OAME$[|F $TNAIEGY SEC oN D E o r r r o N ffi
A u in a sh D i x i t Princeton University
S u s a n S/ cea t h Wellesley...
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OAME$[|F $TNAIEGY SEC oN D E o r r r o N ffi
A u in a sh D i x i t Princeton University
S u s a n S/ cea t h WellesleyCollege
W . W. N o rton & Com pany N e w Y ork . London
I william warder \\'. \v. Nofton & Companyhas been independentsinceits founding in 1923,when Institute' the People's at the delivered \orton and Mary D. Heiler Norton first published lectures their adult educationdivision of New York City's CooperUnion. The Nortons soon expanded and America from academics program beyond the Institute, publishing books by celebrated books and abroad.By mid-century,the two major pillars of Norton's publishing program-trade of the control transferred family college texts-rvere flrmly established.In the 1950s,the Norton a staff of four hundred and a comparable number of standsas trade, college,and professionaltitles published eachyear-w. w. Norton & company the largestand oldest publishing house owned wholly by its employees'
company to its employees,and today-with
Copyright@ 2004,1999byW. W' Norton & Company,Inc' All rights resewed. tN tHs UNlrEo Srargsop ANarnIc'{' PRINTED Editor: JackRePcheck Managing Editor, College:Marian Johnson Copy Edito r: Patty Zimmerman Produ cti on M anager: RoYT edoff Book Design: Gina Webster iulia Hines Editorial Assistai?/: Art Research:NeilRYderHoos Compositionby UG / GGSInformation Seruices'Inc' Manufacturing by Courier, Westford Library of CongressCataloging-in-Publication Data Dixit, Avinash K' Gamesof strategy / Avinash Dixit' SusanSkeath p. c m ' Includes bibliographical referencesand index'
ISBN 0-393-92499-8
l.Gam et heor y . 2. Polic y s c ienc es . 3 . D e c i s i o n m a k i n g . I 'S k e a t h , S u s a n . I I . T i t l e . HBr44.D592004 2003066236
5r93_d.c22
W. W. Norton & Company,Inc.,500 FifthAvenue,NewYork' N'Y' 10110 \ m"vv.\nvnorton.com W. W. Norton & CompanyLtd., CastleHouse,75l76 Wells Street'London WIT 3QT 123456 7 8 9 0
I
Contents
Prefaceto the SecondEdition
xtx
PABT l|lIE Introduction and GeneralPrinciples
I
BasicIdeas and Examples 1 wuer rs A GAMEop srnerrcv?
3 4
2 soug EXAM PLESAND STO RI ESO F S T R A T E G I CG A M E S A. \A/hichPassingShot? 6 B. TheGPARatRace 7 C. "We Can'tTaketheExam,BecauseWeHadaFlatTire"9 D. \t\ihyAre ProfessorsSo Mean? l0 E. Roommates and Families on the Brink
ll
F. The Dating Game 13 3 o un STRATEG YFoR STUDYI NG G A M E S O F S T R A T E G Y
I4
vtl
CON T E N T S
V iii
2
t7
Howto ThinkAbout StrategicGames 1 nnc t s t or { s v ERSUS G AM ES G AM ES
2 c las s r pv t Nc
18
20
A. Are the Moves in the Game Sequential or Simultaneous? 20 B. Are the Players'Interests in Total conflict or Is There Some commonality?
21
C. Is the Game Played Once or Repeatedly,and with the Sameor Changing Opponents? 22 D. Do the PlayersHave Full or Equal Information?
23
E. Are the Rulesof the Game Fixed or Manipulable? 24 F. AreAgreementstoCooperateEnforceable?25 3 s or r n TERM I NoLoc Y AND B A C K G R o U N D A S S U M P T I o N S
27
A. Strategies 27 B. Payoffs 28 C. Rationality 29 D. Common Knowledgeof Rules 31 E. Equilibrium
33
F. DlnamicsandEvolutionaryGames 34 G. Obsewation and ExPeriment 35 4 r nn us ES oF G AM E THEoRY
36
5 r un s r RUc r uRE oF THE c H A P T E R ST o F o L L o w S UM M ARY K EY TERM S
38
41 4I
EXERCI SES 42
PABIIWl| Conceptsand Techniques Gameswith SequentialMoves 1 cair,rnrnsss
46
A. Nodes,Branches,andPathsofPlay 46 B. Uncertainty and "Nature's Moves" 46 C. OutcomesandPaYoffs 48 D. Strategies 48 E. Tree Construction 49
45
CO N T EN T S
V iii
2
T7
Howto ThinkAbout StrategicGames I oe c r s t oNs v ERSUS G AM ES G AM ES
2 c l, ls s r pv r Nc
18
20
A. Are the Moves in the Game Sequentialor Simultaneous? 20 B. Are the Players'Interestsin Total conflict oI Is Theresome commonality? 2l C. Is the Game Played Once or Repeatedly,and with the Sameor Changing Opponents? 22 D. Do the PlayersHave Full or Equal Information?
23
E. AretheRulesoftheGameFixedorManipulable?24 F. AreAgreementstoCooperateFnforceable?25 3 s oun TERM I Nor , oc Y AND BA C K G R o u N D A S S U M P T I o N S
27
A. Strategies 27 B. Payoffs 28 C. Rationality 29 D. Common Knowledgeof Rules 31 E. Equilibrium
33
F. DlnamicsandEvolutionaryGames 34 G. ObservationandExPeriment .35 4 r ue us ES oF G AM E THEoRY
36
5 THE STRUCTUREO F THE CHA P T E R ST O F O L L O W S UM M ARY K EY TERM S
38
41 4T
E XERCI SES 42
PABIIWl| Conceptsand Techniques Gameswith SequentialMoves 1 crrtp rner,s 46 A. Nodes,Branches,andPathsofPlay 46 B. Uncertainty and "Nature's Moves" 46 C. OutcomesandPaYoffs 48 D. Strategies 48 E. Tree Construction 49
45
C Oi {TE N TS i x 2 s o rv tN c GA M ESB Y U s IN GT R E E S 50 3 eoorNc MoRE PLAYERS 55 4 onopn ADVANTAGES 60 5 a o o rN c Mo R E M o v E S 6 1 A. Tic-Tac-Toe61 B. Chess 63 6 n v rn n N c n c o N C E R N IN GR o L L B A C K 69 7 srnarscrns rN THE suRVIVoRocAME
72
SUMMARY 77 K E YT E R MS 7 8 E X ER C IS ES7 8
4
I: Gameswith PureStrategies Simultaneous-Move Discrete Strategies 83 I D EPI CTI NG SI M ULTANEO US- M O V EG A M E SWI T H D I S C R E T E S TRATEG I ES 84 2 Nns s EeUTLTBRI UM 86 A. SomeFurther Explanation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium B. Nash EquilibriumAs a Systemof Beliefs and Choices 89
3 oorrrxeNcs
90
A. Both PlayersHave Dominant Strategies 92 B. One Player Has a Dominant Strategy 93 C. SuccessiveElimination of Dominated Strategies 95 4 s ns r - Res poNSE ANALYSI S 98 5 rn E M I NI M AX M ETHoD FoR z E R o - s u M G A M E S 6 ru nr e
99
PLAYERS 101
7 Naur t lpt s
EeuI LI BRI A I N PURE s T R A T E G I E S 1 0 5
B No eeur uBRI UM SUMMARY KEY TERMS
I N PURE s TR A T E G I E S 1 1 1
f f3 II4
EXERCTSES ll4
AppENDrx: Some General Definitions
120
87
X
CONTE NTS
Simultaneous-MoveGameswith Pure StrategiesII: Continuous Strategiesand III: Discussionand Evidence L23 I
p u Rg ST RAT EGIES T HAT ARE C ON TIN U OU S A. Price Competition
V A R IAB LE S
r24
124
B. PoliticalCampaignAdvertising
I29
2 eN4pt nr c Rr -EVI DENCEc oNCE R N I N G N A S H E Q U I L I B R I U M
131
A. Laboratory and ClassroomExperiments 132 B. Real-WorldEvidence 135 3 c Rt r r c el
DI SCUSSI O NoF TH E N A S H E Q U I L I B R I U M
c oNCEPr
139
A. TheTreatmentofRiskinNashEquilibrium B. MultiplicityofNashEquilibria
140
142
C. Requirements of Rationality for Nash Equilibrium 4n er r oNar r z ABr LI TY
L44
I 45
A. ApplyingtheConceptofRationalizabiliry L46 B. Rationalizability Leading to Nash Equilibrium SUM M ARY K EY TERM S
147
151 157
EXERCI SES 151
155
Combining Sequentialand SimultaneousMoves 1 CRUSS W I TH BO TH SI M ULTA N E O U SA N D S E Q U E N T I A L M ov ES
156
A. Two-StageGamesand Subgames 156 B. Configurations of Multistage Games 160 2 c HaNc I Nc
r HE oRDER oF M o v E S I N A G A M E
162
A. Changing Simu-ltaneous-MoveGamesinto Sequential-Move Games 163 B. Other Changesin the Order of Moves 170 3 c uRr uc e I N THE M ETHoD oF A N A L Y S I S
l7I
A. Illustrating Simultaneous-Move Gamesby Using Trees I7L B. Showing andAnalyzing Simultaneous-Move Gamesin StrategicForm 4 r uRnn, - pr , AYERG AM ES SUMMARY
179
176
172
C ON TE N TS xi KE Y TERM S
lBO
EXERCI SES lBO
I
Simultaneous-MoveGameswith Mixed StrategiesI: Zero-SumGames t8s I wuat
I S A M I XED s t n, qr Ec Y?
186
2 uNc s Rr RI N ACTI O NS: M I XI NG M o v E S T o K E E P T H E o P P o N E N T c uEs s I NG
LB7
A. Best-ResponseAnalYsis lBB 194
B. TheMinimaxMethod
3 x as g EQ UI LI BRI UM AS A SYS T E MO F B E L I E F SA N D R E S P O N S E S 1 9 8 4 M I XI NG W HEN O NE PLAYERH A S T H R E E O R M O R E P U R E s TRATEG I ES 199 A. AGeneralCase 200 B. Exceptional Cases 203 C. Caseof Domination by a Mixed Strategy 204 5 MIXING WHEN BOTH PLAYERSHAVE THREE STRATEGIES 207 A. Full Mixture of All Strategies 208 B. Equilibrium Mixtures with Some StrategiesUnused 210 6 nv r onx c n
oN M I XI NG I N z ER o - s u M G A M E S
212
7 uow r o us E M I XED STRATE G I E SI N P R A C T I C E 2 1 4 SUMMARY KEY TERM S
216 2I 7
EXERCI SES 2I 7
Probability and Expected Utility AppENDDc 1 r ur
22I
BASI C ALG EBRAoF PRO B A B I L I T I E S 2 2 2
A. TheAdditionRtie
224
B. The ModifledAddition Rule 225 C. The Multiplication Rule 225 D. The Modified Multiplication Rule 226 E. The Combination Rule 227 F. ExpectedValues 228 2 aTTTTUO ESTO W ARD RI SK AN D E X P E C T E DU T I L I T Y SUMMARY KEY TERMS
231 232
228
Xii
CONTEN TS
I
II: Gameswith MixedStrategies Simultaneous-Move Non-Zero-Sum Gamesand III: GeneralDiscussion 233 234
1 tr, t t x t r v cs us r AI NED BY UNCERT A I N B E L I E F S A. Will HarryMeet Sally? 234 B. DicedChicken? 239 2 N ow- z nRo- s uM
M I XI NG wI TH T H R E E S T R A T E G I E S 2 4 I
3 cE NEner DI Sc us s I oN oF M I XE D - s T R A T E G YE Q U I L I B R I A
243
A. WeakSenseofEquilibrium 244 B. Opponent's Indifference and GuardingAgainst Exploitation
244
C. Counterintuitive Outcomes with Mixed Strategiesin Zero-Sum Games 245 D. Another Counterintuitive Result for Non-Zero-Sum Games 249 4 svr onNc n oN M Tx I NG I N NoN- zE R o - s u M
GAMES
250
: ENERAL 5 UTx TNGAM O NG THREE O R M O R E S T R A T E G I E SG THEoRY
250
SUMMARY
257
KEY TERMS
258
EXERCISES 258
PARIIHREE SomeBroad Classesof Gamesand Strategies I
263
Uncertaintyand Information 1 R s v naunr nr c TNFoRM ATI oN: BA S I C I D E A S 2 ol nr c r
264
CO M M UNI CATI O N, oR " C H E A P T A L K "
3 sIc Nat I Nc
AND s c REENI NG
4 INc nur r v E
PAYM ENTS 277
272
5 E gur r r nnr A r N s I G NALI NG G AM E S A. SeparatingEqullibrium B. Pooling Equilibrium
284
285
C. SemiseparatingEquilibrium D. GeneralTheory 289
287
280
266
COilTENTS 6 nv lI nNc n
ABO UT SI G NALI N GA N D S C R E E N I N G 2 9 2
sUMMARY
294
KEY TERMS
x l i 'i
295
EXERCI SES 295
Information and Risk 300 APPENDx: 1 I NTBRnTNc PRO BABI LI TI ESF R O M O B S E R V I N GC O N S E Q U E N C E S 3 O I 2 c oNr not t lNc
AND M ANI PU L A T I N G R I S K
304
A. Strategiesto ReduceRisk 304 B. Using Risk 307 C. Manipulating Risk in Contests 307 SUMMARY KEY TERM S
| 0
309 310
strategicMoves
311
1 a crassIpIcATIoN oF srRArEGIc MovES
312
A. UnconditionalStrategicMoves 313 B. ConditionalStrategicMoves 314 MovE s 2 c n s n rs l tl T y o F s T R AT E G IC 3 cotr4rvrrrlnsNrs
315
317
4 rHnsers AND PRoMISES 321 A. Exampleof a Threat:U.S.-IapanTradeRelations 322 PricingGame 326 B. Exampleof a Promise:TheRestaurant C. ExampleCombiningThreatandPromise:foint U.S.-ChinaPolitical Action 328 5 s o Ms A D D IT Io N A Lro P l c s
329
A. WhenDo StrategicMovesHelP? 329 VersusCompellence330 B. Deterrence 6 e c e u tn Iw c c R E D IB IL IT Y 331 331 A. ReducingYourFreedomofAction B. ChangingYourPayoffs333 MovES 7 couNr.BnrNc youR oPPONENT'ssTRATEGIC A. Irrationality 337 B. CuttingOff Communication 337 338 C. LeavingEscapeRoutesOPen
lF.
337
x iv
CO N T E N T S D. UnderminingYour Opponent's Motive to Uphold His Reputation E. Sa]amiTactics 338 SUMMARY KEY TERMS
339 340
E XERCI SES 340
il
The Prisoners'Dilemmaand RepeatedGames
345
I rsn BASrccAME(nnvrnw) 346 2 sorurtoNs r: REPETITToN 347 A. Finite Repetition 348 B. Infinite Repetition 349 C. Gamesof Unknor,vnLength 353 D. GeneralTheory 354 3 s or ur r oNs
r r : pENALTTESAN D R E WA R D S 3 5 6
4 s or ur r ox s
r r r : LEADERSHT P 3 5 9
5 pxpnRruENTAL EVTDENcE 6 npar - wont , D
362
DTLEM M AS 3 6 5
A. Governments Competing to Attract Business 365 B. LaborArbitration
367
C. EvolutionaryBiology D. Price Matching suMMARy KEY TERMS
368
369
372 372
EXERCISES 373 APPENDx: Infinite
t2
Sums
378
Collective-ActionGames
382
I corrEcrrvE-AcTroN GAMESwrrH TWo pLAyERS 3B3 2 c o rrrc tIv E-A c rIo N
p R o B L E MS IN LA R GEGR oups
3 e e R re FH rs ro R Y o F rD EA S 393 4 s o rv rN c c o l l E c rrv E-A C T IoN pR oB LE MS 394 A. Analysis 395 B. Applications 400
387
C ON TE N TS xv 5 s pr r r ov s ns ,
oR EXTERNALI T T E S 4 0 3
A. TheCalculusoftheGeneralCase 406 B. Negative Spillovers 406 C. PositiveSpillovers 4ll 6
, . HELP! ' ' :
A G AM E oF CHI CKEN WI T H M I X E D S T R A T E G I E S 4 I 4
SUM M ARY
418
KEY TERMS
4I9
EXERCISES 420
t3
Evolutionary Games
425
1
r un FRAM EW oRK
2
pnr s oNERS' DTLEM M A
426 430
A. The RepeatedPrisoners'Dilemma 432 B. Mn-ltiple Repetitions 436 C. Comparing the Evolutionary and Rational-PlayerModels 437 3
c Hr c r pN
4
THE ASSURANCEGAME
5
r Nr pnac r r oNS
6
r up HAW K- Dov E G AM E
439 44I
ACRos s SPE C T E S 4 4 4 44 7
A. Rational StrategicChoice and Equilibrium
448
B. EvolutionaryStabilityfor V> C 448 C. Evolutionary Stability for V< C 449 D. V< CStable Pol5.,rnorphicPopulation450 E. V < C:Each Player Mixes Strategies 450 7
r nRBB pHENor y pES r N THE p o p u l A T r o N
452
A. Testing for ESS 452 B. Dynamics 453 B
solraE GENERALTHEoRY
9
prayrNc rHE FrELD
10
EVoLUTToN oF c oopERATr o N A N D A L T R U T S M
SUMMARY KEY TERMS
462 463
EXE RCI SES 463
456
458 459
XYi
CONTENTS
PABITI|UR Applications to SpecificStrategicSituations
t4
47I
Brinkmanship: The Cuban Missile Crisis 1 A BRI EF NARRATI oN oF EVENT S
472
2 e s lr r pr p G AM E- THEoRETI C EX P L A N A T I o N
4BI
FoR ADDI TI oNAL c o M P L E X I T I E S
3 ec c ouNr I NG
4 n pnos ReI LI STI C THREAT 5 p nac r r c r x c
479
48 7
BRI NKM ANSHI P
49I
495
SUM M ARY KEY rERMS
496
EXE RCTSES 496
| 5
500
strategyandvoting 1 v or r Nc
RULESAND PRoc EDUR E S
501
A. BinaryMethods 501 B. Plurative Methods 502 C. Mixed Methods 503 2 v or r Nc
PARADox ES
505
A. TheCondorcetParadox 505 B. TheAgendaParadox 507 C. The ReversalParadox 508 D. ChangetheVotingMethod,ChangetheOutcome 509 3 c s r us ner I DEAS PERTAI NI NGT o P A R A D o x E S
510
A. Black'sCondition 512 B. Robustness 513 C. IntensityRanking 513 4 S TRATEG I CM ANI PULATI O N O F V O T E S
5I4
A. Plurality Rule 515 B. PairwiseVoting 517 C. StrategicVotingwithlncompletelnformation 520 5 c nNBnaI - I DEAS PERTAI NI NGT o M A N I P U L A T I o N
523
C ON TE N TS xvi i 524
6 r uB M EDI AN v or ER THEoRE M A. Discrete Political Spectrum 525
B. Continuous Political Spectrum 528 SUMMARY KE Y TERM S
531 531
EXERCISES 532
| 6
BiddingStrategyandAuctionDesign
538
1 rvpss oF AUCTIoNS 539 2 rus wINNER's CURSE 541 3 sroltNc
sTRATEGIES 544
4 vrcKRnY's rRUTH sERUM 545 5 arr-pev AUCTIoNS 547 6 H o w ro s E L LA T A U C T Io N 550 BiddersandIndependentEstimates A. Risk-Neutral 551 B, Risk-AverseBidders C. CorrelatedEstimates 552 7 s o rra nA D D EDT W IS T ST o c o NS ID E n 554 A. Multiple Objects 554 B. Defeating the System 555 C. Information Disclosure 557 B eucrtoNs
oN THE INTERNET
9 RnorttoNAr,
READING oN THE THEoRY AND PRACTICE
oF AUCTI oNS SUMMARY KEY TERMS
557
560
561 562
EXERCISES 562
l], | ,
566
Bargaining I Nas u' s CO O PERATI VESO LU T I O N A. Numerical Example 568 B. GeneralTheory 569 2 venrasrs-THREAT BARGAINING
t F
575
X Y iii
C ON T EN T 5 3 atrpnruauNc-oFFERS MoDEL I: TorAL vALUE DECAys 4 BxpEnrueNTALEVTDENcE SZg 5 a rrn n x e u N c -o F F E R S Mo D E L rr: TMpA TTE N C ES B 2 6 rraarurputarlNcTNFoRMATToN IN BARGAINTNG SBT 7 eaRcetxll{c wITH MANy pARTTES AND rssuEs
590
A. Multilssue Bargaining 590 B. MultiparryBargaining 592 SUMMARY
592
KEY TERMS
593
EXERCTSES 593
t8
Markets and Competition
596
I a sruprn TRADTNG GAME 5gB 2 rHe cons
606
A. Numerical Example 608 B. Some Properties of the Core 609 C. Discussion 6ll 3 r ne M ARKET M ECHANTs M
613
A. Properties of the Market Mechanism 615 B. Experimental Evidence 617 4 r ne s HApLEy v ALUE
6lB
A. Power in Legislaturesand Committees 620 B. AllocationoflointCosts
622
5 rarR DrvrsroN MECHANTsMs suMMARy KEY TERMS
624
625 626
EXERCISES 626
Glossary
629
Index
647
PABI||lIE w
Introductionand GeneralPrinciples
I
BasicIdeasand Examples
LL rNrRoDUCroRy rEXrBooKSbegin by attemptingto convincethe student readers that the subject is of great importance in the world and therefore merits their attention. The physical sciencesand engineering claim to be the basisof modern technologyand thereforeof modern life; the social sciencesdiscussbig issuesof governance-for example, democracy and taxation; the humanities claim that they revive your soul after it has been deadenedby exposureto the physical and social sciencesand to engineering. Where does the subject gamesof strategy,often called game theory, fit into this picture, and why should you study it? We offer a practical motivation much more individual and closer to your personal concernsthan most other subjects.You play gamesof strategyall the time: with your parents,siblings,friends, and enemies,and even with your professors.You have probably acquired a lot of instinctive expertise,and we hope you will recognize in what follows some of the lessonsthat you have already learned. We will build on this experience,systematizeit, and develop it to the point where you will be able to improve your strategicskills and use them more methodically. Opportunities for such uses will appear throughout the rest of your life; you will go on playing such gameswith your employers, employees, spouses,children, and even strangers. Not that the subject lacks wider importance. Similar games are played in business,politics, diplomacy, and wars-in fact, whenever people interact to strike mutually agreeabledeals or to resolve conflicts. Being able to recognize
CH. 1 ]B AS IC ID EA S A N D EX AMP LE S
such games will enrich your understanding of the world around you and will makeyou a better participant in all its affairs. It will also have a more immediate payoff in your study of many other subjects. Economics and business courses already use a great deal of gametheoretic thinking. Political science is rapidly catching up. Biology has been importantlv influenced by the concepts of evolutionary gamesand has in turn exported these ideas to economics. Psychologyand philosophy also interact with the study of gamesof strategy.Game theory has become a provider of concepts and techniques of analysisfor many disciplines,one might say all disciplines exceptthose dealingwith completelyinanimate objects.
The word game may convey an impression that the subject is frivolous or unimportant in the larger schemeof things-that it dealswith trivial pursuits such as gambling and sportswhen the world is full of more weighty matters such as war and businessand your education, career,and relationships.Actually, gamesof strategy are not "just a game"; all of these weighty matters are instances of games,and game theory helps us understand them all. But it will not hurt to start with gambling or sports. Most gamesinclude chance,skill, and strategyin varying proportions. Playing double or nothing on the toss of a coin is a game of pure chance,unlessyou have exceptional skill in doctoring or tossing coins. A hundred-yard dash is a game of pure skill, although some chanceelementscan creep in; for example,a runner may simply have a slightly off day for no clear reason. Strategyis a skill of a different kind. In the context of sports,it is a part of the mental skill needed to play well; it is the calculation of how best to use your physical skill. For example, in tennis, you develop physical skill by practicing your serves(first serveshard and flat, secondserveswith spin or kick) and passing shots (hard, low, and accurate).The strategicskill is knowing where to put your serve (wide, or on the T) or passingshot (crosscourt,or doum the line). In football, you develop such physical skills as blocking and tackling, running and catching,and throwing. Then the coach, knowing the physical skills of his own team and those of the opposing team, callsthe plays that best exploit his team's skills and the other team's weaknesses.The coach's calculation constitutesthe strategy.The physical game of football is played on the gridiron by jocks; the strategicgame is played in the offices and on the sidelinesby coachesand by nerdy assistants. A hundred-yard dash is a matter of exercisingyour physical skill as best you can; it offersno opportunities to observeand react to what other runners in
WH A T I S A G A M E O F S T i : - E G Y ?
5
the race are doing and therefore no scope for strategy.Longer races io entail strategy-whether you should lead to set the pace, how soon before i:e finish you should try to break away,and so on. Strategicthinking is essentiallyabout your interactions with others: soleone elseis also doing similar thinking at the sametime and about the samesit,.tation. Your opponents in a marathon may try to frustrate or facilitate voi-rr attempts to lead, as they think best suits their interests.Your opponent in tennis tries to guesswhere you will put your serveor passingshot; the opposing coach in football calls the play that will best counter what he thinks you will call. Of course,just as you must take into account what the other player is thinking, he is taking into accountwhat you are thinking. Game theory is the analysis,or science,if you like, of such interactivedecisionmaking. \.\hen you think carefully before you act-nlhen You are aware of your objectivesor preferencesand of any limitations or constraintson your actions and chooseyour actions in a calculatedway to do the best according to your own criteria-you are said to be behaving rationally. Game theory adds another dimension to rational behavior-namely, interaction with other equall-vrational decisionmakers.In other words, game theory is the scienceof rational behavior in interactivesituations. We do not claim that gametheorywill teachyou the secretsof perfectplay or ensurethat you will never lose.For one thing, your opponent can read the same book, and both of you cannot win all the time. More importantly, many games are complex and subtle enough,and most actual situationsinclude enough idioslmcratic or chance elements,that game theory cannot hope to offer surefire it doesis to provide some generalprinciples for thinking recipesfor action.\.A/hat about strategic interactions. You have to supplement these ideas and some methods of calculation with many details specific to your situation before you can devisea successfulstrategyfor it. Good strategistsmix the scienceof game theory with their ovm experience;one might saythat gameplaying is as much art as science,We will developthe generalideasof the sciencebut will alsopoint out its limitations and tell you when the art is more important. You may think that you have alreadyacquired the art from your experience or instinct, but you will find the study of the scienceuseful nonetheless.The science systematizesmany generalprinciples that are common to severalcontexts or applications.Without generalprinciples, you would have to figure out from scratcheach new situation that requiresstrategicthinking. That would be especially difflcult to do in new areas of application-for example, if you learned your art by playing gamesagainstparents and siblings and must now practice strategy against business competitors. The general principles of game theory provide you with a ready referencepoint. With this foundation in place,you can proceed much more quickly and confidently to acquire and add the situationspecificfeaturesor elementsof the art to your thinking and action.
iCH. 1 ] B AS IC ID EA S A N D E XA M P LE S
tout with the aims announced in section 1, we will begin by offering you some simple examples,many of them taken from situations that you have probably encountered in your own lives, where strategyis of the essence.In each casewe will point out the crucial strategicprinciple. Each of theseprinciples will be discussed more fully in a later chapter, and after each example we will tell you where the details can be found. But don't jump to them right away;for a while, just read all the examplesto get a preliminary idea of the whole scope of strategy and of strategicgames.
