FROM WIVES TO WIDOWS IN EARLY MODERN PARIS
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FROM WIVES TO WIDOWS IN EARLY MODERN PARIS
Women and Gender in the Early Modern World Series Editors: Allyson Poska and Abby Zanger In the past decade, the study of women and gender has offered some of the most vital and innovative challenges to scholarship on the early modern period. Ashgate’s new series of interdisciplinary and comparative studies, ‘Women and Gender in the Early Modern World’, takes up this challenge, reaching beyond geographical limitations to explore the experiences of early modern women and the nature of gender in Europe, the Americas, Asia, and Africa. Submissions of single-author studies and edited collections will be considered. Titles in this series include: Salons, History, and the Creation of Seventeenth-Century France Mastering Memory Faith E. Beasley Hermaphrodites in Renaissance Europe Kathleen P. Long Women and Poor Relief in Seventeenth-Century France The Early History of the Daughters of Charity Susan E. Dinan Widowhood and Visual Culture in Early Modern Europe Edited by Allison Levy Childbirth and the Display of Authority in Early Modern France Lianne McTavish The Power and Patronage of Marguerite de Navarre Barbara Stephenson
From Wives to Widows in Early Modern Paris Gender, Economy, and Law
JANINE M. LANZA
Wayne State University, USA
© Janine M. Lanza 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Janine M. Lanza has asserted her moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hants GU11 3HR England
Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA
Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Lanza, Janine Marie From wives to widows in early modern Paris : gender, economy and law. – (Women and gender in the early modern world) 1. Widows – France – Paris – Social conditions – 16th century 2. Widows – France – Paris – Economic conditions – 16th century 3. Widows – France – Paris – Social conditions – 17th century 4. Widows – France – Paris – Economic conditions – 17th century I.Title 306.8'83'0944361 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lanza, Janine Marie. From wives to widows in early modern Paris : gender, economy & law / by Janine M. Lanza. p. cm. — (Women and gender in the early modern world) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-5643-2 (alk. paper) 1. Widows—France—Paris—Social conditions. 2. Widows—Legal status, laws, etc.— France—Paris. 3. Women—France—Paris—Social conditions. 4. Women—Legal status, laws, etc.—France—Paris. I. Title. HQ1058.5.F7L36 2007 306.88'30944361—dc22 2007033679 ISBN: 978-0-7546-5643-2 Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall.
For Aeneas Brendan Neligan
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Introduction
viii x 1
1
Law in Early Modern France
21
2
Women and Religious Institutions
51
3
Women’s Place in Guilds
83
4
Widows in the Workshop
121
5
The Calculus of Remarriage
153
6
The Trap of Poverty
183
Conclusion
221
Bibliography Index
231 249
Acknowledgements I am delighted, and relieved, to be able to thank the many people who have helped me write this book. The history departments at Appalachian State University and at Wayne State University have provided me with support and assistance in the process of turning a dissertation into a book. A fellowship from the Einaudi Foundation and a Bourse Chateaubriand allowed me to spend two years researching this book. A Bernadotte E. Schmidt Research Fellowship from the American Historical Association funded a summer of further research in France. A Mellon Postdoctoral Fellowship at the Newberry Library gave me the opportunity to spend a year revising the manuscript. While researching I benefited from the expert guidance of staff of the Archives Nationales, especially Mme Bimbinet who answered numerous questions about navigating the Y series. I am also grateful to the library staffs at Cornell University, Appalachian State University, and Wayne State University for helping me locate and borrow crucial texts through interlibrary loan. My graduate advisor, Steven L. Kaplan, has provided me with guidance and encouragement throughout this process. He is a model of intellectual rigor and curiosity who continues to inspire me. I am deeply grateful for his support and friendship. I thank Isabel V. Hull for her advice and interest in this project. David Sabean’s comments on my work have been very helpful. Many friends and colleagues have provided me with helpful criticism and advice on this project. I would like to thank Larry Bond, Jeffrey Bortz, Michael Moore, Neva Specht, and James Winders at Appalachian State University who read and listened to many parts of this project. The Newberry Library Fellows of 1999–2000 helped create an invigorating and fruitful environment for revising, especially Fran Dolan, Martha Few, Anne Cruz, Amy Froide, Jim Grossman, Kate Rousmaniere, and Carla Zecher. My colleagues at Wayne State University have helped me push through the final stages of this process. Sandra Van Burkleo and Chris Johnson read all of the chapters with great patience and enthusiasm. My chair, Marc Kruman, has been unstinting in his encouragement. Many colleagues have generously read and commented on my work. Suzanne Desan and James Farr read early versions of chapters and helped me chart my revisions. Joan Scott read my entire manuscript and provided me with excellent and probing advice. Gilles Postel-Vinay provided me with crucial data from the 1761 Minutier Central records. André Burguière offered me assistance with
Acknowledgements
ix
interpreting Officialité records as well as data from those court records. Martha Howell, Jeffrey Merrick, Sarah Hanley, Sara Chapman, Philippe Minard, Simona Cerutti, Gail Bossenga, Greg Brown, Jeff Horne, Dan Ringrose, Michael Kwass, Laura Mason, Martin Bruegel, Daryl Hafter, Julie Hardwick, and Rene Marion have all given me useful ideas and comments. Michael Wilson, Cynthia Koepp, Sydney Watts, Susan Matt, Sandie Gravett, Stella Anderson, Greg and Tamara Swedberg, Elizabeth Faue, Renee Bricker, Betsy Lublin, Eric Ash, Catherine Ash, and Daniella Kostroun have each provided a sympathetic ear and constant friendship. Clare Crowston has been a dear friend and colleague since our years at Cornell. My family has given me the support and love necessary to seeing this project through to its completion. My parents, Dorothy and Gerald Lanza, have provided unfailing encouragement and assistance. I thank my sister Jennifer Williams and my niece Jessica Williams, and my brother Denis Lanza, for giving me support when I needed it. My aunt Mary Neligan asked me if my book was finished, until it was. My in-laws Barbara Cho, and Yanglai Cho and Marion White have also lent a hand in this project. My husband Adrian Cho deserves all the thanks I can give him. He has read this manuscript, lending me his considerable skills as a writer. More importantly, he has given me his love and faith throughout this process. Our children Audrey and Emmett have contributed by making me immensely happy. Finally, my grandfather Aeneas Brendan Neligan deserves my best thanks for his love.
List of Abbreviations AN
Archives Nationales
BN
Bibliothèque Nationale
JF
Joly de Fleury Collection
MC
Minutier Central
AS
Archives de la Seine
Introduction
The status of baker is one of a great many that a solitary woman cannot oversee; she would find herself at the mercy of her workers (garçons), and her shop would degenerate, if she had not given them a master.1
When Grimod de la Reynière, the nineteenth-century gourmand and writer, penned that assessment in the early 1800s, he echoed the sentiments of many of his contemporaries: women could not wield authority or control men, regardless of their abilities, training, intelligence, or experience. Given his assumptions about women, Grimod expresses palpable relief that Madame Poizard, the baker’s widow in question, planned to remarry and re-establish order within her enterprise, and presumably in her private life as well. Not only would that restore Grimod’s confidence in the quality of one of his favorite bakeries, it would also bring this unmarried woman back to her natural place in the social hierarchy—under the authority of a man. Grimod de la Reynière was not alone in believing that widows presented problems for French society. Many early modern French writers feared that widows could disrupt gender roles designed to help maintain a well-ordered hierarchical society. Admonitions to remarry or, alternately, to devote their lives to pious works bespoke an effort to ensure that widows did not use their independence in ways that challenged the patriarchal order. Those widows who moved beyond such prescribed roles provoked misgivings in their contemporaries, a reaction that produced a number of formal mechanisms designed to limit female action. Laws that curtailed female control over property also served to place widowed women under the control of other family members, namely fathers or uncles, after a husband’s death. Independent women could threaten the orderly, patriarchal structure of society, particularly if, like artisanal women, they had access to wealth, expertise, or community ties.2 This book is about widows of master craftsmen in early modern Paris and the ways that their lives changed after their husbands died. Our understanding of widows and widowhood has been shaped more by assumptions about and representations of the era than by sustained consideration of widows’ social roles 1
Grimod de la Reynière, Almanach des Gourmands (8 vols, Paris, 1803–1812), vol. 7, p. 201. 2 Merry E. Wiesner, Women and Gender in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 9–34; Judith M. Bennett and Amy M. Froide, ‘A Singular Past,’ in Judith M. Bennett and Amy M. Froide (eds), Singlewomen in the European Past, 1250–1800 (Philadelphia, 1999), pp. 11–21.
From Wives to Widows
2
and their everyday experiences. The poor and humble widow who barely sustained herself, the pious widow who consoled herself with religion, the “merry widow” who used her freedom to lead a scandalous life—all of these stereotypes have figured prominently in discussions of widowed women. But widows’ lives went beyond these characterizations. No close examination exists of either the cultural assumptions and restrictions that shaped notions of widowhood or the everyday practices of these women in early modern France. How, then, did the early modern French view widows? How did widows use their newly acquired legal emancipation? How did they handle their grief? How did their roles in their families and their communities change? How did they remain financially solvent without a man at the head of the household? For the most part, these questions touch upon the experiences of widows and the ways they related to normative structures and ideologies. For the widow, marriage mutated into a new life, one that began with a death and a funeral. At the deathbed, a wife was still concerned with her husband’s worsening physical condition and imminent death. During one of his walks, Restif de la Bretonne described witnessing such a scene. As he passed the house of the recently deceased, he heard that “his wife was there; she is in despair…(entering) I found the young and beautiful widow dissolving in tears, still holding her husband’s corpse.”3 Restif was able to bring the widow back to her senses, although he describes an emotional and despondent woman. But even in her lassitude, a new widow owed her deceased husband certain ministrations before he could finally be laid to rest. The overwhelming obligation in these last moments was to minister to physical and spiritual needs. In almost every instance, a priest was already present as death approached, having been called to administer extreme unction to the dying and religious comfort to everyone in the house. To ensure that all those who died were in a state of spiritual readiness, the royal government demanded that a physician notify the local curé after the second visit to a patient’s home.4 The community 3
Nicolas Restif de la Bretonne, Les nuits de Paris, ou le Spectateur nocturne (7 vols, London, 1788–89), vol. 3, pp. 568–9. 4 A Royal Declaration of 1712, reiterated in 1724, promulgated these regulations so that family shock and delicacy might not unwittingly serve to deny a dying penitent the crucial last rites, final confession and extreme unction. This law also coincided with the height of concern over the influence of Jansenism, another factor in its passage. If the physician did not comply with this declaration, he was fined 300 livres for the first infringement, and was suspended from practicing medicine for three months after the second time. These rigid regulations seemed to be effective, since according to John McManners, “(e)xcept in Protestant areas, or in cases of sudden death, there were few who died without the ministrations of the Church.” François André Isambert, Recueil general des anciennes lois françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la révolution de1789 (29 vols, Paris, 1821–33), vol. 20, p. 574. John McManners, Death and the Enlightenment: Changing Attitudes to Death among Christians and Unbelievers in Eighteenth-Century France (Oxford, 1981), p. 244.
Introduction
3
also participated in the rituals of death. Neighbors began to prepare themselves when they saw the curé bringing the sacrament to a private home, and when they heard the church bells ring they knew that a soul had just gone to its final reckoning.5 At that point, friends and relatives gathered to pay their last respects, and the body remained in the house overnight while the closest family and friends kept a prayerful vigil.6 The vigil completed, neighbors and friends would join family members in escorting the body to the church and its final resting place.7 After a service over the body, during which it was typically surrounded by candles and sprinkled with holy water, the deceased’s loved ones bid final farewell at the burial.8 For the widow of a master artisan, there was an additional layer of funerary rites that accompanied her husband’s death. To mark the passing of one of their brethren, the guild and its confraternity participated in the rituals of a master’s death. A portion of yearly confraternal dues paid for masses to be said for the souls of deceased members, as well as candles for funerals. Statutes of the carpenters’ confraternity explain in detail the functions of that group and its administrators. The administrators notified fellow masters if one of their peers was mortally ill so that they could all begin saying prayers for his recovery. Members were also obliged to bring communion to an ailing master to speed along his recuperation. At a master’s death, the confraternity paid for a mass to be said for the soul of the deceased, attended by all fellow confraternity members. Each year, on the feast day of the guild’s patron saint, the confraternity also sponsored a mass for the souls of deceased members.9 Once a woman had fulfilled her spiritual duty and ensured her husband a Christian burial, her other vital concern was the safeguarding of the family’s assets. At his death she became the guardian of the family’s resources, and by extension of its future. If the family had any possessions of note, she needed to arrange for a police commissioner to come and seal the house so that heirs would 5
McManners, p. 271. While the vigil had a primarily religious purpose, to send the deceased to his final reward accompanied by the prayers of his loved ones, it also could have a practical purpose. In the eighteenth century, there was some fear of being buried alive; a watchful companion could lay such apprehensions to rest. See Jean-Louis Bourgeon, “La peur d’être enterré vivant au XVIIIe siècle. Mythe et réalité,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 30/1 (1983): 144–8. 7 Vanessa Harding, “Whose Body? A Study of Attitudes toward the Dead Body in Early Modern Paris,” in Bruce Gordon and Peter Marshal (eds), The Place of the Dead: Death and Remembrance in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 180–81. 8 Pierre Chaunu, La mort à Paris: XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris, 1977), pp. 359– 60. 9 René de Lespinasse, Les métiers et corporations de Paris XIVe-XVIIIe siècle (3 vols, Paris, 1886–97), vol. 2, p. 658. 6
From Wives to Widows
4
be assured they would receive their due from the deceased’s estate. When the commissioner came to shut the house, he also made an initial account of everything in it.10 The seals he left behind and the record he made ensured that no servant or disgruntled relative could pilfer items from the home before property was rightfully distributed. The police commissioner’s list was later affirmed and expanded by a pair of notaries who made a careful and legally binding account of the deceased’s estate.11 A notary arrived later to make a formal reckoning in an inventaire après décès, a probate inventory. At that point, any wills or contracts pertaining to the distribution of the estate could take effect. After the death of her husband, religious custom urged the widow to retire from society for a period of mourning, in order to reflect on her changed situation and in order not to thrust a reminder of death before others’ eyes. The widow, because she had just witnessed her husband’s death, reminded those around her of their inevitable fate. In order to dissipate some of the widow’s energy due to her association with death, she undertook a period of mourning.12 This time served as a transition from wife to widow, and allowed her and those around her to adjust to the new situation. Often the widow remarried after spending some time in seclusion, and thus readopted a role appropriate for a woman. But if the widow did not remarry, she embodied contradictory qualities; she shared roles with men and women, and yet differed from both. While we know that the scenes evoked above happened to women more than to men, we do not know precisely how death rearranged relationships and individual roles. Death and its disruptions formed a regular part of married life. In early modern France, approximately 25 per cent of the population lost at least one spouse prematurely, and often more than one, over the course of a lifetime.13 But while we know that such ruptures frequently formed part of individual experience, the meaning for those involved, and for the society as a whole, eludes us. In many 10
For the pre-Revolutionary period, these preliminary inventories are in the Y series of the Archives Nationales. 11 Due to their cost, probate inventories were not universal. A poor family with few assets was not likely to spend the money on a notary’s services. However, the families of most master artisans did invest in these services in order to safeguard their sometimes substantial assets. See Adeline Daumard and François Furet, Structures et relations sociales à Paris au milieu du XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1961), pp. 23–4 and Daniel Roche, The People of Paris: An Essay in Popular Culture in the Eighteenth Century, trans. Marie Evans and Gwynne Lewis (Berkeley, 1987). 12 Nancy C. Lutkehaus, “Feminist Anthropology and Female Initiation in Melanesia,” in Nancy C. Lutkehaus and Paul B. Roscoe (eds), Gender Rituals: Female Initiation in Melanesia (New York, 1995), p. 17; Jean Comaroff, Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South African People (Chicago, 1985), pp. 85–6; LouisSébastien Mercier, Tableau de Paris (12 vols, Geneva, 1979), vol. 5, pp. 133–8. 13 Jacques Dupâquier, La population rurale du Bassin parisien à l’époque de Louis XIV (Paris, 1979), pp. 112–14.
Introduction
5
ways, widows were troubling to their society. They represented a point of instability and anxiety in a culture that was organized around the ideology of patriarchy.14 They behaved in many respects as men did. Widows held a place of authority in their families and communities; they managed wealth; they possessed legal personhood. And yet, at the same time, widows were represented as encompassing all of the worst aspects of the female sex. Writers stereotyped them as avaricious, promiscuous, and vain. One cultural manifestation of this ambiguity toward widows can be found in contes de fée, or fairy tales. In these stories, widows often appear as less than admirable figures. In contrast to the pious widows of religious tracts who immersed themselves in prayer to surmount their losses, widows in fairy tales lived more pragmatic, and less exemplary, lives. They eked out an existence and raised their children, usually with bad humor. One of the ways widows distinguished themselves from other women in these fictional tales was by their aggression and by the nature of their speech. In the story entitled La Fée Conte, for example, a widow with two daughters raises the elder to be greedy and obnoxious and the younger, who resembles her father, to be honest and sweet.15 The good-natured daughter gives a drink to an old crone she encounters at the well while fetching water for the household. The generosity and kindness of her gestures lead the crone to reveal herself as a fairy. She then confers a gift on the girl. Each word the good daughter utters results in a precious gem falling from her mouth.16 When the girl returns home her mother scolds her for tarrying at the fountain. As the girl explains what has happened, her mother is astounded to see gemstones form from the words. In response, the widow sends her other, disagreeable daughter to the well so she too might benefit from such a gift. When the elder daughter encounters the same fairy, her evident greed and ill-will result in excrement forming each time she spoke a word. The widow rails against her elder daughter’s fate and chases the younger from her home. The younger daughter subsequently marries a prince and lives happily ever after.17
14 A large body of work exists that discusses the patriarchal basis of French social structure. See, among other works, Julie Hardwick, The Practice of Patriarchy: Gender and the Politics of Household Authority in Early Modern France (University Park, 1998); Sarah Hanley, “Social Sites of Political Practice in France: Lawsuits, Civil Rights and the Separation of Powers in Domestic and State Government, 1500–1800,” American Historical Review, 102/1 (1997): 27–52; James R. Farr, Authority and Sexuality in Early Modern Burgundy (1550–1730) (Oxford, 1994); Jeffrey Merrick, “Fathers and Kings: Patriarchalism and Absolutism in Eighteenth-Century French Politics,” Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 308(1993). 15 Charles Perrault, Histoire du temps passé, ou les contes de ma Mere l’Oye avec les moralités (London & Brussels, 1786), p. 8. 16 Ibid., p. 9. 17 Ibid., pp. 10, 12.
From Wives to Widows
6
In this tale, the widow’s disagreeable nature, as reflected in her daughter, prompted punishment without appeal. The search for wealth by the widow and her daughter, even when undertaken to support a fatherless family, met with a reproof created not only to thwart the attempt to accumulate material goods but also to humiliate an avaricious woman. The child who might have supported this family fled, leaving her mother and sister to eke out a meager existence in the forest. This tale, and others like it, reveal a number of ambiguities about widows. The widow failed to raise her children well; one child was greedy, mean, and grasping. And in the end the child’s failings, which were by extension her mother’s, came to be punished by a supernatural entity. From this, the reader might draw the lesson that a widow could not raise her children properly without a man in the house. Scholars of fairy tales have found a pattern in the treatment of willful women in all such tales. Women who wished to exercise their will over external circumstances, rather than react to the consequences of others’ actions, found themselves chastened in some way for acting beyond the bounds of their sex. A women seeking to support herself acted toward a commendable end, “yet within the general pattern of punishing any sort of female agency, it seems fair to suggest that they are punished as much for their excessive agency as for its moral content.”18 We will find in particular that women who spoke their minds, sought success, and wielded authority sometimes found themselves mocked, shunned, or disparaged by their contemporaries. The strategies widows used to navigate, and at times redefine, the roles dictated to them by their gender as well as those dictated by desire or necessity are at the heart of this book. The reactions of others, both individuals and institutions, form the backdrop to understanding the meaning of the lives of these sometimes problematic women. Various cultural sources reveal the ways in which French society mistrusted the independence of widows. Most troubling were acts and behavior that endangered family wealth and honor.19 In many eighteenth-century literary representations, widows appear as sexual wantons and greedy wastrels. The widowed Marquise de Merteuil from Les Liaisons Dangereuses, one of the most infamous protagonists of eighteenth-century literature, displays the range of decadent behavior.20 She uses her inherited wealth, and especially her freedom from male authority, to indulge in numerous sexual adventures. Such conduct presents a particular danger to the family as it could produce an illegitimate child who might try to make a claim on the family’s patrimoine. In great measure, the Marquise de Merteuil and her fellow libertine the Vicomte de Valmont are able to cause so much turmoil precisely 18
Sherri Ortner, Making Gender: The Politics and Erotics of Culture (Boston, 1996),
p. 10. 19
On the connection between sexual comportment and ideas of honor, see Farr, Authority and Sexuality. 20 Pierre Choderlos de Laclos, Les Liaisons Dangereuses, trans. Douglas Parmée (Oxford, 1995).
Introduction
7
because there are no virtuous male figures in this novel to protect the helpless female victims, or to guide them through the challenges presented by dissolute society. In the absence of such men, families fall apart. Cécile de Volanges, the fifteen-year-old girl ruined by Valmont, has only a widowed mother. Had Cécile a father to defend her virtue, would Valmont reconsider his project? Madame de Tourval, “a grass widow” because of her husband’s perpetual absence, is lured into adultery and eventually a guilt-ridden and self-induced death because she lacks her husband’s supervision. In his work “Le Chevalier à la mode,” Florent Dancourt, a seventeenth-century playwright, introduces his reader to Madame Pantin, the wealthy widow of a royal tax-collector.21 After her husband’s death, she comes into possession of millions of livres and, in order to ensure the future existence of this fortune, her brother-inlaw, Serrefort, betroths her to the financier Migaud. But Madame Pantin rejects her brother-in-law’s attempt to chart her future, spurning the spouse he chooses for her. Instead, she sets out to find a younger, noble husband who can provide both a step up in society and satisfaction in the bedroom. Serrefort and Migaud scheme to keep Madame Pantin from ruining herself by taking a worthless husband, although Serrefort does not have any formal leverage over his sister-in-law’s behavior. Madame Pantin has reached the age of legal majority, and she has no children whose interests Serrefort needed to protect. Serrefort and Migaud continue to reason with the silly widow Pantin, and finally convince her that she should follow their advice. Until the end of the play, when Madame Pantin meekly submits to the planned marriage, she conforms to the stereotype of the irresponsible and frivolous widow who desperately needs her male kin to guide her actions and correct her unsound judgment. In terms of their representation in literary sources, writers used many of the same tropes to describe widows as were used to describe women in general. Widows were unstable, irrational, incapable of controlling their sexual urges, and ultimately untrustworthy. In reality, however, widows enjoyed the property rights accorded men, as well as the role of head-of-household. In some ways, with respect to the practical problems that emerged after a husband’s death, early modern French society was ready to treat the widow as an ‘honorary man’ in order to ensure the smooth devolution of property and the continued integrity of the family.22 However, writers depicted widows as unworthy of such a status due to 21
Florent Carton Dancourt, Le Chevalier à la mode, ed. Robert H. Crawshaw (Exeter, 1980). Two recent dissertations have examined the role of widows in early modern French literary works. Kathleen Marie Llewellyn, “The Widow in Early Modern French Literature,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University, 2000) and Deborah Hahn, “The School for Widows: Gender, (Re) Marriage, and Comedy on the Absolutist Stage,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University, 1999). 22 The notion of the “honorary man” comes from Laurel Thatcher Ulrich’s Good Wives: Image and Reality in the Lives of Women in Northern New England, 1650–1750 (New York, 1982).
