Gaming in the New Market Environment Edited by
Matti Viren
Gaming in the New Market Environment
This page intention...
20 downloads
1410 Views
926KB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
Gaming in the New Market Environment Edited by
Matti Viren
Gaming in the New Market Environment
This page intentionally left blank
Gaming in the New Market Environment Edited by Matti Viren
Selection and editorial matter © Matti Viren 2008 Chapters © their authors 2008 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2008 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 13: 978–0–230–50050–1 hardback ISBN 10: 0–230–50050–1 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gaming in the new market environment / edited by Matti Viren. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–230–50050–1 (alk. paper) 1. Gambling industry. 2. Gambling. 3. Lotteries. I. Viren, Matti. HV6710.G38 2008 338.4′7795–dc22 10 17
9 16
8 15
7 14
6 13
2008014546 5 12
4 11
3 10
2 09
1 08
Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne
Contents List of Tables
vi
List of Figures
vii
Acknowledgements
viii
List of Contributors
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
1
Chapter 2
When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide
23
Chapter 3
Demand Issues in the Market for Lotto and Similar Games
54
Chapter 4
Lottery Design Lessons from the Dismal Science
75
Chapter 5
Lotteries as a Source of Revenue
99
Chapter 6
Problem Gambling and European Lotteries
126
Chapter 7
The Economics of Scale and Scope in the Lottery Industry
160
Chapter 8
The Political Economy of Regulating Gambling
184
References
209
Index
221
v
List of Tables 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 6.1 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4
Summary of demand elasticities Regression results, UK Saturday Lotto sales (millions) UK Saturday Lotto sales regression Spending on Lotto and other models of gambling Estimated parameters of log sales equations Gross tax rates, EU lotteries Gambling revenues (£ million) and gross tax rates, UK Excise rates – UK National Lottery, alcohol, tobacco and petrol products Tax revenues, with and without the lottery Share of total income spent on ‘vices’, by income decile Share of spending on ‘vices’, by income decile Correlation coefficients of expenditures Why do people play the National Lottery? What is ‘an excellent way to spend’ lottery money? A summary of the most common forms of offline commercial gambling Panel data estimates of the cost function for European lotteries Cross-section estimates from the European data Cost function estimates with the US data Change in cost shares over time in the US Marginal effect of sales on costs Further estimates of scale economies Some demand function estimates with the US data The variables and the main bookkeeping relations Names in Danish and our translation Categories and main results of Danish gambling dependency studies Gambling prices for various products in Denmark
vi
60 65 67 72 89 100 102 103 104 110 112 112 121 122 128 169 170 171 172 172 172 177 192 197 198 199
List of Figures 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 5.1 5.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.10 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6
Consumer surplus Consumer surplus for two types of gamblers – recreational and pathological Efficiency of production and consumption in a world with legalised gambling Shifts in the production possibility curve Sales of Saturday Lotto tickets in the United Kingdom Probability distribution of winnings in a typical UK Lotto draw Lotto’s peculiar economies of scale Expected value in rollover and regular draws Two-game lottery market UK sales (£m per week) Effects of varying n on sales and revenue Effects of varying τ on sales and revenue Tax Lorenz curves – lottery, gambling, tobacco and alcohol Good causes and lottery spending Optimal payout ratio with different demand elasticities and marginal costs Operating costs in Europe 1995–2005 Personnel costs in Europe 1995–2005 Operating costs in the US in 2005 Factors affecting operating costs in the US Two alternative marginal costs curves Marginal costs for US companies 1992–2005 Effect of prizes on sales in the US Operating costs/sales from European and US lotteries Operating costs for certain private gaming companies, 2005 Demand for gambling by a normal and an addicted gambler Demand for gambling by an addicted gambler The effect of a tax increase on normal gamblers A stylised theory of the gambling problem Adding the possibility of excess production The distributions of unit costs for the typical market firm and SOE vii
26 30 41 43 57 62 82 82 85 88 91 92 111 119 162 165 166 167 168 174 175 178 179 180 187 188 189 194 196 202
Acknowledgements The preparation of this book would not have been possible without the support of the Finnish Veikkaus. The CEO, Risto Nieminen, and director, Jari Vähänen, deserve special thanks for supporting the original initiative and encouraging work at latter stages. Ms Paivi Ahtola has also helped a lot in all practical matters, especially in organising the authors’ workshop along with the EL congress in Budapest in May 2007. Marja Heikkinen has kindly checked the English of several chapters and Päivi Nietosvaara has edited the final version of the manuscript. Several persons have provided useful comments and other help during the process of writing different chapters of the book. Some of these people are mentioned in the context of individual chapters but the authors would like to express their gratitude to all of them. Also all the European lotteries that responded to a survey on the consequences of the changing market environment deserve warm thanks. Finally, the assistance of Alec Dubber of Palgrave and Shirley Tan of EXPO Holdings Sdn Bhd was paramount for the rapid publication of the book. Helsinki, September 2007 Matti Viren
viii
List of Contributors Lisa Farrel, School of Economics and Geary Institute, University College Dublin, Ireland. David Forrest, Centre for the Study of Gambling, University of Salford, UK. Mark Griffiths, International Gaming Research Unit, Psychology, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, UK. Martin Paldam, Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, Denmark. Sarah Smith, Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK. Matti Viren, Department of Economics, University of Turku, Finland. Ian Walker, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK.
ix
This page intentionally left blank
1 Introduction Matti Viren
1.1
Background
The idea behind this book is the observation that gaming markets are changing rapidly. This change manifests itself in institutions, the nature of games and in the volume and pricing of gaming.1 Formally, the institutional set-up has not changed very much during the past ten years. However, under the surface a great deal has happened. The most important engine of change, of course, has been the internet which has enabled cross-border gambling in an unprecedented scale. Although we do not exactly know the volume of cross-border sales, we can use the estimates of a recent survey conducted across European lotteries.2 According to this survey, cross-border sales constitute an average of 7.4 per cent of the gaming companies’ total sales. It is not a strikingly big figure but when we look at the individual games, we are faced with certain very high percentages. For example, while crossborder sales in lotto are around 1 per cent, their share in sports betting amounts to up to 39 per cent. From the point of view of existing companies and governments, the situation is alarming already because of major losses of revenue. Governments are also concerned about tax revenue: private bookmakers do not pay taxes for their cross-border sales, which in turn further deteriorates the governments’ fiscal position. State-owned Lotto companies have legal monopolies in almost all European countries. This applies to lotto all over Europe and, in many countries, to all gambling activities (including slot machines). Along with the state companies, there are a number of private bookmakers, which obviously would like to expand their activities to markets now governed by public monopolies. For this purpose they keep challenging the markets by selling their products via the internet and by questioning 1
2 Gaming in the New Market Environment
the justification of exclusive rights in courts of law. In fact, dozens of court cases are currently pending. Thus far, the exclusive rights have not been found illegal. Yet, the current system has been found to be at variance with other legislation and principles of competition in a number of countries (cf., e.g., Littler and Fijnaut, 2006). More importantly, the European Commission has shown strong interest towards the opening of the gambling sector to competition. Consequently, it has made several inquiries on the functioning of the gambling markets in Europe, the most notable of which was made by the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law (the so-called Swiss Institute Report, 2006). Thus, it is quite obvious that cross-border sales will continue to grow in the future unless strict regulations, such as the restrictions imposed in the US on the transfer of money via the banking system, are enforced. Moreover, there is growing pressure on the current institutional set-up dealing with sport-betting, in particular. This does not mean that the only thing that could happen is the simple liberalisation of gambling markets. It is possible that the tax system changes so that a heavy excise tax (along with the VAT) is imposed on all types of gambling, which would effectively take out the profits from gambling. At present, tax rates vary considerably from one country to another (among the EL members, taxes may equal the lotteries’ net profits). This is not important in the current state monopoly system because the distinction between tax revenue and company profits is somewhat artificial from the government point of view. In a more competitive system, this would no more be true and familiar problems of tax competition and tax harmonisation would become relevant. Because lottery services can be produced in basically any country, there would be large incentives for tax competition, which would limit the governments’ chances of compensating the reduced profits from state lottery companies by taxes. Another complicated tax issue deals with the taxation of internet gaming which is right now a grey area in the European Union (Jeanneret-Druckman, 2004). Along with the lines of VAT taxation cross-border internet gambling ought to be taxed in the customer country, yet taxes are not collected in practice. Whatever will happen, it is clear that we are moving towards more competitive markets and prices will fall (accordingly, prizes and the payout ratios will increase).Thus, while the average payout ratio of the European companies is now at 53.3 per cent as compared to 48.5 per cent ten years ago, all companies expect it to increase substantially in the next ten years. If all restrictions were abolished, the payout ratios
Introduction 3
could reach 70 per cent according to the current European state lotteries.3 This would obviously increase the volume of sales. Using the subjective estimate of the companies as a benchmark we could say that such a change in the payout ratios would increase the overall demand by almost one-third. Quite clearly, such changes would show in all indicators: production, employment, advertising and, maybe most importantly, problem gambling. What would be the nature and magnitude of these effects is a subject to the analyses and reviews that are presented in this book. Even though we are focusing strongly on the future, this book is not a forecast. Rather than trying to say what the situation is in 2017 we wish to put forward alternatives which are available to decision-makers and consequences of these alternatives, including the alternative that no significant changes in the current institutional system would take place. The nature of gaming will change even without institutional change. This can be clearly seen in the increase of multi-jurisdictional lotteries. The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and also Estonia) have the Viking lotto, several European lotteries (Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the UK with a total population base of 208 million people) are involved in the EuroMillions, and in the US, as many as 29 states participate in Powerball. The motivation for this trend is clear: consumers prefer very large jackpots and they are only achievable by putting together the clientele of several small lotteries. The idea that we might have a fully global lotto one day does not sound terribly unrealistic any more. In fact, some suggestions have already been put forward. Along with globalisation, the structure and nature of games keep changing. To illustrate previous developments, we could take the example of Finland. In 1940, when the Finnish lottery Veikkaus was founded, it started with just one game (Football Pools). In 2006, there were already 12 lotto, keno and sports betting games and, in addition, 12 instant games. Over the years, at least the same number of games have come and gone and many of the remaining games have changed their form – frequently into games playable over the internet (Veikkaus’ Annual Report, 2006). When considering these alternatives, the deep dividing question concerns the role of government regulations and the role of state monopolies in the production of gambling services. Thus, we could ask whether there is a case for curtailing the demand for lotto and gambling. A partly related question concerns the role of state monopolies: should we preserve the monopoly or not? In the latter case of no state
4 Gaming in the New Market Environment
monopoly, we have to consider whether we should have a licence system (one or several licences), or whether we should implement a completely unregulated system. These questions are difficult because they concern the role of government and the scope to which governments can go in securing their fiscal needs and protecting consumers without jeopardising free entrepreneurship and free competition. To illustrate the difficulty of deciding what form the lottery markets should take in the future, let us look at the history of lotteries in the United States. In the United States lotteries have a long history starting before the independence. Initially, there were both public and private lotteries with different licensing systems in different states. In the early 19th century lotteries had their ‘golden age’, but since 1830 growing criticism and popular opposition led to the curtailment of the lotteries’ operations and sales. After the Civil War, the situation culminated in that the government (different states with the help of the Federal Government) abolished gambling altogether for almost a century (for details, see Clotfelter and Cook, 1991 and Ezell, 1960). Basically, the prohibition could be explained by the general view that gambling creates more harm than benefit for consumers. To some extent at least, this presumption was caused by misdeeds of criminal-minded lotteries that received wide publicity. Finally, in 1964, New Hampshire legalised lottery activities again, and was gradually followed by most US States. Currently, only eight US states prohibit legalised lotteries.4 In Europe, the attitudes have not been as strongly divided, although they have varied across different countries (cf., e.g., Douglas, 1995). It is only in the case of casinos that there has been extensive resistance in almost all European countries. In the rest of the world, gambling has a somewhat shorter history and it has only recently become a major industry that has benefited from relatively liberal government policies. Right now, the general attitude towards gambling is fairly positive. Relatively few consumers and organisations would be ready to prohibit all sorts of gambling. This, in turn, can be interpreted as an indication that the favourable welfare effects of gaming proceeds are generally well recognised. Even so, the measurement and role of the welfare effects are still worth thorough analysis. Through demand analysis, we can derive a large amount of useful and objective information on these effects. It is interesting to notice that the acceptance of gambling manifests itself in long cycles. This can be seen especially in the US, where the attitudes have moved from one extreme to another. It is hard to say
Introduction 5
how much of this is due to religion or, more generally, a certain way of thinking. Sauer (2001) argues that fiscal factors are decisive in this respect. When fiscal needs have been high – due to wars or otherwise increased government expenditures there has been more willingness to allow gambling to alleviate the pressure of taxation. In Sauer’s view, the recent growth of lotteries can be attributed to the growth of government expenditure worldwide (e.g., due to the construction of the welfare state). Fiscal pressures have paved a way for new sources of revenue, and gambling is an obvious possibility for new income source. It is difficult to say exactly how important fiscal matters are but it is clear that we cannot isolate ‘attitudes’ and ‘ways of thinking’ from the development of the economy. Certainly, there exist differences between e.g., federalist and non-federalist countries because state-level authorities have had less alternatives in generating additional revenues. This may show up in attitudes towards casinos, age-limits and so on. Naturally, the demand for gambling has its own dynamics: when gambling grows extensively, the dark side becomes more prominent and opposition emerges. By contrast, in a heavily regulated system, virtually no problems seem to exist and there is no demand for an anti-gambling movement. In the 1950s and 1960s, state gaming monopolies seemed the obvious way of arranging gaming activities.5 Governments could delegate the production of services to the monopoly company and curtail the possible harmful effects by monopolistic pricing. At that time, the harmful effects probably mattered much less than the fiscal effects. As fiscal agencies, government monopolies were ideal. There was no need to design a tax system for various products. Instead, it was left to the monopoly company to find the optimal pricing and production scheme. Revenues from gaming monopoly (monopolies) are definitely important for governments, although the figures do not seem very high. Thus, in the US, lottery revenue represented roughly 2.3 per cent of all own-source general revenue or lottery states (Hansen, 2004). According to Eurostat, taxes on gambling, lotteries and betting correspond to about 0.4 per cent of all taxes and social security contributions to general government. We have to be careful with these numbers because they are not comparable and because the quality of the European figures at least is dubious.6 Moreover, we have to keep in mind that a possible squeeze of lottery revenues would not hurt all levels of government on the way. Let us take one example. In Finland, the share of taxes on gambling, lotteries and betting out of the total taxes and social security contributions to general government was 1.3 per cent in 2006. However, if we compare these revenues to central government income tax
6 Gaming in the New Market Environment
revenues, the share is as high as 7.6 per cent. Thus, from the central government’s point of view, lottery revenues are important because if they have to be compensated with the main tax instruments (income tax or VAT), the average rates should be increased by more than one percentage point. Although all lottery revenue does not go to government (literally to the account of the treasury) the revenue is equivalent to other government revenue from the government’s point of view in most cases. Thus, if state lottery proceeds were not available, the governments should probably provide similar levels of funding to the lottery beneficiaries (when the government is not the beneficiary directly). This would require higher taxes, basically entailing a trade-off between the ‘lottery tax’ and, say, the income tax. Comparing these two alternatives is not easy because it is not completely clear to what extent ‘lottery tax’ is comparable with income tax (rather it is comparable to some commodity taxes). The only thing that is clear is that the two ‘taxes’ have quite different distributional effects: the ‘lottery tax’ is known to be highly regressive, whereas the income tax is usually progressive. Thus, moving away from the ‘lottery tax’ would be good for distributional reasons at first sight. Yet, we have to keep in mind that the ‘lottery tax’ does not necessarily disappear if we abolished state monopolies but rather it changes its form to (private) lottery companies’ profits. At any rate, this trade-off is a real problem because taxation is not only an issue of distribution. From the economics point of view, the deadweight losses are probably more important. In the case of income taxation, we have long thought to be relatively unimportant (assuming that labour supply is almost inelastic). However, the general views are quite different at present. Thus, in public finances we have experienced a ‘flight from high income taxes’ to alternative sources of finance. Unfortunately, or fortunately, in the modern world, we have very few options for alternative sources of finance: tax competition sets strict limits to capital taxation and commodity taxation. On top of that, we should keep in mind that at least in income taxation, both trade unions and employer’s associations have great influence on decisionmaking. There will never be equally powerful gamblers’ associations to lobby in London or Brussels. Needless to say, the fiscal problem varies from country to country depending on the earmarking system and budgeting practice. In the case where the lottery money goes to sports and arts, it looks like there is no direct obligation on the government to compensate for the loss of money. We should remember, however, that sports organisations and
Introduction 7
the arts lobby have always been powerful and skilful lobbyists for government expenditures and that they would probably receive as much as now from the government if there were no lottery funds available. Although the revenues from gambling constitute an important fraction of governments’ resources there is a big policy problem with this source of funds: the importance of lottery revenue does not justify monopolies as such. The fact that a government monopoly is highly profitable in a certain market does not provide the government with a justification to set up a monopoly and prevent competition. The government must have a proper justification for preventing market outcome. Basically, this is the position adopted by the European Court of Justice and several national courts. If the fiscal necessity does not constitute the case for government lottery, what could then be the proper justification? The primary explanation appears to be the need to curtail the harmful side effects of gambling, by which we usually mean problem gambling. The idea is simple: with monopolistic pricing, the volume of sales stays relatively small and if problem gambling is related to the level of sales, problem gambling should also remain well under control. The previous argument makes sense; yet it can be challenged by at least two arguments. First, problem gambling does not appear to be really widespread and second, the reduction of demand could be achieved by means other than state monopoly, i.e., by taxes and legal restrictions. In this respect, government monopoly could only be better if it behaved in a way different from that of private operators, e.g., by showing greater self-restraint in creating new games, restricting sales to high risk-groups and using less (effective) advertisement to stimulate demand. These are issues which probably vary enormously from country to country depending on the role of fiscal authorities (Ministry of Finance) in the administration of the companies, the system followed in appointments (does the board consist of politicians, business people, academics, etc.), and what is the general business culture in public enterprises like. In the US, state lotteries seem to clearly resemble each other, but in Europe there is no uniform model for them. Take for instance, Finland and Italy and compare their market structure, licensing policy, and legislation! The role of problem gambling is quite delicate as it is suggested later in this book. It is generally argued that problem gambling has been well under control thus far, and that it only represents a problem for a small minority, say 1 per cent of the adult population, which appears a typical estimate in most jurisdictions. But we have to be careful in quantifying the significance of problem gambling. Small numbers of
8 Gaming in the New Market Environment
participation may not necessarily mean small economic impact. The consequences of problem gambling can be experienced by a much larger set of people than the problem gamblers themselves, and the damage on the lives of the sufferers and their families can be much larger than our numbers would suggest. We could imagine that problem gambling could go to extreme forms, such as theft and fraud. Then, its true incidence would no more be marginal. From the point of view of the present analysis, the key issue is not really the current state of problem gambling but the connection between market change and the growth of problem gambling. The fact that problem gambling has been under control does not necessarily mean that problems will not occur shall markets change. Increase in sales and, in particular, the development of more intensive games could change the problem gambling environment entirely.7 We should also notice that even if problem gamblers might not lose money, they (and their social environment) would still suffer from problem gambling. With less binding budget constraints, they could devote their entire lives to gambling leaving aside schooling, social contacts and work, which sounds problematic even though the gambler’s utility would be maximised. Thus, even if increased competition lowered prices, cutting the existing problem gamblers’ monetary losses, assuming that their demand is relatively inelastic, problem gambling would not automatically become less problematic as a whole and may even become worse. Besides the desire to limit problem gambling, we have basically two further rationalisations by which the gambling monopoly can be justified: (1) the gambling markets may not stay competitive and (2) there are several public policy reasons for monopoly. If the gambling market does not become competitive, consumers will not benefit from lower prices (increased consumer surplus). It is this fact that is often used as to motivate government intervention in public economics. If consumers were not awarded greater surplus, public monopoly would not be any worse than the market solution. Our argument stems basically from the fact that costs are predominantly fixed in gambling, especially in lotteries. Thus, marginal costs are small and apparently falling.8 Such a cost structure clearly favours monopolies (creating an environment for what could be called a natural monopoly). A natural monopoly would have a permanent cost advantage in comparison with smaller firms, driving smaller companies out of the market and stopping new companies from entering the market. Thus, we would not end up with a competitive market
Introduction 9
solution in the long run, but rather with a single monopoly or monopolistic competition depending on the role of costs when sales become very large. Some caveats should, however, be considered here. First of all, we know relatively little about the cost conditions of gaming companies. Moreover, all empirical analyses make use of data for relatively small companies. In fact, in the US, the biggest company (New York State Lottery) represents just 12 per cent of the total sales in US, whereas the biggest European company (Lottomatica) represents 15 per cent of the European sales. Hence, we know little about the cost conditions of companies that would cover the total US and/or European markets. Another caveat deals with the nature of games. The cost conditions for setting up new games or selling them may be quite different in the future, which obviously affects the shapes of relevant cost curves. This is obvious if we compare, e.g., the costs incurred by internet sales with traditional retailer commissions. It might be argued that a natural monopoly would not be a problem because the government could control it by various regulations, as has been the case with various energy, water and transportation monopolies customarily (for a comprehensive literature review on the regulation of natural monopolies, see e.g., Depoorter, 2000). Controlling a natural monopoly is somewhat controversial since it is the most efficient way of production. Yet, the adverse distributional effects usually make governments set upper limits to prices. Correct pricing is a very delicate matter because the government should basically give subsidies to the company to obtain the most efficient production structure. In the case of full-scale market liberalisation a more serious institutional problem would, however, arise because all the companies would be inevitably global. Consequently, we would need a global organisation to control the supply side. Right now, there is no obvious organisational solution for the problem although regional institutions like the EU Commission, might try to do that.9 Turning to public policy problems, there are several issues to be considered. The first issue concerns fraud and other misbehaviour. Such phenomena would most probably be relevant in the case of a seemingly competitive system with many small providers of gambling services. Those having difficulties in surviving would be tempted to use illegal, or morally dubious means of surviving in the market. They might also collaborate with the criminal-minded producers of false results.10 Small firms might be founded solely for the purpose of crime, money laundering, in particular. Money laundering is a big issue in modern
10 Gaming in the New Market Environment
societies, since it is lies behind all economic crime and misbehaviour. On the other hand, gambling is ideal for money laundering because of its big volumes and frequent transactions. Even now, payout ratios are sufficiently high to exceed the critical levels required to support money laundering (see, e.g., Fabre G., 2003). The problem is generally recognised and various legal and administrative steps have been done to prevent it but very few cases have, after all, been discovered and brought to justice (Skala, 2004). Finally, on the list of public policy issues, there are regulatory problems caused by advance payments, presentation of correct results etc.11 All of the items on this list suggest that, under all institutional arrangements, a completely unregulated system could not be allowed. Instead, a certain licence system should be imposed, similar to the one used in banking. In a non-monopoly system, more funding should probably be required to regulatory activities to the extent of setting up a separate agency for lottery supervision. While the above-mentioned issues may provide justification for government gambling monopolies, there are also arguments that favour the abolishment of those monopolies. On the top of the list is probably the need to increase competition, decrease government intervention and, in addition, the desire to achieve a more efficient production of lottery services. A more competitive system would, ceteris paribus, lower the ‘lottery tax’ and increase the demand for lotto. It would enhance welfare even if it increased problem gambling. If markets did not stay competitive but turned into private monopolies, we would not gain very much from liberalising the markets. Rather, we would be dealing with certain adverse distributional issues. A relevant question would then be: who will gain from the government’s monopoly lottery versus who will gain from the private lottery monopoly. Public vs. private ownership would probably – irrespective of market structure – affect the efficiency of production. There are two possible reasons for this. First, even if we had a monopoly for reasons other than legal considerations in private production, there would always be a contestable market option. Unlike the case of legal monopoly, a private monopolist would have to be prepared for the entry of a possible new competitor. Thus, it could not set its prices too high even if there were no apparent competition. Secondly, a private monopoly has to be responsive to its shareholders and therefore try to increase its profits by, e.g., reducing costs. Basically, public monopolies have the same requirement but they have been typically less keen on reducing
Introduction 11
costs and increasing efficiency. What is said about reducing costs basically applies to innovations and investments, as well. If managers are not under constant pressure to increase profits, less effort is devoted to improvements. Naturally, it is generally assumed that the ‘public ownership slack’ also shows in public lottery companies. Unfortunately, there is no empirical analysis which would allow us to conclude whether the presumption is right or wrong. Existing data facilities allow only very rough comparisons. Even though these comparisons are not very informative casual evidence from lottery companies suggests that the differences are not very large and at least some improvement in the efficiency at public lottery companies has taken place. Thus, in spite of a rapid growth of sales, employment has not increased but rather decreased. There can be various reasons for this but it seems likely obvious that increased interest in the public companies’ efficiency could be one reason behind the change. We also have to pay attention to the fact that state monopolies, although they have a legal monopoly, are de facto competing with private gambling companies. Thus, gambling markets in Europe are more competitive than contestable in an abstract sense. But for efficiency comparisons, we would definitely need empirical analysis to answer the question of whether important efficiency differences exist, both between state monopolies and between private and public companies. The problem is that even the efficiency issues have two sides: a more efficient company can sell more, which, from the problem gambling point of view, could be detrimental. This reflects the current schizophrenic situation in the European gambling markets. Increased cross-border trade has made markets competitive and state lottery monopolies face difficult choices. If they start competing (in the sense of defending their market share) by lowering prices, increasing advertising and introducing more games then private competitors and possibly even the regulators would accuse the monopolies for behaving like competitive firms and ignoring the harmful side-effects of gambling. In such a case, their existence would be hard to justify. If, by contrast, state monopolies do not react in any way to cross-border competition, they lose their market shares, and the markets will start functioning like any other market. Again it would be difficult to justify the state monopoly if it has no role in market behaviour and no fiscal importance. How should the companies, or their regulators, behave in such an environment? Right now, nobody seems to know. Obviously, some solution
12 Gaming in the New Market Environment
has to be reached, and transparent and enforceable rules have to be imposed on the market. It is also evident that, in the future, we will have to reconsider fiscal issues from various viewpoints. It is probable that some tax harmonisation will take place. It would be highly timely for Europe where both the rates and the institutions vary considerably. As we have pointed out earlier, some European countries have a formal lottery tax while others rely on direct transfers of profits from state lottery companies. Some (mainly Eastern European) countries also tax winnings, whereas they are tax free in most other countries. The taxation of winnings from other countries (private companies & internet) is even more of an open issue. In the future, one might expect that the European countries would move to a system of formal gambling taxation. The taxation would, of course, be realised as source taxes so that winnings would be tax free. But what type of taxes should be imposed? This issue is handled in several articles in this volume (especially in Chapter 5). The problem is that ‘optimal’ tax considerations seem to indicate that the taxes should not be excessively high. Yet, there are political economy considerations that might lead to relatively high rates. Governments would probably be eager to impose very high tax rates on all gambling, not only to reduce problem gambling but to discourage private gaming companies from entering the market. Gambling is an area where various special interest groups and lobbies have a lot of influence. We think it is unrealistic to expect that taxation would be organised on a purely theoretical basis. Yet, bearing in mind the above issues, certain basic principles of welfare economics should be acknowledged. Here we will not answer the question of how the gambling markets should be arranged, even though we provide a large amount of material which helps to take a stance on this matter. Thus, individual chapters of the book focus on the key issues of gambling and provide necessary information to answer the questions: how much will gambling (lotteries) increase if competition increases?; what is the contribution of the present games and changes in the existing games?; what are the welfare and fiscal effects of these changes?, what happens to the market structure if various restrictions on cross-border gaming are abolished?; how will problem gaming respond to changes in the sales volume and gaming menu?; and, what public policy concerns the change will bring? We are well aware that all relevant issues are not covered. Take, for instance, the interplay between lottery companies, governments and various beneficiary organisations in the area of public policy, or the
Introduction 13
problems of crime and fraud. Despite the partial coverage, we believe that the key issues are relatively well represented here and they will facilitate more intelligent discussion of the choices that could, or have to be made in the future. What follows next is a short summary of the individual chapters. At the end, some concluding remarks are presented.