Shot? Passing A. Which Tennis at its best consistsof memorable duels between top players:John McEnroe versus Ivan Lendl, Pete Sampras versus Andre Agassi, and Martina Navratilovaversus Chris Evert. Picture the 1983U.S. Open final between Evert and Navratilova.l Nawatilova at the net has just volleyed to Evert on the baseline. Evert is about to hit a passingshot. Should she go down the line or crosscourt? And should Navratilova expect a down-the-line shot and lean slightly that way or expecta crosscourtshot and lean the other way? Conventionalwisdom favors the down-the-line shot. The ball has a shorter distanceto travel to the net, so the other player has less time to react' But this does not mean that Evert should use that shot all of the time. If she did, Nawatilova would confidently come to expectit and prepare for it, and the shot would not be so successful.To improve the successof the down-the-line passing shot, Evert has to use the crosscourtshot often enough to keep Navratilova guessingon any singleinstance. Similarly in football, with a yard to go on third dornm,a run up the middle is the percentageplay-that is, the one used most often-but the offense must throw a passoccasionallyin such situations"to keep the defensehonest'" Thus the most important general principle of such situations is not what Evert should do but what she should not do: she should not do the same thing all the time or systematically.If she did, then Navratilovawould learn to cover that, and Evert'schancesof successwould fall' Not doing any one thing systematicallymeans more than not playing the same shot in every situation of this kind. Evert should not even mechanically lchris Evert won her first title at the U.S. Open in 1975.Nawatilova claimed her first title in the 1983flnal.
SOMEEXAMPLES AND STORIES OF STRATEGIC GAMES 7 switch back and forth between the two shots. Nawatilova would spot and exploit tl;^ispattern or indeed any other detectable system. Evert must make the choice on eachparticular occasionat randomto prevent this guessing. This generalidea of "mixing one's plays" is well knoum, even to sports commentators on television.But there is more to the idea, and thesefurther aspects require analysisin greater depth. vvhy is dor,rm-the-linethe percentageshot? Should one play it B0%of the time or 90Toor 99%?Does it make any differenceif the occasionis particularly big; for example,does one throw that pass on third dor,r,nin the regular seasonbut not in the Super Bowl? In actual practice,just how does one mix one's plays?\Alhathappenswhen a third possibility (the lob) is introduced?we will examineand answersuch questionsin chapters 7 and B. The movie ThePrincessBride (1987)illustratesthe same idea in the "battle of wits" between the hero (Westley)and a villain [lizzini). Westley is to poison one of two wineglassesout of Yizzini's sight, and Yizzini is to decide who will drink from which glass.vizzini goes through a number of convoluted arguments as to why westley should poison one glass.But all of the arguments are innately contradictory, because westley can anticip ate yizzini's logic and chooseto put the poison in the other glass.conversely,if westley usesany specific logic or system to choose one glass,Yizzini can anticipate that and drink from the other glass,leaving westley to drink from the poisoned one. Thus, Westley'sstrategyhas to be random or unsystematic. The scene illustrates something else as well. In the film, yizzini loses the game and with it his life. But it turns out that westley had poisoned both glasses;over the last severalyearsrhe had built up immunity to the poison. so Yizzini was actually playing the game under a fatal information disadvantage. Playerscan sometimes cope with such asymmetriesof information; chapter 9 examineswhen and howthev can do so.
B. TheGPA RatRace You are enrolled in a coursethat is graded on a curve. No matter how well you do in absoluteterms, only 40'/oof the studentswill get As, and only 40%will get Bs. Therefore you must work hard, not just in absolute terms, but relative to how hard your classmates(actually,"classenemies" seemsa more fitting term in this context) work. All of you recognize this, and after the first lecture you hold an impromptu meeting in which all studentsagreenot to work too hard. As weekspassby, the temptation to get an edge on the rest of the classby working just that little bit harder becomes overwhelming. After all, the others are not able to observeyour work in any detail; nor do they have any real hold over you. And the benefitsof an improvement in your gradepoint averageare substantial. Soyou hit the library more often and stay up a little longer.
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The trouble is, everyoneelse is doing the same.Thereforeyour grade is no better than it rvould have been if you and everyone else had abided by the agreement.The only differenceis that all of you have spent more time working than you would have liked. This is an exampleof the prisoners' dilemma. In the original story, two suspects are being separatelyinterrogatedand invited to confess.One of them, say A, is told, "If the other suspect,B, doesnot confess,then you can cut a very good deal for yourself by confessing.But if B does confess,then you would do well to confess,too; otherwisethe court will be especiallytough on you. So you should confessno matter what the other does."B is told to confess,with the use of similar reasoning.Facedwith this choice, both A and B confess.But it would have been better for both if neither had confessed,becausethe police had no reallv compelling evidenceagainstthem. Your situation is similar. If the others slacken,then you can get a much betgrade ter by working hard; if the others work hard, then you had better do the same or else you will get a very bad grade.You may even think that the label "prisoner" is very fltting for a group of studentstrapped in a required course. There is a prisoners' dilemma for professorsand schools,too. Each professor can make his courselook good or attractiveby grading it slightly more liberally, and each school can place its students in better jobs or attract better applicantsby grading all of its coursesa little more liberally. Of course,when all do this, none has any advantageover the others; the only result is rampant grade inflation, which compressesthe spectrum of gradesand therefore makes it difficult to distinguish abilities. People often think that in every game there must be a winner and a loser. The prisoners' dilemma is different-both or all players can come out losers. People play (and lose) such games every day, and the lossescan range from minor inconveniencesto potential disasters.Spectatorsat a sports event stand up to get a better view but, when all stand, no one has a better view than when they were all sitting. Superpowersacquire more weapons to get an edge over their rivalsbut, when both do so, the balanceof power is unchanged;all that has happenedis that both have spent economic resourcesthat they could have used for better purposes,and the risk of accidentalwar has escalated.The magnitude of the potential cost of such gamesto all players makes it important to understand the ways in which mutually beneficial cooperation can be achievedand sustained.All of Chapter 11 dealswith the study of this game. Justas the prisoners'dilemma is potentially a lose-losegame,there are winwin games,too. International trade is an example;when each country produces more of what it can do relativelybest, all sharein the fruits of this international division of labor. But successfulbargaining about the division of the pie is neededif the full potential of trade is to be realized.The same applies to many other bargaining situations.We will study thesein Chapter 17.
SOME E XA M PL E SAN D S TOR IE SOF S TR A TE GICGA ME S
9
C. "WeCan't Take theExam, Because WeHada FlatTire,, Here is a story, probably apocryphal, that circulates on the undergraduate e-mail networks;each of us independentlyreceivedit from our students: There were two friends taking chemistry at Duke. Both had done preth, rvell on all of the quizzes,the labs, and the midterm, so that going into the final th/ each had a solid A . They were so confident the weekend before tbe.Dna) that they decided to go to a party at the University of Virginia. The party was so good that they oversleptall day Sunday,and got back too late to study for the Chemistry final that was scheduledfor Monday morning. Rather than take the final unprepared, they went to the professorwith a sob story. They said they each had gone up to UVA and had planned to come back in good time to study for the final but had had a flat tire on the way back. Because they didn't have a spare,they had spent most of the night looking for help. Now they were really too tired, so could they pleasehave a makeup final the next day?The professorthought it over and agreed. The two studied all of Monday eveningand camewell prepared on Tuesday morning. The professorplaced them in separaterooms and handed the test to each. The first question on the first page, worth l0 points, was very easy.Each of them wrote a good answer, and greatly relieved, turned the page.It had just one question,worth 90 points. It was: "\Vhich tire?" The story has two important strategic lessonsfor future party goers.The first is to recognizethat the professormay be an intelligent gameplayer.He may suspectsome trickery on the part of the students and may use some device to catch them. Given their excuse,the question was the likeliest such device.They should have foreseenit and prepared their answer in advance.This idea that one should look aheadto future moves in the game and then reason backward to calculate one's best current action is a very general principle of strategy, which we will elaborate on in Chapter 3. We will also use it, most notably, in Chapter10. But it may not be possible to foresee all such professorial countertricks; after all, professorshave much more experienceof seeingthrough students' excusesthan studentshave of making up such excuses.If the pair are unprepared, can they independently produce a mutually consistentlie?If each picks a tire at random, the chances are only 25% that the two will pick the same one. [Why?) Can they do better? You may think that the front tire on the passengerside is the one most likely to suffer a flat, becausea nail or a shard of glassis more likely to lie closerto the side of the road than the middle and the front tire on that side will encounter it first. You may think this is good logic, but that is not enough to make it a good choice.\Mhat matters is not the logic of the choice but making the same choice
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as your friend does. Therefore you have to think about whether your friend would use the same logic and would consider that choice equally obvious. But even that is not the end of the chain of reasoning.Would your friend think that the choicer,vouldbe equally obvious to you?And so on. The point is not whether a choice is obvious or logical, but whether it is obvious to the other that it is obvious to vou that it is obvious to the other. . . . In other words, what is needed is a convergenceof expectationsabout what should be chosen in such circumstances.Such a commonly expectedstrategyon which the players can successfully coordinateis called a focal point. There is nothing generalor intrinsic to the structure of all such gamesthat createssuch convergence.In some games,a focal point may exist becauseof chancecircumstancesabout the labeling of strategiesor becauseof some experience or knowledgesharedby the players.For example,if the passenger'sfront side of a car were for some reason called the Duke's side, then two Duke students would be very likely to chooseit without any need for explicit prior understanding.Or, if the driver's front side of all carswere painted orange (for safety, to be easily visible to oncoming cars), then two princeton students would be very likely to choosethat tire, becauseorange is the Princeton color. But without some such clue, tacit coordination might not be possibleat all. we will study focal points in more detail in chapter 4. Here in closing we merely point out that when asked in classrooms,more than 50% of students choosethe driver's front side. They are generallyunable to explain why, except to saythat it seemsthe obvious choice.
D. WhyAreProfessors 5oMean? Many professorshave inflexible rules not to give makeup exams and never to acceptlate submission of problem sets or term papers.students think the professorsmust be really hardheartedto behavein this way. The true strategicreason is often exactly the opposite. Most professorsare kindhearted and would like to give their studentseveryreasonablebreak and acceptany reasonableexcuse.The trouble lies in judging what is reasonable.It is hard to distinguish between similar excusesand almost impossibleto veriff their truth. The professor knows that on each occasionhe will end up by giving the student the benefit of the doubt. But the professoralso knows that this is a slippery slope.As the students come to know that the professor is a soft touch, they will procrastinate more and produce ever-flimsier excuses.Deadlines will cease to mean anything, and examinations will become a chaotic mix of postponements and makeup tests. often the only way to avoid this slippery slope is to refuse to take even the first step dor,r.m it. Refusalto acceptany excusesat all is the only realisticalterna-
S OM E EX AMP L ESAN D S TOR IE SOF S TR A TE GICGA \4E S 1 1
tive to accepting them all. By making an advance commitment to the "no excuses"strategy,the professoravoidsthe temptation to give in to all. But how can a softheartedprofessormaintain such a hardheartedcommitment?He must find some way to make a refusalfirm and credible.The simplest way is to hide behind an administrativeprocedure or university-wide policr. "l wish I could acceptyour excuse,but the university won't let me" not only puts the professorin a nicer light, but removes the temptation by genuinely leaving him no choice in the matter. Of course,the rules may be made by the same collectivity of professorsas hides behind them but, once made, no individual professorcan unmake the rule in any particular instance. If the university does not provide such a generalshield, then the professor can try to make up commitment devicesof his own. For example,he can make a clear and firm announcement of the policy at the beginning of the course.Any time an individual student asksfor an exception,he can invoke a fairnessprinciple, saying,"If I do this for you, I would have to do it for everyone."Or the professorcan acquire a reputation for toughnessby acting tough a few times. This may be an unpleasantthing for him to do and it may run againsthis true inclination, but it helps in the long run over his whole career.If a professoris believed to be tough, few studentswill try excuseson him, so he will actually suffer lesspain in denying them. We will study commitments, and related strategies,such as threats and promises,in considerabledetailin Chapter10.
E. Roommates andFamilies ontheBrink You are sharing an apartment with one or more other students.You notice that the apartment is nearly out of dishwasherdetergent,paper towels, cereal,beer, and other items. You have an agreementto share the actual expenses,but the trip to the store takes time. Do you spend your time or do you hope that someone elsewill spend his, leavingyou more time to study or relax?Do you go and buy the soap or stay in and watch TV to catch up on the soap operas?2 In many situations of this kind, the waiting game goeson for quite a while before someonewho is really impatient for one of the items (usuallybeer) gives in and spends the time for the shopping trip. Things may deteriorate to the point of seriousquarrelsor evenbreakupsamong the roommates. This game of strategycan be viewed from two perspectives.In one, each of the roommates is regarded as having a simple binary choice-to do the shopping or not. The best outcome for you is where someoneelsedoes the shopping 2Thisexamplecomesfrom Michael Grunwald's"At Home" column, "A Game of Chicken,"in the Boston GlobeMagazine, April 28, 1996.
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and you stay at home; the worst is where you do the shopping while the others get to use their time better. If both do the shopping (unknown to each other, on the way home from school or work), there is unnecessaryduplication and perhaps some rvasteof perishables;if neither does, there can be seriousinconvenience or even disasterif the toilet paper runs out at a crucial time' This is analogousto the gameof chicken that used to be played byAmerican teenagers.Two of them drove their carstoward each other. The first to swerveto avoid a collision was the loser (chicken);the one who kept driving straight was the rr.inner. We will analyze the game of chicken further in Chapter 4 and in ChaptersB and 13. A more interesting dynamic perspectiveon the same situation regardsit as a "war of attrition," where each roommate tries to wait out the others, hoping that someone else'spatience will run out first. In the meantime, the risk escalatesthat the apartment will run out of something critical, leading to seriousinEach player lets the risk escalateto the point of his convenienceor a blou,-r-rp. or,tmtolerance;the one revealedto have the leasttoleranceloses.Eachseeshow closeto the brink of disasterthe otherswill let the situation go. Hence the name "brinkmanship" for this strategy and this game. It is a dynamic version of chicken,offering richer and more interestingpossibilities. One of us (Dixio was privileged to observea brilliant example of brinkmanship at a dinner party one Saturdayevening. Before dinner, the company was sitting in the living room when the host's fifteen-year-olddaughter appearedat the door and said, "Bye,Dad." The father asked,"\t\{hereare you going?"and the daughter replied, "Out." After a pause that was only a couple of secondsbut seemedmuch longer, the host said, "All right, bye." Your strategic observer of this scene was left thinking how it might have gone differently. The host might have asked,"With whom?" and the daughter might have replied, "Friends." The father could have refusedpermission unless the daughter told him exactlywhere and with whom she would be. One or the other might have capitulated at some such later stage of this exchangeor it could have led to a blowup. This was a risky game for both the father and the daughter to play. The daughter might have been punished or humiliated in front of strangers;an argument could have ruined the father's evening with his friends. Each had to judge how far to push the process,without being fully sure whether and when the other might give in or whether there would be an unpleasantscene.The risk of an explosionwould increaseas the father tried harder to force the daughterto answerand as she defied each successivedemand. In this respectthe game played by the father and the daughterwas just like that between a union and a company's management who are negotiating a labor contract or between two superpowers who are encroaching on each other's sphere of influence in the world. Neither side can be fully sure of the
SO M E EXAM PLES AND S T O R I E S O F S T R A T E G I C : : : . 4 E S
I3
other'sintentions,so eachside exploresthem through a successiono: snrallincremental steps,each of which escalatesthe risk of mutual disaster.Thr riaughter in our story was exploring previously untested limits of her freedol the father was exploring previously untested-and perhaps unclear even to irinrself-limits of his authority. This was an exampleof brinkmanship, a game of escalatingmutual risk, par excellence.Such gamescan end in one of two ways. In the first way, one of the playersreachesthe limit of his orn"rr tolerancefor risk and concedes.(The father in our story concededquickly, at the very first step.Other fathersmight be more successfulstrict disciplinarians,and their daughters might not even initiate a game like this.) In the secondway, before either has conceded,the risk that they both fear comes about, and the blowLrp(the strike or the war) occurs.T'hefeucl in our host's family ended "happily"; although the father concededand the daughterwon, a blow-upwould have been much worse for both. We will analyzethe strategy of brinkmanship more fuliv in Chapter 10; in Chapter 14,we will examinea particularly important instanceof it-namely, the Cubanmissilecrisisof 1962.
F. TheDating Game you are dating,you want to show off the best attributesof your personality \.44ren to your date and to concealthe worst ones.Ofcourse,you cannot hope to conceal them forever if the relationshipprogresses;but you are resolvedto improve or hope that by that stagethe other person will acceptthe bad things about you with the good ones.And you know that the relationship will not progressat all unlessyou make a good flrst impression;you won't get a secondchanceto do so. Of course,you want to find out everything,good and bad, about the other person. But you know that, if the other is as good at the dating game asyou are, he or she will similarly try to show the best side and hide the worst. You will think through the situation more carefully and try to figure out which signs of good qualities are real and which ones can easilybe put on for the sakeof making a good impression.Eventhe worst slob can easilyappearwell groomed for a big date; ingrained habits of courtesy and manners that are revealedin a hundred minor details may be harder to simulate for a whole evening.Florversare relatively cheap;more expensivegifts may have value, not for intrinsic reasons, but as credible evidenceof how much the other person is willing to sacrificefor you. And the "currency" in which the gift is given may have different significance, depending on the context; from a millionaire, a diamond malr bs r,,"'orth less in this regard than the act of giving up valuable time for your compan)/ or time spent on some activity at your request. You should also recognizethat your date will similarly scrutinize your actions for their information content. Thereforevou should take actions that are
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credible signalsof I'our true good qualities, and not just the ones that anyone can imitate. This is important not just on a flrst date; revealing,concealing,and eliciting information about the other person's deepest intentions remain important throughout a relationship.Here is a story to illustrate that. Once upon a time in NewYork City there lived a man and a woman who had separate rent-controlled apartments, but their relationship had reached the point at rvhich they were using only one of them. The woman suggestedto the man that they give up the other apartment. The man, an economist, explained to her a fundamental principle of his subject: it is always better to have more choice available.The probability of their splitting up might be small but, given even a small risk, it would be useful to retain the second low-rent apartment. The woman took this very badly and promptly ended the relationship! Economistswho hear this story say that it just confirms their principle that greaterchoice is better. tsut strategicthinking offers a very different and more compelling explanation.The woman was not sure of the man's commitment to the relationship, and her suggestionwas a brilliant strategicdevice to elicit the truth. Words are cheap; anyone can say, "I love you." If the man had put his propefiy where his mouth was and had given up his lent-controlled apartment, that would have been concreteevidenceof his love. The fact that he refusedto do so constituted hard evidenceof the opposite,and the woman did right to end the relationship. Theseare examples,designedto appeal to your immediate experience,of a very important classof games-namely, those where the real strategicissue is manipulation of information. Strategiesthat convey good information about yourself are called signals;strategiesthat induce others to act in ways that will credibly reveal their private information, good or bad, are called screeningdevices. Thus the woman's suggestionof giving up one of the apartments was a screeningdevice,which put the man in the situation of offering to give up his apartment or elserevealinghis lack of commitment. We will study gamesof information, aswell as signalingand screening,in Chapter9.
We have chosen several examplesthat relate to your experiencesas amateur strategistsin real life to illustrate some basic conceptsof strategicthinking and strategicgames.We could continue, building a whole stock of dozensof similar stories.The hope would be that, when you face an actual strategicsituation,you might recognizea parallel with one of these stories,which would help you de-
OURSTRATEGY FORSTUDYING GAMESOF STRATEGY15 cide the appropriate strategy for your or'rmsituation. This is the casesrudy approach taken by most businessschools.It offers a concreteand memorable vehicle for the underlying concepts. However, each new strategic situation typically consistsof a unique combination of so many variablesthat an intolerably large stock of casesis neededto cover all of them. An alternativeapproach focuseson the generalprinciples behind the examples and so constructsa theoryof strategicaction-namely, formal game theory. The hope here is that, facing an actual strategicsituation, you might recognize which principle or principles apply to it. This is the route taken by the more academic disciplines,such as economics and political science.A drawback to this approach is that the theory is presented in a very abstract and mathematical manner, without enough casesor examples.This makes it difficult for most beginners to understand or remember the theory and to connect the theory with reality afterward. But knowing some generaltheory has on overwhelming compensatingadvantage.It givesyou a deeperunderstandingof gamesand of why they have the outcomesthey do. This helps you play better than you would if you merely read some casesand knew the recipes for howto play some speciflcgames.with the knowledge of why, you can think through new and unexpected situations where a mechanical follower of a "how" recipe would be lost. A world champion of checkers, Tom wiswell, has expressedthis beautifully: "The player who knows how will usually draw, the player who knows why will usually win."3 This is not to be taken literally for all games;some gamesmay be hopelesssituations for one of the players no matter how knowledgablehe may be. But the statement contains the germ of an important general truth-knowing why givesyou an advantage beyond what you can get if you merely know how. For example, knowing the why of a game can help you foresee a hopeless situation and avoid getting into such a gamein the first place. Therefore we will take an intermediate route that combines some of the advantagesof both approaches-case studies (how) and theory (why). we will organize the subject around its generalprinciples, generallyone in each of the chapters to follow. Thereforeyou don't have to figure them out on your or.tmfrom the cases. But we will developthe generaiprinciples through illustrative casesrather than abstractly, so the context and scope of each idea will be clear and evident. In other wotds, we will focus on theory but build it up through cases,not abstractly. of course,such an approach requires some compromises of its or,r,n.Most importantly, you should remember that each of our examplesservesthe purpose of conveyingsome generalidea or principle of game theory. Thereforewe 3Quoted in victor Niederhoffer, The Education of a speculator (New york: wiley, 1997),p. 169. We thankAustin Iaffe of PennsylvaniaState University for bringing this aphorism to our attention.
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nill leave out manv details of each casethat are incidental to the principle at stake.If some examplesseem somewhat artiflcial, pleasebear with us; we have generallyconsideredthe omitted detailsand left them out for good reasons. A word of reassurance.Although the examplesthat motivate the development of our conceptual or theoretical frameworks are deliberatelyselectedfor that purpose (evenat the cost of leaving out some other featuresof reality), once the theory has been constructed, we pay a lot of attention to its connection with reality. Throughout the book, we examine factual and experimental evidencein regard to how well the theory explains reality. The frequent answer-very well in some respects and lesswell in others-should give you cautious confldence in using the theory and should be a spur to contributing to the formulation of better theories. In appropriate places,we examine in great detail how institutions evolve in practice to solvesomeproblemspointed out by the theories;note in particularthe discussion in Chapter 11 of how prisoners' dilemmas arise and are solved in reality and a similar discussionof more generalcollective-actionproblemsin Chapter12. Finally, in Chapter 14we will examine the use of brinkmanship in the Cuban missile crisis.Suchtheory-basedcasestudies,which take rich factual details of a situation and subject them to an equally detailed theoretical analysis,are becoming common in suchdiversefieldsasbusinessstudies,political science,and economic history; we hope our original study of an important episodein the diplomatic and military areaswill giveyou an interesting introduction to this genre. To pursue our approach in which exampleslead to generaltheoriesthat are then testedagainstreality and used to interpret reality,we must flrst identi$r the generalprinciples that serveto organizethe discussion.We will do so in Chapter 2by classifringor dichotomizing gamesalong severalkey dimensions of different strategicmatters or concepts.Along each dimension, we will identify two extreme pure types. For example, one such dimension concerns the order of moves,and the two pure t],pesare those in which the playerstake turns making moves (sequentialgames)and those in which all playersact at once (simultaneous games).Actual gamesrarely correspondto exactly one of these conceptual categories;most partake of some featuresof each extremetype. But each game can be located in our classificationby considering which concepts or dimensions bear on it and how it mixes the two pure types in each dimension. To decide hol'r'to act in a specific situation, one then combines in appropriate ways the iessonslearnedfor the pure tJ,?es. Once this generalframework has been constructedin Chapter 2, the chapters that follor'vwill build on it, developingseveralgeneralideas and principles for each player's strategicchoice and the interaction of all players' strategiesin games.
I
Howto ThinkAbout StrategicGames HApTERI cavE sove simple examplesof strategic games and strategic thinking. In this chapter, we begin a more systematic and analltical approach to the subject.we choose some crucial conceptual categoriesor dimensions,in each of which there is a dichotomy of types of strategicinteractions. For example,one such dimension concerns the timing of the players' actions, and the two pure t],pes are gameswhere the players act in strict turns (sequentialmoves) and where they act at the same time (simultaneous moves).We consider some matters that arise in thinking about each pure type in this dichotomy, as well as in similar dichotomies,with respectto other matters, such as whether the game is played only once or repeatedlyand what the playersknow about each other. In the chaptersthat follow, we will examine each of these categoriesor dimensions in more detail and show how the analysiscan be used in severalspecific applications.of course,most actual applicationsare not of a pure type but rather a mixture. Moreover, in each application, two or more of the categories have some relevance.The lessonslearnedfrom the study of the pure types must therefore be combined in appropriate ways. we will show how to do this by using the context of our applications. In this chapter, we state some basic concepts and terminology-such as strategies,payoffs, and equilibrium-that are used in the analysis and briefly describe solution methods. we also provide a brief discussion of the uses of game theory and an overviewof the structure of the remainder of the book.