From Wives to Widows
8
their myriad shortcomings. The dissonance between what widows could do, indeed what they were compelled to do for their own well-being and that of their families, and how they were imagined in cultural sources demonstrates that conceptually, widows could be understood neither as women nor, certainly, as men. They stood as a group apart, one that their society allowed to act in ways that benefited them and their families, but also one that was barely tolerated and misunderstood. By examining practice along with representation, we can see that, in many respects, widows occupied the interstices of this culture, particularly with regard to gender ideals. My study of widows—the ways they were represented and how they experienced widowhood—challenges many scholarly assumptions about women and their roles with respect to law, the family, and economic activity. Widows were to be found in every social and economic level in Paris. This filthy and violent city crushed its inhabitants, creating widows at a more rapid clip than did the countryside.23 It also enclosed within its figurative walls all kinds of people who came to the capital for myriad reasons. Nobles sought out the latest in culture, as well as the ears of bureaucrats and financiers. Peasants came looking for work they believed would be easier and more plentiful than what they could find on farms. Skilled workers came to the city that set the economic and cultural standards for the kingdom and the continent beyond. Paris’s economic, political and cultural ascendancy, in short, created a city more diverse than any other in France. In order to observe the wide variety of Parisian social and economic experiences, I focused my research on widows of guild masters. Guilds were work-centered institutions that organized skilled trades in early modern Paris and in other French cities. In wealth and social position, master craftsmen in these guilds covered the gamut. Many masters ran extremely successful businesses and earned fortunes that rivaled those of the nobility; others barely eked out a living, skating at the edge of poverty. While master craftsmen shared a title, then, they did not share a social or economic class. Yet all masters were unified in the theoretical social taxonomy that ordered this society by virtue of their status in guilds.24 The widows of master craftsmen, in turn, represented a wide range of social and economic levels who nonetheless shared a set of privileges and a status unavailable to other members of Parisian society. What is already known about widows and guilds is that these women did have a claim on their husbands’ mastership after death. Many historians of guilds have not explored the meaning of
23
Arlette Farge, “Les artisans malades de leur travail,” Annales: Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations, 32/5 (1977): 993–1006. 24 On the issue of social taxonomy and guilds, see Steven Laurence Kaplan, “Social Classification and Representation in the Corporate World of Eighteenth-Century France: Turgot’s Carnival,” in Steven Laurence Kaplan and Cynthia J. Koepp (eds), Work in France: Representations, Meaning, Organization and Practice (Ithaca, 1986).
Introduction
9
the widow’s privilege, and have assumed that she was not capable of taking advantage of the mastership she inherited.25 But widows were often very active and successful businesswomen. The title ‘maîtresse,’ or mistress, encapsulated their newfound authority in the shop as well as in the community. Given the advantages accorded widows of master craftsmen, they were arguably the most privileged women in French society. Because they did not belong to an elite social status, these widows were not subject to family pressures to remarry and establish new ties of patronage for their kin group, nor were they constrained by elite rejection of labor that kept wealthy and noble women from working. Guild widows also had the potential to escape some of the problems of poorer and less skilled people. They possessed capital and hands-on training in trades that gave them the possibility to avoid poverty or menial work. They had a socially acceptable and practical way to carve out an independent, respectable and prosperous situation for themselves at a time and in a place where this achievement was unlikely. My study of widows challenges assumptions in three broad theoretical areas of French history. First, understanding widows dramatically alters our understanding of gender, both in terms of how it was lived in this period and also how historians can use this construct to advance analysis. Prescriptive and literary writings of the period portrayed widows as women in need of some source of control due to the lack of male authority in their lives. Whether it be through religion or a male relative, the most desirable course of action for the widow was to quickly insert herself into some sort of stable patriarchal relationship, lest she wreak havoc by behaving foolishly, ruining her reputation and squandering her family’s wealth and good name. These religious and literary works sought to reimpose the constraints of femaleness, and female gender roles, on women who had the momentary opportunity to exercise independence. But widows did not follow the advice provided for them in prescriptive texts. Instead, they disrupted gender norms, occupying a liminal space, by acting as men could in some situations, but constrained as women were in other instances. Because they enjoyed legal rights denied to other women, widows acted out ambiguous roles in their daily lives, by coping with singleness, responsibility, and social expectations. They held social positions that women normally did not occupy—for example, as heads of households or owners of businesses, and as authority figures in their homes and communities. By their practices, they devised a new set of gender norms that served their needs and departed from the roles they had filled as daughter and wife. While undeniably living within a patriarchal system, widows, in their actions, nonetheless broke away from a conception of
25
See for example William Sewell, Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848 (Cambridge, 1980) and Michael Sonenscher, Work and Wages: Natural Law, Politics, and Eighteenth-Century French Trades (Cambridge, 1989), neither of whom discuss any roles for women in the trades.
10
From Wives to Widows
gender as binary opposition and were able to occupy a spectrum of acceptable gendered roles. Second, my work engages the historiographical issue of business and entrepreneurship, particularly women’s participation in the world of work. The notion of the “family economy” assumes a family unit in which men orchestrated labor, reinforced in these efforts by wives and children. “Family economy,” while asserting the importance of women’s work, reinscribes the model of the patriarchal household. As conceived by historians, the family economy demanded that all members of the household contribute their labor, and the wages generated thereby, in order to maintain the family’s solvency. Such economic logic would seem to dictate the impoverishment of the household after the father’s death since the loss of his labor, most valuable in terms of wage compensation, left the family with a gaping economic hole.26 My evidence shows otherwise and argues for a reconception of the idea of the “family economy.” Women ran large, successful businesses on their own in a sphere where nominally women were not welcomed. Furthermore, widows, despite the limitations of their gender, shared in a trade identity based on their membership in guilds. A chapter about remarriage patterns, based on the little-used records of the Parisian ecclesiastical court, shows widows overwhelmingly remarrying within their trade. These marriages, coupled with the daily business transactions between widows, the guild and other masters, solidified the trade ties and identities that widows created after their husbands’ deaths. In looking at the ways widows interacted in the marketplace, we see that the crucial family resources at work here were monetary assets and social privilege, another powerful form of capital in this context. A widow could do without her husband’s labor if she had control over the capital of their joint business. The key was not labor so much as a thriving shop which served to anchor the family’s survival. In light of these findings, historians must rethink both the nature of the guild as an institution and, more broadly, the ways that women participated in economic activity in early modern French society. These findings challenge a notion that all women enjoyed more or less the same relationship to power, and, with it, the historian’s single model of female exclusion from the skilled sectors of the economy. Third, my study explicitly examines the place of the law in lived experiences of the early modern period. The use of the law as an analytical category for understanding the past has generally been left to historians of early modern England and America, especially those who study political and legal institutions. Such works generally have taken the law to be a static body of knowledge, imposed by the State on its subjects with little consideration for the ways in which the law penetrated the fabric of daily life. In terms of gender issues, historians of 26 Joan W. Scott and Louise Tilly, Women, Work, and Family (New York, 1978); Olwen Hufton, “Women and the Family Economy in Eighteenth-Century France,” French Historical Studies, 9/1(1975): 1–22.
Introduction
11
the law in early modern Europe traditionally offer a past where men used the rigidity and coercive power of the law to control women. Sarah Hanley depicts a royal government scheming with fathers to assert dominance over women, married and single, through law. She pessimistically sees few ways that women could use law to argue for their own subject position in their families or communities. Martha Howell focuses on shifts in the form of marriage contracts and posits a loss in status for women through legal changes in inheritance practices. In this case, too, Howell shows women trapped in a trajectory of legal change that diminished their opportunities without providing them with tools to resist such changes.27 These interpretations, however, fall short. The law was not monolithic, nor was it employed solely by a certain segment of society. While sixteenth- and seventeenth-century widows faced limitations when they entered a second marriage, many other aspects of civil law privileged them. For example, a Parisian widow was entitled to the lifetime use of half of her late husband’s property, a proviso that deprived his heirs of the full use of their inheritance, often for many years, in order to ensure the widow’s continued financial independence. Notarial contracts show how, in the face of resistance by heirs, widows used their understanding of civil law and contract to maintain control over family property. Furthermore, civil law provisions that limited the ways property could be distributed constrained men’s behavior as well as women’s, a fact that casts doubt on its purely patriarchal operation. The law, then, was a far more supple and complex field of activity than many historians have suggested. The law was a strategic field, tied up with practice as well as with explicit norms, mutating to conform to the needs of those who interacted with it. Here I follow the work of the anthropologist Louis AssierAndrieu and the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu who both stress the malleable and social elements of law, not its purely formal qualities.28 They see the law as something that has a dual purpose. In strategic terms, the law serves social actors in ways that go beyond its foundational, or original, meaning. Families and their individual members understood and manipulated provisions of civil law in order to facilitate their particular goals—a change in status or wealth, for example, or a redistribution of patrimony to new heirs. However, while the law certainly lent itself to certain kinds of strategic uses, it was also a constitutive language that forcefully brought into being what it declared through courts and the State. While 27
Sarah Hanley, “The Jurisprudence of the Arrêts: Marital Union, Civil Society, and State Formation in France, 1550–1650,” Law and History Review, 21/1 (2003): 1–40 and “Social Sites of Political Practice in France: Lawsuits, Civil Rights, and the Separation of Powers in Domestic and State Government, 1500–1800,” American Historical Review, 102/1 (1997): 27–52; Martha Howell, The Marriage Exchange: Property, Social Place, and Gender in Cities of the Low Countries, 1300–1550 (Chicago, 1998). 28 Louis Assier-Andrieu, Le droit dans les sociétés humaines (Paris, 1996); Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge, 1991).
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acknowledging the malleable aspects of the law, in other words, it is also necessary to recognize this constructive element of legal language. Notarial contracts governing marriages, divisions of family property, and financial agreements show how widows used their knowledge of the law in strategic ways when they conducted their personal and professional business. Law did constrain behavior and did encapsulate the power of the State to enforce conduct, but it was also an instrument to be manipulated in order to achieve certain limited goals. Law cannot be understood merely as an ideological mechanism for imposing the will of the King on his subjects and, analogously, the will of the father on his family. The status and experiences of widows cast doubt on other scholarly assumptions about women, law, family and entrepreneurship. In this period, for example, widows did not lose their rights to take over the role as head of household, to direct their family or business, or to manage property. In the legal sphere, while the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed the royal government attempting to rationalize the diverse law codes of France, the rights of widows as independent legal agents largely continued to be upheld. For example, the codification and revisions of French common law maintained widows’ broad discretion over family property. While prescriptive literature may have expressed increased ambivalence about widows, they did not experience a diminution of their legal rights. The experience of widowed women remaps our understanding of gender, revealing a middle, ambivalent, ground between male and female spheres. Widows, then, were subject to a range of constraints and choices that accompanied their new status as stewards of households without male heads. They moved on unfamiliar terrain, either because they had made certain choices themselves or because circumstances constrained them. In working out how these women navigated the choices they faced and in addressing the historical issues discussed above, I rely upon two conceptual languages—gender and practice. The concept of gender refers to the ways in which societies interpret the meanings and implications of biological difference; in turn, cultural understandings of biological difference structured access to resources, power, and position. As historians of women have observed, exploration of gender practices changes the basic structure of history.29 Periodization, class structures, and ideas about power in the state and the family all change when we consider gender.30 The notion of 29
Joan Scott emphasizes the need to look at gender as a dynamic category, grounded in particular social configurations and changing with social shifts. In order to endow the concept of gender with analytic power, she stresses the need to examine “why these relationships are constructed as they are, how they work, (and) how they change.” “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” in Joan Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (New York, 1988), p. 32. 30 The literature encompassing gender is vast. The following works have been particularly useful to my work. Joan Kelly, Women, History and Theory (Chicago, 1984);
Introduction
13
gender is particularly salient for understanding the structure of the world of work and labor, since “the attempt to find a place for gender and women in this model disarranges teleologies, blurs boundaries between levels, or breaks the model apart altogether.”31 For the study of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, understanding the meaning of gender roles reveals the limits of the workings of the family economy and family strategies, as well as the ways in which traditional ideas about gender obfuscate many dimensions of female experience. Understanding widows inflects the broader limits of male and female behavior. Women cannot be examined as a block, defined solely by their biological sex. Indeed, widows could behave in ways forbidden to other women, leading us to see that gender roles were relatively porous and diverse. This book is organized thematically rather than around the female life-cycle. Shaping a study of female experience around life-changes seems to ground them in their biology, a seemingly timeless and universal set of constraints, rather than in the social structures, discursive constraints, and individual choices that shaped women’s lives. Focusing on thematic issues allows us to examine the ways in which external boundaries structured widows’ lives, and the experiences resulting from such constraints and private choices. In this endeavor, the insights of practice theorists also serve as a guide. When examining those who did not explain their acts and their behavior, we are left with a study of what they did rather than what Natalie Zemon Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Stanford, 1975); Scott, Gender and the Politics of History; Scott and Tilly, Women, Work and Family; Joan Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca, 1988); Lynn A. Hunt (ed.), Eroticism and the Body Politic (Baltimore, 1990); Ortner, Making Gender; Michelle Perrot (ed.), Writing Women’s History (Oxford, 1992); Nancy Lutkehaus and Paul Roscoe (eds), Gender Rituals: Female Initiation in Melanesia (New York, 1995); Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, Women, Family, and Ritual in Renaissance Italy (Chicago, 1985); Thomas Kuehn, Law, Family and Women: Toward a Legal Anthropology of Renaissance Italy (Chicago, 1991); Howell, The Marriage Exchange. More broadly, several works on women’s position under the American legal system have also provided a valuable comparative point of view. See Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law: Women, Marriage, and Property in Nineteenth-Century New York (Ithaca, 1982); Mary Lynn Salmon, Women and the Law of Property in Early America (Chapel Hill, 1986); Karin Wulf, Not Only Wives: Women of Colonial Philadelphia (Ithaca, 2000); Cornelia Dayton, Women Before the Bar: Gender, Law, and Society in Connecticut, 1639–1789 (Chapel Hill, 1995). 31 Kathleen Canning, Languages of Labor and Gender: Female Factory Work in Germany, 1850–1914 (Ithaca, 1996), p. 5. See also for the impact of gender on the examination of labor Martha Howell, Women, Production and Patriarchy in Late Medieval Cities (Chicago, 1986); Merry Wiesner, Working Women in Renaissance Germany (New Brunswick, 1986); Tessie Liu, The Weaver’s Knot: the Contradictions of Class Struggle and Family Solidarity in Western France, 1750–1914 (Ithaca, 1994); Laura Frader and Sonya Rose (eds), Gender and Class in Modern Europe (Ithaca, 1996); Daryl Hafter (ed.), European Women and Preindustrial Craft (Bloomington, 1995); Clare Haru Crowston, Fabricating Women: The Seamstresses of Old Regime France, 1675–1791 (Durham, 2001).
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they said, with the “‘tactics’ articulated in the details of everyday life.”32 In the search for an understanding of how individuals and groups navigated, altered, and bowed to norms, moreover, practice theory allows historians to reach an understanding that “human action is made by ‘structure,’ and at the same time always makes and potentially unmakes it.”33 Practice theory both acknowledges the power of social constraint and allows for a certain amount of agency in those who lived within a given set of social norms. This aspect of practice theory has grown in great measure out of concern over the emphasis on binary opposition to be found in the work of structuralist social theorists. In particular, Pierre Bourdieu’s writings seek a balance between objectivist understandings of social action, which see actors as subordinate, and even oblivious, to social structures, and subjectivist understandings which posit independent, empowered, all-knowing agents who freely exercise their will.34 In order to navigate this theoretical divide, Bourdieu uses the concept of habitus to describe the nature of objective forms. Habitus consists of “systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices.”35 In addition, Bourdieu notes that “the responses of the habitus may be accompanied by a strategic calculation tending to perform in a conscious mode the operation that the habitus performs quite differently… But these responses are first defined, without any calculation, in relation to objective potentialities.”36 As such, agents are both constrained by and make choices within the structures around them. They work on both sides of a binary opposition. The process is not necessarily conscious, although social actors can be aware of their strategic calculations. It is a formulation of comportment that encompasses the objective and subjective, the strategic and the involuntary, and provides ways to bridge the gap between these seemingly irreconcilable values. Such bridging of opposing categories is crucial for the study of gender. Early works in feminist anthropology noted the power of “sexual asymmetry” to define women as the eternal Other, to use Simone de Beauvoir’s characterization of her sex.37 Such a typology of men and women argued for separate hierarchical 32
Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley, 1984), p. xiv. 33 Ortner, Making Gender, p. 2. However, as a cautionary note on the issue of agency, I add Ortner’s caveat: “it must be emphasized that the practice-theoretical perspective on agency is in no way a form of voluntarism, does not presume that agents are free individuals, does not construct the agent as a bourgeois subject, and so forth,” p. 7. 34 For an interpretation of Bourdieu’s social theory as a way to navigate between subjective and objective views of society see “Introduction” in Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma, and Moishe Postone (eds), Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives (Chicago, 1993). 35 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford, 1990), p. 53. 36 Ibid. 37 Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere, “Introduction,” in Michelle
Introduction
15
domains for the two sexes, with corresponding social roles. Breaking down the association of women with nature, which implied as well an association with the biological and the irrational, became part of the project of reconceptualizing the meaning of gender.38 Practice theory, with its emphasis on the problems inherent in binary oppositions, gives historians of gender a way to understand how women and men have been, and remain, confined and constrained by patriarchal social structures while still finding space to move beyond obstructions. Thus we can conceptualize ways women could avoid being determined by patriarchy while still acknowledging its considerable power. Key to this endeavor are law and legal institutions which strongly shaped, and were shaped by, the experience of widowhood. As we have seen, the law upholds a normatively patriarchal system of social organization. This image of the law as ideologically driven by the demands of patriarchy dovetails with the misogyny of many Church teachings that trace the origins of sin to Eve, the mother of all temptresses.39 However, if we examine the system of patriarchy more critically, we see that such a univocal understanding of the law’s meaning does not take sufficient note of the press of circumstances. When a man died, his family needed to have an individual empowered to make legally binding decisions on its behalf. Some families chose to appoint a male relative of the deceased to manage their affairs. However, such an arrangement often proved to be impractical for day-today business. As a result, that option surfaced mainly among social elites.40 Here we see one of the limitations of patriarchy in practice. At certain moments men who refuse to empower women risk serious consequences.41 We cannot hope to understand civil law, the law of private life and the family, without exploring the legal status of the widow. The laws that determined women’s legal status, married Zimbalist Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere (eds), Women, Culture, and Society (Stanford, 1974), pp. 1 and 8–9. 38 This question surfaces in several of the essays that make up the collection Women, Culture, and Society. See “Introduction;” Michelle Z. Rosaldo, “Woman, Culture, and Society: A Theoretical Overview;” Nancy Chodorow, “Family Structure and Feminine Personality;” Sherri B. Ortner, “Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?” 39 Cullen Murphy, The Word According to Eve: Women and the Bible in Ancient Times and Our Own (Boston, 1999), p. 54; James Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe (Chicago, 1987), pp. 85–6. 40 Barbara Diefendorf, Paris City Councillors in the Sixteenth Century: The Politics of Patrimony (Princeton, 1983). I did not find a single artisanal family that chose to empower a male relative over a widowed wife. 41 Sarah Hanley in her pioneering work on the French legal system is quite right to point out the gendered nature of its purpose. However, in practice her findings are more appropriate to elite sectors of society rather than other ranks. On this weakness inherent to patriarchy, see Frances E. Dolan, “Household Chastisements: Gender, Authority, and Domestic Violence,” in Patricia Fumerton and Simon Hunt (eds), Renaissance Culture and the Everyday (Philadelphia, 1999), p. 205.
From Wives to Widows
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and single, as well as the statutes regulating marriage, become intelligible only when they are placed in the context of what happened to a woman when her husband died. While at their heart laws appeared to be designed to uphold a patriarchal system, in practice it was not possible entirely to strip women of any rights over property and maintain the family’s prosperity in all circumstances. On the one hand, the legal changes put into effect by the royal government between 1556 and 1639 limiting the amount of wealth a widow could share upon remarriage responded in part to anxieties about women who were not under the direct control of men.42 In keeping with the ways women were typically represented, many noble families, as well as the royal government, believed that women freed from male authority would behave irrationally and prove incapable of managing the wealth they had inherited. On the other hand, the provisions of these laws were also shaped by the experiences of widows. Although this was a society that was ideologically committed to placing women under the control of men, practical issues like maintaining the integrity of family property and providing means of support to widows mandated compromise. For example, common law responded to notions about widowhood when it demanded that the widow have the right to the usufruct of one-half of her deceased husband’s real property, lest she should fall into poverty without a man’s care and support. On the surface these two stipulations appear to pertain specifically to the problem of widows without touching upon broader issues of property law. A closer analysis, however, shows that the principles at stake shaped the entire configuration of the marital estate. The prospect of widowhood determined the disposition of property within both the newly created family and the natal family. The question of what properties should be handed over to children, and how much should devolve upon a widow, undergirded the negotiations families undertook when creating new kinship alliances. Concern over widowhood and widowerhood permeated the civil legal system, even where those concerns were not explicitly voiced. Likewise, we cannot understand the family in the early modern period without considering the widow in two important respects. First, relationships within the family were strongly shaped by the tenets of written and customary law. Marriage contracts and marital alliances explicitly considered how the family would function after the death of its male head. Even if this scenario never materialized, relationships within the family were structured by awareness of the future legal status of the widow. Second, the widow’s experience impinged upon the emotional dimension of family life and is crucial for understanding relations between mothers and children. Since mortality rates were high, children frequently lived with only one parent, sometimes starting at a very young age. Studies of the history of childhood delve into the child’s relationship to both mother and father, but none 42
See Chapter one for further discussion of marital law.
Introduction
17
seem to consider the child of the eighteenth-century version of the broken home.43 Public approbation of a woman acting on her children’s behalf powerfully redirected relationships and behavior within the family. Finally, gender conditioned work itself. The widow of the master craftsman commanded greater privileges than did other widows. She was entitled, and often compelled, to take over the family business at his death, and even took the title of maîtresse, the feminine form of the title master. In her capacity as a maîtresse, the widow enjoyed broad authority over her family and its assets, including the laborers obliged to work in her shop.44 This position not only empowered the widow beyond what other women in her society could hope for, but also placed her in a superior position to the male workers who never managed to achieve mastership. While mastership offered the widow a great deal of possible benefit, it also demanded energy, stamina, cunning, and hard work in return. Guild members pitched in to assist the family through the master’s last illness and funeral, but solicitude did not extend to the business their brother and rival had left behind. An active business usually demanded all, and the widow of a baker or a tavern-keeper could not spend time mourning while she tried to sort through her feelings. Not opening the shop for even one day presented the risk of losing valuable customers, as well as reliable journeymen and workers who might leave an imperiled enterprise. If the widow faltered, those who had mourned at her husband’s funeral might gleefully lure his customers and laborers away from the shop, placing her livelihood in grave jeopardy. But we know that many widows took that chance and bet that they could succeed in the male world of the guilds. Widows thus constituted an important part of guild life in early modern Paris.45 While women generally had very limited 43
See David Hunt, Parents and Children in History: The Psychology of Family Life in Early Modern France (New York, 1970); David Garrioch, Neighborhood and Community in Paris, 1740–1790 (Cambridge, 1986); Tamara K. Hareven, “The History of the Family and the Complexity of Social Change,” American Historical Review, 96/1 (1991). For views of family relations that take gender more explicitly into account, see Kristen Gager, Blood Ties and Fictive Ties: Adoption and Family Life in Early Modern France (Princeton, 1996); Frances E. Dolan, Dangerous Familiars: Representations of Domestic Crime in England, 1550–1700 (Ithaca, 1994). 44 Chapter three discusses at length the guild privileges a widow could access. 45 To jump ahead somewhat, I have found widows working in some capacity in nearly every incorporated guild in early modern Paris. Chapter four examines the experiences of working widows at length. While works on the guilds often include a mention of the presence of widows in the ranks of masters, their place in those bodies has not been much explored. Steven L. Kaplan, Le meilleur pain du monde. Les boulangers de Paris au XVIIIe siécle (Paris, 1996) incorporates an extended discussion of family life in his work, and addresses the role of women and widows particularly in chapters eleven and twelve. His La fin des corporations (Paris: Fayard, 2001) also discusses wives and widows explicitly in his
18
From Wives to Widows
access to the corporate trades, the fact that guilds regularly included widows among the ranks of masters must lead historians to rethink women’s roles in the trades.46 Mastership constituted a valuable commodity in the eighteenth-century, particularly in Paris, but without family connections to the guild, it was often difficult to become a master. Marriage to a widow offered a sure path to the higher ranks of the guilds, something not otherwise easily found. While the husband of a widow did have to be qualified in the trade, and paid an entry fee, her status vis à vis the guild gave him access to the mastership. In addition, many widows possessed valuable capital such as inventory, tools, raw material, and an established clientele. Moreover, the widow herself, after years of working at her husband’s, and often parents’, sides, counted as a valuable resource for the newly forged mastership. She served as a conduit for transferring capital and skills from one master to another, thereby contributing to the social reproduction of the guild structure and commercial knowledge. She could, of course, choose to use that knowledge for her and her family’s enrichment alone. But whatever path she chose after her husband’s death, the widow maintained a presence in guild life, and shared in its benefits and demands. The insights of practice theory strongly influenced the two-part structure of this book. The first section, reflecting the constraints widows faced, explores the social conventions and norms that created barriers in widows’ lives. These chapters examine expectations of female comportment and how they shaped widows’ behavior and actions after their husbands died. They also look at how certain representations of widows influenced the ways these women interacted with their families and communities. The first chapter explores the ways that the French legal system under the Old Regime dealt with family life and women. In examining the body of legal texts that touch upon marriage and remarriage, inheritance, and women’s legal status, the chapter lays out the way legal texts envisioned female behavior as well as information about how women functioned under this body of legislation. As a result we see how women worked around the constraints written into law in order to achieve their goals. Widows were able to manage family assets and enter into remarriages on their own terms, despite some of the misogynistic language of early modern French law. Chapter two examines the ways that the Catholic Church in France sought to curtail widows’ behavior. By reading church tracts, sermons, and policies, we see
analysis of the recreation of the guilds as both economic and social bodies. In contrast, another important work on French guilds, Michael Sonenscher’s Work and Wages in France, says little about widows’ importance to these institutions. 46 Of course, a number of female guilds existed in this period. These included most notably seamstresses and linen drapers. See Hafter, European Women; Natalie Zemon Davis, “Women in the Crafts in Sixteenth-Century Lyon,” in Barbara A. Hanawalt (ed.), Women and Work in Preindustrial Europe (Bloomington, 1986); Crowston, Fabricating Women.