1.2
Summary of different sections
Just to give an idea of what the book is about, we try to summarise here the individual chapters. Needless to say, the summaries are no substitutes to the articles. In the first article (Chapter 2) ‘When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide’, Lisa Farrell starts with a basic issue: how does gambling affect welfare. To start, she notes that the betting and gaming sector attracts a lot of interest from outside parties. Those within the sector view their products as leisure activities competing in a tough market place, whilst groups outside of the industry question the (ethical) nature of these products and their contribution to society. There are few industries (tobacco and alcohol included) that not only have to face the daily struggle to earn a profit but also have fight to justify their very existence. It is not always easy to unravel some of these often emotive issues and examine the link between gambling and welfare. Lisa Farrell shows that in a rapidly expanding market place it is important to be able to assess the impact of the gambling industry on society in order to inform the policy debate concerning the relaxation of betting and gaming legislation and the licensing of new products. Her chapter explores the theoretical foundations of gambling impact studies. Such studies aim to weigh the costs associated with the betting and gaming industry against the benefits in order to provide a figure which reflects the net monetary effect of the industry on society. Most studies find that the net impact is negative, i.e., that the costs are greater than the benefits. However, it can be shown that this result is due to the fact that most studies ignore the direct consumption value derived from the purchase of these products (as well as a number of other theoretically inconsistent assumptions). Farrell defines the total community costs/benefits of any activity as: Total benefits = private benefits + social benefits and Total costs = private costs + social costs. This can be rearranged as: Net impact = total benefits – total costs = (Private Benefits – Private costs) + (Social Benefit – Social Costs). In the literature to date it is common to include private costs but
14 Gaming in the New Market Environment
to neglect to include the private benefits associated with the consumption value of the product. Other studies only look at social costs and benefits and therefore totally disregard consumer preferences. In essence, most studies are methodologically flawed and this renders them entirely non-comparable. To address these shortcomings Farrell’s chapter reverts back to welfare economics and looks at the theoretical definitions of private costs/ benefits and social costs/benefits in order to aid applied researchers. Returning to first principles provides a useful insight into the existing studies and allows us to suggest improvements to the current methodologies utilised by applied economists when conducting impact studies. However, even with firm theoretical foundations difficulties still exist in trying to apply theoretical models and concepts to complexity at real world situations. In the second article ‘Demand Issues in the Market for Lotto and Similar Games’ (Chapter 3), David Forrest seeks to review attempts by economists and statisticians to model the demand for online lottery games such as lotto. This idea behind this article is the notion that knowing the demand patterns allows us both to make predictions about future developments and to assess the current market structure behaviour of supplies of gambling services. The article starts with an overview of published research and recent results obtained in a number of current lottery-related projects. The purpose is to draw out the extent to which the modelling exercises reported can illuminate the debate on the major trends and issues in the world of lotteries. The dominating issue in demand studies is the sensitivity of demand with respect to prices. Forrest illustrates the importance of the concept of price elasticity in assessing the correctness of the pricing policy by existing lotteries. He focuses not only on the price effects but also looks at the effect of other products on the demand for individual games. This phenomenon – usually called cannibalisation – is important in the modern gaming environment where new games appear continuously and the prices of existing games are manipulated even more often. If the cross-price effects are ignored we are faced with clearly misleading results in terms of the overall price sensitivity of lottery products. Forrest points out that lotteries operate in a fast changing and increasingly competitive gaming sector. Worldwide, potential players enjoy new opportunities to gamble via the internet, whether on lotteries, betting or forms of gaming (such as poker) to which they may not
Introduction 15
previously have had any access at all. The availability of cheaper versions of their own products, and of new potential substitutes, poses a threat to the established operators in Europe and elsewhere and makes the maintenance of their traditionally high take-out rates problematic. The problem of cannibalisation may not only be related to different lottery products but also to other gambling activities, most notably casinos. Forrest summarises some recent evidence from Australia, which seems to suggest that casinos do not exert great impact on the overall level of lottery expenditure except where the network of venues gives easy access to the most of population. Most demand analyses have thus far been done with traditional demand equations which focus on the expected prices (by ‘prices’ we refer to the amounts that individuals pay for lotto – in the aggregate, it is the inverse of the share of prizes out of total sales). Forrest reviews some second generation demand equations taking into account the specific risk features of the lotteries. He concludes that it is not only the expected price that is important but also the distribution of prizes. Thus far, there has been relatively little evidence on these features. Yet, Forrest convincingly argues that the new models provide a better basis for analysing demand patterns, at the same time offering the suppliers of lottery services new guidance on how to set the prizes. Ian Walker’s article ‘Lottery Design Lessons from Dismal Science’ (Chapter 4) also deals with demand issues. Basically, it explores the use of estimates on how lottery sales vary, in order to understand how changes in design might affect sales. The essence of Walker’s analysis is based on exploiting exogenous variation in the shape of the prize distribution to explain sales variation over time. In particular, he uses the rollover-driven variation in the prize distribution as a source of exogenous variation to test the hypothesis that players are motivated, in part, by the skewness of the prize distribution. While this idea has a long history, it has rarely been tested convincingly in the existing literature. Lotto games have strongly left skewed prize distributions – typically most players lose their stakes and only a tiny proportion receive large prizes. However, when a rollover occurs, the size of the largest prizes on offer usually rise and this causes the degree of skewness in the prize distribution to change. While the dataset that is used in Walker’s analyses does not feature any changes in the design parameters of the game, we can exploit the fact that there is a deterministic relationship between the mean, variance and skewness of the prize distribution (the distribution’s first three moments), as well as both the design parameters
16 Gaming in the New Market Environment
and the level of the prize pool rolled over from the previous draw. Since we know how the moments depend on both of these factors, and since we can estimate how sales depend on the moments, we can combine these to infer how sales depend on the design parameters even when there has been no variation in those parameters across the sample. This modelling strategy complements that pursued by other researchers who attempt to analyse the proximate determinants of sales (see, for example, Forrest (2008) and references therein). Both strands of related literature make arbitrary functional form assumptions. In one case the focus is on the role of the prize distribution and the assumption is that this can be captured through a ‘linear’ function of the moments of the prize distribution. One advantage of this more structural approach that emphasises the effect of the moments of the prize distribution on sales is that it is explicitly couched within a theoretical framework that has been widely used, in other markets, to analyse brand choices. It is common for lottery markets to feature a portfolio of games each with particular characteristics so that each game can be thought of as a brand. This theory helps us to understand the relationship between sales of different games in the same market and, in particular, enables us to make inferences about how to design games. Sarah Smiths’s article ‘Lotteries as a Source of Revenue’ (Chapter 5) focuses on the highly controversial fiscal aspects of lotteries. Smith notices that lotteries run by states around the world are typically characterised by two features. The first is a high tax rate. While a lottery is not itself a tax, as it is sometimes called, the fact is that almost the entire take-out rate (the price of a ticket minus the expected value of the prize) goes to the government as revenue. Smith shows that the tax rates on most lotteries are high – above those on other forms of gambling and those on alcohol and tobacco. In the new competitive gaming environment there is likely to be pressure on governments to reduce lottery taxes. Assuming that the current tax rates are at the revenue-maximising level, which the evidence suggest that they broadly are, cutting the tax rate is the appropriate response if demand becomes more price-sensitive, in order to continue to meet the goal of revenue-maximisation. There is no obvious economic efficiency argument for the fact that taxes on lotteries are so high. Taxes on vices, such as smoking or drinking are typically justified by these activities’ big negative externalities. But the evidence on problem gambling suggests that the negative externality argument is unlikely to justify such a high tax rate in the case of lotteries. Moreover, the fact that demand for lotteries is fairly
Introduction 17
sensitive to price suggests that the consumer welfare loss associated with taxing the lottery is likely to be fairly high, and the so-called Ramsey rule would imply that the overall distortionary cost could be reduced by raising taxes on goods with relatively less sensitive demand, subject to distributional considerations. Reducing lottery taxes would also be likely to improve the overall fairness of the tax system, although the impact would be very small since spending on lotteries is a small part of total income. Smith also looks at the issue of hypothecation, and asks what reduced earmarked revenues might mean for the good causes and for the lotteries themselves. Smith points out that if lottery taxes were cut it would mean a loss of earmarked revenue for the good causes. The evidence suggests that this would have little or no effect on the demand for the lottery – for most people it is the jackpot that matters, not the good causes. However, the loss would obviously be strongly opposed by the good causes themselves. Most studies (from the US) find that the good causes do benefit from earmarked revenues, albeit not by the full amount. While the good causes may have been seen as a useful bit of window dressing when lotteries were introduced, they are likely to turn into a political headache if lottery taxes – and the good causes funding – have to be reduced. What is perhaps most interesting in Smith’s analysis is the comparison of welfare and fiscal effects of the different taxes, including lottery tax. If we take government expenditures as given we may ask how good or bad lottery taxation really is. Although we cannot necessarily produce definite numbers, we can establish a proper framework for comparison and predictions. Mark Griffiths’ article ‘Problem Gambling and European Lotteries’ (Chapter 6) takes us a bit outside of the economic jargon and focuses on the complex issue of problem gambling mainly from the point of view of psychology. Although most people gamble occasionally for fun and pleasure, Mark Griffiths highlights that gambling brings with it inherent risks of personal and social harm in the form of problem gambling. Problem gambling can compromise, disrupt or damage family, employment, personal or recreational pursuits. More specifically, it can negatively affect significant areas of a person’s life, including their physical and mental health, employment, finances and interpersonal relationships. His chapter examines the extent to which lotteries can cause or exacerbate problem gambling. In doing this, Griffiths overviews problem gambling by examining the definitions of problem gambling and the social context in which people gamble. He also examines
18 Gaming in the New Market Environment
in detail the pathological features of problem gambling; briefly considers some of the main psychometric screening tools that have been (and are currently) used in the field; and discusses the consequences and co-morbidities of problem gambling. Griffiths argues that the type of gambling also impacts on the development of gambling problems. This has particular relevance for the lottery sector. It also has consequences for understanding the risk factors involved in the disorder, as well as the demographic profile of those individuals who are most susceptible. For instance, certain features of games are strongly associated with problem gambling. These include games that have a high event frequency (i.e., that are fast and allow for continual staking), that involve an element of skill or perceived skill, and that create ‘near misses’ – i.e., the illusion of having almost won (Griffiths, 1999). Size of jackpot and stakes, probability of winning (or perceived probability of winning), and the possibility of using credit to play are also associated with higher levels of problematic play. Games that meet these criteria include electronic gaming machines (EGMs) and casino table games. In general, lottery products are not associated with problem gambling with the exception of those that have the potential for continuous gambling (e.g., video lottery terminals (VLTs), scratchcards, and some instant win games on the internet). Further, Griffiths overviews other specific areas in relation to lottery products, including youth gambling and remote gambling (with particular reference to internet gambling). The main form of problem gambling among adolescents has been the playing of slot machines although, as Griffiths’ chapter highlights, a number of studies have also indicated that scratchcards can be problematic to a small minority. Griffiths goes on to argue that gambling is a multifaceted rather than a single phenomenon. Consequently, many factors may come into play in various ways and at different levels of analysis (e.g., biological, social or psychological). Central to the latest thinking is that no single level of analysis is considered sufficient to explain either the aetiology or the maintenance of gambling behaviour. Moreover, this view asserts that all research is context-bound and should be analysed from a combined, or biopsychosocial, perspective. Griffiths also argues that the situational and structural characteristics of the gambling activity are important in the development of problem gambling and that many lottery products have structural characteristics that are unlikely to facilitate problem gambling behaviour. Griffiths concludes his chapter by exploring some of the policy implications for lotteries, including the type of research that needs to
Introduction 19
be carried out, legislative policy implications and policy initiatives in the areas of education, prevention and treatment. Matti Viren’s article ‘The Economies of Scale and Scope in the Lottery Industry’ (Chapter 7) takes us to the supply of gambling. More concretely, Viren focuses on empirical evidence on scale economies in the lottery industry. The analyses deal with both European and US state lotteries for the period of the past 15 years. The article is strongly empirical, although certain conceptual and measurement issues are also discussed. Most of the article is devoted to the estimation of the cost functions from different panel data sets. Thus, the record of individual countries is largely bypassed. The analyses, which make use of a large number of data, more than 500 observations, show quite clearly that there is evidence of both economies of scale and scope. In other words, average costs decrease along with the volume production and the number of products. Practically the same result applies to Europe and the US. The paper has potentially important policy implications because the existence of economics of scale (and scope) indicates that a competitive market solution would not probably prevail in the long run, at least in the case where all legal restrictions to market entry and market operations were abolished. Because the biggest company would always have the lowest unit costs it could take over the whole market. The existence of economics of scope suggests that, in the lottery industry, multi-product suppliers would have an advantage over providers of a single lottery product. Thus, it would not be completely unrealistic to expect that we would end up with a very large global multi-product gambling monopoly. Although the results of the empirical analysis seem quite clear, there is still some uncertainty in terms of predictions of costs for very large (global) gambling companies. Thus, it is possible that the long-term solution would not literally be a natural monopoly, but rather monopolistic competition between relatively few large market players. Even then, prices (and consumer welfare) could be anything but an ideal and perfect competition case. Whether regulation could help is an issue briefly touched upon in the article. Viren’s article also presents some evidence on demand behaviour at the aggregate (country/company) level. The results seem to indicate that the aggregate demand is relatively sensitive to the output menu. Moreover, the sensitivity of demand seems to be related to the size of the market in the sense that sensitiveness increases along with market size. Martin Paldam’s article ‘The Political Economy of Regulated Gambling’ (Chapter 8) deals with the public policy issues that are related to gambling. The idea is to apply some basic concepts and ideas from the
20 Gaming in the New Market Environment
public policy research agenda to the analysis of gambling. Paldam points out that the gambling sector is regulated in order to collect taxes and control the gambling problem of addiction. The regulation may be done without or through a state-owned gambling enterprise with monopoly over some or all of the range of gambling products. Paldam introduces a macro model to identify the problem as excess net gambling expenditure and a dead weight loss. The model is calibrated using Danish data, to give estimates of the aggregate cost to society of the gambling problem. Paldam notices that the rents from public gambling monopolies are often distributed in a way that creates stakeholders. The role of these stakeholders represents itself an interesting research issue. Paldam’s view is that those afflicted by the gambling problem are few and unorganised. Politicians are under lots of pressure to spend, and the stakeholders are normally powerful groups. Consequently, the goal of tax collection easily dominates over the goal of reducing the gambling problem. Paldam also considers efficiency issues: what are the implications of ownership structure for efficiency of production? From policy point of view this issue is, of course, highly significant. Yet, unfortunately, we have very few hard empirical facts from the gambling world on this specific point.
1.3
Final remarks
The present book does not cover all areas of the economics of gambling. Especially the area of public policy is so wide and includes so many different issues that it simply cannot be covered in one volume. Because some of these issues have not been analysed in depth in the existing literature, it is even more difficult to make sensible assessments. Issues like ‘gambling and crime’ have been subject to some research but the outcome has typically been limited to the observation that gambling and crime are connected somehow. The exact nature of this connection has not been identified, nor has it been established empirically. We have deliberately bypassed all the legal issues of gambling. This has been done even if we are well aware that these issues are both important and timely. We have wanted to concentrate on a broad economic perspective avoiding, at the same time, the highly controversial legal and political questions, which will require different sort of legal and political expertise. Whilst dealing with the recent advances of research, this book also covers certain deficiencies in the analysis and data. We have had par-
Introduction 21
ticular problems with data. For the demand analysis, there are relatively few data sets, especially outside the UK and the US. There is little information usable for public policy type analyses, such as the fiscal issues and cost conditions. For instance, interesting issues of efficiency (efficiency comparisons) cannot be tackled with the existing information. The lack of data effectively discourages all research attempts on the part of the academic community, thus creating an obstacle for useful cooperation between researchers, on the one hand, and providers and regulators of gambling services, on the other hand. Whether for lack of data or other reasons, there has been almost no research on gambling in continental Europe. This is lamentable, since our market structure and institutions are drastically different from those of the Anglo-Saxon countries, where most research results come from. The book has touched several controversial issues of gambling most of which are related to the role of government in regulation, taxation and production of gambling services. In this respect, this book does not arrive at a given simple result or conclusion. Nor does it provide any policy recommendation. Rather, it shows the level of complexity of the issues we are dealing with. We cannot, for instance, simply say ‘just look at the elasticities, stupid’. Rather we have to control a wide range of factors and issues before we can make affirmative conclusions in any direction. Needless to say, this requires a lot of additional research. It would also be valuable that both the general public and the decisionmakers would know much more about ‘the economics and gambling’ and the issues behind the current controversies. Notes 1 To give some idea of the magnitude of the change, we can mention here that in the European lotteries, sales increased by an average of 4.5 per cent in real terms per annum during 1995–2005, whereas the average payout ratios increased by 4 percentage points (from 48.5 per cent to 53.5 per cent). In the US, the corresponding figures for growth in sales and payout ratios for the period between 1992 and 2005 were 3.3 per cent and 6.2 per cent). In Europe, rapid growth resulted mainly from new state lotteries’ fast recovery from a very low initial level of sales. In the US, sales have mainly increased due to new state lotteries. In the existing lotteries, the sales between 1992 and 2005 only increased 1 per cent on the average. In 2006, sales in the US increased again considerably, more than 5 per cent in real terms. In 2006, the total sales of European lotteries amounted to EUR 74,850 million (USD 93,912 million), whereas the sales of US state lotteries totalled EUR 45,777 million (USD 57,436 million). The US figure roughly corresponds to 0.43 per cent of the GDP and 0.69 per cent of personal disposable income (cf. NASPL, 2007, and La Fleur’s, 2007).
22 Gaming in the New Market Environment 2 The survey was conducted by the Finnish National Lottery Veikkaus in April 2006. The questionnaire was sent to all of the EL (European State Lotteries and Toto Association) member companies of which nearly 50 per cent responded. 3 These figures are obviously subject to the possible sampling errors in the EL questionnaire. The average payout rates may not be very informative because they vary considerably between games even now (and different companies have different gaming menus). This was reflected in the abovementioned survey: the payout ratios ranged from 30 to 95 per cent. 4 Between 1894 and 1964, no legal government sponsored lotteries operated in the United States. Even other forms of gambling were severely restricted. Thus, only three states permitted horse racing in 1900. In 1931 Nevada legalised gambling casinos, slot machines and horse racing (but not lotteries, although now it seems likely that the constitutional ban for a state lottery will be abolished). 5 Some lotteries are even older than that. For instance, the Swedish lottery (Penninglotteriet) was founded in 1897, whereas the Finnish Lottery (Veikkaus) was founded in 1940. In Denmark, the history of the Danish State Lottery goes back to 1753. 6 Unfortunately, we do not have complete data on governments’ gambling revenues. Although institutions like the Eurostat compile data on government revenues, the numbers are generally not comparable. Sometimes the numbers may only include direct lottery taxes and leave out the profits which are contributed to government (see the GOV_A_TAX_AG Table in the public finances statistics, Eurostat, 2007). In the case of state lotteries’ profits it is sometimes hard to say how to treat the direct contributions to good causes that the lottery companies make. If the government de facto determines the beneficiaries, the contributions are hardly distinguishable from government transfers. Finally, one has to keep in mind that, in some countries, winnings constitute taxable income, whereas in most countries they are tax-free (on the average, the taxation of winnings only constitutes a couple of basis points of the total government revenue). 7 When the respondents in the EL survey were asked to assess the elasticity of problem gambling to sales the mean value was roughly one. 8 This could be seen in the survey to European lotteries. Up to 70 per cent of the respondents said that if sales increased, say by 10 per cent, costs would increase less. Similarly, as we asked how much the retailers costs would increase as a response to an eventual increase in sales, two-thirds of the respondents said that they would increase less than the sales. 9 Legal cross-Atlantic disputes in the Microsoft case suggest that would not run smoothly, either. 10 Bribe might be paid both to fix the results or to encourage the use of illegal means to achieve better results (e.g., doping). 11 These are issues which, at least in the history of American lotteries, were important and turned the public opinion against all types of gambling during the second half of the 19th century. Various cases are quite eloquently described in Clotfelter and Cook 1991 and Ezell (1960).
2 When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide Lisa Farrell
2.1
Introduction
The betting and gaming sector attracts a lot of interest from outside parties. Those within the sector view their products as leisure activities competing in a tough market place, whilst groups outside of the industry question the (ethical) nature of these products and their contribution to society. There are few industries (tobacco and alcohol included) which not only have to face the daily struggle to earn a profit but also have to fight to justify their very existence. In this chapter we will try to unravel some of these often emotive issues and examine the link between gambling and welfare. We will critically appraise different measures of welfare and existing studies that attempt to measure welfare effects. We will consider the consequences/impacts of the expanding gaming market on individual and social welfare. It is not however, our intention to provide a full appraisal of the benefits and costs of the betting and gaming sector, the focus here is to provide a better understanding of the methodologies that practitioners use to address welfare issues, so that we can more clearly evaluate the results of such studies in order to make sensible, evidence-based, policy decisions. It is hoped that the chapter provides a valuable introduction to the important theoretical concepts on which the existing empirical studies are based. We shall present only first principles of welfare economics in order to make the material accessible to a board audience. The betting and gaming industry consists of a wide range of very different products each with its’ own set of consumers, although some intersection across these sets exists (gambling activities are not mutually exclusive and the difference characteristics of each game results in variation in the groups of consumers who participate – reflecting the 23
24 Gaming in the New Market Environment
heterogeneity in consumer tastes and preferences). The market sector comprises the following commercial activities: broadly these are i) wagering (both on and off course), ii) gaming in the form of casinos and electronic gaming machines (EGM’s) and iii) numbers games such as keno, lotto and scratch cards. To undertake a complete review of this sector is not the focus of this chapter, however there some notable attempts to undertake such an activity. See, for example, the study conducted by the Australian Productivity Commission (1999) which provides an extensive and complete picture of an entire countries betting and gaming market. This review was in part possible due to the vastly superior data collected on the sector within Australia.1 Here we will predominantly refer to academic papers and independent reports on the welfare effects of gambling in order to present objective research. There are numerous reports published by interest groups but the difficulty of determining the independence of these studies means that most have not been included in this review. There are some general trends across countries in terms of the betting and gaming industry that are important to mention. Most countries have undergone considerable deregulation in the last decade and all countries face the challenge of trying to ‘police’ the growing online gaming market. The betting and gaming industry is at the forefront of technology and is characterised by extensive product innovation which means it often operates within (and exploits) legislative gaps. Historically, most countries imposed a stringent regulatory framework on the industry but a more liberal society and a realisation that valuable and significant tax revenues can be extracted from gaming activities has lead to an increasing pattern of deregulation. Trends in the literature follow this pattern of deregulation. As the limits of operation within the market have changed, researchers have naturally asked what the effects of these changes are and from this perspective the literature makes a lot of sense. For example, the issue of the merits of Indian Reverse gaming is unique to the US market2 and the resurgence of literature on numbers games such as lotto by UK academics3 is a direct result of the launch of the new National Lottery game there. So the literature focuses on questions of national importance in the context of the domestic market, after all academic research, in part, evolves to meet the needs of policy-makers. Simply to look at the literature in its entirety and ask if the body or evidence mostly in favour of against the existence of the industry is hennas crime which decontextualises the studies from their historical and cultural setting. Each country has its own social, political and cultural environment meshed
When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide 25
with unique legislative and historical backgrounds, that means at best the question of the industries net welfare effects has to be asked for each country in turn and even within countries there are numerous state variations that can not be ignored.4 That said, it is not uncommon to find government and consultancy reports that do exactly this. Whilst a shortage of studies (often explained by a paucity of data) means that often we do have to look to international studies to understand the impacts of legislative changes the warning still remains, that whilst the signs of the important coefficients may be indicative and helpful, let the policy-maker beware of recommendations based in the size of estimated qualitative effects based on international experience. Here, we will be proactive and ask, ‘What are the limitations of our methodologies and the available data that gives rise to this general lack of evidence for policy-makers?’ We will look at the methods researchers have utilised in order to address questions relating to the welfare effects of the gambling industry and consider how these theories sit within the theoretical framework of welfare economics. It is our intention to provide a structure within which to think about welfare effects in order to be better able to evaluate existing and future studies. Whilst we will not provide an exhaustive review of all the literature we will look at typical examples. In essence, we will consider what we can learn from existing studies and what are the limitations of these studies which inhibit their generalisation.