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.iiffi \\4ren a person (or team or firm or government) decideshow to act in dealings with other people (or teams or flrms or governments),there must be some cross-effectof their actions; what one does must affect the outcome for the other. \\'hen GeorgePickett (of Fickett's Chargeat the battle of Gettysburg)was asked to explain the Confederacy'sdefeat in the Civil War, he responded, "I think the Yankeeshad somethingto do with it."r For the interaction to become a strategic game, however, we need something more-namely, the participants' mutual awarenessof this cross-effect. \\hat the other person doesaffectsyou; ifyou know this, you can leact to his actions, or take advanceactions to forestall the bad effectshis future actions may have on you and to facilitate any good effects,or eventake advanceactionsso as to alter his future reactionsto your advantage.If you know that the other person knows that what you do affectshim, you know that he will be taking similar actions. And so on. It is this mutual awarenessof the cross-effectsof actions and the actions taken as a result of this awarenessthat constitute the most interesting aspectsof strategy. This distinction is capturedby reservingthe label strategic games (or sometimes just games, becausewe are not concerned with other types of games, such as those of pure chance or pure skill) for interactions between mutually awareplayersand decisionsfor action situationswhere eachperson can choose without concern for reaction or responsefrom others. If Robert E. Lee (who ordered Pickettto lead the ill-fated Pickett'sCharge)had thought that the Yankees had been weakened by his earlier artillery barrage to the point that they no longer had any ability to resist,his choice to attackwould have been a decision; if he was aware that the Yankeeswere prepared and waiting for his attack,then the choice becamea part of a (deadly)game.The simple rule is that unlessthere are two or more players, each of whom responds to what others do (or what eachthinks the others might do), it is not a game. Strategicgamesarise most prominently in head-to-headconfrontations of two participants:the arms race between the United Statesand the SovietUnion from the 1950sthrough the l9B0s;wage negotiationsbetweenGeneralMotors and the United Auto Workers; or a SuperBowl matchup between two "pirates," the Tampa Bay Buccaneersand the Oakland Raiders.In contrast, interactions among a iarge number of participants seem less prone to the issuesraised by mutual awareness.Becauseeach farmer's output is an insignificant part of the
rJamesM. McPherson,"AmericanVictory, American Defeat," in why the confecleracy Lost, ed. GaborS.Boritt (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1993),p. 19.
DECISIONS VERSUS ::\4ES
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whole nation's or the world's output, the decisionof one farmer to Src\vmore or lesscorn has almostno effeclon Ihe markelprice,and not much al]:rrrfsto hinge on thinking of agriculture as a strategicgame. This was indeed the '''jenr prevalent in economics for many years. A few confrontations between iarge Ford' companies,as in the U.S.auto market that was once dominatedby GM, and Chrysler,were usefully thought of as strategicgames,but most econonllc interactionswere supposedto be governedby the impersonal forces of supplr and demand. In fact, game theory has a much greater scope.Many situations that start out as impersonal markets with thousands of participants turn into strategic of interactions of two or just a few. This happens for one of two broad classes reasons-mutual commitments or private information' Considercommitment flrst. \\4len you are contemplating building a house, you can chooseone of severaldozen contractorsin 1'otLrarea;the contractor be an can similarly choosefrom severalpotential customers.There appearsto customer impersonal market. once each side has made a choice, however,the plan of pays an initial installment, and the builder buys some materials for the the from this particular house. The two become tied to each other, separately get away market. Their relationship becomes bilateral' The builder can try t0 delay with a somewhatsloppy job or can procrastinate,and the client can try to payment of the next installment. Strategyenters the pictufe' Their initial conintract has to anticipate their individual incentives and specify a scheduleof of the stallmentsof paymentsthat are tied to successivestepsin the completion project. Even then, some adjustmentshave to be made after the fact, and these adjustmentsbring in new elementsof strategy' Next, consider private information. Thousands of farmers seek to borrow forth, money for their initial expenditureson machinery, seed,fertilizer, and so not and hundreds of banks existto lend to them. Yet the market for such loans is will impersonal.A borrower with good farming skills who puts in a lot of effort borbe more likely to be successfuland will repay the loan; a less-skilledor lazy rower may fail at farming and default on the loan. The risk of default is highly personalized.It is not a vague entity called "the market" that defaults,but individual borrowers who do so. Therefore each bank will have to view its lending relation with each individual borrower as a separategame' It will seekcollateral The from each borrower or will investigateeach borrower's creditworthiness' the farmer will look for ways to convince the bank of his quality as a borrower; bank will look for effectiveways to ascertainthe truth of the farmer's claims' the Similarly, an insurance company will make some efforts to determine when a health of individual applicants and will check for any evidenceof arson of indiclaim for a fire is made; an employer will inquire into the qualifications particvidual employeesand monitor their performance.More generally,when the ipants in a transaction possess Some private information bearing on
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[C H. 2]
HO W TC THI NK ABO U T S T R A T E G I C G A M E S
outcome,eachbilateraldealbecomesa gameof strategy,eventhough the larger picture may har-ethousandsof very similar dealsgoing on. To sum up, rvl'Leneachparticipant is significantin the interaction, either becauseeach is a large piayer to start with or becausecommitments or private information narro\\' the scope of the relationship to a point where each is an important plar,'ertuithin the relationship, we must think of the interaction as a strategicgante. Such situations are the rule rather than the exception in business,in politics,and evenin socialinteractions.Thereforethe study of strategic gamesforrns an important part of all fields that analyzethesematters.
Gamesof strategyarise in many different contexts and accordinglyhave many different features that require study. This task can be simplified by grouping thesefeaturesinto a few categoriesor dimensions,along each of which we can identify two pure types of gamesand then recognizeany actual game as a mixture of the pure types.we develop this classificationby asking a few questions that will be pertinent for thinking about the actual game that you are playing or studying.
A. AretheMoves intheGame Sequential orSimultaneous? Moves in chessare sequential:\Mhite moves first, then Black,then \.44riteagain, and so on. In contrast, participants in an auction for an oil-drilling lease or a part of the airwave spectrum make their bids simultaneously,in ignorance of competitors'bids. Most actualgamescombine aspectsof both. In a race to researchand developa new product, the flrms act simultaneously,but each competitor has partial information about the others' progress and can respond. During one play in football, the opposing offensive and defensivecoachessimultaneouslysend out teams with the expectationof carrying out certain plays but, after seeinghow the defensehas set up, the quarterback can change the play at the line of scrimmageor call a time-out so that the coach can changethe play. The distinction between sequential and simultaneous moves is important becausethe two types of gamesrequire different types of interactivethinking. In a sequential-movegame,each player must think if I do this, how will my opponent react?Your current move is governedby your calculation of its future consequences.with simultaneous moves, you have the trickier task of trying to figure out what your opponent is going to do right now.Butyou must recognize that, in making his own calculation, the opponent is also trylng to figure out
CLASSIFYING::\4ES
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your current move, while at the same time recognizing that you are .loing the samewith him. . . . Both of you have to think your way out of this circle. In the next three chapters,we will study the two pure cases.In Chapier 3, tr,e examine sequential-movegames,where you must look ahead to act tlo''.: itt Chapters 4 and 5, the subject is simultaneous-movegames,where you lllust squarethe circle of "He thinks that I think that he thinks . . . " In each case.\re will devise some simple tools for such thinking-trees and payoff tables-ar-rd obtain some simple rules to guide actions. The study of sequentialgamesalso tells us when it is an advantageto move first and when second.Roughly speaking,this depends on the relative importance of commitment and flexibility in the game in question. For example,the game of economic competition among rival firms in a market has a flrst-mover advantageif one flrm, by making a fi.rm commitment to compete aggressively, can get its rivals to back off. But, in political competition, a candidatewho has taken a firm stand on an issue may give his rivals a clear focus for their attack ads,and the game has a second-moveradvantage. Knowledgeof the balance of these considerationscan also help you devise ways to manipulate the order of moves to your own advantage.That in turn leads to the study of strategicmoves, such as threats and promises,which we will take up in Chapter 10.
(onflict Some Commonality? orlsThere inTotal Interests B. ArethePlayers' In simple games such as chessor football, there is a winner and a loser. One player's gain is the other's loss. Similarly,in gambling games'one player'swinnings are the others' losses,so the total is zero. This motivates the name zerosum games for such situations. More generally, the idea is that the players' interestsare in complete conflict. Such conflict ariseswhen playersare dividing up any fixed amount of possiblegain, whether it be measuredin yards, dollars, acres,or scoopsof ice cream. Becausethe availablegain need not alwaysbe exactly zero, the term consrant-sumgame is often substituted for zero-sum; we will use the two interchangeably. Most economicand socialgamesare not zero-Sum.Trade,or economicaCtivity more generally,offers scopefor dealsthat benefit everyone.Ioint ventures can combine the participants' different skills and generatesynelgy to produce more than the sum of what they could have produced separately.But the interests are not completely aligned either; the partners can cooperate to create a larger total pie, but they will clash when it comes to deciding how to split this pie amongthem. Even wars and strikes are not zero-sum games.A nuclear war is the most striking example of a situation where there can be only losers,but the concept is far older. Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, defeated the Romans at Heraclea in
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280e.c.but at such great cost to his own army that he exclaimed:"Another such victory and we are lost." Hence the phrase "Pyrrhic victory." In the 1g80s,at the height of the frenn' of businesstakeovers,the battles among rival bidders led to such costly escalationthat the successfulbidder's victory was often similarly Pyrrhic. Most gantesin reality have this tension between conflict and cooperation, and manv of the most interesting analysesin game theory come from the need to handle it. The players' attempts to resolvetheir conflict-distribution of territory or profit-are influenced by the knowledge that, if they fail to agree,the outcolrle rvill be bad for all of them. One side'sthreat of a war or a strike is its attenrpt to frighten the other side into concedingits demands. Evenwhen a game is constant-sumfor all players,when there are three (or more) players,we have the possibility that two of them will cooperateat the expenseof the third; this leads to the study of alliancesand coalitions.We will examine and illustrate theseideaslater, especiallyin chapter l7 on bargaining.
C. lstheGame Played 0nceorRepeatedly, andwiththeSame (hanging or 0pponents? A game playedjust once is in some respectssimpler and in others more complicated than one with a longer interaction. You can think about a one-shot game without worrying about its repercussionson other gamesyou might play in the future againstthe sameperson or againstotherswho might hear of your actions in this one. Thereforeactionsin one-shot gamesare more likely to be unscrupulous or ruthless.For example,an automobile repair shop is much more likely to overchargea passingmotorist than a regular customer. In one-shot encounters,each player doesn't know much about the others; for example,what their capabilitiesand priorities are,whether they are good at calculating their best strategiesor have any weaknessesthat can be exploited, and so on. Thereforein one-shot games,secrecyor surprise are likely to be important components of good strategy. Gameswith ongoing relationshipsrequire the opposite considerations.You have an opportunity to build a reputation (for toughness,fairness,honesty,reliability, and so forth, depending on the circumstances)and to find out more about your opponent. The players together can better exploit mutually beneficial prospectsby arrangingto divide the spoils over time (taking turns to "win") or to punish a cheater in future plays (an eye-for-an-eyeor tit-for-tat). we will considerthesepossibilitiesin Chapter11 on the prisoners'dilemma. More generally,a game may be zero-sumin the short run but have scopefor mutual benefit in the long run. For example,each football team likes to win, but they all recognize that close competition generatesmore spectator interest, which benefits all teams in the long run. That is why they agree to a drafting
CLASSIFYING CT\4ES
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schemewhere teams get to pick playersin reverseorder of their curretlt standing, thereby reducing the inequality of talent. In long-distanceraces.tlle runners or cyclistsoften developa lot of cooperation;two or more of then"rcan help one another by taking turns to follow in one another's slipstream.Near the end of the race,the cooperationcollapsesas all of them dash for the finish line' Here is a useful rule of thumb for your own strategicactionsin life. In a ganre that has some conflict and some scopefor cooperation,you will often think up a great strategyfor winning big and grinding a rival into dust but have a nagging worry at the back of your mind thatyou are behavinglike the worst 1980s)'uppie. In such a situation, the chancesare that the game has a repeatedor ongoing aspect that you have overlooked.Your aggressivestrategymay gain you a short-run advantage,but its long-run side effectswill cost you even more. Thereforeyou should dig deeper and recognizethe cooperativeelement and then alter youl strategyaccordingly.You will be surprisedhow often niceness,integrity, and the golden rule of doing to others as you would have them do to you turn out to be not just old nostrums,but good strategiesas well, when you considerthe whole complex of gamesthat you wilt be playing in the courseof your life.
Information? FullorEqual Have D. DothePlayers In chess,each player knows exactlythe current situation and all the moves that led to it, and each knows that the other aims to win. This situation is exceptional; in most other games,the players face some limitation of information. Such limitations come in two kinds. First, a player may not know all the information that is pertinent for the choice that he has to make at everypoint in the game.This includes uncertainty about relevant externalcircumstances-for example, the weather-as well as the prior and contemporaneousactions of other players. Such situations are said to have imperfect information. We will develop the theory of games with contempolaneous actions in Chapter 4 and methods for making choices under uncertainty in the appendix to Chapter 7 and in Chapter 9. Trickier strategicsituationsarisewhen one player knows more than another does;they are called situations of incomplete or, better, as)rmmetric information. In such situations, the players' attempts to infer, conceal, or sometimes conveytheir private information become an important part of the game and the strategies.In bridge or poker, each player has only partial knowledge of the cardsheld by the others.Their actions (bidding and play in bridge, the number of cards taken and the betting behavior in poker) give information to opponents. Each player tries to manipulate his actions to mislead the opponents (and, in bridge, to inform his partner truthfully), but in doing so each must be aware that the opponents know this and that they will use strategicthinking to interpret that player'sactions.
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GAMES ICH.2] HOWTO THINKABOUTSTRATEGIC
You may think that, if you have superior information, you should always concealit from other players.But that is not true. For example'supposeyou are the CEOof a pharmaceuticalfirm that is engagedin an R&D competition to develop a nerv drug. If your scientistsmake a discoverythat is a big step forward, you may \vant to let your competitors know, in the hope that they will give up their or.m searches.In war, each side wants to keep its tactics and troop deployments secret;but, in diplomacy, if your intentions are peaceful,then you desperatelvr'r,antother countriesto know and believethis fact' The generalprinciple here is that you want to releaseyour information selectively.You want to reveal the good information (the kind that will draw responsesfrom the other players that work to your advantage)and conceal the bad (the kind that may work to your disadvantage). This raisesa problem. Your opponents in a strategicgame are purposive rational players and know that you are one' too. They will recognizeyour incentive to exaggerateor even to lie. Therefore they are not going to accept your unsupported declarationsabout your progressor capabilities.They can be convinced only by objective evidenceor by actions that are credible proof of your information. Such actions on the part of the more-informed player are called signals, and strategiesthat use them are called signaling. Conversely,the lessinformed party can create situations in which the more-informed player will have to take some action that credibly revealshis information; such strategies are called screening, and the methods they use are called screening devices. The word screeningisused here in the senseof testing in order to sift or separate, not in the senseof concealing.Recallthat, in the dating game in Section2'F of Chapter 1, the woman was screeningthe man to test his commitment to their relationship, and her suggestionthat the pair give up one of their two rentcontrolled apartmentswas the screeningdevice.If the man had been committed to the relationship,he might have acted first and volunteered to give up his apartment;this action would have been a signalof his commitment. Nowwe seehow, when different playershave different information, the manipulation of information itself becomesa game,perhaps more important than the game that will be played after the information stage. Such information gamesare ubiquitous, and to play them well is essentialfor successin life' We will studv more gamesof this kind in greaterdetail in Chapter9'
orManipulable? Fixed oftheGame E. AretheRules The rules of chess,card games,or sports are given, and everyplayer must follow them, no matter hory arbitrary or strangethey Seem.But, in gamesof business, politics, and ordinary life, the players can make their own rules to a greater or Iesser extent. For example, in the home, parents constantly try to make the rules, and children constantly look for ways to manipulate or circumvent those
CLASSIFYING CAN4E5
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rules.In legislatures,rules for the progressof a bill (including the order in which amendments and main motions are voted on) are fixed, but the game that sets the agenda-which amendments are brought to vote first-can be manipuIated; that is where political skill and power have the most scope, and n'e uill addressthesematters in detail in Chapter 15. In such situations, the real game is the "pregame" where rules are made, and your strategic skill must be deployed at that point. The actual playrng out of the subsequentgame can be more mechanical;you could even delegateit to someone else.However, if you "sleep" through the pregame,you might find that you have lost the gamebeforeit everbegan.For manyyears,Americanfirms ignoredthe rise of foreign competition in just this way and ultimately paid the price. Others, such asoil magnateIohn D. Rockefeller,Sr.,adoptedthe strategyof limiting their participation to gamesin which they could also participate in making the rules.2 The distinction betriveenchanging rules and acting within the chosen rules will be most important for us in our study of strategicmoves, such as threats and promises. Questionsof how you can make your ornmthreats and promises credible or how you can reduce the credibility of your opponent's threats basically have to do with a pregamethat entails rrlanipulatingthe rules of the subsequent game in which the prorhisesor threats may have to be carried out. More generally,the strategic moves that we will study in Chapter 10 are essentially ploys for such manipulation of rules. But, if the pregame of rule manipulation is the real game, what fixes the rules of the pregame?Usually these pregame rules depend on some hard facts related to the players' innate abilities. In business competition, one firm can take preemptive actions that alter subsequentgamesbetween it and its rivals; for example,it can expand its factory or advertisein a way that twists the results of subsequentprice competition more favorablyto itself.\.Mhichflrm can do this best or most easilydependson which one has the managerialor organizational resourcesto make the investmentsor to launch the advertisingcampaigns. Playersmay also be unsure of their rivals' abilities. This often makes the pregame one of unequal information, requiring more subtle strategiesand occasionallyresulting in some big surprises.We will comment on all thesematters in the appropriateplacesin the chaptersthat follow.
Enfotceable? to Cooperate F. AreAgreements We saw that most strategicinteractionsconsistof a mixture of conflict and common interest.Then there is a caseto be made that all participants should get together and reach an agleement about what everyoneshould do, balancing their 2Formore on the methods used in Rockefeller'srise to power, see Ron Chernow, Titan (New York: RandomHouse, 1998).
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mutual interest in maximizing the total benefit and their conflicting interestsin the division of gains.Suchnegotiationscan take severalrounds, in which agreements are made on a tentative basis,better alternativesare explored, and the deal is finalized only when no group of players can find an).thing better. The concept of the core in chapter lB embodiessuch a processand its outcome. However, el-en after the completion of such a process,additional difflculties often arise in putting the flnal agreement into practice. For instance, all the players must perform, in the end, the actions that were stipulated for them in the agreement.vvhen all others do what they are supposedto do, any one participant can typically get a better outcome for himself by doing something different.And, if each one suspectsthat the others may cheat in this way, he would be foolish to adhereto his stipulated cooperativeaction. Agreementsto cooperatecan succeedif all players act immediately and in the presenceof the whole group, but agreementswith such immediate implementation are quite rare. More often the participants disperseafter the agreement has been reached and then take their actions in private. Still, if these actions are observableto the others and a third party-for example,a court of law-can enforcecompliance,then the agreementofjoint action can prevail. However, in many other instances individual actions are neither directly observablenor enforceableby external forces. Without enforceability, agreements will stand only if it is in all participants' individual intereststo abide by them. Games among sovereigncountries are of this kind, as are many games with private information or gameswhere the actions are either outside the law or too trivial or too costly to enforce in a court of law. In fact, games where agreementsfor joint action are not enforceable constitute a vast majority of strategicinteractions. Game theory usesa specialterminology to capture the distinction between situationsin which agreementsare enforceableand those in which they are not. Gamesin which joint-action agreementsare enforceable are called cooperative, and thosein which such enforcementis not possible,and individual participants must be allowed to act in their ornminterests,are called noncooperative. This has become standard terminology, but it is somewhat unfortunate becauseit gives the impressionthat the former will produce cooperativeoutcomesand the latter will not. In fact, individual action can be compatible with the achievementof a lot of mutual gain, especiallyin repeatedinteractions.The important distinction is that in so-callednoncooperativegames,cooperationwill emergeonly if it is in the participants' separateand individual interests to continue to take the prescribed actions.This emergenceof cooperativeoutcomesfrom noncooperativebehavior is one of the most interesting flndings of game theory, and we will develop the ideain ChaptersIl,12, and 13. we will adhereto the standardusage,but emphasizethatthe terms cooperatiue and noncooperatiuerefer to the way in which actions are implemented or
S OM E T E R MIN OL OGYAN D B A C K GR OU N DA S S U MP TION S 27
enforced-collectively in the former mode and individually in the laner-and not to the nature of the outcomes. As we said earlier, most games in practice do not have adequate mechanisms for external enforcement of joint-action agreements.Therefore most of our anall'tical development will proceed in the noncooperativemode. The felr exceptionsinclude the discussionof bargaining in Chapter 17 and a brief treatment of marketsand competition in Chapter 18.
\Alhenone thinks about a strategicgame,the logical place to begin is by speciffing its structure.This includes all the strategiesavailableto all the players,their information, and their objectives. The first two aspects will differ from one game to another along the dimensions discussedin the preceding section, and one must locate one's particular game within that framework. The objectives raise some new and interesting considerations.Here, we consider aspectsof all thesematters.
A. Strategies Strategiesare simply the choicesavailableto the players,but eventhis basicnotion requires some further study and elaboration.If a game has purely simultaneous moves made only once, then each player's strategy is just the action taken on that single occasion.But, if a game has sequentialmoves,then the actions of a player who moves later in the game can respond to what other players (or he himself) have done at earlier points. Therefore each such player must make a complete plan of action, for example:"If the other doesA, then I will do X but, if the other does B, then I will do Y." This complete plan of action constitutes the strategyin such a game. There is a very simple test to determine whether your strategyis complete. It should speciff how you would play the game in such full detail-describing your action in every contingency-that, if you were to write it all dornm,hand it to Someoneelse,and go on vacation,this other person acting as your representative could play the game just as you would have played it. He would know what to do on each occasionthat could conceivablyarise in the course of play, without ever needing to disturb your vacation for instructions on how to deal with some situation that you had not foreseen. This test will become clearerin Chapter 3, when we develop and apply it in some specificcontexts.For now, you should simply remember that a strategyis a complete plan of action.
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This notion is similar to the common usageof the word strategyto denote a longer-term or larger-scaleplan ofaction, as distinct from tacticsthat pertain to a shorter term or a smaller scale.For example,the military makesstrategicplans for a war or a large-scalebattle, while tacticsfor a smaller skirmish or a particular theater of battle are often left to be devisedby lower-levelofficersto suit the local conditions. But game theory does not use the term tacticsat all. The term strategycoversall the situations,meaning a complete plan of action when necessaryand meaning a single move if that is all that is needed in the particular gamebeingstudied. The word strategyis also commonly used to describe a person's decisions over a fairly long time span and a sequenceof choices,even though there is no game in our senseof purposive and aware interaction with other people. Thus you have probably already chosen a careerstrategy.\.Ahenyou start earning an income,you will make savingand investmentstrategiesand eventuallyplan a retirement strategy.This usageof the term strategyhas the same senseas ours-a plan for a successionof actionsin responseto evolvingcircumstances.The only difference is that we are reseruingit for a situation-namely, a game-where the circumstancesevolvebecauseof actionstaken by other purposiveplayers.
B. Payoffs \Ahen askedwhat a player'sobjectivein a game is, most newcomersto strategic thinking respond that it is "to win"; but matters are not alwaysso simple. Sometimes the margin of victory matters; for example,in R&D competition, if your product is only slightly better than the nearestrival's,your patent may be more open to challenge.Sometimesthere may be smaller prizes for severalparticipants, so winning isn't everything.Most importantly, very few gamesof strategy are purely zero-sumor win-lose;they combine some common interestand some conflict among the players.Thinking about such mixed-motive gamesrequires more refined calculationsthan the simple dichotomy of winning and losing-for example,comparisonsof the gainsfrom cooperatingversuscheating. We will give each player a complete numerical scalewith which to compare all logicallyconceivableoutcomesof the game,correspondingto eachavailablecombination of choicesof strategiesby all the players.The number associatedwith eachpossibleoutcomewill be calledthat player'spayoff for that outcome.Higher payoffnumbersattachto outcomesthat arebetter in this player'srating system. Sometimesthe payoffs will be simple numerical ratings of the outcomes, the worst labeled I, the next worst 2, and so on, all the way to the best. In other games,there may be more natural numerical scales-for example, money income or proflt for firms, viewer-shareratings for televisionnetworks,and so on. In many situations, the payoff numbers are only educated guesses;then we should do some sensitivity tests by checking that the results of our analysisdo
SOMETERMINOLOGY AND BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS29 not changesignificantlyif we vary theseguesseswithin some reasonablemargin of error. Two important points about the payoffs need to be understood clearlv. First, the payoffsfor one player capture everythingin the outcomesof the game that he caresabout. In particular, the player need not be selfish,but his concem about others should be alreadyincluded in his numerical payoff scale.second, we will supposethat, if the player faces a random prospect of outcomes,then the number associatedwith this prospect is the averageof the payoffs associated with each component outcome, each weighted by its probability. Thus, if in one player's ranking, outcome A has payoff 0 and outcome B has payoff 100, then the prospect of a 75Toprobability of A and a 25Toprobability of B should have the payoff 0.75 x 0 + 0.25 x 100 : 25. This is often called the expected payoff from the random prospect.The word expectedhasa specialconnotation in the jargon of probability theory. It does not mean what you think you will get or expectto geUit is the mathematical or probabilistic or statisticalexpectation, meaning an averageof all possibleoutcomes,where each is given a weight proportional to its probability. The secondpoint createsa potential difficulty. Considera gamewhere playget ers or lose money and payoffs are measured simply in money amounts. In reference to the preceding example, if a player has a 75Tochance of getting nothing and a 25Tochanceof getting $100,then the expectedpayoff as calculated in that example is $25. That is also the payoff that the player would get from a simple nonrandom outcome of $25.In other words, in this way of calculating payoffs,a person should be indifferent to whether he receives$25 for sure or facesa risky prospect of which the averageis $25.one would think that most people would be averseto risk, preferring a sure $25 to a gamble that yields only $25 on the average. A very simple modification of our payoff calculation gets around this difficulty. We measurepayoffs not in money sums but by using a nonlinear rescaling of the dollar amounts. This is called the expectedutility approach, and we will present it in detail in the Appendix to Chapter 7. For now, pleasetake our word that incorporating differing attitudes toward risk into our framework is a manageabletask.Almost all of game theory is based on the expectedutility approach, and it is indeed very useful,although not without flaws.We will adopt it in this book, but we also indicate some of the difficulties that it leavesunresolved,with the use of a simple examplein Chapter B,Section3.
