surplus seats. In addition, for the first time the CSU gained three surplus seats in Bavaria. It was estimated that this adjustment was equal to an extra million and a half votes in the proportional representation voting system (Behnke 2009). The political outcome of this effect within the Bundestag deserves some attention. Thanks to those twenty-four Christian Democratic surplus seats, the government will be able to count on a rather sound majority of 332 seats out of 622. Without such surplus seats, the majority would be rather thin: 308 seats out of 598. Therefore, a mechanism, considered to be quite minor for a long time, is now causing a distortion for the entire electoral system. Its actual effects are not so secondary anymore, and they are much debated particularly in terms of their breach in that proportionality principle that was the legislator’s

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objective since 1949. Surplus seats have even come under scrutiny by the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) which, in a 2008 ruling, said that they violated the equality of vote principle envisaged by article 38 Basic Law, and imposed to the Bundestag an electoral law revision by June 30, 2011. The SPD, and even more so the Greens and the LP, had obviously insisted that this revision take place before the 2009 election,12 but they had to face the resistance of the Christian Democrats and the Liberals (Stoltenberg 2009). The CSU was particularly opposed to this insistence, because one possible modification might imply that the first votes should also be calculated at the federal level—instead of at the Länder level—which would hamper its chances in Bavaria. Any revision remains not only politically, but also technically difficult—reaching a solution by the deadline set by the FCC is a challenging task. Conclusion The electoral campaign had been overcast by the Grand Coalition, which both major parties had temporarily set aside in order to renew it, if necessary (chapter 5). On September 27, 2009, a majority of German voters got what they wanted: the end of the Grand Coalition, and stability for the next four years. The center-right coalition will hold without too much trouble, given the ample majority enjoyed in the Bundestag (also thanks, as just described, to their twenty-four surplus seats). The same majority has lasted in the Bundesrat, but it has been shattered by the defeat in the North Rhine-Westphalia Land election, celebrated in May 2010. The overall composition of the Bundestag is clear and well-defined. There are two opposing blocs: compromise politics should be a distant memory, while confrontation and conflict should be assured. The centerright bloc appears solid. The Liberals were the actual winners and the chancellor in office, whose explicit wish was to form a coalition with them, strengthened her leadership within her party. Stock markets, banks, and big business all praised the center-right victory. The CDU/CSU’s performance is largely due to Chancellor Merkel’s popularity, who also benefited from the extra bonus usually enjoyed by incumbent governments. After her success in managing the Grand Coalition, Angela Merkel will profit from that experience and find it all the more comfortable to lead the new coalition with a much smaller partner. There is a chance she will prevent the CDU’s decline as a party, and take advantage of the CSU’s weakening in this respect. The CSU’s crisis, as outlined above, might actually be a long-term symptom of deterioration

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of the Bavarian Catholic territorial subculture. In the short term it might provide more stability to the Berlin coalition agreement—allowing the chancellor to fear her sister party less. The FDP remains a relatively small party, with less than 100,000 members, and its success is closely linked to its leader role (Dittberner 2009). While the FDP’s support has now greatly improved, becoming increasingly representative of all social groups and regions, its future is unsettled. Being a government-oriented party (it has been in power longer than any other party, thanks to its alternate alliances with either of the big ones), the FDP should eventually benefit from being back in the driver’s seat, thereby strengthening even further the center-right partnership. It should be noted here that the center-right bloc is not exactly lacking voting support: on September 27, 2009, the center-right coalition gained just over one million more votes. The balance of power resulting from the Bundestag seat counting will enable a strong opposition over the next four years. The three parties, however, are still divided regarding the perspectives and roadmap leading to whatever agreements are reached in the future. The SPD is having difficulty climbing back. A leadership change is a necessary step, but evidently not sufficient to regain power. The party should make more clear and appealing its policy program while sitting on the opposition bench, but it will need a strong mobilization effort aimed at increasing its membership and popular support. The party’s troubled history after Willy Brandt stepped down from his 1964–1987 solid chairmanship is evidenced by the number of chairmen elected after him: ten in the following twentytwo years. Most important, the SPD must define a clear strategy for future alliances. Sitting in opposition with other parties does not necessarily lead to a coalition agreement. While the SPD’s left-wing faction will push some sort of partnership with the Greens and the LP, the leadership and the Länder-level cadres might decide to apply the brakes. Already well-established in the East, the LP will seek further expansion in western regions, to the SPD’s detriment, especially by focusing on the economic crisis still producing higher unemployment rates and frozen salaries. Different opinions on a possible alliance with the SPD are still a dividing factor within the LP, creating a pragmatic and an orthodox side as well. On the other hand, the Greens are also showing an increasing gap between realists and fundamentalists. They may converge to the left on issues like pacifism and the nuclear power opposition struggle, but they seem more concerned with civil rights protections and the end of industrialism.

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The road to transforming the center-left bloc into a winning alternative is anything but simple. On the day after the 2005 election, while that bloc had a majority in the Bundestag, the time was not ripe yet for a tripartite coalition government. The German tradition of experimenting alliances in the Länder governments is also very difficult to apply, given the three parties’ diverging paths in the different Länder. However, after the 2005 election it was already possible to notice that, “From a possible amalgamation of the left-wing bloc a perfect bipolar system might emerge, which some observers had already spurred in the mid 1990s. From such bipolar system, stronger control by voters over the formation of governments might in turn emerge” (Helms 2006, 294). The German party system is therefore on the move. Whatever its direction—and in spite of some negative signs emerging from the September 2009 election, notably the growth of abstention and party fragmentation—the Federal Republic of Germany is still, undoubtedly, a strong and stable democracy. Notes 1. Adenauer’s third cabinet was in power from October 1957 to November 1961: in July 1960 the coalition partner DP (Deutsche Partei) stepped down, leaving the CDU/CSU in a single-party government. Erhard’s third cabinet (1966) and Schmidt’s fourth cabinet (1982) also were single-party governments, but they were “crisis” governments and therefore only stayed in power for a few weeks. 2. From among many statements and interviews to this effect cf. Merkel (2009). 3. It was an indirect election by the Federal Convention composed of the Bundestag deputies and the same number of delegates by the sixteen Länder parliaments. The SPD presented her own candidate, Gesine Schwan. Köhler was elected in the first round by a (tight) absolute majority including the votes of CDU/CSU, FDP and the grassroots movement Freie Wähler. 4. The reference here is to opinion polls by Infratest, Emnid, Forsa, Allensbach, and Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. For a systematic overview of their respective data, please see http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/index.htm (accessed on January 28, 2010). 5. Rumor had it, that the SPD might even form a coalition with the Greens and the LP halfway through the term, after an initial reconstruction of the Grand Coalition. 6. We shall discuss the German electoral system later in this chapter. 7. With the exception of the 31 percent gained in the first 1949 election. However, in 1957 the CDU/CSU had reached 50.2 percent and then stayed above 40 percent for decades.

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8. The reference is to data processed by the Institut für Wahl-, Sozial- und Methodenforschung in Ulm and published by the Frankfurter Rundschau on September 29, 2009. The method used is based on a cross-comparison of first to second votes in about 5,000 administrative units (from municipalities to Länder) and a cross-comparison of all vote outcomes to preelectoral polls. The institute states at most a 0.03 percent error rate. Other studies are only based on survey data. 9. These are: high civil servants, public and private white collars, selfemployed, and blue collars. The German employment landscape has changed radically over the past thirty years. For instance, the blue collar workers have decreased steadily, along with self-employed people. Instead high civil servants as well as public and private white-collar workers have increased, and now make up three-fifths of the German workforce. 10. Except for a 5 percent difference in favor of the CDU/CSU, mainly due to the surplus seats, as explained below. 11. In the 1949 election, the threshold was calculated at the Länder level, so that a number of regional and regionalist parties entered the Bundestag, albeit with very few seats. In 1953 a legal amendment set the threshold at the federal level thus penalizing those parties whose vote was locally concentrated, while in 1956 another amendment raised from one to three the number of single-member constituencies where parties had to win to be considered in the calculation of proportional representation, even though they had not reached the 5 percent threshold. In 1994 the PDS received three direct mandates in East Berlin and was allocated 4.5 percent of the parliamentary seats, while in 2002 it only won two direct mandates and had to make do with those. To make the degree of proportionality in the allocation of seats even higher, pressure by the Liberals and Greens led to the adoption in 1987 of the Hare/Niemeyer formula, in place of the d’Hondt formula that had been used until then. In 2009 the even more proportional Sainte-Laguë-Schepers formula was used. 12. Even if the SPD eventually voted against a bill initiated by the Greens for reasons of coalition discipline.

CHAPTER 7

An Electorate on the Move Explaining Vote Choice in the 2009 Federal Election Bernhard Weßels

Introduction The 2009 German federal election marked the end of the Grand Coalition comprising Christian and Social Democrats, in power since 2005. On election night, September 27, it was clear that the victory margin gained by the Christian Democrats, which later formed a coalition government with the Liberals, was larger than expected. Actually, the overall outcome showed two main features. Instead of a close race, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) experienced the worst election result since World War II. In addition, its new competitor, the new Left Party (LP), increased its strength compared to 2005. Turnout, in constant decline since 1998, decreased by another seven percentage points to 70.8 percent. This is the lowest ever recorded turnout in a German federal election. There is no doubt that the German party system is on the move, following its rapid changes after the 1990 reunification. To understand the relevance of this recent development, one has to keep in mind that the (West) German political system, including its party system, was generally regarded as “super-stable.” In this chapter we address the structure and transformation of this party system, and we elaborate on the relationship between these changes and German voters. Moving our focus to the 2009 federal election, we also investigate parties’ and voters’ strategies, and parties’ and leaders’ performance. We also attempt to explain voters’ choice. Our findings are then brief ly summarized.

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A Party System on the Move—Providing a Context to the 2009 Election The German party system’s basic structure, based on class and religious cleavages, was established in the 1950s and remained stable until the 1980s. Political cleavages are the major features structuring West European party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Fundamental conf licts, rooted in different historical periods, are then ref lected and taken up by various interest groups and parties, which in turn mobilize people on their respective issues. Cleavages are based on structural conf licts of interest, reproduced and strengthened by party politics. They can be regarded as politicized social structures (Pappi 1977) able to organize voter alignments (social alliances between voters and organizations/elite groups) and the related coalitions between political or organizational elites (Stinchcombe 1975). As in most Western European societies, the major division lines in Germany are the religious and the class cleavage: two features that have characterized the German party system for almost three decades (Weßels 1991). The German party system is not a totally symmetric ref lection of the cleavage structure, given the double role played by Christian Democrats. They represent, at least partly, the pro-business pole on the class dimension and also the confessional pole on the religious dimension. In the class cleavage, the Social Democrats traditionally embody the opposite front. The religious dimension is to some degree asymmetric in itself, because a clear opponent is missing here, although the Liberals and parts of the Social Democrats and the Greens show a secular vein. Today, the religious cleavage is hardly ever based on any denomination. The important characteristic is religiosity, on one hand, and participation or abstention from religious service, on the other (chapter 6). Pappi has demonstrated again and again the explanatory power of such respective social characteristics on voting behavior (Pappi 1973, 1979, 1986, 1990). This relevance of social group differences as related to voting behavior eroded in the last decade or two. In addition to the tremendous change in the social composition of the electorate—that is, the decreased strength of former electoral core groups (Weßels 2000)—also the social structure effect on voter choice seems to weaken. The “super-stability” frame was challenged for the first time in 1983, when the Greens made it into the federal parliament (Bundestag). Political observers applauded such breach into the established parties’ cartel and the German electoral system impermeability. This transformation demonstrated that new interests, when reaching a critical mass,

An Electorate on the Move Table 7.1

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Change in parties and voting in Bundestag elections, 1990–2009

Election Year 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009 Difference 2009–1990

Effective Number Vote Concentration of Parties (Votes) Parties Running (two largest parties) Volatility 2.6 2.9 2.9 2.8 3.4 4.0 1.4

23 22 32 24 25 28 5

77.3 77.9 76.0 77.0 69.4 56.8 –20.5

7.2 7.2 7.7 6.5 8.1 12.6 5.4

Source: Author’s calculations based on election results from the Federal Statistical Office.

could gain a political representation despite the 5 percent threshold. This event happened again only in 2005, this time favoring the newly formed LP. In formal terms (fragmentation, that is the number of effective parties; asymmetry, that is vote share differences between the two largest parties; concentration of votes, that is vote share of the two largest parties) the German party system remained very stable between 1957 and 1983 (Niedermayer 2000). Table 7.1 illustrates the shift since 1990. The number of parties or lists running in each election is steadily increasing, ref lecting a similar trend in the effective number of parties. The two major parties—CDU/CSU and SPD—are falling short in their own vote concentration, while volatility—the average aggregate change in parties’ vote share—appear to be on the rise. At the 2005 elections, CDU/CSU and SPD results were closer than expected. In combination with the unwillingness of all parties to consider a coalition with the LP, this deadlock situation prevented a government majority that would exclude either one of the two big parties. The outcome was the above-mentioned formation of a Grand Coalition under the leadership of Angela Merkel (CDU). To some extent, the disastrous election result obtained by the SPD in 2009 is a direct consequence of its participation in the unloved Grand Coalition government. The Changing Voter: Insecurity as the New Feature Increasing voter f lexibility, in conjunction with a political supply differentiation—the formation and running of new parties—led to a completely different macro-structure within the traditional party system.

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This event would not have been possible without similar changes at the micro-level—that of the voters. Whereas for decades the voting landscape was considered rather balanced with regard to both longterm factors of party loyalties and shortterm factors during election campaigns, since 1990 this environment has been dramatically transformed. Voters tend to decide at the last minute whether to vote and for which party. This trend substantiates the increasing importance of shortterm factors such as campaign performance and presentation. Voting behavior seems to become more and more driven by party performance, while any possible electoral choice appears to be increasingly linked to the evaluation of parties’ political competence and their own personnel, rather than to more emotional factors like longterm and stable loyalties. This environment can easily put political competitors (and pollsters’ forecast as well) in a situation of insecurity, as suggested by the dramatic increase in f loating voters. Until 1987, the proportion of f loating voters was 15 percent or lower. Since then, it has continuously increased to top about 34 percent in 2005. This figure refers to an actual switching percentage from one party to another and from one election to the next. If considering f loating also during the election campaign (including switching from non-voting to voting or vice versa) there have been 43 percent f loaters in 2002, and 57 percent in 2005 (Weßels 2007). But when applying the strict definition of f loating—switching from one party to another from one election to the next—to the 2009 elections, f loating has actually decreased by ten percentage points, down to 24 percent: essentially, back to the 1998 level. However, in face of the large turnout decline by seven percentage points, there may be doubt whether this is an appropriate definition of floating. Accounting for the ten percent of 2005 voters who decided to desert the polling booths in 2009 (i.e., switching from one party to a non-vote decision), f loating has basically gained the same 2005 top level (32 percent). A second indicator of the higher flexibility of voters is the increasing ticket splitting. The two-ballot system in Germany enables citizens to vote for a party list, and also to cast a preference in single-member constituencies (SMCs) (chapter 6). A splitting procedure is rational if preference goes to a smaller party, which would benefit from a list vote but not so much from a personal vote within a SMC, because it has no chance of winning a direct mandate. In order to avoid a “wasted vote,” voters can decide to assign such personal preference to one of the two major parties, depending on their coalition preference. Ticket splitting was a rarely used practice up to the 1980s. Since then, though, it rose

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and increased during the last three election cycles by six percentage points: 21 percent in 2002, 24 percent in 2005, and 27 percent in 2009 (Infratest dimap 2009, 65). In this relatively insecure environment for political parties, which cannot rely on a stable electoral support any longer, and insecure voters, who cannot easily foresee a government majority, both actors had to look for appropriate strategies for decisions and behavior. Parties’ and Voters’ Strategies Unlike 2005, when political parties were well aware that only a Grand Coalition could be formed in that situation, in 2009 they demonstrated their own partnership preferences. The Social Democrats deemed impossible a coalition with the LP, which in turn decided not to join any coalition at the federal level due to its clearly diverging position on both the Afghan War involvement and the Hartz IV reforms—a contested bundle of unemployment measures established by the Schröder cabinet. The CDU/CSU favored a Christian-Liberal coalition versus the Grand Coalition continuation, while also excluding any partnership with the Greens. The Liberals (FDP) refused to join both the SPD and the Greens, declaring that if they could not form a government with the Christian Democrats, then they were ready to seat on the opposition bench, said FDP Chairman, Guido Westerwelle, speaking to party delegates at the party convention in Hannover in May 2009. The party secretary of the Liberals said in an interview that the best would be a Christian-Liberal coalition. The alternative would be to take a role in opposition, which would make the FDP even stronger in future elections (WiWo.de, May 15, 2009). Such announcements of (mutual) “incompatibility” revealed an obvious fear of a deadlock similar to 2005. Voters had to choose between two likely coalition options: the Grand Coalition continuation or a Christian-Liberal government. There was no clear policy profile for a renewed Grand Coalition, the alternative was to embrace a Black-Yellow government, which would pursue tax and health care reforms, at least as far as the Liberals were concerned. In their election platform, the Christian Democrats promised to reduce taxes for higher incomes, as did the Social Democrats. Liberals envisaged a system with fixed rates for different income groups. In labor-market policies, Social Democrats asked for a guaranteed minimum wage, whereas the Christian Democrats and the Liberals opposed it. The Liberals also wanted to combine all social transfers into one payment, called Bürgergeld (guaranteed basic income). Regarding the

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health care system, the Christian Democrats planned to increase competition and choice options for the compulsory insured. The Liberals demanded instead a change toward a private insurance system with fixed insurance rates for every citizen and a compensation rule for lowincome households. The SPD asked for a compulsory insurance system covering all citizens, including the self-employed and entrepreneurs, and a return to the 50/50 rule for employers and employees in reference to insurance premiums. Therefore, for many voters it may have seemed that the choice was between “more of the same” or “more reform”—an expression very popular in German political debates (chapter 9). A pre-electoral survey on voters’ coalition preferences reflects to some extent such limited choice options. The majority considered over the Grand Coalition: 57 percent found it an undesirable option, and only 27 percent favored it. The most preferred options were a ChristianLiberal or a SPD-Greens coalition (39 percent each). Nevertheless, only the Christian-Liberal coalition was regarded as a likely outcome: 60 percent expected this to be the future government, only 14 percent envisioned an SPD-Greens government (GLES1101, pre-election survey, question 77). It is quite interesting to note that voters seem to think in a strategic fashion. The last survey results, published one week before the election, did not envision an actual majority for the Christian Democrats and the Liberals together: the Black-Yellow coalition reported instead an average preference around 48 percent. Given the impossibility of any other alliance beside the Grand Coalition or the Christian-Liberal, those parts of the electorate favoring a government change detected a solution in the current German mixed electoral system. A party gains its seat share according to its list preferences—that is, the proportional component of the electoral system. However, there are also the seats won directly by a personal vote within the constituency. Such “direct mandates” are deducted from the total seats assigned to a party according to the proportional vote. The more direct seats a party wins, the fewer seats it can fill from the party list. Majorities in Germany are generally produced by small margins. This means that even a moderate ticket splitting can achieve a majority status. A glance to the distribution of direct mandates earned within the constituencies and of the seats from the party lists, shows that the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) won almost three-quarters of all constituencies and filled 218 seats from district mandates, and only twenty-one from the party list, which is only 6.5 percent of all list mandates. Regarding mandates from party

An Electorate on the Move Table 7.2

Party CDU/CSU SPD FDP LP Greens Total

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Bundestag election 2009: District and list mandates by party SMCs mandates

% SMCs mandates

List mandates

218 64 0 16 1 299

72.9 21.4 0.0 5.4 0.3 100.0

21 82 93 60 67 323

% List mandates 6.5 25.4 28.8 18.6 20.7 100.0

All mandates

% All mandates

239 146 93 76 68 622

38.4 23.5 15.0 12.2 10.9 100.0

Remarks: The German Bundestag’s regular number of seats is 598. If a political party wins more district seats than the seats won by proportional votes the result can be so-called Überhangmandate (surplus seats), which extend the number of seats. After the 2009 election, there were 24 surplus seats in the Bundestag. Source: Author’s calculations based on election results from the Federal Statistical Office.

lists (proportional vote), the winner was actually the FDP (table 7.2), filling ninety-three seats from the party list, which is almost 29 percent of all list mandates. As for the sixteen Länder, the Christian Democrats won more than 90 percent of the constituency seats in three of them (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and Saxony), and more than three-quarters in other five Länder (Hesse, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, and Thuringia). The strategic splitting of those voters who preferred a government change to a Christian-Liberal alliance certainly contributed to an election outcome with a clear majority. This is made clear by a simple example. Let’s assume, if one-third of those who gave the FDP the list vote are Christian Democratic voters who decided to split their ticket—district vote to the Christian Democrats, list vote to the FDP—would not have split their vote and would have given both to the Christian Democrats. It would not have helped the Christian Democrats much in terms of mandates (about 31 from the list), but would have reduced the number of surplus seats. However, it would have reduced the list vote share of the FDP by one-third and their number of seats to about 62. This would have led to about 308 seats for the Black-Yellow coalition instead of 332 it really got. The SMCs election results support this viewpoint. In those constituencies showing a large difference between the percentage of constituency votes and list votes (the direct result of ticket-splitting) where the former were in favor of the CDU/CSU, the Liberals gained more list votes. By aggregating this result at the Länder level, it becomes clear that the larger the splitting in favor of constituency votes for the CDU/CSU, the higher the

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20

Baden-Württemberg

Liberals (FDP), % seccond ballot

18 16 14

Saxony Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania Berlin Bremen Brandenburg Saxony-Anhalt Thuringia

12 10 8

Rhineland-Palatinate Schleswig-Holstein Hesse Bavaria North Rhine-Westphalia Hamburg Lower Saxony Saarland

6 4 2 0 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Difference % first ballot minus % second ballot, Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU)

Figure 7.1

Ticket splitting among CDU/CSU voters and success of the FDP

Source: Author’s calculations based on district election results provided by the Federal Statistical Office.

gains of list votes for the FDP (figure 7.1). Voters—or at least a reasonable part of them—uncovered the right tactic to deal with what parties had announced as their coalition strategy. The two-ballot system thus opened a strategic opportunity, and it was well exploited. Parties’ Performance and Leaders’ Characteristics The Christian Democrats’ and Liberals’ success was not a landslide victory but nevertheless larger than expected. In fact, the growth margin gained by the two parties combined, when compared to the 2005 results, was only 3.4 percent. The true big change was the dramatic decline of the Social Democrats. They lost 11.2 percent—roughly one third—of the 2005 vote share. Is such a result related to a general party performance, something that produced a stable vote share for the Christian Democrats and a disaster for the Social Democrats, or was it due to their top candidates? The answer is that both factors contributed to the overall outcome. On balance, 11 percent more voters were dissatisfied with the Grand Coalition performance (48.5 percent) than satisfied (37.1 percent). Overall, voters expressed higher discontent for all parliamentary parties’ performance—even if with some important differences. Whereas the dissatisfaction about the CDU’s performance in the government gained only a 4 percent margin, as compared to the satisfaction level, such

An Electorate on the Move Table 7.3

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Bundestag election 2009: Performance of parties in and out of government

Performance of . . .