2.2
Individual welfare effects
Welfare economics has a long tradition in economics. In measuring welfare the distinction made is between individual welfare and social welfare. Individual welfare considers the welfare of individuals (as opposed to communities) under the belief that individuals are the best judge of their welfare. Two essential assumptions are made when measuring individual welfare and these are: firstly, individuals prefer more to less and secondly, that individuals preferences are revealed through their observed behaviour. This implies that if there is a demand for a good then the provision of this good must be welfare enhancing. If this was not the case then individuals would simply switch their resources to the consumption of commodities which afford them greater utility (satisfaction). In the context of the gambling market this implies that so long as there is a demand for gambles then the provision of products to fulfil this demand generates welfare. Moreover, it also implies that markets should expand to the point where there is no demand for
26 Gaming in the New Market Environment
new products. The introduction of a new gambling product will increase consumer welfare because utility-maximising individuals voluntarily purchase the good. That is, assuming income remains constant, individuals must be substituting expenditure away from goods which yield lower utility. The introduction of a tax on the good will erode some of this benefit, but the overall effect is still welfare improving for the player. Whether this is socially desirable is another question and one which we will address in due course, but from the individuals perspective there must be a welfare gain or there would be no demand for the product. Consumer surplus is a measure of the aggregate welfare of the group of individuals who consume a given commodity. It measures the difference between what consumers are willing to pay for a good and the market price of the good that is what they actually pay. It can be calculated by looking at the area bounded by the demand curve and the equilibrium price in the market (the market price). This corresponds to area PAB in Figure 2.1. Where P is the market price and Q is the quantity demanded. Gambling products are usually taxed so it is important to consider the impact the tax has on consumer surplus. Let’s assume that some proportion of the tax t, is passed on to the consumer through higher prices. It is evident from Figure 2.1 that this erodes away a proportion Price A
C
P+ t
B
P
Q Figure 2.1
Consumer surplus
Quantity
When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide 27
of the consumer surplus – decreasing individual welfare. The consumer surplus is now represented by the area (P + t)CA. In the extreme case when all the tax is absorbed by the producer then the price remains unchanged and the introduction of the tax has had a neutral impact on the level of consumer surplus. Brinner and Clotfelter (1975) and Cook and Clotfelter (1987) both make this point in the context of lottery taxes. One further point to note is that the consumer surplus story is one of partial equilibrium, with more than one market and other methods of taxation. It is welfare improving to raise revenue by taxes that introduce the smallest efficiency loss, which may or may not be taxes on gambling. We know of no optimal taxation studies to consider gambling taxes. However, Farrell (1997) does look at the dependence of lottery taxes, income tax and unearned income tax. The comparative statics analysis within suggests that there is considerable interdependence between direct taxation and the revenue that can be raised from gambling taxation. Changes in the tax regime have a significant impact on risk seeking behaviour and so gambling taxes should not be perceived as lucrative new sources of revenue. The most recent literature on the taxation of gambling centres on the issue of what should be taxed, stakes (a commodity tax) or expenditure (an ad valorem tax), see Smith (2000). Paton et al (2001) show that an ad valorem tax is superior in terms of individual welfare (an ad valorem tax results in lower prices and greater turnover) and efficiency (more revenue is generated for a given level of price and quantity). However, it is sufficient for our purposes to simply appreciate that the introduction of a tax results in a fall in consumer surplus and so decreases individual welfare. It is important to note that the welfare impacts of taxation are further complicated by the redistributional effects of the tax and this point will be discussed in detail later. There have been few empirical studies that have attempted to measure the size of the consumer surplus for gambling products. In the case of lotteries Brinner and Clotfelter (1975) and Cook and Clotfelter (1987) both acknowledge that a welfare gain exists, but they concentrate their analysis on the tax incidence (issues relating to the distribution of the tax burden across the population will be discussed in Section 2.3.2). There are, however, two key studies that we will focus on here. The first is Farrell and Walker (1999) who illustrate the methodology for the case of lotto and the second is the Productivity Commission (1999) who take this methodology and rise to the challenge of estimating the consumer surplus associated with the entire Australian gambling market.
28 Gaming in the New Market Environment
Farrell and Walker (1999) directly measure the welfare effects from the availability of the market for lottery tickets following the launch of the UK National Lottery by measuring the associated consumer surplus.5 This was a natural research question at the time the study was conducted given that there was no lottery market in existence in the UK prior to the National Lottery’s launch (with the exception of small charity raffles/lotteries). The analysis is slightly complicated by the fact that lottery tickets can only be purchased in integer amounts and that the real price of a lottery ticket is not the face value of the ticket but the expected value of the ticket calculated as, one minus the expected return. We shall call this the effective price. However, despite these empirical complications the basic principle remains the same. In the case of lottery tickets the supply curve is perfectly elastic – a horizontal line crossing the x-axis at the effective price of a ticket for any given draw. Note that in the case of lottery tickets the effective price is lower in a rollover week as the expected return is higher and this essential price variation allows us to measure the price elasticity of demand and hence to determine the slope of the demand curve. The results of the analysis suggest that in a typical year (with an average number of rollovers) the welfare gains from the game are in the order of £1 billion (equivalent to a 0.5 per cent reduction in income tax) suggesting considerable welfare gains! The relative size of the welfare gain is a reflection of the popularity of the game, 63 per cent of the population played on a regular basis at the time of the analysis (rising to 72 per cent in a rollover draw) although they purchased on average only 1.5 tickets per draw (rising to 2.3 tickets in a rollover draw).6 In principle it would be possible to conduct a similar analysis for all the products offered by the betting and gaming sector in order to find the total welfare impact. However, in order to perform this analysis we need to know the response of sales to changes in price (the price elasticity of demand) of all products in order to estimate the demand curves (given that consumer surplus is a measure of the area under the demand curve and the equilibrium price). A general paucity of data makes this exercise very difficult in practice. To calculate price elasticities we need to observe price variation and there is the added complication of understanding what constitutes the price of a gamble. It has become standard practice to define price as the amount paid out by the consumer minus the takeout (player losses), where the takeout is the proportion of any bet (sales revenues) that is not returned as winnings (the takeout covers supplier costs, profits and taxes). This definition of price is called the effective price in the Farrell and Walker example just dis-
When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide 29
cussed. Under this definition price changes usually only occur when there are changes in the tax rates for the product which result in a change in the takeout (given that, the minimum amount that must be returned to players as prize money is either defined under legislation or an item in the license contract issued to the operator). Since tax rate changes are not common events in practice (and tend to be nonrandom events) there are few studies which have estimated price elasticities. Without knowledge of price elasticities we cannot determine the slope of the demand curve and it is therefore impossible to measure consumer surplus.7 Lotteries are an exception where the price changes occur naturally and more importantly randomly through the design of the game, namely the occurrence of rollovers. Indeed, the vast majority of the studies that have estimated price elasticities in gambling markets have looked at lotteries. There are a few studies that have taken on the challenge of estimating the consumer surplus associated with the entire gambling industry and one of these was conducted by the Australian Productivity Commission (1999). They suggest that the net benefit to the Australian consumer of the betting and gaming market is in the order of 4.4 to 6 billion Australian dollars. It should, however, be noted that in order to conduct the analysis a number of necessary modelling assumptions have been made. The most important of these is the assumption that elasticities for gambling activities are constant across national boundaries, across types of gambling products and through time. To obtain estimates of the required elasticities they look at all the estimates currently available in the literature and select preferred estimates. The problem with this approach is that the elasticities vary by type of product yet the Productivity Commission assumes them to be constant across products and further they vary by country. For example, estimates for the price elasticity of lotto are much higher for the USA than they are for the UK and New Zealand. Cloflelter and Cook (1990) report an elasticity of –2.55 for the USA, whereas Farrell and Walker (1998) report estimates of –1.55 to –2.6 for the UK and, BERL (1997) find an elasticity of –1.054 for New Zealand. It is hard to know how these findings can be informative of the elasticity for Australia where there are no estimates in the literature. Furthermore, some of the studies which estimate price elasticities for gambling products date from the 1970’s when the range of products available to the gambler was very different from what it is today (following the recent trend in the liberalisation and deregulation) and this will have impacted on price sensitivity. This exercise is further complicated by the issue of
30 Gaming in the New Market Environment
short run versus long run elasticities. Initial responses to price changes may be different from long run equilibrium responses. However our understanding of the dynamics of gambling participation is limited by the fact that there is a paucity of panel data sets available from which we can analyse behaviour through time. A further complication in the measurement of consumer surplus arises due to the presence of pathological gamblers in the market place. Basic economic principals tell us that addictive goods have higher price elasticities and in the context of the betting and gaming industry, this suggests that addicted consumers will be less sensitive to price changes than non-addicted consumers; implying that there is potentially more than one demand curve for each gambling product. For recreational gamblers there is a whole market of leisure activities they can engage in and so they are sensitive to price changes (resulting in a less steep demand curve relative to pathological gamblers), problem gamblers, on the other hand, face a smaller market to satisfy their demand for gambles and therefore are less price sensitive (resulting in a steeper demand curve). In terms of measuring consumer surplus this means that we have to sum the surplus for recreational gamblers and pathological gamblers together. Figure 2.2 illustrates the associated consumer surpluses. The consumer surplus (in the absence of any tax) for recreational gamblers is the area PAB and the consumer surplus for problem gamblers is the area PEF. Again it is noted that the presence of tax reduces the consumer surpluses. Recreational Gamblers
Pathological Gamblers
Price
Price
E
A P+t P
C
P+t B
G F
P Dr
Dp Qr
Quantity
Qr
Quantity
Figure 2.2 Consumer surplus for two types of gamblers – recreational and pathological
When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide 31
It is often assumed that the presence of pathological gamblers can be ignored in empirical studies, given that their number is small relative to recreational gamblers. However, in terms of levels of expenditure, problem gamblers account for considerable volumes of revenues. In Australia, it is estimated that approximately 2 per cent of the population are problem gamblers and contribute a startling 33 per cent of expenditure revenue (in 1997–98).8 Interestingly, this expenditure does vary by product suggesting that there are characteristics of the gamblers themselves that make some products potentially more addictive than others, for example, problem gamblers account for 33.1 per cent of the expenditure in wagering markets but just 5.7 per cent of expenditure on lottery tickets. Therefore, splitting the playing population in this way may be very important in terms of the accuracy of the estimated total consumer surplus. In acknowledging the different demand curves the Productivity Commission report states that the consumption of problem gamblers over and above that of recreational gamblers represents ‘poor value-formoney’ and so they discount this section of the consumer surplus for pathological gamblers. Whilst this seems logical at first glance, it actually violates the theoretical axioms on which the concept of consumer surplus is based. Utility-maximising individuals will cease consumption once marginal utility turns to zero; so simply subtracting away the component of consumer surplus derived from excessive play infringes the very definition of consumer surplus. If consumers are rational they will have accounted for all the associated impacts with their chosen level of play and therefore ought to receive the full consumer surplus derived from these activities. If they were not enjoying the surplus they would switch their expenditure to other goods. In markets where consumers can be differentiated according to the slope of their demand curves the economic argument usually follows that greater profits can be obtained through product differentiation and hence charging each group a different price. For example, people travelling at peak-times on trains (with inelastic demand) usually pay a higher price for their journey than those travelling off-peak (with elastic demand). It would however be hard to justify the practice of charging addicted gamblers higher prices. That said, most suppliers of gambling products offer a range of different games which differ in accordance to their takeout rate (and hence their effective price), one could think of this as price discrimination if one abstracts from the other characteristics which also differ across gambling products. To summarise, whilst measuring consumer surplus for the betting and gaming sector is in theory simply a matter of calculating the appropriate
32 Gaming in the New Market Environment
area under the demand curve for each product and adding the resultant consumer surpluses, empirical practicalities make it a less than exact science in practice. Understanding price in gambling markets has long been an issue of debate and calculating price elasticities in order to determine the slope of the demand curve is complicated by the fact that price variations are hard to come by and elasticities are generally estimated from non-random price changes.9 In essence, the exercise becomes at best an educated guess, where the outcome is highly dependent on the treatment of surpluses accruing to pathological gamblers. Most studies ignore problem gamblers by looking at a single demand curve (usually due to an inability to identify problem gamblers from recreational gamblers when looking at expenditure or sales data). Some studies acknowledge that they might have differing demand schedules, and the productivity commission report noted here even goes as far as to discount the size of the consumer surplus under the problem gamblers demand schedule. Whilst economists are not new to the realisation that the real world is more complex than theory it is the added complication of problem gamblers in the market place that makes the economic models more difficult to utilise in this industrial sector. That said, the results do suggest that the welfare gain to individuals from the sector is large. Moreover, it suggests that as the market continues to expand the consumer surplus will grow if the games are liked by consumers (that is the games match their tastes for risk). This leads us to an interesting question, ‘how can economists deal with pathological gamblers in their models and estimations?’ 2.2.1
Rationalising addiction
The individual approach to welfare economics is built on the assumption that consumers are the best judge of their own welfare, but if we allow consumers to exhibit addictive behaviour then in principle we violate this assumption. Furthermore, there may be negative costs imposed on other members of society. Indeed, there are numerous clinical psychology and sociology studies that point to the existence of a small group of individuals who consume gambling products excessively, who experience a loss of control whilst engaged in these activities (often leading to financial implications) and later regret their actions (resulting in emotional stress and relationship conflict).10 Here we have adopted the term pathological gamblers to represent this group, although we accept that there are varying degrees of gambling addiction which members of this group experience. Were it not for the existence of this group the gambling industry would be free from much of the controversy that
When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide 33
surrounds its existence. That said, it would be hard given the body of evidence to deny their existence and hence in measuring the welfare associated with the industry we need to find a way to model the consequences of addiction. For this reason there is a vast body of literature dedicated to understanding addiction as a medical affliction and in aiding recovery. This literature is not however the focus of this section, see Korn (2000) for a discussion of these issues. Here, we focus exclusively on how economists deal with the presence of addiction when trying to measure the associated costs-benefits of the gambling industry. The focus in the economics literature has been on extending rationality in order that utility maximisation remains intact as the central determinant of demand. Lets begin with the hypothesis that individuals may experience some reduction in utility associated with excessive levels of play (we will consider possible impacts of pathological gamblers participation on society overall in Section 2.3). Most models of gambling adopt the expected utility framework (Von Neuman and Morgernstern (1944)); the standard approach for analysing decision-making in the face of risk.11 This model states that the utility gained from consuming a risky product, such as a gamble, can be measured by the expected utility associated with the activity. The expected utility being the probability weighted average of the utilities associated with each of the possible outcomes. In the case of most gambles the expected utility is less than the utility associated with retaining the stake with certainty. So you are better off keeping your money rather than participating in the gamble. Hence the model predicts that people will not participate. In the case of lotto only around 45 per cent of the stake is returned as prizes and this has earned lotteries the title of the ‘suckers bet’. Many casino games offer 80 per cent or more: but also demand greater skill/ability from the players. So why do people gamble? This apparent contradiction may arise because there is some additional non-pecuniary benefit from participating in the activity, gambling is enjoyable! Players enjoy the opportunity to join in this aspect of popular culture and to discuss with friends and family losses and successes. Participation gives them the ability to brag about near misses or perhaps they love the thrill of being at the race track or in the casino. In the case of lotteries there is often an associated donation to charity and one could postulate that players receive a ‘warm glow’ from the knowledge that they have made an (indirect) charitable donation. The standard framework that has been adopted in the literature is to place an additive positive non-pecuniary utility component to the
34 Gaming in the New Market Environment
expected utility. The first formal representation of this model in the literature can be found in Simon (1998) who looks at the ‘dream function’ for lotteries12 and this model was later tested empirically by Johnson et al (1999) for the case of betting on horse races and Forrest et al (2002) for lottery players. Here we propose the next logical extension to this approach, to account for the potential disutility associated with excessive play, would be to include a non-pecuniary additive negative component to the individuals expected utility function. The expected utility for a gamble can then be specified as below, EUit = α + βXit + γEVt + δFUNit + λCOSTSit + εit
(2.1)
Where i denotes the individual and t denotes time, Xit is a vector of personal characteristics thought to be associated with demand such as age, gender, income and so on. EV is the expected value of the gamble, FUN is the non-pecuniary positive utility associated with play and COSTS is both the pecuniary and the non-pecuniary disutility associated with play incurred by the individual – the private costs of play. The non-pecuniary factors associated with play can be thought of as psychic factors such as emotional stress and regret, for example, whereas the pecuniary costs could be those associate with the cost of servicing gambling debts and so on. In this framework demand is a function of both the financial investment in the gamble, the fun of playing and any associated private costs of playing. Empirically, one would expect costs to be positively related to the degree of addiction and to be equal to zero for recreational gamblers. The implications of the above framework is that individuals are choosing levels of consumption which have already factored in the costs of play and hence when calculating consumer surplus there is no rationale for treating the surplus associated with excessive play any different from that associated with recreational play. This is more theoretically pleasing than simply removing from consumer surplus calculations the surplus associate with play generated by pathological gamblers or by discounting the utility derived from excessive play in some way. One criticism of the ‘expected utility plus fun’ model is the ad hoc nature of the non-pecuniary fun component and the same criticism can be applied here when we make the costs of participation explicit in the individual’s utility maximisation problem.13 One might even think of interpersonal utility functions as an extension of this model where the utility of family and friends enter as arguments in the individual’s utility function. In this model a gambler would consider the impact
When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide 35
their behaviour has on those people whose utility they care about and choose their expenditure accordingly.14 Within the mainstream economics the literature there are few studies of addiction since traditional economic theory assumes that preferences are exogenous. There is a strand of literature on habit formation that has evolved from empirical demand system analysis that allows past consumption of a good to influence current consumption of the good, so that preferences are interdependent through time. This methodology has been used to explain repeated purchases but is not generally thought of as a model of addiction. Explicit models stem from the work of Becker and Murphy (1988) who present and test empirically a theoretical model of addiction. The novelty of their approach is that the individual can behave rationally over her addiction.15 Becker and Murphy’s theoretical model identifies two forms of addiction – myopic and rational addiction. In the case of myopic addiction individuals consider their past consumption levels when deciding on current consumption. This is essentially the same as a single period, linear, lagged consumption, habit formation model. In the case of rational addiction individuals take account of both past consumption levels and future consumption levels in determining current consumption levels. In this scenario individuals are forward looking, they look at expected future prices and take these as an indicator of future consumption levels. If future prices are expected to fall individuals will expect to consume more in the future and hence increase consumption today in order to build up their stock of addiction and so achieve the maximum utility from anticipated future consumption. In essence, individuals behave rationally over their addiction. In the absence of addiction an expected fall in prices would decrease current consumption as consumers intertemporally substitute their expenditure. Farrell et al (1999) show the presence of myopic addiction in the case of lottery players but were unable to test for rational addiction given the absence of anticipated future price variation. Indeed, we know of no studies that test for rational addiction amongst gamblers.16 An important point to note is that the emphasis in the economics literature on rationalising problem gambling implies that the individual understands the potential costs associated with their play and makes consumption decisions taking these into account and hence enjoy the consumer surplus associated with their expenditure decisions. It suggests that welfare should not be adjusted to take account of the harm problem gamblers do to themselves. Indeed, it suggests they adjust their expenditures to account for the private costs of their addiction
36 Gaming in the New Market Environment
and hence society need not be concerned. Moreover, there is no requirement that we should adjust standard economic measures of welfare for this group of consumers. Psychologists may disagree with this statement on the basis that many problem gamblers report that they experience a ‘loss of control’ whist gambling (see Korn (2000)) and are therefore not factoring in the associated private costs of their expenditure at this point. Economists might respond to this by suggesting that they suffer from bounded rationality17 and fail to consider or understand the full consequences of their expenditure. Collins and Lapsley (2003) make a similar point but refer to individuals as having a lack of information and not being fully informed about the probability of becoming addicted and the consequences of addiction – an asymmetric information problem. However, even accepting this explanation, one still faces the challenge of understanding why some individuals experience bounded rationality (or asymmetric information) whilst others, recreational gamblers, do not (or have full information). This line of reasoning takes us back to a personality profile search for addiction characteristics; where one attempts to identify the individual heterogeneity that can explain why some gamblers become addicts and others do not. Economists tend to find this approach too ad hoc, and very difficult to formulate in a behavioural model. An interesting departure from the assumption of total rationality is suggested by Donoghue and Rabin (1999) who proposed a model where individuals are allowed to suffer from self-control problems leading to time-inconsistent, present biased preferences. They show that a lack of self-control alone is not sufficient to explain harmful addictive over consumption, one must also assume a degree of unawareness of the potential poor self-control problems that may arise in the future as a result of current consumption. This is a powerful model in that it helps us to understand the transition from recreational play to problem gambling and understanding this transition is especially important in the context of an expanding market. As a final caveat to this section it should be noted that the emphasis in the demand literature on the individual’s decision-making behaviour distracts from the games themselves. There may be characteristics of the gambles which raise the probability of players becoming addicted, and so changes in game design may increase/decrease the number of pathological gamblers in society. This is an important distinction, if addiction is an individual specific affliction then the industry as a whole might offer support to sufferers but can not itself be brought to blame for their condition, if alternatively the industry designs games
When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide 37
to foster and promote addiction then it might have more to answer to. There are a lot of studies undertaken by psychologists which investigate why some games appear to be more addictive than others. This literature talks about characteristics such as the length of play, the frequency with which play can occur and many other aspects of the gambles, see for example Griffiths (1995). Whilst we will not review this literature here we do note that it is clear that not all games are equal in their appeal to pathological gamblers. Lesieur (1998) shows that the expenditure shares of pathological gamblers vary immensely between different gambling products. His results suggest that pathological gamblers have a taste for gambles that occur with high frequency such as wagering and electronic gaming machines, and are less likely to purchase lottery tickets. Interestingly, there are notable gender differences with female problem gamblers having a higher spend on bingo/keno (high frequency numbers games) and male problem gamblers having a higher spend on wagering activities, see for example, Wayne et al (1996). Economists on the whole have not paid much attention to the games themselves as the discipline seeks to explain behaviour so the unit of analysis is usually the individual and the characteristics of the games do not vary across individuals. There are, however, a few studies that have sought to understand the impact on demand of different game designs but these in the main have concentrated on lotto (a game for which the evidence suggests that the percentage of addicted players is low). Let’s quickly note a couple of these. Farrell et al (2000) look at the roll of conscious selection (the idea that lotto players do not pick their numbers at random), in determining sales. They find that players do pick the numbers they play in a nonuniform way and this leads to more rollovers than would otherwise occur and results in players getting locked into the game. Rollovers stimulate sales and have a knock on effect of lifting sales in following draws. If player always play the same numbers or have a system for picking their numbers then they can’t risk not playing in any given draw in case their numbers come up. Walker and Young (2001) look at the skewness of the prize distribution as a factor stimulating demand; they argue that lotto players have a taste for long odds. It is important to note that these studies look at the affect of the game characteristics on sales and do not distinguish between sales generated by pathological gamblers relative to those generated by recreational gamblers. Indeed, it is important to make the distinction between characteristics that enforce loyalty and habitual behaviour and those that encourage excessive play. In the case of lotteries if players feel they
38 Gaming in the New Market Environment
have ownership over a set of numbers and are hence locked into buying a ticket for each draw they are exhibiting persistence but not excessive play (there is no benefit to buying more than one ticket for any given set of numbers). One could argue that by promoting conscious selection the operators of a lottery are doing little more than encouraging persistence in expenditure not dissimilar to that encouraged by supermarket reward schemes. There is nothing in these design aspects of the game that suggest that players are not behaving rationally when they participate. Habit and persistence is an accepted feature of applied demand analysis. Thus there is no justification for adjusting consumer surpluses for particular games based on design features that foster persistence in play. In summary, this section has shown little support for the argument that in measuring welfare effects through consumer surplus for the betting and gaming industry one needs to adjust the measure to account for the presence of pathological gamblers. Whilst the presence of pathological gamblers is not denied, the economics literature explains addiction whilst preserving rationality and hence if agents are assumed to be rational then they must have factored into their consumption decisions all the relevant private costs and hence receive the full surplus associated with their expenditure. One could, however, argue that whilst the individual might be assumed to consider all the relevant costs borne on himself he has no incentive to consider costs that his consumption might impose on society overall. So how do we measure the welfare impacts of pathological gamblers on society?