Introduction
19
that Catholic teaching advocated a secluded life centered around religious devotion. While pious women were praised, most women could not live up to such expectations. Instead, women incorporated religious practices into their lives while also engaging in behavior not sanctioned by the Church. In this way, women created a way to embrace religious consolation without giving up their public activities. The third chapter moves into the world of the guilds, and the lives of widows of master craftsmen. While these women faced the same challenges and constraints as did other widows in early modern French society, they also navigated the choppy waters of guild life. Using guild statutes, business almanacs, and records of business disputes, I argue that despite being largely ignored in official guild documents, widows of master craftsmen nonetheless played an important role in how guilds defined the tasks of masters and the ways families participated in work life. As in other areas of life, widows found ways to function within the masculine structures of guilds. The second section of the book explores choices that widows could make—that is, the question of lived experience. Probate inventories, notarial documents, police records, and other business documents reveal how widows lived under changed circumstances, in households without husbands. They also show how these women managed to navigate and act within the boundaries society laid out for them. Chapter four continues our investigation of the place of widows in the workshop but emphasizes what widows did in the businesses they inherited from their husbands. Using notarial contracts, police records, and records of business failures, it emphasizes the conditions under which widows were able to succeed or fail in business. The decisive factor seems to have been not the widow’s level of engagement or her expertise, but the health of the business that her husband left her. If a woman had ample assets and a healthy customer base, she was likely to flourish in her commercial enterprise. If her husband had suffered from a lengthy illness and left large debts, no amount of work or talent could save a widow from failure. In other words, what was crucial for business success was not necessarily a man’s labor at the head of an enterprise, but a healthy and vibrant workshop. Chapters five and six explore other possibilities for women who had lost their husbands. Chapter five looks at the question of remarriage and the circumstances under which a widow might decide to take another husband. Using marriage contracts and dispensations to remarry granted by the Archbishop of Paris, we see that widows differed significantly from first time brides in matters such as what wealth they contributed to the new household and how they drew up their marriage contracts. This evidence suggests that part of what made widows into fully constituted adults was not simply their legal emancipation but also their experience as married women. When they entered subsequent marriages, they entered on comparatively independent terms which reflected the changes widowhood had wrought. Furthermore, widows tended to enter marriages based on their own needs and interests rather than those of their families.
20
From Wives to Widows
Chapter six documents one possibility that all widows feared: poverty. Records of parish poor relief, as well as religious tracts and evidence from probate inventories, document the relationship of widows to poor relief. For most widows, the descent into poverty reflected the failure of work. If a widow was aged or infirm, she was likely to turn to relief to keep herself from abject poverty. If her business was in poor shape, poverty was also a distinct possibility. The evidence suggests that poverty did not stalk widows because of any inherent inability to support themselves. To the contrary, this book provides numerous examples of successful and prosperous widows. For those who failed, physical or material conditions had fallen short. These two sections work together to show, from several different vantage points, how women and their contemporaries experienced and understood life in female-headed households. Each chapter sketches out a distinct element of the experience of widows in Old Regime France as well as the normative frame that shaped these women’s choices and actions. Bringing this material together helps us to see that widows, while subject to many challenges and constraints, nonetheless succeeded in creating functional lives for themselves and their families.
Chapter 1
Law in Early Modern France Introduction In early modern France, the law provided a foundation for some of the most important acts individuals and families undertook. Most prominent among them were decisions about inheritance, marriage, and remarriage. When families decided how much and what kinds of property to include in a marriage settlement or an inheritance clause, they harkened to the provisions of civil law in making their decisions. Even determining the suitability of a prospective marriage partner could include consideration of aspects of civil law. The choice of a partner determined to a great extent a family’s ambitions for social and economic mobility. This process also served to establish a family’s financial and inheritance strategies, and the ways they would enrich the next generation in advance of an elder’s death. In all of these kinds of decisions, civil law provisions played a role. Before examining these legally charged moments, we need to consider what law means as an analytic category. In its most basic guise, the law is an instrument that creates social structure; a body of provisions, understood as the legitimate voice of the state, that aspires to regulate and circumscribe behavior. As Pierre Bourdieu explains, “(l)aw consecrates the established order by consecrating the vision of that order which is held by the State. It grants to its actors a secure identity, a status, and above all a body of powers (or competences) that are socially recognized.”1 Legal activity recognizes, and even creates, the social body, and hierarchy and authority within that social body. Law defines what is permissible and what is not permissible in a certain temporal and geographical context. The law also reflects power relations within a given social structure, expressing the wishes and aspirations of varied groups.2 In keeping with this function, 1
Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field,” trans. Richard Terdiman, The Hastings Law Journal, 38/5 (1987): 838. 2 On the power of law as a language that calls into being the social relations and behavior it names see Bourdieu, “The Force of Law,” p. 838. He notes here that “In contrast, the judgment of a court, which decides conflicts or negotiations concerning persons or things by publicly proclaiming the truth about them, belongs in the final analysis to the class of acts of naming or of insulting. The judgment represents the quintessential form of authorized, public, official speech which is spoken in the name of and to everyone.” Emphasis in original.
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women’s position under early modern French law was marked by ambiguity. Much of the language of the law was marked by a distrust of women. They were considered unreliable and thus did not enjoy the independence and authority granted to men, particularly married men. But in order to assess the impact of legislation on women, we must note that different women fell into different legal categories. Marital status and attainment of adulthood were key to knowing the limits of female legal agency. A wife could not sign contracts without her husband’s permission nor could she manage her money independently. A daughter was also beholden to her father, not having the ability to marry without parental permission until the age of 25, risking poverty if she did so. Widows escaped a number of the restraints imposed on other women and legal minors for reasons that this study will explore. They could grant their children permission to marry without input from other family members. They were the preferred legal guardians for their children, and in that capacity managed all of the household’s wealth. Such freedom of behavior, while practical in some ways, also produced concerns which manifested themselves in a number of ways which this chapter will examine. The independence a widow had in managing her own household and raising her children often troubled her family and her contemporaries. But they could not rein in these prerogatives without obliging themselves to financially supporting the widow and her children. A family, and society as a whole, needed either to allow widows broad enough freedom of conduct that they could act as heads of household or they had to pledge long-term financial support to them and their families. But even given the decision to grant widows some independence, widows’ families wished to have legal mechanisms to remind them that widows’ independence had limits. In many ways, the widow’s position demonstrates the limits of the law’s control over women and the clear distinction this society drew among single, married, and widowed women.3 Understanding the various law systems that existed in France at this time requires a balancing of the words of legal codes themselves with the ways they were employed. The interpretation of law through the mechanisms of strategy and lived practice, and the place of ambiguity in creating legal categories, formed part of what French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu terms the habitus of this culture. Habitus is a way to join an objective to a subjective perception of the world, but in a way that rejects this binary opposition by using a theory of practice to understand how both kinds of knowledge allow the individual to navigate society. It recognizes that “responses are first defined, without any calculation, in relation to objective potentialities.”4 But rather than simply conditioning the behavior of 3
In her study of noble widows Gayle Brunelle also examines the dissonance between the laws on women and the strategies widowed women used to maintain their independence of action. See her “Dangerous Liaisons: Mésalliance and Early Modern French Noblewomen,” French Historical Studies, 19/2 (1995): 75–103. 4 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford, 1990), p. 53.
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individuals, objective structures also yield to the goals and wishes of the individual. Habitus, then, “is a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways…(and to) generate practice, perceptions and attitudes which are ‘regular’ without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any rule.”5 Such an understanding of the way objective structures shape individual reactions without clearly determining either their choices or the outcome of the process is particularly apt for the field of law. As an area of knowledge that expressed the coercive power of the state, as well as the power relations within the household, law was (and is) a structure that strongly marks transactions. Yet, as we shall see, individuals had strategies to impose their wishes on the contracts they signed, even when those contracts were strongly shaped by the demands of legal necessity. This chapter examines the ways various elements of the law shaped people’s lives and the choices they made, as well as the ways individuals used the law to achieve their own ends. By placing legal codes beside contracts, we can question the ways early modern French experienced and used law in this period. More broadly, this juxtaposition enters into the question of the relationship between theoretical norms and lived experience within the boundaries created by those norms. Did the terms of legal edicts change the ways Parisians formalized marriage? Did they shape inheritance strategies? Did they make an impact on relations within the family? How was law involved in creating ideas about gender and gender relations?
The Contours of the Law The civil and criminal legal structure of early modern France was the product of centuries of accretion. Based in the far past on the laws of the Roman Empire, over the centuries that classical legacy had melded with Germanic legal custom, the Church’s canon law, and various local laws governing areas that came under the control of French kings. By the eighteenth-century, France enjoyed the dubious distinction of harboring more than 200 autonomous legal systems within its borders. While regions remained distinct in certain ways, these legal systems were grouped into several families.6 In the north, civil law was organized into regional customs (coutumes), bodies of law that had developed over time from the precedents set in legal cases as well as on communal understanding. The south of
5
John B. Thompson, “Introduction,” in Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge, 1991), p. 12. Emphasis in original. 6 Jean Yver, Egalité entre héritiers et exclusion des enfants dotés. Essai de géographie coutumière (Paris, 1966). See in particular the map showing the largest legal groups.
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France, known as the region of written law (pays de droit écrit), used written law codes based loosely on the Justinian Code and Roman law.7 In addition to the plethora of legal customs, written law, the canon law of the Catholic Church, royal legislation, parliamentary decisions, and even discrete urban and corporate regulation played distinct roles in creating a regulatory structure.8 In theory, each of these systems had a sphere of jurisdiction although there was certainly overlap and contestation over issues of precedence. Local customary law regulated most matters of civil and criminal law. However, the body of royal legislation, which was becoming more ambitious in scope and better systematized during the early modern period, modified the provisions of regional custom. When there was a difference of opinion, royal word was supposed to prevail. But given the fluid nature of customary law, based as it was on interpretation of precedent, and the differences in ways of deciding cases that prevailed across the kingdom, there was not a clear theory of judicial precedence.9 Canon law enjoyed jurisdiction over matters deemed religious, a category that became narrower as French kings strengthened and centralized their domain. By the seventeenth century the Catholic Church’s sphere was reduced to authority over matters of faith, religious persons (priests, nuns, and monks), and decisions over what constituted a valid marriage. Even the Church’s jurisdiction over marriage had shrunk. Canon law laid out what constituted free consent to marriage by both partners, and Church courts could grant dispensations if spouses were related within the forbidden degrees of closeness (consanguinité).10 However, all issues of property and inheritance pertaining to the couple and their families, the meat of any marital arrangement, fell under the jurisdiction of civil law. In this arena, too, royal legislation aspired to alter the provisions of the local custom and to shape the ways property could be granted from generation to generation. However, in practice the weight of royal law was minimized in most marriage 7
Emile Chénon, Histoire générale du droit français public et privé des origines à 1815 (2 vols, Paris, 1926), vol. 2, p. 317. 8 Sally Falk-Moore, in Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (London, 1978), discusses the difference between law and reglementary systems (what I have called here regulatory systems). She draws a distinction between sets of rules that are governmental as opposed to non-governmental: “It is inclusive enough to encompass government law and non-governmental site of rule-making and/or rule-enforcing. In complex societies ‘law’ can then be reserved for the government-enforceable” (p. 18). In early modern France, such codes that sought to regulate behavior were recognized and accepted by the royal authority. However, not all such systems were governmental in nature (e.g., canon law). The term “regulatory system” acknowledges both the varied origins and roles of these overlapping rules as well as their ability to shape, and even determine, behavior. 9 Adhémar Esmein, Cours élémentaire d’histoire du droit français (Paris, 1898), pp. 719 and 749. 10 For a fuller discussion of Church law see chapter two.
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contracts and the main determinant of property agreements remained the provisions of customary law. In this Byzantine thicket of competing laws, individuals needed some means of access. Mediation was particularly necessary given the myriad legislation that issued from the Crown, the Church, and custom, much of which offered conflicting regulations concerning the same problem.11 For those not in possession of a formal legal education, the notary, with his specialized training, offered assistance in translating the wishes for a settlement into a valid legal contract.12 The contracts themselves show that notaries used the works of commentators as well as their own knowledge to shape their interpretation of laws that often left ambiguities as to how they were to be applied. As we shall see, a contract could create nearly any kind of property arrangement, even when laws seemed to provide clear cut guidance on the matter. In Old Regime France, the law made incursions into people’s lives at two main junctures: marriage and death. Nonetheless, while law may have been visible most clearly at those two moments, it consistently structured relations within families. It was the marriage contract itself that declared the existence of a new family. This contract did so on a basic level when it assumed that the two parties signing together would mutually abide by its terms in creating their new household. Further, it determined how wealth and property would function to enrich and support the next generation. Survivor’s benefits and children’s stakes were broadly sketched out in the marriage contract, although there was no way of foreseeing the future value of assets. The greater the amount of the widow’s dower and survivor’s allowance, the less firm hold children and other lineage members would have on the deceased’s wealth. The contract balanced all of these conflicting interests and produced a result marked by compromise. Thus the marriage contract laid out property relations not simply for the couple signing the paper but also for their future offspring and their kin. The testament acted as a corollary to this document, determining the disposition of a certain amount of property not already claimed in the marriage contract. But ultimately it played a minor role in the disposition of wealth as the will was fundamentally an
11
This complexity prompted David Bell, in his book on Old Regime lawyers, to note that “(m)anuals for aspiring barristers routinely warned that a basic mastery of French jurisprudence took decades of applied study.” Lawyers into Citizens: The Making of a Political Elite in Old Regime France (New York, 1996), p. 23. 12 Julie Hardwick, The Practice of Patriarchy: Gender and the Politics of Household Authority in Early Modern France (University Park, 1998), p. 2. Hardwick points out the critical role of the notary in mediating relations between subjects and the early modern state. Barbara Diefendorf cites one probate inventory that includes a legal tome, although her subjects too rely heavily on notaries for making contracts. Paris City Councillors in the Sixteenth Century: The Politics of Patrimony (Princeton, 1983), p. 178.
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individual contract rather than a family one. In the end, these two types of legal documents served as a base and structure for the household unit.13 The process of creating legal documents was fairly well established. Notaries resided in cities of all sizes and constituted a well-trained corps of professionals trained to draw up contracts, frequently based on certain established formulas, that would have the force of a binding agreement.14 Members of many strata of French society, from the wealthiest to the more modest, used the services of a notary to ensure the validity of their contractual agreements. In addition, by the seventeenthcentury, French civil law was established in written codes, even if the legal system of the kingdom as a whole was not regularized. Merchants in Paris who signed contracts could have faith that the system was stable enough to ensure that their agreements were legally binding.15 In addition, legal specialists themselves were becoming more aware of their professional identity and imposing stricter standards of conduct and training on themselves.16 Finally, the genre of the legal commentary, works where prominent legal scholars clarified and glossed elements of civil and criminal law, became increasingly popular in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although there were competing realms of legal regulation, the royal government aspired to present the law, a reflection of the King’s power, as the sole source of justice, and by bringing more and more local jurisdiction under central control to minimize and eventually eradicate local nodes of legal power. While the Ordinances of 1539, and particularly of 1670, did move toward the goal of placing the dispensation of all criminal justice in royal courts, these projects still fell short of the total regularization of the justice system that each of these monarchs had envisioned.17 In each of these reforms Francis I and Louis XIV and the Parlement of Paris hoped to carve out a more substantial and stable role in the juridical process for the central government. For example, the Ordinance of 1539 made the King’s procurator the focal point for all information pertaining to a criminal case and left the final decision about a case in his hands.18 In contrast, the Parlements envisioned using changes in the law to create a political system where the power of the monarch was constrained by a strong Parlement. And in the mid-eighteenth century a number of philosophes called for the reform of the criminal legal system, most notably the elimination of torture as 13
Jean-Paul Poisson, “Histoire et actes notariés: problematique et methodologie,” in Bernard Vogler (ed.), Les actes notariés. Source de l’histoire sociale XVIe-XIXe siècles (Strasbourg, 1979), p. 21. 14 For notarial practice, see Jean-Paul Poisson, Notaires et société: travaux d’histoire et de sociologie notariale (Paris, 1985), pp. 106–8. 15 Hardwick, Practice of Patriarchy, p. 18. 16 Bell, Lawyers and Citizens. 17 Adhémar Esmein, A History of Continental Criminal Procedure, trans. John Simpson (London, 1914), pp. 148–50; 183–6. 18 Ibid., p. 156.
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an interrogation method, in hopes of shaping a more rational and humane criminal justice system and society. Each of these projects saw in the law a way to create a better, more harmonious and prosperous society. In these instances the law was not a means of coercion but a means of realizing ideals and creating a certain kind of society. And, in the domain of civil law, one of the most common ways that the law functioned to create that society was through the construction of marriage.
The Legal Conception of Marriage While it was local custom, here the Coutume de Paris, that offered guidance for settling property issues within a marriage contract, it was royal law that defined more broadly what constituted a marriage and how a valid marriage could be created. In creating a definition of marriage, royal edicts worked in relation to, and at times in opposition to, canon law. Traditionally, canon law pronounced upon what constituted a valid marriage. Because marriage was a sacrament in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, rather than a civil contract, the Church claimed primary jurisdiction in this domain. The Church asserted that it had the exclusive right to decide who could marry and in what fashion. But distribution of property to the new couple was not part of the sacramental union and thus was not regulated by Church law. According to the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church it was simple to effect a marriage. Two individuals, one male and one female, needed to consent to their union to create a valid marriage. Even the promise of a marriage in the future became as binding as a complete nuptial vow and prevented either engaged party from marrying another. Obviously there was no possibility for divorce in Catholic Europe, so a marriage once recognized as valid in the eyes of the Church, sole arbiter of marital status, could be dissolved only by the death of one of the partners or an expensive and politically charged annulment by the Pope. This religious conception of marriage privileged individual choice over any other consideration. In defining marriage as a relationship entered freely by both parties, and requiring nothing else, the Catholic Church was resisting the growing trend of considering marriage as an economic and social transaction. By granting individuals the ability to contract a marriage privately and without familial consent the Church was providing children with a means of escaping what it considered degrading “commercial” marriages. This conception of the meaning of marriage clashed strongly with the concerns of many French elite. Those families with property, offices, and influence planned marital alliances to enhance their prestige, wealth, and political connections. The clan’s desire for upward mobility trumped a child’s emotional wishes. French monarchs of the early modern period showed by the edicts they drafted that their sympathies rested with the wishes of families. Beginning with the passage of the Edict against Clandestine Marriages in 1557, continuing in the Edict on Second Marriage in 1560, and culminating in the Edict
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regulating the Formalities of Marriage in 1687, royal regulations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, while narrowly avoiding a definitive break with the Roman Church, made it progressively more difficult for children to contract unsanctioned unions.19 In order to understand why the royal government was becoming increasingly concerned with regulating marriage, to the point of provoking the Church, we need to consider a number of contexts. Two situations, one broad and long-term and the other acute, influenced Henry II’s passage of the Edict against Clandestine Marriages. The Council of Trent convened itself periodically from 1545 to 1563, with deliberations on the definition of marriage finally formalized in 1563. The French bishops who attended the council pushed for the adoption of parental consent as a condition for contracting a valid marriage. The Tridentine pronouncement on marriage, called Tametsi, repudiated this demand. Partly as a reaction to this repudiation, the French clergy and the Crown did not accept the decisions of Trent until 1614.20 The council did put new requirements into place for contracting a marriage, but in the end they maintained that if the two partners had freely consented to the marriage then it could not be dissolved.21 Henry II opposed this decision and proceeded to use royal law to compel prior parental consent for all unions. This bitter disagreement between the French monarch and the Pontiff foregrounded subsequent legislation on marriage. A 1556 incident involving marital strategy in the royal house demonstrated the possible repercussions of allowing marriage to be determined by individual promises. However, what was important about this particular incident was the way it reflected the great anxiety about marriage that French families, particularly elite ones, were experiencing at this moment.22 Henry II planned to marry his widowed illegitimate daughter, Diane de France, to François de Montmorency, the son of his Constable. Such an alliance, ardently desired by both Henry and the Montmorency family, would help cement the Constable’s loyalty to his king and bind one of the most powerful noble houses to the royal family. However, the match was endangered when it came out that the prospective bridegroom had made a promise of marriage before witnesses to one of the Queen’s maids of honor. To make the situation even more difficult, the couple 19 François André Isambert, Recueil des anciennes lois françaises depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la Révolution de 1789 (29 vols, Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1821–33), vol. 13, p. 469; vol. 14, p. 36; vol. 16, p. 520. 20 Gabriel LeBras, “Note sur le droit et les institutions de l’église de France au XVIIe siècle,” Dix-septième siècle, (1963): 74. Even then acceptance was conditional. 21 Jean Bernhard, “Le mariage,” in Jean Bernhard, Charles Lefebvre, and Francis Rapp (eds), L’époque de la réforme et du Concile de Trente (Paris, 1990), pp. 245, 264–5. 22 A number of works address the problem of parental consent and mésalliance. A selection of such works include: Diefendorf, Paris City Councillors; James Farr, Authority and Sexuality in Early Modern Burgundy (New York, 1995); Brunelle, “Dangerous Liaisons.”