C. Rationality Each player's aim in the game will be to achieve as high a payoff for himself as possible.But how good is each player at pursuing this aim?This question is not about whether and how other playerspursuing their o'orninterestswill impede
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him; that is in the ven' nature of a game of strategicinteraction. we mean how good is each plar-erat calculating the strategythat is in his onm best interests and at following this strategyin the actual courseof play. Much of game theory assumesthat playersare perfect calculatorsand flawlessfollowers of their best strategies.This is the assumption of rational behavior. Obsen'ethe precisesensein which the term rationalis being used.It means that eachhas a consistentset of rankings (valuesor payoffs)over all the logically possible outcomes and calculatesthe strategythat best servesthese interests. Thus rationality has two essential ingredients: complete knowledge of one's own interests, and flawless calculation of what actions will best serve those interests. It is equally important to understandwhat is notincluded in this concept of rational behavior. It does not mean that players are selflsh; a player may rate highly the well-being of some other and incorporate this high rating into his payoffs.It does not mean that playersare short-run thinkers; in fact, calculation of future consequencesis an important part of strategicthinking, and actions that seem irrational from the immediate perspectivemay have valuable longterm strategicroles.Most importantly, being rational doesnot mean having the samevalue systemas other players,or sensiblepeople, or ethical or moral people would use; it means merely pursuing one's own value system consistently. Therefore,when one player carriesout an analysisof how other playerswill respond (in a gamewith sequentialmoves) or of the successiverounds of thinking about thinking (in a game with simultaneous moves), he must recognizethat the other playerscalculatethe consequencesof their choicesby using their or,rm value or rating system.You must not impute your own value systemsor standards of rationality to others and assumethat they would act as you would in that situation. Thus many "experts" commenting on the persian Gulf conflict in late 1990predicted that saddam Husseinwould back dor.,r,n "becausehe is rational"; they failed to recognizethat Saddam'svalue systemwas different from the one held by most Westerngovernmentsand by the Westernexperts. In general, each player does not really know the other players' value systems; this is part of the reason why in reality many gameshave incomplete and asyrnmetric information. In such games,tr]lng to flnd out the values of others and trying to concealor conveyone's oltm becomeimportant componentsof strategy. Gametheory assumesthat all playersare rational. How good is this assumption, and thereforehow good is the theory that employs it? At one level, it is obvious that the assumption cannot be literally true. Peopleoften don't even have full advance knowledge of their own value systems; they don't think ahead about how they would rank hlpothetical alternativesand then remember these rankings until they are actually confronted with a concrete choice. Therefore they find it very difficult to perform the logical feat of tracing all possibleconsequences of their and other players' conceivablestrategic choices and ranking
ASSUMPTIONS31 AND BACKGROUND SOMETERMINOLOGY the outcomes in advance in order to choose which strategyto follorv. Even if they knew their preferences,the calculation would remain far from easv.Most games in real life are very complex, and most real players are limited in their thinking and computational abilities. In gamessuch as chess,it is knorvn that the calculation for the best strategy can be performed in a finite number of steps,but no one has succeededin performing it, and good play remains largel-v an art. The assumption of rationality may be closer to reality when the players are regulars who play the game quite often. Then they benefit from having experienced the different possible outcomes. They understand how the strategic choices of various players lead to the outcomes and how well or badly they themselvesfare. Then we as analystsof the game can hope that their choices, even if not made with fulI and consciouscomputations,closelyapproximatethe results of such computations.We can think of the playersas implicitly choosing the optimal strategyor behaving as if theywere perfect calculators.We will offer some experimental evidence in Chapter 5 that the experienceof playing the game generatesmore rational behavior. The advantage of making a complete calculation of your best strategy, taking into account the correspondingcalculationsof a similar strategicallycalculating rival, is that then you are not making mistakes that the rival can exploit. In many actual situations, you may have specific knowledge of the way in which the other players fall short of this standard of rationality, and you can exploit this in devising your own strategy.We will say something about such calculations, but very often this is a part of the "art" of game playing, not easilycodifiable in rules to be followed. You must always beware of the danger that the others are merely pretending to have poor skills or strategy,losing small sums through bad play and hoping that you will then raise the stakes,when they can raise the level of their play and exploit your gullibility. \tVhenthis risk is real, the saferadviceto a player may be to assumethat the rivals are perfect and rational calculatorsand to choosehis own best responseto them. In other words, one should play to the opponents' capabilitiesinstead of their limitations.
ofRules Knowledge D. (ommon We supposethat, at some level, the players have a common understanding of the rules of the game. In a Peanutscartoon, Lucy thought that body checking was allowed in golf and decked Charlie Brown just as he was about to take his swing.We do not allow this. The qualification "at some level" is important. We saw how the rules of the immediate game could be manipulated. But this merely admits that there is another game being played at a deeper level-namely, where the players choose the rules of the superficialgame.Then the question is whether the rules of this
[!14t
32
I CH .2 ] H OW T O T H IN K A BOU T S TR A TE GICGA ME S
deepergame are f,xed.For example,in the legislativecontext,what are the rules of the agenda-settinggame?They may be that the committee chairs have the power. Then hon' are the committees and their chairs elected?And so on. At some basic level, the rules are fixed by the constitution, by the technology of campaigning,or by generalsocialnorms of behavior.we askthat all playersrecognizethe given rules of this basic game,and that is the focus of the analysis.of course,that is an ideal; in practice, we may not be able to proceed to a deep enough level of analysis, Strictly speaking,the rules of the game consist of (l) the list of players, (2) the strategiesavailableto eachplayer, (3) the payoffsof eachplayer for all possible combinations of strategiespursued by all the players,and (4) the assumption that eachplayer is a rational maximizer. Game theory cannot properly analyzea situation where one player does not know whether another player is participating in the game, what the entire sets of actions availableto the other players are from which they can choose, what their value systems are, or whether they are conscious maximizers of their own payoffs. But, in actual strategic interactions, some of the biggest gains are to be made by taking advantageof the element of surprise and doing something that your rivals never thought you capable of. Severalvivid examples can be found in historic military conflicts. For example, in 1967 Israel launched a preemptive attack that destroyed the Egyptian air force on the ground; in 1973it was Egypt's turn to create a surprise by launching a tank attack acrossthe SuezCanal. It would seem, then, that the strict definition of game theory leavesout a very important aspectof strategicbehavior,but in fact matters are not that bad. The theory can be reformulated so that each player attachessome small probability to the situation where such dramatically different strategies are available to the other players. Of course, each player knows his o'nm set of available strategies.Thereforethe game becomesone of asymmetricinformation and can be handled by using the methods developedin Chapter 9. The concept of common knowledge itself requires some explanation. For some fact or situation X to be common knowledgebetween two people, A and B, it is not enough for each of them separatelyto know X. Eachshould also know that the other knows X; otherwise,for example,A might think that B does not know X and might act under this misapprehensionin the midst of a game. But then A should also know that B knows that A knows X, and the other way around, otherwiseA might mistakenly try to exploit B's supposedignorance of A's knowledge. Of course, it doesn't even stop there. A should know that B knows that A knows that B knows, and so on ad inflnitum. Philosophers have a Iot of fun exploring the fine points of this infinite regressand the intellectual paradoxesthat it can generate.For us, the generalnotion that the playershave a common understandingof the rules of their gamewill suffice'
tuliiiill8unh.
S OM E T E R MIN OL OGYA N D B A C K GR OU N DA S S U MP TION S 33
E. Equilibrium Finally, what happens when rational players' strategiesinteract? Our ansn'er will generally be in the framework of equilibrium. This simply means that each player is using the strategythat is the best responseto the strategiesof the other players.We will develop game-theoreticconcepts of equilibrium in Chapters3 through B and then use them in subsequentchapters. Equilibrium does not mean that things don't change; in sequential-move gamesthe players' strategiesare the complete plans of action and reaction,and the position evolves all the time as the successivemoves are made and responded to. Nor does equilibrium mean that everything is for the besq the interaction of rational strategicchoicesby all playerscan lead to bad outcomesfor all, as in the prisoners' dilemma. But we will generallyfind that the idea of equilibrium is a useful descriptivetool and organizing concept for our analysis.We will considerthis idea in greaterdetail later, in connection with specificequilibrium concepts.We will also see how the concept of equilibrium can be augmented or modified to remove some of its flaws and to incorporate behavior that falls short of full calculating rationality. Just as the rational behavior of individual playerscan be the result of experience in playing the game,the fitting of their choicesinto an overall equilibrium can come about after some plays that involve trial and error and nonequilibrium outcomes.We will look at this matter in Chapter 5. Defining an equilibrium is not hard; actually finding an equilibrium in a particular game-that is, solving the game-can be a lot harder. Throughout this bookwe will solvemany simple gamesin which there are two or three players, each of them having two or three strategiesor one move each in turn. Many people believethis to be the limit of the reach of game theory and thereforebelieve that the theory is uselessfor the more complex gamesthat take place in reality. That is not true. Humans are severelylimited in their speed of calculation and in their patience for performing long calculations.Thereforehumans can easilysolveonly the simple gameswith two or three players and strategies.But computers are very good at speedyand lengthy calculations.Many gamesthat are far beyond the power of human calculators are easy games for computers. The level of complexity that existsin many gamesin businessand politics is alreadywithin the powers of computers.Even in gamessuch as chessthat are far too complex to solve completely, computers have reached a level of ability comparable to that of the best humans;we considerchessin more detail in Chapter3. Computer programs for solving quite complex games exist, and more are appearingrapidly. Mathematica and similar program packagescontain routines for flnding mixed-strategyequilibria in simultaneous-movegames. Gambit, a National ScienceFoundation project led by ProfessorsRichard D. McKelvey of
34
iC H .2 ] H OW T O T H IN K A BOU T S TR A TE GICGA ME S
the California Institute of Technologyand Andrew Mclennan of the University of Minnesota, is producing a comprehensiveset of routines for finding equilibria in sequential-and simultaneous-movegames,in pure and mixed strategies, and with vaning degreesof uncertainty and incomplete information. We will refer to this project again in severalplaces in the next several chapters. The biggest advantageof the project is that its programs are in the public domain and can easilv be obtained from its Web site with the IJRL http://hss.Caltech. edul- gantbi t/ Gambit. html. \\trv then do we set up and solveseveralsimple gamesin detail in this book? The reasonis that understandingthe conceptsis an important prerequisitefor making good use of the mechanical solutions that computers can deliver, and understandingcomes from doing simple casesyourself.This is exactlyhow you learned and now use arithmetic. You came to understand the ideas of addition, subtraction,multiplication, and division by doing many simple problems mentally or using paper and pencil. With this grasp of basic concepts,you can now use calculators and computers to do far more complicated sums than you would ever have the time or patience to do manually. If you did not understand the concepts, you would make errors in using calculators; for example you might solve 3 + 4 x 5 by grouping additions and multiplications incorrectly as (3 + +1X 5 : 35 insteadofcorrectlyas3+ (4 x 5) - 23. Thus the flrst step of understandingthe conceptsand tools is essential.Without it, you would never learn to set up correctly the gamesthat you ask the computer to solve.You would not be able to inspect the solution with any feeling for whether it was reasonableand, if it was not, would not be able to go back to your original specification, improve it, and solve it again until the speciflcation and the calculation correctly capture the strategic situation that you want to study. Thereforepleasepay seriousattention to the simple examplesthat we solveand the drill exercisesthat we askyou to solve,especiallyin Chapters3 through B.
F. Dynamics andEvolutionary Games The theory of gamesbased on assumptionsof rationality and equilibrium has proved very useful, but it would be a mistake to rely on it totally. \Alhengames are played by noviceswho do not have the necessaryexperienceto perform the calculationsto choosetheir best strategies,explicitly or implicitly, their choices, and thereforethe outcome of the game,can differ significantlyfrom the predictions of analysisbasedon the concept of equilibrium. However,we should not abandon all notions of good choice;we should recognize the fact that even poor calculatorsare motivated to do better for their own sakesand will learn from experienceand by observing others. We should allow for a dynamic processin which strategiesthat proved to be better in previous plays of the game are more likely to be chosenin later plays.
ASSUMPTIONS35 AND BACKGROUND SOMETERMINOLOGY The evolutionary approach to games does just this. It is derived from the idea of evolution in biology.Any individual animal's genesstronglyinfluence its behavior. Some behaviors succeedbetter in the prevailing environment, in the sensethat the animals exhibiting those behaviors are more likely to reproduce successfullyand passtheir genesto their progeny.An evolutionary stablestate, relative to a given environment, is the ultimate outcome of this processover severalgenerations. The analogyin gameswould be to supposethat strategiesare not chosenby consciousrational maximizers,but instead that each player comes to the game with a particular strategy "hardwired" or "programmed" in. The players then confront other playerswho may be programmed to play the same or different strategies.The payoffs to all the players in such games are then obtained. The strategiesthat fare better-in the sensethat the players programmed to play them get higher payoffs in the games-multiply faster, while the strategiesthat fare worse decline. In biology, the mechanism of this growth or decayis purely genetic transmission through reproduction. In the context of strategic games in business and society, the mechanism is much more likely to be social or cultural-observation and imitation, teaching and learning, greater availability of capital for the more successfulventures,and so on. The object of study is the dynamics of this plocess.Does it convelge to an evolutionary stable state?Does just one strategyprevail over all others in the end or can a few strategiescoexist?Interestingly,in many gamesthe evolutionary stable limit is the same as the equilibrium that would result if the players were consciously rational calculators. Therefore the evolutionary approach givesus a backdoorjustification for equilibrium analysis. The concept of evolutionary gameshas thus imported biological ideas into game theory; there has been an influence in the opposite direction, too. Biologists have recognizedthat significant parts of animal behavior consist of strategic interactionswith other animals.Members of a given speciescompete with one another for spaceor mates;members of different speciesrelateto one another as predators and prey along a food chain. The payoff in such gamesin turn contributes to reproductive successand therefore to biological evolution. Just as game theory has benefited by importing ideas from biological evolution for its analysis of choice and dyramics, biology has benefited by importing gametheoretic ideas of strategiesand payoffs for its characterization of basic interactions between animals. We have truly an instance of sgrergy or syrnbiosis.We provide an introduction to the study of evolutionarygamesin Chapter 13.
andExperiment G. 0bservation All of Section3 to this point has concernedhow to think about gamesor how to analyze strategic interactions. This constitutes theory. This book will give an
36
GAMES ICH.2] HOWTO THINKABOUTSTRATEGIC
illustrations e\rremely simple leYel of theory, developed through cases and just the same' theory be it will instead of formal mathematicsor theorems,but the All theory should relate to reality in two ways. Reality should help structure theory, and realin-should provide a check on the resultsof the theory. (1) by obwe can find out the reality of strategicinteractions in two ways: experiments servingthem as they occur naturally and (2) by conducting special methods have that help us pin down the effectsof particular conditions. Both contexts' proper in the each of been used,and we will mention severalexamples behavNlanr-people have studied strategicinteractions-the participants' among classrooms in ior and the outcomes-under experimental conditions, ,,captive"players,or in speciallaboratorieswith volunteers'Auctions, bargainstudied in this ing, prisoners, dilemmas, and severalother games have been are $-at-.The results are a mixture. Some conclusionsof the theoretical analysis generborne out; for example,in gamesof buying and selling' the participants allv settlequickly on the economic equilibrium. In other contexts,the outcomes prisoners' differ significantly from the theoretical predictions; for example, based on dilemmas and bargaining gamesshow more cooperation than theory while expect, to us lead would the assumption of selfish maximizing behavior auctionsshow some grossoverbidding. At severalpoints in the chaptersthat follow, we will review the knowledge relatesto that has been gained by observationand experiments,discusshow it the theory, and consider what reinterpretations,extensions,and modiflcations of the theory have been made or should be made in the light of this knowledge'
your per\ve beganchapter I by sayingthat gamesof strategyare everywhere-in polity sonal and working life; in the functioning of the economy, society, and should around vou; in sportsand other seriouspursuits;in war; and in peace'This game what is that and be motir,ation enough to study such gamessystematically, idea of theon. is about,but your study can be better directedif you have a clearer just horvYou can put gametheoryto use.we suggesta threefoldmethod. The first use is in explanation Many eventsand outcomesprompt us to ask: \Ahy did that happen?'rAlhenthe situation requires the interaction of decision makers with different aims, game theory often suppliesthe key to understandresult of ing the situation. For example,cutthroat competition in businessis the the book the rivals being trapped in a prisoners' dilemma. At severalpoints in how understand to us helps we will mention actual caseswhere game theory study and why the eventsunfolded as they di
TH E U S E SOF GA ME --:3R Y
37
The other two uses evolve naturally from the first. The second t> -:-,urecliction.\Nhen looking aheadto situationswhere multiple decision makers '.till interact strategically,we can use game theory to foreseewhat actions ther rrill take and what outcomes will result. Of course,prediction for a particular context dependson its details,but we will prepare you to use prediction by anai'zing severalbroad classesof gamesthat arisein many applications. The third use is in aduiceor prescription:we can act in the serviceof one participant in the future interaction and tell him which strategiesare likely to yield good resultsand which onesare likely to lead to disaster.Onceagainsuchwork is contextspeciflc,and we equip you with severalgeneralprinciplesand techniques and showyou how to apply them to some generaltlpes of contexts.For example, in Chapters7 and B we will show hor,r,to mlx moves,in Chapter 10 we will examine how to make your commitments, threats, and promises credible, and in Chapter11we will examinealternativewaysof overcomingprisoners'dilemmas. The theory is far from perfect in performing any of the three functions. To explain an outcome, one must flrst have a correct understanding of the motives and behavior of the participants.As we saw earlier,most of game theory takesa speciflc approach to these matters-namely, the framework of rational choice of individual playersand the equilibrium of their interaction.Actual playersand interactions in a game might not conform to this framework. But the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Game-theoreticanalysishas greatly improved our understandingof many phenomena, as reading this book should convince you. The theory continues to evolve and improve as the result of ongoing research. This book will equip you with the basicsso that you can more easilylearn and proflt from the new advancesas they appear. \,4/henexplaining a past event, we can often use historical records to get a good idea of the motives and the behavior of the playersin the game.V\4renattempting prediction or advice, there is the additional problem of determining what motives will drive the players' actions,what informational or other limitations they will face, and sometimes even who the playerswill be. Most importantly, if game-theoretic analysis assumesthat the other player is a rational maximizer of his own objectiveswhen in fact he is unable to do the calculations or is a cluelessperson acting at random, the advice based on that analysismay prove wrong. This risk is reduced as more and more players recognizethe importance of strategicinteraction and think through their strategicchoicesor get expert advice on the mattel, but some risk remains. Even then, the systematic thinking made possibleby the framework of game theory helps keep the errors down to this irreducible minimum, by eliminating the errors that arise from faulty logical thinking about the strategic interaction. Also, game theory can take into account many kinds of uncertainty and incomplete information, including that about the strategicpossibilitiesand rationality of the opponent. We will considera few examplesin the chaptersto come.
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t C H .2 l H OW T O T H rN K A BOU T S TR A TE GICGA ME S
In this chapter rve introduced severalconsiderationsthat arise in almost every game in realitr'. To understand or predict the outcome of any game, we must know in greater detail all of these ideas.We also introduced some basic concepts that rr-illprove useful in such analysis.However,tryrng to cope with all of the concepts at once merely leads to confusion and a failure to grasp any of them. Ti-rereforewe will build up the theory one concept at a time. We will der-elopthe appropriate technique for analyzingthat concept and illustrate it. In the first group of chapters,from Chapters3 to B,we will construct and illr-rstrate the most important of these conceptsand techniques.We will examine purely sequential-move games in Chapter 3 and introduce the techniquesgame trees and rollback reasoning-that are used to analyzeand solve such games.In Chapters4 and 5, we will turn to gameswith simultaneousmoves and developfor them another set of concepts-payoff tables,dominance, and Nash equilibrium. Both chapterswill focus on gameswhere players use pure strategies;in Chapter4, we will restrict playersto a finite set of pure strategiesand, in Chapter 5, we will allow strategiesthat are continuous variables.Chapter 5 will also examine some deeper conceptual matters and a prominent alternative to Nash equilibrium-namely, rationalizability. In Chapter 6, we will show how gamesthat have some sequentialmoves and some simultaneousmoves can be studied by combining the techniques developed in Chapters 3 through 5. In Chapter 7, we will turn to simultaneous-movezero-sum gamesthat require the use of randomization or mixed strategies.Chapter B will then examine the role of mixed strategiesin nonzero-sum gamesand will develop a little generaltheory of mixed strategies. The ideas and techniques developedin Chapters3 through B are the most basic ones: (1) correct forward-looking reasoning for sequential-movegames and (2) equilibrium strategies-pure and mixed-for simultaneous-move games.Equipped with these concepts and tools, we can apply them to study somebroad classesof gamesand strategiesin Chapters9 through 13. Chapter9 studieswhat happensin gameswhen playersare subjectto uncertainty or when they have asymmetric information. We will examine strategies for coping with risk and even for using risk strategically. We will also study the important strategiesof signaling and screeningthat are used for manipulating and eliciting information. In Chapter 10, we will continue to examine the role of player manipulation in gamesas we consider strategies that players use to manipulate the rules of a game, by seizing a first-mover advantage and making a strategic move. Such moves are of three kinds-
THE STRUCTURE O F T H E C H A P T E R S T O F C - - O W
39
to commitments, threats, and promises.In each case,credibility is esser-rtial the successof the move, and we will outline some ways of making sttch moves credible. In Chapter 11,we will move on to study the most well known game oi tl-rem all-the plisoners' dilemma. We will study whether and how cooperation cart be sustained,most importantly in a repeatedor ongoing relationship.Then, in Chapter 12,we will turn to situationswhere large populations, rather than pairs or small groups of players,interact strategically,gamesthat concern problems of collective action. Each person's actions have an effect-in some instances beneficial, in others, harmful-on the others. The outcomes are generallynot the best from the aggregateperspectiveof the societyas a whole. We will clarify the natureof theseoutcomesand describesomesimplepoliciesthat can lead to better outcomes. All these theories and applicationsare based on the suppositionthat the playersin a game fully understandthe nature of the game and deploy calculated strategiesthat best servetheir objectivesin the game. Such rationally optimal behavior is sometimestoo demanding of information and calculating power to be believableas a good description of how people really act. Therefore Chapter 13 will look at games from a very different perspective. Here, the players are not calculating and do not pursue optimal strategies. Instead,each player is tied, as if geneticallypreordained,to a particular strategy. The population is diverse, and different players have different predetermined strategies.When players from such a population meet and act out their strategies,which strategiesperform better?And, if the more successful strategiesproliferate better in the population, whether through inheritance or imitation, then what will the eventual structure of the population look like? It turns out that such evolutionary dynamics often favor exactly those strategiesthat would be used by rational optimizing players.Thus our study of evolutionary games lends useful indirect support to the theories of optimal strategic choice and equilibrium that we will have studied in the previous chapters. In the final group, Chapters 14 through 18, we will take up specific applicationsto situationsof strategicinteractions.Here, we will use as neededthe ideas and methods from all the earlier chapters.We will start with a particularly interesting dynamic version of a threat, known as the strategy of brinkmanship. We will elucidate its nature in Chapter l4 and apply the idea to study the Cuban missile crisisof 1962.Chapter 15 is about voting in committees and elections. We will look at the variety of voting rules available and someparadoxicalresultsthat can arise.In addition,we will addressthe potential for strategicbehavior not only by voters but also by candidatesin a variety of electiontypes.
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t C H .2 ] H OW T O T H IN K A BOU T S TR A TE GICGA ME S
Chapters 16 through 18 will look at mechanismsfor the allocation of valuable economic resources:Chapter 16 will treat auctions, Chapter 17 will con* sider bargaining processes,and Chapter 18 will look at markets. In our discussionof auctions,we will emphasizethe roles of information and attitudes toward risk in the formulation of optimal strategiesfor both bidders and sellers. We will also take the opportunity to apply the theory to the newest t5,pe of auctions, those that take place online. Chapter 17 will present bargaining in both cooperativeand noncooperativesettings.Finally, Chapter 1Bwill consider gamesof market exchange,building on some of the conceptsused in bargaining theon- and including some theory of the core. All of thesechapterstogetherprovide a lot of material;how might readersor teacherswith more specializedinterestschoosefrom it? Chapters3, 4,6, andT constitute the core theoreticalideas that are needed throughout the rest of the book. Chapters10 and 11 are likewiseimportant for the generalclassesof games and strategiesconsideredtherein. Beyond that, there is a lot from which to pick and choose. Chapters 5 and B consider some more advanced topics and go somewhat deeper into theory and mathematics.These chapterswill appeal to thosewith more scientiflcand quantitativebackgroundsand interests,but those who come from the social sciencesor humanities and have less quantitative background can omit them without loss of continuity. Chapter 9 deals with an important topic in that most gamesin practicehave incomplete and as).rynmetric information, and the players' attempts to manipulate information is a critical aspect of many strategicinteractions.However, the concepts and techniques for analyzing information gamesare inherently somewhat more complex. Therefore some readersand teachersmay chooseto study just the examplesthat convey the basic ideasof signalingand screeningand leaveout the rest.We have placed this chapter ear$ in Part Three, however,in view of the importance of the subject. Chapters 12 and 13 both look at gameswith large numbers of players.In Chapter 12,the focus is on socialinteractions;in Chapter 13,the focus is on evolutionary biology. The topics in Chapter 13 will be of greatestinterest to those with interestsin biology, but similar themes are emergingin the social sciences, and studentsfrom that backgroundshould aim to get the gist of the ideaseven if they skip the details.Chapters14 and 15 present topics from political scienceinternational diplomacy and elections,respectively-and Chapters 16 through 18 cover topics from economics-auctions, bargaining, and markets. Those teaching courseswith more specializedaudiencesmay choosea subset and indeed expandon the ideasconsideredtherein. \I/hether you come from mathematics, biology, economics, politics, other sciences,or from history or sociology, the theory and examples of strategic gameswill stimulate and challengeyour intellect.We urge you to enjoy the subject even asyou are studying or teachingit.