Satisfied with performance %

Dissatisfied with performance %

. . . the government . . . the CDU in government . . . the CSU in government . . . the SPD in government

37.1 41.2 33.0 31.4

48.5 45.6 51.5 47.0

Performance of non-governmental parties . . . —FDP —Greens —LP

30.7 33.2 24.0

44.4 43.0 56.8

n = 1.825 (min) = 100 %; difference to 100% = indifferent Remarks: Answers on 11-point scales (–5: fully dissatisfied; +5: fully satisfied) recoded into positive (+1 to +5), indifferent (0), and negative (001E1 to –5), balance of positive minus negative answers. Source: GLES1102, German Longitudinal Election Study, Federal Elections 2009, post-election survey, author’s calculation.

gap increased up to 16 percent with the Social Democrats (table 7.3). Of those who had voted for the Social Democrats in 2005, only 50 percent were satisfied with the party’s performance, while 36 percent said they were dissatisfied. For the CDU, the respective figures were 77 satisfied, 15 dissatisfied; for the CSU, respectively, 67 and 18 percent (GLES1102, post-election survey, questions 53a-c in relation to recall 2005; figures not reported in table). Therefore, the 2005 SPD voters were extremely unhappy about the role played by the party within the Grand Coalition. In addition to performance evaluation about past parliamentary and governmental activity, voters express their opinions about the future, too. Not only retrospective considerations are relevant for vote choice, but sometimes prospective considerations embody even more relevance (Rosema 2006; Fiorina 1981). In this respect too, the Christian Democrats had a great advantage as compared to the Social Democrats. Whereas about 36 percent of the respondents attributed to the Christian Democrats the capacity to solve at least one of the most important problems, only 24 percent said the same for the Social Democrats. For voters, the CDU/CSU would be able to manage roughly one-third of the mentioned problems, while the SPD could only handle 18 percent. A little more than a half of the voters regarded CDU/CSU and FDP combined to be able to govern at least one of the three most important problems. Thus, a huge disadvantage gap for the Social Democrats was

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Bernhard Weßels Table 7.4 Bundestag election 2009: Evaluation of the problem-solving capacity of parliamentary parties Competence to solve three most important problems in % No. of problems 1 2 3 in % respondents in % problems

CDU/CSU SPD FDP Greens 10.7 10.9 14.8 36.4 29.2

9.0 8.2 6.2 3.2 9.1 3.7 24.3 15.1 18.4 9.7

7.0 2.0 2.2 11.2 6.7

LP

No party competent

6.2 3.2 3.4 12.8 12.8

11.7 5.3 3.8 20.8 12.8

Remarks: Because of respondents regarding more than one party competent, percentages regarding respondents sum up to more than 100 percent. Number of respondents 1.836; sum of problems mentioned 4.845. Source: GLES1102, German Longitudinal Election Study, Federal Elections 2009, post-election survey, author’s calculation.

seen not only about its past performance, but also with respect to its expected future accomplishments (table 7.4). Besides past or future policies, the leadership aspects also play a role in this context. The debate about the personalization of politics is quite lively in Germany as elsewhere. Research results about the candidates role for chancellorship seem to indicate a lack of any increasing personalization trend (Pappi and Shikano 2001; Gabriel and Neller 2005). However, this feature does not preclude the relevance of top candidates in some elections. Willy Brandt (SPD) versus Rainer Barzel (CDU/ CSU) in the 1972 elections, Helmut Schmidt (SPD) versus Franz Josef Strauß (CDU/CSU) in 1980, Helmut Kohl (CDU/CSU) versus Gerhard Schröder (SPD) in 1998: all these federal elections were characterized by very personalized campaigns with visible effects on the overall outcome (chapter 5). As for the 2009 federal election, there was a huge gap between Merkel and Steinmeier concerning the voters’ candidate preferences for chancellorship as well as the public perception of their characteristics. Angela Merkel and Frank-Walter Steinmeier were, respectively, the Christian Democrats’ and Social Democrats’ top candidates while at the time running for the chancellorship seat. The distribution of voter preferences skewed very much in favor of Angela Merkel, the Grand Coalition’s outgoing chancellor. Only 24.1 percent liked Frank-Walter Steinmeier, minister of foreign affairs and vice chancellor in the Grand Coalition, compared to 46.5 percent who preferred Angela Merkel. This shift certainly echoes the different personalities as perceived by the

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public at large: 59 percent credited Merkel with good leadership skills, while Steinmeier received a slim 28.6 percent. In addition, Merkel surpassed Steinmeier by eight percentage points when it came to general trustworthiness and 38.2 percent thought that she showed more confidence in dealing with the economic crisis fallout—while Steinmeier did not go above 27.4 percent. Only the candidates’ likeability offered a somewhat balanced response: 43.6 percent for Merkel and 43.1 percent for Steinmeier (GLES1102, post-election survey). Going beyond the two chancellor candidates, a look at the like- dislike ratings covering all top candidates shows the following (figure 7.2): among those who also voted for the candidate’s party, Merkel ranked first. The Christian Democrat followers liked their top candidate more than the LP voters liked their own top candidate, Oskar Lafontaine. It is also striking that among the Social Democratic voters Steinmeier was less liked than Guido Westerwelle (FDP) among the Liberals’ supporters. This finding is in line with the low preference share Steinmeier gained in the chancellor race. His inability to gain as much support from his own party as the top candidates of other parties gained among their

(−5) Dislike < -------------------------> Like (+5)

4 3 2

Merkel, CDU Westerwelle, FDP Steinmeier, SPD Künast, Greens Lafontaine, LP

1 Merkel, CDU Steinmeier, SPD

0

Künast, Greens Westerwelle, FDP

−1

Lafontaine, LP

−2 −3 −4 Voters of same party as the candidate Voters of other parties

Figure 7.2

Voters of other parties Voters of same party as the candidate

Like-dislike scores for top candidates in the 2009 Bundestag election

Source: GLES1102, German Longitudinal Election Study, Federal Elections 2009, post-election survey, author’s calculation.

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own followers, points clearly to a leadership problem within the SPD. All top candidates obtained little support by others’ party voters— an obvious consequence of party competition. However, it is interesting to note that the rank-order according to the respective party voters—that is, Merkel, Westerwelle, Steinmeier, Künast (Greens), and Lafontaine (figure 7.2, left)—looks quite different from the rank established by other parties’ supporters (figure 7.2, right). Merkel still comes up first, and Lafontaine last. Among the remaining three, Westerwelle drops to the last position, thus making room for Steinmeier, second, and Künast, third. The characterization of the 2009 federal election, in terms of parties’ and politicians’ performances, leads to a crystal clear conclusion. The past performances of the two government parties were judged very differently: quite positively with regard to the CDU/CSU, rather poorly for the SPD. Regarding expected future performances, the Christian Democrats are in first place. There is a wide gap in voters’ opinion between CDU/CSU and SPD about their perceived capacity to solve the most important problems on the table. The same applies to leadership, more specifically to voter preferences for chancellor and chancellor candidates’ characteristics. In three areas—past performance, expected future performance, and leadership evaluations—the Christian Democrats were well ahead of the Social Democrats. With respect to the three smaller parties, neither the great success of the Liberals—their vote share grew by 4.8 percentage points—nor the 3.2 percentage point increase for the LP, seems to result from performance differences in the same clear way as it does for Christian and Social Democrats. The Liberals received a poorer evaluation for their past performance than the Greens, and ranked behind the LP with regard to their problem-solving ability, if measured versus the number of problems at hand (tables 7.3 and 7.4). Finally, even if the LP received a very low grade for its past performance, eventually it performed better than the Greens at the polls. Vote Switching and Non-Voting Choices There are two separate possible explanations for the FDP and LP electoral success despite their performance differentials detailed in the above paragraph. For the Liberals the coalition preference of many voters may have mattered most. As mentioned above, the Grand Coalition was the least preferred and most opposed coalition option. For the LP, the frustration of many former Social Democratic voters largely

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137

Vote transfers from Bundestag election 2005 to 2009 Voting for . . . in 2005

Vote 2009

CDU/ CSU SPD

FDP LP Greens Others Total

CDU/CSU SPD FDP LP Greens Others Non-voters

23.6 1.0 4.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 4.6

3.0 17.1 1.6 2.9 3.1 0.8 5.8

1.7 0.4 5.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.2

0.3 0.4 0.2 5.7 0.3 0.3 1.6

0.4 1.1 0.2 0.6 4.8 0.5 0.7

0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 2.1 0.8

29.3 20.2 12.4 10.0 8.9 4.4 14.7

Total

34.7

34.3

9.9

8.8

8.3

4.0

100.0

Source: Author’s calculation from vote transfer figures of Infratest dimap (2009, 11).

determined their success. Even more important, however, was the fact that so many 2005 SPD supporters this time decided to desert the voting booths (chapter 6). The exit polls on election day involving several tens of thousands of voters provided a good estimate of vote switching. Based on these vote transfer tables, we can successfully calculate net losses and gains. According to the transfer table (table 7.5), the Social Democrats lost 2.9 percent of their 2005 voters to the LP. However, we should also consider those 2005 LP voters who switched to the SPD (0.4 percent). Therefore the SPD net loss in favor of the LP amounts to 2.5 percent of voters. The SPD net loss to the CDU/CSU is 3.0 percent, 3.1 percent to the Greens, 0.8 percent to other parties, and 5.8 percent to non-voters. This means that almost one-fifth of the 2005 SPD voters decided to abstain from voting in 2009. A low turnout clearly penalized the Social Democrats: unhappy with the party’s performance in the Grand Coalition, many 2005 supporters decided to stay at home in 2009. Among those who had previously voted for the SPD but did not vote in 2009, as many as 50 percent were dissatisfied with the party’s performance versus a lower 26 percent satisfaction level. This is almost the opposite of the average of 2009 SPD voters, and even worse if compared to 2009 SPD voters who had expressed the same preference in 2005 (72 percent satisfied, 12 percent dissatisfied) (GLES1102, post-election survey, questions 53a-c in relation to recall 2005; figures not reported in table). Obviously, a large share of dissatisfied 2005 SPD voters simply decided to abstain (instead of immediately switching to another party). Furthermore, it is clear that many 2005 CDU/CSU voters switched their list vote to the Liberals, with a 2.5 percent net effect—a not so

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Table 7.6 An evaluation-driven model of vote choice in the 2009 Bundestag election— logistic regressions CDU/CSU Variable

SPD

FDP

Greens

LP

Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio

Vote in 2005 Problem Solving Capacity

31.0 2.2

26.2 2.5

36.8 3.9

17.1 3.3

9.2 6.0

Chancellor Preference/ Candidate liking Past Performance

2.4

1.7

1.6

1.2

1.1

1.2

1.4

1.5

1.4

2.0

Pseudo R-square

0.67

0.62

0.64

0.56

0.63

Remarks: Vote in 2005: based on recall. All variables significant, except candidate liking in case of the LP. Problem solving: ranging from 0 to 3 problems expected to be solved by the respective party. Chancellor preference: applied only for CDU/CSU- and SPD-vote. 1 if the candidate of the respective party is preferred, –1 if the candidate of the opposing party is preferred, 0 if indifferent. Candidate liking: applied only for Liberals, Greens, and Left. Scale from –5 (dislike) to +5 (like). Past performance: satisfaction with the performance in government (CDU/CSU and SPD) and performance in parliament (Liberals, Greens, and Left). Scale from –5 (dissatisfied) to +5 (satisfied). Source: GLES1102, German Longitudinal Election Study, Federal Elections 2009, post-election survey, own calculation.

negligible share. However, these switches did not amount to an actual loss in seats due to the strategic ticket splitting and the large number of surplus seats for the CDU/CSU (chapter 6). Explaining the Overall 2009 Vote Choice In the 2009 federal elections, German political parties faced an electorate clearly unhappy with the government performance in its previous four years. All figures illustrated so far, about parties’ performance, leader evaluation, and problem-solving capacity, point in the same direction: the SPD role within the government was not cherished, its performance got a poor rating both in retrospective and for future perspective, while its leadership achievements were not good, either. The combination of all these elements embodies a very clear picture for immediate political change. The remaining issues are whether this viewpoint holds true for voter choice and which factors are more relevant at that moment. Such issues will be explored with a rather simple model of vote choice including the factors discussed above—namely evaluation of expected future performance (particularly, the problem-solving capacity), leadership evaluations, and past performance assessment (table 7.6). Because vote

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preferences expressed in prior elections are usually good predictors for next ballots, and because previous choices suggest—to some extent—a certain degree of party loyalty, this factor will also be included as a control variable. A vote is either for or against a party. This means that the dependent variable is a binary choice for each party. Binary dependent variables demand a logistic model. Thus, for each party a logistic regression model will be estimated, where the vote choice variable scores one if voted for the respective party, and zero otherwise. The models are composed in a way that they all include the four explanatory factors, but on a party-specific level.1 This simple evaluation-driven model predicts electoral choice quite well. Pseudo R-square, a measure for the proportion of variance in vote choice “explained” by the model is rather high for an individual-level model. The best voting prediction concerns the Christian Democrats (R-square 0.67, that is 67 percent “explained” variance), while least predicted is the vote choice for the Greens (56 percent of the variance “explained”). The interpretation of the odds ratios in table 7.6 is not very intuitive. Therefore, odds ratios have been transformed into an estimation of surplus in vote share produced by the variables, because their values also depend on the explanatory variables scaling. The scales range from binary (chancellor preference) to 11 points (like/dislike scales), which make a direct comparison impossible. Therefore, we calculate the impact of the explanatory variables on the increase in vote shares. First, odds ratios have been transformed into probabilities. Then such probabilities are applied to the distribution of the respective variable in order to calculate the estimated surplus in vote share produced by this variable. This step allows for an easy interpretation regarding the main factors, and their importance, for each party. Figure 7.3 shows the results. Problem-solving capacity—that is, the expectation that a party can solve up to three among the most important problems facing Germany today—increases the vote share for all parties but to a different degree if comparing “no problem solved” to “three problems solved.” If all other factors—vote choice in 2005, leader, and past performance evaluations—remain constant, the Christian Democrats could gain more than 21 percentage points, the SPD 12, the FDP 8, the Greens 4, and the LP 7 percentage points. In terms of probabilities to vote for the respective party, an increasing problem-solving ability helps the SPD and the Greens much less than the other three parties. The vote probabilities are displayed on top of the bars in figure 7.3. In addition, the evaluation of the

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Estimated gain in vote share by respective variable, all else equal

35

0.92

30

0.70

25 0.88

CDU/CSU 0.98

20

SPD FDP Greens

0.91

15

LP 0.66

10

0.63 0.92 0.98

0.94 0.95

5

0.92

0.95

0.87

0.70

0 Problem Solving Capacity

Chancellor Preference/ Candidate liking

Past Performance

Figure 7.3 Bundestag election 2009: Contribution of evaluations of problem-solving capacity, leadership, and past performance to vote shares increase Remarks: Bars represent the increase in vote share for the highest value on scale (⫹5) compared to neutral point of scale (0/⫺5), or to opposite point (⫺1) in case of binary coding. On top of columns: estimated probability of vote choice for the respective party in the highest category of scales. Source: Author’s calculation from logistic regression results documented in table 7.9.

CDU/CSU’s problem-solving skills looks much stronger than the SPD’s. The combination of the higher probabilities and distribution in favor of the Christian Democrats explains the huge differential in vote gain from increasing problem-solving capacity between the two parties (over 20 percentage points versus about 10 points). The same figure does not apply to the preferences for chancellorship and candidate liking. As shown in figure 7.3, the probability to vote for their own party at the highest scale value (+5) is equally high across parties (over 90 percent). In any case, there are even larger differences with regard to the estimated vote share gained (over 30 points for CDU/CSU, almost 20 points for the FDP, almost 15 points for the SPD). This is an evident effect of the distribution of chancellor preferences, which is strongly skewed in favor of Merkel. As for the prior performance—that is, the assessment for the two government parties’ performance, as well as for the opposition parties’— instead the probabilities are unevenly distributed. A good performance in government does not increase the likelihood of vote choice for the respective party to the same degree as good performance in parliamentary work of opposition parties (Grand Coalition parties scored around 70 percent, while opposition parties about 90 percent). However, differences in the contribution to the estimated increase in vote share of past performance are rather small between SPD, Liberals, Greens, and LP (all about 10 points gain), but they become huge in regards to the

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difference between these parties and the Christian Democrats, which are estimated to gain almost 25 percentage points. This is an effect concerning the distribution of past performance assessments. As shown in table 7.3, the proportion of good evaluation is roughly ten percentage points higher for the Christian Democrats, in particular the CDU (41.2), than for other parties. This vote choice model results seem to confirm the interpretation that voters’ evaluations already signaled a demand for change in government. All considered factors—prospective evaluations, leadership, past performance—contributed to the various parties’ success and failure: particularly, a success for the FDP and LP, and a failure in the SPD case. From the Grand Coalition to the New CDU/CSU-FDP Government The 2009 federal election was a remarkable event in many respects. It showed the highest change in aggregate vote share between two elections since 1953, the highest number of effective parties since 1953, and the highest share of ticket splitting since the Federal Republic’s foundation. Furthermore, the election produced the lowest vote concentration on the two main parties since the first elections held in 1949. Therefore, the 2009 election represents the current peak of major changes in both the electorate and voting behavior. Today the German party system is more competitive than ever, while coalition formation is nevertheless still partially constrained—no party wants to engage in a coalition with the LP at the federal level. This factor is clearly limiting the options for majority building and government formation. In this regard, the 2009 federal election did not leave so much choice to the voters: the politically possible coalitions were either a continuation of the Grand Coalition or a Christian-Liberal and SPD-Greens alliance, respectively. Only two of these three options proved to be viable in the face of the expected election outcome. The voter choice was limited to remain with a Grand Coalition or to move toward a Christian-Liberal government. The assessment of government party performances, along with voters’ coalition preference ratings, made clear that Germans were quite unhappy with the Grand Coalition. And they were particularly unhappy with the Social Democrats. However, such evaluations may not directly translate to an election result implying the end of the Grand Coalition. As explained above, before the election it was unclear whether the Christian-Liberal alliance could actually win a majority. Not so few

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observers expected a very close race between a Christian-Liberal coalition and the Grand Coalition’s extension. The strategic vote splitting between the personal vote in the constituencies and the list vote for the parties proved itself crucial to push the outcome in favor of a Christian-Liberal coalition. Many voters supporting such alliance actually gave their list vote to the Liberals and their personal vote to the Christian Democrats. In this way, FDP sympathizers were able to minimize the amount of wasted votes with regard to their personal vote providing the Christian Democrats with it, which is part of the huge success of the CDU/CSU winning almost three-quarters of the constituency mandates. At the same time, they increased the FDP vote share in the party list. This was a clever move: the Christian-Liberal coalition gained such a large majority nobody could expect before the election. However, this is only one side of the story. The other side is the disastrous result of the Social Democrats. They received the lowest vote share since 1949, an obvious punishment for their disproving role within the Grand Coalition. In particular, their own voters were disappointed to a degree that they switched to other parties—in particular the LP—or did not vote at all. The reasons for the decline of the Social Democratic vote share and the simultaneous rise of the small parties are manifold. A broad dissatisfaction with the major parties contributed to this volatility—beside the SPD’s weakening, also the Christian Democrats lost when compared to the 2005 election results, although much less—along with an increasingly f lexible and evaluative electorate. The analysis presented here has not only demonstrated the huge differences in performance and leadership evaluations among parties— especially for the Social Democrats disadvantage. Our review has also shown that these factors combined—past performance assessment, expected future performance, and leadership evaluations—contribute considerably toward an accurate explanation of the 2009 federal election outcome. In conclusion, the German electorate is definitely on the move. It is becoming much more f lexible and creates more insecurity for the political parties. Such parties can no longer simply rely on a steady electorate, while the major parties should forgo their expectations to form an easy government alliance with one of the smaller parties. If voters behave as they did in the 2009 election, a clear majority will always emerge. Otherwise the probable outcome will be a Grand Coalition, as was the case with the 2005 election. This is not a satisfying solution for German citizens. It seems likely, therefore, that the parties must

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consider the possibility of multi-party coalitions, if they want to allow for substantial government changes—that is, to avoid a “permanent” Grand Coalition. Note 1. This means, for example, that the vote choice model for the CDU/CSU includes also the perceived capacity to solve the most important problems for the Christian Democrats. The SPD vote choice model comprises problem- solving capacity, and so on.