2.3
Social welfare effects
Welfare economics looks at the welfare of society as a whole i.e., it is the summation of the individual’s welfares. The literature is divided into two parts: the first is the efficiency of the production of wealth – how much output can be produced from a given input (i.e., how large is the pie?) and the second is the equity – the distribution of wealth across members of society (i.e., how is the pie shared out?). It is therefore logical to divide our discussion along these lines also. 2.3.1 2.3.1.1
Efficiency Defining social costs
Researchers often assume that as well as there being private costs, borne by the individual, associated with excessive gambling participation, there are also costs (of some form) that affect society as a whole. There is a vast literature in this area. Economists have been called to evaluate
When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide 39
many parts of the betting and gaming industry through cost-benefit exercises to determine if these activities are of net benefit to society. Most of the cost-benefit analysis that has been conducted consider either, the total gambling sector or casino gambling (as a result of their recent growth in the market). There are a number of government studies that try to evaluate the entire industry in order to inform the policy debate regarding the legalisation of gambling activities. This literature is predominantly USA and Canadian in origin: see, for example, Thompson (1996) among others.18 The literature is at best confused and at worse misleading, and the crux of the problem lies in understanding (defining and measuring) what constitutes a social cost. There is also a secondary issue to be addressed, the first question being which costs should we label as social costs and the second question is one of how to measure some of the more ‘intangible’ costs such as those associated with emotional stress.19 To bypass this issue some studies use the terminology of economic and psychic costs and state that psychic costs are non-pecuniary in nature and this renders them outside the business of economists. This seems like an excellent way to avoid tackling an interesting (if somewhat difficult) question. Eadington (2003) notes these issues and also provides a critique of the approach made by the Productivity Commission (1999) when defining and measuring social costs in Australia. However, the correct method of quantifying non-monetary costs is not the focus here. We will concentrate our efforts on definitional aspects of what constitutes a social cost.20 Whilst it would be possible to take each study in turn and ask if the authors ‘got it right’ in deciding what are and what aren’t social costs this would be a long and laborious task and the answer would almost certainty be ‘no’ to some aspect of every study. The reader is referred to Walker and Barnett (1999) for a thorough discussion of the literature in this context. For the interested reader with a need to digest numbers, here are a few of the estimated figures taken from the literature – make of them what you will! With respect to the entire gambling industry the Productivity Commission estimate the costs for Australia to be between AU$1.8 billion and AU$6.1 billion. Considering they measured the total consumer surplus to be AU$4.4–6 billion this implies a small (potentially negative) net benefit! With respect to casino gaming, Gazel (1998) reports net figures (benefits minus costs) of US$188.96 million for Wisconsin in 1995 and US$286.78 million for Illinois for 1995. These few examples alone illustrate the variation across studies. See Grinols and Mustard (2001) for the results from a host of studies on the net impact of casinos. Here we will not attempt to unravel the empirical
40 Gaming in the New Market Environment
studies in order to identify the factors which account for this variation. It is sufficient to say that a lack of agreement in what constitutes a social cost is a primary factor. Therefore, it seems more fruitful to ask how far the theoretical literature can help in clearing up some of the confusion associated with the determination of the social costs and benefit associated with gambling. Examples of social costs that have been used in the literature are psychic costs, financial costs, treatment costs and productivity costs, among others. Most authors use the term social cost to define any affect or impact experienced by members in society as a result of the actions of those who participate in gambling activities i.e., any third party impacts. These are termed externalities in the economics literature, but not all externalities are social costs according to the welfare economics definition of a social cost. The crux of the matter is the usage economic terms without adhering to the strict definition of that term. What the empirical literature terms social costs are an impact as a result of gambling activities (usually excessive gambling activities) which are experienced by members of society other then the individual herself. However, utilising this definition the literature has not been able to determine a single set of accepted variables that need to be included in a cost-benefit study of the gambling industry. Moreover, this is not the definition of a social cost as proposed by economic theory and hence the confusion. Walker and Barnett (1999) discuss these issues in detail and we will summarise some of their arguments below. Social welfare is defined as the sum of the individual’s wealth in the society and welfare economics defines social costs as the extent to which an activity reduces the efficient use of resources and so reduces total wealth. According to this definition redistributions of wealth are not social costs. There may be important equity issues associated with wealth redistribution (this point will be discussed in the next section) but they do not represent social costs as they are defined in the theoretical welfare economics literature. Walker (2003) summarises this point nicely when he states ‘(a) social cost must be something other than mere expenditures by a person, or negative consequences to an individual’ (p. 169). The problem is that applied researchers have attributed a variety of different costs to social costs that are contrary to the welfare economics definition. Moreover, they have summed over social costs and redistributions for one person to another (transfer payments) to give nonsensical aggregates from the perspective of welfare economics.
When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide 41
Walker (2003) illustrates the welfare economics definition of a social cost through the use of the production possibility curve and social indifference curves i.e., efficiency of production and consumption. Figure 2.3 provides a useful starting point for understanding the economic theory. Consider a simple two good economy: good X denotes legalised gambling and good Y represents all other goods available in society. The production possibility frontier shows all the points of efficiency in the production of goods X and Y. The social indifference curve represents societies tastes and preferences for the two goods. Its shape reflects the law of diminishing marginal returns: the more you have of good X relative to good Y, the less of Y you are willing to trade for more X and vice versa. Assuming that individuals have some taste for participating in gambles (that is there is positive demand) then social welfare is maximised at point B in the diagram (sometimes called the bliss point). This is where the production possibility frontier is tangent to the highest possible social indifference curve (SIC*). In terms of social costs any cost that moves us to a point inside the production possibility curve reduces social welfare through a reduction in net wealth and meets the theoretical requirements for a social cost.
GOOD Y
B A SIC* SIC
PPF
GOOD X Figure 2.3 gambling
Efficiency of production and consumption in a world with legalised
42 Gaming in the New Market Environment
A movement along the production possibility curve to say point A moves us onto a lower social indifference curve (SIC) and is therefore inefficient in consumption. Collins and Lapsley (2003) provide a list of criterion that must be satisfied if a cost is to be classified as private rather than social. Failure to meet this criterion implies that a cost is a social cost in that it reduces net wealth. • Gamblers must be fully informed • Gamblers must be rational, and • Gamblers must be prepared to bear the total cost of their gambling. Whilst this definition is helpful in a conceptual sense it is debatable if it adds clarification in a practical sense. As the authors themselves point out in order to utilise it we need to be sure what constitutes rational behaviour. To illustrate the precision of this definition lets take the well healed (but nevertheless informative) example of the crime of theft. Assume a pathological gambler steals a laptop to fund his gambling activities. The theft itself is simply a transfer from the victim to the perpetrator and therefore the cost of the laptop should not be considered a social cost. However, if the victim becomes security conscious as a result of the theft and purchases new locks and alarms then these costs do represent resources being taken away from other productive activities which they would have been utilised in, in the absence of the crime. Court costs for the theft also represent real resource costs. The literature is full of this kind of illustrative example and highlights how careful one needs to be in deciding on what constitutes a social cost if one is to adhere to the definition proposed by welfare economics. In summary, the literature to date is still debating the correct definition of a social cost to use in cost-benefit studies of legalised gambling. The strict economic definition derived from welfare economics suggests that many impact studies include costs that do not satisfy this definition (also implying that many studies may have over estimated the social costs of pathological gamblers). Further the variation across studies in terms of what is and isn’t accounted for in the calculation means the studies are not comparable. A standard methodology is clearly needed and the definition debate looks set to continue. Despite the methodological literature, we know of no empirical studies that have used the welfare economics definition as its basis for the deter-
When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide 43
mination of social costs. Whilst some look to economic theory for clear definitions others, see for example Henriksson (2001), urge for a more interdisciplinary approach that might lead to a new paradigm for researchers to adopt in their empirical modelling. Henriksson argues that much of the confusion comes from the fact that researchers for different disciplines are using the same language to measure conceptually different things. It is therefore only through better dialog between the interested researchers across economics, psychology and sociology that the confusion will be eliminated. However, one suspects that, as the theoretical literature advances we shall find out that even with the help of rigid definitions the real world can still be confusing! 2.3.1.2
Gambling and economic growth
Supporters of the expansion of the betting and gaming industry often claim that the industry leads to economic growth and on these grounds it is a net benefit to society. Economic growth is clearly welfare enhancing as it shifts the production possibility frontier outwards reflecting the increase in net wealth. There are two ways the production possibility frontier can shift; the first is as a result of an increase in technology and the second is through an increase in the factors of production
GOOD Y
PPF1
PPF2 PPF3
GOOD X Figure 2.4
Shifts in the production possibility curve
44 Gaming in the New Market Environment
(land, labour and capital). Let us illustrate these concepts in the context of the gambling industry with the help of Figure 2.4. The initial state of the economy is depicted by the production possibility frontier labelled PPF1, where Good X represents gambles and Good Y represents all other available commodities. If there is a technological advancement in the gambling sector that allows more output to be produced from a given level of inputs then the production possibility frontier shifts outwards to PPF2. The shape of the new curve shows the change in the opportunity cost between the production of gambling products and the production of other commodities in society. Alternatively, if there is an increase in any of the factors of production (land, labour or capital) and assuming the factor of production is equally efficient in the production of both commodities then the production possibility frontier will shift out to PPF3. The majority of papers which claim that gambling is welfare enhancing due to the fact that it generates economic growth suggest that the mechanism for growth is through the theory of export led growth. This theory suggests that by exporting goods outside of the domestic economy (state or jurisdiction) an inflow of income is generated. In the case of the above analysis this additional income can be used to increase the capital used for production (i.e., to purchase new equipment and machinery) and so represents an increase in one of the factors of production. In most empirical studies economic growth (and the resultant employment creation) has been regarded as the principle social benefit associated with the gambling market. It is the potential impact on growth that has led many state governments in economically struggling areas to adopt state sponsored gambling in an attempt to boost local prosperity. This trend has of course been the topic of much debate. Since the 1990’s policy-makers have looked to the legalisation of casino gaming as a means to generate growth. State finances also benefit from the tax revenues collected. Walker and Jackson (1998) empirically tested the theory that legalised gambling leads to economic growth at the state level in the USA and find evidence that growth in the gambling industry promotes economic growth in the state.21 Gazel (1998) states that the impact is more general than just an export effect he lists a host of impacts from employment effects to casinos being a stimulus for construction in the local area. However, Eadington (2001) warns that this growth and development strategy can only be successful if the gaming is licensed strategically. He highlights the fact that, growth only occurs if income is earned from visitors to the region and hence it is important to pro-
When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide 45
mote resort style gambling opportunities that will attract tourists. A general increase in gambling within the region through the licensing of many small venues will only attract domestic dollars and hence have no effect on net wealth. Some authors have argued that the growth story has been over sold and that there are losses to be considered from the ‘cannibalisation’ of the existing market. Displacement effects refer to revenues lost as consumers divert their consumption from products within the existing market towards the consumption of new products. This is often referred to as the cannibalisation of the market for existing products. Given that consumers have a fixed budget, in order to consume a new product, expenditure has to be directed away from existing products. It is likely that the majority of this lost expenditure will be within the existing betting and gaming sector – but it is worth noting that some expenditure may also be diverted from the wider leisure and entertainment market. There have been a number of attempts to quantify the extent of displaced expenditures within the gambling sector. We will mention just a few here that relate to the impact of casinos on traditional forms of betting and gaming since casinos have been seen by many as the instrument for growth through gambling. Anders and Siegel (1998) and Siegel and Anders (2001) focused on the impact of Indian gaming on lottery revenue in Arizona. They estimate that a 10 per cent increase in the number of slot machines22 in casinos located on reservations is associated with a 3.7 per cent decline in lotto sales. Farrell and Forrest (2006) also look at this issue in the context of the Australian gambling market and find evidence that casino gaming displaces expenditure from lottery games. These are just some of the examples of the studies that exist in this area, for a more complete review of the empirical literature see Paton et al (2003). However, such displacement does not imply economic costs or inefficiencies. The basic argument is that if one industry expands it must be at the expense of another industry i.e., resources are moved from the production on good Y towards the production of good X. Assuming this demand is voluntary then it must reflect the consumers tastes for gambling products. Looking back at Figure 2.1: consider the economy is initially at point A and then due to a taste for gambles resources are diverted away from the production of other goods towards the production of gambles then we move to point B which is clearly on a higher social indifference curve. This is based on the assumption that the supply of gambling is not restricted – if there are supply restrictions then the production possibility curve will be truncated at
46 Gaming in the New Market Environment
the supply limit and depending on the position of the social indifference curve a corner solution may arise. It should also be noted that there may be competitive pressure placed on other suppliers in the leisure sector. Anecdotal illustrations talk about the local restaurant that is forced to close as a result of competition from the new casino, but likewise, from an economist’s perspective, this just represents a transfer of resources following changing consumer tastes and preferences. It is just the natural outcome of a competitive market place for leisure goods and services. In summary, whilst there is some literature relating casinos to growth in economically depressed regions it is unclear how long this growth is sustainable as the opportunities to gamble increase. Arguments concerning the cannibalisation of the existing gambling and leisure markets are essentially red herrings. Whilst there is evidence that individuals substitute expenditure from existing activities towards new opportunities to participate in gambles this simply represents their changing preferences in a wider and more varied market place. If resource allocation follows these changes in consumer taste this is purely an efficient market response and should not be seen as an economic cost. 2.3.1.3
The importance of the counterfactual
As a final caveat to the above discussion of social costs; it is important to note that most studies ignore the counterfactual. The counterfactual condition is the basis of the comparison or control group in medicine, natural and social sciences. The experimental or treatment group demonstrates ‘if X is present, then Y is present’ (i.e., if gambling exists in society then social costs are incurred). The control group allows the testing of the idea that if X does not occur, neither will Y (i.e., if gambling is prohibited, then these social costs will not be incurred). Through this basis it is possible to establish causality, and hence control groups are used as one of the important conditions of empirical testing.23 Most of the existing studies relating to the social costs of gambling report figures along the lines of X dollars a year or X dollars per capita, but they do not report the counterfactual against which these figures are presented. Collins and Lapsley (2003) suggest 4 possible counterfactuals: i) no past or present gambling, ii) no past or present problem gambling, iii) all gambling banned and, iv) some forms of gambling banned whilst others remain legal. Each of these implies a different estimate of the social cost of gambling. In the majority of cases the implicitly assumed counterfactual (although not explicitly stated) is that of gambling prohibition under the assumption that prohibition is
When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide 47
costless to society. But if this is the counterfactual being utilised one has to ask what are the social costs of prohibition and is there a resulting net benefit when these costs are considered? In essence, it is important to ask ‘what would have happened in the absence of a gambling industry?’ The answer to this question lies in part in knowing if addiction is a primary disease or secondary disorder and in part in knowing what are the alternative costs associated with prohibition. Consideration of pathological gambling as a primary or secondary disorder is an important step towards determining causality. Just because excessive gambling participation is correlated with social costs does not mean that gambling is the root cause of these costs. Correlation does not imply causality. We need to know if in the absence of a gambling industry the proportion of the population defined as pathological gamblers would have no outlet for their addiction and hence be free from their affliction or if they would simply divert their expenditure and time to other activities which may have greater (or perhaps smaller) social costs. Shaffer and Korn (2002) provide some evidence on this point. They note that there is evidence of co-morbidity amongst pathological gamblers, that is, other disorders may coexist. However, it is still hard to tell if disorder X causes disorder Y or vice versa. Whilst problem gambling and the associated mental disorders may be statistically related, they too do not have a clear cause and effect relationship. They also note that pathological gambling along with its associated comorbidity is a multidimensional disorder and is best thought of as a syndrome.24 Finally, they note that, pathological gambling is not diagnosed if the behaviour can be better described as a manic episode. Whilst this evidence might sway one to think of pathological gambling as a secondary disorder the medical profession is far from being able to conclusively make this statement. This leaves us in a difficult position when trying to consider the outcome of the counterfactual of gambling prohibition on the alternative behavioural outcome. It is also worth noting that prohibition is not without its own set of associated costs. An important point to note is that the removal of the activity from the market place would mean the loss of the consumer surpluses discussed above. Secondly, due to the large potential profitability of the industry there is an incentive for rent seeking behaviour to occur (see Walker and Barnett (1999) for a full discussion of these ideas). That is, interested parties may devote large amounts of resources to lobbying governments to legislate in their favour. Further, supporters of the ban on gambling will need to continually devote resources to lobbying for the continuance of the ban: all these activities require
48 Gaming in the New Market Environment
resources that could otherwise be used in a productive manor. Such behaviour means that resources are not being utilised in the most efficient way and so society moves to a position inside the production possibility frontier and hence a social cost is created. Finally, the potential for illegal gambling activities means that a society exercising a prohibition on gambling needs to divert resource towards policing and enforcing the ban. The potential for illicit gambling (historically associated with criminal activities) suggests further impacts that would need to be considered if the counterfactual was to be properly formulated. 2.3.2
Equity
The final aspect of welfare to be considered in this review is that of equity. Equity is the concept of fairness or justice in economics, particularly in terms of taxation and welfare economics. We will only briefly discuss the relevant issues here in the interest of completeness but issues of taxation will be discussed in detail in later chapters of this book. One common argument in the literature is that the recent wave of liberalisation of gambling legislation is a reflection of the potential for jurisdictions to generate tax revenues from these activities. It is argued that gambling activities can be taxed successfully and at high rates with little public objection. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, many people view the taxation on a ‘sinful’ product as just and therefore acceptable. This concept stems from the history of high taxation on tobacco and alcohol which were both taxed quite heavily long before health issues where taken into account. Secondly, there is no obligation to participate and high taxation is perceived as a necessary price to pay for participation in products of this nature and a mild deterrent from engaging too frequently. Of course there are limits on the levels of tax that can be set. If the rate is too high it provides an incentive for illegal participation. Sceptics have said that gambling taxes are voter friendly new source of tax revenues but the study noted earlier by Farrell (1997) suggests this logic is floored by a lack of consideration of the relationship between gambling taxes and the wider tax system. There may be some cases where institutional factors also play an important role. For example, in Australia gambling taxes are collected by the state whereas income tax is collected by the federal government and hence this factor leads to the attraction to gambling revenues by state legislators despite their interdependence in the wider tax system. In terms of the production possibility frontier any redistribution caused through taxation simply moves us along the curve, having the poten-
When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide 49
tial to move society away from the bliss point to some other position on the production possibility frontier and hence leads to inefficiency in consumption. That is, assuming there are no costs of enforcement or collection which would divert resources away from production and hence move us to a point inside the production possibility frontier. By definition these costs would represent the social costs associated with the tax. So taxation is simply a redistribution and as such not a social cost. Nevertheless one might be concerned about the fairness of this redistribution of wealth within society. If gambling is an activity concentrated amongst the poorest in society then they will carry the burden of the tax incidence. Regressive taxes reduce the tax incidence of people with higher incomes and shift the incidence disproportionately to those with smaller incomes. To understand if gambling taxes are regressive it is essential to know the pattern of expenditure across the income distribution. It is feasible that gambling may become more attractive to low income groups if it perceived as a means to increase ones wealth. However, it is not clear that the rich have no incentive to participate; a high stakes card game might be a perfect way for them to satisfy their taste for risk. Income elasticities of demand tell us how gambling expenditure responds to changes in income and hence are the first step in understanding the incidence of play across the income distribution. However estimates of the income elasticities of demand for gambles are hard to find, although some do exist. For example Haig and Reece (1985) report income elasticities of between 0.6 and 1.0 for horse racing in the US, Mason et al (1989) find elasticities of 0.3–0.8 for Las Vegas gamblers and Farrell and Walker (1999) report findings of 0.1–0.4 for lottery play. As expected, gambles associated with higher levels of addiction have higher income elasticities. However the elasticities are all positive and between zero and one suggesting that gambles are normal goods. With respect to equity this is an important result as it shows us that as income increases spending on gambling increases but at a less than proportional rate i.e., individuals at the lower end of the income distribution spend a higher proportion of their income on gambles than those at the higher end of the income distribution and hence carry the greater tax burden. It is important to note that these studies only report income elasticities calculated at mean levels of income and expenditure but it is likely that the income elasticity for problem gamblers will be much larger than that of recreational gamblers. Unfortunately the expenditure surveys from which these estimates are calculated do not contain enough information
50 Gaming in the New Market Environment
for the researcher to distinguish between problem and recreational gamblers. To investigate the tax incidence issues further Suits (1977b) considers the issue of regressitivy of gambling taxes using data from the US National Survey of Gambling Behaviour 1974. He calculates a regressivity index, to compare the regressivity of lottery taxes with other gambling taxes. Lotteries are found to be among the more regressive of the gambling taxes and casino taxes are found to be progressive.25 It should be noted, however, that this study takes place before the recent rapid growth of casino gaming with large areas devoted to electronic gaming machines. It should also be noted that there are no studies of tax regressivity that account for the presence of pathological gamblers. Given that pathological gambling usually leads to financial difficulties it is likely that the regressivity of gambling taxes is downward biased by this group relative to the measure one observe in their absence. It would be interesting to know what the degree of regressivity of gambling taxes looks like for the group of recreational gamblers alone. But as well as the tax incidence we need to think about how the tax dollar is spent. Gambling taxes have been accused of imposing a ‘reverse Robin Hood effect’ on society – they take from the poor and give to the rich. Cooper and Cohn (1994) discuss in detail the budgetary incidence of the revenues generated from a lottery tax which may heighten or reduce the regressivity of the tax. The central argument is that if the revenues raised fund activities primarily participated in by the wealthy then this heightens the regressivity of the tax. This hypothesis has been investigated in the case of lotteries as the tax on lottery play tends to be hypothecated and therefore it is easier to assess how the taxed is spent. Feehan and Forrest (2007) considers this question of the UK National Lottery whose tax revenues go to a number of ‘good causes’. He found that more affluent areas of the country receive larger transfers and are also known to purchase fewer tickets. In summary, the evidence suggests that the taxation of gambling is regressive. However there is a need for updated studies following the recent expansion of the market for gambles and its integration into the wider leisure market. In the case of lottery taxes this regressivity appears to be heightened by the nature of the activities that tax revenues support. However, where gambling taxes accrue to general government spending this question is much harder to address as specific revenue flows are difficult to determine. Finally, taxation represents a transfer of wealth within society and is therefore only of interest from a social
When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide 51
welfare perspective in terms of equity (assuming that it is efficient to collect).
2.4
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the literature on the welfare effects of gambling, in terms of both individual and social welfare. We have looked at the theoretical backgrounds of the empirical literature and asked if welfare economics can help clarify areas of confusion amongst practitioners. Whilst we have by no means surveyed all the literature we have drawn from typical studies in order to give the reader a flavour of the analysis that has been conducted regarding the study of the welfare impacts of gambling. Our primary conclusion is that there is huge potential for good theoretical work on appropriate methodologies which would allow applied researchers to deliver methodologically sound and comparable studies. Most of the current literature is best viewed as case specific studies and reviews that have attempted to draw collective evidence on welfare effects invariably conclude that i) empirical studies are sparse and ii) methodologies are diverse. Welfare economics is grounded on the assumption that consumers are rational in making consumption decisions. Under this assumption the benefits from gambling activities can be measured through the associated consumer surplus generated by the industry. The few studies that have measured consumer surplus suggest that it is quite large. However, the presence of pathological gamblers has caused some to doubt the validity of the utility maximisation framework in the context of gambling markets. Yet this theory, with a few tweaks, is surprisingly capable of explaining gambling whilst preserving rationality. Moreover, one might argue that utility maximisation is (in the very least) appropriate for approximately 98 per cent of participants in the market place (the recreational gamblers) and in this light it seems strange that there is pressure for the most fundamental economic model of individual behaviour to be dismissed so quickly. And if one is to dismiss utility maximisation in the case of the gambling industry then one has to ask if this should be the case for other industries too, such as, those of tobacco and alcohol, and if so: where do we stop? The power of utility maximisation and rationality is that it is universal across products and individuals. The danger of its abandonment is that things become ad hoc with different behavioural models for different products and different types of consumers. It remains to be seen if such an alternative paradigm can yield better predictions and it is worth remembering that the purpose of models of economic
52 Gaming in the New Market Environment
behaviour is not to mirror all aspects of the real world, but to simplify them, whist still allowing the policy-maker to accurately simulate behavioural responses to regime changes. If we are to entertain the possibility of an entirely new paradigm then the growth of health economics as a subdiscipline offers an exciting opportunity to combine the vast clinical knowledge on pathological gambling with models of economic behaviour. By not adhering to the welfare measures of costs and benefits proposed by welfare economics this paper suggests that most studies underestimate the benefits (mostly by ignoring private benefits of consumption value measured by the consumer surplus) and over estimate the costs (by wrongly including transfers between individuals as economic costs): resulting in significantly lower net welfare than economic theory would suggest. We conclude that as yet practitioners have not produced studies based on sound theoretical foundations for us to be able to draw conclusive quantitative evidence: despite the desperate need for such evidence to guide policy-makers at this crucial point in time when the market place for gambling products is expanding rapidly. Notes 1 Readers are referred to the Tasmanian Gaming Commission, who maintain and update state level gambling data for Australia. 2 See, for example, Anders (2003). 3 See, for example, work by Farrell, Forrest and Walker: amongst others. 4 See ‘Australian Gambling Comparative History and Analysis’ (1999) prepared by the Australian Institute for Gambling Research, University of Western Sydney for a comprehensive discussion of the importance of historical factors in shaping the current Australian gaming market. 5 The UK National Lottery is a standard (6/49) lotto game and was launched in 1994. 6 Source: National Opinion Polls data collected on behalf of the Office of the National Lottery. 7 The reader is refereed to Table C.1 in the Productivity Commission review for a summary of the existing literature which has estimated price elasticities for betting and gaming products. The vast majority of these studies look at lotteries. 8 Figures obtained from the National Gambling Survey conducted by the Productivity Commission. The American Psychiatric Association estimates the figure to be 1–3 per cent in the USA. 9 If the price change is non-random the investigator cannot be sure if the changes in demand that are observed are true price effects or if they are a response to the factors that brought about the price change. 10 There are many clinical and psychological definitions of problem gamblers and this description includes those aspects which appear with greatest frequency in the literature although we accept that not all problem gamblers experience the same symptoms in relation to their addiction.