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acted as though they were married, publicizing their promises and engaging in sexual relations.23 Under canon law, the simple mutual promise of marriage resulted in the presumption of a lawful union. Even before the alliance was made public and approved by the families of the couple, it was irrevocable. Legally François de Montmorency could not wed Diane de France as he was already married in the eyes of the Catholic Church. However, royal politics demanded that the match be made, so the couple released each other from their promises and Montmorency asked Pope Paul IV for a dispensation, essentially a dissolution of the earlier marital promise he had made, so he could marry Diane de France. The Pope refused on the grounds that the Church continued to recognize marriage contracted by simple mutual promise. Most likely the Pope’s obstreperousness stemmed in part from the French delegation’s attitude in the meetings of the Tridentine council. At the moment when this crisis was taking place, bishops were meeting to decide what in fact constituted a valid marriage for the Roman Church. The French prelates insisted that parental consent be made mandatory, a position the Church was loathe to endorse. Thus the Pope and his supporters were contending with the French bishopric’s opposition when this request for a dispensation came to the papal court. Without the Church’s dispensation, the hoped for marriage could not legitimately take place, a set-back Henri II and Montmorency père refused to accept. The King issued a royal decree stating that any marriage contracted without parental consent was invalid. Diane de France married François de Montmorency. This incident is significant not in its details but in the new era of conflict it ushered in between the French crown and the Roman church. It also marks a fundamental change in the conception of marriage and the family as reflected in royal legislation. Keeping in mind the personal, political, and ecclesiastical background of the Council of Trent and Diane’s marriage, we can now turn to the series of laws this context influenced, and analyze how it shaped the new conception of the family. While Henri II may have issued the Edict against Clandestine Marriages specifically in response to the debates taking place at Trent and his daughter’s marriage, the ideas about marriage that this edict revealed grew out of widely held opinions. In particular, elite families clamored for a means to maintain control over their children’s marital alliances. Without this control established, marriages might be considered mésalliances, and thereby thwart a lineage’s hopes for social prestige and advancement.24 In fact, legislation in the areas of written law, influenced by precepts of Roman law, did require parental consent to marriage
23 Frederic J. Baumgartner, Henry II, King of France, 1547–1559 (Durham, 1988), pp. 161–2. Also private communication, Anne Lefèbvre-Teillard. 24 Diefendorf, Paris City Councillors, p. 157.
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even though such a provision was technically at odds with canon law.25 Thus Henri’s extension of such a requirement to his entire kingdom was not simply an act of defiance against a pope who was opposing him. It was also an affirmation of southern French practice and northern French wishes. The edict begins with a sense of urgency and moral decline, as well as a tone of outrage. It claimed that due to daily complaints about marriages contracted by children out of a carnal, indiscreet, and disorderly desire, in defiance of and against the will and consent of their fathers and mothers, (and) not having before their eyes fear of God, (nor) the honor, reverence and obedience that they owe their parents
the King was forced to act decisively to stem the rising tide of these insidious matches.26 While the King could not move the hearts of such defiant children who “from fear of God, the honor and the paternal and maternal reverence did not turn back from doing ill,” they might nonetheless do so from fear of “temporal pain,” namely, being disinherited.27 Not only would children who were disinherited lose their share of the family’s wealth, they were also barred from challenging this testamental act, and would be obligated to return any gifts (donations et avantages) they had received from their parents. Such disobedient children were also prevented from claiming wealth promised them in their parents’ marriage contract or claiming anything under customary law. In short, all of the possible legal avenues of Old Regime wealth transference were closed off to individuals who entered a marriage without prior parental consent. In addition, anyone who helped children marry without their parents’ consent was subject to punishment. These restrictions legally applied only to men under the age of 30 and women under 25, although the edict urged all children, regardless of age, to ask advice of their fathers and mothers.28 This edict marks a change in the way marriage was treated under the law in France. From this point forward, royal legislation sought to define marriage more narrowly while still formally acknowledging the Church’s primacy in sanctioning marriage. From the sixteenth to the late eighteenth century there were 23 royal pronouncements about what constituted a valid marriage. Of those 23, all but five reiterated in some fashion the need for parental consent to a proposed match. Two of those remaining five dealt with widows’ remarriages. Thus the issue of parental 25
Jules Basdevant, Des rapports de l’église et de l’état dans la législation du mariage du Concile de Trente au Code Civil (Paris, 1900), p. 3. 26 Isambert, Receuil général des anciennes lois, vol. 13, p. 469. 27 Ibid. Note that the ordinance specifically names paternal and maternal obedience so at least linguistically this edict was not written solely to shore up paternal power but rather parental power. 28 Ibid. At the end of the edict it also states that children of remarried widows did not need formal permission but should nonetheless ask for advice.
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consent, a requirement that was asserted repeatedly over these three centuries, was at the heart of the Crown’s conception of the family. In addition, the repetition of these ordinances suggests not only its importance but also suggests that some children continued to flaunt the law and marry partners of their own, rather than their parents’, choice.29 The language of this body of royal legislation reveals more about the Crown’s conception of family structure and gender roles, and the ideology that informed its conception. Each time an edict forbade clandestine marriage it stated that children could not marry without the consent of “their fathers, mothers, tutors or guardians.”30 This requirement reveals both a hierarchical conception of authority over children as well as a leveling of that authority. It privileges paternal power in that fathers are always the first of the people who could sanction children’s marriages. This ordering implies that a father’s blessing would be sought out first and would be most valuable, but this legislation recognizes a mother’s or guardian’s permission to be as valid as a father’s. It does not require that in the absence of a father, a child would need multiple permissions. A child without a father did not need the blessing of his or her mother along with other family members. The mother’s word sufficed on its own. As such, while this law subtly privileges the father’s authority over his child by consistently placing him first in the list of accepted authority figures, it does not weigh his word as legally more valuable than that of the mother’s. Further, the legislation bolsters the ability of the mother to hold the position of guardian over her children, particularly in a society where children and their labor comprised a valuable asset. It helped a widow gain control over a resource with important economic, social, and psychological worth, that was denied to such women in other societies.31 More interesting in this regard is the wording of the Edict on Second Marriages dating from 1560. This legislation limited the amount of property a widow could dispose of if she remarried. The law explained that “not recognizing that they were being sought after more for their property than for themselves, they abandon their wealth to their new husbands…leaving aside the natural duty to their children.”32 29
Danielle Haase-Dubosc examines the problem of clandestine marriage from the point of view of the children involved, who entered such alliances strategically in order to try to thwart parental wishes. Ravie et enlevée: De l’enlèvement des femmes comme stratégie matrimoniale au XVIIe siècle (Paris, 1999). 30 This is quoted from the Edict of Blois, passed by Henry III and the Parlement of Paris in 1579. Isambert, Recueil des anciennes lois, vol. 14, p. 392, although the language is identical in every edict that outlaws secret marriages. 31 See for example the discussions in Frank S. Frick, “Widows in the Hebrew Bible: A Transactional Approach,” in Athalya Brenner (ed.), A Feminist Companion to Exodus to Deuteronomy (Sheffield, 1994), p. 141 and Betty Potash, “Widows in Africa: An Introduction,” in Betty Potash (ed.), Widows in African Societies: Choices and Constraints (Stanford, 1986), p. 4. 32 Isambert, Recueil des anciennes lois, vol. 14, p. 36.
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In order to prevent such a travesty, a widow with children was allowed to grant her new spouse only the amount of property that one of her children could claim. In this way, a stepfather could not dispossess his wife’s children from a previous marriage of their patrimony. However, the law goes on to make a comment about the relationship that should prevail between a widowed mother and her children. It remarks that “seeing themselves (children) deprived of the comfort and assistance of their fathers, widows must use every means to perform the double duty of mother and father: the distress of good families follows from such gifts (at remarriage) besides the quarrels between mothers and their children, and consequently the diminishing of the strength of the public state.”33 What is fascinating about the wording of this law is the emphasis placed on the duties of a widowed mother toward her children, the assumption that a woman could assume a role both paternal and maternal, and the fear that the vigor of the state depended on good relations between a widow and her children. Obviously the importance of the family headed by a father was not at all questioned in this law, and certainly fathers were revered in a way that mothers were not. However, at least as far as this legislation is concerned, the family was at the foundation of the state even if it was headed by a woman. The ambivalence about widows that emerges in this law, which on the one hand describes them as women who could be seduced by a gold-digger unless restrained by law and on the other hand holds them up as part of the foundation of the family, and hence the state, appears in other legislation governing widows. In the Edict of Blois, the problem of widows marrying beneath their estates, and thus endangering the family’s prosperity, resurfaced. At this time the portrayal of widows was less sympathetic than in the earlier edict. Widows were no longer viewed as the bond holding the family together and helping their children get on without fathers. In the Edict of Blois emphasis was placed on mismanagement of family wealth and, again, ill-conceived marriages. To prevent widows from giving away what rightfully belonged to their children, the law forbade them from giving any gifts to their new spouses. Nor could widows sell property in order to contribute more assets to a second marriage. A remarriage, whether inappropriate or desirable, posed a threat to the wealth that had belonged to the first household and its members. In order to protect the family from a widow’s poor judgment or a suitor’s greed, the edict treated all second marriages as suspect and regulated their terms. On the surface this edict appears to pass harsh judgment on widows, suspecting them of being unable to resist the charms of any ne’er-do-well who might cross their paths. However, comparing this edict to the ones banning children from entering clandestine marriages reveals a more nuanced picture. The legislation 33 Ibid., vol. 14, p. 36. “(O)utre les querelles et divisions d’entre les mères et les enfans s’en ensuit la désolation des bonnes familles, et conséquemment diminution de la force de l’estat publique.”
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addressing mésalliances for children meted out the harshest punishments available, namely cutting such children out of the family patrimony and threatening those who entered such marriages with the charge of seduction and the possibility of being sentenced to death.34 Such provisions revealed the power of the family’s head at its broadest. In contrast, the Edict of Blois, while speaking of widows in unflattering terms, did little to constrain the rights of the widow herself. Because a woman who had children from an earlier relationship was expected to place her loyalty to them above any emotional attachment to a new husband, the law required her to make that attachment concrete by preserving her children’s wealth from a new husband. But despite its unflattering language, this law did not take any measures to deprive widows of the rights they had over their own property. Here they were prevented only from granting new husbands property obtained from a deceased husband. But it did not deprive the remarried wife of her survivor’s benefits or her dower. Even a less than desirable remarriage did not strip the widow of the life use of some of her deceased husband’s property. Particularly if she owned the tools of a trade and commanded skills, the new couple could enhance its wealth with riches from the prior marriage. While she could not grant these assets to her new husband, their household could benefit from the goods and income they provided. Indeed, rather than creating a further limitation over the widow’s use of her wealth, this law prevented a new spouse from exercising control over his wife’s property. In a sense, the widow gained greater control over the ultimate fate of her wealth from an earlier marriage by being obliged to maintain control over it herself rather than having to hand its administration over to a man. The law required a widow to conserve her children’s’ inheritance, which did not so much restrict her autonomy as it showed the crown’s interest in shaping what it deemed proper family relations. This apprehension over widows contracting inappropriate marriages, and the laws that expressed that anxiety, stemmed in part from the early modern conception of families. In this period, when spouses created a new household by marrying, they continued to be conceived of as members of their birth families. As we shall see, the way property ownership was understood shows that families and partners signing a marriage contract considered most of the wealth given to the bride and groom to be on loan rather than an outright gift. Of primary importance in drawing up a marriage contract was the maintenance of family control over properties given to children. However, the perception of spouses as remaining members of their birth families went beyond property issues. As David Sabean has remarked in his extensive study of German village life, “(a)ffines are the quintessential enemies because they define the group in which one finds marriage partners, one’s equals, those people whom it is necessary to cooperate with in order
34
The issues of abduction and marriage are central to Farr’s, Authority and Sexuality.
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to survive but with whom one is in the greatest competition.”35 Thus there was always the feeling that despite a marriage, even a long one, the two spouses had conflicting interests in the final reckoning. And a prime moment to act upon those conflicting loyalties, between one’s interests versus the interests of one’s spouse, was at the death of one of the marriage partners. Under Parisian customary law, a woman was legally emancipated by her husband’s death and could make her own decisions, including the decision about whether and whom to marry. As such, neither the widow’s birth family nor that of her deceased husband could dictate the way she used what was now her own wealth. This law on second marriages, subtle in the same way that the law on clandestine marriages was in that it went as far as it could given other legal mandates, constrained what elements of the widow’s property it could. Royal law could limit the ways a widow disposed of her property, but only after her death. Without changing the mechanism of legal emancipation, this royal ordinance could not tell the widow who to marry or how to spend the interest on her property during a remarriage. Interestingly, this law did not demand that guardians be appointed for widows under a certain age, although such a move would have coincided with the spirit of the law on clandestine marriages. So while widows saw their property rights limited in certain royal edicts, they did not see their fundamental legal independence curtailed as children did. The widow’s independence from family control evidenced itself in the latitude she had to manage her children’s wealth. After her husband’s death, a woman with children under the age of majority had the option of maintaining a fictional marital community and using the family’s common resources to support the family. Such an arrangement could be more advantageous to the children, especially if they were very young. They could continue being supported by the community rather than come immediately into their inheritance at an age where they were not capable of managing money on their own or have those assets become the subject of family conflict.36 But recall that children who were grown but not yet 25 were legal minors. One of the purposes of depriving children of emancipation was to give the head of the family the option of maintaining control over property. The widow, head of the family in the husband’s absence, served this function. Only if a woman wished to remarry was she obliged to divide the marital community. Until that moment, when she committed herself to the creation of a new family, she was free to do as she pleased with the family’s fortune.
35
David W. Sabean, Power in the Blood. Popular Culture and Village Discourse in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge, 1984), p. 32. 36 Micheline Baulant, “The Scattered Family: Another Aspect of Seventeenth-Century Demography,” in, Robert Forster and Orest Ranum (eds), Family and Society: Selections from the Annales, Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations, trans. Elborg Forster and Patricia Ranum (Baltimore, 1976), p. 109.
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Widows could use this prerogative strategically. Geneviève Tixerand and Madeleine Rousseau, widows of artisans, maintained the community of property long after the death of their husband. Each woman was obliged to commission an inventory only before she remarried, in order to ensure that the children of her first marriage, and any other heirs, received their share of the first husband’s assets.37 Tixerand drew up a probate inventory three days before her remarriage; Rousseau just one day ahead. Those inventories only briefly enumerated their scant belongings; they were official but desultory accounts that allowed the first marriage to close and a new one to begin. The contracts for the subsequent marriages made use of these inventories though. In each marriage contract, the bride contributed her portion of the first marriage’s estate to the new household. While neither woman could endow her new husband with a substantial gift or inheritance, each woman used what she claimed from her first marriage to enrich her new household. These examples illustrate the latitude women enjoyed in managing their households and wealth in widowhood. Neither Tixerand nor Rousseau accounted for how they had managed their household funds, a demand the law did not include. Any mismanagement that had happened did not surface in the inventory that closed the earlier marriage community, and there were no repercussions for the widow. A widow simply needed to provide a formal description of the estate before moving herself and her property into a new marital community. The purpose of the Edict on Second Marriages was purportedly to safeguard the welfare of children, but without diminishing or questioning their mothers’ legal autonomy as the head of the household. Here we see the edict in use but it appears that its fiery rhetoric did not reflect the way the edict was applied. First, the edict, while supplying some measure of protection for children, did little to shape daily use of wealth. Second, various legal commentators that explain this law on second marriages applied equally to men and women.38 Legal manuals that explained how to apply legislation in particular contexts highlight the role of legal scholars in mediating between the text of the law and its use in practice. True, the language of the Edict on Second Marriages was unambiguously gendered, not only in its singling out of widows as the object of its provisions, but also in its description of women as untrustworthy. According
37
AN, MC, étude XI/574, 27 January 1751 and 17 April 1751. Pierre Néron and Etienne Girard, Recueil d’édits et d’ordonnances royaux, sur le fait de la justice et autres matières (2 vols, Paris, 1720) vol. 1, p. 366. See also Isambert’s commentary on this law in Recueil des anciennes lois, vol. 14, p. 38, as well as Charles Dumoulin, Coustumes de la prevosté et vicomté de Paris (Paris, 1678), p. 417. Jean Baptiste Denisart, in his Collection de décisions nouvelles et de notions relatives à la jurisprudence actuelle (4 vols, Paris, 1771) also notes in discussing this edict that “the same prohibition applies for gifts and donations that men make to their second or third wives, because we find the same objections with regard to them,” vol. 3, p. 424. 38
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to the description offered in this body of law, widows’ lust and romantic sensibilities would override their natural attachment to their children and thus render them unable to protect their patrimony. Yet despite its emphasis on women’s shortcomings, the Edict on Second Marriages applied as much to men as to women. Any man who remarried could not grant his new wife survivor’s benefits that exceeded the portion of one of his children. Men were expected to have an attachment to their children, and an interest in maintaining their inheritance, just as women were.39 Apart from recognizing the emotional bonds that tied a family together, this edict also showed the logic that was meant to underpin a successful family unit. Wealth was intended to enrich the mother’s and father’s biological heirs, and was not to enrich new families created by subsequent marriages. Men were as hampered by these imperatives as women were. Although the law singled out women in its rhetoric, its practical application applied to anyone contracting a remarriage. These two marital laws marked the beginning of the Crown’s engagement in matters of marriage and the attendant property issues. They reveal a trend in attitudes toward marriage that would continue through the eighteenth century. The royal government’s idealized family, as reflected in the laws it wrote from the sixteenth century onwards, was one with a single person authorized to make decisions for all members and with an interest in maintaining wealth for the lineage’s advancement rather than allowing it to be used for the personal gratification of an individual. However, within these parameters there was some room for variation. As all of the laws forbidding clandestine marriage state, the person in the family expected to decide upon marital strategies was the father, given that he was always named first in marriage legislation. But it was clearly acceptable for the mother or a guardian to make such a decision in the absence of the father. In fact, apart from the positioning of the father as first in the list of acceptable legal agents, the language of the law makes no gender distinctions and does not even explicitly express a preference for a paternal head of the family.40 Widowed mothers certainly arranged marriages for their children, and authorized those marriages in contracts by themselves. In practice there seems to have been little resistance to a widow taking on this position as leader of the family. And this law did not offer any obstacles to the widow’s assumption of the role of head of household. It simply indicated that minors needed authorization from an officially sanctioned elder to enter into an engagement. This interpretation of royal law as privileging a family headed by a single individual, regardless of sex, is at odds with recent historiography of legal change 39
David Hunt, Parents and Children in History: The Psychology of Family Life in Early Modern France (New York, 1970), p. 112. 40 Those who could consent to a marriage on behalf of minors were “their fathers, mother, tutors, or guardians.” Isambert, Recueil des anciennes lois, vol. 14, p. 392.
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in this period. Sarah Hanley, most notably, has examined the laws of the household for this period and has seen in them a means for the French Crown to enhance the power of the father at the expense of both his wife and children. She has termed this move toward more consolidated and authoritarian paternal rule the French Law Canon, “a marital-regime system of male governance, domestic and political, along parallel lines.”41 This male system of governance held that subordination in the home was critical to subordination in the political sphere; that it was, in fact, a precursor to women’s disenfranchisement from political action. At its most extreme, Hanley asserts that “women were responsible for offenses that laws must address, accused them of fraud in obtaining marital separations, or openly charged women with potential wreckage of the family and, by analogy, the state, through adultery (an act of treason).”42 Given this complicity between fathers and the State, women were hedged into a role from which it was nearly impossible to emerge as legal actors. Hanley argues that despite the material claims a woman and widow could make on her husband’s property, she remained locked into a position of weakness in this society. At first glance it appears to be difficult to refute Hanley’s observations. There is no question that women had problematic access to public power and authority. As noted earlier, even those laws that pertained to both men and women, like the Edict on Second Marriages, used misogynistic language to justify their provisions. The need for this law was couched in terms of women’s weaknesses, not in terms of the conflict of interest that might emerge when a widow or widower remarried. And a statute regarding the inheritance of offices sneeringly refers to women who had fraudulently obtained separations from their husbands, presumably to have the freedom to squander their financial resources.43 Such insults were stock in trade when many writers discussed women in the early modern period. But such an analysis privileges the language of a few pieces of legislation over both the overall choice of discourse of royal edicts from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, and, more importantly, practice within families that faced the very situations described by these laws. When placed in this far broader context, the linguistic implications of the Edict on Second Marriages, and the outcomes of 41 Sarah Hanley, “Social Sites of Political Practice in France: Lawsuits, Civil Rights, and the Separation of Powers in Domestic and State Government, 1500–1800,” American Historical Review, 102/1 (1997): 29. In Hanley’s earlier works she used the term “FamilyState Compact” to describe the relationship among women, authority, politics, and the household as it was described in royal legislation. “Family and State in Early Modern France: The Marriage Pact,” in Marilyn Boxer and Jean Quataert (eds.), Connecting Spheres: Women in the Western World (Oxford, 1987) and “Engendering the State: Family Formation and State Building in Early Modern France,” French Historical Studies, 16/2 (1989): 4–27. 42 Hanley, “Social Sites,” p. 32. 43 Isambert, Recueil des anciennes lois, vol. 18, p. 329.
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the separation cases that Hanley uses to describe the application of the French Law Canon, appear more anomalous than descriptive of an entire system. Furthermore, if we look at widows as a group separate from women, married or single, a more nuanced picture of the status of women under the law surfaces. For example, in a 1606 declaration the King forbid notaries from allowing women to forfeit their survivors’ benefits in their marriage contracts or any other agreements they might draw up with their husbands or families.44 Any such agreements were declared void and notaries would be punished for their transgression. The purpose of such a declaration was to ensure that women could not be defrauded of their legal rights, and that they would have a means of support in the event that their husbands died. But the language used did not rehash women’s weakness or susceptibility to being fooled. It instead treated the issue as a problem for notaries who needed to look out for women’s interests in the contracts they drafted. To turn to a related example of the use of contracts to assert women’s needs, a separation decree of 1787 describes the process a woman, married to her second husband, used to assert control over her own wealth. A wife could seek a property separation (separation de biens) if she believed her husband was managing her assets irresponsibly. If a judge agreed, he could order the husband to account for his wife’s property and then force him to return all that money to her.45 After that point the couple would continue to live together but would keep their finances separated. In this instance, a woman’s husband was ordered to return 31,500 livres to his wife. She had acquired most of that wealth from her first husband’s sizeable estate, and thus she had a stronger argument for taking its management away from her second husband.46 In order to meet this obligation the husband eventually needed to sell some of his personal affects, including his watch and clothing. But the apparent hardship this man experienced did not prevent his wife and the courts from pressing ahead with her petition. In this case, and other separation cases, the wife was allowed some independence from her husband, and there was even a tacit implication that she would manage her money better than her husband had done. Despite the male-encoded norms regarding the use of family property, we see that in practice the legal terrain was more than simply a place where women were subjugated to male right. The situation was more complicated. What stands out in 44
Ibid., vol.15, pp. 302–3. In addition to a financial separation (called a séparation des biens), a woman could also request a physical separation (séparation de corps). In the latter case a judge decided that a woman was being so badly abused that she could no longer safely live with her husband. In some sense, this served as an alternative to divorce. On separations see Hanley, “Social Sites of Political Practice”; Nadine Bérenguier, “Victorious Victims: Women and Publicity in Mémoires Judiciaires,” in Elizabeth Goldsmith and Dena Goodman (eds), Going Public: Women and Publishing in Early Modern France (Ithaca, 1995); James Traer, Marriage and the Family in Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca, 1980). 46 AN, MC, étude XXIV/959. 2 August 1787. 45
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this legislation on marriage and the family is that women, and particularly widows, form a separate legal category, but not one that was coterminous with that of legal minor. It is certainly true that several laws draw upon derogatory language to describe women and their behavior. The legislation on separations speaks of women as liars and manipulators. The Edict on Second Marriages describes women in similar terms. We know that women did not enjoy the same legal rights under the law that men did, although we need to keep in mind the distinctions the law drew among single, married, and widowed women. While the language of the law parroted a patriarchal ideology that excluded women from public roles based on the deficiencies of their sex, it also recognized the practical need to empower certain women. The Old Regime law that excluded women from having full control over their own property when married, allowed single women to support themselves and widowed women to govern their households. Expediency could overcome gender bias, a point that comes through in the ways that families and couples drew up marriage contracts.