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PART III

The New Government and the Challenges Ahead

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CHAPTER 8

Coalition-Building in Germany 2009 Simulating Real Politics, Preparing Merkel III? Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer

T

he federal election in Germany in 2005 forced the two big parties, the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU)1 and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), into the second Grand Coalition in the history of the Federal Republic. None of the partners had wanted that alliance, let alone strived for it but the mathematics of the result had allowed nothing else. The familiar alliances of one big and one small party, that is a Red-Green (SPD-Greens) or a Black-Yellow (CDU/CSU-FDP) coalition, did not muster sufficient votes, and the mathematically possible combinations of three parties (the “traffic light”: Red-Green-Yellow, the “Jamaica” version: BlackYellow-Green, and the Red-Red-Green option) either had been excluded by the potential partners or never had been seriously considered. The 2005 election outcome gave rise to a debate—and indeed fears— that the end of stable two-party government had come in Germany. The CDU/CSU and SPD seemed unable to halt the downward trend of catch-all parties in general. And—in spite of some gains—the three small ones seemed too weak to counterbalance this sufficiently to make a small coalition possible. However, alliances of three would bring together partners whose politics would not match easily because they cut across camps or include the successors of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), the former state party of the German Democratic Republic. Under these conditions the only alternative was the coalition of the Christian and Social Democrats—an option traditionally not

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only regarded as makeshift but as a threat to democracy. This view is based on the bad reputation of the first Grand Coalition (from 1966 to 1969) that had been held responsible for the growth of extremism on both the right and the left wing during those years. And although it has been shown that this is an unjustified allegation (for example, Hildebrand 2006) the suspicion dies hard. Preparing the Ground for a Change of Government Almost immediately after the 2005 election a majority of voters accepted the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition as the best constellation to carry out necessary change. The achievements of the Grand Coalition in Berlin during the subsequent four years (chapter 1) and the growing number of such partnerships at the Land level further contributed to a generally better image of this coalition format. At mid-term, 44 percent of the electorate expressed satisfaction with the governing coalition under Chancellor Angela Merkel and her Social Democratic Vice Chancellor Franz Müntefering, an alltime high during that election period (Hilmer 2010, Infratest dimap 2007, 13). Nevertheless, prior to the election in 2009 the old pattern was back: only 14 percent of the voters opted for a continuation of the Grand Coalition, and 38 percent were in favor of an alliance between the Christian and the Free Democrats (Infratest dimap 2009, 64). Given the possibility—many thought the likelihood—that there would not be a sufficient majority in the Bundestag for a small coalition after September 27, the CDU/CSU and the SPD had to find the right balance in their campaigns. Both parties wanted to end the Grand Coalition, and therefore they had to compete against one another. The Social Democrats knew that renewing the Grand Coalition would harm their electoral prospects more and more, and while this was also true for the Union, albeit to a lesser extent, 2 many inf luential Christian Democrats saw the major reasons for putting an end to the alliance elsewhere. The more conservative forces hoped for better chances for their policy agenda in a Christian-Liberal coalition. Merkel had moved the party away from the more market-radical positions taken before the 2005 election, which had almost brought about defeat. For some of her colleagues, namely minister presidents in the Länder and also in the parliamentary party, she had succumbed too much to Social Democratic stands. In her own perspective, she had regained “ die Mitte,” 3 the middle ground in the German party system. In so doing she conquered former Social Democratic terrain—with the strategic consequence that the center-right camp of the combined Christian and Free Democrats

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offering sufficiently broad policy solutions to stand a chance in the next election. At the same time this caused the problem that the programmatic positions of the prospective partners differed more from each other than in 2005. Despite these goals and calculations the two big parties could not entirely burn the bridge between them during the campaign because they had to prepare for a result that would leave them the only possible partners in a second edition of the Grand Coalition after 2009. Hence, the attacks, especially between Merkel and her Foreign Minister and Social Democratic chancellor candidate Frank-Walter Steinmeier, were mitigated (chapter 5). Observers were led to speculate that these two individuals, and particularly Chancellor Angela Merkel, would tacitly prefer a continuation of their partnership—differing from the explicit interests of their parties. These mixed motives also led to a mutual mistrust between the CDU/ CSU and the FDP when it came to publicly announcing their coalition preferences before the election—a practice that the voters in Germany traditionally demand.4 The Liberals suspected that the CDU/CSU had not entirely written off the future for a Grand Coalition, whereas the Christian Democrats, particularly in Bavaria, criticized the FDP for its failure to reject unequivocally the option of a “traffic light” coalition with the SPD and the Greens (Decker 2009, 23). The Christian Democrats themselves did not hasten: when adopting their election manifesto at a joint meeting of the executive boards of the CDU and the CSU in June 2009 the coalition issue was not explicitly addressed (chapter 5). The public and the FDP had to wait another month before Chancellor Merkel took the opportunity of a television interview to declare that she aimed at a “Black-Yellow” alliance (Saalfeld 2010). And the FDP even waited until one week before the election to announce their preferred partner (Wunschpartner), the CDU/CSU, thus excluding the “traffic light” alternative. At last, the point of no return was reached: if the results on election night would allow, the country would get the new old Christian-Liberal coalition. In retrospect, the reservations and reluctance that could be observed during the summer of 2009 might have been a foreboding for what became the worst start a new government ever got. Creating the Environment: Winning the Federal Election The election brought about a moderate minus 1.4 percentage points for the CDU/CSU (their worst result since 1953) and landslide losses for

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the SPD (–11.2 percentage points). Just as spectacular was the fact that the three small parties together won over ten percentage points, compared to 2005, with the FDP improving its result from 9.8 to 14.6 percent, the best in sixty years (chapter 6). The envisaged coalition thus commanded 332 of the 622 seats in the seventeenth Bundestag, a sound absolute majority for the chancellor election as well as a solid foundation for stable and calculable government support in the years to come. At first glance, this spelled fast and unproblematic negotiations between the partners, and indeed a standard figure—the time it took to build the coalition—points this way: with thirty-one days between election Sunday and the day the cabinet was sworn in the process in 2009 lies well below the average of thirty-eight days (table 8.1). However, this fact cannot be taken at face value: one of the longer procedures occurred in 1957, when, for the first and only time, a coalition partner was not needed but the controversies over the allocation of ministries inside the parliamentary party of the CDU/CSU were fierce. Furthermore, it must be considered that a difference in duration can be the result of different attitudes toward the nature of the negotiations. Some actors strived for forging very detailed plans for their future legislative cooperation, while others were satisfied, or had to be satisfied, with more general agreements. The first federal Grand Coalition, for instance, was concluded in 1966 after only fifteen days of negotiations and did so without a formal document (Schindler 1999, 1648). Although this did not happen after an election but because the original alliance broke up after only one year, it contrasts remarkably with the second Grand Coalition in 2005 that came about after two months of informally sounding out and preparing the terrain and formally negotiating a coalition treaty that was the longest ever.5 Insofar formal indicators such as the duration of negotiations are of limited value to assess the difficulties of the arrangement. This time, the going was undoubtedly rough, although it may be debated whether the further fragmentation of the German party system in the wake of the federal elections created a more complex “bargaining environment” than ever before in coalition negotiations (Saalfeld 2010, 185). A “climate of great insecurity and nervousness” (ibid.) may have existed in general due to the country’s serious economic problems and their social and political repercussions. It may also have existed on the Social Democratic side because they were and are faced with the bitter necessity of drastic changes in persons and policies, as well as in rethinking coalition options. With regard to the negotiators of

Coalition-Building in Germany 2009 Table 8.1

151

Building federal governments in Germany, 1949–2009

Election period 1. (1949–1953) 2. (1953–1957) 3. (1957–1961) 4. (1961–1965) 5. (1965–1969) 6. (1969–1972) 7. (1972–1976) 8. (1976–1980) 9. (1980–1983) 10. (1983–1987) 11. (1987–1990) 12. (1990–1994) 13. (1994–1998) 14. (1998–2002) 15. (2002–2005) 16. (2005–2009) 17. (2009–) a

●

Federal election

Start of coalition negotiations

End of coalition negotiations

14/08/1949 06/09/1953 15/09/1957 17/09/1961 19/09/1965 28/09/1969 19/11/1972 03/10/1976 05/10/1980 06/03/1983 25/01/1987 02/12/1990 16/10/1994 27/09/1998 22/09/2002 18/09/2005 27/09/2009

06/09/1949 10/09/1953 20/09/1957 02/10/1961 12/10/1965 30/09/1969 23/11/1972 25/10/1976 27/10/1980 17/03/1983 05/02/1987 04/12/1990 27/10/1994 01/10/1998 01/10/2002 17/10/2005 28/09/2009

16/09/1949 15/09/1949 20/09/1949 19/10/1953 09/10/1953 20/10/1953 23/10/1957 22/10/1957 29/10/1957 13/11/1961 07/11/1961 14/11/1961 20/10/1965 20/10/1965 26/10/1965 15/10/1969 21/10/1969 22/10/1969 08/12/1972 14/12/1972 15/12/1972 14/12/1976 15/12/1976 16/12/1976 03/11/1980 05/11/1980 06/11/1980 22/03/1983 29/03/1983 30/03/1983 09/03/1987 11/03/1987 12/03/1987 16/01/1991 17/01/1991 18/01/1991 11/11/1994 15/11/1994 17/11/1994 20/10/1998 27/10/1998 27/10/1998 16/10/2002 22/10/2002 22/10/2002 11/11/2005 22/11/2005 22/11/2005 24/10/2009 28/10/2009 28/10/2009

Election of Chancellor

Swearing in Duration of cabinet in daysa 33 34 38 52 32 24 26 74 32 24 46 47 32 30 30 65 31

Days between the general election and the election of the Chancellor in the Bundestag.

Source: Author’s composition on the basis of Schindler (1999) and Feldkamp (2010).

the new coalition, however, insecurity and nervousness do not seem to be the appropriate words to describe them, given the f lamboyant self-confidence that the Liberals carried into the negotiations and the unf linching insistence of the Christian Democrats that they are the true people’s party in the center. Furthermore the so-called chancellor bonus—the high reputation of the incumbent Merkel—enhanced their strong negotiating position as well as the fact that in reality a coalition without them was impossible. One may indeed turn the argument around: if especially the Free Democrats had been a little less sure of themselves this may have spared the partners much of their later grief. Instead they displayed an exuberant spirit over having regained access to government after eleven hard years in opposition, which at times seemed actually immature or irresponsible. Organizing the Coalition Negotiations Contrary to conventional wisdom it is not the parties—understood as organizations outside parliament—that play the most important role in coalition negotiations in Germany. This notion not only prevails in the

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media but also is nourished by politicians themselves. Looking at the entire process makes it very clear that beyond the level of party leaders the parliamentary parties are heavily involved in the negotiations. Indeed, it is a false perspective to look at the actors with that dichotomy of party “outside” and party “inside” parliament. It has been shown that, for the building of governments in Germany until the 1990s, small groups of top politicians dominate, and these politicians hold high offices simultaneously in the cabinet, in the parliamentary party, and in the party organization (Schüttemeyer 1998, 2001). For instance, it is impossible to determine whether Helmut Kohl conducted the negotiations with the FDP in the 1980s and 1990s in his role as chancellor, or as chairman of the federal party of the CDU. Even when the chancellor was not the party leader (as was the case of Helmut Schmidt in 1976 and 1980) the incumbent chairman (Willy Brandt) held a seat in the Bundestag and was well aware of the preferences for persons and policies in the parliamentary party of the SPD, which had to be represented primarily because this group will or will not elect the chancellor and accept the cabinet, and will or will not support the government in the following years. Moreover the dominance of the leaders usually does not extend to the policy details of the coalition negotiations. For this purpose working groups have been installed whose influence varied—depending on the particular party, the structures of the parliamentary parties, and the leadership style of the chancellors or designated chancellors (Schüttemeyer 1998, 258–266). But in spite of such differences, it seems that the principles of hierarchization and division of labor that characterize the Bundestag parties are mirrored in the organization of the coalition negotiations. A top group composed of the leading politicians of the partners is assisted by working groups that contain mostly members of the Bundestag (MdB) who are experts in their parliamentary parties on the respective fields (sometimes supplemented by politicians from the Länder). These groups settle the thematic details of the coalition treaty within the broad guidelines set by the leaders (and programmatic positions of the parties) and only if agreement cannot be reached at this level of negotiation are the leaders involved and act as controllers or as clearing-houses. In 2009 this pattern was the same 6 : the day after the election Angela Merkel, chancellor and chairwoman of the CDU, and Guido Westerwelle, leader of the Free Democrats’ parliamentary party and chairman of the party, met in the chancellor’s office and agreed on the organizational structure and timetable for the coalition negotiations.

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The Große Koalitionsrunde, the Great Commission with twentyseven high-ranking members, nine each from the CDU, the CSU and the FDP, headed by their respective leaders Merkel, Seehofer (Minister President of Bavaria, former vice chairman of the CDU/ CSU-parliamentary party and Minister of Agriculture in Berlin), and Westerwelle, would gather as the key actors to conclude the coalition treaty. Ten working groups with eleven to eighteen members were in charge of negotiating the issues in detail and trying to agree upon a legislative program for the coming four years. Each group was headed by one person from the Union and one from the Liberals. A steering group composed of the three secretary generals of the parties, the leader of the chancellor’s office (in the rank of a cabinet minister) and Westerwelle’s office manager7 were to coordinate the working groups, collect their results and prepare the decisions for the great round (see figure 8.1).

Great Commission (Große Koalitionsrunde) (9 + 9 + 9) CDU: Merkel, Koch, Rüttgers, Schavan, Wulff, Pofalla, Schäuble, de Maizière, Kauder CSU: Seehofer, Merk, Stamm, Dobrindt, zu Guttenberg, Aigner, Ramsauer, Söder, Fahrenschon FDP: Westerwelle, Brüderle, Pinkwart, Pieper, Niebel, Rösler, Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Solms, Homburger

Steering Group CDU: de Maizière (Chief of Chancellor’s Office), Pofalla (General Secretary) CSU: Dobrindt (General Secretary) FDP: Niebel (General Sekretary), Biesel (Chief of Party Chairman’s Office)

WG Taxation, Finance, Budget Chair: de Maizière (CDU), Solms (FDP)

WG Interior Affairs, Justice, IT and Society Chair: Schäuble (CDU), LeutheusserSchnarrenberger (FDP)

WG Education, Research, Innovation Chair: Schavan (CDU), Pinkwart (FDP)

WG Labor, Social Affairs, Pensions Chair: Pofalla (CDU), Niebel (FDP)

WG Foreign Affairs, Defence, Development, Europe Chair: Jung (CDU), Hoyer (FDP)

WG Environment, Agriculture, Consumer Protection Chair: Aigner (CSU), Kauch (FDP)

WG Family, Integration, Culture, New Media Chair: Böhmer (CDU), Otto (FDP)

WG Health, Nursing Care Chair: von der Leyen (CDU), Rösler (FDP)

WG Economics, Energy, East German Development Chair: zu Guttenberg (CSU), Brüderle (FDP)

WG Housing, Transport Chair:Friedrich (CSU), Döring (FDP)

Figure 8.1

Organizational structure of the coalition negotiations 2009

Source: Author’s composition.

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Parties or Parliamentary Parties? Among the nine CDU-delegates in the Great Commission, six were members of the Bundestag, and the FDP-delegation contained seven MdBs. To illustrate the argument from above with some examples: Westerwelle was then the leader of the FDP parliamentary party and also chairman of his party; the Christian Democrat Annette Schavan held a seat in parliament, was minister of education, and the vice chairwoman of the CDU; the three non-MdBs in the CDU-delegation were minister presidents from the Länder and vice chairmen of their party; the first meeting of Westerwelle and Merkel took place in the chancellor’s office not at party headquarters. This all indicates how little sense it makes to speak of the level of “the” party opposite the level of parliament, let alone to locate coalition negotiations in “the” party when trying to assess who the actors were. Obviously, the case of the CSU is different as it operates only in Bavaria and most of its leading personnel are based in that Land, its parliament and government; this was the case for six CSU delegates. The remaining three held seats in the Bundestag; two of them were ministers in Merkel’s first cabinet, and one was the vice chairman of the CDU/CSU-parliamentary party. Hence, the delegations of the three coalition parties mirror the necessities of representation in such processes. The parliamentary parties were represented through their leaders; six members of the incumbent government were present; in most cases these persons simultaneously represented the party organizations outside parliament as they were also members of their executive boards (chairmen and vice chairmen). Our picture of negotiation politics is one of groups of professional politicians acting inside and outside parliament in various functions and positions, with the dominance of the federal parliamentary level underlined by findings from the ten working groups. Of 141 positions (a handful of people served on two groups) 80 percent were filled with Members of the Bundestag. The vast majority of the non-MdBs were ministers from the Länder (including three Minister Presidents), which shows once more the strong impact of federalism in German politics.

Negotiating the Coalition Treaty It took the partners only three days to agree on the organizational structure for the negotiations and nominate the persons for the various

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groups. Only one week after the election, the official negotiations started with the first meeting of the Great Commission, and the working groups took up their assignments on the next day. Putting it all on a fast track was intended to signal the public that the new majority acted responsibly and was geared to efficient decision-making. But already during the first week the considerable differences between the Union and the FDP, and also inside the CDU/CSU, became visible or were purposefully made visible. Westerwelle propagated “solidity before speed” (Gründlichkeit vor Schnelligkeit), thus contradicting Chancellor Merkel and the newly agreed-on timetable for the negotiations. The Free Democrats wanted a “new beginning for Germany,” and insisted on drastic changes in taxation and the public health system. Leading Christian Democrats made it very clear that established policies and decisions in these areas were not negotiable. At the same time, the organized economic interests in the CDU (Mittelstandsvereinigung, Wirtschaftsrat) voiced hope for more inf luence in a Christian-Liberal coalition whereas the wing representing social interests within the party massively warned not to touch employees’ rights or social benefits. At the outset, all sides evoked harmony, and the Christian Democrats were ready to say that policy agreement would be easier with the Free Democrats than with the Social Democrats four years previously, and that the common ground with the FDP was much broader. Ten days later, reality set in: especially on the issues of taxation, health, and atomic energy controversial stands prevailed that could not easily be bridged. Merkel, Westerwelle, and Seehofer had hoped that the experts in the working groups would compromise. Now the three leaders had to accept that those problems were too complex and controversial to be solved at the lower levels of expert deputies and politicians from the Länder. Complications with these issues became especially salient because they contained the major promises that the Free Democrats had made to their voter clientele and were now fighting for big-mouthed and tenaciously— with an all-time high of 15 percent in the election to back them. At the end of the second week of negotiations the three leaders were challenged to settle disputes, in particular those over the organization and financing of the health insurance systems and the lowering of taxes as the Free Democrats demanded. For this task they adopted a practice that confirmed their role as clearinghouse (and is known from the decision-making processes in the European Union): the so-called confessional box procedure (“Beichtstuhlverfahren”). At first the Great Commission discussed the drafts from all ten working groups. Where solutions or compromise could not be found, Merkel, Westerwelle, and

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Seehofer would conduct individual talks with the chairmen of the working groups and then decide the issue among them. Despite all efforts over the weekend, neither the key differences over the health system nor the right balance between lowering taxes and reorganizing the budget after the worldwide financial crisis could be settled among the adversaries. Agreement could only be found on a framework for a common energy policy. In the following days minister presidents of the Union heavily criticized the uncompromising attitude of the FDP and made it very clear that they would not tolerate tax reductions under the circumstances of empty tax coffers because the Länder were especially hit by the economic crisis. They called the Liberals’ plans “nonsense” and “irresponsible” (Süddeutsche Zeitung, October 19, 2009), thus forcing Chancellor Merkel and the leader of the parliamentary party, Volker Kauder, to appease them in lengthy talks. 8 The task, however, remained to reconcile the far reaching demands of the Liberals who needed to satisfy their voters and justify their election results, with the realistic financial situation and the traditional reputation of the Christian Democrats to be reliable and solid housekeepers. Before the coalition treaty could be concluded the negotiators fiddled with a number of budgetary measures which the public interpreted as outrageous tricks to hide the real financial situation of the state or—in a more cynical stance—as the futile attempt to square the circle of contradicting election promises. More and more the Union ran the risk of being painted with the same brush as the Liberals, who were accused of shamelessly conducting naked clientele politics. But the partners—in the absence of realistic alternatives—were condemned to victory. By the end of the third week of their negotiations they had hammered out a treaty under the title “Growth. Education. Unity” 9 that each side sold as a victory—the Liberals boasted that they had reached all their twenty key goals, whereas Merkel spoke of a “courageous beginning.” The two parliamentary parties gave their formal consent on Saturday, the parties followed on Sunday and Monday with no votes against the coalition and only few abstentions. But again, what looked like harmony disguised itself almost immediately. The ink on the treaty was not dry yet, when leading Christian Democrats distanced themselves from parts of the agreement, voiced doubts as to its feasibility, or pointed out that all clauses of the treaty stood under the explicit reservation that financial resources were available. And it is only too plausible to assume that these reactions would have been less hostile or at least less prompt if Westerwelle had been more modest in claiming the success of the negotiations for the FDP.