When Welfare Economics and Gambling Studies Collide 53 11 There are some non-standard expected utility gambling models but these are few and the majority of the theoretical literature exists within the expected utility paradigm. 12 The dream refers to the fact that the motivation for the purchase of lottery tickets is to enjoy the dream of winning and to fantasise about how winnings would be spent. Interestingly, this was not a new concept to the marketers of lottery products but no formal model had previously been specified in the economics literature. 13 See Hartley and Farrell (2002) for a further discussion of this and a general discussion of modelling gambles within the expected utility framework. 14 Interpersonal utility functions are often used to explain the motives for leaving bequests. 15 This model has been mostly utilised and tested for the consumption of physically addictive goods, for example Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1988) consider the demand for cigarettes and Walter and Sloan (1995) consider alcohol consumption, however it is perfectly applicable to activities like betting and gaming. 16 The theory of rational addiction has been tested for physically addictive goods where tax rate changes where anticipated which caused price rises. Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1988) look at the demand for cigarettes and Waters and Sloan (1995) consider alcohol consumption. 17 See, for example, Kahneman (2003). 18 See Walker and Barnett (1999) Table 1 for other examples of studies that look at the costs of gambling in total and those that look at the impacts of casino gaming. 19 See Collins and Lapsley (2003) Table 1 for a break down of social costs into tangible and intangible costs. 20 I do make some apology to the interested reader for once again side stepping the measurement issue. 21 This is one of the few papers to utilise states without gambling opportunities as a control group against which to measure impacts – that is, the authors consider the counterfactual. 22 Tribes are not obliged to file turnover and other financial data and the number of slots therefore had to serve as a proxy for dollar expenditure on slots. 23 Panel data studies provide some opportunity to allow for the counterfactual. The statistical methodology makes use of observations (usually States) where gambling is prohibited as the base against which to compare the impacts in other States where gambling is permitted. 24 The description of a syndrome usually includes a number of essential characteristics: which when concurrent lead to the diagnosis of the condition. Frequently these are classified as a combination of typical major symptoms and signs – essential to the diagnosis – together with minor findings, some or all of which may be absent. 25 Farrell (1993) looks at tax Lorenz curves and Suits S-index for the UK and finds that the taxation of most types of gambling was regressive (except for the case of horse race betting where proportionality was found). However, this study was prior to the launch of the UK National Lottery which considerably changed patterns of gambling and hence these results may no longer hold.
3 Demand Issues in the Market for Lotto and Similar Games David Forrest
3.1
Introduction
This chapter seeks to review attempts by economists and statisticians to model the demand for online lottery games such as lotto. There is an overview of published research and further illustrations are drawn from results obtained with my co-authors in a number of current lottery-related projects. Throughout I attempt to draw out the extent to which the modelling exercises reported can illuminate debate on major trends and issues in the world of lotteries. Lotteries operate in a fast changing and increasingly competitive gaming sector. Worldwide, potential players enjoy new opportunities to gamble via the internet, whether on lotteries, betting or forms of gaming (such as poker) to which they may not previously have had any access at all. The availability of cheaper versions of their own products, and of new potential substitutes, poses a threat to established state-owned operators in Europe and elsewhere and makes it problematic that their traditionally high take-out rates can be maintained. Within Europe, state-sanctioned monopolists also face legal challenges based on claims that the freedom to trade across national boundaries within the European Union should apply equally to gambling as to other services. Thus, for example, bookmakers based in the UK have attempted to assert their right to trade in Italy and Greece and have challenged the legality of the policy in The Netherlands that internet service providers may not permit access to gaming sites located outside the country. Many such cases remain outstanding at the European Court of Justice and their outcomes will determine the body of case law on which the future shape of gambling in the European Union will depend. Early 54
Demand Issues in the Market for Lotto and Similar Games 55
judgements, in the Schindler and Gambelli cases, recognised that member states may restrict the availability of gambling services for social reasons, but only if rigorous conditions are met. Barriers to trade within the Union could not be based merely on an intention to protect existing tax revenue or profits. Any restrictions that were maintained had to be non-discriminatory, proportionate to the objectives and consistent with other policies. The conditions set down have been widely interpreted as signalling that state-owned enterprises providing lotteries, betting and other forms of gaming are unlikely in the future to be allowed to enjoy the territorial monopolies under which they have operated until now.1 Perhaps the most striking development in global gambling in the recent past has been the relentless increase in the number of jurisdictions permitting machine gaming either within or outside casinos. This trend has been strongest in North America and Asia where there appears to be a ‘domino effect’: as more countries allow casinos, there is pressure on neighbouring states to do the same, to capture the expenditure of their own citizens who would otherwise gamble across the border. Thus far, Europe has lagged the rest of the developed world in casino investment. There are no large casinos on the international model such as are found in Las Vegas, Macau, Sydney or Cape Town. But the United Kingdom proposes to open a ‘super casino’ in 2009 and The Netherlands debates a Vegas style casino in Maastricht (close to borders with Belgium and Germany). If, in due course, Europe follows America and Asia in the direction of developing a new style casino sector, this is likely to intensify even further the competitiveness of the market in which the official lottery agencies operate. So, on several fronts, European lotteries face intensification of competition. This poses a number of issues for them and for the societies in which they operate. In general terms, increased competition drives down prices.2 For example, horse betting is popular in both France and the United Kingdom. In France, bettors can wager only through the state-sanctioned monopoly Pari Mutuel-Urbain, where take-out is more than 27 per cent; in the United Kingdom, betting is available at a number of rival operators and they typically retain only 13 per cent of stakes. In any jurisdiction where new entry is permitted, there seems little reason to suppose other than that the current national monopolies will see the price the betting market will bear driven down to the levels observed in Britain. Any attempts by governments to tax bets to compensate for loss of profits from state-owned betting operations are likely to be frustrated if their citizens are permitted to bet offshore via the internet.
56 Gaming in the New Market Environment
For lottery operations, falling prices for other gambling services will raise questions such as: how readily do lotto players switch to alternative modes of gambling when relative prices change? If they offer improved value for money on their own products, will committed lotto players buy more tickets? Would changing the prize structure of the games they offer help protect their markets? if state operators combine forces to offer multistate games with bigger jackpots, will this help maintain market share in gambling or merely cannibalise existing national games? For society as a whole, erosion of prices across the range of gambling services also raises questions. How much more of household budgets will be drawn into gambling? And will new gambling opportunities just reallocate spending within the gambling sector or will they significantly raise gaming spend (with concomitant implications for the incidence of problem and pathological gambling)? Demand modelling can potentially answer many or most of these questions. This chapter focuses on the demand for lotto and similar games. The literature reviewed offers many insights but also has deficiencies. Amongst these is that models were developed that successfully tracked lottery sales and they offered answers to questions on the appropriate level of take-out; but the leading studies look back to the period before competition in, and globalisation of, gambling markets and there is an urgent need for new research employing contemporary data. Further, the academic literature is strongly orientated towards the English speaking countries where the ‘economics of gambling’ has become an established and respectable branch of the discipline. In most of Europe there are very few practitioners and this is reflected in a paucity of evidence on the behaviour of relevant gaming markets. There is a compelling case for European lottery operators to commission econometric research pertinent to issues raised in this chapter. Of course many operators in Europe have wider gaming interests than lotteries; but because the academic literature has come mainly from the United States and the United Kingdom, the focus of research has been very much on lotto (scratchcards, another offering of state agencies in the English speaking countries, have been largely ignored by investigators, probably because data are not so readily available and because the terms available to players tend often to have been invariant over time, frustrating any hope of drawing inferences concerning player preferences over game characteristics). Throughout America and in Britain, developments in lotto have followed a broadly similar trajectory with sales of the original game suffering secular decline and agencies responding by introducing new
Demand Issues in the Market for Lotto and Similar Games 57
games, grouping together in lottery blocks to offer multi-state lotto with more exciting jackpots and, more recently in American states, accepting a lower take-out. Demand modelling may offer a route to evaluating the success of such responses to falling sales and also offer a clue on the extent to which new gaming products from the private sector are likely further to erode the market. Figure 3.1 presents the time series of Saturday Lotto sales for the case of the United Kingdom National Lottery. It is typical of the data series that researchers have attempted to model. Two features stand out. First, there is a pronounced downward trend in sales from about 1997 (for example, average sales fell from approximately 60m in 1997 to just 38m in 2006, with real sales revenue falling even more drastically once inflation is taken into account). Second, there is considerable variation week-to-week as consumers respond to jackpots augmented by rollovers or by bonus money added to the prize pool when the operator declares a ‘superdraw’. These two features have been incorporated into the standard specification employed by authors fitting statistical models q = f(ev, trend, controls) Here variations in sales (q) are modelled as being accounted for by variations in the expected value (ev) of holding a ticket,3 by the passage of time as represented by ‘trend’ and by a selection of other variables
140,000,000
120,000,000
100,000,000
Sales
80,000,000
60,000,000
40,000,000
20,000,000
0 1994
Figure 3.1
1995
1997
1998
1999
2001 Date
2002
2004
Sales of Saturday Lotto tickets in the United Kingdom
2005
2006
58 Gaming in the New Market Environment
included as controls. The estimation method, as pioneered by Gulley and Scott (1993), is typically two-stage least squares, to allow for the fact that, while an increase in ev (caused, for example, by rollover money boosting the prize fund) is presumed to affect sales, sales in turn also change expected value (as there are more entries, the probability of there being no jackpot winner diminishes and ev is increased). In the two-stage least squares exercise, the amount rolled over from the previous draw is usually employed as a convenient instrument for ev. This permits statistically efficient estimation of the coefficient on ev. The coefficient estimate shows how strongly demand responds when the value-for-money offered by a ticket is improved. The focus in the literature has been on this issue of how responsive demand is to value. We shall return to the question below and ask what has been learned and whether the results can be trusted. But one might note in passing that it would be potentially more useful to the industry to understand why trend is relentlessly negative. Authors often cite that the trend term in their equations captures increasing ‘boredom and disillusion’ with the game; but there is likely to be more to it than that. Lotteries are a ‘network good’ such that the attractiveness (to any one individual) of the proposition on offer depends on how many other people are playing because this determines how exciting the level of the jackpot is. If there is an exit from the existing player base, this reduces the jackpot, lowers the appeal of the game to remaining players and provokes further exit. This sets up the possibility of a downward spiral that could eventually lead to the collapse of the game if the jackpot were to pass below some critical level necessary to make any significant number of people play at all. Unfortunately, models generally only allow for negative trend, they do not explain it. Because risks to operators posed by negative trend are serious, it would be desirable to refine models by building into them dynamics that would capture the possibility of a vicious circle of declining sales. This has not been done as yet. But by choosing appropriate controls for inclusion in the specification, existing models can at least be used to address issues such as how introduction of new lottery games and new alternative forms of gaming might have modified the severity of effects from trend.
3.2
Take-out
The standard Gulley-Scott model, set out above, was designed explicitly to help assessment of whether changes in take-out rate would be
Demand Issues in the Market for Lotto and Similar Games 59
capable of raising greater amounts of net revenue for government. For example, if more from each ticket were paid into the prize fund, players might buy many more tickets and, even accounting for greater payouts, the state would then be better off. But will the response of players in fact be sufficiently great? The model proposes that we can find out from econometric analysis of how players responded in the past to the draw-to-draw variation in value for money that occurs when rollovers and promotional draws result in some draws having prize pools that are more generous than usual. What the Gulley-Scott model yields is a demand curve that shows predicted sales at all possible values of ‘effective price’ (effective price is the cost of purchasing a ticket minus the ev of winnings). This has policy relevance to operators because it shows what would happen if they changed take-out, for example a 5 cents reduction in take-out would lower effective price by (close to) 5 cents and the demand curve predicts by how much sales would increase. The demand curve is invariably found to be downward sloping, reflecting that consumers indeed respond to better value (more prize money, lower take-out) by, collectively, purchasing more tickets. Just how readily they respond is captured by own-price elasticity of demand. For example, if, at a specified take-out, elasticity were –2, this would mean that, on the basis of the demand curve estimated, a change of –1 per cent in take-out would induce a change in number of tickets sold of +2 per cent. In this case, operator revenue net of prizes (which equals take-out multiplied by number of tickets sold) would increase. Reducing the take-out would then be advantageous to the operator because a sufficiently greater number of tickets would be sold to more than compensate for the increase in the amount from each one that was paid into the prize fund. If elasticity were found to be –2 at the current take-out, take-out would have been wrongly set and should be reduced. Similarly if elasticity were estimated as –0.5 (inelastic rather than elastic), this would show players to be relatively unresponsive to take-out which could then profitably be increased (a 1 per cent increase in take-out would be met by only a 0.5 per cent fall in ticket sales, allowing net revenue to rise). The test for whether current take-out is already consistent with net revenue maximisation is that elasticity should equal –1. In this circumstance, a small change in take-out would be met by an equiproportionate change in number of tickets sold, so that net revenue would remain the same. This would demonstrate that net revenue was already being maximised.
60 Gaming in the New Market Environment
Gulley and Scott applied their pioneering model to data on sales of lottery games in Ohio, Kentucky and Massachusetts. In the first two of these states, they found no evidence of mispricing; and in Massachusetts, take-out was also broadly ‘correct’ though there were two lotto games and there appeared to be some scope to gain extra revenue by increasing take-out on one and reducing it on the other. Generally, their study and subsequent ones in the United States, found no evidence that the high take-outs on lotto games could be lowered and still maintain net revenue. A number of studies for the United Kingdom have applied the Gulley-Scott model to estimate elasticity for the national lotto game. Their results are summarised in Table 3.1. The earliest, that of Farrell and Walker (1999), reported elastic demand. But this finding was not replicated in subsequent studies where elasticity of demand was always estimated close to –1 (and never statistically significantly different from –1 at the 95 per cent level of confidence). Thus the early FarrellWalker result appears to have been misleading. The explanation is that they studied a data period where findings were unduly influenced by two particular draws with very high jackpots that occurred within a month of each other, about one year after the start of the game. These draws yielded huge publicity because the prizes offered were unprecedented in the United Kingdom. The resulting ‘lotto frenzy’ pushed sales to very high levels that were never to be repeated on future occasions when the jackpot was unusually large. Subsequent authors had longer data series to analyse and, with these, elasticity estimates settled at close to –1, indicating that legislation setting the take-out rate had got the price about ‘right’. Lotteries everywhere could take this as evidence that high take-outs relative to other forms of gaming were justified, to the extent that the policy goal was to maximise proceeds Table 3.1
Summary of demand elasticities Period
Draws included
Observations
Estimate of elasticity
Farrell and Walker (1999)
Nov 1994– Feb 1997
Saturday
116
–1.55
Forrest et al (2000)
Nov 1994– Oct 1997
Saturday/ Wednesday
188
–1.03
Forrest et al (2002)
Feb 1997– June 1999
Wednesday Saturday
127 127
–1.04 –0.88
Demand Issues in the Market for Lotto and Similar Games 61
for government, presumably because willingness to pay was higher for a long-odds/ high prize gaming product. Of course, it cannot be taken for granted that similar studies applied to contemporary data would yield similar results given changes in the market such as lower popularity of lotto and greater competition from new forms of gaming. With consumers enjoying more choice in gaming opportunities, the lotto market might, over time, become more sensitive to take-out. On the other hand, if large numbers quit lotto because they become bored with the game and prefer new forms of gambling, then those that remain may represent a hard core of players who are relatively insensitive to value for money. Whether these effects are present and which is dominant can be settled only empirically. Ongoing research on demand in the market is therefore likely to be valuable.
3.3
New generation demand models
However, mere replication of the earlier studies would now be regarded as unsatisfactory. The Gulley-Scott model has been subject to increasing scepticism. It has two principal flaws. The first flaw is that it assumes that consumer response to one-off changes in expected value, associated with rollovers and promotional draws, will be replicated if changes are applied to every draw. In fact, response might well be less because greater sales in a rollover are likely to be partly attributable to inter-temporal substitution, such as some players saving all their expenditure for special draws. This would imply that model estimates of sensitivity of sales to take-out are biased upwards. The second flaw is that we observe only player responses to variations in the expected value that occur in rollovers and promotional draws and these are inevitably accompanied by a change in prize structure because all the bonus funds accrue to the top-tier prize. It is implausible that consumers are indifferent to prize structure4 and therefore the model is wrong in attributing changes in sales only to changes in the value-for-money on offer. Consumers might in fact behave differently if faced with similar improvements in expected value accomplished by a lowering of take-out that spread more generous payments across all prize pools. This implies that model estimates are biased in an unknown direction. The first flaw has not been addressed in the literature. In principle, it could be if the model were applied to data from a jurisdiction that had changed take-out permanently. But there has been some attempt to deal with the second.
62 Gaming in the New Market Environment
While the Gulley-Scott model was an elegant innovation econometrically, its representation of player preferences may not have been adequate. Buying a lottery ticket can be interpreted as investing in a financial asset that has an uncertain return. In the British case, there is an approximately .98 probability of winning nothing and an approximately .017 probability of winning a fixed £10 prize. The probabilities of winning other amounts are very small, with the shape of the distribution reflecting the amounts in the various prize pools and the possible number of winners between which these pools may be shared. Figure 3.2, devised by Ian McHale, presents a stylised (not to scale) representation of the complex probability distribution that UK lotto players acquire when they purchase a ticket for a non-rollover draw. As noted above, there are two substantial ‘spikes’, corresponding to the fixed prizes of zero and £10. The rest of the distribution is continuous because the amount paid to a winner depends not only on how many numbers on a ticket are ‘correct’ but also on how many other winners at that prize level there are and on how much of the prize fund has already been used up on fixed £10 prizes. Local maxima in the probability distribution relate to the different prize pools (four numbers correct, five numbers correct, five numbers and the bonus ball correct, all six numbers correct).
£0 winners NOT TO SCALE
Probability
£10 winners
4 ball winners 5 ball winners
5 plus bonus ball winners
Jackpot winners
Winnings
Figure 3.2
Probability distribution of winnings in a typical UK Lotto draw
Demand Issues in the Market for Lotto and Similar Games 63
Rollovers provide an opportunity to observe how players respond to a new probability distribution of pay-offs when extra money is paid into the six ball (jackpot) prize fund. Rollovers have the effect of translating the rightmost segment of the probability distribution further to the right. The response of sales in such a case is assumed in the Gulley and Scott model to be purely a response to variation in expected value but players may in fact be influenced by other changes that a rollover presents (for example, possibilities of a higher absolute pay-out than is possible in an ordinary draw) and that are represented in the probability distribution of pay-offs. By modelling sales as dependent not only on expected value but on other measures that capture the complex probability distribution sold in the form of a lotto ticket, it is potentially possible that one could then examine more reliably what would happen if different take-outs and prize structures were introduced. Walker and Young (2001) proposed capturing the essential features of the probability distribution by three statistical measures rather than one as in the Gulley-Scott model. They calculated the variance and skewness, as well as the mean (expected value), of the distribution offered in each draw and included all three measures in the specification of their lotto sales model. This specification implies that gamblers are interested not just in overall value for money (the proportion of stakes that is expected to be returned in prize money) but also in issues such as how likely they are to win and the spread of prizes across pools. To an extent, mean, variance and skewness capture the terms of the game in all these dimensions. A study of returns to betting at American racetracks by Golec and Tamarkin (1998) had reported evidence consistent with gamblers having a positive preference for value for money (mean), a negative preference for risk (variance) and a positive preference for skewness (strong enough to allow odds on risky ‘outside’ bets to deliver lower expected value than bets on favourites and yet still find takers). This pattern of preferences does not appear to characterise all betting markets (Forrest and McHale, 2007) but seemed to hold amongst British lotto players according to Walker and Young (2001), who reported estimated sales equation coefficients on expected value, variance and skewness that were positive, negative and positive respectively. Obstacles to successful employment of the approach to demand modelling initiated by Walker and Young include that the calculations for variance and skewness are by no means straightforward and that correlation between variance and skewness is high. It is also difficult to
64 Gaming in the New Market Environment
allow for the endogeneity issue that expectations of all three moments would be expected to influence sales by modifying consumer behaviour but sales then influence the actual values of the three moments in a deterministic sense (indeed Walker and Young estimated with ordinary least squares, thus ignoring the issue altogether). Notwithstanding these problems, I illustrate here what findings look like and imply when mean, variance and skewness (the standardised third moment about the mean) are included in a model to account for a historic time series of lottery sales (UK Saturday Lotto sales from launch in 1994 to early 2007). The model, the result of work currently in progress with my colleague Ian McHale, has three stages. The final stage estimates the sales equation q = f(ev, variance, skewness, trend, controls) Given that ev, variance and skewness are all endogenous, ‘expected’ rather than actual values are included when this equation is estimated. Expected values of ev and variance are generated in stages 1 and 2. In stage 1, sales were regressed on a set of strictly exogenous variables: trend, controls, amount rolled over from the preceding draw, amount announced to be used to top up the prizes in certain superdraws, and a series of dummy variables representing various sizes of minimum jackpot guaranteed in different superdraws.5 In stage 2, we used fitted values of sales from stage 1 as an input in the calculation of corresponding measures of mean, variance and skewness for each draw. These values were then employed in estimation of the equation of interest (stage 3). Results appear in Table 3.2. The findings contrast with those of Walker and Young to the extent that, while consumers respond positively to expected value, they appear from this estimation exercise to have a negative preference for skewness. That skewness here is statistically significant as a determinant of sales is certainly suggestive of the limitations of the expected value model because this demonstrates that players are indeed influenced by the structure, as well as by the total value, of prizes. However, because all the variation in the three moments in the data set is driven by rollovers, there is high correlation between variance and skewness and this makes it problematic to infer aggregate player preferences from coefficient estimates. The problem of colinearity does not however prevent the results from being employed for forecasting the level of sales if take-out and prize structure were changed in a specified way. In a standard, nonrollover United Kingdom Lotto draw, 45 per cent of sales revenue is
Demand Issues in the Market for Lotto and Similar Games 65 Table 3.2
Regression results, UK Saturday Lotto sales (millions) coefficient
Constant Mean Variance
117.14 91.66 .000002
t-statistic 8.16 6.68 0.86
Skewness
–.024
–8.05
Trend
–.026
–15.69
first lag of sales
.19
9.48
second lag of sales
.18
9.11
preceding Wednesday sales
.12
4.02
–2.96
–2.74
Dummy: Wednesday Lotto available Dummy: Thunderball available
–1.01
–2.44
Dummy: Princess Diana’s funeral
–9.86
–4.06
Dummy: first two double rollovers
20.95
9.30
Number of observations
637
paid into the prize fund. Suppose this were increased to 50 per cent, i.e., take-out was reduced by 5 pence per ticket. According to the equation, the effect this would have on sales would depend on how the extra pay-out were distributed across the prize funds: different decisions on how to use the enhanced prize money would modify variance and skewness in different ways. The simplest way to implement a decrease in take-out of 5 pence would be to leave the fixed prize for three correct balls at £10 and then allocate remaining prize money between the higher prize funds in the same ratios as now. For a standard Saturday draw (with controls set to plausible values and trend to a value corresponding to 2007), we calculated values for mean, variance and skewness for existing arrangements and for this alternative, lower takeout regime. Using the stage 3 equation estimate, we forecast sales of 34 million with a 55 per cent take-out and 41 million with a 50 per cent take-out. Lowering the take-out would in this case raise ‘revenue net of prizes’ for the draw by a non-trivial 9.6 per cent. The exercise reported illustrates the mean-variance-skewness approach might prove capable of being used to provide more soundly based guidance than hitherto. However, even with refinement, it would still suffer from the fundamental problem that, if there have been no prior
66 Gaming in the New Market Environment
changes in game structure, all the variation in the properties of the lottery ticket (mean, variance and skewness) that are observed in the data originates with rollovers and occasional promotional draws; the data reveal the response of sales when different terms are offered on the ticket for one draw only. It remains a leap of faith to suppose that players would respond similarly to changes in terms that were introduced on a permanent basis. This sounds negative. But prospects for future model building based on an expected value-variance-skewness approach are nevertheless good because the lottery market is changing. In Britain the Saturday Lotto game still dominates other products offered by the operator but, as elsewhere, its relative importance has declined as a broader portfolio of games has emerged. The new games, by design, offer different packages of risk and skewness from Lotto because they are intended to appeal to segments of the market with particular tastes in these dimensions. Some of the new games themselves feature rollovers, generated independently of those of Lotto, providing considerable week-to-week variation in the package of choices as defined by mean, variance and skewness of returns from the respective games. Further variation in the choices available to players occurs as the operator experiments with games offering unusual formats or prize structures. With all this variation present in the data sets, modelling how relative and absolute sales of each product respond week-to-week is likely to be fruitful in terms of informing policy on take-out and on the package of games that would generate most revenue. Another likely fruitful research strategy would be to focus research on jurisdictions where there have been significant changes in arrangements for the main lotto game on offer, for example Florida and Texas where the game was made harder to win. Of course, such changes tend to be introduced when a game is in crisis and care would be needed in attributing any increase in sales to a change in the mean-varianceskewness offer rather than to recovery from a downturn secured by a relaunch and associated marketing.
3.4
Cannibalisation
Thus far the tone of the chapter has been that, to date, existing demand models have not proven capable of generating robust findings that would settle issues such as whether the take-out rate or the structure of Lotto should be changed. That is not to say that the models have no insights to offer. If expected value/ variance/ skewness are viewed as in
Demand Issues in the Market for Lotto and Similar Games 67
fact control rather than focus variables, some interesting insights may be gained from results on other covariates included in the model. For example, if operators tend to face a downward trend in sales of their lead game, they must replace lost revenue by innovating with new games. Their innovation will be successful only to the extent that new offerings do not simply cannibalise the sales of the core product. The results in Table 3.2 suggest that the introduction of Wednesday Lotto in 1997 took nearly 3 million from Saturday Lotto sales while the addition of Thunderball to the portfolio in 1999 has drawn about 1 million from Saturday Lotto. Both figures indicate that sales of the new game were only to a limited extent at the expense of the original game. When new games are introduced, it is often in recognition that player preferences are not homogenous and there may be segments of the market that would respond to a game with a radically different meanvariance-skewness profile than Lotto. Forrest and Alagic (2007) trace the history of one game in Britain that was certainly different. Lotto Extra was offered as part of the United Kingdom National Lottery’s portfolio of games between 2000 and 2006. Played on Saturdays and Wednesdays, it had the same 6/49 format as Lotto but all of the prize fund was allocated to the ‘all six balls correct’ prize pool. At the disappointing levels of sales achieved for this unusual product, rollovers were the rule. Indeed, at one time 104 consecutive Wednesdays passed without Table 3.3
UK Saturday Lotto sales regression coefficient
Constant Trend expected loss, Lotto
15.00 –.001
–22.08
.19
6.27
previous Wednesday sales
.002
number of observation r-squared
2.53
–.09
–7.31
.13
5.21
–.078
3.05
dummy: EuroMillions available expected loss, EuroMillions
27.25 –18.59
–1.29
log of previous Saturday sales
dummy: Superdraw
t-statistic
401 .915
t-statistics calculated with robust standard errors, dependent variable is the log of sales, two-stage least squares estimates.