KEY i:RMS
41
., Strategicgamessituations are distinguished from individual decision-makir-rg situationsby the presenceof significant interactions among the players.Games can be classifledaccording to a variety of categoriesincluding the timlng oi play, the common or conflicting interestsof players,the number of times an interaction occurs,the amount of information availableto the players,the type of rules, and the feasibilityof coordinated action. Learningthe terminologyfor a game'sstructureis crucial for analysis.Players have strategiesthat lead to different outcomeswith different associatedpayoffs. PayoffsincorporateeverJrthing that is important to a player about a gameand are calculatedby using probabilisticaveragesor expectations if outcomesare random or include somerisk. Rationality,or consistentbehar.ior,is assumedof all players, who must alsobe awareof all of the relevantrules of conduct. Equilibrium arrses when all playersuse strategiesthat are best responsesto others' strategies;some classesof gamesallow learning from experienceand the study of dynamic movements toward equilibrium. The study of behaviorin actual game situationsprovidesadditionalinformation about the performanceof the theory. Game theory may be used for explanation, prediction, or prescription in various circumstances.Although not perfect in any of these roles, the theory continues to evolve;the importance of strategicinteraction and strategicthinking has also become more widely understood and accepted.
lirJlailiiitrii asymmetric information (23) cooperativegame (26) decision(lB) equilibrium (33) evolutionarygame (35) expectedpayoff (29) game (18) imperfect information (23) incomplete information (23) noncooperativegame (26)
payoff (28) rational behavior (30) screening (24) screening device (24) sequentialmoves (20) signal (24) signaling (24) simultaneous moves (20) strategicgame (18) strategies(27)
'The number in parenthesesafter each key term is the page on which that term is defined or discussed.
42
tC H .2 l H OW T O T H IN K AB OU T S TR A TE GICGA ME S ,i+i*ii$*tiiiiiilj :,,,
l. Determine n-i-tichof the following situations describegames and which describe decisions.In each case,indicate what specificfeaturesof the situation causedlou ro classifyit asyou did. (a) A group of groceryshopperschoosingwhat flavor of yogurt to purchase (b) A pair of teenagegirls choosingdressesfor their prom (c) -\ college student considering what type of postgraduate education to pursue (d) \Iicrosoft and Netscapechoosingprices for their Internet browsers (e) A stategubernatorialcandidatepicking a running mate 2, Consider the strategic games described below. In each case,state how you rvould classifzthe game accordingto the six dimensions outlined in the text: whether moves are sequential or simultaneous,whether the game is zerosum, whether the game is repeated,whether there is imperfect or incomplete (asymmetric)information, whether the rules are fixed, and whether cooperative agreementsare possible.If you do not have enough information to classify a game in a particular dimension, explain why not. (a) Rock-Paper-scissors; on the count of three, each player makesthe shape of one of the three items with his hand. Rockbeatsscissors,scissorsbeats paper,and paper beatsrock. (b) Roll-call uoting:Voterscast their votes orally as their names are called.In a two-candidateelection,the candidatewith the most voteswins. (c) Sealed-bidauction: Bidders seal their bids in envelopesfor a bottle of wine. The highest bidderwins the item and pays his bid. 3. "A game player would never prefer an outcome in which every player gets a little profit to an outcome in which he gets all the available profit.,, Is this statementtrue or false?Explainwhy in one or two sentences. 4. You and a rival are engagedin a game in which there are three possibleoutcomes:you win, your rival wins (you lose), and the two of you tie. you get a payoffof 50ifyouwin, apayoff of20ifyoutie,and apayoffof zeroifyoulose. \\4rat is your expectedpayoff in each of the following situations: (a) There is a 50% chancethat the game ends in a tie, but only alTvo chance that you win. (Thereis thus a 40Tochancethat you lose.) (b) There is a 50-50 chancethat you win or lose.There are no ties. (c) There is an B0%chance that you lose and a r0Tochance that you win or that you tie. 5. Explain the differencebetween game theory's use as a predictive tool and its use as a prescriptive tool. In what tlpes of real-world settings might these two usesbe most important?
PART IWl| I
Conceptsand Techniques
r
Gameswith SequentialMoves
equential-movegames entail strategicsituationsin which there is a strict order of play. Playerstake turns making their moves,and they know what players who have gone before them have done. To play well in such a game, participants must use a particular type of interactive thinking. Eachplayer must consider:If I make this move, howwill my opponent respond? \Arheneveractions are taken, playersneed to think about how their current actions will influence future actions,both for their rivals and for themselves.Players thus decide their current moves on the basis of calculations of future consequences. Most actual gamescombine aspectsof both sequential-and simultaneousmove situations.But the conceptsand methods of analysisare more easilyunderstood if they are first developedseparatelyfor the two pure cases.Therefore in this chapter we study purely sequential games.Chapters 4 and 5 deal with purely simultaneousgames,and Chapter 6 and parts of Chapters7 and 8 show how to combine the two types of analysisin more realisticmixed situations.The analysispresentedhere can be used whenever a game includes sequentialdecision making. Analysis of sequential games also provides information about when it is to a player'sadvantageto move flrst and when it is better to move second. Playerscan then devise ways, called strategicmoL,es,to manipulate the order of play to their advantage.The analysis of such moves is the focus of Chapter10.
45
46
t CH .3 ] GA M ES W IT H S EQU EN TIA LMOV E s
,,ffi we begin br developing a graphical technique for displaying and analyzing sequential-nto\-egames,called a game tree. This tree is referredto as the extensive form of a game.It showsall the component parts of the game that we introducedin Chapter2: players,actions,and payoffs' You hat,eprobably come acrossdecision trees in other contexts.Such trees decisionpoints, or nodes,for a singledecisionmaker in shorvall tlte successive a neutrai environment. Decision trees also include branches correspondingto joint decithe ar ailable choicesemerging from each node. Game tlees are just possible the all of sion treesfor all of the playersin a game.The trees illustrate acrions that can be taken by all of the players and indicate all of the possible outcomesfrom the game.
PlaY Pathsof Branches,and A. Nodes, Figure 3.1 shows the tree for a particular sequentialgame.we do not supply a story for this game,becausewe want to omit circumstantial details and to help you focus on generalconcepts.Our game has four players:Ann, Bob, Chris, and Deb. The rules of the game give the flrst move to Ann; this is shoum at the leftmost point, or node, which is called the initial node or root of the game tree' At this node, which may also be called an action or decision node, Ann has two (rechoicesavailableto her.Ann's possiblechoicesare labeled"Stop" and "Go" member that these labels are abstract and have no necessarysignificance)and are shown as branches emergingfrom the initial node' If Ann chooses"Stop,"then it will be Bob'sturn to move.At his actionnode, he has three availablechoiceslabeled I,2, and 3. If Ann chooses"Go," then chris gets the next move, with choices "Risky" and "Safe." other nodes and branches follow successivelyand, rather than list them all in words, we draw t'our attention to a few prominent features. If Ann chooses"stop" and then Bob chooses1, Ann gets another turn, with netr, choices,"IJp" and "Dor,tm."It is quite common in actual sequential-mOve gamesfor a player to get to move severaltimes and to have her availablemoves differ at different tllns. In chess,for example,two playersmake alternatemoves;each move changesthe board and thereforethe availablemoves at subsequentturns'
Moves" and"Nature's B. Uncertainty If Ann chooses"Go" and then chris chooses"Risky,"somethinghappens at random-a fair coin is tossed and the outcome of the game is determined by whether that coin comes up "heads" or "tails." This aspectof the game is han-
GA ME TR E E S 47 (2,1,t' 1
(1,-2,3, * )
(' t.3,2, 13,:1\
(2,8,-" 1,2)
(3,s,1,1) Tree Game FIGURE 3.1 Anlllustrative
dled in the tree by introducing an outside player called "Nature." Control over the random event is ceded to the player knoum as Nature who chooses,as it were, one of two brancheseachwith 50%probability. The probabilities here are fixed by the type of random event, a coin toss,but could vary in other circumstances;for example,with the throw of a die, Nature could specify six possible outcomes each with l6J% probability. Use of the player Nature allows us to introduce uncertainty in a game and gives us a mechanism to allow things to happen that are outside the control of any of the actual players. You can trace a number of different paths through the game tree by following successivebranches.In Figure 3.1, each path leads you to an end point of the game after a finite number of moves.An end point is not a necessaryfeature of all games;some may in principle go on forever.But most applicationsthat we will considerare finite games.
r& . . . , . , * gi.ss
48
I CH .3 ] GAME S WIT H S EQU EN TIA LMOV E S
andPayoffs C. 0utcomes At the last node along each path, called a terminal node, no player has another move. (Note that terminal nodes are thus distinguishedfrom action nodes.)Instead,we shorvthe outcome of that particular sequenceof actions,as measured by the pavoffsof the players.For our four players,we list the payoffsin the order (Ann, Bob, Chris,Deb). It is important to speci|/ which payoff belongsto which player. The usual convention is to list payoffs in the order in which the players make the moves.But this method may sometimesbe ambiguous;in our example, it is not clearwhether Bob or Chris should be said to have the secondmove. Thus tr-ehave used the alphabeticalorder. Further, we have color-coded everythrng so that Ann's name, choices and payoffs are all in black, Bob's in red, Chris's in grey, and Deb's in pink. \Mhen drawing trees for any gamesthat you anal.vze,you can choose any specific convention you like, but you should state and explain it clearlyfor the reader. The payoffs are numerical, and generallyfor each player a higher number means a better outcome. Thus, for Ann, the outcome of the bottommost path (payoff 3) is better than that of the topmost path (payoff 2) in Figure 3.1. But there is no necessarycomparability acrossplayers.Thus there is no necessary sensein which, at the end of the topmost path, Bob (payoff 7) does better than Ann (payoff 2). sometimes, if payoffs are dollar amounts, for example,such interpersonalcomparisonsmay be meaningful. Playersuse information about payoffswhen deciding among the various actions availableto them. The inclusion of a random event (a choice made by Nature) means that players need to determine what they get on averagewhen Nature moves.For example,if Ann chooses"Go" at the game'sfirst move, Chris may then choose "Risky," giving rise to the coin toss and Nature's "choice" of "Good" or "Bad." In this situation, Ann could anticipate a payoff of 6 half the time and a payoff of 2 half the time, or a statistical averageor expectedpayoffof 4:(0.5x6)+(0.5x2).
D. Strategies Finally,we use the tree in Figure 3.1 to explain the concept of a strategy.A single action taken by a player at a node is called a move. But players can, do, and should make plans for the successionof moves that they expectto make in all of the various eventualitiesthat might arisein the courseof a game.Such a plan of action is called a strategy. In this tree, Bob, chris, and Deb each get to move at most once; chris, for example, gets a move only if Ann chooses"Go" on her first move. For them, there is no distinction between a move and a strategy.Wecan qualify the move by specifying the contingency in which it gets made; thus, a strategyfor Bob
GAME TREES
49
might be, "Choose I if Ann has chosenStop." But Ann has two opponunities to move, so her strategy needs a fuller specification. One strategy for her is, "ChooseStop,and then if Bob choosesl, chooseDo\ m." In more complex games such as chess,where there are long sequencesof moves with many choices availableat each, descriptions of strategiesget ven' complicated;we considerthis aspectin more detail later in this chapter.But the generalprinciple for constructing strategiesis simple, except for one peculiarity. If Ann chooses "Go" on her first move, she never gets to make a second move. Should a strategyin which she chooses"Go" also specifiiwhat shewould do in the hypothetical casein which she somehow found herself at the node of her second move?Your first instinct may be to say no,but formal game theory saysyes,and for two reasons. First, Ann's choice of "Go" at the first move may be influenced by her consideration of what she would have to do at her second move if she were to choose "Stop" originally instead. For example,if she chooses"Stop," Bob may then choosel; thenAnn getsa secondmove and her best choicewould be "Up," giving her a payoff of 2. If she chooses "Go" on her first move, Chris would choose "Safe" (becausehis payoff of 3 from "Safe" is better than his expected payoff of 1.5from "Risky"),and that outcome would yield Ann a payoff of 3. To make this thought processclearer,we stateAnn's strategyas, {'ChooseGo at the first move, and chooseUp if the next move arises." The second reason for this seemingly pedantic specification of strategies has to do with the stability of equilibrium. \Alhen considering stability, we ask what would happen if players' choices were subjected to small disturbances. One such disturbanceis that players make small mistakes.If choicesare made by pressinga key, for example,Ann may intend to pressthe "Go" key, but there is a small probability that her hand may tremble and she may press the "Stop" key instead.In such a setting, it is important to specify how Ann will follow up when she discoversher error becauseBob chooses I and it is Ann's turn to move again. More advancedlevels of game theory require such stability analyses,and we want to prepare you for that by insisting on your specifuingstrategies as such complete plans of action right from the beginning.
E. TreeConstruction Now we sum up the generalconceptsillustrated by the tree of Figure 3.1. Game treesconsistofnodes and branches.Nodes are connectedto one another by the branchesand come in two R?es. The flrst node type is called a decision node. Each decision node is associatedwith the player who choosesan action at that node; everytree has one decision node that is the game'sinitial node, the starting point of the game.The secondtype of node is called a terminal node. Each terminal node has associatedwith it a set of outcomesfor the playerstaking part
5O
I C H .3 ] GAME S WIT H 5 EQU EN TIA LMOV E S
in the game; these ourcomes are the payofl's received by each player if the game has followed the branches that lead to this particular terminal node. The brancl-resof a game tree represent the possible actions that can be taken from anr decision node. Each branch leads from a decision node on the tree either to another decision node, generally for a different player, or to a terminal node. The tree must account for all of the possible choices that could be made bv a plar-erat each node; so some game trees include branches associated with the choice "do nothing." There must be at least one branch leading from each decision node, but there is no maximum. Every decision node can have onlt' one branch leading to it, however. Game trees are often drawn from left to right across a page. However, game trees can be drawn in any orientation that best suits the game at hand: bottom lrp, sideways, top down, or even radially outward from a center. The tree is a nretaphor, and the important feature is the idea of successive branching, as decisions are made at the tree nodes.
We illustrate the use of trees in finding equilibrium outcomes of sequentialmove games in a very simple context that many of you have probably confronted-whether to smoke. This situation and many other similar oneplayer strategicsituations can be describedas gamesif we recognizethat future choicesare actually made by a different player. That player is one's future self u,ho will be subject to different influences and will have different views about the idealoutcomeof the game. Take, for example, a teenagernamed Carmen who is deciding whether to smoke. First, she has to decide whether to try smoking at all. If she does try it, she has the further decision of whether to continue. We illustrate this examnle as a simpledecisionin the tree of Figure3.2. The nodes and the branches are labeled with Carmen's available choices, but r,r'eneed to explain the payoffs.Choosethe outcome of never smoking at all as the standard of reference,and call its payoff 0. There is no special significance to the number zero in this context; all that matters for comparing outcomes, and thus for Carmen's decision, is whether this payoff is bigger or smallerthan the others.SupposeCarmenbest likes the outcome in which she tries smoking for a while but doesnot continue. The reasonmay be that shejust likes to have experiencedmany things first-hand or so that she can more convincingly be able to say "I have been there and know it to be a bad situation" when she tries in the future to dissuadeher children from smoking. Give this outcome the payoff L The outcome in which she tries smoking and then contin-
traNrr
.iLludrylia.s,
SOL V I N G G A M E S B Y U S I N G
=A E E S
51
-1
Decision 3.2 TheSmoking FIGURE ues is the worst. Leavingasidethe long-term health hazards,there are immediate problems-hef hair and clothes will smell bad, and her friends will avoid her. Give this outcome the payoff -1. Carmen'sbest choice then seemsclearshe should try smoking but she should not continue. However,this analysisignores the problem of addiction. Once Carmen has tried smoking for a while, she becomesa different person with different tastes, as well as different payoffs.The decision of whether to continue will be made, not by "Today's Carmen" with today's assessmentof outcomesas shown in Figulre3.2,but by a different "Future Carmen" with a different ranking of the alternativesthen available.VVhenshe makesher choice today, she has to look ahead to this consequenceand factor it into her current decision, which she should make on the basis of her current preferences.In other words, the choice problem concerningsmoking is not really a decisionin the senseexplainedin Chapter 2-a choice made by a single person in a neutral environment-but a game in the technical sensealso explainedin Chapter2, where the other player is Carmen's future self with her own distinct preferences'\Mhen Today's Carmen makesher decision,she has to play againsther future self' We convert the decision tree of Figure 3.2 into a game tree in Figure 3'3, by distinguishingbetween the two playerswho make the choicesat the two nodes. At the initial node, "Today's Carmen" decideswhether to try smoking.If her decision is to try, then the addicted "Future Carmen" comes into being and chooseswhether to continue. We show the healthy red-blooded Today's Carmen, her actions, and her payoffs in red, and the addicted Future Carmen, her actions, and her payoffs in black, the color that her lungs have become. The payoffsof Today's Carmen are as before.But Future Carmenwill enjoy continuif she does not continue' Let ation and will suffer terrible withdrawal sJ,nnptoms FUtureCarmen'spayoff from "continue" be + I and that from "not" be - 1. Given the preferencesof the addicted Future Carmen,shewill choose"continue" at her decisionnode. Today's Carmen should look aheadto this prospect and fold it into her current decision,recognizingthat the choice to try smoking
52
tcH.3l GAME S WIT H S EQU EN TIA LMOV E S
Try TODAY'S CA R M EN
FUTURE CARMEN
1 ,- 1
Not
FIGURE3 . 3 The Sm ok inoG am e
rr-ill rnevitably lead to continuation. Even though Today's Carmen does not rvant continuation to happen given her preferencestoday, she will not be able to implement her currently preferredchoice at the future time, becausea different Carmen with different preferenceswill make that choice. So Today's Carmen should foreseethat the choice "Try" will lead to "Continue" and get her the payoff - 1 as judged by her today, whereas the choice "Don't Try" will get her the payoff 0. So she should choosethe latter. This argument is shown more formally and with greatervisual effect in Figure 3.4.In Figure 3.4a,we cut off, or prune, the branch "Not" emergingfrom the second node. This pruning correspondsto the fact that Future Carmen, who makes the choice at that node, will not choosethe action associatedwith that branch, given her preferencesas shown in black. The tree that remains has two branchesemergingfrom the first node where Today'sCarmen makesher choice;each of thesebranchesnow leadsdirectly to a terminal node. The pruning allows Today'sCarmen to forecastcompletelythe eventual consequenceof each of her choices."Try" will be followed by "Continue" and yield a payoff - l, as measuredin the preferencesof Today'sCarmen, while "Not" will yield 0. Carmen'schoicetoday should then be "Not" rather than "Try." Thereforewe can prune the "Try" branch emerging from the first node (along with its foreseeablecontinuation). This pruning is done in Figure 3.4b. The tree shov,n there is now "fully pruned," leaving only one branch emerging from the initial node and leadingto a terminal node. Following the only remaining path through the tree showswhat will happen in the game when all players make their best choiceswith correctforecastingof all future consequences. In pruning the tree in Figure3.4,we crossedout the branchesnot chosen. Another equivalent but alternativeway of showing player choices is to "highlight" the branches that are chosen.To do so, you can place check marks or arrowheadson thesebranchesor show them as thicker lines.Any one method will do; Figure 3.5 shows them all. You can choosewhether to prune or to highlight,
SOLV IN G GA ME S B Y U S IN G TR E E S 53 (a) Pruningat secondnode:
TODAY'S CARMEN
(b) Fullpruning:
TODAY'S CARMEN
Game FIGURE 3.4 PruningtheTreeof the Smoking
TODAY'S CARMEN
on the Treeof the SmokingGame FIGURE 3.5 ShowingBranchSelection
54
MOVES ICH.3] GAMESWITH SEQUENTIAL
but the latter, especialll in its arrowhead form, has some advantages.First, it producesa cleanerpictule. Second,the mess of the pruning picture sometimes does not clearlr-shorvthe order in which various brancheswere cut. For example, in Figure 3.1b, a reader may get confused and incorrectly think that the "Continue" branch at the secondnode was cut first and that the "Try" branch at the first node followed by the "Not continue" branch at the second node were cut next. Fina1ly,and most importantly, the arrowheadsshow the outcome of the sequenceof optimal choices most visibly as a continuous link of arrows from the initial node to a terminal node. Therefore,in subsequentdiagramsof this npe, we generally use arrows instead of pruning. \A4renyou draw game trees, \-ou should practice showing both methods for a while; when you are comfortablewith trees,you can chooseeither to suit your taste. \o matter how you display your thinking in a game tree, the logic of the analysisis the same and important. You must start your analysisby considering rhose action nodes that lead directly to terminal nodes.The optimal choicesfor a player moving at such a node can be found immediately by comparing her payoffs at the relevant terminal nodes. With the use of these end-of-game choices to forecast consequencesof earlier actions, the choices at nodes just preceding the flnal decision nodes can be determined. Then the same can be done for the nodes before them, and so on. By working backward along the tree in this way, you can solvethe whole game. This method of looking ahead and reasoning back to determine behavior in sequential-movegamesis knov,n asrollback. As the name suggests,using rollback requires starting to think about what will happen at all the terminal nodes and literally "rolling back" through the tree to the initial node asyou do your analysis.Becausethis reasoningrequires working backward one step at a time, the method is also called backward induction. We use the term rollback becauseit is simpler and becoming more widely used, but other sourceson game theory will use the older term, backward induction. Justremember that the two are equivalent. \A4renall players choose their optimal strategiesfound by doing rollback analysis,we call this set of strategiesthe rollback equilibrium of the game; the outcome that arises from playing these strategiesrs the rollback equilibrium outcome.Game theory predicts this outcome as the equilibrium of a sequential gamewhen all playersare rational calculatorsin pursuit of their respectivebest payoffs.Later in this chapter, we addresshow well this prediction is borne out in practice. For now, you should know that all finite sequential-movegames presentedin this book have at least one rollback equilibrium. In fact, most have exactly one. Only in exceptional caseswhere a player gets equal payoffs from two or more different setsof moves,and is therefore indifferent between them, will gameshave more than one rollback equilibrium. In the smoking game, the rollback equilibrium is where Today's carmen choosesthe strategy"Not" and Future Carmen choosesthe strategy"Continue."
ADDING MORE PLAVERS
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VVhenToday's Carmen takes her optimal action, the addicted Future Carmen does not come into being at all and therefore gets no actual opponuniry to move. But Future Carmen's shadowy presenceand the strategythat she rvould chooseif Today's Carmen chose "Try" and gaveher an opportunity to mor-eare important parts of the game. In fact, they are instrumental in determining the optimal move for Today'sCarmen. We introduced the ideas of the game tree and rollback analysisin a ven' simple example,where the solution was obvious from verbal argument.Now we proceed to use the ideas in successivelymore complex situations,where verbal analysisbecomesharder to conduct and the visual analysiswith the use of the tree becomesmore imporl.ant.
ITPI.AYERS The techniquesdevelopedin Section2 in the simplest setting of two playersand two moves can be readily extended.The trees get more complex, with more branches,nodes, and levels,but the basic conceptsand the method of roilback remain unchanged.In this section,we consider a game with three players,each of whom has two choices;with slight variations, this game reappeals in many subsequentchapters. The three players,Emily, Nina, and Talia, all live on the same small street. Each has been askedto contribute toward the creation of a flower garden at the intersection of their small street with the main highway. The ultimate size and splendor of the gardendependson how many of them contribute. Furthermore, although each player is happy to have the garden-and happier as its size and splendor increase-each is reluctant to contribute becauseof the cost that she must incur to do so. Supposethat, if two or all three contribute, there will be sufficient resources for the initial planting and subsequentmaintenance of the garden; it will then be quite attractive and pleasant.However, if one or none contribute, it will be too sparseand poorly maintained to be pleasant.From each player's perspective, there are thus four distinguishableoutcomes: . She does not contribute, both of the others do (pleasant garden, saves cost of own contribution) . Shecontributes,and one or both of the others do (pleasantgarden,incurs cost of contribution) . She does not contribute, only one or neither of the others does (sparse garden,savescost of or'rmcontribution) . Shecontributes,but neither of the others does (sparsegarden,incurs cost of own contribution)
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I C H .3 ] GA M ES W IT H S EQU EN TIA LMOV E S
of these outcomes,rhe one listed at the top is clearly the best and the one listed at the bottom is ciearlythe worst. we want higher payoff numbers to indicate outcomes that are more highly regarded;so we give the top outcome the payoff 4 and the bottom one the payoff 1. (Sometimespayoffs are associated with an outcome's rank order; so, with four outcomes, 1 would be best and 4 worst, and smaller numbers would denote more preferred outcomes. \Alhen reading,r'ou should carefully note which convention the author is using; when writing, r'ou should carefullystatewhich convention you are using.) There is some ambiguity about the two middle outcomes. Let us suppose that each player regardsa pleasantgarden more highly than her ornmcontribution. Then the outcome listed secondgetspayoff 3, and the outcome listed third getspar-off2. Suppose the players move sequentially. Emily has the first move, and chooseswhether to contribute. Then, after observing what Emily has chosen, \ina makesher choice between contributing and not contributing. Finally, having observedwhat Emily and Nina have chosen,Talia makesa similar choice.r Figure 3.6 shows the tree for this game.we have labeled the action nodes for easyreference.Emily moves at the initial node, a, and the branches corre-
PAYOFFS
3,3,4 ?A
1 , 2 ,? 4?
2,1, ?-
2,2,;FIGURE3.6
The StreetGardenGame
rln later chapters, we vary the rules of this game-the order of moves and payoffs-and examine how suchvariation changesthe outcomes.