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Simulating Real Politics When inspecting the treaty it is indeed remarkable that “dilatory compromise”10 seems to prevail, in particular in those areas where distribution conflicts occur and where, consequently, the public is especially attentive and nervous, namely taxation, health, social welfare, education and, to a lesser extent, energy. These are also the issues that divide the partners of the new coalition much more severely than they had admitted initially—with the CDU (re-)gaining the center under Angela Merkel and the FDP having won the election with neo-liberal stands at a time when neo-liberalism had just failed pitifully worldwide. It can certainly be conceded that there are policy fields where the partners are in unison or where true compromise and real solutions could be found (Saalfeld 2010). But given the overburdened budgets at all levels—from the federation over the Länder to the local authorities— and the shrinking economy with decreasing state income from taxes it could have been foreseen from the start of the new coalition that it would soon backfire. The negotiators had failed too often to go beyond general statements of intent and had left too much incomplete because there had been no scope for deals and trade-offs. This would bring them constant conflict and incessant resistance from one side or the other. Not even one hundred days had lapsed to find out how true the devastating criticism in a leading newspaper was that the coalition treaty was nothing but the simulation of real politics (Süddeutsche Zeitung, October 26, 2009). Building the Cabinet Journalists but also political scientists and constitutional lawyers have created myths about cabinet-building in Germany that reality seems to be unable to destroy. The most prominent among them read that chancellors are independent in choosing their ministers and that it is a sign of strength when a (designated) chancellor does not publish his cabinet list before he or she is elected by the Bundestag. The facts of six decades tell a different story. Even Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic, was not at all a “lone wolf,” as he was depicted, when assembling his governments. It was in those years that the expression “right of presentation” was coined, meaning that the small coalition partners were virtually entirely free whom they put into the cabinet once the distribution of portfolios was agreed upon between the parties. Only the severest of doubts enabled the chancellor to reject

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a person nominated by his coalition partner(s) or rather: suggest that someone else should be nominated. And the restrictions that Adenauer encountered in his own parliamentary party made him say in 1953 that he would rather conduct three more election campaigns than one more coalition-building effort. Ever since, the selection of cabinet ministers is a delicate balance. A (designated) chancellor has to command the art of representation if he/she does not want to lose too much ground in his parliamentary party right at the start. Wings and interests must be integrated and incorporated into the cabinet discipline so that cohesive behavior in future law-making is not endangered. Thus, gender, denomination and regions, left and right, employers and employees are key categories that must be taken into account when selecting ministers (depending on the party, others may be added). If groups inside the parliamentary party cannot be satisfied during this process, that is if “their” candidate for a ministerial position is not considered, often the first retaliation is to withhold the votes in the chancellor’s election in the Bundestag. There are several examples of designated chancellors who therefore did not publish the cabinet list before their election; for fear of losing support they tried to keep their parliamentary party in suspense (Schüttemeyer 1998). Angela Merkel was apparently self-confident enough: she presented the list of ministers at her cabinet table together with the coalition treaty four days before the scheduled chancellor election. In that election, she received 323 votes. Assuming that no opposition member voted for her, nine coalition deputies denied support; that means that Merkel reached 96.6 percent of possible votes. This is much better than 2005 (88.6 percent) but does not reach the results that Brandt, Schmidt, and Kohl obtained.11 It was leaked that several CDU-deputies from the new Länder did not vote for Merkel because they regarded the representation of East German interests in the government as insufficient. Indeed, aside from the chancellor, only one minister is from East Germany (table 8.2). A look at the list of ministers reveals a balanced cabinet: of the sixteen members six are women (including Merkel). Among the ten ministers from the CDU/CSU five are Catholic and five are Protestant (plus Merkel). The inf luential party organizations from the larger Länder (and those where the minister president is a Christian Democrat) are well represented. There are ministers who are affiliated with the Christlich-Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft, the association of Christian Democratic employees as well as to the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, the umbrella organization of German industrial employers (Saalfeld 2010).

Table 8.2

Angela Merkel’s Second Cabinet (as of December 2009) Party

Angela Merkel Federal Chancellor Guido Westerwelle Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Vice Chancellor Thomas de Maizière Ministry of the Interior Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger Ministry of Justice Wolfgang Schäuble Ministry of Finance Rainer Brüderle Ministry of Economics and Technology Ursula von der Leyen Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs Ilse Aigner Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Protection Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg Ministry of Defence Kristina Schröder Ministry of Family, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth Philipp Rösler Ministry of Health Peter Ramsauer Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development Norbert Röttgen Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection Annette Schavan Ministry of Education and Research Dirk Niebel Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development Ronald Pofalla Chief of Chancellor’s Office and Minister for Special Affairs Source: Author’s composition.

Land

CDU Mecklenburg-West Pomerania FDP North RhineWestphalia

Age Denomination 55

luth.-protestant

47

no entry

CDU Saxony

55

luth.-protestant

FDP

58

no entry

CDU Baden-Württemberg

67

luth.-protestant

FDP

64

no entry

CDU Lower Saxony

51

luth.-protestant

CSU

Bavaria

46

catholic

CSU

Bavaria

37

catholic

CDU Hesse

32

luth.-protestant

FDP

Lower Saxony

36

no entry

CSU

Bavaria

55

catholic

CDU North RhineWestphalia

44

catholic

CDU Baden-Württemberg

54

catholic

FDP

46

no entry

50

luth.-protestant

Bavaria

Rhineland-Palatinate

Baden-Württemberg

CDU North RhineWestphalia

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The selection of ministers in 2009 also confirms the finding that the parliamentary parties in the Bundestag are the key factor in recruiting and socializing members of the executive. Only one minister is not also MdB. Ten have held seats for more than eleven years (one even 37 years). Remarkable also that ten out of sixteen hold Ph.D. titles. To what extent cabinet-building is a delicate act of representation, which is more complex than can be explained by the standard assumptions of coalition theory12 is also ref lected in the distribution of portfolios between the coalition partners. Although the CSU lost more voters’ support in the election than the CDU, Merkel gave the Bavarian sister party three instead of the two ministries in the previous government. She certainly foresaw the conf lict potential that lies between the political stands of the FDP and the CSU and had to ensure the loyalty of her Bavarian partner with all available instruments. In fact, the overrepresentation of the small parties in German coalition governments is tradition. Sometimes it reached over ten percentage points and is usually around five (Schindler 1999, 1143–1145; Feldkamp 2005, 297). Neither the CDU nor the SPD has ever reaped the fruit entirely in the sense that it obtained as many ministries as it would have been entitled to if the allocation of portfolios were proportional to votes gained in the election. This is also true for 2009. And it is the price that has to be paid for forging a coalition in the first place and keeping the partners happy for four years of future cooperation. Another tradition in German cabinet building is that the leader of the junior partner becomes vice chancellor and, since the first Grand Coalition in 1966, that the small coalition-party fills the foreign ministry. For a while there was speculation in 2009 whether Guido Westerwelle wanted the latter post. But the position of foreign minister is too prestigious and offers too many opportunities to appear in public that he could have put up with a less profitable position in the cabinet—despite his lack of foreign policy experience. Furthermore, certain longstanding priorities of parties come to bear on their choice of portfolios. Thus, since 1972 the minister of economics was always a Liberal when the FDP was in government. Also the ministry of justice is a stronghold of the Liberals. That they claimed the ministry of health can be regarded as the consequence of their election campaign when they fiercely criticized the incumbent coalition’s health policy and made a reform of the German insurance system a major issue. Filling the ministry of economic cooperation and development with a Free Democrat is rather a makeshift solution: for their fifth portfolio they had to take what was left although it was this ministry that they had wanted to abolish.13

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When benefits are at stake the CSU is quick to assert its character as an independent party and to downplay its role as little sister in the Union. Foreign policy is an especially well suited field to prove this independence. When they had to replace their hardly visible minister of economics in Merkel’s first cabinet, they chose the young Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, a security policy expert. At that time the minister of defense was the non-descript Franz Josef Jung, the protégé of the minister president of Hesse, a powerful figure in the CDU. What was more obvious than claiming the ministry of defense after the election in 2009, when Jung could be transferred to the ministry of labor. Whether this choice was wise for the CSU may be doubted as Guttenberg is now in charge of the German deployment in Afghanistan, a mission less and less supported by the German public. By making the former minister of the interior, Wolfgang Schäuble, minister of finance in her second cabinet, Merkel proved her clear understanding that the distribution of posts is first and foremost power policy: having thus been endowed with probably the most important ministry at the time, Schäuble who had kept his distance from her after she had followed him as president of the party in 2000 was obliged to allegiance. Moreover, he, the old Christian Democratic warhorse, disposes of experience, competence, steadfastness and reputation to tackle the consequences of the worldwide financial crisis and to fence off the neo-liberal fiscal policies of the Free Democrats. Another clever move was to promote two of her confidants to cabinet positions: The first, Norbert Röttgen, Chief Whip of the CDU/CSU in the Bundestag, became Minister of the Environment, a position where he can gain reputation, as climate change and the use of atomic energy are high on the agenda. The second, Ronald Pofalla, former general secretary of the CDU, now heads the chancellor’s office in the rank of a minister, following the only East German, Thomas de Maizière, in that post, who succeeded Schäuble as minister of the interior. Despite Angela Merkel’s power-minded talent in choosing ministers she had to cope with the fastest resignation ever in the Federal Republic’s history: only four weeks after the appointment of the cabinet by the Federal President, Franz Josef Jung took the responsibility for a questionable bombardment in Afghanistan a few weeks before the elections and stepped down. He was replaced with the successful and ambitious Minister of Families, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, Ursula von der Leyen. In order not to disturb the fine regional balance of her cabinet, Merkel had to look for a candidate from Hesse, the home state of Jung. With Kristina Schröder, MdB since 2002, only 32-years-old and

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supported by the Minister President of Hesse, another woman entered the cabinet. *

*

*

In sum, Angela Merkel has made clever moves when assembling her cabinet. This can only be said with reference to her own party, because the long-established patterns of coalition building in Germany allow the (designated) Chancellor only weak informal inf luence—if any—on the choices his partners make for their representatives in the government. Clearly less convincing was her performance in negotiating the coalition treaty. Lack of leadership was a frequent assessment during the process and when the document was published. This criticism was proven right in the first months of the new coalition. Merkel passed a crucial test for chancellors: being elected a second time. But she was not strong enough to tame the Liberals, self-assured beyond measure by their best election result ever. After eleven years in opposition the FDP has difficulties to reconcile the two roles of a party in government: being the advocate of its voters on one hand, finding more widely accepted policy solutions and taking over responsibility for society as a whole on the other hand. It seems, however, that Westerwelle and his party are overreaching their hand. Their ratings in opinion polls have declined drastically, forebodings for the defeat in the North RhineWestphalia state election in May 2010. The public’s reactions to their continuing clientele politics become more and more hostile. Inside the coalition open resistance, especially from the CSU, is growing. The CDU and Merkel herself carefully seek distance to their partner. She cannot wait much longer to present consistent, measured, and convincing answers to severe pending problems. Being chancellor in a Grand Coalition first and foremost meant to mediate. She did it and downsized the SPD. Now, heading a small coalition, Merkel has to adopt a more forceful leadership style. Given her political talents, the political agenda, and circumstances, it is not farfetched to envisage that she will outmanoeuvre also the FDP and become the first chancellor who will have lead three different coalitions—after 2013 with the Greens. Notes I would like to thank Pat (Samuel C.) Patterson for sharing his knowledge as scholar and his experience as chief editor of the American Political Science Review with me.

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1. Unless specified, the CDU and the CSU are treated here as one party and are referred to as the “Union.” 2. It was almost exclusively the CDU/CSU that profited from the satisfaction with the Grand Coalition during the election period (Hilmer 2010). 3. Not only the most prominent campaign term used on street billboards was die Mitte, but recently the CDU’s website (http://www.cdu.de) features what looks almost like a new name: Die Mitte—CDU. 4. Given that an absolute majority in a federal election has only been achieved once, in 1957, and that Germany has had coalition governments ever since, it is only obvious that voters expect from the small parties a clear statement which chancellor candidate from one of the two big parties they would vote for in the Bundestag. This was especially important between 1961 and 1983 when the only small party were the Liberals. Depending on their coalition choice they would determine who became Chancellor—a strategic position that the voters were only willing to grant to a party that usually gained less than ten percent in the election under the condition to learn in advance what parliamentary majority would be created in the Bundestag. 5. In 1982 the document launching Helmut Kohl’s first cabinet contained 3,900 words, while his last one in 1994 had grown to 13,900 words. Almost four times as much (52,800) became the foundation of Angela Merkel’s first cabinet (Stüwe 2006, 549). 6. Uwe Thaysen (2006a, 2006b) showed its validity for the process of coalition building after the federal election 2005. 7. Here the sources vary: some do not mention him as a formal member of the steering group, but it seems that he played a major role in coordinating the leaders’ group together with the FDP’s Secretary General. 8. Eight weeks later Merkel would have to pay: in order to get the required assent from the Länder in the Bundesrat for the Fostering Economic Growth Act (Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz), which contained considerable tax reductions, she had to compensate the Minister Presidents with heavy financial aids from the federal budget for education. 9. It contains six chapters under the headings: Prosperity for All; Germany, the Republic of Education; Social Progress; Freedom and Security; Securing Peace; Operating Procedures within the Coalition. 10. This is one of the seven types of dissent management in pluralist democracies that have been identified by Günther (2006). 11. Some of these results, however, were obtained under conditions of scarce majorities in the Bundestag, for instance only four seats in the cases of Schmidt 1976 and Kohl 1994 (cf. Thaysen 2006b). 12. Saalfeld discusses the inadequacy of traditional coalition theory in this respect at greater length and with further references (cf. Saalfeld 2010, 193–195). 13. Insofar it may be doubted that also the distribution of ministries in the field of foreign policy is—as Saalfeld suggests (2010, 195)—a rational decision in order to find a solution for an agency problem.

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CHAPTER 9

A Fresh Start or More of the Same? The Domestic Policy Agenda of the Center-Right Coalition Roland Sturm

The Legacies of the Grand Coalition When new coalition governments define their policy preferences they have to take into account a number of factors: their election manifestos, the compromises made in the negotiations on a coalition treaty, and the legacy of the former government’s policy decisions. Election manifestos have gained importance, because German parties seem to have discovered—what has become the received wisdom of political campaigning elsewhere1—that trust and strategic honesty can help parties win elections. To be precise, what matters is how (a few) electoral pledges are communicated and whether they can mobilize important sections of the electorate. In the 2009 electoral campaign the Liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP) as party in opposition successfully portrayed themselves as the only political party in Germany that favors lower taxes for hard-working citizens and supports ordinary taxpayers who foot the bill of the welfare state. 2 There was a widely underestimated mood in parts of the German electorate that the role of the state in the economy, as well as the inroads the state had made into the sphere of civil liberties, had become problematic. And the voters trusted the Liberals to deliver political reforms. The Christian Democrats (CDU) were much more cautious in both respects and tended to defend the record of the Grand Coalition, whereas its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), in one of its populist tactical moves tried to take up the tax reform topic. The different approaches regarding

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the scale and shape of change advocated by the CDU, the CSU and the FDP that formed the 2009 government found expression in compromises written into their coalition treaty, which will be discussed in greater detail below. These and some other differences between the policy preferences of the new coalition partners were heavily influenced by at least five legacies of the Grand Coalition (Sturm 2010a; chapter 1). One legacy was the way the Grand Coalition had secured for itself financial room for maneuver when it came into office in 2005. Though the Social Democrats (SPD) had promised not to raise the Value Added Tax (VAT) and had attacked the plans of the Christian Democrats for a 2 percent higher VAT rate, they broke their electoral promise. VAT was raised by 3 percent. The political price the Social Democrats paid for their about-face was such that the 2009 coalition government was not willing to follow their example. It felt obliged to honor the pledge made in the election campaign not to raise taxes. This meant, however, that costly electoral promises needed to be funded by some other mechanism. Cuts in public expenditures could have been such a mechanism, but the coalition partners had shied away from announcing reductions in public expenditures—on the contrary, new expenditure programs for education and child support were promised during the election campaign. A second legacy were the financial consequences of ambitious new programs the Grand Coalition had started, among them support for families and private households when they employ helping hands. In addition there are new programs to fund research and development, economic recovery, and the improvement of public transport infrastructure. The Grand Coalition started these programs with a 25 billion Euros budget (Sturm 2006). Only in periods of economic expansion the new government of CDU, CSU, and FDP could have hoped not to feel the immediate impact of these programs on budgetary choices. But the third legacy of the Grand Coalition dashed such expectations. The worldwide financial and economic crisis of 2008 overshadowed the second half of the Grand Coalition’s period in office. To fight its consequences the government had started new expenditure programs to stimulate the economy. Their aim was to keep up employment and to create new economic demand. These programs were financed by public borrowing and therefore contributed to the growth of public debt. Extra spending and the economic downturn limited, however, the amount of money available for social policies and caused additional deficits. When the center-right coalition came into office its budgetary options were therefore extremely limited and those available were unpopular. Neither

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had the voters expected that the new government were to engage in deep cuts in social expenditures, nor did they prefer uncontrollable deficits. Balanced budgets were still on the political agenda not only because of the Maastricht criteria of the European Union, but also because of the fourth legacy of the Grand Coalition, the 2009 federalism reform (chapter 2). This reform introduced a constitutional requirement for the federal government and the states (Länder) to balance their budgets by 2016 (federal government) and 2020 (Länder). The center-right coalition had to adjust its budgetary timetable to the envisaged beginning of budgetary retrenchment in 2011, as laid down in the constitution. In addition to budgetary restraints a fifth legacy of the Grand Coalition hampered the new coalition. After the initiative of the RedGreen coalition in 2002 and 2003 to modernize labor market policies (Schmid 2007, 282–283) no visionary and broad attempt to reform social and health policies was tried again. This created unresolved, but also pressing problems with regard to the deficits of the social insurance systems and the health service. The Grand Coalition had more or less postponed necessary decisions. It had agreed on a structural reform of the health service, which was above all a political compromise and much less a well-designed fresh start in health policies. A new health fund was created, which after one year was already underfinanced and had developed new moral hazard problems for the broad range of interests involved (chapter 1). The 2009 coalition partners were confronted with a welfare state that in times of increasing public debt needed more financial support. On the agenda were also reductions in social transfers and far-reaching reforms to adjust the financial incentives of the relevant actors in order to reduce efficiency problems. At the same time there was no doubt that reforms had the potential to alienate large sectors of the electorate. A last restriction for the decision-making process on the agenda of the new government needs to be mentioned: the Land election in North Rhine-Westphalia on May 9, 2010. North Rhine-Westphalia is the most populous German Land (18 million inhabitants). It was governed by a CDU-FDP coalition. When in July 2010 the Land coalition changed, the federal government lost its majority in the second chamber (Bundesrat). This creates considerable problems for the legislative agenda of the new coalition, as the winners of the 2009 federal election had foreseen. One iron rule of the negotiations on the coalition treaty had therefore been not to estrange North Rhine-Westphalian voters and to postpone all unavoidable political “cruelties” to a point in time after the May 2010 election. Instruments to achieve this aim, which are

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explicitly mentioned in the coalition treaty, are commissions to prepare further deliberations and numerous “declarations of intentions” to test certain policy options. Major Policy Decisions of the CDU/CSU-FDP Coalition The agenda of the center-right coalition does not rely on a new narrative of politics in Germany. Its guiding thought is less a vision than a list of priorities that the coalition treaty summarizes in its three-word headline: growth, education, and solidarity. Economic growth is seen as the necessary pre-condition for sound public finances. It is to be secured by the return of politics to the social market principles of Germany’s father of the “economic miracle” of the 1950s and 1960s, the then Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard. Education is seen as the strategic resource Germany must develop further to secure the competitiveness of the country on world markets. And solidarity is meant to guarantee a socially inclusive society in the future, too. Of course all these aims are fairly vague and could be supported by almost everybody in Germany. For observers the interesting question was whether the new coalition treaty would herald a new age of neo-liberalism in Germany. The answer is no, because the Christian Democrats are not willing to lose the political support of those voters in the middle of the political spectrum that they have won over from the Social Democrats. Even the Liberals have accepted most aspects of the quite elaborate German welfare state. They differ from the CDU and the CSU more in matters of degree than in principle. The new government will therefore muddle through when making policies and, especially with regard to budgetary decisions, will move along “by ear,” the metaphor the government favors.3 A closer look at the coalition treaty confirms the importance traditional economic (tax reform, budgetary matters) and social policymaking, including health and education policies, have for German politics. But also some additional issues have established themselves now firmly on the political agenda (migration, the consequences of German unification, the regulation of financial markets, nuclear energy, agriculture, and internal security). Tax Reform Tax reform was supposed to be a major element of the fresh start of the center-right coalition. One has to distinguish between four types of tax

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reform here: symbolic reforms; reforms that undo decisions of former governments; reforms to satisfy special interests, and reforms that try to create a new system of taxation. Of symbolic value is the “right-away program” of tax cuts to speed up the economy’s recovery from recession, which started on January 1. Although it has some useful longterm elements, such as tax breaks for businesses and especially higher deductions for the cost of servicing debt, the “right-away program” is meant above all to prove that the new coalition keeps its promises and reduces taxes. Tax relief for families with children, also a feature of the “right-away program,” is always popular, because it is another one of the now numerous efforts of German governments that encourage couples to have children. On January 1, 2010 taxes were reduced by 21 billion Euros, to which the “right-away program” contributes 7 billion. The (much bigger) rest are reductions already legislated during the last phase of the Grand Coalition. Among the past reforms undone is the reform of the inheritance tax. Two important elements of this reform are lower taxes and greater incentives for the next generation to accept responsibility for existing companies. Special interests are served, for example, by a reduced VAT rate for hotels and restaurants (from 19 percent to 7 percent), or by the possibility to deduct the cost of advice on the annual declaration of taxes from one’s taxable income. A big question mark is still behind efforts to create a new system of taxation planned for January 1, 2011. This project is the brainchild of the FDP, and a kind of f lagship for the Liberals, who see themselves as champions of a fairer tax system. They want to replace today’s rate structure, which has many small steps that hit middle incomes particularly hard, with a simpler system of fewer, but bigger increments that would reduce the overall tax burden. The reduction of tax income would, however, not only affect the federal budget, but also the budgets of the Länder. This has provoked resistance to tax reform already during negotiations on the coalition treaty and also among Christian Democrat Länder premiers (Braun and Blechschmidt 2009, 5). The conf lict is not only about financial resources, it is also an ideological one. The Liberals, the CSU and some politicians in the CDU, believe in Arthur Laffer’s idea of self-financing tax cuts (self-financing because the economic growth they stimulate increases tax income; Plickert 2009, 12). Politicians in the Länder and also in the federal government are more skeptical and demand higher taxes elsewhere to offset the budgetary impact of tax cuts, or at least a postponement of these cuts until large scale economic growth has returned.