68 Gaming in the New Market Environment
a winner. The result was that sometimes large jackpots accumulated (there was no cap on the number of rollovers) such that the expected value of a ticket reached nearly £1.40 (compared with a purchase cost of £1). Even when the expected return was positive and so large, sales barely reached 1 million, indicating little interest in a product that offered such extreme variance and skewness. Such low sales, even when expected return was actually positive, demonstrate very clearly of course that it is inadequate to model behaviour as driven solely by expected value. Variance and skewness also potentially matter.
3.5
EuroMillions
A special case of new game occurs when operators combine to offer multijurisdictional versions of Lotto. This has been the strongest trend in lotteries worldwide over the last ten years. All but one of the 42 American states offering lotteries are now affiliated to a lottery block and the last hold-out state in Australia has joined the others in replacing its domestic Saturday game with participation in a cross-country version. In Europe, the Nordic countries have long combined and in 2004 operators in the United Kingdom, Spain and France joined forces to offer EuroMillions. Six other national lottery organisations affiliated subsequently and this has allowed jackpots of up to nearly €200 million to emerge to provoke outbreaks of ‘lotto frenzy’ across the block. In its application to renew its licence to run the United Kingdom National Lottery, Camelot proposes forming a worldwide alliance that promises yet greater prizes. Multi-state games have the obvious advantage of combining populations to permit greater exploitation of the peculiar scale economies of lotto. This was illustrated when New South Wales became the final addition to the Australian lottery block. Sales in all the existing member states grew because the extra population provided by New South Wales made the potential jackpot so much greater. Of course, smaller states have more to gain from cooperation as the development of their game is particularly constrained by the smallness of the jackpots their populations can support. A more subtle advantage for them is that barriers to entry are raised when existing games grow in scale. A new operator will find it more risky to enter the market if it has to offer higher initial jackpot guarantees to persuade enough early players to buy and so make the market for its product self-sustaining. The relationship between existing games and a new multi-state game will likely vary between small and large jurisdictions. Therefore, research on the impact of EuroMillions on the sale of local lottery products
Demand Issues in the Market for Lotto and Similar Games 69
should be extended to cover a variety of countries. Here I note only preliminary results obtained for the British case. In the United Kingdom, lottery sales and jackpots were already high and the benefits to the operator are therefore likely to be less than in small states like Portugal where EuroMillions permitted the lottery agency to offer the population dramatically high prizes for the first time. For the United Kingdom, EuroMillions was to be a supplement to national Lotto rather than a replacement. But what would be the relationship of Lotto to EuroMillions? Two issues arise. First, will sales of EuroMillions lower the size of the Lotto market by causing some player expenditure permanently to switch to the new game? Second, will a particularly attractive EuroMillions draw eat into Lotto sales that week? Matheson and Grote (2006) ask similar questions concerning the relationship between state-specific and multi-state games in the United States. They find that typically local game sales fell when a state joined one of the two cross-country lottery blocks though the displacement was only partial so that membership was still worthwhile in terms of revenue from the expanded portfolio of products. But they also found that in the new regime, where local and national games were offered side by side, the two emerged as complements, i.e. in weeks when, say, Powerball offered an enhanced jackpot, this induced greater sales of Powerball but also greater sales of local games. A similar finding emerges for the United Kingdom. Ian McHale and I estimated a Gulley-Scott type demand function for Saturday Lotto to assess the impact of the new EuroMillions game. To provide as clean an environment as possible for testing, we restricted our period of analysis so that it began with the introduction of Thunderball in 1999. Thus, EuroMillions was the only major product introduced during the period. We included a dummy variable set equal to one from the week that EuroMillions was launched and a price variable, the expected loss from purchasing a EuroMillions ticket that week. The combined results (Table 3.3) suggest that sales of Saturday Lotto were enhanced in the period when EuroMillions was available and that this effect was magnified when EuroMillions became more attractive because of rollover. Of course, it is possible that the time trend has been specified too crudely (i.e., the unknown counter-factual could be that the rate of decline of Lotto sales may have slowed even without EuroMillions). But the results make it implausible that cannibalisation was a problem and certainly suggest that, once EuroMillions was in place, it proved complementary to Lotto: when rollovers made the multi-state game more attractive, this actually proved of benefit to Lotto sales. The timing of the European draw
70 Gaming in the New Market Environment
may have been crucial to this outcome. If people join the queue at the lottery booth on Friday, the next Lotto draw is close enough for it to be worthwhile to buy a Lotto ticket as well. Even for those who planned to buy on Saturday anyway, the earlier purchase benefits the operator because it eliminates the possibility that the customer will for some random reason fail to make it to the booth next day. The results suggest that the game has been well designed for the United Kingdom market and that it is possible to develop new games that actually help the old.
3.6
Relationship of lotteries to other modes of gambling
The strand of research discussed above focuses on the offerings of lottery agencies themselves. It shows that there is a potential for the development of new games, specifically multi-state lotto, to help sustain current levels of revenue as competition in the gaming market intensifies. But how serious is the threat to lotteries from other sectors? A distinction here is drawn between the impact on lotteries as the price of current rival modes, such as betting, is driven downwards and the impact as new forms of gaming become available, for example electronic gaming machines in casinos or casino style gaming on the internet. Both these threats are likely to be of increasing concern to the operators. In many jurisdictions within the European Union, the opening of the betting market to bookmakers from other member states looks likely as a result of the principles laid down by the Court of Justice in the Gambelli case. William Hill, a major British bookmaker, has, for example, recently applied for licences to operate in Greece. Such incursions are likely to drive down the price of betting. Will this take custom from lotteries? Again, Europe as a whole has been slow to permit modern casino style gaming but liberalisation is on the agenda in many countries, for example with mega-casinos proposed in Manchester and Maastricht. Would increased accessibility to high prize casino style gaming machine (in or outside casinos) initiate decline in lottery play? And of course everywhere Internet gaming poses a competitive challenge with no guarantee that it will be possible in countries like France and the Netherlands to sustain the policy of restricting access to foreign gaming sites. Will the Internet be the death of conventional lotteries?
3.7
Cross price elasticity
I first address the issue of whether, for example, improved value to consumers in betting will lead to that sector attracting expenditure pre-
Demand Issues in the Market for Lotto and Similar Games 71
viously spent on lotteries. The review of the scientific literature presented in Swiss Institute of Comparative Law (2006) certainly illustrates that bettors in America and Britain are conscious of value for money in the product. Across nineteen studies, the average estimate of own price elasticity of demand for betting was –1.76, i.e., a 1 per cent drop in take-out was typically associated with a near 2 per cent increase in betting volume. Typical of consumer response was the substantial boom in United Kingdom betting which followed the abolition of betting duty in 2001 (Paton et al, 2004). With so many studies generating a firm consensus as to how elastic demand is, it would be reasonable to predict that falling take-outs in Europe, at least in countries with a strong betting culture, will stimulate betting sectors hitherto constrained by the high take-outs associated with monopoly control of the market. Unfortunately there are far fewer studies which investigate how much of the extra betting will be new gambling and how much will represent expenditure drawn from lotteries (and other modes). This is an issue of cross-price elasticity of demand. A condition favouring strong effects from price of one product to amount sold of another is that the two share a common pool of potential customers. In the case of gambling, there is evidence that markets do in fact overlap heavily. In Forrest and Gulley (2006), we looked at the spending diaries of 6,634 United Kingdom households which took part in the government’s Family Expenditure Survey. Data distinguished whether and how much each household spent on Lotto, scratchcards, the Irish Lottery, other lotteries (e.g., run by charities), bookmaker betting and bingo. Table 3.4 shows correlations between participation in Lotto and each other form of gambling and in every single case the coefficient is positive and highly statistically significant. Table 3.4 also shows, for households who engaged in each of a pair of activities, the correlation between level of spending on lotto and level of spending on the other mode. Again correlation is always positive and in most cases highly statistically significant. Thus many households to whom the Lottery appeals also display a taste for gambling elsewhere. Consequently it is reasonable to suppose that spending by current lottery players may be displaced to some extent if existing modes of gambling become better value. As noted, there are few studies that attempt to measure these cross effects between modes. Paton et al (2004) use monthly betting tax revenue data from the United Kingdom to assess the impact on betting of variations in the effective price of lotto (averaged across the draws in each month). They estimated a cross-price elasticity of +0.35, i.e., the
72 Gaming in the New Market Environment Table 3.4
Spending on Lotto and other models of gambling
Correlation between participation in lotto and participation in – football pools
.095 (.000)
other lotteries
.046 (.000)
Irish Lottery
.070 (.000)
scratchcards
.137 (.000)
bingo
.109 (.000)
bookmaker betting
.152 (.000)
Correlation between level of spending on lotto and level of spending on – football pools
.238 (.004)
other lotteries
.577 (.103)
Irish Lottery
.209 (.265)
scratchcards
.234 (.000)
bingo
.325 (.000)
bookmaker betting
.143 (.000)
p-values are in parentheses Source: UK family expenditure survey (2001), 6634 households.
activities were substitutes, a 1 per cent fall in the effective price of a lottery ticket reduced betting by 0.35 per cent. In Forrest, Gulley and Simmons (2008), we addressed the same issue with the advantage of much less aggregated data provided by the industry. We were able to model daily betting volumes, on horses, dogs, football and numbers games, at a major United Kingdom bookmaker over a period of more than five years. For all sectors except dogs, we identified a relationship between turnover and the size of jackpot on offer in the next scheduled draw of Lotto. Thus not only do the populations of lottery players and bettors overlap but they are also ready to reallocate funds between the bookmaker shop and the lottery booth. The degree of cross-price elasticity is, however, as in Paton et al, fairly low. The modelling literature therefore suggests strongly that competition in the betting sector will improve value for money for consumers and lead to substantially more betting activity. However, the limited investigation of cross effects between modes suggests that only a limited amount of this extra betting will be at the expense of lottery games.
Demand Issues in the Market for Lotto and Similar Games 73
3.8
Displacement of lottery sales by new modes of gambling
A possibly greater threat to lotteries may emerge as customers encounter entirely new forms of gambling. Internet gaming is one focus of concern for the industry but also for social reasons: lotteries are regarded as particularly ‘soft’ form of gambling whereas internet gaming is likely to be a more serious source of problem gambling given that it presents opportunities for repeat and fast paced play. As yet, econometric modelling has little to say about displacement of Lottery spending by rival internet gambling options. Developments are too recent and data still scarce. But there is strong evidence that liberalisation of conventional gaming, another manifestation of increasing competition, has the capacity to damage state lottery operations. Much of the evidence is from the United States where several studies demonstrate that lottery revenue is threatened when high prize slot machines become more accessible (Elliott and Navin, 2002, Fink and Rork, 2003, Walker and Jackson, 2008). Further, the impact is large.6 In Farrell and Forrest (2008), we checked whether Australian experience was the same as American. Australia provides a convenient laboratory in which to examine the impact of legalising machine gaming. A small number of what Australians call ‘casinos’ (what others might term mega-casinos) have appeared across the country, roughly one per state. Seven of the eight states and territories have also legalised ‘gaming halls’ which can house typically 100–200 casino-style, high or unlimited jackpot gaming machines. In some states these are very thick on the ground, with provision as dense as, for example, that of bookmaker offices in British cities. Because legalisation of such venues occurred at different dates in different states (and not at all in Western Australia), there is sufficient variation in the data to permit statistically precise estimates of the degree of cannibalisation of online lottery games by the new facilities. Further Australian data distinguish by state between turnover and player losses in casinos on the one hand and gaming halls on the other. In our preferred specification we regress turnover of a state’s online lottery games on state casino turnover, state gaming hall turnover and a set of control variables. We employ fixed effects instrumental variables estimation with a panel of eight states and territories. Our finding is that the growth of ‘casinos’ had no effect on lottery sales. Recall though that Australia uses the word ‘casino’ to refer to a very small number of destination facilities, visits to which are necessarily infrequent for most
74 Gaming in the New Market Environment
of the population. The implication for Europe is that a single large isolated casino in Manchester or Maastricht would not be expected to harm the lottery market. However, the finding is very different for the gaming halls which provide local service in city centres and suburbs in most Australian states. Here we find that every extra dollar placed in a slot machine results in lottery spending falling by 1.8 cents. Such is the volume achieved in the gaming hall sector that this implies that, at recently reported levels of activity in gaming halls, individual state lotteries have lost 20–30 per cent of their online games revenue directly as a result of the emergence and growth of machine gaming. The Australian evidence confirms, but is yet more compelling, than the American. It tells us more because it is possible to distinguish clearly between effects from isolated mega-casinos and effects from machine gaming in neighbourhood locations. It is the more accessible form of casino-style gaming (with high jackpots) that provides the threat to lotteries. Perhaps few European jurisdictions would contemplate providing such a network of, effectively, neighbourhood casinos as is now in place in New South Wales or Victoria. But internet gaming can provide even more accessible opportunities to lose money on casino style games and it has yet to be learned how serious this competition might be to state lotteries. Notes 1 A comprehensive review of previous cases and several incisive commentaries on evolving European case law are provided in Littler and Fijnaut (2006). 2 In economic analysis, the price of a gambling service is commonly identified with ‘take out’, i.e. the proportion of stake retained by the operator. This varies widely, from as high as 50 per cent for many lotto games to as low as 2 per cent in the most competitive machine gaming markets in Nevada. 3 Several articles present models expressed in terms of ‘effective price’ but this is merely the difference between the price of a ticket and its expected value. 4 Indeed, Forrest et al (2002) demonstrated that there was misspecification, for example, if size of jackpot pool were excluded from the sales equation. 5 In a few early superdraws, the operator announced a bonus payment with which the jackpot was to be topped-up. The amounts are treated as exogenous. These top-ups are therefore akin to rollovers. In a large majority of superdraws, however, the operator has advertised a minimum level of jackpot. This has always been binding in the sense that extra money was indeed paid into the prize fund but the amount added was endogenous since less will need to be paid the more successful such a promotion is in boosting number of tickets sold. We therefore accounted for these draws with dummy variables for various levels of guarantee rather than actual payment into the prize fund. 6 An extensive review of American evidence is provided in Walker (2007).
4 Lottery Design Lessons from the Dismal Science Ian Walker1
4.1
Introduction
Understanding gambling is a problem for economists. The economist’s traditional toolbox is not well equipped to understand why risk-averse individuals would participate in gambles that are actuarially unfair bets. However, gambling is a pervasive feature of most economies and a number of simple departures from traditional economic thinking have been suggested in the literature to attempt to reconcile gambling with the idea that individuals are risk averse. One recent phenomenon in betting markets has been the growth of lottery products. The scale and scope of lotteries has expanded considerably over recent decades and there has been considerable controversy over their increasing use by governments as sources of revenue. In most economies lottery operators are charged with raising revenue that can then be used either to support general expenditure or is earmarked for particular purposes. Indeed, operators are generally expected, within bounds, to maximise the revenue that they raise. We will take it for granted that such gambles are not (or rather, are not just) financial assets which have no intrinsic value in themselves. Rather we view a lottery ticket as a product within which is embedded a number of characteristics some of which consumers like and some they don’t – but that, at least for some individuals, the attractive characteristics outweigh the unattractive ones. Some of these characteristics are fixed and while these might contribute to sales, on average, because they are fixed they cannot explain variation in sales over time. For example, the number of lottery sales outlets is usually relatively static over time. Thus, here we confine our attention to the effect of those characteristics that vary over time to explain the variation in sales over 75
76 Gaming in the New Market Environment
time. In this we exploit a peculiar feature of many lottery games – that they are pari-mutuel bets where the number of winners in any particular draw is a random variable. This leads to a probability that there will be no winner in any draw (a rollover). Lottery games that have this feature are usually referred to as lotto and are designed so that when a rollover occurs the prize pool is transferred to the next draw. In this chapter we explore how the sales of lottery tickets are affected by the shape of the prize distribution that is ultimately determined by the way in which the lottery game has been designed. By shape, we mean the distribution of the prize fund across the winners of different prize pools. The size of the overall fund is determined by the take-out rate, the proportion of sales revenue that is not put into the prize fund (and so is used to pay for the costs or is given to the government or its agent), and the level of sales. Most lotto games feature a jackpot prize pool that is reserved for winners of the hardest to win jackpot prize (usually matching all n of the balls drawn), another for those that fulfil the easier task of matching n-1 balls, etc. Each prize pool will consist of a given proportion of the overall prize fund. Thus, in lotto games there is random variation in the number of winners of each prize pool from draw to draw. And, in particular, the number of jackpot winners varies so that there will sometimes be no jackpot winners in a given draw The rules of lotto then usually dictate that the unclaimed jackpot pool gets transferred to the following draw and added to that jackpot pool – a phenomenon known as a rollover. Casual empiricism shows that rollovers are associated with higher sales in the subsequent draw because they increase its jackpot prize pool.2 Thus, the distribution of possible winnings is determined by: game design parameters, such as the take-out rate and the given proportions of the overall funding going to each prize pool; random fluctuation in the number of winners in each prize pool; and the size of any rollover amount from the previous draw. The design parameters are known to players and are fixed; the rollover amount varies from draw to draw but is known one draw in advance; the number of winners of each prize pool depends on the number of players and the numbers that are drawn in that draw (if popular numbers are drawn there will be many winners) which are not known in advance. In practice there are many complications that have to be faced, but the essence of our analysis is based on exploiting the variation in the shape of the prize distribution to explain sales variation over time. In particular, we examine how variation in the prize distribution affects sales to test the hypothesis that players are motivated, in part, by the
Lottery Design Lessons from the Dismal Science 77
skewness of the prize distribution. Lotto prize distributions are highly left skewed because almost all players lose their stakes, with a small proportion winning small prizes, and a very small proportion winning very large prizes. But when a rollover occurs the size of the largest prize rises and so the degree of left skewness falls because the largest prize suddenly becomes larger. In addition to testing the proposition that skewness motivates gambling, our analysis has a practical purpose: we use this estimated model to try to make counterfactual inferences about how changes in the design of the lottery game that generates our data might affect the level of sales. While the dataset we use does not contain any changes in the design parameters of the game we exploit the fact that there is a deterministic relationship between the mean, variance and skewness of the prize distribution (the prize distribution’s first three moments) and both the design parameters and the level of the rollover from the previous draw. Since we know how the moments depend on both of these factors, and since we can estimate how sales depend on the moments, we can combine these to infer how sales depend on the design parameters even though there has been no variation in those parameters across the sample. This paper updates and extends earlier research in Walker and Young (2001). The major empirical difficulty with that earlier work is that it failed to resolve satisfactorily the fact that, although sales will depend on the moments of the prize distribution, the moments of the prize distribution themselves depend on sales. Thus the relationship between sales and the moments of the prize distribution is a simultaneous one – so the major empirical difficulty we face is to estimate the extent to which variations in the moments cause variations in sales. Moreover, the moments are not known until the draw is closed and sales can be tallied. Thus, it seems plausible that individuals form expectations of the moments based on sales in the current draw and that these expectations are driven, in part, by any observed rollover from the previous draw. A large rollover will lead potential players to expect larger sales in this draw so that the expectation of the expected value will be larger, the expected variance will be larger, and the expected level of skewness will be less left skewed, than would be the case with no rollover. The usual way of resolving simultaneity in the relationship between two variables is to exploit factors that affect one relationship but not the other. A possible candidate factor is the size of the rollover – this affects sales in the next draw via the effect on the moments of the prize distribution.
78 Gaming in the New Market Environment
However, sales in one draw may be correlated with sales in the next, even in the absence of rollovers. For example, this correlation might arise because a temporary factor that boosts sales in one draw may bring a few new individuals into the game who then gain (or regain) the habit of playing and so subsequent sales are affected. This serial correlation in sales implies that we cannot use sales in a previous draw. Unfortunately this rules out exploiting the rollover size because this is a given fraction of the sales in the previous draw. Instead we exploit a peculiar feature of the game whereby the proportion of winners in each prize draw is a random variable which depends on the winning numbers that are actually drawn. Some numbers are more popular than others (see Farrell et al (2000) for estimates of the extent of this phenomenon – which is sometime referred to as conscious selection). In draws where unpopular numbers are drawn there are few winners of prizes below the jackpot level (as well as few winners of the jackpot). One purpose of these smaller prizes in lotto design is that many small winners might encourage players to think that winning big is more likely than it really is. Moreover, many players participate through consortia – groups of workplace colleagues or family members who agree (explicitly or not) to share their winnings. When such consortia win small prizes they are thought to often reinvest their winnings, rather than take the trouble of dividing the winnings into very small amounts per consortium member. Thus, for a given level of sales in a particular draw, the number of small prize winners (which is a random variable, conditional on overall sales) does affect the level of sales in the subsequent draw. This will be true irrespective of any serial correlation is sales. Our modelling strategy is to use this property to isolate the effect of moments on sales. Once we allow for this endogeneity of the moments of the prize distribution, we find quite conclusive evidence that skewness is an important factor in driving lottery sales. A complementary modelling strategy has been pursued by other researchers who attempt to analyse the proximate determinants of sales (see, for example, Forrest (2008) and references therein). The rationale for this line of research is to provide estimates of the effect of actual changes in the marketplace. Thus this approach has, for example, been used to analyse the effects of de-regulation of other forms of gambling on lottery sales; and has been used to estimate the effect on the sales of one product of the introduction of another to address the extent to which one game cannibalises sales from another. This complementary literature has some advantages: not least, it is much more straight-
Lottery Design Lessons from the Dismal Science 79
forward. In principle, such a more straightforward regression exercise could estimate the effect of actual game design changes on sales. In practice, such game design changes are few and far between and, moreover, are not likely to be exogenous. Observed changes in game design are likely to be a response by the operator to an opportunity to raise sales – for example, if sales are flagging, for some reason, the operator may feel that it is appropriate to change the design of the game to attempt to arrest the decline in sales. Thus, observed game design changes (and even the introduction of new games) are unlikely to be exogenous and estimation methods ought to address this problem. In practice, such studies do not consider this causality issue. Moreover, both strands of this literature make arbitrary functional form assumptions. In one case, the focus is on the role of the prize distribution and the assumption is that this can be captured through a linear function of the moments of the prize distribution. In the other case, the specification is more pragmatic and sales are assumed to depend on the jackpot size, or the expected jackpot winnings that depend, in turn, on the size of the rollover. In practice, it is difficult to argue that time series variation in sales is really due to the variation in the skewness in the prize distribution rather than arising from some complicated non-linear function of the rollover size. It is especially difficult to argue for a specific model if there is limited variation in the size of rollovers across draws. In practice, there is simply insufficient variation in the jackpot size across draws to be able to argue for one specification or another.3 One advantage of the more structural approach here, that emphasises the effect of the moments of the prize distribution on sales, is that it is explicitly couched within a theoretical framework that has been widely used, in other markets, to analyse brand choices. It is common for lottery markets to feature a portfolio of games, each with particular characteristics so that each game can be thought of as a brand. The theory is due to Lancaster (1971) and has famously been applied to UK egg sales in pioneering work by Gorman (1980) and, more recently, to understanding the market for cellphones in the US by Hausman (1997) and minivans by Petrin (2002). This theory helps us understand the relationship between sales of different brands in the same market and, in particular, makes it possible for us to make inferences about how to design games. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 explains lotto games and how to calculate their odds which is fundamental to understanding lotto design. Section 4.3 builds on this to work out the
80 Gaming in the New Market Environment
expected value of a lottery ticket, and Section 4.4 extends this to include higher moments of the prize distribution. Section 4.5 introduces the Lancastrian approach in the context of lottery games and explains how one might recover the effects of game design effects from estimates of a model of sales which is driven by variations in the moments of the prize distribution induced by rollovers. Section 4.6 explains the econometric methodology that provides unbiased estimates of the effects of exogenous variation in the moments. Section 4.7 presents some tentative simulations of how sales would be affected by variation in the major parameters in the design of the game. Section 4.8 concludes with some directions for future research.
4.2
The odds of winning a (pari-mutuel) lottery
Lotteries have traditionally featured selection mechanisms that have numbered tickets drawn at random from an urn. While the details differ from game to game, modern incarnations of these mechanism usually feature N numbered balls bouncing in a transparent, often rotating, container from which n are drawn (usually without replacement). Individuals buy tickets by marking n numbers on a printed matrix of N numbers on an entry form. The form is scanned electronically and a ticket is printed out and given to the customer as a record. Each combination of n numbers has the same chance of winning given by p = N!/n! (N – n)! For example in the commonly used n = 6, N = 49 design p = 1/13,983,816. Thus, if sales are 40 million then we would expect, on average, the number of winners to be approximately 3. The probability that a given ticket does not win is 1 – p. If two tickets are sold, then the probability that neither are winning tickets is (1 – p)2, and so on for 3 tickets, 4 etc. Thus the probability that there are no winners (that is, that there is a rollover) in draw t when sales are St is given by (1 – p)St. Thus, suppose sales are around 40 (20) million and p is 1 in 14 million then the probability of a rollover is approximately 6 per cent (25 per cent).4 Rollovers are doubly important if there is serial correlation in play. Rollovers cause sales to rise in the next draw and the serial correlation then causes sales to rise in the draw after that (and after that …), albeit by to a lesser extent, in all subsequent draws. Sequential rollovers could, in principle, cause sales to ratchet upwards. However, in practice the tedium of lotto games causes sales to exhibit a long run secular decline. Thus rollovers, of the appropriate frequency and size, can offset the tendency for sales to decline. However, more rollovers are not necess-
Lottery Design Lessons from the Dismal Science 81
arily better. If rollovers have high frequency then players will come to expect them and will engage in intertemporal substitution – reserving their lottery spend until a rollover (or several) has already occurred before playing. The optimal frequency of rollovers will depend on the relative strengths of the trend decline, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and the degree of serial correlation.