Property as the Heart of Marriage The particular points of law at issue in drawing up marriage contracts had little to do with gender relations. Contracts revolved around who received property and under what terms. Parisian property law distributed and classified property according to two criteria. The first consideration was the kind of property. As in most other legal codes, moveable property (meubles) was governed by different principles than immoveable, or real, property (immeubles). Cash money was of course the most obvious form of moveable wealth, but clothing, household goods, and the tools of a trade were also considered moveable goods. Real estate, a venal office, or an annuity were several common forms of immoveable property. Second, the source of the property determined in part how it could be used. Wealth acquired by an individual, called acquêts or conquêts, had a different level of flexibility than inherited wealth, propres. In most instances, inherited property could not be sold or otherwise permanently alienated from the family line. To determine the ways property could move, it was laid against these two axes, its quality was determined, and then it could be used or distributed. In theory, when a couple married all of the spouses’ liquid wealth, either that given to them by their parents or assets they had earned through their labor, entered the marital community of property. The immovable property that remained was attached to each spouse, as it was in the process of being acquired by a new generation, and the new family could spend only the interest on that property. In order to clarify the nature of the property a household possessed, it was the task of the marriage contract to lay out the amount and type of property each partner brought so that there would be no conflict over how the new household’s
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resources could be used.47 Although each spouse contributed to the community of property, according to the Parisian custom the husband was the head of the marital fund.48 As such he had control over the family’s wealth, and his wife had a limited role in the management of their assets. The husband could employ community property as he wished, without consulting his wife or family before doing so. When two families provided funds for the marital community they were giving over control of those assets to the future husband without any means to limit their use. But the management of inheritance property (propres) did entail certain restrictions. A husband could not alienate his wife’s real property without her permission. Furthermore, if a husband alienated his wife’s real property, he would eventually face accountability for that action. Her family could demand its restoration the moment the marriage ended, generally upon a spouse’s death. As we saw earlier, if the husband and wife had respected the property terms of the marriage contract, a surviving spouse could hold on to the family’s assets until remarriage without having to distribute anything to heirs. The prospect of having to raise a large sum of money on extremely short notice served as a brake on men’s uses of their wives’ property, although they still generally made cautious use of these assets over the course of the marriage. In practice, the system rarely functioned so predictably and couples used property as was most useful for them rather than according to legal guidelines. Given the underlying tension each family must have felt at the moment of consummating an alliance, both sides generally negotiated a property classification that benefited their child and their family’s interests without alienating future inlaws. Both families wished to maintain control over their assets, particularly the woman’s which understood that she would have limited control over her own wealth after she married. But they also wanted to provide enough property so their 47
For this paragraph and what follows see the following sources: François OlivierMartin, Histoire de la coûtume de la prévôté et vicomté de Paris (2 vols, Paris, 1972); Ralph Giesey, “Rules of Inheritance and Strategies of Mobility in Prerevolutionary France,” American Historical Review, 82/2 (1977): 271–89; Yver, Egalité entre héritiers; Jacques Lelièvre, La pratique des contrats de marriage chez les notaries au Châtelet de Paris de 1769 à 1804 (Paris, 1959); Paul Ourliac and J. de Malafosse, Histoire du droit privé (3 vols, Paris, 1961). 48 If a woman ran an independent business she could seek the status of femme marchande publique which gave her the right to conduct the affairs of her enterprise without having continually to seek out her husband’s permission. Once he gave his initial approval of this status for his wife, she was free to run her business without his interference. However, this independence did not apply to joint assets. In their household the husband remained in charge of the money. Women holding this status were relatively few in eighteenth-century Paris. Jacques Lelièvre found 35 contracts identifying women as femme marchande publique out of the 3500 marriage contracts he examined. See his La pratique des contrats de marriage.
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children could live in reasonable circumstances. The marriage portion served another end, as it was an advance of the child’s eventual inheritance, and allowed a family to make a gradual transfer of its assets to heirs. The strategy employed in most marriage contracts to broker these conflicting aims was to provide a rather limited sum for the community of property which the new household could use as it wished, and to classify the rest as immoveable property that could generate interest but could not be sold out of the family’s possession. One problem a number of families encountered with this strategy was that they wished to provide their children with moveable property that would help them establish a new household, but at the same time wanted to see their assets given the protection of real property. In the sixteenth century annuities presented a problem in this respect since any such financial instrument established on the basis of a cash payment was treated like moveable property and the annuity was considered to have the quality of the collateral it was based upon. Such a classification entailed certain risks as a bride who brought a hefty annuity based on a cash payment could see her husband squander the entire sum, principal and interest alike. It was the potential financial risk such a situation posed that led to the creation of the category propre fictifs, fictional real property. According to Ralph Giesey, all annuities had been considered moveable property prior to the late Middle Ages, given that interest payments were made in cash. Then rentes foncières, annuities based on the value of land or a house, were classified as real property since they were based on the value of the immoveable property given to set up the annuity in the first place. Once that principle had been established, assets were not always categorized according to the traditional division between moveable and immoveable property. Thus a yearly cash payment that came from such an annuity could be reckoned in the same way as a house; thereafter it became possible to manipulate property categories even further. So rentes constituées, based not on a piece of property but as interest on the payment of a lump sum of money, came to be considered not as moveable property but as real property and thereby subject to certain legal strictures. As Giesey explains, rentes foncières earlier had been deemed immovables by fiction because of their contractual relationship with immovables by nature, now rentes constituées were called immovables by fiction… In effect, the first immoveable by fiction bred its own kind.49
Once this intellectual boundary had been breached, couples drawing up a marriage contract attempted to classify their property as they wished, without reference to any fixed categories. In order to try to stem the tide of infinite manipulation of property categories, rendering them meaningless, certain legal commentators began obsessively to 49
Giesey, “Rules of Inheritance,” p. 273.
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classify kinds of property in treatises meant as blueprints for drawing up marriage contracts. For example, in Pothier’s Traité du douaire, he explains that if a house has a pond on its property, the pond is real lineage property while any fish in that pond would be moveable property.50 While this is obviously a situation that few families had to consider, it does demonstrate the desire of a number of legal commentators to define property classification rather than allowing families to do it on an ad hoc basis when they drew up contracts. But as we shall see, the property provisions of marriage contracts were very often at odds with how the law technically should have classified them. Barbara Diefendorf records manipulation of property in many marriage contracts of Parisian elites, showing that this was a practice that spanned various social groups and existed from as early as the sixteenth century.51 Similarly, venal offices were classified as real property and treated like annuities in marriage contracts and successions. Venal offices were government positions that had been purchased by their holders. Some of these offices were primarily honorific, but most required a high level of education and expertise. For example, all of the members of the Parlements were venal office holders, as were the holders of most municipal posts.52 Venal offices originated in 1467 with the monarch’s need for revenue. Originally conceived of as a temporary measure, venal offices reverted to the Crown at the holder’s death so that the King could maintain some control over who exercised them and so they could produce additional income. Office holders balked at this system and in 1604 the Crown granted them the right of ownership over their offices and the right to pass them down as a form of property. In exchange for this privilege, officers paid a yearly tax to the King, called the paulette, and paid an additional fee when the office was handed from one family member to another.53 As a result of this reform, a venal office became the permanent property of a certain family and would always be exercised by a male member of the kin group. Another implication of creating this tax was the transformation of venal offices into fictive real property. As an asset that could not be sold or otherwise alienated, that was repeatedly handed from one generation to another, venal offices immobilized a portion of family wealth. Another aspect of venal offices that influenced their place in the family’s portfolio was the stricture that women, single, married, or widowed, could not occupy these offices. If a daughter were her 50
Robert-Joseph Pothier, Traité du Douaire (Paris: chez Debure père and Orléans: Veuve Rouzeau-Montaut, 1770), pp. 24–5. 51 Diefendorf, Paris City Councillors, pp. 242–3. 52 J.H.M. Salmon, “Venality of Office and Popular Sedition in Seventeenth-Century France. A Review of a Controversy,” Past and Present, 37/3 (1967): 21–43; James Collins, The State in Early Modern France (Cambridge, 1995). 53 Salmon, “Venality of Office,” p. 22 and Marcel Marion, Dictionnaire des institutions de la France aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris, 1989), p. 404.
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father’s sole heir, by law she had to hand the use of a venal office to a male relative who then benefited from the position. That restriction on venal offices made them even less flexible than other kinds of real property. Most families did not possess such offices so these issues were not common. But the change in treatment of venal offices and annuities shows how conceptions of property changed over time to serve the needs of families who wished to exert control over the disposition of wealth. The most common kinds of property for master artisans were moveable goods—cash, household goods, tools and materials for a business, with some annuities, real estate, and land. While few families at the artisanal level of society owned a venal office, they did possess a distinct asset that resembled it: the mastership. It is difficult to understand the legal nature of the mastership as a piece of property. It was not discussed in these terms in either customary or royal law, or in guild statutes. Only one guild explicitly discussing mastership as property. In 1777, in the aftermath of the short-lived abolition of the guilds and their reconstitution, the printers’ guild responded to two royal edicts governing the basis for restructuring their corporate body. In response to an edict that hoped to limit the time a master could maintain his guild privileges, the printers responded that such limits would violate their “right in property, the most sacred of all and the dearest to His Majesty.”54 In couching their argument against further royal encroachment upon guild privilege, the printers invoked their property rights several times, going beyond the language of status to articulate an investment and property interest in masterships. Other guilds did not use the term “property” to characterize their interests in masterships, as the printers had, but by observing how individuals used masterships we can draw certain analogies. When a master artisan died his widow had the right to take over his position and his shop, taking for herself the title of mistress, maîtresse. From this point the widow had the right to run her late husband’s shop and enjoy most of the privileges of other masters. However, if the widow remarried she lost her late husband’s mastership, which reverted to the guild to be assigned to a new member. Furthermore, a master’s son could not inherit his father’s position in the guild. Given these characteristics, the mastership, in a number of important ways, resembles a piece of real property that was lent to a master from its true owner, the guild. In the sense that a master could not sell, rent, or otherwise alienate his title, nor could he pass it down to his heirs, the mastership functioned as real property. The master could use the interest of the mastership, in this case the ability to work in a certain trade for his and his family’s enrichment. But he could never assert ownership and inheritance rights over his title, both of which remained in the hands of the guild. In that respect, while masterships shared some commonalities 54
Requête au Roi, et consultations des anciens avocats aux conseils du Roi & au Parlement de Paris, pour le corps de la librairie et imprimerie de Paris, (np, nd.), p. 3.
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with venal offices in that they were both valuable family assets, masterships never appeared in contracts governing the handing over of wealth from one generation to the next. Rather it was the accoutrements of mastership, tools, goods, and raw materials, that preoccupied artisanal families, whatever their economic status. As marriage contracts reveal, most couples classified the bulk of their assets as real property, regardless of the nature of those assets, which immobilized much of their wealth. That real property provided the household with some income but could not be deployed freely to enhance a couple’s economic standing. This system ensured stability and accountability to parents with respect to family assets; children were blocked from squandering their parents’ money. But it also helped to reproduce social and economic standing. Family members could not use money in unsanctioned ways to try to change their social position. Just as birth strongly influenced social standing, so too did the legal property system and the ways individuals made us of it.
The Practice of Marriage While not mandatory, many couples wishing to formalize their engagement went to a notary to draw up a contract. They were generally accompanied by family and friends, but the process was heavily influenced by the notary, not surprising given the complexity of property settlements that appear in many marriage contracts. Of all the contracts a notary drew up, the marriage contract was one of the most uniform. In comparison with a loan agreement, for example, the marriage contract varied little from couple to couple, while a loan agreement was tailored more closely to the individual situation. As such, the notary acted as a strong mediator between the partners’ wishes for their new household and the written, legal, expression of the household. There are several reasons why the notary’s hand lay so heavy on the marriage process. Certainly the notary’s role was couched as one of legal advisor, and couples wishing to draw up a contract that would meet their needs did well to take advantage of the notary’s expertise.55 With the complexity of property requirements, and the high stakes, the notary’s expertise served to hedge against imprudent financial decisions. The ubiquity of the marriage contract surely contributed to the notary’s prominent role. A study of Parisian social structure in the eighteenth century has suggested that approximately 75 per cent of couples drew up a contract before marrying.56 Even partners with less than 100 livres in assets sometimes went to the trouble of drawing up a contract specifying how that wealth would be used by the 55
M.-H. Renaut, “Les contrats de mariage à Saint-Omer et à Aire-sur-la-Lys au XVIIIe siècle,” Revue historique, 589/1 (1994): 132. 56 Adeline Daumard and François Furet, Structures et relations sociales à Paris au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1961), p. 9.
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couple and then distributed at death.57 There are a number of reasons that might account for the frequent use of contracts. Perhaps the most attractive aspect of the marriage contract was its ability to revise the requirements of customary law. Only clauses that explicitly flouted established bedrocks of marital custom, such as the requirement that a husband provide his widow with a dower, could not be abridged.58 However, most other elements of customary law could be, and were, altered in contracts. This flexibility allowed families to exert greater control over wealth and to plan explicitly for the eventuality of death rather than allowing the law to determine the distribution of assets. A family concerned with following a strategy of social mobility would be particularly interested in the control a marriage contract provided. Another factor in the large number of marriage contracts may have been the sophistication of the Parisian population. Paris was the legal and administrative center of the kingdom. City dwellers read about court cases in the increasingly popular legal briefs that circulated, and they also saw members of the legal profession living and working in their city.59 This factor is particularly salient for this study as members of guilds were intimately involved in legal matters as a result of their corporate membership. Guilds were constantly involved in lawsuits with each other over perceived encroachments on rights, and masters themselves understood the legal nature of their status.60 Given this context, it is not surprising the members of this social strata availed themselves of notaries’ services. The marriage contract itself had three distinct sections. The first section provided information about the bride and groom and their witnesses. The second part summarily explained the main provisions of Paris customary law that pertained to marriage. The third part specified the property arrangements of the two parties. Each of these sections incorporated certain required elements. According to the edicts on marriage, certain individuals needed permission to marry which would be noted, when necessary, at the head of the contract. When explaining the structure of Parisian customary law, the contract always specified whether a couple intended to set up a community of property or if their goods would remain separated. The latter scenario was rare; the great majority of couples set up a common fund to support the household. A notary also made clear that the 57 Ibid., pp. 18–19. To put this amount into perspective, a manual laborer would earn on average 55 livres per year. Micheline Baulant, “Le salaire des ouvriers du bâtiment à Paris de 1400 à 1726,” Annales: Economie, Société, Civilization, 26/2 (1971): 482. 58 Lelièvre, La pratique des contrats du mariage, p. 164. 59 Sarah Maza, Private Lives and Public Affairs: The Causes Célèbres of PreRevolutionary France (Berkeley, 1995); Bell, Lawyers and Citizens; Richard M. Andrews, Law, Magistracy, and Crime in Old Regime Paris, 1735–1789 (Cambridge, 1994). 60 Steven L. Kaplan, “La lutte pour le contrôle du marché du travail à Paris au XVIIIe siècle,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 36/3 (1989): 361–412. Michael Sonenscher, Work and Wages: Natural Law, Politics and the Eighteenth-Century French Trades (Cambridge, 1989).
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spouses would not be responsible for debts contracted before the marriage took place and spelled out the ability of widows and children to opt out of the estate’s debts and declare themselves creditors. The contract also stipulated that any property the couple acquired during their marriage, regardless of its source or nature, would be governed by Parisian customary law. This was an important clause as different legal customs could have widely varying property regulations. For example, if a wife inherited a parcel of land in Normandy, rather than being governed by the Norman dower regime which would require that she subtract the value of that property from her dowry, it would be governed by the Parisian inheritance regime that mandated equal inheritance for all children. The third section of the marriage contract incorporated the fewest required elements. Couples and their families had few restraints on they how they could apportion their property. The one necessary element was the widow’s dower. Parisian customary law demanded that a widow be provided with some means to support herself after her husband’s death. Under custom, the widow was entitled to the usufruct of one-half of all of her husband’s assets. However, such a scenario was hardly attractive to the husband’s heirs who would consequently see a great deal of their inheritance tied up for what could be an extended period of time. Instead a contract could alter the terms of the dower, replacing the customary usufruct rights with other financial support. As long as the husband provided his widow with survivor’s benefits, and she agreed by signing the contract, he could minimize his estate’s obligations to his widow. The contracts themselves demonstrate the ways Parisians interpreted and employed the laws pertaining to marriage. Overall they followed the broad outlines of these legal requirements. But in a number of key areas marriage contracts ignored the provisions of customary law. Perhaps the most surprising anomaly was the lack of concern over certain parts of the laws on abduction. As discussed earlier, the law urged widows and minors to obtain consent before they married in order to avoid a charge of abduction against a spouse. According to the statutes, however, widows, “even over the age of 25” needed to get advice and council from their parents.61 But in practice this requirement was seldom followed, at least with respect to widows. In a sample of 46 marriage contracts involving widows, only three of the widows were accompanied by a parent or guardian who avowed their consent. These three women were all under the age of 25 and were thus under the age of legal majority for a never-married woman. It is very likely that these widows’ ages contributed to the perception that they needed to have a guardian present. All of the other widows, as emancipated adults, simply spoke for themselves in this process. Not every marriage contract lists witnesses, but in those that do family members were usually present at the ceremony. However, the
61
Isambert, Recueil des anciennes lois, vol. 20, p. 290.
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widow did not need to have a family member grant her formal permission to marry. In contrast, all of the men and women who were marrying for the first time and were not yet over the age of consent had a parent or guardian present. This segment of the law was clearly enforced in practice. Occasionally men who were over the age of 25 had their parents stand with them as they signed the contract. Strictly speaking, this was not required by the edicts on marriages. However, in practice it appears that parents kept a close eye on their children’s alliances when they married for the first time even if they did not intervene in subsequent marriages, although they had the right to do so under the law. Several examples will serve to make this point clearer. Louis Buisson, called a bourgeois de Paris, married Anne Dory, the widow of a Parisian wine merchant. There is no indication of the partners’ ages although Dory had two young children from her first marriage. Buisson haled originally from Savigny sur Orge, about 30 miles from Paris, but had by this point established a residence in Paris. His residence in the capital and the amount of money he contributed to the marital community suggested that Buisson was not a youngster, although there is no way to know his age. Despite his independence, his mother had traveled from her village to attend her son’s wedding in Paris, and also to give her consent to this match. The contract thus stated that she “attended and authorized to what followed for him and in his name as the first party.” Dory spoke “for herself and in her name as the other party.”62 Both partners had other witnesses present. In addition to his mother, Buisson had a friend sign his marriage contract on his behalf. On Dory’s side were two brothers and a cousin. But none of these three men offered formal consent to the match. It is perhaps more surprising in this case because Dory had two young daughters, ages 12 and 7, whose paternal, or maternal, relations might have been uneasy about their welfare in the new household. But despite possible concerns about the interests of these two children, Dory’s family did not insist that she seek permission to remarry; they believed that Dory would not neglect her children’s’ interests in favor of her new husband. Although the law did provide a mechanism of oversight, Dory’s family, and many other widows’ families, did not employ it. We see a similar disparity in the marriage of Pierre Lespiau and Jacqueline Loulliart, the widowed mother of six children. Lespiau was a garçon tailleur and Loulliart’s deceased husband was a master tailor. Both partners derived obvious advantages from the match. After the marriage Lespiau could get his mastership by taking over Loulliart’s title. Loulliart procured a father for her children and help in the shop and at home. Loulliart spoke for herself in this contract, but Lespiau had a guardian appointed for him by his father who lived in the city of Condon and did not make the trip to the capital for his son’s wedding. Nonetheless, Lespiau was
62
AN, MC, étude XVII/517. 4 February 1709.
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called a fils majeur, meaning that he was a legal adult.63 In this instance, the law was turned on its head. The widow, legally enjoined to have a guardian stand up with her at remarriage, negotiated her marriage by herself, despite the fact that she had six young children. The adult male had a guardian speak for him although he was legally capable of marrying without parental consent.64 While these two contracts do not speak for all Parisians who married, it does suggest that couples and their families chose to follow the legal provisions that worked toward their interests and disregarded others that did not seem to have much importance for the situation at hand. This assertion is backed up by the treatment of community of property and propres in marriage contracts. As we have seen, the question of what constituted lineage property was a complex one and legal commentators wrote extensively about how to distinguish different types of property for inheritance purposes. However, the process was vastly streamlined in contracts themselves. One way in which contracts were simplified was by omitting detailed accounts of the property each spouse brought to the new household unit. In fact, in the majority of contracts the groom’s wealth was never assigned a specific value, whereas the amount of the bride’s dowry was always specified. When a woman spelled out her monetary contribution, she simply stated how much of it she would enter into the community of property and how much would remain her lineage property. When the man’s wealth was declared, he too simply verbally distinguished these two types of property. Never did the partners list the composition of their wealth, be it cash, land, or goods, in order to justify what should be common property and what should remain separate. Those decisions appeared to be the result of previous negotiations between the two families. Naturally land and houses, if they were part of the marriage settlement, were classified as real property and did not become part of the communal fund. However, for most of the couples here, their contributions consisted of purely moveable wealth—cash, tools, household goods. Under the logic of the customary classification system there was no reason to consider such assets as real property. However such a decision would have forced all non-elite couples to surrender the bulk of their wealth to the ephemeral communal fund. These circumstances posed an important problem as many brides and grooms had considerable wealth composed of just such items. A great deal was at stake in the process of classification. In order to prevent all the couples’ assets from falling into the community, and to allow couples who owned only moveable goods to maintain a more stable hold on them, the category of propres fictifs expanded. The process became purely voluntary, a matter of endowing property with its character simply by the process of naming. Types of wealth were created verbally without explicit 63
AN, MC, étude VII/309. 7 August 1757. Barbara Diefendorf also notes that in the marriage contracts she examined men who had already reached legal majority often had parents who formally consented for them. See Paris City Councillors, p. 187. 64
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reference to the origin or nature of the property. The words of the contract, and consent by signature, endowed property with its legal nature. When Augustin Bernard, a master smelter, married Catherine Lefort, the widow of another master smelter, each partner specified how much money they would bring upon marriage. Each partner brought 1500 livres total wealth in a combination of cash, household goods, work tools, commercial inventory, and raw materials. Each partner also stated in the marriage contract that 500 livres of this total would go into the community of property and 1000 livres would remain lineage property.65 In the marriage of Philippe Paris, who called himself a bourgeois de Paris, and Louise Riverand, the widow of a master upholsterer, there was also parity in the amounts the two spouses entered into the community of property. Both Paris and Riverand contributed 3000 livres into the marital fund and kept the rest of their wealth for themselves. Riverand’s wealth consisted of her share of her husband’s substantial estate, valued at 5600 livres, and 100 livres of rent per year on a house she owned. Paris brought 2900 livres in cash and household goods and 2215 livres in various investments and annuities.66 In both of these cases, and many others, there were no attempts to justify the amount of each spouse’s propres by somehow connecting those assets to lineage properties. Families or partners simply decided how much wealth they wished to put into the community of property and held back the rest for themselves and their heirs. What was important in writing these contracts was the basic framework of the law that said an individual could distinguish between lineage and personal property in finalizing a marriage agreement. Legal guidelines for classifying different types of property seemed to be irrelevant to the process, except perhaps in lawsuits disputing contracts and inheritances. The ability to endow children with property but at the same time protect it from the strangers who would soon be in-laws resolved an important tension in the process of making marriages. Yet the legal guidelines meant to structure that process of preservation were ignored. The general principle was embraced by the two contracting families but they wished to determine the classification of their property themselves. In practice families and notaries used the law in ways that do not come through in legal commentaries. Lawyers and legal scholars understood the law in a way that was too recondite or complex for the needs of these Parisians. This evidence from marriage contracts allows us to buttress an important argument about how the law functioned and was understood in this period. Clearly the law was not an abstract concept for Parisians who married in the early modern period. These people used contracts and notaries to ensure that their property settlements were clearly established at the beginning of this new partnership. Thus the provisions of the law shaped practice. Law also influenced gender norms and representations both in the language it used to describe men and women and in the 65 66
AN, MC, étude LXXXV/528. 4 April 1751. AN, MC, étude XCII/571. 15 June 1751.
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differences it laid out in the ways men and women could act. Even if those norms were rejected, the gendered construction of legal language influenced attitudes about men’s and women’s natures and capabilities. But while law may have been a part of Parisian life, people altered its terms to suit their situations. Law served as an element of habitus, as Pierre Bourdieu might describe it. It structured relations between individuals and institutions but not in a deterministic or formulaic way. The interpretation and use of the law mediated the individual’s relationship between the objective structures of the state and his or her subjective goals and concerns. It served as a backdrop, as a group of assumptions that members of this society could draw upon as a resource in creating their life strategies. It introduced both constraint and strategy.