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Budgetary Policies The most complicated task of the new government is to balance its annual budget. An even greater challenge is the reduction of public debt. The Grand Coalition was on course to a balanced budget, but its efforts were derailed by the government’s decision to give financial support to the endangered banking sector and big companies in trouble to help them overcome the consequences of the worldwide financial and economic crisis. How big the bill will be the German government has to foot as a result is unclear, because the extent to which the government’s loan guarantees will be needed by the banks is still unknown. In order to make a distinction between the regular budget and the amount of money needed to avoid the bankruptcy of companies that are regarded as too big to fail, a special fund as part of the federal budget was established. This accounting device does, however, not change the basic fact that German public debt has grown considerably and has made it much more difficult to balance the federal budget. The center-right coalition tried to secure for itself some flexibility in budgetary matters by inventing a new fund (Sozialversicherungsstabilisierungsfonds), which was supposed to finance (by public borrowing) the cost of the Grand Coalition’s new social policies. This would have freed the Liberals from the social policy legacy of the Grand Coalition and would have created space for new expenditures in the regular budget. The idea was put aside during the negotiations on the coalition treaty, because had the fund been established immediately, that is in 2009, although the money was not needed until 2010, this would have collided with the constitutional principle of annual budgets. In the meantime this idea has been shelved. Regulating the Financial Markets The center-right coalition sees itself firmly in the German tradition of the social market economy, which also implies in the tradition of ordoliberalism. The ideas of individual responsibility and subsidiarity are of crucial importance in this context. The new government has come to the conclusion that the current international banking crisis can only be fought successfully, if the big banks are forced to strengthen their capital base, if national contexts play a bigger role for regulatory frameworks, and if more and more efficient regulation is in place. This implies new rules for financial products and financial markets, minimum standards for lending, accountability (including financial liability) of rating companies, and a stronger supervision of the banks by an independent

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regulator. In Germany the role of the central bank (Bundesbank) will be strengthened in this context. Social Policies The Liberals went into the coalition talks with the conviction that the administration of labor market policies was inefficient, that labor market policies provided the wrong incentives, that the labor market was too inf lexible (especially with regard to the dismissal of employees), that minimum wages should be abolished, and that the German system of co-determination was in need of reform. The outcome of their negotiations with the Christian Democrats did not oblige the new government, however, to work for radical change. The center-right coalition avoided legislation to introduce a general minimum wage—a pet project of the Social Democrats. The existing minimum-wage arrangements between the partners of industry will be evaluated by October 2011. Wage dumping that results in inhuman wage levels will be forbidden by law (this only transforms the predominant opinion of the German labor courts into law). The German Labor Office will have to go through an efficiency test, but it will not be abolished as the Liberals had wanted. Co-determination will also survive unchanged. The center-right government is in favor of co-ownership of employees via share-holding, it supports a codex for shop stewards as well as for managers and wants to strengthen the supervisory board visà-vis the board members who are responsible for running a company. In an early move to counterattack the accusation that the new government will be hopelessly “neo-liberal” and not caring (Höll 2009, 4), the coalition partners decided in the course of their negotiations on a coalition treaty to increase the amount of money that a person supported by social aid in case of unemployment is allowed to set aside for her or his old age (Schonvermögen) without losing social security payments. The center-right government also raised the limit for additional income recipients of social aid are permitted to earn. To appease the conservative voters the Christian Democrats argued for a new social balance of child support payments, especially with regard to the traditional role of parents. Parents who do not use public facilities for childcare will receive 150 Euros per month from 2013. For the patchwork families the promise was made to handle the financial support for parenthood with greater f lexibility and even to allow part-time support for those working part-time. For pensioners there should also be more f lexibility with regard to the age of retirement. But a new retirement age

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was not laid down in the coalition treaty. This is not surprising, because the decision of the Grand Coalition to raise the retirement age step-bystep to 67 is still a very controversial political issue. The fear that this would result in political dispute may also explain why the social policy agenda of the center-right coalition does not address the soaring costs of the German social security system, although savings on welfare seem to be unavoidable. Health Care System Germany has a very expensive health service, which is also a political minefield. The health sector has grown into a health-industrial complex with powerful lobby groups, supported by the illusion of patients/voters that health care of highest standard has to be freely available everywhere. The costs of health services have become uncontrollable, but so far no consensus on the need for rationing has developed. Instead of rationing the Grand Coalition had opted for a model of health service provision (the health fund) that did not contain costs, but broadened the financial base of the health sector by forcing the taxpayers and private insurance companies to contribute to the fund. Both the Liberals and the Christian Democrats (with the exception of the CSU) had earlier supported a model for funding health services that was based on greater individual responsibility for individual health insurance. The chancellor herself departed from this vision and was one of the initiators of the health fund. The center-right coalition could therefore not simply revert to earlier ideas of the FDP and the CDU. Instead they revived only a few ideas from their former toolboxes. The center-right government wants to freeze employers’ contributions to the state-run insurance system. This reduces labor costs and may help fight unemployment. Additional financial contributions will therefore have to come from both the employed and the taxpayers. The idea also is to set workers’ contributions at a fixed premium rather than a fixed share of wages as they are now. That low income earners will then find it more difficult to pay for additional insurance should be compensated for example by tax relief or public financial support for individual insurance contributions. With the reliance on different sources of income (taxes and contributions) for the health service, the center-right coalition seems to be willing to follow the Dutch model (Niejahr 2009, 4). Another plan the Liberals favor is a competitive market in health care akin to other forms of insurance and with possibilities of regional differences in contributions.

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In any case, with regard to health policies hard choices are ahead. The fact that the health fund is financially unsustainable is well known. The solution found to this problem will demonstrate whether the centerright coalition puts more emphasis on a greater role of the state (with all budgetary consequences this will have) or on private initiative and individual responsibility. Almost nowhere else in German politics are voters so much aware of policies they dislike (often because their doctors tell them). This makes hard choices even more difficult. Another aspect of the health policy is care for the elderly and chronically ill patients. The separate insurance system for this group, in place since 1995, was invented by the last center-right coalition when Helmut Kohl (CDU) was chancellor. It is now on the verge of bankruptcy. The coalition treaty proposes to supplement the income of this insurance system, which so far comes only from the contributions of the employed, by a system based on earnings from invested capital. It is planned that contributions to the financial resources for these investments should be made obligatory for all adults living in Germany. This policy sounds more like a compromise between the FDP and the Christian Democrats than a clear preference for either individual responsibility or state guidance. Education The idea to transform Germany into an “education republic” (Bildungsrepublik) was first debated on the level of the Länder when German federalism was reformed in 2006. This is not surprising, because the Länder have the responsibility for education policies in Germany, and the 2006 federalism reform even added new competences in this field to their older ones. Still, the federal government sees education as a strategic resource in the interest of Germany as a whole, and tries to influence Länder policies (Münch 2009). This can best be done by offering the Länder what they urgently need: money. The center-right government aims at an “education partnership” of the federal government, the Länder and local governments. The budget of the education and research minister, Annette Schavan, is the only ministerial budget that will grow in the near future. The government has promised to increase it until 2013 by 12 billion Euros. A number of activities (education vouchers, partnerships for education at the local level) are planned to leave no child behind. Each newborn baby will be given a bank account filled with 150 Euros as an incentive for parents to save money for the future education of their children. For the sums parents add to the account of their child the federal government will

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pay an additional premium until the child is eighteen. The government also plans a national grants program for the universities and more financial support for the best students. It believes that a higher percentage of school-leavers should go to universities. For those who do not, Germany’s vocational training should be more informed by modern technologies. Universities are promised more budgetary freedom. The center-right coalition sees a problem with the pessimism with which Germans often meet technological change and scientific progress, especially in the fields of biotechnology. One remedy, it is suggested, might be more information, a “dialogue” with the citizens and a “House where one can experience the future” (Haus der Zukunft) in Berlin. Migration Policies All German parties now agree that Germany is a multicultural society in which migrants play an important role. In the coalition treaty this is ref lected in new ideas for the institutionalization of migrants as a pressure group (Bundesbeirat für Integration) and the promise of continuity for the political role of established institutions that speak for minorities (for example, the Deutsche Islam Konferenz). To cope with the social and economic problems of integration into German society, “integration partnerships” in model regions are planned. At the center of all efforts to integrate migrants are measures that provide support for learning German. This should be seen as a duty and could therefore be made part of a contract with migrants that also comprises information and counseling to help them in the job market. The center-right government supports efforts to convince migrants to become German nationals when they make their choice (the age limit for this choice is 23). Well-educated specialists are encouraged to come to Germany. Migration will be systematically regulated by clearly defined criteria. The threshold for the acceptance of exam results at non-German educational institutions as equivalent to German exams shall be lowered. Migration policies do not imply a break with the policy orientation of the Grand Coalition. They give priority to integration and favor a dialogue between the representatives of the migrants and German institutions on all levels. Nuclear Energy The issue of nuclear energy is an especially tricky one in German politics. A two-thirds majority of Germans is skeptical whether this is a safe

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technology. The center-right parties that form the new coalition have been extremely cautious in their support for nuclear energy. They justify this support as a contribution to the fight against global warming, because nuclear energy does not contribute to carbon dioxide pollution. And they argue that nuclear energy is a transitional form of energy that we only need to bridge until renewable energy can make up the lion’s share of energy production (Brückentechnologie). The center-right government intends to uphold the ban on new nuclear power plants. It will, however, extend the time periods existing nuclear power stations will be allowed production. It is not clear yet what will be done with the quite considerable extra profits made by the electricity companies in this case. One possibility is to make the electricity companies pay a kind of windfall profits tax. The tax receipts will then be used to subsidize the development of technological solutions for the production of renewable energy. In 2020 the new government expects, for example, to see one million electric cars on German streets. Agriculture Agricultural policy is the domain of the European Union, but at the same time the farmers are still an important group of voters for the Christian Democrats and especially the CSU. In some parts of Germany the end of the milk quota and the low price for milk were prominent issues in the 2009 election campaign. As part of the agenda of the new government the CSU secured for the farmers for the next two years an extensive aid program on top of the subsidies the EU pays. Eight hundred million Euros will be spent for the milk producing farmers, and for the insurance of farmers against accidents in order to avoid that their insurance contributions increase. In addition the tax on diesel the farmers use will be reduced. Homeland Security The protection of civil liberties, even when the state is confronted with organized crime or a terrorist threat, has been an issue that in the past sharply divided the Liberals and the Christian Democrats. The present Justice Minister Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (FDP) left Helmut Kohl’s center-right cabinet in 1998 in protest against new competences for the police to listen secretly to private conversations. After 9/11 the German parliament passed a number of new security laws. The Liberals opposed most of them, whereas Christian Democrats were sometimes

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advocating even stronger measures (Lange 2006). The Liberals also opposed the centralization of security services, the tendency to blur the dividing line between secret services and the police and the idea that Germany’s armed forces should take over police work in times of crisis or should be allowed to shoot down airplanes hijacked by terrorists. The general fear of the Liberals and of many of their voters was that the role of the German state in matters of internal security may have changed. Instead of protecting citizens against real threats, the state was seen to develop capacities which would force ordinary citizens to prove their good intentions, because the state was too much involved in preventing crimes and therefore no longer able to make a clear distinction between real and potential dangers. The Liberals were expected to demand wideranging changes in the existing security laws during the coalition talks with the Christian Democrats (Prantl 2009, 9). The compromises found raise new questions concerning the direction of internal security policies, which remains rather vague. The coalition treaty mentions that the effects of some of the security laws will be tested, which might lead to new legislation. Some legal hurdles for police activities will now be higher and internet pages with child pornography are to be deleted instead of a denial of access to internet pages. The coalition treaty is fairly short on matters of internal security if the yardstick is the importance the Liberals gave this issue in their election campaign. Much remains open and will be the topic of future negotiations with the Christian Democrats, who still have a different perspective and prefer a stronger role of the state in internal security matters. German Unification Twenty years after German unification in 1990, its consequences are still an important issue in domestic politics. One government after the other has promised to overcome economic disparities and to guarantee comparable standards of living in West and East Germany. The center-right coalition is no exception to this “tradition.” It promises the end of differences in living conditions by 2019. This is the year when new rules for the fiscal equalization mechanisms of German federalism need to be found. If the government is successful, this would mean the end of preferential treatment for the East German Länder with regard to the distribution of public funds. The new government’s recipes for East German economic success are, however, neither new nor promising. The plan is to increase subsidies and to bring together an expert

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commission, which produces ideas. These ideas will then be tested in East German model regions. In addition, more federal offices shall be situated in East Germany. To commemorate the victims of the 1953 rising in East Germany against the Stalinist dictatorship a national freedom and unity monument is planned in Berlin, and to commemorate the peaceful revolution in East Germany in 1989 a freedom and unity monument is planned in Leipzig. It is also envisaged to increase the old-age pensions of the victims of the communist dictatorship in East Germany. As for its predecessors, East Germany remains a political challenge for the center-right coalition. This has nothing to do with the fact that in the sixteen person strong cabinet only two politicians, both members of the CDU, come from East Germany: Chancellor Angela Merkel and Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière. It is more the consequence of a lack of policy alternatives for East Germany’s industrial development that is closely connected to the long-term structural nature of the economic problems in some parts of the former GDR. Conclusion The center-right coalition is convinced that its election victory has the potential for a fresh start in German politics. Seen from outside its coalition treaty is, however, more the document of work in progress than a fixed and elaborate timetable for substantial reform, although it mentions some concrete dates. It is a compromise between three parties of the center-right of which two entered into negotiations with past government experience and one (the Liberals) as opposition party with a much more radical agenda. It may be true that “what is immediately on offer is more sparkle than substance” (The Economist, October 31, 2009), but seen in perspective there is, despite the vagueness of the coalition treaty, potential for greater and more profound political change. Much depends, however, on the chancellor and her willingness to get off the fence. Instead of being a moderating quasi-president as she used to be in the Grand Coalition (Sturm 2010b), she needs to engage in bold decisions if the Merkel II government is to be more than an uninspiring episode. Crucial are also the strategic moves of the Christian Democrats. If they hope to further marginalize the Social Democrats by stealing their clothes and act accordingly, we will witness a new welfare state coalition in power with only a few concessions to the supporters of free markets in the coalition parties, as well as favors for special interests. But maybe the coalition has some surprises in store. After

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all there are now new young faces of high intellectual caliber in the ministries of defense (Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, CSU), environment (Norbert Röttgen, CDU), and health (Philipp Rösler, FDP). There is at least some hope that they and the cabinet heavyweights will use the opportunity for a fresh start in order to redefine German domestic politics in the aftermath of the worldwide financial and economic crisis. The Liberals are certainly willing to support a bold reform agenda. The Christian Democrats have to choose whether they want to return to their more market-oriented pre-Grand Coalition program and join the reform-minded Liberals, or oppose and control them to guarantee more of the same (Geis 2009, 3). Notes 1. For example in Britain since Tony Blair’s landslide victory in 1997 (Seyd 1998, 60). 2. In 2005 a similar strategy of the Christian Democrats had backfired, because the Social Democrats successfully depicted them as enemies of the welfare state (Best 2009). 3. In German: auf Sicht fahren.

CHAPTER 10

The “Grand Coalition State” between Past and Present Continuities and Discontinuities of a Changing Political System Gabriele D’Ottavio

Introduction In the second half of the twentieth century, the analysis of the German political system has been greatly inf luenced by past failures and tragedies (the Weimar Republic and Nazism), on one hand. On the other, by the virtues shown by the Federal Republic of Germany over the last sixty years: the extraordinarily widespread support for democracy shown by the political class and the citizens alike; the achievement of an accomplished democracy of political alternation in power; the high degree of political stability; and excellent economic and foreign policy outcomes, the first and foremost of which is the German reunification.1 In this regard, the 1990 decision to proceed with the idea of adopting West Germany’s legal and political structure in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), rather than going through the arduous process of drafting and approving a new constitution, can be seen as a “success story” (Dalton 1993; Sontheimer 1999). German political system has been appreciated most by Western European countries at first, and later by their Eastern European counterparts, who had to face processes of democratic transition. Moreover, within the European Union, Germany, more than any other country, has probably most influenced the integration process by exporting some relevant features of its political system, like the model of a politically

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independent central bank with an anti-inf lationary approach (Dyson and Featherstone 1999, 306–447). For all these reasons, the Federal Republic of Germany has been regarded as a “successful democracy” (Wolfrum 2006). As time goes by, a gradual change in perspective is emerging—and through a close examination of recent election results, this becomes easily recognizable. This change of perspective points toward the mismatch between the consolidated confidence in the long-term stability of the German political system, and the increasing perception that Germany is experiencing an intense time of change, which might impair some of its traditional political and institutional features (Kimmel 2008). This chapter discusses events concerning Angela Merkel’s first government and possible further developments through the prism provided by some categories of analysis that are associated with, and help single out, some distinctive elements of the German political system in a broader historical perspective. In particular the evolution of today’s “fluid five-party system” (Niedermayer 2008) from the first Grand Coalition (1966–1969) to the second one (2005–2009); the possible new meaning of the so-called lessons from Weimar, as far as the effects attributed to “rationalized parliamentarism” (Beyme 1989) are concerned; the functioning of a system, also known as “chancellor democracy” (Niclauß 2004), within which the head of government plays a predominant role, no matter in what kind of coalition he/she is operating; and finally the success and contradictions of Germany as a “civilian power” (Maull 1992) in the international arena. This chapter does not aim to offer an exhaustive overview of the German political system over the last sixty years. Rather, the purpose is to provide a synthetic and analytical framework in which to critically connect the present to the past, and gain a better understanding of the direction Germany’s political system is heading. Between Bipolarism and Consensus-based Political Culture: The Crisis of the Volksparteien The first Grand Coalition (1966–1969) marked a turning point for Germany’s political system and, notably, for the party system. 2 The coalition agreement between CDU/CSU and SPD was the expression and the catalyst for two long-term phenomena that were closely interrelated: the consolidation of a consensus-based political culture and the structuring of a bipolar party system, with two “catch-all parties” at around 40 percent and a third smaller party (FDP) willing to join in a

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coalition as circumstances required. The first Grand Coalition turned out to facilitate an essentially bipolar trend—rather than warping it—in a process toward an accomplished democracy based on political alternation and the so-called two-and-a-half-party system (Blondel 1968). In particular, it enabled the Social Democrats to earn the status of a legitimate government alternative, while at the same time facilitating the shift of the Liberals to the political center. By virtue of its being the pivotal party, in the next thirty years (1969–1998) the FDP held the balance of power in the process of forming a government. In Germany the bipolar system has also shown uncommon f lexibility throughout the years, when two other political actors—the Greens and the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS, now the Left Party)—came to the fore beside the three traditional parties. At that time, political circumstances suggested including rather than excluding these new political actors, representing wider-scoped cultural trends and social phenomena, such as post-materialism and post-communism. Thus, in the course of the 1990s, the structure of the “bipolar quadrille” was developed, with Social Democrats and Greens on one side and Christian Democrats and Liberals on the other. In fact, the consensus-based political culture survived the polarization of political discourse following the first Grand Coalition, and became more consolidated (Laver and Schofield 1990), also because it was fostered by a fragmented policy-making system that involved—and still does—a wide variety of co-governing forces and veto players, such as coalition parties in federal government, the state governments, the autonomous central bank, a powerful Constitutional Court, and self-administration bodies in local governments (Schmidt 2003). Forty years after the first Grand Coalition, the second of such coalitions seems to mark another turning point in Germany’s history. This political system, however, could be heading in a different, if not opposite, direction, than the one taken in the late 1960s. This assumption takes into consideration some important differences emerging from the comparison of the two experiences of federal Grand Coalitions. The first difference lies in the circumstances in which the two CDU/CSUSPD governments were formed, circumstances that appear to be qualitatively different. In December 1966 the Grand Coalition resulted from a political choice: CDU/CSU and SPD decided to face together the first economic recession after World War II, through the development of an ambitious plan of reforms.3 Instead, in November 2005, it had to be done. The two major parties were forced to stand together in a Grand Coalition after an election that

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produced a majority that could neither confirm the incumbent government nor form a coalition with the opposition parties. The SPD’s decision to relinquish their aspirations for the chancellorship was also strongly influenced by two new institutional constraints. First was the possibility that Federal President Horst Köhler (CDU), in the presence of a candidate who could not receive the absolute majority of votes in the parliament (Bundestag), might decide—in compliance with the provisions of the Basic Law—to dissolve the Bundestag, rather than appoint a candidate elected only by a relative majority as chancellor. Second—and more important—was the understanding that the Christian Democrats and Liberals could easily interfere with the law-making activity of the federal government through a strategic use of veto power (Proksch and Slapin 2006), in view of their clear majority in the Bundesrat. The latter element is useful in highlighting the second important difference between the two Grand Coalitions. In the 1970s and 1980s the main political parties continued to show a “peculiar propensity for consensus” (Klingemann 1987, 321), by approving a great part of the federal legislation (although not the most relevant one) by unanimous vote, even at a time in which the two chambers had opposing majorities. Instead, the birth of the second Grand Coalition came after a period of divided government with an opposition that had no qualms about interfering with, and in many instances stopping, the activity of the federal government through its power of veto in the Bundesrat (Mayer 2003). Certainly this development was an institutional problem, referring as it did to the weight of the Bundesrat, notably the overextending of co-decision rights assigned to it.4 But it was also a political one. As a matter of fact, the tendency of opposition parties to blockade for political reasons is quite a recent praxis, which has been steadily increasing in the very last few years, since the beginning of the 1990s (Leonardy 2004, 187–202). Nonetheless, it would be misleading to speak of the end of the traditional consensus-based political culture in Germany, because—besides the limitations imposed by the election results—it would have otherwise been impossible to come to a new edition of the Grand Coalition. Nonetheless, the more frequent opting for political blockades is certainly, at least in part, the result of the increased polarization of political life, which has become more evident after reunification (Stöss 2000). It is questionable whether the Grand Coalition—with the reform of German federalism in 2006 that entails a relevant reduction of matters subject to the Bundesrat’s approval (chapter 2)—really succeeded in removing one of the main constraints that contributed to making the government alliance of the two large parties necessary in 2005.5