4.3
The expected value calculation
In raffles the expected value of a ticket falls with sales since the prizes are fixed. At low levels of sales tickets are valuable, and as sales rise their value falls. The operator faces the risk that sales revenue will not exceed the cost of prizes and the players face the risk that they have to compete with many other players for the prizes. In lotto games the design is pari-mutuel and players compete for shares of the prize pool(s) as opposed to fixed prizes. Thus, as sales rise the prize pool expands and the expected winnings (that is, losses) remain the same. However, the possibility of a rollover implies that the (top) prize pool might not be won at all in this draw and this depresses the expected value of participating in the current draw. Thus, sales have an additional effect on the expected value of participating in any given draw – higher sales cause the rollover probability to fall which raises the expected value. Thus the expected value of a ticket in a given draw depends on the size of the prize fund: which is the proportion of sales that is not taken out as tax and operator costs (that is, (1 – τ)St where τ is the take-out rate) plus any rollover from the previous draw. But this is multiplied by the probability that there is at least one winner, that is, 1 – (1 – p)St. Further details of the algebra of the calculation of the expected value are in the Appendix but Figures 4.1 and 4.2 capture the important intuition. Figure 4.1 shows how the expected value or mean return, m1t, of a lottery ticket that costs $1 for common types of design in a regular (non-rollover) draw. In the figure the take-out rate τ is set at 0.55 which is a typical value. The shape of this figure has given rise to what has been called lotto’s ‘peculiar economies of scale’5 since it shows that the game gets cheaper to play (in the sense that the expected value gets higher) the higher is sales. This is because the higher is sales the smaller is the chance of a rollover occurring because more of the possible combinations are sold. This makes the return higher in the current draw because rollovers take money from the current draw and add it to the next draw; and your ticket in this draw gives you a possible claim on prizes in this draw but not the next. So the higher the chances that
82 Gaming in the New Market Environment 0.46 0.44
Mean return
0.42 0.4
6/49
0.38
6/42 6/45
0.36
6/44 0.34
6/53
0.32 0.3 20 Figure 4.1
30
40
50
60 70 Sales (£m)
80
90
100
Lotto’s peculiar economies of scale S=S(V)
rollover
1– τ
Expected value
no rollover
Sales Figure 4.2
Expected value in rollover and regular draws
a jackpot rolls-over, the less a ticket for the current draw is worth. Indeed, from an individual player’s perspective, it doesn’t matter if the money is rolled over or given to another player in this draw, only that he or she does not win.
Lottery Design Lessons from the Dismal Science 83
Note that at very large levels of sales all game designs have the same mean return which simply equals the 1 – τ, because the chance of a rollover is very small when ticket sales are very large since most possible combinations will be sold. Notice also that, at any given level of sales, easier games offer better value in regular draws since the rollover chance is smaller. When a rollover of size Jt–1 has taken place, the expected value function shifts upwards by an amount equal to Jt–1/St (because everyone has the same chances of getting the rolled over amount) and this diminishes as St rises. Thus, the function shifts upwards more at low sales than at high sales and the shifted function will, in general, have a single maximum. Figure 4.2 shows the shape of the m1t function for regular and rollover cases. Note that, the effects of rollover on expected value, and thence on sales, will be small when sales are high, and when Jt–1 is small because πn, the share of the total price pool for those who match all n balls (i.e. jackpot winners), is small or because τ is high. A double rollover, when the jackpot had not been won for two earlier draws, would shift the m1t even higher upwards. In principle, with multiple rollovers the expected value could exceed the cost of the ticket – although we would expect sales to rise with the expected value and consequently we would be unlikely to observe tickets being worth more then their cost.
4.4
Higher moments of the prize distribution
It seems likely that sales are affected by higher moments of the prize distribution – in particular, by the variance and skewness of the prize distribution. Indeed, if only the first moment mattered then we would find it difficult to reconcile gambling with aversion to risk. Individuals who are risk averse would not be expected to participate in lotto games that offered expected values that were less than the cost of participation. There is accumulating evidence that gambling is affected by the skewness in the prize distribution.6 That is, lotteries offer the possibility of a huge change in lifestyle. Lottery prize distributions are highly left skewed – the vast majority of players lose a small amount (the stake), a small number win low prizes, and a very small number win large prizes. However, the existing studies neglect the fact that the observed moments in prize distributions are themselves a function of the bets that are placed. For example, as sales rise in lotto the expected value rises and this makes participating more attractive. Moreover, lottery operators have chosen the design of the game to deliver a particular
84 Gaming in the New Market Environment
vector of moments, taking into account the likely size of the market. If the market is expected to be small then we might expect the operator to choose a different design (one that is easier to win) than if the market were large. Similarly, as well as the expected value, the higher moments of the prize distribution will be affected by sales. Thus, the mechanical relationship between sales and the moments of the prize distribution may contaminate the behavioural response of sales to variation in the moments that are due to chance. The distribution of winnings implied by the n/N design typically has a large spike at zero, since most players lose altogether, and successive peaks corresponding to matching more of the n winning numbers until a final peak occurs for matching the n-ball and winning (a share in) the jackpot prize pool. The distribution at these further local maxima associated with more difficult-to-win prizes arises because the amount won depends on the number of people who also win a share in each prize pool. Thus, instead of a spike, there is a small peak with a (local) maximum in the distribution for each prize type, which corresponds to the most probable number of winners for that type, but around this is a distribution that arises because there may be fewer winners each getting a larger share of the pool or more winners than expected each getting a smaller share. Successive peaks, corresponding to the mean winnings of bigger prizes are lower (as the chance of winning is smaller) and narrower (because the variance in the number of prize winners is lower for the more difficult to win prizes). The overall distribution is thus left skewed (by the large majority of losers) but a rollover decreases the left skew since it increases the size of the jackpot pool. The formulae for the variance and skewness are complicated functions of the rollover size and the lotto design parameters and can be seen in the Appendix to Walker and Young (2001).7
4.5
Lancastrian approach
The characteristics approach to demand due to Lancaster (1971) is useful for thinking about sales of closely related products. The first application was a famous paper by Gorman (1991) that modelled egg sales in the UK. More recently, the approach has been used for thinking about brands of goods (see Hausman (1997) and Putrin (2002)). The essence of the approach is that, in contrast to conventional microeconomic theory, goods are not valued for their goodness but rather for the bundle of characteristics that they contain. So goods that are good substitutes for each other are likely to contain similar combinations of character-
Lottery Design Lessons from the Dismal Science 85
istics. In the context of the lottery market the products sold effectively differ in their prize distributions and a convenient way of summarising these distributions is via their first three moments. The first moment, the expected value m1t, is effectively the price variable since the expected cost of participating is the face price (usually one unit of currency) minus the expected value. On average each lottery ticket costs 1 – mlt and the larger is the expected value of a ticket the better the bet is. Apart from this mean return to a ticket, a ticket is characterised by design parameters that imply specific variance (m2t) which is a characteristic that is disliked, and specific skewness (m3t) which is liked. Suppose a market is characterised by two lottery games, labelled W and S, both with the same take-out rate for convenience. The position is illustrated in Figure 4.3 where each product is portrayed as a ray in characteristics space. The length of the rays are given by multiples of 1 – mlt to indicate their cost. Both games have specific combinations of –m2t (variance is disliked so it is measured negatively in the figure) and m3t (skewness) with the W game being less skewed, at given variance, than the S game. Each ray indicates a ticket type and movements
W’ –m2t
W E’
E
S
m3t O Figure 4.3
Two-game lottery market
86 Gaming in the New Market Environment
along the ray away from the origin indicate higher levels of sales of that game. We could envisage the population having a distribution of preferences between –m2t and m3t with many preferring the heavily skewed S game but, nonetheless, some preferring the W game. Aggregate sales of the two products can be described by a position along the line WS and imagine that the position E is chosen where the market has a slightly higher proportion of S-type tickets than W-type tickets (as seen by their distances along the respective rays from the origin). Now consider what happens when the W game experiences a design change that results in a price fall so the line OW gets longer since more W-type tickets can be afforded. And suppose that the skewness in W’s prize distribution, at any level of variance, gets larger so OW gets less steep. Thus, W’ has become a more attractive bet and the frontier for the aggregate market changes to W’S. Now that W has become both cheaper and more similar in the combination of characteristics that it offers to S we would expect E to move to a position like E’ where many more W-type tickets are bought and somewhat fewer S-type. Note that if only S existed, sales would be OS. If W is now introduced then sales of S slump, but this is more than compensated for by the extra W-sales. Thus, diversification of the game portfolio can increase aggregate sales because two products better cater for the distribution of preferences for the characteristics in the population.8
4.6
Econometric methodology, data, and estimates
One way of summarising the complications of how all the various aspects of game design impacts on sales is through the mean, variance and skewness of the prize distribution.9 For example, one might allow St = S(m1t, m2t, m3t, Xt) + εt by choosing some parametric form for S(.).10 The term εt captures the effects of all unobservable factors (and may be correlated with the same factors in previous draws – serial correlation) on sales; while Xt is a vector of observable factors that, independently of the parameters of the game, affect sales. Most other research has focussed on the role of such Xt’s in determining sales.11 One modelling approach would be to substitute the formulae that show how the moments are related to the game design variables into S(.) to obtain a reduced form model of sales whereby St = F(n, N, τ, π, R t Jt–1) + ut. This F(.) is a complicated highly non-linear function and it is not practical to estimate the structural model coefficients from this reduced form. A special case of F(.) arises when all of the game design para-
Lottery Design Lessons from the Dismal Science 87
meters are fixed in the time series being modelled, so that only the rollovers determine sales variation across time, although this will still be highly non-linear.12 A fundamental issue is that while Rt–1Jt–1 affects St in F(.) it also depends on St–1, because lagged sales affect the rollover probability and also determine the size of the previous jackpot. Thus, the presence of serial correlation is sufficient to undermine the assumption that rollovers occur randomly since it implies that St depends on St–1 directly, as well as indirectly via any rollover. However, conscious selection is a strong phenomenon in lotto markets. Operators encourage it since having ownership over the numbers that one bets on makes playing more persistent – individuals are more likely to play in every draw if they feel that they are playing their own numbers. It is thought that, by allowing players to choose their own numbers, this has a large impact on sales. If players consciously select their numbers when they bet then there is likely to be larger variation in the number of prize winners in each prize pool than if there were no conscious selection. In particular, the number of 3-ball matches is likely to vary considerably from draw to draw. With sales of 40 million in 6/49 we would expect the number of 3-ball winners to be approximately 700 thousands with a standard deviation of approximately 100 thousand.13 3-ball winners usually win a modest prize14 and it is common for players to re-invest these modest levels of winnings in more lottery tickets in the next draw.15 Moreover, a substantial minority of sales is accounted for by syndicates16 who are thought to reinvest such small dividends to save the trouble of distributing them to syndicate members. Thus, in practice the number of 3-ball winners affects subsequent sales.17 Thus, we use an approach that uses the proportion of 3-ball winners in the t – 2 draw to explain the variation in R t–1 Jt–1 and then use the predicted value of this instead of the actual value. The assumption here is that 3-ball winners in draw t – 2 affect sales in t – 1, and hence the probability and size of any rollover, but it is assumed not to directly affect sales in t. This seems like a reasonable assumption. The data is the sales and rollover information, winning number and number of winners of each prize pool that Camelot, the UK operator, is obliged to publish for every draw. The data is sales in the Saturday and Wednesday online lotto games in the UK from the first draw, though the introduction of the Wednesday game was introduced in early 1997, to draw 310 in mid-1999 just before the start of the Thunderball game was introduced.18 This spans the period when the portfolio of games consisted of the Saturday lotto game, then the Wednesday and Saturday
88 Gaming in the New Market Environment
6/49 lotto games, then scratchcards, which were introduced in early 1998,19 as well as the two lotto draws. Figure 4.4 shows the history of sales over this period and for some time subsequent to this. The estimation period covered a time when there was rapid growth in sales fuelled, in part, by several large rollovers which are indicated by the sharp spikes in sales; followed by the introduction of the Wednesday lotto draw; and then the period, after the introduction of scratchcards, which saw a rapid decline in scratchcard sales, a slow decline in Saturday sales, and an even slower decline in Wednesday sales.20 We assume that the parametric form for Saturday and Wednesday sales, Ss(.) and Sw(.), are log-linear. That is, the log sales in each draw is assumed to be a linear function of the log of the moments.21 We include only the moments relating to the current draw in each equation.22 Our vector X includes data on: daytime maximum temperature and rainfall (the averages over the week of sale) prior to the draw, averaged over all met stations; seasonal (month) control variables; a cubic trend; and the sales of scratchcards in the week of sale). Further control variables were included in experiments and checks for robustness but even when they were statistically significant they failed to change the coefficients on the moments. Indeed, the estimated coefficients hardly change at all even when all of the control variables (except the cubic trend) are excluded.
160
Scratch Weds Extra Sat Extra Sat Regular Weds Regular
140
£ millions/week
120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1
Figure 4.4
27
53
79
105
131
157
UK sales (£m per week)
183
209 235 Draws
261
287
313
339
365
391
Lottery Design Lessons from the Dismal Science 89
An important innovation in this research is that our estimation method treats the dataset as an unbalanced panel (of two games) – it is unbalanced because the Wednesday game was not introduced until 15 months after the establishment of the Saturday draw. The specification is a logical one but explicitly excludes any dynamic effects apart from via the residuals. This is quite restrictive in this context but relaxing this gives rise to significant estimation difficulties and we reserve more complex specifications for future research.23 The results are presented in Table 4.1. We compare results with OLS (where the m’s are treated as exogenous but we still allow for serial correlation). The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and a variety of tests of specification, parameter stability and forecasting power, were employed.24 The OLS results show that: sales are a statistically significant increasing function of the mean of the prize distribution – so better bets are more attractive ones; sales are a statistically significant but decreasing function of the variance in the prize distribution – so riskier bets are less attractive; and sales are a statistically significant and increasing function of the skewness of the prize distribution – so players appear to exhibit a preference for skewness.25 The GMM estimates are also similar although the Wednesday results, in this case, show somewhat higher sensitivity to all three moments which is consistent with endogeneity being a bigger problem in the Wednesday game because at lower level
Table 4.1
Estimated parameters of log sales equations
OLS using actual jackpot to determine m’s Wednesday
Saturday
GMM using t-2 3-ball winners Wednesday
Saturday
m1
0.344 (0.090)
0.211 (0.076)
0.451 (0.110)
0.471 (0.193)
m2
–0.042 (0.009)
–0.072 (0.007)
–0.050 (0.018)
–0.102 (0.040)
m3
0.062 (0.024)
0.111 (0.023)
0.194 (0.083)
0.162 (0.043)
ρ
w
0.057 (0.019)
0.003 (0.022)
0.051 (0.020)
0.011 (0.023)
ρ
s
0.123 (0.020)
–0.001 (0.010)
R2
–0.001 (0.009) 0.932
0.800
0.931
0.297 (0.088) 0.813
Note: All equations contain control variables listed in the text. First stage results for the estimates show that the moments are significantly affected by the number of 3-ball winners and are available on request.
90 Gaming in the New Market Environment
of sales, in 6/49, the moments are more sensitive to the level of sales and to the jackpot size than is the case at a higher level of sales. Although the qualitative results support our original vision – that sales depend positively on the mean of the prize distribution, negatively on its variance, and positively on its skewness, the quantitative interpretation of the results are less straightforward. To give a feel for what the results mean in quantitative terms imagine a (large) rollover which adds £5 million to the Saturday jackpot, where Saturday sales are approximately 40 million. This bonus would increase the expected value by approximately 25 per cent, given the UK lotto design parameters, and would cause a modest rise in variance, and a large increase in skewness (of about 10 per cent). Thus, according to the GMM estimates in the final column of Table 4.1, this would raise sales by about 12 per cent though the effect on the expected value and a further 2 per cent because of its effect on skewness, offset by an effect of more variance of less than 1 per cent. There would be a jump in sales of about 13 per cent. But note that the serial correlation would raise sales the following Saturday by about 4 per cent over what would have happened (with a small effect on Wednesday too). Cumulating the effects over time, and across both games, the effect of a £5 million rollover would be to raise sales by approximately £8 million.26 Clearly our estimates rely on the functional form restriction that rollovers affects sales only through their effect on the first three moments for the prize distribution and that this relationship is log-linear. However, it is difficult to test this specification against alternatives because rollovers have rather limited variance so that tests of functional form would have little power. Thus, in the absence of other evidence, and with support from studies of gambling on other datasets, we feel that our interpretation of the estimates of the way in which sales vary with rollover size is the best available, and we exploit the estimates to simulate the effect of game design induced changes in moments below.
4.7
Game design simulations
Making inferences from the observed estimated relationships between sales and the moments requires that we solve the estimated equations for sales as a function of the design parameters. This is complicated because these equations are highly non-linear and do not admit an analytical solution.27 Throughout we use the estimates from the GMM estimation procedure – note that these estimates tended to imply that sales were more sensitive to the moments. The simulation strategy was
Lottery Design Lessons from the Dismal Science 91
to draw an initial value for εt for each game, solve the model for initial sales for given values of the design parameters, then use this solution to generate a rollover probability and a level of the rollover conditional on one occurring in the next draw. Whether or not a rollover occurred was chosen at random from distribution with mean given by the predicted rollover probability. This then generated a subsequent sales prediction and the rollover probability and conditional sales were solved, etc. This exercise was repeated for 250 draws and the average sales computed. This process was looped a further 100 times, drawing a new initial εt on each occasion. The figures report the average sales from these 100 simulated 250-draw histories. Our simulations are entirely illustrative. To simplify the calculations the π vector is fixed so that πn = 1 and all π’s for lower prize pools were set to zero. The lack of lower level prizes implies that we are analysing hypothetical games with a very high variance and high skewness. We concentrate here on the effects of τ and of n on revenue (N is fixed at 49). Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the effects of varying τ and of n where we have added together the sales figures from Wednesday and Saturday games to compute the predicted sales and revenue (R) for an average week over the 250 draw period. In Figure 4.7 τ = 0.5 while in Figure 4.8 N=49. Figure 4.5 suggests that a harder to win game, such a 6/53 would raise higher revenue – almost 20 per cent higher than 6/49. It also suggests 70 Sales
60
R 50 40 30 20 10 0 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Figure 4.5
Effects of varying n on sales and revenue
92 Gaming in the New Market Environment 120 Sales 100
R
80
60
40
20
0 1 Figure 4.6
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Effects of varying τ on sales and revenue
that making the game very hard to win, beyond 53, would cause sales and revenue to fall steeply. Figure 4.5 shows the effects of the take-out rate – in this case revenue is fairly insensitive to the take-out over a wide range although the revenue maximising rate is approximately 0.4.28
4.8
Conclusion
Our analysis has considered some of the important questions relevant to running a lottery. Our methodology for analysing the implications of game design is analytically rigorous and yet it reflects the informal received wisdoms that dominate industry debate. Thus, it probably captures many of important features of the realities of the game but provides a degree of abstraction from reality to allow counterfactual changes to be analysed in a formal and quantitative way. However, our results need to be qualified. The simulations assume that sales respond to variations in mean, variance and skewness from design changes in the same way as they respond to these variables when rollovers occur. However, it is plausible that people may respond differently to these two types of changes. Firstly, changes induced by occasional rollovers allows for the possibility of substitution between draws,
Lottery Design Lessons from the Dismal Science 93
but this possibility does not exist for changes coming through the game design rather than rollovers. This suggests that ticket sales are higher when changes come from rollovers than from game design. Rollovers are rather like sales promotions – they induce people to change their behaviour quite differently to a temporary difference in the offer than they would to a permanent change. This failure to come to grips with intertemporal substitution is an important shortcoming on the present research. It would be difficult to overcome this in the UK data because, so far, there have been no clean and simple game changes that would allow us to challenge the implicit assumption that sales respond to temporary changes in moments in the same way as to permanent ones. However, some preliminary work using Irish time series data, which contains several simple game design changes, suggests that, despite the large incentives to engage in this, intertemporal substitution does not seem to be statistically important.29 There are several avenues for further research. The econometric analysis needs to be extended to incorporate newer games if we are going to be able to exploit a longer run of data. There are some practical difficulties in doing this because their introduction is potentially endogenous and because the newer games have typically involved rather low levels of sales. However, Forrest (2008) provides results that suggest that this extension is potentially important. Smith (2008) highlights the role that the hypothecation of the lottery revenue may play in determining sales. This is an interesting suggestion and could be incorporated into a time series analysis such as the present one providing there is sufficient variation in how the hypothecation is done. In the UK there have only been limited changes. US data offers better prospects for this kind of exploration because there have been changes in the hypothecation across states and across time. This essentially time series work could usefully be complemented by a microeconometric analysis of the effects of income using cross-section data in order to compute the regressivity of the take-out. Smith (2008) clearly shows that the share of income spent on lotteries declines steeply across the income distribution. Moreover, she shows that very high income shares seem to be confined to quite low income households. Such a microeconometric analysis could also incorporate the effects of rollovers if panel data were available. Ultimately such an analysis could enable researchers to simulate the effects of game design on the size distribution of individual levels of play, as well as on aggregate sales, and hence offer the prospect of designing out the problem gambling alluded to in Griffiths (2008), and Paldam (2008).
94 Gaming in the New Market Environment
Notes 1 This paper builds on earlier research that was funded by ESRC under research grant R000236821. This work was supported, in part, by a research studentship jointly funded by ESRC and the UK National Lottery Commissioners. However, the views expressed here are those of the author alone. 2 In horserace betting the idea that punters favour longshots unduly is a related phenomenon. 3 Kearney (2002) is more convincing in this respect because her analysis is based on US data where the game design and population varies quite markedly across states as well as across time. 4 The figures correspond approximately to UK figures for the Saturday and Wednesday lotto games. In practice, we observe many more rollovers in lottery games than would be implied by the observed level of sales and the discrepancy is due to the extent to which their are similarities in the way players choose their numbers – a phenomenon known as conscious selection. This can be accommodated into the analysis by allowing the rollover probability to be (1 – p)αSt with α ⭐ 1 such that α = 1 implies no conscious selection (i.e., completely random choice) and α = 0 implies that all payers have chosen exactly the same combination of numbers. Casual inspection of UK data suggest that α ⬇ 05. 5 See Cook and Clotfelter (1993). 6 See Golec and Tamarkin (1998) for US racetrack betting, and Garrett and Sobel (1999), and Kearney (2002) for US lotteries. 7 That paper makes clear that there is a strong correlation between each of the moments of the prize distribution. In particular, locally at least, they each respond in similar ways to a variation in sales. What is required to break this multicollinearity is data that contains sufficient variation in sales. 8 Note that m 2t and m3t are not, in general, independent of each other – it may be difficult to have more of one without having more of the other also. While, it will not be possible to have any combination of the two one may be able to expand the set of possible combinations through more complex design – such as introducing a bonus ball. 9 Note that each moment depends in a known and deterministic way on n, N, τ, π (the vector of π’s), and on St and Jt–1. That is, mkt = mkt(n, N, τ, π, St, Rt–1Jt–1), for k = 1,2,3 and so it is clear that, while sales depend on the moments, the values of the moments also depend on sales. Thus, when estimating the causal effects of the moments on sales account needs to be taken of their endogeneity. Forrest (2008) also presents estimates of such an S(.) function for the UK Saturday lotto game. That paper uses simple regression methods that ignore the endogeneity of the moments. 10 For a simple example, Farrell, Morgenroth and Walker (1999) assumed that S(.) was a linear function of m1t and did not depend on higher moments at all. 11 Notice also that the specification treats rollover-driven temporary variation in the moments as equivalent to design-induced permanent variation in moments. Forrest is, rightly, critical of this and the same point is made in Walker and Young (2000). Nonetheless, it is useful, for the moment, to
Lottery Design Lessons from the Dismal Science 95
12
13
14 15
16
17
18 19 20
21
22
think of S(.) as capturing the structural determinants of sales – that is the variation in sales that is due to variation in the moments that arise for any reason. Moreover, F(.) is only the reduced form of S(.) if εt exhibits no serial correlation. If it does, then the rollover size would be determined by previous sales and on the level of sales two draws previously. The reduced form would then have to substitute RtJt–1, Rt–1Jt–2, etc. out of the model recursively. Moreover, a further problem arises because total sales, and hence the moments, are not known when individuals are making purchase decisions so players have to estimate the moments from the information that is know prior to the draw – and this information set will include the value of Rt–1Jt–1. In the two games analysed here one has sales of the order of 40m and yet the standard deviation of the number of 3-ball winners in the data used here is more than 200 thousand. In the UK game the 3-ball prize is not pari-mutuel. Rather it is a fixed prize of £10. In most games, retailers are empowered to pay out the small prizes. This, in itself, will encourage players to spend their winnings on more lottery tickets, for the next draw, when they collect their winnings. Indeed Guryan and Kearney (2005) identify a lucky store phenomenon that arises because of habit persistence in players’ expenditures. These are consortia of players who agree to contribute to the stakes each week and share the winnings. They are commonly organised at the workplace. A simple correlation in our data for our two draws suggest that an additional 100 thousand 3-ball winners in the large game draw at t will increase sales in t+1 by a statistically significant 178 thousand in the large game, while the same for the small draw raises subsequent sales by 128 thousand. We reserve the data beyond draw 310 as a hold-out sample that allows us to conduct some forecasting tests. The results were very similar when the dataset was extended to later periods when further portfolio diversification took place. One of the peculiar features of the two games in the UK is that they were linked via their rollovers. That is, if there are no winners then the jackpot from Wednesday (Saturday) is added to the jackpot on the following Saturday (Wednesday). When computing the moments we allowed for conscious selection by calibrating α for each game so that the level of sales were consistent with the correct number of rollovers across the estimation period. We use a log specification to avoid negative predictions in simulation. We allowed for serial correlation and estimation was conducted using seemingly unrelated regression methods to allow for the correlation in the residuals across draws. That is we allow the residual from the sales on a Wednesday (Saturday) to affect both the coming Saturday’s sales as well as the following Wednesday’s. That is, we estimate Swt = βwXwt + γw1m1t + γw2m2t + γw3m3t + εwt where εwt = ρwwεwt–1 + ρwsεwt–1 Swt = βsXst + γs1m1t + γs2m2t + γs3m3t + εst where εst = ρswεwt–1 + ρssεst–1
96 Gaming in the New Market Environment 23 Estimation was conducted using GMM provided by the xtabond facility in STATA9. 24 A number of specification tests fail in the OLS and OLS using operator jackpot forecast suggesting that the endogeneity of the moments is an important factor. Tests of their endogeneity strongly suggest that this is a problem – especially in the Wednesday game. This is to be expected since when sales are small the moments are considerably more sensitive to sales variation and jackpot size than when sales are low. In the GMM model we find that the AR test is passed, indicating absence of higher order autocorrelation than the first order allowed here although this is sensitive to the inclusion of the cross-correlation between the two games. The ARCH test for heteroscedasticity also passes which is surprising given how the variance of sales seems larger in rollover weeks compared to regular weeks. The normality test passes although this failed when we tried to include earlier data in the analysis-possibly because of the large outliers associated with early double rollovers. The parameter constancy tests for both models (which were carried out on the remaining observations up to draw 395) now failed. The RESET test, however fails (albeit marginally) for Wednesday suggesting that there is some further specification problem. It seems likely that this is associated with the use of a fixed degree of conscious selection across draws. This implies that rollover frequency, conditional on sales, should be constant across draws. In fact there is some suggestion that rollover frequency is falling. Moreover, it seems likely that the degree of conscious selection is lower in rollover draws because players often wish to purchase more then their usual number of tickets and may be more likely to use the random number generator built-in to the retailers’ tills for this purpose. 25 Similar results were obtained in Forrest (2008) for the Saturday draw data. 26 The operator might be tempted to lace the jackpot in order to improve sales. However, even with the large estimates sensitivity to the jackpot implied by these results this is unlikely to be profitable for it. This is for two reasons. First, the operator retains only 55 per cent of the additional sales (i.e., a little over £4 million). Secondly, the assumption has been that this £5 million arises from a randomly occurring rollover – if the operator were to try to make such bonuses occur at a regular basis players would become to expect them and the model would cease to be a valid description of sales behaviour. In fact, in many cases operators do have some discretion over adding bonuses to the jackpot pool (in the UK this is referred to as a Superdraw). In practice they are used sparingly, to offset the effects of a temporary drought of rollovers. 27 The ‘findroot’ command in Mathematica, which solves non-polynomial expressions using the Jenkins-Traub algorithm was used and applied to simplified expressions for the moments. In practice this proved very time consuming which limited the range of simulations that could be conducted to those with πn = 1. 28 Unfortunately, it has not been possible to compute standard errors around these forecasts so it is difficult to say how precise these forecasts are likely to be.