ADDING MORE PLAYERS
57
sponding to her two choices,Contribute and Don't, respectively,lead to nodes b and c. At each of these nodes, Nina gets to move and to choosebefireen Contribute and Don't. Her choiceslead to nodes d, e,f, and g, at each of rn'hichTalia getsto move. Her choiceslead to eight terminal nodes,where we show the par'offs in the order (Emily, Nina, Talia).2For example,if Emily contributes, then Nina does not, and finally Talia does,then the garden is pleasant,and the nro contributors get payoffs 3 each,while the noncontributor getsher top outcome with payoff 4; in this case,the payofflist is (3, 4, 3). To apply rollback analysisto this game,we begin with the action nodes that come immediately before the terminal nodes-namely, d, e, f, and g' Talia moves at each of thesenodes.At zl,she facesthe situation where both Emily and Nina have contributed. The garden is alreadyassuredto be pleasangso, if Talia choosesDon't, she getsher best outcome,4, whereas,if she choosesContribute, she gets the next best, 3. Her preferred choice at this node is Don't. We show this preferenceboth by thickening the branch for Don't and by adding an arrowhead; either one would suffice to illustrate Talia's choice.At node e, Emily has contributed and Nina has not; so Talia's contribution is crucial for a pleasant garden.Talia getsthe payoff 3 if she choosesContribute and 2 if she chooses Don't. Her preferred choice at e is Contribute. You can check Talia's choicesat the other two nodes similarly. Now we roll back the analysisto the preceding stage-namely, nodes b and c, where it is Nina's turn to choose.At fu Emily has contributed. Nina's reasoning now goesas follows: "If I chooseContribute, that will take the game to node d,where I know that Talia will chooseDon't, and my payoff will be 3. (The garden will be pleasant,but I will have incurred the cost of my contribution.) If I choose Don't, the game will go to node e, where I know that Talia will choose Contribute, and I will get a payoff of 4. (The garden will be pleasant,and I will have savedthe cost of my contribution.) ThereforeI should chooseDon't." Similar reasoningshowsthat at c, Nina will chooseContribute. Finally, consider Emily's choice at the initial node, a. She can foreseethe subsequentchoices of both Nina and Talia. Emily knows that, if she chooses Contribute, these later choiceswill be Don't for Nina and Contribute for Talia. With two contributors, the garden will be pleasant but Emily will have incurred a cost; so her payoff will be 3. If Emily choosesDon't, then the subsequent choiceswill both be Contribute, and, with a pleasantgarden and no cost of her or,rmcontribution, Emily's payoffwitl be 4. So her preferredchoice at a is Don't. The result of rollback analysisfor this streetgarden game is now easilysummarized. Emily will chooseDon't, then Nina will chooseContribute, and finally 2Recallfrom the discussionofthe generaltree in Section1 that the usual convention for sequentialmove gamesis to list payoffs in the order in which the playersmove; however,in caseof ambiguity or simply for clarity, it is good practice to specifirthe order explicitly.
,rEt$
58
iC H ,3 ] GA M ES W IT H S EQU EN TIA LMOV E S
Talia will choose contribute. These choices trace a particular path of play through the tree-along the lower branch from the initial node, a, and then along the upper branchesat each of the two subsequentnodes reached,c and f. In Figure 3.6, the parh of play is easily seen as the continuous sequenceof arrowheadsjoined tail to tip from the initial node to the terminal node fifth from the top of the tree. The payoffs that accrue to the players are sho,,nm at this terminal node. Rollback analysisis simple and appealing.Here, we emphasizesome features that emergefrom it. First, notice that the equilibrium path of play of a sequential-rnovegame misses most of the branches and nodes. Calculating the best actions that would be taken if these other nodes were reached,however,is an important part of determining the ultimate equilibrium. Choicesmade early in the game are affectedby players' expectationsof what would happen if they choseto do something other than their best actions and by what would happen if any opposing player choseto do something other than what was best for her. These expectations,based on predicted actions at out,of-equilibrium nodes (nodesassociatedwith branchespruned in the processof rollback), keep players choosingoptimal actions at each node. For instance,Emily,s optimal choice of Don't at the first move is governedby the knowledge that, if she chose contribute, then Nina would chooseDon't, followed by Talia choosing contribute; this sequencewould give Emily the payoff 3, instead of the 4 that she can get by choosingDon't at the first move. The rollback equilibrium gives a complete statement of all this analysisby speciffing the optimal strateg/ for each player. Recall that a strategy is a complete plan of action. Emily moves first and has just two choices;so her strategy is quite simple and is effectivelythe sarnething as her move. But Nina, moving second,acts at one of two nodes, at one if Emily has chosen contribute and at the other if Emily has chosenDon't. Nina's complete plan of action has to specify what she would do in either case. one such plan, or strategy,might be "choose contribute if Emily has chosen contribute, choose Don't if Emily has chosen Don't." we know from our rollback analysisthat Nina will not choose this strategy,but our interest at this point is in describingall the availablestrategiesfrom which Nina can choosewithin the rules of the game.we can abbreviate and write c for continue and D for Don't; then this strategycan be written as "c if Emily choosesc so that the game is at node b,D if Emily choosesD so that the game is at node c," or, more simply, "C at b,D at c,,,or even ,,CD',if the circumstancesin which each of the stated actions is taken are evident or previously explained.Now it is easyto seethat, becauseNina has two choicesavailable at each of the two nodeswhere she might be acting,shehas availableto her four plans, or strategies-"C at b, C at c," "C at b,D at c,',,,D at b, C at c,,, and'D at b, D al c," or "CC," "CD," "DC:' and "DD.', Of these strategies,the rollback
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analysisand the arrows at nodes b and c of Figure 3.6 show that her optimal strategyis "DC." Matters are even more complicated for Talia. When her turn comes, the history of play can, accordingto the rules of the game,be any one of four possibilities. Talia's turn to act comes at one of four nodes in the tree, one after Emily has chosen C and Nina has chosen C (node d), tli-.esecond after Emily's C and Nina's D (node e),the third after Emily's D and Nina's C (node/), and the fourth after both Emily and Nina chooseD (node g). Each of Talia's strategies,or complete plans of action, must specify one of her two actions for each of thesefour scenarios,or one of her tvvo actions at each of her four possible action nodes. With four nodes at which to specifii an action and with two actions from which to choose at each node, there are 2 times 2 times 2 times 2, or 16 possiblecombinationsof actions. SoTalia has availableto her 16possiblestrategies.One of them could be written as "C at d,D at e,D at f, C at {' or "CDDC" for short, where we have fixed the order of the four scenarios(the histories of moves by Emily and Nina) in the order of nodes d, e, f, and g. Then, with the use of the same abbreviation,the full list of 16 strategiesavailableto Talia is CCCC,CCCD,CCDC,CCDD,CDCC,CDCD,CDDC,CDDD, DCCC,DCCD,DCDC,DCDD, DDCC,DDCD, DDDC, DDDD. Of thesestrategies,the rollback analysisof Figure 3.6 and the arrows at nodes d, e,f, andgshow that Talia's optimal strategyis DCCD. Nowwe can expressthe findings of our rollback analysisby stating the strategy choices of each player-Emily choosesD from the two strategiesavailable to her, Nina choosesDC from the four strategiesavailable to her, and Talia choosesDCCD from the sixteen strategiesavailableto her. \Mhen each player looks aheadin the tree to forecastthe eventualoutcomes of her current choices, she is calculatingthe optimal strategiesof the other players.This configuration of strategies,D for Emily, DC for Nina, and DCCD for Talia, then constitutesthe rollback equilibrium of the game. We can put together the optimal strategies of the players to find the actual path of play that will result in the rollback equilibrium. Emily will begin by choosing D. Nina, following her strategyDC, choosesthe action C in response to Emily's D. (Rememberthat Nina's DC means "choose D if Emily has played C, and choose C if Emily has played D.") According to the convention that we have adopted, Talia's actual action after Emily's D and then Nina's C-from node fi-is the third letter in the four-letter specification of her strategies.BecauseTalia's optimal strategyis DCCD, her action along the path of play is C. Thus the actual path of play consistsof Emily pla1rng D, followed successively by Nina and Talia playing C.
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To sum up, \\-ehavethreedistinctconcepts: 1. The lists oi alailable strategiesfor each player. The list, especiallyfor later plat'ers,nay be very long, becausetheir actions in situations corresponding ro all conceivableprecedingmoves by other playersmust be specified. 2. The optimal strategy,or complete plan of action for each player. This srrareg]'must specify the player's best choices at each node where the rules of the game specify that she moves, even though many of these nocleswill never be reachedin the actual path of play. This speciflcation is in effect the preceding movers' forecastingof what would happen if they took different actions and is thereforean important part of their calculation of their own best actions at the earlier nodes. The optimal strategiesof all playerstogetheryield the rollback equilibrium. 3. The actual path of play in the rollback equilibrium, found by putting togetherthe optimal strategiesfor all the players.
In the rollback equilibrium of the street-gardengame, Emily gets her best outcome (payoff4), becauseshe can take advantageof the opportunity to make the first move. V\4renshe choosesnot to contribute, she puts the onus on the other two players-each can get her next-best outcome if and only if both of them chooseto contribute. Most casualthinkers about strategicgameshave the preconception that such first-mover advantage should exist in all games.However, that is not the case.It is easyto think of gamesin which an opportunity to move secondis an advantage.Considerthe strategicinteractionbetweentwo firms that se1lsimilar merchandisefrom catalogs-say, Land's End and L. L. Bean. If one firm had to releaseits catalogflrst, and then the secondfirm could seewhat prices the first had set beforeprinting its ornmcatalog,then the secondmovel could just undercut its rival on all items and gain a tremendouscompetitiveedge. First-mover advantagecomes from the ability to commit oneself to an advantageousposition and to force the other playersto adapt to it; second-mover advantage comes from the flexibility to adapt oneself to the others' choices. \,\4rethercommitment or flexibility is more important in a specific game depends on its particular conflguration of strategiesand payoffs; no generally valid rule can be laid down. We will come acrossexamplesof both kinds of advantagesthroughout this book. The generalpoint that there need not be firstmover advantage,a point that runs against much common perception, is so important that we felt it necessaryto emphasizeat the outset.
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\Mhen a game has a flrst- or second-moveradvantage,each plaver Irav try poto manipulate the order of play so as to securefor herselfthe advantageoLls in moves, which we consider strategic are sition. Tacticsfor such manipulation Chapter10.
We saw in Section 3 that adding more players increasesthe complexity of the analysisof sequential-playgames.In this section,we consider another type of complexity that arisesfrom adding additional moves to the game.We can do so most simply in a two-person game by allowing plat'ersto alternatemoves more than once. Then the tree is enlargedin the same fashion that a multiple-player game tree would be, but later moves in the tree are made br- the players who have made decisionsearlier in the samegame. Many common games, such as tic-tac-toe, checkers,and chess,are twoperson strategicgameswith such alternating sequentialmoves.The use of game treesand rollback should allow us to "solve" such games-to determine the roliback equilibrium outcome and the equilibrium strategiesleading to that outcome. Unfortunately, as the complexity of the game glows and as strategies become more and more intricate, the searchfor an optimal solution becomes more and more difficult as well. In such cases,when manual solution is no longer really feasible,computer routines such as Gambit, mentioned in Chapter 2, become useful.
A. Tic-Tac-Toe Start with the most simple of the three examplesmentioned in the preceding paragraph,tic-tac-toe, and consider an easier-than-usualversion in which two players (X and O) each try to be the first to get two of their symbols to fill any row, column, or diagonal of a two-by-two game board. The flrst player has four possiblepositions in which to put her X. The secondplayer then has three possible actions at each of four decision nodes. \&4:renthe first player gets to her second turn, she has two possible actions at each of 12 (4 times 3) decision nodes.As Figure 3.7 shows,even this mini-game of tic-tac-toe has a very complex game tree. This tree is actually not too complex, becausethe game is guaranteed to end after the flrst player moves a second time; but there are still 24 terminal nodes to consider. We show this tree merely as an illustration of how complex game trees can become in even simple (or simplified) games.As it turns out, using rollback on the mini-game of tic-tac-toe leadsus quickly to an equilibrium. Rollbackshows
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I CH .3 ] GA M ES WIT H S EQU EN TIA LMOV E S X !\ ins X wr ns Bottom r ight
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rop '" i
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FIGURE3.7
Bottom left X wins
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The ComplexTreefor SimpleTwo-by-TwoTic-Tac-Toe
that all of the choices for the first player at her second move lead to the same outcome. There is no optimal action; any move is as good as any other move. Thus when the secondplayer makes her first move, she also seesthat each possible move yields the sameoutcome and she,too, is indifferent among her three choicesat each of her four decision nodes. Finally, the same is true for the first player on her first move; any choice is as good as any other, so she is guaranteed to win the game. Although this version of tic-tac-toe has an interestingtree, its solution is not as interesting. The first player always wins; so choices made by either player cannot affectthe ultimate outcome. Most of us are more familiar with the threeby-three version of tic-tac-toe. To illustrate that version with a game tree, we would have to show that the first player has nine possible actions at the initial node, the second player has eight possible actions at each of nine decision nodes,and then the first player, on her secondturn, has sevenpossibleactions at each of B times I : 72 nodes,while the secondplayer,on her secondturn, has six possible actions at each of 7 times B times 9 : 504 nodes.This pattern continues until eventuallythe tree stops branching so rapidly becausecertain combinations of moveslead to a win for one player and the game ends.But no win is possible until at least the flfth move. Drawing the complete tree for this game requiresa very largepiece of paper or very tiny handuriting. Most of you know, however, how to achieve at worst a tie when you play three-by-threetic-tac-toe. So there is a simple solution to this game that can be
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found by rollback, and a learned strategicthinker can reduce the complexity of the game considerablyin the quest for such a solution. It turns out rhat, as in the two-by-two version, many of the possiblepaths through the game rree are strategicallyidentical. Of the nine possible initial moves, there are only three types;you put your X in either a corner position (of which there are four possibilities), a side position (of which there are also four possibilities),or the (one) middle position. Using this method to simplify the tree can help reduce rhe complexity of the problem and lead you to a description of an optimal rollback equilibrium strategy. Specifically, we could show that the player who moves second can always guaranteeat least a tie with an appropriate first move and then by continually blocking the first player's attempts to get three symbolsin a row.3
B. Chess \Mhen we consider more complicated games, such as checkersand especially chess,flnding a complete solution becomes much more difficult. Students of checkersclaim, but have not proved, that the secondplayer can alwaysguarantee a tie. Those who have studied and are still studying chesshave even less to report, despite the fact that chess is the quintessential game of sequential moves and thereforetechnically amenableto full rollback analysis. In chess,'White opens with a move, Black respondswith one, and so on, in turns. All the moves are visible to the other player, and nothing is left to chance, as it would be in card gamesthat include shuffling and dealing. Therefore the "purest" kind of strategic reasoning in chess is to look ahead to the consequencesof your move in just the way explainedearlier.An exampleof such reasoning might be: "If I move that pawn now, my opponent will bring up her knight and threaten my rook. I should protect the square to which the knight wants to move with my bishop, before I move the par.tm."Moreover, a chess game must end in a flnite number of moves. The rules of chessdeclare that a game is drar.rmif a given position on the board is repeated three times in the course of play. Becausethere are a finite number of ways to place the 32 (or fewer after captures) pieces on 64 squares,a game could not go on infinitely long without running up againstthis rule.
3If the first player puts her first s).rynbolin the middle position, the second player must put her first symbol in a corner position. Then the second player can guarantee a tie by taking the third position in any row, column, or diagonal that the first player'tries to flll. If the first player goesto a corner or a side position first, the second player can guarantee a tie by going to the middle first and then following the same blocking technique. Note that, if the first player picks a corner, the second player picks the middle, and the first player then picks the corner opposite from her original play, then the secondplayer must not pick one of the remainingcornersif she is to ensureat leasta tie.
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Thereforein principle chessis amenableto full rollback analysis.We should know what will happen in a rollback equilibrium where both playersuse the optimal strategies:a rr-infor V'/hite,a win for Black, or a draw. Then why has such analysisnot been carried out? \.Mhydo people continue to play, using different strategiesand getting different resultsin different matchups? The ansu-eris that, for all its simplicity of rules, chess is a bewilderingly complex game. From the initial set position of the pieces,\.Vhitecan open with any one of 20 moves,aand Black can respond with any of 20. Therefore 20 branchesenerge from the first node of the tree, each leading to a secondnode from each of which 20 more branchesemerge.There are already400 branches, each leadrngto a node from which many more branchesemerge.For a while, at each turn the number of availablechoicesactually increasesto a number much larger than 20.And a t)?ical game goeson for 40 or more moves by each player. The total number of possiblemoves in chesshas been estimatedto be r0120, or a "one" with r20 zerosafter it. A supercomputera thousand times as fast as your PC, making a billion calculationsa second,would need approximately 3 times years to check out all these moves.sAstronomers offer us much less time 10103 before the sun turns into a red giant and swallowsthe earth. Recently,a physicist carried out the thought experiment of regarding the whole universe as a gigantic computer. If all the energyand order in the universewere dedicatedto computation, how many calculationscould have been made since the universe beganin the big bang?6His answeris about 10120. So coincidentally,if all the energy and order in the universe since its creation had been used to solve the game of chessby rollback,we would only now be on the vergeof completing the task. There is clearlyno hope of ever drawing the complete tree for chess.Even in the smaller game starting from any speciflc position, the remaining tree becomes far too complex in just five or six moves. Looking ahead even that far is possibleonly becausejust a little experienceenablesa player to recognizethat severalof the logically possible moves are clearly bad and therefore to dismiss them from consideral"ion. The generalpoint is that, although a game may be amenablein principle to a complete solution by rollback, its complete tree may be too complex to permit such solution in practice.Facedwith such a situation, what is a player to do?we
*He can move one of eight pav,ns forward either one square or two or he can move one of the two knights in one of h,voways (to the squareslabeledrook-3 or bishop-3). sThiswould have to be done only once because,after the gamehas been solved,anyonecan use the solution and no one will actually need to play. Everyonewill know whether \.\trite has a win or whether Black can force a draw. Playerswill toss to decide who gets which color. They will then know the outcome)shakehands,and go home. 6"ThePhysicsof Information," TheEconomlsr,June6,2002.
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can learn a lot about this by reviewingthe history of attempts to program computers to play chess. \.4hencomputers flrst started to prove their usefulnessfor complex calculations in science and business,many mathematicians and computer scientists thought that a chess-playingcomputer program would soon beat the uorld champion. It took a lot longer, even though computer technology improved dramatically while human thought progressedmuch more slowly. Finally, in December 1992,a German chessprogram called Fritz2 beat world champion Gary Kasparovin some blitz (high-speed)games. Under regular rules, where each player getsz;hours to make 40 moves,humans retained greatersuperiority for longer.A team sponsoredby IBM put a lot of effort and resourcesinto the development of a specializedchess-playingcomputer and its associatedsoftware. In February 1996,this package,called Deep Blue, was pitted againstGary Kasparovin a best-of-six series.Deep Blue causeda sensationby winning the first game,but Kasparovquickly flgured out its weaknesses,improved his counterstrategies,and won the serieshandily. In the next 15 months, the IBM team improved Deep Blue's hardware and software, and the resulting Deeper Blue beat Kasparovin another best-of-sixseriesin May 1997. To sum up, computers have progressedin a combination of slow patches and some rapid spurts,while humans have held some superiority but have not been able to improve sufficiently fast to keep ahead.Closerexamination reveals that the tvvouse quite different approachesto thinking through the very complex gametree of chess. If you cannot look ahead to the end of the whole game,how about looking part of the way-say, 5 or 10 moves-and working back from there?The game need not end within this limited horizon; that is, the nodes that you reach after 5 or 10 moves will not generallybe terminal nodes. Only terminal nodes have payoffs specified by the rules of the game-nodes from which you can work backward. Therefore you must attach payoffs to the nonterminal nodes at the end of your limited look-ahead,but you cannot know exactlywhat those payoffs should be. You need some indirect way of assigningplausiblepayoffsto nonterminal nodes, becauseyou are not able to explicitly roll back from a full lookahead. A ,rule that assigns such payoffs is called an intermediate valuation function. In chess,humans and computer programs both use such partial look-aheadin conjunction with an intermediate valuation function. The t5,picalmethod is as follows. Each piece is assigneda value-say, 1 for a pawn, 4 for a bishop, and 9 for a queen. Positional and combinational advantagesare assignedtheir ou'tr values. For example,two rooks that are aligned in support of each other are more valuable than they would be when isolated from each other. The sum of all the numerical values attached to pieces and their combinations in a position is the intermediate value of that position. Quantiflcation and trade-off between different good and
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bad aspectsof the position are made not on the basisof an explicitbackwardcalculationbut from the rvholechess-playingcommunity'sexperienceof play in past gamesstartingfront suchpositionsor patterns.Then a move is judgedby the value of the position to n-hich it is expectedto lead after an explicit forward-looking calculation for a cenain number-say, five or six-of moves. The et-aluationof intermediate positions has progressedfarthest with respect to chessopenings-that is, the first dozen or so moves of a game. Each opening can lead to any one of a vast multitude of further moves and positions, but erperienceenablesplayersto sum up certain openingsas being more or less likeh to tavor one player or the other. This knowledgehas been written dornmin massir-ebooks of openings,and all top playersand computer programsremember and use this information. -\t the end stagesof a game,when only a few pieces are left on the board, baclcvardreasoningon its own is often simple enough to be doable and complete enough to give the full answer.For example,some endings are known or easyto figure out: if one player has the king and a rook while the other has only her king, then the first will win; if one player has her king and a bishop and the other has only her king, then the second player can achieve a draw. Farther away from the end, however, the position that would be reached at the end of your five- or six-move horizon is no simpler than the current position-it may be evenmore complex-and playershave to use indirect methods to evaluateit. The hardest stageis the midgame,where positions have evolvedinto a level of complexity that witl not simpliff within a few moves.Looking ahead5 or even 10 moves will not give you a sure conclusion from which to reasonback. If you could spend a lot of computing effort to improve your look-ahead ability from five moves to six, it is not clear that this effort would alwaysimprove your performance. You may do well in situations where disasterwould have struck on preciselythe sixth move, but at other times after six movesyou may end up in a more complex situation that you cannot evaluate.In other words, to find a good move in a midgame position, it may be better to have a good intermediate valuation function than to be able to calculateanother few moves farther ahead. This is where the art of chessplaying comes into its own. The best human players develop an intuition or instinct that enablesthem to sniff out good opportunities and avoid subtle traps in a way that computer proglams find hard to match. Computer scientists have found it generally very difficult to teach their machines the skills of pattern recognition that humans acquire and use instinctively-for example, recognizing faces and associating them with names. The art of the midgame in chessalso is an exercisein recognizing and evaluating patterns in the same, still mysterious way. This is where Kasparov has his greatestadvantage over Fritz2 or Deep Blue. It also explainswhy computer programs do better against humans at blitz or limited-time games: a human does not have the time to marshal his art of the midgame.
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In other words, the best human players have subtle "chess knorrledge," based on experienceor the ability to recognizepatterns, which endou-sthem with a better intermediate valuation function. Computers have the advantage when it comes to raw or brute-force calculation. For a while, chessprogrants were designedto imitate human thinking. This was the approach of the artificial intelligencecommunity. But it did not work well. Chessprogrammers graduallrfound that it was better to "let computers be computers" and use their computational power to look ahead to more moves in less time. Now, although both human and computer players use a mixture of look-ahead and intermediate valuation, they use them in different proportions: humans do not look as many moves ahead but have better intermediate valuations based on knowledge; computershave lesssophisticatedvaluation functions but look aheadfarther by using their superior computational powers. Recently,chesscomputers have begun to acquire more knowledge.VVhen modifying Deep Blue in 1996and 1997,IBM enlisted the help of human experts to improve the intermediate valuation function in its software.These consultants played repeatedly against the machine, noted its weaknesses,and suggestedhow the valuation function should be modified to correct the flaws. An episode of this processis particularly instructive.TGrandmasterloel Benjamin "noticed that whenever Deep Blue had a pawn exchangethat could open a file for a rook, it would always make the exchangeearlier than was strategically correct. Deep Blue had to understand that the rook was already well placed, and that it didn't have to make the exchangeright away. It should award evaluation points for the rook being there even before the file is opened." In other words, Deep Blue's intermediate valuation function knew that a well-positioned rook with an open file was good, so it immediately made the captures that opened the file and createdthis situation. But it failed to recognizethat the mere positioning of the rook had "option value"; once the rook was there, it could exercise the option of making the par.r,nexchangethat opens up the file at any time. If the pawn was servingsome other good purposewhere it was, then the actual exchangewould be best postponed.This subtle kind of thinking results from long experienceand an awarenessof complex interconnectionsamong the pieceson the board; it is easierfor humans to acquire, often without even knowing that they have it, than it is to codify into the formal stepsof a computer program. If humans can gradually make explicit their subtle knowledgeand transmit it to computers,what hope is there for human playerswho do not get reciprocal help from computers?At times in their 1997encounter, Kasparovwas amazed by the human or even superhuman quality of Deep Blue's play. He even attributed one of the computer's moves to "the hand of God." And matters can only TThis account is taken from "!\lhat Deep Blue Learned in Chess School," by Bruce Weber, The New York Times, May tB, 1997.
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get worse:the brr,rte-force calculatingpower of computersis increasingrapidly rr,hile they are simulraneously,but more slowly, gaining some of the subtletv that constitutesthe adr-antage of humans. Finally, u'ill ri-retime come when the machine is able to spot its or,rmweaknessesand ntodih lts own intermediatevaluation function? In other words, can the machine learn from its own experienceand acquire chessknowledgeas humans do? If rhat ever happens, will such programs spread to other areas of strategicinreraction,such as business?And then what will it mean to be human an\rfar ? \\'e leave such questions to philosophers,who have thousands of years of erperiencein discussingthe really big questionsabout life, the universe,and er-enrhir-rg, and not flnding any answersto any of them. we point out only that the more powerful computers are at the disposalof human users.And, after all, hurlans can do one thing that computers cannot do: a human can pull the plug or sn,itch off the power to a computer, but computers have no such ability to terminatehumans. The abstracttheory of chesssaysthat it is a finite gamethat can be solvedby rollback. The practice of chessrequires a lot of "art" based on experience,intuition, and subtlejudgment. Is this bad news for the use of rollback in sequentialmove games?we think not. It is true that theory does not take us all the way to an answer.But it doestake us a long way; looking aheada few moves constitutes an important part of the approach that mixes brute-force calculation of moves with a knowledge-basedassessmentof intermediate positions.And, as computational power increases,the role played by brute-force calculation, and therefore the scopeof the roilback theory, will also increase. we can sum up the matter of complexity in the following way. For really simple games,we can flnd the rollback equilibrium byverbal reasoningwithout having to draw the game tree explicitly.For truly complex games,such as chess, \\-ecan draw only a small part of the game tree, and we must use a combination of trvo methods: (1) calculation based on the logic of rollback and (2) rules of thr-rmbfor valuing intermediate positions on the basisof experience.For games having an intermediate range of complexity, verbal reasoningis too hard but a complete tree can be drawn and used for rollback. Sometimes,we may enlist the aid of a computer to draw and analyzea moderatelycomplicatedgame tree. Thankfully, most of the strategic games that we encounter in economics, politics, sports, business,and daily life are far less complex than chess.The gamesmay have a number of players who move a number of times; they may even have a large number of playersor a large number of moves.But we have a chance at being able to draw a reasonable-lookingtree for those gamesthat are sequentialin nature. The logic of rollback remains valid, and it is also often the casethat, once you understandthe idea of rollback,you can carry out the necessarylogical thinking and solvethe gamewithout explicitly drawing a tree. More-
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over, it is preciselyat this intermediatelevel of difficulty, betweenthe simple examples that we solved explicitly in this chapter and the insoluble casessuch as chess,that computer softwaresuch as Gambit is most likely to be useful: this is indeed fortunate for the prospectof applying the theory to solvemany gamesin practice.