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In any case, German citizens themselves made sure that the Grand Coalition would not turn into a permanent necessity, when they de facto rejected the consensus formula by assigning the Christian Democrats and Liberals the task of leading the country in the next legislature during the 2009 election (chapter 7). On close scrutiny, however, the third and perhaps most important element that makes the second Grand Coalition qualitatively different from the first, that is the concern about a “permanent” Grand Coalition (Kimmel 2008), has not proved to be unfounded. As a matter of fact, rather than solving, the Grand Coalition seems to have aggravated the problems that had accompanied and partly fostered its reason to exist in the first place: the fragmentation of the party system and the growth of citizens’ estrangement from politics. If the Grand Coalition emerged as an imperative in 2005, with CDU/CSU and SPD both punished by voters, and in 2009 this situation did not occur, it was only due to some exceptional circumstances that would not present themselves again in the future: the large popularity of Chancellor Merkel, which, while not transferring into more votes for the CDU, probably contributed to containing the plunge of her party, and the extraordinarily negative and positive performances shown by the Social Democrats and Liberals, respectively (chapter 6). It is precisely in these specific circumstances, the growth of an increasingly volatile electorate, which is also disenchanted with politics, that we can perceive one of the newly emerging elements, as well as one of the main paradoxes of recent developments in German politics. Both of the government coalitions in 2005 and in 2009 ref lected the preferences expressed by German voters. And yet, at the same time, by punishing the two “catch-all parties,” the citizens dealt a terrible, perhaps fatal, blow to that specific structural element of Germany’s party system— the presence of two dominant parties at around 40 percent—which for forty years had regulated the functioning of a democracy based on political alternation, enabling voters to decide with their ballots which of the alternative coalitions would actually come into power. In this perspective, what is new in recent developments is the critical dimension that the erosion of the two Volksparteien to the benefit of smaller parties has taken (chapter 6). With CDU/CSU and SPD below the threshold of 35 percent and 23 percent of votes, respectively, the FDP, the Left Party (LP) and the Greens exceeding together 37 percent of votes, in addition to a level of abstentions equal to 30 percentage points, in today’s scenario, not only party dynamics, but also the trustbased circuit between government and citizens seem fated to change. Namely, there is a shift from a system based on a bipolar rationale,

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with two major parties leading coalition governments in turn, to a system with five strategic parties, where the formation (as well as the fall) of governments may no longer be the direct expression of the electorate’s will, but rather the result of parliamentary dealings (Niedermayer 2008). If we extend–although forcing–this interpretation a step further, this development might even be considered a sort of step back toward the first 1949 election, which produced a “moderately polarised multiparty system” (Sartori 1976), with ten parties sitting in the Bundestag. The Difficult “Lessons from Weimar”: Myths and Virtues of a Rationalized Parliamentarism It is still an open question whether and to what extent Germany’s stability over the last sixty years is attributable to learning from the mistakes of the past. In fact, the architects of the Basic Law were strongly inf luenced by the failure of the Weimar Republic, the first German democratic experience (Fromme 1962). Here, particular reference is made to the constitutional jurisprudence making the German democracy a “well-fortified democracy” (Kommers 1997) 6 and the institutional arrangements of “rationalized parliamentarism” aimed at strengthening the chancellor vis-à-vis parliament and presidency (Beyme 1989). Some of these institutional devices are worthy of specific analysis, because from a comparative perspective (Ceccanti 1997), they represent distinguishing elements of the German constitutional model and may be useful in understanding the (expected or failed) effects they have produced up to now and might possibly produce within a more fragmented party system. Let us analyze them in detail. Of the anti-crisis devices, the state of legislative emergency is certainly the most original one. This is an extremely powerful deterrent for the Bundestag, with respect to the Bundesrat, as it envisages the possibility of the former being temporarily placed under receivership in its legislative function, in favour of the latter.7 The fact that a call for a state of legislative emergency has never been made, does not mean that it has never produced deterring effects. Instead, the constructive no-confidence vote, envisaging the possibility of bringing down the government with a no-confidence motion only which should also name a possible new candidate, has had a very limited impact, considering that in the last sixty years motions for the resignation of the government have almost always had an extra-parliamentary origin. In the two instances in which a constructive no-confidence vote was applied, it ended up producing distorted effects, as it fostered

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hardly transparent behaviors by political parties that were ready to put their government responsibility at stake (Beyme 1999). Thus, both in 1972 and in 1982, the coalition shifts (one failed, the other succeeding) took on the form of a real plot, with parties forced to start negotiations behind the chancellor’s back, to avoid the possibility of the chancellor forestalling their action through an early dissolution. Conceived as a deterrent against parliamentarian withdrawals as it requires the rejection of a confidence motion or a failed motion of constructive no-confidence as prerequisite for its activation, early dissolution of the Bundestag has in fact become a sort of quasi-discretionary power for the chancellor, dependent only on the Federal president’s assent. In particular, Brandt in 1972, Kohl in 1983, and Schröder in 2005 had no qualms against activating the measure, by making sure that their parliamentary majority rejected the confidence motion specifically presented to make the Federal president call for an early general election, and actually obtaining it. This provision has contributed to assigning early dissolution of the Bundestag a much wider political meaning, thus confirming the evolution of a form of government where the executive has developed a much stronger direct relationship with its constituencies in terms of accountability (Lauvaux 2004). In light of this picture, one might ask what could be the effects of these instruments of constitutional engineering, designed by Bonn constituents, in a fragmented party system. A more frequent application of some of these provisions may be posited, although with some important specifications. The first of these refers to the randomness of the stabilizing effects often attributed to the constructive no-confidence motion (Beyme 1999). In the case of simple and heterogeneous majorities, coalition agreements are, in principle, weak: coalition governments could therefore fail even without the no-confidence vote. The second is the possibility that a different or distorted use of some of these institutional devices might produce the opposite effect than the one expected cannot be written off. In this regard, it would be wise to recall—as a mere example—the Weimar’s precedent, where the political-institutional drift toward an authoritarian presidential regime was marked by the president’s arbitrary recourse to emergency powers envisaged by the notorious article 48. 8 In fact, it is not only the emergency decrees power, but also the Federal president’s powers of appointment, that could acquire more political weight in a scenario no longer characterized by absolute majorities in the Bundestag. This was already experienced, at least in part, in the aftermath of the 2005 election. In case no agreement on the chancellor is reached who could get the absolute majority of seats,

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the president has the authority to choose whether to appoint the candidate for the chancellorship who can count on the relative majority, or to decree the dissolution of the Bundestag. In theory, a scenario may be even outlined, whereby a president could blackmail the members of parliament, openly threatening their seats and forcing them to vote in favour of his candidate. Today, this scenario in fact seems to be very unrealistic, as it implies that the relevant parties would not be able to cooperate as they actually still do. Nonetheless, it is important to note that in the presence of a more fragmented political scenario many of the assumptions of the “lessons from Weimar” might turn out to be inaccurate or even misleading if confronted with short circuits involving institutional factors and political dynamics, which are difficult to foresee. These uncertainties are evidently unable to undermine “the success of the Basic Law” (Baer et al. 2010); however they cannot be ignored by anyone interested in importing Germany’s constitutional model (or just some portions of it) into a very different political context. The Chancellor Democracy: Put to Test of the Grand Coalition The stability and high political and economic returns usually attributed to the German government system seem to be linked to a successful mix of majority structures typical of a “competitive democracy,” and the political-institutional features of a “consensus democracy” (Lijphart 1984). On one hand, we have a strong hierarchy in the executivelegislative relations, which enables the former to hold the monopoly of the political and legislative initiative and impose its government actions without too many problems (Fabbrini and Vassallo 1999, 135–136). On the other hand, there is the peculiar yet necessary willingness to cooperate shown by the main political actors, given the constraints deriving from a complex decision-making process, which, as already mentioned, involves a multitude of co-governing forces and veto players. According to the theorist of the “Grand Coalition state” (Schmidt 2008), in Germany it is almost impossible not to be governed by a formal or informal Grand Coalition of the major parties, and a formal or hidden Grand Coalition comprising Bund and Länder governments. The chancellor plays an unmistakably predominant role within this government system by virtue of his/her power to determine the guidelines of government policy (“chancellor principle”). But at the same time he/she can hardly be considered the absolute holder of decision-making power. First of all, because both the autonomy of individual ministers in dealing with matters pertaining to their area of competence, and the

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principle of the government’s collective responsibility are guaranteed by the constitution; secondly, because the chancellor could not disregard the demands of the allied party in the exercise of his/her powers without risking a government crisis because he/she has always worked with a coalition government, at least until now.9 Of course, the opportunity for the head of the executive to assert his/her prerogatives, usually associated with the idea of the “chancellor democracy” (Kanzlerdemokratie) may vary, depending on the scope and internal cohesion of the government coalition led by the chancellor. What seems relevant here from a historical perspective is that some scholars have considered the experience of the first Grand Coalition a phase marked by a weakening of the “chancellor principle” and, correspondingly, by a strengthening of the “negotiation-based democracy” (Lehmbruch 1999, 41–61; Schönhoven 2004, 27–28). In particular, Chancellor Kiesinger had to recognize that his room to maneuver within the Grand Coalition was much more limited than the one enjoyed by his predecessors. His tasks had consisted mainly in coordinating government activities and looking for compromises in settling the internal disagreements within his cabinet and majority parties (Knorr 1975, 214–218). However, the kinds of pressure parties belonging to the opposite sides are subject to when cohabitating, did not prevent Kurt-Georg Kiesinger—or Angela Merkel forty years later—from asserting some of the main prerogatives (although with some differences) of the “chancellor democracy” (Niclauß 2008). In particular, if focusing our attention on the second Grand Coalition—apart from the inevitable activity of mediation and conflict-resolution with coalition partners—not only Chancellor Merkel has been able to play an active role in foreign and European policy, finding particularly fertile ground in gaining authoritativeness and consolidating her leadership (chapter 4); she has also been able to unhesitatingly assert her leadership within the cabinet in order to overcome the differences between coalition partners and avoid a possible blockade of the decision-making process (ibid.), and finally, as was clearly shown by the 2009 election, she was able to win a much wider popularity than her own party’s. If the Grand Coalition has survived the many problems that cohabitation between parties belonging to opposite sides usually entails, this is also due to a system of government that enables the chief executive to exercise correct and effective power and policy steering, independent from the makeup of the government coalition he/she has been called upon to lead. What is more questionable is whether and to what extent

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the chancellor democracy will be able to metabolize, or even prevent, a further fragmentation of German electorate and party system. In the short run, the stability of the government system will presumably depend on Merkel’s ability to preserve both her position of primus inter pares and the plebiscitarian component of her first term in office. It is noteworthy that the relevant difference in public support between Merkel and her own party has led some observers to talk about a latent “presidential personalism” (Rusconi 2009), a phenomenon that had previously appeared when the charismatic and telegenic Gerhard Schröder came to the fore in the late 1990s, while becoming much more relevant in other contexts, such as Italy and France. However, in contrast to her immediate predecessor and other European leaders, Angela Merkel has stood out for her stark and essential government style, features that seem to be characteristic of her private life as well (Langguth 2005). Beyond Merkel’s individual performance, however, the safeguard of the Kanzlerdemokratie will in the end basically depend on the capacity/ willingness of both major parties, CDU/CSU and SPD, to represent in future a reliable and potentially successful government alternative. Success and Contradictions of Germany as a Civilian Power Given the high level of interrelation that has always existed between the international system and the Federal Republic, foreign policy is an important vantage point, quite useful to explore and assess the most recent changes of the German political system, with a long-term scenario in the background. The success of the democratic transition, political stability, and good performance of the Federal Republic of Germany cannot be explained—in a deterministic perspective—solely as the direct result of the context from which it has originated. Undoubtedly, the looming of an international bipolarism and the strategic centrality of Germany, have deeply inf luenced both the implementation and subsequent development of German democracy, placed as it is along the demarcation line between East and West. In light of the gravity of the clash between the Soviet Union and the Western powers who won World War II, first and foremost the United States, the principle of subordination had to be replaced by the principle of integration with respect to West Germany. Therefore, even before attaining a certain degree of autonomy in formulating and implementing its foreign policy, the Federal Republic of Germany found itself strongly rooted in the main Western multilateral institutions (Katzenstein 1987).

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Throughout the years, Euro-Atlantic boundaries became something more than mere obligations from which Germans could hardly imagine to free themselves (Hanrieder 1995). Particularly, while other former European powers, like France and Great Britain, considered European integration and the Atlantic Alliance as useful instruments in pursuing their national interests and preserving their role as middle-size powers, Germany also perceived in them an opportunity to redeem itself from the crimes of the past as well and a way to restore its political and moral credentials, by promoting a “civilian power” approach (Maull 1992, Rusconi 2003). According to Harnisch and Maull, the civilian power role concept includes at least three essential norms: “1. The willingness and ability to civilise international relations as a promoter or initiator of international action; 2. The willingness to transfer sovereignty or autonomy to supranational institutions as a promoter of collective security and opponent of unilateral action; 3. The eagerness to realise a civilised international order, even if this implies foregoing short-term national interests (power or plenty)” (Harnisch and Maull 2001, 4). After the fall of the Berlin Wall and during the Maastricht negotiations, when the Germans managed to pursue their goals by showing a pronounced willingness for self-integration, this civilian power role turned out to be very useful.10 Some international crises, however, have also shown the limits, difficulties, and contradictions of Germany as “civilian power.” For example, the way the country faced the first Yugoslav crisis in the early 1990s, when the German government showed a quite new assertiveness in its attempt to immediately recognize the breakaway Republics of Slovenia and Croatia (Libal 2004) proved to be particularly controversial. Germany had to remove the constitutional ban on out-of-NATOarea operations, which the composite group of non-interventionists invoked—as they had done at the time of the first Gulf war—in order to thoroughly back this move, and with it the legitimacy of an armed intervention against Milosevič’s Serbia (Philippi 2001). That was when the gap between a country increasingly aware of its importance in the European arena and its persistent inability (or difficulty) to take charge of relevant international responsibilities manifested itself. Additionally, this contradiction was matched by the international community’s ambiguity, who wished for, and at the same time, also feared Germany’s return to “normalcy” (Staack 2000).11 Germany’s first participation in a military operation since the end of World War II took place in 1999, during the Kosovo crisis. The circumstance appears like one of those twists and turns that history in its perfidy likes to amuse itself with, which saw as

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the main player not the Christian Democrat Kohl, the (alleged) heir of Adenauer, but rather his political Social Democrat rival and successor, Gerhard Schröder.12 However, toward the end of Schröder’s first term in government, Germany decided to step back and aim almost exclusively for close relationship of cooperation with France.13 Under the heated pressure of the election campaign, Schröder even announced that no government led by him would support a U.S. “adventure” in Iraq—not even in the event of a UN mandate, either politically, militarily, or economically was considered “improbable” in any case (Missiroli 2002, 1094–1095). And once the war started, the reappointed duo SchröderFischer, together with Chirac and de Villepin in France, promoted a document of protest against the military intervention in Iraq, which had the effect of highlighting the divisions within the European Union, causing eight countries to feel compelled to state their pro-American stand. At the time, it became clear that the Franco-German axis, the historical driver of integration, would not find the same legitimacy it had in the past—and even clearer after the joint election campaign of Chirac and Schröder in favor of the French referendum for the ratification of the “European Constitution” (Fagiolo 2007). The end of the Cold War made it unnecessary for the Federal Republic to maintain its role as outpost for the Western bloc in the clash between East and West. In the early twenty-first century, the inevitable cooperation with Putin’s Russia turned into a full-f ledged strategic partnership, fostered by a growing complementarity of the two economies, and by the start of a personal connection between the Russian president and Chancellor Schröder. Within this framework, Germany’s foreign policy underwent significant changes in the 2005–2009 term, showing Chancellor Merkel’s attempt to link up again with Adenauer’s tradition: safeguarding complementarity—and not inconsistencies—between the Atlantic and the European perspective. More precisely, in her first four years of government Angela Merkel outlined new points of equilibrium. By proving to be a fervent ally in the war against international terror, Merkel succeeded in mending the rift in relations with the United States caused by Schröder, but also felt free to proudly criticize President Bush’s unilateralism and state publicly that the Guantanamo case was unacceptable. Angela Merkel also revamped privileged ties with Paris, while distancing herself from Chirac’s “multipolar vision,” which had exacerbated the divisions in the transatlantic relations through its competitive approach (Hacke 2006). Eastwards, the chancellor was as attentive as her predecessor to the strategic centrality of cooperation with

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Russia; here as well, however, Merkel, the daughter of a Protestant pastor in East Germany, took a less condescending stand regarding human rights and other obscure aspects of Putin’s rule, gaining further consensus for her country from Eastern European partners. Finally, as for the European Union, Germany decided to play a leadership role, offering a decisive contribution to the compromise on the EU budget in 2005 and revamping—during the German six-month presidency of the European Union in 2007—the European constitutional process, which had come to a standstill (chapter 4). That Chancellor Merkel earned important results in foreign policy may seem surprising, considering the fact that at the time of the launch of the Grand Coalition, foreign policy themes were kept in the background. However, considering the importance all chancellors after Adenauer have assigned to international policy, Merkel’s great activism is actually less surprising (Padgett 1994). These results are not yet enough to posit that Angela Merkel may one day be likened to Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, or Helmut Kohl. Nonetheless, Chancellor Merkel might perhaps already aspire to being remembered as the head of government who succeeded better than her two predecessors in ending the transition from the Bonn Republic to the Berlin Republic and leading her country toward real normalcy. Conclusion Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and sixty years after the promulgation of the Basic Law, German democracy is still appreciated for its stability and its good performance. Recent political developments, however, suggest the necessity of rethinking the German political system as a whole and, particularly, its evolutive dynamic in the long term. The same is true for the concepts that mark the political history of the Federal Republic of Germany—from the “catch-all parties” to the “lessons from Weimar,” from the “Grand Coalition state” to the “chancellor democracy,” from the “Franco-German tandem” in European affairs to the “civilian power” in the international arena. The party system, shifted to a “f luid five-party system” today (Niedermayer 2008), continues to be the privileged mirror of change, in the presence of a government system that has remained essentially the same with the passing of the time. An additional fragmentation of the party system, however, could also entail important implications on the functioning of the chancellor democracy. In particular, a shift could take place toward a system, where the formation of governments

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could become the result of parliamentary dealings rather than a government system based on a bipolar rationale, and therefore on a strong direct relationship between the executive and the electorate. Moreover, if German voters continue to systematically punish governing parties and award opposition parties instead, the number of possible alternative coalition government scenarios might even increase. Beside a return to a consensus option, like the Grand Coalition, Red-Green governments supported by the LP, which until now have been excluded at the federal level, might also be considered. In the presence of scant and heterogeneous majorities, the rationalized parliamentarism and the anti-crisis mechanism envisaged by Bonn constituents could find wider application, although their effectiveness would still be quite difficult to ascertain. Finally, Germany will probably continue to be viewed with a mix of suspicion and trust abroad, as all of the recent post-reunification period international crises have shown, and the management of today’s Iranian and Afghan issues seem to confirm. And concerns relating to the image of an économie dominante (Kreile 1978) will continue to be interlaced with the hopes that Europe may again find in Germany the driving force that the former seems to have lost. In brief, today’s scenario, qualitatively different from the one at the time of the first Grand Coalition and closer—mutatis mutandis—to the one that emerged from the first elections of the Bundestag in 1949, could therefore represent a significant test to verify, and possibly review, the many opinions and biases (mostly positive) that have been formulated on the German political system in general. Another scenario might be opening with the end of the 2005–2009 Grand Coalition, that could also be interpreted, although from other perspectives, as a sort of return to the past (although not as distant as the one of 1949). In the future, if the asymmetry between SPD and CDU/CSU persists, and the internal cohesion of the center-right forces consolidates, as has happened—although with due differences—in France, at first with Chirac, and later with Sarkozy, and in Italy with Berlusconi, it is in fact possible to imagine a long stay in power for the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. In this case, if successful in keeping her popularity levels high, Chancellor Merkel (class 1954), could even aspire to the political longevity attained by her Christian Democratic predecessors, Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl. This will obviously depend on internal political balances and international dynamics, but also on the chancellor’s ability to utilize the resources and potential

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of a government system that enables the head of the executive to fully exercise his/her power to dictate the political line. Both scenarios might represent a possible way out from the mismatch between past and present now characterizing the analysis of the German case. A further fragmentation of the party system could put a strain on the extraordinary ability to metabolize the changes exhibited by the “Grand Coalition state” so far. A return to a bipolar structure, on the other hand, could lead the 2005–2009 Grand Coalition—after the first 1966–1969 experience—to be the second exception within a political system normally characterized by political alternation in power. At the moment, it is unclear which of the two possible scenarios will prevail, or if and when the mismatch between the legacy of a “success story” and the increasing perception that recent changes might impair Germany’s traditional stability, will be overcome. Notes 1. Kaase and Schmid (1999) have defined Germany as a “learning democracy.” 2. For an in-depth historical reconstruction, refer to Schönhoven (2004). 3. Let us recall that this decision was facilitated by the fact that settling differences between Christian Democrats and Liberals had been impossible on matters concerning which strategy to adopt to solve the problem of the budget deficit, differences which had previously led to the resignation of Chancellor Ludwig Erhard. On this, see also Gassert (2006, 498–527). 4. This was mostly the result of an important development in the interpretation of the Basic Law, supported by the Federal Constitutional Court’s caselaw (Mayer 2003). 5. On this, cf. Zohlnhöfer (2008a). 6. The major instruments of the German “well-fortified democracy” include the ban on unconstitutional political parties, the prohibition of anti-system associations and the two-third majority in the Bundestag and Bundesrat for constitutional amendments. 7. With respect to art. 81 of the Basic Law, the state of legislative emergency can be called by the Federal president, upon request by the federal government and with the assent of the Bundesrat, for a bill defeated by the Bundestag despite the government’s declaration of urgency, or if linked to a confidence vote not passed with an absolute majority. Following said declaration, and after a new rejection by the Bundestag, the law is considered passed, with the assent of the Bundesrat only. At this regard, it is also noteworthy that in 1968, at time of the first Grand Coalition, a constitutional amendment was approved, adding emergency clauses to ensure the federal government’s ability to act in crises such as natural disasters, uprisings or war.