Lottery Design Lessons from the Dismal Science 97 29 This, albeit provisional, finding is consistent with there being a strong presentbias in individual preferences. That is, individual decisions may be time inconsistent because they discount the immediate future more than the more distant future. Farrell (2008) explores addiction in the context of the welfare economics of problem gambling. Making a formal connection between the behavioural economics of gambling and welfare would be an important contribution that empirical research such as this could play into.
Appendix The Expected Value Formula
The expected value of a ticket is the first moment of the prize distribution – which is the product of the probability of it being won and the size of the prize if it is won. That is, it is given by m1t = (1 – (1 – p)St)[(1 – τ)St + Rt–1Jt–1] where Jt–1 is the jackpot from the previous draw (which equals (1–α)St–1 in the case where the only prize is the jackpot) and Rt–1 is an indicator for whether the previous draw was a rollover or not and is assumed to be known at the time that draw t tickets are purchased.30 The first term in parentheses is the probability of no rollover (i.e., the probability that the jackpot is won) while the term in square brackets is the expected size of prize. The level of m1t is unaffected by the nature of the prize distribution31 – in the absence of a rollover it depends only on the takeout rate and sales revenue irrespective of how that fund of revenue is distributed across prize pools. In practice, it is only ever the jackpot prize pool that has no winner and is rolled over – the easier to win prize pools are usually sufficiently easy to win that there are always many winners. Thus, when a rollover from the previous draw occurs it is only the jackpot n-ball prize pool that is rolled over. Thus, in practice, Jt–1 = πn(1–α)St–1 where πn is the proportion of the overall prize pool going to the n-ball matches (that is, shared by those who have chosen all n of the winning numbers). Notes 30 In most lotto games it is possible to commit to buying a ticket before it is known whether the previous draw is a rollover or not. For example, one can place an order to buy a ticket for every future draw. In practice, only a small proportion of tickets are bought in this way. 31 In practice, lotto games are designed so that the prize fund is spread, in predetermined shares, between those that match all n balls (the jackpot fund), those that match n–1 balls, n–2 balls, etc. Let these shares be defined by π = (πn, πn–1, πn–2…). which are usually set such that the expected prize in the n-ball pool exceeds that in the n-1 pool, etc. Some designs are more complex and feature additional bonus balls. 98
5 Lotteries as a Source of Revenue Sarah Smith1
5.1
Introduction
Lotteries run by states2 around the world are typically characterised by two features. The first is a high tax rate. While a lottery is not itself a tax, as it is sometimes called, the fact is that almost all of the take-out rate (the price of a ticket minus the expected value of the prize) goes as revenue to the government.3 For most lotteries, the tax rate is above that for other forms of gambling and higher, even, than ‘sin’ taxes on alcohol and tobacco. The second feature is that most states formally hypothecate lottery revenue to one or a number of ‘good causes’. These range from very narrow purposes, such as a specific sports stadium, to wider designated good causes, commonly including sports, arts, heritage and charities. In a more competitive gaming environment this source of revenue is potentially under threat if lottery sales fall or if governments consider reducing tax rates to try to boost sales. The aim of this chapter is to examine the taxation of lotteries, judged by a range of criteria including cost and convenience, efficiency and equity – and to compare them to other taxes that may have to be raised to meet the revenue shortfall. It asks whether the typical tax rates on lotteries meet the stated goal of revenue maximisation, and what increased competition is likely to mean for the revenue-maximising tax rate. Finally it looks at the issue of hypothecation, and asks what reduced earmarked revenues might mean for the good causes and for the lotteries themselves. Most of the empirical work that is referred to here concerns lotteries run by US states. In addition, the chapter uses the UK National Lottery as a case study – it shares many features in common with other state lotteries and is the largest lottery in the world in terms of sales. 99
100 Gaming in the New Market Environment
5.2
Lotteries as a source of revenue
Many state lotteries have been set up with the explicit purpose of raising money. In the UK, for example, the duty of the National Lottery Commission, the regulator of the National Lottery is ‘to do [its] best to secure that the proceeds of the National Lottery are as great as possible’, subject to duties to ‘ensure that the National Lottery… is run with all due propriety’ and ‘that the interests of every participant in the Lottery are protected’.4 Many US states have similar objectives with Florida’s being typical of many: ‘[The mission of the Florida Lottery is to] maximize revenues in a manner consonant with the dignity of the state and the welfare of its citizens’ (see Garrett, 2001a, b). The design of many lotteries reflects their aim of revenue-maximisation. Most have been set up as monopolies run, or authorised, by the state. Competition from outside the state is also often limited, with (for EU lotteries) restrictions on sales – and advertising – by foreign competitors, although in the future, the growth of online lottery-playing may begin to affect states’ ability to control revenues, an issue we shall return to later. Tax rates on lotteries are typically high. There are at least two ways of measuring the tax rate on a lottery. The first, summarised for EU Table 5.1
Gross tax rates, EU lotteries
Country
Gross tax rate
Country
Gross tax rate
Austria
32%
Italy
55%
Belgium
28%
Latvia
20%
Cyprus
37%
Lithuania
13%
Czech Republic
19%
Luxembourg
19%
Denmark
47%
Netherlands
13%
Estonia
13%
Poland
53%
Finland
47%
Portugal
33%
France
28%
Slovakia
22%
Germany
41%
Slovenia
19%
Greece
62%
Spain
20%
Hungary
4%
Sweden
57%
Ireland
41%
United Kingdom
40%
EU25 (excl. MT)
37%
Lotteries as a Source of Revenue 101
countries in Table 5.1, is to measure tax5 as a proportion of gross expenditures or turnover. The (unweighted) average tax rate across the EU countries is 37 per cent, while the comparable figure for the US is 33 per cent, down from 41 per cent in 1985 (Clotfelter et al, 1999). Table 5.2 compares revenue and the gross tax rate on the UK National Lottery with those on other forms of gambling. The Lottery is by far the biggest single source of revenue, contributing more than all other forms of gambling combined – and more than four times the next biggest single source (general betting duty). This doesn’t reflect the fact that more money is staked on the National Lottery – in the latest year (2005–06) £44 billion was staked on general betting compared to £5 billion on the Lottery – but instead the far higher gross tax rate. On other forms of betting, the general trend has been towards lower gross tax rates, motivated in large part by increased competition from offshore betting (in the case of general betting duty) and from the National Lottery in the case of pools betting. It remains to be seen whether increased competition will result in a lower tax rate on lotteries. In comparing taxes on lotteries with those on other goods, it is more usual to define the tax rate as a percentage of net expenditures since the true ‘price’ of playing is equal to one minus the expected value of the prize. In this case, with a take-out rate of 0.5, the tax rate on the National Lottery is equal to 80 per cent. As shown in Table 5.3, this is higher than ‘sin’ taxes on alcohol, tobacco and petrol in the UK, which are themselves relatively high compared to the EU average. Yet, the actual amount of revenue received from lotteries (and other forms of gambling) is relatively small for many countries. For the UK, which has the largest lottery in the world in terms of sales, National Lottery receipts (including money for the good causes) are well below those from alcohol (beer, wine and spirits combined), tobacco and petrol and, as shown in Table 5.2, have remained fairly constant in nominal terms over time. As a proportion of total tax revenue, receipts from the National Lottery (including the money for the good causes) have fallen over time, from 1.0 per cent in 1995/96 to 0.5 per cent in 2005/06. Including revenues from other forms of gambling increases the total share, but again revenues have been fairly constant in nominal terms and the overall share has fallen from 1.4 per cent in 1995/96 to 0.7 per cent in 2005/06. Comparing tax receipts across other EU countries is complicated by the different ownership rules. But given the much larger per capita expenditure on gambling in the UK, even higher tax rates would be needed to generate revenues of a similar order of (absolute) magnitude (see Europe Economics, 2004).
102
Table 5.2 Financial year
Gambling revenues (£ million) and gross tax rates, UK Betting duty
Pools betting duty
Gaming
Amusement Machines
Rev
Rev
Bingo Rev
Rate
National Lottery
Rev
Rate
Rev
Rate
Rev
Rate
1996–7
453
6.79%
127
27.36%
79
128
96
9.64%
1,891
40%
1997–8
462
6.71%
97
27.83%
92
131
102
9.71%
2,204
40%
1998–9
480
6.72%
70
27.18%
91
157
105
10.44%
2,084
40%
1999–00
492
6.75%
38
18.61%
107
160
107
9.97%
2,027
40%
2000–1
487
6.87%
30
17.33%
129
153
114
10.18%
2,017
40%
2001–2
433
4.27%
26
17.85%
130
155
116
9.93%
1,933
40%
2002–3
304
1.62%
16
13.03%
151
149
122
9.98%
1,820
40%
2003–4
383
1.18%
13
11.98%
138
144
111
7.71%
1,835
40%
2004–5
443
0.98%
12
11.04%
157
157
81
4.55%
1,904
40%
2005–6
433
0.97%
11
12.17%
143
154
82
4.47%
2,004
40%
Notes: Rates are calculated as tax receipts divided by total stakes except in the case of the National Lottery. Information taken from HM Revenue and Customs (2007a,b). Data for total stakes is not available for gaming or amusement machines. The pools competitions are based on predicting the outcome of football matches.
Lotteries as a Source of Revenue 103 Table 5.3 products
Excise rates – UK National Lottery, alcohol, tobacco and petrol
Tax rate as % of sale price National Lottery
80%
Total revenue (£ million) 2,004
Spirits
63%
2,309
Wine
53%
2,308
Beer
49%
3,076
Cigarettes
76%
7,473
Petrol
67%
23,438
Notes: The tax rate on alcohol, tobacco and petrol includes both the ad valorem Value-Added Tax and the fixed-rate excise duty. Since excise duties apply to quantity rather than price, tax rates will depend on assumed pre-tax prices. These are taken from HM Revenue and Customs (2007) for alcohol and tobacco and Wood Mackenzie OPAL for petrol. Receipts are for excise duties only.
In general, lotteries run by state governments tend to be relatively more important as a source of revenue, because of the typically narrower tax base than for national governments. For the US states, lotteries account for between 0.41 per cent (New Mexico) and 4.07 per cent (Georgia) of total state revenues (Kearney, 2005). Among the highest revenue shares from gambling are to be found in Australia. Worthington (2001) reports that in the case of New South Wales, taxes, fees and fines on gambling contributed 10.3 per cent of state taxes in 1996/7. However, these revenue numbers overstate the extent to which the introduction of a lottery would generate additional revenue for the government since lottery spending substitutes away from other taxable goods.6 Table 5.4 illustrates the potential revenue effects of a lottery. In these examples, we assume a gross lottery tax rate of 0.4 out of every £1 spent, a general sales tax rate on other non-lottery goods and services of 0.2 out of every £1 spent, additional ‘sin taxes’ on alcohol and tobacco of 0.5 out of every £1 spent and an income tax rate of 0.25. The expected value of the prize is equal to 0.5. These stylised examples are intended to illustrate the range of potential net revenue effect of the lottery – which may even be negative – and the importance of factors such as what Lottery spending substitutes for, whether the winnings are taxed and what the winnings are spent on. In practice, the revenue effects are likely to be further complicated by
104 Gaming in the New Market Environment Table 5.4
Tax revenues, with and without the lottery
£1 spent on the Lottery
Tax revenue lost
Tax revenue gained
Net revenue effect
Lottery spending substitutes for spending on other goods and services; winnings are taxed and post-tax winnings are spent on other goods and services
0.2
0.4 + (0.5 × 0.25) + (0.5 × 0.75 × 0.2) = 0.6
+0.4
Lottery spending substitutes for spending on other goods and services; winnings are not taxed and are spent on other goods and services
0.2
0.4 + (0.5 × 0.2) = 0.5
+0.3
Lottery spending substitutes for alcohol and tobacco; winnings are not taxed and are spent on other goods and services
0.7
0.4 + (0.5 × 0.2) = 0.5
–0.2
the distributional impact of the lottery. In the examples in Table 5.4, it was assumed that spending patterns were relatively unaffected by winning the lottery, but clearly with the size of the prizes on offer, that is unlikely to be the case. Indeed, the opportunity to change your life is precisely why many people play the lottery in the first place. In this case, calculating the impact of the lottery on tax revenues may need to take into account where and how the winnings are invested (housing, equity, etc). Several studies in the US have attempted to measure the effect of lotteries on tax revenues from other sources. Borg et al (1993) looked at the relationship between total sales tax revenue and lottery sales over the period 1953–87 for nine states that operated lotteries on a continuous basis, finding a negative and significant effect for six out of the nine states. Their results indicate that the lottery has a positive effect on overall revenues, but a smaller one than looking at lottery revenues would suggest. Using more recent data (1967–99) and controlling for self-selection into being a lottery state, Fink et al (2004) find that the lottery has a negative effect on tax revenues overall. This is driven by a decline in sales and excise revenue, and is in spite of offsetting income
Lotteries as a Source of Revenue 105
and corporate tax increases. They argue that the increases in income and corporate tax revenues reflect a political as well as a behavioural response to the introduction of a lottery that needs to be factored into the overall impact on revenue. These two studies both rely on time-series variation in both lottery sales and tax revenues to identify any effect. One potential problem with this approach is that there may be other time-varying factors which affect both lottery sales and other tax revenues and which cannot be properly controlled for. Kearney (2005) provides further evidence of the (behavioural) spending response to the introduction of a lottery using household-level data from the US Consumer Expenditure Survey. She uses data from 1982–98 and exploits the fact that lotteries were introduced in 21 states over this period, but at different points in time, to identify the difference between changes in spending patterns in states that introduce lotteries compared to changes in spending in states that did not. The effects are not precisely estimated, but she finds that there is a decline in spending spread across a number of categories, including necessities such as food, rent, mortgages and other bills. This is particularly the case for low-income households. There is also a significant reduction in the likelihood of buying alcohol and tobacco. Lottery spending does not appear to be financed by a reduction in other forms of gambling – if anything, spending on other forms of gambling increases. From the point of view of revenuemaximisation, Kearney’s results are ‘good’ news for policy-makers – spending on lotteries appears to substitute away from goods which are not heavily taxed, implying only a small loss in (non-lottery) revenue. However, they highlight one of the main concerns with the lottery as a source of revenue, which is it impact on low-income households and the fact that a tax on the lottery is regressive, something we return to in Section 5.3.
5.3
Are high tax rates on lotteries ‘optimal’?
Since the time of Adam Smith, economists have attempted to define characteristics by which to judge taxes. There is fairly broad agreement on the following three desirable criteria (see Heady, 1993, for further discussion): • cost and convenience – that taxes should be cheap and easy to collect (both for the government and for taxpayers); • efficiency – that taxes should minimise disincentive effects; and
106 Gaming in the New Market Environment
• equity – that taxes should be fair, although the definition of fairness varies. So, how does a tax on the lottery perform when assessed against these criteria? Section 5.4 discusses equity – here we focus on cost and convenience and efficiency. 5.3.1
Cost and convenience
Lotteries tend to be relatively attractive as a source of revenue in terms of cost and convenience of collection. The costs of collecting income tax in the UK (including compliance costs for taxpayers) have been estimated at between 4–6 per cent of total revenue.7 The administrative costs of running a lottery are of a similar size (5 per cent of receipts in the UK), but these reflect the cost of delivering a service to consumers and not the cost to the government (and lottery-provider) of collecting the revenue, which is a tiny fraction of this. Dealing with a single lottery provider is clearly one way of keeping tax-collection costs to a minimum. It has been argued in the US that lotteries provide an unreliable source of revenue owing to large year-to-year variation. However, much of the measured variability arises from fast growth which, as Clotfelter and Cook (1989) point out, is not the sort of variability that politicians are likely to lose much sleep over. Moreover, Szakmary and Szakmary (1995) argue that lotteries have a potential stabilising role in a portfolio of taxes because the variability of lottery revenue is uncorrelated with that of revenue from other sources. Mikesell and Zorn (1990), for example, show that lottery revenues vary with such things as the age of the lottery and competition from lotteries in neighbouring states, factors that do not affect revenues from other taxes, while lottery spending has been found to be relatively unaffected by unemployment (Vasche, 1985), suggesting that it is likely to be less variable over the economic cycle than many other taxes. The revenue figures for the UK shown in Table 5.2 suggest that it is the lack of variability – and in particular the lack of growth – in revenue from the National Lottery which is a potentially greater issue. 5.3.2
Efficiency
High taxes on alcohol, tobacco and petrol are often justified on the grounds of economic efficiency as Pigouvian taxes, i.e., the additional taxes required to reflect the negative externalities that their consumption imposes on others (through e.g., the cost of healthcare for smokers,
Lotteries as a Source of Revenue 107
the cost of policing to deal with drunken disorder and the cost of pollution) and reduce consumption to an optimally lower level.8 There is little reason for believing that high taxes on the lottery are justifiable on the same externality grounds – much of the evidence presented in the chapter on problem gambling in this volume suggests that the social costs of playing the lottery are relatively small. Moreover, the fact that lotteries are typically heavily promoted by the states running them – and that the adverts are deliberately designed to encourage play, rather than simply providing information on the odds of winning or the potential dangers of excessive gambling – is inconsistent with the use of taxation as a tool to reduce consumption. These arguments suggest that taxes on lotteries could be lowered without undue concern about excessively high problem gambling. In the absence of significant negative externalities, the work of Ramsey (1927) has provided important and influential insights into the design of optimal indirect taxes. He addressed the problem of designing sales taxes to raise a given amount of revenue at the least possible distortionary cost. The resulting ‘Ramsey rule’ is that taxes should be set to yield equal proportional reductions in the consumption of each good. Assuming that the demand for each good is independent of the prices of other goods, this equates to the ‘inverse elasticity rule’, that goods with more price-inelastic demands should be taxed more heavily. The basic intuition is simple – since the distortion from imposing indirect taxes arises as a result of individuals reducing their consumption, then in order to minimise distortion, taxes should be applied to goods where individuals will least change their behaviour. Incorporating distributional considerations, Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), showed that goods which are consumed relatively more by the poor should experience a lower-than-average proportional reduction – the exact degree depending on the coefficient of inequality aversion. This produces a clear trade-off between efficiency and equity considerations since in practice many goods with low price elasticities also have low income elasticities. However, if redistribution can be achieved via other means (e.g., transfer payments) then, so long as all goods are normal, the government would be better achieving its distributional aims via transfer payments than from reductions in sales taxes, which will benefit the rich more (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976). As discussed further in Section 5.5, most estimates of the price elasticity of demand for lotteries suggest that demand is elastic (greater than one in absolute value), which would, according to the Ramsey rule, imply that taxes should be relatively lower than those on other
108 Gaming in the New Market Environment
goods. From a demand function, it is possible to estimate the welfare loss from the tax rate on the National Lottery and the associated reduction in demand. Walker (1998) estimates the following demand function: Weekly Sales = 4.7 + 135 × (Expected Ticket Value). At the current payout rate of 0.5, the estimated demand is 72.2 million (sales per week) while, if the payout rate were to increase to 0.9 (i.e., in the absence of any tax), then estimated demand would rise to 126.2 million. The implied loss in consumer surplus associated with the tax on the National Lottery is therefore equal to £10.8 million per week, or 37 per cent of the amount of revenue raised. It is important to emphasise, however, that this is a very rough estimate and that there are a number of issues around the demand elasticity estimate, which are discussed further in the next section. Moreover, this obviously overstates the extent to which cutting the tax rate on lotteries would increase consumer welfare since the revenue would have to be raised somewhere else, imposing other distortionary costs. However, the implication of the Ramsey rule is that (subject to distributional considerations) the overall welfare cost could be reduced by lowering the lottery tax and raising taxes on goods with less elastic demand because the distortionary behavioural response would be smaller. What about making up the revenue by an increase in income tax? For the UK, the amount of money raised from the National Lottery (approx £2 billion a year) would require a 0.5 per cent increase in the basic rate of income tax.9 Traditionally, estimates of the deadweight cost of income taxes focused on reductions in labour supply arising as a result of increased taxation. The fact that most studies find labour supply to be fairly inelastic, at least for men, implied that the welfare cost of income tax was quite low.10 However, more recent work has recognised that the standard labour supply behavioural response is only one component of the total welfare cost of increasing income taxes, which should also take into account changes to the form of compensation (increasing tax-exempt forms of remuneration), unmeasured effort and compliance. Rather than looking just at labour supply, taxable income responses have been used to derive a more inclusive assessment of the deadweight cost of income taxes. At one extreme, the influential US study by Feldstein (1999) suggested that the deadweight cost of income tax could be as high as $2 for every $1 raised. Of course, the responsiveness to tax changes varies with income and is typically greater for higher rate taxpayers, suggesting that the cost of an increase in the basic rate of tax is likely to be nowhere near as high
Lotteries as a Source of Revenue 109
as Feldstein’s figures suggest. Nevertheless, the overall conclusion from the recent literature is that the deadweight cost of increased income taxation is likely to be at least of a similar order of magnitude to the estimated welfare loss associated with the high tax rate on the National Lottery.
5.4
Just how (un) fair is a tax on the lottery?
Tax from lotteries is sometimes referred to as a ‘painless tax’. There is a perception that it is voluntary, on the basis that it is only paid by those who willingly choose to play the lottery11 and, for politicians, raising incomes or sales taxes to replace lost revenue from the lottery is likely to impose considerable political pain. However, the one aspect of lottery taxes which may be seen as inflicting (financial and political) pain is the fact that they disproportionately impact on the poor. Numerous studies have looked at the distributional impact of taxes on lotteries – see inter alia, Clotfelter and Cook (1989), Scott and Garen (1993), Stranahan and Borg (1998), Walker (1998) and Worthington (2001). The common finding, across time and across different countries, is that a tax on lotteries is regressive, i.e., the burden of the tax as a proportion of income is greater for poor households than it is for richer households. This is shown for the National Lottery – as well as for other ‘vices’, including other gambling, alcohol and tobacco – using recent data for the UK in Table 5.5.12 The tax is regressive not because playing the National Lottery is more likely among low income households; younger households (aged 25-plus) and older households (aged 65-plus) are less likely to play the Lottery and typically have lowerthan-average incomes. Nor is it regressive because low-income households who play the Lottery spend more than high income households. But, as household income rises, spending on the National Lottery rises by less, causing the percentage of income spent on the National Lottery to fall – from an average of 1.67 per cent of income among the poorest 10 per cent of households to 0.13 per cent among the richest 10 per cent of households. Suits (1977a) defined a methodology for summarising and comparing the regressivity of different taxes, based on tax Lorenz curves, shown in Figure 5.1. These relate the cumulative proportion of the tax burden13 to the cumulative proportion of total income, across the income distribution. In practice, we define the curve over ten income deciles. If a tax were proportional, its Lorenz curve would lie along the diagonal. For a progressive tax, the Lorenz curve lies below this line
110 Gaming in the New Market Environment Table 5.5
Share of total income spent on ‘vices’, by income decile
Household income
Share of income on the National Lottery
Share of income on other gambling
Share of income on alcohol
Share of income on tobacco
Poorest 10%
1.67%
1.