How well do actual participants in sequential-movegamesperform the calculations of rollback reasoning?There is very little systematicevidence,but classroom and researchexperimentswith some gameshave yielded outcomes that appear to counter the predictions of the theory. Someof these experimentsand their outcomes have interesting implications for the strategic analysis of sequential-movegames. For instance, many experimentershave had subjects play a singie-round bargaining game in which two players,designatedA and B, are chosen from a class or a group of volunteers. The experimenter provides a dollar (or some knor,rmtotal), which can be divided between them according to the following procedure.PlayerA proposesa split-for example,"75 to me,25 to 8." If player B acceptsthis proposal, the dollar is divided as proposed by A. If B rejects the proposal,neither player getsanything. Rollbackin this casepredicts that B should accept any sum, no matter how small, because the alternative is'even worse-namely, zero-and, foreseeing this, A should propose "99 to me, 1 to B." This particular outcome almost never happens.Most playersassignedthe A role propose a much more equal split. In fact, 50-50 is the single most common proposal. Furthermore,most playersassigned the B role turn dor.tmproposalsthat leave them 25Toor less of the total and walk awaywith nothing; some reject proposalsthat would give them 40Toof the pie.8 Many game theorists remain unpersuaded that these findings undermine the theory. They counter with some variant of the following argument. "The sums are so small as to make the whole thing trivial in the players' minds. The B playerslose 25 or 40 cents,which is almost nothing, and perhaps gain some private satisfaction that they walked away from a humiliatingly small award. If the total were a thousand dollars, so that 25Toof it amounted to real money, the B
sReadRichard H. Thaler, "Anomalies: The Ultimate Game," Journal of Economic Perspectiues, vol. 2, no. 4 (fail fgBB),pp. 195-206,and DouglasD. Davis and CharlesA. Holt, ExperimentalEconomics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 263-269, for a detailed account of this gameand relatedones.
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players would accept." But this argument does not seem to be valid. Experiments with much larger stakesshow similar results.The findings from experiments conducted in Indonesia, with sums that were small in dollars but amounted to as much as three months' earningsfor the participants,showedno clear tendencl on the part of the A players to make less equal offers, although the B plar-erstended to accept somewhat smaller sharesas the total increased; similar experimentsconducted in the SlovakRepublicfound the behavior of inexperiencedplayersunaffectedby large changesin payoffs.s The participants in these experimentstypically have no prior knowledge of game theory and no special computational abilities. But the game is extremely simple: surely even the most naive player can see through the reasoning,and ans\\-ersto direct questionsafter the experiment generallyshow that most participants do. The results show not so much the failure of rollback as the theorist s error in supposing that each player cares only about her own money earnings. Most societies instill in their members a strong sense of fairness, rvhich then causesmost A players to offer 50-50 or something close and the B playersto reject anything that is grosslyunfair. This argument is supported by the observation that even in a most drastic variant called the dictator game, where the A player decides on the split and the B player has no choice at all, manyAs give signiflcant sharesto the 8s.10 Some experimentshave been conducted to determine the extent to which fairness plays into behavior in ultimatum and dictator games. The findings show that changes in the information available to players and to the experimenter have a significant effect on the final outcome. In particular, when the experimental design is changed so that not even the experimenter can identifiz who proposed (or accepted)the split, the extent of sharing drops noticeably. Evidencefrom the new fleld of "neuroeconomics"includes similar results.Alan Sanfeyand colleaguesconducted experimentsof the ultimatum game in which thev took MRI readingsof the subjects'brains as they made their choices.They found "that activity in a region lof the brain] well known for its involvement in negative emotion" was stimulated in the responders (B players)when they rejected "unfair" (lessthan 50:50) offers. Thus deep instincts or emotions of
'The resultsof the Indonesianexperimentare reported in Lisa Cameron,"Raisingthe Stakesin the Ultimatum Game: ExperimentalEvidencefrom Indonesia," EconomicInquiry, vol.37, no. I 0anuary 1999),pp. 47-59.Slonim and Roth report resultssimilar to Cameron's,but also found that ofTers(in all rounds of play) were rejectedlessoften as the payoffswere raised.SeeRobert Slonim and Alvin Roth, "Learningin High StakesUltimatum Games:An Experimentin the SlovakRepubIic,"Econometrica,vol.66, no.3 (May 1998),pp.569-596. l0Onecould argue that this social norm of fairness may actually have value in the ongoing evolutionary game being played by the whole of society. Playerswho are concerned with fairness reduce transactioncostsand the costsof fights that can be beneficialto societyin the long run. Thesematters will be discussedin ChaotersI 1 and 12.
EVI DEN C E C O N C E R N I N G R O L T B A C K
71
anger and disgust seem to be implicated in these rejections. Ther- also found that "unfair" (lessthan 50:50) offers were rejected less often when responders knew that the offerer was a computer than when they knew that the offerer rvas human.ll Another experimental game with similarly paradoxical outcomes goes as follows. Two playersare chosenand designatedA and B. The experimenterputs a dime on the table. PlayerA can take it or pass.If A takesthe dime, the game is over, with A getting the 10 cents and B getting nothing. If A passes,the experimenter adds a dime, and now B has the choice of taking the 20 cents or passing. The turns alternate, and the pile of money grows until reaching some limitsay,a dollar-that is knovrn in advanceby both players. we show the tree for this game in Figure 3.g. Becauseof the appearanceof the tree, this type of game is often called the centipeclegame.you may not even need the tree to use rollback on this game. PlayerB is sure to take the dollar at the last stage;so A should take the 90 cents at the penultimate stage,and so on. Thus A should take the very first dime and end the game. However,in most classroomor experimentalsettings,such gamesgo on for at least a few rounds. Remarkably,by behaving "irrationally," the players as a group make more moneythan theywould if theyfollowed the logic of backward reasoning.sometimesA doesbetter and sometimesB, but sometimesthey even solvethis conflict or bargainingproblem. In a classroomexperiment that one of us (Dixit) conducted, one such game went all the way to the end. player B collected the dollar, and quite voluntarily gave50 cents to player A. Dixit askedA, "Did you two conspire?Is B a friend of yours?',and A replied, ,,No, we didn,t even know each other before.But he is a friend now.,' once again, what is revealedis not that players cannot calculate and use game-theoreticlogic but that their value systemsand payoffs are different from those attributed to them by the theorist who predicted that the game should end with A taking the dime on the first step. we will come acrosssome similar
Pass B Take dim e 10,0 FIGURE3.8
0 ,2 0
30,0
0,100
The CentipedeGame
lrSeeAlan Sanfey,Iames Rilling, IessicaAronson, Leigh Nystrom, and Jonathan Cohen, ,,The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Makingin the Ultimatum Game," Science,vol. 300 (June 13, 2003),pp. 1755-1758.
72
MOVES [CH.3] GAMESWITHSEQUENTIAL
evidenceof cooperation that seemsto contradict rollback reasoningwhen we look at flnitely repeatedprisoners'dilemma gamesin Chapter11.12 The exampiesdiscussedhere seem to indicate that apparent violations of strategiclogic can be explained by recognizingthat people do not care merely about their orrr money payoffs,but internalize concepts such as fairness.But not all obsen'edplays, contrary to the preceptsof rollback, have some such explanation. Peopledo fail to look ahead far enough, and they do fail to draw the appropriate conclusions from attempts to look ahead. For example, when issuers of credit cards offer favorable initial interest rates or no fees for the flrst vear, rrrany people fall for them without realizing that they may have to pay much more later. Thereforethe game-theoreticanalysisof rollback and rollback equilibria servesan advisoryor prescriptiverole as much as it doesa descriptive role. Peopleequipped with the theory of rollback are in a position to make better strategicdecisionsand get higher payoffs,no matter what is included in their pat'off calculations.And game theorists can use their expertiseto give valuable adviceto those who are placed in complex strategicsituations but lack the skill to determine their own best strategies.
The examplesin the preceding sectionswere deliberatelyconstructed to illustrate and elucidate basic concepts such as nodes, branches,moves, and strategies,as well as the technique of rollback. Now we show how all of them can be applied,by consideringa real-life (or at least "reality-TV-life")situation. In the summer of 2000,CBStelevisionbroadcastthe first of the seriesof Sun ivor shows,which became an instant hit and helped launch the whole new genre of "reality TV." Leaving aside many complex details and some earlier stagesnot relevantfor our purpose,the conceptwas as follows.A group of contestants,called a "tribe," was put on an uninhabited island and left largelyto fend for themselvesfor food and shelter. Every 3 days they had to vote one of themselvesout of the tribe. The person who had the most votes cast against him or her at a meeting of the remaining players (calledthe "tribal council") was the r.ictirn of the day. However, before each meeting of the tribal council, the sun'ivors up to that point competed in a game of physical or mental skill that was devisedby the producers of the game for that occasion,and the winner of this competition, called a "challenge,"was immune from being voted off at the following meeting. Also, one could not vote against oneself. Finally, r2Once again,
one wonders rvhat would happen ifthe sum added at each step were a thousand
dollars instead of a dime.
I S T R A TE GIE SIN TH E S U R V IV OR ' GA ME
73
when two people were left, the seven who had been voted off most recently returned as a "jury" to pick one of the two remaining survivors as the milliondollar winner of the whole game. The strategic problems facing all contestantswere: (1) to be generallr-regarded as a productive contributor to the tribe's searchfor food and other tasks of survival,but to do so without being regardedas too strong a competitor and therefore a target for elimination, (2) to form alliancesto secureblocks of votes to protect oneself from being voted ofl (3) to betray these allianceswhen the numbers got too small and one had to vote against scimeone,but (4) to do so without seriouslylosing popularity with the other players,who would ultimately have the power of the vote on the jury. We pick up the story when just three contestantswere left: Rudy, Kelly, and Rich. Of them, Rudywas the oldest contestant,an honest and blunt person who was very popular with the contestantswho had been previouslyvoted off. It was generallyagreedthat, if he was one of the last two, then he would be voted the million-dollar winner. So it was in the interestsof both Kelly and Rich that they should face each other, rather than face Rudy, in the final vote. But neither wanted to be seen as instrumental in voting off Rudy. With just three contestants left, the winner of the immunity challenge is effectively decisive in the cast-offvote, becausethe other two must vote againsteach other. Thus the jury would know who was responsible for voting off Rudy and, given his popularity, would regard the act of voting him off with disfavor.The person doing so would harm his or her chancesin the final vote. This was especiallya problem for Rich, becausehe was known to have an alliance with Rudy. The immunity challengewas one of stamina; each contestanthad to stand on an awkward support and lean to hold one hand in contact with a totem on a central pole, called the "immunity idol." Anyone whose hand lost contact with the idol, even for an instant, lost the challenge;the one to hold on longestwas the winner. An hour and a half into the challenge,Rich figured out that his best strategy was to deliberatelylose this immunity challenge.Then, if Rudy won immunity, he would maintain his alliance and keep Rich-Rudy was known to be a man who always kept his word. Rich would lose the final vote to Rudy in this case, but that would make him no worse off than if he won the challengeand kept Rudy. If Kelly won immunity, the much more likely outcome, then it would be in her interest to vote off Rudy-she would have at least some chance against Rich but zero against Rudy. Then Rich's chancesof winning were quite good. Whereas,if Rich himself held on, won immunity, and then voted off Rudy, his chancesagainstKellywould be decreasedby the fact that he voted off Rudy. So Rich deliberately stepped off, and later explained his reasonsquite clearly to the camera. His calculation was borne out. Kelly won that challenge and voted off Rudy.And, in the final jury vote between Rich and Kelly, Rich won by one vote.
74
t C H .3 ] GA M ES WIT H S EQU EN TIA LMOV E S
Rich's thinking rvasessentiallya rollback analysisalong a game tree. He did this analysis instinctively, without drawing the tree, while standing awkwardly and holding on to rhe immunity idol, but it took him an hour and a half to come to his conclusion. with all due credit to Rich, we show the tree explicitly, and can reach the answerfaster. Figure 3.9 shows the tree. You can see that it is much more complex than the trees encountered in earlier sections.It has more branches and moves; in addition, there are uncertain outcomes,and the chancesof winning or losing in various alternativesituationshave to be estimatedinstead of being known preciselr'.But you will seehow we can make reasonableassumptionsabout these chancesand proceedwith the analysis.
Rich
f
prob.0.45f ,,J:E* f Ric h
Richwins with prob.,
= o'18+ o'3= o'48
keeos r,eeo:
/
t\tarurer Narurer//
:" r 1l
/
\
\
\ ouro \ ?r*l).t:.+i \
\*
\\
Kelly*& Kellywins 0.4
,xetty Kee's
uau-*--:--*." PtcKs-" Rich
".,
Kelly Keeps
['ri*turs: p:irhs irrrruunitv wiflr x$ l
Richwinswith prob. = 0.54 FIGURE 3.9 Survivor lmmunitvGameTree
Rich 'ffi--------e
:j .
.
tuRY w------------w ,.i .. .:' , " .
P l cK sw
R i ch Hlcnwlns 9'6 --ffi Prob'= o'54 ruRy **-/ #\---._ PlcKs Kelly-ffi Kellywins 0.4 JURYwPlcKsw
"': . . : '
0.3
,u^, *X* plcKs*^---__
M .1..i4,i
Kelly proD.
w' .; ''.
Rich ffi Hlcnwlns ^. prob. =
'-,illilll''u( \A"rlr.iitflr
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Kellv . prob. b.s ^,Ifl'un
,/
Rich ffi fitcnwtns ^" '7^ * P r o h . =0 . 1 8 IURY w.-'' *\---.\ PICKS Kelly-ffi Kellywins 0.6
IURY**' P rcK s-
, . ''':
* .. ,. " ' v {' ": '
STRATEGIES IN THE SURVIVORGAME 75 At the initial node, Rich decideswhether to continue or to give up in the im_ munity challenge.In either case,the winner of the challengecannot be forecast with certainty; this is indicated in the tree by letting ,,Nature',make the choice, as we did with the coin-toss situation in Figure 3.1. If Rich continues, Narure choosesthe winner from the three contestanfs.we don't know the actual prob_ abilities, but we will assumeparticular values for exposition and point out the crucial assumptions.The supposition is that Kelly has a lot of stamina and that Rudy, being the oldest, is not likely to win. so we posit the following probabilities of a win when Rich choosesto continue: 0.5 (50%)for Kelly, 0.45 for Rich, and only 0.05for Rudy. If Rich givesup on the challenge,Nature picks the winner of the immunity challengerandomly between the two who remain; in this case,we assumethat Kelly wins with probability 0.9 and Rudy with probability 0.1. The rest of the tree follows from each of the three possiblewinners of the challenge.If Rudy wins, he keepsRich as h9 promised, and the jurv votes Rudy the winner.13If Rich wins immunity, he has to decide whether to keep Kelly or Rudy. If he keepsRudy,the jury votesfor Rudy.If he keepsKelly,it is nor cerrain whom the jury chooses.we assumethat Rich alienatessome jurors by turning on Rudy and that, despitebeing better liked than Kelly, he getsthe jury,s vote in this situation only with probability 0.4. similarly, if Kelly wins immunity, she can either keep Rudy and lose the jury's vote, or keep Rich. If she keepsRich,his probability of winning the jury's vote is higher, at 0.6,becausein this casehe is both better liked by the jury and hasn't voted off Rudy. \Mhatabout the players'actual payoffs?we can safelyassumethat both Rich and Kelly want to maximize the probability of his or her emerging as the ultimate winner of the $I million. Rudy similarlywants to get the prize, but keeping his word to Rich is paramount. With thesepreferencesof the various playersin mind, Rich can now do rollback analysisalong the tree to determine his own initial choice. Rich knows thar, if he wins the immunity challenge (the uppermost path after his o",rmflrst move and Nature's move), he will have to keep Kelly to have a 40%ochanceof eventual victory; keeping Rudy at this stagewould mean a zero probability of eventualvictory. Rich can also calculatethat, if Kelly wins the immunity challenge(which occurs once in each of the upper and lower halves of the tree), shewill chooseto keep him for similar reasons,and then the probability of his eventualvictorywill be 0.6.
r3Technically, Rudy facesa choice between keeping Rich or Kelly at the action node after he wins the immunity challenge. Becauseeveryone placed zero probability on his choosing Keily (owing to the Rich-Rudyalliance),we illustrateonly Rudy'schoiceof Rich.The jury similarly,has a choicebetween Rich and Rudy at the last action node along this branch ofplay. Again, the foregone conclusion is that Rudywins in this case.
76
MOVES [CH.3] GAMESWITH sEQUENTIAL
\Mhat are Rich s chancesas he calculatesthem at the initial node? If Rich chooses Give Up ar the initial node, then there is only one way for him to emergeas the elentual winner-if Kelly wins immunity (probability 0.9), if she then keepsRrch iprobability f), and if the jury votes for Rich (probability0'6)' Becauseall three things need to happen for Rich to win, his overall probability of victon' is t1-reproduct of the three probabilities-namely, 0'9 X I X 0.6 - 0.51.:=If Rich choosesContinue at the initial node, then there are two wavs iri tvhich he can win. First, he wins the game if he wins the immunity challenge probability0.45),if he then eliminatesRudy (probability1),and if he still uins rhe jury's vote against Kelly (probability 0.4); the total probability of winr-ringu-rthis way is 0.45 X 0.4 : 0.18.Second,he wins the game if Kelly wins the challenge (probability 0.5), if she eliminates Rudy (probability 1), and if Rich : gersthe jury's vote (probability0.6);total probability here is 0.5 x 0.6 0.3. Rich's overall probability of eventualvictory if he choosescontinue is the sum : of the probabilities of thesetwo paths to victory-namely, 0'18 + 0'3 0'48' Rich can now comparehis probability of winning the million dollarswhen he choosesGiveUp (0.S4)with his probability of winning when he choosesContinue (0.4g).Giventhe assumedvaluesof the variousprobabilitiesin the tree,Rich has a better chanceof victory if he givesup. Thus, Give Up is his optimal strategy'Although this result is based on assumingspecific numbers for the probabilities' Give Up remains Rich's optimal strategyas long as (1) Kelly is very likely to win the immunity challengeonce Rich givesup and (2) Rich wins the jury's flnal vote rnore often when Kellyhasvoted out Rudythan when Rich has done so'ls This example servesseveral purposes. Most importantly, it shows how a complex tree, with much unceftainty and missing information about precise probabilities, can still be solved by using rollback analysis.we hope this gives You some confidence in using the method and some training in converting a somewhat loose verbal account into a more precise logical argument. You rnight counter that Rich did this reasoning without drawing any trees. But kt-ro.,tingthe system or general framework greatly simplifies the task even in ne1, and unfamiliar circumstances.Therefore it is deflnitely worth the effort to acquire the systematicskill. A secondpurpose is to illustrate the seeminglyparadoxicalstrategyof "losing to n,in." Another instance of this strategy can be found in some sporting competitions that are held in two rounds, such as the soccerWorld Cup' The first round is played on a leaguebasisin severalgroups of four teams each' The top two teams from each group then go to the second round where they play
raReadersr,r,honeed instruction or a relresher course in the ruies for combining probabilities will {ind a quick tutorial in the Appendix to Chapter 7. rsReaderswho can handle the algebra of probabilities can solve this game by using more general of this chapter' svmbols instead of specific numbers for the probabilities, as in Exercise 10
S U I , " , 'A R Y
77
others chosen according to a prespecifledpattern; for example,the top-ranked team in group A meets the second-rankedteam in group B, and so on. In such a situation, it may be good strategy for a team to lose one of its flrsr-round matches if this loss causesit to be ranked second in its group; that rankrng might earn it a subsequentmatch againsta team that, for some particular reason, it is more likely to beat than the team that it would meet if it had placed first in its group in the first round.
ii$iiiiliii..{gfifififffi
S U M M ARY:rilllliiiiriilil!1|,i,
.
Sequential-movegamesrequire plaversto consider the future consequencesof their current moves before choosing their actions.Analvsis of pure sequentialmove gamesgenerallyrequiresthe creation of a gante tree.The tree is made up of nodes and branchesthat show all of the possible actions available to each player at each of her opportunities to move, as well as the pal'offs associated with all possibleoutcomes of the game. strategiesfor each player are conplete plans that describeactions at each of the player's decisionnodes contingent on all possiblecombinations of actionsmade by playerswho acted at earliernodes. The equilibrium concept employed in sequential-movegamesis that of rollback equilibrium, in which players' equilibrium strategies are found by looking ahead to subsequentnodes and the actions that would be taken there and by using these forecasts to calculate one's current best action. This process is known as rollback, or backward induction. Different types of games entail advantagesfor different players, such as first-mouer aduantages.The inclusion of many players or many moves enlarges the game tree of a sequential-movegame but does not change the solution process.In some cases,drawing the full tree for a particular game may require more spaceor time than is feasible.Suchgamescan often be solvedby identifying strategicsimilarities between actions that reducesthe size of the tree or by simple logical thinking. chess, the ultimate strategic sequential-move game, is theoretically amenableto solution by rollback. The complexity of the game,however,makes it effectivelyimpossible to draw a full game tree and to write out a complete solution. In actual play, elementsof both art (identification of patterns and of opportunities versus peril) and science (forward-looking calculations of the possible outcomes arising from certain moves) have a role in determining player moves. Human chessplayers still maintain an advantagein the use of knowledge and instinct, but computers perform the raw calculationsnecessary for true rollback much faster and more accuratelythan humans. As computers increase in power, a more complete solution of chess using rollback comes closerto becoming a reality.
78
MOVES tCH.3] GAMESWITHSEQUENTIAL
Testsof the theon' of sequential-movegamesseemto suggestthat actual play shows the irrationality of the players or the failure of the theory to adequately predict behavior. The counterargument points out the complexity of actual preferencesfor different possible outcomes and the usefulnessof strategic theon- for identifuing optimal actions when actual preferences are known.
,rilfiiiirilliii{.1t}il{ffi KEYTERMSii+r}itd,iii,lli{tji[i.ifiiiii action node (46) backward induction (54) branch (46) decision node (46) decision tree (46) equilibrium path of play (58) extensive form (46) first-mover advantage (60) game tree (46) initial node (46)
,,':,litirlriiil;l};;
intermediate valuation function (65) move (48) node (46) path ofplay (58) prune (52) rollback (54) rollback equilibrium (54) root (46) second-moveradvantage(59) terminal node (48)
[+iijlli{ii$i$Fii:f,;,iiri EXERC|SES
l. Suppose two players, First and Second, take part in a sequential-move game.First moves first, Secondmoves second,and each player moves only once. (a) Draw a gametree for a game in which First has two possibleactions (Up or Down) at each node and Second has three possible actions (Top, Middle, or Bottom) at each node. How many of each node tlpedecision and terminal-are there? (b) Draw a game tree for a game in which First and Secondeach have three possible actions (Sit, Stand, or Iump) at each node. How many of the two node t),pesare there? (c) Draw a game tree for a game in which First has four possible actions (North, South, East,or West) at each node and Secondhas two possible actions (Stayor Go) at each node. How many of the two node t],pesare there?