Chapter 2
Widows and Religious Institutions Introduction The teachings and traditions of the Catholic Church constituted another structural frame within which widows found their ambitions both constrained and broadened. In its teachings and rhetoric, the Catholic Church sought to limit the autonomy and public presence of widows, often teaching that a woman who had lost her husband should move to a new, contemplative phase of life and devote herself to prayer and pious works. While this was only a model that Church leaders presented to women who might be searching for direction after the death of a mate, and had little power to force women into religious service, it nonetheless had a certain amount of influence. For the widow, looking to refocus her daily life and deal with her loss, the words of a priest or other religious leader carried weight. This model was hardly a practical one for women who needed to work to support themselves and their families. But it did create a confining notion of how a widow should behave, particularly given the Catholic Church’s stature in this society. But in another way, the Church opened up certain widows’ lives, sometimes by offering them the opportunity for a new kind of public life in charitable works or by providing the less fortunate with assistance that helped to keep them out of destitution. It also provided widows with a means to address their feelings of loss within a culturally sanctioned mechanism. Prayers, masses, reminders that the afterlife would reunite them with a loved one, all presumably helped to diminish the pain of losing a spouse. But, with respect to artisanal women, the Church’s teachings had a far smaller structural impact on their actions than either the civil law or guild statutes. I argue that the reason for the weakness of the Church’s influence in this area was twofold. By the end of the seventeenth century, the political standing of the Crown and its campaign to erode the power of the Roman church, particularly with respect to shaping the norms of family life, meant that, in practical terms, religion had a rather weak influence on widows’ decisions. The other, more important reason, for the weakness of the Church’s influence on widows was its attempt to neutralize the ability of the widow to take on male roles, ones that were necessary if the widow were to maintain her family’s prosperity and status after the loss of the patriarch. The Church was concerned about the widow’s situation and wanted to neutralize her newfound legal and cultural power by pushing her back into the gender role
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occupied by other women, a move not even the law, with its practical and ideological ambitions, managed to do. In order to assess the extent of the Catholic Church’s influence over widowed women, we must look first to religious teachings and doctrine associated with widowhood and remarriage, and then the ways that the Church as an institution, and religion as an ideological structure, shaped a widow’s experience of religiosity and the religious institution of the Church in their lives. Many of the influences for Church ideas went back for centuries: scriptural teachings and canon law decisions, while perhaps not actively invoked in determining how to treat or think about widows, formed part of the religious tradition and framework that informed these ideas. In this chapter I will begin by discussing the ways widowhood was addressed in Church teachings and how it was ideally conceived. Next, I will examine the ways that widowed women experienced religion in their lives and how they interacted with the institution of the Church.
Scriptural Teachings The distinct status of the widow attracted the attention of the Christian Church from its earliest days, and the basis for this concern was grounded in the writings of the Old and New Testaments. For the most part, Scriptural pronouncements concerning widows couched them as passive unfortunates in need of assistance from the community in order to survive, and stressed the community’s obligation to provide assistance to poor widows. In the books of both the Old and New Testament, widows as a group were regarded as highly vulnerable, financially and emotionally, and thus in need of protection and assistance. Concern for the wellbeing of widows arose even when Jehovah was laying out his law for the Israelites, demonstrating the great importance of this social duty. While laying out the religious duties of the Israelites, Jehovah explained that he also “executes justice for the fatherless and the widow,” an exhortation rendered particularly compelling by its linkage with the reminder of his supreme powers.1 By placing this command after a recitation of divine might, the obligation to aid these unfortunates became even more compelling. Just as widows were singled out for protection here, along with the fatherless, more than half of such references to widows in the Old Testament paired them with orphans, the other category of vulnerable individuals.2 Rhetorically this
1
Deuteronomy 10:18. All citations come from Herbert G. May and Bruce M. Metzger (eds), The New Oxford Annotated Bible with the Apocrypha, Revised Standard Version (Oxford, 1973). 2 Frank S. Frick, “Widows,” in Carol Myers, Toni Craven, and Ross S. Kraemer (eds), Women in Scripture: A Dictionary of Names and Unnamed Women in the Hebrew
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juxtaposition emphasizes the passivity of the widow, equating her in this context not with a grown adult but with an isolated child. It also removes the expectation that a widow could function on her own, given this construction of utter helplessness and need.3 This belief in the widow’s inability to survive on her own helped to shape the communal response to the situation of such women. So that widows would not be left alone in their state of adult female orphanage, so to speak, this society created an institutional mechanism for automatically and quickly replacing the family support widows had enjoyed before their husbands’ deaths, and minimizing the period when she would be alone and vulnerable. When a woman’s husband died, she was expected to marry her deceased husband’s brother in what was called levirate marriage, a practice meant to provide women with security. Because women had no other proper role in ancient Jewish society than unmarried virgin living in her father’s house or married mother living in her husband’s house, this practice ensured that there would not be a population of female social misfits without an honorable place to live. Furthermore, once a woman married she was considered a member of her husband’s family and many of the ties with her family of birth were severed.4 Given this belief, it was unlikely that the widow’s family would welcome her back after they had transferred responsibility for her to others. When she married her brother-in-law, the widow honored her dead husband by seeking to perpetuate his name by bearing more children for his line and ensured herself a proper place in the home of her husband’s family.5 If a widow refused to participate in such a marriage, a grave decision indeed, she was expected to return to the home of her birth, dishonored.6 While this practice neglected the emotional dimension of marriage, it did serve an important social function. It ensured the widow an honorable and productive position in society and provided her with security and protection. The duty of the husband’s family to provide in such a way for his widow also demonstrates the seriousness of the charge to provide for these precariously positioned women. There was a certain level of continuity between the Old and the New Testaments with regard to the treatment of widows. The responsibility to support the poor widow remained paramount to Christians. In particular the Gospels Bible, the Apocryphal/Deuterocanonical Books, and the New Testament (Boston, 2000), p. 198. 3 Frank Frick notes that this emphasis on helplessness, drawn from the Biblical characterization, has come to mark the ways that modern scholars understand widowhood. “Widows in the Hebrew Bible: A Transactional Approach,” in Athalya Brenner (ed.), A Feminist Companion to Exodus to Deuteronomy (Sheffield, 1994), pp. 139–40. 4 Paula S. Hiebert, “Whence Shall Help Come to Me?: The Biblical Widow,” in Peggy Day (ed.), Gender and Difference in Ancient Israel (Minneapolis, 1989), p. 129. 5 Frick, “Widows,” pp. 198–9. 6 Genesis 38:11.
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emphasized the duty Christians had toward unfortunate members of society and Jesus frequently admonished his followers to give their wealth to the poor. But in contrast to the Old Testament, where widows were frequently invoked as the members of society who were most worthy of assistance, in the Gospels Jesus did not similarly single out widows as the most unfortunate, and indeed did not even invoke widows as representing a discrete group with its own particular needs and concerns as did the Old Testament. He mentioned widows specifically only a few times in the books of the Gospel. In one instance, Jesus drew attention to a very poor widow who contributed a very small sum to the temple. He praised her gift, recognizing that she had made a true sacrifice given her extreme poverty.7 In this episode, Jesus reaffirmed the association made in the gospels of widowhood with material need and fragility. In addition, he presented the widow as a particularly just and pious member of the community.8 The other moment when Jesus addressed the person of the widow was when he was asked about the implications of his teachings for the practice of levirate marriage. A group of Sadducees asked Jesus about the fate of a widowed woman who married seven brothers in succession as each one died without having produced a child with her. The priests inquired as to whose wife this woman would be after the resurrection, as “the seven had her as wife.”9 Jesus’ response sidestepped the technical aspects of this question, and instead focused on the spiritual quality of existence after the resurrection. He replied that “those who are accounted worthy to attain to that age and to the resurrection from the dead neither marry nor are given in marriage, for they cannot die any more, because they are equal to angels.”10 This answer asserted that human relations and social organizations did not prevail after death. In itself, this reply had little to say about the position of widows and was more concerned with establishing the radical difference of existence in the afterlife. But, it did implicitly frown upon the practice of levirate marriage by asserting that the real concern was what would happen after the resurrection rather than on earth, and that these two realms were not comparable. It initiated a shift in thinking about widows within the Christian Church from concern for practical survival to concern for spiritual matters.11 7
Mark 12:42–44; Luke 21:2–4. Mary Rose D’Angelo, “(Re)presentations of Women in the Gospel of Matthew and Luke-Acts,” in Ross Shepard Kraemer and Mary Rose D’Angelo (eds), Women and Christian Origins (Oxford, 1999), pp. 185–6. 9 Luke 20:28–33. This story was included in all of the synoptic gospels in similar form. See Mark 12:18–27 and Matthew 22:23–33 in addition to the version in Luke. 10 Luke 20:35–36. 11 In discontinuing the practice of levirate marriages, early Christian society broke with a method employed in many traditional societies for providing for widows’ well being. For one example see M.K. Slater, “Foreword: Sons and Levirs,” in Betty Potash (ed.), Widows in African Society: Choices and Constraints (Stanford, 1986), pp. xv–xxii. 8
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In 1 Corinthians, Paul completed this shift with respect to widows’ situations, strongly emphasizing the need for these solitary women to attend to their salvation rather than the practical concerns of everyday life. Believing that the world was near its end, he exhorted Christians to think of their salvation instead of carnal pleasure.12 Paul’s condemnation of sexual activity tinged his writings with a sense that sex, by its nature, was indecent. He stated very bluntly in this letter that “(t)o the unmarried and the widows I say that it is well for them to remain single as I do. But if they cannot exercise self-control, they should marry. For it is better to marry than to be aflame with passion.”13 As is well established, in this passage Paul did not acknowledge any other reason for marriage than the restraint of sexual desire.14 This position on married versus single life existed because Paul believed that “the unmarried woman or girl is anxious about the affairs of the Lord, how to be holy in body and spirit; but the married woman is anxious about worldly affairs.”15 Thus in preparing for the afterlife, the unmarried person had an advantage over someone who was part of a family, as a wife and mother. Paul reasserted his concern with the suitability of the remarried Christian widow in a later letter. Here Paul made clearer his belief that Christians who had lost a spouse ideally should not remarry.16 For example, he explained that only widowed women over the age of sixty who had been married once could be part of the religious community. With respect to younger widows, he wrote “they grow wanton against Christ (and) they desire to marry…some have already strayed after Satan.”17 Paul thought little of widowed women who sought to reclaim traditional female roles for themselves, as wife and mother, after a husband’s death. He also rebuked widows who hoped to live independently in the world as he explained that “(I)f any believing woman has relatives who are widows, let her assist them; let the church not be burdened, so that it may assist those who are real widows (e.g. those who required material support).”18 In this evocation of “real widows,” Paul denigrated those woman who sought to remain part of a family, either as the wife of another man or as an independent woman, in favor of those women who essentially gave up all they had to serve the church in chastity. 12
Willy Rordorf, “Marriage in the New Testament and in the Early Church,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 20 (1969): 195. 13 1 Corinthians 7:8–9. 14 Yet he did not abolish remarriage, as a number of other early Christian writers wished to do. One possible reason for this accommodation with the material concerns of widows may have been their prominence in the early Church and the great assistance wealthy widows gave to this precarious movement. See Margaret Y. MacDonald, “Reading Real Women through the Undisputed Letters of Paul,” in Ross Shepard Kraemer and Mary Rose D’Angelo (eds), Women and Christian Origins (Oxford, 1999), pp. 200–201. 15 1 Corinthians 7:34. 16 Rordorf, “Marriage in the New Testament,” p. 198. 17 1 Timothy 5:11–15. 18 1 Timothy 5:16.
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Paul’s priorities, as expressed in his epistles, strongly shaped the path future Church teachings would take with respect to marriage, sexuality, remarriage, and widowhood. His primary focus on the ethereal conflicted with concern for material survival after a husband’s death. Paul’s insistence on subordinating material worries to the spiritual ones represented an important shift. Where the Old Testament discussed widows primarily in terms of support and survival, the writings of Paul, building upon Jesus’ message, emphasize spiritual well-being. As far as he was concerned, the widow needed to heed the state of her soul and consider her physical survival as of secondary importance.19 In terms of scriptural precedent, the Church had a choice between the Old Testament, which taught that widows should remain part of society by remarrying, and the New Testament, which told widows to remain chaste and regarded remarriage, and reintegration into a traditionally female role, as suspect. This incongruity became embedded in Catholic attitudes toward women in general, and widows specifically, as priests taught that women were sinful and could only redeem themselves through denial and chastity and yet allowed, and at times condoned, marriage as a necessary part of life.
Early Church Teachings The writings of early Christian thinkers, whose ideas formed the beginnings of the canon law that would be codified later, took Paul’s aversion to sexuality and emphasis on spiritual preparation as fundamental principles to be explored in their own writings. One of the clearest expressions of this position on sexuality was the “conviction of the superiority of virginity over married life (that) became a mark of the whole patristic tradition.”20 The most well known of the early Patristic writers, St. Augustine, Tertullian, and St. Jerome, all expressed deep suspicion of sexuality and sought to curb its practice as much as was realistically possible.21 For example, Augustine believed that individuals married only for carnal reasons, and thus objected to remarriage due to “the sexual opportunities that remarriage furnished.”22 While many leaders of the Church wished to ban the marriages of 19 James Brundage, Law, Sex and Christian Society in Medieval Europe (Chicago, 1987), p. 61 20 Rordorf, “Marriage in the New Testament,” p. 203. 21 On the issue of engaging in sex only for procreation see John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century (Chicago, 1980), pp. 148–9 and 164. 22 Brundage, Law, Sex and Christian Society, p. 95. In terms of official Church attitudes toward the place of sex in marriage, Brundage summarizes them neatly: “Much more common was the argument that although sex itself was morally indifferent, the pleasure that accompanied it was wicked. Hence marital sex was free from sin only so long as no one enjoyed it,” p. 429.
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widows and widowers, and the heretical Manicheans did so for their followers, Paul’s grudging acceptance of the practice ensured that it would remain licit. Paul’s position as intellectual founder of the Christian Church ensured adherence to his ideas, even if they at times clashed with the views held by later religious leaders. However, the acceptance of this practice by Paul and later Church leaders did not translate into approbation for remarrying widows and widowers. The rhetoric of early Church writers demonstrated their contempt for widows who took another husband rather than seizing the chance to return to a state of celibacy and devote themselves and their resources to religious endeavors. Widowers who took a wife faced a more concrete expression of this disapproval: they could not hold positions in the Church as remarried men. All Christians who remarried were also required to do extensive penance “for their lascivious conduct.”23 Thus, in contrast to married priests who were forced by reforming Popes to give up their families despite centuries of precedent, remarriages were never outlawed but were always discouraged and considered as suspect and undesirable. This misgiving about remarriage certainly formed part of the Church’s ambivalent attitude toward widows and grounded its position that the best place for a widow was in the home and the best activities were prayer and religious service. The early modern Catholic Church could not easily reconcile itself to the woman who was compelled to take on the role as head of her family for practical reasons.
Canon Law Despite the force of scriptural precedent and patristic writings, this body of doctrine certainly did not dictate marital behavior by the early modern period. But it did strongly shape canon law, a body of strictures that in theory exercised sole authority over issues of marriage and family life after the twelfth century. As we have seen, the way that the Catholic Church regarded the issue of widowhood reflected the tension surrounding these women that arose initially from the different views espoused in the Old versus New Testament, discrepancies that remained part of early church writings on these questions. The debate over whether widowed women ideally should seek to remarry and again enter a traditional female position within the family, as was explicitly advocated in the Old Testament, or if she should remain a chaste and solitary person devoting her life to prayer, as Paul advised, was clearly reflected in the Church’s teachings to and about widows. The inability to resolve this tension resulted in the Church never finding a way to think about the widow as an everyday part of Christian society. Even while allowing the faithful to remarry after a spouse’s death, the Church continued to preach the virtues of celibacy to widowed women. Accordingly, the 23
Brundage, Law, Sex and Christian Society, p. 142.
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Church never showed women a way to both engage with society and live an exemplary holy life. The earliest formulations of canon law concerned themselves with the proper role of widows. The Didascalia Apostolorum, a third century text that represented one of the first explicit formulations of Church law, discussed the community’s responsibility toward widows by making reference to the stereotype of the impoverished and vulnerable solitary woman. However, echoing later religious representations of widows, this text also chastised the bad widow, the woman who did not respect authority, who wished to run her own affairs, in short, who believed she could take on a male role.24 This latter model of widowhood, one that might in fact simply describe a woman who needed to assert herself in order to meet her family’s material needs, is emblematic of the widow who would be castigated for centuries to follow. According to this text, responsibility for providing relief to these vulnerable populations rested with the bishop of each diocese.25 This responsibility was not questioned over the centuries and remained part of the work of the diocese, as later formulations of canon law codes continued to include the instruction to care for widows. It is not at all surprising, considering the ways societies imagined widows as poor, lonely and vulnerable, that the Church continued to teach care and compassion for these unfortunate women. What is striking about this concern for widows is the way that the Church imagined a Christian widow’s existence. Drawing heavily from the letters of Paul for its position, the Catholic Church continued to uphold chastity in widowhood as the ideal. The reason that the community needed to care for the widow was because ideally she would not take another husband to provide for her. Instead, she would rely upon neighbors and family to support her while she devoted herself to prayer and remembrance. This text shows the legalistic basis of the Christian attitude toward widows, one that did not change substantially over the centuries. Subsequent councils whose work was to add to, change, and refine canon law did not consider the place of the widow in their work, even during the course of the most important and contentious Church gatherings. In terms of an official position on widowhood, the point most debated was whether remarriage would remain licit. Widows were never prevented from remarrying if they chose to, but the Church nonetheless continued to show ambivalence about widows who took a husband. One manifestation of the Church’s disapproval of second marriages was ritual in nature. Priests refused to grant a nuptial blessing to remarrying couples. These marriages were legally and 24
Didascalia Apostolorum, trans. R. Hugh Connolly (Oxford, 1929), chapter XV, subsections iii; 5–10. See also Charlotte Methuen, “Widows, Bishops, and the Struggle for Authority in the Didascalia Apostolorum,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 46 (1995): 198. 25 In addition to the citations in the previous footnote, see James Brundage, Medieval Canon Law (New York, 1995), p. 6.
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spiritually binding, but did not merit full approbation. Alexander III instituted this policy in the late twelfth century without giving any reason for changing Church practice.26 It is not clear how the faithful might have perceived the meaning behind this change, particularly in a society where the validity of marriage was not necessarily linked to the presence of a priest or participation in a ceremony, but to the exchange of promises to marry and sexual intercourse. But the lack of the nuptial blessing did convey meaning to theologians who considered unions not so blessed to be lesser than first marriages that enjoyed the full approbation of the Church hierarchy. In fact, some writers asserted that a marriage that did not have the nuptial blessing was not sacramental in nature, and was thus not a fully valid marriage.27 This position did not accord with official teaching, however it did reflect the range of ambivalence about remarriage and the belief that widows and widowers should re-embrace chastity after a spouse’s death. This prohibition on conferring a nuptial blessing lasted through the early modern period, visually and orally demonstrating during the ceremony itself the marginal quality of second marriages. But by later centuries, this restriction seems to have changed somewhat. While Alexander’s decision was meant to apply to both men and women who married after the death of a spouse, over time this censure applied almost exclusively to remarrying widows. Men who took a virgin as a second wife were allowed the nuptial blessing as part of their union.28 This double standard reflected the troubling nature of second marriages when they involved widows. Because the definition of what constituted a valid marriage was unambiguous and stripped of any ritualistic requirements, a priest was not necessary to contract a Christian marriage. But the nature of the priest’s interaction with a couple sent a message about the Church’s assessment of the value of their relationship. Furthermore, since popular opinion about marriage placed great importance on the process of creating a nuptial bond, the absence of this blessing made such a union less than complete in the eyes of the community.29 The source for continued ambivalence on this question is not entirely clear but it appears to stem from two main sources. First, the powerful and long-standing precedent set by Paul’s letters continued to shape Church policy for centuries. Related to this long-standing acceptance of remarriage as constituting a necessity at times was the belief that women were particularly beset by lust and sexual desire and the only means for them to legitimately tame those appetites was by marrying. 26
Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society, p. 343. Seamus P. Heaney, The Development of the Sacramentality of Marriage from Anselm of Laon to Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 113. 28 Philippe Ariès, “Introduction,” in Jacques Dupâquier (ed.), Marriage and Remarriage in Populations of the Past (London, 1981), p. 29. 29 Jean Bernhard, “Le mariage,” in Jean Bernhard, Charles Lefebvre, and Francis Rapp (eds), L’époque de la réforme et du Concile de Trente (Paris, 1990), p. 212. 27
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Thus the Church’s attitude continued to rely on the argument Paul laid out, and Augustine furthered, that marriage was hopelessly tangled up with lust and was thus somewhat suspect in the eyes of good Christians. A second and more recent development was the decision that marriage was a sacrament, as solemn and important an act for Christians as receiving holy orders or extreme unction. This decision was part of the broader reconfiguring of canon law pertaining to marriage in the late twelfth century and particularly the emphasis on the centrality of consent to constituting a valid marriage. As a consequence the debate about what constituted a valid marriage took on a more serious tenor once it was definitively categorized as a sacramental act. In Christian teaching, a sacrament is a complicated and layered concept. It denotes the ways in which faithful Christians can both experience and participate in the union of Christ and the Church. But there is a distinction between the sacrament as a performative act and the lasting impact of this moment. To express the complex nature of sacraments Church teaching refers to them as having “matter” and “form,” a duality coined and explained by Thomas Aquinas. Consequently sacraments have two effects and functions: “(they) are signs, and they cause grace precisely in accord with their nature. They effect what they signify; they are signs that cause what they signify and cause by signifying.”30 So sacraments change participants both in the moment when they are performed, in accordance with their nature as form, and over time by dint of the bond they call into being between and within the participants, in accordance with their nature as “matter.” The precise goal and effect that the sacrament of marriage had was “to produce a visible manifestation of the union of Christ and His Church,” thus creating a mystical and permanent bond between husband and wife.31 This decision to make marriage a sacrament strengthened the Church’s opposition to dissolving marriages except under the rarest of circumstances and reaffirmed the high value of marriage in Christian society. What is striking about this extended debate over designating marriage a sacrament, which lasted for over a century and resulted in a significant formal change in its definition, is the absence of discussion about the implications for remarriage.32 Clearly Christian thinkers did not consider marriage and remarriage to be exactly equivalent acts, given their diverging attitudes towards these two actions and the differences in the ceremonies. But while the Church shaped and refined its position on marriage to correspond and react to its changing social and economic landscape, canonists did not consider how those changes should influence teaching on remarriage. Instead, the Church continued to rely on the teachings of the early Church to direct their attitude toward unions of widows or widowers. Given that this important redefinition of marriage as a sacrament left 30 31 32
New Catholic Encyclopedia (17 vols, New York, 1967), vol. 12, p. 808. Ibid., vol. 9, p. 472. Heaney, Development of Sacramentality, pp. 43–4.
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remarriages unchanged, it is worth considering what impact this new doctrine might have exerted even if it went unsaid in Church writings. Canon lawyers had been discussing marriage, whether it was a sacramental act and the nature of the grace conferred by this specific act for centuries, debating whether an institution that included such a physical dimension could be considered to confer divine enlightenment. The position that marriage was a sacrament, while not exerting any formal pressure on the Church’s ambivalence concerning remarriage, did seem to play a part in the subtle discouragement of remarriage for widows if we follow the logic demanded in the creation of a valid marriage. On the simplest level, raising marriage to the sacramental level placed greater importance on the free consent of both partners. Any intimation that consent to a marriage had been forced, and that it was at heart an invalid union, had more serious implications if the forced relationship were also a sacramental one. Because Church officials had great concerns over the nature of free consent in second marriages, they continued to have serious misgivings about the desirability of allowing remarriage. Church leaders were particularly concerned about the degree of pressure a family might place on a wealthy widow to remarry, particularly if she were still in her childbearing years.33 The further solemnization of the marital bond as a sacrament relieved a widow from feeling obligated to remarry for the sake of her children or family if she were not inclined to do so. But, paradoxically, while many Church attitudes toward widows had the effect of disempowering these women by counseling them to devote their energies toward spiritual pursuits, the place of consent in marriage authorized the widow alone to make this decision about her future. By definition, it forced her to act, rather than pushing her to rely on others, when faced with the decision to contract a second marriage, and placed all of the responsibility and moral weight of this act squarely on the shoulders of the widow. The other way the refinement of marriage’s spiritual nature may have influenced the continuing disapproval of remarriage lies in the meaning of sacraments. Central to this notion was a sense that performing the sacramental act transformed the participants in a fundamental way. In a marriage, a mystical bond was created that was meant to join the spouses permanently in a divine connection that allowed them to experience in some fashion the relationship between Christ and the Church. Given the transcendent meaning of marriage, as far as Christian teaching was concerned, it was not clear that an individual could enter into such a relationship with more than one person. Technically, marriage was a sacrament
33 Janet S. Loengard, “Of the Gift of Her Husband: English Dower and its Consequences in the Year 1200,” in Suzanne Wemple and Julius Kirshner (eds), Women of the Medieval World: Essays in Honor of John H. Mundy (Oxford, 1985), p. 237.