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8. Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution attributed to the Head of State the power to “take, if public security and order are seriously disturbed and endangered, the measures necessary to their restoration, intervening if need be with the assistance of the armed forces.” Even if meant only as an emergency provision, the article was used to issue decrees without the backing of the parliament (Reichstag), thus allowing the executive to rule without the support of the Reichstag. 9. For an analysis of the “chancellor democracy” in the long run, cf. Niclauß (2004). 10. On this, cf. D’Ottavio (2009). 11. For the phenomenon of hard-won “normalization” of German post-W WII foreign policy, see also Haftendorn (2001) and Schöllgen (2001). 12. However, if read from another perspective, notably taking into due consideration the modernizing and reformist profile newly-elected Schröder wanted to embody as representative of the “Third Way”; the political affinities with the two leaders of the United States and Great Britain (Clinton and Blair), and finally the ethical dilemma posed by the conf lict in Kosovo (absolute pacifism vs. the protection of minorities and human rights), the story of the “former 1968-activist at war,” that is Schröder, seems less paradoxical. For a critical foreign policy analysis of the Red-Green government cf. Maull et al. (2003). 13. On the meaning of the recent edition of the Franco-German tandem from a historical perspective cf. Defrance and Pfeil (2005).

CONCLUSION

The Long Shadow of the Grand Coalition Florian Grotz and Silvia Bolgherini

A

Grand Coalition is a paradoxical case of parliamentary government: it unites the two major parties that usually oppose each other for the chancellorship. Federal governments comprising Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD) have not been popular within the German public. They have been avoided in the Federal Republic’s history as much as possible, and, when actually formed, they have been perceived as a temporary arrangement by both citizens and political parties. At first glance, the CDU/CSU-SPD government that was built under Chancellor Angela Merkel after the 2005 election perfectly matched this overall picture. It was neither the voters’ nor the parties’ preference but turned out to be the only feasible option in that situation. The two Volksparteien had not thought about common policy projects in advance, and it took quite some time for the CDU/CSU and the SPD to agree on a government agenda with the lowest common denominator (Jun 2009b, 165–168). As a consequence, initially many observers were critical of the potential performance of the first Merkel government (Thaysen 2006b). Eventually the Grand Coalition was terminated without further discussion when the outcome of the 2009 federal election enabled a majority government consisting of Christian Democrats and Liberals (FDP). In retrospect it seems as if the 2005–2009 Grand Coalition was only an ephemeral interregnum between a Red-Green and a Black-Yellow cabinet. However, the uniqueness of the first Merkel government might have been able to inf luence domestic politics and policies in a particular

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way. Given Germany’s “gathering crisis” (Miskimmon et al. 2009) and the resulting need for a structural change, a Grand Coalition has been widely considered the only constellation within the semisovereign state qualified to implement demanding policies and institutional reforms. As the CDU/CSU-SPD government emerged out of a dynamic party environment, its inherently paradoxical configuration might have had played a lasting role in the further evolution of the “f luid five-party system” (Niedermayer 2008). Against this background, this book has explored whether the 2005–2009 Grand Coalition was a mere episode or a turning point for politics and policies in the post-unification Germany. It goes without saying that any possible response to this issue should be considered as a preliminary attempt, the more so as it is quite difficult to differentiate those outcomes genuinely ascribable to the Grand Coalition from those rather due to other circumstances. This final chapter attempts to draw some tentative conclusions about the Grand Coalition’s impact on German politics and policies—as suggested by the multifaceted findings detailed in the previous chapters. Further on the Move: Party Politics after 2005 The overall picture painted by these chapters illustrates a peculiar inf luence exerted by the Grand Coalition on German party politics. In the run-up to the 2005 federal election, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats fought against each other in a polarized campaign (SchmittBeck 2009). One could have assumed that the Grand Coalition would be plagued by internal disputes and might not accomplish its four-year term—at some point either partner could have terminated this unstable alliance for any strategic reason. However, the CDU/CSU and the SPD governed together in a harmonious fashion embracing a more or less “centrist course.” This outcome was also due to the CDU’s quiet relinquishment of its neo-liberal reform program announced before the 2005 election, with the adoption of more “leftist” economic and welfare policies (Clemens 2007, 2009). Such unexpected consensus-orientation within the Grand Coalition, combined with a fragmented and weak parliamentary opposition, affected the structures of party competition at least in two respects (chapter 3). First, turnout rates in most 2005–2009 Länder elections reached an all-time low, ref lecting the evident lack of political polarization between the two Volksparteien. Second, voting behavior in the same election period displayed a clear “centrifugal tendency” (Sartori

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1976): both CDU/CSU and SPD experienced heavy losses, while smaller parties with more clear-cut profiles—especially the FDP on the right and the LP on the left—gained considerable strength. This backdrop reinforced the transformation of the German party system from a “two-party dominance” type to a more “pluralist” type (Niedermayer 2008, 14). At the same time the Grand Coalition could not change the traditional structures of coalition politics within the multilevel party system. In the aftermath of the Länder elections held during the 2005–2009 period, CDU-SPD governments were not actively pursued by either party, but remained the “last resort” for those situations where all other coalitions were not considered politically feasible. It is worth noting the attempts to build new coalitions beyond the traditional “blocs” carried on between 2005 and 2009: Black-Green in Hamburg, Black-YellowGreen (“Jamaica”) in Saarland, and the failed experiment of a RedRed-Green alliance in Hesse. Each of these Länder coalitions emerged in a specific regional context—that is, they were neither a (indirect) consequence of the federal Grand Coalition nor did they prompt similar choices at the federal level for the time being. The Grand Coalition exerted specific inf luence on party politics at Länder level, and also created a distinctive terrain for the 2009 Bundestag election. In sharp contrast to previous federal elections, the 2009 campaign was hardly characterized by adversarial tones, but rather by a “sleeping atmosphere” (chapter 5). The main parties featured an unusual reluctance to address key policy issues during the electoral prelude. At first glance, such behavior might be astonishing in a situation where the repercussions of the most severe economic downturn in the FRG’s history had enormously increased its budgetary constraints—thus increasing the reform pressure for years to come. On the other hand, it could be assumed that such economic turbulence was indeed the main reason in preventing parties from taking a firm programmatic position impossible to keep afterward. As convincingly unveiled in chapter 5, the sleepy electoral campaign largely resulted from the particular party constellation that emerged under the Grand Coalition. On the government side, the harmonious cohabitation between CDU/CSU and SPD prevented both parties and their own top candidates—Chancellor Merkel and Vice Chancellor Steinmeier—to carry a polarized “left vs. right” campaign as was the case in previous elections. This tacit “non-aggression pact” between the two Volksparteien was reinforced by a possible 2009 electoral outcome pointing to a continuation for their shared cabinet. In fact, given the “non-coalitionable”

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status assigned by all federal parties to the LP, the only realistic options for a post-electoral government were either a CDU/CSU-FDP alliance or a Grand Coalition. This strategic alternative provided the Christian Democrats with an extremely favorable position reinforcing Merkel’s decision to avoid any adversarial tones preceding the elections. At the same time, the CDU/CSU’s favorable position hindered the FDP to launch an aggressive campaign against the Merkel government because this attitude might have irritated its only potential ally. The 2009 Bundestag election displayed some extraordinary outcomes that can be explained by the specific impact of the Grand Coalition (chapters 6 and 7). On the aggregate level, the 2009 election result was marked by several historical records: the lowest voter turnout since 1949, the sharpest change in vote share between parliamentary parties since 1953, and the highest party fragmentation in the Bundestag since 1953. Although such outcomes could be considered in line with the medium-term evolution in the German party system (Niedermayer 2008), the unusually large increase in voter abstention, along with the remarkable growth gained by smaller parties, clearly reflected the broad discontent among German citizens about the Grand Coalition’s performance at the end of its term. Turning to the individual parties, the most remarkable results in the 2009 election were the unprecedented downfall reported by the SPD (from 34.3 to 23.0 percent), and the all-time high achieved by the FDP (14.6 percent)—the “real winner.” Both outcomes were more or less direct consequences of the party constellation that emerged during the 2005–2009 period. As highlighted by empirical analysis of voting behavior (chapter 7), the SPD suffered heavily from participating in the Grand Coalition: its performance received a poor rating from voters, both in retrospect and for future outcomes, while its top candidate, Steinmeier, was not perceived as a serious challenger for Chancellor Merkel. A considerable part of the Social Democratic electorate switched to other parties—especially the LP—or did not cast votes at all. As for the Liberal success, the citizens’ willingness to put an end to the unloved Grand Coalition may have mattered most. Because a Black-Yellow coalition turned out to be the only realistic alternative to the incumbent government, more voters than ever before in a federal election behaved strategically—assigning their “personal” vote to the Christian Democrats and their “party list” vote to the FDP. Hence, the CDU/CSU was able to conquer almost three-quarters of the constituency seats, which the peculiar workings of the German electoral system eventually increased to a twenty-four surplus seats (chapter 6). At the same time, the ticket splitters expanded significantly the FDP share of the party list

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seats. As a result, the Black-Yellow coalition won a clear majority, a result somewhat unexpected by relying on pre-election opinion surveys. This way the Grand Coalition triggered German voters to produce the largest parliamentary majority gained by a “small” coalition since 1994—despite a highly increased fragmentation in the Bundestag. The Grand Coalition’s impact on German party politics did not cease with this effect, but also reached beyond the 2009 federal election. To the surprise of many observers, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition—which both partners had claimed to prefer in their electoral campaigns— showed the worst opening ever featured by a federal government since 1949 (chapter 8). Since their coalition negotiations, in fact, the relationship between Christian Democrats and Liberals was characterized by internal tensions and open disputes. The coalition treaty seemed to be a mere compilation of “dilatory compromises” (chapters 8 and 9), and after its formal inauguration the second Merkel government did not follow a coherent policy agenda. These initial problems are natural for an alliance comprising a former government party (CDU/CSU) and a longtime opposition wing (FDP). However, the severe conflicts between the coalition parties might also explain the steady increase in programmatic divergences within the “center-right” camp. On one hand, during its eleven years in opposition the FDP maintained a clear-cut neo-liberal profile. On the other hand, the participation in the Grand Coalition provided Angela Merkel with an opportunity to quietly move her party toward the middle ground within the German party system—suggesting some sort of “socialdemocratization” for the Christian Democrats (Egle 2010). This positional change certainly broadened the programmatic basis of the center-right camp, thus helping the CDU/CSU and the FDP to win the federal election while afterward causing serious friction within the new government. At this time, it is unclear whether this modified position of the Christian Democrats will be reversed in due course or become a lasting feature of German party politics. The chapters in this book clearly indicate that the 2005–2009 Grand Coalition’s influence on the transforming party system was not limited to its time in power, rather casting some relevant “shadows” beyond its termination. Between Renovation and Stagnation: The Policy Legacy of the Grand Coalition When it took office, the Grand Coalition puzzled many observers regarding its own policy-making capacity. Many people thought that

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this kind of federal government would bring a political stalemate, which in turn would prevent Germany from addressing its urgently needed reforms. At the same time, there was also the possibility that Christian Democrats and Social Democrats would fully cooperate, leading to ambitious reforms presumably possible only under a Grand Coalition. However, the policy outcomes of its four-year term, as presented in the chapters of this book, reveal a mixed balance. On one side, the first Merkel government did not embark on highflying policy reforms. Neither the CDU/CSU nor the SPD pushed for radical innovations in the labor market, fiscal policy, health care, or the welfare state in general. On the other side, the Grand Coalition’s achievements in various policy areas cannot be disregarded, as extensively illustrated in chapter 1. One of the most remarkable successes is the considerable improvement in the budget consolidation before the 2008/09 global financial crisis. This achievement, also obtained due to an accurate fiscal policy, combining tax increases and decreasing expenses, enabled the country as a whole to face the crisis peak in relatively good shape. The business tax reform was instrumental in overcoming a decade-long discontent, and to reinforce German entrepreneurs’ competitiveness, while the pension age increase was a necessary— despite highly unpopular—measure in a rapidly ageing country. A new approach in family policy to reconcile the working and private environments is also a notable achievement gained by the Grand Coalition. These accomplishments could only be reached in a favorable economic landscape—which lasted until the outbreak of the 2008 global crisis—thus allowing the CDU/CSU-SPD government to increase revenues and cut social spending. Indeed, the overall 2005–2009 government outcomes show more unsuccessful or even contradictory policies: health care reform led to higher non-wage labor costs, extra pension increases opposed the pension age rise, and the unemployment benefit extension for elder people eroded the efforts to reduce insurance contributions. In respect to domestic policy, if it is true that the Grand Coalition did not provide radical solutions for the challenged semisovereign state, it did not reinforce the “gathering crisis” (Miskimmon et al. 2009) either. Certainly the CDU/CSU-SPD government did not embody that unique window of opportunity to solve Germany’s big problems—some of them were simply postponed and still lay unattended. On the other hand, it did not always rely on the lowest common denominator nor lead the country into a permanent gridlock, as some observers feared in fall 2005.

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A similar “mixed result” can be seen in foreign and European affairs. The Grand Coalition neither launched a new course in Germany’s EU policy nor embarked upon a major supranational initiative to strike a vital blow to the European Union’s institutions and policies. At the same time, the Merkel government did not represent an insignificant “interregnum” either, during which Germany decreased its inf luence abroad due to a domestic intra-coalitional blockade. Instead, a specific combination of continuity and change emerged—as pointed out in several chapters in this book. Chapter 4 details a general “pragmatization” of Germany’s EU policy also under the Grand Coalition: since the 1990s, national interests have systematically gained center stage at the European level, while the overall perception of European integration as Germany’s reason of state has declined. At the same time the Merkel government succeeded in re-launching the EU’s constitutional reform process, resulting in the Lisbon Treaty, while simultaneously pushing a courageous EU environmental policy plan (with the so-called 20–20–20 formula) and even building up—although temporarily—a world advocacy coalition about climate protection policy. Merkel’s leadership brought Germany toward a renewed entente with France, along with a new stability in European and transatlantic relations (chapter 10). While such process was partly based on past trends, especially concerning the relationships with Russia (and, to a certain extent, with France), these steps also showed new features. As clarified in chapter 10, Merkel distinguished herself from her predecessors by establishing new balance points in international relations. These efforts include an appeased relationship with the United States after the open bilateral tensions during the Schröder government, and an increased linkage with East European countries thanks to her critical stand toward Russia concerning human rights protections. This quite new trend was mainly based on Merkel’s political skills, which enabled her to reshuff le in her favor the traditional “two-headed” governance in foreign affairs between the chancellor and the foreign minister. Contrary to previous chancellors, Angela Merkel conquered the spotlight on both European and international stages immediately after her mandate opening: her sober and consensus-seeking, although goal-oriented, approach enabled her to eventually achieve remarkable results. In brief, the discontinuity traits in foreign and European policies may be mostly explained by the dominant role Chancellor Merkel was able to develop on the international scene during the 2005–2009 term— rather than by a genuine approach carried out by the Grand Coalition.

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This finding may not come as a surprise, given the broad basic consensus between both Volksparteien that Germany should act as the “driving force” of European integration and as a “civilian power” on the international stage (Bredow 2008; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet et al. 2010). A comprehensive look at whether the Grand Coalition was a single episode or a turning point also has to take into consideration its policy legacy. As clearly explained in chapter 9, the Grand Coalition’s achievements and failures constitute a specific inheritance for the new Black-Yellow government, both in terms of constraints and opportunities. As mentioned earlier, initially the policy performance of the Grand Coalition was influenced by favorable economic circumstances at first and eventually by the need to fight the most severe financial and economic crisis after World War II. The Black-Yellow government started in a turbulent context of crisis management and tight budgetary constraints—issues still relevant today. The combination of crisis repercussions, limited budgetary options, and the financial consequences of the Grand Coalition’s ambitious policy programs is posing severe restrictions on the maneuvering room available to the new executive. Some policies proposed by the CDU/CSU-SPD government—such as financial support for families, research and development, or countermeasures against the outbreak of the financial crisis—may hamper the new government in its search for the necessary money to fund social expenditures, foster economic reprise, and achieve a balanced budget. As a consequence, in the long-term these legacies may hinder the CDU/ CSU-FDP government from some (still quite urgent) policy reforms. In the short term, they already resorted to a prevailing “dilatory compromise” in the coalition treaty, as detailed in chapter 8. Some decisions of the Grand Coalition can also be regarded as opportunities for the new Christian-Liberal government to sharpen its own policy agenda. During its term, the different opinions of the Grand Coalition parties led to dilatory compromises that cleared the way for many possible future policy developments, while a few other policies just failed—notably about health and social care. By employing a more transparent approach toward those policy issues left unresolved by the first Merkel government, the Black-Yellow coalition could gain an important political capital to be spent for its reelection. The Grand Coalition did not represent an unbearable historical burden for the new cabinet and the (same) chancellor, but neither was it—as some observers thought at the outset—a mere “business as necessary” government (Thaysen 2006b, 607), unable to leave a characteristic imprint on German domestic and foreign policies.

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The contributions in this book suggest that the combination of domestic and foreign policies brought about by the Grand Coalition may be labeled as a balance between stagnation and renovation—a mutual hindering among the coalition partners, on one hand, and an effort to find a positive response to the most urgent problems facing the country, on the other hand. While only time will tell about its long-term successes and failures, surely the CDU/CSU-SPD government has not been just an occasional transition between two alternative coalitions (Red-Green and BlackYellow) in a traditional bipolar party system. Germany after the Grand Coalition: Political Dynamics beyond Institutional Reform Generally the formation of the Grand Coalition in 2005 was considered as the political manifestation of Germany’s “gathering crisis” (Miskimmon et al. 2009). Under the given circumstances, federal elections seemed unable to produce parliamentary majorities for either a center-right (CDU/CSU-FDP) or a center-left (SPD-Greens) government. All other alliances—except from the unwanted coalition comprising the two Volksparteien—were outright excluded (Red-Red-Green) or regarded as inherently unstable (Red-Yellow-Green and Black-YellowGreen). To avoid these problems in the future, quite a few observers demanded replacing the proportional electoral system with a majoritarian one that should produce clear majorities in the Bundestag—thus ensuring the alternation of “stable” right-wing and left-wing cabinets (Strohmeier 2009). A Grand Coalition was considered the best—if not the only— option for implementing such institutional reform, because both the CDU/CSU and the SPD would obviously profit from a majoritarian system at the expense of smaller parties. Therefore, the July 2008 ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) declaring unconstitutional the surplus seats generated by the current electoral system and imposing a Bundestag reenactment by June 2011, seemed to open up an extraordinary “window of opportunity.” However, the electoral system remained unchanged during the Grand Coalition’s term (chapter 6): as Christian Democrats and Social Democrats could not even agree on a minor modification in the federal election act, the Black-Yellow government will now be in charge of implementing those requirements set by the FCC. In all likelihood, the revised election act will eliminate the possibility of surplus seats while preserving the basic structure of the mixed-member proportional system (Grotz 2010).

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The electoral system reform has thus not proved as an effective and legitimate means to counterbalance the increased fragmentation within the German party system and to overcome the resulting difficulties of government formation. The unambiguous outcome of the 2009 election did nothing to solve this problem. On the contrary, as the parliamentary fragmentation in 2009 has been almost as high as the level reached by the Bundestag in its early stage in 1949 (chapter 10), inconclusive outcomes such as in the 2005 election are very likely to happen again. Building reliable government majorities in absence of an electoral reform will remain a major challenge for German politics in the years to come. This task may only be achieved in a reasonable fashion if the relevant parties are willing to embrace new alliances beyond a “permanent” Grand Coalition. Although party politics during the first Merkel government have not revealed any expansion in the traditional coalition options at the federal level, at least some remarkable dynamics emerged in this regard. As outlined in several chapters, the issue of (viable) coalition alternatives acquired major significance both for the campaign and the voter choice in the 2009 election. There is good reason to assume that the main parties will become more flexible in their respective coalition strategies. The framework outlined at the end of chapter 8—that Angela Merkel might outmaneuver the FDP until the next federal election and become chancellor of a Black-Green coalition in 2013—is speculative at this time. However, such setting could reasonably descend from the evolutionary logic of German party politics that has emerged during the Grand Coalition’s term. Another—and probably more important—approach to overcoming the crisis of the semisovereign state by institutional means has been federalism reform. As mentioned in the introduction to this book, a relevant initiative to “modernize” the federal order had already been launched under the Schröder government, which aimed at disentangling the heavily interlocked relationships between Bund and Länder—thereby enhancing transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness of multilevel governance in Germany. While the relevant reform draft was formulated in detail, it could not be approved before the 2005 election. This situation provided the “enforced” Grand Coalition with a unique opportunity to prove its “acting capability”: still within its first year in office, federalism reform went into force, constituting the most extensive change of the Basic Law in its entire history. And the Merkel government moved even further with a second reform stage addressing the federal financial relations, which was eventually approved by both the Bundestag and Bundesrat just toward the end of its term in summer 2009.