EXERCISES
79
2. Use rollback to find equilibria for the following games:
(a)
o,2,:
2,2
In each case,how many pure strategies(completeplans of action) are available to each player?For each game,\^Tite out all of the pure strategiesfor each player. 3. For each of the gamesillustrated in Exercise2, identify the equilibrium outcome and the complete equilibrium strategyfor each player. 4. "In a sequential-movegame, the player who moves first is sure to win." Is this statement true or false?Statethe reason for your answer in a few brief sentences,and give an exampleof a game that illustratesyour answer. 5. Considerthe rivalry betweenAirbus and Boeing to develop a new commercial jet aircraft. SupposeBoeing is ahead in the development processand Airbus is consideringwhether to enter the competition. If Airbus staysout, it earnszero profit, whereasBoeing enjoys a monopoly and earnsa profit of $1 billion. If Airbus decides to enter and develop the rival airplane, then Boeing has to decidewhether to accommodateAirbus peaceablyor to wage a price war. In the event of peaceful competition, each firm will make a
80
I C H .3 ] GA M ES WIT H SE QU E N TIA LMOV E S
profit of $300million. If there is a price war, each will lose $100million becausethe prices of airplaneswill fall so low that neither flrm will be able to recoupits developmentcosts. Drarv the tree for this game.Find the rollback equilibrium and describe the firms' equilibrium strategies. 6. The centipedegame illustrated in Figure 3.8 can be solvedby using rollback without drarving the complete game tree. In the version of the game discussedin the text, playersA and B alternatelyhad the opportunity to claim or pass a growing pile of dimes (to a maximum of 10) placed on the table. Supposethe rules of the gameswere changedso that: (a) PlayerA getsa nickel reward everytime she passes,giving her opponent another turn. Find the rollback equilibrium strategiesfor eachplayer. (b) Two rounds of the game are played with the sametwo players,A and B. In the flrst round, A may not keep more than flve dimes, and B may not keep more than nine. Find the rollback equilibrium strategiesfor each player. (c) Two rounds of the game are played with the sametwo players,A and B. In the first round, A may not keep more than five dimes, and B may not keep more than four. Find the rollback equilibrium strategiesfor each player. 7. Two players,Amy and Beth,take turns choosingnumbers;Amy goesfirst. On her turn, a player may chooseany number between I and 10,inclusive,and this number is added to a running total. lVhen the running total of both players' choicesreaches100,the game ends.Considertwo alternativeendings:(i) the player whose choice of number takesthe total to exactly 100is the winner and (ii) the player whose choice of number causesthis total to equal or exceed100is the loser.For each case,answerthe following questions: (a) \Mho will win the game? (b) \A/hatare the optimal strategies(completeplans of action) for eachplayer? B. Consider three major department stores-Big Giant, Titan, and Frieda'scontemplating opening a branch in one of two new Boston-areashopping malls. Urban Mall is located closeto the large and rich population center of the area;it is relatively small and can accommodate at most two department stores as "anchors" for the mall. Rural Mall is farther out in a rural and relatively poorer area;it can accommodateas many as three anchor stores.None of the three storeswants to have its store in both malls becausethere is sufficient overlap of customersbetween the malls that locating in both would just be competingwith oneself.Eachstoreprefersto be in a mall with one or more other department stores than to be alone in the same mall, because a mall with multiple department storeswill attract sufficiently many more total customers that each store's profit will be higher. Further, each store prefers Urban Mall to Rural Mall becauseof the richer customer base. Each store
EXERCISES
81
must choosebetween tr)4ng to get a spacein Urban Mall (knouing rhat, if the attempt fails, they will try for a spacein Rural Mall) and trying to get a spacein Rural Mall directly (without even attempting to get into Urban Mall). In this case, the stores rank the five possible outcomes as follon-s:5 (best),in Urban Mall with one other department stere;4, in Rural Mall n-ith one or two other department stores; 3, alone in Urban Mall; 2, alone in Rural Mall; and I (worst),alone in Rural Mall after having attempted to get into Urban Mall and failed, bywhich time other nondepartment storeshave signedup the best anchor locations in Rural Mall. The three storesare sufficiently different in their managerialstructures that they experiencedifferent lags in doing the paperwork required to request an expansionspacein a new mall. Frieda'smoves quickly, followed by Big Giant, and finally by Titan, which is the least efficient in readyinga location plan. \.Vhenall three have made their requests,the malls decide which stores to let in. Becauseof the name recognition that both Big Giant and Titan have with the potential customers,a mall would take either (or both) of thosestoresbeforeit took Frieda's.Thus,Frieda'sdoesnot get one of the two spacesin Urban Mall if all three storesrequestthose spaces;this is true even though Frieda'smoves flrst. (a) Draw the gametree for this mall location game. (b) Illustrate the rollback pruning processon your game tree and use the pruned tree to find the rollback equilibrium. Describe the equilibrium by using the (complete)strategiesemployed by each department store. VVhatare the payoffsto each store at the rollback equilibrium outcome? 9. There are two distinct proposals,A and B, being debatedin Washington.The Congresslikes proposalA, and the presidentlikes proposalB. The proposals are not mutually exclusive;either or both or neither may become law. Thus there are four possibleoutcomes,and the rankingsof the two sidesare asfollows,where a largernumber representsa more favoredoutcome. Outcome
Congress
President
A becomeslaw
4
1
B becomeslaw
1
4
Both A and B become law
3
3
Neither(statusquo prevails)
2
2
(a) The moves in the game are as follows. First, the Congress decides whether to pass a bill and whether it is to contain A or B or both. Then the president decideswhether to sign or veto the bill. Congressdoesnot have enough votes to override a veto. Draw a tree for this game and find the rollback equilibrium.
82
MOVES ICH.3] GAMESWITH SEQUENTIAL (b) Now supposethe rules of the game are changedin only one respect:the president is gir-enthe extra power of a line-item veto. Thus, if the Congresspa55e5a bill containing both A and B, the president may choose not onl| to sign or veto the bill as a whole, but also to veto just one of the n\'o items. show the new tree and find the rollback equilibrium' (c) Explain intuitively why the differencebetweenthe two equilibria arises'
10. consider the survivor game tree illustrated in Figure 3.9. Supposethat, unlike in Figure3.9,you want to use only generalvaluesfor the various probabiliries. In particular, supposethat the probability of winning the immunity - xclrallengewhen Rich choosescontinue is x for Rich,y for Kelly, and | when Rich choosesGive Up ,r for Rudy; similarly, the probability of winning is z for Kelly and | - z for Rudy. Further, suppose that Rich's chance of being picked by the jury is p if he has won immunity and has voted off Rudy; his chance of being picked is 4 if Kelly has won immunity and has voted off Rudy. continue to assumethat, if Rudy wins immunity, he keepsRich with probability 1, and that Rudy wins the game with probability I if he ends up in the final two. (a) V\4ratis the algebraic formula for the probability, in terms of p, q, x, and choosesContinue?!\4rat is the /, that Rich wins the million dollars if he probability that he wins if he chooses Give up? can you determine Rich'soptimalstrategywithonlythislevelofinformation? (b) The discussionin Section3.7 suggeststhat Give up is optimal for Rich as long as (i) Kelly is very likely to win the immunity challenge once Rich gives up and (ii) Rich wins the jury's final vote more often when Kelly has voted out Rudy than when Rich has done so. write out expressions entailingthegeneralprobabilitieS(P,4,x,y)thatsummarizethesetwo conditions. (c) Supposethat the two conditions from part b hold. Provethat Rich's optimal strategyis Give UP.
T
-MoveGames Simultaneous I: with PureStrategies DiscreteStrategies ECALLpnov CHRprsn2 that gamesare said to have simultaneousmoves if players must move without knowledge of what their rivals have chosen to do. It is obviously so if playerschoosetheir actions at exactlythe same time. A game is also simultaneouswhen players choose their actions in isolation, with no information about what other players have done or will do, even if the choices are made at different hours of the clock. (For this reason, simultaneous-movegamesare often referred to as gamesof imperfectinformation or imperfect knowledge.)This chapter focuses on games that have such purely simultaneousinteractions among players.We consider a variety of types of simultaneous games,introduce a solution concept called Nash equilibrium for these games,and study gameswith one equilibrium, many equilibria, or no equilibrium at all. Many familiar strategicsituations can be described as simultaneous-move games.The various producers of television sets,stereos,or automobiles make decisions about product design and features without knowing what rival firms are doing about their o'o,nproducts.Voters in U.S.electionssimultaneouslycast their individual votes; no voter knows what the others have done when she makesher ornmdecision.The interaction between a soccergoalieand an opposing striker during a penalty kick requires both players to make their decisions simultaneously-the goaliecannot afford to wait until the ball has actuallybeen kicked to decidewhich way to go, becausethen it would be far too late. !\4ren a player in a simultaneousmove game choosesher action, she obviously does so without any knowledgeof the choicesmade by other players.She 83
84
[CH.4 ]
SI M ULTANEO US. M O VE
GA M E S WI T H P U R E S T R A T E G I E S
alsocannotlook aheadto hou-theywill reactto her choice,becausethey act simultaneouslyand do not know what she is choosing.Rather,each player must figure out what others are doing when what the others are doing is figuring out what this plaver rs doir"rg.This circularity makes the analysisof simultaneousmove gamessonten-hatmore intricate than that of sequential-movegames,but is not difficult. In this chapter,we developa simple concept of equithe anal-vsis Iibrium for sucl-tganes that has considerableexplanatoryand predictive power.
In Chapters2 and3, we emphasizedthat a strategyis a complete plan of action. But, in a purely simultaneousmove game,each player can have at most one opportunity to act (although that action may have many component parts); if a player had multiple opportunities to act, that would be an element of sequentiality. Therefore there is no real distinction between strategy and action in simultaneous-movegames,and the terms are often used as synonyms in this context.There is only one complication.A strategycan be a probabilistic choice from the basic actions initially specifled. For example, in sports, a player or team may deliberately randomize its choice of action to keep the opponent guessing.Such probabilistic strategiesare called mixed strategies,and we consider them in Chapters7 and B. In this chapter,we conflne our attention to the basic initially specifledactions,which are calledpure strategies. In many games,each player has availableto her a flnite number of discrete pure strategies-for example, Dribble, Pass,or Shoot in basketball. In other games, each player's pure strategy can be any number from a continuous range-for example,the price chargedby a firm.I This distinction makesno differenceto the generalconcept of equilibrium in simultaneous-movegames,but the ideas are more easily conveyedwith discrete strategies;solution of games with continuous strategiesneeds slightly more advanced tools. Therefore, in this chapter,we restrict the analysisto the simpler caseof discretepure strategies and take up continuously variablestrategiesin Chapter 5. Simultaneous-movegameswith discretestrategiesare most often depicted with the use of a game table (also called a g:rme matrix or payoff table). The table is called the normal form or the strategic form of the game. Gameswith any number of piayers can be illustrated by using a game table, but its dimentln fact, prices must be denominated in the minimum unit of coinage-for example,whole cents-and can thereforetake on only a finite number of discretevalues.But this unit is usually so small that it makesmore senseto think of the price as a continuousvariable.
DEPICTING SI M ULTANEO US- M O VE G AM E S WI T H D I S C R E T E S T R A T E G I E S
85
sion must equal the number of players.For a two-player game,the table is twodimensional and appearssimilar to a spreadsheet.The row and column headings of the table are the strategiesavailableto the flrst and second plar-ers,respectively. The size of the table, then, is determined by the numbers of strategiesavailableto the players.Each cell within the table lists the pavoffs to all players that arise under the configuration of strategiesthat placed plar-ers into that cell. Games with three players require three-dimensional tables; u-e considerthem later in this chapter. We illustrate the concept of a payoff table for a simple game in Figure 4.1. The game here has no special interpretation; so we can develop the concepts without the distraction of a "story." The players are named Row and Column. Row has four choices (strategiesor actions) labeled Top, High, Low, and Bottom; Column has three choiceslabeled Left, Middle, and Right. Each selection of Row and Column generatesa potential outcome of the game.Payoffsassociated with each outcome are shown in the cell corresponding to that row and that column. By convention, of the two payoff numbers, the first is Row'spayoff and the second is Column's. For example, if Row choosesHigh and Column choosesRight, the payoffs are 6 to Row and 4 to Column. For additional convenience, we show everything pertaining to Row-player name, strategies,and payoffs-in black, and everything pertaining to Column in red. Rememberthat, in some games,most notably in sports contexts,the interestsof the two sidesare exactlythe opposite of each other. Then, for each combination of the players' choices,the payoffs of one can be obtained by reversing the sign of the payoffs to the other. As noted in Chapter 2, we call these zerosum (or constant-sum)games. In zero-sum games,we can simplify the game table by showing the payoffs of just one player, generallythe Row player. Those of the Column player are left implicit. Figure 4.2 shows an exampleof this shorthand notation for a very simplified version of a singleplay in (American)football. The team on the offenseis attempting to move the ball forward to improve its chancesof kicking a field
COLUMN Middle i Top
3 ,1
2,3
10,2
High
4\
?n
6,4
Low
2 ,2
\4
12,3
Bottom
5 ,6
4,5
a7
ROW
FIGURE4.1
Representinqa Simultaneous-Move Game in a Table
86t c H. 4] S IM U L T A N E o U S -M o VE GAME S W ITH P U R E S TR A TE GIE S D E FE N S E
Run
Fass q
Blitz 13
Run
2
ShortPass
6
5.6
10.5
Me d i u mPa s s
6
4.5
1
LongPass
10
3
-2
O FFENSE
inaTable Game Simultaneous-Move a Zero-sum 4.2 Representing FIGURE
goal. It has four possible strategies:a run and one of three different-length passes(short,medium, and long).The defensecan adopt one of threestrategies to try to keep the offenseat bay: a run defense,a pass defense,or a blitz of the quarterback.The game is zero-sum; the offensetries to gain yardagewhile the defensetries to prevent it from doing so. Supposewe have enough information about the underlying strengthsof the two teams to work out the probabilities of completing different plays and to determine the averagegain in yardage that could be expectedunder each combination of strategies'For example'when Offensechoosesthe Medium Passand Defensecounterswith its Passdefense,we -4.5 (yards),but estimateoffense's payoff to be 4.5 (yards).2Defense',spayoff is this number is not explicitly shown in the table. The other cells similarly show Offense's payoff with Defense'spayoff implicit and equal to the negative of whateverOffensereceives.
To analyzesimultaneousgames,we need to consider how players choosetheir actions.Return to the game table in Figure 4.1. Focus on one speciflc outcome-namely, the one where Row choosesLow and Column choosesMiddle; payoffsthere are 5 to Row and 4 to Column. Each player wants to pick an action
2Hereis horv the payoffsfor this casewere constlucted.'WhenOffensechoosesthe Medium Pass pass and Detensecounters \,vith its pass defense,our estimate is that with probability 50% the (0 yards), incomplete pass will fall the 40% will be completedfor a gain of I5 yards,with probability average and with probability 10%the passwill be interceptedwith a loss of 30 yards;this makesan by a were constructed : table in the numbers yards' The ( 4.5 x 30) x + x + 15 0.4 0 0.1 of 0.5 They small panel of expert neighborsand friends convenedby Dixit on one fall sunday afternoon' receiveda liouid consultancYfee.
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
A7
that yields her the highest payoff, and in this outcome each indeed makessuch a choice, given what her opponent chooses.Given that Row is choosing Low, can Column do any better by choosing something other than Middte? \o, because Left would give her the payoff 2, and Right would give her 3, neirher of which is better than the 4 she gets from Middle. Thus Middle is column's besr response to Row's choice of Low. conversely, given that column is choosing Middle, can Row do better by choosing something other than Low? Again no, becausethe payoffs from switching to Top (2),High (3), or Bottom (4) would all be no better than what Row getswith Low (5).Thus Low is Row's best response to Column'schoiceof Middle. The two choices,Low for Row and Middle for Column, have the property that eachis the chooser'sbest responseto the other'saction.If they were making these choices, neither would want to switch to an],.thingdifferent on her own. By the deflnition of a noncooperativegame, the players are making their choices independently; therefore such unilateral changes are all that each player can contemplate.Becauseneither wants to make such a change,it is natural to call this state of affairs an equilibrium. This is exactly the concept of Nash equilibrium. To state it a little more formally, a Nash Equilibrium3 in a game is a list of strategies,one for each player, such that no player can get a better payoff by switching to some other strategythat is availableto her while all the other players adhereto the strategiesspecifiedfor them in the list.
A. Some Further Explanation oftheConcept ofNash Equilibrium To understand the concept of Nash equilibrium better, we take another look at the game in Figure 4.1. Consider now a cell other than (Low, Middle)-say, the one where Row choosesHigh and Column choosesLeft. Can this be a Nash equilibrium? No, because, if Column is choosing Left, Row does better to chooseBottom and get the payoff 5 rather than to chooseHigh, which givesher only 4. Similarly, (Bottom, Left) is not a Nash equilibrium, becauseColumn can do better by switching to Right, thereby improving her payoff from 6 to 9. The definition of Nash equilibrium does not require equilibrium choicesto be strictly better than other availablechoices.Figure4.3 is the sameas Figure4.1 3Thisconcept is named for the mathematician and economist Iohn Nash, who developedit in his doctoral dissertationat Princetonin i949. Nash alsoproposeda solution to cooperativegames, which we considerin Chapter17.He sharedthe 1994Nobel Prizein economicswith two other game theorists,ReinhardSeltenand John Harsanyi;we will treat some aspectsof their work in Chapters9 and 10.SylviaNasar'sbiographyof Nash,A BeautifulMind (NewYork: Simon & Schuster,ig98),was the (loose) basis for a movie starring RussellCrowe. Unfortunately, the movie's attempt to explain the concept of Nash equilibrium is hopelessly wrong. We explain this failure in Exercise 12 of this chapterand in Exerciseg ofChapter 8.
88t c H. 4lSIMU L T AN Eo U S-Mo V EGA M E S W ITH P U R E S TR A TE GIE s COLUMN Left ,
Rrght
Top
3,1
2,5
10,2
High
4,5
3,0
6,4
Low
1a
Row
Bottom FIGURE4.3
5,6
12,3 9,7
Variationon Gameof Figure4.1 with a Tie in Payoffs
exceptthat Row'spayoff from (Bottom,Middle) is changedto 5, the sameas that from (Low, Middle). It is still true that, given Column's choice of Middle, Row cottld not do anybetterthan shedoeswhen choosingLow. Soneither playerhas a reasonto changeher action when the outcome is (LoW Middle), and that qualifies it for a Nash equilibrium.a More importantly, a Nash equilibrium does not have to be jointly best for the players.In Figure 4.1, the strategypair (Bottom, Right) givespayoffs (9, 7), which are better for both playersthan the (5, 4) of the Nash equilibrium. However, playing independently, they cannot sustain (Bottom, Right). Given that Column plays Right, Rowwould want to deviatefrom Bottom to Low and get 12 instead of 9. Getting the jointly better payoffsof (9, 7) would require cooperative action that made such "cheating" impossible.We examinethis type of behavior later in this chapter and in more detail in Chapter 11.For noq we merely point out the fact that a Nash equilibrium may not be in the joint interests of the players. To reinforce the concept of Nash equilibrium, look at the football game of Figure4.2.If the Defenseis choosingthe Passdefense,then the best choicefor the Offenseis Short Pass(payoff of 5.6 versus5, 4.5, or 3). Conversely,if the Offense is choosing the Short Pass,then the Defense'sbest choice is the Pass defense-it holds the Offensedown to 5.6 yards, whereasthe Run defenseand the Blitz would be expectedto concede6 and 10.5yards, respectively.(Remember that the entriesin each cell of a zero-sum game are the Row player'spayoffs; thereforethe best choice for the Column player is the one that yields the smallest number, not the largest.)In this game,the strategycombination (ShortPass, Passdefense)is a Nash equilibrium, and the resulting payoff to the Offenseis 5.6yards. 4Butnote that (Bottom, Middle) with the payoffsof (5, 5) is not itself a Nash equiiibrium. If Row was choosing Bottom, Column's oltm best choice would not be Middie; she could do better by choosingRight.In fact, you can checkall the other cellsin the table to verify that none of them can be a Nash equilibrium.
N A S H E QU IL.sR IU M
89
How does one find Nash equilibria in games?One can alwar-scheck every cell to seeif the strategiesthat generateit satis$rthe definition of a \asl"r equilibrium. Such cell-by-cell-inspection or enumeration is foolproof, but tedious, and unmanageableexceptin simple gamesor unless one is using a good computer program for finding equilibria. Luckily, there are many other methods, applicable to special types of games,that not only find Nash equilibria more quickly when they apply, but also give us a better understandingof the process of thinking by which beliefs and then choices are formed. We develop several such methods in later sections.
B. Nash Equilibrium Asa System ofBeliefs andChoices Beforewe proceed with further study and use of the Nash equilibrium concept, we should try to clariff somethingthat may have bothered some of you. We said that in a Nash equilibrium each player choosesher "best response"to the other's choice. But the two choicesare made simultaneously.Hou, can one respondto somethingthat has not yet happened,at leastwhen one doesnot know what has happened? People play simultaneous-movegames all the time and do make choices. To do so, they must find a substitutefor actual knowledgeor observationof the others' actions.Playerscould make blind guessesand hope that they turn out to be inspired ones,but luckily there are more systematicways to try to figure out what the others are doing. One method is experienceand observation-if the players play this game or similar gameswith similar players all the time, they may developa pretty good idea of what the others do. Then choicesthat are not best will be unlikely to persist for long. Another method is the logical processof thinking through the others' thinking. You put yourself in the position of other playersand think what they are thinking, which of courseincludes their putting themselves in your position and thinking what you are thinking. The logic seems circular, but there are severalways of breaking into the circle, and we demonstratethese ways by using speciflc examplesin the sectionsthat follow. Nash equilibrium can be thought of as a culmination of this processof thinking about thinking, where eachplayer has correctly figured out the others' choice. VVhetherby observation or logical deduction or some other method, you the gameplayer acquire some notion of what the others are choosingin simultaneousmove games.It is not easyto find a word to describethe processor its outcome.It is not anticipation, nor is it forecasting,becausethe others' actions do not lie in the future but occur simultaneouslywith your own. The word most frequently used by gametheoristsis belief. This word is not perfect either,becauseit seemsto connote more confldenceor certainty than is intended; in fact, in Chapter5, we allow for the possibility that beliefsare held with some uncertainty. But for lack of a better word, it will have to suffice.
9O
IC H. 4]
SI M ULTANEO US- M O VE
G A M E S WI T H P U R E S T R A T E G I E S
Now think of \ash equilibrium in this light. We defined it as a configuration of strategiessuch thar eacl-rplayer'sstrategyis her best responseto that of the others. If she does nor knor'r,the actual choices of the others but has beliefs about them, in \ash eqr-riiibriumthose beliefs would have to be correct-the others'actuai acriot-ts should be just what you believethem to be. Thus we can define Nash eqtrilibrium in an alternative and equivalent way: it is a set of strategies,one ior each player, such that (1) each player has correct beliefs about the srraregies of the othersand (2)the strategyof eachis the best for herself,gir en i-ierbeliefsaborit the strategiesof the others. This rr ar of thinking about Nash equilibrium has two advantages.First, the cor-rcepi of "bestresponse"is no longerlogicallyflawed.Eachplayeris choosing her bestresponse,not to the asyet unobseled actionsof the others,but only to her orrrt alreadyformed beliefsabout their actions.Second,in Chapters7 and 8, rrhere we allow mixed strategies,the randomnessin one player's strategymay be better interpreted as uncertainty in the other players' beliefs about this player's action. For now, we proceed by using both interpretations of Nash equilibrium in parallel. You might think that formation of correct beliefs and calculation of best responsesis too daunting a task for mere humans. We discusssome criticisms of this kind, as well as empirical and experimental evidence concerning Nash equilibrium, in Chapter 5 for pure strategiesand Chapters 7 and B for mixed strategies.For now, we simply saythat the proof of the pudding is in the eating. We developand illustrate the Nash equilibrium concept by applying it. We hope that seeing it in use will prove a better way to understand its strengths and drawbacksthan would an abstractdiscussionat this ooint.
Some gameshave a special property that one strategyis uniformly better than or , rorsethan another. \.44renthis is the case,it provides one way in which the searchfor Nash equilibrium and its interpretation can be simplifled. The n ell-known game of the prisoners' dilemma illustrates this concept well. Considera story line of the type that appearsregularlyin the televisionprogram ,\T?D Biue. Supposethat a husband and wife have been brought to the precinct under the suspicion that they were conspirators in the murder of a young woman. DetectivesSipowiczand Clark place the suspectsin separatedetention rooms and interrogatethem one at a time. There is little concrete evidence linking the pair to the murder, although there is some evidencethat they were involved in kidnapping the victim. The detectivesexplain to each suspect that they are both looking at jail time for the kidnapping charge,probably 3
'
DOMINANCE
91
years, even if there is no confessionfrom either of them. In addition. rhe husband and wife are told individually that the detectives "know" what happened and "know" how one had been coercedby the other to participatein the cnme; it is implied that jail time for a solitary confessorwill be significantly reduced if the whole story is committed to paper. (In a scenefrom virtually every episode,the yellow legalpad and a pencil are produced and placed on the table at this poirt.l Finally, they are told that, if both confess,jail terms could be negotiated dorrrr but not as much as theywould be if there were one confessionand one denial. Both husband and wife are then playersin a two-person,simultaneous-move game in which each has to choosebetween confessingand not confessingto the crime of murder. They both know that no confession leaves them each with a 3-year jail sentencefor involvement with the kidnapping. They also know that, if he or shewill get a short sentenceof I yearfor cooperating one of them confesses, with the police, while the other will go to jail for a minimum of 25 years. If both confess,they figure that they can negotiatefor jail terms of 10yearseach. The choicesand outcomesfor this game are summarizedby the game table in Figure 4.4.The strategiesConfessand Deny can also be called Defect and Cooperate to capture their roles in the relationship between the two players; tht;s Defect means to defect from any tacit arrangementwith the spouse,and Cooperate means to take the action that helps the spouse (not cooperatewith the cops). Payoffshere are the lengths of the jail sentencesassociatedwith each outcome; so low numbers are better for each player.In that sense,this examplediffers from most of the games that we analyze in which large payoffs are good rather than bad. We take this opportunity to alert you that "large is good" is not alwaystrue. VVhenpayoff numbers indicate players'rankings of outcomes,people often use I for the best alternativeand successivelyhigher numbers for successivelyworseones.A1so,in the table for a zero-sum game that showsonly one player'sbigger-is-betterpayoffs,smallernumbers are better for the other. In the prisoners' dilemma here, smaller numbers are better for both. Thus, if you ever write a payoff table where large numbers are bad, you should alert the readerby pointing it out clearly.And, when reading someoneelse'sexample,be aware of the nossibiliw.
W IFE Deny(Cooperate) Confess(Defect)
HUSBAND
Deny(Cooperate)
F lG URE 4. 4P ri s o n e rs ' D i l e mma
1Oyr,10Y r
1 yr,25yr
25 yr, 1 Yr
3 yr,3yr
92
iC H .4 ] 5 IMU L T AN EOU S-MOV EGA ME S W ITH P U R E S TR A TE GIE S
Now consider the prisoners' dilemma game in Figure 4.4 from the husband's perspective.He has to think about what the wife will choose.Supposehe believesthat she nili confess.Then his best choice is to confess;he gets a sentence of only l0 \-ears,when denial would have meant 25 years.\Mhat if he believesthe wife n-ill deny?Again, his own best choice is to confess;he gets only I year instead of the 3 that his own denial would bring in this case.Thus, in this specialgame,Confessis better than Deny for the husband regardlessof his belief about tlte wife's choice.We say that, for the husband, the strategyConfessis a dominant strategy or that the strategy Deny is a dominated strategy. Equivalentlr', rve could say that the strategy Confessdominatesthe strategyDeny or that the strategyDeny is dominatedby the strategyConfess. If an action is clearly best for a player, no matter what the others might be doing, then there is compelling reason to think that a rational player would chooseit. And, if an action is clearly bad for a player, no matter what the others might be doing, then there is equally compelling reasonto think that a rational player would avoid it. Therefore dominance, when it exists,provides a compelling basisfor the theory of solutions to simultaneous-movegames.
A. BothPlayers Have Dominant Strategies In the preceding prisoners' dilemma, dominance should lead the husband to choose Confess.Exactly the same logic applies to the wife's choice. Her own strategyConfessdominates her own strategyDeny; so she also should choose Confess.Therefore (Confess,Confess)is the outcome predicted for this game. Note that it is a Nash equilibrium. (In fact it is the only Nash equilibrium.) Each player is choosinghis or her own best strategy. In this special game, the best choice for each is independent of whether their beliefs about the other are correct-that is the meaning of dominancebut each, attributing to the other the same rationality as he or she practices, should be able to form correct beliefs.And the actual action of each is the best responseto the actual action of the other. Note that