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like receiving the Eucharist was. An individual could participate in this ritual more than once.34 However, unlike the individual’s participation in the Eucharist, which reenacted the same relationship between the faithful and the transformed host, in remarriage a widowed spouse entered into a sacramental bond with a different partner. While the bond was the same, and what it represented was also stable, the widow or widower performed it with a different partner, in a sense then pledging to be part of a mystical, permanent relationship with another. The Church addressed some of these issues by explaining that marriage created a bond not of souls but of persons; thus the bond that “constitutes this union ceases to exist when one of the parties…ceases to exist.”35 However, Church leaders did not explicitly discuss or connect it to their unease with remarriage. Despite official reckoning with respect to the possibility of sacramental remarriage, it is telling that at nearly the same time that the sacramental nature of marriage was finally solidified in doctrine, the Pope also withdrew the nuptial blessing from remarriage ceremonies. Remarriages were clearly not readily condoned, as first marriages were. And while the misgivings of some theologians about the sacramental status of a union that lacked a nuptial blessing were never officially supported, the Church’s continued ambivalence about remarriages implies that they were not wholly rejected either. Based on the teachings of the Church about marriage, remarriage, and widowhood, and drawing out the logical intersections of these related ideas, it seems that part of the problem stemmed from the ramifications of marriage’s sacramental nature.36 But while this may not be wholly clear, the fact remains that the Church continued to discourage remarriage, even while never explicitly addressing that unease or re-examining that posture in the face of changing social realities and practices.37 34
This was in contrast to the sacraments of baptism, confirmation, and holy orders that were believed to mark an individual permanently, thus eliminating the possibility of receiving them more than once. 35 Heaney, Development of Sacramentality, p. 181. 36 Suggestive in this respect is the discussion that took place during the Council of Trent concerning the sacramentality of clandestine marriages. A number of bishops asserted that secret marriages, contracted without the benefit of priestly rituals, were not fully sacramental. This reasoning supports the related idea that without the nuptial blessing a remarriage was not fully sacramental—both positions see full grace as conferred by the Church’s rituals with these less than ideal marriages that lacked full ceremony also lacking full sanctity. Bernhard, “Le mariage,” p. 247. 37 Partners entered remarriages for many reasons—economic, emotional, familial. Remarriages functioned to achieve certain property goals and to mitigate the impact of high mortality on population levels. Yet the Church never considered demographic or economic changes in its consideration of remarriage. See for example Ståle Dyrvik, “Gagne-pain ou sentiments? Trait du remariage en Norvège au dix-neuvième siècle,” and especially Henri Leridon, “Effets du veuvage et du remariage sur la fécondité. Résultat d’un modèle de
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The Council of Trent The Church’s official position on marriage and remarriage, as well as the preference for widows’ chastity, accounts in part for its absence from the agenda at the most important religious meeting of the early modern period, the Council of Trent. In part due to unrelenting criticism from Protestant reformers about the abuses of clandestine marriage and the need for parental permission for this most important decision, the Council did take up the question of what constituted a valid marriage as one of its major concerns. The question of what constituted a valid marriage was disputed not only by Protestant reformers who wished to criticize the Roman Church in the strongest terms for their position on marriage, but also within the ranks of faithful Catholics who agreed to some extent with these calls for change. While they might not have fully agreed with Martin Luther’s and other reformers’ criticisms of the Catholic conception of marriage, many members of the Roman church nonetheless wished for certain changes in the ways that a couple could contract a valid union.38 The most pressing concern swirled around the role of parental consent. The majority of French bishops, and French laypeople, wished to see parental consent made a required part of entering into a marriage. In fact, the French contingency at Trent went so far as to demand that marriages lacking parental consent and due publicity, in short clandestine marriages, should be declared null, leaving both partners free to marry others. Such changes, advocates argued, would smooth the family and social disorder often occasioned by ill-conceived and hasty unions, as well as lend greater meaning and harmony to what were by force lifetime partnerships. While a great many of the bishops present were sympathetic to this position, two issues doomed these proposed changes. The first, and perhaps more serious problem, was that this change would severely compromise papal teaching on free consent. It is difficult to see how requiring parental consent could mesh with requiring the free consent of the partners at the same time. Sanctioning such a change would overturn centuries of Church teaching about what made a marriage, and particularly what made marriage a sacrament.
simulation,” both in Jacques Dupâquier (ed.), Marriage and Remarriage in Populations of the Past (London, 1981). These authors argue in their essays that the impulse to remarry served certain changing social needs and so responded in part to economic and demographic changes. 38 In his article on the codification of canon law in 1917, René Metz emphasizes that while there was a desire to reshape canon law at the Council of Trent as part of the Catholic response to the Reformers’ criticisms, Trent did not achieve this complete revision of Church law. Instead what resulted from this council were “d’importantes décisions disciplinaires.” René Metz, “Pouvoir, Centralisation, et Droit. La codification du droit de l’église catholique au début du XXe siècle,” Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religion, 51 (1981): 51.
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The second problem was tied up in the polemics of Protestant reformers. They criticized the Roman Church for allowing secret marriages to have validity, charging that such unions undermined the authority of parents and introduced unhappiness and disorder into society. A much more sensible, and realistic, approach to marriage regulation, according to such critics, would require parental consent to marriages and allow marriages to be annulled in certain circumstances.39 Acceding to the requests of Catholic reformers who wished to change the definition of valid marriage thus came to be seen as a capitulation to Protestant reformers and an admission that the Church had been mistaken in this area of doctrine. Given the hostile relations between Rome and its critics, such a position of accommodation was not politically feasible. Thus the bishops at Trent were left to devise a solution that addressed the legitimate concerns of their members, upheld the rightness of papal teaching on marriage, and held firm against the criticisms of Luther and his ilk. In the end, finding a solution that met all of these criteria proved to be impossible. Ultimately the Council tried to accommodate the desire for meaningful reform but without going so far as to negate papal pronouncements about the indissolubility of marriage except in the rarest of circumstances. The decrees on marriage that emerged at Trent were called the Tametsi decrees. After much wrangling, the council declared that while two individuals could contract a valid marriage by the exchange of free consent, and that no other elements were necessary to create such a union, in the future couples were strongly admonished to make their union public before solidifying it.40 In fact, the council went further by declaring that it was illegal to marry without public banns and the presence of a priest, a position that would be reiterated in French royal legislation. Yet they ultimately refused to declare clandestine marriages null and pronounced heretical any attempt to break up such unions by reason of their secrecy.41 This decree thus placed the full moral force of the Church behind supporters of parental consent but balked at modifying the free consent definition of valid marriage, thus eliminating the possibility of annulling marriages that took place without parents’ knowledge. By following this path the Council did not succeed in mollifying any of its critics, and in fact the French contingent was so incensed by the Council’s failure to include parental consent in the definition of a valid
39
Bernhard, “Le mariage,” pp. 216–21; Lyndal Roper, The Holy Household: Women and Morals in Reformation Augsburg (Oxford, 1989), pp. 159–60; Steven Ozment, When Fathers Ruled: Family Life in Reformation Europe (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 28–30. 40 Jean Bernhard gives a thorough description of the long and difficult discussions, spanning from 1547 to 1563, that took place around the issue of marriage. See his “Le mariage.” 41 On the illegality, but validity of clandestine marriages, Bernhard, “Le mariage,” pp. 224, 230–31, 260.
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marriage that they refused to accept the teachings of Trent for nearly three decades.42 One of the most striking aspects of this episode is the failure of the council to take up the issue of remarriage. Bishops spent months debating the definition of marriage, seeking in their response to take into account not only centuries of Church teaching and tradition, but also the needs of contemporary European society. By considering the issue of parental consent, the Council obliquely acknowledged the interests, social, political and economic, that a family had in children’s marriages. Yet even with the extended attention paid to this question, the Council never considered clarifying or altering the Church’s teachings about widows, widowers, and remarriage. In fact, the issue never seems to have come up. It is not clear why the Council neglected to address this important question. As we know, death and remarriage were a regular part of life in early modern Europe, and a large minority of the population contracted marriages after a spouse passed away. This was not by any means a marginal practice that could be safely overlooked by the Church; it affected many of the faithful. The question of what constituted a valid marriage caused a great deal of debate and controversy, and even had political ramifications in France. But even in this charged context, the question of remarriage did not emerge. Several possibilities come to mind. First, the Church’s ambivalence toward remarriage, particularly for women, remained in place and needed no further clarification. If the goal of the Catholic Church was to influence women to remain celibate after the deaths of their husbands, they needed to go no further to make this point clear. Second, unlike with marriage, there were not influential groups or individuals pressing the Catholic Church for change. Neither the nobility nor wealthy commoners showed concern over their children’s remarriages. Without such pressure, the Council did not have any vital reason to open up the issue of remarriage for discussion. Finally, ignoring the question of remarriage tacitly reinforced the notion that widows should dedicate themselves to religion rather than to building a new household.
Polemical Texts The Catholic Church usually dealt with the issue of widows by reverting back to the position articulated in Paul’s letters and ignoring many of the pressing practical concerns that widows faced. In fact, over centuries the Church never fully reexamined Paul’s position on widows and what women should do under such circumstances, preferring instead to adhere to his teachings. Rather than constructing a coherent position on remarriage, the Church waffled on its legitimacy and desirability, never making clear the exact status of remarriage. The place where early modern Catholic attitudes toward widows and remarriage 42
Diefendorf, Paris City Councillors, p. 163.
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emerged far more clearly was in pious pamphlets and tracts. Religious writers explicitly frowned upon remarriage, and explained the reasons behind this disapproval. They discussed far more clearly than did Church doctrine the Christian ideal of widowhood and disapproval of remarriage. Such religious texts help to fill in some of the logic behind canon law and traditional teachings and decisions. Religious texts from several different genres explored what writers considered the problems of widowhood, and how women should address these problems. Perhaps the most vexing issue for religious writers was that of sexuality. The Church exhorted widows to remain chaste in order to live an exemplary life. The priest Gerard de Villethierry, who wrote a widely read tract called La vie des veuves emphasized the difficulties widows would have controlling their sexuality. He reasons that widows would struggle particularly with maintaining their chastity since “having lived a long time in a marriage, they have more difficulties with keeping (sexually) continent than those who have kept their first virginity: their passions are not accustomed to being repressed.”43 The solution for potentially unbridled women was to maintain what Villethierry called a second virginity; in order to do so widows would need to remain unmarried. In making his plea to widows, Villethierry used Paul’s aversion to sexuality to justify his ideas. He tells widows that in chastity “they are keeping their bodies for God alone.” In addition to using their celibacy to honor God, it also served as a kind of penance and widows should “consider their widowhood as a means that God give them to purify the faults they may have committed during their marriages.”44 With her husband’s death, a widow found another opportunity to turn her energies to the Christian life. The distrust of sexuality, the idea that a sexual life was lesser than a celibate one, closely informed religious instruction to widows in how to become better Christian women. A related challenge for widows was how to honor their deceased husbands. Certainly funeral rites and prayers formed one way to mark a passing. But writers urging women to remain unmarried and chaste argued that such a course pleased their deceased husbands as well as God. One potential problem when a widow remarried was that she might forget her first marriage, but those who retain their widowhood, and who keep their resolution to remain (sexually) continent for the rest of their days, are ordinarily full of esteem and respect for the spouses from whom God has separated them, and they (widows) honor them in a special way; because they always carry their (husbands’) names.45
43
Girard de Villethierry, La vie des veuves, ou les devoirs et les obligations des veuves chrétiennes (Paris, 1736), preface. 44 Villethierry, Vie des veuves, pp. 77, 82. 45 Villethierry, Vie des veuves, p. 51.
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While this explanation does not explicitly raise the sacramental nature of marriage, the assertion that a widow maintained a tie with her deceased husband, and owed him loyalty beyond the grave, reminds readers that marriage, as a sacrament, changed participants permanently. An even stronger statement about the lasting connection between spouses asserts that if the respect they hold for (their husbands) is sincere, it does not end with death, and they (widows) will always obey them, they will be eager to follow advice that they (husbands) customarily gave, they will maintain conduct similar to what (their husbands) demanded of them when they were alive.46
A remarrying widow faced serious consequences. Without violating a true sacramental imperative, the widow nonetheless turned her back on both her husband and the spiritually transcendent nature of their connection. Further, the remarrying widow ignored the advice of religious advisors about the best Christian life. The problems of sexuality and marriage were not the only ones that widows faced in seeking to lead an exemplary Christian life. Widows often found themselves seduced by other worldly attractions. Anne de Gonzague, the Princess Palatine, a widow eulogized by no less an orator than Jacques Bossuet, found herself pulled toward material concerns in the months after her husband’s death. She was tempted to stray by “forgetting the eternal mourning and the character of desolation, which serves as the mainstay of the glory of her state, (and) she abandons herself to the enjoyment of the world.”47 She spent the time directly following her husband’s death involved in the affairs of court, a place Bossuet describes in pejorative terms. He cedes that it was a place where people went out of necessity, in order to oversee their affairs and maintain their fortune. But he also condemned much of the activity that went on there as corrupting, explaining that at court “you find everywhere veiled interests, tricky jealousies.”48 While Anne de Gonzague did have legitimate reasons to be at court, she was also in danger of losing her moral footing and forgetting her duties as a true Christian widow. Despite the Princess Palatine’s attempts to maintain her integrity, she did become corrupted by the life of court, and was troubled by this moral decline. Bossuet diagnosed the problem for his readers, “what was lacking in our princess’ happiness? God, whom she had known and all to do with Him.”49 Even a woman of moral character found herself led astray as she attempted to mix with the world.
46 47 48 49
Villethierry, Vie des veuves, p. 53. Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, Œuvres choisies (5 vols, Paris, 1871) vol. 4, p. 378. Bossuet, Œuvres, p. 379. Bossuet, Œuvres, p. 382.
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What remedies to these problems existed according to religious authorities? The most desirable, and at the same time most impractical, course of action was to join a religious order. The short biography of Widow Pollalion, who chose to take religious vows, provides an example of one such worthy widow. Marie Lumague, Widow Pollalion, was experiencing the pain and sadness that all women felt when they lost their husbands. But this admirable woman did not wallow in her emotions or use her misfortune as an excuse for self-pity. Rather, Widow Pollalion decided to take consolation in her faith and “wanting nothing but what was in God’s plan, (she) thus found in Him, and in submission to His will, what could moderate her grief.”50 The ideal widow, Pollalion placed her fate in God’s hands. She did not look to family, friends, work, or other distraction to heal her pain; she passively accepted God’s will and devoted herself to doing his work. The Widow Pollalion quickly realized that God’s work required her to adopt formal adherence to religious life. She chose to become a tertiary member of the Order of Saint Dominique and “she spent the rest of her life in the order’s habits which were always very modest, like those of a Christian widow.”51 This path was ideal for a true Christian woman who found herself without a husband. In some sense, becoming an adherent to a religious order transferred determination of her actions from her husband to her superior. This scenario ensured that the widow would not exercise authority or agency on her own behalf. And the choice to become a tertiary also eased acceptance of this decision by a woman’s family, as these religious were considered secular members of their order which allowed them to own property, thus not disrupting the family’s inheritance strategies.52 Like an ideal Christian woman, Widow Pollalion lived according to an exemplary model of Christian widowhood, institutionalizing her devotion to her faith by joining a religious order. But while the Church certainly rejoiced in such women, Christian writers recognized that they needed to provide widows with other models of comportment as not all such women would embrace the life of a dévote. Religious authorities needed to find other, less dramatic, ways for widows to express their piety and devotion to spiritual ideas. One option was self-defined seclusion and isolation. In order to make the journey back to ideal widowhood, and piety, Anne de Gonzague “withdrew to the country, sequestered from the world, and spent three whole years ordering her conscience and her affairs.”53 But the Princess could not achieve moral redemption alone. Her confessor, a man instrumental in this process, accompanied her to her 50 M. Collin, Vie de la vénérable servante de Dieu Marie Lumague veuve de M. Pollalion, gentil-homme ordinaire du Roy, Institutrice des filles de la Providence (Paris, 1744), p. 27. 51 Collin, Vie de Lumague, p. 29. 52 Elizabeth Rapley, The Dévotes: Women and Church in Seventeenth-Century France (Montreal, 1990), p. 206. 53 Bossuet, Œuvres, p. 382.
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country home, pushing her to recognize how she had succumbed to temptation in the period after her husband’s death and what was needed to achieve true Christian widowhood. The prescription for redemption is a familiar one: Anne de Gonzague needed to withdraw from public life, most especially the court, spend her time in reflection and prayer, and devote the energies she once spent at worldly pursuits to acts of charity and religious devotion. Once Anne de Gonzague renounced the trappings of the court, and even its physical space, she appeared in public only one time, to announce her decision to withdraw from the world. After this defining moment, the Princess hewed to an orthodox path, fulfilling the duties of the Christian widow with little deviation. She kept herself “industriously occupied, exerting herself in works where piety has provided the plan: it was either clothes for the poor or vestments for altars... As it was not necessary to speak, the wise Princess kept silent.”54 Here a silent woman was a pious woman; if she did not speak, she could not assert her own agency or will and act contrary to what her confessor or Heavenly Father might ordain. Without taking religious orders, the Princess Palatine nonetheless created an exemplary Christian life for herself. Of course, even widows who could not achieve such levels of disengagement from the world could find other ways to express their piety and desire to live in accordance with their religious beliefs. One decision a widow could make in order to enhance her moral state was to remain single. As discussed earlier, there were theological and spiritual reasons for women to remain chaste after their husbands died. But one problem with this scenario was that in the absence of a husband, and perhaps of a father and brother as well, a woman answered to no male authority. True, she was expected to follow the guidance of the Church and its male leaders, but such authority figures were rather abstract for most women and certainly could not have the impact of a spouse or father. Thus while the unmarried widow encapsulated ideal womanhood, it also introduced the frightening specter of the independent woman, making decisions on her own behalf. For this reason, an unmarried, spiritually devoted, widow, while she would not disturb her family’s inheritance strategies or succumb to the lures of a physical relationship, was nonetheless a profoundly disturbing figure. Absent the explicit requirement that widows either remarry or rejoin their natal families in some capacity, there was not much society could do to solve this dilemma. While religious polemicists reminded widows that God demanded obedience from them, just as a husband or father did, this abstract authority did not necessarily resonate like the physical presence of a man. Widows living outside an order, or without a confessor, could present the image of living ideal Christian lives but they were also living without male authority. Although it was not an ideal solution to this vexing problem, religious writers urged contemplation and prayer to guide women through the temptations of 54
Bossuet, Œuvres, p. 389.
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widowhood. In order to reinforce all of the spiritual teachings about her state, the widow was to pray often, honoring the memory of her late husband, seclude herself from society, perform good works, and shun luxury and avarice. If a widow fulfilled all of these dicta, she would serve as model to her fellow Christians, employ her time and energy in a worthwhile endeavor, and, most importantly, achieve salvation. A woman who was not able to commit to this kind of existence, who wished to remain part of the world, was in danger of losing her happiness and her soul through these ill-conceived actions. While the demands made on widows were quite heavy, the potential rewards offered by such efforts were considerable. Widows could achieve “eternal salvation…to enjoy the eternal presence of our lord Jesus Christ in heaven.”55 But how reasonable were such demands for women who did not belong to the social elite? It was not coincidental that a common belief about widows was that “widows have almost no other obligations but to preserve their worldly goods, to oversee their lawsuits, to govern their families.”56 Widows who did indeed need to look after such practical matters had to find other strategies for creating respectable, pious, but practical lives for themselves. According to religious teachings and texts, widows were best off when they either withdrew from the world, minimizing the temptation to engage with secular pursuits, or when they devoted themselves publicly to a life filled exclusively with piety and religious service. However this model represents only an ideal and does not take into account the ways widows understood, reacted to, adopted, or resisted such instruction. With respect to some of these concerns, we can know how widows responded. In early modern France remarriages comprised about 25 per cent of all marriages, with widowers taking new spouses more quickly and more often than widows. For all kinds of reasons, economic, emotional, domestic, people who lost spouses found new partners. When assessing their needs and wishes, many widows found a continuation of married life more compelling than a retreat into religious contemplation. Likewise, most widows, particularly those from the more modest levels of society, remained active members of their communities, working to support themselves and their families, making decisions about their children’s careers and marriage partners, engaging in the life of the guild and the neighborhood. Particularly if there were family resources that needed to be husbanded and enlarged, a widow would find it very difficult to turn her back on such concerns, thus endangering her family’s continued well-being. In these terms, widows did not strictly heed priests who told them to devote their lives to piety and prayer. But there were other facets of religious advice that even widows who continued to mix with secular society could follow. They could heed exhortations to pray, 55 56
Villethierry, Vie des veuves, preface. Villethierry, Vie des veuves, p. 2.
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consider mortality, live a moral and pious life even while working or being a wife to a second husband. To assess the impact of religious writings on such subjective activities is far more difficult. The widows under examination here, like the vast majority of women in their society, left virtually no written records of their thoughts, feelings, or ideas. Thus a widow who embraced these kinds of priestly appeals might not often leave traces of such sentiments. But in indirect ways we can glean the impact religion made on the lives of widows. By examining their testamentary behavior, their relationship to their parish, and their material possessions, we can gain a notion of how widows understood and practiced religion, and the role it played in their lives.