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Have these reforms marked a turning point in the evolution of the semisovereign state, by opening the door to a “new federalism”? Like all other aspects of the Grand Coalition’s impact discussed earlier, this question needs a differentiated response. On one hand, the 2006 and 2009 constitutional changes confirmed the general rule that any comprehensive reform of German federalism requires a Grand Coalition government (chapter 2). Since the late 1990s, many observers blamed the “over- complex” and “over-stable” federal order for promoting an overall “reform blockage.” Hence, just changing the constitutional foundation of German federalism seemed to be some kind of success in itself. Furthermore, the new constitutional provisions provided the Länder with more room for autonomous policy-making, while the veto powers of the Bundesrat were cut to a certain extent. In addition, the 2009 reform set explicit limits for the public debts from 2011 onward—constitutional provisions that will seriously constrain the clearing available to Bund and Länder governments for deficit spending in the middle and long run. On the other side, either reform did not modify the structural features of German federalism (chapters 1 and 2). Many policies are still decided within the close areas of horizontal and vertical cooperation, most key policy decisions continue to require the Bundesrat consent, and the main problems within the fiscal federalism have remained untouched—including the lack of tax-rising competencies for the Länder and the anticompetitive equalization scheme. The new constitutional framework has apparently not yet affected the accustomed patterns of political behavior at the federal level. A case in point is the election in North Rhine-Westphalia held in May 2010 (chapter 9): as this Land was ruled by a Black-Yellow coalition, and as the government change—which actually occurred—would have cost the new federal executive its majority in the Bundesrat, the coalition treaty signed by the CDU/CSU and FDP tended to avoid any clear-cut announcements of painful reforms that might have affected their electoral chances in the North-Rhine Westphalian “midterm contest.” At the Länder level, however, different dynamics developed after the 2006 federalism reform. As described in chapter 2, some Länder tried to make use of their newly gained competencies in some policy areas, addressing their own situations while disregarding other Länder activities. Whether this will establish a trend toward more political diversity, thus undermining the traditional structures of “unitary federalism” (Hesse 1962), remains to be seen. In any case, such outcome seems to confirm that the impact of federalism reform depends on how the main political actors will actually employ their new or modified powers.

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Despite a turbulent environment and some constitutional changes achieved under the Grand Coalition, the German semisovereign state has maintained its main characteristic: an incremental adaptation of its domestic politics and policies beyond any institutional reform. Within this corridor mainly set by a sort of historical path-dependency, the Grand Coalition left a long and deep “shadow.” In fact, even though the Grand Coalition was thought to be—and actually was—a temporary arrangement, with regard to party politics and the policies it pursued, it has had a lasting impact in manifold ways.

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Index

Adenauer, Konrad, 95, 105, 107, 123, 157–158, 190–192 Agenda 2010, 7, 16, 21, 29, 90 agricultural policy, 175 Alliance ’90/Greens, see Greens (Die Grünen) Baden-Württemberg, 43, 45, 53–54, 56, 59, 62, 67, 131–132, 159 Barroso, José Manuel, 73, 75, 81 Basic Law (Grundgesetz), 1, 3–4, 17, 25, 28, 31–36, 38, 40, 45–46, 86, 121, 182, 184, 186, 191, 193–194, 204 Bavaria, 10, 38–39, 45, 53–54, 56, 58, 61–62, 67, 111–112, 120–122, 131–132, 149, 153–154, 159–160, 165 Beck, Kurt, 56 Berlin, 10, 18, 43, 47–48, 53, 56–59, 62, 69, 73–76, 83–84, 86, 95, 103, 109, 113, 119, 122, 124, 132, 148, 153, 174, 177, 189, 191 Black-Green coalition (CDU/ CSU-Green), see coalitions Black-Yellow coalition (CDU/ CSU-FDP), see coalitions Blair, Tony, 71, 178, 194 Brandenburg, 48, 53–54, 56, 58, 63–66, 113, 132 Brandt, Willy, 101, 116, 122, 134, 152, 158, 185, 191 Bremen, 18, 48, 53, 56, 58–60, 62, 68, 96, 105, 112, 132

budget, 19–20, 22, 25, 28–29, 71–72, 153, 156–157, 163, 166–170, 173–174, 191, 193, 197, 200, 202 budget consolidation, 19–20, 25, 28–29, 200 Bundespräsident, see Federal President Bundesrat, 4, 6–9, 11, 16–18, 26, 28, 31–33, 35–39, 45–47, 49–52, 56, 59, 62–64, 67–68, 85–86, 121, 163, 167, 182, 184, 193, 204–205 veto rights, 32, 35, 37 Bundestag, 3–4, 6–8, 15–18, 20, 23–24, 27–28, 32, 36, 39, 46, 50–52, 55, 64, 66–67, 85–86, 92, 103, 105, 107–111, 115–124, 126–127, 131, 133, 134–135, 137–138, 140, 148, 150–152, 154, 157–158, 160–161, 163, 182, 184–186, 192–193, 197–199, 203–204 Bundesverfassungsgericht, see Federal Constitutional Court cabinet, 2–4, 8, 10, 39, 53–55, 57, 59, 61, 64, 70–71, 95, 107–108, 123, 129, 150–154, 157–163, 175, 177–178, 187, 195, 197, 202 catch-all parties (Volksparteien), 1, 3, 7–8, 50, 52–53, 60, 64–66, 92, 97–98, 108, 115, 147, 180, 183, 191, 195–197, 202–203 CDU, see Christian Democratic Union CDU/CSU, see Union

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CFSP, see Common Foreign and Security Policy chancellor, 1–4, 7, 9, 15–16, 28, 64, 69, 70–72, 74–83, 85, 89–90, 93, 95–102, 104–105, 108, 121–122, 134–136, 138–140, 148–163, 172–173, 177, 180, 182–188, 190–195, 197–198, 201–202, 204 chancellor democracy, 97, 180, 186–188, 191, 194 Chirac, Jacques, 71, 83, 190, 192 Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 1–2, 7, 10, 15–17, 26–27, 29, 37–38, 44, 47–48, 53–57, 59–67, 71, 89–90, 92–93, 95, 97–99, 101–102, 104–105, 108–109, 111–113, 115–117, 120–121, 125–127, 129–136, 139–143, 147–149, 151–163, 165–166, 168–169, 171–173, 175–178, 181–183, 193, 195–196, 198–200, 203 see also Union Christian-Liberal government, see Black-Yellow coalition Christian Social Union (CSU), 10, 38, 46, 48–49, 54, 61–62, 90, 92, 95, 99, 101, 111, 116–117, 120–121, 133, 147, 149, 153–154, 159–163, 165–166, 168–169, 172, 175, 178 see also Union civilian power, 180, 188–189, 191, 202 cleavages, social, political, 113, 126 coalitions Black-Green coalition (CDU/ CSU-Green), 61, 197, 204 Black-Yellow coalition (CDU/ CSU-FDP), 6, 66, 91, 97, 100, 129–131, 141–142, 147–149, 155, 171, 195, 198–199, 202–203, 205 coalition formation, 9, 141 coalition negotiations, 2, 10, 150–154, 199

coalition treaty, 10, 15, 19, 24, 28, 51, 70–71, 83, 86, 122, 150, 152–154, 156–158, 162, 165–174, 176–177, 180, 185, 199, 202, 205 Jamaica coalition (CDU/CSU-FDPGreens), 63, 66, 91, 147, 197 traffic light coalition (SPD-FDPGreens), 91, 95, 147, 149 Red-Green coalition (SPD-Greens), 6, 15–16, 21, 25–26, 28, 37, 55, 60, 62, 67, 90–91, 94–95, 130, 141, 147, 167, 192, 195, 203 Red-Red-Green coalition (SPD-LP-Greens), 60, 64, 91, 147, 197, 203 multi-level effects, 9, 49–52, 57, 64, 66 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 76–77, 86 constitution (German) see Basic Law Constitutional Treaty (European), see Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe CSU, see Christian Social Union de Maizière, Thomas, 153, 159, 161, 177 DVU, see German People’s Union East Germany (German Democratic Republic—GDR), 5, 53, 72, 112–113, 147, 158, 176–177, 179, 191 economic crisis, 25, 27–28, 70, 84, 104, 122, 135, 156, 166, 170, 178, 202 economic policy, 15, 34 education and research policy, 23, 40 excellence initiative (Exzellenzinitiative), 40 Hochschulpakt II, 40 Joint Science Conference (Gemeinsame Wissenschaftskonferenz), 40, 47

Index elections, 1–3, 6–9, 15–16, 27–28, 30, 38–39, 48–61, 63–68, 74–75, 87–105, 107–113, 115–121, 123–131, 133–135, 137–142, 147–152, 155–158, 160–163, 165–167, 175–177, 180–185, 187, 190, 192, 195–199, 202–205 end-term time, 56, 58, 63–66 European elections, 50, 89, 92–93 federal elections, 1–3, 6–7, 9, 48, 51, 63, 65–66, 87, 89, 91–93, 96, 100, 104–105, 107–108, 112, 117, 125, 133–134, 138, 141–142, 147, 149–151, 163, 167, 195–199, 203–204 honeymoon time, 55–56, 58, 62, 67 Länder elections, 50–52, 55–59, 61, 64, 66–67, 89–91, 93, 197 midterm time, 56, 58–59, 61–62, 66 opinion polls, 91, 93–100, 102, 104–107, 109, 111–112, 123, 162 second order elections, 50–52, 55, 66 turnout, 51–52, 56–61, 65–66, 92, 108, 116, 125, 128, 137, 198 electoral behavior, 9, 50–52, 66, 108–109, 113–114, 126, 128, 141, 196, 198 electoral abstention, 113, 116–117, 183, 198 floating voters, 128 multi-level effects, 51–52 performance evaluation, 100, 125, 132–142 personalization, 90, 93, 101–102, 104, 134 unified Germany, 5–6, 50–51, 68–69, 110 volatility, 55, 67, 127, 142 voter preferences, 134, 136, 139

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227

electoral campaigning, 2, 9, 15, 56, 89, 91, 93, 96–101, 103–105, 121, 165, 197, 199 electoral system, 3, 6, 9, 107, 110, 117, 119, 120, 123, 126, 130, 198, 203, 204 direct mandates, 119, 124, 128, 130 mixed-member proportional electoral system, 3, 10, 203 party lists, 110–111, 119, 128, 130–131, 142, 198 proportionality, 3, 10, 117, 119–120, 124, 130–131, 203 single-member constituencies (SMCs), 113, 117, 119, 124, 128, 131 surplus seats (Überhangmandate), 10, 110, 117, 119–121, 124, 131, 138, 198, 203 ticket splitting, 119, 128, 130–132, 138, 141, 142 energy policy, 79, 156 nuclear energy, l47, 80, 122, 168, 174–175 renewable energy sources, 79–80, 175 environmental policy, 36, 39, 201 climate protection, 9, 70, 77, 79–80, 85–86, 161, 201 20–20–20–until 2020 formula (or 20–20–20 formula), 79–80, 201 ESDP, see European Security and Defense Policy EU, see European Union European Council, 9, 71–73, 76–77, 79–80, 82, 84, 86 German EU presidency, 9, 70–79, 83, 86, 191 European policy, 9, 41, 69–70, 78–86, 187, 201 pragmatization of Germany’s EU policy, 69–70, 80, 83, 201 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), 76, 86

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European Union (EU), 5, 9, 20, 25, 28, 41, 43, 69–86, 155, 167, 175, 179, 190–191, 201 Council of Ministers, 76 European Commission, 72–73, 79, 86 European Parliament, 75, 77, 92, 107 family policy, 23, 25, 27–29, 200 day care facilities, 23–25 parental leave benefit (Elterngeld), 23, 25 FDP, see Free Democratic Party Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) (Bundesverfassungsgericht), 4, 19–20, 26–27, 34–35, 37–38, 43–44, 47, 85–86, 121, 193, 203 Federal President, 8, 26, 86, 89, 92, 108, 161, 182, 185, 193 federalism, 5, 7, 9, 17, 25–28, 31–33, 35–39, 41–43, 45–47, 49, 154, 167, 173, 176, 182, 204–205 federalism reform, 7, 9, 17, 25–28, 35–39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 167, 173, 204–205 joint-decision trap, 39, 46 joint tasks, 31, 33 lex posterior rule, 34 necessity clause (Erforderlichkeitsklausel), 34, 46 new federalism, 31, 41, 45, 205 financial market crisis, 2, 9, 17, 19, 24–25, 27–28, 70–71, 81–82, 84–85, 91, 104, 135, 156, 161, 166, 168, 170, 178, 200, 202 fiscal policy, 4, 17, 19, 161, 200 see also tax reform Fischer, Joschka, 85, 94, 190 foreign affairs, 4, 97, 134, 153, 159, 201 foreign policy, 78, 160, 161, 163, 179, 188, 190–191, 194, 202–203 France, 70–71, 73–74, 81–84, 188–190, 192, 201 Free Democratic Party (FDP), 1–2, 6, 15, 47, 49–50, 53–58, 60–61,

64–66, 90–95, 98–100, 102–105, 108–115, 118–126, 129–142, 148–157, 159–163, 165–166, 168–172, 175–178, 180–183, 193, 195, 197–199, 204–205 Freie Wähler, 59, 61, 123 G8 summit, 79–80 G20 summit, 81–82 German Democratic Republic (GDR), see East Germany German model, 1, 5, 179, 184, 186 German People’s Union (DVU), 53, 59, 90, 105 Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU-SPD) first Grand Coalition (1966–69), 15, 31, 68, 148, 150, 160, 180–181, 187, 192–193 government formation 2005, 2, 6, 11, 15, 50–52, 61, 66–67, 128, 142, 147–148, 150, 163, 181–183, 193, 195–196, 203 at Länder level, 9, 49–52, 55, 67, 197 Grand Coalition State, 7, 10, 179, 186, 191, 193 Greens (Die Grünen), 1, 6, 15–16, 49–50, 53–54, 57–58, 60–62, 64–65, 67, 90–95, 98, 100, 102, 108–115, 117–124, 126, 129, 131, 133–140, 149, 162, 181, 183 Grundgesetz, see Basic Law Guttenberg, Karl-Theodor zu, 153, 159, 161, 178 Hamburg, 53, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 67–68, 108, 112, 132, 197 Hartz IV reform, 38, 129 health care, 15–16, 21–22, 26–27, 37–38, 47, 96, 129–130, 155–157, 160, 167–168, 172–173, 178, 200–202 health care fund (Gesundheitsfonds), 22, 167, 172–173

Index Hesse, 54–56, 58, 60–62, 64, 67, 91–92, 105, 113, 131–132, 159, 161–162, 197 homeland security, 175 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), 76–77 Ioannina Clause, 77 Juncker, Jean-Claude, 84 Jung, Franz Josef, 153, 161 Kohl, Helmut, 6, 101, 116, 134, 152, 158, 163, 173, 185, 190–192 Köhler, Horst, 8, 86, 92, 105, 108, 123, 182 Kosovo, 189, 194 Künast, Renate, 135–136 Kyoto Protocol, 79–80, 86 labor market, 7, 15–17, 21, 24–26, 28–29, 37–38, 95, 99, 102, 129, 167, 171, 200 Lafontaine, Oskar, 29, 65, 95, 105, 113, 135–136 Länder, 4–7, 9, 11, 17–19, 23, 31–47, 49–62, 64–68, 89–93, 107, 112, 117, 119, 121–124, 131, 148, 152, 154–158, 163, 167, 169, 173, 176, 186, 197, 204–205 Left Party (Die Linke) (LP), 10, 15, 29, 47, 50, 59–61, 64–66, 90–95, 98–100, 102, 108–115, 118–123, 125, 127, 129, 131, 133–142, 181, 183, 192, 197–198 Lisbon Treaty, 77–78, 85–86, 201 Lower Saxony, 53, 56, 58, 60, 62, 67, 105, 113, 132, 159 LP, see Left Party (Die Linke) Maastricht Treaty, 72, 167, 189 Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 48, 53–54, 56–59, 62, 67, 105, 131, 132

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229

Merkel, Angela, 1–2, 6, 8–9, 11, 15–17, 19, 21, 25–26, 28–30, 55, 59, 64–67, 70–86, 89–90, 93, 96–102, 104–106, 108, 112, 114, 121, 123, 127, 134–136, 140, 147–149, 151–163, 177, 180, 183, 187–188, 190–192, 195–202, 204 ‘Merkel method’, 76, 85 migration policy, 174 mixed-member proportional electoral system, see electoral system Müntefering, Franz, 93, 100, 105, 148 multilevel governance, 9, 31–33, 39, 41, 46, 204 National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), 53, 57, 59, 64, 68, 90, 105, 117 NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nice Treaty, 74 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 189 North-Rhine Westphalia, 205 NPD, see National Democratic Party of Germany parties, 1–4, 6–11, 15–16, 27–28, 30, 37–38, 42–44, 46, 49–54, 57, 59–61, 64–67, 85, 89–93, 95–97, 99–101, 103–105, 107–109, 111–129, 132–142, 147–154, 156–157, 160, 163, 165, 174–175, 177, 180–188, 191–193, 195, 197–199, 202–204 party competition, 3, 8, 31, 42, 136, 196 Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), 6, 10, 50, 53–54, 57, 59, 109–112, 117–118, 124, 181

230

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Index

party system, 2–6, 8, 10–11, 29, 32, 42, 46, 49–55, 57, 60, 67–68, 107–108, 116, 123, 125–127, 141, 148, 150, 180–181, 183–185, 191, 193, 196–199, 203–204 asymmetry, 53, 127 concentration, 3, 8, 54, 127, 141 effective number of parties, 127 fragmentation, 6, 10, 50, 108, 117, 123, 127, 150, 183, 188, 191, 193, 198–199, 204 ‘fluid five-party’ system, 6, 67, 116, 180, 191, 196 Länder party systems, 6, 49–55, 57, 60, 68, 197 multi-level congruence, 49–50, 52, 55 polarization, 56, 66, 98, 108, 181–182, 196 stability, 1, 109, 126, 179–180, 184, 186, 188, 191, 193, 201 ‘two-and-a-half-party’ system, 181 PDS, see Party of Democratic Socialism pensions, 16, 22, 25, 27–29, 153, 171–172, 177 pension age increase, 22, 25, 27–28, 171, 177, 200 Pofalla, Ronald, 95, 153, 159, 161 political cleavages, see cleavages political culture, 180–182 post-materialism, 181 presidentialization, 89 privatization, 19, 25–26 rationalized parliamentarism, 180, 184, 192 Red-Green coalition (SPD-Greens), see coalitions Red-Red-Green coalition (SPD-LPGreens), see coalitions religion, 47, 113–115, 126, 158

reunification, 1, 3, 5, 41, 50, 52–54, 69, 108, 120, 125, 168, 176, 179, 182, 192, 196 Rhineland-Palatinate, 48, 53–54, 56, 58–59, 62, 113, 131–132, 159 Rösler, Philipp, 153, 159, 178 Röttgen, Norbert, 159, 161, 178 Saarland, 18, 48, 53–54, 56, 58–59, 63–67, 91, 96, 98, 113, 132, 197 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 74, 81–84, 192 Saxony, 48, 53–54, 56, 58–59, 63–65, 67, 91, 96, 98, 113, 131, 159 Saxony-Anhalt, 18, 48, 53–54, 56–59, 62, 67, 132 Schäuble, Wolfgang, 153, 159, 161 Schleswig-Holstein, 18, 48, 53–54, 56, 58, 63–67, 113, 131–132 Schmidt, Helmut, 102, 123, 134, 152, 158, 191 Schmidt, Ulla, 96–97, 102 Schröder, Gerhard, 2, 6–9, 21, 29, 69–71, 80, 83, 90, 94, 99, 101–102, 105, 112, 129, 134, 185, 188, 190, 194, 201, 204 Schröder, Kristina, 159, 161 SED, see Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands semisovereign state, 3–8, 196, 200, 204–206 Social-Democratic Party (SPD), 1, 6–8, 10, 15, 17, 19, 26–27, 29, 37, 47, 49–50, 52–68, 72, 90–98, 100, 102–105, 108–118, 120–127, 129–143, 147–150, 152, 155, 160, 162, 166, 168, 171, 177–178, 180–181, 183, 188, 192, 195–198, 200, 203 social policy, 21, 28–29, 166, 168, 170–172 Bürgergeld (guaranteed basic income), 129 social spending, 200

Index Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), 53, 147 SPD, see Social-Democratic Party Steinbrück, Peer, 19, 72 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter, 64, 90, 95–97, 99–102, 104–106, 134–136, 149, 197–198 Stoiber, Edmund, 101 tax reform, 20, 25, 27, 165, 168–169, 200 business tax, 20, 25, 27–28, 200 inheritance tax, 20, 26, 169 Value Added Tax (VAT), 19–21, 27, 166, 169 see also fiscal policy TCE, see Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe terrorism, 32, 34 Third Way, 194 Thuringia, 48, 53–54, 56, 58–59, 63–66, 91, 96, 98, 131–132 trade unions, 108, 115 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), 70–71, 73–77, 84, 86, 190–191 Turkey, 71 unemployment, 5, 21, 24–25, 27–29, 122, 129, 171–172, 200 Union (CDU/CSU), 1, 6–8, 10, 15, 21, 26, 28, 49–50, 52, 58, 60, 65, 68,

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231

71, 90, 92–95, 98, 100, 103, 109–116, 118–120, 123–124, 127, 129–134, 136–138, 140, 142–143, 147–150, 153–154, 158, 163, 180–181, 183, 188, 192, 195–199, 200, 203, 205 Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), 83 veto players, 4, 26, 38, 180–181, 186 Verhofstadt, Guy, 73 vice chancellor, 2, 90, 97, 100, 134, 148, 159–160, 197 Volksparteien, see catch-all parties von der Leyen, Ursula, 153, 159, 161 vote of no-confidence, 3, 184–185 voting behavior, see electoral behavior Wahlalternative Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit (WASG), 10, 59 WASG, see Wahlalternative Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit Weimar Republic, 179–180, 184–186, 191, 194 welfare state, 7, 16, 26, 29, 90–91, 165, 167–168, 177–178, 200 Westerwelle, Guido, 2, 85–86, 90, 94–95, 98, 103, 106, 129, 135–136, 152–156, 159, 160, 162 Wowereit, Klaus, 57