Death and Life Thereafter Instructions to a widow began at the very moment when she became a different kind of woman, at the death of her husband. This event changed her relationship to many of the people around her. She no longer performed only wifely tasks; she became a stand-in for her husband. That moment was solemnized by the rituals of death, mediated by the Catholic Church. After the completion of those rites, the widow became a different person. While her husband experienced socialization in the form of apprenticeship, we can imagine the rituals surrounding death as a kind of socialization for the widow. It was an experience that fundamentally changed her relation to her family, the law, the state, the guild. She took on a new status and a new place in society as a result of her husband’s death. The events surrounding death in eighteenth-century France were clearly prescribed, both by law and by custom. At the moment when it became clear that someone was on the verge of death, a train of pre-set events went into effect. The curé came to the house bearing the sacrament, a signal to the neighborhood that a member of their community would soon die. A priest was indispensable for the seriously ill, and the government demanded that a physician notify a priest after the second visit to a patient’s home. A Royal Declaration of 1712, reiterated in 1724, promulgated these regulations so that family shock and delicacy might not unwittingly serve to deny a dying penitent the crucial last rites, final confession and extreme unction. If the physician did not comply with this declaration, he was fined 300 livres for the first infringement, and was suspended from practicing medicine for three months after the second time.57 These rigid regulations seemed to be effective, as it seemed to be the case that “(e)xcept in Protestant areas, or in cases of sudden death, there were few who died without the ministrations of the Church.”58 57
Isambert, Recueil des lois, vol. 20, p. 574. John McManners, Death and the Enlightenment: Changing Attitudes to Death among Christians and Unbelievers in Eighteenth-century France (Oxford, 1981), p. 244. 58
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The rituals of death involved not only religious rites, but secular ones as well. The other official an urban family would frequently send for was the neighborhood commissioner of police. As soon as possible after the death of the head of the household its members would ask the police commissioner to seal up the house and make a preliminary inventory, to be formalized once a notary arrived to make a proper probate inventory (inventaire après décès). This step sought to head off arguments between heirs and creditors, and to prevent the property of the deceased from being removed from the house. In villages, the parish bell-ringer would inform the community of a death; in the cities there were criers to perform that function, or for the more fashionable printed death notices informed intimates of the bad news.59 While friends and relatives gathered to pay their last respects, the body would remain in the house overnight while someone nominally kept prayerful vigil. Once the moment came for the body to leave the house, Church ritual dictated precisely how the rite should proceed. The Catholic ritual used for lay funerals, unchanged until the reforms of Vatican II, was set out in 1614 by Pope Paul V as the last of the major changes of the Council of Trent. The official Roman Ritual, as it was called, provided for “procession from the house of the departed to the church; the office of the dead; the funeral mass followed by the absolution; and a procession to the place of burial followed by the burial proper.”60 At each point, the celebrant recited a series of prayers and psalms set down in the Roman Ritual as appropriate to meditation on the theme of mortality and eternal life. For guild masters, members of their confraternity also provided some of the ritual structure of the funeral procession. The deceased master’s companions accompanied his bier to the church where the funeral mass was to be held, lending brotherly support to his family and a formal marking of the loss the community had experienced.61 When a master stone cutter died, his fellow masters carried candles, paid for out of the communal purse, as they marched to the church. The community also paid for the funerals of destitute masters and widows, thus ensuring that these unfortunate brothers and sisters would have a service appropriate to their standing as part of an incorporated community.62
59
Ibid., p. 271. Geoffrey Rowell, The Liturgy of Christian Burial (London, 1977), p. 71. 61 While all of the classic works on the guilds mention confraternities, little work has been done on them as independent entities. See Gabriel LeBras, “Les Confréries chrétiennes, problèmes et propositions,” Revue historique de droit français et étranger, (1940–41). For comparative insights see Maureen Flynn, Sacred Charity: Confraternities and Social Welfare in Spain, 1400–1700 (Ithaca, 1988). On the place of the procession in the funeral rite, Vanessa Harding, “Whose Body? A Study of Attitudes towards the Dead Body in Early Modern Paris,” in Bruce Gordon and Peter Marshall (eds), The Place of the Dead: Death and Remembrance in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 2000). 62 Lespinasse, Les corporations, p. 2. 60
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Once the procession arrived at the church, the priest or curé in charge would take over the rest of the ritual. The order of the mass chosen reflected “the note of judgment and the terror of death (which) came to replace the earlier emphasis on entry into the joy of paradise.”63 The priest used the opportunity to teach the congregation how to prepare for judgment upon death, and emphasized not the release death provided from earthly toil, but the danger an unprepared soul faced in the afterlife.64 Such teachings were meant not only to inspire mindfulness and piety in the hearts of listeners, but more specifically to instruct widows on their new roles.
Devotional Practices The funeral, the first event that followed a death, was meant to put religious matters in mind. The events at the church and burial ground were meant to remind widows of their heightened religious obligations. There were a number of ways women could express their devotion to religious concerns. Widows were seen as being particularly drawn to the Church, in part because of the emptiness that accompanied their loss, and in part because they now could set aside their secular concerns, cares for their families, and focus on their spiritual well-being. Certainly experiencing death at such close quarters must have made them consider their mortality and the state of their soul. This reminder of mortality may have had the effect of urging widows to become more devoted to their Church. But given that women have traditionally been more committed to religious beliefs and practices than men, widows were probably already more predisposed toward religious devotion than widowers.65 For widows, then, the expectations placed on them after their husbands’ death were not wholly new but rather required a change in degree of commitment to a pious life. 63
Rowell, Liturgy, p. 72. This change in emphasis seems to be connected in part to the shift in emphasis in sermons and burial practices that occurred during the Wars of Religion. On this see Larissa Juliet Taylor, “Funeral Sermons and Orations as Religious Propaganda in Sixteenth-century France,” in Bruce Gordon and Peter Marshall (eds), The Place of the Dead: Death and Remembrance in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 2000), p. 227. 65 There are numerous historical works that point out the connection between gender and piety. Of particular note on this point are Rapley, The Dévotes; Suzanne Desan, Reclaiming the Sacred: Lay Religion and Popular Politics in Revolutionary France (Ithaca, 1990); Sara Nalle, God in LaMancha: Religious Reform and the People of Cuenca, 1500– 1650 (Baltimore, 1992). Annick Pardailhé-Galabrun makes this connection more concrete in her examination of ownership of religious objects. La naissance de l’intime. 3000 foyers parisiens XVIIe–XVIIIe siècles (Paris, 1988), chapter 11. Pierre Chaunu also discusses what he calls the “feminization” of the Church in his L’église, culture et société: Essais sur réforme et contre-réforme (Paris, 1984). 64
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The ways widows expressed religious sentiments could signify a range of attachment to spiritual pursuits. Obviously the decision to join a religious order signaled the highest level of commitment and the most radical response to the changes wrought by widowhood. Certain structural changes that accompanied the Counter-Reformation meant that women could join non-cloistered religious communities in what were known as tertiary orders. Women’s embrace of such religious roles accelerated rapidly in the seventeenth and, especially, eighteenth centuries as many of them saw a formal position in a tertiary as a means to live a licit and secure single life.66 For the most part the women most involved in this migration came from the noble and wealthier segments of society.67 In the secular world, women could not marry without dowries and familial permission, whether taking a spouse for the first or second time. Unlike women who might work to support themselves, those more privileged members of society found their actions hemmed in by familial constraints and saw very limited opportunities to live independent lives. A life devoted to serving the Church within a religious order opened up the possibility of living beyond the demands of family strategies. Such generalizations about the impact social and economic status had on godly vocations are borne out in the records of entries to active religious orders. While there were certainly women with vocations from the ranks of working people, they were a distinct minority. Further, most women who took religious vows were quite young. Not infrequently, girls who had just finished their educations entered the religious order where they had been schooled. The average age of women entering religious institutions was quite young in the early modern period, under twenty years of age.68 Given this preponderance of young entrants, we must recognize that the notion that widows, like Madame Pollalion whose life we examined above, would embrace a formal religious life was based in wishful thinking and not social practice. The other way that women sometimes integrated themselves into the fabric of a religious house, without taking vows, was by becoming boarders of the nuns there. Renting out lodging was one of the primary ways that impoverished convents supported themselves. But, again, the vast majority of women who rented such accommodations were young women, usually women being educated within the walls of the convent where they lived. A handful of widows might take up
66
Rapley, The Dévotes, pp. 5–7. Rapley, The Dévotes, p. 17. Barbara Diefendorf also addresses the preponderance of higher status individuals among those who joined religious communities in her article “Give Us Back Our Children: Patriarchal Authority and Parental Consent to Religious Vocations in Early Counter-Reformation France,” Journal of Modern History, 68/2 (1996): 267. 68 Rapley, The Dévotes, p. 187, 200, appendix, graph 5. Marie-Andrée Jégou, Les Ursulines du faubourg Saint-Jacques (Paris, 1981). 67
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residence within a community of nuns, but they too were in the minority.69 The evidence from religious houses suggests that widows, despite their level of piety or their attraction to a religious life, did not find immersion in the life of a religious order an appealing or viable option. But this avoidance of a formal religious life by no means reflected a lack of concern for spiritual matters. While it is not clear that artisanal widows embraced greater religiosity as a result of their husbands’ death, the evidence does reveal that piety was an meaningful part of their lives. The language of widows’ wills, their material possessions, and their relationships to the Church all suggest ways in which widows made religious practice a part of their concerns and experiences.
Testamentary Practices The strongest evidence for widows’ religious sentiments comes from the wills they drew up. In these documents women specified charitable bequests, all of which benefited religious institutions, designated funeral rites and masses, requested a place of burial, and distributed small gifts to friends and relatives who would not normally inherit from the estate. These elements dominated the wills of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century widows. Only rarely did testaments distribute substantial amounts of property. The bulk of such allocations were determined in marriage contracts generally in accordance with the dictates of customary law, the family’s economic strategy laid out long before death.70 Items disposed of in the will were generally small sentimental items with little monetary value. Those dispositions that did appear in widows’ wills generally carried some kind of religious significance, reinforcing the image of the testament as a means to express and order the end of one’s spiritual life rather than a way to order material issues. Wills usually evidence a great deal of uniformity. They tended to conform to the same format, and diverged little in their general content. Since wills were drawn up by notaries, it is not surprising to see their form strongly mediated by the amanuensis. After the widow gave her name and avowed to the notary that she was Roman Catholic and of sound mind (if not always of sound health), she began the statement of her last wishes by commending her soul to God. She then generally 69
Rapley, The Dévotes, p. 181; AN H5 3782. I found just three widows who lived in religious communities. AN MC étude LXXXV/528; étude LXII/403; étude LXXXI/307. 70 Wills often provided the names of intended heirs, but these simply reiterated the closest family members whose right to inheritance was established in the couple’s marriage contract. As Dénisart points out intended heirs were those designated by law according to family relationship to the deceased; “celle (customary law code) de Paris rejette l’institution d’héritier par l’article 299.” Collection de Décisions Nouvelles et de notions relatives à la jurisprudence actualle (4 vols, Paris, 1771), vol. 2, p. 610. Paul Ourliac also stresses the lack of testamentary freedom under the Coutume de Paris. Paul Ourliac and J. de Malafosse, Histoire du droit privé (3 vols, Paris, 1961).
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begged the intercession of the Virgin and the saints, another avenue to salvation for the pious and proof of adherence to Catholic teaching.71 After this introduction, the widow instructed those who survived her to make provision for masses for her soul. Occasionally she would also ask that her late husband be remembered in these services. Most commonly, the testator requested that masses be said the day of her burial. Some wills also noted the deceased’s wish that masses be said on the one year anniversary of her death, although such provisions, costly as they were, remained in the minority.72 Next the widow specified where she wished to be buried, generally in the graveyard or a chapel of her parish. Those widows who did not leave specific instruction generally left the arrangements to their executor, most often one of their children who could presumably be trusted to carry out a mother’s wish. In order to ensure that her wishes were respected, a few women set aside a certain amount of money for transportation costs should her body need to be brought to her home from elsewhere.73 A significant minority (39 per cent) of widows in a sample of 82 wills also asked to be buried next to their deceased husbands. We might not be surprised to see such a request coming from a widow who had recently lost her husband. Marie Denise Lechamp wished to be buried next to the husband who had died but a year before she wrote her will. Similarly, Marie Caillié had been widowed for about a year and a half when she wrote that she too wanted to be laid to rest near her deceased spouse.74 But two widows whose husbands had died decades earlier also expressed the wish to be laid to rest with their spouses. Louise Françoise, whose husband died in 1762, asked in her 1787 will that she be buried next to her husband. She had never remarried and apparently still had a sense of attachment to
71 Protestants did not believe in the efficacy of saints or the Virgin Mary, and thus did not include such invocations in their wills. Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris (Oxford: 1991), pp. 113–14. One widow in this sample did not call upon the saints and Virgin to aid in her salvation and asked that her burial be arranged with “la plus grande simplicité.” She also did not make any provisions for her burial or masses. AN, MC étude CXVIII/589. 72 Fifty-five per cent of the wills in my sample requested masses on the day of their burial. Only 32 per cent also asked that masses be said on the one year anniversary of their deaths. Of those who did not make specific provision for masses, 22 per cent simply noted that their executor would see that they received a proper burial. The remaining wills were very short and simple for the most part, perhaps implying that their wishes were known to those around them and did not need to be solemnified in a written statement. 73 67 per cent of wills named a burial place. Those who did not asked that their executor make suitable arrangements. 74 AN, MC étude XVII/632, 21 December 1723; XXXVI/390, 18 May 1722.
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a man who had been gone for decades.75 When Marie Goubette, a widow who also did not remarry, made her will in 1742, she asked to be buried next to her husband who had died in 1725.76 One widow, Marie Anne Dubois, asked to be buried next to her husband and also wished “that my funeral rites be the same as those said for him.”77 Her deceased husband was to be included in all of the masses and prayers said at the occasion of her burial and on the anniversary of her death. There is no indication of when Dubois’ husband died, but the instructions in her will suggest that there remained a strong affective bond between this widow and her deceased spouse, feelings that she acted out in part by the ritual to take place when she died. Perhaps Dubois believed that by recreating the circumstances surrounding her husband’s burial she could ensure their reunion after death. Such appeals to be buried in a certain place and in a certain way suggest a level of continuity between the married and the widowed state. The language of wills shows that many of these women continued to live in the same parish where their husbands had been buried. Presumably even if a widow had moved from one lodging to another in the years after her husband’s demise, remaining in the same parish kept her in the same religious and social community to which she had belonged as a married woman. This consistency suggests that widows found assistance and support in their neighborhoods and resisted moving from them even as they went through changes in family life. Another factor influencing a widow’s decision to remain in her parish would have been the link between certain geographic areas and particular professions. Ties to her trade and her spiritual community kept a widow in place, grounding her in certain ways, even as life at home was undergoing profound transformation.78 But the allegiance to her parish did not stem simply from calculations about the value of neighborhood and trade ties, as important as they could be to the widow’s continued prosperity. In addition, widows saw their parishes as sources of comfort and support, of spiritual and material kinds. And given the desire of almost half of these widows to have their graves near their husbands’, the impulse to remain in the same parish also seems to have affective meaning behind it. Expressing the wish to be laid to rest in a certain parish revealed a strong bond to that place. The grave was believed to be the body’s final resting place, and the place whence a person would be resurrected at the end of days. The choice of 75
AN, MC étude XXIV/960, 18 October 1787. In her will Françoise mentioned the date of her husband’s will as 1759. The date of his death is found in his probate inventory, AN, MC étude CV/1276, 29 April 1762. 76 AN, MC étude LXXXII/301, 5 August 1742. 77 AN, MC étude VII/309, 8 August 1757. 78 Evidence from probate inventories shows that widows who remained single tended to stay in the same area while those who remarried often moved with a new husband and family. See chapter 4.
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where to be buried thus expressed a strong attachment with lasting implications. This was not a decision to be made lightly given the temporal implications. The wish to be laid to eternal rest near a loved one emphasized the profound meaning the choice of a gravesite carried for the testator. For these women, the parish offered them a final spiritual refuge where they could wait in a well-known and cherished place near a loved one for the last trumpet call.79 Their interest in being associated with a certain church and a certain religious community for eternity helps to illuminate the meaning of religion to these widowed women. In addition to whatever personal dimension their piety included, part of the religious experience was grounded in the people and the church of their parish. Requests for masses said in the local parish, included in most wills, also created a spiritual bond between the widow and her religious community. Entrusting prayers, and thus the duty for helping to free her soul from purgatory, to her parish and its priest expressed trust and attachment. They also formed the basis for an ongoing relationship with the widow’s parish. It provides another way to understand how the widow’s religious sentiments were based in a particular place. Gifts to the parish poor and religious confraternities, as well as bequests to individual priests and nuns, also provide indications about the way widows lived religion. Nearly four-fifths of the wills specified a sum to be given to the Church in some form, either to pay for masses and services, as assistance for the parish poor, or a gift for the parish confraternity.80 A few of these bequests were provided in exchange for attendance at the widow’s funeral. These gifts were generally of a modest amount, a pattern that reflects the economic status of this group of women as well as the general trend of dechristianization the scholars of this period have noted.81 79
Harding, “Attitudes toward the Dead Body,” p. 184; Pierre Chaunu notes that concern over the gravesite dropped precipitously in the early eighteenth century. He finds that many wills did not mention burial, but instead were preoccupied with including safeguards against being buried alive. My sample reveals people still very much concerned about where they would be buried, and not at all concerned about being buried alive. In fact, one widow requested that she be buried the morning she died if possible, perhaps to hasten her journey to her eternal reward. That will is AN, MC étude CXII/700, 19 June 1749. Pierre Chaunu, La mort à Paris. XVIe, XVIIe, XVIIIe siècles (Paris, 1978), pp. 435–38. 80 Seventy-eight per cent of the wills included such clauses. Two of the wills that were not included asked that executors provide for masses but did not specify the amount to be given for that purpose. 81 The wills that included somewhat larger bequests came from widows whose trades were generally well remunerated, like mercers or goldsmiths. Martha Howell notes that wills from French speaking Flanders in the late medieval period included rather generous gifts for religious purposes. “Fixing Movables: Gifts by Testament in Late Medieval Douai,” Past and Present, 150/1 (1996): 11. On the changes in testamentary practices and dechristianization, see Michel Vovelle’s classic study Piété baroque et déchristianisation en Provence au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1973).
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But beyond these insights, this group of wills shows how widows expressed one aspect of their religion through post-mortem gifts. None of these women gave money beyond their local parish. They did not endow distant religious houses or church projects. They kept all their gifts local, reflecting in another way how their belonging to their community expressed itself through religion and how their communal identity was shaped by religious practice. Making this link even more personal, several widows singled out a priest or nun to whom they wished to grant some token of their esteem and affection. These were generally religious attached to the local parish, either as confessor or celebrant of the parish. The nuns so mentioned were endowed by the few women who were boarders in convents, thus implying that these widows gave gifts to those religious who were their friends and support in the places where they lived. Overall, gifts aimed toward religious ends seemed to center on the widow repaying local debts of gratitude, reiterating her sense of belonging in her local community, rather than trying to use such gifts to build expansive networks of obligation or inflate her importance by endowing an important but far-flung religious institution. Another clue about the lived experience of religion comes from probate inventories. As other historians have noted, the presence of certain material objects in a home can shed light on the ways individuals may have used and understood those items. Widows’ probate inventories show that the vast majority of these women owned at least one devotional object, and often more than one. Out of 77 widows, only 11 owned no type of religious object. Three of these latter inventories were only two to three pages long, implying that many of the deceased’s possessions had been distributed before the notaries arrived to draw up an inventory. There is also no way of knowing if a woman had been buried with a cross or devotional picture, thus making invisible certain religious objects. Despite the possible impact of such factors, it is clear that most women had some kind of religious object in their homes. The most common religious icon was the cross. Of the 56 women who possessed a pious object at their deaths, only four widows did not have a cross. The other articles that figured prominently in these inventories were devotional images. Most portrayed Jesus or the Virgin Mary, and they were usually to be found in the room where the widow had died.82 There is no way of knowing how such possessions were used or valued by their owners. They may have simply been part of the house, representing no particular sentiment on the part of the inhabitants. Or they may have been highly cherished and comforting objects that assisted the widow in her moment of extremis. However, the presence of religious objects in the bedchamber does implies a more personal connection between the owner and 82
Some of the inventories state explicitly that the image was with the deceased when she died. Other notaries simply note their presence in what seemed to be a bed chamber, also suggesting that this was the place of death. Only a handful of such images were in other rooms, like a sitting room or dining room.
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the article than prints or religious objects kept in the shared spaces of the house. The ubiquity of religious paraphernalia suggests that widows felt some pull toward the trappings of religion, incorporating them into their domestic surroundings and, in turn, into their daily lives. The other religious possessions that figured in probate inventories, although less prominently, were books. Forty-five widows owned some kind of devotional literature. A few owned numerous volumes, like Marie Sabatier, the prosperous widow of a gilder, who had in her possession “forty volumes of books, most of them prayers, devotional tracts, and religious history.”83 For the most part, widows owned just one or two volumes of prayers, often described as “old” and well-used, that were found in their bedchamber. More so than crosses or prints, the books catalogued in the household inventory can speak to us about how much they were used and prompt us to imagine these widows as partaking daily of their advice and directives. The widows who owned and read religious texts tell us that piety was part of the rhythm of their lives. In a few instances, inventories show us a widow who owned sacred books and objects that were not part of the household’s belongings at the time of her husband’s death. For example, when the thrice widowed Petronille Verrier died in 1765 the inventory of her house showed that she had thirty volumes of books, most of which were devotional. She also owned two ivory crucifixes and three paintings of religious subjects—one of Mary Magdalene, one of a clergyman, and one of Christ.84 What is notable is the contrast between the list of her possessions and the inventory made after the death of her third husband, Jean Guyot. In that document, none of these religious objects appeared. The two inventories were drawn up from the same notary’s office, Verrier remained in the home she had shared with her late spouse, and the two lists were about the same length and overlapped in the household furnishings they itemized. But apparently despite the continuity she maintained in her domestic space, Widow Guyot felt compelled to invest a substantial amount of money in these sacred objects. At the time of her late husband’s death, the house contained a copper crucifix and a painting of Christ, different from the one that later hung in his widow’s home.85 Both of these religious objects owned by the couple were worth far less than the devotional art Verrier owned. We can imagine that in the long years of Verrier’s second widowhood, after her third husband had died, she began to place more emphasis on spirituality at the end of her life, and acted upon that impulse by reading Scripture and other devotional texts, and by selecting religious art that inspired her. In particular, the decision to invest a substantial sum of money in books evidenced desire on the widow’s part to incorporate devotional reading into 83
AN, MC étude LXXXVI/649, 26 August 1751. AN, MC étude XLV/524, 8 March 1765. It is hard to know what the painting of the clergyman (ecclésiastique) depicted given the notary’s cursory description. 85 AN, MC étude XLV/509, 5 February 1760. 84
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her life, perhaps as a way to come to terms with the loss of yet another spouse as well as her own mortality. Another husband and wife demonstrated similar divergence in ownership of religious items. Jacques Meyboum, a master goldsmith, died in 1730 leaving a widow and two children behind. At that time the family had in their home a small crucifix and two paintings, one of Mary Magdalene and the other of the Virgin. These paintings and the crucifix were described as being in the room where Meyboum died.86 In the thirty years that separated Meyboum’s death from his widow’s, her house changed significantly. Marguerite Picasse had moved to larger lodgings and her extensive inventory, nearly twice as long as her late husband’s, catalogued all of the additional goods she had acquired to fill this space. Picasse had continued to run her husband’s shop, and its seeming prosperity must have kept her occupied. She also seemed to devote some time to religious contemplation, judging from the items found in her possession when she died. In a small room next to the room where she died there was an image of Mary Magdalene and 36 volumes of devotional books. Judging from the furnishings, this room seemed to function as a study. Next to it, in the room where Picasse died, there were three paintings, one of the Virgin, another of Mary Magdalene, and an unidentified female saint. She also had a small gold crucifix worth a substantial 12 livres with her when she died.87 While both Picasse and her husband had religious images near them when they died, Picasse’s many volumes of books give evidence of a different attachment to religion than the one her husband seemed to have. The notary made no remark about the condition of the books so we cannot know how much Picasse used them. But their proximity to the room where she died helps us imagine that she took solace from these texts. The considerable sum she invested in them, ten livres, also suggests that they had a certain importance to Picasse, even if the evidence does not let us see the precise ways she employed these objects. The subjects of the paintings surveyed here, as well as those inscribed in other such inventories, have a certain gendered significance as well. These items help us to understand how widows’ responses to death, especially their emotional responses, were shaped in gendered ways, even while in other ways widows reacted in ways that would have been read as male in this society. In general, women have been more attentive to religious obligations and have been more receptive to allowing the sacred to play a role in their lives.88 This particular 86
AN, MC étude CVII/368, 8 November 1730. AN, MC étude LXVI/529, 13 September 1760. 88 For a theoretical consideration of the relationship between gender and notions of morality see Ruth L. Smith, “Moral Transcendence and Moral Space in the Historical Experiences of Women,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion, 4 (1988), esp. p. 22 where Smith reminds her readers of the historically grounded nature of feminine moral values and the meaning they come to have. Also, for the early modern period Mary Elizabeth Perry, Gender and Disorder in Early Modern Seville (Princeton, 1990), pp. 98–100 and Flynn, 87
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From Wives to Widows
attachment to piety has made an impact not only on female ministrations, but also on the material objects they used to worship. Representations of Christ, the Virgin, and Mary Magdalene resonated in special ways for women in CounterReformation Europe. Paintings of the Magdalene, the female saint whose image was found most often in eighteenth-century Parisian homes, represented repentance, forgiveness, and religious ecstasy.89 Contemplating Christ crucified allowed women to enter a state of acceptable spiritual meditation, helping to validate the Church’s teaching through private worship.90 Because the Catholic Church curtailed women’s public religious roles, devotional objects in the home took on greater importance as they offered the best way for lay women to develop and experience their faith. For widows, whose thoughts and energies were directed toward acts of faith